Essays and treatises on several subjects

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I

ESSAYS

AND

TREATISE

O N

SEVERAL SUBJECTS.
By DAVID HUME, Efq;
VOL. II.
CONTAINING, /

An E N QJJ I R Y concerning HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING;

A DISSERTATION on the PASSIONS;

An ENQJJIRY concerning the PRINCIPLES
of MORALS;

AND

The NATURAL HISTORY of RELIGION.

A NEW EDITION.

DUBLIN:

Printed by J. Williams, [No. 21,] Siinner-Roiv,

/

M,DCC,LXXIX.

Digitized by the Internet Archive

in 2011 with funding from

Princeton Theological Seminary Library

i

http://www.archive.org/details/essaystreatiseso02hume ,

ADVERTISEMENT.

IVX O S T of the principles, and reafonings, con-
tained in this volume, were publifhed in a work in
three volumes, called A Treatife of Human Nature :
A work which the Author had projefted before he
left College, and which he wrote and publifhed
not long after. But not finding it fuccefsful, he
was fenfible of his error in going to the prefs too
early, and he call the whole anew in the following
pieces, where fome negligences in his former rea-
foning, and more in the expreflion, are, he hopes,
correfled. Yet feveral writers, who have honoured
the Author's Phllofophy with anfwers, have taken
care to diredl all their batteries againfb that juve-
nile work, which the Author never acknowledged,
and have affected to triumph in any advantages,
which, they imagined, they had obtained over it :
A practice very contrary to all rules of candour and
fair-dealing, and a ftrong infhance of thofe pole-
mical artifices, wiiich a bigotted zeal thinks itfelf
authorifed to employ. Henceforth, the Author
defires, that the following Pieces may alone be re-
garded as containing his philofophical fentiments
and principles.

A a

THE

CONT E NTS

O F T H E

SECOND VOLUME.

An ENQJJIRY concerning HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING.

Sedlion Page

I. V-/F the different Species of Philofophy 3
II. Of the Origin of Ideas 17

III. Of the AfTociation of Ideas 23

IV. Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operati-

ons of the Underftanding 27

V. Sceptical Solution of thefe Doubts 45

VI. Of Probability 61

VII. Of the Idea of neceflary Connexion 65

VIII. Of Liberty and Neceffity 85

IX. Of the Reafon of Animals 11 1

X. Of Miracles 117

XI. Of a particular Providence and of a future

State 141

XII. Of the academical or fceptical Philofohy 159

A Diflertation on the PalTions I77

An

CONTENTS.

An ENQUIRY concerning the PRINCIPLES
Of MORALS.

Seftion Page

I. V>/F the general Principles of Morals 215

II. Of Benevolence 223

III. Of Juftice 231

IV. Of political Society 253
V. Why Utility pleafes 261

VI. Of Qualities ufeful to Ourfelves 281

VII. Of Qualities immediately agreeable to Our-
felves 299
VIII. Of Qualities immediately agreeable to
Others 311
IX. Conclufion 319

APPENDIX.

I. Concerning moral Sentiment 337

II. Of Self-love 349

III. Some farther Confiderations with regard to

Juftice 357

IV. Of fome verbal Difputes 2^^
A Dialogue 377

The NATURAL HISTORY of RELIGION.

Section Page

Introdudlion 401

I. X HAT Polytheifm was the primary

Religion of Men 402

II. Origin of Polytheifm 407

III. The fame Subjedl continued 410

IV. Deities not confidered as Creators or For-

mers of the World 415

V. Various

CONTENTS.

Section

V. Various Forms of Polytheifm : Allegory,

Hero-Worfhip Page 422

VI. Origin of Theifm from Polytheifm 426

VII. Contirmation of this Doftrine 432

VIII. Flux and Reflux of Polytheifm and Theifm

434

IX. Comparifon of thefe Refigions with regard

to Perfecution and Toleration 436

X. With regard to Courage or Abafement 440

XI. With regard to Reafon or Abfurdity 441

XII. With regard to Doubt or Conviction 444

XIII. Impious Conceptions of the divine Nature

in popular Religions of both Kinds 457

XIV. Bad Influence of popular Religions on

Morality 461

XV. General Corollary. 466

AN

A N

E N Q^ U I R Y

CONCERNING

HUMAN

UNDERSTANDING.

Vol. II. B

SECTION I.

Of the Different Species of Philosophy.

iVlORAL philofophy, or the fcience of human
nature, may be treated after two different man-
ners ; each of which has its peculiar merit, and
may contribute to the entertainment, in(lru6tion,
and reformation of mankind. The one confiders
man chiefly as born for adlion ; and as influenced
in his meafures by tafle and fentiment ; purfuing
one objeft, and avoiding another, according to the
value which thefe objeds feem to poflfcfs, and ac-
cording to the light in which they prefent them-
felves. As virtue, of all objcifls, is allowed to be
the mofl: valuable, this fpecies of philolbphers paint
her in the moft amiable colours -, borrowing all
helps from poetry and eloquence, and treating
their fubjedt in an eafy and obvious manner, and
fuch as is belt fitted to pleafe the imagination,
and engage the affections. They fele6l the moil
ilriking obfervations and inftances from common
life; place oppofite chara6ters in a proper contrafl:;
and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the views
of glory and happinefs, dired our fteps in thefe
paths by the foundeft precepts and mofl illuflrious
examples. They make us feel the difference be-
tween vice and virtue; they excite and regulate
our fentiments; and fo they can but bend our hearts

B 2 to

4 S E C T I O N I.

to the love of probity and true honour, they think>
that they have fully attained the end of all their
labours.

The other fpecies of philofophers confider man
in the light of a reafonable rather than an aftivc
being, and endeavour to form his underflanding
more than cultivate his manners. They regard
human nature as a fubjed of fpeculation j and
v/ith a narrow fcrutiny examine it, in order to find
thofe principles, which regulate our underftanding,
excite our lentiments, and make us approve or
blame any particular objefl, action, or behaviour.
They think it a reproach to all literature, that
philofophy fhould not yet have fixed, beyond con-
troverfy, the foundation of morals, reafoning, and
criticifm; and Hiould for ever talk of truth and
falfehood, vice and virtue, beauty and deformity,
without being able to determine the fource of thefe
di'fbindions. While they attempt this arduous tafk,
they are deterred by no difficulties j but proceed-
ing from particular intlances to general principles,
they ftill pulh on their enquiries to principles more
general, and reft not fatisfied till they arrive at
thofe original principles, by which, in every fci-
ence, all human curiofity muft be bounded.
Though their fpeculations leem abftratt, and even
unintelligible to common readers, they aim at the
approbation of the learned and the wile; and think
themfelves fufficiently compenfated for the labour
of their whole lives, if they can difcover fome hid-
den truths, which may contribute to the inftrudi-
on of pofterity.

It is certain that the eafy and obvious philo-
fophy, will always, with the generality of man-
kind, have the preference above the accurate and
ubflrufe ; and by many v/iil be recommended,
not only as more agreeable, but more ufeful
than the other. It enters more into common

lifei

or the Different Species of Philosophy. 5

life J moulds the heart and affeftions ; and, by
touching thofe principles which aftuate men, re-
forms their condudl, and brings them nearer
to that model of perfection which it defcribes.
On the contrary, the abftrufe philofophy, being
founded on a turn of mind, which cannot enter
into bufmefs and a6lion, vanifhes when the phi-
lofopher leaves the fhade, and comes into open
day; nor can its principles eafily retain any in-
fluence over our condutl and behaviour. The
feelings of our heart, the agitation of our paf-
fions, the vehemence of our affections, diflipate all
its conclufions, and reduce the profound philo-
fopher to a mere plebeian.

This alfo muft be confeffcd, that the moft du-
rable, as well as julteft fame, has been acquired
by the eafy philofophy, and that abftradt reafon-
ers feem hitherto to have enjoyed only a momen-
tary reputation, from the caprice or ignorance of
their own age, but have not been able to fupporc
their renown with more equitable pofterity. It
is eafy for a profound philofopher to commit a
miftake in his fubtile reafonings ; and one miftake
is the neceiTary parent of another, while he pufhes
on his confequences, and is not deterred from
embracing any conclufion, by its unufual appear-
ance, or its contradiction to popular opinion.
But a philofopher, who purpofes only to reprefenc
the common fenfe of mankind in more beautiful
and more engaging colours, if by accident he
falls into error, goes no farther ; but renewing
his appeal to common fenfe, and the natural fen-
timents of the mind, returns into the right path,
and fecures himfelf from any dangerous illulions.
The fame of Cicero flourifhes at prefent ; but that
of Aristotle is utterly decayed. La Bruyere
pafles the feas, and ftill maintains his reputa-
tion: But the glory of Malebranche is con-
fined

6 SECTION I.

fined to his own nation, and to his own agre. And
Addison, perhaps, will be read with pleafure,
•when Locke fliall be entirely forgotten.

The mere philofopher is a chara6ler, which is
commonly but little acceptable in the v/orld, as
being fiippofed to contribute nothing either to
the advantage or pleafure of fociety ; while he
lives remote from communication with mankind,
and is wrapped up in principles and notions equally
remote from their comprehenfion. On the other
hand, the mere ignorant is ftill more defpifed j
nor is any thing deemed a furr fign of an illi-
beral genius in an age and nation where the fci-
ences flourifh, than to be entirely deflitute of
all relifh for thofe noble entertainments. The
moft: perfcd character is fuppofed to lie between
thofe extremes ; retaining an equal ability and
tafte for books, company, and bufinefs ; pre-
ferving in converfation that difccrnment and de-
licacy which arife from po'ite letters ; and in bu-
finefs, that probity and accuracy which are the
natural refult of a jufl; philofophy. In order to dif-
fufe and cultivate fo accompliflied a chara6ter,
nothing can be more ufeful than compofitions of
the eafy Ryle and manner, which draw not too
much from life, require no deep application or
retreat to be comprehended, and fend back the
ftudent amono; mankind full of noble fentiments
and .wife precepts, applicable to every exigence
of human life. By means of fuch compofitions,
virtue becomes amiable, fcience agreeable, com-
pany infcrudtive, and retirement entertaining.

Man is a reafonable being; and as fuch, re-
ceives from fcience his proper fcod and nou-
rilhment : But fo narrow are the bounds of human
iinderftanding, that little fatisfadlion can be hoped
for in this particular, either from the extent or
fecurity of Iiis acquilitions. Man is a fociable,

no

or the Different Species of Philosophy. 7

no lefs than a reafonable being: But neither can
he always enjoy company agreeable and amufing,
or preferve the proper relifh for them. Man
is alfo an aftive being; and from that difpofition,
as well as from the various necelTities of human
life, mull fubmit to bufinefs and occupation : But
the mind requires fome relaxation, and cannot al-
ways fupport its bent to care and induftry. It
feems, then, that nature has pointed out a mixed
kind of life as moft fuitable to human race, and
fecretly admoniflied them to allow none of thefe
biafles to draw too much, lb as to incapacitate
them for other occupations and entertainments.
Indulge your paffion for fcience, fays fhe, but
let your fcience be human, and fuch as may have
a diredl reference to aflion and fociety. Ab-
ftrufe thought and profound refearches I prohibit,
and will feverely punifh, by the penfive melan-
choly which they introduce, by the endlefs un-
certainty in which they involve you, and by the
cold reception which your pretended difcoveries
fiiall meet with, when communicated. Be a phi-
lofopheri but, amidft all your philofophy, be flill
a man.

Were the generality of mankind contented to
prefer the eafy phiiofophy to the abftraft and pro-
found, without throwing any blame or contempt
on the latter, it might not be improper, perhaps,
to comply with this general opinion, and allow
every man to enjoy, without oppofition, his own
tafte and fentiment. But as the matter is often
carried farther, even to the abfolute rejefting of
all profound reafonings, or what is commonly
called mctaphyficsy we fhall now proceed to confi-
der what can reafonably be pleaded in their be-
half.

We may begin with obferving, that one confi-
derable advantage, which refults from the accu-
rate and abftraft philofophy, is, its fubferviency

to
3

8 S E C T I O N I.

to the eafy and humane; which, without the
former, can never attain a fufficient degree of ex-
adnefs in its fentiments, precepts, or reafonings.
All poJite letters are nothing but pi<flures of hu-
man life in various attitudes and fituations ; and
infpire us with different fentiments, of praife or
blame, admiration or ridicule, according to the
qualities of the objeft, which they fet before us.
An artift muft be better qualified to fucceed in this
undertaking, who, befides a delicate tafte and a
quick apprehenfion, pofleircs an accurate know-
ledge of the internal fabric, the operations of the
underftanding, the workings of the paflions, and
the various fpecies of fentiment which difcrimi-
nate vice and virtue. How painful foever this
inward fearch or enquiry may appear, it becomes,
in fome meafure, requifite to thofe, who would
defcribe with fuccefs the obvious and outward ap-
pearances of life and manners. The anatomiil:
prefents to the eye the moft hideous and difagree-
able obje(5ls3 but his fcience is ufeful to the pain-
ter in delineating even a Venus or an Helen.
While the latter employs all the richeft colours
of his art, and gives his figures the moll grace-
ful and engaging airs ; he muft ftill carry his at-
tention to the inward itrudure of the human body,
the pofition of the mufcles, the fabric of the bones,
and the ufe and figure of every part or organ.
Accuracy is, in every cafe, advantageous to beau-
ty, and juft reafoning to delicate fentiment. In
-vain would we exalt the one by depreciating the
other.

Befides, we may obferve, in every art or pro-
fefiion, even thofe which moft concern life or ac-
tion, that a fpirit of accuracy, however acquired,
carries all of them nearer their perfedion, and
renders them more fubfervient to the intercfts of
fociety. And though a philofopher may live re-
ivjote from bufinefs, the genius of philofophy, if

carcfullv

Of the Different Species of Philosophy. 9

carefully cultivated by feveral, mufl: gradually
diffufe itfelf throughout the whole fociety, and
beftow a fimilar corredtnefs pn every art and call-
ing. The politician will acquire greater forefight
and fubtilty, in the fubdividing and balancing of
power; the lawyer more method and finer princi-
ples in his reafonings ; and the general more re-
gularity in his difcipline, and more caution in his
plans and operations. The liability of modern go-
vernments above the ancient, and the accuracy of
modern philofophy, have improved, and proba-
bly will ftill improve, by fimilar gradations.

Were there no advantage to be reaped from
thefe fiiudies, beyond the gratification of an in-
nocent curiofity, yet ought not even this to be
defpifed ; as being one accelTion to thofe few fafe
and harmlefs pleafures, which are beflowcd on
human race. The fweeteft and mofb inofienfive
path of life leads through the avenues of fcience
and learning} and whoever can either remove
any obftruftions in this way, or open up any new
profpefl, ought fo far to be efteemed a benefadtor
to mankind. And though thefe refearches may
appear painful and fatiguing, it is with fome
minds as with fome bodies, which being endow-
ed with vigorous and florid health, require fevere
exercife, and reap a pleafure fram what, to the
generality of mankind, may feem burdenfome and
laborious. Obfcurity, indeed, is painful to the
mind as well as to the eye ; but to bring light
from obfcurity, by v/hatever labour, mud needs
be delightful and rejoicing.

But this obfcurity in the profound and abftradV
philofophy, is objefted to, not only as painful and
fatiguing, but as the inevitable fource of uncer-
tainty and error. Here indeed lies the juftefb and
moft plaufible objection againft a confiderable part
of metaphyfics, that they are not properly a fcience;

but

lo SECTION I.

but arife either from the fruitlefs efforts of human
vanity, which would penetrate into fubjedls ut-
terly inacceflible to the understanding, or from
the craft of popular fuperftitions, which, being
unable to defend themfelves on fair ground, raife
thefe intangling brambles to cover and proteft
their weaknefs. Chafed from the open country,
thefe robbers fly into the forefl:, and lie in wait
to break in upon every unguarded avenue of the
mind, and overwhelm it with religious fears and
prejudices. The ftouteft antagonift, if he remit
his watch a moment, is opprefled. And many,
through cowardice and folly, open the gates to
the enemies, and willingly receive them with re-
verence and fubmiffion, as their legal fovereigns.

But is this a fufficient reafon, why philofo-
phers fhould defift from fuch refearches, and leave
fuperftition ftill in poflTelTiGn of her retreat ? Is it
not proper to draw an oppofite conclufion, and
perceive the neceflity of carrying the war into
the moll fecret recefles of the enemy ? In vain do
we hope, that men, from frequent difappoinment,
will at laft abandon fuch airy fciences, and dif-
cdvtT the proper province of human reafon. For,
befides, that many perfons find too fenfible an
intereft in perpetually recalling fuch topics ; be-
fides this, I fay, the motive of blind delpair can
never reafonably have place in the fciences j fince,
however unfuccefsful former attempts may have
proved, there is ftill room to hope, that the
indiiftry, good fortune, or improved fagacity of
fucceeding generations m.ay reach difcoveries un-
known to former ages. Each adventurous genius^
will ftill leap at the^arduous prize, and find himfelf
ftimulated, rather than dilcouraged, by the failures
of his predecefibrsj while he hopes that the glory
of archieving fo hard an adventure is referved for
him alone. The only method of freeing learning,

at

or the Different Species of Philosophy, ii

at once, from thefe abftrufe queftions, is to en-
quire ferioufly into the nature of human iinder-
lianding, and fhew, from an exaft analyfis of its
powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted
for fuch remote and abftrufe fubje<5ts. We mull:
fubmit to this fatigue, in order to Jive at eafe ever
after : And mull cultivate true metaphyfics with
fome care, in order to deftroy the falfe and adul-
terate. Indolence, which, to fome perfons, af-
fords a fafeguard againft this deceitful philofophy,
is, with others, overbalanced by curiofityj and def-
pair, which, at fome moments, prevails, may give
place afterwards to fanguine hopes and expe6tati-
ons. Accurate and juft reafoning is the only ca-
tholic remedy, fitted for all perfons and all difpo-
fitions ; and is alone able to fubvert that abftrufe
philofophy and metaphyfical jargon, which, being
mixed up with popular fuperftition, renders it in
a manner impenetrable to carelefs reafoners, and
gives it the air of fcience and wifdom,

Befides this advantage of rejeding, after delibe-
rate enquiry, the moft uncertain and difagreeable
part of learning, there are many pofitive advanta-
ges, which refult from an accurate fcrutiny into the
powers and faculties of human nature. It is re-
markable concerning the operations of the mind,
that, though moft intimately prefent to us, yet,
whenever they become the objeft of refiedion,
they feem involved in obfcurity; nor can the eye
readily find thofe lines and boundaries, which dif*
criminate and diftinguifh them. The objedls are
too fine to remain long in the fame afped or fitua-
tion ; and muft be apprehended in an inftant, by
a fuperior penetration, derived from nature, and
improved by habit and reflexion. It becomes,
therefore, no inconfiderable part of fcience barely
to know the different operations of the mind, to
feparate them from each other, to clafs them un-
der their proper heads, and to corredall thatfeem-

ins:

12 SECTION I.

ing diforder, in which they lie involved, when
made the objeft of refleftion and enquiry. This
talk of ordering and diftinguifhing, which has no
merit, when performed with regard to external bo-
dies, the obje6ls of our fenfes, rifes in its value,
when directed towards the operations of the mind,
in proportion to the difficulty and labour, which
we meet with in performing ic. And if we can go
no farther than this mental geography, or delinea-
tion of the diftin6b parts and powers of the mind,
it is at leaft a fatisfadlion to go fo far; and the
more obvious this fcience may appear (and it is by
no means obvious) the more contemptible ftill
muft the ignorance of it be efleemed, in all pre-
tenders to learning and philofophy.

Nor can there remain any fufpicion, that this
fcience is uncertain and chimerical j unlefs we
fhould entertain fuch a fcepticifm as is entirely
fubverfive of all fpeculation, and even adlion. It
cannot be doubted, that the mind is endowed with
feveral powers and faculties, that thefe powers are
diflinfl from each other, that what is really dif-
tin<5t to the immediate perception may be diflin-
guifhed by refle6lion ; and confequently, that there
is a truth and falfehood in all propofitions on this
fubjeft, and a truth and falfehood, which lie not
beyond the compafs of human undcrftanding.
There are many obvious diftincftions of this kind,
fuch as thofe between the will and under Handing,
the imagnation and paflions, which fall within the
comprehenfion of every human creature; and the
finer and more philofophical diftin6tions are no lefs
real and certain, though more difficult to be com-
prehended. Some inltances, efpecially late ones,
of fuccefs in thefe enquiries, may give us a jufter
notion of the certainty and folidity of this branch
of learning. And ffiall we eftecm it worthy the
labour of a philofopher to give us a true fyftem of
the planets, and adjufl the pofition and order of

thofe

or the Different Species of Philosophy. iJ

thofe remote bodies; while we affect to overlook
thofe, who, with fo much fuccefs, delineate the
parts of the mind, in which we are fo intimately
concerned ?

But may we not hope, that pliilofophy, if culti-
vated with care, and encouraged by the attention
of the public, may carry its refearclies (till farther,
and difcover, at leaft in fome degree, the fecret
fprings and principles, by which the human mind
is aduated in its operations ? Aftronomers had
long contented themfelves with proving, from the
phaenomena, the true motions, order, and magni-
tude of the heavenly bodies: Till a philofopher, at
laft, arofe, who feems, from the happiell reafon-
ing, to have determined the laws and forces, by
which the revolutions of the planets are governed
and directed. The like has been performed with
i"egard to other parts of nature. And there is no
reafon to defpair of equal fuccefs of our enquiries
concerning the mental powers and oeconomy, if
profecuted with equal capacity and caution. It is
probable, that one operation and principle of the
mind depends on another; which, again, may be
refolved into one more general and univerfal : And
how far thefe refearches may poflibly be carried, it
will be difficult for us, before, or even after, a
careful trial, exactly to determine. This is certain,
that attempts of this kind are every day made even
by thofe who philofophize the mod negligently :
And nothing can be more requifite than to enter
upon the enterprize with thorough care and attenti-
on; that, if it lie within the compafs of human un-
derllanding, it may at laft be happily atchieved; if
not, it may at laft be rejefted with fome confidence
and fecurity. This laft conclufion, furely, is not
defirable; nor ought it to be embraced too ralhiy.
For how much muft we diminilh from the beauty
and value of this fpecies of philofophy, upon fuch
a fuppofition ? Moralifts have hitherto been accuf-

tomedj

14 S E G T I O N I.

tomed, when they confidered the vaft multitude
9.nd diverfity of thofe aftions that excite our appro-
bation or diflike, to fearch for feme common prin-
ciple, on which this variety of fentiments might
depend. And though they have fometimes carri-
ed the matter too far, by their pafTion for fome one
general principle J it mull, however, be confefled,
that they are excufable in expefting to find fome
general principles, into which ail the vices and vir-
tues were juftly to be refolved. The like has been
the endeavour of critics, logicians, and even poli-
ticians : Nor have their attempts been wholly un-
fuccefsful; though perhaps longer time, greater
accuracy, and more ardent application may bring
thefe fciences ftill nearer their perfection. To
throw up at once all pretenfions of this kind may
juftly be deemed more rafh, precipitate, and dog-
matical, than even the boldeft and moft affirmative
philofophy, that has ever attem.pted to impofe its
crude dictates and principles on mankind.

What though thefe reafonings concerning human
nature feems abftradl, and of difficult comprehen-
lion ? This affords no prefumption of their falfe-
hood. On the contrary, it feems impoffible, that
what has hitherto efcaped fo many wife and pro-
found philofophers can be very obvious and eafy.
And whatever pains thefe refearches may coft usj
we may think ourfelves fufficicntly rewarded, not
only in point of profit but of pleafure, if by that
means, we can make any addition to our ftock of
knowledge, in fubjefts of fuch unfpeakable im-
portance.

But as, after all, the abflraclednefs of thefe fpe-
culations is no recommendation, but rather a dif-
advanc«ge to them, and as this difficulty may per-
haps be furmounted by care and art, and the avoid-
ing of all unnecelTary detail, we have, in the fol-
lowing enquiry, attemj^ted to throw fome light up-
©n fubjeds, from which uncertainty has hitherto

deterred

Of the Different Species of Philosophy. 15

deterred the wife, and obfcurity the ignorant.
Happy, if we can unite the boundaries of the
different fpecies of philofophy, by reconciling pro-
found enquiry with clearnefs, and truth with no-
velty ! And ftill more happy, if, reafoning in this
eafy manner, we can undermine the foundations of
an abftrufe philofophy, which feems to have hi-
therto ferved only as a fhelter to fuperftition, and
a cover to abfurdity and error !

( 17 )

SECTION II.

Of the Origin of Ideas.

E

VERY one will readily allow that there is a
confiderable difference between the perceptions of
the mind, when a man feels the pain of exi effive
heat, or the pleafure of moderate warmth, and when
he afterwards recalls to his memory this fenfation,
or anticipates it by his imagination. Thefe facul-
ties may mimic ^ copy the perceptions of the fen-
fesi but they ne\^er can entirely reach the force
and vivacity of the original fentiment. The utmoft
we fay of them, even Vv^hen they operate v/ith great-
eft vigour, is, that they reprefent their obje6l in fo
lively a manner, that we could almoft fay we feel
or fee it : But, except the mind be difordered by
difeafe or madnefs, they never can arrive at fuch
a pitch of vivacity, as to render thefe perceptions
altogether undiftino-uifhable. All the colours of
poetry, hov/ever fplendid, can never paint natural
obje<fls in fuch a manner as to make the defcripti-
on be taken for a real landfkip. The moll lively
thought is ftill inferior to the dulleft fenfation.

We may obferve a like diftinftion to run through
all the other perceptions of the mind. A man in
a fit of anger, is actuated in a very different
manner from one who only thinks of that emo-
tion. If you tell me, that any perfon is in love,
1 eafily underftand your meaning, and form a
juft conception of his fituationj but never can

Vol. II. C miftakc

i8 SECTION IL

iniftake that conception for the real diforders^
and agitations of the paflion. When We refledV,
on our pad fentiments and affeftionsy our thought
is a faithful mirror, and copies its objedts truly;
but the colours which it employs are faint and
dull, in comparifon of thofe in which our origi-
nal perceptions v/ere clothed. It requires no
nice difcernment or metaphyfical head to mark
the diilinftion between them.

Here therefore we divide all the perceptions
of the mind into two claffes or fpecies, which
are diilinguillied by their different degrees of
force and vivacity. The lefs forcible and lively
are commonly denominated Thoughts or Ideas.
The Other fpecies want a name in our language,
and in moft others; I fuppofe, becaufe it was not
requifite for any, but philofophical purpofes, to
rank them under a general term or appellation.
Let us, therefore, ufe a little ffeedom, and call
them Impreffionsi employing that word in a fenfe
fomewhat different from the ufual. By the term
imprej/ion, then, I mean all our more lively per-
ceptions, when we hear, or fee, or feel, love or
hate, or defire, or will. And imprefTions, are dif-
tinguifhed from ideas, which are the lefs lively
perceptions, of which we are confcious, when we
ref^eft on any of thofe fenfations or movements
above mentioned.

Nothing, at firfl viev/, may feem more unbound-
ed than t!ie thought of man, which not only ef-
capes all human power and authority, but is not
even reflraintd within the limits of nature and rea-
lity. To form monfters, and join incongruous
iliapes and appearances, cofts the invagination no
more trouble than to conceive the mod natural
and familiar objedts. And while the body is con-
fined to one planet, along which it creeps with
pain an J difficulty; the thougli't can in an inflant
tranlport us into the moft diftant regions of the uni-

verfe;

or the O R re I N of Id E AS. 19

verfe; or even beyond the univerfe, into the un-
bounded chaos, where nature is fuppofed to lie
in total confufion. What never was feen, or
heard of, may yet be conceived 3 nor is any thing
beyond the power of thought, except what im-
plies an abfolute contradiction.

But though our thought fecms to pofTefs this
unbounded liberty, v/e ihall find, upon a rearer
examination, that it is really confined within very
narrow limits, and that all this creative power of
the mind amounts to no more than the fliculty
of compounding, tranfpofing, augmenting, or di-
minifhing the materials afforded us by the fen-
i'es and experience. When we think of a golden
mountain, we only join two confiftent ideas, gold,
and mountain^ with which we were formerly ac-
quainted. A virtuous horfe we can conceive;
becaufe, from our own feeling, we can conceive
virtue; and this we may unite to the figure and
fhape of a horfe, which is an animal familiar to
us. In fhort, all the materials of thinking are
derived either from our outv/ard or inward fen-
timent : The mixture and compofition of thefe
belongs alone to the mind and will. Or, to ex-
prefs myfelf in philofophical language, all our
ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of
our impreffions or more lively ones.

To prove this, the two following arguments
will, 1 hope, be fufficient. Firfl, when we ana-
lyfe our thoughts or ideas, hov/ever compound-
ed or fublime, we always find, that they refolve
themfelves into fuch fimple ideas as were copied
from a precedent feeling or fentiment. Even
thofe ideas, which, at firfl: view, feem the moft
wide of this origin, are found, upon a nearer
fcrutiny, to be derived from it. The idea of
God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, v^'ife,
and good Being, arifes from refiecling on the
operations of our own mind, and augmenting,

C 2 without

cio SECTION It.

without limit, thofe qualities of goodnefs an'cl
wifdom. We may profecute this enquiry to what
length we pleafe; where we fliall always find,
that every idea which we examine is copied from
a fimilar imprefTion. Thofe who would alTert,
that this pofition is not univerfally true nor with-
out exception, have only one, and that an eafy
method of refuting itj by producing that idea,
w^hich, in their opinion, is not derived from this
fource. It will be incumbent on us, if we would
maintain our doclrine, to produce the imprefliork
or lively perception, which correfponds to it.

Secondly. If it happen, from a defe6t of the
organ, that a man is not fufceptible of any
fpecies of fcnfation, we always find, that he is
as little fufceptible of the correfpondent ideas.
A blind man can form no notion of colours j a
deaf man of founds. Reftore either of them that
fenfe, in which he is deficient; by opening this
new inlet for his fenfations, you open an inlet for
the ideas; and he finds no difficulty in conceiving
thefe objects. The cafe is the fame, if the objeft,
proper for exciting any fenfation, has never been
applied to the organ. A Laplander or Negroe
has no notion of the reliih of wine. And though
there are few or no inftances of the like deficien-
cy in the mind, where a perfon has never felt or*
is wholly incapable of a fentiment ar palTion, that
belongs to his fpecies ; yet we find the fame obfer-
vation to take place in a Icfs degree. A man of
iTiild manners can form no idea of inveterate re-
venge or cruelty; nor can a feliifli heart eafily con-
ceive the heights of friendlhip and generofity. It
is readily allowed, that other beings may polTefs
many fenfes of which we can have no conception ;
becaufe the ideas of them have never been intro-
duced to us, in the only manner, by which an idea
can have acccfs to the mind, to wit, by the adtual
feeling and fenfation.

There

of the O R I G I N of I D E A S. 11

There is, however, one contradiftory phrenome-
non, which may prove, that it is not abfolutely im-
poiTible for ideas to arife, independent of their
correfpondent imprefTions. I believe it will readi-
ly be allowed, that the feveral diftinft ideas of
-colour, which enter by the eye, or thofe of found,
which are conveyed by the ear, are really different
from each other; though, at the fame time, re-
fembling. Now if this be true of different colours,
it muft be no lefs fo of the different fhades of
the fame colour; and each fliade produces a dif-
tin6l idea, independent of the reft. For if this
jfhould be denied, it is polTible, by the conti-
nual gradation of ihades, to run a colour infenfi-
bly into what is moft remote from it; and if you
will not allow any of the means to be different,
you cannot, without abfurdity, deny the extremes
to be the fame. Suppofe, therefore, a perfon to
■have enjoyed his fight for thirty years, and to have
become perfectly acquainted with colours of all
kinds, except one particular fliade of blue, for in-
itance, which it never has been his fortune to meet
with. Let all the different fhades of that colour,
except that fingle one, be placed before him, def-
cending gradually from the deepeft to the lighteftj
it is plain, that he will perceive a blank, where
that fhade is v/^anting, and will be fenfible, that
there is a greater dillance in that place between
the contiguous colours than in any other. Now I
2i{k, whether it be poffible for him, from his own
imagination, to fupply this deficiency, and raife
up to himfelf the idea of that particular fliade,
though it had never been conveyed to him b/ his
fenfes ? I believe there are fev/ but will be of opi-
nion that he can : And this may ferve as a proof,
that the fimple ideas are not always, in every in-
ftance, derived from the correfpondent impref-
fions ; though this inftance is fo finaular, that it
is fcarcely worth our obferving, and does not me-
rit.

22 SECTION II.

rit, that for it alone we fhould alter our general
maxim.

Here, therefore, is a propofition, which not
only feems, in irfelf, firnple and intelligible 3 but,
if a proper ufe were made of it, might render
every difpute equally intelligible, and banifli all
that jargon, v/hich has fo long taken poiTefiion of
inetaphyfical reafonings, and drawn diigrace upon
them. All ideas, efpecially abftracl ones, are na-
turally faint and obfcure : The mind has but a
{lender hold of them : They are apt to be con-
founded with other refembling ideas ; and when
we have often employed any term, though with-
out a diltincl meaning, we are apt to imagine it
has a determinate idea, annexed to it. On the
contrary, all impreiTions, that is, all fenfations,
either outward or inward, are ftrong and vivid ;
The limits between them are more exactly deter-
mined: Nor is it eafy to fall into any error or
miftake with regard to them. When we enter-
tain, therefore, any fufpicion, that a philofophi-
cal term is emiployed without any meaning or
idea (as is but too frequent), we need but en-
quire, frc7n what impreffion is that Juppqfed idea
derived? And if it be impoflible to aflign any,
this will ferve to confirm our fufpicion. By
bringing ideas into fo clear a light, we may rea-
fonably hope to remove all difpute, which may
arife, concerning their nature and reality*.

SECTION

See NOTE [A].

mu L' ivut 1 gyjuaauw

SECTION IIL

Of the ASSOCIATION of Ideas.

I

T is evident, that there is a principle of con-
nexion between the different thoughts or ideas
of the mindj and that, in their appearance to the
memory or imagination, they introduce each
other with a certain degree of method and re-
gularity. In our more ferious thinking or dif-
courfe, this is fo obfervable, that any particular
thought, which breaks in upon the regular tradt
or chain of ideas, is immediately remarked and
rejected. And even in our wildefl: and mofl wan-
dering reveries, nay in our very dreams, we fhall
find, if we relleft, that the imagination .ran not
altogether at adventures, but that there was llill
a connexion upheld among the different ideas,
which fucceeded each other. Were the loofeft
and freeft converfation to be tranfcribed, there
would immediately be obferved fomething, which
connedled it in all its tranfitions. Or where this
is wanting, the perlbn, who broke the thread of
difcourfe, might ilill inform you, that there had
fecretly revolved in his mind a fucceffion of thought,
which had gradually led him from the fubjed of

converfation.

24 SECTION III.

convcrfation. Among different languages, even
where we cannot fufpect the leaft connexion or
communication, it is found, that the words, ex-
prefTive of ideas, the moft compounded, do yet
nearly correfpond to each other: A certain proof,
that the fimple ideas, comprehended in the com-
pound ones, were bound together by fome uni-
verfal principle, which, had an equal influence on
all mankind.

Though it be too obvious to efcape obferva-
tion, that different ideas are connefted together i
1 do not find, that any philofopher has attempt-
ed to enumerate or clafs all the principles of af-
fociationj a fubjedl, however, that feems worthy
'of curiofity. To me, there appear to be only
three principles of connexion among ideas, name-
ly, Rejemblancej Contiguity in time or place, and
Catife or Effe5i.

That thefe principles ferve to connefl ideas will
not, I believe, be much doubted. A pidture na-
turally leads our thoughts to the original * : The
mention of one apartment in a building naturally
introduces an enquiry or difcourfe concerning the
others f : And if we think of a wound, we can
fcarcely forbear refledting on the pain which fol-
lows it J. But that this enumeration is compleat,
and that there are no other principles of affocia-
tion, except thefe, may be difficult to prove to
the latisfa6lion of the reader, or even to a man's
own fatisfa»5lion. All we can do, in fuch cafes, is
to run over feveral inftances, and examine care-
fully the principle, which binds the different
thoughts to each other, never Hopping till we
render the principle as general as poffible §. The

more

* Refemblance. f Contiguity. t Caufe and EfFeft.

§ For inllance. Contrail or Contrariety is alfo a connexion
among Ideas : But it may, perhaps, be confidered as a mixture
cf Cau/ation and Refemblance. Where two objeds are contra-
ry.

I

Of the Association of Ideas. 25

niore inftances we examine, and the more care we
employ, the more afiiirance fliall we acquire, that
the enumeration, which we form from the whole,
is compleat and entire.

ry, the one deftroys the other ; that is, the caufe of its annihi-
lation, and the idea of the annihilation of an objeft, implicB
the idea of its former cxillence.

[ 27 ]

k

SECTION IV-

Sceptical Doubts concerning the Opera-
tions of the Understanding.

PARTI.

,i\.LL the obje6ls of human reafon or enquiry
may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit.
Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fa£l. Of the
firft kind are the fciences of Geometry, Algebra,
and Arithmetic j and in fhort, every affirmati-
on, which is either intuitively or demonftra-
tively certain. That the Jquare of the hypothenufe
is equal to the Jquare of the two fides , is a pro-
pofition, which expreffes a relation between thefe
figures. That three times five is eqiioj, to the half
of thirty, expreffes a relation between thefe num-
bers. Propofitions of this kind are difcovera-
ble by the mere operation of thought, without
dependence on what is any where exifbent in
the univerfe. Though there never were a cir-
cle or triangle in nature, the truths, demonflrat-
ed by Euclid, would for ever retain their cer-
tainty and evidence.

Matters of fa6t, which are the fecond objeds
of human reafon, are not afcertained in the fame
manner J nor is our evidence of their truth,
hov/ever great, of a like nature with the forego-
ing.

28 SECTION IV.

ing. The contrary of every matter of facft is
flill pofiible ; becaufe it can never imply a con-
tradi6tion, and is conceived by the mind with
the fame facility and diftinclnefs, as if ever fo
conformable to reality. 'That the Jim 'ujill not
rife to-morrow is no lefs intelligible a propofiti-
on, and implies no niore contradiction, than the
affirmation, that it will rije. We fhould in vain,
therefore, attempt to demonftrate its falfehood.
Were it demonilratively falfe, it u'ould imply
a contradiftion, and could never be diftindtly
conceived by the mind.

It miay, therefore, be a fubjeft worthy of cu-
riofity, to enquire what is the nature of that
evidence, which affures us of any real exiftence
and matter of faft, beyond the prefent teilimo-
ny of our fenfes, or the records of our memo-
ry, This part of philofophy, it is obfervable,
has been little cultivated, either by the ancients
or moderns ; and therefore ou.r doubts and er-
rors, in the profecution of fo important an en-
quiry, may be the more excufable ; while we
march through fuch difficult paths, without any
guide or dired:ion. They may even prove ufe-
fui, by exciting curiofity, and dellroying that
implicit faith and fecurity, which is the bane
of all reafoning and free enquiry. The difcove-
ry of defetis in the common philofophy, if any
fuch there be, will not, I prefume, be a dif-
couragement, but rather an incitement, as is
iifual, to attempt fomething more full and fa-
tisfaftory, than has yet been propofed to the
public.

All rcafonings concerning matter of fa<5t feem
to be founded on the relation of Caujc and Ef-
fetl. By means of that relation alone we can go
beyond the evidence of our memory and fenfes.
If you were to afl< a man, wliy he believes any
ijiatter of fad, which is abfent \ for inftancc,

that

Sceptical Dounrs. 29

that his friend is in the country, or in France;
he would give you a reafon ; and this reafon
would be fome other fad: ; as a letter received
from him, or the knowledge of his former refo-
Jutions and promifes. A inan, finding a watch
or any other machine in a dcfart ifland, would
conclude, that there had once been men in that
ifland. All our reafcnings concerning taft are of
the fame nature. And here it is confl:antly fup-
pofed, that there is a connexion between the
prefent fci6t and that which is inferred from it.
Were there nothing to bind them togeriier, tiie
inference would be entirely precarious. Thehear-
ino; of an articulate voice and rational difcourfe
in the dark afTures us of the prefence of fome
perfon : Why ? becaufe thefe are the efFedts of
the human make and fabric, are clofely con-
nefted with it. If we anatomize all the other
reafonings of this nature, we fhall find, that they
are founded on the relation of caufe and eff^eCt,
and that this relation is either near or remote,
direct or collateral. Heat and lig-ht are colla-
teral effects of fire, and the one etieft may juilly
be inferred from the other.

If we would fatisfy ourfelves, therefore, con-
cerning the nature of that evidence, which afTures
us of matters of faft, we mufc enquire how we
arrive at the knowledge of caufe and effedl.

I fhall venture to affirm, as a general propofiti-
on, which admits of no exception, that the know-
ledge of this relation is not, in any inftance,
attained by reafonings a priori ; but arifes en-
tirely from experience, when we find, that any par-
ticular objedls are conftantly corjoined with each
other. Let an objctl be prefented to a man of ever
fo ftrong natural reafon and abilities j if that ob-
jedt be entirely new to him, he will not be able,
by the mofb accurate examination 01 its fenfible
qualities, to difcover any of its caufes or ef-

feds.

3d SECTION IV.

fe<fts. Adam, though his rational faculties be
fuppofed, at the very firft, entirely perfedl, could
not have inferred from the fluidity, and tran-
fparency of water, that it would fuffbcate him,
or from the light and warmth of fire, that it
would confume him. No objeft ever difcovers,
by the qualities which appear to the fenfes,
either the caufes vv^hich produced it, or the ef-
fefts which will arife from it ; nor can our
reafon, unafllfted by experience, ever draw any
inference concerning real exigence and matter
of fact.

This propofition, that canjes and effecfs are dif-
coverable^ not by reafon, but by experience, will
readily be admitted with regard to fuch ob-
jedls, as we remember to have once been al-
together unknown to us ; fince we muft be
confcious of the utter inability, which we then
lay under, of foretelling, what would arife from
them. Prefent two fmooth pieces of marble to
a man, who has no tincture of natural philo-
fophy ; he will never difcover, that they will
adhere together, in fuch a manner as to re-
quire great force to feparate them in a dire(51:
line, while they make fo fmall a refrllance to
a lateral preflfure. Such events, as bear little
analogy to the common courfe of nature, are
alfo readily confefled to be known only by ex-
perience ; nor does any man imagine that the
explofion of gunpowder, or the attraction of a
loadllone, could ever be difcove^-ed by argu-
ments ^ priori. In like manner, when an ef-
fect is fuppofed to depend upon an intricate ma-
chinery or fecret fl:ru6ture of parts, we make no
difficulty in attributing all our knowledge of it
to experience. Who will afiert, that he can give
the ultimate reafon, why milk or bread is pro-
per nourifliment for a man, not for a lion or
a tyger ?

3 B^t

Sceptical Doubts. 31

'But the fame truth may not appear, at firfl:
fight, to have the fame evidence with regard
to events, which have become familiar to us from
our firfl appearance in the world, which bear a
clofe analogy to the whole courfe of nature, and
which are fuppofed to depend on the fimple
qualities of objedls, without any fecret ftruc-
ture of parts. We are apt to imagine, that we
could difcover thefe effe6bs by the mere opera-
tion of our reafon, without experience. We fan-
cy, that were we brought, on a fudden, into
this world, we could at firft have inferred, that
one Billiard-ball would communicate motion to
another upon impulfe ; and that we needed not
to have waited for the event, in order to pro-
nounce with certainty concerning it. Such is the
influence of cuftom, that, where it is ftrongefb,
it not only covers our natural ignorance, but even
conceals itfelf, and feems not to take place,
merely becaufe it is found in the higheil de-
gree.

But to convince us, that all the laws of na-
ture, and all the operations of bodies without
exception, are known only by experience, the
following reflections may, perhaps, fufHce. Were
any objedl prefcnted to us, and were we requir-
ed to pronounce concerning the effeft, which
will refult from it, without confulting paft ob-
fervation -, after what manner, I befeech you, muft
the mind proceed in this operation ? It mufl in-
vent or imagine fome event, which it afcribes to
the objed as its effect ; and it is plain that this
invention muft be entirely arbitrary. The mind
can never pofTibly find the effedt in the fuppof-
ed caufe, by the moft accurate fcrutiny and ex-
amination. For the effect is totally different from
the caufe, and confequently can never be difco-
vered in it. Motion in the fecond Billiard-ball
is a quite diftind event from motion in the

firfli

32 SECTION IV.

firjfl ; nor is there any thing in the one to fug-
ged the fmallelt hint of the other. A ftone or
piece of nietal raifed into the air, and left with-
out any fupport, immediately falls : But to con-
lider the matter a priori, is there any thing we
difcover in this fituation, which can beget the
idea of a downward, rather than an upward, or
any other motion, in the ftone or metal ?

And as the firft imaofination or invention of a
particular efFe£t, in all natural operations, is ar-
bitrary, where we confult not experience ; fo
muft we alfo cfteem the fuppofed tye or con-
nexion between the caufe and efFed, which binds
them together, and renders it impoffible, that
any other efFeft could refult from the operati-
on of that caufe. When I fee, for inftance, a
Billiard-ball moving in a ftraight line towards ano-
ther ; even fuppofe motion in the fecond ball
fhould by accident be fuggefted ro me, as the re-
fult of their contad or impulfe j may I not con-
ceive, that a hundred different events might as
well follow from that caufe ? May not both thefe
balls remain at abfolute reft ? May not the firft^
ball return in a ftraight line, or leap off from the
fecond in any line or diredion ? All thefe fup-
pofitions are confiftent and conceivable. Why
then fliould we give the preference to one, which
is no more confiftent or conceivable than the
reft ? All our reafoning a priori will never be
able to ftiew us any foundation for this prefe-
rence.

In a word, then, every effed is a diftind event
from its caufe. It could not, therefore, be difco-
vercd in the cayfe, and the firft invention or con-
ception of it, a priori, muft be entirely arbitrary.
And even after it is fuggefted, the conjundion of it
with the caufe muft appear equally arbitrary; fince
there are always many other effeds, which, to
reafon, muft feem fully as confiftent and natu-
ral.

I

Sceptical Doubts. 23

ral. In vain, therefore, ihould we pretend to de-
termine any fingle event, or infer anv caufe or cC-
feci, without the afliilance of obfervation and ex-
perience.

Hence we may difcover the reafon, why no phi-
lofopher, who is rational and modell, has ever
pretended to afTign the ultimate caufe of any na-
tural operation, or to fhow diftinftly the action of
that power, which produces any fingle effecfl in the
univerfe. It is confeffed, that the utmoil effort
of human reafon is, to reduce the principles,
productive of natural ph^Enomena, to a greater
fimplicity, and to refolve the many particular ef-
fects into a few general caufcs, by means of
reafonings from analogy, experience, and obfer-
vation. But as to the caufes of thefe general
effects, we fliould in vain attempt their difcove-
ly ; nor fhall we ever be able to fatisfy ourfelves,
by any particular explication of them. Thefe
ultimate fprings and principles are totally fhut
up from human curiofity and enquiry. Elafti-
city, gravity, cohefion of parts, communication
of motion by impulfe ; thefe are probably the
ultimate caufes and principles which we fliall
ever difcover in nature ; and we may efteem
ourfelves fufficiently happy, if, by accurate en-
quiry and reafoning, we can trace up the par-
ticular phcenomena to, or near to, thefe gene-
ral principles. The mod perfecSl philofophy of
the natural kind only ilaves off our ignorance a
little longer : As perhaps the mod perfe6t phi-
lofophy of the moral or metaphyseal kind ferves
only to difcover larger portions of it. Thus the
obfervation of human blindnefs and weaknefs is
the refult of all philofophy, and meets us, at eve-
ry turn, in fpite of our endeavours to elude or
avoid it.

Nor is geometry, when taken into the afTiftance
©f natural philofophy, ever able to remedy this

Vol. II. D defed,

34 SECTION IV'.

defe6l, or lead us into the knowledge of ulti-
mate caufes, by all that accuracy of reafoningy
for which it is fo juftly celebrated. Every part
of mixed mathematics proceeds upon the fup-
pofition, that certain law^s are ellabiilhed by na-
ture in her operations ; and abflraft reafonings are
employed, either' to aiTiit experience in the difco-
very of thefe laws, or to determine thdr influence
in particular inftances, where it depends upon any
precife degree of diftance and quantity. Thus,
it is a law of motion, difcovered by experience>
that the moment or force of any body in mo-
tion is in the compound ratio or proportion of
its folid contents and its velocity : and confe-
quently, that a fmall force may remove the greateft
weight, if, by any contrivance or machinery, we
can encreafc the velocity of that force, fo as to
make it an overmatch for its antagonill. Geo-
m.etry adifts us in the application of this law, by
giving us the juft dimenfions of all the parts and
figures, which can enter into any fpecies of ma-
chine; but flill the difcovery of the law itfelf
is owing merely to experience, and all the ab-
flradl reafonin2;s in the world could never lead
us one ftep towards the knowledge of it. When
we reafon a priori^ and confider merely any ob-
je6l or caufe, as it appears to the aiind, indepen-
dent of all oblervation, it never could fuggeft to
us the notion of any diliin6l objefb, fuch as
its effeft ; much lefs, fliew us the infeparable
and inviolable connexion between them. A man
muft be very fagacious, who could difcover by
reafoning, that cryftal is the effed of heat, and
ice of cold, without being previoufly acquaint-
ed with the operation of thefe qualities.

PART

Sceptical Doubts. 35

P A R T II.

But we have not, yet, attained any tolerable
fatisfaction with regard to the queftion firft: pro-
pofed. Each folntion fiill gives rife to a new
queftion as diflicult as the foregoing, and leads
us on to farther enquiries. When it is aficed,
What is the nature of all our reajomngs concern-
ing matter of fa£l ? the proper anfvv'er feems
to be, that they are founded on the relation of
caufe and effect. When again it is aiked. What
is the foundation of all our reafonings and conclnfions
concerning that relation? it in ay be replied in one
word. Experience. But if we ftill carry on our
fifting humour, and afk, What is the foundation of
all conclnfions from experience ? this implies a new
queftion, which may be of more difficult folu-
tion and explication. Philofophers, that give them-
felves airs of fuperior v/ifdom and fufficiency, have
a hard tafl<:, when they encounter perfons of in-
quifitive difpofitions, who pufli them from every
corner, to which they retreat, and who are fure at
laft to bring them to fome dangerous dilemma.
The beft expedient to prevent this confufion, is
to be modeft in our pretenfions ; and even to dif-
cover the difncuky ourfelves before it is objett-
ed to us. By this means, we may make a kind
of merit of our very ignorance.

I fhall content myfeif, in this fection, with an
eafy talk, and fliall pretend only to give a ne-
gative anfwer to the queftion here propofed. I
fay then, that, even after we have experience of
the operations of caufe and ePieft, our conclufi-
ons from that experience are not founded on rea-
foning, or any procefs of the underftanding. This
anfwer we muil endeavour, both to explain and
to defend.

D 2 It

.36 SECTION IV.

It mud certainly be allowed, that nature has
kept us at a great diftance from all her fecrets,
and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few
fuperficial qualities of objeds; while flie conceals
from us thofe powers and principles, on which the
influence of thefe obje6ls entirely depends. Our
fenfes inform us of the colour, weight, and con-
fiflence of bread ; but neither fenfe nor reafon
can ever inform us of thofe qualities, which fit
it for the nouriihment and fupport of a human
body. Sight or feeling conveys an idea of the
adlual motion of bodies ; but as to that, wonderful
force or power, which would carry on a moving
body for ever in a continued change of place, and
which bodies never lofe but by communicating it
to others; of this we cannot form the moft diftant
conception. But notwithftanding this ignorance
of natural powers * and principles, we always pre-
fume, when we fee like fenfible qualities, tlwt they
have like fecret powers, and expeft, that efi^efts,
fimilar to thofe which we have experienced, will
follow from them. If a body of like colour and
confiflence with that bread, which we have for-
merly eat, be prefented to us, we make no fcruple
of repeating the experiment, and forefee, with
certainty, like nourifliment and fupport. Now
this is a procefs of the mind or thought, of which
I would willingly "know the foundation. It is al-
lowed on all hands, that there is no known con-
nexion between the fenfible qualities and the fe-
cret powers ; and confequently, that the mind is
not led to form fuch a conclufion concerning their
conflant and regular conjun6lion, by any thing
which it knows of their nature. As to pafl Ex-
^erienccj it can be allowed to give di7'e^ and cer-
tain

* The word, Power, is here ufed in a loofeand popular fenfe.
The more accurate explication of it would give additional evi-
dence to this argument. Se Seft. 7.

Sceptical Doubts. 37

tain information of thofe precifc objcdls only, and
that precife period of time, which fell under its
cognizance : But why this experience fhoiild be
extended to future times, and to other objedls,
which for aught we know, may be only in ap-
pearance fimilar ; this is the main queftion on
which I would infill. The bread, which I formerly
eat, nourilhed me^ that is, a body of fuch fenfible
qualities was, at that time, endued with fecret powers:
But does it follow, that other bread muft alfo
nourifh me at another time, and that like fen-
fible qualities muft always be attended with like
fecret powers ? The confequence feems no wife ne-
cefTary. At leall, it muft be acknowledged, that
there is here a confequence drawn by the mind ;
that there is a certain ftep taken ; a procefs of
thought, and an inference, which wants to be ex-
plained. Thefe two propofitions are far from be-
ing the fame, / have found that Juch an ohjeSl has'
always been attended with fuch an effect y and I fore^
fee, that other objects, which are, in appearance^
fimilar, will be attended with fimilar effects. I Ihall
allow, if you pleafe, that the one propofition may
juftly be inferred from the other: I know in facl»
that it always is inferred. But if you infifl, that
the inference is made by a chain of reafoning, I
defire you to produce that reafoning. The con-
nexion between thefe propofitions is not intuitive.
There is required a medium, which may enable the
mind to draw fuch an inference, if indeed it be
drawn by reafoning and argument. What that
medium is, I muft confefs, paflcs my apprehen-
fion ; and it is incumbent on thofe to produce it,
who affert, that it really exifls, and is the origia
of all our conclufions concerning matter of fatt.

This negative argument muft certainly, in pro-
cefs of time, become altogether convincing, if
many penetrating and able philofophers fhall turn
their t'nquiries this way j and no one be ever able

to

3

38 SECTION IV.

to difcover ;iny connefting propolition or interme-
diate Hep, which fiipports the underdanding in
this conclufion. But as the queilion is yet new,
every reader may not truft fo far to his own pene-
tration, as to conclude, becaufe an argument
elcapes his enquiry, that therefore it does not
really exiit. For this reafon it may be requifite to
venture upon a more difiicult tafK ; and enume-
rating all the branches of human knowledge, en-
deavour to flievv, that none of them can afford
fuch an argument.

All reafonings may be divided into two kinds,
namely demonfcrative reafoning, or that concern-
ing relations of ideas, and moral reafoning, or
that concerning matter of fa6t and exiftence. That
there are no dcmonftrative arguments in the cafe,
feems evident ; fince it implies no contradiction,
that the courfe of nature may change, and that
an obje6l, feemingly like thofe which we have ex-
perienced, may be attended w^ith different or con-
trary effeds. May I not clearly and diftindly
conceive, that a body, falling from the clouds,
and which, in all other refpedts, refembles fnow,
has yet the tafce of fait or feeling of fire ? Is
there any more intelligible propofition than to af-
firm, that all the trees will fiourilli in December
and January, and decay in May and June ? Now
whatever is intelligible, and can be diftindly con-
ceived, implies no contradiction, and can never
be proved f^ilfe by any demonftrative argument
or abftrad reafoning a priori.

If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments to
put truft in paft experience, and make it the ftan-
dard of our future judgm.ent, thefe arguments
muft be probable only, or fuch as regard matter
of fad and real exiftence, according to the divifi-
on above mentioned. But that there is no argu-
ment of this kind, muft appear, if our explication
of that fpccies of reafoning be admitted as folid

and

Sceptical Doubts. 39

and fatisfadory. We have faid, that all argu-
ments concernino; exiftence are founded on the re-
lation of caufe and efFcvit j that our knowledge of
that relation is derived entirely from experience ;
and that all our experimental conclufions proceed
upon the fuppofition, that the future will be con-
formable to the pafb. To endeavour, therefore,
the proof of this lail fuppofition by probable argu-
ments, or arguments regarding exiftence, muft be
evidently going in a circle, and taking that for
granted, which is the very point in quefbion.

In reality, all arguments from experience are
founded on the fimilarity, which we difcover among
natural objedls,, and by which wc are induced to
expect efFeCls fimilar to thofe, which we have found
to follow from fuch objefts. And though none
but a fool or madman will ever pretend to difpute
the .authority of experience, or to rejefl that great
guid^ oi human life ; it may fiirely be allowed a
philofopher to have fo inuch curiofity at leaft, as
to examine the principle of human nature, which
gives this mighty authority to experiencej and
makes us draw advantage from that fimilarity,
which nature has placed among different obje£ls.
From caufes, which appear fimilar^ we expert
fimilar effeds. This is the fum of all our experi-
mental conclufions. Now it fcems evident, that, if
this conclufion were formed by reafon, it would be
as perfect at firft, and upon one inftance, as
after ever fo long a courie of experience. But
the cafe is far otherwifj. Nothing fo like as
eggs j yet no one, on account of fhis appear-
ing fimilarity, expedts the fame tafte and relifii
in all of them. It is only after a long courfe
of uniform experiments in any kind, that we
attain a firm reliance and fecurity with regard
to a particular event. Now where is that pro-
cefs of reafoning, which, from one infi:ance,
draws a conclufion, fo different from that which

it

40 SECTION IV.

it infers from a hundred inflances, that are no-
wife diiix-rent from that fingle one ? This quef-
tion I prbpofe as much for the fake of infor-
mation, as with an intention of raifing difficul-
ties. I cannot find, 1 cannot imagine any fuch
reafoning. But I keep my mind (till open to in-
llru(ftion, if any one will vouchfafe to bellow it on
me.

Should it be faid, that, from a number of
uniform experiments, we bifer a connexion be-
tween the fenfible qualities and the fecret pov/ers j
this, I muft confefs, feems the fame difficulty,
couched in different terms. The queftion ftill
recurs, on what procefs of argument this infe-
rence is founded ? Where is the medium, the in-
terpofing ideas, which join propofitions fo very
wide of each other ? It is confelTed, that tlie co-
lour, confifbence, and other fenfible qualities of
bread appear not, of themfelves, to have any con-
nexion with the fecret powers of nourifliment and
fupport. For otherwife we could infer thefe fe-
cret powers from the firit appearance of thefe fen-
fible qualities, without the aid of experience ;
contrary to the fentiment of all philofophers, and
contrary to pli?iii matter of faft. Here then is
our natural ftate of ignorance with regard to the
powers and influence of all objefts. How is this re-
medied by experience ? It only ffiews us a num-
ber of uniform effeds, rcfulting from certain ob-
jects, and teaches us, that thofe particular ob-
jedts, at that particular time, were endowed with
fuch powers and forces. When a new objedl en-
dowed with fimilar fenfible qualities, is produc-
ed, we expe6l fimilar powers and forces, and
look for a like effetl. From a body of like
colour and confiftence with bread, we expect
like nouriffiment and fupport. But this furely
is a Itep or progrefs of the niind, which wants
to be explained. When a man fays, / have found,

in

Sceptical D o u n t s. 41

;/; nil pajl infianccs^ Juch Jcnfible qualities conjoined
ivith Juch Jecret powers : And then he fays, Jimilar
Jenfible qualities ivill always be conjoined zvith ftmilar
fecret poivcrs ', he is not guilty of a tautology, nor
are thefe propofitions in any refpecft the fame.
You fay that the one propofition is an inference
from the other. But you mull confefs that the in-
ference is not intuitive j neither is it demonftra-
tive : Of wliat nature is it then ? To fay it is ex-
perimentaJ, is begging the queftion. For all infe-
rences from experience fuppofe, as their foundati-
on, that the future will refemble the paft, and
that fimilar powers will be conjoined with fimi-
lar fenfible qualities. If there be any fufpicion,
that the courfe of nature may change, and that the
pall may be no rule for the future, all experience
becomes ufelefs, and can give rife to no inference
or conclufion. It is impoilible, therefore, that
any arguments from experience can prove this re-
femblance. Let the courfe of things be allowed
hitherto ever fo regular j that alone, without fome
new argument or inference, proves not, that, for
the future, it will continue fo. In vain do you
pretend ^to have learned the nature of bodies from
your paft experience. Their fecret nature, and
confequently all their eflcfts and inlluence, may
change, without any change in their fenfible qua-
lities. This happens fometimes, and with regard
to fome objefts : Why may it not happen always,
and with regard to all objeds ? What logic, what
procefs of argument fecures you againft this fup-
pofition ? My praftice, you fay, refutes miy doubt.
But you mifiake the purport of my queftion. As
an agent, I am quite fatisfied in the point; but as
a philofopher, who has fome fliare of curiofity, I
will not fay fcepticifm, I want to learn the foun-
dation of this inference. No reading, no enqui-
ry has yet been able to remove my difficulty, or
give me fatisfaclion in a matter of fuch impor-
tance.

42 SECTION IV.

tance. Can I do better than propofe the diffi-
culty to the public, even though, perhaps, I have
fmall hopes of obtaining a folution ? We fhall
at leall, by this means, be fenfible of our igno-
rance, if we do not augment our knov/ledge.

I mult confefs, that a man is guilty of unpar-
donable arrogance, who concludes, becaufe an ar-
gument has efcaped his own invefligation, that
therefore it does not really exill. 1 muft alfo con-
fefs, that though all the learned, for feveral ages,
fhould have employed themfelves in fruitlefs fearch
upon any fubje6t, it may Hill, perhaps, be rafh
to conclude pofitively, that the fubject muft,
therefore, pafs all human conprehenfion. Even
though we examine all the fources of our know-
ledge, and conclude them unfit for fuch a fub-
je6l, there may ftill remain a fufpicion, that the
enumeration is not compleat, or the exan^ination
not accurate. But with regard to the prefent fub-
jeft, there are fome confiderations, which feem to
remove all this accufation of arrogance or fufpici-
on of miftake.

It is certain, that the moft ignorant and ftupid
peafants, nay infants, nay even brute be^s, im-
prove by experience, and learn the qualities of na-
tural objefls, by obferving the effects, which re-
fult from them. When a child has felt the fen-
fation of pain from touching the flame of a candle,
he will be careful not to put his hand near any
candle i but will expeCt a fimilar efledt from a
caufe, which is fimilar in its fenfible qualities
and appearance. If you affert, therefore, that the
underltanding of the child is led into this conclu-
lion by any procefs of argument or ratiocinati-
on, I may juilly require you to produce that
argument -, nor have you any pretence to refufe
fo equitable a demand. You cannot fay, that
the argument is abflrufe, and may poffible ef-
cape your enquiry ;. fince Vv^u contcfs, that it is

obvious

Sceptical Doubts. 43

obvious to the capacity of a mere infant. If you
hefitatc, therefore, a moment, or if, after reflec-
tion, you produce any intricate or profound ar-
gument, you, in a manner, give up the queftion,
and confefs, that it is not reafonins; which eno;ao-es
US to fuppofe the pad refembling the future, and
to expedl fimil ir effcfts from caufcs, which are, to
ajipearance, fimilar. This is tlie propofition which
I intended to enforce in theprefent fetlion. If I be
right, I pretendnot to have made any mighty difco-
very. And if I be wrong, I mufl acknowledge
myfelf to be indeed a very backward fcholar;
Jlnce I cannot now difcover an argument, which,
it feems, was perfectly familiar to me, long be-
fore I v/as out of my cradle.

( 45 )

SECTION V.

Sceptical Solution of thcfe Doubts.

PART 1.

X HE paflion for philofophy, like that for re-
ligion, feems liable to this inconvenience, that,
though it aims at the correftion of our manners,
and extirpation of our vices, it may only ferve, by
imprudent management, to fofter a predominant
inclination, and pufli the mind, with more deter-
mined refolution, towards that fide, which alrea-
dy dra\xjs too much, by the biafs and propenfity of
the natural temper. It is certain, that, while we
afpire to the magnanimous firmnefs of the philofo-
phic fage, and endeavour to confine our pleafures
altogether within our own minds, we may, at lad,
render our philofophy like that of Epidetus, and
other StoicSy only a more refined fyftem of felfifh-
nefs, and reafon ourfelves out of all virtue, as well
as Ibcial enjoyment. While we Itudy with atten-
tion the vanity of human life, and turn all our
thoughts towards the empty and tranfitory nature
of riches and honours, we are, perhaps, all the
while, liattering our natural indolence, which,
hating the buftle of the world, and drudgery of
bufinefs, feeks a pretence of reafon, to give itfelf

a full

46 S E C T I O N V.

a full and uncontrouled indulgence. There is,
however, one Ipecies of philofophy, which feems
little liable to this inconvenience, and that becaufe
it ftrikes in with no diforderly paffion of the hu-
man mind, nor can mingle itfelf with any natural
affeftion or propenfity ; and that is the Academic
or Sceptical philofophy. The academics always
talk of doubt and fufpenfe of judgment, of danger
in hafty determinations, of confining to very nar-
row bounds the enquiries of the underfiranding,
and of renouncing all fpeculations which lie not
v/ithin the limits of common life and practice.
Nothing, therefore, can be more contrary than
fuch a philofophy to the fupine indolence of the
mind, its ralli arrogance, its lofty pretenfions,
and itc fuperftitious credulity. Every palTion is
mortified by it, except the love of truth -, and that
paffion never is, nor can be carried to too high a
degree. It is furprifing, therefore, that this phi-
lofophy, which, in almoft every inftance, muft be
harmlcfs and innocent, fhould be the fubjeft of fo
much groundlefs reproach and obloquy. But, per-
haps, the very circumftance, which renders it fo
innocent, is what chiefly expofes it to the public
hatred and refentment. By flattering no irregular
paffion, it gains few partizans : By oppofing fo ma-
ny vices and follies, it raifes to itfeli abundance
of en,emies, Avho ftigmatize it as libertine, pro-
fane, and irreligious.

Nor need we fear, that this philofophy, while it
endeavours to limit our enquiries to common life,
fliouid ever undermine the reafonings of common
life, and carry its doubts fo far as to deftroy all
aftion, as well as fpeculation. Nature will always
maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over
any abflrad reafoning whatlbever. Though we
fl^ould conclude, for inftance, as in the foregoing
feftion, that, in all reafonings from experience,
there is a ftep taken by the mind, which is not

fup-

Sceptical Solution of thefe Doubts. 47

fupported by any argument or procefs of the un-
derllanding ; there is no danger, that thefe reafon-
ings, on which ahnod all knowledge depends,
will ever be affected by fuch a difcovery. If the
mind be not engaged by argument to make this
llep, it mull be induced by fome other principle
of equal weight and authority ; and that principle
will preferve its influence as long as human na-
ture remains the fame. What the principle is,
may well be worth the pains of enquiry.

Suppoie a perfon, though endowed with the
ftrongeft: faculties of reafon and ref^eclion, to be
brought on a fudden into this world ; he would,
indeed, immediately, obferve a a continual fuccef-
fion of objecls, and one event follow another ;
but he would not be able to difcover any thing
farther. He would not, at firfl, by any reafoning,
be able to reach the idea of caufe and efFed:;
fince the particular powers, by which all natural
operations are performed, never appear to the
fenles; nor is it reafbnable to conclude, . merely
becaufe one event, in one inftance, precedes ano-
ther, that therefore the one is the caufe, the other
the effect. Their conjunction may be arbitrary
and cafual. There may be no reafon to infer
the exiftence of one from the appearance of the
other. And in a word, fuch a perfon, without
more experience, could never employ his conjec-
ture or reafoning concerning any matter of ia6t,
or be affured of any thing beyond what was imme-
diately prefent to his memory and fenfes.

Suppofe again, that he has acquired more expe-
rience, and has lived fo long in the world as to
have obferved fimilar objefts or events to be con-
Itantly conjoined together ; what is the confe-
quence of this experience ? He immediately in-
fers the exiftence of one obje6l from the appear-
ance of the other. Yet he has not, by all his
experience, acquired any idea or knowledge of

the

4S S E C T I O N V.

the fecret power, by which the objeft produces
the other ; nor is it, by any procefs of reafoning,
he is engaged to draw this inference. But ftill he
finds himfelf determined to draw it : And though
he fhould be convinced, that his underftandinor
has no part in the operation, he v/ould never-
thelefs continue in the fame courfe of thinking.
There is fome other principle, which determines
him to form fuch a conclufion.

This principle is Cuftom or Habit. For where-
ever the repetition of any particular aft or opera-
tion, without being impelled by any rcafoning or
procefs of the underftanding ; we always fay, that
this propenfity is the effeft of Cuftom. By em-
ploying that word, we pretend not to have gi-
ven the ultimate reafon of fuch a propenfity.
"We only point out a principle of human na-
ture, which is univerf.dly acknowledged, and
which is well known by its effedts. Perhaps, we
can puili our enquiries no farther, or pretend to
give the caufe of this caufe , but muft rcll con-
tented with it as the ultimate principle, which
•we can affign, of all our conclufions from expe-
rience. It is fufficient fatisfaclion, that we can go
fo far; without repining at the narrownefs of our
faculties, becaufe they will carry us no farther.
And it is certain we here advance a very intelli-
gible propofition at lealt, if not a true one, v/hen
we affert, that, after the conftant conjundtion of
two objedts, heat and flame, for inftance, weight
and folidity, we are determined by cuftom alone
to expedl the one from the appearance of the
other. This hypothefis fccms even the only one,
which explains the difficulty, why we draw, from
a thoufand inftances, an inference, which we are
not able to draw from one inftance, that is, in
no refpeft, different from them. Reafon is in-
capable of any fuch variation. The conclufions,
which it draws from confidering one circle, are

the

Sceptical Solutiov of thcfe Doubts. 49

the fame which it would form upon furveying all
the circles in the univerfe. But no man, hav-
ing feen only one body move after being im-
pelled by another, could infer, that every other
body will move after a like impulfe. All infer-
ences from experience, therefore, are efFe<5ls of
cuftom, not of reafonino; *.

Cufcom, then, is tlie great guide of human
life. It is that principle alone, vvhich renders
our experience ufeful to us, and makes us ex-
pedl, for the future, a fimilar train of events
with thole which have appeared in the paft.
"Without the influence of cullom, we Ihould be
entirely ignorant of every matter of faft, beyond
what is immediately prefent to the memory and
fenfes. We fhould never knov/ how to adjuft
means to ends, or to employ our natural pow-
ers in the produ6lion of any effedl. There would
be an end at once of all a(5tion, as well as of
the chief part of fpeculation.

But here it may be proper to remark, that
though our conclufions from experience carry us
beyond our memory and fenfes, and affure us of
matters of fa(5b, which happened in the moft dif-
tant places and moft remote ages; yet fome fad:
iiHift always be prefent to the fenfes or memo-
ry, from whence we may firft proceed in draw-
ing thefe conclufions. A man, who fliould find
in a defert country the remains of pompous build-
ings, would conclude, that the country had, in
ancient times, been cultivated by civilized inha-
bitants i but did nothing of this nature occur to
him, he could never form fuch an inference.
We learn the events of former ages from hifto-
ry ; but then we muft perufe the volumes, in
which this inftruction is contained, and thence
carry up our inferences from one teftimony to
Vol, II, E another,

* See NOTE [BJ.

50 S E C T 1 O N V.

another, till we arrive at the eye-witnefTes SncJ
fpedators of thefe diftant events. In a word, if
we proceed n^ot upon fome fad:, prefent to the
memory or fenfes, our reafonings would be mere-
ly hypothetical ; and however the particular links-
might be connetled v/ith each other, the whole
chain of inferences would have nothing to fup-
port it, nor could we ever, by its means, ar-
rive at the knowledge of any real exiftence. If
I afis;, vv'hy you believe any particular matter of
fadt, which you relate, you muft tell me fome
reafon ; and this reafon will be fome other fad,
connefted with it. But as you cannot proceed
after this manner, in infinitia-n.^ you mufl at laft
terminate in fome fad:, which is prefent to your
memory or fenfes ; or muft allow that your belief
is entirely without foundation.

What then is the conclullon of the whole matter ;
A fimple one j though, it muft be confefled, pret-
ty remote from the common theories of philofo-
phy. All belief of matter of fa6l or real exiftence
is derived merely from fome objedt, prefent to the
memory or fenfes, and a cuflomary conjunftion
between that and fome other objeft. Or in other
Words ; having found, in many inilances, that any
two kinds of objects, flame and heat, fnow and
cold, have always been conjoined together ; if
fiamc or fnow be prefcnted anew to the fenfes,
the mind is carried by cuftom to expert heat or
cold, and to believe^ that f .ch a quality docs ex-
ift, and will difcover itfelf upon a nearer approach.
This belief is the necellary refult of placing the
mind in fuch circumftances. It is an operation of
the foul, when we are fo fituated, as unavoidable
as to feel the pailion of love, when we receive
benefits i or hatred, when we meet with injuries.
All thefe operations are a fpecies of natural in-
ftincls, which noreafoning or procefs of the thought

anci

Sceptical Solution of chefe DciucTS. rf

and iinderftanding is able, cither to produce, or
to prevent.

At this point, it would be very aliov/able for
us to flop our philofophical refearches. In mod
queftions, we can never make a fingle ilcp fartlier;
and in all qucflions, we miiO; terininate here at
laft, after our moft refrlefs and curious enquiries.
But ftill our curiofity will be pardonable, per-
haps commendable, if it carry us on to Itill far-
ther refearches, and make us examine more accu-
rately the nature oi' this hliefj znd o{ the cu/lo;na-
ry conjun^ion^ whence it is derived. By this means
we may meet with fome explications and anjlogies,
that will give fatisfa6lion ; at leaft to fuch as love
rhe abfl:ra(fi: fciences, and can be entertained with
fpeculations, whicr,, however accurate, may ftill re-
tain a degree of doubt and uncertainty. As to
readers of a different tafte ; the remaining part of
this fe6lion is not calculated for them, and the fol-
lowing enquiries may well be underllood, though
it be negletled.

P A- R T II.

Nothing is more free than the imagination of
man ; and though it cannot exceed that original
Itock of ideas, furniihed by the internal and ex-
ternal fenfes, it has unlimited pov/er of mixing,
compounding, feparating, and dividing thefe ideas,
in all the varieties of hction and vifjon. It can
feign a train of events, v/ith all the appearance of
reality, afcribe to them a particular time and place,
conceive them as exiltent, and paint rhem out to
itfelf with every circumftance, that belongs to any
hiftorical faft, which it believes with the crreateft
certainty. Wnerein, tlierefore, con nils the differ-
ence between fuch a fiction and belief? It lies not
merely in any peculiar idea, which is annexed to
fuch a conception as commands our alTent, and
E 2 which

52 S E C T I O N V.

which is wanting to every known ficlion. For as-
the mind has authority over all its ideas, it could
voluntarily annex this particular idea to any fidlion,
and confequently be able to believe whatever it
plcafes ; contrary to what we find by daily experi-
ence. We can, in our conception, join the head
of a man to the body of a horfe ; but it is not in our
povi^er to believe, that fuch an animal has ever really
exifted.

It follows, therefore, that the difference between
fi^icn and belief lies in fome fentiment or feeling,
which is annexed to the latter, not to the former,
and which depends not on the will, nor can be com-
manded at pleafure. It mull be excited by nature,
like all other fentiments j and mufb arife from the
particular fituation, in which the mind is placed at
any particular juntlure. Whenever any objedt is
•prefented to the memory or fenfes, it immediately,
by the force ofcuilom, carries the imagination to
conceive that objed:, which is ufually conjoined to
it ; and this conception is attended with a feeling
or fentiment, different froni the loofe reveries of
the fancy. In this ccnfifls the whole nature of be-
lief. For as there is no matter of faft which we be-
lieve fo firmly, that we cannot conceive the contra-
ry, there would be no difiercnce between the con-
ception affented to, and that which is rejecfled, were
it not for fome fentiment, which diftinguilhes the
one from the other. If I fee a billiard-ball moving
towards another, on a fmooth table, I can cafily
conceive it to ilop upon contact. This conception
implies no contradidion j but ilill it feels very dif-
ferently from that conception, by which I reprefent
to myfelf the impulfe, and the communication of
motion from one ball to another.

Were we to attempt a definition of this fentiment,

we ffiould, perhaps, find it very difficult, if not an

impoffible talk; in the fame manner as if we fiiould

endeavour to define the fcelmg of cold or paffion of

3 an^rer.

Sceptical Solution of thefe Doubts. 5j

anger, to a creature who never had any experience
of thefe fentimenrs. Belief is tlic true and proper
name of this feeling j and no one is ever at a lols to
know the meaning of that term; becaufe every man
is every moment confcious of the fentiment repre-
fented by it. It may not, however, be improper
to attempt a defcrvption of this fentiment; in hopes
we may, by that means, arrive at fome analogies,
which may afford a more perfect explication of it.
I fay then, that belief is nothing but a more vivid,
lively, forcible, firm, fteady conception of an ob-
jedl, than what the imagination alone is ever able
to attain. This variety of terms, which may feem
fo unphilofophical, is intended only to exprefs that
a6t of the mind, which renders realities, or what is
taken for fuch, more prefent to us than fi6lions,
caufes them to weigh more in the thought, and
gives them a fuperior influence en the pafTions and
imagination. Provided we ag^'ee about the thing,
it is needlefs to difpute about the terms. The ima-
gination has the command over all its ideas, and
can join and mix and vary them, in all the ways
poflible. It may conceive fiftitious obje6ls with all
the circumftances of place and time. It may fet
them, in a manner, before our eyes, in their true
colours, jufl: as they might have exifted. But as
it is impofllble, that this faculty of imagination can
€ver, of icfelf, reacii belief, it is evident, tiiat be-
lief confiils not in the peculiar nature or order of
ideas, but in \kv^ manner of their conception, and in
tht'w feeling to the mind. 1 confefs, that it is im-
pofllble perfedly to explain this feeling or manner
of conception. We may make ufe of words, which
exprefs fomething near it. But its true and proper
name, as we obferved before, is belief; which is a
term, that every one fufficiently underfl:ands in
common life. And in philofophy, we can go no
farther than aflert, that belief is fomething felt by
, the mindj which dillinguifhes the ideas of the judg-
ment

54 S E C T I O N V.

ment from the fidions of the imagination. It
gives them more weight and influence 3 makes them
appear of greater importance ^ inforces them in the
mind j and renders them the governing principle
of our adions. I hear at prefent, for inllance, a
perfon's voice, with whom I am acquainted ; and
the found comes as from the next room. This im-
preflion of my fenfes immediately conveys my
thought to the perfon, together with all the fur-
rounding obje(5i:s, I paint them out to myfelf a?
exiiling at prefent, with the fame qualities and re-
lations, of vv'hich I formerly knew them poifefTed.
Thefe ideas take fader hold of my mind, than ideas
of an enchanted caftle. They are very different to
the feeling, and have a much greater influence of
every kind, either to give pleafure or pain, joy or
forrow.

Let us, then, take in the whole compafs of this
doftrine, and allow, that the fentiment of belief is
nothing but a conception more intenfe and fteady
than what attends the mere fictions of the imagina-
tion, and that this manner of conception arifes from
a cuflomary conjundlion of the object with fome-
thing prefent to the memory or fenfes : I believe
that it will not be difficult, upon thefe fuppofitions,
to find other operations of the mind analogous to it,
and to trace up thefe phienomena to principles Hill
■more general.

We have already obferved, that nature has ella-
blilTied connexions among particular ideas, and that
no fooner one idea occurs to our thoughts than it
introduces its correlative, and carries our attention
towards it, by a gentle and infenflble movement.
Thefe principles of connexion oralTociation we have
reduced to three, namely, Refemblance-, Conti^nityj
and Caufation; v/hich are the only bonds, that unite
our thoughts together, and beget that regular
train of refledion or difcourfe, which, in a greater
or Icfs degree, takes place among all mankind.

Now

Sceptical Solution of thefe Doubts. 55

How here arifes a queftion, on which the folution
of the prefenc difficulty will depend. Does it hap-
pen, in all thefe relations, that, when one of the
objefls is prefentcd to the fenfes or memory, the
inind is not only carried to the conception of the
correlative, but reaches a Headier and llronger con-
ception of it than what otherwife it would have been
able to attain ? This feems to be the cafe with that
belief, which arifes from the relation of caufe and
cffeft. And if the cafe be the fame with the other
relations or principles of alFociation, this may be
eflablifiied as a general law, which takes place in
all the operations of the mind.

We may, therefore, obferve, as the firft expe-
riment to our prefent purpofe, that, upon the ap-
pearance of the pidture of an abfent friend, our
idea of him is evidently enlivened by the rejemblancey
and that every paffion, which that idea occafions,
whether of joy or forrow,- acquires new force and
vigour. In producing this efFeft, there concur
both a relation and a prefent imprefTion. Where
the pidlure bears him no refemblance, at leall was
not intended for him, it never fo much as conveys
our thought to him : And where it is abfent, as
well as the perfon j though the mind may pafs from
the thought of the one to that of the other j it feels
its idea to be rather weakened than enlivened by
that tranfition. We take a pleafure in viewing the
picture of a friend, when it is let before us j but
when it is removed, rather chufe to confider him
direftly, than by reile6lion in an image, which i$
equally diftant and obfcure.

The ceremonies of the Roman Catholic religion
may be confidered as inftances of the fame nature.
The devotees of thatfuperftition ufually plead in ex-
cufe for the mummeries, with which they are upbraid-
ed, that they feel the good effeft of thofe external
piotions, and poftures, and aftions, in enlivening

their

56 S E C T I O N V.

their devotion and quickening their fervour, which
otherwife would decay, if direfted entirely to dif-
tant and ini.naterial objedts. We fhadov/ out the
objetts of our faith, fay they, in fenfible types and
images, and render them more prefent to us by the
immediate prefence of thefe types, than it is pofTi-
ble for us to do, merely by an intelledual view
and contemplation. Senfible objects have always
a greater intiuence on the fancy than any other;
and this influence they readily convey to thofe
ideas, to which they are related, and which they
refemble. I fhali only infer from thefe praftices,
and this reafoning, that the effedl of refemblance
in enlivening the ideas is very common ; and as in
every cafe a refemiblance and a prefent impreffion
mufc concur, we are abundantly fupplied with ex-
periments to prove the reality of the foregoing prin-
ciple.

Vv^e may add force to thefe experiments by others
of a different kind, in confidering the effects of
contiguity as well as of rejemhlance. It is certain,
that diftance diminifhes the force of every idea, and
that, upon our approach to any objecl; though it
does not difcover itfelf to our fenfesj it operates
upon the mind with an influence, which imitates an
immediate impreffion. The thinking on any objedl
readily tranfports the mind to what is contiguous s
but it is only the a6lual prefence of an objeft, that
tranfports it v/ith a fiiperior vivacity. When I am
a few miles from home, whatever relates to it
touches me m.ore nearly than when I am two hun-
dred leagues diftant ; though even at that diftance
the reflecting on any thing in the neighbourhood
of my friends or family naturally produces an idea
of them. But as in this latter cafe, both the ob-
jedls of the mind are ideas; notwithftanding there
is an eafy tranfition between them ; that tranfition
alone is not able to give a fuperior vivacity to any

of

Sceptical Solution of thefe Doubts. 57

of the ideas, for want of fome immediate imprcf-
fion *.

No one can doubt but caiifation has the fame in-
fluence as the other two relations of refemblance
and contiguity. Superftitious people are fond of
the reiiques of faints and holy men, for the fame
reafon, that they feek after types or images, in or-
der to enliven their devotion, and give them a more
intimate and ftrong conception of thofe exemplary
jives, which they defire to imitate. Now it is evi-
dent, that one of the beft reliques, which a devotee
could procure, would be the handywork of a faint;
and if his cloaths and furniture are ever to be con-
fidered in this light, it is becaufe they were once at
hisdifpofal, and were moved and affected by him;
in which refpeft they are to be confidered as imper-
fe6l effcAs, and as connecfted with him by a fhorter
chain of confequences than any of thofe, by which
we learn the reality of his exiftence.

Suppofe, that the fon of a friend, who had been
long dead or abfent, were prefented to us ; it is
evident, that this objefl: would inftantly revive its
correlative idea, and recal to our thoughts all paft
intimacies and familiarities, in more lively colours

than

• *' Naturane nobis, inquit, datum dicam, an errore qoo-

•' dam, ut, cum ea loca videainus, in quibus memoria dignos

'' viros accepeiimus multum efie verfaios, magis moveamur,

'' quam fiquando eorum ipforum aut fada audiamus aut fcrip-

*' turn aliquod Icgamus ? Velut ego nunc moveor. Venit

" enim mihi Platonis in mentem, quern accepimus pri-

" mum hie difputare folitum : Cujus etiam illi hortuii propin-

" qui non memoriam folum mihi afterunt, fed ipfum viden-

<' tur in confpeftu meo hie ponere. Hie Speusippus, hie

" Xenocrates, hie ejus auditor Polemo ; cujus ipfa ilia

«' felBo iuit, quam videamus. Equidem etiam curiam nof-

" tram Hostilia.m dico, non hanc novam, quse mihi minor

" efle videtur poftquam ell major, folebam intuens, Scipio-

" NEM, Catonem, L^.lium, noftriim vcro in primis avum

" cogitare. Tanta vis admonitionis eft in locis ; ut non fine

" caufa ex his mcmorias dedufta fit difciplina." CiCBRt

de Finilus. Lib»v.

85 S E C T I O N V.

than tliey would otherwife have appeared to us.
This is a:u)ther phenomenon, which leems to prove
the principle above-mentioned.

We may obferve, that, in thefe phasnomena, the
belief of the correlative object is always prefup-
pofed ; without vvhich the relation could have no
efTcft. The influence of the pidure fuppofes, that
we believe our friend to have once exiiied. Con-
tiguity to home can never excite our ideas of home,
unkTs we believe that it really exiils. Now I aflert,
that this belief, where it reaches beyond the me-
mory or fenfes, is of a fimilar nature, and arifes
from fimilar caufes, with the tranfition of thought
and vivacity of conception here explained. When
I throw a piece of dry wood into a fire, my mind
is immediately carried to conceive, that it augments,
not extinguiflies the flame. This tranfition of
thought from the caufe to the efi^ecl proceeds not
from reafon. It derives its origin altos-ether from
cuilom and experience. And as it firfl: begins from
an object, prelent to the fenfes, it renders the idea
or conception of flame more flirong and lively than
any loofe, floating reverie of the imiagination. That
idea arifes immediately. The thought moves in-
ilantly towards it, and conveys to it all that force
of conception, which is derived from the imprefli-
on prefent to the fenfes. When a fvvord is levelled
at my breafl:, does not the idea of wound and pain
ftrike me more ftrongly, than when a glafs of wine
i^ prefented to me, even though by accident this
idea fliould occur after the appearance of the latter
objed:? But what is there in this whole matter to
caufe fuch a Itrong conception, except only a pre-
fent objeft and a cufl:omary tranfition to the idea
of another objedl, which we have been accufl:omed
Xo conjoin with the former ? This is the whole ope-
ration of the mind, in all our conclufions concern-
ing matter of fad and exiltencc; and it is a fatif-
fadion to find Ibmc analogies, by which it may be

explained.

Sceptical Solution of thefe Doubts. 59

exphiined. The tranfition from a prefent object
tlocs in all cafes give ftrength and folidity to the re-
lated idea.

Here, then, is a kind of pre-eftablifl-ied harmo-
ny between the coiirfe of nature and the fuccefTion
of our ideas ; and though the powers and forces,
by which the former is governed, be wholly un-
known to us ; yet our thoughts and conceptions
have ftilj, we find, gone on in the fame train with
the other works of nature. Cultom is that princi-
ple, by which this correfpondence has been effedled;
lb necelTary to the fubfillence of our fpecies, and
the regulation of our condu6t, in every circumftance
and pccurrence of human life. Had not the pre-
fence of an object inftantly excited the idea of thofc
objects, commonly conjoined with it, all our know-
ledge mult have been limited to the narrow fphere
of our memory and fenfes -, and we fhould never
have been able to adjuft means to ends, or employ
our natural powers, either to the producing of good,
or avoiding of evil. Thofe, who delight in the dif-
covery and contemplation oi final caujesy have here
ample fubject to employ their wonder and ad-
miration.

I fhall add, for a further confirmation of the
foregoing theory, that, as this operation of the mind,
by which we infer like efi'e6ts from like caufes, and
vice verjuy is fo eflential to the fubfiftence of all hu-
man creatures, it is not probable, that it could be
trufted to the fallacious deductions of our reafon,
which is flow in its operations; appears not, in any
degree, during the firft years of infancy; and at
belt is, in every age and period of human life, ex-
tremely liable to error and miftake. It is more
conformable to the ordinary wifdom of nature to
fecure fo neceflary an a6t of the mind, by fome in-
ftinct or mechanical tendency, which may be infal-
lible in its operations, may difcover itfelf at the
firft appearance of life and thought, and may be

independent

6o S E C T I O N V.

independent of all the laboured dedudions of the
underftanding. As nature has taught us the ufe of
our limbs, without giving us the knowledge of the
mufcles and nerves, by which they are aduated ; {o
has fhe implanted in us an inftinft, which carries
forward the thought in a correfpondent courfe to
that which fhe has eftablifhed among external ob-
je6ls ; though we are ignorant of thofe powers and
forces, on which this regular courfe and fucceflion
of objed:s totally depends.

S E C-

( 6i ;

SECTION VI.

Of.PROBABILI TY*.

X HOUGH there be no fuch thing as Chance.
in the world j our ignorance of the real caufe
of any event has the fame influence en the un-
derftanding, and begets a like fpecies of belief
or opinion.

There is certainly a probability, which arifes.
from a fuperiority of chances on any fide; and
according as this fuperiority encreafes, and fur-
pafles the oppofite chances, the probability re-
ceives a proportionable encreafe, and begets fbill
a higher degree of belief or aflent to that fide,
in which we difcover the fuperiority. If a
dye were marked with one figure or number of
fpots on four fides, and with anothe*- figure or
number of fpots on the two remaining fides, it
would be more probable, that the former would
turn up than the latter; though, if it had a thou-
fand fides marked in the fame manner, and only
one fide diff'erent, the probability would be much
higher, and our belief or expectation of the event

more

• Mr. Locke divides all arguments into demonftrative and
probable. In this view, we muft fay, that it is only probable
all men muft die, or that the fun wiH rife to-morrow. But to
conform our language more to common ufe, we ought to divide
arguments into demonfirations, proofs, and probabilities. By
proofs meaning fuch arguments from experience as leaye no
room for doubt or oppoUtion.

62 S E C T I O N VI.

more fleady and fecure. This procefs of the
thought or reafoning may feem trivial and ob-
viousj but to thofe who confider it more narrowly,
it may, perhaps, afford matter for curious fpe-
culation.

It feems evident, that, when the mind looks
forward to difcover the event, which may refulc
from the throw of fuch a dye, it confiders the
turning up of each particular fide as alike proba-
ble; and this is the very nature of chance, to ren-
der all the particular events, comprehended in it,
entirely equal. But finding a greater number of
Jides concur in the one event than in the other^
the mind is carried more frequently to the event,
and meets it oftener, in revolving the various pof-
fibilities or chances, on which the ultimate refulc
depends. This concurrence of feveral views irk
one particular event begets immediately, by an
inexplicable contrivance of nature, the fentiment
of belief, and gives that event the advantage over
its antagonifl, which is fupported by a fmaller
number of views, and recurs lefs frequently to the
mind. If we allow, that belief is nothing but a
firmer and flronger conception of an object than
what attends the mere fiftions of the imagination,
this operation may, perhaps, in fome meafure, be
accounted for. The concurrence of thefe feveral
views or glimpfes imprints the idea more ftrongly
on the imagination; gives it fuperior force and
vigour; renders its influence on the paffions and
affeftions more fenfible; and in a word, begets
that reliance or fecurity, which conllitutes the na-
ture of belief and opinion.

The cafe is the fame with the probability of
caufes, as with that of chance. There are fome
c^ufes, which are entirely uniform and conftant
in producing a particular eff»"d:, rnd no inftaiice
has ever y^t been found of any Lilure or irregula-
rity in their operation. Fire has always burned,

and

Of* Prob A B I L iTY. 6;;^

and water fuffbcated every human creature: The
produiftion of motion by impulle and gravity is
an univerial law, which has hitherto admitted of
no exception. Rut there are other caufcs, which
have been found more irregular and uncertain;
nor has rhubarb always proved a purge, or opium
a foporific to every one, who has taken thefe me-
dicines. Jt is true, when any caufe fails of pro-
ducing its ufual effeft, philofophers afcribe not this
to any irregularity in nature; but fuppofe, that
fome fecret caufes, in the particular Itrutture of
parts, have prevented the operation. Our reafon-
ings, however, and conclufions concerning the
event are the fame as if this principle had no place.
Being determined by cullom to transfer the part:
to the future, in all our inferences; where the pafh
has been entirely regular and uniform, we exped:
the event with the greateft affurance, and leave
no room for any contrary fuppofition. But where
different effedls have been found to follow from
caufes, which are to appearance exactly fimilar, all
thefe various effefls muft occur to the mind in
transferring the paft to the future, and enter into
our confideration, when we determine the proba-
bility of the event. Though we give the prefe-
rence to that which has been found moft ufuaJ,
and believe that this effe6l will exift, we mufl
not overlook the other effefts, but muft alFign to
each of them a particular weight and authority, in
proportion as we have found it to be more or lefs
frequent. It is more probable, in almoft every
country of Europe, that there will be frofl fome-
time in January, than that the weather will con-
tinue open throughout that whole month ; though
this probability varies according to the different
climates, and approaches to a certainty in the
more northern kingdoms. Here then it feems
evident, chat, when we transfer the paft to the fu-
ture, in order to determine the effetl, which will

refult

64 S E C T I O N VI.

refult from any caufe, we transfer all the different
events, in the fame proportion as they have ap-
peared in the paft, and conceive one to have ex-
ifted a hundred times, for inftance, another ten
times, and another once. As a great number of
views do here concur in one event, they fortify
and confirm it to the imagination, beget that fen-
timent which we call beliefs and give its object
the preference above the contrary event, vrhich is
not fupported by an equal number of experiments,
and recurs not fo frequently to the thought in
transferring the paft to the future. Let any one
try to account for the operation of the mind up-
on any of the received fyftems of philofophy, and
he will be fenfible of the difficulty. For my part,
I fhall think it fufficient, if the prefent hints ex-
cite the curiofity of philofophers, and make them
fenfible how defedlive all common theories are
in treating of fuch curious and fuch fublime
lubje6V$,

SEC-

( 65 )

SECTION VII.

Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion.
PART I.

X

HE great advantage of the mathematical
fciences above the moral confifts in this, that
the ideas of the former, being fenfible, are al-
ways clear and determinate, the fmallell diiliinc-
tion between them is immediately perceptible,
and the fame terms are ftill expreffive of the
fame ideas, v/ithout ambiguity or variation. An
oval is never miftaken for a circle, nor an hy-
perbola for an ellipfis. ' The ifofceles and fcaienum
arediftinguiflied by boundaries more exa6t than vice
and virtue, right and wrong. If any term be de-
fined in geometry, the mind readily, of itfelf,
fubftitutes, on all occafions, the definition for the
term defined: Or even when no definition is em-
ployed, the objett itfelf may be prefented to the
fenfes, and by that m.eans be fteadily and clear-
ly apprehended. But the finer fentiments of the
mind, the operations of the underftanding, the
various agitations of the paflions, though really
in themfelves diftinft, eafily efcape us, when fur-
veyed by refledlion ; nor is it in our power to re-
cal the original object, as often as we have occa-
fion to contemplate it. Ambiguity, by this means,
is gradually introduced into our reafonings: Simi-
VoL, IL' F lar

66 SECTION Vir.

lar obje£ls are readily taken be to the fame: And;
the conclufion becomes at lad very v/ide of ther
premifes.

One may fafely, however, affirm, that if we con-
fider thefe fciences in a proper light, their advan-
tages and difadvantages nearly compenfate each
other, and reduce both of them to the ftate of
equality. If the mind, v/ith greater facility, re-
tains the ideas of geometry clear and determinate,,
it muft carry on a much longer and more intri-
cate chain of reafoning, and compare ideas moch'
wider of each other, in order to reach the abiLru-
fer truths of that fcience. And if moral ideas
are apt, without extreme care, to fall into obfcu-
rity and confufion, the inferences are alv/ays much
fhortef in thefe difquifitions, and intermediate fteps^
\Vhich lead to the- concufion, much fewer than in
the fciences which treat of quantity and number.
In reality, there is fcarccly a propofition in Euclid
fo fimple, as not to confift of more parts, than are
to be found in any moral reafoning which runs
not into chimera and conceit. Where we trace
the principles of the human mind though a few
ileps, we may be very well fatisfied with our pro-
grefs; confidering how foon nature throws a bar
to all our enquiries concerning caufes, and redu-
ces us to an acknowjedcrment of our i^rnorance..
The chief obftacie, therefore, to our improvement
in the moral or m.etaphyfical fciences is the obfcu-
rity of the ideas, and ambiguity of the terms. The
principal difficulty in the mathematics is the length
of inferences and compafs of tliought, requifite to
the forming of any conclufion. And, perhaps,,
our progrefs in natural phiioi'ophy is chiefly re-
tarded by the want of proper experiments and pha?-
nomena, which are often difcovered by chance,
and cannot always be found, when requifite, even
by the mod ciiligent and prudent enquiry. As
moral philofopiiy feems hitherto to have received'

kfs

Of* the Idea of Necessary Connexio!-j. 67

lefs improvement than either geometry or phyfics,
we may conclude, that, if there be any difference
in this refpeft among thcfe fciences, rhe difficul-
ties, which obftruch the progrefs of the former,
require fuperior care and capacity to be farmount-
ed.

There are no ideas, which occur in metaphyfics,
more obfcure and uncertain, than thofe of fowery
force, energy, or necejfary connexion, of which it is
every moment necelTiiry for us to treat in all our
difquifitions. We lliall therefore, endeavour, in
this fcClion, to fix, if poilible, the precife mean-
ing of thefe terms, and thereby remove fome part
of that obfcurity, which is fo much complained
of in this fpecies of philofophy.

It fecms a proportion, v/hi,:h will not admit of
much dil'pute, that all our ideas are nothing but
copies of our imprelTions, or, in other words, that
it is impolTible for us to think of any thing, which
we have not antecedently feli, either by our ex-
ternal or internal fenfes. 1 have endeavoured * to
explain and prove this proportion, and have ex-
prelTed my hopes, that, by a proper application
of it, men may reach a-greater clearnefs and pre-
cifion in philofophical reafonings, than what they
have hitherto been able to attain. Complex ideas
may, perhaps, be well 'known by definition, which
is nothing but an enumeration of thole parts or
fimple ideas, that compofe them. But when v.'e
have puHied up definicions to the moil fimple ideas,
and find ftill fome ambiguity and obfcurity; what
refource are v/e then polfefTed of? By what inven-
tion can we throw light upon thefe ideas, and ren-
der them altogether precife and determinate to
our intelledlual view? Produce the imprefHons or
original fentirrents, from which the ideas are co-
pied. Thefe imprefTions are all flrong and fen-

F 2 fible.

* Secllon II,

6S S E C T 1 a N VIL

fible. They abmit not of ambiguity. They are
not only placed in a full light themfelves, bur
may throw light on their correfpondent ideas,
which lie in obfcurity. And by this means, we
may, perhaps, attain a new microfcope or fpecies
of optics, by which, in the moral fciences, the
moft minute, and mDll: fimple ideas may be fo
enlarged as to fall readily under our apprehenfion^
and be equally known with the groflcft and moft
fenfible ideas, that can be the objedl of our in-
quiry.

To be fully acquainted^ therefore, with the idea*
©f power or neceffary connexion, let us examine
its imprefnonj and in order to find the imprelTion
with greater certainty, let us fearch for it in all-
the fources, from which it may polTibly be derived.

When we look about us towards external ob-
jects, and confider the operation of caufes, we are
never able, in a fingle infbancc, to difcover any
power or n^ceiTary connexions, any quality, which,
binds the effefl toy the caufe, and renders the one
an infallible confequence of the other. We only
find, that the one does actually, in fa6l, follow
the other. The implufe of one billiard-ball is at-
tended with motion in the fecond. This is the
whole that appears to- the outward fenfes. The
mind feels no fentiment or inward imprelTion from
this fuccelTion of objecls: Confequencly, there is-
not, in any fingle particular inflance of caufe and
cfFecft, any thing which can fuggeil the idea of
power or neceflary connexion.

Prom the firft appearance of an objeft, whene-
ver can conjecfbure what effecl will relult from it.
But were the power or energy of any caufe difco-
verable by the mind, we could forefee the effedt,
even without experience; and might, at firfl, pro-
nounce with certainty concerning it, by the mere
4iint of thought and reafoning.

In reality, there is no part of matter^ that does

evcT;^-

I

Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion. 69

ever, by its fenfible qualities, difcover any power
or energy, or give us ground to imagine, that it
■could produce any thing, or be followed by any
other objecl, which we could denominate its ef-
fcft. Solidity, extenfion, motion; thefe qualities
are all complete in themfelves, and never point
out any other event which may refult from them.
The fcenes of the univerfe are continually fliifting,
and one object follows another in an uninterrupted
luccefTionj but the power or force, which aftuates
the whole machine, is entirely concealed from us,
and never difcovers itfelf in any of the fenfible
qualities of body. We know, that, in faft, heat
is a conftant attendant of flame i but what is the
connection between them, we have no room fo
much as to conje6lure or imagine. It is impof-
fible, therefore, that the idea of power can be de-
rived from the contemplation of bodies, in fingle
inftances of their operation; becaufe no bodies
€ver difcover any power, which can be the origi-
nal of this idea*.

Since, therefore, external objedls as they appear
to the fenfes, give us.no idea of power or necefTa-
ry connexion, by their operation in particular in-
ftances, let us fee, whether this idea be deriv-
ed from reflcftion on the o'^cracions of our own
minds, and be copied from any internal impref-
fion. It may be faid, that we are every moment
confcious of internal power; while we feel, that,
by the fimple command of our will, we can move
the organs of our body, or direct the faculties of
our mind. An aCl of volition produces motion

in

* Mr. Locke, in his chapter of power, fays, that, finding from
experience, that there are feveral new produdlions in matter,
and concluding that there rnuft fomewhere be a power capable
of producing them, we arrive at laft by this reafoning at the
idea of power. But no reafoning can ever give us a new,
original, fimple idea; as this philofopher himfelf confeiTes,
This, therefore, can never be the origin of that idea.

70 SECTION VII.

in our limbs, or raifes a new idea in our imagi-
nation. This influence of tlie will we know by
confcioufners. Hence we acquire the idea of pow-
er or energy; and arc certain, that we ourfelves
and all other intelligent beings are poflefled of
power. This idea, then, is an idea of reflefcion,
lince it arifes from refieding on the operations of
our own mind, and on the command which is ex-
ercifed by will, both over the organs of the body
and faculties of the foul.

We flialj proceed to examine this pretenfion; and
firll with regard to the influence of volition over
the organs of the body. This influence, we may
obferve, is a faft, which, like all other natural
events, can be known only by experience, and
can never be forefcen from any apparent energy
or power in the caufe, which connects it with the
effedlj and renders the one an infallible confequence
of the other. The motion of our body follov/s up-
on the command of our v/ill. Of this vv'e are eve-
ry moment confcious. But the means, by which
this is effefted ; the energy, by which the will per-
forms fo extraordinary an operation; of this we
are fo far from being immediately confcious, that
it muft for ever efcape our mofc diligent enquiry.

Vox firft; is there any principle in all nature
more myfterious than the union of foul with body;
by which a fuppofed fpiritual fubftance acquires
fuch an influence over a material one, that the
mod refined thought is able to a6tuate the grofleft
matter ? Were we empowered, by a fecrec wifh,
to remove mountains, or control the planets in
their orbit; this extenfive authority would not
be more extraordinary, nor more beyond our com-
prehenfion. But if by confcioufnefs wc perceived
any power or energy in the will, we muil know
this power; we mufl know its connexion with the
efi-e6t ; we rnull know the fecret union of foul and
body, and the nature of both thefe fubftances;

by

Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion, 71

by whrch the one is able to operate, in fo many
inflances, upon the other.

