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A  N 

ESSAY 

towards  the 

IMPROVEMENT 

REASON 

in  the 

Purfuit  of  Learning, 

AND 

Condu(5t  of  Life. 


By  Josh.  Oldfield, 


LONDON, 

Printed  for  ^.  l^ackfitlCffj  at  the  Bible  and  Three 
Crowns    in    Cheapfide  :     %  EObiUfOll,    at    the 
GoldenLvon  in  St.    Pj^/'s    Church  -  Zwd  ;    and 
3!   laUJ^ence,  ac  the  Angel  in  the  Foultrey, 
M-DCCVir. 


Xhe  Contents. 


THE  \ntw6\ji&\ox\  leading  1 0 the  Ejfay,  Page  i 

Se(5tion  i.  Reafon  in  Man  defer ibd. 

2.  Its  need  of  all  the  farther  Help,  which  can  he  given. 

3.  This  Ej/ay,    a  kind  of  Logic^    but  out  of  the  common 
Roady  and  more  Ext  en  five.  \\ 

"    Its  general  Nature.,  and  Defgn. 
.  It  is  to  dire^  our  Thought^    Difcourfe,  Behaviour^  and 
Jjfairs. 

6.  The  Natural  Faculty ,  how  to  he  improved  by  it. 

7.  Reafon  is  not  us^d  in  Reafoning  only.  \\\ 

8.  The  InjlruBions  are  to  be  in  the  way  of  Rules  and  Helps* 

9.  They  are  to  be  general  and  common ^  leading  te  Prudencif 
and  opening  the  way  to  farther  Knowledge. 

10.  Somewhat  about  this^  as  it  may  he  varioufly  taken. 

1 1.  Matters  to  be  known  are  Things ,  fVords,  and  Notions. 

iv 

1 2.  0/  tbeje  fomewhat  is  prefupposd^yet  more  may  he  need- 
\     full. 

^i.  Words ^  in  what  way  to  he  got. 

1 4.  Things  are  delivered  in  the  way  of  Speculation.^  or  for 

Pra^lice^  or  both  ;  and  thus  it  fliould  be  in  Logic.        v 
I  J.  Speculative  Points  are  Matters  ef  la^^  with  rational 

Enquiries  and  Accounts,  as  in  Geography.^  Hiflory^  &c. 

1 6,  VraBical  Points  are  Matter  of  Skill,  or  Duty  ^  as  in 
the  Vulgar y  or  more  Learned  Arts. 

1 7.  Lrgic  K  to  precede  the  Sciences  and  Arts.  This  Ejjay  may 
be  of  Ufe  to  Perfons  of  inferior  Occupation. 

iS.  Its  lnJlru5lions  to  be  peculiarly  fitted  to  guide  and  affift 
our  Reafon  :  But^  that  they  may  reach  their  End,  vi 

19.  They  muftbe  well undaflood^  oft  review" d^  and  applfd 
to  Ufe. 

3o,  21,  22.  The  Mtthcd  and  gimrd  Heads  of  this 
Effny.  ■   ^iiJviii 

h  2  Tb« 


The  Contents. 


The   ESSAY. 

PART    f. 

CHapter  I.  Of  Thoughts  as  leading  to  Thmgy.   Page  l 
Seiftion  i.  We  Jhould  have  a  general  and  crderly  Ac- 
quaintancewitb  the  Matters  of  1  hot. 

2.  Ho-w  we  come  by  what  we  have^    which  is  commonly 
i)ery  de€cient> 

3.  Oar  Thinking  and  Tho't  are  the  neare^  and  furefi  OhjeEis 
of  our  Tho't.  '       2 

4.  Hew  we  may  conceive  of  them.     Of  Reflexion. 

5.  IVe   know  Things  only  as  ferceivd^  tmagind,    or  con- 
ceivd. 

6.  That,  avd  how,  we  think   in  conceiving,  Verceiving^ 
and  Imagining.  3 

7.  In  what  Ways  Tho'ts  may  fpring  from  Thought. 

8.  J  hot  may  heconjider'd,  either  in  ft  felf,  or  with  relation 
to  what  is  thdt  of.   And 

9.  We   moft  commonly  take  our  Ideas  or  Thots  for  the 
Things  themfehes  to  which  they  refer  :     Tho^  4 

I  o.  Thefe  are  not  always  reprefented  by  thofe.    How  vijible 

Ohjetis  are  judged  cf. 
3  I .  Jmsginatton  moflly  do's  but  copy  our  fenfihle  Verceptims. 
12.  What  our  Underfiavdirgs  cannot  do^    and  what  they 

are  capable  of^  with  reference  to  Things.  ♦  5 

I  J.     Without  Innate  Ideas,    we  are  tntutively  certain  of 

fome  Toints. 
7  4.  Only  one  part  cf  a  Coniti'^d-ciion  can  be  true  ;  and  the 

more  probable  is  generally  fo  to  be  accounted :  therefore, 
1 5",  There  mujt  be  real  Obje^s  abmt  m  (God  woud  not 

deceive  m^: 

16.  They  really  affeB  us-.,  and  we  are  as  fure  cf  them, 
as  God  faw  fit  we  fhoud  be.  6 

17.  As  to  the  Things  which  are  here  to  be  prefented,  onl) 
fucb  Notions  wiR  be  offer  d  as  may  generally  approve  tbaft- 
felves. 

Ch.»p.  U.  Of  the  Ways  of  Thinking,  as  they  are  amongjt 
the  ObjeSIs  of  Thought.  7,  &ci 

Section  i.  Thefe  are  frft  to  he  confider^d  in  a  ?nore  familtar 
way,  PdtC 


The  Contfncs. 

Part  I.  Chap.  11.  Page 

Se(^ion  2.  The  general  T>t{tgn  is  a  plain  Summary  Accnttnt 

of  the  Ways  of  Thinking  .    with  other  OhjeSis  of  Tho't, 

5 .  U^at  tbi  more  general  Uje  of  fuch  an  Account  way  be. 
4.  Tho'ts  t»ay  bs  tn  tbemfelves  Matter  of  Tho't : 

J".  I>Jor  can  Vfe  think  of  ether  Things,  but  as  they  are  pre- 
fented  in  T'hoti :  8 

6.  Thefe  are  as  it  were  Draughts  of  thofe,  fome  way  cor- 
refpondtng  to  them,  and  yet  differing  from  them. 

7.  8.  That^  and  ivhat,  we  think,  we  certainly  know  at 
prefent ;  and  often  afterwards-     Memory  abfolutely  need- 

9.  Several  Cafes  in  which  it  fails,  or  falters. 

I  o.  How  writing  may  be  helpful  to  it.  ^ 

11.  Some  other  Helps  to  Memory- 

12.  The  Special  T^efgn  here^  is  to  Comprize,  Contra(5tj 
Sele<9:,  Difpofe  and  Treat  of  Tho^ts  and  Things ;  oi 
may  heft  anfwer^ 

13.  The  Special  Ufes,  which  may  he  made  of  the  following 
Summary.  i  o 

14.  In  thinking  we  always  mind^  <!»</ apprehend  fme' 
what. 

i  5".  The  differing  ways  of  Perceiving  by  Senfe  j 

1 6.  The  'Various  ways  of  Imagining  :  \i 

17.  How  intelle6lual  Conception  differs  from  them,botb: 

1 8.  Of  Thots  that  ftartj  recur,  follow,  or  i\y  us  f^  as  if 
they  were  injediecJ, imprefsM,  or  withdrawn: 

1$'  Of  Tho'ts  form'd  by  us,  when  we  rove,  glance, 
pore,  turn,fcan,  deted,  dired:ly  view,  or  refled.  1 2 

20,  How  we  refer,  compare,  abftract,  name,  fignj' 
conned:,  or  disjoin. 

21.  How  we  diitingui/h,  fix  the  Senfe,  defcribs,  define, 
or  divide. 

21.  When  we  may  befaid  to  {\ate,  to  fee  asjelfe'tidenr^ 
to  hold,  confirm,  and  arm  our  jelves.  1 3 

2;.  When,  to  deem,  guefsjdoubr,  argue,  weigh,  decide, 
or  fulpend. 

24.  When^  to  ftandj  change  ^  objed,  (bive,  flighc,  ap» 
ply. 


A  3  Par 


The  Coil  terns" 


Jartl.  Chap.IL  "Page 

Se<aion  25".  To  believe,  conlent,  depend  ;   miftruft, 
,     diflent ;  eye,  aim.  14 

2(5,  27,2s.  7^0  judge,  rate,  will,  nill ;  like,  diflike; 

fly,  wiih;   fear,  hope  ;  truft,  defpair;  joy,  grieve  i 

defign,  .adb.efe, 
^9. To  pity,  envy ;  charge,  acquit,  approve,  admire,  ij- 
30..  To  prefage,  recal,  propound,  feek,    find,   retire, 

purfue. 
3 1.   Tc  (uppofe,  infer,  miftake,  take  right,  inquire.   \$ 
5.2/  Some  of  the  Mentioned  AUs  may  be  perform  4  etherwuysj 

as  well  as  in  That,     How  other   Alatters  of  Tho't  are 

deliver  d  in  fome  following  Chapters, 
Chap.  III.  Of  the  Works  of  Nature.  16,  &c. 

Sedion  i.  There  are  Th\ug%  cgntrad'^ftinguifid  to  Thqt* 
2,.;.  Spirit?,  what  theyare\  how  known  to  he^  &c.  17 
4a. J.  Body*,  what  they  are:   they  affe^i  the  Touch,  Tafie^ 

Smelly  and  Hearing. 
6t  What  Sight  may  difcover  in  or  about  them.  1 8 

7s  Compounds,  of  what  Kinds  ;  how  made  and  unmade. 

8.  The  general  Heads  of  the  following  Account. 

9.  The   mutual  Attraction^    or  Gravitation  of  Eodys  to 
each  other- 

ip<  The  Heavens^  the  ConJ^ellations,  the  twelve  Signi, 
&c.    i  19 

li.  T%  Poles  J  Orbs^  Vianet  ary  Motions -.^    the  Slin's  Pc- 
riod^  &c. 

12.  The  Moon'^  Epicycle  ;    the  Eclipfe  of  the  Sun  find 
Moon  \  the  Lunar  Month.  20 

13.  The  Periods  0/ Saturn  and  Jupiter  with  their  Atten' 
dants ;  Itkewije  of  Mars,  Venus,  and  Mercury. 

1 4.  Several  Engines  which  may  be  made  about  Comets, 

21 
If.  Airy  Vapoun,  Clouds^  Wind/,  Lightening,    Thunder, 

Rain,  Snow^  Hail.,  and  Hoar  Froajt. 
16.  Night  fires.^  Halvs,    Rainbows^  counterfeit  Suns  and 

Moovi. 
I  J.  of  the  Shape  and  Motion  of  the  Earth.  22 

18.  The  Climates,  Seas.^  Land  unknowr,  JJles.,  Ccntinenty 
Quarters,  Latitude  and  Longitude. 

Part 


Vhe  Contents. 


Part  I.  Chap.  III.  Page 

Seft.  1 9.  Some  Account  of  the  Tide^  and  of  its  Differences.!  j 

20.  What  may  be  en^mr'd  or  ohferv'd  in  relation  to  differ- 
ing Countries  about  the  Inhabitants,  Commodities^  Ports^ 
Riversy  Baths,  Towns,  Buildings^  Living  Creatures^ 
Plants,  &c. 

21.  Somewhat  of  the  Analogy  and  Difference  betwixt 
Plants  and  Animals^  more  particttlarl/  of  the  Blood  in 
thefe:   Mans  Prebeminence.  24,  2 J 

Chap.  IV.  The  Works  of  Creatures,     Divine  Providence, 

Sed;ion  i .  Creatures  borrow  from  Nature  :  In  what  fort 
they  Work :  What  fome  inferior  Animals  produce. 

2.  Some  of  the  Works  of  Man.  Of  Infitncf,  What  we 
Jhould  obferve  in  our  Attempts. 

3.  Providence  y  what  in  the  General,  and  from  what  kind 
of  Wtil  in  God.  2^ 

4.  Miracles.  The  more  ufuat  courfe  of  Things  agreeable  to 
Scripture,  as  in  the  Seafons^  the  Rainbow,  Propagati* 
on,  &c. 

j.  Lots  of  differing  Kinds :  Chance  :  Turns  and  Changes: 
permijjlve,  and  penal  Dtfpenfattons,  28 

6.  Mans  Fall  in  Adam  :  The  way  of  his  Refiauration 
and  Advancement  in  and  thro"  Chrift.  2^ 

7.  How  the  GoffeL  has  prevailed,  and  fhaS.  The  Day  of 
'Judgment. 

%.  What  might  feem  to  be  Mans  chief efi  Good:    that  the 

Divine  ¥ avour  is  truly  and  plainly  fo.  jq 

p.  The  Judgment  to  be  rightly  formed  fo,  as  Well  to  govern 

the  Will  and  AffeBions ;  fitll  depending  on  the  g/wdneft 

.    of  God  for  hts  Acceptance. 

10.  What  the  JslQin^  which  Prudence  dire^s,  and  whence 
,   its  Meafures  are  taken.  51 

1 1 .  Moderation  how,  and  where.,  a  Virtue, 

12.  We  jhould  feek  and  take  the  way  to  be  Frugal,  Tem- 
perate, Chalie,  Conltanc,  Wary,  Induftriou?,  Pa- 
tient, BoldL  Brave,  Pioui,  Kind,  Mtek,  Courtecus 
faithful,  True  :  as  aljo^ 


A  4  Part, 


The  Contents. 


Pare  rChap.  IV.  Page 

Sedicn  ig,  Jhat  cur  Alinds  may  he  large  and  Impartial, 

bent  to  -what  u  Bvicoming,  Grateful,  Liberal,  Juft, 

and  Merciful.  32 

14, 1  5.  Lauti  ofGod^  Nature,  Nations^  Realms^  Scc  tvitb 
~    fever al  things  relating  thereto.  ;  5 

.1 6.  Ltherties  and  Properties  to  be  fecurd  by  Perfons  in  Au' 

tbority  :  H^hat  relates  to  fuch.  54 

17.  Leagues^  Treaties,  Embajjys^  Peaee^  Trajfickj  War^  "with 

v/bat  relates  to  it,  55" 

a  8,  19,  Private  Dealings  in  the  way  of  Trade  and-Bufi- 
'    »e/-',  with  fome  Particulars  belonging  thereto.        3  5^36 

Chap.V.  Of  what  is  taught  and  learn  d.  4  Set  of  En- 
quiries, &c.  35,  &c. 

5e<ition  I,  2.  Some  things  are  learnt  by  the  By^  others 
are  folonnly  taught :    divers  Injtances  are  given  in  both 

,     Kindt.  ;7 

3.  Number  and  Meafure  are  joind  with  H^ordi,  or  with 
Mffical  Notes :  they  are  al/o  apply  d  to  Time,  to  Weight, 
and  in  divers  regards  to  Motion  {its  Laws  being  chiefly 
dttirrntnd  thereby):  likewife  to  Sight ^  &C.  and  to 
whatever  adtnits  of  n\o\Q  or  lels. 

4.  IVe  have  to  do  wiih  Number  or  Meajure  abjtraclly  con- 
fidird  in  the  purer  Mathematicks,  as  tn  Vulgar  or  De- 
cimal Arithmetick.  IjS 

y.  Some  Account  of  Logarithms^    and  what  they  wtU  per- 

farm. 
6.  Somewhat  of  Geometry^  which  reaches  to  general  F  tints : 

Ataljodo'j,  ;p 

y,S,  Algebra:    S  ^mething  of  this  is  briefly  fhswn :    Par- 
ticularly, .  40 
5?,  'Ihe  b'cunJationj   md  working  of  the  Rule  of  Three  is 

jliewn  in  the  Algebraical  way. 
10     IVhat  M  to  be  enquird  tn  relation   to  Language  or. 

Words.  41 

J  J,  12.  Divers  Things  to  be  obfervd,  when  Words  are  put 

tfgether  in  Dfjconrfe,  or  Sentences  at  lea(l.  41,  42 

I  5.  :)or/,ewbat  wrh  relation  to  the  lefs  tfjual  ways  of  Ex- 

pr^u:g  Jhot.  . 

Part 


The  Contents, 


Part  I.  Chap.  V.  Page 

Section  14,  ly,  16.  Sets  of  Emjuiries^  which  may  he  more 

generally  apply  d  ;    or  however  to  many.rof  the  Points, 

which  have  been  emttted.  42,  45 

17.  Pf'hat  KinJs  of  Things  are  chiefly  to  be  attended  to.  44 

1 8.  What  particular  Matters  may  be  Jingled  out  from  the 
vreft, 

ip.    How  the  Jummary  Account  of  Tho'ts  and  Things 

may  be  farthtr  drawn  out. 
20.  The  Tables  of  Animals,  Plants,  Scc.  in  Dr.Wilkins'i 

real  CharaS}er,  recommended,  4^ 

Chap.  VI.  Leading  to  the  more  Notional  Confideration  of 
Things  or  Objttts  of  Tho't  j  and  giving  fome  Account 
of  God  who  tranfcehds  all  other  Being.  45',.&C. 

Section  i.  Second  Notions  about  Things  arife  from  fuch 
at  have  been  already  deliver  d :  av.d  they  may  he  either  a 
kfnd  of  Elementary  Not  ions  ^  or  others  rejulting  from 
them. 

2.  Thing  or  Somewhat,  our  mofl  fundamental  and  com' 
mon  Notion  j  agreeing  to  whatever  imply  $  not  a  Con' 
tradiciion, 

5.  What  we  can  think  of  *f  with  us  a  Thing,  and  a  di' 
flinSl  Thing,  of  which  we  can  dift^intlly  think  j  hut 
Jhould  not  thence  conclude  it  a  real  Thing,  or  really  di- 
fitnti :  Our  Minds  can  only  comprehend  their  own  Fro- 
duce.  46 

4.  Modes  of  Things  are  indeed  Themes  or  ObjeBs  of  Tho't 
to  us ;  but  what  they  are  in  chemfelves,  we  need  not ^ 
and  perhaps  cannot,  define. 

5.  Some  Themes  are  Things  in  an  higher  Senfe,  as  lying 
nearer  to  the  htgheft  being.  47 

6.  Objecls  of  Tho't .^  how  numerom  foever.^  may  be  reducd 
under  fome  general  Heads  by  common  and  dijlm^ive 
Cbara^ers. 

J.  The  Work  of  Nature  not  fully  comprebtnded  by  our 
Minds,  but  only  Juch  At>jlraCitons  as  are  properly  their 
own  Work.  48 

8.  The  Divine  Ejjcnce  involves  Neteffary  Exigence -^  jo 
that  God  cannot  but  he. 

Part 


The  Contents. 


part  I.  Chap.  VI.  Page 

Sec^lion  $.A  Sckeute  of  Things  orOhjetis  ofTbo^tj  as  they 

may  he.  notionally  Jtvided^andfuhdivide^ij  according  to 

our  Manner  cf  conceiving. 
I  o.  Somt  Account  of  God,  tn  the  ufajf  to  which  wt  ^e  It' 

mited.  4^ 

ii.  God  to  he  conceivd  as  a  Spirit :  There  can  be  hut  one 

GOD  J  tbo"  there  be  fame  kind  of  Trtplicity  in  the  Dtvint 

Unity.  -50 

1 2.  Somewhat  of  God^s  ABs  and  Relations :   Our  Idea  df 

God  may  be  fu-fficicnt  fir  af,    tho\  tt  cannot  hut  be  very 

(hort  of  him. 
Chap.  VII.  The  Scale  of  what  is  Finite  and  Contingent ^ 

under  thofe  Confidirations,  which  are  a  kind  of  Notional 

Elements.  yi 

Se<9tion  l .  Joe  Account  proceeds  from  what  lies  nearer  the 

Supreme  Being  JlfU  downward  to  rphat  u  more  and  more 

remote.. 
2,  ;.  This  or  that  Subftance,    the  Baps  and  Support  of 

whatever  elfe  belongs  to  this  or  that  Being.  .  c 

4j  5,  6.  This  or  that  Accident  more  immediately  belonging 

to  the  Subj^ance.^  but  not  of  the  fame  Rank  wtth  it,    nor 

here  confiderdas  Accidental  to  it.  «--i  .v.t  :y2,'J3 

J.  The  Terms f  Accident.^  Mode^and  Modeofa  Mode,  bovf 

limited  here. 
8.  This  or  that  Mode  more  immediately  determines   the 

Accident,  fo  or  fo. 
g^j  10.  The  Mode   of  a  Mode  more  immediately  affeBi. 
■  its  Mode,  fo  or  fo  :     Of  this  there  may  be  feveral  De- 
grees., as  is  fnewn  tn  an  Inflance.  J4 
iU  This  or  that  Adion  (ibu,  with  Vaffion,  is  of  atran-' 

fient  Nature)  ;    What  it  js,  and  what  CharaBer  it  has^ 

when  proptrly  taken. 
12,  1  ;•  Paffion,  bow  conjiderd  here :    What  is  but  impro- 
perly fo  call'd.  yj 
14.  Thtsor  tbatVi'wrmon  ;  What  it  is,  and  of  what  Con- 

Jideration,  5"  6 

1^,—- — 20.  This  or  that  mere  Negation^    What  it  is  j 

divers  Remarks  about  the  U/e  of  Negative  Terms.     y6, 

Fare 


The  Contents. 


Part  1.  Chap.  VII.  Page 

Sc(^ion  21,  22.  This  or  that  Formality;  What  it  is  ; 
the  formal  Confideration  under  which  a  Thing  is  taken 
ought  to  be  ftrtHly  attended  to. 

22j— — If.  Tbts  or  that  Fidion,  efpeciaUji  what  is  fo  Je^ 
Jignd ;  hoiv  tt  differs  from  Moral  Faljhood ;  whence 
taken  ^  how  far  h  may  be  carry  d  j  to  what  Ufe  it  may 
ferve.  ^9 

2^.  The  Modei  of  Action^  ^c.  as  alfo  of  Combination s^ 
fiCC.  wiU  be  of  a  'Nature  juitable  thereto.  6o 

Chap.  VIlI.  Of  Combtnations  and  Separations ,  which  are, 
asfuch,  a  kind  of  Notional  Rejultances  from  the  fore- 
mentioned  Elements.  6o,  &C, 

Se<^ion  !•  There  •was  fomewhat  of  Combination ,  Sepa' 
ration^  or  yihjiraHim,  Relation^  and  Expreffon  in  the 
treceding  Scale  ;  but  they  are  here  to  be  confiderd  as  pro- 
ceeding farther,  and  being  more  obfer'vable. 

2,  libeje  ways  of  confidering  Things,  are  in  them/elves  Ob' 
jeEis  of  Tho^ty  and  may  afford  many  more. 

3,  4,  f.  This  or  that  Combioatiorij  whether  miBaken, 
fuppos'd,  or  real^  as  in  finite  Beings ;  aninfiance  in  tbts 
or  that  Man.  6l 

6,  7.  Several  ways  of  Combination  in  Nature  and  Art» 
Some  that  are  more  confiderable  than  the  reft.  6z 

5.  When  Combinations  are  rightly  apprehended.  65 
^^  ■  >   .  12.  This  or  that  Separation,  mi/takenfjuppos'dor 

real;  how  differing  from  Ab^raBion  j   to  what  forts  of 

things  it  may  relate :  It  is  not  always  the  Reuerje  or  Ke- 

folutton  of  the  forementioned  Combination.  6^^  6^ 

^3i"     'if'  Divers  ways  of  Separation ^   Mental  or  Real. 

Chap.  IX.  O/*  Abfr racking  the  "Particularity ,  Sorts ,  and 
Kinds  of  Things. 

Sedion  i,  2,  3.  This  or  that  Ab  ft  ration  :  What  to  ah- 
jiraB:  what  there  veas  of  thu  in  the  foregoing  Scale.^ 
but  not  formally  prefented.  6^^  66 

4,  y.  What  may  be  abfiraBed^  viz.  The  Farticularitjf, 
Species,  &C.  66,6"/ 

6,  7.  How  the  Particularity  of  thts  or  that  may  be  ab- 
(iraBed  :  an  Injt ance  given  in  that  i>/ Adam. 

Pare 


The  Contencs. 


Part  I.  Chap.  IX.  Page 

Se<5tk)n  8— —  i;.    How  the  Species  or   Sort  majt  be  ah- 

firaHed^  as  in  reiatton  to  Marty  T9  other  Lhftng  Creatures^ 

to  Plants^  and  to  unorganized  Matter.       "-'-  -"■     68,  69 
14 1  6.   How  the  Genus  or  Kind  fnaj  bl  "ab^ra^ed 

from  the  feveral  (orts  of  Animals,  Plants ^Scc.      6^,  70 
17.  H  w  higher  Kinds  may  be  ab/lra^ed  fi-om  the  lower. 
Chap.  X.  0/  Jome  abjhraBed  Attributes  "wherein  divers 

7htngs  agree  or  differ^  fo  as  to  be  reckon  d  of  the  jamt  ot 

dtfftrtng  Sorts  or  Kinds. 
Se<ftion    1,2.    H'hat  Abfirachons  are  Univcrfals',  boTV 

far  they  are  extended  ;   and  that  they  comprehend  Jo 

much  the  lefs.  .'.^ 

3i  What  the  Adjeqaati  Idea  of  an  Individual  contains.   Jt- 
4.  The  Kind  with  the  Subordinate  Dtjlinguifoing  CharaBers 

make  up  this  or  that  Sort.  72 

y.  Thoje  difringuijhing  CbaraEiers  may  be  cenfider^d  intbt 

Abfira5t,  or  in  the  Concrete  as  implying  fome  fit  Subje^, 
6.  Some  Attributes  and  Affetttons  gf  Things  are  treated,  as 

if  tbej  were  abjolute  and  difiinEt  Things  of  themfelves  j 

particularly  in  divers  Arts  and  Sciences. 
7;—        10.  Simplicity  and  Compojifton  ^     Infinite  and  Fi- 
nite-,    A^tvtty  and  PafihiUtj,    or  Aclive   and  faffivi 

Porvers.  73 

II,  12.  ObjeBs  are  fitted  to  be  fo  perctivd,    but  the  Af- 

feBion,  as  it  is  ptrceivd,  is  not  in  them  but  in  us.  75^74 
13,  14.   What  there  is  m  or  about  the  ObjeBs  which  maj 

caufe^  or  octafion  our  Senfations  of  them. 
Chap.  XI.  Some  farther  Attributes  belonging  tO'  Bodies^  or 

Spirits  or  botb^  as  they  may  he  ahflVa^lly  confidad.    7y 

Sedion  I,  2.    The  fame  jenfibk  Qualities  may  very  dtffc 

-tentlj  affeH  rfs  ,     Mens    Perceptions  ef  what  they  caU 

White,  Sweet,  &C.  may  fomewhat  di^er '^  but  are  pro'  ^ 

bably  much  alike  for  the  mofi  part. 
3,  4,  5.   Body  has  Extenfion  m  Length,  Breadth,  andThick- 

mfi :  It  may  be  folid,  or  hollow  j    full  or  empty  ,  fo  or  fo 

ftgur'd'  Jo  put  together-,  and  in  jucb  a  Vojlure^  or  Po- 

fition.  7^7^ 

6,  7.  Somewhat  of  the  ABive  Powers  belonging  to  our  own 

AliKus,  A?id  in  fowe  j07t^  but  //j  provtrh,  to  thi  Bcdy.  77 


The  Contents. 

Parti.  Chap. XI.  Page 

Section  8,9.  There  are  Habits  of  the  Bodjn^  htft  efpeciallj 

of   the  Mind^  ghen  or  acejuird.  77,  78 

I Q^ 1 ; .  Jr  belongs  to  finite  Sprits  as  weU  as  Biidies  to 

be  fomewhere  j  to  mcve  hither  or  thither  ;  to  be  at  fame 
time^  and  for  fome  while  j  as  alfo  to  be  (0  many  ;  and  to 
have  thu  or  that :  here  jomewhat  of  Place,  Time,  Num- 
ber, &c. 
Chap.  XU.  Of  Relation,  and  its  different  Sorts.  79 

5e(5tion  i,  2.    This  or  that  Relation.     What  may  be  re- 

ferdy   to  how  many  Things,  and  in  how  many  Re[pe6ts. 
3,4.  Relation  is  not  formally  tn  the  Tbtng  refer'' d,    but 
virtually^  in  that  which  is  the  Foundation  thereof ^  and 
may  he  the  Ground  of  contrary  delations. 
y.   Relations  may  be  of  very  great  confidtration  to  direSl  our 
Eftimate  and  Behaviour, 

6.  The  SubjeH  and  Term,  which,  together  with  the  Re- 
lation are  the  Relative  and  Correlatej  do  then  ipiply  the 
Ground  of  the  Relation.  80 

7,  8.  In  im f licit e  Relatives ,^  the  Reference  is  fcarce  ob- 
jervd.  80,  81 

^,10.^  But  in  tbofe,  which  are  more  exflicite,  that  is 
chiefly  attended  to.  In  fiances  of  Similar  Perjonal  Rela- 
tions J  as  alfo  of  thofe,  that  are  D'ljpmtlar :  and  hoit^ 
each  are  founded. 

II, — 14.  Amongfl  Relations.^  that  are  common  to  Vex  font 
and  Things.^  fomewhat  is  vbfervd  as  to  Identity,  Di- 
verfity,  and  Oppofition,  betwixt  Relatives,  Difparates^ 
Contrary  s,  as  alfo  in  the  way  of  Privation  and  Kegation : 
and  It  is  always  equal  on  both  fides.  8^,  S  j 

ly.  Some  other  obfervable  Relations,  how  founded. 

16.  Thofe  which  have  the  fame  Denomination  are  not  al- 
ways jujt  alike. 

]  7.  What  ts  abfolpftely  exfresd  muft  oft  be  comparatively 
meant.  84 

Ch.ip.  XIII.  Of  fome  more  peculiar ,  and  important  Rela- 
tions. 

$e<5tion  i, 4.  Some  Attributes  may  be  refer''d  to  this 

.  or  that  Subject,  as  Accidental,  Eilential,  ir  proper 
tkereto:  jome  Account  of  each.  84,85- 

Fait 


The  Contents. 


Parti.  Chap. XIII.  Page 

Se^ion   y.   /»  what  refpeBs  one  thing  may  he  Prior,  or 

Pofterior  to  another. 
«5,  7,  8.  Subject  «»</  Adjun<?t,  what  this  is,  and  of -what 

differing  Sorts  »  particularly  S^ns,  CtrcumfianceSy   and 

Ceremonies.  86 

9.  The  Caufe   <a«iEfFe<a.    Ti&«End,  r^&g  Matter,  ?/&<• 

Form. 

1.0, 14.  T/6«  Efficient,  w^i&/3f  jf  dos  :  the  firjh  Caufe  : 

feeond  Caujes :  General ,  Remote ,   Accidental,    Principal 

(in  a  Vhyjical  or  Moral  way)  lefs  principal,  &c.         87 
15".  Analogy,   or  Proportion^  Arithmetical  and  Geometri- 

cal» 

Chap.  XIV.  Of  the  Matter  and  Form  of  Exprefion.     88 

5e<9;ion  1,2,;.  Tbu  or  that  Expreffion  :  The  Danger 
of  miffing  in  tt.  What  the\Matter  of  it^  "whence  it  may  be 
taken. 

4.  What  Senfes  may  he  applfd  to^  and  with  what  kind  of 
Signs.  89 

y,  6.  The  Tfio^  ufual  vifihle  Signs  are  certain  Marks  or 
Lines,  which  are  adapted  to  the  parts  of  Articulate 
Sound  formed  hy  the  Organs  of  Speech.  90 

7,  8.  The  Advantages  of  Writing,  efpeciaSy  Printing,  en 
one  hand,  and  of  Speaking  on  the  other. 

9,  10,  II.  Some  Signs  refer  to  Things  -  Expreffons;  chief- 
ly to  Thots:  parts  of  Words,  as  juch  do  net  fgntfie,    pi 

12,  13,  14.  Signs  may  have  their  Sigmficancy,  jometimes 
from  their  own  Nature ;  or  -from  Injfitution  (as  in  the 
Sacraments,  and  Matters  of  Law)  \,  but  Words.,  chiefly 
from  Ufage  in  [uch  Cafes  and  Ctrcumfi ances.  A  ^uery 
about  {Not  Gmhy'].  91,92. 

Chap.  XVc  Ihe  Logical  Account  of  Words.  p; 

Sedion  I.  hefs  principal  Words  exprefs  only  fame  fmalltr 
Appendages  of  cur  Ideas :  as  fome  Particles,  and  what 
they  comnmily  call  Articles.^  as  a,  an,  the,  &c, 

2j  3.  Noun-fubltantiveSj  fi&«rSr^>;i/7caf;o«j  and  differing 
Sorts  r'Thefe  and  Pronoun-Subibntivcs  figmfie  alone  : 
■mojl  other  Words  muji  have  fomewbat  join'dwtth  them. 

Pare 


Ihc  Contents. 


Parti.  Chap.  XV.  .  Page 

Sc<aion4— 7.  Noun-Adjeaives  •,  Pronoun-Adjeaives 

find  Participles :    Some  Account  of  Number,  Cafe,  and 

Gender.  94 

8,  9.  Verbs  affirm,  what ;  of  whom,  or  vjhat ;  in  what 
Manner  \,  -with  what  Time  :  here  fomewhst  of  their  'va- 
riouf  Accidents  ^  of  Auxiliary  Verbs^  Gerunds  and  Su- 
ptnes.  ,        ^    94^95 

JO, — 14.  Adverbs,  Prepofition?,  Conjundions,  In- 
terjections. The  njoriety  of  the  Sorts  of  Words  jaws  a 
'vafi  numbtr  which  would  be  rec^utfite  if  there  wen  but 
three  Sorts. 

15,— 18.  Several  differing  ways.^  according  to  which 
Words  may  he  taken  tn  differing  Senfes.  96 

19,  20.  Some  words  are  in  themjehes  altogether  ambiguous, 
and  fome  Synonymous,  but  few  exailly  (0. 

21.  Words  may  be  Simple  or  Compound  ;  primitive  or  De- 
•  rivative :  hence  Conjugates  and  Varonymous  Words.    97 

22.  The  Senfe  of  Words  foEows  Ufage  more  than  Etimology, 
2^.  What  Syntax  ferves  to. 

24.  We  art  forced  to  take  Things,  as  we  can,  under  differ- 
ing Faces,  and  by  partial  Vtews. 
Chap.  XVI.    Preliminary  Pofitions,   or  Meafures  to  be 
agreed,   for  the  greater  part  hewtver,    before  we  enter 
upon  folemn  Difcourfe  with  any.  9-8- 

Sedion  I.  Single  Amotions  without  Principles  would  he  of 

little  or  no  Service. 
2,  3,  4.  We  have  a  Faculty  capable  of  dtjcerning  the  Agree- 
ment or  Difagreement  of  fome  Ideas  :    and  jo,     tho"  we 
trot  not  the  Fo/iticas  ready  form'd  into  the  World  with 
Hs,  yet  we  have  them  vtrtualiy  in  the  Power,    that  can 
form  them  upon  Occaf.on,  or  proceed  without  them.  Tet 
5,  6.  General  Pofitions,     that  are  certainly  right^    are  of 
n9  fmall  Value  and  Ufe  in  divers  Refpe^s.  P9 

7'  The  Marks  which  are  ft  to  each  P  eft  ion,  frve  for  the 
more  convenient  referring  to  any  of  them,  and  infer  ting 
others,  if  Occafion  be. 
8.  The  general  Dtjlributton  of  them  into  the  more  exttnftve 
and  more  limited  Fofuions.  The  former  are  cah^d  Pre- 
liminary, arid  may  be  refer' d  as  fdlcwi. 


The  Contents. 


Part  I.  Chap.  XVI.  Page, 

A  — E  We  mujt  have  Prweiples  to  proceed  upon  er  recur  to: 

99.  lOo. 

F  What  may  he  accounted  [uch.  G— K  Of  Identity  and  Di- 

<verfity, 
L,  M     Relatives.    N — T,    Attributes.    V,  What  is  to  he 

accounted  the  fame  Body.    W — 2,  True  or  Falfe.    lOl 
a,  b,  c,    Contradtciory  Tofitions.    d,  e.   Sufficient    Proof 

lOl,  102 

f,  ContradiBioM   Inferences,    g— 1,    Tr«f/&  <»w^  FalJhoeJ, 
m,  Con/ideration,   may  he  re^uird  as  to  what   u  felf" 
evident. 

"jO,  p,  Troof.    q,  r,  r  Confutation.  102,10} 

t — Ao,  Mathematical  Points  accomodated^  &C.  103,  104 

Ap,  Aq,  Attefiatton.  Ar — Be,   ^or<//.  Names.    Bf,  Bg, 

Denominations.  loy,  106 

Chap.  XVII.  Introdadory,  <«»^  Speculative,  Pofitiorfs', 

ic6,  &c. 

Bh,  Somewhat*  Bi,  Bk,    Exigence.    BI—Bf,  Somewhat 

tmcatts^d.,  &C.  10 5, 107 

Bt,  Bu,    0«r  Mak^r  -,  He  would  not  impofe  upon  us 

Points  of  Speculative  Knowledge.    B\A/--By,  Of  the 

Mind,  Imagination^  Senfes.  Vid.  Cb,Cc. 

Bz,  mt.    Ca,   Judgment.     Cd— Ck,   Spirits ;    GOD, 

&C.    CI— Co,   Matter.  107,  108 

Cp — Cu,   Our  Limits    and  Capacity.  ,108,109 

Cw — Gy,   Ji&c  fVorld,  and  Courfe  of  Nature.    Cz,  Da, 

God's  Interpofal. 

Db— D w,  Of  EffeEif  and  their  Caufes.      I  ©9, 1 1  o,  1 1 1 

Dy,    Whither  to    refer   Things.    Dy,  Dz,    0«r  Senftble 

Perceptions  and  apprehen/ions.    Ea*— Ed,  Poffibdtty  and 

Exifience. 

Ee — Eo,    Truth  in  general'.^    and  in  Special   Regards. 

iir,  112 
Ep— Er,    Pleafare,     Pain.    Ef—Eu,     Wijlnng^   WtHir^. 

Ill,  115 
Ew— E2  2.  of  our  kingli-arioujly  affeSled.  Natural Goi)^ 
and  Evil.  ,. 

Part 


The  Contenrs 


Part  1.  Chap.  XVIII.  Page 

Points  that  are  Moral,  and  more  MreSly  binding.  113,  &C. 
Fa,  Fb,  what  is  to  be  Cbofen,  or  Sbund.     Fc— Ft,    God 
u  to  be  pleat'd.  11  5,  II4 

Fg__Fl^   of  special^  and  Scriptural  Revelation 
Fm— Fr,   Our  Concern,  Management ^  Inclinations  and  A^ 

prehenftons. 
Ff__Fu,   Of  Confcttnce.    Fw,   Fx,    Duty  to  Man  is  al/o 
Duty  to  God.  115" 

Fy,   Of  Parents.     Fz~Gb,    Of  Magifirates.     Gc,   Of 

Scruples.^ 
Gd— Gf,  U^bat  may  be  or  is  morally  Good^  Bad^  or  Indif- 
ferent. 1 1  f ,  n  6 
Gg,  Gh,    Of  merely  Pefitive  Inflitutions  ;     and    abftlufe 

Power. 
Gi,  Gk,   Of  Charity  andjufitce. 
Gl~Go,  Of  Natural  and  floral  Free  Will :  Liberty :   The 

Vicious  not  Free. 

Gp— Gf,  What  only  tends  t»  Good  or  Evil  may  be  fo  calTd , 

and  may  entitle  or  [ubjcB  Men  to  what  is  conjequent 

thereon.  116,  117 

Gt — Gw,    How  God  may  accept  "what  is  not  perfeB.^    or 

firicfly  good. 
Gx — Gz,   Of  (peaking  True  or  Falfe. 
Ha — He,  Of  keeping  Promifes  ^    and  performing  Threat' 

nings. 
Hf — HI,  Of  Offending.^  Repent ing^  allowed  Stn^   and  late 
Repentance.  1 1  8 

Hm,  We  mufi  endeavour  to  get  Prudence^  and  to  ufe  it. 

Chap.  XIX.  Some  Points  and  Rules  o/Prudence.  i  j  9,&C. 

Hn — Hr,    The  general  Mature  ;    the  great  need  thereof; 

its  more  Special  Intendment ^  what  ts  truly  becoming  and 

mofi  advantagioas. 

Hi — Hu,  That  we  Jhould  well  examine  \     what,    when, 

and  bow. 
Hw~  Ic,  Of  convincing  and  perfwading  others.   ii%izO 
Id,  le,    Of  Hearing  and  fpeaking  about  difputable  Matters 
If,  Ig,   Mens  Attempts^    and  Regards  how  to  bt  dirtied 
and  govern  d, 

i,  Pate 


The  Contents. 


Part  I.  Chap.  XIX.  Page 

Ih — In,  Some  Meafuresy  whereby  to  Efiimate  Advanta- 
ges and  Difadv  ant  ages.  120,  12I 

lo— Iq,  Of  making  and  managing  Attempts. 

Ir — Iw,  Ofpurfmng  Advantages ;  and  fubmitting  to  In- 
conveniences. 

Chap.  XX.  Some  Mea  fur  es  ofVroh^\X\i^.  I22,  &C. 
Ix,  ly.  What  iti3\  thofcj  to  be  chiejiy  apply  d  to  Vra^ice, 
Iz — Kh,  When  vje  Jlwuld  not  take  up  with  Trobability : 

When  we  may  }  and  "when  "we  muft  dofo. 
Kc,  Kd,  Of  defending  en  Humane  Tefiimony.    Ke,  Ihe 

be/}  Hypothefis. 
Kfj  Kg,   The  Middle  way :     Moderation. 
Kh — K.n,  Of  Caufes  and  Ejfecls :  how  Men  are  like  to  aif^ 
and  Things  likely  to  go.  125 

Ko — Kq,  Of  General  Points 'j  Belief  and  A ffeB  ion:   Ve- 
racity. 
Kr,  Kl^    More  Means  and  Ways  for  a  Thing* s  coming  to 

pafsy  or  fewer  make  it  more  or  Icfs  probable. 
The  Vofiticns  that  are  here  offered  may  at  Uafi  afford  fome 
help  to  thofe  who  are  fearchtng  after  Truth.  i  24 

The  Second   PAB.T, 

Which  Treats  of  applying  our  Reafoi,  together 
with  the  Furniture  laid  in,  to  leveral  Ules  and 
Purpofes.  i2^^&c» 

Chap.  I.  Of  Juch  Conjiderations^  as  are  Exirinfecal  to  a 
Difceurje^  which  are  to  help  hs  rightly  to  take  what 
others  Deliver.  • 

Seftion  i,  2,  ;.  Two  Subfervient  Vfes  of  cur  Reafon,  re' 
lating  to  the  Exprfffion  of  other  AUns  Tho'ts^  and  of  our 
cwn. 
4.  Our  Attending  to  what  is  rightly  and  weU  deliver  dhy 
others  ts  one  con ftder able  way  to  Knowlet-ge :  Learners 
jhould  alfo  be  able  in  Jome  Meajitre  rightly  to  exi^refs 
tbemjilvu. 

c,6.  Tirei 


The  Contents. 


Part  II.  Chap.  I.  pjge 

Se(5lion  5",  6.    Tbne  may  he  Grammatical  Syntax^  whtre 

there  is  not.  Logical  Senfe  j  an  Injfance  thereof.    We  mufi 

firjt  learn  to  underfiahdaLanguage^before  Tvego  to  [peak 

it.  125",  116 

7.  That  "iife  may  rightly  under [t and  others^  7t/e  mujt  oh- 
ferve  fome  Things  that  are  extrinfecal  to  the  Difcourfe  it 
[elf:  as 

8,  p.  Who  Speaks  or  Writes :  (Somewhat  of  Divine  Re- 
velation ^  and  of  Dtjcourjes  that  are  merely  Humane) ; 

10.  Whether  he  delivers  his  own  or  another  s  Mind  j     127 

11,  12, 1 5.  How  far  Skilful  ana  Accurate  y  his  Opinion^ 
"Party  .^  and  other  Cir  cum  [lances. 

14,  1 5",  16.  We  fljduld  endeavour  to  have  the  Perjons  ewn 

Words ;    chu[tng  the  Original  rather  than  a  Tranflation ; 

getting  the   beft   Cofy  and  Edition  j    aljo   the   various 

Readings  of  Sacred  Writ y  &C.  127,  128 

17,  18.  We  mufi,  farther,  confider  the  Ftrfons  apply^d  io 

{of  what  fort .^  andinwhatdrcumflanees):    As  aljo 
19,  20,  21.  The  End  and  Furpofe,  which  ts  not  always 

what  may  be  profefid^   but  probably  governs  both   tb: 

Matter  and  Exprt£ion  :    Laj^ly, 
22,  23.  The  Time  and  Place,    with  what  belongs  thereto, 

129 
Chap.  II.  Of  what  is  Intrinfick  to  the  Difcourfe,  we  would 

under ff^ and.  129,  &c. 

Sedion  l.  tVe  (hould  be  beforehand  act^uainted  with  the 

Language. 
2,  3,  4.  Our  JSfative  Tongue  Jhould  be  more  t brolly  mafierd: 

Somewhat  of  the  Means,  Advantages,   and  NeceJJlty  of 

this.  129,  i;o 

5",  6.  Proverbial  and  Figurative  ways  of  fpeaking  are  to  be 

fiudyd.^    and  we  Jhould  before  acejuamt  our  /elves  with 

the  Arts  and  Sciences,    which  may  be  reftfd  to. 

7.  In  order  tofuch  Prerequijites,  moji  will  need  an  In/l'ricclor ; 
The  Character  ofjucb  an  one  as  were  to  be  defird :  kiow 
the  Want  of  one  may  be  m  fome  rheajure  jupplyd. 

8.  XVhat  Jort  of.  Books  we  Jlioald  have  ready  to  be  confulted 
upon  Occafion  5  how  to  jup^lf  that  want,  j^  i 

a  2  t'i.  t 


The  Contents. 


Part  11  Chap.  11.  Page 

Sedion  9,  i  o.  The  Argument  or  SubjeB  of  a  Difceurfe  is 
to  be  carefully  obfervd ;  we  fiiould  fir  ft  take  a  more  ge- 
neral and  curforj  view  of  the  whole,  or  of  fome  confide- 
rable  fart,  before  we  corjider  it  more  cloftly.      i  ^  r,  1 52 

I  J.  We  muft  carry  the  Argument  fitU  in  our  Mind  as  a 
F.ey^  or  Clue. 

I2j  I  5.  \Ve  mujt  not  run  to  a  lefs  common  Senfe^  nor  take 
up  what  u  abfurd  or  falfe,  without  good  Rea(on,  and  a 
kind  of  Keceffuy.  132,  135 

14,  15".  What  Courfe  to  betaken^  as  to  what af fears dubiom. 

16 J  17.  As  to  what  *f  deliver  d  univerfally^  or  on  the  By  J 
and  alfoj 

J  8j  19.  As  to  what  ii  hut  once  or  rarely  mention  d.  We 
are  likewife  fometimes  to  conjider  what  may  be  under- 
flood  to  complete  the  Senfe.  1  34 

20,  21,  22.  We  muft  undtrjtand  what  is  of  Divine  Ori- 
ginal, fo  as  it  fliall  be  conffient  with  it  felf 'y  and  even 
what  is  Humane  for  the  mojt  part.  How  feeming  Inconfi- 
fiencies  may  be  commonly  ncencil^d.  154,  135" 

2;.   Emblematical  Reprefentattons,  how  to  be  fearch'd  cut. 

24,  2^.  IVhat  Courfe  may  be  taken  as  to  Cryp'ual  and  Se- 
cret ways  of  Writing.  1 3  j,  135 

Chap.  III.  Juftly  to  exprefs  what  we  our  felves  In- 
tend. i;5,  &c, 

St<5tion  I — 4.  The  need  of  fome  Direction  here :  what  is 
to  be  defgnd  and  endeavoured  for  that  purpofe.  136,  i  37 

J.  Tf'hat  u  to  be  done  as  to  Hifibrical  Reprefentatiins^ 
Emblem  and  Cryptography. 

6.  Exercife,  the  great  Means  toget  a  juft  way  of  Speak- 
ing, and  to  improve  therein. 

7.  IVe  jhcnld  endeavour  to  be  Mafters  of  the  Language  we 
would  Ufe. 

8.  Ji^e  mu/t  be  very  Converfant  with  fuch  as  write  and 
fpeak  properly.  138 

9.  10,  II.  H'e  are  to  fee  that  our  Exprfjfions  are  both  ca- 
pable of  and  limited  to  the  Senfe  we  dtfign  :  how  tbej 
mi^y  be  fx^d^  and  open  d. 

Part 


The  Contents. 


Part  II.  Ghap.  llf.  Page 

ScAion  12.  fVe  Jhould  take  heed  of  adding  "what  might 
raife  any  Mifapprebenfian.  i ;  9 

1 1 — 1 5".  Great  Care  is  to  be  taken  as  to  the  Ufe  of  Par- 
ticles, and  Relatives. 

i6f  17.  We  fhould  ufe  to  rvrite  down  our  Tho'ts  on  -what 
is  nice  and  difficult ;  and  to  re'view  tbem  :  alfo  to  try, 
how  we  are  underfiood  by  Perfons  rigbtljf  chofen  for  our 
purpofe.  139,  140 

18.  The  mentioned  Exercifes  of  out  Reafon  may  prepare  tt 
for  the  foUowingUf es,  IV herein  it  u  farther  to  be  dtreBed 
and  affifled. 

Chap.  IV.  Of  making  Enquiries,  particularly  about  Signs 
and  ExpreJJions.  140,  &c. 

Se(ftion  I.  Some  farther  Help  to  be given^  that  we  may 
rightlj  make  and  ptirfue  Enquiries. 

2f  %.  Logic  is  to  fuggefi  proper  Quefltons^  as  alfo  to  give 
us  Aim  what  kind  of  Anfwers  to  look  for,  and  how  to 
feek  them.  How  the  Summary  of  Tho^ts  and  Things 
may  here  be  cf  Ufe.  » 41 

4 — 8.  An  hfiance  with  relation  to  Rome;  fome  dtfimtl: 
Sets  of  Enquiries  are  here  to  be  given,  141,  142 

$  — 18.  A  Set  of  Enquiries  about  Signs— -^ — 142,  14^ 

Chap.  V.  Sets  of  Enifuiry  about  things  themfelves.'-'^  44,&c. 

Scdion  r,  2.  As  to  the  more  general  Nature  and  Condi- 
tion of  the  Thing  : 

3 — 6.  As  to  what  is  not  exifiing  but  poflible:  As  to 
what  exids.  144,  145' 

7,  8.  As  to  a  ColleAion  of  di/linB  and  feparate  Things. 

9— II.  As  to  fome  general  Charaders  belonging  to  the 
Effence  of  thu  or  that.  145",  1 46 

12 — If.  As  to  the  Common  Nature  of  what  we  ar'e  con- 
fidermg.  146,  147 

1 6— 1 8.  As  to  its  peculiar  and  di^inguiflsing  Nature 

Chap.  VI.  Farther  Sets  cf  Encjuirys,  with  DireHions  bow 
to  purfue  thefe  and  the  refi.  148,  &C. 

Sedion  i,  2.  As  to  Adive Powers,  whether  loco-mottve^ 
er  apprehen/ive, 

a  3  Part 


The  Contents. 


Part  II.  Chap.  VI.  Page 

5e<aion  ;,  4,  5-.  As  to  Paflive  Capacity,   Properties, 

and  Habits.  148, 149 

$,  7.  Ai  tq  other  internals  4^cideix^^;  anA'.alj^l^xs^ 

Particles,  W  Texture.  >v.r.'t,' .  ;  W-     .'av/ 

8.  As  to  Privations,  Neg^ions,  and  extrtpkca!  Beno- 
mina  ions.  149.  ijo 

9.  As  to  Rebtive  Confjdsrations,  and  who:,  is  AtJjoin- 
ing,  or  otberways  Appertfiining. 

10  — 14.  5(3»5e  peculiar  Enquiries  as  to  "what  is  reported 
by  others,  «  v  ?•  ^S"^*  '5' 

15".  The  joUowing   General  Heads  imply  fo  wanji  Special 

■    Enquirp,  which  are  to  be  more  fuUj  purfu'd. 

z6-—i8.  Soma  gencr^d  Qirefiions  tn  order  tqfhe  ^aifing^, 
Follo-wiKg^  dind  Refohing  of  Enquiries,  1 5 1 ,  i  J  2 

cJiap.  VII.  What  we  may,  look  on  at^  contro-dicltous  in  it 
[elf,  orfucb  a  fitrt  of  A^ttcr ,  as  we  are  incapable  fff,  or. 
unconcern  d  with.  ^\\.'^.^^  .        ij2,&:c. 

Sedion  J.  Our  Reafon.ough  Ti%ht\y[  to  difcern,  whe- 
ther that  which  lies  b'etore  us  be  a  Mitta  proper  for 
us  to  piocted  upon  v  or  how  ^ar  it  may  be  (b.  We 
ought  certamly  io  ab^ain^  or  defi^  from  funne  furfuits. 

2— '4.    ^^;  are  to  fee    v^hetber  the  Matter  be  not  Abfurd^ 
and  Coniradi^ioui  :   J^hat  u  fo  j  bmf  tv  mfke  the  Dif- 
covery:  ^  lyj 

f,  6,  7.  Ife  li'iufl  farther  obferve,  whether  it  appear  not^ 
that  we  are  Incapable  of  this  or  that,  or  unconcerrid  with 
It:  when  this  latter  may  be  concluded.  IJ4 

8,  9,  U'e  are  abfolutely  incapable  of  fome  Things,  and  ac- 
cidentally of  others  j  and  we  are  thereupon  Jo  far  uncon- 
cern d  with  them,    if  our  Incapacity  be  not  our  Fault. 

10—12.  Mankind  is  naturally  incapable  of  comprehending 

what  is  Inhnice  and  of  dijcerning  the  inward  Atflions 

of  free  Agents  :    Alfo 

I  ;.■  0/  Reajcmng  out  what  is  purely  Contingent.        156 

24.  G/  knowing  Things  where  we  bave  no  Faculty 

^  fluted  to  I  him. 

Psrf 


X^e  Contents. 

p^rt  II.  ctTap.  vrr       =^—  ~  p^ 

Sciftion  1 5",  1 6.  Of  penetrating  into  the  very  Subftance 
of  Things i  or  into  their  j^r^  Elements,  i  j  6 

17,  18.  Of  explaining  our  Senfible  Percsptions,  or  prov- 
ing 'what  is  already  Self-evidenf.,  ^^  ,„^  1 57 

Chap.  VIII.  if  hat  we  may  he  capable  of  with  reference  to 
the  mentioned  ObjeBs.,.   .  1  f  7j  &C. 

Sed:jon  i,  2,  3.  We^rnay  and  ftould  acqat^int  our  fehej 
with  God^  but  at  the  Jar^if  time  Jetting,  Bounds  to  our 
En<juiries  andRejol'ves.  15-7,1^8 

4i  S"'  '^^  V^^y  ^"^M'  fomewhati  ^^^  conjeBure  more  as  tq 
the  inward  ABingi  of  free  Agents^  together  with  their 
Motives  and  Ends.  ,  ,  , 

^,7.  We  may  en<]uire  of  Coniingencp,  0dgnefs  at  them, 
M  we  can.  .     .    ,    ■  ^         ^•  IJ9 

8,  9.  We  may  examine^ahdyuSge  of  extraordinary  Noti- 
ceSf  as  to  thofe  Things _  that  fall  not  under  ordinary  Ob- 
fervatioh. 

10,  II.  Much  way  be  known  with  j^lation  to  Suhfiance, 

^  tho  it  remain  unknown.-  " 

12,  15.  We  may  make  Entjuiries  and  ConjeBures  about  the 
fir[t  Elements  and  fmaUe(i  Farttcles  of  Bodys^  and  their 
Texture.  160 

14,  i^t  We  may  know  fomewhat  with  reference  to  our 
fenfible Perceptions:  We  may  examine  them,  and contrfve 
how  to  excite  the  like^  &c. 

16.  We  may  farther  'view  what  appears  intuitively  Cer- 
tain, 6cc.  161 

l"].  We  mu(i  examine  the  Marias  of  what  is  offer  d^  as 
from  God -J  and  are  carefully  to  fearcb  out  the  Senfe  and 
Meaning  of  what  is  really  jo. 

Chap.  IX.  T'he  grand  Meafure  of  Importance  fixd  and 
opend.  161,  8CC. 

Seftion  I.  We  are  rightly  to  adign  what  place  this  or 
that  ought  to  have  in  our  Attendance,  and  what 
Proportion  of  it. 


a  4 


Part 


The  Contents, 

Parcll.  Chap.  IX.  ~  pl^e 

Se(ftion  2,  5.    It  muft  therefore  be  en^uird^    -what  is  my 

Concernment  in  this  or  that^  and  "what  my  Capacity  for 

it}  The  Method  of  this  general  Head.  162 

4.  We  muft  have  a  jufi  Meafure  of  Importance :  Whence 
it  is  to  be  taken. 

5",  6.  There  is  fome-ivhat  of  a  Confcience  in  Man:    and 

Atbiefis  cant  be  jure  there  u  no  God.  i  (53 

7,8.   No  rational  or  holding  Satisfaclion^  but  in  our  being 

accepted  with  God,    and  approvd  of  our  otvn  Mtnds. 

16;,  1(5^ 
9,  10.  This  is  to  be  firmly  believed,    embracd,    and  re^ 

garded,  Sec. 
I  r.  God  if  net  properly  plea/d  or  difpleas'd  with  us,    but 

on  Moral  Accounts.  165 

12.  Some  Things  of  that  kind  may  be  e^uaUy  pleafing.^    or 

alike  dijpUaftng  to  Ged: 
1 ;.  Some  may  be  fo  taken y    where  we  cannot  eajily  difcern 

other-wife. 
14.  Wc  mujl  foUow  the  be^  Light  we  have,    or  can  well 

attain.  166 

1 5".  What  is  defeSlively  good  will  be  accepted  of  God ^  where 

it  anfwers  what  be  abfolutely  ivjijls  on :    But 
16.  No  other  AcctJJionj  or  Alteration  can  make  up  the  want 

of  that. 

Chap.  X.  Remarks  for  the  better  applying  of  the  Meafure 
before  given.  I  (f  5 ,  &C. 

Scdion  I.  Prefent  Opportunity  and  Occafion  for  what  is 
Lawful  andUfeful,  not  wterfenrg  with  what  ts  plainly 
priferahle^  efpecidlly  when  the  Thing  it  felf  is  fo  in  fome 
reived,  be/peaks  our  prejent  Application  to  it. 

1.  What  u  to  be  done  where  the  Determination  is  of  Ivu 
portance,  but  very  dffficult.  167 

5.  Woere  one  Side  of  the  Que  ft  ion  is  Dangerous  ^  the  other 
Safe  j  fhtf  ts  to  be  taken. 

4.  ALre-  Scruples  a^ain/i  folid  Argument  are  to  be  difre' 
ffjru  J  if  thcj  cannot  he  remcvd..  j68 


Pjrc 


The  Contents. 


Part  II.  Chap.X.      ^  ^  Page 

Seiftion  5" — 8.  How  God  is  to  he  fleas' d  muft  befi  appear 
from  h:s  own  Word  :  Sometpbat  of  ivhich  ts  here  hrtefiy 
offered.  16%,  169 

9 — ly.  TTje  more  general  Gradation  of  Importance  feems^ 
upon  the  whole,  to  Us  thus,  That  our  Chofen  State  be  not 
fuch  as  would  he  dijplea(ing  to  God^  hut  that  it  he  well 
pka/ivg,  hoth  in  refpeB  of  cur  Minds  and  of  our  Bodies  5 
and  then  that  our  Actions  be  not  provoking^  but  fuch  as 
he  approves y  or  at  leaji  allows.  1 70,  171 

Chap.  Xf.  Somewhat  farther  about  the  various  ImpoT' 
tance  of  our  ABions^  and  the  certainty  of  that  ImpoV' 
tance ;  as  alfo  our  greater  or  lefs  Capacity^  together  with 
the  ProfpeB  of  its  Advance,  or  Continuance.      171,  &c. 

Se(5tion  l,  2,  3.  A  more  particular  Gradation  of  Anient 
according  to  their  differing  Importance.  ^7'j  172 

4 — 6.  The  Gradation  of  Evil  A^ions^  and  of  thofe  that 
are  Good.  ^7^»  ^7% 

7.  We  mujt  in  fome  Cafes  reckon  the  Importance  fomt- 
what  differently  frofh  the  Order  here  ftt  down. 

8 — 12.  The  Importance  may  he  Selfevidenty  probable^ 
doubtful,  or  only  poffible^  and  thus  'tis  gradually  leJfen*J» 

173, 174 

13,  14.  How  our  greater  or  lefs  Capacity  direSIs  our  ap- 
plication, with  reference  to  what  u  more  or  lefs  Necefja- 

15 — 18.  How  the  ProfpeB  of  tbut  Capacity  advancing  or 
continuing  may  dtreU  our  Attendance  to  this  or  that. 
What  Combination  of  all  tbofe  Points  requires  an  earlier 
and  fuller  Application. 

19.  Many  other  Combinations  might  he  made  as  an  Exer* 
ctfe  of  Thot  and  Judgment-^  but  could  fcarce  be  made 
Vraiiically  ufeful.  176 

20.  Some  few  general  InftruBions,  which  may  be  of  more 
ready  and  continual  Ufe^  if  duly  regarded. 


Part 


"    " '  ~~    "     The  (jQiyeaq.    '         ~ 

Part  If.  Page 

Cbgp.  XII.  4h(>tit our mortSimfle  A,pprehmftom  ofThittgs: 
^.  A  Kiil^^^f  j}(idgMent  fetich  arid  explain  d..  i  jy^  &,c. 
Spiftion  I.  According  to  ivhat  has  appear  d  upon  the  fore' 
\^oing  Gmeral  Heads^  v^eJh.oi{i^.,^ndeavoi4r  TjtfUb  prop^r-^ 
^^^jionabJ^.Garfr  rightly  ^q  eOiqiafe  the  Apgrehenfioni 
y/^cf  Tb^Jngs,  as  they  ars  iuigly  taken.  Whai  thofeare: 
2i  3>4'  -Kpi^  they  are  form  A :  noj;  alwap  uncompounded, 
\  hut  mihout  Affirmation  cf  f^e^y.,  ^tbe^>^eja  be  of 

fome  dt^cring  Idea.  -^    ,  ...      . 

^i '6.  There  maybe  for»€what  virtually  affirm' d  in  our 
fingle  AppKehen/ions^  which  miglx  be  drawn  out  into  ex- 
prefs  Fff jettons  :  an  Injiance  giv*n.  ^7^ 

7.  What  u  to  be  more  particularly  enquird  about.  Jingle 
ideas :     '  .    . .   ,.  ..:•.■  V  '7^ 

^^  9.  The  Object  tifereof  if  .^i^h^  li^hat  we  our  fdves  dejign, 
^  or  fupftofe  to  be  intended  by\  others.  I79 

^p,  II,  12.  i^sto  the  manner  of  the  Ideas  agreeing.  What 
'■we   piuft_,    or  may,    take    for   right.     Of  what^   by 
whatf  and  according  to  w^at',we  mufi  judge. 
13,  14.  Weare  to.  judge  of  tk^iifgf.  or  of  Jbpt  j  '  either 
^dtreB^  orx^xi  ...i.;  Uv    ■;  v  A  -'  180 

ij- — 18.'  We  are  to  judge  ^j(  Bjiflex  Thinkings  and  ac- 
cording to  Cenfciom  Knowledge^  and  other  well  ajfured 
ApprehmfiQns.  ■\^. -v-  \  180,181 

Chap.  Xlil.  When,  and' how  far.^  fmgU  Apprehenjions 
way  hf  accounted  Right:  181,  8CC. 

Section  i,  2.  They  be  abfoluteli^  or  relatively  fo.   ■■■ 
5,4,  5",  6.  W^at  we  may  or  mufi,  proceed  upon  as  certain- 
ly.^ probably t  or  doubtfully  right :  What  U  ad^ej^Atelyy  or 
inadequately  fo.  182 

7)  ^>  9-  ^^bat  u  fundamentally  and  virtually^  what  for' 
mally  andexplipitely  Ad£eiuate.  ,18^ 

|0j  1 1.  Of  clear  and  difiincJ^    dark  and  confused  Ideas, 

183, 184 

12 — 14.    What  is  Ejfentially   or  t:^tra-eJf[tnti.^Uy  Right  ^ 

neceffarily  or  accidentally  fo  :  What  the  EjJ'ence  of  Things » 

ic.    The  ftated  or  defigned  Effence  ts  commonly  the  Stan- 

dardof  what  is  to  be  accounted Effential^  Extraeffential^ 

S:c:  but,  18  £ 

Pare 


The  Contents. 

Past  II.  ChapXIII.  ~~       "  Pig*? 

Sedioa  i6.  The  I^iffic^lty  is  to-  fi^e^    or.  de^n  if^  as  ^ 

Qught  to  he,  185 

1 7.  S.Qnia  Ideas  rnay,  he  right  enough  for  the  prefentOccafi- 

m^  See.  J 86 

Chap.  XIV.  HoKf  Signs  in  general  may  he  right.  I)ireBi- 
ont  {or  the  forming  of  right  Ideas.     •■'\^-.         l86^8^o> 
S?<^ion  I .  Signs  are  either  to  reprefent  or  enlj^  to  0j^t& 
"  Things  to  the  Mind  :■  '     /■'       '-t     i^i^yf'^^, 

2,  %.  py  hat  fort  of  Ideas  tsjay  he  dccottnteAto  refrefent  their 
OhjeSIs ;    JVhat,   to  give  only  /owe  Intimation  of  thini, 

4v.f*  5/]g^».j  may.  he  Trimary  or  Secondary  ;  and  mpre  or 
lefs  remote.  '  '  ' 

^rrr^.;  When  Chara^ers^  common  JVritingy  Speaking. 
Th^nking^  or  Sigri^  in^gen^rM  -^r^  to _^i  accounted  nght 
andjufi.  "■■'..    '"'"      ,1''      'V-'\'     187,188 

^o,,i  I.  Better,  to  fecure  right  Ideas  7ve  mufi  endea^voftr  ta 
free  and  furnijh  our  ^ndsi,a^al/o{  ^'^  H  ^1  '^f 
Organs  of  Sen  fatten .     y  ,      "  '  '..' 

12.  We pould  examine  Quy  Ideas,  if  it  may  he ^  hyTaxts. 

I } — 1 6.  Several  other  InfiruEi  ions  for  the  fame  Purpo/ei   . 

Chap.  XV.  Of  Complex  Themes  er  Proportions.  W^at 
Sorts  of  Things  may  he  affirrnd^    in   ten  Partictslai;s^ 

189,  &C. 

Sedlion  I,  2.  We  fheuld  take  care  rightly  to  judge  and 
pronounce  of  Things  in  Affirming  or  Denying. 
Somewhat  to  be  remarked  as  to  the  ivay  ofexprejfing  this 
or  that  Senfe.  189,190 

5,4,  5".  Of  the  Suhj'eB  and  Predicate.  What  is  reqttir'd 
fo  tf  true  Negative  Fropofition  :  What  Juffices  to  a  true 
Affirmative. 

6,  7,  8.  What  is  affirm'd  muft  he  the  fame  Thing.^  but  utt' 
der  a  differing  Conjideratton :  Differing  ConJiderationSg 
tbo*  of  the  fame  Thtngy  cannot  he  offirmdof  each  other. 

i9t 

Part 


The  Contents. 

Part  II.  Chap.  XV.  ~~  p^ 

Sedion  p— -12.    ATredicabk.     The  Di'vifions  and  Suh- 

div'tfions  of  what  may  be  affirm  d.  191,  192 

13  —  21.  Ten  Sorts  of  Attributes,  which  may  be  affirmed 

of  moft  kind  of  Subje^s  :     Infianca  given   throughout 

mth  reference  to  the  Sun.  ip2 — 1^4 

Chap.  XVL  Of  the  common  Nature,  andfome  of  the  dif-; 

feting  Sorts,  of  Tropofttiom.  I94,&C. 

Sedion  i.  TVe  Jhould  rightly  judge  both  of  Tr  of  oft  ions 

themfehes^  and  of  the  Subjtft  in  and  by  them: 
2,  3,4.  What  we  put  together  in  them :    Their  Matter  and 

Form  :  An  ObjeBtve,  and  a  Formal  Vropofition.     19 j 
5.  The  Major  and  Minor  Terms  ^  not  always  reaSy  fucb, 

^7,  8.  The  Import  of  Denying  or   Affirming.     Things 
"."  €an?t  be  faid  to  he,  what  they  may  be  truly  jaid  to  have. 

Of  placing  the  Negative  Particle.  '^ 

9,  10.  Of  affirming  or  denying  the  SubjeB's  Exijlenee,  19*7 
II,  12.  Principal,  and  Incidental  Propojttions :    ihcfe  dont 

commonly  affirm  or  deny  any  thing,    but  may  femetimes 

intimate  an  affirmation  or  denial :  they  either  explain,  or 

limir. 

13.  Some  Enunciations  are  lefs  Plain  and  Obvious  in  refpeSf 
of  the  placing  and  the  way  of  Affirming  or  Denying  ; 
Here,  ip8 

14,  15.  The  SubjeB  is  to  be  carefully  determined '^  7 be 
fafi  and  future  Time  is  to  be  reducd  to  the  prefent,  as  u 
exemplify^  d: 

16—18.  Other  Moods  are  to  he  reducdte  the  Indicative  » 

Interrogations  are  te  he  turnd^    as  is  aljo  (hewn ;    and 

.  what  u  Ambiguoujl^  delivered  it  to  be  difiinguifj'd,  and, 

'  if  it  may  be,  fix' d.  199 

ip.  Complex  Enunciations  are  to  be  drarvn  out  into  what 

they  contain,  2  00 

Ghap.  XVII.  In  order  to  judge  rightly  of  the  Subject  in 
and  by  Propofitiens^  fomewhat  is  offer  d  as  to  their  ilua- 
Uty  and  Quantity.  2  00,  &:c. 

5e«5lion  t.  Some  ^uefiions  to  be  put  about  what  is  pro- 
-  f;-':»c'(I.  Pdtt 


The  Contents. 


Part  II.  Chap.  XVII.  Page 

Se<^ion  2.  What  help  has  been  already  given  towards  the 
frefent  Pttrpofe.  20 1 

5  —  6.  Somewhat  fartSer  about  right  Affirming  and  De- 
nying. 201,202 

"7,  8.  The  Quality  and  Quantity  of  Vropofitions :  Thu 
really  belongs  alfo  to  the  Predicate ;  hut  is  commonly  tin- 
derfiood  only  of  the  Subje^. 

9—12.  When  we  rightly  pronounce  UniverfaHy^  Tarticu- 
larly,   Indefinitely ,  or  Totally.  203 

|-— .ip.  Truth  or  Falfljood  may  fometimes  better  appear  by 
ebferving  and  comparing  the  Farts  of  a  Contradi^ion : 
How  an  Univerfal^  &c.  may  be  contradi^ed  in  order  to 
judge  of  the  Truth.  204,  26  j 

Chap.  XVIII.  of  Modal  VropoftionSj  with  feveral  other 

Sorts ;  and  when  they  are  to  be  accounted  right.  206,&c. 
Section  i,  2,  3.    What  is  a  Modal  Propojttion:    The 

Modes  ufually  obfer'vd\  and  others  that  might  be  added, 
4.  The  Di<^um  and  the  Modus :   When  fucb  a  Proportion 

is  true :  207 

5",  6.  How  "'tis  contradttUd :    A  Scheme  of  Modal  PropO' 

fitions,  that  are  Synonymous,  Subalternate^  Contradiilo'^ 

ry,  Contrary^  and  Subcontrarious. 
7.  Somewhat  in  particular  of  Subalternate  and  Sub  contra- 

riom  Propofttons.  208 

8;  9.  Copulative  Propojitions.     What  they  are ;  when  true  ; 

what  is  contradi^ioMs  to  them^  and  what  fully  contrary, 
10  — 17.  Of  Propojitions  that  are  T>isj unlive.,  Conditional^ 

Caufaly  Difcrettve,  Exclujive,   Exceptive,    KefiriUive^ 

or  which  import  Beginnings  or  Ending  j  what  they  are^ 

when  right fS)Cc.  208— 2 1« 

Chap.  XIX.  Some  farther  Obfervationi  as  to  what  maj^ 
or  may  not,  be  rightly  pronouncd:  and  alfo  of  DijUnSli' 
ons,  Divijionsy  Defimttons  and  Defcriptions.       2 10,  &C. 

Sec^lion  i.  SwgU  Apprehenfons,  the  Foundation  of  our 
fujhmenti. 


Vm 


The  Contents. 


Part  11.  Chap.  XIX.  Page 

JeiSiibn  2.  How  tBe  fame  thing  may,  in  fome  {ort^  bejatd 

of  the  fame.  ^±11 

5.  4,  5".  Of -what  is  contradiciious  \  or  feemingly  fo. 

6.  Of  Confiderations  and  Thivgs  formally  differing.  ^ 

7.  The  Concrete  may  be  affirm'' d  ofthft  to  which  the  Ab; 
firaci  belongs.  212 

8j  9.  What  may  be  affrm^d,  as  Effential 'y  or  as  fome  way 

Neceffary. 
10.  Logical,  Phyfical.^  and  Moral  Neceffity.  J*'l 

I  i.  If' hat  in  any  Senfe  agrees  or  difagrees^  may  be  accora* 

ingly  Vredicated. 
i'2/15.  Rightly  to  Difiinguijlr.^  or  to  Divide, 
i^- — 18.  Rightly  to  Define  Logically^  or  in  a  more  Natural 

way:   Aggregates  J  6cc.  may  be  defind.  .214 

19.  Rightly  to  defcribe  j    by  what  kind  of  Attributes,  &c, 

20.  l^hat  is  truly  faid  may  be  truly  inverted  y   how^  and 
why. 

21.  What  is  not  true  may  yet  be  rightly  faid  in  fome  men'" 
fjioned  Cnfes :    What  u  fitly  faid. 

22.  ObjeBive  and SubjeUive  Certainty         -^  zi6 

Chap.  XX.  Of  what  is  fufficiently  Evident  without  Proof 

2i6,&c. 
S^i^ion  I.  That  we  may  better  determine  of  other  Things, 

we  ought  rightly  to  apprehend  and  admit  what  is 

fufficiently  Evidenr. 
2.  What  is  to  be  taken  for  Self-evident. 
3i.4»  *Tis  here  prefuppos'd,  that  the  Terms  be  competently 
*  ,  itnderflood.  2 1 7 

y.'  What  uto  bedone.^  where  fuch  Evidence  is  notfeen. 
^»  It  S«    ^^  ^^i^  ^^f  admit  for  Self-evident  unexamined 
'    Senfations^  unfuf peeled  Imaginations,   or  unweigB'd  Pre- 

fumptions:     Ttt,  2 '8 

9.  We  are  not  formaUy  to  doubt  of  every  Thing :   butf 


.*■< 


The  Contents. 


Part  II.  Chap.  XX.  Page 

Se(2:ion  lo,  1 1.  tVe muft  allow  fomt  Things  not  to  need,  or 

admit  of.    Proof:    Where  this  is  to  be  done  j    and  more 

particularly  y  219 

12—14.  Confiious  Knowledge,  undoubted  Principles,  and 
undeniable  Conjequences :  219,229 

1 5",  16.  Elfe  we  fljould  vainly  weary  our  [elves  and  others , 
without  any  pojjibility  of  Satisfaiiion  :  And 

i7j  18.  We  Ihouldeljertnder  aU  our  ABions  unaccountahh 
and grojly  refieU  upon  our  Make,  and  Maker.  221 

19,  20.  Be/ides  the  Pofttions,  which  arefufficently  evident 
in  themjelves  or  by  t)edu8ion  j  many  more  will  he  found 
fufficiently  Evident  in  the  comparative  way^  'which  yit 
we  fnuji  not  therefore  conclude  to  be  infaUtbly  fo. 

21.  No  Pra^tcal  Scepticks  in  Secular  affairs. 222 

Ch^^p.  XXl.  What  danger  of  MiOake  ia  this  or  that 
Cafe,  and  ot  what  Importance  a  Miftake  would  be  : 

222,  6cc. 

Section  l,  2.  To  thofe  we  muft  attend^   yet  reckoning  it 

properly  a  Danger  ;  only  where  the  flatter  is  of  Moment y 

and  where  is  Caufe  of  Sufptcion.  .   \ 

5.  Moral  Certainty  fliould  be  fufficient  to  quiet  our  Minas» 

22^ 

4.  There  is  real  Danger  of  Miftake  in  determining  of  what 

ist9  us  unfearchable : 
J,  6.  Where  we  want  the  Pre-requifies :  In  Cafei  of  rnani- 

fejt  Difficulty  : 
7,  8.  In  Defcribmg,  efpeaally  in  Defining  :    Under  Indifpo- 
fition :  224 

9.  In  Matter  of  doubtful  Report:    Mere  common  Opinion., 

or  Singular  Sentiments  : 
xo,  II.  In  unexamined  /ipprebenfions :  In  following  Edu" 

cation  : 
12,13.  In  what  falls  in  with  inclination,  ^ffettion,   &C  : 
as  alfo  where  there  appears  no  over-  BaUatw,    t>r  very  lit  • 
;;e',  225- 

H^f?'  Ho**'  io  meafure  the  Importance  of  a  Mifiakai 
fv'.rd  Cajes  and  Re/pdis,  in  7/  hich  ft  mufi  be  greater 
than  :n  vth-n.  2."    226 


The  Contents. 

The  Third  PART  ' 

Page 
Treating  of  fome  more  Special  Ufesof  our  Realbn, 
which  come  nearer  to  Common  Service,       227,  Sec- 
Chap.!.  Proof  in  general  iUujirated:    The  Froof  of  a  Con- 

fiejuence. 
Sedion  I.  M^e  are  rightly  to  eftimate  Proof,    and  to 

alTent  accordingly,  fo  Far,  as  the  Proof  will  warrant 

and  juftifie  :     bow  'tis  to  he  eftimated. 
2.  When  there  is  Occafionfor  Proof. 
3—9.  An  Jllufiration  of  this  Matter  carrfd  on  in  divers 

particulars .  227 — 2  3 1 

10,  II.  Confequences   are  to  he  provd  by  an  Enunciation 

fairly  imply  d 'j  and  jhould  be  made  out  at  once.  231,2^2 
12 — 14.  What    is   under [iood  in   this  way  of  Arguing: 

When  it  lies  too  open. 
15* — 18.  Proof  by  contratHng  both  Enunciations  into  one: 

"The  Negation  of  a  Conjequence  •,    and  the  Confequence 

tf  a  Negation :  8cc.  255 

Chap.  II.  The  more  Simple  Conditional  or  Relative  way 
of  proving.  2^4 

Se^ion  I,  2.  Another  Enunciation  plac'^d  together  with  the 
whole  Quefiion. 

3,4,5".  Somewhat  u  fr/i- fupposd,  and  then  aver  d.    255" 

^.  How  the  Argument  wtU  not  hold,   but  in  Juch  a  Cafe. 

7,8.  Tie  Reafon  of  it  open  d,  and  tllujhated.  2^6 

9— II.  A  Caution  about  this  way  of  Arguing.,  which  ^ 
not  ordinarily  to  be  chofen:  the  Relative  and  Hypothetical 
vpay  much  alike.  257 

12 — 14.  Of  changing  it  to  what  is  Abfolute,       238,2;*^ 

Chap.  III.  Of  an  lndu£iion^  oft  given  in  an  Enthymeme  : 
A  Dilemma,  &c.  25^,  &c. 

Se<5tion  i — 4.  What  an  InduStion  is  ;  how  it  holds  \  ^tis 
commonly  deliver  d  in  an  Enthymeme.  25^',  240     . 

5,  6.  How  a  Difiribution  is  to  be  made  j  and  how  to  reafon 
upon  it.  24 1 

Pare 


The  Contents. 

Part  III.  Chap.  III.  .  Page 

Seftion  7,  8,  9.  Of  a  Dikmnta  ;  -when  it  i^elds  ^  to  what 

it  ferves.  241,242 

lo— ij.  A  Dispin^ive  Argument-^    how  it  holds,  &c. 

242 — 244 

Chap.  IV.  Of  a  Sorites  ^  and  of  a/impte  Categorical  Ar- 
gument. 244,  &c. 

Sed:ion  r,  2.  What  a  Sorites  is  ;  how  it  holds. 

3,  4,  5",  6.  An  Inftance  from  Rom.  8.  2p,  50  5  The  Re' 
folving  of  it  into  fimple  SjUogifms  :  fome  Account  of 
ibeje.  •>  :    .     245- 

y,  8.  The  Middle  Term  a  kind  of  Meafure ,  Its  placing 
makes  the  Figure.  246 

9— II*  Of  placing  it  in  the  Middle  ^^  what  there  is  for 
and  againjl  it.  ^  .246,  247 

12—14,    An  Epichirema.     Of  tra?ifpofmg  t^e  Fnmifes, 

247,248. 

Chap.  V.  The  Modes  :  the  Grounds  aviTleafcn  of  them. 

248,  &c. 
Se<5lion  i,  2,  3.    The  Quality  and  Quant itj  of  the  three 

Enunciations :     How.  ike  Fredt^att.m.tbem  is  fuppos'-^ 

to  be  tak^n.  .      ■'...• 

4.  7 he  ufual  Mcmorative  Terms  for  the  Modes  refer  d  to 

their  Figures.  •    '  2^9 

5".  Rules  implfd  in  thofe  Technical  Words. 
6.  7.  XJpon  what  Suppojition  it  is^    that  there  can  he  only 

thofe  Modes  :    there  may  he  others  in  fome  Cafes  ( Vid.  § 

»rJ  250 

8 — 15.  The  Foundations  of  the  Rules  ahout  Modes  and  Fi- 
gures. 250—252 

i  6.  What  is  necejfary  to  make  the  Form  of  a  SyHogtfm 
right,  briefly  Jhewn. 

Chap.  VI.    Some  brief  Summary  Rules  for  judging  of  a 

,    Categorical  SyUogijm.  2^2,  &C. 

Sedion  1,2.  What  Number  of  Modes  might  pojfihly  be^ 

and  how,  redacd,  252,25'? 

fe  Pare 


The  Contents. 


Part  III.  Chap.  VI.  Page 

Sej^ion  3.  One  general  Ruk  ahoHtSyUogifw  si 
4,  5",  6,    Another  :     Of  Identification   and  Suhfiittition. 

25-;,  2f4 
7,  8,  p.  The  farther  opening  and  applying  of  the  latter  Rule. 
10.  A  Compendious  way  of  Arguing  by  a  double  Subfiitu- 

tion. 
II  —  1^.  Hw  the  contracted  Argument  may  be  forrnd  in- 
to an  Hypothetical  SyOogifm^    or  drawn  out  into  two 
Categorical  ones.  2^5" 

Chap.  VII.  of  the  Goodnefs  of  Proof  with  reference  to  its 
Matter.  ■      ■-  1)6.  Six, 

Sedion  1,2.  Whence  curMifiakesin  Arguingmore  commonly 
are:  and  what  is  to  be  done^  by  way  ef  pttvintion^  in 
the  general.  :'    '  ' 

3,  4,  5.  of  unfiated  IVerds^  Terms,  or  Fhrafei:  What  is 
not  to  the  Point.  256,  zyy 

6.  Prefuming  what  jhould  be  proifd. 

7—  1 2.  Wrong  Caajes :  ImperfeU  Views  :  What  u  but  Ac 
cidental:  III  joinings  or  dividing',  from  limited  to  Ab- 
[olute  I  from  fame  to  Aft.  2^8 

15 — 17.  From  the  Re  af on  of  Things  ]  Similitude:,  Diffe- 
rence ;  a  true  Confa^uencei  Somewhat  of  a  Alatter  falfe. ' 

•■•i-    ■:  .4'.r  ...        2^^ 

18,  19.  From  had  Proof  to  a  bad  Caufe  i  Divert  other  Oc- 
cafions  of  Error.  2^0 

20,  21.  Of  the  drffering  Nature  and  Kinds  of  V  roof',  what 
way  jufiifie  O^'mion  :  Of  Humane  TefHrnony. 

22.  JVhat  may  give  fttfficient  Certaany  i  Divine  Faith  i 
Science.  261 

i;,  24.  Demoijflration  th?.:,  and  why  a  Thin^  is  fo. 

2f,  2.6.  Of  Proof  Complete  or  Inchoate-.,  Single  or  Compli- 
cated ;  DtreB  or  Indirett  j  Abfolute  or  Comparative  j 
fimply  or  relatively  good.  262 


Pare 


The  Contents. 


Part  III.  P^ge 

Chap.  VIII.  What  -we  may  at  temp  to  prove  :  Help  a/rea- 
dy given.  ^         265,  Sec. 

Se<5tion  I.  IVhat  Occafon  ive  may  have  rightly  to  make 
out,  what  may  be  fitly  fuppoled  True,  hut  appears 
not  yet  fufficiently  Evident,  by  fuch  Proof,  as  the 
Matter  will  admit,  and  the  Ocafion  requires. 

2,  5,  4.  Of  Vr oof  -which  is  Rhetorical,  or  ftri^lly  Logical; 
both  may  be  jomd.  26^,2(^4 

5",  6.  What  is  htre  endeavour  d  {of  a  Natural  Genius ,  and 
Artificial  Help)'.  The  Method  of  Procedure. 

7—  I  3.  What  we  may  attempt,  or  how  far  :  Of  -what  is 
Inconfiftent^  S^.lf -evident.^  jufficiently  prov'd,  douh'^ul, 
probalfley  certain  to  us,  6cc.  "2-^^^  ^^6 

14 — 24;  Help  already  given  in  the  Set  of  Vofittovi  and 
otherwife'y  farticuhriy  Jvjtb  reference  tc  Thots,  and 
Things  in  the  more  fnnnliar  V/ay  •  En^^ty  ir,  general  • 
God  I  .  Finite  Things  mor^  T^qticr.ally  cenfiderd.^  as  to 
their  Elements  andRejultance^ ;  Ho'a'  the  tofitions  mi-y 
here  be  of  Uje ;  as  aljc  ^hatba^  been  jatd  of  Ap^ nhend' 
ing  others^  and  txprefptjfi  our  'elves,  of  En^iiiries,  &c. 
under  the  general  Hi^ads  ibifs  far.  267 — 26^ 

Chap.  IX.  Of  Proof  with  relation  to  the  diffi-ring  Fcrtfii 

of  Eiiunciat;ons  ^  and  fomewha:  as  to  the  M.n.tr  ofthe'.r,. 

269,  &c, 
Se(SHon  I — 3.   What  is  not  our  Bufinefs.  and  what  is,  for 

the  proving  of  an  Hyppothetical^  or  Relative  Pr<'pofirtof?, 

269,  270 
4 — 8.  What  we  have  to  do,    as  to  the  pyoving  of   Dif 

jun^tve  Prcpo(iticT}s,  ConjuncHvc,  andAhxt:  270,271 
9)  10.  Propofitions  olherways  Compounded  are  to  be  taken 

in  pieces,  and  attempted  by  Farts,  as  far  as  there  is  Oc- 

cafion.  272 

ll  — 15.    As   to  Frcof  with  relation  to  Wordsy  Thoughts^ 

and  fecond  Actions i  272,27^- 

16.  4i  to  proving  firfi  Notions  ^    this  to  be  more  largely 

treat  ei.  2  74 


fe  *  Pm 


The  Contents. 


Part  III.  Pag 

Chip.  X.  Ahottt  the  Troofof  what  is  contingent ,  Probable 
Certain^  NccejJ'ary  ^  Mathematical,  Moral,  Natural^  or 
Su^er -natural.  274,  &C. 

Se<5bion  1,2,  5.  Of  making  out  fame  more  general  Af- 
feBions  of  differing  Points  as  they  may  be  Pojftbky  or  Pt&- 
hable  :  274, 27 J 

4' — ?•  Asto  Abjolute,  and  Moral  Certainty  I  Hiflory,  com' 
mon  find  Sacred  \  Reports  y  PrediBions.  275;,  27^ 

8 — 12.  As  to  Neceffitj  in  fever al  Kinds  or  Degrees ;  and 
ovhat  r»aj  be  call'd  Demonjlration  with  reference  thereto. 

276,277 

1; — 17.  Of  proving  what  «  Mathematical  intheAritb- 
metrical,  Geometrical,  and  Algebraical  Way.  zys — ^80 

18 — 21.  As  to  Quefiions  that' are  Moral,  Natural,  or  Su- 
per-natural;  what  fort  of  Proof ^  and  whence.  280,281 

.  Chap.  XI.  What  Method  may  he  us  d  for  the  finding  out  of 

Proof  and  carrying  it  on.  28i,8cc. 

Se<Sion  1 .    What  Room  or  Occafion  for  Proof ,   $s  to  be 

confidtr^d. 
2 — 4,  The  very  Faint  is  to  be  fiated,    and  ^uejiion  Nar- 
row'd :  Help  may  be  fought,  tf  requifite,  282 
5".  The  Form,  and  Matter  of  the  Qutfiion  is  to  be  obferv^d. 

283 
6,  7.  The   Principal  Heads  of  Argument  may  be  conjulted 

with  reference  to  the  Faints  in  hand:  pariicularly  thoj^^ 

which  are  here  offer  d  as  Middle  Terms. 
8j  p.  A  Set  of  Middle  Terras  tn  Memorative  Lines^  with 

/o?.ve  brief  Notes  upon  them  :  284 

10. 1  i.  It' hat  IS  not  defignd  by  the  foregoing  Table  ;    its 

Ufe.  28  J 

12,  15,  14.  The  Procefs  of  Argument,  as  it  might  poffibly 

happen  injome  or  other  Caje^  reprefented  in  a  Scheme :  2  86 
1 5".  It  is  to  bs  endeavour  d,  that  we  may  have  only  one  of 

the  Premtjes  at  moft  to  be  prov'd.  287 

16   What  is  the  Socracical  way  of  Arguing  \   it  needs 

Help  as  well  as  ths  other. 


Part 


The  Contents. 


Part  Iir.  Page 

Chap.  XII.    The  InfiruBions  given  about  Proof  are  iUu- 

f  rated  by  an  In  fiance,    "which  is  furfud  at  large  tbro^ 

this  whole  Chapter.  287 — 294 

Chap.  XIII.  The  ufefulnejs  of  deducing  cm  Toint  from 
another  J  with  divers  Things  in  order  to  it,       294,  &C. 

Section  I.  'Tts  a  fingular  Ufi  of  our  Reafon  rightly  to 
infer,  fb  that  what  is  inter'd  may  evidently  appear 
to  be  a  juft  Conlequence  of  that  from  which  it  is 
deduc'd. 

2,  3,  4.  This  tnufi  he  of  life  to  furnifh  out  Hypothetical 
Arguments  J  may  fomettmes  fave  the  Trouble  of  Jeeking 
"Proof:  Some  Infiances  of  Geometrical  Dedudlion  294,  295* 

c— 8.  Other  /Advantages  of  froceedivg  in  fuch  a  way. 

^  296,  297 

9,10.  Of  the  Antecedent,  cr  what  ts  frefuppoPd '^  which 
may  be  more  than  one  Point :  Of  what  u  infer  d. 

I.I.  The  Bat  ion  J  or  Conjetfuence -^    it  a  to  he  fiecffjary  and- 
"Evident:  298 

1 2.  There  is  a  Point  imply^d,  which  is  fuppoid  to  need  no 
Proof 

j,^'--l  J.  For  the  examining  of  an  Inference  the  latent  Enunci" 
tion  is  to  be  fupply^d  and  confided d :  how  ths  Enthymeme 
is  to  befiU'd  up^  &C.  25?9j  300 

Chap.  XIV.  Rules  and  Helps  for  inftrring  rightly ,    and 

with  greater  Keadinejs.  500^  &c. 

5e<5tion  l,  2,  5.  What  can  be  tffe^uaUy  provd  by  any  Ar^ 

gument  may  be  infer  d  fi-om  tt :    What  Care  is  here  to  be 

taken. 
4—16.  What  fort  of  Inferences  the  Middle  Terms  before 

Jpecify^d  will  refpe^ively  afford.  501,502 

17 — 19.    A  general  Rule  for  Inferring  exemplify^ d  and 

iUufirated.  505,  504 

20.  Another  General  Rule  for  the  fame  Purpofe,  305" 

21—24.     More  Special  Rules  and  Htlps  :     A  Memora' 

five  Table  containing  fame  Grounds^  on  which  we  may 

proceed  in  drawing  Inferences.  306,  507 

b  5  Pare 


The  Contents., 

4- 


Part  111.  Chap.  XIV.  I  Page 

Scdion  25",  2d.  The  s^eneral  Dejigti  df^h^  Table:    Some 

Demand  1,  as  to  Words,  are  inrermix'd  init,  307 

Ch,ip.  XV.   Part  of  the  more  ffectal  Rules  for  Inferring, 

optnd^  and  cleared.  :jo8,  &c. 

Sedion  i.    The  Cenfequence  is  ali^'ays  to  reft  upon  fome 

certain  Potnt,    and   that  ^ell  applfd  in   the  prefent 

Cafe. 
2,  3.  Of  Inverfions:  how  to  be  made  in  the  way  of  Corref- 

porjency.  508,  :j09 

4,  5'.  Of  what  is  Include dy  or  l,nplfd. 
6,7.  Inconfiltencyt     Mens  hcltnations.  510 

8,  9.  Of  A'egatiifes  :  Name,  Notion^  Nature, 

10.    Notation    or    EtimoUgy    of   Words  :      Narrations, 

311 
II  — 13.  Form:    Foundation:    Foretold,  forekno-ivn,  ful- 

filU 
14.  Freedom,   Liberty^  Free  vi^  explain  d.  ;i2 

15  — 18.    Several  Pomts     about    Effictency  and    Fffedts. 

19,  20.  Of  wb. It  is  Right ^  Related,  or  Rejembhng. 

21 .  Ratios  :  di'vers  ways  of  hiftrrtng  here.  314 

Chap.  XVI.  The  remaining  Fart  of  the  Table  of  Infe- 
rences exphin'dj  as  Rule 3  for  Infei  ring.  ?  *  5"  ?  &C. 

Sedion  I — 4.  Ends:  Expedient:  Effectual:  Equal: 
Exceeding, 

4,  5".  JV.  ceffity :  Voluntary  /Agents.  5 1  j",  3 1 5 

6,  7,  8.  Ah'olutt  Frtedom :  Neutrality  :  IVtll^  how  ltd. 

9,  10.  Needle  ft  :  Neiier  ;  what  this  tmports.  317 
I  J— 13.    AbjiraB  and  Concrete  :    Conjugates:    Contra- 

diciion :   Contrary. 
14.  Cohfcitnce  \  what  follows  theme ;  and  what  dos  not : 

318 
15: — 18,  Ettri    Effince,  and  Exifiencs'j  Confifiency ',  Ef- 

fential :  Example. 
19.  The  Confcquence  holds  f-om  One,   as  Such,    to  All 

juch. 

Part 


The  Contents. 


Part  III.  Chjp.  XVI.  Page 

Se<3ion  20— 2;.  AdjunQ  and  Subjeci  l  Mode  and  Suh- 
fiancei  Suhfifience  i  A  Sufpofitum  :  a  Per  [on  j  Effects, 
not  mere  Nol^le  than  tbeir  Caufes.  319 

24 — 28.  fi'hat  is  Such  in  tt  felf,  u  more  Such:  Like  : 
Similitudef  i  Signs ',  Superior  Names  and  Terms ;  Su- 
bordinate Natures.  320 
29.  What  is  a  ivell  fiud/d  IVriting^  or  DifcO:trf, 
50,  ;r.  U^bat  may  be  accounted  Sufficient.  Pflpere  more 
Axioms  may  he  fought.                                                               $21 

Chap,  XVII.  Of  Applying  Things  to  Ufe  and  Service  : 
How  we  may  come  to  do  it  :  Whither  to  refer  the  U(e  of 
them  ;  What  it  is  to  be.  5  2  r,  &c. 

SstSion  I.  We  are  rightly  to  direcfl  and  appK  to  Ufe 
and  Service,  what  ought  to  he,  or  is  capable  of  be- 
ing, fo  direded  and  apply'd. 

2,3.  Some  general  Account  of  this  Matter'.  321,  322 

4.  It  is  to  be  directed  frft  more  at  large  j  and  then  as  to 
this  Efjay. 

5 — ic.  How  we  may  come  to  the  Hubit  of  applying  things 
to  Ufe.  ;2  2, —  324 

II — 14.  To  what  Perfons  and  Points  we  are  to  direct  the 
Ufe  and  Service  of  Things.  524,  525" 

If— 21.  Some  Account  of  the  Ufe  we  jlwuld  endeavour 
to  make  of  Things.  5  2  y — 3  27 

Chap.  XVIII.  What  is  to  be  improvd  to  Service  ;  and 
what  peculiar  U^emay  be  made  of  [owe  Things : 

Section  i,  2.  Whatever  can  well  be  apply  d  to  Service; 
more  particularly ^  Evil  DifpofittonSy  and  Aeltngs^  tnour 
jelves.,  or  others, 

3.  Natural  IfnperfeBions,  in  our  felves  or  others  ^  with 
what  other  Troubles  may  ly  upon  as  or  them.  328 

4.  I03ar  Evils  may  threaten  a? ^  or  others : 

y.  What  there  is  of  Good  in  m  or  them^  or  that  is  done, 
or  enjofd  by  either  : 


b  4  Pare 


The  Contents. 


Parr  111.  Chap.  XVIII.  Page 

Section  6—9.  Perfons  under  our  Influence ;    Tiwg,  O/*- 
portunuy:  Ejlatei    Inferior  Creatures  about  tfs\       529 
10 — I 'j.  Natural  Powers  :    Habits  i    Notions:    Occur- 
rences: Converfe:  Reading.  330 

Chap.  XIX.  The  Ufe  of  this  Ejjay  :    How  it  may  be  ad- 
'vsntagtBuJly  read.  331,  &i:. 

S:6tion  i,  2.  3.  To  what  the  fever al  farts  of  this  Effaj 
may  ferve. 

4.  Of  Reading  it  with  Advantage:  for  this  Furpofi,    352 

5",  6.  Its  general  Nature,  Defign  and  Method  may  fir  ft  be. 
obferv'dj    what  we  take  not  at  the  fecond  Readings    to 
be  noted  down,    or  marked :    It   may  be  reviewed  by  . 
pieces f  before  we  proceed  very  far. 

7.  What  is  to  be  carry  d  alot^g  with  m  in  reference  to  the 
m  re  Notional  Account  of  Things^  6CC.  33} 

Sj  9.  Of  Residing  each  of  the  General  Heads  quite  tbroy 
that  are  not  very  long,  or  their  Branches  not  Jo  diftintl^ 
before  we  review  it  j  which  may  left  be  done  next  Morn- 
ing :  Not  to  read  very  far  at  once. 

10 — -I).  Divers  other  Suggeflions  to  make  the  Reading  of 
it  more  beneficial^  &c.  3  3  4>  3  5  J" 

Chap.  aX,  rrw^/XXL  do  very  particularly  ^ew  J  byway 

'    of  Example,    how  n  Learner  may  be  emplofd  upon  this 

F.ffay,  cr  with  reference  to  it^  jo  as  to  improve  more  by 

St:  3$5'-'34-2,  &c. 


Chap.  XXII.  Of  Condud:  in  general^  with  Rules  about 
it.  349,  &C. 

Se(^ion  I.  We  are  here  to  be  fomewhat  more  jpectally  dt- 
reBed  arj  affifled,  rightly  to  conduct  our  (elves,  and 
our  Affairs,*  more  particularly  in  the  way  of  Learn; 
ing.  \ 


Pare^ 


The  Contents. 


Part  ill.  Chap.  XXlI.  Page 

Se<9:ion  2—4.  The  many  differing  Matters  here  to  be  but 
hriefi/  toutb'd :  Hints  may  fet  the  Mmd  on  Work,  or 
carry  it  en:  Scholars  ought  to  have  fame  Acquain- 
tance with  other  Affairs  hejidis  thofe  of  Literature, 

349*  ?Jo 
5, 6,  7.  ConduSi  in  general  reffeBs  the  End,  the  Means 

and  Meafures ;  fomewhat  of  each.  ;5'o,  35'i 

8 — 12.  'T»  a  Dictate  of  Reafon,   that  we  fhould  begin, 

proceed  and  end  with  God:  and,  3f  i,  ^fz 

15 — 16.  That  we  jhould  confult  and  ohferve  Its  Word, 

17.  We  are  carefully  to  fiate^  and  confider,  what  it  is  we 
are dejigningi  and, 

iS.  To  adjuft  the  Importance  of  it;  ^^6 

19 — 21.  With  an  Eye  both  to  that  and  this ^  we  Jhould 
fix  Subordinate  htentiom  j  yet  not  aH  of  them  at  once^ 
nor  unalterably.  %S^>  %S1 

2  2 — 27.    Divers   other  general  Rules    are   added  here. 

357— 3f  9^ 

Chap.  XXIIT.  The  ConduSi  of  our  felves,  under  a  more 
Abfolute  Conjideration.  3J9,&C. 

Section  I, — 4.  We  are  here  to  aim  at  regular  SatisfaBion, 
reafonable  Acceptationy  and  real  Ufefulnefs.      55"  9,  J 6,0 

^^6.  A  due  Mean  «r  to  be  kept,  tho*  not  the  very  Mid- 
dle betwixt  the  Extremes,  &c, 

7,  §.  Of  Time  and  Opportunity  :  We  fhould  (0  manage  our 
felves,  that  we  may  need  as  little  as  is  well  poffible  in 
any  kind^  and  that  be  not  Slaves  to  Cufiom.  ^61 

9 — iz.  About  Sufpicion,  Speaking  and  Silence,  Humour 
and  Fancy  ;  Looks^  Gefiure,  &C  :  A  Monitor  to  be 
early  engaged.  562 

15.  How  we  may  endeavour  to  relieve^  fecure,  gratifie^ 
■  and  recommend  our  felves ;   Cautions  here  to  be  obferv'J. 

365 


Part 


The  Coiiteiii^. 


Part  III.  Chap.  XXIII.  ^-^^^^  .  i^  Pjigp 

Sedion  14— i^.   Of  Omamm  ahdCloatbin^:'  Shmi^- 

Tifbat  about  Food.  '      36!;,  564 

17—19.  Recreations:  Fbyfick  and  Surgery.       364,  36 j 
•20.  The  furniPiing  of  our  Minds  with  Knowledge. 
21 — 24.  The  regulating  of  our  Inclinations  ;   in  what  way 

to  he  done.  ^66 

G^ap.  XXIV,    The    Kelatrve    Condu^    ef  our  fehni, 

367,  &c. 

Seftion  I — 4.  Of  our  Carriage  towards  God^  good  and 
had  Angels,  our  felves,  and  our  Neighbour  : 

y,  6.  We  would  not  that  others  Jhoutd  mole^  us  on  Accounts, 
that  are  purely  Religion  j  nor  may  we  do  it  to  them  : 
On  the  contrary,  ^6g 

7.  Whatfoever  we  (reafonahl/)  would,  that  others 
ihould  do  to  us,    we   mult  do  even  fo  to  them. 

;69 

8,  p.  We  jhould  endeavour  that  our  Converfe  may  he 
Ujeful  and  Agreeable :  Not  to  make  any  one,  need^ 
tefly  our  Enemy  j  nor  too  deeply  to  rejent  Injurys^ 
&c. 

10,  II.  Of  Reproof  Kefpe^  ;  Kindnefs  offer  d^  receiv'd, 
return  d.  370 

12.  As  to  Inferiour  Creatures. 

I  J,  14.  As  to  Circumjlances  determined  for  us  hy  Proxti- 
dence.  ;7i 

j^.  As  to  Mens  Vifpafals  of  tts.  ':^']%- 

1 6.  As  to  what  we  our  {elves  may^  in  fome  Meafure,  or 
der. 

17,  18.  Of  our  ^ated  Bujinefs,  Flace  of  Ahod*,  and  Ser- 
vants. si^r^Ji 

19—21.  As  to  the   Choice   of  a   Verfon  for    Marriage, 

373'  374 
22—26.  How  to  carry  our   felves  in  ConduBing  others. 

374-576 


Part 


The  Contents. 


Part  III.  Page 

Chap.  XXV.   The  tHeri  common  Affairs  of  Life^   and 

Special  UnJef takings.  576,  &c. 

Seiftion  I.    We  mufi  fet  Bounds  to  our  P.^fnsr  Purfuits,, 

and  Cares.  ".''     '  *^'* 

2,  3.  Of  being  Rich  :    Of  Diligence;    Sparing  and  Spend' 

ingy  BaUancing  Certainties  and  Adventures,  Computings 

Contending. 
4 — 7.   Of  Credit  ;   Tromifes  ;    Favours  ;    Accepting  of 

Service ;    Ready-Money  j    Under  feUtng,     Engrcjjing  • 

Ajfurances  in  Law  ;    Honefty   ivitb  Ability  5    early  Se- 

ciirity  :    Appointments ;  By- Difcourfe.  ill-ill^ 

8—10.  As  to  Jome  Special  Undertakings :    Of  Secrefy  and 

Veracity, 
II  — 15.  Experiment  and  Enquiry  :    Safe  and  Convenient 

Delay:     A  way  of  Retreat:  379 

14— 16.  Fu  AHoivances   for    what  way  fall  out  crofs  : 

Set  Bounds  beforehand  to   Experiments,  &cc  ;    Of   ex- 

peclwg  froT^i  others,    and  tranjathng  with  them.  380, 

381 
17,  I S.  Of  Employing  others :    A  particular  Agent : 

19.  Caution  here  to  be  usd,  382 

20.  Of  tranfa'ding  with  a  Body^    er  greater  1^ umber  of 
Men : 

Chap.  XXVI.  The  ftated purfuit  of  ufeful  Knowledge: 
■     The  Choice  and  UJe  of  Books.  383,  8CC. 

Se<5ti'on  I — 3.  UJeftJ  Knowledge  h  the  ftated  Turfuit  there- 
of'.   That  IS  re^ui/ite  to  other  Improvements  ;    how  to 
be  fought  : 
4,  J.   I  he  Foundations  to  belaid  Jure  and  large;    here  fo 
'   Ejja/d.  ;84 


Part 


The  Contents, 


Part  III.  Chap.  XXVI.  Page 

$e(%ion  6,  7, 8.  Tbey  are  to  be  fecurdi    and  the  Super- 

firuButt  carry  d  on^  equally,  if  it  may  be^  t»fome  farther 

Height.    What  is  peculiarly  defignd  is  to  be  chiefly  at- 

tended,  ^S^ 

5,  10.  Of  htfiruS^ors :   What  is  incumbent  on  the  Learner, 

If.  Of  tbofe  Booh  "which  give  an  Account  of  other  i :    Of 

getting  it  other-ways.  587 

12.  Hi>w  we  may  make  fame  Judgment  of  a  Book^  &c^ 

;88 

15.  Ofujtng  Bookjtbat  are  Alphabetically  difpos'd, 

14.  Of  common  SyfiemSy  and  other  Treatifesi   Of  Ancient 

and  Ahdern, 
j^.  Books   that  are  more  Concife,     which  give  Occafion 

and  Affiflance  to  Thought,   are  like  to  be  more  improv- 

ifjg  than  others.  389. 

16— —19.    of    Epitomizing,    Explaining,    Analyfing 

389,  ;9o 
20 — 22.  Of  Common-Placing :  A  way  recommjended,  6c,c. 

591 
2^,24.  Stated  Times  of  Study  for  this  and  that  part  of 

Learnings    &C.   Of  A(lrologyi    Of  Controverfie.   192, 

Chap.  XXVII.  The  Choice  and  XJfe  of  Exercife^  and  of 
Company.  393  >  &c. 

Sei^ion  l,  2,  Knowledge  and  other  Improvements  are  to 
he  got  and  perfe^ed  by  proper  and  fuitable  Exercife. 

?93,3P4 
3—- 5".  Particularly  with  relation  to  Language,  by  way  of 

Infiance. 
$,  7.  Somewhat  of  Inventive  Exercifes ;    of  Verfes,  Scc, 

?9S 
$.  So?Ke  peculiar  Sorts  of  Exercife  upon  feveral  Heads  i», 
this  Effay, 


Part 


The  Contents. 


Part  III.  Chap.  XXVII.  Page 

Seftion  9.    Exercijes  are,  in  the  generah  Attempts:  how 

thefe  are  to  be  made  and  carrfd  on,  39^ 

I  o.  Proper  Society  Advantageous. 

II — 13.  The  UJe  of  it  in  ConVerfation. 

14,  If.  Several  fit  Ferjons  may  he  Severally  employ  d  upon 
differing  EfK^mries  and  Purjuits,  or  upon  the  jatne^  a$ 
alfo  in  Reading  the  /ante  Book,  or  dtvers,  by  common 
Agreement*,  Their  {ever al  Difcoverys  and  Obftrva' 
tiont   to   he    communicated  and^  confider'd    together  % 

Chap.  XXVIII.  Of.  Solemn  Conpderatiw  -^  Of  more  JaM 

,  andfnee  Dijcourjes'^  ^nd  of  Set  C'ompofuris'.^      398,  BCC; 

Section  I,  2,  g.'  Of  draii/tng  out  KtiowUdge  in  regulaf 

Dtfiourfe,   or  other  like  Performances  ^  __^  thefe  are  onjj 

glanced  upon.  -  -    ^  ■ 

^,5,6.  0/ Internal  pifcourfe,  »r  the  Solemn  Applicaiioi^ 

'■'of  Thdt  to  thii  or  thd}  Matter :  ^Th'e  Jeveral  $nds  and 

^-  Turpofes   thereof,    which   are  to   beMtahlj^.  furfud, 

7j  8j  9*  ^'^^^  differing  "Ways  of  Meditation :  What  feemt 
to  be  moft  eafily  Vr  amicable:  What  may  he  helpful  in  tht 
way  of  Solemn  Thinking,  or  Study.  '  400 

10.  As  to  External  Difcourfe,  that,?vhich  is  more  lax  and 
Free,  many  admit  of  fucb  general  Direbiiom  as  are 
here  very  briefly  fugge fie d.  40,1, 

11,  12.  Somewhat  more  Special  about  the  vpay  0/ Read- 
ing upon  fit  and  proper  Authors. 

13,  14.  About  formed  Compofures:  Their  Matter, 
j^U.hod^  and  Manner  to  be  adapted  to  the  Defign^  &c. 

402 

IJ,  l5.  As  ;>  the  Tvlatter  of  a  Difcourfe  5  of  what  fort  it 
mufi  be  ;  fame  Lght  and  Kelp  may  probably  be  drawn 
fiomfuch  or  fuci  Heads  of  this  Effay.  402,  40} 

J7,  1 8.  What  farther  Courfc  may  be  taken  hire. 


Part 


The  Cbhtents. 


Parr  III.  Pagq| 

Chap.  XXIX.     About    the    Method  of  a  Dtfcourje, 

404,  &c. 
Se(5iion  i.    The  Import  of  the  JVord^    with  fame  general 

Account  of  tht  Thing  : 
2,  2.  //  fnajf  famewhat  vary  according  to  the  Nature  of 

the  !^.uhjetl  and  Defign, 
4,  f.  Srrt^er  Method  m^y  ^iffofe  Things^    as  they  he  in 

Nature,   or  in    the  way   of    JSotipnal   Conjideration. 

6j  7.  Somewhat  of  the  Synthetica!  Method ^    and  of  the 
Analytical ;    where  and  when  they  are  to  be  us'd  : 

4'^5,4o6 
tyThe  intermixing  of  them  iJlu ft  rated, 

^/io.  About  forming  the  Plan  of  any  Special  Undertak- 

,ingf  and  proceeding  upon  it :  407 

l-i,i2.  More  particularly  of  laying,    and  ordering  a  Dif- 

,.  -I^.^J^U'  407^  408 

J%,  \a.  pPhai  fori  of'Thing's  are  (om.m^nh  to  precede,  and 

/  what  to  jmow:  _,  ,\-.. .        \  4oo>4<^9 

XX-^Moft  of  the  Rules  of  Method'muft  hk  vary'd  fro'm  up- 

■^^  juft  Ckcajion.  _   ;,.  " 

l^yof  Dividing  and  Subdividing^    Numbering  Heads ^ 

"'Set,    '      '^  •'    ' 

CWa|5:  XXX.  .Sowre  Rules  about  the  Manner  of  a  Dif 

courfe.  410,  Sec* 

Sedion  1,2.    Things  muft  be  truly  and  fitly  exprefs'd^ 

what  is  to  be  done  in  order  thereto. 
3~y.  Expreffi^ns  fhould  be  clear  and  ^afie ',  Some  Dire 61 U^ 

on  in  order  to  that  I  411 

6  J  7.  Of  making  a  Difcourfe  acceptable'.  Caution  to  be  us^d 

in  relation  thereto.  .4  ijt 

8«— 10.  What  is  to  be  ebfervd  by  the   Terfon  Difccurfing 

with  reference  to  himfelf  and  in  relation  to  thoje  to  whom 

his  Difcourfe  is  addrejid^    and  other i  who  may  take  No". 

ttceofit:  412,  41 J 


^AXt 


The  Contents. 


Part  III.  Chap.  XXX.  P^^-e 

S5<5i:ion  ii,  I2.    Somewhat  ahout  the  CcnJiJcration  to  be 
■    had  of  the  Time  an  J  Place :  4  j^ 

13  —  16.  Of  difcourfing  fuitably  to  the  Nature  ^  and  Qn- 
dition  of  the  Argumait  or  Suhjeil,  414,  41  j- 

Chap.  XXXL  Of  divers  Ends  andVurfafes^  which  are 
to  be  fomev/bat  variottJl]/fulted  and'anjwef.d.     4i5j6cc. 

SecStion  I.  The  Defgn  of  the  Difcourje  it  Jelf  cr  th^t  to 
V'-hich  we  may  well  refer  it 3  is  cbiifiy  to  govern  the  Man' 
ver  of  it, 

2,  ;.  SorKcrvbat  about  the  IVay  and  Manner  of  Infiru<9:- 
ing  :    0/ Entertaining  :  416 

4,  y.  0/ Confirming,  or  Kzi\iimg  a  Dtfccurfe  :  Some- 
what-at  to  both  in  common:  ^ij 

6-  As  to  Confirming  or  Vindicating  in  Special:  and 
alfo 

7.  As  to  Oppofing  and  Refuting.  418 

8,  9  What  way  u  to  be  generally  tjken  in  order  to 
Convince  J  and  what  may  be  JpeciaHy  reqwjite  in  Jome 
Cafes, 

10.  Ofraifngandergagifi^theAff'eSlions.  4I9 

II  —13.  Of  pcrjwadmg ;  Intereft -^  Example \  ObjeSlions, 
&  420 

14.  Of  Solemn  Difcourfes,  which  are  to  be  Spoken. 

15",  16.  What  is  farther  to  be  obferv'd  with  reference  to 
them  ;  and  what  may  be  done  in  order  to  fecure  fucb 
Vomts.  421 

17.  O/Publidiing  :  wh^t  may  or  fhould  be  fubltfj'd'j  of 
Writivg  agreeably  to  the  Genius  of  the  Age  j  of  ufng 
different  CbaraBers  or  Ltti^rs. 

18.  Of  making  fome  fl(.j  upon  what  is  ohfervable^  &c. 

422 


Ji^arr 


The  Contents. 


Part  III.  Chap.  XXXI.  Page 

19.  Of  giving  fome  Cheice  of  Matter  to  differing  Readers. 
Of  (ontr  over  fie  andFerfonal  Matters.  422 

20.  Of  Writing  in  a  Cafe  of  Common  Concernment  l  Of 
Confulting  with  others.  423 

ai.  Of  delivering  what  u  Nice  and  Difficult.  What  may 
he  puhlickly  fig^iffd  by  Authors^  •with  reference  to  what 
they  fublifi. 

22.  A  particular  Advice  for  the  better  fecuring  fome  Ad- 
vantage from  this  Ejjay.  423,  424 


THE 


THE 


n 


^  1. 1"^  EASON  is  oft  more  flriftly  taken  for  the  Power 
1^  of  Arguing  and  Inferring  only  :  But  what  I  am 
■^  here  Eifaying  to  culrivatc  and  improve,  is  to  be 
finderftood  in  a  larger  Senfe,  of  that  difcerning  Faculty  in 
Man,  which  is  commonly  made  his  diftinguilhingCharader, 
lind  plainly  gives  him  a  Capacity  far  Superiour  to  that  of 
Brutes.  By  this  our  Creator  tenchetb  us  more  than  the  Benjis 
of  the  Edrch^  and  makes  us  xvifer  than  the  Fovp/s  of  Heaven.  By 
this  we  are  capable  of  examining  mpre  throughly  the  Ap- 
pearances of  Things,  to  re^lifie  or  conhcm  our  Apprehen- 
fions  about  them.  We, can  hereby  form,  abftraifl  and  general 
Notions,  refle6t  upon  the  Operations  of  our  Mind,  and  go  be-r 
ypnd  the  fphcre  of  Senfe  and  Imagination,  fo  as  to  cany  our 
Tiio'ts  upward  to  God,  and  forward  to  a  future  Life.  Fi- 
nally, (to  mention  no  more)  we  are  hereby  enabled  to  invent 
and  employ,  lit  Means  to  repfefcnt  diftindly  to  others,  what 
we  our  felves  conceive. 

.  ^  2.  But  whereas  H.umane  Reafon  is  naturally  weak  in 
its  earlier  Ufe  and  Excrcifc,  as  alfo  darkned  and  deprav'd 
thro'  evil  Difpoli^ions,  and  liable  to  be  carry'd  away  with 
pievailing  Error  and  Prejudice :  It  evidently  ftands  in  need  of 
all  the  Advances  that  can  from  time  to  time  be  made  for  its  Di- 
ijedionand  AlHftance. 'liiis  New  EflTayistherefure added toth« 
number  of  foregoing  Efforts,  for  the  farther  Improvement  of 
Logic,  and  of  our  Reafon  by  it,  that  they  may  better  anfwcc 
the  various  Purpofes  they  ought  to  ferve,  whether  in  refpe«5t 
of  Learning,  or  for  the  condudt  of  Life.  In  order  to  which, 
IJhaUhcreendcavour  toopen,  fix,  and  iharpen  the  Mind  by  a. 
^f  lE.pgagement  arid  proper  Eser.ife  of  Tho't,  whilft  I  am  la- 
^'il^j^g.  to.fyjrpipi  it, with. a,  competent  Stock  of  the  more 
ccir.r^rclisnriv'ikiiding  Noiices,  and  to  put  it  in  a  furer  and 

B  nearer 


ii  Tie   Introdii^jon. 

nearer  way  ot  purfuir.g  \yhat  is  requifire,  and  of  ufing  what 
we  have,  in  a  prudent  Manner,  andiothebeft  Advantage. 

