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ESSAYS IN LEGAL HISTORY

HUMPHREY MILFORD
PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

ESSAYS

LEGAL HISTORY

READ BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL

CONGRESS OF HISTORICAL STUDIES

HELD IN LONDON IN 1913

EDITED BY

PAUL VINOGRADOFF, F.B.A.

CORPUS PROFESSOR OF JURISPRUDENCE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
ACTING-PRESIDENT OF THE SECTION OF LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CONGRESS

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

LONDON, EDINBURGH, GLASGOW

NEW YORK, TORONTO, MELBOURNE, BOMBAY

V \

-.'n't

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

THE collection of papers in this volume consists of the communi-
cations made to the Section of Legal History (Via) of the Inter-
national Congress of Historical Studies held in London in April 1913.
All the papers read in the Section have been kindly contributed
by their authors for this publication. In some cases, where the
communications actually read were in the nature of extracts from
longer treatises, the papers have been reproduced here in extenso.
The papers of Geheimrath O. von Gierke and Dr. A. Lappo-
Danilevskij were read at General Meetings of the Congress, but
were written for the Section of Legal History, and naturally
take a place in its transactions. The essays in the present volume
are presented in a different order from that in which they followed
each other at the Congress, as it was desirable to group them some-
what more systematically. On several occasions some discussion
followed the reading of the papers, but it proved unnecessary to
publish the minutes of such discussions, as most of the principal
points were afterwards embodied in the revised texts of the
communications.

The general course of the proceedings in the Section was as
follows : —

Thursday, April 3. — The first meeting was held at 2 P.M. in
the Old Hall of Lincoln's Inn, which was kindly lent by the
Treasurer (Mr. Douglas Walker, K.C.) and the Masters of the
Bench of Lincoln's Inn. Sir Frederick Pollock, on behalf of the
President, Lord Alverstone, Lord Chief Justice of England, who was
absent through ill health, welcomed the meeting. The Presidential
Address was delivered by Professor Vinogradoff, Acting-President.
Geheimrath O. von Gierke took the chair. Papers were read by
Professor Wenger (No. Ill of this volume) and Professor Galante
(No. XVIII).

Friday, April 4. — Professor Vinogradoff in the chair. Papers
by Dr. W. Blake Odgers, K.C. (No. XII), discussed by Professor
Galante, Mr. Bolland, Professor Vinogradoff; Dr. H. D. Hazeltine

vi Introductory Note

(No. XIII), discussed by Professor Vinogradoff ; Dr. W. S. Holds-
worth (No. XV).

Saturday, April 5. — In the chair — Professor Vinogradoff in
the morning, Professor Fockema-Andreae of Ley den in the
afternoon. Papers by Geheimrath Lenel (No. V), discussed by
Professor Ehrlich of Czernowitz, Professor Goudy, Professor
Koschaher of Prague; Professor Riccobono (No. IV), discussed
by Professor Ehrlich, Geheimrath Lenel, Professor Galante,
Geheimrath von Gierke ; Professor E. C. Clark (No. VI), discussed
by Dr. Strachan- Davidson of Oxford and Geheimrath Lenel.

Monday, April 7. — In the chair — Sir Courtenay Ilbert in the
morning, Geheimrath Lenel in the afternoon. Papers by Sir
Frederick Pollock (No. XIV), discussed by Professor Vinogradoff ;
Professor Goudy (No. XI), discussed by Sir Frederick Pollock and
Professor Astoul of Caen ; the late Professor A. Esmein x (No. X),
read in the absence of the writer by Professor Huvelin of Lyons ;
Professor Hiibner (No. XX), discussed by Sir Courtenay Ilbert.

Tuesday, April 8. — Professor Galante in the chair. Papers
by Professor Schreuer (No. VII), discussed by Professor Fockema-
Andreae, Geheimrath von Gierke, Professor Hiibner, Professor
Huvelin ; Professor Caillemer (No. IX), read in the absence of
the writer by Professor Astoul ; Professor Taranger (No. VIII) ;
Dr. W. Konopczynski (No. XVII).

Professor Galante from the chair proposed a vote of thanks
to the Acting-President, Professor Vinogradoff; to the Vice-Presi-
dents, Sir Frederick Pollock and Sir Courtenay Ilbert ; and to the
Hon. Secretaries, Dr. W. S. Holdsworth and Mr. F. de Zulueta.
Professors Schreuer, Huvelin, and Riccobono having spoken in
the same sense, the vote was unanimously carried. Sir Frederick
Pollock and Sir Courtenay Ilbert returned thanks.

The difficult enterprise of publishing a polyglot volume of this
kind has only been rendered possible by the liberal support which
the Delegates of the Oxford University Press have placed at the
disposal of the Section of Legal History.

1 While these sheets were in the press, the sad news arrived of the death
of one of our most distinguished contributors, Professor A * Esmein. We are
indebted to his son, Monsieur Paul Esmein, for the correction of the proofs
which were forwarded to his late father.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Welcome to the Members of the Legal Section. The Right Hon.

Sir FREDERICK POLLOCK, F.B.A. i

II. Presidential Address. Professor PAUL VINOGRADOFF, F.B.A.,

University of Oxford ..... 3

III. Die heutigen Aufgaben einer romischen Rechtsgeschichte. Pro-
fessor L. WENGER, University of Munich . . .13
IV. Dalla Communio del diritto quiritario alia comproprieta moderna.

Professor S. RiCCOBONO, University of Palermo . . 33

V. Zur Geschichte der Heredis Institutio. Geheimrath Professor

O. LENEL, University of Freiburg-im-Breisgau . .120

VI. Numismatic Illustrations of the History of Roman Law. Pro-
fessor E. C. CLARK, University of Cambridge . .143
VII. Cotter und Tote als Rechtssubjekte bei den alten Germanen.

Professor H. SCHREUER, University of Bonn . . 153

VIII. The Meaning of the Words Oftal and Skeyting in the Old
Laws of Norway. Professor A. TARANGER, University of
Christiania . . . . . 159

IX. Les Idees coutumieres et la Renaissance du Droit romain
dans le Sud-Est de la France. Professor R. CAILLEMER,
University of Grenoble . . . . .174

X. La Maxime Princeps. legibus solutus est dans 1'ancien Droit
public frangais. By the late Professor A. ESMEIN, of the
Institute of France, and of the University of Paris . . 2oiy

XI. Two Ancient Brocards. Professor H. GOUDY, University of

Oxford . . . . . . .215

XII. A Sketch of the History of the Four Inns of Court. Dr.
W. BLAKE ODGERS, K.'C, Director of Legal Education in
the Inns of Court, London . . . -233

XIII. The Early History of English Equity. Dr. H. D. HAZELTINE,

Reader in the University of Cambridge . « '.• . (261)

vii

viii Table of Contents

XIV. The Transformation of Equity. The Right Hon. Sir

FREDERICK POLLOCK, F.B.A. . . . . ( 286

The Influence of Coke on the Development of English Law.

Dr. W. S. HOLDSWORTH, Reader in the University of

Oxford ....... 297

XVI. Uber die Geschichte des Majoritatsprinzips. Geheimrath

Professor Otto von GlERKE, University of Berlin . . 312

XVII. Une Antithese du Principe majoritaire en Droit polonais. Dr.

W. KONOPCZYNSKI, Decent in the University of Cracow . 336
XVIII. The Modern Study of Canon Law. Professor ANDREA

GALANTE, of the Italian Legal Faculty formerly at Innsbruck 348
XIX. L'Idee de 1'Etat et son Evolution en Russie depuis les

Troubles du xvne Siecle jusqu'aux Reformes du xvme.

Dr. A. LAPPO-DANILEVSKIJ, of the Imperial Academy of

Sciences, St. Petersburg . . . . 356

XX. Der Verfassungsentwurf der Siebzehn Vertrauensmanner. Ein

Beitrag zur Geschichte des Frankfurter Parlaments.

Professor R. HUBNER, University of Giessen . . 384

WELCOME TO THE SECTION

DELIVERED BY

SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK

BY the Lord Chief Justice of England's desire I have to inform you
that to his great regret, a regret in which I am sure every one here
fully concurs for our sake as well as his, ill health prevents him
from carrying out his intention of welcoming the Section of Legal
History and delivering the inaugural address. I am charged to
bid you welcome in the Chief Justice's name and as his deputy ; the
inaugural address will be given by my friend Professor Vinogradoff,
who is specially qualified for the task by his cosmopolitan learning
and his mastery of historical and comparative jurisprudence.

As one of the delegates to this Congress of the Honourable
Society of Lincoln's Inn, in whose Old Hall we now meet, I beg to
add a hearty welcome on behalf of the Treasurer and my fellow
Masters of the Bench.

This year 1913 is the year which some of our amateur alarmists,
only a little while ago, had fixed upon as the time appointed for
an invasion of this realm from lands beyond sea. We now see
their prediction fulfilled after a sort, perhaps as near the letter as
most amateur predictions are. The invaders are here, and the
British Academy, we hope, was not altogether unprepared. For
some months, at any rate, its heralds cried, like Hagen when
he stands on the rock in the Gotterddmmerung, ' Waffen durch's
Land ! Gute Waffen ! Starke Waffen ! ' A multitude of more or
less learned and academic persons, even more diversely equipped
in their several Faculties than Gunther's vassals, answered the call,
and when they came with like words in their mouth — ' Was soil

i B

2 F. Pollock [i

ihm das Heer nun noch helfen ? ' — the instructions they received,
though not unexpected, were otherwise not unlike Hagen's. ' Starke
Stiere sollt ihr schlachten ' : whatever else the invading host of
historians were to find, there should be a festive meeting with the
usual accompaniments. Committees and sub - committees have
accordingly been engaged in preparations which may be called, in
a general way, serving tables — I do not mean exclusively or chiefly
dining tables. These preparations, useful and needful as they are,
do not make it easier for those who are occupied with them to give
adequate attention to making ready the feast of reason contemplated
as the main object of our gathering. Nor can we expect, at this
time of year, much reinforcement from our English-speaking
brethren of the American schools.

But our spiritual feast is such that the guests do not come
empty-handed, and the list of papers to be read gives ample warrant
that any defects on the part of the British Academy and the
British Faculties will be more than made good by contributions in
which Continental seats of learning from Christiania to Palermo
will be worthily represented.

I call on Professor Vinogradoff to take the chair.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

DELIVERED BY

PROFESSOR P. VINOGRADOFF

IT is to be regretted that our proceedings should not be inaugurated
by a distinguished member of the English Bench : in England
more than in any other country one has to look to the considered
decisions of learned judges for the historical development of legal
doctrine. It is not mere chance that the two most influential
expositors of English law — Bracton and Blackstone — were judges.
As, however, the task of giving the inaugural address has been
entrusted to me, I must approach it from what may be called the
academic point of view. The duty of addressing an audience
composed of representative jurists from the principal countries of
Europe is not an easy one, but it would not be amiss, I think, if,
before speakers take up the thread of their various subjects, I dwelt
very briefly on some of the points which unite us all and supply the
connecting links between the various researches in Roman and
English, German and Slavonic, Civil, Canon, and Common Law.
The attempt is not so presumptuous as it may seem at first sight,
because certain guiding lines have been traced by generations of
leading workers, and what is chiefly required on the present
occasion is a summing-up of familiar inquiries. After all, every
one of us, whether he treats expressly of general principles or not,
is bound to make up his mind on this subject : investigations as to
the legal systems of particular nations, states and periods, bear
necessarily on the theory of law, and embody in concrete forms
conceptions and methods of jurisprudence.

The fundamental unity of our study may be realized from two

4 P. Vinogradoff [n

main points of view. They are provided by continuity on the
one hand and by similarity on the other. There are streams of
doctrines and institutional facts which pass through the ages and
cross national boundaries from one historical formation to another.
These constitute what may be called the current of cultural
tradition. Again, the solutions of legal problems on different
occasions fall into groups according to similarities and contrasts,
for which there is a common basis in the nature of the problems
themselves. This gives rise to the application of the comparative
method. The continuity of culture and comparative jurisprudence
produce the atmosphere of what might have been called Inter-
national Law, had not the term been appropriated to other uses.

It is not necessary to dwell at length on the progress which
has been made in tracing cultural continuity in the history of legal
systems. A classical example used to be drawn from the reception
of Roman Law by mediaeval and modern Europe. In recent
years we have witnessed another and hardly less remarkable move-
ment of investigation in regard to the force of cultural traditions :
the study of inscriptions and papyri has led to a rediscovery of
Hellenism. In the hands of Mitteis, Dareste, Grenfell and Hunt,
Rostowzew, Wenger, and many others, it has entirely changed the
aspect of ancient history, connecting, as it does, the doctrines of
the Digest and of the Code with Greek and Oriental antecedents.
The other day Sir William Ramsay, one of the pioneers of this
study, called attention to an interesting fact of this kind. In St.
Luke's Gospel (ii. 1-5) it is stated that Joseph and Mary had to
leave the town of Nazareth where they dwelt to go to Bethlehem,
Joseph's birthplace, in order to be enrolled there for the census.

1. And it came to pass in those days, that there went out a
decree from Caesar Augustus, that all the world should be enrolled
(A.V. taxed). . . .

2. And all went to be enrolled, every one to his own city.

4. And Joseph also went up from Galilee, out of the city of
Nazareth, into Judaea, unto the city of David, which is called
Bethlehem ; (because he was of the house and lineage of David :)

5. To be enrolled with Mary, his espoused wife, being great
with child.

This idea, that a person's birthplace is a home to which he
remains perpetually attached, is quite foreign to modern notions,
but it played an important part in the legal arrangements of the

n] Presidential Address 5

ancient world. It appears as the Origo so rigidly kept up by the
Emperors of the Lower Empire — Diocletian, Constantine, and
their successors — and it has to be considered as one of the principal
rules of the state of siege in which the Empire lived from the
fourth century A.D. Yet the verses of St. Luke just quoted, and
many other indications (e.g. a decree of a Roman governor of
Egypt in 1 54 A.D.), connect it with another set of facts — viz. with
the Eastern conception of populations firmly established in their
homes — a notion expressed by the Hellenistic term ISia. We may
add that it connects it also, with Oriental forms of absolute rule
tending to register and tax subject populations according to the
requirements of fiscal utility.1

In this case the continuity of principle rests on the broad basis
of social traditions. Sometimes similar results are produced by the
development of what may be called juridical invention. When a
technical method has been discovered which provides simple and
adequate means for satisfying certain needs, it is not likely to dis-
appear, even after vast changes have taken place in social conditions.
For example, the law of jettison and salvage from shipwreck was
settled by the naval customs of the Greeks. As Rhodian law,2 it
was received by the Romans and incorporated in the Digest (xiv. 2).
It remained the basis of maritime law in the Byzantine Empire and
took shape in the tract called No/xos Navmcos. Thence it spread
through the customs of Mediterranean and Adriatic cities, as
exemplified, for instance, by the ordinances of Ragusa.3 In sub-
stance, the rules formulated in this way still remain the basis of
modern maritime law in European countries, including England.

The second method of connecting materials belonging to different
spheres of national development arises from the comparison of
analogous and contrasting formations of law. What I have
particularly in view is not the accumulation of more or less similai
facts which used to be the aim of writers like Post. The enthusiasm
for comparison frequently led in this case to confusion : interesting

1 See The Expositor, Dec. 1912. Cf. Rostowzew, Studien zur Geschichte
d. rbmischen Kolonats ; and de Zulueta, De Patrociniis Vicorum, in
Vinogradoff 's Oxford Studies, 1 909.

2 See Ashburner, The Lex Rhodia.

3 See Liber Statutorum Civitatis Ragusii, ed. BogiSic and Jirecek, 1904.
Cf. Dareste, £tudes d'Histoire du Droit, iii. 93 ; and Vinogradoff, Law
Quarterly Review, 1903.

6 P. Vinogradoff [n

data might be reduced to a mixture of commonplace statements and
unproved assumptions which on closer inspection were often shown
to be anything but homogeneous. The excesses of such uncritical
accumulation have, indeed, thrown some discredit on the com-
parative method itself. Fortunately this method has found a
better treatment at the hands of writers equally skilled in historical
criticism and in juridical analysis. It is not the juxtaposition
of resembling facts, but the dialectical examination of given
principles in various surroundings, which yields fruitful and some-
times unexpected results. Let me take as an example the curious
treatment of obligation in recent literature. Brinz, a leading authority
on Roman Law, dissected the notion of the obligatio of the Digest.
He observed that obligatio does not correspond to the German
Verpflichtung : the latter points to duty, and any duty, including
a legal one, resolves itself into a charge on the will of a person,
whereas obligatio points at the same time to a state of subjection
or liability (Haftung) which is derived from physical sway.1 This
led to a subtle analysis of the notions of legal duty and of liability
as the two constituent elements of Roman obligation. Von Amira
showed that the two elements were not only theoretically separable
but actually distinct in Scandinavian law 2 ; while Puntschart
conducted a similar demonstration in regard to the mediaeval law
of Saxon Germany.3 Partsch applied the discovery in a brilliant
manner to ancient Greek law, by showing that the process of
enforcing an obligation was carried out by a recourse to a pledge over
whom the obligee obtained physical sway.4 A striking instance of
this was drawn from the scene in the Odyssey in which Poseidon
comes forward to release Ares and Aphrodite from the net thrown
over them by the deceived husband, Hephaestus.5 It is recognized
that Ares owes the husband a customary compensation (ato-ipx),
and Poseidon offers himself as a security for the enforcement of the
payment. The sea-god would be primarily liable in his own person
as a hostage for Ares, but Hephaestus does not like the idea of
binding so powerful a god, and prefers a promise from the pledge

1 Brinz, Archiv fur dmlistische Praxis, i. (1874) 15 ff.

2 Amira, Nordgermanisches Obligationenrecht, ii. 73.

3 Puntschart, Schuldvertrag u. Treugelobnis des sdchsischen Rechts des
Mittelalters (1896).

4 Partsch, Griechisches Burgschaftsrecht, i. I o ff.

5 Od. viii. 344 sqq.

n] Presidential Address 7

to pay instead of Ares if the latter should take to flight. This
suggestive interpretation of the scene serves as an appropriate in-
troduction to the Greek law of pledge. Von Gierke investigated
thoroughly the dualism of duty and liability (Schuld and Haftung}
in German law.1 He showed, among other things, how legal duty
{Schuld} came to be treated as an object in itself, how it gave rise to
real right, and was sometimes combined with possession of land. On
the other hand, the development of securities for enforcement also
assumed a peculiar bent, because the pledge was regarded not
as a subsidiary help to the- principal, but as a substitute for the
direct fulfilment of the legal duty ; while the wager was explained
as a symbol of the surrender of property. It would lead Us too
far afield to consider the reaction of this historical analysis on the
well-worn controversy as to the meaning and operation of the nexum
in early Roman law.2 I only mention the renewal of this famous
dispute in order to recall to your minds that a discussion begun by
a Romanist, carried on by eminent Germanists and by a student of
Greek law, reverted, as it were, to the history of Roman law in its
early stages.

The method of comparative investigation in such cases is
characterized by the part assigned to the dialectics of principles.
It starts from the definition of conceptions and traces their ' ramifi-
cation ' (Abzweigung\ their conflicts and compromises. At the
same time it opens the way for the study of the material conditions
of development. It is not only from the point of view of logical dis-
tinctions that analogies and contrasts in law have to be considered.
It is clear that there is a background of social conditions which
account to a great extent for the stages of the doctrinal evolution.
As regards this very dualism of legal duty and liability, for example,
it was called forth historically by the characteristic attitude of
early commonwealths to the question of the enforcement of law.
We are so accustomed nowadays to the correspondence between
legal rights and legal remedies that it is difficult for us to imagine
a state of society in which such a direct correspondence did not
exist. And yet it is with such states of society that we have to
deal in early Germanic as well as in early Greek and Roman law.
When self-help was the principal mode of enforcing right, when

1 Von Gierke, Schuld u. Haftung im alterer deutschen Recht.

2 See de Zulueta, The Recent Controversy about Nexum, Oxford, 1912.

8 P. Vinogradoff [n

juridical conflicts commonly resolved themselves into feuds, or had
to be managed by arbitration, when even legal proceedings were
initiated by ceremonial agreements, the practical enforcement of
liability naturally took the shape of an appeal, not to public force,
but to private execution. The two necessary elements of such an
execution are recognition by the parties, and assured substitutes
for the fulfilment of a recognized duty. The importance of
recognition as a basis of law is as instructive in this case as it is
in the formation of modern Constitutional and International Law.
It is certainly important to realize that the formation of law
proceeds in many, if not in all cases, not from the command of a
sovereign, but from recognition by parties. The process of execu-
tion by the taking of pledges is quite as characteristic. The pledge
is originally a hostage.1 The treaties between contracting parties
and litigants in Iceland, Norway, Saxon England, or Germany,
had to be supplemented by the giving of pledge-hostages, and
sometimes these pledges experienced the treatment of hostages in
a literal sense : they might be imprisoned or coerced until the
obligation had been fulfilled either by them or by the principal.2
It is by comparing the evidence of Greek, Roman, and Germanic
practice that we realize to what extent these features of technical
law depended on the conditions of societies in the stage of what
may be called primitive confederation.

This leads to a further step in the application of the comparative
method. If juridical conceptions can serve as links in comparative
analysis, it is natural to ask whether these links are themselves
perennial or subject to transformation. How far have we to deal
with certain constant attributes of legal thought which provided a
frame for varying contents, and how far do vital and important
legal doctrines take shape from historical conditions? Attempts
to construct a science of law composed of constant and ever-
recurring rules have been made again and again. Quite recently,
an eminent representative of the Neo-Kantian school, Stammler,
has brought together in a voluminous book the absolute require-
ments of juridical logic, and has inscribed on his work the significant
motto — Non est mortale quod opto. Undoubtedly a certain amount

1 Rintelen, Schuldhaft u. Einlager im Vollstreckungsverfahren.

2 Esmein, Melanges de Rome, viii. (1888) 426-436 ; cf. Glotz, La Solidarity
de la Famille.

n] Presidential Address 9

of logical doctrine arises in connection with law ; it is necessary
not only in order to explain the common phraseology of law, but
to guide us in the process of juridical reasoning. But when too
much insistence is laid on this department of jurisprudence, it is
apt to degenerate into scholasticism, and to recall the famous
strictures of Goethe's Mephistopheles on the teaching of logic :

Then, the philosopher steps in
And shows, no otherwise it could have been :
The First was so, the Second so,
Therefore the Third and Fourth are so ;
Were not the First and Second, then
The Third and Fourth had never been.1

As in every other branch of knowledge, it is the contents of law
that interest men rather than the formal framework ; and the
contents, even the most fundamental, are admittedly subject to
variation. As Ihering has forcibly expressed it :

Law is not less a product of history than handicraft, naval
construction, technical skill : as Nature did not provide Adam's
soul with a ready-made conception of a kettle, of a ship, or of a
steamer, even so she has not presented him with property, marriage,
binding contracts, the State. And the same may be said of all
moral rules. . . . The whole moral order is a product of history,
or, to put it more definitely, of the striving towards ends, of the
untiring activity and work of human .reason tending to satisfy
wants and to provide against difficulties.2

The causes producing variations of legal principles are many :
the influence of economic surroundings, of national character, of
historical collisions, of cultural loans, the cross-currents of religious
and philosophical thought, may be mentioned among the factors
which lead to variations. It would be out of the question to make
anything but a passing reference to these factors. One class of
causes, however, deserves particular attention, because they not
only differentiate theories and systems of law, but combine them

1 Der Philosoph, der tritt herein
Und beweist euch, es musst' so sein :
Das Erst' war' so, das Zweite so,
Und drum das Dritt' und Vierte so ;
Und wenn das Erst' und Zweit' nicht war',
Das Dritt' und Viert' war7 nimmermehr.
2 Ziveck im Recht, ii. 112.

io P. Vinogradoff [n

into groups. I mean the effect of the social type on the formation
of definite sets of jurisprudential theory. There have not been so
many fundamental types of social organization — at least in the
Western world. Roughly speaking, we have to reckon with six
great types. Human society has assumed the form of a tribe, that
is, an association based mainly on real or supposed kinship ; it has
been concentrated in cities ; it has adapted itself to the relations of
a landed estate ; it has expanded into churches ; it has been made
to serve the aims of free individuals under state control ; lastly, it
may be organized as an association for the purpose of controlling
the production and distribution of goods.

According to the road selected by a community among these
classes, certain points of view are created for the formulation and
solution of juridical problems, as may be gathered from familiar
examples. Property will be treated differently by individualistic
and by socialistic communities, but it has also received a peculiar
treatment at the hands of the Church and of the City-State, as well
as in feudal and in tribal law. Again, the notions of crime and
punishment have been differentiated according to the character of
the social tie. In tribal society, crime was substantially ' contempt
of court' or a direct offence against the tribe, while punishment
appeared chiefly as revenge ; the City was unsparing in its require-
ments from its children, the citizens, and relentless in its methods
of educating and eventually suppressing them. The notion of
breach of faith is as characteristic of feudal jurisprudence as the
notion of sin is characteristic of the Church. The treatment of
crime as an expression of perverse will and the psychology of
deterrent punishment are natural to individualistic communities ;
whereas in societies with a- socialistic bent crime comes to be
considered from the pathological point of view, and punishment
assumes the aspect of medical treatment. Even the fundamental
conceptions of law itself are to a great extent dependent on sub-
mission to one or the other type of social order. In tribal societies,
law is a declaration of custom ; in city-states it is justice as con-
ceived by the city — So£a rrjs n-oAews ; in feudal organizations it is
based on express or tacit agreements ; from the point of view of the
Church, it is the recognition of Divine precepts in the govern-
ment of the world ; in individualistic societies it is the command
of the sovereign will ; from the socialistic point of view, it should

n] Presidential Address 1 1

be the means for carrying out social justice and expediency in the
attribution of rights.

In laying stress on jurisprudential principles as realized by
history, I do not wish to suggest for a moment that any one of
these notions has reigned supreme in a particular commonwealth
to the exclusion of all others. Juridical history, as well as history
in general, shows to what extent political ideas slide and shade off
one into the other, and how, on the other hand, every epoch
presents contradictions and compromises between rival forces.
Nevertheless, the study of juridical evolution discloses prevailing
tendencies which change with the times — as has been brilliantly
illustrated, for example, in reference to our own age. in Dicev's

ERRATA

Page 7 note I for al&erer read alteren
Page n, 1. 20 for Wenger read Menger

Vinogradoff, Legal History Face p. 10

Nov. 1913

its necessary complement, in Bentham's theory of the summation
of individual expediencies. Both elements are, as a matter of fact,
blended in the rationalistic system of Austin. All these doctrines
take root in the competition of the modern commercial world, and
find a curious counterpart in the individualistic jurisprudence of
the Pax Romana as encased in the political fabric of the Empire.
It I seems, in fact, as if, instead of seeking for the philosopher's
stone in the shape of a single theory of law, we had better attend
for the present to five or six theories of law derived from different
social premisses.

However this may be, one thing seems clear. Jurists approach
historical problems on their own lines, with their particular habits
of mind. Whatever attention they may give to the careful study
of evidence, to the proper sequence of events, and to exact

io P. Vinogradoff [n

According to the road selected by a community among these

notion of sin is characteristic of the Church. The treatment of
crime as an expression of perverse will and the psychology of
deterrent punishment are natural to individualistic communities ;
whereas in societies with a socialistic bent crime comes to be
considered from the pathological point of view, and punishment
assumes the aspect of medical treatment. Even the fundamental
conceptions of law itself are to a great extent dependent on sub-
mission to one or the other type of social order. In tribal societies,
law is a declaration of custom ; in city-states it is justice as con-
ceived by the city — 86ga -njs iroAcws ; in feudal organizations it is
based on express or tacit agreements ; from the point of view of the
Church, it is the recognition of Divine precepts in the govern-
ment of the world ; in individualistic societies it is the command
of the sovereign will ; from the socialistic point of view, it should

n] Presidential Address 1 1

be the means for carrying out social justice and expediency in the
attribution of rights.

This makes it both possible and desirable to group the facts
supplied by history not only in their organic sequences of national
development, but also according to the social types to which they
correspond. Many partial attempts have been made in this direc-
tion. I may refer, for example, to Maine's and Leist's books on
Aryan tribal law ; to statements of jurisprudence by Catholic writers
like Cathrein, and by socialists like Wenger. But the method is
worthy of a much wider application. For example, it would be
an interesting task to treat from this point of view the theories of
jurisprudence which correspond to modern systems of public and
private law. It would be found, perhaps, that Hobbes' theory of
the omnipotent state finds its opposite pole, and at the same time
its necessary complement, in Bentham's theory of the summation
of individual expediencies. Both elements are, as a matter of fact,
blended in the rationalistic system of Austin. All these doctrines
take root in the competition of the modern commercial world, and
find a curious counterpart in the individualistic jurisprudence of
the Pax Romana as encased in the political fabric of the Empire.
It ! seems, in fact, as if, instead of seeking for the philosopher's
stone in the shape of a single theory of law, we had better attend
for the present to five or six theories of law derived from different
social premisses.

12 P. Vinogradoff [n

knowledge of historical environment, they are sure to look out for
doctrine in the end — that is, for statements of principles, of their
consequences in theory and their application in practice. This
being so, methods of analysis and of constructive reasoning which
are exercised daily in pleading and deciding cases, in stating and
interpreting rules, in formulating and safeguarding rights, are
bound to reappear in the grouping and discussion of historical
material by lawyers. Legal history as an exact reproduction of
the past has, indeed, to be supplemented by historical jurisprudence
in the sense of a reasoned account of the evolution of legal
principles. Such a jurisprudence is free from the delimitations
imposed on nations and periods : it derives its divisions and
chapters from conceptional distinctions.

This feature is especially noticeable in those connecting studies
with which I have been dealing in my address. The gravitation
towards the home (or the traditions of maritime law) are not
circumscribed by the boundaries of monarchies. The principles of
legal duty and liability unfold their contents not only in theoretical
discussion, but in the analogies and contrasts of various legal
systems. The conceptions of property, of crime and punishment,
of law itself, appear in correspondence to the social type in their
environment. And, I should like to say in conclusion, it is perhaps
this alliance between exact observation and dialectical reasoning
which makes our mode of studying history, despite technical diffi-
culties and the dryness of many details, so attractive to the mind.
Thanks to the juridical method, masses of historical facts, accumulated
as if by accident, are sifted and become capable of being treated as
manifestations of a certain Aoyos — of reason governing the moral
world.

Ill

ROMISCHE RECHTSGESCHICHTE

DIE Frage, welche ich vor Ihnen, wenn nicht zu beantworten, so
doch zu erortern versuchen will, veranlasst mich, obwohl vor einem
internationalen Forum von Historikern und Rechtsgelehrten spre-
chend, doch einen nationalen Ausgangspunkt zu wahlen. Wie
Ihnen alien bekannt, hat Deutschl^nd zur Jahrhundertswende sich
ein neues nationales Privatrecht geschaffen und damit die friiher
weit verbreitete Geltung des altehrwiirdigen Corpus Juris Civilis
beseitigt. Der notwendige Riickschlag, den diese Neuregelung
eines so wichtigen Gebietes der staatlichen Ordnung auf das
Studium dieser Ordnung selbs.t ausiiben musste, hat eine arge
Unruhe in den Studienbetrieb an den juristischen Fakultaten
hineingetragen. Die Zeiten, in denen das Pandektenstudium — im
deutschen Sinne, d.h. also das Studium des durch Wissenschaft
und Praxis ausgestalteten „ gemeinen Rechts " — die vornehmste
Aufgabe fur Forschung und Lehre an den deutschen Universitaten
war, sind dahin : Lehrer und in neuerer Zeit auch Schiller schlagen
sich ubersturzende Reformen vor: von Riickkehr zur alten
Ordnung, Wiedereinfuhrung des Pandektenstudiums erhoffen die
einen Forderung, von Beseitigung des romischen Rechtsstudiums,
insbesondere der sogenannten Rechtsgeschichte, aber nicht bloss
der romischen, auch der deutschen, von rein praktischer Gegen-
wartsausbildung schwarmen die anderen. Ich brauche vor dieser
Versammlung von Mannern, die ihre Lebensarbeit in den Dienst
historischer Forschung gestellt haben, die geschichtliche Methode
des Rechtsunterrichts und der juristischen Forschung nicht zu
verteidigen, nicht zu betonen, wie jene „ Reformer" die Jurisprudenz
in ihrem Lebensnerv bedrohen, die sie aus einer Wissenschaft zu

14 L. IVenger [m

einer positiven Kunde von Bestimmungen degradieren wollen, welche
man im praktischen Leben unmittelbar brauchen konne. Es sind
Banausen, die nicht nach der Idee der Publizitat fur den Im-
mobiliarrechtsverkehr fragen, sondern nach der Art, wie ein Grund-
buchsgesuch ausserlich aussehen muss, die nicht von den Gedanken
gehandelt wissen wollen, die sich im Recht der Wertpapiere
verkorpern, sondern verlangen, dass der Rechtsunterricht auf alle
Einzelheiten der gegenwartig geltenden Wechselordnung eingehend
vorbereite !

Aber gerade dieser Ansturm gegen allesGeschichtliche zwingt die
Vertreter einer historischen Rechtsforschung zur Anspannung aller
Krafte der Verteidigung. Es soil, um von der romischen Rechts-
geschichte zu sprechen, der Beweis erbracht werden, dass sie mehr
ist, als was jene unkundigen Verachter von ihr behaupten, ,mehr
als eine blosse Aufzahlung von Leges und Senatsbeschliissen, von
Juristennamen und Juristenschriften, die heute niemanden mehr
interessieren. Ich bin damit bei meinem Thema angelangt und
werde in der Kiirze der mir zu Gebote stehenden Zeit auf einiges
von dem hinzuweisen versuchen, was meines Erachtens heute
Aufgabe einer Darstellung der romischen Rechtsgeschichte ist.

Ich meine dabei eine Darstellung, welche dem Studierenden
und dem Gebildeten geboten werden kann, welche die Resultate
der Forschung zusammenfasst und die Zusammenhange aufweist,
die das Einst und Jetzt verbinden, aber auch die Gegensatze nicht
verhiillt, die Vergangenheit und Gegenwart von einander scheiden.
Und ich meine, dass es zur Zeit an einer liber den Grundriss sich
erhebenden Darstellung, die der Forschung auf alien Gebieten des
offentlichen und privaten Rechtslebens der Antike folgt, tatsachlich
fehle. Es sei mir gestattet, wieder an einer deutschen Parallele
zu exemplifizieren. Ein entsprechendes Werk wie etwa Schroders
Lehrbuch der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte , oder auch nur Brunners
Grundzuge der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte fehlt den Romanisten.
Es existieren gute Arbeiten aus friiherer Zeit : es liegt mir feme,
sie hier aufzuzahlen oder gar zu kritisieren. Aber seit einem
Vierteljahrhundert ist kein deutsches Lehrbuch der romischen
Rechtsgeschichte mehr erschienen : auch keine Neuauflage eines
alteren Buchs. Erst in aller jiingster Zeit (1912-13) macht Robert
von Mayr in der bekannten Sammlung Goeschen den Versuch, die
romische Rechtsgeschichte darzustellen — die Enge des verfiigbaren

in] Romische Rechtsgeschichte 15

Raums, der Zweck der Sammlung bindet aber den Verfasser, der,
wenn ich ihm nachempfinden darf, uberall durch die ihm gezogenen
Grenzen beengt ist. Man vergleiche etwa Schroders Lehrbuch
mit Schroders eben erscheinender Darstellung der deutschen
Rechtsgeschichte in Goeschens Sammlung ! In gewisser Hin-
sicht gilt, wenn ich mir liber eigene Arbeit ein Urteil erlauben
darf, dasselbe auch von den Partien iiber Verfassung und Ver-
waltung des europ&ischen Alter turns (1911) und von der eben
im Druck befindlichen Abhandlung iiber das Recht der Griechen
und Romer in Hinnebergs Kultur der Gegenwart. Ich habe in
wiederholten Gesprachen mit Kollegen an deutschen und oster-
reichischen Universitaten zu konstatieren Gelegenheit gehabt, dass
dieser Mangel und die Wichtigkeit der Aufgabe einer Neu-
darstellung allgemeiner empfunden wird. Die romische Rechts-
geschichte ist ihrem umspannenden Namen untreu geworden, sie
ist zur Geschichte der Quellen und Literatur zusammengeschrumpft,
obwohl sie sich — wenigstens in den Universitatskatalogen — noch
„ romische Rechtsgeschichte " nennt. Ja, ich begegnete auch der
Ansicht, dass eben nur das als „ Rechtsgeschichte " in Betracht
kame. Die gangbaren Lehrbiicher des Privatrechts — ich nenne
etwa als Vertreter Sohm, Czyhlarz, Girard, Costa — beschranken
sich darauf, eine Quellengeschichte oder den Abriss einer solchen
voranzustellen. Diese selbst erfreut sich eingehender Bearbeitung :
P. Kriiger ist (1913) in zweiter, Kipp (schon 1909) in dritter
Auflage erschienen.

Eine Arbeit allerdings erfullt in ihrer eben erschienenen Neu-
auflage eine auch weit gespannte Erwartung : Lenels Neudar-
stellung von Bruns* Geschichte und Quellen des romischen Rechts.1
Hier finden wir in knappster Skizzierung grosse Partien einer
modernen romischen Rechtsgeschichte, leider war der Verfasser
durch Bruns' StofTabgrenzung und die Anlage des ganzen enzyklo-
padischen Werkes gebunden.

Nicht unerwahnt soil endlich Pacchionis Corso (1905) bleiben,
wenngleich auch er prinzipiell nur Staatsverfassung und Quellen
bringen will.

Uberall sind die wichtigen Probleme der — ich mochte zusam-
menfassend sagen — Staatsverwaltung in den Hintergrund gedrangt,

1 Holtzendorff- Kohler, Enzyklopddie der Rechtswissenschaft, 7. Aufl.
(1913), Bd. i. S. 303 ff.

1 6 L. IVenger [m

hochstens gelegentlich gestreift, das interessante Gebiet des Straf-
rechts ist ganz vernachlassigt, nur das Privatprozessrecht erfreut
sich im Anschluss an das dominierende Privatrecht eingehenderer
Beachtung. Aber wahrend die Darstellung des Privatprozessrechts
meist kaum bis zum Kognitionsverfahren, jedenfalls nicht bis zum
justinianischen Prozessrecht herabgefiihrt wird, liegt im Privatrecht
alles Gewicht auf dem vom Rechtskaiser kodifizierten Recht.

Ich will hier die alte theoretisch naturlich unlosbare, praktisch-
empirisch nach den Erfahrungen des einen so, des anderen anders
zu beantwortende Frage nicht erortern, ob die Darstellung
geschichtliche Perioden der Entwickelung des Rechts fixieren und
innerhalb dieser den ganzen Werdegang des Rechts darstellen, oder
ein Rechtsinstitut von den grauesten Anfangen durch alle Zeit hin-
durch verfolgen soil. Beide Methoden haben ihre Vor- und Nach-
teile, beide lassen sich im miindlichen Unterricht verwerten, doch
fur buchmassige Darstellung ist meines Erachtens die Perioden-
teilung brauchbarer.

Die Frage, ob die herkommliche Teilung der romischen Rechts-
geschichte in die bekannten vier Perioden beibehalten oder aufge-
geben zu werden verdient, ist schwer zu entscheiden. Wenn man
das Privatrecht oder den Prozess im Auge hat, da wird man an die
Zwolftafeln, an die neu einsetzende Entwickelung des Rechts- und
Wirtschaftslebens seit den siegreichen Kampfen mit Karthago,
oder im Privatprozessrecht an die Bedeutung der aebutischen Lex
denken : aber die Verfassungsgeschichte heischt doch die alther-
kommliche Teilung in Konigsherrschaft, Republik, Prinzipatszeit
und Despotic. Auch der Abschluss der Darstellung der Rechts-
geschichte ist von selbst mit Justinians Werk gegeben. Das
offentliche Recht ist von der Zeit der Griindung germanischer
Reiche auf romischer Erde der Domane der nationalen Rechts-
geschichte zugewiesen ; naturgemass ist auch die Darstellung des
Privatrechts von da ab nationale Rechtsgeschichte, die ihrerseits
freilich die Aufnahme der fremden Rechte in den Bereich der
Darstellung ziehen muss. Ganz eigenartig und nur mit dem
iiberragenden Einfluss der rezipierten romischen Rechtsmassen
auf deutscher Erde erklarlich ist die Entstehung der deutschen
Pandektenlehre und -Praxis, des im neuen biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch
noch so lebhaft nachwirkenden „ gemeinen Rechts."

Nach den zu behandelnden Gegenstanden wird sich eine

in] Rmnische Rechtsgeschichte 1 7

Darstellung der „ romischen Rechtsgeschichte " am besten in
folgende Abschnitte gliedern konnen : Staatsverfassung uiid Quellen-
geschichte, Staatsverwaltung, . Strafrecht und Strafprozessrecht,
Privatrecht und Privatprozessrecht. Es sei gestattet, einige
Fragen aus diesen Kapiteln fur die einzelnen Perioden naher
zu behandeln.

I. DieKonigszei t. — Bei alien Z weifeln liber die Anfange Roms,
bei aller Uberwucherung der Konigsgeschichte mit sagenhafter
Ausschmiickung, wird doch soviel behauptet werden diirfen, dass
auch Rom beim Eintritt in die Geschichte von Konigen beherrscht
war — und dies selbst dann, wenn die Griinder der ewigen Stadt
Etrusker gewesen sein sollten. So sehr schon hier die Hypothese
anstelle sicherer Erkenntnis tritt, so miissen wir selbst den Versuch
wagen, in die Zeit vor der „ Griindung " der Stadt zuriickzublicken.
All die reizvollen Probleme der vorhistorischen Zeit tauchen da
auch vor dem Auge des romischen Rechtshistorikers auf : wo sind
die Vorvater der Romer her? wo sassen die Indogermanen ? was
weiss man liber ihre Kultur? wo fangt die reine Hypothese an?
Dann das grakoitalische Problem. 1st etwas Wahres an der lange
behaupteten engeren Verwandtschaft zwischen Griechen und
Italikern? Gerade hier kann neben der Sprachvergleichung die
Rechtsgeschichte der allgemeinen, Geschichte durch Vergleichung
der Rechtsinstitute einen Dienst erweisen. Endlich das italische
Volkerproblem. Wo sind sie alle her, die in Italien sesshaft
geworden, die Japygen, die Etrusker, die Latiner und die Samniten ?

Und dann die Anfange Roms : die Fragen nach der personalen
Gliederung des Volks, nach Familie und Geschlecht und nach den
Mannerverbanden, den Phratrien und Kurien, aber auch nach der
territorialen Gliederung der sesshaft Gewordenen, nach Dorf und
Gau und der jungeren Tribus.

Die Grundung der Stadt, die Bedeutung der Stadt und des
Stadtbiirgertums fiihren zur Frage nach dem Stadtstaat und seinem
Gegensatz zum Territorialstaat. Senatus populusque Romanus ist
Rom und <n 'A&jvcuoi Athen, auch wenn der Feind die heimische
Scholle erobert hat. Wir diirfen auch an diesem Punkte Halt
machen und der griechischen Staatsphilosophie gedenken, die
politische und wirtschaftliche Autarkic der Polis noch zu der Zeit
forderte, als Alexander das Erbe der orientalischen Weltmonarchie,
des grossartigsten Territorialstaates, angetreten hatte.

i8 L. IVenger [m

Die Griindung der Stadt und die Konigsgeschichte riihrt aber
wiederholt auch an das etruskische Ratsel. Dann Uberhaupt : wie
ist das Konigtum gekommen, wie hat es gewirkt, wie ist es
beseitigt worden ? Welch bose Schuld hat es auf sich geladen,
dass selbst Caesar noch fur den Zuruf Rex mit dem Tode biissen
musste ? Welcher historische Kern liegt der „ servianischen Reform "
zugrunde und ist etwa die Episode der Tarquinier absolutistische
Restauration ? 1

Dann die Stande des Volks : Patrizier und Plebejer. Worin
lag der Gegensatz begriindet ? Ist er zuerst nur wirtschaftlicher,
sekundar politischer Natur ? Wie stellen sich die Plebejer zu den
Klienten ?

Die in dem Abschnitt liber Staatsverwaltung zu erorternden
Fragen nach Gross- und Kleinbesitz treten schon in der Konigszeit
entgegen : dann muss auch der primitivste Organismus — der
librigens das konigliche Rom gewiss nicht mehr gewesen ist — die
Heeres- und Finanzverwaltung regeln.

Ebenso schwierige als interessante Probleme stellen die in
dieser altesten Zeit der romischen Rechtsgeschichte wurzelnden
Institute des Privat- und des damit innig zusammenhangenden
Privatprozessrechts dar. Eher noch konnen wir liber Familien-
und Erbrecht Genaueres wenn nicht behaupten, so doch vermuten.
Freilich auch da ist Raum flir Zweifel genug : schon die Erklarung
der verschiedenen Eheschliessungsformen mit dem gleichen Er-
gebnis legitimer Vollgewalt des Mannes tiber die Frau ist nur
in hypothetischer Form moglich. Adoption und Testament, die
wir recht frlih ansetzen dlirfen, erinnern an Parallelen aus der
griechischen Entwickelung. Natlirlich ist gerade bei dieser Rechts-
vergleichung ausserste Vorsicht am Platze. Noch unsicherer
sind die Anfange des Vermogensrechts. Da stehen zunachst die
Anschauungen in einem Punkte einander ganz entgegen : ist das
Eigentum Gemeineigentum oder Individualeigentum ? Hier kann
wohl nur weitausgreifende Rechtsvergleichung, wie sie ja gerade auf
diesem Gebiete schon angewendet ist, zu einem Resultate flihren,

1 Wieviel hier unsichere Uberlieferung ist, wie wenig wir hier und in der
Folgezeit bis auf die Zeit der Gracchen Sicheres wissen, ist so recht wieder
bei einer Besprechung dieser Fragen im Freundeskreise der ,, Miinchener
Philologischen Gesellschaft " zum Ausdruck gekommen. Es ist richtig : auch
die neueste juristische Literatur ist recht konservativ.

in] Romische Rechtsgeschichte 19

das Anspruch auf Wahrscheinlichkeit erheben darf. Hier hat sich
auch Mommsen zur Konstruktion einer kommunistischen Agrar-
genossenschaft verleiten lassen, von der, wie Pohlmanns scharfe
Kritik1 dartut, nichts iibrig bleibt, als die blosse Moglichkeit
gemeinwirtschaftlicher Elemente in der altesten Agrarverfassung.
Da gilt es, manche landlaufige Theorie zu revidieren und manche
Behauptung zu iiberpriifen, die sich wie ein Axiom von Lehrbuch
zu Lehrbuch vererbt. Auf dem Gebiete des Vertragsrechts haben
sich wohl auch im altesten Rom die Prinzipien der Barleistung
und der Entgeltlichkeit geltend gemacht, wahrend das spater so
iiberall vorbildliche romische Obligationenrecht von der scharfen
begrifflichen Scheidung von Schuld und Haftung, dem Leistensollen
des Schuldners und dem Einstehen des Biirgen oder selbstbiirgen-
den Schuldners, nicht minder beherrscht gewesen sein wird, als
das Recht der Germanen und das der Griechen, ja auch das der
Babylonier und der Assyrer. Gerade diese Fragen miissen fiir die
romische Rechtsgeschichte noch der Antwort naher gebracht
werden, als dies bisher der Fall ist. Und hier hilft, wie die neuen
Arbeiten von Partsch und Koschaker gezeigt haben, die Rechts-
vergleichung weiter. Dass auch wichtige Fragen des Prozessrechts
mit der Schuld-Haftungslehre zusammenhangen, ist nach neueren
Vermutungen recht wahrscheinlich.

Noch ist der Anfange des staatlichen Strafrechts zu gedenken,
dabei aber die Vorstufe nicht zu ubersehen, die das Straf- oder
richtiger Racheverfahren der Familie und der Sippe bildet. Schon
in diese Zeit ist aber gewiss die Scheidung der delicta privata von
den crimina publica zu verlegen, und die bewusste oder unbewusste
Erweiterung des Kreises der letztgenannten auf Kosten der
Delikte zu beachten, die der privaten Ahndung — wenn auch nicht
mehr immer der Selbsthilfe — iiberlassen sind.

Schon ins „ konigliche " Rom miissen endlich die Anfange des
Verkehrs mit dem Auslande fallen : die verschiedenartigen Vertrage
mit anderen Stadten iiber Rechtshilfe und gegenseitigen Rechts-
schutz der Burger und iiber das hospitium, das dem staatlichen
Recht auch hier vorangeht. Es ist von grossem Interesse, diese

1 Geschichte der sozialen Frage und des Sozialismus in der antiken Welt,
2. Aufl. (1912), ii. 415-433. Vgl. auch Bruns-Lenel, a. a. O. 311. Vgl. fur
Hellas Pohlmann Bd. i. Vgl. auch allgemein und insbesondere fur die
Germanen R. Hildebrand, Recht und Sitte^ 2. Aufl. (1907).

2O L. Wenger [m

Wurzeln des ,,V6lkerrechts" blosszulegen und bedeutende Arbeiten
gerade englischer Herkunft l haben diese Probleme wesentlich
gefordert. Neben diesen losen Beziehungen zum Auslande steht
aber der eigenartige latinische Bund, dessen Bedeutung fiir den
spater so fruchtbaren Gedanken, dass es iiber der Poliszusammen-
gehorigkeit noch grossere Zusammenhange geben konne, nicht
gering eingeschatzt werden darf.2 Uberall und nicht zuletzt auf
dem Gebiete der internationalen Beziehungen werden aber mit
Vorteil die griechischen Parallelen heranzuziehen sein.

II. Die Zeit der Re'publik. — In helleres Licht scheint die
Geschichte Roms nach dem Sturz seiner Konige zu treten. Die
von der romischen Uberlieferung geschilderten Verfassungskampfe
sind uns in grossen Ziigen schon von der Schule her bekannt : wir
sehen die nicht immer parallel verlaufenden, sondern sich wieder-
holt auch kreuzenden wirtschaftlichen und politischen Gegensatze.
Darin wird bei alien sonstigen Zweifeln gewiss Wahres stecken.
Wir verstehen die Bedeutung der Zwolftafelgesetzgebung, deren
Authentizitat freilich in neuerer Zeit hart angefochten, aber dank
Girards, Lenels und anderer Gegenkritik nun als fester erhartet
gelten mag, als vor Pais' und dem viel weiter gehenden Angriff
Lamberts. Dabei haben freilich auch die Angreifer manches
Richtige beobachtet und namentlich Pais' besonnene Stellungnahme
auf unserem letzten Kongress in Berlin sei noch in Erinnerung
gebracht.3 Auch weiten Juristenkreisen Frankreichs und Deutsch-
lands ist aber die Beachtung der historischen Tatsache recht ein-
dringlich nahezulegen, dass „ freies Recht " kein Freiheitspostulat
ist, und dass das antike Richterkonigtum Uberall der Herrschaft
des Gesetzes wich, unter dessen Tyrannis sich auch der Grieche
willig beugte.

Die romischen Verfassungskampfe fiihren nach der Uber-
lieferung wenigstens formell zu einer Demokratie, wie sie selbst
Athen nie gekannt hat : ich meine den fiir verschiedene Jahr-
hunderte bezeugten, und freilich schon darum bedenklichen Satz ut
quod tributim plebes iussisset populum teneret. Die Gesetze der

1 Coleman Phillipson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient
Greece and Rome. 2 Bde. 1911.

2 Fiir die Konigszeit freilich mit alien notigen Vorbehalten und Frage-
zeichen.

3 Literaturiibersicht neuestens bei Bruns-Lenel, a. a. O. 325 A. 2 und 3.

HI] Romische Rechtsgeschichte

Plebejerversammlung, zu welcher der Patrizier nicht Vejmjxalx
Zutritt hat, sollten auch ihn binden. Die Geschichte der Verfas-
sungskampfe bietet auch sonst noch genug des Dunkleri : 'manches
Licht ist in jiingster Zeit erst angesteckt worden. Sicher erscheint
aber im Widerspruch zur Theorie der Uberlieferung die Tatsache,
dass Rom praktisch eine vollendete Demokratie doch nie
geworden ist. Wir diirfen ja bei all den Schilderungen der inneren
Kampfe, die schliesslich angeblich das Ubergewicht der Plebejer
endgiltig festlegen, nicht vergessen, dass die aussere Geschichte
Roms von dieser Demokratisierung der Verfassung, wenn sie
wirklich so oder ahnlich, wie uns erzahlt wird, vor sich gegangen
ist, wenig spiiren lasst. Wahrend die Regierung der Imperien-
trager fiihrt, der Inhaber von Gewalten, deren Vereinigung ihm eine
ganz besondere Stellung verlieh, liegt die aussere Politik — auch
damals die ungemein wichtigere Ausserung des Staatslebens — in
den Handen des Senats.

Was ist aber „ Rom " in der republikanischen Zeit geworden ?
Drei Bestandteile hat es : die herrschende Stadt, die dienenden
Provinzen und die verbiindeten oder sonstwie angegliederten
Stadte. Hier muss eindringlich auf die merkwiirdige Verleihung
des Burgerrechts an Leute hingewiesen werden, die politisch
mangels einer Reprasentativverfassung damit nichts anzufangen
wissen : denn wer wollte nach Rom reisen, um dort in die
Volksversammlung zu gehen, wenn er in Spanien seine Heimat
hatte ? Rom hat den Fehler vermieden, der Athens Herrlichkeit
zu Fall gebracht hat : es hat den Bundesgenossen in weitestem Aus-
mass das Danaergeschenk seines Burgerrechts gemacht. Da der
romische Zivitat erwerbende Burger einer Landstadt die Eigen-
schaft eines Burgers dieser Stadt nicht verliert, so ist damit der
Gegensatz zwischen dem Staatsburgerrecht und dem Stadtburger-
recht tatsachlich gegeben.

In aller Stille vollzieht sich auch die Latinisierung erst Italiens,
dann des ganzen Westens, soweit der Romer Herrschaft reicht.
Das ist eine Erscheinung, die mir wenigstens immer zu den merk-
wiirdigsten der ganzen romischen Geschichte zahlte. Die Stadt,
die von sich aus eine solche Entnationalisierung weiter Gebiete
durchfiihrt, wie wir sie doch annehmen miissen, muss eine ganz
gewaltige Lebenskraft besessen haben. Freilich sind wir im ganzen
Westen liber das Fortleben des nationalen Elements und seine

22 L. Wenger [m

Ausserung in der Volkssprache und dem Volksrecht viel schlechter
orientiert, als im Osten — aber es muss doch wohl ein bedeutender
Unterschied zwischen den Beziehungen Roms zu dem kulturell so
viel tiefer stehenden Westen und zu den politisch unterworfenen,
kulturell aber stets als Lehrer verehrten Griechen bestanden haben.

Wir kommen damit auf ein besonders wichtiges Gebiet der
romischen Rechtsgeschichte, auf die Frage des griechischen Ein-
flusses. Sie ist oft und viel erortert worden, aber sie ist noch
keineswegs erledigt. In der republikanischen Periode begegnet
sie, Antwort verlangend, in der Zwolftafelgesetzgebung ; sie be-
gegnet allgemein bei den Beziehungen Roms zu Grossgriechenland
und weiter zum griechischen Mutterlande und alien Gebieten des
hellenistischen Ostens. Wir diirfen aber, wenn wir das Mass
griechischen Einflusses auf der Romer Recht zu ergriinden suchen,
auch nicht vergessen, die Frage zu iiberprlifen, inwieferne etwa
unsere Quellen tatsachlich griechisches Recht bringen, wenn sie
lateinisches zu geben scheinen : ich denke natiirlich in erster
Linie an Plautus und Terenz.

In der Darstellung der Staatsverwaltung dieser Zeit wird
neben der voranstehenden Erorterung des Staatsgebietes und
der Verwaltungskorper, worauf schon die Sprache kam, die des
Heer- und Finanzwesens, dann aber der Agrargeschichte und
der Entwickelung des Handels einen breiten Raum einnehmen.
„ Recht und Wirtschaft" ist kein bloss modernes Schlagwort :
kein Rechtshistoriker darf die Wirtschaftsgeschichte beiseite-
schieben.

Das fiihrt zu Partien, die mit mehr oder weniger Grund
herkommlich im Privatrecht verhandelt werden : Standegliederung,
steigende Bedeutung der Sklaverei, damit wohl zusammenhangend
der privatrechtliche Grundsatz von der Unzulassigkeit freier
Stellvertretung, Zwischenbildungen verschiedener Arten von
Halbfreiheit, dann aber auch die Bildung des neuen Adels, der
Nobiles l und der Ritter.

Fur das Privatrecht der republikanischen und der Prinzipats-
zeit ist jetzt Mitteis' Romisches Privatrecht bis auf die Zeit
Diokletians richtunggebend. Zwar behandelt der bisher vorlie-
gende erste Band (1908) nur die Grundbegriffe und die Lehre
von den juristischen Personen, aber diese Gebiete eingehend

1 Dazu jetzt M. Gelzer, Die Nobilitiit der romischen Republik (1912)

in] Rmnische Rechtsgeschichte 23

und grossenteils ganz in neue Bahnen weisend. In seiner
Stellungnahme zu grundlegenden Fragen, die bereits gestreift
wurden, ist das Werk vorbildlich : so zum Problem des arischen
Rechts, zum Verhaltnis des Romerrechts zu dem der Umbro-
Samniten, endlich zum griechischen Recht.

Ungeschrieben ist noch eine Geschichte des romischen
Privatprozessrechts, die Wlassaks peinlich sorgfaltige For-
schungen verwertet hatte, von den ,,Prozessgesetzen" an bis zu
den neuesten Arbeiten liber Exzeptionen und Praskriptionen.
Lenels Ediktsrekonstruktion, Girards Studien und so manche
andere Arbeit muss erst erworben werden, damit wir sie auch voll
besitzen. Kellers vorzligliches Zivilprozessbiichlein ist seit 1883
nicht wieder erschienen und seither auch kein anderes. Wie
viel Arbeit steckt aber in einzelnen Artikeln von Pauly-Wissowas
Realenzyklopadie !

III. Die Zeit des Prinzipats. — Bewundernswert ist Augustus'
kluges Werk, mit dem die Revolutibnsepoche abschliesst. Die
Republik ist scheinbar wiederhergestellt : eadem magistratuum
vocabula, und doch : quotus quisque reliquus qui rempublicam
vidisset? Wie viel besagt diese taziteische Charakteristik des
Reichs beim Regierungsantritt des Tiberius (Annal. i. 3) ! Die
staatsrechtliche Umgestaltung ist unschwer zu schildern, aber der
im modernen Staatsrecht zutn Kampfe zweier Richtungen
gewordene Gegensatz zwischen juristischer und politischer
Betrachtung des Staatslebens tritt hier klar entgegen. Politisch
ist die Republik tot und die Monarchic auf dem Wege, und in
dieser Hinsicht darf man jetzt schon sagen, dass der Schwerpunkt
des Reichs in den hellenistischen Osten verlegt ist. Sind doch
dort die Kaiser Gotter, ein Gedanke, der dem Romer, auch seit die
alte Virtus nur selten mehr auf Erden wandelte, doch hart in den
Kopf ging. Die Verfassungsgeschichte dieser Zeit muss zeigen,
wie aus der Republik die Monarchic wird, wie erst die Volksver-
sammlung depossediert wird und wie dann in energischem Ringen
die beiden iibrig bleibenden Gewalten, Senat und Prinzeps, nach
der Beseitigung des Rivalen streben, bis endlich der Reorganisator
Diokletian den Staat als orientalische Despotic neu aufrichtet.

In der Staatsverwaltung spielen die Provinzen eine immer
mehr hervortretende Rolle. Und da ist aus Inschriften und
neuerdings aus den Papyri ein Erkenntnismaterial geboten, wie es

24 L. Wenger [in

lange den antiken Rechtshistorikern vorenthalten geblieben war.
Wir haben aus den Papyri Einzelheiten einer romischen Provinzial-
verwaltung kennen gelernt, nach denen fruher kein Einsichtiger
zu fragen gewagt hatte. Wir lernten dabei aber auch das Mass
dessen richtiger einschatzen, was die Romer neu eingefiihrt, und
dessen, was sie von ihren Vorgangern in der Macht iibernommen
hatten. Und das war auf verwaltungsrechtlichem Gebiete gewiss
nicht wenig. Freilich Agypten, wo wir diese Dinge an den Papyri
am besten studieren konnen, ist nicht der Typus einer normalen
Provinz. In diesem richtiger als kaiserliche Domane bezeichneten
Erbe der Ptolemaer ist der Prinzeps von je das gewesen, was 'er
erst nach und nach in den anderen Reichsgebieten wurde : der
gottliche Konig oder auch der konigliche Gott. Aber je mehr
eben die Gewalt des Prinzeps steigt, umsomehr darf Agypten als
Typus des romischen Provinziallands genommen werden. In
Agypten lernen wir, wie die Regierung Gesetze und Verordnungen
durch eingehende Publikationshandlungen zur allgemeinenKenntnis
brachte, wie Beamte und deren Stellvertreter amtierten, wie sie
mit den Parteien, wie mit den vor- und nachgeordneten Behorden
verkehrten, wie und welche Steuern und Abgaben erhoben wurden,
aber auch wie der grosse und der kleine Grundbesitz verwaltet
wurde.

Aber die Papyri zeigen noch mehr. Aus ihnen lernen wir das
Leben des kleinen Mannes mit all seinen Freuden und Leiden, mit
seinen hasslichen und schonen Ziigen kennen : wir lernen ihn als
Glaubiger und Schuldner, als Hausherrn und Mieter kennen, als
Ubeltater und Beleidigten, als Klager und Verklagten, wir sehen
ihn in der Familie als Eheherrn und Hausvater, wir finden ihn
als Arbeiter und Arbeitgeber, als Gutsherrn und Verwalter, als
Schiffer und Soldaten. Schubarts eben erschienene Sammlung
verdeutschter Briefe aus dem Altertum1 sagt auch dem Rechts-
historiker sehr viel. „ Antike Seelen, die fur immer verschollen
schienen, werden wieder lebendig " : ein Wort, das ich Deissmann 2
nachspreche. Die Prosopographie der ersten drei Jahrhunderte
der Kaiserzeit hat nur die der antiken aristokratischen Geschichts-
betrachtung bedeutsam erscheinende Oberschicht beriicksichtigt,

1 Ein Jahrtausend am Nil (1912).

2 Licht vom Osten^ 2. u. 3. Aufl. (1909), S. 217. Vgl. zum Folgenden
Deissman 217 f.

in] Romische Rechtsgeschichte 25

sed hominum plebeiorum infinita ilia turba qua scripta ecclesiastica
et auctorum iuris referta sunt procul semota est.1 Fur Verwaltungs-,
Prozess- und Privatrecht sind;aber diese die in Betracht kommenden
Personen.

Aber noch fur etwas anderes : unter diesen Kleinen, unter den
Armen und Demiitigen ist die Saat des Christentums aufgegangen,
unter der ,, grossen Schar, die niemand zahlen konnte/ aus alien
Volkern und Stammen, und Nationen und Sprachen " (OfFenb.
Job. vii. 9). Wie das grosse Problem des Verhaltnisses des Staats
zu seinen Nationen, tritt jetzt auch das weltbewegende Problem
„ Staat und Kirche " in die Rechtsgeschichte ein. Der heidnische
Staat kennt das Problem nicht, er kann es nicht kennen, da der
Gotterkult ein durchaus nationaler ist, und als solcher der staatlichen,
nicht irgendwelcher vom Staate unabhangigen Macht, eigen ist.
Die Stellung des Staats zum Christentum verdient eine eingehende
Betrachtung. Auch hiezu, insbesondere zu den Christenverfol-
gungen unter Decius haben die Papyri viel Material beigesteuert.2
Um sich vom Verdachte mangelnder Gotterverehrung zu reinigen,
reichen die in diesen Verdacht gekommenen libelli ein, dass sie
mit Weib und Kind immer und so auch jetzt vor der Opferkom-
mission geopfert und vom Opferfleisch genossen haben, und die
Kommission bestatigt diese libelli durch einen Bescheinigungs-
vermerk.

Fiir Privatrecht und Prozess mochte ich auch nur dessen in
wenigen Worten Erwahnung tun, was wir aus den Papyri zulernen
konnen und miissen. Nach antiker AufTassung lebt jeder nach
seinem Personalrecht. So natiirlich vor allem der Grieche in der
griechischen Reichshalfte. Als nun Caracalla das Burgerrecht in
weitem Ausmasse austeilte, waren demgemass alle damit Begliickten
zur romischen Rechtsordnung verpflichtet. Das Volksrecht aber
lebte nichtsdestoweniger fort: das hat L. Mitteis3 schon vor mehr
als zwei Dezennien festgestellt und das hat die rechtshistorische
Papyrusforschung seither durchaus bestatigt. Nicht anders als in
Agypten war es aber in den anderen Diadochenstaaten : eine Tat-

1 Klebs, Praefatio zur Pros. \. p. viii.

2 P. M. Meyer, Die Libelli aus der decianischen Christenverfolgung
(1910).

3 Reichsrecht und Volksrecht in den bstlichcn Provinzen des romischen
Kaiserreichs (1891).

26 L. IVenger [in

sache, die uns am besten im syrisch - romischen Rechtsbuche
entgegentritt. Jetzt erst konnen wir eine Reihe kaiserlicher
Konstitutionen bewerten, die anscheinend — fur den Kenner bloss
des romischen Rechts — Selbstverstandliches mit Emphase einschar-
fen : es ist da stets die Annahme berechtigt, dass irgend ein
volksrechtlicher Brauch sich der romischen Ordnung zum Trotz
hartnackig erhielt. Doch ich darf bei diesen Dingen, iiber die sich
sovieles sagen liesse, nicht langer verweilen, so schwer es hier wird,
auch nur Schlagworte dariiber zuruckzudrangen, wie uns diese
wunderbaren Quellen die romische Rechtsgeschichte der Wirklich-
keit, nicht der, wenn auch antiken, Theorie, naher gebracht
haben.

IV. Der absolute Staat. — 'Ev ovoynart TOV Kvpiov /cat SecrTroTOv
X|OMrrov TOV Beov KOI (rwnj/oos ^yawv /?a<rtAetas rov Of.iOTO.rov KOL
TTaTov i^uicov SecrTrorov *$*XavLOV NLavptKLov Ti^Septov TOV alwvtov A.V-
yovcrrov AvroKpdropos erovs SwSeKarov KOL VTrareias T^S avrutv yaX-^vor^TOS
GTOVS zvSeKOiTov f Me^etp Ka r^s L/3 tvStKTiovos tv ^vrjvr) f. So beginnt

eine Dialysisurkunde, die am 15. Februar 594 n. Chr. zwischen
Schwagern abgeschlossen wird, nachdem ein Presbyter den Frieden
vermittelt hat. Die Urkunde, der Miinchener Papyrus Inv. Nr.
IO2,1 ist typisch fiir das Ende der Entwickelung des Absolutismus.
Wohl ist der Staat christlich, aber das hindert nicht, Christus
Seo-TTorqs zu nennen und in einem Atem damit auch dem Kaiser
dasselbe Beiwort zu geben ; bei Gott dem Allmachtigen, bei der hi.
und wesensgleichen Dreieinigkeit zu schworen und zugleich VLK^V /cat
Sta/Aoiojv, ja selbst rrjv ddav KOI ovpdviov rvx^v des Kaiserpaars im Eide
anzurufen,2 der Herrscher der Welt, der ewigen Erlauchten und
Selbstherrscher. Nirgends, in keiner offiziellen Rechtsquelle, in
keinem Schriftstellertext spiegelt sich der Wandel der Zeiten so
sehr wieder, wie in unseren Papyrusurkunden. Ihre Formalien sind
keine Zufalligkeit, sie zeigen den Wandel der Zeiten und den
Wandel der Menschen. Was den Orientalen gewohnt sein mochte,
ist jetzt auch den Romern gelaufig geworden, denn unter den
Parteien und Zeugen der Grenzgarnison in Syene, die uns in den
genannten Miinchenerurkunden begegnen, zu denen die erganzenden

1 Nr. 14 in der im Druck befindlichen, von Heisenberg und mir heraus-
gegebenen Sammlung byzantinischer Papyri in der K. Hof- und Staats-
bibliothek zu Miinchen.

2 So P. Mon. Inv. Nr. 104 Z. 46-48 ; Nr. 12 der Ausgabe.

in] Romische Rechtsgeschichte 27

Paralleltexte das British Museum birgt;1 finden wir Kopten, Griechen
und Romer in buntem Gemisch, alle aber dem Staatsblirgerrecht
nach romische Burger.

Die Theorie der Staatsverfassung ist die einfachste der Welt :
alles ist der Kaiser, Gesetzgeber, Regent und Richter ; alles, was
geschieht, geschieht in seinem Namen. Die Juristen, die in der
fruheren Epoche selbstandig redend aufgetreten sind und das
grossartige romische Privatrecht geschaffen haben, sie sprechen
jetzt nur mehr im geheimen kaiserlichen Konsistorium und das
Ergebnis ihrer Arbeit ist formell ein Wort aus des Kaisers Munde.
Sie sind aufgegangen in der namenlosen Schar der Untertanen,
deren hochstes Gliick es sein muss, dem kaiserlichen Herren zu
dienen.

Aber auch der 0eioTaros CUJTOK/HXTW/O kann die Welt nicht ohne
Organe verwalten. Wiederum zeigen uns die Papyri die Staats-
verwaltung dieser neuen Epoche. Jetzt gibt das agyptische Bild
noch getreuer die Lage im ganzen Reiche wieder. Denn die
Romer selbst sind uberall Untertanen geworden und die Zeiten,
da der Kaiser nur princeps civium gewesen, sind langst dahin.

Die Verkleinerung der Provinzen, die Zerschlagung historisch
gewordener Individualitaten und all die sonstigen Mittel zentrali-
stischer Verwaltungsversuche konnen doch nicht den Zerfall des
Reiches in das Westreich und Ostreich verhindern, und sie konnen
im Innern des Reichs den Feudalisierungsprozess, das unverkenn-
bare Zeichen schwacher Zentralgewalt, nicht aufhalten. Die
dunkle Zeit des vierten und fiinften Jahrhunderts ist auch durch
die Papyri noch nicht geniigend erhellt worden. Aber die Grund-
ziige der Entwickelung konnen wir sehen. Von entscheidender
Bedeutung sind die Agrarverhaltnisse. Dem Kolonat muss in
einer romischen Rechtsgeschichte ein besonders eingehendes
Kapitel gewidmet werden. Wir sind jetzt dank Rostowzews
Studien2 liber die weit in die hellenistische Zeit hineinragenden
Wurzeln dieses Instituts und iiber seine Entwickelung, insbesondere
in Afrika, aufgeklart. Wir sehen eine auch sonst wiederkehrende
Erscheinung. Der Latifundienbesitz miisste brach liegen, gelange
es nicht, Bauern in halber, stets wachsender Abhangigkeit zur
Bewirtschaftung heranzuziehen. Neben der Ausnutzung wirtschaft-

1 Vgl. Bell, A'/wxiii. 160-174.

2 Studien zur Geschichte des romischen Kolonates (1910).

28 L. IVenger [m

licher Abhangigkeit kam es dabei wohl auch oft genug zu brutaler
Gewaltanwendung, die den freien Nachbarn in den Gutsleibeigenen
verwandelte. Die Bindung an die Scholle lasst sich deutlich
verfolgen, bis sie zur Rechtsinstitution wird und nur mehr als
natiirliche Folge der Erblichkeit der Berufe erscheint. Aber der
staatliche Steuerzwang hat nicht minder der Feudalisierung indirekt
Vorschub geleistet. Um der Steuererpressung zu entgehen, ver-
kauft manch ein Freier sein bischen Freiheit und wird Klient
eines Patrons. Diese Patroziniumsbewegung, die, unter schliess-
licher staatlicher Sanktion, eine Reihe von Freien zu Halbfreien
und zu Horigen macht, haben in neuester Zeit Gelzer1 und de
Zulueta 2 genau untersucht.3

Von den traurigen Verwaltungszustanden des 6. Jahrhunderts
geben uns jetzt die Papyri aus dem Museum zu Cairo, die Jean
Maspero in dankenswert rascher Folge publiziert,4 Auskunft. Sie
haben bei den Historikern und Juristen berechtigtes Aufsehen erregt,
sie zeigen uns Dinge, welche die Rechtsbiicher verbieten, in vielfach
praktischer Anwendung, zeigen uns die Gewaltigen, die das Recht
wohl prinzipiell als Macht werten, und die Kleinen, die um Haus
und Hof kommen, die im Schuldturm sitzen und Peinigungen aller
Art erdulden miissen, deren Leben nicht sicher ist, wenn nicht ein
Patronus den Schutz bietet, den der Staat nicht mehr bieten kann,
und den seine pflichtvergessenen und geldgierigen Beamten nicht
bieten wollen. Auch die Mlinchener Papyri werden dazu einen
Beitrag bringen, den ich fiir so unwahrscheinlich hielt, dass ich
lange nach anderer Erklarung suchte. In einem Prozesse Inv. Nr.
103 5 kommt zum Vorschein, dass der mit seiner Mutter in einen
Erbstreit verwickelte Sohn dem einen Richter eine Nachlassquote
angeboten hat, wenn dieser der Mutter die strittigen Objekte durch

1 M. Gelzer, Studien zur byzantin. Verwaltung Agyptens (1909).

2 F. de Zulueta, De patrociniis vicorum, in Vinogradoff, Oxford Studies
in Social and Legal History, vol. i. (1909).

3 Vgl. zur ganzen Frage die Ausfiihrungen Wilckens, Grundzuge d.
Papyruskunde, 314-326.

4 Catalogue general des antiquites tgyptiennes du Musee du Caire, i.
(1910-11), ii. (1911-13).

5 P. Mon. 6 der Ausgabe. Ein Stuck der Urkunde befmdet sich als Lond.
Inv. Nr. 1807 im British Museum. Danach ist die Datierung auf das Jahr
583 moglich. Ich darf schon hier den Herren Kenyon und Bell fiir freund-
liche Mitteilungen und Gestattung der Einsichtnahme in die Londoner Gruppe
der Syene-Papyri herzlichst danken.

in] Romische Rechtsgeschichte 29

einen Exekutor kurzerhand wegnehmen lasse, der Richter aber ist
dazu bereit gewesen ; und der andere Richter, vor den die Frage zur
neuerlichen Entscheidung kommt, hat das mit dem milden Tadel
zugegeben, die Richter sollten nicht x^fyv vorgehen.

Auch die Militarverwaltung wird erst durch diese Papyri in
rechtes Licht gestellt. Eine vor Kurzem erschienene Arbeit
Masperos1 hat denn auch ausser den Kairenern schon die
Miinchenertexte ausfiihrlich herangezogen.

Fur die Heeresverwaltung ist entsprechend dem Streben nach
zentralistischer Einheit die starke Verwendung lateinischer termini
nur natiirlich. Eine Auslese aus den Miinchenertexten bringt den

dSiovriop, aKTOvdpios, avyowraAios, /^t/capios, /3iKa/uavos, Sov£, SpaKovdpios,
Ka(3a\\dpLo<s, Kcvrvpiwv, opSivdpcos, Trpcu'^eKTOs, Tr/ai/xi/ce^ios, die Trpiopes, den

reiptov und rpi(3ovvo<$. Neben dem fypovpiov steht das Kacrr/ooi/, neben
dem apifyios die Aeyewv. Auf Grund der Tcpo^ar^pia wird der Rekrut
(vcoo-T/aaTos, TCI/MOV) in die /xar/nf eingetragen und am Ende schreibt
man ihm auf die Bescheinigung in woKl griechischen Lettern /?eve
/3aAea9. In der Prozesssprache begegnen die Ocia dSvovranw, die
divina adnotatio, und die Beta ftp/la des Kaisers.2

Neben dem Verwaltungsrecht haben die byzantinischen Papyri
aber auch das Privat- und Prozessrecht ungemein bereichert. Hier
ist die herkommliche Darstellung noch durchaus ruckstandig. Das
hat schon bald nach dem Erscheinen des ersten Heftes der Kairo-
Papyri Mitteis konstatiert und eine zusammenfassende Betrachtung
des justinianischen Rechts nicht als Endpunkt von Untersuchungen
iiber friihere Zeiten, sondern als eines selbstandigen Erkenntnis-
gegenstandes als dringendes Bediirfnis bezeichnet.3 Partsch 4 hat
aus diesen Urkunden wertvolle neue Resultate zum justinianischen
Reskriptenprozess gewonnen, und Collinet6 hat kiirzlich einem
beginnenden Werke uber das justinianische Recht den Untertitel
gegeben : Le caractere oriental de Pauvre legislative de Justinien
et les destinies des institutions classiques en Occident. In der
Betrachtung der justinianischen Gesetzgebung droht uber der Inter -

1 Organisation militaire de vAgypte Byzantine (1912).

2 Zu alledem vervveise ich auf die alsbald erscheinende Ausgabe der
Miinchener Papyri und einstweilen auf meinen Vorbericht in den Sitz. Ber.
Bayer. Akad. (1911), 8. Abh.

3 Zeitschr. Sa-uigny Stiff, f. Rechtsgesch., Rom, Abt. xxxi. S. 393.

4 Gott. Nachrichten, phil.-hist. Kl. (1911), 201 ff.

5 £tudes historiques sur le Droit de Justinien^ i. (1912).

30 L. IVenger [in

polationenjagd die Wertung der interpolierten Texte, das eigentlich
Justinianische am ganzen Werk, zu kurz zu kommen.

Diese Justinianische Gesetzgebung darf aber nicht bloss nicht
als Endpunkt vorhergehender Rechtsentwickelung, sondern auch
nicht bloss als Anfangspunkt der spateren nationalen Privatrechts-
geschichte in den Landern der Rezeption aufgefasst werden.
Flir sich, als selbstandige Grosse gehort sie in die Darstellung der
vierten Periode der romischen Rechtsgeschichte.

Ich habe endlich des Strafrechts nur ganz zu Anfang Erwah-
nung getan. Es muss natiirlich in seiner Entwickelung durch
alle Perioden verfolgt werden. Mommsens Romisches Strafrecht
erleichtert uns diese Aufgabe ganz besonders. Auch dieses Werk
des Meisters darf nicht ungeniitzt verstauben. Und wenn jiingst,
von der Kritik Mommsens ausgehend, James Leigh Strachan-
Davidson1 einzelne Fragen des romischen Kriminalrechts in
ausfuhrlicher Behandlung gesammelt hat, so hat er gewiss in
Mommsens Sinne gehandelt, der nichts weniger wollte, als dass auch
mit seiner Arbeit ein Arbeitsgebiet als ausgeschopft verlassen werde.

Kaum irgendwo sehen wir so wie im Strafrechte eine Wellen-
bewegung in der romischen Kulturentwickelung : die Frage nach
dem, was Straftat sein konne und die Frage nach dem Ubel, nach
der Strafe, welche die Tat vergelten oder den Tater bessern oder
andere von gleicher Tat abschrecken soil, und was an Strafrechts-
theorien es sonst noch geben mag, all diese Fragen beantworten die
Jahrhunderte auch der romischen Geschichte verschieden. Wie hat
sich, um nur eines zu nennen, Begriff und Ahndung des Staats-
verbrechens und des crimen laesae maiestatis im Laufe der Zeiten
gewandelt ! Hier auch zeigen uns jetzt die Urkunden Menschen,
die fehlen und biissen, Richter, die verurteilen und strafen. Ich
erinnere etwa nur an den Papyruskodex, Berliner Griechische
Urkunden IV. Nr. 1024, worin uns Prozesse vor dem Statthalter
aus dem 4. Jhd. n. Chr. iiberliefert sind. Immer resiimiert der
Statthalter den Tatbestand und schliesst daran das Urteil : einmal
handelt es sich um Ermordung der mit dem Ehebrecher ertappten
Frau durch den beleidigten Gatten, hier ist das Urteil verloren ; in
einem anderen Falle hat der Tater sich Grabschandung zu Schulden
kommen lassen : da sagt der Richter in rhetorisch gehobener
Sprache :

1 Problems of the Roman Criminal Law ',,2 Bde., 1912.

in] Romische Rechtsgeschichte 31

„ Du hast den Toten ausgegraben, den die Stadt auf Volks-
beschluss beerdigt und betrauert hat. Du scheinst mir das Herz
eines Tieres zu haben und nicht eines Menschen, oder eigentlich
auch nicht einmal das eines Tieres. Denn auch die Tiere
greifen zwar die Menschen an, sie schonen aber die Toten. Du
aber hast dich an einem Leichnam vergriffen, der schon ausge-
schieden war aus dem Geschlechte der Menschen. Wo nahmst du
den Mut her, den schon zur Ruhe Gelegten auch noch der letzten
Hoffnung zu berauben? Fiirwahr beim Zeus es war der letzte
Schmuck, den die Gesetze gewahren, es waren Geschenke der
Stadt an den Toten, es waren Siihngaben. So wirst du denn fur
deine Tat mit deinem Haupte biissen."

Nicht weniger wirken schon rein menschlich die folgenden Falle,
die in der genannten Urkunde beisammen stehen.1

Doch ich muss mit Einzelheiten abbrechen.

Wie im Strafrecht, so in der Geschichte der Latifundien,
wie in der Schutzvorschrift fur den Schuldner gegen den
wuchernden Glaubiger, so in der Norm der freien Beweiswiirdigung
und der entgegenstehenden Festlegung bestimmter Beweisregeln,
wie in der Regelung des Erbrechts, so in der Frage, wer im Heere
dienen soil, jeder Burger oder der fremde Soldling, wie in den
Problemen der Steuergesetzgebung, so in denen des Verhaltnisses
des Staats zu seinen Nationen' und Konfessionen, und wie die
Fragen alle heissen mogen, die der Rechtshistoriker stellt und
beantwortet zu sehen wiinschte — Uberall sind es nicht bloss Probleme,
die den Juristen interessieren, sondern Probleme der Geschichte der
Menschheitskultur.

Das alles aber — wir diirfen mit einem Schlagwort sagen :
Mommsens Lebensarbeit — soil in einer romischen Rechtsgeschichte
verarbeitet sein. Sie wird dann allerdings an Umfang zunehmen
miissen, aber es lasst sich vielleicht auch hier ein Mass finden, das
dem Studierenden und Gebildeten doch mehr bietet, als eine Auf-
zahlung von Leges und Senatuskonsulten, als eine trockene Anein-
anderreihung der Namen der Juristen, die das romische Recht
geschaffen haben, und der Titel ihrer Werke. Nie darf der
Ausblick auf die antike Rechtsgeschichte uberhaupt versaumt
werden. Nie sollte aber auch der Rechtshistoriker an dem vor-

1 Besprochen von Wenger in Gross' Archiv fur Kriminal- Anthro-
pologie^ xvi. 304-323.

32 L. JVenger [m

iibergehen, was auf anderen Gebieten der antiken Geschichts-
forschung und der Philologie zu Tage kommt. Die Zeit der
splendid isolation der romischen Rechtswissenschaft ist auch fur
Deutschland voriiber und soil, so wollen wir hoffen, nicht wieder
kommen.

Mag es unerfullbarer Optimismus sein, dass ein einzelner, dessen
eigene Arbeit nur auf kleinem Gebiete sich bewegt, das weite
Arbeitsfeld auch nur ganz zu ubersehen vermochte, dass es ihm,
auch wo er bescheiden nur sichten und sammeln wollte, gelange,
iiberall die Spreu vom Weizen zu sondern — aber welche Arbeit ist
je ohne frischen Optimismus begonnen worden ? Freilich, mehr
denn bisher bedarf das neu zustromende Quellenmaterial der
Bearbeitung in entsagender Einzelforschung und hier darf vielleicht
der Jurist an die Universalhistoriker die Bitte richten, mehr noch
als bisher den juristischen Quellen, den Rechtsurkunden vor allem,
ihr Augenmerk zuzuwenden. Viel gemeinsame Arbeit ist noch zu
tun, um auch auf dem Gebiete der Rechtserkenntnis vorwarts-
zukommen, um auch hier aus der Geschichte die Lehre furs Leben
zu ziehen, zu sehen, welche kulturellen Voraussetzungen diese oder
jene Folgen zeitigen, das Ideal zu verwirklichen, soweit Menschen-
kraft es vermag, das, wie jedem Geschichtsforscher, so auch dem
Rechtshistoriker vorschwebt :

Rerum cognoscere causas.

L. WENGER.

DALLA COMMUNIO DEL DIRITTO QUIRI-
TARIO ALLA COMPROPRIETA MODERNA

1. LA comproprieta osservata negli scritti dei giureconsulti
romani ha la proporzione di una figura geometrica, in cui P insieme
dei punti e delle linee concorrono a formare una superficie com-
passata con precisione e che percio costituisce ancora la base di
tutte le trattazioni moderne ; cioe a partire dal sec. xvi fino ai
nostri giorni. Ma nondimeno e vero che hel Corpus Juris Civilis,
lungo quelle linee regolari, tratto tratto appariscono delle curve che
sono delle incognite nella scienza ; e siccome esse premono sui
punti fondamentali dell' istituto, ne turbano d' un tratto P armonia e
conducono gli scrittori a formule indecise, complicate e tortuose.

La presente trattazione e dedicata a svelare la natura di quelle
deviazioni ed il loro valore, che e veramente altissimo ; perche
quelle linee divergenti nella figura della communio romana costi-
tuiscono in realta i fondamenti della comproprieta moderna.

Ma e imprescindibile che anche qui P impostatura dello istituto
classico sia designata come quella che costituisce il punto di par-
tenza da cui si muove la formazione dell' opera futura.

CAP. I

DIRITTO CLASSICO

2. La comproprieta romana vive e si esplica in tutto secondo i
principii fondamentali del dominio quiritario, che e essenzialmente
esclusivo ed abbraccia la cosa intera in tutti i suoi rapporti.

Di conseguenza e impossibile che il dominio su di una cosa
possa appartenere in solidum a piu persone. E possibile invece che
diritti molteplici di dominio coesistano sulla cosa medesima in

33 D

34 S- Riccobono [iv

maniera da limitarsi a vicenda. La limitazione e di natura
meccanica ; nel senso che il diritto di ciascuno dei titolari incontra
un ostacolo nel concorrente diritto di altri ; e perci6 esso deve di
necessita arrestarsi entro un limite insuperabile. E la limitazione e
di natura meccanica ancora nel senso che essa non porta tra i
diritti molteplici alcun coordinamento ; e quindi nessuna distri-
buzione delle facolta di dominio e nessuna dipendenza tra i titolari
del medesimo. I quali sono tutti domini?- ed hanno tutti rispetto
alia cosa una posizione pari. Tale posizione si manifesta in tutta la
sua efficienza nelle conseguenze.

(a) Ciascuno dei titolari esercita il suo potere di dominio colla
massima indipendenza dagli altri ; puo disporre del suo diritto come
e quando vuole, presupposto che con ci6 non offenda il diritto pari
degli altri. Tale carattere hanno, di regola, tutti gli atti di disposi-
zione giuridica della cosa. E pertanto guardata da questo punto di
vista la comproprieta romana ha nulla di particolare ; essa si esplica
in tutto nel modo consueto, secondo i principii e le norme che valgono
per il dominio solitario.

(b) All' opposto qualsiasi disposizione che si realizza con atti
materiali sulla cosa, ovvero quella disposizione giuridica che per
sua natura investe la cosa intera, non sono consentite ad uno dei
condomini singolarmente ; infatti 1' agire in quel modo di un socio
verrebbe a costituire una menomazione del diritto, una invadenza
della sfera giuridica degli altri :

quodammodo sibi alienum quoque ius praeripit, si quasi solus
dominus ad suum arbitrium uti iure commune velit.2

Atti di questa sorta possono effettuarsi sulla cosa comune soltanto
col consenso di tutti i titolari, nessuno eccettuato. Se la volonta
di un solo manca, abbia pur questi nella comunione una parte
minima, 1* atto e illegittimo. E perci6, quando le volonta dei singoli
condomini sono in disaccordo rispetto a quella data categoria di
disposizioni della cosa ne deriva un conflitto di diritti, e 1' effetto
che segue deve di necessita essere negative : colui che nega e
poziore. Ci6 e inevitabile.

Onde il principio potior est causa prohibentis forma precisa-

1 D. x. i, 4, 5, Paul, xxiii. ad ed. plures dominos \ D. viii. 2, 26 ; 10 ; 3,
28, nemo dominorum.

2 D. viii. 5, 1 1.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 35

mente P asse dell' istituto della communio ; in quanto 1' istituto
assurge, per aspetti determinati, ad una figura particolare di diritto.
Ed il principio entra in azione, come s' e detto, tutte le volte
che i titolari dei dominii non si accordano circa 1* uso, il godimento,
la conservazione, la destinazione della cosa, o rispetto ad atti di dis-
posizione giuridica che colpiscono necessariamente la cosa intera.
fe appena necessario poi notare che quel principio stesso rappre-
senta pure la manifestazione piu vivace ed estrema della indipen-
denza assoluta dei singoli condomini. Ed invero, nel disaccordo il
potere dei singoli si paralizza e P azione deve arrestarsi, perche la
risultante di piu forze eguali applicate in senso contrario sullo stesso
corpo non pu6 essere che negativa : I'immobilita.

3. Tale effetto fu constatato dai giuristi piu antichi. Labeone

10 applica come di evidenza intuitiva ; percio nega tra condomini
la denuncia di nuova opera : et putat Labeo non posse nuntiare,
quia possum eum alia ratione prohibere aedificare.'1

E Proculo, citato da Paolo, asseriva gia non posse prohiberi
vicinum, quo minus balineum habeat secundum parietem com-
munem. 2 II giurista contemplava in questo luogo casi in cui uno
dei condomini del muro avesse operate qualcosa entro i confini
della sua proprieta attigua in suoy in maniera da non invadere la
cosa comune. Per contrario si deduce che posse prohiberi quando
1' opera o qualsiasi disposizione materiale si realizzino^ sulla cosa
medesima.

4. Ma la dottrina dello ius prohibendi va particolarmente sotto

11 nome di Sabino, il quale la formu!6 in una massima celeberrima,
che costituisce appunto il cardine dello istituto della comproprieta.

fr. 28 D. x. 3, Pap. vii. qu. Sabinus ait in re communi neminem
dominorum iure facere quicquam invito altero posse. Unde mani-
festum est prohibendi ius esse ; in re enim pari potiorem causam esse
prohibentis constat.

La massima propria di Sabino e riferita da Papiniano integral-
mente, e si contiene nel primo periodo : Sabinus . . . posse, come
e palese per la costruzione indiretta e dai confronti che vedremo
subito.

Nei periodi che seguono Papiniano enuncia : dapprima la con-
seguenza immediata che scaturisce da quel principio di diritto, cioe
1 D. xxxix. i, 3, 2. 2 D. viii. 2, 19 pr.

36 S. Riccobono [iv

10 ius prohibendi \ ingiunge poi la ragione intrinseca di tal diritto
in modo positive, vale a dire : « perche essendo pari la condizione
dei titolari dei dominii il diritto di veto e necessariamente poziore. »

11 testo contiene cosl tutta la dottrina della communio romana : il
principio di fondo, la conseguenza piu diretta ed operativa, ed infine
la ragione dommatica che rivela la intima essenza di tutte le norme
e degli effetti specifici del condominio, e li coordina.

II testo merita per cio di essere annoverato tra i piu cospicui
usciti dalla penna del grande giurista. Papiniano vi e tutto
presente, con la visione completa dell' istituto, con la sua logica
temprata, che sa concatenare in modo rapido e saldo i fatti, i
principii di diritto ed insieme gli effetti.1

5. Ora sappiamo dunque che lo ius prohibendi aveva costituito
gia il punto di partenza nella formazione della dottrina della com-
proprieta, e che e veramente il cardine su cui 1' istituto si muove.
Per ci6 si riscontra in applicazioni varie negli scritti dei giurecon-
sulti, che vanno qui considerate.

fr. ii D. viii. 5, Marcell. vi. dig. . . . prohibendi potius quam
faciendi esse ius socio, quia magis ille, qui facere conatur, ut dixi,
quodammodo sibi alienum quoque ius praeripit, si quasi solus
dominus ad suum arbitrium uti iure 2 communi velit.

II fondamento che Marcello attribuisce qui allo ius prohibendi
ha una direzione particolare, che verra posta in luce piu oltre ; per
ora dico solo che quell' elemento approssimativo espresso dal
quodammodo non diminuisce, in confronto, la ratio iuris espressa
da Papiniano ; ma anzi la esalta, perche Marcello giunge a con-
siderare, in certo modo, il socio che opera senza il consenso del-
T altro sulla cosa comune, come un estraneo che affronti il diritto di
proprieta altrui. L' analogia e di grande rilievo, come T effetto che
ne deriva, che vedremo ben tosto.

fr. 27 D. viii. 2, Pomp, xxxiii. ad Sab. . . . socius prohibendi
ius habet . . . quia invito socio in iure* communi non habeas
ius aedificandi.

Qui la massima di Sabino serve di base alia decisione, ed ha la
forza di una regola di diritto da cui quella conseguenza promana.

1 Si noti per altro che la parita della posizione giuridica dei condomini e
messa in evidenza da Giuliano : fr. 27 D. viii. 3 ... quia par utriusque
domini ius in utroque fundo esse incipit.

2 re Mo. 3 re leg.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 37

Ed infine Paolo ne fa un' applicazione particolarissima in materia
di servitu :

fr. 26 D. viii. 2, Paul. xv. ad Sab. In re communi nemo
dominorum \iure servitutis\ neque facere quicquam invito altero
potest neque prohibere quo minus alter faciat ; nulli enim res sua
servit.

Nella prima parte la formula di Paolo combacia perfettamente
con quella di Papiniano ; essa e dunque tratta alia lettera dal-
F opera di Sabino. Ma vi e tuttavia una differenza rimarchevole che
si manifesta subitamente per la parola servitutis incuneata nella
formulazione di Sabino, e che viene a limitare inaspettatamente
ed in maniera essenziale la forza e la estensione della regola
medesima.

Secondo Sabino il socio pu6 nulla fare sulla cosa comune senza
il consenso degli altri ; e ci6 iure = per diritto, e non gia iure
servitutis.

Tra T una cosa e F altra, come ognun vede, la distanza e enorme.
Non si tratta di semplice proporzione, come di cose che stanno fra
loro nel rapporto del generale al particolare, ma di enunciazioni
sostanzialmente diverse. Quella che si legge nel testo di Paolo e
falsa ; perche il socio puo mai operare sul fondo comune iure
servitutis, nemmeno col consenso delF altro. Infatti F ostacolo
alia servitu e nel potere di dominio che egli ha sulla cosa comune,
e non gia nel divieto del socio.

Questo principio, che peraltro discende dalla struttura del
condominio romano, e messo in evidenza da Giavoleno, il quale
nega tra socii la possibilita dell' actio negatoria, appunto perch&
quel che e comune appartiene a ciascuno dei compartecipi di pieno
diritto : nam quod communiter socius habet et. in iure l eum habere
constitit.

Per la stessa ragione non e possibile la costituzione di servitu
tra due fondi, dei quali uno sia comune e F altro di proprieta
esclusiva di uno dei socii.2

1 fr. 4 D. xxxiii. 3, Jav. ix. ep. La preposizione in e nel brano riferito
sicuramente inopportuna ; Mommsen corregge : item iure me habere, ma
1' emendazione e arbitraria e nel risultato banale ; io proporrei : pleno iure
\domini iure?} eum habere ; cfr. D. x. i, 4, 7 ; xi. 3, 14, 2 . . . perinde
atque si proprius meus servus cet ; D. xlvii. io, 15, 36 . . . cum iure domini
idfecerit.

2 Cfr. 32 D. viii. 3, Afric. vi. quaest.

38 S. Riccobono [iv

E nelle stesse condizioni di fatto e esclusa 1' actio finium re-
gundorum perche ego et socius meus . . . unius loco habemurl

E perci6 la frase invito socio> che e essenziale nella formula
di Sabino, respinge con fermezza qualsiasi riferimento alia servitus.
E tuttavia non bisogna supporre una grave alterazione del testo,
dacche io credo si possa rimettere in ordine con un semplice
spostamento della parola servitutis^ che deve avere piuttosto
la sua collocazione nel secondo membro del periodo, come segue :

In re communi nemo dominorum neque facere [iure'] quicquam
invito altero potest neque prohibere [iure servitutis~\ quo minus alter
facial : nulli enim res sua servit.

Paolo, dunque, metteva in relazione la massima di Sabino con
la dottrina delle servitu, e cio in modo veramente opportuno,
perche egli trattava in quel luogo de servitutibus? ed intendeva
precipuamente far notare che il socio nemmeno ha facolta di
proibire iure servitutis quo minus alter faciat.

La ragione e manifesta ; che avendo ciascuno dei condomini
un pieno diritto sulla cosa, tra i medesimi non vi e possibilita di
esercizio o pretesa di servitu, e di conseguenza e preclusa la via
allo esperimento dell' actio negatoria : nulli res sua servit. Questo
punto di diritto, per altro, ci e noto dal passo di Giavoleno sopra
riferito, e da altri testi classici che verranno subito in esame ; esso
fu posto in grande evidenza da Cuiacio, che interpreto rettamente
il fr. in esame, senza proporne 1' emendamento.3

I moderni hanno avvertito le difficolta del passo, ma non le
hanno superate. Se poi la dislocazione della frase iure servitutis
debba attribuirsi a svista di amanuensi ovvero all' opera dei com-
pilatori e cosa che non posso giudicare.

Certo molti argomenti rendono piu verisimile la seconda ipotesi ;
infatti il lettore trovera piu oltre prove sufficienti per convincersi che
Giustiniano si adopr6 deliberatamente a stremare in tutti i modi
la regola di Sabino, che affermava nella maniera piu recisa la
indipendenza dei singoli condomini rispetto alia cosa comune, e che
inoltre egli trasformo lo ius prohibendi in un' azione giudiziaria.

6. E lo ius prohibendi si determina ora con precisione. Esso

1 D. x. i, 4, 7.

2 Cfr. Lenel, Pal \. c. 1289.

3 Cfr. Opp. vol. vii. p. 676 ad 1. 27 (8-2) ; ibid. p. 674 ad 1. 26 eod. ;
ibid. p. 737 ad 1. n (8-5); ibid. p. 945 e, p. 2223 ad 1. 4, D. xxxiii. 3.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 39

scaturisce, come conseguenza ineluttabile, dalla posizione pari dei
condomini. E un effetto naturale del dominio posto in quella
particolare situazione ; e perci6 e enunciate come un diritto fonda-
mentale e caratteristico, che entra in azione tutte le volte che
T accordo tra i condomini si rompe.

Prohibere non s' intende nel senso che al socio competa 1* actio
negatoria o prohibitoria contro T altro. Ma significa, invece, che
ciascuno dei socii pu6 direttamente impedire con la forza, di sua
autorita, T opera o qualsiasi azione sulla cosa intrapresa dall' altro.
Tale significato e fuori dubbio. Marcello contrappone prohibere
& facere, ed i due termini si rapportano sicuramente all' ingerenza
materiale, che e positivamente (facere) inibita a ciascuno dei socii
ove manchi il consenso degli altri ; ed e invece negativamente
(prohibere) permessa a ciascuno per impedire qualsiasi uso della
cosa contro la sua volonta. Ma il passo di Marcello subl una grave
mutilazione ed e nei Digesti del seguente tenore :

fr. 1 1 D. viii. 5, Marc. vi. dig. An unus ex sociis in communi loco
invitis ceteris iure aedificare possit, id est an, si prohibeatur a sociis,
possit cum his ita experiri ius sibi esse aedificare, et an socii cum eo
ita agere possint ius sibi prohibendi esse vel illi ius aedificandi non
esse : et si aedificatum iam sit, num possint l cum eo ita experiri
ius tibi non esse ita aedificatum habere, quaeritur \et magis did
potesf\ 2 prohibendi potius quam faciendi esse ius socio, quia magis
ille, qui facere conatur, ut dixi, quodammodo. sibi alienum quoque

1 num possint Hal. ; non possit F.

2 La frase et magis did potest e interpolatizia, inserita dai compilatori
per sopprimere la piu estesa dimostrazione di Marcello. Sospetta e la frase
per se stessa, che ritorna in molti testi rimaneggiati da Triboniano (magis
infinite volte ; potest did qualche volta ; cfr. D. xlvii. 2, 9, i ; D. ix. 4, 19 pr.)
inoltre, a breve distanza, s' incontra di nuovo magis che era nel testo genuine,
e 1' espressione ut dixi non ha piu riscontro nel passo dei Digesti, mentre
Marcello ricollegava cosi la decisione alia argomentazione piu ampia (quaeritur)
che precedeva.

Anche il Lenel (ZSS. vol. xii. p. 12) osservo con il solito acume la di-
minuzione del testo operata dai compilatori, ma non la precisa, e percio nel-
1' interpretazione tien conto degli elementi che vi si leggono, concludendo che
Marcello ammetteva 1' actio prohibitoria e non la negatoria. Di cio piu oltre.

Non ha invece fondamento il sospetto da Beseler (Beitrage, i. p. 79, i)
manifestato sul periodo : id est . . . habere ; perche, in verita, il giurista aveva
posto quesiti fondamentali che si presentavano naturalmente in una trattazione
larga della dottrina.

Ed & ovvio che tutte quelle formule rassegnate da Marcello rappresentavano

40 S. Riccobono [iv

ius praeripit, si quasi solus dominus ad suum arbitrium uti iure1
communi velit.

Marcello aveva dovuto negare recisamente la possibilita di
qualsiasi azione tra i socii a titolo di servitu, come 1' aveva negate
Giavoleno ; ed aveva dovuto invece ammettere il diritto del socio
ad impedire 1' opera comechesia, nel senso che ho dichiarato di
sopra. La motivazione di Marcello, sopravvissuta nel testo, acquista
cosl il suo giusto valore e perfetta proporzione ; perche essa e
indirizzata a giustificare la violenza privata contro il socio che
disponendo della cosa a suo arbitrio : sibi alienum quoque ius
praeripit. Ne pu6 sorprendere in questo luogo la legittimazione
della privata difesa ; avvegnache il diritto di ciascuno dei socii
d' impedire con la forza qualsiasi ingerenza o di distruggere 1' opera
eseguita sulla cosa comune, senza preventivo accordo, deriva dal
potere essenziale di dominio che ciascuno ha sulla medesima. II
proprietario non e tenuto a tollerare che altri faccia in suo
alcunche contro il suo volere ; piuttosto egli puo distruggere
P opera di sua autorita : iure suo posse eum intercidere, et merito^ . . .
quod hie in suo protexit?

Questo principio non soffre restrizione nel condominio ; pre-
cisamente per il motive che i condomini sono tutti in pari causa
ed indipendenti P uno dalP altro. E siffatta conseguenza era pro-
babilmente affermata da Pomponio nel fr. 27 D. viii. 2, con la frase
rent perdere, ove le si attribuisca il valore che le diedero gl' inter-
preti fin dalla Glossa, cioe che il socio possa opus sua auctoritate
destruere quando il condomino agisca senza il suo consenso ; la
quale frase perci6 deve essere genuina, nel testo rifatto largamente
dai compilatori.3

7. Onde i Romani, considerando lo stato di anarchia in cui i
socii si trovavano rispetto all' uso ed al godimento della cosa,
poterono dire che la communio e mater rixarum, e constatare, di

varii attegiamenti dell' a. negatoria secondo le diverse ipotesi. Ne la parola
prohibere inclusa in quelle formule ha un valore speciale :

cfr. D. viii. 5, 8, 5 : prohiberi posse fumum immittere . . . agique sic posse
. . . ius ei non esse fumum immittere.

1 re scr.

2 fr. 29 § i D. ix. 2.

3 Per T esame di questo passo v. cap. ii. n. 29, p. 61.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 41

conseguenza, ogni giorno che propter immensas contentiones
plerumque res ad divisionem pervenitl

E questa affermazione & vera nella sua interezza, per la stessa
struttura del condominio e per le attestazioni concordi degli antichi;2
comunque, per altro, il periodo che la contiene possa essere stato
rimosso o ricollegato dai compilatori.

8. Affermato cosl il punto centrale della dottrina del con-
dominio e agevole ora procedere all1 esame di tutte le conseguenze
giuridiche che ne derivano, che debbono per cio stesso manifestarsi
chiare ed incontestabili.

La posizione dei socii nella comunione e, come s' e visto, de-
terminata sempre dai principii fondamentali del dominio, senza
attenuazione o modificazione di sorta. Nei particolari cio si
dimostra mirabilmente con un rapido esame degli effetti giuridici
che scaturiscono dallo stato di comproprieta, sotto T aspetto positive
e negative ; e cioe :

(a) in ordine alia disposizione giuridica della cosa comune, che
compete a ciascuno dei socii.

(£) in ordine agli atti di disposizione materiale della cosa, che
non possono attuarsi senza il concorso di tutti i compartecipi. In
questa categoria va pure annoverata qualsiasi disposizione giuridica
che investe di necessita la cosa intera, come avviene per le servitu
attive o passive.

9. Rispetto al primo punto e certo che ognuno dei compro-
prietarii puo esercitare tutte le facolta di disposizione giuridica del
dominio con lamassima indipendenza. Ciascuno quindi puovendere,8
donare, sottoporre ad ipoteca,4 costituire usufrutto, dare in dote,5
disporre per testamento o altrimenti alienare la cosa, in proporzione
della parte che gli spetta, senza attendere il consenso dei socii, e
senza che una qualsiasi ingerenza di essi sia ammessa.6 L' atto
dispositive dell' alienante ha naturalmente efficacia reale solo nel
limite del diritto che effettivamente gli compete sulla cosa comune.

1 fr. 26 D. viii. 2.

2 fr. 77 § 20 D. xxxi. . . . cum discordiis propinquorum sedandis pro-
spexei it, quas materia communionis solet excitare.

3 Cod. iv. 52, 3 (DiocL et Max.} ; c. 4 e 5 eod. ; D. x. 2, 44, 2.

4 D. x. 3, 6, 9 ; xx. 4, 3, 2 ; xx. 6, 7, 4.

5 Cod. v. 12, 1 6 (DiocL et Max.).

6 D. 1. 17, 26; cfr. Lenel, Pal. Ulp. n. 2748 ; Cod. iv. 52, 3.

42 5. Riccobono [iv

Tale conseguenza e affermata da Papiniano per la vendita come per
T ipoteca disposta dal condomino.

II passo che si riferisce alia vendita e alquanto oscuro rispetto
agli element! di fatto, che furono certamente ridotti dai compilatori ;
ma per quel che concerne il punto in esame il testo e sicuro e di
grande significazione.

Nei Digesti & cosi riferito :

fr. 64 § 4 D. xxi. 2, Pap. vii. 9. Qui unum iugerum pro
indiviso solum habuit, tradidit : secundum omnium sententias non
totum dominium transtulit, sed partem dimidiam iugeri, quemad-
modum si locum cerium aut fundum similiter tradidisset^

L' alienazione per cio ha efficacia solo per la parte che il socio ha
nella comunione.2 E lo stesso vale per 1' ipoteca ; onde Papiniano
con una fine argomentazione ne deduce che si possono avere su di
una parte d' un fondo ipoteche non concorrenti ; cioe T una costituita
durante la comunione, che gravera, dopo la divisione, sulle parti pro
diviso, in ragione di meta : e P altra costituita per garanzia in favore
del socio, nell' atto divisorio, che investe 1' altra meta : sed priorem

1 Nel passo la traditio fu sostituita alia mancipatio (Lenel, Pal. ad h. 1.) ;
ma i compilatori soppressero inoltre molti element! nella relazione del fatto,
che era certamente piu complicato. Cosl il solum, aggettivo o avverbio che
sia, resto nel passo senza alcun significato ; ed invero che importa cio nel
trasferimento per mane, di cosa determinata ? Ma il similiter tradid.,
poi, rivela che il giureconsulto aveva riferito avanti una speciale clausola della
mancipatio.

lo suppongo che in un fondo di Tizio era stato legato un solo iugero a due
conliberti senza designazione della regione, e che uno dei legatarii mancipo
1' intero ingero che era/r<? indiviso nel fondo di Tizio.

Papin. pot& scrivere :

Qui unum iugerum pro indiviso solum \in fundo Titii commune cum
Simplici conliberto habuit mancipio dedit Seio hac formula : unum iugerum
quod est in praedio Titii pro indiviso\ cet.

Si spiegherebbe allora 1' aw. similiter che presuppone un' analogia di specie
che Papiniano usa altre volte, ed inoltre il confronto con il locus certus Q/undus.
Nel caso esaminato da Papiniano si doveva trattare di locus indeterminate :

cfr. D. 1. 1 6, 60 : locus est . . . portio aliqua fundi ... § 2 ... locus
vero latere potest quatenus determine tur et definiatur. La mancipatio di pars
pro indiviso doveva del resto essere frequente nella comunicazione di fondi
societatis causa, cfr. Riccobono, Traditio ficta, c. iii.

E quindi errava Cuiacio (Opp. iv. p. 795 ad h. 1.) supponendo che la traditio
fosse avvenuta nel testo in esame mediante la semplice consegna dei titoli di
proprieta, in base all' erroneo concetto che non fosse possibile tradizione cor-
porale di pars pro indiviso.

2 fr. 68 D. xvii. 2.

iv] Communio e Compropritfa 43

secundo non esse potiorem, quoniam secundum pignus ad earn partem
directum videbatur, quam ultra partem suam f rater non consentiente
socio non potuit obligare.1

E parimenti i frutti del fondo spettano a ciascuno dei soci
iure soli, in proporzione della parte di dominio che risulta dalla
concorrenza dei diritti degli altri : ita qui communem fundum
posszdet, nonfaciet suos fructus pro ea parte > qua fundus ad socium
eius pertinebit? La stessa attribuzione vien fatta per gli increment!
del fondo.3

II quale principle assume poi una grande importanza nella
comunione di schiavi, dacche conduce alia regola generale che
gli acquisti dello schiavo comune, anche se fatti ex re alterius
dominorum, vanno attribuiti, per lo meno quanto alia forma, a
tutti i socii pro parte dominiit Effetti cotesti ben congrui e
proporzionati alia struttura del condominio, e per cio sotto ogni
riguardo necessarii ed inderogabili ; avvegnache, se, come si esprime
Papiniano,5 i condomini hanno sulla cosa una posizione pari, ne
deriva per necessita imprescindibile che ciascuno dei titolari non
puo avere una facolta di disposizione al di la della sua parte, e
ciascuno non puo far suoi i frutti, o pretendere dagli acquisti a
mezzo di schiavi, che una parte corrispondente a quella ex qua
dominus est. Ne vi e ragione per cio di concepire il con-
dominio romano come un concorso di proprieta parziali sulla
cosa medesima ; perche cotali effetti si coordinano con perfetta
misura al concetto della comproprieta integrate ; in cui ciascuno
dei titolari incontra un limite insuperabile nel diritto concorrente
degli altri. Onde necessariamente tutte le facolta del dominio si
riducono entro quel limite in cui esso e in realta ristretto, a causa
del concorso degli altri diritti.

II che vuol dire, che la posizione pari dei condomini rispetto
al diritto sulla cosa, e poi immanente in tutti gli effetti giuridici
proprii del dominio. E cosl deve essere. Un' affermazione

1 fr. 3 § 2 D. xx. 4, Pap. xi. resp. ; cfr. Gai in D. xx. 6, 7, 4 : ... dimsione
facta cum socio non utique earn partem creditori obligatam esse, quae ei optingit,
qui pignori dedit^ sed utriusque pars pro indiviso pro parte dimidia manebit
obligata. 2 fn 25 pr. D. xxii. i Jul. vii. dig.

3 fr. 4 § 5 D. x. i unusquisque portionem habebit quam in fundo habet et
pro indiviso.

4 D. xli. i, 45, Gai vii. ad ed. pr. ; D. x. 3, 24, pr. Jul. viii. dig.

5 D. x. 3, 28.

44 -S1- Riccobono [iv

diversa non avrebbe che un valore metafisico, contrario alia natura
ed alia forza del diritto.

10. E per altro se la struttura del condominio si manifesta cosl
limpida, osservata dal lato positive, cioe rispetto alle facolta che
ciascuno dei titolari pu6 esercitare in modcx indipendente dagli
altri, e che dai giureconsulti romani sono ammesse con tutta
naturalezza ; essa deve poi mostrarsi in maggior rilievo, esplorata
nelle sue manifestazioni negative, che rivelano appunto la im-
possibilita di qualsiasi regolamento obbiettivo della comunione, in
ordine agli atti dispositivi sulla cosa. I quali, come la natura della
proprieta esige, in qualsiasi contingenza, dipendono unicamente
dalla volonta unanime dei compartecipi. In contrapposto agli
atti di disposizione giuridica compiuti dal condomino, che mai
possono ledere il diritto degli altri, sotto il secondo aspetto si con-
templano, in primo luogo, gli atti materiali sulla cosa comune,
i quali per la loro natura, necessariamente, invadono in una volta
il diritto dei socii. Per ci6 essi sono inibiti ai singoli compartecipi
in modo assoluto. Onde qui entra in azione e spiega la sua forza
la regola di Sabino : in re communi neminem dominorum iure facere
quicquam invito alter o posset II verbo facere si riferisce appunto
a tutti gli atti materiali. E da cio segue, che nessuno dei socii pu6
di propria iniziativa usare la cosa, coltivare il fondo o eseguirvi
miglioramenti, costruzioni o in generale opere nuove, nemmeno
semplicemente conservative, senza il consenso di tutti i condomini.

Ne giova distinguere qui tra gli atti che sono rivolti ad un uso
normale della cosa, conforme alia sua destinazione, e gli atti che
esorbitano da questo limite e che importano un utilizzamento
difforme o contrario alia destinazione della medesima.

La distinzione non puo aver luogo ; perche il divieto del
facere, qualunque esso sia, deriva dalla forza del diritto degli altri,
e per cio e assoluto, ed ha nulla che vedere con la natura dell' uso
e la specie degli atti.

E pertanto, come la volonta unanime dei socii e necessaria per
abbattere o riedificare un muro o parte di un edificio, cosi pure le
riparazioni necessarie ai muri ed agli edificii comuni esigono il volere
concorde di tutti.2 A nessuno quindi e consentito fare uso del
muro comune o utilizzarlo in qualsiasi modo, come appoggiandovi
fabbriche o scale o tubi per la condotta delle acque.

1 fr. 26 D. viii. 2 ; fr. 28 D. x. 3. 2 D. viii. 2, 8, Gai vii. ad ed.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 45

II. Su questo punto per6 e bene fermarsi ; perche fin dalla
Glossa si asserisce il contrario, particolarmente rispetto a determinati
utilizzamenti della parete comune, non che per le opere riparative
degli edificii. La quale affermazione e esatta ove si abbia
riguardo al diritto giustinianeo, come vedremo piu oltre ; ma per
il diritto classico, invece, e sicuramente falsa.

Infatti se in frammenti notissimi dei giuristi romani si permette
al condomino di tenere il bagno dappresso la parete comune, o di
costruire una camera o una scala addossata alia stessa, in tutte
quelle decisioni e presupposto che egli deve eseguire le opere entro
i limiti della sua proprieta esclusiva ; e non solo che il bagno, la
camera o la scala non debbono recar danno al muro, ma che
debbono inoltre stare del tutto indipendenti da esso. I testi cui
alludevo sono lucidissimi in questo senso, e si esprimono nel modo
seguente :

fr. 19 D. viii. 2, Paul. vii. ad Sab. Fistulam iunctam parieti
communi, quae aut ex castello aut ex coelo aquam capit, non
iure haberi Proculus ait ; sed non posse prohiberi vicinum, quo
minus balineum habeat secundum parietem communem, quamvis
humorem capiat paries ; non magis quam si vel in triclinio suo vel
in cubiculo aquam effunderet. Sed Neratius ait, si talis sit usus
tepidarii ut assiduum humorem habeat, et id noceat vicino, posse
prohiberi eum.

§ i. luxta communem parietem cameram ex figlino opere factam,
si ita retineatur, ut etiam sublato pariete maneat [si modo non
impediat refectionem communis parietis\, iure habere licet.

§ 2. Scalas posse me ad parietem communem habere, Sabinus
recte scribit, quia removeri hae possunt.

Tutti i giuristi, come si vede, sono concordi nell' enunciare
condizioni di fatto tali che escludono 1' uso del muro comune a
sostegno di quelle opere o impianti ; che son fatti bensi tuxta,
secundum parietem^ cioe addossati al muro ma non sostenuti da
esso. II muro comune e dunque fuori quistione ; tan to e vero che
si esige pure che la costruzione etiam sublato pariete maneat?-

Nello stesso senso e diretta la argomentazione di Proculo rispetto
al bagno : egli dice, giustamente, che non e sufficiente motivo

1 E per ci6 1' inciso * si modo non impediat refectionem communis parietis '
e evidentemente interpolatizio ; perche la condizione enunciata dal giurista
e gia assorbente. Indizii della interpolazione : si modo — la superflua
ripetizione del sostantivo : communis parietis, che precede immediatamente.
La ragione dell' inciso verra in evidenza nel c. ii. n. 47.

46 5. Riccobono [iv

d' impedire al socio di tenere il bagno addossato alia parete il fatto
che vi si comunica 1' umidita ; perche cio avviene pure nel lavare il
pavimento del triclinio o del cubiculo versandovi 1' acqua a getto.

Da ci6 si desume che in tutti quei casi presi in esame la parete
comune non e adibita a sostegno delle opere. II presupposto
essenziale e questo appunto. Se ci6 non e, in fatto, interviene il
divieto. Cosl nel caso di tubi infissi al muro per lo scarico delle
acque piovane o dal castello, o di appoggio di una fabbrica.1

Ma il divieto poi di tenere un forno applicato alia parete
comune 2 o caloriferi ha un' altra ragione piu generale, il danno cioe
che ne viene alia fabbrica dal continue calore o dalla fiamma. E
Proculo fa notare precisamente la distinzione tra i due casi, con le
parole : de tubulis eo amplius hoc iuris esty quod per eos fiamma
torretur paries?

E evidente, dunque, che il richiamo di quei passi e erroneo ;
e che in essi non pu6 trovar appoggio quell' antica dottrina che
consente al socio P uso normale della cosa comune, secondo la sua
destinazione.4 E soggiungo che tale dottrina nemmeno si giustifica,
per quanto attiene al diritto classico, invocando la facolta che ha il
condomino di abbellire con pitture o stucchi la parete comune ;
perche se e lo stesso Proculo5 che ammette ci6, egli non poteva
contradirsi ; mentre a togliere qualsiasi valore alia decisione per la
dottrina in esame della destinazione, basta osservare che le pareti
non si costruiscono per le pitture o per gli stucchi, ne quando vi si
eseguano pu6 dirsi che si faccia un uso normale della cosa. La
permissione deve avere percio altri motivi ; e cioe in primo luogo
quello che le pitture e gli stucchi non toccano e non ledono la
sostanza della cosa comune ; ed inoltre poi la considerazione che le
esigenze del diritto non vengono mai a porsi in contrasto col buon
senso, come verrebbero a trovarsi vietando al condomino di tenere
la parete decorosa o di spazzar via i ragnateli dalla medesima,
senza il consenso degli altri.6

12. Dopo tutto resta la sola quistione delle riparazioni agli

1 Z>. viii. 2, 13 pr. 2 D. ix. 2, 27, 10.

3 D. viii. 2, 13 pr.

4 Cfr. p. es. Ferrini, Pand. p. 450.

5 D. viii. 2, 13, i.

6 Ma pur troppo il diritto e trascinato spesso non solo in contrasto col
buon senso ma pure in situazioni ridicole, come avviene oggi presso di noi con
la ormai famosa iscririone d' ufficio del Re nelle liste elettorali politiche.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 47

edificii e muri comuni, che e in realta assai intricata. Ma 1' esame
piu largo di essa deve essere rimandato al c. ii., appunto perche le
interpolazioni giustinianee sono in questa materia emergenti nel
Corpus luris.

Or per quel che concerne il diritto classico abbiamo due dati
certi per ritenere anche in questo punto di diritto il vigore della
regola di Sabino.

In primo luogo il passo di Gaio, piu volte richiamato, che
attesta nella maniera piu esplicita per il muro comune alterutri
. . . reficiendi ius non esse.1 E poi il Senato consulto provocato
da M. Aurelio, che concedette ai singoli condomini, che avessero
eseguite le riparazioni necessarie agli edificii, il diritto di esigere in
proporzione la spesa erogata entro 4 mesi con gl' interessi, e, nel
caso di mora dei socii al pagamento o di rifiuto, 1* acquisto della
proprieta delle parti dell' edificio loro spettanti. Soltanto queste
disposizioni attribuiscono le fonti 2 alia Oratio di M. Aurelio ; ma
essa doveva contenere certamente, come premessa, I1 obbligo rivolto
ai singoli condomini di tenere in ordine gli edificii, ai fini principal-
mente della loro stabilita.

LJ occasione a tali provvedimenti pote essere apprestata dalla
inondazione del Tevere, che, giusto in quel tempo, fu spaventevole
e che a dire di Capitolino 3 multa urbis aedificia vexavit et pluri-
mum animalium inter emit et famem gravissimam peperit.

Del resto e nota la cura somma degli Imperatori e del Senate4
per il decoro edilizio della Citta, che diede luogo a disposizioni
gravissime limitatrici della proprieta, che furono estese pure alle
Provincie 5 e severamente custodite. E pertanto il provvedimento
legislative di carattere eccezionale conferma, come a me sembra, la
regola dello ius civile, quale e riferita da Gaio ; nel senso che ai

1 D. viii. 2, 8.

2 D. xvii. 2, 52, 10 (Ulp.-Papin.) ; Cod. viii. 10, 4 (Philipp. a. 245);
Harmenopulo, Exab. x. 3, 27. — Male Cuiacio, Opp. iv. p. 785 ad 1. 28 D. x.
3 spiega pure con la Oratio dim Marti la 1. 32 D. xxxix. 2. Cf. c. ii. n.
Nelle Leges saeculares (L. 98 ed. Ferrini) le disposizioni del SC. sono applicate
pure ai proprietarii dei diversi piani di una casa, essendo, come ora sappiamo,
nelle provincie orientali ammessa la proprieta divisa dei piani di un edificio ;
cfr. Wenger, ZSS. v. 32, p. 334 ; ma v. Partsch, Archiv Pap. v. p. 496.

3 Hist. M. Ant. Philoph. 8.

4 Cfr. Riccobono, Fontes, p. 233.

5 Cfr. Epistula Hadriani ad Stralonicenses Hadrianopolitas (Riccobono,
Fontes, p. 325 ed ivi citati).

48 S. Riccobono [iv

singoli condomini non e data facolta di provvedere alle riparazioni
necessarie agli edificii, senza il concorso della volonta degli altri.
Mentre, d' altro lato, pu6 ben dirsi che la disposizione del Senate
non venne qui ad alterare nessun principio fondamentale del-
1' istituto della comproprieta ; avvegnache il singolo condomino, se
pu6 e deve ora eseguire le riparazioni agli edificii cadenti, ci6
facendo non esercita una facolta di dominio, ma adempie piuttosto
un precetto d' indole amministrativa, munito perci6 di speciale
sanzione.