Secondly^ We are not abie to move all the or-
gans of the body with a like authority; though
v.'e cannot affign any reafon befides experience,
for fo remarkable a difference between one and
the other. Why has the will an influence over
the tonf]j'je and finders, not over the heart or
iiver ? This qiieftion would never cmbarrafs lis,
were we confcious -of a power in the former cafe,
not in the latter. We fhould then perceive, inde-
pendent of experience, why the authority of will
over the organs of the body is circumfcribed.
within fuch particular limits. Being in than cafe
fully acquainted with the power or force, by
v/hich it operates, v.'e fliould alfo know, why its
influence reaches precifely to fuch boundaries, and
no farther.

A man, fuddenly ftruck with a palfy in the leg
or arm, or who had newly loft thofe members, fre-
quently -endeavours, at firft, to move them, and
employ them in their ufual oiHces. Here he is as
much cor-ifcious of power to command fuch limbs,
as a man in perfeft health is confcious of power to
^.vftuate any member which remains in its natural
Itate and condition. But confcioufnefs never de-
ceives. Confequently, neither in the one cafe
nor in the other, are we ever confcious of any
power. We learn the influence of our will from
experience alone. And experience only teaches
us, how one event confequently follows another ;
v/ithout inflrutling us in the fecret connexion,
which binds them together, and renders them in-
feparable.

1'hirdly^ We learn from anatomy, that the imme-
diate objefb of power in voluntary motion, is not the
member itfelf which is moved, but certain mufcles,
and nerves, and animal fpirits, and, perhaps, fome-
t-hing ftill more minute and more unknown, through

v/hich

72 SECTION VII.

which the motion is fucceffively propagated, ere
it reach ere it reach the member itfelf whofe
motion is the immediate obje6l of volition. Can
there be a more certain proof, that the power,
by which this whole operation is performed, fo
far from being direclly and fully known by an
inward fentiment or confcioufnefs, is, to the laft
degree, my[lerioas and unintelligible ? Here the
mind wills a certain event: Immediately another
event, tinknown to ourfelves, and totally diffe-
rent from the one intended, is produced: This
event produces another, equally unknown: Till
at laft, through a long fucccfilon, the defired
event is produced. But if the original power
were felt, it muft' be known : Were it known,
its efieft muft: aifo be known j fincc all power
is relative to its efFedl. And vice verfa, if the
effeft be not known, the power cannot be known
nor felt. How indeed can we be confcious of
a power to remove our limbs, when we have no
fuch power; but only that to move certain ani-
mal Ipirits, which, though they produce at laft
the motion of our limbs, yet operate in fuch a
manner as is wholly beyond our comprehenfion ?

We may, therefore, conclude from the whole,
I hope, without any temerity, though with aflu-
rancej that our idea of power is not copied from
any fentiment or confcioufnefs of power within
ourfelves, when we give rife to animal motion,
or apply our limbs to their proper ufe and of-
fice. That their motion follows the command
of the v/ill is a matter of common experience,
like other natural events : But the power or energy
by which this is effefled, like that in other natural
events, is unknown and inconceivable *.

Shall we then aflert, that we are confcious of a
power or energy in our own minds, when, by an
ai^or command of our will, we raife up a new idea,

fix
* See NOTE [CJ.

Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion. 73

fix the mind to the contemplation of it, turn it on
all fidei-, and at hdl diiiiiifb it for fome other
idea, when we think that we have furveyed it
with fufficient accuracy? I believe the fame ar-
guments vsill prove, that even this command of
the will gives us no real idea of force or energy.

Firjiy It muft be allowed, that, when we know
a power, we i:now that very circumRance in ihe
caufe, by which it is enabled to produce the ef-
fcifl: For thefe are fuppofed to b^ fynonimous.
We muft, therefore, know both the caufe and
etfc<5t, and the relation between them. But do
-we pretend to be acquainted with the nature of the
human foul and the nature of an idea, or the apti-
tude of the one to produce the other? This is a real
creation; a produftion of fomething out of nothing:
Which implies a power fo great, that it may feem,
at firll fight, beyond the reach of any being, lefs than
infinite. At leaft it mull be owned, that fuch
a power is not felt, nor known, nor even conceiv-
able by the mjnd. We only feel the event, name-
ly, the exillence of an idea, confequent to a com-
mand of the will: But the manner, in which this
operation is performed ; the power, by which it is
produced; is entirely beyond our comprehenfion.

Secondly^ The command of the mind over it-
felf is limited, as well as its command over the
body; and thefe limits are not known by reafon,
or any acquaintance with the nature of caufe and
efFecc; but only by experience and obfervation,
as in all other natural events and in the operation
of external objecls. Our' authority over our fen-
timents and pafiions is much weaker than that
over our ideas; and even the latter authority is
circumfcribed within very narrow boundaries. Will
any one pretend to afTign the ultimate reafon of
thefe boundaries, or fliow why the power is de-
ficient in one cafe, not in another ?

Thirdly, This felf-command is very dijfiferent
at different times. A man in health polTeiTes

more

74 SECTION VII.

more of it, than one languiHiing with ficknefs,
"We are more mafter of our thoughts in the
morning than in the evening: Failing, than af-
ter a full meal. Can we give any reafon for
thefe variations, except experience ? V/here then
is the pov/er, of which we pretend to be confci-
oiis ? Is there not here, either in a fpiritiial or
material fubftance, or both, feme fecrct mecha-
nifim or ftriifture of parts, upon which the ef-
fect depends, -and which, being entirely unknov/n
to us, renders the power or energy of the will
equally unknov»'n and incomprehenfjble ?

• Volition is furely an aft of the mind, with which
we are fufficienr'y acquainted. Refieft upon it.
Confider it on all fides. Do you find vny thing in
it like this creative power, by which it raifes from
nothing a new idea, and with 2 kind of Fiat,
imitates the omnipotence of its Maker, if I may
be allowed fo to fpeak, who called forth into
exiftence all the various fcenes of nature ? So far
from being conicious of this energy in the will,
it requires as certain experience, as that of which
we are poffefTed, to convince us, that fuch extra-
ordinary efFeds do ever refult from a firnple a6l
of volition.

The generality of manking never find any dif-
ficulty in accounting for the more common and
familiar operations of nature; fuch as the defcent
of heavy bodies, the grov/th of plants, the gene-
ration of animals, or the nouriihment of bodies
by food : But fuppofe, that, in all thefe cafes,
they perceive the very force or energy oi the
caufe, by which it is conne6led with its c{-
i'ccty and is for ever infallible in its operation.
They acquire, by long habit, a turn of mind,
that, upon the appearance of the caufe, they
immediately expedt with affurance its ufual at-
tendant, and hardly conceive it poflible, that
any other event could refult from it. It is on-
ly on the difcovery of extraordinary phceno-

mcna.

of th^ Idea of Necessary Connexion. 7^

rnena, fuch-as earthquakes, pcftilence, and prodi-
gies of any kind, that they find themfelves at a
iofs to aliign a proper caufe, and to explain the
manner, in which the effc(5l is produced by it.
It is iilual for men, in fuch difficulties, to have
recourle to Ibme inviGblc intelligent principle*,
as the immediate caufe of that event, which fur-
prifes them, and which they think, cannot be ac-
counted for from the common powers of nature.
But philofophcrs, who carry their fcrutiny a little
farther, iiVimediaeely perceive, that, even in the
mod familiar events, the energy of the caufe is
as unintelligible as in the mofb unufual, and that
we only learn by experience the frequent Con-
jun(5i:ion of objects, without being ever able to
comprehend any thing like Connexion between
them. Here then, many philoibphers think them-
felves obliged by reafon to have recourfe, on all
occafions, to the fame principle, which the vul-
gar never appeal to but in cafes, that appear
miraculous and fupernatural. They acknowledge
mind and intelligence to be, not only the ulti-
inate and orio-inal caufe of all things, but the
immediate and fcle caufe of every event, which
appears in nature. They pretend, that thofe ob-
jeds, which are commonly denominated caiijes,
are in reality nothing but occafions \ and that the
true and dire£l principle of every effect is not any
power or force in nature, but a volition of the
Supreme Being, who v/ills, that fuch particular
objecfts fliould, for ever, be conjoined with each
other. Inftead of faying, that one billiard-ball
moves another, by a force, which it has derived
from the author of nature ; it is the Deity him-
felf, they fay, who, by a particular volition, moves
the fecond ball, being determined to this ope-
ration by the impulfe of the firft ball j in confe-
quence of thofe general laws, which he has laid

down

* 0Si^ CCTTO ^T^<i,n;^

76 SECTION VII.

down to himfelf in the government of the univeiTe.
But philoJbphers advancing flili in their enquiries,
difcover, that, as we are toZ3.\\y ignorant of the
power, on which depends the mutual operation of
bodies, we are no lefs ignorant of that power,
on which depends the operationof mind on bo-
dy, or of body on mind ; nor are we able, ei-
ther from our fenfes or confcioufnefs, to affign
the ultimate principle in one cafe, more than in
the other. The fame ignorance, therefore, redu-
ces them to the fame conclufion. They aflcrt, that
the Deity is the immediate caufe of the union be-
tween foul and bodyj and that they are not the
organs of fenfc, which, being agitated by exter-
nal objedfts, produce fenfations in the mind; but
that it is a particular volition of our omnipotent
Maker, which excites fuch a feniation, in confe-
quence of fuch a motion in the organ. In like
manner, it is not any energy in the will, in the
will, that produces local motion in our mem-
bers : It is God himfelf, who is pleafed to fe-
cond our will, in itfelf impotent, and to com-
mand that motion, which we erroneoufly attri-
bute to our own power and efRcacy. Nor do
philofophcrs Hop at this conclufion. They fome-
tim.es extend the fame inference to the mind it-
felf, in its internal operations. Our mental vifk-
on or conception of ideas is nothing but a revela-
tion made to us by our Maker. When we volun-
tarily turn our thoughts to any objeft, and raife
up its image in the fancy; it is not the will
which creates that idea: It is the univerfal Crea-
tor, who difcovers it to the mind, and renders
it prefent to us.

I'hus, according to thefe philofophcrs, every
thing is full of God. Not content with the prin-
ciple, that nothing exifts but by his will, that
nothing j)oire(res any power but by his concef-

fion :

of the Idea of Necessary Connexion. 77

fion: They rob nature, and all created beings,
of every power, in order to render their depen-
dence on the Deity Itill more fcnfible and imme-
diate. They confider not, that, by this theory,
they diminifh, inftead of magnifying, the gran-
deur of thofe attributes, which they affed fo much
to celebrate. It argues furely more power in the
Deity to delegate a certain degree of power to
inferior creatures, than to produce every thing by
his own immediate volition. It argues more wif-
dom to contrive at firll the fabric of the world
with fuch perfedl forefight, that, of itfelf, and by
its proper operation, it may ferve all the purpo-
fes of providence, than if the great Creator were
obliged every moment to adjufl its parts, and ani-
mate by his breath all the wheels of that ftupen-
dous machine.

But if we would have a more philofophical
confutation of this theory, perhaps the two fol-
lowing refiediions may fuffice.

Firj}^ It feems to me, that this theory of the
univerfal energy and operation of the Supreme
Being, is too bold ever to carry conviction with
it to a man, fufficiently apprized of the weaknefs
of human reafon, and the narrow limits, to which
it is confined in all its operations. Though the
chain of arguments, which conduct to it, were
ever fo logical, there muft arife a flrong fufpi-
cion, if not an abfolute aflurance, that it has car-
ried us quite beyond the reach of our faculties,
when it leads to conclufions fo extraordinary,
and fo remote from common life and experience.
We are got into fairy land, long ere we have
reached the laft fteps of our theory; and there
we have no reafon to trud our common methods
of argument, or to think that our ufual analo-
gies and probabilities have any authority. Our
line is too Ihort to fathom fuch immenfe abyfles.
And however we may flatter ourfelves, that we
are guided, in every Hep which we take, by a kind

of

78 SECTION Vll.

of verifimilitude and experience; we way be af-
fured, that this fancied experience has no authority,
when we thus apply it to fubjefts, that lie en-
tirely out of the fphere of experience. But on
this we Ihall have occafion to touch afterwards*.
Secondly, I cannot perceive any force in the ar-
guments, on which this theory is founded. Wo.
are ignorant, it is true, of the manner in which
bodies operate on each other : Their force or ener-
gy is entirely incomprehenfible: But are we not
equally ignorant of the manner or force by which
a mind, even the fupreme mind, operaces either
on itfelf or on body ? Whence, I befeech you, do
we acquire any idea of it ? We have no fentiment
or confcioufnefs of this power in ourfelves. We
have no idea of the Supreme Being but what we
learn from refiedlion on our own faculties. Were
our ignorance, therefore, a good reafon for rejed-
ing any thing, we fhould be led into that princi-
ple of denying all energy in the Supreme Being
as much as in the grof^ell matter. We furely
comprehend as little the operations of one as of
the other. Is it more difficult to conceive, that
motion may arife from impulfe, than that it mav
arife from volition ? All we know is our profound
ignorance in both cafes -j-.

P A R T II.

But to haflen to a conclufion of this argu-
ment, which is already drawn out to too great
a length : W^e have fought in vain for an idea
of power or neceffiry connexion, in all the four-
ces from which we could fuppofe it to be de-
rived. It appears, that, in fingle inftances of
the operation of bodies, we never can, by our
iitmoft fcrutiny, difcover any thing but one ^v^nt
following anotheri without being able to compre-
hend
• Seaion xir.

t See NOTE [D].

Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion. 79

hend any force or power, by which the caufe ope-
rates, or any connexion betv/een it and its fup-
pofed effe<fl:. The fame difficulty occurs in con-
templaiting the operations of mind on body;
where we obferve the motion of the latter to fol-
low upon the volition of the former j bnt are not
able to obferve or conceive the tye, which binds
together the motion and volition, or the energy
by which the mind produces this eflx^cl. The
authority of the will over its own faculties and
ideas is rot a v/hit more comprchcnfible : So that,
upon the whole, there appears not, throughout:
all nature, any one inftance of connexion, which
is conceivable by us. All events feem entirely
loofe and feparate. One event follows another;
but v;e never can obferve any tye between them.
Th^y feem conjoined^ but never connc5fcd. And as
v/e can have no idea of any tlhing, which never
appeared to our outward fenfe or inward fenti-
ment, the necelTary conclufion feems to be, that
we have no idea of connexion or power at all,
and that thefe words are abfolutely without any
meaning, when employed either in philofophicai
leafonings, or common life.

But there ftill remains one method of avoid-
ing this conclufion, and one fource which we have
not yet examined. When any natural object or
event is prefented, it is impoffible for us, by any
fagacity or penetration, to difcover, or even con-
jedlurc, without experience, what event will refalt
from it, or to carry our forefight beyond that
objed, wliich is immediately prefent to the me-
mory and fenfes. Even after one inftance or ex-
periment, where we have obferved a particular
event to follow upon another, we are not entit-
led to form a general rule, or foretel what will
happen in like cafes; it being juftly efteemed an
unpardonable temerity to judge of the whole
courfe of nature from one fingle experiment, how-
ever

So SECTION VII.

ever accurate or certain. But when one parti-
cular fpecies of event has alv/ays, in all inftan-
ces, been conjoined with another, we make no
longer any fcruple of foretelling one upon the
appearance of the other, and of employing that
reafonin^, which can alone afTure us of any mat-
ter of fact or exiftence. We then call the one
objedl, Cauje\ the other, Effe5i. We fuppofe, that
there is fome connexion between them; fome
power in the one, by which it infallibly produces
the other, and operates with the greateft certain-
ty and ftrongeft neceffity.

It appears, then, that this idea of a neceffary con-
nexion among events arifes from a number of
fimilar infbances, which occur, of the conftant con-
junction of thefe events ; nor can that idea ever
be fuggefted by any one of thefe inflances, fur-
veyed in all polTible lights and pofitions. But
there is nothing in a number of inflances, dif-
ferent from any fingle inftance, which is fuppofed
to be exadtly fimilar; except only, that after a
repetition of fimilar inftances, the mind is car-
ried by habit, upon the appearance of one event,
to expeft its ufual attendant, and to believe, that
it will exift. This connexion, therefore, which
we feel in the mind, this cuftomary tranfition of
the im.agination from one objedt to its ufual at-
tendant, is the fentiment or impreffion, froiTi
which we form the idea of power or neceffary
connexion. Nothing farther is in the cafe. Con-
template the fubjedl on all fides; you will never
find any other origin of that idea. This is the
fole difference between one inftance from which
we can never receive the idea of connexion, and
a number of fimilar inflances, by which it is
fuggefted. The firfl time a man law the com-
munication of motion by impulfe, as by the fhock
of two billiard-balls, he could not pronounce that
the one event was conne^ed: but only that it was

conjoined

of the Idea of Necessary Connexion. 8i

conjoined with the other. After he has obferved
feveral inftances of this nature, he then pronoun-
ces them to be connecied. What alteration has
happened to give rife to this new idea of con-
nexion'^ Nothing but that he now feeU thefe events
to be conne^ed in his imagination, and can readi-
ly foretel the fxiftence of one from the appear-
ance of the other. When we fay, therefore, that
one objett is connected with another, we mean
only, that tJiey have acquired a connexion in our
•thought, and give rife to this inference, by which
they become proofs of each other's exifcence :
A conclufion, which is fomewhat extraordinary^
but which feems founded on fufficient evidence.
Nor will its evidence be weakened by any gene-
ral diffidence of the underftanding, or fceptical
fufpicion concerning every conclufion, which is
new and extraordinary. No conclufions can be
more agreeable to fcepticifm than fuch as make
difcoveries concerning the weaknefs and narrow
limits o{ human reaion and capacity.

And what ftrong-er indance can be produced of
the furprifing ignorance and weaknefs of the un-
derftanding, than theprefent? For fu rely, if there
be any relation among objects, which it imports
us to know perfectly, it is caufe and effe6l.
On this are founded all cur reafonings concern-
ing matter of fact or exiftence. By means of it
alone we attain any afTurance concerning obje6ts,
which are removed from the prefent teftimony of
our memory and fenfes. The only immediate
utility of all fciences, is to teach us, how to
control and regulate future events by their cau-
fes. Our thoughts and enquiries are, therefore,
every moment, employed about this relation : Yet
fo imperfeft are the ideas which we form con-
cerning it, that it is impofUble to give any juft
definition of caufe, except what is drawn from
fomething extraneous and foreign to it. Similar

Vol. II. G objeds

82 SECTION VII.

obje£ts are always conjoined with fimilar. Of this
"Vve have experience. Suitably to this experience,
therefore, we may define a caiue to be an obje^y fol-
lowed by an other J and zvhere all the objecfSyJimilar to the
frjly are foUozved by oujeSis fimilar to the Jecond.
Or in othiir words, where^ if the firfi objetf had
not been, the fecond never had exijied. The appear-
ance of a caule alvv^ays conveys the mind, by a cuf-
tomary tranfition, to the idea of the effed:. Of
this alfo we have experience. We may, there-
fore, fuitably to this experience, form another
definition of caufe j and call it, an object followed
by another, and whoje appearance ahvays conveys
the thought to that other. But though both thefe
definitions be drav/n from circumftances foreign
to the caufe, v/e cannot remedy this inconveni-
ence, or attain any m.ore perfefl definition, which
may point out that circumllance in the caufe,
which gives it a connexion with its efi^eft. We
have no idea of this connexion; nor even any
diilinft notion what it is we defire to know, when
we endeavour at a conception of it. We fay,
for infhance, that the vibration of this firing is
the caufe of this particular found. But what do
we mean by that afiirmation ? We either mean,
that this vibration is followed by this found, and
that all fimilar vibrations have been followed by fi-
milar founds .■• Or, that this vibration is followed by
this found, and that upon the appearance of one, the
mind anticipates the fenfes, and forms immediately
an idea of the other. We may confider the re-
lation of caufe and efFe(5b in either of thefe twd
lights; but beyond thefe, we have no idea of it*.
To recapitulate, therefore, the reafonings of
this fedlion : Every idea is copied from fome pre-
ceding imprelTion or fentiment; and where we
cannot find any impreffion, we may be certain
that there is no idea. In all fingle inftances of

the
• See NOTE [E].

Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion. 83

the operation of bodies or minds, there is no-
thing that produces any imprefFion, nor confe-
quently can fugged any idea, of power or ne-
cefTary connexion. But when many uniform in-
ftances appear, and the fame objeft is always
followed by the fame events we then begin to
entertain the notion of caufe and connexion.
We then feel a new fentiment or impreflion, to
wit, a cuftomary connexion in the thought or
imagination between one objedt and its ufual at-
tendant; and this fentiment is the original of that
idea which we feek for. For as this idea arifes
from a number of fimiiar inftances, and not from
any fingle inftance; it muft arile from that cir-
cumftance, in which the number of inftances dif-
fer from every individual inftance. But this cuf-
tomary connexion or tranfition of the imagi-
nation is the only circumftance, in which they
differ. In every other particular they arc alike.
The firft inftance which we faw of motion, com-
municated by the fhock of two billiard-balls (to
return to this obvious illuftration) is exafbly fi-
miiar to any inftance .that may, at prefent, oc-
cur to us ; except only, that we could not, at
firft, infer one event from the other; which we are
enabled to do at prefent, after fo long a courfe
of uniform experience. I know not, whether the
reader will readily apprehend this reafoning. I
am afraid, that, ftiould 1 multiply words about
it, or throw it into a greater variety of lights,
it would only become more obfcure and intri-
cate. In all abftraft reafonings, there is one point
of view, which, if we can happily hit, we ftiall
go farther towards illuftrating the fubjeft, than
by all the eloquence and copious expreffion in
the world. This point of view we ftiould endea-
vour to reach, and referve the flowers of rheto-
ric for fubjefts which are more adapted to them.

G 2

[ 85 ]

SECTION VIIL

Of Liberty and Necessity.
PART I.

It might reafonably be expe^ed, in queftions,
which have been canvafled and difputed with great
eagernefs, fince the firft origin of fcience and phi-
lofophy, that the meaning of all the terms, atleaflr,
fhould have been agreed upon among the difpu-
tants ; and our enquiries, in the courfe of two
thoufand years, been able to pafs from words to
the true and real fubjed: of the controverfy. For
how eafy may it feem to give exaft definitions of
the terms employed in reafoning, and make thefe
definitions, not the mere found of words, the ob-
je6t of future fcrutiny and examination r But if
we confider the matter more narrowly, we (hall
be apt to draw a quite oppofite conclufion. From,
this circumftance alone, that a controverfy has beea
long kept on foot, and remains ftill undecided,
we may prefume, that there is fome ambiguiry ia
the expreflion, and that the difputants affix diife-
rent ideas to the terms employed in the controver-
fy. For as the faculties of the mind are
fuppofed to be naturally alike in every indivi-
dual ; otherwife nothing could be more fruitlefs
than to reafon or difpuce together j it were impof-

fible.

86 SECTION VIIL

fible, if men affix the fame ideas to their terrr?
that they could fo long form different opinion^
of the fame fubjeft ; efpecially when they com-
municate their views, and each party turn them-^
felves on all fides, in fearch of arguments, which
may give them the vicftory over their antagoniils.
It is true ; if men attempt the difcuITion of quef-
tions, which lie entirely beyond the reach of human
capacity, fuch as thofe concerning the origin of
worlds, or the ceconomy of the intelleclual fyftem
or region of fpirits, they may long beat the air
in their fruitlefs conteils, and never arrive at any
determinate conclufion. But if the queftion re-
gard any fubjedt of common IJfe and experience -,
nothing, one would thing, could prcferve the dif-
pute fo long undecided, but fome ambiguous ex-
prefTions, which keep the antagonifls ftill at a dif-
tance, and hinder them from grappling with each
other.

This has been the cafe in the long difputed
quefbion concerning liberty and necelTityj and to
fo remarkable a degree, that, if I be not much
miftaken, we fhall find, that all mankind, both
learned and ignorant, have always been of the
fame opinion with regard to this fubjecb, and that
a few intelligible dehnitions would immediately
have put an end to the whole controverfy. I own,
that this difpute has been fo much canvafTed on
all hands, and has led philofophers into fuch a
labyrinth of obfcure fophiilry, that it is no won-
der, if a fenfible reader indulge his eafe fo far as
to turn a dt^i" ear to the propofal of fuch a quef-
tion, from which he can cxped neither inilrudion
nor entertainment. But the Hate of the argument
here propofed may, perhaps, ferve to renew his
attention ; as it has more noveky, promifes at lead
fome decifion of the controverfy, and will not
much diilurb his eafe by any intricate or obfcure
rcafoning.

1 hope.

'&•

or LiBERTv and Necessity. 87

I liope, therefore, to make it appear, that all
men have ever agreed in the dodrine both of ne-
cefllty and of liberty, according to any reafonable
fenfe, which can be put on thefe terms ; and that
the whole controverfy has hitherto turned merely
upon words. We fhall begin with examining the
doftrine of neceffity.

It is univerlally allowed, that matter, in all its
operations, is actuated by a neceOary force, and
that every natural effedl is fo jorecifely determined
by the energy of its caufe, that no other eifeft, in
fuch particular circumftances, could pofTibly have
refulted from it. The degree and dire6lion of
every motion is, by the laws of nature, prefcribed
with fuch exadnefs, that a living creature may as
foon arife from the fhock of two bodies, as moti-
on, in any other degree or dire6lion than what is
adlually produced by it. Would we, therefore,
form a juft and precife idea of necejjity^ wc mufb
confider whence that idea arifes, when we apply
it to the operation of bodies.

It feems evident, that, if all the fcenes of na-
ture were continually fhifted in fuch a manner,
that no two events bore any refemblance to each
other, but every object was entirely new, without
any fimilitude to whatever had been feen before,
we fhould never, in that cafe, have attained the
leaft idea of necciTity, or of a connexion among
thefe objetts. We might fay, upon fuch a fup-
pofition, that one objett or event has followed
another j not that one was produced by the
other. The relation of caufe and effett muft
be utterly unknown to mankind. Inference and
reafoning concerning the operations of nature
would, from that moment, be at an end j and
the memory and fenfes remain the only canals,
by which the knowledge of any real exillence
could pofiibly have accefs to the mind. Our
idea, therefore, of neceffity and caufation arifes

entirely

88 SECTION Vin.

Entirely from the uniformity, obfervable in the
operations of nature ; where fimilar objetls are"
conftantly conjoined together, and the mind is
determined by cuftom to infer the one from the
appearance of the other. Thefe two circumftances
form the whole of that necefiity, which we afcribe
to matter. Beyond the conftant conjanStion of
fimilar objects, and the confequent inference from
one to the other, we have no notion of any necef-
iity, or connexion.

If it appear, therefore, that all mankind have
ever ailov/ed, without any doubt or hefitation, that
thefe two circumftances take place in the volun-
tary aftions of men, and in the operations of
mind; it muft follow, that all mankind have ever
agreed in the doftrine of necelTity, and that they
have hitherto difputed, merely for not underftand-
ing each other.

As to the firft circumftance, the conftant and re-
gular conjunction of fimilar events; we may pof-
fibly fatisfy ourfelves by the following confide-
rations. It is univerfally acknowleded, that there
is a great uniformity among the aftions of men,'
in all nations and ages, and that human nature
femain^s ftill the fame, in its principles and ope-
rations. The fame motives always produce the
fame a<ftions : The fame events follow from the
fame caufes. Ambition, avarice, felf-love, vanity,
friendlhp, generofity, public fpirit ; thefe paflions,
mixed in various degrees, and dillributed through
fociety, have been, from the beginning of the
world, and ftill are, the fource of all the ac-
tions and enterprizes, which have ever been obfer\-
ed among mankind. Would you know the fen-
timents, inclinations, and courle of life of the
Greeks and Romans ? Study well the temper and
actions of the French and Englifli . You cannot
be much miftaken in transferring to the former
mojl of the obfervations, which you have made

v.'ith

of Liberty and Necessity. S^

■with regard to the latter. Mankind are fc much
the fame, in all times and places that hiftory in-
forms us of nothing new or ftrange in this parti-
cular. Its chief ufe is only to difcover the con-
ftant and univerfal principles of human nature, by
fliewing men in all varieties of circumftances and
fituations, and furnifhing us with materials, from
which we may form our obfervations, and become
acquainted with the regular fprings of human ac-
tion and behaviour. Thefe records of wars, in-
trigues, fa6\ions, and revolutions, are fo many
collections of experiments, by which the politi-
cian or moral philofopher fixes the principles of his
fcience ; in the fame manner as the phyfician or
natural philofopher becomes acquainted with the
nature of plants, minerals, and other external ob-
jedls, by the experiments, which he forms con-
cerning them. Not are the earth, water, and other
elements, examined by Ariftotle, and Hippocrates,
more like to thofe, which at prefent lie under our
obfervation, than the men, defcribed by Polybius
and Tacitus, are to thofe, who now govern the
world.

Should a traveller, returning from a far coun-
try, bring us an account of men, wholly different
from any, with whom we were ever acquainted ;
men, who were entirely divefted of avarice, ambi-
tion, or revenge ; who knew no pleafure but friend-
fhip, generofity, and public fpirit ; we fhould im-
mediately, from thefe circumftances, dete6t the
falfehood, and prove him a liar, with the fame
certainty as if he had ftuffed his narration with
ftories of centaurs and dragons, miracles and pro-
digies. And if we would explode any forgery in
hiftory, we cannot make ufe of a more convincing
argument, than to prove, that the aftions, afcrib-
ed to any perfon, are diredlly contrary to the courfe
of nature, and that no human motives, in fuch
circumftances, could ever induce him to fuch a

condud.

9d SECTION VIII.

condufl. The veracity of Quintus Curtius is as
much to be fufpefted, when he defcribes the fu-
pernatural courage of Alexander, by which he was
hurried on fingly to attack multitudes, as when
he defcribes his fupernatural force and adivity, by
which he was able to refift them. So readily and
univerfally do we acknowledge a uniformity in hu-
man motives and adlions as well as in the operati-
ons of body.

Hence likewife the benefit of that experience,
acquired by long life and a variety of bufinefs and
company, in order to inftru(5t us in the principles
of human nature, and regulate our future conduct,
as well as fpeculation. By means of this guide,
we mount up to the knowledge of men's inclina-
tions and motives, from their a6tions, expreffions,
and even geftures ; and again, defcend to the in-
terpretation of their anions from our knowledge of
their motives and inclinations. The general ob-
fervations, treafured up by a courfe of experience,
give us the clue of human nature, and teach us
to unravel all its intricacies. Pretexts and ap-
pearances no longer deceive us. Public declarati-
ons pafs for the fpecious colouring of a caufe.
And though virtue and honour be allowed their
proper weight and authority, that perfe<5t difinte-
reftednefs, fo often pretended to, is never expedled
in multitudes and parties ; feldom in their lea-
ders ; and fcarcely even in individuals of any rank
or ftation. But were there no uniformity in hu-
man adions, and were every experiment, which
wc could form of this kind, irregular and ano-
malous, it were impoiTible to collect any general
obfervations concerning mankind ; and no expe-
rience, however accurately digclled by retieftion,
would ever ferve to any purpofe. Why is the
^ged hufbandman more ilcilful in his calling than
the young beginner, but becaufe there is a cer-
tain uniformity in the operation of the fun, rain,

and

Of Liberty and Necessity. 91

and earth, towards the production of vegeta-
bles ; and experience teaches the old pradtitioner
the rules, by which this operation is governed and
dirc<fled.

We mufl not, however, expeft, that this uni-
formity of human adlions fhould be carried to fiich
a leneth, as that all men, in the fame circum-
ftances, will always adl precifely in the fame man-
ner, without making any allowance for the diver-
fity of characT:ers, prejudices, and opinions. Such
a uniformity in every particular, is found in no
part of nature. On the contrary, from obferving
the variety of conduct in different men, we are
enabled to- form a greater variety of maxims,
which ftill fuppofe a degree of uniformity and re-
gularity.

Are the manners of men different in different
ages and countries ? We learn thence the great
force of cultom and education, which mould the
human mind from its infancy, and form it into a
fixed and eftablifhed chara£ter. Is the behaviour
and conduct of the one fex very unlike that of the
other ? It is thence we become acquainted with
the different characters,- which nature has impreffed
upon the fexes, and which fhe preferves with con-
ftancy and regularity. Are the adtions of the
fame perfon much diverfified in the different pe-
riods of his life, from infancy to old age ? This
affords room for many general obfervations con-
cerning the gradual change of our fentiments
and inclinations, and the different maxims, which
prevail in the different ages of human creatures.
Even the characters, which are peculiar to each
individual, have a uniformity in their influence;
otherwife our acquaintance with the perfons and
our obfervation of their condu6t, could never teach
us their difpofitions, or ferve to dire6l our behavi-

our with regard to them.

I grant

92 SECTION viir.

I grant it pofTible to find fome adions, which
feem to have no regular connexion with any known
motives, and are exceptions to all the meafures of
condiid:, which have ever been eftablijfhed for the
government of men. But if v/e would willingly
know, what judgment fliould be formed of fuch ir-
regular and extraordinary aftions ; we may con-
fider the fentiments, commonly entertained with
regard to thofe irregular events, which appear in
the courfe of nature, and the operations of exter-
nal objefls. All caufes are not conjoined to their
ufual effects, with like uniformity. An artificer,
who handles only dead matter, may be difappoint-
ed of his aim, as well as the politician, who di-
redls the condud; of fenfible and intelligent
agents.

The vulgar, who take things according to their
firft appearance, attribute the uncertainty of events
to fuch an uncertainty in the caufes as makes
the latter often fail of their ufual influence; though
they meet with no impediment in their operati-
on. But philofophers, obferving, that, almoft in
every part of nature, there is contained a vaft va-
riety of fprings and principles, which are hid, by
reafon of their minutenefs or remotenefs, find, that
it is at leaft poffible the contrariety of events may
not proceed from any contingency in the caufe, but
from the fecret operation of contrary caufes. This
pofTibility is converted into certainty by farther ob-
fcrvation ; when they remark, that, upon an exa£t
fcrutiny, a contrariety of efiefts always betrays a
contrariety of caufes, and proceeds from their mu-
tual oppofition. A peafant can give no better
reafon for the Hopping of any clock or watch than
to fay that it does not commonly go right : But
an artift: eafily perceives, that the fame force in the
fpring or pendulum has always the fame influence
on the wheels j but fails of its ufual efl^edt, perhaps
by reafon of a grain of duft:, which puts a ftop to

the

or Liberty and Necessity. 97

the whole movement. From the obfervation o
feveral parallel inftances, philofophers form a
maxim, that the connexion between all caiil'es and
effects is equally neceffary, and that its Teeming
uncertainty in fome inllances proceeds from the fe-
cret oppofition of contrary caufes.

Thus for inftance, in the human body, when
the ufual fymptoms of health or ficknefs difappoint
our expectation -, when medicines operate not with
their wonted powers j when irregular events fol-
low from any particular caufe j the philofopher
and phyfician are not furprized at the matter, nor
are ever tempted to deny, in general, the neceffity
and uniformity of thofe principles, by which the
animal oeconomy is conducted. They know, that
a human body is a mighty complicated machine :
That many fecret powers lurk in it, which are al-
together beyond our comprehenfion : That to us it
muft often appear very uncertain in its operations :
And that therefore the irregular events, which out-
wardly difcover themfelves, can be no proof, that
the laws of nature are not obferved with the
greateft regularity in its internal operations and
government.

The philofopher, if he be confident, muft apply
the fame reafoning to the actions and volitions of
intelligent agents. The moft irregular and un-
expected refolutions of men may frequently be
accounted for by thofe, who know every particular
circumftance of their chara6ler and fituation. A
perfon of an obliging difpofition gives a peevifh.
anfwer . But he has the toothake, or has not dined.
A ftupid fellow difcovers an uncommon alacrity in
his carriage : But he has met with a fudden piece
of good fortune. Or even when an adion, as
fometimes happens, cannot be particularly account-
ed for, either by the perfon himfelf or by others ;
we know, in general, that the chara6ters of men
arCj to a certain degree, inconftanc and irregular.

This

94 SECTION VIII.

This is, in a manner, the conflant tharader of
human n;itiire ; though it be applicable, in a more
particular manner, to fome perfons, who have no
fixed rule for their conduct, but proceed in a con-
tinued courfe of caprice and inconftancy. The
internal principles and motives may operate in a
uniform manner, notvvithftanding thefe feeming
irregularities -, in the fame manner as the winds,
rain, clouds, and other variations of the weather
are fuppofed to be governed by fteady principles ;
thougli not eafily difcoverable by human fagacity
and enquiry.

Thus it appears, not only that the conjundion
between motives and voluntary aftions is as regu-
lar and uniform, as that between the caufe and
efFeft in any part of nature ; but alfo that this re-
gular conjundion has been univerfally acknow-
ledged among mankind, and has never been the
fubje6t of difpute, either in philofophy or com-
mon life. Now, as it is from pad experience,
that we draw all inferences concerning the fu-
ture, and as we conclude, that objects will al-
ways be conjoined together, which we find to have
always been conjoined ; it may feem fuperfluous
to prove, that this experienced uniformity in hu-
man acftions is a fource, whence we draw inferen-
ces concerning them. But in order to throw
the argument into a greater variety of lights,
we fliall alfo infill, though briefly, on this lat-
ter topic.

The mutual dependence of men is fo great,
in all focieties, that fcarce any human aclion is
entirely compleat in itfelf, or is performed with-
out fome reference to the adlions of others, which
are requifite to make it anfwer fully the intention
of the agent. The pooreil artificer, who labours
alone, expefts at lealt the protedion of the magi-
Itrate, to enfure him the enjoyment of the fruits
of hid labour. He alfo expeds, that, when he

carries

Of Liberty and Necessity. 95

carries his goods to market, and oflers them at
a reafonable price, he fhall find purchafers; and
fhall be able, by the money he acq'iires, to en-
gage others to fupply him with thofe commodi-
ties, which are requifite for his fubfiftence. In
proportion as men extend their dealings, and ren-
der their intercourfe with others more complicated,
they always comprehend, in their fchemes of life,
a greater variety of voluntary anions, which they
expedl, from the proper motives, to co-operate
with their own. In all thefe conclufions, they
take their meafures from paft experience, in the
fame manner as in their reafonings concerning ex-
ternal objects ; and firmly believe, that men, as
well as all the elements, are to continue, in their
operations, the fame, that they haye ever found
them. A manufacturer reckons upon the labour
of his fervants, for the execution of any work, as
much as upon the tools, which he employs, and
would be equally furprized, were his expedations
difappointed. In fhort, this experimental inference
and reafoning concerning the adions of others en-
ters fo much into human life, that no man, while
awake, is ever a moment without employing it.
Have we not reafon, therefore, to affirm, that all
mankind have always agreed in the doftrine of ne-
ccfllry, according to the foregoing definition and
explication of it ?

Nor have philofophers ever entertained a diffe-
rent opinion from the people in this particular.
For not to mention, that almoft every a£lion of
their life fuppofes that opinion ; there are even
few of the fpeculative parts of learning, to which
it is not efiential. What would become o( hijiory,
had we not a dependence on the veracity of the
hiftorian, according to the experience, which we
have had of mankind ? How could politics be a
fcience, if laws and forms of government had not
a uniform influence upon fociety ? Where would be

the

96 SECTION VIII.

the foundation of morals^ if particular charafters
had no certain or determinate power to produce
particular fentiments, and if thefe fentinrjents had
no conftant operation on actions ? And with what
pretence could we employ our criticijm upon any
poet or polite author, if we could not pronounce
the condu(5l and fentiment of his a61:ors, either na-
tural or unnatural, to fuch characters, and in fuch
circumftances ? It feems almoft impofiible, there-
fore, to engage, either in fcience or aftion of any
kind, without acknowledging the doclrine of ne-
cefTity, and this inference from motives to voluntary
adtions ; from characters to conduft.

And indeed, when we confider how aptly yiatural
and moral evidence link together, and form only
one chain of argument, we fhall make no fcruple
to allow, that they are of the fame nature, and de-
rived Yrom the fame principles. A prifoner, who
has neither money nor intereft, difcovers the im-
polTibility of his efcape, as well when he confiders
the obftinacy of the gaoler, as the walls and bars,
•with which he is furrounded ; and, in all attempts
for his freedom, chufes rather to work upon the
ftone and iron of the one, than upon the inflexible
nature of the other. The fame prifoner, when
condufted to the fcafFold, forefces his death as
certainly from the conftancy and fidelity, of his
guards, as from the operation of the ax or wheel.
His mind runs along a certain train of ideas : The
refufal of the foldiers to confent to his efcape ;
the aftion of the executioner \ the feparation of the
head and body ; bleeding, convulfive motions, and
death. Here is a connefted chain of natural caufes
and voluntary aftions ; but the mind feels no dif-
ference between them, in palTing from one link to
another : Nor is lefs certain of the future event
than if it were conncd:ed with the objcdls prefent
to the memory or fenfes, by a train of caufes, ce-
mented together by what we are pleafed to call a

fhyfical

Of L I B E R T V and Necessitv. 97

phyf:c(il ntCQ^xiy. The fame experienced union has
the fame effect on the mind, whether the united
objects be motives, volition, and adlions ; or figure
and motion. We may change the names of things ;
but their nature and their operation on die under-
ftandino; never chano;e.

Were a man, whom I know to be honed and
opulent, and with whom I live in intimate friend-
fhip, to come into my houfe, where I am furround-
ed with my fervants, I reft afTured, that he is not
to ftab me before he leaves it, in order to rob me
of my filver ftandil"h j and I no more fufucil this
event, than the falling of the houfe itfelf which is
new, and folidly built and founded. — But be may
have been feized with a Judden and unknown frenzy.
— So may a fudden earthquake arife, and fliake
and tumble my houfe about my ears. I fhall
therefore change the fuppofitions. I fhall fay, that
I know with certainty, that he is not to put his
hand into the fire, and hold it there, till it be
confumed : And this event, I think I can foretell
with the fame affiirance, as that, if he throw him-
felf out at the windov/, and meet with no obftruc-
tion, he will not remain a moment fufpended in the
air. No fufpicion of an unknown frenzy can give
the leaft pollibility to the former event, which is
fo contrary to all the known principles of human
nature. A inan who at noon leaves his purfe full
of gold on the pavement at Charing-Crofs, may
as well expe6t that it will fiy away like a feather,
as that he will find it untouched an hour after.
Above one half of human reafonings contain in-
ferences of a fimilar nature, attended with more or
lefs degrees of certainty, proportioned to our ex-
perience of the ufual condud of mankind in fuch
particular fituations.

Vol. II. H I have

98 SECTION VIII.

1 have frequently confidered, what could pofli-
bly be the reafon, why all mankind, though they
have ever, without hefitation, acknowledged the
dodrine of neceffity, in their whole practice and
reafoning, have yet difcovered luch a reludlance to
acknowledge it in words, and have rather fnewn a
propenfity, in all ages, to profefs the contrary
opinion. The matter, I think, may be accounted
for, after the following manner. If we examine
the operations of body, and the production of
effedls from their caufes, we fiiall find, that all our
faculties can never carry us farther in our know-
ledge of this relation, than barely to obferve, that
particular objetts are confiantly conjoined together,
and that the mind is carried, by a cufiomary tranfi-
t'lon^ from the appearance of one to the belief of
the other. But though this conclufion concerning
human ignorance be the refult of the flri(fteft
fcrutiny of this fubjecl, men Hill entertain a flrong
propenfity to believe, that they penetrate farther
into the powers of nature, and perceive fomething
like a necefTary connexion between the caufe and
the effedl. When again they turn their reflections
towards the operations of their own minds, and
feel no fuch connexion of the motive and the ac-
tion ; they are thence apt to fuppofe, that there is a
diflerence between the effects, which refult from ma-
terial force, and thofe which arile from thought
and intelligence. But beinn; once convinced, that
we know nothing farther ol caufation of any kind,
than merely the conjlant conjiin^ion of objefts,
and the confequent inference ot the mind from
one to another, and finding, that thefe two cir-
cumfbances are univerfally allowed to have place
in voluntary actions ; we may be more eafily led
to own the fame neceffity common to all caufes.
And th.ough this reafoning mav contradift the fyf-
tems of many philofophers, in afcribing necelTity
to the determinations of the will, we Ihall find,

upon

or Liberty and Necessity. 99

upon refleftion, that they difTent from it in words
only, not in their real fentimcnt. NecefTity, ac-
cordino; to the fenfe, in which it is here taken, has
never yet been rejeded, nor can ever, I think, be
rejefted by any philofopher. It may only, perhaps,
be pretended, that the mind can perceive, in the
operations of matter, fome farther connexion be-
tween the caufe and effect; and a connexion that
has not place in the voluntary aftions of intelli-
gent beings. Now whether it be fo or not,
can only appear upon examination ; and it is in-
cumbent on thcfe philofophers to make good their
affertion, by defining or defcribing that neceffity,
and pointing it out to us in the operations of ma-
terial caufcs.

It would feem, indeed, that men begin at the
wrong end of this queftion concerning liberty
and neceflity, when they enter upon it by ex-
amining the faculties of the foul, the influence of
the underftanding, and the operations of the will.
Let them firll difcufs a more fimple queftion,
namely, the operations of body and of brute
unintelligent matter j and try whether they can
there form any idea of caufation and necefTity,
except that of a conftant conjunftion of objefts,
and fubfequent inference of the mind from one
to another. If thefe circumftances form, in
reality, the whole of that necefTity, which we
conceive in matter, and if thefe circumftances be
alfo univerfally acknowledged to take place in
the operations of the mind, the difpute is at an
end ; at leaft, muft be owned to be thenceforth,
merely verbal. But as long as we will rafhly
fuppofe, that we have fome farther idea of ne-
cefTity and caufation in the operations of exter-
nal objects ; at the fame time, that we can find
nothing farther, in the voluntary aflions of the
mind ; there is no pofTibility of bringing the
c[ueflion t;o any determinate iflue, while we pro-

H Q, ceed

TOO SECTION virr.

ceed upon fo erroneous a fuppofition. The on^
ly method of undeceiving us, is> to mount up
higher] to examine the narrow extent of fcience
when applied to material caiifes j and to convince-
ourfelves, that all we know of them, is, the con-
ilant conjun6lion and inference above mention-
ed. We may, perhaps, find, that it is with diffi-
culty we are induced to fix fuch narrow limits to hu-
man underftanding : But we can afterwards find no
difficulty when we come to apply this doctrine to the'
a6lions of the will. For as it is evident,, that
thefe have a regular conjundion with motives^
and circumftances and chara6lers, and as we al-
ways draw inferences from one to the other, we
mufl be obliged to acknowledge in words, that
necelTity, which v/e have already avowed, in eve-
ry deliberation of our lives, and in every Hep or
our condu(5l and behaviour*.

But to proceed in this reconciling projefl with
regard to the queftion of liberty and neceffity ;
the moft contentious queftion, of metaphyfics,
tlie moft contentious fcience ; it will not require
many words to prove,- that all mankind have
ever agreed in the dodrine of liberty as well as
in that of neceffity, and that the whole difpute,.
in this refpeft alfo, has been hitherto merely ver-
bal. For what is meant by liberty, when appli-
ed to voluntary atlions ? We cannot furely mean,
that actions have fo little connexion with mo-
tives, inclinations, and circumftances, that one
does not follow with a certain degree of uni-
formity from the other, and that one afiords no
inference by which we can conclude the exif-
tcnce of the other. For thefe are plain and ac-
knovvlcdged matters of fadt. By liberty, then,
we can only mean a power of a^ing or 7iot atlingy
eiccording to the deienninatioHS of the will ; that is>

if

• Sec NOTE [FJ.

Of Liberty and N e c e s s i t v. i oi

if we chufe to remain at refl, we may; if we
•chufe to move, we alfo may. Now this hypo-
thetical liberty is univerfally allowed to belong
to every one, who is not a prifoner and in chains.
Here then is no fubjefb of difpute.

Whatever definition we may give of liberty,
we flioiild be careful to obferve two reqiiifite
-circumllancesj firjl^ that it be confiftent with plain
matter of fa6t; fecoiidly, that it be confiftent with
itfelf. If we obferve thefe circumftances, and ren-
der our definition intelligible, I am perfuaded that
all mankind w^ill be found of one opinion with
regard to it.

It is univerfally allowed^ that nothing exifts
without a caufc of its exiftence, and that chance,
when ftridly examined, is a mere negative word,
and means not any real power, which has any
where, a being in nature. But it is pretended,
that fome caufes are neceflary, fome not necef-
fary. Her-e then is the advantage of definitions.
Let any one define a caufe, without comprehend-
ing, as a part of the defijiition, a necejj'ary con-
nexion with its efFeft ; and let him Jdiew difl:in6lly
the origin of the idea^ cxprefTed by the defini-
tion; and I fhall readily give up the whole con -
troverfy. But if the foregoing explication -of the
matter be received, this muft be abfolutely im-
pradlicable. Had not objeds a regular conjunc-
tion with each other, we fhould fiever have en-
tertained any notion of caufe and efi-ecl; and this
regular conjundlion produces that inference of
the underftanding, which is the only connexion,
that we can have any comprehenfion of. Who-
ever attempts a definition of caufe, exclufive of
thefe circumftances, will be obliged, either to em-
ploy unintelligible terms, or fuch as are fyno-
nimous to the term, which he endeavours to de-
fine*. And if the definition above mentioned

be
* See NOTE [G].

102 SECTION VIII.

be admitted ; liberty, when oppofed to necefllty,
not to conftraint, is the fame thing with chance;
which is univerfally allowed to have no exiftence.

PART II.

There is no method of reafoning more com-
mon, and yet none more blameable, than, in phi-
lofophical difputes, to endeavour the refutation of
any hypothefis, by a pretence of its dangerous con-
fequences to religion and morality. When any
opinion leads to abfurdities, it is certainly falfej
but it is not certain that an opinion is falfe, be-
caufe it is of dangerous confequence. Such topics,
therefore, ought entirely to be forborne; as ferv-
ing nothing to the difcovery of truth, but only
to make the perfon of an antagonift odious.
This I obferve in general, without pretending to
xiraw any advantage from it. I frankly fubmit
to an examination of this kind, and fhall ven-
ture to affirm, that the doclrines, both of necef-
fity and of liberty, as above explained, are not
only confiftent with morality, but are abfolute-
ly efiential to its fupport.

Necefllty may be defined two ways, confor-
mably to the two definitions of cauje^ of which
it makes an eflVntial part. It confifts either in
the conftant conjundion of like objefts, or in the
inference of the undcrfhanding from one objedl to
another. Now necefllty, in both thefe fenfes,
(which, indeed, arc at the bottom, the fame) has
univerfally, though tacitly, in the fchools, in the
pulpit, and in common life, been allowed to be-
long to the will of man; and no one has ever
pretended to deny, that we can draw inferences
concerning human adlions, and that thofe in-
ferences are founded on the experrenced union
of like actions, v/ith like motives, inclinations,
and circuinitances. The only particular, in which

a.ny

of Liberty and Nf. cessity. 103

any one can differ, is, that either, perhaps, he
will refufe to give the name of neceffity to this
property of human actions : But as long as the
meaning is underftood, I hope the word can do
no harm: Or that he will maintain it poffible to
difcover fomething farther in the operations of
matter. But this, it muft be acknowledged, can
be of no confequence to morality or religion,
whatever it may be to natural philofophy or me-
taphyfics. We may here be miftaken in alTerting, that
there is no idea of any other necelTary connex-
ion in the adions of body : But furely we af-
cribe nothing to the a6lions of the mind, but
what every one does, and muft readily allow
of. We change no circumftance in the receiv-
ed orthodox fyftem with regard to the will, but
only in that with regard to material objefts and
caufes. Nothing therefore can be more innocent,
at leaft, than this do6lrine.

All laws being founded on rewards and pu-
nifhrnjcntSj it is fuppofed as a fundamental prin-
ciple, that thefe motives have a regular and uni-
form influence on the mind, and both produce
the good and prevent the evil adtions. We may
give to this influence what name we pleafej but,
as it is ufually conjoined with the aftion, it muft
be efteemed a cauje, and be looked upon as an
inftance of that neceffity, which we would here
eftabliih.

The only proper object of hatred Dr ven-
geance, is a perfon or creature, endowed with
thought and confcioufnefsi and when any crimi-
nal or injurious actions excite that paffion, it is
only by their relation to the perfon, or connexi-
on with him. Actions are, by their very nature,
temporary and perilhingj and where they pro-
ceed not from fome caufe in the character and
difpofition of the perfon who performed them,
they can neither redound to his honour, if good;

nor

J04 SECTION VIII.

nor infamy, if evil. The actions themfelves may
be blameable; they may be contrary to all the
rules of morality and religion: But the perfon
is not anfwerable for them 3 and as they pro-
ceeded from nothing in him, that is durable and
coniLant, and leave nothing of that nature behind
them, it is impcffible he can upon their account,
becom.e the object of punifhment or vengeance.
According to che principle, therefore, which de-
nies nccelTity, and confequently caufes, a man is
as pure and untainted, alter having committed
the moil horrid crime, as at the firll moment;
of his b'-^h, nor is his character any wife con-
cerned in his actions; lince they are not derived
from it, and the wickedneis of the one can ne-
ver beufed as a proof of the depravity of the other.

Men are not blamed for fuch actions, as they
perform ignorandy and cafually, whatever may
be the confeq.iences. Why ? but becaule the prin-
ciples of thefe actions are only momentary, and
terminate in them alone. Men are lefs blamed
for fuch actions as they perform haftily and un-
premeditately, than for fuch as proceed from de-
liberation. For what realbn ? but becaufe a halty
temper, though a conftant caufe or principle ia
the mind, operates only by intervals, and infects
not the whole character. Again, repentance wipes
off any crime, if attended with a reformation of
life and manners. How is this to be accounted
for? but by afferting, that actions render a per-
fon criminal, merely as they are proofs of cri-
minal principles in the mindj and when, by an
alteration of thefe principles, they ceafe to be
juft proofs, they likewife ceafe to be criminal.
But, except upon the doctrine of necefTity, they
never were juil proofs, and confequently never
were criminal.

It will be equally eafy to prove, and from the
fame arguments, that liberty^ according to that

• definition

of Liberty and Necessity. 105

definition above mentioned, in which all men
agree, is alfo cffential to morality, and that no
human actions, where it is wanting, are fufcep-
tible of any moral qualities, or can be the ob-
jects either of approbation or diOike. For as
actions are objects of our moral fentiment, fo far
only as they are indications of the internal cha-
racter, pafnons, and affections ; it is impoffible
that they can give rife either to praife or blame,
where they proceed not from thefe principles, but
are derived altogether from external violence.

I pretend not to have obviated or rcmove4
all obje6lions to this theory, with regard to ne-
ceffity and liberty. I can forefee other objedti-
ons, derived from topics, which have not here
been treated of. It may be faid, for inftance,
that, if voluntary aftions be fubjefted to the fame
laws of necelTity with the operations of matter,
there is a continued chain of neceffary caufe^,
pre-ordained and pre-determined, reaching from
the original caufe of all, to every volition of every
human creature. No contingency any where in
the univerfe; no indifference; no liberty. While
we adl, v,'e are, at the fame time, afted upon.
The ultimate Author of all our volitions is the
Creator of the world, who firH bellowed mo-
tion on this immenfe machine, and, placed all
beings in that particular pofition, whence every
fubfequent event, by an inevitable neceffity,
muft refult. Human actions, therefore, either
can have no moral turpitude at all, as proceed-
ing from fo good a caufe; or if they have any
turpitude, they m.uft involve our Creator in the
fame guilt, while he is acknowledged to be their
ultimate caufe and author. For as a man, who
fired a mine, is anlwerable for all the confequen-
ces whether the train he employed be long or
fhort ; fo v/herever a continued chain of necef-
fary caufes is fixed, that Being, either finite, or

infinite.

io6 SECTION VIII.

infinite, who produces the firft, is likewife the
author of all the reft, and muft both bear the
blame and acquire the praife, which belong to
them. Our clear and unalterable ideas of mo-
rality eftablilTi this rule, upon unqueftionable rea-
ibns, when we examine the confequences of any-
human adion; and thefe reafons muft ftill have
greater force, when applied to volitions and in-
tentions of a Being, infinitely wife and powerful.
Ignorance or impotence may be pleaded for fo
limited a creature as man; but thofe imperfedi-
ons have no place in our Creator. He forefaw,
he ordained, he intended all thofe adions of men,
which we fo raftily pronounce criminal. And we
muft therefore conclude, either that they are not
criminal, or that the Deity, not man, is accoun-
table for them. But as either of thefe pofitions
is abfurd and impious, it follows, that the doc-
trine, from which they are deduced, cannot pof-
fibly be true, as being liable to all the fame ob-
jedlions. An abfurd confequence, if neceffary,
proves the original dodlrine to be abfurd; in the
fame manner as criminal aftions render crimi-
iial the original caufe, if the connexion between
them be neceffary and inevitable.

This objection confifts of two parts, which we
Ihall examine feparately; FirJ}^ that, if human
aftions can be traced up, by a neceffary chain,
to the Deity, they can never be criminal; on ac-
count of the infinite perfeftion of that Being,
from whom they are derived, and who can in-
tend nothing but what is altogether good and
laudable. Or, Secondly^ if they be criminal, we
muft retrafl the attribute of perfection, which
we afcribe to the Deity, and muft acknowledge
him to be the ultimate author of n^uilt and moral
turpitude in all his creatures.

The anfwer to the firft objedlion feems obvious
and convincing. There are many philofophers,

who,

of Liberty and Necessity, 107

who, after an cxaft fcrutiny of all the phaenomena
of nature, conclude, that the Whole, confidered
as one iyftem, is, in every period of its exiftence,
ordered with perfe£l benevolence ; and that the
utmoft polTible happinefs will, in the end, refult
to all created beings, without any mixture of po-
fitive or abfolute ill and mifery. Every phyfical
ill, fay they, makes an efiential part of this bene-
volent fyltem, and could not poITibly be removed,
even by the Deity himfelf, confidered as a wife
agent, without giving entrance to greater ill, or
excludino; o;reater g-ood, which will refult from it.
From this theory, fome philofophers, and the an-
cient Stoics among the reft, derived a topic of con-
folation under all afflictions, while they taught
their pupils, that thofe ills, under which they la-
boured, were, in reality, goods to the univerfe;
and that to an enlarged view, which could com-
prehend the whole fyftem of nature, every event
became an objedt of joy and exultation. But
though this topic be fpecious and fublime, it was
foon found in pra6lice weak and ineffedluai. You
would furely more irritate, than appeafe a man,
lying under the racking pains of the gout, by
preaching up to him the redlitude of thofe gene-
ral laws, which produced the malignent humours
in his body, and led them through the proper ca-
nals, to the finews and nerves, where they now
excite fuch acute torments. Thefe enlarged views
may, for a moment, pleafe the imagination of a
fpeculative man, who is placed in eafe andfecurity;
but neither can they dwell with conftancy on his
mind, even though undifturbed by the emotions
of pain or paflion ; much lefs can they maintain
their ground, when attacked by fuch powerful an-
tagonifts. The affedtions take a narrower and more
natural furvey of their obje6t; and by an oecono-
my, more fuitable to the infirmity of human

minds.

io8 SECTION VIII.

minds, regard alone the beings around us, and
are aftuaied by fuch events as appear good or ill
to the private fyftem.

The cafe is the fame with moral as with -phyjical
ill. It cannot reafonably be fuppofed, that thofe
rennote confiderations, which are found of fo little
efficacy with regard to one, will have a more
powerful influence with regard to the other. The
mind of man is fo formed by nature, that, upon
the appearance of certain charafters, difpofitions,
and aclions, it immediately feels the fentiment of
approbation or blame ; nor are there any emotions
more elTential to its frame and conftitution. The
chara»51:ers, which engage our approbation, are
chiefly fuch as contribute to the peace and fecu-
rity of human fociety ; as the chara6ters, which
excite blame, are chiefly fuch as tend to public de-
triment and difl:urbance : Whence it may reafon-
ably be prefumed, that the moral fentiments arife,
either mediately or immediately, from a reflection
on thefe oppofite interefl:s. What though philofo-
phical meditations efl:ablifli a difi'erent opinion
or conjecture; that every thing is right with re-
gard to the whole, and that the qualities, which
difliurb fociety, are, in the main, as beneficial, and
are as fuitable to the primary intention of nature,
as thofe which more diredly promote its happinefs
and welfare ? Are fuch remote and uncertain fpe-
culations able to counterbalance the fentiments,
which arife from the natural and immediate view of
the objects ? A man who is robbed of a confi-
derable fum; does he find his vexation for the
lofs any wife diminiflied by thefe fublime reflecti-
ons ? Why then fliould his moral refentment againfl:
the crime be fuppofed incompatible with them?
Or why fliould not the acknowledgment of a real
difl.in(5tion between vice and virtue be reconcile-
able to all fpeculative fvfl:cms of philofophy, as
well as that of a real difdnclion between perfonal

beauty

or Liberty and Necessity. to^

beauty and deformity ? Both thefe diftincflions are
founded in the natural fentiments of the humani
mind : And thefc fentiments are not to be con-
trouled or altered by any philofophical theory or
fpeculation whatfoever.

Whe Jecond objeflion admits not of fo eafy and
fatisfacftory an anfwcr ; nor is it pofTible to explain
diftindtly, how the Deity can be the mediate caufe
of all the adions of men, without being the au-
thor of fin and moral turpitude. Thefe are myile-
ries, which mere natural and unafTifted reafon is
very unfit to handle ; and whatever fyftem flie
embraces, fhe mull find herfelf involved in inex-
tricable difficulties, and even contradiflions, at
every llep which fhe takes with regard to fuch
fubje6ls. To reconcile the indifi^erence and con-
tingency of human actions with prefcience ; or to
defend abfolute decrees, and yet free the Deity
from being the author of fin, has been found hi-
therto to exceed all the power of philofophy. Hap-
py, if Ihe be thence fenfible of her temerity, when
fhe pries into thefe fublime mylteries; and leaving
a fcene fo full of obfcurities and perplexities, re-
turn, with fuitable modeily, to her true and pro-
per province, the examination of common life;
where fiie will find difficulties enow to employ her
enquiries, without launching into fo boundlefs aa
©cean of doubt, uncertainty, and contradiction !

SECTION

( >II )

"l*—

S E C T I O N IX.

Of the Reason of Animals.

jr\LL our reafonings concerning matter of faiSt
are founded on a fpecies of Analogy, which leads
us to expeft from any caufe the fame events, which
we have obferved to refult from fimilar caufes.
Where the caufes are entirely fimilar, the analogy
is perfect, and the inference, drawn from it, is re-
garded as certain and conclufive : Nor does any
man ever entertain a doubt, where he fees a piece
of iron, that it will have weight and cohefion of
parrs -, as in all other inflances, which have ever
fallen under his obfervation. But where the ob-
je6ls have not fo exa£t a fimilarity, the analogy is
jefs perfect, and the inference is lefs conclufive;
though ftill it has fome force, in proportion to the
degree of fimilarity and refemblance. The anato-
mical obfervations, formed upon one animal, are,
by this fpecies of reafoning, extended to all ani-
mals ; and it is certain, that when the circulation
of the blood, for inftance, is clearly proved to
have place in one creature, as a frog, or fifh, it
forms a ftrong prefumption, that the fame prin-
ciple has place in all. Thefe analogical obferva-
tions may be carried farther, even to this fcience,

of

ill SECTION IX.

of which we are now treating ; and any theory, by
which we explain the operations of the underftand-
ing, or the origin and connexion of the paflions in
man, will acquire additional authority, if we find,
that the fame theory is requifite to explain the fame
phenomena in all other animals. We fhall make
trial of this, with regard to the hypothefis, by
which, we have, in the foregoing difcourfe, en-
deavoured to account for all experimental reafon-
ings ; and it is hoped, that this new point of view
will ferve to confirm all our fonner obferva-
tions.

Firfiy It feems evident, that animals, as well as
men learn many things from experience, and infer,
that the fame events will alv/ays follow from the
fame caufes. By this principle they become ac-
quainted with the more obvious properties of ex-
ternal objeds, and gradually, from their birth,
treafure up a knowledge of the nature of fire, wa-
ter, eanh, flones, heights, depths, ^c, and of the
effedls, which refult from their operation. The
ignorance and inexperience of the young are here
plainly diftinguilliable from the cunning and fa-
gacity of the old, who have learned, by long ob-
fervation, to avoid what hurt them, and to purfue
what gave eafc or pleafure. A horfe, that has
been accuftomed to the field, becomes acquainted
with the proper height, which he can leap, and
will never attempt what exceeds his force and
ability. An old greyhound will truft the more
fatiguing part of the chace to the younger, and
will place himfeif lb as to meet the hare in her
doubles i nor are the conjectures, which he forms
on this occafion, founded in any thing but his ob-
fervation and experience.

This is ftill more evident from the effeds of dif-

cipline and education on animals, who, by the

proper application of rewards and puniHiments, may

3 be

of the Reason of Animals. 115

be taught any courfe of a£lion, the mod contrary
to their natural inftinfts and propenfities. Is it not
experience, which renders a dog apprehenfive of
pain, when you menace him, or lift up the whip to
beat him ? Is it not even experience^ which makes
him anfwer to his name, and infer, from fuch an
arbitrary found, that you mean him rather than any
of his fellows, and intend to call him, when
you pronounce it in a certain manner, and with a
certain tone and accent?

In all thefe cafes, we may obferve, that the ani-
mal infers fome fa6l beyond what immediately
ftrikes his fenfes: and that this inference is alto-
gether founded on pail experience, while the crea-
ture expects from the prefent objecfl the fame con-
fequences, which it has always found in its obfer-
vation to refult from fimilar obje6ts.

Secondly^ It is impoflible, that this inference of
the animal can be founded on any procefs of ar-
gument or reafoning, -by which he concludes, that
like events muft follow like objeds, and that the
courfe of nature will always be regular in its ope-
rations. For ifthere.be in reality any arguments
of this nature, they furely lie too abftrufe for
the obfervation of fuch imperfect underftandings \
jfince it may well employ the utmoft care and at-
tention of a philofophic genius to difcover and
obferve them. Animals, therefore, are not guided
in thefe inferences by reafoning : Neither are chil-
dren : Neither are the generality of mankind, in
their ordinary a6tions and conclufions : Neither
are philofophers themfelves, v/ho, in all the ac-
tive parts of life, are, in the main, the fame with
the vulgar, and are governed by the fame max-
ims. Nature mufl have provided fome other prin-
ciple, of more ready, and more general ufe and
application ; nor can an operation of fuch im-
menfe confequence in life, as that of inferring ef-

YoL. II. I fedj

it4 SECTION rx!.

fefts from caufes, be trjfted to the uncertain prd-
Gefs of reafoning and argumentation. Were this
doubtful with regard to men, it feems to admit
of no queltion with regard to the brute cfeatiort';
and the conclufion being once firmly eftablifhed
in the one, we have a rtron;g prefumption, from
all the rules of analogy, that it ought to be uni-
verfally admitted^ without any exception or re-
ferve. It is cuftom alone, which engages animals,
from every objedt, that ftrikes their fenfes, to m-
fer its ufual attendant, and carries their imagina-
tion, from the appearance of the one, to conceive
the other, in that particular manner, ^vhich we de-
nominate i"^//^. No- other explication can be gi-
ven of this operation, in all the higher, as well as
lower claffes of feafitive beings, which fall under
our notice and obfervation *.

But though anitnals learn many parts of their
knowledge from obfervation, there are alfo mar.y
parts of it,' which they derive from the original
hand of nature ; which much exceed the fliare of
capacity they poffefs on ordinary occafions; and
in which they improve, littl-e or nothing, by the
longeft practice and experience. Thefe we deno-
minate Inftinfts, and are lb apt to admire, as fome-
thing very extraordinary, and inexplicable by ali
the difquifitions of human underltanding. But our
wonder v/ill, perhaps, ceafe or diminifli ; when we
confider, that the experimental rcafon-ing itfelf,
which we poffefs ia common with beafts, and on
which the whole conduftof iife depends, is nothing
but a fpecies of inllincl or mechanical power, that
afts in us unknown to- ourJelves ; and in its chief
operations, is not directed by any fuch relations or
comparifons of ideas, as are the proper oi^jecfts of
bur intellectual faculties. Though the infiinct be

different,

* See NOTE [H].

Of the kEASoN of Animals. 115

different, yet flill it is an inilinct, which teaches
a man to avoid the fire ; as much as that, vhich
teaches a bird, with fuch exactnefs, the art of incu-
bation, and the whole oeconomy and order of its
nurfery.

1 2

1

( "7 )

SECTION X.

Of Miracles.

PART I.

T

HERE is, in Dr. Tillotfon's writings, an
argument againft the real prejence^ which is as
concife, and elegant, and frrong as any argument
can poflibly be fuppofed againft a doctrine, fo
little worthy of a ferious refutation. It is ac-
knowledged on all hands, fays the learned prelate,
that the authority, either of the fcripture or of tra-
dition, is founded merely in the teftimony of the
apoftles, who were eye-witneffes to thofe miracles
of our Saviour, by which he proved his divine mif-
fion. Our evidence, then, for the truth of the
Chrijlian religion is lefs than the evidence for the
truth of our fenfes ; becaufe, even in the firft
authors of our religion, it was no greater ; and it
is evident it muft diminifh in pafling from them
to their difciples ; nor can any one reft fuch confi-
dence in their teftimony, as in the immediate ob-
ject of his fenfes. But a weaker evidence can ne-
ver deftroy a ftronger; and therefore, were the
doctrine of the real prefence ever fo clearly re-
vealed in fcripture, it were directly contrary to
the rules of juft reafoning to give our afient to
it. It contradidls fenfe, though both the fcrip-
ture

ii8 S E C T I O N X.

ture and tradition, on which it is fuppofed to
be built, carry not fuch evidence wirh them as
fenfe; when they are confidered merely as ex-
ternal evidences, and are not brought home to
every one's breaft, by the immediate operation of
the Holy Spirit.

Nothing is fo convenient as a decifive argument
of this kind, which mull at \e^{\:/iience the moll ar-
rogant bigotry and fuperflition, and free us from
their impertinent folicitations. I flatter myfelf, that
I have difcovered an argument of a like nature,
which, if jud, will, with the wife and learned, be
an everlalling check to all kinds of fuperftitious delu-
fion, and confequently, v/ill be ufeful as long as the
world endures. For fo long, I prefume, will the
accounts of miracles and prodigies be found in all
hiltory, facred and profane.

Though experience be our only guide in reafon-
ing concerning matters of fa£l ^ it mull be acknow-
ledged, that this guide is not altogether infallible,
but in fome cafes is apt to lead us into errors. One,
who in our climate, fhould expeft better weather
in any week of June than in one of December,
would reafonjuftly, and conformably to experience j
but it is certain, that he may happen, in the event,
to find himfelf miftaken. However, we may ob-
ferve, that, in fuch a cafe, he would have no caufe
to complain of experience; becaufe it commonly
informs us beforehand of the uncertainty, by that
contrariety of events, which we may learn from a
diligent obfervation. All effefls follow not with
like certainty from their fuppofed caufes. Some
events are found, in all countries and all ages, to
have been conilantly conjoined together : Others
are found to have been more variable, and fome-
times to difappoint our expedlations ; fo that, in
our reafonings concerning matter of fadl, there
are all imaginable degrees of aflTurance, from the

hiofhcfw

Of M I R A C L E S. 1'j9

liighefl: certainty to the lowed fpecies of moral
jevidence.

A wife min, therefore, proportions his belief to
the evidence. In fuch conclufions as are founded
on an infallible experience, he expefts the event
with the lad: degree of aflurance, and regards his
pall experience as a fuW proof of^ the future exiltence
of that event. In other cafes, he proceeds with
more caution : He weighs the oppofite experiments :
He confiders which fide is fupported by the greater
number of experiments : To that fide he inclines,
with doubt and hefitation j and when at laft he fixes
his judgment, the evidence exceeds not what we
properly call probability. All probability, then,
fuppofes an oppofition of experiments and obferva-
tions, where the one fide is found to overbalance
the other, and to produce a degree of evidence,
proportioned to the fuperiority. A hundred in-
ftances or experiments on one fide, and fifty on ano-
ther, afford a doubtful expeftation of any event ;
though ^n hundred uniform experiments, with only
one that is contradiftory, reafonably beget a pretty
ftrong degree of afllirance. In all cafes, we muft
balance the oppofite experiments, where they are
oppofite, and dedu6l the finaller number from the
greater, in order to know the exa6t force of the fu-
pcrior evidence.

To apply thefe principles to a particular inflance:
we may obferve, that there is no fpecies of realbn-
ing more common, more ufeful, and even necelTa-
ry to human life, than that which is derived from
the teftimony of men, and the reports of eye-wit-
nefles and fpeftators. This fpecies of reafoning,
perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the rela-
tion of caufe and efi^ect. I fhall no! difpute about a
word. It will be fufficient to obferve, that our af-
furance in any argument of this kind is derived
from no other principle than our obfervation of
.the veracity of human teflimony, and of the ufual

conformity

lao S E C T I O N X.

conformity of facts to the reports of wltnefTe?.
It being a general maxim, that no objects have-
any difcoverable connexion together, and that all
the inferences,: which we can draw from one to
another, are founded merely on our experience
of their conftant and regular conjunction, it is
evident, that we ought not to make an excep-
rion to this maxim in favour of human teflimony,
whofe connexion with any event feems, in itfelf,
as little neceffary as any other. Were not the
memory tenacious to a certain degree ; had not men
commonly an inclination to truth and a princi-
ple of probity; were they not fenfible to fhame,.
when detected in a falfehood : Were not thefe, f
fay, difcovered by experience to be qualities, inhe-
rent in human nature, we ihould never repofe the
lead confidence in human teftimony. A man de-
lirious, or noted for falfehood and villany, has no
manner of authority with us.

And as the evidence, derived from> witnefl^s
and human teftimony, is founded on paft experi-
ence, fo it varies with the experience, and is re-
garded either as a p-oof or a probahility, according
as the conjunction between any particular kind
of report and any kind of object has been found ta
be conftant or variable. There are a number of
circumftances to be taken into confideration in
all judgments of this kind; and the ultimate
ftandard, by which we determine all difputes, that
may arife concerning them, is always derived from
experience and obfervation. Where this experi-
ence is not entirely uniform on any fide, it is at-
tended with an unavoidable contrariety in oOr
judgments, and with the fame oppofition and mu-
tual deftruflion of argument as in every other
kind of evidence. \\ e frequently hefitate con-
cerning the reports of others. We balance the
oppofite circumftances, which caufe any doubt or
uncertainty ; and when we difcover a fuperiority

on

of M I R A G L £ S. 121

on any fide, we incline to it ; but ftill with 1 dimi-
nution of afiurance, in proportion to the force of
its antagonift.

This contrariety of evidence, in the prefent cafe,
may be derived from feveral different caufes j from
the oppofition of contrary teftimony ; from the
characfter or number of the witneflesj from the
manner of their delivering their teftimony j or from
the union of all thefe circumftances. We en-
tertain a fufpicion concerning any matter of fact,
when the witneflfes contradid each other; when
they are but few, or of a doubtful charafter;
when they have an intereft in what they affirm;
when they delfver their teftimony with hefitation,
or on the contrary, with too violent afleverations.
There are many other particulars of the fame kind,
which may diminifh or deftroy the force of any
argument, derived from human teftimony.

Suppofe, for inftance, that the fadl, which the
teftimony endeavours to eftablifh, partakes of the
extraordinary and the marvellous; in that cafe, the
evidence, refulting from the teftimony, admits Cf
a diminution, greater or lefs, in proportion as
the fadb is more or lefs unufual. The reafon,
why we place any credit, in witneftes and hiftori-
ans, is not derived from any connexion, which we
perceive a priori, between teftimony and reality,
but becaufe we are accuftomed to find a con-
formity between them. But when the faft at-
tefted is fuch a one as has feldom fallen under
our obfervation, here is a conteft of two oppofite
experiences; of which the one deftroys the other,
as far as its force goes, and the fuperior can only
operate on the mind by the force, which remains.
The very fame principle of experience, which
gives us a certain degree of afTurance in the tefti-
mony of witnefTes, gives us alfo, in this cafe, ano-
ther degree of aflurance againft the faft, which

they

122

E C T I O N X.

they endeavour to eftablifli ; from which con"*
tradiction there necefiarily arifes a counterpoize,
and mutual deftruction of belief and autho-
rity.

/ Jhould not believe Juch a fiory were it told me
hy Catoj was a proverbial faying in Rome, even
during the life-time of that philofophical pa-
triot *, The incredibility of a fact, it was allov/-
edj might invalidate fo great an authority.

The Indian prince, who refufcd to believe the
firft relations concerning the effects of froft, rea-
foned juflly; and it naturally required very llrong
teiiimony to engage his affent to facts, that arofe
from a ftate of nature, with which he was unac-
quainted, and which bore fo little analogy to thofe
events, of which he had had conftant and uni-
form experience. Though they were not con-
trary to his experience, they were not conform-
able to it j-.

But in order to encreafe the probability againft
the teftimpny of witnefles, let us fuppofe, that
the fact, which they affirm, indead of being
only marvellous, is really miraculous; and fup-
pofe alfo, that the teftimony, , confidered apart
and in itfelf, amounts to an entire proof; in that
cafe, there is proof againft proof, of which the
ftrongeft mull prevail, but ftill with a dimi-
nution of its force, in proportion to that of its
antagonift.

A miracle is a violation of the \z,\\% of nature ;
and as a firm and unalterable experience has efta-
blilhed thefe laws, the proof againf!: a miracle,
from the very natyre of thje fact, is as entire as
any argument from experience can poffibly be ima-
gined. Why is it more than probable, that all men
mull die; that lead cannot, of ulelf, remain fuf-

pended

* Plutarch, in vita Catonis.
t Sec NOTE [I],

Of M I R A C L E S. 123

pended in the air; that fire confumes wood, and
is extinguifhed by water j unlefs it be, that thefe
events are found agreeable to the lavv's of na-
ture, and there is required a violation of thefe
laws, or in other words, a miracle to prevent
them ? Nothing is efteemed a miracle, if it ever
happen in the common courfe of nature. It is
no miracle that a man, feemingly in good health,
fhould die on a fudden : becaufe fuch a kind of
death, though more unufual than any other, has
yet been frequently obferved to happen. But it
is a miracle, that a dead man fhould come to
life ; becaufp that has never been obferved, in
any age or country. There muft, therefore, be
an uniforrn experience againft every miraculous
event, otherwife the event would not merit that
appellation. And as an uniform experience a-
mounts to a proof, there i§ here a direct and full
froof^ from the nature of the fadt, againft the ex-
iftence of any miracle ; nor can fuch a proof be
deflroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by
an oppofite proof, which is fuperior *.

The plain confequence is (and it is a general
maxim of our attention), " That no teftimony is
" fufficient to eftablifli a miracle, unlefs the tti-
" timony be of fuch a kind, that its falfehood
" would be more miraculous, than the fa6V, which
" it endeavours to eftablifh: And even in that
*^ cafe there; s a mutual deltruftion of arguments,
" and the fuperior only gives us an aflurance
*^ fuitable to that degree of force, which re-
*' mains, after deducing the inferior." When any
one tells me, that he faw a dead man reftored to
life, I immediately confider with myfelf, whether
it be more probable, that this perfon fhould ei-
ther deceive or be deceived, or that the fadt,
which he relates, fliould really have happened.

T weigh

• See NOTE [K].

114 S £ C T i O N X.

I weigh the one miracle againft the other; and
according to the fuperiority, which I difcover, I
pronounce my decifion, and always reject the
greater miracle. If the falfehood of his teftimony
world be more miraculous, than the event which
he relates; then, and not till then, can he pre-
tend to command my belief or opinion.

P A R T II.

In the foregoing reafoning we have fuppofed,
that the teftimony, upon which a miracle is found-
ed, may pofTibly amount to an entire proof, and
that the falfehood of that teftimony would be a
real prodigy : But it is eafy to ftiew, that we have
been a great deal too liberal in our conceftion,
and that there never was a miraculous event ef-
tabJiftied on fo full an evidence.

For/r/?, there is not to be found, in all hiftor)^,
any miracle attefted by a fufficient number of men,
of fuch unqueftioned good-fenfe, education, and
learning, as to fecure us againft all delufion in
themfelves ; of fuch undoubted integrity, as to
place them beyond all fufpicion of any defign
to deceive others ; of fuch credit and reputati-
on in the eyes of mankind, as to have a great
deal to lofe in cafe of their being detected in any
falfehood ; and at tl\e fame time, attefting facts,
performed in fuch a public manner, and in fo ce-
lebrated a part of the v/orld, as to render the de-
tedion unavoidable : All which circumftances are
requifite to give us a full aflurance in the teftimo-
ny of men.

Secondly. We may obfcrve In human nature a
principle, which, if ftpdly examined, will be
found to diminifli extremely the afiurancc, Vvhich
we might, from human teftimony, have, in any
kind of prodigy. The maxim, by which v/e com-
monly conduct curfclves in oor realonings, is,
3 that

Of Miracles, 125

that the objects, of which we have no experience,
refemble thofe, of which we have ; that what we
■have found to be mod ufual is always molt pro-
bable ; and that where there is an oppofition of ar-
guments, we ought to give the preference to fuch
as are founded on the greateft number of paft ob-
fervations. But though, in proceeding by this
rule, we readily reje<5t any fa6t which is unufual
and incredible in an ordinary degree ; yet in ad-
vancing farther, the mind obferves not always the
fame rule ; but when any thing is afKrmed utterly
abfurd and miraculous, it rather the more readily
admits of fuch a fact, upon account of that very
circumflance, which ought to deftroy all its autho-
rity. The paffion oi Jurprize and wonder^ arifing
from miracles, being an agreeable emotion, gives
a fenfible tendency towards the belief of thofe
events, from which it is derived. And this goes
fo far, that even thofe who cannot enjoy this plea-
fure immediately, nor can believe thofe miraculous
events, of which they are informed, yet love to
partake of the fatisfaction at fecond-hand or by re-
bound, and place a pride and delight in exciting
die admiration of others.

With what greedinefs are the miraculous ac-
counts of travellers received, their defcriptions of
fea and land monfters, their relations of wonder-
ful adventures, ilrange men, and uncouth man-
ners? But if the fpirit of religion join itfclf to the
love of wonder, there is an end of common fenfe j
and human teftimony, in thefe circumftances,
lofes all pretenfions to authority. A religionift
may be an enthufiaft, and imagine he fees what
has no reality : He may know his narrative to be
falfe, and yet perfevere in it, with the beft intenti-
ons in the world, for the fake of prom.oting fo
holy a caufe : Or even where this delufion has not
place, vanity, excited by fo ftrong a temptation,
operates on him more powerfully than on the

reft

iz6 $ E C T I O N X.

reft of mankind in any other circumftances; arid
felf-intcreft with equal force. His auditors may
not have, and commonly have not, fufficient
judgment to canvafs his evidence: What judg-
ment they have, they renounce by principle, in
thefe fublime and myfterious fubjedts : Or if they
were ever fo willing to employ it, paffion and a
heated imagination difturb the regularity of its .
operations. Their credulity encreafes his impu-
dence : And his impudence overpowers their
credulity.

Eloquence, when at its higheft pitch, leaves
little room for reafon or refledtion ; but addrefT-
ing Itfeif entirely to the fancy or afFeflions, cap-
tivates the willing hearers, and fubdues their un-
derftanding. Happily, this pitch it feldom at-
tains. But what a Tully or a Demofthenes could
ibarcely effedl over a Roman or Athenian audience,
every Capuchin, every itinerant or ftationary teacher
can perform over the generality of mankind, and
in a hi-gher degree,, by touching fuch grofs and
vulgar paffions.

The many inftances of forged miracles, and pro-
phecies, and fupernatural events, which, in all
ages, have either been dete6ted by contrary evi-
dence, or which deteft themfelves'by their abfur-
dity, prove fufficiently the ftrong propenfity of
mankind to the extraordinary and the marvellous,
and ought reafonably to beget a fufpicion againft
all relations of this kind. This is our natural
way of thinking, even with regard to the moft
common and moft credible events. For inftance :
There is no kind of report, which rifes fo eafily,
and fpreads fo quickly, efpecially in country places
and provincial towns, as thofe concerning mar-
riages; infomuch that two young perfons of equal
condition never fee each other twice, but the whole
neighbourhood immediately join them together.
The pleafure of telling a piece of news fo intereft-

ing.

Of Ml R A C L ES. liy

Ing, of propagating it, and of being the firft re-
porters of it, fpreads the intelligence. And this
is fo well known, that no man of fenfe gives at-
tention to thefe reports, till he find theni con-
firmed by fome greater evidence. Do not the
fame palTions, and others ftill ftronger, incline
the generality of mankind to believe and report,
with the greateft vehemence and alTurance, all
religious miracles ?

Thirdly. It forms a ftrong prefumption againft
all fupernatural and miraculous relations, that they
arc obferved chiefly to abound among ignorant
and barbarous nations; or if a civilized people
has ever given admiflion to any of them, that
people will be found to have received them from
ignorant and barbarous anceftors, who tranf-
mitted them with that inviolable fan6tion and
authority, which always attend received opinions.
When we perufe the firft hiftories of all nations,
■we are apt to imagine ourfelves tranfported in-
to fome new world; where the whole frame of
nature is disjointed, and every element performs
its operations in a different manner, from what
it does at prefent. Battles, revolutions, pelti-
lencej famine, and death, are never the efTedl of
thofe natural caufes, which we experience. Pro-
digies, omens, oracles, judgments, quite obfcure
the few natural events, that are intermingled with
them. But as the former grow thinner every
page, in proportion as we advance nearer the
enlightened ages, we foon learn, that there is no-
thing myfterious or fupernatural in the cafe,
but that all proceeds from the ufual propenfity
of mankind towards the marvellous, and that,
though this inclination may at intervals receive a
check from fenfe and learnino- it can never be
thoroughly extirpated from human nature.

It is Jirange, a judicious reader is apt to fay,
upon the perufal of thefe wonderful hiftorians, that

Jucb

128 S E C T I O N X,

Juch prodigious events never happen in our days. But
it is nothing flrange, I hope, that men fliould
lie in all ages. You mull furely have feen in-
llances enow of that frailty. You have yourfelf
heard many luch marvellous relations flatted,
which^ being treated with fcorn by all the wife
and judicious, have at lad been abandoned even
by the vulgar. Be aflured, that thofe renowned
lies, which have fpread and fiourifhed to fuch g,
monflrous height, arofe from like beginnings;
but being fown in a more proper foil, lliot up at
iall into prodigies almoft equal to thofe which
they relate.

It v/as a wife policy in that falfe prophet, Alex-
ander, who, though now forgotten, was once
fo famous, to lay the firfl fcene of his impoftures
in Paphlagonia, where, as Lucian tells us, the
pe;ople were extremely ignorant and flupid, and
ready to fvvallow even the groifefl delufion.
People at a diflajice, who are weak enough to
think the matter at all worth enquiry, have no
opportunity of receiving better information. The
llories come magnified to them by a hundred
circumilances. Fools are induflrious in propagat-
ing the impgllure ; while the wife and learned are
contented, in general, to deride its abfurdity,
without informing themfelves of the particular
facts, by which it may be dillinctly refuted. And
thus the impoftor above-mentioned was enabled
to proceed, from his ignorant Paphlagonians, to
the enlifling of votaries, even among the Grecian
philofophers, and men of the moft eminent rank
and dillinftion in Rome : Nay, could engage
the attention of that fage emperor Marcus Au-
relius ; fo far as to make him trull the fuccefs
of a military expedition to his delufive prophecies.

The advantages are fo great, of flatting an
impollure among an ignorant people, that, even
though the delufion fhould be too grofs to im-

pofe

of M I R A c L E s. lag

pofe on the generality of them (zuhich, though
Jf.ldom^ is Jometimes the cafe) it has a much bet-
ter chance for fucceeding in remote countries,
than if the firll fcene had been laid in a city
renowned for arts and knowledge. The molt
ignorant and barbarous of thefe barbarians carry
the report abroad. None of their countrymen
have a large correfpondence, or fufficient credit
and authority to concradift and beat down the
delufion. Men's inclination to the marvellous
has full opportunity to difpiay itfelf. And thus
a ftory, which is univerfally exploded in the
place where it was firll llarted, fhall pafs for
certain at a thoufand miles difbance. But had
Alexander fixed his refidcnce at At/xcns, the phi-
lofophers of that renowned mart of learning had
immediately fprcad, throughout the whole Ro-
man empire, their fenfe of the matter; which,
being fupported by fo great authority, and dif-
played by all the force of reafon and eloquence,
had entirely opened the eyes of mankind. It is
true ; Lucian, paOing by chance through Paphla-
gonia, had an opportunity of performing this
good office. But, though much to be wifhed,
it does not always happen, that every Alexan-
der meets with a Lucian, ready to expofe and
dete(5t his impoftures.

I may add as a fourth reafon, which diminiflies
the authority of prodigies, that there is no tefti-
mony for any, even thofe v/hich have not been
exprefsly detetled, that is not oppofed by an in-
finite number of witneffesj fo that not only the
miracle deftroys the credit of teftimony, but
the teilimony deftroys itfelf. To make this the
better underftood, let us confider, that, in mat-
ters of religion, whatever is different is contrary;
and that it is impoffible the religions of ancient
Rome, of Turkey, ofSiam, and of China flioald,
all of them, be cftablifhed on any folid foundati-

VoL. II. K on.

I30 S E C T I O N X

on. Every miracle, therefore, pretended to have
been wrought in any of thefe religions (and all of
them abound in miracles), as its direft fcope is
to eftablifh the particular fyftem to which it is
attributed J fo has it the fame force, though more
indiredly, to overthrow every other fyftem. In;
deftroying a rival fyftem, it likewife deftroys the
credit of thofe miracles, on which that fyftem was
cftabliftied ; fo that all the prodigies of different
religions are to be regarded as contrary fafts,
and the evidences of thefe prodigies, whether
weak or ftrong, as oppofite to each other. Ac-
cording to this method of reafoning, when we
believe any miracle of Mahomet or his fucceftbrs,
we have for cur warrant the teftimony of a few
barbarous Arabians: And on the other hand, we
are to regard the authority of Titus Livius, Plu-
tarch, Tacitus, and, in Ihorr, of all the authors
and witnelTes, Grecian, Chinefe, and Roman Ca-
tholic, who have related any miracle in their par-
ticular religion; I fay, v/e are to regard their tef-
timony in the fame light as if they had mentioned
that Mahometan miracle, and had in exprefs
terms contradided it, with the fame certainty
as they have for the miracle they relate. This
argument may appear over fubtile and refined;
but is not in reality different from the reafoning
of a judge, v/ho fuppofes, that the credit of two
witneffes, maintaining a crime againft any one,
is deftroyed by the teftimony of two others,
who affi'-m him to have been two hundred leagues
diftant, ar the fame inftant when the crime is faid
to have been committed.

One of the beft attefted miracles in all profane
hiP.ory, is that which Tacitus reports of Vcfpa-
fi^.n, who cured a bJind man in Alexandria, by
means of Lis fpitrle, and a lame man by the
mere touch of his foot ; in obedience to a vifion
of the god Serapis, who had enjoined them to h^ve

recourfc

or Miracles. 131

recourfe to the Emperor, for thefe miraculous
cures. The (lory may be feen in that fine hif-
torian * ; where every circumftance feems to add
weight to the tcftimony, and might be difplayed
at large with all the force of argument and elo-
quence, if any one were now concerned to en-
force the evidence of that exploded and idolatrous
fuperftition. The gravity, folidity, age, and pro-
bity of fo great an emperor, who, through the
whole courfe of his life, converfed in a familiar
manner with his friends and courtiers, and ne-
ver afFeded thofe extraordinary airs of divinity
aflumed by Alexander and Demetrius. The hif-
torian, a cotemporary writer, noted for candour
and veracity, and withal, the greateft and moft
penetrating genius, perhaps, of all antiquity ; and
fo free from any tendency to credulity, that he
even lies under the contrary imputation, of athe-
ifm and profanenefs : The perfons, from whofe
authority he related the miracle, of eftablifhed
charadler for judgment and veracity, as we may
well prefume; eye-witneffes of the fact, and con-
firming their teftimony, after the Flavian family
was defpoiled of the empire, and could no longer
give any reward, as the price of a lie. Utrumque,
qui interfiiere^ nunc quoque memorant, pcjiquam nul-
lum mendacio pretium. To which if we add the
public nature of the facts, as related, it will ap-
pear, that no evidence can well be fuppofed ftrong-
er for fo grofs and fo palpable a falfehood.

There is alfo a memorable ftory related by Car-
dinal de Retz, which may well deferve our con-
fideration. When that intriguing politician fled
into Spain, to avoid the perfecution of his ene-
mies, he paflfed through Saragofla, the capital of
Arragon, where he was fhewn, in the cathedral,
K 2 a man,

* Hid. lib. V. cap. 8. Suetonius gives nearly the fame ac-
count in 'vita VtSP.

132 $ E C T I O N X.

a man, who had ferved {even years as a door-'
keeper, and was well known to every body in
town, that had ever paid his devotions at that
church. He had 'been feen, for fo long a time,
wanting a leg; but recovered that limb by the
rubbing of holy oil upon the flump ; and the
cardinal allures us that he faw him with two legs.
This miracle was vouched by all the canons of the
church ; and the whole company in town were ap-
pealed to for a confirmation of the fa6l ; whom the
cardinal found, by their zealous devotion, to be
thorough believers of the miracle. Here the re-
later was alfo cotemporary to the fuppofed prodigy,
of an incredulous and libertine chara6ber, as well
as of great genius j the miracle of fo ftngular a na-
ture as could fcarcely admit of a counterfeit, and
the witnefles very numerous^ and all of them, in a
manner, fpedlators of the facl,- to which they gave
tiieir teftimony. And v/hat adds mightily to the
force of the evidence, and may double our fur-
prize on this occafion, is^ that the cardinal him-
{t:\(y who relates the (lory, feems not to give any
credit to it, and confequently cannot be fufpefled
of any concurrence in the holy fraud. He confi-
dered juflly, that it was not requifite, in order to
rejecl a fad of this nature, to be able accurately,
to difprove the teftimony, and to trace its falfe-
hood, through all the circumitances of knavery
and credulity which produced it. He knew, that,
as this was commonly altogether impoflible at any
fmall diftance of time and place j fo was it extreme-
ly diflicult, even where one was immediately pre-
fent, by reafon of the bigotry, ignorance, cunning,
and roguery of a great part of mankind. He there-
fore concluded, like a juft rcafoner, that fuch an
evidence carried falfehood upon the very face of it,
and that a miracle, fupported by any huinan tefti-
mony, was more properly a fubjeitof deriiion than
of argument.

There

Of M r R A c L E s. 133*

There furely never was a greater number of mi-
racles afcribed to one perfon, than thofe, which
were lately faid to have been wrought in France
upon the tomb of Abbe Paris, the famous J anfenifl,
with whofe fanclity the people were fo long delud-
ed. The curing of the fick, giving hearing to the
deaf, and fight to the blind, were every where
talked of as the ufual effefts of that holy fepulchre.
But what is more extraordinary; many of the mi-
racles were immediately proved upon the fpot,
before judges of unqueftioned integrity, attefted
by witnefles of credit and diftintlion, in a learned
age, and on the moft eminent theatre that is now
in the world. Nor is this all : A relation of them
was pubJifhed and difperfed every where ; nor
were the JefuitSj though a learned body, fupported
by the civil magiftrate, and determined enemies
to thofe opinions, in whofe favour the miracles
were faid to have been wrought, ever able diftinft-
ly to refute or deteft them *. Where fhall wc
find fuch a number of circumftances, agreeing to
the corroboration of one fa6t ? And what have we
to oppofe to fuch a cloud of witnefles, but the
abfolute impoflibility or miraculous nature of the
events, which they relate? And this furely, in the
eyes of all reafonable people, will alone be re-
garded as a fufficient refutation.

Is the confcquence juft, becaufe fome human
teftimony has the utmoft force and authority in
fome cafes, when it relates the battle of Philippi
or Pharfalia for inftance; that therefore all kinds
of tefl:imony muft, in all cafes, have equal force
and authority? Suppofe that the Casfarean and
Pompeian fadions had, each of them, claimed the
viftory in thefe battles, and that the hiftorians of
each party had uniformly afcribed the advantage to
their own fidcj how could mankind, at this dif-

tance,

* See NOTE [L].

♦ 134 SECTION X.

tance, have been able to determine between thenn ?
The contrariety is equally ftrong between the mi-
racles relai.ed by Herodotus or Plutarch, and
thofe delivered by Mariana, Bede, or any nionkirti
hiilorian.

The wife lend a very academic faith to every re-
port which favours the paffion of the reporter;
whether it magnifies his country, his family, or
himfelf, or in any other way ftrikes in with his na-
tural inclinations and propenfities. But what
greater temptatioii than to appear a rnKTionary, a
prophet, an ambaflador from heaven? Who would
■ not encounter many dangers and difficulties, in or-
der to attain fo fublime a character ? Or if, by the
help of vanity and a heated imagination, a man
has firft made a convert of himfelf, and entered
feriouOy into the delufion; who ever fcruples to
make ufe of pious frauds, in fupport of fo holy
and meritorious a caufe ?

The fmalleft fpark may here kindle into the
greatefl fiame ; becaufe the materials are always
prepared for it. The avidum genus aiiiiculani'm *,
the gazing populace, receive greedily, ' without
examination, whatever fooths fuperftition, and
promotes wonder.

How many ftories of this nature, have, in all
ages, been detedled and exploded in their in-
fancy ? How many more have been celebrated
for a time, and have afterwards funk into ne-
glect and oblivion? Where fuch reports, there-
fore, fry about, the folution of the phenome-
non is obvious ; and we judge in conformity to
regular experience and obfervation, when we ac-
count for it by the known and natural princi-
ples of credulity and delufion. And fliall we,
rather tlian have a recourfe to fo natural a fo-
lution, allow of a miraculous violation of the mofl
cftablifhed laws of nature ?

I need
• Lucret.

Of Miracles. 135

1 need not mention the difiiculty of deteftlng a
falfchood in any private or even public hiftory,
at the place, where it is faid to happen ; much
more when the fccne is removed to ever fo
fmall a dillance. Even a court of judicature,
with all the authority, accuracy, and judgment,
which they can employ, find themfelves often at
a iofs to diltinguilh between truth and faliehood
in the mod recent actions. But the matter never
comes to any iffue, if trufled to the common
method of altercation and debate and flying ru-
mours ; efpecially when men's paflions have
taken part on either fide.

In the infancy of new religions, the wife and
learned commonly efceem the matter too inconfi-
derable to deferve their attention or regard. And
when afterwards they would willingly deted the
cheat, in order to undeceive the deluded multi-
tude, the feafon is now paft, and the records and
witnefles, which might clear up the matter, have
periflied beyond recovery.

No means of detedion remain, but thofe which
■niuft be drawn from the very teftimony itfelf
of the reporters : And thefe, though always fuf-
ficient with the judicious and knowing, are com-
monly too fine to fall under the comprehenfion
of the vulgar.

Upon the whole, then, it appears, that no tef-
timony for any kind of miracle has ever amount-
ed to a probability, much lefs to a proof; and
that, even fuppofing it amounted to a proof, it
would be oppofcd by another proof; derived
from the very nature of the fact, which it would
endeavour to eftablifh. It is experience 'only,
which gives authority to human teftimony; and
it is the fame experience, which afllires us of the
laws of nature. When, therefore, thefe two
^iinds of. experience are contrary, we have no-
thing

136 S E C T I O N X.

thing to do but fubtract the one from the other,
and embrace an opinion, either on one fide or
the other, with that afiurance which arifes from
the' remainder. But according to the principle
here explained, this fubftraction, with regard to
all popular religions, amounts to an entire anni-
hilation; and therefore we may efbablifh it as a
maxim, that no human teftimony can have fuch
force as to prove a miracle, and make it a juft
foundation for any fuch fyftem of religion.

I beg the limitations here made may be re-
marked, when I fay, that a miracle can never
be proved, fo as to be the foundation of a fyftem
of religion. For I own, that otherwife, there
may pofiibly be miracl(;s, or violations of the
ufual courfe of nature, of fuch a kind as to ad-
mit of proof from human teftimony ; though,
perhaps, it will be impofiible to find any fuch
in all the records of hiftory. Thus, fuppofe,
all authors, in all languages, agree, that, from
y the firft of January, 1600, there was a total

darknefs over the whole earth for eight days :
Suppofe that the tradition of this extraordinary
event is ftill ftrong and lively among the peo-
ple : That all travellers, who return from foreign
countries, bring us accounts of the fame traditi-
on, without the leaft variation or contradiction :
It is evident, that our prefent philofophers, in-
ftead of doubting the fact, ought to receive it
as certain, and ought to fearch for the caufes
whence it might be derived. The decay, cor-
ruption, and dilTolution of nature, is an event
rendered probable by fo many analogies, that any
phjcnomenon, which feems to have a tendency
towards that cataftrophe, comes within the reach
of human teftimony, if that teftimony be very ex-
tenfive and uniform.

But fjppofe, that all the hiftorians who treat
of England, fiiould agree, that, on the firft of

January

of Miracles. 137

January, 1600, Queen Elizabeth died; that both
before and after her death fhe was feen by her
phyficians and the whole court, as is ufual with
perfons of her rank ; that her fucceflbr was ac-
knowledged and proclaimed by the parliament;
and that, after being interred a month, fhe again
appeared, refumed the throne, and governed Eng-
land for three years: I muft confefs that I
fhould be furprized at the concurrence of fo
many odd circumftances, but fhould not have
the leaft inclination to believe fo miraculous an
event. I fhould not doubt of her pretended
death, and of thofe other public circumflances-
that followed it : I fhould only afTert it to have
been pretended, and that it neither was, nor pof-
fibly could be real. You would in vain objett
to me the difficulty, and almofl impofTibility of
deceiving the world in an affair of fuch confe-
quence ; the wifdom and folid judgment of that
renowned queen ; with the little or no advan-
tage which fhe Could reap from fo poor an ar-
tifice : All this might aflonifh me ; but I would
flill reply, that the knavery and folly of men
are fuch common phenomena, that I fhould ra-
ther believe the mofl: extraordinary events to
arife from their concurrence, than admit of fo
fignal a violation of the laws of nature.

But fhould this miracle be afcribed to any
new fyflem of religion ; men, in all ages, have
been fo much impofed on by ridiculous flories
of that kind, that this very circumftance would
be a full proof of a cheat, and fufficient, with
all men of fenfe, not only to make them rejedt
the fa6b, but even rejedt it without farther ex-
amination. Though the Being to whom the mi-
racle is afcribed, be, in this cafe. Almighty, it
does nor, upon that account, become a whit
more probable ; fince it is impofTible for us to

know

13? S E C T I O N X.

know the attributes or aftions of fuch a Being,
otherwile than from the experience which we
have of his produftions, in the ufual courfe of
nature. This ftill reduces us to paft obferva-
tion, and obliges us to compare the inftanccs of
the violation of truth in the teftimony of men,
with thofe of the violation of the laws of na-
ture by miracles, in order to judge which of
them is moft likely and probable. As the vi-
olations of truth are more common in the tef-
timony concerning religious miracles, than in
that concerning any other matter of fa6t; this
mufb diminifh very much the authority of the
former teftimony, and make us form a general
rcfolution, never to lend any attention to it, with
whatever fpecious pretence it may be covered.

Lord Bacon feems to have embraced the fame
principles of reafoning. " We ought, fays he,
" to make a colledcion or particular hiftory of
" all monfters and prodigious births or produc-
*^ tions, and in a word of every thing new, rare,
*^ and extraordinary in nature. But this muft
" be done with the moft fevere fcrutiny, left
*' we depart from truth. Above all, every re-
" lation muft be confidered as fufpicious, which
" depends in any degree upon religion, as the
" prodigies of Livy : And no lefs fo, every thing
" that is to be found in the writers of natural
" magic or alchimy, or fuch authors, who feem,
** all of them, to have an unconquerable appe-
" tite for falfehood and fable *."