§  3.  Now,  tliat  I  may  profecuce  fo  great,  fo  ufeful,  and 
fo  needful  a  Defignmo  e  directly,  and  as  throughly  as  I  can, 
I  find  my  felf  obliged,  notto  proceed  in  the  beaten  Road,  or 
within  the  ukial  Conrinemcnts  ot  Logical  Syftems  ;  but  to 
vary  i'o.newhat  widely  rrom  them,  both  in  Matter  and  Man- 
ner ^  whiUt  yet  I  Ihall  gladly  tall  in  with  them  in  every  thing, 
which  I  conceive  may  be  of  real  and  valuable  Service  to  the 
prefent  Undertaking.  And  rho'  I  have  not  thot  it  fo  conve- 
nient to  prefix  the  name  of  Logic  in  the  Title  Page;  yet  I 
Ihall  take  the  liberty  of  applying  it  upon  occaGon  to  this  Ef- 
fay,  \vhiifk  I  am  endeavouring  it  may  anfwer  that  jV^jw?  in 
reference  both  to  the  interior  and  exterior  '■-■)  ^'^  (or  ReafoiY 
in  Expieilion  as  well  as  in  Conception)  and  car;y  on  the 
Thing  to  a  farther  extent,  and  higher  degree  of  ufefulnefe  : 
Tho'  I  may  not  hope  to  compleat  it. 

§  4.  This  is,  however,  a  farther  Arte.-npt  towards  a  Sy-' 
ik'mof  Logic,  or  an  orderly  Scheme  of  general  Inftrucftions, 
peculiarly  fitted  to  pfo-Juce  luch  an  habit  in  the  Mind,  ais 
may  juftly  be  call'xl.  The  Art  of  ufing  our  Rcafon  ro  the  va- 
rious Piirpofes  it  may  and  ought  to  ferve,  under  the  Con- 
dud:  and  influence  of  Inltru^ftions  given  ro  that  end. 

1^  %.  Logic,  as  an /i/r,  is  not  to  be  purely  or  principally 
Spcccilative,  but  Praiilical ;  Its  Inftruc>ions  are  rhertforeto 
be  adapted,  directed,  and  iipply'd  to  Pradice,  chiefly,  or, 
however,  more  immediately  to  the  exercife  of  the  Mind  for 
tlie  better  Conduit  of  our  Thi/ts,  and  confequentiy  of  our 
Difcourfe,  Behaviour,  and  Aflairis,  as  occafion  may  re- 
quire. 

-  §  6.  The  Art  of  ufing  our  Rea^Dn,  pre  fuppofes  the  Na- 
t'.iral  Faculty  before  defcrib'd,  and  is  the  Habit  (or  nearer 
Capacity)  of  ufing  it  well;  fo  :is  that  we  may  more  rightly^ 
and  wirh  greater  rcadincls,  bo:h  fix  and  purfue  intermediate 
Intentions,  and  reach  our  fardieli  End  in  the  moll  advanta- 
gidus  Way,  as  he  only  is  faid  to  have  the  Art  of  doing  any 
thing,  who  can  perform  it  with  the  greater  certainty,  exaiit- 
ne(s  and  difpatdi,  which  arc  inofl  comuionly  owing  to  Inltru- 
ction  and  Exercife. 


§  7.  The 


* 1 -: Hi- — 4-fc 

The  ivtrodu&ioff.  -W 


§  7.  The  ufmg  of  our  l^enfon^  is  not  only,  tho'  it  may  be 
chiefly,  what  we  call  reafoning  :  i.  e.  the  deducing  one  thing 
from  anotlier,  or  confirming  it  by  another ;  but  it  alfo  takes 
in  divers  other  ways  of  employing  it;  fomeof  which  we  (hill 
fpecifie  as  needing,  deferving,  and  admitting  the  help  of  fo- 
lemn  Inftrudlions. 

,,  §  8.  Now  the  principal  InjlruHions  here,  will  be.eitbec 
l^ides  to  lead  us  in  a  right  way  of  ufing  our  Reafon,  or  Helps 
to  render  it  more  accountable  and  eafie  by  what  may  be  of- 
fer'd,  either  previoufly  or  purfuant  to  the  Rules,  to  let  us  into 
the  Reafon  and  Intendment  of  them  ;  or  to  afliit  us  in  apply- 
ing them  to  Ufe.  And  hither  may  be  refer'd  whatfoever 
elfe  has  a  tendency  to  induce  and  fatisfie,  or  to  furnifh,  en- 
lighten, and  enlarge  the  Mind. 

§  9.  The  Rules, and  Helps  are  to  be  of  a  general  Nature 
atid  Ufe ;  moft  of  them  common  to  the  differing  Subjedls  of 
divers  Arts  and  Sciences  :  And  for  fuch  of  them  as  may  be 
more  peculiarly  related  to  any  one,  (fuppo.fe  to  Ethicks  0? 
Theology)  they  will  not,  however,  defcend  to  the  lowej 
Subdivifions  thereof ;  but  (hall  be  only  fome  of  the  more  prin- 
cipal, comprehenfive,  leading  Points,  and  fuch  as  are  con- 
ceived effeniially  rev^uifite  to  the  general  defign  of  this  Eflay  j 
more  efpecially  that  it  may  lead,  not  only  to  a  nice  and  cri- 
tical, but  to  the  truly  wife  and  prudent  Ufe  of  Reafon: 
And  that  it  may  ferve  as  a  kind  of  Mafter-key  to  let  us  more 
readily  into  the  feveral  Apartments  of  ufeful  Knowledge, 
whether  in  order  to.  a  fummary  View  of  the  princiffel  Parts, 
or  to  the  more  accurate  Survey  of  this  or  that  in  particular, 
as  occafion  may  require. 

'  §  10.  Knowkdge  in  the  moft  lax  and  comprehenfive 
Senfe  may  be.  coniider'd  either  Objedivsly^  as  propounded 
(fiippofe  in  Writing,  or  other  wife)  to  the  Mind,  or  5«^r 
jf lively,  as  poffelfed  by  it ;  the  former  to  be  us'd,  as  a 
Means  in  oi:dtr  to  the  latter,  as  its  End.  And  this  confifts 
either  in  the  tranfient  A(ft,  or  in  the  fixed  H^bit,  which  i^ 
the  more  immediate  Capacity  of  repeating,  and  improving 
that  AQ:  at  any  time,  upon  occafion,  with  cafe  and  readinefs  j 
and  it  is  tnoft  comm,pnly  acquir'dbyan  attentive  and  reite^ 
rated  view,  of  the  Matter  known,  togetherwiib  frequent  Ex-* 
^rcjfe;  in  relation  .t9,  it.^ ,;  'T/:  not  knowledge,  but  Error  and 
Miftakej  if  there  be  rot  a  fight  ^preheniion  of  the  Objeit, 

B  a  (fit 


(or  Tho't  agreeable  to  ihe  Tiling)  fo  far  hoAvevcr^  and  in  fuch 
manner  as  cjic  thing  (or  obicft  of  Tlio'c/  is  preCuiu'iior  ;iiip- 
posM  to  be  known,  vvhechcr  iu  whole  or  in  party- per&SIy 
or  impcrfedly,'  as  'ris  iNfally  iii-i,t  lelf,  ,or  as  the  Humane 
Mind  is  capable  of  taking  it.  ,^  Wc'niay  Be  iaii  ro  know-tliis 
"or  that,  cither  by  the  ielUiiiohy  of  ochefs,-.f\vhi,,h  is  more 
properly  believing  than  knowing  vi  by  ov'v'  own  iniincdiare 
Obfervation  or  Conii delation;  And  we  may.jullly  be  more 
orlefs  Dubious,  or  ahogcthcr  Certain,,  a  covdmg  as  the  Te- 
iliinony  it  {c\i  and,  the  fcnfc  in  whicii  wc  take  it,  on  ojte 
hand,  or  the  Obfervation  wc  have  niaiie.  aiKl  iJi,e  coniidera- 
tion  we  have  ulcd  on  the  o dicr,  are  liioiv  or  Ids  to  l^e  de- 
pended on. 

§'ii.  As  for  the  Matters  to  be  known,  T  iv.ight  reJi'-ce 
them  to  three  General  Heads,  .'Z:^.  (i.)  'VLkho-Xuv  the  piincipa! 
Objeds  of  Tho't,  to  which  Words  ajid  Nouoas  are  related 
and  fiibfcrvient.  {z)  if^o^ds^  or  the  J^xprellions  of  Tho'tj  in 
reference  to  any  of  its  Obicifts  what  foever;  and,  {'i)  Noti- 
ons, by  which  is  here  liefi^ff  d  the  l-rading  and  more  gejieral 
Obfervations  and  Remarks  about  Tilings  or  VVords,  or  even' 
about  Notion'^  thonilelv'cs.  Karrre  fecnis  coninxonly  to  lead 
Men  to  fcgin  at  the  fir({  of  ihefe,  as  they  can  ;  ro  proceed' 
with  thefeconci,.  and  lo  t:''  adv.in"c  to  the  lalt.  And  as  they 
attain  to  any  more  general  Notions,  to  lay  them  cp,  and 
ufe  them  in  rekrcnce  to  Ihings,  or  Words,  or  other  Noti- 
ons. 

•  §  12.  Somewliat  in  each  of  thefe  ki^^.ds  is  here  prcfujipo- 
fed,  as  already  laid" in;  but  moie  efpecially  fomc  competent 
Acquaintance  wich  Words,  and  their  Meannig  ;  and  yet  we 
ma  V  need  more  of  rive  Logical  Notions  and  Inftru£i^ions  about 
the  Ex-prelTions  of  Tho't,  as  well  as  its  more  principal  Ob- 
]eSts  to  carry  us  farther  into  the  refpeCtive  Nature  and  Ufe, 
both  of  Words  and  Things,  and  even  of  general  Notions  them- 
lelves. 

^13.  As  to  the  more  fpeclal  knowledge  of  Words,  its 
Foundations  may  feem  to  be  moll  fitly  laid  ,  as  Conwie-iius 
hathflicwii/  in  a  fummary  Acconnt  of  the  more  f^A^ic  and 
obvions  Things,  gradually  taking  in  the  Gfamiriaticai  No- 
tions and  Inftiudlons  iii  the  way  of  Pradicej  and  proceeding 
.  tbthofeofRhctorick  in  reading  proper  Authors. 


§  14.1  hi 


ihc   Introduclion. 


§  14.  The  rrtorc  fpccial  accojnt  of  things  may  be  deli-- 
ver'd,  cither  wholl)  in  rhc  way  of  Sp:ctdntioti^  or  in  that 
which  diredJy  anci  profciftdly  leads  to  Prcclic.-,  or  with  the 
intermixture  of  both  :  As  is  aiflually  dune,  where  Theorcms- 
(or  Mathematical  Points  to  be  known)  and  Problems  to  be 
perform'd  arc  inteuvoven,  as  in  Pr-d/V's  Ge  ;metry.  And 
certainly  the  Notions  in  Logic  Ihould  not  be  barren  and  crtip- 
ry  Speculations;  but  Notions  originally  drawn  from  Pra- 
<n-icc,  and  according  y  both  iittedand  applied  to  lead  us  to  it, 
and  help  us  in  it :  as  a  Path  once  trac'd  from  any  place,  may 
after  ferve  to  make  our  way  diithcr  mere  ccrtam  and  rea- 
dy. . 

§  1 5.  The  more  fpccial  points  of  Spxuir.ticn^  are  cither 
7^Litters  of  had,  whether  they  lie  open  to  common  view,  or 
only  to.a  mcre.curious  Obfervation ;  or  elie  >dtional  Ennur- 
ricsand  /1ccJir,!ts^  in  reference  to  Beings  themfelvcs,  and  what 
reiates  tJiereto  ;  more  particularly  foir.c  of  their  Atrributes 
abftraAJy  confider'd,  as  Mcafure,  Number,  Sound,  Z^c 
HitP.er  we  may  chiefly  refer  Geography,  Hiftory,  Civil  and 
Natural,  fome  parts  of  the  Mathematicks,  Natural  PhUofo- 
pby,  Fneumatalogy,  i3c, 

kj  \6.  The  more  fpeclal  points  of  P  (telle:,  arc  either  on- 
ly Mr.rtcr  of  Si{'(i\  whether  in  the  vulgar  and  mechanical  Way. 
or  in  that  of  Learning  ;  or  clfe  Mirtcr  of  Duf-''^  in  refpeft  of - 
Cod.  our  IcKes,  or  others,  according  to  tlic  Liglit  and  Law- 
of  Nari^re,  or  of  Scriptnrej  or  the  more  peculiar  Laws  of 
particular  Civil  Societies.  Hither  we  may  refer  the  Me- 
chanical and  Liberal  Arts  or  Difciplincs,  as  Politicks,  Ethicks, 
Theology,  Q^c. 

§  17.  The  more  general  Notions  of  I  ogic  are  to  precede 
our  folcmn  Application  to  the  mentioned  Points  of  Specula- 
tion and  Practice,  ro  open  and  prepare  the  way,  and  may, 
not  unfitly,  come  after  them  too  for  the  farther  improvement 
of  them.  And  tho'  Logic  might  feem  to  have  little  or  no- 
thing to  do  with  inferior  Employments,  whicli  require  but 
few  lnftri;iitions,  and  thofc  more  particular  and  plain,  as 
refhng  almoft  wholly  upon  Example  and  Exercife ;  yet  many 
of  thofc,  who  are  or  may  be  fo  employed,  might  be  capable 
of  fbme  confiderable  Benefit  by  this  Effay  ;  at  leaf!  by  the 
Obfervations  and  ^nftrudiom,  which  are  more  directly  fui- 

B  3  ted 


vi  1  he   IntrodHCiion. 


ted  to  the  prudent  ordering  of  our  felvcs,  our  Enquiries,  Un- 
dertakings, and  Purfuits. 

§  1 8.  Now  in  order  to  produce  the  mentioned  Habit  of 
ufing  our  Reafon  in  a  better  vav,  and  to  better  purpofc,  en- 
deavour will  be  us'd,  that  the  Inftru<^ions  here  may  be  in- 
deed pcculinrly  fitted  to  that  end  ;  fo  as  their  tendency  to  it 
may  be  more  direft  and  full  than  that  of  the  Mathematicks, 
Metaphyficks,  Law,  or  even  of  the  common  Logicks,  which 
yet  may  all  be  of  Service  to  render  the  Mind  more  Attentive, 
Accurate,  and  Acute. 

§.  19.  But  that  the  Mind  may  be  brought,  and  continu'(^ 
under  the  hfluencs  nnd  Conduct  cf  fuch  Inp.ruBions^  how  pro- 
per foever  they  may  be,  it  is  of  abfolutc  Neceflity.  (i .)  That 
they  be  well  underftood,  and  for  this  the  greateft  part  of  Lcarr: 
ners  will  need  a  fit  Inftruftor.  (i.)  That  the  principal 
Matters  be  carefully  recolleded  and  remember  d  (cfpccially 
fuch  as  are  more  fuited  to  our  State  and  Circumftances)  fo 
that  they  may  lie  ready  in  the  Mind  for  Ufc :  Nor  fhould 
this  be  done  by  Learners  only  ;  others  might,  perhaps,  do 
well  to  revile  fome  fuch  Trad  as  this,  even  as  fome  great 
Men  have  tho't  fit  to  review  their  Grammar,  once  a  Year. 
And  this  were  the  rather  to  be  done  in  regard  we  do  often 
mifs  it,  not  fo  much  from  the  want  of  Knowledge,  as  thro' 
our  not  remembring,  or  attending  duly  to  what  we  know  r 
And  therefore  this  Effay  may  be  allow'd  to  do  the  part  of  2 
Remembrancer  to  thofe,  who  need  it  not  as  an  Inftrudor. 
(5)  That  thelni^ructionsbereduc'd  to  Exercifeand  PraOice, 
and  it  were  beft  for  Learners,  that  it  fhould  be  under  a  pro- 
■per  Infpeftor,  eitlier  as  he  may  fpecially  Order,  or  as  this 
tffay  it  fdf  may  more  particularly  dkc('>',  towards  the  clofc 
thereof  And  fome  fuch  Mrthod  fl^.ould  be  carry'd  on,  till  the 
Learner  come  to  an  habit  of  ufing  his  Reafon,  with  eafe  and 
difpatch,  agreeably  ro  rhe  Rules  delivered,  without  a  formal 
Reference  to  thcui,  or  actual  thinking  of  them,  as  Artifts  in 
Other  Cafes  ate  wont  to  do,  without  attending  to  the  Mea- 
fiires  by  which  they  tirft  attain  d  their  Skill:  And  it  would 
be  indeed  pedantic  tomakcOftentation  of  our  Acquaintance 
wr.h  Lop'c,  bv  atfe^^ing  thofe  Terms  of  Art,  which  like  the 
Workman's  |;iftruments,  are  only  to  be  us'd,  notfjiewn. 


§  2oi  As 


The  IntrodudioK.  vii 


§  20.  As  to  the  Method  of  this  EflTay,  I  (hall  firft  give 
the  Appar/itiis  Lcgicus,  or  Logical  Furniture,  Avhich  I  con- 
ceive to  be  previoufly  rcquiflce  towards  the  dircfting  or  al- 
fiftingof  our  Reafou  ;  and  then  what  I  inay  call  the  Vfus  Lc- 
gicus,  or  Logical  Ule  of  it  in  treating  of  feme  more  obferva- 
ble  purpofes,  wherein  our  Reafon  is  lo  be  dircrted  and  aill- 
fted.  The  former  will  make  the  lirft  Port  of  this  Treatife  j 
and  here  I  fhaJl  fpeak  fomewhat  of  Tho'ts  as  leading  to 
Things,  and  then  of  Things  as  they  are  the  Objefts  of  Tho't  .- 
And  Ihall  firft  endeavour  to  fet  forth  the  whole  compafs  of 
Things,  under  the  more  obvious  and  common  Notions,  and 
afterwards,  according  to  a  more  Nice  and  abftraft  Confide- 
ration,  whether  in  their  Elements,  or  the  Rcfultances  from 
them  :  I  Ihall  then  draw  out  fome  of  them,  which  appear 
to  ftand  fairly  connected  or  disjoin'd,  in  certain  Pofitions, 
which  will  be  either  Principles,  or  the  nearer  Dedu^ions 
from  them. 

§  21.  When  T  come  to  treat  of  the  Ufes  and  Purpofes, 
which  areto  be  ferv'dby  Reafon  ;  I  fhallfirfl  fpeak  of  fuch, 
as  may  be  fubferviem  to  the  reft,  vi:(.  Rightly  to  take  what 
others  deliver,  and  juftly  to  exprefs  what  we  our  fclves  ir- 
lend  ;  and  then  (hall  proceed  to  thole  which  may  be  thereby 
fubferv'd,  as,  (i.)  Rightly  to  make  and  purfue  Enquiric?. 
(z.y  Rightly  to  difccrn,  whether  that  which  lies  before  i:s,be  a 
matterproper  for  us  to  proceed  upon,  or  how  far  it  may  befo. 
(3.)  Rightly  to  aHign  what  place  this  or  that  ought  to  have 
in  our  Attendance,  and  what  proportion  of  it.  (4.)  Rightly 
ro  eftimate  the  Apprehenfions  of  Things  as  they  are  fingly 
taken.  (5.)  Rightly  to  judge  and  pronounce  of  Thingsin 
affirming,  or  denying.  ,;6.)  Rightly  to  apprehend  and  ^d- 
mit  what  is  fufficiently  Evident.  (7.)  Rightly  to  difcern 
what  danger  there  may  be  of  Miftake  in  any  Cafe,  and  of 
what  importance  a  Miitake  would  be :  And  thefe,  together 
with  the  fubfervient  Ufcs  of  our  Reafon  will  make  up  the  fe- 
cond  part  of  this  Eflay. 

§  21.  I  (hall  conclude  the  whole  with  thofe  farther  Ufes 
of  our  Reafon,  which  are  fomewhat  more  Special,  and  come 
rearer  to  common  Service,  vi:(.  (i.)  Rightly  to  eftimate 
Proof,  and  to  aflent  accordingly,  fo  far  as  the  Proof  will 
warrant,  and  juftifie.  (2.)  Rightly  to  make  out  what  may 
be  fitly  fuppos'd  True,    but  appears  not  yet  fufficiently  Evi:- 

B  4  dear. 


viii  Ihe  Itttroduciion, 

dent,  by  fuch  Proof  as  tlie  Matter  will  admit,  and  the  oc- 
cafion  requires.  (3.)  Rightly  to  infer,  fo  as  what  is  inferr'd, 
may  evidently  appear  to  I  e  a  juft  Confequence  of  that,  from 
which  it  is  dcdiic'd.  (4.)  Rightly  to  dire!^^  and  ap'ph'  to 
Ufe  and  Service  what  ought  to  be,  or  is  capable  of  l->€iLig  fo 
diredted  and  apply  d,  Laftly,  and  more  at  large.  Rightly 
to  conduft  our  felves.  and  our  Ai^^airs,  n^ore  particularly  in 
the  way  of  Learning. 


AN 


A  N 

ESS  A  Y 

For  the  Improvement  q( 

REASON,  6-c. 

PART   I. 


F 


CHAP.     I. 


§  r.  ^  ^OR  the  better  dircAing  and  aflifting  of  our 
Reafon  and  Tho't,  It  feems  highly  requilue, 
if  not  altogether  Neceflary  ;  thatlirft  of  all,  we 
be  led  into  feme  general  and  orderly  Acquain- 
tance with  the  various  matters  of  Tho't,  as  being  the  Objedls 
about  which  Reafon  is  Converfant.  It  may  be  therefore  gi- 
ven as  a  previous  and  preparatory  Rule  for  the  prcfent  Exer- 
cife  and  Improvement  of  Reafon,  in  order  to  the  farther  Ufe 
thereof;  That  vpcfumifo  our  Minds  with  n  mctlocdicalSet  of  ge- 
neral and  apprcvcd  Kotirm ,  about  the  differ ;nt  Sorts  of 
Things,   vehichmay  come  under  Conftderation. 

§  z.  We  were  not  Confcious  that  our  Minds  began  to 
Work,  till  they  were  excited,  whether  by  Supernatural 
Touches  upon  them ;  or  by  the  inward  feeling  we  had  of 
Pain  or  Pleafure,  fpringing  within ;  or  the  Notices  drawn 
by  fenfible  Perception  from  without ;  all  which  have  been 
flowly  improv'd  by  growing  Obfervation  and  Experience, 
together  with  Difcourfe  and  Reading,  as  we  became  capable 
ofthem,  and  were  engaged  in  them  :    And  yet  perhaps  all 

has 


2  An  tjjay  for  the  Part  I. 

has  not  hitherto  amounted,  nor  Avould  in  a  much  longer 
time,  to  a  every  extendve,  tho'  but  fuperlicial  Acquaintance 
with  Things :  And  What  we  commonly  have  is  far  from  be- 
ing orderly  digefted  ;  fo  that  the  feveral  forts  of  Notions  Ave 
have  got  might  be  readily  gone  to ;  bur,  as  they  came  in  Ac- 
cidentally at  various  Times,  and  on  various  Occafions,  fo 
they  have  been  thrown  together,  as  it  happened,  without  any 
thing  of  Method  or  Order.  I  fhall  therefore  offer  the  requi- 
fite  Help,  for  obferving  the  forementioned  Rule,  and  begin 
with  fome  Remarks  about  Tho  t  it  felf,  as  leading  to  Things. 
Now  here  it  may  be  i^fefully  obferv'd. 

§  3.  (r.)  That  the  exercife  of  our  Minds  in  T/j/«Vw^,  and 
the  Tho'ts  therein  form'd,  and  prefcnted  to  our  Confideration, 
are  tlie  moft  immediate  Objecits  of  the  Underftanding,  where- 
of we  are  Confcious,  and  cannot  doubr,  but  know  them  in- 
tuitively without  Reafoning,  and  certainly  beyond  Queftion, 
toth  that  they  are,  and  are  fucii,  as  we  perceive  them  to  be  j 
when  yet  we  cannot  enter  farther  into  the  Nature  of  them, 
than  by  conceiving  them  generally  and  indiflinftly,  as  At- 
tributes or  Modes,  /.  c.  Somewhat  appertaining  to,  and  depen- 
ding upon  fomething  elfe  in  us,  which  does  fo  adt,  or  is  fo 
aftefted,  as  we  inwardly  feel:  and  perhaps  both  at  once,  in 
differing  Refpecls :  For  fuch  may  be  the  make  of  our  Souls, 
as  that  being  acted,  or  mov'd,  they  Aft,  and  when  excited  do 
exert  their  Power  of  Thinking. 

^  4.  {%.)  By  Thinking^  is  therefore  Underftood,  that 
Action  or  Imprcflion,  whereby  the  Mind  is  pnt  under  fuch  a 
Mode,  and  by  Tho*t,  the  Mode  it  felf  fo  produc'd  j  rieitherof 
which  we  can  juftly  explain,  but  might  illuftraic  by  tlie  Mo- 
tion of  the  Body,  fuppofein  fitting  down,  and  its  conthiued 
Pofn^'c  ^f  fitting  afterwards.  Now  the  Mind  can  refled:,  or 
tun;  ivp  Obfervatioiiupon  it  felf,  as  it  is  mov'd  in  Thinking, 
or  m  xLified  in  formed  Tho'.^ght,  almoft  as  if  it  wer-e  another 
Mind  diftindl  and  fcparate  from  it  felf:  And  this  it  feems 
to  do  by  V  ircue  of  that  wonderful  power  of  Memory,  which 
ierves  to  retain  or  to  recover  foregoing  Tho'ts,  and  to  fet 
them  before  us  as  in  a  Glafs  to  be  obferv'd  and  confider'd. 

§  5.  (3  J  It  is  fufliciently  plain,  or  even  felf-evident  to 
our  inward  Perception,  that  whatever  we  think  of,  is  pre- 
fented  in  Tho't,  by  our  Minds  to  themfelves.  And  where 
we  feem  moft  immediately  to  lay  hold  on  Things  themfelves, 
bv  their  grolfer  Subftance,  as  when  they  ate  taken  into  the 
ISiouth,  or  grafped  with  the  Hand  j  y^t  wliat  we  do  firft  and 
moft  diredly  attend  to,  is  the  fendble  Perception  we  have 
by  the  Tail  or  Feeling.    It  is  very  certain,  that  we  know 

norhing 


Chap.  I.         Improvement  of  Reafon. 


nothing  of  Things,  but  as  we  confcioufly  Perceive,  Imagine, 
or  Conceive  them  ;  fince  our  knowing  Things  is  indeed  no- 
thing elfe,  but  our  perceiving,  imagining,  or  conceiving  them, 
with  confcioufnefs  that  we  do  fo. 

§  6.  (4.)  Thefe  Operations,  or  imprefles  of  the  Mind, 
as  they  are  confcioufly  felt,  or  inwardly  perceiv'd,  are  fo  ma- 
ny different  ways  of  Thinking,  and  kinds  of  Tho't,  For  we 
cannot  properly  be  faid  to  perceive  any  thing  by  the  outward 
Senfes,  er  inwardly  to  imagine  any  fenfible  QbjctfJ:,  or  to 
conceive  of  what  is  intelleiSual,  and  falls  not  diredWy  under 
Senfe  or  Imagination,  unlefs  we  attend  thereto  by  Thinking, 
of  the  thing  perceiv'd,  imagin'd,  or  conceiv'd.  Andweniay 
conceive  of  Things  as  certain,  in  what  is  caifd  Knowledge 
more  ftridly,  or  in  well  aflured  Faith ;  as  probable,  in  Opi- 
nion, or  in  a  more  inform  Belief^  as  Doubtful,  in  Con- 
je(ftiire ;  as  Dark  when  we  enquire  into  them,  as  fome  way 
obfervable  when  we  Contemplate  or  conlider  of  them.  Our 
fenfible  Perceptions  are  commonly  diflinguifh'd  according  to 
the  various  bodily  Organs,  by  means  of  which  our  Souls  do 
perceive:  We  might  call  them  all,  Feeling,  either  by  what 
is  common  to  the  whole  Body,  vi:{.  Aji  inward  Skin  fpread 
chro'  it,  and  the  Nerves  which  terminate  therein;  or  by 
what  is  peculiar  to  fome  more  curious  Parts,  as  the  Eye,  the 
Ear,  Mouth,  and  Noftrils,  with  the  more  obfervable  Nerves 
belonging  to  them ;  and  perhaps  fome  other  Parts  might  alfo 
be  reckon'd  as  particular  Organs  of  Senfation.  Our  Imagi- 
nations are  no  other  than  the  inward  Reprefentation  of  fen- 
fible Perceptions,  in  abfence  of  the  fenfible  Obje£l ;  or  when, 
without  ufing  the  outward  Organ,  we  are  inwardly  af- 
fedcd,  in  fome  meafure  atleaft,  as  if  we  faw,  or  heard,  or 
ptherwife  perceiv'd  the  f.niible  Objedl. 

§  7.  (5  )  A  fingle  Tho't  may  give  rife  to  many  more  by 
way  of  reflexive  Confideration,  inquiry,  Conjedure,  In- 
ference, Argumentation,  and  Refolves  about  it .-  For,  bcfides 
the  confcioufnefs  we  have  of  our  Thinking,  when  we  do  fo, 
we  may  be  excited,  or  can  fet  our  felves,  to  take  a  more  So- 
lemn and  defign'd  review  of  our  precedent  Thinking,  or 
Tho't,  by  various  Acts  of  reflect  Thinking  and  Tho'ts  there- 
in form'dj  as  we  may  of  thefe  again  by  farther  Reflection, 
and  fo  might  proceed  endlefly,  in  a  continued  and  manifold 
Series. 

§  8.  (6.)  Tho't  may  be  confider'd,  either  abfolutely  in 
it  felf,  as  what  is  confcioufly  known,  or  relatively,  as  what 
is  underftood  to  refer  to  fome-what  elfe,  whereof  it  brings 
the  ReprQfcntation  or  Report  to  qui  Minels :    And  this  is  the 

more 


4  rln  t'ff.iv  for  the  Parr  I. 

morcufual  way  of  corildering  it,  for  ive  do  generally  refer 
our Tho'cs  to  1  hings ;  or  rather, 

^  9-  (l)  ^'^•'e  commonly  overlook  the  Thp'ts,  and  our 
Minds  run  dircdly  rothc  1  hings  Avhereof  we  think,  fo  tliac 
Tho'cs  arc  generally  to  our  Confideration  inftead  of  the 
Things  themfelcs;  atvl  wc  fupppfe  our  felves  to  confider 
Thi<5  or  that  Thing  in  it  felf  immediately  and  diredly,  when 
as  we  cannot  pOiTibly  take  any  Cognizance  thereof,  but  under 
thofe  fcnfibie  Perceptions,  iniaginative  Reprcfentations,  or 
intelK'dtiial  ConC'T^ions,  whi  h  are  to  us  the  Natural  and 
Intcrr^al  Sicns  of  Thir.g>,  as  they  arc,  fpme  way  or  other 
objcdlcd  to  onr  M  njs,  and  fometimes,  only,  by  the  Ope- 
ration of  the  Phanfie,  nr  by  tlie  Ijitelltft,  conjoining,  divi- 
ding, and  varioufly  difpoling,  what  has  been  other  wife  trik;cn 
in,  or  clfe  by  Imprcirions  made  upon  us,  in  a  Supernatural 
or  Preternatural  way,  by  G'  d,  or  Angels,  or  by  fome 
accidental  and  un.onimon  Motions  of .  the  Blood  and 
Spirits. 

'  §  lo.  (8.)  Otir  Perceptions  doc  nor  a'wnys  refemblc  the 
Tlung"^  to  wh'ch  they  relate,  nor  ordinarily  fervc  by  them- 
felves  to  let  us  far  into  the  Nature  of  them  ;  they  are  com- 
monly no  more  than  Notices  and  Intimations  of  foinewhafor 
other  in  the  Make  of  the  fennbleObjed:,  orat-nidingit,  witl^ 
which  we  are  fo  AfF'  £tcd.  Flat  fupctficial  Figures,  as  of  a 
Triangle,  Circle,  Squa-e,  Trapezium,  c^r.  Teem  to  be  the 
onlv  Things  v/hich  cur  Sigh':  can  cxa£l]y  take,  as  they  are  in 
themfelvcs:  VVhnt  is  C  \-,cave  or  Convex  may  be  reprefen- 
tcd  by  difpofing  lighter  and  darker  Co'oi"!rs  accordingly  upon 
Ti,  Flat ;  They  are  not  rhercfoi  e  difccrned  by  the  Eye  in  thei? 
Qwn  proper  Nature,  hvx  the  Objedl  is  judg'd  to  be  fuch,  ' 
upon  comparing  together  our  differing  Perceptions  of  the 
Ttme  1  hing,  as  by  the  Sight  and  by  the  Touch,  or  elfc  by 
our  Reaff-ning,  tho'  perhaps  unobfervedly,  upon  the  vilible 
Appcirance  in  our  nearer  approaches,  or  in  our  viewing  the 
fcveral  parts  fucccirively,  and  in  differing  ways.  In  (hort, 
'tis  only  the  fuperficies,  not  the  fubftance  of  Bodies  we  fee  ; 
tho'  by  a  quick  procedure  of  Tho't  we  may,  as  it  were,  in 
a  moment,  travel  all  over  the  Obje£t,  and  thro'  it,  fo  as  to 
apprehend  fomewhat  of  that  fubftantiality,  which  we  cannot 
perceive  by  the  Eye :  Nor  will  the  other  Senfes  by  them- 
felves  inform  us,  what  there  is  in  the  feveral  Bodies,  which 
fo  affe£tstheEar,  the  Smell,  or  Tafte,  or  Touch. 

§  11.(9.)  The  imaginative  Reprcfentations  of  the  Phan- 
fic,  which  they  call  the  common  and  internal  Senfe,  cannot 
of  themfelvcs  mftri^d  us  farther  about  the  nature  of  Objeds, 

-    than 


Chap.  I.  b/i^'rovL.K>'t^}t  of  Reaion.  5 

than  our  fenfible  P.ercepcioiis  could,  being  general] y  a  kind 
of  Repetition  of  thcfc,  as  has  been  Ihewn. 

§  12.  J  c.)  Our  inrelletitual  Conceptions  cannot  giv-€  us 
(however  in  our  prefent  Stare)  the  intuitive  Knowledge,  ot 
the  immediate  and  airuring  View,  as  it  vvfie,  of  what  is  in 
or  about  the  ObjeA  diftindl  from  our  iJea  or  Tho't;  Yet 
we  may  hereby,  :  i.j  Apprehend  fcmewhat  in  relation  there- 
to as  Self-evident,  and,  (z.)  Reafon  out  foincwhat  farther 
with  fiifficien:  certainty.  (3.)  Colleft  ioniewiiat  farther  jlUi, 
as  high'y  probable-  (4.)  Conjecture  yet  more,  as  not  un- 
likely. (5.)  We  may,  perhaps,  conceive  a  great  deal  far- 
ther, as  no  ways  inconfiltent  or  impoilible.  And  finally  in  a 
negative  way  (6.)  We  might  always  obferve  a  multitude 
of  Points,  which  poflibly,  probably,  or  certainly  do  not,  it 
may  be  cannot,  belong  to  this  or  that. 

S  15.  {\i.J  Tho'  it  appears  not  that  wc  have  any  innate 
Ideas,  or  formed  Notions  or  Principles  laid  in  by  Nature,  an- 
tecedenrly  to  the  cxercife  of  our  Sences  and  Underflandings,^ 
yet  it  muft  be  granted,  that  we  were  born  with  the  Natural 
Facuk)',  whereby  we  adtually  difcern  the  agreement  or  difa- 
grecment  of  fome  Notions,  lo  loon  as  wcliave  the  Notions 
themfelves  ;  as  that  we  can  or  do  Think,  that  therefore  we 
our  fclvcs  are ;  that  i  and  1  make  3  >t.hat  Gold  is  not  Silver,  nor 
Ice  formally  Water;  that  the  whole  is  greater  than  its  part, 
^c.  and  if  wc  ihould  fet  our  felves  to  do  it,  we  cannot  deli- 
berately and  ferioiifly  doubt  of  its  being  fo.  This  wc.may 
call  intuitive  Knowledge,  or  Natural  Certainty  wrought  in- 
to our  very  Make  and  Conltitution.     Now, 

^  14.  (12).  It  is  to  us  intuitively  certain,  or  by  a  very 
iliortand  ealie  Dcduftion,  that  contraditUous  Points  cannot 
both  be  True  or  both  Falfe  ;  as  for  a  Thing  to  be,  and  not 
to  be  at  once,  and  in  the  fame  rcfpect  •  but  if  one  be  falfe, 
the  other  muft  be  true,  or  if  that  were  true,  the  other  muft 
be  falfe  :  And  it  is  farther  alike  certain,  that  where  the  Caie 
is  fuch,  that  part  of  the  two  mult  be  fo  long  taken  for  True, 
which  upon  ftrift  Examination  approves  it  felf  to  be  more 
like  Truth  than  the  other. 

§  15.  (13.)  That  there  are  Things  about  us  really  ex- 
isting, whether  we  or  oihers  think  of  them  or  no,  mull,  ac- 
cording to  thcfe  indifpurable  Meafures  be  taken  for  True, 
if  It  had  but  ever  fo  little  more  to  be  rarinnaily  faid  for  it, 
than  can  be  offer'd  for  the  ccntradiftory  Point,  vi:(.  £thac 
there  are  not  real  Things  without  us,  wuh  which  we  are  lo 
atfecled,  but  that  they  are  all  prcfented  to  cur  JMinds  byde- 
Julive.  Imagination,    as  in  Dreamsj    '.vhen  yet  it  muft  be 

ownV. 


6  Jft  tjfay  for  the  Part  I. 

own'd,  that  we  never  did  our  Iclves  awake  from  our  clear 
and  well  examin  d  fenfible  perceptions,  or  felf  evident  and 
approv'd  Conceptions,  lb  as  to  deteft  them  to  have  been  but 
breams  and  Illufions  j  nor  could  we  never  hear  of  any  other 
Man  who  did  :  But  on  the  contrary,  all  the  Reafon  and 
Argument  lies  oh  the  affirmative  fide,  and  there  is  fcarce  any 
thing  againft  it  but  the  paultry  Cavil,  of  a  meer  fuppofed 
poflibility  to  the  contrary,  fuch  as  Atheifts  commonly  take  up 
againft  the  being  of  a  God  ;  and  irreligious  Perfons  againft  a 
future  State  :  Whenas  we  cannot  reafonably  fuppofe  it 
poflible,  that  we,  with  all  Men  before  us  and  about  us,  have 
teen  in  a  continual  Dream  ;  nor  without  the  blackeft  Impu- 
tation upon  our  Maker,  as  if  he  could  be  fo  grofly  deficient, 
in  Wifdom,  Power  or  Gcodnels,  as  to  lay  us  under  an  inevi- 
table necciTity  of  being  continually  deceived.  : 

§  i6.  (14,)  Uponthe  whole,  how  abfurd  were  it  to  calj 
the  teality  ef  thofe  things  in  Qiieftion,  which  do  fo  really 
irid  unavoidably  to  our  bceling,  either  Accommodate  or  InT 
commode  us  in  our  prefent  State :  To  us  therefore  they  muft 
be  real,  whether  we  would  or  no,  as  being  of  real  Concern-^ 
Dient.  And  it  were  Ridiculous  ro  doubt  of  their  being  fo  for 
no  better  Reafoq,  than  becaufe  we  are  not  furer  of  it,  than 
God  law  fit  to  make  us  naturally  capable  of  bcing>  or  there 
was  any  need  we  (hould  be,  for  any  valuable  end  or  purpofe 
Encumbent  on  us  to  purfue. 

§  17.  I  fliall  therefore  make  no  doubt  of  proceeding 
from  the  Account  thus  given  of  Tho'ts,  to  that  of  Things, 
about  which  they  are  employ'd,  and  (hall  be  very  careful  to 
offer  only  fuch  Notions  about  them,  as  may  approve  them- 
felves  to  Humane  Sen  Pes  and  Minds  in  their  proper  State,  as 
they  are  more  generally  found,  and  in  that  regular  ufe  of 
them  which  common  Obfervation  and  Experience  dire».'t  ^ 
and  which  will  appear  right  (if  not  atfirft  view,  yet)  upon  a 
little  Confi deration,  or  however,  as  they  will  be  fupported 
with  Proof,  or  inferr'd  from  fure  Principles,  fo  that  we  may 
take  them  fafely  and  with  Satisfa^ion,  for  a  firm  Bafis  to. 
OUT  farther  Conlideration  of  Things,  and  anufefui  Fountain 
of  Solution  to  a  multitude  of  Enquiries  about  themo 


CHAF« 


Chap.  2.  Improvement  of  K^t^iou, 


CHAP.   n. 

§  i.  ]  Shall  now  confider  Things  in  the  largcft  Acceptation, 
*  as  Themes,  or  Objeds  of  Tho'c :  And,  Firfi,  in  a  more 
familiar  and  lefs  notional  Way  ;  in  order  to  ibmewhai  of 
i  general,  tho'  but  overly  Acquaintance  with  them,  and  to 
fubferve  fome  valuable  Purpofes,  to  which  the  following 
Account  may  be  apply 'd,  and  will  ( in  part  however)  be  di- 
refted  in  the  procedure,  or  afterwards. 

§  2.  What  I  am  here  endeavouring,  is  a  plain,  fliort,  and 
Nummary  Reprefentation  (\,}  Of  what  we  may  call  the 
Imelle^ual,  or  Ideal,  and  Lcjfer  PVorid,  which  yet  is  in  fome 
fort  capable  of  taking  in  the  Greater:  I  mean,  the  various 
iVays  of  Thinking,  which  we  cither  aftually  have,  or  may, 
and  ought  to  ufe  upon  Occafion,  whether  in  reflefting  upon 
thefe  very  Modes  of  Tho'ts  themfeJves,  or  upon  the  Mntter 
of  rhem,  fo  as  to  confider  {e.  gr,)  what  our  Notions  or  Ideas 
in  thernlelves  are;  to  what  Objeft  they  refer ;  whether,  and 
how  far,  they  may  bereafonably  judg'd,  agreeing  or  difagree- 
ing  thereto,  z3c.  and,  (2.)  Of  that  v^hich  may  be  term'd  the 
objeftive,  real  and  greater  fVorU  about  us,  as  it  may  be  fairly 
collected  from  what  we  confcioufly  know,  and  can  rationally 
conclude,  as  has  been  fliewn  in  the  clofe  of  the  preceding 
Chapter :  So  that  we  may  well  take  the  greateft  part  of 
Things  about  us  to  hav.-  a  real  Correfpondency  to  the  Ideas, 
in  which  they  are,  and  have  been  conftantly  [teknied  to  the 
generahty  of  Mankind,  and  that  no  good  Reafon  can  be  gi- 
ven, why  we  ihould  not  acquiefce  therein,  as  well  as 
they. 

§  3.  The  more  general  Ufe  and  Service  of  the  Reprefen- 
tation here  may  be  to  bring  our  Minds  into  a  more  intimate 
Acc-jutiintance  with  their  own  v/ays  of  Working  and  Capaci- 
ties, as  alfo  to  fix  and  further  the  K^wvoledge  of  other  Thingsj 
and  by  all,  to  lead  them  up  to  God  the  Father  of  our  Spirits, 
and  Maker  of  the  Univerl'e  ;  That  they  may  center  in  him 
as  the  Chief  and  Ultimate  Good.  Now  we  may  here  Ob- 
fcrve. 

§  4.  I.  That  cur  Tho'ts,  both  as  they  arc  forming  or 
framing,  and  alio  as  actually  form'd  and  objef^ed  to  our 
M'.nd,  are  matter  of  Tho't,  as  being  what  we  may  and  do, 
and  are  often  greatly  conccrn'd  to  think  (S:  But  that  ha%  'tis 
hop'd,  {"ifficienUy  appcar'd  in  ihe  fonner Chapter,  as  alio  ; 

§5.  2.  Ofkr 


^  A/t  hjfty  for  the  Pare  i. 

§  5.  2.  Thnt  ether  Thhigs  cannot  be  tho'tof  b\  us,  but  as 
ihc)' z.^e  inxv-irdtyprejenten  in  fome  or  oth&r  Idea,  w"r.  As  per- 
ceiv'd,  imagiii'd  orconcciv'd  :  So  chat  the  more  immediate 
Objediot  our  Coiilideracion  is  not  properly  the  very  Thing ic 
fclf  without  u5,  but  the  inward  Apprelieniich  wc  have  of  it  t 
Tho'  by  comparing  cne  way  of  perceiving  the  fame  Objet"t 
with  another  ,  and  by  rcafonuig  upon  the  Matter,  we  have 
cafily  come  to  know,  that  there  is  generally  an  Object  really 
without  us,  as  wclla^  an  Apprchcnfion  ot"  ic  w.thin  ;  as  when 
we  fee  a  Book,  which  yot  we  cannot  feel  witho-n  putting  out 
oar  hand  to  reach  it,  we  aie  better  allur'd,  both,  that  there 
IS  a  real  Obje'>,   and  that  it  is  without  ns. 

«j  6.  3.  I'hcre  is  commonly  fonie  good  degree  of  Cor- 
iTcfpondency  (fo  r.-ir  as  may  be  needful  for  us)  betwixc  inter- 
nal Ideas,  and  external  Objefts ;  /.  c.  fomcwhat  in  thcjc  na-_ 
turally  totted  fo  to  afteCt  us  in  producing  thofc  ^  tho'  it  may, 
or  perhaps  mull  confi'icrably  differ,  a^  the  Draught  or  Pu'ture 
of  a  Glob^rfcm  the  Globe  it  felf.  ; 

_  §  7.  4.  Whilit  we  tinnk,  we  cannot  but  be /«;c  we  do- 
10;  as  hkcuile  that  we  think  .*/-'/;  cr  thr.t  in  particular  of  this 
or  that. 

§  &.  5.  Ottcn^ioies  we  may  be  equally  /«>v,  tliat  we 
have  fo  Tho'tor  did  fo  ihink  at  f'ch  a  tune  on  fuch  an  Occa- 
lion,  and  by  the  fame  reafun  cTiac  we  did  Hear,  See,  Read, 
Speak,  or  A-:^  thii  or  that.  And  this  is  what  we  call  a  pcr- 
fe't  or  certain  Remembrance  proceeding'  from  a  Faccdty  ab- 
folutcly  neceilary  for  ilie  canying-  on  of  1  ho't,  Difcourfe, 
or  Brdinei>;  and  much  inore  fur  rcfunnngany  ot  them  after 
an  Interruption' or  Intcrmiiiion  ;  and  it  ought  certainly  to  be, 
culrivated  wuh  great  care  on  many  accoants  (which  i  can- 
rot  Itay  to  mention);  and  fo  much  the  rather,  becaufe, 

^  9.  6.  In  many  Cafes  Memory  is  in  danger  to  fail  us,  fo 
that  we  may  be  unLCitni//,  or  .nay  very  ficxp  v,  and  with  dir- 
ficulcy  rccolJeut,  whether  a  Matter  were  fo  or  not  :  And 
moreefpecially  as  to  what  is  lorp  without  rational  Connexion: 
(as  Names,  (^s.)  Nice  and  Critical,  fo  that  a  fmall  Miftakc 
tnay  make  a  great  Alteration  (a5  in  accurate  detiiutions,  <^s.). 
tchfus'J,  not  put  into  any  ^^^cd  Order,  to  as  one  thing  migliD 
lead  to  another ;  h./.g,  conhiiing  of  many  Parts,  or  Pomts  jv 
le/i-mtUiieJ^  jsconcciv'd  to  be  ot  no  contcrn  >>i  iictle  .to  us; 
liot  much  affeding  us  with  Plcalareor  Pain,  CS'c..  and  farther, 
what  we  have  hot  lnte':y  call' J.  to  Miiul,  or  net  Jo  often  as  the 
diificuity  ofPvemembring  mightrtqu.re;  Ladly,  (tomauion 
J 10  luore)  What  ctcurs  to  us  in  old  j]gc^  wiien  the  Spirits  are 
iowcr,  ani  the  Mind,   perhaps,  deeper  engaged  ocherways;' 

^vhen 


Chap  2.  Improvement  of  fveafon.  a 

when  as  lome  Things,  which  fell  out  much  longer  fince» 
are  well  remember'd,  as  having  then  made  a  great  ImpreiH- 
6n.  and  thti  it  may  be  fince  ofcen  renew'd  by  the  frequent 
recolle'^ing  and  repeating  of  fuch  Matters .     Bur, 

§  lo.  7.  M'^ri ting  down  feme  Minutes,  and  Hints  at  leall, 
of  what  we  would  preferve,  is  altogether  Neceflkry  for  all 
Perfons  in  fome  Cafes  i  and  in  all  much  fafer  than  trufting 
wholly  to  Memory :  And  befides  that  our  writing  Things 
rtiay  often  be  a  means  to  imprint  them  deeper  upon  our 
Minds  J  the  frequent  Review  is,  hoAvever,  lure  to  do  fo  ; 
and  even  a  glance  of  the  Eye  upon  fome  leading  Words  or 
Paflages  may  prompt  or  help  useafily  to  recoiled:  the  reft  with-" 
6ut  reading  it  on  :     And, 

§  II.  8.  There  are  divers  other  helps  to  Memory;  as 
by  Referring  what  we  would  remember  to  fomewhat  elfe, 
which  we  are  very  Converfant  with,  and  imagining  we  faw 
it  writteji  here  or  there ;  by  fome  notable  Token ^  i.  e.  either, 
fome  very  obfervabie  Circumftance  attending  what  was  faid 
or  done,  or  lomewhat  unufual  to  our  feh  es,  as  a  Thread  or 
Ring  put  on  a  Finger,  where  we  do  not  commonly  wear  one', 
to  mind  us  of  fomething  to  be  faid  or  done.  Again,  by  ufi>ig 
what  we  would  retain  in  Converfe  or  otherwife  ;  as  alio 
ufing  Memory  it  felf,  frequently  and  with  gradual  Ad- 
vances, but  not  over-loading  it :  It  may  likewife  be  helpful 
to  Place  what  we  would  remember,  in  feveral  Divifions  upon 
a  paper  feparated  by  Lines,  and  that  fome  leading  Words  or 
Sentences  be  very  remarkably  writ  in  differing  Chara'  ers,  or 
with  Ink  of  differing  Colours,  and  that  then  we  fetour  felves- 
to  imagine  the  Writing  as  if  it  were  a  Picture  :  Alfo  th^. 
dcfing^  or  however  the  fixivg  of  our  £>e,  may  be  of  ufe  to  fix 
the  Mind,  and  help  the  Memory  :  Committing  things  tOj 
Memory  over  Night,  and  recolle^Ung  them  in  the  Morning, 
with  divers  other  Methods  might  be  mentioned,  but  we  mult 
pafs  on. 

§  1 2.  I  proceed  therefore  to  more  fpccial  Modes  of  Thin- 
king, and  Matters  of  Tho't,  or  How  Men  think,  and  ofH^oat  .- 
and  lliall  here  labour,  as  far  as  well  may  be,  to  r'jwf^-j^c 
and  take  in  the  whole  of  thefc,  but  vnn\iCo>itrn^  the  Account 
into  as  narrow  a  compafs  as  will  confift  with  the  intendment 
of  it:  And  vvhilft  every  Thing  may  not  be  cxprcfly  menti- 
on'd,  (hall  endeavour  to  Se'ecl  and  draw  out  what  may  be  of 
greatelt  Uie,  djvofwg  them  in  fuch  Order,  as  may  hel^x  the 
Underftanding and  Memory,  ^ndTrcifi' g  them  more  or  lefe 
briefly,  as  may  belt  anfwer  the  fpecial  Purpofes  here  de- 
fignM,-  VI z\  '  ■  ^Li-" 

C  §  13.  That 


lO  An  Ejfaj/  for  the  Pare  i . 

§  13.  That  the  Reader  may  fiixl  fome  or  other  Head, 
whereto  he  niay  rcter  whatever  manner  of  Thinking,  or 
Matter  of  1  ho't  he  is  acqiuiiited  ^vicli  aheady  ;  and  that 
having  thus  refer  d,  and  as  it  -were  hdg^d  his  prtfent  Store,  he 
may  the  caficr  review  it  uf  on  any  peculiar  Occafion  :  As 
alfo  for  the  better  fecttririg  and  retaining  Avhat  Knowledge  he 
has ;  and  that  he  may  have  fit  He^ds  to  proceed  upon,  and 
Trains  to  purfuc,  with  Qj^erks  to  be  put,  and  fome  Hintj  td 
help  towards  the  Anfwering  of  them,  when  he  would  ufe  his 
own  Skill  for  the  eulai^gement  of  his  Stock  :  And  that  in 
cafe  he  has  any  particular  Arpumert  in  hand,  he  may  here 
look  out  and  try  what  wa\s  of  Tliinking  the  Matter  will  ad- 
mit or  may  require  ;  as  alfo  what  may  be  here  fug|;?^ed, 
which  can  help  him  to  defcry  the  Kj»d  or  common  Nacure, 
the  Sorts  or  differing  Natures,  the  more  noted  Marks  or  diftin- 
guifliii^  Chara^ers,  the  l^^ns  which  go  to  make  up  the  whole, 
the  Relatives,  or  what  other  Thingsarc  refer'd,  to  what  he  has 
ut>der  Conlideration  ;  and  more  particularly  what  is  ^ik?  ^ 
tmiike  in  this  or  that  reCpeS  j  what  the  Mntter  from,  or  of 
which  it  is  made  ;  what  the  fVw  or  moft  fundamental  Di- 
ftin^ion;  hywhat  A^^-ena -ruJ  fveaiss  ^T<ydxiccd,  f»r  what  end  ^ 
and  what  the  Thing  it  fcif  either  coyjtitutn  or  produces.  And 
wheieas  in  fome  Cafes  more  may  arife  than  were  Ncceflary, 
orfkto  be  made  ufe  of.  He  may  draw  ovt  of  the  mentioned 
particulars,  what  will  be  likely  beft  to  anfwer  his  Pur- 
pofe. 

§  14.  In  all  kinds  of  Tlw't,  we  miW,  obfervc,  or  attend 
to  fomewhat,  either  more  or  Icfs ;  and  aUo  have  fome  or 
other  Appreherifiov,  Notion,  or  Idea,  whether  it  be  right  or 
vrrong,  perfect  or  imperfect,  clear  and  diftin^,  or  dark  and 
confus'd. 

§  15.  In  perceiifitig  om  Sonh  attend  to  fome  Impretfion 
made  in  the  Brain  by  the  Motion  of  the  Spirits  or  Nerves  (or 
both  '  leading  thither  from  the  feveral  Organs  or  Inftruments 
of  Senfation ;  which  either  ferve  to  the  more  genera]  and 
common  way  of  Feeling,  unufual  Motions  ariling  from  Caufes 
within,  or  Objefts  without,  by  means  of  fome  inner  Skin 
made  of  the  Nervous  Fibres,  (which  mavbeaffefted  rhro'  the 
outer  Skin)  or  to  the  fpecial  Modes  of  Senfation,  which  are 
peculiar  to  the  Tongue  and  Palate  in  Tafting;  to  the  NoftxiJs 
in  SrnelUng  ;  to  the  Ear,  with  its  Tympanum  or  i^tietched 
Skit;,  and  inward  Furniture  in  Hearing  •  and  to  the  Eye, 
with  its  various  Coats  and  Humors  in  Seeing, 


§  16,  In 


(.hap.  2.  improvement  of  ^itdiion  II 

§  1 6.  \v\  imagining,  VJC  ?aicx\d  to  fcnne  like  ImprdTions 
or  Motions  in  the  Brain,  as  if  we  felr,  tailed,  Imelt,  heard, 
or  faw,  when  we  really  do  not,  but  either  do  by  defign,  in- 
wardly to  our  felves,  reprejent  feniible  Things  more  or ;  lels 
perfeftjy  ;  when  we  know  they  are  not  aftually  prefent  or 
by  miftake  Conceit  them  to  be  prefent,  when  they  really 
arc  not ;  or  defignedly  Feign  and  prefent  toour  Minds,  fome- 
what  of  a  fenfible  Kind,  which  we  did  never  fee,  hear,  &  ' 
by  compounding,  dividing,  or  otherways  altering  the  Ideas, 
we  have  fome  time  or  other  taken  in  by  Senfe  ;  or  elfe  Dreaw^ 
wheri  we  attend  to  certain  Motions  in  the  Brain,  whilft  the 
ufe  of  the  outward  Senfes  is  intermitted  thro'  a  general  Re- 
laxation of  the  Nerves ;  whereupon  the  contained  Spirits 
being  lefs  comprefs'd  are  lefs  elaltick,  and  fo  more  unfit  to 
tranlmit  any  Impreffion  from  external  Objedls. 
.  §  17.  Properly  and  ftridly  to  Conceive^  is  an  Adl  more 
purely  IntcUeElnal,  proceeding  from  a  Faculty  Superior  to 
thofe  of  Senfe  and  Phanfie,  or  Imagination,  which  are  limi- 
ted to  corporeal  Things,  and  thofe  Hetermind,  as  all  particu- 
lars muft  be,  to  this  or  that  Place,  Time,  Manner,  &c. 
When  as  that  Higher  Power  in  Man,  which  we  may  call  the 
Mind,  can  form  Appreheniions  of  what  is  not  Material  (u/^, 
of  Spirits  and  the  Affediions  of  Bodies,  which  fall  not  under 
Senfe)  andalfo  can  fTzmegenerrJ  Ideas  or  Notions,  orconfi- 
der  of  Things  in  a  general  way  without  attending  to  their 
particular  limited  Circumftances,  as  when  we  think  of  length 
in  a  Road  without  obferving  its  determinate  Meafure. 

§  1 8.  As  to  what  is  yet  more  Special  in  the  Modes  of 
Thinking  J  fome  Tho'ts  may  be  faid  to  y^^rr  or  rife  in  the 
Mind  as  ic  were  of  themfelves,  and  to  recur  or  return  again 
upon  us,  when  we  fought  them  not,  zs  3Lli6  to  follow^  and  as 
it  were,  hang  upon  us  when  we  would  rather  be  free  of  them, 
or  to  flis  from,  us  when  we  would  hold  and  fix  them.  And 
thefennight.feem  to  be  always,  as  they  may  really  be  fome- 
tirnes  injedted,  cajl  in  and  ftired  up  by  fome  invifible  Agent 
•v^ithout  us,  who  can  either  more  immediately  work  upon  cur 
Minds,  or,  however,  move  our  Animal  Spirits  j  or  to  be  by 
like  means  imprejfid,  continu'd  and  enforced ;  or  voithdrawu^ 
huidrcd,  and  diverted  :  But  we  may  rather  f  fpofe  'tis 
more  generally  from  fuch  rtcciJ.entai  and  lels  ufual  M  tims  of 
the  Blood  and  Spirits,,  9s  the  Brain  is  af^cAcd  withal  in  com- 
mon Dreams,  whjpn  'tisfo  dllfos'd  before  hand,  as  to  be  more 
capable  of  receiving  fuch  Impreflion. 


^■ 


C  2,  §  19.  But 


J  2  A^  ^Iny  f(^^  '^'«'  Part  I. 

§  19.  But  thegrearelt  part  of  our  Tho'cs  may  be  faid  to 
be  more  properly  onr  own,  as  being  confciouHy  Fomcd  by  us 
as  well  as  in  us :  Fur  even  when  we  rove  we  carry  our  Tho'ts 
thro' a  variety  of  Obietfts,  tho"  without  a  methodical  Proce- 
dure or  formed  Intention  fo  10  do.  In  glr.rcing^  we  make  no 
ft^y  upon  v.'hac  is  before  is,  and  do  but  llighdy  obferve  irs 
firft  and  general  Appearance  :  Whilft  pcrin^  is  a  continued 
Thinking  of  Tome  one  thine,  commonly  without  any  fpecial 
Defign,  and  to  no  good  Eife£l ;  for  the  avoiding  of  which, 
we  Ihould  endeavour  to  tum  or  transfer  our  Tho'ts  to  fome- 
what  elfe.  We  Scan  Things  by  confidering  them  intently  as 
it  were  on  all  fide?,  and  at  all  Points;  an  i  thus  we  may  come 
to  dctcH  or  dilcox  cr  what  lay  hid  before  under  fome  differing 
(and  commonly,  better)  Appearance.  We  firfl  take  in 
Things  by  a  more  dirccft  anJ  fimphV-ew^  or  Attendance  to 
them  i  but  may  afterwards  reflrci  thereon,  and  c  onfider  both 
the  manner  of  our  \iewing  ihcm,  and  the  Apprehenfion  or 
Idea  we  thereupon  had  of  them,  or  come  to  have  upon  far- 
ther Tho't.     And  here, 

§  ao,  Wc  may  /t/V/  one  Thing  to  ano:her,  as  fome  way 
or  other  appertaining  or  related  ro  it-  We  may  cnmt.ne  one 
way  of  perceiving,  imagining,  or  conceiving  with  another: 
Alfo  the  Idea  taken  in  one  way  with  what  we  have  other- 
ways;  and  likewife  one  external  Cbjedt  with  others,  to  fee 
bow  rhey  agreeor  difagree  :  We  mav  M>l}rr.cl^  or  diftindtly 
and  loparatciy  confidcr  what  cannot  be  aiflually  feparated  (as 
the  length  of  a  way  may  be  obferv'd  without  attending  to 
any  thing  of  Breadth,  tho  it  niuft  of  Ncccifity  have  fome  or 
Other  Breadth; .-  We  may,  cither  a'tPlearure,  or  from  fome 
Analogy  of  Things  and  Words  alTign  a  Kr.mc  to  this  or  that, 
or  determine  of  fome  other  Sr>«  to'exprcfs  it  by.  We  may 
2.\{o  disjoin  x.\\\s  from  that,  0TCr»nt^z\\d  join  Things  to^-e- 
ther,  where  there  is  no  inconfiflehcy  in  our  Imagining  or 
Corceiving  them  as  if  they  were  really  fo  conne£ted  or  dif- 
join'd. 

§21.  We  fhouIdcMiWfwy?.  of  Things  which  any  way  differ, 
tho*  it  were  onlv,  as  this  is  not  that,  however  they  do  or  might  a- 
grec;  Andalfc  of  Words  or  other  Signs,  whenthcyhave  differ- 
ing Senfe  ;  thatfo  we  mav  /jv  and  fettle  theprcfent  Meaning,  or 
what isthe  matter  defign'd  ;  which  we  may  dcjcribe  by  any  fort 
andfetof  Charavilers  that  are  not  elfe  where  to  be  found  toge- 
ther ;  or  more  a  curately  and  briefly  defin:  by  a  fummary  Ac- 
count of  the  commonNatureand  grand  fimdamentalDifference 
betwixt  this  and  timt,  which  comes  nea'cft  to  it  amonglt  the 
Things  which  differ  conlicc rab!y  from  it ;     And  we  may  then 

proceed. 


Chap.  2.         Improvement  of  Reaforu i^ 

proceed  to  divide  it,  or  to  reckon  up,  as  near  as  we  can,   all 
the  Sorts  or  Parts  which  go  to  make  it  up. 

§  22.  What  we  would  lay  down  as  a  Principle,  a  De- 
mand, a  general  Rule,  or  as  the  Point  in  Difpure,  ^c  is  to 
be  carefully  fl^.ted-^  fo  as  to  make  it  neither  too  lax  nor  teo 
itrait,  neither  taking  in  what  is  unfafc*  or  needlefs,  nor  yet 
leaving  out  any  Point  which  is  Necelfary,  or  would  be  Ad- 
vantagious.  What  is  clear  and  Self-evident  we  nay  See,  or 
know  to  be  right  without  farther  opening,  or  however,  with- 
out proof  by  immediate  Intuition  (as  that  the  whole  is  greater 
than  its  part);  And  fome  Things  which  we  cannot  thus 
See,  yet  we  may,  or  perhaps  ought  to  hold,  and  take  for 
right,  as  being  known  to  have  been  well  conddcr'd  and  made 
out  (as  the  Being  of  God,  ^c)  and  xet  it  may  be  highly 
requifitc  to  Ann  and  fonifie  our  Minds  as  to  fome  fuch 
Points,  with  the  ftrongeft  Evidence  we  can  againit  the  Af- 
faults  that  may  be  made  upon  us,  whether  within  or  from 
without. 

§  23.  There  arc  fome  other  Points,  which  from  probable 
Marks,  we  may  rcafonably  deem  to  be  right  (as  where  com- 
petent and  impartial  Judges  are  moftly  of  that  Opinion)  yet 
we  fliould  not  therefore  hold  them  as  certainly  True,  till 
we  have  furer  Evidence.  Where  we  can  find  noching  that 
may  Eiirly  render  one  fide  of  the  Queftion  to  us  more  proba- 
ble than  the  other,  we  can  but  mi;rely  Zit:fs^  and  yet  m.ay 
fometimcs  find  our  feivcs  under  a  neceftity  to  proceed  upon 
the  one  or  the  other  fide  as  Right ;  Whilft  yet  wc  cannot 
but  be  altogether  in  doubt  whether  it  be  fo  or  rot :  And 
where  there  is  any  thing  to  be  faid  for  and  againft  ir,  we 
(hould  (however  if  concern'd  in  the  matter)  (ex.  our  feives  to 
Argue  the  Point  both  ways ;  and  having  fo  done  to  ivj/^o  the 
Arguments  on  one  fide  againft  thofe  on  the  other,  with  a  Mind 
as  inditferent  as  pofTibly  we  can,  before  we  adventure  to  de- 
ad: or  determine  the  Queftion  one  way  or  other:  And  till 
this  can  be  done  to  Sujpend^  obliging  our  feives  not  to  fall  in 
with  this  or  that  part,  and  if  it  might  be  not  to  lean  this 
way  or  that  in  our  Inclinations. 

§  24.  But  when  a  Point  has  been  well  examln'd  by  us, 
and  that  we  have  fettled  our  Judgment  about  it  upon  folid 
Argument,  it  would  be  a  Weaknefs  not  to  Jiand  and  abide  in 
fuch  a  Sentiment :  And  yet  without  refolving,  we  will  ne- 
ver change  our  Mind,  which  is  more  than  we  can  well  under- 
take, and  may  be  in  fome  Cafes  what  we  Ihould  do  ill  to 
perform  r  Since  'tis  poflible  fomewhat  may  be  ohjeBed  [omc" 
time  or  other  by  our  own  Minds  or  otherwife ;  which  if 

C  3  we 


14 An  Effay  for  the  Pare  i . 

we  cannot  Solve  or  Anfwer  (  nor  get  a  good  Solution  of) 
fhould  oblige  us  to  give  up  the  Point  if  it  overthrow  the  only 
Foundation  on  which  that  Point  can  ftand  or  inconteftably 
prove  the  concradidtory  to  it  to  be  Right ;  hut  there  are  fome 
Objeitions  which  we  may  very  rcafonably  Slight ^x\\o  neither 
we  nor  others  for  us  can  folve  them ;  /.  c  n\eer  Difficulties  with 
ivhich  Truth  may  be  incuuibred,  when  they  are  oppos'd  to 
fubftantial  Argument  on  the  other  fide.  What  is  either  Self- 
evident,  or  has  been  well  made  out,  we  (hould  npply  to  the 
good  Purpofes  which  may  be  thereby  fer^'d. 

§  25,  We  are  not  only  to  regard  the  Reafon  and  Evi- 
dence of  Things,  but  to  believe  what  is  credibly  teftify'd  by 
fuchasare  knowing  and  Faithful ;  efpecially  what  God,  or 
any  of  the  ever  bleffed  Trinity  can  be  known  to  Witnefs  td 
us  J  which  is  always  to  be  received  according  to  the  Nature  of 
the  Marter  teftify'd ;  and  therefore  muft  engage  the  Confent 
of  our  Will,  when  not  only  an  offer  is  made,  but  our  Accep- 
tance requir'd  according  to  the  Tenor  and  Terms  thereof  : 
And  that  therefore  we  Ihould  depend  upon  what  is  declar'd, 
that  in  the  appointed  time  and  way  it  will  be  made  out  to  a 
Tittle;  Nor  ihould  we  jvijlrvji  or  queftion  the  Wifdom, 
Power,  Good-will,  or  Faithfulnefs  of  God,  or  any  way  dif- 
fi«t^  as  Perfons  difinclmed  to  his  prefcribed  Methods ;  but 
aiming  at  tlie  Favour  and  Fruition  of  God  as  our  end,  we 
fhould  fixedly  £>r  his  Word,  as  the  Ku!e  of  our  Principles, 
"Words,  and  A<Sions,  and  the  Lord  Jefus,  as  our  Principal 
Exnmple,  looking  with  enlarged  Defire,  and  raifed  Expecjla- 
tion  to  Him,  as  the  Author  and  Leader,  the  Finifher  and  Re- 
warder  of  our  Faith. 

§  26.  There  is,  wc  fee,  a  Praiftical,  as  well  as  Specula- 
tive Life  to  be  made  of  our  Tho'ts ;  for  we  are  td  'Judge,  not 
only  whether  this  or  that  be  true,  but  whether  it  be  Good, 
Lawful,  and  convenient;  and  that  not  only  in  the  general, 
but  whether  it  be  ib  to  us  at  this  time,  and  in  thele  Circum- 
ftances  :  We  are  then  to  rr.t:  or  eftimate  how  far  it  is  fo, 
and  in  what  degree,  whether  more  or  lefs  than  the  omifllon 
or  contrary  Ad  would  probably  be :  And  we  are  according- 
ly to  mil  and  Chufe,  or  to  xV  V  and  Refufe. 

§  17.  The  PaHionsor  Aitedions  are  to  be  govern  d  by 
the  deliberate  Judgment,  Eftimate  and  Will,  whiift  we  like 
or  love,  drjl-ks^  hate,  are  angry  at,  or  difpleafed  with  any 
Perfon  or  Thing,  and  either  j?>  them,  as  wifliing  they  may 
rot  approach  us  on  the  one  hand,  or  wifti  and  defire  theni  on 
the  O'her,  and  accordingly  either /f^r  the  event  or /:'C'/'^  it 5 
and  where  difficulties  lie  in  the  way,  either  trujl  that  Vtt 
"'■'  ca/> 


Chap  1.         JMprovoff/ent  of  Ksiion.  15 

can  furmount  them,  or  dcfpair  of  doing  it ;  ami  finally,  ei- 
ther /o;«  and  rejoice  in  prefenc,  or  expected  Good,  and  in 
our  deliverance  from  prefenc  or  threatning  Evils,  or  elfe 
giieve  and  lament  vvpon  the  contrary  Accounts. 

§  28.  The  defigning  or  refolving  what  we  conceive  to  be 
in  our  own  Power  ;  or  hope  we  (hall  be  aflifted  to  perform, 
is  plainly  an  A(ft  of  the  Will;  and  may  feem  to  imply  that 
there  is  alfo  fome-what  of  affe(fiionate  Deltre  to  the  doing  of 
it ;  efpeciatly  when  we  i^dhcre  to  the  refolurion  againlt  all 
that  would  divert  us  from  it. 

§  19.  We  fitly  others,  when  from  good  Will  to  them  we 
are  grieved  at  their  Troubles,  and  would  help  them  if  we 
could ;  but  Envy^  on  the  contrary,  is  grieved  at  the  good  of 
others;  and  proceeds  from  a  deficiency,  at  lead,  in  the  good 
Will  we  ihould  bear  to  others,  whom  we  are  thence  prone  to 
charge  either  unjuftly,  too  deeply,  or  without  a  fufficient  Call 
to  do  it  ;  Whilft  we  are  commonly  too  backward  to  the 
judging  of  our  lelves,  tho' there  may  be  great  occalQoii  for  it ; 
too  ready  to  r.c^uit  and  clear  our  felves  on  any  llight  pretext : 
Tho'  perhaps  we  will  not  pardon  others  upon  Repentance 
and  Amendiwent :  We  are  alfo  naturally  prone  to  c.pprcve^ 
if  not  admire  what  we  our  felves  do  when  there  may  be  little 
Reafon  for  it,  but  rather  caufe  to  ndmire  it  as  unaccountably 
Strange,  that  we  fhould  be  fo  partial  to  our  felves. 

§  30.  TheMindof  Man  do's  in  fome  Cafes,  and  at  feme 
Times,  frcjnge  and  ftrangely  con}e(fture  fome  future  Events, 
which  are  altogether  contingent,  and  cannot  be  forefecn  by 
him  in  their  Caufes  :  This  might  feem  to  arife  from  fome 
fuperior  Agency,  efpecially  when  the  Prefage  arifes  to  a  kind 
of  abfohue  and  certain  fore-light.  The  recalling  to  Mind 
what  we  have  almoft  wholly  lolt  is  often  very  difficult ;  but 
there  is  always,  when  we  go  about  it,  fome  or  other  Cha- 
radler,  tho' dark,  remaining  by  which  we  endeavour,  by  the 
various  turning  of  our  Tho'ts,  to  find  out  fomewhat  more  of 
the  Matter,  and  perhaps  it  would  more  eafily  pefen\  if  we 
had  a  fct  of  Queries  ready  to  propound  to  our  felves,  or 
others,  to  be  confider'd  and  anfwer'd  in  relation  to  the  Mat- 
ter we  are  feeking,  which,  when  found,  is  eafily  known  by 
its  anfwering,  and  correfponding  to  what  we  have  already  : 
and  thus  in  the  feeking  out  of  New  Inventions,  we  propound 
fomewhat  to  be  perform'd,  and  endeavour  to  jittd  by  what 
means  it  may  be  done,  aed  what  is  the  moft  commodious 
way  to  do  it,  and  fo  pcxjue  the  Defign  from  one  ftep  to  ano- 
ther, unkfs  being  wearied,  difcouraged,  or  otherways  taken 
off,  we  be  forc'd  or  induc'd  to  rerxVcand  leave  it. 

C  4  §31.  We 


i  6  /^n  Pjfay  for  the  Part  i  • 

§  3 1.  We  do  ofcen  fnppofc^  or  put  the  Cafe  that  this  or 
that  be  fo,  and  fomefimes  when  we  know  it  to  be  ocherwife, 
that  we  may  iyifer  or  draw  feme  Confequence  from  it ;  whe- 
ther to  lead  us  or  orhers  to  feme  farther  Truth  ;  or  to  corre6]; 
a  Mijiak?  by  (hewing  fome  Abfurdity  which  would  follow 
from  it;  But  in  order  to  tal{e  things  right^  and  apprehend 
them  as  really  they  are,  perhaps  there  is  nothing  mure  ne- 
ceflTary  or  ufefu],  than  that  we  (hould  mcjui'C^  efpecially  if 
we  be  furnifhed  with  a  convenient  Set  of  Enquiries,  audhave 
fomething  before  us,  as  in  the  Summary  here  undertaken, 
which  may  help  to  fuggeftfit  Anlwers. 

§  32.  Now  as  Enquiries  may  be  made  and  parfu'd,  not 
only  in  our  own  retired  Tho'ts,  but  in  Conve>fe  with  others, 
and  iofflking  into  Broks;  fo  divers  orhers  of  the  foremcnti- 
oned  Ways  of  Thinking  arc  capable  of  being  drawn  forth  in- 
to Words,  and  perform'd  in  Speaking  and  Writing,  as  well 
as  Thmking  ;  as  may  eafily  appear  upon  reviewing  the  Par- 
ticulars: And  fonie  of  them  do  likcwife  admit  of  rUiion  as 
wcl!  as  Exprclfion:  Since  we  may  (?.  .^^. /'  'ove  with  the 
Eye  and  Feet  as  Avell  as  in  Tho'ts  cr  Difcourfe:  But  there 
arc  a  multitude  of  other  Matters  that  may  employ  us  divers 
ways,  and  particularly  may  find  work  for  our  Tho'ts:  Thofe 
I  have  endeavour'd  to  fum  up  in  f  me  following  Chapters, 
nor  wholly  in  dijUn^l  and  peculiar  Terms,  but  fometimes  lay- 
ing divcrfe  Things  together  \ix\Ar:x^ Synonynmn  Expreilions  : 
And  for  the  moft  part  they  are  clofely  cnici'd  \n  icnemlTerms ; 
yet  fometimes  the  more  confiderable  Sorts  are  drawn  forth 
under  their  common  Head,  and  I  fhall  here  and  there  give 
fome  brief  Explication  uponfome  of  them  ;  defigning  and  en- 
deavouring to  place  it  upon  Matters  of  greater  N-ff,  and 
more  obfervable,  or  of  greater  Zfc  to  us,  or  PVorth  and  Value 
in  themfelves. 


CHAP.     Ifl. 

§  !•  \1  E  proceed  to  thofe  Matters  of  Tho'tjwhich  may  be  pe- 
culiarly  call'd  Things^  not  only  in  contradiftindtion 
to  the  particular  Tho'ts  imploy'd  about  them,  but  to  Tho't  in 
general  as  being  in  their  own  Natuce,  not  Tho'ts,  but  a  far 
differing  kind  of  Things,  and  (hall  begin  this  account  with 
Beings  themlelves,  and  after  proceed  to  their  Appendages, 
Thofe  Beings  which  furnifh  the  Univerfc  or  World,  ate  Spi- 
rits-,'' 


Chap.  :^.  Improvement  of  Kqql^Ou.  17 

lies,  diftin£t  Bodies,  and  the  compounds  of  thefe,  or  of  both 
the  forts  together;     And, 

§  2.  I.  Spirits  are  indivifibJc,  felt-moving,  penetrative 
Beings.  Thefe  do  confcio.ully  ,  and  certainly  know,  that 
they  Thi>ii{  (in  all  or  fome  of  the  mentioned  ways)  that  rhey 
are  pleas'd  or  delighted,  fnitPd  or  troubled,  do  rhemfelves 
mive^  and  moveoihtx  Things,  and  therefore  cannotdoubt  of 
tlieir  own  Exiftencc,  tho'  it  may  be  queftionM  as  to  fome  of 
them,  whether  or  how  far  they  may  rcfled:  upon  it,  or  know 
themfelves :  Yet  they,  with  others,  may  be  known  both 
that  they  nre^  and  of  what  Jort,  together  with  their  peculiar 
Gcniuf,  Difpolition,  and  Capacity,  by  Ibch  Operation  and  £/- 
fe'ils  as  we  cannot  reafonable  afcnbc,  either  to  grofs  Matter 
or  its  finer  Particles  of  whatever  Make,  or  in  wharfocver 
Circumftances,  whether  at  Reft  or  in  Motion,  Single  or 
Combin'd,  inthis  or  that  Pofition,  G?c. 

§  3.  And  whereas  Scripture  has  appear'd  {0  undeniably 
true  by  an  agreeable  courfe  of  Things,  particularly  in  the 
fulfilling  of  its  Prophefics,  we  may  well  be  allow'd  to  con- 
firm our  felves  from  ir,  as  to  the  being  of  God,  good  and  bad 
Angels,  the  Souls  of  Men,  z3f.  and  alfo  thence  to  inform  our 
felves  farther  about  them  ;  But  the  Beings  which  appear  to 
lie  more  open  to  us,  and  with  which  we  are  more  converfant 
in  our  prefent  State  are 

§  4.  II.  Bodies^  which  are  (at  leaft  in  Conceptions^  di- 
vifible  and  of  themfelves  ina(ftive,  nor  can  penetrate  one 
another,  whi'.ft  they  are  all  penetrated  by  that  infinite  Spi- 
rit, in  whom  we  live,  and  move,  and  have  our  Being,  whe- 
ther they  be  fo  minute  as  to  efcape  the  naked  Eye,  or  fuffici- 
ently  large  to  be  obferv'd  by  it,  either  diftintftly  or  confus'd- 

§  5.  Bodies  that  are  of  a  competent  bignefs  may  be  felt 
|3y  us  as  heavy  or  preffing  hard ;  or  light,  whofe  preffure  we 
fcarceiy  perceive ;  as  hard,  fofr,  moift,  dry,  hot,  c  ild,  cS'c. 
and  they  may  give  us  Pain  or  Pleafure  as  they  are  fuited  or 
unfuitable  to  the  Make  and  temper  of  our  Bodies.  Some  of 
them  may  alfo  be  tr.fied  by  the  Tongue  and  Palate,  as  fweer, 
bitter,  (harp,  ©"c  And  fome  do  atfedl  the  Noftrils  in  their 
near  approach  by  invifiblc  Particles  klfuing  from  them,  agree- 
ably or  difagreeably,  asfweet,  orftinking,  mufty,  {^r.  Some 
Bodies  being  ftruck,  are  fo  tremuloufly  moved,  and  do  fo 
move  the  Air,  as  that  ftriking  upon  the  Drum  of  our  Ear, 
it  is  perceiv'd  in  what  we  call  Sound,  as  acute,  or  grave, 
pleafant  or  unpleafam,  inarticulate  or  formed  into  Letters, 
Syllables,  Words,  6c» 

§6.  But 


l8  An  tjfay  for  the  Part  I. 

§  6.  But  Sight  gives  us  the  moft  particular  difcovery  of 
Bodies,  efpecially  by  the  help  of  Glafles,  and  here  we  may 
firft;  obferve  the  general  Shew  or  Appearance,  either  by  that 
Light  which  fome  Bodies  do  of  themfelves  afford,  or  which 
fhines  upon  them  from  fome  other,  and  which  they  reflecft  to 
our  Eye;  By  means  whereof  we  may  obferve  their  Shape  or 
Figure  ;  their  fi-{e  and  bignefs  (if  we  make  due  allowance 
for  its  being  lefned  in  appearance  by  its  greater  diftance 
from  us)  asalfo  their  hus  or  colour,  according  as  the  Surface 
is  varionlly  difpofed  and  refledts  the  Light ;  but  the  inward 
Texture  or  compofure  of  Particles  is  not  fo  eaiily  known,  nor 
the  Pores  or  fmall  void  fpaces  intermixed  amongft  them. 
There  are  alfo  Parts  in  Motion,  as  the  Spirits  and  Blood  which 
are  not/'-i/?  or  firmly  joined,  but  toofc,  and  may  bceafily  fe- 
parated  from  the  reft  of  the  Body,  which  may  have,  befides 
its  natural  covering,  fome  acceflory  Guarb  ( as  Cioaths,  Ar- 
mour, &c.)  and  not  only  the  whole  have  this  or  that  diffe- 
rent Site  or  placing  in  refpedt  of  other  Things  about  it,  but 
alfo  its  parts  may  be  variouily  placed  one  to  another,  as  in 
ftanding,  fitting,  kneeling,  lying,  (^c. 

§  7.  III.  As  to  Compounds,  Bodies  are  generally  fuch: 
and  tho'  fome  are  more  fimple,  uniform  and  fimilar  than 
others,  yet  ev^n  thefc  are  really  compounded  of  Particles  or 
little  Bodies  into  which  they  may  be  refolv'd  B  t  what  is 
heredefign'd,  is  either  thofe  works  of  Art  which  are  mf.de  up 
cf  Bodies  plainly  diftin(5V,  and  lefs  curioufly  join'd,  or  thofc 
natural  Beings  which  are  mr.de  of  Spirit,  or  Soul  and  Body 
vitally  united  fo,  as  that  the  Soul  not  only  actuates  the  Bo- 
dy, but  is  fenfibly  affedted  by  or  through  it ;  they  are  unmade 
or  diflblv'd  when  the  organized  Body  is  rendred  unfit  for  the 
ufesofLife,  and  is  thereupon  deferred  by  the  Soul,  which 
in  animated  Brutes  may,  perhaps,  according  to  the  Order  of 
Nature  then  ccafe  to  be,  or  may  be  removed  to  animate  the 
Embrioof  fome  other  Brute. 

§  8,  To  tkefe  three  Kinds  (Spirits,  Bodies,  and  Com- 
pounds) all  Natural  and  Anificial  Beings  are  reducible,  and 
tho'  I  cannot  here  defcend  to  their  loweft  Sorts^  yet  I  may 
touch  upon  fome  of  the  higher,  together  with  their  more  con- 
fiderable  Parts,  principal  Markj^  aad  Characters,  and  the 
chief  /ippmdages  belonging  to  them,  in  treating  briefly  of  the 
Works  of  Nature,  thofe  of  Creatures,  and  of  Divine  Provi- 
dence, and  alfo  of  fome  confiderable  Humane  Affairs,  Inqui- 
ries ro  be  made,  and  Points  to  be  fpecially  attended  to,  with 
general  imimaiions'how  the  account  may  be  farther  carried  on. 

$  9-    As  to  the  Works  of  Nature,  it  is  obferv'd  by  the 

juftly 


Chap.  3.         Improvement  of  Reaion.  1 9 


(uftly  celebrated  Author  of  the  PrmcipU  Mnthematica  ;  that 
the  feveral  inanimate  Bodies  of  this  vifible  World  are  muta- 
lally  attra(fl:ed  by  each  other ;  or  do  gravitate  and  ivcllm  to- 
iivards  each  other,  in  proportion  to  their  Bulk  and  DiftaiKc  ; 
fo  much  the  more  as  the  former  is  greater  and  the  other 
icfs  ;  that  is,  according  to  the  Cubes  of  their  Diameters, 
which  give  the  proportion  of  ihe  Matter  they  contain,  (fup- 
pofing  them  equally  denfe  or  compad)  and  the  Squares  of 
their'Diftances,  the  increafe  of  which  does  accordingly  letfcn 
their  Gravitation.  This  Natural  Conatus  or  Propenfion, 
communicated  by  the  Divine  Power  and  Wifdom,  may 
feem  to  determine  the  refpeftive  places  of  the  feveral  parts  of 
the  Univerfe,  particularly  the  Orbs  of  the  heavenly  Bodies 
%vith  their  various  Motions  and  the  Lities  wherein  they  move  as 
that  admirable  Treatife  (hews. 

§10.  We  may  here  confider  the  feveral  Hcnvens ;  that- 
above  the  Stars,  and  thofe  wherein  they  move  in  higher  and 
lower  Spheres  ( referving  that  below  the  Moon  to  the  fol- 
lowing Head) :  Pi^tjo,  or  what  Inhabitants  there  may  be 
in  any  of  them.  The  differing  Magnitudes  of  Stars,  as  they 
appear  to  us,  with  thofe  in  the  milky  Way,  which  cannot  be 
diftin£lly  feen  without  a  Telefcope  ;  fuch  as  are  not  fervid  * 
into  Conftellations,  and  thofe  which  are,  being  long  fince 
call'd  by  the  N/jr«f^  of  ArHums^  Orion,  &c.  importing  what 
they  no  ways  refemble ;  yet  from  thence  it  might  feem  Judi- 
cial Aftrology  has  taken  the  occafion  to  afcribe  to  them  and 
the  Planets  fuch  or  fuch  feigned  Povoers,  as  of  rendring  thofe 
who  are  born  when  they  were  in  the  Afcendant,  and  in  fuch 
pofition,  either  good  or  bad,  happy  or  unhappy,   and  of  dif-  * 

covering  other  particular  Secrets.  The  moil  noted  Conftel- 
llations  are  thofe  of  the  Twelve  Signs,  more  commonly  known 
and  fpoken  of  than  the  reft,  vi:(.  Aries,  Taurus,  Gemini,  Can- 
cer, Leo,  Virgo,  Libra,  Scorpio,  Sagittarius,  Capricorn,  A- 
quarius  and  Pifces,  which  lie  in  the  Eccliptick  or  that  Line, 
which  the  Sun  is  coiKeived  to  dcfcribe  by  his  yearly  Courfc 
(if  it  be  indeed  he  that  moves)  Anciently  beginning  with  the 
firft  Degree  of  Aries  upon  the  Equinoctial  Day  ;  but  in  along 
trad  oiTime  Aries,  with  all  the  other  Conftellatioa<5,  have    .  ^^ 

very  /lovely gone  backward ',  fo  that  now  the  Sun  is  enter 'd  upcm  il(^^  ^^  ICti 
Taura*^  when  the  Days  and  Nights  are  made  equal.  ^     .  ,       ' 

§11.    The  fuppofcd  Motion  of  the  Heavens  implies  tw«  '    '      "  ' 
oppofite  Points  call'd  Poles,  on  which  they  turn  ;  the  North 
Pole,   which  appears  to  us  being  near  the  hindmoft  Star  iii  - 
the  Tail  of  the  little  Bear,  thence  call'd  the  Polar  Star-  Thert 
are  alfo  higher  and  lower  Orbsy  conceiv'd,  to  anfwer  the 

greater 


2  0  An  Ifi'V  f'.'f  the  P^rt  L 

grc  titer  nyid  Isj's  dijlnnce  of  the  fever  al  Planets  from  us  ;  as  alfo 
the  Points,  wherein  they  are  fartheft  Norh  or  South,  and 
(eem  to  be  Sr^tionary,  not  moving  obfervably  Northward  or 
Southward  fo'  fome  time ;  whence  they  are  a  f:crwards, plain- 
ly returninu  Sack  agai::  '■©wards  rhe  North  or  South,  from 
whence  they  came  •  ?^ A  .  t  are  aii  this  while  proceeding  real- 
lyonwardin  their ft-cc:i*ourfe;  anddoevery  dayappearup- 
C"  nr  fame  M:ridim  or  Souii ■crn-lineo^  ihis,  or  that  place,  near 
the  ti  lie,  and  not  far  from  the  Spot,  in  which  they  were  fcen 
the  forcgoireDay,  and  each  of  the  Planets  recovers  again  the 
fame  moft  Northerly  Point,  it  had  before,  at  a  fet  and  cer- 
tai>i  r?ri'd  :  Thiuhe  •••..  doe«  after  Twelve  Lunar  Months, 
with  \  r  Dast:  wards  the  thirteenth,  which  Number  is  the  firft 
Epaft  after  the  S'Jn  and  Moon  have  fet  out  together,  as  ii  is 
the  2d,  and  33  would  be  the  3d,  but  thirty  being  fet  afide,as 
making  a  full  Monih,  only  3  isretain'd,  fo  that  the  4th  Epacfl 
is  1 4,  the  5th,  25,  the  6th  6,  the  7th  17,  and  ^0  on  till  m  a 
Courfe  of  1 9  Years  the  Cycle  of  the  Moon )  it  come  to  be 
again  1 1 ,  as  at  firft ;  but  there  is  befides  5  Hours,  1 1  Minutes 
to  'e added  to  the  365  days  of  the  Year  to  tini(h  the  Suns 
Courfe,  which  piece  of  a  day  does  every  fourth  Year  make 
up  near  another  day  to  be  added  to  the  Leap  Year,  but  not 
being  fully  a  Day,  the  Account  in  length  of  Time  comes  to 
need  rectifying,  which  has  given  Occafion  to  the  New  Stile 
gomg  now  /I  daj  s  before  ours. 

§  I  z.  The  Moon  has  an  Epicycle  (or  fmaller  Circle  upon 
her  greater  Orbit)  in  which  (he  is  moftly  a  little  befide  the 
Sun  in  her  Nctp,  and  befide  the  interpofing  Ihadow  of  the 
Earth,  when  Ihe  is  full ;  that  llie  might  not  Eclip/e  the  Sun 
every  Kew^  nor  le  ccUffcd  by  that  Shaddow,  every  FuU^  to 
which  fhe  returns  again  thro'  all  her  differing  Forms  after  29 
Days,  I X  Hours  and  3  quarters,  which  is  the  Lunar  Month, 
and  what  they  call  her  Synodical  Period. 

§  13.  Setu  n,  the  higheft  of  the  Planets,  is  obferved  by 
the  Telefcope  to  be  girt  or  encompafled  about  at  fome  di- 
ftance  with  a  bright  Arch  or  Circle,  and  to  have  five  fmaller 
Planets,  calfd  his  Satellites,  or  Guards  (which  are  concciv'd 
to  be  as  Moons)  attending  him  ;  his  Period  is  30  Years,  or 
10950  days:  Jupiter,  the  next  Planet,  has  four,  which  ac- 
company him  in  his  Courfe  of  1 1  Years ;  Mnrs  requires  to 
go  thro'  his  almoft  2  Years j  Venus  performs  hers  in  114 
days  and  two  thirds ;  and  Mercury  ('which  is  ncareft  to  the 
Sun)  finiihes  his  inlefs  than  a  quarter  of  a  Year. 


S  ii!^.Ccmetj 


Chap.  3.         iMprovewtnt  of  Realon.  21 

§  14.  Comets  are  but  rarely  feen,  and  it  is  matter  of  curi- 
ous and  difficult  Enq'iirv,  vohnt  they  may  probably  be,  how 
made  to  appear  with  fuch  kind  of  Hair  ^  as  they  call  it)  or 
Beards  or  Trains,  whnt  Marion  they  have  ;  xpim.ce  they  fet 
our,  and  vphither  they  retire,  if  they  were  before  in  Being, 
and  continue  afcer  they  ceafe  to  appear  to  us  ;  and  finally, 
whether  or  no  they  may  be  defigned  to  forelliew  any  greac 
Events  approaching. 

§  15.  Below  the  Moon  there  may  be  firft  ^^fAr'r  or  purer 
Air,  and  then  whatis^^'o/Te^'and  more  fui ted  to  the  Creatures 
%vhich  live  and  fiy  in  it,  whether  fuch  as  have  Feathers,  or 
only  Wings  of  5<:;«  (as  Bats,  Flies,  G^r.  Here  are  the  dryer 
earthy  Fogs,  dewy  Mijh,  and  lefs  difcerned  Steams  or  Va- 
pours, which  the  Heat  of  the  Sun-Beams  darted  upon  the 
Water  or  moift  Land  forces  up  till  meeting  with  a  Colder  Air 
above  (where  the  Sun's  retie(Sed  Rays  are  weaker)  they  are 
condenfcd  fo  as  to  become  Clouds,  which  are  driven  by  the 
variable  or  the  more  ftated  Winds  that  bloAv  at  certain  times 
in  fuch  or  fuch  parts  of  the  Ocean  (being  probably  the  rarifi'd 
and  thind  Air  floooting  cut  as  ic  Can  find  pafl'age  and  room). 
There  may  be  not  only  watry  but  Nitrous  and  Sulphureoui 
Particles  therewith  mixt,  which  taking  fire  by  fome  rapid 
Motion,  ftriking  them  one  againft  another,  may  (fomewhat 
like  Gunpowder)  flafti  out  in  Lightnings  rending  the  Clouds 
and  Air,  and  caufing  them,  as  it  were,  to  roar  and  roll  along 
in  Thunder  :  But  i^i/«  may  eafily  be  conceiv'd,  as  it  oftner 
does,  to  proceed  from  the  comprelFion  of  Watry  Vapouis, 
and  thind  becoming  thence  too  heav\  for  the  Air  any  longer 
to  fupport,  which  then  muft  fall  in  Rain;  unlefs  its  dewy 
Particles  being ./>r.;^fw  in  paifingthe  cold  middle  Region  of  the 
Air  turn  to  Snow,  or  its  bigger  drops  to  Hail ;  and  that  what 
Ihoiild  be  a  Morning-dew  is  alfo  by  Cold  turned  to  Hoar- 
frojK 

§  16.  What  we  commonly  call  proofing  or  falling  Stars, 
Ignes  fatiu\  and  the  like  N.ght-Fires  are  probably  nothing 
but  fome  oily  or  /niphu  :-,'U>  Vapours,  drawn  from  fat  and 
fenny  Groond)  which  being  laid  as  a  kind  of  Train  in  the 
Air  do  by  Morion  take  Fire  and  un  or  dance  along  (accor- 
dirgasthe  1  rain  lay)  till  it  be  fpent.  The  B.ams  of  Light 
being  refleiled  (as  it  a-erriS  iikely)  from  a  number  of  watry 
or  icie  Particles  in  the  Air  ;  as  alio  variouily  intermixed  and 
iriterv/ovcn  with  each  other  bv  a  manifold  Refradlion,  pro- 
duce Hn'oiov  party  Colour'd  Circles  abour  the  Sun  or  Moon, 
as  alio  I{.jinbows,  and  the  Appearance  of  divers  Sum  or 
iMocns.  .  ..■■•■ 

§17.  Our 


2i  Jn  tjfay  for  the  Part  1. 

§  iy.  Our  Earth  has  long  been  accounted  as  a  kind  of 
Globe  or  BnU,  the  higheft  Mountains  being  but  trifling  Ine- 
qualities, compared  with  the  Dimenfion  of  about  leven  Thou» 
land  Miles  Diameter  :  But  upon  later  Obfervatious  and 
Confideration,  it  is  rather  thought  to  refemble  a  jgow/,  being 
fetter  near  its  Poles,  and  riling  higher  about  its  Aiquino£Hal,' 
or  the  middle-moft  parts  between  them.  But  the  great  Que- 
ftion  with  fome,  is,  whether  or  no  it  turn  round  its  Axk 
once  in  24  Hours,  I0  fetching  Day  and  leaving  it  by  turning 
ftill  onwatd  towards  the  Sun,  and  from  him  SuccclVively, 
and  whether  once  a  Year  it  do  compafs  the  Sun  (as  a  fixed 
Center)  ftiU  keeping  its  Axis  cotijlantly  pointing  rowards  the 
PoJe-Star,  whilA  it  proceeds  thro'  a  vafi  Curve,  which  is  not 
a  juft  Circle,  but  Elliptical,  fothat  it  is  one  part  of  tlie  Year 
nearer  the  Sun,  and  another  part  farther  off ;  and  yet  fo  vaft  a 
compafs  murt  be  only  as  a  P&int  compar'd  with  the  Starry 
Heaven,  or  otherwife  the  Axis  ©f  the  Earth, being  always  pa- 
i^lel  to  it  felfmuft  point  befide  the  Poles  of  the  Heaven  when 
the  Earth  is  on  this  or  that  fide  of  her  yearly  Circuit. 

§  18.  TYit  dimes,  or  Climates  are,  one  torrid  between 
the  two  Tropicks,  where  the  Sun  is  at  one  time  of  the  Year 
juli  over  head,  and  two  fro:^efi  ones  within  the  Polar  Circles, 
at  which  they  begin  to  have  a  day  of  twenty  foyr  Hours,  and 
jult  under  the  Pole  a  day  of  fix  Months,  and  as  long  a  Night : 
And  laRly,  Two  temperate  Climates  or  Zones,  which  lie 
betwixt  thofe  before  mention'd  ;  where  the  longejl  Ddy  is 
Jefs  than  24  Hours,  and  fo  the  longeft  Night.  The  Sett  has 
ditfering  Names,  moftly  according  to  the  Countries  on  which 
it  Borders:  Some  Shears  have  been  difcover'd  where  the 
JLand  is  yet  unkjioven^  (as  the  Trrr<j  incogn-itn  Auftralis,  8cc.) 
The  Earth  has  its  Hills  and  Mountains,  Vallies^and  Plains, 
with  Promontorys  or  Points  running  out  into  the  Sea,  this 
has  its  Bays  running  into  the  Land,  alfo  its  Rocks  and  Safids 
with  lliallow  Water  :  Ifles  are  incompafs'd  with  Sea,  whilft 
Continents  are  large  Traits  of  Land,  either  not  fo  bounded  or 
not  known  to  be.  The  four  main  parts  of  the  World,  Europe^ 
4fia,  Africa  and  America,  lie  fo  and  fo  (as  maybe  feen  in  gc-. 
oeral  Maps)  to  each  other,  are  fo  bounded  on  this  and  that  fide, 
have  fuch  and  fuch  P^r^j  with  their  particular  Boundaries: 
This  or  that  place  has  fuch  a  Latitude^  or  lies  fo  many  Degrees 
Cor  560th  parts  of  its  Meridian  or  North  and  South  Line) 
w.deof  che^quino£lial,and  on  the  Northern  or  Southern  fide 
thereof:  It  has  aUb  fuch  Longitudeox  has  its  Meridian  fo  many 
Degrees  reinov'd  from  that  which  palfes  rhro'  the  Ifles  A^crci 
reckoning  Eajiward it om  thence  upon  the  iEquator, 

§  i^.The 


Chap.  3*  Improvement  vf  ^tdiion^  xj 

§  19.  T/jf  Tide,  or  flowing  and  Ebbing  of  the  Sea  is 
apprehended  to  be  from  the  Tendency,  or  IncUnanon  of  it 
towards  the  Moon,  which  therefore  rifes  where  Ihe  is  in  the 
Meridian  over  it,  while  the  oppofite  part  of  the  Sea  (being  then 
about  7000  Miles  farther  from  the  Moon,  and  tending  there- 
fore lefs  towards  Herj  hangs  back, ;  fo  as  to  be  left  riung  alf» 
Oh  that  fide  at  the  fame  time  j  thus  the  Sea  fwcUs  tmce  in  the 
fame  place  within  15  Hours  j  and  it  rifcs  higher  in  the  New 
and  Full  of  the  Moon,  when  fhe  and  the  Earth  arc  very  near 
in  the  fame  Li?ie  with  the  Sun,  towards  whom  the  Sea  docs 
alfo  gravitate  or  incline,  but  more  weakly  in  regard  of  his 
greater  diftance ;  however  this  Tendency  does  now  fall  in 
With  that  to  the  Moon,  fo  as  to  make  the  Spring-tides  grea- 
ter than  thofe  they  call  Neap-tides,  when  the  Inclination  of 
the  Sea  towards  the  Sun  falls  not  in  with  that  towards  the 
Moon,  but  paffes  juft  acrofs  ity  fo  as  to  draw  away  fomewhat 
from  the  Tides  to  that  Part,  where  the  Sun  is  then  diftant  a 
Quadrant  (or  quarter  of  a  Circle)  from  the  Moon.  The 
Tide  rife*  highejl  a.  little  after  the  Autumnal  ^^uinox^  and 
again  before  the  Vernal  in  the  New  and  Full  of  the  Moon  ; 
becaufe  the  Water  then  inclines  more  ftrongly  towards  the; 
Sun,  as  being  net:rer  it  in  the  Winter-perigaeon,  and  when  he 
is  fo  near  the  /Ecjuinoclial  Points  ;  but  then  there  are  alfo 
xhtlonrji  El?bs  in  the  firft  and  laft  Quarters  ©f  the  Moon ;  be- 
caufe there  is  then  a  ftronger  Tendency  ot  the  Water  towards 
the  Sun  (as  being  fo  much  nearer)  juft  crofs  ways  to  its  Gra- 
vitation towards  the  Moon.  'Tis  High-Heater  at  Sea,  where 
the  Moon  is  over  it  in  the  Meridian  (as  it  is  at  Noo«-day, 
when  we  count  it  New,  and  at  Midnight  when  we  reckon  ic 
Full  but  it  reaches  not  London-Bridge  till  three  hours  after  the 
Moons  Southing,  and  is  every  day  about  three  Quarters  of  an 
Hour  later  than  it  was  the  day  before :  But  there  are  a  great 
many  Things  which  may  make  the  Tide  earlier  or  later  in  dif- 
fering places,  and  may  fometimes  alter  it,  even  in  the  (ame 
place,  as  at  London  ;  fuch  as  violent  Winds  and  other  Acci- 
dents, befidcs  the  diftance  from  the  Sea,  the  differing  Make 
and  lying  of  feveral  Channels,  the  meeting  and  interfearing 
of  Tides  from  feveral  Parts,  as  particularly  at  Tunning  in 
China,  where  there  is  no  Tide  when  the  Moon  is  near  the 
Equinodial;  and  at  other  times  only  one  Flux  and  Reflux 
in  Z4  Hours. 

§  20.    Some  Countries  (as  Africa)  haveS/<Jc/(  Men,  whilflt 
the  generality  living  in  cooler  Parts  are  iVhite  .-     Some  are 
i{ude.   Barbarous  and  Unpolilh'd  ;    whilft  others  have  Lear- 
ning and  Arcs  flourilhing  amongft  them  :     Some  are  Hea- 
thens, 


2  4  Am  t.Jfay  for  the  Part  I. 

then"?,  others  Mahometans,  Jews,  Chriftians,  Papiits,  Prctc- 
ftants,  cj'c.  lome  under  abfolute,  others  under  limited  Mo- 
narchy; others  are  States,  ^c  Some  Countries  have  5;o/c, 
nor  on!y  for  \J(c,  Convenience  and  Pleafure,  but  to  Export: 
in  the  way  of  Merchandize  •  Yet  moR  want  fomething, 
either  XecclJ^n^j,  or  at  leaft  Dcjvnblc^  which  they  are  to  fetch 
from  abroad.  Po  r.r  and  Harbours  for  Shipping,  where  thofe 
of  a  confiderable  Burden  may  pafs  and  lie  fate,  are  a  great 
Ac'orr.modation,.  Such  Masters  as  are  already  mention'd,' 
and  thofe  which  follow  ("tho'  they  be  natural  Works  of 
Nature)  are  to  be  enquir'd  after,  if  we  would  acquaint  onf 
felvcs  well  wirh  a  Country  ;  and  to  be  treated,  of  if  we 
would  defcribe  it,  v'.-{.  What  L^/^v,  Rivers  and  Bridges; 
what  fort  of  Land  or  Soil ;  what  Medicinal  Bnihs  or  Sfaws ; 
wliat  Towns,  how  Built;  what  publick,  or  other  extraordi- 
nary Bviildings ;  what  Courts,  and  how  order'd  ;  what  An- 
tiquities^ or  what  of  later  Fame ;  wiiac  fores  of  Provifton  ;  what 
Fifh  and  Fowl  ;  v/hat  Cattle  ;  what  Infedts,  or  otl^er  lefs 
confidcrabje  Creatures ;  whit  Reptiles,  cfpccially  fiich  as 
are  more  obfervable  ;  v/hat  fort  of  Wild-Beafts  or  other 
Creatures  for  Gnyyie  ;  what  there  riiay  be  which  is  y/irc  to  be 
found  elfewhere,  or  itrange  in  irs  Make,  whether  Natural  or 
prDeternatura!  ;  Nice  or  Curious,  either  of  the  forementi- 
oned  or  following  Kinds,  vi-{.  Of  thcfeveral  forts  of  iimifj 
Shrubs,  Trees,  Fruits,  Herbs,  f^rugs,  Minerals,  Metal;^,  or 
Stones;  In  which  we  may  conlider  how  the  Sorts  n?rc.\ 
what  is  their  moft  material  Oijlcro/cc  ;  what  Vhs  they  do 
or  may  ferve;  what  vnluc  is  ticre  put  upon  them  ;  what 
Methods  there  are  of  ^ctti)/(r  or  procuring  them,  of  applying 
ihem  to  fervice,  or  of  turning  them  in  any  other  way  to  Ad- 
vantage, and  what  Prrfit  may  be  made  of  them  inthis  Or  that 
way. 

§  II.  More  particularly  Plnnts  and  Animals  are  to  be 
confider'd  in  the  various  Divifions  and  Degrees  of  lefs  and 
greater  Perfecftion,  fo  as  to  obfcrve  what  we  may  call  the 
Scitle  of  Nature,  efpecially  in  this  Noble  Divifion  thereof. 
And  here  we  may  confider  how  they  are  relpedlively  Orga- 
>.'/^V  or  furnifti'd,  not  only  with  diftering  Parts,  but  with 
Velfels  and  Inftruments  ferving  to  the  Animal  or  VegetabJe 
Life;  and  particularly  what  D»,f6Te«cc  attends  the  obiervable 
Aiiniogy  or  Correfpondency  betwixt  Animals  and  Plants  ;  as 
the  Be  10  of  a  living  Creature,  how  far  anfwering  to  the 
I\pot  of  a  Tree,  and  yet  how  greatly  differing  from  it :  So 
the  T'M-k  and  L/rw/'j  of  both ;  the  Leaves  and  Rind  to  be 
C-.  mpar'd  with  the  Skins  ajid  Hair  or  Nails,  as  alfo  the  Fibres 


Chap  5-  Improvement  of  K.t2iion.  25 

and  Nerves  on  both  fides  :  The  $aj)  and  Chyle  which  nou- 
riih  the  one  and  the  other  :.  The  Seed  and  Fruit  with  Buds 
and Bloffoms  on  the ene hand;  the  Eggs  with  Embrios  for- 
ming in  them,  and  the  Coats  which  cover  andfapply  them,  on 
the  other  hand :  What  there  is  on  one  fide  and  on  the  other, 
ferving  to  take  in  proper  Nutriment,  to  fit  and  prepare  it,  to 
ftrain  and  feparate  what  is  unfuitable  from  what  is  fuitaSle  j 
to  pais  away  the  former ;  to  convey  arid  diftribute  the  latter  .- 
what  there  is  peculiarly,  for  ufing  the  Air,  and  circulating  the 
Juices,  and  efpecially  for  the  Blood  in  Animals,  whofe  ^eins 
return  it  fo  continually  to  the  Heart,  whence  the  Arteries  re- 
ceiv'd  it.  And  tim  being  fo  much  the  Band  of  the  Animal 
Life,  it  ought  to  be  confider'd,  what  has  a  tendency  to  render 
it  Bad  or  GWj  as  e.gr.  the  B»V?/' or  Conftitution,  thence  der 
riv'd  from  Parents ;  the  Air^  which  ill  or  well  agrees  ;  the 
foody  which  is  improper  or  proper  :  the  i^e/?,  which  is  too 
little,  too  much,  er  well  adjufted  j  the  Motio7i  which  may 
be  unfit  in  the  Sort  or  Meafure,  or  both  ways  right ;  Tho't 
fpending  or  refrelhing ;  ikilful  Applic/ttionSy  or  Failure  therein, 
whether  by  defe£l,  excefs,  or  improper  Means;  and  finally^ 
Accidents,  which  may  externally  befal  us,  Bruifes,  Cuts, 
Frights,  &c.  with  the  Confequences  thereof;  all  which  may 
iffeft  our  Blood  in  a  Mechanical  way  of  Working,  according 
to  the  ftated  and  fix'd  Laws  of  Matter,  Motion,  cS'c.  There 
are  alfo  in  Animals,  the  Flejhy  Bones,  Joints,  Guards,  (fuch 
as  Grifles,  (^c.)  Ties,  Ligaments,  and  Tendons,  alfo  the 
Mufcles,  and  efpecially  the  B^^in  ;  where,  if  the  Soul  be  not 
lodg'd,  yet  it  certainly  has  there  and  from  thence  thofe 
Animal  Spirits  which  are  of  fo  great  Vfe ,  even  in  our 
^eafoningy  whilft  we  are  in  thefe  Bodies,  as  well  as  for  Aio- 
tion  and  Senfe'y  thefe  we  appear  to  have  in  common  with 
Brutes,  however  with  the  more  perfect  amongft  them  ;  and 
fbmewhat  very  like  Reafon  they  feem  ro  have  in  relation  to 
fenfible  Things  as  well  as  we,  but  the  Capacity  of  knowing 
God  and  enjoying  him  Eternally,  is  Mans  chief  and  fure 
Preheminence  above  them. 


CHAP. 


7.6  .  An  r/iay^pjr.t^U     . .  Part'i^. 

C  H  A  P      IV. 


irom  ixaiuic  lue  ivic:[er  iiicy  worK  in  on,  as  weji  astne  ftweis 
by  whlcli  rhey  give  it  fome  d' fueling  Turn,  and  3,  new  kind  of 
Make  or  Manner,  whether  by  joitrlh^  or  disjoining;  ptitting 
Nature  under  lome  kind  of  I^i^JCc  ot  Reftraiiit ;  making  an 
eftcRual  ^If plica: ictjoi  Adives  to"  Pailives,  as  in  placing  a 
A^'ind-miJl  where  the  Wind  is  wont  to  Slow  Frequently  and 
Feel-.  ^f':.v,  Combs,  iand  Honey,  are  the  known  Produce 
of  the  induArlcns  Bee  ;  Silk  of  tl}e  Wcrm,  v/hich  has  its 
name  from  thence;  Cob-webs  are  a  nice  and  ciir ions  I^ro- 
diicition of  the  Spider;  Divers  Anim.ils  prov Me  tTiemfelves 
iBurroiighs,  as  a  kind  of  Houfe  in  rile  Rock  , or  Earth,  ancj 
Birds  do  pJace  a.nd'furm  their  Nefts  with  wonderfbi  Cohr 
tr  V-i.nce. 

§  z.  Man  l/imfelfcan  fcarcely  n:?atch  fofrie  of  the  menci- 
cned  Auificeis  at  their  peciliar  Bnfinefs :  but  then  h?  out- 
does theui  far  in  feme  other  Works,  a^)d  goes  a  much  greater 
compafs,  as  in  devifing  and  making  G'7;;/j  (e^ecially  as  'tis 
employed  to  allift  the  Eye  in  Mcrofcopes,  ^c.)  Cloths,  Ar- 
rnpvir,  \jfc.  cpntri'^  ing  aiidv  ereflUig  adniifable.  Buildings  ; 
Deviling  andi  preparing  a  very  great  Variety  of  Turnitare 
and  Urcnfils  ;  drelling  and  ordering  FieldS;,  Gardais,  Trees, 
and  Food  ;  Framing  Machines  of  various  kinds;,  and  fome 
of  theft!  f(T  noble  ]->urpofes  (as  the  Prcfs,  Clocks,  Watcher, 
G^c.)  Studying  and  Writing  uleful  Books,  finding  out  and 
preparing  effcdlive  Medicines /,  and  in  a  word,  providing 
himfelf  with  fucli  kind  o[ bifirumetits  zs  may  render  his  Work- 
ing feafible,  eafie  and  accurate:  i  or  for  Diyertifement .;  AIJ 
this  in  Man  is  plainly  /^-rj  but  we  cannot  fo  certainly  deter- 
imne  as  to  the  other  Creatnres  mention  tJ,  whether  they  a(ft 
withconfcio'  s  Defign  and  Contrivance,  or  are  carry'd  on  as 
in  a  beaten  Road  by  fome  kind  of  Natural  Irifinci,  which  we 
krow  not  how  to  account  for.  B'M  as  ro  ourfelves,  it  is  cer- 
tainly a  great  and  requifite  adl  of  Pri'dence,  when  we  are 
defignirg  any  more  tbana,<3rdinai  y  Work,  to  confider  v/ell 
what  Tho't  it  may  rcv-juire,  as  alfo  what  Help,  Matter,  La- 
bour and  Coll ;  and  what  is  ihe  Bcncfir  we  propofe  from  it  ; 
what  Credit,  Ser  ice  or  Pro%  to  our  felvcs  or  others  j  and 
thereupon  to  calculate,  as  well  as  we  can,  what  lH^e/ibccJ 
there  may  be  of  ob;aii  ing  our  Ann,  and  whether- it  would 
be  like  to<z///iV(r/-,  if  we  do.  ^3.  The 


C/hap.  4.  ImVfoi'emcnt  of  Fvcalon  27 

^  .3.  The  Works  of  Providence  are  in  general  God's  Atft- 
ing  fo  or  fo  towards  his  Crearures,  and  being moft  largely  ta- 
ken it  comprehends  alfo  the  v/itholding  of  his  Influences  from 
them :  Tho'  the  Beings  which  are  made,  fuftain'd,  C£?c.  have 
been  reckoned  Works  of  Nature,  yet  they  are  to  be  referr'd 
to  Providence,  as  made  at  firft  in  the  extraordinary  way  of 
Creation,  or  fince  in  that  of  Natural  Produ(5tion,  and  alfo  as 
fiifinlnd  in  being  or  ailing,  as  rcdscmd  and  put  under  the 
iiiore  immediate  Conduct  and  Government  of  Chrift;  zsus'd 
Of  employ 'd  in  the  producing  of  Effe^fts  by  fecond  Caufes ; 
as  rid\i  by  Influence,  Direction  or  both ;  as  born  and  futfer'd 
in  the  Contrariety  and  Oppofition,  which  is  ftill  chargable 
on  fomeof  them,  or  was  however  fo  long  .-  All  this,  by  and 
according  to  a  moll  powerful  H^lll,  whereby  God  can  do  all 
that  He  adtuadly  Wills,  or  can  will  to  do  by  a  Will  fo  good,  fo 
fVi/e^io  Jufi  as  that  he  can  only  will  what  isfo,  and  may  fcrve 
to  fuel}  purpofes  ;  fofixt  as  that  he  cannot  alter  or  run  counter 
to  what  he  has  fo  determin'd  j  but  after  all,  there  may  well 
be  Determinations  and  Procedures,  of  which  we  can  give  no 
other  Account  than  the  Sovereign  Will  of  God,  whatever 
Reafons  he  himfelf  may  have  for  them.  And  in  thefc  his 
Will  cannot  be  concluded  abfolutely,  or  altogether,  Abfohue ; 
but  is  certainly  under  the  Condudt  of  his  other  infinite  Per- 
fe£lions,  and  not  lefs  free  for  its  being  fo;  lince  'tis  the  very 
Nature  of  Rational  Liberty  to  follow  what  is  reafona- 
bic. 

§  4.  There  are  fome  ff^or/^j  of  Providence  which  appear 
Str^.nge  and  extraordinary,  not  only  to  the  Ignorant,  but 
CO  the  knowing  and  skilfil  in  fuch  Jlffairs  ;  and  if  they  be 
of  fi)oh  a  Kjnd  as  is  not  unbecoming  God  (efpecially  when 
plainly  fuitable  to  his  Goodnefs,  Juftice,  Truth,  &c,)  arid 
alfo  arc  of  a  Force  Superior  to  any  that  is  oppofed  to  vie  wiih 
-'em,  and  that  the  Dcfign  to  which  they  are  dirc'fi'ed,  is  not 
difagreeabic  'efpecially  when  'tis  plainly  agreeable)  to  the 
Divine  Perfecftions,  we  may  fafely  look  on  theni  as  troe  iM/- 
raclcs  or  fingular  Works  of  God,  atteiUng  the  Trwfwof  God  : 
In  fome  of  thefe  the  Order  of  Unture  ts  iu-verted  fas  when  cHe 
Waters  of  the  Sea  were  made  to  ftand  as  a  Waf',  ^s.)  hm 
common  Providence  mnirani?is  its  more  ufnal  Courfe,  therein 
alfo  f'idfillirig  God's  Word  according  to  rhe  true  Mennir,g^ 
which  may  be  known  if  it  be  duly  confider'd,  tho'  not  always 
according  to  the  firil  Appearance,  which  fome  are  apt  td 
^atch  and  run  av/ay  with.  And  this  is  univerfally  done,  in 
tj)e  l-i-nv2ns,  (which  afford  us  the  promifed  Seafons  of  Se^'d- 
time  and  Harveft,  Summer  and  Winter,  Day  and  Night)  : 

D'  X  in 


28  An  tjfay  for  the  Part  i. 

in  the  Air  (particularly  the  Rainbow  there,  fijfficiently  fre- 
qiienr  to  keep  up  the  Remembrance  of  God's  Promife,  that 
the  World  ihould  be  no  more  drown'd j :  as  alfo  in  the  Water. 
and  -/-^wd'by  a  continued  Series  of  innumerable  inftances  of 
Promifes,  Threatnmgs,  and  other  Declarations;  particularly 
whilft  L  ks  produces  its  Llkt  by  Seed,  Grafts,  or  Slips,  and 
amongft  Animals  by  what  we  may  call  Eg?^s  either  laid  by 
fome  to  be  afterwards  Hatch'd,  or  retain  d  by  others  Cwhich 
are  term'd  Viviparous,  and  bring  forth  what  is  a(5iually 
Living)  to  be  foim'd  in  the  Womb;  and  thus  they  are  fruit- 
ful, and  multiply,  according  to  the  Divine  Benedidlion. 