13. Onde per quel che riguarda il facere possiamo con-
ch iudere che le applicazioni della regola di Sabino sono tutte
concordanti nello stesso senso, come dovevano essere ; perche la
materia non poteva qui offrire occasione a dubbii e controversie,
trattandosi di deduzioni semplici ed incontrovertibili dei principii
fondamentali del dominio.1

Infatti, se la condizione dei singoli compartecipi e pari in diritto,
qualsiasi atto compiuto nella cosa da uno o dai piu contro la
volonta di altri costituisce certamente una menomazione del diritto
di questi ultimi, un' invadenza della loro sfera giuridica. Ma,
d' altro lato, non vi e ragione ne posto per ammettere la prevalenza
della volonta di uno sull' altro, o anche dei piu contro uno. Perche,
essendo tutti domini, ciascuno puo disporre della cosa come vuole ;
e qualunque cosa voglia non puo essere soggetta a contraddizione.

E percio 1' effetto deve essere negative ; colui che nega e
poziore, nel senso che qualsiasi disposizione materiale della cosa
comune viene ad essere impedita. E cosl e vero, negativamente,
che nessuno pu6 disporre di fatto della cosa a suo talento, per
1' energia del diritto pari degli altri ; come e pur vero, in senso
positivo, che ciascuno ha il potere d' impedire con la forza il
tentative del socio che voglia far prevalere la sua volonta operando
sulla cosa ; perche questi allora quodammodo sibi alienum quoque
ius praeripit) si quasi solus dominus ad suum arbitrium uti \re\
communi velit.

1 Nella presente trattazione non sono considerati i casi di comunione di
sepolcri e le facolta di seppellire nel luogo puro comune ; perche in questa
materia le innovazioni di Giustiniano sono ancora piu profonde e determinate
da 1' idea prettamente religiosa. Onde mi parve necessario dedicare all' ar-
gomento un lavoro speciale. E per altro, per quel che qui interessa, e fuori
dubbio che nel diritto classico il condomino non ha facolta di far religiose il
luogo puro introducendovi il cadavere ; cfr. D. xi. 7, 41, che del resto e inter-
polate nella seconda parte : cum extranei . . sepeliretur ; e D. x. 3, 6, 6.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 49

14. E la posizione e identica e quindi identico lo effetto, quando
per via di atti giuridici la disposizione di uno dei socii investe di
necessita la cosa intera ; perche anche in questo caso si determina
un conflitto tra i molteplici dominii come in seguito al facere ; e
perci6 il potere del singolo socio deve arrestarsi.

Nessuno dei socii pu6 quindi acquistare al fondo una servitu, per
quanto ne sia evidente il vantaggio o la necessita ; l e nessuno pu6
singolarmente gravare il fondo di servitu.2

Nell' uno e neir altro caso si richiede il consensus omnium, o,
per meglio dire, quell' atto dispositive congruo a costituire la servitu,
che puo essere simultaneo ovvero successive da parte dei singoli.3

La denunzia di nuova opera rispetto al fondo comune puo essere
attiva o passiva ; e cioe da parte dei condomini a causa di opera
eseguita in alieno e che invade il fondo o ne minaccia in modo
qualsiasi la liberta o la consistenza fisica ; ovvero, dal lato passivo,
contro i condomini per opera che s' inizia sul fondo comune.

Ma in ambo i casi gli effetti giuridici si riflettono su tutti i
condomini solo quando vi sia il consenso di tutti.4 Ove tale
consenso non vi sia per la denunzia, o nel caso inverso per F opera,
la responsabilita incombe solo all' autore della denunzia ; nel
secondo caso a chi inizio F opera sul fondo.5 E pari & la decisione
intorno alia cautio damni in/ecti, nei casi in cui ha luogo.6

Abbiamo qui dunque esempii perspicui per dimostrare che il
principio della indipendenza dei socii & inalterable nella comunione,
e che il diritto romano in nessun caso pervenne a riconoscere la
facolta di un socio di rappresentare gli altri, per garentire F interesse
comune o per la responsabilita di fronte ai terzi. Ne questa afferma-
zione resta infirmata dal fatto che ciascuno dei condomini ha potere
di rivendicare in solidum la servitu dovuta al fondo 7 o di assicurare
con F esercizio F esistenza della medesima,8 perche cotali effetti,

1 D. viii. 3, 19.

2 D. xxxix. 3, i o pr. omnium voluntatem esse sequendam ; D. viii. 1,2;
D. xxi. 2, 10.

3 D. viii. 3, n, per altro interpolate.

4 D. xxxix. I, 18, Pap. 3 qu. si . . . ex voluntate omnium opus fiat.
5 § 6 D. eod.

5 fr. 1 8 D. xxxix. i in solidum obligabitur.

6 D. x. 3, 6, 7 necesse tibi non fuerit in solidum cavere, sed sufficere
pro parte tua.

7 D. viii. 5, 4, 3 \itaque . . . posstt\ Trib. conf. Eisele, ZSS. xxx. p. 120.

8 D. viii. 6, 1 6.

50 S. Riccobono [iv

come e ovvio, dipendono unicamente dalla natura della servitu, che
e per se stessa indivisibile, e quindi non si puo ne acquistare ne
rivendicare ne perdere pro parted

15. Sono disegnati cosi i lineamenti essenziali, cioe quelli che
appariscono i soli necessarii a rappresentare la struttura piu rilevata
e caratteristica dell' istituto del condominio, secondo i classici.
Essi ci hanno rivelato che i singoli hanno sulla cosa comune un vero
e pieno diritto di proprieta, e che questo diritto si comporta del
tutto con la stessa forza e la stessa energia come nella proprieta
unica, secondo i principii del diritto quiritario ; per cui il domino
ovvero i condomini hanno sulla cosa un potere assoluto che
esercitano con la massima indipendenza in qualsiasi momento e
situazione. Le conseguenze di questa posizione sono evidenti e
note. Le facolta di disposizione giuridica restano illimitate nei
singoli condomini. Ma 1' uso ed il godimento della cosa non pu6
aver luogo che mediante F accordo di tutti, per ogni singolo atto
ed in ogni momento.

Quando quest' accordo non si raggiunga la comunione si
paralizza subitamente. Si tratta pertanto di un rapporto senza
disciplina e senza regolamento di sorta, ed in questo senso
addirittura anarchico ; in cui il sistema individualistico romano si
manifesta in tutta la sua potenza.

II risultato e sicuramente antieconomico ed antisociale, ma non
in modo diverse che tutto F ordinamento della proprieta. E percio
non e a pensare che i Romani abbiano avvertito le durezze del loro
sistema di comproprieta ; di certo non tentarono mai di apportarvi
alcuna mitigazione, che, come s' e visto, applicarono sempre il
principio di fondo con tutte le conseguenze sopra rilevate, con la
logica piu perfetta ed inesorabile.

1 6. Quando il disaccordo si manifesta tra i socii, in ordine al-
F esercizio delle facolta di dominio sulla cosa, vuoi per la maniera
o la distribuzione del godimento, vuoi per la condotta di uno
pregiudizievole agli interessi degli altri o semplicemente alia
volonta degli altri, non vi ha nessun mezzo e nessuna azione che
intervenga a comporre il dissidio, che rimetta F ordine, che costringa
F uno o gli altri a consentire od agire in modo ragionevole e vantag-
gioso per F interesse comune ; ovvero che possa impedire F abuso o il
danneggiamento della cosa. Preminente, sempre, resta il principio :

1 D. viii. i, ii.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 51

potior est condicio prohibentis, lo stato cioe d' inazione, di paralisi.
E potior s' intende iure ; per cio in qualsiasi evenienza, al di sopra
di qualsiasi interesse, vantaggio o danno dei singoli cointeressati.

17. E la paralisi pu6 risolversi soltanto con un mezzo energico
e definitive, cioe con lo scioglimento della comunione.

Per ci6 ciascuno dei socii puo chiedere la divisione mediante
T actio communi dividundo in qualsiasi momenta.1 Ed a questo
diritto non si ammette rinunzia. Ma di piu i giureconsulti con
esitanza, come pare, riconobbero la validita del pactum ne intra
cerium tempus dividatur? II motive ne era evidente. Dacche il
patto di non dividere, anche limitato nel tempo, non poteva avere
efficacia reale, e se in un modo qualsiasi si fosse potuto consentire
siffatto valore, esso avrebbe arrecato una limitazione essenziale al
diritto assoluto ed alia indipendenza dei condomini.

Giustiniano, s' intende, superc- la barriera facilmente accordando
alia convenzione efficacia reale.3

In questo punto pero, giova rilevarlo, anche la giurisprudenza
classica aveva ammesso un' eccezione al principio dell' assoluta
liberta dello scioglimento della comunione in qualsiasi momento e
per volonta di un solo ; cio& rispetto al vestibolo comune, che non
puo essere dedotto nel giudizio divisorio invito altero :

fr. 19 § I D. x. 3, Paul. vi. ad Sab. De vestibule communi
binarum aedium arbiter communi dividundo invito utrolibet dari non
debet, quia qui de vestibule liceri cogatur, necesse habeat interdum
totarum aedium pretium facere, si alias aditum non habeat.

Come si vede il motive e di quelli che rompono qualsiasi teoria,
sia pure costruita su basi di granito, quale era quella romana della
comproprieta.4

1 8. Raccogliamo ora i fili sparsi in questo breve saggio. E la
prima constatazione che emerge spontanea dall' insieme ci mostra
F istituto del condominio rigorosamente costruito sui principii della
proprieta solitaria, senza alcuna attenuazione. Cosl gli effetti
giuridici di sopra descritti sono tutti normali, e dipendenti dalla

1 D. x. 3, 8 pr. ; x. 2, 43 ; viii. 2, 26, nella parte genuina.

2 D. xvii. 2, 14, pr., vedi la nota appresso.

3 D. xvii. 2, 1 6, i, fortemente interpolate; 17 pr. eod. aut c. div. Trib.\
x. 3, 14, 2: Trib.\ § 3 eod. rimaneggiato da Triboniano : quare emptor
\quoque\ communi dividundo agenda eadem exceptione \non Paul] summo-
vebitur, qua actor eius summoveretur.

4 Cfr. Harmenopuli Exab. ill. x. 30 ; Bos. xii. 2, 1 9 e scolii.

52 >S. Riccobono [iv

teoria del dominio quiritario, che esiste illeso in ciascuno dei
compartecipi. Per ci6 e manifesto che quelle dottrine che vedono
nella communio una proprieta unica, attribuita ad una molte-
plicita di subbietti ovvero all' insieme dei titolari considerate come
un gruppo collettivo, con o senza personalita giuridica, sono
certamente erronee e lontane dall' ordinamento della comproprieta
classica. E vero, per altro, che esse hanno nelle fonti un qualche
fondamento, ma lo hanno precisamente in passi interpolati da
Giustiniano, e percio saranno a suo luogo prese in considerazione.1

19. La comproprieta classica, invece, quale ci si e manifestata
nelle trattazioni dei giureconsulti si determina nettamente come
una pluralita di dominii su di una cosa medesima, coesistenti in
maniera che il singolo diritto rimane compresso dalla forza del-
1' altro ; e per ci6 ciascuno dei titolari ha, per effetto del concorso
di diritti molteplici di pari forza, un dominio sulla cosa intera pro
indiviso pro parte. E questa appunto la designazione molto
precisa che Celso attribuisce al condominio in D. xiii. 6, 5, 15 — sed
totius corporis pro indiviso pro parte dominium habere\ dove i
due caratteri salienti della figura del condominio sono perfetta-
mente messi in evidenza ; e cioe in primo luogo la proprieta
integrate di ciascuno, e poi la forzata riduzione di essa quanto
agli effetti dinamici entro un limite insuperabile, a causa del
concorso degli altri dominii.

Nello stesso senso si esprime Ulpiano, di cui il pensiero come
di solito assume una forma piu trasparente :

D. xxxix. 2, 15, 1 8 : equaliter omnes quasi in totum missi con-
cursu partes habebunt.

II testo si riferisce alia missio in possessionem damni infecti
nomine ', ex primo decreto, che non attribuisce in vero il dominio.

Ma alia missio puo seguire in un secondo momento la proprieta,
e non si vede davvero ragione per sospettare che la posizione
giuridica dei missi debba, per questo rispetto, vale a dire quanto
alia struttura dei rapporti tra i concorrenti, mutarsi col sopravve-
nire del dominio. Si pu6 dire anzi il contrario ; che cioe il giure-
consulto si sforza di attribuire ai missi non proprietarii quella tale
relazione giuridica che & nota dal condominio.

Nella comproprieta quindi il rapporto tra i condomini e per-

1 Cfr. c. iv.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 53

fettamente identico a quello dei coeredi nella hereditas. I coeredi
sono tutti chiamati alia eredita intera, e solo per effetto del concorso
ciascuno consegue una parte proporzionale al numero dei con-
correnti, o quella parte che la legge o il testatore gli conferisce.
Anche qui il diritto di ciascuno sull' asse ereditario si determina
precisamente pro indiviso pro parte. Di conseguenza, se uno
dei chiamati rinuncia o non pu6 acquistare la parte che gli era
designata, essa si accresce, di regola, agli altri coeredi, in pro-
porzione della quota di ciascuno.

20. Cosi avviene nella communio. Se uno dei condomini, in
un modo qualsiasi, rinuncia al suo dominio, per manomissione del
servo o per derelizione etcc., la parte si accresce ipso iure agli
altri socii. Ci6 e attestato rispetto allo schiavo.1

Ma sicuramente non vi e ragione di negare lo stesso effetto per
la derelizione di altri oggetti della proprieta, come si suol fare.2
Perche in nessun caso il diritto romano ammise una differenza
qualsiasi tra il dominium su schiavi e quello su altre res mancipi,
ne per il contenuto ne per 1' intensita ne per le forme di trasferi-
mento. Una differenza si nota bensi, ma solo riguardo al possesso,
perche e res facti ; e quindi il possesso si configura diversamente
secondo la natura dell' obbietto.3 In materia di diritto, al-
T opposto, tale distinzione non ha senso.

E per altro P applicazione dello ius adcrescendi tra condomini
si evince in generale da un testo di Modestino, annoverato sempre
tra i loci conclamati^ e che realmente e oscuro, per il fatto che la
conclusione vi fu soppressa. II testo dice :

fr. 3 D. xli. 7, Mod. vi. differ. An pars pro derelicto haberi
possit, quaeri solet et quidem si in re communi socius partem
suam reliquerit, eius esse desinit, ut hoc sit in parte, quod in toto :
at quin totius rei dominus efficere non potest, ut partem retineat,
partem pro derelicto habeat [verius est partem pro derelicto haberi
non posse, nam socius rei communis, si alter partem suam reliquerit,
totius rei solus dominus efficitur].

1 Dosithei, fr. 10; Ulp. Reg. i. 18 ; Paul. S. iv. 12, i ; cfr. 7. ii. 7, 4.

2 V. Pernice, ZSS. xix. p. 177 n. i. Lo ius adcrescendi rispetto allo
schiavo sarebbe per il P. un effetto della potestas ; e non si accorge che la
sua opinione s' infrange dinanzi alia dottrina di Proculo [testi cit.] che
ammetteva appunto lo ius adcrescendi anche in seguito a man. inter amicos,
per ci6, necessariamente, sul fondamente della derelizione, compiuta da uno
dei condomini.

3 Cfr. D. xli. 2, 3, 13; fr. 47 eod.

54 S- Riccobono LIV

II completamento del passo, cosl come io 1' ho tentato ai fini
della dimostrazione, mi sembra necessario, perche la incompiutezza
ne e evidente.

II testo ha un indirizzo teorico, conforme all' indole dell' opera
da cui fu ricavato,1 e vuol risolvere una quistione sorta tra i giuristi
intorno alia possibilita della derelictio partis. La conclusione
manca. Ma se noi indaghiamo la ragione dei dubbii elevati dai
giuristi, e certo che non pu6 rinvenirsi dal lato soggettivo, cioe
rispetto alia perdita della proprieta di colui che non vuole esser
domino della parte, dacche negarlo sarebbe assurdo : ut hoc sit in
parte quod in toto. Ma il contrast© poteva bensi pronunziarsi dal
lato obbiettivo, cio& se la parte ora relitta dal socio poteva conside-
rarsi come derelitta in senso giuridico, e quindi acquistarsi dall' altro
socio o da qualunque terzo come res nullius ; ovvero, data la
natura del condominio, in cui ciascuno : totius rei pro indiviso pro
parte dominium habety non si dovesse piuttosto ritenere la cosa
comune soggetta interamente al dominio di ciascuno, e quindi in
nessun momento priva in parte di domino, per effetto dell' abban-
dono di uno dei titolari. L' argomentazione di Modestino si
appunta verso quest' ultima conclusione, che e ben fondata.
E pertanto lo ius adcrescendi tra condomini appare sicuramente
discusso tra i giuristi, ed ammesso in generale, con argomenti tratti
dalla struttura stessa dell' istituto.

21. Ed il riconoscimento di tale effetto e d' una importanza
decisiva ; che esso rivela nella maniera piu sfolgorante 1' intima
essenza della comproprieta, quando la si valuti, come si deve, alia
stregua di quella regola enunciata da Celso che suona : totiens ius
adcrescendi esse, quotiens in duobus, qui solidum habuerunt, concursu
divisus est?

II principio invero e applicato qui al concorso nell' usufrutto ;
ma esso e del pari efficace ed incontrovertibile in tutti i casi in cui
un diritto e attribuito per intero a piu persone ; quindi ha vigore
nella hereditas^ nel legato, come nel condominio, qualunque sia la
causa che lo determina.

22. Ed accertato questo punto, quella dottrina che vede nel
condominio romano una comproprieta plurima parziale diviene

1 Cfr. fr. 1 1 D. viii. i : estratto dallo stesso libro e che concerne 1' acquisto
o la perdita della servitu pro parte [Lenel, Pal. i. c. 704].

2 V. F. 79.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 55

esanime. Perche un diritto parziale, in se, non pu6 aver forza in
nessun caso di espandersi al di la del suo limite, come non ha forza
di dilatarsi P obbligazione parziaria, che in realta cade su piu oggetti
varii, unificati casualmente in un oggetto complessivo. E 1' errore
per altro nella dottrina del condominio e visibile, determinato dal-
1' osservazione che tutti gli atti dispositivi del socio hanno valore,
e gli emolumenti che provengono dalla cosa comune si dividono,
sempre pro parted Ma tali effetti, fu gia avvertito, dipendono dalla
resistenza opposta dagli altri diritti di pari forza, che per cio
formano un limite insuperabile.

23. Ed ora che da un nucleo centrale compatto e forte abbiamo
visto irradiarsi in linee ben precise, quanto in direzioni necessaria-
mente varie, tutti gli effetti del condominio romano, fatti ormai
chiari nella loro essenza, possiamo e dobbiamo intendere che tra il
condominio del diritto private e la collegialita dei magistrati non
vi e nessun punto di contatto. Tra 1* esercizio della potestas,
infatti, dei magistrati e P esercizio del potere dei condomini la
differenza e essenziale. Perche 1' attribuzione della potestas ai
colleghi nella magistratura e intera ed indipendente, nel senso che
ciascuno di essi pu6 esercitarla in ogni momento senza la coopera-
zione ed il concorso della volonta dell' altro. Nel condominio invece
qualsiasi atto esecutivo sulla cosa deve essere necessariamente
consentito da tutti, in modo positive, come afferm6 gia splendida-
mente il piu grande interprete del diritto classico, Cuiacio,2 il quale
scrisse : invitum . . . accipere debemus non eum qui contradicit^ sed
eum qui non consentit.

II dubbio in questo punto non e lecito.3

E se nell' un ordine e neir altro puo intervenire lo ius prohibendi,
si tratta di una coincidenza del tutto esteriore, diversa nel fonda-
mento, nella forma e nell' efficacia e che non puo farci smarrire la
esatta nozione delle cose. Vero e per altro che lo ius prohibendi,
che ricorre nei due casi, se pote impressionare la mente del

1 Cfr. avanti al n. 9.

2 Opp. vol. iv. p. 944 : ma s' intende che Cuiacio attribuisce pure alia parola
un altro significato secondo i testi che comentava. Cosl nel v. iv. p. 783 ad 1.
28 D. x. 3 scrive : invitus est proprie quiprohibet alteri . . . invitus est etiam ius
qui abest et per absentiam prohibere non pot est. Ma il Cuiacio si trovava qui di
fronte ad un testo interpolato, come vedremo piu oltre. Varii significati ammette
Fadda, Studii Brugi, p. 145.

3 Cfr. Perozzi, MM. Girard, ii. p. 371.

56 5*. Riccobono [iv

Mommsen e di cultori insigni del diritto private, quali il Fadda,1 il
Bonfante ed il Pacchioni, ci6 si deve, in buona parte, alia deforma-
zione dello ius prohibendi tra condomini operata da Giustiniano, e
che sara tosto messa in chiaro.

24. Dalla struttura del condominio classico derivano altre
conseguenze di maggior rilievo, di cui fu fatto cenno, e che si co-
ordinano convenientemente al concetto fondamentale qui svolto.

Tra condomini sono ammissibili ben poche azioni ; e cio& solo
quelle che mirano a fare ottenere ad uno dei titolari il riconosci-
mento del suo diritto o la partecipazione al possesso e godimento
della cosa ; e percio e possibile la reivindicatio, la publiciana o la
condictio furtiva. L' esperimento di queste azioni non puo trovare
ostacolo di sorta in qualsiasi contingenza ; cio e intuitive, perche si
tratta in definitive dell' attivazione del diritto di proprieta, che e
essenzialmente leso per la perdita del possesso.

Ma le altre azioni, che di solito competono al domino, non sono
ammesse tra socii. Cosi se uno di essi abusa della cosa comune o
la danneggia o tenta di stabilire uno stato di cose che agguagli 1' onere
di una servitu o delle opere, di suo arbitrio, non vi e un mezzo
giudiziario per reprimere 1' abuso, ottenere il risarcimento del danno
o una penale, ovvero per impedire o far rimuovere le opere.

Quindi tra socii non si puo esperire 1' actio legis Aquiliaef non la
negator ia? non 1' a. finium regundorumf nemmeno 1' a. de servo
corrupto 5 o iniuriarumf o T actio noxalis per delitto del servo
comune.7

Anche il rimedio della cautio damni infecti fu oggetto di
discussione tra le scuole dei giuristi.8 E tutto cio e ben intelligibile.

1 Studii Brugi, p. 142 ed ivi citati.

2 D. ix. 2, 27, i : \ne sit in potestate servi ut tibi soli serviaf\ Trib.\
§ 10 eod. \et ideo aequius puto . . . cautionem~\ Trib.\ cfr. 26 D. x. 3, Alfen.

3 D. xxxiii. 3, 4 ; cfr. avanti n. 5.

4 D. x. 1,4, 6, 7, Paul, xxiii. ad ed. : quia ego et socius meus (in hac
actione ? glossa) adversarii esse non possumus, sed unius loco habemur.

5 D. xi. 3, 14, 2, Paul. xix. ad ed.: Sabinus non posse agi cum soa'o,
perinde atque si proprius meus serwts corrupisset conservum. II fr. 9 pr.
eod. e interpolate.

6 D. xlvii. 10, 15, 36, Ulp. 77 ad ed. : cum iure domini id fecerit.
Cfr. 17 §9 eod.

7 D. ix. 4, 8, Ulp. 37 ad ed.: dominus enim pro parte factus non potest
cum socio noxali experiri ; quel che segue contiene element! giustinianei.

8 Cfr. D. xxxix. 2, 32, Gai xxviii. ad ed. pr. ; D. viii. 2, 13, i ; D. ix. 2,
27, 10.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 57

L' ostacolo insuperabile per tutte quelle azioni sta nella posizione
giuridica che hanno i socii tra loro. Se ciascuno & dominus, ed ha
un diritto sulla cosa pari a quello dell' altro, ne deriva che qualunque
sia 1' agire del socio e qualunque cosa faccia, egli opera in suo e
non in alieno. E quindi nessuna delle formule di quelle azioni
potrebbe dirigersi contro di lui, che esse competono al proprietario
avverso chi tale diritto non puo vantare sulla cosa. Manca quindi
la condizione precipua per la legittimita e 1' efficacia di quelle azioni,
come e dichiarato espressamente dai giureconsulti nei passi rimasti
illesi nella Compilazione di Giustiniano.1

Ne da cio deriva che T agire inconsulto,arbitrario o pregiudizievole
di un socio sia, in tutti quei casi, senza alcun rimedio ; che ciascuno
ha contro 1' altro lo ius prohibendi\ di propria autorita, suis
manibus, in forza del suo diritto che e pari a quello dell' altro, che
tenta di sopraffare il suo. Prohibere, come sappiamo, significa
vietare, impedire in qualsiasi modo.

Ed in ultima analisi se la cooperazione e T accordo si rendono
impossibili, chi desidera la pace puo chiedere lo scioglimento della
comunione con 1' actio c. dividundo ; nella quale inoltre vengono
dedotte tutte le ragioni personali per danni, spese ed utili, suscitate
dalla comunione.

CAP. II

DIRITTO GIUSTINIANEO

25. Tutta la struttura della communio appare profondamente
alterata nella compilazione di Giustiniano, dove i passi relativi alia
materia sono folti di interpolazioni, sparse nei diversi volumi a
guisa di temperamenti e correzioni, nella forma consueta, come per
smorzare la durezza delle decisioni classiche. E la critica moderna
ha potuto facilmente scovrire molte delle aggiunte inserte dal
legislatore del vi sec. nei testi classici, ma nessuna attenzione ha
rivolto ai passi mutilati, e sopratutto poi non si e curata di abbrac-

1 Non e possibile affrontare in questo luogo tutto il problema delle azioni
che competono tra condomini, perche esso richiede un esame analitico di un
numero considerevole di passi, che di regola furono alterati da Giustiniano
nelle forme piu varie. La dimostrazione per ci6 sara data a parte. Ma per
quel che urge qui credo si debbano ritenere sufficient! i motivi resi dai giurist
per escludere tra condomini 1' ammissibilita delle azioni piu gravi ; motivi che
ho riportati nelle note che precedono.

58 S. Riccobono [iv

ciare in una sintesi complessiva 1' insieme di quelle riforme, onde
non ha potuto giudicare se effettivamente 1' istituto classico sia uscito
dalle mani di Giustiniano solo attenuate o non piuttosto svelto
dalle sue basi.

In realta il nucleo centrale, e quindi le linee piu rilevate del-
1' istituto, ne furono spezzati, come mi accingo a dimostrare.

I. I US PROHIBENDI
(a) La prohibitio tra condomini

26. La regola di Sabino e ancora riportata nei Digesti, come
sappiamo : ma effettivamente essa ha ora un campo di applicazione
piu ristretto e quindi un valore diverse. La conseguenza piu
immediata ed energica di essa, a dire di Papiniano, si manifestava
nello ius prohibendi ; per cui ciascuno dei socii poteva proibire con
tutti i mezzi, di propria autorita, qualsiasi azione iniziata dagli altri
sulla cosa e distruggere P opera compiuta senza il suo consenso.
Questo diritto essenziale aveva fondamento nel potere di dominio
assoluto ed indipendente che ciascuno dei titolari conserva nella
comproprieta.

Nel diritto giustinianeo, invece, lo ius prohibendi ha un contenuto
diverse ed una nuova direzione ; fu trasformato in un mezzo giu-
diziario, che si pu6 sperimentare per via di actiones varie ed inter-
dicta. La riforma legislativa determin6 in primo luogo la mutilazione
del fr. 1 1 D. viii. 5 di Marcello, esaminato di sopra,1 e che pertanto
assunse altro significato. E questo, dunque, un caso insigne in cui
ha luogo la duplex interpretatio.

Soppressa2 dai compilatori, come fu notato, la dimostrazione
di Marcello, diretta ad escludere nella specie lf applicability della
negatoria, la frase \et magis did potesf\ prohibendi potius esse ius
si riallaccia nel nuovo testo, immediatamente, alle varie formule di
azioni proposte nella introduzione della quaestio, delle quali una per
lo meno figura ammessa.

Dubbia pu6 essere solo la scelta. E la designazione di essa e
stata per piu di mezzo secolo oggetto di sapienti discussioni. Gli
antichi si attennero di preferenza all' actio c. div., per evitare la

1 Cfr. n. 5.

2 Anche il Lenel, ZSS. xii. p. 12, sospetto nel testo, come dissi, una
mutilazione; cfr. ora Segre, Mel. Girard, ii. p. 528.

iv] Communio e Comproprieth 59

contraddizione con altri testi ; ma si affermo pure 1' applicability
della negatoria1 o, piu recentemente, della prohibitoria, rivelata
giusto dallo Zacharia,2 o dell' una e dell' altra insieme.3 N& in
contrario c' e nulla da dire ; perchk come afferm6 il Lenel, cui
dobbiamo 1' analisi piu profonda del passo, da quel che di esso
sopravanza si desume con certezza che il socio pu6 impedire 1' opera
iniziata dalP altro sulla cosa comune per via di una azione. Se
per6 questa norma, come io dico, e di Giustiniano, la quistione
della specie dell' actio svanisce ; diviene cosa di secondaria impor-
tanza. I compilatori infatti poterono bene riferirsi alia negatoria o
alia prohibitoria od al indicium c. d., come vedremo piu oltre.

27. Per ora urge radunare i testi nei quali si tratta dello ius pro-
hibendi, onde vedere come si esplica nel diritto di Giustiniano. E
sul proposito e ovvio pensare che la ricerca deve dirigersi su quei
passi che nelle trattazioni dei giureconsulti riportavano giusto i
fondamenti dell' istituto della comproprieta ; perch& se la trasfor-
mazione dello ius prohibendi & vera, come io la suppongo, quei
passi dovevano tutti esser rifatti da Triboniano, per togliere per
sempre dalla vista degli interpreti il significato classico del pro-
hibere in questo luogo.

E cosl e di fatto.

La riforma fu applicata immediatamente nei due frammenti piu
cospicui della materia che tramandavano la dottrina di Sabino, cioe
in quello di Paolo : D. viii. 2, 26 ed in quello di Papiniano : D.
x. 3, 28.

Nel passo di Paolo la massima di Sabino era ricondotta alia
materia della servitu, e vi si affermava, convenientemente, che il
socio nulla pu6 facere sulla cosa comune invito altero, ne pro-
hibere iure servitutis. Cosi il giureconsulto escludeva direttamente
la possibility della negatoria tra socii ; e doveva nel seguito, come

1 Per gli antichi v. Zacharia, Zeit. f. g. RW. vol. xii. p. 277 (a. 1845).

2 L. c. p. 259 seg.

3 Cosl Ferrini, Per /' viii cent. delF Universitcl di Bologna, p. 96, che
riporta p. 99 n. 5 1' opinione posteriore dello Zacharia, che avrebbe in seguito
riconosciuto le due formule egualmente applicabili, mentre sagacemente nel-
1' art. cit. aveva escluso la negatoria, come fa tuttora il Lenel, ZSS. vol. xii. /. c. ;
Segre, /. c. p. 525 segue il Ferrini. Secondo una opinione particolare di
Beseler, Beitrage, i. p. 79, « Marcellus meint in Wirklichkeit die a° pro socio » ;
uno svarione certamente, generato dalla critica « a turbina » ; che s' indulge
volentieri, per altro, per il prezioso contribute di nuove osservazioni che
P illustre scrittore ha saputo portare allo studio del Digesto.

6o S. Riccobono [iv

io ritengo, far menzione della proibizione privata che il socio
dissenziente poteva adoperare. II tratto pero fu dai compilatori
eliminate e sostituito dal seguente periodo :

[Sed per communi dividundo actionem consequitur socius, quo
minus opus fiat aut ut id opus quod fecit tollat, si modo toti
societati prodest opus tolli.]

L' a. c. d. serve, dunque, ora a regolare i rapporti tra i socii
durante la comunione, e serve qui particolarmente ad impedire
P opera che uno dei socii voglia eseguire sulla cosa invito altero,
ovvero quando sia compiuta a farla rimuovere. E pertanto la
interpolazione di questo passo combacia perfettamente, quanto al
risultato sostanziale, con quella osservata di sopra nel testo di
Marcello.

E la sovrapposizione e piu visibile nelP altro di Papiniano, gia
noto, e che cosl continua :

[fr. 28 D. x. 3. Sed etsi in communi prohiberi socius a socio ne
quid faciat potest, ut tamen factum opus tollat, cogi non potest, si
cum prohibere poterat, hoc praetermisit : et ideo per communi
dividundo actionem damnum sarciri poterit ; sin autem facienti
consensit, nee pro damno habet actionem, quod si quid absente
socio ad laesionem eius fecit, tune etiam toliere cogitur.]

Lo ius prohibendiy nel senso a noi chiaro, che Papiniano riportava
all' uguaglianza dei diritti dei socii, subl qui un' illustrazione
sovversiva, da parte di Triboniano, mediante varie distinzioni di
cui ci occuperemo in luogo opportune, ma che son dirette pure a
render palese che il mezzo con cui esso si esplica e appunto P a. c.
d.> resa ora necessaria per chiedere risarcimento del danno o per far
rimuovere P opera, e quindi anche per ostacolarne P inizio.

Anche questo testo, cosl, si riannoda a quelli di Marcello e di
Paolo, in quanto concerne la forma giudiziaria del prohibere.

28. In altri due testi accanto al indicium c. d. si fa pure
menzione del pretore che pu6 essere adito per attuare P impedi-
mento alP opera iniziata da uno dei socii. I passi sono consecutivi
e del seguente tenore :

fr. 3, § i, D. xxxix. i, Ulp. 52 ad ed. Si in loco communi
quid fiat, nuntiatio locum habebit adversus vicinum, plane si unus
nostrum in communi loco faciat, non possum ego socius opus novum
ei nuntiare, sed eum prohibebo [communi dividundo iudicio vel per
praetorem~\.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 61

§ 2. Quod si socius meus in communi insula opus novum faciat
et ego propriam habeam, cui nocetur, an opus novum nuntiare ei
possim ? et putat Labeo non posse nuntiare, quia possum eiim alia
ratione prohibere aedificare, \hoc est vel per praetorem vel per
arbitrum communi dividundo :] quae sententia vera est.

Le aggiunte tribonianee sono evidentissime : J e mirano appunto
a dare all' indicium c. d. quella funzione a noi nota di regolare
i rapporti dei socii, in qualsiasi evenienza.

I giureconsulti negavano 1' applicabilita tra socii della o. n. n.y
per la natura stessa del condominio, perche, essendo ciascuno di
essi domino, poteva, secondo la frase di Labeone : alia ratione
prohibere^ cioe di propria mano. fe possibile anzi che Ulpiano
avesse in questo luogo dichiarata la forma della proibizione, cui
poteva ricorrere il socio, ma i compilatori si affrettarono a sostituirvi
quella legale ; o per mezzo del iudicium c. d. ovvero per praetorem.
In quest' ultimo caso con quale formula ? Non certamente con
T Uti possidetiS) come si ritiene, perche tra due possessor! T interdetto
resterebbe inefficace.2 E se la domanda ed il dubbio restano qui
senza una congrua risposta, noi vedremo che in questa materia il
caso si ripetera assai di frequente. Tenga pertanto il lettore
memoria, per ora, della frase per praetorem ripetuta nei due testi,
e che incontreremo in altri passi.

29. Anche Pomponio, che escludeva, come sappiamo,3 tra
condomini il iudicium finium regundorum, appare in altro luogo
fermo nell' ammettere tra essi un' azione per impedire immissioni
da parte di uno nell' edificio comune :

27 D. viii. 2 Pomp, xxxiii. ad Sab. Sed si inter te et me
communes sunt Titianae aedes, et ex his aliquid non iure in alias
aedes meas proprias immissum sit, nempe tecum mihi agere licet
aut rem perdere. Idem fiet si ex tuis propriis aedibus in communes
meas et tuas aedes quid similiter esset proiectum : mihi enim soli
tecum est actio.

L' azione accordata con una certa baldanza non e poi determi-
nata, nemmeno qui. Intanto la negatoria non puo essere, che
Giavoleno 1' esclude recisamente,4 tanto meno il iudicium c. d. che
non aveva siffatta funzione.

1 Cfr. Berger, TeilungskL p. 235 ; ivi per la letteratura.

2 D. xliii. 17, 3 pr.

3 Cfr. D. x. i, 4, 7, e sopra n. 24. 4 D. xxxiii. 3, 4.

62 S. Riccobono [iv

Dunque e un mezzo nuovo introdotto dai compilatori, e che
si ricongiunge al fr. 26 di Paolo, che precede nel titolo, dove la
proibizione del socio si esplica mediante il indicium c. d. ; o che si
puo riconnettere al fr. 1 1 D. viii. 5 di Marcello, vale a dire ad una di
quelle formule della negatoria o della cosl detta prohibitoria, che gia
conosciamo. E di fatto le due interpretazioni sono rappresentate.1

Ma per il diritto classico la cosa e ben diversa. Pomponio
doveva ivi contemplare la negatoria, escludendola appunto, come
1' aveva esclusa Paolo, nella maniera che sappiamo, nel luogo
corrispondente dell' opera ad Sabinum ; e Pomponio doveva pure
ricordare in quel tratto che il socio ha sovratutto lo ius prohibendi,
in forza del quale pu6 distruggere di sua autorita 1' opera fatta nel-
T edificio comune : aut rem perdere.

Se questa frase, come e stato sempre ritenuto,2 ha un tal
significato, noi abbiamo qui una traccia ben marcata dell' indirizzo
che aveva il passo di Pomponio, e delle alterazioni compiutevi dai
compilatori.3 Tentarne la restituzione non e possibile, perche gli
elementi sono scarsi ; ma la dimostrazione esauriente che ne ho data,
e sopratutto la confluenza di tutte le interpolazioni verso lo stesso
punto non possono lasciare dubbio di sorta.4

E cosi e provato che 1' attuazione dello ius prohibendi a mezzo
del magistrate, con una formula qualsiasi spesso neppure designata,
e un' innovazione di Giustiniano.

1 Ferrini (Per F viii centenario della Univ. di Bologna, pp. 97, 99 ; Pand.
p. 449 n. i) riferisce la decisione alia negatoria, e vi si richiama per spiegare
altri passi ; cosi ora Segre, MM. Girard, ii. p. 525 nota.

2 Cf. Glossa e Gotofredo ad h. L, che danno della frase una doppia
spiegazione ; (a) perdam ius prohibendi \ (b) id est destruere opus. Cuiacio ac-
colse la prima (Opp. v. p. 550) : si non egero rent perdidero ; ed in altro luogo
spiega : libertatem praedii amittere. Ma la maggioranza degli interpret! e
Gliick stesso che ne riferisce (Erldut. v. x. p. 76) abbraccib la seconda
spiegazione, cioe : opus factum propria auctoritate destruere, con richiamo al
fr. 29 § i D. ix. 2.

3 Un altro passo di Pomponio alterato nello stesso senso si ha in D. viii. 5,
1 4, pr. . . \irno etiam agere tecum potero, ut ea, quae nova immiseris to lias]
mentre il giurista ammetteva sola la proibizione : prohiberi a me potes. E
cosl nel § i, . . . potero tecum agere : Pomp, avrk scritto : non potero t. a.
L' interpolazione e visibile nel pr. del testo, dacche la prohibitio vi appare in
contrasto (immo) con 1' agere.

4 Come semplice chiarimento della dimostrazione fatta, si puo supporre
che Pomp, avesse scritto nella parte centrale cosl : nempe tecum mihi agere
\nori\ licet ; [ius tibi non esse it a immissum habere ; sed possuin\ rem perdere.
[Quod si] . . .

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 63

(b) Formula prohibitoria

30. E dalla dimostrazione che precede fluisce un' altra conse-
guenza di singolare rilievo, che riflette la formula prohibitoria messa
in luce dallo Zacharia1 da uno scolio di Stefano al fr. 5, § I, D. vii.
6, e che ha avuto un' esistenza travagliata.2 Ma in ultimo essa
ebbe posto onorevole nell1 Editto, per F adesione manifestata dal
Lenel, che ne era state 1* avversario piu formidabile ed autorevole.3
Tra i casi di applicazione della prohibitoria quello offerto dal fr. 1 1
D. viii. 5 di Marcello era certamente il piu insigne, sovratutto il piu
verisimile, perche gia lo Zacharia e poi il Lenel avevano notato la
inamissibilita della negatoria tra condomini. Si disse, per ci6, che

10 ius prohibendi consentito da Marcello doveva riportarsi alia
formula prohibitoria.

II risultato qui raggiunto intorno al significato del prohibere tra
condomini, ed in particolare nel passo genuine di Marcello, toglie
ogni base a quelle interpretazioni, e di conseguenza a questa
applicazione precipua della formula prohibitoria.

E cosi e chiusa la breve storia della nuova formula rivelata da
Stefano ; avvegnache tolto di mezzo il testo di Marcello, quell' altro
concernente 1' usufrutto, cui il maestro bizantino direttamente si
riferisce nella sua parafrasi, e meno che mai idoneo a giustificare
F esistenza nell' editto d' una speciale azione proibitoria. Ne per cio
abbiamo noi bisogno di svalutare le notizie dei giuristi bizantini e
delle fonti greche in generale. Perch& esse hanno importanza di
prim' ordine sotto un doppio aspetto : (a) per il diritto classico, e
quindi per ricostruire i testi antichi, quando lo scoliaste trae i suoi
materiali dai lavori compiuti dagli ^/awes sulle fonti romane ;4 (b) per

11 diritto giustinianeo, negli altri casi in cui F interprete greco lavora
direttamente sui libri di Giustiniano.

Nel caso nostro non e dubbio che Stefano in quel punto inter-
pretava e commentava il passo dei Digesti^ senza F aiuto di esemplari

1 Zeitschrift f. g. RW. v. xii. (1844), p. 259 seg. Bas. Suppl. p. 112,
scol. 6.

2 Contro specialmente, Lenel, ZSS. ii. p. 72 seg. ; in favore Ferrini, Per
F viii centencuio della Univ. di Bologna^ p. 92 seg.

3 ZSS. v. 12, p. i seg. ; Ed. Perp. 2a ed. p. 186. Per la letteratura cfr.
Audibert, Studii per Fadda, v. 5, p. 363 seg. ; Segre, Mil. Girard,\\. p. 525
seg.

4 Molti esempii nei miei scritti : cfr. ZSS. v. 33, p. 288, e citazioni ivi,
n. i.

64 S. Riccobono [iv

antichi. La parafrasi in discorso e sotto molti aspetti miserabile,
tra i prodotti piu scadenti del maestro coevo di Giustiniano. Ma
della notizia che egli da non si puo ne si deve dubitare.1 La formula
prohibitoria e riportata dal comentatore, particolareggiata, in con-
trapposto alia negatoria : aAAoi/ TVTTOV Trpovifitropiov ; ed e poi
confermata da altre testimonianze ; 2 ed e applicata ad un testo
sicuramente3 rimaneggiato dai compilatori, come io credo con
1' aggiunta delle parole vel sibi ius esse prohibendi ; e per cio non
abbiamo motivo per negar fede a Stefano, che riferisce appunto lo
stato del diritto e della pratica del suo tempo. Se la formula in
discussione sia poi da considerare come un mero prodotto della
Compilazione, o piuttosto della pratica bizantina avanti Giustiniano,
e un problema su cui d' ora innanzi potra 1' indagine indirizzarsi.
Per ora e accertato questo : che nei Digesti e visibile la distinzione
tra una formula negatoria e altra prohibitoria^ come Stefano
insegna ; e poi, che i compilatori diedero sicuramente significato e
valore processuale al prohiberey che era inteso dai classici in altro
senso.4

3 1. L' affermazione ultima fatta nella chiusa del paragrafo che pre-
cede deve essere posta qui al sicuro da ogni dubbio, ed approfondita
per via di una rapida indagine sul diritto alia difesa privata, che era
ammesso in molti casi neir ordinamento giuridico del periodo
classico ; ed appare, invece, con singolare perseveranza, soppresso
da Giustiniano, surrogate dovunque con un mezzo processuale
qualsiasi.

32. I casi sono di vario ordine :

(a) II proprietario poteva impedire di propria autorita, anche

1 Per Beseler, Beitrage, i. p. 79, e una « leggenda ».

2 Cfr. Zacharia, /. c. ; Lenel, Ed. p. 186, n. i.

8 Cos! gia Zacharia, Z. cit. p. 263, n. 4, che vi suppone « etwas ausgefallen
e poi Ferrini, /. c. p. 96, e Lenel, Z. cit. 12, p. 12 ; Beseler, Beitrdge, i. 78,
dichiara interpolata tutta la parte centrale ; Segre, Mel. Girard, ii. p. 527, la
frase vel . . . prohibendi.

4 Per cio riprendono ora tutta la loro forza i relievi del Lenel fatti in ZSS.
ii. loc. cit., e principalmente la constatazione che nei comentarii all1 Ed. non vi
e traccia di una tale formula. II Ferrini (/. c. p. 95), nei fervore per 1' actio
prohibitoria, giunse a dire che essa dovette essere oscurata dai compilatori,
che intendevano fonderla con la negatoria ; asserzione questa del tutto
gratuita.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 65

con la forza, qualsiasi costruzione o immissione nel fondo, senza
ricorrere alia denuncia di nuova opera. Giustiniano ne ha fatto
divieto, come si pu6 dimostrare con 1' esame del passo che segue :

5 § 10 D. xxxix. I, Ulp. 52 Ulpianus.

ad ed. Meminisse autem opor- Meminisse autem oportebit,
tebit, quotiens quis in nostro quotiens.quis in nostro aedificare
aedificare vel in nostrum im- vel in nostrum immittere vel
mittere vel proicere vult \melius proicere vult [posse nos eum per
esse eum per praetorem vel per manum] prohibere, quam operis
manum id est lapilli ictum~\ novi nuntiatione cet.
prohibere, quam operis novi
nuntiatione. Ceterum operis
novi nuntiatione possessorem
eum faciemus, cui nuntiaverimus.
At si in suo quid faciat, quod
nobis noceat, tune operis novi
denuntiatio erit necessaria.

\_Et si forte in nostro aliquid
facer e quis per s ever at > 'aequis si-
mum erit interdicto adversus eum
quod vi aut clam aut uti possidetis
uti.}

La ragione per cui Ulpiano sconsigliava il mezzo della denuncia
e rimarchevole ; e qui va notata particolarmente, perche non se
n' e fatto il conto che merita. Infatti e ovvio che il proprietario
non deve esser messo nella condizione piu sfavorevole processual-
mente, come lo sarebbe con la denuncia ; la quale costituisce
P avversario possessore1 e riversa gli oneri della prova, ed un pericolo
maggiore per 1* esito della lite, a chi e gia nel possesso del fondo.
Questi pertanto ha facolta momentaneamente di respingere il
tentative fatto dal terzo, che menoma il sup diritto ; e lo pu6
respingere con la forza, per manum^ come si esprimeva Ulpiano in
maniera significativa ed appropriate Ma Giustiniano reprime il
consiglio turbolento e, sconvolgendo il testo, addita la via migliore
cioe per praetor em^ ovvero mediante P innocuo getto del lapillo, che
qui diventa ridicolo.2 II rinvio al pretore, con 1' identica frase e
nella medesima situazione occorre, come sappiamo, due volte nel
fr. 3 dello stesso titolo ; ed in tutti cotesti casi solo la credenza

1 D. xxxix. i, i, 6.

2 E percib la frase si e ritenuta una glossa : cfr. Windscheid, Pand. § 465,
n. 1 8 ; Lenel, Pal. ii. c. 745 n. 2 ; Audibert, I.e. p. 360, n. 2.

66 5*. Riccobono [iv

radicata nell' incontaminata riproduzione dei passi dei giuristi ha
potuto intendervi T Uti possidetisy cosi designate da uno scrittore
classico. Certo nella compilazione tale significato non solo e
possibile ma e piano ; come lo dimostra gia la chiusa dello stesso
frammento, che e pure evidentemente interpolatizia.1

33. (b) Colui che si trova nel godimento pacifico di una servitu
pu6 impedire prontamente, di sua autorita, qualsiasi innovazione
sul fondo servente, che verrebbe a ledere 1' esercizio del suo diritto.

fr. 6 § i D. viii. 5, Ulp. 17 ad ed.

Sciendum tamen in his servitutibus possessorem esse eum
\iuris et petitorem~\ ; et si forte non habeam aedificatum altius in
meo adversarius meus possessor est : nam cum nihil sit innovatum,
ille possidet et aedificantem me prohibere potest [et civili actione
et inter dicto Quod vi aut clam : idem et si lapilli iactu impedieritJ]
sed et si patiente eo aedificavero ego possessor ero effectus.

Questo passo si agguaglia in tutto al precedente. Sullo stesso
fondamento il giureconsulto insegnava che colui il quale gode il
possesso della servitu non deve perdere tale vantaggio per T opera
o il fatto arbitrario di chi 1* appresta ; ne deve egli per cio assumere
le parti di attore ; ch& piuttosto puo prohibere con qualsiasi mezzo,
1' inizio delle opere che modificherebbero lo stato delle cose. Ma se
poi egli non si oppone alia edificazione e tollera le opere intraprese
dair avversario, allora perde la qualita di possessore e deve assumere,
quando voglia, le parti di attore.

II testo di Ulpiano era, dunque, lucidissimo e cospicuo ; ma fu
rovinato da Giustiniano per bandire ogni traccia della difesa
privata. E pertanto egli ingiunge, che il possessore di siffatte
servitu deve di necessita essere pure petitorem^ quando T avversario
per via di opere o altrimenti menoma il suo diritto ; ed in luogo
della prohibitio privata regala al possessore i mezzi piu varii : una
civilis actio, un interdetto e, dopo tutto questo, con atroce ironia,
il diritto del «lapillo».

S' intende che nessuno di cotali mezzi s' e potuto finora giusti-
ficare o soltanto spiegare ; come ha mostrato di recente P Audibert 2
in una speciale dissertazione, persuasiva e stringente nella parte

1 Osserva : si forte . . . aequissimum erit . . . uti. Ma perche molto
equo ? E vero per altro che quando la proibizione privata resta inefficace vi
hanno tutte le condizioni per esperire 1' Int. Quod m aut clam.

2 Studii per Fadda, vol. v. p. 341 seg.

iv] Communio e Comproprietct 67

critica o negativa che si voglia dire, ma che per il resto risuscita
piu vivo lo sconforto per la soluzione del problema.

Infatti I1 Audibert ha voluto vedere nella civilis actio indicata
nel testo nientemeno che la o. n. nuntiatio ; cioe giusto quel mezzo
che Ulpiano escludeva nel fr. 5 § 10 D. xxxix. I, onde il posses-
sore non avesse a perdere il vantaggio della sua posizione ed esser
costretto a iniziare la lite da attore. Ed e questo rilievo e le
ulteriori coincidenze tra i due passi che debbono attirare la nostra
attenzione, senza per altro indugiare sulla strana terminologia che
si attribuisce ad Ulpiano per designare la nuntiatio. lo affermo
per cic- che i due testi coincidevano anche rispetto al mezzo di
difesa additato da Ulpiano.

34. Ma si dira che tra i due passi v' e un punto di differenza
che non si pu6 colmare ; perche il fr. 5 § ioZ>. xxxix. I, riguarda il
proprietario, che al postutto puo essere autorizzato a distruggere le
opere o impedire 1' invasione del proprio fondo, perche agisce in
suo ; mentre nel caso del fr. in esame ammettere la proibizione
privata contro colui che inizia le costruzioni entro i confini della
sua proprieta sarebbe cosa gravissima ed inaudita.

La osservazione e impressionante a prima vista ; ma non nella
sostanza. Perche giusto 1' elemento del possesso attuale, nell' uno
e neir altro testo, e messo in rilievo dal giureconsulto ai fini pro-
cessuali ; e su quell' elemento e fondata la decisione, eguale nei
due casi, perche pari e la posizione. Chi e nel godimento di una
servitu, che presuppone uno stato di cose permanente, e considerate
possessore, ed ha diritto di fronte all' avversario di veder mantenuto
quello stato, fino a tanto che non intervenga un pronunziato del
giudice che dichiari la liberta del fondo servente. E percic- il
tentative di alterare, arbitrariamente, la faccia dei luoghi, in modo
lesivo per 1' esercizio della servitu, pu6 essere represso con la forza ;
nella stessa misura che il proprietario pu6 respingere con la forza
1' invasione di altri nel proprio fondo. La differenza tra chi opera
in alieno ovvero in suo esiste certamente ai fini della liceita o
meno della difesa privata ; ma essa viene in considerazione solo
quando colui che opera in suo non lede uno stato di diritto che
altri gode.1 Quando cio avvenga, invece, anche colui che opera
in suo secondo la felice espressione di Marcello : quodammodo

1 E il caso del fr. 29 § i D. ix. 2 : nullo iure habebam.

68 S. Riccobono [iv

sibi alienum quoque ius praeripit. E per ci6 la proibizione im-
mediata e legittima.1

35. E del resto nelle fonti vi hanno tracce evident! di tale
diritto, in materia di servitti precipuamente. Cosl Africano in
D. xxxix. i, 15 dice : che quando il possessore della servitus altius
non tollendi — ed e proprio il caso del fr. 6 § I in esame — non si
difende, vien punito ut iure suo probare necesse haberet ; e per
cio deve prestar cauzione nee opus novum se nuntiaturum nee
aedificanti vim facturum. Or io chiedo, perche deve egli garentire
che non opporra violenza air opera che sara per fare il proprietario
del fondo servente ? La risposta e semplice : perche ha il diritto
di servitu ed il godimento attuale.2 E pertanto solo ai fini pro-
cessuali, per pena, gli e inibito di proibire con la forza P alterazione
dello stato dei luoghi che il proprietario del fondo servente potra
con nuove opere arrecare. Se ha ragioni da far valere : iure suo
probare necesse habet. Nel fr. 15 D. viii. 2, Ulpiano, a proposito
di opere fatte che impediscono la servitus luminis pone, in primo
luogo, il diritto del titolare della medesima a prohibere e cosl si
esprime : quodcunque igitur faciat ad luminis impedimentum, pro-
hiberi potest, si servitus debeatur ; \ppusque ei novum nuntiari potest,

1 La riforma di Giustiniano in questo punto di diritto ha per ci6 una grande
importanza, che essa venne a stabilire una eccezione gravissima al principio
che spetta all' attore, cioe a colui che non ha il possesso della cosa o il godi-
mento del diritto, 1' onere della prova. Qui per reprimere la difesa privata si
rovescio quella massima, e si disse : possessorem eum esse iuris et petitorem.
Io ritengo ora fermamente che sia questo appunto 1' unus casus famoso delle
Inst. iv. 6, 2. Infatti la riforma cosi grave attuata dai compilatori doveva
bene aderire alia loro mente, e poteve inoltre essere accennata di sfuggita nel
libro di scuola, come quella che nei latioribus digestorum libris era indicata
apertis verbis. Cfr. per altro, da ultimo, Segre, Studii Brugi, p. 411 e seg.

2 Che questo elemento sia decisivo emerge sotto altro aspetto dal fr. 7
§ 2 D. xliii. 24 : lulianus ait . . . licere enim debet aedificare ei, qui satis-
dederit, cum possessor hoc ipso constituatur cet. Dunque, chi e in possesso
pu6 edificare senza temere proibizione di sorta ; mentre la quistione di diritto
rimane impregiudicata. Ma quando il possesso e dalla parte del titolare della
servitu, questi puo impedire con la forza qualsiasi opera che muti Io stato dei
luoghi. Si noti ancora nel testo di Giuliano la frase possessor . . . con-
stituatur usata rispetto all' esercizio o meno di una servitu, nella specie per la
liberta del fondo, e quindi ai fini unicamente processuali ; dal che emerge
che Ulpiano nel fr. 6 § i D. viii. 5, non poteva scrivere possessorem esse
eum turisl La determinazione iuris fu aggiunta dai Compilatori certa-
mente ; perche per 1' attribuzione delle parti di attore o convenuto in processo
e decisivo solo possessorem esse cioe che sia nel godimento di un certo stato,
di una posizione di fatto.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 69

si modo sicfaciat, ut lumini noceaf\. La prohibitio ha luogo dtmque
se la servitus & dovuta. La nuntiatio. forma nel passo un' appendice
tribonianea, che si manifesta tale per la ripetizione del verbo
(potesf) e del presupposto dell' impedimento alia servitu (si modo
. . . noceaf).

Per ci6 anche nel fr. 6 § 7 D. viii. 5. Ulpiano doveva am-
mettere in primo luogo la proibizione privata contro il proprietario
delF edificio che deteriora il muro gravato dalla servitus oneris,
mentre Giustiniano vi sostituisce delle azioni : deteriorem si facit
\aut per hanc actionem aut per operis novi nuntiationem\ prohibetur.

36. E la proibizione privata la sorprendiamo viva in molti testi,
nel momento della sua attuazione e del conflitto.

i § II D. xliii. 24: si te volentem ad prohibendum venire
deterruerit aliquis.

20 § I eod. : Prohibitus autem intellegitur quolibet prohibentis
actu, id est vel dicentis se prohibere vel manum opponentis
lapillumve iactantis prohibendi gratia.

5 § I eod. : ut intra diem occurrere ad prohibendum non possit.

4 § 7 D. viii. 5 : adversus dominum Seianarum volo experiri
altius me tollere prohibentem.

in D. xlv. I : si me non prohibeas, uxorem autem meam
prohiberes, vel contra uxore mea stipulata me prohiberes, an
committatur stipulatio?

14 fr. D. viii. 5 : prohiberi a me potes.

Ed in tutti questi casi il divieto si esplica in difesa della pro-
prieta o della cosa comune, o del possesso di una servitu, per
opere fatte in privato o in pubblico e con tutti i mezzi, fino alia
distruzione dell' opera eseguita in alieno, come si vede dagli esempi
che seguono.

(c] fr. 7 § 3 D. xliii. 24, Ulp. 72 ad ed. Bellissime apud lulianum
quaeritur, an haec exceptio noceat in hoc interdicto, ' quod non tu
vi aut clam feceris ' ? ut puta utor adversus te interdicto quod vi
aut clam, an possis obicere mihi eandem exceptionem quod non tu
vi aut clam fecisti ?

et ait lulianus aequissimum esse hanc exceptionem dare : nam
si tu, inquit, aedificaveris vi aut clam, ego idem demolitus fuero
vi aut clam et utaris adversus me interdicto, hanc exceptionem
profuturam [quod non aliter procedere debet, nisi ex magna et satis
necessaria causa : alioquin haec omnia officio iudicis celebrari oportet\

L' eccezione giova a colui che us6 violenza e che distrusse
1' opera fatta in alieno, soltanto perche egli proteggeva in tal modo il

70 S. Riccobono [iv

possesso di un diritto, che 1* avversario, malgrado la proibizione,
aveva leso con le nuove costruzioni. Da che si deduce, che se e
ammissibile la difesa privata quando T opera e compiuta, a maggior
ragione la si pu6 esplicare in tutti i modi per impedire 1' inizio
della stessa.

L' interpolazione dell' ultimo brano fu avvertita dal Fabro.
E di fatto Giustiniano non poteva lasciar correre senza protesta
un esempio cosl improbo.

37. (d) fr. 2 § 33 D. xliii. 8 : Scio tractatum, an permittendum
sit specus et pontem per viam publicam facere : \et plerique probant
interdicto eum teneri\\ non enim oportere eum deteriorem viam
facere.

II passo & stato di recente discusso 1 e denunziato per le mende
formali evidentissime. Che il brano dovette essere compresso dai
compilatori e rilevato dal Mitteis, che suppone sagacemente, al
posto di plerique. Ulpiano avesse riportati nomi dei veteres.
Certo il giureconsulto inizia con certa solennita la trattazione, che
e poi ridotta a nulla. Ed io suppongo che anche qui Ulpiano
faceva menzione della privata difesa,2 come si legge, a proposito
di un caso che ha una certa analogia con il presente, nel

fr. 50 D. xli. I Pomp. vi. : ex Plautio : Quamvis quod in litore
publico vel in mare exstruxerimus nostrum fiat, tamen decretum
praetoris adhibendum 'est, ut id facere liceat : immo etiam manu
prohibendus est, si cum incommodo ceterorum id faciat; nam
civilem eum actionem de faciendo nullam habere non dubito.

E questo 1' unico esempio, per quanto e a mia conoscenza, in
cui e ammessa la legittimita della difesa privata, ed e veramente
prezioso, come una sopravvivenza storica.

Ma nella compilazione il testo genuino fu indubbiamente
annullato in D. xxxix. I, cioe nel titolo in cui Triboniano us6 piu
vigilanza nell' eliminare lo ius prohibendi nel senso classico, e
percio noi leggiamo ora nel fr. I § 18 — {si quis igitur velit ibi
aedificantem prohibere, nullo iure prohibet ; neque opus novum
nuntiare ; nisi ex una causa potest si forte damni infecti velit sibi

1 Cfr. Beseler, Beitrage, ii. p. 16 ; Mitteis, ZSS. vol. xxxiii. p. 193.

2 Non affronto qui la quistione se 1' ed. de damno infecto avesse contenuto
una clausola relativa a opus quod in via publica fiet, cio che io negherei. Ma
v. Lenel, Ed. p. 360, n. i, che ha gia ben valutato le ragioni del dubbio.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 71

caveri\. I contorcimenti del periodo e le forme bizantine consuete
rivelano 1' alterazione del testo.

38. (e) Nel caso di rilascio del possesso da parte dei mis si in
possessionem.

fr. i § 2 D. xxv. 5, Ulp. 34 ad ed. Necessario praetor adiecit,
ut, qui per dolum venit in possessionem, cogatur decedere : coget
autem eum decedere [non] praetoria potestate vel manu ministrorum
[ sed melius et civilius faciet si eum per interdictum ad ius ordinarium
remiserit\.

Qui sembra che il giurista dia al pretore il consiglio di agire
con piu correttezza e piu civilmente, costringendo il possessore
doloso ad abbandonare il possesso per mezzo di un interdetto.
Quale non si scorge ne si rinviene.1 Ed e vero, invece, che la
costrizione aveva luogo in simili casi praetoria potestate, ed
occorrendo manu ministrorum. Ci6 vieta Giustiniano.

00 fr- 5 § 2 D. xlii. 4, Ulp. 59 ad ed. Ait praetor : si is pupillus
in suam tutelam venerit eave pupilla viripotens fuerit et recte
defendetur : eos, qui bona possident, de possessione decedere
iubebo.

§3. ... ergo oblata defensione deici poterit \interdicto reddito\

Finita la causa che diede luogo alia missio in possessionem^ e
nel caso in esame quando il pupillo e gia in grado di difendersi o
e difeso da altri, il pretore ordina ai missi il rilascio del possesso.
E venuta meno la iusta causa possidendi autorizzata dal magistrate,
ove il detentore non ubbidisca air ordine di abbandonarlo, pu6
esserne impunemente deietto per mano degli interessati. Infatti
ora il suo possesso e vizioso.

C' e bisogno per ci6 di un interdetto ? Ma dove mai si rinviene
un interdetto che permetta la deiectio ? Non lo ritrova appunto il
Lenel che noi veneriamo come il piu insigne conoscitore del-
P Editto, dopo Salvio Giuliano.

La interpolazione per altro e lampante ; z oltre il mistero del-
1' interdetto, due ablativi assoluti riferiti a diversi agenti, nessuna

1 Cfr. Lenel, M Jiang. Girard, ii. p. 82.

2 Identica interpolazione in D. xxxvi. 3, u, Gai xiii. ad ed. . . . \mihi
praetor accommodat interdictum quo'] ; quel che resta corrisponde al procedi-
mento effetivo in tutti i casi di missio ; cf. D. xlii. 5, 33, I — satisdatione
interposita iudicium accipiatur et a possessione discedatur. Quindi, senz' altro
rimedio processuale.

72 5. Riccobono [iv

traccia di soggetto del verbo poteritl Identica interpolazione
si riscontra nel fr. 40 D. xlvi. 3 Marc. 3 Inst. . . . \alioquin nascitur
heredi inter dictum, ut eos deicere possif\^ Qui la mano di Triboniano
si manifesta nel nascitur che non mi sembra possa adoperarsi per
un rimedio che presuppone ogni volta speciale formulazione.3
E finalmente nella chiusa del

fr. i § 9 D. xliii. 3 : . . . [ Tutius tamen erit dicendum hoc inter-
dictum competere, maxime si satisdatum sit iam legatorum nomine
nee recedat, tune enim etiam possidere videtur\.

II rimedio che Ulpiano indicava in questo luogo e gia
visibile nel Digesto dal fr. 5 § 2 D. xlii. 4, sopra richiamato, da
cui risulta che T Editto provvedeva particolarmente perche i missi
in possessionem si ritraessero dal possesso quando la causa della
immissione era cessata. All' ordine del pretore poteva seguire la
deiectio, come rilevai or ora.

Direi anzi che cio e attestato direttamente da Ulpiano, a
proposito della missio d. inf. nomine, in

D. xxxix. 2, 4, 4 ; si forte duretur non caveri ut possideri liceat,
quod causa cognita fieri solet, non duumviros sed Praetorem vel
Praesidem permissuros, item ut ex causa decedatur de possessione.

Che questo brano possa essere stato compresso dai compilatori,
come dimostra la forma infelice, non importa ; 1' ultimo periodo, che
qui interessa, e sicuramente genuino ; e vi si attesta che il pretore
provvede, senz' altro, con decreti alle ulteriori fasi della missio ; cioe :

(a) ut possidere liceat (cfr. Lenel, Ed. p. 53).

(b) ut decedatur de possessione.

E pertanto si manifesta in tutta la sua evidenza in tutti quei
passi avanti esaminati il motivo delle interpolazioni, foggiate tutte
su di uno stampo, con le frasi consuete : melius, civilius, tutius e
che introducono un mezzo processuale qualsiasi, sostituito alia
difesa privata. Nel brano ultimo, riferito i caratteri dello stile
bizantino vi sono impress!*.4

1 II Lenel (/. c. p. 83) pensa a interdetti formulati per i singoli casi infactum.

2 Lotmar (ZSS. vol. xxxi. p. 100) intende 1' Int. Quod legatorum ; contro
Lenel, /. c. p. 81.

3 Cfr. Lotmar, /. c. p. 101 ; ma vedi Lenel, /. c. p. 83, n. i.

4 Per altri argomenti sostanziali v. Lenel, /. c. p. 84 ; ma essi hanno per
me un valore ancora piu assoluto, da escludere nel caso fatto da Ulpiano 1' Int.
Quod legatorum, o altro mezzo giudiziario. Diversamente Lotmar, /. c. p. 103.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 73

39. (g) Una costituzione dell' a. 205 attesta, anche per il diritto
dell' Impero, 1' uso e 1' efficacia del patto in forza di cui il creditore
ipotecario era autorizzato ad immettersi di propria autorita nel
possesso deir ipoteca, quando al termine stabilito il suo credito non
fosse sodisfatto. Se tale convenzione era pure inclusa nella lex
commissoria non possiamo giudicare.1 Ma dal diritto dei papiri
greco-egizii e documentata ora a dovizia 1' efficacia del titolo
esecutivo munito della clausola Ka.Qa.Trep €/c Sticks 2 in forza della
quale, sembra,3 che il creditore avesse diritto di pervenire senza
alcun procedimento nel possesso e nel dominio del fondo. Ma nel
diritto di Giustiniano, a parte il divieto della lex commissoria
stabilito da Costantino, e inibito al creditore d' immettersi nel
possesso senza 1' autorizzazione del magistrate, come risulta dalla c.
seguente :

3 C. viii. 14 (Impp. Sev. et Ant.) : Creditores qui non reddita
sibi pecunia conventionis legem, ingressi possessionem exercent,
vim \quidem\ facere non videntur \attamen auctoritate praesidis
possessionem adipisci debent\.

L' interpolazione delle parole segnate in corsivo e nota,4 ed essa,
come fu pure avvertito dal Naber determine inoltre la soppressione
del non avanti al verbo potest nella c. 5 Cod. ix. 12, dell' a. 294. 5

40. E Giustiniano a ricacciare da ogni angolo della sua opera
qualsiasi vestigio di privata difesa attacca . pure le massime piu
venerande, che secondo i Romani erano fondate sulla naturalis ratio.
E cosi la legge decemvirale : Si nox furtum faxsit, si im occisit,
iure caesus esto, fu ridotta nei Digesti nei termini seguenti : 6

4 § i D. ix. 2, Gai vii. ad ed. Lex XII. tab. furem noctu
deprehensum occidere permittit \ut tamen id ipsum cum clamore testi-

ficetur~\ : interdiu autem deprehensum ita permittit occidere, si is se
telo defendat, \ut tamen aeque cum clamore testificetur\

1 Papin. V. F. 9.

2 Per la letteratura v. Bertalan Schwarz, Hypothek und Hypallagma, p. 7 1
n. 2 ; cfr. Mitteis, Grundzuge, ii. I, p. 94.

3 Cfr. Bertalan, o. c. p. 94.

4 Cfr. Naber, Mnemos. vol. xxiv. p. 171; Gradenwitz, ZSS. vol. xxvi.
p. 348 n. i.

5 Un altro caso di vis legittima punita da Giustiniano e in D. xlvii. 8, 2,
1 8 : quidem . . . sed aliter multabitur. Ma sul proposito della violenza
nelF esercizio del diritto abbiamo la nota legge di Valentiniano dell' a. 389
riportata nel Cod. Just. viii. 4, 7, che commina la grave pena della perdita
del dominio. 6 Cfr. Riccobono, Fontes, p. 47 n. B.

74 S- Riccobono [iv

II clamore deve qui togliere il dubbio che 1' uccisore non abbia
agito in state di necessita, per la difesa della persona.1 I vicini
accorrenti ne potranno fare la verificazione.

Ed il vivo senso di repulsione per qualsiasi atto di privata difesa
manifesta con forza il legislatore in una delle solite motivazioni
aggressive, che egli aggiunge alle decisioni pratiche : Cur enim,
inquit lulianus, ad arma et rixam procedere patiatur praetor ', quos
potest iurisdictione sua componere?^ L' interrogazione e tutto
un programma legislative ; da cui scaturisce poi quella massima
di diritto, una tra le piu cospicue e realmente universali nel
sistema nuovo, cioe :

fr. 176 pr. D. L. xvii. Paul. 13 ad Plaut. Non est singulis
concedendum, quod per magistratum publice possit fieri : ne
occasio sit maioris tumultus faciendi.

La quale pel diritto elaborato dai giureconsulti non e vera. Se
essa fu scritta effettivamente da Paolo, doveva avere una struttura
piu limitata, e riferimento particolarissimo.3

41. Ed ora possiamo conchiudere ed affermare che la riforma di
Giustiniano rispetto allo ius prohibendi trascende di molto i
confini e I1 importanza del tema in esame. Poiche essa ci ha
rivelato un nuovo atteggiamento della legislazione di Giustiniano,
rispetto al diritto classico, che appare per ci6 diffuse in tutta T opera
ed attuato con fermezza, mediante amputazioni profonde di decisioni
e motivi e principi classici, tanto da sconvolgere tutta la fine
orditura delle actiones e dei mezzi di difesa giudiziaria del diritto
antico. E 1* importanza della riforma non'va ricercata alia superficie,
ma nell' intimo pensiero e nella forza da cui fu prodotta. Perche
essa non e vicenda esteriore, quanto nuova luce, che rivela nel
contrasto aspetti profondi delle due piu grandi civilta della storia.

In quel nucleo di norme, infatti, che e venuto alia luce, rimettendo
a posto nel libro immortale ogni parola della sapienza antica, vi
e un grande movimento di vita e di forza, che si esplica con
T affermazione energica della volonta individuale, e quindi con la

1 Cfr. per altro fr. 5 pr. D. ix. 2 = Collatio vii. ii. iii. 3 : sin autem
. . . tenebitur ; che contiene certe limitazioni in proposito, che non possono
derivare dai giuristi classici.

2 fr. 13 § 3 D. vii. i. Cfr. Beseler, Beitrage, ii. p. 88.

3 Ma il nesso non e dato scorgerlo : cfr. Lenel, Pal. i. c. 1 167 n. 5 : haec
adinterdicta multa posse referri palam est. Ed il campo ora e davvero ristretto.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 75

potenza del diritto dei singoli, che non soffre menomazione alcuna,
neanche momentanea. E di sopra a questo punto centrale e
incardinato e si muove tutto il sistema del diritto private, elaborate
con saggezza profonda.

Ma quella base si corrodeva ogni giorno, e la forza del diritto
individuale si svigoriva nell' ultima fase dell' Impero fino a
Giustiniano ; in quel periodo in cui i piu grandi rivolgimenti sociali
e politici e spirituali si maturarono. Ora la prepotenza1 piu
facilmente usurpava il posto del diritto, e nell' esquilibrio delle
forze sociali lo Stato doveva assumere a se un potere maggiore,
che si estrinseca nella organizzazione amministrativa dioclezianea,
salda, ordinata nei piu minuti particolari, e preveggente.

Lo Stato ne esce rinvigorito, ed allarga ogni giorno piu le
sue funzioni, assumendo un carattere pacificatore ; e per ci6 per
ottenere 1' ordine, la disciplina, il vantaggio generale Esso esige
qualsiasi restrizione della liberta dei singoli, ed in primo luogo dello
assoluto diritto individuale.

Questa evoluzione si compie nella legislazione del VI secolo ;
essa ebbe nel suo cammino la cooperazione di una grande forza,
quale era quella della dottrina cristiana,2 che deprime e annulla
i sentimenti egoistici ed inculca, come primi doveri, la pace e
T amore fra tutti gli uomini, anc.he per conseguire i fini della vita
terrena ; sentimenti che ebbero in realta una potente penetrazione
in tutti gli atti della vita.3

1 Cfr. Mitteis, Melang. Girard, ii. p. 226.

2 In questo senso Leonhard, Inst. p. 531 n. 2 ed. ivi cit.; cfr. ora anche
Lenel, Holttendorff" s Enc. 7 ed. p. 375 § 63. Quanto poi al problema
generale dell' influenza cristiana sul diritto private potremo volutarla via via
con la conoscenza dei principi direttivi della Compilazione del sec. VI, che,
come si vede, sono per noi tutti ancora un mistero ; cfr. piu oltre, nota
ultima del presente cap.

8 E percio il motivo della tolleranza, della pace, della consideraziorie del
prossimo s' insinua pure nella legislazione, come si osserva in una decisione
cospicua che si ricollega alia difesa privata e quindi all' argomento in esame.
Nessun dubbio, come diceva Q. Mucio, che il proprietario puo cacciar via dal
fondo gli animali penetrativi, con tutti i mezzi idonei allo scopo, e che non
puo rispondere con la lex Aquilia qualora un danno ne derivi alle bestie ; fr.
39 D. ix. 2, Pomp. 7 ad Q. M. Ma Giustiniano soggiunge subito ; Pomponius :
quamvis alienum pecus in agro suo quis deprehendit, sic illud expellere
debet quomodo si suum deprehendisset, quoniam si quid ex ea re damnum cepit,
habet proprias actiones. itaque qui pecus alienum in agro suo deprehenderit,
non hire id includit, nee agere illud aliter debet, quam ut supra diximus

76 5. Riccobono [iv

Nel diritto giustinianeo si manifesta per cio un mondo tutto
nuovo, in cui la difesa privata del diritto era inconcepibile. Ed essa
e surrogata dal piu svariato campionario di actiones, interdicta,
provvedimenti e mezzi giudiziari ; perche ciascuno deve in ogni
evenienza invocare 1' aiuto del magistrate, che e il solo tutore dei
diritti dei singoli.

Tra i nuovi mezzi escogitati dal legislatore o dalla pratica
bizantina si annovera la irpovifiiTopia,

II. IUD1CIUM COMMUNI DIVIDUNDO

42. Ma 1' azione che puo dirsi propria e generale per il regola-
mento dei rapporti tra condomini e 1' a. c. div., che da Giustiniano
fu adibita insietne agli altri mezzi processuali nei casi piu svariati.
E per ci6 pu6 affermarsi che all' azione divisoria venne conferita
nella Compilazione una nuova funzione, cio& quella di dirimere
tutti i conflitti tra i socii e regolare la vita della comunione, senza
per altro condurre allo scioglimento della medesima. Nei passi
dianzi esaminati si hanno le testimonianze piu cospicue del nuovo
carattere assunto dal indicium c, d.

E ci e noto pure che in tal modo Giustiniano ne altero in

quasi suum : sed vel abigere debet sine damno vel admonere dominum ut
suum recipiat. E qui, come si vede, la mansuetudire evangelica si scioglie
in precetti e consigli che suonano duri anzi sovrumani al fiero agricoltore :
quod tibi non vis alteri ne feceris. E percio il proprietario deve trattare gli
animali altrui come i proprii, non deve loro far male, non deve includerli,
perch£ del resto ha per il danno ricevuto proprias actiones. Deve piuttosto
avvertire I3 interessato (!). Indizii della mano di Triboniano : quamvis . . .
deprehendit, in agro, proptias actiones, quasi, ut suum recipiat, e poi la
ripetizione del concetto fondamentale e sovratutto lo spirito. Sospetti gia
in Di Marzo, Libri ad Q. Mucium, p. 89.

E lo stesso motive opera nella chiusa del celebre frammento di Alfeno II.
dig. che tratta del bettoliere che rincorre in semita noctu colui che gli
aveva rapita la lucerna : fr. 52 § i D. ix. 2. . . . \sed si ab eo non prior
vapulasset, sed cum ei lucernam eripere vellet, rixatus essel, tabernarii culpa
factum videri\. Giustiniano, dunque, ammonisce, che chi esercita la difesa
del proprio diritto e rincorre il rapitore delle cose proprie, deve usare
moderazione e pacatezza ; cerchera di strappare al malvivente le cose sottratte,
ma non deve attaccare la persona ; deve prima lasciarsi battere, e poi magari
non avra colpa del danno che nella reazione apportera all' altro. Per la critica
del brano, vedi le osservazioni finissime di Huvelin, MM. Girard, i. p. 259 seg.,
il quale per altro non attribuisce le addizioni ai Compilatori. lo ritengo
decisive il confronto con le aggiunte al testo di Q. Mucio, avanti riportato.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 77

maniera essenziale la natura; poiche nel diritto classico ogni azione
divisoria mirava in via principale ad effettuare lo scioglimento della
comunione, con 1* attribuzione della parte spettante a ciascuno dei
socii ; ed in secondo luogo poi a definire in una volta tutti i rapporti
personali sorti per causa della comunione.

Cosl si spiega che un profondo conoscitore delle fonti romane
quale era Cuiacio * pote vigorosamente negare 1' ammissibilita del
indicium c. d. durante la comunione ; perche in realta la Compi-
lazione di Giustiniano contiene tutti gli elementi proprii delP uno
e dell' altro sistema, in linee rilevate ; ma al grande interprete si
manifestava solo quello arcaico, perche egli accostava il Corpus luris
con spirito d' umanista, che gP impediva di scorgere e comprendere
1' opera di Giustiniano. E P influenza del Cuiacio fu somma, come
si sa, ed anche qui perniciosa ; e valse a velare la verita per lungo
tempo, tanto che il Windscheid2 giustamente lamentava, che
P actio c. d. era stata trascurata nella dottrina rispetto alia sua
funzione regolatrice dei rapporti tra socii, e riporta pure decisioni
giudiziarie che fino agli ultimi tempi si ostinavano a negarla.

Ma i Greci e la Glossa avevano ben conosciuto P indole delP a.
c. div. giustinianea, senza ombra di dubbio. E la critica piu recente
ha definitivamente 3 stabilito i confini tra il vecchio ed il nuovo in
questa materia, come e tramandato alia rinfusa nel Corpus luris.

43. E pertanto in questo luogo non interessa prendere in esame
tutti i singoli testi che provano la nuova funzione delP a. c. d.,
quanto piuttosto adunare i precipui tra essi, o quelli che offrono
maggiori difficolta d' interpretazione, e presentarli ordinati in V
categoric, alle quali si aggregano i passi adibiti :

(a) per attuare lo ius prohibendi, nei casi e nei limiti in cui esso
ha luogo nella Compilazione ;

(£) per la partizione ed il conseguimento delle spese fatte da
uno dei socii ;

(d} per la esecuzione di opere conservative sulla cosa, ed in
particolare per le opere relative ad edifici e muri comuni ;

1 Opp. vol. vii. p. 575 ad 1. 3 D. Com. div.

2 Pand. § 449 n. 4, ed ivi citati.

3 Accenni gia in Pernice, ZSS. vol. xix. p. 173 n. 4; ma ora in modo
esauriente Berger, Teilungsklagen, p. 221 seg., che tuttavia lascia insoluti
molti punti, del resto secondari.

78 5. Riccobono [iv

(e) per applicazioni varie del iud. c. d. e fam. ere., anche per
conferire efficacia giuridica a rapporti che non 1' avevano nel diritto
classico.

44. (a) Prohibitio.

E per quanto concerne il primo gruppo non occorre indugiare
oltre sul tema dello ius prohibendi, che e stato discusso sotto ogni
aspetto nelle pagine che precedono ; onde e sufficiente qui referirci
all' esame compiuto sui fr. 26 D. viii. 2 ; 28 D. x. 3 ; 3 §§ 2, 3 D.
xxxix. i.

45. (b) Impensae.

II indicium c. d. adibito, durante la comunione, per il consegui-
mento di spese fatte da uno dei socii e piu direttamente attestato
dai seguenti passi.

fr. 14 § I D. x. 3, Paul. 3 ad Plaut. — quae cum ita sint, rectissime
dicitur etiam impendiorum nomine utile iudicium dari debere mihi
in socium [etiam manente rei communione] . . . igitur et si abalie-
navero praedium quia in ea causa fuit, ut mihi actio dari deberet,
danda mihi erit, ut lulianus quoque scribit \negotiorum gestorum
actio].

Questo frammento collocato in sede materiae contiene delle
riforme gravissime, ed e interpolate in vari luoghi. Ma qui non e
il caso di prendere in esame il testo intero, tanto piu che la rico-
struzione di esso, fatta gia or sono parecchi anni nel mio Seminario,
sara pubblicata fra breve.1

Ma i due punti che qui occorre rilevare possono ora dirsi lievi.
Nel passo si accorda il iud. c. d. utile per le spese fatte da un socio
sulla cosa comune, che deve pur aver luogo etiam manente rei
communione. In secondo luogo si da 1' actio negotiorum gestorum
al socio che abbia alienato il fondo. E sono appunto coteste azioni
che furono in ogni tempo causa di dubbii e discussioni.

Infatti 1' ammissibilita di quelle azioni nei termini presupposti
perturba nel modo piu strano tutte le nostre conoscenze. E per
cio, rispetto al primo punto, si voile ristabilire una concordanza
artificiale con T inserzione2 di un non dopo la parola etiam

1 V. per ora Berger, o. c. p. 2 1 o e seg. ed ivi citati ; per altro i punti
essenziali in cui dissento dal Berger e dagli altri scrittori, circa 1' interpre-
tazione del passo giustinianeo, si mostreranno da s£ stessi.

2 Cuiacio, Opp. vol. v. p. 907, e cosi ancora 1' opinione dominante.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 79

della prima frase sopra trascritta ; e si attribui facilmente poi ad
una glossa maldestra la menzione dell' actio negotiorum gestorum}-

Rimedii vani ed arbitrari, consueti per altro e suggeriti soltanto
dalla imperfetta conoscenza che si e avuta del dritto giustinianeo,
che e restate fin dal sec. xvi, in grazia degli studi piii profondi,
come offuscato dallo splendore dei passi classici, serrati, tersi e
coordinati sempre in una suprema armonia.

Ma oggi quei -dibattiti hanno termine. Si sa che il indicium
c. d. fu ammesso dai Compilatori in realta etiam manente rei
communione, e si dirige appunto per costringere il socio a non
impedire un' opera sulla cosa comune, ovvero a pagare gli oneri
che gli incombono, o la parte delle spese, e cosi via. E parimenti
dovrebbe esser noto che Giustiniano accordc- pure al socio, accanto
all' actio c. d.> anche la negot. gest. per rendergli possibile il con-
seguimento delle spese fatte. E 1' actio neg. gest. ritorna, precisa-
mente congiunta ai indicia divisoria, nelle costituzioni, 18 C. iii.
36 ; 20 C. eod., inserita nei rescritti con le parole vel negotiorum
gestorum.

La stessa interpolazione che abbiamo riscontrata nel fr. 14 § I
in esame si riaffaccia poi, in una forma piu larvata, nel fr. 29 D.
x. 3, Paul. 2 quaest. e che tratta una delle ipotesi contenute in quel
testo ; cioe di spese fatte da un socio sulla cosa comune nella
credenza che il compartecipe fosse Tizio invece di Gaio. Ebbene
nel fr. 29 si legge :

recte dicitur etiam communi dividundo indicium ei sufficere.

Paolo aveva scritto assai probabilmente recte dicitur in com-
muni dividundo indicium ea quae impendisset venire.

Nel testo rifatto da Giustiniano e la congiunzione etiam ed il
verbo sufficere'1 stanno ad indicare che il socio a conseguire dal-
1' altro la parte delle spese puo adoperare vari mezzi, anche T actio
c. d. laddove il giureconsulto non poteva ammettere qui che il
giudizio divisorio, e mai altra azione personale. Infatti la spesa
sulla cosa comune, non essendo eseguita in considerazione della

1 Cosl gia Cuiacio, /. c,; Scialoja ad h. 1. nella nostra edizione del Digesto ;
Berger, Teilungskl. p. 217, ma v. Kriiger ad h. 1. (ed. 1 2a).

2 Verbo frequente nei brani interpolati : D. vi. 2, 7, 17 : Nee quisquam
putet hoc nos existimare, sufficere ; — D. xv. i, 19, 2: Idem etiam contra
eveniet quamvis in duobus dominis sufficiat pro socio vel communi dividundo
actio : Ulp. aveva scritto presso a poco : contra eveniet in duobus dominis,
nam inter eos est c. d. iudicium.

8o S. Riccobono [iv

persona, non pu6 mai dar luogo all' actio negot. gest. La quale e
esclusa dal giureconsulto nella stessa dimostrazione, esplicitamente :
neque enim negotia socii gero, sed propriam rem tueor, et magis ex re,
in quam impenditur quam ex persona socii actio nasciturl Ho
ragione per ci6 di ritenere che il sufficere fu inserto dai Com-
pilatori al posto della proposizione in cui Paolo escludeva nel caso
in esame 1J a. negot. gest.

46. (c) damnum.

II danno arrecato da uno dei socii alia cosa comune puo ora
immediatamente essere perseguito in giudizio per mezzo del c. d.

II principio e appunto codificato nel celebre passo di Papiniano,
che giova qui riportare per intero :

fr. 28 D. x. 3 — Sabinus ait in re communi neminem dominorum
iure facere quicquam invito altero posse, unde manifestum esse
prohibendi ius esse : in re enim pari potiorem causam esse pro-
hibentis constat [sed etsi in communi prohiberi socius a socio ne
quidfaciat potest, ut tamen factum opus tollat, cogi non potest si cum
prohibere poterat, hoc praetermisit : et ideo per communi dividundo
actionem damnum sarciri poterit sin autem facienti consensit, nee pro
damno habet actionem. quod si quid absenti socio ad laesionem eius
fecit) tune etiam t oiler e cogitur\.

L' interpolazione e variamente indicata.2 Ma io ritengo che in
realta essa comprenda tutta la seconda parte dello squarcio.3 Nel
periodo sed etsi . . . praetermisit, si dispone che il socio non ha
diritto di ottenere la rimozione dell' opera fatta dair altro, qualora
egli abbia omesso, potendolo, di opporre il suo divieto. Questo e
sicuramente un concetto nuovo, che e in vivo contrasto, come
sappiamo, con la natura del condominio classico, in cui ciascuno
dei socii conserva una signoria piena ed indipendente, pro indiviso^
sulla cosa comune ; e che perci6 non pu6 soffrire menomazione

1 Si sa che 1' a. negot. gest. puo aver luogo tra condomini, ma solo
quando si verifichino le condizioni espresse appunto da Paolo nel testo ; cfr.
D. iii. 5, 39, Paul. x. ad Sab. — quia potui partem meant ita defender e, ut
socii partem defendere non cogerer. D. x. 3, 6, 2 Ulp. 19 ad ed. — ceterum
non alias c. d. iudicio^ locus erit, ut et Papinianus scribit, nisi id demum gessit,
sine quo partem suam recte administrare non potuit : alioquin si potuit^ habet
negotiorum gestorum actionem eaque tenetur.

2 Cfr. Lenel, ZSS. xii. p. 1 4 n. 3 [si cum prohibere . . . praetermisit] ;
Fadda in Studii Brugi, p. 144 n. 2 [sin autem . . . cogitur^.

3 Cosl gik Segre, Rivista it. per le scienze giur. vol. viii. p. 373 ; Berger,
Teilungskl. p. 233 ; Paozzi, Melanges Girard, ii. /. c.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 81

per un semplice atto di negligenza. Ma di piu la forma del tratto
ha vari indizii rivelatori della mano di Triboniano ; e cioe il
mutamento del soggetto a cominciare dalla proposizione cum
prohibere poterat ; 1' imperfetto indicative poterat ; la frase ut tamen
— dummodo, adoperata con vera prodigalita dai compilatori, per
introdurre limitazioni e nuovi presupposti alle massime riferite dai
classici.1

Nella continuazione poi 1' aggiunta interpolatizia e manifesta
per i riscontri ormai noti : e qui appunto si rinviene I1 actio c. d.
diretta unicamente al risarcimento del danno. Ed inoltre, nella
chiusa, emerge quel concetto tutto giustinianeo : che 1' opera fatta
nellj assenza del socio deve esser rimossa, si . . . ad laesionem eius
fecit. Significa questo che P elemento della lesione dell' interesse
del socio e essenziale, onde sia autorizzata dalla legge la rimozione
della opera ? Ma se cosl e, si deve certamente riconoscere che il
socio in assenza dell' altro, o quando questi non contraddica, pu6
fare sulla medesima tutte le opere che siano di vantaggio, senza
timore ne dello ius prohibendi? ne dello ius tollendi e nemmeno
del risarcimento del danno.3 La questione e molto grave, e sara
esaminata piu oltre. Qui interessava solo accertare, che per il
danno dato da uno dei socii si pu6 provocare il iud. c. div.^ senza
chiedere lo scioglimento della cormmione, e che questo principio e
d' origine giustinianea.

47. (d) refectiones aedificiorum.

II condomino secondo il diritto classico non poteva fare
nemmeno le riparazioni necessarie all' edificio o muro comune senza
il consenso degli altri. E non e dubbio che questa norma e
schietta applicazione di un principio fondamentale. Ma tosto essa
e abbandonata da Giustiniano :

fr. 12 D. x. 3, Ulp. 71 ad ed. Si aedes communes sint aut
paries communis et eum reficere vel demolire \vel in eum immittere
quid opus sit> communi dividundo iudicio erit agendum , aut interdicto
uti possidetis experimur\.

II significato di questo passo e molto piano, e la interpretazione
ferma fin dalla Glossa. Vi si dice che ciascuno dei condomini di

1 Cfr. D. vi. i, 21 (due volte); D. ix. 2, 4 (due volte); D. xli. i, 54,
2-3 (due volte) ; D. xlvii. 8, i. 2 Cfr. fr. 26 D. viii. 2.

3 In questo senso giustamente il Fadda, Studii Brugi, p. 144 ; e cosi gli
antichi, cfr. Baldo ad h. 1.

82 S. Riccobono [iv

un edificio o di un muro puo costringere gli altri socii a riparare o
demolire P edificio, ed anche a consentire una immissione nel muro.
La coazione cui il testo si riferisce e giudiziaria. II socio ha a sua
disposizione vari mezzi, e cioe P actio c. d. o P int. Uti possidetis, coi
quali puo costringere P altro a non impedire la riparazione o
demolizione delP edificio, ovvero qualsiasi opera necessaria.

E P int. Uti possidetis serviva in realta al possessore solitario
allo scopo indicate, cioe per respingere la violenza dei terzi :

fr. 3 § 2 D. xliii. 17, Ulp. 69 ad ed. Hoc interdictum sufficit ei,
qui aedificare in suo prohibetur : etenim videris mihi possessionis
controversiam facere, qui prohibes me uti mea possessione.

Ma nuova e P applicazione che Giustiniano voile fare di questo
mezzo nei rapporti fra i condomini ; perche nel dritto classico
P interdetto non poteva avere effetto alcuno tra due possessori. Lo
stesso Ulpiano nel fr. 3 pr. eod. scrive : neuter nostrum vincetur nam
et tu possides et ego. E se vi e caso in cui si deve applicare questa
massima, quello qui considerato della comproprieta e il piu sicuro.

Non occorre quindi di cercare altre spiegazioni del testo in
esame, perche certamente Giustiniano voile concedere anche
P interdetto possessorio tra comproprietari. E P actio c. d. e pur qui
rivolta al fine di comprimere il divieto del socio, che impedisce le
riparazioni, o le nuove opere sulP edificio comune, la quale funzione
del indicium c. d. sappiamo che e giustinianea.

L' interpolazione del testo e nota, per altro ; l ma io ritengo che
salvo le parole paries communis et eum reficere vel demolire tutto
il resto e opera di Triboniano. E credo che il testo dicesse sempli-
cemente che mediante P actio c. d. il socio puo ottenere nel caso di
disaccordo la divisione del muro comune. I compilatori lo amplia-
rono, come di solito, con altri esempii, perche in esso avevano
consacrato un nuovo ordinamento che giovava mettere in evidenza.

48. Piu fine e perci6 difficile a dimostrare e P alterazione intro-
dotta in un altro passo di Gaio, che ha un significato di grande
rilievo :

fr. 32 D. xxxix. 2, Gai. 28 ad ed. prov. Si aedibus meis proximae
sint aedes meae et tuae, quaeritur, an, si hae vitium mihi faciant,
cavere mihi debeas pro damno propriarum mearum aedium, scilicet

1 Pernice, ZSS. xix. p. 173 n. 3 ; ed ora piu pienamente Berger,
TeilungskL p. 237.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 83

pro qua parte dorninus existes. et hoc plerisque l placet : sed
movet me, quod ipse meas 2 aedes reficere possim et impensas pro
socio aut communi dividundo iudicio pro parte consequi. nam et si
unas aedes communes tecum habui eaeque vitium faciant et circa
refectionem earum cessare videaris, nostri praeceptores negant
cavere te debere [quia ipse reficere possim recepturus pro parte, quod
impenderim iudicio societatis auf\ communi dividundo : ideo et
interpositam cautionem minus utilem futuram, quia alia ratione
damnum mihi posset sarciri. [et est plane nostrorum praeceptorum
haec sententia, ut credamus inutilem esse damni infecti stipulationem,
quo casu damnum alia actione sarciri possit : quod et in superiore
casu intelligendum est.~]

II passo di Gaio a prima giunta appare perfetto nella struttura
ed illibato nella forma; percio e bene qui procedere con ogni
circospezione.

Quello che si enuncia nei punti segnati in corsivo e sicuramente
prodotto di alterazioni giustinianee. Di piu il caso esaminato nel-
1' inizio del passo fu male compreso dal Mommsen, che, seguendo la
Glossa, propose la correzione meas in eas, per significare che il
socio ha facolta di riparare liberamente la cosa comune. Questo
senso del passo e arbitrario, e svisa i presupposti di fatto e turba la
limpidezza delle norme giuridiche vigenti in questa materia. Infatti
Gaio suppone il caso di chi abbia comune un edificio con altri, e
contiguo allo stesso uno di sua 'esclusiva proprieta. L' edificio
comune ha cagionato danno a quello proprio del socio, e si cerca
il mezzo per il risarcimento. La maggioranza degli autori, dice il
testo, accordavano tra socii la cautio damni infecti ;3 Gaio invece
oppone : che nella specie il proprietario danneggiato puo riparare
il suo edificio, meas aedes, e chiedere poi dal socio la quota delle
spese coll' actio c. d. ovvero con 1' actio pro socio* Gaio rafforza la
decisione supponendo un altro caso piu tipico, in cui il danno sia
avvenuto nell' unico edificio comune ai due condomini ; nel qual
caso, se il socio indugia o vien meno a provvedere alle riparazioni
necessarie all' edificio, secondo la sentenza dei Sabiniani, non si puo
ricorrere alia cautio damni infecti. Quale la ragione ? Qui appunto

1 Cassio ? cfr. apud Ulp. fr. 28 D. xxxix. 2.

2 Eas Mo., e certamente male.

3 Cfr. fr. 35, 37 D. xxxix. 2; D. ix. 2, 27, io = Collatio xii. 7, 8 ; D.
xxxix. 2, 39, Pomp. 21 ad Sab.

4 Cfr. D. xxxix. 2, 28, Ulp. 81 ad ed. : propter vitium communis parietis
. . . aedificia suafulsit.

84 S. Riccobono [iv

si nasconde il vizio del testo, poiche vi si dice cosa del tutto con-
traria alia essenza della communio^ affermandosi che il socio dili-
gente possa, malgrado la negligenza o il diniego dell' altro, eseguire
le riparazioni ed ottenere poi coll' actio c. d. la quota di spese dal
socio. Ma noi sappiamo, e per fortuna da Gaio stesso e dalla
medesima opera, che il socio non pu6 senza il consenso degli altri
riparare il muro comune :

fr. 8 D. 8, 2, Gaio 7 ad ed. prov. Parietem qui naturali ratione
communis est, alterutri vicinorum demoliendi eum et reficiendi ius
non est, quia non solus dominus est.1

E questa decisione ha un fondamento certissimo nella essenza
della comunione classica, e nelP insegnamento di Sabino, maestro
ed autore del nostro Gaio. II quale non poteva non applicare in
proposito la celebre massima : Sabinus, in re communi neminem
dominorum iure facer e quicquam invito altero posse.

La contraddizione quindi e patente. E come tale non poteva
sfuggire alia Glossa, perche il testo in esame di Gaio [fr. 32] dice :
ipse reficere possim^ cioe in ogni caso, senza alcuna considerazione
del consenso degli altri. E percio la Glossa us6 qui il consueto
espediente, distinguendo : le riparazioni dalle opere nuove ; Glossa
possim ; sed hie de reficiendo, ibi de novo opere faciendo?

Ma per sostenere siffatta distinzione la Glossa richiamava in con-
fronto il fr. 12 D. x. 3 ; giusto quello in cui 1* alterazione giustinia-
nea e oggi accertata. Non resta pertanto alcuna via di scampo per
mantenere il testo di Gaio come ci e tramandato, e per ci6 deve
ritenersi dimostrata 1* origine emblematica del periodo : quia ipse
reficere possim recepturus pro parte quod impenderim. E T inter-
polazione consente, in modo ben preciso, che ciascuno dei socii
possa, in ogni caso, eseguire nell' edificio comune le opere necessarie,
e costringere poi gli altri a contribuire la loro quota mediante il
iudicium c. d.

Ed a chiarire 1* interpolazione, altri argomenti balzano ora
fuori ; invero il bel periodo di stile gaiano, uscito dalle mani dei
compilatori, non e in realta che una riproduzione di quello redatto da
Gaio nel caso esposto avanti, e che si riferiva, come sappiamo, ad
una specie ben diversa : quod ipse meas aedes reficere possim et im-
pensas pro socio aut communi dividundo iudicio pro parte consequi.

1 Cfr. D. viii. 2, 40 : nullo iure fenestras immisisse.

2 Vedremo nel c. iv. che questa opinione e ancora dominante.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 85

I due brani coincidono appieno nella sostanza, e"'parzialmente
anche nelle parole. Per i compilatori una decisione unica per i
due casi, che ritennero assai vicini nei presupposti di fatto, esercitava
sempre una grande attrattiva. La semplificazione del diritto, e
particolarmente dei mezzi di attuazione, era obbiettivo precipuo che
Giustiniano si propose e con tutte le forze si sforz6 di conseguire.
Sappiamo altresl che 1' abuso dei mezzi gener6 equivoci, contrad-
dizioni e quindi dibattiti senza fine.

L' interpolazione inoltre risulta dalla designazione giustinianea
dell' actio pro socio comunemente indicata : iud. societatis, e poi
dal confronto con la motivazione classica che segue nel testo : ideo
et interpositam cautionem minus utilem futuram, quia alia ratione
damnum mihi posset sarciri.

Dove e facile notare come Gaio nella seconda ipotesi
contemplava unicamente il mezzo per il risarcimento del damnum, e
non per il compenso delle impensae. Puo mai il termine damnum
includere anche le impensae fatte appunto per evitarlo ? Non credo
che ci6 sia conforme alle consuetudini dei giuristi, che possedevano
un linguaggio tecnico meraviglioso, per cui potevano sempre
esprimere i loro concetti con grande rilievo, precisione e simmetria.

Anche la chiusa del testo e sospetta ; avvegnache essa non
contiene nulla di nuovo, ma riassume parafrasandola la motivazione
che precede : inoltre alia actione e troppo determinate in una
formula di carattere generale, e Gaio poco avanti aveva bene
scritto alia ratione ; e cosl Labeone in una specie analoga riferita
da Ulpiano in D. xxxix. I, 3, 2.

II plane & ora segnalato come indizio per scorgere la mano di
Triboniano.1 E nel riepilogo del testo vi e per altro un pensiero
legislative ben intellegibile ; che avendo Giustiniano ammesso tra
socii il iud. c. d. per regolamento di tutti i rapporti, la cautio d.
infecti perdeva qualsiasi funzione.2

1 Cfr. Peters, ZSS. vol. xxxii. p. 254.

2 E il disfavore per la cautio d. inf. si manifesta in altri passi interpolati,
cosl in D. xxxix. 2, 39, Pomp. 2 1 ad Sab. : Inter quos paries communis est,
aedificiorum nomine, quae quisque propria habet stipulari d. inf. \solet. sed
tune ea cautio necessaria est, cum aut alter solus aedificat et vitium ex opere

futurum est, aut alter pretiosiora aedificia habet et plus damni sensurus sit
decidente pariete ; alioquin si aequale periculum est, quantum quis vicino
praestat tantum ab eo consequitur.~\

Distinzioni tutte balorde queste, che provano soltanto la inutilita della
cautio. Per 1' interpolazione del verbo solet vedi piu oltre p. 101, n. i.

86 S. Riccobono [iv

Dunque, in conclusione, abbiamo qui un testo fondamentale, che
fu alterato dai compilatori,1 e che rende una precisa testimonianza
del mutamento del diritto in questa materia. Poiche i Sabiniani
reputavano inutile la cautio damni infecti tra socii, adducendo che
ciascuno potesse far valere le proprie ragioni nelF indicium c. </.,
nel momento della divisione ; Giustiniano invece dispone che
ciascuno dei socii puo riparare la casa senza attendere il consenso
e la cooperazione degli altri, e che mediante F actio c. d. egli puo
ottenere, in qualsiasi momento, da ciascuno la parte di spese che
gli spetta. A togliere ogni dubbiezza in questa materia o ragione
di equivoco, e bene ricordare che nelle fonti e frequentissimo il caso
di ripetizione di spese fatte sulla cosa comune da uno dei socii nel
giudizio divisorio. Ma appunto nei testi genuini si intende sempre
che il giudizio e ordinato per la divisione, ed inoltre che le spese
furono fatte o da chi aveva la amministrazione della cosa comune,
e quindi col consenso dei socii, ovvero in casi in cui il condomino
e ignoto ; mai per6 in seguito ad un dissenso come pu6 intendersi
il testo di Gaio che abbiamo esaminato ; in cui il contrasto tra i
condomini e per lo meno possibile, e la decisione e formulata in un
modo assoluto. La cosa dunque e ben diversa. I passi piu
notevoli, nei quali si accenna alia valutazione di spese fatte in re
communi nell' indicium c. </., sono riportati in nota.2

La opinione infine di Cuiacio,3 che spiegava la decisione gaiana
con 1' Oratio divi Marci non ha bisogno di confutazione, perche
F opera ad ed. da cui il fr. deriva fu compiuta avanti di Marco
Aurelio ; 4 ma poi, e questo e decisivo, la coazione dei socii a pagare
le spese di riparazioni agli edificii non si attuava secondo il SC.
mediante il iud. 'c. d.> sibbene con la minaccia della perdita della
proprieta.5

Probabilmente Pomponio riferiva la dottrina contraria di Sabino, i compilatori,
per cio, soppressero tutta la trattazione.

1 Diversamente Berger, Teilungsklagen, p. 230.

2 fr. 4 § 4 e 5 D. x. 3 (vi si discute dell' actio, non dei presupposti) ; 6 § 12
D. x. 3 (pena) ; 6 pr. D. x. 3 (socio ignoto) ; 1 1 pr. D. x. 3 (presupposto
accordo) ; 38 § i D. xvii. 2 (accordo); 65 § 13 D. xvii. 2 (si discute solo
delP actio); 15 § 19 D. xxxix. 2 (come il precedente) ; 46 D. xliv. 7 (cosa
comune col pupillo amministrata dal socio ? ).

3 Opp. v. iv. p. 785 ; cfr. c. i. n. 12, p. 47.

4 Cfr. Fitting, Alter und Folge, p. 54 ; Lenel, Pal. i. p. 189 n. i.

5 I compilatori non fecero ricorso mai nei Dig. all' Oratio divi Mara,
perche le riforme da loro introdotte in questa materia erano piu profonde.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 87

49. Ed ora possiano valutare un passo di Paolo riferito dai
Visigoti e che e sorprendente :

Paul. Sent. v. 10, 2 : De communi pariete utilitatis causa hoc
coepit observari, ut aedificet quidem cuius aedificare interest^ cogatur
vero socius portionis suae impensas agnoscere

II testo e veramente strano, e non ha riscontro alcuno nemmeno
nei libri di Giustiniano. Ma e davvero un' inezia, quando si con-
sideri che la credibilita di quest' altra fonte scade ogni giorno
sempre piu.

II senso della sentenza e piano. Vi si afferma che il condomino
del muro comune pu6 edificare senza il consenso del socio, e che
questi pu6 esser costretto a pagare la sua quota di spese. E qui
non e dubbio che vi si supponga un socio dissenziente, come lo
prova la coazione cui si ricorre per obbligarlo al contributo. Di
piu, la frase utilitatis causa indica gia che vi si enuncia una
nor ma eccezionale ; e 1' altra cuius aedificare interest presuppone
e designa un interesse particolare o piu immediate di uno dei socii.
Ma e cio possibile? Come poteva affermarlo un giureconsulto,
quando tutti i testi classici negano ad uno dei socii anche la
semplice facolta di reficere il muro comune, anche nell' interesse
di tutti ? II nostro testo invece ammette pure la aedificatio. Ma
1' origine spuria del testo si mostra per vari indizi : non e indicata
P azione con la quale il socio pu6 costringere 1' altro a contribuire
per P opera fatta ; manca il soggetto di aedificet^ e la frase coepit
observari e indeterminata ed insolita ai giuristi. Tutto ci6 induce
a ritenere che i compilatori visigoti ebbero a mutare profondamente
il passo di Paolo, riferendosi alia pratica del loro tempo. Certo
ad una pratica male appresa ; perche in nessun diritto e tanto meno
nella vita pratica, puo esser mai consentito ad uno dei socii, che ha
un interesse esclusivo (sic) ad innalzare il muro comune, che egli
possa costringere il male avventurato condomino a pagare una
parte della spesa. La norma di diritto in tali casi e ben diversa,
come appare dalle legislazioni moderne.1

Ed e rimarchevole che la interpretatio visigota riconduce quella

Ma i Compilatori del Codice accolsero un rescritto di Filippo : c. 4 Cod. viii, 10,
che vi si riferiva, e, come sembra, lo ampliarono pure ; infatti il brano : etenim
. . . constiterit e fortemente sospetto \aedificaveris ?] e certamente spuria la
frase mndicare vel.

1 Cod. civ. italianO) art. 555.

88 5. Riccobono [iv

sentenza cosi sbalestrata alia sua giusta misura, e cosl spiega :
sed si ab uno ex his communis paries propter metum ruinae fuerit
reparatus expensas fabricae socius illi pro portione sua praestare
cogendus est.

Cosl per lo meno si ritorna all' ipotesi delle riparazioni. E la
interpretatio inoltre premette al periodo ora riferito una nozione
esatta della cautio damni infecti, che sicuramente e tratta da buone
fonti.

50. E cosl tutta questa materia del paries communis, giustamente
malfamata in ogni tempo per le sfrontate contraddizioni con cui fu
presentata nei Digestif riprende la sua figura semplice e dignitosa ;
separando precisamente le norme del diritto classico dal nuovo
assetto che Giustiniano le diede. Onde non solo essa ebbe un' im-
pronta che 'puo servire di modello al diritto moderno' come gia
osserv6 il Brugi,2 ma costituisce nelle sue linee essenziali il diritto
moderno.

51. (e) Applicazioni varie.

In questo gruppo ho raccolti casi varii che dimostrano 1' applica-
zione costante del c. d. iudicium per definire subito, in tutte le
evenienze, i rapporti obbligatori sorti per causa della res communis.

fr. 15 D. x. 3, Paul. 5 ad Plaut. Si socius servi communis
nomine conventus et condemnatus sit \aget c. d. et antequam praestet\ ;
nam et si noxali iudicio cum uno actum sit \statim aget cum socio ut
ei pars trader etur, cautionibus interpositis, ut, si non dederit, reddat\.

Che il c. d. serve qui al socio per ottenere immediatamente la
prestazione dalF altro e detto nel testo : statim . . . ut ; percic- il
testo e giustinianeo ; come inoltre si dimostra dalla forma aget, che
nel secondo periodo manca poi del soggetto, invece di agere potest.
Ed invero il verbo agere al futuro o al congiuntivo concessivo agas
e indizio certo d' interpolazioni.8

1 Cfr. Zacharia, Zeitschr. f. g. RW. vol. xii. p. 271 in nota, che la designa
come una delle materie piu aggrovigliate ; Berger, Teilungskl. p. 238 ed ivi cit.

2 Rivista ital. per le s. gtur. vol. iv. p. 405.

3 Cotali forme sono soltanto giustificate nelle Epistulae o nei brani da esse
derivati, cosi p. es. in D. xii. 5, 15 ; d' ordinario hanno impronta legislativa in
quanto esprimono la facolta concessa dal legislature, e non quella che viene
all' individuo dal proprio diritto. Esempii : 30 § I D. xxxiii. 2 (Riccobono, in
BIDR. vi. p. 139); fr. 20 D. xliii. 16 (forse un sunto dell' originale) ; fr.
60 § 2 D. xix. 2 (cfr. Gradenwitz, Interpol. p. 29 ; ma 1' interpolazione s' inizia
con la parola agis ; fr. 1 8 § 2 D. x. 3 (cfr. piu oltre in questo lavoro) ; fr. 2 1 D.
xvii. 2 (il brano e indicate da Eisele e Kriiger come glossa; certamente male).

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 89

La trattazione di questa materia nelle opere dei giuristi era ben
piu complicata, come e ancora visibile dal fr. 8 D. ix. 4 di Ulpiano,
che peraltro e fortemente interpolate. Ma I1 argomento potra essere
esaminato nel capitolo relativo alle azioni tra condomini.1

52. fr. 23 D. x. 3, Ulp. 32 ad Ed. Si convenerit inter te et
socium tuum, ut alternis annis fructum perciperetis, et non patiatur
te socius tui anni fructum percipere, videndum, utrum ex conducto
sit actio an vero communi dividundo. Eadem quaestio est et si
socius, qui convenerat ut alternis annis frueretur, pecus immisit et
effecit, ut futuri anni fructus quos socius percipere oportuit, corrum-
perentur. [et puto magis communi dividundo iudicium quam ex
conducto locum habere (quae enim locatio est cum merces non inter-
cesserit ?) aut certe actionem incerti civilem reddendamJ]

La frase locum habere si riporta al iud. c. d. nella sua nuova
funzione regolatrice della comunione, ed e perci6 giustinianea.
La soluzione e sostanzialmente di Ulpiano ; il puto magis avverte
per6 che i compilatori hanno eliminato la trattazione piu ampia
del giurista, condensandone il risultato e aggiungendovi la famosa
civilis incerti a.2

fr. 17 D. xvii. 2, Paul. 6 ad Sab. Sed et si socius alienaverit
contra pactionem accipit committit et tenetur \societatis aut communi
dividundo\ iudicio.3

Paolo aveva scritto : iudicio pro socio.

fr. 19 § 2 D. xv. I ; cfr. supra, p. 79, n. 2.

fr. 4 D. xxxiii. 3. lavol. 9 rp. \itaque de ea re arbiter com-
muni div. sumendus est^~\

53. E la riforma attuata con perfetta vigilanza si propaga quasi
natural men te al iudicium familiae erciscundae, in cui fu applicata
pure per munire di coazione rapporti che nel diritto classico non
avevano sanzione giuridica. Un esempio insigne si rinviene
appunto nel

fr. 1 8 § 2 D. x. 2, Ulp. 19 ad ed. Idem quaerit, si quis testa-
mento caverit, ut servus exportandus veneat, officio familiae ere.
iudicis contineri, ut voluntas defuncti non intercidat. sed et cum

1 Diversamente Berger, Teilungskl. p. 227.

2 Cfr. Pernice, ZSS. xix. p. 174 nota.

8 La denominazione iudicium societatis deve considerarsi sospetta.

4 Pernice, ZSS. xix. p. 174, considera qui il iud. come « ein letztes Aus-
kunftsmittel » e cosl Berger, Teilungskl. p. 239. Ma Giavoleno discuteva
solo il diritto o meno del socio di fare immissioni nel paries communis, e
percio la quistione della divisione non gli si poteva presentare alia mente.

90 S. Riccobono [iv

monumentum iussit testator fieri, familiae erciscundae [agent, ut
fiat], idem tamen temptat, quia heredum interest, quos ius
monumenti sequitur, praescriptis verbis posse eos experiri, ut
monumentum fiat.

Nel § che precede Pomponio negava, ed Ulpiano plaudiva
vivamente (rectissime], che si potessero dedurre nel indicium f.
ere. indagini circa la morte del testatore ecc., poiche : haec ad
divisionem rerum hereditariarum non pertinere. L' introduzione
del § sopra trascritto : idem quaerit e dell' amanuense (F1), ma nel
ms. si legge pure 1' emendazione del correttore (F2) : idemque erit, che
rappresentava la dizione originaria del testo. Infatti i casi che
seguono dovevano avere entrambi 1 la stessa soluzione negativa,
approvata avanti da Ulpiano. L' interpolazione e evidentissima
nella frase : agent, ut fiat\ di cui invano si cercherebbe il soggetto.
Anche il seguito e mal connesso col precedente, perche i Com-
pilatori, nel mutare e condensare la trattazione, vi eliminarono i
nuovi presupposti considerati dal giurista (cfr. quia heredum interest,
quos ius m. sequitur].

L' alterazione del testo e dunque, anche in questo luogo, di
grande rilievo ; perche il iud. f. ere. e adoperato come il c. div.
(26 D. viii. 2) per costringere il coerede a fare qualche cosa, e quindi
per regolare singoli rapporti dei coeredi.2

54. II motivo per altro dell' interpolazione e dichiarato, per il
caso concernente il monumento, dal legislatore in altro luogo ed in
una formula generale, che si legge a guisa di riepilogo nel testo
che segue :

fr. 7 D. xxxiii. i, Pomp. 8 ad Q.M. — Pomponius. In testamentis
quaedam scribuntur, quae ad auctoritatem dumtaxat scribentis
referuntur nee obligationem pariunt. haec tamen talia sunt. si te
heredem solum instituam et scribam, uti monumentum mihi certa
pecunia facias : \nullam enim obligationem ea scriptura recipit, sed\
ad auctoritatem meam conservandam poteris, si velis, facere \aliter
atque'] 3 si coherede tibi dato idem scripsero : nam sive te solum

1 II primo esempio relative all' ordine dato dal testatore : vendita del
servo con la condizione che sia esportato, e contemplato dalla c. 5 Cod. iii. 36
di Aless. Severe, e la decisione e conforme a quella che si legge ora nei
Digesti. Ma la struttura del rescritto e quanto mai strana, perche nella
decisione, contenuta nella seconda parte : proinde . . . sequetur spunta una
folia di nuovi presupposti del tutto inaspettati. Per cio dovette pure essere
modificata 1' introduzione : in ipsius . . . mutare.

2 V. in senso contrario : Ulp. in D. x. 2, 2 pr. 3 item. Pomp.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 91

damnavero, uti monumentum facias, coheres tuus1 agere tecum
poterit familiae herciscundae, uti facias, quoniam 2 interest illius :
qui etiam si utrique iussi estis hoc facere, invicem actionem3 habebitis.
ad auctoritatem scribentis hoc quoque pertinet, cum quis iussit in
municipio imagines poni : ' nam si non honoris municipii gratia id
fecisset, sed sua, actio eo nomine nulli competit' itaque haec
Quinti Mucii scriptura : * liberi mei ibi sunto, ubi eos mater sua esse
volet' nullam obligationem parit, sed ad auctoritatem defuncti
conservandam id pertinebit, ut ubi iusserit ibi sint. nee tamen
semper voluntas eius aut iussum conservari debet, veluti si praetor
doctus sit non expedire pupillum eo morari ubi pater iusserit
' propter vitium, quod pater forte ignoravit in eis personis esse, apud
quas morari iussit.' si autem pro cibariis eorum in annos singulos
aurei decem relicti sint, sive hoc sermone significantur, apud quos
morari mater pupillos voluerit, sive ita acceperinus hunc sermonem,
ut ipsis filiis id legatum debeatur, utile erit : et magis enim est, ut
providentia filiorum suorum hoc fecisse videatur. [et in omnibus
ubi auctoritas sola testatoris est, neque omnimodo spernenda neque
omnimodo observanda est. sed interventu iudicis haec omnia debent>
si non ad turpem causam feruntur, ad effectum perduci^\

La trattazione di Pomponio riprende il suo carattere perspicuo
e quindi la sua forza riponendo a posto, come ho fatto nelle note,
le negazioni eliminate dai Compilatori, per ridurre la decisione di
alcuni casi nel senso affermativo. E malgrado le inversioni
giustinianee il ragionamento di' Pomponio e ancora trasparente.
Vi hanno disposizioni del testatore, egli dice, che non sono
coercibili, ma riescono tuttavia efficaci, perche la loro effettuazione
e assicurata dalla sua autorita morale, come avviene nel caso che
egli imponga all' erede di fargli un monumento ; ne il valore
giuridico dell' ordine si muta se gli eredi sono due o piu ; perche
in ogni caso per la disposizione concernente la statua o il monu-
mento, se mira ad onorare la memoria del testatore : actio eo nomine
nulli competit.

E quel che Pomponio insegnava e accertato per ogni rispetto.
Sappiamo che i Romani custodivano religiosamente la volonta
espressa del testatore, anche se non munita di efficacia giuridica ;
gli scrittori, a cominciare da Cicerone, attestano con orgoglio ed
esaltano questo tratto del costume romano. Cosi Plinio 4 scrive ad
un coerede : Confido accessurum te sententiae meae^ cum religiosissime
soleas custodire defunctorum voluntatem, quam bonis heredibus

1 non. Pomp. 2 non. Pomp. 8 non. Pomp. 4 Epist. iv. 10.

92 S. Riccobono [iv

intellexisse pro iure est. Neque enim minus apud nos honestas quam
apud alios necessitas valet. Nella specie contemplata da Plinio si
trattava di una manomissione e d' un legato allo stesso servo
inefficaci.

Ma sovratutto poi si deve considerare che il coerede non pu6
avere un' azione contro 1' altro se non ha un interesse ; e nel caso
della statua in memoria del testatore la posizione dei coeredi e pari,
nel senso che ne I1 uno ne 1' altro vi ha interesse. Onde a conseguire
tali fini il legato con un modus era di consueto ordinato in favore
d' un terzo ovvero d' un Ente, ed in particolare di Municipt.1

La riforma di Giustiniano, pertanto, in questa materia mirava
a dar forza giuridica, per lo meno nel caso che vi fossero piu eredi,
alle disposizioni testamentarie che avevano lo scopo di onorare
la memoria del defunto ; ed allora il legislatore attribul un' azione
all' uno degli eredi contro 1' altro. Nella chiusa del testo anzi la
formulazione e piu larga ; perche vi si dice che in tutti i casi, la
volonta del testatore che sia onesta e meritevole di protezione, deve
essere osservata merce 1' opera del giudice. Ma qui evidentemente
intervenne Triboniano,2 che con due tratti di penna condense nella
chiusa tutto il pensiero legislative.

55. Ed un altra applicazione immediata e cospicua della stessa
norma si rinviene appunto in sede materiae, cioe nel

fr. 44 § 8 D. x. 2, Paul. 6 ad Sab. Si duo coheredes damnati
sint statuam ponere et altero cessante alter earn fecerit, non
\esse iniquum\ lulianus ait familiae erciscundae iudicium \dare\ ut
pars impendiorum boni viri arbitratu praestetur.

II termine damnati era pure di frequente usato nei testamenti
con riferimento a disposizioni incoercibili ; 8 come nella specie in
esame. Ma la decisione affermativa ora non sorprende ; e si rivela
come opera di Giustiniano per il nudo richiamo all' equita ; laddove,
come sappiamo, 1' elemento decisive era 1' esistenza dell' interesse
giuridico di uno degli eredi a fare, che solo poteva generare
1' azione.4 E 1' alterazione del testo si manifesta poi nella forma

1 Cfr. D, xxxiii. i, 21, 3, Scaev. 22 digest. ; Testamentum Postumii luliani
in Bruns-Gradenwitz, Forties, n. 121 p. 316.

2 Cfr. Pernice, Labeo, iii. p. 39 ed ivi cit. Di Marzo : Libri di Pomp, ad
Q. M. p. 67.

3 Pernice, /. c. p. 32.

4 Cfr. D. x. 2, 1 8, 2 — quiaheredum interest, quos ius monumenti sequitur.
Cfr. avanti al n. 53.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 93

impersonale della seconda parte (praestetur) in disaccordo con i
presupposti riferiti ; ed inoltre nella frase : iud. dare, che mette in
evidenza la nuova funzione dei iud. divisoria. Forse il testo diceva : l
non posse eum lulianus ait, familiae erciscundae iudicio consequi, ut
pars impendiorum sibi praestetur?

Ma qui bisogna interrompere la revisione critica dei testi che
provano il nuovo ufficio delle azioni divisorie nel diritto di Giu-
stiniano, perche gli esempii recati dimostrano a dovizia come i
compilatori, con sovrapposizioni pazienti e continue, tendevano a
coprire i tratti che ricordavano la funzione determinata dei indicia
divisoria^ e che invece seppero rivolgere agli scopi piu varJ, per
disciplinare la vita dell' istituto della comunione.

III. LA UTILITA SOCIALE

56. Azioni, interdetti e mezzi vari, per lo piu innominati ed a volte
maldestri ed anche contradditori, accordati da Giustiniano ai condo-
mini sono tutti convergenti verso un segno ben determinate. E lo
scopo, come ho avuto occasione di rilevare piu fiate, era quello di re-
golare la vita della comunione, disciplinarla, onde potesse durare ed
esplicarsi in perfetta pace, con la cooperazione di tutti per il vantaggio
comune. Per conseguire un tale effetto il legislatore doveva in
primo luogo annullare il principio della indipendenza assoluta dei
singoli condomini, che costituiva il punto centrale della comunione
classica. E quel principio fu annullato. Infatti ciascuno socio ha
ora potere e mezzi di costringere gli altri ad eseguire riparazioni sulla
cosa comune, a consentire una particolare opera o qualsiasi altra
cosa ; e viceversa ciascuno pu6 impedire il socio dal fare un' opera
o immissioni ecc., sempre mediante prohibitio giudiziaria. Tutto
ci6 e stato dimostrato nelle pagine che precedono.