I am the better plcafed with the method of
reafoning here delivered, as I think it may ferve
to confound thofe dangerous friends or difguifcd
enemies to the Cbrijlian Religion, who have un-
dertaken to defend it by the principles of human
reafon. Our moft holy religion is founded on
Failbj not on reafon j and it is a fure method of

expofing

* Nov. Org. lib. ii. aph. 29.

of M I R A C L E S. 139

cxpofing it to put it to fuch a trial as it is,
by no means, fitted to endure. To make this
more evident, let us examine thofc miracles, re-
lated in Icripturej and not to lofc ourfelves in
too wide a field, let us confine ourfelves to fuch
as we find in the Pentateuch^ which we fhall ex-
amine, according to the principles of thcfe pre-
tended Chriftians, not as the word or teftimony
of God himfelf, but as the produ6lion of a mere
human writer and hiftorian. Here then we are
firll to confider a book, prefented to us by a
barbarous and ignorant people, written in an age
when they were ftlll more barbarous, and in all
probability long after the fads which it relates,
corroborated by no concurring teftimony, and
refembling thofe fabulous accounts, which every
nation gives of its origin. Upon reading this
book, we find it full of prodigies and miracles.
It gives an account of a ftate of the world and of
human nature entirely difierent from the pre-
fent : Of our fall from that ftate : Of the age of
man, extended to near a thoufand years: Of the
deftruction of the world by a deluge : Of the
arbitrary choice of one people, as the favou-
rites of heaven; and that people the country-
men of the author : Of their deliverance from
bondage by prodigies the moft aftonifhing ima-
ginable : I defire any one to lay his hand upon
his heart, and after a ferious confideration de-
clare, whether he thinks that the falfehood of
fuch a book, fupported by fuch a teftimony,
would be more extraordinary and miraculous
than all the miracles it relates ; which is, howe-
ver, neceflary to make it be received, accord-
ing to the meafures of probability above efta-
bliftied.

What we have faid of miracles may be ap-
plied, without any variation, to prophecies; and

indeed.

J40 S E C T I O N X.

indeed, all prophecies are real miracles, and
as fuch only, can be admitted as proofs of any
revelation. If it did not exceed the capacity of
human nature to foretel future events, it would
be abfurd to employ any prophecy as an argu-
ment for a divine miffion or authority from hea-
ven. So that, upon the whole, we may conclude,
that the Chrijlian Religion not only was at firft at-
tended with miracles, but even at this day can-
not be believed by any reafonable perfon with-
out one. Mere reafon is infufficient to convince
us of its veracity; And whoever is moved by
Faith to aflent to it, is confcious of a continued
miracle in his own perfon, which fubverts all
the principles of his underftanding, and gives
him a determination to believe what is moft
contrary to cuftom and experience.

SEC-

( 141 )

SECTION XL

Of a Particular Providence and of a
Future State.

X Was lately engaged in converfatlon with a
friend who loves fceptical paradoxes j where, though
he advanced many principles, of which I can by
no means approve, yet as they feem to be cu-
rious, and to bear fome relation to the chain
of reafoning carried on throughout this enquiry,
I fhall here copy them from my memory as ac-
curately as I can, in order to fubmit them to
the judgment of the reader.

Our converfation began with my admiring the
fingular good fortune of philofophy, which, as it
requires entire liberty above all other privileges,
and chiefly flourilhes from the free oppofition of
fentiments and argumentation, received its firit
birth in an age and country of freedom and to-
leration, and was never cramped, even in its mod
extravagant principles, by any creeds, confefli-
ons, or penal llatutes. For, except the banifh-
mentof Protagoras, and the death of Socrates, which
lafl: event proceeded partly from other motives,
there are fcarcely any inftances to be met with,
in ancient Iiiftory, of this bigotted jealoufy, with
which the prefent age is fo much infefted. Epi-
curus lived at Athens to an advanced age, in

peace

t4'2 SECTION XI.

peace and tranquillity: Epicureans* were even ad-
mitted to receive the facerdotal chara6ler, and to
officiate at the altar, in the moft facred rites of
the eftabliihed religion : And the public encou-
ragementf of penfions and falaries was afforded
equally, by the wifeft of all the Roman emperorsjl,
to the profeffors of every fe6l of philofophy. How
requifite fuch kind of treatment was to philofo-
phy, in her early youth, will eafily be conceiv-
ed, if we reflet^, that, even at prefent, when fhe
may be fuppofed more hardy and robuft, fhe
bears with much difficulty the inclemency of the
feafons, and thofe harffi winds of calumny and
perfecution, which blow upon her.

You admire, fays my friend, as the fingular
good fortune of philofophy, what feems to refult
from the natural courfe of things, and to be un-
avoidable in every age and nation. This per-
tinacious bigotry, of which you complain, as fo
fatal to"* philofophy, is really her offspring, who,
after allying with fuperftition, feparates himfelf
entirely from the intereft of his parent, and be-
comes her moft inveterate enemy and perfecu-
tor. Speculative dogmas of religion, the prefent
occafions of fuch furious difpute, could not pof-
fibly be conceived or admitted in the early ages
of the world; when mankind, being wholly illi-
terate, formed an idea of religion more fuitable
to their weak apprehenfion, and compofed their
lacred tenets of fucli tales chiefly as were the
objedls of traditional belief, more than of argu-
ment or difputation. After the firft alarm, there-
fore, was over, which arofe from the new para-
doxes and principles of the philofophers; thefe
teachers feem ever after, during the ages of an-
tiquity, tp have lived in great harmony with the

eftabliffied

• LUCIAM aVIXTT. y., A:t/Tl9<tJ.

t LuciANi UKX'^, t id, Si Dio.

Of a Providence and Future State. 1(4^

cftabliflied fuperftition, and to have made a fair
partition of mankind between them ; the former
claiming all the learned and wife, the latter pof-
fefling all the vulgar and illiterate.

It lecms then, faid I, that you leave politics en-
tirely out of the qiieftion, and never fuppofe, that
a wife magiilrate can juftly be jealous of certain te-
nets of philofophy, fuch as thofe of Epicurus, which,
denying a divine exiftence, and confequently a pro-
vidence and a future ilate, feem to loofen, in
a great mcafure, the ties of morality, and may
be fuppofed, for that rcafon, pernicious to the
peace of civil fociety.

I know, replied he, that in fa<5t thefe per-
fecutions never, in any age, proceeded from calm
reafon, or from experience of the pernicious con-
fequences of philolbphy; but arofe entirely from
paffion and prejudice. But what if I Ihould ad-
vance farther, and aflert, that, if Epicurus had
been accufed before the people, by any of the
Jycophants or informers of thofe days, he could
cafily have defended his caufe, and proved his
principles of philofophy to be as falutary as thofe
of his adverfaries, who endeavoured, with fuch.
zeal, to expofe him to the public hatred and
jealoufy ?

I wifh, faid I, you would try your eloquence
upon fo extraordinary a topic, and make a fpeecli
for Epicurus, which might fatisfy, not the mob
of Athens, if you will allow that ancient and
polite city to have contained any mob, but the
more philofophical part of his audience, fuch as
might be fuppofed capable of comprehending his
arguments.

The matter would not be difficult, upon fuch
conditions, replied he : And if you pleafe, I fhall
fuppofe myfelf Epicurus for a moment, and make
you fland for the Athenian people, and fhall de-
liver you fuch an harangue as will fill the urn

with

144 S E C T I O N XI.

with white beans, and leave not a black one tp
gratify the malice of my adverfaries.

Very well : Pray proceed upon thefe fuppofitions.

I come hither, O ye Athenians, to juftify in
your aflembly what I maintained in my fchool,
and I find myfelf impeached by furious antago-
nifts, inllead of reafoning with calm and difpaf-
fionate enquirers. Your deliberations, which of
right fhould be direded to queftions of public
good, and the intereft of the commonwealth, are
diverted to the difquifitions of fpeculative phi-
lofophy; and thefe magnificent, but perhaps fruit-
lefs enquiries, take place of your more familiar
but more ufeful occupations. But fo far as in
me lies, I will prevent this abufe. We fhall not
here difputc concerning the origin and govern-
ment of worlds. We fhall only enquire how far
fuch queftions concern the public interefV. And
if I can perfuade you, that they are entirely in-
different to the peace of fociety and fecurity of
government, I hope that you will prefently fend
us back to our fchools, there to examine, at lei-
fure, the queflion, the moft fublime, but, at the
fame time, the moll: fpeculative of all philofo-

The religious philofophers, not fatisfied with
the tradition of your forefathers, and do6lrine of
your priefts (in which 1 willingly acquiefce), in-
dulge a rafli curiofity, in trying how far they can
eftablifh religion upon the principles of reafonj
and they thereby excite, inflead of fatibfying,
the doubts, which naturally arife from a di-
ligent and fcrutinous enquiry. They paint, in the
moft magnificent colours, the order, beauty, and
wife arrangement of the univerfe; and then afk,
if fuch a glorious difplay of intelligence could
pi'oceed from the fortuitous concourfe of atoms,
or if chance could produce what the greateft
genius can never fufhciently admire. I fhall not
J examine

Of a Providence and Future State. 145

examine the juflncfs of this argument. I fhall al-
low it to be as folid as my antagonifls and ac-
cufers can defire. It is fufficient, if I can prove,
from this very reafoning, that the quedion is en-
tirely fpeculative, and that, when, in my philo-
fophical difquifitions, 1 deny a providence and
a future llate, I undermine not the foundations
offociety, but advance principles, which they them-
felves, upon their own topics, if tliey argue con-
fidently, muit allow to be folid and fatisfaftory.

You then, who are my accufers, have acknow-
ledged, that the chief or fole argument for a di-
vine exigence (which I never queftioned) is de-
rived from the order of nature j where there ap-
pear fuch marks of intelligence and defign, that
you think it extravagant to alTign for i'ts caufe,
either chance, or the blind and unguided force
of matter. You allow, that this is an argument
drawn from efFedls to caufes. From the order
of the work, you infer, that there mufb have
been projedt and forethought in the workman. If
you cannot make out this point, you allow, that
your conclufion fails; and you pretend not to
eftablifh the conclufion in a greater latitude than
the phenomena of nature will juftify. Thefe are
your concellions. I defire you to mark the con-
fequences.

When we infer any particular caufe from an
effedl, we mufb proportion the one to the other,
and can never be allowed to afcribe to the caufe
any qualities, but what are exactly fufHcient to
produce the effeft. A body of ten ounces raif-
ed in a fcale may ferve as a proof, that the
counterbalancino; weiG,ht exceeds ten ounces: but
can never afford a reafon that it exceeds a hun-
dred. \i the caufe, afTigned for any effedt, be
not fufficient to produce it, we mufb either re-
je(5b that caufe, or add to it fuch qualities as will
give it a jufb proportion to the effed:* But if we

Vol. II. L afcribe

146 SECTION XL

afcribe to it farther qualities, or affirm it capa-
ble of producing other effedls, we can only in-
dulge the licence of conjecture, and arbitrarily
fuppofe the exiftence of qualities and energies,
without reafon or authority.

The fame rule holds, whether the caufe af-
figned be brute unconfcious matter, or rational
intelligent being. li the caufe be known only
by the effedt, we never ought to afcribe to it
any qualities, beyond what are precifely requi-
fite to produce the effc6l : Nor can we, by any
rules of juft reafoning, return back from the caufe,
and infer other efFeds from it, beyond thofe by
which alone it is known to us. No one, mere-
ly from the fight of one of Zeuxis's pidures,
could know, that he was alfo a ftatuary or ar-
chitect, and was an artift no lefs fl<.ilful in ftone
and marble than in colours. The talents and tafte,
difplayed in the particular work before us ; thefe
we may fafely conclude the workman to be pof-
fefled of. The caufe muft be proportioned to
the effettj and if we exadlly and precifely pro-
portion it, we fhall never find in it any qualities,
that point farther, or afix)rd an inference con-
cerning any other defign or performance. Such
qualities muft be fomevvhat beyond what is mere-
ly requifite for producing the eiTedt, which we
examine.

Allowing, therefore, the gods to be the au-
thors of the exiftence or order of the univerfej it
follows, that tiiey pofTefs that precife degree of
powLT, intelligence, and benovelence, which ap-
pears in their workmanfhip; but nothing farther
can ever be proved, except we call in the alTif-
tance of exaggeration and flattery to fupply the
defefls of argument and reafoning. So far as the
traces of any attributes, at prefent, appear, fo
far may v/e conclude thefe attributes to exift.
The fuppofition of farther attributes is mere hy-

pothefis i

of a Providence and Future State. 147

pothefis ; much more the fuppofition, that, in dif-
tant regions of fpace or periods of tirrif, there
has been, or will be, a more magnificent cifpiay
of thefe attributes, and a fcheme of admmlllra-
tion more fuitable to fuch imaginary virtues.
We can never be allowed to mount up fiom ihe
univerfe, the effeifl,. to Jupiter, the caufe; and
then delcend downwards, to infer any new ef-
fe6t from that caufe; as if the prefent effeds
alone were not entirely worthy of the glorious
attributes, which we afcribe to that deity. The
knowledge of the caufe being derived folely from
the efFe6b, they muft be exadly adjufted to each
other; and the one can never refer to any thing
farther, or be the foundation of any new mfe-
rence and conclufion.

You find certain phasnomena in nature. You
feek a caufe or author. You imagine that you
have found him. You afterwards become fo en-
amoured of this offspring of your brain, that
you imagine it impoffible, but he m.ift produce-
fomething greater and more perfed: than the
prefent fcene of things, which is fo full of ill
and diforder. You forget, that this fuperlaiive
intelligence and benevolence are entirely imagi-
nary, or, at lead, without any foundation m rea-
fon; and that you have no ground to afcribe to
him any qualities, but what you fee he has ac-
tually exerted and difplayed in his producflions.
Let your gods, therefore, O philofophers, be fuit-
ed to the prefent appearances by arbitarry fup-
pofitions, in order to fuit them to the attributes,
which you fo fondly afcribe to your deities.

When prielts and poets, fupported by your au-
thority, O Athenians, talk of a golden or filver
age, which preceded the prefent ftate of vice and
mifery, 1 hear them with attention and with re-
verence. But v/hen philofophers, who pretend to
negledt authority, and to cultivate reafon, hold

L 2 the

148 Section xl

the fame difcourfe, I pay them not, I own, the
lame obfequious fubmiffion and pious deference,
I aflcj who carried them into the councils of the
gods, who opened to them the book of fate, that
they thus rafhly affirm, that their deities have
executed, or will execute, any purpofe beyond
what has actually appeared? If they fell me, that
they have mounted on the fleps or by the gra-
dual afcent of reafon, and by drawing inferences
from effedls to caufjs, 1 fti-11 infill, that they have
aided the afcent of reafon by the wings of ima-
gination; otherwrfe th-ey could not thus change
their manner of inference, and argue from cau-
fes to efl'edl's ; prefum'ing, that a more perfe6t pro-
duftion than the prefent world would 'be more
fuitable to fuch perfecfl beings as the gods, and
forgetting that they have no reafon to afcribe
to thefe ccieftial beings any perfecftion or any at-
tribute, but what can be found irl the prefent
world.

Hence a!l the fruitlefs induftry to account for
the ill appearances of nature, and fave the ho-
nour of the gods; while we mult acknowledge
the reality of that evitl and diforder, v/ith which
the world fo much abounds. The obltinate and
intraftable qualities of matter, we are told, or
tlie obfervance of general laws, or fome fuch rea-
fon, is the fole caui'e, which controlled the pow-
er and benevolence of Jupiter, and obliged him
to create mankind and every fenfible crea-
ture fo imperfeeft and fo unhappy. Thefe attri-
butes, then, are, it feems, beforehand, taken for
granted, in their greatcft latitude. And upon that
fuppoficion, 1 own, that fuch conjedlures may,
perhaps, be admitted as plaufible fokuions of the
ill phitnomena. But lliil I aH-:; Why take thefe
attributes for granted, or why afcribe to the caufe
any qualities but what a<fl-uaily appear in the ef-
fe(^t ? Why torture your brain tojuftify the courfc

of

Of a Providen-ce and Future State. 149

of nature upon fuppofitions, which, for aught you
know, may be entirely imaginary, and of which there
are to be found no traces in tiie courfe ofnature?

The religious hypothefis, therefore, mull be con-
fidered only as a particular method of account-
ing for the vilible phiEnomena of the univerfe:
But no juft reafoner will ever prefume to infer
from it any fingle fa6t, and alter or add to the
phcEnomena, in any Cngle particular. If you think,
that the appearances of things prove fuch caufes, it
is allowable for you to draw an inference con-
cerning the exiftence of thefe caufes. In fuch
complicated and fublime fubjefts, every one
fliould be indulged in the liberty of conje^lure
and argument. But here you ought to reft. If
you come backward, and arguing from your in-
ferred caufes, conclude, that any other fad; has
exifted, or will exiil, in the courfe of nature,
which may ferve as a fuller difplay of particu-
lar attributes i I muft admonifh you, that you have
departed from the method of reafoning, attach-
ed to the prefent fubjeft, and have certainly ad-
ded fomething to the attributes of the caufe,
beyond what appears in the efifeft; otherwife you
could never, with tolerable fenfe or propriety,
add any thing to the efFeft, in order to render
it more worthy of the caufe.

Where, then, is the odioufnefs of that doflrine,
which I teach in my fchool, or rather, which I
examine in my gardens ? Or what do you find
in this whole qucftion, wherein the fecurity of
good morals, or the peace and order of fociety
is in the leaft concerned ?

I deny a providence, you fay, and fupreme
governour of the world, who guides the courfe
of events, and punifhes the vicious with infamy
and difappointment, and rewards the virtuous with
honour and fuccefs, in all their undertakings. But
furely, I deny not the courfe itfelf of events,
which lies open to every one's enquiry and exa-
mination.

I50 SECTION XI.

mination. I acknowledge, that, in the prefent
order of things, virtue is attended with more
peace of mind than vice, and meets with a more
favourable reception from the world. I am fen-
fible, that, according to the pail experience of
mankind, friendfhip is the chief joy of human
life, and moderation the only fource of tranquil-
Jity pnd happinefs. I never balance between the
virtuous and vicious courfe of iifci but am fen-
fible, that to a well dilpofed mind, every ad-
vantage is on the fide of the former. And v/hat
can you fay more, allowing all your fuppofitions
and reafonings ? You tell me, indeed, that this
difpofition of things proceeds from intelligence
and defign. But whatever it proceeds from, the
dilpofition itfelf, on which depends our happinefs
or m'lftry, and confequently our conduft and de-
portment in life, is ftill the fame. It is ilill open for
me, as well as you, to regulate my behaviour, by my
experience of paft events. And if you affirm, that,
while a divine providence is allowed, and a fu-
preme diftributive juftice in rhe univerfe, I ought
to expe6l fome more particular reward of the
good, and punifliment of the bad, beyond the ordi-
nary courfe of events j 1 here find the fame fallacy,
which I have before endeavoured to deteA. You
perfift in imagining, that, if we grant that divine
exigence, for which you fo earneflly contend, you
may fafely infer confequenccs from it, and add
fomethingto the experienced order of nature, by ar-
guing from the attributes which you afcribe to your
gods. You feem not to remember, that all your
reafonings on this fubjeft can only be drawn from
effecls to caufes i and that every argument, deduced
from caufes to effeds, muft of neceffity be a grofs
fophifm ; fince it is impoflible for you to know any
thing of the caufe,' but what you have antecedently,
not inferred, but difcovered to the full, in the effcd:.

But

OfaPROviDENCE and Future State. T51

But what muft a philofopher think of thofe
vain reafoners, who, inftead of regarding the
prefent fcene of things as the fole objed of their
contemplation, fo far reverfe the whole courfe
of nature, as to render this life merely a paf-
fage to fomething farther; a porch, which leads
to a greater, and vaftly different building; a pro-
logue, v/hich ferves only to introduce the piece,
and give it more grace and propriety? Whence, do
you think, can fuch philoibphers derive their
idea of the gods ? From their own conceit and
imagination furely. For if they derived it from
the prefent ph;Enomena, it would never point to
any thing fartiier, but mud be exa6lly adjufted
to them. That the divinity may poffibly be endowed
with attributes, which we have never feen exert-
ed ; may be governed by principles of adtion,
which we cannot difcover to be fatisfied : All
this will freely be allowed. But ftill this is mere
pojjibiliiy and hypothefis. We never can have rea-
fon to infer any attributes, or any principles of
aflion in him, but fo far as we kfiow them to
have been exerted and fatisfied.

Are there any marks of a diflributive jufiice in
the world ? If you anfwer in the affirmative, I con-
clifie, that, fince juftice here exerts itfelf, it :s
fatisfied. If you reply in the negative, I con-
clude, that you have then no reafon to afcribe
juftice, in our fenfe of it, to the gods. If you
hold a medium between affirmation and negati-
on, by faying, that the juflic^ of the gods, at
prefent, exerts itfelf in part, but not in its full
extent ; I anfwer, that you have no reafon to give
it any particular extent, but only fo far as yo u fee
it, at prefent^ exert iifelF.

Thus I bring the difpute, O Athenians, to a
Ihort iflue with my antagonifls. The courfe of
nature lies open to my contemplation as well as to
theirs. The experienced train of events is the

great

152 S E C T I O N XI.

great ftandard, by which we all regulate our con-
dud. Nothing elfe can be appealed to in the
field, or in the fenate. Nothing elfe ought ever
to be heard of in the fchool, or in the clofet. In
vain would our limited underftanding break through
thofe boundaries, which are too narrow for our
fond innagination. While we argue from the
courfe of nature, and infer a particular intelli-
gent caufe, which firfl beftowed, and ftili preferves
order in the univerfe, we embrace a principle,
which is both uncertain and ufelefs. It is uncer-
tain i becaufe the fubjefh lies entirely beyond the
reach of human experience. It is ufelefs ; becaufe
our knowledge of this caufe being derived entirely
from the courfe of nature, we can never, accord-
ing to the rules of juft reafoning, return back from
the caufe with any new inference, or making ad-
ditions to the common and experienced courfe of
nature, eftablifh any nev; principles of conduct and
behaviour.

I obferve (faid I, finding he had finifhed his ha-
rangue) that you negleft not the artifice of the
demagogues of old ; and as you were pleafed to
make me ftand for the people, you infinuate
yourfelf into m.y favour by embracing thofe prin-
ciples, to which, you know, I have always ex-
prefTed a particular attachment. But allowing you
to make experience (as indeed I think you ought)
the only flandard of our judgment concerning this,
and all other queftions of fad; I doubt not but,
from the very faifie experience, to which you ap-
peal, it may be poflible to refute this reafoning,
which you have put into the itiouth of Epicurus.
If you faw, for inftance, a half-finiflied build-
ing, furrounded with heaps of brick and Itone
and mortar, and all the inflruments of mafonryj
could you not infer from the eifetl, that it was a
work of defign and contrivance ? And could you
not return again, from this inferred caufe, to infer

new

Of a Providence and Future State. 153

new additions to the effcdl, and conclude, that
the building would foon be finiflied, and receive
all the further improvements, which art could be-
ftow upon it ? If you faw upon the fea-fhore thq
print of one human foot, you would conclude,
that a man had paflfed that way, and that he had
alfo left the traces of the other foot, though ef-
faced by the rolling of the fands or inundation of
the waters. Why then do you refufe to admit the
fame method of realbning with regard to the or-
der of nature ? Confider the world and the pre-
fent life only as an imperfect building, from which
you can infer a fuperior intelligence ; and arguing
from that fuperior inteHigence, which can leave
nothing imperfe6t ; why may you not infer a more
finifhed fcheme or plan, which will receive its com-
pletion in fome diftant point of fpace or time ?
Are not thefe methods of reafoning exa6bly fimilar ?
And under what pretence can you embrace the one,
■while you rejedt the other ?

The infinite difference of the fubjeifts, replied
he, is a fufficient foundation for this difference in
my conclufions. In works of human art and con-
trivance, it is allowable to advance from the effedt
to the caufe, and returning back from the caufe,
to form new inferences concerning the effect, and
examine the alterations, which it has probably un-
dergone, or may flill undergo. But what is the
foundation of this method of reafoning ? Plainly
this; that man is a being, whojn we know by
experience, whofe motives and defigns we are ac-
quainted with, and whofe projects and inclina-
tions have a certain connexion and coherence,
according to the laws which nature has eftablifh-
ed for the government of fuch a creature. When,
therefore, we find, that any work has proceeded
from the fkill and induflry of man j as we are
otherwife acquainted with the nature of the ani-
mal, we can draw a hundred inferences concerning

what

154 S E C T I O N XI.

what may be expefbed from him ; and thefe in-
ferences will all be founded in experience and ob-
fervation. But did we know man only from the
fingle work or produdion which we examine, it
were impoflible for us to argue in this manner ;
becaufe our knowledge of all the qualities, which
we afcribe to him, being in that cafe derived from
the production, it is impoffible they could point
to any thing farther, or be the foundation of
any new inference. The print of a foot in the
fand can only prove, when confidered alone, that
there was fome figure adapted to it, by which it
was produced : But the print of a human foot
proves likewife, from our other experience, that
there was probably another foot, which alfo left
its imprefTion, though effaced by time or other ac-
cidents. Here we mount from the effc6l to the
caufe ; and defcending again from the caufe, in-
fer alterations in the effe6t ; but this is not a
continuation of the fame fimple chain of reafoning.
We comprehend in this cafe a hundred other ex-
periences and obfervations, concerning the ujual
figure and members of that fpecies of animal,
without v/hich this method of argument muft be
confidered as fallacious and fophiftical.

The cafe is not the fame with our reafon*
ings from the works of nature. The Deity is
known to us only by his productions, and is a
fingle being in the univerfe, not comprehended
under any fpecies or genus, from whofe experien-
ced attributes or qualities, we can, by analogy,
infer any attribute or quality in him. As the
univerfe fhews wifdom and goodnefs, we infer
wifdom and goodnefs. As it fhews a particular
degree of thefe perfedlions, we infer a particular
degree of them, precifely adapted to the efied:
which we examine. But farther attributes or far-
ther degrees of the fame attributes we can ne-
ver be authorifed to infer or fuppofe, by any

rules

Of aPROviDiNCE and Future State. 155

rules of juft reafoning. Now, without fome fuch
licence of fuppofition, it is impolllble for us to »
argue from the caufe, or infer any alteration in
the effeft, beyond what has immediately fallen
under our obfervation. Greater good produced
by this Being muft IHII prove a greater degree
of goodnefs : A more impartial diftributioa of
rewards and punifliments muft proceed from a
greater regard to juftice and equity. Every fup-
pofed addition to the works of n.iture makes an
addition to the attributes of the Author of na-
ture; and confequently, being entirely unfup-
ported by any reafon or argument, can never
be admitted but as mere conje(5lure and hypo-
thefis *.

The great fource of our miftake in this fub-
jecb, and of the unbounded licence of conjefture,
which we indulge, is, that we tacitly confider
ourfelves, as in the place of the Supreme Being,
and conclude, that he will, on every occafion,
obferve the fame condudt, which we ourfelves,
in his fituation, would have embraced as reafo-
nable and eligible. But, befides that the ordi-
nary courfe of nature may convince us, that al-
moft every thing is regulated by principles and
maxims very different from ours -, befides this, I
fay, it muft evidently appear contrary to all rules
of analogy to reafon, from the intentions and
projefts of men, to thofe of a Being fo different,
and fo much fuperior. In human nature, there
is a certain experienced coherence of deligns and
inclinations ; fo that when, from any fad, we
have difcovered one 'intention of any man, it
may often be reafonable, from experience, to in-
fer another, and draw a lono; chain of conclu-
fions concerning his paft or future condudl. But
this method of reafoning can never have place

with

• See NOTE [M].

156 SECTION XI.

with regard to a Being, fo remote and incom-
prehenfible, who bears much lefs analogy to any
other being in the univerfe than the fun to a
waxen taper, and who difcovers himfelf only by
fome faint traces or outlines, beyond which we
have no authority to afcribe to him any attribute or
perfection. What we imagine to be a fuperior
perfe6lion, may really be adefedt. Or were it ever
fo much a perfedlion, the afcribing of it to the
Supreme Being, where it appears not to have
been really exerted, to the full, in his works,
favours more of flattery and panegyric, than of
juft reafoning and fouad philofophy. All the phi-
lofophy, therefore, in the world, and all the reli-
gion, which is nothing buc a fpecies of phiiorophy,
will never be able to carry us beyond the ufual
courfe of experience, or give us meafures of con-
duct and behaviour different from thofe which are
furnifhed by reflexions on common life. No new
fadl can ever be inferred from the religious hypo-
thefis j no event forefeen or foretold ; no reward
or punifhment expefted or dreaded, beyond what
is already known by pradlice and obfervation. So
that my apology for Epicurus will ftill appear fo-
lid and fatisfadory j nor have the political interefts
of fociety any connexion with the philofophical
difputes concerning metaphyfics and religion.

There is flill one circumfl:ance, replied I, which
you feem to have overlooked. Though I fhould
allow your premifes, 1 muft deny your conclufi-
on. You conclude, that religious doflines and
reafonings can have no influence on life, becaufe
they ought to have no influence : never confider-
ing, that men reafon not in the fame manner you
do, but draw many confequences from the belief
of a divine Exifl:ence, and fuppofe that the Deity
will inflidl punifliments on vice, and bcftow re-
wards on virtue, beyond what appear in the or-
dinary courfe of nature. Whether this reafoning

of

Of a Providence and Future State. 157

of theirs be juft or not, is no matter. Its influence
on their life and conduft mull ilill be the fame.
And, thofc, who attempt to difabufe them of fuch
prejudices, may, for aught I know, be good rcafo-
ners, but I cannot allow them to be good citizens
and politicians ; fince they free men from one re-
llraint upon their paffions, and make the infringe-
ment of the laws of fociety, in one refpe6t, more
eafy and fecure.

After all, 1 may, perhaps, agree to your gene-
ral conclufion in favour of liberty, though upon
different premlfes from thofe, on which you en-
deavour to found it. I think, that the ftate ought
to tolerate every principle of philofophy; nor is
there an inflance, that any government has fuffer-
ed in its political interefts by fuch indulgence.
There is no enthufiafm among philofophers j their
dottrines are not very alluring to the people; and
no reftraint can be put upon their reafonings, but
what mud be of dangerous confequence to the
fciences, and even to the Hate, by paving the way
for perfecution and oppreffion in points, where the
generality of mankind are more deeply interefted
and concerned.

But there occurs to me (continued I) with re-
gard to yo'rmain topic, a difficulty, which I fhall
juR propofe to you, without infilling on it; left it
lead into reafonings of too nice and delicate a nature.
In a word, I much doubt whether it be poPible
for a caufe to be known only by its effect (as you
have all along fuppofed) or to be of fo fingular and
pat dcular a nature as to have no parallel and no
fimilarity with any other caufe or objedl, that has
ever fallen under our obfcrvation. It is only when
two /pedes of objedls are found to be conflantly
conjoined, that we can infer the one from the other;
and were an effed: prefented, which was entirely
fingular, and could not be comprehended under
any known JpecieSi I do not fee, that we could

form

158 SECTION XI.

form any conje6bure or inference at all concerning
its caufe. If experience and obfervation and ana-
logy be, indeed, the only guides which we can rea-
fonably follow in inferences of this nature; both
the effe6b and caufe muft bear a fimilarity and refem-
biance to other effects and caufes, which we know,
and which we have found, in many inftances, to be
conjoined with each other. I leave it to your own re-
fiedtion to purfue the confequencesof this principle.
I fhall juft obferve, that, as the antagonifts of
Epicurus always fuppofe the univerfe, an effeft
quite fingular and unparalleled, to be the proof of
a Deity, a caufe no lefs fingular and unparalleled ;
your reafonings, upon that fuppofition, feenn, at
leafb, to merit our attention. There is, I own,
fome difficulty, how we can ever return from the
caufe to the effefl, and, reafoning from our ideas
of the former, infer any alteration on the latter, or
any addition to it.

SECTION

( >59 )

SECTION XIL

Of the Academical or Sceptical Philo-
sophy.

PART I.

A HERE is not a greater number of philofo-
phical reafonings, difplayed upon any fubjetb, than
thofe, which prove the exiftence of a Deity, and
refute the fallacies of Atheifts j and yet the moft
religious philofophers ftill difpute whether any
man can be fo blinded as to be a fpeculative atheill.
How fhall we reconcile thefe contradidtions ? The
knights-errant, who wandered about to clear the
world of dragons and giants, never entertained the
leaft doubt with regard to the exiftence of thefe
monfters.

The Sceptic is another enemy of religion, who
naturally provokes the indignation of all divines
and graver philofophers j though it is certain, that
no man ever met with any fuch abfurd creature,
or converfed with a man, who had no opinion or
principle concerning any fubjeft, either of action
or fpeculation. This begets a very natural quef-
tion ; What is meant by a fceptic ? And how far it
is pofTible to pufh thefe philofophical principles of
doubt and uncertainty ?

There

i6o SECTION fXif.

There is a fpecies of fcepticifm, antecedent to al!
ftudy and philofophy, which is much inculcated
by Des Cartes and others, as a fovereign preferva-
tive againll error and precipitate judgment. It
recommends an univerfal doubt, not only of all
our former opinions and principles, but alfo of
our very faculties ; of whofe veracity, fay they, we
muft aiTure ourfelves, by a chain of reafoning, de-
duced from fome original principle, which cannot
poffibly be fallacious or deceitful. But neither is
there any fuch original principle, which has a pre-
rogative above others, that are felf-evident and
convincing : Or if there were, could we advance
a ftep beyond it, but by the ufe of thofe very fa-
culties, of which we are fuppofed to be already
diffident. The Cartefian doubt, therefore, were it
ever polfible to be attained by any human creature
(as it plainly is not) would be entirely incurable j
and no reafoning could ever bring us to a Hate of
afiurance and conviftion upon any fubjedl.

It muft, however, be confefled, that this fpecies
of fcepticifm, when more moderate, may be un-
derftood in a very reafonable fenfe, and is a necef-
fary preparative to the ftudy of philofophy, by pre-
ferving a proper impartiality in our judgments,
and weaning our mind from all thofe prejudices,
which we may have imbibed from education or
rafh opinion. To begin with clear and felf-evi-
dent principles, to advance by timorous and fure
fteps, to review frequently our conclufions, and
examine accurately all their confequences; though
by thefe means we fliall make both a flow and a
fhort progrefs in our fyftcmsj are the only me-
thods, by which we can ever hope to reach truth,
and attain a proper ftability and certainty in our
determinations.

There is another fpecies of fcepticifm, conje-
quent to fcience and enquiry, when men are fup-
pofed to have difcovered, either the abfolute fal-
3 lacioulhefs

Academical or Sceptical Philosophy. i6i

lacioufnefs of their mental faculties, or their un-
fitnefs to reach any fixed determination in all thofe
curious fubjefts of fpeculation, about which they
are commonly employed. Even our very fenfes
are brought into difpute, by a certain fpecies of
philofophers ; and the maxims of common life are
fubjedted to the fame doubt as the mofl: profound
principles or conclufions of metaphyfics and theo-
logy. As thefe paradoxical tenets (if they may be
called tenets) are to be met with in fome phi-
lofophers, and the refutation of them in feveral,
they naturally excite our curiofity, and make us
enquire into the arguments, on which they may
be founded.

I need not infift upon the more trite topics,
employed by the fceptics in all ages, againft the
evidence o{ Jenje ; fuch as thofe which are derived
from the imperfedlion and fallacioufnefs of our or-
gans, on numberlefs occafions j the crooked ap-
pearance of an oar in water ; the various afpefts of
objects, according to their different diftancesj the
double images which arife from the prefling one
eye ; with many other appearances of a like na-
ture. Thefe fceptical topics, indeed, are only
fufficient to prove, that the fenfes alone are not
implicitly to be depended on j but that we mufl:
corredl their evidence by reafon, and by con-
fiderations, derived from the nature of the me-
dium, the diftance of the obje<5t, and the dif-
pofition of the organ, in order to render them,
within their fphere, the proper criteria of truth
and falfehood. There are other more profound
arguments againft the fenfes, which admit noc
of fo eafy a folution.

It feems evident, that men are carried, by a
natural inftin6t or prepolTelTion, to repofe faith in
their fenfes ; and that, without any reafoning, or
even almoft before the ufe of reafon, we always
fuppofe an external univerfe, which depends not on

Vol. II. M our

i62 SECTION XII.

our perception, but would exift, though we and
every fenfible creature were abfent or annihilated.
Even the animal creation are governed by a
like opinion, and preferve this belief of exter-
nal objefts, in all their thoughts, defigns, and
aftions.

It feems aifo evident, that, when men follow
this blind and powerful inftindt of nature, they
always fuppofe the very images, prefented by the
fenfes, to be the external obje<5ls, and never en-
tertain any fufpicion, that the one are nothing but
reprefentations of the other. This very table,
which we fee white, and which we feel hard, is
believed to exift, independent of our perception,
and to be fomething external to our mind, which
perceives it. Our prefence beflows not being on
it : Our abfence does not annihilate it. It pre-
ferves its exiftence uniform and entire, indepen-
dent of the fituation of intelligent beings, who
perceive or contemplate it.

But this univerfai and primary opinion of all
men is foon deftroyed by the flighteft philofophy,
which teaches us, that nothing can ever be pre-
fent to the mind but an image or perception,
and that the fenfes are only the inlets, through
which thefe images are conveyed, without being
able to produce any immediate intercourfe be-
tween the mind and the obje6b. The table, which
we fee, feems to diminifh, as we remove farther
from it : But the real table, which exifts inde-
pendent of us, fafFers no alteration : It was,
therefore, nothing but its image, which was pre-
fent to the mind. Thefe are the obvious dic-
tates of reafon j and no man, who reflecfts, ever
doubted, that the exiftences, which we confider,
when we fay, this houfe and that tree, are no-
thing but perceptions in the mind, and fleet-
ing copies or reprefentations of other exiftences,
which remain uniform and independent. '

So

Academical or ScEPTrcALPHiLosoPHY. 163

So far, then, are we necefTitated by reafoning
to contradid or depart from the primary inftindts
of nature, and to embrace a new fyfteni with re-
gard to the evidence of our fenfes. But here phi-
lofophy finds herfelf extremely embarraflfed, when
fhe would juftify this new fyftem, and obviate the
cavils and objecflions of the fceptics. She can no
longer plead the infallible and irrefiftible inftinft
of nature : For that led us to a quite different
fyftem, which is acknowledged fallible and even
erroneous. And to juftify this pretended philo-
fophical fyftemj by a chain of clear and convinc-
ing argument, or even any appearance of argu-
ment, exceeds the power of all human capa-
city.

By what argument can it be proved, that the
perceptions of the mind muft be caufed by ex-
ternal objefts, entirely different from them, though
refembling them (if that be poftible) and could
not arife either from the energy of the mind it-
felf, or from the fuggeftion of fome invifible and
unknown fpirit, or from fome other caufe ftill more
unknown to us ? It is acknowledged, that, in faft,
many of thefe perceptions arife not from any thing
external, as in dreams, madnefs, and other dif-
eafes. And nothing can be more inexplicable
than the manner, in which body ftiould fo operate
Upon mind as ever to convey an image of itfelf
to a fubftance, fuppofed of fo different, and even
contrary a nature.

It is a queftion of facl, whether the percep-
tions of the fenfes be produced by external ob-
jedls, refembling them : How ftiall this queftion
be determined ? By experience furcly ; as all other
queftions of a like nature. But here experience
is, and muft be entirely filent. The mind has
never any thing prcfent to it but the percepti-
ons, and cannot poffibly reach any experience of
their connexion with objedls. The fuppofition

M 2 of

164 SECTION XII.

of fuch a connexion is, therefore, withotit any
foundation in reafoning.

To have recourfe to the veracity of the Su-
preme Being, in order to prove the veracity of
our fenfes, is furely making a very unexpe6led
circuit. If his veracity were at all concerned in
this matter, our fenfes would be entirely infalli-
ble ; becaufe it is not pofTible that he can ever de-
ceive. Not to mention, that, if the external
world be once called in queflion, we fhall be at a
lofs to find arguments, by which we may prove
the exiflence of that Being or any of his attri-
butes.

This is a topic, therefore, in which the pro-
founder and more philofophical fceptics will al-
ways triumph, when they endeavour to introduce
an univerfal doubt into all fubjeds of human know-
ledge and enquiry. Do you follow the inftinfts
and propenfities of nature, may they fay, in af-
fenting to the veracity of fenfe ? But thefe lead
you to believe, that the very perception or
fenfible image is the external objedt. Do you
difclaim this principle, in order to embrace a
more rational opinion, that the perceptions are
only reprefentations of fomething external ? You
here depart from your natural propenfities and
more obvious fentiments; and yet are not able
to fatisfy your reafon, which can never find any
convincing argument from experience to prove,
that the perceptions are conne6led with any exter-
nal objedls.

There is another fceptical topic of a like na-
ture, derived from the moft profound philofophy;
which might merit our attention, were it requifite
to dive fo deep, in order to difcover arguments and
realbnings, which can fo little ferve to any feri-
ous purpofe. It is univerfally allowed by mo-
dern enquirers, that all the fenfible qualities of ob-

jeds.

AfcADEMICALOr SCEPTICAL PniLOSOPHY. 165

je(fts, fuch as hard, fofr, hot, cold, white, black,
iffc. are merely fecondary, and cxift not in the ob-
jefts themfelves, but arc perceptions of the mind,
without any external archetype or model, which
they reprefent. If this be allowed, with regard to
fecondary qualities, it muft alfo follow, with re-
gard to the fuppofed primary qualities of extenfion
and folidity ; nor can the latter be any more en-
titled to that denomination than the former. The
idea of extenfion is entirely acquired from the
fenfes of fight and feeling ; and if all the quali-
ties, perceived by the fenfes, be in the mind,
not in the objeii, the fame conclufion mult reach
the idea of extenfion, which is wholly dependent
on the fenfible ideas or the ideas of fecondary
qualities. Nothing can fave us from this con-
clufion, but the aflerting, that the ideas of thofe
primary qualities are attained by AhJlraElion^ an
opinion, which, if we exaipin^ it accurately, we
fhall find to be unintelligible, and even abfurd.
An extenfion, that is neither tangible nor vifible,
cannot pofiibly be conceived : And a tangible or
vifible extenfion, v/hich is neither hard nor foft,
biack. nor white, is equally beyond the reach of
Jiuman conception. Let any man try to conceive
a triangle in general, which is neither IJoceles nor
Scalenum^ nor has any particular length or pro-
portion of fides; and he will foon perceive the ab-
furdity of all the fcholaflric notions with regard to
abftradlion and general ideas *.

Thus the firll philofophical ob;c(5lion to the
evidence of fenfe or to the opinion of external
cxiftence confills in this, that fuch an opinion, if
refted on natural inftincft, is contrary to reafon, and
if referred to reafon, is contrary to natural inftintft,
and at the fame time carries no rational evidence
>vith it, to convince an impartial enquirer. The

fecond

* See NOTE [N].

i66 SECTION XIL

fecond objeftion goes farther, and reprefents this
opinion as contrary to reafon : at leaft, if it bcia
principle of reafon, that all fenfible qualities are
in the mind, not in the objed. Bereave matter of
all its intelligible qualities, both primary and fe-
condary, you in a manner annihilate it, and leave
only a certain unknown, inexplicable fomethingj
as the caufe of our perceptions j a notion fo im-
perfect, that no fceptic will think it worth while to
contend againft it.

P A R T II.

It may feem a very extravagant attempt of the
fceptics to deflroy reafon by argument and ratioci-
nation j yet is this the grand fcope of all their en-
quiries and difputes. They endeavour to find
objediions, both to our abftradt rcafonings, and
to thofe which regard matter of fadl and exif-
tence.

The chief objeftion againft all ahJiraEl reafon-
ings is derived from the ideas of fpace and time ;
ideas, which, in common life and to a carelefs
view, are very clear and intelligible, but when
they pafs through the fcrutiny of the profound
fciences (and they are the chief object of thefe
fciences) ajfford principles, which feem full of
abfurdity and contradiction. No prieftly dogmas,
invented on purpofe to tame and fubdue the re-
bellious reafon of mankind, ever fhocked com-
mon fenfe more than the dodrine of the infinite
divifibility of extenfion, with its confequences ;
as they are pompoufly difplayed by all geometri-
cians and metaphyficians, with a kind of triumph
and exultation. A real quantity, infinitely lefs
than itfelf, and fo on in iyijinitum \ this is an edi-
fice fo bold and prodigious, that it is too weigh-
ty for any pretended demonftration to fupport,
becaufe it fliocks the clcareft and molt natural

principles

KY, II

Academical or Sceptical Philosopmy. 167

principles of human reafon *. But what renders
the matter more extraordinary, is, that thefe feem-
ingly abfurd opinions are fupported by a chain of
reafoning, the cleared and moil natural ; nor is it
pofllble for us to allow the premifes without ad-
mitting the confequences. Nothing can be more
convincing and fatisfaftory than all the conclufions
concerning the properties of circles and triangles ;
and yet, when thefe are once received, how can
we deny, that the angle of contact between a cir-
cle and its tangent is infinitely lefs than any refti-
lineal angle, that as you may encreafe the diame-
ter of the circle in infinitum, this angle of coniact
becomes ftill lefs, even in infinitum, and that the an-
gle of contadt between other curves and their tan-
gents may be infinitely lefs than thofe between any
circle and its tangent, and fo on, in infinitum ? The
demonftration of thefe principles feems as unex-
ceptionable as that which proves the three angles of
a triangle to be equal to two right ones, though
the latter opinion be natural and eafy, and the
former big with contradiction and abfurdity. Rea-
fon here feems to be thrown into a kind of amaze-
ment and fufpenfe, which, without the fuggeftions
of any fceptic, gives her a difKdence of herfelf,
and of the ground on which fhe treads. She fees a
full light, which illuminates certain places; but that
light borders upon the moil profound darknefs. And
between thefe fhe is fo dazzled and confounded,
that fhe fcarcely can pronounce with certainty and
alTurance concerning any one objeft.

The abfurdity of thefe bold determinations of
the abftradt fciences feems to become, if poflible,
flill more palpable with regard to time than exten-
fion. An infinite number of real parts of time,
pafTing in fuccelTion, and exhaufted one after ano-
ther, appears fo evident a contradiction, that no man,
one fhould think, whofe judgment is not corrupted,
inftead of being improved, by the l'ciences_, would
ever be able to admit of is;. Yet

t See NOTE [O].

i68 SECTION XII.

Yet flill reafon muft remain reftlefs, and un-
quiet, even with regard to that fcepticifm, to
which fhe is driven by thefe feeming abfurdi-
ties and contradiftions. How any clear, diftind:
idea can contain circumfcances, contradidory to
itfelf, or to any other clear, diftinft idea, is ab-
folutely incomprehenfiblej and is, perhaps, as
abfurd as any propofition, which can be formed.
So that nothing can be more fceptical, or more
full of doubt and hefitation, than this fcepticifm
itfelf, which arifes from fome of the paradoxical
conclufions of geometry or the fcience of quan-
tity *.

The fceptical obje(5lions to moral evidence, or
to the reaionings concerning matter of fadt, are
cither popular or philc/cpbical. The popular objec-
tions are derived from the natural weaknefs of hu-
man underftanding; the contradidlory opinions,
which have been entertained in different ages
and nations; the variations of our judgment in
ficknefs and health, youth and old age, profpe-
rity and adverfity ; the perpetual contradi(fbion of
each particular man's opinions and fentiments ;
with many other topics of that kind. It is need-
lefs to infift farther on this head. Thefe ob-
jedions are but weak. For as, in common life,
we reafon every moment concerning faft and exift-
ence, and cannot pofTibly fubfift, without continu-
ally employing this fpecies of argument, any po-
pular objeftions, derived from thence, mult be
infufficient to dcftroy that evidence. The great
fubverter of Pyrrhonlfm or the cxcelTive principles
of fcepticifm, is adlion, and employment, and the
occupations of common life. TheJe principles
may flourifli and triumph in the fchools ; where
it is, indeed, dilficult, if not impoilible, to refute
them. But as foon as they leave tlie fnade, and
by the prefence of the real objects, which acluate

our
I Sec NOTE [P].

AcADEMiCALOr Sceptical Philosophy. 169

our pafTions and fentiments, are put in oppofition
to the more powerful principles of our nature,
they vanilK like fmoke, and leave the moft de-
termined fceptic in the fame condition as other
mortals.

The fceptic, therefore, had better keep within
his proper fphere, and difplay thofe philofophical ob-
jedions, which arife from more profound refearch-
cs. Here he feems to have ample matter of tri-
umph; while he juftly infifts, that all our evidence
for any matter of fa6t, which lies beyond the tef-
timony of fenfe or memory, is derived entirely
from the relation of caufe and efFedt ; that we
have no other idea of this relation than that of
two objefts, which have been frequently conjoined
together; that we have no argument to convince
us, that objects, which have, in our experience,
been frequently conjoined, will likewife, in other
inftances, be conjoined in the fame manner; and
that nothing leads us to this inference but cuf-
tom or a certain inftindt of our nature; which
it is indeed difficult to refifl, but which, like
other inflindbs, may be fallacious and deceitful.
While the fceptic infifts upon thefe topics, he
fliews his force, or rather, indeed, his own and
our weaknefs ; and feems, for the time at leaft,
to deftroy all aflurance and conviction. Thefe
arguments might be difplayed at greater length, if
any durable good or benefit to fociety could
ever be exped;ed to refult from them.

For here is the chief and moft confounding ob-
jection to excejjive fcepticifm, that no durable good
can ever refult from it; while it remains in its
full force and vigour. We need only afk fuch a
fceptic, What his meaning is ? And what he propojes
by all thefe curious rejearches? He is immediately
at a lofs, and knows not what to anfwer. A Co-
pernican or Ptolemaic, who fupports each his
different fyftem of aftronomy, may hope to produce

a con-

ijo SECTION XII.

a convi(5lion, which will remain conflant and du-
rable, with his audien.ce. A Stoic or Epicurean
difplays principles, which may not only be durable,
but which have an effedl on cofidud: and beha-
viour. But a Pyrrhonian cannot expe6l, that his
philofophy will have any conftant influence on
the mind: Or if it had, that its influence would
be beneficial to fociety. On the contrary, he
muft acknowledge, if he will acknowledge any
thing, that all human life muft perifli, were his
principles univerfally and fteadily to prevail. All
difcourfe, all adtion would imm.ediatcly ceafe ;
and men remain in a total lethargy, till the ne-
celTities of nature, unfatisfied, put an end to their
miferable exiftence. It is true ; fo fatal an event
is very little to be dreaded. Nature is always
too ftrong for principle. And though a Pyrrho-
nian may throw himfelf or others into a momen-
tary anaazement and confufion by his profound
reafonings ; the firfl and mofl trivial event in life
will put to flight all his doubts and fcruples; and
leave him the fame in every point of adion and
fpeculation, with the philofophers of every other
fed:, or with thofe who never concerned them-
felves in any philofophical refearches. When he
awakes from his dream, he will be the firft to
join in the laugh againft himfelf, and to con-
fefs, that all his objections are mere amufement,
and can have no other tendency than to fhow
the whiipfical condition of mankind, who muft
ad and reafon and believe; though they are not
able, by their moft diligent enquiry, to fatisfy
themfelves concerning the foundation of thefe
'operations, or to remove the objections, which
may be raifed againft them.

PART

Academical or Sceptical PHiLOSopHy. 171

PART III.

There is, indeed, a more mitigated fcepticifm or
academical philofophy, which may be both durable
and iifeful, and which may, in part, be the re-
fult of this Pyrrhonifm, or excejfive fcepticifm, when
its undiftinguifhed doubts are, in fome meafure,
corrected by common fenfe and reflection. The
greater part of mankind are naturally apt to be
affirmative and dogmatical in their opinions ; and
while they fee objects only on one fide, and
have no idea of any counterpofing argument, they
throw themfelves precipitately into the principles,
to which they are inclined ; nor have they in-
dulgence for thofe who entertain oppofite fenti-
ments. To hefitate or balance perplexes their un-
derftanding, checks their paffion, and fufpends
their action. They are, therefore, impatient till
they efcape from a ftate, which to them is fo
uneafyi and they can never remove themfelves
far enough from it, by the violence of their af-
firmations and obftinacy of their belief. But could
fuch dogmatical reafoners become fenfible of the
ftrange infirmities of human underftanding, even
in its moft perfect ftate, and when moft accu-
rate and cautious in its determinations; fuch a
reflection would naturally infpire them with more
modefty and refervc, and diminifh their fond opi-
nion of themfelves, and their prejudice againft
antagonifts. The illiterate may reflect on the dif-
pofition of the learned, who, amidft all the ad-
vantages of ftudy and reflection, are common-
ly ftill difiident in their determinations: And if any
of the learned be inclined, from their natural tem-
per, to haughtinefs and obftinacy, a fmall tincture
of Pyrrhonifm might abate their pride, by fhewing
them that the few advantages, which they may have
attained over their fellows, are but inconfiderable,

if

172 SECTION XII.

if compared with the univerfal perplexity and con-
fufion, which is inherent in human nature. In
general, there is a degree of doubt, and caution,
and modefty, which, in all kinds of fcrutiny and
decifion, ought for ever to accompany a juft
reafoner.

Another fpecies of mitigated ' (ceipticKmy which
may be of advantage to mankind, and which may
be the natural refult of the Pyrrhonian doubts
and fcruples, is the limitation of our enquiries
to fuch fubjefts as are beft adapted to the nar-
row capacity of human underftanding. The ima-
gination of man is naturally fublime, delighted
with whatever is remote and extraordinary, and
running, without controul, into the moft diftant
parts of fpace and time in order to avoid the
objeds, which cuftom has rendered too familiar
to it. A correct Judgment obferves a contrary
method, and avoiding all diftant and high en-
quiries, confines itfelf to common life, and to fuch
fubjefts as fall under daily practice and experi-
ence; leaving the more fublime topics to the
embellifhment of poets and orators, or to the
arts of priefts and politicians. To bring us to
fo falutary a determination, nothing can be more
ferviceablc, than to be once thoroughly convinc-
ed of the force of the Pyrrhonian doubt, and of
the impoflibility, that any thing, but the ftrong
power of natural inftindt, could free us from it.
Thofe who have a propenfuy to philofophy, will
ftill continue their refearches; becaufe they re-
fled:, that befides the immediate pleafure, attend-
ing fuch an occupation, philofophical decifions
are nothing but the refledtions of common life,
methodized and correded. But they will never
be tempted to go beyond common life, fo long
as they confider the imperfection of thofe facul-
ties which they employ, their narrow reach, and
jdicir inaccurate operacions. While wc cannot

give

Academical or Sceptical Philosophy. 173

give a fatisfaftory reafon, why we believe, after a
thoufand experiments, that a ftone will fall, or
fire burn -, can we ever fatisfy ourfelves concerning
any determination, which we may form, with re-
gard to the origin of worlds, and the fituation
of nature, from, and to eternity ?

This narrow limitation, indeed, of our enqui-
ries, is in every refped, lb reafonable, that it luf-
fices to make the flighted examination into the na-
tural powers of the human mind, and to compare
them with their objedls, in order to recommend it
to us. We fliall then find what are the proper fub-
jefts of fcience and enquiry.

It feems to me, that the only objefts of the ab-
ilradt fciences or of demonftration are quantity and
number, and that all attempts to extend this more
perfect fpecies of knowledge beyond thefe bounds
arc mere fophiftry and illufion. As the component
parts of quantity and number are entirely fimilar,
their relations become intricate and involved j and
nothing can be more curious, as well as ufeful, than
to trace, by a variety of mediums, their equality
or inequality, through their different appearances.
But as all other ideas are clearly diftin6l and diffe-
rent from each other, we can never advance farther,
by our utmoft fcrutiny, than to obferve this di-
verfity, and by an obvious reflediion, pronounce
one thing not to be another. Or if there be any
difficulty in thcfe decifions, it proceeds entirely
from tlie undeterminate meaning of words, which
is corrected by jufter definitions. That tbefquare
of the hypothenufe is equal to the fquares of the other
two ftdeSj cannot be known, let the terms be ever
fo exaflly defined, without a train of reafoning and
enquiry. But to convince us of this propofition,
that ivhcre there is vo property ^ there can he no in-
jufiicey it is only neceffary to define the terms, and
explain injuflice to be a violation of property. This
propofition is, indeed, nothing but a more, imper-
fect

174 SECTION XIL

fc<5t definition. It is the fame cafe with all thole
pretended fyllogiftical reafonings, which nnay be
found in every other branch of learning, except
the fciences of quantity and number; and thefe
may fafelyj I think, be pronounced the only pro-
per objects of knowledge and demonftration.

All other enquiries of men regard only mat-
ter of fa6t and exiftencej and thefe are evident-
ly incapable of demonftration. Whatever is may
not be^ No negation of a fa*^: can involve a
contradiction. The non-exiftence of any being,
without exception, is as clear and diftinft an idea
as its exiftence. The propofition, which affirms
it not to be, however falfe, is no lefs conceiv-
able and intelligible, than that which affirms it
to be. The cafe is different with the fciences,
properly fo called. Every propofition, which is
not true, is there confufed and unintelligible.
That the cube root of 64 is equal to the half
of 10, is a falfe propofition, and can never be
diftinftly conceived. But that Csefar, or the an-
gel Gabriel, or any being never exifted, may be
a falfe propofition, but ftill is perfectly conceiv-
able, and implies no contradiftion.

The exiftence, therefore, of any being can
only be proved by arguments from its effect;
and thefe arguments are founded entirely on ex-
perience. If we reafon a -priorij any thing may
appear able to produce any thing. The falling
of a pebble may, for aught we know, extinguiOi
the fun; or the wifh of a man controul the planets
in their orbits. It is only experience, which
teaches us the nature and bounds of caufe and
effect, and enables us to infer the exiftence of
one object from that of another*. Such is the foun-
dation of moral reafoning, which fonns the grea-
ter part of human knowledge, and is the fource
of all human action and behaviour.

Moral
• See NOTE [ CL].

Academical or Sceptical Philosophy. 175

Moral reafonlngs are either concerning par-
ticular or general facts. All deliberations in life
regard the former; as alfo all difquifitions in
hiftory, chronology, geography, and aftronomy.

The fciences, which treat of general facts,
are politics, natural philofophy, phyfic, chymif-
try, ^c. where the qualities, caufes and effects
of a whole fpecies of objects are enquired into.

Divinity or Theology, as it proves the exif-
tence of a Deity, and the immortality of fouls,
is compofed partly of reafonings concerning par-
ticular, partly concerning general facts. It has
a foundation in reajouy fo far as it is fupported
by experience. But its befl: and mod folid foun-
dation is faith and divine revelation.

Morals and criticifm are not fo properly ob-
jects of the underllanding as of tafte and fentiment.
Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more
properly than perceived. Or if we reafon concern-
ing it, and endeavour to fix its ftandard, we regard
a new fact, to wit, the general tafte of mankind,
or fome fuch fact, which may be the object of rca-
foning and enquiry.

When we run over libraries, perfuaded of thefe
principles, what havoc muft we make? If we take
in our hand any volume; of divinity or fchool me-
taphyfics, for inftance; let us afk. Does it contain
any ahftraEl reafoning concerning quantity or number?
No. Does it contain any experimental reafoning con-
cerning matter of fa5i and exiflence? No. Commit
it then to the flames : For it can contain nothino-
but fophiftry and illufion.

( 177 )

A
DISSERTATION

O N T H E

PASSIONS.

SECT. I.

,.S

OME objects produce immediately an agree-
able fenfation, by the original flrudure of our or-
gans, and are thence denominated Good ; as others,
from their immediate diiagreeable fenfation, ac-
quire the appellation of Evil. Thus moderate
warmth is agreeable and good j excefllve heat pain-
ful and evil.

Some objects again, by being naturally con-
formable or contrary to paflion, excite an agree-
able or painful fenfation ; and are thence called
Good or Evil. The punifliment of an adverfa-
^y> ^y gratifying revenge, is good ; the ficknefs
of a companion, by affetting friendfhip, is evil.

1. All good or evil, whence-evcr it arifes, pro-
duces various paffions and affedlions, according
to the light in which it is furveyed.

When good is certain or very probable, it
produces Joy : When evil is in the fame fitua-
tion, there arifes Grief or Sorrow.

Vol.11. N When

lyS A DiS SER TAT ION

When either good or evil is uncertain, it gives
rife to Fear or Hope, according to the degree
of uncertainty on one fide or the other.

Defire arifes from good confidered fimply; and
Averfion, from evil. The Will exerts itfelf,
when either the prefence of the good or abfcnce
of the evil may be attained by any a6tion of the
mind or body.

3. None of thefe pafTions feem to contain any
thing curious or remarkable, except Ho-pe and
Feavy which, being derived from the probability
of any good or evil, are mixed pafiions, that me-
rit our attention.

Probability arifes from an oppofition of con-
trary chances or caufes, by which the mind is
not allowed to fix on either fide ; but is incef-
fantly tofl^ed from one to another, and is deter-
mined, one moment, to confider an object as ex-
iftent, and another moment as the contrary. The
imagination or underftanding, call it "which you
pleafe, fiuftuates between the oppofite views ; and
though perhaps it may be oftener turned to one
fide than the other, it is impoffible for it, by
reafon of the oppofition of caufes or chances, to
reft on either. The pro and co7i of the queftion
alternately prevail ^ and the mind, furveying the
objects in their oppofite caufes, finds iuch a con-
trariety as deftroys all certainty or eftablifhed opi-
nion.

Suppofe, then, that the obje6b, concerning
which we are doubtful, produces either defire or
averfion; it is evident, that, according as the
mind turns itfelf to one fide or the other, it muft
itt\ a momentary imprefllon of joy or forrow.
An objeft, whofe exiftence we defire, gives fa-
tisfaftion, when we think of thofe caufes, wliich
produce it ; and for the fame reafon, excites grief
or uneafinefs from the oppofite confideration. So
that, as the underftanding, in probable queftions,

is

1

On the Passions. 179

is divided between the contrary points of view,
the heart mud in the fame nnanner be divided
between oppofite emotions.

Now, if we confider the human mind, we
fliall obferve, that, with regard to the pafTions,
it is not like a wind inflrument of mufic, which,
in running over all the notes, immediately lofes
the found when the breath ceafes ; but rather re-
fembles a Itring-inftrument, where, after each
ftroke, the vibrations ftill retain fome found,
which gradually and infenfibly decays. The ima-
gination is extremely quick and agile ; but the
paflions, in comparifon, are flow and reftive :
For which reafon, when any objedl is prefcnted,
which affords a variety of views to the one and
emotions to the other ; though the fancy may
change its views with great celerity; each ftroke
will not produce a clear and diftindt note of palTion,
but the one paffion will always be mixed and con-
founded with the other. According as the pro-
bability inclines to good or evil, the palTion of
grief or joy predominates in the com^pofition i and
thefe paflions being intermingled by means of the
contrary views of the imagination, produce by the
union the paflions of hope or fear.

4. As this theory feems to carry its own evi-
dence along with it, we fhali be more concife in
our proofs.

The paflions of fear and hope may arife, when
the chances are equal on both fides, and no fu-
periority can be difcovered in one above the other.
Nay, in this fituation the paffions are rather the
ftrongeft, as the mind has then the leaft founda-
tion to refl: upon, and is toft with the greateft un-
certainty. Throw in a fuperior degree of proba-
bility to the fide of grief, you immediately fee that
pafllon difiufe itfelf over the compofition, and tinc-
ture it into fear. Encreafe the probability, and by
that means the grief; the fear prevails iiill more

N 2 and

i8o A Dissertation

and more, 'till at lad it runs infenfiblyj as the
joy continually diminifhes, into pure grief. Af-
ter you have brought it to this fituation, diminifh
the grief, by a contrary operation to that, which
encreafed it, to wit, by diminifliing the probabili-
ty on the melancholy fide; and you will fee the
paflion clear every moment, 'till it changes infen-
Iibly into hope; which again runs, by flow de-
grees, into joy, as you encreafe that part of the
compofition, by the encreafe of the probability.
Are not thefe as plain proofs, that the paflions of
fear and hope are mixtures of grief and joy, as
in optics it is a proof, that a coloured ray of
the fun, pafTing through a prifm, is a compofition
of two others, when, as you diminifh or encreafe
the quantity of either, you find it prevail pro-
portionably, more or lefs, in the compofition ?

5. Probability is of two kinds; either when the
objeft is itielf uncertain, and to be determined by
chance; or when, though the object be already
certain, yet it is uncertain to our judgment,
which finds a number of proofs or prefumptions
on each fide of the queflion. Both thefe kinds of
probability caufe fear andjhope; which muft pro-
ceed from that property, in which they agree ;
namely, the uncertainty and fludluation which
they beftow on the pafTion, by that contrariety of
views, which is common to both.

6. It is a probable good or evil, which com-
monly caufes hope or fear; becaufe probability,
producing an inconftant and wavering furvey of
an objt6t, occafions naturally a like mixture and
uncertainty of pafTion. But we may obferve, that,
wherever, from other caufes, this mixture can be
produced, the pafTions of fear and hope will arife,
even though there be no probability.

An evil, conceived as barely pojjible^ fomctimes
produces fear ; cfpecially if the evil be very
great. A man cannot think on excefllve pain

and

on the Passionts. i8i

and torture without trembling;, if he runs the
lead rifque of fuffering them. The fmallnefs
of the probability is compenfated by the greatnefs
of the evil.

But even impojjible evils caufe fear ; as when
we tremble on the brink of a precipice, though
we know ourfelves to be in perfeft fccurity, and
have it in our choice, whether we will advance a
ftep farther. The immediate prefence of the evil
influences the imagination and produces a fpecies
of belief; but being oppofed by the reflexion on
our fecurity, that belief is immediately retraced,
and caufes the fame kind of palTion, ns when,
from a contrariety of chances^ contrary pafTions
are produced.

Evils, which are certain^ have fometimes the
lame effe(rt as the pofiible or impoflible. A man,
in a flrong prifon, without the leafl; means of ef-
cape, trembles at the thoughts of the rack, to
which he is fentenced. The evil is here fixed in
itfelf; but the mind has not courage to fix upon
it; and this fluctuation gives rife to a palTion of a
fimilar appearance with fear.

7. But it is not only where good or evil is un-
certain as to its extftencej but alfo as to its kind,
that fear or hope arifes. If any one were told that
one of his fons is fuddenly killed; the paffion,
occafioned by this event, would not fettle into
grief, 'till he had got certain information which
of his fons he had loft. Though each fide of the
queltion produces here the fame pafTion ; that
pafTion cannot fettle, but receives from tlie imagi-
nation, which is unfixed, a tremulous unfteady
motion, refembling the mixture and contention of
grief and joy.

8. Thus all kinds of uncertainty have a ftrong
connexion with fear, even though they do not caufe
any oppofition of paflions, by the oppofite views
which they prefent to us. Should I leave a friend

in

i82 A Dissertation

in any malady, I fhould feel more anxiety upon
his account, than if he were prefent j though per-
haps I am not only incapable of giving him alTift-
ance. but likewifc of judging concerning the event
of his ficknefs. There are a thoufand little cir-
cumftances of his fituation and condition, which
I defire to know ; and the knowledge of them
would prevent that fiu6tuation and uncertainty,
fo nearly allied to fear. Horace has remarked this
phsenomenon.

Ut ajfidens implumihus pullus avis

Ser-pentilm allapfus timet^
Magis relidis ; non-^ ut adfit, auxili

Latura plus praifentibus.

A virgin on her bridal-night goes to bed (u\\
of fears and apprehenfions, though Ihe expedls no-'
thing but pleafure. The confufion of wifhes and
joys, the newncfs and greatnefs of the unknown
event, fo embarrafs the mind, that it knows
not in what image or pafTion to fix itfelf.

9. Concerning the mixture of afFeftions, we may
remark, in general, that when contrary paflions
arife from objeds nov/ife connected together, they
take place alternately. Thus when a man is af-
flidled for the lofs of a law-fuit, and joyful for
the birth of a fon, the mind, running from the
agreeable to the calamitous objed ; with what-
ever celerity it may perform this motion, can
fcarcely temper the one affeflion with the other,
and remain between them in a ftate of indifl'erence.

It more eafily attains thiit calm fituation, when
th^Jame event is of a mixed nature, and contains
fomething adverfe and fomething profperous in its
different circumilances. For in that cafe, both
the paflions, mingling with each other by means
of the relation, often become mutually deftruflive,
gnd leave the mind in perfedl tranquillity.

But

on the Passions. • 183

But fupppofe, that the object is not a compound
of good and evil, but is confidered as probable
or improbable in any degree ; in that cafe, the
contrary paflions will both of them be prefent at
once in the foul, and inftead of balancing and
tempering each other, will fubfifl together, and by
their union produce a third impreflion or affedtion,
fuch as hope or fear.

The influence of the relations of ideas (which
we fhall explain more fully afterwards) is plain-
ly feen in this affair. In contrary paflions, if
the objedts be totally different ^ the paflions are like
two oppofite liquors in diff^erent bottles, which
have no influence on each other. If the objedls
be intimately conneSfedy the paflions are like an al-
cali and an acidy which, being mingled, defl:roy
each other. If the relation be more imperfeft,
and confifl: in the contraditlory views of the Jame
obje(ft, the paflions are like oil and vinegar, which,
however mingled, never perfectly unite and in-
corporate.

The efi^edl of a mixture of paflions, when one
of them is predominant, and fwallows up the other,
fliall be explained afterwards.

SECT. II.

I. Befides thofe paflions above-mentioned, which
arife from a direft purfuit of good and averfion
to evil, there are others which are of a more com-
plicated nature, and imply more than one view
or confideration. Thus Fride is a certain fatif-
fadlion in ourfelves, on account of fome accom-
plifliment or poflfeflion, which we enjoy ! Hu-
milityy on the other hand, is a diflTatisfadion with
ourfelves, on account of fome defe6t or infirmity.

Love or Friendjhip is a complacency in another,
on account of his accomplifhments or fervices :
Hatred^ the contrary.

2. In

l84 A DiS S ER T ATION

2. In thefe two fets of pafllon, there is an ob-
vious difti nation to be made between the obje5l
of the paffion and its caufe. The objeft of pride
and humility is felf : The caufe of the paffion is
fbme excellence in the former cafe ; fome fault,
in the latter. The obje<5l of love and hatred is
fome other perfon : The caufes, in like manner,
are either excellencies or faults.

With regard to all thefe pafTions, the caufes are
what excite the emotion; the objeft is what the
mind directs its view to when the emotion is ex-
cited. Our merit, for inftance, raifes pride j and
it is efTential to pride to turn our view on our-
felves with complacency and fatisfaftion.

Now, as the caufes of thefe paflions are very
numerous and various, though their objeft be uni-
form and fimple ; it may be a fubject of cu-
riofity to confider, what that circumitance is, in
which all thefe various caufes agree; or in other
words, what is the real efficient caufe of the
pafllon. We fhall begin with pride and humi-
lity.

3. In order to explain the caufes of thefe paf-
fions, we muft refle<5b on certain principles, which,
though they have a mighty influence on every ope-
ration, both of the underflianding and pafllons,
are not commonly much infift:ed on by philofo-
phers. The firfl; of thefe is the ajfociation of ideas,
or that principle, by which we make an eafy
tranfltion from one idea to another. However
uncertain and changeable our thoughts may be,
they are not entirely without rule and method
in their changes. They ufually pafs with regula-
rity, from one object, to what refembles it, is
contiguous to it, or produced by it *. When
one idea is prefent to the imagination, any other,
united by thefe relations, naturally follows it, and

enters

* See Enquiry concerning Human Underftanding, Sedl. IIL

on the Passions. 185

inters with more facility, by means of that intro-
duflion.

The fecofid property, which I fhall obferve in the
human mind, is a like affociation of impreffions
or emotions. All refembling imprelTions are con-
neded together; and no fooner one arifes, than
the reft naturally follow. Grief and difa,^point-
ment give rife to anger, anger to envy, envy to
malice, and malice to grief again. In like man-
ner, our temper, when elevated with joy, natu •
rally throws itfelf into love, gcnerofity, courage,
pride, and other refembling affeftions.

In the third place, it is obfervable of thefe two
kinds of alTociation, that they very much affift and
forward each other, and that the tranfition is more
eafily made, where they both concur in the fame
objedt. Thus, a man, who, by an injiry received
from another, is very much difcompofed and
ruffled in his temper, is apt to find a hundred
fubjeds of hatred, difcontent, impatience, fear,
and other uneafy pafllons ; efpecially, if he can
difcover thefe fubjefts in or near the perfon, who
was the objeft of his firft emotion. Thofe prin-
ciples, which forward the tranfition of ideas, here
concur with thofe which operate on the paflions;
and both, uniting in one aftion, beftow on the
mind a double impulfe.

Upon this occafion I may cite a paffage from
an elegant writer, who expreflfes himfelf in the
following manner * : " As the fancy delights in
" every thing, that is great, ftrange, or beautiful,
•^^ and is ftill the more pleafed the more it finds
*'^ of thefe perfections in tht Jame object, fo iti s
" capable of receiving new fatisfa6tion by the af-
" fiftance of another fenfe. Thus, any continual
" found, as the mufic of birds, or a fall of waters,
^' awakens every moment the mind of the be-

" holder,

* Addlfon, Spedator, No. 412.

i86 A Dissertation

holder, and makes him more attentive to thfc
feveral beauties of the place, that lie before
him. Thus, if there arifes a fragrancy of fmells
or perfumes, they heighten the pleafure of the
imagination, and make even the colours and
verdure of the landfcape appear more agreeable ;
for the ideas of both fenfes recommend each
other, and are pleafanter together than where
they enter the mind feparately : As the differ-
ent colours of a pifture, when they are well dif-
pofed, fet off one another, and receive an additi-
beauty from the advantage of the fituation."
In thefe phasnomena, we may remark the affocia-
tion both of impreffions and ideas ; as well as the
mutual affiftance thefe affociations lend to each
other.

4. It feems to me, that both thefe fpecies of
relation have place in producing Pride or Humili-
ty, and are the real, efficient caufes of the paffion.

With regard to the firft relation, that of ideas,
there can be no queftion. W|iatever we are proud
of muft, in fome manner, belong to us. It is
always our knowledge, our fenfe, beauty, poffef-
fions, family, on which we value ourfelves. Self,
which is the obje^ of the paffion, muft ftill be
related to that quality or circumftance, which
caufes the paffion. There muft be a connexion
between them ; an eafy tranfition of the imagi-
nation ; or a facility of the conception in paffing
from one to the other. Where this connexion
is wanting, no objedt can either excite pride or
humility; and the more you weaken the connex-
ion, the more you weaken the paffion.

5. The only fubjcft of enquiry is, whether
there be a like relation of impreffions or fenti-
ments, wherever pride or humility is felt ; whe-
ther the circumftance, which caufes the paffion,
previoufiy excites a fentiment fimilar to the pal-

fion i

on the Passions. 187

fion ; and whether there be any transfufion of the
one into the other.

The feeling or fentiment of pride is agreea-
ble; of humility, painful. An agreeable fenfation
is, therefore, related to the former; a painful, to
the latter. And if we find, after examination,
that every objedl:, which produces pride, pro-
duces alfo a feparate pleafure ; and every object,
which caufes humility, excites in like manner a
feparate uneafinefsj we mull allow, in that cafe,
that the prefent theory is fully proved and af-
certained. The double relation of ideas and fen-
timents will be acknowledged inconteftable.

6. To begin with perfonal merit and demerit,
the moft obvious caufes of thefe pafTions; it would
be entirely foreign to our prefent purpofe to ex-
amine the foundation of moral diftinctions. It is
fufficient to obferve, that the foregoing theory
concerning the origin of the pallions may be de-
fended on any hypothefis. The moft probable
fyftem, which has been advanced to explain the
difference between vice and virtue, is, that ei-
ther from a primary conftitution of nature, or
from a fenfe of public or private intereft, cer-
tain characters, upon the very view and con-
templation, produce uneafinefs ; and others,
in like manner, excite x^^^^f^'re. The uneafi-
nefs and fatisfaction, produced in the fpecta-
tor, are effential to vice and virtue. To approve
of a character, is to feel a delight upon its ap-
pearance. To difapprove of it, is to be fenfible
of an uneafinefs. The pain and pleafure, there-
fore, being, in a manner, the primary fource of
blame or praife, muft alfo be the caufes of all
their effects ; and confequently, the caufes of
pride and humility, v/hich are the unavoidable
attendants of that diftinction.

But fuppofing this theory of morals fhould not
be received; it is ftill evident that pain and plea-
fure,

i88 A Dissertation

fare, if not the fources of moral diflinctions, are
at lead infeparable from them. A generous and
noble character affords a fatisfaction even in the
furvey ; and when prefented to us, though only
in a poem or fable, never falls to charm and
delight us. On the other hand, cruelty and
treachery difpleafe from their very nature ; nor is it
pofiible ever to reconcile us to thefe qualities, ei-
ther in ourfelves or others. Virtue, therefore,
produces always a pleafure diftinct from the pride
or felf-fatisfaction which attends it : Vice, an un-
eafinefs feparate from the humility or remorfe.

But a high or low conceit of ourfelves arifes not
from thofe qualities alone of the mind, which,
according to common fyftems of ethics, have
been defined parts of moral duty ; but from any
other, which have a connexion with pleafure or
iineafinefs. Nothing flatters our vanity more than
the talent of pleafing by our wit, good-humour,
or any other accomplifhment; and nothing gives
us a more fenfible mortification, than a difappoint-
ment in any attempt of that kind. No one has ever
. been able to tell precifely, what zuit is, and to
fhew why fuch a fyftem of thought muft be receiv-
ed under that denomination, and fuch another re-
jefted. It is by tafte alone we can decide con-
cerning it; nor are we pofTefl'ed of any other
ftandard, by which we can form a judgment of this
nature. Now what is this tajie, froin which true
and falfe wit in a manner receive their being, and
without which no thought can have a title to either
of thefe denominations ? It is plainly nothing but
a fenfation of pleafure from true wit, and of difguft
from falfe, without our being able to tell the reafons
of that fatisfaftion or uneafinefs. The power of ex-
citing thefe oppofite fenfations is, therefore, the ve-
ry eflfence of true or falfe wit ; and confequently,
the caufe of that vanity or mortification, which
arifes from one or the other.

7. Beauty

on the Passions. 189

7. Beauty of all kinds gives us a peculiar de-
light and fatisfadlion ; as deformity produces pain,
upon whatever fubjedl it may be placed, and whe-
ther furveyed in an animate or inanimate objeft.
If the beauty or deformity belong to our own face,
fhape, or perfon, this pleafure or uneafinefs is con-
verted into pride or humility; as having in this
cafe all the circumftances requifite to produce a
perfedt tranfition, according to the prefent theory.

It would feem, that the very effence of beauty
confifts in its power of producing pleafure. All
its effedls, therefore, mufl proceed from this cir-
cumftance : And if beauty is fo univerfally the
fubjed of vanity, it is only from its being the caufe
of pleafure.

Concerning all other bodily accompli fliments,
we may obferve in general, that whatever in our-
fdves is either ufeful, beautiful, or furprizing, is
an objeft of pride -, and the contrary of humility.
Thefe qualities agree in producing a feparate plea-
fure : and ag;ree in nothino; eife.

We are vain of the furprizing adventures which
we have met with, the efcapes which we have
made, the dangers to' which we have been expofed :
as well as of our furprifing feats of vigour and ac-
tivity. Hence the origin of vulgar lying ; where
men, without any intereft, and merely out of va-
nity, heap up a number of extraordinary events,
which are either the fi6lions of their brain; or, if
true, have no connexion with themfelvcs. Their
fruitful invention fupplies them with a variety
of adventures j and where that talent is wanting,
they appropriate fuch as belong to others, in or-
der to gratify their vanity : For between that paf-
fion, and the fentiment of pleafure, there is always
a clofe connexion.

8. But though pride and humility have the qua-
lities of our mind and body, that is, of felf, for
their natural and more immediate caufes; v/e find

by

190 A Dissertation

by experience, that many other objefts produce
thefe affedlions. We found vanity upon houfes,
gardens, equipage, and other external objefts j
as well as upon perfonal merit and accomplifli-
ments. This happens when external objefts ac-
quire any particular relation to ourfelves, and are
aflfociated or connected with us. A beautiful fifh
in the ocean, a well-proportioned animal in a foreft,
and indeed, any thing, which neither belongs nor
is related to us, has no manner of influence on our
vanity ; whatever extraordinary qualities it may
be endowed with, and whatever degree of far-
prize and admiration it may naturally occafion.
It mufl be fomeway aflbciated with us, in order
to touch our pride. Its idea muft hang, in a
manner, upon that of ourfelves; and the tranfition
from one to the other muft be eafy and natural.

Men are vain of the beauty either of their
country, or even of their parifh. Here the
idea of beauty plainly produces a pleafure.
This pleafure is related to pride. The object or
caufe of this pleafure is, by the fuppofition, relat-
ed to felf, the objeft of pride. By this double re-
lation of fentiments and ideas, a tranfition is made
from one to the other.

Men are alfo vain of the happy temperature of
the climate, in which they are born ; of the ferti-
lity of their native foil ; of the goodnefs of the
wines, fruits, or victuals, produced by it ; of
the foftnefs or force of their language, with
other particulars of that kind. Tiiefe objefts
have plainly a reference to the pleafures of fcnfe,
and are originally confidered as agreeable to the
feeling, talte or hearing. How could they be-
come caufes of pride, except by means of that
tranfition above explained ?

There are fomc, who dilcover a vanity of an
oppofite kind, and affedt to depreciate their own
country, in comparifon of thofe, to which they

have

on the Passions. 191

have travelled. Thefe perfons find, when they
are at home, and furrounded with their country-
men, that the ftrong relation between them and
their own nation is ihared with (o many, that it
is in a manner loft to them ; whereas, that diftanc
relation to a foreign country, which is formed by
their having feen it, and lived in it, is augmented
by their confidering how few have done the fame.
For this reafon, they always admire the beauty,
utility, and rarity of what they met with abroad,
above what they find at home.

Since we can be vain of a country, climate or
any inanimate obje6t, which bears a relation to
us ; it is no wonder we fhould be vain of the
qualities of thofe, who are connedted with us by
blood or friendfhip. Accordingly we find, that
any qualities which, when belonging to ourfelves,
produce pride, produce alfo, in a lefs degree, the
fame affection, when difcovered in perfons, relat-
ed to us. The beauty, addrefs, merit, credit,
and honours of their kindred are carefully dif-
played by the proud, and are confiderable four-
ces of their vanity.

As we are proud of riches of ourfelves, we
defire, in order to gratify our vanity, that every
one who has any connexion with us, fhould like-
wife be poflelTed of them, and are afhamed of fuch
as are mean or poor among our friends and re-
lations. Our forefathers being regarded as our
nearcft relations; every one naturally affcd:* to
be of a good family, and to be defcended from
a long fuccelTion of rich and honourable ancef-
tors.

Thofe, who boaft of the antiquity of their fa-
milies, are glad when they can join this circum-
ftance, that their anceftors, for many generations,
have been uninterrupted proprietors of the fame
portion of land, and that their family has never
changed its pofTeflions, or been tranfplanted into

any

192 A Dissertation

any other country or province. It is an additi-
onal fubjeft of vanity, when they can boaft, that
thefe pofTeflions have been tranfmitted through a
defcent, compofed entirely of males, and that the
honours and fortune have never paflTed through any
female. Let us endeavour to explain thefe phse-
nomena from the foregoing theory.

When any one values himfelf on the antiquity
of his family, the fubjecls of his vanity are not
merely the extent of time and number of anceflors
(for in that refpedt all mankind are alike), but
thefe circumftances, joined to the riches and cred-
it of his anceflors, which are fuppofed to reflecl
a luflre on himfelf, upon account of his connexi-
on with them. Since therefore the pafllon de-
pends on the connexion, whatever flrengthens the
connexion mufl alfo encreafe the pafTion, and
whatever weakens the connexion muft diminifh
the pafTion. But it is evident, that the fame-
nefs of the polTefTions muft ftrengthen the rela-
tion of ideas, arifing from blood and kindred,
and convey the fancy with greater facility from
one generation to another; from the remoteft an-
ceftors to their pofterity, who are both their heirs
and their defcendants. By this facility, the fenti-
ment is tranfmitted more entire, and excites a
greater degree of pride and vanity.

The cafe is the fame with the tranfmiilion of
the honours and fortune, through a fucceflion
of males, without their palling through any fe-
male. It is an obvious quality of human na-
ture, that the imagination naturally turns to what-
ever is important and confiderable -, and where
two objedls are prefented, a fmall and a great, it
ufually Jeaves the former, and dwells entirely on
the latter. This is the reafon, why children com-
monly bear their father's name, and are efteemed
to be of a nobler or meaner birth, according to his
family. And though the mother fhould be poiTef-

fed

on the Passions. 193

fed of fiiperior qualities to the father, as often hap-
pens, the g^fieral rule prev2i'i\Sy notwithltanding the
exception, according to the doiSlrine, which fhall
be explained afterwards. Nay, even when a fu-
periority of any kind is fo great, or when any other
reafons have fuch an effect, as to make the chil-
dren rather reprefent the mother's family than the
father's, the general rule (till retains an efficacy,
fufficient to weaken the relation, and make a kind
of breach in the line of anceftors. The imagina-
tion runs not along them with the fame facility,
nor is able to transfer the honour and credit of the
anceftors to their pofterity of the fame name and
family fo readily, as when the tranfition is confor-
mable to the general rule, and pafles through the
male line, from father to fon, or from brother to
brother.

9. But property^ as it gives us the fulleft power
and authority over any object, is the relation, which
has the greateft influence on thefe paflions *.

Every thing, belonging to a vain man, is the
beR that is any where to be found. His houlcs,
equipage, furniture, cloaths, horfes, hounds, excel
all others in his conceit ; and it is eafy to obfefve,
that, from the leait advantage in any of thefe
he draws a new fubjed: of pride and vanity. His
wine, if you will believe him, has a finer flavour
than any other; his cookery is more exquifitej his
table more orderly 5 his fervants more expert ;
the air, in which he lives, more healthful ; the
foil, which he cultivates, more fertile; his fruits
ripen earlier, and to greater perfection : Such a
thing is remarkable for its novelty; fuch another
for its antiquity : This is the workmanlhip of a
tamous artift ; that belonged once to fuch a prince
or great man. All objects, in a word, which are
ufeful, beautiful, or furprizing, or are related to

Vol. II. O fuch,

* Sec NOTE [R].

1 94 ADiSSERTATlON

fuch, may, by means of property, give rife to this
pafTion. Thefe all agree in giving pleafure. This
alone is common to them ; and therefore muft be
the quality, that produces the paffion, which is
their common efFeft. As every new inftance is a
new argument, and as the inftances are here with-
out number ; it would feem, that this theory is
fufficiently confirmed by experience.

Riches imply the power of acquiring whatever
is agreeable ; and as they comprehend many par-
ticular objefts of vanity, neceflarily become one
of the chief caufes of that pafTion.

lo. Our opinions of all kinds are ftrongly af-
fedled by fociety and fympathy, and it is almoft
impoflible for us to fupport any principle or fenti-
ment, againft the univerfal confent of every one,
with whom we have any friendfhip or correfpon-
dence. But of all our opinions, thofe, which we
form in our own favour, however lofty or prc-
fuming; are, at bottom, the fraileft, and the moft
eafily fhaken by the contradidlion and oppofition
of others. Our great concern, in this cafe, makes
us foon alarmed, and keeps our paflions upon the
watch : Our confcioufnefs of partiality ftill makes
us dread a miftake : And the very difficulty of
judging concerning an objeft, which is never fet at
a due diftance from us, nor is feen in a proper
point of view, makes us hearken anxioufly to the
opinions of others, who are better qualified to form
juft opinions concerning us. Hence that ftrong
love of fame, with which all mankind are poflefled.
It is in order to fix and confirm their fiivourablc
opinion of themfelves, not from any original
paflion, that they feek the applaufes of others.
And when a man defires to be prailcd, it is for the
fame reafon, that a beauty is pleafed with furveying
hcrfelf in a favourable looking-glafs, and feeing
ihe reflection of her own charms.

Though

on the Passions. 195

Though it be difficult, in all points of fpecula-
tion, to diftinguifli a caufe, which encreafes an ef-
{e£ty from one, which folely produces it j yet in
the prefent cafe the phasnoniena feem pretty ftrong
and fatisfadlory in confirmation of the foregoing
principle.

We receive a much greater fatisfaftion from the
approbation of thofe whom weourfelves elleem and
approve of, than of thofe whom we contemn and
defpife.

When efteem is obtained after a long and inti-
mate acquaintance, it gratifies our vanity in a pe-
culiar manner.

The fuffrage of thofe, who are fhy and backward
in giving praife, is attended with an additional re-
lifh and enjoyment, if we can obtain it in our favour.

Where a great man is delicate in his choice of fa-
vourites, every one courts with greater earneftnefs
his countenance and proteftion.

Praife never gives us much pleafure, unlefs it
concur with our own opinion, and extol us for thofe
qualities, in which we chiefly excel.

Thefe phasnomena feem to prove, that the fa-
vourable fuffrages of the world are regarded only
as authorities, or confirmations of our own opinion.
And if the opinions of others have more influence in
this fubjed: than in any other, it is eafily account-
ed for from the nature of the fubjeft.

II. Thus fev7 objefls, however related to us,
and whatever pleafure they produce, are able to
excite a great degree of pride or felf-fatisfaftion j
unlefs they be alfo obvious to others, and engage
the approbation of the fpeftators. What difpofi-
tion of mind fo defirable as the peaceful, refigned,
contented ; which readily fubmits to all the dif-
penfations of providence, and preferves a conftant
ferenity amidft the greateft misfortunes and difap-
pointments ? Yet this difpofition, though acknow-
ledged to be a virtue or excellence, is feldom the
O a foundation

196 ^A Dissertation

foundation of great vanity or felf-applaufej having
no brilliancy or exterior liiftre, and rather cheer-
ing the heart, than animating the behaviour and
converfation. The cafe is the fame with many
other qualities of the mind, body, or fortune; and
this circumftance, as well as the double relations
above mentioned, mull be admitted to be of con-
fequence in the produ6lion of thefe pafTions.

A fecond circumftance, which is of confequence
in this affair, is the conftancy and durablenefs of
the objeft. What is very cafual and inconftant,
beyond the common courfe of human affairs, gives
little joy, and lefs pride. We are not much fatis-
fied with the thing itfelf; and are ftill lefs apt to
feel any new degree of felf-fatisfaftion upon its ac-
count. We forefee and anticipate its change ; which
makes us little fatisfied with the thing itfelf : We
compare it to ourfelves, whofe exiftence is more
durable ; by which means its inconftancy appears
ftill greater. It feems ridiculous to make ourfelves
the obje6l of a pafTion, on account of a quality or
pofTelTion, which is of fo much fhorter duration,
and attends us during fo fmaii a part of our exif-
tence.

A third circumftance, not to be neglefted, is that
the objefts, in order to produce pride or feif-value,
muft be peculiar to us, or at leaft common to us
with a few others. The advantages of fun-fhine,
good weather, a happy climate, &c. diftinguilh us
not from any of our companions, and give us no
preference or fuperiority. The comparifon, which
we are every moment apt to make, prefents no in-
ference to our advantage -, and we ftill remain,
notwithftanding thefe enjoyments, on a level with
all our friends and acquaintance.

As health and ficknefs vary inceffantly to all
men, and there is no one, who is folely or certainly
fixed in either; thefe accidental bleflings and cala-
niitics are in a manner feparated from us, and are

not

on the Passions. 197

not confidered as a foundation for vanity or humi-
liation. But wherever a malady of any kind is fo
rooted in our conftitution, that we no longer en-
tertain any hope of recovery, from that moment it
damps our felf-conceit, as is evident in old men,
whom nothing mortiMcs more than the confidera-
tion of their age and infirmities. They endeavour,
as long as pollible, to conceal their blindnefs and
deafnels, their rheums and gouts; nor do they ever
avow them without relucftance and uneafinefs.
And though young men are not afhamed of every
head-ach or cold which they fall into; yet no to-
pic is more proper to mortify human pride, and
make us entertain a mean opinion of our nature,
than this, that we are every moment of our lives
fubjedt to fuch infirmities. This proves, that bodi-
ly pain and ficknefs are in themfelves proper
caufes of humility ; though the cufliom of ellimat-
ing every thing, by comparifon, more than by its
intrinfic worth and value, makes us overlook thofe
calamities, which we find incident to every one,
and caufes us to form an idea of our merit and cha-
ra6ler, independent of them.

We are afham.ed' of fuch maladies as afFeft
others, and are either dangerous or difagreeable
to them. Of the epilepfy ; becaufe it gives a
horror to every one prefent : Of the itch; becaufe
it is infeftious : Of the king's evil; becaufe it of-
ten goes to pofterity. Men always confider the
fentiments of others in their judgm.ent of them-
felves.

A fourth circumftance, which has an influence
on thefe palTions, is general rules ; by which v/e
form a notion of different ranks of men, fuitably
to the power or riches of which they an-t poffefTed ;
and this notion is not changed by any peculiarities
of the health or temper of the perfons, which may
deprive them of all enjoyment in their pofTefllons.
Cuftom readily carries us beyond the jujI -bounds in
our pafTions, as well as in our reafonings It

198 A Dissertation

It may not be amifs to obferve on this occa-
fion, that the influence of general rules and max-
ims on the paffions very much contributes to fa-
cilitate the effects of all the principles or inter-
nal mechanifm, which we here explain. For it
feems evident, that, if a perfon full grown, and of
the fame nature with ourfelves, v/ere on a fud-
den tranfported into our world, he would be
much embarraffed with every objeft, and
would not readily determine what degree of
Jove or hatred, of pride or humility, or of any
other paffion Ihould be excited by it. The paf-
fions are often varied by very inconfiderable
principles; and thefe do not always play v/ith
perfeft regularity, efpecially on the firft trial.
But as cuftom or pradice has brought to light
all thefe principles, and has fettled the juft va-
lue of every thing; this muil certainly contri-
bute to the eafy produftion of the paffions, and
guide us, by means of general eflablilhed rules,
in the proportions, which we ought to obferve
in preferring one objeft to another. This re-
mark may, perhaps, ferve to obviate difficulties,
that may arife concerning fome caufes, which we
here afcribe to particular paffions, and which
may be efteemed too refined to operate fo uni-
verfally and certainly, as they are found to do.

PART III.

M. In running over all the caufes, which pro-
duce the paffion of pride or that of humility;
it would readily occur, that tiie fame circumllance,
if transferred from ourfelves to another pt*rfon,
would render him the object of love or hatred,
efteem or contempt. The virtue, genius, beauty,
family, riches, and authority of others beget fa-
vourable fentiments in their behalf; and their
vice, folly, deformity, poverty, and meannefs ex-
cite the contrary fentiments. The double rela-
tion

on the Passions. 199

tion of imprefllons and ideas ft'll operates on
thefc paflions of love and hatred -, as on the for-
mer of pride and humility. Whatever gives a
feparate pleafure or pain, and is related to ano-
ther perfon or conneded with him, makes him
the object of our affe6lion or difguft.

Hence too injury or contempt towards us is
one of the greateft Iburces of our hatred j fcr-
vices or efteem, of our friendfhip.

2. Sometimes a relation to ourfelves excites
affedion towards any perfon. But there is al-
ways here implied a relation of fentiments, with-
out which the other relation would have no in-
fluence*,

A perfon, who is related to us, or connected with
us, by blood, by fimilitude of fortune, of adventures,
profelTion, or country, foon becomes an agree-
able companion to us j becaufe we enter eafily
and familiarly into his fentiments and concepti-
ons: Nothinsr is Itrano-e or new to us: Our ima-
gination, pafTing from felf, which is ever inti-
mately prefent to us, runs fmoothly along the
relation or connexion, and conceives with a full
fympathy the perfon, who is nearly related to
felf. He renders himfelf immediately accepta-
ble, and is at once on an eafy footing with us:
No diftance, no referve has place, where the per-
fon introduced is fuppofed fo clofely conneded
with us.

Relation has here the fame influence as cuf-
tom or acquaintance, in exciting affedlion ; and
from like caufes. The eafe and fatisfa6tion, which,
in both cafes, attend our intercourfe or commerce,
is the fource of the friendfliip.

3. The paflions of love and hatred are always
followed by, or rather conjoined with, benevo-
lence

• The afFedlion of parents to children feems founded on
an original inlHnft. The af»edion towards other relations
depends on the principles here explained.

20O A Dissertation

lence and anger. It is this conjundlion, which
chiefly diftinguifhes thefe affeftions from pride
and humility. For pride and humility are pure
emotions in the foul, unattended with any defire,
and not immediately exciting us to aftion. But
love and hatred are not compleat within them-
felves, nor reft in that emotion, which they pro-
duce; but carry the mind to fomeching farther.
Love is always followed by a defire of happi-
nefs to the perfon beloved, and an averfion to
his mifery : As hatred produces a defire of the
mifery, and an averfion to the happinefs of the
perfon hated. Thefe oppofite defires feem to be
originally and primarily conjoined with the paf-
fions of love and hatred. It is a conftitution of
nature, of which we can give no farther expli-
cation.

4. Companion frequently arifes, where there is
no preceding efteem or friendfliipj and compaf-
fion is an uneafinefs in the fuffenngs of another.
It feems to fpring from the intimate and ftrong
conception of his fufferings; and our imaginati-
on proceeds by degrees, from the lively idea to
the real feeling of another's niifery.

Malice and envy alfo arife in the mind with-
out any preceding hatred or injury j though their
tendency is exadly the fame with that of anger
and ill-will. The comparifon of ourfclves with
others feems to be the fource 01 envy and ma-
lice. The more unhappy another is, the more
happy do we ourfelves appear in our own con-
ception.

5. The fimilar tendency of compafTion to that
of benevolence, and of envy to anger, forms a
very clofe relation between thefe two lets of paf-
fions; though of a different kind from that which
was infifted on above. It is not a refemblance
of feeling or fentiment, but a refemblance of ten-
dency or direction. Its efl'edb, however, is the

fame.

' on the Passions. 2qi

rame, in producing an afTociation of pafTions.
Compaffion is feldom or never felt without fome
mixture of tendernefs or friendfliip; and envy is
naturally accompanied with anger or ill-will.
To defire the happinefs of another, from what-
ever motive, is a good preparative to affection;
and to delight in another's mifery almofl: un-
avoidably begets averfion towards him.

Even where intereft is tiie fonrce of our con-
cern, it is commonly attended with the fame
confequences. A partner is a natural objedl of
friendfliip; a rival of enmity.

6. Poverty, meannefs, difappointment, produce
contempt and diflike: But when thefe misfor-
tunes are very great, or are reprefented to us
in very ftrong colours, they excite compaffion,
and tendernefs, and friendihip. How is this con-
tradiction to be accounted for? The poverty and
meannefs of another, in their common appear-
ance, gives us uneafinefs, by a fpecies of imper-
fe(5t fympathy; and this uneafinefs produces aver-
fion or diflike, from the refc;mblance of fenti-
ment. But when we enter more intimately into
another's concerns, and wifh for his happinefs, as
well as feel his mifery, friendfliip or good-will
arifes, from the fimilar tendency of the inclina-
tions.

A bankrupt, at firfl:, while the idea of his mif-
fortunes is frefli and recent, and while the com-
parifon of his prefent unhappy fituation with his
former profperity operates Itrongly upon us, meets
with compaflion and friendfliip. After thefe ideas
are weakened or obliterated by time, he is in
danger of compaflion and contempt.

7. In refpeft, there is a mixture of humility,
with the efl:eem or affe<5lion : In contempt, a mix-
ture of pride.

The amorous paflion is ufually compounded of
complacency in beauty, a bodily appetite, and

friendfliip

*02 A Dissertation

friendfliip or affedion. The clofe relation of
thefe fentiments is very obvious, as well as their
origin from each other, by means of that rela-
tion. Were there no other phsenomena to re-
concile us to the prefent theory, this alone, me-
thinks, were fufficient.

SECT. IV.

1. The prefent theory of pafTions depends en-
tirely on the double relation of fentiments and
ideas, and the mutual affiftance, which thefe re-
lations lend to each other. It may not, there-
fore, be improper to illuftrate thefe principles by
fome farther inilances.

1. The virtues, talents, accomplilhments, and
pofleflions of others, make us love and eftecm
them: Becaufe thefe objedls excite a pleafing fen-
fation, which is related to love ; and as they have
alfo a relation or connexion with the perfon, this
union of ideas forwards the union of fentiment,
according to the foregoing reafoning.

But fuppofe, that the perfon, whom we love,
is alfo related to us, by blood, country, or friend-
Ihip; it is evident, that a fpecies of pride muft
alfo be excited by his accomplifhments and pof-
feffions ; there being the fame double relation,
which we have all along infilled on. The per-
fon is related to us, or there is an eafy tran-
fition of thought from him to us; and the fen-
timents, excited by his advantages and virtues,
are agreeable, and confequently related to pride.
Accordingly we find, that people are naturally
vain of the good qualities or high fortune of their
friends and countrymen.

3. But it is obfervablc, that, if we reverfe the
order of the pafTions, the fame effeft does not
follow. We pafs eafily from love and affeflion
to pride and vanity; but not from the latter paf-

fions

3

on the Passions. 203

fions to the former, though all the relations be
the fame. We love not thofe who are related
to us, on account of our own merit; though
they are naturally vain on account of our merit.
What is the reafon of this difference ? The tran-
fition of the imagination to ourfelves, from ob-
jedls related to us, is always eafyj both on ac-
count of the relation, which ficilitates the tran,-
fition, and becaufe v/e there pafs from remoter ob-
jects, to thofe which are contiguous. But in paf-
fing from ourfelves to objefls, related to us;
though the former principle forwards the tran-
fition of thought, yet the latter oppofes it ; and
confequentiy there is not the fame eafy tranf-
fufion of paflions from pride to love as from
love to pride.

4. The virtues, fervices, and fortune of one
man infpire us readily with efteem and alFedii-
on for another related to him. The fon of our
friend is naturally entitled to our friendfliip: The
kindred of a very great man value themfelves,
and are valued by others, on account of that
relation. The force of the double rela-don is
here fully difplayed.

5. The following are inftances of another kind,
where the operation of thefe principles may ilill
be difcovered. Envy arifes from a fuperiority in
others; but it is obfervable, that it is not the
great difproportion between us, which excites that
paflion, but on the contrary, our proximity.
A great difproportion cuts off the relation of the
ideas, and either keeps us from comparing our-
felves with what is remote from us, or dimi-
nilhes the effefts of the comparifon.

A poet is not apt to tnvy a philofoplier, or
a poet of a different kind, of a different nation, or
of a different age. All thefe differences, if they do
not prevent, at lead weaken the comparifon and
confequentiy the paffion.

This

'204 A Dissertation

This too is the reafon, why all objefts appear
great or little, merely by a comparifon with thofe
of the fame fpecies. A mountain neither mag-
nifies nor diminifhes a horfe in our eyes: But
when a Flemifh and a Welfh horfe are feen toge-
ther, the one appears greater and the other lefs,
than when viewed apart.

From the fame principle we may account for
that remark of hiftorians, that any party, in a
civil war, or even factions divifion, always choofe
to call in a foreign enemy at any hazard, rather
than fubmit to their fellow-citizens. Guicciar-
din applies this remark to the wars in Italy;
where the relations between the different ftates
are, properly fpeaking, nothing but of name, lan-
guage, and contiguity. Yet even thefe relations,
when joined with fuperiority, by making the com-
parifon more natural, make it likewife more grie-
vous, and caufe men to fearch for fome other
fuperiority, which may be attended with no relati-
on, and by that means, may have a lefs fenfible
influence on the imagination. When we cannot
break the afllbciation, we feel a ftronger defire
to remove the fuperiority. This feems to be the
reafon, v/hy travellers, though commonly lavifh
of their praife to the Chinefe and Perfians, take care
to depreciate thofe neighbouring nations, which
may ftand upon a footing of rivalfhip with their
native country.

6. The fine arts afibrd us parallel inftances.
Should an author compofe a treatife, of which
one part was ferious and profound, another light
and humorous j every one would condemn fo
flrange a mixture, and would blame him for the
neglc(5t of all rules of art and criticifm. Yet
we accufe not Prior for joining his Alma and
Solonion in the fame volume j though that ami-
ble poet has perfeftly lucceeded in the gaiety of
the one, as well as in the melancholy of the

other.