§  5.    Where  Lets  are  us'd  by  any  fpecial  Intimation  of  the 
Divine  Will,  they  may  be  accounted  Sacred,   and  to  be  Under 
thedi^/ofal  of  a  particular  Providence  .•    Tet  they  may  have 
a  Civil  and  ev*n  Ludicrcm  Ufe,   where  fuch  Matters  cant  b^ 
fo  well  manag'd  without  them ;  but  then  we  ought  to  took  on 
tlieni  as  order'd  by  a  more  common  Providence,   as  many 
other  Things  are,  which  really  follow  the  Natural  Tendency 
of  C^ufes  lefs  known  or  obfcrv'd,   and  therefore  fcem  to  us  no 
other  than  uncertain  Chaticc-s  -.     Which  may  alfo  in  fdme  fort 
befal  Perjvfis,  Families,  Sacred  and  Civil  Societies,   together 
with  the  various  Forms  and  Polities,  or  the  Marnier  and  Me- 
thods belonging  to  them ;  in  refpecfl  of  their  Hjfe,  or  firft  Ap- 
pearance,  the  Imtis  and  Alterations  pafling  lipon  them,  as' 
alfo  their  Falls  and  final  Periods  ;    all  which  may  come  to 
pafs  wholly  or  in  parr,  either  by  more  Oh-viom  Means  lying 
open  to  common  or  fpecial  Obfervation,  or  by  fome  Energies 
and  Influences  that  are /»;V  from  Humane  Sight;    as  is  the 
more  inward  Work  of  God  in  purring  rcjhaints  upon  the  Spi- 
rits of  Men  by  foggcfting  or  enforcing  fit  Confidcrations  or 
otherwife,   or  in  rcnexving  and  reftoring  them  to  fomewhac 
cf  the  Divine  Likcnefs  (as  habitual  and  abiding)  as  alfo  in 
V  cv-ng  and  exciting  them  to  exert  themfelves,in  guiding  and 
affifting  them ;   and  when  He  does  wifely,  holily,  and  juftly 
formic  Men  or  Angels  to  take  their  own  Evil  Courfe,  yet  li- 
miting and  Qvcr-ruliig  it  to  ferve  fome  or  other  Purpofes 
worthy  of  himfelf.     Providence  generally  Spares  thofe  who 
humble  themfelves  for  their  Offences ;   but  as  to  thofe  who 
harden  themfelves  in  their  Evil  Courfes,    It  fometimes  deals 
with  them  in  this  World,  to  hove  them  to  the  Will  of  God, 
or /'??<?/(.  and  deftroy  them  by  the  Tokens  of  his  yVy?  Indignati- 
m  ;    fuch  as  Earth-quakes,  Storms,    Fire,    Sword,  Plague, 
with  other  SickiKfs,  Dearth,  or  Scarcity,  Inundations,  C^c. 


§  6.  We 


Chap.  4.         Improvement  of  Kealon.  29 

§  6.    We  may  6nil  in  Sacred  Writ,  the  only  Account  of 
the  Creation,  and  the  fureft  Hiftory  of  many  other  Admirable 
Scenes  of  Providence,  efpecially  in  relation  to  the  Church  of 
God,  together  with  prophetical  Difcoveries,   fome  of  them 
cleard  up  by  their  Accomplifliments  as  the  reft  will  alfo  be  in 
due  time.    Only  fome  very  fev/  Points  I  fhall  here  very 
briefly  touch,  leaving  them  with  the  reft  to  be  gathered  more 
certamly  and  fully  from  the  Scriptures  thenifelves,  Avhere  we 
may  learn  how  Adam  and  Eve  fthe  common  Parents  of  Man- 
kinds were  madey  how  feduc'd  and  led  away  to  the  eating  of 
the  forbidden  Fruit 9  how  they  vj'nh  Theirs  (the  Pofterity 
Naturally  fpringing  from  them)    did  thereby  fall  from  an 
Holy  and  Happy  State,   under  the  Taint  and  Guilt  of  Sin, 
tame  to  have  the  Sentence  of  Death  upon  them,  with  the 
Seeds  thereof  in  them,    and  to  be  juftly  liable  to  the  HelHJh 
State  of  fixed  Separation  from  God,  good  Angels  and  good 
Men,  and  to  be  fliut  up  wirh  the  bad  under  a  degree  of  Mi- 
fery  fuited  to  their  State,   and  Preportion'd  to  their  Guilt : 
How  the  Seed  of  the  H^oman  (by  the  more  immediate  Power  of 
God,  without  the  Man)  has  been /orf/fe<rw«  by  Promifes,  Pro- 
pbefies,  Types,  and  prefiguring  Inftitutions  j   how  the  Hu- 
mane Nature  of  the  Son  of  God  has  been  bniis'd,  and  having 
by  amoft  intire  Obedience,  «v'n  to  the  accurfed  Death  of  the 
Crofs,  (thro*  the  Dignity  of  his  Divine  Perfon)  repair'd  the 
Honour  of  God  and  his  violated  Laws,  was  raifed  the  third 
Day  from  his  Grave,  and  after  Forty  Days,  to  Heaven,  where, 
as  Mediator,  he  is  next  to  the  Moft  High.    Thro'  him  fal  n 
Man  may  be  freed,  not  from  the  Bonds  of  Duty  (which  as 
his  Priviledge  are  fome  way  made  ftronger  upon  him)  but 
from  being  hound  under  a  Curfe,  either  for  his  pait  Offences,  or 
to  a  future  perfedt  Obedience,   as  alfo  from  the  Dominion  of 
Sin,  the  Sting  of  Death,  and  Danger  of  Hell,    wharevej;^ 
Troubles  and  Chaftenings  may  befall  him  (which  will  be 
blefs'd  to  recover,  fecure  and  forward  himj  in  his  Paffageto 
Heaven,  whither  he  is  certain  to  be  Advr.ncd  at  laft  in  the 
way  God  has  appointed,  vi:{.    That  of  Practical  Believing, 
Penitential  Amendment  and  fincere  perfevering  Obedience 
according  to  the  various  Degrees  of  Light  and  Capacity  Men 
have  or  may  attain. 

§  7«  We  may  farther  obferve  how,  thro'  the  Word,  ac- 
company'd  with  the  Spirit  of  the  Father  and  the  Son,  in  his 
Miraculous  Operations,  together  with  his  other  Gifts  and 
faving  Graces,  the  Falfe  Gods  of  the  Heathen  World  loft  by 
Degrees  the  greateft  part  of  their  Adorers;  their  Oracles  be- 
ing itruck  Dumb,    and  their  Temples  for  the  greater  part 

D  3  demo- 


An  tjjay  for  the  Fare  i 


demo]ifhed.  And  even  the  Myftical  Woriliip  and  Ccremomes 
which  God  himlelf  had  appointed  by  MoJ-s^  having  receiv'd, 
their  Accomplifhrnent  in  our  Saviour,  and  being  rendered  im- 
pia  icable  by  the  Deitn'frioii  of  Jervjalcm  and  the  Temple, 
wliichliehad  foretold,  gave  way  to  C/^^-.'V^/.-i/nVy,  which  j/'f'trf 
fxr  and  wiJe  thro'  the  then  known  World,  and  farther  lince: 
And  hoiv'cvcr  negledlai  or  oppos'd  by  remaining  Heathens,  ob- 
durate Jews,dcluded  Mahon-ctans,or  Antichnftian  Romanifts, 
yet  !t  ihaJl  finally  prevail  according  to  Scriptural  Prediftioii,' 
which  alfo  acquaints  us  in  how  Gloriors  and  awful  a  man- 
I'.er  CLriJi  ilialJ  come  and  jvuige  thoie,  who  (ha!)  then  be 
Livir.g  upon  Earth  (who  I'haJ]  not  die,  but  be  changed)- and 
tlie  D\td,  v.'hofe  raifed  Bodies  fhall  be  reunited  to  their  Souls: 
How  he  iliali  dijfolve  this  World,  and  tne  prefent  Frame  of 
?^ature,  CiTxvnin^  Snhns  with  everlalting  Joy  and  Glory, 
crujnirig  the  guilty  Head  of  the  Serpent  and  all  his  wicked  Ad" 
herents  with  an  endlcfs  infupportaMc  Vengeance. 

'y  8.  J.  now  proceed  to  fomc  Account  of  Humnns  ulffalrsy 
3jid  here  the  grand  Enquiry  may  jiiftly  be,  What  is  Mr.ti's 
ci-'ict J:  GcqJ?  Whether  it  be  Hc.tith,  or  Stores  fan  abundance 
of  external  Provifion)  it  Friey.ds,  (whether  otherwifc  nnrc- 
lated,  or  related)  or  Honcus  (places  of  Dignity,  or  Marks  of 
Eftecm,  real  or  fuppofed)  or  Eaje  (freedom  from  Toil,  or 
Pain)  or  the  various  P/enJ'nr'-},  which  cither  meer  l^havfy  cxt- 
ates,  (as  in  imagining  our  felvcs  to  be  what  we  arc  nor,  0"/.) 
or  S.'n/l- perceives,  or  the  iM/«(i'  conceives  ;  as  in  Knowledge, 
^c.)  or  that  it  be  Virtue^  or  diverfe,  or  ail  of  thcje  together  ? 
B.ir  certainly  the  rr.vour  <?/GW  nuft  be  indeed  onr  chief  Good, 
and  it  mull  be  our  main  Concern  to  fcciirc  that,  which  will' 
lec:ire  ail  other  Things,  that  are  indeed  grod  for  us;  and  en- 
able us  rvejito  bear  the  Ei^ii.%  we  may  not  hope  altogether  to 
efc.jpe  in  this  World;  nor  only  fo,  hvx  will  turn  the  wo^fi 
Ez'tis^  that  befal  us  here  tothegreateft  Advantage  to  usj  and 
upon  the  whole  make  thof.-  Enjoyments  fure,  which  arc  in- 
coiKeiveably  better  than  all  ihis  World  can  afford  us. 

y  p.  'Tis  of  great  Importance,  that  we  (bould  know, 
and  piirfue  the  belt  and  fureft  way  of  forming  the  Judgment^ 
M^at  it  may  rightly  lead,  and  H'lll  that  it  may  readily  follow 
f'ch  a  Judgment,  not  only  in  general  anddiftant  Purpofes  or' 
Relblves,  bur  in  partiailar  Cafes,  whenit  comes  to  Practice ; 
and  Jikewife,  fo  to  difpofe  the  Pafficns  (whether  by  Moral, 
Medicinal,  or  other  Methods)  that  they  may  be  under  the 
Conduit  of  a  Judgment  and  Will  fo  form'd.  And  whereas 
we  cannot  hope  for  Perfeftion  in  this  Life,  nor  fhould  preteiid 
to  It,     We  may  at  once  animate  our  Endeavours,   and  keep 

down 


Chap  4.         J ///provci>p/e^t  of  Rta[on.  i^i. 

down  Prefumprion  by  confidering,  thar  Divine  Gocdntfs  docs' 
on  rlie  account  of  our  Saviour,  and  that  alone  can  cfteem 
dmfmcerc  Aim  at  Perfedrion,  and  Endeavours  towards  it  rO 
be  rr?v/y  gc-H  whlift  they  are  not  throughly  fo,  nor  can  there- 
fore bear  the  Eie  of  Stridter  Juftioc  ;  lince  there  is  fomewhac 
wanting,  that  ought  to  be  in  them,  or  added,  which  ought 
not  to  be  ;  and  that  fo  long  they  cannot  daim  Acceptance 
with  God  on  their  own  Account,  how  well  foever  our  AAi^ 
onsbe  w-?w  '^ci  in  other  rcfpect?,  or  on  our  acco -nr,  how 
well  foever  we  might  carry  onr  felves  in  other  Points  ;  for 
*tis  plain  we  owe  all  Wj;.',and  tkar  bcfides,  which  is  orherways 
wanting. 

§  10.  We  ou^ht  to  be  well  appriz'd,  what  /''h^nn  or 
Middle  thitf  is  which  PruH-nc-  (the  great  intelledtual  Vivtue 
and  Direcftrefs  of  Moral  Actions)  teaches  from  the  Conlide- 
ration  of  Perfons  and  Things  wiih  the  Circu^'t<}nnce:  attending, 
forcgo'ng,  01'  followirg,  and  cfpecially  from  thofe  important 
Enquiries;  "What  are  the  variou-s  £/?Jj  we  may  wlII  propofc 
to  oar  felves  in  this  or  that  Adion,  Which  are  the  hrjl  oi' 
them  when  we  can't  reach  them  all.  and  bv  what  means  ar.in 
what  way  we  m.ay  reafonably  hope  l>^Ji  to  reach  thofe  which 
are  really  the  l^efi  ;  How  it  may  be  moft  fully  done,  and  at 
the  fame  time  moft  frucally,  with  the  leaft  expcnce  of  Time, 
Coft,  tj)c.  How  the  Mean  is  to  be  kept  in  ovr aiding  '^^  ithoiit 
ftraitning  the  PraAlce  of  T-^'r/^j/r,  and  infringing  the  IL-ipphicfs 
ifje  might  attain  by  a  more  Heroic  Eiercife  thereof;  for  tha 
we  murt  not  be  prodigal,  we  cannot  be  too  Liberal  in  aright 
and  prudent  way  of  giving,  no  more  than  we  can  JLivd  too 
fafe,  or  thrive  too  well  by  d^vifvg  Liberm  Things. 

^11.  M'^demtirn  muft  be  duly  plac'd,  and  is  undoubted- 
ly then  a  cnnfiderable  Virtue,  tho'  Lukewarmncfs  be  not  fo 
in  a  Matter  that  dcferves  our  Zeal.  Wt-tlionld  generally  nio- 
derate  cur  Eftcem  of  Mui  and  Thinjs,  as  this  World  common- 
ly goes,  and  are  the  Ulcer  to  do  them  Jnflicc  in  fo  doing ;  but 
cfpecially  we  Jhould  take  care  to  fet  an  Humble  and  Mrdeji 
J{ate  upon  our  own  Parts,  Grace,  Performances,  Acquirc- 
tntnts,  Birth,  Reputation,  and  Condition  ;  not  that  we  are 
to  lefTen  cur  lelves,  but  to  confider  how  little  Elleem  is  due 
to  what  is  really  fo  low  in  fon:ie  or  other,  perhaps  in  many 
fefpeds. 

§  li.  As  to  the  Virtues  menticn'd,  and  the  greater 
Number  which  follow,  it  greatly  concerns  us,  not  only  to 
know  them,  bur  to  knov^/  how  we  may  hope  to  come  by 
them  ;  What  kind  of  Tho'e  and  Conliderations  we  (hculd 
wfe,  how  we  Ihouid  Pray,    and  how  conduit  our  felves  in  re- 

D  4  ipec^ 


^1.  An  Ejjay  for  the    .  Parti* 

fpe£l  of  Faith,  Hope,  Fear,  Care,  Food,  Phyfic,  Bufinefe, 
Expences,  ^c.  ^s  nlfo  whntfort  of.  Company  we  fhould  kpep^  that 
tfe  may  learn  to  be  Contented  with  what  we  have,  and  with  our 
State,  not  Ccivetous  or  Ambitious  ;  F/  w^^/,  not  wafting  what 
jnay  well  be  fav'd ,  not  Lavifh  or  Profufe ;  temperate^  in  re- 
fpe(ft  of  Meat,  Drink,  Sleep,  Recreations,  ^c.  not  Lux- 
urious  or  indulging  to  Appetite,  Eafe,  or  Pleafure^  Chajl, 
not  looling  either  Body  or  Mind  to  any  thing  irregular  or  ex-. 
ccirivc,  in  what  relates  to  this  or  that  Sex  ;  hix'd  and  Con- 
ftant  in  what  is  right  and  good,  not,  wavering  and  unfetled  ; 
H^'^.tchfiiizn^  Obfervantj  not  heedlelsor  unwary ;  Indujiriom^ 
notflothful  or  trifling  ^  Patient,  not  fretful,  in  bearing  Evils, 
or  hafty  in  the  defire  of  Good  ;  Bcld^  to  follow  a  juft  call 
into  Dangers  and  Difficulties  ;  neither  Tinriorous  and  diffi- 
dent on  the  one  hand ;  nor  rafti  and  prefumptuous  on  the 
Other  ;  Brr.ve,  as  detefting  what  is  Bafe,  Sordid  or  Treache- 
rous ;  Pious,  as  having  the  higheft  Veneration  for  God,  with 
a  juft  and  affedionate  Reeard  for  our  Parents  and  Country  ; 
Kind,  williing  well  to  others,  rejoycing  in  their  Profperity, 
and  condoling  their  Troubles  ;  Meel^,  not  eafily  provoked, 
or  immoderately  Angry  ;  Ccurteous,  having  a  due  regard  even 
for  our  Inferiors,  and  exprefllng  it  in  our  receiving  of  ethers 
and  Converfe  with  them  ;  Faithful,  carefully  anfwering  the 
Truft  repofed  in  us;  T'-ue,  ufing  Words,  or  other  agreed 
Signs,  according  to  their  genuine  Meaning  ;  not  cxpreffing 
our  felvcs  otherwife  than  we  think,  and  efpecially  that  we  do 
ir,  not  with  an  injurious  Aim  or  Tendency. 

§  1 3.  VVe  Ihould  farther  endeavour  to  have  a  Urgenefs  of 
Mindj  a  fomewhac  more  than  Publick  Spirit,  an  univerfal 
Concern  for  the  good  of  Mankind  ;  as  alfo  an  Impartial  Up- 
right Mind,  not  to  be  bials'd  by  any  Confiderations  or  Re- 
gards that  enter  not  the  Merits  of  a  Caufe  ;  but  at  the  fame 
rime,  a  Mind  ftrongly  propending  and  incUn'd  to  what  is 
Fit  or  /'^:cwj7i^  us  in  our  Place,  Station  and  Condition;  Grate- 
fu',  and  expremve  of  the  Scnfc  we  really  have  of  Kindnefe 
receiv'd;  fo  as  it  ftould  be  to  us  (in  fomc  Cafes)  a  piece  of 
Self-denia',  not  to  make  a  Return  even  beyond  what  we  may 
be  well  Capable  of;  and  yet  ou»  Inclination  fhould  go  farther 
tp  what  is  Free  and  unpronipted,  to  fhew  Kindnefs  where  we 
are  not  fo  prcoblig'd,  and  without  the  Mercinary  Aim  of 
drawing  more  again,  or  as  much  from  others ;  but  we  may 
by  no  Means  fail  of  being  conftantly  and  unalterably  bent  to' 
the  rendring  to  every  one  what  is  his  refpeftive  Due^  to  this 
we  muft  be  neverthelefs  inclin'd,  even  tho'  we  be  difabled ; 
but  as  to  the  Juftice  of  puniihing,  it  muft  only  refped  fome 

good 


Chap.  4-  Intprevement  of  Ktziou.  55 

good  End  to  be  that  way  purfu'd,  otherwife  Mercy  fhouJd  tri- 
umph over  ftri£t  and  rigorous  J«ftice  -,  and  to  that  we  fhould 
ftrongly  incline  as  to  a  Point  of  Juftice,  forgiving  as  thofe 
xX'ho  our  felves  need  forgivenefs ;  Giving,  as  thofe,  who  ac- 
count it  an  indeterminate  kind  of  Due;  pitying  however 
and  helping  where  we  can,  as  we  our  felves  would  and  might 
juftly  expe(^  from  others,  were  the  Tables  turn'd  betwixt  us 
and  thofe  in  Afflidtion. 

§  14.  There  have  been,  and  yet  are  Laves  which  may 
be  peculiarly  called  God's  Laws,  ■either,  as  exprefling  his  po- 
fitive  Will,  or  however,  as  being  fpecially  revealed  by 
him  ;  fome  of  which  are  alfo  the  Laxvs  of  Mature,  as  being 
ijrplyM  in  the  Nature,  Relations,  and  Condition  of  PcrJbns 
and  Things ;  and  amongft  thefe,  fome  concern  Katkns  one 
towards  another,  and  are  in  a  manner  tacitcly  agreed  amongft 
them :  But  there  are  alfo  Laws  peculiar  to  this  and  that 
I{ealm,  Time,  and  particular  Pince  ;  and  befidcs  what  may 
be  written,  there  are  oft  unwritten  I^u/es,  by  which  Courts 
proceed,  and  D//?6»n;  which  are  a  kind  of  Common,  as  the 
others  are  Statute  Law  :  All  refer  to  fome  or  orhcr  C^Je,  or 
Set  of  Circumftances,  and  command  or  forbid  {oirieth\ng,  ap- 
point publick  Taxes,  are  enforced  with  certain  Paitis  and  Pe- 
nalties, do  fometimes  contain  Grants,  Immunities,  orPrivi- 
ledges,  and  always  imply  fome  Benefits  upon  the  obfer^ing 
of  them.  For  applying  the  general  Laws  to  parcicu'ar 
Cafes  there  are  Courts  of  Judicature  (Ecclefiaftical  and  Ci- 
vil), Terms  or  fet  Times  of  trying  Catifes  betwixt  Parties 
(Complainant  or  Plaintiff  and  Defendant^  upon  Proof  made 
by  Writings  and  Oaths:  Bills  of  Indidtment,  for  of  Petition 
in  Chancery)  as  alfo  Declarations  are  Exhibited,  Picas  and 
yJnfvoers  made  or  given  in ;  and  Pf'^rits  (or  Authoritative 
Writings)  iffu'dout;  Forwajof  Law  and  Formalities  obferv'd; 
Covenants  of  two  or  more  Parts  with  their  Caufes,  Confide- 
rations,  Conditions,  and  Limitations,  made,  Executed,  Wit- 
neffed,  Pleaded  ;  iVills  (vi:(,  fuch  are  the  laft  Will  and  Te- 
ftament  of  this  or  that  Perfon  deceafed,  and  who  had  power 
to  make  and  ordain  them)  prov'dand  enter'd,  Letters  of  Ad- 
miniftration  thereupon  taken  out :  Gifts  and  Legacies  paid 
after  reafonable  Funeral  Expences  and  real  Debts,  which  may 
be  fecur'd  with  Perfonal  Security  ("as  Notes,  Bonds,  e?c.)  or 
Real  (as  Mortgages,  C^c) 

§  15.    Summons  (by  Warrant,    Citation,   Subpaena,   or 

otherwife)  is  given :    Upon  an  Arrejf,  the  Perfon  muft  fa- 

tisfie  the  Demand,  or  go  to  Prifon,   or  put  in  Bail  to  anfwer 

^h«  5«;>  and  ftand  Trial ;  but  Trials  do  alfo  refer  to  Criminal 

i:-.-  (as 


(is  well  as  Klfi  frim).  CdiVL^GS'y  and  there  are  thofewho  pre- 
y?^e  as  Judges,    /T/^i/?  as  Council,    ^freW  as  Officers,    Attor- 
neys, Solicitors,    Prodlors,  Ijc.    belides  the  Grand  Jury  of 
ly,  12  of  which  mufi:  agree  to  find  and  bring  in  an  Indi(^- 
memas  Bllii  ^era^  or  throw  it  out  by  returning  Ignoraymu  upon 
i.t:    But  the  Petty  Jury  of  1 2  muft  all  agree  in  their  Verdi^ 
to  clcnr  or  c.ijl  the  Prifoner,  who  yet  in  fome  Cafes  may  Pray 
and  be  admitted  to  the  Benefit  of  his  Clergy  to  /^7/ii,  as  the 
Ordinary  lliall  appoint,  and  thereupon  to  come  off  with  his 
Lice,   tho'  -not  ahogetlier  without  Pv^niiliment.     The  Judge 
('o>:dcmns,    and  may  for  fome  lliort  limited  time  t^epricvCy 
but  to  do  this  loi:ger,  or  to  Pard  ?>,  belongs  to  the  Sovereign  j 
ro  ■'■'^JliLi  or  e:cccu:e  the  Sentence  to  the  Sheriff  and  his  under 
Officer^:.     Jn  Adtions  a  certain  Drww.-r.e  is  laid  or  try'd  for, 
with  Ccjts  of  Suit,   but  only  fo  much  of  either  ^iv'n  upon 
carrying  the  Caufc,  as  is  tho't  Reafonable.  Juftice  ought  not 
to  be  dclf^yd,   much  lefs  denfd,  as  polTibly  it  may  fometimcs^ 
be,  thro*  Favour,  Ill-ivill,  or  upon  Inrerefl.     The  Letter  of 
the  Law  is  to  be  in  fome  Cafus  foftvcd,  in  others  fupplyd  by 
Equly,   but  bo'h  as  near  as  can  be  according  to  what  may 
be  fairly  fuppos'd  aprceab'e  to  the  Mind  of  the  Legiflature,  If 
fuch  Cafe  had  been  before  them,  and  the  Procedure  in  Chan- 
cery is;obe  regulated  by  fome  known  Rules  and  Methods. 
'   k  16.     The  more  Pubiick  Affairs  and  Concernments  of 
Civil  Societies  are  the  common  Liberties  (or  a  due  Freedom 
of  a£fing  in  Secular  or  Spiritual  Matters)  and  Properties  (or 
every  ones  juft  Qaim  and  Poffeffion  to  be  fecur'd  and  peace- 
ably enjoy 'd)  for.  which  purpofes  /Authority  is  by  common 
Agreement  or  Submiillon  lodg'd  in  fome  or  other  Hand  or 
Hands.     Some  only  claim,   but  enjoy  not  the  Extrcife  of  it, 
or  may,  perhaps,  have  it,  when  they  have  not  a  rightful  and 
lawful  Claim  thereto  :     Seme  have  the  Sovereign  or  Supreme, 
others  only  a  Subordiyicte  Authority,  and  may  be  faid  to  ferve 
the  Pubiick  in  Eccleliaftical  or  Civil  Affairs,  in  fuch  particu- 
lar Station  and  Degree  :     As  to  each  of  thefe  it  may  be  cori- 
fider'd  how  they  are  yti^Jc  or  conftituted  ( by  Defcent,  Choice 
or  otherways   ;    what  the  Names  and  Titles  belonging  to 
them ;   what  Marias  and  Badges  of  their  Dignity  or  Place  1 
what  l^'crl^^  Bufinefs  or  Charge  lies  upon  theni  j    what  the 
Expence  of  fuch  a  Station,  and  what  Bjvenue  to  Support  it ; 
what  ftated  P^y,  Salarys  and  Perquifites,  or  what  Fee  appoin- 
ted, ufually  given,  or  commonly  expedted. 


$17  Leagud 


Ghap.  4-         Improve metit  of  ?s.tz{on.  95 

'•  §•  17.  Le/tgiu-s  are  made  betwixt  Sovereign  Powers,  and 
fbnieniires  have  other  Princes  as  Guarrantees  to  fecure  the  Per- 
formance. Trenties  may  be  fet  on  foot,  and  carry'd  on  in  re- 
R'rence  to  fome  particular  Agreements,  ev'n  in  a  State  of 
War :  Embr.JJjes  are  a  fort  of  folenin  Meflages  from  one 
Sovereign  Power  to  another  :  Pence  is  the  quiet  Enjoyment 
of  our  Liberties  and  Properties,  and  is  often  the  Rcfult  of  an 
Agreement  for  that  Purpofe,  which  gi\  es  an  Opportunity  and 
Security  to  Trafficl^  or  Trade  betwixt  the  Countries  fo  agreed. 
Arms  or  ff-^^r,  fuppofe  the  Peace  broken  by  Injuries  done, 
and  that  thereupon  War  is  denounc'd  or  proclaimed  ;  Men 
raised  and  hfted  [t\e.  common  Soldiers  under  Superior  and 
Subordinate  Officers)  AloTicy  provided,  together  with  Stores 
of  Arms,  Am.munition  and  Provifions,  Forts ^  or  Fortifications, 
Cr.mps  to  accommodate  and  fecure  Armies  in  the  Field,  Ship 
or  Men  of  War  with  their  Furniture :  Acftion  is  either  Fights 
and  Skirmiflies  or  Sieges  with  Ttenches,  Mines,  Counter- 
mines, Batteries,  G?c.  nor  is  all  to  be  done  in  a  more  open 
way,  but  much  by  IT^iles  and  Stratagems  in  order  tothcealier 
and  furer  Viclory  which  yet  is  not  wont  to  be  carr\M  without 
fomewhat  of /:/^'Wj  and  Loffcs  ev'n  on  the  Conquering  fide, 
but  they  are  commonly  much  greater  on  the  other. 

§  18.  Mens  private  Dert//«^j  with  each  other  in  relation 
to  matters  of  Property  may  be  either //3/>,  as  they  themfches 
would  be  dealt  withal  \  or  foul  in  the  way  of  Tricking  ;  or 
downright  fnJfe  and  deceitful,  whether  in  Buying  or  felling 
for  Money,  or  in  Bartering  and  changing  away  one  Thing  for 
another  •  when  Truft  or  Credit  is  given,  'tis  but  reafonable 
fomewhat  be  allowed  for  the  ZJJc  of  the  Money,  of  which 
divcrfe  I{etwns  might  perhaps  have  been  made,  whiHt  it 
lay  dead  aud  unimprov'd  :  Notes,  Bills,  or  other  Payment* 
may  be  abated,  according  to  Difcount,  fo  much  as  the  Inrereft 
comes  to,  when  they  are  paid  before  they  come  due  :  Sure 
Pny,  tho'  it  be  flow,  may  be  born  j  but  F(crJy- Money  is  to  be 
chofen,  tho'  with  lefs  Profit.  The  Ti7ne  for  which  Apprenti- 
ces are  Bounds  muft  cither  be  few'd  out,  or  giv'?i  in  order  to 
their  being  Free :  Journey-men  and  other  Servants  maybe 
/j/>V,  as  alfo  Lodgings,  Houfes,  Horfes,  c^c.  Publick  Re- 
venues are  fometimes  Farmd  at  a  certain  yearly  Rate,  as 
Land  alfo  is,  which  is  commonly  let  for  Jome  Term  ofTenrs,  or 
for  Lives ;  where  belides  Harriots,  or  the  beft  quick  Goods 
to  be  givenio  the  Land-Lord  upon  the  falling  ot  a  Life, 
there  is  a  Fine  or  prefent  Summ  to  be  paid  to  him,  at  the 
taking  or  renewing,  of  a  Leaje ;  but  then  the  yearly  I^cnt 
ought  to  be  proportionably  Eafier ;    A  Free-hold  Eftaie  fliould 

be 


3  6  An  Fjfay  for  the  Part  I. 

b»  wholly  Rent-free  ;  when  as  Copy-hold  pays  fomewhafe 
to  the  Lord  of  the  Manner ;  and  with  us,  tho'  it  exceed  Forty 
Shillings  a  Year,  yet  it  does  not  ufually  qualifie  to  Vote  for 
a  Member  of  Parliament.  Wagers  laid  upon  this  or  thai 
Point  are  Won^  when  it  proves  according  to  what  was  laid 
upon  ;  Ibjl  if  otherwifc.  Negleded  Payments  run  Men  into 
Arrenrs. 

§  19.  WMes,o\  Commodities  are  vended,  either  by  ff^o/c- 
Snh  in  larger  Qiiantities,or  by  i^ef^/finfmaller;  and  may  be 
^4^  or  faulty,  gooi^  righr,  and  as  they  ought  to  be,  or  the  hefi 
of  the  fort,  and  chenf  or  denr^  as  there  is  greater  or  lefs  Plenty, 
more  or  lefs  Demand  for  them  ;  and  however  itbe,theff^^;^/j#, 
or  Meyju-  c,  or  Tnlc^    and  Number  ought  to  be  what  is  pre- 
tended to,   and  agreed  upon.     Partners  join  their  Stocks, 
bear  their  Charges  in  common,  and  ihare  the  Product  accor-^ 
ding  to  Agreement ;  /Icccuras  of  what  is  disburfed,  owing  to 
us,  or  received  by  ns  ought  to  be  carefully  l(epty    caft  up, 
and  Jlated  at  fit  Seafon«,  and  to  be  brought  to  a  clear  RefuU 
or  BiilUnce ,  fo  as  we  may  know  what  is  gamd  or  loji  upon  the 
"Whole ;  and  what  lies  in  Danger  to  be  loft:    We  may  enfure 
Houfes  in  Cafe  of  Fire,  alfo  Ships  and  Merchandize  for  a 
Premium  of  fo  much  in  the  Hundred :    Stock,  or  the  Intereft 
we  have  or  are  fuppos'd  to  have  in  this  or  that  Bank  or  Com- 
pany, maybe  fold  in  Stockrjobblng^zi  alfo  parts  of  Mines,  (3c. 
In  cafe  of  their  Breaking,  with  whom  we  Deal,  fo  as  they 
are  not  able  to  difcharge  the  Whole,  we  may  Compound,  and 
take  a  part  inftead  of  it,  or  nfe  Fm-bearance,  and  allow  them 
farther  Time  for  Payment. 


CHAP.     V. 

§  I.  xK^LL,  and  good  Management  may  be  learnt  by 
the  By,  even  in  Points,  that  are  not  folemrjy  or 
profeffedly  Tnught,  as  by  obferving  and  imitating  Patterns 
and  Examples,  as  alfo  by  aiming  and  PraStfing;  but  good 
J^u/?j  andDiredions,  when  they  can  be  had,  may  together 
with  thofe  expedite  and  forward  our  Learning,  whether  it  be 
alone,  or  in  Company,  and  perhaps  at  School :  In  fome  or 
otherof  the  mentioned  ways,  Men  come  to  I{ead,  Write,  caft 
Accounts,  Meafure,  Sail,  Work  this  or  that  Manufacture, 
Trade  in  Buying  and  Selling,  Sing  and  Play,  Dance,  Fence 
and  Ride  with  Skill  j   as  alfo  10  be  vers'd  in  Games,  in 

Tongues, 


Chap.  5.         Improvement  of  Realon.  57 

Totigues,  in  learned  Sciences  and  Arts  j  and  to  get  the  way 
of  TMcA»»g  others  ;  of  i^e<iW/«g  with  Advantage  by  themfelves, 
and  to  others;  o^Notingy  Extracting,  commonplacing,  CJfc. 
ofordering  well  their  courfe  of  S?«^i>j,  of  Praying  regularly 
and  ufefully  with  others  j  of  Difcourfing  to  them  or  Difputing 
with  them  ;  of  Civil  Behaviour^  and  good  Manners  j  of  re- 
gulating the  VoicCy  together  with  the  Gefiure  in  Speaking  ;  as 
likewife  of  Conducing  our  felves  in  refpe(ft  of  our  Judgment, 
Will,  AfFedtions,  ExpreiTions,  Company,  Recreations,  Ex- 
pences,  (3c.    And, 

§  2.  Men  may  alfo  be  led  into  the  Care  and  ConduB  of  the 
Church,  or  any  Sacred  Society,  the  State  or  Civil  Affairs  j 
Ah  Army,  or  Navy,  a  Company,  or  Incorporation,  a  parti- 
cular Bufinefs  and  fpecial  Undertaking,  fome  or  other  Per- 
ibn  (as  a  Guardian,  Tutor,  &c.)  or  a  Family,  as  the  Head 
aftd  Governour  of  it ;  And  finally  (to  inftance  no  farther) 
the  differing  PraHice  in  Law  y  as  a  Judge  on  the  Bench, 
Council  at  the  Bar,  or  in  his  Chamber,  a  ^Jierk  in  Chancery, 
Clerk  of  the  Peace,  G?c.  a  Solicitor,  Attorney,  (3c.  and  in 
Phyfick^y  that  of  a  Do6tor  or  an  Apothecary  \  in  Surgery ^  thofe 
of  Bone-fetting,  Difmembring,  Curing  Hurts,  (3c.  Now  in 
all  forts  of  Bufinefs,  the  SkjU  and  Care  and  Faithfulnefj,  which 
have  approv  d  themfelves  upon  the  moft  confiderable  Trial^ 
do  ftrongly  recommend  a  Perfon,  as  fit  to  be  employ 'd ;  and 
yet  fome  who  have  not  as  yet  had  the  Time  or  Opportunity 
of  fo  far  approving  themfelves,  can,  and  will  make  up,  in  a 
more  diligent  Attendance^yNh^t  mighihe  farther  defir'd  in  fome 
other  refpeifts. 

^  3.  Number  and  Meafure  fwhich  are  the  Bufinefs  of 
Mathematicks,  whether  pure  or  mixt^  deferve  and  require 
a  fpecial  Confideration,  ev'n  as  they  may  be  joirid  with 
Sounds,  and  Words,  and  particularly  with  the  No^wof  Mu- 
fick,  higher  and  lower  j  the  Parts,  as  harmonious  or  difcor- 
dant ;  Airs  of  all  forts,  whether  flat  or  Iharp  (according  to 
their  Key,  or  manner  of  Clofing,  in  a  greater  or  leffer  Third) 
foft  or  loud  ',  And  finally  the  Time  as  it  is  common  or  Triple, 
fwifter  or  llower,  with  Refts  and  Fuges  or  without.  Num- 
ber and  Meafiire  are  likewife  apply  d  to  Time  in  the  more 
lifual  Senfe,  as  alfo  to  freight,  and  very  remarkably  to  Mc- 
ticv,  in  rel'peft  of  what  it  is,  that  drives  or  dram  (whether  it 
be  of  a  fixed  unaltering  Meafure,  or  that  in  driving  it  Shrinks, 
and  Stretches  in  drawing) ;  what  Stops  or  Guides \  what  ta/ifs 
dff  fron;  the  Motion  by  '  aking  part  of  it,  or  turns  and  refle(5ts 
it  (whether  that  Le  yielding  or  not,  and  how  farj  j  as  alio 
in  refpedt  of  the  Force  moving,   what  degrees  it  has,  the  B.o^?v, 

rmvd 


3^ 


-i'«  tjjay  for'  the 


Parti! 


v:cvdj  of  what  Weight  and  Figure  5  and  the  Medium  or  Way 
how  far  it  is,  and  how  fill'd :  The  L^tp/  of  Motion  sxt 
determind  by  the  Number  of  Degrees  in  the  Force  and 
Weight,  and  by  the  Meafure  of  Bodies  in  other  Refpecfis  : 
But  Number  and  Meafure  are  yet  more  evidently  apply'dp 
Sigkt  in  Opticks  ;  to  the  Sun,  and  Stars,  and  Dials  fitted  to 
them,  in  Aftronomy  j  to  the  Lnnd  and  Se.-r,  in  Maps  and 
Chares,  as  alio  in  Travelling  and  Sailing  ;  to  the  diredijig 
of  Machines,  Fordfications,  Architefture,  and  in  a  Word  to 
whatfoever  is  any  ways  affedled  with  more  and  IcJ's^  fo  a^ip 
be  more  fo,  or  Icls  lo  than  fomewhat  elfe  with  which  it  ma;^ 
be  compar'd. 

§  4.  Number  and  "Meafure  are  altogether  ahflr/tHv^, 
when  we  attend  only  to  thofe  Attribures,  whatever  be  thp 
Subjects  of  them  ;  as  when,  hi  A^ithmctick_^  we  read  iuc® 
Words  what  is  writin  Figures,  or  Note  or  fet  down  in  thefe, 
whan  is  given  in  thole  ;  when  we  Subftra(5i,  Add,  Multiply 
or  Dividl*,  whether  Lines,  Figures,  Bodies,  Saunrcs  ^  rifing 
from  the  Multiplication  ot  a  Number  by  it  felf,  as  3  by  j 
13p.aii.es  9)  Cubes  ;  from  the  farther  Multiplication  of  the  fame 
Kuniber  again  by  iti  felf :  So  9  by  3^  makes  27)  qx  B^^tioSy 
.»,  c.  the  Proportion  ^of  Numbers,  as  when  the  firftr  is  lb  often 
contained  in  the  fecond,  as  the  third  is  in  the  fourth ;  or  does 
fb  oft  contain  the  2d,  as  the  jd  does  the  4th  i  thus  3  is  to  9,as  9 
"is  to  17;  or  as  9  is  to  3,  fo  is  27  to  9,  the  Qi'otity  being  alike 
on  both  fides,  ;'.  e.  three  times  containing,  in  this  latter  In- 
ftance ;  three  times  contained,  in  the  former  :  But  alj  this 
while  we  are  ty'd  to  this  or  that  particular  Inftance  j  as  we 
likewifeare  in  Vulgar  and  Decimal  Pmts  or  Fratflions,  and  in 
the  latter  fort  the  parts  are  always  fo  many  Tenths  or  Hull- 
dredths,  or  Thoufandths,  or  Ten-thoufandchs,  CS'c 

§  3.     And  we  are  ftill  ty'd  to  particulars  in  the  Making 

and  Uling  of  Logirithm- 
Sines,  Tn}igcntsz.ndL  Num- 
bers as  we  have  them  in 
Briggs  and  other  printed 
Tables.  Logarithms  pro- 
ceed in  what  they  call 
Arithmetical  Proportion, 
by  fit  Diffc-enccs,  an- 
fwering  to  Numbers  in 
Geometrical  Proportion, 
or  in  that  of  Q^wtity  ;  fp 
th.at,  whereas  10  times 
lo  is  looj  and  10  times 
100  is 


So 

0  3 

Numbers. 

As 

I 

K  to 
10 

Logarithm. 

differing  each 
j.000,000 

and  Hi 
0.000,000 

is  to 
1.000,000 

p  ■* 

fo  is  this  to 

fo  n  tins  to 

100 

nnd  this  to 
1  oco 

2.000,000 
niid  this  to 
5.000,000 

-"  0' 

and  tins  to 

and  this  to 

s  £ 

0  0 

lOOOO 

•.He.    * 

4.000,000 
&c. 

Chap.  5.  hjprovemcnt  of  R. talon.     39 

ioo  is  1000;    therefore  if  you  give  to  lo  the  Logarithm- 
Number  i.cco^ooo,   you  muft  give. to  100  the  Logarithra 
i..ooo,ooo,,  and  to,  1  ru.o  the  Lcgariihrp  3.000,000,  as  in 
the  Margin  ;     And  hence  you  may,    by  the  help  of  Tables 
prepared,    Mvltipiy  two  Numbers  by   rMlng  the  Logarithms 
alfign'd  to  them  in  the  Table  j  and  th-^n  feeking  out  the  Loga- 
rithm  produc'd  by  Adding,  in  the  Table,    you  wil.  find  a-, 
gainft  it  the  Number  prouuc'd  by  the  Multiplication  of  the 
giv  n  Numbers :     You  may  alfo  divide,  a.  Number  l)y  Sub- 
ftrading  the  Logarithm  of  the  Diyiibr  from  its  Logafithn?, 
the  Remainder  will  be  th^Logarithm  o\  the  Quotient  foughc. 
You  may  alfo  excrad  ihc  Square  B^ot  of  any  Nimibcr  (fo  far 
as  )our  Tables  goj  by  taking  h-vf  its  Logarulim,  which  will 
be  the  Logarithm  of  its  Square  Root  ;^  as  a  third  of  the  Loga- 
rithm of  any  Number  will  be  the  Logarithm  of  hs  Cuhe  Hoot  i; 
thus,  whereas  1.000,000  is  the  Logarithm  of  100,   its  half- 
r. 000, 000  is  the  Logarithm  of  1  c,  the  Square  Root  of  100 _j 
for  ten  Multiply 'd  by  i  cis  100:  And  whereas  3,000,009  is 
the  Logarithm  of  1  coo,  its  third  i.oco,ooo  is  the  x  ogaritljm 
of  I  o,  the  Cube  Root  of  i  uoo  ^  for  teniime^tep  is  lop,  an^ 
ic;n  times  1 00  is  1 000.  .,,  +  .,,,         ^  ^; ,,  _.,  .>  ^.  ., ,      ;  ,,    ,. .  - 
§  6.    But  if  we  would  get  cut  a  general  iPoinr,  we  muft 
go  to  Gecmufy  or  .algebra.     As  if,  for  Inilancc.  it  were  to  be^ 
ihewn,  that  a  ftraight  Line  failing,  i,nany  manner  whatever, 
upon  another  ftraight  Line,  will  make  tw-o  Angles  with  it,^ 
which  taken  together  fhall  be  equal  to  z  Right  Angles :  The 
Gfo/we^ricrt/ Demonftra'ion  ■  f  this  general  Theorem   (or  Sper 
culative  Point)  wiiJ  arife  from  the  Defiuiti'r.s  oi  2^n  ^tigle, 
and  of  a  Right  one ;    from  the  D:r!ia7:d  nr:d  Gr.r.t  (as  being, 
what  cannot  be  den/d)   that  fuch  a  Line  be  made,   of  fup- 
P5»'d  to  be,   at  right  Angles  with  that,    on  which  the  givea 
Line  fell ;   and  finally  fiom  the^Self-evident  jixiomy  that  al| 
the  Pares  taken  together,  ace  equal  to  the  whole.     Let  the 
Line  n  />,  in  the  annexed  Scheme,  fall 
^t  adventure  upon  c//;   I  fay,  that  g. 

the  two  Angles  it  makes  therewith  ace  :       P'     . 

equal  to  two  right  Angles.-.    For  if  the  -f-^/  '■ 

pjtick'd  Linec/'ismade,  orfiippos'd  to  Q/h       Jv 

te,  at  right  Angles  with-  c,d  {/.  e.  th.c     C  ■      7  *^ 

the  Angle  toward  c  is  equal  to  that  to- 
wards dj  the  Angle  f  w.iibeir  (elf  one  right  Ang'e,  aijd  the 
Angles  g  and  /'  do  torerher  make  up  aiioihcr  (being  all  it$ 
parcsj  and  therefore  the  Angles  which  a  b  made  .with  c  d  (ihat 
is  h  on  one  fide  and  0  on  the  oiher)^  were  toge  her  e<a"al  to 
two  right  ones  ^  E.  D.  -       ^  ^ 

f  7.  ^/>--4?-rf 


40  An  EfJ'ay  for  the  Part  I. 

^7.  Algebra  may  like  wife  help  us  to  general  Points  and 
Refolutions,  whUft  it  teaches  to  put  differing  Marks,  (com- 
mpnly  Letters,)  for  the  feveral  Terms  (ufually  Corifcnants 
ibrthofe,  that  ar€  knpwn>  and  Vowds  for  the  unknown)  and 
then  zo  flat e  the  Matter  in  hand,  according  to  its  Tenor, 
with  thofe  Marks  inftead  of  the  particular  Quantities  thereby 
defign'd  j  drawing  out  Equations,  fubftituting  one  Equal  in 
the  place  of  another,  working  I{Atios  into  an  Equation  by 
multiplying  the  Terms,  which  are  To  many  times  greater, 
by  thofe,  which  are  as  many  times  lefs,  than  their  Fellows  re- 
fpedtively,  and  thus  the  Produd  of  the  Extremes  (or  firft  and 
laft  Terms)  will  equaU/j4/-  of  the  mean  or  middle  Terms, 
i.  e.  the  fecond  and  third  ;  whenever  they  are  fo  placed  (whe- 
ther Originally  or  by  Tfanfpofirion,  or  otherwifej  that  the 
firft  is  to  the  fecond,  as  the  third  is  to  the  fourth,  either  con-: 
taining  its  Correfponding  Term,  or  contained  by  it  as  many 
times  on  the  one  hand  as  on  the  other* 

§  8.  Algebra  farther  ihows,  how  we  may  re  of  on  on  from 
one  Placing  of  proportional  Terms,  and  alfo  from  one  Equati- 
on to  another,  in  the  way  of  tranjpofmg,  or  putting  that  quan- 
tity, which  ftands  with  a  P/w  (or  f  the  Note  of  Addition)  on 
one  fide  of  the  Equation,  to  ftand  on  the  other  with  a  Minus 
(or  —  the  Note  of  Subftrailion) ;  and  this  may  be  carry'd 
on  to  the  placing  of  all  the  Terms  on  one  fide,  as  =  (Equal 
to)  0,  on  the  other ;  there  may  be  likewife  an  Expunging^  or 
ftriking  out  of  like  Quantities,  when  they  ftand  on  one  fide 
with  t»  and  on  the  other  with  —  ;  alfo  if  there  be  one  oi; 
more  Quantities  divided  by  any  Quantity,   as  /'  by  <i  (which 

is  thus  cxpreft  —  )  all  the  other  Quantities  may  be  multi- 

a 

ply'd  by  that  Divifor,  which  is  exprcfs'd  by  the  Sign  x,  put 
betwixt  the  Marks,  fthus  d  x  4  i$  d  multiply'd  by  a)  or  un- 
derftood,  whenever  divers  Marks  are  put  together  without 
any  Sign  betwixt  them,  and  thus  d  a  is  d  multiply'd  by  a ; 
There  are  many  other  Rules  and  Methods  for  deducing  one  ■ 
Equal  from  another,  till  we  may  find  fomewhat  known  on  one 
fide  equal  to  what  is  unknown  and  fought,  on  the  other  j 
and  however,  that  the  Matter  be  brought  to  fuch  a  State,  as 
has  a  genetal  Canon,  or  Method  diredcd  tor  the  Refolution 

of  it.  _ 

^9.    It  muft  here  fulfice  to  inftance  in  the  Foundation, 

and  Working  of  the  Goldcn-Rule,  or  Rule  of  Three,  which 

is  of  fo  common  ufe  m  Bufinefs.     Now  lee  /»,  c,  d,  iiand  for 

ihr(e  given  Qiiantities ;    and  the  Queftion  be  this,   what 

Quintit/  will  bear  a  like  Proportion  to  /',  as  e  does  to  .V,  or; 


Chap  5.  Ir/f^rovtm&nt  of  Reafon.  41 

if  A  give  c,  what  muft  h  give  ?  Put  a.  for  what  anfwers,  and 
the  matter  will  ftand  thus,  a  is  to  ^,  as  c  is  to  d,  and  may  be 
thus  exprefs'd,<J :  b  : :  c  :  d,  therefore  a  d-=-b  c  (that  is  the  Pro- 
dudtof  the  firft  and  laft  Terms  multiply'd  together,  is  equal  to 
that  of  the  middle  Terms)  •,  and  therefore  ^-^'■'=-  a  (i.  e.  b  mul- 
tiply'd by  c,  and  the  Producfl  divided  by  d^  will  give  4  for  the 
Quotient  J :  for  if  you  multiply  a  by  i/,  it  will  be  as  before, 
ti  d,  and  it's  all  one,  as  if  you  had  divided  ^dbyd^  for  that 
da  was  found  equal  to  h  c.  Now  if  d  were  i  /.  5  i.  (or  25  s.) 
and  bought  c  i.  c.  i  i  Yards  (or  ">  half  YardsJ/',  i.e.  5/.  (or 
1 00  J.)  will  buy  a,  i.e.  20  half  Yards,  or  ten  Yards  of  the 
fame  Silk;  for  ^c(i.  e.  iaox5)  =  5oo,  and  this  divided  by  </, 
i.  e.  25,  will  give  20  for  a  ;  and  20  X25  =  500  =  loox  5. 

§10.  Amongft  Humane  Affairs,  Language  is  of  no  fmall 
Importance  to  us,  particularly,  as  it  may  ferve  us,  both  to 
learn. other  things,  and  to  teach  them.  We  are  concerned 
therefore  to  know  XQhnt  is  the  Tongue  fpoken  or  written,  be- 
caufe  the  fame  Word  for  Sound  and  Writing  may  have  dif- 
fering Senfes  in  feveral  Tongues,  as  no  is,  in  Latin,  I  Swim  ;  in 
Engl,  fo  it  only  denies.  We  muft  alfo  know  what  the  words  nre^ 
whether  Subftantives,  Ad je£iives,  Verbs,  ©"f.  how  usd^  for 
what  Idea  j  What  their  Accidents  of  Number,  Cafe,  Gen-, 
der,  Mood,  Tenle,  (3c ;  which  the  Nominative  to  the  Verbj 
the  Subftantive  to  the  Adjedtive,  &c\  What  Cafcs  are  go- 
vern'd  by  fach  or  fuch  a  Verb,  or  other  part  of  Speech,  fj?c ; 
Wc  may  alfo  critically  enquire,  how  and  whence  the  Lan- 
guage Sprung  ;  what  Chnnges  it  has  undergone;  how  this  or 
that  may  be  juftly  turnd  or  tranflated  into  fuch  or  fuch  other 
Language. 

§  II.  But  in  Words,  that  are  fuppos'd  to  be  Coherent, 
the  great  Queftion  muft  be,  What  is  the  Senfe,  or  Meaning, 
and  of  what  Kjnd  ?  As  whether  it  confift  of  one  or  more  Sen-. 
fences-^  vvhcther  they  he  dift in ci  one  from  another,  or  con-^ 
join'd  ;  whether  infirc  and  abfolute  in  themfelves,  or  imper- 
frft  and  depending  upon  fomewhat  underftood,  or  exprefs'd 
m  what  goes  before,  or  follows  after ;  whether  this  or  that 
Point  be  Self-evident,  ov granted,  or  already  frov'd,  or  fuch  as 
wnnts  Proof; ,  whether  the  particular  Sentence,  or  the  conti- 
nu'd  Difcourfe  be  iliort  or  long, .  comparatively  with  fomc 
pther,  or  with  what  it  might,  or  (hould  have  been  ;  whether 
if  be  D.rd-^  or  Clear,  as.co  its  meaning  and  manner  of  Ex- 
prelfion ;  loofe  or  clofe,  Verbofc  or  Concife  in  more  or  fewer 
Words  whether  it  be  F^Z/c  or  True  (ornot  apparently  .ei- 
^bQr) ;  f^'rt^  ayd  Infignificant^Of  VV'ife  and  Inftrudive ;  whe^ 
rh^r  it  I:e  dohver'd  m  j^-opcr  i,nd  literal,  or  Figurative  Terms  j 


4^  ^"^  ^  Jf(iy  for  the  Part  i. 

s^ ■-'•—i -^ • i— : ^1 , 

and  whether  it  might  be  purpofeJy  done  to  render  it  Jefs  ob- 
^ious  to  fuch  as  would  not  duly  attend,  or  more  to  inftrut^ 
and  affed. 

§  J  2.  What  Pans  01  Branches  a  Difcourfe  has ;  what 
Points  (zs  Commas,  Colons,  (Jjc);  what  Marias  (of  Interro- 
gation, Admiration,  Section^,  Hefercnces,  d^c);  and  what 
Xiofihcu  or  Figures,  elpecially  thatare  fct  to  the  Diviiionsand 
Subdivifions ;  What  this  or  that  Claufe  refers  tOy  and  how  j 
whether  as  Qu'Ji ion  oi  Atjwci  ;  Sujpcjttioti,  or  a  Gafeputi 
Motives  to  ir/witp  Qxd.cci,  i-'roof^  to  Convince  or  Confirm  the 
judgment,  that  it  is  or  fl^ould  be  (o  ;  Rcujmi  to  fatisfie  tlie 
Mind,  whence  it  is  lo,  or  why  it  flio.uld  be  fo  ;  Inference  to 
improve  what  was  avcrr'd,  or  difprove  what  was  only  fup- 
pos'd  ;  B.nEluciir.tio)i,  or  Opening  j  a  Siiniiic  orRefemblance 
to  illuftrace the  ThLrg,  or  affcClthc  Ferfons  we  maybe  con^ 
cerned  with. 

§  I  J.  But  bcfides  Language,  anci  the  ufual  way  of  wri- 
ting ir,  there  are  fome  other  S;_^wj  and  ExprciTions  of  Tho't, 
as  Charaders,  Pidlurcs,  GelUncs,  Cyc.  And  here  we  may 
confider  of  «'/-:;^7o*r  the  Kjy  (or  that  which  fliould  lead  us  in- 
to the  SenlC/  muft  be,  that  we  may  better  feek  out  what  it  is, 
particularly  for  Emblems  and  Figures  (which  may  be  fome 
infcription,  Ufage,'Likenefs,  Gjc),  fr  this  or  that  ^/jorf-Z^w^ 
(Tome  peculiar  Alphabet,  Symbolical  Marks,  &c.)  and  for 
Cryptography ,  fomewhat  fpecially  agreed  on  beforehand,  be- 
twixt or  an-.ongft  the  Parties  conccrn'd. 

^  14.  Thus  there  has  been  given  fome  Account  of  a  good 
Numberof  Things ;  but  becaufc  very  many  Themes  or  Objcfts 
of  Tho't  ha\ebeen  ev'n  defignedly  p<^Js\i  by,  and  that  we  may 
need  mr.ch  more  Li^iht  as  to  thole  menrion'd,  than  could  well 
be  given  here,  the  following /;^/7/;;V;cj  may  be  put  and  purfu'J 
in  tit  X^'ays.  J4^i:eti.er  the  Matter  be  at  all,  or  le  fo  ?  IVm^  or 
what  Perfon,  God,  Angel,  Fipnd,  or  other  Spirit,  Man, 
Woman,  Child?  J-V.  nt  Thing,  of  what  Kind,  Sort,  ©'c 
Which  cf  the  Kinds,  Sorts,  or  Particulars  >  H'tjcrc,  in  what 
Place  cr  State?  W.^encc^  from  what  Place,  Caufe  or  Rea- 
fon  ?  trhirhcr,  to  what  Place,  State,  End  or  purpofe  ? 
ff7j>,  for,  or  from  what  Reafon  ?  iVocr?^  at  what  time  ? 
H  ova  long,  for  what  time?  ihw,  in  what  Manner?  By  vphot?!^ 
what  Perfon  emplo.'d?  iVrnt  iV.rrrA^.t,  Allowance  or  Au- 
thority? H^hnt  i\lgi  r,  or  Title  to  this  or  that  f  l  thereby,  h^ 
what Inflrument  or  Means?  ll'ith  rvhcm,  in  what  Company, 
with  what  help?  lf^>  nt  Coi,nt,  i.  c  what  Number  or  way  of 
Niimbring  J  what  Re.  koning  cr  way  ol  Peckcning'(asfroni 

the 


Chap.  ^.         Improvement  of  ^^2([OT\.  4^^ 

the  Creation,  or  the  Birth  of  our  Lord,  by  the  Old  or  New 
Stile,  now  eleven  days  before  the  Old:  The  Longitude Eaft- 
ward  from  the  Teneriff  or  the  Azores,  &C.  Wbat  Powsrs^ 
whether Crf/J/iciVje J  of  being  fuch  or  fuch,  fo  or  fo  influenc'd; 
or  Abilities  of  bearing  or  doing  this  or  that  ">  lVh.it  Bent,  In- 
clination of,  Willj  or  Tendency  of  Nature P  TVoat  I{eJ}^  of 
the  whole  or  part -,  Stilnefs  of  Body,  or  Quietnefs  and  Satisr 
fadion  of  Mind  ?  M^oat  Change,  what  Motion  of  the  whole 
or  parts  in  or  from  their  place  •,  or  what  other  Alteration  ? 
H^'mt  I{elntion  or  Reference  this  Thing  or  Perfon  has  to  others  ? 
Wtmt  Tie  or  Obligation  thence  arifing  ?  How  the  Relation 
and  Obligation  might  be  caus'd,  or  what  the  Foundation  of 
it  ?  How  held  or  continued  ?  How  Null'd  or  diffolv'd  >  Hew 
fali'd,  as  to  what  appertains  thereto,  or  is  thereupon  Due  ? 
How  arifwei''d,  in  either  or  both  refpefts  ? 

^15.  What  the  Matter  and  Manner  of  what  is  done,  faid^ 
born  (endur'd  or  undergone^  h/td,  as  belonging  to  this  or  that 
Perfon  or  Thing,  or  as  poffefs'd  by  fuch  Perfon,  or  finally  rc- 
fei''d  to, either  in  thinking  or  fpeaking  of  thenn ;  more  efpecial- 
ly  as  to  Perfpns,  iVbat  Habits  (what  readier  Powers  or  Pro- 
penfion«)  we  or  others  once  had  or  now  have,  oi  Virtue  (as 
before  fpccify'd)  or  the  contrary  Vices,  Or  of  SkjH  (which 
^o's  not  denominate  morally  Good  or  Bad )  whether 
they  be  of  the  Mind  .  asquicknefsof  Apprehenlionj  Invention, 
Memory,  8ccJ  or  of  the  Tongue  in  this  or  that  manner  of 
Speaking,  Singing,  &c.  or  of  the  Feet  in  Going,  Running, 
Dancing,  &c.  of  the  Hand  in  Writing,  Working,  &c.  How 
the  Habit  was  come  by  -,  whether  extraordinarily  given  or 
got  in  this  or  that  way  (as  by  Exercife,  &c.)  how  it  is  or  may 
be  k,ept^  advanced,  lejfened,  tjulte  lofi  j  and  if  fo,  whether, 
and  how  to  be  rf^^/wV  and  reeover'd  ? 

^  i6.  As  to  Adions,  or  Undertakings,  we  may  enquire 
what  leads znd  induces,  or  at  leaft  goes  before  ;  what  attends 
or  accompanies-,  what  has  enfu'd  in  like  Cafes  •,  what  do's  in 
thcprcfent,  or  certainly  mujl,  or  probably  may;  or,  atlcaft, 
po/Jlb/y  :  What  Events  for  other  Things;  arc  to  be  look'd  on 
asCwnwow,  what  asV^rf/c,  what  as  O/../,  or  New,  Natural,  oc 
bejUe  the  ufual  Courfc  of  Nature,  what  -^galnjl^  or  above  it. 
Whatihisor  that  Perfons  ludgment  or  Sentiments  are  i  what 
the  Inclinations  of  his  Will  •,  what  his  Predominant  or  obfer- 
vable  Pajjions,  and  whether  they  are  Itrong  and  vehement, 
unruly  or  under  Government  :  What  the  Things,  which 
are  plcafing  and  agreeable,  or  which  are  grievous  to  the  Body, 
and  o^efzii  the  Mind^i  ?"«  what  refpe«£l  they  arefo,  whence  i^ 
comes  to  pals  j  -wha?  Burned)  in  r4ie  Cafe,  'or  how  it  may  beft 

£  i  be 


44 ^^  ^Jf^y  for  ^^g Part  i. 

be  born  -    and  what  the  I^ecompeyicc,    or  Advantage  which  ei- 
ther iscercain,  or  may  accrue. 

§.  17.  Anioiigft  all  the  Matters  of  Tho't  'whenas  we 
can't  take  in  all,  nor  far  purfue  what  we  have ; )  We  Ihould 
ihaimy  bend  our  Minds  to  what  is  more  NeeJfu/^  or  like  to  be 
mere  Vf.fiti  to  our  fcives  or  ethers,  and  where  we  can't,  per- 
haps, deiermme  fo  well  of  that,  we  Ihould  however  give  a 
peculiar  Attendance  to  what  is  in  it  felf  more  Excellent-. 
.  Now  I  have  endeavour'd  to  fingle  out  fome  fuch  Points  in 
what  here  follows,  vi:{. 

§  18.  Tliat  we  fhould,  in  what's  our  fpecial  and  ftated 
Bufinefs,  Vie  with  thofc,  who  are  the  Chief  in  that  way,  and 
endeavour  to  equal  or  outdo  them,  if  we  can  .-  That  we  go 
as  tar  as  well  we  may,  in  fearching  out  the  Nature  of  Plants^ 
B'lteu  and  Moi,  efpccially  as  to  their  Produd:ion  ;  alfo  in 
what  Way  and  by  what  Means  they  live,  thrive,  change  and 
alter,  fail  or  decay,  and  die  at  laft :  Likewife  carefully  to 
inform  our  ftivcs  about  Phantoms  and  Apparitions  by  ftriitly 
examining  the  Accounrs  that  go  of  them  :  and  as  to  Scuh  in 
con|undion  with  the  Body,  and  n\  their  fepar ate  State, 
about  good  and  evil  A^ige.s  ;  but  efpecially  as  to  the  niofi 
HilJ-;  v::^.  the  Three,  that  are  One  :  Enquiring  diligently 
into  the  X.itnre  of  this  infinite,  and  ihofe  fijiite  Beings,  their 
Widely  differing  State,  (or  Condition)  Powers  and  Capaci- 
rie.' ;  what  thv^y  do,  witli  what  Aim  and  Defign  ;  particular- 
]y  how  far,  ar.d  what  way  they  do  any  of  them,  Concern 
themfeives  with  Men,  hereon  Earth  ;  finally  wefnouldmake 
it  our  great  Studv  and  Endeavour  to  be  throughly  acquainted 
with  the  Surer  TiJcciQg\  in  which  the  Wifc-A  and  Beit,  and 
thct  even  among  thofe,  who  differ  in  Iclfcr  Matters,  are 
agreed,  itill  bringing  ic  to  the  Divine  Lig>.t  of  Sacred  Scrip- 
ture ;  and  in  the  Ufe  of  all  tit  Means  within  our  f<.each,  de- 
penning  en  the  Divine  ll'umination,  thence  to  draw  out  the 
bcft ' '.  c.  the  fulleft,  clcarci\,  and  moff  Efficacious^  Difccv.^}, 
wharS>/'/>,  what  F^///',  what  Co«//i?  of  Tho'ts,  AfFedions, 
Words  and  Adions  will  not  fail  to  lead  us  up  to  celeftial 
Xhrones  of  inconeeivab'.eand  Eternal  Happinefs. 

^  19.  And  nowat  laft  to  hipply  and  fi. -7  «/■  the  Account, 
which:  has  been  aade  as  general  and  lliorr,  as  the  Matter 
could  well  bear:  \Vc  may  on  any  Special  Occahon  fet  our 
feh-cs  ro  obfcive,  wb.it  this  or  that  Point  in  the  foregoing 
Shmniary  implies,  as  comprized  in  it,  or  connected  .with  v, 
and  a.'fo  what  :'x/?;vupcn  ic,  asbeingof  iikc  Natir^'^'witlvit, 
or  Ties  in  d'uc^..Op.pclition  to  if,  ftnji-tinally  wliac  may^  be  drawn 
fi^pln  .iny  oije  r:.  itiofc  of  the  .  mentioned  Particular*,  as  a 


Chap.  6.         l/?/proveme?7t  of  Kealcn.  45 

Ficiicn,  or  Suppofition  by  mental  Divifion,  Compofirion, 
or  Alteration  J  or  as  a  farther  Notion  by  lome  higher  Al  ftraft- 
ion  ;  or  as  a  I{enlitie  omitted,  which  ^et  has  been,  perhaps, 
one  way  or  other  Suggeftcd,  if  not  by  any  fingle  Point,  yet 
by  the  ConjundHon  of  divers. 

§  10.  And  whereas  Plants  and  Animals,  with  many 
•ther  comprchenfive  Heads,  have  been  here  but  very  briefly 
touch'd,  in  the  moft  general  Way  ;  They  who  would  ac- 
quaint themfelves  with  the  differing  Sorts,  fo  as  to  know 
fomewhat  of  their  common,  and  dittinguifhing  CharadVers, 
may  have  recourfe  to  the  elaborate  Tables  of  Plants,  Ani- 
mals, G?c,  in  that  Learned  and  Ingenious  F-Jfay  tovoards  a  rert 
Character  and  Philnfophical  L/rn^uag:^  by  Dr.  Pf^///;/wj.  And 
they,  who  cannot  reach  fo  far,  may  fomewhrc  eilarge  their 
Acquaintance  with  Things,  as  well  as  Words,  by  the  help 
of  Commenim  his  Janua  Liriguarum,  a  piece  of  greater  Worth 
than  is  commonly  apprehended,  and  which  might  certainly 
be  of  much  greater  Ufe,  than  is  generally  ir.ade  of  it. 


CHAP.     VI. 


§  r.  TJ  Aving  thus  gone  thro'  the  Compafs  of  Things,  ac- 
*■  ■*  cording  to  their  more  obvious  and  common  Ideas, 
we  now  proceed  to  fome  farther  Cenfiderations  about  them, 
which  zrifedom  thofe;  and  are  moftly  fuch,  as  they  call  Se- 
cond Notions,  more  general,  abftrad,  and  Nice.  I  Ihall,  at 
prefent,  take  them  fingly,  without  affirming  or  denying  one 
of  another,  beginning  with  Thing,  or  Somewhat^  and  thofc 
higher  Notional  Subdivilions  or  Sorts  thereof,  which  are 
Fundamental  to  the  reft,  and  may  be  call'd  Elements,  or 
leading  Points  ;  and  afterwards  (hall  treat  of  the  Refulta?ic:s 
from  them,  under  fome  other  Notional  Confiderations  ;  all 
which  may  ferve  to  render  our  Tho't  more  Subtle,  and  Nice, 
and  to  guide  us  into  fome  more  general  Notices,  in  order  to 
our  farther  fearch  after  fpecial  and  particular  Natures,  or 
that  we  may  proceed  upon  any  Subjed:  in  a  more  accurate 
manner. 

§  1.  The  moft  general  ObJevS  of  our  Tho't  is  that  of 
Things  or  Somewhat,  which,  in  its  largert  Senfe,  is  the  fame 
with  Theme,  intending  whatfoever  is,  or  may  be  propos'd  to 
the  Mind  to  be  confider'd,  or  obferv'd.  This  moft  univerfal 
Idea  is  form'd,    when  either  we  know  not,  or  attend  not  to 

£  3  any 


4-6  An  t.jjay  for  the  Part  i. 

any  diftinaive  Charader  at  all,  but  only  to  that  one  com.- 
rx.on  Attribute,  that  the  Thing,  whatever  it  be  other  wife,  or 
in  it  felf,  is,  or  may  be  the  Objed  of  Coiifideration  ;  and 
this  is  only  an  extriufecal,  relative  Denomination,  and  enters 
nor  at  all  into  the  Nature  of  the  Thing  ;  but  is  certainly 
right,  fo  far  as  ic  goes :  For  whatever  I  can  think  of,  is  un- 
deniably matter  of  Tho'c ;  nor  can  I  poflibly  be  miftaken 
about  it,  whilft  I  form  no  farther  Notion  ©f  it.  In  this  Senfe 
the  Ad  of  1  luiiking  and  formed  Tho't  are  plainly  Things ; 
io  are  alfo  Chima?ras,  Fiftions,  and  meer  Suppofitions,  that 
have  no  Exift ence,  but  in  Tho't ;  as  alfo  the  parts  of  a  Con- 
tradidion,  feparately  taken ;  and  'tis  only  thefe,  when  we 
•w  culd  put  them  together,  that  amount  to  Nothing  ;  for  they 
cannot  in  thnt.  way,  be  tho't  of  lince  the  one  part  removes 
the  o  her  by  denying,  and,  in  a  Logical  Senfe,  deftroying  it : 
^  ■^'^/-'',  I  may  in  fomc  fort  apprehend,  and  what  it  is  to  be 
tjArk  or  without  Light ;  but  of  a  durk^  Light  I  can  have  no 
Idea,  it  being  all  one,  as  a  Light  that  is  no  Light :     But, 

§  3.  Whatever  any  one  can  thinks  of,  is  with  us,  in  fome 
fort,  a  Thing  ;  and/y  they  are  diftinci  Thifigs  of  which  diftinii 
Tvo't:  can  Le  form'd.  Nor  is  there  any  danger  of  miftake 
here,  fo  long  as  by  Thing  we  underftand  only  what  is  fubjed 
to  Tho't.  But  we  muft  take  great  heed  of  making  our 
Tho'ts  not  only  the  Signs,  but  the  Meafure  and  Standard  of 
Things;  fo  as  to  account  whatever  we  can  really  and  truly 
think  of,  a  real '!";/«?,  either  adually  exifting,  whether  any 
one  think  of  it  or  not ;  or  indeed  fo  much  as  virtually,  and 
potentially,  in  the  Natural  Caufes,  which  may  produce  it, 
in  an  ordinary  way  ;  nor  may  we  prefently  conclude,  that 
the  Things,  or  Objecls  of  Tho't,  are  in  themfelves  really  di- 
^tinll,  cf  which  we  can  form  Tho'ts  really  and  truly  diftind, 
and  differing.  The  Truth  is  (as  I  conceive)  that  our  Minds 
ivere  never  fitted,  or  defign'd  to  penetrate  to  the  bottom  of 
thofe  Things,  which  are  not  properly  and  intirely  its  own 
Work,  as  Arithmetical  and  Geometrical  Abftradions  are, 
which  take  in  no  more  of  Beings,  than  what  the  Mind  could 
take  up  by  a  clear  and  diftind  Apprehenfion,  as  their  being 
fomany,  fo  grrar,  or  fo  form'd. 

§  4.  As  to  that  famous  Queftion,  whether  the  Modes  of 
Things  for  the  m  mner  of  their  being)  be  themfelves  Things  ; 
I,  for  my  part,  muft  anfwer.  They  are  fo  far  Things  to  me, 
as  that  they  can,  by  themfelves,  employ  my  Tho't;  fo 
Number  and  Meafure,  forlnftance,  plainly  can:  ButI  can- 
not therefore  allow  them  to  be  in  themfelves  Beings  really  di- 
ftind from  that,  which  they  modifie  ;  and  yet  I  muft  own, 

they 


Chap  6.         Jwprove/^/ent  of  Kealon.  47 

they  feem  not  to  be  the  very  Subftance  it  fcif,  nor  any  part, 
thereof,  in  all  Cafes :  Nor  does  it  fully  fatisfie,  to  fay,  they 
are  certain  Determinations  or  Denominations  of  that,  to 
which  they  belong  :  For  it  may  farther  be  ask'd,  is  it  No- 
thing, that  fo  Determines  or  Denominates ;  or  can  it  well 
bcfaid,  that  the  very  Being  of  the  Thing  modify 'd,  does  it 
foritfelf?  Methinks,  the  faircft  and  moft  ingenious  An- 
fwer  were  to  fay,  that  h  far  our  Minds  are  fitxed  to  go,  that 
they  may,  with  good  Reafon,  take  the  Modes  of  Things 
for  diftind  Subjcds  of  Tho'c ;  but  are  not  capable,  it  fhould 
feem,  of  making  a  deeper  Judgment  of  them,  in  themlelves  ; 
no  more  than  of  the  Subftance,  determiii'd  by  them,  in  its 
Fundamental  Nature.  And  is  it  not  enough  for  us  to  know, 
that  we  can  reafonably  form  fuch  and  fuch  differing  Conil- 
derations  in  relation  to  Beings  ?  And  may  it  not  anfwer  the 
purpofes  of  Life  as  well  as  if  we  were  more  inwardly  and 
thro'ly  acquainted  with  their  Eflence,  or  is  it  nor  really  more 
for  our  higheft  Advantage,  if  it  fcrve  but,  as  it  ought,  to 
make  and  keep  us  Humbiie;  whilft,  at  every  turn,  we  meet 
with  our  N?  j>lus  u.'fra  ;  plainly  finding  our  felvesto  be  finite 
and  limited,  not  Capable  of  going  fully  through,  even  with 
tfie  Modes  of  Things;  how  much  lefs  with  the  Things  chem- 
felves,  to  which  they  belong?  But  after  all,  our  Reafon 
plainly  tells  us,  we  muft  not  allow  Maics  to  be  Thin7j^  in 
the  fame  Senfe,  or  of  thefame  Clafs,  as  the  Subjects  are,  to 
which  they  appertain. 

§  "5.  All  I  fhall  here  farther  attempt  as  to  the  Fonhmen- 
tal  Confideration  of  our  mofl  general  Jdea,  and  indeed,  of 
all  the  reft,  as  they  fall  in  with  that,  will  be  to  point  out 
amongft  the  variors  Obje(5ts  of  Tho't,  which  may  be  fairly 
judg'd  to  lye  nearer  to  the  Supreme  and  Infinite  Being,  and 
vphich  to  be  farther  remov'd  -,  fo  as  to  be  Things  in  an  higher 
or  lower,  in  a  more  or  lefs,  eminent  Senfe:  As  may  appear 
by  the  jufl  Account,  I  Ihall  endeavour  to  give  of  Things,  or 
Matters  of  Tho't,  according  to  the  higher  and  lower  Place, 
which  may  feem  to  belong  to  them,  in  refpeft  of  their  greater 
or  lefs  Reality  ;  or  as  the  very  Notions  of  the  Theme  may  dif^ 
claim  any  precenfions  thereto,  as  that  of  Privation,  Negati- 
on, ^c  will  appear  to  do. 

§  6.  As  to  Things  in  that  mofl  comprehenfive  Senfc, 
which  has  been  given ;  They  certainly  appear,  to  vs,  innume- 
rable*, for  the  differing  Objeds  of  Tho't  are  plainly /o  :  Yet 
they  may  bereduc'd  under  fome  general  Heads,  as  they  agree 
together  infomerefpedts,  whilft  they  differ  in  others :  And 
Ibmcwhat  will  here  be  effay'd  in  a  brief  and  general  Way, 

E  4  ^  both. 


4?  An  Ejfay  for  the  Part  i. 

both,  as  to  their  Agreement  and  diftingui(hing  Charadters ; 
torth^feveral  Objeftsof  Tho'tare /omw/Zy  dilthiguiih'd  (as 
wemay  farther  fhow)  as  having  this  or  that  Idea,  notaiiother: 
Yet  fome  of  thofe  divers  and  diiFering  Themes  may  be  fo 
much  aUke,  as  to  be  accounted  of  the  fame  Sort^  and  to  differ 
only  (as  Logicians  exprefs  n)  Numerically,  (o  a.s  tins  is  not 
th.it;  tho'  it  (hould  be  as  hke  as  one  Egg,  or  as  one  Guinea, 
may  be  to  another  :  But  other  Themes,  differing  more 
conlidcrably ,  than  they  agree,  may  be  fitly  accounted 
Th'ngs  of  clivers  Kjnih^  or  at  ieaft  of  differings  Sorts. 

§  7.  The  int ire  Nature  of  this  or  that  f  whatever  it  be  ill 
it  felf,  and  to  him,  before  vphwi  all  things  are  naked  aiid  opeti) 
is  to  us  the  ColJedion  of  all  thofe  various  Objects  of  Tho't, 
which  goto  conftitute  or  make  it  up  intire  and  full  as  it  is  in 
it  ielf,  in  every  refpccft.  And  thofe  we  may  fully  compre- 
hend, when  the  thing  under  Confideration  is  no  more,  than 
what  the  Mind  has  clearly  taken  up  of  this  or  that  Objedl: 
Suppofe  it  were  the  Length  of  a  Way,  an  Acre  of  Land,  the 
'Number  of  Shillings  in  a  Pound,  the  Virtuoufnefs  or  Viciouf- 
nefs  of  fuch  a  Perfon  or  Aifiion,  the  Mcchanifmov  artificial 
Mal{e  of  a  Clock,  ^s :  But  where  we  take  in  the  Work  or 
produce  of  Nature,  together  with  that  of  our  Mind  or  Hand, 
there  fccms  to  lye  fomewhat  ftill  hidden  from  us,  or  but  very 
confus'dly  apprehended  by  us;  fo  that  the  fro'/;.o/Go^  appears 
to  be  tousinone  refped:  or  other,  always  unfea^chnblc:  And  we 
are  forc'd  to  help  our  our  general  and  indiftin£l:  Idea  thereof,  as 
we  can,  witha  Sef  of  Atcributes.  And  fuch  of  thefc,  as  we  con- 
ceive to  make  up  the  principal  Stnmina,  and  fummary 
Account  of  a  Thing,  or  to  be  the  Epitome  of  its  intire  Na- 
ture, and  without  which  it  cannot  be^  or  be  fuch,  is  with  us 
the  Eff.  nee  of  that  Thing. 

§  8-  Now  Ejfcricc,  in  relation  to  God,  muft  involve  a 
ncccjfary  Exiflence  ;  for  we  cannot  in  any  meafure  duly  con- 
ceive, vehat  He  k.  without  conceiving,  that  He  if,  and  indeed 
ca7inot  but  be.  The  Name  He  takes  to  Himfelf  is,  I  AM,  (or 
J  H^ILL  BE) :  This  is  the  Cuntradlion  of  that  larger  Name, 
/  AM  WHAT  I  AM,  (or  /  PVILL  BE  WHAT  I  WILL  BE), 
which  may  feem  clofely  to  conjoin  God's  unqueftionable, 
neceffary  Exificr.ce  with  his  unfoarchable,  boundlefs  Effence. 
§  9.  Things,  or  the  Objcdts  of  Tho't  (in  their  feparate 
State,  without  affirming  or  denying  one  of  another)  may  be 
reduc'd  ro  the  following  Scheme  :  FjV/?  of  all.  The  ti  >vo)si3v  to 
Ss«,  that  which  may  and  ihould  be  known  of  the  unlimited 
rfc-Jf.try  Being,  whom  we  Ihall  briefly  confider  apart,  by 
hiixileif^  as  infinirdy  tranfccnding  all  thofe  Beings,  frorn 
•'     ■  ■  which, 


Chap  6.  ImprovemcKt  of  Kt.\{or\.  49 

which,  by  the  way  of  Analogy,  we  draw  our  afHrmatr.  e 
Conceptions  of  God,  nuking  them  our,  as  we  can^  by  the 
Negation  of  Limits,  and  other  marks  of  Imperfection  bo 
longing  to  Creatures.  And  then,  as  to  Things  that  are  iJ- 
mhed  ayidCentingent,  they  may  be  confiderd,  either,  as  P-^ - 
mary  and  Lending^  in  the  Fundamental  Scale,  which  arc  a 
kind  of  Elements;  or  as  thofe^  which  follow  in  the  Secondary- 
Scale  containing  n  Set  of  ^fultnmcs.  In  the  former  feme 
Things  will  be  \enl^  and  exifting  (whether  they  be  tho'c  of 
or  not)  potentially  ac  leaft,  in  their  Natural  Caufcs;  others 
will  be  more  purely  Notional,  depending  upon  Tho'r,  for 
what  fort  of  being  ihey  have :  The  Real  will  be  cither  Po- 
fitive  or  Negative j  and  even  thefe  may  be  adlual  and  true.- 
The  Pofitive  will  be  either  more  Penuanent  and  SrabJc,  or 
Tranfient  and  Fleeting :  The  Permanent  wUl  be  either 
what  fuflains,  {vi:(.  Subftance)  or  what  is  fnftain'd,  and  this 
either  more  immediately  by  the  Subftance  it  felf,  which  I 
(hall  call  Accident ;  or  mediately  by  fomewhat  intervetiini^, 
and  I  fhall  term  that  a  Mode,  which  is  diftanced  from  the 
Subftance  by  one  Attribute  only  ;  but  if  by  more  than  one, 
the  Mode  of  a  Mode  :  What  is  Real  and  alio  Affirai3,tive,  but 
tranfient,  may  be  call'd,  in  the  general.  Motion,  and  this 
either  moving,  in  Aciion  ;  or  receiv'd,  in  PcJJiqji  .-  Whar. 
Really  is,  but  is  Negative,  is  either  a  Privr.tion  or  meer 
Negation:  Finally,  what  is  in  it  felf  only  Notional,  either 
has  a  Foundation,  and  is  bottom'd,  in  Nature,  and  may  be 
nam'd,  n  Formality  ^  or  elfe  borrow'd  from  it  as  a  meer  Sun- 
pofitlon  or  Fitlion. 

§  10.  The  abfolutely  NecelTary  and  infinitely  perfetfl 
Being,  the  only  true  God,  is  indeed  the  higheft  and  moii 
concerning  Objeft  of  our  Tho't;  but  infinitely  beyond  tlie 
iitmoft  reach  thereof,  as  he  k  in  hlmjelf.  And  whereas  our 
limited  Minds  are  under  a  NecefTity  of  conceiving  the  Di- 
vine Nature  by  way  of  Analogy,  chiefly  to  that  of  our  Sotils 
we  ought  to  know,  that  ftriiftly  fpeakmg  every  thing  oi'Ciod 
is  fo  far  tranfcending  all  Created  Being  and  PerfecHrion,  that 
it  may  be  juft:ly  faid,  to  be  in  him  quite  another  kind  of 
Thing,  than  in  us,  or  in  the  higheft  Creature  :  as  c.  gr.  that 
God  not  only  knows  infinitely  more  than  any  Creature ;  but 
that  he  knows  Things  in  a  Manner,  which  we  cannot  pof- 
fibly  conceive,  as  it  is  in  God.  There  is  at  the  Bottom,  and 
as  the  Ground-work  of  all  thofe  Glorious  Attributes,  under 
which  we  are  forced  to  think  and  fpeak  of  God,  an  In'-v-te 
Being,  or  EJfence,  which  we  cannot  otherwife  apprehend, 
dian  that  there  is  fomewhat,  which  has  the  Charadlers  of 
>  •  cve>y 


50  An  tjfay  for  the  Fart  I. 

every  wr.y  Perfect ;  really  and  necdFarily  Exlftlng ,  whether 
Tho't  on  or  no ;  altogether  Vndepending^  Immutable,  Eter- 
nal, and  linmenfe ;  infinitely  furmounting  all  the  Being, 
that  is  in  the  World  befides,  which  makes  not  any  more  En- 
tity of  the  fame  kind  or  Clafs  ;  has  in  Comparifon,  no  Rea- 
lity ;  and  plainly  bears  no  Proportion  to  that  of  God.  This 
tranfcendent  Height  leading  down  to  the  Scale,  we  are 
here  defipninp,  may  be  faintly  ftiadow'd  out  by  the  highcft 
degree  of  a  Tangent^  which  keeps  within  no  Bounds,  but  in- 
finitely excurs,  as  running  parallel  to  the  Tangent  Line,  and 
therefore  never  meeting  with  it. 

§  II.  The  Divine  Elfonce  has  the  Nurture  of  a  Spirit, 
not  that  of  Body  ;  is  as  fu:b  indivifible ;  penetrates  all  other 
Beings  (whilft  God  ca'ifc'sand  adniits  them  in  him  tolive^  nnd 
wcvp^  and  have  their  Brivg^;  is  continually  Acftive  in  the  ne- 
ver ceafing  txercife  of  Underftanding  and  Willi  moft  pow- 
erful. Wife,  and  Good,  /.  e.  Ho'^y,  Jull,  True,  and  Kind  ; 
and  dio'  thefe  Attributes  are  irf  fome  fort  communicated  to 
the  nT^re  perfc£l:  Creatures ;  yet  never,  as  rhey  are  in  God 
himfelf,  infinitely,  eternally,  and  nnchangably.  The  Di- 
'  ine  Being  and  Nature  cannot  be  multiply'd,  fo  as  there 
ihould  be  more  diftinc^  Gods,  but  it  is  intirely  owe,  fo  far  as 
Zhiity  may  be  in  God  a  Perfeftion :  Yet,  upon  the  Divine 
7'cftimony,  it  muft  be  acknowlcdg'd,  that  there  are  Three^ 
the  Father,  the  Word,  (the  >o>(^',  or  the  Son)  and  the  Spi- 
rit ^  Mnt.2S.  19.  and  that  thefe  Three  are  one,  not  «f,  but 
*  .  (/•  d.  One  Thing,  or  Being,  I  J  oh?.  5.  7.  Thefe  are,  no' 
doubt,  clfcntial  and  neceflary  to  the  Divine  Being  Telfe  they 
cou'd  nor  havebeenat  all  but  fo,  as  that  we  could  not  di- 
ftinftly  know  them  without  Supernatural  Revelation  .-  Nor 
may  we  pretend  ;/rTr  to  conceive  cf  them  as  they  are  in  God  r 
But  only  by  fomc faint  and  very  broken  Analogy  to  what  is  , 
found  a  nong  Creatures,  or  may  be  confidently  fuppos'd  ; 
As  the  Souls  being  a  threefold  Principle  in  Man,  vi:(.  of  Rea- 
fon,  Senfe,  and  NIotion  ;  or  that  it  actuates  at  once  the  Heart, 
the  Head,  and  Hand;  or  if  we  might  fuppofe  one  Soul  to  anH 
mate  three  diftinft  Bodies.  ;   ' ' 

§11.  The  internal  and  immanent  A^s  of  God  we  con- 
ceive, as  unchangable  Counfels  and  Purpofes,  not  NecelTary 
1:0  him,  butchofe'n  by  himi  who,  if  hehad  fopleafed,  might 
have  refolv'd  upon  other  Sorts,  or  a  different  Syf^em  and 
Courfe  of  Things .-  God's  External  and  tranfient  Af^s  may 
feem  to  be  no  more  than  the  terminating  of  his  Decrees, 
which  according  to  the  feveral  Points  of  Time  therein  defign'd 
rcrpeftivc^\-  take  place,   without  any  thing  farther,    in  the 

\^'orks 


Chap.  7-         Improvement  of  )^.(^aioi\.  51 

Works  of  Creation  and  Providence.  From  thefe  arife  the 
Relations,  wherein  God  Hands  to  his  Creatures,  as  of  Crea- 
tor, Grand  Proprietor,  Protet^or,  and  Preferver,  Ruler,  Be- 
nefaftor,  Redeemer,  San^ifier,  &c,  with  ocher  exrrinfecal 
Denominations,  as  the  God  o^Ifae!,  &c.  Our  Idea  ©f  God 
thus  form'd  may  be  accounted  Right,  /.  c.  fuch  as  we  arc  Ca- 
pable of »  and  which,  with  due  Attendance  to  Supernatural 
Revelation,  may  be  lufficient  for  us,  and  accepted  of  God  ; 
if  we  confider  it  as  carrying  only  fome  faint  Refemblancc  to 
him,  and  falling  infinitely  Ihortof  him. 


CHAP.     Vfl. 

§  i.  VX/E  proceed  to  the  Fundamental  Scale,  or  Gradation 
of  what  is  Finite  and  Contingent,  which  has  had 
God  himfelf  at  the  Head  of  it,  but  fo  inconceivably  tranfcen- 
ding  the  very  higheft  part  thereof,  that  it  was  by  no  nicans 
fit  to  include  him  in  it,  whom  even  the  Hcnven  of  Hcav?ns  cnn- 
not  contain.  All  the  following  forts  of  Things  will  be  confl- 
der'd  as  Individuals,  under  the  Notion  of  thi;  ot  that  (which 
may  ftill  be  apply'd  to  any)  Particular  of  the  Sort.  I  fha)i  b.^"- 
gin  with  what  lies  nearer  to  the  Supreme  Being,  iho'ataii 
infinite  diftance,  dcfcending  to  what  may  fecm  to  be  far- 
ther and  farther  ftill  removed  from  hirh.  And  here  we 
have, 

§  2.  I,  This  or  that  Unite  Sulftance;  by  which  is  not  here 
intended,  this  or  that  Subftance,  as  it  exifts  complcat  and 
finilh'dt  for  fo  it  involves  likewife  the  Accidents,  Modes, 
C2?r.  which  go  to  make  it  up  :  As  Alexander^  Bucephaiu<,aivi 
Lmdon-Jlme  comprize  a  Number  of  Accidents,  Modes,  ^c. 
which  arc  generally  requir'd  to  make  up  a  Man^  or  an  Horfc^ 
or  a  Stone  refpe^ively  ;  and  yet  more,  or  more  peculiar  ones 
belong  to  that  particular  Man,  or  Horfe,  or  Stone.  But 
the  only  Thing  defign'd,  at  prefent,  is  that  in  the  particular 
Being,  which  is  to  be  confider'd,  as  the  Bafis,  and  G"oand- 
work  of  itv  which  with  fnch  peculiar  Make  or  fet  of  Acci 
dents,  Modes,  c^c.  is,  or  makes  up  that  Being. 

§  3-  And  whereas  our  Idea  of  the  Subftance,  in  it  fclf 
confider'd,  is  very  dark  and  indiftinf^,  being  only,  that  ge- 
neral one  of  Thing  or  Somewhat,  and  this  amounting  to  no 
more  than  that  it  is  an  Objeft  of  Tho't;  therefore  to  help  out 
the  Idea,  as  we  can,  we  confider,  that  whatever  the  Subftancr 
be 


51  An  l^Jfay  for  the  Part  I. 

be  in  it  felf,  it  has  unqueitionably  thefe  general  Gharaf^ers, 
?>;>■.  (i.)  Thatit  Aands,  as  a  Being  of  it  felf,  not  fubje<J>ed  in 
another  ,'tho'  flill  depending  upon  God)j  and  (2.)  That  it 
I'uitains  the  Form  or  Make,  whereby  it  is  a  Being  of  fuch  a 
kind,  or  fort,  and  alio  the  farther,  and  more  peculiar  Make, 
whereby  'tis  this  or  that  particular  Being .-  And  chiefly  from 
this  2d  Charafter  the  Name  o^  Suhftance  is  taken ;  ^.  d.  Th/it 
xvhich  Jlnyjds  tindsr  the  Accidents  and  Modes.  Now  Sub- 
stance has  Entity  in  a  meafure  and  manner  infinitely  below 
the  Supreme  Bcirg  ;  and  yet  ina  far  higher  Senfe,  than  what 
\vc  have  next  to  oonfider,  vi:(. 

§  4.     II,     This  or  that  Accidenr,    which  has  its  Being 
(whatever  th.^t  is)  thro'  and  by  means  of  the  Subftance,  where- 
in it  is  I'ubjecled,   or  to  which  it  appertains.     That  the  felf- 
fan-ie  Subftance  may  admit  of  various  and  differing  Turns 
cannot  be  doubted  ;  now  the  inadequate,  partial,  and  imper- 
feifl  way  of  conceiving  Things,  to  which  we  are  accuftom'd, 
and  feem  to  be  confined,  leads  us  to  conCidei  firji,  fomewhat, 
which  receives  this  or  that  Turn;  and  thsn  fomewhat  farther, 
as  the  Turn  or  Make  it  receives :     But  if  we  would  more 
juftly  take  the  Matter,  as  it  feems  to  lye  in  Nature,  we  (hould. 
always  confider  the  Make    together  with  fotnevehnt  in  the 
general,  which  is  fo  mfJc,    in  the  Concrete  rather  than  the 
Somexfhat  by  it  felf,  and  the  Make  by  it  felf,   more  abftradt- 
ly  :     But  if  we  take  the  latter  by  it  felf,   we  muft,    by  no 
means,  conceive  it  as  a  Being  of  the  fame   Rank  and  Clafs 
with  Subftance,  if  at  all  diftin£l  from  it.    The  Summ  of  the 
Matter,  once  for  all,  feems  to  be  this,   as  we  confider  Things 
not  fo  immediately  in  themfelves,    but  in  the  Ideas  we  have 
of  them,  fo  we  may  diftinguifh  of  our  Tho'ts  about  them,  and 
ought  to  do  it,  without  determining,  that  the  Things  are  fo 
divided  in  themfelves,   but  only  obferving,  that  there  is  in- 
deed fomc  Foundation  or  Occafion  in  and  from  Things  them- 
felves, for  the  Ideas  Which  we  may  call  Suhjlnntial,  Acciden- 
ffl/.  Modal,  &C. 

^  5.  Our  Idea  of  Accident  (if  we  rightly  underftand  our 
felvesj  gives  no  fuch  kind  of  Entity  to  Accident  as  was  at- 
tributed to  Subftance :  And  yet  created  Subftance  has  a  lefs 
confidcrable  Entity  in.refpec^of  the  Creatour  ;  than  Acci- 
dent, in  refpect  of  Subftance ;  for  it  contributes  nothing  at 
all  to  the  compleating  of  him,  as  Accident  may  be  conceiv'd 
to  do  to  SubRance,  whilft  yet  it  is  more  than  equally  depen- 
ding on  him. 


§  6.  By 


Chap.  7.         Improvement  of  Reaioii.  55 

§  6.  By  jlccident,  is  not  here  to  be  undcrftood  only  what 
is  accidental,  or  happens  to  this  or  tnat  Subftance  i  for  to 
Subftance  in  general,  this  or  that  fpecial  Accident  is  indeed 
what  may  or  may  not  be)  :  nor  yet  muft  we  take  in  n/i  that 
may  accldcre  or  acccdsrc^  happen  or  be  fuperadded  to  this  or 
that  Subftance  .-  For  that  might  be  another  diftincSt  Sub- 
ftance; as  when  Silver-wire  is  guilt  with  Gold,  howfmall  fo- 
evcr  it  may  be  drawn,  and  confequcntly  how  thin  foeverthe 
Guilding  might  be,  fo  as  not  to  be  capable  of  bearing  the 
Air,  by  it  felf  alone,  without  the  Silver  "Wire  within  to  fup- 
portit ;  yet  the  Guilding  may  be  conceived,  as  a  very  fmall 
hollow  Tube,  that  had  no  fuch  inner  Support :  Whenas  Ac- 
cident as  'tis  here  defign'd  cannot  be  conceiv'd  with  the  de- 
nial of  any  Subitance  to  Support  it,  tho'  it  may  well  be  con- 
fidcr'd  without  confidering  this  or  that  Subftance ;  but  not 
clearly  or  diftindlly  without  any  at  all,  for  the  very  Notion 
of  Accident  implies  fome  or  other  Subftance  to  which  it  be- 
longs ;  and  the  Name  is  here  defign'd,  in  a  limited  Senfe  of 
fuch  Attributes  only  as  are  refer'd  immediately  to  the  Sub- 
ftance without  any  thing  intervening,  as  Extenfion  is  to  Mat- 
ter J  but  Figure  feems  to  belong  more  immediately  to  Ex- 
tenfion, and  to  be  in  our  way  of  Thinking  a  Mode  of  that 
Accident. 

§7.  It  is  here  to  be  obferv'd,  and  remembred,  that  in 
this  Scale  the  Names,  Accident,  Mode,  and  Mode  of  a  Mode^ 
are  limited  to  fomewhat  Subjedled,  and  Supported,  which  is 
not  only  renl,  and  dffirmntive,  but  alfo  ferynnnent^  i.  e.  ftan* 
ding,  and  abiding  more  or  lefs  in  one  State :  The'  the  Trcin-. 
fienty  the  Negative,  and  the  more  purely  notional  Obje(n-s  of 
Tho't  might  likewifc  be  call'd  Accidents  or  Modes  in  the 
larger  and  more  ufual  Acceptation  of  thofe  Terms ;  as  per- 
haps they  have  been  alfo  us'd  in  this  Eflay,  or  may  be  fome- 
times,  but  then,  'tis  hop'd,  it  may  appear  by  what  accompa- 
nies  them  in  fuch  plases.  But  to  proceed,  the  next  defcen- 
ding  ftep  is, 

§  8.  Ill,  This  or  that  Mode^  undcrftanding  it  of  that, 
which,  more  immediately  deterniinesthis  or  that  Accident  as 
before  explained  :  To  this  it  more  nearly  appertains,  and 
might  fecni  to  be  in  a  manner  fubjeded  in  it,  according  to 
our  Model  of  Thinking  and  Speaking,  as  it  is  in  Subftance, 
And  thus  tlie  Accident  feenis  to  be  confider'd,  as  a  kind  of 
kvoiidary  Subltance,  and  its  Mode,  as  a  fecondary  Accident ; 
when  yet  we  do  well  know,  'tis  only  the  proper  Subftance, 
■  whuh-is  the  Fundamcnul  Subjcdt  and' Support  of  Modes, 
WKhcut  Avhich  they  cannot  cxilt,  nor  would  be  rightly  con- 

ceiv'd 


54       ^«  bjfay  for  the  Part  1. 

ceiv'd,  if  we  fhould  deny  their  relation  to  it.  When  we 
.think  or  fpeak  of  this  or  that  Stone,  as  hnrdly  divifible^  [hard- 
ly] irnports  the  mode  or  manner  of  the  Accident  [diviliblc]  i 
and  farther  refers  to  the  Subftance  of  the  Stone,  which  is  Ui- 
vitible,  but  wiih  difficulty. 

§  9.  IV.  This  or  that  Mode  of  a  Mode  is  a  farther  remove 
from  Subftance;  and  there  may  be  yet  more  dii'tant  Removes 
under  the  lame  Denomination  ;  or  for  diftindtion,  we  might 
call  the  Mode  of  a  Mode  a  Second-rate-Mode^  and  lo  on,  as 
occafion  rr  av  require  :  And  tho'  we  ai  e  not  to  apprehend  fo 
many  diftinft  Entitys  heap'd  one  upon  another ;  yet  there  are 
plainly,  in  our  imperfect  and  broken  way  of  concei-ingj' 
fo  many  diftincl  Modes  ot  Being,  or  a  fort  of  cumulative 
Atrribute  made  up  of  an  Accident  with  the  Train  of  Modes 
it  draws  with  it. 

§  10.  By  way  of  Inflance,  if  wc  would  very  diftin(5Hy 
apd  nicely  conlider  [the  moft  extcnfiveufefulnefsof  a  right 
JHabi.c  fuperadded  to  the  reafoning  Capacity  of  that  Thinking 
Power,  wherewith  this  or  that  Soul  is  endow'd],  we  have 
jiere,  (i.)  A  particular  Subifance,  thii  or  tint  SuL  (2.)^^ 
Accident  belonging  more  immediately  to  that  Subftance,  vi:^. 
n  Pcmcr.  (3.)  A  Mode  which  fpecihcs  and  diltinguiflies 
that  Accident, -y/;^.  Toi^ikjh^,  fj  tiiac  the  Power  is  capable  of  ,j 
that  AcV,  whether  it  exert  it  felf  in  aftual  Thinking  or  no. 
(4.)  A  Mode  of  that  Mcde,  (or  Second-rate-Mode)  v,':(,  n 
I^ff.fo'riino^  Cr'pncity  niore  immediately  belonging  to  Thinking, 
as  'tis  one  way  of  Thinking,  (5.)  A  Mode  of  the  laft  fore- 
going Mode,  (or  3d- rate-Mode)  vi:^.  an  Habit  fuperadded. 
;  6)  A  Mode  of  this,  (or  ^th-rate-Mode)  'vi:{.  that  the  Habit 
he  rigi.t.  (7.J  A  farther  (which  we  may  cajl  a.^th-rate) 
Mode,  vi-^_.  the  Vfcfulncjs  of  that  Reditude,  or  of  the  Ha- 
bit as  right.  (8.)  A  yet  farther,  or  6th- rate- Mode,  the  Ex- 
tcnfionoi  that  Ufefulmfs  :  and,  C9.)  The  fimlhing  Mode, 
/.  e.  the  degree  of  that  Extenfion,  as  higheft,  the  mTfi  exten- 
(ive.  And  tho'  fuch  a  Length  as  this  is  very  feldom  or  never 
run  ;  yet  it  is  not  infrequejit  to  have  the  Subje^^,  the  Power, 
the  Habit,  and  the  Degree  of  that  Habit  under  confideratirn. 
What  we  have  had  hitherto,  how  minute  foever  the  Mode  of 
a  Mode  might  be,  is  yet  confider'd  as  permanent  \  but  the 
two  next  Objetls  of  Tho't  will  be  of  a  f  ar.fi  nt  and  fleeting 
Nature,  as  confifting  in  Motion  :     And  we  have, 

§  1 1.  V,  This  or  that  Adion^  whether  it  be  a  proper  Lo- 
cal Motion  of  the  whole  Being  from  or  in  its  place,  or  of  a 
part, only  ■■,  or  be  fomewhat  Analagous  thereto,  which  we  can- 
not lo.'.afily  ox  clearly  cojiceive  ^  as  luppole  it  were  the  let- 

rit  5 


Chap.  7*  Improvement  of  ^^3iion.  55 

ling  and  applying  our  felves  to  Study  fome  Point,  or  to  put 
the  Body  into  fuch  a  Pofture.  But  whatever  it  be  in  it  felf 
or  in  other  refpc^s  fropcr  Aftion  has  always  this  Charafter; 
that  it  proceeds  from  an  internal,  intelligent,  and  ele-Uve 
Principle,  and  ftri^My  taken  it  Teems  to  belong  only  to  Spirits; 
fo  that  a  Stone  is  rather  mov'd,  than  moves,  downward;  and 
tho'  it  might  appear  to  take  that  way  of  it  felf,  yet  'tis  really 
from  a  Force,  wherewith  it  has  been  originally  imprefs'd,  or 
which  is  atprefcnt  pur  upon  it,  agreeably  to  the  Nature  and 
Make  of  the  Stone  it  felf,  as  being  compa^,  and  which  ope- 
rates according  to  the  differing  Medium  thro'  which  the 
Stone  is  to  fall ;  for  it  paffcs  v/ith  greater  difficulty,  thro'  a 
very  thick  Medium,  than  thro*  that  which  is  very  thin.  Now 
the  Counter-part  of  A^ion  is  Paflion ;  whenfoever  the  Ob- 
jeft  whereon  it  terminates  is  capable  of  being  mov'd,  alter'd, 
or  any  way  afFeiHedby  it :  for, 

§  12.  VI,  This  or  that  Pajjion  is  either  Motion  conlidcr'd  as 
imprefb'd,  or  fome  other  Alteration,  as,  and  whilft  it  is  pro- 
duc'd  and  receiv'd.  For  we  here  intend  the  Affef^ion,  as  it 
is  in  fieri,  not  in  f^Ho  ejje,  as  'tis  producing,  not  when  it  is  af^u- 
ally  produc'd  ;  for  fo  'tis  permanent  and  abiding  moce  or  lefs ; 
not  tranfient  and  fleeting,  as  Motion  is.  'Tis  P^jjion^  when 
the  Eye,  together  with  the  Animal  Spirits  and  Brain  are 
mov'dand  affe<^^ed  by  the  Rays  of  Light  retiefted  from  fome 
vifible  Subftance,  and  the  Mind  thereupon  excited  to  attend 
and  obferve;  but  that  its  Attendance  and  Obfervation  isalfo 
meer  Paflion  cannot  fo  well  be  allow'd  ^  tho"  'tis  not  to  be 
doubted  but  the  Mind  may  be  fometimes  conftrain'd  thereto, 
as  in  the  ImprefTions  that  are  more  than  ordinarily  agreeable  or 
difagreeing,  alfo  in  ftrong  Impulfes,  G^j.  For  certainly  God 
can  powerfully  imprefs  the  Mind  with  this  or  that  Tho'r, 
and  give  it  even  a  New  Turn  of  Inclination,  when  he  fees, 
fiti  but  when  it  fets  it  felf  to  confider  of  any  Thing,  or  to 
form  an  imaginative  Reprefentation,  &c.  this  is  much  rather 
to  be  taken  for  A<^tion  than  Paffion :  Yet  Hill  our  ufual  Per- 
ceptions appear  to  beinthefirftand  fecond  inftant  of  a  palfive 
Nature,  whilil  the  Organ  of  Scnfation  is  mov'd,  and  the 
Mind  thereupon  excited  to  attend. 

-  §  13.  It  fcemsto  be  but  improperly  call'd  PaiHon,  when 
there  is  no  fort  of  Motion  or  Alteration  in  the  Subje^,  to 
which  the  A'tion  is  refer'd:  e.  gr.  loh^Thot  on^  ox  Spoken  of, 
is  in  it  felf  properly  no  Paflion  ;    tho'  a  Perfon  may  be  fome 

way  or  other  afle':»ed  thereupon,  in  cafe  he  know,  that  he  is 
well  or  ill  Spoken  of,  or  1  ho't  on  by  fuch,  as  he  is  concern'd 
withal,  or  icr  whofc  Sentiments  he  has  a  f-'gau! :     But  then 

'tii^ 


5  6  ^»  ^py  for  the  Part  f. 

'tio  his  being  pJeas'd  or  difpleas'd,  which  is  properly  the  Paf- 
fibn  ;  nor  the  being  prais'd  or  difprais'd,  which  in  and  by  it' 
ielf  do's  not  affef\  thePerfon  at  all,  but  only  as  he  may  conli- 
der  of  if,  and  according  to  the  Reflexions  he  makes  upon  it 
agrt-eably  to  the  Temper  an  1  Difpolition  of  his  Mind  or  Bo- 
dy, or  of  both  together.  A  Man's  being  Spoken  of,  Tho'r 
on,  I.ov'd,  Fcar'd,  <:^s.  aire  indeed  in  themfehes  only  lb 
many  relative  and  excrinfccal  Denominations  or  Conlidera- 
tions  about  him,  not  any  thing  of  Paf^ion  fubjcf^ed  in  him  as 
when  he  receives  InftruCtion,  or  Corre^^Uori,  Reward  or  Pu- 
niftmenr,  C>j.  •  . 

§  14,  Thus  far  we  hiive  obferv'd  only  what  is  of  an  af- 
firmative or  pofitive  Nature;  we  proceed  to  what  is'Nega- 
tivc,  and  here  we  have, 

VII,  This  or  that  P'/V'-^/ow,  or  rhe  abfcnce  of  what  oughr 
to  be  in  this  or  that  Subllancc,  Accident,  Mode,  c?.-.  accor- 
ding to  the  ufiial  couffe  ot  Nature,  or  rhe  Rule  of  Duty  : 
As  Bhf.'^ncfs,  i  e.  the  total  Want  of  Sight,'  or  a  Dcfici<-ncy 
therein,  in  Man  at  any  Age  vvhatlocver,  or  in  fome  other 
Creatures  afrer  they  arc  To  many  Days  Old;  Culpable  De- 
fc">s  as  the  total  or  partial  want  ot  luch  good  Principles  or 
ir.ciinatipns,  as  oueht  ro  be  in  Angels  or  Men.  Now,  tho' 
Privation  be  not  an  aflirmative  Ihingi  yet  it  is  plainly  a  very 
confidciable  Subjef^  ot  Tho't,'  as  drawing  with  or  after  it  no 
fiXXdW  Conilqaences  in  relation  to  what  is  fo  or  fo  Defective; 
au  humane  hving  Body  without  Sight  or  Hearing,  Hands  01 
Fccr,  and  cfpecially  without  allof  them  muft  be  far  differing 
from  what  it  Ihould  be  by  the  ufual  Courfe  of  Nature  ■,  and 
lo  the  Mind  without  fome  degrees  of  Knowledge  and  Virtue, 
mult  be  dilagreeing  to  the  Rule  ot  Moral  Obligation,  and  lye 
cxpos'd  many  ways  to  Sin  and  Sorrows.  Privation  may  be 
confidcr'd  as  fomethmg  (/.  c.  fome  Objeft  of  Tho't)  fubjeited 
in,  or  rather,  appertaining  to  the  Subftance,  Accident,  cJ'r. 
which  is  lo  depriv'd  of  what  it  might  and  fliould  farther 
have. 

§  1 5. VIII, This  or  that  mQe.iKegation\s  fimply  the  Abfence 
cf  this  or  that  Subftance,  Accident,  Mode,  ©c.  where  it  is 
not  requir  d  either  by  the  courfe  of  Nature  or  any  Rule  of 
Duty :  As  in  the  Characters  of  mt-a-Sfirit,  not-living^  not- 
hearings  yiot-jccing,  &s.  apply'd  to  this  or  that  Stone;  not- 
barmdj  yiot-piom^  &s.  to  a  Brute-Creature.  Thcfc,  and 
other  Negatives  ir.ay  be  matter  of  U  ho't,  and  even  K:thiva. 
it  ielf  may  have  abundance  or  Notions  form'd  aboiu  it  in  the. 
way  <'f  Negation;  lince  every  positive  Thing  wjiar forever; 
may  bj  deny'd  of,  or  ( which  comes  all  to  one)  alHrmed  w.rh^ 

a 


Chap  7-  J hiprove/^ent  of  Ke^^on.  57 

a  Negation,  as  that  Nothing  is  not  God,  or  an  Angel,  or 
Man,  C^c.  or  that  ic  is  nor-God,  not-an-Angei,  not-a-Man, 
&c.  not  all,  or  fomc  nt  thefe  together,  in  ftiorr  rl.at  it  is  not 
quite  fo  confiderabk  as  Privation,  but  meerly  and  fimpiy  a 
Negation  of  Entity,  and  indeed  of  any  pofitive  Idea  what- 
foever, 

§  16.  Yet  it  may  defervetobe  noted,  that  in  affirming  a 
Negative  wc  often  feem  to  intend  fomewhat  farther  than  in 
denying  the  Affirmative,  as  in  faying  a  Stone  is  not-living^  or 
as  Logicians  give  it  in  Latin,  uon-vivens,  we  feem  atloalito 
mean  that  it  is  fonic  politive  Thtng  or  Being,  which  tho'  it 
have  not  Life,  yet  has  fome  other  affirmative  Attributes: 
But  ia  this  Scnfc  'tis  not  to  be  reckon'd  a  meer  Negation,  but 
father  an  indeterminate  (which  they  ufualJy  call  an  infinite) 
Affirmation  attended  with  a  Negation. 

§  17.  And  we  may  fometimes  ufe  the  Affirmation  of  d 
Negative,  as  the  mod  comprehenfive  way  of  affirming,  as  if 
I  fay,  Oniric  Jiatumlitcr  non-audiens  efi  etiam  natiiraliter  tion^ 
loquens,  evVy  not-hearing  Being,  that  is  naturally  fuch  is 
alfo  naturally  a  not-fpeaking  Being  ;  I  defign  by  the  Term^ 
nct-henrin'T^  a  multitude  of  pofitive  Beings,  as  Earth,  Waterj,- 
Stone,  and  indeed  whatever  elfe  is  naturally  without  Hear^ 
ing  ;  but  by  the  other  Negative,  not-fpcakjng^  I  intend  noE 
to  affirm  nny  other  Adtion,  much  lefs  every  one  beiides  that 
of  fpeaking. 

§  18.  Oftentimes  by  a  Negative-term  we  aim  at  fome- 
what Affirmative,  which  we  cannot  perhaps  better  exprefs, 
or  diftindlly  conceive ;  as  in  applying,  infinite  to  God,  im" 
»nor$nl  to  our  Souls,  irrational  to  Brutes,  ^s.  In  fuch  cafts 
what  we  do  m.ore  diftincTtly  Speak  or  Think  is  Negative,  but 
what  we  are  aiming  at  is  rather  an  Affirmative  of  v/hich  we 
want  the  more  clear  and  diftindt  Idea. 

§  19.  Even  the  mere  Negation  which  we  here  delign,  is 
confider'd  in  our  way  of  Thinking,  as  if  it  were  fomewhat, 
not  barely  as  it  can  be  thought  of,  but  as  it  gives  the  Mind  a 
differing  Idea  of  the  Thing  propounded  with  the  Negation; 
.and  t}>e  Thing  is  indeed  thereupon  really  differing  from  what 
it  would  othcrwife  be,  yet  not  by  adding  any  thing  to  it  but 
by  taking  fomewhat  from  it,  and  it  may  be  fomecunes  by  the? 
imply 'd,  or  fuppofed  Subftitution  of  fomewhat  clfe  in  its 
place,  as  not-well-bred^  leads  the  Mind  to  think  of  what  if 
oppofite  to  good  Breeding,  and  to  conceive  a  Man  with  that 
Negative  Character  is  to  give  him  that  ©f  Chmnifh  or  I^ude : 
Bat  thus  'tis  indeed  fome%vhat  more  than  meet  Negation  j 
■vet  ev'n  thu  we  conceive  as  a  kind  of  Attribute  belorging.^o 

JF  the 


58  An  Ejfay  for  the  Parti. 

the  Subjed  ;  bnt  fhould  take  heed  of  placing  it  higher  in  the 
Scale  of  Things  than  we  ought. 

§  10.  Nor  (honldweordmafilyufe  a  Negative  to  deter- 
mine any  Sub)ed,  but  \X'here  there  is  danger  it  would  elfe  be 
tho'tto  have  what  it  really  has  not  belonging  to  it,  as  in  fay- 
ing an  Ape  is  irraiionni,  or  mt-rfttional  as  Man  »  Such  a  one 
is  not  M'ije  tho'  he  be  Learned.  To  fay,  this  or  that  is  impojjibk 
is  the  ftrongeft  kind  of  Negation ;  and  to  be  inconjijlent  vs 
indeed  to  be  impoirible  ;  as  that  God  who  is  Holy,  Ihouldbe 
the  Author  of  Sin:-  Or  that  he,  who  is  Juit,  fhould  coi> 
ftrain  his  Creatures  to  Sin,-  and  then  condenfin  thesi  for 
fmning. 

§  21.  Privations  and  Negations  really  and  tru^y  are, 
whether  we  think  of  them  or  not :  But  there  arc  Subjeds  of 
Tiio't,  which  depend  upon  Tho't,  as, 

IX,  This  or  that  Formality,  or  fpccial  Confideration  re- 
lating to  this  or  that  Thing :  Of  thefe  there  may  be  divers, 
and  fometimes  very  many  belonging  to  the  felf-famc  Thing; 
ft)r  each  diftintl  Attribute  may  be  diftinftly  conflder'd,  and' 
rho'  it  will  rtili  be  materially  the  fame  Thing  when  conceiy'd 
or  rcprefcntcd  with  this  Attribute,  as  with  thr.t ;  yet  its  At- 
tributes in  their  own  proper  Nature  and  Idea  will  be  formai- 
//diftering,  yea,  tho' they  lliouldbe  jiift  alike  :  as  in  a  Cube 
or  Dye,  the  Body  conlidcr'd  f.s  long  differs  from  the  fame 
confider'd  ri>  brand,  or  iH  deep ;  and  the  Length,  Breadth, 
and  Depth,  are  not  the  fame  Thing,  nor  have  the  fame  Idea, 
tho'  they  be  exadlly  equal ;  fo  that  any  one  fide  may  be 
taken  ^r  the  Length,  any  other  adjoining  fidefor  the  Breadth, 
and  that  which  is  adjoining  to  them  both,  for  the  Depth  or 
Thicknefs. 

§  12.  'Tis  of  abfolute  Neceflity,  that  in  Thinking  or 
Speaking,  we  attend  to  wliat  in  Logic  or  Metaphy licks  is 
cali'd  the  Formaln  I{atic,  i.  e.  the  formal  and  diftindt  confi- 
deration under  which  a  Thing  is  taken  ■■,  we  cannot  eh'e 
think  or  fpeak  appofitejy  to  the  Point  in  Hand ;  nor  indeed 
fo  much  as  mftly  and  accurately  take  what  is  nicely  offer 'd 
upon  any  Argument.  When  a  Way  is  fpoken  of  as  meafiir'd, 
we  muft  confider  it  /jj  lor/g^  not  tts  Iroad;  Man  may  be  tho't 
Or  fpoken  of  either  a<  to  hu  fuhjlantiality  in  general,  or  as  to 
the  Materiality  of  his  Body,  or  the  Spirituality  of  his  Soul, 
or  his  Thinking  Power,  or  adual  Tho't,  or  as  to  his  pecu- 
liar Diipofition,  or  Age,  or  Relation,  ^c,  ami  acrordingly 
fuch  or  fuch  things  are  to  be  afiirm'd  or  deiiy'd  of  him.  And 
here  let  it  be  carefully  noted,  that  there  is  a  formril  Diffence 
between  Suhfianct  in  Man  and  the  Suidantialifi  oi  Man,  and 

fo 


Chap.  7-         Improvement  of  ^^zion,  «59 

fo  betwixt  his  Matter^  and  Materiality^  and  that  Subftslnce  is 
not  Subftantiality  it  felf  nor  Matter,  Materiality  it  felf;  the 
Jong  way  is  not  the  very  Length  of  the  way  confider'd  Ab- 
ftra^Iy  from  it. 