Ora, per ci6, bisogna vedere il risultato del nuovo ordinamento
stabilito da Giustiniano. Dacche e evidente che tutte quelle azioni
concesse ai condomini presuppongono una serie di diritti e facolta,
che ciascuno di essi ha ormai sulla cosa comune, e che pu6 eserci-

1 II modello per la restituzione del passo si ha in D. x. 3, 4, § 4 : scribit
lulianus . . . sumptum istum c. d. itidido conseqiti me non posse.

2 Cfr. c. 5, Cod. iii. 44 dell' a. 224, dove appunto la incoercibilita di tale
disposizione anche nel testamento militare e presupposta. E per ci6 erronea-
mente il Pernice, ZSS. xix. p. 173 n. 4, attribuisce quelle decision! ad un
progresso della giurisprudenza, per opera di Giuliano.

94 S. Riccobono [iv

tare mediante opere e disposizioni, anche senza il consenso degli
altri. Nel caso di opposizione ha mezzi coercitivi legali. Ed allora
e certo, in primo luogo, che se ciascuno dei condomini ha ora, posi-
tivamente, facolta di agire sulla cosa in contraddizione agli altri :
La regola di Sabino fu sostanzialmente abolita ; perche essa
negava che il socio quicquam facere posse invito altero.

Ma fino a qual punto fu quel principio messo da parte ? E nella
ricerca della risposta a questa domanda, si deve pure necessaria-
mente porre in evidenza il principio che fu collocate al posto di
quello classico ; perche senza un nuovo regolamento, senza una
vera organizzazione dei compartecipi, le facolta dei singoli avrebbero
condotto ora ad un' anarchia ancora piu grave di quella che avevano
sperimentato i giureconsulti classici. Tutto questo sara messo in
luce nella trattazione che segue.

57. Cominciamo dall' osservare il

fr. 6 § 12 D. x. 3, Ulp. 19 ad ed. Urseius ait, cum in communi
aedificio vicinus nuntiavit, ne quid operis fieret, si unus ex sociis ex
hac causa damnatus fuisset, posse earn poenam a socio pro parte
servare. lulianus autem recte notat ita demum hoc verum esse, si
[interfuit aedium hoc fieri].

II testo e piano. Vi si dice che uno dei condomini che aveva
fatta una nuova opera nell' edificio comune fu condannato in seguito
alia denuncia del vicino. Debbono i socii contribuire al pagamento
della pena? Urseio lo affermava. Giuliano appose al response
una delle solite note esplicative, che pero fu modificata dai compi-
latori. La frase finale si interfuit aedium hoc fieri e sicuramente
interpolata ; lo si desume dalla personificazione delle aedes, che e
di stile bizantino, in luogo della utilitas rei\ e poi, perche aedium
e non aedificiorum, cioe il termine piu generico che era nell' ipotesi
proposta? Di piu hoc si riferisce a damnatus fuisset^ mentre
evidentemente 1' interpolatore voleva significare hoc = opus fieri.

E per altro la nota di Giuliano si ricostruisce sicuramente col
sussidio di un passo di Papiniano che tratta lo stesso caso :

fr. 1 8 D. xxxix. I, Pap. 3 quaest. Aedibus communibus, si ob
opus novum nuntiatio uni fiat, si quidem ex voluntate omnium opus
fiat, omnes nuntiatio tenebit, si vero quidem ignorent, in solidum
obligabitur, qui contra edictum praetoris fecerit.

La decisione qui e correttissima e proporzionata in ogni sua
parte ai principii fondamentali della comunione.

1VJ Communio e Comproprieta 95

E perci6 la nota di Giuliano doveva dire :

lulianus autem recte notat : ita demum hoc verum esse si ex
voluntate omnium opus fieret, quod si quidam ignorent in solidum
obligabitur qui contra edictum praetoris fecerit.

La ragione, che indusse i compilatori a sopprimere una dis-
tinzione cosi equilibrata, non puo essere ora occulta ; quel che
dispiacque appunto fu il consenso omnium, come fondamento e
norma dei rapporti tra condomini ; cui si sostitul un elemento
obbiettivo, il vantaggio della cosa comune, che pertanto e in-
dipendente dall' arbitrio dei singoli e dal concorso della volonta di
tutti.

Lo spostamento dei concetti e qui essenziale, dunque. E
percio 1' interpolazione in questo punto ha investito il principio
centrale dell' istituto del condominio.

58. Ed ora si scorge tutto il significato di una frase adoperata
da Giustiniano dove egli ammette tra condomini 1' efficacia del
patto ne intra certum tempus dividatur. Perche il legislatore pone
ivi in risalto questo nuovo elemento del vantaggio collettivo,
dichiarando valido il patto : quod etiam ipsius rei qualitati prodest1,
cosl non la volonta unanime dei socii ne determina la validita, ma
bensl T utilita per se stessa, il vantaggio della cosa comune.

59. Or, se un siffatto principio, che aveva in se la potenza di
travolgere d' un tratto tutta la struttura della communio, era in
realta nella mente del legislatore, egli doveva di necessita metterlo
in evidenza immediata la dove i giureconsulti avean posti i
fondamenti incrollabili del nostro istituto, e doveva precisamente
sovrapporlo all' altro di Sabino, che esigeva essenzialmente, in
ogni momento e per qualsiasi disposizione materiale della cosa,
il concorso di tutti i socii. E cio era imprescindibile, perche la
comunione classica, come sappiamo, era tutta improntata come in
un conio nella formulazione di Sabino, in cui lo schema di mirabile
perfezione, dai tratti vigorosi ed indelebili, si mostrava tutto. Per
ci6 la regola di Sabino precludeva la via a qualsiasi riforma o
deviazione nella materia della comunione. Anche la semplice
vicinanza era fatale. E Giustiniano quindi senti la necessita di
stremarla la sul posto, con sovrapposizioni ponderose, che dovevano
opprimerla.

i D. x. 3, 14, 2.

96 S. Riccobono [iv

I passi che riportavano la massima di Sabino erano due, e
furono entrambi, come sappiamo, transfigurati.

60. Al fr. di Paolo fu aggiunto il periodo che segue :

26 D. viii. 2 — sed per communi dividundo actionem consequitur
socius, quo minus opus fiat aut ut id opus quod fecit tollat, si modo
toti societati prodest opus tolli.

Quest' interpolazione si determina soltanto ora nei suoi par-
ticolari, ed illumina 1* istituto giustinianeo. Essa rende tutta la
nuova struttura del la comproprieta. Lo ius prohibendi vi e
rinnovellato ; e T actio c. d. serve ormai a regolare tutti gl' interessi
dei socii. Mediante essa si impedisce T opera che uno voglia
eseguire sulla cosa ; ovvero quando 1' opera sia compiuta se ne
ottiene la rimozione. La quale non deve aver luogo in ogni caso,
bensl quando giovi alia comunione, o meglio alia societa, come
Giustiniano vuole si dica : si modo toti societati prodest opus tolli.

La volonta dei singoli socii anche qui e interclusa, di fronte al
vantaggio della collettivita. Ne occorre avvertire che tra le due
cose non v' e coincidenza. La voluntas omnium da una parte ed
il prodesse societati dall' altra sono quantita eterogenee. Anzi
nella formula sovrapposta da Giustiniano, e prospettato un caso
in cui si giunge alia distruzione dell' opera eseguita da uno dei
socii, perche torna di vantaggio alia collettivita. E quindi il
proposito di uno e frustrate. Naturalmente ; perche il criterio
della utilitas rei e obbiettivo, quello della voluntas e soggettivo ;
e per ci6 1' uno e indipendente dall' altro.

E cosl siamo ritornati allo stesso principio che ci si rive!6
avanti, in altri testi, quasi di soppiatto. Vale a dire, mentre nel
diritto classico solo la volonta di tutti i socii ha efficacia rispetto al
facere sulla cosa comune, e la volonta di un solo, per conseguenza,
puo impedire qualsiasi atto od opera sulla medesima, in forza della
prohibitio ; al contrario, nella compilazione, alia volonta dei singoli
si surroga la utilitas rei, la quale ora determina e regola i poteri
dei socii sulla cosa. Lo ius prohibendi e non solo trasformato,
ma in molti casi pure escluso. Fino a qual punto ?

61. La risposta la ricaviamo dal celebre testo di Papiniano, la
dove egli enunciava precisamente la massima di Sabino, ed in cui
la violenza usata da Giustiniano all' antica dottrina si manifesta
nella maniera piu aperta.

iv] Communio e Coniproprieta 97

II testo ben noto continua cosl :

fr. 28 D. x. 3 . . . sed etsi in communi prohiberi socius a socio
ne quid faciat potest, ut tamen factum opus tollat, cogi non potest,
sz, cum prohibere poterat, hoc praetermisit : et ideo per communi
^dividundo actionem damnum sarciri poterit^ sin autem facienti
consensit, nee pro damno habet actionem. quod si quid absente socio
ad laesionem eius fecit ', tune etiam toller e cogitur.

Dunque, lo ius prohibendi c' e ancora, ma solo per impedire
P inizio dell' opera. Che se questa fu compiuta senza proibizione di
alcuno, allora, chi omise di intervenire a tempo non pu6 altro
pretendere che il risarcimento del danno, mediante I1 actio c. d.
E se poi, per un motivo giustificato, egli non pote interporre divieto
in tempo opportune, allora P opera dev1 essere rimossa da chi la
esegul, solo quando risulti che ridonda a danno del socio ; anzi, il
testo dice : quando risulti che fu fatta a danno del socio :«"..,
ad laesionem eius fecit.

Ed anche qui P aggiunta, con le molteplici distinzioni, rivela
in tutta la sua comprensione il nuovo principio regolatore della
communio.

Lasciamo da parte la questione che e secondaria, se nella frase
ad laesionem eius fecit non si rifletta pure un raggio della nota
dottrina giustinianea del divieto di atti emulativi, ma qui preme
sopratutto trarre da quest* ultimo inciso le conseguenze piu certe
ed immediate. E cioe, che secondo quel dettato, I1 opera fatta da
uno dei condomini senza la volonta dell' altro non si puo rimuovere,
per disposto di legge, quando non leda 1' interesse del socio che
nega. fe il lato positive della nuova formula. E perci6 quando
la disposizione di uno dei socii, o 1' opera eseguita, tornano di
vantaggio alia comunione, e non ledono gli interessi dell' altro,
allora la volonta di colui che ha ordinato 1' opera prevale; o meglio,
in realta, prevale 1' interesse sociale.

Coincidenza dunque perfetta di parole, di concetti e di norme
in tutte le correzioni ed aggiunte fatte da Giustiniano nella materia
in esame.

62. Ne P attivita di Giustiniano s' arresta a paralizzare solo la
forza dei principi astratti ; ch& le riforme in quella nuova direzione
investono, di necessita, tutti i punti della teoria della communio, e
tutte le conseguenze ; e dimostrano che il nuovo regolamento di
essa ebbe nella compilazione pieno e decisive sviluppo.

98 S. Riccobono [iv

Cosl circa la costituzione di servitu sul fondo comune
leggiamo nel

fr. 10 D. xxxix. 3, Ulp. 53 ad ed. Si autem plures sint
eiusdem loci domini, unde aqua ducitur, omnium voluntatem esse
sequendam non ambigitur : \iniquum enim visum est voluntatem
unius ex modica forte portiuncula domini praeiudicium sociis facere1^.
An tamen subsequi voluntas possit, videamus. [et placet nihil
interesse utrum praecedat voluntas aquae ductionem an subsequatur,
quia et posteriorem voluntatem praetor tueri debet^\

Ulpiano esigeva la voluntas omnium. E non si poteva dubi-
tarne : non ambigitur. Ma Giustiniano nota « essere iniquo che la
volonta di uno che abbia nella comunione una piccola porziuncola
possa pregiudicare gli altri».

Sarebbe errore intendere quell' inciso che e nel pr. del testo,
come giustificazione o comento alia parola omnium ; perche se
si esige la volonta unanime dei socii il plus o il minus delle quote
non conta. Per ci6 la Glossa con semplicita spontanea disse : idem
et si maximam partem habet. E cio e vero. Ma allora, nemmeno
e giusto attribuire ai compilatori un comento cosl stupido. Ed in
verita il periodo aggiunto ha valore per se stesso, per quel che dice.
Esso ha non il valore di una chiosa alia decisione che precede, ma
quello piuttosto di una limitazione, e cioe per significare che in ogni
caso la volonta di uno che ha nella comunione un interesse minimo
non deve pregiudicare agli altri.

Ecco di nuovo T interesse collettivo posto in risalto da
Giustiniano, in confronto della volonta dei singoli. E per ci6 e
sicuro che anche il testo in esame rappresenta un punto di vista che
si coordina perfettamente al nuovo principio qui posto in evidenza,
e fatto palese dai frammenti piu cospicui della materia. Se poi la
decisione del comune vantaggio spetti alia maggioranza numerica
dei socii, ovvero a coloro che hanno la prevalenza degli interessi, e
cosa che vedremo piu oltre.

L' applicazione del nuovo principio in materia di servitu sul fondo
comune deve valere, a fortiori^ per 1' acquisto, precisamente il
contrario di quello che insegnavano i classici.2

Ma ritornando al testo in esame osservo che la interpolazione
contenuta nel § I ha un significato ancora piu sovversivo ; perche
essa ammette la validita di concessione di servitu fatta da un gruppo

1 Eisele, ZSS. vol. xxx. pp. 133, 135. 2 D. viii. 3, 19, si omnes stipulentur.

iv] Communio e Comproprietct 99

di socii, cui piii tardi potranno accedere gli altri quando sia
costituita. II senso del periodo non pu6 essere equivoco. Non si
vuol dire certamente che la servitu viene ad esistere coir atto di
concessione fatto dall' ultimo, perche invece vi si suppone, espressa-
mente, che altri possano accedere alia concessione della servitu
costituita : et placet nihil interesse, utrum praecedat voluntas aquae
ductionem an subsequatur. Ed allora se non si vuole attribuire a
Giustiniano, oltre che un' eresia giuridica pure un' incongruenza, e
d' uopo sottintendere anche qui ripetuta la condizione posta avanti,
nel principio del testo ; cioe che la concessione deve aver luogo con
P effettivo vantaggio della collettivita, e che non pu6 esser posta nel
nulla da coloro che hanno nella comunione un minimo interesse.

Ed allo stesso risultato, per quanto concerne la possibilita della
cessione della servitu da una parte dei socii, conduce il

fr. 1 1 D. viii. 3, Celsus 27 dig. Per fundum, qui plurium est, ius
mihi esse eundi agendi potest separatim cedi. ergo \subtili ratione~\
non aliter meum fiet ius, quam si omnes cedant et novissima demum
cessione superiores omnes confirmabuntur : \benignius tamen dicetur^
et antequam novissimus cesserit, eos, qui antea cesserunt, vetari uti
cesso iure non posse].

Le superstrutture giustinianee sono qui evidenti e notissime.1
II legislatore dispone la efficacia giuridica della cessione fatta da
una parte dei condomini, che e irrevocabile, e per ci6 produttiva
degli effetti propri ad essa, anche prima che avvenga la disposizione
dell' ultimo. Proprio il contrario di quel che insegnava Celso nel
testo originale, e che era inevitabile per la natura del dritto che
compete ai singoli titolari della cosa comune, che dava a ciascuno
una posizione pari ed indipendente sulla cosa, per cui : non aliter
meum fiet tus, quam si omnes cedant ', et novissima demum cessione
superiores omnes confirmabuntur. *

Cosi sono anche questi testi coordinati attorno al nuovo
principio, e lo determinano e lo confermano in tutte le conseguenze.

63. Ma un altro punto, che riguarda lo scioglimento della
comunione di cose, inita per contratto, dev' essere qui con-
siderate ; non solo per il motivo che gl' interpreti antichi lo col-
legarono al fr. 26 D. viii. 2, ma perche in realta il nuovo ordina-
mento di Giustiniano vi si manifesta con grande rilievo. II passo
cui alludo e il

1 Kruger ad h. 1. 2 Cfr. D. viii. 4, 6, 2.

ioo S. Riccobono [iv

fr. 65 § 5 D. xvii. 2, Ulp. 32 ad ed. Labeo autem posteriorum
libris scripsit, si renuntiaverit societati unus ex sociis eo tempore,
quo interfuit socii non dirimi societatem, committere eum in pro
socio actione : nam si emimus mancipia inita societate, deinde
renunties mihi eo tempore, quo vendere mancipia non expedit, hoc
casu. quia deteriorem causam meam facis, teneri te pro socio
iudicio. Proculus hoc ita verum esse ait, [si societatis non intersit
dirimi societatem: semper enim non idy quod privatim interest
unius ex sociis, servari solet, sed quod societati expedit. haec ita
accipienda sunt,'] si nihil de hoc in coeunda societate convenit.

La decisione di Labeone era indubbiamente per ogni rispetto
giusta, come quella che discendeva dai principi piu fermi, che
regolano la societa. La quale al pari della comunione non era
riguardata dai giureconsulti classici come un ente organizzato, con
interessi distinti da quelli dei singoli, bensi come una semplice
aggregazione d' individui per conseguire determinati scopi ; e per
ci6, quando la societa fosse convenuta senza termine, ciascun socio
poteva rinunziarvi, in qualsiasi momento, salvo la responsabilita che
gli incombeva per la rinunzia fatta in tempo inopportune pregiu-
dizievole ai singoli come tali : interfuit socii non dirimi societatem.
II che vuol dire che il fondamento dell' actio pro socio si deve
ricercare nella lesione dell' interesse dei singoli, e non gia nel
pregiudizio che uno possa arrecare all' interesse collettivo.

Proculo consentiva certamente in cio : verum esse. Ma a rimuovere
qualsiasi ragione di equivoco notava : Proculus hoc ita verum esse
[...] si nihil de hoc in coeunda societate convenit'^ perche allora il
socio e legato dai contratto, che limita la sua liberta di rinunzia.
Tutto il resto che si legge nel passo e opera dei compilatori. Nella
F manca la frase ait si e cotali omissioni sono di frequente una
conseguenza delle saldature delle interpolazioni.2 Nella frase
servari solet si manifesta la incertezza di un principio direttivo,
la quale non puo essere nemmeno tolta di mezzo dai semper
che precede. E solet e verbo frequentissimo nelle correzioni

1 L' identica chiusa in 7. iii. 25, 5.

? Non sappiamo ancora il procedimento pratico adottato dai compilatori
nel correggere i passi ; ma indizii di vario ordine fanno ritenere che le
modificazioni erano apposte sui mss., tra le righe o nel margine con richiami.
Nel punto in esame sono visibili direi come due note sovrapposte : hoc ita
verum esse . . . haec ita accipienda sunt che non possono derivare dalla
stessa mano. E perche il plurale : accipienda sunt in luogo del singolare
accipiendum ? L' uso del plurale in questi casi e indizio d3 interpolazione ;
cfr. D. xli. 3, xliv. 3 ; Riccobono, ZSS. vol. xxxi. p. 359.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 101

giustinianee ai testi classici, adoperato sia nelle aggiunte che
portano una modificazione ai principii fondamentali, sia per
attenuare le decisioni ferme della giurisprudenza classica, ovvero
per limitare una sentenza avulsa dai suoi presupposti.1 Nel nostro
caso il verbo in parola e incongruo ed impressionante ; poiche tra
1' interesse della societas considerata come unita e quello dei singoli
socii come tali la distanza e enorme. Se Proculo mirava veramente
a contraddire il maestro, in un punto cosl essenziale, avrebbe scritto
con fermezza servatur. Di piu se Proculo, contrastando, riusciva
a colpire cosl in pieno la decisione di Labeone, egli non avrebbe
potuto iniziare la nota con la frase : hoc ita verum esse. II dissenso
su di un principio fondamentale non ammette concessioni. Or
alia stregua della dottrina esposta nella nota la decisione di
Labeone cade tutta, irremissibilmente, perche non e piu vero che
contro il socio rinunziante possa accordarsi un' azione, si interfuit
socii non dirimi societatem. Questo motive non ha piu valore ; e
per conseguenza nulla conta che a causa della rinunzia intempestiva,
come si esprimeva Labeone, deteriorem causam meam facts,

Ecco pertanto come la nota di Proculo investe a fondo la
decisione che precede ; appunto perche quella muove da un
principio diverse, secondo cui e 1' interesse sociale .<non quello dei
singoli che va tenuto in considerazione.2

E se guardiamo i termini del dissenso tra Labeone e Proculo
da un altro punto di vista la contraddizione diviene ancora piu
stridente ; avvegnache Labeone ammetteva 1' actio pro socio in
seguito alia rinunzia intempestiva fatta da uno dei coobbligati, e
ci6 in quanto derivasse una lesione all' interesse dell' attore :
interfuit socii non dirimi societatem ; Proculo invece avrebbe detta
questa decisione vera, ma solo nel caso si societatis non intersit
dirimi societatem ; cioe giusto enunciando un presupposto di fatto
contrario a quello indicate da Labeone, e che induce per se la
inammissibilita dell' actio , e di conseguenza la decisione contraria a
quella data dal suo maestro.

1 Cfr. Cod. viii. 53, 7 ; Riccobono, ZSS. vol. xxxiii. p. 292 ; D. iv. 4, 7
§ 2 ; D. xxvii. 10, I pr. ; D. 1. 17, in, in confronto col fr. 23 § 8 D. ix. 2 ;
e specialmente nel titolo de R. I. ha una funzione limitatrice come fere,
Praesertim, maxime^ plerumque^ saepe, onde contenere entro certi limiti la
massima che avulsa dai suoi presupposti assumeva una portata generale :
cfr. fr. 19, 58, 86, 94, 114 D. 1. 17. Pel fr. 39 pr. D. xxxix. 2 di Pomponio
cfr. p. 85, sotto il n. 48. 2 Cfr. B. xii. I, 62 scol. 8 (Heimb. i, p. 774).

IO2 S. Riccobono [iv

Si puo immaginare incongruenza piu manifesta tra due termini,
cosl discordanti sia nei presupposti, nel fondamento, nella decisione
e tuttavia congiunti P uno all' altro con la frase : ita verum esse ?
Si sarebbe dovuto perlomeno aspettare nella nota : si societatis
intersit non dirimi societatem, come corresse Aloandro, e gia il
glossatore Giovanni, ed ora i moderni contro la F.1

II lettore ha ora tutti gli elementi per decidere. E dira che
la correzione del testo e necessaria ; ma che insieme il brano
esaminato e tutto dei compilatori ; il quale giudizio, a mio modo
di vedere, s' impone in questo luogo per le considerazioni di vario
ordine esposte avanti, ma sopratutto poi per il riflesso che la nota
attribuita a Proculo s' inquadra perfettamente nell' ordine di idee
di Giustiniano.

64. Fu infatti Giustiniano che, come sappiamo, sostitui ogni
volta nella comunione alia volonta dei singoli P interesse sociale ; e
cosi Egli giunse pure a considerare la societa come un gruppo
collettivo, che ha volonta ed interessi distinti da quelli dei singoli
socii. E perci6 i compilatori ritoccando i testi, con tutta sponta-
neita, rappresentavano la societas come una unita, e scrivevano :

fr. 49 D. xvii. 2, Ulp. 31 ad ed. \Si hoc facto societatem laesit^
si verbi gratia negotiatorem servum vulneraverit vel occiderit.

In questo passo il primo periodo e emblematico ; i giuristi
esprimono il concetto con le frasi damnum in re communi socius
dedit fr. 47 § I eod. ; rei communi socius nocuit fr. 52 § 2 eod.

Nello stesso ordine di confronti e caratteristico il

fr. 58 § I D. xvii. 2, Ulp. 31 ad ed.

Item Celsus tractat, si pecuniam contulissemus ad mercem
emendam et mea pecunia perisset, cui perierit ea. et ait, si post
collationem evenit, ut pecunia periret, quod non fieret, nisi societas
coita esset, utrique perire, ut puta si pecunia, cum peregre
portaretur ad mercem emendam, periit ; \si vero ante collationem,
posteaquam earn destinasses, tune perierit, nihil eo nomine
consequeris, inquit, quia non societati periit\.

L' interpolazione della parte riprodotta in corsivo e manifesta

1 La correzione e gia nella Glossa (Giovanni), seguita da Aloandro, dagli
edd. italiani, ed ha un appoggio nei B. xii. i, 62 (Heimb. v. i, p. 775), dove
Stefano nella paragrafe (scol. 10) scrive : et p) rfj Koivcoviy Sia</>e/oei TO
Tavnrjv

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 103

principalmente per la inversione dei soggetti l ; poiche 1' ipotesi
fondamentale, esaminata dal giurista era : et mea pecunia periisset,
la quale si capovolge nel seguito del testo: si vero . . . destinasses
. . . quia non societati periit? E pertanto nella parte prima si
dice utrique perire, nella seconda invece non societati periit. fe
vero che qui la frase e senza conseguenze.

Tutta la dottrina della societas merita per ci6 una revisione da
questo punto di vista ; perche come s' e constatato il fr. 65 § 5,
nella parte interpolata coincide precisamente con quelle riforme
introdotte da Giustiniano nella comunione. In questo luogo
interessava porre in relievo il confronto, che da forza alia nostra
dimostrazione.

IV. LA VOLONTA DELLA MAGGIORANZA

65. L' autonomia dei singoli nella comunione e nella societa fu
certamente soppressa nella Compilazione di Giustiniano, in cui,
come s' e visto, la considerazione dell' interesse collettivo prende il
posto del vantaggio e del volere dei singoli compartecipi. Ed in
rispondenza perfetta con questo nuovo principio si rinviene pure
surrogata alia unanimita del consenso di tutti, per qualsiasi
disposizione materiale della cosa, la volonta della maggioranza, la

1 Essa aveva soltanto lo scope di completare 1' esame del caso, invertendo
i presupposti enunciati avanti. Indizii : si vero. . . . tune perierit . . .
periit. Cfr. Harmenopuli Exab. iii. 10, 21.

2 Nei fr. genuini dei giureconsulti e costante la terminologia conferre in
societatem, imputare societati, omnibus, ceteris, le quali frasi sono per-
fettamente equivalent!, e si riferiscono sempre all' interesse dei singoli socii
considerato in complesso solo per il lato economico, ma non giuridicamente.
Infatti per quel che concerne le conseguenze giuridiche soltanto 1' interesse e
la persona dei singoli vengono posti in azione ; cosl in D. xvii. 2, fr. 60 Pomp.
13 ad Lab. . . . usuras quoque eum praestare debere Labeo ait . . . sed
quod socii intersit moram eum non adhibuisse. — fr. 73 eod. Ulp. I resp. . . .
ea quoque, quae in honorem alterius liberorum erogata sunt, utrisque
imputanda. — 2-3 pr. eod. . . . sociis praestet.

E piu rimarchevole ancora e vedere che nello stesso fr. 65 D. xvii. 2,
richiamato sopra, Cassio e Paolo usano gli stessi termini adoperati da
Labeone nel decidere i singoli casi : § 3 (Cassius) . . . se autem ab tilts non
liber are. § 4 ... teneberis qiianti interest mea. § 5 (Labeo) . . . interfuit
socii non dirimi societatem . . . deteriorem causam meam fads. § 6. (Paulus)
. . . socium a se, non se a socio liberat\ cfr. 21 D. eod. (Ulpjanus) . . .
nos cum eo non communicabimus. Cfr. Cuq, Inst. ii. p. 442. E vero, per
altro, che le alterazioni tribonianee sono continue nel senso inverso accennato
in questo scritto.

IO4 S. Riccobono [iv

quale ora ha il potere di deliberare intorno al godimento, alia
conservazione o destinazione della cosa comune.

Come di solito le interpolazioni giustinianee sono anche in
questo proposito saltuarie, e non rendono a prima giunta una norma
ben precisa e determinata ; ma la cosa tuttavia e certissima, come
si scorge dalla dimostrazione che precede, e come deve emergere
con evidenza osservando i testi fondamentali che si riferiscono
alia comunione, e che riunisco qui per coordinarli in una sintesi :

fr. ii D. viii. 3 ... benignius tamen dicetur et antequam
novissimus cesserit, eos, qui antea cesserunt, vetare uti cesso iure
non posse.

fr. 10 D. xxxix. 3. ... iniquum enim visum est voluntatem
unius ex modica forte portiuricula dominii praeiudicium sociis facere.

fr. 26 D. viii. 2. ... si modo toti societati prodest opus tolli.

fr. 65 § 5 D. xvii. 2. si societatis intersit non dirimi societatem.

Nei quali passi al consenso unanime dei socii e costantemente
sostituita la volonta o la disposizione di una parte di essi, che, a
volte espressamente, e autorizzata ad agire in opposizione ad uno
dei socii, che ha nella communio un interesse minore.

Ed allo stesso risultato si giunge quando si tenga conto di
quelle altre frasi in cui Giustiniano non si riporta alia volonta dei
socii, ma si bene all' interesse della cosa medesima ; perche, come
s' & detto, 1' interesse obbiettivo non coincide per s& stesso con la
volonta dei singoli socii :

fr. 6 § 12 D. x. 3. si interfuit aedium hoc fieri,
fr. 14 § 2 D. x. 3. quod etiam ipsius rei qualitati prodest.
fr. 28 D. x. 3. ut tamen factum opus tollat cogi non potest [in
confronto con 26 D. viii. 2].

66. E del resto su questo proposito vi e un passo di grande
importanza che pu6 essere ora esaminato con ben altra perspicacia :

fr. 14 D. xvi. 3, Gai. ix. ad ed. Si plures heredes exstiterint
ei qui deposuerit, [dicitur, si maior pars adierit, restituendam rent
praesentibus : maiorem autem partem non ex numero utique
personarum, sed ex magnitudine portionum hereditariarum in-
telligendam : cautela idonea reddendd}.

Questa decisione e nuova,1 ed ha un' importanza di prim' ordine
neir argomento in esame.

1 L' interpolazione si manifesta per varii indizii : 1' ablative assoluto finale
fu rilevato dagli antichi, dal Brissonio e dal Fabro : Coniect. xii. 1 6, 6 ; il quale

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 105

E dico avanti tutto che non c' e modo di aggregate una siffatta
decisione ai principii piu certi seguiti dai giureconsulti. Infatti,
ove si supponga che i coeredi siano condomini della cosa depositata
e che vogliano agire con la ret vindicatio non e dubbio che ciascuno
deve agire pro parte ; e parimenti se esperiscono P actio depositi
deve ciascuno agire pro parte, sul fondamento del titolo di eredita.
Tutto ci6 e sicuro. II dubbio ha ragion d' essere solo nella
compilazione di Giustiniano, e particolarmente rispetto al deposito
di cose indivisibili ; perche anche questa materia fu profondamente
rimescolata da Giustiniano. Ma secondo il diritto classico ne uno
degli eredi ne la maggioranza di essi hanno diritto a richiedere la
restituzione dell' intero, che li esporrebbe alia plus petitio. Cia-
scuno deve invece chiedere sempre la parte che gli spetta per il
titolo di erede. Soltanto questo e vero, che il depositario puo
evitare la condanna dichiarandosi pronto a restituere rem anche
ad un solo, quando gli si offra cauzione per le possibili molestie da
parte degli altri coeredi. Tale procedimento e attestato dallo stesso
Giustiniano, che lo accolse in passi interpolati (cfr. fr. I §36/7. xvi.
3) in confronto con quello in esame, ed e per altro il rimedio
consueto in qualsiasi evenienza.

Esso e applicato da Giuliano nella specie che segue :

fr. i § 37 D. xvi. 3 Ulp. 30 aded. Apud Julianum libro tertio
decimo digestorum talis species relata est : ait enim, si depositor
decesserit et duo existant, qui inter se contendant unusquisque solum
se heredem dicens, ei tradendam rem, qui paratus est adversus alterum

raccolse altre identiche aggiunte di Triboniano ; cfr. De Ruggiero, Studii
Fadda, ii. p. 217 nota ; appare inoltre dalle molteplici ellissi che si riscontrano
nello squarcio ; e cioe dopo deposuerit si richiederebbe rem, il genitive
eorum dopo maior pars ; ed infine vanno notati i due gerundii : restituen-
dam, intellegendam privi del verbo ausiliare. Ma piu di tutti cotesti indizii
ha peso quel disgraziato adierit non determinate nell3 oggetto, e che perci6
ha fatto difficolta di interpretazione. L' opinione dominante presso gli antichi
voile intendere : adierit hereditatem [cfr. Gliick, Erldut. vol. xv. p. 231], ed
essa ha il conforto dei B. xiii. 2, 14, scolio i di Stefano (Heimb. v. ii. p. 47).
La Glossa piti. accorta spiego : ad repetundum depositum. A. Fabro, /. c.,
corresse il testo in modo arbitrario ; ma la sua argomentazione nella parte
negativa e ineccepibile. Egli scriveva : legendumque aderit, nam priora ilia
' si plures heredes exstiterint ' ostendunt ab omnibus heredibus aditam fuisse
hereditatem^ quia nee testamentarii nee legitimi heredes nee alii denique
quam sui prius exstiterunt heredes quam adierint. sequentia vero ' restituen-
dam rem praesentibus ' demonstrant eum casum tractari quo pars tantum
heredum adsit petatque depositum.

io6 S. Riccobono [iv

reum defendere, [hoc est eum qui depositum suscepit] : 1 quod si
neuter hoc onus suscipiat commodissime dici ait non esse cogendum
a praetore iudicium suscipere : \pportere igitur rent deponi in aede
aliqua, donee de her edit ate iudicetur\?

E per altro P azione di deposito si da pro parte quando due o piu
sono i deponenti :

fr. 17 pr. D. xvi. 3 ... quod aliter est [scilicet non in solidum],
cum rem communem plures deponunt ; — fr. I § 3 1 D. eod. . . .
unicuique dominorum in partem competit depositi.

Dunque la soluzione del quesito proposto da Gaio nel fr. in esame
era pronta ; perche i coeredi debbono esperire P actio depositi pro parte.
E se la cosa e indivisibile P attore deve offrire cauzione al convenuto
per la parte degli altri coeredi, dai quali il depositario deve essere
garentito e protetto da ogni possibile molestia. La cautio mette in
evidenza che ciascuno dei coeredi ha diritto di esercitare le azioni
del defunto solo per la quota di eredita a lui pervenuta ; non potendo
il dritto degli altri essere in modo alcuno leso o solo menomato
dalP azione di uno o di una maggioranza qualsiasi degli eredi.

E percio possiamo ritenere sicura in questo punto la innovazione
legislativa di Giustiniano, il quale all' accordo di tutti i coeredi
all' azione dei singoli pro parte sostitul P azione concessa ad un
gruppo, costituito da coloro che nelP eredita rappresentano la
maggioranza degli interessi. Si noti che nel passo non e fatta
distinzione di obbietto divisibile o indivisibile ; quale rilievo e
gravissimo, perche induce un' evidente contraddizione tra il passo
in esame e gli altri citati piu sopra. Giustiniano per altro tratto con
vera predilezione e cura la materia del deposito, e voile particolar-
mente porre riparo a quel sistema delP actio pro parte, specie in se-
guito ad eredita, che a suo modo d' intendere era complicata ; e che
poteva dar luogo a tergiversazioni da parte di uno o dei pochi,
che avendo nella eredita una modica portiuncula, potevano facilmente
assumere un atteggiamento astioso, pregiudizievole agli altri.3

1 Glossa, cf. Lenel, Pal. ii. c.

2 Triboniano. Infatti la conseguenza (igitur) non si ricava dalle premesse
contenute nel testo e riguarda per nulla la lite tra i pretendenti della eredita.
La depositio in aede, del resto, e rimedio consueto adoperato da Giustiniano,
come si vedrk subito.

3 Le riforme di Giustiniano in questa materia indicate sommariamente
furono le seguenti :

(a) Egli stabili che ove la cosa depositata sia indivisibile la restituzione
deve essere in solidum a ciascuno dei titolari ;

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 107

La riforma, dunque, anche in questo luogo e determinata da

fr. 22 D. xvi. 3 : [ — et nisi pro solido res non potest restitui. nee tamen
absurde sentiet, qui hoc putaverit, plane nisi integrae ret restitutione eum, cum
quo actum fuerit, liberari non posse, condemnandum tamen, si res non resti-
tuetur, pro qua parte heres extitit.] II giureconsulto trattava solo de!la
responsabilita solidale del coeredi per la contrettazione dolosa del deposito,
e Giustiniano rivolge la decisione alia restituzione della res. Per la interpola-
zione del brano : Nee tamen . . . extitit cfr. Eisele, ZSS. xxx. p. 1 20.

Altra interpolazione, che in alcuni punti coincide con quella or indicata,
nel fr. i § 44 eod. Sed si duo deposuerint et ambo agant, [si quidem sic
deposuerunt; ut vel unus tollat totum, poterit in solidum agere ; sin vero pro
parte, pro quae eorum interest, tune dicendum est in partem condemnationem
faciendam\ La conclusione e banale, e la forma del testo pessima, d' im-
pronta bizantina.

(ft) Ammise 1' intervento del magistrato per la consegna ai coeredi della
loro parte ; ed ove la cosa fosse indivisibile anche il deposito in aede : cfr. I
§ 36 D. eod. interamente interpolate, come vide gia Fabro, Con. xii. 16, 8.
II rimedio del deposito si riscontra pure nel fr. 5 in f. eod. nisi . . . deponi.
E cosl in materia di pagamenti da fare al minore nel fr. 7 § 2 D. iv. 4. . . .
[Sed hodie solet pecunia in aedem deponi], ut Pomponius 1. xxviii scribit, ne
vel debitor ultra usuris oneretur, vel creditor minor perdat pecuniam, \aut
curatoribus solvi, si sunt~\. La citazione di Pomp, si riferiva appunto alia
necessita di nominare un curator al minore, di cui si tratta nel seguito del
testo.

(c) In armonia col fr. 14 D. xvi. 3, esaminato sopra, ammise che la cosa
depositata indivisibile si restituisse alia pars heredum ma in seguito a iussus
praetoris ; fr. 8 1 § i D. xlvi. 3 : Si lancem deposuerit apud me Titius et pluribus
heredibus relictis decesserit : [si pars heredum me interpellet optimum quidem
esse, si praetor aditus iussisset me parti heredum earn lancem tradere, quo casu
depositi me reliqtds coheredibus non teneri. sed et si sine praetore sine dolo
malo hoc fecero liberabor aut (quod verius est) non incidam in obligationem.
optimum autem est id per magistratum facere\.

La struttura del passo, a cominciare dalla frase : si pars heredum me
interpellet da luogo a gravi sospetti per le ripetizioni : si lancem . . . earn
lancem . . . pars heredum . . . parti heredum . . . reliquis . . . Per i
tempi dei verbi etcc. cfr. anche Di Marzo, Libri 'di Pomp, ad Q. M. p. 52 ;
1' interpolazione del periodo finale sed etsi . . . facere fu notata dal Pernice
(Berliner Sitzungsber. a. 1886 p. 1 180 n. 5); ed ora sappiamo meglio che tutti
questi espedienti per effettuare la restituzione del deposito a parte degli eredi
sono giustinianei. Solo che qui, richiedendosi 1' intervento del magistrato, non
si esige la consegna ne sia fatta alia maior pars heredum. E per ci6 tutta la
materia e folta d' interpolazioni che suscitarono in ogni tempo controversie ;
Accursio da come opinione dominante fra i glossatori quella che ammetteva
sempre 1' actio pro parte, salvo patto in contrario : fr. i § 44 D. xvi. 3 ; altri
per6 distinguevano 1' oggetto divisibile da quello indivisibile, accordando in
quest' ultimo caso la petizione in solido : cosi Baldo ad 1. 14 D. xvi. 3 ;
Duareno, Opp..\\\. p. 500; e gia gl' interpret! greci : Stefano : B. xiii. 2, 14
(Heimbach, ii. p. 47).

io8 5. Riccobono [iv

quello stesso ordine di idee e da quel medesimo spirito, che indussero
un cosi profondo mutamento in tutto il diritto di comproprieta.

67. Ma qui conviene indugiare un memento per gettare uno
sguardo su altri rapporti regolati ex novo nella compilazione, e dai
quali potremo apprendere, che in realta il diritto di disposizione
della cosa comune, conferito da Giustiniano alia maggioranza dei
socii, risponde ad un principle generale applicato dal legislatore
tutte le volte che piu persone si trovano in una medesima situazione,
collegate da un comune interesse. Lo rinveniamo, pertanto, adottato
tra coeredi e condomini, nella cessione dei beni come nel concorso
dei creditori, sempre negli stessi termini, cioe con la prevalenza
accordata, in primo luogo, a coloro che hanno la parte o 1* interesse
maggiore.

In ordine alia cessione dei beni la innovazione e annunziata da
Giustiniano direttamente nella c. 8 Cod. vii. 71, diretta a Giovanni,
emanata durante la formazione dei Digesti.

II legislatore dice : Et sancimus ut vel ex cumulo debiti vel ex
numero creditorum causa iudicetur. I creditori che hanno il maggiore
interesse, sia uno o piu, hanno il diritto di decidere : ipsius sententia
optineat — amplior debiti cumulus minori summae praeferatur — Part
autem quantitate debiti inventa . . . tune amplior pars creditorum
optineat) ut quod pluribus placeat statuatur. Sin vero undique
aequalitas emergat — tune eos anteponi qui ad humaniorem declinant
sententiam, non cessionem exigentes sed inducias.

Le stesse statuizioni si riscontrano applicate nei Digesti con
grande coerenza, quantunque saltuariamente.

In primo luogo nel

fr. 7 § 19 D. ii. 14 Ulp. 4 ad ed. Hodie tamen ita demum pactio
huiusmodi creditoribus obest, si convenerint in unum et communi
consensu declaraverint quota parte debiti contenti sint : si vero dis-
sentiant) tune praetoris paries necessariae sunt, qui decreto suo sequetur
maioris partis voluntatem.

L' interpolazione in questo punto1 fu inserita per dare ai
creditori, che siano d' accordo, un potere dispositive, nel senso che
la loro deliberazione e munita per se stessa d' efficacia giuridica.
L' intervento del pretore si esige soltanto nel disaccordo degli
stessi, e solo in questa ipotesi il magistrate con decreto dara
esecuzione alia volonta della maggioranza. Tale ordinamento e
1 Beseler, Beitrdge^ ii. 97.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 109

nuovo. Perche nel diritto classico ove e fatta menzione del-
1' assemblea del creditor! e della maggioranza di essi, per la creazione
del magister? per la nomina del curator bonorum? per la lex bono-
rum vendundorum* si richiede sempre la proposta o il consenso
degli interessati, della maggioranza di essi, essendo per altro la
creazione del magister o la nomina del curator o le condizioni della
vendita poste in essere da un decreto del pretore. La differenza
dunque risalta : nel diritto classico i creditori cooperano col magi-
strate e sono adunati per far proposte ; nel diritto di Giustiniano
hanno entro certi limiti facolta di disporre direttamente.

II passo che segue nei Digesti contiene applicazioni di altre
norme sancite nella c. 8 cit, ed e cosl riportato :

fr. 8 eod. Pap. 10 resp. Maiorem esse partem pro modo debiti,
non pro numero personarum placuit [quod si aequales sint in cumulo
debiti) tune plurium numerus creditorum praeferendus est ; in numero
autem pari creditorum auctoritatem eius sequetur praetor \ qui dignitate
inter eos praecellit. sin autem omnia undique in unam aequalitatem
concurrant) humanior sententia a praetor e eligenda esi\ hoc enim ex
divi Marci rescripto colligi potest.

L' interpolazione della parte centrale del testo fu accertata dal
Gradenwitz ; 4 il quale, con la consueta perspicacia, rinvenne pure
di recente, nella cosl detta legge delle citazioni di Teodosio e
Valentiniano il modello di cui si servirono i compilatori.5

Lo schema di quella celebre legge e davvero interessante e val
la pena di riprodurlo qui per un altro riscontro che ci occorrera
subito.

c. 3 Th. i. 4 : Ubi autem diversae sententiae proferuntur, potior
numerus vincat auctorum, vel si numerus aequalis sit eius partis
praecedat auctoritas, in qua excellentis ingenii vir Papinianus
emineat. . . . Ubi autem pares eorum sententiae recitantur, quorum
par censetur auctoritas, quod sequi debeat eligat moderatio iudi-
cantis.

68. Or e degno di nota che cotesto criterio della maggioranza e

1 Gai iii. 79 (creari) ; Theoph. iii. 12 (7iy>o/:?aAA«r#ai); su questi passi v.
Kniep (MM. Girard^ i. p. 630 e seg. ; Cic. ad Att. vi. i, 15).

2 fr. 2 pr. § i D. xlii. 7 ; Lenel Ed. p. 419.

3 fr. 58 § i D. xvii. i ; Paul. 4 quaest. — maiore parte creditorum consen-
tiente a praetore decretum est.

4 Interpoldtionen, pp. 62, 63 ; Lenel, Pal. Pap. 650.

5 ZSS. vol. xxxii. p. 383.

no S. Riccobono [iv

della parita di voti si rinviene adottato, negli stessi termini come
nei passi avanti riferiti, pure in un' opera occidentale contemporanea,
cioe in un passo di Paolo Visigoto a proposito del servo comune :

Paul. S. iv. 12, 5. Communem servum unus ex sociis vinciendo
futurae libertati non nocebit. \Inter pares enim sententia clementior
severiori praefertur : et certe humanae rationis estfavere miserioribus,
prope et innocentes dicere quos absolute nocentes pronuntiare non
possunt J]

Nella parita dei voti dei compartecipi si dice anche qui che deve
prevalere sententia clementior ; come nella c. 8 Cod. si antepon-
gono : qui ad humaniorem declinant sententiam, e nel fr. 8 D* ii. 14,
humanior sententia . . . eligenda est. Ma in qual momento pote
introdursi tale principio per il diritto private ? lo dico che il passo
or riferito non pu6 essere di Paolo. La frase inter pares priva di
un sostantivo ha fatto difficolta. Huschke ridusse all' accusative la
parola sententia che segue, senza accorgersi che allora il compara-
tive clementior resta in aria. Ma tutto cio importa poco. II
senso del passo e chiaro e si determina nella continuazione, dove si
dice certamente che nella parita dei voti deve prevalere la disposi-
zione piu clemente in favore della liberta ; e dove la massima si
costruisce pure con un argomento che e proprio per i corpi delibe-
ranti di diritto pubblico, cioe che nella parita non vi pu6 essere
condanna, perche il giudizio sfavorevole e annullato dai voti con-
trarii : quos absolute nocentes pronuntiare non possunt. II lettore
vede gia che il verbo possunt spunta come un fungo, e attesta in
maniera irrefutabile che tutto il brano e d' origine postclassica.
Genuine e solo il primo periodo : communem . . . non nocebit^ che
contiene precisamente 1' applicazione del principio classico del condo-
minio, per cui uno dei socii non puo menomamente pregiudicare la
facolta di disposizione dell' altro rispetto alia cosa comune ; x e non
puo, pertanto, ne dare la liberta al servo ne impedirla in mode
assoluto. Piu tardi, e vero, anche nel periodo della giurisprudenza
classica, furono adottate disposizioni di favore per la liberta dei
servi, svolte poi largamente da Giustiniano.2

69. Tutti cotesti elementi, dunque, raccolti da fonti tarde3 e

1 Cfr. Paul. S. iv. 12, i.

2 Const, un. Cod. 7, 7 ; Riccobono, BIDR. vol. vii. p. 244 ; Mitteis,
Archiv f. Pap. iii. p. 252 seg.

3 Per quel che concerne il diritto private si trova menzione della facolta
di disposizione della maior pars in una lex mandpio dicta, aggiunta alia

iv] Communio e Comproprieta in

varie rendono piu chiara la visione del nostro problema ; perche in
realta noi rinveniamo applicati nella Compilazione di Giustiniano
gli stessi principii al condominio ; in primo luogo il diritto della
maggioranza di disporre della cosa comune.

E per ci6 la posizione indipendente che i singoli avevano nelJa
comproprieta, secondo la struttura classica dell' istituto, resta, nel
nuovo sistema inaugurate da Giustiniano, essenzialmente annullata.
Ora, invece, la comunione puo dirsi organizzata in una certa
forma ; ha una volonta complessiva, la quale custodisce, regola ed
esplica 1' interesse collettivo sotto tutti gli aspetti. Di con-
seguenza, al consenso di tutti i socii, che era necessario per
qualsiasi disposizione materiale della cosa comune, si sostitul la
facolta di disposizione della maggioranza.

70. E pertanto le aggiunte giustinianee ai passi dei giuristi
classici acquistano ora un significato preciso e grande rilievo, che
esse si aggregano tutte perfettamente attorno al nuovo ordinamento,
che ha un deciso carattere sociale. Si puo negare forse un tale
significato a quella norma legislativa che permette la rimozione
dell' opera fatta da un socio solo nel caso che giovi alia colletti-
vita ? : si toti societati prodest opus tolli> 26 D. viii. 2. E la stessa
formula, come sappiamo, ritorna nel fr. 65 § 5 D. xvii. 2 : si intersit
societati non dirimi societatem. E piu vivamente ancora quel con-
cetto e accentuate nel fr. 10 pr. D. xxxix. 3.: iniquum enim visum
est voluntatem unius ex modica forte portiuncula dominii prae-
iudicium sociis facer e. Che eresia giuridica e mai questa? Colui
che ha parte nella comunione, e sia una minima parte, ha diritto
di far valere la sua volonta come gli altri, perche la sua posizione
giuridica e pari a quella degli altri. Cosl ragionava la giuri-
sprudenza aurea. Ma nell' inciso giustinianeo si da un gran rilievo

donatio Flavii Syntrophi del II o in sec. p. C. (Bruns-Gradenwitz, n. 1 39, p.
337) : et & quis ibi inhabitare voluerit ex communi omnium consensu
maiorisve partis eorum qui vivent^ id ei liceat. Naturalmente il potere con-
ferito alia maggioranza non ha qui un valore speciale, perche si tratta di una
condizione espressa dal disponente, e nulla si oppone, inoltre, alia validita di
una tale convenzione tra condomini che sia diretta a regolare il godimento o
P amministrazione della cosa comune. Nel documento citato si tratta in
realta di condominio ; perch& se la mancipatio degli orti fu fatta ad un liberto,
egli deve comunicarli a tutti i conliberti, e tutti insieme devono godere del
reddito dei beni, che sara impiegato per il culto della tomba del disponente,
nei giorni designati.

112 S. Riccobono [iv

alia utilita ed alia considerazione dei maggiori interessati, e quindi
la prevalenza a coloro che rappresentano la parte maggiore ; il quale
interesse non deve essere paralizzato, si dice, da colui che ha nella
comunione una modica porzioncella. Nella frase stessa usata dal
legislatore, P interesse del singolo, e per giunta minore al confronto,
scade fino al dispregio. Naturalmente. Perche nella Compilazione
di Giustiniano P idea dell' interesse sociale, del vantaggio dei piu,
considerate sempre in modo obbiettivo, irrompe su ogni angolo, e
si diffonde come un getto di sole vivo. E per cio nella comunione
e nella societa alia volonta ed agli interessi dei singoli debbono
sempre prevalere la volonta della maggioranza, e P utilita sociale.
Cosl nelP eredita : la maior pars degli eredi ha diritto di chiedere
il deposito fatto dal loro autore, qualunque esso sia ; e la maggio-
ranza si determina ex magnitudine portionum hereditariarum}

E la maggioranza che in caso di conflitto sceglie, per votazione,
il depositario delle cautiones hereditariae : fr. 5 D. x. 2 \yel
suffragio\? E, cosa veramente sorprendente, alia maggioranza dei
coeredi si attribuisce la facolta di alienare validamente P intera cosa
ereditaria :

fr. 44 § 2 D. x. 2. Si coheredes absente uno coherede rem ven-
diderunt et in ea re dolo malo fecerunt, quo plus ad eos perveniret
[vel familiae erciscundae iudicio praestabunt ei qui abfuit vel heredi-
tatis petitione].

L' interpolazione si manifesta nel praestare senza oggetto ;
dacche la correzione del Mo. e arbitraria. Or se P assente, come
dice il testo, ha soltanto le azioni contro i coeredi, ci6 significa che
P alienazione e considerata efficace per la cosa intera. Vedi contro
fr. 64 § 4 D. xxi. 2, esaminato piu sopra a p. 42, e principalmente
poi il fr. 54 D. x. 2 di Nerazio, che esclude il iud. fam. ere. rispetto
al fondo venduto da parte di alcuni eredi.

V. LA STRUTTURA DELLA COMMUN1O NEL DIRITTO
GIUSTINIANEO

71. La ricostruzione dommatica di un istituto di dritto pre-
suppone ferma conoscenza dei principii di fondo del medesimo e

1 fr. 14 pr. D. xvi. 3.

2 L3 interpolazione nel testo e forse piu estesa.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 113

delle norme particolari ; e quindi la determinazione precisa del loro
valore.

Nella legislazione di Giustiniano esistono, come si e visto, due
ordini di principii riguardo alia comunione ; e di conseguenza
molte disposiztoni particolari sono in perfetta opposizione tra loro.

Qui dunque bisogna intendersi preliminarmente sui criterii che
T interprete deve seguire nella ricostruzione dello istituto. Ed io
suppongo che per questo rispetto P accordo non dovrebbe incon-
trare ostacolo di sorta ; avvegnache tutti debbono consentire in
ci6 : che ove la compilazione di Giustiniano si voglia considerare
come un Codice, per ricavarne i principii fondamentali dei singoli
istituti, per 1* applicazione pratica o per la trattazione scientifica, e
sempre necessario procedere ad un confronto tra i testi contrad-
dittorii, dar la prevalenza ai concetti affermati dal legislatore nella
sua opera, lasciando cadere poi quegl' altri che nel corpo della
Compilazione figurano come una sopravvivenza storica, e perci6
come punti morti nell' organismo del nuovo diritto.

Siffatto metodo e imposto dalla natura stessa dell' opera
legislativa, formata in una maniera cosl singolare.

La Glossa adoper6, se guardiamo i risultati, un processo identico.
Essa, come e noto, mise alia luce tutto il contenuto del Corpus
Juris, e lo doto di nuova forza, ma secondo 1' indole dei tempi giunse
a quel risultato mediante distinzioni, conciliazioni ed artifici molti,
considerati nei singoli casi come idonei a superare le difficolta dei
testi contraddittori. Oggi noi arriviamo piu direttamente e con
maggior sicurezza alia meta, merce la critica storica.

II metodo e quindi diverso, ma i risultamenti debbono pareg-
giarsi, come vedremo tosto nel c. iii. della presente trattazione.

72. Or applicando cotali criterii nello studio della communio,
noi siamo costretti a tagliar fuori avanti tutto il principio di fondo,
quale era rappresentato dai giuristi classici, e che appare in tutta
la sua energia nella formulazione di Sabino, che e stata gia larga-
mente discussa.

Secondo i giuristi ciascuno dei socii ha pieno il diritto di pro-
prieta sulla cosa comune. E perci6 i singoli hanno una posizione
di dritto perfettamente uguale ; sono liberi ed indipendenti ; e per
consequenza la volonta di ciascuno deve valere quanto la volonta
degli altri. Da'cic- deriva necessariamente la regola : che colui che
vieta e poziore ; effetto inevitabile per il concorso di dritti che

ii4 S. Riccobono [iv

hanno forza pari. La comunione pertanto e un istituto senza di-
sciplina, che non sopporta norme regolatrici, le quali sarebbero in
contrasto col dritto assoluto dei titolari della proprieta. Quando
il disaccordo si manifesta non v' e altro rimedio che la divisione.

Or e certo che tutta questa struttura della communio fu distrutta
da Giustiniano, perche i testi che contenevano appunto i principii e
le conseguenze or esposti furono annullati direttamente dalle nuove
aggiunte legislative, applicate giusto in tutti i passi fondamentali
dei diversi titoli del Digesto. E sono queste aggiunte e quelle
riforme che debbono apprestare all' interprete gli elementi precipui
per la ricostruzione del nuovo istituto ; perche, come bene osservo
il Lenel,1 una interpolazione, ed a maggior ragione una serie di
interpolazioni, costituiscono sempre un « deliberate atto legislative »
ed il risultato als bewusster Gesetzgebungsakt lega 1' interprete
con la forza di un ordine.

Ed abbracciando per cio in una volta, in una sintesi generale,
tutte quelle riforme dianzi discusse, la struttura della communio
risulta nella legislazione di Giustiniano come segue.

73. La comunione del diritto giustinianeo e disciplinata da
norme generali, le quali elisero in primo luogo quella indipendenza
che i socii avevano in virtu della loro posizione pari, secondo il
diritto quiritario del dominio.

Ed accertata questa nozione fondamentale e generalissima, il
nuovo schema dell' istituto si disegna come appresso.

(1) La regola centrale di tutto 1' istituto classico formulata da
Sabino, che vietava a ciascun socio qualsiasi disposizione materiale
della cosa, fu essenzialmente abolita.

(2) Ogni condomino pu6 ora, positivamente, compiere atti dis-
positivi che si esplicano sulla cosa, anche contro la volonta degli
altri ; esigendosi soltanto che gli atti di disposizione o le opere siano
di vantaggio alia collettivita.

(3) Di conseguenza, lo ius prohibendi, rinnegato come privata
difesa, fu ammesso in via giudiziaria entro certi limiti soltanto ; e
cioe prima dell' inizio delle opere o per rimuovere quelle che fossero
riconosciute pregiudizievoli all' interesse della comunione.

(4) I condomini hanno rispetto alia cosa una posizione pari, come
prima ; ma essi nori sono piu indipendenti e sciolti, sibbene collegati
tra loro ed organizzati in un gruppo collettivo.

1 Archil) f. civ. Praxis^ vol. Ixxviii. p. 362.

iv] Communio e Comproprietct 115

(5) L' organizzazione dei socii si manifesta nel diritto che spetta
alia maggioranza di essi di decidere intorno al godimento, alia con-
servazione ed alia destinazione della cosa. La maggioranza si
determina anche qui mediante il compute del maggior valore delle
quote rappresentate dai singoli socii.

(6) A tutelare le facolta attribuite ai singoli compartecipi servono
ora tutte le azioni che di norma competono al domino solitario, e
che possono esperirsi tra socii vicendevolmente ; e ci6 sia per
costringere gli altri a prestare il loro consenso per 1' esecuzione di
un' opera o 1* attuazione di qualsiasi atto dispositivo, sia per im-
pedire nuove opere ovvero ottenere la rimozione di quelle fatte, sia
per conseguire indennizzo per il danno arrecato da uno alia cosa
comune ; ed infine per la partizione di spese e utili.

(7) II iud. communi dividundo pu6 esperirsi durante la comu-
nione, per far valere tutte le ragioni di sopra indicate. Come tale
il indicium c. d. pu6 designarsi quale un mezzo generale e proprio
a tutela dei diritti dei condomini ; F azione per antonomasia che
regola la vita ed il buon andamento della comunione in qualsiasi
evenienza. Ma tutte le altre azioni speciali, di cui si disse (6), con-
corrono, a scelta dell' interessato, per ovviare o reprimere abusi,
danni, immissioni, etcc. a seconda i particolari presupposti richiesti
per F esercizio delle medesime.

Tutte queste proposizioni nel loro insieme costituiscono la
nuova struttura della communio del diritto giustinianeo ; esse non
esigono alcuna illustrazione e nemmeno citazioni di testi ; perche si
appoggiano, in tutti i particolari, sulla dimostrazione che precede.

74. Ma se le aggiunte e gF incisi giustinianei piu sbalestrati e
finora deserti acquistano nella presente trattazione un carattere di
unita cosl saldo, io chiedo, mi siano consentite, nel chiudere questo
capitolo, alcune riflessioni d' indole piu generale.

La dimostrazione fornita ha accertato nel modo piu sicuro che
la comunione ebbe nel diritto giustinianeo una disciplina, nel senso
piu particolare che i socii sono ormai reciprocamente legati da un
ordinamento che viene dalla legge, e che deve in ogni caso attuarsi,
anche contro la volonta dei compartecipi. Ma caratteristico e
nel contempo insigne e il pensiero centrale che anima tutta quella
nuova disciplina, e che e costituito dalla utilita collettiva che deve
attuarsi in ogni caso, senza considerazione degli interessi dei singoli.

ii6 S. Riccobono [iv

E questo pensiero, inciso fortemente in tutte le norme, ebbe la
potenza di soppiantare tutte le regole del diritto classico in materia
di comunione : colpl anzitutto >la concezione stessa del dominio
nella sua radice piu vigorosa, ed annient6 cosl la indipendenza dei
singoli socii ; e per conseguenza F arbitrio, la onnipotenza della
volonta, e lo ius prohibendi, affermazione virile sempre pronta del
diritto individuale. Ora, invece, F interesse sociale deve in ogni
caso prevalere. La volonta della maggioranza annulla quella dei
singoli socii. In caso di dissenso o di opposizione materiale ha
luogo la coazione giudiziaria ; qualunque ne sia la causa ; si mani-
festi cio6 per il godimento della cosa, per le opere conservative
ovvero per innovazioni sulla cosa comune. In proposito non vi ha
limite alcuno nei testi, come pretese la Glossa,1 e non occorre per
ci6 distinguere tra atti dispositivi riguardanti F uso normale della
cosa e altri che importerebbero innovazioni.

E cosi, io dico, nel diritto giustinianeo la comunione dei beni,
comunque derivata, ebbe un assetto del tutto nuovo e diametral-
mente opposto a quello che aveva nelle opere dei giureconsulti.
E pertanto su questo punto abbiamo elementi nuovi che ci inducono
a modificare le idee e le conoscenze ritenute finora come verita
infallibili. E cio va bene.

75. Ma lo scopo piu essenziale di questo risultato andrebbe per-
duto, in gran parte, se noi si tralasciasse una ulteriore indagine, onde
porre in evidenza le forze che hanno determinato trasformazioni
cosl essenziali, che appaiono d' un tratto nelF opera legislativa,
travolgendo tutto un sistema di diritto, che aveva radici profonde e,
sovratutto, una grande perfezione e proporzione in tutti i particolari,
e lo splendore e la dignita che i giureconsulti avevano saputo
conferirgli nella trattazione. Quelle forze dissolventi di un' opera
cotanto insigne dovevano per ci6 essere irresistibili ; energie vive e
possenti nel tempo in cui la legislazione fu compiuta.

76. E F indagine si rende piu attraente ed ansiosa quando subito ci
accorgiamo che un ricollegamento delle riforme giustinianee al
diritto greco, considerato pure nella sua ultima fase del periodo
bizantino, non e possibile in questo punto. Infatti il condominio,
quale ci si rivela nei documenti greco-egizii, ha la struttura ferma
di una proprieta divisa tra i titolari,2 che si manifesta in ogni

1 Cfr. c. iii.

2 Cfr. Weiss, Archiv f. Papyr. iv. p. 353 e seg.

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 117

direzione ; e cioe nell' assenza del t'us adcrescendi tra condomini,1
nella facolta di disposizione giuridica che compete ad ognuno senza
il concorso degli altri 2 ; nelle singole denunzie catastali e nei libri
catastali, dove ciascun comproprietario figura iscritto per la sua
parte anche infinitesimale ; nella obbligazione parziale e nori
solidale di ognuno per 1' imposta.3

Un condominio che ha tutte queste linee diritte e semplici
si raffigura, perci6, come una comproprieta parziale su di una
stessa cosa, che non ammette legami di sorta e reciproca
dipendenza.

E se nessuna traccia si rinviene nel diritto greco degli ordina-
menti giustinianei in questa materia ; e nessun possibile nesso pu6
esistere tra quelle riforme ed i diritti provinciali che avevano subita
influenza ellenica, bisogna rivolgersi altrove. Dal nulla, nulla pu6
divenire.

77. Ma e sufficiente il semplice confronto dei due sistemi, il classico
ed il giustinianeo, per stabilire nella maniera piu semplice il nesso
storico, ed insieme la energia che apport6 un cosl profondo muta-
mento in questa materia.

L' istituto romano, come sappiamo, traeva la sua struttura dal-
F ordinamento prettamente individualistico della proprieta. Per ci6
F autonomia individuate nel sistema del diritto privato non si piega
e non si arresta ne davanti alia posizione pari o alia liberta degli altri,
ne davanti agli interessi collettivi ; perche il principio fondamentale
e F individuo, F affermazione della propria volonta, della propria
indipendenza, che contiene in se F anarchia. In contrasto F istituto
giustinianeo e regolato in conformita della piu viva considerazione
degli interessi sociali ; e tutto compenetrato dal principio etico, che
ove gli uomini s' incontrino in un comune interesse, la non vi e
ragione di lotta, ma ragione permanente di cooperazione.4 Le
conseguenze sono immediate : F interesse individuale, F arbitrio, la
indipendenza dei singoli sono annullati, irremissibilmente.

E questo principio di socialita rinvigorito e diffuso soltanto
dalla dottrina cristiana, divenne coscienza popolare e si tradusse
in norme giuridiche nella prima codificazione dell' epoca cristiana.

1 Cfr. Mitteis, Archiv f. Papyr. iii. p. 253 ; e Reichsrecht, p. 386.

2 Cfr. Wenger, Gott. g. Anz. 1907, p. 291 ; e Weiss, /. c. p. 358.
8 Weiss, L c. p. 356.

4 Riccobono, Rivista di diritto civile^ vol. iii. p. 52.

u8 S. Riccobono [iv

78. Cosl il divenire del diritto si rende visibile ed appare
naturale, come il prodotto di quella specie d' atmosfera in cui la
legislazione fu compiuta, e si ricollega a tutte quelle forze vive del
tempo. Ne le riforme poste qui in luce possono essere isolate.
Perche, in realta, la penetrazione di quell' idea fondamentale della
solidarieta umana si manifesta in tutto il campo del diritto privato,
e piu energicamente nell' istituto della proprieta, che ne esce svigorito
nella sua complessione, per via di limitazioni infinite, d' ogni ordine,
dirette sempre a soddisfare esigenze sociali, ad attuare il principle
che la proprieta deve per quanto e possibile essere utile ai piu,
e contribuire nella maggiore misura al benessere sociale.1 Nel
condominio 1' applicazione di questi nuovi ideali era soltanto piu
ovvia edjmmediata. E nel condominio, come fu ordinato da
Giustiniano, si mostra gagliardo quel vivo e comune sentimento di
cooperazione e di fratellanza, che doveva prontamente trasformare
T istituto nella sua struttura e nelle norme particolari. Alia
volonta libera ed indipendente dei singoli fu, per cio, sostituita
1' utilita sociale che e ora il centre attivo che da vita a questa figura
di diritto e la disciplina in ogni sua parte.

La spiegazione ed il nesso sono quindi semplici, piu che si
possa richiedere ; non potendosi mettere in dubbio che quel
principio della utilita generale, quei sentimenti di solidarieta
umana furono diffusi e resi attivi nel mondo dalla dottrina
cristiana ; e che soltanto essi poterono via via travolgere tutto il
sistema individualistico romano, e fin da principio comprimerlo
nell' opera legislativa, quanto alle sue manifestazioni piu spietate.

Chi non sa vedere tale ricollegamento nella materia che ci
occupa, dovrebbe mostrare, positivamente, che sul cadere del
mondo antico altre forze operarono un rivolgimento, cosl essenziale
nella concezione della vita e negli ordinamenti giuridici.

Certo le difficolta piu gravi si riscontrano quando noi ci facciamo
a valutare i fattori morali della civilta, perche non si possono
misurare n& pesare, non hanno corpo, sono niente ; e pur sono
tutto. Fattori prodigiosi, invisibili che giorno per giorno creano
situazioni nuove, portano argomentazioni definitive, insinuano negli
uomini sentimenti che divengono forze vive nel campo dell' azione,
per cui visibilmente ne appare spostato il corso della civilta.2

1 Riccobono, Rivista di dir. civ. iii. p. 54.

2 Per cio non posso consentire nella spiegazione che in deffinitivo da il

iv] Communio e Comproprieta 119

Ed ora potremo meglio valutare e stabilire in quale misura
la legislazione di Giustiniano influl sulla formazione del, diritto
comune, ed in particolare dell' istituto della comunione, che e
argomento della trattazione.1

S. RlCCOBONO.

Lenel (Holtzendorff Js Enc. p. 375) di quelle tendenze filantropiche che si
mostrano nella legislazione da Costantino in poi, e particolarmente in quella
di Giustiniano. II Maestro e disposto ad ammettere I3 influenza cristiana,
particolarmente rispetto alia protezione dei deboli, in largo senso, al divieto
della difesa privata, al favore per la beneficenza. E tutto ci6 non sarebbe
poco ; perche se si ammette 1' influsso di quelle idee cosi generali nel-
P opera legislativa, esse dovevano agire come un fermento in tutta la materia
del diritto privato. Ma qui non importa discutere i limiti ; dacche il Lenel
poi inclina a ricondurre tutte le manifestazioni accennate « a quella tendenza
propria al despotismo di mostrarsi generoso con la borsa di altri ». Or questa
spiegazione, dico, mi sembra esteriore. Perch£ in verita nel corso del diritto
possono in dati momenti manifestarsi direzioni o deviazioni speciali, determinate
da forze e tendenze precarie ; ma che necessariamente si irrigidiscono e
si annullano col cessare della causa. Se gli effetti, invece, sono permanent],
e sempre piu rigogliosi, come e nel nostro caso, tutte quelle riforme debbono
aver radici piu profonde e vive, nel sentimento comune degli uomini. E si
sa che quell' idea cristiana della fratellanza, che viene qui particolarmente in
considerazione, costitul appunto il fulcro di tutta la civilta nuova, in contrasto
aperto per questo riguardo, con quella del mondo antico.

1 La trattazione ha preso uno sviluppo cosi esteso quale io non supponevo
da principio, e che non pu6 essere oltre tollerato in questo luogo. Mi riserbo
percio di pubblicare a parte la continuazione (c. iii. Dalla Glossa alle legis-
lazioni moderne e c. iv. La dottrina dal sec. xvi al sec. xx) che sara esposta
oralmente al Congresso.

ZUR GESCHICHTE DER HEREDIS
INSTITUTIO

UBER das Wesen der romischen Erbfolge und folgeweise auch der
romischen Erbeinsetzung herrscht bekanntlich Streit. Der rein
vermogensrechtlichen Auffassung beider steht eine familienrecht-
liche gegeniiber, die in dem heres der Urzeit einen Nachfolger in
der Hausherrschaft erblickt1 und sich in Bezug auf die heredis
institutio bei manchen Schriftstellern zu der bestimmten Hypothese
verdichtet, dass diese aus einer urspriinglichen Adoption hervor-
gegangen sei,2 ja in ihrer altesten Gestalt noch selbst als eine —
von der Arrogation verschiedene — adoptio in hereditatem gedacht
werden miisse.3 Dabei besteht wieder Meinungsverschiedenheit
dariiber, ob die Loslosung der Erbeinsetzung von der Adoption
im Recht der zwolf Tafeln bereits vollzogen sei oder nicht.4

In diesem Widerstreit der Meinungen ist eine Vorfrage nicht
geniigend erwogen worden, die m. E. der Erorterung recht
sehr bedarf : die Frage nach dem Alter der testamentarischen
Erbeinsetzung iiberhaupt. Man halt es eben sehr allgemein fur
selbstverstandlich, dass die heredis institutio bereits dem Rechte

1 Scialoja, Bullett. iii. 176 f. ; Bonfante, Bullett. iv. 97 f., Istitt 511 f . ;
Costa, Storia del dir. rom. priv. 462 f. Auch Mitteis, rom. Privatr. i. 93 f.,
und v. Mayr, rom. R. Gesch. i.2 91 f., betonen die familienrechtliche Grundlage
der romischen Universalsukzession.

2 Cans, das Erbrecht in weltgeschichtl. Entivicklung (1825) ii. 49 f.,
Schulin, d. griech. Testament -vergl. mit dem rom. (1882) 50 f., Lehrb. d.
Gesch. d. r. R. 458 ; Lambert, La Tradition rom. sur la succession des formes
du testament (1901) ; Appleton, Le Test. rom. (1903) 61 f. ; Sohm, Institute
721 ; Perozzi, Istit. ii. 359 f.

8 So bestimmt Lambert, a. a. O.

4 In ersterem Sinn Appleton, in letzterem Lambert, a. a. O.

120

v] Romisches Testament 121

der zwolf Tafeln angehore, dass der Satz heredis institutio est
caput et fundamentum testamenti so alt sei wie das romische
Testament selber.1 Ganz unbestritten ist freilich diese Meinung
schon bisher nicht geblieben. In einer 1886 veroffentlichten
Abhandlung spricht Cuq dem altromischen Testament die Erbein-
setzung zwar nicht geradezu ab, aber er lehrt doch, dass der heres
extraneus „ ne diffe"rait alors du le"gataire que par l'e"tendue de ses
droits."2 Weiter ging Ehrlich in einem 1903 vor dem historischen
Kongress in Rom gehaltenen Vortrag.3 Das alteste Testament
war nach ihm ein reines Legatentestament. Allerdings nimmt er
an, dass es „ in Rom schon in sehr friiher Zeit bei der testamenta-
rischen Erbfolge neben Legataren auch heredes gegeben habe ";
diese heredes waren aber nach ihm die gesetzlichen Erben, nicht
beliebige heredes institute Ebenso findet sich bei Binder
(die Plebs, 1909, S. 353) die Ausserung, dass „ erst das jiingere
Manzipationstestament ein letztwilliges Erbeinsetzungsgeschaft
im Sinne des klassischen romischen Rechts gewesen sein kann."
Im folgenden soil die Frage nach dem Inhalt des altromischen
Testaments einer erneuten Priifung unterzogen werden : hat das
Recht der zwolf Tafeln eine heredis institutio gekannt ? war
nicht der einzige Weg, auf dem sich damals ein Erblasser klinstlich
einen Universalsukzessor zu scha.ffen vermochte, der allbekannte
der Arrogation ?

Bei dieser Untersuchung nehme ich zwei Thesen als feststehend
an, die, obwohl bestritten, doch immer noch der herrschenden
Meinung entsprechen. Erstens: dass die Zwolftafelgesetzgebung
im 5. Jahrhundert v. Chr. entstanden ist, — meine Griinde dafiir

1 Dieser herrschenden Meinung gibt Appleton, a. a. O. 86, scharfen
Ausdruck, wenn er die heredis institutio fur „ 1'essence meme du testament
k Rome " erklart.

2 NRH. x. 542. Wendungen, die Cuq 537 f. gebraucht („ en presence
de sui le testament . . . ne devait contenir que des dispositions particulieres,
comme un legs," „ en Pabsence d'heritiers siens, on pouvait le"guer tous
ses biens k une personne etrangere k la famille "), legen den Gedanken nahe,
dass- er fur das alte Testament die Erbeinsetzung auch formell leugne ; doch
ist dies nach dem obigen Zitat wohl nicht seine Meinung gewesen. Ganz
ausdriicklich spricht er sich fur das Vorhandensein der Erbeinsetzung schon
vor den zwolf Tafeln in seinen Instit. jurid.'2' i. 124 aus; nur beschrankt er
ihre Mbglichkeit auch hier auf den Fall, dass keine sui vorhanden sind.

8 Z. f. vgl. Rechtswiss. xvii. 99 f.
4 a. a. O. 101 f.

122 O. Lenel [v

habe ich anderwarts ausgefiihrt.1 Zweitens: dass das Testament
der zwolf Tafeln noch das Komitialtestament war ; 2 daflir ist mir
schon entscheidend der Umstand, dass den Romern schwerlich
eine Erinnerung an das Komitialtestament geblieben sein wiirde,
wenn es bereits in so grauer Vorzeit aus der Anwendung
verschwunden ware. Ein naheres Eingehen auf diese Thesen ist
im Zusammenhang dieses Vortrags nicht moglich, wohl auch
nicht notig.

Wer eine Frage, wie die vorliegende, zu beantworten versucht,
wird gut tun, nicht von den Erorterungen der klassischen Juristen
auszugehen, die durch eine vielhundertjahrige Entwicklung von
den zwolf Tafeln geschieden sind, sondern — ohne auf der anderen
Seite diese Erorterungen zu ignorieren — von dem liberlieferten
Texte des Gesetzes selbst. Jedem aufmerksamen Leser dieses
Textes muss es auffallen, dass das Gesetz das Wort heres nur in
Bezug auf den suus heres verwendet zu haben scheint, und dass in
eben dem Satze, wo dies geschieht, der proximus adgnatus nicht
durch ein heres esto, sondern mit den Worten familiam habeto
berufen wird. Man hat daraus schliessen wollen, dass der Name
heres damals nur fur den suus heres gebraucht und auf den
sukzedierenden Agnaten nicht angewendet worden sei.3 Es wird
eine Zeit gegeben haben, fur die dies zutrifft ; fur die zwolf Tafeln
ist mir der Schluss bedenklich. Umgekehrt : wenn es keine
anderen heredes gab, als die sui heredes^ wozu dann die Wendung
cut suus heres nee escif* Mir scheint die Beifiigung des Wortes
suus an dieser Stelle kaum anders zu erklaren, als durch die
Annahme, dass es eben schon damals auch extranet heredes gab.
Aber allerdings verlangt die beriihrte Terminologie eine Erklarung.
Sollte man befiirchtet haben, durch ein gesetzliches heres esto
den Agnaten zum Zwangserben gleich dem suus zu machen?
Aber dem ware ja durch Hinzufiigen eines si volet > wie es die
zwolf Tafeln anderwarts zu ahnlichem Zwecke verwenden, leicht
vorzubeugen gewesen. Die richtige Erklarung liegt anderswo.
Uns Modernen ist der Ausspruch Papinians in D. v. 3,. 50
pr. hereditas etiam sine ullo corpore iuris intellectum habet in

1 ZRG. xxxix. 498 f., Holtzendorff-Kohlers Enzyclop? 1. 324 f.

2 Vgl. dazu noch Mitteis, rom. Privatr. i. 82 n. 24, und die dort Angeff.
8 Perozzi, Istit. ii. 362 (vgl. 356) ,, il nome di heres esprimeva non il

solo fatto della successione, ma anche la qualita di figlio. " S. auch Cuq
Instit. jurid? i. 123.

v] Romisches Testament 123

Fleisch und Blut ubergegangen. Aber diirfen wir eine solche
Abstraction schon dem fiinften Jahrhundert V. Chr. zutrauen?
Ich meine, fiir die naiv-sinnliche Vorstellungsweise, die wir in
dieser friihen Zeit voraussetzen miissen, konnte die hereditas kein
blosses Gedankending sein ; den Romern der zwolf Tafeln war sie
etwas korperlich greifbares : l Haus und Hof, Sklaven und Vieh.
So darf man denn auch die klassischen Begriffe von Delation und
Acquisition der Erbschaft nicht in das Zwolftafelrecht versetzen.
Diese Begriffe beruhen auf der Vorstellung, dass die hereditas eine
blosse Rechtsstellung sei, die dem extraneus vom Gesetz angeboten
und dann von ihm durch einfachen Willensakt erworben werde. 1st
aber die hereditas etwas korperliches, so kann sie, so wenig wie
sonst eine herrenlose Sache, durch eine blosse Willenserklarung
erworben werden. Wer vielmehr nicht schon wie der suus als
Hausherr im Hause sitzt, wird heres nur dadurch, dass er sich der
familia tatsachlich bemachtigt, und eben darum erblickt das
Gesetz seine Aufgabe lediglich darin, denjenigen zu bezeichnen,
der sich in Ermangelung eines suus heres der familia bemachtigen
diirfe, — familiam habeto ; heres wird er dann durch die wirkliche
Inbesitznahme.2 Dass dies in der Tat die alte Auffassung war,
lasst sich, wie ich glaube, mit grosser Sicherheit erweisen. Der
Beweis liegt in dem Mangel einer. zivilen Form fiir den Antritt der
Intestaterbschaft. Erwagt man, eine wie ausnahmslose Herrschaft
die Form sonst im alten Zivilrecht iibt, so erscheint es unbegreif-
lich, dass sich fiir ein so ungemein wichtiges Geschaft wie den
Erbschaftsantritt keine Form ausgebildet hatte, wenn man darin
iiberhaupt ein Geschaft erblickt hatte. Nun glaubt ja freilich
eine heute weitverbreitete Ansicht eine solche Form wirklich
entdeckt zu haben, — in der cretio namlich.? Aber diese Ansicht

1 Das empfand schon ganz richtig Kuntze in seinem Programm Vber die
Erbeinsetzung auf bestimmte Nachlassstucke (1875) 9f-> nur dass die Art> wie
er dieser Empfindung Ausdruck gibt, durch die Hereinziehung der Begriffe
Tauschwert und Gebrauchswert Anstoss erregen muss. Ganz im Sinne des
Texts Cuq, NRH. x. 542 f.

2 Wie aber, wenn er — vielleicht von einem anderen Pratendenten — an
dieser Inbesitznahme gehindert wird ? Man beachte, dass die legis actio
der hereditatis petitio immer mit einem symbolischen Besitzakt, dem vindicare,
verbunden ist, und dass der Gegner gezwungen wird, die Vornahme dieses
Besitzaktes zu dulden.

3 Vgl. u. a. -Karlowa, RG. ii. 896 und die dort Angeff. ; Girard, Manuel*
871 n. 7 ; Sohm, Institute 698 n. 7 ; Czyhlarz, Institut. § 124; Bonfante,

124 O. Lend [v

steht nicht nur mit der klassischen Uberlieferung im Widerspruch,
die nur von testamentarischer Festsetzung, nichts von gesetzlicher
Geltung der cretio weiss, sondern sie tmterstellt auch eine sachlich
unmogliche Entwicklung. Wenn man in Testamenten die cretio
festzusetzen pflegte — solet cretio dari, wie Gaius ii. 164 sagt — , so
kann das doch nur geschehen sein, weil man eine solche Form fur
den Erbschaftsantritt zweckmassig fand. Wie vertragt sich damit
die Annahme, dass man diese selbe zweckmassig befundene Form
da, wo sie kraft rechtens gefordert war, soil haben fallen lassen?
Nein : dies Formalgeschaft ist dem alten Rechte fremd ; es ist fur
die testamentarische Erbfolge, einerlei einstweilen wann, erfunden
worden ; der Erwerb der Intestaterbschaft aber fand von jeher
nicht durch cretio^ sondern durch korperliche Inbesitznahme statt.1
Das adire ist in seinem ursprunglichen Sinn ganz wortlich zu
nehmen als ein Betreten der Erbschaftsgrundstiicke, wie das
griechische l/z/JaTeveti/ ets T^V ovo-tav und das germanische ,,zu dem
Erbe gehen."2 Und das familiam habeto der zwolf Tafeln hat
genau den gleichen Sinn, wie ursprlinglich das do lego des Vin-
dikationslegats, dem ja in der Tat spaterhin ein sumito oder
sibi habeto oder capito gleichgeachtet wurde : 3 es will eben jene
Inbesitznahme gestatten.

Habe ich in obigem das familiam habeto des Gesetzes richtig
gedeutet, so ergeben sich daraus wichtige Folgerungen. fur das
altromische Testament. Denn wenn das Gesetz die Wendung
heres esto deshalb nicht gebrauchte, weil man Herr der korperlich
gedachten Erbschaft nicht durch ein blosses Wort des Gesetzes
werden kann, sondern nur durch die Tat, so scheint es undenkbar,
dass im Testament gerade jene Wendung auch nur liblich,
geschweige denn, dass sie fur die Giltigkeit des Testaments
geradezu vorgeschrieben gewesen sein sollte. Auch der Testator
verfiigte nicht iiber das Gedankending der Erbschaft, sondern iiber

Istit.* 488 n. i ; Costa, Storia del dir. pr. rom. 520. Anders Perozzi, Istit.
ii. 505.

1 Damit diirfte auch zusammenhangen, dass die usucapio p. h. nach Gai.
ii. 5 2 nur zugelassen war in Bezug auf eine res hereditaria, cuius possessionem
heres nondum nactus est. Die Inbesitznahme war der Erwerbsakt. In dieser
Beziehung iibereinstimmend : Perozzi, Istit. ii. 505.

2 Grimm, Rechtsaltertiimerf \. 659.

3 Man beachte, dass es auch fur den Erwerb des Vindikationslegats
keine Form gab.

v] Romisches Testament 125

sein Haus, seinen Hof, seine Sachen iiberhaupt, indem er den
Bedachten ermachtigte, sie nach seinem Tode an sich zu nehmen.
Dafiir aber war die gegebene Form nicht die Erbeinsetzung, sondern
die alteste l Form des Legats, das Vindikationslegat : das Komitial-
testament war ein reines Legatentestament. Dafiir, dass dem so
war, haben wir sichere Anhaltspunkte. Vor allem : die einzige
Bestimmung, die die zwolf Tafeln liber Testamente enthielten,
handelt nur vom Legat, unter welchen BegrirT nach dem alten
Sprachgebrauch allerdings auch die tutoris datio gefallen sein
muss : 2 uti legassit (super pecunia tutelave) 3 suae ra', ita ius esto.
Pomponius in einer allbekannten Stelle4 findet in diesem Satze
freilich auch die Ermachtigung zur Erbeinsetzung ausgesprochen :
latissima potestas tributa videtur et heredis instituendi u.s.w.
Die Stelle, mag sie nun lediglich Ausserung des Pomponius sein
oder auf den von ihm kommentierten Q. Mucius zuriickgehen, ist
als historisches Zeugnis wichtig, nicht um ihres positiven Inhalts
willen, — sie belehrt uns nicht liber den ursprlinglichen Sinn des
Satzes, sondern liber den Sinn, den eine weit spatere interpretatio
ihm beilegte — , wohl aber deshalb, weil sie beweist, dass die zwolf
Tafeln eine die heredis institutio zulassende Bestimmung nicht
enthielten. Ausgeschlossen scheint mir, dass das Gesetz, wenn
ihm neben dem Legat auch die Erbeinsetzung bekannt war, das
fur ersteres formelmassig technische Wort auch fur die letztere
verwendet hatte.5 Ausgeschlossen aber nicht minder auch der
schon mehrfach laut gewordene Gedanke, jener Satz habe fur
Legate, nur fur Legate (oder auch nur fur Legate von res nee
mancipi) die von der Zustimmung der Komitien unabhangige
Autonomie des Erblassers proklamieren wollen, wahrend fur
Erbeinsetzungen (oder wenigstens fur die von Nichtintestaterben)
jene Zustimmung noch immer erforderlich sein sollte.6 Ich unter-
suche hier nicht, ob das Testament Iiberhaupt jemals eine der

1 Vgl. hierzu die iiberzeugenden Ausfiihrungen Wlassaks, ZRG. xliv.
198 f.

2 Holder, ZRG. xliii. 72.

3 Die Authentizitat der eingeklammerten Worte kann hier dahin gestellt
bleiben. Vgl. dazu und dagegen besonders Appleton, Le Test. rom. 59 n. i.

4 D. 1. 16, 120; vgl. auch Gai. ii. 224.

6 Vgl. Mitteis, rom. Privatr. i. 82 n. 24 ; Wlassak, ZRG. xli. 70 n. i,
auch Holder, Beitrage, 65.

6 Sohm, Instit.^ 722, Cuq, Instit. i.2 130 f., und in anderer Formulierung
Mitteis, a. a. O., Wlassak, ZRG. xliv. 2 1 8.

126 O. Lenel [v

Zustimmung des Volkes bedurftige lex gewesen ist; undenkbar
scheint mir, dass, wenn es dies war, die Zustimmung zu irgend
einer Zeit fur etwas anderes gefordert gewesen sein kann, als fur
die Totalitat des letzten Willens. Es ist ja doch klar, dass es fur
die Genehmigung der Erbeinsetzung, wenn eine solche erforderlich
war, nicht hatte gleichgiltig sein konnen, ob und welche Legate
der Erblasser z. B. enterbten oder ubergangenen Verwandten
hinterliess ; dass es eine Farce gewesen ware, wenn man fur die
Erbeinsetzung Zustimmung der Komitien verlangt, den Erblassern
aber gestattet hatte, die institutio durch Legate mehr oder weniger
ihres Inhalts zu berauben.1 Der ganze Testamentsinhalt bildet
vielmehr eine untrennbare Einheit, die nur in ihrer Gesamtheit
einer Genehmigung des Volkes hatte unterliegen konnen.

Fiir die Auffassung des Komitialtestaments als Legatentestament
spricht nun aber noch eine zweite ganz sichere historische Tatsache,
die Fassung der Nunkupationsformel des testamentum per aes
et libram, die allein auf Legate und zwar Vindikationslegate 2
zugeschnitten war, ita do ita lego ita tester itaque vos Quirites
testimonium mihi perhibetote. Dass diese Formel zu einem
Erbeinsetzungstestament nicht passt, wird heute sehr allgemein
anerkannt.3 Man erklart aber den Mangel einer Bezugnahme auf
die heredis institutio daraus, dass im alteren testamentum per aes
et libram derfamzlzae emptor selbst heredis loco gewesen sei, sodass
sich die Beschrankung der Formel auf die Bestatigung von Legaten
von selbst ergeben habe. Gewiss ! Nur bleibt dabei unerklart,
warum man, als auch die heredis institutio im Manzipationstesta-
mentUnterkommen fand, nicht jetzt zuriickgriff auf die umfassendere
Formel, die die herrschende Meinung notwendig dem Komitial-
testament zuschreiben muss. War die Erbeinsetzung selbst trotz
Aufkommens des alteren Manzipationstestaments [nicht in Ver-
gessenheit geraten, dann, so miisste man annehmen, kann man
auch den auf sie beziiglichen Teil der alten Bestatigungsformel
nicht vergessen haben. Die Erbeinsetzung, wenn sie dem Komitial-
testament eigen war, hatte aber niemals in Vergessenheit geraten

1 Dies gilt, wenn gleich in gemindertem Masse, auch dann, wenn man fiir
die zwolf Tafeln nicht voile Legierfreiheit, sondern, was ich freilich fiir unbe-
griindet halte, solche nur hinsichtlich der res nee mancipi annimmt. Auch
diese konnten ein recht betrachtlicher Bestandteil des Vermogens sein.

2 Wlassak, a. a. O. 206.

3 Vgl. etwa Sohm, Instit.™ 725, Wlassak, a. a. O.

v] Romisches Testament 127

konnen, aus dem einfachen Grunde nicht, well das Komitialtesta-
ment als Testament mit Erbeinsetzung vor dem blossen Legaten-
testament die wesentlichsten Vorziige besessen und sich daher ohne
Zweifel so lange erhalten haben wiirde, bis die Erbeinsetzung in
das Manzipationstestament Aufnahme fand.1 Als dieser letzte
bedeutsame Schritt geschah, ware also die umfassendere Formel
nicht nur noch bekannt, sondern in haufigem praktischem Gebrauch
gewesen ; alles hatte darauf hingewiesen, sie nunmehr auch fur das
Manzipationstestament zu verwerten, und gleichwohl hatte man
dies unbegreiflicherweise unterlassen ! Glatt und einfach erklart
sich dagegen das iiberlieferte ita do ita lego> wenn man mit der
hier vertretenen Anschauung annimmt, dass auch das Komitial-
testament selbst ein blosses Legatentestament war und gerade in
der iiberlieferten Formel seine zutreffende Bestatigung fand. Dann
hat eben hier wie so oft eine uralte Formel trotz Wechsels des
durch sie zu deckenden Inhalts sich unverandert durch die Jahr-
hunderte erhalten, ein redendes Zeugnis des alteren Rechtszustands.
Wer mit uns glaubt, das Komitialtestament sei ein reines
Legatentestament gewesen, steht nun freilich vor gewissen Fragen,
die der Antwort harren.

Wir sind vom klassischen Testament her gewohnt, uns als
unentbehrliche Basis fiir die Legate eine heredis institutio zu
denken. Wenn nun das alte Testament keihe solche enthielt, wer
figurierte dann als heres ? wer haftete fiir die Erbschaftsschulden ?
etwa der heres legitimus ? Der Wortlaut der zwolf Tafeln fiihrt
zur Verneinung der letzteren Frage. Der heres legitimus ist
nur berufen, si intestate moritur, d. h. in Ermangelung eines
Testaments ; der Satz, dass niemand ex parte testatus, ex parte
intestatus sterben konne, ist allem Anscheiri nach schon Bestand-
teil des altesten Rechts.2 Dieser Satz nun gilt immer noch als das
grosse Ratsel des romischen Erbrechts, und man macht immer neue
Versuche, ihm eine oft mehr oder weniger mystische Erklarung
zu geben. Gerade fiir ein Legatentestament aber war jener
Grundsatz das natiirlichste von der Welt. Man muss sich hier
folgendes klar machen. Ein Testament, zu dem man die Komitien
bemiihte, war sicherlich nicht gedacht als ein Mittel, dem oder

1 Vgl. hierzu auch Wlassak, a. a. O. 214.

2 A. M. Ehrlich, Z. f. vgl. Rswiss. xvii. 102. Vgl. fiir das testa-
mentum per aes et libram auch Schulin, Lehrb. d. Gesch. d. r. R. 460.

128 O. Lenel [v

jenem ein kleines Andenken zu hinterlassen ; dazu hatten sich die
Komitien sicher auch als Zeuge nicht gebrauchen lassen. Es muss
vielmehr gedacht und auch geiibt gewesen sein als planmassige
Verteilung des ganzen Verrnogens, als divisio bonorum^ bei der
normalerweise nur durch ein Versehen irgend ein Stuck unverteilt
bleiben konnte.1 Wenn nun der Testator bei Aufstellung eines
solchen Verteilungsplanes den Intestaterben,der ohne das Testament
alles erhalten hatte, ubergangen oder mit irgend einem einzelnen
Stiick bedacht hatte, so war damit auf das klarste zu erkennen
gegeben, dass er ihn von der Erbschaft sei es ganz und gar sei es
im ubrigen habe ausschliessen wollen, und alles musste daher den
alten Juristen naher liegen, als dennoch gerade dem Intestaterben
auf die etwa versehentlich unverteilt gebliebenen Sachen ein
Vorrecht zuzugestehen.2 Jeder beliebige stand fur sie diesen
Sachen mindestens ebenso nahe oder naher als der Intestaterbe.
Diese Sachen waren vakant, und ihr rechtliches Schicksal wird
bestimmt worden sein durch jenes Rechtsinstitut, das als ein
Rudiment uralten Rechtes noch bis in die klassische Zeit hereinragt :
die usucapio pro herede. Tatsachlich wird diese wohl in der
Regel hauptsachlich den Legataren von Haus und Hof zugute

1 Ahnlich schon Jhering, Geist des r. R. iv. 147, der aber ein Erbein-
setzungstestament annimmt, wo die Sache minder klar liegt. Aus jenem
Charakter des alten Testaments erklart sich auch, dass ein neues Testament
notwendig das alte aufhebt. Man kann nicht zwei Verteilungsplane fur
dieselbe Erbschaft aufstellen.

2 Es scheint mir nicht iiberfliissig, darauf hinzuweisen, dass auch unser
modernes Recht die Intestaterben neben einem Testament im Grunde nur
beruft, well wir annehmen, dass dies dem vermutlichen Willen des Erblassers
entspreche, und von ihrer Berufung absieht, wo diese Vermutung offenbar
nicht zutrifft. Wenn z. B. ein Vater von seinen drei Kindern das alteste auf
die Halfte einsetzt, so wird es niemandem einfallen, auf die andere unvergebene
Halfte die Intestaterbfolge zu eroffnen, wo das alteste wieder zu 1/3 partizipieren
wiirde, sondern diese Halfte erhalten die beiden jiingeren allein. Hat ferner
jemand in einem Testament unter Ubergehung der Intestaterben den A.
zum Alleinerben und dann in einem zweiten den B. auf die Halfte eingesetzt,
so wird man die in dem zweiten Testament nicht vergebene Halfte dem A.
und nicht etwa den Intestaterben iiberweisen. Man konnte mit gutem Fug
behaupten, auch das moderne Recht kenne keine wirkliche Konkurrenz von
Testaments- und Intestaterbfolge ; der Unterschied vom altromischen liege
vielmehr allein darin, dass es — was in dem vom Formalismus beherrschten
altromischen Recht freilich unmoglich war — neben dem erklarten Willen auch
den unausgesprochenen, aber aus den Umstanden erkennbaren Willen des
Testators beriicksichtige, moge dieser nun auf Berufung der Intestaterben
oder anderer Personen gehen.

v] R&misches Testament 129

gekommen sein, die meist am ehesten in der Lage sein mussten,
sich auch der unvergebenen Sachen zu bemachtigen.

Die Erwahnung der usucapio pro herede fiihrt uns sofort zu der
anderen oben aufgeworfenen Frage : wer haftet auf Grund des
Legatentestaments fur die Erbschaftsschulden? Wir miissen uns
hiiten, die Ideen, nach denen sich in klassischer Zeit die Haftung
fur die Erbschaftsschulden regelte, in die Zeit der zwolf Tafeln zu
iibertragen ; Uber die Anschauung der alten Zeit gibt uns, wie ich
glaube, die usucapio pro herede, deren rohe Struktur hochstes
Alter verrat, ganz sicheren Aufschluss, vorausgesetzt nur, dass
man sich an das halt, was liber dieses Institut authentisch iiber-
liefert ist, und darauf verzichtet, eine durch nichts beglaubigte
Urgeschichte desselben zu erfinden.1 Jeder Beliebige, so berichtet
uns Gaius ii. 52 f., konnte sich der Sachen einer nicht in Besitz
genommenen (und so sicher auch der einer vollig vakanten)
Erbschaft bemachtigen und sie durch einjahrigen Besitz usukapieren.
Dadurch aber erwarb er nach der alten (olim) Anschauung nicht
etwa bloss diese Sachen, sondern ipsam hereditatem und wurde
fur die Erbschaftsschulden haftbar. Dieser Bericht lasst freilich
mancherlei Zweifel ubrig. Zunachst : was bedeutet das velut
ipsae hereditates usucapi credebantur bei Gaius? Soil das etwa
heissen,dass jeder Usukapient einer beliebigen Erbschaftssache nach
vollendeter Usukapion als successor in universum ius defuncti
behandelt wurde? Man braucht sich diese Frage nur vorzulegen,
um zu sehen, dass man auf diesem Wege zu Unmoglichkeiten
gelangt.2 Dann wlirde ja die Vollendung der ersten Usukapion
sei es auch an dem geringwertigsten Gegenstand, da nunmehr
die Erbschaft einen Herrn gehabt hatte, jede weitere Usukapion
ausgeschlossen haben, und der Usukapient etwa eines Schafes

1 Dahin gehort insbesondere die Hypothese, die usucapio p. h. sei ihrer
urspriinglichen Idee nach dazu bestimmt gewesen, den Mangel der zum
Erbschaftserwerb eigentlich erforderlich gewesenen cretio zu decken. So
Karlowa, RG. ii. 897 f., ihm folgend Sohm, Instit.^ 694. Wir haben
gesehen, dass das alte Recht die cretio noch gar nicht kennt. Ebenso
willkiirlich scheint mir die Annahme Perozzis, die usucapio p. h. sei urspriing-
lich nur z. G. des familiae emptor zugelassen worden und habe lediglich die
Unwirksamkeit fax familiae mancipatio gedeckt (Istit. ii. 383 f.).

2 Dagegen auch Holder, Beitrage 129 f. und Karlowa, RG. ii. 899, der
aber (so auch Scheurl, Krit. Vjschr. xxiv. 219) willkiirlich annimmt, in alter
Zeit habe der Besitz der maior pars pecuniae geniigt, um zur Ersitzung der
ganzen Erbschaft zu fiihren.

130 O. Lenel [v

wiirde dem von Haus und Hof, wenn dieser vielleicht einen Tag
spater als er den Besitz ergriffen hatte, Haus und Hof haben
abfordern konnen. Oder, wenn man dies nicht annehmen will,
nach welchem Massstab sollten die verschiedenen Usukapienten die
Gesamterbschaft untereinander teilen ? Vielmehr scheint mir klar
und sicher, dass der Usukapient pro herede an Aktiven niemals
mehr erwarb als er sich angeeignet hatte,1 und mit der bei
Gaius liber lieferten Wendung wird nicht auf eine Gesamtnachfolge
in die Aktiva, sondern nur auf die mit dem Erwerb verbundene
Schuldenhaftung hingedeutet. Wer nun diese Schuldenhaftung
jemandes, der nicht Universalsukzessor ist, von dem Vorstellungs-
kreis des klassischen Rechts aus betrachtet, dem muss sie freilich
als unbegreifliche Anomalie erscheinen. Ganz anders aber, wenn
man sie unter das Licht stellt, das von der Rechtsvergleichung
ausgeht. Dann erscheint die Haftung des Usukapienten nur als
eine allerdings eigentiimliche Anwendung eines Prinzips, das auch
das germanische und, wie kaum zu bezweifeln, auch das griechische
Recht beherrscht:2 die Schuldenhaftung ruht auf der Erb-
schaft. Ein Recht aber, das, wie das romische, in Ermangelung
von heredes die Usukapion der Erbschaftssachen gestattete, musste
notwendig dazu kommen, die Erbenhaftung an jede einzelne
Erbschaftssache zu kniipfen und also jeden haften zu lassen, der
etwas aus der Erbschaft sich aneignete. Gait aber dies Prinzip
bei der usucapio pro herede^ so ist es sehr unwahrscheinlich, dass
seine Geltung sich auf diesen einen Fall beschrankt habe, und
wer mit uns uberzeugt ist, dass das Komitialtestament ein reines
Legatentestament war, darf nicht zogern, neben die Schulden-
haftung des Usukapienten die des Legatars zu stellen, der sich
der ihm legierten Sache bemachtigt hat. Vielleicht erscheint
manchen eine solche Annahme als unerhorte Ketzerei. Aber man
beachte wohl : die Schuldenhaftung der Legatare war im alten
Recht praktisch gar nicht zu entbehren, selbst dann nicht zu

1 Dass dem z. Zt. des Q. Mucius so war, diirfte daraus hervorgehen,
dass er die Haftung fiir die sacra in Ermangelung von heredes demjenigen
auferlegte, qui de bonis . . . usu ceperit plurimum possidendo (Cic. de leg.
ii. 48). Aber auch schon in der alteren Ordnung (Cic. eod. ii. 49) war bei
dem si maiorem par tern pecuniae capiat der Usukapient gewiss mitverstanden
und nicht als Universalsukzessor gedacht. A. M. Karlowa, RG. ii. 901.

2 Wegen des germanischen Rechts bedarf es wohl keiner Nachweisungen ;
wegen des griechischen vgl. Partsch, Burgschaftsrecht, i. 232 f.

R&misches Testament

entbehren, wenn die heredis institutio entgegen unserer Ansicht
ein Urbestandteil des romischen Testaments gewesen ware. Man
setze den Fall, ein mittelloser oder iiberschuldeter Erbe habe die
Erbschaft angetreten. Im klassischen Recht gewahrt hier das
beneficium separationis den Erbschaftsglaubigern die Moglichkeit,
im Weg des Separatkonkurses die ganze Erbschaft zu ihrer
Befriedigung heranzuziehen und sich so vor Schaden zu schiitzen.
In die Zeit der zwolf Tafeln wird niemand dies Benefiz zuriick-
riicken wollen. Sollten damals die Glaubiger kein Mittel gehabt
haben, auf die per vindicationem legierten Sachen zu greifen ?
Sollten sie darauf beschrankt gewesen sein, sich an den heres
institutus zu halten, und leer ausgegangen sein, indes die lachenden
Legatare die Erbschaftssachen okkupierten ? 1 Und zu diesem
Argument tritt eine sichere historische Tatsache, die beweist, dass
den alten Romern eine Schuldenhaftung der Legatare durchaus
nicht so fremdartig vorgekommen sein kann, wie man glaubt.
Ich denke an die bekannte Ordnung der Haftung fiir die sacra
hereditaria, wie sie uns bei Cicero (de legib. ii. 48 ff.) uberliefert ist.
Zu Ciceros Zeit hafteten fur die sacra in Ermangelung von heredes
freilich nicht mehr alle Legatare, sondern nur der Partitionslegatar
qui tantundem capit quantum omnes heredes. Aber Cicero selbst
berichtet von einer alteren Ordnung, wonach die Haftung auf drei
Weisen begriindet werden konnte : hereditate aut si maiorem
partem pecuniae capiat aut [si maior pars pecuniae legata esf\
si inde quidpiam ceperit. Die beiden letzten Haftungsgriinde
beziehen sich selbstverstandlich nicht bloss auf Usukapienten,2
sondern auch auf Legatare, und streicht man, wie man m. E. muss,
die eingeklammerten Worte als in den Text geratenes Glossem,3
so ist hier fiir die sacra sogar die Haftung jedes einzelnen Legatars
bezeugt, die wir auch fiir die Schulden behaupten. Der Gedanke

1 Keinen Gegenbeweis kann C. iv. 16, 7 liefern. Der Schluss von der in
den zwolf Tafeln sanktionierten Haftung der Erben, worunter im Sinne des
Gesetzes m. E. nur die Intestaterben zu verstehen waren, auf die Nichthaftung
der Legatare ist keineswegs zwingend.

2 Andere (z. B. Scheurl, Krit. Vjschr. xxiv. 220) nehmen an, dass der
Usukapient schon von dem Haftungsgrund hereditate mitgetroffen wurde.

3 Das Glossem sollte den zweiten Haftungsgrund erlautern. Es verrat
sich schon durch den Indikativ est statt des in der indirekten Rede zu
erwartenden sit.. Sachlich erscheint es mir unverstandlich, warum haftbar
erwartden Erwerb irgend eines Stiicks nur der werden soil, dem die maior
durch ecuniae vermacht ist. A. M. freilich Holder, Beitrdge^ 140 f.,

132 O. Lenel [v

liegt nahe, dass der zwischen der Haftung des Erben und
des einzelnen Legatars eingeschobene zweite Haftungsgrund — qui
maiorem partem pecuniae capiat — bereits eine Abwandlung des
noch alteren nur zweigliedrigen Haftungssystems enthalte. Sei
dem wie ihm wolle, der Schluss von der Sacrahaftung der Legatare
auf die Schuldenhaftung drangt sich geradezu zwingend auf:
warum sollte man den Glaubigern verweigert haben, was den
Gottern recht war? Aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach handelt es
sich hier um eine Erscheinung, die wir auch sonst sowohl im
griechischen wie im romischen Recht beobachten konnen : dass
namlich eine ursprlinglich allgemeine Haftungsform im Laufe der
Zeiten auf solche Anspriiche beschrankt wird, bei denen ein
offentliches oder religioses Interesse obwaltet.1

Die Haftung der Legatare — wir diirfen dieser Frage nicht aus-
weichen — kann nur als beschrankte gedacht werden. Niemand
wird annehmen wollen, dass die Aneignung des geringfiigigsten
Legats unbeschrankte Schuldenhaftung mit sich brachte. Wir
sind vom klassischen Rechte her so sehr daran gewohnt, in der
unbeschrankten Schuldenhaftung des Erben ein Grundprinzip des
romischen Rechts zu erblicken, dass es fast verwegen aussieht,
dem altromischen Recht eine beschrankte Schuldenhaftung zu-
zuschreiben. In der Tat glaube auch ich, dass die unbeschrankte
Schuldenhaftung schon dem altesten romischen Rechte bekannt
war, namlich als Haftung des suus heres. In alter Zeit wird sich
das Zugriffsrecht der Glaubiger auch auf die Gewaltunterworfenen
des Schuldners erstreckt haben, und diese personliche Haftung
erlosch sehr natiirlich nicht mit dem Tode des Schuldners.2 Dem
suus heres mag dann aus Griinden praktischer Zweckmassigkeit,

Karlowa, a. a. O. 902. Von den Editoren streichen den Passus Christ und
Baiter, wahrend Vahlen ihn beibehalt, mit der unzureichenden Begriindung,
dass sonst das folgende si inde quidpiam in der Luft schwebe. Inde, d. h.
ex ca pecunia.

1 Ich erinnere aus dem romischen Recht an die Beschrankung der
urspriinglich gewiss allgemein zulassigen Privatpfandung auf die wenigen bei
Gaius erwahnten Falle der legis actio per pignoris capionem. Ganz anders
freilich Mitteis, rom. Privatr. i. 98 n. 12: das die sacra betreffende Pon-
tifikaledikt habe mit der Schuldenhaftung nichts zu tun. Diese Behauptung
erklart sich nur daraus, dass Mitteis Vorstellungen, die aus dem Gedankenkreis
des klassischen Rechtes stammen, ohne weiteres in das alteste Recht versetzt.

2 Lenel, krit. Vjschr. xxviii. 175. So auch Cuq, NRH. x. 547, freilich
mit Beschrankung auf das problematische nexum.

v] Romisches Testament 133

auf die ich noch komme, im Laufe der Zeit der proximus adgnatus
angeglichen worden sein ; die Legatare aber werden fiir die sacra
wie fiir die Schulden personlich nur dann gehaftet haben, wenn sie
die Sache, an der die Haftung hing, dem Glaubiger nicht iiber-
liessen.1 Ebenso kann ich mir auch die Haftung des Usukapienten
pro herede nur als beschrankte vorstellen. Das Gegenteil ist ja
herrschende Meinung, die besonders drastisch in der bekannten
scherzhaften Darstellung Jherings2 hervortritt, wo die usucapio
pro herede als „ die Mausefalle des alien Erbrechts " figuriert. Ich
halte diese Auffassung fiir kaum moglich. Man konnte sie sich
allenfalls zurechtlegen, wenn die alte Zeit in der usucapio pro
herede ein Delikt erblickt hatte, das durch die Schuldenhaftung
hatte gewissermassen bestraft werden sollen. Aber von diesem
Standpunkt aus bliebe die Zulassung dieser Art Usukapion ein
Ratsel, und die Schuldenhaftung hatte man dann wohl nicht
an die vollendete Usukapion, sondern an die blosse Aneignung
gekniipft. Der alten Zeit war die usucapio p. h. m. E. nichts als
eine Erganzung des engbegrenzten Intestaterbrechts, die wohl
meist den Nachststehenden zugute gekommen sein wird. Und
gab es nicht eine auch im modernen Sinn durchaus redliche
usucapio p. h.y seitens dessen namlich, der sich bona fide fiir den
Erben hielt? Ist es glaublich, dass man diesen, der alles, was er
nicht bereits usukapiert hatte, dem wahren Erben herausgeben
musste, unbeschrankt fiir die Schulden haften Hess ? Dass wir bei
Gaius von der Beschrankung der Haftung3 nichts mehr erfahren,
darf nicht wundernehmen. Fiir ihn war ja die ganze Haftung des
Usukapienten eine verschollene Antiquitat, auf deren Details
einzugehen er keinerlei Veranlassung hatte, vorausgesetzt, dass er
davon iiberhaupt noch etwas wusste.

1 Wie aber, wenn ein Legatar aus Besorgnis vor dem Angriff von
Erbschaftsglaubigern den Erwerb seines Legates ganz unterliess ? Dann
muss es den Erbschaftsglaubigern freigestanden haben, sich zu ihrer Befriedi-
gung der so freigewordenen Erbschaftssachen zu bemachtigen, und dies wird
nicht als usucapio p. h. gegolten haben.

2 Scherz und Ernst in der Jurisprudens^ 127 f., 384 f.

3 Dagegen wird die Haftung dessen qui usu cepeiit plurimum possi-
dendo fiir die sacra (Cic. I.e.] allerdings als unbeschrankte zu denken sein.
Den Gottern soil ihre Befriedigung erleichtert werden ; darum konnen sie
sich fiir ihre ganze Forderung an jenen einen halten. Solange aber jeder
einzelne Usukapient haftete, scheint mir die unbeschrankte Haftung kaum
denkbar.

134 O. Lend [v

Ich habe im bisherigen versucht, ein Bild des Rechtszustandes
zur Zeit des alten Legatentestaments zu geben. Je welter nun dies
Bild von verbreiteten Vorstellungen abweicht, um so unerlasslicher
ist es, darzulegen, wie sich von hier aus der ganz andere Rechts-
zustand entwickeln konnte, der uns im klassischen Recht vor
Augen steht. Wie ist die heredis institutio aufgekommen ? Es
versteht sich, dass wir, bei dem Mangel jeder zuverlassigen Uber-
lieferung iiber die auf die zwolf Tafeln folgenden Jahrhunderte, auf
Hypothesen angewiesen sind ; aber diese Hypothesen diirften sich
zu einem hohen Grade der Wahrscheinlichkeit fiihren lassen. Es
war, wie ich glaube, die Sach- und Rechtslage beim alteren Manzi-
pationstestamente, was die romischen Juristen auf den Gedanken
der heredis institutio brachte. Gaius berichtet bekanntlich, der
familiae emptor bei diesem Testament sei heredis loco gewesen
(heredis locum optinebaf}. Was Gaius sich bei dieser Charak-
terisierung dachte, ob er damit eine vollkommene Gleichheit oder nur
eine weitgehende Ahnlichkeit mit der Erbenstellung ausdriicken
wollte, kann hier dahingestellt bleiben. Denn auch im zweiten
Fall bleibt die von mir vermutete Entwicklung verstandlich,
und dass eine solche Ahnlichkeit vorlag, kann auch der nicht
bezweifeln, der, wie auch ich es fur richtig halte, in dem familiae
emptor wesentlich nur einen Treuhander oder Testamentsvoll-
strecker sieht.1 Zunachst war die Giltigkeit aller von dem
Erblasser getroffenen Verfiigungen, wie spaterhin von der der
heredis institutio^ so in alter Zeit von der der familiae manci-
patio abhangig. Der familiae emptor muss ferner in der Lage
gewesen sein, seine Rechtsstellung, mit der das Testament stand und
fiel, gegen den drohenden Angriffder Intestaterben zu verteidigen, es
muss ihm eine legis actio nach Art der hereditatis petitio zuge-
standen haben ; die Gefahr eines solchen Angriffs mag bei dem im
Angesicht des ganzen Volks errichteten Komitialtestament gering
gewesen sein, musste sich aber notwendig einstellen, als man den
Versuch machte, die alte Form durch den Kunstbau des Manzi-
pationstestaments zu ersetzen, und wer hatte sonst die Verteidigung
des Testaments iibernehmen sollen ? Der familiae emptor wird
weiter — wahrscheinlich beschrankt und neben den Legataren — fiir
die Erbschaftsschulden gehaftet haben. Eine solche Haftung des

1 Vgl. u. a. Sohm, Institut. 722 f . ; Cuq, Instit. jurid. i. 128, und be-
sonders Lambert, a. a. O. 52 f.

v] Romisches Testament 135

Treuhanders oder Testamentsvollstreckers findet sich bekanntlich
auch in anderen Rechten ; l bei der Sachlage, wie sie sich aus der
familiae mancipatio ergab, war sie kaum zu entbehren. Nimmt
man, was ich fur sehr wahrscheinlich halte, an, dass das uns
uberlieferte Formular der familiae mancipatio nicht das urspriing-
liche ist, dass urspriinglich der familiae emptor nicht bloss die
custodela, sondern das Vermogen des Erblassers selbst erwarb
und zur Ausfiihrung der Anordnungen des Erblassers damals gar
nicht juristisch, sondern nur moralisch verpflichtet war,2 so zwang
sich seine Haftung geradezu auf. Aber auch in der Zeit, wo der
familiae emptor nunmehr die custodela am Vermogen fur sich in
Anspruch nahm, und man das Eigentum an den vermachten
Sachen vermoge der nuncupatio unmittelbar den Vindikations-
legataren zufallen Hess, war nichts natiirlicher, als dass man die
Erbschaftsglaubiger gleichwohl nicht bloss auf letztere, sondern
auch auf den familiae emptor verwies ; blieb doch immer die
Moglichkeit, dass Legatare vor dem Erblasser starben oder das
ihnen Hinterlassene nicht an sich nehmen wollten, oder die
Annahme sich verzogerte, oder dass nach Entrichtung samtlicher
Legate noch ein unvergebener Rest der Erbschaft sich herausstellte,
der doch ebenfalls den Glaubigern haften musste. Ein solcher
Rest diirfte, solange die familiae mancipatio in irgend einem Sinne
ernst genommen wurde, dem familiae emptor verblieben sein und
so seine Haftung begriindet haben. Ja, es darf angenommen
werden, dass die Testatoren in der Regel die Erbschaft durch
Legate nicht erschopft, sondern mindestens soviel davon freigelassen
haben werden, als zur Befriedigung der (irdischen und himm-
lischen) Erbschaftsglaubiger erforderlich war ; musste ihnen doch
daran gelegen sein, dass die Legatare das ihnen Hinterlassene
unverkiirzt und ohne Besorgnis vor dem Angriff durch Glaubiger
erhalten konnten. In alledem also war die Stellung des familiae
emptor der des Erben verwandt. Aber daneben bestanden er-

1 Fur die germanische Treuhand vgl. A. Schultze, die langobardische
Treuhand, 50 n. 15, 112 n. 24, 178; ferner Caillemer, Orig. et dtvel. de
rexfr. test. 74 f., 429 f., 431 f.

2 So Cuq, NRH. x. 755 ; Lambert, a. a. O. 79. Auf Gaius, ii. 103,
mochte ich mich freilich hiefiir nicht berufen. Gaius hat von dieser Stufe
der Entwicklung des Testaments schwerlich mehr irgend eine Kenntnis, und
mit den ungeriauen Worten ob id ei mandabat wird er nicht auf formlose
Auftrage, sondern auf die nuncupatio haben hinweisen wollen.

136 O. Lend [v

hebliche Verschiedenheiten, und gerade in diesen werden wir die
Motive zu suchen haben, die die Juristen dahin fiihrten, die familiae
emptio zu einem blossen Scheinakt zu degradieren und an Stelle
des familiae emptor einen kiinstlichen im Testamente selbst zu
ernennenden heres zu setzen. Vor allem war, solange diefamttiae
mancipatio ernst genommen wurde, ein Widerruf des Testaments
nur mittels remancipatio familiae moglich, die die Mitwirkung des
familiae emptor erforderte, so dass der Testator von dessen gutem
Willen abhangig war. Weiter : der familiae emptor konnte vor
dem Testator sterben ; dann konnte schwerlich das Testament
bestehen bleiben, — eine Substitution in die Rolle des familiae
emptor war ausgeschlossen. Endlich : die Schuldenhaftung des
familiae emptor ist kaum anders denn als beschrankte zu denken ;
diese beschrankte Haftung aber, neben der die der Legatare
unentbehrlich blieb, musste zu grossen Schwierigkeiten fiihren.
Denn haftete den Erbschaftsglaubigern in seiner Hand nur das,
was nach Befriedigung samtlicher Legatare iibrig blieb, so wird
dessen Belauf, in Ermangelung der Vorsorgemassregeln, die das
moderne Recht trifft, unendlich oft sehr schwer festzustellen
gewesen sein ; hafteten aber, was ich fur viel wahrscheinlicher
halte, solange die Legatare die vermachten Sachen nicht an sich
genommen hatten, diese den Glaubigern auch in der Hand des
familiae emptor^ so litten die Interessen der Legatare not. Sollten
diese Ubelstande die Juristen nicht beschaftigt haben? Such ten
sie aber nach Mitteln der Abhilfe, so wurden sie notwendig auf
den Weg gewiesen, den sie auch eingeschlagen haben : namlich
einerseits die familiae emptio^ in der die Wurzel jener Ubelstande
lag, der ernstlichen Bedeutung zu entkleiden, andererseits dem im
Testament zum Vorschein kommenden letzten Willen einen
breiteren Spielraum zu gewahren. Fur letzteres gab der Zwolf-
tafelsatz cum nexum faciet jederzeit den formalen Anhalt ; frei
interpretiert, bot dieser Satz die Moglichkeit, die Wirksamkeit der
nuncupatio soweit zu erstrecken, als man irgend zweckmassig fand.
Wie sollte man aber vorgehen ? Es kam darauf an, die familiae
mancipatio durch eine Form der Bedenkung zu ersetzen, die dem
Bedachten den ganzen Nachlass uberwies, soweit nicht durch
Legate dariiber verfiigt war, Substitution zuliess und zugleich die
Schwierigkeiten beseitigte, die die beschrankte Haftung mit sich
brachte. Durch ein Legat, wie man es auch formulieren mochte,

v] Romisches Testament 137

konnte man dies letztere niemals bewirken ; einen Legatar hin-
sichtlich der Schuldenhaftung anderen Grundsatzen zu unterwerfen
als die sonstigen Legatare, dazu wiirde es an jeder Handhabe
gefehlt haben. Ein legatum familiae ferner — worauf man durch
die Erwagung hatte kommen konnen, dass es sich um einen Ersatz
fiir den familiae emptor handelte — wiirde ja die ganze familia
umfasst haben, also auch die einzeln vermachten Sachen, und
wiirde daher, der Absicht zuwider, die Einzellegatare eingeschrankt
haben, indem sie samtlich dem Legatar der familia gegeniiber
blosse collegatarii re coniuncti gewesen waren. Es gait also, eine
neue Art letztwilliger Verfiigung zu erfinden, und dies wird auf
den kiihnen Gedanken gefiihrt haben, den heres ^ der bis dahin nur
im Intestaterbrecht eine Rolle gespielt hatte, in das Testament
einzufiihren und mit den Legataren zu kombinieren. Ich vermute,
dass man den heres scriptus nach dem Vorbild des suus heres,
dem der heres legitimus wohl langst gleichgestellt worden war,
von allem Anfang an unbeschrankt fiir die Schulden haften liess.1
Wie sehr man aber die ganze Neuerung der heredis institutio als
kiinstliche empfand, auf wie unsicherem Boden man sich fiihlte, das
konnen wir noch heute erkennen an der merkwurdigen, gewiss sehr
alten Formel der cretio cum exheredatione, die urspriinglich jede
heredis institutio begleitet haben wird. Quodni ita creveris,
exheres esto ! Wie kam man dazu, jemanden, der doch — nach der
klassischen Auffassung — noch gar nicht Erbe ist, ausdriicklich zu
exheredieren, wie den suus heres ? Wer diese Formel verfasste,
der wusste sicher noch nichts von hereditas delata und hereditas
adquisita. Er stand vielmehr, wie mir scheint, unter der Vor-
stellung, das heres esto des Testaments, in Verbindung mit dem
uti lingua nuncupassit, ita ius esto der zwolf Tafeln wiirde den
Ernannten, gleich einem suus heresy auch ohne und wider seinen
Willen zum Erben machen, wenn ihm das Testament nicht selber
die Moglichkeit eroffne, sich der Erbeneigenschaft zu entledigen ;
darum wird ihm, fiir den Fall, dass er die Erbschaft haben will, die

1 Daneben wird man die beschrankte Sachhaftung der Legatare gewiss
nicht alsbald aufgegeben haben ; sie war, wie gezeigt, bis zur Einfuhrung des
beneficiiim separationis gar nicht zu entbehren. Aber sie wird subsidiar
geworden und damit praktisch in den Hintergrund getreten sein, sodass ihre
spatere Beseitigung, als man sie nicht mehr brauchte, nicht als grundstiirzende
Reform erschien.

138 O. Lenel [v

Beobachtung einer Form auferlegt, und wird er, wenn er diese
Form nicht beobachtet, ausdriicklich exherediert.