\ I

on the Passions. 205

other. Even fiippofe the reader fhoiild pcrufe
thefc two compofitions without any interval, he
would feel little or no difficulty in the change
of the palTions. Why ? but becaufe he confiders
thefe performances as entirely different; and -by
that break in the ideas, breaks the progrefs of
the affedions, and hinders the one from influ-
encing or contradi<5i:ing the other.

An heroic and burlefque defign, united in one
pi6lure, would be monllrous; though we place
two pictures of fo oppofite a character in the
fame chamber, and even clofe together, without
any fcruple.

7. It needs be^ no matter of wonder, that the
eafy traqfition of the imagination fhould have
fuch an influence ori all the pafTions. It is this
very circumftance, which forms all the relations
and connexions amongft obje6ls. We know no
real connexion between one thing and another.
We only know, that the idea of one thing is
aflbciated with that of another, and that the ima-
gination makes an eafy tranfition between them.
And as the eafy tranfition of ideas, and that of
fentiments mutually aflift each other; we might
before-hand exped, that this principle miift have
a mighty influence on all our internal movements
and affeclions. And experience fufficiently con-
firms the theory.

For, not to repeat all the foregoing inflances:
Suppofe, that I were travelling with a compani-
on through a country, to which we are both ut-
ter ftrangers; it is evident, that, if the profpe<5ts
be beautiful, the roads agreable, and the fields
finely cultivated; this may ferve to put me in
good-humour, both with myfelf and fellow-tra-
veller. But as the country has no connexion
with myfelf or friend, it can never be the imme-
diate caufe either of felf-value or of regard to
him : And therefore, if I found not the paffion

on

206 A Dissertation

on fome other objedl, which bears to one of us
a clofer relation, my emotions are rather to be
confidered as the overflowings of an elevated or
humane difpofition, than as an eftabliihed pafllon.
But fuppofing the agreeable profpeft before us
to be furveyed either from his country-feat or
from mine; this new connexion of ideas gives
a new dire6lion to the fentiment of pleafure, de-
rived from the profped, and raifes the emotion
of regard or vanity, according to the nature of
the connexion. There is not here, methinks,
much room for doubt or difficulty.

SECT. V.

1. It feems evident, that reafon, in a ftrict
fenfe, as meaning the judgment of truth and
falfehood, can never, of itfelf, be any motive to
the will, and can have no influence but fo far
as it touches fome pafllon or aff'ection. Ahftract
relations of ideas are the object of curiofity, not
of volition. And matters of fa5fy where they are
neither good nor evil, where they neither excite
defire nor averfion, are totally indifferent; and whe-
ther known or unknown, whether mifl:aken or right-
ly apprehended, cannot be regarded as any mo-
tive to action.

2. What is commonly, in a popular fenfe, cal-
led reafon, and is fo much recommended in mo-
ral difcourfes, is nothing but a general and a
calm pafllon, which takes a comprehenflve and
a difl;ant view of its object, and actuates the
will, without exciting any fenflble emotion. A man,
we fay, is diligent in his profefllon from reafon;
that is, from a calm defire of riches and a for-
tune. A man adheres to juftice from reafon;
that is, from a calm regard to public good, or
to a character with himfelf and others.

3. The lame objects, which recommend them-
fclves to reafon ia this fenfe of the word, are

alfo

on the Passions. 207

alfo the objects of what we call pafTion, when
they are brought near to us, and acquire fome
other advantages, either of external fituation, or
congruity to our internal temper} and by that
means excite a turbulent and fenfible emotion.
Evil, at a great diftance, is avoided, we fay, from
reafon : Evil, near at hand, produces averfion, hor-
ror, fear, and is the object of paflion,

4. The common error of metaphyficians has
lain in afcribing the direction of the will entire-
ly to one of thefe principles, and fuppofing the
other to have no influence. Men often act know-
ingly againft their intereft: It is not therefore
the view of the greateft poflible good which al-
ways influences them. Men often counteract a
violent paflion, in profecution of their difliant in-
tereflis and defigns : It is therefore the prefent un-
caflnefs alone, which determines them. In gene-
ral, we may obferve, that both thefe principles
operate on the will j and where they are contra-
ry, that either of them prevails, according to the
general character or prefent difpofition of the
perfon. What we call Jirength of mind implies
the prevalence of the calm paflions above the
violent; though we may eafily obferve, that
there is no perfon fo conftantly pofl!cfl!ed of this
virtue, as never, on any occafion, to yield to the
folicitation of violent afi-ection and defire. From
thefe variations of temper proceeds the great
difficulty of deciding with regard to the future
actions and refoUitions of men, where there is
any contrariety of motives and paflions.

SECT. VI.

I . We fhall here enumerate fome of thofe cir-
cumfl:ances, which render a paflion calm or vio-
lent, which heighten or diminifli any emotion.

It is a property in human nature, that any

emotion.

2o8 A Dissertation

emotion, which attends a paflion is eafily con-
verted into it; though in their natures they be
originally different from, and even contrary to
each other. It is true, in order to caufe a per-
fect union amongft paffions, and make one pro-
duce the other, there is always required a dou-
ble relation, according to the theory above de-
livered. But when two paffions are already pro-
duced by their feparate caufes, and are both pre-
fent in the mind, they readily mingle and unite;
though they have but one relation, and fome-
times without any. The predominant palfion fwal-
lows up the inferior, and converts it into itfelf.
The fpirits, when once excited, eafily receive a
change in their direction j and it is natural to ima-
gine, that change will come from the prevailing
afFecion. The connection is in many cafes clo-
fer between any two paffions, than between any
paflion and indifference.

Vv hen a perfon is once heartily in love, the
little faults and caprices of his miilrefs, the jea-
loufies and quarrels, to which that comm.erce is
fo fubject; however unpleafant they be, and. ra-
ther connected with anger and hatred ; are yet
jfound, in many inftances, to give additional force
to the prevailing paflion. It is a common ar-
tifice of politicians, when they would affect any
perfon very much by a matter of fact, of which
they intend to inform him, firlt to excite his
curiofity ; delay as long as poffible the fatisfying
of it; and by that means raife his anxiety and
impatience to the utmoll, before they give him
a full infight into the bufinefs. They know,
that this curiofity will precipitate him into the
paflion, which they purpofe to raife, and will
aflift the object in its influence on the mind.
-A. foldier advancing to battle, is naturally in-
fpired with courage and confidence, when he
thinks on his friends and fellow-foldiers ; and is
ftruck with fear and terror, when he reflects on

the

on the Passions. 2051

the enemy. Whatever new ennotion therefore pro-
ceeds from the former, naturally encreafcs the
courage; as the fame emotion proceeding from
the latter, augments the fear. Hence in marti-
al difciplincj the, uniformity and luftre of habit,
the regularity of figures and motions, with all
the pomp and majefly of war, encourage ourfelves
and our allies; while the fame objc6ls in the ene-
my ftrike terror into us, though agreeable and
beautiful in thcmfelves.

. Hope is, in itfelf, an agreeable paflion, and al-
lied to friendfliip and benevolence; yet is it able
fomctimes to blow up anger, when that is the
predominant paflion. Spes addita Jujcitat iras.

2. Since pafTions, however independent, are na-
turally transfufed into each other, if they be both
prefent at the fame time; it follows, that when good
or evil is placed in fuch a fituation as to caufe
any particular emotion, befides its dirett paflion
of defire or averfion, this latter palTion muft ac-
quire new force and violence.

3. This often happens, when any objedt excites
contrary paflions. For it is obfervable, that an
oppofition of paflions commonly caufes a new
emotion in the fpirits, and produces more difor-
der than the concurrence of any two affedtions
Cif equal force. This new emotion is eafily con-
verted into the predominant paflion, and in ma-
ny inftances, is obferved to encreafe its violence^
beyond the pitch, at which it would have ar-
rived, had it met with no oppofition. Hence we
naturally defire what is forbid, and often take
a pleafure in performing akflionsy merely becaufc
they are unlawful. The notion of duty, when
oppofite to the paffions, is not always able to
overcome them; and when it fails of that effe6l,
is apt rather to encreafe and irritate them, by
producing an oppofition in our motives and prin-
ciples.

Vol. II. JP* 4. The

aio A Dissertation

4. The fame efFc6t follows, whether the oppo-
fition arife from internal motives or external ob-
ftacles. The paffion commonly acquires new
force in both cafes. The efforts, which the mind
makes to furmount the obftacle, excite the fpirits,
and enliven the paffion.

5. Uncertainty has the fame effe6b as oppofition.
The agitation of the thought, the quick turns which
it makes from one view to another, the variety of
paffions which fucceed each other, according to the
different views: All thefe produce an emotion in
the mind J and this emotion transfufes itfelf into the
predominant paffion.

Security, on the contrary, diminilhes the paffi-
ons. The mind, when left to itfelf, immediate-
ly languifhes; and in order to preferve its ardour,
mufl be every moment fupported by a new flow of
paffion. For the fame reafon, defpair, though con-
trary to fecurity, has a like influence.

6. Nothing more powerfully excites any affecti-
on than to conceal fome part of its objed:, by
throwing it into a kind of Ihade, which at the fame
time that it fhows enough to prepoffefs us in favour
of the objcift, leaves ftill fome work for the imagi-
nation. Befides that obfcurity is always attended
with a kind of uncertainty} the effort, which the
fancy makes to compleat the idea, rouzes the fpi-
rits, and gives an additional force to the paffion.

7. As defpair and fecurity, though contrary, pro-
duce the fame effedlsj fo abfcnce is obbftrved to
have contrary effe6ts, and in different circumftan-
ces, either encreafes or diminifhcs our affeftion.
Rochefoucault has very well remarked, that abfencc
deftroys weak paffion, but encreafes ftrong; as the
wind extinguifhes a candle, but blov/s up a fire.
Long abfencc naturally weakens our idea, and di-
miniffies the paffion: But where the" afteftion is fo
ftrong and lively as to fupport itfelf, the uneafinefs,
arifing from abfcnce, encreafes the paffion, and

gives it new force and influence.

8. When

.1

on the Passions. 211

8. When the foul applies itfelf to the perform-
ance of any action, or the conception of any object,
to which it is not accullomed, there is a certain un-
pliablenefs in the faculties; and a difficulty of the
fpirits moving in their new direction. As this dif-
ficulty excites the fpirits, it is the fource of wonder,
furprize, and of all the emotions, which arife from
novelty; and is, in itfelf, agreeable, like every thing
which enlivens the mind to a moderate degree. But
though furprize be agreeable in itfelf, yet, as it
puts the fpirits in agitation, it not only augments
our agreeable affections, but alfo our painful, ac-
cording to the foregoing principle. Hence every
thing that is new, is moft affe6ting, and gives us
either more pleafure or pain, than what, ftriftly
fpeaking, Ihould naturally follow from it. When
it often returns upon us, the novelty wears off; the
paflions fubfide ; the hurry of the fpirits is over;
and we furvey the objedl with greater tranquillity,

9. The imagination and affections have a clofe
union together. The vivacity of the former gives
force to the latter. Hence the profpect of any
pleafure, with which we are acquainted, affects us
more than any other pleafure, which we may own
fuperior, but of whole nature we are wholly igno-
rant. Of the one we can form a particular and de-
terminate idea : The other we conceive under the
general notion of pleafure.

Any fatisfaction, which we lately enjoyed, and of
which the memory is frefh and recent, operates on
the will with more violence, than another of which
the traces are decayed and almoft obliterated.

A pleafure, which is fuitable to the way of life,
in which we are engaged, excites more our defirc
and appetite than another, which is foreign to it.

Nothing is more capable of infufing any pallion
into the mind, than eloquence, by which objects
are reprefented in the flrongeft and mod lively co-
lour?. The bare opinion of another, efpecially

P 2 when

214 A Dissertation, &c.

when enforced with paffion, will caufe an idea to
have an influence upon us, though that idea might
otherwife have been entirely negledted.

It is remarkable, that lively paflions commonly
attend a lively imagination. In this refpeft, as well
as in others, the force of the paflion depends as
much on the temper of the perfon, as on the nature
and fituation of the objed.

What is diftant, either in place or time, has not
equal influence with what is near and contiguous.

* * *

I pretend not to have here exhaufted this fubjedi.
It is fufficient for my purpofe,- if 1 have made it ap-
pear, that, in the produftion and condud of paf-
fions, there is a certain regular mechanifm, which
is fufceptible of as accurate a difquifition, as the
laws of motion, optics, hydroftatics, or any part of
ijatural phiiofophy.

A- N"

A N

E N Q^ U I R Y

CONCERNING THE

PRINCIPLE S

O F

MORALS.

1

( 2'$ )

SECTION I.

Of the General Principles of Morals.

n

'ISPUTES with men, pertinacioufly obftinate
in their principles, are, of all others, the moft
irkfon:ie; except, perhaps, thofe with perfons, en-
tirely difingenuous, who really do not believe
the opinions they defend, but engage in the con-
troverfy, from affedlation, from a fpirit of oppofi-
tion, or from a defire of fhowing wit and inge-
nuity, fuperior to the reft of mankind. The
fame blind adherence to their own arguments is
to be expedled in both ; the fame contempt of
their antagonifts j the fame pafiionate vehemence,
in inforcing fophiftry and falfehood» And as rea-
foning is not the fource, whence either difpu-
tant derives his tenets -, it is in vain to expedt,
that any logic, which fpeaks not to the affec-
tions, will ever engage him to embrace founder
principles.

Thofe who have denied the reality of moral
diftinftions, may be ranked among the dilinge-
nuous difputants ; nor is it conceivable, that any
human creature could ever ferioufly believe,
that all characters and actions were alike en-
titled to the affection and regard of every one.
The difference, which nature has placed between
one man and another, is fo wide, and this dif-
ference

2i6 S E C T I O N 1.

ference is ftill fo much farther widened, by edu-
cation, example, and habit, that, where the op-
pofite extremes come at once under our ap-
prehenfion, there is no fcepticifm lb fcrupiilouSs
and fcarce any afTjrance fo determined^ as ab-
folutely to deny all diftinction between them.
Let a. man's infenfibility be ever fo great, he
mull often be touched Vv'ith the images of Right
and Wrong ; and let his prejudices be ever fq
obftinate, he muft obferye, that others are fuf-
ccptible of like impreffions. The only way,
therefore, of converting an antagonift: of this
kind, is to leave him to himfelf. For, finding
that nobody keeps up the controverfy with him,
it is probable he will, at lail, of himfelf, from
mere wearinefs, come over to the fide of commoi^
fenfe and reafon.

There has been a controverfy ftarted of late,
much better worth exaipination, concerning the
general foundation of Morals ; v/hether they be
derived from Reafon, or from Sentirnent ; whe-
ther we attain the knowledge of them by a chain
of argument and induction, or by an immedi-
ate feeling and finer internal fenfe j whether, like
i\\\ found judgment of truth and falfehood, they
Ihould be the fame to every rational intelligent
being; or whether, like the perception of beauty
and deformity, thty be founded entirely on the
particular fabric and conllitution of the human
fpecies.

The ancient philofophers, though they often
j^ffirm, that virtue is pothing but conformity to
reafon, yet, in general, feem to confider morals
as deriving their exiftence from tafte and ien-
timent. On the other hand, our modern en-
quirers, though they alio talk much of the
beauty of virtue, and deformity of vice, yet have
cpmiT^only endeavoured to account for thefe dif-

tinctions

Of the General Principles of Morals. 217

tinctions by metaphyfical reafonings, and by de-
ductions from the moil abftract principles of the
iinderftanding. Such confufion reigned in thefe
fubjects, that an oppofition of th^ greatefl: con-
fequence could prevail between one fyftem and
another, and even in the parts of almoft each
individual fyftem -, and yet no body, till very
lately, was ever fenfible of it. The elegant Lord
Shaftefbury, who firft gave occafion to remark
this diftinction, and who, in general, adhered to
the principles of the ancients, is not, himfelf,
entirely free from the fame confufion.

It muft be acknowledged, that both fides of
the queftion are fufceptible of fpecious argu-
ments. Moral didindbions, it may be faid, are
difcernible by pure reafon: Elfe, whence the
many difputes that reign in common life, as
well as in philofophy, with regard to this fub-
je61: : The long chain of proofs often produced
on both fides ; the examples cited, the authori-
ties appealed to, the analogies employed, the
fallacies detedted, the inferences drawn, and the
feveral conclufions adjufted to their proper prin-
ciples. Truth is difputable ; not taile : What
exifts in the nature of things is the ftandard of
our judgment; what each man feels within him-
felf is the ftandard of fentiment. Propofitions
in geometry may be proved, fyftems in phyfics
may be controverted ; but the harmony of verfe,
the tendernefs of pallion, the brilliancy of wit,
muft give immediate pleafure. No man reafons
concerning another's beauty i but frequently con-
cerning the juftice or injuftice of his actions.
In every criminal trial the firft objeft of the
prifoner is to difprove the fa6ls alleged, and de-
ny the a6lions imputed to him : The fecond to
prove, that, even if thefe actions were real, they
might be juftified, as innocent and lawful. It is
coafeftedly by deductions of the underftanding,

that

2iS SECTION!.

that the firft point is afcertained r How can wc
fuppofe that a different faculty of the mind is
employed in fixing the other ?

On the other hand, thofe who would refolve
all moral determinations into Jentiment^ may en-
deavour to {how, that it is impoffible for reafon
ever to draw conclufions of this nature. To
virtue, fay they, it belongs to be amiahUj and
vice odious. This forms their very nature or ef-
fence. But can reafon or argumentation dillri-
bute thefe different epithets to any fubjects, and
pronounce before-hand, that this muft produce
love, and that hatred ? Or what other reafon can
we ever affign for thefe affections, but the origi-
nal fabric and formation of the human mind,
which is naturally adapted to receive them ?

The end of all moral fpeculations is to teach
us our duty; and, by proper reprcfentations of
the deformity of vice and beauty of virtue, be-
get correfpondent habits, and engage us to avoid
the one, and embrace the other. But is this ever
to be expected from inferences and conclufions
of the underftanding, which of themfelves have no
hold of the affections, or fet in motion the active
powers of men ? They difcover truths : But where
the truths which they difcover are indifferent, and
beget no defire or averfion, they can have no
influence on conduct and behaviour. What is ho-
nourable, what is fair, what is becoming, what is
noble, what is generous, takes poffeffion of the heart,
and animates us to embrace and maintain it. What
is intelligible, what is evident, what is probable,
what is true, procures only the cool affent of the
\inderftanding; and gratifying a fpeculative curiofi-
ly, puts an end to our reiearches.

Extingui/h all the warm feelings and prepoffeffions
in favour of virtue, and all difguilor averfion to vice:
Render men totally indifferent towards th^^fe diilinc-
tionsi and morality is no longer a practical ftudy,

2 nor

^i

of theGENERAL Principles of Morals. 219

nor has any tendency to regulate our lives and ac-
tions.

Thefe arguments on each fide (and many more
might be produced) are fo plaufible, that I am
apt to fufped:, they may, the one as well as
the other, be folid and fatisfaftory, and that rea-
Jon and Jcntiment concur in almoft all moral deter-
minations and conclufions. The final fentence, it
is probable, which pronounces chara6lers and ac-
tions amiable or odious, praife-worthy or blame-
able j that which ftamps on them the mark of
honour or infamy, approbation or cenfure ; tlist
which renders morality an adlive principle, and
conftitutes virtue our happinefs, and vice our
mifery : It is probable, I fay, that this final fen-
tence depends on fome internal fenfe or feeling,
which nature has made univerfal in the whole fpe-
cies. For what elfe can have an influence of this
nature ? But in order to pave the way for fuch a
fcntiment, and give a proper difcernment of its ob-
jedl, it is often necefl^ary, we find, that much
reafoning Ihould precede, that nice diftin<5lions
be made, juft contlufions drawn, diftant compa-
rifons formed, complicated relations examined,
and general fafts fixed and afcertained. Some
fpecies of beauty, efpecially the natural kinds, on
their firft appearance, command our affection and
approbation ; and where they fail of this effed:, it
is impofiible for any reafoning to redrefs their
influence, or adapt them better to our tafle and
fentiment. But in many orders of beauty, particu-
larly thofe of the finer arts, it is requifite to em-
ploy much reafoning, in order to feel the pro-
per fentiment ; and a falfe relifh may frequently
be corrected by argument and reflection. There
are juft grounds to conclude, that moral beauty
partakes much of this latter fpecies, and demands
the afliftance of our intellectual faculties, in or-
der

420 SECTION I

der to give it a fuitable influence on the human
inind.

But though this queftion, concerning the gene-
ral principles of morals, be curious and impor-
tant, it is needlefs for us, at prefent, to employ
farther care in our refearches concerning it. For
if we can be fo happy, in the courfe of this en-
quiry, as to difcover the true origin of morals, it
will then eafily appear how far either fentiment or
reafon enters into all determinations of this na-
■ture *. In order to attain this purpofe, we fhall
endeavour to follow a very fimple method : We
fhall analyze that complication of mental qualities,
which form what, in common life, we call Perfo-
nal Merit : We fhall confider every attribute of the
mind, which renders a man an object either of .ef-
teem and affection, or of hatred and contempt ;
.every habit or fentiment or faculty, which, if af-
cribed to any perfon, implies either praife or blame,
and may enter into any panegyric or fatire of his
character and manners. The quick fenfibility,
which, on this head, is fo univerfal among man-
kind, gives a philofopher fufficient afTurance, that
he can neyer ,be confiderably miflaken in framing
the catalogue, or incur any danger of mifplacing
the objects of his contemplation : He needs only
enter into his own breaft for a moment, and
confider whether or not he fhould defire to have
this or that quality afcribed to him, and whether
fuch or fuch an im.p-utation would proceed from a
friend or an enemy. Tjie very nature of language
guides us almofl infallibly in forming a judgment
of this nature ; and as every tongue pofTelTes one fet
of words which are taken in a good fcnfe, and ano-
ther in the oppofite, the leafl acquaintance with the
idiom fuffices, without any reafoning, to direct us
in collecting and arranging the eflimable or blame-
able

* See Appendix I.

1

Of the General Principles of Morals. 221

able qualities of men. The only object of reafon-
ing is to difcover the circumilanccs on both fides,
which are common to thefe qualities ; to obfervc
that particular in which the eflimabie qualities a-
gree on the one hand, and the blameable on the
other; and thence to reach the foundation of ethics,
and find thofe univerfal principles, from which all
cenfure or approbation is ultimately derived. As
this is a queftion of fact, not of abftract fcience,
we can only expect fuccefs, by following the expe-
rimental method, and deducing general maxims
from a comparifon of particular inftances. The
other fcientifical method, where a general abftract
principle is firft eftablifhed, and is afterwards
branched out into a variety of inferences and con-
clufions, may be more perfect in itfelf, but fuits lefs
the imperfection of human nature, and is a com.-
mon fource of illufion and miftake in this as well
as in other fubjects. Men are now cured of their
paffion for hypothefes and fyftems in natural philo-
fophy, and will hearken to no arguments but thofe
which are derived from experience. It is full time
they fhould attempt a like reformation in all moral
difquifitions; and reject every fyftem of ethics,
however fubtile or ingenious, which is not founded
on fact and obfervation.

We fhall begin our enquiry on this head by the
confideration of the focial virtues, benevolence and
juftice. The explication of them will probably
give us an opening by which the others may be ac-
counted for.

o

( ^ij )

SECTION 11.

Of B E N E V O L E N C E.

PART I.

I

T may be efteemed, perhaps, a fuperfluous talk
to prove, chat the benevolent or fofter affeftions
are ESTIMABLE; and wherever they appear, en-
gage the approbation, and good-will of mankind.
The epithets Jociahle^ good-natured, humane y merci-
fuU gratefuly friendly, generous, beneficent, or their
equivalents, are known in all languages, and uni-
verfaily exprefs the highefl: merit, which human
nature is capable of attaining. Where thefe ami-
able qualities are attended with birth and power
and eminent abilities, and difplay themfelves in the
good government or ufeful inftruftion of mankind,
they feem even to raife the pofTeflbrs of them above
the rank of human nature, and make them approach
in Ibme mearure to the divine. Exalted capacity,
undaunted courage, profperous fuccefs ; thefe may
only expofe a hero or politician to the envy and
ill-will of the public : But as foon as the praifes
are added of humane and beneficent; when inftan-
ces are difplayed of lenity, tenderncfs, or friend-
fhip J envyitfelfis filent, or joins the general voice
of approbation and applaule.

When Pericles, the great Athenian flatefman
and general, was on his death-bed, his furround-
ing friends, deeming him now infenfiblc, began
to indulge their forrow for their expiring patron,
-by enumerating his great qualities and fuccefTes,
his conquells and vidories, the unufual length

of

224 S E C T I O N IL

of his admlniftration, and his nine trophies ereft-
ed over the enemies of the republic. Tou for-
getj cries the dying hero, who had heard all, you
forget the moft eminent of my praifesy while you dwell
fo much on thofe vulgar advantages ^ in which fortune
had a principal Jhare, Tou have not ohferved^ that
no citizen has ever yet worn mourning on my ac-
count *.

In men of more ordinary talents and capacity,
the focial virtues become, if poflible, ftill more
eflentially requifite ; there being nothing eminent
in that cafe, to compenfate for the want of them,
or preferve the perfon from our fevereft hatred, as
well as contempt. A high ambition, an elevated
courage, is aptj fays Cicero, in lefs perfecft
characters, to degenerate into a turbulent ferocity.
The more focial and fofter virtues arc there chief-
ly to be regarded. Thefe arc always good and
amiable f.

The principal advantage, which Juvenal difco-
vers in the extenfive capacity of the human fpe-
cies is, that it renders our benevolence alfo more
extenfive, and gives us larger opportunities of
fpreading our kindly influence than what are in-
dulged to the inferior creation J, It muft, in-
deed, be confeffed, that by doing good only, can
a man truly enjoy the advantages of being emi-
nent. His exalted ftation, of itfelf, but the more
expofes him to danger and tempeft. His fole
prerogative is to afford fhelter to inferiors, who
repofe themfelves under his cover and proteftion.

But I forget, that it is not my prefent bufinefs to
recommend generofity and benevolence, or to
paint, in their true colours, all the genuine charms
of the focial virtues. Thefe, indeed, fufRciently
engage every heart, on the firft apprehenfion ot

them i

• Plut. in Pericle. 'f Cic. dc Officiis, lib. r.

X Sat. XV. 139, & feq.

\

Of BENEVOLnNCE. 22^

them ; and it is difficult to abfLain from forn^
fally of panegyric, as often as they occur in dif-
courfe or reafoning. But our objecft here !ving
more the fpeculative, than the pradlical part of mo-
rals, it will fuffice to remark, (what will readily,
I believe, be allowed) that no qualities are more
intitled to the general good-will and approbation
of mankind than beneficence and humanity, friend-
fhip and gratitude, natural affection and public
Ipirit, or whatever proceeds from a tender fym-
pathy with others, and a generous concern for
our kind and fpecies. Thefe, wherever they ap-
pear, feem to transfufe themfelvcs, in a mann'-r,
into each beholder, and to call forth, in the; own
behalf, the fame favourable and affectionate fenti-
ments, which they exert on all around.

PART II.

We may obferve, that, in difplaying the praifes
of any humane, beneficent man, there is one cir-
cumftance which never fails to be amply infifbed
on, namely, the happinefs and fatisfaftion, deriv-
ed to fociety from his intercourfe and good offices.
To his parents, we are apt to fay, he endears him-
felf by his pious attachment and duteous care, fbill
}nore than by the connexions of nature. His chil-
dren never feel his authority, but when employed
for their advantage. With him, the ties of love
are confolidated by beneficence and friendffiip.
The ties of frienddiip approach, in a fond obferv-
ance of each obliging office, to thofe of love and
inclination. His domeflics and dependants have in
him a fure refource ; and no longer dread the pow-
er of fortune, but fo far as ffie excrcifes it over him.
From him the hungry receive food, the naked cloath-
ing, the ignorant and flothful flci'l and induftry.
I. ike the fun, an inferior minifter of providence,

'Vol. II. CL ^e

S26 SECTION 11.

he cheers, invigorates, and luilains the furrounding'
world.

If confined to private life, the fphereof his adivi-
ty is narrower; but his influence is all benign and-,
gentle. If exalted into a higher ftation, mankind-
and pofterity reap the fruit of his labours.

As thefe topics of praife never fail to be employ-
ed, and with fuccefs, where we would infpire efteem
for any one: may it not therk:e be concluded, that
the Utility, refulting froni the focial virtues, forms,
at leaft, a^<^r/ of their merit, and is one fource of
that approbation and regard fo univerfally paid to
them ?

When we recommend even an animal or a plant
as u/eful and leneficial, v;e give it an applaufe and
recommendation fuited to its nature. As, on the
other hand, refledion on the baneful influence of
any of thefe inferior beings always infpires us with
the fentiment of averfion. The eye is pleafed
with the profpecV of corn-fields and loaded vine-
yards; horfes grazing, and flocks pafturing : BuE
iiiesthe view of briars and brambles^ affording fhel-
ter to wolves and ferpents.

A machine, a j^iece of furniture^ a veftment, a
houfe well contrived fc>-r ufc and convenicncy, is {o
far beautiful, and is contemplated with pleafure and
approbation. An experienced eye is here fenfible
to many excellencies, which cfcape perfons igno-
rant and uninilrudcd.

Can any thing (Wronger be faid in praife of a
profeflion, lUch as nierchandize or manufaiflure,
than to obferve the advantages which it procures to
fociety ? And is not a monk and iriquifitor enraged
when we treat his order as ulclefs or pernicious to
mankind ?

Ihe hiRorian exults in difplaying the benefit
arifing from his labours. The writer of romance
alleviates or denies the bad confequences afcribed
fo his manner of compofitioo.

In

Of B E N' E V O L E N C E. ll'J

In general, what praife is implied in the fimple
epithet ujefiill What reproach in the contrary !

Your God?, fays Cicero '^, in oppofition to the
Epicureans, cannot jullly claim any worfhipor ado-
ration, with whatever imaginary perfections you
may fuppofe them endowed. They are totally ufe-
lefs and unadive. Even the Egyptians, whom you
ib much ridicule, never confecratcd any animal
but on account of its utility.

The fceptics aflert f , though abfurdly, that the
origin of all religious worfuip was derived from the
utility of inanimate objeds, as the fun and moon,
to the fupport and well-being of mankind. This
is alfo the common reafon alfigned by hiftorians,
for the deification of eminent heroes and legifla-
tors J.

To plant a tree, to cultivate a field, to beget chil-
dren ; meritorious acts, according to the religion
of Zoroafter.

In all determinations of morality, this circum-
ftance of public utility is ever principally in viewj
and wherever difputes arife, either in philofophy or
common life, concerning the bounds of duty, the
queftion cannot, by any means, be decided with
greater certainty, than by afcertaining, on any
fide, the true interefls of mankind. If any falfe
opinion, embraced from appearances, has been
found to prevail ; as foon as farther experience and
founder reafoning have given us jufter notions of
human affairs; we retract our firii fentiment, and
adjufl: anew the boundaries of moral good and
evil.

Giving alms to the common beggar is naturally

praifed ; becaufe it feems to carry relief to the dif-

trefied and indigent : But when we obferve the en-

0^2 couragement

* De Nat. Deot. lib. i.

t Sext. Emp. adverfus Math. lib. viii.

t Diod. Sic. paflim.

228 S E C T I O N II.

couragement thence arifing to idlenefs and debauch-
ery, we regard that fpecies of charity rather as a
weaknefs than a virtue.

'Tyrannicide^ or the aflairmation of ufurpers and
oppreflive princes, was highly extolled in ancient
times ; becaufe it both freed mankind from many
of thefe monfters, and feemed to keep the others
in awe, whom the fword or pCigrtard could not
reach. But hiftory and experience having, fince
convinced us, that this praftice encreafes the jea-
loufy and cruelty of princes, a Timoleon and a
Brutus, though treated with indulgence on account
of the prejudices of their times, are now confider-
ed as very improper models for imitation.

Liberality in princes is regarded as a mark of be-
neficence : But when it occurs, that the homely
bread of the honeft and induftrious is often there-
by converted into delicious cates for the idle and
the prodigal, we foon retraft our heedlefs praifes.
The regrets of a prince, for having loft a day,
were noble and generous : But had he intended
to have fpent it in a6ts of generofity to his greedy
courtiers, it was better loft than mifemployed after
that manner.

Luxury, or a refinement on the pleafures and
conveniencies of life, had long been fuppofed the
fource of every corruption in government, and the
immediate caufe of facStionj fedition, civil wars,
and the total lofs of liberty. It was, therefore,
univerfally regarded as a vice, and was an objedt
of declamation to all fatyrifts, and fevere moralifts.
Thofe, who prove, or attempt to prove, that fuch
refinements rather tend to the encreafe of induftry,
civility, and arts, regulate anew our ?;;or^/ as well
as political fentimen's, and reprefent, as laudable
or innocent, what had formerly been regarded as
pernicious and blameable.

Upon the whole, then, it feems undeniable, /Z^^/
nothing can beftow more merit on any human crea-
ture

i

of Benevolence. dig

ture than the fentiment of benevolence In an emi-
nent degree; and ihaf a. part, at leaft, of its me-
rit arifes from its tendency to promote the intcrefts
of our fpecies, and beftow happincfs on human fo-
ciety. We carry our view into the falutary confe-
quences of fuch a charadler and difpofition ; and
whatever has fo benign an influence, and forwards
fo defirable an end, is beheld with complacency
and pleafure. The focial virtues are never regarded
without their beneficial tendencies, nor viewed as
barren and unfruitful. The happinefs of mankind,
the order of fociety, the harmony of families, the
mutual fupport of friends, are always confidered
as the refult of their gentle dominion over the breafts
of men.

How confiderable a part of their merit we ought
to afcribe to their utility, will better appear from
future difquifitions *j as well as the reafon, why
this circumflance has fuch a command over our ef-
teem and approbation f.

• Seft3dand4th. f Seft. 5th.

S E C-

( ^31 )

?5

SECTION III.

of Justice.
P A R T h

i HAT Juftice is iifcful to Ibciety, and con-
fequently ths.< part of its merit, at leaft, muft arife
from that confideration, it would be a fuperfluous
undertaking to prove. That public utility is the
fole origin of juftice, and that reflexions on the
beneficial confequences of this virtue are the fole
foundation of its merit; this propofition, being
jnore curious and important, will better deferve
our examination and enquiry.

Let us fuppofe, that nature has beftowed on the
human race iuch profufe abundance of all external
conveniencies, that, without any uncertainty in
the event, without any care or indullry on our
part, every individual finds himfelf fully provided
with whatever his moll voracious appetites can
want, or luxurious imagination wifh or defire.
His natural beauty, we fhall fuppofe, furpaffes all
acquired ornaments: The perpetual clemency of
the feafons renders ufelefs all cloaths or covering:
The raw herbage affords him the mod delicious
fare; the clear fountain, the richeft beverage. No
laborious occupation required: No tillage: No
navigation. Mufic, poetry, and contemplation
form his fole bufinefs : Converfation, mirth, and
friendlhip his fole amufement,

It

232 SECTION III.

It feems evident, that, in fuch a happy ftatCj
every other foclal virtue would flourifh, and re-
ceive tenfold encreafe ; but the cautious, jealous
virtue of juftice would never once have been
dreamed of. For what purpofe make a partition
of goods, where every one has already more than
enough ? Why give rife to property, where there
cannot poffibly be any injury ? Why call this ob-
}tdi miney when, upon the feizing of it by another,
I need but ftretch out my hand to pofiefs myfelf of
what is equally vaiuable ? Jufticc, in that cafe, be-
ing totally Ufelf-fs, would be an idle ceremonial,
and could never poliibly have place in the cata-
logue of virtues.

We fee, even in the prefent neceflitous conditi-
on of mankind, that, wherever any benefit is be-
ftcwed by nature in an unlimited abundance, we
leave it always in common among the whole hu-
man race, and make no fubdivifions of right and
property. Water and air, though the mcfl neceffa-
ry of all objefts, are not challenged as the pro-
perty of individuals; nor can any man commit in-
jullice by the mod lavifli ufe and enjoyment of
thefe blefiings. In fertile extenfive countries, with,
few inhabitants, land is regarded on the fame
footing. And no topic is fo much infifted on by
thofe, who defend tiie liberty of the feas, as the
unexhauited ufe of them in navigation. Were the
advantages, procured by navigation, as inexhauft-
ible, thefe reafoners had never had any adverfaries
to refute , nor had any claims ever been advanced
ofaleparate, exclufive dominion over the ocean.

It may happen, in fome countries, at fome pe-
riods, that there be eftablifhed a property in water,
none in land*; if the latter be in greater abun-
dance than can be ufed by the inhabitants, and
the former be found, with difficulty, and in very
fmail quantities.

Again -,

* Gencfis. chap. xiii. a.nd xxi.

Of Justice. 223

Again ; fuppofe, that, though the neceffities of
human race continue the fame as at prefent, yet
the mind is fo enlnrged, and fo replete with friend-
fhip and generofity, that every man has the utmoft
tenderntrfs for every man, and feels no more con-
cern for his own intereft than for that of his fellows :
It feems evident, that the Ufc of juftice would,
in this cafe, be fufpended by fuch an extenfive be-
nevolence, nor would the divifions and barriers of
property and obligation have ever been thought of.
Why lliould I bind another, by a deed or prom ife,
to do me any good office, when I know that he
is already prompted, by the ftrongefl inclination,
to feek my happinefs, and would, of himfeif, per-
form the defired fervice j except the hurt, he there-
by receives, be greater than the benefit accruing
to me ? in which cafe, he knows, that, from my
innate humanity and friendfhip, I fhould be the
firfl to oppofe myfelf to his imprudent generofity.
Why raife land-marks between my neighbour's
field and mine, when my heart has made no divi-
fion between our intereftsj but fhares all his joys
and forrows with the fame force and vivacity as if
originally my own ? Every man, upon this fup-
pofition, being a fecond felf to another, would
truft all his interefts to the difcretion of every man;
without jealoufy, without partition, without dif-
tindlion. And the whole human race would form
only one family; where all would lie in common,
and be ufed freely, without regard to property $
but cautioufly too, with as entire regard to the ne-
ceffities of each individual, as if our own interells
were mod intimately concerned.

- In the prefent difpofition of the human heart,
it would, perhaps, be difficult to find compleat
inftances of fuch enlarged afi^edlions ; but ftill we
may obferve, that the cafe of families approaches
towards it ; and the ftronger the mutual benevo-
lence

.a34 S E C T I O N III.

lence is among the individuals, the nearer it ap-r
-proachcs J till all diflinftion of property be, in a
^reac nieafure, lofl and confounded amono- them.
Betiyeeji married perfons, the cement of friend-
Ihip is by the law fuppofed fo ftrong as to abolifh
all 'divifion of polTeHionsj and has often, in rea-
lity, the force afcribed to it. And it is obferv-
able, that,' during the ardour of new enthufiafms,
when every principle is inflamed into extrava-
gance, the community of goods has frequently
been attempted; and iiorhing but experience of
its inconveniencies, from the returning: or difo-uifed
felfifhnefs of men, could make the imprudent fa-
natics adopt anew the idea, of juflice and of fe-
parate property. So true is it, that this virtue
derives its exiftence entirely from its necefTary
nfe to the intercourfe and focial ftate of man-
kind.

To make this truth more evident, let us reverfe
the foregoing fuppofitions ; and carrying every
thing to the oppofite extreme, confider what
would be the effed; of thefe new fituations. Sup-
pofe a Ibciety to fall into fiich want of all com-
mon necelTarics, that the utmofb frugality and in-
dufbry cannot preferve the greater number from
perifliing, and the whole from extreme mifery :
It will readily, I believe, be admitted, t-hat the
fcricSl laws of juftice are fufpended, in fuc-ii a
prefiing emergence, and give place to the ftrong-
er motives of neceflity and felf-prefcrvation. Is
it any crime, after a fhipwreck, to feize whatever
means or inftrument of fafety one can lay hold,
of, without regard to former limitations of proper-
ty ? Or if a city befieged were perifhing with
hunger; can we imagine, that men will fee any
means of prefervation before them, and lofe their
lives, from a fcrupulous regard to what, in o-
ther fituations, would be the rules of equity and
jultice ? The Ufe and Tendency of that virtue

is

Of Justice. 235

is to procure happinefs and fecurity, by preferv-
ing ordtT in ibciety : But where the Ibciety is
ready to pcrilh from extreme necefiity, no greater
evil can be dreaded from violence and injufticej
and every man may now provide for himfelf by
all the means, which prudence can dictate, or hu-
manity- permit. The public, even in Icfs ur-
gent" necellities, opens granaries, without the con-
lent of {)roprietars ; as jullly fuppofing, that the
authority of magiflracy may, confiftent with e-
quity, exttnd fo far: But were any number of
men to afiemble, without the tye of laws or ci-
vil j urifdicfti on ; would an equal partition of bread
in a famine, though effedled by power' and even
violence, be regarded as criminal or injurious?

Suppofe likewife, that it fliould be a virtu-
ous man's fate to fall into the fociety of ruffians,
remote from the protection of laws and govern-
fricntj what condu6t muft he embrace in that
melancholy fituation ? he fees fuch a defperatc
rapacioufnefs prevail ; fuch a difregard to equi-
ty, fuch contempt of order, fuch ftupid blind-
nefs to future confcquences, as mufb immediately
have the mod tragical conclufion, and muft ter-
minate in deilru(flion to the greater number,
and in a total diflbluticn of fociety to the reft.
He, mean while, can have no other expedient
than to arm himfelf, to whomever the fword he
feizes, or the buckler, may belong : To make
provifion of all means of defence and fecurity :
And his particular regard to juftice being no
longer of Ufe to his own fafety or that of o-
thers, he muft confult the didates of felf-pre-
fervation alone, without concern for thofe who
no longer merit his care and attention.

When any man, even in political fociety, ren-
ders himfelf, by his crimes, obnoxious to the
public, he is puniflied by the laws in his goods
and perfon ; that is, the ordinary rules of juf-
tice

asS SECTION III.

tice are, with regard to him, fufpended for $,
moment, and it becomes equitable to inflift on
him, for the henefit of fociety, what, otherwife,
he could not fufFer without wrong or injury.

The rage and violence of public warj what is
it but a fufpenfion of juftice among the warring
parties, who perceive, that this virtue is now no
longer of any uje or advantage to them ? The
Jaws of war, which then fucceed to thofe of
equity and juftice, are rules calculated for the
advantage and utility of that particular ftate, in
which men are now placed. And were a civi-
lized nation engaged with barbarians, who ob-
ferved no rules even of war ; the former muft
alfo fufpend their obfervance of them, where they
no longer ferve to any purpofe -, and muft ren-
der every a6lion or rencounter as bloody and per-
nicious as pofTible to the firft aggreflbrs.

Thus, the rules of equity or juftice depend
entirely on the particular ftate and condition,
in which men are placed, and owe their origin
and exiftence to that Utility, which refults to
the public from their ftrid and regular obferv-
ance. Reverfe, in any confiderable circumftance,
the condition of men : Produce extreme abund-
ance or extreme neceflity : Implant in the human
breaft perfe6l moderation and humanity, or per-
fe<^ rapacioufnefs and malice : By rendering juf-
tice totally ufelefs, you thereby totally defttoy its
cflence, and fufpend its obligation upon man-
kind.

The common fituation of fociety is a medium
amidft all thefe extremes. We are naturally
partial to ourfelves, and to our friends ; but are
capable of learning the advantage refulting from
a more equitable condu6t. Few enjoyments are
given us from the open and liberal hand of na-
ture i but by art, labour, and induftry, we can

extradt

^

or Justice. 237

extrad them in great abundance. Hence the
ideas of property become neceflary in all civil
fociety : Hence juftice derives its ulefulnefs to the
public : And hence alone arifes its merit and mo-
ral obligation.

Thefe conclufions are fo natural and obvious,
that they have not efcaped even the poets, in
their defcriptions of the felicity, attending the
golden age or the reign of Saturn. The feafons,
in that Hrft period of nature, were fo temperate,
if we credit thefe agreeable fiftions, that there
was no necefTity for men to provide themfelves
with cloaths and houfes, as a fecurity againil the
violence of heat and cold : The rivers flowed
with wine and milk: The oaks yielded honey;
and nature fpontaneoufly produced her greateft
delicacies. Nor were thefe the chief advantages
of that happy age. Tempefts were not alon*e
removed from nature ; but thofe more furious
tempefts were unknown to human breafts, whick.
now caufe fuch uproar, and engender fuch con-
fufion. Avarice, ambition, cruelty, felfifhnefs,
were never heard of: Cordial affection, compaf-
fion, fympathy, were the only movements with
which the mind was yet acquainted. Even the
pundtilious diltin^lion of mi?7e and thine was ba-
nifhed from among that happy race of mortals,
and carried with it the very notion of property and
obligation, juftice and injuftice.

This poetical fiction of the golden age is, in
fome refpefts, of a piece with the philofophical
fi6tion of the Jiate of nature -, only that the for-
mer is reprefented as the moft charming and
moil peaceable condition, which can poffibly be
imagined ; whereas the latter is painted out as a
ftate of mutual war and violence, attended with
the moft extreme neceflity. On the firft origin
of mankind, we are told, their ignorance and fa-
vage nature were fo prevalent, that they could

238 SECTION III.

,give no mutual truft, but muft each depend upon
himfelf, and his own force or cunning for protec-
tion and fecurity. No law was heard of: No
rule of juftice known : No diftinftion of property
regarded : Power was the only meafure of right j
and a perpetual war of all againft all was the refult
of men's untamed felfifhnefs and barbarity *.

Whether fuch a condition of human nature could
ever exifl, or if it did, could continue fo long as
to merit the appellation of a Jiate, may juftly be
doubted. Men are neceffarily born in a family-
fociety, at lead ; and are trained up by their pa-
rents to fome rule of conduft and behaviour.
But this mull be admitted, that, if fuch a flate of
mutual war and violence was ever real, the fuf-
penfion of all laws of juftice, from their abfolute
inutility, is a necefiary and infallible confequence.

The m.ore we vary the views of human life, and
the newer and more unufual the lights are, in
which we furvey it, the more Ihall we be con-
vinced, that the origin here afTigned for the virtue
of iuftice is real and fatisfa£lory.

Were there a fpecies of creatures, intermingled
with men, which, though rational, were pofTelT-
ed of fuch inferior ftrength, both of body and
mind, that they were incapable of all refiftance,
and could nevef, upon the higheft provocation,
make us feel the effefts of their refcntment ; the
necefiary confequence, I think, is, that we fhould
be bound, by the laws of humanity, to give
gentle ufage to thefe creatures, but jfhould not,
properly fpeaking, lie under any rcftraint of juf-
tice, with regard to them, nor could they polfefs
any right or property, exclufive of fuch arbitra-
ry lords. Our intercourfe with them could not
be called fociety, which fuppofes a degree of

equality ;

* See NOTE [S].

of J U S T I C Ei 229

equality ; but abfolute command on the one fide,
and fervile obedience on the other. Whatever
we covet, they muft inftantly refign : Our per-
mifiion is the only tenure, by which they
hold their poiTeirions : Our companion and kind-
nefs the only check, by which they curb our
lawlefs will : And as no inconvenience ever
refults from the exercife of a power, fo firn^.ly
cftablilhcd in nature, the rcflraints of jullice and
property, being totally u/elc/s, would never have
place in fo unequal a confederacy.

This is plainly the fituation of men, vv^ith re-
gard to animals ; and how far thefe may be laid
to poiTcfs reafoil', I leave it to others to deter-
iViifte. The great fuperiority of civilized Euro-
peans above barbarous Indians, tempted us to

imae;ine ourfelves on the fame footins; with re-
ts o

gard to them, and made us throw off all re-
itraints of jtiftice, and even of humanity, in our
treatment of them. In many nations, the female
fex are reduced to like flavery, and are render-
ed incapable of all property, in oppofition to
their lordly mailers. But though the males, when
united, have, in all countries, bodily force fuffi-
eient to maintain this fevere tyranny j yet fuch
are the inlinuation, addrefs, and charms of their
fair companions, that women are commonly able
to break the confederacy, and fliare with the o-
ther fex in all the rights and privileges of fo-
ciety.

Were the human fpecies fo framed by nature as
that each individual poffeiTcd within himfelf every
faculty, requifite both for his own prefervaticn
and for the propagation of his kind: Were all fo-
ciety and intercourfe cut off between man and
man, by the primary intention of the fupreme
Creator : It feems evident, that fo folitary a be-
ing would be as much incapable of juftice, as of
fociai difcourfe and converfation. Where mutual

regards

i40 SECTION III.

regards and forbearance ferve to no manner of
purpofe, they would never direft the conduct of any
reafonable man. The headlong courfe of the paf-
fions would be checked by no refleftion on fu-
ture confequences. And as each man is here
fuppofed to love himfelf alone, and to depend
only on himfelf and his own adVivity for fafety
and happjnefs, he would, on every occafion, to
the utmoft of his power, challenge the preference
above every other being, to none of which he is
bound by any ties, either of nature or of in-
tercft.

But fuppofe the conjunftion of the fexes to
be eftablilhed in nature, a family immediately
arifes ; and particular rules being found requifite
for its fubfiftence, thefe are immediately embrac-
ed j though without comprehending the reft of
mankind within their prefcriptions. Suppofe, that
feveral families unite together into one fociety,
which is totally disjoined from all others, the
ruler, which preferve peace and order, enlarge
themfelves to the utmoft extent of that fociety j
but becoming then entirely ufeVls, lofe their force
when carried one ftep farther. But again fup-
pofe, that ftveral diftindt focieties maintain a kind
of intercourfe for mutual convenience and ad-
vantage, the boundaries of juftice ftill grow lar-
ger, in proportion to the largenefs of men's views,
and the force of their mutual connexions. Hif-
tory, experience, reafon fufficiently inftrudt us in
this natural progrefs of human fentiments, and in
the gradual enlargement of our regards to juftice,
in proportion as we become acquainted with the
cxtenfive utility of that virtue.

PART II.

If we examine the pnyticidar laws, by which juf-
tice is direi^cd, and property determined; we fliall

ftill

of Justice. 241

ftill be prefented with the fame conclufion. The
good of mankind is the only obje6l of all thefe
laws and regulations. Not only it is requifite, for
the peace and intereft: of fociety, that men's pof-
lefTions flioiild be feparated ; but the rules which
we follow, in making the feparation, are fuch as
can beft be contrived to ferve farther the interells
of fociety.

We fhall fuppofe, that a creature, pofTefled of
reafon, but unacquainted with human nature, de-
liberates with himfelf what RULES of juftice or
property would beft promote public intereft, and
eftablifh peace and fecurity among mankind : His
moft obvious thought would be, to afllgn the
Jargeft pofiefTions to the moft extenfive virtue, and
give every one the power of doing good, propor-
tioned to his inclination. In a perfedt theocracy,
where a being, infinitely intelligent, governs by
particular volitions, this rule would certainly have
place, and might ferve to the wifeft purpofes : But
were mankind to execute fuch a law ; i^o great is
the uncertainty of merit, both from its natural ob-
fcurity, and from the felf-conceit of each indi-
vidual, that no determinate rule of conduct would
ever refult from it ; and the total difTolution of
fociety mutl be the immediate confequence. Fa-
natics may fuppofe, that dominion is founded on
gracCy and that faints alone inherit the earth i but
the civil magidrate very juftly puts thefe fub-
lime theorifls on the fame footing with common
robbers, and teaches them by the fevereft dif-
cipline, that a rule, which, in fpeculation, may
feem the moft advantageous to fociety, may yet be
found, in practice, totally pernicious and deftruc-
tive.

That there were religious fanatics of this kind in
England, during the civil wars, we learn from hif-
tory; though it is probable, that the obvious /^«-
dency of thefe principles excited fuch horror in

Vol. II. R mankind,

242 SECTION III.

mankind, as foon obliged the dangerous enthu-
fiafts to renounce, or at leaft conceal their tenets.
Perhaps, the levelle?'S; who claimed an equal dif-
tribution of property, were a kind of poliiical fa-
natics which arofe from the religious fpecies, and
more openly avowed their pretenfions j as carrying
a more plaufible appearance, of being pradicable
in themlclves, as well as ufeful ta human focie-

It muft, indeed, be confefTed, that nature is {o
liberal to mankind, that, were all her prefents
equally divided among the fpecies, and improved
by art and induilry, every individual would enjoy
ail the neceflaries, and even mod of the comforts
of life ; nor would ever be liable to any ills, but
fuch as might accidentally arife from the fickly
frame and conftitution of his body. It muft alfo
be confefled, that, wherever we depart from this
equality, we rob the poor of more fatisfadion than
we add to the rich, and that the flight gratificati-
on of a frivolous vanity, in one individual, fre-
quently cofts more than bread to many families,
and even provinces. It may appear withal, that
the rule of equality, as it would be highly ufe-
ful^ is not altogether impra5iicable ; but has taken
place, at leaft in an imperfed: degree, in fome re-
publics; particularly that of Sparta; where it was
attend, it is laid, with the moft beneficial con-
fequences. Not to mention, that the Agrarian
laws, fo frequently claimed in Rome, and carri-
ed into execution in many Greek cities, proceed-
ed, all of them, from a general idea of the utility^
of this principle.

But hiftorians, and even common fenfe, may in-
form us, that, however fpecious thefe ideas oi fer-
fetf equality may feem, they are really, at bottom,
InfraoJicahle ; and were they not fo, would be ex-
tremely pernicious to human fociety. Render pof-
fefiions ever (o equal, men's dificrent degrees of

art.

Of Justice. 24J

art, care, and induflry will Immediately break that
equality. Or it you check thcfe virtues, you re-
duce fociety to the moft extreme indigence ; and
inftfad of preventing want and beggary in a few,
render it unavoidable to the whole community.
The moft rigorous inquifition too is requifite to
watch every inequality on its firil appearance 5 and
the moft fevere jurifdidion, to punilh and redrefs
it. But befidcs, that ^o much authority muft (oon
degenerate into tyranny, and be exerted with great
partialities ; who can pollibly be poffeiTed of it, in
fuch a fituation as is here fuppofed ? Perfedt equa-
lity of pofteiHons, deftroying all fubordination,
weakens extremely the authority of magiftracy,
and muft reduce ail powernearly to a level, as well
SiS property.

We may conclude, therefore, that, in order to
cftablifti laws tor the regulation of property, we
muft be acquainted with the nature and fituation
of man j muft rejedt appearances, which may be
falfe, though fpecious J and muft fearch for thofe
rules, which arc, on the whoie, moft uf^ful and
beneficial. Vulgar fenfe and llight experience are
fufficient for this purpofe ; when men give not
way to too feinfti avidity, or too exteniive en-
thufi;'.fm.

Who fees not, for inft^nce, that whatever is
produced or improved by a man's art or induftry
ought, for ever, to be fecured to him, in order to
give encouragement to ujeful habits and accom-.
plifliments ? That the property ought alfo to de-
fcend to children and relations, for the fame ujeful
purpofe ? That it may be alienated by confent, in
order to beget that commerce and intercourlc,
which is fo beneficial to human fociety ? And that
all contra(5ls and promifes ought carefully to be ful-
filled, in order to fecure mutual truft and confi-
dence, by which the general interefi of mankind is
lo much proir.cted ?

R a - Examine

i44 SECTION III.

Examine the writers on the laws of nature ; and
you will always find, that, whatever principles they
{tt out with, they are fure to terminate here at lad,
and to afTign, as the ultimate reafon for every rule
which they eftablifh, the convenience and necefli-
ties of mankind. A conceffion thus extorted, in
oppofition to fyflems, has more authority, than if
it had been made in profecution of them.

What other reafon, indeed, could writers ever
give, why this muft be mine and that yours ; fince
uninftrudled nature, furely, never made any fuch
diftindion ? The objedls, which receive thofe ap-
pellations, are, of themfelves, foreign to us j they
are totally disjoined and feparated from us ; and
nothing but the general interells of fociety can
form the connexion.

Sometimes, the interells of fociety may require
a rule of juflice in a particular cafe; but may not
determine any particular rule, among feveral, which
are all equally beneficial. In that cafe, the ilighteft
analogies are laid hold of,- in order to prevent that
indifi^erence and ambiguity, which would be the.
fource of perpetual difl^ention. Thus polTeflion
alone, and firil poirelTion, is fuppofed to convey
property, where no body elfe has any preceding
claim and pretenfion. Many of the reafonings of
lawyers are of this analogical nature, and depend
on very flight connexions of the imagination.

Does any one fcruple, in extraordinary cafes,
to violate all regard to the private property of
individuals, and facrifice to public intereft a dif-
tindion, which had been eftabliflied for the fake
of that intereft ? The fafety of the people is the
fupreme law : All other particular laws are fubor-
dinate to it, and dependant on it: And if, in the
common courfe of things, they be followed and re-
garded ; it is only becaufe the public fafety and in-
tereft commonly demand io equal and impartial an
adminiftration.

Sometimes

Of Justice. 245

Sometimes both utility and analogy fail, and leave
the laws of jufticc in total uncertainty. Thus, it is
highly requifite, that prefcription or long polTeflion
fliould convey property ; but what number of days
or months or years fhould be fufficient for that
purpofe, it is impoflible for reafon alone to deter-
mine. Civil laivs here fupply the place of the na-
tural code, and affign different terms for prefcrip-
tion, according to the different utilities^ propofed
by the legiflator. Bills of exchange and promif-
fory notes, by the laws of moft countries, prefcribe
fooner than bonds, and mortgages, and contrails
of a more formal nature.

In general, we may obferve, that all queftions
of property are fubordinate to the authority of ci •
vil laws, which extend, reftrain, modify, and al-
ter the rules of natural juftice, according to the
particular convenience of each community. The
laws have, or ought to have, a confrant reference
to the conltitution of government, the manners,
the climate, the religion, the commerce, the fitu-
ation of each fociety. A late author of genius,
as well as learning, has profecuted this fubjecl at
large, and has eftablillied, from thef? principles,
a fyftem of political knowledge, which abounds in
ingenious and brilliant thoughts, and is not want-
ing in folidity *.

What is a marHs property ? Any thing, which it
is lawful for him, and for him alone, to ufe
But what rule hp-ve wCj by which we can diftin-
guijh thefe ohje5ls ? Here we muft have recourfe
to ftatutes, cuftoms, precedents, analogies, and a
hundred other circumftances -, fome of which are
conflant and inflexible, fome variable and arbitra-
ry. But the ultimate point, in which they all
profeffedly terminate, is, the intereft and happi-

nefs

t See NOTE [O].

246 SECTION III.

ncfs of human fociety. Where this enters not
into confideration, nothing can appear mofe whiiTi-
fical, unnatural, and even fuperftitio'is, than all
ormoft of the laws ofjuftice and of property.

Thofe, who ridicule vulgar fuperftitions, and
expofe the folly of particular regards to nneats,
days, places, poftures, apparel, have aneafytafkj
while they confider all the qualities and relations
of the objefts, and difcover no adequate caufe
for that affedlion or antipathy, veneration or hor-
ror, which have fo mighty an influence over a
confiderable part of mankind. A Syrian woold
have ftarved rather than tafte pigeon ; an Egyp-
tian woi-.ld not have approached bacon : But if
thefe fpecies of food be examined by the fenfes
of fight, fmell, or tafte, or fcrutinized by the fci-
ences of chymiflry, medicine, or phyfics ; no dif-
ference is ever found between them and any other
fpecies, nor can that precife circumflance be
pitched on, which may afford a juft foundati-
on for the religious pallion. A fowl on Thurf-
day is lawful food ; on Friday abominable : Eggs,
in this houfe, and in this diocefe, are permit-
ted during Lent ; a hundred paces farther, to eat
them is a damnable fm. This earth or building,
yefterday was profane ; to-day, by the muttering
of certain words, it has become holy and facred.
Such reflections as thefe, in the mouth of a phi-
lofopher, one may fafely fay, are too obvious to
have any influence ; becaufe they mud always,
to every man, occur at firft fight ; and where
they prevail not, of themfclves, they are furely
ob{lru6ted by education, prejudice, and paffion,
not by ignorance or miftake.

It may appear to a carelefs view, or rather a
too abftrailed reflexion, that there enters a like
fuperltition into all the fentiments ofjuftice; and
that, if a man expofe its objed, or what we call

property.

%

4

Of Ju STI CE. 247

property, to the fame fcrutiny of fenfe and fcience,
he will not, by the moil accurate enquiry, find
any foundation for the difference m.ide by moral
fentiment. I may lawfully nourifh myfelf from
this tree ; but the fruit of another of tiie fame
fpecies, ten paces oif, it is criminal for me to
touch. Had I worne this apparel an hour ago, 1
had merited the feverell punifhment ; but a man,
by pronouncing a few magical fyllables, has now
rendered it fit for my ufe and fervice. Were this
houfe placed in the neighbouring territory, it had
been immoral for me to dwell m it ; but being
built on this fide the river, it is fubjeft to a dif-^
fercnt municipal law, and, by its becoming mine,
I incur no blame or cenfure. The fame fpecies
of reafoning, it may be thought, which fo fuccefs-
fully expofes fuperftition, is alfo applicable tojuf-
ticej nor is it pofliblc, in the one cafe more than
in the other, to point out, in the object, that pre-
cife quality or circumftance, which is the founda-
tion of the fentiment.

But there is this material difference between
fuperfiition zndjujiice, that the former is frivolous,
ufelefs, and burdenfome ; the latter is abfolutely
requifite to the well-being of mankind and exif-
tence of fociety. When we abftrad from this cir-
cumftance (for it is too apparent ever to be over-
looked) it muft be confeifed, that all regards to
right and property, feem entirely without founda-
tion, as much as the groffeft and moft vulgar fu-
perftition. Were the interefts of fociety nowife
concerned, it is as unintelligible, why another's
articulating certain founds implying confent, ftiould
change the pature of my actions with regard to a
particular objed:, as why the reciting of a liturgy
by a prieft, in a certain habit and pofture, fhould
dedicate a heap of brick and timber, and render it,
thenceforth and for ever, facred *.

Thefc
• See NOTE [U],

248 SECTION III.

Thefe refieftions are far from weakening the
obligations of juflice, or diminifhing any thing
from the moft facred attention to property. On
the contrary, fuch fentiment muft acquire new
force from the prefent reafoning. For the ftron-
ger foundation can be defired or conceived for
any duty, than to obferve, that human fociety,
or even human nature could fubfift, without the
eflablifhment of it^ and will Hill arrive at grea-
ter degree of happinefs and perfedlion, the more
inviolable the regard is, which is paid to that
duty ?

The dilemma feems obvious: As juftlce evi-
dently tends to promote public utility and to
fupport civil fociety, the fentiment of juflice is
either derived from our refleding on that ten-
dency, or like hunger, thirft, and other appe-
tites, refentment, love of life, attachment to off-
fpring, and other paflions, arifes from a funple
original inftincl in the human breaft, which na-
ture has implanted for like falutary purpofes. If
th? latter be the cafe, it follows, that property,
which is the obje6l of juflice, is alfo diflinguifh-
ed by a fimple, original inflin6l, and is not af-
certained by any argument or reflection. But
who is there that ever heard of fuch an inftincl ^
Or is this a fubjeft, in which new difcoveries can
be made? We may as well exped: to difcover,
in the body, new fenfes, which had before ef-
caped the obfervation of all mankind.

But farther, though it feems a very fimple pro-
pofition to fay, that nature, by an inllinftive fen-
timent, diflinguifnes property, yet in reality we
fliall find, that there are required for that pur-
pofe ten thoufand different infliniSts, and thefe em-
ployed about objeds of the greatefl intricacy and
nicefl difcernment. For when a detinition of
■property is required, that relation is found to re-
folye itfelf into any poflefiion acquired by oc-

Qupation,

of Justice. 249

cupation, by induftry, by prefcription, by inhe-
ritance, by contraft, &c. Can we think, that
nature, by an original inftindb, inilruds us in all
thefe methods of acquifition ?

Thcle words too, inheritance and contra^V, ftand
for ideas infinitely complicated; and to define
them exactly, a hundred volumes of laws, and
a thoufand volumes of commentators, have not
been found fufficient. Does nature, whofe in-
ftincts in men are all fimple, embrace fuch com-
plicated and artificial objects, and create a ratio-
nal creature without trufting any thing to the
operation of his reafon ?

But even though all this were admitted, it
would not be fatisfactory. Fofitive laws can cer-
tainly transfer property. Is it by another ori-
ginal inftinct, that we recognize the authority of
kings and fenates, and mark all the boundaries
of their jurifdiction ? Judges too, even though
their fentence be erroneous and illegal, muft be
allowed, for the fake of peace and order, to have
decifive authority, and ultimately to determine
property. Have we original, innate ideas of prae-
tors and chancellors and juries ? Who fees not,
that all thefe inftitutions arife merely from the
neceflities of human fociety ?

All birds of the fame fpecies in every age and
country, build their nefts alike : In this we fee
the force of inftinct. Men, in different times
and places, frame their houfes differently: Here
we perceive the influence of reafon and cuftom,
A like inference may be drawn from compar-
ing the inflincft of generation and the inftituti-*
on of property.

How great foever the variety of municipal laws,
it muft be confeffed, that their chief out-lines
pretty regularly concur j becaufe the purpofes, to
which they tend, are every where exactly fimilar.
In like manner, all houfes have a roof and walls,

windows

150 SECTION III.

windows and chimneys j though diverfified in their
fhape, figure, and materials. The purpofes of the
latter, directed to the conveniencies of human
life, difcovcr not more plainly their origin from
reafon and refleftion, than do thofe of the for-
mer, which point all to a like end.

I need not mention the variations, which all the
rules of property receive from the finer turns and
connexions of the imagination, and from the fub-
tilties and abftraftions of law-topics and reafon-
ings. There is no poflibility of reconciling this
obfcrvation to the notion of original inftinfts.

What alone will beget a doubt concerning the
theory, on which I infift, is the influence of edu-
cation and acquired habits, by which we are fo
accuftomed to blame injuftice, that we are not,
in every inftance, confcious of any immediate re-
flexion on the pernicious confequences of it.
The views the moft familiar to us are apt, for
that very reafon, to efcape us; and what we
have very frequently performed from certain mo-
tives, we are apt likewife to continue mechani-
cally, without recalling, on every occafion, the
reflections, which firft determined us. The con-
venience, or rather necelTity, which leads to juf-
tice, is fo univerfal, and every where points fo
much to the fame rules, that the habit takes place
in all focieties; and it is not without fome fcru-
tiny, that we are able to afcertain its true origin.
The matter, however, is not fo obfcure, but that,
even in common life, we have, every moment,
recourfe to the principal of public utility, and
ailc, PFhat miifi become of the worlds if fuch pra^i^
ces prevail':^ How could fociety fuhfifi under fuch
diforders ? Were the diftinction or feparation of
puildiions entirely ufelefs, can any one conceive,
that it ever fhould have obtained in fociety ?

Thus we feem, upon the whole, to have attained
a knowledge of the force of that principle here in-
fifled on, and can determine what degree of ef-

teem

1

Of J U S T I C E. 251

teem or moral approbation may refult from
refle(flions on public interell and utility. The
neceflity of juftice to the fupport of fociety is the
Sole foundation of that virtue j and fince no mo-
ral excellence is more highly efteemed, we may
conclude, that this circumftance of ufefulnefs has,
in general, the ftrongeft energy, and moft entire
command over our fentiments. It mufl, therefore,
be the fource of a confiderable part of the merit
afcribed to humanity, benevolence, friendfhip,
public fpirit, and other focial virtues of that flamp;
as it is the Sole fource of the moral approbation
paid to fidelity, juftice, veracity, integrity, and
thofe other eftimable and ufeful qualities and
principles. It is entirely agreeable to the rules of
philofophy, and even of common reafon ; where
any principle has been found to have a great force
and energy in one inllance, to afcribe to it a like
energy in all fimilar inftances. This indeed is
Newton's chief rule of philofophizing *.

* Princlpia, lib. iii.

( ^S3 )

S E C T I O N IV.

Of Political Society.

H

AD every man {uPn.cicnt fagacity to perceive,
at all times, that ftrong intereft, which binds him
to the oblervance of juftice and equity, and
Jirength of mind fufficient to perfevere in a fleady
adherence to a general and a diflant intereft, in
oppofition to the allurements of prefent pleafure
and advantage; there had never, in that cafe, been
any fuch thing as government or political foci*
ety, but each man, following his natural liberty,
had lived in entire peace and harmony with all
others. What need of politive law where natu-
ral juftice is, of icfelf, a fufficient reftraint ? Why
create magiftrates, where there never arifes any
diforder or iniquity? Why abridge our native free-
dom, when, in every inftance, the utmoft exerti-
on of it is found innocent and beneficial ? It is
evident, that, if government were totally ufelefs,
it never could have place, and that the Sole
foundation of the duty of Allegiance is the ad-
vaniage, which it procures to fociety, by preferv-
ing peace and order among mankind.

When a number of political focieties are erect-
ed, and maintain a great intercourfe together, a
new fet of rules are immediately difcovered to
be i(/efu I in that particular fituationj and accord-
ingly take place under the title of Laws of
Nations. Of this kind are, the facrednefs of the

perfon

254 SECTION IV.

peifon of ambalTadors, abftaining from poifoned
arms, quarter in war, with others of that kind,
which are plainly calculated for the advantage of
ftates and kingdoms, in their intercourfe with each
other.

The rules of juftice, fuch as prevail among
individuals, are not entirely fufpended among po-
litical focieties. All prince^ pretend a regard to
the rights of other princes ; and fome no doubt,
without hopocrify. Alliances and treaties are
every day made between independent ftates, which
would only be fo much wafte of parchment, if
they were not found, by experience, to have fome
influence and authority. But here is the diffe-
rence between kingdoms and individuals. Hu-
man nature cannot, by any means, fubfift, with-
out the afibciation of individuals; and that af-
fociation never could have place, were no re-
gard (paid to the laws of equity and juftice.
Difordcr, confufion, the war of all againft all,
are the neceflary confequences of fuch a licenti-?
ous condudl. But nations can fubfift Avithout
intercourfe. They may even fubfift, in fome de-
gree, under a general v.*ar. The obfcrvance of
juftice, though ufeful among them, is not guard-
ed by fo ftrong a necefllty as among individu-
als; and the moral obligation holds proportion witli
the ujefulnejs. All poliricians will allow, and moft
philofophers, that Reafons of State may, in par-
ticular emergencies, difpenfe with the rules of juf-
tice, and invalidate any treaty or alliance, where
the ftricl; obfervance of it would be prejudicial,
in a confiderable degree, to either of the con-
tradliing" parties. But nothing lefs than the moft
extreme neceffity, it is confefted, can juftify in-
dividuals in a breach of promife, or an invafi-
on of the properties of others.

In a confederated commonwealth, fuch as the
Achaean republic of old, or the Swifs Cantons

and

Of Political Society. 255

and United Provinces in modern times; as the
league has here a peculiar utiliiy^ the conditions
of union have a peculiar facrcdnefs and autho-
rity, and a violation of them would be regarded
as no Icfs, or even as more criminal, than any
private injury or injuftice.

The long and helplefs infancy of man requires
the combination of parents for the fubfiftence of
their young; and that combination requires the
virtue of Chaftity or fidelity to the married bed.
Without fuch a utility, it will readily be owned,
that fuch a virtue would never have been thought
of*.

An infidelity of this nature is much more
pernicious in women than in men. Hence the laws
of chaftity are much ftrifber over the one fex
than over the other.

Thefe rules have all a reference to generati-
on; and yet women paft child-bearing are no
more fuppofed to be exempted from them than
thofe in the flower of their youth and beauty.
General rules are often extended beyond the prin-
ciple, whence they firft arife; and this in all
matters of tafte and fentiment. It is a vulgar
ftory at Paris, that, during the rage of the Mif-
fiflippij a hump-backed fellow went every day
into the Rue de Quincempoix, where the ftock-
jobbers met in great crowds, and was well paid
for allowing them to make ufe of his hump as
a defk, in order to fign their contrails upon it.
Would the fortune, which he raifed by this ex-
pedient, make him a handfomc fellow; though ic
be confefTed, that perfonal beauty anfes very much
from ideas of utility? The imagination is in-
fluenced by afTociations of ideas; which, though
they arife at hrft from the judgment, are not
eafily altered by every particular exception that
occurs to us. To which we may add, in the

piefent
* See NOTE [X].

^^6 S E C T I O N IV.

prefent cafe of chaftlty, that the example of
the old would be pernicious to the young;
and that women, continually forefeeing that a
certain time would bring them the liberty of
indulgence, would naturally advance that pe-
riod, and think more lightly of this whole du-
ty, fo requifite to fociety.

Thofe who live in the fame family have
fuch frequent opportunities of licence of this
kind, that nothing could preferve purity of
manners, were marriage allowed, among the
neareft relations, or any intercourfe of love be-
tween them ratified by law and cuftom. In-
ceft, therefore, being pernicious in a fuperior de-
gree, has alfo a fuperior turpitude and moral
deformity annexed to it.

What is the reafon, why, by the Athenian
Jaws, one might marry a half-fifter by the fa-
ther» but not by the mother? Plainly this: The
manners of the Athenians were fo referved, that
a man was never permitted to approach the
women's apartment, even in the fame family,
unlefs where he vifited his own mother. His
ftep-mother and her children were as much Ihut
up from him as the women of any other fa-
mily, and there was as little danger of any
criminal correfpondence between them. Uncles
and nieces, for a like reafon, might marry at
Athens : but neither thefe, nor half-brothers and
fillers, could contract that alliance at Rome,
where the intercourfe was more open between
the fexes. Public utility is the caufe of all
thefe variations.

To repeat, to a man's prejudice, any thing
that efcaped him in private converfation, or to
malce any fuch ufe of his private letters, is high-
ly blamed. The free and focial intercourfe of
minds muR be extremely checked, where no
fuch rules of fidelity are ellablifhed.

Even

Of Political Society. 257

Even in repeating flories, whence we can fore-
fee no ill confequences to refult, the giving of
one's author is regarded as a piece of indifcretion,
if not of immorality. Thefe ftories, in pafTing
from hand to hand, and receiving all the ufual
variations, frequently come about to the perfons
concerned, and produce animofities and quarrels
among people, whofe intentions are the moft in-
nocent and inoffenfive.

To pry into fecrets, to open or even read the
letters of others, to play the fpy upon tlieir words
and looks and adlions -, what habits more inconve-
nient in fociety ? What habits, of confequence,
rnore blameable ?

This principle is alfo the foundation of moft of
the laws of good manners -, a kind of lefler mora-
lity, calculated for the eafe of company and con-
verfation. Too much or too little ceremony are
both blamed, and every thing, which promotes
eafe, without an indecent familiarity, is ufeful and
laudable.

Conftancy in friendfhips, attachments, and fa-
miliarities, is commendable^ and is requifite to
fupport truft and good correfpondence in fociety.
But in places of general, though cafual con-
courfe, where the purfuit of health and pleafure
brings people promifcuoufly together, public
conveniency has difpenfed with this maxim -, and
cuftom there promotes an unreferved converfation
for the time, by indulging the privilege of drop-
ping afterwards every indifferent acquaintance,
without breach of civility or good manners.

Even in focieties, which are eftablifhed on
principles the moft immoral, and the moft def-
tructive to the interefts of the general fociety,
there are required certain rules, which a fpecies
of falfe honour, as v/ell as private intereft, en-
gages the members to obferve. Robbers and pi-

VoL. II, S rates.

ciS^ SECTION IV.

rates, it has often been remarked, could not main-
tain their pernicious confederacy, did they not
eftablifh a new diftributive juftice among them-
felves, and recal thofe laws of equity, which they
have violated with the reft of mankind.

I hate a drinking companion, fays the Greek
proverb, who never forgets. The follies of the
laft debauch Ihould be buried in eternal oblivi-
on, in order to give full fcope to the follies of the
next.

Among nations, where an immoral gallantry,
if covered with a thin veil of myftery, is, in fome
degree, authorifed by cuftom, there immediately
arife a fet of rules, calculated for the conveni-
ency of that attachment. The famous court or
parliament of love in Provence formerly decided
all difficult cafes of this nature.

In focietics for play, there are laws required for
the condud of the game j and thefe laws are dif-
ferent in each game. The foundation, I own,
of fuch focieties is frivolous i and the laws are in a
great meafure, though not altogether, capricious
and arbitrary. So far is there a material differ-
ence between them and the rules of juftice, fi-
delity, and loyalty. The general focieties of men
are abfolutely requifite for the fubfiftence of the
fpecies; and the public conveniehcy, which regu-
lates morals, is inviolably eftabliftied in the nature
of man, and of the world, in which he lives.
The comparifon, therefore, in' thefe refpedls, is
very imperfetl. "We may only learn from it the
necefllty of rules, wherever men have any inter-
courfe with each other.

They cannot even pafs each otiier on the road
without rules. Waggoners, coachmen, and pofti-
lions have principles, by which they give the way-;
and thefe are chiefly founded on mutual cale and
convenience. Sometimes alfo they are arbitrary,

at

Of Political Society. 259

at leaft dependant on a kind of capricious analogy,
like many of the reafonings of lawyers *.

To carry the matter farther, we may obferve,
that it is impofTible for men fo much as to murder
each other without ftatutes, and maxims, and an
ideaof juftice and honour. War has its laws as
well as peace -, even that fportive kind of war, car-
ried on among wreftlers, boxers, cudgel-players,
gladiators, is regulated by fixed principles. Com-
mon intereft and utility beget infallibly a flandard
of right and wrong among the parties concern-

• See NOTE [Y],

S 2 SECT-

( 26i )

SECTION V.

Why Utility" pleases.

PART L

XT feems fo natural a thought to afcribe to their
utility the praife, which we beftow on the focial
virtues, that one would expefb to meet with this
principle every where in moral writers, as the
chief foundation of their reafoning and enquiry.
In common life, we may obferve, that the cir-
cumftance of utility is always appealed to ; nor
is it fuppofed, that a greater eulogy can be gi-
ven to any man, than to difplay his ufefulnefs
to the public, and enumerate the fervices, which
he has performed to mankind and fociety. What
praife, even of an inanimate form, if the regularity
and elegance of its parts deftroy not its ficnefs
for any ufeful purpofe ! And how fatisfadtory an
apology for any difproportion or feeming deformi-
ty, if we can fhow the necefllty of that particu-
lar conftrudion for the ufe intended ! A Ihip ap-
pears more beautiful to an artiil, or one mode-
rately fkillcd in navigation, where its prow is wide
and fwelling beyond its poop, than if it were
framed with a precife geometrical regularity, in
contradidion to all the laws of mechanics. A
building, whofe doors and windows were exact
fquares, would hurt the eye by that very propor-
tion ; as ill adapted to the figure of a human

creature.

262 S E C T I O N V.

creature, for whofe fervice the fabric was in-
intended. What wonder then, that a man, whofc
fiabits and condudl are hortfui to fociety, and
dangerous or pernicious to every one who has an
intercourfe with him, fhould, on that account, be
an objedt of difapproba-tion, and communicate to
every Ipeftator the ftrongeft fentiment of difguft
and hatred *.

But perhaps the difBculty of accounting for
thefe effedbs of ufefulnefs, or its contrary, has kept
philofophers from admitting them into their fyf-
tems of ethics, and has induced them rather ta
employ any other principle, in explaining the
origin of moral good and evil. But it is no juft
reafon for rejed:irrg any principl-e, confirmed by
experience, that we cannot give a fatisfaftory ac-
count of its origin, nor are able to rcfolve it in-
to other more general principles. And if we
would employ a little thought on the prefent
fubjedt, we need be at no lofs to account foi*
the influence of utility, and to deduce it from
principles, the moft known and avowed in hu-
man nature.

From the apparent ufefulnefs of the focial vir--
tues', it has readily been inferred by fceptics, both'
ancient and modern, that all moral diftinftions
arife from edacation, and were, at firft, invented,
and afterward encouraged, by the in of politici-
ans, in order to render men tractable, and fub-
due their natural ferocity and felfiilintrs, which
incapacitated them for fociety. This principle^
indeed, of precept and education, nuift lb far be
owned to have a powerful influence, that it may
frequently encreafe or diminilh, beyond their na-
tural ilandard, the fentiments of approbation or
diflikej and may even, in particular inltancesy
create, without any natural principle, a new fenti-
nientof this kind; as is evident in all fuperftitious

practices
* See NOTE [Z].

Why XJ-tiLiTY PLEASES. 263

practices and obfervances : But that all mora!
affection or diflike arifes from this origin, will
never furely be allowed by any judicious en-
quirer. Had nature made no fuch dillin6lion,
founded on the original conftitution of the mind,
the words, honourable^ and Jhameful, lovely, and
odious y noble y and de/picabky had never had place
in any language j nor could politicians, had they
invented thefe terms, ever have been able to
render them intelligible, or make them convey
any idea to the audience. So that nothing can
be more fuperficial than this paradox of the fcep-
tics; and it were well, if, in the abftrufer ftudies
of logic and metaphyfics, we could as eafily ob-
viate the cavils of that feft, as in the praftical and
more intelligible fciences of politics and morals.

The focial virtues muft, therefore, be allowed
to have a natural beauty and amiablenefs, which,
at firil, antecedent to all precept or education,
recommends them to the eiteem of uninftru6ted
mankind, and engages their affeflions. And as
the public utility of thefe virtues is the chief
circumftance, whence they derive their merit, it
follows, that the end, which they have a tendency
to promote, mufb be fome way agreeable to us,
and take hold of fome natural affed:ion. It muft
pleafe, either from confiderations of felf-intereft,
or from more generous motives and regards.

It has often been aflerted, that, as every man
has a ftrong connexion with fociety, and perceives
rhe impoffibility of his folitary fubfiilence, he
becomes, on that account, favourable to all thofe
habits or principles, which promote order in fo-
ciety, and infure to him the quiet poflefTion of
fo ineftimable a blelTing. As much as we value
our own happincfs and welfare, as much muft we
applaud the pradice of juftice and humanity,
by which alone the fgci^l confederacy can be

main-

264 S E C T I O N V.

maintained, and every man reap the fruits of
mutual protedion and afliftance.

This deduction of morals from felf-love, or a
regard to private interefl, is an obvious thought,
and has not arifen wholly from the wanton fallies
and fportive alTaults of the fcepiics. To menti-'
on no others, Polybius, one of the graved and
moft judicious, as well as mod moral writers of
antiquity, has afligned this felfiih origin to all
our fentiments of virtue *. But though the folid,
praftical fenfe of that author, and his averfion to
all vain fubtilties, render his authority on the
prefent fubjedl very confiderable ; yet is not this
an affair to be decided by authority, and the
voice of nature and experience feems plainly to
oppofe the felfiih theory.

We frequently beftow praife on virtuous ani-
ons, performed in very diftant ages and remote
countries; where the utmoft fubtilty of imagina-
tion would not difcover any appearance of felf-
intereft, or find any connexion of our prefent
happinefs and fecurity with events fo widely fe-
parated from us.

A generous, a brave, a noble deed, perform-
ed by an adverfary, commands our approbati-
tion; while in its confequences it may be ac-
knowledged prejudicial to our particular in-
tereit.

When private advantage concurs with general
afFeftion for virtue, we readily perceive and avow
the mixture of thefe diilind fentiments, which
have a very different feeling and influence on
the mind. We praife, perhaps, with more ala- ^
crity, where the generous, humane action con-
tributes to our particular intercft : But the topics
of praife, which we infill on, are very wide of
this circumftance. And we may attempt to bring

over

• Sec NOTE [AA],

Why Utility pleases. 265

over others to our fentiments, without endea-
vouring to convince them, that they reap any
advantage from the aflions which we recommend
to their approbation and applaufe.

Frame the model of a praife-worthy chara6ler,
confiding of all the mofl amiable moral virtues :
Give inltances, in which thefe difplay themfelves
after an eminent and extraordinary manner: You
readily engage the efteem and approbation of all
your audience, who never fo much as enquire in
what age and country the perfon lived, who pof-
fefled thefe noble qualities: A circumftance, how-
ever, of all others, the moft material to felf-love,
or a concern for our own individual happinefs.

Once on a time, a ftatefman, in the fhock and
conteft of parties, prevailed fo far as to procure,
by his eloquence, the baniihment of an able ad-
verfary j whom he fecretly followed, offering him
money for fupport during his exile, and foothing
him with topics of confolation in his misfortunes.
Alas ! cries the banilhed ftatefman, with what re-
gret mujl I leave my friends in this city^ where even
enemies are fo generous! Virtue, though in an ene-
my, here pleafed him: And we alfo give it the juft
tribute of praife and approbation j nor do we re-
traft thefe fentiments, when we hear, that the ac-
tion pafTed at Athens, about two thoufand years
ago, and that the perfons names were Efchines
and Demofthenes.

JVhat is that to me? There are few occafions,
when this quellion is not pertinent : And had it
that univerfal, infallible influence fuppofed, it
would turn into ridicule every compofition, and
almoft every converfation, which contain any
praife or cenfure of men and manners.

It is but a weak fubterfuge, when prefled by
thefe fads and arguments, to fay, that we tranf-
port ourfelves, by the force of imagination, in-
to diftant ages and countries, and confider the

advantage.

a66 S E C T I O N V.

advantage, which we fhould have reaped from
thefe charaflers, had we been contennporaries,
and had any commerce with the perfons. It is
not conceivable, how a real fentiment or pafTi-
on can ever arife from a known imaginary in-
tereft; efpecially when our real intereft is ftill
kept in view, and is often acknowledged to be
entirely diftinft from the imaginary, and even
fometimes oppofite to it.

A man, brought to the brink of a precipice,
cannot look down without trembling; and the
fentiment of imaginary danger aftuates him, in
oppofition to the opinion and belief of real
fafety. But the imagination is here aflifled by
the prefence of a ftriking objeft; and yet pre-
vails not, except it be alfo aided by novelty,
and the unufual appearance of the objeft. Cuf-
tom foon reconciles us to heights and precipi-
ces, and wears off thefe falfe and delufive ter-
rors. The reverfe is obfervable in the eftimates,
which we form of chara6ters and manners j and
the more we habituate ourfelves to an accurate
fcrutiny of morals, the more delicate feeling do
we acquire of the mofl minute diftindtions be-
tween vice and virtue. Such frequent occafion,
indeed, have we, in common life, to pronounce
all kinds of moral determinations, that no objedl
of this kind can be new or unufual to us ; nor
could any falfe views or prepofleflions maintain
their ground againft an experience, fo common
and familiar. Experience being chiefly what
forms the aflbciations of ideas, it is impoflible
that any aflbciation could eitablilli and liipport
itfelf, in diredt oppofition to that principle.

Ufefulnefs is agreeable, and engages our appro-
bation. This is a matter of fa<5t, confirmed by
daily obfervation. But ufeful ? For what ? For fome
body's intereft, furely. Whofe intereft then ? Not
«ur own only : For our approbation frequently ex-
tends

WhyUtility pleases. 267

tends farther. It muft, therefore, be the intereft
of thofe, wfio are ferved by the charader or adti-
on approved of; and thefe we may conclude,
Jiouever remote, are not totally indifferent to us.
By opening up this principle, we fhall difcover one
great fource of moral diftindlions.

PART II.

Self-love is a principle in human nature of fuch
extenfive energy, and the intereft of each indivi-
dual is, in general, fo clofely conneded with that
of the community, that thofe philofophers were
excufable, who fancied, that all our concern for
the public might be refolved into a concern for
our own happinefs and prefervation. They faw
every moment, inftances of approbation or blame,
fatisfadlion or difpleafure towards charaders and
aftions; they denominated the objedts of thefe fen-
timents, virtues or vices; they obferved, that the
former had a tendency to encreafe the happinefs,
and the latter the mifery of mankind; they afked,
whether it were polhble that we could have any
general concern for fociety, or any difinterefted
refentment of the welfare or injury of others; they
found it fimpler to confider all thefe fentiments as
modifications of felf-love ; and they difcovered a
pretence, at leaft, for this unity of principle, in
that clofe union of intereft, which is fo obfervable
between the public and each individual.

But notwithftanding this frequent confufion of
interefts, it is eafy to attain what natural philofo-
phers, after lord Bacon, have alTe<5led to call the
expsrimc'ntum crucisy or that experiment, which
points out the right way in any doubt or ambiguity.
We have found inftances, in which private intereft
was feparate from public j in which it was even
coniriry : And yet v^e obferved the moral fcntiaient
to continue, notwithftanding this disiundlion of

\^ interefts.

268 S E ,C T I O N V.

intcrefts. And wherever thefe diflind: interefts fen-
fibly concurred, we always found a fenfible en-
creafe of the fentimenr, and a more warm affefli-
on to virtue, and deteflation of vice, or what we
properly caWy gratitude and revenge. Compelled
by thefe in fiances, we muft renounce the theory,
which accounts for every moral fentiment by the
principle of felf-love. We muft adopt a more
public affeiflion, and allow, that the interefts of fo-
ciety are not, even on their own account, entire-
ly indifferent to us. Ufefulnefs is only a tendency
to a certain end; and it is a contradiftion in terms,
that any thing pleafes as means to an end, where
the end itfelf no wife affefts us. If ufefulnefs,
therefore, be a fource of moral fentiment, and if
this ufefulnefs be not always confidered with a re-
ference to felf ; it follows, that every thing, which
contributes to the happinefs of fociety, recommends
itfelf diredlly to our approbation and good-will.
Here is a principle, which accounts, in great part,
for the origin of morality : And what need we feek
for abftrufe and remote fyftems, when there occurs
one fo obvious and natural * ?

Have we any difficulty to comprehend the force
of humanity and benevolence ? Or to conceive,
that the very afpeft of happinefs, joy, profperity,
gives pleafure; that of pain, buffering, forrow, com-
municates uneafinefs ? The human countenance,
fays Horace f , borrows fmiles or tears from the hu-
man countenance. Reduce a perfon to folitude,
and he lofes all enjoyment, except either of the
fenfual or fpeculative kind , and that becaufe the
movements of his heart are not forwarded by cor-
refpondent movements in his fellow-creatures. The

fisns

• See NOTE [B B].

f Utl ridentibus arrident, ita flentibus adflcnt
Humani vultus. Hor..

i

Why Utility pleases. 269

figns of forrow and mourning, though arbitrary,
affed us with melancholy j but the natural fymp-
toms, tears and cries and groans, never fail to in-
fufe companion and uneafinefs. And if the effefts
of mifery touch us in fo lively a manner ; can
we be fuppofed altogether infenfible or indif-
ferent towards its caufesj when a malicious or
treacherous character and behaviour are prefented
to us ?

We enter, I fhall fuppofe, into a convenient,
warm, well- contrived apartment: We neceflarily
receive a pleafure from its very furvey ; becaufe
it prefents us with the pleafing ideas of eafe, fa-
tisfa6bion, and enjoyment. The hofpitable, good-
humoured, humane landlord appeal's. This cir-
cumftance furely mull embellifli the whole; nor
can we eafily forbear reflecting, with pleafure,
on the fatisfadion which refults to every one from
his intercourfe and good-offices.

His whole family, by the freedom, eafe, con-
fidence, and calm enjoyment, diffufed over their
countenances, fufficiently exprefs their happinefs,
I have a pleafing fympathy in the profpefl of fo
much joy, and can never confider the fouice of
it, without the moft agreeable emotions.

He tells me, that an opprelTive and powerful
neighbour had attempted to difpofiefs him of his
inheritance, and had long diflurbed all his inno-
cent and focial pleafures. I feel an immediate
indignation arife in me againft: fuch violence and
injury.

But it is no wonder, he adds, that a private
wrong Ihould proceed from a man, who had
enflaved provinces, depopulated cities, and made
the tield and fcaffold ftream with human blood.
I am ftruck with horror at the profped of fo
much mifery, and am aftuated by the ftrongefl
antipathy againfl its author.

In

270 SECTION V.

In general. It is certain, that, wherever we go,
whatever wq refleft on or converfe about, every-
thing ft'ill prefents us with the view of human
happinefs or mifery, and excites in our breaft
a fympathetic movement of pleafure or uneafi-
iiefs. In our ferious occupations, in our care-
lefs amufements, this principle ftill exerts its ac-
tive energy.

A man, who enters the theatre, is immediately
flruck with the view of fo great a multitude,
participating of one common amufement ; and
experiences, from their very afpedl, a fuperior
fenfibility or difpofition of being affefled with
every fentiment, which he lliares with his fellow-
creatures.

He obferves the aflors to be animated by the
appearance of a full audience, and raifed to a de-
gree of enthufiafm, which they cannot command
in any folitary or calm moment.

Every movement of the theatre, by a Ikilful
poet, is communicated, as it were by magic, to
the fpe6tators ; who weep, tremble, refent, rejoice,
and are enflamed with all the variety of paffi-
ons, which actuate the feveral perfonages of the
drama.

Where any event crofles our willies, and in-
terrupts the happinefs of the favourite characters,
we feel a fenfible anxiety and concern. But where
their fufferings proceed from the treachery, cru-
elty, or tyranny of an enemy, our breads are af-
fedled with the Kvelieft refentment againit the au-
thor of thefe calamities.

It is here efteemed contrary to the rules of art
to reprefent any thing cool and indifferent. A
diftant friend, or a confident, who has no imme-
diate intereft in the cataftrophe, ought, if poffible,
to be avoided by the poet ; as communicating
a like indifference to the audience, and checking
the progrefs of the paffions.

Few

/

Why Utility pleases. 271

Few fpecics of poetry are more entertaining than
pajloral ; and every one is fenfible, that the chief
fource of its pleafure arifes from thofe images of
a gentle and tender tranquillity, which it reprefcnts
in its perfonages, and of which it communicates a
like fentiment to the reader. Sannazarius, who
transferred the fcene to the fea-fhore, though he
prefented the mod magnificent obie<5t in nature, is
confefled to have erred in his choice. The idea of
toil, labour, and danger, fuffered by the fifher-
men, is painful ; by an unavoidable fympathy,
which attends every conception of human hap-
pinefs or mifery.

When I was twenty, fays a French poet, Ovid
was my favourite : Now I am forty, I declare for
Horace. We enter, to be fure, more readily into
fentiments, which refemble thofe we feel every
day : But no paflion when well reprefented, can be
entirely indifferent to us ; becaufe there is none,
of which every man has not, within him, at lead
the feeds and firft principles. It is the bufinefs
of poetry to bring every affeftion near to us by
truth and reality: A certain proof, that, wherever
that reality is found, our minds are difpofed to be
ftrongly affefted by it.

Any recent event or piece of news, by which
the fate of dates, provinces, or many individuals
is affefted, is extremely interefting even to thofe
"whofe welfare is not immediately engaged. Such
intelligence is propagated with celerity, heard
with avidity, and enquired into with attention and
concern. The intereft of fociety appears, on this
occafion, to be, in fome degree, the intereft of
each individual. The imagination is fure to be af-
fedled ; though the paflions excited may not always
be fo ftrong and fteady as to have great influence
on the conduct and behaviour.

The

272 SECTION V.

The perufal of a hiftory feems a calm enter-
tainment i but would be no entertainment at all,
did not our hearts beat with correfpondent move-
ments to thofe which are defcribed by the hifto-
rian.

Thucydides and Guicciardin fupport with diffi-
culty our attention ; while the former defcribes
the trivial rencounters of the fmall cities of Greece,
and the latter the harmlefs wars of Pifa. The
few perfons interefted, and the fmall interefl: fill
not the imagination, and engage not the affedli-
ons. The deep diftrefs of the numerous Athe-
nian army before Syracufe ; the danger, which ib
nearly threatens Venice; thefe excite compalTion ;
thefe move terror and anxiety.

The indifferent, uninterefting .ftile of Suetonius,
equally with the mafterly pencil of Tacitus, may
convince us of the cruel depravity of Nero or
Tiberius : But what a differepce of fentiment !
"While the former coldly relates the fafls ; and
the latter fets before our eyes the venerable
figures of a Soranus and a Thrafea, intrepid in
their fate, and only moved by the melting for-
rows of their friends and kindred. What fym-
pathy then touches every human heart ! What
indignation againft the tyrant, whofe caufelefs
fear or unprovoked malice gave rife to fuch de-
teltable barbarity !

If we bring thefe fubjedls nearer : If we remove
all fufpicion of fiftion and deceit: What power-
ful concern is excited, and how much fuperior, in
many inftances, to the narrow attachments of felf-
love and private interefl ! Popular fedition, party
zea^, a devoted obedience to fa6lious leaders; thefe
are ibme of rhe mod vifible, though lefs laudable
efi^ec^s of thisiocial fympathyin human nature.

The ^^rivoloiifnefs of the fubjeft too, we may ob-
ferve, is not'''uieto deta'-h us entirely froin what car-

ries an imageof human fentiment and afi-'ctlion.

When

Why Utility pleases. 273

When a perfon flutters, and pronounces with
difficulty, we even fympathize with this trivial un-
eafinefs, and fuffer for him. And it is a rule in
criticilm, that every combination of iyliables or
letters, which gives pain to the organs of fpcech
in the recital, appears alfo, from a fpecies of fym-
pathy, harfh and difagreeable to the ear. Nay,
when we run over a book with our eye, we are
fenfible of fuch unharmonious compofition; be-
caufe we ftill imagine, that a perfon recites it to us,
and fuiters from the pronunciation of thefe jar-
ring founds. So delicate is our fympathy !

Eafy and unconftrained poftures and motions
are always beautiful : An air of health and vigour
is agreeable: Cloaths which warm, without bur-
thening the body 3 which cover, without impri-
foning the limbs, are well-fafhioned. In every
judgment of beauty, the feelings of the perfon af-
fefted enter into confideration, and communicate
to the fpedlator fimilar touches of pain or plea-^
lure *. What wonder, then, if we can pronounce
no judgment concerning the character and conduft
of men, without confidering the tendencies of
their adiions, and the happinefs or mifery Vv^hich
thence arifes to fociety ? What aflbciation of ideas
would ever operate, were that principle here total-
ly unaclive f.

If any man from a cold infenfibility, or narrow
felfiflinefs of temper, is unaffected with the images
of human happinefs or mifery, he muft be equal-
ly indifferent to the images of vice and virtue :
' Vol. II. T As,

• *' Decentior equus cujus aftricla funt ilia; fed idem ve-
** locior. Pulcher afpcflu fit athlcta, cujus lacertos exercita-
" tio exprelfit ; idem certamini paratior. Nunquam enim
" fpecies ab utilitaie dividitur. Sed hoc quidem difcernere mo-
*' dici judicii elt." Quintilian tail. lib. viii. cap. 3.

+ See NOTE [CC].

274 SECTION V.

As, on the other hand, it is always found, that a
warm concern for the interefls of our fpecies is
attended with a delicate feeling of all moral dif-
tinctions ; a ftrong refentment of injury done to
men ; a lively approbation of their welfare. In
this particular, though great fuperiority is obfer-
vable of one man above another ; yet none are fo
entirely indifferent to the interefl of their fellow-
creatures, as to perceive no diflinftions of moral
good and evil, in confequence of the different ten-
dencies of actions and principles. How, indeed,
can we fuppofe it poffible in any one, who wears a
human heart, that if there be fubjefted to his cen-
fure, one charafler or fyftem of conduft, which is
beneficial, and another, which is pernicious, to his
fpecies or community, he will not fo much as give
a cool preference to the former, or afcribe to it the
fmalleft merit or regard ? Let .us fuppofe fuch a
perfon ever fo felfifh ; let private intereft have in-
grolled ever fo much his attention ; yet in inftan-
ces, where that is not concerned, he mufb una-
voidably feel /ome propenfity to the good of man-
kind, and make it an objeft of choice, if every
thing elfe be equal. Would any man, who is
v/alking along, tread as willingly on another's gou-
ty toes, whom he has no quarrel with, as on the
hard flint and pavement ? There is here furely a
difference in the cafe. We furely take into con-
fideration the happinefs and mifery of others, in
weighing the fcveral motives of aclion, and incline
to the former, where no private regards draw us
to feek our own promotion or advantage by the
injury of our fellow-creatures. And if the prin-
ciples of humanity are capable, in many inftances,
of influencing our aftions, they muft, at all times,
have /c;;z^ authority over our fcntiments, and give
us a general approbation of what is ufeful to focie-
ty, and blame of what is dangerous or pernicious.
The degrees of thefc fcntiments may be the fubjedl

of

Why Utility pleases. I75

of controverfy ; but the reality of their exiftencej
one fliould think, mull be admitted, in every theo-
ry or fyitem.

A creature, abfolutely malicious and fpiteful,
were there any fuch in nature, mult be worie than
indifferent to the images of vice and virtue. All

" his fentiments mud be inverted, and dircftly op-
pofite to thofc, which prevail in the human fpecies.
Whatever contributes to the good of mankind, as
it crolTes the conftant bent of his wifhes and de-
fires, muft produce uneafinefs and difapprobation ;
aad on the contrary, whatever is the fource of dif-
order and mifery in fociety, muft, for the fame
reafon, be regarded with pleafure and complacen-
cy. Timon, who, probably from his affedled
fpleen, more than any inveterate malice, was deno-
minated the man-hater, embraced Alcibiades; with
great fondnefs. Go on^ my boy I cried he, acquire
the confidence of the people : 7'cu will one day, I fore-

fee J be the caufe of great calamities to them* : Could
we admit the two principles of the Manicheans, it
is an infallible confequence, that their fentiments
of human aftions, as well as of every thing elfe,
muft be totally oppofite, and that every inflance of

juftice and humanity, from its neceffary tendency,
muft pleafe the one deity and difpleafe the other.
All mankind fo far refemble the good principle,
that, where intereft or revenge or envy perverts
not our difpofition, we are always inclined, from
our natural philanthropy, to give the preference to
the happinels of fociety, and confequently to vir-
tue, above its oppofite. Abfolute, unprovoked,
difintereftcd malice has never, perhaps, place in
any human breaft; or if it had, muft there per-
vert all the fentiments of morals, as well as the
feelings of humanity. If the cruelty of Nero be
allowed entirely voluntary, and not rather the ef-

T 2 fed

* PtutARCH in vita ALct

276 S E C T I O N V.

feft of conftant fear and refentment ; it is evident,
that Tigellinus, preferably to Seneca or Burrhus,
muft have pofTelTed his fleady and uniform appro-
bation.

A ftatefman or patriot, who ferves our own
country, in our own time, has always a more paf-
fionate regard paid to him, than one whole benefi-
cial influence operated on diftant ages or remote
nations ; where the good, refulting from his ge-
nerous humanity, being lefs connedted with us,
feems more obfcure, and aflfedls us with a lefs
lively fympathy. We may own the merit to be
equally great, though our fentiments are not raif-
ed to an equal height, in both cafes. The judg-
ment here corrects the inequalities of our internal
emotions and perceptions; in like manner, as it
prefer ves us from error, in the feveral variations
of images, prefented to our external fenfes. The
fame objedt, at a double diftance, really throws on
the eye a pidlure of but half the bulkj yet we
imagine that it appears of the fame fize in both
fuuations; becaufe we know, that, on our ap-
proach to it, its image would expand on the eye,
and that the difference confifts not in the objedb it-
felf, but in our pofition with regard to ic. And,
indeed, without fuch a corre(5lion of appearances,
both in internal and external fentiment, men
could never think or talk fteadily on any fub-
jcdt ; while their fluctuating fituations produce a
continual variation on obje6ls, and throw them
into fuch different and contrary lights and pofi-
tions *.

The more we converfe with mankind, and the
greater focial intercourfe we maintain, the more
fhall we be familiarized to thefe general preferen-
ces and diltinclions, without which our converfati-
on and dilcourfe could fcarcely be rendered intelli-

gible

• Sec NOTE [DD].