§2  3.  X.  And  Laftiy,  This  or  that  Ficiion  or  mere  Suppofi- 
tion,  which  may  be  either  our  Error  and  Miftake,  when  we 
do  not  intend  it  /o :  or  elfe  formally  and  properly  a  Fi«ftion 
or  Suppofition  when  we  fo  dcfign :  Tfew  latter  is  more  com- 
monly obferv'd  and  given  forth  as  fuch ;  but  the  former  more 
ufually,  as  in  Parables,  and  Fables,  deliver'd  without  exprefs 
or  dired  Notice  of  its  being  a  Fi(ftion ;  and  yet  may  carry 
in  and  with  it  fufficient  Marks  of  its  being  intended  for  no 
other;  elfe.it  were  to  be  counted  a  Falfhood,  and  where  the 
Expreflions  that  have  been  tacitely,  at  leaft,  agreed  to  be  us'd 
in  fuch  a  Senfe  do  in  that  Senfc  mifreport  and  contradidl  the 
Apprebenfion  of  him  that  ufes  them,  I  think  it  may.  be  cair4 
a  Moral  Vntruthy  or  Lye ;  tho'  the  thing  fo  deliver'd  Ihould 
happen  to  be  true  ;  and  'tis  generally  agreed  it  muft  be  fo, 
where  we  were  antecedently  obliged  to  acquaint  him  we 
fpeak  to  with  our  real  Sentiment. 

§.  24.  The  matter  of  Suppofitions  and  Fidlions  i§  always 
taken  irom  what  is  fome  where  or  other,  one  way  or  other 
in  Nature  ;  tho'  they  are  not  properly  founded  in  Nature  as 
the  formalities  are  of  which  we  fpoke  before.  We  cannot 
confiftemly  carry  up  Suppofition  or  Fidkion  to  the  Supreme 
Being,  fo  as  to  feign  another  Supreme,  which  would  imply 
a  Contradi£tLon  j  none  can  be  truly  God  who  is  not  xhtjnme 
God:  Nor  can  we  confiftently  fuppofe  him  not  to  be,  or  to 
be  other  than  he  is,  who  neceffarily  both  k  and  alfo  it  v^hnt  he. 
K.  But  whatfoever  implies  no  Contradidion  in  it  felf,  or  to 
any  thing  elfe  which  neceffarily  is,  or  is  fuch,  may  be  fup- 
pos'd  as  if  it  did  exift ;  and  fure  it  might,  if  God  faw  fit,  for 
we  cannot  confiftently  think  beyond  what  he  can  do,  nor  in- 
deed fo  far  as  his  Omnipotence  can  go. 
,  §  25.  Our  Idea  of  a  Fidion  or  Suppofition,  objef*-, 
iN'ely  taken ,  is  then  right ,  when  wc  rightly  conceive 
what  are  the  Things  or  Matters  of  Tho't,  fiow  they  are  put 
together  or  divided  s  and  that  'tis  but  a  Fi^ion  or  Suppofiti- 
on, not  what  really  is,  or  is  really  fo.  The  Ufe  of  it  is  for 
^luftration,  Inftruttion,  Incitement,  and  Advantagious  De- 
light, and  fometimes  for  Confirmation,  or  for  Confutation, 
Tjfhtn^the  Poit^c  to  bs  confuted  may  bclhown,  upon  the  Sup- 
volition  thereof,  td  infer  foniewhac  ceitainlyialfc  ot  sibfurd. 


^iili 


60  An  Ejffay  for  the  Part  i. 

§  26.  It  is  to  be  obferv'd,  that  Af: ion,  Paflion,  Privati- 
on, Negation,  Formality,  and  Fiftion  inay  each  bdve  their 
Modes,  and  Modes  of  thofe  Modes  f  but  then  they  will  be 
i'uited  to  the  Subjects,  whereto  they  refpedively  belong,  and 
for  diftin-'^ion,  may  be  calf d  A^ive,  Paflive,  Privative,  Ne- 
gative, Formal,  andFiOKious:  And  aifo  the  following  i^'*^«/- 
tances  may  have  their  peculiar  Modes  and  farther  Mckies  fui- 
ted  to  Combinations,  Separations,  AbftrafSionN  Relation?, 
and  Exprefficns,  which  may  be  caifd  Coirfbifting  Separating, 
Abftrafting,  Relative  and  Exprofibe  Modes. 

..■,^1,     .n"<    1   1   I : "   '     I'HTfiiW^t    JttJi  ' ' ■ ^ II    ■«■     ' 

c  H  ArR  yni. 

^  I.  tROM  tlic  foregoins;  Sciale  or  Gradation  of  fuch 
'•      *■    Things,    as  we  might  call  Elements^  there  are  far- 
ther matters  of  Tho't  arifing,  which  we  may  term,  as  before 
RrJ'tilt.u  c.".',  in  the  mentioned  ways  of  farther  and  tnore  ob- 
fctvaole  Canbinntion,   Separation^  Abftra'clion^   B^Utiofi^   and 
Ex^prejjion  :    I  fay,  farther  and  more  obfefiable,   be^'aufc 
there  was  fomewhat  of  thefe  in  the  preceding  Scale ;   Efft'nce 
being  ';o»a^Wi'<:^  with  Exiftence  in  the  feveral  Farriculafs  there 
rfferr'<i  to ;   Subftante  mentally  Sefm^jed,   at  rathet  tthfrnB- 
ed^  from  its  Accidents  Modes,  G'c'.  as  alio  thefe  from  it  and 
frcni  each  other ;    yet  fo  as  ftill  to  imply  a  iTEVtvctial  flatten  ; 
nor  could    any  of   them  be  deliver d  Wrthou?  employing 
Exprcjfion  for  that  purpofe. 

§  2.     Now   thefe  very  Ways  snd  Methods  of  taking 
Things  arc  in  then^fclves  Objc^s  ofTho'c ;    And  befides r/ic/(f 
they  have  already    funiifh'd,   "Svill  aifont   ns  many  more 
from  the  foregoing- Heads,  and  &om  am(>fig  chemfelves  in 
thofe  which  follow  ;   cfpeciaily  iR>  rr|;ar!d  o4  the.  farther  and 
farther  Cotabinatioib.  Scpaiatioiris^  Abftra^ions,   Relations 
arfdExprei)i'r.>5:i<i:  which  may  arife;  ap^  for  InftarKC  Sxprf/J/o^/f 
nwy.be  dra.\Vii  ffo'm  arl  biinoft  of  the  ftlcntioned  Heads,  and. 
:\lio'ntay  [je  lieap'd  one  upon  3W>tUer  in  cIk;  farther  and  ya-  . 
cimis  Expreliioii  of  Exprcluons :   For  as  l"ho*ts  are  the  SigOi  - 
of  TfhingSj  lo  articulate  Sounds  are  the  moftufual  ExprefTions- 
I'f'Thot,  common  v.'riting  of  thofe  Sounds,  and  Short-hand"- . 
of  lhat\Vrinng;  befides  that    fome'VVords  are  us'd  to  en-  . 
pvefj  Of  Explain  the  meaning  of  others,  and  one  Language  to 
inrerpret  ar.othcr.     And  after  all  we  can  fay  or  think  of  Sub- 
itance  Accident,  C-ff.   or  of  Cod  binatioT^s-,  Sep5racioBS,  (3c. 
•'    *•  *  wh^ 


Chap.  8.         ir/7provef»erif  oj  Heaicn.  6\ 

>vho  can  rell  what  farther  Advances  might  be  made  by  un- 
fearchablc  VVifuom  and  Ahnighty  Power?  Butco  procceJ, 
we  may -endeavour,  aswccan,  roconfider, 

4)  3,  I,  This  or  x.hzx.  Cumiinittlon  of  Vv'hatfoevcr  farther 
Degree,  .  .;^.  The  Things  conjoined,  and  alfo  the  way  and 
rJiarner  of  their  Conjunction  :  Suppofe  it  were  tVv^o  or  more 
particulars  of  the  former  Scale,  or  of  thi?,  or  of  both  toge- 
ther, whether  under  the  fame  or  differing  Headsin  either,  as 
ihey  may  be  apprehended  thro'  Miftake,  fuppofed  with  De- 
iign,  or  found  in  Realitv  exiftuig  together  in  fome  Being,  or 
Sec  of  Beings,  or  orhcr  Obietts  of  Tho't.  As  if  it  were  crro- 
neoufly  held  that  tiicre  are  three  ciiftinrt  Souli,  the  Vegeta- 
tive, Scnlitive,  and  Rari^mal,  in  one  Man  j  or  one  Soul,  for  a 
faint  Iliuftration  of  the  Blellcd  Trinity,  fuppos'd  to  animate 
tlirce  diftuKi  Bodies  5  or  laftly  a  Body  and  Soul  conceiv'd  as 
utiitfd  in  the  Humane  Nature.  As  to  mijlakcn  Combina,- 
rions,  what  we  have  to  do  is  to'detetV,  evi^,  and  rcjeftthem  ; 
as  to  the  fuppos'd,  to  fee  they  be  not  inconfiftenr,  and  then  to 
improve  them :  But  'tis  of  thofe  which  rer.l/ji  cxifr,  I  would 
chiefly  fpeak. 

§  4.  Now  tothcmaking  of  finite  Beings,  or  fome  of 
their  Appendages  and  Appurtenances,  there  is  at  leafx,  ac- 
cording to  our  impcrfe^^f  xvay  of  conceiving  them,  a  real 
Combmaticn,  fuppofe  of  this  or  that  Subftance,  it  may  be 
of  divers,  with  a  Set  ot  divers  Sets  of  Accidents,  Modes, 
perhaps  with  farther  Modes,  Aftions  PaiTions,  Privations, 
and  certainly  nor  without  manifold  Negations  at  leaft  in> 
ply'din  the  politive  Nature,  and  thofe  might  all  be  fumm'd 
up  in  that  one  comprehenfive  Negation  [Nothing  morej, 
which  if  added,  would  be  indeed  a  finifliing  ftroke,  but 
commonly  it  muft  be  too  bold  as  implying  we  had  before 
given  a  perfeft  Account  of  all  that  was  any  way  compriz'd  fn 
luchObjet>,  crbeloQgingto  it. 

§  5,  Byway  ofinftance,  This  or  that  Man  may  be  con- 
ceiv'd, as  a  C:mt>i>2a}iov  of  two  differing  Subftances ;  the  one, 
•Z7-.  his  Soui,  having  fuch  Powers,  improv'd  or  deprav'd  by 
fuch  Habits,  thcfe  rais'd  or  fain  to  fuch  a  Degree,  (o  acting, 
foa^Acd,  with  fuch  Natural  and  Mo^al  Defei^^s,  and  v.'ith 
a  multitude  of  Negative  Attributes,  fome  of  which  perhaps 
were  fie  to  be  mention'd,  as  fup^ofe  he  were  truly  Wife,  tho' 
not  very  Witty  i  not  Sad,  tho'  Serious,  ^s :  as  to  his  other 
Subftance,  the  Body,  we  may  conceive  it  to  be  of  fiich  a  Na- 
ture, to  have  fuch  inwards  Parts,  and  outward  Shape,  De- 
form'd  or  Comely,  and  that  to  fuch  a  Degree,  fit  to  be  em- 
ploy'd  in  fuch  A6Hon,  fo  or  fo  mov'd,   it  may  be  wanting 

F  3  feme 


62  An  hffay  for  the  Part  i. 

fome  part,  or  having  fomcwhat  redundant,  not  Beautiful, 
iho'  Handfome^  iv)t  Strong,  tho'  Big,  ^s:  But  it  would  be 
Too  adventurous  to  fay,  there  is  no  farther  particular  Acci- 
dera  or  Mode,  cS'r.  belonging  either  to  his  Soul  or  Body. 
^6.  As  to  tlie  wny  and  innnner  of  Comhinntion,  it  appears 
in  fome  Cafes  to  be  fomewhat  alike  in  Nature  arid  Art :  As, 
(i.)  3y  Coinprehenljon  orComprizal  of  various  and  diftindt 
Things,  as  in  the  fame  common  Receptacle,  fuppofe  in  the 
infinite,  or  in  fome  finite  Mind  furveying  them  at  once  9  in 
the  fame  Book,  or  Houfe,  or  Cabinet,  or  in  the  World  as 
'tis  the  Comprchcniion  of  all  Things,  or  at  Icaft  of  all  finite 
Things.  (2.)  By  Concidence  or  Agreement  in  fome  Attri- 
butc,  as  being  of  one  Place,  Age,  Kind,  Sort,  ^s.  (3.)  By 
Concurrence,  as  of  Bodies  tending  to  a  common  Point  and 
gathering  about  it ;  or  of  Men  joying  in  Givil  or  Sacred 
Society;  being  of  the  fame  Opinion  or  Party  j  having  tlie 
fame  Intereft,  &s.  (4.)  By  Contiguity,  as  the  Particles  in 
Water,  or  an  Heap  of  Sand.  (  5.)  By  Commixtion,  whe- 
ther pf  groffer  parts,  as  of  Stones,  Metals,  t^c.  in  the  Earth  ; 
cr  of  finer  Panicles,  as  in  a  Medicinal  Compound,  or  in  the 
31ood.  (6.)  By  Colligation,  as  in  a  Fagot,  or  in  a  Bad. 
■7-)  By  Conrexture  or  Interweaving,  as  of  Threads  in 
Cloatli,  and  Fibres  in  the  Leaves  of  Trees.  (  S.  To  in- 
ffance  no  more  in  this  kind)  by  Complication,  or  the  Twi- 
ning and  Twilling  together  of  long  and  tough  Parts,  as  in 
Thread  ani  Cords  ■■,   in  the  grofler  Nerves  and  Ugaments, 

§  7.  But  there  are  Combinations  yet  more  confiderable, 
as  (f.)  By  the  Continui:y  and  Confiftencyof  fmaller  Parti- 
cles ho!<iuig  together,  fo  as  to  make  up  larger  Bodies.  (i.)By 
the  Coalif.on  of  Things,  which  according  to  our  Model  of 
Appi'thenlioji  are  in  themfclves  very  differing,  and  yet  fall  in 
togedicr  jnro  one  Being,  as  S.^bftance  and  Accidents,  Force 
imprclsd  and  Motion  with  the  Thing,  which  is  mov'd,  (^s. 
C5.  By  the  Conjunftion  and  vital  Union  of  fuch  differing 
S'vibftani  es  as  the  Soul  and  Body  in  Man,  fo  as  they  fhould 
in  fuch  manner  mu  ually  aifcd  and  be  affet^ed  by  and  thro' 
each  orher.  And  it  we  may  here  touch  upon  what  is  Super- 
natural. (^  )  The  Myfiical  Union  of  Chrift  and  Believers 
^s  partaking  of  the  fame  Holy  Spirit.  (5.)  The  perfonal 
Union  of  fuch  differing  Natures  as  thofe  of  God  and  Mlnin 
our  Savour  ;  and  (6.)  The  Subftantial  Union  of  the  Three, 
wiiom  we  commonly  call  Perfons  in  God. 


Chap  8.         Improvement  of  Kt^{oi\,  62 

§  8.  Our  Apprehenfion  of  Combiijations,  is  fo  far  right 
as  we  righrly  underftand  what  arc  the  Things  combin'd,  and 
what  the  manner  of  their  Combination.  Ajjd  hence  it  is, 
that  we  are  fo  much  in  the  Dark  as  to  thofe  complicated  Na- 
tures, which  furijilh  out  the  Univerfc  ;  becaufe  we  know  fo 
very  little  of  the  Particulars,  combined  in  them,  or  how  they 
arc  puttogether:  And  ya,  no  doubt,  wc  do,  or  may  know, 
what  is  needful  and  convenient  for  us  in  our  picfejit  State. 
"What  we  have  next  to  confider  is, 

§  9.  II,  This  or  that  Separation^  of  whatever  Degree  : 
H^}at  is  disjoin'd,  and  the  manner  how.  What  is  here  ap- 
prehended by  Miftake,  ihould  be  fearch'd  out  and  redify'd  j 
what  is  defignediy  fuppos'd  or  feign'd  muft  be  confiltent 
with  it  felf  and  otlj^r  Things,  that  it  may  be  rightly  con- 
ceiv'd  and  apply'd  to  fome  fit  purpofe  ;  but  our  main  Bufi- 
nefs  here  is  with  Separations  really  made,  or  which  at  Icaft 
may  bey3  conceiv'd,  as  when  fome  part  or  degree  of  a  Thing 
i$  indeed  fever'd  from  the  Relidue,  not  as  Subftance  from  Ac- 
cident, Mode,  cS^c.  or  thefe  from  it  or  one  another,  vhilft 
they  cannot  be  rightly  conceiv'd,  as  exifting  without  the  Sub- 
ject to  which  they  belong. 

§  10.  The  Separation  here  defign'd,  is  more  than  an 
Abftratftion,  or  the  Confidering  of  fomewhat  without  codIi- 
dering  fomewhat  elfe,  when  yet  it  cannot  be  fo  much  as  con- 
fiftently  conceived  to  be  without  it :  But  what  we  are  here 
confidering,  is  what  either  adtually  is,  or  really  may  be  (a- 
ver'd  and  taken  away,  as  (i.)  One  intire  Thing  from  fome 
other,  with  which  it  was  fome  way  combin'd,  as  one  Stone 
from  an  Heap,  or  one  Friend  from  another  by  Alieniation, 
Diftance  or  Death.  (2.)  Some  Part  or  Particle  of  a  Body 
from  the  reft,  as  in  the  wear  of  Utenfils,  or  in  Difmcmbrmg, 
(3.)  Some  Attribute  loft  whilft  the  Subjcdl  continues,  and  is 
perhaps  orherways  ihe  fame  as  it  was.  (4.)  Some  degree  of 
an  Accident,  Mode,  Adion,  PaiTion  or  Privaiion  gone, 
whilft  the  reft  continues,  and  the  Subftance  is  not  diminilhd  ; 
but  remains  intire  and  undivided,  and  is  it  may  be  in  its 
own  Nature  indivifiblc.  Water  may  become  lefs  Hot  with- 
out being  Icfs'ned  in  Quantity,  and  the  Mind  lefs  contented, 
tho'  it  cannot,  in  Subftance,  be  lefs  than  it  was. 

§  1 1.  And  yet  farther,  (^.)  Some  fort  of  Attributes  can- 
not be  divide  without  their  Subject,  yet  with  it,  they  eafily 
may  :  As  the  Weight  and  Figure  of  a  Body  may  be  divided 
with  it,  tho*  not  otherwife  :  So  the  number  of  Soldiers  in 
an  Army,  with  the  Array.  (6.)  Abftra^5t  quantity  may  be  fe- 
paratcdimo  the  parw  of  which  it  was  made  up;  Magnitude, 

F  4  Number, 


64  An  hffay  -for  the  Part  i . 

Number,  Duration,  and  the  Degrees  of  Intention  may  be 
taken  by  parrs.  (7  )  Other  Complex  Jdeas  may  be  relolv'd 
into  the  feveral  diftinct  Notions  therein  comprizM  :  and 
(8.)  Many,  even  of  thofe  Ideas,  which  may  be  call'd,  com- 
paratively, Simple,  have  yet  their  common  and  diftinguilh- 
ing  Charaders  .-  The  Perception  we  have  of  Light  may  be 
confider'd,  as  it  comes  by  or  thro'  a  fenfible  Organ,  and  par- 
ticularly by  the  Eye,  and  tho'  v/e  can't  accurately  define  we 
may  defcribe  it.,  as  a  Perception  we  take  in  chiefly  from  the 
Sun,  being  plc?/ant  if  not  too  intenfe,  ferving  to  the  difco- 
very  of  Colnvir,  i^c. 

§  12.  By  what  has  been  offer'd,  it  may  feem,  that  the 
Separation  of  which  v/e  fpeakis  not  always  (tho'  it  may  be 
in  divers  Inftances)  the  Reverfe  or  Refolution  of  chc  Combi- 
nation bcfi:)re  treated  of,  particularly  when  there  is  only  fome 
Degrees  of  an  Accident  abated,  but  whilft  thofe  are  loft,  the 
reft  continue  ftill  combined  with  theSubjedt. 

^  13.  As  to  the  way  and  manner  of  Separation,  ( i .)  There 
may  be  an  Idea  of  this  Separate  from  the  Idea  of  that,  and 
without  implying  any  Relation  to  it  in  very  many  Cafes,  and 
indeed,  whenever  weconGder  Things  that  are  Abfolute,  di 
fuch,  in  themfelves :  The  Idea  of  fhilip  as  the  Father  of  Alex- 
Undcr  is  indeed  drftindt  from  that  of  Alcx.ihdrr,  but  not  ftricft- 
Jy  feparate  from  it  as  the  Idea  of  King  Phillfs  Perfon  is  from 
that  o^  Alcxnnder''<.  [2.)  We  may  comider  this  or  that  as  if 
it  were  aftually  feparated,  tho'  it  be  not .  whilft  we  know  'tis 
pc{]ib!e  to  be  fo:  The  living  Body,  that  has  now  its  Arms 
and  Legs,  may  be  conceiv'd  as  it  it  were  aftiuily  without 
them.  Thele  two  Sorts  may  be  term'd  in  fome  fenfe  iWental- 
Separations,  but  efpccially  the  latter :  r/t  procefed  to  what 
is  Real  in  one  way  or  other,  and 

§  14,  {^.y  There  may  be  in  the  fame  intirc  Body  a  lineal 
Separation,  as  by  a  Line  drawn  on  Paper,  or  tho  Appearance 
of  a  Crack  in  firm  and  folid  Marble.  [% )  We  may  take  up 
©nly  (omc  part  of  what  lay  together,  in  a  ~\  ho':,  a  Sentence, 
a  Book,  an  Houfe,  an  Age,  or  in  the  World,  to  be  the  Sub- 
ject of  our  Confideration  or  Difcourfe.  (5.)  The  parts  or 
ev^n  fmallcrParticles  of  a  Body  may  be  locally  diftanc'd  from 
ieach  other.  (6.)  Where  they  remain  ftiil  Contiguous  so  each 
©thcr,yet  the  Band  or  tye  of  Union  rniay  be  taken  away,  as  in 
unglewing  cr  otherways  unfaft'nihg  what  was  fome  way 
faft'red  together  :  Yea,  (7.)  The  Continuity  of  a  Body  may 
be  diflblv'd  as  in  Breaking,  Cutting,  Rending,  C^c  and 
(8.)  Some  inward  Particles  may  be  fever'-d  from  the  re (^,  as  in 
Piitilling  ind  drawing  off  Spirits,  i^r/   ,'9.;    7HieBand  of 

Life 


C^hap.  9.  Improve firettt  of  Ktzion.  65 

i  ife  may  be  broken,  and  the  Vital  Principle  in  Brutes  (what- 
ever that  be)  difcharg'd.  as  in  feparating  the  Blood  from  the 
Body,  fio.)  The  Humane  Soul  may  be  diilodg'd  and  disjoined 
-from  its  Body:  Tho*  neither  Death,  nor  any  thing  eife 
(hall  feparate  thofe  who  are  truly  join'd  and  adhere  to  Chrift, 
from  the  Love  of  God, 

•  §  1 5,  (i  I .)  There  may  be  (as  has  been  intimated)  a  Par- 
tition of  feme  Accidents  or  Modes,  together  with  their  Sub- 
jed,  vi:t.  wlicn  they  depend  upon  the  Bulk  or  Figure  of  it; 
and  this  may  be  call'd  a  double  Separation  perform'd  at  once, 
as  when  wcpart  the  weight  of  any  Stone,  or  the  Virtue  and 
Force  of  a  1  oad-ltonc  with  the  Stone  it  felf.  (12.  And  in 
the  laft  place)  Where  Accidents  or  Modes,  <^c.  are  fuch  as 
may  be  intended  or  remitted  without  incieafing  or  diminiih- 
ing  the  Subfrance  of  their  Subjedt,  in  fuch  Cafe  there  may 
be  a  lowering  the  Degree  of  fuch  Attributes  without  other- 
wife  affediing  the  Subjecl :  We  may  well  conceive  only  a 
feparated  part  of  the  Heat  to  remain  in  the  Water,  when  it 
has  begun  to  cool ;  and  only  fome  degree  of  former  Lear- 
ning to  abide  in  the  Mind,  when  the  reit  is  forgotten  and 
loft. 


C  H  A  P.     IX. 

§  I.  T  proceed  now  to  treat  much  morclargely  of  the  three 
•••  remaining  Heads;  and  fliall  in  the  next  place  con- 
fider, 

III,  This  or  that  AbfircElion  of  wh^tfoevcr  other  Sort  or 
farther  Degree,  than  has  been  yet  obferv'd,  or  infifted  on  in 
this  Effay.  And  we  are  here  to  confider  PVhnt  is  abftracflcd, 
and  inxvhai  vpr.j.  Now  th^t  is  abftrafted,  which  is  taken  by 
it  ielf  to  be  confidct'd  or  apply 'd  alone,  tho'  it  could  not  be 
confiilcntly  judged,  that  it  do's  or  can  exift  alone  :  For  if 
that  might  be,  it  ought  to  be  accounted,  as  has  been  (hewn, 
rather  a  Separation  than  Abftradion. 

§  a.  TheXormer  Scale  was  indeed,  according  to  this  ac- 
count, made  up  of  Abftradions  and  by  Abflradion ;  for 
this  or  that  particular  Subltance  was  abllradied  from  its  Ac- 
cidents, Modes,  &c.  asalfo  this  or  that /Jitif/cM/^r  Accident, 
Mode,  zic.  from  the  Subftance,  and  from  each  other  :  Yet 
we  did  not  r/jf re  confider  ihe  Particularity  under  itsdiftindive 
Characters  form/jll)  j   but  rather  n}.neri,ilh,  i.  e.   what  is  a 

particular 


66  An  Ejfay  for  the  Part  I. 

particular  Subftance,  Accident,  ^c,  but  rather  m  a  Subftance 
Accident,  ^c.  than  at  a  particular  one  ;  for  we  did  not  there 
fet  our  felves  to  obferve  the  Thu-nefs,  or  That-nefs  of  it,  if  I 
may  be  allow'd  to  fpeak  in  Englifh,  as  Logicia^is  have  long 
taken  the  Freedom  to  do  in  Latin. 

§  3 .  And  the'  we  took  up  the  Common  Nature,  or  ra- 
Vjier  the  common  Idea  of  Subftance,  Accident,  Mode,  t^c; 
yet  we  did  not  then  oblige  our  fclves  to  attend  fo  direOIy  to 
its  being  common ;  but  apply'd  it  to  fome  or  other  particular 
Subftance,  Accident,  Mode,  £^c,  without  fetting  our  felves 
there  to  obferve  that  the  Idea  tnight,  ai  a  common  onc^  be  ap- 
ply'il  to  any  Subftance,  Accident,  C^c.  rcfpe^ively  :  I  fay, 
thzldea  or  Xotim,  for  indeed  there  is  no  fuch  thing  as  a  com- 
mon Nature  ;  but  if  we  will  fpeak  properly  and  ftri^ly  the 
Nature  of  this  or  that  Subftance,  Accident,  C^c.  do's  fo  pe- 
culiarly belong  to  the  individual  Subftance,  Accident,  &c» 
that  it  cannot  in  that  way  belong  to  any  other,  how  like  for^ 
ever  it  might  be ;  for  ftill  it  is  not  the  felf-fame,  nor  has  the 
felf-fame  Nature  or  Attributes,  tho'  they  may  be  reprefen- 
ted  by  the  iame  Notion  or  Idea,  if  we  take  not  in  the  parti- 
cularity^  i.  e.  its  being  this  or  that  Subftance,  Accident,  (3c. 
not  another. 

§  4.    But  we  are  now  to  confider  more  at  large,  whatever 
may  be  abftra^^ed  and  how.    To  begin  with  the  former,  vrhat- 
foever  is  truly  diftinguilhable  by  a  diftinft  Idea,  yet  not  fepa- 
rable,   fo  much  as  in  Notion,   (as  has  been  fhewn)  may  be 
abftrafled:  and  therefore,  (ij  The  individuality  or  pnrticu' 
hrity  of  this  Or  that,  whatever  it  be  j  or  the  confideration  of 
its  being  r/?«  or  thaty    not  any  othet,   but  differing  from  all 
others  of  the  fame  Sort,  and  even  from  fuch,  as  may  exadiy 
refcmble  it,  yet  are  none  of  them  the  felf  fame  with  it. 
(2.)  The  Species,  or  Sort,  which  may  be  abftra(fted  (us  ihall 
be  fhown)  from  the  Particularities  in  an  Idea,  which  may 
agree  to  fuch    particular  Beings  or  Things  in  common. 
(3.)  The  Genu!,  or  KJnJ,  from  the  differing  Sorts  in  a  more 
common  Idea  comprehending  and  containing  no  more,  than 
what  may  extend  and  agree  to  all  the  Sorts,  and  all  the  Par- 
ticulars under  them.    (4.;   The  yet  higher  and  more  general. 
Kjnds^  from  the  lower,  which  in  refpeft  of  them,   are  but 
Sorts ;  tho'  they  be  alfo  Kinds,  as  having  not  oiily  Individu- 
als,  but  thefe  of  differing  Sorts,  under  them^ 


i  5.  We 


Chap.  9.         Improvement  of  Kealon.  67 

§  5.  We  may  Ukewife  abftrad,  (5.)  any  Atnihute,  or 
Ser  of  Attributes^  whether  they  make  the  diftinguilhing  Cha- 
rt£ler  of  the  Individuals,  or  of  the  Sort,  or  ]Kind,  or  higher 
Kind  :  Or  that  they  be  Propertjies,  or  common  Accidents ; 
for  indeed  any  one  or  more  Attributes  togetlier  may  be 
abftraded  from  the  SubjeA  to  w^ich  they  belong,  how  infe- 
parable  foe ver  they  might  be  really,  as  Properties  always 
are  j  tho'  none  of  them  can  be  fo  much  as  conceiv'd  without 
a  Reference,  at  leaft  imply *d,  to  fome  or  other  SubjedV,  and 
indeed  to  this  or  that  particular  Subjed,  whenever  a  parti- 
cular Accident,  Mode,  ^c.  is  abftra£ted  :  This  Whitenefs  is 
the  Whitenefs  of  thit  Paper,  and  of  thts  very  Piece. 

§  6.  As  to  the  vpay  nnd  matmer  rf  AlJlrcBinVy  I  Ihall  ex- 
plain it,  Firjif  In  reference  to  Particularity,  or  the  Individua- 
ting Charader,  which  determines  the  Thing  to  be  th's  or 
that,  not  another.  And  here  we  do  not  fo  direftly  attend  to 
the  Nature  it  felf  j  but  take  up  certain  diftinguilTiing  Marks, 
which  may  be  nothing  more  than  fomc  cxtrinfick  and  acci- 
dental Denominations  belonging  to  the  iSature ;  as  the  Man 
whom  Ifaw  at  fucb  a  time,  infuch  ti  flnce,  8cs ;  whatever  were 
that  Humane  Nature,  which  I  afcribe  to  him,  'tis  his  being 
fijeen  by  me,  which  I  now  attend  to  abftradlly  *,  yet  not  de- 
nying the  Nature,  but  referring  to  it,  and  indeed  to  the  par^ 
ticular  Humane  Nature  of  that  Perfon. 

§  7.  The  Particularity  of  Adam,  by  way  of  Inftance, 
may  be  thus  abftrac^ly  fet  forth,  One,  whofe  Body  was  im- 
mediately form'd  out  of  the  Duft,  and  into  whofe  Noftrils 
God  breath'd  the  Breath  of  Life,  whereby  he  became  a  Liv- 
ing Soul ;  Or,  in  a  more  general  way,  Adam  might  be 
pointed  out  by  \i\%  beginning  to  exift  at  fuch  precife  Time  infuch 
precife  Place,  and  thus  the  Particularity  of  any  Man,  and  of 
very  many  Things  may  be  fundamentally  Stated  j  fince  only 
this  or  that  one  began  to  exift  exadly  at  fuch  a  Moment  of 
Time,  and  in  this  or  that  determinate  Compafs  or  Point  oi' 
Space  :  I  have  faid,  Fundamentally  •  for  indeed  the  formnl 
and  inrire  Particularity  confifts  of  all  the  Parts  and  Attributes 
belonging  to  the  Subjeft  conlider'd  <«  particular  ;  e.  gr.  Thk 
Body,  this  Soul,  fuch  Time  and  Place  of  beginning  and  con- 
tinuingto  be,  fuch  particular  Parents,  fuch  Inclinations,  Adli- 
ons,  ^c;  but  all  the  other  inviduating  Marks  do  ftill  attend 
what  I  gave  before,  r/;^.  the  beginning  to  exift  at  fuch  rima 
and  in ///ft  place. 


§8.  Ant! 


68  An  Fpy  for  the  Part  I. 

§  8.  And  now.  Secondly,  as  to  the  Species  or  Son.,  the 
'Afcftradion  is  made  by  obft-'rving  what  is  the  Principal  and 
Sumniary  Account  of  this  or  that,  not  a$  to  its  ExifterKpe, 
butitsEuence  or  Nature  in  it  felf  confider'4,  and  confequenf- 
iy,  what  is  the  Principal  and  Summary  agreement  of  fuch 
Individuals,  as  we  may  fitly  recl^on  to  be  of  one  Sort.  Buf 
to  this  important  Point,  I  Ihall  fpeak  a  little  more  particular- 
ly, and  here. 

§  9   (i.)  In  relation  to  Man;   we  may  confider  wbatBe^ 
ings  about  us,    do  refemble  our  felvcs  in  the  moi>  material 
Rcfpe£ls,  and  indeed  agree  with  us  in  the  Summary  Account 
of  what  we  our  felves  are,  as  in  having  a  Capacity  for  Re^ 
ligion,  together  with  anOrganiz'd  Body:     And  thus  we  may 
(rightly  enough  for  our  Ut'e  however)   form  the  Idea  of 
"M^n's  Specific'^  Nature,  or  of  that  Species  and  fort  of  ^eing', 
which  we  call  Man,  •-2;;;;.  that  he  is,  or  (as  we  ule  to  exprefs 
itj  has  anEmbody'd  Soul  capable  of  Religion,   or  jiiorp  Lq-. 
gically,  that  he  is  an  Animal  endow'd  with  Ihch  B.xafon,   as 
makes  him  capable  of  Religion.     This  Idea,  we  oqnceiv^, 
takes  in  no  Beings,  that  are  Improper  to  be  taken  in,  neithej? 
the  Spirits  above  us,   nor  fenfitive  Creatures  below  U65   nor 
yet  leaves  out  any  on  Account  of  their  Bodily  Deformity, 
orthe  Deficiencies  of  their  Mind,   where  we  have  Rcafon  to 
believe  there  is  fuch  a  Natural  Capacity,    and  for  this  Cha- 
rader  m  Infants,  we  depend  upon  that  Law  of  Nature,  whicli 
do's  fo  commonly  appear  to  hold,  r/:^.  that  Like  do's  produce 
what  is,  or  would  come  to  be  its  Like  in  the  moil  material 
Refpef^s,  7.  c.  thofe  which  are  fuch  in  a  Phyficalj  Natural 
Confideration,  whatever  unlikenefs  there  may  be  on  Moral 
Accounts.    What  therefore  is  the  living  ClT-fpring  pf  Hu- 
mane Parents  is  (I  think)  to  be  accounted  Humane,  .but  the 
Produftions  of  Brutal  Mixtures  (if  any  be)  with  Humane 
Kind  are  not  (as  I  conceive)  to  be  fo  Lftecm'd,   but  are  ra- 
ther to  be  deftroy'd  than  prefer v'd. 

§  10.  (2.)  The  other  Sorts  of  Animals,  or  Living  Crea- 
tures may,  perhaps,  bed  be  diftinguilh'd  by  their  Origin, 
and  refer'd  to  that  fort,  from  which  they  Spring,  for  that  it 
feems  to  be  a  legible  Chara^cr  imprinted  on  theui  by  thqir 
Creator's  Appointment  and  Blefling,  that  as  they  Avcre  Cre- 
ated, each  after  their  Ivind,  fo  they  flipuld  be  accordingly 
Fruitful  and  Multiply  ;  and  it  has  been  obferv'd,  that  the 
Mixtures  of  one  Kind  with  another,  prOve  Improlifick  and 
Barren,  or  carry  not  on  their  Uncouth  and  uncreated  Likenefs, 
as  f.^.  the  Mule  procreated  of  an  Horfe  and  an  Afs.  But  when 
the  Original  of  a  Living  Creature  is  not  -certainly  known,  we 

can 


Chap.  9.        ImproveMtnt  of  Reafon.  69 

din  only  Guefs  or  prefume  the  Species,  from  the  Shape,  the 
Si*c,  (at  full  growth,  or  when  they  can  Propogate)  and  theit 
Genius,  fo  fat  as  it  can  be  obferv'd. 

§  1 1.  (3.)  As  to  Plants,  the  fame  Rule  may  be  of  Ufe; 
fincc  God  niade  alfo  the  Herbs  and  Trees  after  their  Kind, 
with  fiich  a  Seed,  or  propogating  Principle  as  might  Produce 
their  Like  •,  but  here  fhould  be  added,  what  may  be  obferv'd 
touching  the  Medicinal  Virtues,  as  well  as  the  Make  and 
Form  of  Plants :  And  here,  tho'  Art  may  fomewhat  alter 
the  Individuals,  it  appeats  not  that  Humane  Skill  can  make 
a  nev/  Species,  fuch  as  may  Propogate  or  Perpetuate  its 
Like,  for  however  the  Slips  of  fuch  alter'd  Plants  may  prove 
for  a  while,  yet  they  are  found  Verging  to  their  formee 
Natural  Sort,  and  it  may  be  Queried,  whether  the  SttA 
( more  Properly  fo  caird)  be  not  altogether  of  the  Original 

kind.  .  *  . 

§  12.  (4.)  As  to  Beipgs  of  a  lefs  perfeft  and  unorganized 
Make,  they  arc  to  be  dlftinguifh'd  fas  we  can)  by  the  moft 
Notable  Accidents,  Modes,  (£c.  which  are  found  together 
and  alike  in  fome  good  Number  of  Individuals,  omitting 
thofe  Variations,  which  are  lefs  confiderable  than  the 
Agreement. 

^  13.  And  thus  we  may  proceed,  by  Degrees,  to  the 
moft  obfcrvable  Amaflments  of  Matter  here  below,  ^|/;^.  that 
of  the  Earth,  and  of  the  Water,  T/;w  Fluid,  the  other  .more 
Firm  and  Stable,  which  arc  both  very  confiderable,  as  they  . 
fecm  to  afford  the  Matter  to  all  particular  Bodies  j  whilft  the 
two  other  perceptible  Elements  (as  they  have  long  been 
caird)  ^/V  and  F;Vcfeem  only  to  aflfift  in  the  Forming,  Aba- 
ting, Altering,  and  Abolifliing  of  them  at  laft.  But  the  fatr 
rhcrPurfuit  ofthefe  Things  we  (hall leave  to  Natural  Philo- 
sophy, when  we  have  briefly  obferv'd  that, 

§  14.  (Thirdly),  From  the  Sorts  thus  Colleftedand  Stated ' 
we  may  (perhaps  conveniently  enough)  abftraft  the  Kinds  ot 
Beings,  by  confidering,  wherein  they  agree  with  each 
other :  as,  (i.)  Amongft  Living  Creature^  that  a  Number 
of  the  Sorts  agree  in  this  or  that  way  of  Various,  and  (as 
it  might  feem)  Spontaneous  Motion  .•  The  lefs  Perfect  as 
Oyfters,  Cockcles,  ^Jc,  (if  we  may  number  them  with  Ani- 
mals) move  not  out  of  their  Place,  but  in  it,  by  opening, 
perhaps  at  Fleafure;  whilft  others  Creep,  or  Swim,  or  Fly, 
or  Go,  and  fome  Ufe  differing  Motions.  ^  \. 

§  15.  And  (2.)  As  to  Plants,  they  may  be  gatherUinto 
Kinds,  by  confidering  the  hardnefs  or  foftncfs  of  iheir  Sub-: 
ftance,  as  alfo  the  Form  of  their  Trunk  or  Stalks,  with  their 

3ranch' 


To An  Effay  for  the  Part  I. 

Branc^ing^  leaves^  Flowers,  Fruit,  Root,  (^c :  But  it  weic 
beftofal],  if  their  Virtues,  with  the  feveral  Degrees  of  them» 
were  better  known,  and  made  to  be,  the  Principal  Diftin^ivc 
Chara^ers,  both  of  their  Sorts  and  Kinds. 

§  1 6.  .,(3.'  The  yet  lower  and  lefs  perfeft  Sorts,  (which 
are  Unorganiz''d,  and  are  much  more  Similar)  as  Stones, 
Metals,  0c.  arc  to  be  Abftrat>ed  into  Kinds,  by  omitting 
thofe  Things,  wherein  feveral  Refembling  Sorts  are  found, to 
differ,  and  taking  up  that  wherein  they  Agree,  as  e.  g.  that 
the  feveral  Sorts  of  what,  we  call  Metals,  are  Malleable,  and 
may  be  Melted.     And  now,  in  the  next  place. 

§  17.  (4.J  The  like  Courfe  is  to  be  taken,  for,  the  yet 
more  abftracted  Kinds,  and  fo  \ye  may  proceed  to  ftill  higher 
and  higher  Abftraftions,  till  we  arife  to  thofe  of  the  Funda- 
mental Scale ;  or  might  Afccnd  above  it,  to  Thing  or  Some- 
whar,  were  it  not  that  this  would  ivot  be  VnivoenUy  the 
l^igheft  Kind,  fince  it  agrees  fo  very  Unequally  (as  we  have 
pbferv'dj  to  the  Sorts  or  lower  Kinds  which  are  under 
it. 


C  H  A  P.     X, 

§  kTHUS  I  have  given  fome  Light  towards  the  right 
■■•  forming  of  Abftrai^ed  Natures,  or  Ideas*  namely,  qf 
Individuals,  as  fuch,  and  likewife  of  the  Sons,  Kinds,  and 
higher  Kinds  of  Things,  and  all  but  the  AbftratUon  of  Indi- 
viduals may  be  caird  Univerfals;  fince  the  Idea  of  every, 
Kind,  higher  or  lower,  and  of  every  Sort,  agrees  to  all  the! 
Divifions  and  Subdivifions  under  it  .-  So  that  of  Living 
Creatures  (fuch  as  can  move  Variously  and  Spontaneoufly) 
Agrees  to  the  Humane  Nature,  and  to  every  particular  Man, 
as  alfo  to  the  feveral  Kinds  of  Brutes,  and  to  the  lower  Kinds, 
or  Sorts,  as  they  might  be  diftinguifh'd,  by  the  various  mar^■ 
ner  of  their  Moving,  whether  in  or  out  of  their  Place,  toge- 
iher  with  their  differing  Forms  and  Origin ;  Particularly  to 
the  loweft  Sorts,  which  are,  as  it  were,  fo  many  Clans,  Pro-^ 
pogated  down  from  their  feveral  Heads  at  iirft  Cleared  j 
and  finally,  to  every  Individual,  under  each  of  thefe. 

§  i.  Thus  the  univerfal  Idea  may  be  confidci'd  astoits 
F.xrenlJor^  or  the  Reference  it  has  to  a!l  the  Kin3s,  Sort.*, 
and  individuals  ,  fubje''cd  or  plac'd  under  fuch  general 
H^ad;   but  it  may  be  yet  otherwife  conider'd  inrcfpc't  of 

itV  . 


Chap.  10.  Improvement  of  K^iion,  yi 

its  ComprehenfmJy  or  pf  what  fuch  Idea  contains  in  it,  which 
is  always  left  than  what  is  contain'd  in  the  Adequate  Idea,  of 
any  Kmd  or  Sort  next  under  it,  and  this  again  contains  lefs 
than  the  Idea  of  a  yet  lower  Sort,  as  this  docs  finally  lefs 
than  that  of  an  individual  under  it;  So  that  whilft  the 
Uhiverfal  Idea,  is  call'd  an  Univerfal  Whole,  and  faid  to  be 
divided  into  lower  Kinds  and  Sorts,  and  Individuals,  (tho* 
rather  it  might  be  faid  to  be  divided  iiPto  them,  as  agreeing  to 
each  of  them)  thefe  are  indeed  more  properly  the  Wholes,  and 
the  general  Idea  is  but  an  Abftra^ed  Part,  and  is  accordingly 
nam'd  H  Forrnnl  Part,  of  the  lower  Kind,  or  Sort,  or  Indi- 
vidual, which  is  the  Formal  fVhole. 

§  3.  The  Adequate  Idea  of  an  Individual  contains  in  it, 
(i.)  The  Nature  of  the  higheft  Kind  under  which  it  is,  or 
vthzt  Anfvvers  the  Idea  thereof  in  its  Comprehenfion  j  fo 
jidam  had  the  Nature  of  Subftance,  i.  e.  of  t^^K  Subftance  to 
which  the  general  Idea  of  Subftance  agrees,^  if  we  Ab.ftraft 
fiom  its  being  taken  as  GeneraL  (z.)  All  the  feveral  Na- 
tures of  the  lower  Kinds  or  Softs,  leading  direftly  down  to 
that  Individual ;  as  Adam  had  thofe  of  Body,  of  Living 
Creature,  and  of  Man,  not  indeed  as  General  and  Common, 
but  as  Particular  and  Proper  to  himielf.  And  even  thus  it 
j^ppears,  that  the  Individual  has,  (3.)  The  Individuating 
Niture  and  Charafter,  which  may  be  conGder'd,  either  a$ 
Numerical  only  (as  in  Adam  thu  Subftance,  Body,  Animal, 
Man,  not  nnotber)  or  as  being  alfo  differing  in  one  or  more 
Attributes,  and  (b  even  the  likeit  Twins  muft  be,  as  they 
Were  Born  one  after  the  other  ■  But  there  are  commonly  s 
confiderable  number  of  Accidents,  Modes,  (^c.  which  if  they 
be  not  fingly  and  feverally  differing  from  thofe  of  other  In- 
dividuals, yet  make  up  together  a  differing  Combination. 
(4.  andLaftly)  the  Individual,  as  having  all  the  foremen- 
tioned  Natures,  muft  have  all  the  Logical  Parrs  of  which 
they  are  feverally  made,  vi7{,  their  feveral  Materialities,  arid 
Formalities,  or  what  is  Common,  and  what  is  Peculiar  in 
«iachof  them.  Thus  Lo«<io«-Stone,  hath  what  is  common  to 
both  the  Sorts  of  SuhJI/ince,  together,  with  what  is  Peculiar 
fo  Body;  alfo  what  is  common  to  Bodies,  and  what  is  Peculiar 
to  the  Inanimate  j  what  is  Common  to  Tieje ;  and  what  is  Pe- 
culiar to  Frjjils  •  again  what  is  Common  to  Tref%  and  whar 
is  Pecuhar  to  Stone  ;  farther,  what  is  Common  to  the  Sorts  of 
S'om^  and  what  is  Peculiar  to  thu  Sort  ;  Laltly,  what  is 
Common  to  Stones  0/  thts  Sort,  and  what  is  Peculiar  to  that 
Individual  Stone,  as  to  be  thu,  not  another,  how  like  foevcT 
it  might  be,  to  hold  a  Plac«  which  no  other  Stone  docs,  and 

to 


72  An  Ejfay  for  the  Part  I. 

to  have  fuch  a  Shape,  Size,   Colour,  and  Ornament  about 
it,  as,  probably,  do  not  all  meet  togetlier  any  where  elle. 

§  4.  Now  if  to  a  common  Nature,  or  Idea,  we  add 
thofe. Attributes,  which  make  the  feveral  Subordinate  Pecu- 
liarities or  Differences  j  they  do,  together,  Explain  that  lu- 
ferior  Nature  to  which  they  Lead,  and  in  which  they  Ter- 
minate. So  Subftance,  divifible,  Organized,  Artificial  is 
wkat  we  commonly  mean  by  an  Engine,  or  Artificial  Ma- 
t±ine= 

§  5;  And  whereas  Accidents,  Modes,  ^c.  have  fo  very 
great  a  fhare  in  forming  out  more  diftin<5t  Ideas,  (tho'  they 
are  often  only  nnply'd  in  a  Subftantive,  wliich  is  uS'd  for  the 
comprifal  of  all  the  Superior  abftradied  Natures  and  Cha- 
Jra£fers  j  we  lliall,  a  little,  open  fome  of  the  more  Retnark- 
Hble  Attributes,  which  ferve  to  divide,  or  diftinguilh  the 
Kinds,  and  Conftitutc  or  make  up  the  Sorts,  or  the  Indivi- 
duals; and  whilft  we  find  it  more  Convenient  to  exprefs 
them  in  the  Concrete  (/.  e.  with  the  Connotation  of  a  Subject  j 
it  will  not  be  Difficult,  to  abftraift  the  Attribute,  in  taking 
n  up  alone  by  it  felf,  omitting  the  Intimation  of  any  Subjeft 
to  which  it  belongs.  Thus  Simplicity  is  the  bate  Attribute 
abftradled  from  Simple  ,  which  defignediy  prefents  to  the 
Mind  fome  or  other  Subjedt,  together  with  the  Simplicity^ 
which  gives  it  the  Denomuiation  of  Simple. 

§  6.  The  Attributes  of  Things  might  here  be  confider'd, 
either  as  affeiling  Subftance  it  felf,  and  that  either  immedi- 
ately in  in  felf,  or  mediately  thro'  the  Accidents,  Modes, 
^c.  which  affeft  it,  whether  Internally,  or  Externally  :  Or 
dfe  as  if  they  affected  only  fome  Accident,  Mode,  ^c.  with- 
out any  formed  Confideration  had  of  the  Subjedl,  tho' the 
Abftradl  Notion,  to  which  (as  if  it  were  a  Subftance  or  Be» 
ing  of  it  felf)  weafcribe  this  or  that  farther  Attribute  was 
indeed  Originally  taken  from  fome  or  other  Subftance.  As 
Hurnnns  R^afon,  which  we  are  here  endeavouring  to  Guide 
Right,  and  to  make  m.ore  Ready;  as  alfo  the  Virtues  and 
^7cfj  treated  of  in  Ethicks;  the  Forms,  Relations,  and  ma- 
nagerhent  of  Civil  Government,  in  PoUtid^s;  the  Kinds  and 
Sorts  ef  Natural  Being  in  Phjlcks;  what  belongs  more  gene- 
rally to  Being  or  its  primary  Diftind^ions  in  Metnphyficks  \  the 
Nature  of  Difeafes,  Herbs,-  and  Drugs  in  Medicine;  Num- 
ber, Meafurc,  and  Figure,  m  Mntlxmntickj ;  the  way  of  per- 
forming this  or  that  Operation  in  Mechanical  Arts,  or  other 
like  Occupations  ;  and  whatever  Objedbs  there  may  be  be- 
llies of  ScieTic::  or  Arts,  whether  Learned  or  Vulgar  ;  in  all 
thcfewefbrmtocur  feh-fs  Abftractions,  from  what  is  exifting 


Chap.io.         Improvement  of  ^t2,{ox).  y^ 

in  fome  or  other  Being,  and  having  ^o  done,  we  confider  and' 
treat  of  them,  as  if  they  were  diftind:  Beings  of  thcmfcives: 
But  the  Dilcourfing  of  thefe  and  the  like  Abftradlions  be- 
longs to  the  feveral  Difciplines,  which  have  them  for  their 
Objcdls  or  Subjeds. 

§  7.  What  I  fhall  farther  do,  as  to  the  Attributes  of 
Things,  is  only  to  fpeak  very  briefly  of  fome  other  obfen  a- 
ble  Abftradions,  as  they  may  ftand  connedled  with  each 
other,  and  fome  of  them  leading  on  to  others.  What  feems 
firft  and  moft  inwardly  to  affeft  Subftance  and  other  Subjet^s 
of  Tho't,  are  the  abitrafted  Accidents  of  Simplicity  or  Compo- 
fition  with  the  various  Modes  thereof,  which  may  be  feen 
(at  leaft  fome  of  them)  under  the  Head  of  Combinations.' 
That  there  is  a  fort  of  Subftance  compovmded  of  Parts,  and 
Particles  we  well  know,  and  may  Reafonably,  or  indeed 
muft,  believe,  there  alfo  is  Simple  and  uncompounded  Sub- 
ftance ;  this  we  call  Spirit,  the  other  Body :  This  therefore 
is  perpetually  Divifilfle  at  leaft  in  Conception,  that  altbge* 
ther  Indivifible^  or  Indifcerpible. 

§  8.  Infinite,  or  Fi?jite,  belong  to  Being  and  Attributes  ;' 
the  latter  Imports  a  non-ultra,  or  Bounds,  the  other,  that 
there  is  ftill  fome  what  end  lefty  farther. 

§  9.  A'ciivity  and  PaJJihility,  are  alfo  diftindliveCharafters; 
the  firft  belonging  to  fome  Creatures^  the  latter  to  all,  and 
to  them  only,  for  the  Creator  cannot  be  any  ways  alter'd  by 
any  Creature  or  by  himfelf ;  whenas  the  moft  AfUve  Crea- 
tures come  Paffively  into  Being  with  their  various  Abilities 
for  Moving,  or  otherwife  Afting,  and  Capacities  for  being 
mov'd  or  otherwife  alter'd. 

§10.  Thefe  are  call'd  Aclive  find  Pa/Jive  Porpen,  both 
which  Cwe  conceive)  belong  to  Firtite  Spirits,  which  are 
afelcto  move  themfelves  and  fome  other  Beings,  and  are  alfo 
capable  ot  being  mov'd  by  fome  more  Powerful  Agent,  for 
they  may  furely  be  conftrain'd  or  drawn  to  quit  their  Place, 
as  alfo  ro  Perceive^  Confider,  Remember,  &s.  and  can  like- 
wife  freely  fet  themfelves  fo  to  do.  But  Body  feems  only  to 
have  a  Pa  [five  PovDrr  or  Capacity,  tho'  often  faid  to  move  fom6 
Thing  elfe  ;  and  'tis  true,  other  Things  may  be  mov'd  by 
means  of  a  Body  thruft  upon  them,  of  drawn  with  them,  if 
it  be  faltned  ro  them. 

§  II.  Much  of  what  we  conceive  in  External  Sehfiblfi 
Obje'^^s,  or  internal  Ideas  odjcfted  to  our  Minds,  as  a  Power 
offoAffeOing  us,  is  really  nothing  but  aCapacityof  Firnefs^ 
io  be  foTerceiv'd,  Imagui'd,  Remembred,  Conceived,  or 
Confider'd  by  usj  when  oux  Minds  are,  or  h^ve  been  excited 

Q  x4 


74 ^'^  ^If^y  F^  ^^^^ Part  i. 

to  attend  thereto,  by  foir.e  Motion  of  the  Exterior  Organ, 
together  with  the  Spirits,  Nerves  and  Brain,  by  means  of 
the  SenfibJeObje<^,  or  fomewhat  proceeding  from  it. 

§  12.  What  pjfTesin  us,  which  we  con fcioully  know,  or 
may  reafonably  conclude,  is  not  to  be  conceiv'd  as  an  At- 
tribute of  the  Senfible  Objeft,  but  of  our  own  Bodies  and 
Minds;  and  fuch  things  are  indeed  Affe^ions  and  Anions 
belonging  to  our  Natural  Capacities,  and  Abilities,  but  we 
can  by  no  means  Diftinf^ly  or  Intelligibly  dcfcribe  them, 
to  one  that  hath  known  nothing  of  them,  nor  any  Thing 
like  them. 

§  13.  As  to  what  there  may  be  diftindl  from  us,  which  is 
the  Caufe  or  Occafion  of  the  Aftedlion  or  Adtion  within,  it 
may  be  either,  (i-)  The  Ai^Uve  Power,  or  Effertive  Will  of 
God,  which  can  fo  Aflfett  us,  and  put  us  on  fo  a'^Mng  when 
he  pleafes,  citlier  by  himfclf  immediately,  or  by  fecond 
Caufes,  and  fometimcs,  perhaps,  it  may  be.  (z.)  The 
Agency  of  lome  created  Spirit,  which,  by  God's  Commif- 
fion,  or  Permiilion,  may  move  our  Spirits,  aftett  the  Brain, 
and  excite  the  Mind  to  attend,  and  may  alfo  prefcnt  certain 
Appearances  inwardly  to  the  Imagination,  or  outwardly  to 
the  Eye,  Ear,  (^c,  and  thereby  to  the  Mind ;  or,  (3.)  Senli'- 
blcObjefis  themfelves,  having  a  Natural  Capacity  and  Fit- 
nefs  to  be  fo  variouily  perceiv'd  by  us,  cither  by  reafon  of 
fome  diiference  to  us  mcxplicable  in  the  matter  of  their  fmal- 
leftjParticles ;  or  if  (as  it  is  more  generally  tho'c  by  the  Learned) 
allMatter  be  Fundamentally  and  in  it  felf  alike,  the  occafion 
of  our  being  fo  variouily  Affefted  with  it  m.uft  then  be  either 
fome  Prefence  and  Power  of  a  Spirit  attending  it,  or  (whifth 
we  take  to  be  the  Truthj  only  the  various  Shape  and  Size 
of  the  Objc*^,  and  of  its  Compounding  Patts  and  Particles  ; 
the  various  ways  of  their  Being  put  together  (as  in  Water^ 
Metals,  Stones,  Flefli,  &c.)  •  their  various  Motion  or  Reft 
(as  in  Water,  or  a  piece  of  Ice),  together  with  the  various 
AccelTion  or  other  Contingencies  which  may  happen  inward- 
ly amongd  the  Fartitles,  or  outwardly  to  the  Surface  of  the 
Seiifibie  Body.      "•  :  ; 

§  14.  And  here  there  are,  (i.)  The  various  Effef^s  of 
Li^ht  Rcfiaftcd  and  Refle.*^ed  from  the?  Objei^.  (2.)  The 
Vibrations,  or  Undulations  of  the  moved  Air,  or  the  Repe- 
ti^tion  (as  fome  will-bave  it)  of  Cracks  and  Pulfes  therein, 
by.reafm  of  a  tremulous  Motion  in  the  Sonorous  Body. 
(i.)  Subtile  and  Spirituous  Particles  omitted,  or  rather  fcr^ld 
out  by  the  Moved  Air,  or  Wind  from  Odoriferous  Bodies. 
(4.)  The  Separation  of  Saline  Particles  by  the  Tongue  from 

Bodies. 


Chap.  II.        Improvement  of  ^tziau.  75 

Bodies,  that  have  Savour  or  Relilh.  ^5  )  The  Occafion  of 
our  Feehng  may  be  either  fome  Parts  or  Particles  in  our 
own  Bodies  uncommonly  Mov'dj  or  ocherwife  art'ected,  as 
in  the  fenfible  Pleafure  or  Pain,  which  proceeds  not  from 
without;  orelfe  the  various  Application  of  our  Hodies,  to 
the  grofs  Subftance  of  the  Tangible  Objert,  or  cf  that  to  ouf 
Body,  as  in  Touching,  Prelling,  Grafping,  Bearing,  'ds. 
on  the  one  Hand,  or  in  Piercing,  Cutting,  (^:,  on  the  other. 
We  have  here  exprefs'd  the  more  immediate  Ca.  acity,  and 
intimated  the  more  Remote,  by  virtue  of  which,  Senlible 
Bodies  are  capable  of  being  fo  or  foperceiv'd. 


§ 


CHAP.    XI, 

I.  THE  Senfible  Qualities  in  Objeds,  or  appertaining 
-■■  to  them,  are  certainly  the  fame  in  themfeJves  ; 
and  yet  they  do  not  afFeA  all  Men  alike  (or  even  the  fame 
Man  at  all  Times)  by  reafon  of  the  various  Difpolition  of 
Body  and  Mind  :  Yet  the  greater  part  are  commonly  fa 
far  alike  as  generally  to  have  like  Pcrcept'ons  of  fenfible 
Things,  fo  far  as  they  can  be  compar'd  ;  and  we  mutt  there- 
fore account  ours  to  be  Right,  when  they  fall  in  with  the 
generality  of  fuch  Perfons,  as  appear  to  be  in  good  Health,' 
and  of  found  Undcrltanding  ;  tho'  perhaps  we  cannot  be  ab- 
folutely  Sure,  that  others  mean  exa^^ly  the  fame  InternaJ 
Perceptions,    as  we  do  by  tVoke,   Sw^et^  Smooth,  &s. 

§  2.  And  we  can  lefs  certainly  Judge,  what  are  the  very- 
Attributes  in  Things  themfelves,  or  about  them,  wherewith 
others,  or  we  our  feJves,  arc  fo  aflfed:ed ;  tho'  'tis  highly,. 
Probable,  they  may  be  Reduc'd  to  fome  or  other  of  the 
foremention'd  Heads  ;  but  it  is  left  to  Natural  Philofophy 
to  fearch  out,  and  Determine  more  Particularly  ,  whac 
Contexture  of  fenfible  Bodies  themfelves,  or  what  Acceffion 
or  Contingency  about  them,  may  be  the  Caufe  or  Occafion 
of  this  or  that  Effed  in  us,  which  may  be  faid  in  fome  fort, 
to  belong  to  the  fenfible  Objeiis,  as  it  is  depending  od 
them,   tho'  not  exifting  formally  in  them, 

§  3.    But  there  are  certainly  belonging  to  Matter  or  Bo" 
dy  fuch  as  the  following  Attributes,  viz,    ^  i .)  Extenfion^  or 
a  fortof  Qiiantity  which  has  its  parts  continued  or  conjoin'd,'; 
and  permanent  or  exilting  together  at  once  ;    and  whereby 
that  Vv'hich  is  cvreijded,    has  one  Part  without  or  beyond 

G  2  anochera 


76  An  tjjay  for  the  Part  I- 

another,  foas  to  reach  farther  than  a  Point :  It  is  commonly 
caji'd  Magnitude,  and  account  is  ufually  taken  of  it  by  a 
deternninate  Meafure  drawn  from  fomewhat  in  Nature  as  a 
Foot,  a  Pnhn,  or  Hand,  ^s.  Now  if  the  Extcnfion  be  con- 
fider'd,  as  reaching  only  length-ways,  'tis  Ljneal  or  a  Line, 
and  that  either  Jlraight,   as  proceeding  ftill  directly  onward 

bytheftrajghteftway  from  the  firft  Point  to  the  laft  zsa b 

or  Curve  as  Declining  continually  from,  or  drawing  towards 
that  neareft  way,  zsc  ^d,  (f^/,  or  mix'd,  which  part-- 
ly  keeps  in  that  way,  partly  goes  oil  it  as  the  Hyperbolical 
Line  /•^Z',  the  hooked  Line  i-O^.  8cs.  If  the  Exten- 
fion  be  confider'd  as  reaching,  not  only  length-ways,  but 
breadth-ways  too  i.  c.  tranfverfe,  or  fideways  from  the 
Length,  'tis  then  Superficial,  or  a  Surface,  which  is  either 
Plain  and  Flat,  Convex  and  Swelling  towards  us,  Concave 
and  Sinking  from  us,  or  Compounded,  v/hether  of  two,  or 
of  all  the  three  Sorts  ;  But  when  the  Exrenfion  is  confider'd, 
as  running  out  tranfverfe  or  fideways  from  the  Surface,  it 
is  that  of  Body,  or  of  Space  at  leaft,  confider'd  as  reaching 
fo  far  in  Length,  fo  far  in  Breadth,  and  fo  far  alfo  at  the  fame 
time  in  Height,  or  Depth,  or  Thicknels,  according  as  the 
third  Dimenfion  may  be  fomewhat  diverfely  obferv'd,  as 
from  this  fide  to  that,  from  the  Bottom  to  the  Top,  or  from 
the  Top  to  the  Bottom  :     Hither  may  be  refer'd, 

§  4.  (2.)  Solidity^  where  the  matter  of  the  Body  it  felf 
reaches  thro'  the  Space,  which  contains  it,  or  that  the  Pores 
and  Hollowb  are  however  lefs  obfcrvablej  Concavity  where 
it  is  otherwife,  as  in  a  Bottle,  Drinking-Glafs,  &s.  and 
which  are  near  a  Kin  to  Solidity  and  Concavity.  C3.)  Ful- 
t>efs,  where  there  is  fome  fenfible  Matter  filling  up  the 
Space;  and  Vacuity,  where  there  is  none,  or  what  is  not 
fo  obfervable. 

§  5.  (4.J  Figure,  which  is  Magnitude  fo  or  fo  termina- 
ted and  bounded ;  and  it  is  either  Superficial,  as  in  Trian- 
gles, Squares,  Gs'c,  or  Solid,  as  in  Cubes,  Globes,  &j. 
Now  Meafure  and  Figure  may  he  confider'd,  either  as  to  an 
intire  Body,  or  as  to  its  groiler  Parts,  or  finer  Particles,  and 
in  refpeft  of  thefe,  there  is  alfo  belonging  to  Body, 

(5./  The  way  and  manner  of  Compofition  and  Contex- 
ture, whether  by  Ci>7Z/"jgj./.'y,  as  in  Water,  or  Conti/iuity,  which 
maybe  cither  more  or  Jet  firm,  with  a  tougher  or  more  brittle 
Texture,  without  or  with  Pores,  and  thefe  more  or  fewer, 
uniform  or  differing,  greater  or  lefs,  Cc. 


6.  Pofitlon, 


Chap  II.         Improvcj/jcnt  of  ^^di{ov\.  j^ 

6.  Pofirion,  either  of  rhc  whole  Body  in  refpedl  of  Ibmc* 
thing  elfe ;  as  Eaftward,  Oppofire,  Sideways,  ©'c  >  or  of 
the  Pans  among  themfelves,  as  in  Sitting,  Standing,  CS^c,  or 
of  the  Particles  towards  each  other. 

§  6.  We  have  before  obferv'd,  that  there  are  Abilities 
or  Ai"ive  Powers  belonging  to  Finite  Spirits.  Our  Minds, 
"with  which  we  are  better  acquainted,  than  with  other  Spi- 
rits, have  not  only  the  Cnpncity  of  being  niov'd  and  Affedtcd 
'"by  means  of  the  Body,  but  alfo  the  Ability,  or  Adive  Power 
of  Moving  and  Aife^Hng;  as  alfo  of  defigned  Thinking, 
Enquiring,  Forming,  and  Objecting  Ideas  to  itfelf,  and  Re- 
fledhng  thereon,  Acquitting  or  Condemning  our  Selves, 
Turning  from  this  Obje£l  to  that,  committing  to  Memory 
by  repeated  Tho't,  or  otherways,  and  calling  more  diftindlly 
to  Remembrance,  what  we  do  in  part  Remember,  Acquief- 
cing  in  what  is  Evident,  Qiieftioning  the  Truth  or  Goodnefs 
of  Things,  and  fufpending  its  Aflent  orConfent,  Confider- 
ing,  and  Concluding,  Choofing,  Refufing,  and  Refolving; 
Exciting,  Moderating  or  Suppreffing  the  various  Affedions 
or  PafTions  of  Complacency  and  Dillike,  Defire  and  Avcrfa- 
tion,  Hope  and  Fear,  which  may  arife  into  Alfurance  and 
Difpair,  as  has  been  obferv'd.  Now  thefe  feveral  Powers  of 
our  Souls  may  be  confider'd  as  fo  many  Accidents  with  their 
various  diftinguilhing  Modes,  and  their  feveral  Exercifes. 

§  7.  By  way  of  Participation,  the  Body  alfo  may  be  faid 
to  have  certain  Powers  ;  amongft  which,  that  oi  Propaga- 
tion is  moft  confidcrable,  depending  upon  a  differing  Make  of 
Body  in  Male  and  Female,  and  feems  to  be  ordinarily  atten- 
ded with  fomewhatof  a  differing  Temperament  and  Genius  ; 
there  is  alfo  the  Power  of  Speaking,  Singing,  Wriring,  ^s; 
Tho',  ftri<Sly  fpeaking,  the  Bodily  Organs  and  Parts,  have 
only  the  Paflive  Power  or  Capacity  of  being  fo  us'd,  whether 
by  fome  Agent  without  us,  or  by  the  Soul  within. 

§  8.  And  whereas  in  this  latter  Refpeft,  fome  of  the  Ca- 
pacities here  mention'd,  are  fomeways  Improvable,  there 
arc  therefore  Bodily  Hnhits^  as  of  Speaking  diftinftly  and 
readily.  Singing  Tunably,  Writing  Fairly  or  Swiftly,  Mov- 
ing Gracefully,  Working  Artfully,  (Sjs:  And  there  are  yet 
niore  confidcrable  Habits,  ImellcHual  and  Mor^l,  belonging 
more  direftly  to  thofe  Powers  of  the  Soul,  v^hich  are  capa- 
ble of  Advance,  in  their  becoming  more  Perfed;,  Eafic,  or 
Ready;  as  e.gr.  to  the  Apprehenfion,  Invention,  Memory, 
Judgment,  Confcience,  and  Choice,  to  the  three  iaf^  of 
which,  do  chiefly  belong  the  Habits  of  Virtue  and  Vice. 

G  5  §  9.  And 


7^  An  Effay  for  the  Partly 

§  cj.  And  as  the  Powers  in  themfelves  may  be  more  or 
lefs  Perfect,  fo  likewife  the  Habits  have  their  Vurious  De- 
grees, as  well  as  differing  Originals,  for  they  may  be  either 
^ivcn  more  immediately  by  God,  iii  our  Creation,  at  our 
fBirth,  or  Afterwards;  or  elfc  be  acquir'd  (fome  of  them  at 
Jeaft)  by  our  ufing proper  Exercife,  and  other  Means:  The 
Tendency  towards  a  fixed  and  confirmed  Habit  may  be  call'd 
a  Difpofition. 

§  lo.  There  are  farther  belonging  to  Spirits,  as  well  as 
Bodies  Vbiety,  or  Place,  whether  Aclunl  where  they  are, 
which  is  either  Indefinite  as  fomewhere,  or  determin'd  by  re- 
ference to  fome  what  before  known,  or  now  declared,  as 
Here,  There,  Ke^.r,  Far  ojf,  tit  Tor l^,  &s  i  Or  elle  Potetitial 
•Noting  the  Term,  whither  they  tend,  or  whence  they  are,  as 
Hence,  'Thence,  to  Tork^^  from  Toi\,  8cs. 

§11.  There  is  alfo  belonging  to  created  Spirits  and  Bo- 
dies Ti'w,  i.e.  either  the  time  l4oien,  which  has  relation 
to  fome  Point  of  Time  before  known,  or  now  declar'd  •■,  oi 
Hovo  lon^,  which  Notes  Duration,  and  refers  to  fome  known 
Meafure  of  lime,  moft  commonly  to  fome  certain  and  equa- 
ble Motion,  as  of  a  Clock,  Waich,  or  the  Heavenly  Bodies, 
or  of  the  Earth,  and  this  is  caU'd  contiitucd  flowing  Quantity^ 
as  Magnitude  is  calfd  Permmen\ 

§  12.  There  is  alfo  Number,  for  Angels  and  Souls  may 
be  counted  as  well  as  Bodies,  and  this  is  call'd  Di fir cie  Q}izn- 
tity,  as  being  made  up  of  unconnected  Parts,  which  here  are 
Unites,  but  even  One  it  lelf  may  be  confidcr'd  as  a  Num- 
ber, anfwering  to  the  Queftion,  hovp  many,  as  Really  as  one. 
•  Thoufand.  Number  may  be  faid  to  be  Potentially  Infinite,  as 
being  Ir.finirely  Increalible,  but  for  that  very  Reafon,  a 
Number  cannot  be  given  which  is  adtually  Infinite,  fince  it 
will  alv/ays  admit  of  an  Addition  forward,  as  well  as  Dimi- 
n'Jtion  backward  from  one  to  ^  -|,  &c.  It  inay  be  Noted, 
that  in  whole  Numbers  and  Fractions,  th^  Unites  are  of 
differing  Natui;es  and  Value  from  each  other. 

§  1:5.  Thereis,  yet  farther,  H,j/?/>,  or  ,if  Imay  fo  fpeak) 
Habition,  which  is  or  may  be  us'd  to  denote  only  the  Rela- 
tive Denomination  of  Polfefling,  being  invefted  with,  or 
ochcrwife  having  this  or  that  Subftance,  and  is  exprefs'd  by 
the  Exrrinfecal  Denomination,  which  arifes  thence,  as  being 
Cloth'd,  Cover'd,  Guilded,  ^c.  and  even  an  Angel  nuay  be 
faid  to  be  Habited,  fuppofe  with  an  Aery  Vehicle.,  or  to 
be  Hous'd,  as  really  as  a  Man  .•  And  the  Soiil  to  :be  Embo- 
died, as  well  as  the  Body  Animated,  Finally,  Loe't^l  Moficv, 
er  the  affeit  of  being  mov'd  /«  or  fiom  the  Place  where  the 
:         /  Body, 


Chap.  12.  J/^/provement  of  Kealcn.  79 

Body,   or  Finite  Spirit  is,  Upward,   Downward,    Hither, 
Thither,  ^s. 


CHAP.    XII. 

§  I,  \1/E  are  next  to  confider,  IV,  This  or  that  ^^Intlon 
"  ofwhatever  farther  Degree, /.e.  what  is  refer'd,  and 
the  manner  of  Reference.  Now  the  Subjeft  of  a  Relation 
may  be  any  Thing  whatfoever,  under  any  of  the  foregoing 
or  following  Heads;  for  every  Thing  may  be  refer'd  to 
ievery  Thing  befides,  and  even  to  it  fcif,  as  otherwife  con- 
fider'd. 

§  2.  As  to  the  ways  of  Reference,  they  arc  raftly  Nii- 
merotis,  and  in  feme  fort  Infinite,  fince  every  Particular  Be- 
ing and  part  of  ir,  every  Sort,  every  Kind,  and  every  far- 
ther Kind,  in  refpectof  every  Thing  in  them,  or  any  ways 
belonging  to  them,  raay  bs  refer'd  feverally  and  jointly  to 
every  other  Particular  Being  or  Part  of  it,  to  every  Sort, 
Kind,  farther  Kind,  and  even  to  themfelves,  and  that  in 
refpedl  of  every  Thing  in  them,  or  any  ways  belonging  to 
them,  feverally  and  jointly.  All  we  can  here  Undertake,  is 
jirjl  to  obfcrve  fomewhat  of  Relation  or  Relative  Denomi- 
nation in  General,  and  then  of  the  Kinds  to  which  all  or  mdft 
of  them  may  be  reduc'd. 

§  3.  I{elittion  (fuppofeof  Like,  Unlike,  Equal,  Friend, 
Foe,  Mafter,  Servant,  (3s.)  is  not  any  Thing  formally  ex- 
ifting  in  the  Subje^^  or  B^lative^  which  is  refer'd  to  the  Ter- 
minus,  or  Correlate ;  yet  it  is  virtually  there,  in  theSubftance, 
Accident,  Mode,  &c,  which  is  the  Ground,  Foundation  or 
Reafon  upon  which  it  may  be  refer'd  to  this  or  that,  under 
fuch  Confideration  and  Relative  Denomination,  as  Like,  or 
Unlike,  Equal,  &c.  All  there  is  of  thefeinthe  Subjedt,  is 
only  a  Capcity  and  Eitnefs,  whether  Immediate  or  Remote, 
for  irs  behig  fo  or  fo  Con»'ider'd  and  Denominated,  upon 
comparing  it  with,  or  refering  it  to  this  or  that. 

§  4.  Relation  is  therefore  a  kind  of  a  Potential  or  Vir- 
tual Mode,  which  the  Mind  reprefents  to  izMf,  asific 
wereadually  in  the  Subjcdl;  whenas  there  is  only,  as  we 
have  faid,  a  Capacity  or  iitnefs  for  its  being  fo  conlider'd; 
which  is  no  other  than  fomewhat,  which  either  goes  to  con- 
ftitute  the  Subject,  or  is  fome  farther  AccefTionto  it;  and 
whilil  it  is,  in  its  felf,  but  one  and  the  fame,  yet  may  afford 

G  4  Ground 


8o  An  tjfay  for  the  Part  I . 

Groundfor  many  very  differing,  and  even  contrary  Confide" 
rations  and  Denominations ;  as  of  Equal  to  this,  Unequal 
to  that,  Like,  Unlike,  ^c.  We  muft  therefore,  by  no 
means,  Imagine  that  the  R^clative  has  any  Diminution,  Ad- 
dirion,  or  Alteration  at  all  upon  its  being  conceiv'd  as  Lefs 
or  Greater,  Like  or  Unlike,  Father,  Mafter,  Son,  or  Ser- 
vant, &c;.  but  that  the  Subjed  of  fuch  Relations  may  be  in 
its  felf  3 Lift  the  fame  as  before. 

§  5.  And  yet  Relation,  how  little  foever  there  may  feem  to 
be  in  it  (if  any  thing  at  all  of  Phyfical  Entity  j  is  no  doubt  a 
Subjeftof  Tho't,  and  that  not  of  the  loweft,  but  often  of  the 
Jiighelt  Confiderarion  and  Ufa  for  diredling  our  Eflimate 
and  Carriage.    Thus  God's  being  related  t©  us  as  our  Crea- 
tor, tho'  it  no  ways  alters  him,    yet  is  of  mighty  Confe- 
quence  for  the  Direfting  and  Engaging  a  fit  Behaviour  to- 
tvardshim.    Oi^r  Duty  to  God  and  Man,  together  with  the 
value  and  ufe  of  Things,  do's  mightily  depend  upon  Relati- 
on, and  that  even  whilft  the  Relation  it  felf,  does  often  de- 
pend upon  fomexvhat  Tranfient,    and  that  perhaps  adlualiy 
pall,  as  upon  AAion  in  the  Efficient  Caufe,    and  Paffion  in 
the  Efftdb,   where  the  Relation  abides  whilft  the  Relative 
and  its  Correlate  continue,   tho'  the  Ground  of  it  be  not 
now  otherwife  in  Being,  than  as  itisTho'tof  and  Confider'd. 
§  6.     The  Subjert,  or  what  is  refer'd,  under  its  Chara£ler 
tii  refcr^d^  is  the  Relative  ;  The  Term,  or  that  to  which  the 
Reference  is  made,    under  the  CharaOer  in  refpeft  whereof 
the  Reference  is  made  to  it,  is  the  Correlate.    Thofe  Cha- 
la^'^ers  on  each  hand,  imply  the  Ground  and  Reafon  of  their 
being  fo  refer'd,    or  referable,  that  to  this,  and  this  again  to 
that.     When  we  confider  AlcxnnAcr  the  Great,  as  the  Son  of 
Philips    Alexander  is  the  Snbjeft  of  the  Relation,  imply 'd  to- 
gether with  its  Ground    by  CSonI,  which  intimates  his  ha- 
ving been  begotten  by  Philip,  and  imports  the  Son-floip  there- 
in founded  ;   and  whereas   Philip  is  referable  back  again  to 
/llexander^   under  the  Chara£ter  of  [Father]  this  Intimates 
his  having  begotten  Alexander,   and  together  with  that  the 
Fnternity  therein  founded. 

§  7.  Relations  n^ay  be  only  \mplicite^  vi:{.  fueh  as  ar^ 
lefs  diredly  attended  to,  whilft  the  Things  themfelves  to 
xvhichthey  belong  arc  more  diredkly  and  chiefly  obfcrv'd ;  as 
in  this  or  that  Subftance,  Accident,  Mode,  ijc  'tis  the  Ab- 
folutc.  Thing  we  principally  mean,  when  yet  there  is  a  Rela- 
tion imply'd  together  with  it,  by  the  very  Nature  of  the 
Thing,  or  at  leaft  in  our  manner  of  Conceiving  it,  for  where- 
as, we  cannot  enter  far  (if  at  ail)  into  the  abfolaie  Eflcnce  of 

Things, 


Chap.  12.         improvement  of  Kealon.  8i 

Things,    we  fupply  that  Deficiency,   as  we  can,  by  confid^>- 
ing  them  in  a  way  of  Reference  to  fomewhat  elfe. 

§  8.  Thefe  implicite  Relatives  feem  to  be  defigfi'd  in 
what  Logicians  call  I{elatn  feciindmn  did,  ij.  d.  Relatives, 
that  may  be  fo  call'd ;  but  it  feems,  that  there-is  foinewhat 
more  in  the  Cafe,  and  that  they  muft,  or  (hould  be  fo  call'd, 
if  we  look  into  rhem,  fince  forinflance,  the  Nature  of  Finite 
Subftance,  Accident,  ^c.  implies  a  Relation,  which  is,  per- 
haps lefs  attended  to :  And  in  all  Attributions  there  is  in- 
volv'd  a  Reference  to  fome  Subjed,  to  which  they  belong ; 
tho'  it  may  be  obfciir'd  with  an  abfolute  Name  :  Thi^s 
Wifdom,  Power,  Goodnefs,  ^c.  as  well  as  Wife,  Powerful^ 
Good,  G?f.  imply  fome  fit  Subjeft  to  which  they  belong,  and 
alfo  proper  Objedls  which  they  Rcfpedl :  Combinations, 
Separations,  Abftraftions,  ExprefTions,  do  alfo  imply  a  Re- 
ference to  thelhings  which  are  Combined,  ^c. 

§  9.  But  befides  thefe,  there  are  more  explicite  Relations, 
.wherein  the  Reference  and  refpeft  of  Things  is  more  dire^ly 
and  chiefly  attended  to,  whilft  the  Things  to  which  they 
belong,  are  but  indireftly  and  lefs  Principally  regarded. 
And  thefe  are  either  of  a  more  Peculinr,  or  Common  Nature, 
By  Peculiar  J  I  intend  Perfonal  Relations,  which  alfo  are  of 
two  Sorts  5  fox  there  are  fome,  which  we  may  call  Similar^ 
when  the  Relation  is  mutually  alike  on  both  fides,  tho'  per- 
haps not  exad>ly,  as  betwixt  Friend  and  Friend,  Enemy  and 
Enemy;  and  here,  tho*  the  Ground  of  Reference,  and  the 
Reference  it  felf  be  alike,  and  have  the  fame  Denomination, 
yet  it  is  not  the  felf  fame.  Thus  Friend-fhip  (the  Abjim^ed 
Relation  J,  and,  its  Concrete,  Friends  (/.  e.  Perfons,  toge- 
ther with  the  Abftraft  Relation^  are  founded  in  Special  and 
Mutual  Intimacy,  Affe^ion ,  and  Truft-,  Neighbours,  in 
Nearnefs  of  Habitation;  Strangers  in  Non-acquainrance ; 
Enemies  in  Mutual  DifafFeftion  i  Contemporaries  in  theit 
being  of  the  fame  Age,  or  Time  •,  Fellow  Students  in  purfu- 
iiig  like  Studies  together  ;  Bretluren  and  Sifters  in  being 
Sprung  of  the  fame  Parents,  G?j. 

§  10.  There  are  other  Perfonal  Relations,  which  we  may 
call  DiJ]]miUr,  where  the  Foundation  is  differing  on  each 
Hand,  and  confequencly  the  Relation  from  the  one  to  the 
Other,  e.^.  that  of  Crentour  2ind  Crer.ture,  founded  in  Abfo- 
lute making  on  one  fide,  and  being  fo  made  on  the  other  ; 
t  arents  and  Children ,  in  the  Natural  producing  ar.d 
being  fo  Produc'd ;  here  the  Relations  are  founded,  as  in  ma- 
ny other  Cafes,  in  Tranfient  Action  and  Paffion,  which  (as 
we  obferv'd)  is  a<^uaUy  over,  when  yet  the  Relation  con- 
tinues : 


82  An  Effay  for  the  Hart  I. 

tinues  ^  That  of  Sovereign  and  Subject,  Teacher  and  Learner, 
Mrfier  and  Servant,  &s,  are  founded  in  Confenc,  and  Obli- 
gation to  the  various  Duties  on  either  fide,  only  the  Confen": 
is  not  always  that  of  the  Perfon  for  himfelf,  but  may  be  by 
fuch,  as  have  Right  to  Tranra£l  for  another,  vi'hether  by /?» 
Appointment,  or  that  of  fome  Superior  Authority. 

§11.  There  are  alfo  Cowwow  Relations;  which  may  re- 
fer either  Perfons  or  Things  to  each  other.  And  we  may  here 
confider,  firft  of  all,  Identity  and  D:ve,fi:y  5  Identity,  or  the 
fayne  (which  is  the  Identity  with  its  Sub jeO  is  when  that 
which  is  one  Thing  in  it  felf  (  at  leail  in  the  Main)  is  under 
differing  Circumftances,  or  Attributes  refer'd  to  it  felf,  and 
confider'd  as  being  (^  nowithftanding  fuch  difference)  the 
fame,  or  felf-fame,  not  another.  As  Peter,  in  Age,  is  the 
fame  Perfon,  vv'ho  was  fometime  Young;  London-Jhne^  the 
fame  now  in  the  Street,  as  it  was  before  in  the  Quarry.  Things 
which  we  call  the  fame,  as  agreeing  in  their  Kind,  or  Sort, 
■or  in  fome  other  Refpei^s  are  rather  to  be  confider'd  as  Like  ; 
and  tjio'  they  (hould  Refemble  each  other,  not  only  in  all 
that  is  Effential,  but  alfo  in  what  is  Accidental  (as  two  or 
more  Guineys  may  do)  yet  they  are  not  to  be  accounted  pro- 
perly the  fame,  but  divers  and  D;j^I'r/w^  1  as  Logicians  fpeak) 
Vw  Number,  fince  they  may  be  counted  fo  many  (vj^.  two  or 
more;  as  well  as  if  they  were  unlike,  whether  in  refpeil  of 
various  Accidentakonly,  or  alfo  of  Ellentials.  •-■.•■>• 

§  12.  There  is  a  fort  of  Div-<fity  belonging  e^  en  to  Iden- 
tity ;  for  the  Confidcrations  and  Formahties  are  divcrfe  from 
each  other  in  refpeJ^  of  which,  the  fame  Perfon  or  Thing  is 
compar'd  with  it  ^clL  Peter^  ds  a  Child  is  not  the  fame  with 
Peter  ai  r.  Mnv,  but  divcrfe  and  ditfering  from  him.  But 
there  is  a  greater  diverficy  of  Perfons  and  Things  (as  we  have 
intiffiatcd)  which  only  refemble  one  another,  how  great  fo- 
€ver  thcRefcmblancebe,  finceltheoneofthemis  not  the  other. 
§  13.  The  rjientjoned  forts  of  Diver fity  might  be  ac- 
counted the  lowe{t  Degrees  of  Oppofition ;  fince  even  the  dif- 
fering Confidcrations  and  Formalities  belonging  to  the  fame 
Subjcrt  do  not  agree  to  it  at  the  fame  Time,  or  however, 
TTOt  in  the  fame.Refpeft :  And  thofe  may  be  calfd  oppofites, 
■whereof  the  one  is  not  the  other  »  nor  can  they  agree  to  the 
fame  Subje^  at  the  fame  time  in  the  fame  Refpeft  and  man- 
ner, but  Logicians  commonly  reckon  only  the  following 
fort?  of  Oppofites,  (t.)  Relatives,  viz.  Such  as  are  more  di- 
le-^  ancl  cxplicite. '  And  here  even  Like  is  oppos'd  to  its  Like, 
and  Friend  to  his  Friend,  as  well  as  Diiiimilar  Relatives, 
■fuch  as  Prince  to  his  People,  Lcfs  to  Greater,  &jc. ,  (2.)  DiJ- 

farates^ 


Chap.  12.  Improvement  of  Realon.  83 

par/ttes,  where  one  is  equally  and  in  the  fame  manner  op- 
pos'd  to  divcrfe,  as  a  Man  to  an  Horfe,  Lion,  8cc.  3.  Con- 
traries^  where  only  one  Affirmative  attribute  is  oppus'd  to 
another;  and  thcfc  are  diametrically  oppofitf,  as  being  the 
raoft  remote  Sorts  under  the  Tame  Kind  :  Some  of  which 
have  one  or  more  middle  Attributes  betwixt  them,  fait.iki7ig 
of  both  Extremes,  as  Hot  and  Cold,  have  Lukewarm ;  Black 
and  White,  have  Green,  Yellow,  &c.  Butfome  admit  of  no 
fuch  Mean,  as  Odd  and  even  Numbers.  4.  Privative  and 
Po/i^rz;e  affeflions,  as  Blindnefs  is  opposed  to  Sight  j  and  here 
as  in  diverfe  of  the  foregoing  Oppofitions,  there  may  be  a* 
Medium  of  Negation^  Or  what. is  not  reducible  to  either  Ex- 
treme, as  Motion  is  neither  Sight,  nor  Blind nefs.  5.  An 
Affirmative  and  Negative,  which  admit  of  no  Medium, 
either  of  Participation  or  Negation,  zse.gr,  either  it  is  Day 
or  not  Davi  a  Man  or  not  a  Man,  &s, 

§  r  4.  The  Terms  in  Oppolition  are  mutually  and  equal- 
ly Oppofite  to  each  other,  which  Men,  who  dirter  in  their 
Sentiments  and  Imerefts  ought  fo  ro  confider  as  to  Moderate 
their  Refentments  towards  each  other. 

§  15.  Farther,  to  fhew  how  fome  obfcrvable  Relations 
are  Founded,  Eriimlity  undi  Inequality^  are  common'y  under- 
ftood  to  refpeft  Quantiry,  /.  e.  Meafure,  Number,  Durati- 
on, or  Degree,  fas  of  Heat,  Weighr,  &s.)  but  they  arc 
fomccimes  extended  to  Condition,  Character,  &s :  Things 
are  alfo  confider'd  as  being  in  a  Lax  Sence,  Like  or  Vnllkp, 
upon  thefe  or  any  other  Account  whatfoever,  wherein  they 
Agree  or  difagreej  but  thefe  Relations  more  ftridJy  taken, 
refer  only  to  Quality,  /.  e.  to  fach  Accidents,  Modes,  &s, 
as  make  their  Subje£l  to  be  of  fuch  or  fuch  a  Nature,  not  of 
fuch  a  Size  or  Degree.  Near  or  Dijiant,  are  P^.elations  foun- 
ded in  Place.  Collateral^  Parallel,  Converging,  (or  inclining) 
d^s,  in  Pofture,  Simultatiecus,  or  Cotemporary,  in  Time,  and. 
all  Relatives  as  fuch  are  indeed  Coexifting  v/ich  their  Corre- 
lates J  Parents  and  Children  do  begin  and  end  their  bein^ 
fuch  together. 

§  \6.  Relations,  Which  have  the  fame  Name,  and  arc 
fouftded  in  fomcwhat  common,  are  not  the  felf-fame;  nor  al- 
ways juft  alike,  tho'  refembllng  each  other;  it  might  feem 
that  tlie  diftance  of  two  Places,  lince  it  is  the  felf-fame 
Ground  lies  betwixt  them,  muft  be  all  one  either  way,  when- 
as  from  that  to  this  it  may  be  Uphil,  from  this  to  that 
Dovvnhil ;  ealie  to  find  forward,  and  yet  difficult:  back  again  by 
Realon  of  the  Turnings  which  may  go  off  Acutely  : 
As  there  is  no  danger  of  miiring  the  Way  from  h  %o  a. 

but 


but  only  from  a  to  /?,    in  regard  of  the  Turnings  that  go  off 
acutely,  or  near  the  ftraight  Line.     ^  =^->:^:^'''rC<^  |^ 

§  17.  What  is  ablol'jteiy  expres'd,  may  yet  be  Relative- 
ly defign'd  as  Great,  i,  e.  Greacer,  and  it  is  ordinarily  under- 
ilood  much  Greater,  than  what  ve  have  in  View.  Little, 
i  e,  Lels ;  a  Monfe  is  Li:t!e,  if  I  think  of  a  Mountain, 
Great,  if  I  think  of  a  Mite ;  a  Peer  is  Great  in  rcfpeil  of  % 
Peafant,  Little  ro  a  Soveraign  Pnnce ;  here  the  Relation  is 
founded  in  Condition,  or  (Civil  j  Qaality,  there  in  Quanti- 
ty or  Magnitude  :  M:wy^  or  F(ftv,  (/.  e.  More  or  Fewer)  in 
Number,  Lry>ig,  or  Short,  (i.  e.  Longer  *or-  Shorter  )  in  the 
Meafure  of  Time,  or  Way,  or  other  Extenfion,  High  or 
Lffn?,  (/.  e.  Higher  or  Lower)  in  Scituation  or  Condition : 
So,  Heavy,  Light,  Cold^  Hot^  Strong,  i^^eaky  ^^ifi.  Fool  if:,  &s, 
are  to  be  underftood  a?  being  confiderabJy  more  fo  in  Com- 
parifon  with  fome  other  Subjed:  of  prefcnt  Difcourfe  or 
Tho  t :  But  in  fuch  Cafes  the  Correlate  is  not  diftindly  at- 
tended to. 


CHAP.     XTII. 

§  I.  T  Shall  a  little  more  fully  confidcr  the  Relative  Noti- 
•■■  ons  of  Accidr77tfil,  Ejfential,  and  Prefer,  where  there 
is  on  one  hand  the  Subject  of  fuch  Attribute,  and  on  the 
other  the  Attribute  it  felf.  This  is  refer'd  to  that,  as  being 
Accidental  (or  Contingent  j,  EfTential  (or  Conftitucnt,  Pro- 
per (or  Confequenr),  and  the  Subjc*^:  may  be  back  again  re- 
fer'd to  the  Attribute,  as  being  thereby  Atfecfted  fo  or  fo  j 
and  fif  I  may  fo  fpeak)  Accidentnted,  Ejfentiatedy  or  Propri- 
iited  by  it. 

§  z.  EfTential  and  Accidental  are  Relative  Modes, 
ExpreHing  what  is  belide  or  belonging  to  the  Subjedi  of  our 
Tho't  or  Dif-ourfe  precifcly  taken,  as  it  was  perhaps  Stated, 
or  Defign'd,  or  at  Icaft  as  it  fliould  have  been:  Thnt  may  be 
confider'd  as  only  Accidental  to  this  or  that  Thing,  which 
yet  may  generally  belong  to  the  Sort,  and  is,  perhaps.  Natu- 
rally Inlcparablo  from  itj  but  however  the  Subjed:  may  be 
well  conceiv'd  without  it:  Whitenefs  is  indeed  EfTential  to 
a  White- SwaUj  when  we  confider  it  df  fuch,  yet  not  fo  Ef- 
Tential to  a  Swan,  as  if  it  mufi  ceafe  to  be  that  fort  of  Fowl, 
if  by  Miracle,    Art,   or  otherwife   its   Colour  ibould  be 

chang'd. 

§  3.  That 


Chap.13'  Improvement  of  F«.eaLon.  85 

§  3.  That  is  £//r«fi<?/ to  any  Thing  which  belongs  to  the 
Principal,  Fundamental,  and  Svimmary  A:count  thereof, 
and  without  which  it  cannot  be  rightly  conceiv'd  :  As  the 
Mntter  of  which  a  Thing  is  made,  and  the  Form,  whereby  it 
isdiftinguilh'd  from  other  Thmgs,  which  have  the  lan-.e  lore 
of  Matter :  T-'/j  in  a  Shilling  is  Sil.ci-Mcney,  and  its  Form 
the  Weight,  whereby  it  differs  from  all  Silver-Coin  of  a 
lower  and  higher  Value:  In  Man  the  Organiz'd  Body  is 
his  Matter,  and  a  Soul  capable  of  Rehgion,  his  Form,  when 
he  is  Phyficallv  confider'd  according  tu  ;ne  Natural  Parts  of 
which  he  is  made  upj  but  in  a  Logical  and  more  Notional 
way,  taking  what  he  has.  in  common  with  Brutes,  whether 
in  Body  or  Soul,  we  call  him  an  Anhnal,  or  Living  Crea- 
ture ;  and  conildering  what  do's  chiefly  diftinguilli  hin» 
from  Brutes,  we  may  fa),  that  he  xscnpnbie  of  I{e!igion;  The 
former  exprcfles  his  nearcji  Kjnc^^  the  latter  is  his  Specificli 
Dijfcreiicc. 

§  4.  What  is  Pro/^er  to  this  or  that,  may  be  either,  (i.) 
Every  Particular  belonging  to  it  in  refpeft  of  its  Particulari- 
ty J  for  tho*  SubftaiKe,  Accident,  C5'c.  be  not  proper  to  this 
Man,  yet  tins  Subflance,  tins  Accident,  &c.  are  fo.  Or, 
(2.)  Such  a  Combination  of  the  Sorts  of  Subflance,  Accident, 
CJ'c.  as  is  no  where  elfe  to  be  found  ;  Or,  (3.)  Somewhat 
lefs  Complex,  which  is  indeed  Peculiar  to  this  or  that  Kind 
or  Sort,  but  not  belonging  to  ail  the  Sorts  of  that  Kind,  or  Par- 
ticulars of  that  Sort ;  as  the  Power  of  Walking  to  Living 
Creatures,  or  being  a  Printer  to  Man,  or,  (4  J  What  is  Pe- 
culiar, and  at  foir.e  Time  or  other  adually  belonging  to  alJ 
the  Sortsand  Particulars:  Or,  (5,)  What  is  always  fo  be- 
longing, and  this  muft  be  either  Fundamentally  FfTentia! 
(which  might  be  call'd  Proper)  or  neceffaniy  conne^ed  with 
what  is  fo,  and  it  is  this  lafi:  which  Logicians  call  Proprium 
^larto  Modo,  and  is  commonly  underftood  to  be  the  Picpsrty 
of  this  or  that ;  as  e,^.  The  incomparable  heavinefs  of  Gold ; 
and  that  a  Right-lin'd  Triangle  has  its  three  Angles  equal 
to  two  Right  ones. 

§  "j.  A  farther  obfervable  fort  of  Common  and  Diflimilar 
Relations(  is  that  of  Prior,  and  Prfterior,  or  Foregoing  and 
Following.  Now  Things  are  Jo,  either  in  refped  of  Time, 
or  Dignity,  or  Value,  or  Difpolinon,  (i.e.  the  placing  of 
them)  or  their  appearing  to  us,  or  in  the  Nature  and  Confti- 
Eution  of  Things  thenifeh  cs,  as  the  Caufe  is  before  its  Elfccl 
in  order  of  Nature,  however  it  le  in  Time;  and  the  more 
general  Natures  or  hi,uher  Attributions,  before  the  more  Spe- 
«iaI  and  Particular^  The  leparace  Things  before  their  Com- 
bination, 


86  An  Ejjay  for  the  Part  I. 

bination,  (tho'  they  might  be  created  together) ;  The  Total 
Eflence  before  its  Part,  as  fuel: ;  The  Thing  lignified  before 
its  Sign ;  and  that  which  is  related,  before  that  which  is  con- 
fider'd  as  irs  Correlate:  The  Former  of  allthefe  being  Pre- 
fupfos'd  to  rhe  Latter. 

§  6.  Suljerf^  and  Adjunct,  are  a  farther  fort  of  Rela- 
tives, the  Adjunft  is  an  Accellion  to  the  Effence  of  that 
Thing,  which  is  the  Subjecfl ;  but  not  when  it  is  confider'd 
as  being  the  Subjed  thereof,  for  fo  thnt  Adjundt  is  Elfential  to 
it,  as  Adjund:  in  General,  is  to  SubjedV  in  General.  Now  the 
yidjunEl,  eicher,  ([.)  agrees  to  the  entire  Subjed-,  or  elfe, 
(ij  Only  to  a  Part  of  it  Properly,  when  yet  it  might  be  faid 
of  the  whole,  in  caferhac  part  were  very  confideraUIe.  Maa 
is  abfolutely  fpeaking,  Mortal,  his  Frame  being  diffolvable, 
when  we  consider  him  as  compounded  of  Soul  and  Body,  yet 
may  be  conceived  as  hmnortnl,  when  we  confider  him  with 
an  Eye  to  his  Soul :  and  here,  what  we  may  Afcribe  to  the 
whole,  underftanding  it  in  Reference  to  a  Part  only,  muft 
not  however  be  afcrib'd  to  the  other  Part :  We  may  not 
conceive  the  Body  Immortal,  tho'  the  Man  be  fo  in  fome  Re- 

§  7.  The  Adjumft  maybe,  (3.)  An  Acceflion/«  the  Sub- 
je«it,  as  this  Whitenefs  in  this  Paper  ;  or  (4.)  Out  of  it  as 
this  Paper  is  the  Adjunft  or  Objcdl  of  my  Sipht :  Reafon  \s 
the  Objcdkor  Subject  about  which  I  am  here  Employ 'd. 

§  S.  (5.)  A  Sign  may  be  confider'd  as  ad join'd  {vl:{.  by 
its  refembling  Nature,  by  Appointment,  or  by  common 
Ulage)  to  the  Thing  fignitied,  which  therefore  it  brings  to 
Mind.  (6)  A  Circnmltance  is  conceiv'd  as  lying  without 
the  Subjcd,  and  not  enrring  its  Eifence,  and  yet  may  be  in 
the  General  KccelTary  to  it,  as  Jome  Time,  fome  Place,  fome 
Gefture  is,  e.g.  to  Baprifm,  whereas  the  Sign  of  theCrofs  is 
a  Ceremony,  not  a  mere  Circumftance,  much  lefs  a  Necefla- 
ry  Circumftance. 

§  o.  Laftiy,  We  may  here  confider  that  fo  Eminent  Re- 
lation of  the  C.iiije  (by  means  of  which  (om.ewhat  is)  and 
Effctt,  or  the  Thing  Caus'd  :  And  here  one  Thing  may  fu- 
ftain  both  Relations  under  differing  RefpeCts  •  the  End  (the 
Thing  tor  which,  and  it  tiiay  have  a  Pcrfon  for  whom  j  asf 
an  Houfe  is  for  Habitation,  and  this  for  an  Inhabitant)  isar 
Caufe  as  it  is  defign'd,  and  Excites  to  AcftiGn,  but  an  Effedt 
as  it  is  obrain'd.  The  Matte,-  from  which  a  Thing  is  pre-' 
duc'd  (as  Plants  from  Seed)  or  of  which  it  conlifts,  and  alfo 
the  Fnrn  (that  which  diftinguiflies  this  from  that)  are  Effefts 
as  they  are  mcroduc  d  and  laid  together,  Caufcs  only  as  their 

Elfencep- 


Chap.  15-        Improvement  of  K^2i[or..  Sj 

Eflence,  not  any  Adtive  Influence  of  theirs.  Enters  and  Can- 
ftitutes  the  Effctt. 

§  lo.  The  Effccl  has  this  N^iie  from  the  Principal  fort 
of  Caufe,  the  Ejficienty  by  the  more  proper  force  whereof  the 
Thing  i?''/?  w,  oxh  Piefervd,  ox  Alter'' d  ox  Ahclijlod,  and  in 
this  lail  Cafe,  the  Effeft  is  either  merely  tlic  not-b:ing  of  the 
Thing,  when  'tis  Annihilated,  or  together  with  it  the  Beirig 
of  fomewhat  elfe  inftead  thereof,  As  an  Heap  of  Rubbifli 
upon  the  blowing  up  of  an  Houfe ;  here  the  Form  or  Faflion 
onlyisdeftroy'd,  the  matter  Remains. 

§  II.  God  is  the/jr^ /:«^  ^^/o/Vf^  Efficient,  as  his  Glory 
is  the  Ultimate  Final  Caufe :  Creatures  are  only  Seccndary 
and  Depending  Caufes,  amongft  thefe,  fome  are  more  General 
Efficients^  Concurring  to  many  very  differing  EfFe(^s  at  once, 
as  the  Heavens  and  Sun.  i{emote  Efficients  do  immediarcly 
Produce  only  that  which  is  the  Caufe,  or  perhaps  only  the 
Caufe  of  that  Caufe,  cfjc,  and  they  do  but  give  Occafion  to 
the  farther  Effe<:T,  unlefs  they  did  indeed  produce  the  proper 
and  direct  Caufal  Force,  whereby  thar  Effect  was  after  Pro- 
duc'd,  as  Adam  propagated  Men  with  a  Power  of  Propa- 
gation. 

§  11.  He  is  an  Accidental  Efficient,  who  Effects  what  he 
did  not  intend,  and  the  Thing  is  alfo  fo  call'd,  which  Ehects 
fomewhat  befides  its  Natural  Tendency. 

§  13.  He  \sz  Principal  Efficient,  Phyfically,  who  has  a 
Principal  part  in  working  the  Effect,  as  an  Architect  or  a 
Mafter- Workman  ;  and  Morally  he  may  be  fo  cali'd,  who 
employs  Men  as  his  under  Agents,  and  perhaps  other  Infiru- 
ments,  which  are  then  faid  to  be  lefs  Principal  Caufes,  and 
thefe  laft  do  not  properly  Ad,  but  are  Acted,  as  thofe  alfo 
arc,  which  they  call  Necejfary  Caufes,  but  indeed  lefs  obfer- 
vably,  for  we  difcern  not  by  what  Means  the  Fire  is  forc'd 
to  Burn  the  Fuel. 

§  14.  He  is  z  Natural  Coefficient^  who  directs,  or  other- 
ways  aififts,  he  is  Morally  an  Efficient  ffo  accounted,  and  to 
be  dealt  with  accordingly)  who  perfwades  another,  and  may 
be  call'd  Caufa  Procatarclica ;  that  which  inwardly  Difpofes 
and  Incites,  Proegumena  j  as  the  Defire  of  Gain  in  a  Work- 
man. 

§  15.  Toalldiefe  Relations  we  may  here  fubjoin  thofe 
of  Analogy  or  Proport.on,  wherein  one  Relation  is  compared 
With  another  Relation,  and  faid  to  be  like  {c.gr.  as  a  Pilot 
is  to  a  Ship,  fo  is  a  Governour  to  his  Province)  or  to  bear 
fuch  Proportion,  whether  Arithmetic  illy,  where  the  difference 
\%  the  fame  (3s  i  is  to  4,  fo  3  to  5)    or  GectnetrkaHy,   when 


oj]e 


^ ^«  tjfay  for  the  Part  V 

one  is  fo  often  contain'd  in  another,  thus,   as  i  to  4,  fo  3 


too 


§ 


CHAP.     XIV. 

I.  TTremains  thatwe  confider,  V,  This  or  that  E;t/'r(?/i- 
"■■  y/ow,  i*  e.  both  what  is  or  may  be  us'd  for  that  Pur- 


pole,  and  in  o'hat  PVay,  or  with  what  kind  of  Signiticancy, 
and  whence  it  is.  And  here  we  may,  by  Miitake,  apprehend- 
our  felvcs  to  exprefs,  what  really  we  do  not ;  for  our  Mind, 
being  poflefs'd,  with  the  Senfe  we  are  defigning,  is  in  Danger 
to  take  up  with  almoft  any  way  of  Expreifion,  to  which  we 
our  fclves  can  affix  that  Senfe,  without  attending,  as  we 
ought,  to  the  Laws  and  Rules  of  Speaking,  according  to' 
which  others  are  like  to  proceed  in  taking  our  Meaning ;  To 
avoid  this,  is  a  Matter  of  fo  great  Confequence,  that  I  have 
defign 'ti  to  treat  more  folemnly  of  it,  when  I  fhall  come  to 
Ihew  how  we  may  be  helped,  not  only  rightly  to  take  what 
others  deliver,  but  juft'y  to  exprefs  what  we  our  feives  in- 
tend :  And  that  the  way  may  be  better  opened  cowards  both 
thofe  Purpofes,  I  fhall  here  confider, 

§  2.  I,  What  may  be  the  M/irrcr  of  Expreifion,  or  Things 
employ'd  to  Exprefs  other  Things :  And  indeed  the  various 
Matters  both  of  the  foregoing  Scale,  and  of  that  we  are  here 
upon  may  lerve  to  that  Purpofe.  Perceptions,  Imaginations 
and  Conceptions  are,  to  us,  the  Internal,  Natural,  and  pri- 
mary Signs  of  other  Things ;  and  what  Men  go  to  exprefs  in 
Words,  or  otherways,  is  but  fome  or  other  Apprehenfion 
formed  in  their  Minds :  But  then  they  may  endeavour  to  fet 
it  forth  either  by  fome  Subfiantinl  Beprefentation,  as  that 
of  a  material  Image  refembling  the  Body;  or  the  Soul  of 
Man,  as  it  may  bear  fome  faint  Refemblance  to  God  ;  or  by 
foine  ylcc.id:7it  as  the  Divine  Underftanding  and  Will  may  be 
fh.idow'd  ourby  what  we  find  of  that  fort  in  our  feives  j  or 
by  fome  Mcde^  as  of  the  moved  Air  in  Speaking,  or  of 
Lines  fo  form'd  in  Writing;  or  by  the  Mode  of  a  Mode,  fup- 
pole  fome  particular  Pofture  of  this  or  that  Figure,  as  if  we 
fhould  exprefs  Stability  by  a  Cube  Horizonally  plac'd,  or 
Jnftability  by  a  Triangle  landing  upon  one  of  its  Angular 
Points,  or  tlie  Year  (as  ufnally)  by  the  Figure  of  a  Snake 
turned  round ;  or  elfe  Things  may  be  expres'd  by  Action,  as 
in  our  fotoTiing  ImaginationSj  or  Conceptions,  to  our  felvcs, 

pointing 


Chap,  r 4-         Iwprovewent  of  Kt'ii'on.  89 

■  '■  - 

pointing  the  way  to  others,  ^c  j  or  by  Pnjjion^  as  in  the 
Imaginations,  or  Conceptions  imprefs'd  upon  us,  or  an  In- 
volun:ary  Change  of  tlie  Countenance  thro'  Fear,  Guilt,  ©"j, 
ox  {)y  Privation^  as  if  I  would  exprefs  untinilhd  thus,-Q. 
by  three  Lines  Triangularly  plac'd',  but  the  Angles  not 
form'd,  or  thus  o  by  a  Ring  unclos'd  ;  or  by  Negation^  z& 
if  I  make  a  Line  that  is  not  fo  long,  as  another  under  it  -^  to 
fignilie  unequal,  or  two  Lines  not  inclining  to  exprefs  ParaL 
lei  thus,  11;  or  hy  ^ome  Formality,  as  when  the  greatnefs 
of  Divine  Love  is  fet  forth  by  Breadth,  and  Length,  and 
Depth,  and  Height,  Epbef  ^.  18.  or  elfeby  Suppolition,  or 
Fiction^  as  if  Divine  Providence  were  reprefenced  by  an 
Hand,  with  an  Eye  in  it,  iflfuing  from  a  Cloud  ;  and  in  this 
Inftance  we  have  both  a  Combination^  and  alfo  a  Separation 
employ'd. 

§  3.  The  matter  of  every  Sign,  is  always  the  Subjeft  of 
a  [{elation  to  the  Thing  Signify'd  ;  and  all  our  common  Ideas 
(which  are  Internal  Signs)  are  plainly  fo  many  Abftratliojis 
from  the  diftinguifhing  Forms  and  Charadlers  of  Things: 
Finally  the  Pidares  us'd  in  Hicroglyphical  Reprefentations 
(as  in  thofe  above,  of  the  Year,  and  of  Providence  are 
doubly  Signs,  whilft  the  Things  fo  reprefcnted,  are  defign'd 
to  fignifie  fom.ewhat  farther  ;  and  it  has  been  obferv'd,  that 
Short-hand  Letters  ate  the  Signs  of  thofe,  which  are  more 
commonly  us'd  to  fignifie  Sounds,  and  our  Meaning  by  theiiij 
or  the  Things  we  Mean. 

§  4.  External  Expreflions  are  fuch  as  are  defignedly  pte- 
fented  and  otfer'd  to  Senfe,  or  which  dp,  however,  lye  open 
to  it,  and  they  may  affedl  either,  (i.)  The  Smell,  as  if  fome 
fragrant  Spice  were  ofter'd  to  give  us  fome  Idea  of  the  Smell 
of  fuch  a  Flower ;  or,  (2.)  The  Tafte,  as  if  one  fort  of  Food 
were  prefented  to  acquaint  us  in  fome  meafure  with  the  Re- 
lifliof  another ;  or,  (3.)  The  Touch,  as  if  I  jog  another  ; 
fo  exprelling  my  Defign  to  awaken  him,  or  to  excite  his  At- 
tention, or  fpeak  to  a  Deaf  Man  in  the  Dark  by  Motions  up- 
bn  his  Hand  and  Fingers ;  or,  (4.)  The  Hearing,  whether  by 
Sounds  that  are  Inardculate,  and  of  a  lefs  diftind:  Sipnifica- 
tion,  as  in  Sighing,  Shouting,  cS'j;  dr  Articulate  as°in  for- 
med Speech,  the  moft  ufual  ExprefTion  of  our  Tho'ts ;  ofj 
(5.)  The  Sight,  and  this  either  by  what  is  more  Naturaly 
Jbutoflefs  Diftind  Signification,  asin  Weeping,  ftrikirig  the 
Breaft,  lifting  up  the  Eyes  and  Hands,  PointiiTg,  cS.f,-  or  elfe 
by  what  is  Artificial,  and  here  it  may  be  by  a  more  obfcurc 
Intimation,  as  in  Hieroglyphicks,  and  in  rhe  Cryptical  tvays 
of  Writing,  which  require  fome  peculiar  Key  to  Explain 
them.  H  §  5.  But 


90  An  Ejfay  for  the  Part  i, 

§  "5.    But  the  more  clear  and  ufual  Expreffion  to  the  Eye, 
is  by  Marks  that  are  more  commonly  known,    however  in 
this  or  that  Country,  and  to  them  who  can  read  the  Lan- 
guage,  to  which  fuch  Marks  are  accommodated ;  and  thefe 
are  either  of  lefs  frequent  Ufe,  as  in  what  we  call  Short-hand 
or  Chara£ler3,    exprefling  Letters,    or  whole  Words  (as  Bp. 
yVUk^ins's  Univerfal  Charadter)    or,  perhaps,  Sentences  \   or 
elfe  the  more  ufual,  in  Long-hand,    which  is  diftinClly  adap- 
ted to  the  feveral  parts  of  Articulate  Sound,  in  fo  many  Let- 
ters as  make  up  the  Alphabet,    or  intire  Set  in  this  or  that 
Language ;  and  of  thefe  either  fingly  taken,    or  varionfly  put 
together,  fewer  or  more  of  them,  with  Repetition  or  with- 
out, are  made  Words,  Claufes,  Sentences,   Periods,  Para- 
graphs,  forSedionsj  Chapters,  Books,  Volumes,   and  en- 
tire Treatifes,  without  any  danger  of  exhaufting  the  Num- 
berlcfs  Words,  which  may  be  drawn  out  of  the  24  Letters 
in  the  EngUjh  Tongue,  or  out  of  fewer  in  fome  other  Lan- 
guages. 

§  6.  Now  fingle  or  double  Vowels  in  Speaking,  are 
Form'd  by  divers  ways  of  opening  the  Mouth  ;  and  Confo- 
nants  along  with  them  by  the  various  Moulding  of  the  Vo- 
cal Breath,  or  Air  employ'd  in  Speech,  by  means  of  the 
Throat,  Palate,  Tongue,  Teeth,  Lips,  and  Noftrils :  In 
Writing  they  are  made  of  Straight,  Curve  or  Mixed  Lines, 
Printed  or  orhcrwife  mark'd  upon  Paper,  Parchment,  Me- 
tal, Stone,  or  other  fit  Materials,  and  of  Old,  upon  an 
£^ip.'/.zw  Reed,  or  Waxed  Tables. 

§  7.  Writing,  and  efpecially  Printing,  has  in  fome  Re- 
fpedis  the  Advantage  of  Speaking:  In  Priming,  when  once 
the  Letters  are  Set,  or  Plate  Engraven,  a  Number  of  Copies 
are  eafily  and  fpeedily  Wrought  off,  containing  the  fame 
Words,  Letters,  Figures,  Points,  Lines,  and  other  Marks, 
all  of  the  fame  Size  and  Shape :  What  is  Printed  or  Writ- 
ten is  capable  of  abiding,  whenas  the  Sound  in  Speaking,  is 
a  Tranfient  Thing :  There  are  alfo  fome  differing  Words, 
which  are  not  diftinguifh'd  barely  by  the  Sound,  but  are  dif- 
ferently Written,  as  Writs  fto  J-Vritc)  Rjght  (Claim)  F{ite 
for  Ceremony)  j  nor  can  we,  by  Speaking,  communicate  our 
Mind  at  a  greater  Diftance,  or  v.-ichout  the  Privity  of  thofe 
within  Hearing .-    But  then, 

-  §  8.  In  Speaking,  our  Senfc  is  more  eafily  and  readily 
Communicated  and  Receiv'd,  as  alfo  in  fome  Cafes  better 
Apprehended,  and  more  Imprcffive,  fince  the  Accent  and 
Mannerof  Delivery  may  often  ferve  to  determine  the  Senfc, 
and  to  enforce  iti  befides  that,  the  well  modulating  of  the 

Voice, 


Chap.  14.        Improvement  of  Keafon.  oi 

Voice,  and  a  becoming  Gefture  in  SpeaJcing,  may  render 
what  is  faid  mucii  more  acceptable  than  otherwife  it  would 
be.  Having  thus  touch'd  upon  the  matter  of  ExpreiTions  , 
We  may  proceed  to  confiider, 

§  9.  II,  What  is  the  Form  of  Expreffions  or  Signs  ai 
fuch:  Now  this  is  the  expreflive  Force  or  Significancy, 
which  belongs  cither  to  Things,  as  Images,  Pidlures,  Models, 
Writing,  Sounds,  C^r.  or  to  Tbots,  when  they  are  us'd  by 
the  Mind  it  felf,  or  utter'd  in  Words,  which  feem  to  be  more 
immediately  expreflive  of  Tho'ts,  even  when  they  are  farther 
defign'd  to  lead  to  Things.  Mufical  Notes  added  to  Words 
may  be  fomcrimes  expreifive  of  fuitable  Afted:ions,  or  of  3 
defire  to  excite  and  engage  them :  But  as  many  other  Sounds 
carry  no  defigned  or  determinate  Senfe,  fo  there  might  be  a 
Number  even  of  Articulate  on6s  without  meaning  j  but  they 
would  be  capable  of  having  Ideas  afiixed  to  them  by  Ufage 
or  Agreement. 