Den Satz heredis institutio est caput et fundamentum testa-
menti halt die herrschende Meinung fiir einen Urbestandteil des
romischen Testamentsrechts.1 Wie ware dies moglich, da doch
jedenfalls das altere Manzipationstestament die Erbeinsetzung
gar nicht kannte ! M. E. gehort er erst der Zeit an, da sich
die Umwandlung des Manzipationstestaments vollzog. Mehreres
mag da ztisammengewirkt haben. Man hatte in dem familiae
emptor einen Verteidiger und Vollstrecker des Testaments
besessen und war der Vorteile einer solchen Einrichtung inne
geworden : man wird diese Vorteile nicht haben aufgeben wollen,
als man ihn durch den heres scriptus ersetzte. Vor allem aber :
die Juristen miissen die Gefahren der beschrankten Schulden-
haftung, die sich notwendig einstellen, wo nicht, wie im justinia-
nischen und den neueren Rechten besondere Schutzmassregeln
getroffen werden, durch vielfaltige Erfahrung kennen gelernt
haben. War es da nicht ganz natiirlich, dass man die Giltigkeit
des Testaments von dem Vorhandensein des unbeschrankt haften-
den heres scriptus abhangig machte, der den Glaubigern die
Notwendigkeit ersparte, ein Dutzend verschiedener Legatare
angehen zu miissen? Fiir den Fall, dass der Eingesetzte nicht
Erbe wurde, konnte der Testator durch Substitution Vorsorge
treffen. Ausserlich wird die Abhangigkeit des Testaments von der
Erbeinsetzung kaum sehr aufgefallen sein ; war man doch daran
gewohnt, dass der Universalerwerb — des familiae emptor — die
samtlichen Singularerwerbe bedingte. Uns ist die Regel nur
deshalb ein Stein des Anstosses, weil wir es als das natiirliche
ansehen, dass, was die letztwilligen Verfugungen iibrig lassen,
den Intestaterben zufalle. Den Romern aber, die von altersher
sowohl (wie ich oben zu zeigen versuchte) beim Komitialtestament
wie beim Manzipationstestament daran gewohnt waren, das
Testament als Verfiigung liber das ganze Vermogen anzusehen,
wird das Gegenteil natiirlich erschienen sein ; sie werden von
demjenigen, der seinen Intestaterben bedenken wollte, erwartet
haben, dass er dies ausdriicklich tue.

Dass die republikanische Jurisprudenz eine Neuerung von
solcher Tragweite durchzusetzen vermochte, darf nicht wunder-
1 Anders Cuq, NRH. x. 550, 568.

v] Romisches Testament 139

nehmen. Man erinnere sich, dass dieselbe Jurisprudenz Rechts-
institute wie die Emanzipation und Adoption geschaffen, das
gesetzliche Intestaterbrecht der Frauen eingeschrankt,1 das Frauen-
testament ermoglicht, das Pflichtteilsrecht erfunden hat u. a. m.
Das waren Neuerungen von nicht geringerer Kiihnheit. Man
kann die produktive Kraft und die Macht jener Jurisprudenz gar
nicht hoch genug einschatzen. Was Pomponius von P. Mucius,
Brutus und Manilius berichtet — qui fundaverunt ius civile — , darf
nicht als leere Redensart angesehen werden ; an dieser Fundierungs-
arbeit aber hatten sicherlich auch zahlreiche literarisch nicht
hervorgetretene Vorganger ihren Anteil, und zu ihrem Werk
gehort auch die Schopfung der heredis institutio.

Das Datum der Neuerung entzieht sich, wie so vieles in den
auf die zwolf Tafeln folgenden Jahrhunderten der Rechtsent-
wicklung, unserer Kenntnis. Bei Plautus lasst sich, wie schon
Lambert2 gezeigt hat, die Erbeinsetzung nicht nachweisen. Wir
begegnen allerdings wiederholt bei ihm der Wendung heredem
facere, bald in Verbindung mit einer vorgangigen Adoption 3 bald
ohne solche.4 Man muss sich aber wohl hiiten, in diesen Worten
einen sicheren Beweis der damaligen Existenz der Erbeinsetzung
zu sehen. In den erstgenannten Stellen heisst es ubereinstimmend :

adoptat (puerum) . . .

eumque heredem fecit, quum ipse obiit diem.

In diesem Zusammenhang aber diirfte heredem fecit nicht auf
einen besonderen Einsetzungsakt hinweisen, sondern einfach als
die rechtliche Folge des Adoptionsakt gedacht sein : der Erblasser
adoptiert und macht demgemass den Adoptierten durch seinen
Tod (quum ipse obiit diem} zum Erben.5 Darum heisst es auch
Poen. iv. 2, 82 von dem gleichen Falle schlechthin :

1 Die Uberlieferung dariiber wird bekanntlich von manchen angezweifelt
und die obige Beschrankung schon dem altromischen Rechte zugeschrieben,
— wie mir scheint, ohne Grund. Solange die Frauentutel in voller Kraft
bestand, waren die Frauen in der Hand ihrer Agnaten, und ebendeshalb
eine Einschrankung ihres Intestaterbrechts uberfliissig.

2 a. a. O. 98 n. i.

3 Menaechm. prol. 60-62, Poen. prol. 76, 77.

4 Poen. prol'. 68-70, v. 2, 109, 10. Vgl. auch iv. 2, 17.

5 Im griechischen Vorbild mag K\^pov6jjLov iroifurOat im Sinn von „ sich
einen Erben schaffen " gestanden haben.

140 O. Lend [v

is in divitias homo adoptavit hunc, quum diem obiit suum.1

Damit verlieren aber auch die Stellen ihre Beweiskraft, wo das
heredem facere ohne Adoption vorkommt. Es handelt sich da
(Poen. prol. 68-70, v. 2, 109, no) um das Erbewerden ernes frater
patruelis des Verstorbenen, und wenn es da von heisst et is me
heredem fecit, quum suum obiit diem, so diirfte es auch hier viel
naher liegen, diese Worte davon zu verstehen, dass der Verstorbene
durch seinen Tod den anderen als nachsten Verwandten zum Erben
„ machte", als von einer dem Tod vorausgehenden Erbeinsetzung. So
bleibt nur die eine Stelle iibrig, in der liber einen Sklaven gesagt wird :

omnia edepol mira sunt, nisi erus hunc heredem facit

(Poen. iv. 2, 17). Gewiss geht daraus die Moglichkeit hervor, einen
Sklaven kiinstlich zum Erben zu machen. Den Weg aber, auf
dem dies geschah, lasst die Stelle im Dunkeln, und nichts zwingt
dazu, hier eher an eine eigentliche heredis institutio als an eine
Adoption wie in den ersterwahnten Fallen zu denken.2 1st hie-
nach das Rechtsinstitut der Erbeinsetzung in den Komodien des
Plautus nicht nachzuweisen, so folgt freilich daraus keineswegs,
dass es nicht damals schon bestand. Die folgende Erwagung aber
macht es wahrscheinlich, dass es doch nicht sehr viel alter ist.
Sobald das Erbeinsetzungstestament aufkam, brachte es die Gefahr
mit sich, dass der heres scriptus infolge von Uberlastung mit
Legaten die cretio unterliess und so das ganze Testament zum
Scheitern brachte. Dieser Gefahr entgegenzutreten hatte man
Ursache sowohl deshalb, weil man damals wohl bereits die Ordnung
der Sukzession durch letzten Willen gegenuber der Intestaterbfolge
begunstigte, als auch deshalb, weil bei der Enge des Kreises der
heredes legitimi die Intestaterbfolge gewiss sehr oft versagte, ein
insbesondere fiir die Erbschaftsglaubiger sehr unerwiinschter Fall.
Die altesten Gesetze nun, die nach der Uberlieferung3 jener

1 Zu Grunde liegt natiirlich eine cunroirjcris im griechischen Vorbild.

2 S. auch Lambert, a. a. O.

3 Gaius ii. 225 f. Diese Uberlieferung scheint mir aus den im Text
angefuhrten Griinden durchaus glaublich, und ich kann mich den Schrift-
stellern, die dem iiberlieferten Zweck einen anderen substituieren wollen (vgl.
besonders Lambert, a. a. O. 100, Ehrlich, Z. f. vgl. Rwiss. xvii. 104 f.), nicht
anschliessen. Auch an eine Verwandtschaft der Tendenz der lex Furia mit
der der lex Cintia glaube ich nicht. Die Gefahr, der diese entgegenwirken
sollte, bestand bei den stets widerruflichen letztwilligen Verfiigungen nicht.

v] Romisckes Testament 141

Gefahr zu begegnen bestimmt waren, die leges Furia und Voconia^
liegen schwerlich sehr weit auseinander, und die lex Voconia
datiert erst vom Jahre 169 v. Chr. Die Tatsache ist vom Stand-
punkt der herrschenden Meinung, die von uraltersher Erbein-
setzung und Legate nebeneinander stehen lasst, auffallend genug.
Sie lasst sich nicht durch die Annahme erklaren, dass in alterer
Zeit Uberlastungen des heres nicht oder nur selten vorgekommen
seien. Bewusst wird freilich nicht leicht jemand die Erben iiber-
lasten, wenn er weiss, dass von ihrem Antritt die Giltigkeit des
ganzen Testamentes abhangt ; aber unabsichtliche Uberlastungen —
infolge von Uberschatzung des Vermogensbestands, nachtraglich
eingetretener Vermogensverluste, neu erwachsener Schulden -
sind bei dem Erbeinsetzungstestament immer eine sich leicht
verwirklichende Moglichkeit. Sehr einfach lost sich das Ratsel,
wenn man unserer Vermutung folgt, dass die Erbeinsetzung selber
die lex Furia gar nicht so sehr an Alter iiberragt.1

Wenn der Entwicklungsgang des testamentarischen Erbrechts
im obigen richtig gezeichnet sein sollte, so tritt das altromische
Erbrecht aus der isolierten Stellung heraus, die es nach der
herrschenden Ansicht gegeniiber alien anderen Rechten ahnlicher
Entwicklungsstufe einnehmen wtirde. Eine Universalsukzession,
die unabhangig ware von jeder sei es leiblichen sei es kiinstlichen
Verwandtschaft, hat das altromische Recht ebensowenig gekannt
wie das altgriechische und altdeutsche. Das altromische Legaten-
testament stellt sich neben die Arrogation, wie das altgriechische
neben die cunroirpris, wie die altdeutsche donatio post obitum neben
die affatomie und die thingatio. Sicherlich bestehen zwischen
diesen Rechtsinstituten sehr erhebliche Unterschiede ; aber das

1 Ahnliche Folgerungen, freilich anders motiviert, zieht auch Lambert,
nur nicht fur das Alter der Erbeinsetzung iiberhaupt, sondern fur den
Zeitpunkt ihres Auftretens im Manzipationstestament.

Wie kommt es, dass die lex Furia die Legate so mechanisch durch
Festsetzung eines absoluten Maximums einschrankte ? Wenn die Romer von
jeher daran gewohnt waren, iiber ihr ganzes Vermogen in Form von Legaten
zu verfiigen, so begreift sich, dass infolge dieser Gewohnheit die Einfiihrung
der Erbeinsetzung in die Praxis auf Schwierigkeiten stiess, und die Tendenz
der lex Fuiia wird gewesen sein, die Testatoren im Interesse der Erbschafts-
glaubiger zu notigen, die Hauptbedenkungen in die Form der Erbeinsetzung
zu kleiden. Dass man mit dem absoluten Maximum zu weit gegangen war,
wird man spater eingesehen haben, und so trat dann an seine Stelle das
relative der lex Voconia.

142 O. Lenel [v

ist den drei Rechten gemeinsam, dass der Ausgangspunkt des
testamentarischen Erbrechts die Einzelvergabung, nicht die Erb-
einsetzung ist. Die Einfiihrung und Ausgestaltung dieser erscheint
als eine Grosstat der romischen Jurisprudenz, ist aber auch
nur als solche verstandlich, und nicht als Produkt primitiven
Gewohnheitsrechts.

O. LENEL.

NUMISMATIC ILLUSTRATIONS OF
ROMAN LAW

I FEAR the title of my subject is somewhat misleading. Starting
with a much wider plan, I find myself narrowed, by shortness of
time for the making and the reading of my paper, to archaeological
illustration by coins only, and that extending over a comparatively
limited period.

I do not propose to enter on the obscure early history of the
subject, but will accept without remark what I think is still the
general view,1 that the beginning of any regular coinage at Rome
cannot be admitted before that 'codification of customary law by
the Decemviri, in which I still believe, and which is dated about
450 B.C. I need not give specimens of its well-known devices. I
incline to believe the head of Janus borrowed from Greek art.2
The ship's prow was persistently connected by the Romans them-
selves with victories over the maritime power of Antium, by some
referred to a time just before the Decemviri (468 B.C.),3 by some
to a considerably later date (338) at which C. Maenius is repre-
sented as carrying the rostra of the Antiates to Rome.4 We have
an obvious reference to this family legend in a triens of P. Maenius
AntiaticuSy a moneyer of no B.C.5

Of the political changes effected at this time, or later, by
members of the Maenian gens I have no note to show you.

1 Babelon, Monnaies de la rtpublique romaine, Introd. p. vi.

2 Babelon, ib. x.

3 Livy ii. 65 ; Babelon, ib. vii.

4 Pliny xxxiv. 5. II ; Livy viii. 14.

5 No. i on p. 145 ; Babelon ii. 164 (see, however, Introd. p. vii.).

144 E. C. Clark [vi

A silver coinage was, according to Pliny, introduced for the first
time at Rome in 269 B.C., a date when the defeat of Pyrrhus and
the conquest of Southern Italy had brought a supply of the more
precious and portable metal into the Treasury.1 Shortly after-
wards the officers charged with the administration of the mint
began to insert 2 on their coins both of bronze and silver symbols
of high office held by some member of their family, or of canting
heraldry on its name, or abbreviations of the name itself, with
which I will not trouble you. But in the last two centuries B.C.
the silver coinage came to bear artistic representations of family
history or legend. It is in these so-called Consular coins that
I have sought to find some record of the political movements
or of the stages of development of which we read in Roman
Law. I am afraid I must confess to having drawn almost a
blank.

With but few exceptions these beautiful denarii refer to successes
in war or treaty claimed for the moneyer's family, to its divine
or heroic lineage, furnished probably by some Greek Burke or
Debrett ; but very little to such ordinary human matters as the
peaceful growth of law.

The well-known reverse of the Dioscuri is now most frequently
traced to a prevalent cult in maritime Magna Graecia, where a
coasting commerce thoroughly appreciated a clear sky with the
two great stars — lucida sidera — in the stormy nights of March.
But their symbol was appropriated, in another light no doubt, by
many an ancient family whose ancestors fought at the battle of
the Regillus, as some of our own were at Hastings or at least
came over with the Conqueror. There are, however, rather special
presentations of Castor and Pollux washing or watering their
horses ' at the well that springs by Vesta's fane ' on coins struck
by members of the gens boasting among its ancestors the dictator
of that day.3 This reverse of the gens Postumia dates actually
from 89 B.C. It is interesting to note that among the families
which were, if we can place any reliance upon the Fasti, of com-
paratively later 'arrival,' we find, as is perhaps not unusual in
modern times, claims of the highest descent. A denarius, for

1 Ridgeway, Origin of Currency and Weight-Standards^ p. 383.

2 Babelon, Introd. p. xxxiv.

3 No. 2 on p. 145 ; Babelon ii. 379.

I. Coh. p. Iviii. Marcia 2.

2. Coh. p. xxxv. Postumia 4.

3. Coh. p. xxvi. Marcia 8.

4. Coh. p. xxxiv. Pomponia 2.

5. Coh. p. xxiii. Junia 12.

6. Coh. xl. Valeria 5.

146 E. C. Clark [vi

instance, of the Marcian gens? of actual date about 60 B.C.,
besides indicating real achievements of alliance or conflict with the
last kings of Macedonia, or of bringing the first great aqueduct, the
Aqua Marcia, to Rome, will find a founder of the family in Ancus,
the august doublet of Numa, fourth among the many questionable
predecessors of the probably historical Tarquinii. Beyond this
fabulous ancestry there is no indication of patrician rank in the
Marcian gens, except the beautiful story, which one scarce has
the heart to touch, about Caius of Corioli. Neither is there
among the Pomponii, whose heraldic history goes back to Numa
himself.2

To return, however, to quasi - historical times of the early
Republic, I have sometimes hazarded the suggestion that a Junius
in the first reported pair of Republican Consuls may possibly
indicate some tradition of a brief union against a common tyranny,
and some idea of representing both orders in the famous dual
magistracy, which was not permanently realized till the Licinian
Rogations. Anyhow the coin which was struck by the murderer
of Caesar about 43 B.C. represents his supposed ancestor, Brutus
the Ancient, simply in a dignified procession as Consul? It has
nothing to do with the story of his sons' execution which Vergil
skates over so dexterously in the 6th Aeneid (820-824).

With regard to another hero of the same revolution, if there is
in the coins of the historical Valerii any reference to the ancient
Publicola, it is not to a limitation of the new magistracy by an
alleged lex de provocatione, but solely to the overthrow of the old
Royalty.4 Of the convenient charge of conspiring for the restora-
tion (regni affectandi) of kingly power we have a memorial in
another Junian denarius of 43 B.C. Here we see, coupled with the
Brutus of the early Republic,5 that Servilius Ahala who is so
warmly eulogized in Livy (iv. 14) for the butchery of Sp. Maelius
439 B.C. And to the alleged informer against Maelius, on this
occasion, I find an undoubted reference in a denarius of an old
plebeian family. This informer was, we are told, one Lucius

1 No. 3 on p. 145 ; Babelon ii. 187, 197.

2 Ib. No. 4.

8 Ib. No. 5 ; see Cohen, Texte, 174.

* Ib. No. 6.

5 No. 7 on p. 147.

7. Coh. p. xxiii. Junia n.

8. Coh. p. xxviii. Minucia 4.

9. Coh. p. xviii. Flaminia 2.

10. Coh. p. xli. Veturia.

II. Coh. p. xxxiv. Porcia 3.

148 E. C. Clark [vi

Minucius, who gained a temporary popularity, and had a statue
erected to him (Livy iv. 13, 16) for distributing at a low price the
confiscated corn stores of the unfortunate Maelius. Here1 we
have the corn and the statue on the coin of a moneyer, Ti.
Minucius, of whose cognomen I shall speak presently. Besides
this Act of Attainder, if I may dignify it with that name, there is
scarcely any numismatic notice, during the whole time occupied
by the struggle between the two Orders, of aught but achievements
in the field.

Ap. Claudius, obviously the main author of the XII Tables, and
probably the victim of an aristocratic reaction, has been so
successfully blackened by family spite or sensational romancing
that we are not surprised to find little record but lies of his
legislation. When we pass on, however, to the influential and
wealthy gens Licinia, in which the family of Stolones were still of
high rank and importance under Augustus, we look naturally for
some reference to the famous Rogations of 367 B.C. or their result.
But we look in vain.

Of the Q. Publilius Philo who comes in so abruptly in Livy's
8th Book, 339 B.C., with his convenient dictatorship and his Junius
Brutus for a magister equitum> and his laws anticipating the Hor-
tensian settlement of fifty years later — of all this the only numismatic
record that I can find is on a Greek coin of Naples (of which I do
not give a drawing, as it is not Roman), apparently referring to the
dubious success gained by Publilius about this time, with the help
of a traitor, over Palaepolis, henceforth Neapolis (Naples).2

To take up once again the strange story of the Claudian
reformers, on whom Mommsen has shed the first true light. Claudii
occur, as we know, still bearing the ancient name of Appius, quite to
the close of the Republic. But there is no record on their denarii
of the famous Censorship of Ap. Claudius Caecus in 312 — no
Censorinus to follow, though that achievement is common in at
least two other gentes. One trace only can I find of the many
consequences of Appius's reform, and that indirectly as a result of
the lex Ogulnia^ which law, by the way, is entirely ignored in the
denarii of the gens Ogulnia itself.

The lex Ogulnia of 300 B.C., as we learn from Livy,3 threw

1 No. 8 on p. 147. 2 Livy viii. 26 ; see Babelon i. 15.

3 Livy x. 6. 9.

12. Coh. p. xxxviii. Silia.

13. Coh. p. x. Calpurnia 24.

14. Coh. p. xviii. Fufia.

All the drawings, except the last, are from H. Cohen's Medailles Consulaires, 1857 (Planches).

150 E. C. Clark [vi

open the Pontificate and Augurate to the Plebeians, one of those
elected to the latter office being a Minucius. It is clearly to the
first attainment of this honour by one of the family that the
cognomen Augurinus refers on the coin last cited.1 The
whole matter may seem unimportant, but students of Roman
Private Law know how much of its development results from this
primarily religious career becoming ouverte aux talents.

Of the dictatorship of Quintus Hortensius or his law, which fills
so important a place in our legal records, I can find no illustration,
nor to my knowledge does a gens Hortensia appear at all on any
known Republican coin.

The introduction of a silver coinage in 269, of which I spoke
just now, is by many good authorities connected with a reduction
of the original heavy bronze (as libralis} to what was practically a
token.2 It is perhaps more probable that this was a depreciation
of the coinage due to the troubles of the First Punic War, which was
followed by a more serious one during those of the Second.3 This
last reduction is generally attributed to a lex Flaminia connected
with the name of the unfortunate general who fell in the disastrous
battle of Thrasimenus in 217, of which Livy and Polybius make him
the scapegoat.4 The history of this C. Flaminius is important, but
obscure to a degree. He is undoubtedly the champion of the later
plebs as against the senatorial party, and in the demoralization of
the assemblies, attributed to him, we clearly recognize a principal
turning-point in the history of Rome. Of all this we have no
numismatic record. I hardly dare to suggest that in the much
contested legend of a Flaminian denarius we may possibly recognize
an exceptional attainment of the rigidly guarded office of Flamen
by some ancestor of low birth, and even the formation of a quasi-
gentile name. I refer to the Pri. Fla. of a Flaminian moneyer,
struck 44 B.C., which has been interpreted Primus Flamen? though
Mommsen, more in accordance, no doubt, with the rest of the legend,
reads Primus Flavit.

I wish briefly to mention here a reference not indeed directly to
law, but to an early treaty between Rome and some Campanian or
other Greek nationality, on a coin of the Veturii, the idea of which

1 No. 8 on p. 147. 2 Babelon, Introd. p. xiii.

3 Pliny xxiii. 44, 46. 4 Livy xxii. 4-6 ; Polybius iii. 82, 83.

5 No. 9 on p. 147 ; Babelon i. 494, 496.

iv] Numismatic Illustrations 1 5 1

is supposed to have been furnished by the reduction of Capua in
2ITB.C.1 A Roman and a Greek lay their hands jointly on a pig
held ready for sacrifice by a sacerdos fecialis. This is interesting as
illustrating Livy's picturesque account (in i. 24) of the ancient
ceremony foedus ferire.

The obscurity surrounding the institution of a second Praetor,
and the reform in Private Law which we vaguely describe as the
lex Aebutia, derive no light from numismatics.

The first undoubted direct reference to a historical enactment
on a coin is to be found in the provoco of Publius Laeca, a moneyer
of about no B.C.2 It symbolizes that final narrowing of the
imperium which was effected in the leges Porciae. This appeal
against sentence of flogging was carried or first brought forward in
199 B.C.

A denarius of about the same minting date (no B.C.) by P.
Licinius Nerva, gives an interesting representation of the ballot-
voting introduced by his ancestor C. Licinius Crassus in 145 B.C.3
The voter, you see, steps up to the rogator, receives his ballot, and
passes singly over the pans to deposit it in the urn.

What was practically a beginning of the largesses of the later
Republic and the Empire may be recognized in a coinage
expressly issued to meet a scarcity of corn under the lexfrumen-
taria of Saturninus, 100 B.C.4 Note the quaestors ad fru\inentuin\
emu\ndum~\ (Piso, Caepio, Q.) and the head of Saturn with hisfa/x,
for the Treasury, and probably a reference to the name Saturninus.

The end of the formidable Social War, and the incorporation
of the Italian allies with the Roman people, is indicated in a denarius
of the genus Fufia? This striking coin of the moneyer Q. Fufius
Calenus is dated by Babelon 82 B.C., when the pacification of Italy
was completed.

In the stormy close of the Republic there are not wanting
occasional coins of legal or political significance, nor in the Julian
and Augustan or in the first centuries of the Empire generally.
These I am obliged to omit for lack of time. In one coin only I

1 No. 10 on p. 147 ; Babelon ii. 534.

2 Ib. No. 1 1 ; Babelon ii. 370.

3 No. 12 on p. 149 ; Babelon ii. 129 ; see Varro, De re rustica, ii. 2.

4 Ib. No. 13 ; Babelon i. 288.

5 Ib. No. 14 ; Babelon i. 512.

152 E. C. Clark [vi

should like to bring to your notice what has been regarded as the
numismatic record of a wider gift of Roman citizenship than that last
mentioned, in fact throughout the Roman world, in orbe Romano, as
Ulpian says.1 This gift is attributed by Justinian 2 to the Emperor
Antoninus Pius, erroneously, as is usually held by modern writers
on the strength of a passage in Dio Cassius,3 which gives the
credit, though not on any very high ground, to Caracalla, who
amongst several other later Emperors debased that honoured name.
There is, however, in the Cabinet de France a bronze medallion of
Pius4 bearing the striking legend Ampliatori civium within a wreath
of oak-leaves. That this really refers to a vast extension of citizen-
ship by that great and humane Emperor has been strongly
maintained by authorities who were quite aware of the passage in
Dio.5 The difficulties arising in subsequent law are about the same
in both cases. This medallion is placed by Cohen between A.D.
140 and 143. The disputed question as to its meaning I leave
to you.6

E. C. CLARK.

1 Dig. 1. 5. 17.

2 Nov. 78. 5.

3 Dio Cassius, Ixxvii. 9.

4 Cohen, Monnaies de VEmpire, ii. 347, no. 789 ; see last drawing on
p. 149.

5 E.g. Hommel.

6 The discovery of the papyrus published as P. Giess. 40 seems, as has
been pointed out to me by Professor Lenel, to confirm the conclusion that
thejan^ersaypaji^-oiURDjman citizenship is to be_attribute.d_to Caracalla. I
still think that the medallion of Pius may refer to some less advanced or less
effective measure in the same direction, of which we otherwise know nothing.

VII

COTTER UND TOTE ALS RECHTS-
SUBJEKTE BEI DEN ALTEN GERMANEN

UNTER Rechtssubjekt verstehen wir ein Wesen, das Rechte (und
allenfalls auch. Pflichten) haben kann. Wir nennen ein solches
Wesen auch Person im Rechtssinne. Die Gottheit in unserem
modernen Sinne ist sicherlich auch Person. Wir legen ihr Vernunft,
Willen, Handlungsfahigkeit bei. Wir glauben an einen personlichen
Gott. Aber unser Gott ist Person nur im moralischen, im ethischen
Sinne. Nicht im Rechtssinn. Unser Gott ist nicht Eigentumer
im Rechtssinn.

Anders schon das Mittelalter. Das Mittelalter spricht Gott und
den Heiligen Rechtspersonlichkdt zu. Sie haben Eigentum an
Grundstiicken und Fahrnis. Sie haben Vasallen, Dienstmannen
und Horige. Die Heiligen gehen Vertrage ein und werden daraus
berechtigt und verpflichtet. Sie haben offentliche Rechte. Die
Rolle des heiligen Petrus in der Entwicklung der staats- und
kirchenrechtlichen Verhaltnisse ist bekannt. Gott als Grundherr
und Eigentumer der Welt hat Anspruch auf Zehent. Raub von
Kirchengut ist Beraubung Gottes und seiner Heiligen. Das hat
bereits vor rund 50 Jahren Otto Gierke festgestellt und voll ein-
dringend erortert.

Ich meine, man kann eine solche iiberaus lebendige, sinnliche
Auffassung auch schon im vorchristlichen Germanentum nach-
weisen. Die anthropomorphistisch theokratische Anschauung
des Mittelalters findet sich bereits im germanischen Altertum
vorgebildet. Nicht nur im Keim, sondern womoglich noch viel
sinnlicher.

Es scheint mir reizvoll, diesem Problem nachzugehen, umsomehr,
als sich <3abei tiefere Einblicke in die Rechtsinstitutionen des

154 H. Schreuer [vn

menschlichen Verkehrs ergeben. In einer in Kiirze erscheinenden
Publikation 1 biete ich eingehende Erorterungen. Hier mochte ich
eine gedrangte Ubersicht der Hauptresultate vorfuhren, die sich
mir ergeben haben.

I. DAS WESEN DER GERMANISCHEN COTTER

Es ist notwendig, zuerst das Wesen der germanischen Cotter
einigermassen herauszuarbeiten. Die germanischen Cotter, soweit
wir ihrer habhaft werden konnen, sind von Haus aus reale Machte,
die sich handgreiflich bemerkbar machen. Caesar B. G. vi. 21 nennt
Sol, Vulcanus, Luna ; reliquos ne fama quidem acceperunt. Das
waren also zunachst Naturkrafte, die uns als gegebene, aussermen-
schliche und iibermenschliche Machte von ungeheurer Wirksamkeit
entgegentreten, die man zu spiiren bekommt. Das ware das Reale.
Die Naturvolker lieben es aber, Krafte, denen sie begegnen,
als Ausserungen menschenahnlicher Subjekte sich vorzustellen.
Hinter den Naturerscheinungen von Sonne, Mond und Blitz
(Feuer) sieht der Germane. Wesen, die der menschlichen Seele ver-
wandt sind. Die — wirklichen oder auch eingebildeten — Funkzionen
von Sonne, Blitz und Mond sind ihm Tatigkeiten psychischer
Wesen. Der Schade, den sie verursachen, erscheint ihm als
Feindseligkeit, der Nutzen als Wohlwollen (Animatismus, Animis-
mus). Die Ohnmacht des Menschen gegeniiber den Naturgewalten
wird so zur Unterordnung unter die Herrschaft ubermachtiger
Cotter. Es ist kein Wunder, dass man diesen uberlegenen Geistern
auch hoheres Wissen beilegt.

So schon nach den Angaben Caesars. Dies beweist unter
Anderem der Gebrauch von Orakel und Opfer. Vulcanus ist der
germanische Thonaraz, Sol ist Tiwaz. Es kann auch gar kein
Zweifel sein, dass diese Cotter mannlich gedacht sind. Ihnen
gegenuber steht eine weibliche Gottheit, Luna, wie ich meine die
weibliche Gottheit KO.T efox^. Das ist schon eine sehr weitgehende
Vermenschlichung.

Noch weiter geht die Vermenschlichung der Cotter nach den
Angaben des Tacitus. Die Cotter stehen da zu einander in men-
schlichen Familienverhaltnissen, ja die germanischen Volker leiten
ihre Herkunft von den Gottern ab, vor allem von dem uralten

1 ZSS, 1913.

vn] Goiter und Tote 1 55

Haupt- und Obergott Tin. Ich glaube nicht zu viel zu sagen,
wenn ich den Germanen auch eine gottliche Stammesmutter,
etwa kurz gesagt, die Mutter Erde, zuschreibe. Nicht mit alien
physiologischen Einzelheiten, aber doch unter Festhaltung der
Familienrechtsbegriffe : Vater und Mutter.

Diese Auffassung hat sich mir als gemeingermanisch, urger-
manisch ergeben. Die Germanen sind von Haus aus Tiu-Sohne
gewesen, wie es noch zur Zeit des Tacitus ganz besonders die
Herminonen (Sueben), speziell die Semnonen sind. Ja ich bin
sehr geneigt, diese Vorstellungen als arisches Urerbe anzusehen.

Diese Versippung der Gotterwelt mit dem Menschengeschlechte
ist fur das religiose aber auch fur das Rechtsleben von tiefstgrei-
fender Bedeutung.

Gotter und Menschen sind durch den Friedens- und Rechts-
verband der Sippe organisch zusammengeschlossen. In religioser
Beziehung tritt zur Macht die Liebe, die Innigkeit. In juristischer
Beziehung erscheint die sakrale Gotterherrschaft ahnenkultlich
konstruiert. Die religiose Vorstellung der Gotterherrschaft wird
durch das ahnenkultliche Element der rnenschlichen Rechtsordnung
eingegliedert.

II. RECHTSSTELLUNG DES TOTEN

Die Verschmelzung der Gotter mit den Ahnen fiihrt auf die
Rechtsstellung des Toten. Die Lehre von der Fortdauer der
Rechtspersonlichkeit nach dem Tode ist in letzter Zeit namentlich
durch Heinrich Brunner belebt und vertieft worden. Einiges
kann ich aus eigenen Untersuchungen, die nun neun Jahre zuriick-
liegen, hinzufiigen.

Nach altgermanischer Anschauung erlischt die Personlichkeit
des Menschen mit dem Tode nicht. Im Gegenteil bewirkt der Tod
eher eine Steigerung der Personlichkeit an Wissen und Konnen.
Fiir das Rechtsgebiet kann man geradezu den Grundsatz aufstellen,
dass prinzipiell die Rechtsfahigkeit und die Handlungsfahigkeit,
dass die Rechtsverhaltnisse, soweit nicht besondere Griinde
eintreten, auch nach dem Tode fortbestehen. Als Sitte und Pietat
ragen ja diese Vorstellungen noch in unsere Tage hinein. Nach
altgermanischem Rechte dauert das Personenrecht des Toten fort.
Schon am Korper kann eine Ehrung, Beschimpfung, Bestrafung
des Toten vollzogen werden. Die eheliche Treue und die Gefolg-

156 H. Schreuer [vn

schaft wahren liber das Grab hinaus. Ebenso das Vermogensrecht.
Der Tote hat Eigentum an seinem Grabe (als an seiner Behausung)
und an Allem, was er mitbekommt.

Mit eherner Logik und in scharfster Auspragung haben die
Romer das Recht des Toten festgehalten. ^^paterfamilias
bleibt Rechtssubjekt seines Vermogens. So erklart sich m. E. die
eigentiimliche Anschauung, dass der Erbe, der heres^ die Person-
lichkeit des Toten in sich aufnimmt, dass er sie fortsetzt. Daher
auch die ungeheuer friihzeitige Testirfreiheit der Romer. Weil
eben dem Toten wie bei Lebzeiten das Gut gehort, und zwar das
ganze Gut, darum kann der Lebende ohne weiteres liber den Tod
hinaus dariiber verfiigen. Noch tiefer fassend und in fernste Zeiten
zuriickgreifend wird man wohl sagen diirfen, dass auch die patria
potestas den Sohnen, den sui heredes, durch Absorpzion der Seele
des Vaters iiberkommen sei. Die romischen Begrabnis- und
Totengebrauche zeigen die zu Grunde liegende Anschauung in
grosser Lebhaftigkeit. Der Tote lebt in dem Erben fort.

Auch bei den Germanen stirbt der Tote nicht. Der Tote,
der Ahn, bleibt insbesondere Eigentiimer seines Hauses, er bleibt
Hausherr. Noch im Mittelalter ist im deutschen Handgemal, im
englischen frumstol, eftel, im nordischen d§al — kurz im Erbgut der
Gedanke von Eigentum und Herrschaft des Toten lebendig. Noch
in spater, geschichtlicher Zeit okkupiert ein toter Norweger
(Kvelldulfr] Land auf Island. Und ausdriicklich erklaren die
Hochsitzpfeiler des nordischen Bauernhauses, die ondvegissulur,
dass an dem Hochsitz die Seele des Ahnen hause. Auch fiir das
deutsche Institut des sog. „ Dreissigsten " und dessen Parallele, das
nordische Erbbier, muss ich — entgegen Homeyer — als den einen
Grundgedanken das Recht des Toten in Anspruch nehmen.

Selbst die familienrechtliche Gewalt des Hausvaters bleibt
bestehen. Nicht nur folgt ihm freiwillig die Treue liber das Grab.
Der Tote erscheint auch selbst und stellt Forderungen. Bei wich-
tigen Anlassen wird er beschworen und um Weisungen ersucht.

'Andererseits zeigen die germanischen Anschauungen gegenliber
dem romischen Recht eine Abschwachung der Rechte des Toten.
Der Tote ist da nicht Eigentiimer seines ganzen Nachlasses, wie in
Rom. Er erhalt bios bestimmte Vermogensstiicke oder eine
Quote, kurz den Totenteil. Das entspricht aber dem Verhaltnis
schon bei Lebzeiten. Schon bei Lebzeiten steht das Vermogen in

vn] Cotter und Tote 157

gemeinschaftlichem Eigentum der Familienglieder, allerdings unter
voller Gewere des Vaters. Ich will ganz davon absehen, in wiefern
die Bestattung ausserhalb des Hauses, der Gedanke von Walhall
und christlichem Jenseits nach germanischer Anschauung losend
wirken musste. In dem deutschen „ Dreissigsten " sehe ich als
zweiten Grundgedanken die Abfindung, Abschichtung des aus-
wandernden Toten. Aber schon fur die Urzeit tritt der Gesichts-
punkt in Kraft, dass die laufende Ausiibung der Rechte dem
Toten genomnen war. Die Gewere hat der Erbe. (Dieser Vor-
stellung mag auch der spatere Satz entsprechen : Le mort saisit
le vif.) So ergibt sich ein Nebeneinander, Miteinander in der
Herrschaft, in dem Haus- und Familienregiment des Ahnen und
des Erben. Der Erbe hat eine unmittelbare Gewere, die in histo-
rischer Entwicklung leicht zu Nutzungseigentum und schliesslich
Ablosung, Abstossung des Obereigentums fiihrt.

III. DAS RECHT DER COTTER UND MENSCHENRECHT

Zieht man nun das ahnenkultliche Element der altgermanischen
Religion heran, so werden nicht nur diese erbrechtlichen Grundsatze
bekraftigt. Durch das Totenrecht tritt auch das Sakralrecht mit
juristischer Plastik hervor — sowohl das sakrale Vermogensrecht,
wie das sakrale Personenrecht. Zweifellos ist die Gottheit Eigen-
tiimerin ihres Haines, ihres Tempels, ihrer Schatze, der Tiere in
ihrem Gehege.. Auch die bekannten nordischen Privattempel sind
Eigentum der Gottheit. Der Gode ist von Haus aus nur Priester, wie
die Gydja Priesterin. Als solcher ist er allerdings Organ der Gott-
heit ; er fiihrt deren Handlungen aus ; er libt Amtsgewere, diedann
freilich weitgehender Sakularisierung, Allodialisierung fahig ist.
Ja selbst der einfache Hausvater ist in seiner Stellung als Haus-
und Grundherr transzendental, gotter- und ahnenkultlich verankert.
Der Hausfriede ist nicht sein Friede sondern sakral. Die zwangs-
weisen Grundanweisungen durch die Fiirsten Caesars konnen nur
durch das sakrale Eigentum resp. Obereigentum der in der
Volksversammlung anwesenden Gottheit erklart werden. Und noch
in spatgeschichtlicher Zeit weisen Heiligkeit der Grenzzeichen,
feierliche Umgange, das nordischefara eldium landit, der Hammer-
wurf u. A. auf die sakrale Wurzel des Grundeigentums. Auch im

158 H. Schreuer [vn

Personenrecht regiert die Gottheit, die vom Konige, Landespriester
oder Hausvater um ihre Weisung befragt wird.

Die Heiligkeit der Eltern aber auch die Banngewalt der
Obrigkeit, die iubendi potestas hat eine gotter- und ahnenkultliche
Wurzel. Das cogere der principes Caesars, dessen magistratus,
qui vitae necisque habent potestatem, all das ist bei dem charakter-
istischen Unabhangigkeitssinn der Germanen nur auf sakraler
Grundlage moglich.

IV. DER RECHTSVERKEHR

Es eriibrigen noch einige Worte zu der Frage, wie sich diese
transzendenten Rechtssubjekte im Rechtsverkehr dieser Welt
geltend machen. Sie bringen sich selbstandig oder befragt, be-
schworen durch sinnlich wahrnehmbare Ausserungen zur Geltung.
Es sind reale Geschehnisse, die als Ausserungen der gottlichen
Ahnen, Freunde oder Feinde, gedeutet werden. Die Personen, an
welche und durch welche sich die Gottheit an die anderen wendet,
erscheinen da in priesterlicher Funkzion. Von besonderer Wich-
tigkeit sind dabei gewisse Attribute der Gottheit. Uber die
Vorstellungen, welche hier durchgreifen, gibt vor Allen Tacitus
Auskunft : Deum adesse bellantibus credunt. Effigiesque et signa
quaedam detracta lucis in proelium ferunt. Diese Wahrzeichen
des Gottes sind Wahrzeichen seiner Anwesenheit. Der Gott ist
da, sichtbar durch sein Wahrzeichen. Derjenige, der das Wahr-
zeichen handhabt, ist ein Werkzeug in der Hand des Gottes. Er
bringt den gottlichen Willen zur sichtbaren, vernehmbaren Aus-
serung. Daher umgekehrt : wer das Wahrzeichen des Gottes hat,
ist dessen Priester, Bote, Stellvertreter. Daher soil der islandische
Gode, wenn er in Funkzion tritt, den Opferring an der Hand
tragen. Dann ist es der Gott, der aus ihm spricht. So wird mit
dem Feuer das Land geheiligt, ebenso mit dem Hammer Thors
das Land ausgemessen. Das ist die tiefere Bedeutung des germa-
nischen Konigsspeers, der Konigsfahne, des Schwertes und wohl auch
des Gerichtsstabes. Noch die spateren Kronungsformeln lassen
den Stab als Zauberstab erkennen. Auch hier tritt der Gedanke
der Amtsgewere und Allodialisierung ein : Der Bote wird zum
Stellvertreter, dieser zum Eigenberechtigten von Gottes Gnaden.

H. SCHREUER.

VIII

THE MEANING OF THE WORDS 6DAL
AND SKEYTING IN THE OLD LAWS OF
NORWAY

I. THE LEGAL TERMINOLOGY

O§al. — If we consider the terms used in contrast to the word cftal,
we shall best understand its original meaning.

The first term of this kind is aurar (moveables). This distinc-
tion is observed throughout in the oldest of our legal sources, the
Gulat kings law. A deceased person's property is either oftal or
aurar \ tertium non datur.1 In ihe Pros tat kings law, dated 100
years earlier, we find the same distinction indicated by the words
jgr^> and aurar?

Another term used in contradistinction to cfcal isfyng (acquired
land) 3 or kaupijqrft (purchased land).4 The last distinction also re-
appears in the Frostathingslaw, where we find kauplendingr (the
owner of kaupland or kaupijqr^} distinguished from &§alsma!§r
(the odaller).5 In the Landslaw of Magnus Lagab0tir (the Law-
mender), 1 274, fqng and kaupijqtQ are comprised in the term utjqr'S
(outland).6

S key ting. — The s key ting (L&\.. scotatid] is the very ancient Scan-
dinavian form for ' transfer of property in land.' This at least is the
communis opinio doctorum? But in my opinion the correct defini-
tion of the legal act of skeyting is this : the skeyting is originally
the legal form for ' transfer of $fo/-right in $fo/-land.' ' To buy land

1 G. 103, 104; cpr. 270, 275. 2 F. v. 13; cpr. G. 53.

3 G. 285. 4 G. 223. 5 F. xiii. 25. 6 L. v. 7.

7 See Ebbe Hertzberg, Glossary to the Old Laws of Norway, s.v. ' Skeyting.'

159

160 A. Tar anger [vm

for skeyting' (at kaupa jqr§ til skeytingar)1 is the same as 'to buy
land for ffiat' (at kaupa jqr^ ser til cftals}? The old provincial laws
for Gulathing3 and Frostathing4 only use the terms skeyta and
skeyting in connexion with transfer of <ftta/-land, and the same is
the case in Lands law?

II. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF ODAL AND SKEYTING

In 1907 Professor Vinogradoff published in the Harvard Law
Review a paper on ' Transfer of Land in Old English Law.' It is
this paper which has prompted me to make the following remarks
about the original meaning of the words &§al and skeyting in the
old laws of Norway.

As to the general meaning of the word d$al\ it signifies the
family -ownership of land, and also land as the object of such
ownership. Mr. Hertzberg in his Glossary of our old laws, how-
ever, has put this conception of the word as a secondary one, and
has made it evident, or at least tried to make it evident, that the
original legal meaning of cfoal was simply ownership in land and
land as an object of such ownership. The word concerns only
property in land or soil.

My own investigations have led me to the same conclusion.
But what does ' property in land ' indicate ? What kind of ' land '
is owned ?

Everywhere in the Teutonic world we observe that the oldest
valuation of land only comprises the arable land. And I believe it
to be just as certain that only the arable land originally was the
object of ownership. The real basis of land-ownership is the tilling
of the soil.6

Having studied our old laws, particularly the oldest one, the
Gulathing -slaw \ I found that the real $ta/-land was the arable land,

1 G. 278, 279. 2 F. xii. 4. 3 G. 278, 279, 292.

4 F. xii. i, 2, 4 ; ix. 4 (jqtfS). I do not think that F. xii. i is against my
opinion, that the common intention of the skeyting originally is transfer of
<?oW-right in <?3tf/-land ; but, as I will show later on (p. 1 70), the skeyting in F.
has more the character of transferring the gewere than that of transfer of a
' right.' This was formerly my view of the skeyting ; see my paper ' Den
norske besiddelsesret ' in Tidsskrift for Retsvidenskab, x. 105 sqq.

5 L. vi. 8, 10.

6 Adolf Astrom, Svensk jordaganderatt (Stockholm, 1897), has treated this
subject at large and in a very convincing way.

vni] Odal and Skeyting 161

the tilled ground, the ' fenced-in ' fields, meadows and pastures, in
fact the homestead. This is the original 6$al, both in the vulgar and
the legal meaning of the word.1 We have two convincing evidences
of this fact. The one is the act of &§alsskipti> the other is the act
of skeyting.

The act of 6§alsskipti (division of the o^af) is, according to the
Gulathingslaw, 87, only a division of houses or tilled ground (hus
&8a JQrti), or of b<t>ar (townships). The division of mountain-
pastures (s&tr) or forest (mqrk) is regulated in quite a different
way in G. 86.

The act of skeyting is once described in the Gulathingslaw before
its revision by King Olaf the Saint (ob. A.D. 1030) or King Magnus
Erlingsson (A.D. 1 163). Of this description we still have a notice in
G. 292, which gives us a clear idea of its peculiarities.

The most essential act of the skeyting was the ' mould-taking '
(moldtaka\ generally performed by the seller ; but if the seller
refused to perform this duty, the purchaser himself might do so.
In the latter case G. 292 provides : ' He shall take the mould
according to the order of the law : Take some mould from the four
corners of the hearth, from the seat of honour (the gndvegissceti,
the 'high seat'), from where the field and meadow meet, from where
the fenced-in pastureland and grove meet.' 2 From other sources
we know that the mould thus taken was cast into the lap (skauf)
of the purchaser, and hence the whole ceremony was named
skeyting) which verbally would correspond to an English word
' lapping ' (from c lap ').

This old ceremony of skeyting takes us back to the very
primitive days of Norwegian peasant life. We find ourselves in
the ancient peasant house with its hearth in the middle of the

1 According to Falk u. Torp, Etym. WB.^ d§al means " « eigentum, heimat,
vaterland, grundbesitz, vorkaufrecht ' = ags. 6]?el, e]?el 'heimatland,' afries.
othol, ethel, as. othil * erbgut,' oht. uodal in ders. bedeut. ; vgl. got. haimopli
' heimatliches gut.' Eine urspriinglichere bedeutung liegt vor in poet,
anord. otSal 'gemiit, natur, wesen ' = aoal, eoli. Daraus entwickelte sich die
bedeutung « geschlecht, herkunft ' (so bei anord. eoli und bei adel) und daraus
wieder 'heimat' usw. Die alteste bedeutung der wortgruppe ware 'einge-
weide,' falls as. inothri, ahd. inuodili und inadiri ' eingeweide,' Gr. ^TO/>,
'hertz' verwandt sind."

2 * Hann £ mold at taca sem i logum er maelt : Taca at arenshornom
fiorum oc i ondveges saete. oc ]?ar sem acr oc eng m0tezt. oc ]?ar sem
holt oc hage m0tezt.'

1 62 A. Tar anger [vm

earthen floor, and the seat of honour, belonging to the master,
placed in direct contact with the same earthen floor. The hearth
and the high seat were the chief things within the old <?&z/-house
of Norway. The ancient Norwegian peasant, looking at his oftal-
homestead, would, I believe, consider himself as much a lord as
the English landowner when he declares, ' My house is my
castle.'1 Nobody could enter against the will of the ^^/-house-
holder. If anybody wished to summon him before the Thing, or
tribunal, he had first to summon him ' home ' ; because the
summoning to the courts of law was not lawful when the defendant
was not sitting * in his qndvegi? 2 When the heir took the seisin
of the ancestral property the act was symbolized by the heirs
taking their place in the high seat.3 Thus the qndvegi may be
named the 'throne' in the ^/-householder's realm, which comprised
the house and the fenced-in land, the fields, meadows, grove, and
home-pasture. When transferring this * realm ' to another house-
holder, he had to make it over to his successor in this dramatic
way of ' mould-taking ' and ' mwld-skeyting*

I presume we are not very far from the truth in asserting
that the above-mentioned formula of skeyting dates from a time
when every Norwegian free peasant was an $ta/-man, that is, the
owner and the farmer of his own <?S<z/-homestead. Leaseholders
(leigulendingar} of <?oW-land had not yet made their appearance in
the agrarian history of Norway, in which they were afterwards to
play so prominent a part. The ^/-householder farmed his land
himself with the assistance of his family and his serfs.

How far back in our history have we to go in order to find
such conditions ? The answer to that question was given as long
ago as 1889 by Konrad Maurer in his paper on Die norwegischen
holdar. He has proved that the word hauldr (holdr ags. hold]
originally was synonymous with the word bondi (husband, free
peasant), and we still find these words used as synonyms in the
laws of Eastern Norway in the twelfth century. But in the laws
of Western Norway (the Gulathingslgg and the Frostathingslqg)

1 Note the answer of a defendant in the procedure of redeeming <?&W-land :
* thou shall never get this land from me, without taking it from my corpse '
fyufcer Ipd iord eigi of mtr. nema ]>u af mer datiftum drager, G. 268, cpr. 265).

2 See G. 35, 266 ; F. x. 2.

3 G. 115: ' Nu er maftr dauSr, arve skal i ondvegi setjazt.'

vm] 6dal and Skeyting 163

hauldr is synonymous with fiftalborinn maftr or
while bondi here means an inferior class of free peasants,
who are not $fo/-born or <?&z/-men. This division of the peasant
community may have taken place before the beginning of the
ninth century, when we meet the Norwegian hold in the
Anglo-Saxon Chronicles and in the Northleoda laga as a man
standing in the middle rank between the ealdorman and the
\egn^ just as the Norwegian hauldr ranks between the lendrma&r
and the bondi.

This division of the peasants living round the Western fjords
is no doubt one of the many evolutionary factors which the raids
of the Vikings introduced into Norway. During this period the
sons of the ancient ^/-families developed more and more into
a class of warriors and merchants, to whom farming seemed
degrading and inadequate for the economic needs of their new
households, which were greater and more costly than under the
old standard of living on a single $fo/-estate. They developed
from <?tfo/-peasants into landlords. The story of Harek in Tjotta
(first half of the eleventh century) is very significant in this respect.2
His father, Eyvind Skaldaspiller, had not been storaudigr (very rich),
and in his time there lived in Tjotta many small peasants. His
son Harek at first bought only one farm, and that not very large ;
but in a few years he bought out all the small bfindr, who had
lived there before, so that he himself alone owned the whole island
and built a big ' manse ' upon it.

Under such circumstances the small <?&z/-peasants were trans-
formed into leaseholders of <?&z/-land belonging to others, or they
founded, new <ftfo/-estates by clearing away the forests and tilling
uncultivated soil. About a thousand years after the advent of
Christianity this development got a new impulse in that Christianity
did away with serfdom. Olaf and his Anglo-Saxon court bishop,
Grimkell, had very effectively advocated the abolition of serfdom.
They ordered in their new Christian law that every year at every

,r einn

1 Maurer, Die holdar, pp. 198-99.

2 ' I ftottu bjoggu >a smair b0ndr ok eigi allfair. Hdrekr keypti J?a. ™.«
b0 fyrst ok eigi allmikinn ok for J?ar buSum til ; en a fam misserum hafSi
hann rutt i brot gllum b6ndum, >eim er ]?ar bjoggu aSr, sva at harm atti pa
einn alia eyna ok gerfti ]?ar ]?a h9fudb0 mikinn ' (Heimskringla, ed. Firinur
Jonsson, ii. 215).

164 A. Tar anger [vm

Lawthing and Fylkisthing in the land a serf should be set free;1 the
inhabitants of the thinglqg should every year give the sum of
money which was needed to pay the freedgeld to the owner of the
serf, and the solemn act of free-giving was performed on the first
Sunday in the session. K. Maurer has expressed the opinion
that the object of this act of free-giving was to establish a contrast
to the heathen sacrifices of serfs at the commencement of the earlier
things. It was truly an effective way of preaching the Gospel,
and one which commended itself to the understanding of the
people. Its consequences were that 1 50 years after the death of
King Olaf (1030) there existed no more serfs in Norway, this being
100 years earlier than their disappearance in Denmark and about
200 years before their disappearance in Sweden.

III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE

(IITH TO I3TH CENTURIES)

From the unfree population there now grew up a stock of free
labourers, who naturally found their way into the class of small
leaseholders and new settlers.2 The cultivation of the land was
extended. During the first Christian centuries the woods and
valleys of Norway are cleared, and the inhabited land gets the
shape and extension it has kept up to recent times. The place-
names composed with ru^ — about 3000 in number — spread
over all the inland districts, show us the value of the cultivation
carried on by these petty strugglers for life.

There was created a great deal of fresh ffial, in the ancient
meaning of the word, i.e. cultivated land. But who were the * 8&al-
men' to this oftat? Were they the tillers and settlers themselves,
or were they the old <?S<2/-families whose domains were extended
in this way, or were they the King and Crown, whose * commons '
(almenningar) were transformed into bygftir (inhabited districts) ?

Of course both these things happened, and the principal
result of the riftningr (reclaiming of land) is an immense
increase of the leaseholders. An undated statute of King Magnus
Lagab0tir (1263-80) assumes that every inhabitant of a ruftstaftr

1 G. 4 : ' Pat er nu ]?vi nest, at ver skolom geva manne fraelsi dr hvert her
i Gula.' — 5 : * pat er nu J?vi nest at ver scolom manne fraelsi geva i fylki hveriu
i Gula]?ings logum.'

2 In the sense of persons reclaiming land for cultivation (ry§ningsm<znd).

vm] Octal and Skeyting 165

is a leaseholder ; but it assumes, too, that many of these settlers
do not know who is their landlord. It is therefore their duty to
go to the heraftsthing and * call for a landlord (bondt] ' ; and if
they do not find one, the King is the owner of the ruftstaftr.1

But, after all, we must presume that in these early Christian
centuries there also grew up a new class of independent owners —
in other words, new $te/-men and <?o#/-families. In Eastern
Norway such parvenus, when free-born, seem to have been regarded
as b0ndr and hauldar in the eye of the law. Perhaps this view was
not taken as early as the first generation ; but when their home-
stead had passed from father to son, it became dSal in Norway as it
became arvejord (terra hereditarid) in Sweden.2

In Western Norway also this rule originally prevailed. In G.
270 are mentioned * the land tycer jarftir) which shall follow the
cfoals : it is that which the forefather has left to his successor (su er
ein er ave hever ava leiff]' The use of the word ave for both of
them indicates that the land for many generations has been in the
same family.3 But when we remember that fiSal simply means
tilled ground, we are bound to assume that originally it was
enough to make it oftal, in the sense of terra hereditaria, that it
had at some time or other passed to an heir.

Now we meet in the Gulathingslaw, 266, another provision
for the 8§alsbrig§ (the redemption of <?tta/-land). The person
redeeming the land must ' tell off (count) his 5 ancestors, who
have owned (the land), and the 6th, who held both in ownership
and in dSal.' 4 And the Frostathingslaw, xii. 4, provides : * The
land of no man shall become fiSal before 3 ancestors have
owned it and it has come into the possession of the 4th without
interruption.'5 These regulations, I think, are consequences of
the above-mentioned aristocratic tendencies in West Norway to
distinguish between the $ta/-born men and the common peasants
(b0ndr). I do not think it was the original rule that a homestead

1 Norges gamle Love, ii. 485.

2 Nordstrom, Svenska Samhalls forfatningens historia, ii. 140 sqq.

3 See Hertzberg, Glossarium s.v. * af i ' ; Fritzner, Ordbog, s.v. * af i ' 2.
DN. iv. No. 848 : 'J?at hefir fylgt afi eptir afa.'

4 * Peir scolo telia til langfe<5ra sinna v. er att hava, en sa hinn sette er
baeSe atte at eign oc at oSrle.'

5 « Engum manni verSr iqrft at oSali fyrr en iij. langfeSr hafa att oc kemr
undir hinn iiij. samfleytt.'

1 66 A. Tar anger [vm

first got the quality of fi$al after six or four generations of
successive possession in the same family. In ancient times it
becomes fi§al as soon as it is established as a homestead for a
free-born bondi. In my opinion it was the extensive and common
' free-giving ' of serfs which was the chief cause of the provision as
to the six or four generations. Then it was an old rule that the
family of a freedman could not enter the class of the b0ndr till
after at least four generations.1

The natural effect of the above-mentioned regulation was to
diminish both the <?&?/- land and the cftal- families. Magnus
Lagab0tir accepted in his Landslaw (vi. 2) the rule of the
Pros tat kings law relating to the four generations. But the
common rule amongst the people was that an <?tS<2/-witness should
make clear the pedigree of the ancestors ' as far back as the haugr
(burial mounds) of heathen times.'2

A perfect $$<2/-estate possessed a burial-mound (haugr) of the
heathen ancestor. In the pedigrees of the ancient ruling families
in Sondmor we find the following characteristic remarks :

Herbjorn ligger i hougen i Drifftvig. Aatte til eigu och odel
Helgabostad och Holm och Starrin.

Barder Nessiakonung ligger i hougen paa Bardarstad ; hand
aatte all Roma och alia Strandarvig och Gudoy och Hundeidavig.

Eilifr jarl ligger i Eilifshoug i Gudo.

Tosten Blafotr ligger indeni Hundeid.

Rafn som ligger i Hval i Heimdal.

Grimr ligger i hougen paa Hjordal paa Sundmor.3

It cannot be wondered at that under such conditions the class
of haulds was decreasing. Both the Frostathingslaw (xiv. 7) and
the Landslaw (vii. 61) reckon with the possibility that in a fylke
(county) there may not be found as many as twelve haulds.
Indeed, the exact meaning of the term hauldr is no longer familiar
to the common mind ; therefore the Landslaw (vii. 64) must

1 See Konrad Maurer, Die Freigelassenen nach altnorwegischem Rechte
(1878). Seebohm, Tribal Custom in Anglo-Saxon Law, p. 319. Paul
Vinogradoff, ' Geschlecht imd Verwandtschaft im altnorwegischem Rechte '
(Zeitschrift fur Social und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, vii. i sqq.).

2 * Greinande skilvislega langfaeSgatal til haugs ok til heiSni,' Norges
gamle Love, iii. 121 (1316). In the Landslaw vi. 16 this o^al is named haugs
or haugao^al. It is opposed to utjar^ir in DN. ii. No. 694 (A.D. 1427).

3 Gustav Storm, 'Indskuddene i Fagrskinna' (Kristiania Videnskabsselskabs
Forhandlinger, 1875, pp. 100-106).

vm] Octal and Skeyting 167

define it : * But he is hauldr who has foals by inheritance both
from his father and his mother, which his forefathers have owned
before them and which have not been the (foals of other men, who
have got it by purchase or by collateral inheritance.'1 This
definition makes it evident that the genuine cftal is the cftal
inherited from lineal ancestors, not from collaterals. The o^al is
terra hereditaria /car

IV. TRANSFER AND PRESCRIPTION OF &X4Z.-RIGHT

The ordinary way of acquiring <?tta/-right in <?S<z/-land was that
of inheritance. In G. 270 inheritance is mentioned as the first
method of acquiring $ta/-right to land. The second is forfeiture of
land as gjold for a manslaughter. The third is branderfft ; that is,
when a man takes into his household another man with all his
property in order ' to maintain him until he is carried to the funeral-
pyre ' (til brannz oc til bals}? The fourth is the ' gift of honour '
(hefolauri) from a king or prince. The fifth is the * gift for drink '
(drekkulauri)* if it is given by the king. The sixth the ' gift for
child-fostering ' (barnfostrlaun). The seventh is the foalsskipti.

Although it is not stated in the law, we must presume that the
form of skeyting originally was in use for all these ' gifts,' and also
for the gjold (forfeiture), where it was performed by the thing
with wapentak) unless the manslaier performed it himself on the
^/-estate.

But it is to be observed that 'sale' is not mentioned in
G. 270 as a title creating 0tta/-right. Our old laws knew different
kinds of 'sale,' as sal til stefnu (for 15 years) or sal til mala
(pawn), all of which were conditional and possessed a form of
pledging the land. But in G. 278 and 279 we hear of a sal til
skeytingar, and, as I have said before (p. 160), that must have been
a sale of the $fo/-right, and skeyting is the form of transferring that
right. If the seller refuse to perform it, the thing shall perform

1 * En sa er hauldr er hann hefir oSaul at erfSum tekit bseSe eptir faSur oc
moSor )?au er bans forellrar hafa att aSr firir J>eim oc eigi annara manna
oSaul i at telia, ]?au er meS kaupi eru at komin eSa uterfftum.'

2 * Su er bin xvi. (erfS) er heitir branderfS. ef maSr tecr mann d bond ser
at liufu oc at leiSu. oc f0Ser hann til brannz oc til bdls, kveSr at ferno male '
(G. 108).

3 Cp. drikkelaun in the North, preosta lagu, i. 67 § I. See Vinogradoff,
Transfer of Land, pp. 537 sqq.

1 68 A. Taranger [vin

it by wapentak, if the purchaser can prove that he has lawfully
' taken mould ' (G. 279, 292). In selling <?oW-land, the vendor had
first of all to offer it publicly in the thing to his <?oW-fellows, who
had the right of 'first refusal.' If none of them would buy it at
the price which he might be expected to get from outsiders, he
could sell it out of the $fo/-group. But if he sold it ' unoffered,' the
<?&z/-men could redeem it in twelve months. Such is the provision
in G. 278 by sal til skeytingar. l

If the land was sold with a right of redemption by the seller, he
had to keep this right alive by ' publication ' (lysing) in the thing.
If lysing was neglected for twenty years the contractual right of
redemption was deemed to be extinct by prescription ; the seller,
however, still had his $fo/-right of redemption, if the land was his
&&al\ but he had now to pay full value for the land, not merely
the sum he had got by the conditional sale.2 In this case the
Gulathingslaw says that 'the land has become <?3<2/,' viz. for the
purchaser ; * then he (the purchaser) may deny the cftal (of the seller)
and assert it for himself.' 3 Here we have clear evidence that &§al
means simple ownership, not family ownership ; but it is assumed
that the latter is still retained by the seller, who can redeem it by
faalsbrigG.

We have seen that the 0S#/-group lost their right of redemption
in regard to 'offered' <?tfo/-land after a very short period of pre-
scription, viz. twelve months. I think this provision dates from a
time which regarded $5tf/-right mainly as simple ownership. But
whether it is old or not, it is a valuable concession to the right of
free disposition by the actual owner of the land. Then, of course,
the family right of redemption was a hampering restriction on the
free trade in <$5<2/-land, which as early as the first centuries after the
introduction of Christianity had become more and more extensive.

It is, however, quite another question whether the sold 0S<z/-land
became the family-<?oW of the purchaser and his kinsmen at once

1 * Nu kaupir maSr iorS til skeytingar. oc tecr skeyting a" J>d scolo }?eir
oSalnautar bans ef their ero innan fylkis. oc vilia brigt hava. ]>£ scolo ]?eir
brigt hava d fyrstum xii. mdnatfom. ellar seal sd. hava er keypt hafSe' (G.
278, cp. 289).

2 G. 272 and 276 in fine.

3 * Nu liggr ior<5 um stefnu. oc liggr xx. vetr. oc hava ]?eir enga lysing }>ar
a\ }?a" er hon at oSrle orSen. J?a" md. hann (purchaser) dula 8&als oc kenna
ser' (G. 276).

vm] Octal and Skeyting 169

or in a twelvemonth. Personally I am convinced that the
skeyting-diC.^ was intended to transfer the $ta/-right, not merely the
ownership, from the seller and his offspring to the buyer and his
offspring. None of the seller's offspring had any right of redeem-
ing sold $ta/-land, if it had been lawfully * offered.' On the contrary,
he had to ' offer ' it even to his own son.1 Only, if he would sell
til stefnu and not til 8§als, he was not required to 'offer' to his
son.2 That this is the intention of the skeyting is stated expressly
in many s&eyti*g~dceds. I will quote as an instance one of the
oldest that has come down to us, viz. a donation-deed of 1281.
The donor says : ' This land, which hitherto has been my d§aly
shall henceforth be considered by everybody as the cftal of the said
monastery.'3 The common phrase runs that the land is sold or
given til alda oftals, or til cefiligrar eignar ok alda cftals, or /// alda
foals ok ubrig&ligrar eignar* Here redemption by the seller or
donor and his offspring is certainly excluded.

But in regard to the acquisition of family $te/-right by pre-
scription, the old provincial laws have only the above-mentioned
(p. 165) rules relating to possession for five (£.) or three (F.) genera-
tions. The last rule is the later in date and was first, I think,
introduced in favour of the King and the Church. As an exception
it is in G. 271 applied to the King, who acquires $to/-right by pre-
scription in ' three kings' time.' According to F. xiv. 7 the
possessor of land, cultivated in the King's Commons, gets owner-
ship if the land was cultivated ' before three kings' time, of whom
none was in the land for a shorter space than 10 years.' The
shortest time of prescription is thus thirty years, or just the term
within which the Church may obtain prescriptive ownership of
$W-right.5 Of course the $fcz/-right of ' offering ' and ' redemption '
was not favourable to the greatest landlords, the King and the
Church; but in the old Gulathingslaw (271) the King is bound to

1 G. 276.

2 G. 288. I do not agree with the conjecture of Boden, 'Das altnor-
wegische Stammgiiterrecht ' (ZSS, xxii. 109), that the phrase in G. 288 in
fine, * ef hann vill,' means * if the son will.'

3 DN. xii. No. 5 : c seal J»essi eigh[n] er mit hefuir vaerith odhal her til,
uerdha hsedhan af odhal firir sagdz stadhar firir huariom manne.'

4 See Fritzner, Ordbog s.v. « 6Sal,' i.

5 F. xiv. 3 : ' En )?at verSr kirkiu at oSali ef hon hefir at xxx. vetra. en ]?at
vitni beri henni kirkiusdcnar menn.'

170 A. Tar anger [vm

allow the bftndr to make use of them both against him. In the
Frostathingslaw, however, none of them may be used against the
King ; and if the King skeytir land to a man, the possessor may
not offer it to anybody if the King was before the lawful owner.1
This provision shows that the s key ting in the Frostathingslaw was
not always intended to transfer $fo/-right ; indeed, the skeyting is
used even in * conditional ' sales, where the seller has reserved a
right of redemption.2 The skeyting in F. is rather a form
for transfer of gewere than of a right of ownership. In fact,
there aje in this law of the twelfth century many 'modern'
tendencies which obscure the more archaic features of Norwegian
land-law in the provincial law as shown in the Gulatkingslqg.

The Norwegian Justinian, King Magnus Lagab0tir, had a sharp
eye for these ' modern ' tendencies, which threatened to weaken the
bond which the <?&z/-right had set between the land and the people.
And before he published his new Norwegian Code, he issued a statute
about acquisition of 0&2/-right. Here he laid down the new provi-
sion that 0&z/-right should be acquired by sixty years' prescription.
This new rule he put in the first paragraph in his Code which re-
lates to this matter. In the second paragraph he put the old
rule from the Gulat kings law, 270, that land given by the King
is 6$al, ' if he has not given it subject to other conditions.' In the
third place, he took the rule from the Frostathingslaw concerning
possession for three generations ; and in the fourth the foalsskipti.*

Next, he laid down new provisions for the 'offer' and the
1 redemption.' I shall not go into details ; but the alterations are
essential and go very far in favour of the person redeeming the
land. His redemption-right is not lost by prescription in a twelve-
month as in the Gulat kings law, but in ten years. And if he
has lawful exceptions (nauftsyn), he may publish them every tenth
year, and (thus keep Jiis $fo/-right alive for sixty years. The first
exception is very favourable to a poor man using the right of
redemption : he can publish his ' lack of money,' and that suffices.
Another provision, quite as favourable to him, is that the sum of

1 F. xii. 4 : « En ef konungr sceytir manni iorft, ]?d seal ]?£ iorS engum
manni bioSa ]?6 at hann vili selia hvergi er atti aftr, ef konungr atti sigan
heimila. En engi ma5r seal bioSa konungi iorS. oc eigi konungr 65rum
manni.'

2 See F. xii. i. 8 L. vi. 2.

vni] Octal and Skeyting 171

redemption-money should not be the price the owner could get in
free trade, but the sum assessed by a body of six men.1

It is evident that the new $ta/-law was intended to secure the
$ta/-right for the common peasantry. But the popular King did
not achieve his object. In every decade before the great disaster
of the Black Death (1349-50) both the nobility and the clergy
grew richer by land which for centuries had been got out of the
foal possessions of the b$ndr. It is the common view that the
Church obtained most of her landed property by gifts or testa-
ments. In some degree this view is right in regard to the parish
churches and chapels ; but it is not so in regard to the greater
ecclesiastical institutions — the episcopal sees, the cathedrals, the
chapters, and the monasteries. The only instance in which we can
verify the truth of this assertion is that of the monastery of Munkelif
to Bergen. Between 1223 and 1349 this institution acquired 64!
mdnaftsmatabol by gifts, 157! by purchase of prevent ("board" in
the cloister), 181 by purchase, and 232 by conditional sale with
right of redemption reserved by the seller. But none of these sellers
were economically in a strong enough position to make use of their
redemption-right, and the land became the property and the dSal of
the monastery. Thus the great ecclesiastical institution played the
same part in the economic life -of the Norwegian peasant in the
Middle Ages as the ' Hypothecary Banks ' to-day, furnishing them
with ready money and getting their land in mortgage. The best
and most favourable $ta/-right could not prevent this economic
evolution, or rather degradation, of the peasantry. Against the
want of money nothing is of avail but money ; and for ready
money the Norwegian peasants sold not only their land, but also
their $fo/-right. If the buyer was willing to pay the skey tings-
aurar* or cfoalskaup* or oftalslausn,* he got the c®al~ rights of
the seller at once.

It is, however, a significant fact that from the time of Magnus
Lagab0tir the terms skeyta and skeyting disappear in the title-deeds
of land. We have thousands of such deeds published in Diplo-

1 L. vi. 4.

2 DN. iv. No. 147 (1321), 899 (1447); cp. von Amira, OR. ii. 687,
who has a different view.

8 Dipl. Oread, i. No. 48 (1575).

4 DN. ix. No. 577 (1526), 793 (1565).

172 A. Taranger [vm

matarium Norwegicum, but as far as my knowledge goes we shall
scarcely find the terms skeyta and skeyting in fifty of them.
According to von Amira1 they were changed into afhenda and
afhending. I am not convinced that the last-named terms really
took the places of skeyta and skeyting. In the title-deeds
prevail the terms selja (sell) and sal (sale), or kaupa (buy) and
kaup (purchase). The fact is, in my opinion, that skeyta and
skeyting disappear, because the transfer of $ta/-right became more
and more infrequent. As we learn from the title-deed book of Mun-
kelif the ' conditional ' sales are in an absolute majority.

V. THE EXPANSION OF THE OEMZ-CONCEPTION

Finally, I shall in a few words, and without collecting the
evidence, try to point out another change which the Middle Ages
brought into the old <9cta/-conception. This was, as already men-
tioned, originally meant to include only the tilled field and the
fenced-in pastureland. Outside this lay the commons (almennin-
gar\ and the commons were not an object of ownership (eiga, eign}
but of possession (hafa). In the Gulat kings law, however, a part of
the common is already attached to the cftal, viz. the mqrk (forest)
and the scetr (summer pastures in the mountains). Of this the
odaller can get ownership by twenty years' use (prescription). Never-
theless it is not yet o^al and not included in the foakskipti? In the
later skeyting formulas the chief object of the transfer is the oftat,
or more commonly the jgrft (the tilled ground) and the ' appurten-
ances ' (lunnendi) belonging to the same. ' Appurtenances ' include
hafn (pasture), hogg (wood), vatn (water), veiftista&ir (fishing or
hunting places), and various other uses. All these ' appurtenances '
are included in the term eign (owned land), but not in the term
oftal. We see that the right of ownership in untilled land surround-
ing the o^al grew up out of these many ' uses ' in it. Originally
only the &§al is owned, and 8§al is obviously synonymous with eign,
and was perhaps the most common term for eign. Afterwards the
eign was expanded to the regularly * used ' woods and pastures
outside the cfoal in the commons. And lastly, the ^/-conception
comprises the whole eign. Such is its meaning in the o^alsskipti
of Magnus Lagab0tir's Landslaw (vi. 3), which, as opposed to its

1 OR. ii. § 64 2 G. 86 compared with 87.

vm] Odal and Skeyting 173

source, G. 87, includes the whole eign, inside and outside the fence,
and not merely the fenced-in &8al. But the tilled ground, as being
the more valuable, has to be divided by stick (skapf] or string
(albur^r] ; for the land outside the fence the ' eye-measure ' (aug-
naskof] is sufficient.

Takmgrk and heimrqst are the terms which are used in Magnus
Lagab0tir's Code to indicate the eign as a whole, or most commonly
the land outside the fences. Takmqrk^ according to Hertzberg's
Glossary -, means ' boundary,' but the common term for ' boundary '
is takmark, I am inclined to believe that the takmqrk is the taken
mqrk (wood, forest), which also is a feminine word; but it is
impossible for me to establish this view with philological precision.
The term heimrqst may be verbally translated by ' home-mile.'
In the Landslaw it evidently means ' homeway,' viz. ' the way from
the highway to the beer' 2 or ' the way from the home to the out-
pastures.'3 In a document from Gudbrandsdalen (1432) we learn
that the heimrqst reaches from the storehouse to the commons,4 a
distance of 6-7 kilometres.5 This document gives us an idea of an
tfoW-peasant's claims in regard to wood and pasture-land. Under
such circumstances it is not surprising that the commons soon
became private property ; and the fixing of the boundaries between
eign and common was placed in the hands of the haulds or * best
peasants.' The thing was to elect twelve of them, and two of
the twelve were to * swear to the limit.' 6 As a contrasting fact I
will mention that a settler in the common had no power of
disposition over a greater distance from his fence than he could
throw his snidl, a knife for cutting twigs. But in later times the
lagretsmen (a kind of jury), who had to fix the boundaries of the
reclaimed plots, were more generous, and considerable portions of
the commons were often attached to them. There was land enough
to draw from, and the poor eremites sometimes obtained forests
which are now sold for fortunes.

A. TARANGER.

1 L. vii. 60. 2 L. vii. 46. 3 L. vii. 41, 58. 4 DN. iii. No. 717.

5 In Shetland hemrost is synonymous with hemhoga, the nearest pasture-
land outside the hedges. In the Pharoes heimrustir means the ground around
the houses = I eel. and Norw. tun. See Jakobsen, Etymologisk ordbog over
det norrone sprog paa Shetland, s.v. 'hemrost,' and Tillceg til Forslag og
Betcenkninger afgivne af den fceroiske Landbokommission^ p. 426.

6 F. xiv. 7 ; L. vii. 6 1 .

LES ID£ES COUTUMI£RES ET LA RENAIS-
SANCE DU DROIT ROMAIN DANS LE SUD-
EST DE LA FRANCE

LES regions du Sud - Est de la France, qui ont constitue" au
moyen age la partie me"ridionale du royaume d'Arles,1 vallee du
Rhone et versant occidental des Alpes, Lyonnais, Bresse, Savoie,
Dauphin^ et Provence, ont £te* comprises dans les « pays de droit
ecrit». Mais on oublie trop que, pendant le haut moyen age, ces
regions ont pratique un droit coutumier original, tres nettement
distinct du droit remain, tres voisin du droit des « pays coutumiers »
de la France du Nord. Ces idees coutumieres n'ont pas brusque-
ment disparu, au xile siecle et au XIIP, au contact des ide"es
romaines. La renaissance de 1'etude et de 1'enseignement du
droit romain n'a pas change soudainement le droit ante"rieur. Les
survivances des vieilles ide"es coutumieres, au Xllle siecle et au
xive, sont nombreuses et frappantes ; elles montrent que le
triomphe des id£es romaines fut, sur beaucoup de points, lent,
difficile et incomplet.

Cette lenteur de la penetration des ide"es romaines est d'autant
plus remarquable que, de tres bonne heure, ce pays a ete" touche"
par la renaissance du droit romain savant, plus t6t que le reste de
la Gaule. II n'est pas certain que les Exceptiones Petri aient e*te"

1 Ces regions, politiquement separees du reste de la Gaule lors du de-
membrement de 1'Empire carolingien, ont vecu d'une vie independante
durant une grande partie du moyen age. Meme lorsque, en 1032, elles
furent rattachees au Saint Empire, Faction des Empereurs ne fut que tres
intermittente, leur influence resta presque nulle, et 1'autonomie politique de
la region a durd jusqu'au jour ou les Capetiens s'en emparerent.

174

ix] Droit Coutumier 175

composes a Valence. Par centre, au milieu du xir siecle, un
livre remarquable, le Codt, a e"t£ compost a Aries ; puis, au xilie
siecle, des jurisconsultes tels que Johannes Blancus en Provence,
Johannes de Blanosco en Maconnais, ont apporte" dans notre region
les id£es qu'ils avaient apprises dans les e"coles d'ltalie. II ne faut
pas oublier aussi que Henri de Suze a compose", alors qu'il e"tait
archeveque d'Embrun, au moins une partie de sa Somme des
De"cre" tales. II ne semble pas qu'aucune influence politique ou
religieuse se soit exerce"e dans nos regions, comme la chose a pu
se produire ailleurs, contre 1'enseignement du droit romain. Le
terrain paraissait done admirablement prepare* pour la reception
pratique des id£es romaines. La resistance des anciennes ide"es
coutumieres n'en est que plus caracteristique.

C'est a dessein que nous employons ce mot : « droit coutumier».
Ce droit est, comme le droit coutumier de la France du Nord, un
droit d'origine assez hybride, ou se sont fondus des elements
germaniques et des elements pris au droit romain vulgaire, mais
qui contient surtout des elements nes spontane"ment, destines a
satisfaire des besoins nouveaux, ceux de la socie"t£ du moyen age,
qui ne ressemble ni a la societ£ romaine, ni a la societe* des
Germains avant les Invasions. Dans la vallee de la Saone et du
Rhone, des races tres diverses se coudoient ; les professiones juris
mentionnent la loi salique, la loi romaine, la loi burgonde, la loi
lombarde. En realite, le droit que Ton y pratique est un droit tres
unifi6, et qui n'est ni franc, ni burgonde, ni romain.

Cependant la these de la survie de Pancien droit burgonde a
£te" parfois soutenue, et, recemment, Julius Ficker s'en est fait le
deTenseur. Etudiant 1'extension de 1'augment de dot dans les
coutumes de la fin du moyen age, il a cru trouver une coincidence
entre cette extension et la sphere d'action des Burgondes ; il
a attribue" a 1'augment de dot une origine tres ancienne, et 1'a
rattache au vieux droit burgonde ; puis il a entrepris une demons-
tration du m£me genre pour quelques autres particularity du droit
de la Bourgogne et de TAuvergne.1 Mais sa these, que nous ne
pouvons discuter ici en detail, nous semble inadmissible. Nous
verrons plus loin que 1'augment de dot date tout au plus du XIIIe

1 Ficker, Untersuchungen zur Erbenfolge der ostgermanischen Rechte ; v.
surtout Nos. 1300 et suiv. R. Caillemer, La Formation du droit franqais
mtditval et les travaux de Julius Ficker -, p. 34 et s.

1 76

R. Caillemer [ix

siecle et n'a jamais etc" une institution ge"nerale dans nos regions :
jusqu'au Xlir siecle, les coutumes de la region que nous etudions
ont connu un droit de survie tout different.1

Comme exemple de ces idees coutumieres, tres diffe"rentes des
idees romaines, nous avons de\ja pu, dans des travaux ante"rieurs,
signaler la conception de la proprie'te' fonciere et des droits re"els
sur les immeubles. Loin d'opposer la proprie'te' proprement dite
et les jura in re aliena, les textes de notre region, au haut
moyen age, considerent les divers droits de jouissance, se tra-
duisant par la possession d'un immeuble, comme des modalite's
d'un meme droit re"el fondamental. Le droit de Pusufruitier (p.
ex. du donateur avec reserve d'usufruit ou de beneficium) est un
droit de proprie'te' viagere ; le droit du creancier gagiste est un
droit de proprie'te' limite'e, et les textes lyonnais appellent toujours
1'engagiste emptor* Un acte lyonnais preVoit, le cas e"che"ant,
Palienation de la terre soumise a 1'usufruit par Pusufruitier.3 Le

1 Dans cette etude, nous nous servirons surtout des nombreux recueils de
documents lyonnais et dauphinois publics : M.-C. Guigue, Cartulaire lyonnais,
2 vol. in -4°, Lyon, 1885-1893; Aug. Bernard, Cartulaire de Vabbaye de
Savigny, suivi du Petit Cartulaire de Vabbaye d'Ainay, 2 vol., Paris, 1853 ; De
Charpin - Feugerolles et M.-C. Guigue, Grand Cartulaire de Pabbaye d'Ainay,
2 vol. in-4°, Lyon, 1885 ; De Charpin-Feugerolles et M.-C. Guigue, Cartulaire
du prieure de Saint-Sauveur en Rue, I vol. in-4°, Lyon, 1881 ; De Charpin-
Feugerolles, Cartulaire des Francs-fiefs du Forez, Lyon, i vol. in-4°, 1882 ;
Valentin Smith et M.-C. Guigue, Bibliotheca Dumbensis, 2 vol. in-4°, Trevoux,
1884-1885 ; M.-C. et G. Guigue, Bibliothtque historique du Lyonnais, I,
Lyon, 1886, in- 8°; M.-C. Guigue, Petit Cartulaire de Fabbaye de Saint-
Sulpice en Bugey, Lyon, 1884, in-8° ; Aug. Bernard et Aug. Bruel, Recueil
des chartes de tabbaye de Cluny^ 6 vol. in- 4°, Paris, 1876-1903; Valbonnais,
Histoire de Dauphin^ Geneve, 2 vol. in-f°, 1722; M. Fornier, Histoire
gtntrale des Alpes, publiee par 1'abbe Guillaume, 3 vol. in-8°, Paris et Gap,

1890-1892; Ul. Chevalier, Collection de cartulaires dauphinois, notamment
le t. ier, Cartulaire de Saint-Andrt le Bas, Vienne et Lyon, 1869, in-8° ; le
t. vii, Choix de documents historiques ine"dits sur le Dauphine1, Montbeliard et
Lyon, 1874, in-8° ; et le t. ix, ie livr., Codex diplomaticus ordinis Sancti Rufi
Valentiae, Valence, 1891, in-8° ; P. Guillaume; Chartes de Durbon, Paris,
1893, in-8° ; Auvergne, Cartulaire de Saint-Robert et Cartulaire des £couges,
Grenoble, 1865, in-8°. Pour les regions plus meridionales, nous avons utilise
surtout le Cartulaire de Vabbaye de Saint-Victor de Marseille, public* par
Guerard, Paris, 2 vol. in-4°, 1857; et le Cartulaire de la commanderie de
Richerenches, public par M. de Ripert-Monclar, Avignon et Paris, 1907, in-8°.

2 V. notre etude sur Pengagement, Festschrift Heinrich Brunner, p.
294 et s.

3 Cart, de S.-Andrt le Bos, app., N° 114 : usufruitier qui a le droit de
vendre, de donner, d'echanger, etc.

ix] Droit Cout^lmier 177

droit de 1'usufruitier ou du cre"ancier gagiste n'est pas un simple
jus in re aliena : c'est une propriete temporaire, un estate in use,
comme dirait le droit anglais, qui a admirablement conserv£ sur
ce point la vieille idee me'die'vale ; saisine actuelle, que vient limiter
un estate futur, en reversion ou en remainder.

Nous pourrions encore signaler une autre idee coutumiere, tout
a fait etrangere au droit remain, et que Ton releve dans les actes
du Sud-Est de la France, comme dans les actes d'autres regions :
1'idee que les seuls actes stables et definitifs sont les actes a titre
one"reux, assurant a chacune des parties un avantage en ^change
du sacrifice qu'elle consent ; idee commune aux diverses races
germaniques, et qui se manifeste si nettement dans le launegild
des coutumes lombardes. Elle revit, en plein moyen age, dans
divers documents, et notamment dans les chartes du cartulaire
de Richerenches. Les donataires remettent aux donateurs
une caritas ou une securitas, en argent ou en nature ; et cette
petite contre-prestation a pour but d'assurer la stability de la
donation : les chartes le disent expressement. Dans un autre
document, nous trouvons une donation, accompagne"e de cette
contre-partie, que Ton pense rendre plus stable en lui donnant
Paspect d'un acte a titre onereux, et en la qualifiant de emptio et
de venditio.^

On a quelquefois soutenu que 1'emphyteose avait persiste dans

1 C. de Richerenches, N° 43 (1148): transaction: « Et, ut sic observem
et sic faciam, seccuritatis nomine ab Ugone de Bolbotone de helemosinis
Templi xiicim sextarios accipio boni frumenti, et iiiior ordei, et unum equum,
id est caballum, precio 1 sol. Val. » N° 49 (1149): autre dimissio\ « Ut
autem ista nostra dimissio et libera desemparatio semper seccura et firma
remaneat . . . xcem solidos bone monete Val. et imam saumatam de
frumento accipimus, caritatis nomine. » N° 50 (1149): « Ut autem ista
mea donacio firma et stabilis perpetuo remaneat, de bonis de Templo habui
xicim sol. et dim. Val., et unum palafridum cum sella et freno. » N° 51
(1150): « Facta est hec donacio et guirpicio ... in manu . . . militum
Templi, a quibus caritative helemosinis Templi accepimus ccc sol. Val.
monete. » N° 54 (1147): « Ut autem hec nostra donatio stabilitatem et
securam semper habeat firmitatem, . . . accepimus septuaginta solidos vet.
den. Melg. » On peut rapprocher de ce dernier acte le N° 5 8, qui est qualifie
de venditio-empcio, sans indication de prix de vente, dans le corps de 1'acte.
Mais, apres la signature, vient la note suivante : « Propter hanc empcionem
fratres milicie Templi his supradictis venditoribus septuaginta solidos vet. Melg.
dederunt. » L'acte se presente plutot comme une donation, suivie d'une caritas
de 70 sous, comme dans le N° 54. Cf. Schroder, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte, 3*
dd., p. 294 et s.

178 R. Caillemer [ix

le Sud-Est de la France pendant tout le moyen age ; mais aucun
texte n'en parle avant le XIII6 siecle; les nombreux contrats que nous
avons conserves, relatifs a la culture de la terre, sont, soit des
contrats de prestaria (on ne dit guere : precaria dans notre region),
soit des concessions ad medium plantum, soit, dans la suite, des
albergements. Ce n'est que plus tard, apres la renaissance du
droit romain, que le nom d'emphyteose a e"t£ donn£ a 1'alberge-
ment.1

Nous pourrions encore noter, dans le domaine du droit des
obligations, la persistance des anciennes formes de garantie reelle
(impignoratio^) et de garantie personnelle (hostagium). U hostagium,
meme d£cor£ du nom romain de fidejussio> n'a rien de commun
avec le cautionnement romain.3

Mais nous voudrions surtout parler du droit de famille, et
montrer que, sur ce point, le triomphe du droit romain a e"t£
incomplet, tardif et pe"niblement achete".

§ Ier LAUD AT 10 DES H^RITIERS

Nous noterons d'abord, a ce point de vue, la force des liens
familiaux, se traduisant par la necessity du concours des plus
proches heritiers de 1'alienateur aux alienations immobilieres. Aux
XIe et xile siecles, les transferts d'immeubles sont faits avec la
laudatio des hoirs ; s'il n'y a pas eu de laudatio, a la mort de

1 Dans les actes lyonnais, 1'emphyte'ose apparait en 1255 (C. lyonnais^ ii.
N° 518) : « Donant ... in emphiteosim nomine albergamenti im perpetuum,
pro xl solidis nomine intragii jam solutis, et pro xviii denariis . . . annuatim
de supra servicio persolvendis. . . . Renunciant . . . exceptioni intragii non
soluti. » Dans le recueil des chartes de Durbon, le mot emphyteose n'apparait
qu'en 1327 (N° 687).

2 V. notre etude sur 1'engagement, citee plus haut.

8 C. lyonnais •, i. N° 219 (1226): « Dederunt fidejussores . . . qui . . .
juraverunt quod si ... prefata Michola vel filii vel filie sue ea que supra
dicta sunt non observarent vel in aliquo contravenirent, ipsi . . . ostagium
tenerent inl oco sibi . . . designate. » N° 235 (1228) : « Dederunt fidejussores
. . . qui similiter juraverunt se tenere ostagia Lugduni si premissi Hugo et
frater suus non observarent premissa. » N° 389 (1244): « Dedit ecclesie
fidejussores pads juratos de dicta vendicione in perpetuum tenenda in pace . . .
qui ad ammonicionem dicte ecclesie infra xv dies postquam fuerint moniti,
juraverunt tenere tanidiu ostagium Lugduni, donee a dicta ecclesia licentiam
habuerint recedendi. » N° 402 (1245), acte tres curieux, ou des tuteurs,
vendant des biens de mineur, se portent fidtjusseurs et promettent de tenir
ostagium.

IX]

Droit Coutumier

179

l'alie"nateur ses he"ritiers s'efforcent de reprendre les biens alie"ne"s,
et se font souvent payer tres cher par I'acque'reur leur ratification.1
Get usage de la laudatio persiste apres la renaissance du droit
remain, et il n'est pas rare, meme dans la seconde moitie" du
Xlir siecle, de voir Pali^nateur, donateur ou vendeur, promettre
d'obtenir la laudatio de ses fils ou de ses freres, alors absents ou
empeche"s.2 Dans toute donation importante, le donateur tient a
s'entourer du concours de ses parents et de ses amis, a obtenir
leur consentement, qui parfois ne sera donne que moyennant des
sacrifices pecuniaires, plus ou moins considerables, consentis par
l'acque"reur.3 Ces pratiques ont leur utilite", et ces precautions ne
sont pas superflues. Au Xlir siecle comme pre"ce"demment, il
n'est pas rare de voir, apres la mort de 1'alienateur, ses he"ritiers

1 Exemples de reclamations d'heritiers, au xne siecle : Valbonnais, i.
p. 39, S (1132) : a la suite d'une transaction, les deux fils de 1'une des parties
attaquent 1'acte, disant : « absque consilio et assensu eorum fuisse factum,
ideo minime tenendum. » Selon la vieille conception medievale, les temoins
de 1'acte viennent prendre sa defense, et obtiennent une renonciation des
enfants. Giraud, C. de S.-Barnard de Romans^ ii. preuves, p. 20 : «... Im-
posueramus calumpniam super unam terram . . ., quam terram ecclesia
Romanensis Sd Bernardi ab antiquo tempore acquisierat de nostro genere. »
Les reclamants cedent, moyennant 13 sous, et la concession a Tun d'entre eux
de la jouissance viagere du bien litigieux. C. lyonnais, i. N° 163 (i 190 env.) :
« Moricinus vendidit domum suam. .* . . Postea vero tres filii ejus calum-
niaverunt . . . vendicionem » ; on leur donne 22 sous.

2 Alienateurs promettant d'obtenir la laudatio de leurs fils : C. lyonnais,
i. N° 465 (1251) : «Promitto nichilominus sub virtute prestiti juramenti, quod
omnia premissa et singula faciam in perpetuum a filiis meis Bosone, Symboudo
et Alberto rata habere et firma, et servare illesa, prout superius sunt expressa.»
ii. N° 552 (1259): acte de vente : « Promittit rnsuper sepedictus Berlio
venditor, sub prestito juramento et sub obligatione omnium bonorum suorum,
quod ipse procurabit, faciet et efficiet quod dominus Jacobus de Spina miles,
Guillelmus de Spina domicellus, Albertus de Gorgi frater ipsius Berlionis,
Quarta uxor, Jaquemetus et Guionetus filii ejusdem Alberti, ad requisitionem
dicte domine Brune . . . dictam venditionem . . . laudabunt, approbabunt,
gratificabunt et acceptabunt per juramentum et sub testimonio litterarum » :
ainsi le frere, 1'epouse, deux neveux du vendeur, et deux milites^ sans doute
deux vassaux (parmi les biens vendus figurent les « taschiae illorum de Spina »).
N° 589 (1261) : transaction ; consentement d'un frere present, et promesse de
laudatio de deux freres absents.

3 C. de S.-Sulpice en Bugey^ N° 29 (1239), p. 83 : don fait par £tienne
de Luyrieux avant de partir pour la Terre Sainte, « de voluntate et consilio
amicorum meorum et parentum sive consanguineorum, assensuque G. domini
de Luyrieux nepotis mei et Hu., fratris ejus, super hoc accedente. » Le
donateur revolt 300 florins « nomine placiti», 1'un des neveux 20 florins, et
1'autre 10.

180 R. Caillemer [ix

revendiquer les biens ali£n£s, sous ce pre"texte qu'ils n'ont pas
donn£ leur laudatio, et ne renoncer a leurs preventions que moyennant
un de"dommagement p^cuniaire.1

La necessity de ce consentement des plus proches he"ritiers
prend meme, a ce moment, une nettete" plus grande. Les conditions
de la laudatio se pre"cisent. Lorsque I'he'ritier dont la laudatio est
requise a moins de 14 ans, on assure, au moyen de promesses
spe"ciales, garanties par des fidejusseurs, sa laudatio ulte"rieure,
lorsqu'il aura atteint ses anni legitimi? Les enfants de plus de 14

1 C. lyonnais, i. N° 409 (1246) : « Asserebat . . . Stephanus (Etienne de
Chandieu) duas vercherias . . ., quas . . . prior de Plateria nomine dicte
ecclesie detinebat, ad se jure hereditario pertinere, et ideo eas sibi restitui
postulabat, nonobstante quadam venditione, quam eo inscio et minime requisite,
Berlio frater suus . . . fecerat. » Sentence arbitrate : le reclamant devra
ceder tous ses droits, moyennant^ 7 livres et 20 sous. V. encore N° 251
(1229) ; N° 444 (1250). C des Ecouges, N° 20 (1232) : Lantelme de Saint-
Quentin a donne divers biens aux religieux des Ecouges, mais, apres sa mort,
ses fils veulent reprendre les biens donne's. A la fin, grace a 1'intervention
du Doyen de 1'eglise de Grenoble, Tun des fils, Guillaume de Saint-Quentin,
renonce a sa reclamation, et promet meme de defendre le monastere contre
toute attaque, toute «calumnia» nouvelle. II se fera le defenseur de la donation
meme vis-a-vis de ses freres ; toutefois, il ne s'engage pas a leur faire la guerre
ni a depenser sa fortune a ce sujet : « excepto quod belluin contra fratres facere
vel sua expendere non tenetur » !

2 Sur cette question de la laudatio de 1'enfant, il y a, au haut moyen age,
des systemes divergents : tantot on fait intervenir Penfant lui-meme, tantot
on assure, par des fidejusseurs ou par des serments, qu'il donnera plus tard sa
laudatio. Ce dernier systeme triomphe dans les actes lyonnais du xnie siecle.
On n'admet plus la laudatio emanee des enfants eux-memes. V. C. lyonnais,
i. N° 167 (1220); laudatio des fils, « qui talis erant etatis quod ad eos
laudare pertinebat.» N° 188 (1222): les fils ne donnent pas de laudatio :
« nullus adhuc erat talis etatis, quod ad eum laudare pertineret. » N° 2 1 6
(1225): «laudaverunt omnes filii mei, qui tales erant etatis, quod ad ipsos
laudare pertinebat. » Des lors, si 1'enfant est trop jeune, on promet sa laudatio
pour le jour ou il arrivera a ses anni legitimi, ad plenam etatem. N° 2 1 9
(1226): « et quum minor filius Odo nondum videbatur ad annos legitimos
pervenisse. » N° 221 (1226); « Ut hec venditio rata et firma habeatur,
dederunt fidejussorem Vincencium de Poimia, donee eorum infantuli per-
venerint ad plenam etatem et concesserint plenarie dictam venditionem. »
V. encore t. ii. N° 508 (1255) : ad etatem congruam. Quelques textes parlent
de minors*, de major aetas : i. N° 287 (1234): « Promisit etiam sub eodem
juramento quod, cum Jaquemeta filia ipsius, qui tune temporis minoris etatis
erat, ad annos legitimos pervenerit, faciat earn laudare et jurare pacem de hac
venditione. » N° 269 (1231): « Et obligamus nos eodem juramento quod
heredes nostri, qui tempore donationis erant in minori etate, quando essent in
majori, eamdem donationem laudarent et confirmarent. » Mais ces expressions :
minor aetas, major aetas ne doivent pas etre interpreters comme des allusions

ix] Droit Coutumier 181

ans, mais mineurs de 25 ans, fournissent eux-memes leur laudatio ^
sur le mandat de leur pere, en renonc.ant aux exceptions de
minority et de puissance paternelle.1 L'importance de la laudatio
parait telle, que cette laudatio est souvent consignee dans une
charte spe"ciale, attested par des temoins particuliers.2 Et enfin,
pour entourer cette institution, si completement e"trangere au droit
romain, de formes romaines, on voit apparaitre a la fin des actes
une renonciation nouvelle : a Vexceptio concessionis et laudationis
non fact e?

Get ancien usage de la laudatio des heritiers a laisse", en
Provence et en Dauphine", des traces curieuses. En 1456, Louis
II, le futur Louis XI, alors Dauphin de Viennois, promulgua un
statut exigeant, pour la validite d'une donation, la presence du bailli,
du juge ou du chatelain du domicile du donateur, et, de plus, le
concours de trois de ses plus proches parents habitant la meme

a la majorite de 25 ans. II s'agit en realite de la puberte, que nos coutumes
fixent a 14 ans. N° 445 (1250): « Dictus siquidem Stephanus promisit per
stipulationem et sub prestito juramento quod, quam cito Hugo, Uldricus et
Placencia liberi ipsius ad annos pubertatis pervenerint, ipse faciat et efficiet,
quod ipsi liberi . . . dictam venditionem laudabunt et approbabunt. » ii.
N° 511 (1255): « Hanc autem venditionem Zacharias films dicti Guidonis,
major quatuordecim annis, prout ipsi pater et films per juramentum asserunt,
sponte sciens et prudens laudat, approbat, gratific'at et acceptat. » V. aussi
N° 522 (1255): «facti puberes, prout ipsi per juramentum asserunt. »

1 C. lyonnais, ii. N° 536 (1256): reprise de fief: « Hanc autem re-
ceptionem feudi . . . Petrus, filius dicti Aemari, coram nobis constitutus,
sciens, prudens et spontaneus, de mandate ipsius Aemari, laudat, approbat,
gratificat et acceptat. . . . Renuntiant . . ., et . dictus Petrus exception!
quod metus causa, minoris etatis, beneficio patrie potestatis. » V. aussi
N° 509 (1255), ou les trois fils du donateur, accordant leur laudatio, renoncent
« minoris etatis auxilio et beneficio, et patrie potestati. »

2 Cart, de S.-Ruf, N° 93 (1205) : « Quando Guntardus et Eicburgis, amita
Raimundi, hoc laudaverunt, presentes erant. . . . Quando Ymbertus Runini
(frere du donateur Raimond) hoc laudavit in claustro Sancti Jacobi, et etiam
super iiiior evangelia juravit, presentes erant. ...» De meme N° 96 (1207).

3 C. lyonnais, ii. N° 757 (1279): confirmation par 4 freres : « Johannes,
Guillermetus, majores viginti et quinque annis, Bartholomeus et Jaquetus,
minores viginti quinque annis, majores tamen decem et septem annis » ; et
renonciation : « exception! . . . concessionis et confessionis . . . legitime
non factarum. » N° 813 (1287): laudatio d'un neveu : « renuncians ex-
ceptioni ratifications, acceptationis, confessionis, concessionis, remissionis
et promissionis . . . non factarum vel sine justa causa factarum. » N° 827
(1290) : confirmation par les deux fils du donateur (donation d'une rente d'un
fromage) : ils renoncent « exception! dictarum quittationis, laudationis et con-
cessionis non factarum. »

1 82 R. Caillemer [ix

paroisse.1 Et c'e"tait seulement si Ton ne pouvait trouver ces trois
parents, ou s'ils refusaient d'intervenir a 1'acte, que le magistrat
pouvait appeller comme te"moins d'autres probi viri.

Du Dauphine", la regie est passed en Provence. En 1472, un
statut du roi Rene" est venu exiger, pour la validity des donations,
la presence de deux parents du donateur ; et ici ce ne sont plus de
simples te"moins ; ils viennent eclairer le donateur sur la portee de
la donation. Le statut exige, non seulement leur presence, mais
leur conscientia? Visiblement, le but de ces deux statuts est
moins de proteger la famille du donateur, que de garantir le
donateur lui-meme contre ses propres entrainements. Mais, dans
le precede qu'ils emploient pour atteindre ce but, en faisant
intervenir les parents du donateur, ces statuts nous pre"sentent une
curieuse survie des anciennes id£es medievales.

D'autre part, le retrait lignager s'est developpe, a la fin du
moyen age, dans un assez grand nombre de coutumes locales de
la region. II est ne" d'un desir de concilier les inte"rets de la
famille de Palie"nateur avec la necessite des alienations immobilieres.
Dans quelques documents, nous voyons des disposants instituer
une sorte de retrait lignager conventionnel. Alie"nant un de leurs
biens, ils prevoient la possibilite d'un rachat de ce bien par leurs
heritiers ; 3 ou encore, re"glant le sort de Pensemble de leur fortune

1 Ce statut a etc souvent imprime ; il figure, avec le commentaire de
Joannes a Cruce, a la suite de certaines editions des Decisiones de Guy Pape.
V., p. ex., 1'ed. de Geneve, 1653, 2e pagin., p. 69 et s. : « . . . Decernimus
donationes praedictas (inter vivos) de caetero fiendas non esse aliter valituras,
quam si in baillivi, judicis aut castellani loci sive parochiae domicilii donatoris,
vel locatenentis eorumdem, et trium ex proximioribus consanguineis sive
parentibus ipsius donatoris in dicta parochia existentibus, vel, ubi non reperi-
rentur in dicta parochia, aut vocati adesse nollent in donatione praedicta,
aliorum virorum proborum dictae parochiae non suspectorum, per alterum ex
dictis officiariis, pro numero parentum non repertorum, aut adesse ut supra
nolentium, surrogandorum, praesentia factae fuerint, recitatae et publicatae. »

2 V. notre etude sur le Retrait lignager dans le droit proven$al (Studi in
onore di Carlo Fadda\ p. 1 1 et s. (Naples, 1 906).

3 On trouve, des le xie siecle, des actes de ce genre dans les Ch. de Cluny,
iv. N° 2525 (1000 env.) : « Facio autem hanc donationem eo tenore, ut,
dum aliquis ex filiis meis ad perfectam etatem venerit, si redimere voluerit,
redimat xlta solidis. » N° 2972 (1048-1049): « Dono . . . unum mansum
. . . ea ratione ut filius meus Wichardus, si voluerit eum redimere, det
pro ipso manso habitatoribus supranominati loci (monasterii Cluniacensis)
xx solidos ; sin alias, ipsi monachi teneant et possideant. » V. aussi le N°
2973 (meme date), acte mutil£ : « Dono ... si legalem heredem de uxore

ix] Droit Coutuniier 183

par un partage d'ascendant, ils stipulent que, si Tun des biens de
la succession est vendu par un de leurs heritiers, les autres he"ritiers
auront a son e*gard un droit de preemption. Ainsi, dans un acte
lyonnais de 1243, une veuve, repartissant sa fortune entre ses
enfants, decide que, si Tun des enfants veut vendre ou obliger les
biens compris dans son lot, il devra d'abord les offrir a ses freres,
ou meme a d'autres parents.1

Cette institution du retrait lignager ne s'est pas developpee
partout dans la region qui nous occupe. On ne la rencontre ni
en Savoie, ni en Bresse, ni en Lyonnais ; mais, au XIIIe siecle et
au XIV6, elle a e*t£ consacre"e par d'assez nombreuses coutumes
locales du Dauphin^ et de la Provence ; et elle a e"te" enfin e"tendue
a tout le comt£ de Provence par un statut de 1469.2

§ 2. REGIME MATRIMONIAL

L'etude du regime des gens maries est aussi caracteristique,
qu'il s'agisse des apports de la femme, ou des donations que son
mari lui fait au moment du mariage.

A. Apports de la femme. — Inalienability de la dot.

Pendant tout le haut moyen age, nous trouvons dans nos
regions, comme dans la France coutumiere, une association etroite
des deux epoux dans tous les actes qui se rapportent a la gestion
des biens du manage. Qu'il s'agisse des biens du mari, ou qu'il

habuero, si tenere voluerit, ducentos solidos . . . redimi. ...» Cf.
Festschrift Brunner, p. 294, note I. C. lyonnais, ii. N° 570 (1260):
testament d'un bourgeois de Beaujeu, Mguant, pour son anniversaire et celui
de sa femme, une vigne a Peglise Notre-Dame de Beaujeu : « Si autem dilecti
filii mei Johannes et Bernardus vel alter ipsorum potuerit assignare dictis
presbiteris quindecim solidos Viennensium debitales vel solvere quindecim
libras Viennensium ad emendos redditus pro dicto anniversario faciendo, volo
quod dicta vinea, hoc facto, ad ipsos redeat pleno jure. » Acte de 1272,
cite" dans notre etude sur le Retrait lignager dans le droit proven^al, p. 1 6.
Dans d'autres actes, le droit de rachat est limite a certains cas determines,
p. ex., au cas ou le donataire ne respecterait pas les clauses de la donation, ou
les biens donnes ne seraient pas laisses a 1'usage collectif des moines.

1 C. lyonnais, i. N° 378 : «... Item voluit et ordinavit dicta A., quod,
si predicti filii sui vel alter eorum de rebus supradictis . . . vellent aliquid
vendere, obligare seu alio modo alienare, primo presentarent sive presentaret
fratribus suis aliis predictis vel eorum propinquis. » V. aussi BibL Dumbcnsis,
i. p. 331 (1402).

2 V. notre etude sur le Retrait lignager, 1. cit., p. 16 et s., 25 et s.

184 R. Caillemer [ix

s'agisse des apports de la femme (de"signes, non pas du terme de
dos\ mais des noms de maritagium, matrimonium, mar it amentum,1
vercheria en Provence2), les deux 6poux agissent ensemble et
disposent ensemble de leurs biens. Aucune trace de Tinalie'nabilite'
dotale ne peut etre releve'e. Encore au milieu 'du XIIP siecle nous
trouvons 93. et la des femmes alie"nant leurs immeubles dotaux avec
le concours de leur mari, sans qu'aucun doute s'eleve sur la validite"
de ces actes.3 Pendant tout le haut moyen age, la ne"cessite" de la
laudatio des plus proches heritiers de la femme pour 1'alienation
des immeubles de celle-ci rendait superflu tout autre systeme de
protection. Certains documents sont, a cet e*gard, tres caracteris-
tiques. En Bugey, en 1234, Pierre de Noiret donne aux Chartreux
de Meyriat, du consentement de sa femme, des biens faisant partie
de la dos de celle-ci. Plus tard, il attaque cette alienation ; or, il
n'invoque nullement le caractere dotal des biens alienes ; il allegue
des raisons toutes differentes : ces biens sont occupe"s par des tiers,
qui les detiennent en vertu d'un albergement ; et ces tenanciers,
n'ayant pas consenti a 1'alienation, declarent qu'elle ne leur est pas
opposable. L'arbitre choisi, 1'eveque de Belley, oblige Pierre de
Noiret a faire laudatio de sa propre donation, en obtenant cette fois
la laudatio de ses fils et des tenanciers recalcitrants. II ne semble
pas mettre en doute, au point de vue du regime matrimonial, la
pleine validite de cet acte.4

1 Maritagium : Bibl. Hist, du Lyonnais, p. 29 (1229); C. lyonnais, i.
N° 2 56 (i 229) ; 236 (1228). Maritamentum : C. de S.-Andre1 le Bas, N° 1 93.
Matrimonium: C. lyonnais, i. N° 163 (1219). Cf. C. de S. -Vincent de
Mdcon, N° 477 : « Nepti sue donavit in maritatu. ...»

2 Vercheria : hommage d'Amauri de Montfort a 1'archeveque d'Embrun,
en 1222, a raison des biens de sa femme en Embrunais, Fornier, iii. p. 226.
Le mot est reste dans la langue proven^ale. V. Mistral, Lou Tresor dou feli-
brige, v° verquiero :

Fiho poulido porto sa verquiero au front.

3 P. ex., en 1247 (C. lyonnais, i. N° 417), une femme vend une maison
avec le consentement de son mari, sans que 1'acte contienne la moindre allusion
aux obstacles tenant au regime dotal ; v. encore NOS22I (1226); 287 (1234).
C. de S.-Sauveur en Rue, N° cxxxviii. (1253): « Ego Pictavina, . . . con-
sentiente et volente praedicto viro meo, . . . dono et concede . . . terram
meam dotalem . . . cum censibus et usagiis et pleno dominio dictae terrae. »
Peu importe le mode d'alienation, vente ou donation, et Ton pourrait multiplier
les exemples de ce genre.

4 C. de S.-Sulpice en Bugey, N° 27 (1234). Cette question de la necessite
du consentement des tenanciers dans les alienations a etc, jusqu'ici, assez peu

ix] Droit Coutumier 185

L'idee de la communaute entre e"poux, qui triomphera plus tard
dans la France coutumiere, mais que le regime dotal remain
chassera de la region que nous e"tudions, se manifeste dans diverses
chartes, et notamment dans certains documents lyonnais du haut
moyen age. II arrive souvent que deux e"poux, faisant une
donation avec reserve d'usufruit, stipulent que, au d£ces du pre"-
mourant, 1'usufruit s'e"teindra pour une moitie, que cette moitie" ira
au couvent et servira de donation pro sepultura pour ce premourant ;
tandis que 1'usufruit se continuera pour moitie" au profit du conjoint
survivant.1 Et ce partage par moitie" est particulierement remar-
quable quand le bien donne par les e"poux est un bien qu'ils ont
acquis au cours du mariage, p. ex., par suite d'un contrat de
concession fonciere ad medium plantum?

etudiee dans les actes frai^ais. Cette question se rattache a celle de la
necessite de la saisine pour une alienation valable, principe qui s'affirme des
1'epoque franque, et qui a subsiste dans certaines coutumes (p. ex. dans les
coutumes anglaises) avec une grande nettete.

1 C. de Savigny, N° 83 (env. 970): « Tali convenientia ut, quandiu
vixerimus, teneamus, . . . et qualiscumque de nobis duobus primus obierit,
medietas ipsius mansi in dominicatum veniat. » N° 170 (env. 980): « Eo
videlicet tenore ut quamdiu vixero fructum percipiam ; post mortem vero
meam ex medietate ejus sepulturam habeam\ aliam autem medietatem
Adalendis uxor mea, quamdiu vixerit, possideat ; et, qualiscumque ex nobis
prius obierit, absque ulla contradictione, ad cultores ipsius ecclesiae medietas
de ipsa haereditate perveniat ; post decessum vero utrorumque omnia vobis
cedo. » C. d^Ainay (Bernard), N° 72 (av. 993) : deux epoux donnent «aliquid
ex rebus nostris, hoc est curtilem unum, » avec reserve d'usufruit ; « et, quisquis
ex nobis duobus primus obierit, unam medietatem predicti monachi ex supra-
scriptis rebus recipiant. Post amborum quoque discessu . . . totum ad
integrum teneant et possideant. » N° 105 (989) : memes formules. N° 1 1 1
(env. 1000) : « Ita ut quicumque de nobis duobus prius mortuus fuerit, statim
monachi prescripti loci suam medietatem accipiant, subsequens vero stiam
medietatem teneat dum vixerit ; post mortem autem illius, medietatem illam
monachi prefati in suo jure ponant. »

2 V. notamment C. de Savigny, N° 266 (970 env.). Deux epoux donnent
des terres qu'ils ont acquises par un partage avec les moines de 1'Ile-Barbe :
«quicquid cum monachis Insulae Barbarae partiendo visi sumus habere ; . . .
ita tamen ut medietas de ipsis rebus ad ipsam ecclesiam pro sepultura corporis
mei a die praesenti perveniat ; aliam vero medietatem, quamdiu Dulcisina
uxor mea vixerit, possideat, et post suum decessum sepulturae locum exinde
accipiat.» La terre acquise se partage done egalement entre les deux epoux,
et chacun d'eux dispose de sa part/n? sepultura. V., sur ces tendances des
coutumes de la France meridionale, avant la renaissance du droit remain, les
tres justes observations de M. Lefebvre, Nouv. Rev. hist, de Droit, 1911,
p. 369 et s., notamment p. 390, ou 1'auteur cite encore d'autres actes des
cartulaires d'Ainay et de Grenoble.

1 86 R. Caillemer [ix

Tel e"tait le droit de nos regions avant la renaissance du droit
remain, et il ressemblait en somme singulierement a celui de la
France coutumiere. La romanisation s'est faite peu a peu ; elle
ne se traduit d'abord que dans les mots et dans les formules, et
elle ne modifie pas au debut le fond du droit.

Le mot dos reparait avec son sens remain, et il remplace peu a
peu, pour designer le patrimoine de la femme, les autres termes
rappele"s plus haut.1 Puis, dans les renonciations qui terminent les
actes, on voit apparaitre des clauses se rapportant a la lex Julia
(avec le sens que les romanistes du moyen age donnent a ces mots),
au Se"natus-consulte Velle"ien, au privilege de dot, a 1'hypotheque
de la femme sur les biens du mari.2 Quand une femme reprend en
fief une de ses terres, elle renonce juri prohibenti ne super re

1 Parmi les actes des Dauphins, le premier qui parle de dos au sens
remain est 1'acte de 1202 par lequel Guillaume, comte de Forcalquier, donne
a sa fille Beatrix, qui doit epouser Andre Dauphin, ses possessions de Gap
et d'Embrun. Fornier, iii. p. 222. Vers la meme epoque, dans un acte
lyonnais de 1206 (C. lyonnais, i. N° 99), dos designe sans doute aussi la dot
romaine. Pour 1'epoque anterieure, on ne peut relever que quelques tres
rares documents ou dos designe 1'apport de la femme : Ch. de Cluny, N°
2528 (acte maconnais non date, des environs de 1'an 1000 ?). Partout ailleurs,
jusqu'a la fin du xne siecle, le mot designe la donation du mari (Ch. de
Cluny, Nos 1777, 2628, etc.).

2 Dans le C. de S. -Victor de Marseille, les premieres renonciations de ce
genre remontent aux annees 1202 (N° 977), 1212 (N° 930), 1229 (N° 909) ;
ces documents ont etc deja signales par M. Meynial, Nouv. Rev. hist, de Droit,
1901, p. 275, n. 2, et p. 689, n. 2. Dans les actes lyonnais, on trouve vers
1215, sous une forme encore rudimentaire, les premieres renonciations relatives
au regime matrimonial. C. lyonnais, i. N° 140 (1216): « Renuncians omni
juri sibi in his rebus competenti vel in futurum ratione dotis vel propter
nuptias donationis vel alicujus melioramenti competituro, juramento ab ea
interposito. » N° 164 (1219): « Preterea predicte Dideria et Rollenz pro-
miserunt sub eodem juramento, quod ratione dotis vel alia qualibet ratione
contra hanc venditionem non venirent, nee eundem Stephanum super re
vendita presumerent aliquatenus molestare. » N° 233 (1228): « abre-
nuntiantes . . . exception! dotis. » N° 236 (1228): « Abrenunciavit omni
juri quod habebat in eisdem mansis ratione maritagii vel aliqua alia ratione. »
N° 261 (1230): « Expresse renuncians omni exceptioni et omni benefitio
et auxilio juris canonici et civilis, que ipsam contingerent in hac parte. » Au
N° 256 (1229), la femme renonce simplement au privilegium dotis. Les
renonciations detaillees n'apparaissent que plus tard : Bibl. Dumbensis, ii.
Suppl. N° in (1253). V., sur Phistoire des renonciations en general,
Petude precitee de M. Meynial. On rencontre des renonciations en Dauphine"
et en Lyonnais depuis le debut du xme siecle seulement. Au xiie siecle,
elles sont exceptionnelles : C. des fecouges, N° 5 (1139) ; mais cette charte ne
nous est parvenue que par un vidimus du xive siecle.

ix] Droit Coutumier 187

dotali aliqua servitus imponatur. x Ces clauses sont inse"r£es
re"gulierement et sans discernement dans tous les actes ou des
femmes interviennent, meme s'il s'agit de femmes non marines ou
veuves.2

Peu a peu, cependant, I'id^e d'une veritable protection de la
dot se d£gage ; et cette protection deviendra de plus en plus
necessaire, au fur et a mesure que s'att^nuera 1'ancienne garantie
resultant de la laudatio des proches parents. Et il est meme tres
remarquable que cette idee nouvelle va pe"netrer en de"pit des
renonciations et des cauteles. Meme dans les actes ou les femmes
de"clareront renoncer au be"ne"fice de la loi Julia, Pidee d'inaliena-
bilit£ dotale triomphera ; en de"pit de leur renonciation, les femmes
se pr£occuperont de garantir leur dot. Tant il est vrai qu'il y a
deux romanisations distinctes : celle des formes, la plus connue et
la plus facile a e"tudier ; celle du fond du droit, plus lente, parfois
moins complete, mais dont les resultats, une fois acquis, seront
infiniment plus solides.3

Mais, au XHP siecle, au moins dans la region lyonnaise,4 ce
n'est point l'inalienabilit£ absolue du droit romain qui s'introduit.
La dot reste alienable, a condition que le mari fournisse a sa femme

1 C. lyonnais, ii. N° 546 (1258): « I. R. miles et domina A. uxor ejus
. . . recipiunt in francum feudum . . . quicquid juris dictus miles nomine
dicte domine uxoris sue et ipsa habent. . . . Renunciantes . . . exception! . . .
dotis et Velleiani privilegio, et juri prohibenti ne super re dotali aliqua servitus
imponatur. »

2 C. lyonnais, ii. N° 535 (1256) : Jaquette de Vaux, non mariee, reprenant
des biens en fief du chapitre de Saint-Paul, renonce au « privilegium dotis et
ypothece ».

3 Peut-etre trouvons-nous, dans un litige survenu en 1229, 1'une des
premieres manifestations de Pinalienabilite dotale (C. lyonnais, i. N° 257).
Aymon d'Escullon, avec le concours de son fils, vend a 1'eglise Saint-Just de
Lyon un bien appartenant a sa femme. Puis il veut reprendre le bien vendu,
et son beau-frere soutient cette reclamation : « Duranz Gaudemars, cujus
sororem idem Aymo habuerat in uxorem, de cujus dote idem Duranz dicebat
res predictas fuisse. ...» Les reclamants renoncent cependant a leurs
preventions, moyennant 12 livres viennoises. Toutefois Pacte n'indique
nullement que la base de ces reclamations soit le caractere dotal du bien
vendu ; et, dans les renonciations qui terminent cette transaction, il n'est fait
aucune allusion a la dotalite.

4 Les documents imprimes relatifs aux autres regions que nous etudions,
et en particulier a la Provence, sont trop peu nombreux pour nous permettre
de connaitre 1'extension territoriale du systeme que nous presentent les textes
lyonnais.

1 88 jR. Caillemer [ix

une recompensatio, un excambium, en lui ce"dant des immeubles ou
des droits immobiliers ; au besoin, il devra acheter des immeubles
pour les donner a sa femme en echange du bien dotal alie'ne'. Le
principe est pose tres nettement dans un acte lyonnais de 1236:
Res dotales vendi vel distrahi a maritis non possunt, sine recom-
pensatione sufficienti facta uxoribus.1

Dans les premieres annees du Xlir siecle, ce systeme nouveau
n'est pas encore constitue, et la dot semble encore pleinement
alienable.2 Vers 1200, B. d'Andilly, faisant son testament, legue a
sa femme divers immeubles, pour lui tenir lieu des biens dotaux
vendus ou engages.3 Mais il semble bien qu'il n'y ait encore la
qu'un scrupule du mari, et non pas une obligation stricte ; peut-etre
aussi la femme n'avait-elle pas consenti a 1'alienation.

Mais, a partir de Tan 1220, la doctrine se fait plus precise et
plus exigeante. Desormais le remploi doit etre deja effectue et
accept^ par la femme, au moment ou l'ali£nation du bien dotal
devient definitive. Dans quelques documents, la femme se contente
de declarer qu'elle a regu une recompensatio suffisante ; 4 mais
d'ordinaire, dans 1'acte d'alienation du bien dotal, les biens fournis
en remploi par le mari sont indiques avec precision. Peu importe
d'ailleurs le mode d'alienation du bien dotal, qu'il s'agisse d'une vente,5

1 C. lyonnais, i. N° 305. 2 V. les actes cites plus haut.

3 C. lyonnais, i. N° 80 : « Uxori sue, pro terra sua quam vendiderat, et pro
quadem curte sua quod invadiaverat, dimisit, pro velle suo facere, curtem
. . . et vineam . . . et terram . . . et gageriam. »

4 Bibl. Dumbensis, ii. Suppl. N° 74 (1228) : « Confessa est insuper comi-
tissa se pro predicto castro, quod ad ipsam ratione successionis et jure
hereditario pertinebat, a domino et marito suo Johanne prefato comite per-
mutadonem sufficientem et ydoneam recepisse ; et supradicta omnia rata
habuit et sponte in manu nostra concessit. » Gr. Cart. d^Ainay, ii. p. 181
(1263): «Et quoniam dicte res vendite erant de dote dicte Guigone, ut ipsa
asserit, ipsa confitetur se habuisse et recepisse a dicto marito bonum et
legitimum escambium pro ipsis rebus de dote sua, ut asserit, existentibus, de
quo ipsa se tenet integre pro pagata. »

5 C. lyonnais, i. N° 256 (1229): « Cum autem hec essent de maritagio
predicte Guicharde, facta sibi recompensatione ab Umberto marito suo de eo
quod apud Chal habebat, ambo laudaverunt predictum curtile. » N° 26 1 (i 230):
vente de 3 solidi debitales aux Templiers de Laumusse : « Et cum dicti tres
solidi debitales nominate Dannon fuissent a matre sua legati, propter quod ad
dotem suam videbantur pertinere vel dotis privilegio fungi, ne super hoc dicti

fratres vel alius pro ipsis possent in posterum molestari, prenominatus Willelmus,
uxori sue recompensationem faciens, tres solidos debitales eidem assignavit
in appendiciis . . ., propter quod eadem dictis tribus solidis renunciavit. »

ix] Droit Coutumier 189

d'une donation, ou encore d'une transaction.1 A en croire

N° 305 (1236), acte cite* plus haut : « Quum igitur res dotales vendi vel distrahi
a maritis non possunt sine recompensatione sufficient! facta uxoribus, dictus G.
in sufficientem recompensationem dedit in perpetuum dicte Agneti uxori sue et
heredibus ejus clausum. ...» Entre autres elements de la recompensatio
figure la renonciation du mari et de son frere a une obligation de 100 livres
grevant a leur profit les biens dotaux. V. encore le N° 437 (1249) : « In con-
cambium vero et permutationem rerum venditarum dotalium dicte Petronille,
assignat et concedit dictus Jarento miles prefate Petronille uxori ejusdem . . .,
de quibus rebus sibi nomine dicte concambii et permutationis assignatis dicta
Petronilla se tenet et tenuit coram nobis integre pro pagata. » T. ii. N° 522
(1255): vente de bien dotal par le pere du mari : « que res vendite ad Beatricem,
filiam quondam dicti Hugonis, nunc uxorem Thomassini filii dicte Thome mi-
litis jure hereditario pertinebant. » Les jeunes epoux,/«^// puberes, approuvent.
« Dictus vero Thomas in recompensationem et escambium dictarum rerum
venditarum reddit, tradit et assignat et concedit dicte Beatrici curtile. . . .
De qua recompensatione et escambio dicta Beatrix et dictus Thomassinus de
mandate dicti Thome se tenent pro pagatis ; asserentes per juramentum quod
propter hoc eorum condicio non est in aliquo pejorata, immo quod melior est
effecta. » N° 555 (1259): « Et quoniam dicte res erant . . . de dote dicte
Ysabelle, dictus Stephanus (le vendeur) maritus suus reddidit ei . . . in
escambium et recompensationem ipsarum rerum quicquid idem Stephanus habet
in parrochiis . . . ; de quo escambio et recompensatione dicta Ysabella se
tenet per juramentum pro pagata ; asserens per idem juramentum quod propter
hoc dotis sue conditio melior est effecta. »

On pourrait relever encore, dans les autres recueils lyonnais, au xnie sjecle,
de nombreux exemples de ces alienations de biens dotaux, moyennant remploi
en biens du mari. Gr. C. d'Ainay, ii. N° xi (1279) : * Et cum dicte res vendite
essent de dote dicte domine Margarite, idem miles in recompensationem et
escambium . . . reddit et assignat eidem domine res que secuntur. ...» C
des francs-fiefs du b'orez, N° 41 (1257): vente de 5 sous de rente et du haut
domaine d'une vigne : « Et quia predict! quinque solidi forcium novorum et
dominium ad dictam Aalis pertinent racione dotis, dictus Petrus eidem volenti
et ex certa scientia recipient! reddit et assignat in recompensacionem predictorum
tres jornalatas vinee . . . ; et de istis rebus habitis et receptis dicta Aalis,
cerciorata de jure et de facto, pro supradictis venditis dicto capellano, se tenet
integre, ut asserit, pro pagata. »

II arrive que le mari, au lieu de donner a sa femme la propriete meme de
ses immeubles, en remploi, lui assigne une rente sur ses immeubles. C.
lyonnais, i. N° 173 (1221): vente d'un courtil et de vignes : « Et ob recon-
pensacionem rei vendite, Johannes Dumbeis dedit et concessit uxori sue Proetan
x libras et x solidos super domum quam habet apud Ansam, et inde pacem
ipse et filii sui eidem Proetan in perpetuum juraverunt. » Ce texte est 1'un
des plus anciens ou Ton voie fonctionner le systeme de la recompen-
satio.