Why Utility pleases. 277

gible to each other. Every man's intereft is pecu-
liar to himlelf, and the averfions and defires, which
rcAilt from it, cannot be fuppofed to affed others
in a like de^rree. General lano-ua^e, therefore be-
ing formed for general ufe, muft be moulded on
fome more general views, and muft affix the epithets
of praife or blame, in conformity to fentiments,
which arife from the general interefts of the com-
munity. And if thefe fentiments, in moft men,
be not fo ftrong as thofe, which have a reference to
private good ; yet ftill they muft make fome dif-
tindlion, even in perfons the moft depraved and
felfifhi and muft attach the notion of good to a
beneficent condufl, and of evil to the contrary.
Sympathy, we fhall allow, is much fainter than our
concern for ourfelves, and fympathy with perfons
remote from us, much fainter than that with per-
fons near and contiguous; but for this very rea- ■
fon, it is neceffary for us, in our calm judgments
and difcourfe • concerning the characters of men,
to neglect all thefe differences, and render our fen-
timents more public and focial. Befides, that we
ourfelves often change our fituation in this parti-
cular, we every day meet with perfons, who are in
a fituation different from us, and who could never
converfe with us, v/ere we to remain conftantly in
that pofition and point of view, which is peculiar
to ourfelves. The intercourfe of fentiments, there-
fore, in fociety and converfation, makes us form
fome general unalterable ftandard, by which we
may approve or difapprove of characters and man-
ners. And though the heart takes not part en-
tirely with thofe general notions, nor regulates all
its love and hatred, by the univerfal, abftracl dif-
ferences of vice and virtue, without regard to felf,
or the perfons with whom we are more intimately
conne6led ; yet have thefe moral differences acon-
fiderable influence, and being fufficient, at leaft,

for

278 S E C T I O N V.

for difcourfe, ferve all purpofes in company, in the
pulpit, on the theatre, and in the fchools*.

Thus, in whatever light we take this fubjefb, the
merit, afcribed to the focial virtues, appears ftill
uniform, and arifes chiefly from that regard, which
the natural fentiment of benevolence engages us to
pay to the interests of mankind and Ibciety. If we
eonfider the principles of the human make, fuch
as they appear to daily experience and obfervation,
we muil", a prioriy conclude it impolTible for fuch
a creature as man to be totally indiiferent to the
well or ill-being of his fellow-creatures, and not
readily, of himfelf, to pronounce, where nothing
gives him any particular byafs, that what promotes
their happinefs is good, what tends to their mifery
is evil, without any farther regard or confiderati-
on. Here then are the faint rudiments, at leaft,
or out-lines, of a general diftinflion between ac-
tions J and in proportion as the humanity of the
perfon is fuppofcd to encreafe, his connexion with
thofe who are injured or benefited, and his lively
conception of their mifery or happinefs ; his con-
fequent cenfure or approbation acquires proporti-
onable vigour. There is no necefllty, that a ge-
nerous adlion, barely mentioned in an old hiftory
or remote gazette, fhould communicate any ftrong
feelings of applaufe and admiration. Virtue,
placed at fuch a diflance, is like a fixed ftar, which,
though to the eye of reafon, it may appear as lu-
minous as the fun in his meridian, is fo infinitely
removed, as to afic6t the fenfes, neither with light
nor heat. Bring this virtue nearer, by our ac-
quaintance or connexion with the perfons, or even
by an eloquent recital of the cafe^ our hearts are
immediately caught, our fympathy enlivened, and
our cool approbation converted into the warmeft
fentiments of friendihip and regard. Thefe fecm

neceflary

♦ Se€ NOTE [EEJ.

Why Utility pleases. 279

n^ceflary and infallible confequences of the gene-
ral principles of human nature, as difcovered in
common life and pradtice.

Again ; reverfc thefe views and reafonings : Con-
fider the matter h pojhnori ; and weighing the con-
fequences, enquire if the merit of focial virtue be
not, in a great meafure, derived from the feelings
of humanity, with which it affefts the fpeftators.
It appears to be matter of fad, that the circum-
ftance of utility^ in all fubjeds, is a fource of praife
and approbation : That it is conftantly appealed to
in all moral decifions concerning the merit and de-
merit of adions : That it is the folc fource of that
high regard paid to jullice, fidelity, honour, al-
legiance, and chaftity : That it is infeparable from
all the other focial virtues, humanity, gencrofity,
charity, affability, lenity, mercy and moderation :
And, in a word, that it is a foundation of the chief
part of morals, which has a reference to mankind
and our fellow-creatures.

It appears alfo, that, in our general approbation
of charaders and manners, the ufeful tendency of
the focial virtues moves us not by any regards to
felf- inter eft, but has an influence much more uni-
verfal and cxtenfive. It appears, that a tendency
to public good, and to the promoting of peace,
harmony, and order in fociety, does always, by
affeding the benevolent principles of our frame,
engage us on the fide of the focial virtues. And it
appears, as an additional confirmation, that thefe
principles of humanity and fympathy enter fo deep-
ly into all our fentiments, and have fo powerful
an influence, as may enable them to excite the
ftrongeft cenfure and applaufe. The prefent theo-
ry is the fimple refult of all thefe inferences, each
of which feems founded on uniform experience and
obfervation.

Were it doubtful, whether there were any fuch
principle in our nature as humanity or a concern

for

28g S E C T I O N v.

for others, yet when we fee, in nuinberlefs inflan-
ces, that whatever has a tendency to promote the
interefts of fociety, is fo highly approved of, we
ought thence to learn the force of the benevolent
principle ; fince it is impoffible for any thing to
pleafe as means to an end, where the end is total-
ly indifferent. On the other hand, were it doubt-
ful, whether there were, implanted in our nature,
any general principle of moral blame and appro-
bation, yet when v/e fee, in numberlefs inftances,
the influence of humanity, we ought thence to con-
clude, that it is impoilible, but that every thing,
which promotes the interefl of fociety, mufl com-
municate pleafure, and what is pernicious give un-
eafmefs. But when thefe different reflexions and
obfei-vations concur in eflablifhing the fame con-
clufion, muft they not beftow an undifputed evi-
dence upon it?

It is ho ?^ ever hoped, that tlie progrefs of this ar-
gument will bring a farther confirmation of the pre-
fent theory, by Ihowing the rife of other fentiments
of efteem and regard from the fame or like princi-
ples,

S E C-

( 28i )

SECTION VI.

Of Qualities Useful to Ourselves.
PART I.

I

T feems cvicdnt, that where a quality or ha-
bit is fubje6ted to our examination, if it ap-
pear, in any refpedl, prejudicial to the perfon
pofiefled of it, or fuch as incapacitates him for
bufmefs and aftion, it is inftantly blamed, and
ranked among his faults and imperfections. In-
dolence, negligence, want of order and method,
obftinacy, ficklenefs, credulity; thefe qualities
were never efteemed by any one indifferent to
a character; much lefs, extolled as accompli ih-
ments or virtues. The prejudice, refulting from
them, immediately ftrikes our eye, and gives us
the fentiment of pain and difapprobation.

No quality, it is allowed, is abfolutely either
blameable or praife-worrhy. It is all according
to its degree. A due medium, fay the Peri-,
patetics, is the charafleriftic of virtue. But this
medium is chiefly determined by utility. A pro-
per celerity, for inftance, and difpatch in bufi-
nefs, is commendable. When defeftive, no pro-
grefs is ever made in the execution of any pur-
pofe : When excefiive, it engages us in precipi-
tate and ill-concerted meafures and e;iterprifes ;

By

a82 S E C T I O N VI.

By fuch reafonings, we fix the proper and com-
mendable mediocrity in all moral and pruden-
tial difquifitions j and never lofe view of the ad-
vantages, which refult from any character or
habit.

Now as thefe advantages are enjoyed by the
perfon poflefled of the charadter, it can never
be Jelf-hve which renders the profpe6b of them
agreeable to us, the fpeclators, and prompts our
efteem and aprobation. No force of imaginati-
on can convert us into another perfon, and
make us fancy, that we being that perfon, reap
benefit from thofe valuable qualities, which be-
long to him. Or if it did, no celerity of ima-
gination could immediately tranfport us back,
into ourfelves, and make us love and efteem
the perfon, as different from us. Views and fen-
timents, {o oppofite to known truth, and to each
other, could never have place, at the fame time,
in the fame perfon. All fufpicion, therefore, of
felfifli regards, is here totally excluded. It is
a quite different principle, which actuates our
bofom, and interefts us in the felicity of the perfon
whom we contemplate. Where his natural ta-
lents and acquired abilities give us the profpeft
of elevation, advancement, a figure in life, prof-
perous fuccefs, a ftcady command over fortune,
and the connexion of great or advantageous un-
dertakings; we are ftruck with fuch agreeable
images, and feel a complacency and regard im-
mediately arife towards him. The ideas of hap-
pinefs, joy, triumph, profperity, are connected
with every circumftance of his characfler, and
diffufe over our minds a pleafing fentiment of
fympathy and humanity*.

Let us fuppofe a perfon originally framed fo
as to have no manner of concern for his fel-
low-creatures, but to regard the happinefs and

mifery
• See NOTE [FF].

of Qualities Useful to Ourselves. 283

mifery of all fenfible beings with greater indif-
ference than even two contiguous fhades of the
fame colour. Let us fuppofe, if the profperi-
ty of nations were laid on the one hand, and
their ruin on the other, and he were defired to
choofe; that he would (land, like the fchool-
man's afs, irrefolute and undetermined, between
equal motives; or rather, like the fame afs be-
tween two pieces of wood or marble, without
any inclination or propenfity to either fide. The
confequence, I believe, muft be allowed jud, that
fuch a perfon, being abfolutely unconcerned, ei-
ther for the public good of a community or tlie
private utility of others, would look on every
quality, however pernicious, or however benefi-
cial, to fociety, or to its pofTeffor, as on the moll
common and uninterefting objefl.

But if, inflead of this fancied monfter, wc
fuppofe a man to form a judgment or deter-
mination in the cafe, there is to him a plain
foundation of preference, where every thing elfc
is equal ; and however cool his choice may be,
if his heart be felfifh, or if the perfons inte-
refled be remote from himj there mull flill be
a choice or difl:in6lion between what is ufefiil,
and what is pernicious. Now this diilin6lion is
the fame in all its parts, with the moral dijlhic-
sioriy whofe foundation has been fo often, and
fo much in vain, enquired after. The fame en-
dowments of the mind, in every circumftance,
are agreeable to the fentiment of morals and to
that of humanity; the fame temper is fufcepti-
ble of high degrees of the one fentiment and of the
other; and the fame alteration in the objects,
by their nearer approach or by connexions, enli-
vens the one and the other. By all the rules
of philofophy, therefore, v/e muft conclude, that
thefe fentiments are originally the fame; fince,
in each particular, even the moft minute, they

are

284 SECTION VI.

arc governed by the fame laws, and are moved
by the fame objects.

Why do philofophers infer, with the greateft
certainty, that the moon is kept in its orbit by
the fame force of gravity, that makes bodies
fall near the furface of the earth, but becaufe
thefe effed:s are, upon computation, found fimi-
lar and equal ? And mull not this argument
bring as flrong convicftion, in moral as in natu-
ral difquifitions ?

To prove, by any long detail, that all the
qualities, ufeful to the poflefTor, are approved of,
and the contrary cenfured, would be fuperfluous.
The lead reflei^iion on what is every day expe-
rienced in life, will be fufficient. We fhall on-
ly mention a few inftances, in order to remove,
if poffible, all doubt and hefitation.

The quality, the moll neceffary for the execu-
tion of any ufeful enterprife, is Difcretionj by
which we carry on a fafe intercourfe with others,
give due attention to our own and to their cha-
rad:er, weigh each circumftance of the bufinefs
which we undertake, and employ the fureft and
fafeft means for the attainment of any end or
purpofe. To a Cromwell, perhaps, or a De Retz,
difcretion may appear an alderman-like virtue,
as Dr. Swift calls it; and being incompatible
with thofe vafb defigns, to which their courage
and ambition prompted them, it might really,
in them, be a fault or imperfedion. But in the
conduct of ordinary life, no virtue is more re-
quifite, not only to obtain fuccefs, but to avoid
the moft fatal mifcarriages and difappointments.
The greateft parts without it, as obferved by
an elegant writer, may be fatal to their owner;
as Polyphemus, deprived of his eye, was only
the more expofed, on account of his enormous
ftrength and ftature.

The bell charafter, indeed, were it not rather

too

Of Qualities Useful to Ourselves. 285

too perfe6t for human nature, is that which is
not fwayed by temper of any kind; but alter-
nately employs enterprife and caution, as each
is ufeful to the particular purpofe intended.
Such is the excellence which St. Evremond af-
cribes to marefchal Turenne, who difplayed every
campaign, as he grew older, more temerity in
his military enterprifes ; and being now, from
long experience, perfe6lly acquainted with every
incident in war, he advanced with greater firm-
nefs and fecurity, in a road fo well known to
him. Fabius, fays Machiavel, "was cautious ;
Scipio enterprifing : And both fucceeded, be-
caufe the fituation of the Roman affairs, during
the command of each, was peculiarly adapted
to his genius ? but both would have failed, had
thefe fituations been reverfed. He is happy,
whofe circumftances fuit his temper; but he is
more excellent, who can fuit his temper to any
circumftances.

What need is there to difplay the praifes of
Induftry, and to extol its advantages, in the ac-
quifition of power and riches, or in raifing what
we call a fortune in the world ? The tortoife,
according to the fable, by his perfeverance, gain-
ed the race of the hare, though poflefTed of much
fuperior fwifrnefs. A man's time, when well huf-
banded, is like a cultivated field, ofwhichafew
acres produce more of what is ufeful to life,
than extenfive provinces, even of the richcft foil,
when over-run with weeds and brambles.

But all profpe6l of fuccefs in life, or even of
tolerable fubfiftence, mull fail, where a reafon-
able Frugality is wanting. The heap, inftead
of encreafing, diminifhes daily, and leaves its pof-
feflbr fo much more unhappy, as, not having been
able to confine his expences to a large revenue,
he will ftill lefs be able to live contentedly on
a fmall one. The fouls of men, according to

Plato,

286 SECTION VI.

Plato f, inflamed with impure apperites, and
lofing the body, which alone afforded means of
fatisfadlion, hover about the earth, and haunt the
places, where their bodies are depofited; poflef-
fed with a longing defire to recover the loft
organs of fenfation. So may we fee worthlefs
prodigals, having confumed their fortune in wild
debauches, thrufting themfelves into every plen-
tiful table, and every party of pleafure, hated
even by the vicious, and defpifed even by fools.

The one extreme of frugality is avarice^ which,
as it both deprives a man of all ufe of his riches,
and checks hofpitality and every focial enjoy-
ment, is juftly cenfured on a double account.
Prodigality J the other extreme, is commonly more
hurtful to a man himfelf j and each of thefe ex-
tremes is blamed above the other, according to
the temper of the perfon who cenfures, and ac-
cording to his greater or lefs fenfibility to plea-
fure, either focial or fenfual.

Qualities often derive their merit from com-
plicated fources. Honejlyy fidelity, truth, are praif-
cd for their immediate tendency to promote the
intereft of focietyj but after thofe virtues are
once eflablifhed upon this foundation, they are
alfo confidcred as advantageous to the perfon
himfelf, and as the fource of that truft and con-
fidence, which can alone give a man any confi-
deration in life. One becomes contemptible, no
lefs than odious, when he forgets the duty, which,
in this particular, he owes to himfelf as well as
to fociety.

Perhaps, this confideration is one chief fource
of the high blame, which is thrown on any in-
ftance of failure ainong women in point of chaf-
tity. The greateft regard, which can be acquired
by that fex, is derived from their fidelity; and
a woman becomes cheap and vulgar, lofes her

rank,
t Phsdo.

Of Qualities Useful to Ourselves. 287

rank, and is expofed to every infult, who is de-
ficient in this particular. The fmalleft failure
is here fufficient to blaft her character. A fe-
male has lb many opportunities of fecretly in-
dulging thefe appetites, that nothing can give
us fecurity but her abfolute modefty and re-
ferve -, and where a breach is once made, it can
fcarcely ever be fully repaired. If a man be-
have with cowardice on one occafion, a contrary
conduct rcinftates him in his chara6ler. But by
what a(5lion can a woman, whofe behaviour has
once been difTolute, be able to aflure us, that
fhe has formed better refolutions, and has felf-
command enough to carry them into execution ?
All men, it is allowed, are equally defirous
of happinefs; but few are fuccefsful in the pur-
fuit: One confiderable caufe is the want of Strength
of Mind, which might enable them to refift the
temptation of prefent eafe or pleafure, and car-
ry them forward in the fearch of more diftant
profit and enjoyment. Our affeftions, on a ge-
neral profpe6t of their objeds, form certain rules
of condu6t, and certain meafures of preference
of one above another: And thefe decifions, though
really the refult of our calm pafTions and pro-
penfities, (for what elfe can pronounce any ob-
jeft eligible or the contrary ?) are yet faid, by
a natural abufe of terms, to be the determina-
tions of pure reajon and refleftion. But when
fome of thefe objefts approach nearer to us, or
acquire the advantages of favourable lights and
politions, which catch the heart or imagination ;
our general refolutions are frequently confounded,
a fmall enjoyment preferred, and lafting fhame
and forrow entailed upon us. And however
poets may employ their wit and eloquence, in
celebrating prefent pleafure, and rejefting all dif-
tant views to fame, health, or for':iinej it is ob-
vious, that this praflice is the fource of all dif-

folutenefs

288 SECTION VI.

folutunefs and diforder, repentance and mifeiy^
A man of a ftrong and determined temper ad-
heres tenacioufly to his general refolutions, and
is neither feduced by the allurements of pleafure,
nor terrified by the menaces of pain; but keeps
ftill in view thofe diftant purfuits, by which he,
at once, enfures his happinefs and his honour.

Self-fatisfadion, at leaft in fome degree, is an
advantage, which equally attends the Fool and
the Wife Man: But it is the only one; nor is
there any other circumftance in the condud of
life, where they are upon an equal footing. Bu-
finefs, books, converfation ; for all thefe, a fool
is totally incapacitated, and except condemned
by his ftation to the coarfeft drudgery, remains
a ufele/s burden upon the earth. Accordingly,
it is found, that men are extremely jealous of
their charafter in this particular; and many in-
fbances are feen of profligacy and treachery, the
moft avowed and unreferved; none of bearing
patiently the imputation of ignorance and ftu-
pidity. Dicaearchus, the Macedonian general,
who, as Polybius tells us*, openly erefted one
altar to impiety, another to injuftice, in order
to bid defiance to mankind; even he, I am well
aflured, would have ftarted ar the epithet of fooly
and have meditated revenge for fo injurious an
appellation. Except the affection of parents, the
ftrongeft and moil indifibluble bond in nature,
no connexion has Hrength fufTicient to fi.pport
the difgull arifing from this charafter. Love
itfelf, which can fubfift "under treachery, ingra-
titude, malice, and inftwielity, is immediately ex-
tinguifned by it, when perceived and acknow-
ledged ; nor are deformity and old age more fatal
to the dominio"; of that palTion. So dreadful
are the ideas of an utter incapacity for any pur-

pofe

• Lib. xvii. cap, 35.

Of Qualities Useful to Ourselves. 289

pofc or undertaking, and of continued error and
mifcondud in life !

When it is afked, whether a quick or a flow
apprehcnfion be moil valuable ? Whether one,
that, at firfl view, penetrates far into a fubjedl,
but can perform nothing upon ftudyj or a con-
trary charafter, which muft work out every thing
by dint of application? Whether a profound ge-
nius or a fure judgment ? In Ihort, what charaa-
ter, or peculiar turn of underftanding is more
excellent than another ? It is evident, that we can
anfwer none of thefe queftions, without confi-
dering which of thofe qualities capacitates a man
beft for the world, and carries him fartheft in
any undertaking.

If refined fenfe and exalted fenfe be not fo
ujeful as common fenfe, their rarity, their novel-
ty, and the noblenefs of their objects make fome
compenfation, and render them the admiration
of mankind : As gold, though lefs ferviceable
than iron, acquires, from its fcarcity^ a value^
which is much fuperior.

The defeats of judgment can be fupplied by
no art or invention \ but thofe of Memory fre-
quently may, both in bufmefs and in ftudy, by
method and induftry, and by diligence in com-
mitting every thing to writing; and we fcarcely
ever hear a fhort memory given as a reafon for
a man's failure in any undertaking. But in an-
cient time.s, when no man could make a figure
without the talent of fpeaking, and when tlie au-
dience were too delicate to bear fuch crude, un-
digcfted harangues as ogr extemporary orators
offer to public aflemhiies; the faculty of memo-
ry v/as then of the utmoft confequence, and was
accordingly much more valued than at prefcnc.
Scarce any great genius is mentioned in anti-
quity, who is not celebrated for this talent; and

Vol. i\. \j Cicero

290 SECTION VI.

Cicero enumerates it among the other fublimc
qualities of Ca:far himfelf f.

Particular cuftoms and manners alter the ufe-
fulnefs of qualities : They alfo alter their merit.
Particular fituations and accidents have, in fome
degree, the fame influence. He will always be
• mote efteemed, who poflefles thofe talents and
accomplifhments, which fuit his ftation and pro-
feffion, than he whom fortune has mifplaced in
the part which fhe has affigned him. The pri-
vate or felfifli virtues are, in this refpeft, more
arbitrary than the public and focial. In other ref-
peds, they are, perhaps, lefs liable to doubt and
controverfy^

In this kingdom, fuch continued oftentation,
of late years, has prevailed among men in aBive
life with regard to public Jpirit^ and among thofe
in fpectilative with regard to benevolence y and fo
many falfe pretenfions to each have been, no
doubt, dete(5led, that men of the world are apt,
without any bad intention, to difcover a fullen
incredulity on the head of thofe moral endow-
ments, and even fometimes abfolutely to deny their
exiftence and reality. In like manner, 1 find,
that, of old, the perpetual cant of the Stoics and
Cynics concerning virtue, their magnificent pro-
fellions and {lender performances, bred a dif-
guft in mankind; and Lucian, who, though li-
centious with regard to pleafure, is yet, in other
rerpe<51:P, a very moral writer, cannot, fometimes,
talk of virtue, fo much boif^ed, without betray-
ing fymptoms of fpleen and irony*. But furely

this

f Fuit in illo ingenium, ratio, memoria, literas, cura, cogi-
tatio, diJigentia, i5c. Philip. 2.

• A|-:TMVTii«. Xttj a.au-iJi.ci.TA Xtti A)<p«S" /Lii'^axw tm (pcDVif ^nEipotrai.
Luc. I'lMO . Again, Kai av\a.'/ayci\Ti^ {oKfixco-o(f.oi) ivi,eL7ra.Ty-
ia jt'.fipc'.xi* TnrT=»G;oAy!!irpt,AM'TO) ttpi'Tur Tptt>&'je<fn. IcuRO-MSN»
In teiiothcr place, H«-/r >ap eriv m 'a)0M/2fpi'AAJ)T(g.- ctpiTJi. k (ftcri.,-,
xa; s/^rtf/u:?*)), )cai Ti/C"y em-TTi^- atx xcti kda trpap-zwaTo.) »io,«ctTa.
Deor. Coacil.^

Of" Qualities Useful to Ourselves. 291

this peevifh delicacy, whence-ever it arifes, can
never be carried fo far as to make us deny tlie
exiftence of every fpecies of merit, and all dif-
tindlion of manners and beJiaviotir. Befides dij-
cretioUj caution^ enierprijcy indujlry, ajjiduity, fruga-
lity ^ cfcoyiomy^ good-jenje^ prudence y dijcernment \ be-
fides thefe endowments, I fay, whofe very names
force an avowal of their merit, there are many
others, to which the mofl: determined fcepticifm •
cannot, for a moment refufe the tribute of praife
and approbation. 'Temperance^ Johrietyy patience.^
conjiancy^ per/ever ajtce, forethought, confideratenefs,
Jecrecy, order, inftnuation, addrefs, prefence of mind,
quicknefs of conception, facility of exprejjion; thefe,
and a thoufand more of the fame kind, no man
will ever deny to be excellencies and perfections.
As their merit confiils in their tendency to ferve
the perfon, poffefTed of them, without any mag-
nificent claim to public and focial defert, we are
the lefs jealous of their pretenfions, and readily
admit them into the catalogue of laudable qua-
lities. We are not fenfible, that, by this con-
ceflion, we have paved the v/ay for all the other
moral exctllencies, and cannot confidently hefi-
tate anv lono^er, with req;ard to difinterefted be-
nevolence, patriotifm, and humanity.

It feems, indeed, certain, that firft appearances
are here, as ufual, extremely deceitful, and that
it is mere difficult, in a fpeculative way, to re-
folve into felf-love the merit, which we afcribe
to the felfifll virtues above-mentioned, than that
even of the focial virtues, juftice and beneficence.
For this latter purpofe, we need but fay, that
whatever conduft promotes the good of the com-
munity is loved, praifed, and eiteemed by the
community, on account of that utility and inte-
refl, of which every one partakes : And though
this af^cdion and rt-gard be, in reality, gratitude,
not felf-love, yet a dirtinction, even of this ob-

U 2 vious

292 S E C T I O N VI.

vions nature, may not readily be made by fu-
perficial reafonersj and there is room, at lead,
to fupport the cavil and difpute for a moment.
But as qualities, which tend only to the utility
of their pofleflbr, without any reference to us,
or to the community, are yet efteemed and va-
lued i by what theory or fyftem can we account
, for this fentiment from fclf-love, or deduce it
from that favourite origin ? There feems here a
neceflity for confeffing that the happinefs and mi-
fery of others are not fpe<5tacles entirely indiffe-
rent to usi but that the view of the former,
whether in its caufes or effedls, like fun-fhine
or the profpe£t of well-cultivated plains, (to carry
our pretenfions no higher) communicates a fe-
cret joy and fatisfaftion ; the appearance of the
latter, like a lowering cloud or barren landfkip,
throws a melancholy damp over the imagination.
And this conceffion being once made, the diffi-
culty is over J and a natural unforced interpreta-
tion of the phenomena of human life will after-
wards, we may hope, prevail among all fpecula-
live enquirers.

P A R T IL

It may not be improper, in this place, to ex-
amine the influence of bodily endowments, and
of the goods of fortune, over our fentiments of
regard and efteem, and to confider whether thefe
phenomena fortify or weaken the prefent theory.
It will naturally be expefted, that the beauty of
the body, as is fuppofed by all ancient moralifts,
will be fimilar, in fome refpeds, to that of the
mind; and that every kind of efteem, which is
paid to a man, will have fomething fimilar in
its or'gin, whether it arife from his mental en-
dowments, or from the fituation of his exterior
circumftances.

It

Of Qualities Useful to Ourselves. 293

It is evident, that one confiderable fource of
beauty in all animals is the advantage, which,
they reap from the particular ftrudturc of their
limbs and members, fuitably to the particular
manner of life, to which they are by nature def-
tined. The juft proportions of a horfe, defcrib-
ed by Xenophon and Virgil, are the fame, that
are received at this day by our modern jockeys;
becaufe the foundation of them is the fame, name-
ly, experience of what is detrimental or ufefui
in the animal.

Broad fhoulders, a lank belly, firm joints, ta-
per legs; all thefe are beautiful in our fpecies,
becaufe figns of force and vigour. Ideas of utility
and its contrary, though they do not entirely de-
termine what is handfome or deformed, are evi-
dently the fource of a confiderable part of appro-
bation or diflike.

In ancient times, bodily ftrength and dexteri-
ty, being of greater ufe and importance in war,
was alfo much more efteemed and valued, than
at prefent. Not to infill on Homer and the po-
ets, we may obferve, that hiftorians fcruple not
to mention force of body among the other accom-
plifhments even of Epaminondas, whom they ac-
knowledge to be the greateft hero, ftatefman, and
general of all the Greeks*. A like praife is given
to Pompey, one of the greateft of the Romansf.
This iiiftance is fimilar to what we obferved
above, with regard to memory.

What derifion and contempt, with both fexes,
attend impotence -, while the unhappy object is re-
garded as one deprived of fo capital a pleafure
in life, and at the fair*e time, as difabled from
communicating it to others, Barrennefs in wo-
men,

* See NOTE [GG].

f Cum alacrihus, faltu ; cu7ti njdocihiis, curfu ; cnr^ valid}:
reSt ceriahat, Sali.u«t apud Vecet.

294 SECTION VI.

men, being alfo a fpecies of inutility^ is a re-
proach, but not in the fame degree : of which
the reafon is obvious, according to the prefent
theory.

There is no rule in painting or ftatuary more
indifpenfible than that of balancing the figures,
and placing them with the grateft exaftnefs on
their proper center of gravity. A figure, which
is not jullly balanced, is ugly; becaufe it con-
veys the difagreeable ideas of fall, harm, and
pain*.

A difpofition or turn of mind, which qualifies
a man to rife in the world, and advance his for-
tune, is entitled to efteem and regard, as has
already been explained. It may therefore, natu-
rally be fuppofed, that the atlual pofielfion of
riches and authority will have a confiderable in-
fluence over thefe fentiments.

Let us examine any hypothefis, by which we
can account for the regard paid to the rich and
powerful: We Ihall nnd none fatisfadory, but
that which derives it from the enjoyment com-
municated to the fpeclator by the images of prof-
perity, happinefs, cafe, plenty, authority, and the
gratification of every appetite. Self-love, tor in-
ftance, which fome affedt fo much to confider as
the fource of every fenciment, is plamly infuf-
ficient for this purpofc. Where no good-will or
friendfhip appears, it is difficult to conceive on
what we can found our hope of advantage from
the riches of others; though we naturally ref-
pett the rich, even before they difcover any fuch
favourable difpofition towards us.

We are aff^ected witli the fame fentiments, when
we lie fo much out of the fphere of their acti-
vity, that they cannot even be fuppofed to pof-
fefs the power of fcrving us. A prifoner of war,
in all civilized nations, is treated with a regard

fuited
t Sec NOTE [HH].

or Qualities Useful to Ourselves. 295

luitcd to his condition; and riches, it is evident,
go far towards fixing the condition of any per-
fon. l( birth and quality enter for a fliare, this
flill affords us an argument to our prefent pur-
pofe. For what is it we call a man of birth,
but one who is defcended from a long fuccef-
fion of rich and powerful anceftors, and who ac-
quires our efleem by his connexion with perfons
whom we efteem ? His anceftors, therefore, though
dead, are refpecled, in fome meafure, on account
of their riches ; and confequently, without any
kind of expectation.

But not to go fo far as prifoners of war or the
dead, to find inftances of this difinterefted regard
for riches; we may only obferve, with a little
attention, thofe phenomena, which occur in com-
mon life and converfation. A man, who is him-
felf, we fhall fuppole, of a competent fortune,
and of no profefnon, being introduced to a com-
pany of ftrangers, naturally treats them with dif-
ferenr degrees of refpecl, as he is informed of
their different fortunes and conditions; though it
is impoffible that he can fo fuddenly propofe, and
perhaps he would not accept of, any pecuniary
advantage from them. A traveller is always ad-
mitted into company, and meets with civility,
in proportion as his train and equipage Ipeak him
a man of great or moderate fortune. In fhort,
the different ranks of men are, in a great mea-
fure, regulated by riches ; and that with regard
to fuperiors as well as inferiors, ftrangers as well
as acquaintancT.

What remains, therefore, but to conclude, that,
as riches are defired for ourlelves only as the
means of gratifying our appetites, either ac pre-
lent or in fome imaginary future period ; they
beget efteem in others merely from their having
that influence. This indeed is their very nature
or effencc : They have a direct reference to the

commodities,

296 S E C T I O N VI.

commodities, conveniencies, and pleafures of life.
The bill of a banker, who is broke, or gold in
a defart ifland, would otherwife be full as valu-
able. When we approach a man, who is, as
we fay, at his eafe, we are prefented with the
pleafing ideas of plenty, fatisfadlion, cleanlinefs,
warmth j a chearful houfe, elegant furniture, ready
fervice, and whatever is defirable in meat, drink,
or apparel. On the contrary, when a poor man
appears, the difagreeable images of want, penu-
ry, hard labour, dirty furniture, coarfe or ragged
cloarhs, naufeous meat and diftafteful liquor, im-
mediately ftrike our fancy. What elfe do we mean
by faying that one is rich, the other poor ? And
as regard or contempt is the natural confequence
of thofe different fituations in life; it is ealily {ten
what additional light and evidence this throws on
our preceding theory, with regard to all moral
diftintlions*.

A man, who has cured himfelf of all ridiculous
prepofleffions, and is fully, fincerely, and fteadily
convinced, from experience as well as philofophy,
that the difference of fortune makes lefs difference
in happinefs than is vulgarly imagined ; fuch a one
does not meafure out deerrees of efteem accordino-
to the rent rolls of his acquaintance. He may, in-
deed, externally pay a fuperior deference to the
great lord above the vaffai ; becaufe riches are the
moft convenient, being the mod fixed and deter-
minate, fource of diflindion : But his internal {en-
timents are more regulated by the perfonal charac-
ters of men, than by the accidental and capricious
favours of fortune.

In moft countries of Europe, family, that is, he-
reditary riciies, marked with titles and fymbolsfrom
the fovereign, is the chief fource of diilintlion. In
England, more regard is paid to prefent opulence
and plenty. Each praftice has its advantages and

difadvantagcs.
♦ See NOTE [II].

of Qualities Useful to Ourselves. 297

difad vantages. Where birth is refpected, unactive,
fpiritlefs minds rennain in haughty indolence, and
dream of nothing but pedigrees and genealogies:
The generous and ambitious feek honour ind autho-
rity and reputation and favour. Where riches are the
chief idol, corruption, vendity, ripine prevail :
Arts, manufactures, comm..rce, agriculture flou-
rifh. The former prejudice, being favourable to
military virtue, is more fuited to monarchies. The
latter, being the chief fpur to induftry, agrees bet-
ter with a republican government. And vve accord-
ingly find, that t'^ch of thei forms of government,
by varying the uiiiify of thofe culloms, has com-
monly a proportionable effect on the fentiments of
mankind.

SECTION

( 299 )

SECTION VIL

Of QUjVLITIES IMMEDIATELY AGREEABLE tO

OURSELVES.

VV HOEVER has pafTed an evening with ferl-
ous melancholy people, and has obferved how
fuddenly the converfation was animated, and
what fprightlinefs diffufed itfelf over the coun-
tenance, difcourfe, and behaviour of every one,
on the acceflion of a good-humoured, lively
companion ; fuch a one will eafily allow, that
Chearfulnefs carries great merit with it, and na-
turally conciliates the good-will of mankind. No
quality, indeed, more readily communicates it-
felf to all around; becaufe no one has a great-
er propenfity to difplay itfelf, in jovial talk and
pleafant entertainment. The flame fpreads through
the whole circle -, and the moft fullen and mo-
rofe are often caught by it. That the melan-
choly hate the merry, even though Horace fays
it, I have fome difficulty to allow ; becaufe I have
always obferved, that, where the jollity is mode-
rate and decent, ferious people are fo much the
more delighted, as it diffipates the gloom, with
which they are commonly opprefled : and gives
them an unufual enjoyment.

From this influence of chearfulnefs, both to
communicate itfelf, and to engage approbation,
we may perceive, that there is another fet of
mental qualities, Mhich, without any utility or

any

^oo SECTION VII.

any tendency to farther good, either of the com-
munity or of the polTefTor, difFufe a fatisfa6tion
on the beholders, and procure friendfhip and re-
gard. Their imnnediate fenfation, to the perfon
pofTefled of them, is agreeable : Others enter in-
to the fame humour, and catch the fentiment,
by a contagion or natural fympathy : And as wc
cannot forbear loving whatever pleafes, a kindly
emotion arifes towards the perfon, who commu-
nicates fo much fatisfadlion. He is a more ani-
mating fpeftacle : His prefence difFufes over us
more ferene complacency and enjoyment : Our
imagination, entering into his feelings and difpo-
fition, is affeded in a more agreeable manner,
than if a melancholy, dejeded, fullen, anxious
temper were prefented to us. Hence the affec-
tion and approbation, which attend the former;
The averfion and difguft, with which we regard
the latter *.

Few men would envy the character, which Cas-
far gives of CafTius,

He loves no play.
As thou do'ft, Anthony: He hears nomufic:
Seldom he fmiles -, and fmiles in fuch a fort.
As if he mock'd himfelf, and fcorn'd his fpirit
That could be mov'd to fmile at any thing.

Not only fuch men, as Csefar adds, are common-
ly dangerous, but alfo, having little enjoyment
within themfelves, they can never become agree-
able to others, or contribute to focial entertain-
ment. In all polite nations and ages, a relifh
for pleafure, if accompanied with temperance and
decency, is efteemed a confiderable merit, even
in the greateft men -, and becomes ftill more re-
quifite in thofe of inferior rank and character.
It is an agreeable reprefentation, which a French

writer

• See NOTE [KK].

0/Qu AL 1 Ti ES immediately agreeable to Our/elves, 30 1

■writer gives of the fituation of his own mind in
this particular, Firtue, I love^ fays he, without
aujlerity : Pleajure^ without effeminacy : And life,
without fearing its end *.

Who is not ftruck with any fignal inftance of
Greatnefs of Mind or Dignity of Charadler; with
elevation of fentimcnt, difdain of flavery, and with
that noble pride and fpirit, which arifes from
confcious virtue ? The fublime, fays Longinus, is
often nothing but the echo or image of magnani-
mity i and where this quality appears in any one,
even though a fyllable be not uttered, it excites
our applaufe and admiration ; as may be obferv-
ed of the famous filence of Ajax in the Odyfley,
which exprefles more noble difdain and refolute
indignation, than any language can convey f.

Were I Alexander, faid Parmenio, / would ac-
cept of thefe offers made by Darius. So would I too,
replied Alexander, were I Parmenio, This faying
is admirable, fays Longinus, from a like princi-

Go ! cries the fame hero to his foldiers, when
they refufed to follow him to the Indies, go tell
your countrymen, that you left Alexander compleating
the conquefl of the world. " Alexander,'* faid the
Prince of Conde, who always admired this paf-
fage, " abandoned by his foldiers, among Barba-
" rians, not yet fully fubdued, felt in himfelf fuch
" a dignity and right of empire, that he could not
" believe it pofiible, that any one would refufe to
" obey him. Wheiher in Europe or in Afia, a-
" mong Greeks or Perfians, all was indifferent to
" him : Wherever he found men, he fancied he
«' ihould find fubjeds."

The

• *' J*aime la vertu, fansrudefTe;
" J'ainie le plaifir, fans mole/Te;
*' J 'dime la vie, & n'en crains point la fin."

St. EVREMOND.

t Cap. 9, X Idem.

302 SECTION VIL

The confident of Medea in the tragedy recom-
mends caution and fubmillion ; and enumerating
all the diflrefles of that unfortunate heroine, afks
her, what fhe has to fupport her againft her nu-
merous and implacable enemies. My/elf^ replies
fhe; My/elf, IJay^ and it is enough. Boileaujuft-
ly recommends this palTage as an inftance of true
^ublime *.

When Phocion, the modeft, the gentle Phocion,
was led to execution, he turned to one of his fel-
low-fufferers, who was lamenting his own h ad
fate. Is it not glory enough for yoUy fays he, that
you die with Phocion f ?

Place in oppofition the picture, which Tacitus
draws of Vitellius, fallen from empire, prolong-
ing his ignominy from a wretched love of life,
delivered over to the mercilefs rabble j tofled,
buffeted, and kicked about ; conftrained, by their
holding a poniard under his chin, to raife his head,
and expofe himfelf to every contumely. What
abjcdt infamy! What low humiliation! Yet even
here, fays the hiftorian, he difcovered feme fymp-
toms of a mind not wholly degenerate. To a tri-
bune, who infulted him, he replied, I am Jiill your
emperor X.

We never excufe the abfolute want of fpirit and
dignity of chara6ler, or a proper fenfe of what is
due to one's felf, in fociety and the common inrer-
courfe of life. This vice conftitutes what we pro-
perly call meannejs\ when a man can fubmit to the
bafefl flavery, in order to gain his ends ; fawn up-
on thofe who abufe him \ and degrade himfelf by
intimacies and familiarities with undeferving infe-
riors. A certain degree of generous pride or felf-
value is fo requifite, that the abfcnce of it in the
mind difpleafes, after the fame manner as the

want

* Refleftion lofurLongin. f Plutarch in Phoc.

X Sec NOTE [LL]

«f

0/ Qualities immediately agreeable to Our/elves. 30J

want of a nofe, eye, or any of the mod material
feature of the face or member of the body*.

The utility of Courage, both to the public and
to the perfon pofTelTed of it, is an obvious foun-
dation of merit : But to any one who duly confi-
ders of the matter, it will appear, that this qua-
lity has a peculiar lufte, which it derives wholly
from irfelf, and from that noble elevation infepa-
rable from it. Its figure, drawn by painters and
by poets, difplays, in each feature, a fublimity
and daring confidence ; which catches the eye,
engages the affe<5lions, and difiufes, by fympa-
thy, a like fublimity of fentiment over every fpec-
tator.

Under what fhining colours does Demofthenesf
reprefent Philip ; where the orator apologizes for
his own adminiltration, and juftifies that pertina-
cious love of liberty, with which he had infpired
the Athenians. " 1 beheld Philip,'* fays he, " he
with whom was your contefl:, refolutely, while
in purfuit of empire and dominion, expofing
himlelf to every wound ; his eye goared, his
neck wrefted, his arm, his thigh pierced, what-
ever part of his body fortune fhould feize on, that
cheerfully relinquifliing; provided that, with
what remained, he might live in honour and
renown. And fliall it be faid, that he, born
in Pella, a place heretofore mean and ignoble,
fhould be infpired with fo high an ambition
and third of fame : While you, Athenians,
(iff." Thefc praifes excite the moft lively ad-
miration ; but the views prefented by the ora-
tor, carry us not, we fee, beyond the hero him-
felf, nor ever regard the future advantageous con-
fequences of his valour.

The martial temper of the Romans, inflamed
hv continual wars, had raifed their efleem of

• See NOTE [MM],
f Pro corona.

;504 SECTION VII.

courage fo high, that, in thtir language, it was
called virfuej by way of excellence and of dif-
tindlion from all other moral qualities. The Suevi,
in the opinion of Tacitus f, drejfed their hair wiih a
laudable intent: Not for the purpoje of loving
or being loved: They adorned themf elves only for
their enemies^ and in order to appear more terri-
ble. A fentiment of the hiftorian, which would
found a little oddly in other nations and other
ages.

The Scythians, according to Herodotus J, after
fcalping their enemies, drefled their fkin like lea-
ther, and ufed it as a towel ; and whoever had
the moft of thofe towels was moft efteemed among
them. So much had martial bravery, in that na-
tion, as well as in many others, deflroyed the fen-
timents of humanity j a virtue furely much more
ufeful and engaging.

It is indeed obfervable, that, among all un-
cultivated nations, who have not, as yet, had full
experience of the advantages attending benefi-
cence, juftice, and the fecial virtues, courage is
the predominant excellence; what is moft cele-
brated by poets, recommended by parents and
inftrudtors, and admired by the public in gene-
ral. The ethics of Homer are, in this particular,
very different from thofe of Fenelon, his elegant
imitator J and fuch as were well fuited to an age,
when one hero, as remarked by Thucydides ||,
could afk another, without offence, whether he
were a robber or not. Such alfo, very lately, was
the fyftem of ethics, which prevailed in many
barbarous parts of Ireland ; if we may credit Spen-
cer, in his judicious account of the ftatc of that
kingdom §.

Of

f De moribus Germ. % Lib. iv. [( Lib. i.

§ It is a common ufe, fays he, amongft their gentlemen's fons,

thut.

0/ Qualities immediately agreeable to Ourfehes. 305

Of the fame clafs of virtues with cpurage is
that undiftiirbed philofophical Tranquillity, fu-
perior to pain, forrow, anxiety, and each aflault
of adverfe fortune. Confcious of his own virtue,
fay the philofophers, the fage elevates himfelf
above every accident of life; and fecurely placed
in the temple of wifdom, looks down on infe-
rior mortals, engaged in purfuit of honours, riches,
reputation, and every frivolous enjoyment. Thefe
pretenfions, no doubt, when ftretched to the ut-
moft, are, by far, too magnificent for human na-
ture. They carry, however, a grandeur with
them, which feizes the fpeftator, and ftrikes him
with admiration. And the nearer we can ap-
proach in practice, to this fublime tranquillity
and indifference (for we muft diftinguifh it from
a ftupid infenfibility) the more fecure enjoy-
ment fliall we attain within ourfelves, and the
iTJore greatnefs of mind fliall we difcover to the
world. The philofophical tranquillity may, in-
deed, be confidered only as a branch of magna-
nimity.

Vvlio admires not Socrates; his perpetual fe-
renity and contentment, amidfl the greateft po-
verty and domeftic vexations ; his refolute con-
tempt of riches, and his magnanimous care of
preferving liberty, while he refufed all afliftance
from his friends and difciples, and avoided even
the dependence of an obligation ? Epifletus had
not fo much as a door to his little houfe or ho-
vel ; and therefore, foon loft his iron lamp, the
only furniture which he had worth taking. But

Vol. II. X refolving

that, as foon as they are able to ufe their weapons, they ftrait ga-
ther to themfelves three or four ftraggles or kern, with whom
wandering a while up and down idly the country, taking only
meat, he at lall falleih into fome bad occafion, that Ihail be
ofTered ; which being cnce made known, he is thenceforth count-
ed a man of worth, in whom there is courage.

jo6 SECTION VII.

refolving to difappoint all robbers for the future^;
he fuppiied its place with an earthen lamp, of
which he very peaceably kept pofTefilon ever
after.

Among the ancients, the heroes in philofophy^
as well as thofe in war and patriotifm, have a
grandeur and force of fentiment, which aflonifhes
Gur narrow fouls, and is raflily rejected as extra-
vagant and fupernarural. They, in their turn, I
allow, would have had equal reafon to confider
as romantic and incredible, the degree of huma-
nity, clemency, order, tranquillity, and other fo-
cial virtues, to which, in the adminiftration of
government, we have attained in modern times,
had any been then able to have made a fair re-
prefentation of them. Such is the compenfa-
tion, which nature, or rather education, has
made in the diftribution of excellencies and vir-
tues, in thofe different ages.

The merit of Benevolence, arifing from its
utility, and its tendency to promote the good
of mankind, has been already explained, and is,
no doubt, the fource of a confiderable part of that
efteem, which is fo univerfally paid to it. But
it will alfo be allowed, that the verv ioftnefs and
tendernefs of the fentiment, its engaging endear-
ments, its fond exprelfions, its delicate attenti-
ons, and all that flow of mutual confidence and
regard, which enters into a warm attachment of
love and friendfhip : It will be allowed, I fay,
that thefe feelings, being delightful in themfelves,
are neceffarily communicated to the fpeftators,
and melt them into the fame fondncfs and de-
licacy. The tear naturally ftarts in our eye on
the apprehenfion of a warm fentiment of this na-
ture : Our breall heaves, our heart is agitated, and
every humane tender principle of our frame is fee
in motion, and gives us the pureft and moll: fa-
risfadory enjoyment.

When

0/ Qualities immediately agreeable to Our/elves. 307

When poets form defcriptions of Elyfian fields,
where the blefled inhabitants ftand in no need
of each other's affiftance, they yet reprefent them
as maintaininc^ a conflant intercourfe of love
and friendfhip, and footh our fancy with the
pleafing image of thefe foft and gentle paflions.
The idea of tender tranquillity in a paftoral
Arcadia is agreeable fiom a like principle, as has
been obferved above *.

Who would live amidfl: perpetual wrangling,
and fcolding, and mutual reproaches ? The
roughnefs and harfhnefs of thefe emotions dif-
turb and difpleafe us ; We fuffer by contagion
and fympathy j nor can we remain indifferent
fpedtators, even though certain, that no pernici-
ous confequences would ever follow from fuch
angry paflions.

As a certain proof, that the whole merit of be-
nevolence is not derived from its ufefulnefs, we
may obferve, that, in a kind way of blame, we
fay, a perfon is too good; when he exceeds his
part in fociety, and carries his attention for o-
thers beyond the propor bounds. In like man-
ner, we fay a man is too higb-fpiritedy too intrepid,
too indifferent about fortune : Reproaches, whicli
really, at bottom, imply more efteem than many
panegyrics. Being accuftomed to rate the merit
and demerit of characters chiefly by their ufeful
or pernicious tendencies, we cannot forbear ap-
plying the epithet of blame, when we difcover a
fentiment, which rifes to a degree, that is hurtful :
But it may happen, at the fame time, that its no-
ble elevation, or its engaging tendcrnefs fo feizes
the heart, as rather to encreafe our friendfliip
and concern for the perfon f .

X 2 The

* Sea. V. Part 2.

t Cheerfulnefs could fcarce admit of blame from its excefs,

were

jo8 SECTION VII.

The amours and .. attachments of Harry the
IVth of France, during the civil wars of the
league, frequently hurt his interell and his caufej
but all the young, at leall, and amorous, who
can fympathize with the tender paflions, will al-
low, that this very weaknefs (for they will rea-
dily call it fuch) chiefly endears that hero, and
interefts them in his fortunes.

The excefiive bravery and refolute inflexibili-
ty of Charles the Xllth ruined his own coun-
try, and infefted all his neighbours; but have
fuch fplendour and greatnefs in their appear-
ance, as ftrike us with admiration j and they
might, in fome degree, be even approved of,
if they betrayed not fometimes too evident fymp-
toms of madnefs and diforder.

The Athenians pretended to the firft inventi-
on of agriculture and of laws ; and always va-
lued themfelves extremely on the benefit there-
by procured to the whole race of mankind.
They alfo boafl:ed, and with reafon, of their war-
like enterprizes; particularly againfl: thofe innu-
merable fleets and armies of Perfians, which
invaded Greece during the reigns of Darius and
Xerxes. But though there be no comparifon,
in point of utility, between thefe peaceful and
military honours j yet we find, that the orators,
who have writ fuch elaborate panegyrics on
that famous city, have chiefly triumphed in dif-
playing the warlike atchievements. Lyfias, Thu-
cydides, Plato, and Ifocrates difcover, all of them,
the fame partiality -, which, though condemned
by calm reafon and refledion, appears fo natu-
ral in the mind of man.

It

were It not that difToIute mirtli, without a proper caufe or
fuhjetfl:, is a fiire fymptom and chnrafleriftic ot folJy, and on
that account difguftful.

O/QiTALiTiES immediately agreeable to Qurfehes. 309

It is obfervable, that the great charm of poe-
try confifts in lively pidiires of the fiiblime paf-
fions, magnanimity, courage, difdain of fortune;
or tjiofe of the tender affecl:ions, love and friend-
ship; which warm the heart, and difFufe over it
fimilar fentiments and emotions. And though
all kinds of paflion, even the moft difagreeable,
fuch as grief and anger, are obferved, when ex-
cited by poetry, to convey a fatisfaftion, from
a mechanifm of nature, not eafy to be explain-
ed: Yet thofe more elevated or fofter affedions
have a peculiar influence, and pleafe from more
than one caufe or principle. Not to mention,
that they alone intereft us in the fortune of the
perfons reprefented, or communicate any efleem
and afFeeftion for their character.

And can it pollibly be doubted, that this ta-
lent itfelf of poets, to move the pafTions, this
Pathetic and Sublime of fentiment, is a very con-
fidcrable merit ; and being enhanced by its ex-
treme rarity, may exalt the perfon poflelTed of
it, above every character of the age in which he
lives ? The prudence, addrefs, fleadinefs, and
benign government of Auguftus, adorned with all
the fplendour of his noble birth and imperial
crown, render him but an unequal competitor
for fame with Virgil, who lays nothing into the
oppofite fcale but the divine beauties of his poe-
tical genius.

The very fenfibility to thefe beauties, or a De-
licacy of tafte, is itfelf a beauty in any charafler;
as conveying the pureft, the moft durable, and
moft innocent of all enjoyments.

Thefe are fome inftances of the fcveral fpecies
of merit, that are valued for the immediate plea-
fure, which they communicate to the perfon pof-
fefted of them. No views of utility or of fu-
ture beneficial confequcnces enter into this fenti-
ment.

JIO

SECTION vir.

ment of approbation; yet is it of a kind fimi-
lar to that other fentiment, which arifes from
views of a public or private utility. The fame
focial fympathy, we may obferve, or fellow-feel-
ing with human happinefs or mifery, gives rife
to both ; and this analogy, in all the parts of
the prefent theory, may juftly be regarded as a
confirmation of it.

SECT-

[ 311 ]

SECTION VIII.

Of Qualities immediately agreeable
to Others*.

A

S the mutual fhocks, \n fociety, and the op-
pofitions of intereft and felf-love have conftrain-
ed mankind to eftablifh the laws o( jujlice y in or-
der to preferve the advantages of mutual afTiftance
and protection ; In like manner, the eternal con-
trarieties, in compmiy^ of men's pride and felf-
conceit, have introduced the rules of Good-Man-
ners or Politenefs; in order to facilitate the inter-
courfe of minds and an undifturbed commerce and
converfation. Among well-bred people, a mutual
deference is affected : Contempt of others difguif-
ed : Authority concealed : Attention given to each
in his turn : And an eafy dream of converfation
maintained, without vehemence, without interrup-
tion, without eagernefs for viftory, and without
any airs of fuperiority. Thefe attentions and re-
gards are immediately agreeable to others, abilract-

ed

* It is the nature, and, indeed, the definition of virtue, that
It IS ^ quality of the mind agreeable to or approved of by enjery one,
avho conjiders or contetfiplates it. But feme qunlitie. ^jroduce
pleafure, becaufe they :.re ufeful to fociety, or ufeful or agree-
able to the perfon himieir ; other'; produce it more imn-.ediateiy:
Which is the cafe with the clafs of virtues here confidered.

312 SECTION VIII.

ed from any confideration of utility or beneficial
tenilcncies : They conciliate affedtion, promote
eRccm, and extremely enhance the merit of the
perfon, who regulates his behaviour by them.

Many of the forms of breeding are arbitrary and
cafual ; But the thing expreiTed by them is ftill the
fame. A Spaniard goes out of his own houfe before
his gueft, to fignify that he leaves him mailer of
all. In other countries, the landlord walks out
laft, as a common mark of deference and re-
gard.

But, in order to render a man perfed: good com-
pany, he muft have Wit and Ingenuity as well as
good-manners. What wit is, it may not be eafy to
define ; but it is eafy fiirely to determine, that it
is a quality immediately agreeable to others, and
communicating, on its firll appearance, a lively
joy and fatisfaftion to every one who has any
comprehenfion of it. The moft profound meta-
phyfics, indeed, might be employed, in explaining
the various kinds and fpecies of wit ; and many
clafics of it, which are now received on the fole
teitimony of tafte and fentiment, might, perhaps,
be refolved into more general principles. But this
is fufficient for our prefent purpofe, that it does
affett tafte and fentiment, and bellowing an im.-
mediate enjoyment, is a lure fource of approbati-
on and affedion.

In countries, where men pafs moll of their
time in converfation, and vifus, and aflcmblies,
thefe companionable qualities, fo to ipeak, are of
high ellimation, and form a chief part of per-
fonal merit. In countries, where men live a
more domeftic life, and either are employed in
bufinefe, or amufe themfelves in a narrower cir-
cle of acqMaintance, the more folid qualities are
chiefly regarded. Thus, I have often obfcrved,
that, among the French, the firfb queftions, with
regard to a itranger, are. Is he polite '^ Has he ■tcvV ?

In

0/Qu A L I T I E s mmediateiy agreeable to Others . 313

In our own country, the chief praife beftowcd, is
always that of a good-naturedy Jenfihle fellow ,

In converlation, the lively fpirit of dialogue is
agreeabUy even to thofe who defire not to have any
fhare in the difcoiirfe : Hence the teller of long
ftories, or the pompous declaimer, is very little
approved of But mod men defire likewife their
turn in the converfarion, and regard, with a very
evil eye, that loquacity^ which deprives them of
a right they are naturally fo jealous of.

There is a fort of harmlefs liarsy frequently
to be met with in company, who deal much
in the marvellous. Their ufual intention is to
pleafe and entertain ; but as men are moft delight-
ed with what they conceive to be truth, thefe
people miflake extremely the means of pleafing,
and incur univerfal blame. Some indulgence, how-
ever, to lying or fidlion is given in humorous ftories,
becaufe it is there really agreeable and entertaining;
and truth is not of any importance.

Eloquence, genius of all kinds, even good fenfe,
and found reafoning, when it rifes to an eminent
degree, and is employed upon fubjects of any
confiderable dignity and nice difcernment j all
thefe endov/ments feem immediately agreeable,
and have a merit diftin6l from their ufefulnefs.
Rarity, likewife, which fo much enhances the price
of every thing, muft fet an additional value on
thefe noble talents of the human mind.

Modefty may be underftood in different fenfes,
even abftrafbed from challity, which has been al-
ready treated of. It fometimes means that tender-
nefs and nicety of honour, that apprehenfions of
blame, that dread of intrufion or injury towards
others, that Pudor, which is the proper guardian
of every kind of virtue, and a fure prefervative
againft vice and corruption. But its moft ufual
meaning is when it is oppofed to impudence and
arrogance^ and exprefles a diffidence of our own

judgment.

314 SECTION VIII.

ludgment, and a due attention and regard for
oihers. In young men chiefly, this quality is a
fure fign of good fenfe ; and is alfo the certain
means of augmenting that endowment, by preferv-
ing th?ir ears open to inftrjclion, and making
them ftili grafp after new attainments. But it has
a farther charm to every fpedator ; by flattering
every man's vanity, and prefenting the appear-
ance of a docile pupil, who receives, with proper
attention and refpedb, every word they utter.

Men have, in general, a much greater propen-
fity to over-value than undervalue themfelves ;
notwithftanding the opinion of Ariftotle *. This
makes us more jealous of the excefs on the former
fide, and caufes us to regard, with a peculiar in-
dulgence, all tendency to modefty and feif-diffi-
dence; as eiteeming the danger lefs of falling into
any vicious extreme of that nature. It is thus, in
countries, where men's bodies are apt to exceed
in corpulency, perfonal beauty is placed in a much
greater degree of flendernefs, than in countries,
where that is the moll ufual dcfecfl. Being fo of-
ten ftruck with iniiances of one fpecies of defor-
mity, men thinly they can never keep at too great
a diftance from it, and wiili always to have a lean-
ing to the oppoUte fide. In like manner, were the
door opened to felf praife, and were Montaigne's
maxim obferved, that one fhould fay as frankly,
I have fenfe y I have learnings I have courage, beauty y
or wit; as it is fure we often think fo ; were this
the cafe, I fay, every one is fenfible, that fuch a
flood of impertinence would break in upon us,
as would render fociety wholly intolerable. For
his reafon cullom has eflablifhed it as a rule, in
common focieties, that men lliould not indulge
themfelves in felf-praife, or even fpeak much of
themfelves j and it is only among intimate friends or

people
* Ethic, ad Nicomachum.

3

Of Qualities immediately agreeable to Others. 315

people of very manly behaviour, that one is al-
lowed to do himfelf juftice. No body finds fault
with Maurice, Prince of Orange, for his reply to
one, who aiked him, whom he efteemed the firft
general of the age, 'The marquis <7/Spinola, faid he,
is the Jecond, Though it is obfervable, that the
felf-praile implied is here better implied, than if it
had been diredly exprefled, without any cover or
difguife.

He muft be a very fuperficial thinker, who ima-
gines, that all inftances of mutual deference are
to be underftood in earneft, and that a man would
be more efteemable for being ignorant of his own
merits and accomplifhments. A fmall bias towards
modefty, even in the internal fentiment, is favour-
ably regarded, efpecially in young peoples and a
jflrong bias is required, in the outward behaviour :
But this excludes not a noble pride and fpirit, which
may openly difplay itfelf in its full extent, when
one lies under calumny or oppreflion of any kind.
The generous contumacy of Socrates, as Cicero
calls it, has been highly celebrated in all ages ;
and when joined to the ufual modefty of his be-
haviour, forms a fhining charadler. Iphicrates,
the Athenian, being accufed of betraying the in-
terefts of his country, afked his accufer, Would
yoUi fays he, have^ on a like occafion^ been guilty of
that crime? By no means, replied the other. And
can you then imagine, cried the hero, that Iphicrates
isjould be guilty * ? In Ihort, a generous fpirit and
felf-value, well founded, decently difguifed, and
courageoully fupported under diftrefs and calumny,
is a great excellency, and feems to derive its merit
from the noble elevation of its fentiment, or its
immediate agreeablenefs to its pofleflbr. In ordi-
nary characters, we approve of a bias towards mo-
defty, which is a quality immediately agreeable to

Others :

* Quinftil. lib. v. cap. 12.

ji6 SECTION VIII.

others: The vicious excefs of the former virtue,
namely, infolence or haiightinefs, is immediately
difagreeable to others : The excefs of the latter is
fo to the poflefibr. Thus are the boundaries of
thefe duties adjufted.

A defire of fame, reputation, or a character with
others, is fo far from being blameable, that it feems
infeparable from virtue, genius, capacity, and a
generous or noble difpofition. An attention even
to trivial matters, in order to pleafe, is alfo expect-
ed and demanded by fociety ; and no one is fur-
prifed, if he find a man in company, to obferve a
greater elegance of drefs and more pleafant flow of
converfation, than when he paffes his time at home,
and with his own family. Wherein, then, confifts
Vanity, which is fojuitly regarded as a fault or im-
perfedlion. It feems to confill chiefly in fuch an
intemperate difplay of our advantages, honours,
and accomplifliments ; in fuch an importunate and
open demand of praife and admiration, as is offen-
five to others, and encroaches too far on their fe-
cret vanity and ambition. It is befides a fure fymp-
tom of the want of true dignity and elevation of
mind, which is fo great an ornament in any charac-
ter. For why that impatient defire of applaufe;
as if you were not juftly entitled to it, and might
not reafonably expedl, that it would for ever at-
tend you ? Why fo anxious to inform us of the great
company which you have kept; the obliging things
which were faid to you ; the honours, the diftincli-
ons which you met with ; as if thefe were not things
ofcourfe, and what we could readily, ofourfelves,
have imagined, -vyithout being told of them ?

Decency, or a proper regard to age, fex, cha-
racler, and fl;ation in the world, may be ranked a-
mong the qualities, which are immediately agree-
able to others, and which, by that means, ac-
quire praife and approbation. An effeminate be-
haviour in a man, a rough manner in a woman i

thefe

0/Qu ALiTiES immediately agreeable to Others. 317

thefe are ugly becaufe unfuitable to each charafler,
and dilVerenc from the qualities which we exped in
the iexes. It is as if a tragedy abounded in comic
beauties, or a comedy in tragic. The difpropor-
tions hurt the eye, and convey a difagreeable fen-
timent to tlie fpe(5lators, the fource of blame and
difapprobacion. This is that indecorumy which is
explained fo much at large by Cicero in his Offices.

Among the other virtues, we may alfo give
Cleanlinefs a places fmce it naturally renders us
agreeable to others, and is no inconfiderable fource
of love and afteclion. No one will deny, that a
negligence in this particular is a fault j and as faults
are nothing but fmaller vices, and this fault can
have no other origin than the uneafy fenfation,
which it excites in others; we may, in this in-
llance, feemingly fo trivial, clearly difcover the
origin of moral diflindlions, about which the learn-
ed have involved themfelves in fuch mazes of per-
plexity and error.

But befides all the agreeable qualities, the origin
of whofe beauty, we can, in fome degree, explain
and account for, there ftill remains fomething
myfterious and inexplicable, which conveys an im-
mediate fatisfadlion to the fpe6lator, but how, or
why, or for what reafon, he cannot pretend to de-
termine. There is a manner, a grace, an eafe,
a genteelnefs, an I-know-not-what, which fome
men poflefs above others, which is very different
from external beauty and comelinefs, and which,
however, catches our afFedlion almoft as fuddenly
and powerfully. And though this manner be chief-
ly talked of in the pafiion between the fexes, where
the concealed magic is eafily explained, yet furely
much of it prevails in all our eflimation of charac-
ters, and forms no inconfiderable part of perfonal
merit. This clafs of accomplifhments, therefore,
muft be trufted entirely to the blind, but fure tef-
timony of tafte and fentimentj and mull be confi-

dered

3iS

SECTION VIII.

dered as a part of ethics, left by nature to baffle all
the pride of philofophy, and make her fenfible of
her narrow boundaries and flender acquifitions.

We approve of another, becaufe of his wit, po-
litenefs, modefty, decency, or any agreeable qua-
lity which he pofleflesj although he be not of our
acquaintance, nor has ever given us any entertain-^
ment, by means of thefe accomplifhments. The
idea, which we form of their effeft on his acquain-
tance, has an agreeable influence on our imaginati-
on, and gives us the fentiment of approbation.
This principle enters into all the judgments, which
we form concerning manners and characters.

SECT-

( 3^9 )

SECTION IX.

Conclusion.

PART I.

J.T may juftly appear furprifing, that any man,
in fo late an age, fhould find it requifite to prove,
by elaborate realoning, that Perlbnal Merit con-
fills altogether in the pofTeflion of mental qualities,
u/eful or agreeable to the per/on bim/elf or to others.
It might be expeded, that this principle would
have occurred even to the firft rude, unpra6lifed
enquirers concerning morals, and been received
from its own evidence, without any argument or
difputation. Whatever is valuable in any kind,
fo naturally clalTes itfelf under the divifion of u/e-
ful or agreeable^ the utile or the dulce^ that it is
not eafy to imagine, why we fhould ever fcek
farther, or confider the queflion as a matter of nice
refearch or enquiry. And as every thing ufeful or
agreeable muft poflefs thefe qualities with regard
either to the per/on him/elf or to others, the com-
pleat delineation or defcription of merit feems to
be performed as naturally as a fhadow is caft by
the fun, or an image is reflefted upon water. If
the ground, on which the fhadow is call, be not
broken and uneven ; nor the firface, from which
the image is refle6led, difturbtd and confufedj
a jult figure is immediately prelented, without any

arc

320 S E C T I O N IX.

art or attention. And it feems a reafonable pre-
fumption, that fyftems and hypothefes have per-
verted our natural underftanding ; when a theory,
fo fimple and obvious, could fo long have efcaped
the moft elaborate examination.

But however the cafe may have fared with philo-
ibphy; in common life, thefe principles are ilill
implicitly maintained, nor is any other topic of
praife or blame ever recurred to, when we employ
any panegyric or fatire, any applaufe or cenfure
of human action and behaviour. If we obferve
men, in every intercourfe of bufinefs or pleafure,
in every difcourfe and converfation ; we Ihall find
them no where, except in the fchools, at any lofs
upon this fubje(fl. What fo natural, for inftance,
as the following dialogue ? You are very happy,
we fhall fuppofe one to fay, addrefling himfelf to
another, that you have given your daughter to
Cleanthes. He is a man of honour and humanity.
Every one, who has any intercourfe with him, is
fure of fair and kind treatment *. I congratulate
you too, fays another on the promifing expeftati-
ons of this fon in-law ; whofe affiduous applicati-
on to the lludy of the laws, whofe quick penetrati-
on and early knowledge both of men and bufinefs,
prognofticate the greateft honours and advance-
ment f. You furprize me, replies a third, when
you talk of Cleanthes as a man of bufinefs and ap-
plication. I met him lately in a circle of the gayefl
company, and he was the very life and foul of our
converfation : So much wit with good manners ;
fo much gallantry without afi'eftation ; fo much in-
genious knowledge fo genteelly delivered, I have
never before obferved in any one J. You would
admire him Hill more, fays a fourth, if you knew

him

• Qualities ufcful to others.

f Qualities ufefal to the perfon himfelf.

\ Qualities immediately agreeable toothers.

CONCLUSIOM. 321

him more familiarly. That chearfulnefs, which
you might remark in him, is not a fudden flafh
llruck out by company : It runs through the
whole tenor of his life, and preferves a perpetual
ferenity on his countenance, ^nd tranquillity in
his foul. He has met with fevere trials, misfor-
tunes as well as dangers ; and by his greatnefs of
mind, was ftill fuperior to all of them *. The
image, gentlemen, which you have here delineat-
ed of Cleanthes, cry'd I, is that of accomplifhed
merit. Each of you his given a ftroke of the pen-
cil to his figure : and you have unawares ex-
ceeded all the picflures drawn by Gratian or Caf-
tiglione. A philofopher might feleft this cha-
radler as a model of perfedl virtue.

And as every quality, which is ufeful or agree-
able to ourfelves or others, is, in common life,
allowed to be a part of perfonal merit j fo no
other will ever be received, where men judge of
things by their natural, unprejudiced reafon, with-
out the delufive gloffes of fuperftition and falfe
religion. Celibacy, fafling, penance, mortificati-
on, felf-denial, humility, filence, folitude, and the
whole train of monkifh virtues ; for what reafon
are they every where reje6led by men of fenfe,
but becaufe they ferve to no manner of purpofes
neither advance a man's fortune in the world,
nor render him a more valuable member of fo^
ciety; neither qualify him for the entertainment
of company, nor increafe his power of felf-en-
joyment ? We obferve, on the contrary, that they
crofs all thefe defirable ends; ftupify the under-
ilanding and harden the heart, obfcure the fan-
cy and four the temper. We juftly, therefore,
transfer them to the oppofite column, and place
them in the catalogue of vices; nor has any
fuperftition force fufficient among men of the

Vol. II. Y world,

♦ Qualities immediately agreeable to the perfon himfelf.

J22 S E C T I O N IX.

world, to pervert entirely their natural fentiments,
A gloomy hair-brained enthiifiaft, after his death,
may have a place in the calendar ; bur will fcarce-
ly ever be admitted, when alive, into intimacy and
fociety, except by thofe who are as delirioas and
difmal as himfelf.

It feems a happinefs in the prefent theory, that
it enters not into that vulgar difpute concerning the
degrees of benevoleiice or felf-iove, which prevail
in human nature : a difpute which is never likely
to have any iflue, both becaufe men, who have
taken part, are not eafily convinced, and becaufe
the phsenomena, which can be produced on either
fide, are fo difperfed, fo uncertain, and fubjeft to
fo many interpretations, that it is fcarcely pofTible
accurately to compare them, or draw from them
any determinate inference or conclufion. It is fuf-
iicient for our prefent purpofe, if it be allowed,
what furely, without the greateft abfurdity, cannot
be difputed, that there is fome benevolence, how-
ever fmall, infufed into our bofom ; fome fpark of
friendfhip for human kind; fome particle of the
dove, kneaded into our frame, along with the ele-
ments of the v;olf and ferpent. Let thefe generous
fentiments be fuppofed ever fo weak ; let them be
infufficient to move even a hand or finger of our bo-
dy i they muft ftill diredl the determinations of our
mind, and where every thing elfe is equal, produce
a cool preference of what is ufcful and ferviceable
to mankind, above what is pernicious and danger-
ous. A moral dlftintiiorii therefore, immediately
arifesj a general fentiment of blame and approba-
tion ; a tendency, however faint, to the objects of
the one, and a proportionable averfion to thofe of
the other. Nor will thofe reafoners, who fo earneft-
ly maintain tiie predominant felfifhnefs of human
Jcind, be any wife fcandalized at hearing of the weak
fentiments of virtue, implanted in our nature. On
fhe contrary, they are found as readv to maintain

the

Conclusion. 323

the one tenet as the other; and their fpirit of fa-
tire (for fuch it appears, rather than of corruption)
naturally gives rife to both opinions; which have,
indeed, a great and almoft an indiffoluble connex-
ion together.

Avarice, ambition, vanity, and all paffions vul-
garly, though improperly, comprized under the
denomination o( Jelf-love, are here excluded from
our theory concerning the origin of morals, not
becaufe they are too weak, but becaufe they have
not a proper dire6bion, for that purpofe. The
notion of morals, implies fome fentiment common
to all mankind, which recommends the fame ob-
jedt to general approbation, and makes every man,
or mofl men, agree in the fame opinion or decifion
concerning it. It alfo implies fome fentiment, fo
univerfal and comprehenfive as to extend to all
mankind, and render the actions and condu6l,
even of the perfons the mofb remote, an obje6l of
applaufe or cenfure, according as they agree or
difagree with that rule of right which is eftablifh-
ed. Thefe two requifite circumftances belong
alone to the fentiment of humanity here infilled on.
The other palfions produce, in every breall, many
flrong fentiinents of defire and averfion, affedlion
and hatred ; but thefe neither are felt fo mucli in
common, nor are fo comprehenfive, as to be the
foundation of any general fyftem and eftabliflied
theory of blame or approbation.

When a man denominates another his enemy^ his
rivals his antagomfi^ his adverfary^ he is underilood
to fpeak the language of felf-love, and to exprefs
fentiments, peculiar to himfelf, and arifing from
his particular circumftances and ficuarion.But when
he beftows on any man the epithets of vicioi's or
odious or depraved, he then fpeaks another language,
and expreil'es fentiments, in which, he expefts, all
his audience are to concur with him. He mull
here, therefore, depart from his private and parti -

Y 2 cular

J24 SECTION IX.

Cular lituation, and mull chufe a point of view,
common to him with others : He mull move fomc
univerfal principle of the human frame, and touch
a ftiing, to which all mankind have an accord and
fymphony. If he means, therefore, to exprefs, that
this man pofTelTes qualities, whofe tendency is per-
nicious to foci'^ty, he has chofen this common point
of view, and has touched the principle of humanity,
in which every man, in feme degree, concurs.
While the human heart is compounded of the fame
elements as at preient, it \;ill never be wholly in-
different to public good, nor entirely unaffefted
with the tendency of chara6lers and manners. And
though this affedion of humanity may not gener-
ally be cfteemed fo ftrong as vanity or ambition,
yet, being ^uTmon to aii men, it can alone be tJie
foundatioi-: of mcrals, or of any general fyflem of
blame or praife. One man's ambition is not ano-
ther's ambition ; nor will the fame event or object
fatisfy both: But the humanity of one man is the
humanity of every one 3 and the fame objeft touches
this paflion in all human creatures.

But the fentim.ents, which arife from humani-
ty, are not only the fame iji all human crea-
tures, and produce the fame approbation or cen-
furcj but they aifo comprehend all human crea-
tures j nor is there any one whofe condudl or
charaft^r is hot, by their means, an object, to
every one, of cenfure or approbation. On the
contrary, thofe other paflions, commonly denomi-
nated felfifn, both produce different fentiments in
each individual, according to his particular fitu-
aiion ; and alfo contemplate the greater part of
mankind with the utmofl indifference and unton-
cern. Whoever has a high regard and elleem for
me flatters my vanity ; whoever expreffes con-
itcmpt mortlries and difpieafes me : But as my
name is known but to a fmall part oi" mankind,
tliere are few, who couje within tlie Iphere of tliis

1 paffion.

Co NCLUSIO^. *" 325

pafTion, ■ or encite, on its account, cither my af-
fedion or difgull.- But if you rcprefent a ty-
rannical, infolent, or barbarous behaviour, in any
country or in any age of the world ; I foon
carry my eye to the pernicious tendency of fuch
a condud, and feel the fentiment of repugnance
and difpleafure towards it; No chr.ra6ter can be
fo remote as to be, in this light, wholly indif-
ferent to me. What is beneficial to fociety or
to the perfon himlelf mult ftill be pfeferred.
And every quality or a6lion, of every human be-
ing, mud, by this means, be ranked under fome
clafs or denomination, exprelTive of general cen-
fure or applaufe.

What more, therefore, can we afk to diftinguifli
the fentiments, dependant on humanity, from
thofe connefted with any other paffion, or to fa-
tisfy us, why the former are the origin of mo-
rals, not the latter? Whatever condud: gains any
approbation; by touching my humanity, procures
alfo the applaufe of ail mankind, by affecfling
the fame principle in them : But what ferves my
avarice or ambition pleafes thefe pafTions in me
alone, and aftecls not the avarice and ambition
of the reft of mankind. There is no circum-
ftance of conduct in any mian, provided it have a
beneficial tendency, that is not agreeable to my
humanity, however remote the perfon : But eve-
ry man, fo far removed as neither to crofs nor
ferve my avarice nor ambition, is regarded as
wholly indifferent by thofe pallions. The dif-
tindion, therefore, between thefe fpecies of fen-
timent being fo great and evident, language
muft foon be moulded upon it, and muft in-
vent a peculiar fet of terms,, in order to exprefs
thofe univerfal fentiments of cenfure or appro-
bation, which arife from humanity, or from views
of general ufefulnefs and its contrary. Virtue
and Vice become then known : Morals are re-
cognized :

326 S E C T -I O N IX.

cognized : Certain general ideas are framed of huf
man condu6t and behaviour : Such meafures are
expefted from men, in fuch fituations : This ac-
tion is determined to be conformable to our ab-
ftrad rule; that other, contrary. And by fucix
univerfal principles are the particular fenti-
ments of felf-love frequently controuled and li-
, mited *.

From inftanccs of popular tumults, feditions,
fadlions, panics, and of all palTions, which are
fhared with a multitude; we may learn the in-
fluence of fociety, in exciting and fupporting
any emotion ; while the moil ungovernable dif-
orders are raifed, we find, by that means, from
the flightefl and m*oll frivolous occafions. Solon
was no very cruel, though, . perhaps, an unjuft
legiilator, who punifhed neuters in civil wars ;
and few, I believe, would, in fuch cafes, incur
the penalty, were their affeflion and difcourfe
allowed fufficient to ablblve them. No felfifhnefs,
and fcarce any philofophy, have there force fuf-
ficient to fupport a total coolncfs and indiffer-
ence ; and he mull be more or lefs than man,
who kindles not in the common blaze. What
wonder then, that moral fentiments are found of
fuch influence in life j though fpringing from prin-
ciples, which may appear, at firft fight, fomewhat
fmall and delicate? But thefe principles, we mud
remark, are fecial and univerfal : They form, in
a manner, the farty of hinnan-kind againll vice
or diforder, its connnon cnemv : And as the be-
nevolent concern for others is diffufed, in a great-
er or lefs degree, over all men, and is the fame
in all, it occurs more frequently in difcourfe,
is cherilLed by fociety and converlation, and the
blame and approbation, confequent on it, are
thereby rouzed from that lethargy, into which
they are probably lulled, in folitary and uncul-
tivated
• See N O T E [NN],

Conclusion. 327

tivated nature. Other pafTions, though perhaps
originally Ilronger, yet being fclfilh and private,
are often overpowered by its force, and yield the
dominion of our breall to thofc focial and public
principles.

Another fpring of (;ur conftitution, that brings
a great addition of force to moral fentiment,
is, the love of fame ; v^^hich rules, with fuch un-
controlled authority, in all generous minds, and
is often the grand objedt of all their defigns and
undertakings. By our continual and earneft pur-
fuit of a chara(fter, a name, a reputation in the
world, we bring our own deportment and conduct
frequently in review, and confider how they ap-
pear in the eyes of thofe who approach and re-
gard us. This coniianc habit of furveying our-
felves, as it were, in refle6tion, keeps alive all
the fentiments of right an,d wrong, and begets,
in noble natures, a certain reverence for them-
felves as well as others; which is the fureft guar-
dian of every virtue. Their animal conveniencies
and pleafures fink gradually in their value, while
every inward beauty and mo al grace is ftudiouf-
\y acquired, and the mind is accompliflied in
every perfecStion, which can adorn or embellilh a
rational creature.

Here is the molt perfect morality with which
v/e are acquainted : Here is diiplayed the force of
many fympathies. Our moral fentimeac is itfelf a
feeling chiefly of that nature: And our regard to a
charadler with others feems to arife only from a
care of preferving a chara6tcr with ourfelves ; and
in order to attain this end, we find it neceflary to
prop our tottering judgment on the correfpondent
approbation of mankind.

But, that we may accommodate matters, and re-
move, if poflible, every difficulty, let us allow all
thefe reafonings to be falfe. Let us allow, that,
when we refoive the plcalure, which arifes from

views

328 S E C T I O N IX.

views of utility, into the fentiments of humanity and
lympathy, we have embraced a wrong hypothefis.
Let us confefs it necefiary to find fome other ex-
plication of that applaufe, which is paid to objefts,
whether inanimate, animate, or rational, if they
have a tendency to promote the welfare and ad-
vantage of mankind. However difficult it be to
conceive, that an objedt is approved of on ac-
count of its tendency to a certain end, while the
end itfelf is totally indifferent ; let us fwallow
this abfurdity, and confider what are the confe-
quences.

The preceding delineation or definition of Per-
fonal Merit muil ftill retain its. evidence and au-
thority: It mufl ftill be allowed, that every quali-
ty of the mind, which is iijcful or agreeable to the
perfcn himjelf ox to others^ communicates a pleafurc
to the fpectator, engages his eiteem, and is ad-
mitted under the honourable denomination of vir-
tue or merit. Are not juftice, fidelity, honour,
veracity, allegiance, chaftity, efleemed folely on
account of their tendency to promote the good of
fociety ? Is not that tendency infeparable from hu-
manity, benevolence, lenity, generofity, gratitude,
moderation, tendernefs, friendlhip, and all the
other focial virtues? Can it pollibly be doubted,
that induftry, difcretion, frugality, fecrecy, order,
perfeverance, forethought, judgment, and this
whole ciafs of virtues and accomplifhments, of
which many pages would not contain the cata-
logue} can it be doubted, I fay, that the tenden-
cy of thefe qualities to promote the intereft and
happinefs of their poiletlbr, is the icle foundation
of their merit ? Who can difpute that a mind, which
fiipports a perpetual ferenity and chearfulnefs, a no-
ble dignity and fpirit, a tender affedtion and good-
will to all around i as it has more enjoyment with-
in itfelf, is alfo a more animating and rejoicing
fpc<5lacic, tliaii if dejeded with melancholy, tor-
mented

Conclusion. 329

merited with anxiety, irritated with rage, or funk
into the mod abjeft bafenefs and degeneracy ? And
as to the qualities, immediately agreeable to others,
they fpeak fufficiently for themfelves ; and he muft
be unhappy, indeed, either in his own temper, or
in his fituation and company, who has never per-
ceived the charms of a facetious wit or flowing affa-
bility, of a delicate modefly or decent genteelnefs
of addrefs and manner.

I am fenfible, that nothing can be more unphi-
lofophical than to be pofitive or dogmatical on any
fubjefb ; and that, even if excejfive fcepticifm could
be maintained, it would not be more deftrudtive to
all juft reafoning and enquiry. I am convinced,
that, where men are the mofl fure and arrogant,
they are commonly the moft miftaken, and have
there given reins to paflion, without that proper
deliberation and fufpenfe, which can alone fecure
the grofleft abfurdities. Yet, I muft confefs, that
this enumeration puts the matter in fo itrong a light,
that I cannot, at ^refent^ be more aiTured of any
truth, which I learn from reafoning and argument,
than that perfonal merit confifts entirely in the
ufefulnefs or agreeablenefs of qualities to the per-
fon himfelf poffefTed of them, or to others, who
have any intercourfe with him. But when I refiedl,
that, though the bulk and figure of the earth have
been meafured, and delineated, though the moti-
ons of the tides have been accounted for, the order
and ceconomy of the heavenly bodies fubjedred to
their proper laws, and Infinite itfelf reduced to
calculation; yet men ftill. difpute concerning the
foundation of their moral duties : "When 1 refledt
on this, 1 fay, I fall back into diffidence and fcep-
ticifm, and fufpecSt, that an hypoihefis, fo obvious,
had it been a true one, v/ould, long ere now, have
been received by the unanimous fuffrage and con-
fent of mankind.

PART

330 SECTION iX.

PART II.

Having explained the moral approbation attend-
ing merit or virtue, there remains nothing, but
briefly to confider our interefted obligation to it,
and to enquire, whether every man, who has any
regard to his own happinefs and welfare, will not
beft find his account in the pradtice of every moral
duty. If this can be clearly afcertained from the
foregoing theory, we fhall have the fatisfadlion to
reflefl, that we have advanced principles, which
not only, it is hoped, will (land the teft of reafon-
ing and enquiry, but may contribute to the amend-
ment of men's lives, and their improvement in
morality and focial virtue. And though the phi-
Jofophical truth of any propofition by no means
depends on its tendency to promote the interefts
of fociety j yet a man has but a bad grace, who
delivers a theory, however true, which, he muft
confefs, leads to a pradice dangerous and perni-
cious. Why rake into thofe corners of nature,
which fpread a nuifance all around ? Why dig up
the peftilence from the pit, in which it is buried ?
The ingenuity of your refearches may be admired;
but your fyftems will be detefted : And mankind
will agree, if they cannot refute them, to fink
them, at leaft, in eternal filence and oblivion.
Truths, which are pernicious to fociety, if any
fach there be, will yield to errors, which are fa-
lutary and advantageous.

But what philofophical truths can be more ad-
vantageous to fociety, than thofe here delivered,
which reprefent virtue in all her genuine and moft
engaging charms, and make us approach her with
cafe, familiarity, and afi^cdlion ? The difmal drefs
falls off, with which many divines, and fome philo-
fophers have covered her; and nothing appears but
gentlenefs, humanity, beneficence, afiabiiity; nay,

even.

Conclusion. jji

even, at proper intervals, play, frolic, and gaity.
She talks not of ufelcfs aufterities and rigours, fuf-
fcring and fclf-denial. She declares, tliat her fole
purpofe is, to make her votaries and all mankind,
during every inftant of their exiltence, if poHlble,
cheerful and happy j nor does ilie ever willingly
part with any pleafure but in hopes of ample com-
penfation in Ibmc other period of their lives. The
fole trouble, which fhe demands, is that of jult
calculation, and a lleady preference of the greater
happinefs. And if any auftere pretenders approach
her, enemies to joy and pleafure, fhe eithers rejects
them as hypocrites and deceivers j or if Hie admit
them in her train, they are ranked however, among
the leaft favoured of her votaries.

And, indeed, to drop all figurative expreflion,
what hopes can we ever have of engaging mankind
to a practice, which we confefs full of aufterity and
rigour? Or what theory of morals can ever
ferve any ufeful purpofe, unlefs it can fhow, by a
particular detail, that all the duties, which it re-
commends, are allb the true intercft of each indi-
vidual? The peculiar advantage of the foregoing
fyftem feems to be, that it furnifhes proper medi-
ums for that purpofer'

That the virtues which are immediately ujefnl
or agreeable to the perfon poffefTed of them, are
defirable in a view to felf-intereft, it would furely
be fuperfluous to prove. Moraliils, indeed, may
fpare themfelves all the pains, which they often
take in recommending thefe duties. To what
purpofe coiled arguments, to evince, that tempe-
rance is advantageous, and the exceffes of pleafure
hurtful ? When it appears, that thefe exceffes are
denominated fuch, becaufe they are hurtful ; and
that, if the unlimited ufe of Itrong liquors, for in-
fbance, no more impaired health or the faculties of
mind and body than the ufe of air or water, it
would not be a whit more vicious or blameable.

It

332 SECTION IX.

It feems equally fuperfluous to prove, that the
companionable virtues of good manners and wit, de-
cency and genteelnefs, are more defirable than the
contrary qualities. Vanity alone, without any other
confideration, is a fufficient motive to make us wifh
for the poffeffion of thefe accornplilhments. No
man was ever willingly deficient in this particular.
All our failures here proceed from bad education,
want of capacity, or a perverfe and unpliable dif-
pofition. Would you have your company coveted,
admired, followed; rather than hated, defpifed,
avoided? Can any one ferioufly deliberate in the
•cafe ? As no enjoyment is fincere, without fome re-
ference to company and fociety ; fo no fociety can
be agreeable, or even tolerable, where a man feels
his prefence unwelcome, and difcovers all around
him fymptoms of difguft and averfion.

But why, in the greater fociety or confederacy of
mankind, ihould not the cafe be the fame as in
particular clubs and companies ? Why is it more
doubtful, that the enlarged virtues of humanity, ge-
nerofity, beneficence, are defirable with a view to
happinefs and felf-intereft, than the limited endow-
ments of ingenuity and politenefs? Are we appre-
henfive, left thofe focial affefbions interfere, in a
greater and more immediate degree than any other
purfuits, with private utility, and cannot be grati-
fied, without fome important facrifice of honour and
advantage ? If fo, we are but ill inftrufted in the
nature of the human pafTions, and are more in-
fiuenced by verbal diftindions than by real diffe-
rences.

Whatever contradiction may vulgarly be fuppo-
fed between the Jclfijh and Jocial fentimcnts or dif-
pofitions, they are really no more oppofite than fel-
fiiK and ambitious, felfifh and vain. It is requifite,
that there be an original propenfity of fome kind,
in order to be a bafis to felf-love, by giving a re-
lifh to the objedis of its purfuit; and none more fit

fof

Conclusion. 333

for this piirpofe than benevolence or humanity.
The goods of fortune are fpent in one gratification
or another: The mifer, who accumulates his an-
nual incoine, and lends it out at interell, has real-
ly fpent it in the gratification of his avarice. And it
would be difficult to fliow, why a man is more a
lofer by a generous aflion, than by any other me-
thod of expence; fince the utmoft which he can at-
tain, by the moil elaborate felfiHinefs, is the indul-
gence of fomc afTeclion.

Now if life, without palTion, mufb be altogether
infipid and tirefome; let a man fuppofe that he has
full power of modelling his own difpofition, and
let him deliberate what appetite or defire he would
choofc for the foundation of his happinefs and en-
joyment. Every afFedon, he would obferve, when
gratified by fuccefs, gives a fatisfaftion proportion-
ed to its force and violence : but befides this ad-
vantage, common to all, the immediate feeling of
benevolence and friendihip, humanity and kind-
nefs, is fweet, fmooth, tender, and agreeable, in-
dependent of all fortune and accidents. Thefe vir-
tues are befides attended with a pleafing confciouf-
nefs or remembrance., and keep us in humour with
ourfelves as well as others; while we retain the
agreeable reflexion of having done our part to-
wards mankind and fociety. And though all men
fhow a jealoufy of our fuccefs in the purfuits of
avarice and ambition ; yet are we almoft fure or
their good-will and good-wifhes, fo long as we
perfevere in the paths of virtue, and employ our-
felves in the execution of generous plans and pur-
pofes. What other pallion is tlierc where we fhail
fine fo many advantages unitedj an agreeable fen-
timent, a pleafing confcioufnefs, a good reputati-
on ? But of thefe truths, we may obferve, men
are, of themfelves, pretty much convinced; nor
are they deficient in their duty to fociety, becaufe
they would not wifh to be generous, friendly, and

humane;

334 .SECTION IX.

humane J but becaufe they do not feel themfelves
fuch.

Treating vice with the greateft candour, and
making it all pofTible conceffions, we muil ac-
knowledge, that there is not, in any inftance, the
fmalleft pretext for giving it the preference above
virtue, with a view to felf-intereft; except, per-
haps, in the cafe of juflice, where a man, taking
things in a certain light, may often feem to be
a lofer by his integrity. And though it is al-
lowed, that, without a regard to property, no fo-
ciety could fubfift; yet according to the imperfedt
way in which human affairs are condud^ed, a fenfible
knave, in particular incidents, may think, that an
a<5t of iniquity or infidelity will make a confide-
rable addition to his fortune, without caufing
any confiderable breach in the focial union
and confederacy. That honejly is the heft 'policy^
may be a good general rule; but is liable to
many exceptions : And he, it may, perhaps, be
thought, conducts himfclfwith mofl wifdom, who
obferves the general rule, and takes advantage of
all the exceptions.

I muft confefs, that, if a man think, that this
reafoning much requires an anfwer, it will be little
difficult to find any, which will to him appear fa-
tisfad:ory and convincing. If his heart rebel not
againft fuch pernicious maxims, if he feel no re-
luctance to the thoughts of villany or bafenefs, he
has indeed loft a confiderable motive to virtue;
and we may expert that his practice will be an-
Iwcrable to his fpeculation. But in all ingenuous
natures, the antipathy to treachery and roguery is
too itrong to be counterbalanced by any views
of profit or pecuniary advantage. Inward peace of
mind, confcioufnefs of integrity, a fatisfadlory re-
view of our own condu6t; thefe are circumftances
very requifite to hapj)inefs, and will be chcrifhed

and

Conclusion. ;^t^^

and cultivated by every honeft man, who feels the
importance of them.

Such a one has, befides, the frequent fatisfacflion
of feeing knaves, with all their pretended cunning
and abilities, betrayed by their own maxims; and
while they purpofe to cheat with moderation and
fecrecy, a tempting incident occurs, nature is frail,
and they give into the fnare ; whence they can ne-
ver extricate themfelves, without a total lofs of re-
putation, and the forfeiture of all future trull and
confidence with mankind.

But were they ever fo fecret and fuccefsful, the
Iioneft man, if he has any tin6ture of philofophy,
or even common obfervation and refledion, will
difcover that they themfelves are, in the end, the
greateft dupes, and have facrificed the invaluable
enjoyment of a chara6ler, with themfelves at leafl:,
for the acquifition of worthlefs toys and gewgaws.
How little is requifite to fupply the neceJIities of na-
ture ? And in a view to ■plcajiire^ what comparifon be-
tween the unboughtfatisfaftion of converfation,focie-
ty, ftudy, even health and the common beauties of
nature, but above all the peaceful refledtion on one's
own condudl : What comparifon, I fay, between thefe,
and the feverifh, empty amufements of luxury and
expence? Thcfe natural pleafures, indeed, are really
without price; both becaufe they are below all
price in their attainment, and above it in their en-
joyment.

SECTION

( 337 )

APPENDIX I.

Concerning Moral Sentiment.

AF the foregoing hypothefis be received, it will
now be eafy for us to determine the queftion firfl;
ftarted *, concerning the general principles of mo-
rals ; and though we poit])oned the decifion of that
queftion, left it ftiould then involve us in intri-
cate fpeculations, which are unfit for moral dif-
courfes, we may refume it at prefent, and examine
how far either reqfon or Jentimcnt enters into all de-
cifions of praife or cenfure.

One principal foundation of moral praife being
fuppofed to lie in the ufefulnefs of any quality or
action ; it is evident, that reajon muft enter for a
confiderable fhare in all decifions of this kind;
fince nothing but that faculty can inftru6t us in the
tendency of qualities and a6lions, and point out
their beneficial confequences to fociety and to their
poffeflbr. In many cafes, this is an affair liable
to great controverfy : Doubts may arife ; oppofite
interefts may occur; and a preference muft be
given to one fide, from very nice views, and a
fmall overbalance of utility. This is particularly
remarkable in queftions with regard tojuftice; as
is, indeed, natural to fuppofe, from that fpecies of
utility, which attends this virtue f. Were every
fingle inftance of juftice, like that of benevolence,
ufeful to fociety i this would be a more fimple

Vol. II. Z ftate

• Se.^. I. t See Appendix III.

33S APPENDIX I.

flate of the cafe, and feldom liable to great con-
trovcrfy. But as fingle inllances of jiiftice are of-
ten pernicious in their firit and immediate tenden-
cy, and as the advantage to fociety refults only
from the obfervance of the general rule, and from
the concurrence and combination of feveral per-
fons in the fame equitable condutlj the cafe here
becomes more intricate and involved. The va-
rious circumftances of fociety; the various confe-
quences of any pra<flice j the various interefts,
which may be propofed : Thefe, on many occafi-
ons, are doubtful, and fubjedt to great difcufli-
on and enquiry. The obje<5l: of municipal laws
is to fix all the queilions with regard to juftice :
The debates of civilians ; the reflexions of politi-
cians; the precedents ofhiflory and public records,
are all dire(51:ed to the fame purpofe. And a very
accurate reafon or judgment is often requifite, to
give the true determination, amidft fuch intricate
doubts arifing from obfcure or oppofite utili-
ties.

But though reafon, when fully affifled and im-
proved, be fufficient to inflrud; us in the pernici-
ous or ufcful tendency of qualities and actions ;
it is not alone fufficient to produce any moral blame
or approbation. Utility is only a tendency to a
certain end; and were the end totally indifferent to
us, we ihould feel the fame indifference towards
the means. It is requifite ^.Jentiment fliould here
difplay itfelf, in order to give a preference to the
ufeful above the pernicious tendencies. This fen-
ment can be no other than a feeling for the hap-
pinefs of mankind, and a refentment of their mife-
ry ; lince thefe are the different ends which virtue
and vice have a tendency to promote. Here,
therefore, reajcn inllrudls us in the feveral tenden-
cifs of actions, and humanity makes a diftindlion
in favour of thofe which are ufcful and beneficial.

This

Concerning Moral Sentiment. 339

This partition between the faculties of under-
ftanding and fentiment, in all moral decifions, Teems
clear from the preceding hypothefis. But I fnall
fuppofe that hypothefis falfe : It will then be re-
quifiteto look out for fome other theory, that may
be fatisfadiory ; and I dare venture to affirm, that
none fuch will ever be found, fo long as we fuppofe
realbn to be the fole fource of morals. To prove
this, it will be proper to weigh the five following
confiderations.

I. It is eafy for a falfe hypothefis to maintain
fome appearance of truth, while it keeps wholly in
generals, makes ufe of undefined terms, and em-
ploys comparifons, inftead of inftances. This is
particulaily remarkable in that phwofophy, which
afcribes the difcernment of all moral diftinctions to
reafon alone, without the concurrence of fentiment.
It is impolnble that, in any particular inilance,
this hypothefis can fo much as be rendered intelli-
gible; whatever fpecious figure it may make in ge-
neral declamations and difcourfts. Examine the
crime of ingratitude, for infiance ; which has place,
wherever we obferve good -will, cxprelfed and
known, together with good-olfices performed, on
the one fide, and a refurn of ill-will or indiffe-
rence, with ill-olfices or neglect on the other :
Anatomize all thefe circumflances, and examine,
by your reafon alone, in what confirts the demerit
or blame : You never will come to any ifTue or
conclufion.

Reafon judges either of matter of fciEl or of
relations. Enquire then, firfi, where is that mat-
ter of fatSl:, which we here call crime; point it out j
determine the time of its exiftence ; defcribe its
eiTence or nature ; explain the fenfc or faculty, to
which it difcovers itfelf- It refiaes in the mind of
the perfon, who is ungratefu]. He mufl, there-
fore, feel iL, and be confcious of it. But nothing

Z 2 is

340 APPENDIX I.

is there, except the paffion of ill-will or abfolute
indifference. You cannot fay, thatthefe, ofthem-
felves, always, and in all circiimftances are crimes.
No: They are only crimes, when direfled towards
perfons, who have before exprelTed and difplayed
good-will towards us. Confequently, we may in-
fer, that the crime of ingratitude is not any parti-
cular individual /(3^; but arifes from a complica-
tion of circumflances, which, being prefented to
the fpe6lator, excites the fenlimeni of blame, by the
particular ftrutlure and fabric of his mind.

This reprefentation, you fay, is falfe. Crime,
indeed, confifc not in a particular /^^?, of whofe
reality we are alTured by reajon: But it confiils in
certain moral relations^ difcovered by reafon, in
the fam.e manner as we difcover, by reafon, the
truths of geometry or algebra. But what are the
relations, I aflc, of which you here talk? In the
cafe ftated above, I fee firft good-will and good-
oifices in one perfon ; then ill-will and ill-offices
in the other. Between thefe, there is the relation
of contrariety. Does the crime confift in that re-
lanon ? But fuppofe a perfon bore me ill-will or
did me ill-ofnces -, and I, in return were indifferent
towards hiin, or did him good-ofiices : Here is
f.Jie fame rclat:ic;n of contrariety j and yet my con-
ilucl is often highly laudable. Twift and turn this
matter as much as you will, you can never reft the
morality on relation ; but muft have recouri'c to
the decifions of fentiment.

"When it is affirmed, that two and three are
cqnal to the half of ten j this relation of equality,
I iindcrftand jjerfe6tly. I conceive, that if ten be
divided into two parts, of which one has as many
rnits as the other ; and if any of thefe parts be
compared to two added to three, it will contain as
mi.ny units as that compound number. But when
you draw thence a comparifon to moral relations,
I own that 1 am altos;ether at a lols to underfland

you.

Concerning Moral Sentiment. 341

you. A moral action, a crime, fuch as ingratitude,
is a complicated objecl. Does the mora'ity confift
in the relation of its parts to each other. How ?
After what manner ? Specify the relation : Be more
particular and explicit in your propofitions ; and
you will eafily fee their falfehood.

No, fay you, the morality confiRs in the relation
of aftions to the rule of right ; and they are de-
nominated good or ill, according as they agree or
difagree with it. Wh.it then is this rule of right ?
In what does it confill ? How is it determined ?
By reafon, you fiiy, which examines the moral re-
lations of actions. So that moral relations are de-
termined by the comparifon of adions to a rule.
And that rule is determined by confidering the
moral relations of objefts. Is not this fine reafon-

All this is metaphyfics, you cry : That is e-
nough : There needs nothing more to give a
ftrong prefumption of falfehood. Yes, reply I :
Here are metaphyfics furely : But they are all on
your fide, who advance an abflrufe hypothefis,
which can never be made intelligible, nor quadrate
with any particular inftance or illuftration. The
hypothefis which we embrace is plain. It main-
tains, that morality is determined by fentiment.
It defines virtue to be whatever mental acl'ion or
quality gives to a Jpeofator the pleafmg fentiment of
approbation ; and vice the contrary. We then
proceed to examine a plain matter of fafl, to wit,
what actions have this influence: We confider all
the circumflances, in which thefe aflions agree :
And thence endeavour to extraft fome general ob-
fervations with regard to thefe fentiments. If you
call this metaphyfics, and find any thing abftrufe
here, you need only conclude, that your turn of
mind is not fuitcd to the moral fciences.

II. When a man, at any time, deliberates con-
cerning his own condu6t (as, whether he had bet-

342 A P P E N D I X I.

ter, in a particular emergence, ailill a brother or a
benefadtor), he mud confiacr thefe fepar-^te relati-
ons, with all the circiimftances and fiiuations of
the perfons, in order to deccrfniiie the fup'srior du-
ty and obligation : And in order to determine the
proportion of lines in any triangle, it is necefiary
to examine the nature of that figure, and the rela-
tions which its feveral parts bear to eat h other.
But notwithftanding this appearing fimilarity in the
two cafes, there is, at bottom, an extreme diffe-
rence between them. A fpcculative reafoner con-
cerning triangles or circles confiders the Tev-e'ral
known and given relations of the parts of thefe
figures ; and thence infers fome unknown relati-
on, which is dependent on the former. Bu in
inoral deliberations, we mufb be acquainted, be-
fore-hand, with all the objects, and all their rela-
tions to each other j and from a comparifon of the
whole, fix our choice or approbation. No new
faft to be afcertained : No new relation to bedif-
covered. All the circumftances of the cafe are
fuppofed to be laid before us, ere we can fix any
fentence of blame or approbation. If any material
circumftance be yet unknown or doubtful, we mufl
firft employ our enquiry or intellectual faculties to
alTure us of it^ and muft fufpend for a time all
moral decifion or fentiment. While we are ie-no-
rant, whether a man were ae2;reflbr or not, how
can we determine whether the perfon who killed
him, be criminal or innocent ? But after every
circumftance, every relation is known, the under-
llandipg has no farther room to operate, nor any
object on which it could employ itfelf. The ap-
probation or blame, which then enfues, cannot be
the work of the judgment, but of the heart; and
is not a fptculative propofition or affirmation, but
an aftive feeling or fentiment. In the difquifiions
of the underftanding, from known circumftances
and relations, \ye infer fome new and unknown. In

I moral

CohfCERM.vG Moral Sentiment. 343

moral dccifions, all the circumftances and relations
mull be previoiiQy known j and the mind, from
the contemplation of the whole, feels feme new iin-
prellion of afFcdlion or difgufl, efteem or contempt,
approbation or blame.

Hence the great difference between a m.iftake of
fa^ and one of right \ and hence the reafon why
the one is commonly criminal and not the other.
When CEdipus killed Laius, he was ignor;int of
the relation, and from circumftances, innocent and
involuntary, formed erroneous opinions concerning
the aflion which he committed. But when Nero
killed Agrippina, all the relations between himfelf
and the perfon, and all the circumftances of the
fa<5l, were prcvioufly known to him : But the mo-
tive of revenge, or fear, or intereft, prevailed in
his favage heart over the fentiments of duty and
humanity. And when we exprefs that deteftation
againft him, to which he, himfelf, in a little time,
became infenfible j it is not, that we fee any rela-
tions, of which he was ignorant j but that, from
the reditude of our difpofition, we feel fentiments,
againft which he was hardened, from flattery and a
long perfeverance in the moll enormous crimes.
In thefe fentiments, then, not in a difcovery of re-v
lations of any kind, do all moral determinations
confift. Before we can pretend to form any deci-
fion of this kind, every thing muft be known and
afcertained on the fide of the objector adion. No-
thing remains but to feel, on our part, fome fenti-
ment of blame or approbation ; whence we pro-
nounce the action criminal or virtuous.