§  10.  The  moft  Proper  and  Regular  Ufe  of  Words  is  to 
exprcfs  the  inward  Sentiments  we  really  have,  and  to  inform 
others  what  we  apprehend  of  Perfons  or  Things;  and  they 
are  therefore  wcr/://)'  True,  tho'  they  IhouldnotbeP^Jcrt//)-  fo, 
not  reprefenting  Things,  as  really  they  are  in  themfelves, 
biit  only  as  we  conceive  them  to  be.  But  Words,  or  other 
agreed  and  determinate  Signs,  arc  capable  of  being  abus'd 
to  exprefs  Matters  otherwife  than  we  apprehend^  and  ftill 
they  may  be  call'd  Logically  True,  if  they  do  but  truly  repre- 
fent  what  we  defign'd  to  Eiprels,  tho'  not  what  we  rcallv 
Thox.   ' 

§  II.  The  parts  of  Words,  as  parts,  do  not  fignifie. 
[  Afcribe]  might  be  taken  in  pieces  fo'as  to  make  A  Scribe ;  but 
<j-in  Afcribe  is  not  the  Note  of  Particularity,  nor  Scribe,  the 
Name  of  an  Office  •  only  the  entire  word  is  Significant, 

§  12.  Signs  have  their  exprelFive  Force,  either,  ( I .}  From 
their  own  Nature^  (vi:(.  more  Remotely ),  v/here  there  is 
fomewhatin  or  belonging  to  them  antecedently  to  the  Ufage 
or  Appointment,  which  fits  them  to  fignifie  fome  other 
Things  as  being,  either  the  Counterfeit  and  difguifed  Re- 
femblance  thereof;  fo  falfify'd  Coin,  is  really  but  a  Sign, 
tho'  intended  to  pafs  for  the  Thing  it  felf;  or  the  appearing 
Reprefentation,  whether  it  be  Artificial,  as  a  PiiSure,  6c 
Natural,  as  a  Cloud  may  refemble  Wool  (from  fuch  as 
thefe  are  drawn  Metaphors,  wherein  like  is  put  fur  its  Like) ; 
Or  eKc  fome  other  Relative,  as  implying  its  Correlate,  tjius 
the  containing  Cup,  is  us'd  to  fignifie  the  Liquor  contain'd, 
and  the  Author's  Name  put  for  his  Book,  ds.  This  Rheto- 

n  2,  ficiaas 


92  An  tjjay  for  the  Part  I. 

ricians  call  a  Metcnymy,  but  neither  this  nor  the  foregoing 
Trope  is  to  be  us'd  where  there  may  be  danger  of  Miftake, 
and  that  we  could  be  fuppos'd  to  mean  the  very  thing  we 
mention. 

§  13.  Or,  (2.)  From  Inftltution,  more  immediatly,  as 
the  Water  in  Baptifm  exprelFes  the  Virtue,  or  Juftifying  and 
Sanditving  Influence  Proceeding  from  our  Redeemer's 
Death  j  And  its  being  apply'd  to  the  Body  by  an  Authorized 
Hand,  fignifies  God's  conferring  the  Benetits  of  Redemp- 
tion on  the  Perfon  Baptiz'd  upon  the  Terms,  and  according 
to  the  Tenor  of  that  Covenant,  which  Bapcifm  has  Relation 
to,  and  is  the  Confirmation  of:  Thus  alio  the  Subfcribing, 
Sealing  and  Delivering  of  Writings  are  Signs,  by  Law  ap- 
pointed, to  exprefs  and  ratifie  the  Confent  of  Parties,  touch- 
ing the  Matters  therein  contain'd,  and  to  oblige,  even  thofe 
for  whom  a  Confent  is  regularly  given,  tho'  incapable  of  Con- 
fenting  for  themfelves. 

^  14,  Or  at  leaf!:,  (3.)  "^rornVfage,  which  comes  in  a 
while  to  have  fomewhat  like  the  Force  of  Inftitution,  or  ra- 
ther to  be  a  kind  of  Tacit  Agreement,  among  fuch  as  coha- 
bit in  the  fame  Country,  or  ufe  the  fame  Language ;  fo  that, 
in  Speaking  or  Writing  ro  each  other,  they  do  at  leaft  make 
a  Ihew  of  Exprelfing  their  Minds  according  to  the  knovon  end 
ujiiai  Import  ot  the  words  in  fuch  Language,  and  in  Juch  Cir- 
cumftancesi  for  'tis  not  only  the  Sound  and  Spelling  of 
Words,  but  alfo  the  Accent  in  Speaking  (as  in  Ircnical  Ex- 
preiricns)  and  Manner  of  Writing,  and  in  both,  the  Perfons 
Speaking  and  Spoken  to,  the  Subjed  Matter,  the  Scope,  ^c 
which  are  to  be  regarded  as  helping  to  Determine  the  Senfc, 
according  to  what  is  ufual  in  thofe  Refpc6tsi  unlefs  there 
jjioiild  be  a  Peculiar  and  Exprefs  Agreement,  between  fome 
Perfons  at  feme  time  to  vary  from  the  common  Ufage,  and 
betwixt  themlclves  ,  fjppofe  it  were)  to  put  ^ea  for  «o,  &s : 
or  elfe  that  there  be  fome  Peculiar  Reafon,  which  is  alfo 
fairly  fuppos'd  to  be  known  on  both  fides,  which  may  in 
fome  Cafes  draw  the  words  ufed  to  an  uncommon  Senfe.- 
Thus  it  may  be  queried,  whether  in  Law,  and  at  a  Trial 
the  Meaning  of  [Guilty  or  not  Guilty]  be  not  only  this 
fdoft  thou  confefsthy  felf  Guilty  or  not? 3  fince  upon  plea- 
ding [not  Guilty],  as  if  the  Prifoner  fhould  fay,  [l  do  not 
confefs  my  felf  Guilty]  'tis  then  ask'd  [by  whom  wilt  thou 
be  Try'd]  and  alfo  that  the  0/:th  ex  Officio  has  been  taken 
away,  as'ftanding  in  oppofition  to  the  known  Maxim,  that 
no  Man  is  bound  to  accufe  himfeif. 

CHAP, 


Chap  15.         Improvement  of  K^Qziou.  9^ 


CHAP.     XV. 

§  I.  VT70RDS  may  be,   as  to  their  Senfe  and  Meaning, 

•^    either  Principal j  fuch  as  exprcfs  the  Sum  and  Sub- 

ftance  of  our  Ideas,  or  y?fcf//o9 ,   and  left  Principal,    which 

intimate  only  fome  fmaller  Appendage  thereof,    which  yec 

may  be  in  fome  Cafes  of  very  great  Importance  :     Such  are 

a  Number  of  P4>-r/c/d' J,   which  in  our  Engl :/h  Tongue  may 

be  feen  with  the  various  ways  of  ufing  them  in  a  very  ufeful 

Book,  composed  by  Mr.  iViUiam  PValkgr .-  Particular!  v  there  are 

the  Articles,  [^,   and  r.y{]   moftly  noting  an  indeterminate 

Particularity  or  Unity  j    [  the]  commonly  determining  the 

Kind  or  Kinds,  Sort  or  Sorts,  particular  or  Particulars :  as 

attb  Prefofitions  importing  fome  or  other  way  of  referring  this 

to  that ;  but  [0/]]  is  fometimes  only  a  Note  of  Explication 

or  Specification,  as  in  faying  the  City  of  London. 

§  2.  The  more  Principal  Words  employed  to  exprefs 
either  our  Single  Apprehenfions,  or  the  Judgments  we  make 
about  them,  may  be  reduc'd  to  fome  or  ether  of  the  Chief 
amongft  the  following  Sorts,  (i)  Koun-Suhftantivcs,  xvh'ich 
exprcfs  what  is  or  may  be  the  Subject  of  fome  Attribute,  vi^^. 
Subftances,  as  alfo,  AblVradted  Attributes,  and  Concretes 
confider'd,  as  if  they  were  a  kind  of  Subftances,  and  which 
are  (in  our  way  of  conceiving  Things)  the  Suhftratuyn  and 
Support  of  fome  farther  Appendages.  Thir.g,  Being,  Some- 
whfit  exprefs  our  moft  Fundamental  Ideas;  God,  Siibftance, 
Accideyit,  Mode,  &c.  take  in  fome  Attributes  together  with 
the  foregoing,  which  yet  are  not  to  be  conceiv'd  as  equally 
belonging  to  all  of  thefe  :  H^orid,  Book^,  &s,  exprefs  Com- 
binations of  1  hings,  as  Head,  Feet,  &s.  their  Separations  j 
and  Paternity,  Greattiefs,  &s.  their  Relations.  Abftraftions, 
vi:{.  the  Kinds  and  Sorts  of  Things,  are  expres'd  by  Appel- 
latives, as  Man,  Hcrfc,  Stone,  &c,  and  Individuals,  either 
by  Proper  Names,  as  Adnni,  Bucepinlui,  Tow/er,  &s.  or  the 
Appellatives  fomeway  limited  and  determined,  as  t/vs  Man, 
that  Horfe,  the  Man  who,  &c. 

§  3.  (2.)  Proncun-Subjiantives  '^  as  f,  ye,  it,  8cc,  which 
ferve  inftead  of  the  Subftantives,  to  which  they  relate. 
Thefe  two  forts  fignifie  by  themfclves  alone,  moft  other 
Words  muft  be  join  d  with  the  one  or  other  of  them,  either 
expres'd  or  underftood  ;  becaufe  they  fignifie  the  Attributes 
of  Things  in  Concrete,  or  the  Modification  of  thofe  Attri- 
ibut«Sj  or  the  differing  ways  of  joining  Things  or  Attributes 

H  3  one 


94  An  tjf ay  for  the  Fart  I- 

one  to  another,    as  will  more  particularly  appear  under  the 
following  Ions,  fuch  as, 

§  4.  fB.)  Kcun-AdjeBives;  which' didindly  exprefs  on- 
ly the  Attributes  of  Things  in  the  Concrete,  with  a  general 
Intimation  of  fome  Subjedt  to  which  they  belong,  as  Mnle^ 
m-rd,  Three,  Scs. 

§  5.  (^4.)  Pronoun-Adjecii'ves ;  which  are  either  i^e/^f/w, 
calling  over  again  what  was  before  mention'd,  as  vcho^  vehichy 
this,  that,  8cs ;  or  Pojjejjive^  exprelTing  PofTeffion  or  Title, 
and  intimating  the  Subjed  thereof,  as  either  fpeaking  or 
fpoken  to,  or  fpoken  of  j  as  Mlnc^  Ours^yThine,  Tours  ^  His, 
Hers;  Its,  Theirs.  ,  ' '' 

§  6.  (fy.)  Participles;  a  kind  of  "Verbal  Adje£lives, 
which  give  a  Peculiar  (brt  of  (landing  Denomination,  frotn 
Adion  or  Being,  whether  Abfolure  (as,  cxijliyig)  1  or  fome 
way  determin'd  (as  Lovd^  FsnrA,  Bs-i4,  &c.)  intimating 
withal,  the  Time,  Paft,  Prefent,  or  Future,  together  with 
fome  or  other  Subject  fuflaining  fuch  Denomination. 

§  7.  The  Sorts  hitherto  mention'd,  do,  by  Virtue  of 
their  Singtdar  and  Plural  Nwnbcrj  expreis  or  agree  to  one  or 
more ;  the  Greel^  and  Hehrsvp  have  alfo  a  Dual,  which.  Ggni- 
fies  precifely  two.  Oblique  C^Jes  {_v::{.  the  Genitive,  Dativ^, 
CJ'c.)  ferve  to  intimate  fome  of  the  various  Habitudes,  ^d 
Relations  of  one  Thing  to  another.  Gmders  are  to  exprefs 
the  Sex,  as  it  may  be  Male,  Female,  Undetermin'd,  Com- 
mon,  or  Doubtful.  The  "Neuter  Ihould  belong  to  all  things 
that  have  no  Sex,  but  Cuftom  has.  almoft  unaccountably 
given  the  Mafculine  to  fome  of  them,  the  Feminine  to  others ; 
to  fome  both;  to  Adjedives  (not  without  Reafon)'  all  the 
feveral  Genders,  under  one,  two,  or  three  Terminations. 
The  Articles  beforemention'd  belong  to  Nouns,  arid,  have 
been  in  fome  Meafure  explained. 

§  8.  {6.)  Verbs,  which  do  plainly  and  dire£tly  'y^ffi'-my 
either  the  Ad:ion  or  Being  (\vhether  Simple  and  Abfolute, 
or  fomeway  determinM)  of  what  is  confider'd,  as  Speaking, 
Spoken  to,  or  Spoken  of  in  Paft,  Prefent,  or  Future  Time  j 
They  do  alfo  infinuate,  or  are  adapted  to  a  certain  manner  of 
AiTirming,  vi:[.  Abfolutely  by  tha  Indicative;  conditionally, 
intentionally,  eventually,  or  intimating  Obligation,  Ability, 
or  Dc(ire,  by  the  Subjunctive,  Potential  and  Optative  ;  Autho- 
ritatively, or  Perfwafively  by  the  Imperative;  Indetermi- 
nately by  the  Infinitiv:^  which  is,  as  it  were,  unbounded, 
i.  e.  not  limited  to  this  or  that  Perfon,  ^c  all  this,  or  more, 
Latin  Verbs  do  fignifie  by  the  various  Terminations  of 
their  Voices,  Perfons,  ahd  Numbers,  Moods,  and  Tcnfesi  which 

in 


Chap.  l^".  improvement  of  Realcn.  95 

in  Greeks  are  yet  more  Numerous  and  Nice,  where  there  is  a 
Dtinl  Number,  a  Middle  Voice,  and  more  Tenfes,  than  in  La- 
tine  ;  yet  the  Hebrew  Verbs  do  ftill  in  fome  Refpeds  exceed 
the  Greek,  as  pafTing  thro'  divers  Conjugations,  with  fo  many 
differing  Turns  of  their  Import,  and  intimating,  in  fome  of 
their  Perfonal  Terminations,  whether  the  Subvert  defign'd 
ivere  Male,  or  Femnle. 

§  9.  The  Englijk,  French,  and  other  Living  Languages, 
do  moftly  fupply  the  wantof  f^ch  Variations  by  the  Auxiha- 
ry  Verbs,  Aw,  Have,  May,  Can,  Sic.  The  Latin  Gerunds 
feem  to  be  a  fort  of  ParticipJes  in  Oblique  Cafes;  and  their 
Supines  a  kind  of  Subltantives,  or  elfe  Variations  of  the  In- 
finitive Mood.  The  Verb  Subftantive  [^//w]  doth  generally 
exprefs  Abfoluce  Being,  or  elfe  Identity,  or  being  the  fame  ; 
as  when  wc  fay,  God  is  (/.  e.  God  is  exifting) ;  God  ts  Good 
(i.  e.  the  fame  with  what  is  good,  or  a  good  Being). 

§  10.  (7.}  Adverbss  which  exprtfs  fome  farther  Mode 
fuperadded  to  what  is  imported  by  the  Verb,  Adjeilive, 
Participle,  or  other  Adverb  to  which  they  are  join'd,  i.  e.  a 
more  Definite  Time,  Place,  Degree,  Manner,  ^c  There 
are  alfo  Adverbs  of  affirming,  and  denying,  which  ferve  in- 
ftead  of  repeating  the  Verb  and  Sentence  Affirmatively  or 
Negatively  (as,  Yes,  i.  e.  it  k  jh.  No,  i.  e.  it  k  yiotjo). 

911.  (8.)  Prepcjfiticns ;  which  intimate  this  or  that  Re- 
ference of  one  Thing  to  another,  and  help  to  fupply  the  want 
of  Cafes  in  fome  Languages,  and  of  more  Cafes  in  others. 

§  II.  (p.)  Conjunctions',  which  fignifie  the  Combinati- 
on, or  Separation  of  fingle  Themes,  and  of  the  Judgments 
made  about  them  (as,  nnd,  or,  &c) ;  or  fome  various  Rela- 
tions of  the  one  to  another,  vi7[.  by  way  of  Identity  or  Ex- 
plication (as,  vi:{.  Nnmej,  &s) ;  likenefs  or  Proportion  (lif{e 
^1  fi^)\  Oppofition  or  Exception  (as,  but,  except,  S<Sy ; 
Condition  or  Suppofition,  (as,  if,  fuppo/e,  &s),  Caufality  (as, 
for,  becaufe,  &s.y)  Confequence  (as,  «oiv,  then,  therefore,  8<s)i 
Order  (as,  Firfi,  Second,  next,  after ^  &c) :  It  may  be  ob- 
ferv'd,  that  fome  "Words,  which  commonly  pafs  for  Adverbs, 
are  rather  to  be  Accounted, 

§  13.  (10.)  InterjeBionsi  which  exprefs  fome  lefs  com- 
mon Motion  of  the  Mind  in  a  Compendious  Manner,  as.  Oh, 
i'  e.  I  am  hurt ;  Y^,  hold  your  Peace,  &s. 

§  14.  This  Variety  of  the  forts  of  Words  faves  the  Trou- 
ble of  Inventing  and  Remembring  an  almoft  endlefs  Va- 
riety of  particular  Words,  which  would  be  Necelfary  if 
there  were  only  three  Sorts,  vi^.  a  Number  of  Noun-Sub- 
ftnntiveSf   Sufficient  to  exprefs  all  poflible  Subjects,  that  are 

H  4  to 


y6  An  t.jjay  for  the  Part  I  ♦ 

to  be  Tho't  or  Spoken  of,  under  all  their  various  Relations 
and  Confiderarions ;  Verbs  to  anfwer  all  that  could  be  Tho'c 
or  faid  of  them  ;  and  CotijunBions  to  exprefs  all  the  poflible 
References  of  one  Sentence  to  another. 

§15.  Words  are  taken,  either  Materially  for  the  Sound 
or  Writing,  or  Formally  for  the  Thing  or  Tho't,  thereby  in- 
tended ;  and  there  may  be  one  thing  more  dircEily  meant, 
and  at  the  fame  time  another  connoted  more  Obliquely,  as  Jvji 
intends  him  that  hath  Juftice  more  Diredly,  Juftice  it  felf 
Obliquely. 

§  16.  Again,  Words  are  taken,  either  Largely  or  more 
Snifily  (and  fo  the  fVorld  may  (ignifie  only  Men) ;  Literally^ 
Properly^  and  more  Ufunlly ;  or  Tropically  and  Figuratively^ 
whether  for  wane  of  proper  Words,  or  elfe  the  more  to  Af- 
fedt  or  Pleafe. 

§  17.  Farther,  Nouns  Appellatives  may  be  Underftood, 
either  Colleclively  for  ail  of  that  Name,  or  Dijiributively  for 
each,  or  for  fome  of  all  the  Kinds  (and  thus  ail  Creatures 
were  in  Noah's  Ark)  and  aifo  either  Abfolutety  or  Simply,  for 
the  Nature  expres'd  by  a  Word  which  is  common  to  all  of 
the  Kind  or  Sort,  or  elfe  F^efpe^ively  for  the  Nature,  m  it  k 
common,  fo  Man  is  a  Species,  and  Adam  in  that  Senfe  is  not 
a  Man,  as  not  being  the  Species^  or  common  Nature,  but  an 
Individual. 

§  18.  Appellatives  may  fignifie  more  Things,  either 
Z/nivocally  and  Equally,  juft  in  the  fame  Senfe,  or  only  by 
Annlogy  and  Unequally  ■  as  Being,  when  we  Affirm  it  of  God 
of  Creatures,  Subftancc  and  Accidents,  (^c 

§  19.  Some  Words  in  molt  of  the  abovemention'd  Sorts 
are  Ambiguous,  having  differing  Senfes,  and  are  in  Effedt 
fo  many  ieveral  Words i  fometimes  by  the  more  Common 
and  Literal  ufage  of  them  as  a  Crab  for  the  Fruit,  and  Fifh 
fo  call'd  ;  often  by  Figurative  Acceptation,  and  thus  the  fame 
Words  Ironically  us'd  may  fignifie  the  quite  contrary  to  what 
they  commonly  do,  as,  Or  are  Man,  you  have  taken  good  care 
indeed!  But  very  often  they  have  a  differing  Senfe,  as  when 
the  Eye  is  cail'd  the  Light  of  the  Body ;  and  Virgil  the  Sun 
among  the  Poets. 

§  2o.  Some  differing  words  are  Synonymom,  {izyivig  the  fame 
Senfe,  and  are  in  Effect  one  Word,  as,  Gm,  Deui,  ©«.{,  7^^,  &c; 
but  there  are  comparatively  few,  even  in  feveral  Languages, 
■which  do  fo  Exadtiy  and  Adequately  anfwer  each  other,  as 
not  to  leave  out  or  take  in  fome  or  other  differing  Attribute, 
whilft  they  agree  in  the  main  i  much  lefs  are  there  many  in 
the  fame  Language,  that  are  exa£liy  of  the  fame  Import. 

§  2f.  Words 


Chap.  15.         ir/jfrovement  of  f\.ealon.  97 

§  21.  Words  arc  alfo  either  Simple,  or  Compound,  i.e. 
made  up  of  the  Simple ;  but  put  together  commonly  with 
fome  fmall  Variation,  that  they  may  Sound  the  better  : 
Their  Senfe  is,  or  fhould  be  likewifc  compounded,  but 
Ufage  often  carrys  it  otherwife  ;  fo  that  an  hik^-hom  may  be 
made  of  other  matter  befides  Horn,  if  it  fcrve  but  for  the 
like  Purpofe. 

§  21.  Again,  they  may  be  Primitive,  or  Derivntive^  and 
this  either,  as  to  the  Matter  or  Form,  the  Sound  or  Senfe :  The 
more  Abftrad  Word  is  in  this  latter  Confideration  the  Pri- 
ixiirive  j  thus  PVifdom  is  the  Primitive  of  iVifc,  to  be  Wife^ 
and  iVifely  j  which  are  Words  of  the  fame  Stock  or  Kindred, 
and  may  be  call'd  Conjugates^  or  ?r.ronymoui. 

§  23.  It  is  to  be  obferv'd,  that  Words  do  not  fignifie  lb 
much  according  to  their  Notation  or  Etimology,  as  Ufage  ; 
fo  that  you  may  fometimes  give  an  Account  of  the  Word, 
without  mentioning  the  Thing,  and  there  is  however,  a  de- 
fining of  the  Name,  which  is  but  a  kind  of  pointing  out  the 
Thing  thereby  intended,  without  explaining  it,  fo  that  it 
may  be  NecelTary  that  the  Thing  deiigned  Ihould  be  after- 
wards diftindlly  open  d  and  explained. 

§  24.  As  to  the  Syntax  of  Language,  or  the  way  of  put- 
ting Words  together  into  Sentences,  it  ferves  only  to  intimate 
by  Correfponding  Cafes,  Numbers,  Perfons,  Genders,  Gfc. 
how  the  Words  and  Things  therein  iignified  are  to  be  rc- 
fer'd  to  each  other »  that  fo  we  may  find  the  Principal  Sub- 
ject or  Thing  fpoken  of,  with  what  belongs  thereto,  as  alfo 
the  Predicate  or  Attribute  fpoken  of  it,  with  its  Appendages  ; 
which,  together,  make  up  the  Propofition  or  Sentence, 
wherein  we  exprefly  pronounce  one  Thing  of  another,  and 
of  which  I  fhall  farther  fpeak  hereafter. 

§  25.  Thus  we  have  gone  thro'  thofe  Principal  Heads  of 
Matter  to  fome  or  other  of  which  we  conceive  every  Subjed: 
of  Tho't,  at  leaft  as  they  are  fingly  taken,  may  be  reduc'd, 
and  have  endeavour'd  to  guide  the  Mind  into  right  Appre- 
henfions  about  them  :  And  thus  alfo  we  have  confider'd 
Things  Logicnllj,  as  the  Objects  of  Humane  Tho't,  which 
when  it  cannot  grafp  them  at  once,  is  conibain'd  to  take 
them,  as  it  can,  under  rne  differing  Faces  and  Appearances 
they  carry  to  our  Inadequate  and  partial  Views. 


CHAP. 


9 8  An  Effay  for  the  Part  f. 


§ 


CHAP.   xvr. 

I.  T  have  been  thus  far  endeavouring  to  lay  in  feme  Fur- 
■■■  niture  of  thofe  Ideas,  wherein  there  is  nothing  ex- 
prefly  affirm'd  or  deny'd  of  any  Thing  :  But  fingle  Noti- 
ons without  Connexion  or  Disjundion,  are  like  to  be  of 
little  Ufe,  unlefs  we  have  aJfo  fome  Principles  of  Reafoning 
to  proceed  from  and  recur  to.  I  would  therefore  farther 
add  a  Scheme  of  general  PrincipleSy  together  with  fome 
nearer  Dsdnclicns  from  them ;  or  ^  Set  of  I'ofitions,  which 
may  be,  'tis  hop'd,  of  confiderable  Service  towards  the  uGng 
of  our  Reafon  more  readily,  as  well  as  rightly. 

^  2.  Now  fome  of  thefe  might  feem  to  be  already  giv'n 
us,  with  the  Intuitive  Faculty,  whereby  we  are  capable  of 
difcerning  an  Evident  and  undoubted  Agreement  or  Difa- 
greemcnt  betwixt  fome  of  our  Single  Ideas  and  others ;  as 
alfo  a  plain  and  undeniable  Confequence  or  Inconfequence 
from  what  is  affirm'd  or  deny'd  to  the  affirming  or  denying  of 
f  omewhat  farther. 

^  3.  That  we  fliouldhave  fuch  a  Power  is  altogether  Ne- 
cefiiry  ;  and  that  the  Author  of  Nature  hath  accordingly 
beftow'd  it  on  us  is  equally  certain  by  general  Experience  and 
Obfervation.  Yet  it  follows  not  thence,  that  we  brought 
along  with  us  into  the  World  thofe  complex  Notions  or 
Principles,  which  we  can  Form  or  Apprehend,  asunqueftioT 
nable,  fo  foon  as  we  are  acquainted  with  the  Simple  Terms, 
and  have  them  together  in  our  View  •,  no  more,  than  that 
the  vifible  Appearances  were  Jnnnte^  or  born  with  us,  which 
the  open  Eye  can  fo  early  take  in  and  reprefent  to  the  Mind, 
when  the  Objects  are  before  us. 

§  4.  And  tho'  we  virtually  have  the  firft  Principles  of 
Knowledge,  in  the  mentioned  Power,  yet  it  follows  not, 
that  nothing  of  thefe  fliouid  be  exprefly  laid  before  us ;  but 
that  it  (hould  be  altogether  left  to  the  intuitive  Faculty,  ei- 
ther to  form  them,  as  there  might  be  Occafion,  or  to  pro- 
ceed, without  them,  upon  the  immediate  difcernment  we 
may  have  in  particular  Inftances,  as  a  Child  will  very  foon 
apprehend,  that  the  half  of  an  Apple,  ofTer'd  him,  is  not  fo 
much  £s  the  whole,  and  that  both  the  halves  together  are 
All  of  it,  without  confidering  or  having  firft  known  the  ge- 
neral Principles,  that  a  Part  is  lefs  than  the  Whole,  and  that 
All  the  Parts  logerher  are  equal  to  it. 

§5.  But 


Chap.  1 6.  Ifftprovement  of  Region.  9^ 

^  5.  But  certainly  fuch  general  Pofitiojis  are  a  Nobler 
kind  of  Truths,  much  ntiore  extenfive,  and  at  the  fame 
time  no  lefs  Sure  or  Satisfaftory  for  their  being  fo :  They 
are  alfo  Eternal  and  Immutable,  whereas  the  created  In- 
ftances  had  their  beginning  and  may  ceafe  to  be  ,•  and  tho' 
in  viewing  thefe,  we  may  indeed  be  fufficiently  fure,  that 
the  Matter  is  fo,  yet  we  may  not  be  equally  fatisfied,  as 
when  the  general  Principle  is  apply'd  to  the  particular  Cafe : 
And  that  in  the  mentioned  Inftance  would  plainly  tell  us,  it 
is  not  the  lefs  capacious  Figure  of  the  Half-Apple,  or  its  be- 
ing juft  a  Moiety,  nor  any  other  Reafon,  but  its  being  only 
a  Part,  which  makes  it  to  be  lefs  than  its  Whole. 

§  6,  The  Pofiticns  here  defign'd,  may  not  only  ferve  as 
the  finifliing  Strokes,  and  faftening  Points  of  our  Reafonings, 
but  as  fo  many  Inlets  to  Argument,  and  as  it  were  Keys, 
that  may  open  to  us  large  Treafuries  of  Knowledge,  if  once 
we  can  but  dextroufly  ufe  and  improve  them,  fo  as  to  de- 
duce a  manifold  and  continud  Series  of  Confequences 
&om  a  fingle  Polition  ;  fuch  as  may  be  drawn  from  fome  of 
thofe  at  leaft,  which  will  here  be  felefled,  and  fet  in  Or- 
der. 

§  7.  Now  the  general  Principles  here  ofTer'd,  with  fome 
nearer  Deduftions  from  them  are  fo  many  feveral  Pofitions, 
which  will  be  fcverally  mark'd  with  one  or  more  Letrcrs  of 
the  Alphabet  in  a  continu'd  Order  thro'  the  v/hole  Set,  for 
the  greater  Convenience  of  referring  to  any  of  them,  if 
Occafion  require,  and  alfo  for  inferting  any  others  in  any 
place,  where  they  would  moft  properly  come  in,  by  adding 
a  Number  to  the  Letter  or  Letters;  as  if  the  Reader  fhould 
fee  fit  to  add  a  Pofition  after  that  which  is  mark'd  (H),  he 
might  mark  the  new  one,  thus  (H  2)  \  and  if  he  would  add 
another  after  that,  he  might  mark  it  (H3),  and  fo  on  :  If 
he  fhould  add  any  farther  Pofitions  after  (Km)  he  might 
mark  them,  Km  2,  Km  3,  ^c. 

§  8.  The  Pofitions  here,  will  be  either  of  a  more  exten^ 
five,  or  of  a  more  hmited  Kind  :  The  more  extenfive  will 
be  in  a  fort  Univerfal,  and  fome  of  them  a  kind  of  com- 
mon Mcafure  to  divers  of  the  more  limited  ones ;  we  may 
call  them  2 i^ELIMINABJT,  fuch  as  thofe  which  fol- 
low. 

(A )  We  muft  begin  with  fomething,  that  we  may  proceed 
to  fomething  farther  ;  and  particularly  in  purfuit  of  Knov/- 
ledge,  f  aiething  muft  be  frcfupfos'd,  or  nothing  can  be 
fro.  -/,  i.  e.  fomething  muft  be  taken  as  right  and  fufficiently 
cerrain  without  Pvcafonirg,  or  nothing  can  ever  be  made  ouq, 
as  certain,  by  it.  (B,  There 


lOO  -An  tjfay  for  the  Pare  1. 

(B)  There  muft  be  Steps  in  every  Procedj:?,  which  Jye 
fo  clofe  together,  as  to  admit  of  no  intervening  Step  between 
them  :  And  as  to  the  Progrefs  of  Knowledge,  there  muft 
be  lome  Pofitions  fo  conne£led  or  disjoin'd  in  reference  to 
each  other,  as  to  admit  of  nothing  intermediate  to  make  out 
the  Confcqv.cnce,  or  Inconfetjucnce  from  the  one  to  the  other. 
Now,  in  the  foregoing  and  prefent  Point,  it  is  plainly  im- 
ply'd,  that 

(C)  There  are  fome  Pofitions,  which  muft  be  taken  as 
True,  and  others  as  Falfe;  and  alfo  fome  Confequences  to 
be  admitted  as  Good,  and  others  ro  be  rejected  as  Bad,  pure- 
ly upon  their  own  account,  without  any  Proof  needful  or 
poflibJeto  (hew  the  Truth,  or  Falfhood  of  the  Pofition,  the 
Goodnefs  or  Badncfs  of  theConfequence  :     Therefore 

(D)  We  may  reafonably  demand  fomething  which  muft 
be  granted  by  thofe  with  whom  we  converfe  upon  any  Point ; 
nor  is  there  any  difcourfing  with  them,  who  will  admit  of 
nothing  as  fit  to  be  granted,  but  infill:  upon  having  Proof 
for  every  thing  whatfoever ;  when  at  this  rate  there  could 
neither  be  any  Beginning  in  the  way  of  Inference,  nor  any 
End  in  that  of  Proof ;  no  going  forward  from  any  Principle,  or 
backward  to  it.     And  therefore, 

(E)  Men  lliould  fee  they  be  agreed  in  Something,  either 
more  nearly,  or  diflantly  relating  to  the  Matter  in  Hand, 
before  they  go  to  Difpute  or  Difcourfe  about  it. 

(F)  Things  muft  be  taken  as  right  or  wrong,  and  either 
way  as  fufficiently  certain,  where  neither  we  nor  any  one 
elfe  (fo  far  as  appears  after  due  Confideration  and  Enquiry) 
can  fee  any  Reafon  to  the  Contrary  ;  or  fo  much  as  ferioully 
to  doubt  thereof 

(G)  Whilft  any  thing  is,  or  is  fuch,  it  neceflarily  u,  and 
is  alfo  necefTarily  fuch,  nor  can  it  be,  fo  long,  otherwife.  So 
that, 

(H)  Every  Thing  is  the  Self-fame  Thing  with  it  felf. 
And, 

(1)  The  fame  Thing  ha  at  the  fame  time  all  the  fame  Ac- 
tributes.    And,  on  the  contrary, 

(K)  That  muft  not  be  the  fame,  but  another  Thing, 
which  hath  at  the  fame  time  any  one  dijfaring  Attribute. 

(L)  What  is  any  way  related,  muft  relate  to  fomething. 
Therefore, 

(M)  Every  Relative,  ^s  fuch,  fuppofes  its  Correlate,  or 
fomewhat  to  which  it  is  reUred.    And  therefore, 


(N)  There 


Chap.i6.        Improvewent  of  V*.^2Lion.  loi 

CN)  There  is  no  Artribute,  but  at  fuch,  implies  a  Subjed 
capable  of  it,  to  which  it  is  or  may  be  attributed.  A  Suit 
of  Cloaths  does  imply  (not  indeed  as  they  are  Cloth,  but  as 
Cloaths)  fome  or  other  Body,  on  which  they  arc  or  may  be 
put. 

(O)  An  inhering  Attribute  m  fuch  implies  an  ngreeahk 
Subje£l  wherein  it  muft  inhere. 

{?)  An  exifting  Attribute,  ai  fuch,  muft  have  a  Subjed 
that  adually  exifts.     Yet, 

(QJ  An  inhering  Attribute  may  be  confider'd  without 
our  confidering  the  Subject  wherein  it  inheres  :  As  Length, 
^vithout  the  Way,  or  Cord,  GJ'c.  that  is  long. 

(R)  The  felf-iame  Attribute  cannot  inhere  in  two  differ- 
ing Subjedls  at  once. 

(S)  The  fclf-fame  inhering  Attribute  can't  pafs  out  of  one 
Subjedl  into  another.  And  from  this  with  the  foregoing,  it 
follows,  that 

(T)  Where  there  is  any  one  Attribute  the  felf-fame,  at 
the  fame  time,  there  muft  be  likewife  all  the  other  cotempo- 
rary  Attributes  of  the  fame  Thing. 

(V)  That  mull  be  taken  for  the  fame  Body,  which  is 
either  not  chang'd  at  all,  or  only  by  a  flow  Succeflion  of 
fmallcr  Parts  or  Parricles. 

(W)  Every  Pofition  muft  be  either  true  or  falfe,  and  can- 
not be  both  at  once  under  the  fame  Confideration.    (Vid.  G) 

(X)  "What  is  not  altogether  true  may  be  called  falfe,  as 
it  really  is  in  fuch  or  fuch  refpedt.     Bur, 

(Y)  What  is  in  fome  fort  Falfe,  Ihould  not  be  call'd 
True  without  mentioning  in  what  refpedl  it  is  fo. 

(Z)  No  Pofition  or  Inference  can  rightly  be  both  affirm'd 
and  deny'd  at  once,  and  in  the  fame  refpeft.  We  cannot 
truly  fay  both,  that  the  Sun  now  Shines  upon  this  Spot,  and 
that  it  do's  not ;  or  that  from  the  Sun's  Shining  here,  it  fol- 
lows both,  that  it  is  day  here,  and  that  it  is  not  fo.  There- 
fore, 

(a)  Contradi£lious  Pofitions,  (wherein  the  fame  thing  is 
affirm'd  and  deny'd  of  the  fame  and  in  the  fame  refped)  muft 
be  one  of  them  true  and  the  other  falfe.     But, 

(b)  We  cannot  fafely  determine,  which  part  of  aContra- 
didion  is  True,  and  which  of  them  is  Falfe  ;  till  we  have 
fufficiently  examined  the  Matter,  where  need  requires,  on 
the  one  fide,  or  on  the  other.     Yet, 

(c)  When  it  is  Ncceflary  or  Requifite  to  proceed  upon  the 
one  or  other  part  of  a  Contradiftion,  we  muft  go  upon  that 
as  true^   which  appears  to  have  the  greater  Weight  of  Ar- 
gument 


1 02  An  EjJ'ay  for  the  Part  L 

gnment  for  it,  and  may  fuppofe  the  other  to  be  confequently 
falfe.    Now, 

(d)  To  the  greater  weight  of  Argument  it  is  not  requir'd, 
thi^r  there  fliould  be  a  greater  Number  of  Proofs  or  Reafoos^ 
but  only  that  they  fhould  be  fuch,  and  fo  many,  as  may 
juHIy  be  cftcemed  to  have  the  greater  Force.     And, 

(e)  We  muft  look  upon  that,  as  fufficiently  made  out; 
where  the  kind  and  cogency  of  the  Proof  is  agreeable  to  the 
Nature  of  the  Thing,  and  Exigence  of  the  Cafe,  and  that  it 
can'c  be  rcjeded  without  admitting  fome  Abfurdity. 

(fj  As  to  Contradidtious  Inferences,  tho'  one  of  them 
muft  be  in  it  felf  a  Truth,  the  other  a  Falfhood,  yet  neither 
may  be  Good  or  Juft,  but  both  of-  them  inconfequent  and 
impertinent. 

(g)  In  what  is  Tri/r,  all  Things  do  indeed  agree  to  each 
other,  however  it  might  feem ;  But  Falfocod  may  admit  of 
fomewhat  really  inconfiftent,  even  under  a  feeming  Agree- 
ment. 

(h)  From  Trii:h,  nothing  realfy  follows,  but  what  is  True. 
But, 

(i.)  Truth  may  fometimcs  be  deduced  rightly  from  Falf- 
hood. 

(k)  It  do's  not  fufficiently  prove  the  truth  of  a  Notion,  or 
Narration,  that  there  is  nothing  inconfiftent  in  the  Matter, 
nor  any  thing  which  is  falfe  deduced  from  it :  But  yet  on 
the  contrary, 

( 1 J  1  here  muft  be  fo  much,  at  Icaft,  of  Fallhood,  as  there 
is  of  Inconfiftency,  and  that  muft  be  fomeway  falfe,  from 
which  any  thing  that  is  fo  can  be  regtdarly  drawn. 

(m)  Whatcarrys  ins  own  Evidence  with  it,  and  needs  no 
Proof  may  not  yet  be  clear  without  attentive  Confideration  ^ 
nor  perhaps  without  being  explain'd,  and  illuftrated  to  Per- 
fons  of  lower  Capacity,  or  who  are  not  fufticiently  acquain- 
ted with  the  Words,  or  Matter. 

(n)  Where  Proof  is  needful,  it  is  to  be  given  by  foraething 
more  Evident,  than  what  we  would  prove,  or  at  leaft,  which 
may,  and  accordingly  mult,  be  made  fo. 

(o)  What  is  known  by  thofe,  we  would  Satisfle,  to  have 
been  fufficiently  prov'd,  may  be  employ'd  for  the  proving 
fomewhat  farther  J  tho'  not  back  again  in  a  Circle  for  the 
making  out  of  ^/j-j/-,  which  was  brought  to  prove  it  j  however 
not  to  the  fame  Perfon,  on  the  fame  Occafionj  and  without 
other  fufficient  Proof :  As  when  the  Papifts  pretend  to  argue 
firft  the  Infallibility  of  their  Church  from  Scripture,  and  then 
aflerc  the  Bible  muft  be  taken  for  the  Word  of  God,   and  fo 

underftood 


Chap.  i6.        improvement  of  Ktzion.  105 

underftood  upon  the  Infallibility  of  their  Church  fo  prov'd 
fas  they  would  perfwade  us)  by  Scripture. 

(p)  Proof  may  be  either  Fundamentnl^  without  which  a 
Point  cannot  ftand,  or  only  accejfnry  by  way  of  farther  Con- 
firmatinn. 

(q)  The  Confuting  fomewhat  of  a  Proof  is  not  the  Over- 
throw of  what  was  thereby  prov'd,  uniefs  that  Proof  were 
Fundamental  and  abfolurely  Neceffary  to  it. 

{r)  Meer  difficulties,  tho'  they  can't  be  folv'd,  difprove  not 
that  to  which  they  are  objecSled.    But, 

(f;  What  is  really  abfurd  or  falfe,  proves  that  to  be 
wrong,  from  which  it  follows,  {Vid.  h  ) 
'  ("i)  Mathematical  Principles,  or  thofe  which  relate  to  ab- 
ftradted  Quantity  may  be  accommodated  to  things  of  a  very 
differing  Nature,  in  refpe(5t  of  their  Habitude,  Number,  Fi- 
gure, Meafure,  Degree,  Value,  or  other  Confideration, 
which  is  of  a  Quantitative  fort,  or  fome  way  correfponding 
thereto. 

(u)  Nothing  can  be  One  md  More  in  the  felf-fame  Refpe£l, 
or  under  the  fame  Confideration.    But, 

(w)  What  is  more  in  fome  Refpe£l  may  be  but  One  in  fome 
other :     And  on  the  contrary, 

(x)  What  is  but  One  under  fome  Confideration  may  be 
more  thnn  One  under  fome  other.  The  Triangle,  which  is 
but  One,  as  a  Figure,  is  yet  three -fold  as  to  the  Angles  and 
Sides  belonging  thereto  :  and  the  Humane  Soul,  tho'  but  one 
Spirit,  is  yet  a  three-fold  Principle,  in  rcfpedt  of  Growth, 
Senfe,  and  Reafoning ;  and  might,  perhaps,  be  fuppofed  to 
beiall  this  in  Relation  to  three  diftinft  Bodies. 

fy)  Not  only  every  Thing,  but  every  Part  and  every 
Point  thereof,  may  be  feverally  refer'd  to  every  feveral  Part 
and  Point  of  rhe  fame  Thing,  and  alfo  to  every  other  Thin*?, 
and  to  every  Part  and  Point  thereof.  The  Center  refpefts 
every  part  of  the  Circum.ference  and  Interfpace,  as  thefe 
again  relpeA  the  Center  .-  The  Head  is  refer'd  to  every 
^art  of  the  Body,  and  the  feveral  Parts  of  this  to  that. 
'  (z)  A  Boundary,  as  fuch,  is  no  part  of  the  thing  bounded 
by  it,  as  a  Point,  of  the  Line,  oraLaie,  of  the  Square  3  or 
an  Hedge,  of  the  Field. 

(Aa)  The  greateft  Part  of  any  thing  is  lefs  than  the 
Whole.  As  I  id.  ^>  {  and  fo  onward,  will  always  be  lels 
than  a  Shilling,  tho'  it  come  alvvaj's  nearer  to  it. 

(Ab)  All  the  Parts  taken  together  are  equal  in  Quantiy 
to  the  whole,  tho*  not  always  in  Value  or  \Jk. 

(Ac;  All 


*Q4 ^^  ^JJay  for  the  Part  I. 

(Ac)  All  the  Part3  agreeably  united,  are  the  Thing  it 
feif. 

(Ad)  Things  may  be  faid  to  be  of  the  fame  loweft  Sort, 
whofe  Agreement  is  more  confiderable  than  their  Difference  - 
as  a  ftraight  and  curve  Line  ;  an  obtufe  and  acute  Angle  • 
Adam  and  a  Female  Infant, 

(Kt)  That  which  coinprehends  lefs  of  the  Nature  in  any 
Kind,  is  or  may  be  extended  to  more  Sorts  or  Particulars 
of  that  Kind.  A  Line  belongs  to  every  Magnitude  ;  an 
Unite  to  every  Number i  exillence  to  all  that  adually  is  ^ 
and  Thing  to  whatever  is  not  altogether  nothing. 

(Af)  One  Equal  or  Like,  may  in  reafuning  be  fubftituted 
or  put  for  another,  in  the  Refpedt  wherein  it  is  Equal  or 
Like. 

(Ag)  Things  do  fo  far  agree  together,  as  they  feverally 
agree  to  the  feif  fame  Thing,  or  to  Diverfe  in  the  refpe£l 
wherein  thefc  agree. 

(Ahy  Things  are  differing  in  thftt  Refpe£l  and  Degree, 
wherein  any  of  them  do  agree  to  fomewhat  elfe,  whilft  the 
other  difagree. 

(Ai)  The  greater  Quantity  in  any  Kind  contains  the 
lefler  of  that  Kind,  whether  it  be  Meafurc,  Number,  Weight, 
Degree,  Value,  ^c. 

(Ak)  Things  that  are  dike  affedled,  retain  their  Inequa- 
lity or  Equality,  Likenefs  or  Unlikenefs,  as  before  ;  whe- 
ther they  were  affeded  with  a  like  Addition,  Subtradioa, 
Multiplication,  Divifion,  or  other  Alteration. 

(Pi\)  Perfons  or  Things  may  be  made  Equal  by  taking  off 
from  the  Greater,  fo  much  as  it  exceeds,  or  by  adding  to 
the  Lefs  fo  much  as  it  falls  fhort ;  or  elfe  by  transferring  one 
half  of  tlie  Excefs  from  the  Greater  to  the  Lefs  :  But  if  the 
whole  be  tfansferr'd,  this  will  become  fo  much  greater  as  it 
was  before  lefs. 

(Am )  Perfons  or  Things  unlike  riiay  be  reduc'd  to  Like- 
nefs by  the  Alteration  eitlicr  of  one,  or  of  the  other,  or  of 
both,  fo  far  as  to  meet  in  fome  intermediate  Point. 

(An)  There  can  be  nothing  greater  than  what  is  every 
way  Infinite.    But, 

(Ao)  Where  there  is  only  no  end  of  the  Divifibility, 
Duration,  or  Advancement  of  divers  Things,  there  may 
yet  be  in  reference  to  fome  of  them  an  earlier  or  greater  Be- 
ginning, fo  as  that  which  is  only  in  fome  refpe£l  Infinite  may 
be  fome  way  exceeded  by  what  is  likewife  Infinite  in  fome 
refpeft  only  :  the  Duration  of  the  firft  Soul  may  exceed  that 
of  the  laft,  which  Ihall  come  iato  being  by  many  Thoufand 

Years, 


Chfipi6.         Improvewcfit  of  )\.t:i{'on.  lo^* 

Years,  when  yet  the  Duration  is  endlefs,  and  in  that  refpeft 
Infinite  on  both  Hands  j  yet  it  muft  be  own'd,  that  the  dif- 
ference bears  no  Proportion  to  the  Agreement. 

(Ap)  What  one  or  more  do  atteft  in  Matter  of  Fa(9:  may 
be  taken  for  right,  where  there  is  not  fufficient  Ground  of 
Sufpicion. 

(Aq)  "What  many  Perfons  of  differing  Interefts,  Sehti- 
ments,  and  Circumfiances  do  feverally  Report,  is  to  be  de- 
pended on  as  morally  Certain, 

(At)  Words  muft  be  taken  to  fignifie  according  as  thej^ 
are  generally  us'd  in  fuch  Circuitiftances,  or  as  they  may  be 
otherways  Specially  determin'd.    And, 

(As)  It  may  be  demanded,  that  Words  be  underftbod 
in  fuch  a  Senfe,  as  is  exprefly  given  to  rhem  :     Burthen, 

(At)  The  Senfe  given  to  any  Word  or  Phrafe,  ought  to 
be  ftill  held  to  by  him,  that  hath  fo  determin'd  it,  unlets  he 
fliall  fome-way  fairly  intimate^  that  he  would  afterwards 
haveit  other  wife  underftood. 

(Au)  The  moft  obvioiis  and  ufual  Meaning  is  to  be  ta- 
ken, where  there  is  no  fufficient  Evidence,  that  the  Word  o? 
Phrafe  was  intended  otherwife.    But, 

(Aw)  What  is  really  defign'd  by  any  Expreiljori,  is  al- 
ways to  be  taken  for  the  Senfe  thereof,  where  that  can  be 
any  way  fufficiently  known,  tho'  it  were  not  the  moft  ufual 
or  proper  Import  of  the  Words. 

(Ax)  Every  one  muft  be  allow'd  to  know  beft,  ivhat  h^ 
meant  by  this  ot  that  ExprefTion.    And, 

f Ay)  Every  Man's  own  Explication  of  what  he  himfelf 
hathfaid,  is  to  be  admitted  as  his  Meaning,  where  there  ig 
no  good  Reafon  to  the  contrary,  from  the  Nature  of  the 
Thing,  Connexion  of  the  Words,  Charafter  of  the  PerfoHp 
or  other  Circumftances. 

(Az)  There  may  be  many  differing  Names  or  Denomina- 
tions belonging  to  the  fame  Thing  under  difft  ring  Conliderati- 
ons  or  Relations.-     And  on  the  other  hand, 

(Ba)  The  fame  general  Name  or  Denomination,  rhay  be- 
long to  many  differing  Things,  under  the  Conlideration  dE 
Relation,  that  is  conrimon  to  them.     And  farther  yet, 

(Bb)  ,  The  fame  Special  Appellation  maybe  given  to  di- 
vers Perfons,  or  to  Things  of  differing  Sores,  either  arbitrari- 
ly, or  upon  fome  Relemblance,  Analogy,  or  Relatiort 
ariiongft  therri. 

(Be)  Differing  Words  in  differing  Languages,  and  fome>-' 
rimes  in  the  fame,  may  be  us'd  to  fignifie  the  felf-lam* 
Tl?ing,    Yet, 

i  (Bd)  Wor4 


i'o6  Art  Ejfay  for  tfje  Part  i. 

(Fd)  Words  that  iray  be  us'd  tofignifie  the  lame  thing 
fol-  Subftance,  do  often  import  foittfe  differing  Mode,  toge- 
ther with  it. 

(B-e)  Words  have  the  more  pttti^t  Determination  of 
their  Senfe  from  the  Language  arid  Diak£V,  to  which  they 
belong,  the  Difcipline  and  general  Matter  they  refer  to,  tim 
Ferfori  ^vWch  ufes  them,  and  manner  of  ufing,  together  with 
the  Circumftanccs  of  the  Occafion,  Time,  PJaee,  (^c. 

(Bf)  To  juftifie  an  abfolute  Denomination,  there  muff 
be  a  fuffidcnt  Intenfim  or  degree,  Extenfion  or  Extent,  and 
Protenfioyi  or  Continuance  of  that  which  denominates. 

(Bg)  To  juftifie  a  Comparative'  Denomination  it  ought 
to  hold  gcnemHy  and  between  the  Corrcfpotidin^  Sotts,  Parts, 
Adlionsr,  &c.  Women  may  be  rightly  faid  to  have  a  Weiket- 
Gonftitution  and  ftronger  AffeiSions ;  tho'  it  hold  not  of 
fofiie  particular  Women  cbmpar'd  with  fome  Men  ;  if  it  be 
bbt  tmc  as  to  the  generality,  and  in  comparing  together  thofe 
of  the  higheft  Clafs,  or  the  moft  obfervkblc  in  thofe  refpe6^s 
on  either  hand,  and  fo  to  proceed  with  the  Middle  and  the 
Loweft. 


T 


CHAP.     XVII. 

H  E  more  limited  Pofitions  do  either  lead  towards  th<i 
Knowledge  of  Things,  or  contain  fome  fundamental 
Pbints  thereof:  And  as  to  the  former,  which  may  be  called 
rNT/<^0 DVCro {(Xy  thefc  here  following  are  offered. 

(Bh)  Only  that  which  is  one  way  or  other  Somewhat,  and 
Hi  it  ii  foy  can  be  truly  faid,  to  have,  or  do,  or  fuflFer,  or  be- 
long to,  or  to  be  any  thing,  or  fo  much  as  properly  to  be  at 
all. 

(Bi)  What  is  adlual  or  exifting  can  only  be  attributed  to 
v«fhat  a^ually  is  or  exifts. 

CBk)  I  am  unqueftionably  fomeway  affefted,  even  in 
doubting,  and  therefore  1  unqueftionably  am. 

(Bl;  Nothing  of  it  felf  could  ever  rife  into  fomething. 
Therefore, 

(Bm)  There  never  had  been  afty  thing  at  all,  if  there  had 
not  always  been  Something.    And, 

CBn)  My  Being  and  Faculties,  which  have  not  beien  al- 
ways, muft  be  from  fome  pre-exiftirig  Caufe  or  Succfefllve 
Caufes  which  will  carry  us  up  zofomcwhat  Vncamd. 

(BojNc:: 


Chap.  17'       Improvement  of  txcaibn.  107. 

.(Bo)    Nothing  can  really  produce  what  is  of  a  Nature  Su- 
peri'ourto  its  own.  ,  ^  ; 

,  (Bp)    What  is  produc'd  triuft  be  fomeway  fuitabk  to  the 
Nature,  or  however  to  tjie  f'ower,  that  produces  it. 

rBq>    Where  fomewhat  of  a  ditfc'  ing  Nature  is  produc'd^ 
it  muft  beinferiour  to  that  Avhich  produces  it. 

(Br)     Whatever  we  find  excellent,  or  truly  valuable;  iri 
our  felves,  muft  be  from  ibmewha!:  correfpOiiding  m  the  Na- 
ture or  Power  which  has  Originally  produc'd  it,  butisSupe- 
fiour  to  it  in  every  Point,  wherein  they  uifu;r. 

(BsJ     What  is  uncaus'd  mufl  have  a-  Neccflary  ElTeiice 
and)  Exiftence,  and  cannot  therefore  ceafe  to  be  or  fuHer  any 
real  Change. 

(Bt)    Upon  confideration,  wc  cannot  but  apprehend,  that 
Qpr  Maker*  muft  be  Powerful,  Wife,  Good^  and  everyway 
Excellent,  beyond  what  we  can  comprehend. 
.  \  (Buj     We  cannot  confiftently  fuppofe  chat  our  AlmigHtyj 
AWife,   and  infinitely  kind  Creator  could  have  iny  Ihtereff 
tb  fervejj  or  Inclination  to  gratitie,  cither  by  laying  us  under 
a  NecelTity  of  being  always  deceit  'd,  or  allowmg  us  no  Mean's 
of  knowing,  whether  we  be  or  no. 

The  Politions,   which  contain  fomc  of  tlie  fundamenta! 
Points  of  Knowledg  ( confidered  in  themfelvcs  ;  do  either 
only  inform  the  Mind,    or  guide  the  Man.     As  to  the  former 
forr,    which  are  more  purely  S P ECV L  ATIVE^   I  have 
fingl'd  out  fuch  as  follow  : 

.  f Bw)     Ottr  Mind,    Imagination,  and  outward  Senfes,  in 
their  proper  State  and  Ufe,  may  fervc  to  inform  us  rightly  of 
thihgs,  in  fijch  manner  and  meafurcas  God  <aw  fir, 

(BxJ     The  proper  State  of  Qiir  Mind,  Imngination,  and 
Qlitward  Senfes,    is  their  being  free  from  fuch  Uifcrders  and 
Impediments,   as  would  difturb  or  hinder  the  Natural  Ufe 
and  Exercife  thereof.  ......     .  ,■       .».-. 

(By)  Our  Mind,  Imagination,  and  outward  Senfes  are 
fttly  us'd  about  their  proper  Obje^^^s,  and  in  the  way  which 
Reafon,  Obfervation,  and  Experience  diredl  in  filch  or  fuch 
Cafe. 

,  ^B^)  Wit  fecms  to  ]ye  ii|the  apt  and  ready  Affembling  of 
Ideas,  and  ufing  fome  of  rhem  wirh  reference  to  others  m  a 
way  that  is  generally  taking. 

.  (Ca)  Judgment  fcems  chiefly  to  confiil:  in  penetrating  in- 
ro  the  Nature  and  Caufes  of  Things,  in  accurately  difcer- 
ning  their  Agteemcnt  or  Difagreemcnt,  eipeciaiiy  where  it  is. 
lefs  obfervable,  and  cxa^'tly  "diftinguiihing  the  thing  it  lelf 
Kom  what  i%  very  like  it. 

i?.  {Ch)M 


io8  An  tjfay  for  the  Part  i. 

(Cbj  A  limited  Mind  cannot  comprehend  what  is  unli- 
mited, or  perfedliy  know  even  Finite  Beings,  juftas  they  are 
in  themfelves,  and  by  their  inmoft  Effence. 

(Cc)  Imagination  cannot,  in  a  Natural  way,  reprefent 
the  Objedts  of  any  Senfe  without  oar  ever  having  had  the  ufe 
of  that  Senfe. 

(Cd)  "What  is  Indifcerpible,  Self-moving,  and  fome-way 
knowing  we  may  call  Sfirity  in  contradiftin£lion  lo  Matter 
Qt  Body, 

(Cc)  Spirit  is  a  niiore  perfed  fort  of  Being  than  Bod/. 
And  therefore, 

(Cf )     God  muft  be  conceived  by  us  as  a  Spirit. 

(Cg)  The  Adings,  which  we  are  Confcious  of  in  our 
felves,  and  obferve  in  others  may  fufficiently  Evince,  that 
there  is  in  Man  a  Spiritual  Being. 

rCh)  There  may  be  alfo  Spirits  without  Body  above  us, 
and  embodied  ones  below  us. 

CCij  The  unlimited  Spirit  muft  penetrate  all  other  Spi- 
rits as  well  as  Bodies ;  in  whom  they  are  admitted,  at  his 
"Will  and  Pleafure  only,  to  live,  and  move,  and  have  their 
Being. 

(Ck)  The  Divine  Immenfity  is  its  own  Eternal  and  un- 
changeable Place,  and  atfords  Place  to  whatever  is  bc- 
fides. 

(CI  j  Body,  or  Matter  made  up  of  Parts  and  Particles,  is 
the  Obje^  of  Senfes,  or  the  Thing  fenfibly  perceiv'd. 

(Cm)  The  felt-fame  Matter  may  admit  a  Multitude  of 
various  Forms,  and  under  them  may  be  fo  many  divers 
Things. 

(Cn)  The  Organs  of  Senfe  by  means  whereof  we  fenfibly 
perceive  are  themfelves  Material. 

(Co)  One  Body  or  Portion  of  Matter  can't  be  in  the  felf- 
fame  place  with  another.    Therefore, 

(Cp)  We  cannot,  by  Senfation,  penetrate  into,  or  go 
fully  thro'  the  Objeds  of  Senfe. 

(Cq)  God  has  not  feen  fit  that  the  Humane  Mind  (hould 
be  capable  of  proceeding  very  far  by  meer  Intuitive  Know- 
ledge, without  Reafoning  ;  or  that  it  Ihould  know  much  of 
things  that  are  diftant,  or  future,  or  however  of  Contingen- 
cies, at  leaft  in  our  prefent  State. 

(Cr)  Our  Maker  has  feen  it  beft  for  us  not  to  fit  our  Sen- 
fes to  perceive  what  is  very  minute,  or  to  take  in,  at  once, 
what  is  very  large,  or  to  difcern  things  aright  otherways  than 
under  certain  Conditions  relating  to  the  Objed,  Medium, 
Diftance,  <j^c. 

(Cf)  Divine 


Chap  17.        Improvement  of  K.t2i{on»  loy 

(Cf)  Divine  Providence  may  deny  Men  fome  of  the 
Means  and  Helps  to  Knowledge,    But  then, 

(Ctj  Our  Reafon,  if  well  apply 'd,  is  capable  of  telling 
us,  however,  upon  Obfervation  and  Experience,  what  we 
may  expcd:  from  our  Mind,  Imagination,  and  outward 
Senfcs  in  fuch  a  Cafe,  and  fuch  kind  of  Circumftances.  And 
we  may  reft  aflur'd,  that, 

(Cu)  Our  wife  and  kind  Creator  hath  allow'd  us  in  every 
refpe(ft  what  he  faw  convenient  or  needful  for  us  in  our  pre- 
fent  Condition. 

fCw)  There  is  a  Syjiem  of  things  about  us,  which  we 
call  the  PVorldy  and  a  Courfe  of  Nature  or  fetled  order  of 
Caufes,  Effects,  Antecedents,  Concomitants,  Confequents, 
C^c,  from  which  the  Author  of  Nature,  we  may  be  fure, 
will  not  vary  without  weighty  Reafon. 

(Cx)  Nothing  can  properly  ad:,  by  it  felf  alone,  upon 
any  thing  which  is  at  a  diftance  from  it. 

(Cy)  The  Courfe  of  Nature  is  depending  on,  and  Sub- 
jeft  to,  the  Powerful  Will  of  God,  who  is  prefent  with  ir. 
And, 

(Czj  God  can,  without  breaking  in  upon  the  fetled  or- 
der of  Things,  ealily  give  an  effectual  Touch  upon  the  Minds 
of  Men,  reftraining  or  changing  their  Inclinations  j  or  giv- 
ing fuch  a  turn  to  their  Thoughts  as  may  fubferve,  or  com- 
port with,  what  he  is  otherwife  pleas'd  to  do  in  the  way  of 
his  Providence. 

(Da '  "What  plainly  appears  to  be  above  the  Power  of 
Natural  Agents,  or  contrary  to  the  well  known  Courfe  of 
Nature,  or  very  remarkably  differing  from  what  is  ufual  m 
fuch  Cafe,  may  be  look'd  on  as  a  Divine  Interpofal,  either  in 
the  way  of  Miracle,  or  of  Special  Providence ;  when  it  is 
not  in  any  Manner  or  to  any  Purpofe,  unworthy  of  God. 

(Db)  Our  ufual  and  natural  way  of  knowing  God 
and  Nature,  is  by  afcending  from  Eife^s  to  the  Caufe  of 
Caufes. 

(Dc)  Any  Thing,  which  was  not  before,  or  which  begins 
anew  muft  be  counted  an  EffcdJ:. 

TDdJ  There  can  be  no  Eflfedl  without  an  Efficient  Cauf^, 
which  either  now  is,  or  at  leaft  has  been. 

f  De)  Every  Natural  Being," and  all  that  is  good  belonging 
to  it,  together  with  Evil  that  is  only  Penal,  is  from  God,  ei- 
ther immediately,  or  mediately. 

(Df )  Culpable  Evil  (at  leaft,  as  completed)  is  from  the 
ralh,  or  ill-confider'd  Choice,  or  Adherence  of  the  defe(^ible 
Creature  left  to  his  own  Free- Will  by  the  Creator,  who  made 

I  3  hitu 


110  An  Hjfay  for  the  Part  .i. 

him  Capable  of  a  Law,  and  of  obferving  it,  butftood  nor 
pblig'd  to  atford  him  the  farther  Aid  for  his  Security,  which 
was  neither  promis'd  by  God,  nor  asked  of  him. 

(Dg)  The  fecorid  and  more  immediate  Caufes  of  Tilings 
^re  oft  not  eafie  to  be  found  out,  or  afcertain'd. 

(Dh}  "What  goes  before,  may  be  very  far  from  being  the 
Caufe  of  what  follows  after.  '" "" ' 

(Di)  That  which  only  gives  the  Occafion,  without  wjiich 
this  or  that  wotJd  not  have  been,  much  more  that  from 
which  the  Occafion  is  taken  when  it  was  not  given,  is  not 
properly  the  Caufe. 

(Dk;  Nothing  can  be,  in  any  Sort,  the  Caufe  of  this  or 
that,  which  is  irtcapable  of  contributing  any  thing  towards 
It.    And,  •      ^      "    J"  -"•'   -' 

^  (Dl)  5'hat  cannot  be  the  only  Caufe  which  is  not  capable 
alone  of  producing  the  EtFedt.  v ,./ 1.^rf  ..  v 

^Dm)  That  muft  be  the  Material,  Formal,  Final,  or 
Efficient  Ca'ifc,  wJiich  anfwersthe  general  Chara^Jcr  belong- 
ing to  any  of 'them  refpe^tively.    Vide  Chap.  XIIL  §  9: 

(Dn)  We  cannot  determine  of  the  Effe£l  from  a  Partifil 
Caufe,  tho'  it  were  the  Principal,  piuch  lefs  .from  vy.Hjitls 
otherwife.     And  therefore, 

(Dc)  Whatfoever  Influence  the  Stars,  or  the  Pofitipn  of 
the  Heavens  may  polFibly  have  upOn  Affairs  below';  yet  they 
can  never  deter minately  fhow  thbfe  Events,  whereof  they  can 
fee  no  more  than  a  General ,  Partial ,  and'  lefs  ^riivjipal 
Caufe.  "•■■    '■■■'  '^'^ 

(Dp)  We  cannot  certainly  know  particular  Ef^f^s,  by 
conlidering  tl?e  Caufcs,  that  operate  freely,  or  varibujly  \j\ 
like  Cafes. 

^  (Dq)  The  like  Natural  Caufes,  or  like  canftl  Influence, 
and  indeed  the  farhe,  will  Varipufly  work  upon  differing  Sub- 
jed:s,  that  are  nripre  or  lefs  Capable,  ^r  even  upjOn  the'faine, 
as  It  may  be  mofe  or  lefs  difpo's'd.        V  '  "      /  •  *" , 

(DrJ  UkQ^ntiirnl  Ciufes,  Will  haVe  like -Effedsjn  like 
Cafes ;  and  proportionate  Caufes  will  have  proportionate 
Effeds,  where  nothing  intervenes  on  eit^er;tej(i^  to  dete^^ 
mine  them  otherways.  '  '     '  '';;..'"" 

rDf ;  If  we  would  make  a  Judguient  in  relation  to  an  Effecit, 
we  ilipuld  confider  the  feveril  Caufes,  ^ovv  they  do,  pr  yy'oiil'd 
Severally  work,  how  they  pronioj;e  or  hinder  one  anotners 
Working,  arid  what  there  is  in  tlie  ^ubjcdt  pr  ^(^xxiitip  "^r- 
ward  o£  obftructtheu: united  Iijfluence.       '■:  "■  -''  '^'t;  >;- 

"  (DO  To 


Chap.  17.         Tm^rovemcnt  of  Keafcn.  juj 

CDcj  To  fearch  out  the  probable  Caufc,  we  iJioul4  care- 
;jFully  obferve,  what  is  the  Nature  of  the  Efleil,  and  cgiUe- 
"quently  what  kind  of  Caufe.it  muft  have  •  and  what  there 
is  of  fuchakind,  that  is  any  >vay  capable  of  produciiig  fiicji 
tfii  £ffe<^>,  or  contributing,  ihcrcto,  whiph  either  precedes,  pr 
actendsic. 

(Du)  Itonly  the  £0eft  be  taken  away,  fomewhat  of  tie 
like  S,ort  may  be  expected  to  follow,  whijft  the  Cau^  ce- 
mains  with  a  like  Difpofitiqn  and  Caufal  Force.    But, 

(Dw")  Where  the  Cawfe  is  taken  away  on  which  .^y 
thing  do's  peceffarily  depend,  the  Eifeft  muft  ceafe. 

(Dx)  We  may  look  upon  this  or  that  particular  Thing  to 
be  either  the  Infinite.Being,  or  Finite  Siabft^nee,  or  Accident, 
or  to  fall  under  any  other  Head,  either  of  the  fundamental 
Scale,  or  that  of  Refultances,  according  as  it  anfwej-stbe 
Characfler  there  given  refpedtivcly.  Chap.  6,  7,  ©"c.  to 
Chap.  1 5.     Vide  (As) 

(DyJ  Our  fcnfible  Perceptions  can't  be,expl^in'4  to  fuch 
as  neither  have  had,  nor  can  have  any  thing  like  them,  to 
which  vie  may  refer  the  Perfons  we  would  inftru^  about 
them. 

(Dz)  Our  own  Apprehenfions  of  the  fame  Objed:  may 
confiderably  differ  according  to. the  various  Difpofition  of  the 
Body,  or  Miqd. 

(Ea.)  That  is  .fojjihle.  to  be,  the  like  whereof  hath  been, 
and  which  carries  no  contradiction  in  it  felf,  norJaconfiilenQy 
with^ny  thi^gelfe  that  muft  of  neceflity  be.    Bur, 

(Eb)  There  is  no  Confequence  to  be  drawn  from  a  mere 
Poffibility  to  the  adlual  Exifteqce  of  this  or  that    thing, 

TllQ 

(Ec)  We  may  fafely  conclude,  that  is  not,  which  indeed 
cannpt  be. 

fEd)  The  A(5lual  Exiftence  of  a  Thing,  muft  eithe;r  fee 
concluded  upon  Qbfervation,  or  fufficient  Teftimony ;  or 
elfe  reafon'd  out  from  the  neceflary  Connexion  it  has  with 
fomevvhat  elfe,  the  Exiftence  whereof  we  are  well  ^Ifui'd  of. 

(Ee)  Truth  is  in  general  an  Agrceipenc  \vith  its  proper 
,jl^cafm-e  or  Rule.    And  mpxe  pa,rticularly, 

(Ef )  That  do's  truly  and  reajly  exil^t,  vyhich  h^th,  as  it 
is  fuch  a  Place  in  the  World,  whether  it  be  thought  on  or 
not :  Thus  only  Individuals  truly  are,  and  common  Na- 
tures (fuppofe  that  of  Man,  or  of  a  Propofition  in  general)  do 
not  tr\ily  exift  aiji^j^  but  oqIj  as' Jho't&i  qx  Notions  in  the 
Mind, 

I  4  (Eg)  That 


^  '  2  nn  L.jjuy  pT  the  Part  I . 

<'Eg)  That  is  truly  and  incLeed  fuch  or  fuch  a  Thing, 
which  do's  n-^  only  refenible  it,  but  hath  the  very  Nature 
and  Eflence  of  it,  /.  c,  the  Principal  Stayninn,  or  main  In- 
gredients, which  God  hath  put  together  in  fuch  Work  of 
his,  or  Creatures  in  fuch  of  theirs:  He  is  truly  a  Mail, 
who  hath  not  only  the  outward  Shape,  and  fomewhat  like 
Humane  Adion,  and  Speech,  but  who  has  an  organiz'd 
Body  together  with  a  Mind  capable  of  Religion.  That  is 
truly  and  indeed  a  Propofition,  Book,  Clock,  Honey-comb, 
which  hath  fuch  kind  of  Parts,  and  fo  put  together. 

(Eh)  Tho't  is  fo  far  True  and  Jufl,  as  it  agrees  to  its 
Objedt,  or  to  what  we  think  of. 

(Ei)  An  External  Sign  is  (o  far  true  and  fuitable,  as  it 
Correfponds  to  what  is  defign'd,  or  fairly  fuppofed  to  be 
thereby  fignify'd. 

^Ek)    Narrations  and  Predidions  arc  fo  far  true  and  right 
"as  things  are  therein  declared  agreeably  to  what  really  is,  or' 
was,   or  (hall  be  at  the  time  to  which  they  refpedtively  re- 
fer. 

(EI)  Exprefllon  is  fo  far  True  and  Propery  as  it  is  fitted  to 
convey  what  is  intended  by  it. 

^Em)  We  are  fo  far  true  and  veraciout,  as  we  defign  to 
fpeak  agreeably  to  what  we  think. 

(En)  We  are  fo  far  True  and  Sincere,  as  we  do  ferioufly 
defire  and  endeavour  to  have  in  reality  the  Virtues,  which 
^we  would  appear  to  have. 

(Eo^  We  are  fo  far  True  and  Faithful^  as  we  are  heartily 
defirous  to  anfwer  our  Truft  and  Obligations,  particularly 
our  Piomifes,  fo  far  as  lawfully  we  may,  in  Kind  or  Value. 

(Ep)  Our  Mind  is  capable  of  Satisfa^ion  or  Pleafure, 
and  alfoof  Pain  and  Trouble  in  the  way  of  intelle<5lual  Con- 
ception, imaginati\e  Reprefentation,  and  fenfible  Percep- 
tion. 

(Eq")  Satisfadion  or  Pleafure  is  an  AfFedion  agreeable  to 
the  Mind,  which  upon  its  own  account,  we  could  wifticon- 
tinu'd,  at  leaft  if  it  would  not  fome  way  turn  to  our  greater 
Hurt.    On  the  contrary, 

(Er)  Trouble  or  Pain  is  an  Affetflion  difagreeable  to  the 
Mind,  and  which  on  its  own  account,  we  could  wifh  re- 
Mioved ,  at  leaft  if  it  would  not  fome-way  turn  to  our 
greater  Good. 

(Ef)  In  iViJhing,  we  define  fomewhat,  which  we  con- 
ceive, either  to  be  beyond  our  own  Power,  or  that  the  Ac- 
ceptance or  Purfuit  thereof  on  fuch  Terms  or  in  fuch  way, 
m  not  to  be  refolv'd  upoq  by  us,  or  not  at  prefenc. 

(Et)  In 


Chap.  i8.         Improvement  of  Reafon.  n^ 

(Ex)  In  H^illing^  we  determine  upon  fome-whar,  as  eli- 
gible, which  we  conceive  to  be  within  the  Power  we  have, 
or  may  hope  to  attain. 

(Eu)  That  which  moves  us  to  Will  is  a  comparative  and 
prevailing  Diflatisfadtion  with  what  we  are,  or  have,  or  do, 
or  undergo  at  prefent,  or  at  leaft  our  fixed  Preference  of 
Tome  what  farther. 

(Ew)  The  higher  Satisfaftion,  or  Trouble  belongs  to  the 
higher  Operations  of  the  Mind. 

(Ex)  The  Pleafure  or  Pain,  Satisfaction  or  Trouble,  we 
feel,  is  truly  fuch  to  us,  whether  the  Ground  thereof  be  realj 
or  fuppofed  only, 

^Ey)  Contrary  AfFeftions  may  arife  from  the  fame  Objeft, 
and  attend  upon  like  A^s  in  Perfons  of  a  differing  Make  as 
to  the  Mind  or  Body,  and  even  in  the  fame  Pcrfon  under 
differing  Circumftances. 

(Ez^  That  is  a  Natural  Good  to  us,  which  affords  Plea- 
fure or  Satisfaftion,  or  has  a  teridapcy  thereto  ;  and  that  z 
Natural  Evil,  which  puts  us  to  Pain,  or  gives  us  inward 
Trouble,  or  is  like  to  do  fo. 

(Ez  i)  We  are  not  commonly  fo  much  affefted  thro'  the 
Nature  or  Condition  of  Obje^s  in  themfelves,  as  by  reafon 
of  the  Intereft  we  have,  or  feem  to  have  in  them,  and  their 
Agreeablenefs  or  Unfuitablenefs  to  us. 


CHAP.  xvm. 

*T"HE  Pofitions  which  are  in  themfelves  more  praftlcaJ, 
■■■  and  ferve  to  guide  the  Man,  are  either  more  direftly 
binding,  or  but  confequentially.  As  to  the  former  they 
may  be  termed  Mo\ALy  and  fome  of  thefe  are  here  fee 
down. 

(Fa)  That  is  to  be  chofen,  as  good  for  us,  whatever  it 
may  be  otherwife,  which  at  laft,  and  upon  the  whole  Ac- 
count will  afford  us  the  higheft  Satisfa<^Hon  and  Pleafure. 

(Fb)  That  is  to  be  Ihun'd,  as  Evil  to  us,  whateverit  may 
feem,  or  be  for  the  prefent  and  on  lower  Accounts,  which  at 
laft  and  upon  the  Whole  will  draw  upon  us  the  moft  infuffe- 
rable  Pain  or  Trouble,  or  has  a  tendency  fo  to  do. 

(Fc)  From  an  Eftimate  of  Satisfa^ion  or  Pleafure,  Trou- 
ble or  Pain,  truly  and  juftly  made,  we  might  take  our  Di- 
rection what  we  ought  to  Embrace,  and  what  to  avoid ;  Yet 

wc 


114  -A^^ff^y  for  the  Parti 

we  fliould  not  proceed  upon  that  as  our  only  or  principal 
Reafon.    For  undoubtedly,  *' 

•  (Fd)  The  pleafing  of  our  Maker,  ought  in  Reafon  to  bt, 
pur  farcheft  Aim.     Yet, 

fFe)  In  ple'a^ng  God,  wearetofeek,  and  Ih^ll  afluredly 
■find  the  trueft  and  higheft  Pleafure.    For,  ' 

(Ff )  God  will  be  chiefly  hoilour'd  and  pleas'd  in  oufj 
being  nrroft  highly  pleas'd  and  delighted  in  Him.    Now,    '^' 

(Fg)  God  himfelf  can  undoubtedly  give  us  the  beft  aiid: 
fureft  Account  how  we  may  pleafe  him  atprefent,  and  come 
to  be  unfpcakably  delighted  in  him,  and  wixh  hi<n  Eternally. 
;Andhe  hath  done  it ;  for, 

(Fhj  That  Book  jnuft  be  from  the  Creator  Himfelf, 
which  could  not  be  from  any  Creatures  Good  or  Bad,  con- 
Itflently  with  their  being  fo  :  And  if  it  could  be  fuppos'd  that 
God  would  fo  long  bear  fuch  an  Ufurpation  of  his  Name 
and  Authprity,  y/et  certainly  he  would  never  have  fo  appeared 
to  own  it,  not  only  by  extraordinary  Adls  to  confirm  and 
jpreferve  that  Book ;  but  alfo  in  a  whole  Series  of  Providence, 
agreeable  to  its  Predi£lions,  and  other  Declarations. 

(Fi)  There  caji  be  nothing  in  the  Word  of  God  rerf^ 
Cpntradfdious  to  the  Reafon,  which  God  himfelf  hath  given 
lis;  But, 

(Fk)  It  is  highly  ^eafonnlple  to  admit  that  Supernatural 
Revelation  (hould  go  beyond  our  Natural  Reafon,  in  (hew- 
ing us  both  what  we  muft  believe,  and  do. 

(Flj  The  Holy  Scriptures  muft  undoubtedly  be  fuited 
both  in  their  Matter  and  Manner  of  ExprefTion  to  their  pro- 
fefled  End  of  making  us  wife  unto  Salvation  ;  and  they  muft 
alfo  be  fufiicient  for  it  without  any  thing  of  additional  Re- 
yclatiqn. 

(Fm)  Wc  ought  to  be  rnoft  cqncern'd  about  Things 
ivljich  are  qf  the  greaceft  Importance  tp  us. 

(Tn^  Lower  patters  muft  all  be  tmpag'd  as  far  as  may 
be  in  fubferviency  to  our  higheft  End,  ani  however,  as  piay 
not  be  incqnfiftent  with  it. 

'"  (Fo;  Our  Ipclinatiojis  and  Averfa^ionsare  nattirally  guided 
by  what  appears,  or  \yhat  we  ^pp^eh^nd  to  bg,  at  pteient, 
good  or  beft  for  us.     But, 

(Fp)  "We  rnay  often  have  very  good  Reafon  p  believe 
that  to  be  really  good  or  beft  for  us,  wl^ich  for  the  prefenc 
nfiight  appear  to  be  qtherwife.     And, 

fFq)  Tho'  we  carinot  fo  dire£Hy  and  inirnediately  govern 
out  own  Apprehenflops,  and  command  our  Belief,  yet  i^ 
m^ny  Cafes'  it  piay  be  confequen^iaUy  and  mediately  done. 
For,      '■■         '^^      ^  •-••-^   -.  -    .         (Fr)  The 


Chan  1 8.  Improvement  of  Ktzion.  ii< 

(Vx)  The  ApprehcnGon  ^ve  have,  even  of  Duty,  is  not 
to  beprefently  follow'd  withouc  due  Examination  in  Matters 
about  which  "Wife  and  Good  Men  do  or  may  differ.     Yet, 

(Ff )  We  mufi  comply  with  our  own  Confciences,  where 
we  cannon  have  a  reafonable  Satisfadion  to  the  concirary, 

■  (Ft;  Men  arc  not  to  be  driven  againft  Confciencje  (or  t|ie 
Apprehenfion  of  their  Duty)  on  pretence  of  bringing  them 
by  Incapacitys,  or  other  Penal  Methods  to  conllder  better. 
Whenas, 

(Fu)  The  dired  Ter^(letjcy  and  proper  uf?  of  Givil  .Co- 
ercion, and  its  penal  MerhoiSs,  is  to  bring  Men  to  ad:  what 
Confcicncc,  or  common  ^enfe  either  do's,  or  nnay  eafily, 
tell  them  is  their  t^uty  without  mucK  cpnfideiing  of  the 
Matter. 

(Fw)  Whatever  is  really  due  from  us  to  our  fel.ves  or 
others,  is  more  remotely  anij  ultiniately  a  Point  of  Duty  to- 
ward God.     And, 

(Fxj  We  fliould  render  to  all  their  due  (whether  they 
may  feem  to  deferve  it  from  us  or  noj  vyitli  an  TEye  to  Gpd, 
who  reciuires  it.  .' ' 

(Fy)  The  greater  Abilitie!^  of  Parents,  together  with  t^eir 
Natural  Affedlion,  are  to  fupply  the  deficiencies  of  Children, 
during  their  Minority,  in  fuch  a  way  of  governing  them  fpr 
their  good,  as  may,  and  accordingly  fhoulJ,  be  fuited  to 
their  differing  Age,  Difpbfitidn,  and  Circumftances. 

(Fz)  The  Magiftrate  is  to  be  pblerv'd  a^s  the  Minifter  of 
God,   in  reference  to  what  he  is  in  any  way  authoriz'd  by 

od  to  require  or  forbid. 

(Ga)  The  Magiftrate  has  an  undoujbted  Authority,  _as  to 
what  is  really  Neceij^ry  For  the.Civil  ?eace,  and  Comipojj 
Welfare.  '  '  '  ' "     ' 

(Gb)  The  Magiftrate  is  to  be  own'd  and  Hc^nour'd  as 
the  Minijier  of  'God  to  us  for  Gopd^  whilft  his  Ac^iniftr^tioh 
,p,  atleaft  in  the  Main,  for  the'Putlicjk  Good-  and  that  he 
is  not  manifeftly  attempting  any  tlijng,  which  plainly  tends 
to  the  Ruin  of  it. 

((jc)  What  we  may  inno/:ently  let  alone,  we  Ihould  not 
do,  whilft  we  are  in  doubt  abput  it;  nor  admit  of  Scruples ojc 
Sufpicions  againft  what  may  appear  our  E)uty  upon  (jrounds, 
which  are  really  holding  in  Cafes  of  fuch  a  Nature. 
-  (Gd)  Only  fuch  ^dionsapd  /^fecf^ions  as  do  forne  way 
fall  under  Judgment  and  Choice.  3.c^PJ0P?J  tote  Cioinman- 
ded  or  Forbidden.  -.'  'A^'  * ••-*^^^^-  f''  • 

(Ge;  Only 


1 1 6  An  hjfay  for  the  Pare  I. ! 

(Ge)  Only  fach  A£lions  and  Affedlions  as  are  commanded 
or  forbidden  by  the  Law  or  binding  Rule,  we  are  under, 
are  to  be  accounted  adlually  good  or  bad. 

^Gf )  That  is  left  Indifferent,  which  is  in  no  way,  either 
commanded  or  forbidden. 

(Gg>  What  is.  altogether  Indifferent,  not  only  in  it  felf 
abftradlly,  but  alfo  in  relation  to  its  Circumftances,  Atten- 
dants, and  Confequcnts,  may  not  be  made  Neceflary  unlefs 
by  an  Authority,  which  is  juftly  abfolute  and  unUmited. 

(Gh)  An  Authority  otherways  wholly  unlimited  and 
abfolute  (hould  have  infinite  Wifdom  and  Gcodnefs  to  con- 

duflit.       ,\  ,j; 

(Gi;  Where  there  is  no  juftProperty  or  Claim,  (or  how- 
ever none  from  fuch  Perfon,  or  of  fuch  thing  in  Particular) 
there  may  be  Kindnefs  or  Unkindnefs ;  but  there  cannot  be 
any  thing  of  ftri^l  and  proper  Juftice  or  Injuflice. 

(Gk;  Charity  is  Juflice  under  a  more  general  and  inde- 
terminate Confideration. 

(Gl)  To  be  firee  or  unfbrc'd,.  belongs  to  the  very  EfTence 
of  the  Will,  or  6F  tlie  Mind,  as  it  is  faid  to  will,  which  is 
indeed  to  thoofe  this  or  that, .  either  Simply  in  its  felf,  or  as 
a  Means  tofomewhat  elfc. 

(Gm)  To  ftand  inclin'd  to  what  is  Virtuous,  and  Averfe 
from  what  is  Vicious  is  the  Moral  Red^itudo  of  the  Will, 
and  the  proper  Freedom  of  a  reafonable  Mind;     But, 

(Q\\)  Liberty,  as  it  is  more  commonly  undcrltood  in 
relation  to  the  Man  or  Perfcn,  is  not  the  Inclination  or  Power 
to  Will  as  he  ought,  but  rather  a  Freedom  for.  ading  as  hp 
will.    Yetevcnin  this  refped, 

(Go)  A  Vicious  Man  is  in  a  Senfe  not  Free;  fince  he  is 
fo  frequently  carried  in  particular  Cafes  by  the  Biafs  of  evil 
Inclination  contrary  to  what  he  faw  beft  and  fitteft  •  and  fo 
might  be  faid  to  will  at  a  diftance,  and  in  the  general. 

(Gp)  That  may  be  call'd  in  fome  fort  morally  good  or 
bad,  tho'  it  fall  jidt  under  prefent  Will  or  Choice,  which 
hath  a  Tendency  to  what  is  fuch  in  a  higher  and  more  proper 
Senfe,    Therefore, 

(Gq)  Our  Nature,  Habits,  oi  Difpofitions  are  very  ear- 
ly good  or  bad,  as  they  have  a  tendency  towards  A(Slions, 
that  are  fo. 

(Gr)  The  Moral  Good,  which  falls  not  under  prefent 
Choice,  may  yet  entitle  Men  to  the  Advantages  which  are 
natitrnllj)  Confequent  thereupon.     As  on  the  other  hand. 


(Gf)Thc 


Chap.iB.        Improvement  of  Kt2iiou.  117 

-.— ^-Gf-^-^The  Moral  Evil  which  falls  not  under  prefcnt  choice 
"may  jufHy  Subject  us  to  the  Difadvantages,  which  are  tiatu- 
rally  Confequent  thereon. 

(Gt)  That  only  is  more  ftriftly  and  properly  good,  which 
is  every  way  agreeable  to  the  Rule  of  our  Duty.     And, 

(Gu;  That  in  a  rigorous  Senfe  is  bad,  which  deviates 
from  the  Rule  of  our  Duty  in  any  Refped  or  Degree  what- 
foever. 

(Gw)  What  is  any  ways  deprav'd  cannot  in  that  refpeft 
bepleafing  to  God  who  is  exa6tiy  difcerning  and  altogether 
Purej  yet  it  may  be  accepted  by  him,  who  is  alfo  infinitely 
Merciful  and  Gracious,  not  upon  its  own  Account,  or  curs', 
but  for  his  own  Names  fake,  and  for  our  Saviour's,  where 
there  is  a  fincere  and  living  Faith. 

(Gx)  To  allow  our  felves,  in  Words  or  other  Agreed  Ex- 
preifionjt,  ro  give  out  that  m  Truc^  which  we  know,  or  fuppofe 
to  be  Faije^  is  in  it  felf  and  in  its  Grounds  injurious  to  God^ 
whom  we  ought  to  imitate  and  reverence,  to  truft  in  and 
fubmitto  ;  it  likewife  is  of  a  depraving  Nature,  and  dange- 
rous Confequence  to  our  felves  and  oihers  j  if  not  altogether 
fatal  to  Civil  Society.    Yet, 

(Gy)  Where  we  ftand  not  Specially  engag'd,  Truth  is 
not  always  to  be  fpoken,  much  lefs  the  whole  Truth,  tho'  no- 
thing hut  the  Truth  Ihould  ever  be  delivered  as  true. 

(Gz)  We'rnay,  without  Fallhood,  vary  from  a  declared 
Int^nrion,  which  was  not  given  out  by  way  of  Promife  to 
any  Perfoni  or  where  the  Party,  to  whom  a  Promife  was 
made,  regularly  may  and  do's  releafe  it. 

»,Ha)  Promiles  are  to  be  kept,  where  the  Matter  of  them 
is  lawful,  when  it  comes  to  be  perform'd  j  tho'  it  Ihould  be 
detrimrnta!  to  our  Secular  Intereft.    But, 

(Hb)  We  may  not  Lawfully  promife  what  we  fee  would 
be  tnju  low  and  unwarrantably  hurtful  to  the  Publick,  or  to 
fomc  Paficular  Perfon  j  nor  can  we  lawfully  perform  what 
appears  to  Defo,  when  we  come  to  fee  it.     Yer, 

iHc;  An  ill  Promife  fhould  commonly,  in  Point  of  Ho- 
nour and  Fairncfs,  be  as  plainly  revok'd  as  it  was  given,  and 
thai  as  early  too  as  well  may  be. 

(Hd)  Threatnings  do  not  always  bind  the  Perfon  that 
threatens;  efpecially  where  they  might  reafonably  be  under- 
wood with  fome  known  Exception:  Nor  do  they  indeed 
give  any  proper  Claim  to  the  Party  threatned.    But, 

He)    The  God  of  Truth  will  not  vary  from  what  he  has 
foretold,  as  well  as  threatned. 

(Hf )  Not 


•I  1 8  An  b.jfay  for  the  _  Part  f. 

(Hf)  tslot  to  offend  iTiouId  be  our  firft'  ^ndeavoiir ;  but  it 
muft  be  our  Bufinefs,  wh^n  we  have  ofl^nded,  Tpeedily  to 
Repenrj  ask  Pardon  ;  make  Pveparatiorij  if  it  may  be;  and 
to  take  gr«a'ter  Care  for  the  future. 

(Hg'^  It  is  very  foolifli  to  do  what  is  in  it  f^lf  an  unreafona- 
ble  thing,  and  when  we  know,  the  bei^  that  can  come  of  it 
is,  that  It  be  undone  again,  ft)  far  as  poifible;  and  that  we 
ihould  fometime  account  our  felves  Fools  fordoing  it.  But, 

(Hhj  It  is  extremely  dangerous  to  venture  upon  the  do- 
ing of  what  we  know  (hould  be  undone  again  ;  when  by 
doing-  it,  we  are  like  to  be  lefs  capable  of  amending,  and 
more,  backward  to  it. 

(Hi)  It  is  highly  Criminal  to  allow  our  felves  in  what 
we  know  to  be  difallow'd  by  him,  who  Created  and  Main- 
ttins  us,  hath  redeemed  us,  and  w.ould  favc  us-  and  that 
rfiis  fhould  be  done  againft  all  the  Reniontlrances  made  by 
our  own  Reafon  and  Confcience,  by  others,  by  the  Provi- 
(fence.  Word,  and  Spirit  of  God,  repr'eicriting  Sin  as  the 
mbfi  difingenuous,  perfidious,  and  provoking  Oppoiition  (the 
mort  effeftual  we  can  make)  to  his  Honour  and  Governinentj 
to  his  Glorious  Perfe£lions,  to  his  Bleffednefs,  and  indeed  to 
Kis  very  Being:  And, all  this  to  the  prefcnt  Damage,  and 
farther  Danger  of  the  World  about  us ;  to  the  Difplealing,  and, 
if  it  could  be  the  difturbing  that  above  us;  and  tinally,  to  the 
moft  unnatural  wounding,  and  utter  undoing  of  our  Selves, 
without  that  Mercy  and  Grace,  which  we  do  thus  in  fo  da- 
ring a  Manner,  contemn,  pervert,  affront,  and  put  away 
from  Us.     And  therefore  upon  the  whole, 

CHkj  It  is  highly  abfurd  and  dangerous  as  well  as  Cri- 
minal to  allow  our  felves  in  Offending,  upon  the  Hope  of 
Repenting  afterwards.    Efpccially  when  tho', 

(HI)  True  Repentance  is  indeed  never  too  late;  yet  it 
may  be  greatly  doubted  whether  late  Repentance  be  com- 
monly true. 

(Hm)  Wc  are  obligd  as  reafonable  Creatures  for  the 
tlonour  of  our  Creator,  as  alfo  for  the  Good  of  others,  and 
cur  own,  as  wc  can,  to  get  and  ufe  the  trueft  Meafures  of 
Prudence. 


CHAR 


X 


Chap.  19-        Im^rovemtttt  oj  K^2iioi\.  n^ 


CHAP.     XT)t. 


THE  Poficions  which  are  but  confequentially  binding,  da 
either  guide  us  by  more  certain  Rules,  or  by  rational 
Conjectures :  The  former  may  be  called  PF{VDE  NT  I A  L, 
and  fonie  of  thefe  are  given  here  by  way  of  Specimen. 

(Hn)  Prudence  is  the  due  Confideratiori  of  Things,  and 
of  all  their  Circumftances,  together  with  the  Critical  Dif- 
cernment,  and  careful  Obfervance'  of  wHat  is  agreeing  or 
difagreeing"  thereto.  .^   ,.  *. 

(Ho)  We  have  great  and  continual  heed'  of  Prudence  for 
the  better  ordering  of  what  is  in  it  felf  our  Duty,  ^nd  alfo 
of  thofe  Things,  which  abftradly  coiiMei'd  are  of  a  more 
indifferent  Nature.  ,     ,    -    . 

(Hp)  The  more  Special  Inteiitiori  of  Prudence  is  to  ma- 
nage things  with  the  trueft  Decorum,  and  to  tlie  belt  Ad' 
varitngc. 

(HqJ  That  is  to  be  accounted  decorous  nnd  he^oming^  ivhich 
may  innocently  recommend  the  Peffbn  or  his  Condition, 
Behaviour,  Difcourfe  and  Actions,  with  their  more  abiding 
Efrefls,  to  the  moft,  or  however  to  the  Wifeft  and  Beit. 

,  (Hr)  That  is  advantngicujly  managed^  which  is  fo  per- 
form'd,  as  may  anfwer  the  moft  or  Left  Purpofes  it  is.welJ 
capable  of;  and  that  with  the  leaft  Expehce  of  Time,  Tho't, 
Pains  and  Coft. 

(HfJ  It  is  fit  we  fhould  once  at  leaft  carefully  examine 
thofe  Points  of  Truth  and  Duty,  we  are  capaHe  of  a n,d  con- 
cern d  with,  about  which  Men  of  Reputation  for  Wifdom 
and  Integrity  are  known  to  differ.    But^ 

(Ht)  We  (aduld  net  undertake  the  Examination  of  more 
doubtful  and  drfficult  Matters,  till  wfe  have  laid  in  what  is 
previoully  requilite,  and  are  come  to  fome  Maturity  of 
Judgment.    And,  .    . 

{Hn)  When  we  go  co  examine  a  Matter,  wlierein  there 
may  be  Intereft,  InclinntiQn,  or  any  thing  elfe  to  biafs  us, 
we  Ihould  fir  ft  endeavour  ro  bring  our  Minds  to  an  even  Tem- 
per in  reference  co  fuch  Things,  as  do  not  properly  enter  the 
Merits  of  the  Caufe.    And  alio, 

(Hv/)  We  Ihould  endeavour  firft  to  remove  the  ftronger 
Prejudices,  which  may  probably  iye  in  the  Minds  of  others 
againft  what  we  would  convince  them  of,  or  pcrfwade  thenr 
to,  before  we  offer  our  Arguments  for  fuch  Purporc.   Yet, 

(Hx)  YVhere 


120  An  tffay  for  the  Part  I. 

(Hx)  Where  the  Prejudices  others  may  lye  under,  carry 
in  them  any  thing  diflionourable,  we  ihould  endeavour  to 
remove  them  by  fuch  kind  of  Methods  as  may  be  purfu'd 
without  any  thing  like  Refledlion  upon  the  Perfons  or  Party 
we  would  convince  or  perfwade. 

(Hy)  Our  Method  for  convincing  and  perfwading,  ftiould 
be  fuited  to  the  Capacity,  Dilpofition,  and  Circumftances, 
of  thofe  with  whom  we  have  to  do. 

(Hz)  The  Senfe  or  Authority  of  others  may  more  efpe- 
cially  be  urg'd,  where  that  is  more  regarded,  than  the  Reafon 
of  Things.     And, 

ria)    Mens  own  Apprehenfions,   tho'  miftaken,   where" 
they  are  tenacioufly  held,   may  be  argued  from,  tho'  they 
muft  not  be  allowed  as  right.     And  farther, 

(IbJ  Men  may  be  urg'd  in  fome  Cafes  to  admit  the 
Reafons  ofFer'd,  where  they  cannot  Ihew  better,  or  as  good 
to  the  contrary.    But, 

(Ic^  Arguments  are  efpecially  to  be  drawn  from  what  is 
moft  agreeable  to  the  Natutal  Temper,  Neceflity,  or  other 
inducyig  Circumftances  of  thole,  with  whom  we  have  tO 
do. 

(Id)  In  Points  that  are  difficult,  we  fliould  for  fome  time 
rather  chufe  to  hear,  than  fpeak,  if  it  may  be  ;  or  to  fpeak 
in  the  way  of  Enquiry  or  Propofal,  rather  than  in  that  of 
Determination  or  Difpute. 

(lej  In  difputable  Matters  what  we  offer  fhould  more 
generally  be  in  the  Name  of  others,  what  they  do  or  might 
fay,  rather  than  in  our  own,  what  we  our  felves  think. 

( If)  We  Ihould  throughly  confider  what  we  our  felves  or 
others  are  capable  of,  fo  as  to  govern  our  own  Attempts,  or 
Undertakings,  and  to  dire<^  theirs,  accordingly. 

(Ig)  Our  Regard  to  Perfons  or  Things  is  chiefly  to  be 
govern'd  by  our  greater  or  lefs  Concernment  with  them,  and 
we  (hould  accordingly  proportion  our  Diligence  in  relation 
thereto. 

(Ih)  Not  the  Number  of  particular  Advantages  or  Difad- 
vantages,  nor  the  greatnefs  of  fome  among  them,  but  the 
Amount  of  all  together  is  to  determine  us.    Bur, 

(li)  Where  the  Advantages  or  Difadvantages  are:  equal 
on  both  Sides,  there  even  the  flighteft  Conlideration  fuper- 
added  ought  to  carry  us  this  way  or  that. 

(Ik>  Of  Advantages  otherwife  equal,  the  more  Certairf 
are  to  be  chofen,  and  of  Future  ones  the  more  likely.    But, 

(II)  A  ftir  greater  Good,  tho'  fomewhat  lefs  likely  may- 
be chofen  and  purfu'd. 

(fofi)  hn 


Chap. 19  Iwprovement  of  Bc^Siion.  121 

(Imj  An  Evil  bears  equal  Proportion  to  a  Good,  where 
the  one  is  as  much  hurtful,  as  the  other  Beneficial :  And  in 
fuch  Cafe  it  muft  be  altogether  indiiFerent,  as  to  the  Thing 
it  felf,  whether  we  fliun  the  one,  or  purfue  the  other. 

(In)  Where  it  is  jn  it  felf  Indifferent,  whether  we  (hould 
more  diredly  fet  our  felves  to  purfue  an  Advantage,  or  avoid 
an  equal  Difadvantage,  we  are  to  determine  our  felves,  if  it 
may  be,  by  any  preponderating  Circumftance,  which  attends 
on  either  hand. 

(lo)  We  (hould  not  prefently  conclude  that  to  be  PradH- 
cable  or  Imprafticable,  which  may  fo  appear  in  Speculation, 
without  a  fair  Attempt.    Yet, 

(Ip)  We  Ihould  fee  fome  good  Reafon  for  a  Trial,  before 
we  go  to  make  it ;  and  then  we  (hould  carry  it  on,  till  we 
come  to  fee  thro'  the  Matter,  if  it  may  be  prudently  done. 
Bur, 

(Iq)  We  (hould  before  hand  fet  juft  Bounds  to  Attempts 
and  Experiments,  that  are  not  altogether  Neceffary ;  nor 
ihould  we  eafijy  be  induc'd  to  go  beyond  thofe  Bounds. ' 

(Ir^  We  (hould  not  rejedi  or  negleft  any  real  Advantage 
we  might  have,  where  we  cannot  have,  or  hope  for,  all  wc. 
could  defire.     And  therefore, 

(If)  We  Ihould  not  fo  reach  at  all,  we  could  wi(h,  as  to 
hazard  our  falling  lliort  of  what  we  might  otherwife  attain. 

( It)  We  mult  take  heed  of  flaying  in  the  Means  inftead 
of  reaching  the  End ;  or  of  lofing  this,  whilft  we  are  cond- 
dering  of  thofe,  or  purfuing  fome  nearer  Intention  with 
too  great  Application. 

(lu)  We  (hould  not  purfue  an  Advantage  of  (hort  Con- 
tinuance, which  muft  be  necelTarily  follow'd  by  as  great  a. 
Difadvantage  of  longer,  or  but  equal  Continuance,  or  one 
that  is  fmailer,  but  of  very  long  Continuance. 

(IwJ  We  Ihould,  where  there  is  occafion,  fubmit  to  a 
faultlefs  Evil  of  lliort  Continuance,  which  will  be  followed 
by  an  equal  Good  of  longer,  or  but  equal  Continuance,  or 
by  one  that  is  fmaljer  of  a  very  long  Duration. 

Divers  of  thefe  Points  may  be  refum'd  and  apply 'd  in  the 
following  Parts  of  this  E(ray,  and  fome  may  be  added  upon 
particular  Occafions,  which  will  be  more  peculiar  to  tliem  j 
cfpecially  under  the  concluding  general  Heads, 


K  CHAP 


i^ii         '       ^  AuBffky  for  the  Parti. 


CHAP.     XX.    ^ 

117  E  now  cpme  lafUy  to  thofe  Pofitions,  which  as  they  are 
-■  applicable,  and  fliould  chiefly  be  applied  to  Pra(5tice- 
•niay  be  ("aid  to  bind  us  confcque^ttially^  whilft  they  ferve  to 
guide  us  by  rational  ConjeiEture.  They  may  be  htly  calFd 
?t{P^BABLE:  And  I  ftali  conclude  the  whole  Set  of 
Vofitioni  with  fome  few  Iiiftances  of  thele. 

(Ix)    Probability  is,   when  a  thing  is  likex  to  be,  or  to  be 
io,  than  otherwife. 

(Jy;    Meafures  of  Probability  might  indeed  be  given  or  i 
.  appjyed  to  Matter?  oi  nieer  Speculation ;  but  they  would  not  1 
there  be  fo  Neceilary  or  Ufeful,   as  in  reference  to  fome  I 
•  pj:a<&ical  Points.     But  as  to  thefe, 

^.  \(Iz;    We  ought  not  to  take  up  with  mere  Probability, 

whejfe  Certainty  is  Requifite,    and  may  conveniently  be 

■W'    Yet, 

,  (K^a)-  .  We  inay  go  upon  Probability,  where  the  Matter  is 

not  of  very  great  Confequence,  and  would  not  anfwer  the 

^rputjle  of  looking  after  a  greater  Certainty.    And, 

(Kb)    We  muft  go  upon  Probability,  when  a  Matter,  that  I 
is  nccelfary  will  bear  no  longer  Delay. 

(Kc)    We  may  reafonably  proceed  upon  what  one,    who 
.  )S  ^  Competent  Judge  of  the  Matter,  and  withal  a  Credible 
Perfon  lolemnly  fays,    efpeciaily  what  he  Swears,  and  above 
.  all,   if  it  be  eonfirm'd  with  Circumftances,    and  if  the  Na- 
ture of  the  Cafe  could  not  well  admit  of  faither   Evi- 
dence. . 

(Kd)  What  two  feveral  Pcrfons  do  feverally  report,  may 
■be- taken  as  highly  probable,  efpeciaily  if  they  fhould  agree 
(  in  a  great  number  of  Particulars,  as  to  the  Scnfc,  but  with  a 
.,  different  way  of  exprelling  themfclves  ;  and  moft  of  all  if 
they  ihall  fccin  to  contradict  one  another,  but  what  they  fay 
'  ihail  be  found  reconcileable  upon  Confiderati^in. 
i-  (Ke)  We  may  proceed  upon  that  t-hfothefn  as  more  like- 
;  lyf- iwbicb  goes  tlie  faitiiefi  toward  giving  a  good  Account 
of  the  feveral, things  belonging  to  fuch  a  Science.  ■     '■ 

(Kf )    Where  the  Extremes  are  neither  of  them  certain 
Truth  or  Duty,  it  is  beft  to  take  the  Middlp  way. 


(Kg)  Mode- 


..Jm>^'     ". 


Chap.  20.        improvement  of  tiealon.  1 12 

fKg)  Moderation  is  common jy  Uker  to  hold  than  Ex- 
tremes, whether  in  Opinion  pr  Pr^^ice. 

(Khj  Like  Caules  are  |ikeft  to  produce  like  EfFeds,' 
where  the  Cafe  is  little  differing. 

(Ki)  'Tis  likely,  thnt  may  be  the  Caufe  of  a  thipg,  which 
is  \vont  to  precede  or  attciiji  it ;  apd  that  thefe  js  no  Inftancc 
of  its  having  been  without  it. 

(Kky  'Tis  not  probable,  that  very  great  Alterations  in 
Men  or  Things  ftould  come  to  pafs,  as  it  were,  in  an  Inflanr,^ 
without  any  foregoing  Token  or  preparatory  1  endency. 

( Kl)  Men  are  likeft  to  ad:  as  they  have  been  wont  to 
do  in  Circumftances,  that  are  like  or  not  very  differing. 
And, 

(Km/  Things  are  likely  to  go  as  they  have  been  wont, 
where  there  is  no  Appearance  to  the  contrary.     Yet, 

(Kn)  The  Promifes  and  Threatnings  of  God  in  reference 
to  the  Things  oi  time  are  likely  to  have  an  Accomplifhmenc 
one  time  or  other  in  this  "World,  either  in  the  very  kind  or 
fomewhat  anfwering  to  it. 

(Koj  A  general  Point  confirm'd  by  many  Inftanccs,  and 
not  contradided  (fo  far  as  appears,  upon  due  Enquiry^  by  any 
do's  probably  hold. 

( Kp )  A  Aeddy  Belief,  or  ftrong  Affe5ions,  naturally 
exprefs'd,  are  likely  to  beget  fome^vhat  of  that  kind  in 
others. 

(Kq^  Such  as  are  not  wont  to  falfifie,  and  where  there  i$ 
nothing  extraordinary  to  induce  them  to  it,  do  probably 
fpeak  true. 

(Kr)  Where  there  are  more  Means,  that  are  feverally 
capable  of  producing  an  EfFe(5t,  or  more  ways  of  its  coming 
to  pafs  ;  it  is  then  liker  to  be  .-  And  therefore  on  the  other 
hand. 

(Kf )  Where  there  are  fewer  Means  or  Ways,  none  of 
vs?hich  vv/ould  necelfarily  produce  an  Eiied,  it  is  lefs  likely  it 
IhonJd  come  to  pafs  i  as  that  in  a  Lotrery,  a  Man  fhould  have 
a  Prize;  efpecially,  where  either  the  Blanks,  or  the  ways  of 
producing  them  are  much  more  numerous.  As  if  itpon  $ijc 
Dice  the  extreme  Chances,  as  6,  7,  8,  (^c.  and  36,  35,  54, 
•oc,  be  appointed  for  Prizes,  and  only  a  fmaller  Number  of 
tat  middle  Cafts  for  Blanks,  thcfe  would  be  liker  to  come 
up,  than  the  orher ;  fince  they  might  be  produc'd  by  a  far 
greater  Number  of  differing  Combinations, 


K  1  Thus 


1 24  ^»  ^JJ^y  fof  the  Part  i. 

Thus  we  have  gone  thro'  the  Set  of  Pofitions^  in  which 
fome  of  fhe  forementioned  Simpler  Themes  do  at  leaft  ap- 
pear to  ftand  fairly  conne(5ted  or  disjoin  d  ;  I  have  not  of- 
fer'd  or  delign'd  them  all  as  Principles  or  Axioms  ;  and  if 
fome  of  them  ftoiild  not  be  tho't  fo  much  as  juft  Dedudi- 
ons  by  every  Reader,  yet  they  may,  'tis  hop'd,  come  near 
the  Truth,  and  afford  fome  Help  to  fuch  as  are  fearching:af= 
ter  ito 


The 


Chap-  I.  Improvement  of  Reafon.  125 

Xhe  Second  Part. 


CHAP.     I. 

§  1 .  1~  XAVING  laid  in  the  Furniture,  which  might  be 
I — I  Antecedently  NecelTary,  or  Serviceable,  in  order 
■-  -■■  to  the  better  ufing  of  our  Realon  ;  I  now  pro- 
ceed more  direftly  to  Ipeak  of  fever^l  Ways,  wherein  it  is  to 
be  us'd  i  that  1  may  give  the  beft  Direction  and  Alliftance  I 
can,  as  the  differing  Occafions  may  feverally  require. 

§  z.  I  begin  with  fuch  Ufes  of  our  Reafon,  as  may  be 
Subfervient  to  the  reft,  and  particularly  to  thofe,  which  will 
be  afterwards  treated  of  in  this  EfTay.  What  is  here  defign  d, 
is,  that  we  may  rightly  take  what  others  deliver,  and  ji'jUy 
exprefs  what  we  our  felves  intend :  Both  of  thcfe  do  moft 
dire(ftly  and  immediately  relate  to  Words,  or  oth-r  Ways 
pf  Expreflion,  but  with  reference  to  the  Tho'ts,  they  are 
fuppofed  or  defign'd  to  exprefs. 

§  J.  Man  is  a  Sociable  Creature,  endowed  with  a  Capa- 
city of  opening  his  Mind,  and  imparting  his  Tho'ts  by  Signs 
fitted,  and,  tacitely  at  leaft,  agreed  upon  for  that  purpofe  ; 
He  is  alfo  Capable  of  apprehending  what  others  Mean,  whei^ 
they  exprefs  their  Sentiments  in  a  way,  with  which  he  is  al- 
ready, or  may  come  to  be,  acquainted. 

§  4.  Our  attending  to  what  is  truly  and  fitly  delivered 
by  others,  is  one  of  ihe  firft  and  eafieft  Natural  Means  of 
acquiring  and  improving  the  more  confiderable  Points  and 
Parts  of  Knowledge :  But  then  we  muft  rightly  take  the 
Meaning,  which  they  are  fuppofed  juftly,  or  at  leaft  intelli- 
gibly, to  exprefs.  And  it  isrequifite,  that  even  Learners  and 
Enquirers  fliould  be  able  in  feme  Mcafure  juftly  to  exprefs 
ihemfelves,  at  leaft  as  to  what  they  would  enquire,  and  how 
they  conceive  of  what  lies  before  them. 

%  5.  Grammar  is  indeed  helpful  for  putting  Words  to- 
gether in  fuch  a  fort,  as  to  fliow  the  Reference  they  have  to 
each  other,  as  that  this  is  the  Nominative,  and  that  the  Verb 
related  to  it;  this  the  Subftantive,  and  fW  its  Adjedive, 
&i:  and  alfo  there  is  fome  Intimation  given,  vehkh  Word  is 
defign'd  to  exprefs  the  Thing  Spoken  of;  and  •cvhich  is  inten- 
ded for  the  Thing  affirmed  of  it,  or  deny'd  j  which  is  for  the 

K  }  Subftance 


\  26  An  tjja'y  for  the  Fart  11. 

Subfiance  or  Sub]c£t,  and  which  for  ah  Accident  or  A'djiiii'Sl, 
^c.  And  thus  they  make  up  a  kind  of  Granmmtical  Seiife, 
or  Verbal  Congruity,  where  yei  there  may  be  no  Logical 
Senffi,  or  conliftenc  Meaning:  As  if  it  were  faid,  j^the  Cold 
and  thirfty  Sun-Beams  freeze  tKe  ^Continuous  or  cohering 
Sand  into  Atoms  of  Fire ,  which  may  be  fubdivided  into 
Wouhtaiiibus  Mole-hills]  inftead  of  laying  [the  Dry  Cold 
Wintcr-Air  Freezes  the  difcontinuous  or  incoherent  Water 
into  a  Floor  of  Ice,  which  may  be  broken  into  lelfer  Parts 
and  Particles].  Now  Logic  fhould  help  us  to  chufc  ou;: 
fueh  Words,  and  put  them /o  to  gether,  that  they  may  carry  a 
Meaning  confiftcnt  in  it  felf,  and  likfewife  agreeable  to  the 
Tho'ts  we  would  exprefs. 

§  6.  In  Languages  already  fdrm'd  to  our  hand  ;  we 
rnnft  firiR  endeavour  to  underltand  aright,  what  \i  f&id  by 
others,  cither  as  they  might  really  delign,  or  as  their  Expref- 
fions  are  to  be  rcafonably  taken  ;  before  we  can  well  hope  fo 
to  exprefs  our  fel\  cs :  1  therefore  begin  with  the  former,  as 
bein^  commonly  the  eaficr  of  the  two,  and  fitly  leading  to 
the  other.     Now  that  wc  may  be  dirfedied  and  alliftcd, 

§  7  I,  HJghtly  fo  tnke  what  others  deliver,  there  are  fome 
Things  to  be  obferv'd  and  attended  to,  which  are  indeed 
exfrih  fecal  to  the  Matter  Difcours'd,  and  yet  may  foiVietimes 
be  of  Neccflary  Ufe  to  get  out,  or  better  afccrtain  the  Mea- 
jiihg  ,  as  well  as  other  Things  ivtemr.lly  belonging  to  what  we 
■tt'oiild  endeavour  to  undcrftarid,  either  as  it  might  be  inten- 
ded, or  as  furh  Exprenions  in  fuch  Cafe  And  Circumftances 
ought  inReafon  to  be  conltfiftl. 

§  8.  As  to  what  is  exttinfecal  to  the  Difcoinfe  if  felf  • 
the  folJqwing  Points  are  to  be  regarded,  W^, 

I,  Who  it  is  that  Speakc'i  of  Writes  ;  if  it  be  iii  a  Cafe, 
where  that  may  be  of  any  Confequcnce :  And  in  moft  Cafes 
it  is  certainly  of  Moment  to  know,  if  God  be  the  Author, 
whoever  were  his  Inftrument ;  lince  he  neither  can  be  de-. 
ceiv'd,  nor  would  go  to  deceive  us.  We  ftftly  may,  and 
liiuft  indeed,  take  what  God  has  immediately  dictated,   or 

?pecially  Superintended  to  be  really  confiftcnt  vc^ith  it  felf, 
uitedto  the  Purpoft,  and  that  it  is  to  be  underftood  accor- 
ding to  fuch  fair  and  jyft  Rules  an^'  Meafures  of  Interpre- 
tation, as  impartial  and  unbiafs'd  Reafon  may  Suggeftj  01 
caiuiot  but  approve. 

^  cf.  We  may  not 'To  depend  on  a  Creature,  th^i:  is  not  only 

Fallible,  but  Fain,   and  has  no  Supernatural  AlTiftance  oi: 

unerring  Conduit  ,•   Here  we  muft  be  more  upon  our  Guard, 

both  as  to  the  Mattet  ajid  Expreffion :    Since  we  Catinot.  be 

"■'■■''  .   '  .  ■.     '  •  -■'ajro'Tcrrirv 


Chap.  I.  improvement  of  Realcn.  127 

altogether  furc,  eichef  that  he  intended  to  exprefs  his  real 
Sentiment,  or  that  he  has  rightly  exprefs'd,whathe  did  intend, 
lb  as  we  may  come  at  it  by  the  juft  Rules  of  Interpretation; 
and  it  may  yet  be  more  doubtful,  whether  he  hirtifelf  under- 
flood  the  Matter  a:s  indeed  it  is :  Yet  \\t  may  much  fnrther 
depend  upon  one  that  is  well  acqudinted,  both  with  the  Siib- 
jeClhe  is  upon,  and  the  Language  in  which  he  Treats  it? 
and  who  is  alfo  a  Perfon  of  approv'd  Integrity  •,  than  npoh 
one  of  a  differing  Chara6ler. 

§  I  o.  "We  muft  farthrr  obferve,  whether  he  who  Writes  or 
Speaks,  do  it  in  his  own  Perfon,  or  in  the  Perfon  of  anoiiier; 
10  as  to  deliver,  not  his  own  Senfe  but  anothers  :  And  this 
is  the  more  carefully  to  be  minded,  becaufe  often  rimes  no 
Exprefs  Notice  is  given  in  fuch  Cafe,  but  it  is  left  to  be  col- 
le£led  from  the  Nature  and  Circumftances  of  the  Matter  ,  as 
in  the  Song  of  Solomon  throughout,  where  the  Author  is  gene- 
rally allow'd  to  Perfonate  fometimes  Chrift,  fometimes  the 
Church,  and  fometimes  others. 

§  II.  And  it  muft  be  likewife  obferv'd,  whether  the 
perfon  were  Skilful  and  Accurate  in  the  Matter  of  which  he 
Treats,  of  in  the  way  of  expreffing  himfclfj  whether  he 
were  Learned  or  Unlearn'd,  oc: 

§  II.  And  alfo  of  what  Opinion,  or  Party  he  is,  where 
that  may  give  any  Light  about  his  Meaning,  for  Truth,  and. 
Orthodoxy  muft  be  very  differently  underftood  according  to 
the  differing  Sentiments  of  them,  who  ufe  thofe  Words. 

§  li-  It  fhould  be  likewife  confider'd  if  there  be  any 
other  Circumftance  relating  to  the  Peffon,  which  may  be  of 
Ufe  to  determine  his  Meaning :  For  it  may  be  fuppos'd, 
that  Men  commonly  fpeak  according  to  the  CircumltartCes, 
wherein  they  ftand,  which  therefore  are  to  be  Enquir'd  out, 
where  their  Senfe  or  Meaning  may,  in  any  fort,  depend 
thereon. 

^  14.  It  may  herp  be  ufefully  diredted,  that  we  ihould 
endeavour  to  have  what  is  deliver'd,  from  the  Perfon  hirtt- 
felf,  if  it  may  be,  ftioref  irrimediately,  rather  than  at  fecond- 
hand,  or  in  his  own  Wofds  however,  rather  than  anothers, 
and  therefore,  in  the  Original,  rather  than  a  Tranllation  ; 
at  leaft  this  ought  to  be  compared  with  that^  and  we  Ihould 
doubtlefs  choofe  fif  it  may  bej  to  compare  them  our  felves, 
or  hovrever,  as  well  as  ws  can,  to  examine  what  is  this 
way  done  by  others. 


K  4  §  iSWe 


128  An  hjfay  for  the  Part  II- 

§  1 5.  We  (hould  alfo  take  what  Care  we  can  to  have  the 
moft  correct  Copies,  and  beft  Editions,  and  after  all,  muft 
make  allowance  for  fuch  Miftakes,  as  might  eafily  be  made 
in  Tranfcribing,  or  by  the  Prefs. 