1 La plupart des documents que nous venons de citer concernent la vente
d'un bien dotal. Mais le meme systeme d'alienabilite moyennant remploi se
rencontre aussi dans des donations, ou dans des transactions portant sur la dot.

i go R. Caillemer [ix

certains documents, il faut meme que le bien donne" en recompen-
satio ait une valeur nettement supe"rieure a celle du bien dotal
alie"ne". On exige, par exemple, que les biens donnas en remploi
rapportent 60 sous de rente, si les biens dotaux ali£ne"s valaient 50
livres, ce qui fait un revenu de 6 %.J Ajoutons enfin que cet usage
de 1'ali^nation moyennant remploi a sa repercussion sur la liste des
renonciations : Ton voit apparaitre, a cote de la renonciation a la loi
Julia ou au Velle"ien, la renonciation exceptioni legitime remunera-
tionis non habile?

D'ordinaire, les deux operations, vente du bien dotal et recom-
pensatio, sont reunies dans le meme acte, mais logiquement elles
restent distinctes, et la recompensatio, \excambium doit meme
theoriquement pr£ceder 1'alienation. Un document lyonnais de
1 244 est particulierement curieux a cet e"gard. Au lieu de vendre
directement le bien dotal a l'acque"reur, sauf a assigner a sa femme
une recompensatio, le mari commence par conclure avec sa femme
un echange. Le mari et son frere cedent a la femme un immeuble
qui leur appartient, en ^change de I'immeuble dotal ; ce premier
acte est fait avec le consentement des enfants d'un premier lit de
cette femme, et celle-ci declare que 1'echange est avantageux
pour elle. Puis le mari et son frere, ayant ainsi acquis la libre
disposition du bien dotal, le vendent a une Maison de 1'Ordre de
Malte.3

Gr. C. tfAinay, ii. N° xlix. p. 89 (1227) : proces relatif a un moulin, « que ad
se pertinere dicebat (Radulphus) ratione Aalis uxoris sue. » Une transaction
intervient ; les epoux renoncent a leurs droits sur le moulin, moyennant 1 2
livres viennoises : « Quia vero jus prefate querele ad uxorem dicti Radulphi
militis pertinebat, ut ipsi dicebant, reddidit ei maritus ejus ex causa permuta-
tionis quicquid habebat apud . . ., quam permutationem ipsa domina gratam
habuit et recepit. »

1 C. des francs -fiefs du Forez, N° 27 (1246), p. 121 : Guigues de
Montagny et sa femme vendent, pour 50 livres, des droits immobiliers a
Feurs : « Et qum res superius nominate erant de dote vel de patrimonio dicte
Agnetis, dictus Guigo dedit et tradidit ei, in recompensationem earumdem,
quicquid habebat. . . . Et, si hec non valerent sexaginta solidos fortium
censuales, dictus Guigo debet eos dicte Agneti perficere de redditibus suis
quos habet in mandamento de Fontaneis ; ut de eis faciat quicquid facere
poterat de rebus que erant de dote vel de patrimonio ejus.»

2 Gr. C. d'Ainay, ii. N° vii. (1268): « exceptioni legitime remunerationis
non habite»; N° xi. (1279): « exceptioni legitimi escambii non habiti.» C.
lyonnais, ii. N° 522 (1255) : « exceptioni legitime remunerationis non habite. »

3 C. lyonnais, i. N° 393 (1244) : «... Uxor domini Willermi de Pavenens,

ix] Droit Coutumier 191

Ainsi, au XIIIs siecle, dans la region lyonnaise, la dot, e"chappe
encore a 1'application rigoureuse des regies romaines relatives a
Pinalie'nabilite" dotale, et est soumise a un regime en somme assez
different du systeme romain. La regie romaine d'inalie"nabilit£
absolue ne triomphera que plus tard.1

Cette inalienability relative ne s'est appliquee tout d'abord,
semble-t-il, qu'aux immeubles dotaux de la femme. Mais, dans
le courant du Xlir siecle, un systeme de protection analogue,
quoique moins net et moins e"nergique, a e"te e"tendu aux immeubles
du mari, dans la mesure ou la dot mobiliere de la femme e"tait
assignee sur ces immeubles, et ou ils en garantissaient la restitution.

Au de"but du Xllle siecle, aucune protection spe"ciale de la dot
mobiliere de la femme n'apparait encore. Quand le mari vend un
de ses biens propres, la femme renonce purement et simplement a
tous les droits qu'elle peut exercer sur ce bien a raison de sa dot.2
L'hypotheque que le droit romain lui accordait sur les immeubles
de son mari ne semble guere avoir eu d'application pratique : on la
mentionne rarement, et seulement pour y renoncer.3 II arrive

dicta Boicharda, laudantibus et consentientibus . . . liberis dicte domine
Boicharde, quos ab alio marito suscepit, permutavit dicto W. de Pavenens
marito suo et Jocerando de Pavenens militi, fratribus . . . mansum . . .,
quern dederat dicto Willermo in dotem cum earn accepit in uxorem, cum
manso . . . et cum his que habebant vel possidebant dicti milites apud
Granges . . . ; et juravit dicta domina super sancta Dei evangel ia dictam
permutationem sibi utilem esse, et se imperpetuum per se vel per alium contra
non venturam. — Deinde dicti W. et Jocerandus . . . dictum mansum . . .,
quern ex dicta permutatione habuerunt, vendiderunt ...»

1 Guy Pape ne semble plus connaitre Palienabilite de la dot moyennant un
remploi. La seule question qu'il se pose est la fameuse question de savoir si
un serment de la femme peut valider Palienation de la dot. — Qu. 1 90 ; cf.
Expilly, Arrtts, ch. 123. — On sait que plus tard, le 20 avril 1664, une
ordonnance royale, rendue a la requete du prevot des marchands et des
echevins de Lyon, est venue abroger Pinalienabilite de la dot dans le Lyonnais,
le Maconnais, le Forez et le Beaujolais. Cf. Lefebvre, article precite, p. 428
et s.

2 V. C. lyonnais, i. N° 236 (1228), cite plus haut, et un grand nombre
d'actes du meme recueil.

3 V., p. ex., Bibl. Dumb. ii. Suppl. N° 73 (1228), a la suite d'une obliga-
tion d'immeubles : « Blancha quoque, dicti domicelli uxor, dictam obligationem
expresse laudavit, . . . renuncians cum juramento ypothece dotis generali vel
special!, tacite vel expresse, in rebus supradictis, et omni juri et auxilio legum
vel canonum sibi competent! vel competituro. » N° in (1253), a la suite
d'une receptio feudi faite par un mari avec la laudatio de sa femme : « Re-
nunciantes . . . exception! . . . dotis et ypothece tacite et expresse privilegio,
et Velleiani privilegio, legi Julie de fundo dotali non alienando. »

192 R. Caillemer [ix

meme que la femme du vendeur cede expressdment a Pacheteur les
sommes dotales que 1'immeuble vendu garantissait.1

Cependant son desinteressement n'est pas toujours aussi complet.
II arrive que la femme, apportant ainsi sa laudatio a 1'alienation de
I'immeuble du mari, se fasse payer par 1'acquereur cette laudatio
et cette renonciation a ses droits e"ventuels 2 ; ou bien encore elle se
fait donner par l'acque"reur les «drouillesi>, les prestations accessoires
qu'il est d'usage de joindre au prix de vente.3 Quelquefois enfin,
la femme revolt, lors de 1'alienation, une somme d'argent plus con-
siderable encore : elle se fait remettre par son mari, a concurrence
du montant de sa dot, le prix du bien vendu.f Mais ces precedes,

1 C. lyonnais, i. N° 99 (1206): « Supradicta vero domina in omnibus
possessionibus supradictis habet 1 Irbras de dote, quas predicte domui Templi
dedit et concessit. » N° 163 : meme acte refait en 1219.

2 C. lyonnais, ii. N° 557 (1259): transaction entre Albert de La Tour et
Pabbe d'Ambronay au sujet de leurs droits a Lagnieu ; Pabbe remet, pro bono
pacts, 1 1 1. vienn. a Albert et 30 sous a son epouse : « Nos vero Alasia,
domina de Turre, receptis dictis xxx solidis pro laudibus, laudamus et
approbamus compositionem predictam. »

3 C. lyonnais, ii. N° 573 (1261) : vente par Bertrand de Tassin a 1'eglise
de Lyon : « Hanc autem venditionem et precii solutionem domina Elyoz,
uxor dicti militis . . . sponte sua laudat, approbat, ratificat et acceptat, et
omne jus et ypothecam . . . quitat. . . . Confitetur etiam ipsa domina se
habuisse a dictis emptoribus sex solidos Viennensium pro druelliis. » V. Du
Cange, vis druaylia, drueleria, droillia, drolia et draulia ; Collet, Explication
. . . des statuts . . . de Bresse, art. 83. Chartes de Cluny, vi. N°47ii
(1237) : « pro laudationibus seu drueleriis, » acte deja signale par Du Cange.

4 Cart, lyonnais, i. N° 193 (1223) : vente par Guillaume Bernard a 1'eglise
de Lyon : « De precio quoque supradicto confessus est coram nobis predictus
Willelmus sibi plene satisfactum fuisse, et illud totum Willelme uxori sue pro
dote sua solvit ; unde propter hoc tarn dictus Willelmus quam Willelma uxor
ejus omni juri sibi in prefatis rebus aliquando competenti vel competituro cum
juramento renuntiarunt. » N° 271 (1231): Berard de Pizay et sa femme
Guillelmine, ne pouvant payer leurs dettes, vendent a Amedee de Miribel,
frere de Berard, tous leurs immeubles situes a Soucieu, moyennant 25 livres
payees immediatement et un complement a percevoir sur les revenus d' Amedee
a Ornacieu, jusqu'a ce que les vendeurs aient regu en tout 7500 sous:
« Dictum autem rerum venditarum precium et dictos redditus . . . pro precio
assignatos dictus Berardus assignavit dicte Willelme uxori sue pro dote sua ;
quam assignationem ipsa gratam habuit et acceptam, confitens et recognoscens
dictas res sibi assignatas plus valere quam res que in dotem fuerant sibi date.
Preterea domina Willelma . . . renuntians . . . juri ypothecarum quod
habebat generaliter vel specialiter in rebus et possessionibus omnibus supra-
nominatis. . . . Sub eodem quoque juramento renuntiavit sepedicta Willelma
litteris, si quas habebat, quod dicte res sibi essent pro dote specialiter
assignate ; et promisit se eis decetero non usuram. » N° 274 (1232): Etienne

ix] Droit Coutumier 193

aboutissant a remettre entre les mains de la femme, au cours du
manage, des sommes d'argent plus ou moins importantes, sont
evidemment tres imparfaits. Une telle restitution anticipe"e de la
dot n'est guere admissible.

Aussi, depuis 1240 environ, apparait un autre systeme, plus
conforme aux regies normales du regime matrimonial, plus voisin
des regies qui protegent la dot immobiliere. L'alie"nation de
1'immeuble garantissant la dot n'est valable que si la femme declare
formellement, au besoin sous la foi du serment, que la restitution
de sa dot est assuree au moyen d'autres biens du mari, que de
nouveaux immeubles ont £te" affecte"s a la garantie de la dot, en
recompensatio des immeubles aliened,1 ou du moins que son mari
possede d'autres biens « apparents », suffisants a assurer la restitution
de sa dot.2 Toutefois il convient de noter que 1'acte n'indique

Charreton et son epouse vendent une maison pour 28 livres. « Et ipsa
Petronilla expresse renunciavit sub eodem juramento omni juri ypothecarum
et omni alii juri quod ratione maritagii vel qualibet alia ratione posset ei
competere in domo supradicta vel prodesse quoquomodo. Confessa fuit
etiam quod de pecunia memorata satisfactum ei fuit in xxilll libris forcium,
quas maritus ipsius confessus fuerat ab eadem se in dotem recepisse. »

1 BibL Dtimbensis, ii. Suppl., N° 91 (1236) : « Recognoscens dicta Maria
sibi satisfactum de dote sua, et sibi fuisse cautum alibi de eadem » : ces
derniers mots semblent indiquer que la dot n'a pas ete restituee, mais a etc
assignee sur de nouveaux biens. — C. de Saint-Sauveur en Rue, N° civ. (1242) :
« Hec omnia facta sunt praesente et consentiente Luca uxore mea, et
renuntiante per juramentum privilegio in hoc sibi competent! ratione rei dotalis,
recognoscente et confitente cautum sibi a me alibi de dote sua. » — Grand Cart.
(fAinay, i. N° 49 (1256): « Hanc autem venditionem . . . domina Sibilla
mater dicti Petri et Eliouz uxor sua . . . laudant . . ., et, si forte eis vel
alter! ipsarum predicta fuerunt pro dote vel dotalicio aut alia causa obligata
tacite vel expresse, obligationem et omne jus, quod in predictis habent, quittant
dicto priori . . ., asserentes se recepisse a dicto P. alias possessiones in
recompensationem plus valentes, in quibus condicio sua melioratur, et non
modicum aumentatur; et hoc ita esse . . . juraverunt. » — V. aussi C. de Saint-
Sauveur en Rue, N° cxii. (1251): engagement realise par Hugue Falco,
sa femme, son fils et sa belle - fille : « Et nos praedictae Aalis et Beatrix
renuntiamus praestitis juramentis . . . omni juri et privilegiis dotis et
donationis propter nuptias, et tacitis sive expressis hipothecis pro dotibus
nostris, confitentes alibi in terra dicti militis et filii sui de dotibus nostris
sufficienter cautum esse. »

2 C. lyonnais, N° 386 (1244) : a la suite d'une vente de rentes : «confessa
est etiam dicta nobilis (femme du vendeur) sub prestito sacramento, quod
alias de bonis dicti B. mariti sui de dote sua potest sibi consuli competenter. »

— N° 426(1247) : « Hanc autem venditionem et precii solutionem laudavit et
approbavit et ratam habuit domina Guibors, uxor dicti Hugonis, promittens

194 -#• Caillemer [ix

jamais avec precision quels sont les nouveaux biens du mari ainsi
affectes a la garantie de la dot ; et, des lors, ce systeme de
recompensatio ne fonctionne pas ici avec la meme nettete" et la
meme rigueur que lorsqu'il s'applique aux alienations de la dot
immobiliere.

Ainsi, soit en ce qui concerne Pinalie'nabilite' de la dot
immobiliere, soit en ce qui touche la garantie de la dot mobiliere,
nous voyons apparaitre au Xllle siecle, non pas les pures ide"es
romaines, mais des systemes originaux de protection des int£rets
de la femme : ni 1'inalienabilite" absolue, ni la garantie resultant de
Phypotheque de la femme sur les biens du mari n'ont pene'tre' a
cette epoque dans la pratique.

Quant aux paraphernaux, la pratique les a longtemps ignores.
Les chartes parlent bien des bona dotalia et parafernalia, mais sans
que les contractants sachent ce que ce dernier mot signifie. Une
charte provengale, au de"but du Xllle siecle, englobe meme les para-
phernaux dans l'inalie"nabilite dotale.1 L'ide"e de biens reserves a la
femme, laiss^s a son administration et a sa jouissance, etait trop
contraire aux anciennes conceptions medievales pour pouvoir
pen£trer dans la pratique.2

per sacramentum se contra aliquatenus non venturam de jure vel de facto, . . .
confitens et asserens sub eodem juramento quod ob hanc alienationem seu
venditionem sue dotis conditio deterior non fiebat, cum vir suus plura alia
bona habeat, ob quorum existentiam, prout ipsa asserebat, dos sua sibi large
potest salva consistere et manere. »

Grand Cart. tfAinay, ii. p. 191, Suppl., N° 20 (1272): « predicta Amfelisia,
uxore dicti domini Guichardi, per juramentum asserente sibi posse satis
consuli alibi de dote sua super certis rebus et possessionibus apparentibus
mariti supradicti. »

1 C. de S. Victor de Marseille, ii. N° 909 (1229): Barrale des Baux,
faisant avec le consentement de son mari et de ses enfants une donation
immobiliere a Saint-Victor, renonce : « specialiter juribus que decernunt res
dotales seu parafernales alienari non posse. »

2 La jurisprudence de la France du Midi declarera que, s'il n'y a pas con-
stitution de dot prefixe, ou s'il n'y a pas du tout de contrat de mariage, tous
les biens de la femme sont tenus pour dotaux : Roussilhe, Traitt de la Dot, i.
p. 165 et s. Les paraphernaux sont une anomalie, une institution etrangere
et que Ton tend a restreindre. De plus, cette meme jurisprudence tend a
donner au mari Padministration et la jouissance des paraphernaux. V. Guy
Pape, qu. 468 : il distingue trois especes de biens de la femme, i°, la dot;
2°, les paraphernaux, dont il donne la definition suivante : « Bona parapher-
nalia sunt ilia quae ipsa uxor, tempore quo inducitur in domum mariti, secum
defert, et in quibus administrationem concedit marito tacite vel expresse » ;

ix] Droit Coutumier 195

B. Gains de survie

Comme dans les regions plus septentrionales, nous rencontrons
dans nos pays, au haut moyen age, le douaire. Tantot le mari, au
moment du manage, attribue a la femme certains biens de"termine"s
(sponsalicium\ tantot il lui donne une quote-part de tous ses biens
(dotalicium ; mais cette terminologie n'est pas tres ferme) : souvent,
dans un meme acte, ces deux genres de libe"ralite sont re'unis.1 Ce
douaire appartient en proprie'te' a la femme, mais on releve nette-
ment dans nos regions, comme dans beaucoup d'autres, des tendances
a re"server le douaire aux enfants a naitre du mariage, et aussi, a
deTaut d'enfants, a stipuler le retour du douaire aux parents du
mari : tendances qui, dans d'autres pays, conduiront au douaire des
enfants et au douaire en usufruit?

A partir du XIIP siecle, il se fait un changement dans les
termes, et dans le fond du droit.

L'ide"e coutumiere et germanique du calcul du douaire sur la
fortune du mari va faire place a l'ide"e d'un gain de survie propor-
tionne" a la dot : ce sera V augment de dot des pays meridionaux,
largement inspire des regies romaines relatives a la donatio propter
nuptias. Toutefois l'e"galite" entre la dot et la donatio propter nuptias,
qui a triomphe" dans quelques coutumes locales du Midi, semble
n'avoir jamais pe"ne"tre" dans la region qui nous occupe. D'ailleurs
1'augment de dot n'a pas remplac£ des la fin du moyen age tous les
autres gains de survie. La transformation a e"te plus complexe.
Encore aux XIVe et XVe siecles, on retrouve le mot dotalicium. Ce
mot a pris, il est vrai, des sens varies. Tantdt il s'agit, comme
dans les siecles precedents, d'un douaire veritable, calcule sur la

enfin 3°, les biens qui ne sont ni dotaux, ni paraphernaux, « quae mulier habet
omnino separata a viro et in suo regimine ac dominio reservata. »

1 V., comme exemple tres caracteristique de cette institution, le douaire
(in sponsalitio sive in dotalitio} constitue par Guigue le Gras, comte d'Albon,
en 1070, au profit de sa fiancee, Agnes (Bull, de PAcad. delphinale, 3e Serie,
t. xx. p. 369 et s.) : ce douaire comprend une serie de castra determines, avec
leurs mandements, et le tiers des placita. V. aussi Marion, C. de Ptglise de
Grenoble, A, N° 21 (1023) ; Ch. de Cluny, Nos 7, 88, 105, 229, 439, 659, 686,
687, etc. ; C. de S. Victor de Marseille, Nos 65, 189, 704, 705. Lemotj/^-
salicium se retrouve encore, en 1257, dans le C. de Saint-Sauveur en Rue,
N° cviii. Cf. Gavet, Sponsalitium et Dotalitium dans les chartes de Pabbaye
de Cluny (Melanges F. Ciccaglione, i.).

2 V. notre etude sur les origines du douaire des enfants (Studi in onore di
Vittorio Scialoja, Prato, 1904).

196 R. Caillemer [ix

fortune du mari ou fix£ a une somme determined. En 1273, le
contrat de manage entre Anne, heritiere des Dauphins de la seconde
race, et Humbert de La Tour, contient un dotalicium et doarium
« selon les usages de la Bourgogne » : le fianc£ attribue a sa future
Spouse, outre certains biens determines, Pusufruit de la moiti£ de
tous ses biens.1 De meme, en 1347, dans un projet de mariage
entre Humbert II et Blanche, sceur du comte de Savoie Am£dee,
Humbert promet a sa fiancee, en dotalicium^ une rente annuelle de
10,000 florins. Mais ce dotalicium doit cesser lorsque la dot aura
£te restitute, et, pour ce cas, on stipule un augment de dot, si la
femme survit et s'il n'y a pas d'enfants du mariage : la rente annuelle
fera place alors a un capital une fois paye.2

Au xve siecle encore, Guy Pape connait et etudie le douaire,
dotalicium ou doariumy constitue par le mari au profit de sa
femme pour le cas de survie de celle-ci ; et, suivant sur ce point la
vieille conception medievale, il declare que la femme, bien que
n'ayant sur ce douaire qu'une jouissance viagere, en est cependant
vraiment proprietaire, et qu'elle doit supporter toutes les charges
qui pesent sur la propriety fonciere, impots, cens, etc.3

Dans d'autres textes cependant, le mot dotalicium prend des

1 Valbonnais, Hist, de Dauphin^ ii. p. 1 1 et s.

2 Ibid. ii. p. 569 et s., N° cell. : « Item actum est quod dictus dominus
Dalphinus teneatur dare et assignare dictae dominae Blanchae ratione dotalitii
10,000 flor. annuales, assignandos in castris Visiliae, etc. . . . et quod dicta
castra sibi tradantur. » Et plus loin : « Item, in casu ubi restitutio praedictae
dotis fuerit plenarie facta, quod tune cesset totaliter dotalitium supradictum. »
Si Blanche, devenue veuve, se remarie, le douaire s'eteindra aussitot, ou bien
il faudra imputer les produits de ce douaire sur le chiffre de la dot a restituer.
Si Blanche ne se remarie pas, et reprend cependant sa dot par fractions, a
chacun des termes de restitution de la dot, le douaire sera reduit de 1200
florins. V. encore, en 1369, le dotalicium de Beatrix de Chalon, mentionne
dans le testament de son mari Humbert de Villars, et qui comprend un certain
nombre de castra, avec leurs mandements. Bibl. Dumbensis, i. p. 305.

3 Guy Pape, Decisiones, qu. 524-525 : « Si dotalitium seu doarium con-
stituatur sponsae futurae in casu quo vir praedecederet, utrum valeat ? Die
quod sic ... Et ita in judicando servatur . . . — Sed . . . pone quod
maritus assignat uxori doarium in vitam^ vel aliquam rem ad alimenta aut pro
statu suo tenendo sibi donat vel legat, nunquid istis casibus censebitur uxor
proprietaria ? . . . Et per hoc dico quod mulier, vita sua durante, tenetur
pro talibus rebus solvere collectas quae pro ipsis rebus imponentur, census et
alia onera ex ipsis bonis debita, cum etiam in mulierem talium rerum transeat
dominium . . . Et ita de consuetudine etiam servatur in hac patria, in locis
in quibus collectae et subsidia Delphinalia solvuntur. »

ix] Droit Coutumier 197

significations nouvelles, inconnues pendant le haut moyen age.
Tantdt le mot de'signe une assignation d'immeubles du mari,
destinee a garantir a la femme la restitution de sa dot en deniers :
assignatio facta mulieri causa dotis assequrande^ Tantdt enfin le
mot dotalicium de'signe un « contre - douaire », un droit d'usufruit
constitue par la femme ou par les parents de la femme au profit du
mari, pour le cas de sa survie.2

Puis apparait un gain de survie appele supravita, qui est
mentionne" dans les textes lyonnais depuis le xille siecle,3 et qui,
plus tard, usite" en Maconnais, en Bresse,4 en Dauphine,5 en Provence,6
consiste en une donation reciproque d'une somme d'argent, que le
survivant prendra dans la fortune du pre'de'cede. Ordinairement,
la « survie » de la femme est double de celle du mari.

1 Telle est la definition du dotalicium donnee au cours d'une contestation
entre 1'avocat fiscal et le procureur general du Dauphin et le seigneur de
Sassenage, en 1420, au sujet de la terre de Pont en Royans. Cette terre
avait ete constitute en dotalicium par le seigneur de Sassenage au profit de
son epouse, Alice de Chalon, pour garantir, a concurrence de 10,000 florins,
la restitution de la dot de celle-ci. Les gens du Dauphin reclament, sur
cette constitution de dotalicium, le paiement des lods et ventes dus en cas
d'alienation immobiliere. Le seigneur de Sassenage « dixit se non teneri, quia
tale dotalicium, sive assignacio facta mulieri causa dotis assequrande, non
transfert dominium. » II ajoute que la coutume dauphinoise n'impose pas en
pareil cas le paiement des lods et ventes, puisque la terre doit lui revenir des
que la dot aura ete restituee. U. Chevalier, Choix de documents inedits,
p. 254 et s.

2 Guigue, BibL Hist, du Lyonnais, p. 29 (1229): Humbert de Beaujeu,
apres avoir constitue un maritagium a sa sceur, Sibille, fiancee a Renaud de
Bage, ajoute : « Ego siquidem H., de voluntate et mandato expresso S. sororis
mee, dicto R. contuli in dotalicium medietatem omnium rerum supradictarum,
si forte, quod absit, earn absque libero mori contingeret, quoad vixerit possi-
dendam, et post mortem ipsius ad me et ad meos pleno jure revertetur. »

3 C. Lyonnais, i. N° 464 (1251) : « Hanc autem venditionem. . . . Aalys,
uxor dicti Guigonis, sponte sua laudat, . . . et omnem ypotecam . . . et
omnes actiones, si quas habet in dictis rebus venditis . . . pro dote sua aut
supra-uita . . . quitat. »

4 V., sur les donations de survie, Ch. Revel, D Usage des pays de Bresse,
n. ed., Bourg, 1729, p. 253 : « Item, lesdits Epoux et Epouses futurs se sont
faits les donations de survie suivantes : Sgavoir, que le dit Epoux venant
a mourir avant ladite Epouse, ayant enfans ou non, ce Mariage consomme ou
non, il lui donne de survie 100. Et au meme cas de predeces, ladite epouse
donne audit epoux 50. »

5 Guy Pape, qu. 565.

6 De Cormis, Consult, i. col. 1363. — En Provence, cette donation
reciproque est le seul gain de survie pratique.

198

./?. Caillemer [ix

Quant aux mots : augmentum dotis, melioratio, melior -amentum , ils
ont design^ tout d'abord un accroissement quelconque de la dot, qu'il
vint du mari, ou des parents du mari, ou meme des parents de la
femme.1 Puis le mot augment de dot a pris un sens plus e"troit, et
a de"sign£ un gain de survie calcule" sur la dot. Get augment de
dot n'a jamais eu, dans le Sud - Est de la France, une grande
extension. II a pris le caractere d'un gain de survie ttgal dans
quelques pays (Suisse romande, Savoie, Lyonnais, et aussi Franche-
Comte, ou les roturiers le pratiquent sous le nom de douaire)?
En Dauphine, il n'a jamais existe" qu'en vertu d'une clause formelle.3

1 Bibl. hist, du Lyonnais ', p. 29 (1229): melioramenttim const! tue par le
frere de la femme au profit du mari. Valb. ii. p. 61 : augmentum dotis
constitute par le pere de la femme. C. Lyonnais, i. N° 1 40 (i 2 1 6) : « Renuncians
omni juri . . . ratione . . . alicujus melioramenti competituro » ; N° 220
(1226): melioratio dotis constitute par le pere du marie: « Cum Johannes
films meus contraxisset matrimonium cum filia Boni Johannis, dedi ei et
concessi in melioration^ quicquid idem Johannes acquisierat vel acquirere
poterat cum vinea mea de Poimie. » De meme pour un autre fils.

2 V., pour la Suisse Romande, von Wyss, Eh. Guterrechte, p. 177,
178 et s., 194 et s., 197 et s. ; pour la Savoie, le Bugey, le Valromey, le pays
de Gex, Ant. Favre, Codex Fabrianus, v. i, De don. ante nupt. 3 et s. : pour la
Franche-Comte, cout. de 1459, art. 26. Au contraire « le douaire » des nobles
francs-comtois est un veritable douaire, calcule sur les immeubles du mari.

8 On peut voir un exemple d'augment (sans le nom) en 1309, dans
Valbonnais, i. p. 199, HHH ; la fiancee apportant une dot de 20,000 1., son
fiance lui fait une donation entre-vifs de 10,000 1. La donation du mari est
ainsi egale a la moitie de la dot.

\} augmentum dotis figure dans le projet de mariage, cite plus haut, entre
Humbert II et Blanche de Savoie, en 1347, Valbonnais, ii. p. 370; cet
augment ne doit prendre naissance que si la dot est restituee a la veuve, et
s'il n'y a pas d'enfants nes du mariage : « Item memorandum quod, si dotis
restitutio locum haberet, domino Dalphino praemoriente, non superstitibus
liberis ab eisdem communibus, dat sibi dominus in augmentum dotis decem
millia flor. » En cas de predeces de Blanche, le Dauphin doit garder de meme
10,000 florins sur la dot : on nommera ce droit, plus tard, le contre-
augment.

Guy Pape parle a plusieurs reprises de 1'augment : qu. 274, 363, 430, en
se preoccupant surtout d'ecarter Papplication a 1'augment des regies romaines
sur la donatio propter nuptias. II cherche a etablir que 1'augment sera du a
la femme, meme si la dot n'a pas etc payee au mari : « et ita in judicando
servatur in hac curia Parlamenti » (qu. 274). II montre que 1'augment de dot
peut fort bien ne pas etre egal a la dot : « Licet in pactis de dote et dotis
augmento lucrandis aequalitas debeat servari . . ., tamen inaequalitas dotis
et augmenti quandoque toleratur . . . , primo videlicet, si usus et consuetudo
patriae habeat oppositum . . . : sicut est in patria Delph., quia videmus
quotidie quod ex pacto maritus de dote lucratur pro supermta centum vel

ix] Droit Coutumier 199

II est reste" a peu pres inconnu en Bresse1et en Provence.2 N£
tardivement, apres la renaissance du droit remain, 1'augment ne
saurait eVidemment e"tre rattache, comme le voulait Ficker, au
vieux droit burgonde.

En somme, malgre' la renaissance du droit romain, les coutumes
du Sud-Est de la France n'ont pas adopt£ le systeme romain de la
donatio propter nuptias. Ici encore, en matiere de gains de survie
comme en matiere de protection de la dot, ces coutumes ont e"labor<§
une se"rie d'institutions originales, et ici la resistance aux id£es
romaines a e"te" plus durable, car, tandis que I'lnali^nabilite" dotale a
fini par triompher, cette organisation spontane"e des gains de survie
a persiste jusqu'a la Revolution.

Nous pourrions faire, en ce qui concerne les actes a cause de
mort, des observations analogues. Jusqu'au XIP siecle, le Sud-Est
de la France a completement ignore^ le testament proprement dit,
unilateral et revocable. Les actes appeles « testaments » sont.
des donations ou des ventes. On ne connait que la donation
avec reserve de jouissance viagere. Le gadium dauphinois et pro-
vengal, difficilement revocable, n'est qu'une donation post obitum.
Lorsque, au XIF et surtout au XIIP siecle, le testament reparait, il
se de"barrasse pe"niblement de ces anciens caracteres des actes a
cause de mort. L'institution d'heritier n'apparait qu'avec des
formes hesitantes (institution de Dieu ou des Saints ; tres
nombreuses institutions ex re certa). Le contenu du testament
continue de s'inspirer d'ide'es etrangeres au droit romain. — Mais
cette etude est faite ou va £tre faite ailleurs, et elle nous entrainerait
trop loin.

ducentos florenos, et uxor duplum. » II est curieux de voir Guy Pape, voulant
donner un exemple de 1'augment dauphinois, choisir un cas de supravita.

1 V., pour la Bresse, Ch. Revel, D Usage des pays de Bresse, nouv. ed.,
Bourg, 1729, p. 254 et s. : « L'augment est une complaisance efeminee et une
mauvaise drogue qui nous est venue de de-la les Monts ou de la Savoye : le
droit romain ne 1'a jamais ape^u ; nos Coutumes n'en parlent point. . . .
Get augment est descendu jusqu'en Bugey, mais il n'a pas passe la riviere
d'Ain ...» En Bresse, il n'existe que s'il est expressement stipule, « et on le
peut apeller Poprobre et Pinfamie de notre siecle. » Dans la seconde partie
de cet ouvrage, p. 119 et s., Revel etudie Paugment tel qu'il fonctionne dans
le Bugey, le Valromey et le pays de Gex.

2 V., sur cette extension de Paugment a la fin de notre ancien droit,
Boucher d'Argis, Traiti des gains nuptiaux, ed. de 1787, p. 37.

2oo R. Caillemer [ix

Pour terminer, nous indiquerons encore que les idees romaines
sur la tutelle, la curatelle, la puissance paternelle, I'emancipation
sont absentes du droit du haut moyen age. Les premiers actes
d'emancipation re"ve"lateurs d'une puissance paternelle perpetuelle,
sont du xnr siecle. En 1204, Andre Dauphin, donnant des
franchises a St- Vallier, date 1'acte : anno mee milicie primo ; il a
environ 20 ans ; jusqu'alors, sa mere administrait le comt£
d'Albon : c'est encore la majorit£ feodale, marquee par 1'adoubement.1
Au contraire, en 1237, dans son testament, il distingue, pour son
jeune fils Guigue, la periode de la tutelle (jusqu'a 14 ans) et celle de la
curatelle : 2 les ide"es romaines ont done, en cette matiere, pe"ne"tre"
dans le premier tiers du xille siecle dans la Maison des comtes
d'Albon.

Ces quelques indications, que Ton pourrait encore allonger, nous
paraissent caracte"ristiques : ces « pays de droit e"crit » ont e"te", au haut
moyen age, profondement p^n^tr^s d'id^es coutumieres, qui ont
sur quelques points oppose, a la reception du droit remain, une
vive resistance.

R. CAILLEMER.

1 Franchises de Saint- Vallier, dans la Petite Revue des bibliophiles
dauphinois^ Grenoble, 1869-1874, p. 59.

2 Valbonnais, i. p. 60 : « Item dedit eidem Guigoni tutricem Beatricem.
. . . Item post expirationem tutelae dedit eandem Beatricem curatricem
filio suo supradicto. »

LA MAXIME PRINCEPS LEGIBUS SOLUTUS
EST DANS L'ANCIEN DROIT PUBLIC FRAN-

LE Digeste, au titre de legibus senatusconsultis et longa consuetudine
(i. 3), contient un fragment d'Ulpien (L. 31) qui commence ainsi :
Princeps legibus solutus est. Peu de textes ont exerce" une
influence plus profond sur le deVeloppement du droit public dans
certains pays d'Europe et surtout en France. Seul peut reven-
diquer le meme prestige et meme 1'emporter a cet e"gard un autre
fragment du meme jurisconsulte Ulpien qui forme la loi du titre
suivant, de Constitutionibus principum et qui commence par cette
assertion celebre et mena^ante : Quod principi placuit legis habet
vigor em.

La premiere regie formulee par Ulpien et sur laquelle porte
notre e"tude, avait dans le droit romain du nr siecle une porte"e
precise et limite'e. L'Empereur n'e"tait point affranchi des lois ; il
leur e"tait au contraire soumis en principe. Mais il arrivait que
telle ou telle loi nouvelle exemptait le prince re"gnant de certaines
des regies qu'elle £dictait, et la Lex de imperio Vespasiani montre
que 1'habitude e"tait de maintenir ces exemptions a ses successeurs.1
En dehors de ces franchises spe'ciales et legalement e"dicte"es,
1'Empereur pouvait obtenir du S^nat, competent a cet egard, la
dispense de certaines regies le"gales. Puis, et c'est la un nouvel e"tat
du droit romain deja ^tabli au temps d'Ulpien, on admit que
1'Empereur pouvait lui-meme accorder des dispenses de cette

1 Lex de imperio Vespasiani^ dans P. F. Girard, Textes de droit romain
public's et annote"s, 46ine edition, p. 108 : <t Utique quibus legibus plebisve scitis
scriptum fuit ne divus Aug(ustus), Tiberiusve Julius Caesar Aug(ustus),
Tiberiusque Claudius Caesar Aug(ustus) Germanicus tenerentur, iis legibus
plebisque scitis imp(erator) Caesar Vespasianus solutus sit. »

201

2O2 A. Esmein [x

espece et, comme il pouvait le cas e'che'ant se les accorder a lui-
meme, on admit qu'une telle dispense pour lui-meme allait de soi :
pour plus de simplicity il fut conside're' comme affranchi des regies
le"gales dont il pouvait accorder la dispense. Tel est le sens vrai
et la porte"e originelle de cette petite phrase e"crite par Ulpien :
Princeps legibus solutus est. *• Mais cette faculte" ne s'appliquait
qu'aux lois concernant le droit prive"2 et, ajoute Mommsen, aux
lois de police.3 L'Empereur restait tenu des lois concernant le
droit public4 et meme des lois criminelles, bien qu'en vertu des
principes g6neraux aucune poursuite ne fut possible centre lui
pendant son principat.5

Mais lorsque, lors de la premiere renaissance des e*tudes de
droit romain, le texte d'Ulpien sortit de la poussiere et fut remis

1 Voyez le magistral expose de Theodor Mommsen sur cette question,
Romischer Staatsrecht, zweiter Band, II. Abtheilung, zweite Auflage, p. 728
et s. — traduction franchise par P. F. Girard.

2 Mommsen fait justement remarquer que le texte d'Ulpien est tire de
son commentaire ad legem Juliam et Papiam, c'est-a-dire, sur une matiere
essentiellement de droit prive, et que cela est confirme par ce qui y est dit de
V Augusta^ laquelle n'avait aucune part au gouvernement et pour laquelle il ne
pouvait s'agir que de privileges se rapportant au droit prive : « Augusta tamen
licet legibus soluta non est, principes tamen eadem illi privilegia tribuunt quae
ipsi habent. » Dans ce dernier cas il y a manifestement une dispense accor-
dee par 1'Empereur. D'apres une constitution de 1'empereur Alexandre il
semblerait meme que les princes sur certains points aient de parti pris
restreint leur exemption, Cod. Just. vi. 23, 3 : « Ex imperfecto testamento nee
imperatorem hereditatem vindicare saepe constitutum est. Licet enim lex
imperil solemnibus juris imperatorem solverit, nihil tamen tarn proprium
imperii est quam legibus vivere. » Mais la vraie raison de la decision donnee
la est qu'il s'agissait de la validite d'un acte accompli non par le Prince,
mais par un tiers. Voyez une constitution de Justinien (Cod. v. 16, 26) qui
declare absolument et immediatement valables les donations entre epoux
faites par I'Empereur a V Augusta ou par V Augusta a 1'Empereur.

3 Mommsen, op. tit. p. 728 : « Nicht mit Unrecht wurde darum spaterhin,
wenn ein vom Kaiser vollzogener Rechtsakt einer privatrechtlicher oder nur
poliseilichen Prohibitivvorschrift zuwiderlief, derselbe aufrecht erhalten als die
Dispensation derselben in sich tragend. »

4 Un passage de Suetone me parait montrer que, dans 1' Administration
de la justice qu'il rendait en personne, Auguste se croyait oblige de se
conformer aux lois, Divus Augustus, c. 33 : « Dixit autem jus non diligentia
modo summa sed et lenitate, siquidem manifesti parricidii reum, ne culleo
insueretur, quod nonnisi confessi adficiuntur hac poena, ita fertur interrogasse :
Certe patrem tuum non occidisti ? » Si, par sa seule volonte Auguste avait pu
ecarter la peine du culleus, il n'aurait pas eu besoin d'arreter 1'aveu sur les
levres du coupable.

5 Mommsen, op. cit. p. 729.

x] Princeps legibus solutus est 203

au jour avec les autres, on lui donna une porte"e nouvelle et
absolue. On lui fit dire que le monarque n'etait pas tenu des lois,
qu'il en e*tait affranchi d'une maniere ge"ne>ale. Les Glossateurs,^1
qui avaient fait un de"pouillement integral des textes compris /
dans la Compilation de Justinien, en trouvaient bien qui leur parais-
saient contraires a cette regie ; mais ils les e"cartaient par cet argu-
ment principal que le Prince, quoique non tenu.des lois, pouvait s'y
soumettre de sa libre volonte.1

On regardait done comme une regie incontest£ et absolue du
droit remain que le Prince e"tait affranchi de 1'observation des lois
et cette regie, comme tant d'autres appartenant au meme fonds, se
fit recevoir en France. Elle s'y fit recevoir dans le cours du XIII6
siecle, car, comme on le verra plus loin, elle est visee comme certaine
dans la Practica aurea libellorum de Petrus Jacobi qui fut terminee
en 13 1 1.2 Dans le dernier tiers du XIVe siecle elle est invoquee dans
un texte officiel, dans 1'ordonnance de Charles V de 1374, qui fixe
a quatorze ans la majorit£ des rois.3

1 Le texte principal qui semblait contraire etait une constitution des
empereurs Theodose et Valentinien (Cod. i. 14, 4) ainsi con9ue : « Digna vox
majestate regnantis legibus alligatum se principem profiteri : adeo de auctoritate
juris nostra pendet auctoritas. Et re vera majus imperio est submittere
legibus principatum. Et oraculo praesentis edicti quod nobis licere non patimur
indicamus. » C'est sur ce texte que la glose produit les diverses conciliations
qu'avait trouvees 1'ecole. L'une consistait a dire qu'il etait noble et digne de
declarer que Pempereur etait soumis aux lois, bien que cela fut faux ; glose, vis
Digna vox : « Sed quomodo est digna vox, cum sit falsum 1 ff. L. Princeps et
ff. de leg. Ill ex imperfecto et in authent. de considibus \fin(ali) cap. Ill, et I(nfra)
I. ex imperfecto ? Responde : digna est si dicat se velle quod non sit, Inst.
quibus modis injir(inantur testamentd] § finali et in praeallegata l(ege) ex
imperfecto.)) — Une autre opinion soutenait qu'en pareil cas il etait permis de
mentir ; la glose citee continue ainsi : « Alii dicunt quod hie permittitur
mentiri ut Inst. de act(ionibus') § alia, quod non placet. » Enfin on soutenait
que cela s'appliquait parce que c'etait en vertu de la loi meme que le Prince
etait affranchi des lois, par 1'effet de la lex regia de imperio ; glose sur la loi
Digna vox, vls de auctoritate : <t hoc est ratio primi dicti et quod dicit juris, s(ci-
licet) regis regiae quae est de imperio transferendo de populo in imperatorem. »

2 Savigny, Geschichte des romischen Rechts im Mittelalter, zweite Ausgabe,
sechster Band, § 12, p. 37.

3 (Dupuy), Traite" de la majorite" des rois et des r/gences du royaume, 1722,
t. i. p. 237 : « Super adoptione et administratione regni non reperiatur certa
aetas constituta vel praefinita a jure in Rege, qui solutus est legibus, cum jura
dicentia aetatem exigi in minoribus loquantur (de) jurium ditioni subjectis. »
Le texte repousse ici 1'application des regies du droit remain sur les mineurs
de vingt cinq ans parce que le roi legibus solutus est, et constate d' autre part
que ce droit n'a pas de regies speciales sur la majorite* des rois.

2O4 A. Esmein [x

D'autres pays avaient eu le bonheur d'echapper a cette in-
fluence. Telle 1'Angleterre. Des le XIIP siecle Bracton y pro-
clamait 1'empire absolu de la loi ; le roi lui-meme lui £tait soumis
car «c'e"tait la loi qui faisait le roi)).1 Au XVe siecle Fortescue
expose magistralement la meme these. II montre que 1'Angleterre
de son temps vit sous le regimen politician et non simplement sous
le regimen regale ; c'est une monarchie limited, tandis que la France
lui apparait comme une monarchie absolue, bien qu'en re"alite" elle
ne le fut pas encore a cette £poque. Fortescue e"tablit clairement
la souverainete" des lois anglaises. Non seulement il declare que
toutes les lois humaines sont sacre"es aussi bien que celles du
Deute"ronome,2 mais il rappelle qu'a son couronnement le roi
d'Angleterre promet par serment d'observer ses propres lois.3
Fortescue s'attaque d'ailleurs, non proprement a la regie Princeps
legibus solutus est, mais a la regie Quod principi placuit legis habet
vigorem. II reconnait encore au roi, du moins dans un de ses
ouvrages, le droit de dispenser des lois, lequel ne sera definitive-
men t aboli que par le Bill of Rights.^

1 Henrici de Bracton de legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae libri quinque,
Londini, 1640, L. i. c. 8, § 5, p. 5 : « Ipse tamen rex non debet esse sub homine
sed sub Deo et sub lege, quia lex facit regem. Attribuat igitur rex legi quod lex
ei attribuit, videlicet dominationem et potestatem ; non est enim rex ubi domi-
natur voluntas et non lex. Et quod sub lege esse debeat, cum sit Dei vicarius,
evidenter apparet ex similitudine Jesu Christi. » — Cf. Pollock and Maitland, The
History of English Law before the Time of Edward I, tome i. pp. 160-1.

2 Fortescue, De laudibus legum Angliae . . ., Londini, I775> c- 3) P- 3 :
« Scire igitur te volo quod non solum Deuter. leges sed et omnes leges humanae
sacrae sunt, quia lex his verbis definitur : lex est sanctio sancta, jubens honesta,
prohibens contraria. »

3 De laudibus legum Angliae, c. 34, p. 28 : « Audisti namque superius quod
inter leges civiles praecipua sententia est maxima sive regula ilia quae cavit quod
principi placuit legis habet vigorem : qualiter non sanciunt leges Angliae, dum
nedum regulariter sed politice rex ejusdem dominatur in populum suum, quo
ipse in coronatione sua ad legis suae observantiam astringitur sacramento. »

4 The Governance of England : otherwise called The Difference between an
Absohite and a Limited Monarchy, by Sir John Fortescue, a revised text edited
with introduction, notes, and appendices by Charles Plummer, M.A., Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1885, p. 83 : « There is, however, in the De Natura a pass-
age (c. 24 sq. Works, pp. 85-87) not found in his other works. Et a la note
3 M. Plummer ajoute : « As this passage is rather important as bearing on the
question of the dispensing power, I give Fortescue's exact words : « Ad libitum
« etiam tuum tu semper regis omnia criminalia et poenas cunctas moderaris vel
« remittis : omnimodo sic facere poteris sine subditorum iactura et offensa
« consuetudinum et statutorum regni tui. » On this dispensing power of the

x] Princeps legibus solutus est 205

En France, nous 1'avons dit, la maxima Princeps legibus solutus
est fut re^ue dans le cours du XIIIe siecle et elle se maintint dans
la suite ; elle faisait vraiment partie du droit public de 1'ancienne
monarchic. Elle y avait une grande porte"e et Ton en tirait deux
series de consequences.

Les premieres concernaient le droit prive. Si le roi accomplissait
un acte rentrant dans le droit prive", un acte qu'aurait pu faire un
particulier, s'il faisait son testament, une donation, un contrat, il
les faisait valablement sans tenir compte des regies e"tablies par les
lois ou par les coutumes, en violant ces regies et en les ecartant.
C'e"tait, somme toute, ce qu'avait permis jadis aux empereurs remains
la regie Princeps legibus solutus est. Bodin en cite des applications
topiques, notamment le testament de Philippe de Valois « portant
la clause derogatoire aux coutumes et loix civiles, comme n'e"tant
pas oblige" a icelles &.1 II cite aussi une donation du meme roi a sa
femme, de Tan 1330, qui e"tait ferme et valable, bien que les dona-
tions entre epoux fussent prohibe"es par la plupart des coutumes
de France. Les contrats de manage des rois fournissent de
notables exemples. Celui de Louis XIII et de «l'infante Anne»
portait : « que leurs dites Majesty's tres-chre'tiennes et catholiques
approuveront et ratifieront ladite capitulation et tout le contenu en
icelle, s'obligeant et promettant par leurs foy et paroles royales de
le garder et accomplir inviolablement et seront de"pechees toutes
lettres en la forme et maniere accoutum^e, avec les derogations a
quelconques loix, coutumes et dispositions qui sont au contraire.»

Mais la seconde se"rie de consequences etait autrement grave et
importante, visant le droit public. On tenait que lorsque le roi
intervenait en personne, pour decider lui-meme un acte d'adminis-
tration ou de juridiction, il pouvait le faire valablement sans tenir
compte des lois, que ses officiers, au contraire, e"taient tenus d'observer
et de respecter. Cela £tait surtout remarquable quand il s'agissait

Crown during the Middle Ages see S.CM. iii. 579, 582. The exercise of
this power was more frequent in the Middle Ages than we should consider
consistent with Constitutional Government, but it was often rendered necessary
by the unwise minuteness of many mediaeval statutes. »

1 Bodin, Les Six Livres de la R'epublique^ edit. Geneve, 1629, L. i. ch. 8,
P- 154-

206 A. Esmein [x

de 1'administration de la justice, que le roi, s'il le voulait, pouvait
rendre lui-meme a ses sujets. Cette intervention directe et per-
sonnelle du monarque justicier e"tait d'ailleurs conforme a la tradi-
tion ancienne ; et Bodin discute encore une opinion, d'apres laquelle
ce serait la la meilleure forme de 1'administration de la justice. II
note en meme temps que le roi jugeant en personne pouvait, en
toute libert^, ne juger que d'apres sa conscience : « Si le Prince
jugeoit, lui qui est la loi vive et par-dessus toutes les lois civiles,
accompagn£ de son Conseil, il feroit bonne et brieve justice, ayant
esgard au fond sans beaucoup s'attacher aux formalite's.»1 C'est
par la meme conception qu'il interprete un privilege obtenu par
les nobles polonais : « La noblesse de Pologne obtint de Louis roy
de Hongrie et de Pologne un privilege que les nobles ne pourroient
etre juge"s que par le roy quand il y va de la vie et de 1'honneur,
croyant qu'ils pouvoient aisement e"chapper le jugement du roy et
non pas des juges qui sont obligez aux loix.»2

II resultait de la que le Conseil du roi, quand il jugeait au
fond les causes des particuliers, pouvait toujours decider en
ne consultant que le sentiment de Pe"quite ; car le Conseil du
roi, c'£tait le roi lui-meme, celui-ci e"tant toujours cense" present
dans son Conseil ; c'etait lui que faisaient parler les arrets
du Conseil.3 Nos anciens auteurs insistaient sur ce pouvoir
general de juger en simple &iuite" ; 4 ils relevaient que, dans les

1 Les Six Livres de la Rtpublique, L. iv. ch. 6, p. 612.

2 Ibid. p. 623.

3 Histoire du Conseil du roy, par Guillard, avocat au Conseil du roy, Paris
1717, p. 68 : « Mais si les Cours ont cette liberte (d'evoquer les causes) dans
quelques occasions, celui qui la leur a donnee conserve toujours en sa per-
sonne la plenitude de puissance dont il peut user selon son bon plaisir et son
Conseil etant inseparable de sa majeste, dont il n'est que 1'organe, personne
ne peut dire que le Conseil ne puisse pas dans certaines occasions connoistre
des affaires des particuliers, les evoquer a soy, les decider diffinitivement, sans
les renvoyer a des juges ordinaires comme il les renvoie le plus souvent parce
qu'il s'occupe d'affaires plus importantes. »

4 Guillard, Histoire du Conseil du roy, p. 72 : « II faut convenir que
1'equite naturelle, qui est Fame des lois et des ordonnances, merite beaucoup
d'attention au Conseil du roy pour peu qu'il soit besoin d'entrer dans 1'inter-
pretation de quelques ordonnances, Edits ou Declarations ; et quand on decouvre
une iniquite evidente dans quelque jugement des Cours, le Conseil du Prince
est d'autant plus oblige de soutenir la partie opprimee que 1'on ne doit pas
souffrir que pour quelque formalite mal observee ou obmise les plaideurs de
mauvaise foi profitent du dol et des surprises qu'ils ont mis en usage pour
tromper leurs juges et leurs parties. »

x] Princeps legibus solutus est 207

serments du sacre le roi promettait de rendre la justice en
equitel

La il n'y avait encore que demi mal, bien que le respect du
droit technique soit le meilleur garant des interets le"gitimes ; mais
le principe entrainait, dans d'autres applications, de terribles
dangers. II en r£sultait en effet que le roi, statuant en personne,
pouvait infliger les peines les plus graves sans qu'elles fussent
prononce"es par aucune loi et sans forme de proces. Logiquement il
aurait pu le faire en siegeant comme juge.2 -Mais dans les audiences
prive'es que les rois tinrent pendant longtemps,3 ils ne tranchaient
que des causes civiles de peu d'importance. D'autre part le Con-
seil du roi cessa de bonne heure de revendiquer aucune competence
en matiere criminelle.

Mais les Lettres de cachet e*taient surement une application
du principe. Elles pouvaient contenir un ordre quelconque du
monarque. Mais en fait, employees comme moyen de repression,
elles ne contenaient jamais qu'un ordre d'emprisonnement sans
jugement dans une prison d'Etat, ou un ordre d'exil. II est vrai
que les rois anciennement ont parfois fait mettre a mort sans juge-
ment, par ordre verbal, des personnes qu'ils conside"raient comme

1 Guillard, op. tit. p. 72 : « Nos rois s'engagent meme a leur sacre par
un serment solennel a suivre en tout les regies de Ftquiti et de condamner
Finiquitt en toutes occasions. » C'etait Ik une interpretation forcee ; dans les
serments du sacre le mot tquiti (aequitas) etait pris dans un autre sens ; il
voulait dire que le roi statuerait avec .impartiality.) On se rappelle que, d'apres
Fortescue, le roi d'Angleterre jurait d'observer, non Tequite, mais les lois, ses
propres lois ; voyez ci-dessus, note 3, p. 204.

2 Fortescue, De laudibus, c. 35, p. 30, parait bien dire qu'il en etait ainsi :
(tNobilis tamen non sic exactionibus opprimitur. Sed si eorum aliquis
calumniatus fuerit de crimine, licet per inimicos suos, non semper coram judice
ordinario ipse convocari solet, sed quam saepe in Regis Camera et alibi in
private loco, quandoque vero solum per internuncios ipse inde alloqui visus
est et mox ut criminosum eum Principis conscientia, reatu aliorum, judicaverit,
. . . qualiter et mori audivisti numerum multo majorem hominum quam qui
legitimo processu juris convicti extiterunt. » Ce passage de Fortescue qui
parait reposer sur des bruits non fondes, ne serait point inexact s'il se rap-
portait aux lettres de cachet ; mais les lettres de cachet ne contenaient jamais
1'ordre de mettre a mort une personne quelconque. Ce passage ne peut pas
non plus se rapporter aux Jugements par Commissaires^ dans lesquels £tait
suivie une procedure extraordinaire mais complete.

3 L'ordonnance de Blois de 1579 contient encore une disposition sur cette
administration de la justice intime et familiere.

208 A. Rsmein [x

coupables.1 Nos anciens auteurs appelaient cela proceder par des
votes defait ; mais ils estimaient que le monarque ne devait pro-
ceder que par des votes de droit, c'est-a-dire par les procedures
re"gulieres.2

Ill

II ne faudrait pas croire cependant que la maxime Princeps
legibus solutus est n'ait pas rencontre" en France de contra-
dicteurs.

Des le premier tiers du XIVe siecle, da^ns sa Practica aurea
libellorum? Petrus Jacobi s'efforce d'en e"carter ^ 1'application. II
ne conteste point directement que le roi soit exempt des lois ; il
Tadmet au contraire en droit. Mais il tient qu'il est digne d'un
monarque, que c'est meme son devoir de vouloir ce que veulent les
lois et ne pas e"couter les flatteurs, les courtisans qui tachent de
lui inspirer une volonte" diffe"rente.4 Cette influence neTaste des
courtisans reviendra dans des textes poste"rieurs.

Mais c'est la une note isol^e et timide. II faut attendre la

1 II semble que Louis XI ait agi assez souvent ainsi a 1'egard de petites
gens. La Roche-Flavin, Treize Livres des Parlements de France, Bourdeaux,
1617, L. xiii. ch. 13, N° 5 : « Le roi Louis XI sur la fin de ses jours trouva
sa conscience grandement oppressee du mepris de la justice et, entre autres,
d'avoir pousse jusqu'a 1'exces le pouvoir absolu allant faire prendre par le
Prevost les prisonniers de la Conciergerie du Palais qui les faisoit noyer a
1'endroit de la Grange aux Merciers, » Dans le passage de Fortescue (De
laudibus, c. 35) cite p. 207 n. 2, il est fait allusion aux memes faits qui, sans
que le nom de Louis XI soit prononce, sont rapportes comme une pratique
ordinaire des monarques fran^ais : « In sacco positus absque figura judicii per
Propositi marischallorum ministros noctanter in flumine projectus submergitur. »
La source a laquelle ont puise Fortescue et La Roche-Flavin doit etre la meme.
Ce mode d'execution etait surement familier au xve siecle ; qu'on songe aux
vers de Villon :

Semblablement ou est la royne
Qui commanda que Buridan
Fut jete en un sac en Seine ?

2 La Roche-Flavin, Treize Livres des Parlements de France, L. xiii. ch. 1 2.

3 Edition Venetiis, 1502.

4 Practica aurea libellorum rubrica, xxv. de condictione ex lege, Institution,
de actione § quadrupli, N° 19 :« Princeps debet sibi cavere ne alias laedat sub
coloribus quaesitis et per curiales suos adinventis. Quia, licet princeps sit
solutus legibus, ut ff. de leg. /. Princeps, tamen dignum est sibi profited secundum
leges vivere velle, ut C. de leg. /. digna vox, et idem dicitur de Papa, 1 2, qti.
2, c. non liceat papae. »

x] Princeps legibus solutus est 209

seconde moitie du XVF siecle pour trouver une repudiation e"riergique /
de la maxime, une contestation formulae en vertu de principes bien
arret£s. Elle e"mane des £crivains qui, dans la pe"riode des guerres
de religion, s'efforcerent de deVelopper en France les principes de
liberty politique. Elle est particulierement nette dans les Vindiciae
contra tyrannos et dans le Dejure magistratuum in subditos et officio
subditorum erga magistratus.1 L'auteur, pour respecter la grande
autorite du droit remain, conserve pourtant a la maxime la premiere
se"rie d'effets qu'on lui attribuait, celle qui se rapportait aux regies
du droit priv£ dont le Prince e"tait exempt, mais il l'e"carte, avec
preuves a 1'appui, en ce qui concerne le droit public et le gouverne-
ment de 1'Etat. II affirme aussi en termes saisissants que le roi
est tenu par le droit naturel et par le droit divin ; mais cela alors
personne ne le contestait. L'auteur des Vindiciae contra tyrannos
parait contester meme que le roi soit exempt des regies du
droit prive.2 II s'eleve spe"cialement centre l'id£e que le roi peut
juger sans respecter les lois et les formes de la justice,3 et qu'il ait
sur ses sujets le droit de vie et de mort.4

1 Edition Ursellis apud Cornelium Sutorium, 1 600, a la suite des Vindiciae
contra tyrannos, p. 2 5 3, Repetitio quaest. vi. : « Quod excipere solent Regem legibus
non astringi in genere nee potest nee debet accipi, ut dicunt regum assentatores
regnorumque eversores. Nam ut taceam tot omnium fere nationum exempla,
quae supra allata sunt, quot sunt graves veterum juris consultorum sententiae
e jure naturae excerptae ? Cujusmodi sunt : eos qui leges ferunt legibus quoque
obtemperare. Et quod quisque juris in alium statuit erit, ipse ut eodem jure
utatur. Et nihil imperio magis conducere quam ut rex legibus utatur ;
dignam denique vocem esse Principem se legibus subditum profiteri. Itaque
quod alibi a juris consultis dici videtur Principem esse supra leges aut Principem
legibus esse solutum nonnisi de legibus civilibus deque particular! privatorum
jure est intelligendum, verbi gratia de testamentis, de detractione Trebellianae
vel Falcidianae : non autem de jure publico et ad statum, ut dici solet, pertinente,
multoque minus de jure natural! et divino, cui cum omnes singuli homines
subiciantur, quatenus homines nati sunt, omnino efficitur aut reges homines
non esse aut illos hoc jure teneri. »

2 En effet (quaest. iii. p. 91) il montre que des Princes, pour pouvoir
faire ce que la loi defendait, ont change celle-ci a 1'egard de tous : « Valenti-
nianus, imperator bonus alioquin, quia duas uxores simul habere voluit, singulis
lege permisit. Cambyses, Cyri films, nuptias cum germana sorore, quia
sororem appetebat, licitas esse voluit. Chabades, Persarum rex, adulteriorum
poenam sustulit. »

3 Vindiciae, quaest. iii. p. 89 : « An autem rex, quia juri dicendo praeest,
ex arbitrio jus dicet ? Rexne, inquam, a lege an lex a rege pendebit ? »

4 Vindiciae, quaest. iii. p. 98 : « Adulatorum aulicorum axioma percelebre
est Principes in subditos earn quam domini olim in servos potestatem vitae,

2io A. Esmein [x

Ce ne sont pas seulement au XVP siecle des £crivains poli-
tiques, dont les ouvrages d'ailleurs sont profonde'ment impre'gnes
de droit technique, qui d£clarent le roi soumis aux lois, ce sont
aussi de purs juristes. En voici un, qui n'est pas a proprement
parler un homme supe"rieur, mais qui a joue" un role notable
de son temps, e"ditant ou re"editant de vieux textes qu'il com-
mente, tels que la Somme rural de Boutillier, composant des
livres dont les titres sont presque remains mais qui se rapportent
au droit frangais. C'est Charondas le Caron, dont les deux
principaux ouvrages sont Les Reponses du droit frangais et les
Pandectes du droit fran$ais. C'est dans ce dernier £crit qu'il a traite"
notre question.1 II 1'aborde avec une grande nettete", car il se
demande si les rois sont exempts des lois qui concernent le droit
public et le gouvernement de l'£tat.2 II admet que les rois peuvent
facilement se dispenser d'observer les dispositions de droit prive" et
sont exempts des peines portees par les lois.3 Ce n'est pas qu'il passe
sous silence le texte d'Ulpien ; il en exagere meme la ported.4
Mais il a pour soutenir sa these des raisons meilleures que des

inquam, et necis habere. Adeo vero istis nugis principibus imposuerunt ut
plerique ea saevitia non utantur non minus tamen sibi licere putent sed de suo
jure quodammodo cedere videantur. Dicimus vero nos contra Principem
tanquam legis ministrum et executorem in eos tantum quos lex jusserit gladium
stringere posse. Sin fecerit^ non regem amplius sed tyrannum, non judicem
sed praedonem, non legis custodem sed violatorem esse.»

1 Pandectes ou Digested du droit fran^ais, par Charondas le Caron, docteur
es droits, conseiller du roy et son lieutenant general au bailliage et Comte de
Clermont en Beauvoisis, Lyon, 1 5 96, ch. iii. Des loix et ordonnances et quelles
doivent estre et si le souverain est exempt d*icelles, p. 29 sq.

2 Pandectes du droit frangais, loc. cit. p. 4 1 : « On demande s'il est sub-
ject aux loix establies pour 1'estat public, honnestes et politiques. »

3 Pandectes^ loc. cit. p. 43 : « Je n'ignore qu'il y ait des Edits et Ordon-
nances qui ne concernent 1'estat public dont les roys se peuvent facilement
dispenser, d'autant que la transgression n'est de grande consequence et ne
prejudicie a Putilite commune ; aussi les rois sont exempts des peines portees
par les loix, parce que leurs personnes ne sont subjectes a aucuns juges, ne
recognoissans que Dieu pour souverain et seul juge de leurs actions. »

4 Pandectes^ loc. cit. p. 42: «Je sgay bien que le jurisconsulte Ulpian
dit que le Prince est exempt et absous des loix, ce qu'aucuns ont voulu res-
traindre aux loix penales, c'est a dire a celles qui sont ordonnees contre ceux
qui delinquent, puisque le Prince n'y est subject : mais il semble que les
Romains ont entendu plus largement ceste exemption et absolution des loix,
comme declare Dion au livre cinquante-troisiesme de son histoire, parlant de
1'empereur Auguste auquel fut donnee ceste prerogative, et Pinterprete n'estre
tenu a aucune necessite de loy, ains estre exempt de tout droit escrit. »

x] Princeps legibus solutus est 211

textes, des plus belles et des plus fortes, et il expose courageusement
son opinion, malgre les discours des courtisans, dont la mention
revient constamment en cette matiere.1 Pour Charondas la loi est
la regie normale de tous les etres raisonnables, et il rappelle que le
roi doit gouverner par raison ; 2 d'autres disaient qu'il devait gou-
verner conforme'ment a la loi naturelle. Devangant sur ce point
Montesquieu, il dit, dans le langage de son temps, que Dieu m£me a
des lois.3 Comme le disaient les Monarchomaques^ ses contemporains,
en parlant surtout des lois fondamentales, il affirme que la loi est une
convention entre le Prince et ses sujets, qui lie les deux parties.
Comme Bracton, il proclame que le Prince doit respecter la loi,
parce qu'il ne regne que par elle.4 II considere d'ailleurs que le
monarque est un officier public et remplit une charge,5 et il doit
a ses sujets 1'exemple ne"cessaire du respect des lois.

Dans un pareil milieu I'autorite' de la regie Princeps legibus
solutus est devait decroitre progressivement. On tendait a y voir

1 Pandectes, loc. cit. p. 4 1 : « La question qui se presente est tres espi-
neuse et ne se peut qu'avec difficulte traicter en une monarchic a cause des
flaneurs courtisans qui tirent souvent en mauvaise part ce qu'on allegue de
la bonte et moderation du Prince. Toutesfoys j'en diray mon opinion con-
formement a ce que nos Roys, vrais et excellens princes, ont tousjours observe.))
P. 42 : « Si quelques courtisans veulent dire qu'il ne faut donner frein ni bride
au souverain, je leur respondray que la Loy n'est une bride forcee, ains un
doux lien qui le retient en son devoir et rend plus fort son estat. »

2 Pandectes, loc. cit. p. 41 : « Mais le Prince, qui est homme et commande
aux hommes libres qui sont participans d'une mesme nature et sgavent que
c'est de gouverner par raison, ne se peut plus seurement maintenir avec eux
que par commun lien et accord de la loy. »

3 Pandectes, loc. cit. p. 4 1 : « S'il faut plus avant philosopher, il semble
combien que Dieu par sa puissance souveraine et absolue puisse remuer tout
1'ordre de 1'Univers et n'y soit aucunement astraint, toutesfoys que pour le
conserver il s'y rende aucunement subject, c'est a dire qu'il y accommode
sa volonte et puissance qu'on appelle ordinaire.*

4 Pandectes, loc. cit. p. 4 1 : « La loy qui est (a bien dire en peu de paroles)
une tnutuelle convention entre le souverain et le peuple de bien commander
et bien obeir, pourquoy done le souverain n'y sera subject ? Tous les roys,
empereurs et monarques qui ont merite le tiltre de bons princes, ont tousjours
diet que le Prince devoit obeir aux loix, d'autant qu'il regnoit par Pauctorite
d'icelles. 1>

5 Pandectes, loc. cit. p. 42 : « Car si le Prince doit obeyir a la loi divine
et naturelle, il peut apprendre par icelle qu'il faut que par son exemple il incite
ses subjects a bien vivre, ce qu'il ne peut faire s'il ne se rend subject aux loix
de son royaume, parce que la personne publique ne doit seulement bien vivre
en son particulier, ains aussi selon le droit que requiert sa charge. »

212 A. Esmein [x

une ressource, fondle en droit, mais qui normalement restait dor-
mante par la volont£ meme du monarque, celui-ci preTe"rant le
regne des lois.1 Nos anciens auteurs signalaient en particulier et
avec raison sa jurisprudence regue en France, qui rendait le roi
justiciable de ses propres cours, et permettaient a ses sujets d'agir
centre lui, pour faire valoir le droit resultant de la propri£t£ ou des
contrats. II est vrai qu'alors le procureur du roi figurait seul en
nom au proces ; c'£tait centre lui que le jugement £tait rendu, mais
c'etait le roi qui en subissait les consequences. Tout cela d'ailleurs
n'empechait point que la pratique des lettres de cachet n'entrat
dans son plein ; mais elle prenait 1'aspect d'une institution par-
ticuliere, ayant sa valeur propre.

Dans la seconde moitie" du XVIP siecle, les grands esprits qui
construisaient la the"orie de la monarchic absolue, alors re~alise"e,
s'efforcaient de re"duire, autant qu'il e"tait possible, la porte"e de la
maxime ; ils en avaient vraiment honte. Ecoutons Bossuet, dans
sa Politique tiree des propres paroles de V&criture Sainte : « Les rois
ne sont pas pour cela affranchis des lois. C'est ce que les Princes
ont peine a entendre. . . . De la cette belle loi d'un empereur
romain : c'est une parole digne de la Majeste" du Prince que de se
reconnaitre soumis aux lois. » 2 Et, continuant, voici en quels
termes il expose sa th£orie : « Les rois sont done soumis comme les
autres a l'equit£ des lois, et parce qu'ils doivent etre justes et parce
qu'ils doivent aux sujets 1'exemple de garder la justice ; mais ils ne
sont pas soumis aux peines des lois, ou, comme parle la the"ologie,
ils sont soumis aux lois, non quant a la puissance coactive, mais
quant a la puissance directive. » Dans la proposition pre"ce"dente,
intituled qu'il riy a point de puissance coactive contre le Prince, il
avait e"crit : « On entend par force coactive une puissance pour con-
traindre a executer ce qui est ordonne" le"galement. Au Prince
seul appartient le commandement le"gitime, a lui seul appartient
la force coactive. » Cela revenait a dire que moralement et meme
juridiquement le Prince e"tait tenu de se conformer aux lois,
mais qu'il pouvait s'en ^carter impunement, n'£tant pas soumis aux
peines des lois, et aucune sanction n'e"tant possible contre lui.

1 La Roche-Flavin, Treize Livres des Parlements, L. xiii. ch. 13, N° 6:
« Chose digne de la majeste d'un Prince que nos rois, a qui Dieu a donne
puissance absolue, aient d'ancienne institution voulu reduire leurs volontes k
la civilite des lois. »

2 Livre iv. article i, quatrieme proposition.

x] Princeps legibus solutus est 213

La doctrine du grand jurisconsulte Domat, dans son Droit
public, est a peu pres la meme : « On peut ajouter pour dernier
devoir du souverain et qui renferme aussi tous les autres, qu'encore
que sa puissance semble le mettre au-dessus des lois, personne
n'ayant droit de lui faire rendre compte de sa conduite, il doit
observer celles qui peuvent le regarder et y est oblige, non seulement
pour donner 1'exemple aux sujets et leur rendre leur devoir aimable,
mais encore parce qu'il n'est pas dispense du sien par cette puissance
de souverain et qu'au contraire ce rang 1'oblige meme a preT£rer a
ses interets particuliers le bien commun de TEtat et qu'il est de sa
gloire de regarder comme le sien propre.))1

Cependant jusqu'a la fin de Pancien regime la regie resta dans
le droit public, comme subsisterent les lettres de cachet, qui
ne furent abolies que par PAssemblee Constituante. Les esprits
liberaux qui restaient attache's aux principes traditionnels de
1'ancienne monarchic n'osaient pas repudier ce droit anormal du
roi. Voici ce qu'on lit encore dans un livre publi£ quelques annees
avant la Revolution et qui cut plusieurs editions : « De quelque
utilite que soient les formes legales pour intimider le coupable
par la certitude de la peine que la loi prononce et pour tranquilliser
Pinnocence centre les efforts de la calomnie, pour mettre le monarque
a 1'abri des surprises, elles lui laissent cependant 1'administration
libre, force"es de ceder elles-memes a 1'interet public dont le monarque
est le seul juge. » 2 L'auteur, qui est un esprit eclair^ cependant,
considere cette faculte laisse"e au roi comme une loi fondamentale
de 1'Etat, et il y rattache les lettres de cachet, qu'il approuve dans
leurs principales applications. Moreau, dans son livre intitule
Les Devoirs du Prince ramenes a un seul principe ou Discours sur la
justice dedie au roi? qui avait £t£ compost pour 1'education de
Louis XVI et de ses freres, soutient une these semblable. Voici
comment il defend les lettres de cachet contenant un ordre d'em-
prisonnement ; il est vrai que suivant lui ce doit etre la simplement
une mesure provisoire et le prisonnier doit etre dans un court delai
renvoy£ devant ses juges naturels : « Les formes qui accompagnent
essentiellement la marche de celle-ci (la justice) sont lentes et

1 Domat, Droit public, L. i. tit. 2, sect. 3, N° 14.

2 Les Vrais Principes du gouvernement fran$ais, dhnontre's par la raison et
par les faits, par un Frangois, Geneve 1782, p. 66.

3 A Versailles de I'imprimerie du roi, Depart, des aff. etr. 1775, p. 160.

214 ^- Esmein [x

tardives. Elles furent invente"es pour etre le rempart de 1'inno-
cence. Doit-on souffrir qu'elles facilitent 1'evasion du crime et lui
servant en quelque fagon de barriere ? Non. Les ordres rapides de
1'administration dans ce moment vont au secours de la juridiction
elle-meme. Le coupable que de"signe la voix publique est alors
arrete" par le commandement du Prince. Ce n'est point un jugement
qu'il prononce. C'est une precaution par laquelle il empeche que
ce jugement soit un jour inutile. Mais cette meme autorite" qui
a 6t£ au malfaiteur le pouvoir de fuir, le doit livrer aussitot a la
justice, dont elle n'a fait que preVenir et faciliter les demarches. »

Mais la philosophic du XVIII6 siecle, reprenant avec une force
nouvelle la doctrine exposed par les Monarchomaques du XVIe siecle,
proclamait, comme une regie essentielle de 1'Etat, 1'empire absolu
et inevitable de la loi. Je ne citerai qu'un passage de Voltaire, qui
dans un de ses Dialogues fait ainsi parler un Anglais : « Ce que je
trouve de plus juste c'est liberte et proprUte. . . . Je veux que
chacun ait sa prerogative. Je ne connais de lois que celles qui me
protegent, et je trouve notre gouvernement le meilleur de la terre
parce que chacun y sait ce qu'il a, ce qu'il doit et ce qu'il peut. Tout
est soumis a la loi, a commencer par la royaut£ et par la religion. »*
C'e"tait une cause gagne"e devant 1'opinion publique, et la Constitu-
tion frangaise de 1791 enregistrait la regie nouvelle dans ces termes,
d'une precision et d'une elevation admirables : « II n'y a point en
France d'autorite" superieure a celle de la loi. Le roi ne regne que par
elle, et ce n'est qu'au nom de la loi qu'il peut exiger l'obeissance.»2

A. ESMEIN.

1 DA, B, C ou Dialogues entre A, B, C, traduit de 1'anglais de M. Huet,
troisieme dialogue.

2 Constitution du 3 septembre 1791, tit. ii. ch. 2, sect, i, art. 3.

TWO ANCIENT BROCARDS

THE object of this paper is to explain the import and trace the
history, so far as possible, of two ancient brocards familiar to
modern lawyers and in daily use in British Courts. The term
brocard (low Latin brocarda, also brocardica and other forms 1)
is mediaeval. Calvin, in his Lexicon, says contemptuously :
Vocabulum est barbarum in nostro eleganti Jure Civili ; relin-
quendum igittir barbaris. It means a legal maxim or axiom or
rule — a regula juris. Brocards are rather apt to be dangerous
weapons in the armoury of lawyers. They are apt to represent
conclusions based on slender premisses, or generalizations from an
inadequate number of particulars, the exceptions to the rule being
often more or less disregarded or left out of view in formulating
the rule. Sometimes they have acted as Will-o'-the-wisps to
lead the Courts astray in their decisions. In his preface to the
second edition of Barbosa's Axiomata, J. O. Tabor discusses
the utility of collections of so-called loci communes and mentions
several noted jurisconsults (including Duarenus and Cujacius) who
wholly discountenanced them. Plaustra ista brocardicorum^ said
one old jurist, obscurare sacrosanctam veritatem et cognoscendi
religionem?

Nevertheless brocards and maxims have a certain utility in
concentrating ideas, stimulating the memory, and otherwise, and
they have been much employed both by the classical jurists of
Rome and the great lawyers of the Middle Ages.

1 See Calvin, Lexicon jurid. and Du Cange, s.v.

2 Herman Lather, de Cens. 1618, lib. 2, c. 3, Num. 9, § 60 ; see Cujac.
Epist. consult, praefat.

2-15

216 H. Goudy [xi

I. ACTIO PERSONALIS MORITUR CUM PERSONA

(a) Its Import. — General Observations on the Meaning of
Personal Action in English Law.

Though this is one of the most familiar maxims of English
Law, the veil of obscurity covers not only its origin but its true
import and significance. It is certainly an ancient maxim ; the
late Lord Justice Bowen claimed for it (though erroneously, I
think) an antiquity as great as that of the English Common Law
itself.1 It was not taken from the Roman Law nor from any
mediaeval civilian ; indeed to a Roman lawyer or to a civilian it
would have sounded nonsensical ; yet it has, as we shall see, an
indirect connexion with the Roman Law. Many cases in our
English Courts have been decided on the strength of it, and it has
been the source of not a little injustice. Though sometimes a
lance has been raised on its behalf, it has, in my opinion, been
rightly denounced by one of our best English lawyers as ' a
barbarous rule.' 2

We may translate the maxim thus — ' a personal right of action
comes to an end by the death of either of the parties.' Now, first,
we must see what is meant here by personal action. The familiar
division of Roman Law into actions in rem and in personam — the
former being vindications of property and real rights, the latter
arising out of obligations — was never received into English Law.
On the other hand, old English Common Law divided actions into
real and personal in a special and peculiar sense : the former, the
real actions, being those by which rights to heritable property
(realty) were enforced ; the latter, the personal actions, being those
by which rights to moveable chattels, choses in action, etc., were
enforced.3 This division, old apparently as the Conquest, was due
to the Feudal Law, which, unlike the Roman, made a fundamental
distinction between rights in lands and other immoveables and

1 Phillips v. Homfray, 1883, L.R. 24 Ch. Div. 439 : In Finlay v. Chirney^
1887, 20 Q.B. Div. p. 494, Bowen and Fry, L.JJ., say of the maxim that its
origin is ' obscure and post-classical.'

2 Pollock, Torts, p. 64.

8 Mixed actions (partly real and partly personal) need not be referred to.
The term realis actio is purely mediaeval. The term personalis actio, in the
sense of actio in personam^ appears occasionally in the Digest (e.g. Dig. x. 4,
3 § 3)» but it may be due to interpolation of the compilers.

xi] Two Ancient Brocards 217

rights in moveable or personal property. Real actions, however,
in the above sense gradually became obsolete and were ultimately
abolished by statute, their effects being obtained indirectly by
personal actions. There is no such thing as rei vindicatio in
modern English Law.

Personal actions in English Law are, in the words of Blackstone,
' Such whereby a man claims a debt or personal duty or damages
in lieu thereof; and likewise whereby a man claims a satisfaction
in damages for some injury done to his person or property. The
former are said to be founded on contracts, the latter upon torts or
wrongs.' 1 Now it is in this wide sense that actio personalis in our
brocard should be prima facie understood, but, as we shall see, it
was never, from the time it was first formulated, extended so far
in practice. Had the maxim been taken literally the result would
have been that every right of action, whether arising out of contract
or of tort or other obligation, would have come to an end by the
death of either party. A covenant, for instance, would have ceased
to be actionable by the death of either covenantor or covenantee or
a contract of bailment by the death of bailor or bailee. But an
examination of the Reports from early times shows that the
Common Law never went so far. Apart from torts, the utmost
that can be said is that the old English Law, for a brief period,
refused to recognize the transmission passively of actions on
contract, and even this can only be admitted subject to exceptions,
e.g. actions on covenant under seal. But it clearly ceased to be
the rule once a definite theory of contract was developed and the
action of assumpsit established. When this stage was reached we
find that, apart from one or two special contractual claims such as
the old actions of Debt and Account,2 and (later) the action of
breach of promise of marriage, actions on contract survived ab
utraque parte, and non-transmissibility on death became restricted
in practice to actions based on tort or on facts analogous to tort.
In other words, non-transmissibility applied as a rule only to
actions for reparation of damages for injuries and penalties for
wrongful acts. As is said in Dyer's Reports, * actio personalis

1 Bl. Com. iii. p. 117.

2 I.e. as regards passive liability of executors. The action of account
seems not to have transmitted against executors. See Bacon, Abridgment,
ii. p. 444; Holdsworth, Hist, of English Law, iii. p. 455.

2i8 H. Goiidy [xi

quae oritur ex contfactu dieth not, yet quae oritur ex delicto
moritur cum persona, as all trespasses.'1 This suggests that our
maxim was originally deduced from a misunderstanding of the
Roman Law and, before going further, it may be useful to state
here very briefly what the rules of that Law were on transmissibility
of actions on death.

(b) Transmissibility of Actions on Death by Roman Law.

As is well known, a material difference existed from a pretty
early period in Roman Law between contracts on the one hand
and delicts on the other as regards transmission of actions to and
against the heirs of the parties. In contracts the right of action
almost invariably transmitted both to the heirs of the creditor and
against the heirs of the debtor ; in delicts transmission depended
largely upon whether the action was of a penal nature or not. If
it were poenalis the general rule was that it transmitted to the heirs
of the injured party (i.e. actively) but not against the heirs of the
wrongdoer (i.e. passively). The maxim was actio poenalis transit
heredibus sed non transit in heredes? The actio fur ti, for example,
could be brought by the heirs of the injured party against the thief
but not by the injured party against the heirs of the thief. Where,
on the other hand, a delictal action was not strictly penal — e.g. the
actio doli — it transmitted both actively and passively, except that
as a rule passive transmission was only allowed so far as the
deceased's heir had received benefit from the wrong.3

But to the rule actio poenalis transit heredi sed non in heredem
there were several well-known exceptions of much importance. To
the first part of the maxim — viz. transit heredi — I remind you of
the two following : —

1st. — Injury to a freeman which caused his death gave no right
of action to his heirs for damages either in factum under the lex
Aquilia or otherwise. The reason for this usually given by the
jurists was that no money-value can be put on the life of a free-
man : liberum corpus nullam recipit aestimationem.^ To this harsh
rule the Roman Law steadily adhered down to Justinian ; the
jurists were apparently obsessed by the idea that the person of a

1 Dyer's Rep. 271, 143..

2 Dig. xlvii. i, i ; Gaius, Com. iv. 112.

3 On the extent of this exception the Roman texts are not altogether
consistent. 4 Dig. ix. 3, 3 ; ix. 3, i § 5 ; cf. Dig. ix. 2, 13 pr.

xi] Two Ancient Brocards 219

freeman had no money-value and that there could be no patri-
monial loss to a man's family where the injury to himself could
not be estimated. This has also always been the rule of English
Common Law, based on our brocard, though, as we shall see in a
moment, it has been considerably modified by modern statutes.

2nd Exception. — Injury to a man's person or reputation done
wilfully, as by assault, slander, etc., gave no right of action to his
heirs. In short, the actio injuriarum and a few similar actions did
not transmit at all. The principal reason given by the jurists for
this exception was that the object of such actions was more one
of revenge than of reparation — far from a satisfactory reason once
pecuniary compensation had taken the place of self-revenge. It
and the other actively intransmissible actions of a similar character
in the classical law were called actions vindictam spirantesl

On the other hand, to the second part of the maxim — viz. non
transit in heredem — an important exception occurred in penal
actions for injuries to property ', in which it could be shown that the
estate of the deceased tort-feasor had received benefit from the
delict committed. The injured party was allowed in such case
(just as I have said in the case of non-penal actions based on
delict) to sue the heirs of the tort-feasor in quantum lucrati sunt?
The actio legis Aquiliae is a well-known example.2

Finally — all actions ex delicto, whether penal or not, transmitted
both to and against heirs, if the suit had already begun in the life-
time of the principal parties. This was on the theory of litis con-
testation having created a judicial contract between the parties :
Litis contestatione poenales actiones transmit tuntur ab utraque
parte?

Such, then, broadly stated, were the rules of the Roman Law
as regards transmissibility of actions ex delicto.

The English Common Law from early times proceeded to a
large extent on different lines from these doctrines of the Roman
jurists. I have already broadly indicated how far it held actions
to enforce simple contracts to be extinguished by death of either
party ; and for the moment I leave contracts aside. Apart from

1 E.g. ' querela inofficiosi testament!.3 See Gaius iv. 112; Dig. iii. 6, 4.

2 Dig.\. 17, 38; ix. 23 §8.

3 Dig. xxvii. 7, 8 § i.

22o H. Goudy [xi

contracts, English Common Law has, as a rule, treated death of
either party as sufficient to bar all action on tort both by and
against executors. And whether the plaintiff was seeking damages
by way of penalty or as simple reparation or otherwise, and
whether the action had been already begun during the lifetime of
the principal parties or not, made no difference. To this latter
point I will recur in a moment. The only Common Law excep-
tion to the rule was that property positively appropriated by a
deceased tort-feasor to his benefit, or its value, could be recovered
from his executors by an action which was substantially one for
recovery of property. In other words, passive liability of executors
was recognized where the deceased's estate had been enriched by
the wrong.1 This Common-Law bar to right of action on tort by
death of either party often proved very inequitable, especially in
cases of damage to property, and certain remedies were gradually,
though tardily, supplied by statute. The first remedial step was
indeed taken pretty early, viz. by 4 Edward III cap. 7, which
enacted that for trespass done to a man's goods and chattels
during his lifetime his executors might sue. This statute, though
liberally construed, did not go far, being limited to active trans-
missibility and to personal property. But nearly five centuries
had to elapse before a wider step in the same direction was taken,
viz. by 3 and 4 William IV cap. 42. This Act, in the first place,
made actions for wrongful damage to real property transmissible
to personal representatives of the injured party, just as the Act of
Edward had done for personal property, but subject to the con-
dition that the damage had been done within six months prior to
the death and that the action was begun within twelve months
after the death. In the second place it sanctioned passive trans-
missibility by providing that the personal representatives of one
who had caused wrongful damage to property, whether real or
personal, of another should be liable by action of trespass or tres-
pass on the case to the extent of his assets, but subject always to
similar limitations as to time of injury and of raising action.

The practical effect of these statutes of Edward and William
was to put the English Law (as regards transmission on death of
actions for damage to property) on pretty nearly the 'same footing

1 See Phillips v. Homfray, supra, per Bowen, LJ.; Holdsworth, Hist.
E. L. iii. 455.

XI]

Two Ancient Brocards

221

as the Roman Law on the subject, apart from the just-mentioned
limitations of time.1 One great difference was left unaltered, viz.
the effect of action begun ante mortem. While by Roman Law, as
we have seen, litis contestation ensured transmissibility of the
action to the heirs in every case, English Common Law gave no
effect to it. If, after an action on tort has been competently
brought, one of the parties dies, the action abates by English Law
in accordance with our brocard, and does not pass to or against
his personal representatives. Despite some slight attenuations
introduced into modern practice,2 the rule remains as stated.
This is strongly illustrated by the case of Bowker v. Evans, in
1885, where an action on tort having been referred by the judge
to arbitration, in accordance with previous agreement of parties,
and one of the parties having died while the arbitration was pend-
ing, his executor was not allowed to take his place, although it
had been expressly stipulated by the parties that the award should
take effect though either party died before it was issued.3 It
seems impossible to justify this in equity or good sense.4

The statutes of Edward and William just mentioned relate, it
will be noticed, solely to injuries to property.5 For injuries to
person, on the other hand, little change was made by legislation.
One or two recent statutes, however, have caused English Law in
one respect to make a step in advance of the Roman, viz. by
allowing actions of damages to be brought under certain circum-
stances by the personal representatives of persons killed by fault
(actual or constructive) of others. This was first done in 1846 by
the Fatal Accidents Act (commonly called, after its author, Lord

1 Equity in this matter follows the law. See Peek v. Gurney, 1873, 6
H.L. App. 393.

2 See Twy cross v. Grant, 1878, 4 C.P.D. 40. But see note 4 infra.

3 15 Q.B.D. 565. The agreement for reference to arbitration was held
to be mere matter of procedure, which could not affect the rights of parties
under the action.

4 Oddly enough, in a marginal note to some MSS. of Bracton, fol. U4b
(which cannot be well attributed to B. himself), it is said : ' Notandum quod
poenalis actio non datur in heredes nee transit in eos nisi lis fuerit contestata
cum defuncto.' See Maitland, Bracton and Azo (Selden Series), p. 213.

5 It should be noticed that while the Roman Law only allowed damages
to be claimed from heredes, so far as they were lucrati by the wrongful act,
English Law under 3 and 4 Wm. IV allows action for injury to property, if
timeously brought, to have effect so far as the deceased left assets. This is
in accordance with Canon Law and mediaeval practice. See infra^ p. 228 n. i.

222 H. Goudy [xi

Campbell's Act),1 which enabled children and certain other near
relatives of persons killed to recover through the executors (under
certain conditions as to time of raising action, etc.) damages
for pecuniary loss thereby sustained by them. Subsequently the
Employers Liability Act enabled executors of certain employees
to sue where death was caused by injuries specified in the Act.2
This is a more enlightened view than is contained in the Roman
maxim liberum corpus nullam recipit aestimationem.

But these several statutory reforms, important though they
are, do not after all go very far. The Common Law still remains
in force as regards ordinary actions on tort, and so far actio personalia
moritur cum persona retains its force as a binding maxim.

(a7) Traces of Origin of Brocard.

I shall now endeavour to trace the origin of our brocard. We
have seen that it is not Roman ; neither is it traceable to any of the
post-Justinian civilians or to the Corpus Juris Canonici. We must,
I think, turn in the first place to Bracton. The maxim indeed is
not to be found in his pages, but he may be none the less its fons
et origo. Bracton, who wrote his De Legibus et Consuetudinibus
Angliae in the middle of the thirteenth century, borrowed, as is well
known, a large amount of his matter (not purely feudal) from the
Roman Law. He did so in part (but only in small part) from the
texts of the Corpus Juris directly, but to a large extent, as Dr.
Carl Giiterbock pointed out long ago, from the Summa of the Code
and Institutes of the famous glossarist Azo. Now, in dealing with
obligations, which he does under the general head of actions, he
says this about the modes of their extinction (fol. 101): Item
tollitur \pbligatio\ morte alterius contrahentium, vel utriusque>
maxime si sit poenalis , vel simplex — si autem duple x, scilicet
poenalis et rei persecutoriae^ in hoc quod poenalis est tollitur ; et non
extenditur contra heredes, nee datur heredibusy quia poena tenet suos
auctores et extinguitur cum persona, i.e. an obligation is ' also
got rid of by the death of either of the contracting parties or of
both, especially if it is a penal obligation or a simple one ; but if
it be a double one, namely penal and for recovery, it is got rid of
as far as it is penal and it does not extend to the heirs, nor is it

1 9 and 10 Viet. c. 93, ss. I, 2.

2 43 and 44 Viet. c. 42, s. i. See also Workmen's Compensation Act
(1906), s. 13.

xi] Two Ancient Brocards 223

allowed to the heirs, because a penalty binds the original parties
and is extinguished with the person.' l This is wholly confused.
It is evident that in seeking to apply the Roman doctrine on this
matter to English Law (and he is plainly not stating existing English
rules) he has failed to distinguish between obligatio and actio. As
I have said, he treats the doctrine of obligations under the head of
actions (which in itself is not without justification, as we know
from Theophilus) ; but he mixes them up in a strange way. The
whole section about the dissolution of obligations has been taken,
as Maitland points out,2 in part from Azo's Commentary on Inst.
iii. 29 (Quibus modis obligatio dissolvitur) and in part from the
Institutes directly. But the passage I have just cited is not in Azo,
nor anything like it, much less in the Institutes •, and is, I need
hardly say, very far from representing Roman Law. Whether it is
Bracton's own or was taken by him from some other source, I am
unable to say. It looks like his own.3 What Bracton may perhaps
have had before his mind in composing it was contracts of a penal
character, i.e. contracts in which non-performance was treated as
delictal and punished by a penalty or amercement (e.g. the action
of debt). Nearly all contracts seem to have been of this character
in his age ; they were, with few exceptions (as where made in
writing by solemn form, or perhaps where there was res data\
enforceable only by actions of a delictal character. Contracts
and torts were, in short, hardly distinguished. The fact is — one
cannot dispute it — that, great as were Bracton's merits in other
respects, his knowledge of Roman Law was utterly defective. In
appropriating passages from the Corpus Juris and from Azo, he
over and over again fails to understand them, makes the most
bewildering statements, and is not seldom self-contradictory. This
must be said even in view of Professor Maitland's warning about
possible defects in the manuscripts.4 As glaring illustrations of
such blunders, I may be permitted to refer to one or two other
passages in addition to the one cited. Thus in the same section as

1 Edition of Twiss, ii. p. 123. Cited by Bowen, L.J., in Finlay v. Chirney^
supra, p. 216 n.

2 Bracton and Azo (Selden Series), p. 162.

3 ' Culpa tenet suos auctores' is in Code De Poem's, 1. 24. That Bracton
borrowed from some other civilian than Azo is very probable ; who this was
remains to be discovered.

4 Bracton and Azo (Selden Series), p. xvii.

224 H* Goudy [xi

the above he explains the dissolution of obligations confusione in
this way : Item per confusionem \pbligatio tollitur\ ut si massa
confusa fuerit cum alia, ita quod non appareat, here understanding
confusio in the sense it has in the doctrine of property — mixture of
different materials. Again, on folio 99b, he applies a sentence in
Justinian's Institutes, iii. 14, which relates to mutuum to the
contract of commodatum, so as to make the commodo accipiens
liable for injury to the thing by casus, though a little farther on he
negatives such liability. Attempts have been made to rectify this
passage as a MS. error, but to me it appears an evident blunder
due to want of knowledge. Again, on folio 102, he treats actions
rei persequendae causa as equivalent to actions in rem and says :
Omnes fere personates actiones sunt ex contractu, sicut mutui
commodati, etc., obviously misunderstanding the passage in the
Institutes, iv. 6, § 17, which runs : Earum vero actionum quae in
personam sunt, hae quidem quae ex contractu nascuntur fere
omnes rei persequendae causa videntur. But it is needless to
multiply examples ; they abound.1 In view of what I have just
said, it is impossible to be sure of what Bracton intended in the
passage above cited, asserting that contracts perished by the death
of either of the contracting parties. I think he probably meant no
more than that contracts were so dissolved in which non-performance
was treated as delictal and amercement or fine followed judgment
(e.g. Action of Debt), because he says later, fol. 102 : Personates
vero actiones . . . locum habent adversus eum qui contraxit et
heredem suum, nisi sint poenales? But, whatever he meant,
his statement was copied by Fleta,3 and to some extent influenced

1 These and other instances have been noted by Maitland in Bracton and
Azo, supra. A specially glaring case is iii. 3, § 9, fol. 1030, which Maitland
describes as a ' marvellous mess.'

Where Azo (or his MS.) is wrong Bracton follows him — e.g. compare Azo
in Inst. ii. i, f. 244, No. 7 with Bracton ii. I, § 2, where both use apprehen-
sionem apparently for aucupium and misunderstand Dig. xli. I, 55. Did
Bracton in his constant slight changes in the phraseology of Azo (e.g. substitut-
ing Sempronius for Seius and Maenius for Maevius) intend to compound with
his conscience for plagiarizing him ?

2 See also folio loib, where, dealing specially with delictual actions, he
says : ' In iis autem delictis sive maleficiis obligatur ille qui delinquit ei contra
quern delinquitur, nee dissolvitur obligatio quoad poenam nisi morte utriusque
vel alterius.'

3 ii. 60, § 9. The extent of the influence of Bracton on the Common Law

XI]

Two Ancient Brocards

225

the Courts, so that for a time apparently nearly all personal actions
(whether on contract or delict) were held to be intransmissible
(either actively or passively) on death of one of the parties, though,
as already indicated, this soon became restricted to actions on tort.
But however this be, in the Year Books after Edward I there is
little evidence that an action purely on contract was intransmissible
either to or against executors, apart from the passive intransmissi-
bility of actions of Debt and Account already mentioned. The law,
however, was anything but settled. The Report in Y.B. 15, Ed. IV
Term. Hill. 16, 3, bears that in certain cases an action for debt did not
lie against an executor of a testator, for the reason that the testator
might have waged his law, which executors could not do.1 Most, if
not all, other cases in the Year Books in which transmission was
not allowed (so far at least as text-writers have noticed them) were
in form actions for damages to person and property (e.g. actions of
waste and trespass). In Y.B. 19 Hen. VI 66, pi. 10 (A.D. 1440)
(an action by churchwardens for things carried off from a church),
Chief Justice Newton said, * If one doeth a trespass to me and
dieth, the action is dead also, because it should be inconvenient to
recover against one who was not a party to the wrong.' It is
curious, however, that we do not find our maxim, actio personalis
moritur, cited in the Year Books anywhere. It is said indeed by
Reeves to have been employed in Y.B. 12 Hen. VIII.2 This Report
is interesting. It was an action on the case brought by executors
to enforce a personal promise of guarantee, and the Court was
unanimous in holding the action competent. Fineux, Chief Justice,
said — and his words deserve attention — * This is not a case where
actio moritur cum persona, for that only applied where the hurt or
damage is corporal ; as if one beats me, and dies, my action is
gone ; or if I die, my executors will not have an action, for the
party cannot be punished when he is dead.' This means, I take it,
that in the opinion of the Chief Justice it was only penal actions
that were terminated by death of party. But Reeves 3 apparently
makes a mistake in attributing to the Chief Justice the words actio
personalis moritur \ the words of the Report in the black-letter

is much disputed. It may be perhaps compared to that of Craig (Jus Feudale)
in Scots Law.

1 See also Bacon, Abr. s.v. Executors, ii. p. 444.

2 Fol. n, pi. 3. 8 History of English Law^ iii. p. 403.

226 H. Goudy [xi

edition of the Year Books are simply actio moritur cum persona,
and there seems no reason for supplying the word personalis rather
than poenalis.

The decision in this case of 12 Henry VIII is subsequently
denounced by Fitzherbert in an opinion delivered by him in the
year 1536 and reported in the Year Book 27 Henry VIII, fol. 23.
Though this eminent judge does not cite our maxim, he expressly
declares that the last-mentioned decision was bad law, telling us at
the same time that he himself had been counsel for one of the
parties in it. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Fitzherbert
took the view that personal actions generally (whether on contract
or on tort) did not transmit at Common Law either to or against
executors. No reason is reported to have been given by him ; and,
though his opinion may have governed the practice of the Courts
for a time,1 the question was soon after settled by the case of
Norwood v. Rezdz and that of Pinchon, tempore James I (1609),
reported by Coke.3 The latter of these was an action on Contract
(as sump sit) ; and here for the first time, so far as I have been
able to discover, the phrase actio personalis moritur cum persona
was judicially used. Perhaps Coke himself invented it. In
Pinchon's case the Court disregarded the opinion of Fitzherbert
and in effect followed the earlier judgment in 12 Henry VIII,
above cited. After this, our maxim seems to have become
common in practice, but, save in the old action of Debt and the
modern action for breach of promise of marriage, it never received
any effect in actions on contract or quasi-contract. Its currency
in the Law Courts after Elizabeth is undoubted. It appears in
Noy's Grounds and Maxims of the English Lawsf first published
in 1640. Noy, who was Attorney-General under Charles I, seems
to have understood the maxim in its literal sense as applicable
to contractual as well as delictual obligations. As a legal
writer, however, he is of little authority. What is rather inter-
esting is that in the fifth edition of this book, published with
notes and additions in 1757, Bacon is referred to as authority for
the maxim. Now Lord Bacon did write a small work on legal
maxims. It is styled Rules and Maximes of the Common Lawes of
England, and was dedicated to Queen Elizabeth. It was not

1 Reeves, ut supra. 2 Plowd. p. 180.

3 9 Rep. 86b. 4 Noy, 6th ed. 1794, Maxim 14.

xi] Two Ancient Brocards 227

published, however, till 1630. When we turn to this work we find
that Bacon does not include actio personalis moritur among his
collected maxims, nor does he make the mistake of using that
expression at all. But, oddly enough, he does give incidentally a
maxim which differs by only one word from Noy's, viz. actio
injuriarum moritur cum persona, and it is to this presumably that
Noy's editor refers. Now, this maxim of Bacon, if taken in its
literal sense, would, as I have shown, quite accurately represent the
Roman Law. But unfortunately Bacon misunderstands, on his part,
the meaning of actio injuriarum — showing that his knowledge of
Roman Law must have been very slight. He applies it to damage
to property — viz. waste by a tenant for years, thus failing to
distinguish between injuria as a personal wrong and injury to
property or damnum injuria datum.

Such, then, is the early history of our maxim. If I am right in
my reading of the authorities, I think it came into our law owing
to the misunderstanding by Bracton of the Roman Law, his
inaccurate use of its language, and the consequently erroneous
doctrine adopted by Fitzherbert and others. We can see from
the older cases cited in Bacon's Abridgment how fluctuating
and diverse were the applications of the maxim in practice.
It has been suggested that the expression actio personalis
is merely a mistake for actio poenalis, due originally to some
careless manuscript copyist.1 But in view of the language of
Bracton and Fitzherbert this conjecture may be discarded. Nor
of course, as we have seen, would actio poenalis moritur cum
persona be at all correct for Roman Law.

(e) Its Application in Scots Law.

Till quite recent times our brocard was unknown to Scots Law.
It is nowhere referred to by the great Scotch institutional writers,
such as Stair and Erskine, nor does it appear in any of the Reports
of Cases prior to the nineteenth century. It has indeed crept into
the terminology of the Courts in some recent decisions, but without
being, in my opinion, properly appreciated — an exotic borrowed
from English Law. Speaking generally, both as regards active and
passive transmission of penal actions (i.e. actions for damages in
excess of bare reparation), Scots Law has for the most part followed
the Roman, but in part the Canon Law. Thus for passive survival
1 See B. Abridg. ii. pp. 444-5.

228 H. Goudy [xi

the rule of the Canon Law is applied, and personal representatives
are liable only so far as deceased left assets.1 On the other hand,
as regards the effect of litis contestation or pendency of suit at
death of either the wrongdoer or the injured party, Scots Law
follows the rule of the Corpus Juris? Nevertheless in one or two
respects, and particularly as regards transmission to representatives
of the injured party, Scots Law has varied from the Roman rather
remarkably. It has done so, in my opinion, on grounds of logic
and good sense. Thus actions for personal injury, corresponding
to the actio injuriarum, seem not to have been in older Scots Law
barred as vindictam spir antes or on other grounds, but were held
transmissible actively to the executors of the injured party. Such
at least was decided in 1874 in an action of slander raised by an
executrix of the person alleged to be slandered, in which the
early authorities were all carefully considered.3 The executrix
averred that patrimonial damage had been caused to the deceased
by the slander, and the action was held to be competent. It must,
however, be admitted that in one or two recent cases of a similar
nature the trend of judicial decision has been unfortunately to
depart from this doctrine and accept, as regards personal injuries,
our English brocard to a considerable extent. The doctrine on
this point seems hardly settled.4

Further the law of Scotland, by long and well-established
custom, allows the near relatives of persons who have been killed
wilfully or negligently to sue the wrongdoer for damages — such
damages including not only patrimonial loss but also solatium for
mental distress. Only near relatives, however, who are in the

1 Davidson v. Tulloch, 1860, 3 Macq. 783. Canon Law allowed trans-
mission against executors, but only so far as the deceased's estate was
available. This was a consequence doubtless of the limited representation by
personal representatives in that system, but was based on religious grounds.
See Savigny, System, v. § 211 ; and infra, p. 229 n. 3.

2 Neilson v. Rodger ; 16 D. 325 ; Wood v. Gray, 19 Ret. (H.L.) 31.

3 Auld v. Shairp, 1874, 2 Ret. pp. 199, 940. In this case Moncrieff,
J.C., seems to speak of 'actio personalis moritur' as a Roman maxim, and
fails to distinguish between personalis and poenalis.

4 See General Bill Posting Co. v. Yonde, 1910, S.C. 934, and cases there
cited. The case of Bern's Executor, 1893, 2O Ret- 859> where the Court
refused an action to the executor of a deceased lunatic for injuries done to the
lunatic, causing patrimonial damage, was, in my opinion, a retrograde step.
See criticism by Mr. R. M. Williamson in L.Q.R. x. p. 182, with which I
agree.

xi] Two Ancient Brocards 229

position of dependents on the deceased, can sue, at least where
death has been instantaneous. They sue in their own right and
not in any representative capacity.1 So far, then, Scots Law
has disregarded the Roman maxim, liberum corpus nullam recipit
aestimationem. The doctrine is one peculiar to Scotland, and was
judicially admitted many centuries ago in the action of so-called
assythment or kinbuit by which the near relatives of a murdered
man could recover under certain conditions pecuniary damages
from his murderer.2 This action of assythment is now in desuetude,
but an ordinary action for damages for fatal injury due to fault can
always be brought. Lord Campbell's Act had no application to
Scotland, and was never needed there.

In my judgment these variations of Scots Law from both the
Roman and English Law are based on sound principles of equity.
There is no sufficient reason why the representatives of a deceased
person to whom personal wrong has been done should not have a
right to damages which such person would have been able to
enforce had he lived. It is a civil debt which should transmit like
other debts. In short, there is no good reason why a deceased's
estate, if he leaves assets, should not be held liable for every kind
of injury done by him causing damage to another, and that
whether the estate was positively enriched by the wrongful act or
not.3

II. CUJUS EST SOLUM EJUS EST USQUE AD COELUM

This brocard may be translated, ' He who owns land owns
also that which is above it,' or, more literally, * He who owns land
owns everything above it up to the sky.'4 It appears also in the

1 In McEvaney v. Caledonian Railway Co., Scot. Law Times, April 1913,
the right of executors and other personal representatives of a person killed by
negligence of another to sue for damages was held to depend on the deceased
having made a claim for damages antecedent to his death. See also Erskine,
Principles, 2oth ed. p. 100.

2 See Balfour, Practicks, p. 516 — case of Bairnis of James Steuart v.
Robert Steuart, 1539 — for the grounds on which the rule is based.

3 On the want of equity in the Roman Law as regards the limited trans-
mission of delictal actions against heirs, see Savigny, System, v. § 211 (p. 50
sq.). Compare Bethmann-Hollweg, Civil Progress, ii. p. 298, n. 19, who takes
a different view.

4 See Broom, Maxims, pp. 300, 371, 376.

230 H. Goudy [xi

form Cujus est solum ejus est a coelo usque ad centrum (or usque
ad inferos), i.e. ' He who owns land does so from the sky above it
to the centre of the earth (or to Hades) below it.' x It is cited in
Croke's Reports, in an action for stopping lights, as Cujus est
solum ejus est summitas usque ad coelum, and a reference is
there 2 made to its use in the time of Edward I. It is as old as
the glossarists, though whether due to Irnerius or another I am
unable to say. It appears in the Accursian gloss in the form
Cujus solum ejus esse debet usque ad coelum? On the other hand,
I do not find that it was much used by the commentators or
other Continental civilians after Accursius. Cujacius gives a
somewhat different locution, viz. Quo jure est coelum eodem jure
esse debet solum et contra. Barbosa does not give our maxim
at all.

Unlike actio personalis moritur cum persona, our present brocard,
though it appears nowhere in the Roman texts, is consistent with
the Roman Law, and would not have sounded strange to the
classical jurisconsults. The text that comes nearest to illustrating
it is Dig. xliii. 24 fr. 22 § 4. It is from Venuleius, and he tells us
there that the interdict Quod vi aut clam could be raised against
anyone who caused anything to project over another's burial-place,
for the reason that a burial-place includes not only the solum
but the air-space (coelum} above it : Si quis projectum aut
stillicidium in sepulcrum immiserit, etiamsi ipsum monumentum
non tangeret, recte cum eo agi quod in sepulcro vi aut clam factum
sit, quia sepulcri sit non solum is locus qui recipiat humationem sed
omne etiam supra ad coelum.

The case figured is — Some one has placed a projectum which
interferes with the free air-space above the burial-ground of a
neighbour (sepulcrum). If no right of servitude exists the owner
can have the interdict Quod vi aut clam just as much as if the
solum itself had been encroached upon by an opus manufactum*

Another text is Dig. viii. 2, I pr., where it is stated that no
servitude projiciendi or stillicidii could exist where a public place,
such as a public road, intervened between the dominant and servient
tenement, because coelum liberum esse debet, which means, I take

1 See Lord Mackenzie, Roman Law, p. 170; Dart, Vendors and Pur-
chasers, p. 129.

2 Croke, Elist. p. 118. 3 Gloss to Dig. viii. 2, i pr.

xi] Two Ancient Brocards 231

it, that the air-space above the road should be free to all, like
the road itself.1 It was only from the point of view of vicinage
and servitude that the Romans had occasion to consider the
coelum in this sense. And it was the same with the mediaevalists.
By our older British lawyers the maxim was usually cited in the
following connexions: (i) in describing the nature and extent
of property generally ; 2 (2) in affirming the acquisition ipso jure
by the owner of the soil of what is built or planted on it ; 3 (3) in
asserting the legal right not to have one's uses of one's own land
prevented or restricted by one's neighbour using his for building,
etc. (Baten's Case, tempore James I) ; 4 (4) in connexion with
restrictions by servitudes of light, air, prospect, etc.

The maxim also, in its form Cujus est solum ejus est a
coelo usque ad centrum, has been used in relation to mining
claims and the like, in support of the doctrine that ownership of
land extends beneath the surface in a direct line to the centre of
the earth.5

Neither the Romans nor the mediaevalists had to consider the
important questions of overhead rights that we moderns have to
consider. Balloons and aeroplanes and other air-craft were beyond
their ken. How the Romans would have dealt with such questions
as interference with privacy, disturbance from noise, etc., arising
from air-craft must, of course, be left to conjecture. But I venture
to think that the right of property in the coelum would have sufficed
to prevent air-transit over a man's ground and interdicts to prevent
it would have been granted had damage been caused or threatened.
The assertion of some recent writers that because the air, like the
sea, is res communis and free to all, the circulation of air-craft
would not have been prevented by Roman Law, is, to my mind,
based on an erroneous assumption. It is assumed that aer and
coelum mean the same thing. But though no formal distinction was
made between them by the Roman jurists, and though the terms
are sometimes used as equivalents, a distinction none the less
existed. It was the aer — the omnipresent medium, never at rest
and incapable of appropriation — that was res communis. It was

1 See also Dig. xliii. 24, 21 § 2. 2 Coke on Littleton, 4a.

3 Stair, Inst. i. p. 296.

4 8 Jac. I, 9 Co. 54. This case is similar to Dig. xliii. 24, 22 § 4.

5 Broom, Legal Maxims, p. 302.

232 H. Goudy [xi

so because necessary for the life and health of all. But in contrast
with it the coelum was res sotiand capable more or less of appropria-
tion by the owner of the soil. In this sense it was not so much
aer as spatium (or regie) a'eris, and it is only in this sense that it
can be understood in the two passages above cited. The common
user of aer is indeed asserted by many passages in the Digest, but
private ownership of the coelum is also asserted. There is no
inconsistency.

Whether and how far actions of trespass, nuisance, or the like
are by English Law competent to prevent transit by aeroplanes,
etc., over private ground, are questions on which I do not enter.
They have been abundantly discussed by recent writers, and the
balance of authority seems greatly in favour of such actions being
competent.1 But whatever view may be taken, it is plain that
our maxim will have much play in the judicial discussions that
are likely to arise on the subject in the near future, and the matter
is one that calls for regulation by statute. On the other hand, for
International Law — resting partly on the same principles as the
private law and partly on other considerations — we must hold that
every State has the right of sovereignty over the air-space above
its territory, and the consequent right to exclude foreigners from
it, and rules for transit will have to be provided by international
treaties. From the point of view of international rights air cannot
be treated like the high seas, and we do not need a second Grotius
to write an aer liber.

H. GOUDY.

1 See the interesting French case, Brinquant and others v. Farman and
others^ July 1912, discussed by Valentine in Juridical Review, vol. xxiv.
p. 321.

XII

A SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF THE
FOUR INNS OF COURT

THE LAND ACROSS THE FLEET

THERE was no town or village on the site of the present City of
London when Julius Caesar landed in Britain in 55 B.C. At that
time, indeed, the estuary of the Thames was probably eight or ten
times as wide as it is now ; there was a considerable ebb and flow
of the tide ; and most of the land to the south of our present
Holborn and Cheapside was then mere marsh or fen. Nor was
there any London when the Romans occupied Britain for the
second time in A.D. 43. This is shown by the fact that those who
originally constructed the Watling Street — probably on the track
of an earlier British road — ignored our metropolis and made their
road pass half a mile or so on the western side of Westminster
where it could more safely cross the Thames.

But there was a London of some kind before Agricola left
England ; Tacitus in his Annals (xiv. 33) mentions a Londinium
as existing in A.D. 61. At first it was nothing more than a
fortified barrack posted on a rocky hillock that rose out of the
marshes of the Thames, on or near what we now call Ludgate
Hill, and occupied only by soldiers and camp-followers. As trade
developed merchants and hucksters and other non-combatants
came to reside under its shelter, and London grew to be a colony.
About A.D. 340, in all probability, it became a municipality, and
at some date between A.D. 350 and 370 the famous Roman wall
was built. It enclosed not only buildings but nearly a square mile
of open country as well, in order to secure a supply of water and
grazing for horses and cattle. This wall played a most important

233

234 W. Blake Odgers [xn

part in the subsequent history of London. It was wonderfully well
and strongly built, and portions of it still exist.

We are not concerned to-day with the history of the City of
London, most interesting though it is. I have to deal only with a
small portion of the land which lay to the immediate west of the
old Roman wall. This locality has for many centuries been
largely frequented by lawyers, and it has therefore been sometimes
styled the 'legal quarter of London.' In Norman times the
monks called it the ' territory ultra Fletam.1

The Holeburn, or the stream in the hollow, rose in the High-
gate ponds beneath Ken woods, and soon met another brook,
which had its source in the Hampstead ponds that lie to the east of
Haverstock Hill. The united stream ran down by Battle Bridge,
round the north of Holborn Hill, and discharged itself into the
estuary known as the Fleet. This was a tidal creek of the Thames
flanked on each side by high banks where Holborn Viaduct now
stands, but opening out more widely at the foot of Fleet Hill,
which we now call Ludgate Hill, and then running into the
Thames close under the Roman wall. At high tide it was wider
than Farringdon Street is now. Poor little Fleet brook ! After
helping for centuries to guard the City of London on its western
side, it came to be called the * Fleet ditch,1 and is now shut up in
a sewer under Bridge Street. You may see it at low tide pouring
its contents into the Thames through a round opening in the wall
which supports St. Paul's railway station.

The land bordering on the Thames to the immediate west of
the Fleet brook was in Roman and Saxon times full of creeks and
runnels, though meadows were gradually emerging from the marsh.
This is shown by the names which we still find there — such as
Bridewell, Water Lane, Milford Lane, etc. There was a nameless
stream which was once the chief tributary of the Thames between
the Fleet and the Tyburn. Its source was near the Church of St.
Giles-in-the-Fields, whence it ran across the meadows in a south-
easterly direction towards the site of the future Church of St.
Clement Danes. Before it reached what we till lately knew as
Wych Street, it fell into the creek which was called the Old Wych ;
and close to this spot there was subsequently a water mill and a
ford, at the top of what we now call Milford Lane. The Old Wych
then curled round and fell into the Thames * just at the bottom '

xn] The Inns of Court 235

of Essex Street, where the barges lay in the days of Sir George
Rose ! Then a little farther on, between what we now call
Catherine Street and Wellington Street, there was a bridge called
Strand Bridge ; so there must have been another stream running
into the Thames just there. This all tends to show that the
southern portion of the territory ultra Fletam was originally more
or less a marsh. It was indeed sometimes called ' London Fen.'

A little farther inland from the Thames there soon came to be
fair meadows, sloping up towards Holborn Hill. But in Roman
and in Saxon times there were practically no houses to the west of
the Fleet brook — no Fleet Street and no Strand existed before the
Conquest. There was no road or lane at this time south of
Holborn, and there was no gate in the Roman wall at the foot of
Fleet Hill. There was indeed no use or need for such a gate, as
the Fleet brook was there too wide to jump and too deep to ford,
and there was no bridge. For 800 years after the Romans left
Britain the only gate in the Roman wall on the west side of
the. City was the one afterwards called New Gate. An abbey
was founded at Westminster a little more than a century
before the Norman Conquest ; and shortly after that event the
King had a palace at Westminster. But if either Abbot or King
desired to journey from Westminster to the City of London, he
had either to go by water — for the Thames was the great highway
between the two cities — or else he had to go by road through the
village of Charing and farther northwards till he joined the road
from Oxford, then along Holborn and enter the City at the New
Gate. That was then the only way by road from Westminster to
London.

Very few people before the accession of Henry I ventured to
live outside the Roman wall ; and indeed there was no reason why
they should do so, as there was plenty of room within its protection.
Those who were bold enough to reside outside it naturally clustered
round the existing highway and the neighbourhood of the City
gate. There were houses on both sides of Holborn almost to the
top of the hill for at least a hundred years before there was anything
like a street nearer the Thames. But all the flat ground on the
crest of the hill was devoid of any buildings. In the Manor of
Portpool — that is where now stands Gray's Inn — there were no
houses at the time of which I am speaking, but merely a windmill

236 W. Blake Odgers [xn

and a chantry. The priest who served this chantry came from St.
Bartholomew the Great in Smithfield. He did not dare to sleep in
the wild unknown country of Portpool ; he returned every night to
St. Bartholomew's,

But in the eleventh and twelfth centuries attempts were
successfully made to embank a portion of the Thames and the
mouth of the Fleet brook. Thus much of the marshy ground
came to be meadows which attracted a few bold persons to come
and live outside the City walls. At first these were chiefly
ecclesiastics, as monasteries and churches were less likely to be
attacked by robbers and housebreakers than private dwelling-
houses, and priests could rely both on their sanctity and their
poverty. The churches of St. Bride and St. Dunstan were built
on the west side of the Fleet, and in 1115 we know that the Dean
and Chapter of St. Paul's owned four tenements ultra Fletam,
one of which was occupied by a loriner. There must have been
some road or lane by which folk could go to these churches and
to this loriner's. This is the beginning of Fleet Street. Then
about 1 1 50 or a little later the Lud Gate was opened, and a bridge
of some kind was no doubt made across the Fleet. King Lud
never had anything to do with this gate ; it was not even named
after him. The word * ludgate ' simply means the back gate,
the postern gate.

For centuries there had been wrangling between the City of
London and the Abbot of Westminster as to how much of the
marshy ground south of the Holborn Road belonged to each of
them. At last in the reign of Henry II — about the year 1183 —
this dispute was settled, and a clear line was drawn separating the
two dominions, which to the present day is still the boundary
between the City of London and the City of Westminster. This
line started from the New Gate, crossed the Hole -burn, and
came up Holborn Hill to where still stand Holborn Bars. A little
further on, it turned sharply to the left and ran southwards to where
Temple Bar afterwards stood. At first there were only two posts
and a chain there to guard the new entrance to the City ; this was
known as the Barra Novi Templi as early as 1301. Later a gate of
stone was built there, but not the Temple Bar which we older men
so well remember — that was built by Sir Christopher Wren in 1672,
and removed in 1879. The boundary line between the two cities

xii] The Inns of Court 237

then passes due south through the corner of Messrs. Twinings'
tea warehouse at the top of New Court, then by Ruth Pinch's
fountain and through Garden Court. It cuts off a portion of the
Middle Temple library, and emerges on the Thames Embankment
just where there is a monument to Queen Victoria on the railing
of the Middle Temple Garden.

The area between this boundary and the old Roman wall was
at once treated as a suburb of the City and placed under civic rule,
although it was not till 1223 that it was expressly declared to be
a City ward. It was called at first the ward of Holborn and Fleet
Street, and later the ward of Farringdon. Half of our Inns of
Court and of Chancery lay within this new ward, and half without
it. Thus it contained both the Inner and the Middle Temple,
Staple Inn, Barnard's Inn, Thavie's Inn, Clifford's Inn, and both
the Serjeants Inns ; while Lincoln's Inn, Gray's Inn, Clement's
Inn, and New Inn never were within the City of London.

We will now briefly trace the history of each separate Inn of
Court.

THE KNIGHTS TEMPLARS

It was in the year 1118 that the Knights of the Holy Sepulchre
at Jerusalem first came to England. They were bound by the
strictest vows to poverty, chastity, obedience, to succour the Holy
Land, and especially to ' save the Holy Sepulchre from thrall.'
But they did not always devote the whole of their time to com-
pliance with these vows. Being both soldiers and ecclesiastics,
they did not fear to live outside the Roman wall, so they settled
on a vacant piece of land on the south side of Holborn between
the future Staple Inn and the top of the future Chancery Lane.
There they built a hall and a round chapel ; all the churches
dedicated to the Holy Sepulchre were round. They remained for
over forty years on this site, which was long afterwards known as
the * Old Temple.'