III. This doctrine will become ftill more evi-
dent, if we compare moral beauty with natural, to
which, in many particulars, it bears fo near a re-
femblance. It is on the proportion, relation, and
pofition of parts, that all natural beauty depends j
but it would be abfurd thence to infer, that the
perception of beauty, like that of truth in geome-
trical

J44 APPENDIX I.

trical problems, confifts wholly in the perception
of relations, and was performed entirely by the
underftanding or intelledual faculties. In all the
fciences, our mind, from the known relations, in-
veftigates the unknown : But in all decifions of tafte
or external beauty, all the relations are before-hand
obvious to the eye ; and we thence proceed to feel a
fentiment of complacency or difguft, according to
the nature of the objeft, and difpofition of our or-
gans.

Euclid has fully explained all the qualities of the
circle ; but has not, in any propofition, faid a word
of its beauty The reafon is evident. The beauty
is not a quality of the circle. It lies not in any
part of the line, whofe parts are equally diftant from
a common center. It is only the efFecft, which that
figure produces upon the rriind, whofe peculiar fa-
bric or ftructure renders it fufceptible of furh fen-
timents. In vain would you look for it in the cir-
cle, or feek it, either by your fenfes or by mathe-
matical reafonings, in all the properties of that
figure.

Attend to Palladio and Perrault, while they ex-
plain all the parts and properties of a pillar i They
talk of the cornice and frieze and bafe and entabla-
ture and fhaft and architrave; and give the dcfcrip-
tion and pofition of each of thefe members. But
fhould you aflc the defcription and pofition of its
beauty, they would readily reply, that the beauty
is not in any of the parts or members of a pillar,
but refults from the whole, when that complicated
figure is prcfcntcd to an intelligent m.ind, fufcepti-
ble to thofe finer fenfations. 'Till fuch a fpedta-
tor appear, there is nothing but a figure of fuch
particular dimenfions and proportions: From his
fentiments alone arife its elegance and beauty.

Again ; attend to Cicero, while he paints the
crimes of a Verrcs or a Catiline -, you mufl acknow-
ledge that the moral turpitude refults, in the fame

manner.

Concerning Moral Sentiment. 345

manner, from the contemplation of the whole,
■when prefented to a being, whole organs have fucll
a particular itrufture and formation. The orator
may paint rage, infolcnce, barbarity on the one
fide: Meeknels, fuffering, forrow, innocence oit
the other: But if you feel no indignation or com-
panion aril'e in you from this complication of cir-
cumliances, you would in vain afk him. in what
confills the crime or villany, which he fo vehe-
mently exclaims againft : At what time, or on what
fubjecfV it firft began to exift: And what has a few
months afterwards become of it, when every dif-
pofition and thought of all the acftors is totally al-
tered, or annihilated. No fatisfadlory anfwer can
be given to any of thefe queftions, upon the ab-
ftrad: hypothecs of morals -, and we muft at laft
acknowledge, that the crime or immorality is no
particular fadl or relation, which can be the objed
of the underftanding : But arifes entirely from the
fentiment of difapprobation, which, by the ftruc-
ture of human nature, we unavoidably feel on the
apprehenfion of barbarity or treachery.

JV. Inanimate objects may bear to each other all
the fame relations, which we obferve in moral
agents : though the former can never be the ob-
je6l of love or hatred, nor are confequently fuf-
ceptible of merit or iniquity. A young tree, which
over-tops and deftroys its parentj Hands in all the
fame relations with Nero, when he murdered
Agrippina; and if morality confiiled merely in re-
lations, would, no doubt, be equally criminal.

V. It appears evident, that the ultimate ends of
human actions can never, in any cafe, be account-
ed for by rea/o?iy but recommend themfelves en-
tirely to the lentiments and afFed:ions of mankind,
without any dependance on the intelled:ual facul-
ties. Afl<: a man, zvhy be iijes exercijes ; he will an-
fwer, becaiife he defires to keep his health. If you
then enquire, i^hy he defires health, he will readily

reply.

346 APPENDIX I.

reply, hecaiije ficknefs is painful. If you pufh your
enquiries farther, and defire a reafon, why he hates
pairii it is impofTible he can ever give any. This
is an ultimate end, and is never referred to any
other objeft.

Perhaps, to your fecond quefcion, why he defires
healthy he may alfo reply, that // is necejfary for the
exercije of his calling. If you afk, why he is anxious
on that heady he will anfwer, hecaiife he defires to get
money, if you demand Why ? It is the inflrument
of p leaf are J fays he. And beyond this it is an ab-
furdity to afk for a reafon. It is impoflible there
can be a progrefs in infinitum j and that one thing
can always be a reafon, why another is defired.
Something muft be defirable on its own account,
and becaufe of its immediate accord or agreement
with human fentiment and affe6lion.

Now as virtue is an end, and is defirable on its
own account, without fee or reward, merely, for the
immediate fatisfaftion which it conveys ; it is re-
quifite that there fhould be fome fentiment, which
it touches ; fome internal tafte or feeling, or what-
ever you pleafe to call it, which diftinguifhes mor-
al good and evil, and which embraces the one and
rejects the other.

Thus thediftinfl boundaries and offices g( reafon
and of tajle are eafily afcertained. The former con-
veys the knowledge of truth and falfehood : The
latter gives the fentiment of beauty and deformity,
vice and virtue. The one difcovers objects, as
they really ftand in nature, without addition or
diminution : The other has a productive faculty,
and gilding or itaining all natural objedls with the
colours, borrowed from internal fentiment, raifes,
in a manner, a new creation. Reafon, being cool
and difengaged, is no motive to adlion, and diredls
only the impulfe received from appetite or inclina-
tion, by fliowing us the means of attaining happi-
nefs or avoiding mifery : Tafte, as it gives plea-
fur e

Concerning Moral Sentiment. 347

fure or pain, and thereby conn:irutes happinefs or
niirery, becomes a motive to adlion, and is the firit
fpring or impulfe to defire and volition. From
circumflances and relations, known or fuppofcd,
the former leads us to the difcovery of the conceal-
ed and unknown : After all circumftances and rela-
tions are laid before us, the latter makes us feel
from the whole a new fentiment of blame or ap-
probation. The ftandard of the one, being founded
on the nature of things, is eternal and inflexible,
even by the will of the Supreme Being: The Itan-
dard of the other, arifing from the internal frame
and conftitution of animals, is ultimately derived
from that Supreme Will, which bellowed on each
being its peculiar nature, and arranged the feveral
claflcs and orders of exiftence.

A P'

( 349 )

APPENDIX 11.

Of Self-love.

T.

HERE is a principle, fuppofed to prevail
among many, which is utterly incompatible with all
virtue or moral fentim.enti and as it can proceed
from nothing but the moft depraved difpofition, fo
in its turn it tends ftill further to encourage thac
depravity. This principle is, that all benevolence is
mere hypocrify, friendfhip a cheat, public fpirit'
a farce, fidelity a fnare to procure truft and
confidence -, and that, while all of us, at bot-
tom, purfue only our private intereft, we wear
thefe fair difguifes, in order to put others off
their guard, and expofe them the more to our
wiles and machinations. What heart one mull: be
pofTeffed of who profeflTes fuch principles, and who
feels no internal fentiment that belies fo pernicious
a theory, it is eafy to imagine : And alfo, what
degree of affe6tion and benevolence he can bear to
a fpecies, whom he reprefents under fuch odious
colours, and fuppofes fo little fufceptible of gra-
titude or any return of afi^edion. Or if we fhould
not afcribe thefe principles wholly to a corrupted
heart, we muft, at lealt, account for them from
the moft carelefs and precipitate examination. Su-
perficial reafoners, indeed, obferving many falfe
pretences among mankind, and feeling, perhaps,
no very ftrong reftraint in their own difpofition,
might draw a general and a hafty conclufion, that

all

3S0

APPENDIX II.

all is* equally corrupted, and that inen, different
from all other animals, and indeed horn all other
fpecies of exiftence, admit of no degree of good
or bad, but are, in every inftance, the fame crea-
tures under different difguifes and appearances.

There is another principle, fomewhat refembling
the former j which has been much infilled on by
philofophers, and has been the foundation of many
a fyftem; that, whatever affeftion one may feel,
or imagine feels for others, no paffion is, or can be
difinterefted; that the mod dangerous friendfhip,
however fincere, is a modification of felf-love; and
that, even unknown to ourfelves, we feek only our
own gratification, while we appear the moft deep-
ly engaged in fchhmes for the liberty and happi-
nefs of mankind. By a turn of imagination, by
a refinement of refileftion, by an enthufiafm of
paflion, we feem to take part in the interefts of
others, and imagine ourfelves divefted of all felfifh
confiderations : But, at bottom, the moft generous
patriot and moft niggardly mifer, the braveft hero
and moft abjeft coward, have, in every adlion, an
equal regard to their own happinefs and welfare.

Whoever concludes from the feeming tenden-
cy of this opinion, that thofe, who make profeffion
of it, cannot poffibly feel the true fentiments of be-
nevolence, or have any regard for genuine virtue,
will often find himfelf, in practice, very much mif-
taken. Probity and honour were no ftrangers to
Epicurus and his (eO:. Atticus and Horace feem
to have enjoyed from nature, and cultivated by re-
flexion, as generous and friendly difpofitions as
any difciple of the aufterer fchools. And among
the modern, Hobbes and Locke, who maintained
the felfifh fyftem of morals, lived irreproachable
lives i though the former lay not under any re-
ftraintof religion, which might fupply the defects
of his philofophy.

An Epicurean or a Hobbift readily allows, that

there

OFSelf-Love. 351

there is fuch a thing as friendfhip in the world,
without hypocrify or difguifej though he may at-
tempt, by a philofophical chymiftry, to refolve the
elements of this pafTion, if I may fpeak, into thofe
of another, and explain every afFedion to be felf-
love, twilled and moulded, by a particular turn
of imagination, into a variety of appearances. But
as the fame turn of imagination prevails not in
every man, nor gives the fame direQion to the ori-
ginal paflion ; this is fufficient, even according to
the felfifli fyftem, to make the wideft difference in
human charatlers, and denominate one man virtu-
ous and humane, another vicious and meanly inte-
refled. I efteem the man, whofe felf-love, by
whatever means, is fo direfted as to give him a
concern for others, and render him ferviceable to
fociety : As I hate or defpife him, who has no re-
gard to any thing beyond his own gratifications
and enjoyments. In vain would you fuggeft, that
thefe characters, though feemingly oppofite, are,
at bottom, the fame, and that a very inconfide-
rable turn of thought forms the v/hole difference
between them. Each chara6ter, notwithftanding
thefe inconfiderable differences, appears to me, in
praftice, pretty durable and untranfmutable. And
I find not in this more than in other fubjefts, that
the natural fentiments, arifing from the general ap-
pearances of things, are eafily deftroyed by fubtile
refleclions concerning the minute origin of thefe
appearances. Does not the lively, chearful colour
of a countenance infpire me with complacency and
pleafure; even though I learn from philofophy,
that all difference of complexion arifes from the
moll minute differences of thicknefs, in the moll
minute parts of the fkinj by means of which a fu-
perficies is qualified to refle6l one of the original
colours of light, and abforb the others ?

But though the queflion, concerning the uni-
verfal or partial felfifhnefs of man be not fo ma-
terial,

3s^ A P P E N D I X II.

terial, as is ufually imagined, to morality and
pra6lice, it is certainly of confequence in the fpe-
culative fcience of human nature, and is a pro-
per objecSl of curiofity and enquiry. It may not,
therefore be unfuitable in this place, to beftow a
few refteftions upon it*.

The moll obvious objedlion to the felfifh hy-
pothefis, is, that, as it is contrary to common
feeling and our mod unprejudiced notions, there
is required the higheft ftretch of philolbphy to
eftablilh fo extraordinary a paradox. To the
moft carelefs obferver, there appear to be fuch
difpofitions as benevolence and generofity; fuch
-afteftions as love, friendfhip, companion, grati-
tude. Thefe fentiments have their caufes, effects,
objedts, and operations, marked by common lan-
guage and obfervation, and plainly diftinguifhed
from thofe of the felfifli paflions. And as this
is the obvious appearance of things, it muft be
admitted; till fome hypothefis be difcovered,
which, by penetrating deper into human nature,
may prove the former affeftions to be nothing
but modifications of the latter. All attempts of
this kind have hitherto proved fruitlefs, and feem
to have proceeded entirely, from the love oi fim-
flicityy which has been the fource of much falfe
reafoning in philofophy. I fhall not here enter
into any detail on the prefent fubject. Many
able philofophers have fliown the infuriiciency of
thefe fyftems. And I fhall take for granted what,
I believe, the fmalleft refle6tion will make evi-
dent to every impartial enquirer.

But the nature of the fubjedt furnifhes the
ftrongeft prefumption, that no better fyftem will
ever, for the future, be invented, in order to ac-
count for the origin of the benevolent from the
fclfifli affedtions, and reduce all the various emo-
tions

• See NOTE [OO].

OfSELF-LoVE. J53

tions of the human mind to a perfedV fimplici-
ty. The cafe is not the fame in this fjx^cies of
philofophy as in phyfics. Many an hypothefis
in nature, contrary to firfl appearances; hEs been
fo'Jnd, on more accurate fcrutiny, folid and fa-
tisfadory. Inftances of this kind are lb frequent,
that a judicious, as well as witty philofopher*,
has ventured to affirm, if there be more than one
way, in which any phrenomenon may be produc-
ed, that there is a general prefumption for its
arifing from the caufes, which are the leaft ob-
vious and familiar. But the prefumption always
lies on the other fide, in all enquiries concern-
ing the origin of our paffions, and of the internal
operations of the human mind. The fimpleft
and mod obvious caufe, which can there be af-
figned for any phasnomenon, is probably the true
one. When a philofopher, in the explication of
his fyftem, is obliged to have recourfe to fome
very intricate and refined refleftions, and to fup-
pofe them eflential to the produ6lon of any paf-
fion or emotion, we have reafon to be extreme-
ly on o.ir guard againft fo fallacious an hypo-
thefis. I'he affections are not fufceptible of any
imprcfTion from the refinements of reafon or ima-
gination j and it is always found, that a vigorous
exertion of the latter faculties, necefi^arily, from
the narrow capacity of the human mind, deftroys
all a6tivity in the former. Our predominant mo-
tive or intention is, indeed, frequently concealed
from ourfelves, when it is mingled and confound-
ed with other motives, which the mind, from va-
nity or felf-conceit, is defirous of fuppofing more
prevalent: But there is no inftance, that a con-
cealment of this nature has ever arifen from the
abftrufenefs and intricacy of the motive. A man,
that has loft a friend and patron, may flatter him-
felf, that ail his grief arifes from generous fenti-
VoL. II. A a mcnts,

* Mof. FONTENELIE.

354 A P P E N D 1 X IL

ments, without any mixture of narrow or inte-
refted confiderations : But a man, that grieves for
a valuable friend, who needed his patronage and
proteftionj how can we fuppofe, that his paf-
fionate tendernefs arifes from fome metaphyfical
regards to felf-intereft, which has no foundation
or reality ? We may as well imagine, that minute
wheels and fprings, like thofe of a watch, give
motion to a loaded waggon, as account for the
origin of paflion from fuch abftrufe refledtions.

Animals are found fufceptible of kindnefs, both
to their own fpecies and to ours; nor is there,
in this cafe, the leail fufpicion of difguife or ar-
tifice. Shall we account for all their fentiments, too,
from refined deductions of felf-intereft ? Or if we
admit a difinterefted benevolence in the inferior
fpecies, by what rule of analogy can we refufe
it in the fuperior ?

Love between the fexes begets a complacency
and good-will, very diftinft from the gratifica-
tion of appetite. Tendernefs to their offspring, in
all fenfible beings, is commonly able alone to
counter-balance the ftrongeft motives of felf-love,
and has no manner of dependance on that af-
fedion. What intereft can a fond mother have
in view, who lofes her health by affiduous atten-
dance on her fick child, and afterwards langulfhes
and dies of grief, when freed, by its death, from
the flavery of that attendance ?

Is gratitude no affedtion of the human breaft,
or is that a word merely, without any meaning
or reality ? Have we no fatisfaflion in one man's
company above another's and no defire of the
welfare of our friend, even though abfence or
death fliould prevent us from all participation in
it ? Or what is it commonly, that gives us any
participation in it, even while alive and prefent,
but our atfedtion and regard to him ?

Thefe and a thoufand other inftances arc marks

of

OFSelf-Love. 355

of a general benevolence in human nature, where
no real intcreft binds us to the objeft. And
how an imaginary inrereft, known and avowed for
fuch, can be the origin of any paflion or emo-
tion, feems difficult to explain. No fatisfaftory
hypothefis of this kind has yet been difcovered j
nor is there the fmalleft probability, that the
future indiiftry of men will ever be attended with
more favourable fuccefs.

But farther, if we confidcr rightly of the mat-
ter, we fhall find, that the hypothefis, which al-
lows of a difinterelled benevolence, diftindl from
fclf-!ove, has really v[\ovt ftmplicity in it, and is more
conformable to the analogy of nature, than that
which pretends to refolve all friendfhip and hu-
manity into this latter principle. There are bo-
dily wants or appetites, acknowledged by every
one, which neceffarily precede all fenfual enjoy-
ment, and carry us dire6tly to feek pofleflion of
the objedl. Thus, hunger and thirft have eating
and drinking for their end; and from the gra-
tification of thefe primary appetites arifes a plea-
fure, which may become the objed of another
fpecies of defire or inclination, that is feconda-
ry and intereiled. In the fame manner, there
are mental pafllons, by which we are impelled
immediately to feek particular objefts, fuch as
fame, or power, or vengeance, without any re-
gard to intereft; and when thefe objeds are at-
tained, a pleafing enjoyment enfues, as the con-
fequence of our indulged affections, . Nature muft,
by the internal frame and conftitution of the
mind, give an original propenfity to fame, ere
we can reap any pleafure from that acquifition,
or purfue it from motives offelf-love, and a de-
fire of happincfs. If I have no vanity, I take
no delight in praife : If I be void of ambition,
power gives me no enjoyment : If I be not an-

A a 2 gry.

356 APPENDIX II.

gry, the punifhment of an adverfary is totally in-
different to me. In all thefe cafes, there is a
palTion, v/hich points immediately to the object,
and conftitutes it our good orhappinefsj as there
are other fecondary paffions, which afterwards
ariie, and piirfue it as a part of our happinefs,
when once it is conft ><iteu fuch by our origi-
nal affections. Were no appetite of any kind
antecedent to felf-lovc, that propenfity could
fcarcely ever exert itfelf; becaufe we fhould, in
that cafe, have felt few and flender pains or
pleafures, and have little mifery or happinefs to
avoid or to purfiie.

Now where is the difficulty in conceiving, that
this may likewife by the cafe with benevolence
and friendfhip, and that, from the original frame
of our temper, we may feel a defire of ano-
ther's happinefs or good, which, by means of
that affetftion, becomes our own good, and is
afterwards purfued, from the combined motives
of benevolence and felf-enjoyment r Who fees not
that vengeance, from the force alone of paffion,
may be fo eagerly j^urfued, as to make us know-
ingly negleft every confideration of eafe, or fafe-
ty J and, like fome vindictive animals, infufe our
very fouls into the w^ounds we give an enemy*?
And what a malignant philofophy mud it be, that
will not allow, to humanity and fiiendfnip, the
fame privileges, which are undifputably granted
ro the darker pafiions of enmity and refentment ?
Such a philoiophy is more like a fatyr than a
true delineation or defcription of human nature}
and may be a good foundation for paradoxical
wit and raillery, but is a very bad one for any
ferious argument or reafoning.

APPENDIX

* Animcfque in vulnere ponur.t. ViRC.

Diini altc'ii noceat, lui negligens, fays Seneca of Atiger^
De Ira, I. i.

( 357 )

APPENDIX III.

Some farther Considerations with regard
to Justice.

Ti

HE intention of this Appendix is to give feme
more particular explication of the origin and na-
ture of Juftice, and to mark fome differences bc'
tween it and the other virtues.

The focial virtues of humanity and benevo-
lence exert their influence immediately, by a di-
red: tendency or inftinft, which chiefly keeps in
view the fimple objedl, moving the affections,
and comprehends not any fcheme or fyftem, nor
the confequences refulting from the concurrence,
imitation, or example of others. A parent flies to
the relief of his child j tranfported by that natu-
ral fympathy, which a(ftuates him, and which af-
fords no leifure to reflect on the fentiments or
conduft of the refl: of mankind in like circum-
ftances. A generous man chearfully embraces an
opportunity of ferving his friend ; becaufe he then
feels himfelf under the dominion of the beneficent
affe6tions, nor is he concerned whether any other
perfon in the univerfe were ever before a<5luated
by fuch noble motives, or will ever afterwards
prove their influence. In all thefe cafes, the fo-
cial paflions have in view a fingle individual ob-
je6t, and purfue the fafety or happinefs alone of

the

;558 APPENDIX III.

the perfon loved and efteemed. With this they
are fatisfied : In this, they acquiefce. And as
the good, refulting from their benign influence,
is in itfelf compleat and entire, it alio excites the
moral fentiment of approbation, without any re-
flefbion on farther confequences, and without any
more enlarged views of the concurrence or imi-
tation of the other members of fociety. On the
contrary, were the generous friend or difinterefted
patriot to ftand alone in the pradtice of beneficence;
this would rather inhance his value in our eyes,
and join the praife of rarity and novelty to his
other more exalted merits.

The cafe is not the fame with the fecial virtues
of juftice and fidelity. They are highly ufeful,
or indeed abfolutely neceflfary to the well-being of
mankind : But the benefit, refulting from them,
is not the confequence of every individual fingle
a6t; but arifes form the whole fcheme or fyftem,
concurred in by the whole, or the greater part of
the fociety. General peace and order are the at-
tendants of juftice or a general abftinence from the
poflfeffions of others : But a particular regard to
the particular right of one individual citizen may
frequently, confidered in itfelf, be produdive of
pernicious confequences. The refult of the indi-
vidual a6l:s is here, in many inftances, directly op-
pofite to that of the whole fyftem of aftions ; and
the former may be extremely hurtful, while the
latter is, to the higheft degree, advantageous.
Riches, inherited from a parent, are, in a bad
man's hand, the inftrument of mifchief. The right
of fucceffion may, in one inftance, be hurtful. Its
benefit arifes only from the obfervance of the ge-
neral rule; and it is fufficient, if compcnfation be
thereby made for all the ills and inconvenien-
cies, which flow from particular characters and
fituations.

Cyrus,

Farther Confiderations with regard to Jujiice. 359

Cyrus, young and unexperienced, confidercd on-
ly the individual cafe before him, and reflefled
on a limited fitnefs and convenience, when he
afflgned the long coat to the tall boy, and the
Ihort coat to the other of fmaller fize. His go-
vernor inftru<Sted him better; while he pointed
out more enlarged views and confequences, and
informed his pupil of the general, inflexible rules,
neccffary to fupport general peace and order in
fociety.

The happinefs and profperity of mankind, arif-
ing from the focial virtue of benevolence and its
fubdivifions, may be compared to a wall, built by
many hands; which ftill rifes by each (lone, that
is heaped upon it, and receives increafe propor-
tional to the diligence and care of each workman.
The fame happinefs, raifed by the focial virtue of
juftice and its fubdivifions, may be compared to a
building of a vault, where each individual ftone
would, of itfelf, fall to the ground ; nor is the
whole fabric fupported but by the mutual aflift-
ftance and combination of its correfponding parts.

All the laws of nature, which regulate property,
as well as all civil laws, are general, and regard
alone fome elTential circumftances of the cafe, with-
out taking into confideration the charadlers, fitua-
tions, and connexions of the perfon concerned, or
any particular confequences which may refult from
the determination of thefe laws, in any particular
cafe which offers. They deprive, without fcruple,
a beneficent man of all its poflefTions, if acquired
by miftake, without a good title j in order to be-
ftow them on a fclfifh mifer, who has already
heaped up immenfe ftores of fuperfluous riches.
Public utility requires, that property fhould be
regulated by general inflexible rules ] and though
fuch rules are adopted as be(t ferve thie fame end
of public utility, it is impofllble for them to pre-
vent all particular hardfliips, or make beneficial

confe-

36o APPENDIX III.

confequences refult from every individual cafe. It
is fufficient, if the whole plan or fcheme be necefiary
to the fupport of civil fociety, and if the balance
of good, in the main, do thereby preponderate
much above that of evil. Even the general laws
of the univerfe, though planned by infinite wif-
dom, cannot exclude all evil or inconvenience, in
every particular operation.

It has been afierted by fome, that juflice arifes
from Human Conventions, and proceeds from
the voluntary choice, confent, or combination of
mankind. If by convention be here meant a pro-
mije (which is the moft ufual fenfe of the word)
nothing can be more abfurd than this pofition.
The obfervance of promifes is itfelf one of the
moft confiderable parts of jufticej and we arc not
furely bound to keep our word, becaufe we have
given our word to keep it. But if by convention
be meant a {Qn(c of common intereft; which fenfe
each man feels in his own breaft, which he re-
marks in his fellows, and which carries him, in
concurrence with others, into a general plan or
fyftem of a<5lions, which tends to public utility ;
it muft be owned, that, in this fenfe, juftice arifes
from human conventions. For if it be allowed
(what is, indeed, evident) that the particular con-
fequences of a particular aft of juftice may be
hurtful to the public as well as to individuals; it
follows, that every man, in embracing that virtue,
muft have an eye to the whole plan or fyftem,
and muft expedl the concurrence of his fellows
in the fame condudt and behaviour. Did all his
views terminate in the confequences of each aft
of his own, his benevolence and humanitv, as well
as his felf-love, might often prelcribe to him mea-
fures of conduft very difterent from thofe, which
are agreeable to the ftrift rules of right and juf-
ftice.

Thus

Farther Confiderations with regard to Jujlice. 2^ i

Thus two men pull the oars of a boat by com-
mon convention, for common intereft, without
any promife or contracfb : Thus gold and fdver are
made the mcafurcs of exchange; thus fpeech and
words and language are fixed, by human conven-
tion and ao;reement. Whatever is advantageous
to two or more perfons, if all perform their part i
but what lofcs all advantage, if only one per-
form, can arife from no other principle. There
would otherwife be no motive for any one of them
to enter into that fcheme of condu<5l*.

The word, natural^ is commonly taken in fo
many fenfes, and is of fo looie a fignification, that
it feems vain to difpute, whether juftice be natu-
ral or not. If felf-love, if benevolence be natu-
ral to man ; if reafon and forethought be alfo na-
tural ; then may the fame epithet be applied to
juftice, order, fidelity, property, fociety. Men's
inclination, their neceflities lead them to combine;
their underftanding and experience tell them, that
this combination is impoffible, where each governs
himfelf by no rule, and pays no regard to the
poflcfllons of others : And from thefe pafTions and
refle(5tions conjoined, as foon as we obferve like
paflions and reflections in others, the fentiment of
juftice, throughout all ages, has infallibly and
certainly had place, to fome degree or other, in
every individual of the human fpecies. In fo fa-
gacious an animal, what neceffarily arifes from
the exertion of his intelle6tual faculties, may juft-
ly be efteemed natural f .

Among all civilized nations, it has been the
conftant endeavour to remove every thing arbi-
trary and partial from the decifion of property,
and to fix the fentence of judges by fuch gene-
ral

• See NOTE [PP.]
t Se« NOTE [Q9J.

562 APPENDIX III.

ral views and confiderations, as may be equal to
every member of the fociety. For befides, that
nothing could be more dangerous than to ac-
cuftom the bench, even in the fmalleft inftance,
to regard private friendlhip or enmity i it is cer-
tain, that men, where they imagine, that there
•was no other reafon for the preference of their
adverfary but perfonal favour, are apt to enter-
tain the ftrongeft ill-will againfl the magiilrates
and judges. When natural reafon, therefore,
points out no fixed view of public utility, by
which a controverfy of property can be decided,
pofitive laws are often framed to fupply its
place, and dire6l the procedure of all courts of
judicature. Where thefe too fail, as often hap-
pens, precedents are called for; and a former
decifion, though given itfelf without any fufHci-
ent reafon, juftly becomes a fufficient reafon for
a new decifion. If direft laws and precedents
be wanting, imperfect and indireft ones are
brought in aid ; and the controverted cafe is
ranged under them, by analogical reafonings and
comparifons, and fimilitudes, and correfponden-
cies, which are often more fanciful than real.
In general, it may fafely be affirmed, that jurif-
prudence is, in this refpedt, different from all the
fciences; and that in many of its nicer queftions,
there cannot properly be faid to be truth or falfe-
hood on either fide. If one pleader bring the
cafe under any former law or precedent, by a re-
fined analogy or comparifon j the oppofite pleader
is not at a lofs to find an oppofite analogy or com-
parifon : And the preference given by the judge
is often founded more on tafte and imagination than
on any folid argument. Public utility is the general
objed: of all courts of judicature ; and this uti-
lity too requires a ftabie rule in all controvcr-
fies : But where fcveral rules, nearly equal and in-
different, prefent themfelves, it is a very flight

turn

Farther Conftderations with regard to Jufi'ue. ;^6;^

turn of thought, which fixes the decifion in favour
of cither party *.

We may juft obferve, before we conclude this
fubje(5l:, that, after the laws of jufticeare fixed by
views of general utility, the injury, the hardfhip,
the harm, which refult to any individual from a
violation of them, enter very much into confidera-
tion, and are a great fource of that univerfal blame,
which attends every wrong or iniquity. By the
laws of fociety, this coat, this horfe is mine, and
ought to remain perpetually in my pofieflion : I
reckon on the fecure enjoyment of it : By depriv-
ing me of it, you difappoint my expectations, and
doubly difpleafe me, and offend every byftander.
It is a public wrong, fo far as the rules of equity
are violated : It is a private harm, fo far as an in-
dividual is injured. And though the fecond con-
fideration could have no place, were not the former
previoufly eftabliflied : For otherwife thediftinftion
of mine and thine would be unknown in fociety :
Yet there is no queftion, but the regard to general
good is much enforced by the refpeft to particular.
What injures the community, without hurting any
individual, is often more lightly thought of. But
where the greateft public wrong is alfo conjoined
with a confiderable private one, no wonder the
higheft difapprobation attends fo iniquitous a beha-
viour.

• Ske N O T E [R R].

( 349 )

APPENDIX IV.

Of SOME Verbal Disputes.

_^^ Othing is more ufual than for philofophers
to encroach upon the province of grammarians;
and to engage in difputes of words, while they
imagine, that they are handling controverfies of
the deepeft importance and concern. It was in
order to avoid altercations, fo frivolous and end-
lefs, that I endeavoured to ftate with the utmoft
caution the objedlof our prefent enquiry ; and pro-
pofed fimply to colle6l on the one hand, a lift of
thofe mental qualities which are the objedl of love
or efteem, and form a part of perfonal merit,
and on the other hand, a catalogue of thofe qua-
lities, which are the objeft of cenfure or reproach,
and which detra6l from the character of the per-
fon, poflefled of them; fubjoining fome reflecti-
ons concerning the origin of thefe fentiments of
praife or blame. On all occafions, where there
might arife the leaft hefitation, I avoided the
terms virtue and vice ; becaufe fome of thofe qua-
lities, which I claflcd among the objects of praife,
receive, in the Englifh language, the appellation
of talentSy rather than of virtues ; as fome of the
blameable or cenfurable qualities are often called
defe^Sy rather than vices. It may now, perhaps,
be expedted, thar, before we conclude this moral
enquiry, we fhould exa6tiy feparate the one from
the other -, fliould mark the precife boundaries of

virtues

366 A P P E N D I X IV.

virtues and talents, vices and defefbsj and fliould
explain the reafon and origin of that diftinftion.
But in order to excufe myfelf fronn this under-
taking, which would, at laft, prove only a gram-
matical enquiry, I fhall fubjoin the four following
reflexions, which fhall contain all that I intend to
fay on the prefent fubjeft.

FirJ^j 1 do not find, that in the Englilh, or any
other modern tongue, the boundaries are exad:ly
fixed between virtues and talents, vices and de-
feats, or that a precife definition can be given of
the one as contradiftinguifhed from the other.
"Were we to fay, for inftance, that the efteemable
qualities alone, which are voluntary, are entitled
to the appellation of virtues -, we fhould foon re-
collect the qualities of courage, equanimity, pati-
ence, felf-command ; with many others, which al-
moft every language clafles under this appellation,
though they depend little or not at all on our choice.
Should we affirm, that the qualities alone, which
prompt us to a<5t our part in fociety, are entitled
to that honourable diftindion ; it muft immediate-
ly occur, that thefe are indeed the mod valuable
qualities, and are commonly denominated the fo-
etal virtues j but that this very epithet fuppofes,
that there are alfo virtues of another fpecies. Should
we lay hold of the diftinftion between intelle^ual
and moral endowments, and affirm the lall alone to
be the real and genuine virtues, becaufe they alone
lead to adion j we fhould find, that many of thofe
qualities, ufaally called intelledlual virtues, fuch
as prudence, penetration, difcernment, dilbretion,
had alfo a confiderable influence on condutl. The
diftindlion between the heart and the head may
alfo be adopted : The qualities of the firfl: may be
defined fuch as in their immediate exertion are ac-
companied with a feeling or fentimentj and thefe
alone may be called the genuine virtues: But in-
duftry, frugality, temperance, fecrecy, perfeve-

rance.

Of SOME Verbal Disputes. 367

ranee, and many other laudable powers or habits,
generally ftiled virtues, are exerted without any
immediate fentiment in the perfon poflelTed of them ;
and arrc only known to him by their effects. It is
fortunate, amidft all this feeming perplexity, that
the qucftion, being merely verbal, cannot poflibly
be of any importance. A moral, philosophical
difcourfe needs not enter into all thefe caprices of
language, which are fo variable in different dialeds,
and in different ages of the fame dialed. But on
the whole, it feems to me, that, though it is always
allowed, that there are virtues of many different
kinds, yet when a man is called virtuous, or is de-
nominated a man of virtue, we chiefly regard his
focial qualities, which are, indeed, the moft valu-
able. It is, at the fame time, certain, that any re-
markable defed: in courage, temperance, cecono-
my, induftry, underftanding, dignity of mind,
would bereave even a very good-natured, honeft
man of this honourable appellation. Who did ever
fay, except by way of irony, that fuch a one was a
man of great virtue, but an egregious blockhead.^

But, fecondly, it is no wonder, that languages
fliould not be very precife in marking the bounda-
ries between virtues and talents, vices and defedls ;
fince there is little diftin6tion made in our internal
eftimation of them. It feems indeed certain, that
t\iQ fentiment of confcious worth, the felf-fatisfadbion
proceeding from a review of a man's own condu6t
and character J it feems certain, 1 fay, that this fen-
timent, which, though the moft common of all
others, has no proper name in our language *, arifes
from the endowments of courage and capacity, in-
duftry and ingenuity, as well as from any other
mental excellencies. Who, on the other hand, is
not deeply mortified with refledling on his own
folly and diffolutenefs, and feels not a fecret fting

Of
• See NOTE [SS],

368 A P P E N D I X IV.

or compunftion, whenever his memory prefents any
pait occurrence, where he behaved with ftupidity
or ill-manners ? No time can efface the cruel ideas
of a man's own foolilh conduft^ or of affronts,
which cowardice or impudence has brought upon
him. They flill haunt his folitary hours, damp his
moll afpiring thoughts, and fhew him, even to
himfelf, in the moll contemptible and moft odious
colours imaginable.

What is there too we are more anxious to con-
ceal from others than fuch blunders, infirmities,
and meannelfes, or more dread to have expofed by
raillery and fatire ? And is not the chief object of
vanity, our bravery or learning, our wit or breed-
ing, our eloquence or addrefs, our talle or abili-
ties ? Thefe we difplay with care, if not with of-
tentation; and we commonly fhow more ambiti-
on of excelling in them, than even in the focial
virtues themfelves, which are, in reality, of fuch
fuperior excellence. Good -nature and honelly,
efpecially the latter, are fo indifpenfably required,
that, though the greatefb cenfure attends any vio-
lation of thefe duties, no eminent praife follows
fuch common inllances of them, as feem elfential
to the fupport of human fociety. And hence the
reafon, in my opinion, why, though men often ex-
tol fo liberally the qualities of their heart, they
are Ihy in commending the endowments of their
head: Becaufe the latter virtues, being fuppofed
more rare and extraordinary, are obierved to be
the more ufual objefts of pride and felf-conceit ;
and when boalled of, beget a llrong fufpicion of
thefe fentiments.

It is hard to tell, whether you hurt a man's cha-
rafler moft by calling him a knave or a coward,
and whether a beaftly glutton or drunkard be not as
odious and contemptible, as a felfifh, ungenerous
mifer. Give me my choice, and 1 would rather,
for my own happinefs and felf-enjoyment, have a

friendly.

Of SOME Verbal Disputes. ^^9

friendly, humane heart, than poflefs all the other
virtues of Demofthenes and Philip united : But I
would rather pafs with the world for one endowed
with extenfive genius and intrepid courage, and
fhould thence expeft ftronger inftances of general
applaufe and admiration. The figure which a
man makes in life, the reception which he meets
with in company, the efleem paid him by his ac-
quaintance ; all thefe advantages depend as much
upon his good fenfe and judgment, as upon any
other part of his chara6ler. Had a man the bell
intentions in the world, and were the fartheft re-
moved from all injuftice and violence, he would
never be able to make himfelf be much regarded,
without a moderate fhare, at lead, of parts and un-
derftanding.

What is it then we can here difpute about? If
fenfe and courage, temperance and induflry, wif-
dom and knowledge confefledly form, a confidera-
ble part o( perfonal merit: if a man, pofifeffed of
thefe qualities, is both better fatisfied with himfelf,
and better entitled to the good-will, efleem, and
fervices of others, than one entirely deflitute of themj
if, in fhort, the Jentiments are fimilar, wnich arifc
from thefe endowments and from the focial virtues ;
is there any reafon for being fo extremely fcrupu-
lous about a word^ or difputing whether they be en-
titled to the denomination of virtues ? It ma)", in-
deed, be pretended, that the fentiment of approba-
tion, which thofe accomplifliments produce, befides
its being inferior^ is alfo fomewhat different from
that, which attends the virtues of juftice and huma-
nity. But this fecms not fufficient reafon for rank-
ing them entirely under different clalTes and appel-
lations. The charatler of Cicfar and that of Cato,
as drawn by Salluft, are both of them virtuous, in
the ftridefl and moil limited fenfe of the word ; but
in a different way: Nor are the fentiments entirely
the fame, which arife from them. The one is ami-

VoL. II. B b able;

370 A P P E D N 1 X IV.

able ; the other awful : We fViould wifh to meet
the one charafter in a friend ; the other we fhould
be ambitious of in ourfelves. In like manner the
approbation, which attends temperance or induftry
or frugality, may be fomewhat different from that
which is paid to the fbcial virtues, without making,
them entirely of a different fpecies. And, indeed,
we may obferve, that thefe endowments, more than
the other virtues, produce not, all of them, the
fame kind of approbation. Good fenfe and genius
beget elleem and regard : Wit and humour excite
love and affedion *

Mcft people, I believe, will naturally, without
premeditation, affent to the definition of the elegant
and judicious poet.

Virtue (for mere good-nature is a fool)
Is fenfe and fpirit with humanity f.

What pretenfions has a man to our generous affift-
ance or good offices, who has dilTipated his wealth
in profufe expences, ide vanities, chimerical pro-
jefts, diffolute pleafures, or extravagant gaming?
Thefe vices (for we fcruple not to call them fuch)
bring mifery unpitied) and contempt on every one
addicted to them.

Achasus, a wife and prudent prince, fell into a
fatal fnare, which cofl him his crown and life, af-
ter having ufed every reafonable precaution to guard
himfelf againft it. On tiiat account, fays the hif-
torian, he is a juft obje<St of regard and compiiffion v
His betrayers alone of hatred and coiitcmpt ^l.

The precipitate fiight and improvident negligence'
of Pompey, at the beginning of the civil wars, ap-
peared fuch notorious blunders to Cicero, as quite
palled his friendlhip towards that great man. in '-he
fame manner -i fays he, as zvant of cleanliniifi^y dccoicyy
or dijcretion in a mijtrcjs are found to aiichate cur af-

feclions.

* See NOTE [TT].

f The Art of preferving Health, Book 4.

t Poi-ytius, lib. viii. cap. 2.

of SOME Verbal Disputes. 371

jettons. For fo be exprciTcs himfeif, where he
talks, not in the charafter of a philofopher, but ini
that of a (latefman dnd man of the world, to his
fric^nd Atticiis*.

Buc the fame Cicero, in imitation of all the an-
cien'- moralidsj when he reafons as a philofopher,
enlarges very much his ideas of virtue, and com-
prehends every laudable quality or endowment of
the mind, under that honourable appellation. This
leads to the third refledlion, which we propofed to
make, to wit, that the ancient moralifts, the beft
models, made no material diflindtion among the
different fpecies of mental endowments and defedls,
but treated all alike under the appellation of virtues
and vices, and made them indifcriminately the ob-
je6l of their moral reafonings. The prudence ex-
plained in Cicero's Offices f, is that fagacity, which
leads to the difcovery of truth, and preferves us
from error and mi Hake. Magnanmity^ temperance^
decency, are there alfo at large difcourfed of. And
as that eloquent moralift followed the common re-
ceived divifion of the four cardinal virtues, our fo-
cial duties form but one head^ in the general dillri-
butiori of his fubjeft J^

We need only perufe the titles of chapters in Arif-
totle's Ethics to be convinced, that he ranks cou-
rage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, mo-
defly, prudence, and a manly opennefs, among
the virtues^ as well asjufticeand friendfliip.

To/ii/inin and to abjlaiui that is, to be patient
and continent, appeared to lome of the ancients ai
fummary comprehenfion of all morals,

tpiftetus has fcarcely ever mentioned the fenti-
ment of humanity or compailion, but in order td
put his difciples on their guard againftit. The vir-
tue of the iitoies feems to confift chiefly in a firm
temper and a found underilanding. With them,
B b 2 as

* Lib. ix. epid. lo. f Lib. i. cap. 6-

X See NOTE [UU].

37i A P P E N D I X IV.

as with Solomon and the eaftern moralifts, folly and
wifdom are equivalent to vice and virtue.

Men will praife thee, fays David *, when thoo
doft well unto thyfelf. I hate a wife nnan, fays the
Greek poet, who is not wife to himfelf f.

Plutarch is no more cramped by fyftems in his
philofophy than in his hiflory. "Where he compares
the great men of Greece and Rome, he fairly fets
in oppofition all their blemifhes and accomplifh-
ments of whatever kind, and omits nothing confi-
derable, which can either deprefs or exalt their cha-
rafters. His moral difcourfes contain the fame free
and natural cenfure of men and manners.

The charadler of Hannibal, as drawn by Livy jl,
is efteemed partial, but allows him many eminent
virtues. Never was there a genius, fays the hiftori-
an, more equally fitted for thofe oppofite offices of
commanding and obeying ; and it were, therefore,
difficult to determine whether he rendered himfelf
dearer to the general or to the army. To none would
Ktafdrubal entruft more willingly the conduct of
any dangerous entcrprize; under none, did the fol-
diers difcover more courage and confidence. Great
boldnefs in facing danger ; great prudence in the
midft of it. No labour could fatigue his body or
fubdue his mind. Cold and heat were indifferent
to him : Meat and drink he fought as fupplies to
the neceffities of nature, not as gratifications of his
voluptuous appetites ? Waking or reft he ufed indif-

criminately, by night or by day. Thcfe great

Virtues were balanced by great Vices: inhum^a
cruelty, perfidy more than ^//w/Vj no truth, no faith,
no regard to oaths, piomifes, or religion.

The character of Alexander the Sixth, to be
found in Guicciardin §, is pretty fimilar, butjufier;
and is a proof, that even the moderns, where they

fpeak

* Pfalm 49th.

f M.,> an:i,-Mv ori>" «>c ctu7« !Tof^. Euripides.

X Lib. xxi. cap. 4. § Lib. i.

Of SOME Verbal Disputes. 373

I'peak naturally, hold the fame language with the
ancients. In this pope, fays he, there was a fingu-
lar capacity and judgment: Admirable prudence;
a wonderful talent of perfuafion ; and in all mo-
mentous enterprizes, a diligence and dexterity in-
credible. But thefe virtues were infinitely overba-
lanced by his vices-, no faith, no religion, infatiable
avarice, exorbitant ambition, and a more than
barbarous cruelty.

Polybiusf, reprehending Timasus for his parti-
ality againll Agathocles, whom he himfelf allows to
be the molt cruel and impious of all tyrants, fays :
If he took refuge in Syracufe, as afTerted by that
hiftorian, flying the dirt and fmoke and toil of his
former profefllon of a potter; and if proceeding
from fuch flender beginnings, he became mafter,
in a little time, of all Sicily ; brought the Cartha-
ginian ftate into the utmofl; danger -, and at lafl; died
in old age, and in pofleffion of fovereign dignity :
Muft he not be allowed fomething prodigious and
extraordinary, and to have pofielied great talents
and capacity for bufinefs and attion ? His hiftorian,
therefore, ought not to have alone related what
tended to his reproach and infamy ; but alfo what
iriight redound to his Praife and Honour.

In general, we may obferve; that the diftinflion
of voluntary or involuntary was little regarded by
the ancients in their moral reafonings ; where they
frequently treated the qucftion as very doubtful,
whether virtue could be taught or not*' 'i They juftly
confidered, that cowardice, m.eannefs, levity, anx-
iety, impatience, folly, and many other qualities
of the mind, might appear ridiculous and deform-
ed, contemptible and odious, though independent
of the will. Nor could it be fuppofed, at all times,

in

f Lib. xii.

* Vid. Plato in Me NONE, Se-' eca rtVo/Zoy^/. cap. 31. So
alfo Horace, Virtutem doBrina, paret, Jiaturane donet. Epilh
lib. i. ep. 18. .^scHiNEs SocjiATicus. Dial. 1.

574 A P P E N D I X IV.

In every man's power to attain every kind of mental,
more than of exterior beauty.

And here there occurs xht fourth refleftion which
I purpofed to m.ake, in fuggetting the reafon, why
modern philofophers have often followed a coiirfe,
in fheir moral enquiries, fo different from that of
the ancients. In later times, philofophy of all
kinds, efpecially ethics, have been more clofely
united with theology than ever they were obferved
to be among the Heathens j and as this latter fci-
ence admits of no terms of compofition, but bends
every branch of knowledge to its own purpofe,
without much regard to the phenomena of nature,
or to the unbiafled fentiments of the mind, hence
reafoning, and even language, have been warped
from their natural courfe, and diflindlions have been
endeavoured to be eftablilhed, where the difference
of the obje6t was, in a manner, imperceptible.
Philofophers, or rather divines under that difguife,
treating all morals, as on a like footing with ci-
vil laws, guarded by the fandlions of reward and
punifhment, were neceiTarily led to render this cir-
cumflance, oi voluntary ox involuntary , the founda-
tion of their whole theory. Every one may employ
terms in what fenfe he pleafes : But this, in the mean
time, muft be allowed, thu/entments are every day
experienced of blame and praife, which have objects
beyond the dominion of the will or choice, and of
which it behoves us, if not as moralills, as fpecula-
tive philofophers at leall, to give fome fatisfad:ory
theory and explication.

A blemifh, a fault, a vice, a crime; thefe ex-
preffions feem to denote different degrees of cenfure
and difapprobation ; which are, however, all of
them, at the bottom, pretty nearly of the fame kind
or fpecies. The explication of one will eafily lead
us into a jufl: conception of the others ; and it is of
greater confequence to attend to things than to ver-
bal

or SOME Verbal Disputes. 375

bal appellations. That we owe a duty to oiirfelves
is confefled even in the moft vulgar fyftem of mo-
rals J and it muft be of confequcnce to examine that
duty, in order to fee, whether it bears any affinity
to that which we owe to fociety. It is probable,
that the approbation, attending the obfervance of
both, isofafimilar nature, and arifes from fimilar
principles; whatever appellation we may give to
jeither -of thefe cxcellejncies.

A DI A-

( 377 )

DIALOGUE.

M

Y friend, Palarqedes, who is as great a: ramb-
ler in his principles as in his perfon, who has
run over^ by ftudy and travel, almoft every re-
gion of the intelledual and material world, fur-
prized me lately with an account of a nation,
with whom, he told me, he had pafled a con-
fiderable part of his life, and whom, he found,
in the main, a people extremely civilized and
intelligent.

There is a country, faid he, in the world, cal-
led Fourli, no matter for its longitude or lati-
tude, whofe inhabitants have ways of thinking,
in many things, particularly in morals, diametri-
cally oppofite to ours. When I came among
them, 1 found that I muft fubmit to double pains;
firft to learn the meaning of the terms in their
language, and then to know the import of thofe
terms, and the praife or blame attached to them.
After a word had been explained to me, and
the charadler, which it exprefled, had been def-
cribed, I concluded, that fuch an epithet mull
neceflfarily be the greatefl; reproach in the world;
and was extremely furprized to find one in a pub-
lic company, apply it to a perfon, with whom
he lived in the ftridleft intimacy and friendlliip.

Tou

378 A D I A L O G U E.

Tcu fancy, faid I one day, to an acquaintance, that
Changuis is your m-ortal enemy: I love to extinguijh
quarrels, and Imujl, therefore^ tell youy that I heard
him talk of you in the mojl obliging manner. But to
my great allonilhment, when I rcneaned Changuis's
words, though I had both remembered and under-
ftood them perfeflly, I found, that they were trken
for the moft mortal affront, and that I had very m-
nocently rendered the breach between thefe perfons
altogether irreparable.

As it was my fortune to come among this people
on a very advantageous footing, I was immediately
introduced to the beft company : and being defired
by Alcheic to live with him, I readily accepted of
his invitation ; as I found him univerfaJly efieemed
for his perfonal merit, and indeed regarded by every
pile in Fourli, as a perfeft charader.

One evening he invited me, as an amufement,
to bear him company in a ferenade, which he
intended to give to Gulki, with whom, he told
me, he was extremely enamoured; and I foon
found that his tafte was not fingular: For we
met many of his rivals, who had come on the
fame errand. I very naturally concluded, that
this miflrefs of his muft be one of the fineft
women in town; and I already felt a fecret in-
clination to fee her, and be acquainted with her.
But as the moon began to rife, I was much fur-
prized to find, that we were in the midfl of the
univerfity, where Gulki ftudied: And I was fome-
what aihamed for having attended my friend, on
fuch an errand.

1 was afterwards told, that Alcheic's choice of
Gulki was very much approved of by all the
good company in town; and that it was expeft-
ed, while he gratified his own palTion, he would
perform to that young man the fame good of-
fice, which he had himfclf owed to Elcouf. It
leems Alcheic had been very handfome in his
youth, had been courted by many lovers ; but had

beftowed

A D I A L O G U E. 379

beftowed his favours chiefly on the fage Elcoulf;
to whom he was fuppofed to owe, in great mea-
fure, the aftonilhing progrefs which he had made
in philolbphy and virtue.

Ic gave me fome furprize, that Alchcic's wife
(who by the- bye happened alfo to be his fifter)
was no wife fcandalized at this fpecies of infi-
delity.

Much about the fame time I difcovered (for
it was not attempted to be kept a fecret from mc
or any body) that Alcheic was a murderer and
a parricide, and had put to death an innocent
perfon, the moft nearly connected with him, and
whom he was bound to proted and defend by
all the ties of nature and humanity. When I
afked, with all the caution and deference ima-
ginable, what was his motive for this adion;
he replied coolly, that he was not then fo much
at eafe in his circumftances as he is at prefent,
and that he had a£Ved, in that particular, by the
advice of all his friends.

Having heard Alcheic's virtue fo extremely
celebrated, 1 pretended to join in the general
voice of acclamation, and only afked, by way of
curiofity, as a ftranger, which of all his noble
actions was moft highly applauded; and I foon
found, that all fentiments were united in giving
the preference to the affallination of Ufbek. This
Ufbek had been to the laft moment Alcheic's
intimate friend, had laid many high obligations
upon him, had even faved his life on a certain
occafion, and had, by his will, which was found
after the murder, made him heir to a confide-
rable part of his fortune. Alcheic, it feems, con-
fpired with about twenty or thirty more, moft
of them alfo Uft>ek's friends j and falling all to-
gether on that unhappy man, when he was not
aware, they had torne him with a hundred wounds j
and given hi^n that reward for his paft favours

apd

38o A D I A L O G U E.

and obligations. Ufbek, faid the general voice
of the people, had many great and good quali-
ties: His very vices were fhining, magnificent,
and generous : But this adion of Alcheic's fets
him far above Ufbek in the eyes of all judges
of merit; and is one of the nobleft that ever
perhaps the fan fhone upon.

Another part of Alcheic's conduft, which I
alfo found highly applauded, was his behaviour
towards Calilh, with whom he was joined in a
project or undertaking of fome importance. Ca-
lifh, being a paffionate man, gave Alcheic, one
day, a found drubbing; which he took very pa-
tiently, waited the return of Califh's good-hu-
mour, kept ftill a fair correfpondence with him;
and by that means brought the affair, in which
they were joined, to a happy ifTue, and gained
to himfelf immortal honour by his remarkable
temper and moderation.

1 have lately received a letter from a corref-
pondent in Fourli, by which I learn, that, fince
my departure, Alcheic, falling into a bad flate of
health, has fairly hanged himfelf; and has died
univerfally regretted and applauded in that coun-
try. So virtuous and noble a life, fays each
Fourlian, could not be better crowned than by
fo noble an end ; and Alcheic has proved by this,
as well as by all his other aftions, what he boafl-
ed of near his laft moments, that a wife man is
fcarcely inferior to the great god, Vitzli. This
is the name of the fupreme deity among the
Fourlians.

The notions of this people, continued Pala-
medes, are as extraordinary with regard to good-
manners and fociablenefs, as with regard to mo-
rals. My friend Alcheic formed once a party
for my entertainment, compofed of all the prime
wits and philofophers of Fourli; and each of us
brought his mcfs along with him to the place

where

A t) I A L O G U K. 381

where we afiembled. I obferved one of them
to be worfe provided than the reft, and offered
hinri a fhare of my mefs, which happened to be
a roafted pullet : And 1 could not but remark,
that he and all the reft of the company fmiled
at my fimplicity. I was told, that Alcheic had
once fo much intereft with this club as to pre-
vail with them to eat in common, and that he
had made ufe of an artifice for that purpofe.
He perfuaded thofe, whom he obferved to be
worjl provided, to offer their mefs to the com-
pany i after which, the others, who had brought
more delicate fare, were aftiamed not to make
the fame offer. This is regarded as fo extraor-
dinary an event, that it has fince, as I learn,
been recorded in the hiftory of Alcheic's life,
compofed by one of the greateft geniufes of
Fourli.

Pray, faid I, Palamedes, when you were at
Fourli, did you alfo learn the art of turning
your friends into ridicule, by telling them ftrange
ftories, and then laughing at them, if they be-
lieved you. I affure you, replied he, had I been
difpofed to learn fuch a leffon, there was no place
in the world more proper. My friend, fo often
mentioned, did nothing, from morning to night,
but fneer, and banter, and rally i and you could
fcarcely ever diftinguifli, whether he were injt^ft
or earneft. But you think then, that my ftorv
is improbable; and that I have ufed, or rather
abufed the privilege of a traveller. To be fure,
faid I, you were but in jeft. Such barbarous
and favage manners are not only incompatible
with a civilized, intelligent people, fuch as you
faid thefe were; but fcarcely compatible
with human nature. They exceed all we ever
read of, among the Mingrelians, and Topinam-
boues.

Have a care, cried he, have a care ! You arc

not

382 A D I A L O G U £.

not aware that you are fpeaking blafphemy, and
are abufing your favourites, the Greeks, efpeci-
ally the Athenians, whom I have couched, all
along, under thefe bizarre nannes I employed*
If you confider aright, there is not one ftroke
of the foregoing chara6ter, which might not be
found in the man of higheft merit at Athens,-
without diminiihing in the leaft from the bright-
nefs of his character. The amours of the Greeks^
their marriages *, and the expofing of their chil-
dren cannot but ftrike you immediately. The
death of Ufbek is an exa£t counter-part to that
of Casfar.

All to a trifle, faid I, interrupting him : You
did not mention that Ufbek was an ufurper.

I did not, replied he; left you Ihould difcover
the parallel I aimed at. But even adding this
circumftance, we fhould make no fcruple, accord-
ing to our fentiments of morals, to denominate
Brutus, and Caffius, ungrateful traitors and af-
fafTins: Though you know, that they are, per-
haps, the higheft charadlers of all antiquity; and
the Athenians ered;ed ftatues to them ; which they
placed near thofe of Harmodius and Ariftogiton,
their own deliverers. And if you think this cir-
cumftance, which you mention, fo material to
abfolve thefe patriots, I fhall compcnfate it by
another, not mentioned, which will equally ag-
gravate their crime. A few days before the ex-
ecution of their fatal purpofe, they all fwore feal-
ty to Cacfar; and protefting to hold his perfon
ever facred, they touched the altar with thofe
hands, which they had already armed for his
deftruflionf.

I need not remind you of the famous and ap-
plauded

* The laws of Athens allowed a man to marry his filler by
the fiither. Solon's law forbid p;edcrally to flaves, as being ait
aft of too great dignity for lucii mean perfons.

f Appian. Bell. Civ. lib. iii. Suetonius in vita Cxfaris.

A D I A L O G U E. 33j

plauded ftory of Themiftocles, and of his pati-
ence towards Eurybiades, the Spartan, his com-
manding officer, who, heated by debate, lifted
his cane to him in a council of war (the fame
thing as if he had cudgelled him), Strike! cries
the Athenian, y////^^/ bui hear me.

You are too good a fcholar not to difcover
the ironical Socrates and his Athenian club in my
laft ftory ; and you v/ill certainly obferve, that
it is exadlv copied from Xenophon, with a va-
riation only of the names *. And I think I have
fairly made it appear, that an Athenian man of
merit might be fuch a one as with us would
pafs for inceftuous, a parricide^ an affafnn, un-
grateful, perjured traitor, and fomething elfe too
abominable to be named j not to mention his ruf-
ticity and ill-manners. And having lived in this
manner, his death might be entirely fuitable:
He might conclude the fcene by a defperate ad:
of felf-murder, and die v/ith the moft abfurd
blafphemies in his mouth. And notwithftanding
all this, he fhall have ftatues, if not altars, ereft-
ed to his memory; poems and orations fhall be
compofed in his praife ; great feds fhall be
proud of calling themfelves by his name; and
the moft diftant pofterity fhall blindly continue
their admiration : Though were fuch a ane to arife
among themfelves, they would juftly regard him.
with horror and execration.

I might have been aware, replied I, of your
artifice. You feem to take pleafure in this to-
pic : and are indeed the only man 1 ever knew,
who was well acquainted with the ancients, and
did not extremely admire them. But inftead of
attacking their philofophy, their eloquence, or
poetry, the ufual fubjetts of controverly between
us, you now leem to impeach their morals, and

accufe
* Mem, Soc. lib. iii. Tub. fine.-

jS4 A t) I A L O G U E.

accufe them of ignorance in a fcience, which is
the only one, in my opinion, in which they are ,
not furpaffed by the moderns. Geometry, phy-
fics, aftronomy, anatomy, botany, geography, na-
vigation; in thefe we juftly claim the fuperiority:
But what have we to oppofe to their moralifts ?
Your reprefentation of things is fallacious. You
have no indulgence for the manners and cuftoms of
different ages. Would you try a Greek or Roman
by the common law of England ? Hear him defend
himfelf by his own maxims; and then pronounce.

There are no manners fo innocent or reafonable,
but may be rendered odious or ridiculous, if mea-
fured by a flandard, unknown to the perfons ; efpe-
cially, if you employ a little art or eloquence, in
aggravating fome circumftances, and extenuating
others, as befl fuits the purpofe of your difcourfe.
All thefe artifices may eafily be retorted on you.
Could 1 inform the Athenians, for inftance, that
there was a nation, in which adultery, both aftive
and pafilve, fo to fpeak, was in the higheft vogue
and eftcem: In which every man of education chofc
for his miilrefs a married woman, the wife, perhaps,
of his friend and companion ; and valued himfelf
upon thefe infamous conquells, as much as if he
had been feveral times a conqueror in boxing or
wreftling at the Olympic games : In which every man
alfo took a pride in his tamenefs and facility with
regard to his own wife, and was glad to make
friends or gain interefl- by allowing her to profti-
tute her charms; and even, without any fuch mo-
tive, gave her full liberty and indulgence: I afk,
what fentiments the Athenians would entertain of
fuch a people; they who never mentioned the crime
of adultery but in conjunction with robbery and
j)oifoning? Which would they admire moft, the
viliany or the meannefs of fuch a conduft ?

•Should I add, that the fame people nere as proud
of their llavery and dependance as the Athenians of
their liberty; and though a man among them were

op])rcfled>

A D I A L O G U E. 385

difgraced, impoverifhcd, infulced, or imprifoned
by the tyrant, he would Hill regard" it as the high-
efl merit to love, ferve, and obey him ; and even
to die for his fmallefl glory or fatisfaftion : Thefe
noble Greeks would probably aik me, whether I
fpoke of a human fociety, or of fome inferior,
fervile fpecies.

It was then I might inform my Athenian au-
dience, that thefe people, however, v^^anted not
fpirit and bravery. If a man, fay I, though their
intimate friend, (hould throw out, in a private
company, a raillery againfc them, nearly ap-
proaching any of thofe, v/ith which your generals
and demagogues every day regale each other, in
the face of the whole city, they never can forgive
him; but in order to revenge themfelves, they
oblige him immediately to run them through die
body, or be himfelf murdered. And if a man,
who is an abfolute flranger to them, lliould defire
them, at the peril of their own life, to cut the
throat of their bofom-companion, they imme-
diately obey, and think themfelves highly oblig-
ed and honoured by the commiffion. Thefe are
their maxims of honour : This is their favourite-
morality.

But though fo ready to draw their fword againft'
their friends and countrymen ; no difgrace, no in-
famy, no pain, no poverty will ever engage thefe
people to turn the point of it againfi: their own
bread. A man of rank would row in the gallies,
would beg his bread, would languifh in prifon,
would fuffer any tortures; and ftill preferve his
wretched life. Rather than efcape his enemies by
a generous contempt of death, he would infa-
moully receive the fame death from his enemies,
aggravated by their triumphant infults, and by the
moit exquifire fufFcrings.

It is very ufual too, continue I, among this peo-
ple to erect jails, where every art of plaguing and

Vol. II. ' C c tor-

386 A D I A L O G U E.

tormenting the unhappy prifoners is carefully
ftudied and pradifed : And in thefe jails it is ufuat
for a parent voluntarily to fliut up feveral of his
children ; in order, than another child, whom he
owns to have no greater or rather lefs merit than
the reft, may enjoy his v/hole fortune, and wallow
in every kind of voluptuoufnefs and pleafure. No-
thing fo virtuous in their opinion as this barbarous
partiality.

But what is more fingular in this whimfical na-
tion, fay I to the Athenians, is, that a frolic of
yours during the Saturnalia *, when the flaves are
ferved by their mafters, is ferioufly continued by
them throughout the whole year, and throughout
the whole courfe of their lives; accompanied too
with fome circumftances, which ftill farther aug-
ment the abfurdity and ridicule. Your fport only
elevates for a few days thofe whom fortune has
thrown down, and whom fhe too, in fport, may
really elevate for ever above you : But this nation:
gravely exalts thole, whom nature has fubjefled to
them, and whofe inferiority and infirmities are ab-
folutely incurable. The women, though without
virtue, are their mafters and fovereigns : Thefe
they reverence, praife, and magnify : To thefe,
they pay the higheft deference and refpefb: And in
all places and all times, the fuperiority of the fe-
males is readily acknowledged and fubmitted to by
every one, who has the leall pretenfions to educa-
tion and politenefs. Scarce any crime would be fo
univerfally deteited as an infradlion of this rule.

You need go no further, replied Palamedes i 1
can eafily conje6ture the people whom you aim at.
The ftrokcs, with which you have painted them,
are pretty juft; and yet you muft acknowledge,
that fcarce any people are to be found, cither m

ancient

* The Greeks kept the feaft of Saturn or Chronus, as well a?
the Romans. SceLucian. Epift. datum.

A D I A L O G U E. 387

ancient or modern times, whofc national charafter
is, upon the whole, lels liable to exception. But
I give you thanks for helping me out with my ar-
gument. 1 had no intention of exalting the mo-
derns at the expence of the ancients. I only meant
to reprefent the uncertainty of all thefe judgments
concerning characters ; and to convince you, that
fafhion, vogue, cuftom, and law, were the chief
foundation of all moral determinations. The
Athenians furely, were a civilized, intelligent peo-
ple, if ever there v/ere one; and yet their man of
merit might, in this age, be held in horror and
execration. The French are alfo, without doubt,
a very civilized, intelligent people ; and yet their
man of merit might, with the Athenians, bean ob-
jedl of the higheft contempt and ridicule, and even
hatred. And what renders the matter more ex-
traordinary : Thefe two people are fuppofed to be
the mofb fimilar in their national chara6ter of any
in ancient and modern times ; and while the Eng-
lifh flatter themfelves that they refemble the Ro-
mans, their neighbours on the continent draw the
parallel between themfelves and thofe polite Greeks. .
What wide difference, therefore, in the fentiments
of morals, muft be found between civilized nati-
ons and Barbarians, or between nations whofe
characters have little in common? How fhall we
pretend to fix a flandard for judgments of this na-
ture ?

By tracing matters, replied I, a little higher,
and examining the firft principles, which each
nation eftablifhes, of blame or cenfure. The
Rhine flows north, the Rhone fouth j yet both
fpring from the fame mountain, and are alfo ac-
tuated, in their oppofite directions, by the Ja;ne
principle of gravity. The different inclinations
of the ground, on which they run, caule all the
difference of their courfes.

C c 2 In

388 A DIALOGUE.

In how many circumftances would an Atheniafri
and a French man of merit certainly refemble each
other ? Good fcnfe, knowledge, wit, eloquenccj.
humanity, fidelity, truth, jiillice, courage, tem-
perance, eonftancy, dignity of mind : Thefc you
have all omitted ; in order to infill only on the
points, in which they may, by accident, differ.
Very well : I am willing to com-ply with you ; and
fhall endeavour to account for thcfe differences
from the moft univerfal, eftablifhed principles of
morals.

The Greek loves, I care not to examine more
particularly. I Ihall only obferve, that, however
blameable, they arofe from a very innocent caufe,
the frequency of the gymnaftic exercifes among,
that people -, and were recommended, though ab-
furdly, as the fource of friendfliip, fympathy, mu-
tual attachment, and fidelity *j qualities efteem-
cd in all nations and all ages.

The marriage of half-brothers and fillers feems^
no great difficulty. Love between the nearer rela-
tions is contrary to reafon and public utility -, but
the precife point, where we are to Hop, can fcarce-
ly be determined by natural reafon ; and is there-
fore a very proper fubje6l for municipal law or
eullom. If tlite Athenians went a little too far on
the one fide, the canon law has furely pulhed
matters a great way into the other extreme f .

Had you alked a parent at Athens, why he be-
reaved his child of tiiat fife, which he had fo late-
ly given it. It is becaufe I love it, he would re-
ply ; and regard the poverty which it mull inherit
from me, as a greater evil than death, which it
is not capable of dreading, feeling, or relent-
ing J.

How

• Plat. fymp. p. 182. Ex edit. Ser.

f See Enquiry, Sed. IV.

X Plut. de amore prolis, Tub fine.

A D I A L O G U E. 3^9

How is public liberty, the moft valuable of all
blel]ino:s, to be recovered from the hands of an
ufurper or tyrant, if his power fliields him from
public rebellion, and our fcruples from private
vengeance ^ 1 hat his crime is capital by law, you
acknowledge : And muft the highell aggravation
of his crime, tlit putting of himfelf above law,
form his full fecurity ? You can reply nothing,
but by fhowing the great inconveniences of aflaf-
fination J which could any one have proved clearly
to the ancients, he had reformed their fcntiments in
this particular.

Again, to call your eye on the picture which I
Iiave drawn of modern manners j there is almoft as
great difficulty, I acknowledge, to juftify French
as Greek galJantryj except only, that the former
■ is much more natural and agreeable than the latter.
J>ut our neighbours, it feems, have refolved to fa-
crifice fome of the domeflic to the fociable plea-
furesj and to prefer eafe, freedom, and an open
commerce, to a Uriel fidelity and conftancy. Thefe
ends are both good, and are fomewhat difficult to
reconcile i nor need we be furprifed, if the cuiloms
of nations incline too much, fometimes to the one
iidc, fometimes to the other.

The molt inviolable attachment to the laws of our
country is every v/here acknowledged a capital vir-
tue :j and where the people are not fo happy, as to
have any legiflature but a fingle perfon, the ftridt-
eft loyalty is, in that cafe, the trueft patriotifm.

Nothing furely can be more abfurd and barbar-
ous than the practice of duelling; but thofe, who
juftify it, fay, that it begets civility and good-
manners. And a duellifl:, you may obferve, always
values himfelf upon his courage, his fenfe of ho-
nour, his fidelity and friendihip -, qualities, which
are here indeed very oddly direded, but which have
been elleemed univerfally, fince the foundation of
the world.

Have

390 A D I A L O G U E.

Have the gods forbid felf murder ? An Atheniaa
allows, that it ought to be forborn. Has the Dei-
ty permitted it ? A Frenchman allows, that death is
preferable to pain and infamy.

You fee then, continued I, that the principles
upon which men reafon in morals are always the
fame ; though the conclufions which they draw are
often very different. That they all reafon aright
with regard to this fubjeft, more than with regard
to any other, it is not incumbent on any moralift
to fhow. It is fufficient, that the original princi-
ples of cenfure or blame are uniform, and that er-
roneous conclufions can be corrected by founder
reafoning and larger experience. Though many
ages have elapfed fince the fall of Greece and
Rome; though many changes have arrived in reli-
gion, language, laws, and cuftoms j none of thefe
revolutions has ever produced any confiderable in-
novation in the primary fentiments of morals, more
than in thofe of external beauty. Some minute
differences, perhaps, may be obferyed in both.
Horace * celebrates a low forehead, and Anacreon
joined eye-brows f: But the Apollo and the Venus
of antiquity are ftill our models for male and fe-
male beauty ; in like manner as the character of
Scipio continues our ftandard for the glory of he-
roes, and that of Cornelia for the honour of ma-
trons.

It appears, that there never was any quality re-
commended by any one, as a virtue or moral ex-
cellence, but on account of its being ujeful^ or
agreeable to a man him/elf^ or to others. For what
other reafon can ever be affigned for praife or ap-
probation ? Or where would be the fenfe of extol-
ling a good charafter or aftion, which, at the fame

time,

♦ Epift. lib. i. cpift. 7. Alfo lib. i. ode 3.
I Ode 28. Petronius (cap. 86.) joins both ihcfe circumftan-
ces as beauties.

A D I A L O G U E. 391

lime, is allowed to be good for fwthw^ ? All the
differences, therefore, in morals, may be reduced
to this one general foundation, and may be ac-
counted for by the different views, which people
take of thefe circumftances.

Sometimes men differ in their judgment about
the ufefulnef^ of any habit or adion : Sometimes
alfo the peculiar circumftances of things render one
moral quality more ufeful than others, and give it
a peculiar preference.

It is no-t furprifing, that, during a period of war
and -difcwder, the military virtues fliould be more
celebrated than the pacific, and attradl more the
admiration and attention of mankind, " Flow
*' ufual ivS it,*' fays Tully *, " to find Cimbrians,
*' CeltiberiajTiS, and other Barbarians, who bear,
*' with inflexible conftancy, all the fatigues and
*^ dangers of the field ; but are immediately dif-
*' pirited UF.dtT the pain and hazard of a languifh-
** ing diftemper : While, on the other hand, the
** Greeks patiently endure the flow approaches of
** death, when armed with ficknefs and difeafe ;
^' but timoroufly Hy his prefence, whe-n he attacks
" them violently with fwords and falchions !'* So
<iifierent is even the fame virtue of courage among
warlike or peaceful nations \ And indeed, we may
obferve, that, as the difference between war and
peace is the greateft that arifes among nations and
public focietics, it produces alfo the greateft varia-
tions in moral fentiment, and diverfifics the moft
our ideas of virtue and perfonal merit.

Sometimes too, magnanimity, greatnefs of mind,
difdain of flavery, inflexible rigour ^nd integrity,
may better fuit the circumilances of one age than
thofe of another, and have a more kindly influence,
both on public affairs, and on a man's own

fafety

* Tufc. Qncell. lib. ii.

J92 A D I A L O G U E.

Safety and advancement. Our idea of merit, there-
fore,, will alfo vary a little with thefe variations;
and Labeo, perhaps, he cenfured for the fame
qualities, which procured Cato the highelh appro-
biition.

A degree of luxury may be ruinous and pernici-
ous in a native of Switzerland, which only fofters
the arts, and encourages induftry in a Frenchman
or Englilhman. We are not, therefore, to expetl,
either the fame ientiments, or the fame laws in
Berne, which prevail in London or Paris.

Different cultoms have alfo fome influence as
well as different util'ties; and by giving an early
biafs to the mind, may produce a fuperior propen-
fity, either to the ufeful or the agreeable qualities;
to thofe which regard felf, or thofe which extend
to fociety. Thcfe four fources of moral fentiment
ftili fubliil: ; but particular accidents may, at one
time, make any one of them flow with greater
abundance than at another.

The cuftoms of fome nations fhut up the wo-
men from all focial commerce : Thofe of others
make them fo effential a part of fociety and
converfation, that, except where bufinefs is tran-
fatled, the male-fex alone are fuppofed almoft
wholly incapable of mutual difcourfe and enter-
tainment. As this difference is the mofb mate-
rial that can happen in private life, it muft alfo
produce the greatcft variation in our moral fenti-
ments.

Of all nations in the world, where polygamy
was not allowed, the Greeks feem to have been
the mod referved in their commerce with the fair
fex, and to have impofed on them the ftri(5left
laws of modelty and decency. We have a ilrong
inftance of this in an oration of Lyfias *. A
widow injured, ruined, undone, calls a meeting

of

• Orat. 33.

A D I A L O G U E. 393

of a few of her neareft friends and relations ;
and though never before accuftomed, fays the
orator, to fpeak in the prefence of men, the
diftrefs of her circumftances conitrained her to
lay the cafe before them. The very opening of
her mouth in fuch company required, it feems,
an apology.

When Demofthenes profecuted his tutors, to
make them refund his patrimony, it became ne-
ceflary for him, in the courfe of the law-fuit,
to prove that the marriage of Aphobus's filler
with Oneter was entirely fraudulent, and that,
notwithftanding her Iham marriage, fhe had liv-
ed with her brother at Athens for two years pad,
ever fince her divorce from her former hufband.
And it is remarkable, that though thefe were
people of the firft fortune and diftindtion in the
city, the orator could prove this fadt no way, but
by calling for her female flaves to be put to the
queftion, and by the evidence of one phyfician,
who had feen her in her brother's houfe duri
ing her illnefs *. So referved were Greek man-
ners.

We may be aflTured, that an extreme purity of
manners was the confequence of this referve.
Accordingly we find, that, except the fabulous
(lories of an Helen and a Clytemneflra, there
fcarcely is an inftance of any event in the Greek hif-
tory, which proceeded from the intrigues of wo-
men. On the other hand, in modern times, par-
ticularly in a neighbouring nation, the females
enter into all tranfaftions and all management of
church and Itate : And no man can exped fuccefs,
who takes not care to obtain their good graces.
Harry the third, by incurring the difpleafure of
the fair, endangered his crown, and loft his life,
as much as by his indulgence to herefy.

It

* In Oneterem.

394 A D I A L O G U E.

It is needlefs to diflemble : The confequence of
a very free commerce between the fexes, and of
their living much together, will often terminate in
intrigues and gallantry. We muft facrifice fome-
what of the ufefuly if we be very anxious to ob-
tain all the agreeable qualities; and cannot pretend
to reach alike every kind of advantage. Inftan-
ces of licence, daily multiplying, will weaken
the fcandal with the one fex, and teach the other
by degrees, to adopt the famous maxim of La
Fontaine, with regard to female infidelity, that if
one knows //, // is but a Jmall matter 3 if one knows
it noty it is nothing *.

Some people are inclined to think, that the beft
way of adjulling all differences, and of keeping
the proper medium between the agreeable and
the ufeful qualities of the fex, is to live with
them after the naanner of the Romans and the
Englilh (for the cuftoms of thefe two nation?
feem fimilar in this refpedt f) 5 that is, without
gallantry J, and without jealoufy. By a parity of
reafon, the culloms of the Spaniards and of the
Italians of an age ago (for the prefent are very
different) mufl be the worfl of any j becaufe they
favour both gallantry and jealoufy.

Nor will thefe different cultoms of nations af-
fedt the one fex only : Their idea of perfonal
merit in the males mufl alfo be fomewhac different
with regard, at leaft, to converfation, addrefs,
and humour. The one nation, where the men
live much apart, will naturally more approve of
prudence; the other of gaiety. With the one

fimplicity

* Qnand on le f9alt c'ell pen de chofe :
Qiiand on I'ignore, ce n'elt rien.
t See NOTE [XX].

% The gallantry here meant is that of amours and attachment*,
not that of complaifance, which is as much paid to the tair-fex
in England as in any other country.

A\

A D 1 A L O (; U E. 395

fimplicity of manners will be in the higheft efteem i
•with the other, politenefs. The one will diftin-
giiifh themiclves by good-fenfe and judgment;
the other, by tafte and delicacy. The eloquence
of the former will fhine moll in the fenate j that
of the other, on the theatre.

Thefe, I fay, are the natural effeds of fuch cuf-
toms. For it muft be confefled, that chance has
a great influence on national manners j and many
events happen in fociety, which are not to be ac-
counted for by general rules. Who could imagine,
for inftance, that the Romans, who lived freely
v/ith their women, fhould be very indifferent about
mufic, and efteem dancing infamous : While the
Greeks, who never almoft faw a woman but in
their own houfes, were continually piping, finging,
and dancing ?

The differences of moral fentiment, which na-
turally arife from a republican or monarchical go-
vernment, are alfo very obvious ; as well as thofc
which proceed from general riches or poverty,
union or faftion, ignorance or learning. 1 fhall
conclude this long difcourfe with obferving, that
different culloms and fituations vary not the ori-
ginal ideas of merit (however they may, fome
confequences) in any very effential point, and pre-
vail chiefly with regard to young men, who can
afpire to the agreeable qualities, and may attempt
to pleafe. The Manner, the Ornaments, the
Graces, which fucceed in this lliape, are more
arbitrary and cafual : But the merit of riper
years is almoft every where the fame ; and con-
fifts chiefly in integrity, humanity, ability, know-
ledge, and the other more folid and ufeful quali-
ties of the human mind.

What you infift on, replied Palamedes, may

have fome foundation, when you adhere to the

maxims of common life and ordinary conduct.

3 Experience

39^ A D I A L O G U £.

Experience and the practice of the world readiK
corre6b any great extravagance on either fide. Bu
what fay you to artificial lives and manners ? How
do you reconcile the maxims, on which, in diffe-
rent ages and nations, thefe are founded ?

What do you underftand by artificial lives and
manners ? faid I. I explain nrjyfelf, replied he.
You know, that religion had, in ancient times,
very little influence on common life, and that,
after men had performed their duty in facrifices and
prayers at the temple, they thought, that the
gods left the reft of their conduct to themfelves,
and were little pleafed or offended with thofe vir-
tues or vices, which only affefled the peace and
happinefs of human fociety. In thofe ages, it was
the bufinefs of philofophy alone to regulate men's or-
dinary behaviour and deporpnent ; and according-
ly,, we may obferve, that this being the fole prin-
ciple, by which a man could elevate himfelf above
his fellows, it acquired a mighty afcendant over
many, and produced great Angularities of maxims
and of condu6t. At prcfent, when philofophy has
loll the allurement of novelty, it has no fuch ex-
tenfive influence; but feems to confine itfelfmoft-
ly to fpeculations in the clofet ; in the fame man-
ner, as the ancient religion was limited to facri-
fices in the temple. Its place is now fupplied by
the modern religion, which infpedls our whole
conduct, and prefcribes an univerfal rule to
our adlions, to our words, to our very thoughts
and inclinations ; a rule fo much the more auftere,
as it is guarded by infinite, though diftant, re-
wards and punifliments ; and no infraction of it
can ever be concealed or difguifed.

Diogenes is the mod celebrated model of
extravagant philofophy. Let us feck a pa-
rallel to him in modern times. We fhall
not difgrace any philofophic name by a com-
parifon with the Dominies or Loyolas, or

any

A D I A L O G U E. 397

any canonized monk or friar. Let us compare
him to Pafcal, a man of parts and genius as well
as Diogenes himfelf ; and perhaps too, a man of
virtue, had he allowed his virtuous inclinations to
have exerted and difplayed themfelves.

The foundation of Diogenes's condu6l was an
endeavour to render himfelf an independent being
as much as polfible, and to confine all his wants
and defires and pleafures within himfelf and his
own mind : The aim of Pafcal was to keep a per-
petual fenfc of his dependence before his eyes,
and never to forget his numberlefs wants and in-
firmities. The ancient fupported himfelf by mag-
nanimity, oilentation, pride, and the idea of his
own faperiority above his fellow-creatures. The
modern made conilant profefTion of humility and
abafement, of the contempt and hatred of him-
felfi and endeavoured to attain thefe fuppofed
virtues, as far as they are attainable. The aufteri-
ties of the Greek were in order to inure himfelf
to hardfhips, and prevent his ever fufFering :
Thofe of the Frenchman were embraced merely
for their own fake, and in order to fuffer as much
as polTible. The philofopher indulged himfelf in
the moft beaftly pleafures, even in public : The
faint refufed himfelf the moft innocent, even in
private. The former thought it his duty to love
his friends, and to rail at them, and reprove
them, and fcold them : The latter endeavoured
to be abfolutely indifferent towards his neareft
relations, and to love and fpeak well of his ene-
mies. The great objetl of Diogenes's wit was
every kind of fuperflition, that is every kind of
religion known in his time. The mortality of
the foul was his ftandard pirinciple ; and even
his fentiments of a divine providence fcem to
have been licentious. The moft ridiculous fu-
perftitions directed Pafcal's faith and practice ;
and an extreme contempt of this life, in

compa-

398 A D I A L O G U E.

comparifon of the future, was the chief foundation
of his condudt.

In fuch a remarkable contrafl do thefe two men
Hand : Yet both of them have met with general
admiration in their different ages, and have been
propofed as models of imitation. Where then is
the univerfal flandard of morals, which you talk
of? And what rule fhall we eftablilli for the many
different, nay contrary fentiments of mankind ?

An experiment, faid I, which fucceeds in the air,
will not always fucceed in a vacuum. \Vhe;i men
depart from the maxims of common reafon, and
affect thefe artificial lives, as you call them, no
one can anfwer for what will pleafe or difpleafe
them. They are in a different element from the
reft of mankind; and the natural principles of
their mind play not with the fame regularity, as if
left to themfelves, free from the illufions of religi-
ous fuperllition or philofophical enthufiafm.

T H F

THE

NATURAL HISTORY

O F

RELIGION.

( 401 )

THE

NATURAL HISTORY

O F

RELIGION.

INTRODUCTION.

A

S every enquiry, which regards religion, is
of the utnnofl: importance, there are two quefti-
ons in particular, which challenge our attention,
to wit, that concerning its foundation in reafon,
and that concerning its origin in human nature.
Happily, the firfl queftion, which is the moft im-
portant, admits of the moll obvious, at lead, the
cleared folution. The whole frame of nature be-
fpeaks an intelligent author; and no rational en-
quirer can, after ferious rcfleftion, fufpend his
belief a moment with regard to the primary prin-
ciples of genuine Theifm and Religion. But the
other quedion, concerning the origin of religioa
in human nature, is expofed to fome more diiti-
culty. The belief of invifible, intelligent power
has been very generally difFufed over the humari
race, in all places and in all agesj but it has
Vol. II. D d neither

402 The Natural History of Religion.

neither perhaps been fo univerial as to admit of no
exception, nor has it been in any degree, uni-
form in the ideas, which it has fuggeited. Some na-
tions have been difcovered, who entertained no
fentiments of Religion, if travellers and hiftori-
ans may be credited; and no two nations, and
fcarce any two men, have ever agreed precifcly
in the fame fentiments. It would appear, there-
fore, that this preconception fprings not from an
original inflind: or primary imprellion of nature,
fuch as gives rife to felf-love, affection between
the fexes, love of progeny, gratitude, refentment;
fince every inftin£t of this kind has been found
abfolutely univerfal in all nations and ages, and
has always a precife determinate objed, which it
inflexibly purfues. The firll religious principles
muft be fecondary; fuch as may eafily be per-
verted by various accidents and caufes, and whofe
operation too, in fome cafes, may, by an ex-
traordinary concurrence of circumllances, be al-
together prevented. What thofe principles are,
which give rife to the original belief, and what
thofe accidents and cauies are, which direct its
operation, is the fubjedl of our prefent enquiry.

Se<5l. I. T^hai Polytbeifm was the primary Religion
of Men.

It appears to me, that, if we confider the im-
provement of human fociety, from rude begin-
nings to a ftate of greater perfedicn, polytheifm
or idolatry was, and necelfarily muft Iiave been,
the firft and moft ancient religion of mankind.
This opinion I fliall endeavour to confirm by
the following arguments.

It is a matter of fa6t inconteftable, that about
1700 years ago all mankind were polytheiils.
The doubtful and trepticrd principles o\ a tew
philofophers, or ti-c thcifm, and that too not en-
tirely

The Natural History of Religion, 403

tirely pure, of one or two nations, form no ob-
jection wortii regarding. Behold then the clear
tellimony of hiftory. The farther we mount up
into antiquity, the more do we find mankind
plunged into polytheifm. No marks, no fymp-
toms of any more perfedl religion. The molt an-
cient records of human race (till prefent us with
that fyflem as the popular and efbabiifhed creed.
The north, the fouth, the eafl, the well, give
their unanimous teftimony to the fame fad. What
can be oppofed to fo full an evidence?

As far as writing or hiftory reaches, mankind^
in ancient times, appear univerfally to have beer^
polytheifts. Shall we afTert, that, in more anci-
ent times, before the knowledge of letters, or
the difcovery of any art or fcience, men enter-
tained the principles of pure theifm .'' That is,
while they were ignorant and barbarous, they dif-
covered truth : But fell into error, as foon as
they acquired learning and politenefs.

But in this aflertion you not only contradict
all appearance of probability, but alfo our pre-
fent experience concerning the principles and opi-
nions of barbarous nations. The favage tribes of
America, Africa, and Afia are all idolaters. Not a
fingle exception to this rule. Infomuch, that, were a
traveller to tranfport himfelf into any unknown re-
gion ; if he found inhabitants cultivated with arts
and fcience, though even upon that fuppofition
there are odds againft their being theifts, yet
could he not fafely, till farther inquuy, pronounce
any thing on that head : But if he found them
ignorant and barbarous, he might beforehand de-
clare them idolaters; and there fcarcely is a pof-
fibility of his being miftaken.

It feems certain, that, according to the natural
progrefs ot human thought, the ignorant multitude
mult firft entertain Ibme groveling and familiar no-

D d 2 tioa

404 The Natural History of Religion.

tion of fuperior powers, before they flretch their
conception to that perfeft Being, who beftowed
order on the whole frame of nature. We may as
reafonably imagine, that men inhabited palaces be-
fore huts and cottages, or ftiidied geometry before
agriculture; as aflert that the Deity appeared to
them a pure fpirit, omnifcient, omnipotent, and
omniprefent, before he was apprehended to be a
powerful, though limited being, with human paf-
fions and appetites, limbs and organs. The mind
rifes gradually, from inferior to fuperior: By ab-
ftrafling from what is imperfedl, it forms an idea
of perfedlion : And (lowly diftinguifhing the nobler
parts of its own frame from the grolTer, it learns
to transfer only the former, much elevated and rer-
iined, to its divinity. Nothing could difturb this
natural progrefs of thought, but fome obvious and
invincible argument, which might immediately lead
the mind into the pure principles of theifm, and
make it overleap, at one bound, the vaft interval
which is interpofed between the human and the di-
vine nature. But though I allow, that the order
and frame of the univerfe, when accurately examin-
ed, affords fuch an argument; yet I can never think,
that this confideration could have an influence on
mankind, when they formed their firft rude notions
of religion.

The caufes of fuch objc6ts, as are quite familiar
to us, never ftrike our attention or curiofity ; and
however extraordinary or furprifing thefe objeds in
themfelves, they are palTed over, by the raw and
ignorant multitude, without much examination, or
enquiry. Adam, rifmg at once, in paradife, and
in the full perfetlion of his faculties, would natu-
rally, as reprefented by Milton, be aftonillied at
the glorious appearances of nature, the heavens, the
air, the earth, his own organs and members ; and
would be led to afk, whence this wonderful fcene
arofe. But a barbaious, neceflitous animal (fuch as

a man

The Natural History of Rhligion. 405

a man is on the firft origin of fociety), preflcd by
fuch n'-imerous wants and pallions, has no leifure to
admire the regular face of nature, to make enqui-
ries concerning the caufe of thofe objetls, to which
from his infancy he has been gradually accurtomed.
On the contrary, the more regular and uniform,
that is, the more perfedl nature appears, the more
is he familiarized to it, and the lefs inclined to
fcrutinize and examine it. A monftrous birth ex-
cites his curiofity, and is deemed a prodigy. It
alarms him from its novelty; and immediately fpts
him a trembling, and facrificing, and praying. But
an animal, compleat in all its limbs and organs,
is to him an ordinary fpe6lacle, and produces no
religious opinion or afFeftion. Afk him, whence
that animal arofe; he will tell youj from the copu-
lation of its parents. And thefe, whence ? From
the copulation of theirs. A few removes fatisfy his
curiofity, and fet the objeft at fuch a diftance, that
he entirely loles fight of them. Imagine not, that
he will fo much as dart the queftion, whence the
firft animal; much lefs, whence the whole fyftem
or united fabric of the univerfe arofe. Or, if you«
ftart fuch a queftion to him, expect not, that he
will employ his mind with any anxiety about a fub-
jedt, fo remote, fo uninterefting, and which fo
much exceeds the bounds of his capacity.

But farther, if men were at firft led into the be-
lief of one Supreme Being, by reafoning from the
frame of nature, they could never poffibly leave
that belief, in order to embrace polytheifm ;
but the fame principles of reafon, which at firft pro-
duced and diffufed over mankind, fo magnificent an
opinion, muft be able, with greater facility, to pre-
ferve it. The firft invention and proof of any doc-
trine is much more difficult than the fiipportingand
retaining of it.

There

4o6 The Natural History of Religion.

There is a great difference between hiftorical
fa6ts and fpeculative opinions ; nor is the know-
ledge of the one propagated in the fame manner
with that of the other. An hiftorical fa6t, while
it paffes by oral tradition from eye-witneffes and
contemporaries, is difguifed in every fuccelTive
narration, and may at laft retain but very fmall,
if any, refemblance of the original truth, on which
it was founded. The frail memories of men, their
love of exaggeration, their fupine careleflhefs ;
thefe principles, if not corredled by books and
writing, foon pervert the account of hiftorical
events i where argument or reafoning has little
or no place, nor can ever recal the truth, which
has once efcaped thofe narrations. It is thus the
fables of Hercules, Thefeus, Bacchus are fuppof-
ed to have been originally founded in true hif-
tory, corrupted by tradition. But with regard
to fpeculative opinions, the cafe is far otherwife.
If thefe opinions be founded on arguments fo
clear and obvious as to carry conviftion with
the generality of mankind, the fame arguments,
".v/hich at firft diffufed the opinions, will ftill pre-
ferve them in their original purity. If the ar-
guments be more abftrufe, and more remote
from vulgar apprehenfion, the opinions will always
be confined to a few perfons ; and as foon as
men leave the contemplation of the arguments, the
opinions will immediately be loft and buried in
oblivion. Whichever fide of this dilemma we take,
it muft appear impollible, that theifiii could, from
reafoning, have been the primary religion of hu-
man race, and afterwards, by its corruption, given
birth to polytheifm and to all the various fuper-
ititions of the heathen world. Reafon, when ob-
vious, prevents thefe corruptions: When abftrufe,
it keeps the principles entirely from the know-
ledge of the vulgar, who arc alone liable to cor-
rupt any principle or opinion.

Sect.

The Natural History of Religion. 407

Sect. II. Origin of Polytheifm,

If we would, therefore, indulge our curiofity, in
■enquiring concerning the origin of religion, wc
muft turn our thoughts towards polytheifnn, the
primitive religion of uninftrufted mankind.

Were men led into the apprehenfion of invifible,
intelligent power by a contemplation of the works
of nature, they could never poifibly entertain any
conception but of one fingle being, who bellowed
exiflcnce and order on this vail machine, and
adjulted all its parts, according to one regular plan
or connected fyllem. For though, to perfons of
a certain turn of mind, it may not appear al-
together abfurd, that feveral independent beings,
endowed with fuperior wifdom, might confpire
in the contrivance and execution of one regular
plan ; yet is this a merely arbitrary fuppofition,
which, even if allowed polhble, muft be confefled
neither to be fupported by probability nor ne-
ceflity. All things in the univ^rfe ar^ evidently
of a piece. Every thing is adjulted to every
thing. One defign prevails throughout the whole.
And this uniformity leads the mind to acknow-
ledge one author ; becaufe the conception of dif-
ferent authors, without any diflinction of attri-
butes or operations, ferves only to give perplexi-
ty to the imagination, without beftowing any fa-
tisfacfticn on the underllanding. The ftatue of
Laocoon, as we learn from Pliny, was the work
of three artifts : But it is certain, that, were we not
told fo, we lliould never have imagined, that a
groupe of figures, cut from one itone, and unit-
ed in one plan, was not the work and contrivance
of one fuatuary. To afcribe any fingle efFe<5l to
the combination of feveral caufes, is not furely a
natural and obvious fuppofition.

On

4o8 The Natural History of Religion.

On the other hand, if, leaving the works of na-
ture, we trace the footfteps of invifible power in
the various and contrary events of human life, we
are necefTarily led into polytheifm and to the ac-
knowledgment of feveral limited and imperfeft dei-
ties. Storms and tempells ruin what is nourifhed
^by the fun. The fun deflroys what is foftered by
the moifture of dews and rains. War may be fa-
vourable to a nation, whom the inclemency of the
feafons afflifbs with famine. Sicknefs and pefti-
lence may depopulate a kingdom, amidft the moft:
profufe plenty. The fame nation is not, at the
fame time, equally fuccefsful by fea and by land.
And a nation, which now triumphs over its ene-
mies, may anon fubmit to their m.ore profperous
arms. In fliort, t!ie condu6V of events, or what
we call the plan of a particular providence, is fo
full of variety and uncertainty, that, if we fup-
pofe it immediately ordered by any intelligent be-
ings, we muft acknowledge a contrariety in their
dcfigns and intentions, a conflant combat of op-
pofite powers, and a repentance or change of in-
tention in ' the fame power, from impotence or
levity. Each nation has its tutelar deity. Each
element is fubjefted to its invifible power or agent.
The province of each god is feparate from that of
another. Nor are the operations of the fame god
always certain and invariable. To-day he pro-
tefts : To-morrow he abandons us. Prayers and
facrifices, rites and ceremonies, well or ill per-
formed, are the fources of his favour or enmity,
and produce all the good or ill fortune, v/hich are
to be found amongft mankind.

We m.ay conclude, therefore, that, in all nati-
ons, which have embraced polytheifm, the firfl:
ideas of religion arofe not from a contemplation
of the works of nature, but from a concern with
regard to the events of life, and from the incef-
fant hopes and fears, which actuate the human

mind.

The Natural History of Religion. 409

mind. Accordingly, we find, that all idolaters,
having feparated the provinces of their deities, have
recourfe to that invifible agent, to whole authority
they are immediately fubjccled, and whofe pro-
vince it is to fuperintend that courfe of aflions,
in which they are, at any time, engaged. Juno
is invoked at marriages ; Lucina at births. Nep-
tune receives the prayers of feamen -, and Mars of
warriors. The hufbandman cultivates his field un-
der the proteflion of Ceres ; and the merchant ac-
knowledges the authority of Mercury. Each na-
tural event is fuppofed to be governed by fome in-
telligent agent ; and nothing profperous or adverfc
can happen in life, which may not be the fubjcdt
of peculiar prayers or thankfgivings *

It muft neceflarily, indeed, be allowed, that,
in order to carry men's attention beyond the pre-
fent courfe of things, or lead them into any infer-
ence concerning invifible intelligent power, they
mufl be aduated by fom.e pafiion, which prompts
their thought and reflexion j fome motive, which
urges their firft enquiry. But what pafilon fliail we
here have recourfe to, for explaining an efFeA of
fuch mighty confequence ? Not fpeculative curio-
fity furely, or the pure love of truth. That mo-
tive is too refined for fuch grofs apprehenfions ;
and would lead men into enquiries concerning the
frame of nature, a fubjedl too large and compre-
henfive for their narrow capacities. No pafTions,
therefore, can be fuppofed to work upon fuch bar-
barians, but the ordinary aff^e6bions of human life;
the anxious concern for happinefs, the dread of
future mifery, the terror of death, the thirft of re-
venge, the appetite for food and other necefiaries.
Agitated by hopes and fears of this natjre, efpeci-
ally the latter, men fcrutinize, with a trembling-

curiofity,

• beeNOTE [YY].

4IO The Natural History of Religion.

curiofity, the courfe of future caufes, and exa-
mine the various and contrary events of human
life. And in this difordered fcene, with eyes dill
more difordered and aftonilhed, they fee the firft
obfcure traces of divinity.

Sect. III. The Jam Jubje^ continued.

We are placed in this world, as in a great the-,
atre, where the true fprings and caufes of every
event are entirely concealed from us^ nor have we
cither fufficient wifdom to forefee, or power to
prevent thofe ills, with which we are continually
threatened. We hang in perpetual fufpence be-
tween life and death, health and ficknefs, plenty
and want; which are diftributed amongft the hu-
man fpecies by fecret and unknown caufes, whofe
operation is oft unexpefted, and always unaccount-
able. Thefe unknown caujesy then, become the
conftant objedl of our hope and fear ; and while
the paflions are kept in perpetual alarm by an anx-
ious expedtation of the events, the imagination
is equally employed in forming ideas of thofe
powers, on which we have fo entire a depen-
dance. Could men anatomize nature, according
to the moft probable, at leaft the moft intelli-
gible phiiofophy, they would find, that thefe
caufes are nothing but the particular fabric and
ftru»5ture of the minute parts of their own bodies
and of external objects : and that, by a regular
and conftant machinery, all the events are pro-
duced, about which they are fo much concerned.
But this phiiofophy exceeds the comprehenfion of
the ignorant multitude, who can only conceive
the unknown caujes in a general and confufed
manner ; though their imagination, perpetually
employed on the fame fubjeft, muft labour to form
fome particular and diftinct idea of them. The

more

The Natural History of Religion. 411

inorc they confider thcfe caufes themfelves, and the
uncertainty of their operation, the Icfs fatisfacli-
tion do they meet with in their refcarches ; and,
however unwilling, they muft at laft have aban-
doned fo arduous an attempt, were it not for a
propenfity in human nature, which leads into a
fyftcm, that gives them fome fatisfaftion.

There is an univerfal tendency among mankind
to conceive all beings like themfdves, and to tranf-
fer to every objefb, thofe qualities, with which
they are familiarly acquainted, and of which they
are intimately confcious. We find human faces
in the moon, armies in the clouds; and by a na-
tural propenfity, if not correfled by experience
and refleftion, afcribe malice or good-will to eve-
ry thing, that hurts or pleafes us. Hence the fre-
quency and beauty of the profopcpccia in poetry j
where trees, mountains and flreams are perfonifi-
ed, and the inanimate parts of nature acquire ^tn-
timent and paflion. And though thefe poetical fi-
gures and expreffions gain not on the belief, they
may ferve, at leaft, to prove a certain tendency in
the imagination, without which they could neither
be beautiful nor natural. Nor is a river-god or
hamadryad always taken for a mere poetical or
imaginary perfonage ; but may fometimes enter
into the real creed of the ignorant vulgar; while
each grove or field is reprefented as poflefTed of a
particular genius or invifible power, which inha-
bits and prote(fts it. Nay, philofophers cannot en-
tirely exempt themfelves from this natural frailty ;
but have oft alcribed to inanimate matter the hor-
r ov o( 2i vaammy lympathies, antipathies, and other
afFeclions of human nature. The abfurdity is not
lefs, while we caft our eyes upwards ; and transfer-
ring, as is too ufual, human paffions and infirmi-
ties to the deity, reprefent him as jealous and re-
vengeful, capricious and partial, and, in fliort, a
wicked and foolifh man, in every refpeft but his

fuperior

412 The Natural History of Religion.

fuperior power and authority. No wonder, then,
that mankind, being placed in fuch an abfolute ig-
norance of caufes, and being at the fame time fo
anxious concerning their future fortune, fhould
immediately acknowledge a dependence on invifi-
ble powers, pofleffed of fentiment and intelligence.
The unknown caufes y which continually employ their
thought, appearing always in the fame afpeft, are
all apprehended to be of the fame kind or fpecies.
Nor is it long before we afcribe to them thought
and reafon and pafTion, and fometimes even the
limbs and figures of men, in order to bring them
nearer to a refemblance with ourfelves.

In proportion as any man's courfe of life is go-
verned by accident, we always find, that he en-
creafes in fuperftition ; as may particularly be ob-
ferved ofgamefters and failors, who, though, of all
mankind, the leaft capable of ferious refiedliion,
abound moft in frivolous and fuperftitious appre-
henfions. The gods, fays Coriolanus in Dionyfi-
iis *, have an influence in every afi^air; but above
all, in war; where the event is fo uncertain. All
human life, efpecially before the inftitutlon of order
and good government, being fubjed to fortuitous
accidents; it is natural, that fuperftition fhould
prevail every where in barbarous ages, and put
men on the moft earneft enquiry concerning thofe
invifible powers, who difpofe of their happinefs or
mifery. Ignorant of aftronomy and the anatomy
of plants and animals, and too little curious to
obferve the admirable adjuftment of final caufes ;
they remain ftill unacquainted with a firft and fu-
preme creator, and with that infinitely and perfedV
ipirlt, v/ho alone, by his almighty will, beliowed
order on the whole frame of nature. Such a magni-
ficent idea is too big for their narrow conceptions,

which,

* Lib. viil.

The Natural History of Religion. 413

which can neither obferve the beauty of the work,
nor connprehend the grandeur of its author. They
fuppofe their deities, however potent and invifi-
ble, to be nothing but a fpecies of human crea-
tures, perhaps raifed from among mankind, an4
retaining all human paflions and appetites, to"-
gether with corporeal limbs and organs. Such
limited beings, though mafters of human fate, be^
ing, each of them, incapable of extending his in-
fluence every where, muft be vaftly multiplied,
in order to anfwer that variety of events, which
happen over the whole face of nature. Thus
every place is ftored with a crowd of local dei-
ties; and thus polytheifm has prevailed, and ftill
prevarls, among the greatell part of uninflirudled
mankind *.

Any of the human affeftions may lead us into
the notion of invifible, intelligent power; hope as
well as fear, gratitude as well as affliftion : But
if we examine our own hearts, or obferve what
pafles around us, we fhall find, that men are much
oftener thrown on their knees by the melancholj^
than by the agreeable pafTions. JProfperity is ea-
fily received as our due, and few queftions are
alked concerning its caufe or author. It begets
cheerfulnefs and adlivity and alacrity and a lively
enjoyment of every focial and fenfual pleafurc :
And during this ftate of mind, men have little

leifure

* The following lines of Euripides are fo much to the prc-
fent purpofe, thai I cannot forbear quoting them :

Of* sfiy aSiy OTirov, »T syj~o^((K,
Out ixv ntuxui? -nrpot-craorla /uh -arpa^ei)' xoDtanS".
^vp^a-i i'oiv'i'oi ^ioi ■•nra,A(» Ti jcxi 'Cjfocruj,
TcLfctyuov £VTi9£v/ef, as (lyycuijix
litafiiY oct/lcf, Hecuba.

" There is nothing fecure in the world ; no glory, no prof-
perity. ^ The gods tofs all life into confuiion ; mix every
•' thing with its reverfe ; that all of us, from our ignorance and
" uncertainty, may pay them the more worlhip and reverence."