§  16.  We  ought  to  have  the  various  Readings  of  Sacred 
Writ ;  and  may  fafely  allow,  that  in  Matters,  which  are 
rot  of  NecclTary  Importance  to  Mfikf  m  Wife  unto  Salvation ; 
there  may  polTibly  be  fpme  Miftakes  permitted  by  Divine 
Providence  for  Purpofes  beft  known  to  God,  as  in  lome 
Points  of  Chronology,  or  the  like. 

<>  17.  II,  We  muft  confider  the  Perfons  apply'd  toby 
one  that  isPrudenr,  and  confiders  the  Capacities,  Inclina- 
tion, and  other  Circumftances  of  thofe  he  would  inftrudt  or 
move  ;  for  many  things  are  to  be  Underftnod,  as  deliver 'd 
agreeably  to  thofe  Views,  rather  than  as  they  would  have 
been  expreflcd  had  they  been  defign'd,  or  addrefs'd  to  others : 
Thus  when  'tis  faid,  that  the  Molten  Sea  belonging  to  the 
Temple,  was  Ten  Cubits  over,  and  that  a  Line  of  Thirty 
Cubits  compafs'd  it  about  (i  Ki>'gs  7-  2.3) ;  'tis  not  to  be  un- 
^erftood  that  it  was  but  juft  Thirty  Cubits,  but  that  this  ac- 
count was  near  the  Matter,  and  fufficiently  right  for  thofe  to 
ivhom  it  was  cheifly  defign'd, 

^  18.  Here  we  ought  accordingly  to  undtrftand,  vehnt 
is  faid  to  Superiors,  v>hnt  to  Inferiors,  or  Equals,  v^^bat  to  the 
Learned,  or  to  the  Vulgar,  vphat  in  common  to  all,  or  only 
with  a  peculiar  defign  to  fome,  who  arc  in  fuch  Cafe  or  Cir- 
cumftance. 

^  19.  Ill,  We  (hould  obfcrve  the  Purpofe  or  End  de- 
firn'd,  which  gives  a  dire^5lion  to  the  Means,  and  amongft 
Others  both  to  the  Matter  deliver'd,and  to  the  Manner  of  Ex- 
prefling  it.  He  who  plainly  dcfigns  not  to  (ift  out  the  Truth, 
but  to  carry  his  Caule,  whether  it  fhould  happen  to  be  right 
or  wrong,  muft  be  underftood  to  deliver  not  always  what  he 
himfelf  is  fully  fatished  in,  or  looks  upon  as  firm  and  cogent^ 
tho'  he  oflfer  it  as  fuch. 

§  2o.  Anditis  to  be  fuppos'd,  that  the  Matter  hath  fome 
fitnefs,  or  at  leaft  a  defigned  Tendency  towards  the  intended 
End,  whether  it  were  only  to  Inftrmft,  or  to  perfwade,  &c. 
and  thercfcre  it  is  to  be  undcrftOod,  not  altogether  (imply 
andabfolure'y,  butas  related  to  that  End. 

§  2 1.  Now  the  real  Defign  is  not  always  to  be  taken  from 
what  is  profelVd,  but  from  what  appears  moft  probable  up- 
on Confidciation  of  Perfons  and  Circumftances  j  for  fome 
may  purpofely  feem  to  aim  at  one  End,  whilft  they  are  really 
defigning  another, 

§2Z.|V,  V,V 


Chap.  3.  Improvement  of  Kt2i{on.  11^ 

%  12.  IV,  We  muft  confider  the  Age,  or  Time,  and 
Place,  or  Country,  wherein  a  Treatife  was  written,  or  a 
Difcourfe,  which  we  have  on  Record  was  deliver'd.  Ic  is 
plain,  that  in  various  Ages  and  Counciics  of  the  World, 
there  is  a  great  variety  of  Sentiments,  differing  way«;  of  Ex- 
preffion,  and  other  Circumftances,  which  may  greatly  alter 
the  Senle  from  what  (uch  Expreffions  mighc  import  in  fo:ne 
other  place,  or  at  fome  other  time.    Therefore, 

§  23.  It  maft  be  of  great  and  Necelfary  Ufe  for  the 
right  underftanding  of  Authors,  who  have  written  in  Dill  ant 
Times,  and  Places,  to  acquaint  our  felves,  as  far  as  we  can, 
with  the  Genius,  Difpofition  and  Manners  of  the  Men,  as  al- 
fo  with  the  Affairs  and  Cuftoms  of  fuch  Age  and  Cot  r.try  ; 
and  likewife  with  the  Topogrciphy,  or  Geographical  D  fcripti- 
on  of  the  Place,  and  with  the  Chronology  of  fucn  a  Period. 


CHAP.      II. 

§  I.  "VJOW  as  to  what  is  Intrinfecal  to  the  Difcourfe  it 
•*-^  felf,  we  Ihould  take  Care,  i.  That  we  be  before- 
hand competently  furnifti'd  with  the  Knowledge  of  that 
Language,  or  other  way  of  ExprefTion,  wherein  any  Matter 
is  deliver'd,  and  not  have  it  then  to  feek,  when  we  fhould  ufe 
it ;  we  ought  therefore  to  have  fome  good  Meafure  of  Ac- 
quaintance with  moft,  or  however  the  moft  ufual  Words, 
and  their  more  general  Import ;  as  alfo  with  the  common 
way  and  Manner  of  putting  them  together,  to  exprefs  fuch 
or  fuch  a  Senfe ;  and  laftly,  with  the  Uioms^  and  Phmfeolo- 
^7,  or  Turns  of  Exprellion  peculiar  to  this  or  that  Language : 
Nor  fhould  we  have  thefc  ordinarily  to  fearch  out  from  Vo- 
cabularies, Grammars,  Idiotifms,  or  elfewhere  ;  whenas  they 
ought  to  have  beenprevioufly  laid  in  by  our  being  before  well 
grounded  in  Grammatical  Learning,  Reading  approved  Au- 
thors, Tranflating  the  Language  we  would  undcrftand,  and 
turning  others  into  it,  and  it  deler\  es  to  be  diftindly  Noted ; 
Thar, 

§  1.  1,  We  (hould  notnegled  proper  Means  for  getting  a 
more  txuSt  and  thorough  Acquaintance,  even  with  our  Na- 
tive Tongue,  which  we  are  not  ordinarily  like  to  have  with- 
out divers  of  the  foremention'd  Means;  nor  doth  it  appear, 
that  any  of  them  can  well  be  fpared  here ;  unlefs  it  fhouli 
be  that  cf  Tranflating,  which  yet  were  an  Exercifc  highly 
fending  to  rnakePerfons  more  accurate  Mafters  of  their  own 

Tongue, 


150  An  iijfav  for  the  Part  if. 

Tongue,  whilft  they  are  endeavouring  to  join  fome  other 
with  it  ;  and  it  may  be  with  good  Ufe  fometin\es  to  turn  the 
Senie  of  an  Author  into  other  Words  of  the  fame  Language  ; 
efpecially  if  he  had  not  deliver'd  himfelf  fo  Juftly,  Clearly, 
or  Elegantly. 

§  5.  Certain  it  is,  that  a  thorow  Acquaintance  with  our 
Mother-Tongue,  i.e. amougft  us,  with  the En^li/h  Language,as 
It  hath  been  formerly  us'd,  and  as  now  it  ftands  aker'd,  en- 
Jarg'd,  and  improv'd,  muft  be  of  great  Advantage,  and  per- 
haps of  greater  Confequcnce  to  moii  Perfons,  in  nioft  Cafes, 
than  the  critical  Knowledge  cF  other  Languages  can  ordina- 
tily  be;  fince  not  only  our  daily  Converfe  runs  in  this  Chan- 
nel, but  alfo  Matters  of  greatcft  Importance  are  generally 
this  way  to  be  tranfdded  ;  particularly  in  the  more  Publick 
and  Solemn  Converlations  and  Debates,  and  in  what  is  de- 
liver'd in  Parliament,  on  the  Bench,  at  the  Bar,  in  the  Pul- 
pit, and  moftly  from  the  Prefs. 

§  4.  It  is  not  to  be  deny'd,  that  great  Inconveniencies, 
Contentions,  and  other  Mifchiefs  do  often  arife  from  the  not 
having  or  not  ufing  a  Critical  and  Juft  Difcernment  as  to  the 
Import  of  Expreilions  in  our  own  Language,  And  whereas 
not  very  many  do  therein  exprefs  themfelve^  J^iftly,  and 
Clearly,  it  will  require  the  greater  Application  to  Spell  out 
the  Meaning  of  fome  from  inaccurate  and  obfcure  Dif- 
conrfes. 

^  §  5,  3.  Proverbial  Sentences,  and  Figurative  ways  of 
Speaking  mult  alfo  be  ftudied  in  order  to  our  better  Under- 
ftanding  of  Authors,  01  even  of  common  Difcourfe,  and  for 
thisPurpofe  fome  good  Books,  which  treat  of  them  are  care- 
fully to  be  read;  and  I  ogic  is  in  a  fort  Necellary  to  give  us 
a  right  Apprehenfion  of  Rhetoric. 

§  6.  4.  When  any  more  Solemn  Difcourfe  is,  or  may  be 
refer'd  to  fome  general  Head  of  Knowledge,  as  to  fome  Arc 
or  Science,  it  mult  be  of  great  Ule  that  we  have  fome  previ- 
ous Acqjuaintance  therewith,  and  that  we  do  in  fome  gdod 
Meafare  underftand  the  Principal  Matters  thereto  belonging, 
together  with  the  particalar  Terms  of  fuch  Art  or  Science, 
and  the  peculiar  Senfe  therein  given  to  words  which  may  be 
otheruife  common;  nor  Ihould  we  have  thefe  to  feek  in 
T<7c/-w<r^/ Vocabularies,  or  elfewhere,  when  we  ougnt  to  ufe 
them ,  but  they  ihould  rather  be  laid  in  before-hand.  ^  And, 

§  7.  5 .  In  order  to  our  being  competently  furnilh'd  with 
tkz  mentioned  Prerequifites  the  moft  will  need  proper  In- 
/^ruifrors  to  lead  them  firft  into  the  Grounds  and  Eleilients  of 
rhc-  levera*  Arts  and  Sciences  j   aa'd  beeaufe  it  is  a  matter  of 

"    great 


Chap.  2.  Improvement  of  Realon.  ijt 

great  Importance  that  they  be  carefully  chofen,  it  may  te  of 
Uffe  here  to  give  the  Cllaradlerof  fuch  as  lliould  be  foiight, 
vi^.  Perfons  of  clear  Apprehenfion,  ahd  ExpreHlon ;  ftrici 
Examiners,  and  Impartial  Lovers  of  Truth  ;  ready  to  owh 
it  in  their  Antagonift,  and  careful  to  fift  qnt  what  there  may 
fee  of  it,  evien  from  Error;  fuch  as  will  Encourage  Learners 
in  iifeful  Enquiries ;  and  carefully  weigh  Objcdlions,  but 
dete£t  and  defpife  mere  Cavils,  that  may  be  advanc'd  agairilt 
folid  Argument;  fuch  as  can  diftinguifh  Nicely,  and  ufc  it 
wifely,  not  to  cloud  but  clear  up  Things,  and  particularly  to 
difcover  and  (hew  what  there  may  be  of  real  Difference  or 
Agreement,  where  there  is  a  ftrong  Appeanmce  of  the  cdn- 
t'rafy  ;  in  Ihort,  fuch  as  are  no  Captious  Difputers,  but  can- 
did Interpreters,  and  cautious  Affercors. 

But  in  the  want  of  fuch  help,  we  fliould  get  the  plaincft 
introductory  Treatifes,  we  can,  to  read  ;  and  if  it  may  be  to 
Converfeand  Confer  upon  them  with  fuch  as  are  knowing  in 
the  Matter,  or  at  leaft,  if  vve  can,  to  take  other  Learners 
along  with  us,  in  order  to  mutual  ATiflance.     But  after  a'!, 

§  8.  6.  Whereas  fcarce  anv  Man  can  be  fully  pr'epar'd, 
and  ready  at  all  Points,  it  will  be  requifite,  that  we  have  the 
fcveral  foremention'd  Helps  at  hand  ('vi:{,  Diftionarics,  IJi'o- 
fifms,  Treatifes  of  Proverbs,  Hiftorical,  Geographical,  and 
Technical  Vocabularies,  ^s),  to  be  confuked  andus'duvou 
occafion  ;  or  that  we  fupply  the  want  of  them  as  well  ay  wc 
can  by  Confulting  fuch  Perfons,  as  may  be  like  to  inform  us 
in  arly  particular  Doubt  or  Diificulty  ;  and  if  we  have  not 
fuch  prefent  with  us,  it  were  beft  to  note  down  the  Matters 
of  Enquiry  in  a  Pocket  Book  under  the  Head,  to  which  they 
bfelong,  and  to  take  the  firft  Opportunity,  we  can,  to  j^et 
them  refolv'd  either  by  Perfons,  or  from  Books,  when  we 
hieet  with  them. 

§  9.  But  to  make  the  beft  ufe  we  can  of  the  Knowledge 
already  laid  in  for  the  right  underftandihg  what  we  farther 
i^ad,  or  hear, 

7.  We  rhuft  endeavour  to  get  out,  what  is  the  Argument 
or  Subjetfb  Matter,  if  it  be  not  plainly  declared  ;  this  we'miift 
take  to  be  the  thing-  profefledly  difcours'dof,  if  it  lliall  not 
appear  otherwifej  for  feme  may  pretend  to  treat  of  one 
thing,  wh°n  they  arc  intending,  pr  do  unawares  Aide  into 
another.  "Where  there  is  opportunity  for  it,  the  readiefl  anS 
fureft  Way  may  be  to  enquire  of  fuch  as  can  and  will  inform. 
u§,  what  is  the  Subjeft  of  this  or  that  Difcourfe  :  Othcr- 
V/ife  wc  miift  carefully  obferve  the  Tide,  and  Arguiutnr, 
or  Contends  pf  Books,  Chapters,  pt  other  Subdivinons^   yet 

not 


192  An  bjfay  for  the  Part  II. 

not  fb  intirely  depending  thereon,  as  to  neg|e(5k  the  beft  Ob- 
fervation  we  can  make,  by  confiderii)g  what  is  the  main 
Thing  Defin'd  or  Defcrib'd,  Diftinguifli'd,  Divided,  or  other- 
wife  Handled,  or  v^hat  is  more  frequently  refum'd,  tho'  per- 
haps under  feveral  Islames,  but  of  like  import ;  efpecially 
what  the  Difcourfe  in  its  Procedure  appears  ultimately  to  be 
referred  to  in  the  whole,  tho'  perhaps  not  immediately  and 
dire(itly  in  every  Part  thereof. 

§  10.  If  there  be  a  Scheme,  Analyfis,  or  the  general 
Heads  and  Branches  of  a  Treatife  laid  together,  it  may  be 
belt  to  begin  yvith  that ;  or  elfe  we  mult  ordinarily  read  fuel? 
Book  or  Di\  ifion  as  may  deferve  a  more  careful  Perufal,  firft 
more  ciirforily  over,  in  order  to  take  a  naore  general  View  of 
its  Matter  and  Dellgn,  before  we  proceed  to  read  it  with  a 
nicer  and  clolcr  Application.  And  Men  are  generally  to  be 
heard  out,  before  we  pretend  to  underftand  them  fully,  or 
even  to  make  proper  Enquiries  about  the  Matter  Difcour- 
fed. 

§  II.  8,  The  Argument,  or  Subjedt  Matter,  when  we 
have  it  afcertain'd,  muit  be  kept  in  Mmd,  and  carried  along 
with  us,  as  that  which  is  to  give  fome  light  to  the  Difcourfe  it 
felf,  as  well  as  to  receive  farther  Light  from  it  ;  and  it  is  to 
be  a  kind  of  general  Mealurc  for  our  better  underftanding 
the  Words  and  Phrafes  peculiar  to  fuch  Argument,  or  which 
in  treating  of  it  mav  ha\e  a  peculiar  Senfe  »  and  alfo  we  may 
judge  of  the  Appofitcnefs  of  a  Difcourfe  or  Treatife,  by  ob- 
iervmg,  whether  the  Matter  undertaken  or  attempted  were 
ftillkcpt  in  View,  and  purfued,  or  fome  other  Point  ftarted 
4nd  follow'd,  which  was  not  to  the  prefent  Purpofe,  but  im- 
pertinent. 

§  1 2.  9,  We  muft  never  fly  to  a  lefs  common  or  Figu- 
rative Senfe  of  Words  or  Phrafes,  without  fufficient  Reafon 
ro  enforce,  or  at  Jcaft  to  induce  thereto  ;  as,  that  the  Senfe 
will  not  otherwife  comport  with  the  Subjedt,  or  agree  to 
what  IS  more  plainly  faid,  or  generally  confefs'd  about  it ; 
Thus  the  Eyes,  Ear,  Mouth,  Hands,  Feet,  G/c,  of  God  and  his 
Seeing,  Hearing,  G?c,  in  Scripture  are  neceflarily  to  be  taken 
for  fomewhat  in  him  anfwering  to  fuch  Parts,  or  Powers,  or 
Aits  in  Man:  And  the  Song  cf  Solomon  muft  be  extremely 
Uncouth,  and  Unnatural,  as  well  as  unfit  to  have  a  Place 
a.r.ongit  rhofe  Books,  which  are  confeffedly  infpir'd,  if  wq 
ChdXi  no;  allow  it  a  Figurative,  and  Allegorical  Conftrudti- 
on,  in  reference  to  Chrift  and  his  Church  :  As  alfo  the. 
Propbeiies  of  Scripture  muft  be  Tropically  underftood,  for 
thg  nioj^  Part,  to  reprcfent  their  Meaning  fuitably  tp  the  Di- 
vine 


Chap.2.  IwprovemefTt  of  Kd^ion.  i^^ 

vine  Wifdom,  to  other  Parts  of  Scripture,  and  particularly  to 
thofe  Prophclies,  which  appear  to  have  been  already  unde- 
niably fulfill'd. 

§  13.  lo,  Nothing  abfurd  is  to  be  afcrib'd  to  any  Pcr- 
fon  without  gOod  E\idence,  and  a  kind  of  Neceflity,  in 
that  he  cannot  be  otherwife  underftood  without  a  manifeft 
force  upon  his  Exprellions,  and  the  very  Tenor  of  his  Dif- 
courfe  J  for  otherwife,  what  looks  like  an  Abfurdity,  may 
and  fliould  be  often  fo  underftood  as  to  carry  in  it  fome  more 
fublime  and  forcible  Senfe :  And  Men  (hould  be  generally 
fuppos'd  to  have  fome  intelligible  Meaning  in  what  they  fay, 
and  fome  Appearance,  at  leaft,  of  Reafon  for  it ;  and  tho" 
ihey  exprefs  themfelves  unhappily,  yet  we  ought  not  to 
make  an  Advantage  of  that,  but  rather  fairly  to  ftate  what 
we  may  reafonably  conceive  them  to  Defign. 

§  14.  1 1 ,  If  the  Senfe  fhouldbeleft  doubtful  in  any  Point, 
we  muft  firil  Endeavour  to  fee,  whether  it  were  not  de- 
fignedly  fo  deliver' d,  which  muft  be  judged  by  the  Circum- 
ftances  of  Perfons  and  Things ;  and  we  may  reafonably  fup- 
pofe  it,  where  he  that  fpeaks,  is  not  antecedently  Bound,  nor 
hath  exprcfly  undertaken  to  inform  us  about  the  Matter  ;  ef- 
pecially  if  it  be  fuch  as  he  might  probably  judge  lefs  fit  to  be 
ihore  determinatcly  communicated  to  fuch  Perfons  in  parti- 
cular, or  to  the  World  in  generaf. 

§  15.  But  where  there  is  no  fufficient  Reafon  to  fup- 
pofe  the  mentioned  Defign,  we  are  to  confider  what  are  the 
various  Senfes,  which  may  be  put  upon  the  Expreffion,  and 
here  to  take  in  help  from  what  is  faid  about  the  differing  ways 
in  which  Signs  may  be  taken  (P.  i.C.i5.§  1 5,0'c,)as  Material- 
ly, Formally,  GJ'c  j  and  then  carefully  to  obferve,  which  of  thofe 
Senfes  may  beft  agree  with  the  Argument  and  Defign,  with 
what  precedes  and  follows,  as  alfo  with  the  Perfon,  and  his 
known  Opinions. 

§  16.  11,  What  is  univerfally  or  generally  faid  muft  of- 
ten be  taken  with  Reftridtion,  according  to  what  is  common- 
ly allow'd,  and  agreeably  to  what  is  ocherways  more  particu- 
larly and  difiindly  faid  by  the  fame  Perfon ;  and  it  would 
be  Captious  and  Unfair  to  take  an  Advantage  upon  this  or 
other  like  ways  of  Speaking,  where  the  Intendment  is,  or 
may  be  eafily  known  : 

§  »7-  '3,  What  is  deliver'd  by  the  By,  is  to  be  inter- 
preted agreeably  to  what  is  ofFer'd,  when  the  Matter  is  more 
defignedly  handled  j  and  efpecially  where  it  is  controverted 
and  cjiereirore  more  carefully  ftated  and  examin'd. 


1^4 Anjl^iyjorthe  Part  11. 

§  1 8.  14,  What  is  only  once  or  rarely  mentioned,  muft 
be  under ftood  agreeably  ro  what  is  more  frequently  deli- 
ver'd;  un'efs  there  fhouM  be  fome  confiderable  Diftance  of 
time,  and  that  it  may  be  reafonably  jadg'd  the  Perfqn  hath 
aJter'd  hisMind  upon  farther  Confideration  and  Experience, 
or  however  has  thought  fit  to  profefs  a  differing  Senti- 
ment. 

§  19.  15,  We  muft  enquite,  whether  in  fome  Cafes  there 
jnay  not  be  foniething  ^cinlyVUridci-Jlcod  to  compleat  or  deter- 
mine the  Senfe,  either  from  what  precedes  or  follows ;  or 
where  there  is  a  manifeft  PalTion  rendering  the  Difcpurle 
abrupt  or  broken ;  cr  that  in  .the  known  Uf^gp  cf  fuch 
X^nguage,  fbme  Words  are, wont  ?o  be  Qj;iicted,  wh^ch  yec 
are  to  be  underftood. 

.  §  ?o.  1 6,  What  fq^ciently  appears  tp  \>e.  Divir^ely  Jn- 
fpir'd,  or  .deliver'd  under  the  Special  Influence,  ^n^Conj 
dudt  of  the  Spirit  of  God,  muft  alvvavs  be  To  under-ftood,  as 
to  confift  with  it  Iclf,  and  with  every  thing  elfe,  which  God 
fjarh  reveal'd  :  And  even  Men  of  ipund  Intellci^uals  muil 
generally  be  fuppofed  in  what  they  fay  about  the  fame  Mat- 
ter, in  the  fame  Difcourfe,  or  at  the  fame  Time,  to  have  a 
confirtent  Meaning;  unlefseuher  their  particular  Exprellions, 
or  however  the  Tenor  and  Tendency  of  Uieir  Difcourfe  about 
fuch  a  Point  will  not,  without  manifeft  Violence,  admit  of 
a  Senfe  agreeable  to  what  they  muft  as  unqucftionably  mean 
by  foiuewhac  elfe,  which  they  have  faid  :  As  in  thofe  Po,- 
pifh  Philofophcrs,  who  having  attributed  Extenfion  to  Body, 
and  allow'd  it  to  take  iip  Space,  yet  to  maintain  the 
Poiftiine  oiTr.nJiibJlnntintiori  (to  \yliich  they  have  unhapfily 
ty\l  upthemfelves  in  the  Council qfT-e?//)  will  fuppofe  that 
abfurdity  >yhich  in  conrradiftiniHon  to  <luavi/i-'irod  Extenficn., 
rhev  are  picas'dto  call  Eimtativc  i  whereby  tHcy  co^itradi^fii- 
pufly  hold,  that  the  difiin^k  Parts  of  Matter  [  a^  the  Head. 
Trunk,  and  Limbs  of  our  Saviour's  Body j  ^^  Ip?  all  of 
thein  together  without  their  diftindl  Places. 

§  i\.  But  cpmmonly,  where  there  is  no  fuch  Bigprry  of 
ppinion,  nor  ?  Turn  to  be  ferv'd,  feeming  Jnconiiftences 
may  and  ihould  be  reconcifdhy  fome  allowable  biltjniition; 
fuch  as  thcie  which  follow,  or  the  like  ;  naii-jely.  (i.)  That 
this  is  faid  according  to  common  Opinion,  that  which  appears, 
or  is  perhaps  really  Oppofite  to  it,  is  ouercd  with  a  Defign 
crftating-stid  declaring  the  Matter  more  nicely  and  exaaly 
as  it  is,  cr  as  it  is  conceiv'd  really  to  be.  (2.)  That  tha  i$ 
given,  as  a  Perfon's  own  Sentiment,  that  as  anothers,  who  is 
only  Perfonated,    or  brought  in  Jo  fpeaking,    without  any 

Notice 


Chap.  2.  Improvement  of  Reaion.  155 

Notice  exprefly  given,  that  it  is  the  Sentiment  of  another- 
(3.)  That  thii  is,'  or  may  be  defign  d  to  Perfons  of"  fuch  a 
•Charafter,  that  to  thofe  of  a  ditfeiing  Sort,  with  a  differing 
Meaning  fuited  to  them.  (4.)  That  r/'«  refers  ro  things  of 
fuch  a  Sort,  thnt  to  thofe  of  a  differing  Kind,  tho'  tlicy  may 
pafs  under  the  fame  Denomination. 

§  12.  Or,  f  5.)  That  Thh  is  intended  to  relate  to  one  Time, 
That  to  another  ;  whence  arifes  that  Rule  Dijiingue  Tempora^ 
G)  non  errabv,  Diftinguifti  but  the  Times,  apd  you  fliall  not 
fo  eafily  run  into  Mifapprehenfions.  (6.)  That  Thu  is  meant 
of  a  thing  in  one  RefpecV,  or  under  one  Gonfideration  ;  Thnt 
of  the  felf-fame  thing  indeed,  but  in  fome  ether  Refpeft,  or 
under  fome  differing  Confideration :  We  might  here  add, 
(7  J  That  This  may  be  intended  in  a  Proper,  That  in  a  figu- 
rative Senfe;  and  more  particularly,  the  one  Serioufly,  and 
the  other  only  in  Jefl,  or  by  way  of  Irony  and  Irrifion,  as  may 
he.  difcerr^'d  by  the  Accent,  or  Tone  of  the  Voice  ;  or  by 
the  Gefture  and  Countenance  of  the  Perfon  fpeaking  j  or  by 
confidering  what  fort  of  Perfon  he  is,  what  he  fays,  in  what 
manner,  to  whom,  and  with  what  defign  j  but  we  leave  the 
farther  Profecution  of  this  matter  to  Rhetorick,  and  alfo  the 
more  peculiar  Meafures  for  interpreting  the  Sacred  Scriptures 
£0  thofe,  who  purpofely  treat  thereof. 

§  z?.  For  the  better  underftanding,  what  may  be  the 
Defign  of  B^frejentctions  by  Pi(flure,  Carving,  or  the  Like, 
we  fhould  before  hand  know,  how  the  Virtues,  Sciences, 
Countries,  cj>r.  have  been  ufually  Figur'd  out:  And  we 
fhould  carefully  obferve,  what  there  is  of  Similitude  and  Re-- 
femblance  to  any  thing,  which  is  known  to  have  paffed,  or 
to  be  now  pafling  in  che  World,  or  to  be  ufual,  and  more 
particularly  in  fuch  Part  or  Place,  to  which  the  Reprefenta- 
tion  may  refer  •  but  efpecially,  if  there  be  any  Lemma^  or 
Jnfcription;  we  fhould  endeavour  to  improve  and  ufe  it,  as 
a  Key  to  the  Import  and  Delign  of  the  Hiflorical  or  Emble- 
matical Figures. 

§  24.  As  to  Crypticnl  and  Secret  Writing  ;  that  may  be 
fufpecfted  for  fuch,  which,  (being  from,  or  by,  or  to  fufpi- 
cious  Perfons,  at  a  Time,  and  in  a  State  of  Things,  which 
may  feem  to  require  ir),  carries  a  dubious  and  unaccountable 
Import,  or  conceals  its  meaning  in  uncouth  and  unufual 
•  Charadrers :  In  fuch  Cafe,  if  there  be  Occallon  and  Autho- 
rity for  it,  Perfons  and  Parties,  tnat  may  appear  any  ways 
concerned  fhould  be  cxamin'd,  as  to  the  writing  it  felf,  and 
all  the  various  Circumflances  relating  in  any  Wife  to  it:  The 
'Key  or:  Diredion  for  Reading  it  is  to  be  fQught  j   and  if  it  is 

not 


1^6  An  tffdy  for  the  Part  11. 

DOC  otherways  to  be  got,  we  muft  endeavour  to  guefs  out  the 
Vowels,  or  other  Letters,  or  Words,  which  do  moft  frequent- 
ly occur  in  the  known  or  fuppofed  Language,  by  obferving, 
what  are  the  M.irl{s  moft  frequently  repeated  in  the  ^ii- 

«i"g-  .       .  ^ 

^  25.     And  whereas  there  is  ftili,    as  well  as  in  Daniel's 

Tinne  a  Go^,  who  mealctb  Secrets,  whenever  he  pleafeth,  it 

may  not  be  a  tempting  or  provoking  of  him,   in  fome  very 

fingular  Cafe,   wkh  humble  Subniinion  to  feek  the  help  he 

can  eafily  give  by  almoft  infenlible  Touches  upon  our  Minds, 

whilft  we  are  fetting  our  felves  in  the  likelieft  way  we  can 

to  fcarch  out  the  Matter  j    but  we  should  take  great  Care 

that  wo  be  not  carried  by  a  necdlefs  and  unalloAv'd  Curiofity 

into  any  Manner  or  Method  of  Enquiry,  which  may  be  joft- 

ly  fufpeftcd  as  unwarrantable. 


CHAP.     III. 

§  I.  \17E  now  proceed  to  the  farther  fubfervient  way  (3f 
^^  ufing  our  Reafon,  wherein  it  is  to  be  diretfled, 
and  aflifted,  vi:t, 

IL  Rightly  or  jpj}/y  to  exprcfs  whnt  vee  our  felves  intend^ 
cfpcclaily  in  the  inore  folemn  ways  of  Speaking  or  "Writing. 
It  has  been  oblerv'd,  that  Grammar  do's  by  it  felf  properly 
teach  only  congruous  Words,  not  conliftent  Senfe  in  any 
Sort,  much  Icfs  to  deliver  this  or  that  particular  Meaning  ; 
nor  do's  Rhctorick  fo  diredtly  concern  it  felf  about  the  pro- 
priety of  Expreflioni  but,  prcfuppoling  f/jrt^,  it  proceeds  to 
fiiew,  how  it  may  be  made  more  Pleafing  or  Pungent,  more 
Copious  or  Elegant,  i3s. 

§  2.  Whenas  that^  which  is  fuppos'd  to  be  already  at- 
tain'd,  is  not  fo  eafie  a  Matter,  as  is  commonly  tho't,  nor 
fo  juftly  perform'd  as  is  generally  prefum'd  ;  whilft  the  far 
greater  part  of  Writings  and  Difcourfes  go  upon  what  is  for 
Subftance  previoully  known,  or  allow  themfelves  fo  great  a 
Compals  in  what  is  out  of  the  common  Road,  that  there  is 
lefs  need  of  accurate  Expreilion,  whi'A  one  Sentence  fup- 
plies  ihe  Deficiencies  of  Another,  ot  helps  to  limit  and  fix  its 
Meaning. 


§3.  Yet 


Chap:}  Improvement  of  ^t^ion.  457 

§  5.  Yet,  after  all,  Men  feem  to  be  commonly  much  in 
the  Dark  about  each  others  Meaning,  taking  that  in  one 
Senfe,  which  was  defigi^d  in  another  ;  and  oft  contei  - 
ding  about  H^'ords,  where  ihey  are  really  agreed  about  Things^ 
but  know  it  not,  or  attend  not  to  it.  And  as  Expreflioas  aic 
often  left  undetermin'd  and  unguarded  in  Matters,  that  are 
Critical  and  Difficult,  it  requires  more  Underftanding  and 
Candor  to  take  them  right,  than  is  generally  to  be  met  with- 
al: And  whereas  we  mall  always  inevitably  need  To  much 
of  thefe,  it  concerjis  us  to  iKakje  as  little  "Work  for  them,  as 
polfibjy  we  can. 

§  4.  We  fliould  jtlierefore  endeav.our  to  find  out  fuah 
Words,  and  putxhera  /^.together,  as  that  Perfons  of  a  Mo- 
derate Capacity,  who  liave  the  requifite  Furninnre,  giving 
due  Actendance  to  the  feveral  Words  employ'd,  and  to  the 
way  of  ufing  them  may,  or  indjeed  muft,  apprehend  the  de- 
figned  Import ;  nor  can  any  way  alter  it  without  wrefting  the 
Ekpreflions,  or  not  obCerving  theai  carefully,  or  at  leaft, 
iiot  regarding  the  Contexture,  .ox  fuch  otfaer  determining 
Circumftances  as  have  been  mejttion'd  under  the  foregoing 
General. 

§  5.  I  (hall  not  here  trouble  the  Reader  with  any  thing 
i&rther  about  Hiftorical  01  Eaiblematieal  [{eprefentntions,  than 
that  Natural  Similitude,  and  known  Ufage  be  carefully  fol- 
low'd,  and  fome  Intimation  (if  it  be  needful  and  proper) 
given  of  the  Defign  by  fome  apt  and  concife  Infcripcion, 
As  to  Cryptography^  the  Method,  or  Key,  which  has  been 
communicated  to  our  Correfpondent  is  to  be,  by  us,  exactly 
j)arfu'd  and  obferv'd. 

6  .6.  But  it  is  the  move  .ufual  ways  cff  Eofprefllng  our 
tfeJv.es,  as  in  Speaking  or  Writing,  which  1  would  here  di- 
redband  aiTifl;,  in  order  to  the  juft  Reprefenting  of  our  in- 
JEeodfid  Senfe.  Kow  the  Principal  Means  to  attain  or  improve 
ibJjappy  a  Faculty  mud  be  frequent  exercife  upon  Thot's, 
that  are  Jiice  and  hard  to  be  accurately  exprefs'd  \  and  this 
*o  he  attended  with  heedful  -Obfervation,  whether,  and 
how  far  we  are  rightly  underftood ;  but  in  Conjundlion  .with 
thtit^  -the  follo>wing  Dirediions  may  beof  IJfe.    And, 

§  7.  ;(i.)  We  muft  get  as  pecfedt  an  Acquaintance,  as 
well  we-can,  with  the  Language,  in  whith  we  would  Speak  or 
"Writer  its  various  Words  ;  .the  various  Import  and  Ufe  of 
/fuc-h,  as  we  may .  have  ituore  frequent  Occafion  ifor ;  alfo  the 
Critical  Difference  of  .clipfe,  which  (ignifie  much  alike  for 
the  Main;  the  different  w.iys  of  ufing  them,  foas  to  lignifie 
x'tih  or  that  J  Idioms,  or  Forms  .and  Modes  of  Speakmg  pe- 

L  cuhar 


138  An  tffay  for  the  Pare  ll. 

culiar  to  the  Tongue  we  are  purfuing ;    likewife  Proverbial 
Sentences,  (3c. 

§  8.  (2.)  We  Ihould attentively  hear,  and  heedfully  read 
fuch  as  Speak  and  Write  properly  ;  obferving  how  Words  of 
a  various  Import  are  fix'd  and  determin'd  by  the  way  and 
manner  of  their  ufing  them,  to  Tranflate  fome  fuch  Authors 
might  be  an  Exercife  of  great  Advantage  to  make  us  more 
intently  Obfervant  of  their  Manner,  and  better  to  retain  the 
Impreflion  thereof. 

§  9.  (5  J  We  muft  make  fure  the  Words  and  ways  of 
Speaking  we  ufe  will,  at  leaft,  bear  the  Senfe  we  defign, 
however  in  fuch  Cafe,  and  Circumftances,  without  any 
Strain  or  Force  put  upon  them  :  And,  (/\.)  We  are  farther 
to  confider,  whether  they  will  not  as  well  admit  of  fome 
other  undefigned  Conftrudlion,  without  any  palpable  wre- 
fting  of  them:  And  in  this  Cafe,  ("5  J  We  (hould  change 
the  Ambiguous  Word  or  Claufe  for  what  is  in  it  felf  de- 
terminate, or  will  be  fo  in  the  prefent  way  of  ufing  it ;  but 
if  this  cannot  well  be  done,  then  we  mull  add  what  Ihall  re- 
ftrain  and  determine  the  Senfe :    And  here, 

§  lo.  (6.)  We  may  put  in  fome  Noun  or  Verb  with  a 
Conjunftive  or  disjundlive  Particle  fo,  as  that  the  feveral 
Words  thus  put  together  may  plainly  appear  to  be  defigned, 
not  for  divers  Things,  but  for  the  fame,  thus  diver  fly  ex- 
prcfs'd  by  Words,  which  feparately  taken  would  be  other- 
wife  Underftood,  but  being  us'd  together,  for  the  fame 
Thing,  will  offer  to  the  Mind  that  Senfe  only,  wherein  they 
agree,  exclufive  of  the  farther  or  other  Import  wherein  they 
differ.  As  if  I  Ihould  fay,  a  Craby  or  Fijh,  the  Meaning 
would  be  what -we  fometimes  exprefs  by  Cmb-fljhy  fince  the 
one  Name  fo  limits  the  other,  that  the  Crab  cannot  be  taken 
for  the  Fruit  fo  call'd,  nor  FiJh  for  any  other  than  the  Filh  fo 
call'd.  If  I  fay,  Dipping  and  Dyings  the  Dipping  is  limited 
by  Dying,  and  this  again  by  thnt,  fo  that  both  are  under- 
ftood in  relation  to  colouring  of  Cloth.  The  Senfe  of  an 
Ambiguous  Word  or  Claufe  may  alfo  be  otherways  deter- 
min'd :    For, 

§  1 1.  (7.)  We  may  add  fome  other  Term  or  Exprefllon 
which  more  plainly  declares  the  Meaning;  as  if  I  fay,  the 
Crnb  has  Cinws.  He  lives  by  Dying  Clcth:  Or  we  may, 
(8.)  Once  for  all  Define  or  Defcribe  the  Subjeft  we  Speak  of, 
or  the  Attribute  given  to  it,  or  Explain  and  open  the  Fofition, 
of  which  wie  would  Difcourfe.    But, 


Sii.(9.)Whilfl 


Chap.  g.  Improvement  of  K^ai^on.  i^a 

§  12.  (p.)  Whilft  we  deliver  our  Meaning  with  all  the 
Care  and  Guard,  which  may  be  requifite  to  clear  and  fecure 
it,  we  fhould  heedfuUy  avoid  the  putting  in  of  what  is  ribc 
Neceflary  to  thofe  Ends,  but  might  raife  an  Apprehenfion  of 
fome  other  Intendment,  than  that,  which  would  have  fliew'd 
it  felf  fufficiently  Plain  and  undeniable  without  any  fuch 
Addition  :  As  if  I  (hould  fay,  Minds,  which  are  indijcerpible^ 
are  thinking  Suhjiances^  inltead  of  faying,  Minds  are  thinking 
Subfiances-^  the  added  Qaufe  would  falfely  intimate,  th^c 
I  fuppofed  there  were  Minds  which  might  be  torn  in  pieces^ 
and  that  fome  Minds  were  not  thinking  Subflances. 

§  13.  (ro.)  Since  P nr tides  ^xc  or  fo  great  Significancyj,' 
and  have  fuch  differing  Senfes,  it  is  highly  requifite  to  be  ac° 
curatelySkilJ'd  therein;  and,  for  that  end,  not  only  once  t6 
Read,  but  fometimes  to  Review  the  moil  approved  Tre^tifes 
relating  to  them :  And  tho'  I  know  not  of  any,  that  have 
been  purpofely  compos'd  for  thofe  of  the  Englifb  Tongue  ;yet 
Cole's Die'tionary,  or  l^/.<lkii\  Particles,  may  very  well  ferve 
to  give  their  differing  Acceptations,  whilft  they  diredi  us 
how  to  render  them  in  Latin  according  to  their  various 
Import. 

§  14.  (n.)  Care  is  to  be  taken  in  the  Ufeof  F{elativcsl 
that  they  be  not  too  far  removed  from  the  more  Principal 
Words,  to  which  they  relate  (commonly  call'd  their  Antece" 
dents) ;  but  efpccially  that  it  be  not  left  doubtful  to  what 
they  refer  ;  which  Ihould  therefore  be  the  nearer  Subitan- 
tive,  unlefs  it  may  be  fafely  carry'd  to  one  that  is:  more  re- 
mote, as  being  plainly  fo  determined  by  its  Number,  or 
Gender,  or  by  what  is  laid  of  it  afterwards :  As  in  faying 
England  is  happy  in  fo  Excellent  a  Princcis,  the  Belt  of 
Queens  and  Soveregn  Princes;  and  it  is  like  to  Flourifl/, 
while  She  Reigns  with  fuch  Wifdom  and  Temper,  whatever 
they  do  in  their  refpe£live  Dominions. 

§  1 5.  But,  ( I  a.)  When  there  may  be  danger  of  Miftake 
or  Ambiguity  in  ufing  the  Pronoun  Relative,  we  fhould  ra- 
ther repeat  the  intended  Noun  to  fix  and  fecure  the  Senfe,  if 
it  be  faid,  there  arc  yet  two  diftindt  Kingdoms  in  England 
and  Scotland,  which  is  ready  to  fall  in  with  its  Neighbouring 
Kingdom :  The  Senfe  is  not  here  fo  evident  and  certain, 
as  if  it  weref^id,  ScfifZ/jw.'/ is  ready,  ©"r. 

§  16.  .13.)  It  may  be  of  very  confidcrable  Ufe,  both 
to  the  prcfent  Intention,  and  to  other  valuable  Purpofes, 
that  we  iTiouId  accnftom  our  felves  to  write  down  our  Tho'ts^- 
6r  at  leaii  the  Refult  of  them,  with  its  Grc.nids  and  Realbns, 
apbxi  any  Subject  cif  Importance,  cfpeciaUy  fnch  as  is  Nic^ 

L  2  and 


JJ^JmUl.lgM^k. 


140  /it?  tf jay  for  the  Part  U. 

and  Difficult ;  and  chat  at  fon-.e  diftaiice  of  Time  we  fhould 
review  it,  obferving  whether  our  ExprefTions  wijl  then  give 
us  any  clear  Idea  of  the  Matter;  if  not,  we  ftiould  en- 
deavour, as  well  as  we  can,  to  recollect  it,  and  to  redtifie  the 
Account  thereof.     But, 

§  17.  (14.)  To  make  it  yet  more  Sure,  that  our  Expref- 
fions  do  truly  and  juflly  reprefent  our  intended  Senfe  ;  v^t 
(hould  enquire  of  others  (as  was  before  intimated,  but  is 
now  to  be  farther  open'd)  v(i  ether,  and  baxv  they  underftand 
us  ?  Nor  (hould  we  ask  of  fuch  as  are  of  extraordinary  Ca- 
pacity, or  who  know  before-hand  the  very  Notions,  we  would 
impart;  tho'  they  ought  indeed. to  havefome  more  general 
Acquaintance  with  the  Sub  ed,  nor  (hould  they  be  Ignorant 
of  any  thing  relating  to  the  Words  or  Matter,  which  our 
way  ©f  treating  it  fuppofcs  them  to  be  Furnifh'd  with,  in 
order  to  their  taking  rightly  and  eafiiy  what  we  farther  lay 
before  them,  by  way  of  Experiment  to  fee  whether  it  be 
juftly  exprefs'd, 

§  1 8.  Thus  fomewhat  has  been  endeavoured  towards  the 
Piredion  and  Aififiance  of  our  Realbn,  in  reference  to  the 
two  leading  and  Subfervient  Purpofes  r  We  are  now  to  pro- 
ceed to  fuch  as  may  be  tliercby  fi.bfcrv'd  ;  for  Hearing,  Rea- 
ding and  Difcoiirting  with  others,  and  clpecially  the  writing 
down  of  our  own  Tho'ts,  Reviewing,  Imparting,  and  far- 
ther contideringof  them,  fhould  in  Reafon  mightily  tend  to 
thefurniiliing,  preparing,  and  dilpcfing  our  Minds  better  to 
nianase  the  feveral  following  Purpofes. 


CHAP.     IV. 

§  1.  A  Mongft  the  farther  ways  of  uling  our  Reafon, 
^  which  may  receive  forae  Light  and  Help  from 
thof«  which  have  been  treated  of,  I  fhall  begin  with  flich  as 
are  of  a  more  general  Nature,  and  here  Ihall  endeavoor, 
that  Reafon  may  be  effedually  direded  and  alfifted, 

1^  Bjghtly  to  mnke  and  piirjue  Enquiries.  When  fomething 
lies  before  us,  with  which  we  are  little  or  not  at  all  acquain- 
ted, it  mufl  be  of  ufe  to  be  guided  in  our  Enquiries  about  ir, 
and  indeed  for  the  more  thorow  fearching  out  of  what  we 
may  already  know  in  fome  good  Meafure  :  Some  farther 
/fii^iftance  will  therefore  be  oifer'd  (beyond  the  brief  and  ge- 
flcrai  Iniimations  already  giveOi  Pact  i.  Chap.^.  §  ^^^  5,16.) 

fot 


Chap  4.         Improvement  of  Pveafon.  14^ 

for  the  Beijing,  and  towards  the  B^foiving  of  fit  Fnquiries 
upon  the  various  Kinds  of  Subjedls,  which  may  fall  under 
Confideration. 

§  2.  It  feems  to  be  one  great  part  of  the  Buflnefsof  Lo^tc 
to  fuggeft  fro^er  Queflions^  and  to  give  us  Aim,  what  fort,  of 
Anfxvc.s  we  fhonld  look  for,  and  how  to  feek  them  :  And 
for  fuch  Purpofcs  the  general  Notions  and  leading  Notices, 
therein  given,  (hould  lye  always  ready  in  our  Minds  to 
prompt  Enquiries,  and  point  out  the  Refolutions  by  fuch 
Marks  and  Charaders,  as  may  be  of  fome  Ufe  towards  our 
fcarching  them  cut,  in  the  particular  Inftance,  by  the  Light 
of  what  has  been  faid  in  general  of  Subjiance^  Accident^  &c, 
as  alfo  of  Combimfions^  Separations,  &:c.  And  thus  we  may 
be  not  only  led  to  Enquire,  but  heip'd  rightly  to  determine, 
whether  this  or  that  be  a  Subflance,  Accident,  G?c;  whether 
it  be  fingle  or  combin'd,  and  how  ;  whether  a  whole  or  part, 
and  how  feparated,  (^c  ;  vihether  abfoluce  or  relative,  and 
of  what  fort  ;  v?hether  a  Caufe  or  Effe6t,  S?c.    And, 

§  3.  Whereas  we  have  in  this  ElTay  fome  Account  of 
Things  thcmfelves,  Pare  1.  Chap,  i,  3,  4,  and  5.  as  well  as 
the  Logical  Notions  about  them,  we  may,  with  greater  Eafe 
and  Difpatch,  run  thro'  the  Summary  there  given,  or  fuch 
Branch  thereof  as  we  are  more  diredlly  concern'd  withal,  to 
fee  what  may  be  there  found  or  thereby  fuggefted,  which 
will  anfwer  to  the  general  Mark  and  Charadker  of  a  Subject 
or  Adjund:,  Caufe  orEffe£^,  G'c  in  relarion  to  the  particu- 
lar Matter  before  us  ;  and  may  therefore  be  taken  and  confi- 
der'd,  as  being  accordingly  related  to  it :  And  we  might 
not  dnfitly  call  this  Treatife  Promptuaruim  Logicum,  as  being 
a  kind  of  Score-houfe,  whence  we  mighr  draw  Matter,  and 
alfo  Meafures  for  proceeding  upon  it ;  the  former  chiefly  from 
the  firft  part,  the  latter  from  the  reft'. 

§  4.  If  any  one  having  heard  of  fuch  a  place  as  I^ctne, 
would  here,  at  London,  acquaint  himfelf  with  it,  he  would 
tc  for  enquiring  a  great  many  things  about  it;  fuppofefor 
Inftance,  whether  it  really  be?  What  it  is?  (whether  a 
Country,  or  City  fo  call'd)  where  it  is ; .  or  in  what  pare 
of  the  World  ?  How  big  it  is  ?  Of  what  fort  it  is  ?  (whe- 
ther it  be  the  Seat  of  a*  Sovereign  Prince  ? )  (^c. 

§  7.  Now  in  order  to  the  laifing  of  fit  Enquiries,  it  muft 
be  of  Ufe  to  guide  us  right,  and  make  us  ready ;  If  we 
hare  a  Set  of  Queftions  prepar'd ;  or  be,  at  leaft,  pronrtpted, 
what  to  ask,  by  fome  more  general  Notices ;  and  it  muft  be 
farther  ufeful,  if  we  know  how  to  follow  on  the  more  gene- 
ral Queftions  with  fuch  particular  ones,  as  mu ft  lead  to  th^ 

L  3  eafict 


142.  An  Ejfay  for  the  Fart  II. 

eafier  and  clearer  Refolving  of  them  :  As  if,  for  Inftance, 
we  are  furnifh'd  with  fome  Notions  about  Ql'^nrify  >  we  are 
then  prompted  to  Enquire  of  the  Length  and  Breadth,  and 
Compafs  of  I{pme. 

§6.  And  it  is  farther  of  Ufe,  to  have  fome  aim,  what 
kind  of  Anfwer  we  are  to  look  for ;  as,  4:hat  the  Anfwer  in 
the  mention'd  Cafe  (if  proper)  muft  be  made  by  what  we 
call  Lineal  Quantity  or  long  Meafure,  not  Superficial  or 
Solid  Meafure ;  not  fo  many  Tons,  or  Acres ;  but  fo  many 
Miles,  Furlongs,  Paces,  or  Feet. 

§  7.  And  finally,  it  is  above  all  Ufeful  to  have  it  fug- 
gefted  (at  leaft  in  general  j,  where  we  ftiould  feek.  the  parti- 
cular Anfwers  to  our  Enquiries,  or  how  we  may  attain 
them:  As,  fuppofe  we  aretold,  we  muft  confult  thofe  good 
Authors,  who  have  written  of  the  Modern  or  Prefent  I{pme ; 
or  fuch  knowing  Credible  Perfons,  Avho  are  well  acquainted 
with  Geographical  Writings,  or  who  have  themfelves  been 
ac  /^owf,  &c. 

§  8.  But  if  we  Avould,  our  felves,  go  to  I{nme  j  here 
again  many  Queftions  might  be  fitly  mov'd^  as,  how  far  it 
is?  whether  we  muft  crofs  the  Seas,  &c.  Now  we  ftiall 
here  give  fome  diftin(ft  Sets  of  brief  Enquiries  in  relation  to 
the  Various  Matters,  which  may  lye  before  us.    And, 

§  9.  I,  As  to  the  Sign  or  Signs  more  immediately  pre- 
fented,  by  which  we  are  led  to  fomething  elfe  thereby  no- 
tify a  to  us :  Enquiries  are  here  more  efpecially  to  be  made, 
when  Signs  are  m  themfelves  to  be  Confider'd ;  as  if  we 
would  make  our  Obfervations  upon  the  Ideas,  or  other  Re- 
prefentaiicns  of  Things,  at  lealt  before  we  proceed  to  what 
is  fo  reprefented. 

§  10.  Here  it  may  be  enquir'd,  (i.)  What  it  is  we  con- 
fcioufly  know  and  inwardly  feel,  whether  it  be  the  tranficnc 
Motion  of  Thinking,  or  the  more  fixed  Mode  of  formed 
Tho't  prefented  in  and  by  the  Mind  to  its  own  Confiderati- 
on.  (2.)  Whether  fuch  Thinking  and  Tho't  be  Intelleftual 
and  abftra£led  from  the  Senfes,  or  ally'd  thereto  ?  and  here, 
(3.)  Whether  more  remotely,  as  in  our  imagining  the  abfent 
Senfible  Objedt,  and  repreienting  it  to  our  felves,  in  fome 
Sort,  as  if  it  were  prefent ;  or  more  immediately,  as  in  our 
perceiving  it,  when  really  prefent,  thro'  the  Organs  of 
Senfe  ? 

Sir.  And  when  at  firft  the  Objed  fo  appears  to  us,  we 
may  fomctimes  have  Reafon  to  enquire,  ('4.)  Whether  the 
Obje£l  be  indeed  prefent,  as  it  feems,  or  that  there  is  only 
fome  Ai)pearance  thereof.^    And,  (^.)  Whether  that  be  from 

pure 


Chap.  4.  Improvement  of  Reafcn.  141 

pure  Imagination,  while  the  Organ,  proper  to  fuch  kind  of 
Objed:  is  not  employ'd,  as  in  Dreaming,  or  very  deep  Mii- 
fing;  or  that  it  is  by  means  of  the  outward  Senfe?  And 
here,  (6.)  Whether  the  Appearance  be  Somewhat  objeded 
externally  to  the  Senfe,  as  a  Shadow,  Piiflure^  Airy  Com- 
pofure,  and  the  like,  or  only  an  AfFedion  ot  the  Organ  it 
felf:    And, 

§  12.  (7.)  Whether  that  Affedlion  be  more  Tranfient, 
as  when  the  Eye  is  ftruck,  and  thereupon  Sparkles  appear  to 
move  before  it  j  or  more  fix'd  and  abiding,  as  in  the  Cafe 
of  the  Jaundice,  and  other  Diftempers  of  the  Eye,  or  Dif- 
orders  of  the  Palate,  Hand,  ^c. 

§  13.  We  may  alfo  enquire,  (8.)  Whether  one  or  more 
Senfes  are  affedled,  and  in  what  particular  Manner  ?  as  like-= 
wife,  (p.)  In  what  Degree,  whether  more  or  lefs  intenfely 
and  obfervably  ?  ^ 

§  14.  It  may  be  yet  farther  enquired,  fro.)  Whether 
what  we  conceive,  imagine,  or  perceive,  be  not  the  Sign  of 
Somewhat  elfe  ?  And,  (11 J  of  what  Sort  the  Sign  is? 
(vid.  Part  I.  Chap.  14.)  and  aifo,  (ii.)  Whence  it  comes  to 
fignifie ;  whether  from  its  own  Nature,  or  by  Appointment  ?, 
And,  (i3.J  Whether  the  Appointment  were  implicite  or  es- 
prefs } 

§  1 5.  ( ( 4.)  How  it  fignifies,  whether  fuch  a  thing  Simply,  or 
with  the  Connotation  of  fomewhat  elfe  ?  And,  (15./  Whe- 
ther the  Sign  do  Reprefent,  Illuftrate,  Convey,  or  Confirm? 
(16.)  Whether  its  Import  be  lefs  or  more  diftindl?  (17.)  Whe- 
ther it  be  Articulate,  or  at  lealt  referring  to  that,  which  is 
fo ;  as  the  Marks  in  Short-hand.^ 

§  i^.  If  Articulate,  (18.)  what  it  is  more  Specially, 
whether  written  Characters,  or,  (19.)  Vocal  Sound  .>  And 
either  way,  (lo.)  Whether  it  be  a  Letter,  Syllable,  Word, 
Claufe,  or  Period  ?  And  if  written,  we  may  enquire  yet 
farther  ;  {\%.)  Whether  it  be  a  Paragraph,  Sedion,  Chap- 
ter, Volume,  or  Book  ^ 

§17.  Ifit  be  a  Word,  (21.)  of  what  Grammatical  Sort, 
and  what  its  Logical  Nature  ?  If  a  Claufe,  or  Sentence, 
(Z3.)  What  the  chief  Nominative  or  Subjed ;  what  the 
principal  Verb  or  Attribute ;  what  the  Appendages  of  each  ; 
how  related  to  their  Principals,  and  among  themfelves  ? 

§  1 8.  Laft  of  all  and  chiefly,  (24.)  Whether  the  Sign  or 
Signs  are  in  the  prefent  Cafe,  to  be  confider'd  only  abfolutely 
in  themfelves,  or  relatively  to  what  they  fignirie  j  and  what 
fhat  is,  or  of  what  Sort  ? 

L  4  CHAP 


144  An  bfjay  for  the  Fart  II- 


CHAP.    V. 

§  1.  A  ND  now,  IT,  A*  to  the  more  general  Natvrrt  or 
•'*■  Cnndinoyi  of  rhar  fo  which  th.e  Sign  or  Signs  do  ul- 
eittiately  refer  wc  may  QHixriy,  (i.)  Wherhtr  rt  be  a  mere 
Notion,  or  Icmewhat  in  Nsture  ?  If  the  fonricr,  (2.)  Whe- 
elier  only  a  Fid-iOn,  of  that  which  has  a  Foundation  in  fome- 
thing  Real  r  If  the  firft  of  thefe,  (3.)  Whether  it  he  cO'ntra- 
didicils  or  conliftcm  with  it  feJf  ?  And  either  way,  (4)  of 
w?hat  it  is  made  up,  wlience  dra'^vn,  and  how  put  roge- 
ther? 

^  %.  As  ro  the  Notion,  which  has  a  Fouhdation  in  foiYie- 
what  Real,  (5  )  Whether  it  be  Cnly  lome  Notional  Re- 
mark (as  that  Adriin  is  an  Indrcidunt)  or  an  abftracVed  Na- 
ture ?  As  Adr.rns  hidividudity.  (6.)  Whether  tlie  Abftradi- 
on  be  more  or  lefs  genera!,  and  from  what  it  is  taken  ? 

§  3.  Ill,  As  ro  what  is  not  adually  exifting,  but  only 
PcJJib/e^  as  carrying  with  it  no  Inconfiftency,  we  may  en- 
quire, (i.j  Whether  it  ha-:  been,  or  only  m^iy  be,  or  is  lik;;  to 
b.',  or  certainly  ten'/!  be,  or  neceflarily  nniji  be  ^  As  to  this 
bft,  (1.)  Whether  of  ablolute  Neceflity,  or  only  upon  Sup- 
pofition  of  fomewhat  elfe  ?  And  as  to  any  of  the  foremeilti- 
Gned  Points.  {3.)  Whether  only  by  Supernatural  Agency, 
or  in  a  Natural  way,  by  fecond  Caufes  ?  '  4. )  What 
AfTurance  or  other  E\  idence  there  is  in  relation  to  any  (5f 
^hem  .- 

§  4.  IV,  As  to  the  Exlftence  of  what  actually  is ;  t\-e 
may  enquire,  (i.)  Whether  it?  EDiiftence  be  ahfolately  Ori- 
ginal or  fotVieway  derived?  {1.)  Whether  from  mere  tl'ill 
and  Pleafurc',  or  m  a  Natural  arid  Neccflary  way?  And  as 
to  this,  (3.)  Whether  from  what  is  in  it  felf  alrcgethSr  Ne- 
c'effary,  or  in  fome  refpectl  Contiilgent?  (4,)  Whether  the 
Contingency  be  primary  and  immediate,  as  in  what  is  pro- 
'dluc'd  at  Plcsfure  by  fome  VohiYitary  Agent  ;  or  Secondairy 
and  Mediate  in  what  may  neceflatily  flow  ffrom  thofe  Prc- 
dudidns,  and  yet  might  no't-have-been,  fince  thofe ProduAi- 
ons  Were  themfelves  Contingent  ? 

§  %'  f5')  Whether  what  we  have  under  Confideratio'il, 
Jii^  always  been  or  only  for  foitie  time,  and  for  how  long  a 
time?  Again,  (6.)  Whether  it  miift  <5f  aibfolnte  Neceffity 
<cxniiriuc  a.v-aySj    or  rhar  'tis  pofliblc  :r  flicuJd  fometime 

CCi-ifc 


Chap.  5.  Improvement  of  Keaion.  145 

ceafe  to  be  ?     And  here,  (7.)  Wherher  it  has  a  Natural  ten- 
dency in  it  felf  to  do  fo,  or  is  only  liable  thereto P 

§  6.(8.)Whether  itmay  ceafeto  be  thro'the  Influence  of  any 
Creature,  or  of  the  Creatour  oiily  ?  If  the  former,  (9. )  of 
what  Creature  ?  and  in  what  way?  if  the  latter,  (10  J  Whe- 
ther Gtxi  has  declar'd,  that  he  will,  or  will  not  put  an  end 
to  the  Exiftence  of  this  or  that?  or  which  of  the  two  is  moft 
Jikely? 

§  7 .  Now  what  exifts  may  be  eiclier  CoiJedi ve  or  Single : 
And, 

V,  As  to  any  CoSeSlkin  of  diftin£l  and  feparate  Things 
prefented  together  under  one  Idea,  or  what  nnay  be  fo  taken  : 
As  when  we  read,  or  hear,  or  think  ofKotio?}s,  or  Mm  PJd- 
rally ;  or  of  an  Army,  a  Troop  of  Horfe,  an  Aifembly  ot 
Men,  Women  and  Children ;  we  may  here  begin  with  the 
ColIecfUon  oi  fuch,  but  then  our  Enquiries  (hould  afterwards 
proceed  more  diftindly  upon  the  feveral  Sorts  or  Denomina- 
tions j  and,  if  it  might  be,  fingly  upon  every  feparate  Par- 
ticular. 

§  8.  As  to  the  Colle£lion  it  felf,  it  may  be  confider'd, 
(i.)  Whether  it  be  without  any  regular  Order,  or  orderiv 
difpos'd?  (2.)  In  what /{.2«<^  of  Order,  and  more  particu- 
larly hovo  ?  ('^.)  Whether  the  Things  coUeded  be  nuniier'd, 
or  unnumber'd?  And,  (4.)  whether  more  eafily  or  diScuIa- 
ly  to  be  numbred.  (5.)  Whether  the  Collection  contain 
things  of  one  Kind,  or  Sort,  or  Denomination  only,  or  of 
more?  And  then,  (6.)  Whether  of  ail  the  Kinds,  Sorts,  or 
Denominations,  or  only  fome  of  them  ?  And,  (7,)  What 
Kinds  or  Sorts,  or  Denominations  particularly?  And, 
'8.)  Whether  One  or  More  under  any  of  them  ?  (p. }  Whe- 
ther they  are  nearer  together  or  farther  from  each  other? 
(lo.j  In  what  way  and  manner  the  Combination  is  made, 
•y/V.  Part  I.  Chap.  8.  §6,7.  And,  (11.)  Wliether  it  be 
abiding  or  altering  ? 

$  9.  And  now  to  proceed  upon  the  feveral  parts  of  thofe 
Colled:ions,  we  may  farther  enquire : 

VI,  As  to  fome  general  Characters  belonging  to  the  Eflence 
of  thisor  that,  or  to  the  main  and  Summary  Account  there- 
of, (i.)  Whether  the  Eflence  include  Exiftence  »  or  that  the 
Thing  may  be  conceived  without  conceiving  it  to  be,  or  ex- 
ift.  (i.)  Whether  the  Eflence  comprizes  the  whole  Thing  ; 
or  that  there  is  fomewhat  of  it,  which  is  not  ftridly  of  its 
Eflence,  nor  fo  Neceflary  to  it,  but  that  it  may  adually  be, 
•or  however  be  conceiv'd  without  it. 

s  io.{3.;wh«. 


14^  An  Ejjay  for  the  Part  II. 

§  lo.  ('3.)  Whether  the  EfTence  be  of  the  highe/1  Kind, 
and  have  all  forts  of  Excellencies  agreeable  thereto  -,  or  of 
an  inferiour  Nature,  having  only  fome  of  a  lower  Sort? 
(4J  Whether  the  Excellencies  it  has  be  Infinite  or  Finite  .■' 
Again,  (5.)  Whether  there  is  nothing  Mutable  in  refpecil  of 
Being,  or  Will  belonging  to  it^  or  that  in  the fe  regards  it 
admit  of  Change.  And,  (6 J  Whether  it  be  altogether 
Independent  or  fomeway  depending  ? 

§  1 1.  (7.)  Upon  the  whole,  whether  it  be  uncreated  or  crea- 
ted? (8  J  Whether  it  be  the  DivineNnture  in  its  felf  Simply 
confider'd;  or  one  of  the  T/j^fe  therein  Subfifting?  (9.)  iVhat 
it  is  of  the  former,  or  vohich  of  thefe  latter,  whether  the  Father, 
Son,  or  Spirit  ?  Or,  (10.)  What  it  is  other  wife  appertaining  to 
that,  or  any  of  thefe,  or  to  all  of  them  in  Common  ?  And 
here  we  may  Enquire  of  what  foever  is  farther  belonging  to 
the  uncreated  Being,  as  his  immanent  and  tranfient  A(^s,  Re- 
lation to  his  Creatures,  &c.  f  Part  i.  Chap.  6,  §  8,  ^c.) 

§  I  z.  The  following  Enquires  are  limited  to  what  is  Cre- 
ated ;  And  here, 

VII,  As  to  the  Common  Nature,  wherein  this  or  that  Ef- 
fence  obfervably  agrees  with  fome  other  Eflence,  which  is 
yet  obfervably  differing  from  it  in  fome  other  refpeft ;  It 
may  be  enquir'd,  (i.)  Whether  the  Eflence  do  import,  that 
the  thing  is  fubfifting  of  its  felf,  or  imply  its  Inhering,  or 
being  fubjefled  in  fomcwhat  elfe :  And  here,  ( 2.  y  Whether 
immediately  in  the  Subftance  it  felf,  or  thro'  the  Interventi- 
on of  what  is  inhering  therein.^  And,  (3.)  Whether  it  be  at 
the  firft,  or  fome  farther  Remove,  as  in  the  Mode  of  a 
Mode. 

§  13.  (4.)  Whether  it  ftand  in  Aftion  or  Paflion ?  (5.) 
Whether  in  Privation  or  mere  Negation  .-  (6.)  Whether  it 
be  Real  or  Notional  ?  And,  (7.)  Whether  the  latter  be 
founded  in  Nature,  or  altogether  feign  d ;  andif  fo,  whether 
by  Defign,  orMiftake.^  (8.)  Whether  the  Eflence  be  more 
Simple  ;  or  that  it  is  a  manifeft  Combination  ?  (9.)  Whe- 
ther it  be  theElfence  of  a  Whole,  or  of  a  Part?  (10)  Of 
what  Parts  the  whole  is  made  up,  or  into  what  it  may  be 
divided,  or  diftinguifti'd  ?  And,  (rr.^  What  Proportion 
the  part  bears  to  its  whole  ;  and  whether  it  be  more  or  lefs 
Principal,   or  Neceflary  ? 

<§  14,  (12.3  Whether  the  Thing  be  confider'd,  as  fub- 
jeded  in  fomething  ;  or  as  Abftraded  from  it.  (13.)  What 
are  the  feveral  common  Natures  or  Kjnds  above  the  Thing 
we  are  conlidering ;  and  what  the  Sorts  below  ir,  into  \vhich 
it  may  be  diftiibuted:   or    what  the  P/rmc«/<irj  under  it  ? 

(i4.)Whe- 


Chap  5.  Improvement  of  Reafon.  147 

C14.)  Whether  it  be  Abfolutely,  or  Relatively  taken;  of  what 
Sort  the  Relation  is ;  what  its  Foundation ;  "What,  or  who 
the  Correlate;  what  continues  or  diffolves  the  Relation,  and 
how  'tis  anfwer'd  or  fail'd  ?  (i  5J  Whether  what  we  have  to 
confider  be  a  Sign  aifuch ;  or  contradiftinguifh'd  thereto  ? 

§  1 5.  (16.)  "Whether  it  be  fuch  as  we  can  fully  and  clear- 
ly comprehend  being  only  what  the  Mind  has  it  felf  deter- 
min'd  to  take  up  of  this  or  that  Matter  (fuppofe  it  were  the 
Concave  globular  Figure  of  the  Heavens)*  or  that  we  have 
but  an  obfcure  and  indiftinfl  Idea,  as  to  fomewhat  in  it  ? 
And  confequently,  (17.)  Whether  it  be  intirely  the  Produce 
of  our  Mind,  or  ratlier  our  way  of  confidering  Things ;  or 
that  there  is  fomewhat  of  the  Work  of  God  taken  in,  which 
has  always  fomething  at  the  Bottom  unknown  to  us  ? 

§  1 6.  "VIII,  As  to  the  peculiar  and  dijiinguijhing  Nature^ 
or  what  the  ElTence  under  Confideration  has  obfervably  dif- 
fering from  fome  other  Eflence,  which  do's  yet  obfervably 
agree  with  it  in  other  refpe£ls  ;  here  the  Enquiries  are  to  pro- 
ceed on  from  what  we  had  before  taken  Notice  of  as  Com- 
mon ;  and  we  may  go  thro'  the  Divifion  or  Subdivifions,  or 
the  feveral  Kinds  and  Sorts,  as  they  each  have  their  diffe- 
rencing Character  till  we  come  down  to  that,  which  com- 
pleats  the  Elfence  of  what  we  are  confidering,  and  diftin- 
guilhes  it  from  fuch  other  Eflence,  as  comes  the  neareft  to 
it,  among  thofe,  which  are  not  of  the  fame  Sort  with  it. 

§  17.  Now  if  the  common  Nature  did  import,  that  the 
thing  was  fubfifting  of  it  felf  i  we  may  enquire,  (i.)  Whe- 
ther it  be  Indifcerpible,  and  fejf-moving,  which  we  call 
Spirit;  or  Difcerpible  and  of  it  felf  unadive,  which  we  un- 
derhand by  Matter  ?  As  to  the  former,  (i.)  Whether  it  be 
unrelated,  or  naturally  related  to  fome  grofs  Body  ;  and  be 
Icfs  or  more  limited  as  to  its  Adtivity  and  Reach?  (3.)  Whe- 
ther it  be  out  of  fuch  Body,  or  in  it?  If  in  it,  (4.)  Whether 
naturally  capable  of  exifting  feparate  from  it,  and  of  ading, 
€ven  at  prefent,  in  fome  fort  without  it,  or  not  ? 

§  18.  As  to  what  is  Material,  (^.}  Whether  it  affed  our 
Senfes,  or  not?  If  it  do,  (6.)  Which  of  them,  and  how  ? 
if  the  Object  be  vifible,  (7.)  Whether  to  the  naked  Eye,  or 
by  the  help  of  Glaffes,  k3c.  (8  )  What  the  Shape,  Size,  Co- 
lour, cj;c.  fee  Part  I.  Chap.  3.  §6.  (9.J  Whether  it  be 
Uniform  and  Similar,  or  dillimilar  and  obfervably  various. 
(10.^  Whether  the  various  Matter  be  more  Simple,  or  Or- 
ganiz'd.  (11.)  Whether  the  Organs  ferve  only  for  Nutri- 
tion, or  Senfation  ?  And,  (i  z.)  Whether  thefe  fubferve  to 
Imagination  only,  or  to  the  more  proper  Intelledual  Opera- 
tion? CHAP. 


148  An  tjfay  for  the  Part  1 1. 


CHAP.     VT. 


§  r.    A  S  to  what  do's  not  fubfift  of  it  felf,  but  is  fubjcded 
■^^  in  fomewhat  elfe,  on  which  it  is  depending,  Cft 
feme  way  apparraining  thereto,    I  Ihall  offer  foine  Enquiries 
under  the  farcher  Heads  following.     And, 

IX.  As  CO  yliiive  Pcvi^eis^  (i.j  What  there  is,  either  for 
LucallVioricn,  or  Appreheniion  ?  As co  the  former,  (2,)  Whe- 
ther it  be  for  moving  only  fonnething  cll'e  obfervably,  as  the 
Load-ftone  do's  the  Iron;  or  for  the  moving  of  it  feif  P  And 
here^  (5.;  Whether  only  in  its  Place  Or  from  it  >  ■4.)  What 
is  the  de<?ree  of  the  Motive  Force,  an.!  what  its  Manner  of 
moving. 

§  X.  As  to  Apprehenfive  Power  ;  («;.)  Whether  it  be  li- 
iriiccd  to  Senfible  Tilings,  or  extend  to  fuch  as  are  purely  In- 
rclleAual  .•=  (6.)  Whether  it  be  Intuitive,  difcurfive,  ot 
both?  r?-)  Whether  it  Itop  in  knowing,  or  proceed  to 
fomewhat  farther.^  And  here,  ;  8.)  Whether  to  doing,  or 
deliringonly  ?  (9.)  Whether  the  Dedre  Hzy  in  H^ijhing,  or 
comc  up  to  what  is  properly  Wuling  }  fSce  JPart  i.  Chap.  2. 
§  18.)  And,  (■  I  o.)  Whether  this  be  more  Simple,  or  Paflio- 
nate,  as  agitating  the  Blood  and  Spirits  ?  (See  Part  i .  Chap.i. 
§  27. )  Here  it  may  be  enquir'd,  (11.)  On  what  fort  of  Oc- 
cafions  r  And,  ( 1  2.)  In  what  Manner  ?*  Whether  in  refpecft 
of  outward  Appearance,  inward  feefing,  or  what  is  any 
other  way  Concomitant  or  Confequent.^ 

§  5.  X,  As  to  Pr.jfive  Capacity,  we  may  Enquire,  (i.) 
What  this  or  that  is  capable  of  Becoming,  or  Being,  and  in 
v/hat  Way  ?  (2.)  Whether  and  how  far  it  is  fitted  to  refift, 
or  to  receive  this  or  that  Influence?  More  particularly, 
U.)  To  be  Moved  in  its  Place  or  from  it  ;  (4.)  To  be  fo  or 
io  Difpos'd,  or  Impreft  ;  (5.)  To  be  Difpofed  of,  ufed  or 
employ'd  m  this  or  that  way  ;  (6.)  To  be  continued,  or  dif- 
continudj  (7.)  Annihilated  or  alter'd  i  and  this,  (8.)  for 
the  better,  or  for  the  worfe  .- 

§  4.  XL  As  CO  what  may  be  any  way  Proper  and  Pecu- 
liar^  attending  or  following  the  Eflfence,  tho'  not  ftridlly  of 
it,  2i'-  ('•)  What  can  be  duly  infer'd  from  any  thing  of  the 
Eflence,  which  is  not  To  plainly  included  in  it ;  as  that  x  right 
lin'd  figure.  Which  has  but  three  Angles,  muft  have  them 
al;  tcce.her  equal  to  two  right  ones,  or  to  a  Semicircle.  (1.) 
NVherher  that  which  is  fo  infer'd  can  be  infer'd  from  noth-'ng 

flic 


Chap.  6.  Improvement  of  K^aion.  14^ 

die,  but  from  fuch  Eflence  onlyP  (3.)  Wher her  this  or 
that  belong  only  to  Tuch  particular  Thing,  or  only  to  thofe 
of  fijch  a  fort,  or  of  fuch  more  general  Kind  r  And,  (4.) 
Whether  it  agree  rhcreto  alVvays,  or  only  at  fuch  Times  01 
on  fuch  Occafions  ? 

§  5.  XII.  As  to  Habit Sy  vi-hi.h  tray,  in  fome  Cafes, 
heighten  or  lefTen  theabovemencioned  Powers  and  Capacities. 
Q^.  (i .)  "Which  of  thefe,  and  which  of  either  Sort  in  particu- 
lar the  Habit  do's  affe£l  ?  (2.)  How  T  whether  for  the  better, 
or  for  the  worfe  ?  (3.)  In  what  degree,  more  or  lefs  ?  And, 
(4.)  Whence  it  is,  whether  from  Creation,  or  Generation, 
Supernatural  Infiifion,  or  Acquirement  ?    See  Part  i.  Chap. 

5.  §15- 

§  6.  XIII,  As  to  other  internal  Attnhutes,  which  like- 
wife  are  not  only  Acceflions,  but  Accidental  to  the  Eflence 
J^«.  (i.)  What  there  may  fanher  be  of  fuch  a  Kind  ?  And,* 
(2J  Whether  they  belong  direftly  and  immediately  to  what 
can  fubfiA  of  it  felf,  or  to  what  muft  inhere  and  be  fubjefted 
in  fomewhatelfe  ?  (3.)  Whether  they  be  of  an  Intelledual 
Nature  (as  a  Triangle  without  any  particular  Meafure  or 
Manner  afcrib'd  to  it) ;  or  fenfible,  as  this  or  that  particular 
Triangle  before  our  Eyes  ?  (4.)  What  Senfe  it  belongs  to  ; 
and,  (5,)  What  kind  of  Imprefllon  it  makes  -  Again, 
(6.)  Whether  it  be  more  Simple  or  Complex,  and  refolvable 
into  feveral  Attributes ;  as  Happy  or  Happinefs,  which  com- 
prizes whatfoever  is  regularly  defirable,  and  adually  defir'd 
in  any  Kind.  And,  (7.)  Whether  it  be  more  generally  found 
in  fuch  a  Subjedl,  or  lefs  frequently?  (8.)  Of  what  Mea- 
fuiie  or  Degree  it  is,  and  of  what  Duration  ? 

§  7.  Wc  leave  all  the  foregoing  Enquiries  to  be  farther 
carried  on,  as  there  may  be  occafion  ;  and  ihall  but  mention 
the  following  Heads  of  Enquiry,  which  may  be  more  eafily 
purfu'd. 

XIV,  As  to  the  Parti  oi  compounded  Things  ^  Qu.  Hovv 
inany,  what  they  are,  and  how  put  together  ? 

XV,  As  to  the  infallible  l-'articlej^  and  Texture  of  what 
is  Material,  Qu.  Of  what  Figure  or  Figures ;  in  what  Pro- 
portion to  each  other ;  with  what  Pores  or  Interftices  •,  whe^ 
ther  in  Motion  or  at  Reft^  whether  only  Contiguous  or 
Continuous  ,♦  and  whether  more  loofcly  or  £rmly  Co- 
hering r" 

§  y.  XVI  As  to  Privative  D^ficiences,  the  Eaquiry  may 
be  direded  by  c  : '.dering,  what  is  Natiwally,  or  Morally 
belonging  to  fuch  a  Kind  of  Subicdt,  as  wc  have  under  Cw* 
Cderation,  and  in  fuch  Circumfl^ivei. 

XVII,  As 


1 50  An  Ejjay  for  the  Part  11. 

XVII,  As  to  any  Negative  ^eflriElions,  which  the  Matter 
itiay  feem  to  require,  for  it  would  be  endlefs  and  ufelefs  to 
attempt  the  taking  in  of  4//,  See  Pare  i.  Chap.  7.  §  I5,^c. 

XVIII,  As  to  extrinfccal  Denominntions  (e.  g.  being  in  fuch 
place,  or  fo  Pofited,  Cloathed,  Adorn 'd,  FofTefring  this  or 
that,  ©"cj  the  matter  is  plainly  obvious  to  Senfe,  or  may  be 
drawn  from  credible  Teftimony. 

§  9.  XIX,  ksxo  B^lntive Ccr,fiderntions,\v\\\ch^reoivQTy 
various  and  almoft  infinite  Kinds :  We  may  enquire  whe- 
ther and  how  the  Perfon  or  Thing  may  be  taken  as  related 
to  it  felf  under  differing  Confiderations  i  what  there  may  be 
of  perfonal Relation,  and  what  of  Real;  what  of  Similar, 
or  of  Dilfimilar,  and  how  founded;  what  fort  of  OppofiteS 
there  are;  and  alfo  as  to  Subjeds,  Adjundb,  Caufes,  Effetts, 
&c.  See  Part  1.  Chap.  12,  &  13. 

XX,  As  to  diftindt,  but  adjoining  Appendages,  thfey  art 
cafily  obferv'd ;  as  for  Inftance,  the  exteriour  Place,  the 
Cloathing  it  felf,  the  Guilding,  Painting,  or  other  Orna- 
ments themfelves,  cS?c,  as  belonging  to  this  or  that. 

XXI,  As  to  what  is  only  fome  other  way  Appertaining, 
but  not  appending  (as  Poffef^lons,  Lands,  Houfes,  Reverfi- 
ons,  and  whatfoever  Rights  or  Claims,  (3s.)  they  may  be 
either  obferv'd  by  our  felves,  or  enquir'd  out  from  fuch  as 
know  them. 

§  10.  Thus  far  the  Enquiries  have  proceeded  upon  what 
may  be  fuppos'd  to  fall  under  our  own  more  immediate  Ob- 
fervation ;  the  fame  Qpellions  may  be  put  in  reference  to 
what  we  have  by  Report  from  others:  But  there  is  flill 
fbmewhat  more  peculiarly  requifite  here,  we  may  therefore 
be  direded  to  enquire,  not  only,  (1.)  What  might  be  the 
Thing  obfervd  by  others,  according  to  the  forementioned 
Particulars,  or  fuch  of  them  as  may  be  more  Necef&ry ;  but 
alfo,  (2.;  Whether  the  Perfon,  we  enquire  of,  had  the  Mat- 
ter only  by  Report,  or  by  his  own  Obfervation  ;  if  in  the 
former  way;  T  3.)  From  how  many;  From  whom;  Froni 
what  fort  of  Perfons  ?  how  far  they  were  Capable  and  Credi- 
ble ;  how  they  themfelves  had  it ;  how  longfince  ;  with 
what  Circumflances  of  Time,  Place,  (§c  ?     And, 

§  I  r.  We  may  farther  Enquire,  (4.)  In  what  manner  it 
was  obferv'd,  whether  by  the  By,  ot  Solemnly,  and  Indor- 
ftrioufly  }  (5.)  Whether  by  one  Perfon  only,  or  alfo  by 
others?  And  here,  (6.)  Whether  in  the  fame  place  toge- 
ther, or  in  divers  }  (7.)  Whether  at  the  fame,  or  differing 
Times }  (8.j  Whether  fcverally,  without  having  the  Mat- 
ter fuggefted,  or  being  put  upon  minding  it?    (9.)  Whether 

hter. 


Chap.  6.  Improvement  of  KQ^iion.  151 

later,  or  longer  fince?  (12.)  In  what  Place;  and  more  Spe- 
cially, (i  3  J  Whether  it  were  obferv'd  nearer  Hand  or  far- 
ther oif  ? 

§  1 2.  (14.)  Of  what  Age  and  Capacity  the  Perfon  might 
be  when  he  obferv'd  it  .^  (15.)  How  he  might  be  difpos'd, 
whether  his  Mind  and  Senfes  were  in  order,  or  difordered  ? 
more  particularly,  (i6.)  Whether  he  were  well  awake  or 
under  Drowfinefs  >  (17.)  Whether  he  had  the  requifite 
Furniture  and  Help  for  obferving  rightly  ?  ( 1 8.)  Whe- 
ther the  Obfervation  continu'd  for  fome  time,  and  how 
long  ? 

§  1 3.  As  to  the  EfFeft  of  what  was  obferv'd,  Qu.  (19.)  Whe- 
ther it  were  Pleafurable  or  Painful  ?  Tio.)  Whether  in- 
tenfe  or  remifs  ?  C21.)  Of  what  Duration  ?  (21.)  What 
Part  was  alfefled?  (23.)  In  what  manner?  (24.)  What 
the  final  Iffbe  thereof  ? 

§  14.  Laftly,  as  to  any  thin^  a^ed  or  perform'd,  Qu. 
(25.)  What  it  ivas  ?  (26.)  By  whom  ?  (27.)  In  what  Man- 
ner? (28.  Whether  by  fome  Perfon  alone,  or  with  what 
Help  ?  (29..'  Whether  by  Accident,  or  Defignedly  ?  (30,) 
With  what  Defign  ?  Farther  Enquiries  may  eafily  be  added 
to  rhefe  upon  Occafion,  and  fuch  as  the  particular  Occafion 
may  Specially  diftate. 

§  1  > .  There  are  divers  confiderable  Matters  of  Enquiry, 
which  I  have  tho'tfit  to  purfue  more  fully,  under  the  follow- 
ing General  Heads,  and  to  endeavour  the  Rcfolution  of 
them,  or  at  leaft  to  point  out  the  beft  way  I  could  towards  it ; 
as  whether  we  do,  or  how  we  may  rightly  Difccrn,  whether 
that  which  lies  before  us  be  a  Matter  proper  for  us  to  to  pro- 
ceed upon,  or  how  far  it  may  be  fo  ?  Again,  whether  we 
do,  or  how  we  may  rightly  AfTign  what  place  this  or  that 
ought  to  have  in  our  Attendance,  and  what  Proportion  of  it? 
And  fo,  as  to  the  other  ways  of  ufing  our  Reafon  mention  d 
in  the  Introdu<Sion,  §  21,  &  22. 

§  16.  We  now  conclude  the  prefent  Head  with  fome 
more  general  Direcfiionsm  order  to  the  farrher  Raifing,  Pur- 
fuing,  and  Refclving  of  Enquiries,  as  there  may  be  Occafi- 
on,   And, 

I.  We  fhould  early  and  continually  read  the  Bible  with 
heedfiilOblervation,  enquiring  of  fuch  Perfon«,  and  conful- 
tin^  fnch  Authors,  as  may  help  us  to  Underftand  it.  This 
would  inienfib!)  furnifh  us  with  many  Pofitive  Notices,  and 
farther  matter  of  Enquiry,  not  only  about  Divine  Things, 
which  are  of  Principal  Concern  to  us ;  but  alfo  in  reference 
to  a  Multitude  of  other  Matters,  which  axe  toucb'd  upon,tho' 
not  folemnly  treated  of,  in  Saered  Writ.  §17.  2w. 


152  Jn  tjfay  for  the  Part  11. 

■* 

§  17.  z.  We  (hould  do  well  to  acquaint  our  felves,  as  ear- 
ly as  wc  can,  with  fome  brief  and  general  A<;count  of  the 
whole  Syftem  of  Things;  fuppofe  it  were,  at  firft,  only 
with  fuch  a  one  as  Comcnim's  'janu.t  Lir.guniimi.  Thar  or 
fome  like  Account  iliould  be  made  very  Familiar  by  ofcen 
reading  it,  not  barely  for  the  "Words,  but  Things  contained 
in  it. 

3.  "We  fhould  choofe  a  fit  Inftruf^our,  together  with  the 
mofl  Knowing  and  Communicative  Company  we  can  have, 
and  improve  it  by  heedful  Attention  and  diligent  Enquiries 
on  all  proper  Occafions  ;  and  we  muft, 

§  iS.  4,  Endeavour  to  Recolleft  what  we  have  heard 
read,  or  obferv'd,  relating  to  the  Matter  in  Hand;  and 
fhould  proceed,  if  there  be  Occafion  and  Opportunity,  to 
Tryal  and  Experiment,  Reafonin^;  as  far  as  we  can  upon  the 
Whole.  But  whereas  our  own  Furniture,  and  Reach  may 
be  (hort,  we  fhould, 

5,  Betake  our  felves  to  fuch  Treatifes  as  profeffedly  han- 
dle the  Matter  we  have  before  us ;  and  to  fuch  Perfons,  who 
have  had  the  beft  Opportunities  and  Help,  together  with  a 
Capacity  for  acquainting  themfelves  with  it.     But  withal, 

6 .  We  mult  not  forget,  or  neglfc<^>,  wliereas  we  always 
lack  Wifdom,  to  ask  it  ferioufly  and  conftantly,  and  with 
Expet'ation  from  God. 


CHAP     Vlf. 

'^  I.  TTHE  next  Ufe  of  our  Reafon,  wherein  it  is  to  Jje 
-■-    direfted  and  aflifted,  is, 

llj  Rightly  to  dljcerv,  whether  that  v^hich  lies  before  us  le  n 
'fitter  -proper  for  w  to  proceed  upo>i,   or  bovi  far  it  mr.y  hefo? 

Certain  it  is,  that  we  are  bound  as  Reafonable  Men, 
v»holly  to  abftain  from  fome  Purfuits,  and  to  defift  from 
otliers  ;  and  that  God  hath  given  us  Underftanding  fufficienc 
to  difcern,  that  many  things  are  of  that  Sort,  about  whicli 
fome  do  vainly  puzzle  themfelves  and  others.  I  will  not  fay, 
we  can  always  prefently  or  eafily  know,  that  this  or  that 
particular  Matter  is  fuch,  whicii  yet  may  be  iound  really  fo 
after  fruitlefs  Attempts  to  Uiiderftand  or  Effect  it  :  But 
certainly  the  Reafon  of  Man  might  ferve  hlni,  farther  than  it 
commonly  do's,  for  the  earlier  Difcovery  of  what  lies  with- 
out bis  Compalsj  and  to  apply  his  Miiid  to  this  Poiist,  might 

lave 


Chap. 7-  Improvement  of  Y\.^^[on.  15:? 

fave  him  abundance  of  vain  Trouble,  and  refcrve  a  great 
deal  of  wafted  Time  and  Tho'c,  and  perhaps  Expences  coo 
for  better  Purpofes,  more  efpecially  in  the  way  of  Lear- 
ning. 

§  a.  Now,  to  guide  and  afTift  us  in  Juilging,  whether  this 
or  that  particular  Matter  be  a  proper  Subjev^  for  our  Reafon 
to  be  employ'J  upon,  the  following  Queftion  is  to  be  put 
and  purfu'd, 

"Whether  the  Matter  before  us  be  not  in  it  felf  Contradi£li- 
ous  and  Abfurd ;  or  however,  fuch  as  we  are  plainly  incapa- 
ble of,  or  unconcern'd  with  ? 

S3.  I  fhall  fay  very  little  to  the  firft  Branch  of  the  Que- 
ftion,  vi:{.  Whether  the  Matter  propos'd  be  not  Abfard  and 
Contradiftious  .-  The  Meaning  is,  whether  it  be  not  fuch 
as  is,  in  it  felf,  Unintelligible  or  Impracticable,  by  Reafon 
of  its  implying  a  Contradiction,  or  being  inconfiftent  with  it 
felf:  Asj  fuppofe,  to  apprehend  or  make  out  a  Trinity  in  the 
Divine  Nature,  confider'd  as  abfolutely  and  every  way  Sim= 
pie  J  or  to  extradl  the  Root  of  what  we  call  a  furd  Number, 
as  5,6,  10,  ©'i,  that  is  to  give  the  Root,  where  there  never 
was  any,  or  to  refolve  a  Number  into  Principles,  of  which 
it  was  not  made :  And,  to  inftance  no  morej  fuppofe  ic 
were  requir'd  to  form  a  right  lin'd  Triangle^  whofe  An- 
gles, together,  Ihould  make  more  or  lefs  than  two  tight 
Angles. 

§  4.  In  fuch  Cafes,  Reafon  hath  nothing  to  do,  but  if  it 
can,  to  detedt  the  Inconfiftency  and  Contradidious  Abfur- 
dity,  and  to  difmifs  the  Matter,  when  once  we  can  come  to 
fee  that  which  is  propos'd  to  be  Apprehended,  Acted,  or  Ef- 
feded,  do's  at  leaft  imply  the  Denial  of  fomewhat,  which  is 
or  muft  be  affirm'd;  or  the  affirming  of  what  is,  and  mult  be 
deny'd,  as  to  give,  or  conceive  a  Number  adually  infinite^ 
».  e.  what  is  adtually  Number'd,  and  yet  cannot  be  Num- 
ber d. 

.  But  even  in  order  to  the  Difcovety,  it  will  oftentimes  be 
Neceflary  to  enquire  into  the  Nature  and  Condition'  of  the 
feveral  Terms  or  Points,  which  are  laid  together  in  tl'ie  Mat- 
ter before  us,  and  carefully  to  obferve,  v.'hethcr  feme  one  of 
them  do  not  imply  the  Denial  of  fome  other  among  them^ 
or  of  fomething  elfe,  which  certainly  is  and  muft  be  lo ; 
As  if  it  were  propos'd,  to  prevent  foniewhac,  which  G(yd 
has  undoubtedly  foretold  Ihall  be ;  now  if  once  this  be  plain- 
ly found,  the  Attempt,  how  conliftcnc  foever  and  ealie  it 
rrwiMi  otherivays  be,  ^vould  carry  With  it  the  zh'^Vi'd  ini 
Contradidious  Endeavoui  of  over-powering  Omnipotence^ 

M  Dilpira- 


1-54  "■"  ^  jj'*  y  f''^  '^•'^'  '^^  ^  rt  i  t . 

Difpo^raging  Omnifcieiice,   orDi^roving  Unbkmilli'd,  and 
iwia-lterable  Veracity. 

^  5.  Tjie  Qvieltion,  as  to  what  remains,  is  to  be  put, 
as  it  is  here  given  Xcgnthfiy^  rather  than  .■^[int/t^riveiy  ^  be- 
C-iufe  ourl^urfuicis  to  be.Div'erted,  oi-ftopM,  only  i^pon  dif- 
ctTiiing  ©ur  Incapacity,  or  that  we -are  not  conce-rn'-i .-  Nor 
aiie  we  aiways  to  fta-y,  till  w^  card  plain-ly  fc'e,  t^iat  we  ar€ 
Capable  ot  a  Matter  and  Cojicemeji  in  it,  biforc  we  attempt 
it  J  thole  at€  ordiiiariiy  to  be -I'lj'ppos'd ,  wiier^  the  contrar/ 
doth  not  appear ;  othtrwik  we  (hati  be  in  danger  to  ftop  a£ 
every  Difficulty,  and  fet  too  narrow  Bounds  to  our  ftlves. 

§  6.  It  fe€ms  proper  that  here  it  be  tirll  enquir'd,  whe- 
ther a  Matter  proposed  be  not  Aach,  as  we  are  plainly  ty«- 
couccrh'd  voi.'h,  fince  tliis  may  be  of  fomewhat  eafier  Dileove- 
r.y,  and  fitly  leading  to  the  Inquiry  about  Our  Capacity,  in 
Cafe  it  ftiallnot  othcrwifc  plainly  appear,  rha-t  u'eareuncon- 
cern'd;  as  it  mtift,  v^hen  our  Application  to  this  or  that  is; 
neither  charged  on  us  by  any  proper  Aurhoniy  vtfted  in  Pa- 
jrents,  or  others  for  fuch  Pu;  pufe  ;  nor  advis'd  by  AVife  and 
iFaidifui  Friends  :     And  alfo, 

§  7.  Tliat  the  Thing  it  felf  is  at  the  fame  time  apparently 
fuch,  as  thar  our  knowing  or  efFe<^ting  it,  do's  no  way  Tend 
to  any  prefcnt  or  fuime  Good,  eiilicr  mere  immediately  to 
lOiir  (fives,  or  to  others,  Avhether  i'.i  rerpe:>  of  real  Profit,  va- 
luable Reputation,  or  innocent  Entertainment.  But  how- 
e  er  the  Matter  ftand  inihofe  Regards,  we  may  juftly  reckon 
aur  felv^s  fo  far  Unconcem'd  with  it,  as  we  are  unavoidably 
incapable  of  it ;  vi::(.  in  Part,  or  at  the  Prcfent,  or  e\en  al- 
together, if  the  incapacity  be  Natural,  Abfolute  and  Total : 
For  furely  our  Wile  and  Kind  Creator  has  given  us,  at  leaft, 
the  Fvindamcntal,  and  remote  Capacity,  for  what  wc  are 
really  concern'dto  know,  or  do. 

§  8.     Now  there  can  be  no  doubr,   but  we  are  incapable 
of  fome  things  Naturally  and  Abfolutcly    asof  looking  with 
the  Eye  into  Bodies,   that  are  Denfe  and  Opac,    or  elofely 
Compaft  and  Dark , ;  of  other  things  Accidentally,   and  in 
fome  Pvcfpe'V  only,  as  fnppole,   ( i.)  Thro'  want  of  Natural 
Bodily  Organs,   asof  the  Eye  for  knowing  Colours;    Or', 
(t..)  For  want  of  fit  Age  and  Experience  ;    Or,  (3.)  By  Rea- 
foa  of  fome  prefent  Indifpofrion  of  the  Body  or  Mind;    Or, 
(4.)  Upon  our  being  otherwire  Employ 'd  ;  <-V,  !«).)  Eneag'd 
to  apply  our  f^ives  othicrways ;  O; ,  (6.)  In  that  we  have  not 
i.iid  m  what  is  prcvioully  Ne-eiTary,    nor  taken  the  Steps  by 
vhi  h we  mult  advance  to  this  or  that  fanh-.r  Point  of 
I  no  wledge,  or  Era'^'icc.   a?  if  o;k  (hould  go  upon  the  divi- 
ding- 


Chjp.  7.         improve-went  of  R.ealon.  i^-^ 

ding  of  a  very  large  Number  into  78,  or  S9  Parts,  before  he 
had  learn'd  the  Notation, .  MultipHcation,  and  Subftratiion 
of  Numbers,  all  which  muft  ordinarily  be  eaiploy'd  in  the 
performing  of  fuch  a  Divifion. 

\  §  9.  What  we  are  thm  incapable  of,  we  are  fo  f^r  alfo 
Unconcerned  with :  and  i^fiich  Accidental  Incapacity  be  not 
our  Fault,  we  may  be  fure,  thar  io  long  we  are  not  concer- 
ned, either  in  refpeft  of  Duty,  or  of  our  higheft  Intercit, 
with  the  Matcei-s,  whereof  we  are  fo  incapable.  They, 
vtfho  by  their  incurable  Dulnefs,  or  other  unavoidable  Impe- 
diments are  limited,  (£.  G.)  from  purfuing  this  very  An  of 
ufing  their  Reafon,  may  well  look  upon  ihemfelves  as  noc 
concern'd  to  have  it :  And  thus  there  may  be  very  many 
Things,  of  which  we  are  accidentally,  and  innocently  Inca- 
pable ;  not  only  a  number  of  Mechanical  Arcs,  but  even 
fome  Parts  of  Learning,  and  ii^deed  whatfoever  Points  are  of 
foabftrufe  Speculation,  or  difficult  Performance,  as  that  our 
Genius,  Age,  Prefent  Improvements,  or  other  Innocent  Cir- 
cumftances  will  not  admit  of  them. 

§  IO.  But  befides  that,  which  I  have  call'd  Accidental 
Incapacity,  there  is  yet  farther  a  'Niturnl  Incapncify^  which 
may  feem  to  belong  to  the  common  Make  of  Intelligent 
Creatures ;  or  of  Men,  at  Icafl:  in  thcif,  prefent  State.  And 
I  ihall here  give  fome  Account  of  thofe  Sorts  of  Things,  where- 
of we  are  Naturally  Incapable  ;  if  not  wholly,  yet  in  a  very 
confider^blc  Degree.     And, 

§  1 1.  I,  what  is  Infinite,  at  ftichy  and  in  that  RefpeifJ-^ 
our  Finite  Minds  cannot  comprehend :  We  may  certain  y 
know,  that  there  are  fuch  things,  when  yet  we  cannot  fully 
Underhand,  what  they  are :  Thus  we  mufl  own,  that  there 
has  been  a  kind  of  vaft  Duration  without  beginning,  {oi:^, 
tbnt  oiGadi  ',  for  if  he  had  not  been  always^  he  could  not 
have  been  at  all),  but  when  in  a  way  of  pbfitive  Conception, 
vve  have  heap'd  Ages  upon  Ages  backward,  there  mult  have  ■ 
been  before  them  all  a  Kind  of  Duration,  which  we  cannot 
coticeive,  unlefs  it  be  confuu'dly,  and  in  a  Negative  way  j 
fo  that  it  may  v^ell  be  faid,  Cnnjl  thou  hy  fearchin^  find  out 
God> 

§  12.  1,  We  cannot  Naturally  attain  to  a  certain  and 
dctenninate  Kncwiedge,  as  to  the  inward  Adi.ngs  of  Free 
Agents,  v.hich  are  not  difcover'd  to  us.-  What  depends  upon 
the  Will  and  Pleafure  of  fuch  Agents,  and  efpecially  the 
vi'irevealcd  Purpofes  of  God,  muft  be  to  us  unfearchable,  to- 
gether v/inh'.vhat  is. depending  on  thofe  Purpofes.  PVuat 
Man  kjwweth  (he  Things  of  c  Man,  jnve  the  Spirit  of  Min,  that 


lj6 An  t-ffay  for  the  Fart  II. 

K  in  him  :  even  fo  the  things  of  God  kjujweth  fio  Man,  but  the 
Spirit  of  God. 

§  13.  3,  Wc  cannot  certainly  reafon  out  Things,  that 
do  not  depend  upon  known  and  certain  Caufes  :  And  fuch 
arc  mcft  Matters  of  Fad,  as  to  Time  paft,  or  in  diftant 
Placcsbeyond  the  reach  of  o'JrSenfes;  andmoft  Events  for 
ilie  future:  Here  it  would  be  a  vain  Attempt,  even  as  to 
paft,  or  diftant  Contingencies,  to  go  to  Afccnain  them  only 
by  Rcafoning ;  whenas  they  might  be  fo,  or  otherwifc : 
And  'tis  not  fo  much  our  Reafoning  Faculty  we  muft  here 
depend  upon,  as  careful  Obfervation,  approv'd  Hiftory,  well 
attcltcd  Report,  and  infpir'd  Prophefic :  -  l^Vi^at  we  have  feen 
with  car  Eyes,  or  ciir  Enrs  hnvc  l:cjrH,  and  atr  Fathers  have  cre- 
dibly toLi  uf,  or  the  Spirit  of  Propixfie  cercamly  has  fore- 
told. 

.§  14.  4,  Wherever  the  Humane  Nature  has  no  Organs 
of  Senie,  or  other  Faculty,  fitted  to  acquaint  us  with  fuch 
Things,  or  to  Effedi  them,  we  muft  be  naturally  incapable 
of  thofe  things:  And  thus  the  inviliblc  World  of  created 
Spirits,  as  alio  thofe  parts  of  the  vifible  World,  which  are 
beyond  our  Compjfs,  cannot  be  farther  known  by  us,  than 
as  tJiey  may  be  fpecially  reveal'd,  or  rcafon'd  out  from  fuch 
Revelation,  or  from  fome  uncommon  Appearances  i  and  to 
prefunie  beyond,  this,  muft  ht  zn  intruding  into  thcfe  things 
wc  iy-vc  not  Jeti?,  and  the  Indication  of  n  fcf^lj/  Mind  vainly 
Pujf'dttp. 

§  15.  5,  We  cannot  penetrate  into  the  very  Subftance 
-and  inmoft  Eflencc  of  thofe  Beings,  with  which  we  feem 
beft  acquainted  :  Of  Subftance  vi'c  feem  to  have  no  other 
than  this  obfcure,  indiftinfl  Idea,  that  it  is  fomewhat  fwe 
know  not  what)  which  (e.  gr.)  Thinks,  or  haih  divifible 
Farts ;  nor  doth  it  appear  that  we  have  any  Capacity  of 
looking  farther  into  this  Matter,  as  it  is  Certain  we  have  no 
farther  Concern  :  it  is  the  Creator's  Prerogative,  to  have 
/ill  tbingf^  not  only  valued  before  /;.?«,  but  operied  to  him. 

§  16.  6,  •  The  Firil  Elements  of  Things,  the  leaft  Parti- 
cles of  Matter  actually  exiiling,  together  with  the  Natural 
Means  of  tlicir  Cohering  and  making  up  a  continuous  Body, 
feem  ro  be  beyond  our  Reach  j  and  that  we  arc  not  furnifti'd 
with  Powers  todifcovcr  thefe  and  the  like  Arccna  of  Nature: 
Nordo's  there  appear  any  Ground  to  hope  for  fuch  Artificial 
Amftance,  as  may.  enable  our  Eye  to  difcein  the  Texture 
V  f.  gr. )  of  Water,  or  its  Compounding  Particles ;  Gobi's 
iVorkj  .ir£^  in  fuch  rcfpe(its  as  thefe,  p-iji  our  finding  out. 

§17.7,  The 


Chap  8.         1  ffj  prove  went  of  )ktz{ou.  157 

§  17.  7,  The  Explaining  of  our  fenfiblc  Perceptions  (as 
of  White,  Sweet,  G?j.)  fo  as  to  make  them  better  underftood, 
than  they  arc  by  Senfation,  appears  unfeafibJe  to  us  :  And 
that  however,  we  can  never  give  the  IJea  of  thofo  Things 
to  fuch  as  never  had  the  Perception  of  them,  or  any  thing 
Jikethem.  It  ts  the  Mouth  alone  tafieth  Mcats^  and  ch;  E^r 
tricthlVords,  in  thisrerpcA. 

§  iS.  8,  I  may  here  add,  that  we  fhould  vainly  (as  well 
as  necdlefly)  endeavour  the  Proof  of  a  Fofition  or  Coinexi- 
cn,  which  is  Self-evident,  and  of  which  we  cannot  ferioufly 
doubr,  if  we  would:  To  attempt  fuch  a  thing,  would  be 
indeed  to  dnrk^:n  Counfel  by  PVords  vpithciit  Kjioxvled^c.  If 
fome  will  fay,  we  may  be,  for  ought  we  know,  all  our 
Lives  long  in  a  Dream  (as  we  juftly  reckon  our  felves  to 
have  been,  when  awaking,  we  find  nothing  of  what  we 
dream'd,  to  have  really  been,  but  than  it  was  all  a  delufory 
Imagination),  inftead  of  going  to /rgue  wiihfuch,  I  would 
only  ask,  whether  we  are  any  ways  concern  d  to  be  furer  of 
our  being  Awake,  than  we  are  ;  fincc  we  find  our  felves 
Happy  or  Wretched,  to  our  own  unavoidable  Feeling,  by 
what  paffes,  whether  real  or  not,  and  that  therefore  we 
muft  take  it  for  real,  whether  we  would  or  no. 


CHAP.     VHI. 

§  I.  'T'HOSE  Things,  which  our  Reafon  is  not  capable 
*  of,  have  been  in  fome  Meafure  pointed  out  •  but 
left  we  lliould  too  much  narrow  the  Pro\inceof  Humane 
Reafon,  I  (hall  briefly  fhew,  that  it  may  and  ought  to  be 
fomeway  prudently  employ'd,  even  about  the  Matters  be- 
fore-mention'd  :  And  tho'  we  cannot  accountably  attempt 
the  very  Points  therein,  of  which  we  have  appear'd  to  be  In- 
capable ;  Yet  where  we  are  not  plainly  Unconcern'd,  much 
more  where  we  are  evidently  Concern'd  in  point  of  unquefti- 
onab'.c  Duty,  or  of  fome  confiderable  Intereft,  wo  lliould 
Reafon  as  far  as  we  can  about  thofe  very  Matters,  which 
we  cannot  thro'ly  penetrate,  nor  are  concern'd  to  do  it. 
And, 

§  2.  I,  We  fhould  Labour  to  apprehend  what  we  can, 
and  are  concern'd  wi:h  of  that,  which  is  Infinite,  vvhiift 
we  cannot  comprehend  the  Infinity  it  felf.  We  ought  cer- 
tainly to  form  the  belt  Ideas  we  can  of  God,  fuch  as  Reafon 

M  3  muh 


S^  ^«  ^Jfiiy  for  the  Part  11. 

mult  tell  us  are  true  i  fo  far  as  they  go)  tho'  rot  Adequate, 
or  Accurate  ;  endeavouring  they  may  have,  at  leaft,  iuch  a 
furt  of  Likenefs  and  Analogy,  as  God  himfelf  allows  to  cur 
weak  Apprchcnlions  ;  and  which  may  well  ferve  to  engage 
and  guide  our  Duty,  and  to  fecure  our  Felicity ;  we  may 
nor  indeed  itnagine  that  God  hath  an  Eye  like  ours  ;  but 
mui\  believe  he  certainly  knows  all  things,  without  fuch  an 
E}e,  by  the  help  of  what  we  may  call  his  Underftanding, 
whii^h  we  mud  own  to  be  Infinite,  but  may  not  reafonably 
attempt  to  comprehend  its  Infinity,  or  to  Account  for  the 
Manner  or  Means  of  God's  knowing  infallibly  what  his 
Criaturcs  will  do,  as  well  as  what  he  himfelf  rcfolves. 

*  3.  'Tis  a  very  fit  and  proper  ufeof  Reafon,  in  reference 
to  what  is  Infinite,  to  Terrain  our  Tho'ts  from  endlefs  and 
fjuitlels  Enquiries  and  Puifuits ;  contenting  our  felves  wirh 
what  may  be  known  and  concciv'd  by  Finite  Minds,  with- 
out going  to  limit  what  we  allow  to  be  unlimited  :  In  lliorc, 
we  (hoiild  form  our  more  potuive  Ideas,  by  the  moft  perfed: 
Finite  Models,  with  which  wejare  acqiaintcdjbuLftill  iupply- 
ing  their  Deficiency  by  juft  and  fit  Negatives;  as  when  we 
conceive  the  Divine  Knowledge  to  be  moft  nearly  refembled 
by  what  we  call  Intuition,  but  rot  hmited  as  ours  is  to  one 
or  to  a  few  Objefts  at  a  time,  or  to  any  of  the  Differences 
of  Time  part,  prcfent,  or  future  ;  but  reaching  everyway 
at  once,  and  to  every  thing,  that  has  been,  is,  and  fhall  be, 
or  that  might  be. 

§  4.  1,  As  to  the  undifcovcr'd  inward  actings  of  Free 
Agents,  and  particularly  the  unrcvealed  Counfels  of  God, 
many  Points  may  be  truly  known,  and  with  fLifficient  Evi- 
dence ;  whilft  yet  we  cannot  afcertain  the  very  Thmgs  there- 
in determined  ^  as  (E.G)  that  the  Decrees  of  God  are  nor, 
nor  indeed  can  pcOibly  be,  any  ways  Contradidlious  to  his 
knowii  Nature ;  or  to  what  he  has  m  other  Cafes  reveal'd  of 
bjs  lecret  Counfels. 

^  "5 .  As  to  the  Principles  and  Ends  of  Free  Agents,  we 
are  capable  of  making  probable  Conjectures  »  and  it  highly 
concerns  us,  in  fomc  Cafes,  to  make  the  beft  we  can  about 
them  ;  which  may  ordinarily  anfwer  fome  good  Purpofe  to 
our  fch'es  and  others,  tho'  v\  c  fl.ould  fometimes  fall  into  a. 
Mifiake  :  And  it  will  always  become  us  in  point  of  Mode- 
fty  and  Prudence,  not  ro  take  our  Gueffes  for  infallible 
Certainties,  nor  to  proceed  thereupon  without  fomc  Piovifiom 
in  cafe  iveihouid  l^  miftaken. 


§  6,  3,  As 


Chap.  8.  lr,/provemef2t  of  rvealcn.  j^^ 

§  6.  3^  As  to  die  Contingencies  of  pa'it  or  uillaut  Fatfls 
or  Futnriries  our  Reafonmay  be  us'd  to  find  and  purfue  the 
fceft-  Method  of  inq.uiring  theiu  ovic;  to  make  the  beft  J,udge- 
menc'wecaii,  what  is  an  Obfcrvation^  Hiftory,  Report,  or 
Prophelie  fit  to  be  depended  on,  and  thence  to  draw  only 
juft-  and  certain  Inferences. 

§  7.  And  her€  we  may  find  our  felves  oftentimes  oblig'd 
to  guefs,  as  well  as  we  can,  at  the  Fails  or  Furmines, 
which  neither  our  Reafon>  nor  any  other  Help  within  put 
reach  can  affiire  ns  of;  and  it- may  be  a  Matter  of  f;reat  Im- 
portance, that  we  fliould,  if  poffiWe  guefs  right;  and  that 
therefore  we  lliould  go  upon  the  moft  probable  Grounds, 
and  make  our  Conje£ture  according  to  the  mc  Jl  likely  Mea^ 
fures;  but' laying  in  at  the  fame  time  for  Miftakes  and  Dif- 
appointmenrs. 

5  8.  4,  Where  we  are  deftitute  of  Natural  Orgam  or  Fa- 
culties, in  relation  to  this  or  that  fort  of  ObjcCls,  our  iWa- 
fon  lii^ft  yet  ferve  us  to  Judge  of  any  extraordinary  Notict^s 
we  may  have,  whether  they  are  to  be  depended  on  ;  thst  we 
be  not  abus'd  with  fuch  Notions,  as  are  really  Fanatical  and 
Enthufiaftick  :  We  are  alfo  (as  it  hath  been  intimated;  ro 
Reafon  from  Revelation,  fo  far  as  that  may  fafcly  and  ufe- 
fully-  lead  us. 

§  9.  We  may  alfo  draw  what  Light  we  can  from  frch 
Extraordinary  fenlible  Appearatices  and  Effccflsas'arein  Fact 
undeniably  Certain;  and  of  which  no  other  Caufe  can  bs 
reafonably  aflign'd,  but  fomeinvifible  and  intelligent  Being : 
Thefe  Matters  are  to  be  vn^ry  feverely  examin'd  by  Rcafrrtj 
^s  to  the  Poffibility,  perhaps  alfo  the  probability  of  the  Mat- 
ter reported,  and  the  Credit  due  to  the  Reporters ;  and  afrep 
fcch  Examination  fomewhat  may  be,  probably  at  Icalt^ 
Infer 'd. 

§  10.  5,  Even  about  Subftance,  fomewhat  may  be 
known  by  Reafon,  whilft  the  very  Subftance  it  felf,  in  its 
proper  Nature,  remains  luiknown ;  £,  G?.  That  this  Sub- 
ftance or  piece  of  Matter,  which  is  in  this  Place,  is  not  the 
lelfrfame  thing  with  that,  which  at  the  faine  time  is  in  ano-: 
ther  Place ;  again,  that  the  Subftance, or  Matter,  m.ay,  and  of- 
ten doth  remain  to  be  the  felf-fame  \  tho'  it  be  under  very- 
different  Accidents,  and  Alterations  of  its  Modification  and' 
Appearances  to  us^    as  Water  turned  into  Ice,  ©'j. 

§  n .  And  whilft  we  cannot  penetrate  into  the  innermoft 
Nature  of  Subftance,  yet  allowing  that  to  lye  quiet  in  the 
Dark  ;  we  may  get  fuch  an  Acquaintance  with  its  various 
Attributes,  whether  more  coiiimon  or  Peculiar,  as  may  fufE- 

M'4  ciemly 


i6o  An  h.jfay  for  the  Part  II- 

ciently  anfwer  the  Purpofes  of  Life,  and  be  withal  entertai- 
ning to  our  felves  and  others  *  nor  are  we  fo  muchconcern'd 
to  know  what  it  is,  as  what  its  Properties  and  Accidents 
?ire. 

§  12;  6,  As  to  the  firft  Elements,  and  fmalleft  Particles 
of  Bodies,  with  their  Connexion,  Reafon  may  certainly 
find  a  very  pleafant  and  improving  Exercife,  in  its  Inquiries 
and  Conjectures,  fo  as  to  give  us  and  others  a  very  good 
Entertainment,  to  (liarpen  our  Minds,  and  to  carry  us  into 
the  Admiration  and  Praife  of  God,  where  we  cannot  arrive 
at  a  certainty  about  his  "Work. 

§  1 3.  And  in  f  Jch  kmd  of  Conjectures  we  cannot  dange- 
roufly  Err,  if  we  abftain  but  from  pronouncing  too  confi- 
dently, according  to  this  or  that  Hypothefis,  and  be  not 
taken  up  in  fuch  Matters,  to  the  Neglcdkor  Prejudice  of  our 
greater  Concernmenrs. 

§  14.  7,  Reafon  can  tell  us  fomewhat  about  our  fenfible 
Perceptions,  as  (£.  Gr.^  that  many  of  them  are  to  be  accoun- 
ted the  Effedt  of  fome  unknown  Make  and  Texture  of  the 
fenfible  Objects,  together  with  fome  imprelTed  Force,  rather 
than  that  they  fhould  be  generally  taken  for  the  Reprefenta- 
rions  or  Refemblances  cf  what  is  fubjefled  in  the  Thing  per- 
ceived, or  immediately  refulting  from  it;  and  yet  that  fome 
of  them,  efpecially  the  ideas  taken  in  by  the  Eye,  may  wtW 
be  tbo't  in  lome  foit  to  reprefent  the  Objedt,  particularly  as 
to  the  External  Figure  and  Shape  of  the  vifible  Body. 

§  15.  And  here  our  Realbn  mufl-  contrive,  how  to  excite 
the  Ideas,  which  others  are  capable  of  ;  as  fuppofe  by  our 
pointing  them  to  fomewhat  in  that  refped  like,  which  is  hap- 
pily prefent,  or  a'ready  known ;  as  to  Sugar,  when  vve  would 
raife  the  Idea  of  that  Sweetncfs,  which  is  in  Honeys  and 
Reafon  may  inftruft  us  here  to  enter  fo^ue  fuch  Caution  as 
this,  that  the  fwectnefs  of  Sugar  is  not  altogether  like  that  of 
Honey,  this  being  higher  and  more  Lufcious.  Ic  can  alfo  put 
us  in  the  way  to  recall  and  revive  the  Ideas,  which  we  or 
others  fometime  had  by  Sight,  or  hearing,  or  Taft,  cS'c  •  as 
by  calling  to  Mind  the  particular  Time,  Place,  Company, 
and  other  Circum fiances,  wherein  fuch  Ideas  were  adtually 
preferr.  Our  Seniible  Perceprioni  are  llkewife  fubje(f^  to  be 
exaniriii  .is  Reafon  may  dire<i>;  and  fo,  what  appears  Evi- 
dent to  u-o,  by  one  Senfe,  may  be  try'd  fometimes  by  another, 
or  by  the  Confideration  and  Verdirt  of  Reafon  and  Judg-. 
ment,  as  in  the  Cafe  of  feeing  the  Sun  and  Stars  fo  little  at  fo 
great.a  Piftance \  we  do  or  may  thence  conclude  them.vaft- 
ly  greater  than  they  feem.    And  I^inaliy, 

§  i(<.8/What 


Chap.  y.  Improvement  of  K^'Si^on,  i6i 

§  1 6.  8,  What  appears  Intuitively  certain  and  felf-evident 
to  us  at  one  time,  may  be  reafonably  view'd  over  again  at 
another,  and  when  we  are  in  far  differing  Circumftances  of 
Body  and  Mind ;  we  may  likewife reafonably  enquire  fin  feme 
Cafes),  where  fome  have  Confidence  to  Difpute  the  Matter, 
whether  it  do  not  appear  aUke  Evident  to  others  alfo,  even 
to  Multitudes  ;  and  whether  indeed  it  be  now  ferioujly  and 
deliberately  contefted,  or  ever  were  by  any,  who  had  the 
right  Ufe  of  their  Underftandings  ? 