When the Templars came to England it was natural, no doubt,
for them to settle near Holborn, for that was then the only road
out of London on the western side. But towards the close of the
twelfth century, as we have seen, Ludgate had been opened and
a road carried over the lower Fleet and along what we now call
Fleet Street. And eventually the Templars, wanting more room

238 JV. Blake Odgers [xn

than they could get in Holborn, where houses were springing up
all around them, obtained from Robert de Beaumont, second Earl
of Leicester and Lord High Steward of England, the grant of
a fine open meadow sloping down to the Thames on the southern
side of the new road, and there built a great house and a second
round church. They also acquired a field on the north side of the
new road ; it was called Fickett's Field, and extended from the
Church of St. Clement Danes almost to the future Chancery Lane.
This field they used for tilting ; and doubtless the forge in the
south-east corner of it, for which the City still pays, I believe, a
rent to the Crown, was the place where the armour of the Templars
was fitted and riveted, and their horses shod.

The exact date when the Knights Templars left the Old
Temple and settled in their new habitation, cannot be now
definitely fixed, but it was probably about the year 1162. At
first they had no chapel of their own ; they held their services in
the Church of St. Clement Danes, over which King Henry II
gave them certain rights, but they were busy building the circular
portion of our present Temple Church. And on February 10, 1185
this was consecrated by Heraclius, Patriarch of the Church of the
Holy Resurrection, Jerusalem, in the presence of King Henry II,
his consort, and his Court. King James I in his Charter of 1608
still described this matchless specimen of pure Norman architecture
as ' the Church of the New Temple of London.' There are only
two other examples of the true Norman work above ground in
London — the Chapel of St. John at the Tower of London, and the
Church of St. Bartholomew the Great at Smithfield — though there
are two or three Norman crypts in the City under ground.

Later, in 1220, was built St. Ann's Chapel, the crypt of which
is still to be seen. The Templars also erected a noble refectory of
stone, which stood upon the site of the present Inner Temple Hall ;
indeed two arched crypts which belonged to the refectory are
still standing there. And here the Templars lived in pride and
pomp. They associated only with the nobles. King John himself
came and lodged with them for a week at a time. They looked
down upon the knights of all other religious orders, and at last
their arrogance was their ruin. At the beginning of the fourteenth
century grave charges were brought against them, most of which,
I believe, were unfounded. They were accused, among other things,

xn] The Inns of Court 239

of conducting in secret unholy Rosicrucian ceremonies and other
mystic rites, which they were said to have brought from Palestine.
An inquiry was held in St. Dunstan's Church in 1312, and the
charges were declared to be proved. Under rigorous cross-
examination, and probably under torture, some of the weaker
brethren confessed to crimes which they had never committed, and,
what was worse, to heresies, which they possibly may have held.
All the property of the Knights Templars was confiscated, and
they were expelled from the kingdom in the year 1313.

There were many reasons for their expulsion. First and fore-
most they were reputed to be very wealthy. Then they had done
nothing for many years in performance of their vows. The Knights
Hospitallers of St. John of Jerusalem were jealous of them.
Lastly, the Pope turned against them, and then their doom was
sealed.

But the King obtained little or no booty from his cruel and
unjust treatment of the Knights Templars. The Pope intervened
on the ground that their property was consecrated, and by a decree
made at Vienne in 1312 gave their possessions in England to the
rival Knights of St. John, who continued to hold them till the
dissolution of the monastic orders under Henry VIII. This
property included what was afterwards known as the Inner and
Middle Temple.

But the Knights of St. John found their new acquisition rather
a white elephant. They preferred the open country at Clerkenwell
in which they had been for several years comfortably established.
They had, moreover, a struggle with the King before they could
obtain possession of the Templars' Hall and its precincts, for that
monarch had put into possession of it, first Aymer de Valence,
Earl of Pembroke, and then his own cousin Thomas, Earl of
Lancaster. But the latter nobleman was executed in 1322, and in
1324 the Pope again insisted that all the property of the Templars
must be handed over to the Knights of St. John, lest, as the decree
ran, ' the same should be put to profane uses.' And so, some
years later, in the early part of the reign of Edward III, the
Knights of St. John leased it to the lawyers !

240 W. Blake Odgers [xn

THE INNER AND THE MIDDLE TEMPLE

The exact date of this letting (or, more technically, subinfeuda-
tion) is unknown ; Master Worsley is content to say that it took
place in 'some part of the reign of Edward III.'1 Still less do
we know to what lawyers the land was leased. Was it to an
accidental group of persons who had never previously been
associated ? Was it to a Society of lawyers, who till then occupied
some neighbouring hospice ? We know that there were already
many little communities in the City of London of professors and
students of the law residing each in its separate hostel, taking
their meals in common, and governed by their Readers or
Benchers as the colleges in Oxford and Cambridge were by their
fellows. Did one of these Societies march westward and occupy
the chambers left empty by the Knights Templars within the new
City boundary? Or was this land, as some maintain, divided
from the first between two already existing Societies of lawyers
who had previously been occupying separate hospices? These
questions we cannot answer positively, because we have not the
deeds. In the year 1381 the followers of Wat Tyler went to the
Temple, broke into the Church, seized all the books and papers,
and all the reports of cases which were in the lockers of the
apprentices of the law in the Temple, took them up to the high
road, and burnt them there. The existing registers of the Middle
Temple begin in 1501, those of the Inner Temple in 1505 ; both
contain references to older records now unfortunately lost.

There is no doubt some reason to believe that while the
Knights Templars occupied this land there were on it two halls.
One, their refectory, stood where the Inner Temple Hall now
stands — it was consecrated because the prior slept over it. The
other hall stood on unconsecrated ground occupying a portion of
the site on which at present stand Pump Court and Elm Court —
in other words, in what is now the Middle Temple. But there is
no reason why the same society may not own two halls ; Lincoln's
Inn does so at the present moment, and ex hypothesi, the Order of
the Knights Templars did so before their exile. The presumed
existence, therefore, of the two halls does nothing to settle the
dispute.

1 Master Worsteds Book, edition of 1910, p. 89.

xii] The Inns of Court 241

More may perhaps be made of the undoubted existence of two
rents. In the year 1331 William de Langford was Keeper of the
New Temple under the Order of the Knights Hospitallers of St.
John of Clerkenwell. He paid annually into the King's Exchequer
for the Temple the sum of £24, namely ^"12:4:1 for the con-
secrated portion and ;£ii: 15:11 for the unconsecrated portion.
But then a claim was made to the consecrated portion by Hugh le
Despenser, who alleged that it had been sold to him by the Prior
of the Order in the year 1324. The Prior, however, with the
assistance of William de Langford, was able in 1336 to satisfy the
King that this sale had been extorted from him by force by the
said Hugh ; so William de Langford remained in possession as
tenant of the Prior. Two years afterwards, on i8th June 1338, the
King, being in need of money for his foreign expedition, agreed for
the sum of ;£ioo to allow the Prior the residue or unconsecrated
portion of the manor of the New Temple, together with the rent
due therefrom of £j : 5 : 2. It is explained in the Calendar of
Patent Rolls of this date how the rent had become reduced from
;£ii : 15 : II to this figure ; and it is stated that if this residue of
the manor should be found by valuation to be worth more than
£10 the Prior should pay the excess into the Exchequer. Thus it
came about that the lawyers in occupation of this portion of the
land paid the Prior only £10 a year rental ; the Prior was not
interested in obtaining more. But it was not until the year 1521
that a later prior agreed to reduce the rent of the consecrated
portion to the same amount.1 The Order of the Knights of St.
John of Clerkenwell was dissolved in 1539 and their property all
passed to the Crown. So from that time forward the Societies of
the Inner and the Middle Temple each paid the King £10 a year,
and these rents were retained by the Charter which King James I
granted to the two Societies in 1609. It will be observed, how-
ever, that the two rents were originally one rent ; and, again, there
is no reason why two different rents may not be paid by the same
society for two different properties if that society occupies them
both.

We cannot, therefore, on the materials before us, definitely
determine whether there were from the beginning two distinct

1 For this detailed account of the two rents I am indebted to Mr. E.
Williams, F.R.G.S., of the Prudential Assurance Company.

242 IV. Blake Odgers [xn

societies settled in the Temple. But this much is clear that within
some fifty or sixty years after the first entry of the lawyers two
separate societies were located there. The Prologue to the Canter-
bury Tales was written when Chaucer was on a journey in the year
1388, and it contains a well-known reference to a manciple, on
which Dugdale x bases an argument : ' That they were here seated
in King Edward the third's time, is out of all doubt, from what
our famous old Poet Geffrey Chaucer expresseth in his Prologue
to the Manciple, concerning them (he having also been a Student
of this House, as the History of his life, printed in the front of his
works,2 sheweth).'

A Manciple there was of the Temple,

Of which all Catours might taken ensemple.

But Dugdale here is clearly quoting from an inferior version of
the Prologue. In the best manuscript, the Ellesmere, the lines
run thus": —

A Gentil Maunciple was ther of a temple,
Of which achatours mighte take exemple.

And the use of the phrase ' a temple ' is some evidence that there
was more than one temple known to Chaucer in the year 1388.

Next, we are indebted to Mr. W. C. Bolland of Lincoln's Inn
for an interesting discovery.3 He found an old will preserved at
Somerset House which is dated St. Bartholomew's, day, 24th August
1404. It was made by John Bownt of Bristol, and is written in
Latin. It contains a bequest of two marks to Robert, the manciple
of the Middle Temple (Roberto mancipio medii Templi}. Can this
be the very man who rode with Chaucer along the Pilgrim's Way
to Canterbury ? Again in the year 1440 in the Paston letters we
find one of the Pastons writing to his son and bidding him ' quan
your leysyr is, resorte ageyn on to your college, the Inner Temple.'
So by this time there were two distinct * colleges ' or schools of law
established on the lands formerly held by the Knights Templars
within the boundary between the City of London and the county
of Middlesex.

1 Origines Jurididales^ p. 145. The first edition of this book was
published in 1666.

2 Dugdale is no doubt referring to Speght's edition, published in 1574.

3 See an article by him in the Law Quarterly Review ', vol. xxiv., at
p. 402.

xii] The Inns of Court 243

The lands of the Knights Templars which lay outside that
boundary came naturally to be known as the Outer Temple. The
lawyers never got possession of any of this. The portion of this
land which lay to the south of the Strand became the property
first of the bishops of Exeter, then of Lord Paget, and later of the
Earl of Leicester, and then of his stepson Robert Devereux, Earl
of Essex. Upon it now stand Essex Hall, Essex Street, and
Devereux Court. Much history lingers in the names of streets
and houses. The portion north of the Strand formerly known as
Fickett's Field was in the eighteenth century covered with a net-
work of disreputable slums. These were later cleared away to
make room for the stately pile of the Royal Courts of Justice,
which were opened on 4th December 1882.

THE LEGEND OF THAW'S INN

But before proceeding farther northwards, we must pause to
discuss a tradition mentioned by Dugdale connecting the Temple
with Thavy's Inn. He tells us on p. 144 of his great work the
Origines Juridiciales that

by a Decree made in the great Councel at Vienna in anno 1324 (sic)
(about the iQth year of the same King Edward the II reign) the
lands of the Templars, being generally bestowed upon the Knights
Hospitalers of St. John of Hierusalem, King Edward the 3d
granted this Mansion unto the Knights of that Order here in
England ; who, soon after (as the tradition is) demised the same,
for the Rent of x1- per annum, unto divers professors of the Common
law, that came from Thavyes Inne in Holburne. Now that there
is nothing but tradition left to us ; for this cannot seem strange,
considering what spoil Wat Tyler, with his fellow Rebells, made
here, in 4 Ric. 2. by destroying and burning their Books and
Records.

You will observe how guardedly Dugdale speaks of this
' tradition/ that the first Templars came from Thavy's Inn. Never-
theless a less learned and therefore a bolder writer makes the same
statement in a manuscript still in the possession of the Society of
the Inner Temple. His name is unknown, but he wrote at some
date after the middle of the reign of Charles I, and he ventures to
assign a precise date for the alleged migration. His statement is1

1 Calendar, Inner Temple, i. p. xvii.

244 ^ Blake Odgers [xn

that the lawyers came from Thavie's Inn

about the year 1347, ever since which time they and their suc-
cessors, professors and students of the Common Law, have there
resided, who in tract of time converted and regulated the same
first into one Inne of Court and afterwards, viz., in the reign of
King Henry VI, divided themselves into those two Societies or
Inns of Court, viz., the Inner and the Middle Temple.

We shall see shortly x why the writer fixed on the year 1 347 ; but
his extraordinary looseness as to dates is shown by his startling
statement that there was only one society of lawyers at the Temple
till the reign of Henry VI ! Indeed a few sentences later (p. xviii)
he asserts that there was only one Hall in the Temple till the reign
of Henry VI-

then the lawyers were multiplied and grown into soe great a bulke
as could not conveniently be regulated into one society, nor, indeed,
was the old hall capable of containing so great a number, whereupon
they were forced to divide themselves. A new hall was then erected,
which is now the Junior Temple Hall, whereunto divers of those
who before took their repast and diet in the old hall resorted, and
in process of time became a distinct and divided society.

These are, I believe, the only 'authorities' for the suggestion
that the first Templars came from Thavy's Inn ; and neither of
them carries any weight. As we shall shortly see, no Thavy's Inn
existed in 1347. Moreover, at that date, in all probability, some
lawyers had already entered the Temple.

But where was Thavy's Inn, and who was Thavy? Was he
the same person as Tavy or Davy, who are also accredited by
some with having founded Inns of Chancery in the fourteenth
century ?

There was in the reign of Edward III 'an honest citizen'
called John Tavy who owned three shops on the south side of
Holborn, and behind them a house or hostel in which apprentices
were boarded. They lay to the east of Fetter Lane, pretty much
on the site of the present Bartlett's Buildings ; Tavy had purchased
these in 1323. He was by trade an armourer, and a member of
the Company of Armourers, and was one of the four members of
that Company who were appointed in 1342 to supervise the new

1 Post, p. 247.

xn] The Inns of Court 245

regulations as to the making and selling of armour. He was also
an armiger, which shows that he was a person of some little dis-
tinction in the City.

John Tavy made his will on I2th March 1348, and it was
proved and enrolled in the Husting on 23rd November 1349. He
directed his executors to sell a certain tenement which he had
acquired from John Cok, and with the proceeds to pay his debts,
etc. To Isabella, his daughter, he left a certain shop, and to his
wife Alice all his other tenements in Holborn. After her decease
* the hostel in which the apprentices used to dwell ' was to be sold
and the proceeds devoted to the maintenance of a chantry.

On 1 6th January 1350-51, that is, fourteen months later, the
executors, at Alice's request, sold the hostel and two shops and
the reversion of the third shop held by Isabel, the testator's
daughter, to Sir John de Houton, Baron of the Exchequer.1 But
this sale was only for the life of Alice. On the death of Alice, in
1366, the hostel was sold in fee to Roger de Barnburgh and Sir
Ely de Sutton, clerks of the Chancery (St. Andrew's Church taking
a rent). This was in accordance with the will of John Tavy,
which directed that it should be sold after the death of Alice to
provide a chaplain to pray for the souls of Alice and John.2

There was another and a very different man, John Davy, who
in the year 1376 occupied the land which lay to the south of
Holborn on the east side of John Tavy's land, stretching away
towards St. Andrew's Church and Shoe Lane. He was a Chancery
clerk, Receiver for the King for the counties of Carmarthen and
Cardigan, and a man of great prominence in Holborn from 1350
to 1397, when he died. The land which he occupied is quite
distinct from that which John Tavy owned in 1348. It extended
from a tenement of John Tavy on the west to a tenement of
John de Besville on the east, and stretched from the King's high-
way on the north to the tenements of John de Besville and John
Tavy on the south, and is so described in a deed of 26th June
1346. And on this land there undoubtedly grew up, under the
superintendence of Davy, a little school of law which was named

1 The leading witness to this deed of sale was Thomas de Lincoln,
serjeant-at-law, who at that time was the owner of the first * Lyncolnesyn '
in Holborn.

2 For all these details as to the various properties in Holborn I am
indebted to Mr. E. Williams, who holds the deeds.

246 IV. Blake Odgers [xn

after him Davy's Inn. It was sometimes called Thavy's Inn, but
why we can only conjecture. Possibly Davy, the Receiver for the
counties of Carmarthen and Cardigan, spelt his name with two
' D's,' for the Welsh are fond of double initials, and I am informed
by a high authority that in Welsh * dd ' is pronounced like ' th ' in
* this ' or ' that.' Anyhow, both names seem to have been used in-
discriminately for centuries. But ' Thavies Inn ' eventually gained
the mastery, and the place was called by that name till within
living memory. The property is referred to as ' Davysynne ' in an
old Inquisition post-mortem in 1419, and in the minister's accounts
of the Bishop of Ely in 1444. On 25th January 1550 Gregory
Nicholas, citizen, quit -claimed to Edward Gryffith and others
gubernatoribus hospitii de Lyncolnsyn a 'messuage with a garden
adjoining commonly called Davyes Inne and of old time (olim)
called Thavye's Inne with chambers, etc.,' in Holbourne.

It is clear from the title-deeds that John Tavy, the armourer,
never owned any portion of what was called Davy's or Thavie's
Inn. Yet legal writers soon jumped to the conclusion that this inn
was called after the armourer. The confusion has, no doubt, been
caused by the similarity between the names, but I think my Lord
Coke was also to blame in the matter.

He stumbled one day in the Court of Husting upon John Tavy's
will, and was struck by the fact that it contained the word appren-
ticii. It described the house behind the three shops as hospitium
in quo apprenticii habitare solebant, and this collocation of the
words hospitium and apprenticii made a great impression upon
Lord Coke's mind. Remembering that John Tavy was an
armourer, and a member of the Guild of Armourers, we should now
naturally translate the Latin phrase as 'the house in which my
apprentices used to dwell.' No doubt Tavy had a year before his
death retired from business, and his apprentices had left him and
set up for themselves. But in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries
the apprenticii had played a very important part in legal circles.
There were the apprenticii ad legem — the men who lived in the
Inns of Court, and who roughly corresponded to what we now call
the 'junior Bar' — and the apprenticii attached to the various
courts, who were in fact apprenticed to the clerks of those courts,
and resided in the Inns of Chancery. With these looming large in
his eye, Lord Coke jumped to the conclusion that apprentices of

xii] The Inns of Court 247

the law had lived in Tavy's house — though why students of law
should reside with an armourer I cannot understand ! And later
came our friend who wrote the Inner Temple manuscript, from
which I have copied on p. 244, and he said to himself : * John Tavy's
will was made in 1 348, and in it he says that the apprentices used
to dwell in his hostel (habitare solebanf] ; so they must have left
before he made his will. Ah, I see ; they all moved in a body to
the Temple in 1347 !'

However this may be, Lord Coke refers to the matter on
p. xxxvii of the Preface to the Reader in Part X of his Reports.
After quoting the case of Thomas de Weylond (19 Edw. I) as to
the antiquity of the Order of Serjeants, he adds : —

And in I Edw. Ill 'there is mention made of an apprentice,
and he is called an apprentice of the law . . . and is next in degree
under a serjeant.' See also the ordinance of 20 Edw. I, rot. 5,
addressed to Sir John de Metingham, etc. : 'And so is farther proved
by a record inter communia placita tenta in Hustingo, London,
die Lunae in festo Sancti dementis Papae, anno regni Edw. Ill viz.
die Jovis proxime ante festum Sancti Gregorii Papae, anno domini
1348. Ego Johannes Tavie Armiger lego animam meam Deo, &c.
Item lego omnia tenementa mea cum omnibus pertinentiis quae
habeo in parte australi in parochia Sancti Andreae, &c. Aliciae
uxori meae ad totum terminum vitae suae ; et quod post decessum
praedictae Aliciae, totum illud Hospitium in quo Apprenticii legis
habitare solebant.'

This legend as to Davy's (alias Thavy's) Inn rapidly gained
ground. Sir George Buc, who had himself been a student there,
wrote an Account of the Schools of Learning in London, which
he presented to Lord Coke, and which was published in 1631
as an appendix to Stow's Chronicle of England. And therein he
speaks in glowing terms of his former inn.

And I must and will begin with Thavis Inne, for besides that
at my first comming to London, I was admitted for probation,
into that good house, I take it to be the oldest Inne of Chancery,
at the least in Holborne, and so may justly challenge precedence
by Seigniority, and antiquitie : it was before the dwelling of an
honest Citizen called John Thavie an armorer, and was rented of
him in the time of King Edward the 3. by the chiefe professors
then of the Law, viz. Apprentises, as it is yet extant in a record
in the hustings, and whereof my Lord Coke, shewed to me the

248 W. Blake Odgers [xn

transcript, but since that time it was purchased for the students
and other professors of the Law of Chauncery by the Benchers of
Lincolns Inne, about the Raigne of King Henry the seaventh, and
retaineth the name of the olde Land-lord or owner, master Thavie.

There are two glaring misstatements in this passage. The
apprentices certainly never were ' the chief professors then of the
law.' They always took rank below the Serjeants and readers.
Again, the Society of Lincoln's Inn did not acquire Davy's Inn
in the reign of King Henry VII, but in the year 1550, when his
grandson, Edward VI, was King. Note also that what Lord Coke
showed to Sir George Buc was not the original will in the
Husting, but only a transcript of it.

Lastly, let us have Dugdale's version of this legend ; it was
written before the year I666.1

In this Inne of Chancery were Students of the Law resident
in King Edward the third's time, as may appear by these follow-
ing words, taken out of the last Will and Testament of John
Tavye, whose House it then was, and of whom it took this name ;
viz. — ego Johannes Tavie Armiger, &c. lego animam meam Deo,
&c. Item lego omnia tenementa mea, cum omnibus suis pertinentiis,
quae habeo in parte Australi, in parochia S. Andreae, &c. Aliciae,
uxori meae, ad terminum vitse suae : Et quod post decessum
praedictae Aliciae, totum illud Hospicium, in quo Apprenticii
ad Legem habitare solebant, per Executores meos, si superstites
fuerint, una cum Executoribus praedictae Aliciae, vendatur, et quod
de pecunia inde precepta, unus Capellanus idoneus, pro anima mea,
et anima praedictae Aliciae inveniatur, &c.

But in process of time, the inheritance thereof, coming to the
hands of Gregory Nicholls, Citizen and Mercer of London ; he, by
his Deed, bearing date . . . Jan. 4, E. 6, granted it to the then
Benchers of Lincolns Inne, and their successors for the use of
Students of the Law : After which time, it was by them demised
to the Principal and Fellows of this House, for the Rent iii1. vis. viiid.
per annum ; and hath had the like privilege, for admission of their
Students into the Society of Lincolns Inne, as those of Furnivals
Inne had, and still have.

When I compared the two versions cited above of the will
of John Tavy, the armourer, I was struck by the difference of
phraseology at the all-important point — Lord Coke writing legis
and Dugdale writing ad legem. A suspicion entered my mind
that these words must in each case be a gloss placed by the learned

1 Orig. Jur. p. 271.

xn] The Inns of Court 249

writer on the language of the original will ; each felt sure in
his own mind that the apprentices referred to must have been
apprentices of law, and each of them put in a word or two to make
this quite clear to others. I naturally endeavoured to obtain an
unimproved transcript of the original will. I searched in vain in
the Calendar of Wills proved and enrolled in the Court of Husting,
London, under the name both of Tavy and Thavy. Then a
friend suggested to me to look under the name of Tany, as an
n and a v are often written much alike in old manuscripts. And so
under the name of John Tany, on p. 619, I found the following: —

Tany (John), 'armurer.' — The tenement which he acquired
from Master John Cok to be sold by his executors to pay his debts,
and the residue to be devoted to pious uses. To Isabella his
daughter a certain shop. All his tenements in the parish of S.
Andrew (sic), with the exception of the aforesaid shop, he leaves
to Alice his wife for life, after whose decease a hostel wherein his
apprentices used to live is to be sold, and the proceeds devoted to
the maintenance of a chantry, and his mansion house and shops
to be given to the fabric of the church of S. Andrew in Holbourn.
Dated in the parish of S. Andrew in Holbourn, Thursday next
before the Feast of S. Gregory, Pope [12 March], A.D. 1348.
Roll 77 (242).

It is clear then that neither the word legis nor the phrase
ad legem occurs in the original will. Moreover, I am assured
by my friend Mr. E. Williams, who holds the deed, that in the
grant of 1366 by which the hostel was sold in fee to Roger de
Barnburgh and Sir Ely de Sutton — only seventeen years after the
death of Tavy — it is expressly described as ' a messuage or hospitium
in which the apprentices of John Tavy used to dwell.'

I conclude therefore (a) that there is no evidence to show that
any student of law ever dwelt on the land which John Tavy the
armourer owned in 1348 ; (b) that a School of Law existed in 1376,
and probably a few years prior to that date, on the land which John
Davy occupied in that year ; (c) that there is no evidence that this
School of Law ever had anything to do with either Temple ; it was
no doubt from an early date intimately connected with the Society
of Lincoln's Inn, which till 1412 or a few years later was located in
its immediate neighbourhood.

250 W. Blake Odgers [xn

LINCOLN'S INN

As we have already seen, the ecclesiastics were the first to
venture outside the City walls ; take, for example, the Bishop of
Ely who lived at Hatton Garden and the Bishop of Exeter who
took up his abode in the Outer Temple. So it was that when
Ralph Neville, the great Bishop of Chichester, needed a town
house for himself and his successors in that See, his eye fell on
the meadows to the immediate north and east of Fickett's Field
just outside the new City boundary. And there he built himself
a stately mansion in the year 1227, in which he died in 1244.
This mansion must have occupied the site of the buildings which
lie to the immediate south of Lincoln's Inn Old Hall. And behind
his house was a garden, to the north of it a paddock, and on the
west side of garden and paddock a coneygarth or warren for tame
rabbits. This word was afterwards corrupted into coninger ; for
at a later date the spot is referred to as Coninger Field, and is
now part of the 'gardens of Lincoln's Inn. It probably stretched
as far north as the back gardens of the houses on the south side
of Holborn.

Anyone can find out for himself exactly where the Bishop's
mansion stood by walking up Chancery Lane from Fleet Street,
crossing Carey Street (which did not then exist), and before he
comes to the gateway of Lincoln's Inn he will find on his left hand
two courts — Chichester Rents and then Bishop's Court. These
names still commemorate the approach to the Bishop's house and
identify its situation. And in this house successive Bishops of
Chichester lived for nearly two hundred years. One of them, John
de Langton, was Chancellor of England from 1292 to 1302, and
again from 1307 to 1310. After him, it is said, the lane on the
east side of his house was called Chancellor's Lane, which is now
corrupted into Chancery Lane. The last Bishop who occupied
this house died there in the year 1412; his successor preferred to
live elsewhere.

What happened in the next ten years we do not know for
certain ; but by the year 1422 we find a fully constituted Society
in occupation of the Bishop's property, which is henceforth known
by the quaint name of the ' Inn of Lincoln's Inn.' The records,
which are known as the Black Books, describe the life of the

xii] The Inns of Court 251

Society in delightfully varied detail ; but they tell us nothing of
its origin. The first Black Book begins in the year 1422 ; it
contains entries which show that at this time the Society was
paying a rent of ten marks a year to the Bishop of Chichester for
the occupation of all that portion of his premises that lay to the
west of Chancery Lane. The exact date of the original demise is
not known ; it must have been between 1412 and 1422.

Ralph Neville, Bishop of Chichester, also held land on the
other side of Chancery Lane prior to I235.1 He owned a garden
there to the north of the land which the King had granted to the
House for the support of the brethren converted from Judaism to
the Catholic faith (afterwards part of the Liberty of the Rolls).
This garden was bounded on the north by a ditch known in 1262 as
' Chaunceleresdich.' A portion of the land which lay to the north
of this Chancellor's ditch — between it and Holborn — was occupied
in the middle of the fourteenth century by Thomas de Lincoln, the
King's serjeant, and certain students of the law. Their territory
may be roughly defined as the site of Furnival Street, which we
used to call Castle Street, and of the present Patent Office to the
south of Staple Inn. It was acquired in the following way.

In 1334 the executors of Robert le Hende de Worcester granted
a plot of land extending from the King's Street on the north to
the tenement of the Bishop of Chichester on the south to Thomas
de Lincoln of the Common Bench, the King's serjeant, who is
described as the son of Thomas de Lincoln. In 1331 John de
Totel de Lincoln had granted to Thomas de Lincoln some land
to the east of this, and in 1332 Andrew Courtays had granted a
garden to the south-east of this property to Thomas de Lincoln.
He combined these three properties, and they formed the first home
of the Society of * Lyncolnesynne.' Mr. Paley Baildon has dis-
covered that there was an enormous increase in the work of the
law courts about 1 340, and this would no doubt lead to an increase
in the number of the students of the law and necessitate the
erection of new hostels.

In 1348 Thomas de Bedic granted all his rights of lordship
over this land to Thomas de Lincoln. By three deeds dated
1364, 1366, and 1369, the fee simple of the whole property was

1 That is perhaps why we still find a court called Nevill's Court on the
east side of Fetter Lane.

252 IV. Blake Odgers [xn

conveyed by Thomas de Lincoln to the Abbot and Convent of
Malmesbury. In 1399 a 'Rental' of the property of the Convent
of Malmesbury was drawn up which shows a payment to the
Abbot of £8 De Firmario novi hospicii apud Londoniam vocati
Lyncolnesynne. And in this Rental there is a later entry on the
bottom margin of the same page ; it is undated but it was probably
written early in the fifteenth century. It is to the following
effect: — Hospicium Armigeri jam magnum hospitium quod est
ruinosum reddit per annum 40^. The rent had no doubt been
reduced from £8 to 403. because of the ruinous condition of the
big mansion.1

Hence, early in the fifteenth century, we find the Society of
Lincoln's Inn located in a mansion on the east side of Chancery
Lane which had become ruinous. The landlord apparently did
nothing towards the repair of the mansion. And so it seems clear
that the Society moved across Chancery Lane and entered into
occupation of the house and premises of the Bishop of Chichester,

1 For the above details as to the title of these various properties I am
indebted to Mr. E. Williams, who is in possession of the title-deeds.
See also an article by Mr. G. J. Turner of Lincoln's Inn in the Athenaum,
September 22, 1906, p. 335. It may be interesting to subjoin the text of
the most important entries.

EXTRACT FROM THE RENTAL OF THE PROPERTY OF THE CONVENT
OF MALMESBURY 1399

' De Firmario novi hospicii apud Londoniam vocati . J
Lyncolnesynne ad iiiior terininos solvendo per annum . \ *!,, .

De tenemento quondam Gaillardi Poet in Holbourne xxs
De tenemento quondam Walter Bartone Allutarii . xiils mid '
Written in a different hand, with different coloured ink, at the bottom
margin of the page, and certainly of a later date, the following remarks have
been added :

' London. Hospicium Armigeri jam magnum hospitium

quod est ruinosum reddit per annum . XLs
Tenura Celda proxima annexa hospicio reddit per
tenencium annum ...... ixs

infra silvam Secunda celda reddit per annum . . xs
magni hospicii Tertia celda reddit per annum . . vills

Quarta celda que est . . .'

[Here the page is cut away]

The ( hospicium armigeri ' of the marginal note is obviously the same
building as the ' Lyncolnesynne ' of the former entry. Serjeants were ex
officio 'armigeri,' and, according to Foss, were often so designated in the
fourteenth century.

xii] The Inns of Court 253

which had lain empty since 1412. The exact date of this removal
we cannot fix, but it must have been before 1422 ; for in that year
commence the Black Books, the first volume of which is entitled
Liber Hospitii de Lincolnsin. The earliest entries in this volume
show that the persons then in possession of those premises formed
a fully established society, possessing the constitution, powers, and
privileges of an Inn of Court. And those persons retained their
former title of the Society of Lincoln's Inn, and never called them-
selves Bishop's Inn or Chichester Inn, as would have been the case
with a society newly created. That the Society of Lincoln's Inn
existed before 1422 is clear from the fact that in the Corporation
Letter Books one Thomas Broun is described as Maunciple of
Lincoln's Inn, under date of 1417.

Lastly, we find in the Black Books another entry which
seems to establish the continuity of the present Society with that
formed on the other side of Chancery Lane by the King's serjeant.
In 1466 the Society was paying 95. yearly to the Prior of St. Giles'
Hospital for Lepers for another part of its property ; and no other
rents, apparently, were being paid for any other part on the west
side of Chancery Lane. But on p. 8 of vol. i of the Black Books
of the present Society the following entry occurs : —

In the vigil of the Apostles Peter and Paul 16 Henry VI
(1438) John Row delivered to John Fortescue and others in the
name of the Society to be paid to ... Halssewylle for the farm of
Lyncollysyn in arrear for the I5th year (Henry VI) in the time of
Bartholomew Bolney then Pensioner in full payment 403. out of
money received by him.

That is to say, the Society of Lincoln's Inn, now settled in the
Bishop of Chichester's mansion, was still paying the identical rent
of 403. which it paid at the commencement of the century for the
ruinous hospitium of Lyncolnesynne.

THE LEGEND OF THE EARL OF LINCOLN

But, as time ran on, the King's serjeant was forgotten ; no one
remembered Thomas de Lincoln and his hospice to the north of
the Chancellor's ditch. And men began to wonder why the Society
was called 'Lincoln's Inn/ The name did not seem to have « any
connexion with the history of the Society's present abode ; from

254 ^ Blake Odgers [xn

what source then did it come ? And some one must have recol-
lected that there was an Earl of Lincoln who was a famous man in
the reign of Edward I, and who resided somewhere in this locality ;
possibly he was the founder of the Society. And in that uncritical
age the suggestion soon found favour.

Hence it is that we find in the Origines Juridiciales (at p. 231)
the following remarkable passage : —

After this Ralph Nevill, Richard de Wihtz (commonly called
Saint Richard) had also his residence here. But in the next age
Henry Lacy, Earl of Lincolne became possest thereof, and resided
in it ; whereupon as many other great Houses, did in those dayes
take denomination from their Owners, this had then accordingly
the name of Lincolnes Inne, and hath ever since been so called.

Of this Henry, Earl of Lincolne, is the tradition still current
amongst the Antients here ; that he, about the beginning of King
Edward the seconds time, being a person well affected to the
knowledge of the Lawes, first brought in the professors of that
honourable and necessary study, to settle in this place : but direct
proof thereof from good Authority, I have not as yet seen any.

There was good ground for Dugdale's scepticism. No Earl of
Lincoln ever owned or occupied any portion of the land which
belonged in Dugdale's day to the Honourable Society of Lincoln's
Inn. Every square inch of this land was the property of the See
of Chichester from 1227, when it was granted to Bishop Neville, to
1537) when Bishop Sampson sold it to the Inn. And the only
mansion on the land was, as we have seen, occupied by successive
bishops from 1227 till 1412.

There was no doubt at the beginning of the fourteenth century
a great man living in this neighbourhood, Henry De Lacy, Earl of
Lincoln and Salisbury. He owned the whole manor of Holborn,
having purchased it in 1286 for 550 marks from the Black Friars,
who had occupied it from 1215. His mansion stood in Shoe Lane
on the slope of Holborn Hill, to the south-east of St. Andrew's
Church. He was a valiant knight and an able statesman ; he was
also a successful market-gardener. He made a considerable sum
of money (for those days) by the sale of his fruit and vegetables.
He was famous for the beauty of his gardens, which stretched
down almost to Fleet Street. Think of him in his manor house on
the slope of Holborn Hill looking across the Fleet brook at the little
city still encircled by its Roman wall.

xn] The Inns of Court 255

Forget six counties overhung with smoke,
Forget the snorting steam and piston stroke,
Forget the spreading of the hideous town ;
Think rather of the pack-horse on the down,
And dream of London, small, and white, and clean,
The clear Thames bordered by its gardens green.

And in this house Henry De Lacy, Earl of Lincoln, died in
1311 ; and his mansion and his manor passed to his son-in-law the
Earl of Lancaster, Lord High Steward of England and cousin of
the King, and was subsequently owned by other persons of high
rank, whose title to them is well known. There is not the faintest
evidence that any professors or students of the law ever occupied
any portion of Earl De Lacy's house or grounds.

To get over this difficulty it has recently been suggested that
what the Earl did was to establish the lawyers not in his residence,
but in Thavie's Inn, which stood at a little distance from it on
the other side of Shoe Lane. But this he would have had no
right to do. The Earl never owned either the house which was
later called Davy's or Thavie's Inn, nor that which twelve years
after the Earl's death became the property of John Tavy, the
armourer. The Earl would have had no possible right * to bring
in ' professors of the law into either house.

And note that the tradition recorded by Dugdale does not
assert either of these propositions. Still less does it assert that
the Earl brought the lawyers into his house in Shoe Lane. It
rests upon the assumption that in the reign of Edward II. he
' became possessed of, and resided in/ the mansion built by Ralph
Neville, which we know to be untrue. The fact is that the name
' Lincoln's Inn ' is in no way derived from or connected with
Henry De Lacy, Earl of Lincoln. Yet the Society in 1518 placed
his arms on the side of their gatehouse facing Chancery Lane,
where they still remain. And in 1553 they placed them with
other coats on the ' loover or lanthorn ' over their Old Hall.1

GRAY'S INN

Gray's Inn, like Lincoln's Inn, lies wholly without the City
boundary ; for though it is in the parish of St. Andrew's, Holborn,
none of it is within the ward of Farringdon. It is, in all prob-

1 Dugdale, Orig. Jurid.^ p. 232.

256 IV. Blake Odgers [xn

ability, as old or nearly as old as the other Inns of Court. Sir
George Buc records a tradition currrent at the Bar in Elizabeth's
reign that Gray's Inn had been an Inn of Court since the days
of Edward •III.1 It lies within the Manor of Portpool ; and this
Manor undoubtedly belonged as early as 1298 to Reginald, Lord
Grey de Wilton, Chief Justice of Chester. But there were no
lawyers there during his lifetime. The precise date at which the
students of the law ventured to come outside the City walls and
settle in or near the ancient manor house of Lord Grey de Wilton
cannot be precisely ascertained. They came no doubt from the
Inns of Chancery on the south side of Holborn, and especially
from Staple Inn and Barnard's Inn.

The earliest records which Gray's Inn now possesses are the
Pension Books, which begin in the year 1 569 ; there was an older
volume, to which Dugdale had access, but which now is lost. The
Inn also has preserved a list of its Benchers and Readers, prepared
by its butler Segar in the time of Charles II, which makes the
Inn date back to 1355 ; but this list is not trustworthy. In 1589
Yelverton, J., spoke of Gray's Inn as having been founded * two
hundred years ago at least,' but we cannot implicitly rely on a
statement in round numbers such as this. One thing, however,
is certain. I have already quoted the Paston Letters, and it is
marvellous what valuable things we find in that collection of
letters, discovered almost by an accident. In 1454 William Paston
wrote to his father that when on a journey he had met Sir William
Bylling, Chief Justice of the King's Bench, and this learned judge
said to him: 'I was a felaw in Gray's Inn along with Ledam.'
The word * felaw ' was applied in those days to any member of
one of these Societies, and it would probably even then take a
student forty years to attain to the dignity of a Chief Justice ; so
that there must have been a fully-constituted Inn, either of Court
or of Chancery, on this spot at or soon after the accession of
Henry V in 1413.

In 1 505 the ninth Lord Grey de Wilton, by indenture of bargain
and sale, assigned ' to Hugh Denys, Esquire, his heirs and assigns,
the manor of Portpool, otherwise called Gray's Inn, including two
messuages, four gardens, the site of a windmill, eight acres of land,
ten shillings of free rent, and the advowson of the chantry of Port-
1 S tow's Chronicle, p. 1073.

xn] The Inns of Court 257

poole aforesaid.' Some eight years later, in 1513, the Prior and
convent of Shene (that is Richmond, in Surrey) bought the manor
from Denys' trustees. In 1516 a society consisting of two Serjeants
and four barristers took a lease of the Manor of Portpool from the
Prior of Shene for los. a year and a fine of £6: 13:4. On this
manor still stood the ancient house of Lord Grey de Wilton, of
which probably this society was already in occupation. The manor
escheated to the Crown at the dissolution of the monasteries, but
Henry VIII renewed the lease, and the Inn has long ago bought
the freehold.

The beautiful Hall of Gray's Inn was finished in 1563 — eight
years before the Hall of the Middle Temple, which it much
resembles. At this time houses had been built along Holborn,
almost as far as Southampton Row ; Warwick Court was already
in existence, but there was no entrance into South Square from
Holborn ; that was made by Francis Bacon at a later date. Gray's
Inn was approached by a gate leading into Gray's Inn Square, to
the north of the chapel and the Hall ; that is why the old gate of
the Hall is on its northern side. And once more I would point out
how history lingers in the names of streets. There is still a street
called Portpool Lane, that runs in a line with Hatton Wall from
Leather Lane to Gray's Inn, which it strikes to the north of the
chapel and the Hall. This was no doubt a short cut from the
bottom of Holborn Hill to the Manor of Portpool, and later to the
northern gate of Gray's Inn.

THE INNS OF CHANCERY

It is clear then that the Inner and Middle Temple, Lincoln's
Inn, and Gray's Inn were all established as distinct societies by
the end of the fourteenth century. They were by that time
accepted as general schools of law, and had acquired recognized
privileges as Inns of Court although they held no charter from
the Crown. But, in addition to these four Inns of Court, there
were — as we learn from Sir John Fortescue, who wrote in 1470 —
'ten lesser Inns, and sometimes more, which are called Inns of
Chancery, in each of which there are an hundred students at the
least.' In Lord Coke's time there were only eight.

There is much that might be said about the Inns of Chancery

258 IV. Blake Odgers [xn

if time permitted. In the Inns of Court dwelt those advocates who
had not attained to the degree of serjeant-at-law, and also the more
advanced students. In the Inns of Chancery resided the Clerks of
the Chancery, who prepared the original writs for the King's Courts,
and also the younger apprentices who copied these writs, and thus
acquired some elementary knowledge of civil procedure. With the
possible exception of Simond's Inn and Staple Inn, the Inns of
Chancery differed in their constitutions in no essential particular
from the Inns of Court. But the main distinction between these
two classes of Inns was this — that the Inns of Court could call men
to the Bar, and thus confer upon them the privilege of acting as
advocates in the King's Courts. This no Inn of Chancery could
do. How the Inns of Court acquired this privilege it seems now
impossible definitely to ascertain. Nor is it clear why the Inns of
Chancery did not possess it also ; for some of these — Clifford's Inn,
for instance — appear to be of as ancient a date as the present Inns
of Court. But the four Inns of Court in some way acquired the
mastery, while the Inns of Chancery fell into the second rank.
They served as preparatory schools for the Inns of Court up to the
end of the sixteenth century ; each Inn of Court appears to have
periodically sent to every Inn of Chancery attached to it a reader,1
accompanied by two ' utter barristers/ who there discussed points
of law and presided over ' moots.' This committee of three had
the power of bringing over each term the two most promising
students of the Inn of Chancery and passing them into the Inn
of Court. Hence many students entered an Inn of Chancery in
the first instance, and were thence transferred to an Inn of Court.
Throughout the Tudor period this custom was generally observed,
though by the time of Sir Matthew Hale it had become obsolete.

In the reigns of Queen Elizabeth and James I. Orders were
passed by the four Inns forbidding ' common attorneys ' and
solicitors from joining an Inn of Court, and this exclusion was
confirmed by further Orders passed by the judges and also by
the Privy Council. But these new regulations were not strictly
observed. Attorneys and solicitors were not wholly excluded
from the Inns of Court until towards the close of the eighteenth

1 Thus Mr. Thomas More of Lincoln's Inn went as reader to Furnival's
Inn in the reign of Henry VIII, and Mr. Edward Coke of the Inner Temple
was reader at Lyon's Inn in the reign of Elizabeth.

xii] The Inns of Court 259

century. One consequence of this exclusion was that it now
became impossible for attorneys and solicitors to be heard as
advocates in the superior courts of law and equity. Another
and a later result was the rule of our profession that a barrister
can only plead in those courts when he has been instructed > by
an attorney or solicitor. But in the meantime the attorneys,
being thus excluded from the Inns of Court, gradually obtained
entire control of the Inns of Chancery.

The Inns of Chancery have now all ceased to exist as schools
of law. Staple Inn, which Sir George Buc described as 'the
fayrest Inne of Chancery in this University,' still stands intact ;
for this we have to thank the Prudential Assurance Company, its
present owners. Barnard's Inn, close at hand, is now the property
of the Mercers' Company. The boys of the Mercers' School have
their lunch daily in its old hall, which the Company has carefully
preserved. We have already traced the early history of Thavie's
Inn ; a small portion of one wall is all that is left standing ; the
rest is occupied by part of a modern street called St. Bride's Street.
Furnival's Inn was pulled down in the reign of Charles I, but
was rebuilt by Inigo Jones and lasted until 1820; it stood on
the site now occupied by the offices of the Prudential Assurance
Company. Passing south to Fleet Street we find Clifford's Inn still
standing, close to St. Dunstan's Church. It was founded as a school
of law by Lady Clifford in 1344. It was from the first connected
with the Inner Temple, and many of its students have from time
to time crossed Fleet Street to join that Inn of Court. But there is
no evidence that there ever was a migration of any considerable body
of students from one to the other. Clement's Inn, which adjoined
St. Clement's Church and the Holy-well, is now a row of handsome
offices. New Inn was demolished when Holywell Street and Wych
Street were pulled down in order to widen the Strand. Lyon's Inn,
which stood between Holywell Street and Wych Street, was pulled
down in 1863 to make room for the Globe Theatre. Strand Inn,
which stood on the south side of the Strand, opposite the Church of
St. Mary-le-Strand, was demolished by Protector Somerset in the
reign of Edward VI, in order to make room for his new palace,
which we now know as Somerset House.

So the Inns of Chancery have one by one disappeared ; none
of them, at all events, are in use to-day as places of legal education.

260 W. Blake Odgers [xn

But the Inns of Court still stand four-square — the Inns which
were described by James I in his charter of August 13, 1608,
as ' those four colleges, the most famous in all Europe.' Long
may they flourish ! To them has been entrusted the exclusive
power of admitting students of law to the Bar of England ;
on them has been conferred the right and the duty of selecting
those who shall enjoy the monopoly of audience in the superior
courts of England. His call to the Bar confers great privileges
and powers on the young advocate. He is given the right, the
terrible right, of almost unfettered cross-examination. He has
also the right in his discretion to attack the character of a party
or a witness, and no action for slander can be brought against him.
Such powers must be entrusted only to persons who will use them
honourably and well. Should they pass into the hands of unfit
and dishonourable men they will be taken away from the whole
Bar. Those who confer the privilege of audience in the High
Court of the Kingdom must therefore also have the power to take
that privilege away.

The ancient Inns of Court, whose history 1 have been endeavour-
ing to impart to you to-day, still retain, and rightly retain, the two
high privileges of calling worthy men to the Bar, and of disbarring
those who prove to.be unworthy. And I may add, I think, that
they exercise these powers to the general satisfaction of the English
nation.

W. BLAKE ODGERS.

XIII

THE EARLY HISTORY OF ENGLISH
EQUITY

ONE of the most striking features of the English system of justice
prior to the Judjrature Acts was the dual system of courts adminis-
tering a dual system of justice — common law rules and remedies
and equitable rules and remedies. This dual system of courts had
not always existed ; and the significance of the Judicature Acts
lies in the fact that it brought back conditions that existed before
the Chancery acquired its position as a court of equity. Even the
Chancery exercised a common law as well as an equitable jurisdic-
tion, and long before the establishment of the Chancery as a court
of justice older tribunals had exercised a jurisdiction both at law
and in equity. The beginnings of English equity are to be sought
in the history of these older courts — the common law courts them-
selves, the local courts, the ecclesiastical courts, and Parliament
and the Council acting in their judicial capacity. In the present
paper I wish to draw attention to the equitable jurisdiction of the
early common law courts, omitting all reference to the equity of
local and ecclesiastical courts and of Parliament and the Council.

The Prankish king's court exercised what amounted to an
equitable jurisdiction. Based, perhaps, partly upon this earlier
practice in the land of our legal ancestors and partly upon the
royal justice of Anglo-Saxon times, the English king's courts in
the centuries immediately following the Norman Conquest not
only developed the principles of the early common law, but also
administered a softening and supplementing equity that was dis-
tinguished, both in the theory and in the practice of the times,

261

262 H. D. Hazeltine [xm

from the rigour of the common law itself. As the king's courts
were not yet greatly checked by legislation and by judicial
precedent, but were possessed rather of very wide discretionary
powers, the need of a separate and distinct equity court seems not
to have been felt : the king's courts themselves could do whatever
equity required. But this early equity of the common law courts
— the King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer — was much
more than a broad, vague, and mystical doing of justice ; for these
courts developed a rudimentary system of equitable principles and
equitable remedies very like, in some respects, the more fully
and elaborately developed system of the Chancery in a later age.1
Procedure by bills in eyre, as we have so recently learned from
Mr. Bolland, seems actually to have been the predecessor of the
Chancery's procedure by bills in equity.2 But what I am now
desirous of showing is that even the common law system of
original and judicial writs gave the common law courts an oppor-
tunity to administer equity. The oldest actions of the common
law seem indeed to have been mostly actions brought not so much
for 'damages,' the characteristic relief of the classical common
law, as for what Chancery lawyers, at a later day, designated
'specific relief; and in administering justice by writ process, the
early justices not only gave judgments in rem, but also what we
must designate ( decrees in personamj decrees that under the in-
fluence of the subpoena became so marked a feature of the equity
of the Chancellors.3

I propose in the present paper to give a short account of the
following branches of this early equity of the common law courts :
(i) Uses, (2) Gages, (3) Penalties, (4) Specific Performance, (5)
Prohibitions, (6) Writs Quia Timet.

I. USES

The recent researches of Pollock, Maitland, and other legal
historians prove that the practice of conveying land to uses began

1 See the present writer's essay entitled ' Early History of Specific Per-
formance of Contract in English Law' (Festgabe fur Kohler, 68, 69).

2 Y.B. Edward II, Eyre of Kent, 6 and 7 Edward II 1313-14 (Selden
Soc.), vol. ii. (1912), xxi-xxx.

3 See further the present writer's essay referred to in note i supra, and
the literature therein cited ; also Bigelow, Hist, of Proced. in Eng. chap. iv.

xin] Early Equity 263

long before the interest of the cestui que use was protected by the
subpoena of the Chancellor. It is the generally accepted view
that in this earliest period of the history of the use of land the
obligation of the feoffee to uses was purely moral, and was un-
enforced by judicial process in royal courts.1

In opposition to this view Mr. Justice Holmes maintains, in
his essay on ' Early English Equity/ 2 that the enforcement of uses
did not originate in the Chancery and was not based upon the
personal obedience of the feoffee to the subpoena. According to
Holmes the early feoffee to uses was but the salman or treuhand
of early German law transplanted to English soil. This position
is confirmed, in Holmes's view, by the fact that the executor of
the Continent was simply the Germanic treuhand somewhat
modified under the influence of Roman legal notions, and that the
Continental executor and the English executor of Glanvill's time
were undoubtedly identical. When we look at the protection
accorded to the cestui que use, contends the learned justice, we
find that both the common law and the ecclesiastical courts were
prepared to give remedies. It was usual for feoffees to uses to
enter into covenants in favour of their feoffors. In cases therefore
where feoffors were themselves the cestuis que usent, they were
protected as against their feoffees by the common law writ of
covenant : and by this writ the feoffor might even recover the
land itself. If the cestui que use was a third person and thus a
stranger to the covenant, he was unable to invoke the protection
of the common law courts on their doctrine of covenants, but he
could and did reach the feoffee, in the ecclesiastical courts, for
breach of faith. At a later time ecclesiastical Chancellors developed
the use more fully than their predecessors of the church courts
had been able to do.

Into the arguments that have been advanced against Mr. Justice
Holmes's view I cannot now enter. I must be content to have
drawn your attention to the fact that, at least in Holmes's view,
the early common law courts were employing their writ of covenant
for the enforcement of uses long before the Chancellor made use of
a more comprehensive and effective remedy — the subpoena.

1 See Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 2nd ed., 228-239 ;
Ames, 'The Origin of Uses' (Lectures on Legal History, 1913, pp. 233-247).

2 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, vol. ii. 705-721.

264 H. D. Hazeltine [xra

It appears also that the early common law courts were enforcing
uses or trusts of chattels and money by the writs of detinue and
account. Ames, in his essays on the ' History of Parol Contracts
Prior to Assumpsit ' 1 and the ' Origin of Uses and Trusts,' 2 has
dealt fully with this phase of the equity of the common law courts.
He has shown that on the delivery of money by one man to
another to the use of a third, this third person — the beneficiary —
was permitted to bring the action of account against the one who
had received the money to his use. In the same way the bailment
of a chattel to the use of a third party was enforced by this third
party — the beneficiary — in the action of detinue. It is Ames's
view, to quote his own words, that ' a defendant's duty to account,
whether as bailiff or receiver, arose from his receipt of property as
a trustee, and that a plaintiff entitled to an account was strictly a
cestui que trust. In other words, trusts for the payment of money
were enforced at common law long before Chancery gave effect to
trusts of land. . . . Account against a receiver was long ago super-
seded by the common count for money had and received by the
defendant to the use of the plaintiff. But the words "to the
use of" still bear witness to the trust relation.' ' It must have been
all the easier for the Chancellor,' says Ames in another place, ' to
allow the subpoena against the feoffee to uses because the common
law gave a remedy against a fiduciary who had received chattels
or money to be delivered to a third person, or, as it was often
expressed, to the use of a third person, or to be redelivered to the
person from whom he had received the chattels or the money.'

It is likewise contended by this distinguished historian of
English law that ' as the Chancellor, in giving effect to uses declared
upon a feoffment, followed the analogy of the common law bailment
of chattels, or the delivery of money upon the common law trust,
so in enforcing the use growing out of a bargain and sale, he
followed another analogy of the common law, that of the sale of a
chattel. The purchaser of a chattel, who had paid or become
indebted for the purchase money, had an action of detinue against
the seller. Similarly the buyer of land who had paid or become a
debtor for the price of the land, was given the right of a cestui que
use [by the Chancellor].'

1 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, vol. iii. 304-319.

2 Ibid. vol. ii. 737-752.

xiii} Early Equity 265

Ames's doctrine as to the so-called common law trust of chattels
and money has not gone unchallenged. Hening, for example, in
his 'History of the Beneficiary's Action in Assumpsit,'1 contends
that the obligation of the bailee of a chattel and the receiver of
money as regards the beneficiary cannot be ranged under the
category of trusts, in the modern sense, because the conception of
an ' equitable ownership ' in the beneficiary was lacking in the early
common law. Although we cannot pursue this inquiry further at
the present time, we should note in passing that, whether or not
we agree fully with Ames's view, certainly the early common law
courts were enforcing by means of the writs of detinue and account,
obligations of at least a fiduciary character — the obligations of
persons who received chattels and money to the use of others.

II. GAGES

A study of the law of securities on property in the time of
Henry the Second throws much light upon the equitable nature of
certain features of the procedure in the king's court.2 The court
enforced both the usufruct-gage and the property-gage of land.
The property -gage assumed the form of a conveyance under
condition precedent. If the parties include a clause of forfeiture in
their contract, the gaged land, already in the creditor's possession,
will at once become his absolute property, upon the principle of
forfeiture, on the debtor's failure to pay at the fixed day. On the
other hand, should the contract contain no clause of forfeiture,
the creditor must go into court, and there must be certain legal
proceedings before the law will view the gaged land as absolutely
forfeited to the creditor for non-payment of the debt. These
proceedings are essentially equitable in character, and show very
clearly that the common law courts of the twelfth century had
already arrived at a conception of what Chancery judges of later
times will designate the ' equity of redemption ' and the ' decree of
foreclosure.' What are these equitable proceedings of the king's
court ?

1 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, vol. iii. 339-367.

2 See the present writer's ' Gage of Land in Medieval England '
(Harvard Law Review, xviii. 552 seq. ; also Select Essays in Anglo-American
Legal History, vol. iii. 646-672), and also his Geschichte des englischen
Pfandrechts, 29, 198, 200, 213-232, 248 seq.

266 H. D. Plazeltine [xm

If the land be gaged for a term, and if the debtor fail to pay at
the end of the term, the creditor must sue him. The debtor is then
compelled to appear in court in answer to a writ ordering him to
' acquit' or redeem the gage. If then in court the debt and the
gage be confessed by the debtor or otherwise proved by the
creditor, the debtor is ordered by the court to redeem the gage
within a * reasonable ' time by payment of the debt ; and the court
at the same time declares that, in case of default in payment at
the end of this new period, the gaged land shall become the
property of the gagee and thus forfeited for the debt.1

If, on the other hand, the gage be given indefinitely or without
a term, the creditor may at any time demand the debt. To all
seeming this means that the creditor can at any time go into court
and get a judgment ordering the debtor to redeem within some
fixed and reasonable period ; and that the court will at the same
time declare that, if the debtor fail thus to redeem, the creditor
may do anything he pleases with the gaged land, as it has been
forfeited by reason of the debtor's default.2

At a later time, when the dual system of Common Law and
Equity, administered by two separate and distinct sets of tribunals,
was fully developed, the equitable jurisdiction over gages of law
belonged exclusively to the Court of Chancery. The property-
gage of the time of Henry the Second had become obsolete, and
the classical common law mortgage by conveyance under condition
subsequent had taken its place. The common law courts rigidly
enforced the forfeiture of the mortgaged land for non-payment of
the debt at the very time fixed by the parties in their contract. It
was the Chancery alone which gave relief. The equitable right of
the debtor to redeem the mortgaged land, after absolute forfeiture
at law, became known as the * equity of redemption ' ; and the equit-
able right of the creditor to obtain a decree of Chancery ordering
the debtor to pay or for all time to lose his mortgaged land by for-
feiture, in equity as well as at law, became known as the ' right to
a decree of foreclosure.' Now the interesting thing about the
procedure of the earlier period — the time of Henry the Second
— is that it was the procedure of the king's court, the court of the
common law. This procedure is indeed a very enlightening illus-

1 Glanvill, x. 6-8.

2 Glanvill, x. 8 ; Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. ii. 120.

[xiii Early Equity 267

tration of the fact that, before the development of a system of
equity administered by the Court of Chancery, the courts of the
common law were accustomed, in the interests of justice and equity,
to soften the harshness and rigour of the law by the exercise of
what is known in later times as equitable jurisdiction. Even after ,
non-payment of the debt on the day set by the parties in their
contract of gage, the debtor was given a further opportunity of -
redeeming the land ; and this second opportunity of the debtor
essentially amounted to a rudimentary equity of redemption.1 The
patience of the creditor and of the court had its limits, however,
and if the debtor failed to exercise his equitable right to redeem
within the new period fixed by the court, the land then belonged,
by decree of the court, finally, absolutely, and irrevocably to the
creditor as a forfeiture for non-payment of the debt ; and this final
decree of the court essentially amounted to a rudimentary decree
of foreclosure.

By the time of Edward the First the common law appears to have
taken the position which it has ever since maintained ; for Britton
tells us that the equity (equite) of the common law will not assist
the mortgagor who has allowed the set day to pass without pay-
ment of the debt.2 After the early common law courts had thus
ceased to give relief against forfeiture by means of the ' equity of
redemption/ it was left to the Chancellors of later times to reintro-
duce it into the law of mortgages in the form in which it has ever
since played a conspicuous r61e in the equity of Chancery. By
failing thus to retain the equity of redemption as a working prin-
ciple of their system of justice the common law courts lost for all
subsequent ages jurisdiction over a highly important branch of
English law.

III. PENALTIES

The relief of the early justices in cases of gage of property was

1 The spirit of the twelfth-century common law courts is expressed in the
1 words of Glanvill, x. 8 : ' It is, however, sometimes requisite that he [the

debtor] should be present in court, before the thing in question be adjudged
absolutely to the creditor ; since, were he present, he might allege some
reason why the thing should not irrevocably belong to the creditor/

2 Britton, Book III. chap. xv. 6 (Nichols' ed. ii. 128): « Et si les pleintifs
dient, qe equite les deit eyder pur la petitesce de la dette, ceo ne lour vaille
rien . . .' See Holdsworth, History of English Law^ vol. ii. 249.

268 H. D. Hazeltine [xui

relief against forfeiture. There is some evidence that the equity of
the early common law courts also anticipated the equity of the
Chancery in relieving against penalties.

Maitland, in his Introduction to. the Selden Society's edition of
the - Year Books of 2 and 3 Edward II, • drew attention1 to the
case of Umfraville v. Lonstede? decided in the second year of
Edward II (1308-9), which, in his view, 'seems to deserve the
notice of every future historian of English equity.' In this case, to
quote Maitland's words, 'a man has bound himself to pay a
certain sum if he does not hand over a certain document on a
certain day. Being sued upon his bond, he is unable to deny that
he did not tender the document on the day fixed for the transfer ;
but he tenders it now, excuses himself by saying that he was
beyond the sea, having left the document with his wife for delivery,
and urges that the plaintiff has suffered no damage. The plaintiff
relies upon the words of the bond, and we must confess to having
thought that in and about the year 1309 judgment for the plaintiff
would have followed as a matter of course. But, to our surprise,
Bereford, C.J., after remarking that what is sought to be recovered
is not, properly speaking, a debt (purement dette) but a penalty
(une peine\ exclaims, " What equity would it be to award you the
debt when the document is tendered and you cannot show that
you have been damaged by the detention ? " 3 In the end the
plaintiff is told that he will have to wait seven years for his judg-
ment. Here certainly,' concludes Maitland, ' we seem to see " relief
against penalties " and relief that is granted in the name of " equity,"
though it takes the clumsy form of an indefinite postponement of
that judgment which is dictated by the rigour of the law.' 4

I have not searched for other cases in which common law courts

1 Y.B. 2 and 3 Edward II (Selden Soc.), p. xiii.
5 Y.B. 2 and 3 Edward II (Selden Soc.), 58.

3 Quel equite serra de agarder a vous le dette de pus qe 1'escrit est prest,
si vous ne porriez moustrer qe vous fustes endamage par la de[tenue] ? Par
qei volez receivre 1'escrit ?

In another version Bereford's words are these : — D'autrepart, ceo n'est
pas purement dette, mes une peyne, et veez par quele equite vous poez
demander ceo peyne (Moreover, this is not, properly speaking, a debt ; it is
a penalty ; and with what equity (look you !) can you demand this penalty ?).

4 In a footnote to the report of the case Maitland remarks : ' Observe
that the court does not propose to give judgment against the plaintiff, who has
the letter of the bond on his side.'

xin] Early Equity 269

gave relief against penalties ; but I do not believe that this remark-
able case referred to by Maitland stands alone.

IV. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

We associate specific performance o£contracts with the Chancery,
but the history of this form of relief begins at least two hundred
years before the earliest decree by the Chancellor ; for the common
law courts of Henry II and Henry III were giving, in their own
way, much the same remedy,1 and what the courts of the king were
doing the courts of the fair and the manor and the church were
doing also. The early common law courts, exercising very wide
discretionary or equitable powers, and using their own judicial
machinery, made indeed an honest and a fairly effectual effort to
enforce the specific performance of contractual obligations. They
thus enforced the covenant of the lessor, the covenant to convey,
the obligations arising out of final concords, the agreements of
lords to acquit their tenants from suit of court, the obligations of
warrantors. Specific performance of these contractual obligations
was compelled by the court in various ways. Sometimes the court
ordered the defendant in general terms to keep his promise, i.e. to
specifically perform ; and sometimes the court ordered the de-
fendant to perform his covenant by giving the plaintiff possession
of the land or by executing a conveyance. On the defendant's
failure to comply with the judicial order, performance was then
enforced by the exaction of security from the defendant, by dis-
traint, or even by the threatened loss of the promisor's land. We
have here, in these cases, not judgments in rem, but what we must
designate 'decrees in personamj the characteristic relief of the
equity of chancery in later times. The early common law courts
seem, in fact, to have been striving as best they could to bring the
contractual obligations of defendants home to their consciences.
To that end the court directed the sheriff to command the defendant
to specifically perform his agreement ; and only on disobedience
to this command was pressure exerted upon him. This common
law method of enforcing specific performance seems to have served
a highly useful purpose in the days before Chancery's advent as a

1 See the present writer's ' Early History of Specific Performance of Con-
tract in English Law' (Festgabe fur Kohler, 67-87).

270 H. D. Hazeltine [xni

judicial tribunal. The weak point in the common law method lay,
after all, in the inability of the court to do more than distrain the
disobedient party. Chancery's procedure by subpoena, resulting as
it might in the imprisonment of the party guilty of contempt of
court by refusal to obey the court's decree, was undoubtedly a more
effectual remedy, and naturally supplanted in time the older process
of the common law.

V. PROHIBITIONS

I pass now to the common law writs of prohibition. In Chancery
the injunction was a judicial process, employed for various pur-
poses, whereby a party was ordered to do a particular thing or to
refrain from doing a particular thing ; and injunctions, owing largely
to the fact that they were judicial orders in personam, have gener-
ally been viewed as distinctively characteristic of Chancery as distin-
guished from common law procedure. Common lawyers have not
been slow in drawing attention to the writ of prohibition as a com-
mon law process analogous to the injunction ; but they have usually
emphasized just that employment of this writ which has nothing
to do with anything the Chancery lawyers call equitable; for,
although common law courts made use of the prohibition to restrain
ecclesiastical and other courts, Chancery never restrained common
law or other courts by means of the injunction. What I wish now
to point out is that, in the procedure of the early common law
courts, writs of prohibition and of estrepement and judicial orders
issued in proceedings begun by various other common law writs
anticipated the Chancery injunction as a process in personam
whereby parties, as well as courts, were commanded to do or to
refrain from doing a particular thing.

Let us glance for a moment at the prohibition of waste.

Bracton, in his account of common law procedure in cases of
waste by tenant in dower,1 makes it quite clear that the first step
to be taken was one of self-help. The law gave the one entitled
to the inheritance in the land full permission, without injury to
anyone, to stop the committing of waste. If these private efforts
proved unavailing, recourse to the court was then necessary. A
writ of prohibition of waste was issued to the sheriff, wherein he
was enjoined that he do not permit the woman to cause waste ;
1 Bracton, ff. 315, 316.

[xni Early Equity 27 1

and the sheriff was required to act promptly in carrying out this
order of the court,1 lest irreparable injury be done. If the dowress
still persisted in committing waste contrary to the court's pro-
hibition, the next step was for the heir, or other owner, to sue
her in a common law writ of waste. She was attached to appear
before the court to show cause why she committed waste contrary
to the court's prohibition. On the woman's denial of waste, a
view was taken of the property, and an inquest was held. On
proof of the waste the woman was obliged to make amends
(emendetur vastum) by payment of damages.

If the waste had been committed in a wood the court could, in
exercise of its discretionary power (de consilio curiae\ prohibit any
further waste and issue a writ for the appointment of a forester 2
by the heir. The duty of the forester was to protect the wood and
to see that the dowress took only her reasonable estovers and
committed no further waste contrary to the prohibition. If the
waste had been committed in houses, gardens, and pastures, the
court could add a clause to the writ which empowered the heir
to appoint one of his servants whose duty was to see that the
dowress committed no further waste. The writ3 was directed to
the sheriff, who was enjoined not to impede in any way the appoint-
ment of forester and servant by the heir.4

It is carefully to be observed that we have here in this method
of enforcing the court's order a procedure which is distinctly
equitable in character and which, so far as we can see, had been
developed by the common law courts since the time of Glanvill.5
In certain respects it may be looked upon as an anticipation of the
administrative side of the Chancery's activity.

Bracton's Note-Book contains two instructive cases upon pro-
hibition of waste by dowress. In John Sanfordv. Cecilia Sanford

1 Bracton, f.

2 Coke, Second Institute, 300, states that in the old books forestarius is
equivalent to custos boscorum, a woodward. On woodwards see Select Pleas
of the Forest (Selden Soc.), pp. xxiv-xxv, xlv, Ixvii.

8 Bracton, f. 316.

4 See Bracton's Note-Book, pi. 27, 56, fora case of the year 1219 (referred
to by Bracton, f. 316) in which the court ordered the appointment of a forester
to prevent the dowress and her husband from committing waste by taking
more from the wood than haybote and housebote. See also ibid. pi. 672.

5 See Twiss, Bracton (R.S.), vol. iv. pp. Ixi, Ixii ; Pollock and Maitland,
op. cit. ii. 596.

272 H. D. Hazeltine [xm

the defendant, a dowress, was sued for breach of a prohibition of
waste. So far as one can see, this is a case where the court had
prohibited not only voluntary waste but also permissive waste —
permitting a fish-pond and mill to go dry (molendinum omnino
desiccatum est et fractum et vivarium similiter)! In another case
writ of waste was brought without prior prohibition. In rendering
judgment the court required the defendant to pay damages and
an amercement ; and in addition it ordered the defendant not to
commit further waste under penalty of loss of her land.2

On waste by a guardian he could be reached by the plaintiff
with the common law writ of waste either before or after the issue
of a writ of prohibition ; although we may perhaps gather from
Bracton's account that the usual course was first to issue the
prohibition, and then, on breach of the prohibition, to bring the writ
of waste. The writ of prohibition was directed to the sheriff, and
in it he was enjoined not to permit the guardian to commit further
waste. If breach of the prohibition necessitated the bringing of
the writ of waste, and if the waste was proved, judgment was
rendered that the guardian lose the guardianship, render damages
to the plaintiff, and pay an amercement to the king. A distinction
was thus drawn by the law between waste by a guardian and
waste by a dowress, for the dowress did not, on committing
waste, lose her dower, whereas the guardian, on the other hand,
did lose his guardianship.3

This distinction between the penalties inflicted on dowress and
guardian resulted, as will be observed, in an important difference
between the judgment in the writ of waste against a guardian and
the judgment in the writ of waste against a dowress. As the guardian
lost his guardianship it was unnecessary for the court to include in
its judgment a perpetual prohibition of waste. On the other Kand,
as the dowress did not lose her dower land, it was necessary for
the court in its judgment to restrain waste for the future, and
sometimes even to order the appointment of forester and servant
to see that the prohibition was complied with by the defendant.

1 Bracton's Note-Book, pi. 1617 (A.D. 1223); s.c. Fitz. Wast, pi. 141.
Plowden, 3223, refers to this case. On this and other cases of waste in Brae.
N.-B. see Kirch wey's valuable 'Liability for Waste' (Columbia Law Review,
viii. 425-437). Modern equity courts do not restrain permissive waste.

2 Bracton's Note-Book, pi. 540.

3 Bracton, ff. 316, 317.

xin] Early Equity 273

Attention should be drawn to two interesting cases in Bracton's
Note-Book. In Royesia de la Dene a guardian in chivalry was
sued for waste contrary to a prohibition. In its judgment the
court ordered the defendant to restore a kitchen, which was burned
during the tenancy, and two farm buildings, which had collapsed
owing to non-repair, and also to repair all other buildings upon
the land ; while the court also prohibited her from causing any
waste for the future.1

In another case 2 a guardian had given two houses and two
trees to a dowress, who had taken them off the land. The guardian
was amerced to the king. In addition he was ordered to build
two other houses of the same value as those he had given away,
and was required to find pledges that he would neither carry off
trees nor commit any other waste, and that he would build the two
houses as he had been ordered by the court.3

Bracton's Note-Book contains cases which show us that tenants
for life and lessees for years were also prohibited by the king's
courts from committing waste. In the case of Nicholas Creusquer
v. Peter Pejure the defendant, who held lands ad terminum, was
attached to answer the plaintiff for waste. The case was dismissed
because the waste was of such slight value ; but at the same
time the court issued a prohibition, ordering the defendant to
commit no further waste in the future.4 Ranulf de Gatesdena v.
Matilda de Gatesdena was a case in which the defendant, a tenant
for life, was attached for waste. The inquest found that waste

1 Bracton's Note-Book, pi. 1165 (A.D. 1235): consideratum est quod
nullum fecit uastum, ita tamen quod tales etc. manuceperunt quod eadem
Roeysia reparari faceret coquinam et grangias et ea que ceciderunt tempore
quo eadem custodia exstitit in manu sua infra hunc annum, et quod de cetero
sustentabit omnia alia edificia et quod nullum uastum faciet in situ mesuagii
nee alibi ad exheredacionem predict! heredis.

This case is also fully given in Fitz. Wast, pi. 139, where the report
concludes : et inuenit pleg. ad hec omnia etc.

2 Bracton's Note-Book, pi. 1075 (A.D. 1225).

8 Et idea pro paruitate uasti et modo uastandi consideratum est quod
Godefridus faciet alias duas domos ad ualenciam predictarum domorum et
sit in misericordia. Et invenit tales plegios quod amplius non faciet uastum
nee arbores asportabit et quod faciet domos sicut predictum est etc.

4 Bracton's Note-Book, pi. 607 (A.D. 1231): Consideratum est quod
Petrus inde sine die, et prohibitum est ei quod de cetero nullum uastum
faciat.

Bracton, f. 3160, refers to this case. See also Fitz. Wast, pi. 134.

274 H. D. Hazeltine [xm

had been committed. The judgment of the court was that the
defendant be in mercy, pay the amount of the waste to the plaintiff,
and find pledges ; while in addition the prohibition of the court
issued forbidding her to commit any further waste under penalty
of the loss of her land.1 In Richard de Elmham v. Robert de
Corneville the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a life tenant, had
committed waste contrary to a prohibition. Both parties put
themselves upon the country, and an inquest was ordered.2

Bracton's Note-Book contains twenty-six cases on waste. In
twelve cases the writ of prohibition first issued ; and then later, on
breach of the prohibition, the aggrieved party brought the common
law writ of waste.3 In fourteen cases, on the other hand, the writ
of waste appears to have been brought at once without a prior
prohibition.4 Proceedings upon the writ of waste ended, in six
instances, in a prohibition of waste.5

Readers of the Second Institute will recall Coke's high praise of
the writ of the prohibition of waste. I cannot forbear quoting his
words, for they express very clearly the equitable character of this
common law remedy in effecting the preventive justice that was
later to be claimed by the Chancery as its own peculiar province.
Coke draws attention to two common law remedies for waste, the

1 Bracton's Note-Book, pi. 443 (A.D. 1230), 540 (A.D. 1231): Con-
sideratum est quod ipsa sit in misericordia et satisfaciat eidem Ranulfo de
predictis denariis et dictum est ei quod de cetero sub pena amissionis predicte
terre non faciat uastum uel destruccionem et ipsa inuenit pleg'.

See Bracton, f. 3i6b; Fitz. Wast, pi. 132.

2 Bracton's Note-Book, pi. 1304 (A.D. 1217), 1371 (A.D. 1220): Robertus
de Corneuilla summonitus fuit ad respondendum Ricardo de Elmham de
placito quare ipse fecit uastum contra prohibicionem Dom. Regis de bosco
in Tolleslund'. . . . Et Robertus uenit et defendit contra eum et contra sectam
suam quod nullum dampnum uel uastum fecit post prohibicionem ei factam
sicut curia considerauerit, et inde ponit se super iuratam patrie. Et Ricardus
similiter.

See Bracton, f. 316. The principal case will be found in Fitz. Wast,
pi. 140.

On the writ of prohibition in cases of waste by ecclesiastics, see Cruise,
Digest of the Laws of England respecting Real Property, 4th ed. vol. i. tit. iii.
ch. ii. § 71.

3 Bracton's Note-Book, pi. 27, 56, 388, 580, 632, 640, 718, 739, 880,
1075, I37i, 1617.

4 Bracton's Note-Book, pi. 115, 443, 461, 485, 527, 540, 574, 607, 691,
717, 1131, 1165, 1304, 1743.

5 Bracton's Note-Book, pi. 56, 540, 574, 607, 1075, 1165.

xin] Early Equity 275

writ of prohibition and the action of waste. ' Now the remedy at
the common law/ says Coke,1 ' was in two degrees : first, if he that
had the inheritance did feare (for example) that tenant in dower
would doe waste, he that had the inheritance might before any
waste done have a prohibition directed to the sheriffe, that he shall
not permit her to do waste in this forme. Rex vicecom? salutem.
Praecipimus tibi quod non permittas quod talis mulier faciat vastum,
vel venditionem, vel exilium de terris, hominibus, redditibus, domibus,
boscis, vel gardinis, quae tenent in dotem de haereditate talis in tali
villa, ad exhaeredationem ipsius talis ne amplius, etc. And Bracton's
advice hereupon is as followeth : Et hoc faciat tempestive, ne per
negligentiam damnum incurrat, quia melius est in tempore occurrere,
quam post causam vulneratam remedium quaerere. And the sheriffe
having the warrant of this writ may, as in case of a writ of
estrepement, take posse comitatus, and withstand the doing of any
waste. And this was the remedy [by prohibition] that the law
appointed before the waste done by the tenant in dower, tenant by
the curtesie, or the gardien, to prevent the same, and this was an
excellent law, for praestat cautela quam medela, and preventing
justice excelleth punishing justice. And this remedy may be used
at this day.'

Another striking illustration of the preventive justice admini-
stered by the early common law courts is furnished by the writs of
estrepement f writs that prohibited the commission of waste during
the course of judicial process.

At common law the writ of estrepement could be brought after
judgment in any real action and before execution of the judgment
by delivery of possession on the part of the sheriff ; and the object
of the writ was to prevent the commission of waste by the one
who, although in possession of the land, was not entitled to the
land as his own by reason of the judgment against him in the real
action.3

1 Second Institute -, 299.

2 Blackstone, Commentaries (ed. 1768), iii. 225, says that estrepement is
' an old French word, signifying the same as waste or extirpation.'

Upon the writs of estrepement see Fitz. Estrepement ; Brooke, Estrepement ;
Coke, Second Institute, 327-329 ; Fitzherbert, Natura Brevium, 9th ed., 60,
6 1 ; Blackstone, Commentaries (ed. 1768), iii. 225-227. For the writs them-
selves see Registrum Brevium Originalium, 76, 77 ; Regi 'strum Judiciale, 33.

3 Coke, Second Institute, 327, 328 ; Blackstone, Commentaries (ed.
1768), iii. 225-227.

276 H. D. Hazel tine [xui

So far as one can see, this common law writ of estrepement could
not be brought at any stage in legal proceedings prior to judg-
ment.1 To remedy this defect in the common law system of
preventive justice the Statute of Gloucester introduced, in the
sixth year of the reign of Edward I, a new writ of estrepement.
If a plaintiff justly feared that the tenant — perhaps fully knowing
the weakness of his title — might commit waste while the legal
proceedings were going on, he could bring this statutory writ of
estrepement whereby the tenant would be prohibited from com-
mitting waste pending the suit.2

The writ of estrepement, if directed to the sheriff, ordered him
firmly to prohibit the tenant from committing waste so long as the
legal proceedings in regard to the land were in progress.3 If the
writ was addressed directly to the party himself, the tenant, he
was likewise ordered by the court not to commit waste pendente lite.^

Suppose the defendant failed to observe the court's prohibition ?
If the writ was addressed to the sheriff, then he was obliged to see
to it that the waste was stopped, and in fulfilment of his duty he
could use necessary force, even to the extent of imprisonment or
the raising of the posse comitatus to go to his assistance, ' so odious
in law/ in Coke's words, ' is waste and destruction ' : the court
itself would not imprison the waster, for the duty of preventing
the waste rested solely upon the sheriff who had already received
his orders in the writ addressed to him. On the other hand, if the
writ was addressed directly to the waster himself, the aggrieved
party could, on breach of the court's prohibition, sue the waster,
recovering costs and damages, and get the court to imprison the
defendant for his contempt of court in disobeying the prohibition.5

The interlocutory injunction of Chancery is an order of the
court, issued before the final determination of the rights of the
parties, and its object is the protection of the rights of the plaintiff
pending trial and judgment. How like unto the interlocutory

1 But see Coke, Second Institute ', 327.

2 Statute of Gloucester, 6 Ed. I, c. 13 ; Coke, Second Institute, 327,
329 ; Blackstone, Commentaries •, iii. 225-227.

3 Registrum Brev. Orig. 77 ; Blackstone, Commentaries, iii. 225-227.

4 Registrum Judiciale, 2 1 .

5 Fitz. N.B. 60, 6 1 ; Coke, Second Institute, 329; Blackstone, Com-
mentaries, iii. 225-227; Play stow v. Bacheller, Moore, 100; Cumberland v.
Dowager, Hobart, 85 ; Foliamtfs Case, Coke's Reports, v. f. U5a.

xni] Early Equity 277

injunction was the old common law writ of estrepement \ In its
form it was an interlocutory order in personam and in its object
it was a remedy of preventive justice. After the Chancery had
fashioned its own interlocutory injunction, possibly in imitation
of the writ of esirepement^ the Court of Common Pleas made an
ineffectual effort to extend its own power to give preventive relief
by a further development of the writ of estrepement ; but in 1594
Lord Keeper Egerton made an order that no writ of estrepement
should be issued by the cursitors unless it be in accordance with
the ancient course of the law.2 But for this order by the Lord
Keeper the old writ of estrepement might well have held its own
ground, at least for a time, as against the injunction. But Chancery's
remedy gained the upper hand ; and to-day, while the estrepement
is obsolete and well-nigh forgotten, the interlocutory injunction
is in almost daily use and in the minds of all who have to do with
the administration of English justice.

In the long struggle of the common law courts with their rivals
—in the Middle Ages, chiefly the ecclesiastical tribunals — the writ
of prohibition proved itself a weapon of wonderful power. It was
a writ which could be and was directed not only against parties,
but also against tribunals. In cases involving subject matter
claimed by the common law courts as falling within their own
exclusive jurisdiction, not only were parties restrained by pro-
hibition from suing in ecclesiastical courts, but those courts were
themselves restrained by prohibition from entertaining such
proceedings. It was thus largely by this writ that the courts of
common law preserved and extended their jurisdiction, keeping other
tribunals to their own peculiar province, and that they protected
parties in their common law rights as opposed to rights good at
ecclesiastical law. At a later day the Chancery, in its struggle
with common law courts, employed the injunction to effect a similar
purpose ; but there was this important difference between the pro-
hibition of common law courts and the injunction of Chancery, that

1 Ashburner, in his Principles of Equity, ed. 1902, p. 494, note (d), has
suggested that it was the writ of estrepement 'which perhaps formed the
model for the equitable remedy by injunction.'

2 Kerly, History of Equity, 150; Spence, Equitable Jurisdiction oj
Chancery, i. 672.

On the scope of the writ of estrepement see Fitz. N.-B. 60, 6 1 ; Blackstone,
Commentaries, iii. 225-227.

278 H. D. Hazeltine [xm

the injunction restrained only parties, while the prohibition restrained
both parties and courts.1 Only, therefore, in its effect in restraining
parties can we say that the prohibition anticipated the injunction.

Bracton is careful to explain why there should be two prohibi-
tions— one to the ecclesiastical court and one to the party. At
first sight, he says, it might seem that a prohibition to the judge
alone or to the party alone should suffice, for if the judge, in
obedience to the prohibition, refused to hear the case, the party's
attempt to sue would be of no avail, and if the party, in obedience
to the prohibition, did not proceed with his suit, the judge could
give no judgment for lack of a plaintiff. But two prohibitions are
nevertheless better than one, maintains Bracton, lest either the
judge or the party might proceed in the matter with impunity.
Apparently he means that two prohibitions, rather than one, will
make assurance doubly sure by giving no loop-hole for either judge
or party to assert that he has not been prohibited.2 3

Not forgetting that the writ might serve either as an inter-
locutory or as a final prohibition,4 and is thus directly analogous to
the temporary and perpetual injunctions of the Chancery, we must
now ask the question as to whether the writ of prohibition was
addressed to the sheriff or directly to the ecclesiastical judge and the
party. Glanvill's only form of the writ restraining a party from
suing in the ecclesiastical court is addressed to the sheriff, and
orders him not to permit the party to sue ; 5 but his form of the

1 See Glanvill, vi. 12-14, xii. 21, 22; Bracton, ff. 401-412; Spence,
op. c it. i. 371, 673-676; Kerly, op. cit. 89, 109, 116, 293; Pollock and
Maitland, op. cit. ii. 596; Holdsworth, op. M. ii. 196, 197, 211, 251,
260, 395. 2 Bracton, f. 4050.

8 To enter into a consideration of the question as to when a prohibition
could and could not be brought (see thereon, Bracton, ff. 401-412) would take
us beyond the scope of the present paper, for my only concern is to indicate
the procedural significance of the writ.

4 Bracton, ff. 401-412, makes this quite clear.

5 Glanvill, xii. 22 : Rex vie' salutem. Prohibe R. ne sequatur placitum
in curia christianitatis quod est inter N. et ipsum de laico feodo ipsius R. in
villa ipsa unde ipse queritur quod prefatus N. inde eum traxit in placitum in
curia Christianitatis coram iudicibus illis. Et si praefatus R. fecerit te securum
de clamore suo prosequendo, tune pone per vadium et salvos plegios predictum
N. quod sit coram me vel lustic' meis eo die, ostensurus quare traxit eum in
placitum in curia Christianitatis de laico feodo suo in ilia villa, de sicut illud
placitum spectat ad coronam et dignitatem meam. T. etc.

Beames, Translation of Glanville^ Beale's 1900 ed. p. 243, note 2 : 'This
writ stands in need of a transposition of the capitals to render it intelligible.5

xni] Early Equity 279

writ restraining the court is addressed to the court directly.1 By
Bracton's time the writs appear always to be addressed directly to
the court and directly to the party, without the interposition of the
sheriff as an intermediary between the common law court and the
party restrained ; 2 and so far as we can see, from an examination
of later sources, this continued to be the usual course of procedure.3

In studying the equitable procedure of the early common courts,
this fact that the writs of prohibition in these cases are addressed
in this direct and personal way to the ecclesiastical judge and the
party is, it seems to me, of significance ; for it shows us clearly that
the courts of the common law were in this earlier period exercising
a jurisdiction inpersonam by prohibition which anticipated Chancery
jurisdiction in personam by injunction. Even writs of prohibition
addressed to the sheriff, as the court's official, seem to have been
essentially orders directed against the person of the defendant, as
I shall hope to explain later on ; but the point that the jurisdiction
was in personam is brought out with even greater clearness by
study of the writs addressed directly and personally to the parties
themselves.

But even a royal prerogative writ of prohibition without the
infliction of a penalty for its breach would be a weak thing indeed ;
and we need not be surprised to find that the common law courts
of Bracton's time were possessed of powers to inflict severe
penalties — even imprisonment — upon judge or party who dared
disobey the king's order. The writs of prohibition, as given by
Bracton, contain in themselves no hint as to penalty for breach
of the court's order; but that the disobedient judge or party
will actually surfer a penalty is made quite clear by Bracton, who

1 Glanvill, xii. 21 : Rex illis ludicibus ecclesiasticis salutem. Prohibeo
vobis ne teneatis placitum in curia christianitatis quod est inter N. et R. de
laico feodo predicti R. unde ipse queritur quod N. eum trahit in placitum in
curia christianitatis coram vobis, quia placitum illud spectat ad coronam et
dignitatem meam. T. etc.

2 All of the writs -given by Bracton, ff. 401-412, are of this direct and
personal character.

3 See on writs of prohibition addressed directly to the party suing in the
ecclesiastical court, Y.B. i and 2 Ed. II (Selden Soc.), pi. 5> Io ; Y-B- 2
and 3 Ed. II (Selden Soc.), pi. 33 ; Y.B. 2 and 3 Ed. II (Selden Soc.), p.
203 (Appendix II.); Y.B. 3 Ed. II (Selden Soc.), pi. 45 (and see p. 135 for
note from the record) ; Regis trum Brev. Orig. ff. 33 seq. Cf. also Bracton's
Note-Book, pi. 351.

280 H. D. Hazeltine [xm

gives a full account of the procedure on breach of prohibition.1 If
either judge or party has been guilty of a breach of prohibition the
aggrieved party may sue him. In case the aggrieved party gives
proper security for prosecuting his suit, a writ of attachment,
directed to the sheriff, will issue. The sheriff must then place the
offending judge or party under gage and pledge that he will appear
before the royal justices to show cause why he has held the plea
in the church court contrary to the prohibition, or why he has
prosecuted the plea in the church court contrary to the prohibition.
If either the judge or the party fail to appear on the set day, he is
then attached by better pledges and distrained by all his lands to
be present in court on another day, the order of attachment to be
observed in other personal actions being followed. But if the
defendant be a clerk, and if he be unwilling to find pledges, and
have no lay fee by which he can be distrained, a mandate is then
sent to the ordinaries and bishop that they shall cause the
defendants to come before the royal court. When at last the
parties and the offending judge are before the court, the plaintiff
declares that the defendant, the party, has vexed and aggrieved
him by suing in the ecclesiastical court in a temporal matter con-
trary to the prohibition. The plaintiff proceeds at once with his
proof. Then the offending party and the judge are heard, several
defences being open to them. If judgment be given against either
the defendant party or the defendant judge, he must pay the
plaintiff damages and may even be severely punished by a heavy
amercement.2 If the defendant be a layman he will also be im-
prisoned as a presumer against the royal dignity because he has
disobeyed the prerogative writ of prohibition ; he is treated as
if he had committed the crime of high treason. If, however, the
defendant be a clerk, he is sometimes dealt with more mildly by
grace and out of reverence for the clerical order.

This method of enforcing the court's prohibition certainly seems
rigorous and effective. Indeed, in certain of its features it is closely
analogous to the method of the Chancellors — the writ of subpoena.

Before concluding this account of common law writs analogous
to the injunction of Chancery, attention must be drawn to a
remarkable case recorded on the De Banco Roll of Hilary,

1 Bracton, ff. 401, 402, 409, 410.

2 See Bracton, f. 402.

xm] Early Equity 281

2 Edward II.1 In this case, Prior of Coventry v. William Graumpe
of Coventry and others? the plaintiff complained that the defendants,
men of Coventry, had been buying and selling outside his market
upon market days. The Prior's right was denied by the defendants ;
but verdict was found against them for sixty pounds damages.
The judgment reads : ' And therefore it is considered that the
said Prior recover his said damages against them, and that the
said William and the others henceforth on Fridays on which the
said Prior has his said market do not expose for sale their vendible
wares within the town of Coventry elsewhere than in the said
market.' 3

In commenting on this judgment Maitland says : ' If this is not
an "injunction" and a "perpetual injunction," we hardly know
what to call it. How could this " injunction," if such we may call
it, have been enforced ? It seems possible that if the defendants
had repeated the tort, the plaintiff might have obtained a specially
worded writ reciting the breach of the "injunction," and that in
this new action the judgment would be that the defendants be
taken and imprisoned, and not merely that they be amerced. It
is to be remembered that the action known as contra formam
feoff amenti^ was based on the breach of a royal prohibition ; and
the same had been true of the action of waste.' 5

1 See Maitland's comments, Y.B. 2 and 3 Edward II (Selden Soc.), p. xiii.

2 Y.B. 2 and 3 Edward II (Selden Soc.), 74.

3 Et idea consideration est quod predictus Prior recuperet versus eos
dampna sua predicta, et quod predict! Willelmus et alii decetero mercimonia
sua vendalia per dies Veneris quibus idem Prior habet mercatum suum pre-
dictum alibi in predicta villa de Coventre quam in predicto mercato suo non
vendant seu vendicioni exponant, etc. Et predictus Willelmus et alii in
misericordia etc.

In the Y.B. report of this same case Brabazon, J., says (see Y.B. 2 and 3
Edward II, 71 ; Selden Soc. ed.) : 'Where the King grants a market to a
man, he grants a market in such wise that no man may, in the same town
in which the market is, sell any merchandise save in the market. So, since
you have confessed that the Prior has a market in this town by the King's
grant and that you are resident in the same town, common law will drive
you to his market and prevent your marketing elsewhere in the same town
(comune ley vous chacera de venir a son marche sans aillours marchander en
mesme la ville).'

4 Maitland here refers to cases in Y.B. 2 and 3 Edward II (Selden Soc.),

93, 95-

5 In a footnote to. the report of the case Maitland remarks: 'We can
hardly say that the idea of an injunction was foreign to the common law.

282 H. D. Hazeltine [xm

Let me summarize what I desire to say in regard to prohibitions.

The early common-law jurisdiction in personam by means of
prohibitions was not narrow. The orders of the court were not
only issued in cases of waste,1 nuisance,2 and other torts,3 but also
in cases of contract 4 and property.5 They not only effected, in a
negative way, a restraint upon the doing of an act, but also
effected, in a positive and mandatory way, the actual doing of an
act ; for parties were not only ordered not to commit waste,6 not
to commit nuisance,7 not to sell land,8 not to distrain the plaintiff
to do suit of court,9 not to destroy the wood in which the plaintiff
has house-bote and hay-bote,10 not to expose wares for sale elsewhere
than in the plaintiffs market,11 not to sue in the ecclesiastical
courts ; 12 but parties were ordered to repair walls and buildings,13 to
erect houses,14 to place property in the same condition in which it
had been,15 and to remove existing nuisances.16 The orders of the
court were also not only temporary or interlocutory in character,
but they were final or perpetual ; for parties were not only ordered
not to commit waste while legal proceedings were in progress, and
not to sue in the ecclesiastical court till the rights of the parties at
common law had been determined in the common law court, but
they were also ordered never to commit waste, never to expose

But could this mandate have any other effect than that of estopping the de-
fendants from raising the same question over again ? As to this case see
Mary Dormer Harris, Life in an Old English Town (1898), p. 64, where the
history of the Prior's Half and the Earl's Half at Coventry is related.'

1 See the cases cited pp. 270-77, supra.

2 See Bracton's Note-Book, pi. 1081, 1162, 1253, 1284; Fitz. N.-B. 184,
185.

3 See Y.B. 2 and 3 Ed. II (Selden Soc.), p. xiii., 71, 74 ; Y.B. 18 Ed.
Ill (R.S.), 236.

4 See Bracton's Note-Book, pi. 1920.

5 See Y.B. 30 and 31 Ed. I (R.S.), 324 ; Y.B. 2 and 3 Ed. II (Selden
Soc.), pp. 93-96.

6 See pp. 270-77, supra. 7 See note 2, supra.

8 See Bracton's Note-Book, pi. 1920.

9 See Y.B. 2 and 3 Ed. II (Selden Soc.), pp. 93-96.
™ See Y.B. 30 and 31 Ed. I (R.S.), 324.

11 See Y.B. 2 and 3 Ed. II (Selden Soc.), p. xiii., 71, 74.

12 See pp. 277-80, supra.

13 See Bracton's Note-Book, pi. 1165 ; Y.B. 18 Ed. Ill (R.S.), 236 ; Fitz.
N.-B. 184, 185.

14 See Bracton's Note-Book, pi. 1165.

15 Bracton's Note-Book, pi. 1081. 16 Fitz. N.-B. 184, 185.

xin] Early Equity 283

wares for sale elsewhere than in the plaintiffs market, never to sue
in the ecclesiastical court, and never to do other similar things.1

The order of the court was sometimes contained in the writ of
prohibition itself; sometimes it was issued at the conclusion of pro-
ceedings, such as the common law writ of waste, brought upon
breach of a prior prohibition ; while sometimes it was issued at the
conclusion of actions, such as trespass, brought independently of
the breach of a prior prohibition.

I have stated that the jurisdiction of the common-law courts in
cases of prohibition was a jurisdiction in personam, and such I
believe it was. In all cases the prohibition was issued by the court
itself. In some cases the writ was addressed to the sheriff, and it
was through him, an officer of the court, that the court's order was
conveyed to the party. In other cases the writ containing the pro-
hibition of the court was addressed directly to the party without
the employment of the sheriff as the court's instrument. In still
other cases the court's prohibition was laid upon the party directly,
especially at the close of legal proceedings, without the employ-
ment of writ or sheriff. As I have already indicated, I cannot
think that in cases of the interposition of the sheriff the writ of pro-
hibition is robbed of its character as the court's order in personam ;
for the sheriff acts merely as the court's officer in informing the
party of the court's command. Even if this view of the writ
addressed to the sheriff be not adopted, there is still evidence in
plenty that the court frequently gave orders to the party directly,
either by writ or by command issued to the party as he stood before k
the court in person.

Although the writs of prohibition contain no hint of the
penalties attendant upon disobedience to the command of the royal
court, it is nevertheless clear from our study of the sources that
disobedience resulted in serious consequences. In some cases
breach of the prohibition gave rise to self-help on the part of
the aggrieved person, forceful measures by the sheriff, and even
imprisonment of the disobedient party. So, too, breach of the
prohibition might result in legal proceedings by the injured party,
and in these proceedings the court might inflict severe penalties
for past disobedience and might also take measures of severe
character to ensure that no further breaches of prohibition take
1 See pp. 270-82, supra.

284 H. D. Hazeltine [xni

place. Appearance of the offending parties could be compelled by
one or more attachments by gage and pledge and even by distraint
of all their lands ; and if, on inquest, the breach of prohibition was
proved, there might result payment of damages to the plaintiffs,
heavy amercements to the King, loss of the defendants' lands, and
even imprisonment for contempt of the King's prohibition. On the
conclusion of the legal proceedings the court usually issued a
further prohibition and ensured obedience to this new order by
requiring the party to furnish sureties, by threat of loss of the
party's land, or by appointment of persons, such as foresters and
servants, whose duty it was to see that there should be no further
breach of prohibition.

Surely the way of the disobedient party was not made easy by
the early common law ; and we may well believe that fear of the
process of the courts acted, in the great majority of cases, as a
wholesome restraint. The early common law tribunals had not
the writ of subpoena at their command, but they did on
occasion issue orders which closely resembled that writ, and they
did have an effective machinery of punitive and preventive justice
which operated both upon the person and the property of the one
who did not comply with their prohibitions.

VI. — WRITS QUIA TIMEI

I have dwelt upon the writs of prohibition because they
illustrate so clearly the preventive justice of the early common law ;
but I cannot conclude this paper without a bare reference to
certain other writs which are closely related to writs of prohibition.
I refer to the writs quia timet. These writs anticipated the
Chancery's bills quia timet, which are so called in analogy to the
common law writs which they supplanted. Coke, in his com-
mentary on Littleton, draws attention to the writs in these
words : ' And note, that there be six writs in law, that may be
maintained, quia timit (sic), before any molestation, distresse, or
impleading : as I. A man may have his writ of mesne (whereof
Littleton here [§ 142] speaks) before he be distreyned. 2. A
warrantia cartae, before he be impleaded. 3. A monstraverunt,
before any distresse or vexation. 4. An audita querela, before any
execution sued. 5. A curia claudenda^ before any default of

xin] Early Equity 285

inclosure. 6. A ne injustl vexes, before any distresse or molesta-
tion. And these be called brevia anticipantia, writs of prevention.' x
As explained by Story, in his Equity Jurisprudence, the bills in
equity quia timet * answer precisely to this latter description.
They are in the nature of writs of prevention, to accomplish the
ends of precautionary justice. They are, ordinarily, applied to
prevent wrongs or anticipated mischiefs, and not merely to redress
them when done. The party seeks the aid of a court of equity,
because he fears (quia timet} some future probable injury to his
rights or interests, and not because an injury has already occurred,
which requires any compensation or other relief/ 2

In the present paper I have not attempted to give an exhaust-
ive account of the equity of the early common law courts. What
I have said should be taken as merely suggestive of results that
future detailed investigation may disclose ; for there are evidences
in plenty that in various ways other than those I have mentioned
to-day the early justices were administering principles of equity.
But enough has already been said, I hope, to indicate that not
all the ideas which we associate with English Equity were either
borrowed from the Roman system by the Chancellors or original
with them. The advent of the Chancellor as a judicial officer of
the Crown was at a time when the older tribunals, although ex-
panding their own system to meet the needs of a growing society,
were nevertheless fettered in their powers by statute and precedent
as well as by the conservatism and technicality of the legal pro-
fession. The Chancellor's court, exercising very wide discretionary
powers, gradually developed the elaborate and effective system of
rules and principles which we of the twentieth century know as
English Equity. But while fully recognizing the achievements of
the Chancery, let us not forget that the new tribunal built partly
upon the older practice of the common law and other courts whose
equitable jurisdiction it supplanted. The new tribunal did not
originate English Equity, for it simply carried on the work of the
older courts by developing in greater fulness and with a different
machinery the equity inherent in royal justice.

H. D. HAZELTINE.

1 Co. Litt. looa.

2 Story, Equity Jurisprudence, 2nd Eng. ed., §§ 825, 826.

XIV

THE TRANSFORMATION OF EQUITY1

EQUITY, aequitas, eViei/ceia, and equivalents in modern Continental
tongues, have for several centuries been current terms among
jurists and publicists. In England, and in jurisdictions beyond seas
which took their law from England, Equity has become, by a
peculiar historical development, the name of a special body of
judicial rules administered in the exercise of a special jurisdiction
which in its origin was extraordinary. Historical students of legal
ideas have to remember that this technical use of the word ' equity '
is much less ancient than the jurisdiction itself. In the proceed-
ings of the Court of Chancery before the sixteenth century the
complainants appeal to the Chancellor most commonly in the name
of conscience, pretty often in that of good faith, right, or reason,
very seldom in that of equity.2 Perhaps it is not too much to say
that the term was only becoming current among English lawyers
when St. German discussed it in his Doctor and Student, a discus-
sion to which we shall presently return.3 In the course of the six-
teenth century the Greek word €7rtetKeta was used by a few writers
in an Anglicized form (see the Oxford English Dictionary, s.v.
' Epiky '), but the experiment was short-lived. Whatever words
are used, the general notion underlying them is that of a doctrine
or authority capable of preventing the hardship which otherwise
would ensue either from the literal extension of positive rules to

1 The present paper may be taken as in some measure supplementary to
Professor Vinogradoff's on Reason and Conscience in Sixteenth-Century Juris-
prudence^ read at the Berlin Congress in 1908, and published in the Law
Quarterly Review, xxiv. 373.

2 See Baildon, Select Cases in Chancery (Selden Soc.), 1896, Introduction,
p. xxix.

3 St. German's immediate authority for the Aristotelian doctrine of equity
was Gerson : ib. 374.

286

xiv] Transformation of Equity 287

extreme cases or from the exclusion, also by a strictly literal con-
struction, of cases that fall within the true intention of the rule.

Such being the purpose of equity stated in the widest terms,
there are two quite distinct and almost opposite aspects under
which it may be realized. In the first and more ancient of these
we find equitable power exercised by some one, usually the king
or a great officer of state, who can dispense with rules according to
his discretion, conceived as a reasonable discretion but not defined
beforehand. The other and modern form is the rational interpreta-
tion and qualification of the rules themselves by a dialectic and
scientific process.

The first method works by occasional interference ; the occa-
sions may be frequent or not, but each interference is still an
isolated act. The second method works, on the contrary, by con-
tinuous development. It is by this time almost a commonplace
that the more archaic dispensing power, when it falls into a regular
course of official administration, loses its arbitrary character and
gradually assumes all the features of scientific law, becoming, as
Blackstone said a century and a half ago, an artificial system. In
the technical English terms, extraordinary jurisdiction ends by
being ordinary. So gradual is the change that it is not altogether
easy for the modern student to realize its extent or the discrepance
of the original points of view.

Let us consider the nature of superior dispensing power apart
from any particular forms. It appears to be called for and
determined by the nature of archaic legal rules and archaic juris-
diction. Process of law was, in the beginning, a substitute for
unrestrained private vengeance or self-help. For a long time
there were no regular means at all, and for a much longer time
no adequate means, of compelling parties to use it. Hence early
legal formulas do not necessarily represent the general sense, at
the date of their origin, of what is just and reasonable. They
rather mark an outside limit beyond which vengeance or self-help
will not be tolerated, and that limit has to be fixed with regard to
the passions of ordinary men under provocation. The lawgiver
does not advise taking an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth ;
he forbids taking the whole head. In like manner the harshness
of archaic law towards debtors is capable of several explanations,
and there may well be some truth in all of them. But this one,

288 F. Pollock [xiv

I think, is fairly certain, that the law had to compromise with
creditors on the least amount of power over the debtor which must
be left to them if they were to renounce the use of lawless private
force. At the date of the Twelve Tables that amount included, in
the last resort, the power of life and death, although there is
no reason to believe that the partis secanto clause was ever
executed in historical times.1 In matters of family law we know
that early Indo-European custom hardly touched the despotic
authority of the eldest ancestor. Accordingly the just man, in the
estimation of archaic morality, is not he who stands on his right
and expects others to stand on theirs, but he who knows how and
when to forego the uttermost farthing: and, when once a competent
executive authority has been established, the just ruler is he who
gives effect to the moral sense of the commonwealth by relaxing
penalties in cases of hardship and by putting forth his pre-eminent
strength against enormous evil-doers. Such, indeed, is the pre-
vailing sentiment in Eastern countries to this day. Great men
and superior officials are conceived not as ministers of rule, but as
wielders of a discretion transcending rule. Even educated Asiatics
appear to have great difficulty in understanding that there can be
such a thing as a rule not subject to a power of administrative
dispensation in some one. A normal Eastern ruler would find
nothing strange in one Pope treating Benvenuto Cellini as exempt
from law and another subjecting him to rigorous imprisonment on
mere suspicion, and would see nothing in the indignation roused
by James II.'s prosecution of the seven bishops but one proof more
that all Europeans are mad.

Not that it is an unknown thing in Western lands to sue for
personal favour or indulgence unwarranted by rule, but the suitor,
unless he is very ignorant, knows that he is begging for something
irregular and hopes to persuade the man in authority, perhaps
tries to persuade himself, that a small breach of duty will be
venial. To find an European parallel to the normal Eastern attitude
we must look outside the region of secular law to the popular and
still half-pagan cult of the saints in the Mediterranean countries,

1 ' Dissectum esse antiquitus neminem equidem legi neque audivi ' : A.
Gellius, xx. i. 52 : his guess as to the original intention of the extreme
penalty, ' eo consilio tanta inmanitas poenae denuntiatast ne ad earn unquam
perveniretur J is of course uncritical, but many modern antiquaries have made
as bad guesses or worse.

xiv] Transformation of Equity 289

where, as an ingenious French scholar has shown, the saints have
taken up the heritage of the gods. There, to this day, patron and
other saints are besought and expected, sometimes on pain of
losing their worshipper's devotion, to perform a variety of good
offices in the celestial court, often of a kind hardly in accordance
with the doctrine or discipline of the Church. Among the more
innocent of these favours is that of helping students to pass their
examinations, for which it seems Ste. Radegonde of Poitiers has
a special reputation. I know not whether the operation is in the
nature of strengthening the candidate's brain (which the psychologist
may regard as a not improbable effect of his faith) or of softening
the examiner's heart. When it comes to invoking St. Antony of
Padua to save a man harmless in a duel, in other words to protect
him from the temporal inconvenience, and the still graver spiritual
danger, of being killed in the commission of a wilful and deliberate
mortal sin, the notion of dispensing power appears to be consider-
ably strained. Such a votive tablet, however, I have seen, and I
do not suppose they are hard to find in Italy. These archaic
observances of imperfectly instructed Catholics may be regarded,
it seems to me, as modern survivals from the prehistoric conception
of executive authority in general.

To return to the ground of our own faculty, I took the lex
talionis as a typical example of archaic positive ordinance, although
it is strange to our own legal history : for the system of wergild
and composition which, at the opening of that history, we find in
force among all people of Germanic stock would not be appropriate
for the same purpose. It seems to me to belong to a much later
and more rational stage of ancient law, for it presupposes a long
course of bargaining and settlement of feuds, not so much between
individuals as between families and clans ; and that again pre-
supposes a more or less effectual desire for peace, not by way of
submission to a ruler but by free consent of both parties. We
know that such a process took place in the heroic age of Greece.
The famous trial scene on the Homeric shield of Achilles exhibits
this at the very moment when public opinion begins to enforce the
acceptance of a wergild under proper conditions.

Homer omits to tell us what those conditions were. This is
unlucky for our archaeology, but quite right for the artistic purpose,
which is to describe not the cause in dispute or the scene itself,

290 F. Pollock [xiv

but the representation of it. According to the interpretation in
which I agree with my friend Dr. Leaf, the question is precisely
whether an aggrieved party who refuses the offer of a composition
is not bound to accept it : there does not appear to be any difficulty
about the amount. The choice on the other side, the manslayer's
or offender's, to pay or to bear the feud, lasted into a comparatively
recent period of Germanic antiquity, as is well known. On the
Homeric development the curtain goes down abruptly, and when
it next rises we are in a different order of civilization altogether,
with very slight materials for guessing what has happened in the
meantime. In any case, and even before acceptance or offer of a
composition has become compulsory in form or in fact, the existence
of an assessable value shows that something has been arrived at
corresponding to what we call a market price or a reasonable price
in the world of modern business. Thus the wergild presents itself
not as the utmost that can be exacted by strict law but rather as
an early form of equitable compromise ; and the fixed scales of the
early Germanic law-books are really codification of a fairly settled
customary rule of aequum et bonum. It might be shown, I think,
without much trouble, that such a scale of compensation was in its
time and circumstances a much more sensible institution than it
appears to us at first sight ; but to pursue this would be somewhat
too remote from the argument.

In England the archaic form of equity predominated in the
king's administration of special remedial justice during the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries ; the sixteenth was' a period of transition ;
before the end of the seventeenth the Court of Chancery was not
only a regular court of justice but had started on the road of
technical and scientific elaboration.

We have only within the last year become acquainted with a
form of this jurisdiction earlier than its exercise by the Chancellor
or even by the Council, so early that all remembrance of it was
long lost. Mr. Bolland, in the course of editing for the Selden
Society the proceedings of Edward II's itinerant justices in
Kent, found a course of practice of which no intermediate mention
is known through very nearly six centuries.1 Causes of action
arising or continuing while the Eyre was in the county were brought

1 2 Eyre of Kent (Seld. Soc. 1912), Introd. p. xxi. As to bills on the
Crown side, p. xxii.

xiv] Transformation of Equity 291

before the justices by presenting a bill instead of suing out a writ
in the appropriate form of action. Many of these bills are pre-
served, and they have a marked resemblance in their frame, and
in many cases as to their contents also, to the earliest bills irt
Chancery. To understand the jurisdiction it must be remembered
that the justices in eyre represented the king's authority in a
special and eminent manner. If we may borrow a canonical term,
they carried with them high legatine powers ; they superseded all
ordinary tribunals. Only the King's Bench, the Court held in
contemplation of law before the king himself, could claim to rank
above them. Thus the king's residual or extraordinary function of
causing justice to be done where ordinary means failed lay in their
hand, and they were not only entitled but bound to exercise it.
Students of our legal history do not need to be reminded that this
function had been recognized from the earliest times, and was
treated as living much later. The witnesses for it extend from
King Alfred's companion and biographer, the Welsh bishop Asser,
to the Kentish antiquary Lambarde, one of Elizabeth's justices of
peace. So the justices in eyre, being such exalted ministers of
the king's power, were quite natural depositaries of this royal
discretion when as yet the Court of Chancery was not.

Applications to the justices in eyre by way of bill were
multifarious enough. Some of those which Mr. Bolland has
published are founded on money claims for considerable sums, and
the parties appear to be of good standing. But there is also a
class of petitions by humble suitors for relief against oppression or
extortion, alleging their poverty and inability to cope with their
adversaries by regular process of law. This class anticipates, in
almost every detail, the petitions to the Council and the Chancellor
of which specimens were published in 1820 by the old Record
Commission, and in 1896 by the Selden Society. We find here
exactly the same characteristic mark that distinguishes those early
Chancery proceedings, but in still greater prominence. In a large
proportion of cases the complaint is such as, in the later settled
practice, would have justified a demurrer 'for want of equity.'
The justices are not called op to administer any special rules or to
recognize rights outside the ordinary law. What the suitor asks
them to dispense with is the formality of process ; he claims a
summary investigation, to use canonical language once more,

292 F. Pollock [xiv

sinefigura et strepitu iudicii. Considering the predominant import-
ance of procedure in medieval law,1 this again is quite natural.
Sometimes the petitions are so illiterate that the manner of the
halting Anglo-French is almost more eloquent of the petitioner's
distress than the matter. A specially illiterate one, which gave
Mr. Bolland and myself a good deal of trouble before we arrived
at the true rendering by the help of a French medievalist, relates
the misfortunes of a man who had paid a sum down to secure
board and lodging for the rest of his days. Obviously this crude
makeshift for a life annuity 2 was at the mercy of the host's good
faith ; in this case avarice prevailed, and the host not only failed
to make decent provision for his paying guest, but imprisoned him,
tied him up, it seems, with a chain. This, of course, was a plain
trespass at common law, supposing the fact to have been as
stated. Perhaps the story gained something in the telling; at
any rate the result was a settlement of some kind between the
parties. We have said that there was no question, at this time,
of applying any peculiar law to the suits initiated by bills in eyre ;
but it does appear that the justices, when once they had a case
in their hands, could proceed in a summary manner and use a
pretty free discretion. They could even interrogate the parties, a
thing unknown to common-law process. On the other hand, a case
begun in this way sometimes runs its later course to judgment as
regularly as if it had started with a writ; and this may throw
some light on singularities of early Chancery procedure to which
Mr. Pike had called attention long before we knew that there was
such a thing as a bill in eyre.

It is needless to say more here of Chancery suits in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, as the information is easily
accessible in the Selden Society volume already referred to,
and is summarized by Dr. Holdsworth. There is, however, one
rather curious head of jurisdiction of which I have found no
mention in text-books. It was not very uncommon to apply to
the Chancellor for an injunction to restrain the defendant from

1 The 'lex terrae' of Magna Carta, for example, is rather due process
of law than the substantive law defining offences.

2 Similar agreements were still in use in the latest years of the fifteenth
century: Trice Martin in Archaeologia, Ix. (i) at p. 378, where the com-
plaint is of refusal ' to fynd or kepe ' the plaintiff.

xiv] Transformation of Equity 293

practising witchcraft against the plaintiff, or, it might be, from
making false charges of witchcraft against him. This appears from
a group of cases in which clergymen were concerned, printed in
1907 by Mr. Trice Martin in the Archaeology*? as well as from
the more generally known publications. If there was any usurpation
of jurisdiction in matters of ' nygromancy ' it was against the Court
Christian.

There is no reason to believe that the jurisdiction of the
mediaeval Chancellors was unpopular. Complaints began to be
loud in the sixteenth century, and were heard of earlier.2 But
these were for the most part, if not altogether, made or instigated
by practitioners of the common law who were aggrieved by the
growing competition of the Chancery. If the competition had not
met a public want it would not have been effective. What concerns
us to note here is that the grievance was expressly founded on
charges of arbitrary and uncertain interference with legal rights ;
the Chancellor and his officers went, it was said, by their < conscience
and discretion/ which might mean reasons borrowed from Roman
law or anything else they chose. The only final and satisfying
answer to such objections in a civilized country was to make it
clear that the Court of Chancery was not a fountain of unlimited
dispensations, but as regular a court of judicature as any other, a
court whose existence precluded the king from setting up any new
tribunals with like jurisdiction, or administering its remedies in any
other way ; and this was in fact the line taken by James I with
Bacon's advice when the conflict became open and official.

Meanwhile Christopher St. German, a writer in advance of his
contemporaries in many things, put an explanation of Equity in
the mouth of his imaginary Doctor of Divinity,3 and appropriately
so, when it was still exceptional for the Chancellor to be a layman.
The Doctor speaks, of course, from the canonical point of view, and
does not profess to know Chancery practice. Equity is not yet a
term of art among lawyers. The Student knows something, it
appears later, about the cases in which the writ of sub poena does
and does not lie, but does not care to go into details. Now the

1 Vol. lx. (or 2nd ser. 10) pt. i, 353; cp. the same writer's miscellaneous
specimens in vol. lix., pt. i, I (1904).

2 Holdsworth, H. E. L. i. 246.

3 Doct. and Stud., dial, i, c. 16.

294 F> Pollock [xiv

Doctor quite clearly takes the view that the fundamental principle
of equity is not occasional and overriding interference, but
enlightened scientific interpretation. I am putting St. German's
thought into modern language, but I believe the^ words bear me
out. ' Equity is a righteousness that considereth all the particular
circumstances of the deed . . . and it is called also by some men
epieikeia ; the which is no other thing but an exception of the law
of God, or of the law of reason, from the general rules of the law of
man, when they by reason of their generality would in any
particular case judge against the law of God or the law of reason
— the which exception is secretly understood in every general rule of
general positive law' Of these last words it is hardly too much to
say that they anticipate the reforming and constructive spirit of
Mansfield. The conception of Equity as expounded by St. German
was in itself nothing new. He was quite openly following the
scholastic tradition which went back partly by direct and partly by
indirect ways to Aristotle. But the treatment of it as practically
applicable to English law shows a grasp and insight quite
exceptional at the time. The Doctor goes on to suggest that
there may be * some like equities grounded on the general rules of
the law of the realm ' and elicits from the Student examples of
equitable construction applied within the common law itself. In
the next chapter the Student goes so far as to say that the only
reason why the equitable relief granted upon bills in Chancery does
not count as part of the common law is the absence of a formal
record in the king's court. ' Forasmuch as no record remaineth in
the king's court of no such bill, nor of the writ of sub poena or injunc-
tion that is used thereupon ; therefore it is not set as for a special
ground of the law, but as a thing that is suffered by the law.'

About a century later the Court of Chancery was solemnly
recognized as a perfect and regular court of justice. Yet it was
not till the end of the seventeenth century that James I's decisive
action bore its due fruit. The causes of the check were not legal
but political, and are to be found in the controversies between king
and parliament, between prelates and Puritans, which led to the
Civil War. The Chancellor was still eminently the king's minister ;
his jurisdiction was practically uncontrolled, for there was no
appellate Court ; and men saw in the Chancellor's discretion, as they
had seen in the criminal equity of the Star Chamber, a power of

xiv] Transformation of Equity 295

being abused to political ends. Here, and not in any merely
technical prejudice, is the explanation of Selden's famous gibe
1 Equity is a roguish thing.' It is so because the measure of the
Chancellor's foot may go too near to follow the measure of King
Charles I.'s foot, peradventure even Archbishop Laud's : and so
the fuller working out of equity on St. German's lines had to wait
for the settlement of a free political constitution.

So far as England is concerned, the Puritan dislike of Chancery
jurisdiction may be taken as belonging to the common knowledge
of legal and other historians ; and we know in a general way that
it was carried across the Atlantic. The full extent of its working
on the western continent has been disclosed to the learned world
only by pretty recent publications of American scholars. While
Story was setting forth the beauties of equity jurisprudence in his
most elegant periods, the power of administering equitable remedies
was still, in more than one State, altogether lacking or rudimentary.
Traces of the old prejudice may be found even in much later
American writers. We have to remember, however, that the
Common Law itself found but little favour in the eyes of the
Pilgrim Fathers and their successors. For a time it was in danger
of being replaced by the Pentateuch, and its reception was pre-
carious, even beyond the Puritan commonwealths of New England,
down to the eighteenth century.1 We have also to remember in
extenuation that for some little time after the Restoration English
Common Law judges themselves had not got clear of the old
notions about equity, and wondered what it should have to do with
precedents.

In our own time, it is almost needless to say, courts of equitable
jurisdiction wholly disclaim any such roving powers of dispensation
and administrative interference as were exercised by the medieval
Chancellors. A judge of the Chancery Division can in plain terms
deny that his Court is a Court of conscience.2 It would be beyond
my present scope, and beyond my competence, to look for any
similar process of transformation in other systems of law ; but the

1 S. D. Wilson, ' Courts of Chancery in the American Colonies,' Essays in
Anglo-American Legal History, ii. 779 ; Fisher, ' The Administration of Equity
through Common Law Forms,' ibid. ii. 810 ; Reinsch, 'English Common Law
in the Early American Colonies,' ibid. i. 369.

2 Lord Justice (then Justice) Buckley [1903] 2 Ch. at p. 195.

296 F. Pollock [xiv

case of droit administratif in France is so near at hand and so
generally known that I may allow myself to mention it. The
semi-political jurisdiction of the Conseil d'Etat, established under
the First Empire in the interest of the government rather than of the
citizen, has by this time acquired a perfectly judicial character, and
it is said that the result is at times better for the suitor than what
he could look for under the ordinary law.

During the last two centuries the scientific construction of
equity jurisprudence in England has been in the hands of a highly
specialized section of the Bench and Bar, concentrated in these very
precincts of Lincoln's Inn where we are sitting. Practitioners of
the common law regarded equity much as the lay people regarded
all legal science, that is, as an inscrutable kind of magic, and rather
black than white. Even since the jurisdiction of our present
Supreme Court in all its branches has been made uniform this
frame of mind has hardly become extinct, and there is still some-
thing esoteric about the doctrines of equity and conveyancing. The
whole of the ground sacred to these mysteries would be included in
a radius of five hundred yards, or for abundant caution let us say
metres, drawn from this Old Hall of Lincoln's Inn, within or near
whose walls the law of the Court of Chancery was discussed and
settled by several generations of lawyers.

F. POLLOCK.

THE INFLUENCE OF COKE ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH LAW1

THE age of Coke was a critical period in the history of our common
law. During the sixteenth century the work of making England a
territorial state of the modern type had been accomplished, partly
by the legislature, partly by newly created or newly organized courts
and councils, and partly by the common law courts. With the
natural expansion of the jurisdiction of these courts and councils
conflicts between them had become frequent ; and they became
more frequent and more bitter when the restraining influence of
Elizabeth was removed. A settlement based upon an impartial
consideration of the claims of these rival courts was eminently
desirable. But it was never reached, because these disputes about
jurisdiction soon became merged in that larger question of the
whereabouts of the sovereign power in the State which underlay
the various causes of conflict between the King and his Parliament.
The newly created or newly organized courts naturally magnified
the prerogative on which they leaned, and to which they owed their
authority. They therefore gravitated to the royalist view that in
the last resort the prerogative was the sovereign power in the State.
On the other hand the common law was firmly based upon the

1 This paper is printed in the form in which it was written for the Inter-
national Historical Congress. It is a summary of a fuller account of Coke's
career and influence which will appear in the succeeding volumes of the
author's History of English Law. For this reason the author has thought it
best not to overweight it by inserting the authorities for the statements con-
tained in it. He has therefore only inserted explanatory references when these
appeared to be necessary for the understanding of the text. The fuller account
of Coke will, of course, contain detailed references to the authorities.

297

298 IV. S. Holdsworth [xv

mediaeval idea that in the State the law was supreme, and that the
prerogative was limited by it. The common lawyers therefore
gravitated to the Parliamentary view that definite legal limits
should be assigned to the prerogative, and that ministers who
overstepped those limits should be made responsible to the law.
Conversely the Parliamentary leaders naturally held that the law
to which they were responsible was that common law in which
alone they could find a legal justification for their political views.

But the additions made by the modern cases and statutes to
the mediaeval principles on which the common law was founded
made it often obscure and sometimes irrational. Was it capable,
it might fairly be asked, of supplying the principles needed to
guide the development of the public and private law of a modern
state ? The common lawyers maintained that it was all sufficient
for this purpose ; and though the growth of an independent system
of equity, and the slow development of a reasonable system of com-
mercial law, show that they to some extent exaggerated the capacity
of their system, the history of English public law in the seventeenth
century, and the growth of new branches of private law in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, have justified their faith.
That the common law was given this chance of justifying the
faith of those who believed in its capacity is largely due to the
career and writings of Edward Coke.