414 The Natural History of Religion,

leifure or inclination to think of the unknown in-
vifible regions. On the other hand, every dif"
aftrous accident alarms us, and fets us on en-
quiries concerning the principles whence it arofe :
Apprehenfions fpring up with regard to futurity :
And the mind, funk into diffidence, terror, and
melancholy, has recourfe to every method of ap-
p'eafing thofe fecret intelligent powers, on whom
our fortune is fuppofed entirely to depend.

No topic is more ufual with all popular di-
vines than to difplay the advantages of affli(flion,
in bringing men to a due fcnfe of religion ; by
fubduing their confidence and fenfuality, which,
in times of profperity, make them forgetful of a
divine providence. Nor is this topic confined
merely to modern religions. The ancients have
alfo employed it. Fortune has never liberally ^
without envy^ fays a Greek hiflorian *, bejiowed an
unmixed happinejs on mankind ; but with all her gifts
has ever conjoined Jome dijajirous circumjiance, in
order to chajiize men into a reverence for the godsj
whomy in a continued courfe of profperity ^ they are
apt to neglect and forget.

What age or period of life is the moft addicled
to fuperftition ? The weakeft and moft timid.
What fex ? The fame anfwer muft be given.
The leaders and examples of every kind of fuperfiition^
fays Strabo f, are the 'women. Theje excite the
men to devotion and fupplicationSy and the obfervance
of religious days. It is rare to meet with one that
lives apart from the females ^ and yet is addicted to
Juch pradlices. And nothing can, for this reafon, be
more improbable., than the account given of an order
of men among the Getes, who pra5lifed celibacy, and
were notwithfiandlng the tnojl religious fanatics.
A method of rcafoning, which would lead us to
entertain a bad idea of the devotion of monks ;

did

• Diod. Sic. lib. iii. f Lib. vii.

The Natural History of Religion. 415

did we not know by an experience, not fo conn-
mon, perhaps, in Strabo's days, that one may
pradife celibacy, and profeis chaflity; and yet
maintain the clofeft connexions and moft entire
fympathy with that timorous and pious fex.

Sect. IV. Deities not conjidered as creators or for-
mers of the world.

The only point of theology, in which we Ihall
find a confent of mankind almofb univerfal, is,
that there is invifible, intelligent power in the
world : But whether this power be fupreme or
fubordinate, whether confined to one being, or
diltributed among feveral, what attributes, qua-
lities, connexions, or principles of a6lion ought
to be afcribed to thofe beings ; concerning all
thefe points, there is the wideft difference in the
popular fyllems of theology. Our anceftors in
Europe, before the revival of letters, believed,
as we do at prefent, that there was one fupreme
God, the author of nature, whofe power, though
in itfelf uncontroulable, was yet often exerted by
the interpofition of his angels and fubordinate
minifters, who executed his facred purpofes.
But they aifo believed, that all nature was full
of other invifible powers ; fairies, goblins, elves,
fprights ; beings, ftronger and mightier than men,
but much inferior to the celelliai natures, who
furround the throne of God. Now, fuppofe, that
any one, in thofe ages, had denied the exiftence
of God and of his angels ; would not his impi-
ety juftly have deferved the appellation of athe-
ifm, even though he had ftill allowed, by fome
odd cajTicious reafoning, that the popular ftories
of elves and fairies were juft and well ground-
ed ? The difference, on the one hand, between
fuch a pcrfon and a genuine theift is infinitely

greater

4i6 The Natural History of Religion.

greater than that, on the other, between him and
one that abfolutely excludes all invifible intelligent
power. And it is a fallacy, merely from the ca-
fual refemblance of names, without any confor-
mity of meaning, to rank fuch oppofitc opinions
under the fame denomination.

To any one, who confiders juftly of the mat-
ter, it will appear, that the gods of all polythe-
ifts are no better than the elves or fairies of
our anceftors, and merit as little any pious wor-
fhip or veneration. Thefe pretended religionifts
are really a kind of fuperftitious atheifts, and
acknowledge no being, that correfponds to our
idea of a deity. No firft principle of mind or
thought: No fupreme government and adminif-
tration : No divine contrivance or intention in the
fabric of the world.

The Chinefe, when * their prayers are not an-
fwered, beat their idols. The deities of the Lap-
landers are any large ftone which they meet with
of an extraordinary fhape f. The Egyptian my-
thologifts, in order to account for animal worfhip,
faid, that the gods, purfued by the violence of
earth-born men, who were their enemies, had for-
merly been obliged to difguife themfelves under
the femblance of beafts J. The Caunii, a nation
in the IcfTer Afia, refolving to admit no Itrange
gods among them, regularly, at certain feafons,
affembled themfelves compleatly armed, beat the
air with their lances, and proceeded in that man-
ner to their frontiers ; in order, as they faid, to
expel the foreign deities Ij. Not even the immortal
godsy faid fome German nations to Csefar, are a
match for the Suevi §.

Many

• Peter le Com pte. f Rcgnard, Voiage de Laponie.

X Diod. Sic. lib. i. Lucian, de Sacrificiis. Ovid alludes to
the fame tradition, Metam. lib. v. 1. 321. So alfo Manilius,
lib. iv. II Herodot. lib. i.

§ Caef. Comment, de bello Gallico, lib. iv.

The Natural History of Rlligio!?. 417

Many ills, fays Dione in Honner ro Venus
Wounded by Diomede, many ills, my daughter,
have the gods inflicted on men : And many ills,
in return, have ir.en inflifted on the gods*.
We need but open any clafTic author to meet
with thelc grofs reprelentarions of the deities ;
and Longinus f with reafon obferves, that fuch
ideas of the divine nature, if literally taken, con-
tain a true atheifm.

Some writers J have been furprized, that the
impieties of Ariftophanes fhould have been to-
lerated, nay publicly acted and applauded by the
Athenians; a people fo fuperftitious and lb jea-
lous of the public religion, that, at that very
time, they put Socrates to death for his imagin-
ed incredility. But thefe writers do nor confi-
der, that the ludicrous, familiar im.ages, under
which the gods are reprefented by that comic
poet, inliead of appearing impious, were the ge-
nuine lights in which the ancients conceived their
divinities. What condud can be more criminal
or mean, than that of Jupiter in the Amphitri-
on ? Yet that play, which reprefented his gallant
exploits, was fuppofed fo agreeable to him, that
it was always acted in Rome by public authori-
ty, when the ftate was threatened with peftilence,
famine, or any general calainitylj. The Romans
fuppofed, that, like all old lerchers, he would be
highly pleafed with the recital of his former feats
of prowefs and vigour, and that no topic was
fo proper, upon which to flatter his vanity.

The Lacedemonian^, fays Xenophon §, always,
during war, put up their petitions very early in
the morninc-^, in order to be beforehand with theii
enemies, and, being the firft folicitors, pre-engage

Vol. II. E e the

• Lib. i\'. 3S2. f Cap. ix.

X Pere Brunio, , Theatre des Grecs ; & Fontenelle, Fliflolre*
dei Oracics. || Ainob. lib. vii; § De Laced. Rep<

41 B The Natural History of Religiom,

the gods in their favour. We may gather frorr;
Seneca*, that it was ufual, for the votaries in the
temples, to make interePc with the beadle or fex-
ton, that they might have a feat near the image
of the deity, in order to be the befc heard in
their prayers and applications to him. The Ty-
rians, when befieged by Alexander, threw chains
on the ftatue of Hercules, to prevent that deity
from deferting to the enemy f. Aiiguftus, having
twice loft his fleet by ftorms, forbad Neptune to
be carried in proccfTion along with the other
gods; and fancied, that he had fufficiently re-
venged himfelf by that expedient;]:. After Ger-
manicus's death, the people were fo enraged at
their gods, that they ftoned them in their tem-
ples; and openly renounced all allegiance to
them II .

To afcribe the origin and fabric of the uni-
verfe to thefe impcrfe6l beings never enters in-
to the imagination of any polytheift or idolater.
Hefiod, whofe writings, with thofe of Homer,
contained the canonical fyftem of the heathens §j
Hefiod, I fay, fuppofes gods and men to have
fprung equally from the unknown powers of na-
ture f. And throughout the whole theogony of
that author. Pandora is the only inftance of crea-
tion or a voluntary produdlion ; and flie too was
formed by the gods merely from defpite to Pro-
metheus, who had furniflied men with ftolen fire
from the ceftial regions ft- ^-^^'^^ ancient mytho-
logifts, indeed, feem throughout to have rather em-
braced the idea of generation than that of crea-
tion

* Epifl* xii.

t Quint. Curtius, lib. iv. cap. 3. Diod. Sic. lib. xvii.

.1 Suet, in vita Aug. cap. 16 || Id. in vita Cal. cap. 5.

§ Herodot. lib. ii. Lucian. Jupiter coufutatus, de lutlu, Sa-
tuf/i Sec.

n,-o,uo2jcr :^;;ctac7( :5eoi 2n;;'iojT" av5p-^7ro'. Hef. Opera & Dies,
1. iu8.

ft Thcog. 1. 570.

The Natural History of Religion. 4.1^

lion or formation; and to have thence account-
ed for the origin of this univerfe.

Ovid, who lived in a learned age, and had
been inftru6ted by philofophers in the principles
of a divine creation or formation of the world;
finding, that fiich an idea would not agree with
the popular mythology, which he delivers, leaves
it, in a manner, loofe and dctatched from his
fyftem. ^lifquis fuit ille Deorum*? Whichever of
the gods it was, fays he, that difllpated the
chaos and introduced order into the uni-
verfe. It could neither be Saturn, he knew,
nor Jupiter, nor Neptune, nor any of the receiv-
ed deities of paganifm. His theological fy-
ftem had taught him nothing upon that head;
and he leaves the matter equally undetermined.

Diodorus Siculusf, beginning his work with
an enumeration of the mod reafonable opinions
concerning the origin of the world, makes no
mention of a deity or intelligent mind; though
it is evident from his hifbory, that he was much
more prone to fuperitition than to irreligion.
And in another paffage J, talking of the Ich-
thyophagi, a nation in .India, he fays, that, there
being fo great difficulty in accounting for their
defcent we muft conclude them to be aborigineSy
without any beginning of their generation, pro-
pagating their race from all eternity; as feme of
the phyfiologers, in treating of the origin of na-
ture, have juftly obferved. " But in fuch fub-
*' jecls as thefe," adds the hiftorian, '^ wi;ich
" exceed all human capacity, it may well hap-
" pen, that thofe, who difcourfe the mod, know
*' the leaft; reaching a fpecious appearance of
*' truth in their reafonings, while extremely wide
" of the real truth and matter of facl."

E e.2 A (trange

* Metamorph. lib. 1. 1. 32. f Li^- i- % I^- »btd.

420 The Natural History of Religion.

A ftrange fentiment in our eyes, to be embrac-
ed by a profeffed ar^d zealous religionift* ! But
it was merely by accident, that the queilion con-
cerninof the origin of the world did ever in an-
cient times enter into religious fyilems, or was
treated of by theologers. The philofophers alone
made profeflion of delivering fyftems of this kind;
and it was pretty late too before thefe bethought
themfelves ,of having recourfe to a mind or fu-
.preme intelligence, as the firit caufe of all. So
far was it from being efteemed profane in thofe
days to account for the origin of things with-
out a deity, that Thales, Anaximenes, Heraclitus,
and others, who embraced that fyltem of cofmo-
gony, pad unqueflioned ; while Anaxagoras, the
firfl undoubted theift among the philofophers,
was perhaps the firlt that ever was accufed to
atheifm f*

We are told by Sextus Empiricus ^y i^hat Epi-
cuius, when a boy, reading with his preceptor
thefe veries of Hefiod.

Elded of beings, chaos firft arofe ;
t^cAt earib, wide-ftretch'd, the feaf of all:
the young fcholar firll betrayed his inquifitive
genius, by afking, /Ind chaos whence? But was
told by his preceptor, that he muft have re-
courfe to the philofophers for a folution of fuch
queftions. And from this hint Epicurus left phi-
lology and all other fludies, in order to betake
himfelf to that fcience, whence alone he expell-
ed

* The fiime author, who can thus account for the origin of
tiie worid without a Deity, elteems it impious to explain horn
phyficnl caufes, the common accidents ot' life, earthquakes, in-
undations, and tempclh: and devoutly aicribes thefe to the an-
ger of Jupiter or Neptune. A plain proof, whence he derived
Jiis ideas of religion. See lib. xv. p. 364. Ex. edit. Rhodo-
niani.

t See NOTE [ZZ].

X Adverfus Matheni. lib. ix.

The Natural History of Religion. 421

cd fatisfadlion with regard to thcfe fublime lub-
jefts.

The common people were never likely to piifh
their relearchcs fo tar, or derive from reafoning
their fyftems of religion j when philologers and
mythologiliis, we fee^ fcarcely ever difcovered To
much penetration. And even the philofophers,
who difcourfed of fuch topics, readily affented
to the grofTefl theory, and admitted the joint
origin of gods and men from night and chaos;
from fire, water, air, or whatever they eftablifh-
ed to be the ruling element.

Nor was it only on their firft origin, that the
gods were fuppofed dependent on the powers of
nature. Throughout the v/hole period of their
exiftence they were fubjefted to the dominion of
fate or deftlny. Think of force of neceffity^ fays
Agrippa to the Roman people, that force , io zchicb
even !hc gods 7nuftfubmit^ . And the Younger Pliny f,
agreeable to this way of thinking, tells us, that
amidtt the darknefs, horror, and confufion, which
enfued upon the firft eruption of Vefuvius, feve-
ral concluded, that all nature was going to wrack,
and that gods and rrien v/ere perilhing in one
common ruin.

It is great complaifance, indeed, if we digni-
fy with the name of religion fuch an imperfect
fyftem of theology, and put it on a level with
latter fyftems, which are founded on principles
more jull and more fublime. For my part, I
can fcarcely allow the principles even of Mar-
cus Aurelius, Plutarch, and fome other Stoics and
Academics J though much miore refined than the
pagan fuperltition, to be worthy of the honour-
able appellation of theifm. For if the mytho-
logy of the heathens refemble the ancient Euro-
pean fyftem of fpiritual beings, excluding God

a;.d

* Dionys. Halic lib. vi. f Epift. lib. vi.

49.1 The Natural History off Religion.

and angels, and leaving only fairies and fprightsj
the creed of thefe philofopers- nnay juflly be faid
to exclude a deity, and to leave only angeU
and fairies.

Sed. V- Various Forms ofPdytheifm -.Allegory Hero-
WorJIjtf^

But it is chiefly our pre fent bufinefs to con-
fider the grofs polytheifm of the vulgar, and to,
trace ail its various appeaj ances, in the princi-
ples of human nature, >vh«jnce they are derived.

Whoever learns by arguunent, the exiftence of
invifible intelligent poA^rer, muft reafon from the
admirable contrivance of n; itural objefts, and muft
fuppofe the world to ,be the workmanfhip of that
divine being, the origin al cauie of all things.
But the vulgar poly«:he ift, fo far from admit-
ting that idea, deifies ev' ery part of the univerfe,
and conceives all the cc )nfpicuous productions of
nature, to be themfelve s fo many real divinities.
The fun, moon, and it ars, are all gods accord-
ing to his lyftem : Ff juntains. are inhabited by
nymphs, and trees by hamadryads: Even mon-
kies, dogs, cats, and c .ther animals often become
facred in his eyes, ani J flrike him with a religi-
ous veneration. And thus, however ftrong men's
propenfity to believe invifible, intelligent power
in nature, their pro penfity is equally ftrong to
reft their attentig^i on fenfible, vifible objedls ;
and in order to rec oncile thefe oppofite inclina-
tions, they are led to unite the invilible power
with fome vifiblc object.

The diftributipr i alfo of diftinft provinces to
the feveral deitif>s is apt to caufe fome allegory,
both phyfical ai^r 1 moral, to enter into the vul-
gar fyftems of -f .olvtheifm. The god of war will

naturally

The Natural History of Religion. 423

naturally be reprefented as furious, cruel, and
impetuous: The god of poetry as elegant, polite,
and amiable : The god of merrhandife, efpecially
in early times, as thievilh and dreadful. The
allegories, Aippofed in Homer and other mytho-
logifts, I allow, have often been fo drained, that
men of fenfe are apt entirely to rejeifl them,
and to confider them as the production merely
of the fancy and conceit of critics and com-
mentators. But that allegory really has place
in the heatlien mythology is undeniable even on
the lead refiedtion. Cupid the fon of Venus;
the Mufes the daughters of Memory; Prometheus,
the wife brother, and Epimetheus the foolifh;
Hygieia or the goddefs of health defcended from
iEfculapius or the god of phyfic : Who fees not,
in thefe, and in many other inilances, the plain
traces of allegory ? When a god is fuppofed to
prefide over any pafTion, event, or fyftem of ani-
ons, it is almoft unavoidable to give him a ge-
nealogy, attributes, and adventures, fuitable to
liis fuppofed powers and influence; and to carry
on that fimilitude and comparifon, which is na-
turally fo agreeable ro the mind of man.

Allegories, indeed, entirely perfeft, we ouglit
not to expect as the productions of ignorance
and fuperiticion ; there being no work of genius
that requires a nicer hand, or has been more
rarely executed with fuccefs. That Fear and 'Ter-
ror are the fons of Mars is jUit; but v/hy by
Venus*? That Harmony is the daughter of Ve-
nus is regular; but wliy by Mare-j-j" "XX^dX Sleep
is the brother of Death is fuitable; but why def-
cribe him as enamoured of the Graces If? And
fuice the ancient mythologies fall into miftakes
fo grofs and palpable, we have no rcafon furely
to expeCl: fuch refined and long-fpun allegories,

as

* Heliod. Theog. 1. 935

f Id. ibid. & Pliito. ia vita Pelop. \ Ili.-d. xiv. 267.

424 The Natural History of Religion.

as Ibme have endeavoured to reduce from their
A<^ions.

Lucretius was plainly feduced by the ftrong
appearance of allegory, which is obfervable in
the pagan fictions. Pie firft addrefles himfelf to
Venus as to that generating power, which animates,
renews, and beautifies the univerfe: But is foon
betrayed by the mythology into incoherencies,
while he prays to that allegorical perfonage to
appeafe the furies of her lover Mars: -An idea
not drawn from allegory, but fiom the popular
religion, and which Lucretius, as an Epicurean,
could not confiftently admit of.

The deities of the vulgar are fo little fuperi-
or to human creatures, that, where men are af-
fed:ed with flrong fentimcnts of veneration or
gratitude for any hero or public benefactor, no-
thing can be more natural than to convert him
into a god, and fill the heavtns, after this man-
ner^ with continual recruits fiom among man-
kind. Moft of the divinities of the ancient world
are fuppofed to have once been men, to have
been beholden for their apothecfis to the admi-
ration and aifeftion of the people. The real
hiflory of their adventures, corrupted by tradi-
tion, and elevated by the marvellous, becam.e a
plentiful fource of fable; efpecially in paffing
through the hands of poets, allegorifis, and priefts,
who fuccefnvely improved upon the wonder and
jiftonifliment of the ignorant multitude.

Painters too and fculptors came in for their
Jliare of profit in the facred myfteries; and fur-
ni/hing men with fenfible reprefentations of their
divinities, whom they cloathed in human figures,
gave great cncreafe to the public devotion, and
determined it.s objcdl. It was probably for want
of thefe arts in rude and barbarous ages, that
men deified plants, animals, and even brute, unor-

I ganizcd

The Natural History of Religion. 42?

ganized matter j and rather than be without a fen-
Tible obje(5l of worfhip, affixfd divinity to fuch
ungainly forms. Could any ftatuary of Syria, in
early tmieSj have formed a juft figure of Apolio,
the conic (tone, Heliogabalus, had never become
the objed: of fuch profound adoration, and been
received as a reprefentation of the folar deity *.

Stilpo, was banifhed by the council of Areopa-
gus, for affirming that the Minerva in the citadel
was no divinity i but the workmanrtiip of Phi-
dias, the fculptor f- What degree of reafon muit
we expeO: in the religious belief of the vulgar in
other nations ; when Athenians and Areopagites
could entertain fuch grofs conceptions ?

Thefe then are the general principles of po-
lytheifm, founded in human nature, and little or
nothing dependent on caprice and accident. As
the caufes, which bellow happinefs or mifery, are,
in general, very little known and very uncertain
our anxious concern endeavours to attain a deter-
minate idea of them ; and finds no better expe-
dient than to reprefent them as intelligent vo-
luntary agents, like ourfelvesj only fomewhat fu-
perior in power and wifdom. The limited influ-
ence of thefe agents, and their great proximity to
human wcaknefs, introduce the various diftribu-
tion and divifion of their authority j and thereby
give rife to allegory. The fame principles natu-
rally deify mortals, fuperior in power, courage, or
underftanding, and produce hero-worfliip ; toge-
ther with fabulous hiftory and mythological tra-
dition, in all its wild and unaccountable forms.

And

* Herodian, lib. v. Jupiter Ammon Is reprefented by Cur-
tius as a deity of the fame kind, lib. iv. cap. 7. The Arabi-
ans and Perfmuntians adored alfo fhapelefs unformed ftones as
their deity. Arnob. lib. vi. So much did their folly exceed
that of the Egyptians.

f Diod. Laert. lib. ii.

.26 The Natural History of Religion.

And as an invifible fpiritual intelligence is an
objeft too refined for vulgar apprehenfion, men
naturally affix it to fome fenfible reprefentationj
fuch as either the more confpicuous parts of na-
ture, or the ftatues, images, and piflures, which
a more refined age forms of its divinities.

Almoft all idolaters, of whatever age or coun-
try, concur in thefe general principles and con-
ceptions ; and even the particular chara6ters and
provinces, which they aflign to their deities, are
not extremely different *. The Greek and Ro-
man travellers and conquerors, without much
difficulty, found their own deities every where;
and faid. This is Mercury, that Venus ; this
Mars, that Neptune j by whatever title the ftrange
gods might not be denominated. The goddefs
Hertha of our Saxon anceflors feems to be no
other, according to Tacitus f, than the Mater
Melius of the Romans; and his conjefture was
evidently jufl.

Sect. VI. Origin of 'theijm from Polytheifm.

The doftrine of one fupreme deity, the author
of nature, is very ancient, has fpread itfelf over
great and populous nations, and among them
has been embraced by all ranks and conditions
of men : But whoever thinks that it has owed its
fuccefs to the prevalent force of thofe invincible
reafons, on which it is undoubtedly founded, would
Jhow himfelf little acquainted with the igno-
rance and ftupidity of the people, and their in-
curable prejudices in fiivour of their particular
fuperftitions. Even at this day, and in Europe,
afk any of the vulgar, why he believes in an
omnipotent creator of the world; he will never

mention

* See C;t:nir of the religion of the Gauls, De bello Galll-
co> lilj. xi. t ^^ moribus Germ.

The Natural History of Religion. 427

mention the beauty of final caiifes, of which he
is wholly ignorant : He will not hold out his hand,
and bid you contemplate the fupplenefs and vari-
iety of joints in his fingers, their bending all
one way, the counterpoife which they receive
from the thumb, the foftnefs and flefliy parts of
the infide of his hand, with all the other circum-
ftances, which render that member fit for the ufe,
to which it was deflincd. To thefe he has been
long accuftomed : and he beholds them with lift-
leflhefs and unconcern. He will tell you of the
fudden and unexpected death of fuch a one: The
fall and bruife of fuch another : The exceflive
drought of this feafon : The cold and rains of
another. Thefe he afcribes to the immediate
operation of providence : And fuch events, as,
with good reafoners, are the chief difficulties in
admitting a fupreme intelligence, are with him the
fole arguments for it.

Many theifls, even the moft zealous and re-
fined, have denied a -particular providence, and
have afierted, that the Sovereign mind or firfb
principle of all things, having fixed general laws,
by which nature is governed, gives free and un-
interrupted courfe to thefe laws, and diilurbs
not, at every turn, the fettled order of events by
particular volitions. From the beautiful connex-
ion, fay they, and rigid obfervance of eftabliflicd
rules, we draw the chief argument for theifm ;
and from the fame principles are enabled to an-
fwer the principal objeftions againft it. But fo
little is this underftood by the generality of man-
kind, that, wherever they obferve any one to af-
fcribe all events to natural caufes, and to remove
the particular interpofition of a deity, they are
apt to fufpecft him of the groffeft infidelity. J lli-
tle philofophyy fays lord Bacon, 'makes 'men atheijls :
A great deal reconciles them to religion. For men,
being taught, by fuperftitious prejudice?, to lay

the

428 The Natural History of Religion.

the ftrefs on a wrong place : when that fails thermia
and they difcover, by a little refleftion, that the
courfe of nature is regular and uniform, their
whole faith totters, and falls to ruin. But be-
ing taught, by more refle(5lion, that this very
regularity and uniformity is the llrongeft proof of
defign and of a fnpreme intelligence, they return
to that belief, which they had deferted ; and they
are now able to eftabliih it on a firmer and more
durable foundation.

Convulfions in nature, diforders, prodigies, mi-
racles, though the mofb oppofite to the plan of
a wife fuperintendent, imprefs mankind with the
ftrongeft fentiments of religion ; the caufes of
events feeming then the moft unknown and un-
accountable. Madnefs, fury, rage, and an in-
flamed imagination, though they fink men near-
efl to the level of bealls, are, for a like reafon,
often fuppofed to be the only difpofitions, in which
we can have any immediate communication with
the Deity.

We may conclude, therefore, upon the whole,
that, fince the vulgar, in nations, which have em-
braced the do6lrine of theifm, ftill build it upon
irrational and fuperfHtious principles, they are ne-
ver led into that opinion by any procefs of argu-
ment, but by a certain train of thinking, more
fuitable to their genius and capacity.

It may readily happen, in an idolatrous nati-
on, though men admit the exiftence of feveral li-
mited deities, yet is there fome one God, whom,
in a particular manner, they make the objeft of
their worfhip and adoration. They may either
iuppofe, that, in the diftribution of power and
territory among the gods, their nation was lub-
jedted to the juril'ditlion of that particular deity i
or reducing heavenly objects to the model of
things below, they may reprcfent one god as the
prince or fupreme magiftrate of the reft, who,

though

The Natural History of Religion. 429

though of the fame nature, rules them with an
authority, like that which an earthly fovereign
exercifes over his fubjefts and vafTals. Whether
this god, therefore, be confidered as tlieir peculiar
patron, or as the general fovereign of heaven, his
votaries will endeavour, by every art, to infinuate
themfelves into his favoiT; and fuppofing him to
be pleafed, like themfelves, with praife and flat-
tery, there is no eulogy or exaggeration, which
will be fpared in their addrefles to him. In pro-
portion as men's fears or diftreflTes become more
urgent, they ftill invent new ft rains of adulation;
and even he who outdoes his predeceflbr in fwel-
ling up the titles of his divinity, is fure to be
outdone by his fuccelTor in newer and more pomp-
ous epithets of praife. Thus they proceed ; till
at laft they arrive at infinity itfelf, beyond which
there is no farther progrefs: And it is well, if, in
ftriving to get farther, and to reprefent a magnifi-
cent fimplicity, they run not into inexplicable my-
ftery, and dellroy the intelligent nature of their
deity, on which alone any rational worfhip or
adoration can be founded. While they confine
themfelves to the notion of a perfe6t being, the
creator of the world, they coincide, by chance, with
the principles of reafon and true philofophy j
though they are guided to that notion, not by rea-
fon, of which they are in a great meafure incapable,
but by the adulation and fears of the moll: vulgar
fuperftition.

We often find, amongfl: barbarous nations, and
even fometimes amongfl civilized, that, when eve-
ry ftrain of liattery has been exhauiled towards
arbitrary princes, when every human quality has
been applauded to the utmoft ; their fervile cour-
tiers reprefent them, at lail, as real divinities, and
point chem out to the people as objefts of adora-
tion. How much more natural, therefore, is it,
that a limired deity, who at firft is fuppofed only

the

430 The Natural History of Religion.

the immediate author of the particular goods and
ills in life, fhould in the end be reprefented as
fovereign maker and modifier of the univerfe ?

Even where this notion of a fupreme deity is
already eftablifhed ; though it ought naturally to
leflen every other worfhip, and abafe every objeft
of reverence, yet if a nation has entertained the
opinion of a fubordinate tutelar divinity, faint, or
angel ; their addreffes to that being gradually rife
upon them, and encroach on the adoration due to
their fupreme deity. The Virgin Af^r?, ere check-
ed by the reformation, had proceeded, from being
merely a good woman, to ufurp many attributes of
the Almighty : God and St. Nicholas go hand in.
hand, in all the prayers and petitions of the Muf-
covites.

Thus the deity, who, from love, converted him-
felf into a bull, in order to carry off Europa -, and
who, from ambition, dethroned his father, Saturn,
became the Optimus Maximus of the heathens.
Thus, the God of Abraham, Ifaac, and Jacob,
became the fupreme deity or Jehovah of the
Jews.

The Jacobins, who deny the immaculate con-
ception, have ever been very unhappy in their
do6trine, even though political reafons have kept
the Romifh church from condemnine; it. The
Cordeliers have run away with all the popularity.
But in the fifteenth century, as we learn from
Boulainvilliers *, an Italian Cordelier maintained,
that, during the three days, when Chrifl: was inter-
red, the hypoftatic union was diffolved, and that
his human nature was not a proper objed: of ado-
ration, during that period. Without the art of
divination, one might foretel, that fo grofs and im-
pious a blafphemy would not fail to be anathema-
tized

* HiUoirc abrcgee, p. 499.

The Natural History of Religion. 431

tized by the people. It was the occafion of
great infiilts on the part of the Jacobins; who
now got fome recompence for their misfortunes
in the war about the imaculate conception.

Rather than relinquifh this propenfity to adula-
tion, religionifts, in all ages, have involved them-
felves in the greateft abfurdities and contradidli-
ons.

Homer, in one palfage, calls Oceanus and Tethys
the original parents of all things, conformably to
the eftabliflied mythology and tradition of the
Greeks: Yet, in other paflages, he could not for-
bear complimenting Jupiter, the reigning deity,
with that magnificent appellation J and according-
ly denominates him the father of gods and men.
He forgets, that every temple, every ftreet was
full of the anccftors, uncles, brothers, and lif-
ters of this Jupiter ; who was in reality nothing
but an upfliart parricide and ufurper. A like con-
traditlion is obfervable in Hefiod ; and is fo much
the lefs excufeable, as his profefTed intention was
to deliver a true oenealoo;y of the o-ods.

Were there a religion (and we may fufpefl Ma-
hometanifm of this inconfiftence) which fometimes)
painted the Deity in the moll fubiime colours, as
the creator of heaven and earth ; fometimes de-
graded him nearly to a level with human crea-
tures in his powers and faculties; while at the fame
time it afcribed to him fuitable infirmities, paf-
fions, and partialities, of the moral kind : That re-
ligion, after it was extinft, would alfo be cited as
an inftance of thofe contradiftions, which arife from
the grofs, vulgar, natural conceptions of mankind,
oppofed to their continual propenfity towards flat-
terv and exaoi-Qieration. Nothino- indeed would
prove more llrongly the divine origin of any
religion, than to find (and happily this is the cafe
"with Chriftianity) that it is free from a contradic-
tion, fo incident to human nature.

Sect.

432 The Natural History of RELicfoN".

Sect. VII. Confirmation of this Do5frine.

It appears certain, that, though the original
notions of the vulgar reprefent the Divinity as
a limited being, and confider him only as the
particular caufe of health or ficknefs ; plenty or
want J profperity or adverfity ; yet when more
magnificent ideas are urged upon them, they
efteem it dangerous to refufe their aflent. Will
you fay, that your deity is finite and bounded
in his perfedions j may be overcome by a great-
er force J is fubjed to human pafTions, pains,
and infirmties j has a beginning, and may have
an end ? This they dare not affirm j but thinking
it fafeft to comply with the higher encomiums,
they endeavour, by an affefled raviHiment and
devotion, to ingratiate themfelves with him. As
a confirmation of this, we may obferve, that the
nfTent of the vulgar is, in this cafe, merely ver-
bal, and that they are incapable of conceiving
thofe fublime qualities, which they feemingly at-
tribute to the Deity. Their real idea of him,
notwithftanding their pompous language, is ftill
as poor and frivolous as ever.

That original intelligence, fay the Magians>
who is the firft principle of all things, difcovers
himfelf immediately to the mind and underftand-
ing alone ; but has placed the fun as his image
in the vifible univerfe ; and when that bright
luminary diffiifes its beams over the earth and
the firmament, it is a faint copy of the glory,
which refides in the higher heavens. If you
would efcape the difpieafure of this divine be-
ing, you muft be careful never to fet your bare
foot upon the ground, nor fpit into a fire, nor
throw any water upon it, even though it were
confuming a whole city *. Who can cxprefs
the perfedions of the Almighty ? fay the Ma-
hometans.

♦ Hyde de Relig. vetcru.Ti Perfarum.

The Natural History of Religion. 433

hometans. Even the nobleil of his works, if com-
pared to him, are but dnft and rubbifh. How
much more muit human conc-jption fall Ihort o^ his
infinite perfections? His fmile and favour re "'ers
men for ever happy : and to obrain it ^or your
children, the bzil method is to cut off from them,
while infants, a little bit of Ikin, about hair clie
breadth of a farthing. Take two bits of cloth f,
fay the Rowan Cat holies y about an inch ci an
inch and a half fquare, join them by the corners
with two firings or pieces of tape about fixteen
inches long, throw this over your head, and make
one of the bits of cloth lie upon your breail,
and the other upon your back, keeping them
next your (kin : There is not a better fecret for
recommending yourfelf to that infinite Being, who
exifts from eternity to eternity.

The Getes, commonly called immortal, from
their iteady belief of the foul's immortality, were
genuine theifts and unitarians. They affirmed
Zamolxis, their dciry, to be the only true god j
and aderted the worfliip of all other nations to be
addrelTcJ to mere fictions and chimeras. But were
their religious principles any more refined, on ac-
count of thefe magnificent pretenfions ? Every fifth
year they facrificed a human vicflim, whom they
fent as a mefTenger to their deity, in order to in-
form him of their wants and neceJfities. And
when it thundered, they v/ere io provoked, that,
in order to return the defiance, they let fly arrows
at him, and declined not the combat as une-
qual. Such at leaft is the account, which He-
rodotus gives of the theifm of the immortal
Getes 4:.

Vol. II. F f Sect.

f Called the Scapulairj. % Lib.iv.

434 The Natural History of Religion.

Sect. Ylll. Flux and reflux ofpolytheifm and theljm^

It Is remarkable, that the principles of religiwi

have a kind of flux and reflux in the human mind,
and that men have a natural tendency to rife from
idolatry to theifm, and to fink again from theifm
into idolatry. The vulgar, that is, indeed, all
mankind, a few excepted, being ignorant and
iininllructed, never elevate their contemplation
to the heavens, or penetrate by their difquifiti-
ons into the fecret ftru6lure of vegetable or a-
nimal bodies ; fo far as to difcover a fuprcmc
mind or original providence, which bellowed or-
der on every part of nature. They confider thefe
admirable works in a more confined and felfiih
view; and finding their own happinefs and mifery
to depend on the fecret influence and unforefeen
concurrence of external objefts, they regard, with
perpetual attention, the unknown caujes^ which
govern all thefe natural events, and diftribute
pleafure and pain, good and ill, by their pow-
erful, but filent, operation. The unknown cau-
fes are ftill appealed to on every emergence;
and in this general appearance or confufed image,
are the perpetual objecls of human hopes and
fears, v/ifhes and apprehenfions. By degrees, the
atStive imagination of men, uneafy in this abftra6t
conception of objecls, about which it is incef-
fantly employed, begins to render them more
particular, and to clothe them in fhapes more
luitable to its natural comprehenfion. It repre-
fcnts them to be fenfiblc, intelligent beings,
like mankind; actuated by love and hatred, and
flexible by gifts and entreaties, by prayers and
facnfices. Hence the oriiiin of religion : And hence
the origin of idolatry or polytheifm.

But the fame anxious concern for happinefs,
which begets the idea of thefe invifible, intelligent

powers,

J

The Natural History of Ri-ligion. 43J

powers, allows not mankind to remain long in
the firlt fimplc conception of them ; as powerful,
but limited beings ; mafters of human fate, but
Haves to deftiny and the courfe of nature. Men's
exaggerated praifcs and compliments flill fwell
their idea upon them ; and elevating their deities
to the utmolt bounds of perfedion, at laft beget
the attributes of unity and infinity, fimplicity and
fpirituality. Such refined ideas, being fomewhat
difproportioned to vulgar comprehenfion, remain
not long in their original purity; but r'equire to be
fupported by the notion of inferioi mediators or
fubordinate agents, which interpofe between man-
kind and their fupreme deity. Thefe demigods
or middle beings, partaking more of human na-
ture, and being more familiar to us, become the
chief objefts of devotion, and gradually recal that
idolatry, which had been formerly banifhed by
the ardent prayers and panegyrics of timorous and
indigent mortals. But as thefe idolatrous religions
fall every day into grofler and more vulgar con-
ceptions, they ar lail deftroy themfelves, and, by
the vile reprefen rations, which they form of their
deities, make the tide turn again towards theifm.
But lb great is the propenfity, in this alternate re-
volution of human fentiments, to return back to
idolatry, that the utmoil precaution is not able
efFeftually to prevent it. And of this, fome theifts^
particularly the Jews and Mahometans, have been
fenfible ; as appears by their baniihing a!l the avis
of ftatuary and painting, and not allowing the re-
jMefenrations, even of human figures, to betaken by
marble or colours ; lePc the common infirmity of man-
kind fhould thence produce idolatry. The feeble
apprehenfions of men cannot be fatisiied with con-
ceiving their deity as a pure fpirit and perfect intel-
ligence; and yet their natural terrors keep them
from imputing to him the leafl fliadow of limitati-
on and imperfection. They fluftuate between thefe

F f 2 oppoiite

43^ The Natural History of Religion.

oppofite fentiments. The fame infirmity ftilt
drags them downwards, from an omnipotent and
fpiritual deity, to a limited and corporeal one,
and from a corporeal and limited deity to a ftatue
or vifible reprefentation. The fame endeavour aC
elevation ftillpufhes them upwards, from the ftatue
or material image to the invifible power; and from
the invifible power to an infinitely perfe6t deity,
the creator and fovereign of the univerfe.

Sect. IX. Comparifon of theje Religions^ with regard
to P erf edition and 'Toleration.

Polytheifm or idolatrous worfhip, being founded
entirely in vulgar traditions, is liable to this great
inconvenience, that any praflice or opinion, how-
ever barbarous or corrupted, may be authorized
by it ; and full fcope is given, for knavery to im-
pofe on credulity, till morals and humanity be
expelled the religious fyftem of mankind. At the
fame time, idolatry is attended with this evident
advantage, that, by limiting the powers and func-
tions of its deities, it naturally admits the gods of
other fedls and nations to a fhare of divinity, and
renders all the various deities, as well as rites, ce-
remonies, or traditions, compatible with each
other *. Theifm is oppofite both in its advanta-
ges and difadvantages. As that fyftem fuppofcs
one fole deity, the perfeftion of reafon and good-
nefs, it iliould, if juftly profecuted, banifli every
thing frivolous, unreafonable, or inhuman from
religious worlliip, and fet before men the mofl:
illuflrious example, as well as the moft com-
manding motives, of juftice and benevolence.
Thefe mighty advantages are not indeed over-ba-
lanced (for that is not poITibie), but fomewhat

diminiflied,

* Sec N O T E [AAA].

The Natural History of Religion. 437

•vliminifhed, by inconveniencies, whicli arife from
the vices and prejudices of nianlvind. While one
folc objedt of devotion is acknowledged, the wor-
fhip of other deities is regarded as abfurd and
impious. Nay, this unity of object feems natu-
rally to require the unity of faith and ceremo-
nies, and furnifhes defigning men with a pretence
for reprefenting their adverfaries as profane, and
the objecfts of divine as well as human vengeance.
For as each k^t is pofitive that its own faith and
worfhip are entirely acceptable to the deity, and
as no one can conceive, that the fame being
fhould be pleafed with different and oppofite rites
and principles ; the feveral fe6ls fall naturally
into animoTity, and mutually difcharge on each
other that facred zeal and rancour, the moll fu-
rious and implacable of all human pafTions.

The tolerating fpirit of idolaters, both in an-
cient and modern times, is very obvious to any
one, who is the leail converfant in the writings
of hiftorians or travellers. When the oracle of
Delphi was afked, what rites or worfhip was moft
acceptable to the gods ? Thofe which are legally
eftablifhed in each city, replied the oracle *.
Even priefts in thofe a^esj could, it feems, al-
low falvation to thofe or a different communion.
The Romans commonly adopted the Gods of the
conquered people; and never difputed the attri-
butes of thofe local and national deities, in whofe
territories they refided. The religious wars and
perfecutions of the Egyptian idolaters are indeed
an exception to this rule 5 but are accounted
for by ancient authors from reafons fingular and
remarkable. Different fpecies of animals were
the deities of the differeht fefls among the Egyp-
tians i and the deities being in continual war.

engaged

* Xenoph. Memor. lib. ii.

438 The Natural History of Religion.

engaged their votaries in the fame contention.
The v/orHiippers of dogs could not long remain
in peace with the adorers of cats or wolves *. But
where that reafon took not place, the Egyptian fu-
perftition was not fo incompatible as is commonly
imagined; fince we learn from Herodotus t, that
very large contributions were given by Amafis to-
wards rebuilding the temple of Delphi.

The intolerance of almoft all religions, which
liave maintained the unity of God, is as remark-
able as the contrary principle ot polvtheifls, Ti'ic
imj^ilacable narrow fpirit of the Jews is well
known. Mahometanifm fet out with Hill more
bloody principles ; and even to this day, deals
out damnation, thous;h not hre and fao-o-ot, to all
other fedls. And if, among Chriftians, the Eng-
lifh and Dutch have embraced the principles of
toleration, this fingularity has proceeded from the
Aeady reiolution of the civil magiftrate, in oppo-
fition to the continued efforts of priefts and bir
gots.

The difciples of Zoroailer fhut the doors of
heaven againll all but the Magians J. Nothing
could more obftrudl: the progrefs of the Perfian
conquefts, than the furious zeal of that nation
againft the temples and images of the Greeks.
And after the overthrow of that empire we find
• Alexander, as a polytheiil, immediately re-efta-
blifhing the worihip of the Babylonians, which
their former princes, as monofheifis, had carefully
aboiiflied Ij. Even the blind and devoted attach-
inenr of that conqueror to the Greek fuperftition
hindered not but he himfelf facrificed according
to the Babylonifn ceremonies. §.

So

• Plurarch. de Ifjd. & Ofiride. f Lib- ii- Tub line.

t HydcdeRelig. vet. Perraiuui.

II Ariian* dc iixped. lib. iii. Id. lib. vii.

§ Id. ibid.

The Natural History of Rhligion. 439

So fociable is polytheifm, that the utmoft fierce-
nefs and antipathy, which it meets within an oppo-
site religion, is fcarcely able to difgull it, and
keep it at a diRance. AuguRus prailed extreme-
ly the referve of his grandfon, Caius Ca^far, when
t}>is latter prince, palling by Jeriifalem, deigned
not to facrifice according to the Jewifli law. But
for what realbn did Auguftus fo much approve
of this condiift? Only, becaufe that religion was
by the Pagans efteemed ignoble and barbaroub*.

I may venture to affirm, that few corrihptions
of idolatry and polytheifm are more pernicious
to fociety than this corruption oftheifm-j-, when
carried to the utmofl: height. The human fa-
crifices of the Carthaginians, Mexicans, and many
barbarous nations :|;, fcarcely exceed the inqui-
fition and perfecutions of Rome and Madrid.
For befides, that the efFufion of blood may not be
lb great in the former cafe as in the latter; be-
fides this, I fay, the human viftims, being cho-
ien by lot,, or by fome exterior figns, affeft
not, in fo confiderable a degree, the red of the
fociety. Whereas virtue, knowledge, love of li-
berty, are the qualities, which call down the fa-
tal vengeance of inquifitors; and when expelled,
leave the fociety in the moft Ihameful ignorance,
corruption, and bondage. The illegal murder of
one man by a tyrant is more pernicious than the
death of a thoufand by peftilence, famine, or any
undiftinguilliing calamity.

In the temple of Diana at Aricia near
Rome, whoever murdered the prefent prieft,
was legally entitled to be inftalled his fuc-
ceflbrlj. A very fingular inftitution ! For, how-
ever

• Sueton. in vita Aug. c. 93. f Corruptio optimi fejjlma.

t See NOTE [BBB].

I| Strabo, lib. v. Sueton. in vita Cal.

440 The Natural History of Religion.

ever barbarous and bloody the common fuper-
fcitions otten are to the laity, they uiually turn to
the advantage of the holy order. »

Sect. X. JVith regard to courage or ahajement

Fronn the comparifon of theifm and idolatry,
we may form fome other obfervations, which
will alfo confirm the vulgar obfervation, that
the corruption of the beft things gives rife to
the worft.

Where the deity is reprefented as infinitely fu-
perior to mankind, this belief, though altogether
juft, is apt, when joined with fuperftitious ter-
rors, to finic the human inind in the loweft fub-
milTion and abafement^ and to reprefent the
monkiili virtues of mortification, pennace, humi-
jity, and paffive fuffering, as the only qualities
which are acceptable to him. But where the
gods are conceived to be only a little fuperior
to mankind, and to have been, many of them,
advanced from that inferior rank, we are more
at our eafe in our addrefies to them, and may
even, without profanenefs, afpire fometimes to
a rivalfhip and emulation of them. Hence ac-
tivity, fpirit, courage, magnanimity, love of liberty,
and all the virtues which aggrandize a people.

The heroes in paganifm correfpond exadly to
the faints in popery and holy dervifes in Maho-
metanifm. The place of Hercules, Thc-fcus, Heftor,
Romulus, is now fupplied by Dominic, Francis,
Anthony, and Benedict. Inftead of the deflruc-
tion of monfters, the fubduing of tyrants, the
defence of our native country ; whippings and
faftings, cowardice and humility, abjed fubmif-
fion and flavilh obedience, are become the
means of obtaining ceklVial honours among man-
kind.

One

The Natural History of Religion. 441

One great incitement to the pious Alexander
in his warlike expeditions was his rivalfliip of
Hercules and Bacchus, whom he juftly pretend-
ed to have excelled *. Brafidas, that generous
and noble Spartan, after falling in battle, had
heroic honour paid him by the inhabitants of Am-
phipolis, whofe defence he had embraced f. And
in general, all founders of dates and colonies a-
mong the Greeks were raifed to this inferior rank
of divinity, by thofe who reaped the benefit of
their labours.

This gave rife to the obfervation of Machia-
vel J, that the do6trines of the Chriftian religion
(meaning the catholic ; for he knew no other)
which recommend only paffive courage and fufi^er-
ing, had fubdued the fpirit of mankind, and had
fitted them for flavery and fubjedlion. An obfer-
vation, which would certainly be juft, were there
not many other circumftances in human fociety
which controul the genuis and charatfler of a reli-
gion.

Brafidas feized a moufe, and being bit by it,
let it go. There is 'nothing Jo contemptible^ faid he,
hut what may be Jafe^ if it has hut courage to de-
fend itjelf\. Bellarmine patiently and humbly al-
lowed the fleas and other odious vermin to prey
upon him. We fhall have heaven^ faid he, to re-
ward us for our fufferings : But thefe poor creatures
have nothing but the enjoyment of the prejent life \.
Such difference is there between the maxims of a
Greek hero and a Catholic faint.

Sect. XI. With regard to reaf on or abjurdity.

Here is another obfervation to the fame purpofc,
and a new proof that the corruption of the bell

things

* Arrian paflim. f Thucyd. lib. v. % Difcorfi, lib. vi.
Plut. Apopth. § Bayle, Article Bellarmine.

44^ The Natural History of Religion.

things begets the worft. If we examine, without
prejudice, the ancient heathen mythology, as con-
tained in the poets, we fhall not difcover in it any
fuch monftrous ablurdity, as we may at firfl: be apt
to apprehend. Where is the difficulty in conceiv-
ing, that the fame powers or principles, whatever
they were, which formed this vifible world, men
and animals, produced alfo a fpecies of intelligent
creatures, of more refined fubftance and greater
authority than the reft ? That thefe creatures may
be capricious, revengeful, pailionate, voluptuous,
is eafily conceived ; nor is any circumftance more
apt, among ourfelves, to engender fuch vices, than
the licence of abfolute authority. And in fhort,
the whole mythological fyftem is fo natural, that,
in the variety of planets and worlds, contained in
this univerfe, it feems more than probable, that,
ibmewhere or other, it is really carried into exe-
cution.

The chief objeftlon to it with regard to this
planet, is, that it is not afcertaincd by any juft
reafon or authority. The ancient tradition, in-
iilted on by heathen priefts and theologers, is
but a weak foundation ; and tranfmitted alfo fuch
a number of contradicftory reports, fupported, all
of them, by equal authority, that it became ab-
folutely impofiiii)le to fix a preference amongft them.
A few volumes, therefore, muft contain all the
j^olemical writings of pagan prielts : And their
whole theology muft confift more of traditional
ftories and fuperftitious practices than of philolo-
phical arg.iment and controverfy.

But where theifm forms the fundamental prin-
ciple of any popular religion, that tenet is fo con-
torniable to found reafon, that philofophy is apt to
incorporate itfelf with fuch a fyftem of theology.
And if the other dogmas of that fyftem be con-
tained in a facred book, fuch as the Alcoran, or

be

The Natural History of Religion. 443

be determined by any vifible authority, like
that of the Roman pontiff, fpeculative reafo-
ners naturally carry on their affent, and em-
brace a theory, which has been inftilled into them
by their earlieft education, and which alfo pof-
fefies fome degree of confidence and uniformity.
But as thcfe appearances are fure, all of them, to
prove deceitful, philofophy will foon find herfelf
very unequally yoked with her new affociate ; and
inftead of regulating each principle, as they ad-
vance together, fhe is at every turn perverted to
ferve the purpofes of fuperftition. For befides the
unavoidable incoherences, which mud be recon-
ciled and adjufted; one may fafely affirm, that all
popular theology, efpecially the fcholaftic, has a
kind of appetite for abfurdity and contradi'dtion.
If that theology went not beyond reafon and com-
mon fenfe, her do6trines would appear too eafy and
familiar. Amazement muft of neceffity be raif-
ed : Myftery affedled : Darknefs and obfcurity
fought after : And a foundation of merit afforded
to the devout votaries, who defire an opportunity
of fubduiag their rebellious reafon, by the belief
of the mod unintelligible fophifms.

Ecclefiaitical hiflory fufficiently confirms thefe
reflections. When a controverfy is ftarted, fome
people always pretend with certainty to foretell the
iffue. Whichever opinion, fay they, is moft con-
trary to plain fenfe is fure to prevail ; even where
the general intereft of the fyftem requires not
that decifion. Though the reproach of herefy
may, for fome time, be bandied about among
the difputants, it always refts at laft on the fide of
reafon. Any one, it is pretended, that has but
learning enough of this kind to know the defini-
tion of Arian, Pelagian, Eraftian, Socinian, Sa-
bellian, F.utychian, Neftorian, Monothelite, &c.
not to mention Proteilant, whofe fate is yet un-
certain.

444 The Natural History of Religion.

certain, will be convinced of this obfervation. It
is thus a fyftem becomes more abfurd in the end,
merely from its being reafonable and philofophical
in the beginning.

To oppofe the torrent of fcholaftic religion by
fuch feeble maxims as thefe, that /'/ is impojjtble for
the fame thing y to be and not to he., that the whole is
greater than a 'part, that two and three make five ;
is pretending to flop the ocean with a bull-rufh.
Will you fet up profane reafon againfl facred myf^
tery ? No punifhment is great enough for your
impieiy. And the fame fires, which were kindled
for heretics, will ferve alfo for the dellrudion of
philofophcrs.

Sect. XII. With regard to Doubt or Convi^ion,

We meet every day with people fo fceptical with
regard to hiftory, that they aflert it impolFible for
any nation ever to believe fuch abfurd principles
as tliofc of Greek and Egyptian pagan ifm ; and at
the lame time fo dogmatical with regard to religi-
on» that they think the fame abfurdities are to be
found in no other communion. Cambyfes enter-
tained like prejudices j and very impioufly ridi-
culed, and even wounded. Apis, the great god of
the Egyptians, who appeared to his profane fenfes
nothing but a large fpotted bull. But Herodo-
tus judicioufly afcribes this fally of paffion to a
real madnefs or diforder of the brain : Otherwife,
fays the hiHorian, he never would h^ve openly af-
fronted any eftabliflied worfhip. For on that head,
continues he, every nation are bed fatisfied with
their own, and think they have the advantage over
every other nation.

It muft be allowed, that the Roman Catholics
are a very learned feft ; and that no one com-
munion, but th^t of the church of England, can

difputc
a

The Natural History of Religion. 445

difpute their being the mofl learned of all the
Chriftian churches : Yet Averroes, the famous
Arabian, who, no doubt, had heard of the Egyp-
tian fuperflition, declares, that, of all religions,
the mofl abfurd and nonfenfical is that, whofc
votaries eat, after having created, their deity.

I believe, indeed, that there is no tenet in all
paganifm, v^hich would give fo fair a fcope to ri-
dicule as this of the real prejence : For it is fo ab-
furd, that it eludes the force of all argument.
There are even Ibme pleafant (lories of that kind,
which, though fomewhat profane, are commonly
told by the Catholics themfelves. One day, a
priell, it is faid, gave inadvertently, inftead of
the facrament, a counter, which had by accident
fallen among the holy wafers. The communicant
waited patiently for fome time, expe6ling it would
dilTolve on his tongue: But finding that it flill
remained entire, he took it off. / ivijh, cried
he to the pried, you have not committed feme mif-
take : I ivij/j you have not given me God the Fa-
ther : He is fo hard and tough there is no /wallowing
him.

A famous general,, at that time in the Muf-
covite fcrvice, having come to Paris for the re-
covery of his wound, brought along with him a
young Turk, whom he had taken prifoner. Some
of the doftor.s of the Sorbonne (who are altoge-
ther as pofitive as the dervifcs of Conftantinople)
thinking jt a pity, that the poor Turk fhould be
damned for want of inflruclion, folicited Mufla-
pha very hard to turn Chriftian, and promifed
him, for his encouragement, plenty of good wine
in this world} and paradife in the next. Thefe
allurements were too powerful to be refifted -, and
therefore, having been well inftru6led and cate-
chized, he ?.t laft agreed to receive the facra-
ments of baptifm and the Lord's fupper. The

pricft.

446 The Natural History of Religion.

priell, however, to make every thing fure and
folid, ftill continued his inftrudlions ; and began
the next day with the ufual queftion. How many
Gods are there ? None at all ! replies Benedidl ; for
that was his new name. How ! None at all ! cries
the prieft. 'To be Jure^ faid the honeft profelyte.
Tou have told me all along that there is hut one God :
And yejlerday I eat him.

Such are the do6lrines of our brethren the Ca-
tholics. But to thefe doftrines we are fo accuf-
tomed, that we never wonder at them : Though
in a futureage, it will probably become difficult to
perfuade fome nations, that any human, two-leg-
ged creature could ever embrace fuch principles.
And it is a thoufand to one, but thefe nations
themfelves fhall have fomething full as abfurd in
their own creed, to which they will give a moft im-
plicit and moft religious aflent.
\. I lodged once at Paris in the fame hotel with

an ambafiador from Tunis, who, having pafled
fome years at London, was returning home that
way. One day I obferved his Moorifh excellen-
cy diverting himfelf under the porch, with fur-
veying the fplendid equipages that drove along ;
when there chanced to pafs that way fome Capucin
friars, who had never {ttn a Turk ; as he, on his
part, though accuftomed to the European drefles,
had never fcen the grotefque figure of a Capucin :
And there is no exprelTing the mutual admirati-
on, with which they infpired each other. Had
the chaplain of the embafly entered into a dif-
pute with thefe Francifcans, their reciprocal fur-
prize had been of the fame nature. Thus all
mankind ftand ftaring at one another; and there
is no beating it into their heads, that the turban
of the African is not juft as <TOod or as bad a
fafliion as the cowl of the FAiropean. He is a very

honeft

The Natural History of KISligion. 447

bonefi mauy faid the prince of Sal lee, fpeaking of
de Ruyter, // is a pity he were a Chrijtian.

How can you worfhip leeks and onions ? we
fha!l fuppofe a Sorbonnift to fay to a prieft of Sais.
If we worfliip them, replies the latter ; at leaft, we
do not, at the fame time, eat them. But what
ftrange objefts of adoration are cats and monkies?
fays the learned dodor. They are at leafl as good
as the relics or rotten bones of martyrs, anfwers
his no lefs learned antagonift. Are you not mad,
infifts the Catholic, to cut one another's throat
about the preference of a cabbage or a cucumber?
Yes, fays the pagan; I allow it, if you will con-
fefs, that thole are flill madder, who fight about
the preference among volumes of fophiftry, ten
thoufand of which are not equal in value to one
cabbao;e or cucumber *.

Every by-ftander will eafily judge (but unfortu-
nately the by-ftanders are few) that, if nothing
were requifite to eftablifh any popular fyftem, but
expofing the abfurdities of other fyftems, every
votary of every fupcrftition could give a fufficient
reafon for his blind and bigocted attachment to
the principles in which he has been educated.
But without fo extcnfive a knowledge, on which
to ground this affurance (and perhaps, better with-
ou: it), there is not wanting a fufHcient ftock of
religious zeal and faith among mankind. Diodo-
rus Sicu]js -j- gives a remarkable inftance to this
purpofe, of which he was himfelf an eye-witnefs.
While Egypt lay under the greateft tenor of the
Roman name, a legionary foldier having inadver-
tently been guilty of the facriiegious impiety of
killing a car, the v/hole people role upon him with
the utmofl fury : and all the efforts of the prince
were not able to fave him. The fenate and peo-
ple

* See NOTE [CCC].
t Lib. i.

44^ The Nax'ural History of Religion.

pie of Rome, I am perfuaded, would not, then,
have been fo delicate with regard to their national
deities. They very frankly, a little after that time,
voted Auguftus a place in the celeftial manfions ;
and would have dethroned every god in heaven,
for his fake, had he feemed to defire it. Prefens
divus hahehitur Auguftus, fays Horace. That is a
very important point : And in other nations and
other ages, the fame circumftance has not been
deemed altogether indifferent *.

Notwithftanding the fandity of our holy reli-
gion, fays Tully f, no crime is more common with
us than facrilege : But was it ever heard of, that
an Egyptian violated the temple of a cat, an ibis,
or a crocodile ? There is no torture, an Egyptian
would not undergo, fays the fame author in ano-
ther place J, rather than injure an ibis, an afpic,
a cat, a dog, or a crocodile. Thus it is ftriftly
true, what Dryden obferves,

" Of whatfoe'er defcent their godhead be,
'* Stock, ftone, or other homely pedigree,
*' In his defence his fervants are as bold,
*' As if he had been born of beaten gold."

Absalom and Achitophel.

Nay, the bafer the materials are, of which the
divinity is compofed, the greater devotion is he
likely to excite in the breafts of his deluded
votaries. They exult in their fhame, and make a
merit with their deity, in braving, for his fake,
all the ridicule and contumely of his ene-
mies,

* When Louis the XlVth took on himfelf the proteflion of
the Jelbits' College of Clermont, the fociety ordered the king's
arms to be put up over the gate, and took down the crofs, in or-
der to make way for it : Which gave occafion to the following
epigram :

Suftulit hinc Chrifti, pofuitque infignia Regis :
Impia gens, alium nefcit habere Deum.
t Denat. Dcor. 1. i. || Tufc. QuelV. lib. v.

The Natural History of Religion. 449

mies. Ten thoufand Crufaders inlift themfeves
under the holy banners j and even openly tri-
umph in thofe parts of religion, which their ad-
verfarics regard as the molt reproachful.

There occurs, I own, a difficulty in the Egyp-
tian fyftem of theology; as indeed, few fyftem of
that kind are entirely free from difficulties. It
is evident, from their method of propagation, that
a couple of cats, in fifty years, would ftock a
whole kingdom ; and if that religious veneration
were Itill paid them, it would, in twenty more,
not only be eafier in Egypt to find a god thari
a man, which Petronius fays was in fome parts
of Italy; but the gods muft at lafl: entirely iiarve
the men, and leave themfelves neither priefts nor
votaries remaining. It is probable, therefore,
that this wife nation, the mod celebrated in an-
tiquity for prudence and found policy, forefee-
ing fuch dangerous confcquences, referved all
their worfhip for the full-grown divinities, and
ufed the freedom to drown the holy fpawn or
little fucking gods, without any fcruple or re-
morfe* And thus the practice of warping the te-
nets of religion, in order to ferve temporal in-
terefts, is not, by any' means, to be regarded as
an invention of thefe later ages.

The learned, philofophical Varro, difcourfmg
of religion, pretends not to deliver any thing
beyond probabilities and appearances: Such was
his good fenfe and moderation ! But the paf-
fionate, the zealous Auguftin, infults the noble
Roman on his fccpticifm and referve, and pro-
fcfles the molt thorough belief and ailuranre*.
A heathen poet, however, contemporary with the
faint, abfurdly elteems the religious fyftem of
the latter fo falfe, that even the credulitv

Vol. II. G 2- of

o

De civitate Dei, 1. iii. e. 17.

450 The Natural History of Religion.

of children, he fays, could not engage them' to-
believe itf.

Is it ftrange, when miflakes are fo common, to*
find every one pofitive and dogmatical ? And that
the zeal often rifes in proportion to the error ?
Moverunt^ fays Spartian, ^. ea teyn-peflate^ Jud^i
helium quod vetabantur niutilare genitalia']^.

If ever there was a nation or a time, in which
the public religion loft all authority over man-
kind, we might exped, that infidelity in Rome,
during the Ciceronian age, would openly have
erected its throne, and that Gicero himfelf, m
every fpeech and ad:ion, would have been its
mod declared abettor. But it appears, that,
whatever fceptical liberties that great man might
take, in his writings or in philofophical conver-
fation J he yet avoided, in the common condu6t of
life, the imputation of deifm and profanenefs.
Even in his own family, and to his wife Teren-
tia, whom he highly trufted, he was willing to
appear a devout religionift; and there remains
a letter, addrelTed to her, in which he feriouf-
ly defires her to offer facrifice to Apollo and
^fculapius, in gratitude for the recovery of his
health II.

Pompey's devotion was much more fincere r
In all his conduct, during the civil wars, he
paid a great regard to auguries, dreams, and
prop!iefies§. Auguftus was tainted with fuper-
itition of every kind. As it is reported of Mil-
ton, that his poetical genius never flowed with
eafe and abundance in the fpring; fo Auguftus
obfcrved, that his own genius for dreaming never
was fo perfect during that fcafon, nor was fo much
to be relied on, as during the reft of the year. That

great

f Clniidii Rutilii Nuinitiani iter, lib. i. 1. 386.
X In vita Adriani. || Lib. xiv. epilL 7.

§ Cicero de Divin. lib. ii. c. 24.

The Natural History of Religion'. 451

great and able emperor was alfo extremely nn-
caiy, when he happened to change his fhoes, and
put the right foot fhoe on the left foot*. In
fhort, it cannot be doubted, but the votaries ot
the eftabliflied fuperftition of antiquity were as
numerous in every (late, as thofe of the modern
religion are at prefent. Its influence was as uni-
verfal; though it was not fo great. As many
people gave their afTent to it; though that aflent
was not fcemingly fo flrong, precife, and affir-
mative.

We may obfcrve, that, notwithflanding the dog*
^atical, imperious ftyie of all fuperftition, the
conviction of the religionifts, in all ages, is more
affcvied than real, and fcarcely ever approaches,
in any degree, to that folid belief and perfuafi-
on which governs us in the common affairs of life.
Men dare not avow, even to their own hearts^
the doubts which they entertain on fuch fubiefts :
They make a merit gif implicit faith; and diguife
to themfelves their real infidelity, by the ItrongefL
afTeverations and mofV pofitive bigotry. But na-
ture is too hard for all their endeavours, and
fufFers not the obfcure, glimmering light, afford-
ed in thofe fhadowy regions, to equal the ftrong
impreflions, made by common fenfe and by ex-
perience. The ufual courfe of men's conduft
belies their words, and fhows, that their affent
in thefe matters is fome unaccountable operation
of the mind between difbelief and conviftion, but
approaching much nearer to the former than to
the latter.

Since, therefore, the mind of man appears of
fo loofe and undeady a texture, that, even an
prefent, when fo many perfons find an intereft
in continually employing on it the chiflel and
the hammer, vet are they not able to engrave
theological tenets with any lalting imprelfion ;
G s: 2 how

o

Saeton. Aug. cap. 90, 91, 92. Plin. lib. ii. cap. 7.

452 The Natural Historv of Religioi^.

how much more mufb this have been the cafe ir$
ancient times, when the retainers to the holy"
funftion were fo much fewer in comparifon ? No
wonder, that the appearances were then very in-
confiflent, and that mefi, on fome occafions might
feem determined infidels, and enemies to the ef-
tablifhed religion, without being fo in reality;
or at leaft, without knowins; their own minds
in that particular.

Another caufe, which rendered the ancient re-
ligions much loofer than the modern, is, that
the former v/cre traditional and the latter are
Jcriptitral -y and the tradition- in' the former was
complex, contradictory, and, on many occafionsy
doubtful; fo that it could not poflibly be reduc-
ed to any ftandard and canon, or afford any de-
terminate articles of faith. The ftories of the
gods were numberlefs like the popifh legends;
and though every one, almoft, believed a part
of thefe ftories, yet no one could believe or know
the whole : While, at the fame time, all muft
have acknowledged, that no one part ftood on*
a better fcaindation than- the reft. The tradi-
tions of diferent cities and nations were alfo,
on many occafions, dire6lly oppofite ; and no'
reafon could be aftigned for preferring one to-
the other. And as there was an infinite number
of ftories, with regard to which tradition was
nowife pofitive ; the gradation was infenfible, fronr
the moft fundamental articles of faith, to thofe
loofe and' precarious fictions. The p.igan religi-*
on, therefore, feemed to vp-nifn like a cloud, when-
ever one approached to it, and examined it piece-
meal. It couid never be afcertained by any fix-
ed dogmas and principles. And tjiough this
did not convert the gen.'rality of mankind from-
fo abfurd a faith; for when will the peorle be
reafonabie ? yet it made them faultcr and hefi-
tate more in maintaining their principles, and

was

The Natural History of Religion. 453

^vas even apt to produce, in certain difpofitions
of mind, fome practices and opinions, which had
the appearance of determined infidelity.

To which we may add, that the fables of the
pagan religion were, of themfelves, light, eafy,
and familiar ; without devils, or feas of brim-
(tone, or any objett that could much terrify
the imagination. Vv'^ho could forbear fmiling,
when he thought of the loves of Mars and Ve-
nus, or the amorous frolics of Jupiter and Pan ?
In this refpedV, it was a true poetical religion j
if it had not rather too much levity for the
graver kinds of poetry. We find that it has
been adopted by m.odern bards ; nor have thefe
talked v/ith greater freedom and irreverence or
the gods, whom they regarded as fidtions, than
the ancients did of the .real objefts of their de-
-yotion.

The inference is by no means juft, that, be-
caufe a fyftem of religion has made no deep
imprefTion on the minds of a people, it mult
therefore have been pofitively rejedled by all men
of com.mon fenfe, and that oppofite principles,
in fpite of the prejudices of education, were
generally ^ftablifhed by argument and reafoning.
I know not, but a contrary inference may be
more probable. ThvC iefs importunate and af-
•fuming any fpecies of fupcrflition appears, the
iefs will it provoke men's fpleen and indignati-
on, or engage tiiem into enqviiries concerning
its foundation and origin. This in the mean
time is obvious^ that the empire of all religious
faith over the underllandins: is waverino: and un-
certain, fubjed to every variety of humour, and
dependent on the prefent incidents, which ftrike
the imagination. The difference is only in the
degrees. An ancient will place a ftroke of im-
piety and one: offuperftition aiternatelyj throughout a

whole

454 The Natural History of Religion.

■whole difcourfe*: A modern often thinks in the
fame way, though he may be more guarded in
his expreflion.

Lucian tells us exprcfsly f , that whoever be-
lieved not the mofl: ridiculous fables of paganifm
was deemed by the people frofane and impi-
ous. To what purpofe, indeed, would that agree-
able author have employed the whole force of
his wit and fatire againft the national religion,
had not that religion been generally believed by
his countrymen and contemporaries ?

Livy :|: acknov;ledges as frankly, as any divine
would at prefenr, the common incredulity of
his age J but then he condemns it as ft-verely.
And who can imagine, that a fuperflition, which
could delude fo ingenious a man, would not al-
fo impofe on the generality of the people ?

The Stoics beilowed many magnificent and
even impious epithets on their fage; that he
alone was rich, free, a king, and equal to the
immortal o-ods. They forgot to add, that
he was not inferior in prudence and under-
ilanding to an old woman. For furely no-
thing can be more pitiful than the fentiments,
which that feft entertained with regard to re-
ligious matters -, while they feriouily agree
with the comm.on augurs, that, when z, raven

croaks

* Witnefs this remarkable p.ifiage of Tacitus : " Prxtcr mul-
" tiplices rerum humanarum talus, calo icrraque prodigia, &
** lulminum monitus $c futurorum prxfagia, iaua, inilia, ambi-
*' gua, manifelta. Nee enim uni.jnaiTi atrocioribus populi Ro-
" niani cladibus, magifquc juilis judiciib approbattini t-ll, non
*' elle curte Diis fecuritatei-n noUrani, tiie ultionem." Hilt. lib.
I. AugiiRus's quarrel with Neptune is an iullancc of ihc fame
hind. Had not the emperor believed Neptune to be a real be-
ing, and to have dominion over the fca, where had been tl e
foundation of his anger? And if he believed it, what madnefs
to provoke Hill farther that deity ? The fame obfervation may
be made upon Qainiilian's exclamation, on account of the death
cf his children, lib. vi. Praif.

t Philopfcudes. \ Lib. x. cap. 40,

The Natural History of Religion. 455

croaks from the left, it is a good omen ; but a bad
one, when a rook makes a noife from the fame
quarter. Pan^tius was the only Stok, among
the Greeks, who fo much as doubted with regard
to auguries and divinations*. Marcus Antoninus f
tells us, that he himfclf had received many admo-
nitions from the gods in his deep. It is true. Epic-
tetus J forbids us to regard the language of rooks
and ravens ; but it is not, that they do not fpeak
truth: It is only, becaufe they can foretel nothing
but the breaking of our neck or the forfeiture
of our eftate ; which are circumftances, fays he,
that nowife concern us. Thus the Stoics join a
philofophical enthufiafm to a religious fuperfliti-
on. The force of their mind, being all turned
■to the fide of morals, unbent itfelf in that of
religion \\.

Plato § introduces Socrates affirming, that the
accufation of impiety raifed againft him was owing
entirely to his rejecting fuch fables, as thofe of
Saturn's caftrating his father Uranus, and Jupiter's
dethroning Saturn : Yet in a fubfequent dialogue ^,
Socrates confefles, that the do6lrine of the mor-
tality of the foul was the received opinion of the
people. Is there her« any contradidlion ? Yes,
iurely : But the contradiction is not in Plato ; it is
In the people, whofe religious principles in ge-
neral are always compofed of the mofl difcordant
parts ; efpecially in an age, when fuperftition fate
ib eafy and light upon them 4|.

The

* Cicero de divin. lib. i. cap. 3 & 7.

f Lib. i. § 17. X Ench. § 17.

II The Stoics, 1 own, were not quite orthodox in the efta-
blifhed religion ; but one may fee, from thefe inftances, that
they went a great way : And the people undoubtedly went eve-
ry length.

§ Eutvphro. 4- Phjedo.

-I- 4- See NOTE [DDD].

4^6 The Natural History of Religiont.

The fame Cicero, who aftefbed, in his own family,
to appear a devout religionift, makes no fcruple,
in a public court of judicature, of treating the doc-
trine of a future flate as a ridiculous fable, to which
no body could give any attention *. Salluft f re-
prefents Cccfar as fpeaking the fame language in
the open fenate J.

But that all thefe freedoms implied not a total
and univerfal infidelity and fcepticifm amongft the
people, is too apparent to be denied. Though
fome parts of the national religion hung loofe up-
on the minds of men, other parts adhered more
clofely to them : And it was the chief bufinefs of
the fceptical philofophers to Ihow, that there was
no more foundation for one than for the other.
This is the artifice of Cotta in the dialogues con-
cerning the 7iature of the gods. He refutes the
whole fyftem of mythology by leading the ortho-
dox gradually, from the more momentous flories,
which were believed, to the more frivolous, which
every one ridiculed : From the gods to the god-
deflesj from the goddefles to the nymphs ; from
the nymphs to the fawns and fatyrs. His maf-
ter, Carneades, had employed the fame method of
r^afoning ||.

Upon the whole, the greateft and mofl obferva«
ble diiferences between a traditional^ mythclogical

religion,

* Pro Cluentio, cap. 6i. f Debello Carilin.

X Cicero (Tufc. Quxft.) lib. i. cap. 5, 6. and Seneca (Epifl.
24.) as alfo Juvenal (Satyr. 2.), maintain that there is no boy
or old woman fo ridiculous as to believe the poets in their ac-
counts of a future ftate. Why then does Lucretius fo highly ex-
alt his mailer for freeing us fiom thele terrors? Perhaps the ge-
nerality of mankind were then in the diipofition of Cephalus in
Plato (dc Rep. lib. i.) who while he w^s young and healthful
could ridicule thefe ftories; but as foon as he became old and
infirm, began to entertain apprehenfions of their truth. This
we may obferve not to be unufual even at prefent.

II Sext. Empir. adverf. Mathem. lib. viii.

The Natural History of Religion. 457

religion, and 3. fyjlemntical, Jcholaftic one, are two '
The fornner is often more reaibnable, as confiding '
only of a multitude of ftories, which, however
groundlefs, imply no exprefs abfurdity and de-
monftrative contradiction j and fits alfo fo eafy and
light on men's mind, that, though it may be as
univerfally received, it happily makes no fuch deep
imprellion on the afFeftions and underftanding.

Sect. XIII. Impious conceptions of the divine nature
in popular religions of both kinds.

The primary religion of mankind arifes chiefly
from an anxious fear of future events; and what
ideas will naturally be entertained of invifible, un-
known powers, while men lie under difmal ap-
prehenfions of any kind, may eafily b»e conceived.
Every image of vengeance, feverity, cruelty, and
malice muft occur, and muft augment the ghafl-
linefs and horror, which opprefTes the amazed reli-
gionift. A panic having once feized the mind,
the a6bive fancy ftill farther multiplies the objects
of terror ; while that profound darknefs, or, what
is worfe, that glimmering light, with v/hich we are
environed, reprefents the fpeftres of divinity un-
der the moft dreadful appearances imaginable.
And no idea of perverfe wickednefs can be framed,
which thofe terrified devotees do not readily, with-
out fcruple, apply to their deity.

This appears the natural ftate of religion, when
furveyed in one light. But if we confider, on the
other hand, that fpirit of praife and eulogy, which
neceffarily has place in all religions, and which is
the confequence of thefe very terrors, we mull ex-
peel a quite contrary fyftem of theology to prevail.
Every virtue, every excellence, muft be afcribed

to

458 The Natural History of Religion.

to the divinity, and no exaggeration will be
deemed fufficient to reach thole perfedlions, with
which he is endowed. "Whatever ilrains of pane-
gyric can be invented, are immediately embrac-
ed, without confulting any arguments or phse-
nomena : It is efteemed a fufficient confirmation
of them, that they give us more magnificent
ideas of the divine objeds of our worlhip and
adoration.

Here therefore is a kind of contradiction between
the different principles of human nature, which en-
ter into religion. Our natural terrors prefent the
notion of a devililh and malicious deity : Our pro-
penfity to adulation leads us to acknowledge an
excellent and divine. And the influence of thefe
oppofite principles are various, according to
the different fituation of the human underfland-

In very barbarous and ignorant natipns, fuch
as the Africans and Indians, nay even the Japonefe,
who can form no extenfive ideas of power and
knowledge, worlhip may be paid to a being, whom
they confefs to be wicked and deteflable ; though
they may be cautious, perhaps, of pronouncing
this judgment of him in public, or in his tem-
ple, where he may be ilippofcd to hear their
reproaches.

Such rude, imperfe^V ideas of the Divinity ad-
here long to all idolaters; and it may fafely be af-
firmed, that the Greeks themfclves never got en-
tirely rid of them. It is remarked by Xenophon *.
in praife of Socrate^, that this philofopher aflent-
ed not to the vulgar opinion, which fuppofed
the gods to know fome things, and be igno-
rant of others : Pie maintained, that they knew
everv thing; what was done, faid, or even thought.

But

* Mem. lib. i.

The Natural History of Religion. 459

But as this was a ftrain of philofophy f much
above the conception of his countrymen, we need
not be furprifed, if very frankly, in their books
and convcrfation, ihty blamed the deities, whom
they worfhippcd in their temples. It is obferv-
abJe, that Herodotus in particular fcruples not,
in many paflages, to afcribc envy to the gods ;
a fentiment, of all others, the moll fuitable to
a mean and devililh nature. The pagan hymns,
however, fung In public worfhip, contained no-
thing but epithets of praife; even while the ac-
tions afcribcd to the gods were the moft bar-
barous and detellable. When Timotheus, the
poet, recited a poem to Diana, in which he enu-
merated, with the greatefl eulogies, all the ac-
tions and alitributes of that cruel, capricious god-
defs: May your daughter ^ faid one prefent, become
Juch as the deity whom you celebrate *.

But aG men farther exalt their idea of their divi-
nity ; it is their notion of his power and knowledge
only, not of his goodnefs, which is improved.
On the contrary, in proportion to the fuppofed
extent of his fcience and authority, their terrors
naturally augment; while they believe, that no
fecrecy can conceal them from his fcrutiny, and
that even the inmofl recefTes of their breaft lie
open before him. They muft then be careful
not to form exprefsly any fentiment of blame
and difapprobation. All muft be applaufe, ra-
vifnment, extacy. And while their gloomy ap-
prehenfions make them afcribe to him meafures
of conduct, which, in human creatures, would
be highly blamed, they muft flill affcft to praife

and

f It was conficlered among the ancients, as a very extraordi-
nary, philofophical paradox, that the prefence of the gods was
not contincd to the heavens, but were extended every where;
as we learn from Lucian. Hirmotimus Jive De /edits .

* Plutarch, de Superftit.

460 The Natural History of Religion.

and admire that condud: in the objeft of their
devotional addrefles. Thus it may fafely be af-
firmed, that popular religions are really, in the
conception of their more vulgar votaries, a fpe-
cies of dsemonifmi and the higher the deity is
exalted in power and knowledge, the lower of
courfe is he deprelTed in goodnefs and benevo-
lence; whatever epithets of praife may be be-
llowed on him by his amazed adorers. Among
idolaters, the words may be falfe, and belie the
fecret opinien : But among more exalted religio-
nifts, the opinion itfelf contra<5ls a kind of falfe-
hood, and belies the inward fentiment. The
heart fecretly detefls fuch meafures of cruel and
implacable vengeance ; but the judgment dares
not but pronounce them perfeft and adorable.
And the additional mifery of this inward ftrug-
gle aggravates all the other terrors, by which
thefe unhappy viftims to fuperftition are for ever
haunted.

Lucian * obferves that a yoyng man, who reads
the hifiory of the gods in Homer or Hefiod,
and finds their fa6lions, wars, injullice, inceft, a-
dultery, and other immoralities fo highly celebrat-
ed, is much furprifed afterwards, when he comes
into the world, to obferve that punifhments are by
law inflifted on the fame anions, which he had
been taught to afcribe to fuperior beings. The
contradiction is ftill perhaps flronger between the
rcprefentations given us by fome later religions and
our natural ideas of generofity,. lenity, impartia-
lity, andjufticci and in proportion to the multi-
plied terrors of thcfe religions, the barbarous con-
ceptions of the divinity are multiplied upon us f.
Nothing can preferve untainted the genuine princi-
ples of morals in our judgment of human conducft,
but the abfolutc neceliity of thefe principles to
the exiftence of fociety. If common conception

can
* Nccyomantia.
t See NOTE [EEE.]

The Natural History of Religion. 461

can indulge princes in a fyftem of ethics, fome-
what different from that which fhould regulate pri-
vate perfons ; how much more thofe fuperior be-
ings, whofe attributes, views, and nature are fo
totally unknown to us ? Sunt Juperis Jua jura *. The
gods have maxims of juftice peculiar to them-
lelves.

Sect. XIV. Bad influence of popular religions on
morality.

Here I cannot forbear obferving a fad, which
may be worth the attention of fuch as make human
nature the obje(fl of their enquiry. It is certain,
that, in every religion, however fublime the verbal
definition which it gives of its divinity, many of
the votaries, perhaps the greateft number, will ftill
feek the divine favour, not by virtue and good
morals, which alone can be acceptable to a perfe6t
being, but either by frivolous obfervances, by in-
temperate zeal, by rapturous extafies, or by the
belief of myfterious and abfurd opinions. The
lealt part of the Sadder, as well as of the Pentateuch^
confifts in precepts of morality -, and we may alfo
be aflured, that that part was always the leaft ob-
ferved and regarded. When the old Romans were at-
tacked with a peililence, they never afcribed their
fufferings to their vices, or dreamed of repentance
and amendment. They never thought, that they
were the general robbers of the world, whofe am-
bition and avarice made defolate the earth, and re-
duced opulent nations to want and beggary.
They only created a didatorljl, in order to drive
a nail into a door ; and by that means, they thought
that they had fufficiently appeafed their incenfed
deity.

2 In

* Ovid. Metam. lib. ix. 501.

X Called Di^^ator calvis figendae caufa. T. Livii, I. vii. c. 5.

462 The Natural History of Religion.

In iEgina, one fadlion forming a confpiracy,
barbaroufly and treacheroufly afTafiinated feven hun-
dred of their fellow-citizens ; and carried their fury
fo far, that, one miferable fugitive having fled to
the temple, they cut off his hands, by which he
clung to the gates, and carrying him out of holy
ground, immediately murdered him. By this im-
petyy fays Herodotus*, (not by the other many
cruel aliaflinations) they offended the godsy and con-
traced an inexpiable guilt.

Nay, if wefhould fuppofe, v/hat never happens,
that a popular religion were found, in vvh.cii it was
exprefsly declared, that nothing but morality could
gain the divine favour; if an order of priefts were
inftituted to inculcate this opinion, in daily fer-
mons, and with all the arts of perfuafion ; yet fo
inveterate are the people's prejudices, that, for
want of fome other fuperftition, they would make
the very attendance on thefe fermons the effentials
of religion, rather than place them in virtue and
good morals. The fublime prologue of Zaleucus's
laws J infpired not the Locrians, fo far as we can
learn, with any founder notions of the meifures of
acceptance with the deity, than were familiar to the
other Greeks.

This obfervation, then, holds univerfally: But
ftill one may be at fome lofs to account for it.
It is not fufficient to obferve, that the people,
every where, degrade their deities into a fimilitude
with themfelves, and confider them merely as a
fpecies of human creatures, fomcwhat more po-
tent and intelligent. This will not remove thg
difficulty. For there is no man fo ftupid, as thj^j.
judging by his natural reafon, he would ^^^
efteem virtue and honefty the moil valuable q^^,
lities, which any perfon could pofiefs. Why ^ot
afcribe the fam.e lentiment to his deity ? Why ^ot

make

Lib. vi. I To be found In Diod. Sic. lib.

Xil.

The Natural History of Religion'. 46J

make all religion, or the chief part of it, to confift
in thefe attainments ?

Nor is it fatisfaftory to fay, that the pradlice of
morality is more difficult than that of fuperitition ;
and is therefore rejefted. For, not to mention the
excefTive penances of the Brachmans 2.^6. Talapoins ;
it is certain, that the Rhamadan of the Turks, dur-
ing which the poor wretches, for many days, often
in the hotteft months of the year, and in fome of
the hotteft climates of world, remain without eat-
ing or drinking from the rifing to the fetting funj
this Rhamadan, I fay, muft be more fevere than the
pradlice of any moral duty, even to the mod vici-
ous and depraved of mankind. The four lents of
the Mufcovites, and the aufterities of fome Roman.
CatholicSy appear more difagreeable than meeknefs
and benevolence. In fhort, all virtue, when men
are reconciled to it by ever fo little pradlice, is
agreeable : All fuperftition is for ever odious and
burthen fome.

Perhaps, the following account may be receiv-
ed as a true folution of the difficulty. The du-
ties, which a man performs as a friend or parent^,
feem merely owing to his ben^fador or chil-
dren ; nor can he be wanting to thefe duties,
without breaking: throug-h all the ties of nature
and morality. A flrong mclinarion may prompt
him to the performance : A fentiment of order
and moral obligation joins its force to thefe natu-
ral ties : And the whole man, if truly virtuous,
is drawn to his duty, without any effort or en-
deavour. Even with regard ta the virtues, which
are more auflcre, and more founded on. retieftion,
fuch as public fpirit, filial duty, temperance, o-r
integrity ; the moral obligation, in our apprehen-
fion, removes all pretenfion to religious merit;
and the virtuous condudt is deemed no more than
what we owe to fociety and to ourfelves. In all
this, a fuperftitious man finds nothing, which

4^4 The Natural History of ReLigkjn.

he has properly performed for the fake of his
deity, or which can peculiarly recommend him to
the divine favour and protedlion. He confiders
not, that the mod genuine method of ferving the
divinity is by promoting the happinefs of his crea-
tures. He (till looks out for fome more immedi-
ate fervice of the fupreme Being, in order to allay
thofe terrors, with which he is haunted. And any
pradlice, recommended to him, which either ferves
to no purpofe in life, or offers the ftrongeft vio-
lence to his natural inclinations j that pra6tice he
will the more readily embrace, on account of thofe
very circumftanGes> which ihould make him ab-
folutely reject it. It feems the more purely reli-
gious, becaufe it proceeds from no mixture of any
other motive or confideration. And if, for its
fake, he facrifices much of his cafe and quiet, his
claim of merit appears flili to rife upon him, in
proportion to the zeal and devotion which he dif-
covers. In reftoring a loan, or paying a debt, his
divinity is nowife beholden to him j becaufe thefe
at^s of juflice are what he was bound to perform,
and what many would have performed, were there
no god in the univerfe. But if he fad a day, or
give himfelf a found whipping ; this has a di-
rect reference, in his opinion, to the fervice of
God. No other motive could engage him to fuch
aufterities. By thefe diftinguifhed marks of de-
votion, he has now acquired the divine favour;
and may expetft, in recompence, protection and
fafety in this world, and eternal happinefs in the
next.

Hence the greateft crimes have been found,
in many inftances, compatible with a fuperfti-
tious piety and devotion j Hence, it is jufily re-
garded as unlafe to draw any certain intcrence
in favour of a man's morals from the fervour or
ftriclnefs of his religious exercifes, even though
he himfelf believe them fincere. Nay, it has

been

The Natural History of Religion. 465

been obferved, that enormities of the blackefl: dcy
have been rather apt to produce fiiperftitious ter-
rors, and encreafe the religious palFion. Bomilcar,
having formed a confpiracy for affafllnating at once
the whole fenate of Carthage, and invading the
liberties of his country, loft the opportunity, from a
continual regard to omens and prophecies, 'tbofe who
undertake the moji crminal and moft dangerous enter-
frizes are commonly the moJi Juperjiitious ; as an an-
cient hiftorian * remarks on this occafion. T heir
devotion and fpiritual faith rife with their fears.
Catiline was not contented with the eftablifhed
deities, and received rites of the national religi-
on : His anxious terrors made him feck new in-
ventions of this kind f j which he never proba-
bly had dreamed of, had he remained a good
citizen, and obedient to the laws of his coun-

To which we may add, iliat, after the commif-
fion of crimes, there arifc remorfes and fecret hor-
rors, which give no reft to the mind, but make it
have recourfe to religious rites and ceremonies,
as expiations of its offences. Whatever weak-
ens or diforders the internal frame promote*
the interefts of fuperftition : And nothing i3
more deftrudtive to them than a manly, fteady vir-
tue, which either preferves us from difaftrous, me-
lancholy accidents, or reaches us to bear them.
During fuch calm funfhine of the mind, thefe fpec-
trcs of falfe divinity never make their appear-
ance. On the other hand, while we abandon our-
felves to the natural undifcipiined fuggellions of
our timid and anxious kearts, every kind of bar-
barity is afcribed to the fupreme Being, from the
terrors with which we are agitated ; and every kind -
of caprice, from the methods which we embrace
in order to appeafe him. Barbarity^ caprice -y thefe

Vol. II. H h qUvilities,

* Diod. Sic. lib. xv.

t Cic. Catil. i. SallnH. de bello Catil.

mt

466 The Natural History of Religion.

qualities, however nominally difguifed, we may
univerfally obferve, form the ruling charafter of
the deity in popular religions. Even priefts, in-
ftead of correcting thefe depraved ideas of man-
kind, have often been found ready to fofter and
encourage them. The more tremendous the divi-
nity is reprefented, the more tame and fubmifTive
do men become to his minifters : And the more
unaccountable the meafures of acceptance required
by him, the more neceflary does it become to
abandon our natural reafon, and yield to their
ghoitly guidance and direftion. Thus it may be
allowed, that the artifices of men aggravate our na-
tural infirmities and follies of this kind, but never
originally beget them. Their root (trikes deeper
into the mind, and fprings from the eflential and
univerfal properties of human nature.

Sect. XV. General Corollary.

Though the ftupidity of men, barbarous and
uninltrufted, be fo great, that they may not fee a
fovereign author in the more obvious works of
nature, to which they are fo much familiarized ;
yet it fcarcely feems pofTible, that any one of good
underftanding fhould rejed: that idea, when once
it is fuggefted to him. A purpofe, an intention,
a delign is evident in every thing ; and when our
comprehenfion is fo far enlarged as to contemp-
late the firft rife of this vifible fyftem, we miifb
adopt, with the ftrongeft conviftion, the idea of
fome intellio:ent caufe or author. The uniform
maxims too, which prevail throughout the whole
frame of the univerfe, naturally, if not neceflari-
ly, lead us to conceive this intelligence as finglc
and undivided, where the prejudices of education
oppofe not fo reafonable a theory. Even the con-
trarieties of nature, by difcovering themfelves tvc~
ry where, become proofs of fomc confident plan,

and

The Natural History of Religion. 467

and eftablifh one Tingle purpofe or intention, how-
ever inexplicable and incomprehenfible.

Good and ill arc univerfally intermingled and
confounded, happinefs and mifery, wifdom and
folly, virtue and vice. Nothing is pure and en-
tirely of a piece. All advantages are attended with
difadvantages. An univerfal compenfation pre-
vails in all conditions of being andexiftence. And
it is not poflible for us, by our moft chimerical
wiflies, to form the idea of a ftation or fituation al-
together defirable. The draughts of life, accord-
ing to the poet's fidlion, are always mixed from
vefTels on each hand o( Jupiter : Or if any cup be
prefented altogether pure, it is drawn only, as the
fame poet tells us, from the left-handed veflel.

The more exquifite any good is, of which a
fmall fpecimen is afforded us, the Iliarper is the
evil, allied to it ; and few exceptions are found to
this uniform law of nature. The moft fprightly
wit borders on madnefs -, the higheft efFufions of
joy produce the deepeft melancholy j the moft ra-
viftiing pleafures are attended with the moft cruel
lallitude and difguft ; the moft flattering hopes
make way for the fevereft difappointments. And,
in general, no courfe of life has fuch fafety (for
happinefs is not to be dreamed of) as the tempe-
rate and moderate, which maintains, as far as pof-
fible, a mediocrity, and a kind of infenfibility, in
every thing.

As the good, the great, the fublime, the ravifli-
ing are found eminently in the genuine principles
of theifm; it may be expected, from the analogy
of nature, that the bafe, the abfurd, the mean,
the terrifying will be equally difcovered in religi-
ous fictions and chimeras.

The univerfal propenfity to believe in invifible, in-
telligent power, if not an original inftincl, being
at leaft a general attendant of human nature, may
be confidered as a kind of mark or ftamp, which the
H h 2 divine

468 The Natural History of Religion".

divine workman has fet upon his work ; and no-
thing furcly can more dignify mankind, than to be
thus felc(Eted from all other parts of the creation,
and to bear the image or impreffion of the univer-
fal Creator. But confult this image, as it appears
in the popular religions of the world. How is the
deity disfigured in our reprefentations of him ! What
caprice, abfurdity, and immorality are attributed
to him ! How much is he degraded even below the
charafter, which we fliould naturally, in common
life, afcribe to a man of fenfe and virtue !

What a noble privilege is it of human reafon to
attain the knowledge of the fupreme Being ; and,
from the vifible works of nature, be enabled to in-
fer fo fublime a principle as its fupreme Creator ?
But turn the reverfe of the medal. Survey mofl
nations and mod ages. Examine the religious
principles, which have, in fact, prevailed in the
world. You will fcarcely be perfuaded, that they
are any thing but fick men's dreams : Or perhaps
will regard them more as the playfome whimfies of
monkies in human fhape, than the ferious, pofitive,
dogmatical afleverations of a being, who dignifies
himfelf with the name of rational.

Hear the verbal proteftations of all men : No-
thing fo certain as their religious tenets. Examine
their lives : You will fcarcely think that they re-
pofe the fmalleft confidence in them.

The greateft and truell zeal gives us no fecurity
againft hypocrify : The miOft open impiety is at-
tended with a fecret dread and compun6tion.

No theological abfurdities fo glaring that they
have nor, fometimes, been embraced by men of
the greateft and inoft cultivated underflanding.
No religious precepts fo rigorous that they have
not been adopted by the molt voluptuous and molt
abandoned of men.

Ignorance

The Natural History of Religion. 469

Ignorance is the mother of Devotion : A maxim
that is proverbial, and confirmed by general ex-
perience. Look out for a people, entirely dcfti-
tute of religion : If you find them at all, be aflured,
that they are but few degrees removed from brutes.

What fo pure as fome of the morals, included in
fome theological fyftems ? What fo corrupt as fome
of the practices, to which thefe fyftems give rife ?

The comfortable views, exhibited by the belief
of futurity, are ravifliing and delightful. But how
quickly vaniili on the appearance of its terrors,
which keep a more firm and durable pofienion of
the human mind ?

The whole is a riddle, an a^nigna, an inexpli-
cable myftery. Doubt, uncertainty, fufpence of
judgment appear the only refult of our moft ac-
curate fcrutiny, concejning this fubjeft. But fuch
is the frailty of human reafon, and fuch the irrefift-
ible contagion of opinion, that even this deliberate
doubt could fcarcely be upheld; did we not enlarge
our view, and oppofing one fpecies of fuperfrition
to another, let them a quarrelling; while we our-
felves, during their fury and contention, happily
make our efcape, into the caim^ though obfcure,
regions of philofophy.

NOTES

d

( 471 )

NOTE

T O T H E

SECOND VOLUME'

NOTE [A], p. 22.

I

T is probable that no more was meant by thofe, who de-
nied innate ideas, than that all ideas were copies of our im-
prefTionsj though it muft be confefled, that the terms,
which they employed, were not chofeu with fuch caution,
norfo exactly defined, as to prevent all miftakes about their
doftrine. For what is meant by innate ? If innate be equi-
valent to natural, then all the perceptions and ideas of the
mind muft be allo\\'ed to be innate or natural, in whatever
fenfe we take the latter word, whether in oppofition to
what is uncommon, artificial, or miraculous. If by innate
be meant, cotemporary to our birth, the difputefeems tobe
frivolous; nor is it worth while to enquire at what time
thinking begins, whether before, at, or after our birth.
Again, the word idea, fcems to be commonly taken in a
very loofe fenfe, by Locke and others ; as ftanding for any
of our perceptions, our fenfations and paiCons, as well as
thoughts. Now in this fenfe, I Ihauld delire to know,
what can be meant by aflerting, that felf-love, or refent-
_ment of injuries, or the pafllon between the fexes is not in-
nate ?

But

472

Notes to the Second Volume.

But admitting thefe terms, imprejjions and ideas, in the
fenfe above explained, and undertlandingby innate, what is
original or copied from no precedent perception, thea
may we affert, that all our impreilions are innate, and
our ideas not innate.

To be ingenuous, I muft own it to be my opinion,
that Locke was betrayed into this queftion by the fchool-
men, who, making uie of undefined terms, dravv' out their
difputes lo a tedious length, without ever touching the
point in queilion. A like ambiguity and circumlocution
feem to run through that philofopher's reasonings on this
^s well as moft other fubjecls.

NOTE [Bj, p. 49.

N.

OTHING is more ufual than for writers, even
on moral, political, or phyfical fubjecis, to diftinguith be-
tween reafon and experience, and to fuppofe, that thele fpe-
cies of argumentation are entirely different from eacli
other. The forsjier are taken for the mere refult of our in-
telledlual faculties, which, by confidering a priori the na-
ture of things, and examining the effects, that muft follow
from their operaHon, eflablilh particular principles of fci-
ence and philofophy. The latter are fuppofed to be deri-
ved entirely from fenfe and obfervation, by which we
learn what has a<ffually refulted from the operation of par-
ticular objefts, and are thence able to infer, what will, for
the future, refult from them. Thus, for inftance, the li-
mitations and reftraints of civil government, and a legal
conftitution may hz defended, either from reafcn, which
refle£ling on the great frailty and corruption of human na-
ture, teaches, that no man can fafely be truded with unli-
mited authority ; or from experience and hiftory, which in-
form us of the enormous abufes, that ambition, in every
age and country, has been found to make of fo imprudent
a conridence.

The fame diftinilion between reafon and experience is
maintained in all our deliberations concerning the Condud
of life; while the experienced ftatefman, general, phyfician,
or mercliant is trufted and follov.ed ; and the unprattifed
liovice, with whatever natural talents endowed, neglefted

and

"Notes to the Second V'olume. 4.73

and defpifed. Though it be allowed, that reafon may form
very plaufible conjcdtures with regard to the confequences
of fuch a particular condudt in fuch particular circumftances j
it is ftill luppoled imperfed, without the alTiftance of expe-
rience, which is alone able to give rtability and certainty to
the ma^'ims, derived from ftudy and reflexion.

But notwithftanding that this diftin(Stion be thus univer-
fally received, both in the aitiveand fpeculative fcenes of life,
1 fiiall not fcruple to pronounce, that it is at bottom, errone-
ous, at leaft, fuperlicial.

If we examine thofe arguments, which, in any of the
fciences above-mentioned, are fuppofed to be the mere ef-
feds of reafoning and refledlion, they will be found to ter-
minate, at laft, in fome general principle or concluhon, for
which we can afiign no reafon but obfervation and experi-
ence. The only difference between them and thofe max-
ims, which are vulgarly efteemed the refult of pure experi-
ence, is that the former cannot be eftablifhed without fome
procefs of thought, and fome refledlion on what we have
obferved, in order to diftinguifli its circumrtances, and trace
its confequences : Whereas in the latter, the experienced
even^ is exadly and fully fimilar to that which we infer as
the efult of any particular fituation. The hiftory of a
Tiberius or a Nero makes us dread a like tyranny, were
our monarchs freed from the reftraints of laws and fenates:
But the obfervation of any fraud or cruelty in private life is
fufficient, with the aid of a little thought, to give us the
fame apprehenfion ; while it ferves us as an inftance of the
general corruption of human nature, and fhews us the
danger which we muft incur by repofing an entire confidence
in mankind. In both cafes, it is experience wliich is ulti-
mately the foundation of out inference and conclufion.

There is no man fo young and unexperienced, as not to
have formed, from obfervation, many general and juft max-
ims concerning human affairs and the condudl of life ; but
it mud be confeffed, that, when a man comes to put thefe
in pradice, he will be extremely liable to error, till time
and farther experience both enlarge thefe maxims, and
teach him their proper ufe and application. In every
fituation or incident, there are many particular and feem-
ingly minute circumftances, which the man of greateft
talents is, at firft, apt to overlook, though on them the
juftnefs of his conclulions, and cowfequently the prudence
I of

474 Notes to the Second Volume.

of his condu6l, entirely depend. Not to mention,
that, to a young beginner, the general obfervations and
maxims occur not always on the proper occafions, nor
can be immediately applied with due calmnefs and dif-
tindion. The truth is, an unexperienced reafoner could
be no reafoner at all, were he abfolutely unexperienced;
and when we aflign that charadler to any one, we mean
it only in a comparative fenfe, and fuppofe him pofT-
efled of experience, in a fmaller and more imperfedt
degree.

NOTE [C], p. 72.

I

T may be pretended, that the refinance which we meet
with in bodies, obliging us frequently to exert our force,
and call up our power, this gives us the idea of force
and power. It is this nifus or ftrong endeavour, of
which we are confcious, that is the original impreflion
from which this idea is copied. But, firft, we attribute
power to a vaft number of objefts, where we never can
fuppofe this reGilance or exertion of force to take place;
to the Supreme Being, who never meets with any re-
fiftance; to the mind in its command over its ideas
and limbs, in common thinking and motion, where the
effe(Sl follows immediarely upon the will, without any
exertion or fummonin^ up of force; to inanimate mat-
ter, which is not capable of this fentiment. Secondly^
This fentirnent of an endeavour to overcome refiftance
has no known connexion with any event: What fol-
lows it, we know by experience; but could not know
it a priori. It muft, however, be confelTed, that the
animal riptr, which we experience, though it can afford
no accurate precife idea of power, enters very much in-
to that vulgar, inaccurate idea, which is formed of it.

NOTE [D], p. 78.

I

NEED not examine at length the vis inertia which is
fo much talked of in the new philofophy, and which is

afcribed

Notes to the Second Volume. 475

afcribed to matter. We find by experience, that a body
at reft or in motion continues for ever in its prefent
ftate, till put from it by fome new caufe ; and that
a body impelled takes as much motion from the impel-
ling body as it acquires itfelf. Thefe are fads. When
we call this a vis inertia^ we only mark thefe fafis,
without pretending to have any idea of the inert pow-
er ; in the fame manner as, when we talk of gravity,
we mean certain effeds, without comprehending that zt\-
ive power. It was never the meaning of Sir Ifaac Newton
to rob fecond caufes of all force or energy ; though fome
of his followers have endeavoured to eftablifh that theory
upon his authority. On the contrary, that great philofo-
pher had recourfe to an etherial adlive fluid to explain his
univerfal attradlionj though he was fo cautious and modeft
as to allow, that it was a mere hypothefis, not to be in-
flfted on, without more experiments. I muft confefs, that
there is fomething in the fate of opinions a little extraordi-
nary. Des Cartes infinuated that do£lrine of the univerfal
and fole efficacy of the Deity, without infifting on it.
Malebranche and other Cartefians made it the foundation
of all their philofophy. It had, however, no authority in
England. Locke, Clarke, and Cudworth, never fo much
as take notice of it, but fuppofe all along, that matter
has a real, though fubordinate and derived power. By
what means has it become fo prevalent among our modern
metaphyficians ?

A.

NOTE [EJ, p. 83.

.CCORDING to thefe explications and definitions,
the idea oi power is relative as much as that of caufe ; and,
both have a reference to an effe6t, or fome other event
conftantly conjoined with the former. When we confider
the unknown circumftance of an object, by which the de-
gree or quantity of its effedl is fixed and determined, we
call that its power: And accordingly, it is allowed by all
philofophers, that the efFeiEl is the meafure of the power.
But if they had any idea of power, as it is in itfelf,
why could not they meafure it in itfelf? The difpute whe-
ther the force of a body in motion be as its velocity, or the
fquare of its velocity j this difpute, I fay, needed not be
decided by comparing its effedts in equal or unequal times j
but by a dire6l menfuration and comparifon.

As

n47<5 Notes to the Second Volume.