§  17.  We  might  here  add  more  exprefly  ('what  hath  been 
intimated  before)  that  even  in  Matters  pretending  to  Divine 
Revelation,  and  challenging  our  Faith,  Reafon  may  and 
muft  Examine,  Whether  there  be  the  true  Marks  of  fuch  Re- 
velation, and  whether  we  have  the  true  Meaning  of  what  is 
really  fuch,  which  we  muft  fearch  out  by  the  approved  Rules 
of  Interpretation,  and  may^be  fure  it  will  never  be  indeed  Con- 
tradidtious  to  undoubted  Reafon,  fince  this,  as  well  as  Reve- 
lation is  from  the  fame  Fountain,  and  Father  of  Lights^  with 
whom  K  no  VariablenejSy  no  faying  of  one  thing  by  the  certain 
Evidence  of  Senfe  or  Reafon,  and  the  contrary  by  Revela- 
tion :  Nor  can  thefe  Words  of  Scripture  Q  This  is  my  Body"^ 
be  taken  literally,  as  if  it  had  been  faid,  [Thii  thing  is  really 
my  Boih^  not  figuratively"}  without  going  contrary  to  the  ac- 
knowledged Rules  of  Interpretation,  by  which  ev*n  the  ^c- 
wnvijh  themfelves  proceed  in  a  multitude  of  other  Places. 
Neither  is  it  faid,  that  the  Father,  Son  and  Holy  Spirit  are 
Three  Perfons,  and  yet  but  one  Perfon  ;  or  that  God  is  every 
way  Simple,  and  yet  fome  way  Triple.  And  doubtlefs  the 
Scriptures  never  fay  nor  mean  what  is  really  Contradictious 
to  Reafon,  whether  we  can  precifely  fix  their  Meaning  or 
not;  nor  ought  we  to  pretend  thereto  in  a  Matter  of  fuch  ac- 
knowledged depth,  tho'  we  may  conceive  fofarof  it,  as  i$ 
fufficicnt  for  us,  at  Icaft  in  our  prefent  State. 


CHAP.     IX. 

§  I-  ^A^^HEN,  upon  Confideration,  it  appears  not  that  the 
Matter  before  us  is  to  be  difmifs'd  as  a  Contra- 
dictious Inconfiftency,  or  as  what  we  are  plainly  incapable 
of,  or  wholly  unconcerned  With  ;  the  next  Bufinefs  of  our 
Reafon,  wherein  it  is  to  be  directed  and  afllftcd  is, 

m,^g^tly 


i62  An  tfjjv  for  the  Part  If. 

Ill,  Rjght'y  to  r.ffign  vebr.i  place  this  cr  that  ought  to  have  in 
eur  Attendance,  niid  what  Propcrtion  of  it.  The  juft  Determi- 
nation of  this  mainly  turns  upon  the  Naaire  and  Mearure 
of  our  Concernment  in  that,  which  lies  befur^  uS|,  and  of  our 
Capacit:)'  for  it. 

§  2.  'Tis  undeniable,  that  I  ought  to  allow  all  neceflary 
Attendance,  to  what  f  am  moft  plainly  and  deeply  concernM 
in:  And  here  I  muft-  be  fuppos'd  to  have  the  Fundaineiicai 
and  remote  Capacity  at  Icaft  (otherwife  I  were"  oblig'd  tq 
what's  abfolutely  impoffible,  and  fo  muft  be  inevitabFy  Mi- 
lerable)  ■,  but  if  in  fuch  Cafe,  I  be  under  an  accidental.  Cu- 
rable Incapacity,  I  am  bound  with  the  greater  Application  to 
fearch  out  and  ufe  all  likely  Means  for  the  remo\al  of  it  : 
and  according  to  my  Concernment  and  Capacity,  confider'd 
together,  I  am  to  attend  on  this  or  that,  fooner  or  later, 
inore  or  lefs  •,  and  therefore  muft  endeavour  to  iffue  this  0.ue- 
ftion,  I4^>jat  fort  and  degree  of  concernment^  hiwe  I  in  the  Matter 
before  Me,  findvphr.t  Cr.pncity  for  it  ■ 

§  3.  Kow,  that  I  may  give  fome  help  towards  the  re- 
folving  of  this  Enquiry,  I  (hall  .'1.)  more  at  large  coniider 
the  various  hnportance  of  things  ro  us,  and  afterwards  very 
briefly  touch  upon  the  following  Points,  vi:;_.  (i.)  The  cer- 
tainty of  that  Importance,  ix,)  The  reach  of  our  Capacity, 
and,  (4.)  The  probability  ot  its  Advance,  or  Continuance. 
Upon  the  firft  of  thefe  Heads,  l-lhall  endeavour,  not  only 
juftly  to  ftate,  but  cftablil^  a^id  enforce  the  general  Meafure 
of  Importance;  and  then  proceed  a  little  more  diftinftly  to 
opcnit  •,  adding  fome  Remarks,  that  it  may  be  the  better  ap- 
ply'd  ;  and  laftiy  obfervc,  What  Gradation  there  may  be  ac- 
cording to  thit  Meafure,  and  thofe  Remarks. 

§  4.  I,  As  to  the  differing -T'w/Jorr.jwre  of  Things,  which 
may  lie  before  mc,  it  muft  be  of  the  firft  and  higheft  Confe- 
qucnce  to  me  (as  being  fundamentally  NecelTary  for  the 
right  Condud:  of  my  felf)  to  have  ti  juft  M?-i/i<>-p,  whereby 
loeftimate  my  Intereft  and  Concernment  in  the  various  Mat- 
ters, which  prefent  themfelVes  to  my  Mind,  or  are  laid  Be- 
fore it,  and  it  may  be  prefling  at  once  upon  it.  Kow  that 
Meafure  muft  undoubtedly  be  taken  from  the  Tendency  and 
force  things  have  towards  making  me  Miferable  or  Happy, 
i.  c.  towards  fuiking  me  into  rhe  deepeft  and  moft  lafting 
Trouble  ;  or  raifmg  me  to  the  higlieft  and  moft  abiding  Sa- 
tisGcidicn.  That  the  well,  or  ill  Behaving  our  felves,  hath 
fuclv  a  Tendency  and  Force  is  on  all  hands  confefs'd,  and 
m<»ft  Perfons  who  have  liv'd  any  confiderable  time  in  the 
W|  irld    have  found  fomewhat  of  it  in  their  own  Experience  ; 

•        whiiit 


Chap  9.  Improvement  Of  Rtalon.  165 

whilft  their  Tho'ts  have  (as  the  ApcjftJe  fpcaks  B^m.  2,  15  J 
accujed  or  exciifed  mc  another  ;  aild  that  Confcicnce  hath  con- 
demn'd  or  acquitted  theni  fo  much  ro  their  Difquict  or  Con- 
rcntir.ent,  that  they  have  never  known  the  like  on  any  other 
Occafion ;  To  as  that  of  the  Divine  Poet  liath  been  often  found 
to  hold,  even  in  this  prelent  J..ifc, 

If  thou  (iojl  ill,  the  Joy  fades,  not  the  Pains  • 
If  Well,  the  Pain  doth  fade^  the  Jcy  remains. 

§  «),  If  therefore  fome  would  abfurdjy  Queftion  the  Su- 
preme, Invifible  Being,  who  hath  clearly  Jloemi  his  Eternal 
Power,  rtvd  God-head  by  the  things  that  are  made,  fe  at  to  leave 
the  Heathen  World  without  Exatfe  ;  Yet  there  is  a  kind  of" 
Divine  Prefence  and  Tribunal  %vithin  n«:,  before  which  we 
are  fome  times  conftrained  to  ftand,  and  tt)  be  Judg'd  accor- 
ding to  the  Didates  of  Reafon.that  TVork^cf  the  Law  mitten  in 
our  Hearts,  where  Men  are  either  deftiture  of  a  Superior  Re- 
velation, or  dcfpise  it.  To  this  inward  Obferver,  and  Judge  of 
our  Behaviour  we  are  undeniably  concern'd  to  approve  our 
feives,  as  we  would  be  fecur'd  againft  the  infuppcrtable  Bur- 
then o^zvpoundcd  Spirit ;  and  as  we  would  enjoy  that  inward 
Peace,  which  can  make  us  at  leaft  comparatively  eafie  in  rhe 
midft  of  outward  Dangers  or  Troubles,  according  to  that 
known  Palfage  of  the  L^/'c Peer, 

-    >-■  — ■  ■■  Hie  Muruf  aheneui  effo. 

Nil  confcire  fibi ,  nulla  paJIefcere  Culpa, 

which  might  be  thus  rendred  in  E*igl'f^, 

Be  this  my  ftrong,  impregnable  Defence, 
A  Confcience  clear,  undaunted  Innocence. 

S  6.  But  even  the  Fcols  vphich  fay  in  their  Hearts  there  k  no 
Crod  J  cannot  deliberately  Judge,  or  conclude  it  in  their 
Minds.  They  who  impiouily,  and  fooliHily  enough  ftho' 
wifely,  as  they  think)  Pf^if^:!,  it  were  fo  •  yet  cannot  ferioufly 
or  fteadily  Believe,  it  is  fo ;  and  when  they  have  taken  the 
Courfe  to  lay  Confcience  faft  a  Sleep,  yet  they  cannot  but 
dread  its  awaking  at  lail,  more  terrible  than  before ;  and 
that  for  ali  thofe  evil  Practices,  whereby  they  ftupifie  their 
Minds  frendring  themfelves  Brutjfti,  and  ajmoft  unfit  for 
Humane  Society)  Cod  will  brir.g  them  to  Jvdgmeyu  .-  Now 
fuch  Apprehenfions  lEuft  render  them  in  fome  degree  uneafie 
to  themfelves. 

§  7.  ypon  the  whole.  Men  canjnot  have  any  Rational 
and  holding  Satisfadlion,  but  in  approving  themfelves  to  a 
y.'eli  inftrr.dled  Confcience.,  and  fo  lav  allptohim,  nhomade 
V  ..-  ...  and 


164  An  tjjay  for  the  Pare  !1. 

and  manages  the  Univerfe,  who  can  do  more  againfl,  or  for 
us,  4:baii  all  the  Wcrld  beiides  ;  and  if  plea  fed  with  us,  he 
certainly  will  employ  his  Wifdom,  Power,  and  other  Attri- 
butes, not  againft,  but  for  us-,  fothnt,  nil  things  foall  voo)\tc~ 
gether  for  Cur  Gooii,  and  turn  unfpeakably  to  our  Advantage  in 
the  end,  however  they  may  at  prefent  appear. 

§  8.  Ourbeing  therefore  accepted  of  God,  and  approv'dof 
ourownMinds,  muft  unqueftionably  be  of  the  utmoft  Impor- 
tance to  us ;  and  therefore  the  Concern  we  have  in  this  or 
that  particular  Matter  will  be  bed  determin'd  by  a  juft  Refo- 
lution  of  the  following  Enquiry,  iVhcther^  and  hove  fnr  God 
tfill  be  fleas' d^  pr  difflens'd  •  And  a  well  inform' d  Confcience  fn- 
tisfidor  dlff.it isfd?  Towards  the  anfwering  of  this  impor- 
tant Queftion,^  fomewhat  will  here  be  cffer'd  in  a  geneial 
way,  but  farther  Help  is  to  be  fought  elfewhere,  vi:^.  from 
the  Sacred  Scriptures,  and  other  Books  agreeable  thereto, 
which  treat  of  that  Matter  more  particularly ;  and  from  Men 
of  approved  Knowledge  and  Integrity. 

§  9.  As  to  the  Meafure  fo  far  ictled,  it  is  of  mighty 
Confequence  to  us,  that  it  be  firmly  Bclievd,  confidcring  the 
Attacks,  that  arc  like  to  be  made  upon  us  in  this  Point,  not 
only  by  a  fubtlc  Tempter,  and  a  degenerate  \\''or!d  without, 
but  alfo  by  our  own  depraved  Nature  within:  It  had  need 
Jikewife  to  be  entertan'd  with  the  highcft  Acceptation,  and 
held  as  a  Maxim  fully  fuited  to  oar  Nature  and  Condition  as 
Reafonable  Creatures,  and  that  it  fhould  be  embrac'd,  as 
being  of  the  moft  friendly  Import  and  Tendency  ;  whcnas 
we  are  fiire  to  be  beft  accepted  of  God,  when  we  do  mod 
fhcw  our  fdves  Men  indeed,  and  purfue  our  trueft  Inrereft  in 
the  fureft  way  :  Nor  can  we  ever  fall  Uiider  any  Necefliry 
cr  Temptation  (as  tho(e  who  feek  the  favour  of  Earthly 
Princes  may  fometimes)  to  do  any  thing  Bafe,  Unreafonable, 
or  Unworthy  cf  our  felves :  Finally,  we  Ihould  have  the 
Meafure  thus  given  always  at  hand  and  ready  for  Ufe. 

§  10.  Our  Minds  ought  therefore  to  be  thro'ly  tindur'd 
with  this  Principle,  and  under  the  continual  Influence  cf  it, 
that  our  great,  and  ,(in  a  Senfe,  curj  only  Bufinefs  in  this 
World  i^  the  Pleafing  of  God,  and  that  our  own  Interefts  are 
thus  to  be  molt  effedually  fecur'd.  It  do's  moft  highly  con- 
cern us  to  ufe  all  proper  Means  for  the  better  fixing  of  this 
Point ;  and,  in  order  thereto,  to  Converfe  much  with  Rich 
Authors,  and  Company,  and  above  all,  to  cngage^fuch  help 
from  above,  as  will  not  only  eftablilh  us  in  itj  bift  mind  us 
of  it. 

§  1 1.  Now 


Chap.  9-  improvement  of  K.tziQn,  165 

§  II.  Now  more  diftindtly  to  open  the  mentioned  Rule 
and  Meafure  of  Importance  : 

I.  We  are  not  to  fuppofe,  that  properly  God  ispleas'd  Or 
difpleas'd  mith  tis  for  any  thing  which  hath  no  kind  of  refe- 
rence to  any  Law  or  Rule  of  Duty,  and  therefore  thofe  Per- 
fedions,  or  Dcfcds  of  Mind  or  Body,  which  are  merely 
Natural,  much  tnore  the  State  of  Things  about  us,  do  not 
render  us  morally  Pleafing,  or  Difp leafing  to  God ;  nor  are  they, 
by  any  means,  of  fuch  Importance  to  us,  as  they  are  commonly 
fuppos'd  to  be  :  Our  Bufinefs  is  to  hd,  and  Ad,  as  God  would 
have  lis,  and  to  leave  the  reft  intirely  to  him,  depending  on 
his  Goodncfs,  \Vil<iom,  and  Power,  for  fuch  Ilfues  and 
Events,  as  (hall  linaljy  prove  of  the  greateft  Advantage  to 
us  :  We  are  not  oblig'd,  for  the  pleafing  of  God,  eventually 
to  fccure  all  thole  Ends,  at  which  we  are  yet  bound  to  aim  ; 
but  only  to  take  the  bcfi  way  we  can  towards  them,  that  foic 
maynotbcourFanh,  if  we  be  uoz^cgr.)  Healthful, Ufeful,^r, 

S  iz.  .2.  \\^e  may  reafonably  think,  that  fome  things  of 
a  Moral  Nature,  are  equally  pleafing  or  difpleafing  to  God. 
'Tis,  I  conceive,  fairly  fuppofabie,  he  could  have  equally 
fatisfy'd  himfelf  in  making  fome  other  Syltem  of  Things, 
or  managing  them  fome  other  way  ;  and  that  God 
was  nor  by  any  NeceiTity  ty'd  up  to  this  individual  Frame  of 
Nature,  and  Courfe  of  Providence ;  Nor  can  we  doubt, 
but  there  are  now  feveral  Pieces  in  Nature,  and  Scenes  of 
Providence,  which  appear  to  the  Divine  Wifdom,  equally 
good  and  perfcft  :  And  if  divers  of  God's  own  Performances 
may  bear  the  fclf-fame  Eftimate  with  him,  'tis  reafonable  to 
Judge,  that  fome  of  our  Adlings  may  do  fo  too.  We  are 
not  therefore  to  expe£l  that  every  feveral  Matter,  with  which 
we  are  concern'd,  ihould  have  a  different  Degree  of  Accepta- 
tion with  God,  and  fo  muft  demand  an  higher,  or  only  a 
lower  Regard  from  us :  Whenas  'tis  moft  plainly  undenia- 
ble, that  fome  Adlions  of  ours  muft  be  altogether  equal,  and 
alike  ;  as  fuppofe  whether  I  fhould  choof-r,  and  take  this  or 
that  piece  of  Gold,  if  both  were  exat^ly  alike,  and  offer'd 
under  like  Circumftances. 

§  13.  3.  Ihere  j;, ay  yet  be  many  more  things,  about 
which  we  cannot,  or  at  Icaft  are  not  requir'd  to,  determine, 
which  is  more  pleahng  or  difpleafing  to  God.  It  would  not 
in  many  Cafes  be  u'orch  the  while ;  and  in  fome  it  might 
prove  Matter  of  Temptation  to  us,  rather  than  Advantage  : 
Where  therefore  the  Determination  is  evidently  difficult,  and 
the  Confequences  on  the  one  hand,  or  the  other  appear  not 
likely  to  bear  a  juft  Proportion  to  the  Time  and  Tho't,  which 

would 


1 66  An  tjfay  for  the  Part  I L 

would  be  required  :  Such  Matters  are  to  be  taken  foreq  jal, 
.  ajid  indifferent  j  efpecially,  when  w^  have  not  the  Capacity 
or  Opportunity  to  examine  them  farther. 

§  14.  4.  To  fo.iow  thebcft  Light  we  have,  or  can  well 
attain,  conlidering  it  as  that  which  God  would  have  us  do, 
liiuft  be  in  the  main  plealijig  to  him ;  tho*  we  fhould  happen, 
liotwithftanding  our  Precaution,  t6  fall  into  fome  Miftake  : 
Whenason  the  other  hand  to  go  againlt  our  Light  and  Con- 
fcience  n\\\i\  be  both  difplealing  to  GpJ/  and  difqui^iing  to 
our  own  Minds  ■,  for  in  fo  doing,'  'vvc  Ihould  certainly  Cm- 
demn  our  Jclvcs  in  the  thim^  which  Ke  (lUoWj  and  could  expedt 
no  Other,  than  that  God  (hould  condemn  us  too ;  whofe  fup- 
pos'd  Authority  would  in  fuch  cafe  be  really  contemned  by 
lis ;  tho'  we  might  poffibly  happen  to  take  that  way,  which  in 
itfelf  were  Good  and  Right. 

§  15.  5.  That  only  is  to  be  accounted  good  in  a  ftridt  and 
proper  Senfe,  which  is  intircly  fo,  as  being  in  all  refpecits 
whatfoever  agreeable  to  the  Rule  Of  our  Duty  ;  what  varies 
from  It  in  any  dnz  or  Degree,  is  fo  far  Evil;  and  in  ftriftnefs, 
■were  to  be  a-coanted  fimpiy  bad ;  vet  what  is  deficiently  good, 
is  notwithf^anding  accepted  by  God  ,  when  it  anfwers  his 
Will  in  what  he  abfolutely  and  indifpenfibly  infifteth  on,  as 
inReafon  he  mull:,  upcn  finccrc  Intentions,  and  by  the  Gof- 
pel  he  plainly  do's  upon  a  living  Fairh  in  Chrift.     But, 

^16.  6.  V^'here  there  is  what  God  abfolutely  difallows, 
or  is  wanting  what  he  indifpenfibly  requires,  no  AcccHion, 
or  Alteration  whatfoever,  which  doth  not  corred:  the  Mat- 
ter in  tho/e  Refpeds,  can  render  it  upon  the  whole  pleafing 
to  God;  tho'  they  may  poflibly  make  it  lefs  difpleafing; 
and  it  muft  be  allow'd,  that  he  is  always  fo  far  pleas'd,  as 
there  is  any  thing  of  real  Good  (which  is  indeed  Originally 
from  himfelf ;»,  "vvhcn  yet,  upon  the  whole,  neither  the  Per- 
fon  nor  Performance  may  be  properly  accepted. 


CHAP.     X. 

fc  I.  \T'  E  now  proceed  to  fuch  Remarks,  as  may  farther 

help   us  better  to  apply  the  M.-afure  before  gi- 
,ven:     And, 

1.    A.  prefenc  Opportuniry  and  Ocraflon  for  what  is  appa- 
rcnii\  Lawf.'l,   and  in  fo.i.e  degree  LJf  fui  is  a  fulhcicn:  In- 
uioaii;  x:»,  thr.  v.e  then  nuy  or  oogh: '.0  attend  it,   if  it-inter- 
fere 


Chap.  lo.        J/f/proveMtnt  oj   Keaion.  167 

fere  not  with  what  is  more  t)iTr  Duty,  iad  concern  ar  the  fanie 
time,  cr  at  Jcaft  more  plairtly  fo.  . 

2.  That  is  to  have  ciir  i^rcarer  Regard,  wliich  is  recom- 
mended .to  us  by  any  iTng'le  Confidcraiioii  farther  or  more 
valuable,  whilft  the  thins:;s  compar'd  arc  ahke  or  equal  in  all 
other Refpe^s  ■■,  for  any  lirtje  Addition  on  either  hand  ought 
to  turn  the  Scale,  where  the  wci^ln  was  even  before. 

§  2.    'd-  jijftly  to  dctermTne  what  i?  pleafing  or  difplea- 
fing  to  God,  but  cfpcciaHy  !tvhat  is  more  or  Icfs  fo,  will  com- 
monly require  our  cnrrfidering,    not  only  the  Subftance  of 
Things^  but  their  concurring  Circunrftajices,  which  may  be 
urrfpeakably  \arious,  andvarioully  combin'd,  fo  as  to  render 
the  dccifivc  Judgment  very  difficult  to  us  in  a  multitude  of 
Cafes  J  when  yet  we  muft  determine  in  order  to  Pradlice,  and 
it  is  perhaps  apparently  of  great  Importance  to  us,  that  we 
do  it  rightly  '•     T  his  we  may  not  ordinarily  hope  to  do,  but 
upon  farther,  and  deeper  Coniideration  ;    upon  Conlultation 
and  Advice ;    upon  our  fcrious  imploring  the  Divine  Gui- 
dance, and  duly  waiting  for  it,    fo  long  as  the  Matter  will 
well  bear,   referving  our  fclves  for  fuch  farther  Light,  as  may 
fpring  in  our  Minds  or  otherwife  prelent  it  felf,  and  refolving 
we  will  at  laft  govern  our  Celves  by  what  fhali  appear  molt 
plealmg  to  God. 

§  3.    4.  Where  one  fide  of  the  Queftion  upon  due  Con- 
(ideration  appears  more  evidently  fafe,    the  other  dangerous 
to  our  higheft  Intcreft,    we  ought  certainly  to  take  the  fafer 
fide,  fo  as  to  omit  that  which  we  cannot  fuppofe  to  be  our 
Duty,   or  not  with  like  Evidence,   as  we  have  to  fufpedl  it 
Sinful  ;   and  on  the  other  hand,  to  do  that  which  we  cannot 
fufpe£V  to  be  Sinful ;  cr  not  with  like  Keafon,  as  we  have  to 
fuppofe  it  our  Duty :  E.  Gr.    If  any  would  have  Simple  For- 
nication to  be  Lawful,  or  Family-Prayer  no  Duty  ;  they  had 
need  be  fjrer  of  ir,   than  they  can  rc.nfonably  be,   whilft  there 
is  fo  much  to  he  faid  to  the  contrary,  as  they  can  never  fully 
anfwcr  to  their  ov/n  Minds  upon  cooi  and  mature  Deliberati- 
on :  And  it  can  never  be  fairly  pretended  however,  that  thefor- 
mer  is  a  Duty,  the  latter  a  Sin  ,-  fo  that  the  Performing  of  this 
and   Rcfiaining  from  thr.t ,   mufl  be  the  fate   fide' without 
QiieiUon;    and  the  other  manifefiiy  Dangerous  at  leaft,   if 
no  more  conid  he  made  our,  which  yet  may  be  certainly  done 
in  the  mentioned  Cafes  :     But  if  there  were  only  grtater 
Rcafon  for  Sufpicion,  than  Securitv,   that  Rule  mult  hold, 
Qj.i-d  dubitiUy  ntf:csri<^  what  thoa  dcubtelt,  do  not.    Yet, 


S4.  5.  We 


1 68  An  tjfay  for  the  Part  II. 

§  4.     5.  We  may  juftly  efteem  it  pleafing  to  God,  that 
mere  Scruples  fhould  be  difregarded    (ii  they  cannot  be  re- 
moved) rather  than  cherifh'd  and  indulg'd ,     when  once  we 
can  come  to  fee,    that  the  main  Force  of  Argument  lies  on 
one  fide,   and  only  feme  unfolved  Difficulty  on  the  other, 
which  creates  in  us  a  Sufpicion  contrary  to  right  Rcafon  : 
for  this  inftru£Vs  us  to  yield  to  the  manifeft  Over-weight  of 
Argument ;   tho'  fome  Cavil  (hould  ftill  remain  unanfwer'd, 
or  fome  Difficulty  not  fully  cleared.     For  inftance,  it  feems 
to  be  no  other  than  a  fcrupulous  Weaknefs,    if  fome  dare  not 
own  the  prefent  Government,   which  they  know  hath  been 
fettled  by  common  Confent  and  Advice,  upon  fuch  Grounds 
and  Reafons,   and  fo  much  for  the  Publick  Good,  only  bc- 
caufe  it  is  not  made  fully  clear  to  them,    that  the  pretended 
James  the  3d  had  not  a  Right  to  the  Crown  by  Defcent,   or 
that  fuch  a  Right  is  not  indefefible,   wlicnas  they  can  never 
be  fo  furc  of  his  Right,  as  in  Reafon  they  fliould  be  before 
they  efpoufe  it  againft  fuch  a  weight  of  Argument  to  the 
contrary  :    Nor  do's  it  appear  other  than  a  Scruple,  if  fome 
fhall  not  dare  to  aflert  the  Natural  and  Chriftian  Right  they 
have  (or  indeed  not  dare  to  anfwer  the  Prior,  and  plain  Obli- 
gation, they  are  under)  to  ufe  the  beft  Judgment  they  have, 
or  can  attain  to,  in  chooling  a  Guide,   and  Help  for  their 
Souls,  as  well  as  a  Phyfician  for  their  Bodies,  left  they  Ihould 
violate  a  fuppofed  Authority,   of  which,  in  relation  to  that 
Point,  they  are  not  (and  I  conceive  cannot  be)  equally  fure, 
as  they  are,  or  eafily  may  be,  of  the  mention'd  Right  and 
Obligation.     But, 

§  5.  6.  As  to  what  is  pleafing  or  difpleafing  to  God,  and 
what  is  more  or  lefs  fo,  our  Principal  Light  is  to  be  drawn 
from  the  plain  Declarations,  and  fair  Intimations  God  him- 
fe!f  hath  given  us  of  his  Mind  in  that  Book,  which  we  have 
abundant  Reafon  to  believe  is  in  a  peculiar  and  extraordina- 
ry way  from  him.  Now,  according  to  this  it  is  certainly  the 
Mind  of  God,  (i.)  That  wc  ihould  follow  and  imitate  him 
in  whatever  is  fuitable  to  our  State  and  Condition,  particu- 
larly that  we  ihould  aim  at  recovering  our  Original  likenefs 
to  God,  in  point  of  Knowledge,  Holinels,  Righreoufnels, 
and  Goodnels.  That  therefore  we  Ihould  Labour  rightly  to 
know  what  concerns  us  ;  that  we  ihould  be  intirely  devoted 
to  the  Pleafing  and  Honouring  of  God  ;  that  for  this 
purpofe  we  Ihould  render  to  all,  as  far  as  may  be,  ^vv'hat  wc 
owe  them ;  and  farther  yet  fhoulJ  do  all  the  good  we  can: 
And  in  order  to  this  it  is  the  Will  of  God, 

S  6.  ""a.)  That 


Chap  I O  Improvement  of 'd^iidion.  169 

§  6.  (2.)  Thnt  xoc  foould  be  throughly  furnlflod  unto  all  good 
pP^orkj,  2  Tim.  3,  17.  ylnd  thnt  vohatfover  things  are  Trw^ 
xphatfoever  things  are  Honeji  (or  Honourable,)— ^  J uj}y  —  Piire^, 
—  Lovely,  —  of  good  B^-port  \  if  there  be  any  Virtue,  and  if 
there  be  any  Praife^  we  p^ould  thinks  on  thcfe  things  (follo\ving 
good  Inftrudions,  and  imitating  good  Examples,  as  what 
will  be  plfeafing  to  God  ;  for }  ifwt  thuf  do,  the  God  of  Pence 
vpill  be  xvith  m,  Phil.  4,  8,  9.  In  ftiort,  that  denying  Vngodli" 
nefs  and  worldly  Lujis^  we  fhould  live  Soberly,  Bjghteoujly^  and: 
Godly  in  thu  frefcnt  H^orld^  looking  for  that  blejfcd  Hope,  au4 
the  gtoriow  appearing  of  the  great  God,  and  our  Saviour  Jejm 
Chri/i,  who  gave  himfelf  for  us,  that  he  might  redeem  us  front  aS 
iniquity^  and  furifte  unto  himfelf  ei  peculiar  People,  :{calom  gf 
goodlVorkSi  Tit.  2.  12,  13,  14. 

§7.  (3.)  Where  God  hath  more /'rtmV«/4r/y  ^xprefs'd  oc 
intimated  his  Pleafure,  it  is  to  be  heedfully  regarded,  charg'dt 
upon  our  felves.and  as  far  as  poffibly  we  can,  comply'd  with; 
efpecially  in  the  Points  he  hath  more  abfolurely  infifted  nn^ 
and  more  earneftly  recommended  to  us.  Here  not  only 
Commands  and  Prohibitions,  with  the  San<ition  of  Pxomife^ 
and  Threatnings  are  to  be  attended  to;  but  all  the  pthef 
Methods,  whereby  Divine  Wildom  hath  infinuated  theMinci 
and  Will  of  God,  as  by  Dodtnnal  Declarations,  together 
with  Hiftorical  Narrations,  Parables,  Cj'c-  We  are  alfo  t;o 
obferve  with  what  Degree  of  Eafneftnefs  this  or  that  is  re-^ 
commended,  vv'hilftGod  dire<^s  us  about  it,  Encourages,  Ex- 
horts, Expoftulates,  c^c.  ■    .  . 

§  8.    (4.J  'Tis  certainly  the  Mind  of  God, .  according  to 
Scripture,  that  whatever  makes  againi^  the  .^alvation  of  our 
fel\es  ur  others  ftiould  be  foliciroufly  avoided  ;   what  makes 
for  it,  diligently  attended,  and  m  fuch  a  degree,  as  the  ten- 
dency one  way  or  the  other  is  greater,  or  lefs  ;  furer,  or  more 
uncertain :     And  in  the  general,  tha^t  -v^hat  would  be  like;,' 
alt  things  anfider'' d,  to  produce  a  greate(  Mifhief,  or  prevent 
a  greater  Good,  is  to  be  (liun'd  with  fo  much  greater  Cauti- 
on j    what  is  like,    all  thing:  ccnfider'dy   to  prevent  a  greater 
l^lifchicf,  or  produce  a  greater  Good,  to  be  purfued  Ivith  io 
tnuch  the  greater  Application. :,   When  't\s  faid,  Call  things 
conhderd]  it  is  evident  the  Glory  of  God,  to  be pbtain'd.  iri 
our  confammare  Happinefs  muft  be  taken  into  the  Account  S 
And  that  therefore  (as  i:  is  ftrongly  intimated,   I{pm.  3.  8.) 
1^0  evil  ii  to  be  done^   that  good  rncy  c^rrf  j    .fince  whatfoevef 
Good  riiay  be  fuppofcd  any  way  to  come  o^  ,knpwn  and  air 
lovved  Evil^'it  mult  he  plainly  oy  pr-halJanc'd  by.  the  Difh-  -nour 
dene  to  God  (as  il  he  needed,^  or  warranted"  )tuch"  Means)  | 


170  An  tjf ay  for  the  Part  II- 

together  with  the  Damage,  and  Danger  thence  accruing  to      ' 
Men. 

§  p.  Now  if  the  general  Meafure  of  Importance  be  ap- 
ply'd  in  particular  Cafes,  according  to  the  Intimations  here 
given,  or  the  fuller  Diredions  in  Sacred  "Writ,  and  other 
agreeable  Compofures,  it  will  for  the  moft  part  diredi  our 
greater  and  kfs  Attendance  according  to  the  following  Gra- 
dation. 

h  niuft  plainly  be  our  firft  and  moft  preiTing  Concern, 
that  our  chcjen  St  Ate  be  not  fuch,  as  is  Hijpkiijvig  to  God; 
fince  thnt  would  not  only  be  a  great  Provocation,  but  a  con- 
tinual, ftandingone,  and  we  Ihould  fo  long  abide  imderthc 
Wrath  of  the  Almighty. 

§  I  o.  Next  to  this,  on  the  contrary,  'tis  highly  our  Con- 
cern, that  our  State,  fo  far  as  we  can  order  it,  be  fuch,  as 
is  TPf //  pl<'-{f!»g  to  God  •  fo  that  befides  our  being  deliver'd 
from  under  the  Curfe,  which  would  make  us  really  (tho'  as 
yet  perhaps  not  fenfiblyj  Miferable,  we  may  be  under  the 
Blefling,  which  alone  can  render  us  truly  Happy  :  And  as 
not  to  be  Miferable  is  Naturally  and  NecefTarily  the  firft 
VVifh  of  a  Rcafonable  Creature,  fo  to  be  pofitively  Happy  is 
the  next. 

§  II.  We  are  therefore  deeply  concern'd  to  J!lwoii»  fo  far 
as  well  may  be,  what  State  of  ours  will  be  pleafing  or  dif- 
plea(ing  to  God ;  and  as  we  can  to  acquaint  our  (elves  with 
all  fit  Means ;  and  to  ufe  our  b'eft  Endenvours.  (i.J  That  our 
Minds  be  not  lll-principl'd,  or  lii-affcfled  :  (2.)  That  they  be 
furniih'd  with  needful  and  ufeful  Knowledge,  together  with 
a  right  Temper  and  Difpofition:  (3.)  That  our  Bodies  be 
not  through  any  Mifmanagement,  or  NegleA  of  ours  difor- 
der'd,  or  indifpos'd  for  what  lies  upon  us  i  but  that  (4 )  They 
may  be  in  the  hd\  Condition  for  Service,  efpeciajly  for  that 
which  is  of  higheft  Concernment,  or  which  is  more  peculiarly 
or^r  ftated  Bulinefs  and  Employment.     And, 

§  11.  (5.)  That  our  manner  and  way  of  Living  be  not 
hurtful  or  unprofitable,  as  tkr.t  of  the  pretended  Religious 
Orders  among  Papifts,  and  of  too  many  of  our  Gentry 
among  Proteftants,  who  apply  not  themfelves  to  any  accoun- 
table ^Method  cf  UfeRilnels :  But  that,  (6.)  Our  ftated 
way  of  Living  be  fuited,  as  near  as  we  can,  to  the  demand 
there  is  of  Service,  and  to  the  beft  of  our  Capacity  for  it  } 
■fo  asnor  to  betake,  or  confine  our  fclves  to  a  lefs  ufeful  Poft, 
when  we  are  really  fitted  for, greater  Service,  and  regularly 
CiWd  ibeiew. 

$15.  New 


Cnap.  II.        Improvement  of  \k^2L\.{:)n.  lyi 

§  13.  Next  after  the  Concern  of  our  State,  that  it  be 
pleafing  to  God,  follows  that^  which  relates  to  our  AHions  ; 
and  here,  (i.)  That  we  avoid  whatever  in  this  kind  would  be 
difpleafingto  him,  whocannotbut  abhor  Bad  Men  the  more, 
and  love  even  Good  Men  the  lefs,  for  their  Evil  Doings  ; 
for  which,  as  he  may  juftly  Punilh  ihem,  fo  'tis  to  be  look'cl 
he  Ihould  ordinarily  do  it.one  way  or  other,  fooner  or  later, 
even  in  this  World  ;  efpecially  for  what  is  more  Grofs,  more 
Wilful,  more  deliberate,  or  other  ways  aggravated .-  We  lliould 
therefore  cenje  to  do  Evil,  but  take  heed  of  ftopping  here,  for 
we  muft  alfo  learn  to  do  vfell:  And  it  Jies  upon  us  in  poinfc 
of  Inrereft,   as  well  as  Duty. 

§  14.  (2.)  That  we  always  do  in  one  kind  or  other  the 
things  that  aire  pleafing  to  God,  who  at  the  loweil  will  be 
lefs  offended,  even  with  Bad  Men,  upon  their  doing  what 
is  Good  for  the  Matter  of  it,  tho'  they  fail  in  the  Manner  or 
End  ;  and  is  fure  to  be  more  highly  pleas'd  with  Good  Men 
upon  their  doing  what  is  truly,  tho'  but  imperfeftly  Good  ; 
and  as  thefe  cannot  lofe  their  Labour,  fo  even  thoje  have  of- 
ten fome  temporal  Advantage  by  the  very  Nature  of  the 
thing,  or  thro' the  over-flowing  Goodnefs  of  God. 

§  15.  Now  to  be  free  from  prelling  Troubles  is  whac  wc 
do  generally  and  moft  earneftly  covet,  to  compafs  pofitive 
Advantages,  is  commonly  our  fecond  Care,  and  tho'  the 
latter  may  feem  to  be  in  it  f elf  of  greater  Value  than  the  for- 
mer ;  yet  thti  may  be  reafonably  firft  purfu  d,  as  a  Matter 
of  greater  Importance,  fince  it  is  of  greater  Necellity,  to  m ; 
for  we  can  ealier  bear  the  meer  Abfence  of  what  is  defirable, 
than  the  PrelTure  of  what  is  Difagreeable,  fuppoling  it  were 
in  a  like  Degree  and  Kind;  for  otherwife  we  can  better  en- 
dure a  fmall  Inconvenience,  than  the  want  of  fome  great 
and  needful  Enjoyment, 


CHAP.     XL 

§  »'  T5UT  to  defcend  a  little  farther  inro  the  Confideratlon 
"^  of  A£tlons,  and  the  feveral  Degrees  of  Importance 
belonging  to  them  (vA/henas  we  did  but  generally  touch  upon 
them  in  the  foregoing  Chapter  ,  we  are  here  concem'd  10 
khow  as  far  as  well  may  be,  what  Adions  of  ours,  and  whic 
in  them  may  be  pleafing  or  diff  leafing  to  God  ;  and  alfo  as 
we  can  £0  Jtcquaint  our  felves  with  all  fie  M^ans,  and  co  ufe 

N  2,  out 


172  An  rjjiiy  for  the  Fart  ll* 

cur  befi:  Endejtvours.  (i.)  That  we  may  avoid  all  fuch  Ali- 
ens, as  upon  due  Confideration  appear  to  us  certainly  Evil, 
and  here  it  may  be  commonly  fuffifient  and  moft  convenient 
to  caution  our  felves  and  orhers  by  general  Maiks,  without 
the  particular  mention  of  fome  Evils,  or  rather  of  the  ways 
■tvherein  they  are  Pradlis'd  ;  as,  e.^.  That  in  way  of  Trade, 
or  Dealing  we  ufe  not  any  Methods  of  Impoiing  upon  others 
to  their  Difadvantage. 

§  2.  (i)  That  we  mav  fighfly  difcharge  what  we  deli- 
berately judge  to  be  our  Duty  ;  about  which  it  is  ordinarily 
bed,  that  we  be  more  particularly  Inftrucfted;  Sis,e.g.  In 
reference  to  Prayer,  that  our  Prailes,  and  Thankfgivings, 
Cofifeflions  and  Petitions,  for  our  telves  and  others,  are  to 
be  folemnly  prefcnred  to  Godj  thro'  Chrift,  by  tlie  help  of 
the  Holy  Spirit,  in  Puhlick,in  Families,  and  in  Secret,  with 
Fgi'.h  and  fuirablc  Affeftions,  as  oft  as  may  well  confilt  with 
the  anfuering  our  Other  Obligations. 

§  3'.  (3.)  That  we  may  (lum  what  wereafonably  fufpedl: 
And,  ^^4. )  Do  what  we  have  canle  to  think  could  not  be  in- 
nocently omitted  by  us.  (5.)  That  we  run  not  ncedlefly  up- 
on any  thing  that  has  the  Appearance  of  Evil,  tho'  it  were  no 
more;  or  do  what  is  of  ill  Kcport,  unlefs  it  Ihould  happen 
to  be  plainly  our  Duty  in  fome  rare  and  lingular  Cafe :  And 
(6.)  That  we  nef".lc(il  not  what  is  Acceptable  and  of  good 
Report,  when  there  is  Occafion  and  Opportunity  for  it,  and 
no  plain  Obligation  upon  m  to  the  contrary. 

<5  4.  We  are  certainly  obiigM,  both  in  Duty  and  Inte- 
reft  (if  it  be  riohtly  underltood)  at  all  times  carefully  to 
avoid  all  moral  or  culpable  Evils  of  whatfoever  Kind  or 
Decree ;  but  fince  neither  our  Minds  nor  our  Bodies  can  con- 
tinua'Iy  bear  the  utmoft  Intenfion,  we  are  more  folicitoufly  to 
watch  againft  the  greater  Evils,  and  fuch  as  we  are  in  grea- 
ter danger  of,  as  being  led  thereto  by  our  Conftitution,  or 
Condition,  or  by  fouie  fpeoal  Occafion,  A  Crime  that  is  o- 
therwa^s  equal  to  another  muft  be  accounted  greater  or  lefs 
according  to  the  Characffer  of  the  Perfcn  offended,  dire^ly^ 
and  of  che  Party  offending  rcci'Moceilly  (for  here  'tis  ordinarily 
greater,  as  he  is  lefs  ;  a!'o  as  'tis  againft  an  higher  or  lower 
Authority  :  as  it  is  againlt  both  or  one  of  them  alone ;  as  'tis 
againft  a  Natural,  or  merely  politive  Law  ;  as  'tis  in  Sub- 
ftance  or  Circumltance  only  ;  as  'tis  Open,  or  Secret  ; 
Repeated,  or  Single  j  temptmg  others,  or  tempted  by 
them;  6^c. 


I 


Chap  II.        J//jprovewe»t  of- \xti3i['on.  172 

§  5.  As  to  good  Adions,  we  are  plainly  InfufHv.ient  for 
the  greater  Number  cf  tliat  Kind  ,  nor  are  they  ui  ail  C^les 
our  Duty) ;  and  therefore  'tis  more  our  Concernment  to  dif- 
cern,  what  may  be  incumbent  on  us,  according  to  our  Con- 
dition and  Circumrtances;  as  alfo  what  is  apparently  of  pre- 
fenr,  or  more  prelfmg  Obligation  j  yet  it  is  of  little  S^jrv  ice, 
or  indeed  rather  hurtful  to  puzzle  olt  fclvei  or  others  about 
the  nicer,  and  lefs  difcernable  Ditfercnces  :  But,  where 
there  is  no  fpecial  Reafon  to  over-baliance,  and  carry  ic 
otherwife,  good  A£lions  are  to  be  efieein'd  of  greater  or  lefs 
Importance,  as  they  are  more  or  lefs  abfolut^ly  bound  upon 
US;  as  requir'd  by  an  higher  cr  lower  Authority  ;  by  both 
together,  or  only  one  of  them  alone  ;  as  they  anfwer  a  Na- 
tural or  merely  politive  Law;  as  they  are  the  inward,  or 
only  the  outward  Ads  of  Piety  and  Devotion;  as  A6ts  of 
Juftice,  Charity,  Liberality,  Decency,  &c. 

§  6.  And  farther,  good  Actions  are  more  or  lefs  confi- 
derablc,  as  they  refped  Univerfal  or  Publick  Good,  or  what 
is  only  Private  or  Perfonal ;  as  they  tend  to  the  Security  ef 
thofe,  who  are  apparently  more  ufeful,  or  of  fuch  as  are  Je!s 
Valuable ;  as  they  concern  Life,  Health,  Good  Name,  or 
Eftatc  ;  as  there  may  be  a  Tendency  to  greater  or  farther  ufe- 
fulnefs,  or  only  fome  prefent  and  partii;ular  Service  ;  as 
they  refer  to  ufefulnefs  in  general,  which  is  the  end  of  Life, 
or  barely  to  Life  it  felf ;  as  they  may  relate  to  Virtue  and 
Innocence,  or  only  to  the  lower  Concernments  of  Life*, 
Health,  Eftate,  (^c .-  Finally,  as  they  may  refer  to  ferious 
Bufinefs,  or  only  to  fome  innocent  and  becoming  Divertife- 
ment,  which  ought  to  render  us  fitter  for  Bafinefs. 

§  7.  The  Gradation  here  Eflay'd  may  be  of  fome  Ufe  to 
facilitate  our  Determination,  when  there  is  no  Special,  and 
weighty  Conlideration  to  carry  the  Matter  otherways;  but 
in  fuch  Cafe  we  miift  vary  from  the  more  ufual  Order,  e.  g, 
Tho'  an  ill  State  or  habit  of  Mind,  fuppofe  Covetoufnejsy  be 
worfe  than  a  fingle  Adt  of  Extortion  thence  arifing  ;  yet  an 
allovv'd  A£l  of  Malice,  or  Revenge  muft  undoubtedly  be 
much  more  Criminal  than  the  difallow'd  habit  of  Coldnefi 
in  Religion. 

§  ?.  Having  fpoken  thus  largely  of  the  various  Impor- 
tance of  Things  to  us  according  to  the  general  Meafure  laiJ 
down  for  that  purpofe,  it  remains,  that  I  add  fomewhaE 
briefly  upon  the  other  aientioned  Heads:     And, 


Nj  II,  As 


II,  As  to  the  Certainty  of  that  Importance,  or  of  God's 
being  plcafed  or  difpleafed  more,  or  lets,  or  equally  upon  our 
being  or  adiiing  fo,  or  fo.  Now  where  the  Importance  of 
Ihings  appeared  upon  due  Confideration  to  be  othervvile 
equal,  there  the  greater  Certainty,  if  it  can  be  feen,  claims 
our  firlt  and  clofer  Attendance.     And, 

§  9.  (i.)  We  mviil  take  our  Concernment  and  the  feve- 
rai  Degrees  thereof  to  be  certain,  when  it  is  Self  evident  with- 
out Proof,  fo  that  we  cannot  ferioufly  doubt  of  it,  or  when 
the  Proof  may  amount  to  Demonitration,  and  leave  no 
room  for  Cavil ;  or  finally,  when  there  is  a  manifell  over- 
weight of  Reafon  for  it  j  as  certainly  there  is  in  what  the  ap- 
proved Word  of  God  delivers,  whether  exprefly  or  by  good 
Confequence,  as  to  his  being  pleas'd  or  difpleas'd  with  fuch 
a  State  or  Ad:ion  ;  and  thr.t  clear  Judgment  of  Reafon,  which 
ilands  unconrradidied  by  Divine  Revelation,  is  juftly  to  be 
taken  by  us  for  a  fufficient  Ground  of  Certainty.     But, 

§  10.  (2.)  Where  the  Reafons  on  each  hand  appear  al- 
moft  equal,  and  that  the  Scale  turns  lefs  apparently  on  this 
or  that  fide,  we  can  then  only  call  it  Probability,  which 
is  however  to  be  follow'd,  when  we  muft  determine  one 
^A^ay  ot  other,   and  may  not  farther  deliberate. 

§  1 1.  (3.)  If  we  can  difcern  nothing  at  all  of  over- 
weight on  either  fide,  'tis  then  an  utter  Uncertainty,  whe- 
ther the  thing  be  difpleafing  or  pleafing  to  God,  or  whether 
it  be  more  or  lefs  fo ;  and  in  fuch  Cafe  we  muft  either  take 
the  oppofite  Parts  of  the  Qvieftion,  for  equal  or  indifferent, 
and  proceed  by  a  meer  Arbitrary  Determination,  or  which 
may  be  ordinarily  Safer,  or  better  (  where  it  can  well  be 
done)  to  divert  our  Attendance  to  foniewhat  <^i(cy  wherein 
God  will  be  certainly  or  more  probably  pleas'd. 

§  12.  (4.^^  If  upon  Confideration,  it  appears  only,  that 
fuch  a  Matter  may  poffibly  be  of  Importance,  more  or  lefs, 
but  improbably,  we  are  then  to  account  it  of  little  or  no 
Moment ;  tho'  the  thing  it  felf  ihould  otherwife  be  very  con- 
iiderable,  as  refpe(fting  thePrefervation  of  Life,  or  even  the 
faving  of  our  Souls,  and  accordingly  it  (hould  have  the  laft 
and  loweft  Place,  if  any  at  all  in  our  Attendance. 

§  i^.  Ill,  We  may  farther  confider  our  Capacity  ;  and 
here  if  we  find  our  felves  to  be  really  at  prefcnt  incapable  of 
what  would  be  more  truly  or  more  highly  pieafing  to  God, 
our  Bufinefs  then  is  Ui  aim  at  ir,  and  to  be  preifing  towards 
it,  by  fuch  Means,  and  in  fuch  Methods  as  we  hope  tlW, 
m  fome  Meafure  pleafe  him.  Here  we  may,  and  indeed 
m:it.    taVe  cVe  Steps  thi;  are  poifible  tow.    towards  what 


Chap.  II.        iTnproveme>tt  of  Kealcn.  175 

will  be  more  pleafing  to  God,    whenas  we  cannot  hope  to 
come  ac  ic  crherwife  :     And, 

§  14,  ( I.)  In  reference  to  what  is  of  abfcluteNeccflity^ 
or  of  very  great  and  evident  Concernment  tons,  the  Icfs  our 
Capacity  is,  the  greater  muft  be  our  Application,  in  fuch 
way,  and  by  fuch  Steps,  as  are  moft  likely  to  reach  our  End, 
as  in  preparing  our  felves  for  fome  Itated  Service  in  this 
World,  and  for  Salvation  in  the  other.  But,  (2  J  As  to 
what  is  of  a  lower  Nature,  and  lefs  needful,  the  want  of  a  Ge- 
nius, or  the  weaknels  of  our  Capacity  may  be  look'd  on  as 
our  Difcharge  from  attending  fuch  Matters,  or  at  leaft  from 
purfiiing  them  farther,  than  we  can  do  confiftently  with  what 
is  more  incumbent  on  us. 

§  15.  IV,  (And  laftly)  Somewhat  is  to  be  obferv'd  upon 
the  Profped:  we  may  have,  as  to  the  Advance  or  Continu- 
ance of  our  Capacity,  and,  Ci.)  That  it  is  generally  fo  ill 
afTur'd,  and  altogether  uncertain,  as  that  in  neceffary  things 
we  are  highly  oblig'd  to  prefent  Application  and  rhe  greatefl: 
Diligence ;  and  in  other  Matters  too,  with  what  fpeed  and 
difpatch  we  can,  according  to  the  facred  Advice  and  Charge 
given  us,  Ecclej.f).  lo.  H'^hatfosver  thy  hand  findeth  to  do^  do 
it  with  all  thy  mi^ht^  &c.  Yet  there  is  here  fome  fmall  room 
left  to  diftinguilh  between  the  probable  and  improbable  Ad- 
vance or  Continuance  of  our  Capacity :    So  that, 

§  16,  (t.)  What  is  not  of  neceffity  to  be  now  attended, 
but  may  probably  be  done  hereafter  with  greater  Eafe,  with 
more  Difpatch,  or  to  better  EffeA,  may  reafonably  be  poft- 
pon'd,  and  delay'd  in  hopes  of  that  fitter  Seafon.  Young 
Perfons  muft  therefore  be  allow'd  to  proceed  by  fit  Steps,  and 
flower  advances  towards  the  higher  and  more  difficult  Im- 
provements, which  are  not  of  prefent  Neceffity,  in  hopes  ihey 
may  be  hereafter  more  capable  of  them.    But, 

§  17.  (3.)  Where  the  Advance,  or  even  the  Continuance 
of  our  Capacity  is  improbable,  we  muft  ufe  the  very  fpee- 
dieft  and  clofeft  Application,  wc  can,  to  what  is  of  greateft 
Importance ;  as  fuppofe  a  Perfon  were  under  Sentence  to 
die  the  3d  Day,  or  otherwife  apparently  threaten'd  with 
Death,  or  with  the  lofs  of  hisUnderftanding  and  Senfes  in  a 
little  time.  Yet  even  here  what  cannot,  to  any  good  pur- 
pofe,  be  farther  purfu'd  to  Day,  may  and  muft  be  left  till 
to  morrow. 

§  18.  Upon  the  whole,  a  more  Important  and  more  cer- 
tain Concernment  in  any  thing,  when  there  is  but  a  weaker 
Capacity  for  it,  and  more  doubtful  or  improbable  as  to  its 
Advance,  or  even  its  Continuance  doth  certainly  require  us 

N  4  to 


iyS       -  An  ijjuy  for  the  Part  II- 

.« ^ 

to  givefu*  h  Matter  an  earlier  and  filler  Attendance :  What 
js.lers  Important.  zvA  the  Irnporcance  Icfs  certain,  whilft  the 
Capacity  is  greater  and  like  to  advance,  feems  to  demand 
pjily  a  Jpwer  PJacc  and  lefs  Attendance  from  us. 

^  1 9.  But  there  are  befides,  a  great  Number  of  other 
CaiTibinations,  which  may  diretl  the  Order  and  Degree  of 
Application  and  Attendance :  For  we  might  carry  the  Con- 
fideration  or  Characfter  of  [greater  Importance]  thro'  ihofe 
of  Cg'*e^cer  and  Itfs  Certaintyl ;  and  under  each  of  thefe 
thro'  the  farther  Confidcrations  of  [greater  and  lefs  Capacity]  ; 
under  each  of  thefe  again  thro'  the  Confiderations  of  [its 
Advance,  and  of  its  bare  Continuance]  ;  and  laftly,  under 
each  of  thefe  we  might  take  in  the  Confiderations  of  [Pro- 
babijity  and  Improbability] :  And  in  like  Manner  we  might 
e  irry  the  other  main  Charafter,  tht^t  of  [lefs  Importance] 
thro*  all  the  Divitions  and  Subdivifions  mention'd,  which' 
might  be  an  ingenious  exercife  of  Tho't  ind  Judgment,  but 
perhaps  of  more  Trouble  and  Nicenefsthen  of  Ufe. 

§  20.  I  therefore  conclude  this  momentous  and  difficult 
Head  with  the  following  general  Inftrudions  ;  which,  if 
they  be  underftood  agreeably  to  what  has  been  morefpcci^lly 
deliver'd,  may  be  of  ready  and  coniinual  Ufe. 

Ends  ^re  to  be  throughly  confider'd,  Menns  deliberately 
chofen,  and  the  beft  Pf^ay  of  ufing  them  carefully  fought  out 
before  we  enter  upon  Things. 

Our  farthefi  E^d,  is  to  have  the  firft  and  deepcft  Confide- 
ration,  and  to  bi  ft'll  attendee),  to  in  all  we  go  about  •  Inter- 
medictc  Intention:  are  to  be  more  regarded,  as  they  have  a 
more  neceflary,  dired:,  and  near  Subfcrviency  to  that 
|nd.  / 

Oar  Stated  Btifinefs  is  to  be  carefully  Chofen,  aiid  as  early 
3s  wejl  mav  be;  the  Method  of  Profccitt  ion  is  to  be  laid  with 
deliberate  Confideration  j  and  each  part  to  be  carry 'd  on 
with  diligent  j-Jpplica(ion,  efpecially  what  more  Affeifts  the 
Whole. 

„|.  We  ought  to  take  the  firft  fit  Scafon  for  what  is  Necejjary 
i$t' I{e{juijiic  to  be  doiic  ^  and  the  prefent  Time,  where  it 
cannot  be  fo  c  crrainly,  or  fo  well  done  hereafter. 

'  Farther  Infirudions  to  this  Purpofe  may  be  found  am.ongft 
the  'Moral,  Prud.-ntial,  and  Probable  Pofitions,  Part  I.  Chap. 
1 8,  19,  xo.  and  under  the  concluding  General  Head  about 
Condai3:. 


11:^. 


Chap.  II.         Improvement  of  B-eafon.  177 


CHAP.  xn. 


1^  I.  VT^HEN  that  which  is  before  us,  appears  not,  after 
^  due  Enquiry,  to  be  an  improper  Obje<£l  for  us  to 
proceed  upon,  and  that  we  have  at  lealt  taken  fome  Aim  at 
tlie  Regard  we  ought  to  give  it,  we  are  then  to  ufe  a  pro- 
portionable Care  as  to  the  more  fimple  Idea  of  fqch  Objeft, 
for  it  is  the  next  Bnfinefs  of  our  Reafon. 

IV,  Bjghily  to  ejiim/itc  the  Apprehenfions  of  Things^  as  they 
nre  fingly  t/ikfn^ 

Our  fingle  Apprehenfions  or  Ideas  ^re  fuch,  as  we  may- 
call  our  firft,  or  however  our  foregoing  Notions;  and  they 
are  fome  or  other  of  them,  prefuppos'd  to  what  may  be  for- 
mally and  exprefly  pronounc'd  afcerwards  of  things  by  way 
of  Affirming  or  Denying,  whether  only  in  our  Minds,  or 
ptherwifc. 

§  2.  Single  Apprehenfions,  confider'd  as  fuch,  areform'd 
{uno  ABu  ^  Iclu)  by  a  kind  of  fingle  Adt  of  the  Mind,  and  as 
at  one  ftroke,  tho'  moft  of  them  may  be  Notionally  at  leaft, 
rpfolvable  into  the  Parts  of  which  they  are,  at  leaft  Notio- 
nally compounded  :  For  that  general  and  obfcure  Idea  of 
Thing  or  Somewhat^  goes  towards  making  up  a  very  great 
Number  of  our  more  particular  and  diftin<5t  Apprehenfions, 
which  yet  we  may  term  fingle  ones,  as  we  call  it  one  fingle 
Body,  wiiich  is  compounded  of  the  Head  and  Members,  or 
one  (only)  Soul,  which  neverthelefs  we  conceive  under  the 
compounded  Idea  of  n  Thinkjng  Subjinnce. 

§  5.  But  taking  what  is  thus  Compounded,  as  a  fingle 
Idea,  of  which  nothing  is  formally  and  diredtly  pronounc'd, 
we  may  affirm  or  deny  fomewhat  of  it,  which  is  not  ftridly 
Included,  in  that  Idea  or  Notion ,  as  when  I  fay  or  think,  that 
the  Scul  (which  I  now  conceive,  as  a  Thinking  Subftance) 
if  of  a  Spiritual  Nature  :  But  if  I  affirm  or  judge  that  «  Soul 
K  a  thinking  Subjlance,  the  Idea  I  then  form  to  my  felf  of 
Soul,  may  be  that  of  a  Thing  or  Somewhat,  which  Engli/h- 
Men  commonly  intend  by  that  Name. 
^  §  4.  That  of  which  any  thing  is  affirmed  or  deny'd,  may 
jn  fuch  Cafe  be  conceiv'd  or  defcrib'd  in  any  other  proper 
way,  but  under  the  very  Notion  or  Attribute  mention'd  in 
relation  to  it :  As  when  I  fay,  The  Soul  is  a  thinl^ing  Subjiance, 
Soul  may  be  here  conceiv'd  under  any  other  true  Charader, 
^uc  tha^  of  (I  tbinkjng  Subjlance.    Ic  is  not  to  be  fuppos'd, 

that 


178  M  tffdy  for  the  Pared. 

that  I  here  intend  to  reprefenc  to  my  felf  cr  others,  that  the 
Soul  (conliJer'd  as  a  Thinking  Subftance)  is  a  Thinking  Sub- 
itance,  which  were  only  to  afiirm  the  fame  Idea  of  it  feif. 
and  would  be  as  impertinent  and  infignificant,  as  to  fay,  a 
Spade  is  a  Spado,  unlefs  we  (hould  fuppofe  the  Meaning  and 
Defign  to  be  this ;  Thac  the  Soul,  which  I  and  others  conceive 
to  be  a  Thinking  Subftance,  is  really  fuch. 

§  5.  New,  akho'  our  Idea  is  confider'd  as  Single,  when 
'tis  what  we  pronounce  of  fomewhat  elfe,  or  is  that  of  whxh 
wo  proTioiince  fomewhat  eife ;  yet  it  may  be  really  a  Con- 
jondtion  of  feveral  Ideas,  whereof  one  is  l^irtuah,  tho'  not 
Fo<mr.l!y  affirm'd  of  fome  other,  or  rather  of  that  Thing,  to 
which  alfo  the  other  belongs;  and  the  (ingle  Ideas  are  accor- 
dingly capable  of  being  drawn  out  into  one  or  more  Affirma- 
tive Pofitions  :  When  I  fay,  T/'«  particular  Soul  n  a  Principle 
ofVcluntcj  Motion^  underilanding  by  that  Soul  this  TLhil^ing 
Suhfirjics,  tho'  it  be  here  confider'd  as  only  a  fingle  Appre- 
henlion,  wherein  nothing  at  all  is  formally  pronounc'd,  yet 
it  is  virtually  more  than  one  fingle  Ju-dgment. 

§  6.  The  Idea  of  this  Soul,  conceiv'd  as  this  thint^lng  Sub- 
finhcc,  may  be  drawn  out  into  the  following  Pofitions.  (i.) 
The  Thing  we  call,  tlm  Soul  is  a  Real  Thing,  /.  e,  fome- 
what exilbng,  not  in  Notion  only,  but  in  Nature,  whether 
any  one  think  of  it  or  not.  (2.)  That  Real  Thing  is  diftindt 
from  all  others  of  the  Kind,  as  being  this  only  not  another. 
(3.)  This  Real  and  diftindt  Thing  is  a  Subftance.  ^4.)  This 
Real  Diftindt  and  Subftantial  Thing,  is  a  thinking  one  : 
Nor  is  the  mentioned  fingle  Apprehenfion  Right,  unlefs  all 
thefe  Points  be  true  :  We  may  here  fee  what  is  requir'd  to 
make  our  more  Simple  Ideas  right,  vi:^.  That  the  feveral 
imply'd  Affirmations  be  true,  beginning  as  in  the  Inftance 
given  with  R^n!^  where  that  is  intended  (or  fubfiituting  No- 
tional, where  that  v-  meant)  ;  and  proceeding  on  to  affirm 
{kill  fomewhat  farther  and  farther,  till  we  have  gone  thro' 
the  whole  Idea. 

§  7.  I  ihall  endeavour  to  fettle  a  true  Rule  of  judgment 
when  our  Single  Apprehenfions  are  to  be  accounted  right ; 
and  to  direft  what  may  be  helpful  towards  forming  them  ac- 
cordingly. Now  in  order  to  make  a  true  Judgment  about 
them,  the  following  Qiieftion  may  be  put,  and  is  to  be  pur- 
fu'd  ro  a  fat;sfa£lory  Refolucion,  lVi:)ether  cur  fingle  Apprehen% 
fions  he  fud\  oi  voe  muft  or  may  taJke  to  he  truly  agreenhk  to  the 
ti'n?  therein  defig>/\if  or  fiippoi'di  mdth.it  in  fuch  mr.nner  ai  is 


§  8.  The 


Cnap  12.  Improvement  of  ^e^Lion.  17^ 

§  8.  The  Obiedi  of  fuch  Apprehcnfion,  or  the  thing  (b 
apprehended  maybe  (i.)  What  we  our  felves  defign  ;  as 
it  we  fliould  lay  our  Hand  upon  fomewhar,  or  point  to  it, 
or  Jook  at  it,  or  Reprefcnt  it  in  our  Imagination,  or  other- 
wife  determine  what  it  is  to  which  we  affix  the  Apprehenlion 
or  1  !ea;  thus  I  may  affix  that  of  a  thinking  Subftance  to 
Soul,  hereby  defigning  that  part  of  Man,  which  is  invifible. 
In  my  conceiving  of  this  or  thnt  Man,  I  may  defign  oniy 
whac  do's  Fundamentally,  or  at  leaft  truly,  tho'  not  fully 
diftinguifh  him  from  all  other  Men ;  as  he  who  has  this  or 
that  particular  Son  1,  or  outward  Shape,  0v.  And  my  Idea 
is  to  be  taken  for  Right,  if  it  may  be  reafonably  Judged  to 
anfwer  the  deligned  Objedt. 

§  9.  Or,  (2.;  It  may  be  only  fuppofcd  by  us,  as  what 
we  conceive  others  to  Look  at,  Point  to,  Speak  or  Think  of, 
and  then  our  Idea  may  be  right,  as  to  whac  we  Suppofe,  and 
yet  wrong  as  to  the  thing  by  them  intended  ;  or  to  fpcak 
more  properly,  the  Idea  it  felf  may  be  right,  but  the  Sup- 
pofal  wrong :  As  if  hearing  of  a  Crab,  I  rightly  form  the 
idea  of  the  Fruit  fo  cail'd,  when  as  the  Crab-Filh  was  the 
thing  intended. 

§  I  o.  As  to  the  Manner  of  our  Idea's  agreeing,  it  muft  be 
fo  far  wrong,  if  it  were  defign'd,  or  fuppos'd  to  agree  Eflcn- 
tially  and  Neceflarily,  when  it  did  indeed  truly  agree  yet 
but  Accidentally  :  As  if  it  were  fuppos'd  that  the  Idea  is 
Adequate,  when  it  agrees  indeed  truly,  but  takes  not  in  the 
whole  Compafs  of  the  thing,  to  which  it  was  referr'd. 

^11.  Finally,  there  may  be  Ideas  which  I  muj}  take  for 
right,  or  which  I  reafonably  may,  when  yet,  perhaps  they 
are  not  abfolurely  fo,  but  in  fuch  fort,  and  to  fuch  a  degree 
only,  as  the  Natural  Faculties  beftowed  on  Man  are  fitted  to 
afford  us,  when  yet  it  may  be  an  Angel  ought  not  to  take 
them  for  right,  but  to  form  them  yet  more  exactly,  according 
totheclearer  Difcernment  which  belongs  to  him ;  and  it  is  cer- 
tain, God  may  charge  the  Angels  with  folly  (or  ihort-fighred- 
ilefs)  and  do's  by  his  infinite  Wifdom  form  rhofe  Ideas 
abfolutely  perfed,  which  even  the  Angels  cannot  fully 
reach. 

'  §  12.  We  have  no  other  poflible  way  of  judging,  whe- 
ther our  Apprehenfions  be  right,  but  by  reflex  thinking  of 
rhem,  and  applying  fome  of  our  Tho'cs  as  Meafures  and 
Standards  for  the  trying  of  them.  What  we  are  immedi- 
ately to  judge  of  is  Tho't,  as  has  been  fhewn,  Part  I.  Chap. 
I.  §.5.  what  we  are  to  judge  by,  is  our  farther  Tho't,  and 
what  vve  are  to  judge  according  to,  or  our  Rule  of  Judging, 

*  is 


i8o  An  tff'ay  for  the  Part  U. 

is  fome  or  other  Tho'c,  which  we  are  to  take  as  well  afTur'd  : 
Therefore  fome  of  our  Perceptions,  Imaginations,  and  Con- 
ceptions, are  to  be  look'd  on  as  right,  in  order  to  our  judg- 
ing of  others. 

^  J  3.  What  we  have  more  immediately  to  confider  of 
is,  (i.)  OardiredAdor  Affe6lion  of  Thinking,  or  eife 
the  direct  Tho't  therein  form'd,  e.g.  The  adual  Thinking 
of  wliat  we  See,  Hear,  G5'r.  as  we  are  fome  way  arfedled  and 
mov'd  by  it:  I  might  call  this  the  Perception  Percciii>7^; 
and  there  ts  alfo  the  formed  Tho't,  which  is  commonly  cal.'d 
the  Idea  of  what  we  See,  Hear,  (^c  and  which  I  may  call  tha 
Perception  Perceived.  The  A(ft  or  Affedion  of  Thinking 
feems  to  be  the  Mind's  putting  it  felf  or  its  being  put  by 
fomewhat  elfc,  into,  or  under  fome  Mode  of  Being,  which 
it  had  not  before .-  And  the  Mode  it  felf  may  be  confider'd  as 
the  formed  Tho'r. 

§  14.  Again,  fi.)  The  Reflex  Acfl  of  Thinking  upon 
the  foregoing  A(ft:  of  Thinking  or  Tho't ;  and  the  reflex 
TJio't  herein  form'd  :  But  when  this  reflex  Thuiking  or 
Tho't  is  objected  to  the  Mind,  in  order  to  our  conddering 
thereof  by  a  yet  farther  reflex  Adt  of  Thinking  or  Iho'c 
therein  form'd,  thefe  might  make  a  3d  Clafs :  And  if  thefe 
again  wereobiecVedto  the  Mind,  in  order  to  their  being  con- 
fider'd, they  would  make  the  4th  Clafs :  And  thus  we 
might  proceed  on  infinitely,  if  our  Capacity  would  ferve, 
by  fubfequent  reflex  Thinking  and  Tho't.  Suppofe  a,  to  be 
the  dired  r.£V  of  Thinkmg,  and  x.  the  Tho't  form'd,  I  may  go 
on  to  h,  [the  iadiual  reflex  Tliinking  on,  rf,  or  «,]  and 
to  C,  [rhe  reflex  Tho't  on  either  of  them]]  and  thence  to  c, 
fthe  farther  reflex  Thinking]  and  to  k  [the  farther  reflex 
Tho't  upon  the  foregoing]  and  fo  on. 

§  15.  That  whereby  we  confider  is,  (r.)  The  reflex  Adt 
of  Thinking,  and  the  Tho't  herein  form'd.  (2.)  A  farther 
rettex  Thinking  or  Tho't  upon  the  foregoing,  c5'c.  as  may 
be  farther  k'en  in  the  laft  Seclion. 

§  1 6.  As  to  the  Rule  or  Standard,  which  is  to  be  apply'd 
by  our  reflex  Thinking,  or  formed  Tho't,  to  the  direct,  or 
to  ibme  foregoing  reflex  AA  of  Thinking,  or  form'd  Tho't, 
it  is,  ( r .  ■  The  Confcious  Knowledge  we  have  of  our  Per- 
ceiving, Imagining,  or  Conceiving,  and  of  the  formed  Per- 
ception, Imagination,  or  Conception,  that  is,  the  Certainty 
we  ha-  e,  of  lon\ewbat  paifing,  or  as  it  were  lodging  in  our 
M:nds,  which  we  may  call  by  thofe  Names. 


$17,  (2,}Thof«? 


Chap.  13-        JwproveMe»t  of  Ktaion.  i8f 

§  17.  (2.)  Thofe  Ideas,  which  are  the  Confcious  Repe- 
tion,  Combination  or  other  defigned  Alteration  of  our  pre- 
ceding Apprehenfions,  which  we  fo  remember,  as  to  know 
that  we  do  indeed  remember  them  :  And  here  can  be  no  Er- 
ror, unlefs  it  Ihould  be  by  an  unobfcrved  flip  of  Memory,  which 
can  Icarce  befal  us  in  a  very  JhortTime,  and  in  Ideas  that  are 
not  much  compounded  j  for  infuch  Cafe  we  ihall  at  leaft  be 
Confcious,  that  fomewhatof  thcldea  hasilip'd  us,tho'  perhaps 
we  may  not  always  be  able  prefently,  if  at  all,  to  recover  it.  * 

§  18.  (3.)  The  Senfible  Perceptions,  and  Inteliedlual 
Conceptions,  about  which  there  is  no  reafonable  Ground  of 
Sufpicion,  after  due  Examination;  what  that  is,  I  Ihall  en- 
deavour to  [hew,  when  I  give  the  defigned  Helps  for  oui 
formng  right  Apprehenfions.  (4.)  Whatever  Ideas  are  fa 
dedijc'd  from  any  of  the  foregoing,  or  reducible  to  them, 
^jiat  we  cannot  Rationally  doubt  of  the  Connexion,  if  we 
would. 


CHAP.    XIIL 

§  I.  ^UCH  Tho'ts  a$  thofe  before  mention'd,  are  to 
guide  us  in  judging  of  others,  which  may  be  juft- 
ly  doubted  of,  or  wherein  we  would  wilh  to  be  farther  coft- 
firm'd  j  But  to  help  us  in  a-plyirg  the  Meafures  given  in  the 
preceding  Chapter,  it  will  be  of  ufe  10  fubjoin  feveral  Di- 
ftindions  about  right  Ideas  j  then  to  fhew  how  Signs  in  ge- 
neral tnav  be  faid  to  be  right,  and  lailiy  to  give  fume  Special 
Diredions,  which  may  be  of  Peculiar  Service  tbvviirds  the 
right  forming  of  our  fingle  Ideas. 

§  2.  Now  the  Apprehcnfions  of  Things,  confider'd  fing- 
ly,  may  be,  (1.)  Either  Abjolutely  Right  in  re fped  of  the 
■  Things  themfelves,  or  I^elatively  in  reference  to  our  Natural 
Faculties,  when  our  Ideas  are  fuch,  as  we  were  framed  for 
by  our  Wife  and  benign  Creator  j  who  knew  what  was  titteft 
and  beft  for  us,  in  the  Circumftances,  wherein  he  was  pleas'd 
to  put  us  :  We  may  be  faid  to  See  right,  when  yet  a  well 
drawn  Pidure,  at  loine  diftance,  appears  as  if  it  were  the 
fohd  Body  it  is  intended  to  reprefenr,  becaufe  our  Eye  doV 
riglv.ly  Perform  the  Part  for  which  it  was  appomted  ;  and 
fj  do  our  Minds,  when  they  apprehend  things  in  fuch  a 
\v.:y,  as  they  were  fitted  for,  and  which  we  may  believe,  is 
molt  coin  einent  for  us,  at  Icaft  in  our  prefent  Stiate. 

&3   (i}Our 


1 8  2  An  tjifay  for  the  Par r  1 1 . 

§  3.  (2.)  Our  ideas  may  be  fuch,  as  we  muft  or  may  pro- 
ceed upon,  either  as  Certainly  Right,  or  as  probably  fo,  or 
as  altogether  Doubtful.  Where  upon  Confidcration  it  ap- 
pears needful  or  reqnilite  fo  to  do,  we  may  proceed,  even 
upon  a  doubtful  Idea  either  way,  as  if  it  wefe  right,  accor- 
ding as  a  juft  Occafion  may  require :  e.g.  I  know  not  whe- 
ther the  Apprehenfion  I  have  of  this  Guinea's  being  bad  is 
right  or  no  ;  yet  I  refufe  it  as  bad  ,  if  I  can  have  it 
chang'd,  or  take  it  as  good,  if  I  cannot ;  But  where  my. 
Apprehenfion  cf  its  being  good,  is  much  iiker  to  be  right 
than  othcrwife,! account,  and  take  it  as  fuch  without  more 
ado. 

§  4.  Offome  Ideas  we  ate  altogether  fare,  as  that  we 
"do  rightly  apprehend  our  own  Sente  and  Meaning  Cfuppct- 
fing  we  have  one  in  what  we  Speak  or  Write) ;  as  alio  our 
own  Defign  andiind  in  what  we  d  o.  -Nor  can  the  verieft  Pp  roc- 
niji^  or  Sccpcicl^  doubt  that  he  is  lomewhat,  and  do's  fomewhat 
which  we  call  Thinking,  when  )  et  he.  may  pretend  to  be  fure 
of  nothing,  and  abfwrdly  demand,  a  fort  of  Evidence  and  cer- 
tainty agamft  which  he  cannot  poffibly  make  any  kind  of 
Exception,  i.  e.  fuch  as  is  neither  needful,  nor  would,  per- 
haps, in  all  refpccfts,  be  fo  convenient  for  us,  for  which  God 
has  not  thought  fit  to  frame  our  Natural  Faculties,  and 
which  he  will  not  ordinarily  give  us  ( tho"  he  could  do  it  ) 
in  a  Supernatural  way. 

§  5.  There  are  certainly  Ideas,  which  we  cannot  dif- 
prove,  nor  fairly  queftion,  nor  poifibJy  corred: ;  as  for  In- 
ftance,  that  there  is  fuch  a  Being  as  Ave  call  the  Sun,  that  it 
affords  Light,  Hear,  G^r.  fvch  Points  as  thefe  we  mult  hold 
and  proceed  upon  as  certain  :  But  wc  muft  take  heed  of 
taking  our  fehfible  Perceptions  to  reprefent  Objeds  juft  as 
they  are  in  themfelyes,  and  as  to  lome  things  we  may  be 
fure  we  do  not  apprehend  them  juft  as  they  are  :  For  Aveinay 
eafily  know  we  cannot  conceive  the  Divine  Perfections,  as 
they  are  in  God,  but  in  the  way  of  Analogy  :  Vet  fome 
fuch  Apprehcnlions  may  be  taken  as  Right,  provided  we  ac- 
count them  no  more  then  faint  Refetrblancesof  thofe  Per- 
'fedtions,  as  they  afe  in  God. 

§  6.  (3.)  Our  Ideas  may  be  either  Adequately  Right,  as 
they  take  in  the  whole  cf  the  thing  therein  dcfign'd  or  fup- 
pos'd  ;  or  but  Ivadequately^  as  they  reach  only  to  a  Part  of  it» 
They  commonly  take  in  only  f  irewhatof  1  hings,  as  they  are 
in  themfelves,  but  always  comprehend  the  whole  ( t  fuch 
Riercly  Notional  Idtas  as  we  abftraiit  from  them  ;  For  my 
abllradin^  is  tj^e  Wcrk  ct  my  M:nd,    with  whicfe  1  caiinoc 


Chap.  13.        Improvewtnt  of  Reaion.  18^ 

but  'be  acquainted,  nor  can  I  indeed  properly  abftraft,  but 
by  conceiving  what  I  abftrad,  feparately  from  the  reft,  and 
yet  I  may  have  but  a  confus'd  Notion  or  Conccpiion  of  fome- 
what  which  I  take  in,  as  I  cao,  together  with  my  clearer  Ab- 
ftradion:  The  Number  of  things  I  may  perfedly  apprehend , 
and  yet  be  far  from  having  a  clear  or  juft  Idea  of  what  ia 
Number'd. 

§  7.  (^)  Apprehenfions  tbat  are  in  a  fort  adequately 
Right  may  be  but  Fundamentally^  and  Virtqally,  or  Formally 
and  Explicitely  fuch;  but  thefe  latter  are  perhaps  hardly 
poflible  to  our  narrow  Comprehenfion,  except  in  thofe  Ab- 
ftraftions  which  are  purely  the  work  of  our  Minds,  and  in  the 
repeated  Apprehenfion  of  our  own  Ideas ;  where  we  may  ealUv 
take  in  all  we  had  before  in  our  Idea,  rho*  not  all  belonging  to 
the  thing  ,•  for  who  can  fo  form  his  Idea  of  a  ftraight  Line 
or  even  of  a  Point,  as  to  make  hire  it  fliall  explicitely  take 
in  all  that  may  any  ways  appertain  thereto.  -, 

§  8.  But  as  to  the  Fundamental  Attributes  of  Things 
we  may  more  eafily  take  them  all  in,  and  fo  form  an  Idea 
vhich  im.plies  a  great  deal  more  then  it  dire(itlv  contains  • 
as  e.g.  that  a  Point  may  be  the  Center  of  a  Circle,  the  be- 
ginning or  end  of  a  Line,  the  Apex  of  an  Angle,  ^c  ;  fince 
thofe  Attributes  are  virtually  included  in  its  being  a  Point 
and  in  my  Idea  of  it  as  fuch. 

§  p.  If  1  would  rightly  form  the  Idea  of  a  Particular 
^an  which  (hould  be  fundamentally  Adequate,  as  to  his 
particularity,  I  may  conceive  one,  who  was  born  at  fuch 
precife  Time,  and  in  fuch  precife  Place,  fince  Twins  of  tl^e 
fame  Mother,  in  all  ordinary  Cafes  muft  be  born  one  aft^r 
the  other.  Now  the  mentioned  Idea  of  this  Individual  or 
Particular  Man,  implies  all  that  farther  belongs  to  fuch  a 
Perfon,  as  his  being  of  fuch  Parentage,  his  having  fuch  a 
.particular  Soul,  and  fuch  a  Body  continued  by  a  Succeffjon 
of  Partic'es,  and  never  (hifced  all  at  once,  and  finally,  what« 
•foever  did  or  fliould  any  Time  after  appertain  to  him,  xpho 
vas  fo  born. 

§  10.  (5.;  Ourldeas  may  be  clearly  and  diflin(91y  Right, 
or  dcrkjy  and  confufedly  fo  :  Tis  certainly  a  very  dark  and 
obfcure  Notion  we  have  oi  Thing  or  Somewhat  m  general, 
and  for  that  Reafon,  arr.ongft  others,  there  is,  however  at 
bottom,  f  mething  of  Obfcurity  in  moft  of  our  Ideas;  y<  t 
I  can  form  a  clear  and  diftin<S  Idea,  e.  g.  of  a  right  Lind 
Triangle  fince  it  is  not  only  an  abftradtd  Notion,  but  fuch 
a  one  mro  which  I  take  nothing,  but  what  I  clearly  concei\  e, 
vi^  Three  ftraight  Lines,  fo  difpos'd,  as  tojhrt  in  a  Space,' 
whi  h  Jias  three  Angles.  i,  n.  f 


184  ^n  tffdji  for  the  Part  II. 

,  §  1 1.  I  here  pretend  not  to  fay  with  fomc  Modern  Phi- 
lofophers,  that  every  clear  and  diftind  Idea  is  right,  for 
may  I  not  have  fuch  an  Idea  of  a  Red-Angle  Triangle,  and 
yet  mifapply  it  to  fome  three  corner'd  Figuie,  that  is  not 
fuch  a  Triangle  ?  If  it  be  reply 'd,  that  in  this  Cafe,  I  had 
not  a  clear  and  diftindl  ot  exadt  Idea  of  the  Triangle  fo  mif- 
judg'd,  I  eafily  grant  it,  but  yet  I  feem'd  to  my  felf,  to  have 
ir,  when  I  made  the  Mifapplicadon.  Therefore  all  which  I 
have  here  defign'd  is,  that  fome  right  Apprehenfions  are 
clear  and  diftinct,  when  as  fome  others  that  are  not  fully  fo, 
m^y,  or  mufl-  pafs  for  right,  ;.  e.  for  fuch  as  onr  Humane 
Faculties  can  attain  to. 

§  12.  (6.)  Our  Ideas  may  be  Effentially^  or  Extraejfent'^ 
aUy  Right,  and  alfo  (which  is  near  a  Kin  to  this,  tho*  not 
every  way  the  fame)  they  may  be  Ncccjfari/y^  or  Accidental- 
ly agreeing  co  the  thing  intended  or  fuppos'd.  The  Effence 
of  Things  is  rtiade  up  of  that  common  Nature  wherein  it  is 
founied,  and  of  that  diftindlive  Nature  by  vi'hich  it  is  form'dp 
this  latter  is  commonly  underftood  when  we  fpealc  6f  the  For- 
mality ot  formiilis  I^jirio  (the  formal  Confideration)  of  things ; 
and  it  is  look'd  upon,  as  being  more  Peculiarly  the  Ef- 
fence of  things,  tho'  it  is  certain,  that  a  Triangle  is  is  truly 
made  up  in  part  of  Figure  its  common  Nature,  as  of  the 
Three  Lines  and  Angles,  which  are  diftihdive  and  peculiar 
to  it. 

§  15.  The  Idea  that  agrees  to  any  thing  aifuch^  or  as  it 
is  the  very  thing  intended  or  fuppos'd,  is  EITentrall'y  Right 
and  Necelfarily  fo ;  as  when  I  conceive  Man  to  be  a  living 
Creature,  capable  of  ReHgion,  underftandihg  by  living 
Creature,  what  they  commonly  mean  by  AnimnI,  i.  e.  an 
Animated  Body  :  But  if  I  conceive  Man,  as  Capable  of  Cele- 
ftial  Happinefs,  my  Idea  is  indeed  Right  and  Necelfarily  fo  ; 
yet  not  Eflentially  in  the  ftriftefl  Senfe,  fince  it  only  neceffa- 
rily  follovvs  from  the  forementioned  ElTence,  but  is  not  con- 
(ider'd  as  a  Partof  it. 

§  1 4.  The  Elfence  of  a  Thing  moft  properly  and  ftriflly 
is,  what  do's  firft  and  fundamentally  conlticute  that  thing, 
and  that  only  is  ftridly  Effential,  which  is  cither  the  whole 
or  fome  part  of  the  conftituent  Effence,  as  in  Man  to  be  (as 
before)  a  living  Creature,  or  to  be  capable  of  Religidri  5 
his  being  capable  of  Celcftial  Happinefs,  may  be  call'd  Ei- 
fential  in  way  of  Confequence,  or  Confecutively,  not  Cdn- 
ilituently. 


f  15.  The 


Chap.i:?.  improvement  of  ^td^ion.  185 

^  15.  ■  The  Standard  of  what  is  to  be  accounted  Effenti- 
ally  or  Extraeflentially  Right,  NecelTarily  or  Contingently 
fo,  .  is  the  ftated  or  defigned  Eflence  of  Things,  which  in 
feme  Cafes  may  be  arbitrarily  defign  d,  but  in  others,  is  fup- 
pos'd  to  be  duly  ftated :  I  may  confider  our  prefent  Sove- 
raign  only  as  a  Queeti^  intending  a  Perfon  of  the  Female 
Sex,  who  has  the  Supreme  Adminiftration  of  Government, 
within  certain  Dominions;  and  here  I.  may  equally  intend 
that  which  is  as  it  were  the  common  Matter  in  my  Idea  |^a 
Perfon  of  the  Female  Sex]  together  \vith  that  which  follows 
as  its  Form:  Or  elfe  I  may  fingle  out  the  having  Supreme 
Adminijiration^  8cc.  as  what  I  mainly,  if  not  only  defign  d,' 
and  I  may  hereupon,  conceive,  Grer.e  Britain  in  particular, 
as  Extraeflential ,  or  Acddental  to  Her  Majefty  as  a 
Queeriy  tho*  fome  or  other  Dominions  be  Eflential,  and  Ne- 
celfaryto  Her  as  a  Qiieen,  and  great  Britain  to  the  Qtteen^  or 
this  Queen.  1  may  farther  confider  Her  Majefty  as  the  pre- 
fent Queen  of  Great  Britain,  intending  more  precifely  this 
Ifland,  and  I  may  then  conceive,  that  Ireland  is  not  confti- 
tuentJy  Eflential  to  Her  as  fuch  ;  but  yet  muft  allow  that 
it  is  confecutively  fo ,  as  being  an  Appendage  to  Great 
Britain. 

Again,  I  may  confider  the  fame  Perfon,  as  the  Queen, 
who  has  lately,  from  the  Throne,  moft  gracioufly  exprefs'd 
Her  hearty  Concern  for  the  Welfare  of  all  Her  People ;  and 
may  now  c,all  it  Elfencial  and  Neceffary  to  Her,  under  this 
Confideration,  to  have  had  the  Power  of  fo  exprefling  Her 
Self,  and  efpecially  the  Gracious  Inclination  to  do  it,  but  ic 
was  Extraeflential  and  accidental  to  have  done  it  on  fuch  par- 
^ticular  Day,  and  with  fo  peculiar  a  Grace. 
■-  §  16.  in  thefe  and  like  Inftances,  chat  which  we  made 
the  Eflence  andMeafufe  of  Eflential,  Extraeflential,  Necefla- 
ry  and  Contingent,  is  drawn  forth  at  Pleafure,  but  the  diffi- 
culty is  to  form  a  Right  Idea,  not  fo  much  of  what  ii  taken 
for  the  Elfence,  as  of  what  ought  to  be  fo  taken  ;  as  fuppofe 
for  that  oi aQueen^  or  oi  the  Qiiccn  cf  Great  Britain;  whether 
it  ought  not  to  be  underAood  as  including  Ireland^  8cc.  no: 
only  inferring  it,  as  alfo  what  common  or  Special  Powers  and 
Prerogatives  it  includes.  ' 

What  I  fluU  offer  in  the  clofe  of  this  General  Head,  will 
ferve  to  give  fome  farther  Light,  towards  the  right  forming 
of  our  Eflisntial  Ideas,  fo  as  not  only  to  ftaie  what  we  deiiga, 
but  that  our  defign  may  be  alfo  well  laid,  according  to  ttie 
Nature  of  the  Thing,  fo  far  at  leaft  as  we  arecapaDie  of 
T-aching  it, 

O  §  17.  :om3 


1 86  An  Ejjay  for  the  Part  II. 

§  17.    Some  Ideas  are  not  to  be  accounted  properly  right 
according  to  any  of  the  Diftin£tions  here  given,  and  yet  may 
be  admitted  to  be  in  fome  fort  right,   according  to  common 
Acceptation  and  Allowance,    as  being  fuitable  to  our  Cir- 
cumftances,   or  fufficient  for  our  Purpofe,  tho'  they  be  not 
fuch  as  were  reafonably  to  be  expeSed  from  Perfons  that  are 
or  ought  to  be  better  Skilfd  ;   or  fuch  as  would  be  requifite, 
in  order  to  nicer  Reafonings,  or  a  more  accurate  Performance, 
that  Idea  of  the  Diameter  of  a  Circle,  which  makes  it  the 
3d  part  of  the  Circumference,  may  be  allow'd  right  enough 
for  an  inferiour  Pracflitioner,   and  for  moft  ordinary  Purpo- 
fes,  but  not  for  a  Mathematician,   or  to  give  the  Content  of 
a  Circle  with  any  great  Exadlnefs. 

§  1 8.  But  it  were  no  better  than  Trifling  to  be  very  foli- 
citous  about  an  Accurate  Idea,  where  it  is  not  reafonably  ex- 
f  c(5led  from  us ;  and  that  there  is  no  Occafion  for  it,  but 
that  one  lefs  €xa(5t  will,  as  well  or  better,  fcrve  for  the  dif- 
patch  of  Bufinefs. 


CHAP.     XIV. 

§  I.  Yjf/HAT  was  farther  undertaken,  is  to  Ihew  how 
'  "^  Signs  in  general  may  be  Right :  Now  they  are 
cither  to  Reprefent  and  Refemble  Things,  or  only  to  inti- 
mate and  fuggeft  them  to  the  Mind  :  And  our  Ideas  being 
the  Signs  of  what  is  intended  or  fuppos'd  therein,  are  in  f«ch 
fort,  and  fo  far  right,  as  they  do  either  reprefent  and  re- 
femble  the  Objeft  of  Tho't,  or  as  tiiey  do  at  leaft  intimate  it 
to  the  Mind,  by  Virtue  of  fome  Natural  Connexion,  or  pro- 
per Appointment. 

§  2.     The  dcfigii'd  Repetitions  of  our  own  Ideas  are  juft 
Refemblances,  and  as  it  were  cxadt  Copies  of  them,  if  our 
Memories  fail  us  not  in  repeating  them ;    and  it  is  highly 
probable,  if  not  altogether  certain,  that  by  the  Eye,  '  fuppo- 
iing  it  no  way  diforder'd)   we  have  the  true  Figure  of  a  Su- 
perficies,  prefented  to  it  in  a  proper  Manner,  /.  c  Parallel 
and  Concentral  to  the  Eye,  '  as  one  Wheel  is  upon  the  fame 
Axis  pofited  to  the  other),  alfo  at  a  convenient  Diftance, 
and  thro'  a  lit  Medium:     In  fuch  Cafe,  a  Round,  an  Oval, 
a  Triangle,  a  Square,  &c.  will  appear  fuch  to  us ;  whenasa 
Round  will  feem  Oval,  or  an  Oval  Round,  G/c.  if  they  be 
objected  a  Slant  01  Sloapi;ig  from  the  Eye,  not  Parallel  and 
Oppofite  to  it.  -  -     -  -  -       ^^  Qyj. 


Chap.  14-       Improvement  of  l^^^L^Qn.  187 

§  3.  Our  Imelledual  Conceptions  may  duly  reprefent 
what  is  properly  Intelledtual,  i.  e.  our  Minds  may  conceive 
their  own  Work,  and  Produce  juft  as  it  is  j  what  I  have 
abftra£led,  I  can  ordinarily  take  up  again,  and  as  it  were 
Copy  over ;  but  my  Ideas  or  Apprehenfions  of  Colours, 
Talts,  Touches,  or  the  Motions  caufed  or  occafion'd  in  me 
by  certain  Objects  as  Colour'd,  Taftful,  Tangible,  &c.  do 
not  properly  reprefent,  but  only  intimate  fomewhat  in  the 
Objects  wherewith  I  am  fo  affe£led,  which  is  the  Caufe  or 
Occafion  of  fuch  Ideas  in  me,  and  of  the  Pleafure  or  Pain  (if 
any  be)  attending  them.  ^. 

§  4.  Signs  whether  they  Reprefent,  or  only  intimate 
Things,  may  be  either  Primary  referring  immediately  to 
ihem;  or  Secondary,  which  refer  immediarely  to  the  prima- 
ry Signs,  and  thro'  them  to  the  things  thereby  fignified;  or 
they  may  be  yet  more  remote,  referring  to  fome  diftant  Sign, 
ty  that  CO  the  nearer,  and  thro'  them  all  co  the  Thing  it  felf; 
e.  g.  Writing  in  any  particular  Language,  has  its  Parts  adap- 
ted to  the  parts  of  Sound  us*d  in  thac  i  anguage,  for  this  or 
that  Senfe  j  as  [M  A  N]  has  its  Pares  or  Letters,  not  at  all 
adapted  co  the  Parts  of  a  Man,  but  to  the  Parrs  of  that  Sound, 
for  which  the  Letters  were  fram'd  :  And  I  may  read  a  vvrit- 
ttn  Word  into  its  Sound,  before  I  can  read  it  into  its  Senfe 
or  Meaning. 

§  5.  What  we  call  CharaClers  or  Short-hand-marks,  refer 
firft  to  Words  as  written  at  length,  by  thofe  to  the  Sound  or 
Words  as  fpoken,  by  thefe  again  to  the  Tho'ts  or  Ideas  ufii- 
ally  affixed  to  thofe  Sounds,  and  thro'  all  thefe  hnally  to  the 
things  which  are  fuppos'd,  or  defign'd  to  be  reprefented,  or 
otherwife  intimated  to  the  Mind  by  fuch  Ideas,  only  it  may 
be  obferv'd,  that  the  Mind  being  once  well  accuftom'd  to 
fuch  Charadteis  needs  not,  or  does  not  (at  leaft  obfervably^ 
go  by  thofe  fevcral  Removes  from  them  to  the  Tho'ts  thereto 
chain  d  by  thofe  intermediate  Links. 

§  6.  And  we  may  here  obferve,  by  way  of  Inftanccj' 
what  is  the  Jnftnefs  of  thefe  feveral  Signs  in  reference  to 
what  is  nextly  fignified  by  them,  vi:{.  (1.)  The  Charailer 
for  a  Word  is  right  if  it  confiil  of  thofe  Shore-hand  Letters 
well  made,  and  duly  plac'd,  which  are  a.Tign'd  to  fignifie 
fuch  common  Letters ;  or  if  it  be  any  one  concinu'd  Mark 
appointed  for  that  purpofe. 

§  7.  {2.}  The  Word  written  at  length  is  right  if  it  confift 
of  the  ufual  Letters  commonly  employ'd  in  fuch  Country  or 
Language  to  exprefsthe  intended  Sound,  or  fuch  as  may  well 
enough  be  allow'd  inftead  of  them,  as  fuffi:ins  f°^  the  Sound, 
and  to  fccuie  the  Senfe.  0  a  §  S-(3.)T/.'<j^ 


1  ^<8  An  t.jjay  for  the  Part  II. 

§  8.  (^.)  That  Sound,  or  the  Word  fpoken  is  right,  if  it 
be  what  is,  fo  us'd,  i.  e.  to  fignifie  fuch  a  Tho't  and  Idea. 
(4.)  .And  finally,  the  Idea  is  right,  if  it  be  fuch  as  reprefents 
the  Thing,  or  however  intiuiares,  or  Connotes  it,  agreeably 
to  what  God  has  defign'd.  Humane  Senfes  and  Minds  in 
their  Natural  Make,  and  regular  Ufe  fhouldgive. 

§  9.  In  the  General,  a  Sign  of  whatfoever  Sort  or  Degree 
is  to  be  accounted  fo  far  right,  as  it  anfwers"  what  it  is  more 
immediately  refcr'd  to,  at  leaft  to  fecure  its  being  taken  for 
what  is  intended  by  it. 

§10.  It  remains  to  conclude  this  Head  with  fome  very 
brief  Diredlions,  wh^  (^urfe  may  be  raken  for  the  better 
fecuring  juft  Ideas,     And, 

I.  We  fhould  endeavour  to  free  our  Minds  from  what 
might  iinflcad  us,  and  to  furnifh  them  with  what  may  help 
to  guide  us  right.  We  ought  therefore  to  examine  our  firft 
Apprehensions ;  not  to  depend  on  a  fallible  Authority,  where 
we  may  be  capable  of  judging  for  our  felves  .•  We  ihould 
likcwife  enure  our  Minds  to  fuch  kind  of  Studies,  and  fuch 
Application  of  Tho't,  as  may  render  them  more  acute  and 
penetrating  :  We  ihould  alio  lay  in  the  belt  and  fureft  No- 
tices we  can ;  above  all,  wc  iliou'd  endeavour,  that  the 
Brain  and  Spirits  may  be  in  fuch  a  State,  as  fhall  belt  fub- 
ferve  the  Mind  in  its  Confideration  and  Enquiries,  raking 
care  they  be  not  difturb'd  and  dilorder'd  by  irregular  or  ve- 
hement PaiTions  and  Affections,  or  by  im.moderate  or  unfit 
Eating,  Drinking,  or  Sleeping,  ^i. 

§  II.  2.  We  nmft  ufe  our  Organs  of  Senfc  under  the 
Diredion  and  Corrcdion  of  Judgment  guided  by  Expe- 
rience, Obfervation  and  well  alTured  Information  :  We 
Ihould  therefore  examine  Objetfls  by  more  than  a  (ingle 
Senfe,  where  it  can  be  done ;  wc  Ihould  make  the  nearer  ap- 
proaches if  it  may  well  be,  yet  keeping  withal  the  Diftance, 
which  may  give  us  a  clearer  Perception  ;  uiing  likewife  the  beft 
Means  we  can  for  aiiifting  our  Senfes :  We  ought  alfo  to  make 
feveral  Trials  at  fomewhat  diftant  times,  and  in  differing 
Circumflances,  comparing  our  Obfervations  with  thofe  of 
other  Perfons ;  making  the  Allowances  which  are  fit  on  ac- 
count of  Diftance,  or  of  the  interpofed  Medium,  or  other 
Incidents :  And  finally  where  there  is  any  Caufe  of  Sufpi- 
cion,  we  (hould  carefully  examine,  whether  the  Organ  be 
not  diforder'd  by  fome  Diftemper  or  other  Accident,  ufing 
the  beft  Means  we  can  to  rej£tifie  and  keep  it  right. 


§i2.3.Wc 


Chap.  15-       Improvement  of  KQa(on,  18^ 

§11.  3.  We  Ihould  take  our  Ideas  in  pieces,  anJ  exa- 
mine them  by  parts,  and  fee  that  the  Examination  be  rer- 
form'd  by  more  fimple  Notions,  that  have  been  well  adjulted, 
e.g.  when  we  apprehend  the  Sun  ro  be  a  Round,  Bright,  Hot 
and  moving  Body,  we  fhould  fevcrally  examine  the  Appre- 
henfion  we  have  of  its  being  a  Body,  of  its  being  a  rouni 
one,  bright,  0'c.  according  to  fuch  Notions  as  have  beeii 
well  adjufted  in  reference  to  each  particular;  and  here, 

§  13.  4.  We  fliould  purfue,  as  near  as  we  can,  that  Or- 
der wherein  one  Point  may  fitly  lead  and  give  Light  to  ano- 
ther, making  the  foregoing  as  Clear,  as  well  may  be,  before 
we  proceed  farther  :    And, 

5.  We  lliould  take  up  nothing,  as  yet  certain,  of  which 
we  can  reafonably  doubt,  nor  indulge  to  Sufpicions  without 
any  rational  Ground. 

§  14.  6.  We  Ihould  carefully  ftate  and  preferve  by  wri- 
ting what  has  appear'd  upon  Examination,  that  it  may  be  af- 
terwards Review'd ;  and  that,  if  it  (hall  approve  it  felf  to 
repeated  Confideration,  we  may  proceed  upon  it  as  a  Foun- 
dation in  our  farther  Enquiries. 

§  1 5.  7.  We  ihould  gather  what  we  can  from  the  moft 
approved  Obfervations,  and  Writings  of  others,  as  to  the  in- 
ternal Nature  and  juft  Notions  of  things  in  any  kind. 

8.  We  fliould  admit  of  no  fingle  Apprehenfion  as  Right, 
which  is  contradiftious  to  any  unqueftionable  Truth. 

§  16.  9.  But  whatever  is  a  Natural  and  Neceffary  Con- 
fequence  from  certain  Truth,  is  to  be  concluded  Right.  And, 

I  o.  We  (hould  make  the  farcheft  improvement  we  can  of 
the  Principles  and  Deduftions,  or  any  other  Pofitions  in  this 
Eflay,  which  approve  themfelves  to  deliberate  Tho't,  both 
for  examining  the  Notions  we  have,  and  inferring  others. 


CHAP.    XV. 

§  i.  "pROM  the  more  Simple  Apprehenfions,  wherein  we 
"■•  do  but  impliciiely  and  undefignedly,  if  at  all,  pro- 
nounce one  Idea  of  another,  or  join  it  with  another ;  I  now 
proceed  to  treat  of  thofe,  which  in  Logic  are  commonly 
named  Complex  Themes,  wherein  it  is  done  more  exprefly, 
and  with  Defign  :  And  it  is  the  farther  Bufinefs  of  our 
Reafon, 


i^o  nn  tjjliy  for  the  Part  U. 

V,  mghtly  to  judge  and  pronounce  of  Things  in  nffirming  or 
'denying  :  Or  rightly  and  fitly  to  affirm  or  deny,  whether 
it  be  in  Conception  only,  or  expreffion. 

§  2.  I  am  not  here  defigning  to  fpeak  of  Mental  and  Ver- 
bal pronouncing  for  of  internal  Judgments  and  external  Enun- 
ciations )  afunder,  but  together ;  Since  the  latter  are  but 
the  Exprefiions  of  the  former,  and  Correfponding  to  them: 
only  there  may  be  Occafion  to  remark  fomewhat  more  Speci- 
al, as  to  the  way  of  exprefling  this  or  that  Senfe,  particular- 
ly in  our  own  Language,  and  this  the  rather,  becaufe  fo  lit- 
tle of  this  Nature  has  been  written  in  Englijh. 

§  3.  Whenever  we  do  formally  judge  or  pronounce, 
there  muft  be  fomething  of,  or  concerning  which  we  do  it; 
and  fomewhat  farther,  which  is  the  thing  exprefly  judged 
and  pronounc'd  thereof:  The  former  is  call'd  the  Subje&y 
and  may  be  any  Thing  whatfoever,  which  can  be  any  way 
the  Objedl  or  Matter  of  Tho't  and  Difcourfe,  under  what- 
foever Notion  or  Confideration  it  may  be  taken,  when  we 
go  to  judge  or  pronounce  any  thing  farther  of  it ;  the  latter 
is  call'd  the  Predicate,  or  Attribute,  and  it  may  be  any  Thing 
or  Confideration,  which  can  be  affiim'd  or  deny'd  of  the 
Subjed. 

§  4.  That  fomething  may  be  truly  deny'd  of  fomewhat 
elfe,  it  is  requir'd  that  the  Subjefl  and  Attribute  be  not  the 
fame  thing  in  any  of  the  Sorts  or  Senfes  properly  belonging 
to  them,  at  leaft  as  they  are  us'd  and  intended  in  the  prefent 
Cafe  and  Ciicumftances ;  It  may  be  truly  faid,  a  Dog  n  «of  a. 
Fifh,  if  we  wore  fpcaking  of  Creatures  that  Bark,  fince  not 
any  one  of  thcfe  is  any  fort  of  Fifh;  tho'  there  be  indeed 
what  they  call  a  Dog-Fifh ;  It  cannot  be  truly  faid  of  Judoi, 
who  is  diftinguilh'd  from  the  other,  as  being,  not  Ifcariot, 
that  he  wji  not  jtidas,  fince  he  was  one  of  that  Namie  j  and 
yet  it  might  be  nghtly  faid,  he  was  not  Judd^,  who  betrayed  our 
Lord,  fince  he  did  it  not  in  any  Sort  or  Senfe  ;  as  alfo  of 
Petcr^  that  he  did  7wt  defert  our  Saviour,  fince  he  did  it  not  in 
the  more  proper  Senfe,  wherein  that  Word  is  commonly 
taken,  tho'  his  denying  of  him,  was  a  kind  of  deferting  him, 
in  part  and  for  a  time. 

<i  5.  To  make  an  Affirmation  tme^  it  fuffices  that  the 
Subjed  and  Attribute  be  the  fame  thing  f  tho' under  differ- 
ing Confiderations)  in  fonie  or  other  of  the  Sorts  or  Senfes 
properly  belonging  to  them  in  the  prefent  Cafe  and  Cii'cum- 
ilances.  Seme  Men,  if  we  fpeak  of  Mankind,  nre  indeed 
Children  \  for  fome  of  thofe,  who  have  Hum.ane  Nature,  are 
fome  or  other  fort  of  Children,  vi:{.  Babes,  Boys,  or  Girls. 

§  6.  We 


Chap.  15.        Improvement  of  Reafcn.  loi 

§  6.  We  cannot  truly  affirm  of  any  thing  what  is  not  the 
very  thing  it  felf,  tho'  it  be  otherways  confider'd,  fince  to 
affirm  is  indeed  to  fay  exprefly  or  implicitly,  thn  k  that  -.  A« 
when 'tis  faid,  God  is  good  and  does  goocj^  the  Import  is,  Godii 
the  very  fame  things  as  a  Being  which  is  good  and  does  good  ^  but 
he  is  firft  confider'd,  perhaps,  only  asa  Beirig  call'd  by  that 
Name,  and  then  as  the  fame  Being,  having  fuch  a  Nature, 
and  fo  Ading. 

§  7.  The  formal  Notions  of  differing  Things  are  not  the 
fame,  and  therefore  they  cannot  be  affirm'd,  as  fuch^  one  of 
another .-  Subftance  is  not  Accident,  or  Mode,  or  Mode  of 
a  Mode,  or  Adion,  orPaflion,  &c;  nor  are  any  oneof  thefe 
the  fame  with  any  other:  Yet  Subftance  has  Accident, 
Mode,  (3c,  or  is  the  fame  thing  as  a  Being  poffeft  of  thefe  ; 
and  thefe  belong  to  Subftance,  or  are  the  fame  things  as  Ap- 
purtenances or  Appendages  of  Subftance-  In  (hort,  one  thing 
cannot  be  formally  and  in  it  felf  the  fame  with  another ;  yet 
it  may  well  be  the  fame  to  which  another  fome  way  belongs, 
and  fo  may  be  affirmed  to  be  the  fame  in  the  Concrete^  i,  e. 
the  Accident  or  other  Adjundt  together  with  its  Subjed:; 
thus  Mnn  is  B^ationnl^  or  that  which  is  defign'd  by  the  Name, 
is  the  fame  which  has  fuch  a  Nature. 

§  8.  The'  we  can  only  affirm  that  which  is  the  fame, 
that  we  may  pronounce  truly  of  things,  yet  we  are  not  to 
affirm  it  as  the  fame,  which  would  be  no  better  than  Trifling  ; 
If  it  fliould  be  judg'd  or  faid,  that  the  Sun  (conGder'd  as  a 
Luminary)  is  the  Sun  (fo  again  ccnfider'dj  it  would  be  cer- 
tainly and  evidently  true,  but  of  no  Ufe  or  Service  j  and  if 
in  fome  fort  it  were  rightly  pronounc'd,  yet  not  fitty^  fince  it 
would  be  to  no  Purpofe. 

§  p.  By  a  Predicable  Logicians  have  intended  only  what 
may  be  rightly  affirm'd,  not  deny'd ;  and  whatever  can  be  fi 
predicated  of  any  Subjed  muft  be  indeed  (as  we  have  feen^ 
the  fame  thing  with  it,  but  attributed  under  fome  differing 
Confideraiion,  and  together  with  it  in  the  Concrete  :  And 
it  is  either  of  the  very  ElTence  of  the  Subjed,  or  only  fome 
Acceifion  to  it. 

§  10,  What  is  of  the  Eflence,  or  goes  to  make  up 
the  Principal  and  Summary  Account  of  the  Subjed  is  either 
more  dark  and  confus'd,  or  more  clear  and  diftind  :  Un- 
der the  former  is  the  moft  general  and  indeterminate  Nature, 
that  of  fomevohat,  or  fomething,  together  with  its  relative 
Attribute  or  Charader,   that  it  is  capal>le  of  being  thought; 


P  4  §  ir.TIi? 


192-'  ^»  ^jjay  fer  the  Part  II. 

§  II.  The  more  dear  and  diftind;  Eirential  Predicables, 
are  either  common  or  more  peculiar :  The  former  are  the 
feveral  abftraifled  Natures,  or  common  Ideas  leading  down 
from  the  higheft  equivocrJ  Kjnd  to  the  Suhjed:  of  which  we 
are  judging  or  pronouncmg  ;  as  alfo  the  feveral  abJlraSied 
CharaBets,  which  compieat  and  diftinguifh  thofe  feveral  Na- 
tures or  Ideas :  "What  may  be  call'd  more  peculiar,  is  either 
tlie  entire  Ejfnice  of  the  Subject,  or  the  finijhing  EJJentirJ 
ChartiElery  which  ferves  to  compieat  and  diftinguilh  it  a-. 
Juch. 

§  II.  The  Predicables,  which  are  only  an  AcceiTion  to 
the  Eir.'nce  of  the  Subject,  are  either  Neceflarv,  being  fuch 
»s  follow  the  Effence,  vit^.  the  Prrpcrties  refpedrively  belong- 
ing to  any  of  the  foregoing  Natures  or  Characfters,  or'elfe 
contingent  to  the  Subjecft  aifuch,  vi^.  thofe  accidental  Attri- 
ifutes,  which  may  be  adlually  abfent  from  it,  or  denied  of  it, 
without  contradicting  its  Nature  ;  and  thefe  may  be  either 
Inhering  or  Appending ;  and  this  either  upon  fomewhat  in  or 
appertaming  to  the  Subjcdt,  or  only  in  the  Mind  that  fo  con- 
!Ceives  it ;  the  former  we  may  call  Illative  Attributions,  the 
loiter  mere  Denominations. 

§  1 3.  It  appears  therefore,  that  what  ever  is  a  Predica- 
ble,  and  can  be  affirm'd  of  any  thing  may  come  under  one  ai 
pther  of  the  following  Heads. 

I .  The  mcji  General  avd  equivocd  Nature^  or  the  moft  com- 
jnon,  but  dark  and  indiftindt  Idea,  whereby  any  Subjedt, 
we  can  think  of,  may  be  faid  to  be  jcmcthing.  What  we 
perceive  in  locking  at  the  Sun,  or  conceive  in  a  Fidtion  is 
loaQewhat  ;   and  even  the  latter  is  not  purely  nothing. 

§  14.  2.  The  mofi  common  Chamber  of  every  Subject, 
which  relatively  expounds  the  mentioned  indeterminate  Na- 
ture, viz.  the  Capacity  cf  being  tlyjt  cf\  or  confider'd  j  as  the 
Suo,  or  Fidrion  before  mcntion'd  may  be. 
.  3.  The  Jeveral  Abprn'cl  Natures,  Or  lefs  common  Ideas, 
■which  may  intervene  betwixt  that  above  nam'd,  and  the 
Subjedt  whereof  we  would  Judge  or  Pronounce ;  Thus  the 
Sun  is  a  Reality,  a  Subllance,  a  Body,  a  Luminary,  an  Ori- 
ginal, a  Sun  J  for  we  may  at  leaft  iuppofe  others  in  other 
Parts  and  Provinces  of  the  Univerfe,  which  appear  to  us 
only  as  fixed  Stars,  but  may  be  fo  many  Suns  to  fuch  re- 
fpcaive  Diftricts  of  the  World. 

/  §  1 5.  4.  The  /"veral  Ejfential  Characters,  which  compieat 
and  Diftinguifh  the  feveral  intermediate  Natures  and  com- 
mon Ideas  before  mention'd  :  Thus  it  may  be  faid  of  the 
Sun,  that  (as  being  a  Reality)  it  exifts,  whether  tho't  of  or 

not^ 


Chap.  15-         Improvement  of  KQi(on.  195 

not ;  as  a  Subftance,  it  Subfifts  of  it  felf ;  as  a  Body,  it  is 
partible  ;  as  a  Luminary,  it  affords  Light  from  Heaven  ;  as 
an  Original  it  has  Light  in  and  of  it  felf ;  as  a  Sun,  it  makes 
Day  in  its  rcfpedive  Sphere  and  Province. 

§  16.  5.  The  eutire  EJfence  of  the  Subjed:,  or  the  De- 
finition which  may  be  reciprocated  with  it :  And  this  is  not 
neceflarily  that  of  rhe  lowed  Species  or  Sort,  but  may  be  that 
of  feme  Kind  or  higher  Kind,  or  of  an  Individual,  according  as 
the  Subjecft  whereof  we  predicate  it  is  any  of  rliefe.  Thus 
of  a  Liiminary,  we  may  fay,  it  is  a  Body  aftorv'ing  i  ight 
from  Hea- enj  of  a  Sun,  that  it  is  an  Original  Luminary, 
which  makes  Day  in  its  refpecftive  Sphere;  of  the  Sun,  or  liis 
individual  Sun,  that  it  is  the  Original  Luminary,  which 
makes  Day  in  this  Part  of  the  World,  or  to  i^s. 

§  17.  6.  The  Ejfential  Chnratier  of  the  Subiedt,  which 
ferves  to  compleat  and  diftinguifti  it  oi  fuch :  And  tliis  is  not 
always  the  Specifick  Difference,  but  may  be  that  of  a  K  nd, 
or  of  an  Individual,  according  as  the  Subject  is  of  a  particu- 
lar Nature,  or  of  that,  which  is  more  or  lefs  General :  Thus 
it  may  be  faid  a  Luminary  affords  Light  from  Heav'n,  n  Sun 
makes  Day  in  its  refpediive  Sphere  j  and  the  Sun  or  this 
Sun  makes  Day  in  this  particular  Sphere. 

Whatever  may  be  farther  affirm'd  of  any  Subjed;  muft 
needs  be  only  an  AcceHion  to  its  Eflence.     And, 
.    §  18.     7,  Whatever  follows  any  of  the  foremention'd  Na- 
tures, or  Charaders,  as  a  Property  NecelTary  to  them,   Infe- 
j3arable  from  them,  and  which  belongs  only  to  fuch  Nature 
or  Charader,   and  to  thofe  lower  Sorts  and  Individuals, 
which  have  that  Nature  or  Charader.    Thus  wharfoever  is 
a  Property  of  fomewhat,  or  of  the  Cnfncity  of  being  thot  on  j 
the  Property  of  a  B^ality  or  of  Exijling,  tho'  untho't  of  •  of  a 
Suhflancej    or  of  fubfijling  by  its  felf;    of  a  Body^   or  of  being 
partible  ;  of  a  Luminnry,  or  of  affording  Light  from  Heavn^ 
of  an  Original,  or  of  having  Light  innnd  of  it  felf  ^  of  a  Stm^ot 
of  making  Day  in  its  proper  Sphere  ;  of  the  Sun,  or  of  malting 
Day  here  :     All  thefe  Properties  may  be  aifirm'd  of  the  Sun, 
pr  of  our  particular  Sun  :    the  two  laft  Sorts,  as  being  proper 
to  the  particular  Subjed ;    the  other,  as  proper  to  fomewhat 
or  other  which  is  Eflential  to  this  Sun,   tho'  not  appertaining 
to  it  alone,   but  to  other  Suns  with  it,  if  others  there  were, 
or  be,  as  likewife  to  other  Originals,   Luminaries,   Bodies, 
GJ'c.  together  with  this.    There  are  yet  farther. 


Si9.7,rH- 


194  An  E (fay  for  the  Part  IT. 

§  I  p.  8,  Inherent  Accidents,  which  are  contingent,  in 
refpeft  of  theSubjedt,  fo  that  it  might  be,  and  be  Elfentially 
what  it  is  without  them  :  As  Body  without  this  or  that  parti- 
cular Shape ;  which  yet,  whilft  it  is,  may  be  predicated  of 
it ;  Luminary  without  this  degree  of  Lightj  there  might  alfo 
be  a  Sun  which  were  not  akogether  fo  great,  fo  bright,  fo 
diftant  as  ours ;  and  even  this  particular  Sun  might  be  fome 
ways  alter*-d,  if  God  faw  fit :  Yet  all  the  prefent  Accidents, 
whilft  they  continue,  may  be  truly  affirmed  of  it ;  and  if  it 
were  alter'd,  it  might  neverthelefs  be  always  truly  (aid,  that 
the  Sun  has  been  fo  great,  or  that  it  is  ftill  the  tame  Being, 
ivhich  fometime  had  thofe  Accidents. 

§  2o.  There  yet  remains  what  is  appending  to  the  Sub- 
jed :    And,' 

9.  I{el/ttive  Attribution!,  which  are  not  properly  inhering  in 
the  Subject:,  tho'  bottom'd  upon  fomewhat  in  it,  or  apper- 
taining to  it :  As  that  the  Sun  is  in  Appearance  greater  than 
a  Star,  and  certainly  Jefs  then  the  Sphere,  to  which  it  belongs ; 
that  it  is  feen,  tho't,  or  fpoken  of;  and  this  fitly  leads  to  our 
laftPredicable,  vi::^. 

§  2T.  10,  Merc  Denominations,  taking  their  Rife  wholly 
from  the  Mind,  which  gives,  or  takes  them  up  when  given, 
as  that  this  Thing  or  Being  (hould  be,  /.  e.  be  call'd  tl/Qty. 
>.'x»(5)-,  Sol,  Soleil,  Sun,  ^c. 

Negative  Attributions  maybe  confider'd  fometimes  as  af- 
firm'd  :  Thus  it  may  be  faid,  the  Sun  is  a  Body  not-flnt,  and 
here[[not-flat3  may  be  fitly  enough  faid'to  be  a  Negative  Term 
affirm'd,  together  with  [Body],  of  the  Sun ;  but  if  it  were 
faid,  the  Sun  »  not  flat ^  we  mull  call  it  the  denying  an  affir- 
mative Attribute  fflat]  of  the  Sun^  not  the  affirming  of  a 
Negative  [not-dat]. 


CHAP.     XVf. 