The main facts of Coke's career are well known and a very brief
recapitulation will suffice. He was born in 1551-2, and was called
to the bar in 1578. He became Solicitor-General in 1592, and was
Attorney-General from 1593 to 1606. It was during the latter part
of this period that he published the first three volumes of his
Reports, and gained the reputation of being the most learned
lawyer in England. It was during this period also that he acquired
that reverence for the common law which is the keynote of his
whole career. In 1606 he became Chief Justice of the Common
Pleas, and at once claimed for the common law the position of
supremacy in the State to which he believed it to be entitled.
This involved him in disputes with rival Courts, and, as James I
claimed to be the arbiter of all these disputes about jurisdiction,
with the king himself. These disputes merely confirmed Coke in
his fixed belief as to the position of the common law in the State.
Thus, when, in 1613, ne was made Chief Justice of the King's Bench,

XV]

Coke

299

the quarrel still continued ; and at length, in 1618, he was dismissed
from the Bench and ordered to revise his Reports. After a period
of hesitancy he, in 1620, decisively threw in his lot with the Parlia-
mentary opposition. Till 1628 he took a leading part in all the
Parliaments of James I's and Charles I's reigns, except that of 1626.
In the Parliament of 1628 he drafted and helped to carry the Petition
of Right ; and the stormy scenes which marked its passage were his
last appearance in public life. His remaining six years were spent
in retirement. Charles I, on his death in 1634, seized all his
manuscripts, lest they should contain matter to the prejudice of the
prerogative ; for, as he said, ( he is held too great an oracle among
the people, and they may be misled by anything that carries such
an authority as all things do that he either speaks or writes.'

The fears of Charles are the best evidence of Coke's reputation.
It was a reputation fairly earned by the manner in which he had
devoted all his great powers to the single object of understanding,
applying, explaining, and systematizing the common law. The
large place which he fills in English history is no doubt due in a
great degree to the character of the age. In quieter times he would
simply have been a great common lawyer with conservative
prejudices. But in the seventeenth century a great common lawyer,
who was passionately convinced of the excellence of the common
law and of its right to be the supreme law in the State, was
necessarily drawn into politics in order to defend its claims. The
fact that he was thus drawn into politics causes an apparent
inconsistency in his career, and some real inconsistency in his
statements of the doctrines of constitutional law. At first sight,
there seems to be little in common between Elizabeth's zealous
Attorney-General, and the man who framed and helped to carry
the Petition of Right. But this inconsistency is, to a large extent,
only apparent. He could be a zealous servant of the Crown under
the balanced Tudor monarchy, which so skilfully and diplomatically
shelved fundamental questions. Under James I he was driven
to resist the attempts to substitute the supremacy of the Crown for
the supremacy of the common law. In the later years of James I's
reign, and under Charles I, he was driven into alliance with the
Parliamentary opposition in order to uphold as against the
Crown the laws which secured the rights and privileges of Parlia-
ment, and the liberties of the subject. He stood still. His

3OO W. S. Holdsworth [xv

outlook was always that of a statesman of the latter part of the
Tudor period. It was the changing political scene which seemed to
place him in constantly fresh positions, and necessarily led him to
modify his views as to important doctrines of constitutional law.

The character of the man and of the age fully accounts for his
vast influence upon the law and politics of the seventeenth
century. But they do not fully account for the permanence of his
influence upon the future development of English law. This
permanence is due to the fact that his devotion to the common law
led him to consider it to be his duty to employ the scanty leisure
of a busy career in the work of restating in his writings all its
principal doctrines. If, therefore, we would understand the reasons
for the permanence of his influence, if we would estimate its nature
and extent we must examine the character of these writings.

The two works which have had this great influence are the
Reports and the Institutes.

The first part of the Reports was published in 1600, the next
two shortly after, and the remaining eight at intervals between
1603 and 1615. The twelfth and thirteenth parts were published
after Coke's death in 1655 and 1658. They were not prepared by
him for the press ; and are in fact simply rough notes of cases
and other transactions in which he had taken part. They have
never had the same authority as the other eleven parts, which he
himself published as his considered views upon the matters therein
contained.

When Coke wrote his Reports there was no agreement as to the
proper style of making a law report. The Year Book reports are
often very discursive narratives of the proceedings in Court. But
it is clear that in Coke's day much more attention was being paid
both to the actual discussion, and to the reasons on which it was
based, than in the earlier period. The constant and frequent
citation of cases in court, sometimes on the point and sometimes
at a great distance from that point, is noted by Coke and contrasted
with the earlier practice. But the report was still made primarily
for the benefit of the reporter ; and reporters adopted all styles
from the short notes of Bendloe to the elaborate statements of
record, argument, and judgment contained in Plowden. Coke did
not adopt any one style. To a certain extent he was guided by the
nature of the case which he was reporting. Occasionally he makes

xv] Coke 301

a case a mere peg for a disquisition on some branch of law.1
Sometimes he groups together the reports of several cases on one
topic, e.g. slander, by-laws, usury, copyhold;2 and these reports
are usually summary. When the case is important he often gives
the pleadings at length, a summary of the argument on both sides,
and the decision, together with the reasons for it. In these cases
Coke no doubt intended to give the effect of what was said in
Court. But it is probable that he added both explanations and
disquisitions which his own reading, and his enthusiasm for what he
regarded as sound doctrine, suggested to him. Bacon once said
that in his Reports there was too much ' de proprio.'

The cases reported form a corpus of the common law in the
sixteenth century. All parts of the law old and new are reviewed.
The older learning where applicable is restated ; the manner in
which it had been modified by the statutes of the sixteenth and
early seventeenth centuries is explained ; and the statutes which
introduced new branches of law are applied and interpreted. The
new developments of the common law — such as the beginning of
the struggle against perpetuities, the development of assumpsit, the
practice of allowing actions on contracts made abroad — are noted
and justified. Numerous cases, heard before courts other than the
common law courts (e.g. the Court of Wards and the Court of
Star Chamber), appear. The fact that the common law could
appeal to some of these precedents was very useful to it when
the results of the Great Rebellion gave it all and even more than
all the jurisdiction which Coke had claimed for it.

The four books of the Institutes were designed to supply the
student with a general introduction to the law. The older methods
of legal education were hardly sufficient by themselves, now that
the law was growing more complex. Coke set himself to write,
for the benefit of the student, the earliest of our text-books on the
modern common law. The First Institute contains his com-
mentary on Littleton. The Second is a discursive commentary
on some 39 statutes, of which 28 belonged to the mediaeval period.
Many of them deal with matters of public law. The Third
deals with the criminal law, and the Fourth with the jurisdiction of

1 Blackamore's Case, 8 Co. Rep. i $6a — amendments of process ; Beecher's
Case 8 Co. Rep. $8a — amercements.

2 4 Co. Rep. I2b-2ia (slander) ; 5 Co. Rep. 620-643 (by-laws) ; ibid. 6ga,
7ob (usury) ; 4 Co. Rep. 2ia-32a (copyhold).

302 IV. S. Holdswortk [xv

courts. Throughout the Second, Third, and Fourth Institutes Coke
insists on his views as to the supremacy of the common law courts
which had cost him his seat on the bench. 'The First Institute was
the only one which Coke published in his lifetime. The other
three were published in 1641.

The First Institute is a book of a very different character to
the other three. Littleton was one of the first books which a
student read, and Coke had been collecting material for it all his
life — from the time probably that he first read it as a student.
Coke upon Littleton was meant to be Littleton up-to-date — bearing
somewhat the same relation to Littleton as Justinian's Institutes
bear to the Institutes of Gams. But it is much more than this.
The commentary is extraordinarily minute. It gives the most
elementary pieces of information, and also disquisitions upon the
most abstruse points of law. All parts of the law not dealt with in
the other three books, and many that are, are introduced into this
wonderful commentary. It could never have been a good students'
text-book, and it is rather difficult to see how even its author
could have supposed that it was suitable for this purpose. One
reason may be found in the fact that he did not intend the student
to read it all at once, and another in the fact that it was supple-
mented by the instruction given by the Inns of Court. Moreover,
what is to our eyes one source of confusion, the grouping of a
large number of miscellaneous legal topics round the land law, was
the traditional historic order of the common law. Just as in
Roman law many topics belonging to the general law of contract
are grouped round the stipulatio, because it was the most general
form of contract known to Roman law ; so in English law, from
the days of Bracton, many various topics had been grouped round
the land law, because it was the most highly developed branch
of the common law. The rapid development of the common law
was fast making this grouping of topics obsolete — the law of
contract and the law of personal property were fast becoming
independent branches of law, and as important as the land law.
But it was hardly to be expected that Coke, whose outlook was
always to the past, should appreciate this. That was a point of
view which came more naturally to a man like Bacon whose
outlook was towards the future.

It is easy to see why Coke did not care to publish the last

xv] Coke 303

three parts of the Institutes in his lifetime. The First Institute
dealt with branches of the law very remote from any of the con-
stitutional controversies of the day. But a large number of the topics
treated of in the other three books touched them at many points.
In 1628, when the Second and Third Institutes were finished,
Coke's active career was over ; and, when the Fourth Institute
was finished, Parliament had been dissolved and the country was
being governed by the Prerogative. We cannot blame Coke for
not wishing to shorten his few remaining years by a close im-
prisonment in the Tower. He had recorded his opinions : their
publication could well wait for a more favourable season.

When they were published in 1641 it was the hour of the
victory of the common law and of the Parliament. Men did not
stop to consider the accuracy or the validity of the arguments upon
which Coke based his claim that the common law and the Parlia-
ment were supreme in the State. They simply accepted them and
made them the basis, not only of our modern constitutional law,
but also of the whole of that large part of our modern English law
which is comprised under the general term 'common law.' It is
not surprising therefore that, almost down to our own days, there
have been many lawyers who would hardly admit of the existence
of any serious shortcomings in Coke's work. But during the last
century there has been a reaction. Coke has been attacked on
opposite grounds by two very different schools of lawyers. In the
first place he has been attacked by the historical school on the
ground that he has sometimes carelessly and sometimes, it is even
said, intentionally misrepresented historical facts. In the second
place he has been attacked by lawyers of the school of Austin and
Bentham on the ground that both the material and the form of his
writings are obscure, illogical, and ill-arranged. Let us look at
these two classes of criticism, and see to what extent they are
justified.

(i) THE EXCEPTIONS TAKEN BY THE HISTORIANS

Time has its revenges. Coke in his lifetime was at pains to
advise and correct historians if they ventured into the domain of
law. Now the historians have turned upon Coke and pointed out
that his history is often inaccurate, and that his law is not the
true mediaeval law that he represented it to be ; and it must be

304 W. S. Holdsworth [xv

admitted that there is a large amount of substantial truth in their
criticisms. Coke was always the lawyer, always the advocate, and,
in the latter part of his life, a keen politician. The lawyer, the
advocate, and the politician must needs make excursions into the
domain of the historian for their own special purposes. But
history so produced will generally be, as history, worthless. If we
remember that Coke's excursions into the domain of history are all
made with a purpose, and that in addition he had no conception of
history for its own sake, and no power of criticizing the historical
sources which he used, we shall not be surprised that, as compared
with the work of true historians like Selden or Bacon, his historical
work is almost contemptible. If we glance at the various purposes
for which Coke was obliged to trespass upon the domain of the
historian, we shall be the better able to understand why, in this
historical age, Coke's reputation has fallen to perhaps an unduly
low ebb.

As a lawyer Coke was obliged to make a large use of history in
order to explain his law. The continuity of the common law must
make every sound common lawyer something of a historian. At
the same time the peculiarities of our system of case law cause
lawyers to exaggerate the amount of continuity which there is in
the law. They talk as if the new decisions were merely develop-
ments of the old law ; and this method of reasoning may easily
deceive historians who are not lawyers. Moreover the present
state of our knowledge of English legal history has led historians
who are lawyers to join in condemning Coke. We know more
about the legal doctrines of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries
than about the legal doctrines of the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries. We see a doctrine in Bracton or the earlier Year Books.
We see it in a somewhat different form in Coke, and we are apt
to conclude that Coke has been perverting his sources. To take
an illustration. Mr. Pike x has pointed out that when Coke, com-
menting on Littleton, states that an advowson lies in grant but not
in livery ', he is introducing a negative statement for which there
is no warrant in Littleton. But Coke had authority. In 1490 2
Brian and Vavisor agreed that, because an advowson passed by
grant, it could not pass by livery. Coke was not writing legal
history. He was only using legal history to explain the law of

1 L.Q.R. v. 36. 2 Y.B. 6 Hy. VII, Pasch. pi. 5, p. 3.

xv] Coke 305

his own day. Possibly many of his statements which seem at
variance with the older authorities are based upon more recent
authorities which he was bound to follow. A judge who at the
present day followed seventeenth-century in preference to nineteenth-
century decisions would find that his judgments were frequently
reversed. I cannot, of course, say how many of Coke's departures
from thirteenth-century law can be justified in this way — that would
involve a knowledge to which I cannot pretend. But probably a
good many can be so justified ; and clearly for errors of this kind
he cannot be censured. But this plea cannot be urged in defence
of the errors into which he was led either from his habits of
indiscreet advocacy or from his political bias.

A very cursory acquaintance with Coke's writings will show
that he approached both law and history with the mind of a
strenuous advocate. All through his life he never ceased to be
an advocate of legal doctrines or political causes. Whether he is
reporting a case, or arguing for the supremacy of the common law
in the State, or upholding the rights and privileges of Parliament,
he does it with all his strength ; and the result is that he writes or
talks himself into a decided view on the subject. I very much
doubt whether in all Coke's writings a passage could be found in
which he admits that he has left the law uncertain. On the other
hand there are many passages in which he states that he has
solved all doubts and reconciled all conflicting cases. No doubt
he honestly thought he had done so. Now this defect in Coke's
mind has led to two very grave shortcomings in his writings,
(i) The various causes which he advocated during his long life were
not always quite consistent. Thus the dicta in Bonham's case 1 as
to the power of the common law to overrule Acts of Parliament
are not quite consistent with the views which he elsewhere expresses
as to the supremacy of Parliament. Some of the dicta in the case
of Non Obstante 2 as to inseparable prerogatives of the Crown which
no Act of Parliament can take away, are not quite consistent with
his more considered statements that the prerogative is subject to
the law. (2) This defect made him very uncritical in the use of
his sources. He swallowed all the statements in the Mirror of
Justices because they fitted in with his preconceived ideas as to the
immemorial antiquity of the common law. Moreover, it led him to
1 8 Co. Rep 107. 2 12 Co. Rep. 18.

306 IV. S. Holdsworth [xv

read into his authorities meanings which they never possessed. I
have elsewhere shown that he twice repeats a statement that one
of the counts in an indictment of Wolsey contained an accusation
that Wolsey had attempted to subvert the common law, — the facts
being that the indictment cited is not of Wolsey at all, and that
the passage as to subverting the common law was the common
form of an indictment under the statute of Praemunire.1 The
similar errors into which he fell in connexion with his account of
the Admiralty jurisdiction have been exposed by Prynne in the
seventeenth century, and by Mr. Marsden in our own times. But
this last illustration of Coke's use of his history to advocate his
views is closely connected with the political uses to which he
turned it.

We have seen that Coke in his later years had become a leader
of the Parliamentary opposition. This naturally involved a
reconsideration of some of his earlier opinions on such matters of
public law as the right of the Crown to legislate by proclamation,2
to levy impositions and exact loans,3 to commit to prison without
cause shown,4 to get extra-judicial opinions from the judges.5 In
earlier days these recantations tended to make men believe in the
infallibility of Coke. When men thought that the constitutional
principles established in the seventeenth century were not merely
beneficial to the State, but also incontestably sound law, the views
of Coke on these matters in his published writings were taken to
prove his legal infallibility on all matters. But in our own days
they have had the opposite effect. We see now that the public
law of the seventeenth century was very obscure ; and that though
the victory of constitutional principles was undoubtedly beneficial
to the State, the legal principles upon which the leaders of the
constitutional opposition relied were often very dubious. Hence
we see in these recantations of Coke mere evidences of his political

1 L.Q.R. xxviii. 135-6.

2 Cp. Notes on the Prerogative in State Papers, Dom. (1598-1601),
cclxxvi. 8 1, and the opinion given while Attorney-General, with the case of
Proclamations (1611), 12 Co. Rep. 74.

8 Spedding, Life and Letters of Bacon, v. 146 ; 12 Co. Rep. 119 ; Rush-
worth, Pt. i. 497 ; State Papers, Dom. (1634), cclxxviii. 35 ; ibid. (1603-1610),
Iv. 52.

4 See his speech in the House of Commons, cited Foster, Elliot, ii. 26-28;
and cp. his views in 1620—21, Proceedings and Debates, ii. 25, 109.

5 Spedding, Life and Letters of Bacon, v. 114-18.

xv] Coke 307

bias, and are apt to doubt whether in other branches of the law he
is as infallible as our forefathers thought him. I do not think that
either line of argument is quite legitimate. We must clearly
separate Coke's views on matters which related to the political
controversies of the day from matters which did not ; and I think
that on matters of law unconnected with these controversies a
general charge of inaccuracy is not proved. No doubt dicta can
be found which disparage his accuracy. But of some of these
Mr. Wallace in his book on the Reporters has successfully disposed.
No doubt later cases show that he was sometimes wrong. But
they are small in number compared with the cases in which his
ruling has been accepted. Neither Bacon nor Ellesmere found
any serious faults with his Reports, except in cases of a political or
semi-political character ; and Bacon admitted that the Reports,
' though they may have errors, and some peremptory and extra-
judicial resolutions more than are warranted, yet contain infinite
good decisions and rulings over of cases/ Bacon and the lawyers
who were the contemporaries or the immediate successors of Coke
knew more of the older authorities at first hand than we do. I
should therefore contend that the view that Coke is inaccurate in
his statements of law on matters unconnected with the political
controversies of the day is not proved.

Let us now turn to the criticisms made by the writers of another
school.

(2) THE EXCEPTIONS TAKEN BY THE ANALYTICAL JURISTS

Though Coke's history is often unhistorical he was for all that
a lawyer of the historical school. ' Out of the old fields must grow
the new corn ' was one of his favourite proverbs. And he had all the
defects of the historical school in an exaggerated form. Thus he is
ready with a defence for all the anomalies and anachronisms by
which English law was disfigured. He could explain them ; and
between explanation and justification it never occurred to him that
there could be any distinction. On the other hand he had the virtues
of the historical school. The analytical lawyer usually bases his
analysis mainly upon the ideas current in his own day. He is
therefore inclined to reject as useless all that is not in accord with
these current ideas. But the historical lawyer preserves the ideas
of a past age ; and these ideas often come into their own again in

308 W. S. Holdsworth [xv

a future age. Coke's writings preserved for England the mediaeval
idea of the supremacy of the law at a time when political specula-
tion was tending in the direction of the supremacy of a sovereign
body or person who was above the law ; and the obscurity and
indefinite character of some of the mediaeval rules of law which
he states preserved for the common law a flexibility which is a
condition precedent of natural development and expansion.

As Coke's writings thus possess the vices and the virtues of
the historical school, they have naturally attracted the censure of
those whose minds are cast in an analytical mould. Hobbes, the
forefather of the school of analytical jurists, attacks Coke in his
Dialogue of the Common Law with all the accustomed weapons of
that school. Law should be defined as the command of the
sovereign. Case law is no true law. Useless distinctions should
be got rid of. Absurd rules should be altered. Law should be
stated so plainly that the non- lawyer should be able to give a
sound opinion upon its meaning. Hobbes's criticisms are approved
by Sir James Stephen. But we should do well to remember that,
though Stephen is the historian of our criminal law, he had the
mind of an analytical jurist. And when we read his condemna-
tion of Coke's disorderly mind, of his technical and pedantic
divisions, of his puerile speculations, we might also recall the fact
that, in Austin's opinion, Coke's mastery of the legal system as a
whole was equalled only by that of the great Roman jurists.
Hobbes and Stephen saw part of the truth, but not all.

That at the end of the sixteenth century a restatement of
English law was needed was obvious to the leading lawyers and
statesmen of the day. But what form should that restatement
take ? It was clear to Bacon that the construction of a logical code
was impossible. ' I dare not,' he wrote, ' advise to cast the law
into a new mould.' Instead, he had visions of doing for English law
something of the same nature that Justinian had done for Roman
law. There was to be a revision of the statute book, a revision
of the reports, a book of institutes, and a book of legal history.
But political causes rendered Bacon's scheme impossible of realiza-
tion at the time when it was propounded ; and the merits of Coke's
writings rendered such a restatement at a later period less pressing.

His writings had, it seems to me, five very considerable merits.

xv] Coke 309

(1) They cover the whole field of English law, and restate it
from the point of view of the sixteenth century. In any age in
which large political, social, and intellectual changes have taken
place the law will need to be reconsidered and restated. And it
is not one of the least of the advantages of our system of case law
that it can thus be adapted to a new environment. What a
succession of eminent lawyers have done for the common law in
the nineteenth century, Coke did for the common law of his own
day. Professor- Maitland once said in a letter to me, ' Coke's books
are the great dividing line, and we are hardly out of the Middle
Ages till he has dogmatized its results.'

(2) He deduces from the scattered and inconsistent dicta in the
Year Books positive rules of law. All through his writings Coke
is reconciling Year Books. We could with considerable justice
apply to his work the title applied to Gratian's work — Concordia
discordantium canonum.

(3) His writings not only brought the Year Books into line
with the modern reports, they brought the mediaeval literature of
the common law into line with the modern literature. The great
mediaeval books — Glanvil, Bracton, Britton, and Fleta — were made
to explain and illustrate the law expounded by Perkins, Fitz-
herbert, Staundford, and Lambard.

(4) By the information which they gave as to the doings of
other courts — notably the Star Chamber, the Chancery, and the
Admiralty — they tended to familiarize the common lawyers with
the new ideas which, in those courts, were giving rise to new legal
developments. This made it easier for the common law to fill the
great position which it acquired as a result of the constitutional
conflicts of the seventeenth century.

(5) As a result, his writings ensured the continuity of the
development of the common law amidst all the vast changes of
this century of Renaissance, Reformation, and Reception. This
signal merit of Coke's writings was fully recognized in his own
day. 'Had it not been for Sir Edward Coke's Reports ,' wrote
Bacon, ' the law of this time had almost been like a ship without
ballast ; for that the cases of modern experience are fled from
those that are adjudged and ruled in former times.'

Coke had thus adapted a thoroughly mediaeval body of law to
the needs of the modern State, without any appreciable sacrifice of

310 IV. S. Holdsworth [xv

the mediaeval ideas contained in it. He had maintained that this
body of law ought to be the supreme law in the State ; and the
results of the Great Rebellion had caused his views to prevail.
Naturally the effect of his writings on the future development of
English law has been enormous both for evil and for good.

It can hardly be denied that the victory of Coke's views has
had unfortunate effects upon the form and the substance of English
law. Rules and doctrines were retained which were already half
obsolete in his day ; and, as a result, it is hard to draw the line
between obsolete and living law. Then, too, the appropriation by
the common law of commercial causes made the growth of a
reasonable system of commercial law very slow. Till the codifying
statutes of the nineteenth century, English law could show no
measures dealing with this topic comparable with the French
ordonnances of two centuries earlier. And till the reforms of the
same century our law of bankruptcy was a disgrace to a civilized
community.

On the other hand we cannot doubt that the result of Coke's
writings has been to make English law a very much more uniform
system of law than it would otherwise have been. The result of
the success of the Court of Chancery in its quarrel with the
common law was to split our English law into two halves. If all
the other rival courts had been equally successful, English law
would have been split into many fragments. Coke's writings
helped to save English law from this fate because they successfully
asserted the supremacy of the common law.

And more was involved in the maintenance of the supremacy
of the common law than the settlement of a mere legal quarrel
about jurisdiction. If the common law had lost its supremacy,
would Parliament, we may fairly ask, have gained the victory?
And if it had gained the victory without the help of a common
law which claimed to be the supreme law in the State, would our
constitutional law be what it is to-day ? This we may well doubt.
In the past the common lawyers had helped to make the English
Parliament an efficient representative assembly. In the seventeenth
century the Parliament handsomely repaid the debt by helping
Coke and his fellows to maintain the mediaeval conception of the
rule of law, and to apply it to the government of a modern State.
It was in Coke's writings that this, together with other mediaeval

xv] Coke. 311

conceptions, were given their modern form ; and therefore it is
largely owing to the influence of his writings that these mediaeval
conceptions have become part of our modern law. If their influence
upon some parts of our modern law has not been wholly satis-
factory, let us remember that they have preserved for England and
the world the constitutional doctrine of the rule of law.

The effects of this doctrine were destined in the succeeding
ages to be felt beyond the bounds of England, beyond the bounds
even of English-speaking peoples — in all places and at all times
wherever and whenever men have had the will and the power to
establish constitutional government. We may surely claim that
these large results of this part of Coke's work upon the civilized
world of to-day entitle the most English of our English common
lawyers to a place among the great jurists of the world.

W. S. HOLDSWORTH. ;

XVI

UBER DIE GESCHICHTE DES
MAJORITATSPRINZIPS

Zu keiner Zeit vielleicht hat das Majoritatsprinzip eine so
gewaltige Rolle gespielt wie in der Gegenwart. Bei staatlichen
und kommunalen Wahlen, bei den Beschlussfassungen von
Parlamenten und Gemeindevertretungen, in administrativen und
richterlichen Kollegien, in alien offentlichen und privaten Korper-
schaften, in Vereinen fur wirtschaftliche wie fur ideale Zwecke
entscheidet Stimmenmehrheit. Uberall gilt, was die Mehrheit
will, als Ausdruck des Gemeinwillens. Durch ein Rechenexempel
wird festgestellt, was alle Beteiligten als fiir sie bindend anerkennen
miissen, mag es sich nun um 16 Millionen Stimmender, wie jiingst
bei der amerikanischen Prasidentenwahl, oder mag es sich um
die Abstimmung in einem Dreimannerkollegium handeln. Erst
unterhalb der Dreizahl versagt dieses Allheilmittel fiir Meinungs-
verschiedenheiten. In der Gemeinschaft zu Zweien gibt es keine
Majoritat. Die innigste aller menschlichen Verbindungen, die
Ehe, muss sich ohne Abstimmungen behelfen.

Infolge solcher allgemeinen Anerkennung nehmen wir heute
das Majoritatsprinzip <als etwas Selbstverstandliches hin und
zerbrechen uns nicht viel den Kopf dariiber, warum denn hier
Uberall der Teil so viel gilt wie das Ganze. Auch in juristischen,
politischen und philosophischen Schriften begegnen nur selten
eingehendere Versuche seiner Rechtfertigung.1

Dem war nicht immer so ! Das Majoritatsprinzip hat keines-

1 Eindringlich erortert das Problem Simmel, Soziologie, 1908, S.
186-97 (Exkurs iiber Uberstimmung). Eine Erklarung, die aber in den
sinnlichen Vorstellungen primitiver Zeitalter stecken bleibt, versucht auch
Bolze, Der Begriff der juristischen Person, 1879, S. 109 ff.

312

xvi] Majoritatsprinzip 313

wegs von jeher in Kraft gestanden. Es hat sich erst in langem
geschichtlichen Ringen durchgesetzt und dabei sehr verschiedene
Entwicklungsstufen durchlaufen. Sein Geltungsgrund ist in
mannigfach ungleicher Weise aufgefasst und formuliert worden.
Ein Blick auf diesen Werdeprozess bietet um so grosseres
historisches Interesse, als er sich in engem Zusammenhange mit
dem Wandel der Grundanschauungen liber das Wesen der
menschlichen Verbande abgespielt hat. Zugleich aber mag er
dazu dienen, ein tieferes Verstandnis unseres heutigen Rechts-
zustandes zu fordern.

In diesem Sinne mochte ich es unternehmen, Ihre Auf-
merksamkeit auf die Geschichte des Majoritatsprinzips zu
lenken. Dabei beschranke ich mich aber auf die Darlegung der
auf Grund des germanischen Rechts im Mittelalter und in der
Neuzeit vollzogenen Entwicklung. Insbesondere gehe ich auf
eine Untersuchung der Geschichte des Majoritatsprinzips in der
antiken Kulturwelt nicht naher ein. Bei Griechen und Romern
erfreut sich in den reifen Zeiten, von denen wir genauere Kenntnis
haben, das Majoritatsprinzip bei alien Versammlungsbeschliissen
unbestrittener Herrschaft. Uber Vorstadien, die es vermutlich
gegeben hat, sind wir nicht sicher unterrichtet. Jedenfalls war
man sich solcher nicht mehr bewusst, hegte vielmehr an der
Berechtigung der Entscheidung durch Stimmenzahlung keinerlei
Zweifel. In der griechischen Staatslehre stossen wir iiber-
haupt nicht auf Reflexionen Uber den Grund der Geltung des
Stimmenmehrs. Erst die romischen Juristen suchen nach dem
Geltungsgrunde. Sie begniigen sich aber mit einer sehr ausser-
lichen Rechtfertigung. Refertur ad universes quod pub lice fit
per majorem partem, sagt Ulpian in 1. 160 § I D. de R. J. Ahn-
lich meint Scaevola in 1. 19 D. ad municipalem (56, i): Quod
major pars curiae effecit pro eo habetur, ac si omnes egerint.
Diese Aussprliche, die spater eine grosse Rolle gespielt haben,
laufen auf eine juristische Fiktion hinaus, kraft deren die Mehrheit
gelten soil, als seien es Alle. Wie sich zu dieser Fiktion der
bekannte positive Rechtssatz verhalt, der zur Gultigkeit eines
Majoritatsbeschlusses der stadtischen Kurie die Anwesenheit von
zwei Dritteln fordert, lassen die romischen Juristen, die eine
allgemeine Theorie der Korporationsbeschlusse uberhaupt nicht
ausgebildet haben, unerortert.

314 O. V. Gierke [xvi

Dem germanischen Recht war auf der ungleich primitiveren
Stufe, auf der es bei seinem Eintritt in das Licht der Geschichte
stand, das Majoritatsprinzip fremd. Ihm deckte sich der Gesamt-
wille mit dem Versammlungswillen und der Versammlungswille
mit; dem Willen aller Versammelten. Fur das durchaus sinn-
liche und konkrete Denken der alten Zeit waren Trager alles Ver-
bandsrechtes sichtbare Versammlungen und sichtbare Herrscher.
So wenig man bei dem Herrscher die Individualpersonlichkeit
und die Stellung als Verbandshaupt unterschied, ebenso wenig
unterschied man bei der Versammlung die Gesamteinheit von
der Gesamtvielheit. Alles Gemeinschaftsrecht hatte daher die
Versammlung der vollberechtigten Genossen in ihrer zugleich
einheitlichen und vielkopfigen Erscheinung auszuiiben. In dem
kollektiven Wollen und Handeln Aller offenbarte sich das
lebendige Ganze.

Grundsatzlich bedurfte es also zu jedem Volks- oder Ge-
meindebeschluss eines einhelligen Gesamtaktes. Im Falle
der Meinungsverschiedenheit zu einem solchen zu gelangen, war das
Ziel der Beratung. Wenn aber die Uberzeugungskraft der Griinde
oder das Ansehen und die Beredsamkeit der fiihrenden Manner
nicht zur Ubereinstimmung fiihrten, so setzte sich freilich in
der Regel die Meinung der uberwiegenden Mehrheit durch. Allein
dies geschah urspriinglich keineswegs im Wege einer die Minder-
heit von Rechtswegen bindenden Abstimmung. Von Stimmabgabe
und Stimmzahlung war nicht die Rede. Vielmehr gab die ver-
sammelte Menge mit gesamter Hand und mit gemeinem Munde
ihre Willensmeinung kund. Zusammenschlagen der Waffen mit
Beifallsruf oder sonstige Billigung mit Hand und Mund gait als
Annahme, lautes Murren oder missbilligender Zuruf als Verwer-
fung eines Vorschlags. So schildert uns Tacitus die Beschluss-
fassung in der altgermanischen Volksversammlung, und jiingere
Quellen bestatigen es als gemeingermanische Ubung.1 Verhielten

1 Germ, c. 1 1 : sin placuit, frameas concutiunt; honoratissimum assensus
genus est armis laudare. Vgl. Hist. v. 1 7. Die Waffenriihrung begegnet auch
spater bei den Franken als besonders feierliche Form des Volksbeschlusses :
Zusammenschlagen der Schilde und Beifallsruf bei der Wahl Chlodwigs
durch die ripuarischen Franken nach Gregor = Gregor Tur. ii. 40 ; votibusque
simul et armorum plausu sententiam ducis firmaveruntr^^ Annales Mettenses
z. J. 690, MG. S.S. i. 318. Bei den nordischen Volkern als vdpnatak bei
GesetzgebungsaktenundKonigsannahme. — Doch war, wie sichschonausG^r;;/.

xvi] Majoritatsprinzip 315

sich Dissentierende schweigend, so hatte schliesslich doch die
Versammlung mit gesamter Hand und gemeinem Munde ihren
Willen erklart. Und auch der Widerspruch des einen oder
andern mochte, wenn er iiberhort oder ubertont wurde, die Ver-
kiindigung des Ergebnisses als eines einstimmigen Versammlungs-
beschlusses nicht hindern.

Eine rechtliche Verpflichtung aber, sich dem Mehrheits-
beschlusse zu fiigen, und ihn so zugleich als eigenen Beschluss
anzuerkennen, gab es nicht. Wer seinen Widerspruch trotzig auf-
recht hielt, war durch den Beschluss der andern Genossen, die
nicht mehr Alle waren, nicht gebunden. Allein er loste sich damit
von der in sich einigen Gesamtheit der Anderen, er trat ihr als
Feind gegeniiber und setzte sich ihrem gewaltsamen Zwange aus.
War der Widerstand gegen solche Uberwaltigung wegen der
Starke der Mehrheit aussichtslos, so musste regelmassig schon die
Erwagung der Folgen die Minderheit bewegen, den Widerspruch
fallen zu lassen. Allein den Halsstarrigen konnte nur die tatsach-
liche Macht iiberwinden. Und wenn auch die Minderheit stark war
und sich den Sieg zutraute, so trat an Stelle des einheitlichen Ver-
sammlungsbeschlusses die Spaltung in Teilgesamtheiten, zwischen
denen dann aussersten Falles die Waffen entschieden.

Ein deutliches Bild der Fortdauer dieser urspriinglichen An-
schauungen bieten bis tief in das Mittelalter hinein die deutschen
Konigswahlen. Sie forderten Einstimmigkeit, anfangs Ein-
stimmigkeit der versammelten Stammeshaupter und der zu-
stimmenden Volksmenge, sodann Einstimmigkeit der Fiirsten l und
dann noch, seitdem die Kurfiirsten aus Vorwahlern zu alleinigen
Wahlern geworden waren, Einstimmigkeit der Kurfiirsten. Erst
die goldene Bulle fiihrte das Majoritatsprinzip als Grundsatz
des Reichsrechtes ein.2 Bis dahin musste eine Minderheit, die

c. 1 1 ergibt, der Waffenschlag nicht die einzige Form der Zustimmung. Es
geniigte die acclamatio. Bei den deutschen Konigswahlen wird Emporheben
der Hande neben dem Beifallsruf erwahnt ; Widukind, Res gest. Sax. i. 26,
ii. i. Also, wie dies dem alten Rechtsformalismus entspricht, Billigtmg mit
Hand und Mund.

1 Noch der Sachsensp., iii. 57 § 2, fordert Einigung aller Fiirsten iiber
die Wahl als Grundlage des formellen Kurspruchs : „ sven die vorsten alle to
koninge erwelt, den solen sie (die Kurfiirsten) aller erst bi namen kiesen."

2 Fur die kurfiirstliche Genehmigung koniglicher Verausserungen hatte
schon ein Reichsweistum von 1281 (MG. Const, iii. 290) das Mehrheits-

316 O. v. Gierke [xvi

sich nicht freiwillig ftigte, durch Waffengewalt zur Anerkennung
des gewahlten Konigs gezwungen werden. Die zahlreichen Waffen-
gange zwischen Konigen und Gegenkonigen bei zwiespaltigen
Wahlen sind aus der Geschichte bekannt.

Auch sonst erhielten sich vielfach mit Zahigkeit die alten
Anschauungen. Im deutschen wie im frankischen Reichstage
war zunachst zur Beschlussfassung Einigung erforderlich und die
Unterwerfung derer, die sich ausschlossen, vom Zwange der Uber-
macht abhangig. Friihestens seit dem Ende des dreizehnten
Jahrhunderts wurden Mehrheitsbeschliisse als bindend anerkannt,
sehr viel spater erst Stimmzahlungen unter Fixierung des Stim-
mengewichts eingefiihrt, bis zuletzt in den drei Kollegien, in die
er zerfiel, das Majoritatsprinzip durchdrang und nur Einstimmig-
keit der Kollegien oder im Falle der itio in paries der beiden
Religionskorper notwendig blieb. Langsam und anfanglich nur
in beschranktem Umfange wurde in den landstandischen Ver-
sammlungen und auch hier immer nur innerhalb der einzelnen
standischen Korper der Grundsatz der Einstimmigkeit durch die
Mehrheitsentscheidung liberwunden, langsamer noch in den foe-
derativen Verbanden, wie in der deutschen Hanse und der
schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft. Ebenso musste uberall in
Europa das Majoritatsprinzip in den politischen Versammlungen
die formale Geltung, die es endlich errang, sich erst miihsam
erkampfen. In manchen Landern wurde sogar ihm gegeniiber das
Einstimmigkeitsprinzip zu formaler Geltung erhoben,1 dem jedoch
der endgiiltige Sieg nur im polnischen Reichstage mit dem
beriichtigten liberum veto beschieden war.

Langer noch, als auf den Hohen des offentlichen Lebens,
behauptete sich in dessen Niederungen das alte Recht. Insbeson-
dere wurden auf dem Lande in Markgenossenschaften und
Bauerschaften die Beschliisse stets von der versammelten
Menge der Vollgenossen einmiitig gefasst und einmiindig
erklart. Dass Beschlusse, die das Sonderrecht des einzelnen
Genossen kranken, dessen Zustimmung forderten, ist begreif lich ;

prinzip anerkannt. Bei der Konigswahl wurde zuerst in der Const. Lud.
Licet juris v. 6. Aug. 1338 die Beschlussfahigkeit einer Mehrheit von
vier Kurfursten festgesetzt, mit dem Erforderniss der Einhelligkeit der Ver-
sammelten aber noch nicht gebrochen.
1 So bis 1292 in Arragonien.

xvi] Majoritatsprinzip 3 1 7

zu diesen aber rechnete man unter dem Gesichtspunkte des alten
Gesamteigentums an der Mark vielfach auch die Aufnahme neuer
anteilsberechtigter Genossen und jede Verfiigung liber die All-,
mende oder deren Ertrage zu Gunsten von Ungenossen,raumte daher
in solchen Fallen jedem Genossen ein formales Widerspruchsrecht
ein, das erst durch Verschweigung in Jahr und Tag erlosch.1
Allein auch wo es sich lediglich um die Ausiibung des Gesamtrechtes
oder um das gemeine Beste handelte, wo Recht gewiesen oder
Recht gesetzt, wo ein Vorsteher oder ein Beamter gewahlt wurde,
bedurfte es eines ungezweiten Versammlungsaktes. Hierbei
machte sich nun freilich stets das Ubergewicht der Mehrheit
geltend. Und seit dem dreizehnten Jahrhundert wurde mehr und
mehr auch in den Landgemeinden der Stimmenmehrheit ein
rechtlicher Vorzug zugestanden.2 Allein damit wurde, wie wir
sehen werden, zunachst das Erfordernis der schliesslichen Uber-
einstimmung Aller keineswegs aufgegeben, sodass ausweislich
unzahliger Weistiimer und Urkunden fort und fort die Gemeinde-
beschlusse als einstimmige Versammlungserklarungen verkiindigt
wurden.3

Nicht minder lebendig blieb die ererbte Denkweise bei dem
Urteilsspruch in alien Gerichtsversammlungen. Das
gefundene Urteil erlangte Rechtskraft nur durch die vulbort, die
allgemeine Zustimmung der vollberechtigten Dingleute. Wo
Schoffen oder andere Urtelsfinder ohne Umstand zu entscheiden

1 Fur die Aufnahme neuer Genossen vgl. mein Genossenschaftsr. ii.
232, Anm. 156, Maurer, Einl. 141 ff., Markenv. 112 ff., und dazu tiber
das urspriingliche Recht, wie es der richtig verstandene Tit. leg. Sal. de
migrantibus bekundet, mein Genossenschaftsr. i. 76 ff. Fur Verfiigungen
iiber die Allmende mein Genossenschaftsr. ii. 232, Anm. 153, 158-60,
Lamprecht, Deutsches Wirtschaftsleben im M.A. i. 310, Anm. 6 ; insbesondere
noch die Kundschaft von 1487, b. Grimm, W. i. 400. Fiir Gestattung
der Rodung nach Zeugenaussage v. 1560, b. Landau, Territories S. 117,
Anm. i. — Dazu vgl. man Pollock and Maitland, i. 684.

2 Ausdriicklich heisst es schon im Sachsensp. ii. 55: „ Svat so die
burmester schept des dorpes vromen mit wilkore der merren menie der bure,
dat ne mach die minre deil nicht wederreden." Vgl. Schwabensp. (L.) 214
(mit dem Zusatz : „ dass selbe recht sol man halden in den stetten ").
Rupr. Freis. i. 142. Dazu zahlreiche Belege aus den Weistiimern
in meinem Genossenschaftsr. iii. 220 ff., 478 ff. Vgl. auch Maurer,
Markenv. S. 359 ff., Dorfv. i. 220, ii. 86 ff. ; Thudichum, Gau. u. Markv.

8.315-

3 Vgl. mein Genossenschaftsr. iii. 483, 501 ff.

318 O. v. Gierke [xvi

hatten, war mindestens ihre einhellige Billigung unerlasslich.
Und dieser Grundsatz iiberdauerte wieder die Einfiihrung des
Majoritatsprinzips. Etwas anders verhielt es sich bei dem
Wahrspruch der Geschworenen, der ja von Hause aus nicht
Urteil sondern Zeugnis war.1 Aber auch das Gesamtzeugnis
forderte eine einhellige Gesamtaussage und scheiterte am Zwiespalt
der Meinungen. Das blosse Nichtwissen des Einen oder Andern
mochte der Kraft des gemeinen Wahrspruches nicht schaden, wie
denn im normannischen Recht die feste Regel ausgebildet wurde,
dass der einstimmige Wahrspruch von elf unter den zwolf Ge-
schworenen geniige. Der ausdriickliche Widerspruch aber auch nur
eines einzigen Geschworenen hinderte das Zustandekommen eines
giiltigen Spruchs.2 Von hier aus konnte sich das starre Erfordernis
der Einstimmigkeit in der englischen Jury entwickeln.3 Es konnte
aber auch das Majoritatsprinzip durchdringen, sei es nun, dass eine
iiberwiegende Mehrheit erforderlich blieb, sei es, dass mit einfacher
Mehrheit entschieden wurde, wie dies im normannischen Recht bei
Besitzprozessen der Fall war4 und in Deutschland bei der hier
allein ubrig gebliebenen Bekundung von Besitzverhaltnissen durch
die Umsassen gait.5

Die allgemeine Entwicklungstendenz war, wie wir gesehen
haben, auf die fortschreitende Anerkennung des Majoritats-
prinzips gerichtet, das in der zweiten Halfte des Mittelalters
auch in Deutschland unbestritten in standischen Versammlungen,
Gerichten, Landgemeinden, Stadten, Gilden und Ziinften gait und
in den Rechtsbiichern, den Weistiimern und zahlreichen anderen
Rechtsquellen als generelle Regel ausgesprochen wird. Allein
ich habe schon darauf hingewiesen, dass es zunachst keineswegs
einen Bruch mit den alten Anschauungen bedeutete, sondern sich
in deren Rahmen als ein juristisches Mittel zur Erzielung eines
einheitlichen Versammlungsbeschlusses einfugte. Denn es empfangt
die Fassung: „ Die Minderheit soil der Mehrheit folgen,"

1 Eingehend handelt von dem Stimmenverhaltniss beim Wahrspruch
Brunner, Entstehung der Schwurgerichte, S. 363-71.

2 Brunner, a. a. O., S. 365.

3 Pollock and Maitland, ii. 625 ff.

4 Brunner, a. a. O., S. 367 ff.

6 Sachsensp. iii. 2 1 § i a.l. : „ Sve de merren mennie an'me getiige hevet,
die behalt dat gut."

xvi] Majoritatsprinzip 3 1 9

minor pars sequatur majorem.1 Durch diese Wendung aber oder
durch ahnliche gleichbedeutende Wendungen wird ausgedruckt,
dass die Minderheit ihren Widerspruch aufgeben und der Mehrheit
zustimmen soil, damit ein einhelliger Gemeinwille zu Stande
komme : eine sententia per approbationem et collaudationem
communem^ quae volga dicitur^ ab omnibus et singulis stability
wie ein Weistum von 1340 sagt.2

Hierin bekundet sich ein ausserordentlicher Fortschritt der
Rechtsauffassung. Die Uberwindung des Meinungszwiespaltes
soil nicht mehr von tatsachlichem tfbergewicht und gewaltsamem
Zwange abhangen, sondern durch Erfiillung einer der Minderheit
auferlegten Rechtspflicht herbeigefiihrt werden. Aus dem
genossenschaftlichen Verhaltnis entspringt fiir den Genossen die
Pflicht, um der Einheit des Ganzen willen sich dem Ergebnis der
Abstimmung zu fiigen und durch seinen Beitritt den Mehrheitswillen
zum Gesamtwillen zu erheben. Allein immer noch ist schliessliche
Einstimmigkeit erforderlich, sodass der Beschluss nur Kraft erlangt,
wenn wirklich die Minderheit der Mehrheit folgt. Verharrt sie bei
ihrem Widerspruch, so begeht sie vielleicht ein strafbares Unrecht,3
ein rechtsgiiltiger Gemeinbeschluss aber kommt dann nicht zu
Stande. Ist eine Losung des Konfliktes im Wege Rechtens un-
erlasslich, so kann sie nur durch hohere Entscheidung erfolgen.4

In besonders klarer Auspragung treten diese Anschauungen
im gerichtlichen Verfahren zu Tage.5 Ist auf die richterliche
Frage ein Urteil gefunden, so kann ihm jeder Schoffe oder Ding-
mann ein ihm besser dunkendes Urteil entgegen stellen. Damit
beredet er die vulbort. Dann behalt der, dem bei der Abstimmung
die meisten folgen, sein Urteil. Dieses Urteil erhalt dann dadurch,
dass sich die Minderheit der Mehrheit anschliesst, die vulbort
und steht nun als Rechtsspruch der Gesamtheit, als „ gemeines ",

1 Zusammenstellung zahlreicher Belegstellen in meinem Genossenschaftsr.
ii. 482-3.

2 W. v. Treyse b. Grimm, i. 810.

3 Bisweilen wird die Erfiillung der Folgepflicht im Voraus formlich
versprochen, ein solches Versprechen auch in den Schoffeneid aufgenommen ;
mein Genossenschaftsr. ii. 484, Anm. 25-26.

4 Vgl. mein Genossenschaftsr. ii. 483, Anm. 23.

5 Vor allem im Sachsensp. ii. a. 12, mit dem aber die anderen sachsischen
und im Kern auch die siiddeutschen Quellen iibereinstimmen. Vgl. iiber die
hier in Betracht kommenden Gesichtspunkte mein Genossenschaftsr. ii.
483 ff.

320 O. v. Gierke [xvi

„ gesamtes ", „ einstimmiges ", „ ungezweites " Urteil unanfechtbar
da. Allein der dissentierende SchofTe oder Dingmann kann, so
lange die vulbort nicht erteilt ist, auch anders verfahren. Er kann
das Urteil „ schelten " oder „ verwerfen." Damit wirft er dem
Urteilsvorschlage Rechtswidrigkeit vor und erklart auf eigene
Gefahr bin, dass er demselben niemals und auch nicht, wenn ihm
die Mehrheit folgt, zustimmen werde. In diesem Falle kommt
ein gemeines Urteil nicht zu Stande, es wird um vulbort uberhaupt
nicht gefragt und jede Moglichkeit rechtskraftiger Entscheidung
durch das verhandelnde Gericht ist zerstort. Die Streiterledigung
erfolgt durch Zug an ein anderes und womoglich hoheres Gericht,
vor dem in einem neuen Prozess liber Gerechtigkeit oder Un-
gerechtigkeit des mit der Urteilsschelte erhobenen Vorwurfs
entschieden wird. Wer unterliegt, verliert nicht nur sein Urteil,
sondern wird auch bussfallig. Der Sachsenspiegel aber betont es als
ein besonderes Vorrecht des Sachsen, dass er auch einen anderen
Weg wahlen kann, indem er das gescholtene Urteil an die
rechte Hand zieht. Dann entscheidet gerichtlicher Zweikampf.
Selbsiebent seiner Genossen muss er wider andere sieben fechten ;
auf welcher Seite die Mehrheit siegt, die behalt das Urteil.1
Hier ist also in eigenartiger Weise das Majoritatsprinzip in
die altertiimliche Waffenentscheidung, die in den Rechtsgang
verlegt ist, hineingetragen : wo die Stimmenmehrheit versagt,
dringt die Siegermehrheit durch.

Doch ist auch im Bereiche vorbehaltloser Geltung der Stim-
menmehrheit mit dem Satze „ Die Minderheit soil der Mehrheit
folgen " die alte sinnliche Vorstellung von den Verbandseinheiten
noch nicht uberwunden. Denn im'mer noch wird dabei die
Gesamtheit als Einheit mit der Vielheit Aller identifiziert. Eine
Anderung tritt erst ein, wenn der Mehrheitsbeschluss un-
mittelbar als Ausdruck des Gesamtwillens gilt. Diese
Entwicklungsstufe musste erreicht werden, sobald der alte Genos-
senschaftsbegriff zum Korperschafts.begriff gesteigert wurde,
was am friihesten in den Stadten geschah.2 In der Tat lasst sich
verfolgen, wie mit der korporativen Ausgestaltung der Verbande
diese neue Auffassung des Majoritatsprinzips Hand in Hand geht

1 Sachsensp. ii. 12 § 8 und i. 18 § 3 u. Lehnr. 69 § 3. Jeder Besiegte
muss dem Richter Wette und dem Gegner Busse zahlen.

2 Hiervon handelt mein Genossenschaftsr. ii. 573 ff., 829 ff.

xvi] Majoritatsprinzip 321

und demgemass die nachtragliche Zustimmung der Minderheit
mehr und mehr als uberflussige Formalitat in Wegfall kommt.

Vollzog das germanische Recht eine derartige Umbildung des
Majoritatsprinzips aus sich heraus, so empfing sie doch ihre begriff-
liche Fassung durch die vom romischen und kanonischen
Recht ausgehende mittelalterliche Jurisprudenz. Sie
zuerst stellte eine bis in die feinsten Einzelheiten ausgearbeitete,
fiir die ganze Folgezeit grundlegend gewordene Korporationstheorie
auf, in der das Majoritatsprinzip eine zentrale Rolle spielte.

Die Legisten entnahmen dem Corpus Juris Civilis die grund-
satzliche Geltung von Mehrheitsbeschliissen und deren Rechtferti-
gung durch eine Fiktion, kraft deren die Mehrheit rechtlich so
angesehen wird, als seien es Alle. Wahrend aber die Glossatoren noch
uberwiegend in der Vorstellung befangen blieben, dass die Gesamt-
heit sich mit der Summe der Einzelnen deckt,1 fuhrten die
Postglossatoren die Unterscheidung von omnes ut universi und
omnes ut singuli ein, die schon bei O do f red us das Funda-
ment der Lehre von den Korporationsbeschliissen bildet und bei
Bartolus ihre abschliessende Gestalt empfangt.2 Nur wo das
Gesetz eine Vielheit als universitas zusammenfasse, stelle es die
Mehrheit Allen gleich, wahrend iiberall, wo eine Vielheit nur als
Summe von Einzelnen gelte, der Widerspruch eines Einzigen die
iibereinstimmung aller Ubrigen iiberwinde. Von hier aus erkannte
man in dem Vorrang des Mehrheitswillens ein spezifisch korpora-
tives Prinzip. Man leitete ihn aus dem Wesen der Korporation
her, weil diese eben die Mitglieder zur universitas verbinde, und
versagte umgekehrt, von singularen Ausnahmen abgesehen, dem
Majoritatsprinzip die Anerkennung in der blossen Gesellschaft oder
Gemeinschaft, weil diese nur ein Verhaltnis von plures ut singuli
sei. Weiter aber band man die Kraft des Mehrheitsbeschlusses an
dessen Zustandekommen in einer gehorig berufenen und ordnungs-
massig verhandelnden Versammlung, da nur in einer solchen die
Gesamtheit sich rechtlich als Einheit darstelle, und baute die Lehre
von den Erfordernissen eines jeglichen Korporationsbeschlusses im
Einzelnen aus. Die Beschlussfahigkeit der Versammlung machte

1 Uber die Lehre der Glossatoren vgl. mein Genossenschaftsr. iii. 220 ff.
In der Gl. ord. zu 1. 7 § I D. h.t.v. non debetur (ebend. Anm. 107) heisst
es noch : universitas nihil aliud est quam singuli homines qui ibi sunt.

2 Mein Genossenschaftsr. iii. 391 ff.

322 O. v. Gierke [xvi

man unter Verallgemeinerung des romischen Dekurionenrechtes
von der Anwesenheit von zwei Dritteln der Mitglieder abhangig,
sah aber abweichende Verfassungsbestimmungen als zulassig an.
Endlich entwickelte man auf Grund der Unterscheidung von omnes
ut universi und omnes ut singuli die Theorie von den fiir den
Mehrheitsbeschluss unantastbaren jura singulorum^ die dann durch
die Jahrhunderte hindurch sich behauptet hat, wahrend die Abgren-
zung der Sonderrechte bis heute das umstrittenste Problem des
Korperschaftsrechtes geblieben ist. Konnte doch einerseits durch
libermassige Ausdehnung des Begriffes der jura singulorum alle
Kraft der Gemeinschaftsgewalt gebrochen werden, wie ja vielfach
bei der standischen Steuerbewilligung die Geltung des Stimmen-
mehrs unter dem Gesichtspunkt, dass die Verfiigung iiber den
Geldbeutel des Genossen sicherlich in dessen Sonderrecht eingreife,
in Frage gestellt und spater in Deutschland sogar die Reichsgewalt
durch die Versteifung der jura singulorum lahmgelegt wurde. Auf
der anderen Seite aber lag in der Festhaltung dieser Schranke ein
unentbehrlicher Schutz gegen Majoritatstyrannei. Doch bildet der
wechselvolle Kampf um die jura singulorum ein eigenes Kapitel
der Rechtsgeschichte.

Mit der Lehre der Legisten beriihrte sich die Lehre des
kanonischen Rechtes und der Kanonisten,2 die mehr und
mehr auch auf jene einen tiefgreifenden Einfluss gewann. Wenn
in der Kirche das Majoritatsprinzip in Glaubenssachen stets aus-
geschlossen blieb, so drang es doch bei Wahlen und bei alien
kollegialen Beschliissen liber aussere Angelegenheiten, obschon
auch hier Einstimmigkeit als das Erwiinschtere gait, allgemein
durch. Dabei wirkten im friiheren Mittelalter auf die Ausgestaltung
des Majoritatsprinzips germanische Anschauungen ein, sodass es
nur als Mittel behandelt wurde, den Weg zum communis consensus
zu ebnen.3 Die ausgebildete kanonistische Theorie aber stimmte
mit der romanistischen Theorie in der Gleichsetzung des Mehr-
heitswillens mit dem Gesamtwillen uberein. Auch sie lehrte,
dass im Gegensatz zu den res communes pluribus ut singulis
bei alien negotia universitatis kraft gesetzlicher Fiktion quod

1 Die Anfange schon bei Azo und in der Glosse ; a. a. O., S. 222, Anm.
108. Uber die spatere Jurisprudenz S. 393, Anm. 163, S. 445 ff., S. 472 ff.

2 A. a. O., S. 312 ff.

3 A. a. O., S. 323 ff.

xvi] Majoritatsprinzip 323

major pars facit^ totum facere videtur. Sie suchte jedoch nach
einem inneren Grunde dafiir und fand ihn in der Wahrscheinlich-
keit, dass Viele leichter als Wenige das Richtige treffen werden :
quia per plures melius veritas inquiritur.1

Dies war der treibende Gedanke fur die eigenartige Umpragung,
die das Majoritatsprinzip durch die Einfiihrung des Satzes erfuhr,
dass wahre Mehrheit nur die major et sanior pars ist.2 Die pars
numerosior hat nur die Vermutung der besseren Einsicht fur sich,
kann aber nicht als der grossere Teil gelten, sobald diese Vermu-
tung widerlegt wird. Von Theorie und Gesetzgebung seit dem
I2ten Jahrhundert allmahlich ausgebildet und im Jahre 1179 von
Alexander III. auf dem dritten Lateranensischen Konzil bereits
als allgemeingiiltig behandelt, errang sich das Dogma von der
major et sanior pars alsbald die unbestrittene Herrschaft im kirch-
lichen Recht. Die Anschauung, dass die Stimmen nicht nur zu
zahlen, sondern zu wagen sind, war ja auch dem germanischen
Recht nicht fremd und kam in dem Ubergewicht der Stimmen
der Angesehensten bei der Feststellung des Versammlungsbe-
schlusses zum Ausdruck. Das kanonische Recht aber goss sie in
juristische Form und verinnerlichte den Massstab der Abwagung.
Bei der Ermittlung, welcher Teil der „ gesundere " ist, sollen neben
dem Ansehen (auctoritas) der Stimmenden ihre geistigen und
sittlichen Eigenschaften (ratio et pietas) und die Lauterkeit ihrer
Motive (bonus zelus et aequitas) in Erwagung gezogen, zugleich
aber soil die Vernlinftigkeit des Ergebnisses (insbesondere bei
Wahlen die Wiirdigkeit des Gewahlten) gepriift werden. In den
genauen Regeln iiber die Bewertung der einzelnen Momente
offenbart sich in charakteristischer Weise der spiritual istische
Zug des kanonischen Rechts. Gleichzeitig aber bedeutet das
Erfordernis der sanioritas die Beugung des Majoritatsprinzips
unter das hierarchische Autoritatsprinzip. Denn die Entscheidung
liegt ausschliesslich in der Hand des kirchlichen Oberen. Vielfach
wurde sogar die Ansicht verfochten, dass auch eine Minderzahl
durch sanioritas zur major pars werde, womit im Grunde das
Majoritatsprinzip uberhaupt in die Luft gesprengt war. Doch
siegte schliesslich die Meinung, dass zum giiltigen Beschluss major
et sanior pars unerlasslich sei, also Ubergewicht der Zahl und des

1 Ausspruch von Innocenz IV. ebd. S. 324, Anm. 246.

2 Uber Ursprung und Entfaltung dieser Lehne a. a. O., S. 324 ff., 475.

324 O. v. Gierke [xvi

Wertes der Stimmen zusammentreffen miisse. Und mindestens
bei Wahlen drang die Anschauung durch, dass bei einer Zweidrit-
telsmehrheit die Vermutung fur sanioritas sich zur Gewissheit stei-
gere. In dem einzigen Falle, in dem es an der Moglichkeit einer
Priifung der sanioritas durch einen kirchlichen Oberen fehlte, bei der
Papstwahl, war gerade deshalb Zweidrittelsmehrheit erforderlich.

Wenn die Kanonisten anfanglich fiir ihre Forderung der major
et sanior pars Allgemeingultigkeit beanspruchten und hier und da
hiermit Beifall fanden,1 so siegte schliesslich die Meinung, dass es
sich um eine Besonderheit des kirchlichen Rechtes handle.2
Nur vereinzelt begegnen Nachbildungen im weltlichen Recht.3
Dagegen gewann die kanonistische Anschauung, dass ein starkes
und zwar mindestens doppeltes Ubergewicht der Zahl eine Gewahr
fiir die Verniinftigkeit der Mehrheitsentscheidung biete, allgemeine
Bedeutung. Auf sie geht das Erfordernis einer Zweidrittels- oder
Dreiviertelsmehrheit zu besonders wichtigen Beschliissen, insbeson-
dere zu Verfassungsanderungen zuriick, das schon im Mittelalter
oft vorkommt 4 und heute zu den verbreitetsten Einschrankungen
des Majoritatsprinzips gehort.

In vielen anderen Punkten fiihrten die Kanonisten der Lehre
von den Korporationsbeschliissen bleibenden Gewinn zu. Nur auf
zweierlei will ich hinweisen. Gegenliber der von den Legisten
verfochtenen Regel, dass zur Beschlussfahigkeit einer Ver-
sammlung die Anwesenheit von zwei Dritteln erforderlich sei,
setzten sie die Ansicht durch, dass an sich bei ordnungsmassiger
Versammlung die Anwesenheit einer noch so geringen Zahl geniige,
weil die Ausgebliebenen fiir dieses Mai sich selbst ausgeschlossen
haben (se alienos fecerunf)? Alle Falle, in denen die Beschluss-
fahigheit von der Anwesenheit einer bestimmten Zahl von Mit-

1 Vgl. die Nachweise a. a. O., S. 394, Anm. 169, S. 475, Anm. 284.

2 A. a. O., S. 475. Im kirchlichen Recht wurde das Prinzip der major
et sanior pars niemals aufgegeben, allmahlich aber zuriickgedrangt. Mit
der Zulassung geheimer Abstimmungen wurde es praktisch undurchfiihrbar.

3 Vgl. die Stellen aus Weistiimern in meinem Genossenschaftsr. ii. 481,
Anm. 14. Man denke auch an die Befugnis des Reichshofratsprasidenten,
eine Entscheidung des Kollegiums, wenn sie nur eine geringe Mehrheit und
nicht zugleich die offenbar besseren Griinde fiir sich hat, ad votum Imperatoris
zu bringen. 4 Mein Genossenschaftsr. ii. 481, Anm. 15.

5 A. a. O. iii. 320 ff., 467 ff. Die Folge ist, dass jus universitatis reridit
in ceteros velin unum. Man sprach von einer ,,magna controversia " zwischen
Legisten und Kanonisten.

xvi] Majoritatsprinzip 325

gliedern abhangt, erscheinen demgemass, wie ja auch in heutigen
Recht, als besonders begriindete Ausnahmen. Sodann befruchteten
die Kanonisten die Lehre von den Einzelrechten durch die erst-
malige Unterscheidung zwischen den freien Individualrechten und
den korperschaftlichen Sonderrechten, den jura singulorum propria
und den jura singulorum collegialia oder in universitate^

Fragen wir nach dem Verhaltnis der romanistisch-kanonisti-
schen Korporationstheorie zur Grundauffassung vom Wesen der
Verbande, so leuchtet ein, dass sie mil der durchgangigen Unter-
scheidung der omnes ut universi und der omnes ut singuli die der
alteren germanischen Vorstellung noch nicht gelaufige Abstraktion
der Gesamteinheit von der Gesamtvielheit vollzogen hatte. Allein
in der Identifizierung der Korperschaft mit der Gesamtheit als
einheitlichem InbegrifF blieb sie zunachst stecken. Die univer-
sitas deckt sich eben mit den omnes ut universi \ darumwurde
in stets wiederkehrenden Wendungen die wollende und handelnde
Mitgliederversammlung als die Korperschaft selbst, die univer-
sitas ipsa bezeichnet.2 Im Bereiche der Geltung des Majo-
ritatsprinzips kommt in der major pars die universitas ipsa zur
Erscheinung. Kraft einer neuen Fiktion werden Reprasentanten-
versammlungen, z.B. Stadtrate, der universitas ipsa gleichgestellt.3
Hier liberal 1 handelt die universitas per se. Dagegen liegt ein
agere per alium vor, wenn Vorsteher und Beamte tatig werden.
Sie sind blosse Vertreter der Gesamtheit und handeln nur da, wo
die universitas ipsa nicht zu handeln vermag, kraft gesetzlicher
oder rechtsgeschaftlicher Vollmacht an ihrer Stelle. Diese Unter-
scheidung zwischen dem eignen Handeln der Korperschaft und
dem Handeln ihrer Vertreter war fur den Aufbau der mittel-
alterlichen Korporationstheorie von fundamentaler Bedeutung
und beherrschte namentlich die viel umstrittene Lehre von den
Korperschaftsdelikten.4

Neben der kollektiven Verbandsauffassung aber brach sich eine
ganz andere Auffassung Bahn, die von den Kanonisten und zwar
in voller Scharfe zuerst von Innocenz IV. im Sinne des kirch-

1 A. a. O., S. 297 ff, wo die wichtigsten Stellen aus Innocenz IV., Job.
Andreae, Antonius de Butrio und Panormitanus wiedergegeben sind ; dazu
S. 445 ff, 472.

2 A. a. O., S. 219 ff., 390 ff., 461 ff, 477 ff.

3 A. a. O., S. 222 ff, 394 ff, 478 ff.

4 A. a. O., S. 234 ff, 402 ff., 491 ff.

326 O. v. Gierke [xvi

lichen Anstaltsbegriffes entwickelt und dann auf alle korporativen
Verbande erstreckt wurde. Sie findet die Verbandseinheit in einer
der Mitgliedergesamtheit transzendenten Wesenheit, einer
besonderen Verbandspersonlichkeit, die so gut von der
Versammlung aller Mitglieder, wie von Vorstehern und Beamten
nur reprasentiert wird. Das Mittel ihrer Konstruktion aber ist eine
neue Fiktion. Es ist die im Corpus Juris Civilis erst angedeu-
tete, nun jedoch scharf herausgemeisselte und in den Mittelpunkt
geriickte fingierte Person, die persona ficta, repraesentata^
imaginaria, das erdichtete kiinstliche Individuum ! Bei folgerichtiger
Durchfiihrung dieser neuen Fiktion verschwindet die Gleichsetzung
der Gesamtheit der Mitglieder mit der universitas ipsa. Die
universitas ipsa ist allein das unsichtbare ideale Rechtssubjekt, das
auch, wenn die Versammlung beschliesst, per alium agit. Damit
wird die Theorie der Korporationsbeschliisse auf eine hohere Stufe
gehoben. Denn nunmehr kann die Wirksamkeit aller Ver-
sammlungsakte in Korporationsangelegenheiten in die Schranken
einer der Versammlung selbst zugewiesenen verfassungsmassigen
Zustandigkeit, innerhalb deren allein sie die fingierte Person re-
prasentiert, gebannt werden. Diese Zustandigkeit wird vor Allem
durch den korporativen Lebensbereich, aber auch durch die Zu-
standigkeiten eines Vorstandes oder anderer Vertreter des klinst-
lichen Rechtssubjektes begrenzt. Dariiber hinaus vermag auch
der einstimmige Versammlungsbeschluss nichts auszurichten,
versagt daher erst recht das Majoritatsprinzip, das nur den
Mehrheitswillen zum Versammlungswillen stempelt. Alle solche
Fortschritte aber werden mit der Verdrangung der lebendigen
Verbandseinheit durch das Gespenst der fingierten Personlichkeit
erkauft. Die neue Herrin der gemeinheitlichen Spharen ist ein
willens- und handlungsunfahiges Begriffswesen. Sie gleicht dem
Kinde oder vielmehr, da das Kind einmal mundig wird, dem
unheilbar Wahnsinnigen. Die Verantwortlichkeit fur unerlaubte
Handlungen wird ihr abgenommen, sie wird aber zugleich in allem
Handeln vormundschaftlicher Vertretung unterstellt. Der ger-
manische Genossenschaftsgedanke wird ausgetilgt. Der Korpora-
tionsbegriff empfangt eine rein anstaltliche Farbung.1

1 Uber den kanonistischen Ursprung der Theorie der persona ficta und
ihre Bedeutung fur die Lehre vom korperschaftlichen Wollen und Handeln
vgl. a. a. O., S. 277 ff., 308 ff., 342 ff.

xvi] Majoritatsprinzip 327

Die Theorie der persona ficta wurde auch von den Zivili-
sten angenommen und beherrschte ausserlich die gesamte Jurispru-
denz der folgenden Jahrhunderte. Sie leistete bei der Umbildung
alles Verbandsrechtes im Geiste des obrigkeitlichen Staates wichtige
Dienste. Allein selten wurde sie folgerichtig durchgefiihrt, ging
vielmehr fast durchweg ein Kompromiss mit der zah festgehaltenen
kollektiven Auffassung ein. So setzte sich auch in der Lehre
von den Korporationsbeschliissen immer wieder die Behandlung des
ubereinstimmenden Willens aller Mitglieder als Willens der Kor-
perschaft selbst durch. Fort und fort wurde daher, so weit die
rechtliche Gleichsetzung der Majoritat mit Allen reichte, der
Mehrheitsbeschluss als Willenserklarung der universitas ipsa
betrachtet und zwischen dem eigenen Handeln der Gemeinheit
und ihrem Handeln durch Vertreter unterschieden.1 Damit ver-
wickelte man sich in zahlreiche Widerspriiche, gewann aber die
Moglichkeit, nach Beniirfnis den fortlebenden Gebilden germa-
nischer Herkunft gerecht zu werden und genossenschaftlichen
Gedanken Raum zu geben. Erst im neunzehnten Jahrhundert
machten Savigny und seine Schiiler mit dem Begriffe der fingierten
Person als eines der verbundenen Gesamtheit fremden kiinstlichen
Individuums wieder Ernst und legten ihn ihrem Neubau der Lehre
von den „ juristischen Personen", wie man nun sagte, zu Grunde, in
dem auch das Majoritatsprinzip wieder die entsprechende Fassung
empfing.

Diese Restauration aber entsprang vor Allem dem Gegensatz
gegen die naturrechtliche Gesellschaftslehre, die inzwischen
zur Ubermacht emporgediehen war und das positive Recht liber-
schwemmt hatte. Denn das Naturrecht trieb die rein kollektive
Auffassung aller menschlichen Verbande auf die Spitze. Es leitete
alle Verbande bis aufwarts zum Staat aus der vertragsmassigen
Vereinigung der von Hause aus freien und gleichen Individuen her
und konstruierte alles Verbandsrecht als vergemeinschaftetes
Individualrecht. Ihm war so gut der Staat wie die Ehe und
jede Erwerbsgesellschaft eine vertragsmassig begriindete societas.
Der Sozietatsbegriff verschlang den Korporationsbegriff wie den
Anstaltsbegriff. Nun fordert aber der Vertrag den Konsens aller

1 A. a. O., S. 363 ff., 390 ff., 402 ff., 425 ff., 461 ff., 491 ff. Die Ver-
neinung der Deliktsfahigkeit der Korporationen drang nicht einmal bei den
Kanonisten durch ; a. a. O., S. 343.

328 O. v. Gierke [xvi

Kontrahenten. Darum bereitete gerade das Majoritatsprinzip den
Naturrechtslehrern nicht geringe Schwierigkeiten. Sie halfen sich
mit der Annahme, dass in den ursprunglichen Gesellschaftsvertra-
gen einstimmig die kunftige Geltung des Mehrheitswillens in
Gesellschaftsangelegenheiten vereinbart sei. Die so errichtete
Gesellschaft konnte dann durch Mehrheitsbeschlusse sich eine
Verfassung kuren. Dabei konnte bestimmt werden, dass kunftig
die Gesamtheit durch eine engere Versammlung reprasentiert werde
und in dieser wieder der Mehrheitswille entscheide. Weiter aber
musste die als societas aequalis entstandene Gesamtheit, wenn
die Innehaltung des Gesellschaftsvertrages gesichert werden sollte,
sich einer Zwangsgewalt unterwerfen und so zur societas inae-
qualis werden. So erschien denn vor Allem der Staat erst als
das Produkt eines zweiten Vertrages, durch den die biirgerliche
Gesellschaft in irgend einer Weise die erforderliche summa potestas
auf einen imperans libertragen hatte. In der Monarchic hatte sie
sich einem Einzelherrscher, in der Republik einem Kollektivherrscher
unterworfen. Und im letzteren Falle war es wieder eine Ver-
sammlungsmehrheit, der die Gewalt eingeraumt war, so dass man
sogar nicht davor zuriickscheute, in der Demokratie einen be-
sonderen Unterwerfungsvertrag zwischen der mit Mehrheit be-
schliessenden ursprunglichen Gesamtheit und der jeweiligen kiinf-
tigen Mehrheit Aller zu konstruieren. Aus einem solchen Netze
von Vertragen Hess man schliesslich einen einheitlichen gesell-
schaftlichen Korper hervorgehen. Allein dessen Einheit war das
Werk kiinstlich geschaffner Kollektiv- und Reprasentationsverhalt-
nisse. Wenn man daher auch den gesellschaftlichen Einheiten
Personlichkeit zuschrieb, so erhob man sich doch nicht zu dem
Begriff einer selbstandigen Personlichkeit des Ganzen, sondern
blieb in den Begriffen einer kollektiven Personlichkeit der Gesamt-
heiten und einer reprasentativen Personlichkeit der Herrscher
stecken. Um das Verhaltnis zwischen Volkspersonlichkeit und
Herrscherpersonlichkeit drehte sich in der naturrechtlichen Staats-
lehre der grosse, weltbewegende Streit. Die lebendige Staatsper-
sonlichkeit blieb unentdeckt. Ausgeschaltet aber wurde mehr und
mehr die Uberindividuelle persona ficta. An ihre Stelle trat das,
was die Naturrechtslehrer als persona moralis bezeichneten. Unter
der moralischen Person aber verstanden sie nur eine kollektive
Personeneinheit. Sie meinten, dass mehrere Menschen in ihrer

xvi] Majoritatsprinzip 329

gesellschaftlichen Verbundenheit die Rolle einer einzigen Person
spielen, wie ja auch umgekehrt ein einzelner Mensch kraft repra-
sentativer Stellung mehrere Personenrollen spielen kann.

Verfolgen wir noch etwas naher die naturrechtliche Auffassung
des Majoritatsprinzips, so findet sich zuerst bei Grotius eine ein-
gehende Begrundung des Satzes, dass die Geltung der Stimmen-
mehrheit auf einstimmiger Vereinbarung im urspriinglichen Gesell-
schaftsvertrage beruhe.1 Seitdem wurde dieser Satz zum Axiom
der naturrechtlichen Soziallehre. Hobbes und Locke, Ulrich
Huber, Pufendorf, Thomasius, Christian Wolff, Nettelbladt
und Ac hen wall tragen ihn iibereinstimmend vor,2 Rousseau legt
ihn zu Grunde3 und Kant erklart ausdriicklich, dass die in grossen
Staaten unentbehrlichen Einrichtungen der Mehrheitsentscheidung
und der Representation nur aus einer ,,mit allgemeiner Zustimmung,
also durch einen Kontrakt," vollzogenen Annahme gerechtfertigt
werden konnen.4 Das Bedenken, dass doch jeder Einzelne zur
Versagung seines Konsenses berechtigt gewesen sei, beseitigte man
mit dem Hinweis darauf, dass er damit sich von der Gesellschaft
ausgeschlossen haben und diese ohne ihn errichtet sein wiirde.
Hobbes meint, dann hatten die zum Staate verbundenen Anderen
ihm gegenuber das Kriegsrecht des Naturzustandes, der ja nach
Hobbes ein bellum omnium contra omnes war, behalten. Die
meisten Naturrechtslehrer aber bemiihten sich gleichzeitig um eine
rationelle Rechtfertigung des Majoritatsprinzips, aus der sie eine

1 Grotius, Dej. b. et p. ii. c. 5, § 17. In den friiheren rechtsphilosophischen
Erorterungen liber den Staat und die anderen publizistischen Verbande wurde
die Geltung des Majoritatsprinzips nebst den sonstigen Regeln iiber
Korporationsbeschliisse in Anlehnung an die romanistisch-kanonistische
Theorie fur jede einmal konstituierte universitas und somit auch fur die
Volksgesamtheit ohne Weiteres angenommen ; vgl. mein Genossenschaftsr.
iii. 599 ff., meine Schrift iiber Johannes Althusius, S. 85, Anm. 30, S. 138,
Anm. 48, S. 215, Anm. 14.

2 Hobbes, De cive, c. 6, § 1-2 ; Locke, ii. c. 8, § 96-99 ; U. Huber, De
jure civ. i. 2, c. 3, § 27 ff., ii. 3, c. I, § 21-22, !c. 2, § 3-4; Pufendorf,
Elem. i. d. 12, § 27, Jus nat. et gent. vii. c. 2, § 15-19, c. 5, § 6,
De officio civiS) ii. c. 6, § 12; Thomasius, Inst. jur. div. iii. c. 6, § 64 ;
Wolff, Inst. § 841-845; Nettelbladt, Syst. § 388; Achenwall, Jus nat.
ii. § 24-28. Besonders ausflihrlich Ickstatt, De jure majorum in conclusis
civitatis communibus formandis^ Opusc. ii. op. i, insbes. c. i, § 65-68. Vgl.
auch Gundling, Diss. de universitate delinquente, § 6-8.

3 Rousseau, Contr. soc. iv. c. 2. Vgl. auch Sieyes, i. 144 ff., 167, 207 ff.

4 Kant, Werke, vi. 328 ff.

33° O. v. Gierke [xvi

bis zum Nachweise abweichender Abreden durchgreifende Vermu-
tung fiir dessen vertragsmassige Einfiihrung bei jeder Gesellschafts-
griindung herleiteten. Es sei anzunehmen, dass, wer eine Gesell-
schaft wolle, auch ihren Fortbestand und ihre Aktionsfahigkeit
wolle. Zur Erreichung dieses Zieles aber sei die Anerkennung von
Mehrheitsbeschliissen das geeignetste Mittel. Grotius fiihrt aus,
dass, da es irgend eine verniinftige Art einheitlicher Geschafts-
erledigung geben miisse, das Verlangen aber der Unterwerfung der
Minderheit unter die Mehrheit unbillig ware, nichts iibrig bleibe, als
der Mehrheit das jus integri beizulegen. Hobbes, Pufendorf,
Gun dl ing und viele Andere betonen, dass jede zur Sozietat ver-
bundene Gesamtheit im Stande sein miisse, einheitlich zu wollen,
dass es aber hierfiir kein besseres Auskunftsmittel gebe, als die
Gleichsetzung des Mehrheitswillens mit dem Willen Aller. Locke
geht von dem Begriffe des gesellschaftlichen Korpers aus, der gleich
jedem Korper durch eine einzige Kraft in einheitlicher Weise bewegt
werden miisse, und meint, dass hier die bewegende Kraft nur in
der von der Mehrheit getragenen grosseren Kraft gefunden werden
konne ; darum entspreche es den Natur- und Vernunftgesetzen, den
Mehrheitswillen als Willen des Ganzen gelten zu lassen. Auch
sonst berief man sich ofter auf das Ubergewicht der Mehrzahl an
ausserer Starke,1 griff aber auch hier und da auf die germanische
Vorstellung einer rechtlichen Folgepflicht der Minderheit zuriick.2
Rousseau suchte mit seiner beriihmten Unterscheidung der volonte
generate von der volonte de tons durch einen dialektischen Kunst-
griff zu erweisen, dass der allgemeine Wille notwendig zugleich der
verniinftige und gerechte Wille sei, weil er das Besondere und
Zufallige der in ihm verschmolzenen Einzelwillen nicht in sich
aufnehme ; allein die Erklarung dafiir, warum dieser allgemeine
Wille sich mit dem Mehrheitswillen decke, blieb er schuldig,
begniigte sich vielmehr mit der nichts erklarenden Fiktion der
einstimmigen Vereinbarung im Urvertrage. Im Grunde hatte ihn

1 So besonders Ickstatt, a. a. O., der ausfiihrt, bei motiva disparia
miissten die motiva fortiora entscheiden, der Massstab konne aber nur ein
ausserer sein.

2 Daries, Inst. jurispr. univ. § 750-762 (an sich ist Einstimmigkeit notig,
aber es besteht fiir die Minderheit eine obligatio perfecta zum Beitritt). So
meint auch Pufendorf, wer aus blosser pertinacia sich seinen consensus vorbe-
halte, hindere den Versammlungsbeschluss nicht, dieser binde ihn vielmehr
kraft der allgemeinenVorschrift, ut pars se conformet ad bonum lotius.

xvi] Majoritatsprinzip 33 1

die Konsequenz der Gedanken, die ihn zur Ablehnung des Repra-
sentativprinzips fuhrten, auch zur Verwerfung des Majoritatsprinzips
bewegen miissen. Und zu dieser aussersten Konsequenz des Indi-
vidualismus schritten dann auch einzelne Naturrechtslehrer vor.
Sie behaupteten, dass aus dem Naturrecht allein die Forderung
einstimmiger Beschlusse zu begriinden sei, dass daher in jeder
Sozietat die Vermutung fur das Einstimmigkeitsprinzip spreche
und nur kraft besonders vereinbarter Ausnahmen das Majoritats-
prinzip gelten konne. So z.B. die beiden Schlozer, Vater und
Sohn.1 Den Gipfel aber erklomm Fichte, indem er die rechtliche
Geltung des Majoritatsprinzips schlankweg verneinte und hochstens
in gewissen Fallen der Mehrheit das Recht zur Ausschliessung der
Dissentierenden zugestand.2

In dem Masse, in dem im neunzehnten Jahrhundert die natur-
rechtliche Gesellschaftslehre uberwunden wurde, verlor auch ihre
individualistische Erklarung des Majoritatsprinzips an Ansehen.
Bleibe/id aber behauptete sich die von ihr angebahnte Wieder-
belebung des germanischen Genossenschaftsgedankens. Die
genossenschaftliche Auffassung der menschlichen Verbande drang
gegenuber der anstaltlichen Staats- und Korporationsauffassung
wiederum siegreich vor. Darum war auch in Ansehung der
Mehrheitsbeschliisse der restaurierten romanistisch-kanonistischen
Theorie kein endgiiltiger Erfolg beschieden. Vielmehr gewannen
ihr neue Anschauungen, wie sie zuerst von der germanistischen
Genossenschaftstheorie aus verjungtem germanischem Recht ent-
wickelt wurden, immer breiteren Boden ab.

Doch kann ich das bis heute nicht erledigte Ringen der
gegensatzlichen Auffassungen und die mannigfachen Ausgleichs-
versuche hier nicht verfolgen. Nur das will ich kurz andeuten,
welche Gesichtspunkte fur die Wertung des Majoritatsprinzips
bestimmend sein miissen, wenn die in alien Jahrhunderten
lebendig gebliebene und im modernen Bewusstsein zur Vorherr-
schaft gelangte, der juristischen Konstruktion aber erst im Gefolge
der Genossenschaftstheorie zu Grunde gelegte his tori sch-orga-
nische Verbandsauff assung durchgefiihrt wird.

1 A. L. Schlozer, Allg. Staatsr., S. 76 ff. ; Chr. v. Schlozer, De jure
suffragii in societate aequali, Gott, 1795, § 9-M-

2 Fichte, Naturrecht Einl Nr. III. i. 198, 217 ff., 225 ff. (Werke, iii. 16,
164, 178 ff., 184 ff).

332 O. v. Gierke [xvi

Sind die menschlichen Verbande soziale Organismen, bringen
sie als selbstandige Lebewesen liber dem Einzeldasein das
Gattungsdasein zur Entfaltung, so treten sie auch fur das Recht
den Einzelpersonen als Personen hoherer Ordnung gegeniiber.
Sie lassen sich nicht im Sinne des Naturrechts als blosse Zusam-
menballungen von Individuen zu kollektiven Einheiten begreifen.
Sie diirfen aber auch nicht im Sinne der Fiktionstheorieen als
kiinstliche Individuen von den verbundenen Gesamtheiten los-
gerissen werden. Vielmehr sind sie reale Gesamtpersonen,
selbstandige Gemeinwesen mit immanenter Lebenseinheit, orga-
nische Ganze, die sich aus Einzelwesen aufbauen, aber keineswegs
mit der Summe ihrer Teile decken. Darum ist nicht bloss das
aussere, sondern auch 'das innere Leben der Verbandspersonen,
das ja zugleich ausseres Leben der verbundenen Personen ist,
Gegenstand der Rechtsordnung. Uber Zusammensetzung und
Gliederung des Verbandskorpers, Uber dessen Organisation zum
einheitlichen Ganzen, iiber die Beziehungen der Teile zu einander
und zum Ganzen entscheiden Rechtsnormen. So entsteht der
Rechtsbegriff des verfassungsmassigen Organs. Organe sind die
in einem bestimmten Tatigkeitsbereiche zur Darstellung der
Verbandspersonlichkeit berufenen Glieder und Gliederkomplexe.
Sie sind keine Vertreter im Sinne des Individualrechts, sondern
sichtbare Werkzeuge der unsichtbaren Lebenseinheit des sozialen
Korpers. Was das Organ innerhalb seiner Zustandigkeit will
und tut, das will und tut im Rechtssinne die Verbandsperson
selbst. Durch Organe und nur durch Organe tritt der Staat
und jeder andere korperschaftliche Verband als wollendes und
handelndes Gemeinwesen in die Erscheinung. So kann denn auch
die Gesamtheit aller Mitglieder den einheitlichen Gemeinwillen
nur insoweit zum Ausdruck bringen, als sie verfassungsmassig in
ihrer rechtlich geordneten Versammlung oder in sonstigem kollek-
tivem Zusammenwirken zum Willensorgan der Verbandsperson
berufen ist. Das Gemeinwesen als solches ist etwas durchaus
Anderes als die Summe der ihm jeweilig angehorigen Individuen,
und keine Kunst vermag den ubereinstimmenden Einzelwillen
den einheitlichen Staats- oder Korperschaftswillen zu entlocken.
Als Glieder des Verbandes aber konnen die einzelnen Menschen
nur in ihrem organisierten Zusammenhange das lebendige Ganze
in seiner rechtlichen Einheit zur Darstellung bringen. Jede Ver-

xvi] Majorittitsprinzip 333

sammlung also ist nichts als Organ. Sie ist selbst dann, wenn sie
alle jeweiligen Mitglieder umfasst und einstimmig beschliesst, nur
Organ des Verbandes und daher nur im Bereiche ihrer verfassungs-
massigen Zustandigkeit zur Bildung und Ausserung des Gemein-
willens befahigt. In gleicher Weise aber ist sie Organ, wenn sie
kraft der Lebensordnung des Verbandes einen giiltigen Mehrheits-.
beschluss fasst. Zur Erklarung des Majoritatsprinzips ist also die
Gleichsetzung der Mehrheit mit der Gesamtheit weder ausreichend
noch erforderlich. Die Geltung des Mehrheitsbeschlusses als eines
der verfassungsmassigen Mittel zur Beschaffung einer einheitlichen
Versammlungsaktion ist lediglich ein Stuck der rechtlich geordneten
Organbildung. Sie ist ein Element der Organisation eines zu-
sammengesetzten Organs.

Von diesem Standpunkte aus kommtnun freilich dem Majoritats-
prinzip keine im Wesen der menschlichen Verbande begrlindete
absolute Geltung, sondern nur ein historisch bedingter relativer
Wert zu. Die Herrschaft des Stimmenmehrs allein vermag keinen
Verband und am wenigsten den Staat zur lebendigen Verbands-
person zu stempeln. Immer bedarf es neben einer mit Mehrheit
beschliessenden Mitgliederversammlung fiihrender Organe, damit
ein handlungsfahiges Gemeinwesen zu Stande komme. So weit
durch eine monarchische Verfassung ein Verbandshaupt zum
obersten Organ bestellt ist, versteht es sich von selbst, dass keine
Versammlungsmehrheit fur sich allein den einheitlichen Verbands-
willen erzeugen kann. Aber auch wo kraft streng demokratischer
Verfassung der mit Mehrheit beschliessende Inbegriffder Mitglieder
als oberstes Organ fungiert, offenbart sich nur bei den ihm vor-
behaltenen letzten Entscheidungen in dem Abstimmungsergebnis
der Gemeinwille, wahrend andere selbstandige Organe in ihren
Zustandigkeitsbereichen gleich unmittelbar die Personlichkeit des
Ganzen zur Erscheinung bringen. Irgendwie wird in jedem sozialen
Organismus kraft der verfassungsmassigen Funktionenverteilung
das Majoritatsprinzip durch das Autoritatsprinzip erganzt. Darauf
laufen auch die in grosseren Verbanden unentbehrlichen reprasenta-
tiven Einrichtungen hinaus, kraft deren anstatt der regelmassig
auf den Vollzug von Wahlen beschrankten Gesamtheit der stimm-
berechtigten Mitglieder engere Versammlungen oder Kollegien, die
nach organischer Auffassung keineswegs Vollmachttrager der
Gesamtheit, sondern unmittelbare Willensorgane des Gemeinwesens

334 O. v. Gierke [xvi

sind, zur Bildung des Gemeinwillens berufen werden. Gilt fiir ihre
Beschlussfassungen wiederum das Majoritatsprinzip, so kann es
unmoglich mehr als ein Organisationsprinzip fiir einen Teil des
Gesamtorganismus bedeuten. Soweit nun aber das Majoritats-
prinzip kraft der geschichtlich entwickelten positiven Rechtsordnung
gilt, hangt von dieser auch sowohl seine Ausgestaltung, wie seine
Begrenzung ab. Hinsichtlich seiner Ausgestaltung sind man-
cherlei Einrichtungen darauf berechnet, die Uberwindung der
wahren Mehrheit durch eine bloss scheinbare Mehrheit zu ver-
hindern. So die Anforderungen an die Beschlussfahigheit von
Versammlungen, die Verhaltniswahlen, die Abstimmungs- oder
Wahlpflicht. Andere Einrichtungen aber zielen auf Ermassigung
des tibergewichtes der grosseren Zahl ab. Dahin gehoren alle
Einschrankungen des Kreises der stimmberechtigten Mitglieder,
alle Abstufungen des Stimmgewichts nach Fahigkeit, Bildung
oder Besitz durch Klassenbildung oder Pluralstimrnen, alle Gliede-
rungen der Abstimmung nach Korporationen oder Berufsstanden.
Sie alle sind, wenn die Gleichsetzung des Gesamtwillens mit dem
Mehrheitswillen durchgefiihrt wird, verwerfliche Falschungen des
Gesamtwillens. Dagegen kann die organische Verbandsauffassung
dem mechanischen Kopfzahlprinzip keine Allgemeingiiltigkeit
zusprechen. Eine Begrenzung des Majoritatsprinzips liegt in
den Bestimmungen, nach denen es zu gewissen Beschliissen einer
verstarkten oder qualifizierten Mehrheit oder gar der Einstimmig-
keit bedarf. Wird hierdurch oder durch andere Mittel eine Minder-
heit in den Stand gesetzt, einen Mehrheitsbeschluss zu verhindern,
so neigt dariiber hinaus gerade das neueste Recht auch zur Aner-
kennung positiver Minderheitsrechte, die eine Minderheit von
bestimmter Starke befahigen, in gewissen Fallen wirksam fiir das
Ganze zu handeln und so als Organ der Verbandsperson zu funk-
tionieren. Im Sinne der Herleitung des Majoritatsprinzips aus dem
Wesen der Verbande sind solche Einrichtungen offenbar irrationell.
Selbstverstandlich wird endlich durchweg die Geltung des Majori-
tatsprinzips durch die Unantastbarkeit der Sonderrechte begrenzt.
Hier aber handelt es sich um die Schranken, die im Sinne unserer
Rechtsordnung aller Verbandsmacht iiberhaupt gezogen sind, weil
jeder Verband die ihm eingegliederten Menschen nur hinsichtlich
eines Teiles ihrer Wesenheit in sich schliesst und dariiber hinaus
ihre freie Einzelpersonlichkeit unberiihrt lasst. Die Sonderrechte

xvi] Majoritdtsprinzip 335

aber fallen, auch wenn sie im Verbandsrechte wurzeln, in die den
Mitgliedern vorbehaltenen Individualbereiche. Darum kann iiber
sie nicht einmal ein einstimmiger Korperschaftsbeschluss verfUgen.
Vielmehr ist dazu die Mitwirkung eines individuellen Zustimmungs-
aktes erforderlich.

So ist inder Tat fur die historisch-organische Betrachtungs-
weise das Majoritatsprinzip zwar ein bedeutungsvoller Faktor fiir
den Aufbau der Verbande, aber fiir sich allein zur Gestaltung
lebendiger sozialer Korper nicht befahigt. Sein Geltungsbereich
kann nicht rationell, sondern nur geschichtlich begriindet, sein
Wert nicht absolut bestimmt, sondern nur nach seiner jeweiligen
Wirkungsweise im organischen Leben der Gemeinwesen bemessen
werden.

OTTO VON GIERKE.

XVII

UNE ANTITHESE DU PRINCIPE
MAJORITAIRE EN DROIT POLONAIS1

QuiCONQUE connait tant soit peu Phistoire de Pologne, ou qui
pretend seulement la connaitre, devinera aisement que par « Panti-
these du principe majoritaire» nous entendons le trop fameux
liberum veto. On salt bien en quoi consistait cette institution
bizarre, unique, semble-t-il, dans son genre : elle donnait a chaque
depute" le droit de rompre la diete et a chaque gentilhomme celui
de rompre la di£tine. Cependant, les connaissances de la
litterature europeenne ne vont guere au dela de cette definition.
Le veto tenait parmi les institutions polonaises une place aussi
centrale que le principe majoritaire dans la vie constitutionnelle
des e"tats modernes : il faisait, selon Montesquieu, « 1'objet » meme
de la constitution de Pologne. II entraina la ruine de 1'ind^pendance
de la Pologne, mais non pas celle de sa nationality ni de
sa civilisation distincte. II plongea le pays dans une affreuse
anarchic, mais lui-meme n'etait pas 1'anarchie.

1 Get article resume d'une maniere generate la deuxieme partie d'un livre
polonais qui va paraitre en 1914 sous le titre : Liberum veto. La premiere
partie sera consacree a 1'examen de 1'origine et du developpement du principe
majoritaire, surtout en Angleterre, en France, en Allemagne, en Suisse et en
Aragon. L'auteur conceit parfaitement rinsuffisance des sources a portee
d'un specialiste isole, ainsi que la necessite du concours des savants de tous les
pays, pour aprofondir ce probleme obscur et complique. En communiquant
cette esquisse au Congres de Londres, nous avons tente d'occasionner une
discussion internationale sur la majorite" et le liberum veto, sans laquelle les
efforts des erudits isoles resteront dans ce domaine peu fructueux. Aussi
nous osons nous adresser par 1'intermediaire de cette publication a tous ses
lecteurs, pour les prier de nous faire envoyer leurs remarques supplementaires
ou critiques. En revanche de cette complaisance, nous esperons pouvoir
offrir une version frangaise de la premiere partie de notre livre a la disposition
de tous nos collegues qui voudront bien nous fournir quelques contributions.

336

xvn] Principe Majoritaire 337

Au point de vue pratique c'e"tait une folie, mais une de ces
folies dont on peut dire avec le vieux Polonius :

Though this be madness, yet there is method in 't.

Et c'est justement grace a sa propre « me"thode » de deVeloppe-
ment, grace a sa propre m^thode d'application pratique et syste"-
matique, grace a cette me"thode de se combiner pendant 200 ans
avec 1'existence morale et politique d'une nation, que le veto
me"rite 1'attention du monde savant de 1'Europe. II le me"rite aussi
pour une raison plus gene"rale, bien qu'ici secondaire. Inte"ressante
par elle-meme, 1'histoire du veto reflate a 1'inverse 1'influence de
ces memes facteurs qui sur un autre terrain ont conduit au
triomphe du principe du nombre. Jusqu'a un certain moment
le deVeloppement du liberum veto est identique avec l'e"tablis-
sement du principe de 1'unanimite", et jusqu'a cette date on se
demande plutot pourquoi le principe majoritaire ne s'est-il pas
e"tabli en Pologne, au lieu de se demander d'ou provient le liberum
veto.

Plus tard,< l'e"tendue et la force de son fonctionnement s'e"lar-
gissent d'une maniere nouvelle et imprevue qui ne re"sulte point des
causes qui ont agi contre le regime majoritaire. Ainsi d'une
simple negation il se transforme en 1'antithese de la majorite".
La premiere phase s'e"tend jusqu'a la moitie" du xvile siecle, et
correspond a la phase que le parlement anglais parait avoir
traversed a la fin du XIIP siecle et a celle que les Etats Ge"ne"raux
de France avaient traversed sous les premiers Valois.

Dans 1'espace de cette premiere pe"riode la procedure doit etre
essentiellement la meme pour le terrain polonais, anglais ou
espagnol. II s'agit de d£couvrir quelles sont les influences qui
permettent au plus grand nombre d'imposer ses decisions a la
minorit^ et de constater si ces influences agissaient pre"cise"ment
en Pologne. L'induction et la deduction, le raisonnement par
analogic et a contrario^ concourent ici a decouvrir des rapports de
cause a effet, pour ne pas dire « des lois », d'apres lesquels on peut,
en observant toutes les precautions, reconstruire meme des faits, a
d^faut de sources imm£diates suffisantes. Nous croyons pouvoir
nous dispenser d'exposer nos observations sur ce sujet a mesure
qu'elles se sont pr^sent^es a notre esprit : il sera plus a propos
d'exposer la these definitive en l'e"claircissant par des exemples.

338 W. Konopczynski [xvn

Le point de depart de 1'evolution assez homogene en Pologne
et dans TEurope occidentale est cet etat primitif ou il n'existe
aucune regie pour former la volonte generale. La decision incon-
testable y provient de la concordance effective de toutes les
volontes, lorsque personne ne proteste, ni au cours des delibe"ra-
tions, ni pendant 1'execution de ce qui a e"t£ r£solu. Le point
final du deVeloppement des institutions chez nous et en Occident
n'est pas le meme : en Pologne on aboutira a appliquer la regie
d'unanimite a toutes les deliberations, pendant que le reste de
1'Europe, excepte 1'Aragon et la Catalogne, adoptera le regime
majoritaire, a moins qu'il ne se soumette a la royaute etablie.

Comment expliquer cette difference singuliere ? Et, en general,
comment se forme partout le principe majoritaire ?

II ne fut octroye" nulle part, ni emprunte a des Strangers ; tout
au moins limitation ne fut jamais assez puissante pour dominer
les vieilles habitudes dereglees. Ce principe ne resulte necessaire-
ment d'aucune the"orie universellement reconnue ; il ne fut jamais
1'objet d'une propagande suivie.

Seules la force normative de 1'habitude et celle du fait accompli
peuvent nous fournir une explication r£elle. Tout ce qui se re"pete
plusieurs fois s'appelle normal, et tout ce qui est normal fait une
norme. Ceci parait un sophisme ou un sorite mal construit, mais
c'est par cette voie que le sentiment du droit se re"concilie avec la
force ouverte de la foule. Voila comment il faut entendre 1'opinion
qui pretend que le droit de la majorite repose sur la force : il
repose sur une longue serie d'antece"dents.

Reste a savoir dans quelles conditions la superiority du plus
grand nombre devient constante et par consequent normale. II
faut a cet effet un concours special de conjonctures favorables,
dont aucune separ£ment ne suffirait pour expliquer la genese du
principe du plus grand nombre, mais dont les combinaisons semblent
1'expliquer suffisamment.

i°. D'abord, le vote a la majorite des voix suppose un
denombrement des suffrages census e"gaux en principe. Les
groupements primitifs connaissent une coutume r£pandue de
ponderer les suffrages : les volontes des elements nombreux mais
peu signifiants ont une moindre valeur que celles de quelques gens
riches, braves et accredites. Au fur et a mesure que les elements
les plus forts se concentrent en un college special et que les plus

xvn] Principe Majoritaire 339

faibles (quoique nombreux) se re"duisent a un autre ou a plusieurs
autres niveaux, on rencontre dans chaque college a part la question
du calcul des suffrages de premiere classe, de deuxieme classe, etc.
Dans Thistoire des elections allemandes la fixation du principe
majoritaire coi'ncide avec Pdtablissement du college des electeurs.
II est permis de supposer que dans les Chambres anglaises ce
principe ne se serait pas £tabli aussi facilement sans la division de
la noblesse en pairs et chevaliers de comtes.

Or, malgre toute la distance qui separe la Pologne du XVP et du
XVir siecle de celle de Pe"tat primitif, il ne faut pas oublier que les
dietes et di£tines polonaises e"taient le rendez-vous de la petite
noblesse ainsi que des grands seigneurs, puissants comme les
princes de PEmpire, qui ne se sentaient point les e"gaux de la
petite szlachta. Aussi le liberum veto devint en re"alite, entre les
mains des grands seigneurs, un instrument de lutte centre la majorite".

2°. Le nivellement des votants une fois accompli, il est in-
dispensable qu'un certain ordre de deliberations s'etablisse dans le
groupe en question. Les pr£ce"dents en faveur de la majorite" ou
centre elle ne pourront se produire sans que tout le monde ne
voie bien que c'est pre"cis£ment la majorite qui remporte la victoire
et que ce n'est pas la minority qui au cours des d£bats accede
insensiblement a la majorite", reconstituant par la les apparences de
Punanimite".

En Pologne le reglement des dietes s'elabora dans la pe>iode
ou la victoire penchait du c6t£ du principe de Punanimite. En
attendant il se forma une notion confuse des resolutions semi-
obligatoires auxquelles les palatinats mecontents accedaient apres
coup.

3°. Rien n'inspire une telle solidarity et une telle discipline que
le danger menagant PEtat entier ou au moins une de ses corpora-
tions ; c'est lui qui force a effacer les dissensions intestines et a ne
tenir aucun compte de Popposition vaincue.

La Pologne jouissait au XVIe siecle d'une tranquillity absolue
du c6t£ de POccident ; sa puissance tenait encore POrient en
respect : la R£publique put se permettre de ne pas user de violence
a P£gard des opposants. Au surplus, la classe dominante, c'est-
a-dire la noblesse, se vit hors de la concurrence avec les autres
classes : elle n'avait plus centre qui manifester sa solidarity ou
dissimuler son peu de discipline interne. Cela a puissamment

340 W. Konopczynski [xvn

pousse aux exces les mecontents tant au cours des dietes ou
die"tines qu'apres leur separation.

4°. Des crises reVolutionnaires, grace a leur caractere peu
tolerant, attaquent vigoureusement l'inde"pendance des partis et
des corporations. Elles soulevent dans les partis pre"ponderants des
passions qui leur font oublier tous les scrupules constitutionnels
envers leurs adversaires. La Pologne a subi au XVF siecle une
crise religieuse ; et ce fut justement alors, sous Sigismond
Auguste, que la majorit£ protestante donna le branle a la chambre
des nonces ; quelquefois elle sembla etre prete a faire ce coup de
force salutaire, dont les suites eussent £te" incalculables pour
1'avenir de la Re"publique. Malheureusement ce coup de force
manqua — la vague protestante recula, et la crise se dissipa sans
avoir gue"ri PEtat de ses infirmite's.

5°. Suivons ce meme raisonnement. A P£poque de la reunion
des premieres di£tines et dietes tous les m£contents pouvaient se
transporter en Volhynie, en Podolie et ensuite en Ukraine. II
n'existait aucune categoric de gens forces a s'incliner devant les
decisions de la majorite" pre"ponderante, et pour celle-ci il n'existait
aucun adversaire la tenant en eVeil. Quand la possibilite de cette
emigration cessa, le principe se"duisant de l'unanimit£ etait deja bien
enracine\

6°. A cette contexture de circonstances imprevues s'en ajoutent
d'autres qui furent plus ou moins durables mais qui paraissent
comme fatalement assorties pour de"biliter les dements centralisa-
teurs du parlementarisme polonais. Le vote electoral ou stricte-
ment legislatif, de meme que celui sur les questions internationales,
contribue assez bien a accumuler des pre"ce" dents favorables a la
formation du regime majoritaire. Les affaires financieres et
militaires sont moins propres a atteindre ce re"sultat. En effet, la
majorit£ peut ais^ment imposer son roi au pays ou son depute^ a
une circonscription electorale, car les opposants osent rarement elire
un contre-roi ou meme un contre-d£pute\ On peut facilement
contraindre les mecontents a reconnaitre soit une nouvelle magis-
trature, soit une nouvelle administration royale, soit un nouveau
traite" ratifi£ centre leur gre". Mais il est difficile de lever des
impdts directs ou de convoquer un arriere-ban, si les opposants
r^sistent activement, ou meme passivement. En g£ne"ral, si 1'execu-
tion d'une decision commune se laisse e"mietter, ou si elle depend

xvn] Principe Majorit air e 341

du concours d'£lements r£fractaires, on risque de cr£er un antecedent
prejudicial e a la majorite. C'est justement ce^ qui arriva en
Pologne sous Sigismond Ier (1507-48) au moment ou les destinies
du parlementarisme subissaient une epreuve dangereuse : les dietines
particulieres rejeterent coup sur coup les impots, ainsi que la nouvelle
organisation militaire qui avait ete pr^c^demment agreee a la dicte
generate par la plupart des nonces, et le gouvernement dut plier
devant cet obstacle.

7°. La resistance aux mesures financieres des dietes n'aurait
pas entraine des consequences prejudiciables au parlementa-
risme central si la majority avait trouve dans le pouvoir royal
un ferme point d'appui et une garantie de Tex^cution de ses
decisions, comme cela eut lieu en Angleterre et en France. Ami
ou ennemi, inspirateur ou adversaire des etats, le pouvoir royal
donnait partout et toujours de la consistance aux corps deliberants
et les obligeait de renoncer au principe de 1'unanimite. En Pologne
cet appui salutaire fit deTaut a la representation nationale.

8°. Enfin, le dernier et peut-etre le plus grand obstacle ne fut
pas epargne aux dietes de Pologne. Nous voulons dire le mandat
imperatif, appele chez nous « instruction de nonce ». Selon une
opinion assez r£pandue, cette entrave aurait pu par elle-meme faire
fourvoyer la machine parlementaire et cr£er le liberum veto. On
sait que la diete g^n^rale se forma grace a la jonction des delega-
tions des dietines en assembiees provinciales et de ces dernieres en
un seul corps. En principe les tendances particularistes terriennes
devaient s'effacer au centre de la province pour disparaitre entiere-
ment dans la volonte de 1'assembiee pieniere des etats. La realite
dementit ces esperances. Loin de rompre Tindividualite des dietines,
les assembiees provinciales leur servirent de bouclier centre Tautorite
de la nation entiere ; ayant sauve Tindependance des palatinats,
elles disparurent, comme inutiles. Grace a 1'intervention de ces
assembiees, les dietines tinrent tete a la diete pendant la crise deja
signaiee sous les deux premiers rois Sigismonds. Leurs « instruc-
tions », appuyees par la menace d'une resistance a main armee des
grands palatinats, montrerent une vigueur infiniment plus energique
que celle dont portent temoignages les cahiers frangais, issus des
petites circonscriptions eiectorales (bailliages ou senechaussees).
La diete prit Tair plutot d'un congres de deiegues avec un pouvoir
limite que d'une assembiee nationale representative et souveraine.

342 IV. Konopczynski [xvn

Sans doute, les mandats eux-memes n'auraient jamais empeche
le regime majoritaire, comme ils ne 1'ont pas empeche en France.
Mais ce re"sultat fut inevitable faute de tendances permanentes
centralisatrices au sein de la diete generate, et a defaut de tout
autre facteur sur lequel la majorite aurait pu s'appuyer. Ainsi
1'individu, couvert par le mandat impe"ratif, commenga a opposer son
veto a 1'accord du reste de 1'assembiee, et cela meme dans les cas qui
n'etaient pas regies d'avance par ^instruction ». L'unanimitedes man-
dats imperatifs se transforma peu a peu en unanimite de personnes.

Resumons nos remarques anterieures. Le concours de huit
circonstances, a savoir :

i°, 1'inegalite de fait des personnes participant aux dietes et
aux dietines ;

2°, 1'elaboration tardive et insuffisante d'un reglement pour
les deliberations ;

3°, 1'inexistence de toute pression du dehors ;

4°, la faiblesse des conflits intestins ;

5°, la possibility d'e"migration des mecontents en masse dans
d'autres provinces de la Republique ;

6°, la nature divisible et susceptible d'empechement des pre-
mieres decisions des dietes ;

7°, la faiblesse du pouvoir executif separ£ ;

8°, la puissance des dietines et 1'importance de leurs mandats, —
tout cela cre"a vers la fin de la dynastie des Jagellons une imposante
se"rie d'ant^cedents, apres lesquels le parlementarisme polonais ne
pouvait sortir de sa stagnation vers le regime majoritaire, — qu'au
prix d'une revolution violente.

Les trois interregnes apres 1 572 ne firent qu'aggraver Tincertitude
des principes centripetes et centrifuges dans la constitution de
la Pologne. Si les palatinats aspiraient a la souverainet£ et
pr^tendaient a gouverner la diete, on s'en pouvait tirer, en sub-
stituant a la forme quasi unitaire de TEtat le fe"de"ralisme pur a 1'instar
des Provinces -Unies. Une semblable decomposition aurait et^
une consequence naturelle 'et saine des instructions imperatives.
Mais les interregnes acheverent de fermer cette issue. La nombreuse
noblesse polonaise remportait de ces immenses assembles electorales
un sentiment rafifermi de son unite. D'un autre c6te, quiconque
prenait une part personnelle (yiritiiri) a 1'eiection, se considerait a
juste titre comme titulaire immediat et auteur de la souverainete

xvn] Principe Majoritaire 343

nationale : il contractait, conjointement avec ses pairs, les pactes
fondamentaux avec le roi, done il ne connaissait point d'instance
intermediate entre lui et le chef d'Etat elu a runanimite". S'il a
conserve rinte"grite" de sa souverainete" personnelle sur le champ
electoral, il la gardera d'autant plus facilement centre le plus grand
nombre a la die" tine. Aussi ce ne fut que depuis 1572 que le
principe de 1'unanimite' commenga a infecter les di£tines.

Or, vers la fin du XVP siecle trois principes fondamentaux se
sont e"tablis dans le droit public de la Pologne :

Personne ne peut devenir roi sans une Election libre et unanime
par la noblesse ;

Aucun projet ne deviendra loi sans 1'accord unanime du roi, du
senat et des nonces terriens donnant leurs votes selon la teneur
des mandats ;

Aucune proposition ne pourra etre adopte"e par la die"tine que
du consentement de tous les gentilshommes qui y sont presents.
Certainement, ce sont la des principes sans exemple dans 1'Europe
moderne, excepte dans le royaume d'Aragon et la principaute"
de Catalogne. Us meconnaissent entierement 1'autorite du plus
grand nombre ; ils sont ge*ne"raux et absolus. Us convergent
dans 1'idee d'un libre accord (consensus) embrassant toutes especes
de decisions collectives. Ils contrastent avec toute sorte de de"cret
judiciaire (decretd] soumis a la majorite" des suffrages. Ces principes
agissent, en theorie, dans 1'ordre normal sans restriction, quoique
en pratique les exceptions n'aient pas e"te rares.

D'ailleurs, quelque nombreuses qu'aient e"te" ces exceptions, il
est e"tonnant que la nation ait pu vivre sous une telle constitution
pendant deux siecles. On recourait, il est vrai, dans les cas
extremes au lien d'une confederation, c'est-a-dire, a une convention
qui suspendait Texigence de Tunanimite et soumettait les matieres
les plus difficiles aux decisions majoritaires appelees sancita. Jean-
Jacques Rousseau pouvait s'exprimer a ce propos que la Pologne
vivait en regie dans 1'etat de nature, ou il n'y avait qu'une « volonte
de tous>>, et ne contractait le pacte social qu'en cas d'urgence, pour
cre"er «la volont^ g^nerale)). Toutefois, meme si Ton prend en ligne
de compte les nombreux abus ou les minorites etaient reduites au
silence, on ne saurait me"connaitre chez les Polonais au xvie et au
XVII6 siecle une flexibility speciale vers cet accord unanime dont le
resultat fut les quatre grands Volumina Legum. II est incontestable

344 ^ Konopczynski [xvn

que cet ideal sublime d'une « union des esprits » (unio animorum)
e"levait les multitudes a une abnegation altruiste ; les generations
successives apprenaient sous son influence a joindre la liberte et
l'e"galite" a une fraternite" inconnue ailleurs, et a retenir Pe"goisme
dont les exces auraient fle"tri et compromis le principe meme
d'unanimite". Nier tout cela serait perdre de vue Pensemble et le
principal pour se restreindre au particulier.

Mais tout honneur accorde" aux altruistes, il ne convient pas de
fermer les yeux sur Penvers de la me"daille. Nous avons mentionne"
les Volumina Legum. Us sont vraiment volumineux, mais ils le
seraient dix fois davantage si cette forme de decision difficile et
presque impossible n'eut pas gene" 1'initiative des nonces ou des
dietines. Evidemment il n'y avait qu'une seule voie pour obtenir
1'accord : c'e"tait de heurter de front toute la chambre, de tenir
ferme, de s'opposer a toute autre initiative, jusqu'a ce qu'on eut
accede aux propositions ainsi violemment soutenues. L'entetement
vaut mieux que toutes les raisons. Les instructions exigeaient
souvent des choses incompatibles ou difficiles a concilier ; et meme
si elles ne le faisaient pas, elles en demandaient trop a la fois, et
parfois plus qu'il n'e"tait possible de faire aboutir pendant les six
semaines prescrites par la loi. De la une obstruction re"ciproque
ouverte ou insidieuse ; de la des tentatives de releguer tout ce qu'il
y avait de plus important a la fin des seances, afin de Pintroduire
par surprise ou contrebande ; de la vers la cloture des stances des
abus multiples de la part de la majorite", abus sans lesquels PEtat
serait reste" souvent sans defense ni ressources.

Peu a peu les contradicteurs trouverent un moyen efficace pour
resister aux tentatives d'oppression ou de suppression : on n'avait
qu'a demander acte de sa protestation, ou bien, d'apres le terme
courant en Pologne : a porter un manifeste au greffe. D'abord ce
fut tout un parti mecontent qui fit signer sa protestation par une
foule d'opposants, puis des individus commencerent a suivre cet
exemple. Enfin, meme a Pepoque de la pire anarchic, le veto par
e"crit, quoique signe" par un seul nonce, resta Porgane des factions
et non pas des individus. En vain le gouvernement chercha-t-il a
refuser Pacte de protestation. Si le greffe a Varsovie ou a Grodno
etait ferme", il y en avait quantite" d'autres a la ported des mecontents.

On vit de plus en plus souvent les dietes se dissoudre sans
avoir obtenu aucun resultat. L'union des esprits demeurait Pideal

xvn] Principe Majoritaire 345

de la nation, mais en re"alit£ on n'avait qu'a choisir entre la
violation de ce qu'on appelait «la libert£ doree» ou le prejudice
de 1'Etat. La nation ne voulait pas se decider en faveur du
fe"de"ralisme pur et simple, et elle ne savait pas comment instituer
la forme unitaire de la Republique. Strictement, 1'infructuosite
des dietes ne r^sultait pas encore d'une anarchic: c'£tait la negation
suivie du principe majoritaire qui conduisait le plus re"gulierement
du monde a la paralysie de 1'Etat. L'anarchie fut plutdt le fruit
que la racine du liberum veto. Le public voyait assez bien les
dangers du desordre, les e"crivains politiques sonnaient le tocsin,
mais toutes leurs exhortations ne pouvaient rien centre les
tendances des deux forces sociales oppos£es a la reTorme : les
magnats et la petite noblesse. Les premiers, ennemis naturels
de 1'Etat, ne pouvaient que perdre leur influence sous le regime
majoritaire; 1'autre craignait en ce cas de perdre son repos et
ses prerogatives au profit de 1'lttat ; elle se contentait de sa
toute-puissance passive et apparente, sans aspirer a une libert£ plus
active, mais pe"rilleuse.

Du haut de sa liberte absolue la noblesse polonaise regardait
avec de"dain ce qui s'appelait liberte publique en Europe, sans la
prerogative du veto. Au cours du XVII6 siecle elle voyait avec
inquietude la lutte partout victorieuse de la royaut£ de droit divin
contre les privileges des classes sociales. Elle voyait la moindre
faiblesse du cot£ du peuple encourager les monarques a des
empietements. Hongrois, Tcheques, Allemands, Danois, Su£dois,
sans parler des Espagnols et des Frangais, tous les peuples du
continent europe"en qui s'e"taient pretes a la regie majoritaire
tomberent au cours de ce siecle sous le joug de la monarchic
absolue. La Grande-Bretagne paraissait plonge"e dans des guerres
civiles. En presence de telles experiences pouvait-on ne pas avoir
Pillusion que 1'unanimite et le veto constituaient Punique garantie
contre Pesclavage ?

Mais le torrent de la vie ne s'arrete pas. Le deVeloppement
qui tendait a e" lever 1'individu au-dessus de 1'Etat n'avait pas
encore atteint son terme. Dans la sphere de la conquete des
libert^s, comme partout, le mieux reste 1'ennemi du bien. Ayant
re"alis£ la negation simple du principe majoritaire, le parlemen-
tarisme polonais se pr£cipita dans son antithese.

Car c'est ainsi qu'il faut qualifier logiquement la pratique qui

346 IV. Konopczynski [xvn

s'introduit aux dietes de Pologne depuis la moitie du XVir siecle,
ainsi que la th£orie juridique qui devait 1'exprimer. Pendant
cette deuxieme phase le liberum veto commence a decapiter des
assemblees entieres, et non pas seulement leurs projets. On
commence a rompre les deliberations. Comment y est-on parvenu?
Quelle a et6 ici la « methode » de notre « folie » parlementaire ?
L'explication se trouve, d'un cote, dans le conflit des interets
provinciaux dont nous avons parle* plus haut, de 1'autre dans la
structure originaire des dietes. On a pre"tendu que la premiere
rupture de diete eut lieu en 1652. En verite cette diete a fonctionne"
jusqu'a son terme legal, et ne fut dissoute qu'a cause d'une opposition
legitime a la prolongation des seances. Ce n'est pas ce qu'on
peut appeler une rupture. Mais ce fait arrive en 1652 eut un
retentissement dans tous les palatinats. II demontra clairement
que les Etats de la Republique etaient pr£ts a tout sacrifier pour
1'amour des droits individuels. Alors on fit un pas de plus en
avant. On se mit a protester et a quitter la salle des seances
avant la fin de la diete. Les optimistes pouvaient attendre
patiemment jusqu'au dernier jour ; les pessimistes qui prevoyaient
que le contradicteur ne se laisserait pas flechir rentraient chez eux
desesperant du succes de la diete.

D'ou venait ce desespoir ? Pourquoi ne sanctionnait-on pas au
moins cette partie des projets qui n'etait contestee par personne ?
C'est qu'aucun projet ne pouvait passer loi avant la cloture
solennelle des Etats. La diete polonaise ressemblait a un congres
ou la noblesse obtenait la sanction de ses demandes en echange
du consentement qu'elle donnait aux projets legislatifs du roi, et
surtout en echange des contributions publiques. Si une partie des
contractants proteste et s'absente de Tacte de conclusion, tout le
marche est nul et de nul effet : voila pourquoi dans sa nouvelle
phase le liberum veto> lance contre telle ou telle proposition, a une
force retroactive contre tous les actes de la diete.

Bientot tous les palatinats embrasserent 1'opinion que chaque
particulier avait le droit de fermer la bouche a Passembiee de
ses egaux. La contagion devint generate, elle inonda tous les
territoires, renversant toutes les digues. Le moindre gentilhomme
s'arrogea le droit non seulement de paralyser les decisions, mais
aussi d'empecher de les mettre aux voix. Le veto envahit meme
les territoires qui avaient cru s'en garantir en admettant dans

xvn] Principe Majoritaire 347

les Elections le vote majoritaire : inutilement alle"guait-on cette loi
locale, quand le contradicteur ne permettait pas meme d'ouvrir les
debats ! En 1688 la diete ge"ne"rale fut rompue pour la premiere
fois avant rejection du marshal : on pourrait dire qu'alors « la libre
voix du citoyen » eut plus de valeur que le reglement de la diete !

Le veto devint une puissance sans bornes, e"le"mentaire, ante"-
rieure a toute constitution, — une idole, un tonnerre dans les mains
de milliers d'insense's.

Et voila 1'antithese du principe majoritaire a son apogee.

Baissons le rideau sur les consequences destructives et igno-
minieuses de sa domination. Ce triste tableau n'est que trop bien
connu ; on 1'expose fre"quemment et de parti pris, pour sugg£rer
1'impression que la Pologne s'est tue"e elle-meTne avant qu'on eut
1'idee d'abre"ger son agonie. Jusqu'a quel point et jusqu'a quelle
e"poque le veto domina-t-il la Pologne du consentement des Polonais,
et d'autre part, depuis quand fut-il soutenu par la force e"trangere,
pousse"e jusqu'a la menace de la guerre? — c'est une question qui
n'appartient pas a 1'examen juridique et historique de son origine
ni de son application.

Mais nous nous sentirions coupable d'avoir confirme une
faussete", si nous ne rappelions ici le fait notoire que malgr£
Paveuglement de la soci^te" polonaise avant le partage, malgr£ les
insinuations envenime'es des voisins, on avait trouve le chemin
qui conduisait tout droit du labyrinthe de la « libert£ dore"e » vers
la liberty publique moderne. On Pavait trouve", ce chemin, a la
lumiere des flambeaux de la litte"rature ^clair^e du XVIir siecle ;
on avait os^ y marcher, encourag£ par Pexemple de cette nation
unique qui seule avec nous et avec les Hongrois, mais beaucoup
mieux que nous autres, avait su conserver le tresor de ses libert£s
au milieu des royaut£s e"tablies, — par Texemple de la nation
anglaise. Prenant pour modele les lois de 1'Angleterre, la Con-
stitution du 3 mai 1791 a aboli d£finitivement le veto en de"pit des
garanties e"trangeres, mais au gre de tous les Polonais. Elle n'a
pas sauve l'ind£pendance de la R£publique, mais elle est arriv^e
justement a temps pour sauver 1'ame nationale et pour donner un
dementi aux falsificateurs d'histoire qui nous imputent un suicide.

W. KONOPCZYNSKI.

XVIII

THE MODERN STUDY OF CANON
LAW

AFTER Gratian, in the eleventh century, separated the study
of Canon Law from that of practical theology, Canon Law
formed, with Roman Law (utrumque ius\ the foundation of legal
studies in the universities of the Middle Ages.

The famous Decretum of Gratian, the Concordia Discordantium
Canonum, a private work, which had obtained recognition in
the whole Church, was the object of a series of commentaries
(Summae or Stromae) by the ' Decretists,' who were followed by
the ' Decretalists,' the commentators of the official collections of
Decretals, which formed the second part of the Corpus Juris
Canonici.

This great scientific elaboration of Canon Law corresponded to
its importance in mediaeval life. Canon Law covered at that time
a much larger field than in later periods. It was international, it
was Christian and therefore universal, and it was essentially con-
servative. For these reasons it exercised a very wide influence
upon the development of legal theories in the Middle Ages all over
the Western world.

The theory of sovereignty and of the relationship between
Church and State, as well as the various political theories, were
largely determined by the Canonists, as the Rev. A. J. Carlyle
has demonstrated recently in his learned book, The Political
Theories of the Middle Ages. But at the same time private law,
the systems of land tenures, and especially the marriage law —
this last considered by the Church as her exclusive and absolute
domain — were under the direct influence of Canon Law. Inter-

348

xvin] Ecclesiastical Law 349

national law and the law of procedure took their fundamental ideas
and principles from Canon Law ; and for the reason that many
crimes were subject to ecclesiastical jurisdiction on account of the
element of ' sin ' connected with them, the law of the Church had a
decided influence on the development of penal law. The social
action of the Church, the extension of her property, the monastic
institutions and the philanthropic work connected with them,
dominate the social and economic history of the Middle Ages,
and carry into all branches of mediaeval life the influence of the
legal elements of ecclesiastical ideas.