As to the frequent ufe of the words. Force, Power,
Energy, ^c. which every where occur in common con-
verfation, as well as in philofophy ; that is no proof,
that we are acquainted, in any inftance, with the con-
ne6ting principle between caufe and effedl, or can account
ultimately for the production of one thing by another.
Thefe words, as commonly ufed, have very loofe mean-
ings annexed to themj and their ideas are very uncer-
tain and confufed. No animal can put external bodies
in motion without the fentiment of a nlfus or endea-
vour ; and every animal has a fentiment or feeling from
the flroke or blow of an external objcvfl, that is in mo-
tion. Thefe fenfations, which are merely animal, and
from which we can a priori draw no inference, we are
apt to transfer to inanimate objects, and to fuppofe, that
they have fome fuch feelings, whenever they transfer or
receive motion. With regard to energies, which are ex-
erted, without our annexing to them any idea of com-
municated motion, we confider only the conftant expe-
rienced conjunction of the events ; and as we feel a
cuftomary connection between the ideas, we transfer that
feeling to the objedils ; as nothing is more ufual than
to apply to external bodies every internal fenfation, which
they occafion.

N O T E [F], p. lOo.

A H E prevalence of the doflrmc of liberty may be
accounted for, from another caufe, viz. a falfe fenfa-
tion or feeming experience which we have, or may have,
of liberty or indifference, in many of our adtions. The
necelfity of any action, whether of matter or of mind,
is not, properly fpeaking, a quality in the agent, but in
any thinking or intelligent being, who may confider the
action ; and it confiils chiefly in the determination of
his thoughts to infer the exiftence or that adion from
fomc preceding objefts ; as liberty, when oppofed to
necelfity, is nothing but the want of that determination,
and a certain loofenefs or indifference, which we feel,
in palfing, or not pafFing, from the idea of one objedl
to that of any fuccecding one. Now we may obferve,

that.

Notes to the Second Volume. 477

that, though, in refleSi'mg on human atSlions, we feldom
feel fuch a loofenefs or indifference, but are common-
ly able to infer them with confiderable certainty from
their motives, and from the difpofitions of the agent;
yet it frequently happens, that, in performing the adtions
themfelves, we are fenfible of fomething like it : And
as all refembling objedfs are readily taken for each other,
this has been employed as a demonftrative and even in-
tuitive proof of human liberty. We feel, that our adlions
are fubjetSl to our will, on moft occafions ; and imagine
we feel, that the will itfelf is fubje6l to nothing, becaufe,
when by a denial of it we are provoked to try, we feel,
that it moves eafily every way, and produces an image
of itfelf, (or a Velleity^ as it is called in the fchools)
even on that fide, on which it did not fettle. This
image, or faint motion, we pcrfuade ourfelves, could, at
that time, have been compleated into the thing itfelf;
becaufe, fhould that be denied, we find, upon a fecond
trial, that, at prefent, it can. We confider not, that
the fantaftical defire of fhewing liberty, is here the mo-
tive of our a<Slions. And it feems certain, that, how-
ever we may imagine we feel liberty within ourfelves,
a fpe£tator can commonly infer our actions from our
motives and charader ; and even where he cannot, he
concludes in general, that he might, were he perfectly ac-^
quainted with every circumftance of our iituation and tem-
per, and the moft fecret fprings of our complexion and
difpofition. Now this is the very efi"ence of neceffity, ac-
cording to tlie foreffoino; doiSlrine.

NOTE [GJ, p. 102.

X

M. HUS, if a caufe be defined, that which produces any
thing ; it is eafy to obferve, that producing is fynonimous
to caufmg. In like manner, if a caufe be defined, that
by luhich any thing exijh ; this is liable to the fame ob-
jeifl:ion. For what is meant by thefe words, by which?
flad it been faid, that a caufe is that after which any
thing conjlantly exijis j we fliould have underftood the
terms. For this is, indeed, all we know of the mat-
ter. And this confiiancy forms the very effence of ne-
ceifity, nor have we any other idea of ir.

NOTE

478 Notes to the Second Volume.

NOTE [HJ, p. 114.

»-^INCE all reafoningi concerning fa*3:s or caufes is de-
rived merely from cuftom, it may be afked how it happens,
that men fo much furpafs animals in reafoning, and one
man fo much furpaffes another ? Has not the fame cuftom
the fame influence on all ?

We (hall here endeavour briefly to explain the great dif-
ference in human underfl:andings : After which the reafon
of the difference between men and animals will eafily be
comprehended.

1 . When we have lived any time, and have been accu-
flomed to the uniformity of nature, we acquire a general
habit, by which we always transfer the known to the
unknown, and conceive the latter to refemble the former.
By means of this general habitual principle, we regard
even one experiment as the foundation of reafoning, and
expert a fimilar event with fome degree of certainty,
where the experiment has been made accurately, and
free from all foreign circumftances. It is therefore con-
fidered as a matter of great importance to obferve the con-
fequences of things j and as one man may very much
furpafs another in attention and memory and obferv^a-
tion, this will make a very great difference in their rea-
foning.

2. Where there is a complication of caufes to produce
any efFe6l, one mind may be much larger than another,
and better able to comprehend the whole fyflem of objefts,
and to infer juf\ly their confequences.

3. One man is able to carry on a chain of confequences
to a greater length than another.

4. Few men can think long without running into a con-
fufion of ideas, and miflaking one for another ; and there
are various degrees of this infirmity.

5. The circumitance, on which the eiTe^l depends, is
frequently involved in other circumftances, which are fo-
reign and extrinfic. The feparation of it often requires
great attention, accuracy, and fubtilty.

6. The

Notes to the Second Volume. 479

6. The forming of general maxims from particular ob-
fervation is a very nice operation j and nothing is more ufual,
from hafte or a narrownefs of mind, which fees not on all
fides, than to commit miftakes in tiiis particular.

7. When we reafon from analogies, the man, who has
the greater experience or the greater promptitude of fuggeft-
ing analogies, will be the better reafoner.

8. Byafles from prejudice, education, paflion, party, ^c,
hang more upon one mind than another.

9. After we have acquired a confidence in human tefti-
mony, books and converfation enlarge much more the
fphere of one man's experience and thought than thofe of
another.

It would be eafy to difcover many other circumftances
that make a difference in the underftanding of men.

NOTE [IJ, p. 122.

N.

O Indian, it is evident, could have experience that
water did not freeze in cold climates. This is placing
nature in a fituation quite unknown to him ; and it is
impoflible for him to tell a priori what will refult from
it. It is making a new experiment, the confequence of
which is always uncertain. One may fometimes conjec-
.ture from analogy what will follow j but flill this is but
conjedure. And it muft be confeffed, that, in the pre-
fent cafe of freezing, the event follows contrary to the
rules of analogy, and is fuch as a rational Indian would not
look for. The operations of cold upon water are not
gradual, according to the degrees of cold ; but when-
ever it comes to the. freezing point, the water paffes in
a moment, from the utmoll liquidity to perfedt hard-
nefs. Such an event, therefore, may be derjoirunated ^x-
traordinary^ and requires a pretty ftrotic teftimony, to
render it credible to people in a warm chmate : But ftill
it is not iniraculoih^ nor contrary to iiriJorm experience
of the cout-fe of namre in cafes whe.x all the circum-
ftances are the fame. The inhabitan.'^ of Sumatra have
always feen water fluid in their owr; climate, and the
freezing of their rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy :
But they never favv water in Pvlufcovy during the wMn-

ters

4?o Notes to the Second Volume.

ter ; and therefore they cannot reafonably be pofitive what
would there be the conJfequence.

NOTE [KJ, p. 123.

►Sometimes an event may not, in itfelf, feem to be
contrary to the laws of nature, and yet, if it were real, it
might, by reafon of fome circumftances, be denominated
a miracle; becaufe, in faSf^ it is contrary to thefe laws.
Thus if a perfon, claiming a divine authority, fhould com-
mand a fick perfon to be well, a healthful man to fall down
dead, the clouds to pour rain, the winds to blow, in (hort,
fhould order many natural events, which immediately fol-
low upon his command; thefe might juftly be efteemed
miracles, becaufe they are really, in this cafe, contrary to
the laws of nature. For if any fufpicion remain, that the
event and command concurred by accident, there is no
miracle and no tranfgreflion of the laws of nature. If this
fufpicion be removed, there is evidently a miracle, and a
tranfgreflion of thefe laws ; becaufe nothing can be more
contrary to nature than that the voice or command of a
man ftiould have fuch an influence. A miracle may be
accurately defined, a tranfgrejjion of a law of nature by a
particular volition of the Deity y or by the interpofit'ion of fome
invifible agent. A miracle may either be difcoverable by
men or not. This alters not its nature and eflence. The
raifm^ of a houfe or (hip into the air is a vifible miracle.'
The raifmg of a feather, when the wind wants ever fo little
of a force requifite for that purpofe, is as real a miracle,
though not fo fenfible with regard to us.

NOTE [LJ, p. 133.

A HIS book was writ by Monf. Montgeron, counfellor
or judge of the parliament of Paris, a man of figure and
character, who was alfo a martyr to the caufe, and is now
faid to be fomewhere in a dungeon on account of his book.
There is another book in three volumes called Recucil
d(s Miracki de V Abbe Paris) giving an account of many of
thefe miracles, and accompanied with prefatory difcourfes,
which are very well written. There runs, however, through

the

Notes to the Second Volume. 481

the whole of thefe a ridiculous comparifon between the
jniraclcs of our Saviour and thofe of the Abbe ; wlierein
it is afTerted, tliat the evidence for the latter is equal to
that for the former : As if the teflimony of men could
ever be put in the balance with that of God hiaiiclf,
who conducted the pen of the im'pired writers. If Jicfe
■writers, indeed, were to be confidered merely as human
teflimony, the French author is very moderate in his
comparifon ; fince he might, with fome appearance of rea-
fon, pretend, that the Janfcnifl: miracles much lurpafs the
other in evidence and authority. The following circum-
ftaaces are drawn from authentic papers, inferred in the
above-mentioned book.

Many of the miracles of Abbe Paris were proved imme-
diately by witueiies before the ofliciality or bilhop's court at
Paris, under the eye of cardinal Noailles, whofe character
for integrity and capacity was never contelled even by his
enemies.

His fucceflbr in the archbifhopric was an enemy to the
Janfenifls, and for that reafon promoted to the fee by the
court. Yet 22 rectors or cures, of Paris, with infinite earn-
eftnefs, prefs him to examine thofe miracles, which they
aflert to be known to the whole world, and undifputably
certain : But he wifely forbore.

The Molinift party had tried to difcredit thefe mira-
cles in one inftance, that of Mademoifelle le Franc.
But, befides that their proceedings were in many re-
lpe6ts the mod irregular in the world, pariicularly in cit-
ing only a few of the Janfenill -witneffes, whom they
tampered with : Befides this, I fay, they foon found
themfelves overwhelmed by a cloud of new witneffes,
one hundred and twenty in number, moft of them
perfons of credit and fubflance in Paris, who gave oath
for the miracle. This was accompanied with a folemn
and earnelt appeal to the parliament. But the parlia-
ment were forbidden by authority to meddle in the af-
fair. It was at iaft obferved, that where men are heated
by zeal and enthufiafm, there is no degree of human
teflimony fo ftrong as may not be procured for the
greatefl abfurdity : And thofe who w^U be fo filly as to
examine the affair by that medium, and feek particular
Vol. II. I i flaws

482 Notes to the Second Volume.

flaws in the teflimony, are ahnoll fare to be confounded. It
muftbe a miferabJe impoflure, indeed, that does not prevail
in thatconielh

All who have been in France about that time have
heard of the reputation of Monf. Heraut, the lieutenant
de Police^ whofe vigilance, penetration, activity, and ex-
teniive intelligence have been much talked of. This
magiftrate, who by the nature of his olace is almoft
abfolute, was vefted with full powers, on purpofe to
fupprefs or difcredit thefe miracles ; and he frequently
feized immediately, and examined the witneiTes and fubjecSls
of them : But never could leach any thing fatisfaCtory a-
gainft them.

In the cafe of Mademoifelle Thibaut he fent the
famous De Sylva to examine her ; whofe evidence is
very curious. The phyfician declares, that it was im-
poflible ihe could have been fo ill as was proved by
witnelTes ; becaufe it was impoflible <]ie could, in fo
Ihort a time, have recovered fo perfeitly as he found
her. He reafoned, like a man of fenfe, from natural
caufes ; but the oppolite party told him, that the whole
was a miracle, and that his evidence was the very bell proof
of it.

The Molinifts were in a fad dilemma. They durfl
not affert the abfolute infufficiency of human evidence,
to prove a miracle. They were obliged to fay, that
thefe miracles were wrought by witchcraft and the devil.
But they were told, that this was the relource of the Jews
of old.

No Janfenifl: Was ever embarrafled to account for the
cefiation of the miracles, v.hen the church-yard was fliut
up by the king's cdid . It was the touch of the tomb,
which produced thefe extraordinary effects ; and wiien
no one could approach th.c tomb, no effcits could be
cxpecled. God, indeed, could have thrown down the
walls in a moment ; but he is mafter of his own graces
and works, and it belongs not to us to account tor
them. He did not throw down the walls of every city
like thofe of Jericho, on the founding of the rams horns,
nor break up the prifon of every apoftle, like that ot
St. Paul.

No

Notes to the Second Volume. 483

No lefs a man, than the Due de Chatillon, a duke and
peer of France, of the highed rank and family, gives evi-
dence of a miraculous cure, performed upon a fervant of
his, who had hved feveral years in his houfe with a vifible
and palpable infirmity.

I ihall conckide with obferving, that no clergy are more
celebrated for ftridtnefs of life and manners than the fecular
clergy of France, particularly the rectors or cures of Paris,
who bear teftimony to thefe impoftures.

The learning, genius, and probity of the gentlemen,
and the aufterity of the nuns of Port-Royal, have been
much celebrated all over Europe. Yet they all give
evidence for a miracle, wrought on the niece of the
famous Pafcal, whofe fzntihy of life, as well as extra-
ordinary capacity, is well known. The famous Racine
gives an account of this miracle in his famous hiftory
of Port-Royal, and fortifies it with all the proofs, which
a multitude of nuns, priefts, phyficians, and men of
the world, all of them of undoubted credit, could be-
ftow upon it. Several men of letters, particularly the
biOiop of Tournay, thought this miracle fo certain, as to
employ it in the refutation of atheifts and free-thinkers.
The queen-regent of France, who was extremely pre-
judiced againll the Port-Royal, fent her own phyfician
to examine the miracle, who returned an abfolute con-
vert. In fhort, the fupernatural cure was fo uncontefta-
ble, that it faved, for a time, that famous monaftery from
the ruin with which it was threatened by the Jefuits.
Had it been a cheat, it had certainly been detected by
fuch fagacious and powerful antagonifts, and muft have
haftened the ruin of the contrivers. Our divines, who
can build up a formidable caftle from fuch defpicable
materials ; what a prodigious fabric could they have reared
from thefe and many other circumftances, which I have
not mentioned ! How often would the great names of
Pafcal, Racine, Arnaud, Nicole, have relbunded in our
ears ? But if they be wife, they had better adopt the
miracle, as being more worth, a thoufand times, than
all the reft of the collection. Befides, it may ferve very
much to their purpofe. For that miracle was really per-
formed by the touch of an autlientic holy prickle of

I i 2 the

484 Notes to the Second Volume.

the holy thorn, which compofed the holy crown, which.

NOTE [M], p. 155.

I

N general, it may, I think, be eftablifhed as a maxim,
that where any caufe is known only by its particular
effe6ts, it muft be impoffible to infer any new efFefts
from that caufe; fince the qualities, which are requifite
to produce thefe new efFeils along with the former, muft
either be different, or fuperior, or of more extenfive ope-
ration, than thofe which fimply produce the effect:,
whence alone the caufe is fuppofed to be known to us.
We can never, therefore, have any reafon to fuppofe the
exiftence of thefe qualities. To fay, that the new effefts
proceed only from a continuation of the fame energy,
which is already known from the firll effeils, will not
remove the difficulty. For even granting this to be the cafe
(which can feldom be fuppofed), the very continuation and
exertion of a like energy (for it is impoffible it can be abfo-
lutely the fame), I fay, this exertion of a like energy, in a
different period of fpace and time, is a very arbitrary fup-
pofition, and what there cannot poffibly be any traces of
in the effects, from which all our knowledge of the caufe
is originally derived. Let the inferred caufe be exactly
proportioned (as it fliould be to the known effect; and
it is impoffible that it can poffefs any qualities, from which
new or different effedls can be inferred.

NOTE [N], p. 16^.

L HIS argument is drawn from Dr. Berkley; and in-
deed moft of the writiiigs of that very ingenious author
form the bell: lelfoas of Iccpticilm, which are to be found
either among the ancient or modern philofoplicrs, Bayle
not excepted. He profeffes, however, in his title-page
(and undoubted'y with g eat truth) to have compofed his
book agaiull the fceptics as weH as againft the atheifls
and free-thinkers. But that all his arguments, though
othevvvife intended, are, in reality, merely fceptical, ap-
pears from this, that they admit of no anfwcr and produce no

conviilion.

Notes to the Second Volume. 4S5

convinion. Their only effe6l is to caufe that momentary
amazement and irrefolution and coafufion, which is the rc-
fuJt of fcepticilhi.

NOTE [OJ, p. 166.

w,

HATEVER difputes there may be about mathema-
tical points, we mufl: allow that there are phyfical points ;
that is, parts of extenfion, which cannot be divided or leflen-
ed, cither by the eye or imagination. Thcfe images, then,
which are prefent to the fancy or fenfes, are abfolutely indi-
vifible, and confequently mufl: be allowed by mathematicians
to be infinitely lefs than any real part of extenfion ; and yet
nothing appears more certain to reafon, than that an infinite
number of them compofes an infinite extenfion. How
much more an infinite number of thofe infinitely fmall parts
of extenfion, which are fi:ill fuppofed infinitely divifible.

NOTE [P], p. 168.

XT fcems to me not impoffible to avoid thefe abfurdities
and contradictions, if it be admitted, that there is no fucli
thing as abftra^t or general ideas, properly fpeaking j but
that all general ideas are, in reality, particular ones, attach-
ed to a general term, which recalls, upon occafion, other
particular ones, that refemble. in certain circumllances, the
idea, prelent to the mind. Thus when the term Horfe is
pronounced, we immediately figure to ourfelves the idea of
a black or a white animal, of a particular fize or figure : But
as that term is alfo ufually applied to animals of other co-
lours, figures and fizes, thefe ideas, though not actually
prefent to the imagination, are eafily recalled ; and our
reafoning and conclufion proceed in the fame way, as if they
were actually prefent. If this be admitted (as feems rea-
fonable) it follows that all the ideas of quantity, upon which
mathematicians reafon, are nothing but particular, and fuch
as are fuggefted by the fenfes and imagination, and confe-
quently, cannot be infinitely divifible. It is fuificient to
have dropped this hint at prefent, without profecuting it
any farther. It catainly concerns all lovers of fcience not

to

486 Notes to the Second Volume.

to expofe themfelves to the ridicule and contempt of the
ignorant by their conclufions ; and this feems the readieft
folution of thefe difficulties.

NOTE [Q_], p. 174.

X HAT impious maxim of the ancient philofophy, Ex
nihilo^ nihil fit ^ by which the creation of matter was ex-
cluded, ceafes to be a maxim, according to this philofophy.
Not only the"* will of the fupreme Being may create mat-
ter; but, for aught we know a priori^ the will of any other
being might create it, or any other caufe, that the moft whini-
lical imagination can affign.

NOTE [R], p. ,93.

T

■A HAT property is a fpecies of relation^ which pro-
duces a connexion between the perfon and the objedt is
evident : The imagination paffes naturally and eafily from
the confideration of a field to that of the perfon to whom it
belongs. It may alfo be afked, how this relation is refolva-
ble into any of thofe three, viz. canjation^ contiguity^ and
refemblance, which we have affirmed to be the only conne6t-
ing principles among ideas. To be the proprietor of any
thing is to be the fole perfon, who, by the laws of fociety>
has a right to difpofe of it, and to enjoy the benefit of it.
This right has at leaft a tendency to procure the perfon fhe
exercife of it; and in fa6l does commonly procure him that
advantage. For rights which had no influence, and never
took place, would be no rights at all. Now a perfon who
difpofes of an objedf, and reaps benefit from it, both pro-
duces, or may produce, effedts en it, and is affeded by it.
Property therefore is a fpecies of caufation. It enables the
perfon to produce alterations on the objecf, and it fuppofes
that his condition is improved and altered by it. It is in-
deed the relation the moft interefting of any, and occurs
the moft frequently to the mind.

NOTE

Notes to the Second Volume. 487

NOTE [SJ, p. 238.

T,

HIS fidion of a ftate of nature, as a ftate of war, was
not tirll ftarted by Mr. Hobbes, as is commonly imagined.
Plato endeavours to refute an hypothelis very like it in the
2d, 3d, and 4th books de republica. Cicero, on the contrary,
fupjjofes it certain and univcrfally acknowledged in the fol-
low ing paffage. " Quis enim vcftrum, judices, ignorat, ita
" n.turam rcrum tulifl'e, ut quodam tempore homines,
" nondum neque naturali, ixeque civili jure defcripto, full
*' per agros, ac difperfi vagarentur tantumque haberent
" quantum manu ac viribus, per czedcni ac vulnera, aut
*' eripcre, aut retinere potuiiTent? Qiii igitur primi virtute
" & confilio pr2;ftanti extiterunt, ii perfpe6to genere huma-
** nae docilltatis atque ingenii, ditlipatos, unum in locum
'* congrcgarunt, eoAjue ex feritate ilia ad juftitiam ac man-
" fuetudinem tranfduxerunt. 7\nn res ad communem
" utilitatem, quas publicas appellamus, tum conventicula
*' hominum, qu^e poltea civitates nominatae funt, tum do-
" micilia conjuncla, quas urbes dicamus, invento & divino
** & humano jure, moenibus fepferunt. Atque inter hanc
*' vitam, perpolitam humaniiate, cc illam immanem, nihil
*' tarn interefl quam JUS atque VIS. Horum u ro uti
" nolimus, altero eft utendum. Vim volumus extingui ?
" Jus valeat necefTe ell, id eft, judicia, quibus omne jus
'' continetur. judicia difplicent, aut nulla, funt ? Vis do-
*' minetur necefTe eft?- Ha^c vident omnes." Pro. Sext.
1.42.

NOTE [TJ, p. 245.

X H E autlvor of UEfpirt dcs Lo'ix. This illuftrious
writer, however, fets out with a different theory, and fup-
pofes all right to be founded on certain rapports or relations ;
which is a fyftem, that, in my opinion, never will be recon-
ciled with true philolbphy. Father Malebranche, as far as
I can learn, was the iirft that iiarted this abftracl theory
of morals, which was afterwards adopted by Cudworth,
Clarke, and others ; and as it excludes all fentimeut, and
pretends to found every thing on reafon, it has not wanted

followers

488 Notes to the Second Volume.

followers in this philofophic age. See Section I. Appen-
dix I. With regard to juilice, the virtue here treated of,
the inference againll this theory feems ihort and conckidvc.
I'ropcrty is allowed to be dependent on civil law s ; Civil laws
are allowed to have no other objedt, but the interefl: of fo-
ciety ; Ihis therefore muft be allowed to be the fole foun-
dation of property and jurlice. Not to mention, that our
obligation itfelf to obey the rnagidrate and his laws is founded
on nothing but the iniereflb of fociety.

li the ideas of juftice, ronenmes, do not follow the dif-
poiitions of civil law ; we (hall tind, that thefe cafes, in-
Itead of objeftions, are confirmations of the theory delivered
above. Where a civil law is fo perverie as to crofs all the
interefts of fociety, it lofes all its authority, and men judge
by the ideas of natural juftice, which are conformable to
thofe interefts. Sometimes alfo civil lavvs, for ufeful pur-
poles, require a ceremony or form to any deed; and where
that is wanting, their decrees run contrary to the ufual
tenour of juftice j but one who takes advantage of fuch
chicanes, is not commonly regarded as an honefl man.
Thus, the interefts of fociety require, that contradls be ful-
filled j and there is not a more m.aterial article either of
natural or civil juftice : But the omiifion ot a trifling cir-
cumftance will often, bylaw, invalidate a contract, hi for 0
humana^ but not in foro confcientia, as divines exprefs them-
fehes. In thefe cafes, the magiftrate is fuppofed only to
withdraw his power of enforcing the right, not to have al-
tered the right. Where his intention extends to t4ie right,
and is conformable to the interefts of fociety ; it never fails
to alter the right ; a clear proof of the origin of juftice and
of property, as affigned above.

NOTE [U], p. 247

/•

I

T is evident, that the will or confent alone never transfers
property, nor caufcs the obligation of a promife, (for the
fame rcafoning extends to both) but the will mvdl be exprefi
fed by words or figns, in order to impofc a tye upon any man.
The exprelhon being once brought in as iubfervient to the

will,

Notes to the Second Volume. 489

will, foon becomes the principal part of the promife;
nor will a man be lets bound by his word, though he
fecretly give a different dire£lion to his intention, and
with-hold the allent or his mind. But though the c\-
preifion makes, on moft occalions, the whole of tlv: pro-
mife, yet it does not always fo ; and one who fliould
make ufe of any expreilion, of which he knows not the
meaning, and which he ufes without any fenfe of the
coniequences, would not certainly be bound by it. Nay,
though he know its meaning, yet if he ufe it in jell
only, and with fuch llgns as evidently Ihow, that he
has no ferious mtcntion of binding himfelf, he would
not lie under any obligation of performance ; but it is
neceflary, that the words be a perfeel exprelfion of the
will, wihout any contrary figns. Nay, even this we
mufl not carry fo far as to imagine, that one, whom,
by our quicknefs of underftanding, we conje«£ture, from
certain figns, to have an intention of deceiving us, is
not bound by his expreflion or verbal promife, if we
accept of it; but muft limit this conclufion to thofe
cafes where the figns are of a different nature from
thofe of deceit. All thefe contradidions are ealily ac-
counted for, if juftice arife entirely from its ufefulnefs
to focietyj but will never be explained on any other
hypothefis.

it is remarkable, that the moral decifions of the
yefuits and other relaxed cafuifts, were commonly for-
med in profecution of fome fuch fubtilties of reaioning
as are here pointed out, and proceed as much from the
habit of fcholaflic refinement as from any corruption of
the heart, if we may follow the authority of Monf.
Bayle. See his Dictionary, article Loyola. And why
has the indignation of mankind rifen fo high againft
thefe cafuilts; but becaufe every one perceived, that
human fociety could not fubfift were fuch practices au-
thorized, and that morals mull always be handled
with a view to public intereft, more than philofophi-
cal regularity ? If the fecret direction of the intention,
faid every man of fenfe, could invalidate a contrafl ;
where is our fecurity ? And yet a mecaphyfical fchool-
man might think, that, where an intention was fup-
pofed to be requifite, if that intention really had not

place.

49° Notes to the Second Volume.

place, no confequence ought to follow, and no obliga-
tion be impofed. The cafuiftical fubtiltiei nr.ay not be
greater than the fubtilties of lawyers, hinted at above;
but as the foimer are pcrtiicious, and the latter iwwcent
and even neceffrry^ this is the reafon of the very differ-
ent reception they meet with from the world.

It is a do(9:rine of the church of Rome, that the
prieft, by a fecret direction of his intention, can in-
validate any facrament. This pofition is derived from
a ftridl and regular profecution of the obvious truth,
that empty words alone, without any meaning or in-
tention in the fi eaker, can never be attended with any
effect. If the fame conclufion be not admitted in rea-
fonings concerning civil contracts, where the affair is
allowed to be of fo much lefs confequence than the
eternal falvation of thoufands, it proceeds entirely from
men's fenfe of the danger and inconvenience of the
do6trine in the former cafe : And we may thence ob-
ferve, that however pofitive, arrogant, and dogmatical
any fuperftition may appear, it never can convey any
thorough perfuafion of the reality of its objects, or
put them, in any degree, on a balance with the
common incidents of life, which we learn from daily
obfervation and experimental reafoning.

NOTE [X], p. 255.

\. HE only folution, which Plato gives to all the ob-
jections that might be raifed againll the community of wo-
men, eftablilhed in his imaginary commonwealth, is Ksaais-*

J'Otp (Jn TiiTO XttI Aflirai Kti ASAS^JXai, OT(TOyU?l' 0)^';X\U->t KCUXOY- To

Js BaaS^Pov aicr-^pov Scite enhn ijiudl~ d'lcttur &' dketur. Id
quod utile fit honejlmn ejje^ qucd aiitcm inutile fit turpe ejfe.
De. Rep. lib. v. p. 457. ex edit, Ser. And this max-
im will admit of no doubt, where public utility is con-
cerned; which is Plato's meaning. And indeed to what
other purpofe do all the ideas of chaftity and modefty
ferve ? Nfi utile efl quod facimus,. frujlr a efl gloria, fays
Phasdrus. Kkaov twi (iActS pwv ^Jsi- fays Plutarch de vitiofo
pudore. Nihil eorum quae damnofa funt, pulchrum eft.
The fame was the opinion of the Stoics. C'.^ctiv cv ot

Notes to the Second Volume. 491

2Ta'()iri( aya^oY nyai O'CtihtiAr m ajt erepctv <uf?A5ittS', c^ff-sxciv far
A'>f»rfj- TH> apsTid xaj Til) cnra^ot(*y -sTfct^jK. Sept. Emp. lib;
iii. cap. 20.

NOTE [YJ, p. 259.

JL HAT the lighter machine yield to the heavier,
and, in machines of the fame kind, that the empty yield
to the loaded; this rule is founded on convenience.
That thofe who are going to the capital take place of
thofe who are coming from it j this feems to be found-
ed on fome idea of the dignity of the great city, and
of the preference of the future to the paft. From like
reafons, among foot-walkers, the right-hand intitles a
man to the wall, and prevents jollling, which peaceable
people find very dilagreeable and inconvenient.

NOTE [Z], p. 262.

w,

E ought not to imagine, becaufe an inanimate ob-
je£l may be ufeful as well as a man, that therefore it
ought alfo, according to this fyftem, to merit the ap-
pellation of virtuous. The fentiments, excited by utili-
ty, are, in the two cafes, very different; and the one is
mixed with affection, efteem, approbation, t^fc. and not the
other. In like manner, an inanimate obje61: may have
good colour and proportions as well as a human figure.
But can we ever be in love with the former ? There
are a numerous fet of paflions and fentiments, of which
thinking rational beings are, by the original conftitution
of nature, the only proper objedfs : And though the
very fame qualities be transferred to an infenfible, in-
animate being, they will not excite the fame fentiments.
The beneficial qualities of herbs and minerals are, in-
deed, fometimes called their virtues-, but this is an
effect of the caprice of language, which ought not to
be regarded in reafoning. For though there be a fpecies
of approbation attending even inanimate objeiSls, when
beneficial, yet this fentiment is fo weak, and fo differ-
ent from that which is directed to beneficent magifirates
or flatefmen; that they ought not to be ranked under
the fame clafs or appellation.

A very

49^ Notes to the Second Volume.

A very fmall variation of the obje6l, even where the
fame quahties are preferved, will deilroy a fentiment.
Thus, the fame beauty, transferred to' a different fex,
excites no amorous paflion, where nature is not ex-
tremely perverted.

u

NOTE [AAJ, p. 264.

NDUTIFULNESS to parents is difapproved of

by mankind, 'zzrpoopcu^^ya? to ^.^aaox, ^ (JVXXoyi'(^oi^i)i*? oTj TO

ijrapccTAMtriov £xaroj?ctyT«riv rru^xLipn^ii. Ingratitude for a like
reafon (though he feems there to mix a more generous
regard) crt;vrtj'a,v*XT8vl«.? /wsv TO) TTSActf, a.\a,Y=.f<>y]rf.s S' ^tt' aumc
TO iscLfaLTTMaiov it,ci>v v^royiyvilci TtSinoiO. -crttpExo.s'w xa xct9M)to//o©'

^vvctinia; K) ^icvfin.^. Lib. vi. cap. 4. Perhaps the hiftorian
only meant, that our fympathy and humanity was more
enlivened, by our considering the fimilarity of our cafe
with that of the perfon fuffering; which is a juft fen-
timent.

I

NOTE [BB], p. 268.

NOTE [CCJ, p. 273.

T is needlefs to pufh our refearches fo far as to afk,
why we have humanity or a fellow-feeling with others.
It is fufficient, that this is experienced to be a principle
in human nature. We muft ftop fomewhere in our
examination of caufes; and there are, in every fcience, '

fome general principles, beyond which we cannot hope i

to find any principle more general. No man is abfo- j

lutely indifferent to the happinefs and mifery of others.
The firft has a natural tendency to give pleafure ; the
fecond, pain. This every one may find in himfelf. ,'

It is not probable, that thefe principles can be refolv- j

ed into principles more fimple and univerfal, whatever '

attempts may have been made to that purpofe. But if
it were poffible, it belongs not to the prefent fubjecl;
and we may here fafely confider thefe principles as ori-
ginal : Happy, if we can render all the confcquences
fufficiently plain and perfpicuous !

T

AN proportion to the ftation which a man poffeffes, J

according to the relations in which he is placed; we al- *

ways expecl from him a greater or Icfs degree of good, '

3 and <

i

Notes to the Second Volume. 493

and when difappointed, blame his inutility ; and much
more do we blame him, if any ill or prejudice arife
from liis conduct and behaviour. When the interefts
of one country interfere with thofe of another, we ef-
timate the merits of a ftatefman by the good or ill,
■which refults to his own country from his meafures
and councils, without regard to the prejudice which he
brings on its enemies and rivals. His fellow-citizens
are the objeds, which lie neareft the eye, while we
determine his charaftcr. And as nature has implanted
in every one a fuperior affection to his own country,
we never expeifl any regard to diftant nations, where
a competition arifes. Not to mention, that, while
every man confuks the good of his own community,
we are fenlible, that the general intereft of mankind is
better promoted, than by any loofe indeterminate views
to the good of a fpecles, whence no beneficial aftion
could ever refult, for want of a duly hmited object, on
which they could exert themfelves.

NOTE [DD], p. 276.

J? O R a like reafon, the tendencies of adlions and
characters, not their real accidental confequences, are
alone regarded in our moral determinations or general
judgments J though in our real feeling or fentiment,
■we cannot help paying greater regard to one whofe Na-
tion, joined to virtue, renders him really ufeful to fo-
ciety, than to one, who exerts the focial virtues only
in good intentions and benevolent afFeftions. Separating
the character from the fortune, by an eafy and necef-
fary effort of thought, we pronounce thefe perfons
alike, and give .them the fame general praife. The
judgment corre(5ts or endeavours to correct the appear-
ance : But is not able entirely to prevail over fenti-
ment.

Why is this peach-tree faid to be better than that
other ; but becaufe it produces more or better fruit ?
And would not the fame praife be given it, though
fnails or vermin had deftroyed the peaches, before they
came to full maturity ? In morals too, is not the tree
known by the fruit f And cannot we eafily diftinguifh
between nature and accident, in the one cafe as well as
in the other?

NOTE

494 Notes to the Second Volume.

I

NOTE [EEJ, p. 278.

T is wifely ordained by nature, that private connex-
ions fhould commonly prevail over univerfal views and
confiderations ; otherwiie our affections and aclions would
be diflipated and loft, for want of a proper limited ob-
ject:. Thus a fmall benefit done to ourfelves, or our
near friends, excites more lively fentiments of love and
approbation than a great benefit done to a diflant com-
monwealth : But ftill we know here, as in all the fen-
fes, to correal thefe inequalities by reflection, and re-
tain a general flandard of vice and virtue, founded chiefly
on general ufefulnefs.

O:

NOTE [FFJ, p. 282.

NE may venture to affirm, that there is no human
creature, to whom the appearance of happinefs (where
envy or revenge has no place) does not give pleafure,
that of mifery, uneafinefs. This feems infeparable from
our make and conflitution. But they are only the more
generous minds, that are thence prompted to feek zeal-
oufly the good of others, and to have a real palTion
for their welfare. With men of narrow and ungenerous
fpirits, this fympathy goes not beyond a flight feeling
of the imagination, which ferves only to excite fenti-
ments of complacency or cenfure, and makes them ap-
ply to the object either honourable or difhonourable ap-
pellations, A griping mifer, for inftnnce, praifes ex-
tremely indujiry and frugality even in others, and fets
them, in his efliimation, above all the other virtues.
He knows the good that refults from them, and feels
that fpecies of happinefs with a more lively fympathy,
than any other you could reprefent to him ; though
perhaps he would not part with a fhilling to make the
fortune of the induflrious man, whom he praifes fo
highly.

D,

NOTE [GGJ, p. 293.

^lODORUS SICULUS, lib. xv It may not be
improper to give the character of Epaminondas, as drawn
by the hiftorian, in order to fliow the ideas of perfc6l
merit, which prevailed in thofc ages. In other illuflri-

ous

Notes to the Second Volume: 495

ous men, fays he, you will ohfcrve, that each pofT-
efTed fome one (hining quality, which was tlie founda-
rion of his fame: In Epaminondas all the virtues are
found united; force of body, eloquence of expreifion,
vigour of mind, contempt of riches, gentlenefs of dif-
pofition, and what it chlejiy to be regarded, courage and
condudt in war.

A>

NOTE [HH], p. 294.

.LL men are equally liable to pain and difeafe and
iicknefs; and may again recover health and eafe. Thefe
circumftances, as they make no dirtintlion between one
man and other, are no fource of pride or humility,
regard or contempt. But comparing our own fpecies
to fuperior ones, it is a very mortifying confideration,
that we Ihould all be fo liable to difeafes and infirmi-
ties j and divines accordingly employ this topic, in or-
der to deprefs felf-conceit and vanity. They would
have more fuccefs, if the common bent of our thoughts
were not perpetually turned to compare ourfelves with
others. The infirmities of old age are mortifying; be-
caufe a companion with the young may take place.
The king's evil is induftrioully concealed, becaufe it
affe6ts others, and is often tranfmitted to pofterity.
The cafe is nearly the fame with fuch difeafes as con-
vey any naufeous or frightful images; the epilepfy, for
inflance, ulcers, fores, fcabs, &c.

T,

NOTE [II], p. 296.

HERE is fomething extraordinary, and feemingly
unaccountable in the operation of our pafTions, when
we confider the fortune and fituation of others. Very
often another's adv~ancement and profperity produces
envy, which has a flrong mixture of hatred, and arifes
chiefly from the comparifon of ourfelves with the per-
fon. At tiie very fame time, or at leaft in very fhort
intervals, we may feel the pallion of refpeif, which
is a fpecies of aiiedtion or good-will, with a mixture
of humility. On the other hand, the misfortunes of
our fellowi; often caufe pity, whic'n has in it a Itrong
mixture of good- will. This feiitunent of pity is neri/ly

allied

40 Notes to the Second Volume.

allied to contempt, which is a Ipecies of diflike, with
a mixture of pride. I only point out the phenomena,
as a fubjecl of fpeculation to fuch as are curious with
regard to moral enquiries. It is fufficient for the prefent
purpofe to obferve in general, that power and riches
commonly caufe refpe£t, poverty and meannefs contempt,
though particular views and incidents may fometimes
raife the paffions of envy and of pity,

NOTE [KK], p. 300.

np

A HERE is no man, who, on particular occafions,
is not affedted with all the difagreeable paJions, fear,
anger, dejection, grief, melancholy, anxiety, &c. But
thefe, fo far as they are natural, and univerfal, make
no difference between one man and another, and can
never be the objedt of blame. It is only when the dif-
polition gives a propenfity to any of thefe difagreeable
paiTions, that they disfigure the character, and by giving
ui i.ir.^^fs, convey the fentiment of difapprobation to the
fpectator.

NOTE [LL], p. 32.

T

ACIT. hift. lib. iii. The author entering upon the
narration, fays, Lunicta vejie, fcedum fpeSiaculum duce-
iatur, multis Increfaniibus^ tnillo inlacr'imante : aeformitas
exitus mifericordiam abftulerat. To enter thoroughly
into this method of thinl ing, v,e mufl: make allowance
for the ancient maxims, that no one ought to prol ng
his life after it became difhonourable ; but, as he had
always a right to difpofe of it, it tlien became a duty
to part with it.

NOTE [MM], p. 303.

JL H E abfence of virtue may often be a vice ; and that
of the higheft kind ; as in the inftance of ingratitude, as
well as meannefs. Where we expect a beauty, the difap-
pointmcnt gives an uneafy fenfation, and produces a real de-
formity. An abjednefs of charader, likewife, is difgultful

and

Notes to the Second Volume. 497

and contemptible in another view. Wlicre a man has no
Icnfe of v.Uue in himfelf, we are not likely to have an; higher
erteemofhim. And if the fame perfon, who ciouche - to
his fuperiors, is infolent to his inferiors (as often Iiappeus),
this contrariety of behaviour, inflead of correctinj the for-
mer vice, aa;2;ravates it extremely by the addition of a vice
llill more odious. See fe6l. 8.

NOTE [NN], p. 326.

-It feems certain, both from reafon and experience, that
a rude, untaught favnge regulates chiefly his love md hatred
by the ideas of private utility and injury, and has but
faint conceptions of a general rule or fyftem of beha-
viour. The man who flands oppofite to him in battle,
he hates heartily, not only for the prefent moment, which
is almofl: unavoidable, but for ever after j nor is he fatif-
fied without the moft extreme punifliment and vengeance.
But we, accuilomed to fociety, and to more enlarged re-
fleiffions, confider, that this man is ferving lii^ own coun-
try and community ; that any man, in the fame fituation,
woul '. do the fame; that we ourfelves, in like ciicumftan-
ces, obferve a like conduft ; that, in general, human lociety
is befl: fupported on fuch maxims : And by thefe fuppofi-
tior.s and views, we correct, in fome meafure, our ruder
and narrower paflions. And though much of our friend-
fliip and enmity be ftill regulated by private confiderations
of benefit and harm, we pay, at leaft, this homage to ge-
neral rules, which we are accufiiomed to refpeil, that we
commonly pers'ert our adverfary's conduit, by imputing
malice or injuftice to him, in order to give vent to thofe
pafTions, which arife from felf-love and private intereft.
When the heart is full of rage, it never wants pretences of
this nature ; though fometimes as frivolous, as thofe Ironi
Avhich Horace, being almoil cruihed by the fall of a tree,
affefls to accufe of parricide the firft planter of it.

Vol. IT. Kk NOTE

498 Notes to the Second Volume

N O T E [O ], p. 352.

•Eneyolence naturally divides into two kinds, tii*?
general and the particular. The fvrfl: is, wiierc we have
no friendfhip or connexion or efteem for the perfon, bat
feel only a general fymp ithy with him or a compalTion for
his pains, and a congratulation with his pleafures. The
other fpecies of benevolence is founded on an opinion of
virtue, on fervices done us, or on fome particular con-
nexions. Both thefe fentiments muft be allowed real in
human nature; but whether they will refolve into fome nice
cohfiderations of felf-love, is a queftion more curious tliaa
important. The former fentiment, to wit, that of general
benevolence, or humanity, or fympathy, we Ihall have oc-
caiion frequently to treat of in the courfe of this enquiry ;
and I aflume it as real, from genera;l experience, without
any other proof.

N O T E [PP], p. 361.

T .

J- H IS theory concerning the origin of property, and con-
fequently of juftice, is, in the main, the fame with that
hinted at and adopted by Grotius. " Hinc difcimus, qux'
*' fuerit caufa, ob quam a primsva communione rerum pri-
" mo mobilium, deinde & immobilium difceffum eft : ni-
" mirum quod cum non contenti homines vcfci fpon'e natis,
" antra habitare, corpore aut nudo agere, aut corticibus ar-
*' borum feiarumvc pcllibus vellito, vitas genus exquifitus
" dclcgilTent, induftria opus fuit, quam hnguli rebus fin-
*' gulis adhibercnt : Qiio minus autem fru'itus in commune
*' confcrrentur, prirnum obftitit locorum, in quae homines
*' difceflerunt, diAantia, d'^inde juftitix* &: amoris defei5tus,
*' per qucm fiebat, ut nee in labore, nee in confumptione,
*' fru6luum, qua:; dcbebat, a;qua!itas fervaretur. Simul dif-
*' cimus, quomodo res in pioprietalem ivcrint ; non animi
'^' a(f.tu folo, neque enim fcire alii poterant, quid alii fuuni
*' elTc vellent, ut co abllincrent, & idem velie plures pote-
" rant ; fed padlo quodam aut cxpreflb, ut per divillonem,
" aut tacito, ut per occupationcm." Dejure belli 5: pacis.
I-lb. ii. cap. 2. § 2. art. 4, h 5.

N O T E

Notes to the Second Volume. 499

NOTE [QOJ, p. 36r.

K

ATUPv AL may be oppofed, either to what is unrr-
fuaU miraculous^ or artificial. In tlie two former feiifes,
jurtice and property are undoubtedly natural. But as tlicy
luppoic realbn, forethought, deiign, and a fecial union and
confederacy among men, perhaps, that epithet cannot ftri6l-
ly, in the lall fenl'e, be appHed to them. Had men lived
without fociety, property had never been known, and nei-
ther juflice nor injuftice had ever exifted. But fociety
among human creatures, had been impoITible, without
reafoii, and forethought. Inferior animals, that unite, are
guided by inftinct, which fupplies the place of reafon. But
all thcfe difputes arc merely verbal.

NOTE [RRJ, p. 363.

X H A T there be a feparation or diftinclion of poflVf-
fions, and that this feparation be fteady and conftant ; this
is abfolutely required by the interefts of fociety, and hence
the origin of juftice and property. What pofTeffions are
a/figned to particular perfons j this is, generally fpeaking,
pretty indifferent ; and is-often detcmined by very frivolous
views and confiderations. "We Ihall mention a few parti-
cular^.

Were a fociety formed among feveral independent mem-
bers, the moft obvious rule, which could be agreed on,
would be to annex property to prefcnt pofl'elTion, and leave
every one a right to what he at prefent enjoys. The rela-
tion of poffelFion, which takes place between the perfon and
the object, naturally draws on the relation of propert)'.

For a like realbn, occupaticn or tirft polTeinon becomes
the foundation of property.

Where a man bellows labour and induflry upon any ob-
jeift, which before belonged to no body ; as in cutting down
and fliaping a tree, in cultivating a field, &c. the alterations,
which he produces, caufes a relation between him and the
objedl, and naturally engages us to annex it to him by the
new relation of property. "I'his caufe here concurs with the
K k 2 public

500 Notes to the Second Volume.

public utility, which confifts in the encouragement given tb-
induflry and labour.

Perhaps too, private humanity, towards the poflellbr,.
concurs, in this inftance,, with the other motives, and-
engages us to leave witli him what he has acquired by
his fweat and labour ; and what he has flattered himfelfi
ia the conftant enjoyment of. For though private hu-
manity can, by no means, be the origin of juftice ; fmce
the latter virtue fo often contradicts the former ; yet wher\
the rule of feparate and conftant pofieifion is once form-
ed by the indifpenfable ncceflities of fociety, private huma-
nity, and an averfion to the doing a hardfhip to another^
may, in a particular inftance, give rife to a particular rule of
property.

I am much inclined to think, that the right of fucceftion.
or inheritance much depends on thofe connexions of the
imagination, and that the relation to a former proprietor
begetting a relation to the object, is the caufe why the pro-
perty is transferred to a man after the death of his kinfman,
It is true ; indufcry is more encouraged by the transference
of pofleftion to children or near relations : But this confi-
deration will only have place in a cultivated fociety ; whereash
tlie right of fucceflion is regarded even amons; the o-reateft
Barbarians.

Acquiiitioii of property by nccejfioji can be explained no
way but by having recourfe to the relations and connexions,
of the imagination.

The property of rivers, by the laws of moft nations,
and by the natural turn of our thought, is attributed
to the proprietors of their banks, excepting fuch vaft
rivers as tlie Rhine or tne Danube, which fecm too large
to follow as an accclfion to the property of the neigh-
bouring fields. Yet even thefc rivers are conndered as the
property of that nation, through whofe dominions they
run; the idea of a nation being of a fuitable bulk to cor-
refpond with them, and bear them fuch a relation in the:
fancy.

The accelTions, which are made to land, bordering uport
rivers, follow the land, fay the civilians, provided it be made
by what they call alluvion^ that is, infenlibly and imper-
ceptibly ; which are circumftances, that allilt the imagina-
tion in the conjunctioi\.

Where

Notes to the Second Volume. 501

Where rlu-re is any confiderahle portion torn at once
Jfrom one bank and added to another, it becomes not his
^jroperty, whole land it falls on, till it unite with the
land, and till the trees and plants have fpread their roots
•into both. Before tiiat, the thought docs not fuffioiently
join theui.

In Ihort, we muft ever diftinguifh between the neccfllty
'of a feparation and conftancy in men's pofTeflion, and
the rules, which alhgn particular objects to particular per-
lons. The rirft neceJlity is obvious, lirong, and invincible :
The latter may depend on a public utility more light and
frivolous, on tlie fentiment of private humanity and aver-
fion to private hardlhip, on politive laws, on precedents,
•analogies, and very hue connexions and turns of the ima-
:gination.

NOTE [SSJ, p. 37^.

X HE term, pride, is commonly taken in a bad fenfe ; but
itliis fentiment feems indifferent, and may be either good or
bad, according as it is well or ill founded, and according to
.the other circumftances which accompany it. The French
'.exprefs this fentiment by the term, attiour propre, but as they
alfo exprefs felf-love as well as vanity, by the fame term,
.there arifes thence a gieat confufion in Rochefoucault, and
many of their moral writers.

NOTE [TT], p. 371.

A^OVE and efteem are nearly the fame pafTion, and arifc
•from fimilar caufes. The qualities, which produce both,
are fuch as communicate pleafure. But where this pleafure
is fevere and ferious ; or where its objcft is great, and makes
a itron^ imprelhon, or where it produces anv degree of hu-
mility and awe : In all thefe cafes, the paffion, which arifes
irom the pleafure, is more properly denominated efteem than
■love Benevolence attends both : But is conne6led with
.love in a more eminent degree. There feems to be ftill a
«(lrongcr mixture of pride in contempt than of humility in

efteemj

502

Notes to the Second Volume.

efteem ; and the reafon would not be difficult to one, who
lludied accurately the paffions. All thefe various mixtures
and compolitions and appearance? of fentiment form a very
curious fubjedl of fpeculation, but are wide of our prefent
purpofc. Throughout this enquiry, we always conllder in
general, what qualities are a fubject of praife or of cenfure,
without entering into all the minute differences of fcnti-
ment, which they excite. It is evident, that whatever is
contemned, is alfo diiliked, as well as what is hated ; and
we here endeavour to take objects, according to their moft
fimple views and appearances, l^hefe fciences are too
3pt to appear abftraft to common readers, even with all
the precautions which wc can take to clear them from
fuperfluous fpeculations, and bring them down to every
capacity.

N O T E [UUJ, p. 371.

X HE following pafHige of Cicero is worth quoting, as
being the mofl: clear and exprefs to our purpofc, that any
thing can be imagined, and, in a difpute, v»hich is chiefly
verbal, muft, on account of the author, carry an authority,
from which there can be no appeal.

" Virtus autem, quae efl per fe ipfa laudabilis, et fine qua
*' nihil laudari poteft, tamen habet plures partes, quarum
*' alia efl: alia ad laudationem aptior. Sunt enim alis vir-
" tutes, quae videntur in moribus hominum, et quadam
" comitate ac beneficentia pofitie: alise quas in ingenii aliqua
*' facultate, aut animi magnitudine ac robore. Nam cle-
*' mentia, jufl:itia, l;enignita:s, fides, fortitudn in periculis
^' communibus, jucunda efi audita in laudationibus. C)mnes
*' enim ha; virtutes non tarn ipfis, qui eas in fc habent, quam
*' gencri hominum fruduofa; putantur. Sapientia ct mng-
** nitudo animi, qua omncs res humanas, tcni'cs ct pro
*' nihilo putantur; pt in cogitando vis qua?dam ingenii, ct
** ipfa eloqiientia admirationis habet non minus, jucundi-
*' tatis minus. Ipfos eniin magis \idetur, quos laudamus,
'* quam illos, anud quos i.iudamus, ornare ac tueri : fed
'* tamen in laudenda jungenda funt etiam ha-c genera vir-
" tutum. Ferunt enim aurcs hominum, cum ilia qu-x

"jucunda

Notes to tlie Second Volume.. 503

^' jucunda ct grata, turn ctiam ilia, quae mirabilia funr iu
" virtute, laudarL" De orat. lib. ii. cap. 8g.

I fuppofe, if Cicero were now alive, it would be found
vlifficult to fetter his moral fentiments by narrow fyftems j or
{lerfuade him, that no (}ualities were to be admitted as vir-
tursy or acknowledged to be a part of perfonal merits but
what were recommended by The IFhole Duty of Man.

D.

NOTE [XX], p. 394.

URING the times of the emperors, the Romans
Jfeem to have been more given to intrigues and gallantry
han the Englifli are at prefent : And the women of condi-
tion, in order to retain their lovers, endeavoured to rix a
mame of reproach on thofc who were addicted to wtnching
and low amours. They were called Ancillarioli. See Se-
neca de beneficiis. Lib. i. cap. 9. See alfo Martial^ lib„
xii. epig. 58.

NOTE [YYJ, p. 409.

F.

RAGILIS & laboriofa mortalitas in partes ifta digef-
** lit, infirmitatis fu^e memor, ut portioaibus quifquis co-
*' leret, quo maxime indigeret." Plin. lib. ii. cap. 7. So
early as Hefiod's time there were 30,00 deities. Ope^r. iff
Dier. lib. i. ver. 250.' But the tafk to be performed by
ithefe feems ftill too great for their number. The provinces
of the deities were fo fubdivided, that there v/as even a god
o^ Sneezing. See Arifi. Probl. fe6^. 33. cap. 7. The pro-
vince of copulation, fuitably to the importance and dignity of
it, v.'as divided among fcveral deities.

NOTE [ZZ], p. 426.

T will be eafy to give a reafon, why Thales, y^naxl-
mander, and thofe early plulofophers, who really were
atheiils, might be very orthodox in the pagan creed ; and
why Anaxagoras and Socrates, though real theifts, mull
naturally, in ancient times, be efteemed impious. The
blind, unguided powers of nature, if they could produce
men, might alfo produce fuch beings as Jupiter and Nep-
tune,

504 Notes to the Second Volume.

tune, who being the moft powerful, intelHgent exiftences in
the world, would be proper obje6ts of wor(hip. But a here
a fuprenie iucelligence, the nril caufe of all, is admitied,
thcfe capricious b :ings, if they exift at all, muft appear very
iubordinare and dependent, and confequently be excluded
from the rank of deities. Plato (de [eg. lib. x.) aJhgns this
reafun for the imputation thrown on Anaxagoras, namely
his denying the divinity of the liars, planets, and other cre-
ated objects.

NOTE [AAA], p. 436.

E R R I U S Flaccus, cited by Pliny, lib. xxviii. cap. 2.
affirmed, that 11 was ufual with the Romans, before they
laid liege to any town, to invocate the tutelar deity of the
place, and by promiling him greater honours than thoie he
at prefent enjoyed, bribe him to betray his old friends and
votaries. The name of the tutelar deity of Rome was for
this reafon kept a moft religious myftery ; leil the enemies
of the republic fliould be able, in the fame manner, to draw
him over 10 their fervice. For without the name, they
thought, nothing of that kind could be pradifed. Pliny
fays, that the common form of invocation was prelerved to
his time in the ritual of the pontifs. And Macrobius has
tranfmitted a copy of it from the fecret things of Sammoni-
cus Serenus.

NOTE [BBBJ, p. 439.

■ OST nations have fallen into this guilt of human
facrifices ; though, perhaps, that impious fiiperftition has
never prevailed very much in any civili/,ed nation, unlefs we
except the Carthaginians. For the Tyrians loon abolilhed
it. A facrilice is conceived as a prefent ; and any prefent is
delivered to their deity by deltroying it and rendering it ufe-
lefs to men ; by burning what is folid, pouring out the
liquid, and killing the animate. For want of a better way
of doing him fervice, we do ourfelves an injury ; and fancy
that we thereby exprefs, at leall, the hcartniefs of our good-
will and adoration. Thus our mercenary devotion deceives
ourfelves, and imainnes it deceives the deity.

NOTE

I

Notes to the Second Volume. 505

NOTE [CCC], p. 447.

T is ftrange that the Egyptian religion, though fo
abfurd, ihould yet have borne fo great a refemblance
to the Jewiih, that ancient writers even of the greateft
genius were not able to obferve any difference between
them. For it is remarkable that both Tacitus aiid
Suetonius, when they mention that decree of the fenate,
under Tiberius, by which the Egj'ptian an<i Jewifti
profelytes were baniflied from Rome, exprefsly treat
thefe religions iiS the lame^ and it appears, that even
the decree itfelf was founded on that fuppofition,
<* Adlum & de facris .gyptiis, Judaicifque p;,lendis;
" fa£tumque patrum confultum, ut quatuor millia iiber-
*' tini generis ca fupirjiiiione irife<5ta, quis idonea cetas,
«' in iniulam Sardiiiiam veherenLur, coercendis iilic
*' latrociniis; & fi ob graviratem cceH inreriflent, vUe
** danmum : Ceteri cederent Italia, nifi certam ante diem
*' profanos litus exuifTent." Tacit, ann. lib. ii. c. 85.
" Externas caeremonias, JEgyptios, Judaicofque ritus
*' compefcuitj coa£lus qui fupcrjlitione ea tenebantur,
*' religiofas veftes cum inrtrumento omni comburere,
" &c." Sueton. Tiber, c. 36. Thefe wife heathens,
obferving fomething in the general air, and genius,
and fpirit of the two religions to be the fame, efteem-
ed the differences of their dogmas too frivolous to de-
fcrve any attention.

Xi

NOTE [DDD], p. 455.

.ENOPHON's condud, as related by himfelf, is,
at once, an inconteftable proof of the general credulity
of mankind in thofe ages, and the incoherencies, \s\
all ages, of men's opinions in religious matters. Thai
great captain and philofopher, the diiciple of Socra^.s,
and one who has delivered fome or the raoft reilaed
fentiments with regard to a deity, gave all the followiug
marks of vulgar, pagan fuperftidon. By Socrates s ad-
vice, he confultcd the oracle of Delphi, before he
would engage in the expedition of Cyrus. De expcd.
lib. iii. p. 294. ex edit. Leancl. Sees a dream the night
after the generals were feized ^ which he pays great re-

' gard

5o6 Notes to the Second V'olume.

gard to, but thinks ambiguous. Id. p. 295. He ami
the whole army regard fneezing as a very lucky omen.
Id. p. 300. Has another dream, when he comes to
the river Centrites, which his fellow-general, Chirofophus,
alfo pays great regard to. Id. lib. iv. p. 323. The
Greeks, fuffering from a cold north wind, facrifice to
it; and the hiftorian obferves, that it immediately aba-
ted. Id. p. 329. Xenophon confults the facrifices in
fecret, before he would form any refolution with him-
felf about fettling a colony. Lib. v. p. 359. He was
himfelf a very fkilful aug\ir. Id. p. 361. Is determined
by the vi6lims to refufe the fole command of the ar-
my which was offered him. Lib. vi. p. 273. Cleander,
the Spartan, though very defirous of it, refufes it for
the fame reafon. Id. p. 392. Xenophon mentions an
old dream with the interpretation given him, when he
firft joined Cyrus, p. 373. Mentions alfo the place
of Hercules's defcent into hell as believing it, and fays
the marks of it are ftill remaining. Id. p. 375. Had
almoit ftarvcd the army, rather than lead them to the
tield againll the aufpiccs. Id. p. 382, 3S3. His friend,
Euclides, the augur, would not believe that he had
brought no money from the expedition ; till he (Eu-
clides) facrificed, and then he faw the matter clearly in
the Exta. Lib. vii. p. 425. The fame philofopher^
propofing a project of mines for the encreafe of the
Athenian revenues, advifes them firft to confult the
oracle. De rat. red. p. 392. That all this devotion
was not a farce, in order to ferve a political purpofe,
appears both from the fa£ts tliemfelves, and from the
genius of that age, when little or nothing could be
gained by hypoci'ify. Befides, Xenophon, as appears
from his Memorabilia, was a kind of heretic in thofe
times, which no political d'e^iotee ever is. It is for
the fame reafon, I maintain, that Newton, Locke,
Clarke, &c. being Arians or SocinhniSy were very lin-
cere in the creed tliey profelfed : And I alw a) s oppofe
this argument to fome libertines, who will needs have
it, that it was impofTible but that thefe philofophers
muft have been hypocrites.

NOTE

B

Notes to the Second Volume. 507

NOTE [EEE], p. 460.

• ACCHUS, a divine being, is reprefented by the
heathen mythology as the inventor of dancing and the
tlieatrc. Plays were anciently even a part of public
worlhip on the moil folemn occafions, and often em-
ployed in times of pellilence, to appeafe the offended
deities. But they liave been zealoully profcribed by tlie
godly in later ages; and the play-lioufe, according to
a learned divine, is the porch of hell.

But in order to fliow more evidently, that it is pof-
fible for a religion to reprefent the divinity in ftill a
more immoral and unamiable light than he was pictu-
red by the ancients, we fhall cite a long pafTage from
an author of tafle and imagination, who was furely no
enemy to Chriilianity. It is the Chevalier Ramfay, a
writer, who had fo laudable an inclination to be or-
thodox, that his reafon never found any difficulty,
even in the dodlrines which free-thinkers fcruple the
moft, the trinity, incarnation, and fatisfaftion : His
humanity alone, of which he feems to have had a great
flock, rebelled againfl: the doctrines of eternal reproba-
tion and predeilination. He exprefies himfelf thus:
' What flrange ideas,' fays he, ' would an Indian or
' a Chinefe philofopher have of our holy religion, if

* they judged by the fchemes given of it by our modern

* free-thinkers, and pharifaical doiSlors of all fedls ?

* According to the odious and too vulgar fyflem of
' thefe incredulous fcofFers and credulous fcribblers,
** The God of the Jews is a moll cruel, unjuft, par-
*' tial, and fantaftical being. He created, about 6000
'* years ago, a man and a woman, and placed them
"ma fine garden of Afia, of which there are no re-
*' mains. This garden was furnifhed with all forts of
" trees, fountains, and flowers. He allowed them the
*' ufe of all the fruits of this beautiful garden, except
" one, that was planted in the midll thereof, and that
*' had in it a fecret virtue of preferving them in con-
*' tinual health and vigour of body and mind, of ex-
*' alting their natural powers and making them wife.
** The devil entered into the body of a ferpent, and
*' folicited the firft woman to eat of this forbidden
" fruit; fhe engaged her hulband to do the fame.
*' To punilh this llight curiofity and natural defire of
*^ life and knowledge, God not only threw our firft

*' parents

508 Notes to the Second Volume.

"* parents out of paradife, but he condemned all their
** pofterity to temporal mifery, and the greaieft part
*' of them to eternal pains, though the fouls of thefe
** innocent children have no more relation to that of
*' Adam than to thofe of Nero and Mahomet; fmce,
*' according to tlie fcholaftic drivellers, fabulifts, and
" mythologies, all fouls are created pure, and infufed
*' immediately into mortal bodies, fo foon as the foetus
" is formed. To accomphfh the barbarous, partial de-
** cree of predeftination and reprobation, God abandon-
*'' icd all nations to darknefs, idolatry, and fuperftiti-
*' on, without any faving knov^rledge or falutary gra-
*' ces ; unlefs it was one particular nation, whom he
*' chofe as " his peculiar people. This chofen nation
*' was, however, the moft llupid, ungrateful, rebellious
*' and perfidious of all nations. After God had thus
*' kept tlie far greater part of all the human fpecies,
" during near 4000 years, in a reprobate ftate, he
" changed ail of a fudden, and took a fancy for other
*^ nations befide the Jews. Tlien he fent his only be-
" gotten Son to the world, und-cr a human form, to
*' appeafe his wrath, fatisfy his vindidive juftice, and
*■' die for the pardon of fin. Very few nations, how-
*' ever, have heard of this gofpel ; and all the reft,
*' though left in invincible ignorance, are damned with-
" out exception, or any poifibility of reraifiion. The
*' greatefi: part of thofe who have heard of it, have
" changed only fome fpeculative notions about God,
*' and fome external forms in worlhip: For, in other
" refpedts, the bulk of Chrirtians have continued as
** corrupt as the reft of mankind in their morals;
" yea, fo much the more perverfe and criminal,
" that their lights were greater. Unlefs it be a
** very fmall it\Q.St number, all other Chriftians, like
*' the pagans, will be for ever damned ; the great fa-
'* crifice offered up for them will become void and of
*' no effe6l ; God will take delight for ever, in their
*' torments and blafpliemies; and though he can, by
*' one f.ot change their hearts, yet they will remain
*' for ever unconverted and unconvertible, bccaufe he
*■' will be for ever unappeafablc and irreconcileable. It
■^' is true, that all this makes God odious, a hater of
•" fouls, rather than a lover of them ; a cruel, vin-

" diclive

Notes to the Second VoLtiME. 509

*< di£live tyrant, an impotent or a wrathful daemon,
*' ratlicr than an all-powerful, beneficent father of
*' fpirits : Yet all this is a myftery. He has fecret
*' reafons for his condudt, that are impenetrable ; and
*' though he appears unjuft and barbarous, yet we
*' mud believe the contrary, becaufe what is injuftice,
*' crime, cruelty, and the blackell: malice in us, is in
*' him juftice, mercy, and fovereign goodnefs." Thus

* the incredulous free thinkers, the judaizing Chriftians,
' and the fataliftic do<Sors iiave disfigured and dilhonoured

* the fublime myrteries of our holy faith ; thus they

* have confounded the nature of good and evil ; trans-

* formed the moft monftrous pailions into divine at-

* tributes, and furpaffed the pagans in blafphemy, by

* afcribing to the eternal nature, as perfedtions, what

* makes the moll horrid crimes againft men. The

* groffer pagans contented thenifelves with divinizing

* luft, inceiil:, and adultery ; but the predeftinarian

* dodtors have divinized cruelty, wrath, fury, vengeance,

* and all the blackeft vices.' See the Chevalier Ram-
fay's philofophical principles of natural and revealed re-
ligion, Part 11. p. 401.

The fame author aflerts, in other places, that the
Arminiin and Molinijl fchemes ferve very little to mend
the matter : And having thus thrown himfelf out of
all received fects of Chrilfianity, he is obliged to ad-
vance a fyftem of his own, which is a kind of Origenifm^
and fuppofes the pre-exiftence of the fouls both of men
and beads, and the eternal falvation and converfion of
all men, beads, and devils. But this notion, being
quite peculiar to himfelf, we need not treat of. I
thought the opinions of this ingenious author verv curi-
ous; but I pretend not to warrant the judneff ; '•em.

\

C 511 )

INDEX.

*^* The Numeral Letters refer to the Volume, and
the Figures to the Page.

A:

A.

.B ATEMENT, not the natural Confequence of Poly-

theifm, ii. 440.
Abflradtion, what, ii. 485, Note [PJ.
Abfurdity, not always the greateft in Polytheifm, ii. 442.

, greedily coveted by popular Religions, ii. 443.

Acheans, employed Force in forming their League, i. 479.

, their Number, i. 449,

Addifon quoted, i. 93. 207. ii. 185.

^fchynes quoted, i. 341. 445.

^fchynes Socraticus quoted, ii. 374.

^tolians, their Number, i. 449.

Agathocles, the Tyrant, his Cruelty, i. 425. 558, A/i?/^[CC]

Agreeablenefs, a Source -of Merit, ii. 299.

, to Ourfelf, ibid. &c.

, to Others, ii. 311, ^c.

Agriculture, how befl encouraged, i. 276,277. 434, 435.
Alcoran, its Ethics, i. 243.

Alexander the Impoftor of Lucian, his Artifice, ii, ia8.
Alexander the Great, his Saying to Parmenio, ii. 301.

, his Toleration, ii. 438.

, his Emulation of Bacchus, ii. 441.

Alexandria, its Size and Numbers of its Inhabitants, i. 453.
Allegiance, its Obligation, whence, i. 487. ii. 253.
Allegory has naturally place in Polytheifm, ii. 422.
Anacreon quoted, ii. 390.
Analogies, and fometimes flight, have Influence in Jurifpru-

dence, ii. 244, 362.
Anaxagoras, the firft Theifl:, and the firfl: accufed of Atheifm,

ii, 503, N'oie [ZZ].
Ancillarioli, what, ii. 503, Note [XX].
Angels, modern, equivalent to the Deities of the Philofo-

phers, ii. 421.

Animals,

512 INDEX.

Animals, their Reafon j ii. in, ^c.

Antioch, its Size, i. 453.

Antipater, the Cyreniac, his Saying, i. 188.

Appian Aiexandrinus quoted, i. 343. 393. 413. 41^. 422.
425, 429. 440. 463. ii. 382.

Aruobius quoted, ii. 417. 4215.

Aiiofto, his Chara£ler, i. 246, quoted, 94.

Ariftides the Sophift quoted, 1. 56?., Note [KKJ.

AriOocracy, Polifli, Venetian, in what refpeds different, i*
15, 16.

Ariftophanes not impious according to the Ideas of Anti-
quity, ii. 417.

..-. ,„„„ quoted, i. 408.

Anftorle ;quoted, i. 227. 408. 446. 456. ii. 371. 503^

Note [YY].
Armftroog, Dr. quoted, ii^ 370.
Arri an quoted, i. 132, 369, 432. ii..438. 441.
Atheifm, whether poilibJe, ii. 159.
Athenaeus quoted, i. 443, 444» 446.
Athens, i. 99. 273. 341. 428 443, 444, 446. 478.
Arhenians, on what they chiefly valued themfelves, ii. 308.
Athenian Man of Merit, ii. 377, l^c.
Auguftine ( Saint- 'i his Dogmatifm, ii. 449.
Augudus, hiS Impiety mixed with Superftition, ii. 418.
■ — , his Superiiition, ii. 450.

, his Age compared with thtt of Camillus, i. 274.

Aunoi, Madame, quoted, i. 200.

AureHus, Marcus, his Theifm, ii. 421. his Superfiition, 45c.
Auftria, Houfe of, Caufes of its Decay, i. 358.
Authority of Teachers, ufeful to check, it, i. 126.

JLJACON, quoted, I. 56. 95. 223. 282. ii. 138. 267. 427.
Balance of Power, i. 32. 353, ^c. — Of Irade, i. 327, ^c.

— Of Property, i. 32, 47.
Banks and Paper Credit, whether advantageous, i. 301. 336.
Barbarit)' an Attribute of the Deity in popular Religions, ii.

465-
Bartoli*s Plans of ancient Buildings, i. 451.
Bayle quoted, ii. 441. 484.
Beauty, why the objedt of Pride, ii. 189.
Belief, what, ii. 52, ^c.
Bellarmine, Cardinal, his Siyinfii l). -141.
Benevolence, i. 89. difihterefled zeAl,ii. 349. b'c. its kinds,
3 351-

INDEX. 513

351. a Virtue, 222. from its Utility, 225. from its

Agret-ablenefs, 307.
Berkeley, Dr. a renl Sceptic, il. 484, iV:/^ [N], quoted, i,

223.
Berne, Canton of, its Trcaliire, i. 342.
Benlivoglio quoteil, i. 225.
Boccace quoted, i. 190.
Boileau quoted, ii. 302.
Bolingbroke quoted, i. 25. 44.
Boulainvilliers quoted, i. 571. ii. 43O.
Brafidas, his Saying, ii. 441.
Erumoy, Pere, quoted, ii. 417.

C.

/ESAR quoted, i. 419. 462. 463. 550, Note [K], ii.
416.

his Account of the Numbers llaughtered in his

c

Wars, i. 560, Note [FF].

Cambyfes, his Extravagance, ii. 444.

Capitolinus quoted, i. 491.

Caprice, an Attributcof theDeity in popular Religions, ii. 465.

Carlille, Earl of, quoted, i. 13^.

Cartes, Des, quoted, i. 259. ii. 475, A^ote [D].

Carthage, its Size and Number of its Inhabitants, i. 456.

Carthaginians, their human Sacrifices, ii. ^o^-^Note [BBBJ,

Catholics, Roman, Genius of their Religion, i. 80.

— led into Abfurdities, ii. 446.

Cato de re ruftica, quoted, i. 41 1,

Cato of Utica, his Speech to Ccefar, i. 289.

Caufe and EfiFefl its Ideas, whence, ii. 28, 29, ifc. Its
Definition, 82, 477, Note [G].

Caufes moral, how far they contribute to national Charac-
ters, i. 213.

Phyfical, how far, i. 222.

Ciufation, a Reafon of Alfociation, ii. 24. 56, ^c.

Cavalier Party, i. 69.

Cervantes, his Merit, i. 207, quoted, 250.

Chance, what, ii. 61. Its Influence in Society, i. 117.

Charaflers, national, i. 213, ^c.

Charles, XII, of Sweden, his Chara6ter, ii. 308.

Chaftity, its IMerit, whence, ii. 255.

Cheerfulnefs, its IMerit, whence, ii. 299.

China, its Excellence and Defecfs, i. 126.

Chriftian Relitrion founded in Faith, not in Reafon, ii. 138.
Vol. II. " LI Cicero

$H I N D E X.

Cicero quofec', i. i8. 97. 102. 104. 106. 188. 364. 404
424- 433- 442- 452. 465. 551, Note [O]. ii. 56. 223'
227-. 371. 391. 448, 449. 456. 465.

City, Reafons which limit the Greatnefs of every City,i.456.

Cleanlinefs, its Merit, whence, ii. 517.

Clergy, why no Friends to Liberty, i. 66.

Cold, greater in ancient times, i. 457, 458.

Colonefi and Orfini, Parties in modern Rome, i. 57.

Columella quoted, i, 325. 403. 407, 412, 413. 460. 465.
554, Note [T].

Comitia centuriata & tributa, their different Powers, 1. 392.

Commerce, its Advantages, i. 272. foreign, its Advantages,

279, 280.
Commonwealth, perfect. Idea of it, i. 523, ^c^
Companionable Qualities, ii. 312, ^c.
ComparifonitsEffedl, i. 84. necelTary to forming the Tafl:e,2 54,
Comte, Pere le, quoted, ii. 416.
Conde, Prince of, a Saying of his, i. 124.
Confucius, his Difciples Deifts, i. 79.
Congreve, his Character, i. 209.
Conjiln6tion frequent, conftant, the only circumftance from

which we know Caufe and Effe6i, ii. 75. 79. 83. ^c.
Connexion neceflary, our Idea of it, ii. 65, &c.
Conftantine, Emperor, his Innovation, i. 366.
Conftitution, Britifh, i. 25. 49, &c.
Contiguity, a Reafon of AflTociation, ii. 24. 54,
Contraft, Original, i. 471, &:c.

Conventions, whether the Source of Juftice, ii. 360, drc.
Convictions ilrongefl, but not more general, in Theifm, ii,

444» 445-

Corn diftributed In Rome, i. 451, 452.

Corneille, his Chara6ter, i. 209.

Corpus juris civLlis quoted, i. 423. 556, Note [7L],

Courage, how far national^ i. 226.

■ its Merit, whence, ii. 303.

Country Party, i. 27. 66, 67.

Court Party, i. 27. 66, 67.

Creation or Formation of the World enters not iiito the pri-
mitive Religion, ii. 421.

Credit, public, its Abufes, i. 369, 370, &c.

Curtius, Quintus, quoted, i. 228. 377. 565, Note [NN].
ii. 415. 425. _ . .. o

Cuftom or Habit the Source of experimental Reafcning, ii. 4S.
■ ■■ ■ the great Guide of Life, ii. 49.

Cuftoms, fome remarkable ones, i. 387, &:c.

Cyrus boafts of his Drunkennefs, i. 228. DARIUS

D

1 N D E X. 515

D

'ARIUS I-Iyftafpcs records his Ability in Drinking on his

Tombftonc, i. 228.
Datames, the only Barbarian a General, i. 292.
Decency, its Merit, whence, ii. 317.
Debt, public, its Advantages, i. 372.

■ itsDifadvantages, i. 573, 374.

J^eifts united with the Independents, i. 80.

Delicacy oFPalFion, how hurttui, i. 3, &ic.

of Talle, how advantageous, i, 3, 4, 5. whatitis,

249. whence its Merit, ii. 309.
Democracy without a Reprefentative, hurtful, i. 14, 15.
Demofthenes his Charafter, i. 109. quoted, i. 109. 341.

354. 388. 3qo. 404.408. 418.432. 445. 559, Note [CCj.

s6i,Note [HHJ. ii. 303- 393-
Defire, Averlion, ii. 192.
Diodorus Siculus his Charafter, i. 560, Note [EE].

■ Superftitious, yet not a Theift, li. 419.

Quoted, i. 227. 274. 341.355. 419,420. 426.

427. 429. 431, 432, 434. 438. 441. 443. 447. 449. 453.

458. 463. 469. 542, Note [A]. 543, Note [D]. 568,

Note [QQJ}. ii. 227. 414. 416. 419. 462. 465.
Diogenes Laertius quoted, i. 438. ii. 425.
Diiigenes, the Cynic, his Charatler, ii. 396, 397.
Dion CafTius quoted, i. 324.
Dionyfius Halycarnaffseus quoted, i. 205. 549, N'ote [I]. 429.

45Q. ii. 412. 421.
Dionyfius the Tyrant, his Maflacres, i. 426.

his Army, i. 274. 441,

Difcretion, its Merit, whence, ii. 306.

Divifion of Property, ufeful, i. 420.

Domeftic Situation of Ancients and Moderns, i. 401, 402.

Dorians and lonians, i. 226.

Dryden quoted, i. 215. ii. 448.

Dubos, Abbe, quoted, i. 232. 333. 457. j^66.

E>

E

-CLECTICS, a Sea, i. 127.
Egyptians, why perfecutors, ii. 437.
Egyptian Religion, a DiiTicuhy in it, ii. 449.

— — — and Jewilli refembling, ii. 505, A'c/f [CCCJ,

Eiizribeth, Queen, whether her Rcfurre^^ion could be proved,

ii. 137.
Eloqucncfj :. loi, <Scc.

L -1 a Empires,

5i6 INDEX.

Empires, great, deftruclive, i. 361.

Energy, its Idea, ii. 67, 68.

Englifh, their national Character, whence, i. 221.

Enthufiafm, defended and explained, i, 75, &c.

Envy, whence, ii. 20O.

Epaminondas, his Chara6ler, ii, 494, Note [GG].

Epidetus, his Idea of Virtue, ii. 372. his Superftition, ii. 455.

Epicurus, his Apology, ii. 181, &c.

' why he took himfelf to Philofophy, ii. 420.

Edicurean, i. 143.

Ergafluia, very frequent anciently, i. 403.

Euclid treats not of the Beauty of the Circle, i. 178,

Euripides quoted, ii. 413.

Europe, its Advantages from its Situation, i. 127.

Evidence, natural and moral, of the fame Kind, ii. 95.

Exchange helps to keep the Balance of Trade, i. 331.

Exchange, difficult to know, whether for or againft a Natr-
on, i. 327.

Exiles in Greece, how numerous, i. 426.

Experience, Source of ail our Rcafoning with regard to Fa8,
ii. 30, &:c.

■ ■ why wereafon from Experience, ii. 36, 37. 93.

often the fame with what we call Reafon, ii. 472,

Note [B].

Expofing Children, i. 415. approved by Seneca, ibid.

Jl act. Matters of, one Objea of Reafon, ii. 27,28.
Fa6tions, violent and bloody, among the Ancients, i. 424.
Fairies modern, equivalent to the vulgarDeitics of Antiquity,

ii.415.
Fame, why defired, ii. 191.
Fenclon, his Ethics, i. 242.
Flattery, its Influence in Religion, ii. 428.
Florus quoted, i. 414.

Plux and Reflux of '^I'heifm r.nd Polythcifm, ii. 434, «3iC.
Fontaine, la, quoted, ii. 394.
Fonteneile, Cenfurc of his Paftorals, i. 210.
' ' quotfd, i. 6, 1S8. 233. ii. 353. 41 7.

French Man of Merit, ii. 296.

iheir firft Qucrtion, with regard to a ftrangcr, ii. 3 1 2.

Fregofi and Adorni, Parties of Genoa, i. 57.
Frugality, its Merit, whence, ii. 285.
FuTidins, the dangerous Tendency of, i. 371.

2 GALLANTRY

INDEX. 517

'ALLANTRY of Civility, i. 135.
ot Intrigues, ii. 394.

Gamefters and Sailors why fuperftitious, ii. 412,

Gaul, Numberof its Inhabitants, i. 463.

Gee, Mr. quoted, i. 328.

General Rules, their Influence, ii. 198. 255.

Genoa, its Government and Bank, i. 22.

Geles immortal, their Faith, ii. 433.

Golden Age not fufceptible of Juflice, ii. 237.

Good Senfe, how farefTential to Tafte, i. 256.

Gorgias Leontinus, his Eloquence, i. 543, Note [D].

Government, Origin of, i. 35. Perpetual ftruggle between
Authority and Liberty in all Governments, 38. Violent
Innovations dangerous to Government, 483 Sometimes
prove happy in the Iflue, inftanced in the reign of Henry
VIII, and Charles I. 484.

Greece, its Advantages from its Situation, i. 127.

its whole military Force, i. 450.

r' Numbers of its Inhabitants, i. 461,
Grotius quoted, ii. 498, Note [PP].
Guelf and Ghibelline Parties, i. 58.
Guicciardin quoted, i. 290. ii. 373.
GuftavusVaza, i. 67.

H.

XIARDOUIN, Pere, quoted, i. 563.
Harrington, his Oceana, cenfured, i. 525.

quoted, i. 47. 95-. SM-

Hcliogabalui^, a conic Stone, ii. 425,

Henry IV. of France, his Character, ii. 308.

— a Saying of his, i. 554, Note [S].

Henry the IVth and Vllth of England their Title, 1. 479.

Helvetia, its Inhabitants, i. 464.

Hereditary Right, how important, i. 511.

Herefy, Appellation reils commonly on the Side of Reafon :

Examples, ii. 443.
Hero-worfhip, ii. 423.

Herodian quoted, i, 453. 462. 489. ii. 425.
Herodotus quoted, i.432, 443.449. ii. 304. 416. 433. 438.

444. 459- 462.
Hertha, Goddefs of the Saxons, ii. 426.
Hefiod, not a Theift properly fpeaking, ii. 418.
■ ■ ■ ■ Inconfiftcncy in his Theology, ii. 431.
— — 1 — quoted, i. 411. ii. 418. 423. 431. 503, Note [YY].

Hiero,

5i8 INDEX.

Hiero, King of Syracufe, his Policy, i. 357.
Hirtius quoted, {,425.

Homer, his Chara.S:er, i. 248. his Ethics, i. 242. ii. 304,
Inconfiftency of his Theology, ii. 431. quoted, ii. 417.

423- 431-
Homer and Hefiod, canonical Books of ancient Paganifm, ii.

418.
Honefty the beft Policy, ii. 334.
Hope and Fear defended, ii. 178, 179.
Horace quoted, i. 95. 119. 132. 139.208. 263.407.457.

566, Note [OO]. ii. 182. 268. 374. 390.
HoJIiSf its Signification in old Latin, i. 551, Note [O],
Human Life, general Idea of it, i. 193.

-Nature, its Dignity, i. 83.

Humility, its Caufes, ii. 186.

Hufbandmen, what Proportion they bear to Manufa6turers,

i. 272.
Hutchinfon, Mr. quoted, i. 381.
Hyde de Religione veterum Perfarum, quoted, ii. 433. 438.

I'

JaNSENISTS, their Genius, i. 80. ii. 481, 482,
Ice, Reports of it not credible to an Indian, ii. 122.
Ideas, their Anbciation, ii. 23, 24, ^c 54.

■ their Origin, ii. 17, tffr.
Idolatry, its Origin from Polytheifm, ii. 423.
Jefuits, their Refinement, ii. 496.

Jews, their national Chara6ter, whence, ii. 505, Note [CCC].
—— Reafon of their Infurreftion, ii. 450.
Jewifh'Religion and Egyptian refembling, i\.<,0'i),Note[CCC].
Ignorance of Caufes the Origin of Polytheifm, ii. 411.
Immaculate Concepiion, a popular Opinion, ii. 430.
Immortality of the Son!, on what founded, ii. 151.
Impiety of popiiFar Religions, Ii, 457.
Imprclfions, what, ii. 18.
Impotence and Barrennefs, ii. 293.
Inceft, whence its Crime, ii. 256.
Independents, tiieir Genius, i. 78.
Indians juflly incredulous with regard to Ice, Ii. 122.
Induftry, its Merit, whence, ii. 285.
InftruQions to Members, i. 33.
Intereft, private, how far the Foundation of Government, i.

29. public, ibid.
Intered, its Lowncfs, whence, i. 315. ufeful, 321.
Johnfoii, (Ben) his Charafter, i. 556, Note [ZJ.
lonians and Dorians, Tribes of Greeks, i. 226.

Jofcphus

INDEX. 519

Tofcphus quoted, i. 566, Note [NN]. 568, Note [Q£L]-

Joy, Grief, explained, ii. 177.

Iphicrates, a Saying of his, ii. 315.

Ifocratcs quoted, i. 408. 427, 428,

Irifh, their Idea of Merit, ii. 304.

Italians, Caufe of their Effeminacy, i. 292.

Italy ancient and modern. Number of its Inhabitants, i. 465.

Julian quoted, i. 440.

Juftice, Source of its Merit, ii. 232. farther explained, 357.

Juftin quoted, i. 450. 465.

Juftinian x^uoted, i. 139,

Juvenal quoted, i. 132. 224. 413. 458. 466. 11. 224. 456-

JUaMPRTDIUS quoted, I. 437.

Laws of the twelve Tables, i. 122.

Laws of Juflice, whence derived, ii. 241.

— — of Nature, ii. 253.

Louis XIV. Numbers of his armies, i. 290.

Liberty and NeccfTity, a Difpute of Words, ii. 86.

Liberty, civil, its advantages, i. 91, &c, 119, 120, 121.

Liberty of the Preii, why peculiar to Great Britain, i. 9, 10,

II, 12.
Lipfius, Juftus, quoted, i. 410.
Livy, a fincere Religionift, ii. 454. quoted, i. 23, 57. 220.

274- 542. 356- 41^9- 4-'5- 435- »■ 372. 461.
Locke, (Mr.) quoted, i. g^. 493. ii. 61. 6g. 184. 471, Note

[A].475, A^.L^[D].
Longinus quoted, i. 104. 108. ii. 301, 417.
Louvellein Party in Holland, i. 67.
Love and Hatred, whence derived, ii. 199.
Lucan quoted, i. 414.
Lucian quoted, i. 1S9. 543, Note [Z]. 559., Note [HH]. ii.

12S. 141. 290. 386. 416. 454. 459, 460.
I/Ucretlus, his Chrtrai^ler; i. 209. quoted, ii. 134. 424.
Luxury, its different Senfes, i. 285. its Advantages, 2S7, 2S0.

its Difadvantages, 296, 297.
Luxurious Ages moll happy, i. 286. 289. mofc vireuous, ibid,
I^yfias, Genius of his Eloquence, i. 1 1 2. quoted, i. 424,

425. 432. 439. 442. 445. 448. ii. 392.

M.

IVxACIMAVEL, his RcBeaion on Chriaianity, ii. 441,

quoted, i. 20, 21. 91. 262. 525. ii. 285. 447.
Magifins, their Faith, ii. 432.

Maillet, Monfieur, his Account of Egypt, quoted, i. 44. 461.

Malebranche

520

INDEX.

Malebranche quoted, il. 475, Note [D]. 487, Note [T].
Malice, whence it is derived, ii. 200.
Mandeville, (Dr.) quoted, i. 297.
Manilius quoted, ii. 416,

Marcellinus, (Ammianus) quoted, i. 565, Note [NN],
Martial quoted, i. 407. 414. 466. ii. 503, No/e [XX].
Mary, Virgin, became a Deity among the Catholics, ii.430.
Malfacres, ancient, enumerated from Diodorus Siculus, i. 557,

Note [BB].
Mathematics, their Foundation, ii. 485, Note [P]. their

Advantage?, 65.
Maurice, Prince of Orange, his Saying, ii. 315.
Melon, Monfieur, quoted, i. 272. 553, Note [QJ.
Memory, its Merit, whence derived, ii. 289.
Menander quoted, i. 547, Note [H].
Merit, perfonal, how the objeQ: of Pride, ii. 187.

delineated, li. 319, &c.

Metaphyfics, what, ii. 7, 8.

Mine, Thine, ii. 244.

Aliracles, on what their Evidence is founded, li. 117, &rc.

■ • defined, ii. 122. one mentioned by De Retx. 131.

Mixture of Affe£tions, ii. 182.

Modefty, whence its Merit, ii. 513.

Moliere, i. 140.

Molinills, their Geniur, i. 80. ii. 481.

Monarch", elective, hereditary, which preferable, 1. 17.

Monarchy, and Republic, their Advantages and Difadvan*

tages vv'ith regard to the Arts, i. 129, 130, 131.
Money, its continued Encreafe advantageous, i. 302.

its Diffullon advantageous, i. 306, 307.

Montaigne quoted, ii. 372.

Montefquieu quoted, i. 399. 466. ii. 487, Note [T.]
Monumentum Ancyrianum quoted, i. 451.
Morals, their Standard, i. 242.

— not fiUcUiating, ii. 390.

Morality hurt by popular Religions, ii. 461.

Moral Caufes, have chief Influence on Populcufnefs, 1, 40T.

Mufcovites, their Manners, i. 137.

N.

ATURE, State of, defcribed, ii. 237, imaginary, 487,
Note [S].
Natural, in what Senfe Juflice is natural, W.A^gg^Note [OS-]*
Navigation, ancient, how imperfect, ii. 421.
Ncccfllty, its Definition, ii. 87. 102.
Ncgroe?, their Character, i. 548, Note [M].

Nepos,

INDEX. 521

Nepos, Cornelius, quoted, i. 409,

Neri, and Bianchi, Parties in Florence, i. 57.

Newton, Sir Ifaac, his rule of philofophizing, ii. 251,

Newton, Locke, Clarke, Arians, and fincere, ii. 506. Note

[DDD].
Nicholas, Saint, became a Deity among the Mufcovites,

ii.430.
Nifus, or ftrong Endeavour, not the Origin of the Idea of

Power, ii. 474. Note [Cj.
Northern Nations, their Swarms, no Proof of Populoufnefs,

i. 462.
Numatianus, Claudius Rutilius, his Contempt of the Jewilh,

and confequently of the Chriftian Religion, ii. 450.

O

o

'BEDIENCE, paffive, i. 495, ^c
Obligation, interefled, to Virtue, ii. 330.
Olympiodorus quoted, i. 565.

Opinion, the real Foundation of Government, i. 2g.
Orange, the family of, their Partisans, i. 67.
Oratoribus, Dialog, de, quoted, i. 224.
Oftracifm of Athens, Petalifm of Syracufe, i. 354.
Ovid quoted, i. 118. 132. 403. 459. 461. ii. 416. 419. 461

A- AINTERS, modern, unhappy in their Subjefls, i. 240.
Paper Credit and Banks, whether advantageous, i. 301*,

^ 336, 337»

Paris, L'Abbe de, his Miracles, ii. 481.

Parliament, how far it fhould be independent, i. 43, i^c.

Parnel, Dr. his Character as a Writer, i. 211.

Parties in general, i. 55. perfonal, 56. real, 59, 60.

of Great Britain, i. 65, ^c.

Pafcal his Charafter, ii. 405, quoted, 489.

PafTions, their Kinds, ii. 177. their Obje£lions and Caufes,

184.
Paterculus quoted, i. 342. 440. 465.
Pathetic and Sublime, ii. 309.
Paufanias quoted, i. 449.
Pay, Proportion between Officers and Soldiers anciently,

i.418.

Pericles,

522 INDEX.

Pericles, his Eloquence, i. 113,

Peripatetics, their mediums, ii. 281.

Pcrfecution, whence derived, i. 61, 62. naturally attends the

Principle of Unity of God, ii. 437.
Perfia, ancient, whether pofTefTed of an Ariftocracy, i. 541.
Perfonjfy, to, natural, and the Origin of Poly theifm, ii. 41 1.
Petrarch quoted, i. 266.
Petronius quoted, i. 408. 459. ii. 390.
Phaedrus quoted, ii. 49"*. Note f Xj.

Philip of Macedon, his Charadler in Demofthenes, ii. 303.
' his Occupation in the infernal Regions,

i. 189.
Philip II. of Spain, i. 98.

Philofophy, the two Kinds of it, the obvious and abftrufe, ii.3.
PhyficalCaufes, their fmall Influence onPopuloufnefs, i. 398.
Pindar, his Scholiaft quoted, i. 146.
Plato quoted, i. 92. 369. 442. 493. ii. 374. 388. 455. 487.

Note['$>^. 490, Note [XJ. 504, Note [ZZJ.
Platonift, i. 165.
Plautus quoted, i. 444.
Pliny the Elder quoted, i. 137. 237. 312. 342. 412. 454.

456. 543, Note [C]. 557,A^^/^[AAJ.562, Note\lAJ\. ii.

407. 451. 503, Note [YYJ. 504. Note [AAA].

^ a Paffage of his examined, i. 563.

Pliny the Younger, his Houfe, i. 451. quoted, i. 137. 325.

ii. 421.
Plutarch quoted, 1. 133, 134. 187- 189. 218.228. 302. 327.

369. 389, 390. 403. 409. 413. 415. 420. 423, 426. 431,

440. 441.446.464. 468. ii. 224. 275.302.388.421. 438,

441.459.

, A Paffage of his examined, i. 466.

Pofitenefs, whence its Merit, ii. 311.

Politics, a Science, i. 13, ^c.

Political Cuftoms of Ancients and Moderns compared, i.

415,416.
Pollia and Papiria, Roman Tribes, their Animofity, i. 57.
Polybius quot^id, i. 19. 733. 312. 341. 356, 357, 418. 439.

449. 459. 461.479. 541, Note [BJ. 552, Note [O]. ii.

264.288.371.373.
Polygamy, its Difadvantnges, i. 195.

Polythcifm, the primitive Religion, ii. 402. its Origin, 417.
Pompey, his Supcrftition, ii. 450.

Pope, Mr. his Character, i. 209. quoted, 13, 187. 23. 540.
Power, what its Idea, ii. 68. 475, A'<?/d' [EJ.
Pra£lice how ufeful to Tnfte, i. 253.
Prefbyterians, their Charadcr, i. 67. 78.

Prcfence,

INDEX. 523

Prefcnce, real, ii. 445.

PrelFing Seamen, i. 395.

Prieft, his Chara6ter, i. 214.

IVierts, their Origin, i. '7.

Prior, Mr. quoted, i. 146.

Pride, whence it arifes, ii. 1 86.

Probabihty, what, ii. 61. 119.

Promife, what, and whence its Obligation, i. 475.

not the Origin of Government, ib.

Proof, what, ii. 61. 119.

Property, its Equality imprafticable, ii. 242. defended, 245.

why the Source of Pride, ii. 193.

Proteftant Succeflion, its Advantages and Difadvantages, i.

Providence, particular, on what founded, li. 151.
Provinces, under what Government moft opprefled, i. 17.
Pyrrhus, his Saying of the Romans, i. 292.

a

V^U AKERS, their Charader, i. 78, 79.
Quin6iilian quoted, i. 98. 108. 21 8. ii. 273.315. 454.

R

R

.AC INE, his Character, i. 209. quoted, 265. ii. 483.
Ramfay, Chevalier, quoted, ii. 507.
Reafon, when it influences Adtion, only a cooler Paflion,

how far the Source of Morals, ii. 216.

Reafon and Tafte, their boundaries, i. 244.

Reafon more precarious than Tafte, i. 259.

Reafons of State, ii. 254.

Refinement, in what reipecl ufeful, i. 311.

Regnard his Voyage to Lapland, quoted, ii. 416.

Relations of Ideas, ©ne Object of Reafon, ii. 27.

Religion, two principal Queftions with regard to it, ii. 401.

its firft Principles, not primary but fecondary, ii. 4 4.

Refemblance, a Source of AfTociation, ii. 24. 55.

Retz, Cardinal de, quoted, i. 534. ii. 131.

Revolution, in 1688, no Contrad or Promife, i. 478.

Rhamadan of the Turks, ii. 463.

Rhodes, Number of its Inhabitants, i- 447.

Riches, why the Objedl of Pride or Efteem, ii. 191. 294.

Rochefoucauk quoted, ii. 210. 501, Note [SSJ.

Rome, i. 57.93. 97. 211.

Rome,

524 INDEX.

Rome, anciem, its Size and Number of Inhabitants, i. 452,

453-
■ Name of its tutelar Deity, concealed, ii. 504 Note

[AAA],
Romans, when moft corrupt, i. 22. anciently Pirates, i. 552.

theirGovernmentundertheEmpirenotburdenfome, 1.30?.
Roman Empire, whether advantegous, i. 466.
Roundhead Party, i. 69.
Poufleau quoted, i. 131.
Rowe, Mr. his Tragedy cenfured, i. 239.

V^ADDER contains little Morality, ii. 461.

Sallee, Pnnce of, his Saying of De Ruyter, ii. 446.

Saii'.'ft <iuoted, i. 97. 132. 293. 425. 452. ii. 393. 370.456:

465.
Saint Evremond's Charadler of Turenne, ii. 285.

quoted, ii. 30 t.

Sannazarias, Cenfure of his Paftorals, ii. 271.

Scapulaire, what, ii. 433.

Scepiicifm, ii. 27. 46. exceflive, 159, ^V. moderate, 160.

with regard to the Senfes, 161. with regard to Reafon,

166. Religious, ii. 451.
Sceptic, the, i. 17 .
Sciences, their Divilion, ii. 173.
Sdiolafiic Religion, its ufual Abfurdity, ii. 442.
Scriptures, holy, quoted, ii. 232. 372.
Scriptural and traditional Religions compared, ii. 452.
Selhlh and Social notoppofite, ii. 332.
Self-love not the Foundation of moral Sentiment, ii. 323.
Seneca quoted, i. 404. 408. 411. 415. ii. 356. 374.418.
Seneca the Elder quoted, i. 413.

Sentiment, how far the Source of Morals, ii. 216. 338.
Sextus Empiricus quoted, i. 415. ii. 227. 420. 456. 490.

Ncte[X].
ShafteH^ury, Lord, quoted, i. 93. 135. 391.
Shakefpeare, his Artifice in Othello, i. 236. quoted, ii. 300.
Simplicity in Writing, i. 207.
Slavery prejudicial to Populoufnefs, i. 404.

to Humanity, i. 403.

Sneezing, God of, ii. 503, Note [YYJ.
Socrates, his Character, ii. 305.
Soil, very fertile, no Advantage, i, 283.
Soldier, his Charae^ter, i. 214.

Soldiers,

INDEX. 525

Soldiers, what Proportion they commonly bear to the People,

1.293. ^ .

Sophocles, his Character, 1. 2(^9.
Spain, ancient and modern, its inhabitants, i. 464.
Spaniard, his Politenefs, ii. 312.

Sparta, its Policy, i. 273. Number of its Inhabitants, 448.
Spa'tian quoted, i. 564. ii. 45 .
Spencer quoted, ii. 305.
Sportula, their bad tendency, i. 466.
Stanian quoted, i. 342.
States, fmall, their Advantage, i. 417-
Stoic, the, i. 153.
Stoics, their idea of Providence, ii. 107.

their SuperAition, ii. 454.

Strabo quoted, i. 369. 407, 408. 411. 438. 442. 456. 460.

463, 465. 467. 550, Note [Kl. 562, Note [i^^K]. 566,

Note [NN[. ii. 415. 439.
Stuart Family, whether their SuccefTion ought to have been

retained, i. 51 1. whether reftored, 520.
Subjects particular, fuir not wiih Reiinement, i. 269.
Suetonius quoted, i. 19. 403. 407. 451. 453, 454. 466. 543.

NotelC\. ii. 13-. 582. 418.439.45'-
Suidas quoted, i. 113. 566, Note [Q^XJ ■
Superrtition defined, i. 76, 77, ^c.

Swift, Dr. quoted, i. 329. 344, 559, Note [DD j. ii. 284-
Sycophant, its original Senfe, i. 327-

Sympathy, the great Source of moral Sentiment, ii. 270. 30c-
Syracufe, its Extent and Number of Inhabitants, i. 448.

L AC IT US, fomewhat fuperftitious, though profane,
ii. 454. quoted, i. 10. 19. 67. 120. 134. 384. 407. 41-.
415. 422. 451. 452- 467. 482. 552, Note [PJ. 557, Note
[AA]. ii. 130. 304. 426. 454- 496, Note [hh]. 505,
Note [CCC].

Taflb quoted, i. 148.

Tarte, its Standard, i. 241.

Taxes, when hurtful, i. 363, 364.

do not fall ultimately on Land, i. 366.

Temple, Sir William, i. 95. 226. 364.

Tendency of A(Stions, not their accidental Confequences, re-
garded in Morals, ii. 500, Note [EE].

Terence, his Character, i. 211. quoted, 135. 262.

Tertullian quoted, i. 567, xVtff«[QCi_].

Thebes,

526 INDEX.

Thebes, Number of its Inhabitants, i. 447.
Theifm, its Origin from Polytheifm, ii. 426.
Theifm and Polytheifm, compared, ii. 436.
Theocritus, i. 439.

Thinkfers, abftrufe, how ufeful, i. 269, Ihallow, ibid.
Thucydides, the firft Hiftorian, i. 439.

quoted, i. 190. 273. 341. 355. 418. 425. 433.

438. 443, 444. 449. n. 3-^4. 441 .
Timon of Athens, his affection to Alcibiades, ii. 275.
Timotheus the Poet, his Hymn to Diana, ii. 459.
Tillotfon, his Argument againft the real Prefence, ii. 117,
Toleration naturally attends Polytheifm, ii. 436.
Tory Party, i. 63. their fpeculative Syftem, i. 471.
Tot, Monf. du, quoted, i. 553, Note [Q,].
Tournefort, Monf. quoted, i. 200. 459.
Tragedy, why it pleafes, i. 231.
Tranquility of Mind, whence its Merit, ii. 305.
Treafures, their Effedls, i. 336.
Turkifh Government, i. 368.
Tyrannicide, why blameable, ii. 228.
Tyrants, ancient, their Cruelty, i, 426.

u.

u

ST ARIZ, Geronimo de, quoted, 1.400.
Ufurpation, what, i. 479.

Utility, a Source of Approbation, ii. 226. why, 261.
• to others, ii. 349. to ourfelves, 299.,

V ALERIUS Maximus, quoted, i. 562, Note [LLJ.
Vanity, allies eafily to Virtue, i. 90. why blamed, ii. 316.
Varro quoted, i. 407. 412. 413. 459, 465 ii. 449.
Vauban quoted, i.334.
Vega, GarcillafTo de la, quoted, i. 324.
Verna, its Senfe and Inferences from it, i 555, Note [Xj.
Verney, Paris de, quoted, i. 553, Note [QJ.
Vcfpafian, his Miracle, ii. 130.
Viiftor Aurelius, quoted, i 564.
Viaor, Publius, quoted, 448 565, Note [MM].
Virgil, his Charader, i. 209. quoted, ii. 356. 293.
Virtue and Vice defined, ii. 219.
Vis inertiie, ii. 474, Note [DJ.

Vitelliiis,

INDEX. 527

VitcIIIus, his Meannefs, ii. 302.

Vitruvius quoted, i. ^62, Note [KKJ.

Voluntary and involuntary, why made by tli£ Moderns fo

eflential to Morals, ii. 375.
Voltaire quoted, i. 1 1.

Vopifcus quoted, i. 448. 454. 566, Note [OO].
VolFius quoted, i. 399. 564.

w.

vf

ALLER, his Charafter, j. 141.
Wifdom, its Merit, whence, ii. 288.
Wit or Ingenuity, its Merit, whence, ii. 312.
Whig Party, i. 69, their fpeculative Syftem, i. 471.
WolJey, Cardinal, i. 134.
Women, timorous and fuperftitious, ii. 414.
Wonder, the Pafllon of, inclines us to believe Miracles, ii.
125.

X

X

ENOPHON, his Superftition, ii. 505, Aro/^[DDD].
quoted, i. 92. 100. 353, 354. 411. 4ir

427- 435- 444> 445- 447> 448. 461. ii. 293 383. 437,
458.
Xerxes, his Purfuit of new pleafures, i. 144.

F I N I

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