Perhaps in no other period of history have the doctrines
of the Canonists influenced so deeply and directly the formation
of the law of the Church as at this time, when Rolando Bandinelli,
the eminent decretist, was elected Pope under the name of Alex-
ander III., and Sinibaldo Fieschi, the famous decretalist, ascended
the papal throne as Innocent IV.

At that time Canon Law emanated chiefly from the Papal
authority. But when the occidental schism weakened the position
of the Popes and created the necessity for an appeal from the con-
tending Pontiffs to a higher authority, in order to re-establish the
unity of the Church, the so-called reformatory Councils of Pisa
(1409), Constance (141 1-18), and Basel (1431) tried to substitute the
authority of the Council for that of the Popes in ecclesiastical
legislation, and to assert the position of the bishops against the
supremacy of the Popes and of the Roman Court.

But if those Councils did not succeed in establishing an
episcopal system against the Roman supremacy, their canons
were partly accepted by the State in France and Germany. The
Popes were obliged to make concessions to the sovereigns, under
the form of privileges granted to them by the various Concordats
of the end of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the
sixteenth century.

Thus, at the end of the Middle Ages, the States took up an
independent attitude towards the Church, and a radical change
was brought about in their position as regards ecclesiastical matters
by the Protestant Reformation.

The Reformed Churches accepted the supremacy of the State
(ius circa sacra), granting to sovereigns a large ius inspiciendi et
cavendi in their internal organizations. At the same time, owing

350 A. Galante [xvm

to the fact that the State authorities were confronted by different
denominations, the ecclesiastical legislation of the States developed
on lines independent of the single denominations, and in con-
sequence of that, there arose, besides the strictly denominational
canon law, an ecclesiastical law of the State, which only gradually
and with great difficulty applied the principles of religious liberty.

Thus a new field opened out to the scientific study of Canon
Law. After the decline of the Commentators of the Decretals,
whose last works show a lack of scientific individuality and an
excessive predominance of casuistry and merely practical techni-
cality, with the revival of humanistic studies France is the leading
country in the study of Ecclesiastical Law, and the French school
can boast of a series of great canonists, from Cujas to Thomassin,
whose works are strictly connected with the special relationship of
State and Church in France.

The defence of the Libertates Ecclesiae Gallicanae, which had in
the Assemblies du Clerge very effective means of safeguarding
episcopal rights, led to the formation of a complete system of
Droit civil ecclesiastique, which was only temporarily interrupted
by the French Revolution.

The Council of Trent (1545-63), the greatest legislative work
of the Catholic Church in modern times, marks a decided return to
mediaeval theories of papal supremacy. The whole Council was
presided over by Papal Delegates, all the proposals for its decisions
came from Rome, and the canons of the Council were formally
approved and promulgated by the Pope.

At the same time the new legislation of the Council of Trent,
covering a very extensive field and regulating matters of vital
importance for the State, as was the case with the marriage law,
brought new life into the Canon Law and the studies connected
with it.

Cardinal Bellarmino (1542-1621) and Franciscus Suarez (1548-
1617) affirmed the papal supremacy in a new form, sustaining the
potestas indirecta of the Popes in temporal matters ; and the seven-
teenth century witnessed the completion of the Annals of Caesar
Baronius (d. 1607) and of the Italia Sacra of Ferdinando
Ughelli (d. 1670), while Antonio Augustino, with his great works,
represents for Spain the humanistic revival of the study of
Canon Law.

xvmjj Ecclesiastical Law 35 1

In the struggle between the Papacy and different States in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in France, in Spain, and in
Italy, the defenders of the Erastian theories developed a whole
system of ius circa sacra of the State towards the ecclesiastical
institutions, and the episcopal theories found a vigorous support in
the writings of Zeger van Espen (d. 1728), and in the famous De
statu ecclesiae, which John Nikolaus von Hontheim (d. 1790)
published in 1763 under the pseudonym of Febronius.

In Austria those Erastian theories were accepted by Eybel,
Pehem, Riegger, and Rautenstrauch, and prepared the way for the
great ecclesiastical reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II.

Besides the political writings on Canon Law, this period
also produced the canonistic works of Prospero Lambertini
(Benedict XIV), the researches of the Bishop of Oneglia, Stefano
Berardi, and of the brothers Ballerini of Verona on the sources of
Canon Law ; also the Prompta Bibliotheca of Ferraris and the
Theatrum of De Luca, the first encyclopaedic works covering the
whole field of Canon Law.

The revival of the scientific study of Ecclesiastical Law in the
nineteenth century is due to Germany, where Karl Friedrich
Eichorn in his Grundsatze des Kirchenrechts der katholischen und
der evangelischen Religionspartei in Deutschland (Gottingen, 1831)
applied to Canon Law the principles of the historical school of
Savigny, and gave a systematic exposition of Canon Law based
on its natural structure, breaking the tradition of the division into
personae, res et actiones, which, since Lancellotti, had dominated the
treatment of Ecclesiastical Law.

Thus the merely dogmatic study of Canon Law was abandoned,
and greater importance given to the historical development of
ecclesiastical institutions.

The next phase of the study of Ecclesiastical Law in Germany
is closely connected with the works of Friedrich von Schulte, Paul
Hinschius, and Emil Friedberg, the most eminent canonists of the
period of the so-called Kulturkampf.

Friedrich von Schulte, who later was one of the founders of the Old
Catholic movement, edited a series of the Summae of the Decretists,
and recorded in a monumental work (Geschichte der Quellen und
Literatur des kanonischen Rechtes von Gratian bis auf die Gegen-
wart, Stuttgart, 1875 sq.) the works on Canon Law after Gratian.

352 ^4 - Galante [xvm

To Paul Hinschius, the editor of the Pseudoisidor, canonistic
science owes the largest and most exhaustive treatise on Church
Law (System des Kirchenrechts, 6J volumes, Berlin, 1868-96), which,
although not completed, will remain for many years to come the
basis for historical researches into ecclesiastical institutions.

Of the multifarious works of Friedberg special mention must be
made of his great edition of the Corpus luris Canonici^ after the
first Editio Lipsiensis by Emil Ludwig Richter.

Thus the tradition of the study of Canon Law was kept in
Germany, where, even in distinctly Protestant States, Canon Law
was — as it still is — a subject of lectures and examinations not
only in the theological, but also in the legal Faculties ; and
the German school of Canon Law had a direct influence on the
revival of the canonistic studies in Italy.

In consequence of the theories of separation of Church and
State expressed by Cavour in his famous formula Libera Chiesa in
libero Stato (' A Free Church in a Free State '), and only partially
applied in Italian ecclesiastical legislation, the Theological Faculties
at the State Universities in the Kingdom of Italy were suppressed
in 1873, and the teaching of Canon Law at the legal faculties,
although not formally abolished, was practically abandoned for
many years.

The revival of the study of Ecclesiastical Law in Italy was due
to Francesco Scaduto, who wrote the first exhaustive treatise on
modern Italian ecclesiastical law (Manuale del diritto ecclesiastic^
2 ed., Turin, 1894), and to Francesco Ruffini, whose work on
Religious Liberty has recently been translated into English. They
were, with their various writings, the pioneers of a flourishing
school of Canon Law which has now been restored to the curri-
culum of all legal faculties in Italy.

In France researches into Canon Law were directed mainly to
the study of the droit civil ecclesiastique. Canon Law was not taught
at the legal faculties as an independent subject, but was included
partly in the histoire du droit and in the droit administratif.

Among the most valuable contributions of French science to
canonistic subjects in modern times we must record the work of
Professor Esmein on * Marriage ' (Le Mariage en droit canonique,
Paris, 1891 sq.), and the different works on canonistic subjects of
the Ecole de hautes etudes.

xvin] Ecclesiastical Law 353

In Austria the old tradition of the study of Canon Law has been
kept up at the theological and legal faculties of all the Universities.
To the last generation of Austrian canonists belonged Maassen,
the author of the great history of the sources of Canon Law in the
earlier centuries of the Middle Ages (Geschichte der Quellen und
Literatur des kanonischen Rechtes im Abendlande bis zum Ausgang
des Mittelalters, vol. i., Graz, 1870), and I may point out that one
of the most prominent canonists of Austria, Max von Hussareck, is
at present Minister for Public Education in Vienna.

In Germany, after the period of the settlement of the Kultur-
kampf, the study of Canon Law, which had received such important
assistance from the kindred studies of German law and ecclesi-
astical history (I need only recall the masterly chapters of Gierke's
Genossenschaftsrecht dealing with ecclesiastical corporations, and
Hauck's Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands), seemed for a moment to
stagnate as an independent science. It was then that Ulrich Stutz
with his Geschichte des kirchlichen Benefizialwesens von seinen
Aufdngen bis auf Alexander III. (Berlin, 1895) marked a new de-
parture in the German studies of Canon Law. With a wider applica-
tion of historical methods than had previously been made, and with
great erudition, Stutz pointed out in a decisive way the importance of
proprietary churches in the development of the ecclesiastical institu-
tions of the Middle Ages, and in a series of various studies investi-
gated the different aspects of the private property of churches. His
work gave a new impetus to the historical researches on Canon Law.

For the historical study of ecclesiastical institutions Stutz
founded in 1902 the collection of Kirchenrechtliche Abhandlungen
(Stuttgart, Enke), in which have appeared up to the present time
no fewer than eighty volumes by different authors, dealing with
the most various branches of the historical development of ecclesi-
astical institutions in different countries, and mainly in Germany.

Those researches, in which scholars of different denominations
have taken part, united by that impartiality of scientific investiga-
tion, which must be the base of any study of Canon Law worthy
of the name of science, have brought into prominence the import-
ance of local elements in Canon Law, and have contributed to the
formation of the ' ecclesiastical legal history ' advocated by Stutz.
His foundation of the Canonistische Abteilung of the Zeitschrift
der Savigny-Stiftung (1911), with contributions by canonists of

2 A

354 ^* Galante [xvm

different nationalities in their own language, has created an inter-
national medium of communication for the historical study of
Canon Law.

Side by side with this historical investigation of Canon Law has
proceeded the study of the strictly legal questions connected in the
various countries with ecclesiastical institutions, and what may be
called the * comparative ' study of ecclesiastical law, i.e. the study
of the ecclesiastical legislation in different States, so that the field
of canonistic research has been greatly enlarged in modern times.
Besides, a series of historical publications threw new light on
ecclesiastical institutions, and in this connexion may be quoted the
new Regesta Pontificum by Kehr, the great collection of materials
on the Council of Trent edited by the G^rrcsgesellschaft^ and the
reports of the Papal Nuncii from different countries published during
the last few years by various historical institutes.

At the conclusion of this brief survey of the development of the
study of Canon Law, in which of course I have only been able to
outline the main current of researches, without including all the
individual contributions to the progress of our science, I should like
to say a few words on the particular condition of the study of Canon
Law in England.

Through the Middle Ages Canon Law had been one of the chief
elements of the legal studies in the English Universities, and was
the subject of scientific research. In England, as on the Continent,
Canon Law was 'one of the great civilizing and humanizing in-
fluences of the Middle Ages.' When Henry VIII banished Canon
Law from the academical studies of England he dealt a deadly
blow to canonistic science in England. Although we can see in
the Ecclesiastical Polity of Hooker an attempt to give a scientific
basis to the legal institutions of the Church of England, Canon Law as
an independent science was abandoned, and the legal side of ecclesi-
astical matters was dealt with mainly from a practical point of view.

And yet perhaps no other country presents so much interest
for the study of Ecclesiastical Law as Great Britain, not only on
account of the mediaeval elements which are still alive in her
ecclesiastical institutions, but also for the variety and magnitude
of ecclesiastical questions, so prominent in English public life.
We only need to remind ourselves of the question, still sub judice^
of Welsh Disestablishment and its connexion with innumerable

xvin] Ecclesiastical Law 355

questions of legal history, and we may recall that the 'Royal
Commission on the Church of England and other Religious Bodies
in Wales and Monmouthshire' of 1906 was obliged to declare the
impossibility of proceeding to a legal-historical examination of the
ecclesiastical foundations in Wales.

Some parts of Canon Law, in regard to England, have been
dealt with in the histories of English Law (for example, by
Pollock and Maitland, and Holdsworth), and many valuable con-
tributions to legal history of ecclesiastical institutions in England
are contained in local histories and in the historical records of
bishoprics, chapters, parishes, etc. Also, among the English works
of general interest for canonists, we must remember Phillimore's
Ecclesiastical Law. Still, it would be most desirable that the study
of the legal history of the English ecclesiastical institutions should
be taken up in England on a wider, more comprehensive scale, and
the results of those investigations would be most important, not
only for the legal history of England, but for the history of the
development of Canon Law in general.

The interest created by Maitland's book, Roman Canon Law in
England, showed to a larger public the great importance of the
study of Canon Law for England.

1 should like, in conclusion, speaking in this old Hall of
Lincoln's Inn, so full of ecclesiastical and legal memories, to
express the hope that England, the country which has given to
international science Lyndwood, Hooker, Stubbs, and Maitland,
may revive her old canonistic traditions and take a vigorous share
in the modern researches of Canon Law,

ANDREA GALANTE.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

[Conf. Jacobson, * Das kanonische und kirchenrechtliche Studium sonst tmd
jetzt, in Italien, Frankreich, in den Niederlanden, Belgien und Deutschland'
(Zeitschrift fur Kirchenrecht, L, 1861); Schultc, < if her die Bedeutung und
Aufgabe des Kirchenrechts ' (Archiv fur kathol. Kirchenrecht, L) ; Gross,
Zur Begriffsbestimmung und WUrdigung des Kirchenrechts, Graz, 1871 j
F. Ruffini, * Lo Studio e il concetto odierno del diritto ecclesiastico ' (Rivista
italiana per le scienze giuridiche, 1892); Friedberg, Dot canonische Recht
und das Kirchenrecht (Festrede), Leipzig, 1696 (printed also in the Deutsche
Zeitschrift fur Kirchenrechf) ; Stutz, Die kirchliche Rechtsgeschichte (Rede),
Stuttgart, 1905 ; Galante, ' Diritto ecclesiastico e storia locale ' (in the Reports
of the International Historical Congress of Rome ', 1903).]

XIX

LJID£E DE LJ£TAT ET SON EVOLUTION EN
RUSSIE DEPUIS LES TROUBLES DU XVIIE
SIECLE JUSQU'AUX R^FORMES DU XVIIP

CONSIDEREE dans son essence Pide"e de Pfitat est une concep-
tion normative : c'est la notion de ce que doit etre le rapport entre
le souverain et les sujets, et non seulement la notion du pouvoir
coercitif que 1'Etat a sur les particuliers. C'est done dans le sens
normatif qu'on lui donnait jadis, d'apres les principes d'une civilisa-
tion anterieure a la n6tre, que je traiterai de l'ide"e de 1'Etat et de
son Evolution en Russie.

Cette Evolution a pris une direction qu'il est facile de pre"ciser :
au commencement du XVP siecle l'ide"e de 1'Etat russe est plutot
religieuse que se"culiere ; au commencement du XVIIP elle devient
plutdt se"culiere que religieuse. Tout en suivant ce de"veloppement
dans ses grandes lignes, je ne pretends pas, du reste, en donner ici
une exposition complete. Pour y parvenir il ne suffirait pas de

[ noter les theories qui contribuerent a cette metamorphose; il

) faudrait s'arreter plus longuement, que je n'ai pu le faire, aux

institutions et aux e'venements qui d£terminerent le cours re"el de

ces id^es en Russie depuis les troubles du XVII siecle jusqu'aux

reTormes du XVIIP.

La conception de la civilisation qu'on se faisait en Europe au
moyen age donnait une preeminence marquee a la religion, telle
que 1'entendait TEglise chr^tienne ; mais pour syst^matiser les
verites divines concedees aux lai'ques et les impr^gner de sa doctrine

356

xix] LIdde de F Etat en Russie 357

elle se servait de la scolastique. Quoique 1'figlise grecque se soit
trouv£e dans une position moins propice que PEglise latine pour
jouer ce role, elle cultiva, pourtant, ces id£es non sans succes et
contribua a leur propagation dans des pays lointains.

La Russie, qui, sous le rapport clerical, d£pendait au moyen
age du patriarche de Constantinople, a naturellement £prouv£
cette influence ; mais elle n'en profita qu'avec un grand retard. La
Dialectique de Jean Damascene, dans laquelle il tachait d'adap-
ter Pancienne logique des £coles a la doctrine de 1'Eglise, par
exemple, a £te traduite en «langue slave », et ses copies russes
datent du xve siecle. L'un des admirateurs de Jean Damascene,
dej'a efHeur£ par la Renaissance, Maxime le Grec, pr£conisait
aussi «la logique » en tant qu'elle servait a la gloire de Dieu
et enflammait Tame d'amour pour le Tres-Haut, c'est-a-dire
en tant qu'elle n'etait pas contraire aux paroles divines et
se conformait a elles.1 En suivant ces regies, PEglise grecque
pouvait mettre a profit meme la scolastique latine : Maxime
le Grec n'en £tait pas exempt ; les erudits de Kiev, tels que
SteTan Javorskij, par exemple, en userent largement dans leurs
travaux.

Une doctrine analogue ne tarda pas a se former en Russie
dans le domaine des id£es morales et politiques, soumises, elles
aussi, aux dogmes de 1'Eglise : c'est du sein de l'£glise grecque
que sont sortis les premiers doctrinaires de PEtat russe, et c'est
du point de vue orthodoxe ou « pravoslave », et en conformite avec
plusieurs id£es byzantines, notamment avec celle du basileus,
vicaire orthodoxe de Dieu et autocrate, regnant par le Christ
qui Pinspire et le guide, qu'ils formulaient les principes de
cet Etat.

L'id£e religieuse de PEtat formee a Byzance £tait deja quelque
peu connue en Russie a P^poque de Vladimir le Saint et de
ses successeurs ; mais elle ne s'est d£veloppe"e qu'en Moscovie.
Bien des circonstances contribuerent a son developpement, par-
ticulierement celles qui, dans leur ensemble, produisirent la d£-
cadence de PEmpire byzantin et la formation de PEtat moscovite,

1 loaHHi, J^aMacKHHi,, fliajteKmum, pyc. nep., M. 1862, pp. 9, 10, 104,
106-107, 1 08 ; cf. A. Co6ojieBCKift. Hepeeodnafi jiumepamypa MOCKOBCKOU
Pycu, 2 H3A-, CUB., 1903, pp. 20, 281. MaKCHMt TpeKi,, CouuneniH, Kas.,
1859-1862, i. pp. 462-464.

358 A. Lappo-Danilevskij [xix

de son unit6 et de son ind£pendance ; mais en consid£rant la
porte"e subsequente de ces theories, c'est plut6t leurs principes que
leur genese qu'il importe de noter.

L'une d'elles, celle de Philophe'e du couvent d'6l£azar, d^velop-
pait une these que le me"tropolite Zocime avait deja avance"e en
1492. Philoph£e ia formulait au point de vue religieux et
providentiel, bas£ sur les Saintes Ecritures : toutes ses e"pitres
sont imbues de 1'idee de la Providence, grace a laquelle tout ce
qui arrive dans 1'univers n'arrive que par la volont£ de Dieu,
Cre"ateur de toutes choses, et pour le bien de 1'humanite". C'est a
ce point de vue, renforc£ par les allegories de I'Apocalypse, que
Philophe'e £crivit ses e"pitres au grand due Basile III et au tsar
Jean IV : il y propose, de meme que dans son e"pitre au clerc
Moune"khine, sa doctrine sur le defacement providentiel du centre
de la chre"tiennet£ de Rome a Byzance, et de Byzance a Moscou,
ou il s'est fix£ definitivement, et sur la mission providentielle de ce
nouveau foyer du monde pravoslave. C'est de cette mission qu'il
de"duit le r61e historique de"sign£ par Dieu a 1'Etat moscovite,
comme centre de reunion des divers royaumes de la chre"tiennet£
pravoslave ; les prerogatives de 1'elu de Dieu — du tsar, unique
repr£sentant du pouvoir, qui doit observer et maintenir les
traditions pravoslaves dans 1'Orient chretien, ses devoirs et ses
droits envers ses sujets, etc.1

La theorie de Philophee n'^tait pas de"nu£e de grandeur: au
point de vue orthodoxe ou pravoslave on pouvait 1'appliquer aux
relations internationales et au regime interieur ; mais elle ne
developpait pas les principes de gouvernement et de suj£tion ;
c'est dans des doctrines plus sp£ciales qu'on pouvait trouver ces
deVeloppements.

Une theorie, bas£e sur Porthodoxie la plus stricte et visiblement
influenced par les id^es byzantines — celle de Joseph Sanine — con-
siderait, par exemple, le tsar comme 1'elu de Dieu et le gardien
supreme de 1'orthodoxie, et en d£duisait ses devoirs et ses droits,
de meme que sa responsabilit£ envers Dieu. L'abb£ de Woloko-
lamsk comparait le pouvoir du tsar a celui de Dieu, et parlait de
Pob£issance que lui devaient ses sujets comme de celle qui se
pratique envers Dieu ou dans les cloitres ; pour prouver ses theses

1 B. MajnmHHi, Cmapew Ejieasapoea Mouacmupu (Duaooeu u eio
nocjianin, KieBi, 1901 r., Ilpmr., pp. 36-66.

xix] LIdde de rEtat en Russie 359

il s'en rapportait, entre autres, a Pautorite" des empereurs byzantins,
notamment a celle de Constantin et de Justinien.1

Une the"orie moins rigoureuse, de"veloppe"e par Maxime le Grec,
introduisait les e"le"ments de la justice ou de la prawda particuliere-
ment dans le domaine de la juridiction. Comme St-Thomas
d'Acquin, il distingue les vertus th^ologiques des vertus morales et
place a leur tete la vertu de la justice (justitia) ou de la prawda.
Quoique Maxime le Grec n'ait pas donne" de definition du concept
de la prawda, qu'il considere tantdt au point de vue religieux et
me'taphysique, tantdt au point de vue de la morale chre"tienne, il
en de"duit les devoirs et les droits du souverain, particulierement
dans le domaine de la juridiction : le prince doit observer la
prawda et la de"fendre dans ses cours de justice, ce qui mene a
la « paix inte"rieure et a la force exte"rieure » . Le prince qui plaide
la cause de la prawda regne conjointement avec Dieu, «qui est
Justice, » et ne gouverne que comme son intermediate ; cela donne
a son pouvoir un e"clat surnaturel et une puissance morale, et lui
reserve le droit d'exiger la soumission absolue de ses sujets.2

Les doctrines de Philophe"e, de Joseph et de Maxime que ces
derniers enoncaient, d'ailleurs, non sans reserves, ont joui d'une
grande popularite parmi les lettre's moscovites : le tsar Jean IV
lui-meme en a largement profite ; elles ont certainement subi
quelques deVeloppements et quelques modifications poste*rieures ;
mais elles n'ont pas e"te" supplante"es a cette e"poque par d'autres
systemes. Jean Peresvje"tov, par exemple, avait certainement
donne* une conception diffe"rente de 1'autorit^ «redoutable» du
souverain envers ses sujets et avait indique", de meme qu'Ostrorog,
quelques problemes que TEtat moderne devait resoudre : il recon-
naissait 1'importance du principe « a chacune selon ses ceuvres » et la
n^cessit^ des lois e"crites ; il proposait d'abolir les offices h^r^ditaires
et de re"mune"rer les fonctionnaires ; il insistait sur 1'organisation des

1 IOCH(J)T> Bojioi],KiS, TIpocerbmumeM, Kaa. 1896, 3 ed., pp. 488, 544-
551; pour les restrictions que Joseph Sanine faisait, en parlant des rois
heretiques, voir ib. pp. 286-288, et M. J^LUKOHOBI., Bjiacmb MOCKOOCKUXK
rocydapeiiy CUB., 1899, pp. 26, 95, 103.

2 MaKCHM-B rpeKi>, Couunenifi, v. i. pp. 142, 385, v. ii. pp. 152, 157-184,
209, 210, 286, 319-357, v. iii. p. 237, etc. D'ailleurs, quelques elements de
cette theorie se trouvent deja dans Le Discours sur la justice et ? injustice de
PIsmaragde « de la 2e redaction)) (xv. sc.); mais ils n'y sont pas developpes
systematiquement.

360 A. Lappo-Danilevskij [xix

finances et de Parme"e. Malgre" la haute porte"e de ses ide"es, les
projets de Pe"resvje"tov ne regurent pas la notori£te dont joufesaient
les theories de Philophee et de ses e"mules : celles-ci ont prevalu au
XVI8 siecle et ont e"te" transmises au XVII6.

Cependant ces doctrines « pravoslaves » sur Plitat ne donnaient
qu'une id£e transcendante du rapport entre le souverain et les
sujets ; elles s'exposaient, en outre, a quelques restrictions de la
part des partisans ze"le"s de PEglise, qui rehaussaient Pautorite"
spirituelle et r^clamaient Pobe"issance du monarque aux admonitions
de ses repre"sentants ; elles ne s'accordaient pas avec les serments
que quelques-uns des tsars devaient preter aux bojares a Pe"poque
des troubles ; elles ne preVoyaient pas le role que devaient jouer
les assemblies des etats (semskii ssobory) au commencement du
XVIIe siecle.

II est vrai qu'au temps des troubles les Russes e"prouverent le
sentiment de la difference qu'il y a entre PEtat et la forme du
gouvernement ; mais ils avaient alors des raisons pour croire que
PEtat moscovite ne pouvait conserver son unite" et sa force qu'en
restant fidele aux formes traditionnelles du gouvernement : le tsar
Mihai'l Fe"dorovicz trouva un appui dans les e"tats ge"ne"raux pour
re"tablir Pordre dans le pays, et les theories anciennes continuerent
a y circuler, meme dans la seconde moitie" du XVir siecle.

Le tsar Alexej Mihajlovicz, par exemple, usait volontiers de
ces theories, sans y apporter, du reste, de changements essentiels ;
ne"anmoins il accepta la disposition que le concile de 1667 avait
prise et qui consistait a conserver au monarque son autorite" supreme
dans les affaires de Plitat, tout en la r£servant au patriarche dans
les affaires de PEglise ; mais, apres la deposition de Nicone, ce de"-
doublement du pouvoir ne pouvait durer : il portait atteinte a Punit£
de PEtat et fut de"finitivement aboli par Pierre le Grand.

Ce n'est qu'indirectement — par Pintroduction de la scolastique,
a laquelle le tsar Alexej Mihajlovicz avait accorde" sa protection,
que ces theories « pravoslaves » ont rec^u leurs complements dans les
ide"es, sorties du sein des colleges des je"suites, dont le re"seau
couvrait deja la plus grande partie de la Pologne.

Comme je Pai remarque plus haut, la religion orthodoxe
grecque n'interdisait pas Pusage de la scolastique latine : et c'est
justement pour deTendre les droits de Pliglise pravoslave qu'on
en usa a Kiev ; mais la scolastique latine, qu'on transplantait des

xix] U Idee de I'Etat en Russie 361

colleges des je"suites polonais a Kiev, et de Kiev a Moscou,
contenait quelques principes de morale et de droit qui, de cette
maniere, pe"ne"trerent dans le milieu des lettre"s moscovites.

Ces principes se reliaient, au fond, a la doctrine de St-Thomas
d'Acquin, et, par son intermediate, a quelques ide"es d'Aristote ;
ils caracte"risaient en Moscovie l'e"poque de transition de Pide"e
religieuse a 1'idee seculiere de l'£tat.

L'un des lettre"s moscovites de ce temps-la, Simeon Polotzkij,
par exemple, s'en tenait a cette doctrine mixte. II rattachait les
origines de 1'Etat et du pouvoir souverain non seulement a la
volont£ divine, mais a la tendance naturelle qu'ont les hommes
a s'assembler en societ£ : les hommes, les cit£s et les royaumes
dependent re"ciproquement les uns des autres dans les choses
mate"rielles et spirituelles ; ils e"prouvent aussi le besoin de se"curit£
qui les pousse a se donner un chef, car une socie"t£ sans chef tend
a sa ruine. II se repre*sentait le souverain non seulement comme
celui qui « mene ses sujets aux vertus divines », mais comme celui qui
vaque a leur « bien commun » ; il pre"sumait que le prince doit
re"gner non seulement d'apres les pre"ceptes de la vertu, de la
prawda^ mais aussi d'apres les principes de la justice distributive
et commutative, qu'il distinguait, selon un schema assez re"pandu
dans les manuels de ce temps -la, de la justice vindicative. En
deVeloppant ces principes Sime"on Polotzkij ,donnait une espece
de speculum principis christiani, dans lequel on peut trouver
quelques regies analogues a celles d'Agapithe le diacre dans son
"EK&O-IS Ke<£aAa«t>v Trapati/ertKcui/ et entrevoir,peut-etre, quelque influence
du traits De regimine principum, particulierement dans les restric-
tions du pouvoir temporel en faveur du pouvoir spirituel que Simeon
Polotzkij fait plutdt sous-entendre que formuler ouvertement.1

1 CHMGOHT. IIojion;Ki8, Sanucxu, MS. de la Biblotheque de la Typographic
du Synode a Moscou, N° 1791, 4078, ff. 199 sq. ; Bepmoipadi, MHOIO-
Wrbmnuu, MS. conserve au departement des manuscrits de la Bibliotheque
de PAcademie Imperiale des Sciences de St-Petersbourg, N° 19, Preface,
ff. 57v.-58v., 9ov., 3o6v.-3o8v., 363v., 375-375V., 466v.-477. Le moine
Simeon Polotzkij avait fait ses Etudes k Kiev et au college des jesuites de
Wilno ; il s'etablit a Moscou, probablement en 1663. Les notes qu'il avait
prises au college de Wilno, d'un cours de morale, c'est-a-dire de « monastique »,
« d'economique » et de «politique», qu'il y avait suivi, le recueil de pieces qu'il
a intitule Le Jardin multiflore (« Vertograd Mnogozwetnij ») et dirferents
autres ecrits prouvent qu'il s'dtait quelque peu familiarise avec les doctrines
de St-Thomas d'Acquin et d'Aristote. Cf., d'ailleurs, p. 359 note i.

362 A. Lappo-Danilevskij [xix

Ces theories ont ete reprises par Tun des plus fervents Sieves de
Simeon Polotzkij, grand amateur de la scolastique et quelque peu
connaisseur d'Aristote— par Silvestre Me"dv£dje> ; mais la doctrine
de la justice n'a regu des deVeloppements sensibles que dans les
cours de the"ologie caiques sur la Somme de St-Thomas d'Acquin.

En effet, on distinguait, d'apres la Somme, les vertus morales
des vertus the"ologiques et on y comprenait la prudence, la justice,
la vaillance et la temperance ; mais on considerait la prudence
comme une vertu intermediate entre les vertus the"ologiques et
morales, ce qui permettait de placer la justice a la tete des vertus
morales ; et on en traitait conjointement avec le droit.

C'est done grace aux cours de the"ologie, et particulierement a
leur partie intituled de jure et justitia, que les notions juridiques
commencerent a s'infiltrer dans notre litterature.

L'un des repr^sentants les plus caracteristiques de cette con-
ception fut certainement un professeur de the"ologie a 1'academie
de Kiev, qui y lisait, en 1696-1697, un cours contenant un
tractatus theologicus de justitia. L'auteur, selon toute apparence
Stefan Javorskij, donne dans son traite la definition de la justice
autrefois formulae par Ulpien et rec^ue par St-Thomas d'Acquin,
et tache d'etablir sur ce principe le rapport du souverain et des
sujets.

Stefan Javorskij delibere sur la justice commutative et
distributive d'apres Aristote, St-Thomas d'Acquin ^et quelques
auteurs scolastiques plus regents ; mais il admet, en outre, une dis-
tinction posterieure, quoique deja inclue dans la Somme, de la justice
legale et de la justice vindicative, notions qu'il pouvait puiser, par
exemple, dans le traite de son confrere polonais Mlodzianowskij.

D'apres cette the"orie la justice commutative regie les rapports
prives des hommes, les autres justices — les rapports re"ciproques du
souverain et des sujets.

En effet, la justice distributive fixe les devoirs de la com-
munaute (communitas) envers les personnes privees : elle e"tablit ce
a quoi chacune d'elles a droit, comme membre de la communaute".
La justice le"gale fixe les devoirs des personnes privies envers la
communaut6 — ce que chacune d'elles doit faire pour le bien
commun de la communaute dont elle est membre ; ce nexus
legal est une sujetion formelle, si celui qui devient membre de la
communaute exprime consciemment sa volonte d'en faire partie, ou

xix] Ly Idde de r&at en Russie 363

reste traditionnel, s'il ne fait qu'admettre sa suje"tion, dont 1'acte a
e"t£ accompli ante>ieurement par ceux qui ont £t6 admis par la
communaute" et reconnu par elle. Done, chaque sujet doit veiller
au bien commun (respicere bonum commune titulo nexus ad
communitatem). D'ailleurs, les devoirs de la communaute" ou de
ses membres deviennent respectivement des droits ; la communaute",
par exemple, possede le pouvoir, fonde* sur le nexus le"gal et sur la
loi naturelle (firmata lege naturalt), c'est-a-dire le droit d'exiger des
citoyens le sacrifice de leur bien et meme de leur vie pour la chose
publique.

A 1'instar de la justice distributive et de la justice le"gale, la
justice vindicative a en vue l'inte"r£t de la communaute', mais elle le
preserve, en en e*cartant le mal (nocumentum) par des peines qu'elle
inflige a ceux qui les me"ritent ; elle les inflige « honnetement »
pour preVenir les dommages, ou pour punir ceux qui les ont
occasionne's.

Comme on le voit, SteTan Javorskij remonte aux principes de
1'Etat, fbnde"s sur la justice ; et c'est deja en combinaison avec le
droit naturel qu'il Papplique au regime des personnes et des biens ;
il en traite non sans 1'influence de St-Thomas d'Acquin et d'autres
the"ologiens, par exemple, de Becanus. D'apres cette the"orie, les
hommes, de par leur nature (ex natura), sont tous e"galement libres :
1'homme ne peut etre [naturellement] 1'esclave d'un autre homme ;
mais il peut le devenir grace au droit des gens, s'il est fait
prisonnier dans une guerre juste ou en vertu de la loi positive (lex
positivd) ; il peut aussi devenir esclave de son propre gre\ De
meme la proprie'te' n'est pas fondle sur le droit naturel, mais sur le
droit des gens (ius gentium\ c'est-a-dire sur le consentement des
hommes, qui diviserent les biens. Du reste, cette division corres-
pondait aux exigences de la raison, et en ce sens au droit naturel :
car 1'homme a plus de soin de son propre bien que du bien commun,
et dans l'e"tat primitif chacun pouvait deTendre aux autres d'user
du bien commun, ce qui devenait une source de collisions perpe"-
tuelles, qu'on ne pouvait faire cesser que par la division des biens.

II m'est impossible d'entrer dans les deVeloppements que donne
Stefan Javorskij de ces principes : il delibere, de meme que
Mlodzianowski, sur « l'objet» et le « sujet » de la justice ; il disserte,
pareillement a Becanus, sur les applications des principes de la
justice commutative et de la justice vindicative aux « cas juridiques»,

364 A. Lappo-Danilevskij [xix

et traite, dans sa Casuistique des donations, des testaments et
des contrats ; des devoirs du juge, de « 1'accusateur », des te"moins
et du coupable ; des arrets judiciaires, de la restitution des
droits, etc.

J'espere tout de meme que les remarques que j'ai faites suffisent
pour conclure que Stefan Javorskij donne dans son cours de
the"ologie une espece de traite syste"matique de jurisprudence
ge"ne"rale, de provenance scolastique, mais d'une assez large porte"e :
il commence a appliquer les principes du droit naturel du moyen
age dans le domaine du droit civil, mais ne s'en rapporte pas a
ce droit dans celui du droit public et n'y remonte presque pas pour
en deduire le rapport du souverain et des sujets.1 Ce que je
voudrais noter encore c'est que ces idees commenc^aient a s'infiltrer
dans la pratique : la legislation moscovite du temps du tsar Fe"odor
AlexejeVicz n'y etait pas tout a fait £trangere. Le celebre oukase
de 1682 (janv. 12, v.s.) sur 1'abolition des droits de rang et de
pre"seance des families nobles, c'est-a-dire du mjestniczestvo> en
porte les traces. Dans 1'allocution que le tsar avait adresse"e aux
etats assembles, et qui a e"t£ inclue dans 1'acte de 1'abolition, il
disait qu'il avait re$u son sceptre de la main de Dieu pour prendre
soin de tout ce qui concerne le « bien commun » et d'e"carter tout ce
qui lui porte atteinte ; c'est de ce point de vue qu'il abolissait le
mjestniczestvo, comme nuisible « au bien commun de 1'fitat ».2

Comme on le voit, le tsar Fe"odor Alexeje"vicz avait deja
quelque notion theorique du « bien commun de 1'Etat » ; il 1'^rigeait
en principe de sa reTorme, et lui donnait une valeur qu'il n'a acquise
definitivement qu'aux temps de Pierre le Grand.

L'idee religieuse de 1'Etat en Russie a done subi une Evolution,
grace a laquelle elle se reliait a 1'id^e s^culiere de TEtat.

Plusieurs autres facteurs ont contribue" a cette secularisation ;
je n'en releverai ici que ceux qui ont influe' plus bu moins directe-
ment sur Involution de nos id^es politiques du XVIIe siecle.

D'abord, c'est le mouvement litteraire issu du milieu des
judai'sants.

1 Tractatus theologid collegia Kiioivo-Mohileano traditi et explicati,
Tractatus de iustitia^ MS. de la Kievo-Petcherskaja Lawra, N° vii. 40.

2 Codpanie locyd. ^paM. u doi., P. iv. N° 130 ; cf. IIoji. Co6p. 3aK., t. ii.
N° 905, PP- 373-374-

xix] LIdde de £ lit at en Russie 365

Les judai'sants (zidowstwoujouchczii) ont jou£ en Russie au
XVe-XVIe siecles un r61e analogue a celui des averroi'stes du Xllle :
ils nous ont donne" une logique et une politique, inclue dans le
trait^ Secreta secretorum. Ce trait£ a e"t£ probablement connu
en Russie dans une version juive (et non pas arabe ou latine),
re"dige"e en Allemagne : c'est de la qu'elle a pu etre importee dans
la Russie de 1'Ouest et se propager en Moscovie.

Les Secreta secretorum, faussement attribu£s a Aristote, ont,
certes, un caractere medieval fort prononc£ : ils ne sont pas
denudes de superstitions, proposent toutes sortes de conseils sur
l'utilit£ de 1'astrologie, sur les proprie"te"s miraculeuses ou salutaires
des pierres pre"cieuses et des plantes, etc.; mais ils contiennent
aussi quelques principes plus rationnels que ceux qui avaient
habituellement cours dans notre litte"rature du XVP siecle. Les
Secreta secretorum prdnent, par exemple, les principes de la
raison, grace a laquelle les patens meme ont pu connaitre et
e"tablir quelques regies de justice et d'honnetete utiles a 1'ordre
public. Les Secreta secretorum introduisent ces principes rationnels
dans la politique : elle aussi doit etre fonde'e sur la raison et sur la
justice qui en de"coule ; c'est d'apres ces principes que le prince doit
gouverner ses sujets.

L'occultisme des Secreta secretorum pre"sentait, probablement,
beaucoup plus d'inte"ret pour nos lecteurs que leur rationalisme, ce
qui explique, probablement, leur propagation en Russie : nous n'en
connaissons pas moins de dix copies, dont deux appartiennent
meme au XVIII6 siecle.1

D'ailleurs, outre ce mouvement collateral, il est facile de constater
que la Renaissance et la Re"forme ont certainement influe" sur
Involution de l'id£e seculiere de PEtat en Russie.

C'est grace a 1'influence de la Renaissance que la « philosophic
pratique » s'est quelque peu diffe"renci£e de la religion et a commenc£
a servir de base plus inde"pendante aux theories politiques.

Du reste, les humanistes du xvie siecle, tels que 1'^crivain
polonais Petricij, par exemple, se repr£sentaient la philosophic

1 Aristotelis philosophorum maximi Secretum Secretorum ad Alexandrum
de regum regimine, etc.; j'avais a ma portee 1'edition : Bononiae, 1516, de la
Bibliotheque royale de Dresde ; 1'ancienne traduction russe a e^e* publiee par
M. Speranskij ; v. M. CnepancKiS, Apucmomejieeu Bpama, IlaM. flpee.
. u Hcnyc., N° clxxi. CIIB., 1908.

366 A. Lappo-Danilevskij [xix

pratique dans un schema qu'Aristote avait deja admis dans ses
ouvrages, et qui e"tait depuis longtemps regu dans la scolastique.
Us y distinguaient trois parties : la premiere traitait de la morale
individuelle, en ge"ne"ral (monastica seu solitaria) ; la seconde — des
regies de la vie domestique (economica seu domestica) ; la troisieme
— des principes de la vie en commun, politique ou civile (politico,
seu civilis).

Ces diverses parties, qui survivent encore dans le systeme de
Chr. Wolf, se retrouvent dans notre litt£rature du XVIP siecle.

II est vrai qu'elle n'est pas originale, et qu'elle ne fait que repro-
duire des traductions ou des ouvrages polonais, par exemple, le
DesideriuS) dialogue sur 1'amour de Dieu, e"crit par un catholique,
mais dans un esprit mystique de morale individuelle ; VEconomique
d'Aristote, interpreted par Petricij, les pre"ceptes que Lorichius
proposait aux princes et autres « chefs », etc.1 Tous ces trait£s ont
e"t6 traduits en russe d'une maniere assez satisfaisante ; mais ces
traductions ne sont pas toujours de fideles reproductions des
originaux. La traduction des Loci communes de Lorichius, par
exemple, ne contient, pour la plupart, que des regies pratiques
concernant l'e"ducation du «chef», et des «moyens secrets et
astucieux» qu'il a a sa disposition pour gouverner ses sujets.

Je ne ferais qu'indiquer ici en passant que plusieurs ide"es sur les
principes du gouvernement se trouvent encore dans des dissertations,
d'ailleurs aussi peu originales, sur les causes de la decadence des
empires, par exemple, dans une compilation de Ssadowskij, con-
tenant quelques idees d'Aristote et d'autres auteurs sur la matiere,
notamment de Chokier, etc. - Cette compilation a subi au moins deux
redactions, et fut assez prise"e par nos lecteurs du XVIF et du com-
mencement du XVIII6 siecle.

Quoique la reTorme n'ait pas eu le temps de s'affermir en
Pologne et d'y Jeter des racines plus ou moins profondes, elle a

1 Espejo de Religiosos^ Burgos, J. Junta, 1548; trad, latine de 1616
(Desiderosus, dialogus . . de expedita ad Dei amorem vita) ; trad, polonaise
de G. Wilkowskij, 1589 (beaucoup de reeditions) ; trad, russe du moine
Theophane du monastere du Miracle de 1'archange Michel, faite en 1688 et
imprimee a Moscou en 1785. S. Petrici, Oekonomiki Aristotelesoivej . . .
ksi$gi dwoje^ 2 ed. Krak., 1618 ; trad, russe au Musee public de Rou-
mjanzev a Moscou, N° 627, R. Lorichius, Loci communes de institutione
prinripum> Marburg, 1558; trad, polonaise, Crac, 1558; trad, russe, MS.
appartenant au monastere « Florichtcheva Poustyn », N° 138/712.

xix] LIctte de r lit at en Russie 367

eu quelque influence sur plusieurs hommes de lettres polonais, par
exemple sur Frycz (Modrzevskij), auteur du fameux traite" de la
Republique.

Frycz a passe plusieurs anne"es a £tudier les lettres dans les
centres protestants de la civilisation allemande, a Wittemberg et a
Nuremberg, et est entre* en relations personnelles avec M£lanchthon
et ses collegues ; cela a eu quelque influence sur son ouvrage. L'auteur
du traite de la Republique reste, il est vrai, catholique, mais il veut
profiter de quelques idees promues par la ReTorme, pour re"organiser
le monde catholique et 1'Iitat.

Grace a cette largeur de vues Frycz a pu introduire dans sa
politique non seulement les ide*es d'Aristote, mais les premiers
Elements du droit naturel, e'labore' principalement par les e"crivains
protestants, entre autres par Me"lanchthon et ses emules. Frycz y
raisonne sur l'e"galite naturelle des hommes (du moins sous quelques
rapports), et en de"duit que 1'exemption des nobles de la peine de
mort applique"e aux classes rurales est injuste; il y de"montre que les
principes de cette justice doivent servir de fondement aux mceurs
et aux lois ; il y recherche les origines de 1'Etat, et le relie (non
sans quelques inconsequences) a 1'acte de translation du pouvoir que
les hommes ont remis (deferebant] a celui qu'ils estimaient le plus pru-
dent et le plus juste, « se soumettant ainsi non pas a 1'homme, mais a
la raison, c'est-a-dire, a la loi naturelle . . . » ; il y proclame, en con-
s£quence de ces principes, que le pouvoir du roi est e"tabli pour le
bonheur de ses sujets, qu'il est soumis aux lois de meme que ses
sujets, que la loi doit etre Equitable pour tous, que (d'apres une the"orie
chere a Cice"ron) le gouvernement mixte est le meilleur, etc.

C'est dans Petition polonaise de 1577 du traite" de Frycz qu'on
peut trouver le deVeloppement de toutes ces ide"es (excepte" le livre
sur PEglise) ; la traduction russe du traite", faite d'apres cette Edition
et presque complete, est Tune des meilleures que nous posse"dons
en ce genre ; elle remonte probablement au XVII6 siecle ; quoique
elle ne soit connue que d'apres une copie du XVIII6, et porte les traces
d'un remaniement poste'rieur.1

1 Andreae Fricii Modrevij Commentariorum de Republica emendanda libri
quinque, I ed. (incomplete) Crac. Laz. i 5 5 I ; je me suis servi de 1'edition de
Basileae, 1554; traduction polonaise, edition de I 577, drukowano w Losku,
avec des additions ; le MS. de la traduction russe, faite probablement du
polonais, se trouve dans la collection de manuscrits du Comte Ouvaroff,
N° 790. Le livre De Ecclesia est omis dans les traductions latine et russe.

368 A. Lappo-Danilevskij [xix

II est done possible de conclure, que la Renaissance, et meme
la ReTorme, ont eu quelque influence sur nos ide"es politiques par
I'interm^diaire de la Pologne ; mais les id£es essentielles de la
ReTorme, et la litte'rature poste"rieure qui se rapportait au droit
naturel et a la jurisprudence pratique, nous sont parvenues grace
aux relations directes de la Russie avec 1'Europe, et principalement
avec 1'Europe protestante.

C'est justement cette tendance qui a trouve" un adversaire decide"
dans la personne de Crizanicz, £mule de Possevin et partisan secret
de l'£glise grecque unie.

Crizanicz puise ses principes presque exclusivement dans la
civilisation catholique : il n'est pas exempt des traditions scolas-
tiques ; meme dans ses theses politiques il s'en rapporte plut6t a
St-Thomas d'Acquin qu'a Aristote, aime mieux Bellarmin que
Mariana, et prefere Juste Lipse a Paruta et Botero a Bodin.
Crizanicz voulait inoculer cette culture aux peuples slaves, et par-
ticulierement aux moscovites ; il pensait que la monarchic £tait la
forme de gouvernement la plus propice a la propagande des id£es
qu'il s'e"tait decide" a introduire en Russie.

Relativement a la fin religieuse, que Crizanicz se proposait
d'atteindre, son traite" politique n'e"tait qu'un moyen, par lequel il
croyait pouvoir gagner les bonnes graces du tsar, en lui disant des
choses « utiles et agr£ables ». C'est pourquoi il se gardait bien d'y
toucher aux matieres religieuses et cle>icales, et donnait ainsi a son
contenu un caractere s£culier.

D'ailleurs, ce caractere se renforgait par la tendance nationaliste
que Crizanicz recommandait aux peuples slaves et aux moscovites,
en particulier dans leur politique s£culiere.

Quant au rapport entre le souverain et les sujets, Crizanicz
preTere se le repre"senter sous la forme d'une monarchic absolue, qu'il
reconnait, de meme que Juste Lipse, comme la meilleure forme de
gouvernement — celle qui doit donner le plus de forces a la nation ;
mais en distinguant la monarchic le"gitime, institute par Dieu, de la
tyrannic, il admet tout de meme une espece de pacte entre le mo-
narque et ses sujets qui les garantit des exces de son pouvoir. A la
maniere de Faust d'Aschaffenburg, qui dissertait assez longuement
sur le iuramentum subiectionis, Crizanicz parle des « serments » ou
des « promesses », que le souverain et les sujets se pretent ou se
donnent mutuellement, mais sans leur attribuer la valeur supple"-

xix] LIdde de r&tat en Russie 369

mentaire d'obligations naturelles : ces serments consistent en ce que
le monarque jure au peuple qu'il accomplira ses devoirs et prendra
soin du bien commun, et que ses heritiers, a leur couronnement,
en feront de m£me ; et que le peuple jure, a son tour, apres le
monarque, de lui etre obe"issant et fidele. Tout en pensant que le
pouvoir monarchique «le"gitime» avait e"te" institue par Dieu, ne
fusse que par Pinterme'diaire du peuple, et que le monarque n'£tait
responsable qu'a Dieu, les hommes n'ayant pas le droit de le juger
et de le punir, Crizanicz ne croit pas pouvoir appliquer ces principes
sans quelques restrictions : il les formule, probablement non sans
Pinfluence des theories de quelques -uns de ses confreres sur la
souverainete" du peuple dans les choses temporelles ; il trouve que
cette suje"tion a des bornes : elle peut etre enfreinte, si le monarque,
malgre" ses promesses, devient un here'tique, ou livre son pays au
pouvoir des Strangers, de m£me que s'il se transforme en tyran, que
Dieu peut punir par Pinterme"diaire du peuple ; elle ne subsiste plus
envers l'e"tranger, qui s'est empare" du pouvoir. Dans ces cas-la le
peuple peut se choisir un autre monarque, avec lequel il ^change
de nouvelles promesses ou de nouveaux serments.1

Du reste Crizanicz n'a pas reussi a obtenir la confiance et le
credit qu'il voulait acque"rir aupres du tsar, et a entraver la pro-
pagation des ide"es nouvelles sur PEtat, meme en Moscovie. Une
illustration assez curieuse de Pinfiltration de ces ide"es, ou plutdt
des Merits qui les contenaient, nous presente la bibliotheque d'un
hollandais russifie" — Andr£ Vinius.

Le djak moscovite Andre" Vinius s'e"tait e"tabli a Moscou, mais
il avait conserve" des relations avec son pays natal, nomme'ment
avec Witsen, le docte bourguemestre d' Amsterdam.

Vinius etait un grand amateur de livres : sa bibliotheque pre"-
sentait un assortiment d'ouvrages assez vane's, mais choisis non sans
quelque discernement ; elle contenait, par exemple, des Merits sur
la religion, la philosophic, les belles-lettres, le droit, etc. ; parmi les

1 J. Crizanicz, Razgowori ob wladdtelstwu^ MS. de la Bibliotheque de la
Typographic du Synode a Moscou, N° I799/43Q?, ft 33$, 345, 744-745,
778, etc. ; texte public par Bezssonov, v. i. pp. 276-278, 281, 310 sq., 331,
334, 402 sq. ; v. ii. pp. 29 sq., 49-80, 168-169, 239-240, etc. Voir aussi la
notice de 1641, le rapport de Crizanicz a Levakovicz de 1646-1647 et quelques
autres documents, publics par M. Bjelokourov ; v. C. BiMOKypOBt, HZT>
dyxoenuu wcmnu MocKoecnaio OdiM/ecmea xvii. B., M. 1903, pp. 87-126,
144, 173-179, etc.

37° -^- Lappo-Danilevskij [xix

ouvrages sur la jurisprudence et la politique pre"dominaient ceux
qui se rapportaient principalement a la litte>ature hollandaise et
allemande du XVle-XVIIe siecles. On pouvait y trouver quelques
trace's concernant le droit naturel, par exemple, celui de Grotius
De jure belli ac pads et les Annotata de son antagoniste a Felde ;
les Enarrationes de Kling et le Richterbuchelein (Gerichtsblichelein)
de Vigel, tous deux ayant quelque rapport au droit naturel, et
meme le programme du cours sur la jurisprudence que Thomasius
lisait en 1699 a Halle. On pouvait y rencontrer aussi quelques
manuels relatifs a la jurisprudence allemande pratique, par exemple,
le Viridarium juridicum_ de Gilhausen, la Synopsis politicarum
doctrinarum de Besoldus, etc.1

La presence de ces ouvrages dans la bibliotheque du djak
moscovite, qui devint Tun des collaborateurs de Pierre le Grand,
peut servir d'indice des interets qui commengaient a poindre : dans
ce temps-la 1'idee se"culiere de 1'Etat s'introduisait dej'a en Moscovie ;
en somme, sa the"orie se reliait au droit naturel, mais elle ne s'est
affermie dans les esprits que grace a la secularisation ulte"rieure de
l'ide"e de 1'Etat, promue par la doctrine de Pintere^t de 1'Etat et
manifested dans le Polizeistaat.

L'idee utilitaire de 1'Etat a traverse", du reste, une pe>iode de
transition avant d'acquerir le caractere foncierement seculier et
politique qui lui est propre.

En effet on peut indiquer, au XVII6 siecle et au commence-
ment du XVIIP, quelques doctrines mixtes, orthodoxes et utili-
taires; par exemple, celles d'Ordine-Nachtchokine et de Possochkov.

Ordine-Nachtchokine, homme d'Etat Eminent du temps d'Alexej
Mihajlovicz, professait, par exemple, une doctrine dans laquelle
les concepts de Moscou, comme centre du monde pravoslave et
de la prawda, se combinaient avec le concept du profit du souverain
(gossoudarevo djelo\ qu'il identifiait avec le profit de 1'Etat (gos-
soudastwennyja djela). C'est au point de vue utilitaire, et non
seulement religieux qu'Ordine-Nachtchokine preTere, par exemple,
la monarchic au regime republicain qui produit «toutes sortes
d'erreurs et de perturbations*; c'est au meme point de vue qu'il

1 Catalogue de la bibliotheque d' Andre Vinius, MS. de la Bibliotheque
Imperiale des Sciences de St-Petersbourg, N° xxi/a3 ; transcriptions russes
dans « le Cabinet de Pierre le Grand », Archives de 1'Etat, Bxo^;. N° 42, ff. 37-
70, et N°92, ff. 321-357.

xix] LIdde de lEtat en Russie 371

considere les rapports du souverain et des sujets, qu'il exige plus
d'inde"pendance pour les pouvoirs interme"diaires et plus d'initiative
dans le self-government des villes, qu'il recommande 1'introduction
de plusieurs institutions europe"ennes, etc.

Ordine-Nachtchokine n'e"tait pas le seul a e"mettre de ces ide"es :
on pourrait trouver un melange analogue dans les ouvrages de
Possochkov.

La doctrine de l'inte"r£t de 1'Etat commengait meme en ce temps-
la a se differencier des autres : Vinius, qui est probablement 1'auteur
d'un curieux projet sur les e"tablissements de charite", y expose
quelques-uns de ses e" laments : au point de vue «du profit du
souverain », qu'il entend principalement dans le sens mercantile, et
du bien commun, il exige que les sujets s'instruisent et travaillent
« pour ne pas manger en vain leur pain quotidien ». En lisant ce
. projet on dirait que c'est Pierre le Grand qui parle : en tout cas, il
s'est tres bien assimile' cette conception utilitaire de 1'Etat, et a
grandement contribue" a son affermissement.1

Pierre le Grand ne pouvait, eVidemment, rompre avec les
anciennes traditions moscovites : dans ses ordonnances et autres
Merits il cite les theories du tsar et de 1'etat pravoslaves, et men-
tionne le principe de la prawda^ particulierement dans ses applica-
tions a la justice ; mais c'est une ide"e seculiere et utilitaire, celle de
1'interet de 1'Etat, qu'il prone le plus souvent.

C'est bien la conception de 1'interet de 1'Etat, intimement
lie"e a celle de la « police », et non pas la notion e"troite de la
«raison d'Etat», que Pierre le Grand admet pour principe de sa
politique.

Cette ide"e, effleure"e par Seckendorff, pr^curseur des polic^istes
du XVIir siecle, s'^tait d^ja incorpor^e dans la « monarchic absolue »
de Louis XIV et se pratiquait par Colbert ; elle se d^veloppait en
Prusse dans le Polizeistaat, particulierement depuis 1'ordonnance
du roi Fre"de"ric Guillaume [er du 2 juin 1713 ; elle n'e"tait pas tout
a fait ^trangere aux hommes d'etat russes du XVII8 siecle ; et
c'est plutdt de la pratique que de la the'orie, peu e'labore'e d'ailleurs,
que Pierre le Grand a naturellement pulse" 1'id^e utilitaire de 1'Etat.

Pierre le Grand en a meme fait le principe dominant de son
systeme, et s'en rapportait a ce principe, conforme a sa nature active

1 06^ odWfecmeeuuoM-b npuspnniu ea Pocciu, H3,n. npn
A. CToroMt, CUB., 1818 r., P. i. pp. 31-39.

372 A. Lappo-Danilevskij [xix

et a son gout novateur, pour motiver la plupart de ses reTormes.
Le tsar ne distinguait pas le « profit (polza) du souverain» du
« profit de 1'Etat », et identifiait ces concepts avec ceux de l'inte"ret de
1'lLtat; le reglement ge"ne"ral des colleges, par exemple, explique
ce qu'il faut entendre par ce terme : «l'interet» — c'est le « profit ou
Putilite" » du souverain et de 1'Etat.1

D'apres ce principe le tsar et son gouvernement devait prendre
soin du bien-etre de la population, utile & 1'Etat ; c'est en vue de
« 1'utilite" commune » qu'il devait le"gife"rer, gouverner, policer, pro-
te"ger et juger ses sujets ; d'autre part, les sommations du pouvoir,
dont il disposait envers ses sujets, devenaient d'autant plus irre"-
fragables, qu'ils se profe"raient au nom de ce principe ; les sujets
lui devaient une obe"issance incontestable.

Cependant, tout en renforc.ant les traditions du pouvoir auto-
cratique qu'il avait la possibility d'exercer sans contrainte, Pierre le
Grand ne pouvait conside"rer 1'inte'ret de 1'Etat comme un principe
juridique de sa constitution ; en 1'interpr^tant comme il 1'entendait
lui-meme, il n'en faisait, au fond, qu'une regie de sa politique ; au
nom de 1'lLtat, de son inte"r£t et du bien-etre ge"ne"ral qu'il lui sub-
ordonnait, le tsar £tablissait ses relations avec ses sujets meme dans
les details de leur vie prive*e.

D'ailleurs, en prenant inte"ret £ la civilisation plut6t protestante
que catholique, Pierre le Grand a favorise" lui-meme la propagation
de quelques notions du droit naturel, dans lequel on pouvait trouver
les dements d'une conception juridique de 1'Etat : il a fait faire, par
exemple, une traduction russe du petit traite" de Pufendorff sur les
devoirs de 1'homme et du citoyen, et a contribue" a 1'expansion de
quelques ide"es de Hobbes, conformes a ses fins politiques.

L'un des collaborateurs de Pierre le Grand — le gouverneur de
Kiev, Golitzyne — organisa meme toute une se>ie de travaux, con-
sistant a traduire les principaux ouvrages sur le droit naturel et la
politique ; The"ofane Prokopowicz y prenait part, avec quelques
eleves de l'acade"mie de Kiev. C'est grace a cette organisation que
les grands traite"s de Grotius, de Pufendorff, de Locke et de bien
d'autres moralistes et politiques du XVIF et du XVIII6 siecles
ont paru dans des traductions russes. Ces traductions ne sont pas
toujours completes : elles pre"sentent quelquefois des coupures ou
des abreViations faites non sans quelque conformite avec le but
i. Co6p. 3aK., v. vi. N° 3534.

xix] L Idde de r &tat en Russie 373

que les traducteurs se proposaient — de donner un apergu g£ne"ral
de telle ou telle doctrine.

Une notice pre"liminaire que je trouve a la tete de la traduction
russe de 1'essai de Locke sur le gouvernement pre"sente quelque
inte"ret : cette notice donne une ide"e de ce qu'on entendait alors par
le droit naturel, et est congue ainsi qu'il suit. « Chacun doit connaitre
[les principes] d'apres lesquels il doit vivre en socie"te" civile en con-
formite' avec les lois naturelles. ... II est ne"cessaire de distinguer
diffe'rents genres de relations civiles : celle du mari et de la femme ;
celle des parents et des enfants ; celle des maitres et des esclaves ;
celle de plusieurs families demeurant ensemble et subordonn£es a
une meme loi. Bien des auteurs ont e"crit sur ces matieres, mais
les modernes en ont traite" avec plus de perfection que les anciens ;
ils ont e"lucide" et affermi les principes de la morale et de la vie civile.
Grotius et Pufendorff en sont les fondateurs ; plusieurs autres leur
ont succe"de", mais ne s'accordent pas entre eux. D'ailleurs, tous
sont d'accord que la morale et la vie civile sont fondles sur les
devoirs que chacun a envers soi-meme et envers les autres. Les
devoirs de chacun envers soi-meme reposent sur le principe : connais-
toi toi-me'me ; les devoirs de chacun envers les autres sur le principe :
ne fais pas aux autres ce que tu ne voudrais pas qu'on te fasse.
La divergence des opinions ne se fait jour que quand on commence
a raisonner sur 1'^tablissement de la societe" civile, sur les lois qui
en ont etc* le fondement, et sur le pouvoir, auquel elle doit e"tre
subordonne"e. En effet, les uns pensent que les hommes ont £t£
obliges, pour se soustraire aux agressions et a la ruine, de se
subjuguer au plus fort et de vivre sous les lois, qu'il voudrait
bien leur donner. D'autres supposent que les hommes se sont
spontane"ment rassemble's en societe", ayant en vue leur inte*ret
et leur tranquillite", pour conserver leur liberte", leur proprie'te' et
leur vie de toute agression et violence ; que grace a une entente
commune ils se sont faits des lois et se sont choisis un gardien de
ces lois, qui devait vivre selon elles et n'avait pas de pouvoir sur la
liberte", la proprie'te' et la vie des citoyens. D'aucuns pensent enfin
que les hommes, rassemble's en vue de ces fins, ont donne" les lois,
qu'ils se sont faites, a garder non pas a un seul homme, mais a
plusieurs, car un seul est plus apte a se tromper que plusieurs. » 1

1 MS. de la traduction russe de 1'ouvrage de J. Locke sur <tle gouverne-
ment civil », a la Bibliotheque Imperiale de St-Petersbourg, F. ii. 41.

374 <d- Lappo-Danilevskij [xix

C'est dans ces conceptions differentes que le droit nature!
a eu quelque propagation en Russie au commencement du XVIIP
siecle. Pierre le Grand et son collaborateur The"ofane Prokopo-
vicz ont particulierement prise" la the"orie de Hobbes, qu'il e"tait
facile d'adapter au pouvoir autocratique du tsar; Golitzyne et
Tatichczev ont pre"fe"re" les id£es de Grotius et de ses e"mules, et en
ont profite", de fagons diffe"rentes, dans leurs projets de 1730.

Pierre le Grand et The"ofane Prokopovicz ont expose" leur doc-
trine principalement dans le traite" intitule" Prawda voli monarchej,
c'est-a-dire, «Du droit que le monarque a de se designer un
successeur ». Les principes de ce traite", hormis les Saintes ^critures,
sont pulse's en grande partie des ouvrages de Hobbes. On peut y
remarquer surtout cette influence, par exemple, dans la disserta-
tion sur 1'origine du pouvoir absolu, dont le monarque est
revetu non seulement par la grace de Dieu, mais aussi par
« le peuple » qu'il inspire ; « le peuple » s'est destitue" de sa
« volonte" commune » et 1'a donne"e au monarque ; investi de ce
pouvoir souverain, le monarque absolu n'est responsable qu'a
Dieu ; il n'est pas subordonne" aux lois qu'il donne a ses sujets ;
il les execute sans contrainte par son bon vouloir ; et meme s'il les
transgresse, il ne peut etre juge" par ses sujets, s'il n'a pas e'te'
e"lu a condition d'observer certaines clauses restrictives, qu'il a
expresse"ment accepte"es. Le monarque russe, dont le pouvoir n'a
pas e"te" limite" par des clauses, est done absolu, et la Prawda
voli monarchej lui attribue la summa potestas, que Theofane
Prokopovicz de"finit, d'apres la formule de Grotius, comme « celle dont
les actes sont independants de tout autre pouvoir supe"rieur, en sorte
qu'ils ne peuvent etre annulle*s par aucune autre volont£ humaine ».1

Dans la formule de 1'autocratisme que donnent les reglements de
I'arm6e et de la marine de Pierre le Grand on retrouve ces e"le"ments,

1 H. Grotius, De jure belli ac pads, lib. i. cap. 3, § 7. IIpaB,na BOM
MOHapmeft, CIIB., 1726, ff. n, 15, i6-i6v., etc. Theophane Proko-
povicz a probablement puise ses idees non seulement dans les traites de
Hobbes, Grotius, etc., mais aussi dans celui de T. F. Buddaeus intitule :
Exercitatio juris naturalis de successoribus primogenitorum, Halle, 1695 ;
voyez ses Selecta juris naturae et gentium, 1717. II est vrai que
Theophane Prokopovicz introduit dans sa formule I'ide'e du « bien commun » :
le peuple s'est destitue de sa volonte en faveur du monarque pour qu'il le
gouverne « pour le bien commun » ; mais c'est plutot comme motif ou comme
fin, que comme clause, expressement acceptee par celui qu'on revetait du
pouvoir absolu.

xix] Uldde de r£tat en Russie 375

exprime"s, du reste, dans les termes de la decision du rigsdag
sue"dois de 1693 ; mais la formule russe contient un mot, qui
porte peut-etre, si je ne me trompe pas, les traces de 1'influence
des id£es de Hobbes ou de Pufendorff: d'apres cette formule le
souverain gouverne non seulement selon «sa volont£», mais
comme il le trouve le plus « convenable » (blagomnjenie). Or,
Hobbes admettait que le souverain peut user de son pouvoir,
comme il le trouve le plus convenable (expedient) pour la conser-
vation de la paix et de la s£curit£ commune ; et Pufendorff expri-
mait aussi une idee analogue en disant que le monarque dispose du
pouvoir absolu, grace auquel il peut gouverner d'apres son propre
jugement ... en tant que l'e"tat present des choses parait 1'exiger.1

Et c'est justement de cette maniere que Pierre le Grand pouvait
relier la the"orie du pouvoir absolu du monarque a la doctrine de
l'inte~ret de I'lttat.

II serait facile de d£duire de ces propositions quelques con-
clusions concernant les prerogatives du monarque — la subordination
de 1'Eglise a 1'Etat ; la suppression des institutions qui pouvaient
gener le pouvoir autocratique, de la douma des bojares, des
assemblies des e"tats (zemskii ssobory\ etc. ; mais je n'ai pas la
possibility d'entrer dans ces developpements.

D'ailleurs, les prerogatives du monarque, indues dans la formule
pr£cite"e, ne demandaient pas d'elucidations aussi e"tendues que ses
devoirs. La Prawda voli monarchej les d£duit des « lois inscrites
par le Cre"ateur dans le coeur des hommes», ce qui donnait la
possibility de les relier aux « lois naturelles » ; les reglements et les
ordonnances les rattachent plutot a la doctrine utilitaire de 1'Etat.

Quoiqu'il en soit, c'est en se basant sur la theologie naturelle,
et particulierement sur la politique utilitaire, qu'on pouvait se faire
une idee du monarque comme du premier serviteur de 1'Etat.
Pierre le Grand a assez clairement exprim£ cette pens£e, en disant
« qu'il n'e"pargnait pas sa personne pour l'utilit£ commune de 1'Etat ».

C'est d'apres des principes analogues que Pierre le Grand
concevait les droits et les devoirs de ses sujets : l'£tat leur concede
des droits dont quelques-uns remontent meme au droit naturel,
mais la plupart se conforme aux services qu'ils lui rendent ; car ils

1 Th. Hobbes, Leviathan, Pt. ii. ch. 17 (Works, ed. W. Molesworth, v. iii.
p. 158). S. Pufendorff, De officio hominis et civis, lib. ii. cap. ix. § 5. Ho A.
Co6. 3a,K. v. v. N° 3006 (ch. iii. § 20) ; v. vi. N° 3485 (liv. v. ch. i. § 2, glose).

376 A. Lappo-Danilevskij [xix

doivent incontestablement servir au bien de l'£tat ; ils deviennent
ses serviteurs, c'est-a-dire ceux du monarque, comme son repre"-
sentant, et ils lui en sont responsables.

Cest un melange analogue d'ide"es rationnelles et utilitaires qu'on
retrouve dans plusieurs autres principes, assimile's par Pierre le
Grand, par exemple, dans celui de le"galite".

L'ide"e de « 1'ordre rationnel » avait peut-etre quelque peu influ£
sur le principe de le"galite" de Pierre le Grand, qu'il n'a pas re"ussi,
d'ailleurs, a deVelopper syste"matiquement dans un code des Ibis :
il distinguait les lois « perpe" tuelles » des lois temporelles, le gouverne-
ment de 1'administration de la justice, les divers organes qui la
pratiquaient, les uns des autres, etc. ; mais la doctrine de l'inte"ret de
1'foat donnait encore plus de force a ces principes : « rien n'est plus
indispensable au gouvernement de 1'Etat, disait Pierre le Grand, que
1'observation des lois » ; c'est en correspondance avec cette doctrine
utilitaire qu'il proclamait, par exemple, la ne"cessit£ de son systeme
de surveillance fiscale et de la justice administrative qu'il commengait
a distinguer de celle qui administrait « les torts particuliers ».

Ce m^me principe de tegalite" re"clamait eVidemment 1'observation
obligatoire des lois par tous les particuliers, qui ne pouvaient s'en
de"dire par leur ignorance.

Du reste, Pierre le Grand n'e"tait pas en e"tat de donner a son
principe de le"galite" des bases solides : comme monarque absolu il
pouvait toujours s'immiscer dans toutes les affaires, et son regime
bureaucratique tenait a sa merci les particuliers.

Ce n'est que dans le domaine de la justice que ce principe a
regu une valeur plus inde"pendante. Le Tableau de la procedure
civile, compose" sous 1'influence du code de Saxe, se reTere meme
au droit naturel, qui en est « la base », car, d'apres le droit naturel,
« chacun a le droit de se conserver et de se defendre des attentats
des autres » ; mais ce principe n'y est pas de" veloppe", par exemple,
dans ses applications a la proprie"te". C'est plut6t la doctrine utili-
taire du Polizeistaat qui re"servait plus d'independance a la
justice. Le tsar preTe>ait donner des regies generates aux cours de
justice que d'intervenir dans les cas particuliers qu'elles devaient
juger d'apres ces regies; mais, en conside>ant «tout ce qui est
nuisible a PJitat » comme un crime, il donnait la possibility d'appli-
quer ce point de vue utilitaire et politique a la procedure criminelle ;
en definitive, il restait lui-meme, pour bien des cas, 1'instance

xix] L Idde de r£tat en Russie 377

supreme ou unique, par exemple, dans sa « chancellerie secrete », et
pouvait toujours soumettre a son propre jugement tout ce que bon lui
semblalt, et rendre ses decisions conforme'ment a ses fins politiques.

D'ailleurs, le principe de l^galite* dans 1'administration de la
justice garantissait 1'inviolabilite" des personnes et des biens et leur
droit dese «deTendre des attentats des autres », mais avec les reserves,
implique'es dans le regime politique, que je viens d'indiquer.1

La doctrine de 1'Etat, bas£e sur le droit naturelde Hobbes, recelait
done une grave lacune qu'elle ne re"ussissait pas a combler par les
notions supplementaires de"duites de Pide"e utilitaire de 1'Etat : cette
the"orie n'etablissait pas ce rapport juridique entre le souverain et les
sujets, que Grotius pre"supposait de"ja dans son corpus voluntate con-
tractum, et que ses e'mules ont essaye" d'elucider dans leurs trait£s.

Et c'est ce que quelques politiques russes ont su appre"cier :
Golitzyne et Tatichczev en profiterent dans leurs projets de la
constitution de 1730, quoique de manieres diffe" rentes.

Golitzyne ne s'est mis a e"tudier le droit naturel qu'apres un
assez long stade preparatoire, que je n'ai pas le temps d'elucider
ici : pendant son se"jour en Italic il a pu connaitre quelques ide"es
de Machiavel, de Paruta et de Boccalini, qu'il pouvait lire dans les
originaux, et quelques traditions du « Conseil des dix » de Venise ;
mais c'est plutdt a Kiev, et peut-etre non sans 1'influence de Th£ofane
Prokopovicz, qu'il s'inte"ressa aux trace's de Grotius, de PufendorfF
et de Locke, qu'il a fait traduire a Pacade"mie de Kiev.

II est vrai qu'au nombre de ces traductions Golitzyne en a fait
faire plusieurs qui ne concernaient pas le droit naturel, comme celles,
par exemple, des ouvrages de Furius, de Clapmaier, de Lange, de
Richelieu, de Fredro, de Bessel et de Schroeder sur les regies de la
politique; que parmi les trace's qui rentraient dans le domaine du
droit naturel, il ne distinguait pas assez les classiques des ouvrages
secondaires, tels que ceux de Vernulaeus ou de Cellarius, de Faust
et de Felwinger ; mais, m£me dans ses ouvrages de seconde main,
comme, par exemple, dans celui de Felwinger, qui s'en rapportait
a Grotius, Golitzyne pouvait deja puiser quelques idees sur la
the"orie contractuelle de 1'Etat.2

. Co6p. 3aK., v. v. N° 3006, P. i. ch. i. §§ i, 7 et 8.
2 Bufid. 3an., 1861, v. iii. p. 320. Mamep. dan ucmopiu

v. iv. pp. 135, 178-190. KH. H. TojumHiTB, Hoeua dannufi o
KH. ft. M. rojiuy/una, M. 1 900.

378 A. Lappo-Danilevskij [xix

D'ailleurs, Golitzyne connaissait probablement quelque peu les
ouvrages classiques sur le droit nature!, qu'il pouvait £tudier grace
aux traductions manuscrites de sa bibliotheque. La traduction du
trait^ de Grotius, par exemple, du reste incomplete, porte peut-
etre les traces de son usage : elle a a ses marges quelques croix,
faites a 1'encre.1 La traduction du traite" de Pufendorff, peu original,
mais syste"matique, en donne beaucoup plus de preuves : cette
traduction, faite non sans quelques abreViations, du reste assez
heureuses, est marquee de croix justement aux endroits qui pou-
vaient inte"resser un homme et un politique tel que Golitzyne : les
marges du livre vii., qui traite de 1'origine et de la constitution des
socie"te"s civiles et des Etats, des fondements de la souverainete, des
droits et des devoirs du souverain, des diverses formes de gouverne-
ment et des diverses manieres d'acque"rir la souverainete", par
exemple, sont bariole"es de croix. D'ailleurs, les textes relatifs a
la the"orie des deux conventions ge"nerales, grace auxquelles la societe"
civile se forme, pre"sentent sous ce rapport une particularity curieuse :
ce n'est pas le § 7, celui qui traite de Tengagement de chacun avec
tous les autres, mais le § 8 (correspondant au § 7 de la traduction)
qui est marque" de croix ; or, ce paragraphe traite de la seconde
convention, c'est-a-dire de celle qui se fait apres 1'engagement de
chacun avec tous les autres a se joindre ensemble pour toujours en
un seul corps, et qui consiste en ce que, apres avoir choisi une ou
plusieurs personnes a qui Ton confere le pouvoir de gouverner la
societe", ceux qui sont revetus de cette autorit£ supreme s'engagent
a veiller avec soin au bien public, et les autres, en m£me temps, leur
promettent une fidele obe"issance.2

Les theories de Pufendorff sur la distinction du pouvoir souverain
et du pouvoir absolu, sur la monarchic limited qu'il en deduisait,
sur les promesses solennelles et « particulieres » que les Princes font
en acceptant cette autorite" borne"e, sur la clause « commissoire »
d'apres laquelle le roi est declare" d^chu de la couronne, s'il peche
centre ces lois, sur 1'etablissement d'un conseil sans le consente-
ment duquel le roi ne puisse rien faire en matiere des choses dont

1 MS. de la Bibliotheque Imperiale de St-Petersbourg, F. ii. 36. Cette
traduction, d'ailleurs incomplete, ,a ^te executee d'apres Pedition d'Amsterdam
de 1712, par les etudiants de Tacademie de Kiev, Oronovskij et d'autres.

2 S. Pufendorff, De jure naturae et gentium, lib. vii. cap. 2, §§ 7 et 8 ; cap.
vi. §§ 9 et 10, etc. MS. de la traduction russe, a la Bibliotheque Imperiale de
St-Petersbourg, F. ii. 26.

xix] Uldde de r lit at en Russie 379

on ne veut pas le laisser absolument le maitre, ou bien sur d'autres
institutions analogues pouvaient eVidemment inte>esser Golitzyne :
il £tait imbu d'ide"es aristocratiques ; il sympathisait probablement
au role que les bojares et ses ancetres en particulier avaient jou£ aux
Elections de Basile Schoujskij et de Mihafl Romanov ; lui-m£me
avide du pouvoir que les membres du conseil s'e"taient arrog£
quelquesfois, il e"tait tout pr£t a re"diger la convention qu'il voulait
conclure entre Anna Ivanovna et le peuple, repre"sente" par le conseil,
et qu'il avait probablement pourvue dans sa redaction definitive
d'une « clause commissoire ».

C'est done une the*orie fort analogue a celle de Pufendorff sur
« la seconde convention », et non la doctrine de la souverainete" du
peuple et du pouvoir le"gislatif de Locke, dont le trait£ a e"te* aussi
traduit sous les auspices de Golitzyne, que nous retrouvons dans son
projet de la constitution de I73O.1

Cette the"orie e"tait applicable non seulement a 1'origine des
socie"te"s, mais a un interregne dans le genre de celui qui pre"ce"da
1'election d'Anna Ivanovna en 1730: et Golitzyne voulait prouver
aux membres du conseil, assembles dans la nuit du 18 and 19
Janvier, qu'on e"tait en plein interregne.

Dans ses projets Golitzyne ne parle point de la premiere con-
vention : il n'avait pas 1'intention de convoquer une assemble
ge"ne"rale pour re"gler la forme du gouvernement, et se bornait,
probablement, a conside>er le conseil des grands (werhov-
niki), a 1'instar du conseil des electeurs de 1'empire germanique,
comme repr£sentant «le peuple russe». En tout cas les clauses
de 1730 ont e"t£ re"dige"es par le conseil (avec trois personnes
qui n'y appartenaient pas), et les e"tats supe>ieurs de 1'empire n'ont
e"t£ convoque"s que pour decider la question s'il fallait « confier » le
pouvoir a Anna Ivanovna.

D'ailleurs, Golitzyne concevait le rapport entre Anna Ivanovna
et tous les e"tats de 1'empire comme une convention formelle : elle se
re"duisait a « la promesse » solennelle et particuliere de la princesse
d'observer les clauses qui limitaient son pouvoir monarchique, entre
autres la clause commissoire, et a « la promesse » des e*tats qui

1 MS. de la Biblioth&que Imperiale de St-Petersbourg, F. ii. 41. La
traduction russe du traite de Locke est, peut-etre, la meilleure de celles qui
ont 6t6 faites sous les auspices de Golitzyne ; Theofane Prokopovicz y a,
peut-etre, pris part. Golitzyne a pourvu son exemplaire de sa signature, ce
qui donne lieu a supposer qu'il y attachait quelque prix.

380 A. Lappo-Danilevskij [xix

s'engageaient a une fidele ob&ssance envers elle. Ce pacte devait etre
valide" par deux actes corre"latifs : les « conditions*, signers par Anna
Ivanovna et «le serment» (celui des 16 clauses), fait par ses sujets.

Les clauses de cette convention correspondaient en grande
partie non seulement aux theories de Pufendorff et d'autres juristes,
mais a la constitution sue"doise, c'est-a-dire au « serment du roi » et a
«la forme du gouvernement» de 1720. Cependant, je ne pense pas que
Golitzyne y ait pulse* tout le contenu de sa pens^e intime : il murissait
ses id£es depuis une trentaine d'anne'es sous diverses influences ; dans
les actes sue"dois de 1720, sur lesquels Pick a pu lui donner quelques
renseignements opportuns, il trouva des formules tout pretes, qu'il
a pu utiliser a la hate apres la mort inattendue de Pierre II.1

C'est done en se basant, du moins en partie, sur l'ide"e juridique
ou contractuelle de 1'Etat, que Golitzyne a e'labore' la convention de
1730, qui devait servir a ses fins politiques.

Cependant, la the'orie de Golitzyne pretait le flanc a de se>ieuses
objections ; il supposait que le conseil des grands repre*sentait le
peuple ; mais c'est justement ce qu'il fallait prouver ; et la noblesse
(le schljahetstwo) assemble a Moscou pour les fetes qui devaient
avoir lieu a 1'occasion du mariage de feu 1'empereur Pierre II, ne
voulait pas y croire ; elle craignait I'oligarchie des grands et ne
pouvait avoir confiance en Golitzyne, malgre' les quelques conces-
sions qu'il a du lui faire.

L'un de ses adversaires politiques les plus eclaire"s, Tatichczev,

1 R. KopcaKOBi), Boy/apenie uMnepampimu AHHU loannoenu, Kas.
1880, pp. 179-188. D'ailleurs, la question sur 1'origine et la signification du
plan de Golitzyne, que je n'ai pas la possibilite d'analyser ici en detail, est
encore sujette a controverse ; voir les conceptions differentes de MM. H. Hjarne,
« Ryska Konstitutions- project ar 1730 efter svenska forebilder, » dans Hist.
Tidskrift, 1884, pp. 189-272, et II. MHJUOKOBT), « BepxoBHHKH H uuiaxeTCTBO »
dans Kn ucmopiu pyccKoii unmeajiuieHWu, CUB., 1902, pp. 1-51 ; A.
AjzeKcfceBi,, Jleieuda o6?> ojimapxuHecKUXT> mendeHiiiinx* eepxoeuaio mauuaio
coen>ma ; CUMHUH nepconu e* eepxoenoM^ maunoM'b coerbrnvb^ etc.,
M. 1896, 1898 ; et W. Recke, « Die Verfassungsplane der russischen Oligar-
chen im Jahre 1730 und die Thronbesteigung der Kaiserin Anna Ivanovna, »
dans Zeitschrift fur osteuropdische Geschichte^ Bd. ii. D'ailleurs, meme ceux qui
supposent, comme lefont, parexemple, MM. Filipov et Recke, que les rapports
qui s'etaient deja etablis entre le pouvoir souverain et le conseil apres la dis-
grace de Menchikov avaient beaucoup d'analogies avec les conditions de 1730,
pensent que celles-ci donnaient au conseil de jure ce dont il disposait deja de
facto ; mais c'est justement ce qu'il importe d'elucider ; v. W. Recke, op. tit.,
#., p. 39-

xix] LIdde de r lit at en Russie 381

s'attacha a d6montrer, en s'en rapportant a la raison et au droit
natural, que sa theorie pe"chait par la base.

Tatichczev avait e"tudie" le droit naturel beaucoup plus
syste"matiquement que Golitzyne : il connaissait les principes
e"tablis par Grotius et Pufendorff ; mais, en outre, il s'e"tait assimile"
quelques ide"es de Wolff et de Thomasius ; ceux de leurs trait£s
qui £taient Merits en allemand lui £taient accessibles : tout en
rattachant au Cre"ateur des hommes la « loi naturelle » qui leur est
«inne'e», il tire, parexemple, son principe « fondamental » — Pamour
rationnel de soi-meme et quelques - unes de ses applications —
principalement de la doctrine de Thomasius, interpreted par Walch.

Tatichczev distingue le droit naturel de la loi civile, a laquelle
il doit servir de fondement, et disserte sur la convention qui a eu
lieu entre les hommes pour former une socie"te" civile ; d'ailleurs, il
ne fait qu'effleurer « Tordonnance » par laquelle les hommes, re"unis
en communaute", reglent « la forme du gouvernement D, en parlant,
par exemple, des changements que celui-ci subit au cours de
1'histoire, des gouvernements re"guliers et irre"guliers, de meme que
des gouvernements mixtes ; mais dans son e"crit de 1730 qu'il com-
posait non sans se rappeler la « forme du gouvernement » de 1720, il
se base, comme Golitzyne, particulierement sur la theorie de la
seconde convention, celle qui a lieu entre le souverain et les sujets ;
d'ailleurs, en Pappliquant un peu plus strictement, il parvient tout
de meme a formuler des conclusions diff^rentes.1

Dans son e"crit sur « le gouvernement politique » Tatichczev
raisonne comme il suit. Ce n'est qu'au monarque e"lu ou he"re"ditaire
que nous avons pret£ serment de fide"lit£ et d'ob&ssance, et que nous
avons confe"re" le pouvoir le"gislatif ; or, si le monarque meurt sans
laisser de successeur, sa mort dispense les sujets de leur serment ;
la souverainete" revient done a la communaute' qui dispose du pouvoir
le"gislatif : comme dans l'e"tat naturel, les citoyens deviennent tous
£gaux les uns envers les autres. La mort du souverain met aussi
fin aux pouvoirs interme"diaires, dont sont revetues les institutions
subalternes ; et tant que le nouveau souverain ne les confirme dans

1 B. TaTumeBi,, Pasioeop* o noMsn naym u ynujiuu^ H3,n. H. Ilono-
BHM'B, M. 1888, pp. 19-27, 54, 128-150. Tatichczev s'efforce de prouver
que 1'amour rationnel de soi-meme est commun aux deux subdivisions de la « loi
divine », c'est-a-dire aux « lois naturelles » et aux « lois traditionnelles et ecrites»,
indues dans les Saintes Ecritures, tout en distinguant ces « lois » des lois que
les hommes se donnent a eux-memes, c'est-k-dire des lois canoniques et civiles.

382 A. Lappo-Danilevskij [xix

leurs pouvoirs ou n'en institue d'autres avec des pouvoirs corres-
pondants, personne n'a de pouvoir sur les autres. Comme 1'Etat,
d'ailleurs, ne peut subsister sans gouvernement, meme pendant un
court espace de temps, la communaute" concede a ses organes les
pouvoirs dont chacun d'eux disposait d'apres les lois pre"ce"dentes ;
mais sans la volonte* de la communaute', expresse"ment formulae,
ces organes ne peuvent s'arroger de pouvoirs supe" rieurs ; il est done
eVident qu'ils ne peuvent user du pouvoir le"gislatif, que la com-
munaute' ne cede qu'au souverain, et que le conseil des grands
n'avait pas le droit de le'gife'rer sur la constitution de 1'empire et
de limiter la monarchic absolue par des clauses. Ce n'est done que
la communaute, represented en partie directement par ses membres,
en partie par des de*pute"s qui, selon la loi naturelle, se choisit le
souverain, et non quatre ou cinq personnes, qui veulent le faire
arbitrairement.

Du reste, Tatichczev n'objectait pas a Election d'Anna
Ivanovna ; il pouvait meme la concilier avec la resolution que les
£tats supe"rieurs de I'empire avait prise, et que « personne ne con-
testait». En effet, la doctrine du droit naturel admettait la possi-
bilite" d'un « consentement tacite » de la communaute", et c'est ce que
Tatichczev avait pre'cise'ment en vue en disant que « personne ne
contestait» 1'election d'Anna Ivanovna. Mais en admettant cette
election, Tatichczev repliquait centre les « clauses » de Golitzyne et
lui opposait son projet d'une assembled constituante des repr£sen-
tants du szljahetstwo. D'ailleurs, il y pre"conisait «la monarchic*
comme la forme de gouvernement « la plus utile » a la Russie, et se
declarait pour 1'agrandissement presque exclusif des droits politiques
de la noblesse, qui devait, du moins en partie et temporairement,
prendre part au gouvernement supreme du pays, et recevoir un
accroissement notable de ses privileges.1

Ce projet, qui avait me"rite", d'ailleurs, 1'approbation de plusieurs
de ses collegues, prouve que Tatichczev faisait, au fond, la faute
qu'il imputait a Golitzyne : pour appliquer correctement la th£orie
de la convention il devait prouver que le szljahetstwo avait le droit
de repre"senter toute la communaute" et de"finir ses clauses avec
moins d'inde"cision.

1 B. TaTHmesi., Ilpouseojiwoe u couiacnoe pascywdenie u Munnie
codpaewaiocu uuifixemcmea pycwaio o npaejieniu locydapcmeennoM?,, dans
le Recueil « Yxpo », M. 1859, pp. 369-379.

xix] Uldde de rJELtat en Russie 383

Les deux publicistes, comme on le voit, adaptaient, chacun a sa
fagon, le droit naturel a leurs fins politiques et s'efforgaient de
les justifier par cette the"orie : ils e"taient presque Strangers a Pide"e
de la souverainete" nationale, et ne voulaient profiler de Pide"e de
la seconde convention que dans les limites circonscrites par les
interets des classes dirigeantes ; mais tout de meme ils avaient une
ide"e juridique de PEtat, et concevaient le rapport du souverain et
des sujets, du moins en the"orie, comme une convention immanente
a l'£tat.

II surfit de ce coup d'ceil jette" sur Phistoire de Pide"e de 1'Etat
en Russie pour apercevoir 1'esprit nouveau qui commen^ait a la
transformer.

II est vrai que Phistoire de cette ide"e en Russie pendant cette
pe"riode de transition n'avait pas encore acquis le caractere d'une
Evolution bien continue et progressive : les chainons de cette chaine
ne rentraient presque pas 1'un dans 1'autre ; chacun d'eux de"pendait
plutotdu mouvement general et correspondant des idees europeennes
que du chainon pre"ce"dent, et ne de"terminait que tres faiblement
le chainon poste"rieur. C'etait done une Evolution intermittente
et meme quelques fois assez accidentelle, sans caractere individuel
bien prononce" ; mais c'e"tait ne"anmoins une Evolution et meme un
progres.

En effet, Pid^e du rapport entre le souverain et les sujets qu'on
se faisait en Russie a Pe"poque des reTormes avait subi quelques
changements qui en te"moignent : on commen^ait a se repr^senter
ce rapport, qu'on croyait autrefois transcendant, comme immanent
a 1'Etat, et a puiser les elements de ce concept du droit naturel ; on
s'inte"ressait particulierement a la th^orie de la convention, et on
pouvait d£ja y appre"cier Pid^e de ce que devait etre ce rapport, sa
valeur formelle et juridique, et non seulement son contenu re"el et
sa fin utilitaire ; et, malgre" le regime autocratique que pr£cisaient
les « reglements », on essayait meme parfois de mettre cette ide"e en
pratique, du reste, avec des restrictions et des inconsequences qui
discreditaient la the"orie et donnaient beau jeu a ses adversaires
politiques.

A. LAPPO-DANILEVSKIJ.

DER VERFASSUNGSENTWURF DER SIEB-
ZEHN VERTRAUENSMANNER. EIN BEITRAG
ZUR GESCHICHTE DES FRANKFURTER
PARLAMENTS

DIE BEDEUTUNG DES ENTWURFS FUR DIE VERFASSUNGS-
GESCHICHTE DES 19. JAHRHUNDERTS

ICH mochte Ihre Aufmerksamkeit fiir wenige Augenblicke auf
einen Abschnitt in der Verfassungsgeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts
lenken, einen Abschnitt in der Geschichte der lange Zeit hindurch
vergeblichen Bestrebungen, Deutschland, das seit dem Untergange
des alten heiligen romischen Reiches zu einem geographischen
Begriff geworden war, von neuem staatlich zu einigen. Diese
Bestrebungen fanden bekanntlich einen Hohepunkt in dem von der
Frankfurter Nationalversammlung unternommenen Versuch einer
Reichsgriindung.

Auch dieser Versuch ist ja traurig gescheitert. Aber er spielt
trotzdem nicht nur in der politischen und geistigen Entwicklungs-
geschichte des deutschen Volkes eine ausserordentlich wichtige
Rolle, sondern er darf auch die lebhafte Aufmerksamkeit desjenigen
beanspruchen, der die allgemeine Verfassungsentwicklung der
Neuzeit sich zu vergegenwartigen sucht.

Denn wenn diese ohne Zweifel ihrem wesentlichen Inhalt nach
sich als die schliesslich in alien zivilisierten Staaten vollzogene
Rezeption der in England bodenstandig erwachsenen Grundsatze
des konstitutionellen Staatsrechts darstellt, so kommt auf diesem
Gebiet moderner Geistesgeschichte — und die Entwicklung des

384

xx] Siebzehnerentwurf von 1848 385

Rechts lasst sich letzten Endes nicht anders als Geistesgeschichte
erfassen — jenem Versuch trotz seiner Ergebnislosigkeit eine nicht
geringe Bedeutung zu.

Die Versammlung der Paulskirche hat zu einer so griindlichen
Aussprache liber die Probleme des konstitutionellen Staatsrechts
gefiihrt, sie hat Manner von so tief begriindeter theoretischer
Einsicht und doch vielfach auch so reicher praktischer Erfahrung
zu Worte kommen lassen, dass ihre Verhandlungen als ein hochst
vielseitiger, an Geist und Kenntnissen wenigstens in Deutschland
nicht wieder erreichter parlamentarischer Ausdruck der damaligen
Staatseinsicht angesehen werden kb'nnen.

Die staatsrechtliche Tatigkeit der Frankfurter Nationalver-
sammlung fand ihren Mittelpunkt in ihrem Verfassungsausschuss.
Und dessen Arbeiten wiederum schlossen sich auf das engste an
den Verfassungsentwurf an, den noch vor dem Zusammentritt der
Nationalversammlung die siebzehn sogenannten Manner des allge-
meinen Vertrauens ausgearbeitet hatten.

Diesen Entwurf mochte ich zum Gegenstand meiner Bemer-
kungen machen, unter anderem deshalb, weil mir fur ihn einige
bisher unoekannt gebliebene gleichzeitige Aufzeichnungen vorliegen,
die wie ich glaube manche bezeichnende Lichter auf ihn fallen
lassen.

Jene Manner wurden auf einen Beschluss des durch die Februar-
revolution gewaltig aufgeriittelten Bundestags von den einzelnen
deutschen Regierungen nach Frankfurt geschickt, damit sie dort der
Bundesversammlung als Vertrauensmanner der in ihr vertretenen
siebzehn Staatenstimmen bei der nun auch von ihr endlich beab-
sichtigten Revision der Bundesverfassung mit gutachtlichem Beirate
an die Hand gingen. Allein die Siebzehn — denn diese Bezeich-
nung blieb ihnen, da bei der Abstimmung stets jene Stimmenzahl
massgebend war, wenn auch die Versammlung selbst niemals genau
aus siebzehn Mitgliedern bestand, denn (5sterreich und einige der
zu Gesammtstimmen vereinigten kleinsten Staaten schickten
mehrere Vertreter, wahrend umgekehrt Baiern die langste Zeit
hindurch unvertreten blieb — die Siebzehn setzten sich sofort iiber
jenen beschrankten Auftrag hinweg und machten sich an die Aus-
arbeitung eines eigenen Entwurfs fur die kunftige Verfassung
Deutschlands.

Dieser Entwurf, nach seinem einflussreichsten Miturheber wohl

2 C

386 J?. Hubner [xx

auch derDahlmannsche Verfassungsentwurf genannt, ist die erste
ausgeflihrte Skizze der heutigen Verfassung des deutschen Reiches.
In den Verhandlungen der Siebzehn fand die erste und fur die
Zukunft, die nahere und die fernere, massgebend gebliebene
Erorterung der schwierigen staatsrechtlichen Fragen statt, deren
Losung die Voraussetzung der schon damals als unbedingt not-
wendig erkannten, aber erst sehr viel spater erreichten Umwandlung
Deutschlands aus einem losen Staatenbund in einen festen Bundes-
staat bildete. So heftet sich jenes allgemeine verfassungsgeschicht-
liche und staatsrechtliche Interesse, das iiberhaupt das Frankfurter
Verfassungswerk erweckt, in ganz besonderem Masse an die
Verhandlungen der Siebzehn und den von ihnen aufgestellten
Verfassungsentwurf.

DIE QUELLEN

Als unmittelbare Quellen, aus denen sich ein Einblick in die
Tatigkeit der Vertrauensmanner gewinnen lasst, standen bisher als
wichstigste die bekannt gewordenen offiziellen Berichte zur Ver-
fligung, die einige der Siebzehn liber die Tatigkeit der Versammlung
an ihre Regierungen gerichtet haben. So der ausflihrliche des
hannoverschen Vertreters, Professors Zachariae,1 und der knappe
aber sehr charakteristische von Ludwig Uhlan d,2 dem wiirttem-
bergischen Vertrauensmann. Auch Dahlmann verdanken wir
einige wichtige Bemerkungen liber das Werk der Siebzehn und
seinen Anteil daran.3

Von erheblichem Wert ist ferner die eingehende Erorterung, die
Gervinus, der Vertreter der freien Stadte, liber den Entwurf un-

1 Bericht iiber die Berathungen des Entwurfs des deutschen Reichsgrund-
gesetzes im Schoosse des Collegiums der 17 Beigeordneten zum deutschen
Bundestage, von Professor Zachariae ; de dato Frankfurt, den 30. April 1848.
Actenstiicke zur neuesten Geschichte Deutschlands (mit besonderer Beziehung
auf Hannover). Erstes Heft. Hannover, Helwingsche Hof-Buchhandlung,
1848, S. 122-46.

2 Veroffentlicht nach dem im Schiller-Museum zu Marbach befindlichen
Original von Walther Reinohl, Uhland als Politiker (Beitrage zur Partei-
geschichte herausgegeben von Adalbert Wahl, 2). Tubingen, Mohr, 1911,
S. 182-5.

3 Anton Springer, Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann. Zweiter Teil, Leipzig,
Hirzel, 1872, S. 220-23.

xx] Siebzehnerentwurf von 1848 387

mittelbar nach seiner Veroffentlichung in einer langen Reihe von
Artikeln in der von ihm herausgegebenen Deutschen Zeitung
erscheinen Hess.1 Diese Abhandlung verteidigte die Arbeit der
Vertrauensmanner gegen die ausserordentlich zahlreichen Angriffe,
die alsbald von fast alien Seiten gegen sie gerichtet wurden. Auch
diese Kritiken wird man fur die Wiirdigung des von den Siebzehn
Geleisteten nicht ubersehen diirfen, so unbefriedigend und unfrucht-
bar die grosse Mehrzahl von ihnen auch ist. Die in Gestalt von
selbstandigen Flugschriften erschienenen verzeichnet in irgend
erreichbarer Vollstandigkeit das wertvolle Sammelwerk von
Wentzcke;2 die bedeutendsten unter ihnen sind die von Otto
Abel,3 Schaumann,4 Heinrich von Sybel,5 dem Prinz-Gemahl
Albert von England6 und Bunsen.7

Bei weitem am unergiebigsten sind die diirftigen offiziellen
Protokolle, die liber die Sitzungen der Siebzehn damals veroffent-
licht worden sind.8 Dazu kommt, dass sie von den dreizehn
Sitzungen, die der eigentlichen Verfassungsberatung gewidmet
waren, elf vollkommen iiberspringen und nur die erste und letzte
von ihnen zahlen und bekannt machen.

Diese unerfreuliche Liicke konnen wir aber nunmehr aus dem

1 Deutsche Zeitung^ Nr. 121-30, 136, 137, 140-45. Heidelberg, i. 24,
Mai 1848.

2 Paul Wentzcke, Kritische Bibliographic der Flugschriften zur deutschen
Verfassungsfrage 1848-1851. Halle, Niemeyer, 1911.

3 Otto Abel, Das neue deutsche Reich und sein Kaiser. Berlin, Hertz,
1848. Wentzcke, Nr. 199.

4 A. F. H. Schaumann, Kurze Randglossen zu dem Entwurf eines
deutschen Reichs-Grundgesetzes (Aus der Minerva besonders abgedruckt).
Jena, Braun, 1848. Wentzcke, Nr. 221.

5 Heinrich von Sybel, Vber das Reichsgrundgesetz der X VII Vertrauens-
manner. Marburg, Elwert, 1848. Wentzcke, Nr. 238.

6 (Prinz-Gemahl Albert von England,) Meinungsdusserung eines Prinzen
iiber den Entwurf der Siebzehner. Wentzcke, Nr. 240.

7 Christian Karl Josias Bunsen, Die deutsche Bundesverfasstmg und ihr
eigenthiimliches Verhaltniss 211 den Verfasstmgen Englands und der Vereinigten
Staaten. Zur Prufung des Entwurfs der Siebzehn. Sendschreiben an die
zum deutschen Parlament berufene Versammlung. Frankfurt a. M., Suchs-
land, 1848. Wentzcke, Nr. 247.

8 Sie sind gleichlautend veroffentlicht worden in der Frankfurter Ober-
postamts-Zeitung, Nr. 102-108, 124, 131. Frankfurt, U.-I7. April, 3., 10.

Mai 1848 und in der zweiten Lieferung der von Jucho veranstalteten amtlichen
Ausgabe der Verhandlungen des deutschen Parlaments ; danach sind sie
abgedruckt in Roth und Merck, Quellensammlung zum deutschen bffentlichen
Recht\ Erster Band, Erlangen, 1850.

2C 2

388 R. Hubner [xx

Nachlasse eines der Vertrauensmanner in sehr erwunschter Weise
ausfullen. In den von dem Geschichtsschreiber Johann Gustav
Droysen hinterlassenen Papieren hat sich namlich einmal ein wie
es scheint ganz vollstandiges Exemplar des sogenannten „ Separat-
protokolls " gefunden, das der eine Stimmfuhrer der sechszehnten
Stimme, der in Nachfolge Uhlan dszum Schriftfiihrer bestellte Petri
gerade besonders iiber jene mit der Verfassungsberatung ausge-
fullten dreizehn Sitzungen gefuhrt und beglaubigt hat und das in
lithographischer Vervielfaltigung an alle Vertrauensmanner verteilt
worden zu sein scheint.

Droysen hat sich aber weiter, abgesehen von einem iiber den
Anfang seiner Frankfurter Zeit gefiihrten „ Tagebuch ", in dem an
vielen Stellen auch die Tatigkeit der Siebzehn beriihrt wird, iiber
deren Verhandlungen besondere protokollartige Aufzeichnungen
gemacht, die sich gleichfalls, wie auch jenes „ Tagebuch ", in seinem
Nachlass erhalten haben. Sie sind ganz ahnlich gehalten, wie die
von ihm kurz darauf offiziell gefiihrten und spater in ihrem ersten
Teil veroffentlichten Protokolle des Verfassungsausschusses der
Nationalversammlung. Nur ist ihnen erklarlicherweise, da sie nur
fiir den Privatgebrauch bestimmt waren, die fiir eine Veroffent-
lichung angebrachte Durchsicht und Glattung nicht zu Teil
geworden. Sie behandeln die Verfassungsberatungen mit be-
sonderer Ausfiihrlichkeit und ergangen gerade durch ihre freiere
Art die offiziellen Petrischen Protokolle auf das erfreulichste.
Denn ohne Vollstandigkeit zu beabsichtigen und erreichen zu
konnen, folgen sie, offenbar unmittelbar wahrend der Beratungen,
oft in fliegender Eile, stets in kleinster und engster Schrift auf
grosse Folioblatter niedergeschrieben, bei alien wichtigeren Gegen-
standen dem Gang der Verhandlung von Rede zu Rede und werden
so zu unmittelbaren Zeugnissen des oft hitzigen Kampfes der
Meinungen.1

1 Ich beabsichtige demnachst die Protokolle Petris und die Aufzeich-
nungen Droysens als Anhang zu einer diesen Vortrag etwas naher ausfuhrenden
Studie iiber den Verfassungsentwurf der siebzehn Vertrauensmanner heraus-
zugeben. Damit soil auch ein synoptischer Abdruck des Dahlmannschen
Vorentwurfs und des fertigen Entwurfs verbunden werden, da die Texte, die
C. Varrentrapp in den von ihm herausgegebenen Kleinen Schriften F. C.
Dahlmanns, Stuttgart, 1886, S. 378-90, veroffentlicht hat, nicht ganz genau
sind und es von Wert sein diirfte, das gesammte Material an einer Stelle zu
vereinigen.

xx] Siebzehnerentwiirf von 1848 389

III
DER GANG DER VERHANDLUNGEN

Werfen wir zunachst einen kurzen Blick auf den ausseren Gang
der Verfassungsberatungen im Schoosse der Siebzehn,1 so hatten
bereits die offiziellen Protokolle ersehen lassen, dass gleich in der
zweiten Sitzung (am 5. April) eine Kommission zur Ausarbeitung
eines Verfassungsentwurfs niedergesetzt wurde, in die man vier
Mitglieder unter Hinzuziehungdes Vorsitzenden Max von Gagern
wahlte : es waren Dahlmann, der schon damals beriihmte
Geschichtsschreiber und Bonner Professor, der das Konigreich
Preussen vertrat ; Albrecht, der Vertreter der 15. Stimme, Pro-
fessor der Rechte in Leipzig, einer der bedeutendsten deutschen
Rechtsgelehrten, mit Dahlmann in weiten Kreisen des Volkes
wegen ihrer Beteiligung an dem mannhaften Auftreten der
,, Gottinger Sieben " verehrt und bewundert ; dann Bassermann,
der Abgesandte Badens, einer der im Vordergrund stehenden
Wortfiihrer der liberalen Patrioten. Wilhelm Jordan, der spatere
geschatzte Dichter, der als viertes Kommissionsmitglied gewahlt
worden war, schied bald iiberhaupt aus dem Kreise der Siebzehn
aus. Allein diese Viermannerkommission — auch das ist seit
langem bekannt — uberliess die Arbeit im wesentlichen ihren zwei am
meisten dazu geeigneten Mitgliedern, Dahlmann und Albrecht.
Bereits nach 9 Tagen (in der 9. Sitzung am 15. April) konnte der
Kommissionsentwurf der Versammlung der Vertrauensmanner
vorgelegt werden. Welchen Gang die Verhandlungen riun des
weiteren nahmen, zeigen deutlich die Petrischen und Droysen-
schen Aufzeichnungen. Der Vorentwurf wurde zunachst einer ersten
Lesung unterzogen, die sich meist, wenn auch nfcht ohne Aus-
nahmen, der Reihenfolge seiner Artikel und Paragraphen anschloss,
nicht selten aber streitige Satze vorlaufig zuriickstellte oder auch
an die Kommission zuriickverweis, damit sie auf Grund des statt-
gehabten Meinungsaustausches eine neue Fassung ausarbeite.
Einmal, bei Beratung liber den vom Reichsgericht handelnden

1 Eine Tabelle iiber die Daten sammtlicher Sitzungen und den Abdruck
der iiber sie gefuhrten Protokolle soil der S. 388 Anm. I in Aussicht gestellten
Studie beigefugt werden, wie auch dort ein Verzeichnis der Vertrauensmanner
gegeben werden wird.

39° -#• Hiibner [xx

Abschnitt,wurde eine neue Kommission aus den Juristen Albrecht,
Bassermann undZachariae zur weiterenVorbereitungdesGegen-
standes gebildet. Todt, der Vertreter des Konigreichs Sachsen,
wurde mit der Ausarbeitung der auf das Reichsfinanzwesen bezlig-
lichen Bestimmungen betraut ; doch fanden seine ins Einzelne
gehenden Vorschlage schliesslich keine Aufnahme in den Entwurf.
Die Debatten verliefen sich wohl gelegentlich — wenigstens nach
dem Urteil Droy sens — ins Kleinliche. Aber im allgemeinen — das
lassen Droy sens Niederschriften deutlich erkennen, wie es sich ja
auch bei der geistigen Bedeutung vieler der Siebzehn von selbst
versteht — sind sie offenbar wlirdige Vorlaufer der glanzendsten
Tage der Paulskirche gewesen. Bei manchen Gelegenheiten
steigerten sie sich zu lebhaften dramatischen Szenen, so vor allem

— auch darin die Redekampfe der Nationalversammlung voraus-
nehmend — bei der Beratung liber das Reichsoberhaupt. Auch
ganz am Schluss, als der endgiiltig redigierte Gesammttext
in letzter Lesung angenommen worden war, kam die erregte
Stimmung noch einmal zum Ausdruck : Uhland verlangte, dass
die nur durch Mehrheitsbeschluss erfolgte Annahme des Entwurfs
ausdriicklich bei der Veroffentlichung bekannt gegeben werde.
Nach offenbar scharfen Erorterungen entsprach man diesem
Verlangen und zwar in derWeise,dassDahlmann beauftragt wurde,
eine entsprechende Bemerkung in das Vorwort aufzunehmen, das
er auf Wunsch der Versammlung, wenn auch erst nach einigem
Strauben verfasste, und mit dem dann der Entwurf gedruckt
worden ist.

DIE VERFASSUNGSRECHTLICHEN PROBLEMS UND DER VERSUCH

IHRER L6SUNG

Nicht nur liber den ausseren Gang der Verhandlungen, sondern

— was wichtiger ist — auch liber die Beweggrlinde, von denen sich
die Siebzehn bei ihrem Werke leiten liessen, geben uns die neuen
Materialien, besonders die Droysenschen Niederschriften, naheren
Aufschluss.

Freilich zeigt ja schon der fertige Verfassungsentwurf an sich,
welcher Geist in der Versammlung herrschte. Aber wir sehen
doch jetzt erst deutlich, wie schon hier der vielfaltige Meinungs-

xx] Siebzehncrentwurf *von 1848 391

gegensatz zu Tage trat, der nur allzu bald das versuchte
Einigungswerk als aussichtslos erscheinen Hess.

Im allgemeinen freilich hatten unter den Siebzehn durchaus
diejenigen Anschauungen das Ubergewicht, die spater wahrend
der Nationalversammlung in der Partei des sogenannten rechten
Zentrums oder der erbkaiserlichen Partei ihre Vertretung fanden.
Das kann nicht iiberraschen, da nicht weniger als acht der
Vertrauensmanner spater zu den Mitgliedern dieser Partei gehorten
(Bassermann, Dahlmann, Droysen, M. v. Gagern, Gervinus,
Schmerling, Wippermann, Zachariae); einige freilich nur
voriibergehend, andere aber als massgebende Leiter (Bassermann,
Dahlmann, Droysen). Von denjenigen Vertrauensmannern, die
nicht in das Parlament eintraten, gehorten Albrecht und wohl
auch Gabelentz, Jaupund Petri der gleichen Richtung an. Dem-
gegenuber fand der demokratisch-liberale Standpunkt eigentlich
nur in Ludwig Uhland eine allerdings sehr ausgesprochene und
hartnackige Vertretung. Er verband sich bei Uhland zugleich mit
einer eifersuchtig partikularistischen Gesinnung ; bei anderen war
umgekehrt diese Gesinnung in immerhin verschieden starker
Auspragung das Ergebnis konservativer, selbst reaktionarer
Anschauungen, so bei dem Sachsen Todt, dem Hannoveraner
Zachariae, dem Mecklenburger Stever. Die radikale, eine
deutsche Republik erstrebende Zeitstromung kam in der Siebzehner-
versammlung nicht zu Wort, auch Uhlands Anschauungen gingen
nicht so weit nach links.

Aber schon die vertretenen Gegensatze genligten, um wieder-
holt und vor allem in der grossen Debatte liber das Reichsoberhaupt
zu einem heftigen Zusammenstoss zu fiihren. Zwar war die
Versammlung in dem Wunsche nach einer monarchischen Spitze
des Reichs einig. Aber der demokratische und der konservative
Partikularismus,auch hier durch Uhland und Zachariae vertreten,
wollte nur einen Wahlkaiser zugestehen. Der Erbkaiser konnte
in der ersten Lesung nur mit acht gegen ftinf Stimmen,1 in der
ganz fiir den Schluss aufgesparten zweiten Lesung, an der alle
Stimmen mit einziger Ausnahme der bairischen teilnahmen, nur mit
neun gegen sechs durchgesetzt werden ; die 1 6. Stimme (Hohen-

1 Nach der in Droysens lithographiertes Exemplar des Entwurfs der
Vorkommission (es scheint zweifelhaft, ob von ihm selbst) eingetragenen
Bleistiftangabe ergibt sich fiir die erste am 17. April in der elften Sitzung

392 R- Hubner [xx

zollern, Liechtenstein, Reuss, -Schaumburg-Lippe, Lippe und
Waldeck) war bei der ersten und offenbar auch bei der zweiten
Lesung gespalten. Selbst Bassermann wurde erst in letzter
Stunde gewonnen.

Die Frage des Oberhauptes war derjenige Punkt, an dem
sich die Gefahrlichkeit der Klippen, zwischen denen es hindurch-
zusteuern gait, am scharfsten offenbarte. Deutschland sollte, das
war damals der Wunsch des ganzen Volkes, ein einheitliches
Staatswesen werden, denn der Staatenbund, die Negation eines
solchen, hatte seine Unzulanglichkeit zur Geniige und zum (Jber-
druss erwiesen. Einen Bundesstaat also musste man errichten.
Aber wie sollte und konnte man mehr als dreissig Monarchien,
darunter zwei europaische Grossmachte, einer zentralen Bundes-
gewalt unterstellen, da doch nach heiliger Uberlieferung des
Bundesrechts nichts unverletzlicher war, als die Souveranitat der
Einzelstaaten ? Das war eine Aufgabe, wie sie die Weltgeschichte
noch niemals gestellt hatte. Die in ihr liegenden Schwierigkeiten
iiberstiegen selbst diejenigen, die bei der Begriindung des grossen
amerikanischen Bundesstaates, der Vereinigten Staaten, zu liber-
winden gewesen waren.

Dahlmann und seine Gesinnungsgenossen stellten es schon in
dem Siebzehnerentwurf klar hin und sprachen es schon in den ihm
geltenden Beratungen scharf aus, dass an die Spitze Deutschlands
nicht nur ein erblicher, sondern auch ein machtiger Kaiser treten
miisse. Daher gaben sie dem Reiche eine weite Kompetenz, in

vorgenommene Abstimmung liber die Erblichkeit folgendes Stimmenver-
haltnis :

Es stimmten

gegen die Erblichkeit fur die Erblichkeit

Zachariae Gagern

Todt Gervinus

Langen Droysen

Willmar Stever

Uhland Gabelentz

Jaup fur die halbe 16. Stimme Schmerling

Albrecht

5i* Dahlmann

Petri fur die halbe 16. Stimme

* Irrtiimlicherweise wird in dieser Spalte auch Bergk angefuhrt ; er fehlte bei der
Abstimmung. Auch Bassermann fehlte. Ebenso war Baiern auch hier unvertreten.

xx] Siebzehnerentivurf von 1848 393

alien wesentlichen Stiicken die gleiche, die heut unserem Reiche
zusteht : das Verzeichnis der dem Reich uberwiesenen Angelegen-
heiten, das unsere Reichsverfassung enthalt, lasst deutlich die
Herkunft aus dem entsprechenden Verzeichnis des Dahlmann-
schen Entwurfs erkennen.

Und wenn die Siebzehn in einer damals gebrauchlichen Redewen-
dung ihre Verfassung erklaren liessen, dass „ die Fiille der Reichs-
gewalt in dem Reichsoberhaupte und dem Reichstage vereinigt "
sei (§ 4), so gaben sie — anders wie die heutige Reichsverfassung
— dem Kaiser die voile Stellung eines konstitutionellen Monarchen
mit alien einem solchen zustehenden Befugnissen. Sie gaben
ihm — was auf anderem Wege auch im heutigen Reich verwirk-
licht worden ist — vor allem die voile Verfiigung iiber die milita-
rische Macht : hier war es besonders dem energischen Eingreifen
Droysens zu verdanken, dass dem Kaiser das Ernennungsrecht
nicht bios (wie Dahlmanns Vorentwurf gewollt hatte) hinsichtlich
der hoheren, sondern schlechthin aller Offiziere iibertragen wurde.

Und ferner machte der Entwurf den Kaiser — wesentlich
abweichend von der heutigen Regelung — zu einem neben dem
Reichstag gleichberechtigten Faktor der Gesetzgebung. Erst
durch seine Verkiindigung, so wurde festgesetzt, sollten die
Beschliisse des Reichstags verbindliche Kraft erhalten. Man
nannte das damals ungenau das Vetorecht. „ Der Monarch", so
schreibt Droysen, offenbar das Ergebnis der hierauf gerichteten
Beratungen zusammenfassend, „ erhalte diese grosse Befugnis ;
hoffen wir, dass wir es iiben mit derselben Diskretion wie Englands
Konige."

Die Selbstandigkeit der Reichsgewalt, ihre den Einzelstaaten
iibergeordnete Souveranitat fand auch darin Ausdruck, dass der
Entwurf, an die amerikanische Lehre von der iiberragenden Kraft
der Verfassung ankniipfend, alle mit dem Reichsgrundgesetz in
Widerspruch stehenden Rechtsquellen des deutschen Bundes und
der deutschen Einzelstaaten ausser Kraft setzte und damit mittelbar
auch den kiinftigen Erlass solcher Bestimmungen unmoglich
machen wollte. Wenn damit auch noch nicht der unbedingte
Vorrang der Reichsgesetze vor den Landesgesetzen ausgesprochen
war — wie dies in unserer Reichsverfassung geschehen ist, — so
konnte doch Bassermann nicht ohne Grund schon jene Aufhe-
bung einen „ Staatsstreich " nennen ; denn sie traf die bisher fur

394 & Hiibner [xx

unantastbar gehaltene Souveranitat der Einzelstaaten an ihrer
Wurzel.

Wenn Dahlmann und die Seinen kein Bedenken trugen, die
Einzelstaaten in dieser Weise zu Gunsten des Reichs zu beschranken,
so waren die meisten von ihnen hierzu nur in der festen Zuversicht
entschlossen, dass Preussens Konig der Kaiser des neuen Deutsch-
lands werden und dass damit Preussen das, was es als Einzelstaat
aufzugeben habe, als deutsche Vormacht reichlich ersetzt erhalten
werde. Immerhin gab doch auch in dieser Versammlung ein so
gliihender preussischer Patriot wie Droysen seiner auch schon
anderwarts geausserten Befriedigung darliber Ausdruck, dass
Preussen noch nicht durch eine Verfassung in zentraler Weise
konstituiert worden sei, denn ein solches einheitliches Preussen
wiirde Deutschland unmoglich machen.1

Lagen bei der Kompetenzverteilung zwischen Reich und
Einzelstaaten und ebenso beim Oberhaupt wenigstens die
verschiedenen gangbaren Wege von vornherein klar vor Augen,
so dass man nur zu entscheiden hatte, welchen die Mehrheit
einzuschlagen wiinschte, so tappte man bei der Gestaltung des
Reichstags vollig im Dunkeln. Man war zwar einig, dass nach
englischem Vorbild das Zweikammersystem anzunehmen und also
ein Oberhaus und ein Unterhaus zu schaffen sei. Auch fiir die
Bildung des Unterhauses standen die leitenden Gesichtspunkte
ohne weiteres fest. Aber wie und woraus sollte das Oberhaus
eingerichtet werden ? Das war hier wie uberall, wo man die aus
Englands eigenartigen geschichtlichen Zustanden erwachsene
Einrichtung nachahmen wollte, eine verzweifelte Frage. Die
verschiedensten Vorschlage wurden gemacht ; die Debatten zogen
sich in schleppende Lange. Was schliesslich beschlossen wurde,
namlich ein Oberhaus, in das die regierenden Fiirsten und die
Vertreter der vier freien Stadte, sowie „ aus dem Kreise der
bewahrten Verdienste des Vaterlands " auf Zeit gewahlte Reichs-

1 Vgl. G. Droysen, Johann Gustav Droysen, Erster Teil, Leipzig und
Berlin, 1910, S. 347 ff. Friedrich Meinecke, Weltburgertum und National-
staat. Studien zur Genesis des deutschen Nationals taates. Zweite durch-
gesehene Auflage, Miinchen und Berlin, 1911, S. 352 ff. Durch die im Text
beriihrte Stelle in Droysens Niederschrift erledigt sich die von Meinecke
a. a. O. S. 356 aufgeworfene Frage, ob Droysen auch im Siebzehnerausschuss
seine Gedanken iiber das Aufgehen Preussens vertreten hat, wohl zweifellos
in bejahendem Sinne.

xx] Siebzehnerentwurf von 1848 395

rate eintreten sollten, konnte kaum befriedigen ; mit Recht hat
Dahlmann selbst spater die betreffenden Bestimmungen des
Entwurfs als eine ungliickliche Kombination bezeichnet, die der
Verbesserung unumganglich bediirfe.1 Hier hat erst Bismarcks
Genialitat in der Einrichtung des Bundesrats den einzig moglichen
Ausweg gefunden.

Gliicklicher sind die eigenartigen Bestimmungen des Siebzehner-
entwurfs liber das Reichsgericht, das freilich eine ganz andere
Stellung erhalten sollte, als sie der gegenwartige hochste deutsche
Gerichtshof in Leipzig einnimmt. Es sollte einerseits eine Fort-
setzung der alten sogenannten Bundesaustragalinstanz bilden
und als solche Streitigkeiten zwischen den Einzelstaaten und auch
sonstige ofTentlichrechtliche Streitigkeiten entscheiden, andrerseits
gewisse schwerste Kriminalfalle aburteilen und schliesslich auch
als politischer Gerichtshof fiir die Verhandlung von Ministeran-
klagen dienen. Hier waren offensichtlich Einrichtungen der alten
Reichs- und Bundeszeit mit Gedanken des englisch-amerikanischen
Verfassungsrechts verbunden.

Ein naheres Eingehen hierauf wiirde zu weit fiihren, wie denn
auch iiber die im ganzen knappen Bestimmungen liber die ,,Grund-
rechte des deutschen Volkes ", die der Entwurf der Zeitstromung
folgend verzeichnete, nur das bemerkt werden soil, dass auch hier
vor allem der Gedanke an die herzustellende Einheit, Einheit auch
in rechtlicher Beziehung, im Vordergrund stand. Deshalb wurde
ausdriicklich ausgesprochen, dass diese Grundrechte auch zugleich
der Verfassung jedes einzelnen deutschen Staates zur Norm
dienen sollten.

Einer kiinftigen deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte, die wir
zumal fiir die neueren Zeiten noch schmerzlich entbehren, oder
einer Geschichte des Frankfurter Parlaments, die gleichfalls leider
noch ungeschrieben ist, muss es vorbehalten bleiben, dem Ver-
fassungsentwurf der siebzehn Vertrauensmanner seine Stellung in
der allgemeinen Entwicklung der staatsrechtlichen Anschauungen
zuzuweisen und die Rolle des naheren zu schildern, die er in der
Geschichte der deutschen Einheitsbestrebungen und Verfassungs-
kampfe gespielt hat.

Hier sollte nur ein kurzer Hinweis auf die neuen demnachst
1 Springer, a. a. O. S. 225.

396 R. Hubner [xx

bekannt zu machenden Materialien gegeben werden, die demjenigen,
der jene Aufgabe in Angriff nehmen wird, wenigstens nach
manchen Richtungen hin von Wert sein dlirften.

Ich freue mich, dass es mir vergonnt war, den Siebzehnerentwurf
gerade bei dieser Gelegenheit und an dieser Stelle zu besprechen.
Fiihrt doch die Entwicklung des modernen Staatsrechts in letzter
Linie stets in dieses Land und in diese Stadt !

R. HUBNER.

Printed by R. & R. CLARK, LIMITED, Edinburgh.

DIVERSITY OF TORONTO
LIBRARY

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Full text of "Essays in legal history read before the International Congress of Historical Studies, held in London in 1913"

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