§  i;  T  TAvinp  (hewn  what  is  requir'd  to  a  Negaitive,  and 
•*^  what  to  an  Affirmative  Judgment,  to  make  them 
true;  and  alfo  what  forts  of  things  there  are,  which  may  be 
truly  affirm'd,  I  (hall  endeavour  to  give  fome  more  Special 
AiTiftance,  fi)fl,  that  we  may  rightly  judge  and  pronounce  of 
Propofitions  themfelves  {vi~.  of  their  common  Nature  and 
differing  Sorts)  j  and  then  of  the  Subje(5t;  in  and  by  them. 


Chap,  1 6.  Improvement  of  Reafon.  1^5 

§  2.  As  to  Propofitions  tbemfelves,  we  do  therein  put  to- 
gether our  more  Simple  Apprehenfions  by  Affirming  or  Deny- 
ing this  of  that  (as  when  we  judge  or  fay.  The  Sun  n  n  fiery 
Body  ^The  Moon  ii  not  a  fiery  Body) ;  Or  at  leaft  in  Queftioning, 
whether  this  or  that  be  fo  or  not;  and  even  here  there  is  a  tacit 
Affirmation,  that  the  Pares  of  fuch  a  Disjundion  are  to  be 
confider'd  and  compar'd  in  order  to  the  furer  Determination, 
which  of  them  is  true,  or  more  like  to  be  fo  :  E.  Gr.  Whether 
the  Sun  or  the  Earth  move  ;  i.  e.  Thh  «  fropofed  to  be  confi- 
der'd, 

§  3.  The  Matter  of  Propofitions  is  the  more  Simple  Ideas, 
which  are  therein  put  together,  in  one  or  other  of  the  Men- 
tioned ways,  as  the  Sun  and  n  fiery  Body,  alfor/jw  again  with 
the  Moon  ;  likewife  Motion  to  be  confiderd  in  reference  to  the 
Sun  and  to  the  Earth :  The  Form  of  a  Propofition  is,  that 
the  more  Simple  Ideas  be  put  together  in  fuch  manner,  as  to 
be  pronounced  one  of  another,  either  as  a  Point  concluded 
or  to  be  confider'd:  'Tis  not  putting  them  together  in  any- 
way whatfoever,  that  makes  a  Propofition;  The  Ideai  of 
Body  and  Fiery ,  are  indeed  put  together,  yet  not  fo  as  for- 
mally to  pronounce  any  thing ;  not  fo  much  as  that  fome  Body 
is  Fiery ;  thofe  of  the  5««  and  of  the  Earth,  are  likewife  put 
together  in  the  fame  Sentence,  yet  not  fo  as  formally  to  pro- 
nounce either  that  the  Sun  ii  the  Earth,  or  that  the  Earth  ts  not 
the  Sun ;  nor  fo  much  as  to  propofe  either  of  thcfe  Points  to 
Confideration. 

§  4.  That  is  an  OhjeBive  Propofition,  which  is  proposed 
to  us  as  an  Objedt  of  Tho't;  and  that  a  Formal  one,  which 
we  our  felves  form,  or  however  take  up,  and  adopt  as  our 
own  Senfe,  or  which  at  leaft  we  ufe  as  our  own  Words  : 
When  we  read  a  Book,  we  do  not  Neceflarily  adopt  what  is 
there  faid,  or  make  it  our  own  Saying,  tho'  it  fhouldrun  in 
the  firft  Perfon,  and  happen  to  exprefs  withal  the  very  Name 
of  him  that  reads  it,  as  if  one  who  is  called  Paul  fhould  read 
outtoothersf/;rtf  of  the  Apoftle,  Gal.  5.  2.  Behold,  IP  aid  fay 
witojou,  that  if  ye  be  Circumcis'd,  Chrififhall  profit  yoii  nothing- 
yet  it  would  not  be  the  faying  of  him  that  Reads,  but  of  him, 
who  wrote  or  order'd  it :  Nor  muft  we  neceffarily  make 
thofe  Expreffions  our  own,  which  we  utter  in  Singing  Pfalms, 
or  other  Compofures ;  our  Concern  with  them  is  to  cOnfider 
them,  as  the  Author's  Words,  or  theirs  who  may  be  perfo- 
iiated  by  him,  fo  as  to  inftrudt  or  excite  our  felves  by  them  ; 
iK)t  to  make  them  our  owDj  unlefs  we  fee  Reafon  to  do  it. 


§5.  The 


i$6  An  Ejfay  for  the  Part  II. 

§  5.  The  Subjed  and  Predicate  are  call'd  the  yerms  of 
the  Propofition  or  Enunciation  ;  and  the  Predicate,  the  Ma- 
jor Term,  as  beijig  Tuppos'd  to  be  of  greater  Extent  than  the 
Subjedt  or  Minor  Term ;  and  fo  it  often  is,  but  not  always : 
for  if  it  be  faid,  The  Sun  makes  D<-.y,  making  Day  belongs  on- 
ly to  the  Sun,  not  to  atiy  other  Light ;  but  if  it  be  faid  Eng- 
I'cind  js  a  Chrijiicn  Nntion,  'tis  only  one  of  thofe  that  are  fo, 
and  to  he  fuel,  agrees  to  divers  other  Nations. 

§.  6.  The  Import  of  Denying  or  Affirming  is  (as  has 
been  obferv'd)  that  the  Subjed  is  the  fame  thing  with  the 
Predicate  Materially,  tho'  they  formally  differ,  as  it  is  taken 
under  differing  Coniiderations.  Such  Identity  or  Samenefs 
is  the  very  Pomt  more  precifely  deny'd  or  affirm'd  ;  which 
are  often  espres'd  by  [is  not],  or  [is] ;  this  is  cali'd  the  Co- 
fula  or  Tie  of  the  SubjcA  and  Predicate  ••  And  it  is  not  al- 
ways expres'd,  but  may  be  imply'd  and  underftood  in  feme 
other  Verb,  as  when  we  fay  Time  paffes,  and  Tide  finys  not, 
'tis  all  one  Senfe,  as  if  it  were  faid  Time  k  faffing^  and  Tide 
7!  not  finying ;  only  this  way  of  fpeaking  is  often,  as  in  the 
latter  Infta nee,  lefs  ufual  and  proper.  When  nothing  is  pro- 
nounced of  the  Subjedl  but  [is],  or  [is  not]  the  Import  is, 
as  when  we  fay,  God  »,  i.  e.  »  exijling ;  or  ycjierday  k  noty 
i.e.  li  hot  now  in  being. 

§  7.  Things  cannot  be  faid  to  be  that  abftracfted  Attri- 
bute which  they  may  be  faid  to  have.  The  Sun  has  Subftanti- 
ality.  Corporeity,  Brightnefs,  &c.  but  is  not  any  of  them  ; 
nor  can  we  truly  fay  it  is  Ideality  ic  felf  in  the  Abftrad,  tho' 
we  may  call  it  rt /^?/://V>',  i.  e.  what  has  Reality,  or  is  real, 
in  the  Concrete :  And  it  is  alfo  a  Subftance,  a  Body,  a  Lu- 
minary, (5jc  ;  Subftantial,  Corporeal,  ^c,  i.  e.  a  Subjetit,  which 
has  the  Attributes  of  Subltaniiality,  Corporeity,  ^c,  as  alfo 
that  it  Shines,  or  is  Shining,  /.  r.  fomewhat  which  is  fo  ;' 
thus  there  are  Subftantives,  Adjcdives,  Verbs,  and  Participles 
which  being  Concrete  Words,  /.  e.  taking  in  and  implying 
a  Subjeft  together  with  the  Attribute,  may  be  Predicated  of, 
or  identify 'd  with  the  Subject,  which  is  fometimes  confider'd, 
as  what  is  tho't  of,  feen,  fhcwn,  and  often  only  as  what  has 
this  or  that  Name  ;  and  'tis  commonly  no  more  that  Chil- 
dren mean,  Avhen  they  ask  what  is  this  or  that,  being  content 
if  only  the  Name  be  told  them. 

§  8.  If  the  Negative  Particle  affed  not  the  CopuU,  or 
Note  of  Identity,  but  one  of  the  Terms  only,  the  Propofiti- 
on will  then  affirm  a  Negative  Term,  or  rather  what  there 
is  affirmative  imply'd  or  expres'd  therein,  as  if  it  be  faid,  the 
F.r,  th  1}  a  not  fiery  Body,  or  a  Body  not  fiery  :  It  is  here  af- 
firm'd. 


Chap.  1 6.        Improvement  of  ?y.^^ion.  197 

firm'dj  that  the  Earth  is  indeed  a  Body  of  feme  fort,  the'  it 
be  not  fiery,  when  as  in  a  Negative  Propofition,  as  the  Earth 
is  not  a  fiery  Body,  there  is  nothing  at  all  Affirin'd  ;  fincc  the 
Earth,  for  any  thing  here  faid,  may  neither  be  Hej-;-,  nor  a 
Bcdy^  and  is  plainly  deny'd  to  be  both  together :  But  if  it 
were  faid,  T/;ff  Mnn  k  r.  Non-fuch,  it  is  lit  to  take  it  affirma- 
tively, that  he  is  fuch  as  there  is  none  belides. 

§  9.  In  Affirming  this  of  that,  it  is  not  always  intended,  tha£ 
the  Subje£l:  really  is,  or  ex'ifls  in  Nature,  whether  it  be  tho't  of 
or  IK) :  The  Meaning  more  commonly  is  only,  that  the  Pre- 
dicate belongs  to  the  Idea  or  Notion  of  the  Subje£V,  or  that 
when  this  exifts  it  is  jom'd  with  that ;  where  this  is,  that 
likewife  is :  When  I  fay,  every  Man  ts  B^ntional^  I  am  far 
from  intending,  that  every  Man  is  now  in  being,  when  as 
the  far  greater  part  of  Men  confifts  of  fuch  as  are  already  de- 
ceas'd,  or  not  yet  Born. 

§10.  But  ^vhcn  I  abfolutely  Affirm  what  is  accidental  to 
tiie  Subje£l,  it  is  then  commonly,  but  not  always  neceflarily 
underftood,  that  the  Subjed:  Exifts,  and  is  alfo  fuch  as  I  af- 
firm it,  fome  Men  are  learned,  i.  e.  fome  Men  are  in  being, 
who  adually  have  that  Attribute  :  In  a  Negative  Propofi- 
tion, it  is  not  intended  to  deny  the  Exiftence  of  the  Subjedt, 
but  only  to  fay,  that  the  Attribute  belongs  not  to  it ;  uniefs 
when  we  Simply  fay  this  &  that  is  not,  exifts  not,  or  the 
like. 

§  I/.  An  h.cldcntnl  Propojition  only  defcrlbes  the  Sub- 
je(ft  or  Predicate,  but  doth  not  certainly  Affirm  or  Deny  any 
thing  of  them,  as  exifting  :  So  in  faying,  A  Private  M^.n^ 
who  batk  the  abfoliite  comtnand  [of  his  Pnjjjon  t  »  grcetter  than  the 
Prince^  who  hath  an  univcrfal  Empire  voithciit  it,  'tis  by  n6 
means  Affirm'd,  either  that  there  is  fuch  a  Private  Man,  or 
fuch  a  Prince  ;  but  only  that  the  Idea  or  Chara£tcr  of  the 
former  excels  that  of  the  latter;  and  that  the  firft  lliould  be 
accounted  greater  then  the  other,  if  there  be,  or  were  fuch 
Perfon  in  the  World :     But, 

§12.  When  the  Matter  of  an  Incidental  Propofition  isneither 
Impoflible,  nor  Improbable,  and  that  the  Subjed  is  an  Individu- 
rt/, 'tis  commonly  taken  tor  an  Intimation,  that  there  is  aftually 
what  is  fo  defcnb'd,  as  if  I  fay.  The  Planets^  which  we  can 
Jee  are  a  kind  of  Stars^  which  we  ccnceive  to  have  a  various  Mo- 
tion, I  am  here  fairly  fuppofed  to  intimate,  that  there  are 
fuch  Planets,  Stars,  and  Conceptions  about  them  ;  but  ftill 
what  I  ihould  be  judg'd  more  Certainly  and  Mainly  td  in- 
tend is  only,  tbat  fuch  Planets,  if  rhey  were  or  be,  are  Stars 
of  s^,rh  3  s.-rt;  A,id  this  v,  what  they  c^Wihc  Pri>.c  if  a^  PropL- 

rticil. 


I  ^S  An  Ejjay  for  the  Part  II. 

fition,  to  which  the  Defcriptions  or  Intimations  are  lKc/Wf«^4/, 
and  with  which  they  fall  in,  and  which  chey  fometimes  limit. 

§  13.  The  more  Plain  and  Obvious  Verhal  Enunciations 
are  thofe  wherein  the  Subje£t  goes  before  the  Predicate ;  and 
that  the  former  be  a  Noun-Subftantive  in  the  Nominative 
Cafe,  and  the  latter  a  Verb  of  the  Indicative  Mood,  Prefent- 
Tenfe,  or  a  Noun  connedled  with  the  Subjedl  by  fuch  a  Verb  * 
But  the  Order  may  be  inverted^  and  therefore  we  muft 
Judge,  which  is  the  Subjed,and  which  the  Predicate  rather  by 
the  Senfe  than  Placing  ;  and  there  are  other  ways  of  fpea- 
king,  which  are  Enunciations,  and  may  be  reduc'd  to  the 
Common  Form,  according  to  the  following  Inftruifiions  and 
Inftances,    And, 

§  14.  fi.)  The  Subjedl  is  to  be  rightly  ftated.  Suppofe 
in  difcourfing  or  chinking  of  Phyficks,  I  fliould  fay  or  con- 
ceive, that  the  Canfidcration  of  Natural  Bodies^  belongs  thereto : 
It  may  and  ought  to  be  reduc'd  to  fome  fuch  Propofition  as 
this,  that  Phyfickj  cmfider  or  treat  of  Natural  Bodies :  For  the 
Subjeft,  I  had  in  Purfuit,  was  not  Confideration  it  felf,  nor 
'Natural  Bodies,  but  Phyfickj,  which  I  exphin'd  by  attributing 
thereto  the  Confideration  of  Natural  Bodies:  "That  is  there- 
fore to  be  accounted  the  SubjeS  of  a  Propofition  ;  which 
is  the  thing  explain'd,  divided, ^^^r  othewife  treated  of;  The 
Predicate,  or  fome  part  of  it,  may  indeed  afterwards  become 
the  Subjedl  of  farther  Difcourfe,  or  Confideration,  as  if  I 
fhould  add,  that  Natural  Body  Comprehends  all  thofe  Sorts 
of  Material  Subftanccs,  which  God  has  made,  or  that  are 
produced  in  the  Courfe  and  Order  of  Nature  by  him 
fettled. 

§  15.  (2.)  The /rt/?  and  /wrwrf  Time  is  to  be  reduced  to 
the  Prefent,  as  in  the  Examples  following  ;  yldam  did  fame- 
time  live  upon  the  Earth,  i.  e.  yldam  is  rightly  conceived  with 
the  Attribute  of  living  upon  the  Earth,  as  fometime  actually 
belonging  to  him,  tho' now  it  do  not.  TheSun  hath  often  Set, 
and  yet  hath  I^ifen  again,  i.  e.  The  Sun  is  rightly  conceiv'd, 
with  the  contrary  Attributes  of  Setting  and  Rifing,  as  what 
have  aftually  and  often  SuccelTively  belonged  to  him,  whe- 
ther now  they  do,  or  not.  The  Day  of  Judgment  voill  come,  i.  e. 
it  is  now  rightly  conceiv'd  with  the  Attribute  of  Exiftence, 
as  what  will  hereafter  belong  to  it,  tho'  now  it  do  not.  Wtoen 
it  hath,  or  floall  have,  done  Raining  it  will  be  fair,  i.  e.  the  Air 
®r  Heavens  are  even  now  rightly  conceived  with  the  Attri- 
bute of  F^/r,  as  what  will  adually  belong  thereto,  after  that 
yet  future  Moment  ihall  be  paft  and  over,  wherein  the  Rain 
will  Ceafe.    Thus  a  Verb  of  other  Tenfes,  than  the  prefent 

gives 


Chap.  1 6.       Improvement  of  ^tziou.  199 

gives  the  Qualification  ofpaft  or  future  Time  to  the  Attribute, 
which  is  Predicated  by  it. 

§  16.  (3.)  Other  Moods  are  to  bereducdto  ih.Q  Indica- 
tive^ as  in  the  following  Examples :  Go  thou,  i.  e.  I  com- 
mand or  defire  thee  to  Go,  or  thou  art  bid  to  go.    //,  or 

0  that  thou  h/idfl  known^  even  thoUy  nt  Icaji  in  this  thy  Day,  the 
things  which  belong  unto  thy  Pence  !  i.  e.  Thy  Application,  tho* 
but  now  at  laft,  to  the  things  which  concern  thy  Welfare, 
and  thy  Pra£lical  Acquaintance  with  them  had  made  thee 
Happy  and  been  highly  pleaftng  to  me.  I  muji  ffWl^  the 
M^'ortij  of  him  that  Jent  me,  i.  e.  I  am  obliged  fby  my  Under- 
taking, C^c.j  fo  to  do.  The  Fntber  hc.th  committed  all  Judg- 
ment to  the  Son,  that  all  Men  Jhcutd  Honour  the  Son,  even  as 
they  Honour  the  Father,  i.  e.  He  hath  done  and  declar'd  it  to 
that  End,  as  an  Inducement  and  engagement  fo  to  Honour 
the  Son.     If  I  go,  1  will  fend  the  Comforter  or  Paraclete^  that  is, 

1  promife  to  fend  him,  upon  Condition  or  in  Cafe  of  my  go- 
ing away.  To  fubvert  a  Man  in  his  Caufe,  the  Lord  approveth 
7ioty  i.  e.  that  A(ftion  is  difapprov'd  of  God. 

§  17.    (4.;  /«rfr/o^rf^/o« J  are  to  be  reduced  either,  (i.)  in- 
to an  Appeal  with  ftronger  Affirmation,  when  the  Queftion 
is  Negatively  put  in  a  Matter,  that  is,  or  is  fuppofed.   Evi- 
dent to  fuch  as  we  fpeak  to,  or  at  leaft,  that  it  would  be  fo 
upon  their  confidering  ;  £;  Gr.   Is  it  not  fo  ?   i.  e.  I  appeal 
to    your    Knowledge  or   Conlidcration  ,     that  it  is  fo  ; 
Or,  (2.)  with  ftronger  Denial,  when  the  Qjieftion  is  Affir- 
mative, Canft  thou  by  fe arching  find  out  God  ?   i.  e.  I  appeal  to 
thy  Knowledge  or  Coniideration,  that  thou  canft  not ;   or, 
(3.)  into  an  Expreflion  of  Defire  to  be  informed  as  Are  Ton  wil- 
ling ?     I  defire  to  know,  whether  you  be  or  not.    Is  it  fo> 
or  «  it  not  fo  ?  i.  e.    I  defire  to  be  Inform'd  by  you,    of  the 
Truth  of  the  Matter  ;  or  that  you  fhould  declare,  what  you 
think  about  it :  or  (4 )  into  a  real  or  fuppofed  difputablenefs 
of  the  Point  fo  propos'd  ;  or  at  leaft:,  that  it  is  capable  of  be- 
ing farther  confirm'd-  and  thus,  inftead  of  down-right  After- 
ting  or  Denying,    we  often  put  things  by  way  of  Queftion, 
as  whether  thc^  c  be  Planets  Inhabited}   i,  e.  I  doubt  or  off*er  it 
to  Con  fid  era:  ion.     J^Vi^ether  there  is  n  God  ^   i.e.    Ipropoieic 
for  farther  Contirmation. 

§  l8'  f5.,  V/ hcLt  is  Ambiguoufly  expres''d,  muft  be  diftin- 
guifti'd  into  its  various  Senfes,  ortheDefignof  it  Stated,  and 
determin'd  •  Such  was  that  doubtful  Anfwer  given  by  the 
Oracle  of  ApoHo  to  Pyrrhus. 

Aio  te  ./Encida  I{cmanos  vinccre  Pojfe. 
I  fay,  the  I{omnns  you  may  oyer-coine, 

i.  e.  You 


200  An  hjfay  for  the  Part  H. 

i.  e.   You  may  overcome  the  ^mansy  or  the  B^mans  over- 
come you : 

Such  alfo  was  that  Sentence,  which  Bp.  Tnrlton  is  faid  to 
have  fent  to  thofe,  who  had  King  Edward  the  2d  in  Cuftody, 
Edvnrdum  occidere  nolite  timere  bonum  efi, 

1  o  feek  to  flied  King  Edward\  Blood 
Refufe  to  fear  I  count  it  Good. 

*.  e.  refufe  to  fear,  or  ref  ife  to  flied  it,  for  I  account  it  Good 
to  fhed  it,  or  good  to  fear  the  Ihedding  of  it :  But  the  Keepers 
took  it  as  it  was  moft  probably  meant,  and  niurder'd  the  King. 
§  19.  (6.)  When  the  lame  thing  rs  intended  to  be  feve- 
rally  AffirmM  or  Deny'd  of  divers  Subjef^s,  or  divers  things 
of  the  fame,  there  are  fo  many  Simple  Prnpofidons  to  be 
drawn  out  of  the  Complex,  or  Compounded  Enunciation : 
But  if  divers  Things  are  feverally  meant  of  divers  others,  and 
of  each  of  them  a  part,  the  implied  Simple  Propolitions  are 
fo  many  times  fo  many,  bcfides  what  may  be  conlidered,  as 
more  explicite,  /.  e.  that  all  together  are  plainly  fa'id  of  all 
together  :  E.  G.  the  Sun  and  Moon  are  to  w  great  Lights :  Here 
it  is  to  be  underftood,  (i .)  that  the  Sun  is  a  Light ;  (1.)  The 
S'.m  is  to  us  a  great  Light.  (3.)  The  Moon  is  a  Light.  (4)  The 
Moon  is,  to  ifs,  a  great  Light  j  and  farther  yet,  (5.)  The 
Sun  and  Moon  together  are  Lights;  and,  (6. )  Both  are  to  us 
great  Lights.  Oar  thus  drawing  out  all  the  feveral  Propo- 
fitions,  is  requiiite,  not  only  in  order  to  take  the  Senfe  more 
?ully  and  diftind:ly,  but  alfo  that  we  may  better  judge  whe- 
ther the  Complex  Propontion  be  akogether  right,  or  how 
far,  and  in  what  refpect  it  may  be  wrong. 


CHAP.     XVII. 

§  I.  *TrHUS  I  have  fhewn  how  to  pronounce  or  judge 
*■  of  Propofitions,  as  to  their  Make  and  Import  i 
And  now,  better  to  fecure  the  Pronouncing  rightly  in  and 
by  them,  we  Ihquld  make  fuch  Enquiries  as  thcle,  whether 
what  IS  juJg'd  or  faid  be  not  altogether  Infigniticant,  ac  lealt 
to  the  Purpofe  intended  ?  Or  whether  it  be  not  certainly 
Untrue  ?  And  on  the  oliher  hand,  whether  it  is  what  we 
may  reafonably  take  for  true  j  or  as  making  fuch  Approach 
towards  the  Truth,  as  we  are  cap^^blc  of,  or  is  fufiicient  for 
:hc  prclent  Purpofe.  §  i.  I 


Chap. 1 7-         Improvement  of  Reafon.  201 

§  2.  I  might  here  mind  the  Reader  of  what  help  has 
been  already  given  towards  our  Pronouncing  rightly  concer- 
ning Tho'ts,  and  the  Things  they  are  employ 'd  abour,  and 
likewife  as  to  the  meaning  of  other  Mens  Difcourfe,  and 
what  we  our  felves  intend,  what  Enquiries  may  be  made 
about  things,  as  alfo  touching  our  Capacity  for  them,  and 
Concernment  with  them,  arid  of  their  greater  or  lefs  Impor- 
tance to  us :  But  I  Ihall  here  endeavour  yet  farther  to  Ihew, 
as  to  the  feveral  forts  of  Propofitions,  when  we  may  fairly 
fuppofe  this  or  that  to  be  rightly  pronounc'd,  i.  c.  fo  far  zi 
we  are  capable ,  or  as  is  aimed  at,  or  pretended  to  in  the 
prefent  Cafe.    And  here, 

§  3.  1.  Rightly  to  AffiriH,  the  whole  Predicate  muftat 
Jeaft  in  fome  or  other  of  its  Sorts  agree  to  the  whole  Subjedti 
or  elfe  to  its  Principal,  or  moft  confiderable,  or  more  obfer- 
vable  Parts :  So  Man  is  rightly  faid  to  be  Rational,  Cor- 
poreal, Mortal.  That  a  Quality  may  be  rightly  affifm'd,  there 
muft  be  of  it  Sntis  intenfive,  a  fufiicient  Degree;  futis  exten- 
fi"!^^,  a  fnificient  Extent  J  And  zKo  S /it  ir  frotenfr/iy  a  fufficient 
Continuance  and  Duration  :  A  Face  is  not  rightly  pro- 
nounced Red,  if  it  hath  only  fuch  a  Mixture  thereof  as  is  re- 
fluir'd  to  a  common  Flefli-Colour ;  or  if  it  has  a  deeper 
Red,  but  only  in  the  Cheeks ;  or  only  a  tranfient  Bl'jfli  all  over, 

§  4.  For  the  right  affirming  one  thing  of  another,  it  fu{- 
fices,  after  the  mendoned  Precautions,  that  any  Sort  thereof 
can  be  truly  Affirm'd;  as  for  Mans  being  a  living  Creature, 
it  is  enough  that  he  be  fome  fort  of  living  Creature.  It 
may  be  ufefully  noted,  that  Epithets  which  come  to  be  mere- 
ly Titular,  and  as  a  fort  of  Name,  may  be  rightly  given, 
tho'  the  common  Senfe  of  the  Words  do  not  other  wife  truly 
belong  to  the  Perfon,  as  it  may  be  faid  Lewis  XIV,  is  the 
Afo/?  Chrifiian  King ;  i.  e.  the  King,  who  hath  that  Title, 
tho'  he  do's  not  anfwer  it. 

§  5.  2.  Rightly  to  deny,  the  Predicate  muft  in  no  pro- 
per Sort,  or  Senfe  thereof,  agree  to  the  Subjetit,  r.or  m  any 
very  obfervable  Part  of  it,  hov/ever  not  to  what  is  moi't  con- 
fiderable in  it,  and  which  ufually  denominates  the  whole 
according  a^  it  felf  is  fuch  or  fuch  ;  and  therefore  it  cannot 
be  richtly  laid,  Man  is  not  Rational,  when  as  he  hathi  Rea- 
fonable  Soul ;  nor  that  he  is  not  Vifible,  whillt  he  has  a  vifible 
Body.  Some  Attributes  are  commonly  dehy'd  of  the  wbdle, 
whicl;  belong  to  the  Principal  part,  as  that  Man  is  not  Invi- 
lible,  ^ho'  his  Soul  be  fo  }  yet  generally  it  is  othfct%Vi^j,  biifc 
there  are  fome  lefs  z:zcc\-rua.hh  Ufagcs  in  fpeaking,  which 
muft  be  obferv'd  from  Cuftora.   However, 

P  |g.W^ 


202  nn  Hjjdy  for  the  Parj  II. 

§  6.  We  judge  fufficiently  right  in  our  Conceptions,  if  we 
Affirm  or  Deny  with  an  eye  to  this  or  that  Part,  or  Confide- 
rationof  the  Subjefl;  and  in  Speaking  too,,  if  we  take  care 
to  exprefs  the  Limiration  or  Refpedl  we  have  in  View  ; 
which  is  to  be  done,  whenever  there  might  be  danger  of  Mi- 
ftake,  or  Objedion,  as  luppofe  in  Taying,  Man  «,  ai  to  his 
Soul,  -Invifib.e  and  htimortd'.y  or  thar,  As  to  nis  Scul^  Man  k 
not  Vifible  or  Mortal :  The  former  Propofition  Affirms  thofe 
which  Logicians  call  Infinite  Terms,  which  ufually  imply 
fomewhat  Pofitive  j  and  here  fomcwhat  politive  that  is  not 
vifible  or  Mortal :  The  latter  is  the  Negation  of  Affirmative 
Terms ;  for  that  the  Negative  Particle  doih  here  affecl:  the 
Copula,  or  Note  of  Identy  whenas  m  the  former  Enunciations 
it  afFecSled  only  the  Predicates. 

§  7.  Affirmative  and  Negative  are  calfd  the^/<T///>  of 
Propolitionsjthcy  have  alfo  a  fort  of  Quantity,  in  refped;  of 
which  they  may  be  called  Univerfaj,  or  Particular  which 
is  always  underftood  to  be  not  cn\y  fewer  then  all,  but  alfo  in- 
determinate) Indefinite,  or  Total.  Fciv,  Many^  M/Ji,  all  but 
oM»,  or  two,  end  the  like,  are  reducible  to  the  Head  of  Parti- 
cular, as  being  Indeterminate  and  Fewer  then  all. 

§  8.     Qiiantiry    is  commonly  underftood,   as  belonging 
onlyro  the  Subjcd: ;  whenas  it  doth  as  really  appertain  to  the 
Predicate  alfo,  which  might  likcwife  have  a  Note  of  Quan-- 
tity  :     And  it  is  however  always  10  be  undcrftocd  imiierJaHy 
of  the  whole  Kind,    or  Totally  of  the  whole  Perfon  or  Thing 
in  a  Negative   Propolition  ;    and  ParticaUrly  of  fome  Sort, 
or  of  fome  Particulars  only,   in  an  Affimiativc  Piopofirion 
(as  has  been  intimated,,  unlcfs  by  Accident  the  Predicate  be 
ju  A  of  the  fame  Extent  with  the  Subject ,  as  all  right  Definiti- 
ons and  true  Properties  are);  e.g.  Every  right-lind  Triangle, 
is  a  right-lin'd  Figure,    whcfe  Angles  taken  together  are 
equal  to  two  right  ones;  where  the  Attribute  is  indeed  of  no 
fr.rthcr  Extent,   then  the  Subjcd:,    but  it  might  be  othcrAvif* 
for  anything  here  faid  or  intimated  about  it  :     And  there- 
fore the  Predicate  is  to  be  taken  Particularly,   if  it  hath  no 
exprefs  note  of  Quantity  added  to  defrmine  it  otherwife  ; 
.or  be  not  a  Total,  z,  e.   either  a  determinate  Individual,   or 
elfe  the  Nature  Simply  taken,  as  when  we  fay  Adr.m  a  a  Man^ 
.1.  e.  has  that  fiiigular  Humane  Nature,  which  belongs  to 
hiiii. 

■  §  9.  As  to  the  Quantity  of  the  Subjed,  which  is  the 
thing  commonly  v;nderltocu  by  Qiiancity  here,  we  do  right- 
ly Judge  and  Pronounce, 

{i.)Vniv:r~ 


Chap.  1 7-       Improvement  of  d^^^diion.  202 

(i.)  VnlverjrtUy;^  when  the  Predicate  is  duly  Affirmed  or 
Deny'd  of  the  Subjcdt  in  its  whole  Extent  or  of  all  its  Sorts ; 
buttheufual  Note  of  Univerfality  [rt//J  is  fqmctimes  taken 
only  for  a  great  Majority,  at  other  times  for  fomeof  all  the 
Sorts ;  as  when  our  Lord  faith,  I  mill  ckavi>  all  M:n  unto  me  * 
and  fometimes  not  dijhihutively  for  each,  as  it  ihould  be  to 
make  the  Propofition  Univerfal,but  colleRively  for  All  together; 
in  which  Cafes  it  makes  the  Propofition  rather  Total  then 
Univerfal.  That  may  be  juflly  counted  Univerfal,  as  to  the 
reft,  where  there  is  a  Determinate  Exception:  As  Mankind 
except  Adnm  and  Eve,  are  born  of  Woman  :  But  where  the 
Exception  is  indeterminate,  .the  Propofition  is  to  be  reckon'd. 
Particular,  as  if  it  had  been  faid,  all  Mankind,  fave  two, 
are  born  of  Women  ;  the  Reafon  is,  becaufe  it  is  left  doubt- 
ful^ who  ihofe  two  are. 

§  I  o.  {%.)  We  rightly  Pronounce  Particularly^  when  the  Pre-?' 
dicate  is  duly  affirm'd  or  deny'd  only  of  fome  undetermin'd 
Sorts  or  Individuals. 

And,  ;3.)  Indefinitely^  when  neither  Univerfality  nor  Par- 
ticularity is  expres'd,  but  the  Quantity  left  in  Sufpence;  when 
yet  by  the  Nature  of  the  thing,  or  Ufage  of  Words,  zhe  Inde- 
finite is  perhaps  reafonably  to  be  underftood  Univerfaliy  ; 
as  in  the  Doctrinal  Propofitions  of  Arts  and  Sciences :    So 
if  we  fay  in  Mathemaricks,  Triangles  have  three  Sides,  ic  is  to 
be  underftood,  that  all  have ;  or  elfe  the  Indefinite  Propofiti- 
on is  to  be  ordinarily  taken  Particularly,  vi:{.  in  Hifiorical  Nar- 
rations, or  common  Plfcourfes ;  where  'tis  ufually  intended, 
thar  the  Matters  are  Generally,  or  Moftly,  tho'  not  always 
lo ;  as  when  we  give  the  Charadlers  of  Nations  in  General. 
^  1  r.    But  belides  the  mentioned  Sorts  of  Indefinite  Pro- 
poficions,    which  are  only  fuch  in  ExprelTion,   there  may  be 
Propofitions,  which  are  alfo  Indt-fnite  in  Scnfe^  and  cannot  be 
reduced  eidier  co  Univerfal  or  Particular  Enunciations ;  as  if 
it  be  faid,  Man  ts  one  fpecies  of  living  Creatures  ^  when  ft  can- 
not be  faid  that  all  Men,  (i.  e.  every  Man),   or  fom^  M"w,  or 
thtf  Man  is  cnc  Species  of  living  Creatures  :     But  the  Meaning 
is,  that  the  AbftraAed  Humane  Nature  is  a  Species  or  Sore 
of  Living  Creatures. 

§  12.  (4,/  In  the  Propofitions, '  which  v.'e  call  Totaly 
the  Attribute  is  refer'd  to  a  Singular,  ;.  e.  to  a  Determinate 
Individual ;  as  in  faying,  Chrijl  is  God  ynanlfcfted in  the  F'':jh. 
Now  thefe  fall  in  with  Llniverfal  Propofitions  as  they  refer 
:o  the  entire  Subject,  when  yet  the  Attribute  is  not  therefore 
•£0  hi.  taken  as  always  belon.^ing  to  every  Part  thereof;  buc 
if  IS  enough,  if  it  fo  appertain  to  any,  as]  fiirly  to  give  a  De- 
%  P   2  njminaaon 


204  M  t.jjay  for  the  Part  11. 

rohiination  co  the  Whole.  The  two  tirft  mentioned  forts  of 
Quantities  are  commonly  exprefs'd,  where  they  aie  inten- 
ded. 

§  I  ^.  As  to  the  Truth  or  Falfliood  of  what  is  pronounc'd 
in  any  of  the  forementioned  ways,  or  thofe  which  follow, 
it  may  be  often  times  better  difcern'd  by  confidering  the  Con- 
tradidtory.  Propofition,  which  takes  away  what  was  con- 
cciv'd  or  faid  by  denying  what  was  before  Affirm'd  or  Affir- 
iping  what  was  Deny *d.  Nor  is  it  needful  for  thisPurpofe, 
that  every  Part  or  Point  of  what  was  faid  fhonld  be  contra- 
dicted, which  would  make  it  a  Contmry  Propofition,  whenas 
tothz  Truth  oi  n  Contradiciory^  it  fufficeth,  that  fome  Part 
or  Point  of  the  other  may  be  juftly  gain-faid  :  As  that  the 
Snn  is  not  Hot  nnd  Moij}^  truly  contradi<5^s  the  faying,  that 
the  Sun  is  Hot  and  Moiji  •  and  fo  it  do's,'  if  we  fay  the  Sun  is 
not  Moift  tho'  it  be  Hot,  but  to  fay  the  Sun  is  neither  Hot  nor 
i^oijl,  is  a  Point  blank  Contr/rry^  and  more  then  Contradidory 
to  its  being  Hot  and  ^oijl^  A  Propofition  which  is  only  contra- 
dicioy,  do's  no  more  than  affirm  the  Copula  or  Note  of  Iden- 
tity, <vhich  was  deny'd,  or  deny  that,  which  was  before  af- 
firm'd. 

§  14.  An  Vn'verfiil  Viopodtion,  as  fuch,  is  overchrowrr 
by  contradicfliing  the  Oniverfality,  whether  exprcfly  by  flat 
Denial,  or  contrary  -Affirmation;  or  Impltcitfely  by  an  Ex- 
ception, whether  it  be  ont  undeterhiin'd  Particular,  or  i 
Determinate  Singular;  as  that,  all  Men  are  jtifl.,  is  comra- 
di6led  and  overthrown,  if  it  appear  tHat^  Not  all  Men  arejitjl, 
or  a/l  Men  a-c  ndt  jujiy  but  form  Alen^  or  fomefort  of  Men  fas 
E.  Gr.  the  Co'vetons)  or  thts  f/rrticular  Man  k  not  juft:  But  to 
fay  the  quite  Contrary,  no  Man  is  jtift;  is  more  then  a  Cen- 
tra diAion,  and  runs  into  the  contrary  Extreme,  fo  as  to  ha- 
zard a  falfhood  en  that  Side,  when  we  would  avoid  it  on  ih^ 
ether:    For, 

§  15.  Contrary  Propofuions  may  be  both  Falfe,  tho*  they 
cannot  both  be  True;  fincc  the  one  is  a  Contradiction  to  the 
other,  and  more  then  fo.  But  it  may  well  be  held  that  feme 
^an  is  juft  -J  if  the  Contradidtory  thereof,  vi:{.  thatw*?  Man 
is  jpft,  has  lefs  to  be  faid  for  it :  And  at  the  fame  time  it 
may  be  true,  that  fo:nc  :^t>i:;_.  lome  other,/  Man  is  not  juji. 

§  1 6.  Thofe  feemingly  contrary  Propofuions,  vi^,  fome 
Man  isjufJ- .-  a.nd  fome  Man  is  not  juft,  zre  calfd  Subcontrarioui  y 
and  do  not  really  contradidl  each  other,  as  not  being  fpoken 
of  the  felf-fame  Subjeci:;  nor  would  they,  if  meant  of  the 
fame  Man  at  differing  times,  or  in  refped:  of  divers  Actions : 
For  Comradidious  Enunciations  muit  always  Affirm  or  De- 
ny, 


Crtap.  17-        Improvcf^/e^ft  of  KQa(on.  205 

ny,  either  exprefly  or  in  EfFedl,  the  fame  Attribute  of  the 
fame  Subjedt  at  the  fame  time,  and  in  the  fame  Refpedl. 

§  17.  Apnrticukr  AjfirntAtive  is  contradi(fled  by  an  Uni- 
verfal  Negative,  and  a  particular  Negative  by  an  Univerfal 
Affirmative.  Some  Men  are  immortal,  or  fome  Alan  is  immor- 
tal, are  contradidied  by  faying,  No  Man  is  immortal^  or  ali 
Men  are  mortal^  or  every  Man  is  Jo.  And  by  the  Inftance  here 
given  it  appears,  that  if  the  Attribute  which  was  affirm *d, 
imply  a  Negation,  as  [immortal]  imports  [not  Mortal],  the 
particular  Affirmative  nmay  be  contradidled  by  the  Univerfal 
Affirmation  of  the  Contradictory  Attribute  :  Thus,  that 
fill  Men  are  Learned,  and  fome  Men  Vnlearncd^  are  plainly  Con- 
tradidiious,  tho'  they  be  both  Affirmative ;  becaufe  the  one 
affirms,  that  which  is  contrary  to  what  the  other  affirms. 

§  1 8.  A  Propofition  which  is  Indefinite,  is  to  be  contra- 
dided  according  to  the  Senfe  it  bears,  either  as  an  Univerfal, 
or  as  a  Particular,  or  as  an  Indefinite  in  Senfe;  and  thislaft 
is  contradidled  by  only  adding  a  Negative  Particle,  or  re- 
moving it ;  thus  ^an  is  a  Species^  and  Man  is  not  a  Specie fy 
are  Contradidlious  to  each  other  :  And  fo  are  thefe  which 
follow,  The  Nature  of  Man  is  fufficiently  differing  from  that 
of  Brutes,  tho*  we  (hould  allow  them  to  have  fome  kind  of 
Reafon  ;  on  the  contrary,  The  Nature  of  Man  is  not  fuffici- 
ently diftinguilh'd  from  that  of  Brutes,  if  we  (hould  allow 
them  to  have  fome  kind  of  Reafon. 

§  19.  A  Total  or  fingular  Propofition  is  contradicted  by 
only  changing  the  Affirmation  into  a  Denial,  or  this  into 
that :  Where  a  Predicate  is  a  Negative  Term,  it  may  be 
done  by  calling  away  the  Negation  ;  as  This  Man  is  a  non- An- 
gelical Creature,  is  contradided  by  faying,  This  Man  is  nn 
Angelical  Creature. 

Now  whereas  it  is  Evident,  that  the  two  parts  of  a  Gon- 
tradiAion  cannot  both  be  true  or  falfe  at  once ;  we  muft  take 
that  Part  for  true,  which  upon  due  Examination  appears  to 
be  Uker  Truth. 


CHAP, 


2o6  An  tjf ay  for  the  Part  11. 


CHAP.     XVIII. 


§  I.  \1/E  proceed  to  fome  farther  Sorts,  or  other  diftin- 
**^  guilhing  Charadlers  of  Propofitions ;  but  ftiJl 
with  this  View,  that  We  may  better  difcern,  when  that, 
which  is  therein  pronounced,  is  right  and  true,  and  that  we 
our  felves  may  pronounce  accordingly. 

A  Modnl  Propofition  is,  when  the  manner  of  Agreemenr  or 
Difagreement  between  the  Subjeft  and  Predicate  is  fpecify'd 
to  be  fuch  or  fuch,  vit^.  PoJJil>/p,  Imprfjiblc^  Necejjary^  or  Con- 
tingent^  which  are  the  only  Modes  commonly  obferved  by  Lo- 
gicians :    Bur, 

•'  §  1.  There  might  be  other  Modes  added  to  thofe  already 
mention'd,  (uchzi  Ifnprdh^.ble^  Probable,  <^ertain  •  Once,  fome' 
time,  feldom,  often,  nlw.'.ys^  never,  yet  may  not  be  Neceflari- 
iy  fo,  as  the  Swan  is  never  Back,  but  always  White,  and 
yet  m'ght  be  ftill  a  Swan,  tho'  it  rurn'd  Black. 

It  plainly  expreffes  a  Mode  of  the  Predicate's  agreeing  or 
difagreeing  to  the  SubjeA,  at  lealt  as  to  our  Apprehenfion 
about  it,  if  we  fay,   'Tis  improbable  the  Sun  mo\es  fo  \aft  a 
Compafs,  and  fo  exceeding  Swift,    as  he  NcceJjArih  nwji,  if 
it  be  his  Motion  round  the  Earth,    which  makes  Day  and 
Night  J  but  on  the  other  hand,  'ris  probable,  the  Earth  rather 
do's  it,  as  (he  pojfibly  may,  by  moving  a  far  lefs  Compafs  and 
more  llowly  ;    It  is  nor  certai?/,   that  the  Term  ivcognita,   or 
unknown  part  of  the  Earth,   is  uninhabited  ;    lince  'tis  no 
ways  hnpojpbic,  but  mighc  happen  it  lliouid  be  now  iiihabited, 
as  well  as  America  was  before  we  found  it  out. 
■  §  3.     The  other  mentioned  ways  of  Affirming  or  Deny- 
ing, do  likewife  import  a  manner  of  Agreement  or  Difagree- 
ment betwixt  the  Subjedl  and  Predicate ;    as  if  it  be  faid,   It 
once  was  known,  that  a  Man  and  Woman  were  not  Born, 
but  immediately  Created  ;    he  out  of  the  Earth,  and  (he  out 
cf  him.  It  isfometimes  obferv'd,  that  the  Sun  Shines  out,  when 
yet  it  Rains;   but,  fcldow,  that  it  then  Rains  very  long  to- 
gether ;   Tis  often  feen,   that  a  fair  Day  follows  a  cloudy 
Morning  j  alvp.iys,  that  there  are  Clouds  when  it  Rains  or 
Snows,    or  Hails;    hninever  any  ofthefe,  when  the  Sky  is 
fully  Clear,    And  there  might  be,  no  doubt,  divers  other 
Modes  added  co  thofe  we  have  inft^ncedc 


%  .\.  Si'di 


Chap.  1 8.         improvemerit  of  ReaTon.  207 

§  4.  Such  kind  of  Propofitions  tonfift  of  lomething  faidy 
which  Logicians  calJ  the  DiBum^  and  the  Manner  of  faying 
it,  which  they  call  the  Modus,  and  this  is  to  be  confider'd  as 
the  Predicate,  or  what  is  farther  faid  of  the  thing  faid :  To 
rr.ake  the  Modal  Propolition  true,  it  is  not  always  requir'd, 
thar  the  Thing  (aid  ho.  really  fo,  fimply  in  itfelf;  but  often 
fuffices,  if  it  do  but  hold  as  to  the  manner  in  which  it  is  faid  ; 
as  in  the  Inftance  before,  it  is  not  intended,  that  the  Te;  m  /«- 
ccgnitn  is,  or  is  not,  uninhabited ;  but  only  that  its  being  un- 
inhabited, is  not  certain.  This  holds,  unlefs  the  Mode  be 
fuch  as  do's  it  feJf  imply  Affirmation  or  Negation;  As  if  I 
fay  Man  is  Kecejfnrily  Rational ;  or  thar,  it  is  of  Keccjfity^ 
Man  be  Rational :  And  here  the  thing  /aid  [Man's  being 
Rational]  muft  be  in  it  felf  true  as  well  as  the  maimer  of  ir, 
that  is  NeceJJarj/.  But  if  it  be  faid,  Man  is  Contingently  Lear- 
ned ;  or  it  is  Contingent^  that  Man  be  Learned  ;  'tis  by  no 
Means  intended,  that  he  is  always  Learned,  but  only  that 
when  ever  he  is,  he  is  but  contingently  fo ;  for  he  might  have 
been,  and  yet  may  be,  otherwife. 

§  5.  The  fl^ode  being  confider'd  as  the  Predicate  in  Mo- 
dal Propofitions,  they  are  contradided  by  denying  the  Mode 
when  it  was  affirm'd,  and  affirming  it  when  it  was  deny'd  : 
jE.  Gr.  if  it  were  faid,  it  is  not  Necejfnry  ths  Sun  (hculd  rife  to 
morrow^  'tis  contradided  by  faying,  it  is  'NcceJJ'nry  tl-^f  the 
Sun  rife  tomorrow  ;  and  it  would  be  more  than  a  Contradi(5i- 
on  to  fay,  It  is  Ncccffmy,  that  tho  Sun  rife  not  to  mjr,-jw.  Here 
follows  a  Scheme  of  Modal  Propofitions,  with  the  Synony- 
mous, Subalternatc,  Contradidious,  and  Contrary  Enunci- 
ations, according  to  the  Modes,  that  are  commonly  taken 
notice  of  in  Logic. 

^  rNeceflary  to  be  ^  r  Neceflary  not  to  be 

g  )  Wbat  can't  happen  not  to  be  (    Contrary    ^AVfaat  can't  happen  to  be 
.<  jNotpoflTible  not  to  be  C  O  f\    ^°^  poflible  to  be 

I  (inipoflible  notiobe  }   O.        q^  (impoffible  to  be 

Subaltemate  '*n?"  Subalternatc, 

or  ^C^  °^ 

Included.  aJ^'  ^  Included. 

g  ^NotNeceffary  not  to  be         ^       s^^.        ^Not  Necefliry  to  be 

5  ^  What  doi  or  miy  happen  to  be(  Contrarious,  J>  What  doi  or  may  happen  not  ( 


I  SPoflible  not  to  be  f  „      9'-         S  Poffib'e  not  to  be        [to  ^;el 

=  (Not  ImpolTiIjIe  not  to  be       )  c^lVMr'y.      C^Jt  ImpoiVibla  not  to  be 


,•-<« 


An  hffay  for  the  Part  IL 


§  7.  A  Subahernate  Propofuion  exprelFech  fome  part  of 
thatj which  isdefignedinthe  moreComprehenfivePropofition, 
to  which  it  is  Subalternate  ;  as  Necejfnry  to  he,  is  at  leaft  mi 
'^eceffAry  not  to  be^  or  Pojfible  to  be :  What  is  Subcontrnrious 
is  fo  far  from  being  contrary,  that  it  is  not  fo  much  as  con- 
tradictory, yet  carrys  fomewhat  like  contrariety  in  the  Ex- 
preffion,  whilft  the  Scnfe  do's  well  agree.  "Where  there  is  no 
Mode  apply'd  to  the  Diclum,  i.  e.  to  what  is  faid,  the  Pro--; 
poiition  is  commonly  cail'4  Pure  j  it  might  be  called  Pofitivc, 
or  ratlier  Unmodify'd. 

§  8.  InCopulative  Propofitions,  there  are  two,  or  more  of 
one  Term  to  one  or  more  of  the  other,  and  thofe  join'd  toge- 
ther by  a  Conjundlion  Copulative,  or  Disjundlive:  And  to 
Pronounce  rightly  in  fuch  Propofitions  there  muft  be  an 
Agreement  or  Difagreement  of  ail  that  is  Predicated  to  every 
Subjeft  feverally  f  unlefs  it  were  only  meant  of  them  col- 
leftively  taken,  i.  e.  not  of  each  fingly,  but  of  all  together): 
It  were  not  ftridly  true,  that  Pnui  and  SiUi  were  in  Prifon, 
and  Sung  Pfalms  at  Midnight,  unlefs  both  could  be  faid  of 
each :  Or  that  neither  Death  nor  Life,  nor  Angels,  nor 
Principalities,  nor  Powers,  nor  Things  prefent,  nor  Things 
to  come,  nor  Height,  nor  F^'cpth,  nor  anv  other  Creature 
"Ihall  be  able  ro  feparate  us  from  the  Love  of  God,  which  is 
in  Chrift  Jefus  our  Lord,  unlefs  it  could  be  feverally  denied 
of  each  .•     And  therefore, 

§  p.  Barely  to  contradift  fuch  fort  of  Propofitions,  the 
Copulative  only  is  to  be  contradicted,  as  if  it  could  be 
truly  faidy  Paul  and  Siha  were  not  both  in  Prifon,  and  nljo  both 
Sung  Pfalms  at  Midnight :  Or,  that  fome  one,  or  more, 
of  the  mentioned  Particulais  might  be  able  to  feparate  real 
Chviftians  from  the  Love  of  God  in  Chrift  ;  but  to  fay,  that 
/!w,vone  of  them  whatfoever,  i.e.  either  Death,  or  Life,  or 
^ngels,  ^c.  may  be  able  to  do  it,  would  be  direAly  contra- 
ry, and  more  than  a  bare  Contradiction. 

§  I  o.  The  Propofitions  which  are  call'd  DlsjunHive  are, 
when  we  either  predicate  a  Disjunctive  Attribute,  or  of  a 
Disjunctive  SubjeCt,  or  both  at  once :  And  here  we  aflfirm 
or  deny  only  fome  one  Branch  of  fome  one,  pot  determi- 
ning which,  as  in  faying,  Either  Ci:^ll{_  or  SilvC'','  is  either 
Stove  or  Metnl  in  the  Oar :  Where  'tis  only  intended  that  one 
or. other  of  the  former  is  one  or  other  of  the  latter.-  And  it 
is  contradided  by  faying.  Neither  of  them  is  either.  Such 
Propofitions  are  right,  when  the  Parts  afiign'd  do  tryly  be- 
long to  the  Matter  in  Hand  in  one  or  other  of  its  Sorts  or 
Branches,,  aifo  that  they  do  not  fall  in  with  each  other,,   .md 

tha: 


Chap.  1 8.  Improvemettt  of  Kealon.  309 

that  there  is  no  other  Branch  afiignable  in  the  prefent  Cafe  ; 
E.  Gr.  the  Air  is  either  moiftor  dry.  In  Fight,  Men  muft 
either  Conquer,  or  fall,  or  be  taken,  op  Flee.  Either  the 
Sun  moves  round  the  Earth,  or  the  Earth  round  the  Sun. 

§  II.  Proportions  of  this  Kind  may  be  accounted  tri- 
fling and  fooHlh,  if  it  can  be  Ihewn  either,  that  the  Diftribu- 
tion  is  not  wholly  to  the  Point  (as  if  it  were  faid,  that  a 
Number  is  thick  or  thin,  odd  or  even)  or  elfe,  that  two 
or  more  of  the  Bp^nches  fall  in  together  (as  in  faying,  Man 
is  either  a  Subftance,  or  Spirit,  or  Body,  or  Accident).  They 
are  contradidled  by  denying  the  Disjundinn,  as  in  faying, 
'tis  not  either  fo  or  fo  ;  and  the  Contradi£lion  is  confirm  a 
by  alferting  fomewhat  elfe,  as  what  is,  or  may  be  in  the 
Cafe  :  Thus  it  may  be  faid.  Water  is  not  either  Hot  or 
Cold ;  fince  it  may  be  Lukewarm. 

§  1 2.  Conditional  Propcfjtiofis  are  right,  when  the  Confe- 
quence  holds,  whether  the  Antecedent,  or  Point  fuppos'd, 
and  confequent,  or  what  is  inferr'd,  taken  abfolutely  and 
apart,  be  true  or  not.  E.  gr.  If  in  this  life  only,  rvc  have 
hofe  inChriJ}^  we  are  of  all  31en  moj}  miferalple  :  Tho'  Chri- 
ftians  have  not  in  this  Life  only  hope  in  Chrift,  nor  are  of 
all  Men  moft  Mifer^ble  ^  yet  it  might  hold,  that  they  would 
be  fo,  if  their  Cafe  were  fuch.  They  are  contradiAed  by  de- 
nying the  Confequence;  as  in  faying,  Tho' in  this  Life  only 
wc  had  hope  in  Chrift,  yet  were  we  not  of  all  Men  moft  Mi- 
ferable. 

§  13.  Caufal  Propofitions  are  rightly  and  truly  Contra- 
dided  by  denying  the  Caufe,  when  it  is  not  rightly  affign'd, 
tho*  the  Point,  to  which  it  is  brought,  fhould  be  true.  If 
it  vvere  faid,  ^dam  fell  becaufe  God  foreknew  he  would  fall, 
it  might  be  well  contradided  by  faying,  ^dam  did  not  fall, 
becaufe  God  forefaw  he  would:  other  I\c!ative  Prspoftions  are 
contradided  truly,  by  denying  the  untrue  Relation :  As 
if  it  were  faid,  Silver  has  Drofs  i.n  it  altogether  as  Lead  has ; 
it  may  be  truly  gainfaid,  by  faying  Silver  has  not  Drofs 
in  it  altogether  as  Lead  hasj  fince  it  has  it  not  in  fuch  Pro- 
portion. 

^  14.  Difcretive  Prcpcfiticns  aftirm,  an4  deny  Contrary 
or  Difparate,  and  differing  Points ;  and  fometimes  do  ci- 
ther^ffirm  or  elfe  deny  them,  on  both  hands,  with  an  adver- 
fative  Conjundion,  fuch  as  not  only^  but  alfo  :  And  they 
are  right  vyhen  the  ffvcral  Propofitions  are  fo,  into  which 
they  are  rcfolvable ;  they  are  contradided  by  denyijig  either 
of  thcni,  Tho'  God  be  infinitely  Merciful,  he  is  alfo  juft  : 
Tho'  God  be  infinitely  Merciful,  impenitent  Sinners  fliall 
not  efcape  his  Righteous  Judgaient.  §  1 5.  As 


2,10  An  hffiiv  for  the  '  Part  11. 

§  15.    As  to  that  common  Inftance  from  the  Poec, 
Kcn.FornwJiii  erat^  fed  erat  Fucundm  ZJhJJes. 
(Not  Fair,  Vlyjjes  was,  but  Eloquent.) 
Apply'd  to  our  Famous  B?«.  Johnfon,  in  a  kind  of  Englijh 
Hexameter,  thus, 

Not  Fair-faced  he  voa<y  hut  he  tv,«  Fair-fpcken  UlylTes, 
Here  one  Point  is  deny'd,  the  other  affirm'd  ;  and  there  are 
divers  ways  of  Oppofition  to  fuch  kind  of  Difcretives,  as  if  it 
were  faid  m  the  prefcnt  inltance,  he  was  not  only  not  fair, 
but  alfo  not  Eloquent  ;  or  that  he  was  not  only  Eloquent, 
but  alfo  fair  ;  or  that  he  was  fair,  bnt  not  Eloquent ;  now 
this  laft  is  diredly  contrary  in  both  Parts,  whereas  the  two 
foregoing  Propofitions  fall  in  with  one  Point,  and  contradicSt 
only  the  other. 

§  1 6.  Exclufive^  Exceptive,  znd  ^ejlriciive  Propofttions  ^ire 
right,  wlien  the  Point,  which  is  more  Exprefs,  and  that 
which  is  imply'd  are  both  true  ,  as  when  we  fay,  God  only 
is  Omnipotent:  All  Men,  bur  our  Saviour,  are  Sinful; 
An  Ethiopian  is  White  in  refped  of  his  Teeth ;  /.  e.  He  is 
in  fome  Refpe£l:  White,  and  it  is  in  that  Refpedl :  fuch  Pro- 
pofitions are  contradicted  by  denying  them  4S  they  are  Ex- 
ciufive.  Exceptive,  or  Reftridtiye,  as  in  faying,  The  Ethio- 
pian is  not  VVhite  in  refped  of  his  Teeth  ;  It  would  be  a 
contrary  Piopofition,    to  fay  or  judge,   he  is  not  Whit? 

at  all. 

6  17.  Proprjiticns  which  import  Beginnings  or  Ending^ 
are  right,  when  the  exprefs  Affirmative,  and  imply'd  Nega- 
tive are  both  of  them  true  j  the  ContradiHory  difallows  only 
the  latter ;  the  contrary,  both  of  them.  Our  Lord  Jefus  be- 
gan his  Publick  Preaching  after  his  Baptifm,and  ended  it  at 
his  Death ;  i.  e.  he  publickly  Preach'd  after  his  Baptifm, 
and  not  before ;  he  did  it  before  his  Death,  not  after. 


CHAP.    XIX. 

§  I.  THE  Foundation  of  Judging  and  Pronouncing 
*  rightly  is  laid  in  the  right  forming  of  our  fingle 
Apprehenfions  ;  for  what  we  judge  or  pronounce,-  is  always 
ibvT.cwhat  drawn  out  of  thefe,  which  we  would  have  to  be 
diftinaiy  obferv'd  for  fome  fpecial  Reafon  or  Purpofe,  to 
which  it  ir.ay  ferve ;  and  therefore  what  Rules  aivi  Helps  we 
'•jv-^eforr  friven  ^or  ihc  riqb.r  form-na  of  o'lr  fint^le  Apprc- 


Chap   19.  Improvement  of  Realon.  xix 

henfions  are  here  alfo  to  be  attended  to  and  improv'd  Buc 
we  (hall  yet  farther  fuggeft  fomewhat  about  the  Faults  to  he 
avoided,  and  Meafures  to  be  oblerv'd  in  our  Judging  and 
Pronouncing. 

§  2.  To  fay  juft  the  fame  thing  of  the  fame  (as  has  been 
noted)  is  indeed  plainly  enough  True,  bucUfwlefs  and  Tri- 
fling; unlefs  it  were  meant,  that  thething  .s  certainly  what  in 
it  feif  it  is,  whether  it  fo  appears  tons  or  not:  Vet  the 
Names  of  Things  ihould  be  afcertain'd  or  (as  they  call  it) 
defin'd,  and  this  is  rightly  done  by  any  Method,  which  may 
ferve  to  afllire  others,  what  are  the  things  intended  ;  as  by 
Synonymous  Words  of  the  fame  or  fome  other  Language, 
better  known  ;  or  by  the  Etimology  of  the  Words ;  cr  by 
pointing  to  what  is  thereby  delign'd  ;  or  any  way  defcribing 
it,  fo  as  it  may  be  known,  what  is  the  thing  meant,  thu'  the 
Nature  of  it  be  not  explain'd, 

§  3.  Of  what  is  in  it  felf  Contradictious  or  Inconnftenr, 
nothing  can  be  rightly  Judg'd,  or  Pionounc'd,  but  that  it  is 
/(?,  together  with  what  is  confequent  ther..upon  \  as  that  it 
cannot  poifibly  cxift,  or  fo  much  as  be  conceiv'd,  Cic.  c.  g. 
Erroneous  Wifdom  is  not  rightly  judg'd  Hurtful,  or  Dange- 
rous;  but  that  rather  (properly  SpeakingJ  there  neiihcr  is 
nor  can  be  any  fuch  thing. 

§  4.  What  is  in  it  feif  ContradiAious  or  inconliftej;r  can- 
not in  a  proper  Senfe  be  faid  of  any  thing  •  as  that  any  Perfoa 
is  an  unskilful  Artill. 

§  5.  Terms  Contradidiious  to,  and  Inconliltent  with 
each  other,  cannot  be  affirm'd,  but  muft  be  deny'd  each  of 
the  other,  if  taken  in  a  Literal  and  Proper  Senfe  ;  as  that 
Light  is  Darknefs,  or  Darknefs  Light ;  yet  feeming  Con- 
tradidlions  and  Inconfiftencies  may  hold  in  a  Figurative 
Senfe,  or  in  differing  Kefpedh;  as  in  that  of  our  Saviour,  If 
the  Light  that  is  in  thee  be  Dnrk>7efs,  how  great  is  that  Darj^- 
nefs  ?  For  the  Faculties  and  Principles  which  as  Light  Ihould 
ferve  to  guide  us,  and  do  fo  in  fome  Cafes,  may  yet  be  really 
thro'  our  Neglect  and  Abufe,  as  Darknefs,  hiding  things 
from  us  and  impoling  upon  us  in  other  Refpecls. 

§  6.  Confiderarions  that  are  formally  divers  and  differ- 
ing, cannot  as  fuch  be  one  truly  affirmed  of  another ;  Youth 
is  no:  Manhood :  Height,  as  fuch,  isnotDe.pthj  Length,  as 
fuch,  is  not  Breadth  ;  Nor  is  any  thing  properly  long  as  it  is 
broad,  ^c.  Subftance  is  not  Accident,  nor  Adion,  IPalTion, 
Cc.  Peter  ^  a  Youth,  is  not  Peter  a  Man;  nor  is  Peter  deny- 
ing our  Saviour,  Peter  Repenting,  tho"  he  was  flill  the  fame 
Perfon-  Buc  it  may  wel|  be  faid,  ihac  the  thing  which 
^^"  '        ~  '  has 


212  An  tjfay  for  the  Part  11. 

has  one  Form  has  alfo  feme  other,  and  is  the  fame  thing, 
which  alfo  has  the  other,  the'  not  as  having  it ;  for  that  under 
one  Confideration  it  cannot  be  properly  faid  to  be  the  lame, 
as  under  another;  Yet  things  which  have  differing  Formali- 
ties may  be  faid,  one  of  them  to  belong  or  to  be  appertaining 
to  another;  accident  belongs  to  Subftance;  It  being  the 
ianie  thing,  which  is  belonging  to  Subftance,  with  that 
which  is  called  Accident  or  confider'd  under  any  other  of  its 
Charaders.  No  one  thing  is  properly  another  thing,  how 
iike  foever,  yet  that  which  has  one  Attribute,  may  be  the 
fame  with  that  which  alfo  has  another,  tho'  the  Attributes 
(hould  be  very  differing,  provided  it  be  no  inconliftency,  tiiat 
they  fhould  fo  belong  to  the  fame  Subjed;  as  that  the  Dark 
New-Moon  ftiould  be  then  brighteft,  w^.  on  that  fide  whic^ 
is  towards  the  Sun,  and  nearer  to  him  than  when  Ihe  is 
Full. 

§  7.  The  Concrete  is  juftly  affirmed  of  that,  to  which  the 
Abftrafl  belongs,  fo  as  rightly  to  denominate  the  Subject, 
which  has  it,  (y'ide  Chap.  1 5*  §  7,)  and  of  that  only  ;  for  we 
cannot  call  the  Black-more  fimply  White,  becaufe  there  is 
fomewhat  of  whitenefs  belonging  to  him  :  But  Subftance  is 
rightly  faid  to  be  either  divifible,  or  thinking,  as  it  has  either 
divifibility,  or  the  Power  of  Thinking  intimately~appertai- 
ning  to  its  Effence  or  Nature  ;  and  here  the  known  uiage  of 
Words  falls  in  with  the  Reafon  of  Things ;  butitmuft  guide 
and  govern  verbal  Attributions,  tho'  it  (hould  follow  no  cer- 
tain Rule  infome  other  Cafes,  ^'ide  Chap.  17.  §  5. 

§  8.  That  is  rightly[faid  to  be  Effential,  not  Acci- 
dental ,  which  goes  to  the  Conftituting  of  a  thing  at 
fuch,  either,  as  being  common  to  it,  with  other  things  of 
the  fame  Kind  or  Sarc,  or  peculiar  and  diftinguifhing.  Attri- 
butes are  commonly  faid  to  be  Neceffary,  k*w  ■mmt.  yjt^'  ao-ri, 
and  Ks^^'  oKn  «-f»7M,  as  belonging  to  nil  of  the  Sort,  to  them  at 
fuch,  and  that  Entireij  end  Primarily  :  The  more  common 
Attributes  have  only  the  two  former  Degrees  fas  they  call 
them )  of  Neceffity  :  And  the  Accidental  Attributions, 
which  yet  are  Naturally  and  commonly  ITniverfal,  have  on- 
ly the  firft  Degree,  as  that  Crows  are  Black.  But  now  more 
properly, 

§  9.  That  is  rightly  faid  to  be  Neceffary,  which  cannot 
be  otherwifc,  either  in  refpe6l  of  the  Being,  or  well  being 
of  fome  Perfon  or  Thing ;  and  ahfolutely  Neceffary,  when  'tis 
from  the  Nature  of  the  Perfon  or  Thing  it  felf,  as  that  God  k, 
and  K  every  way  PerfeB^  that  Men  dejire  their  own  Happinefs  ; 
MypotheticaUyy  and  Cotifequentialhy  when  'tis  only  upon  fome 

Suppo- 


Chap.  19-        improvement  of  ^Qdiion,  215 

Suppofition,  as  that  whiift  a  Creature  is,  it  cannot  but  be, 
and  wbilft  it  has  fuch  a  fort  of  Being,  cannot  but  be  fuch. 

§  I  o.  Logical  or  Metnphyfical  Neceflity  is,  when  the  con- 
trary implies  a  Contradiftion,  as  to  fay  there  is,  or  may  be 
no  God,  were  in  eff'ed:  to  fay,  that  tho'  there  are  Beings 
plainly  depending ;  Yet  there  is  no  fit  or  proper  Being  on 
which  they  depend :  PhyJJcal  Neceflity  is,  when  things  are 
fo  according  to  the  fettled  Order  of  Nature;  and  yet  by  Mi- 
racle it  might  be  otherwife,  as  the  Fire  in  the  Babylonian  Fur- 
nace was  reftrain'd  from  burning  the  three  Men  caft  into  it. 
Mcrai  NecelTuy  is,  when  the  Underftanding,  and  Natural 
Make  of  an  intelligent  Creature  does  unalterably  lead  to  this 
or  that  Point,  as  to  Self-Prefervation,  and  the  Defire  of  Hap- 
pinefs, 

§11.  What  is  Accidentally,  Abfolutely,  in  fome  Refped^, 
Certainly,  Probably,  Doubtfully  Agreeing  or  Difagreeing, 
is  rightly  affirm'd  or  deny'd,  if  it  be  but  conceiv'd  and  ex- 
prefs'd  accordingly .-  As  that  the  Sun  is  Accidentally  (or  as 
it  now  happens)  over-clouded  ;  Abfolutely  ("and  in  ic  felf ) 
a  Luminary  j  in  fome  refpedt  rifen  or  fet  (namely  to  this  or 
that  Place);  Certainly  a  fiery  Body;  probably  Globular j 
and  but  doubtfully  of  fuch  a  precife  Diameter. 

§  I  z.  There  are  fome  peculiar  forts  of  Propofitions,  fuch 
as  Diftindions,  Divifions,  Definitions,  O'er,  which  require 
and  deferve  a  more  fpecia!  Confideration.  A  Name  or  Cha- 
radler  is  rightly  diftinguifo'd,  when  its  differing  Senfes  are 
truly  and  fully  affign'd,  fo  far  however,  as  may  ferve  the  pre- 
fent  Occafion  to  prevent  Miftake,  and  better  dear  up  the 
Senle  we  fix  upon,  whether  what  is  under  Confideration 
be  properly  or  figuratively,  ftridly  or  largely  taken,  accor- 
ding to  vulgar  and  common  Ufage,  or  as  it  is  peculiarly  un- 
derftood  in  fome  particular  Art  or  Science. 

§  15.  A  thing  is  rightly  divided,  when  the  Parts  or  Sorts 
are  proper  and  truly  belonging  to  it,  different  each  from 
other,  all  of  them  together  making  up  the  whole,  and  alfo 
the  manner  of  the  Divifion  fuch  as  may  help  the  Under- 
ftanding,  not  perplex  it,  or  opprefs  the  Memory  with  too 
many  Collateral  Branches,  or  too  numerous  Subdivifions  j 
if  this  Inconvenience  can  be  avoided  in  dividing  and  fubdi- 
viding  (till  into  two  Parts  only,  it  is  commonly  to  be  pre- 
fer'd.  as  rendring  them  clearer  by  fo  diredl  an  Oppofition  of 
one  Branch  to  the  other  :.  But  xve  fliall  conlider  this  Matter 
farther  under  the  Head  of  Conduft,  where  amongft  other 
things  we  ihall  dired  fomewhat  about  the  ordering  of  our 
more  folemo  Difcourfes; 

§14.  A 


2  14  An  Ejfay  for  the  Part  II. 

§  1 4.  A  thing  is  Caccording  to  our  Model  J  rightly  ds- 
fin'd,  when  ins  nature  (whatever  that  be)  is  fummarily  and 
Diftinclivcly  explain'd  by  the  moft  Comprehcnfive  and  Pri- 
mary Attributes.  The  thing  defin'd  mnft  hccxplnind^  either 
by  what  is  before  better  known,  or  afterwards  opened',  for 
tho'  the  firft  were  to  be  chofen,  yet  this  latter  way  muft  of 
NecefTity  be  admitted  in  many  Cafes,  where  we  are  not 
drawing  down  the  Account  of  Things  from  the  firft  and  fim- 
pleft  Principles,  which  are  felf  evident,  but  are  forc'd  to  go 
backward  towards  them,  as  fir  as  the  Qccafion  may  re- 
quire. 

^  I").  The  Explication  muft  ht  Snnimary.,  drawing  in 
the  whole  thing.  Comprizing  it  as  briefly  as  may  well  cbnfifl 
with  its  being  fomewhat  of  an  Explication  in  it  felf,  and  fer- 
ying  as  a  Foundation  for  the  farther  ppcning  of  the  Matter 
by  fuch  pares  of  its  Charadler  as  may  fitly  lead  to,  and  thro' 
the  whole.  A  Definition  muft  alfo  be  dijiitidivc,  fo  as  it 
rtiail  agree  only  to  what  is  defined.       ' 

§  i<?.  The  Attributes  are  to  be,  as  hear  as  we  can,  the 
riioft  CL'Tnpreherfive  •  as  m  faying  Man  is  an  A7iimal,  which 
comprehends  his  being  Somewhat,  Real,  Subftantial,  Com- 
pounded, Organized,  Scnfible,  and  the  Subiecfl  of  other  nu-. 
rherous  Accidents,  Modes,  ©":.  thus  we  Comprize  the  feve- 
ral  Characters  of  the  Superiour  Kinds  under  the  Name  of 
that  which  lies  nearcfttothe  thing  defind;  and  whereas  this  is 
only  the  comprizal  of  what  the  thing  has  in  Common  with 
all  of  its  Kind;  We  muft  in  defining  add  the  Primayy  Di- 
fiinctiv;  Attribute,  vt:^.  that  (as  near  as  we  can)  which  lies' 
at  the  bottom  of  other  diftinguifhing  Marks,  which  (£.  gr^} 
in  the  definition  of  Man  may  be  [reafonable^  provided  it  be 
ilnderftood  of  what  renders  him  capable  of  Religion. 

§  17.  Now,  wherever /z/r/j  Attributes  are  known,  or 
ran  be  fiiipd  by  us,  the  thing  may  be  properly  enough  de- 
fin'd ;  tho'  it  be  an  Aigregate  as  an  Army,  or  li.comflcte  as 
an  Embrio.  or  an  bidividtml,  as  Ad.zy?],  &c.  provided  they 
be  fummarilv  and  difiindivelv  explain'd,  Co  as  to  exclude 
every  thing  cKe,  and  to  include  the  whole  thing,  or  all  of 
the  Sort  or  Kind  defin'd,  whilft  the  other  Elfential  Attri- 
butes are  cither  contain'd  in  thofe  aifign'd,  or  deduced  front 
them,  or  feme  way  rcdnoible  to  them. 

•  §  18.  But  befidcs  the  more  iV-jn'o^yrf/ and  logical  way  of 
d:^fning  Things  by  their  ncr.r'il  Genus  or  KJud,  and  the  Spe- 
Ci 'ck  Difference,  or  ±2  iiftincVveChar^cier  of  the  Scrt,  there 
is  alfo  a  more  Snnr-x'-,  or  Phyfical  way  by  afiigning  the  moft 
reinarkabic  Parts,  of  which  things  are  !a;iac  up,  and  into 

*  .  wh;ch 


Chap.  19-        lm^roveme?it  oj  Realon.  215 

which  they  may  be  refolved  by  real  Separation,  fo  as  that 
fomewhat  of  them,  at  leaft,  may  exift  alone  without  the  reft. 
Thus  it  may  be  faid,  that  Man  confiUs  of  a  Keafonable  Soul 
vitally  join'd  with  an  orpanical  Body  ;  that  a  Plant  confifts  of' 
a  Root,  together  with  a  Stalk,  and  what  fpringsfrom  it. 

§  ip.  What  we  cannot  nicely  define,  we  may  ye«  right- 
ly defcribe  by  Ibme  lefs  conliderable  Attribute,  or  a  Set  of  Ac- 
cidents which  in  fuch  a  Conjunction  belong  only  to  the  thing 
defcrib'd,  and  to  all  of  that  Kind  and  Sore,  as  that  Man  has  a 
Body  Naturally  Ered:  :  Oratorical  and  Poetical  Accounts 
of  Things,  are  uhially  made  up  of  a  Number  ot  Accidents, 
which  are  not  elfewhere  found  together, 

§  20.  What  is  rightly  faid  in  Divifion,  Definition,  De- 
fcription  or  otherwife,  may  be  alfo  rightly  inverted,  if  weob- 
fefve  but  how  the  Predicate  was  defign'd,  whether  Univer- 
fally,  Particularly,  Indefinitely,  or  Totally,- and  take  care  to 
give  it  the  fame  Quantity,  when  we  make  it  the  Subject  of 
that  Propofition,  into  which  we  convert  the  Former  :  E.  g. 
Men  are  either  I  earn'd,  or  Unleam'd  ;  and  fome  Beings 
which  are  Learn'd  or  Unlearn'd,  are  Men:  No  Man  is  a 
Stone  ;  and  no  Stone  is  a  Man  :  Some  Men  are  Wife,  (/.  ez 
infome  confiderable  Refpedis) ;  and  fome  Beings,  that  are 
Wife  (in  foriie  confiderable  Refpedts)  are  Men.  The  Ground 
whence  it  is  that  Propofitions  hold  true,  ivhen  they  are  thus 
Converted,  is  that  the  Identity  of  things  muft  needs  be  Re- 
ciprocal, fo  that  if  thif  be  Identified  with  that^  that  may  b6 
back  again  Identified  with  the  other. 

§  21.  Generally  fpeaking,  that  only  is  to  be  accounted 
right,  which  may  be  realbnably  taken  for  true,  fo  far  at 
Jeaft  as  is  Judged  or  Pronounced:  Yet  where  Truth  as  to 
the  Matter  it  lelf  is  not  pretended  to,  that  may  be  faid  to  be 
rightly  pronounced,  v.'hich  is  Inftrudlive,  and  to  the  Purpofe 
mrended  j  as  in  reporting  truly  what  others  falfly  fay  or 
fuppofc :  And  in  the  due  itating  of  Errors ;  as  alfo  in  Para- 
bles, Fables,  0'r,  which  are  confiltent  with  thcmfelves  and 
leading  to  1  ruth,  as  their  Scope  and  End,  provided  they  be 
fo  delivered,  as  not  to  mifgidde  us  into  an  Appreheniion, 
that  the  FaCts  chemlelycs  were  delign'd  for  Hiftorical  Truch[ 
hot  to  leave  us  unavoidably  deceiv'd. 

§  12.  That  is  rightly  pronounc'd,  as  to  the  Nature  of  the 
thiiig  fpoken  and  manner  of  fpeaking,  which  is  in  both  Re- 
ipects- agrceaWe  to  the  Occalion  and  Circua.ftances ,  and 
fuiced  to  the  Capacity  and  Condition  of  thcie  to  whom  we 
arpiy  our  feives ;  as  if  v.'e  fay  in  corrnion  Difcourfe,  that 
the  Sun  Moves,  Rifes,  or  Strsj   that  the  Earih  is  like  a  Ba.  J 

cr 


21^ An  tffay  for  the  \  Part  H. 

or  Bowl  J  or  in  Philofophy,  to  Learners,  and  to  the  Learned^ 
that  it  is  probably  the  Earth,  which  Moves  to  make  Day  and 
Night,  not  the  Sun  j  thit  the  Earth  is  Globular,  or  a 
Sphaeroid. 

§  23.  Finally,  wherefoever  this  or  that  Attribute  is  truly 
affirmed  or  deny'd,  the  Matter  is  Jo  long  Neceflarily,  and 
therefore  alfo  certainly  fo  or  fo,  with  (what  they  call)  OhjsHive 
certainty,  or  that  of  the  thing,  as  really  it  is  in  it  felf ;  and 
there  is  alfo  a  Subjetlive  certainty  of  it  in  the  infinite  Miridj 
which  beholds  all  things  immediately  in  themfelves,  and  ex- 
adtly  as  they  are  by  intuitive  Knowledge;  when  yet  thofe 
things  may  appear  to  us  only  Poflible  and  Doubtful,  or  Pro- 
bable, or  Cerrain,  whether  in  themfelves  or  by  Means  of 
iomt  aflliring  Evidence  and  Proof. 

Therefore  what  our  Reafon  has  next  io  confider,  is  the 
Condition  of  things  in  refpeA  of  their  Certainty  as  to  us  ^ 
ind  firfl ,  of  what  is  to  us  I'ufficiently  Evident. 


CHAP.   XX. 

^  I.  THE  primary  Meafure  of  our  Apprehenfions  and 
■*  Judgments  is  the  Self-evidence  of  iome  Points,  bV 
>vhich  others  are  confirmed,  or  from  which  they  are  Coi- 
ledted  thro'  the  help  of  Connexions  and  Disjunxftions  chat  are 
intuitively  certain  to  us  without  our  Reafoning  about  them  ; 
For  we  neither  ulually  do  it^  nor  indeed  can  to  any  Purpofe, 
but  inftead  of  that  are  una\ oidably  obligd  to  take  them  foi: 
granted,  and  to  Reafon  from  them  aboiit  other  Matters, 
which  are  not  yet  fufficiently  Evident.     And  therefore, 

VI,  It  is  the  farther  Bufinefs  of  oUr  Reafon,  rightly  to  ap- 
prehen^^  and  r.dmit  vohat  ts  firffieiently  Evident,  either  in  it  felf, 
bv  by  its  connexion  with  what  is  Self-evident ;  fo  as  to  acqui- 
efce  and  reft  Satisfy 'd  in  it,  without  indulging  to  doubt,  or 
vainly  feeking  Proof^  where  there  is  indeed  neither  Occafi- 
on,  nor  Room  for  it. 

§  1.  Now  i:  is  here  imply'd,  that  we  rightly  underhand, 
what  is  to  be  taken  for  Self-evident :  And  by  this  we  rtiean, 
that  which  plainly  appears  to  be  undeniably  fo  or  fo,  without 
the  help  of  Argument  or  Proof;  fo  as  ihat  the  Terms,  thus 
iinderftood,  or  the  Ideas  we  have  or  tiiem,  are  rightly  cer- 
tainly and  evidently  Conjoin'd  or  Disjoin'd  in  their  being  af- 
firm'd  or  denv'd  of  each  other :  Thus  three  and  one  toge- 
ther 


Chap.20.  J wprouer^te^t  of  Ke^ion.  2  17 

ther  are  four ;    and  four  is  three  and  one  together  j   three  are 
not  four,  and  four  are  not  (only)  three. 

§  3.  'Tis  prefuppos'd  to  Self-evidence,  that  the  Terms, 
of  which  we  Speak  or  Judge,  are  determinately  underftood; 
(ince  'tis  the  Identity  or  Diverfity  of  Ideas,  to  which  that 
Evidence  refers.  Ihat  may  be  therefore  Self-evident  co 
one  Perion,  or  at  one  time,  which  is  not  fo  to  another  Per- 
fon,  or  to  the  fame  at  ajiorher  time,  by  Rcafon  the  Terms  ar>i 
not  fo  well  underftoDd,  or  the  Ideas  of  them  fo  Jult  and 
Clear,  as  is  requifite  to  make  their  Connexion  or  Separation 
evidently  Right,  without  farther  opening  and  ftating.  Thau 
a  Figure  of  three  Sides,  has  alfo  three  Angles,  and  no  more, 
is  Self-evident  to  fuch,  as  have  juft  and  clear  Ideas  of  a  Fi- 
girrCf  of  its  Sides^  as  alfo  of  an  yJrgle,  and  of  the  Number 
Three  J  and  to  fuch  Perfons  only.     Bur, 

§  4.  We  do  not  here  mean,  that  Perfons  muft  be  able 
accurately  to  define  all  the  Parts  and  Points  belonging  to  this 
or  that  Matter  before  they  can  apprehend  what  is  Self-evi- 
dent about  it  :  Tis  enough,  if  they  can  truly  defcribe 
them ;  or  if  they  do  but  know  them,  when  they  fee  theni, 
or  have  them  clearly  open'd  ;  but  till  they  are  at  lealf  thus 
far  advanc'd  in  Acquaintance  with  the  things  conjoined  or 
disjoin'd,  and  the  Intendment  of  their  Conjundlion  or  Dif- 
jundlion,  we  ought  not  to  wonder,  that  what  is,  to  us. 
Self-evident  fhould  bedeny'djdifputed,  or  doubted  by  others: 
Now, 

§5.  In  this  Cafe  Reafon  fuggefts,  that  we  fhould  try 
whether  the  feveral  Points  be  rightly  and  clearly  Underftood  ; 
that  we  may  explain  them  fo  far  as  the  Occafion  requires, 
inculcating  the  Explication,  if  need  be,  and  waiting,  as  we 
fometimes  muft  do,  with  Patience,  till  it  appear  to  be  rightly 
apprehended  by  thofe  we  would  inftrud.  And  this  is  cer- 
tainly the  Method  to  be  taken,  inftead  of  perplexing  our 
felves  to  prove  what  is,  to  us.  Self-evident;  whereby  we 
ihould  but  tempt  others  to  expevft  and  demand  Proof,  v,?he;c 
tis  neither  needful,  nor  poftible  ;  and,  it  may  be,  teaze  and 
weary  them  to  apprehend  and  admit,  as  Pre  of,  what  is  really 
nofuchth'ng. 

§  6.  As  to  Self  evidence,  wemuftkeepa  due  Guard  and 
Watch  againft  the  two  Extremes  of  fuppofmg  it,  where  it  is 
not,  and  over-looking  it,  where  it  is.     And, 


Ct  i,^i 


2  4^  nn  c.jjuy  jor  the  Part  l!» 

I.  We  muft  jiot  admit  every  thin^  that  looks  like  Self- 
evidence  to  be  real'y  fuch  :  as,  (i.)  Uiiexatnin'd  Percepti- 
ons I  y  our  Senfes ;  e.  ^.  wc  ought  not  to  take  it  for  Self-evi- 
dent, that  the  Sun  is  but  about  a  Foot  over ;  that  the  Earth 
is  a  Flat;  tl:at  what  we  perceive  is  always  formally,  as  well 
as  virtually,  in  the  Obje<fls  themfelves,  becaule  we  feem  to 
See,  or  Tafte,  or  Feel  it  there.  It  is  indeed  Self-evident  to 
me,  and  not  to  be  doubted,  that  this  or  tliat  appears  fo  to  me  j 
but  I  ought  notthence  baftily  to  conclude  it  Sclt-evident,  that 
it  IS  in  it  feif  really  lo,  as  it  appears ;  And  farther, 

§  7.  We  are  not  to  depend,  (2.)  Upon  our  unfufpeAed 
Imacinations,  as  if  what  wc  ftroiigly  conceit,  or  have  in- 
wardly felt,  were  realiy,  as  to  us  it  evidently  feem'd  ;  when- 
as  there  might  be  in  the  Cafe  nothing  of  what  did  To  appear, 
tho'  there  was  indeed  fomewhat  occaGoning  fuch  Appea- 
rance, /.  c.  lomc  Affctfl  and  M  tion  of  the  Humours,  and  of 
the  Spirits  iu  the  Biain  ;  and  it  niuft  be  allow'd,  that  fome 
fort  of  lllncfs  which  is  call'd  Phanfie,  is  in  it  fclf  a  real  Dif- 
ordcr,  and  tho"  it  be  not  wliat  it  is  tho't  to  be,  yet  as  it  has 
real  Caufes,  thtrc  may  be  juft  Occafion  to  ufe  Ibme  proper 
Mcthcd  of  Cure ;  andtho'  perhaps  it  fhould  not  ordinarily  be  a 
Courfc  of  Pliynck.  yet  it  may  require  the  Advice  of  a  Ph)fi- 
cian.    But  farther  yet, 

§  8.  We  are  not  to  depend,  (3.)  upon  our  unweigh'd 
Conceptions,  and  Prefumptions,  which  we  never  mifdoubt- 
ci,  only  bct  aufc  we  never  went  about  to  examine  them : 
Buttirft  catch"d  them  up,  and  ftill  carry  them  on  upon  Truft 
Trom  others,  cr  from  our  own  firft  Tho'rs  of  the  Matter; 
whcnas  every  thing,  which  can  admit  of  being  examined, 
and  wherein  we  arc  concerned,  fnould  once  at  leaft  be  look'd 
into,  and  well  confider'd  according  to  the  Meafure  of  our 
Capacity  for  it,  and  Concernment  with  it,  how  ftrongly  fo- 
ever  others  or  we  our  felves  areperfwadedof  it :  But  ietic 
here  be  carefully  noted,  that, 

<^  9.  It  is  by  no  means  intended,  we  fliould  formally 
doubt  of  the  moft  generally  confefled  Points,  mr.ch  lefs  of 
e  ■ery  thing  ;  bvt  rather  that  we  Ihould  believe  fuch  Mat- 
tersj  wherein  Wife  and  Good  Men  are  fo  generally  agreed, 
wiil.bear  Examination,  and  be  better  eitablilh'd  by  it :  With 
this  Apprchenlibn  and  Expectation  w'e  ipay  fitly  proceed  to 
examine  them,  where  we  can  find  any  Place  or  Occafion 
fov  it ;  and  it  may  be  allow'd  as  a  very  good  and  fufhcienn 
Occafion,  if  we  rea!!y  need  it,  and  may  hope  ro  be  thereby 
more  confirnVd  in  fu^  h  Points.    But  then, 

§10, 1,  We 


Chap.  20.       Improvement  of  Reafon.  219 

§  10.  2,  We  muft  alJow,  that  fome  Things  are  to  be  ta- 
ken as  Self-evident,  and  that  tiiey  neither  need,  nor  indeed 
can  be  reafon'd  out  or  confirm'd,  fo  as  to  be  made  more  Evi- 
dent than  they  are  upon  their  being  jurtly  and  clearly  ap- 
prehended :  Such  things  there  muft  of  NecefHty  be  j  for 
we  could  never  come  to  know  any  thing  by  reafoning,  did 
we  not  firft  know  fomething  as  undeniably  certain  without 
it,  as  it  has  been  obferv'd,  and  laid  down  as  an  undoubted 
Principle,  Vid.  Poiition,  (A)  Pag.  99. 

§11.  Now  ve  muft  acknowledge  a  real  Self-evidence, 
where,  upon  fetting  our  felvcs  to  examine  the  Matter,  we  can 
find  no  place  ferioufly  and  with  Reafon  deliberately  to  doubtj, 
but  in  1  •  real,  v  To  ^  and  that  nothing  can  be  found  to  make  it 
more  certain  than  it  is.  As  that  1  now  do  ibmewhat  which 
we  call  Thinking  ;  r^-at  whatfoever  now  A(fls,  or  is  AfFe£led 
any  way,  realJy  is,  or  exifts,  whether  it  be  tho't  of  or  not  | 
that  r -terefore  i  really  am,  who  really  ad; :  or  that  I  amfome- 
whatreaj,  who  really  do  fomewhat  (vide  Poflcion,  (Bhj  &c. 
pag.  1 06) :  And  in  the  Inftances  given,  it  appears,  that  there 
are  three  forts  of  Self-evidence,  vi:{.  that  of  Confcious 
Knovvledgc,  undoubted  Principles,  and  undeniable  Confe- 
quence.    And, 

^  li.  I,  Confcious  Knowledge  belongs  to  fuch  Matter 
pf  Fa(51:,  as  is  inwardly  perceiv'd  by  us,  fothat  Ave  have  no  Li- 
berty for  calling  it  in  Qiieftion,  or  at  leaft  of  concluding  the 
contrary  ;  thus  all  our  fenlible  Perceptions,  Imaginative  Re- 
prcfenrations,  and  Intelledlual  Apprehenlions  are  to  us,  who 
have  them,  Self-evident  :  For  it  is  unqueftionable  to  us, 
that  they  n^c,  and  that  they  are  Jixhi^  as  we  inwardly  per- 
ceive them;  the'  'ris  not  always  equally  Certain,  to  which 
of  the  formenticned  Sorts  they  ihould  be  refer'd  j  as  whether 
I  fti'-'uld  take  Jus  or  chat  Appearance  for  a  fenfibie  Percep- 
tion ot  fon^^'.vhat  without  me,  or  only  for  an  Imaginative 
Reprefentation  form'd  within  ;  yet  that  there  is  fomewhar^ 
at  leall  wichin,  if  not  alfo  without,  I  cannot  queftion,  if  I 
Would;  nor  d.at  there  was  fomewhat,  whilft  I  firmly  and 
clearly  remember  it.  In  fhort,  tho'  I  can  doubt  of  almoft 
any  thing,  if  I  fet  rny  felf  fo  to  do,  yet  I  can  no  ways  doubt 
that  I  think,  when  I  do  lo. 

^  '3-  ~,  Undoubted  Principles  are  fm;h  PropoCt'ons,' 
as  tray  be  call'd  Primary  and  Fundamental  Trurhs,  Maxims, 
Axioms,  i^s^  from  which  ether  Truths  mav  be  firft  rais'd, 
and  nito  which  they  m,ay  alfo  be  finally  refolv'd.  .As  that 
^'hat  is  not,  fo  long  cannot  ?.d,  or  be  affedied  any  way  j 
that  what  is  at  fill  muft  be  either  in  us,   or  fome^vhere  about 

Q.  2  u^j 


220  An  tjjuy  for  the  Fart  IL 

U5,  or  both  within  us  and  without  us ;  that  all  the  Parts  of  a 
thing  taken  together  are  equal  to  the  whole  :  7  hat  the  fame 
thir.g  cannot  at  once  be  and  not  be  in  the  fame  lelpedt  j  or, 
that  the  two  Parts  of  a  Contradid:ion  cannot  bcth  be  true, 
nor  both  falfe,  ^s.  In  fach  Propofiticns  the  Conjundtion, 
or  Disjun'flion  of  the  Terms,  their  Idejitity  or  Diverfity, 
cannot  be  denyM  with  any  Reafon,  nor  fo  muciras  ferioufly 
and  deliberately  queftion'd.  Amongft  thcfe  may  be  reckon'd 
Self-evident  Diftribuiions  or  Disjuniftions,  which  are  of 
great  ufe  in  the  Imndling  of  Subjcdks,  and  Realoning  about 
them ;  as  that  NumbvT  is  either  Odd  or  Even^  that  every 
Propohcion  is  either  true  or  falfe,  &s :  Nominal  Definitions 
(which  only  Allign  fuch  "Words  to  fignifie  fuchThingSy  are  to 
be  taken  as  a  kind  of  Principles. 

§  14.  3,  Undeniable  Confcqucnce  refers  to  divers  Pro- 
pofiticns which  are  evidently  conjoin  d  j  fo  that  one  is  an 
incontcftable  Inference  from  the  ether.  As  that,  fince  no-- 
thing  cannot  ac^t,  it  cannot  therefore  rile  of  it  felf  into  ibme- 
ching;  and  that  therefore  there  muft  neccifarily  be  fomewhat 
eternally  exifting  without  Beginning.  Thus  the  Procefs  of 
Difcourfe  or  Argument  fnould  be  connccl:ed,  and  ihould 
however  be  brought  at  laft  to  an  Evident  Connedlion  witii 
what  is  Self-evident ;  fo  as  there  rray  be  no  farther  Room 
for  fenous  Denial  or  Doubting  :  Vs'e  Ihould  carry  on  our 
Point  rill  we  bring  it  to  fome  undoubted  Principle  ;  and 
when  the  Marter  is  brought  to  fuch  an  Ilfue,  cur  Reafon  in- 
ftruil's  us  to  acquicfcc  without  indulging  to  doubt ;  Sinee 
*iGt  to  do  fo  :     Were, 

§  15.  (i.)  To  v.eary  cur  fc'ves  or  others  to  no  Purpofe, 
for  we  are  then  come  to  our  Ksplm  uh,j,  and  neither  they 
lior  we  can  pollibly  proceed  any  farther:  But  fuppofe  we 
really  l^e  not  the  Self-evidence  of  that  Pohir,  which  is  of- 
ier'd  as  fuch  by  a  Candid  and  Intelligeni  Perfon,  all  ws 
Ihould  defire  is  the  farther  and  cleaier  Exp-icaticn  of  the 
Terms,  tb.at  vvc  may  come  either  to  lee  the  Matter  Seif^ 
evident,  or  may  be  capable  of  evincing  the  contrary  from 
fomc  Principle,  which  Ihall  appear  undeniable  even  to  ous 
Antagonilt :  But  to  inliR  upjn  the  Proof  of  what  is  indeed 
Se'f-evident ;  were,  } 

§  16,  (2,)  To  cat  oif  our  felve«  from  all  polPibility  cf 
Satisfa<ilion  in  any  thing  :  Since  nothing  can  ever  be  made 
certain  to  us,  if  fomewhat  be  not  firii  admirtcd  by  us  as  cer- 
tain ;  for  that  we  muft  proceed  cndlcfsly  in  pro\ing  cr  coa- 
iijjaing  o;.e  Point  by  another ;  if  we  allow  not  that  fome 
I.  n  g<  nee  J  no  Proof  :     And  10  judge  dthevwife  were, 

§i7.(3.}To' 


Chap  20.        Improvement  of  ?^(t3i{ou.  ixf 

17.  (3.)  To  render  our  a<fting  any  thing  unaccoun- 
table, or  to  put  in  a  Bar  againft  adiing  at  all.-  And  fo  ic 
ought  to  do,  if  we  would  be  confiftent  with  our  fclvcs  in 
maintaining  the  Sceptical  Humour  and  Notions.  For  Ihall 
we  go  to  Ad,  we  know  not  why,  we  know  not  what,  ani 
indeed  (according  to  that  Dodrine)  not  knowing,  whetiier 
we  Ad  or  no,  or  whether  it  may  be  to  any  Effedt  and  Pur- 
pofe  r     But  this  were 

§  18.  (4J  To  caft  a  grofs  Refle£lion  upon  our  own  Make, 
and  upon  our  Maker  too  ;  as  if  our  difcerning  Facukv  were 
of  noUfe  ;  as  if  he  were  defedive  in  Wifdom  ani  Pow^r, 
or  in  Faithfulnefs  and  Goodnefs,  who  Ihould  give  us  fuch  a 
Frame  and  Conftitution,  fuch  Powers  and  Faculties,  as 
Avere  capable  of  knowing  nothing  with  Certainty. 

§  I  p.  I  have  before  given  a  confiderable  Number  of  Se- 
led  Principles  and  nearer  Dedudions  from  them,  which  are 
('tis  hop'd)  fufficiently  Evident:  It  would  be  a  vain  At- 
tempt, fhould  I  go  about  to  enumerate  all  the  more  general  Po- 
fitions  which  might  fairly  be  accounted  fo  ;  and  as  to  the 
more  Special  Axioms  of  other  particular  Arts  and  Sciences, 
they  are  not  here  to  be  expeded,  but  in  the  proper  Difci- 
plines  to  which  they  belong. 

§  20.  Thus  far  we  have  confider'd  wliat  may  be  call'd 
fufficiently  Evident,  more  abiblutely  and  in  it  felf,  whefe 
there  muft  always  be  an  intuitive  Certainty,  either  of  the  Thing 
immediately  in  it  felf,  or  of  its  Connexion  with  what  is  cer- 
tain :  There  may  be  alfoa  fufficient  Evidence  cow/'/zr/if/'yi?/^,  i.e. 
in  refped  of  the  Contrary  Evridence  ^  but  that  muft  be  ac- 
counted fufficient  only  fo  long  as  there  is  an  evident  Prepon- 
deration  or  Over-weight  on  one  fide  of  the  Queftion ;  for 
upon  farther  Views,  the  Scale  may  come  to  turn  on  the  other 
fide  :  And  yet  at  prefent  the  Evidence  may  be  fufficient  for 
us  to  proceed  upon,  whilft  there  is  no  opportunity  of  looking 
farther  into  the  Matter  ;  or  where  there  is  not  mucli  depen- 
ding on  the  Determination  ;  or  that,  if  we  ihould  make  ic 
wrong,  it  may  be  afterwards  well  enough  rcdify'd.  Evi- 
dence Comparatively  fufficient  is  what  fuffices  to  juftifie  us 
before  God  and  Man  in  proceeding  upon  it ;  yet  not  always 
in  concluding  abfolutely  that  the  Matter  certainly  is,  as  ac 
prefent  we  take  it  to  be. 


<Ij  §ii;Thrs 


222  An  tjfay  for  the  Part  Ik 

§  21.  This  General  Head  h^o  beeii  chiefly  defign'd  to 
guard  againft  the  Scepticifm,  which  feemsro  prevail  amongft 
fome,  who  pretend  to  nwre  cp.ai;  ordinary  Senfe  ;  tho'  there 
are  really  no  Pradlical  Scepricks  in  Secular  Affairs:  For 
Men  will  not  forbear  to  Eat,  and  Drink,  and  Trade,  &i  5 
becaufe  they  may  poifibly,  as  they  fay,  be  in  a  Dream;  yet 
moft  do  too  much  negle<5t  the  Concerns  of  the  future  Life 
upon  a  real,  or  pretended,  Doubt  about  it. 


CHAP.     XXI. 


§  r.  \X7HEN  things  appear  not  Evident  in  themfelves, 
•  •  nor  evidently  connedted  in  the  feveral  Steps  of 
their  Proof,  with  what  is  fo,  we  may  well  reckon  there  is  at 
leaft  a  Poltibiliry  of  Miftake  :  And  in  fuch  Cafes  it  is  the 
Bufinefsof  our  Reafon, 

VII,  iijghtiy  to  difcsrn  veh.-n  Danger  there  may  he  cf  Mi- 
fial{e  in  this  or  th/:t  Cafc^  nnd  of  what  Importance  a  Mijiake 
vpoiild  he, 

§  X.  We  ought  not  indeed  to  look  upon  every  PoiTibili- 
ty  of  our  miftaking  to  import  what  may  be  properly  call'd  a 
Danger  of  it,  which  implies  fomewhat  Momentous  in  the 
Point  it  felf :  and  efpecialiy  fome  rcafonablc  Ground  of 
Doubt  and  Sufpicion  about  it:  But  thefe  Marks  are  not  al- 
ways to  be  found,  whereyet  the  Matter  may  not  appear  to  us 
Unqueftionable.  It  is  nor  to  us  undeniably  Certain,  that 
the  Sun  is  a  Globular  Body,  it  may  poflibly  be  orherwife  ; 
yet  the  Point  feems  to  be  of  fo  fmali  Importance,  and  there 
appears  fo  little  Reafon  for  calling  it  in  Queftion  ;  that  we 
can  fcarcely  fay,  there  is  here  a  Danger  of  miftaking,  no 
ipore  than  there  appears  a  Danger  to  us  in  our  miftaking  : 
Nor  iliould  any  Man  be  alarm'd  upon  finding  fuch  a  fort  of 
uncertainty  in  many  Cafes,  as  may  leave  room  for  a  Poliibi- 
liiy  that  the  Con:radi(5loiyj  if  not  Contrary,  Proposition  may 
be  true. 


§  3.  What 


Chap.  2  1.         Improvement  of  Kfi2i[Gr\.  225 

§  3.  What  is  commonly  cali'd  Moral  Ccrtninty  ihould  in 
Reafon  fuifice  to  lay  the  Apprehenfion  of  Miilakc,  vi:;.  when 
the  Matter  cannot  fairly  be  fuppos'd  othcrwifc  ;  but  that  in 
fuppoling  it  fo,  we  muft  admit  what  is  altogether  Improba- 
ble, and  next  to  Impolfible:  .  As,  e.  g.  that  fo  many  Perfons, 
of  differing  Places  and  Circumftances,  lliould  agree  in  re- 
porting and  believing  there  is  fuch  a  City  as  Romc^  if  there 
were  no  fiich  Place.  We  are  cercainly  to  conclude,  that 
wherefoever  there  appears  upon  due  Confideration  a  manifefl 
overweight  of  Evidence,  there  is  really  nothing  which  can 
be  fairly  cali'd  a  Danger  of  Miftake,  fince  one  part  of  a 
Contradiction  muft  always  be  true,  and  we  niuft  take  that 
for  Truth,  which  appears  moft  like  to  be  fo.     But, 

§  4.  There  is  real  Danger  of  our  miftaking  in  many 
Cafes  which  may  be  of  fome  Concernment  to  us,  as 

I.  In  determining  of  Points,  which  are  in  their  own  Na- 
ture, or  however  to  us,  unfearchable  :  Such  as  thofe  before 
mentioned,  Chap.  7,  e.  ^.  if  Ave  (hould  undertake  to  State 
the  Divine  Unity  and  Trinity,  as  in  themfelves  they  are  ; 
or  fuch  other  Matters  as  are  plainly  above  our  Capacity,  or 
are  at  leaft  fo  for  the  prefent.  Here  we  are  not  only  in  ma- 
nifeft  Danger  of  Milling,  but  may  be  in  fome  Cafes  greatly 
endanger 'd  h  it. 

§  5.  1.  Wherever  we  want  what  is  previoufly  requifite 
to  the  making  a  right  Judgment;  as  (i.)  a  jult  and  clear 
Underftanding  what  is  the  Thing  fpoken  of,  or  what  is  faid 
about  it :  Or,  (2.}  Matter  of  Fad:  truly  and  certainly  fta- 
ted,  which  therefore  fhould  be  always  carefully  drawn  out 
fcy  proper  Enquiry  :  Or,  (3,)  The  Meafure,  or  Rule  by 
which  we  miift  judge  in  fuch  Cafe ;  as  fuppofe  it  were  fome 
Point  of  Divinity,  Law,  ^c.  upon  which  the  Matter 
turns- 

§  6.  3.  In  every  Cafe  of  manifeft  Difficulty,  cfpecially 
if  the  Determination  muft  be  fpeedy,  and  admit  not  of  De- 
liberation, or  Confultation,  or  at  leaft  not  of  our  Reviewing 
and  Reconfidering  what  hath  appear'd  Right  at  one  time, 
but  might  not  perhaps  at  another  :  VVhenas  in  difficult 
Cafes  there  is  commonly  occafion  for  fecond  Tho'ts ;  and 
therefore  the  firft  may  be  juftly  fufpeded.  More  particu- 
larly, 


R4  §7. 4.  fa 


2^4  An  tj/ay  for  the  Fart  II. 

§  7.  4.  In  Def^:ribing,  and  much  more  in  Defining;  for 
there  may  be  great  Danger  of  milTing  the  jufl:  diftin£live 
Charat9:er,  atid  of  making  the  Dcfriptionor  Definition,  ei- 
ther to  take  in  what  it  Ui 'dild  not,  or  to  leave  out  fomewhat 
that  fhouLi  be  taken  in.  We  arc  farther  in  danger  of 
Miftakin.e, 

§  S.  5.  Under  Indilpofirion  of  B  Jy  or  Mind,  wli'ch  or- 
/dinaiily  give  feme  Diftuibancc  to  the  'i  ho't  ard  fiidgmenr  : 
and  here  we  are  an.re  clpecially  to  hifpidt  our  Sentiments 
under  vehement  Pairions  and  AttcC^ions ;  fitice  that  faying 
do's  too  COmnT'in'y  hold,  P^; »;  Judiciuw,  dnn  res  trfrvfjt  in 
Ajfettum,  Rcafon  muft  not  give  judgment,  where  Paifion 
tries  the  Caufe.  • 

^  §  9.  6.  In  Matter  of  doi^btful  Rrport  taken  upon  Trull 
from  common  Fame,  or  from  tuch  as  arc  not  of  approved 
Capnciiy  and  Integrity,  or  who  lia\e  not  had  Opportunity 
pf  well  obferving  what  they  report  :  And  tho'  a  Report 
may  come  to  us  from  many  and  g.  oJ  hands,  yet  it  is  to  he 
doubted  of,  whilft  we  know  not,  wlicther  it  took  not  its  Rife 
only  from  one,  and  thav  a  Perfon  dectiv'd,  or  Aviliing  to  De- 
ceive. 

7.  In  Matters  of  common  Opinion,  or  fingular  Sentiment.', 
before  citherof  them  are  well  cxamin'd  ;  for  there  are,  bothy 
Vulgar  Errors,  and  Learned  Frcfum prions,  wherein  Men 
have  foUow'd  one  another  almoft  blindfold. 

§  10.  8.  In  the  Perceptions,  Imaginations,  and  Conccjv 
tions,  which  we  have  taken  up  withovit  due  Confi.ieration, 
or  upon  Partial  Examination  ;  .^s  fi.ppofe  at  too  great  a  Di- 
liance,  .and  under  manifeft  Difadvanrages;  or  by  one  Senfe 
on':y,  where  others  might  be  employ 'd  upon  the  fame  Ob- 
joA;  or  by  thcSenfcs  only  without.theUfe  of  our  Judgment: 
cr  by  mere  Natural  Reafon  without  the  help  which  Super- 
natural Revelation  might  afford  ;  or  by  fome  part  of  Divine 
Revelation,  not  compared  with  fuch  other  Points  of  it,  as 
might  farther  give  Light  and  Help  to  determine  the  Senfe  ; 
mJcb  more  if  wc  fhouid  examine  t)i^nr.<!  by  fome  pretended 
Revelation  without  the  help  of  that  which  is  undoubtedly 
Divine,  or  of  that  Reafon,  whereof  God  is  likewife  the  Au- 
thor, and  which  is  prefuppos'd  to  gyr  entertaining  Revelation 
and  Underftanding  it. 

§  r  1 .  9.  In  following  our  Education  as  to  the  Matters 
about  which  Wife  and  Good  Men  are  not  agreed  ;  which 
therefore  cannot  fafely  betaken  upon  Truft  from  our  Parents 
pi  Piogenirours,  but  ought  to  be  once  at  leaft  well  examin'd, 
Wiu"n  Children  are  growri  up  to  a  Capacity,  and  have  pro- 
per 


Chap.  21.         Improvement  of  Reafon,  225 

per  Furniture  for  that  Purpofe.  There  muft  be  fo  much  the 
greater  Danger  of  Miftake  in  following  our  Anceftorsin  fuch 
Ibrt  of  Points,  as  there  are  many  ways  of  Miftake  to  one  that 
is  Right  and  1  mc. 

•  §  II.  10.  Where  our  Sentiments  fall  in  with  Natural 
Inclination,  Perfonal  Affetition,  or  Secular  Intereft,  for  in 
fuch  Cafes  the  Judgment  is  in  great  Danger  to  be  biafs'd  and 
fway'd  to  that  lide ;  and  therefore  we  are  not  here  to  begin 
with  weighing  the  Arguments  on  each  hand  ;  but  rather  firft 
to  obfcrve  what  might  prejudice  us  for  or  againft  either  fide, 
that  we  may  fettle  and  confirm  our  Minds  againft  that:  this 
being  as  necelfary,  as  to  make  the  Scales  even,  before  we  go  to 
weigh  any  thing. 

§  1 3.  I  r .  Where  there  appears  nothing  more  on  one 
fide  than  on  the  other;  but  the  Matter  looks  altogether  doubt- 
ful,  when  yet  one  fide  only  can  be  right ;  Here  the  Determi- 
nation muft  be  ticklifh,  and  we  are  upon  the  Brink  of  Errour 
on  one  Hand  or  the  other,  unlefs  it  (hould  be  infome  of  thofe 
few  Cafes  where  the  Matter  is  plainly  indifferent. 

II.  Where  the  over-weight  of  Argument  appears  very 
fmall,  and  hardly  difcernibJe ;  for  fuch  Appearance  is  ealily 
counterfeit,  and  in  danger  to  lead  to  a  Miftake. 

§  14.  Now  as  to  the  Importance  of  a  Miftake,  it  is  to 
be  meafur'd  chiefly  by  the  Moment  of  chat,  about  which  we 
make  a  Judgment ;  and  therefore  we  are  to  look  back  into 
the  Difcourfe  on  that  Head,  Chap.  ii,i  5,i2?c:  yet  wefhall  here 
fuggeft  fomewhat  very  briefly,  which  may  be  ufeful  and  im- 
provable ;     And, 

; .  The  Importance  of  a  Miftake  muft  be  greater,  where 
we  are  under  Special  Obligation  to  acquaint  our  felves  with 
the  Truth,  and  have  Opportunity,  with  Means  for  that  Pur- 
pofe, as  in  Matters  relating  to  our  own  peculiar  Province, 
Bufinefsor  Undertaking. 

§  15.  2.  In  refpeft  of  more  general  Principles  and  the 
nearer  Deductions  from  them  :  For  that  one  Errour  there 
may  lead  to  Thoufands,  which  will  Naturally  andjuftly  fol- 
low, ifonce  a  leading  Falfhoodbe  admitted. 

3.  As  to  Pra£lical  Points,  fince  they  are  commonly  of 
greater  Confequence,  than  mere  Speculations. 

4.  In  fixing  the  End  or  Point  and  Scope  at  which  we 
would  aim  in  any  Undertaking ;  forafmuch  as  that  is  to  di- 
rect our  Choice  and  Ufe  of  Means. 


§  16. 5. In 


%26  AnEffay  for  the  Part  IL 

§  16.  5.  In  our  firft  fetcing  out  into  the  WorJd,  or  upon 
aoy  particular  Affair:  For  every  one  knows  that  he  is  like  to 
go  far  wide  of  his  Journey's  End,  whofetsout  wrong  atfirft  ; 
and  in  Proportion,  every  miftake  is  of  fo  much  worfe  Confe- 
guence,  as  it  do's  more  affed:  what  we  are  finally  defign- 
feg. 

6.  In  relation  to  Moral  A£tion ;  fince  we  are  there  un-* 
der  an  Obligation  of  Duty,  and  liable  to  Punifliment  in 
Cafe  of  fuch  Miftake  as  might  be  avoided  by  due  Care,  and 
the  ufe  of  fueh  Means  as  are  within  reach. 

§  1 7.  7,  And  finally,  the  Importance  of  an  Errour  fs  lb 
much  more  Conliderable,  as  its  Influence  would  be  greater 
and  more  extenfive;.  reaching  to  many  Points,  Perfons,  Fa- 
milies,  or  to  a  whole  Country,  ^c.  but  efpecially  where 
it  extends  not  only  to  the  Interefts  of  the  prefent  Time,  but 
•  of  future  Ages,  and  above  all  where  it  is  like  to  have  an 
Influence  upon  our  cverlafting  Concernments. 

Now  laccording  as  there  is  greater  Danger  of  our  miitak-' 
ing ;  and  at  the  fame  time  a  greater  Mifchief  in  it ;  we  arc 
to  employ  a  proportionable  Care  for  the  avoiding  of  it,  and 
therefore  the  Rules  and  Helps,  which  niay  ferve  to  that  Pur-? 
pofe,  are  to  be  fo  much  the  more  attended  to. 


The 


Chap.  I.  Improvement  of  Reafon.  227 


riie  Third  Part. 


CHAP.    I. 


§  r.  /■  ■"NHE   Method  laid  down  in  the  Introdudtion 
'  I       brings  us  now  to  fiicli  farther  ways  of  ufing 

-*-      our  Reafon  as  arefomewhat  nnorc  Special,  and 
come  nearer  to  common  Service .-     And  here, 

I.   That  we  may  rightly  efiimr.te  Proof,  and  ajfent  nccordingly, 
fofnr  M  the  Proof  will  warranty  and  Juftific, 

Proof  being  relative  to  what  is  prov'd,  muft  be  eftimated 
chiefly  from  its  being  really  fitted,  and  duly  apply'd  to 
make  out  the  Point  to  which  it  is  offcr'd  :  /.  c  to  Convince 
or  Confirm  the  Mind,  that  this  is  truly  affirm'd  or  deny'd  of 
that;  as  that'it  is  here  day,  or  that  day  is  here  prefentjbecaufe 
the  Sun  is  above  the  Horizon  of  this  Place. 

§  2.  There  is  juft  Occafion  for  Proof,  when,  after  the 
Terms  of  a  Propofition  are  well  underfiood,  according  as 
they  are  therein  defign'd,  it  do's  not  yet  appear,  whether 
that  more  fimple  Theme  which  is  confider'd  under  fuch  a. 
Charader,  as  the  Subjed^,  may  or  may  not  be  confider'd  alfo 
under  f/j^jr  farther  Charadler,  which  the  Predicate  imports* 
as,  whether  the  Sun  (by  which  is  here  defign'd  the  Bciyig  fo 
call'd)  may  be  farther  confider'd,  as  a  Fiery  Body,  or  as 
Watry  :  As  to  the  latter,  it  would  be  found,  that  the  Sim  is 
net  a  Watry  Body  :  But  as  to  the  Former,  that  the  Sun  is  n 
Fiery  Body  •  and  of  this  Pohit,  Proof  may  be  given  by  fome 
farther  Charafter  belonging  to  one  of  the  Terms,  but  not  co 
the  other,  to  fhew  that  th;  Sun  is  not  Watry ;  and  by  one  be- 
longing to  both,  to  fhew  that  the  Sun  is  a  Fiay  Body :  E.  g. 
the  Sun  do's  not  moiften  things,  as  Watry  Bodies  do  •  but 
heats  them,  as  Fiery  Bodies  are  wont  to  do. 

§  3.  That  the  Occafion  and  Ufe  there  is  for  Argument, 
and  alfo  the  Way  of  Arguing  may  better  appear,  they  may 
be  illuflrated  from  the  followhig Figures  G,H,I,  which  a;e dc- 
figned  to  reprefcnt  fo  many  Solid  Bodies  exa£Vly  alike,  hav- 
ing each  of  them  Six  like  Sides,  (mark'd  wirh  the  Lectors 
a,  /',  c,  dj  e,%)  but  fomewhat  dilferemly.  placed  to  our  View, 

fo 


228 


An  tljfay  for  the 


Pare  III. 


So  that  in  G,  the  Sides  a,  b,  are  more  fully  and  clearly  to  be 
feen,  and  c  more  imperfedly  and  darkly ;  in  H^b  8c  c,  are 
more  fairly  prefented,  and  a  more  obfcurely  ;  in  /,  c  and  J 
are  offer'd  more  directly  to  the  Sight,  and  b  more  obliquely. 

§  4.     Here  it  do's  not 
lb  fjlly  appear,    whether 
the  Body  G, which  is  plainly 
Speck'd ,  v'.:{.  on  the  Side  nn) 
be  a!fo  Shaded  with  crofs 
Lines  (-y/:^.  on  the  Side  cc) ; 
the'  we  are  fuppofed  well 
to  underftand  the  Notion 
of  a  Specked  Body^    under 
which  we  confider  G,   as 
the    Subject    whereof  we 
Ipeak  ;    and  likewife  the 
farther  Notion    of  being 
f:)nded    vaith     crcfs    LineSy 
which  is  attributed  to  that 
fpecked  Body,  by  the  Pre- 
dicate, when  either  we  fay, 
the  fpecked  Body  G  is  alfo 
Ihaded  with  crofs  Lines,  or 
propofe  it  as  matter  of  £n- 
t^uiry,    whether  it  be  fo  or  not '.     But  whereas  there  is  fbme 
Rcafon  to  fuppofe  it  fo,   ypon  the  glance  we  have  of  the  Side 
cc^  therefore  let  an  Attempt  be  made  to  prove  this  Point, 
that  The  Body  G  xchich  u  plainly  fin  fome  Refpedt)  /peeked  is 
rJfo  (in  fome  other  Refpedt )  Jh.ided  vpith  crofs  Lines :    or  ac- 
cording to  the  Terms  us'd  in  Heraldry,  which  may  be  fome- 
what  more  com  nodious  for  oar  prefent  Qccaiion,  G  vohich  » 
OP^  (\.  e.  guile  with  Gold)  is  r.ifo  SABLE^  i.  c.  Black. 

§  5-  Now  looking  upon  G,  we  njay  obferve,  that  it  has 
a  blank  or  white  Side  hb^  which  from  Heraldry  may  be  call'd 
Ai^ENT  (or  Silver)  adjoining  to  the  Speck'd  one  an^  which 
we  have  term'd  O/^ ;  and  looking  farther  we  may  obferve, 
in  the  Figure  H,  that  the  fame  Argent-fide  bb  is  alio  adjoin- 
ing to  the  Sable-fide  c  c  :  whereupon  we  may  thus  argue, 

The  Body  G  which  is  ARGENT  (in  bb)  is  alfo  SABLE 
(in  cc);  as  plainly  appears  in  the  Pofitionof  it  at  H; 

B  It  the  Body  which  is  OR  (in  a  a)  is  the  fame  ARGENT 
Body  : 

Therefore  G,  which  is  OR,  is  alfo  SABLE.  J^  E.  P. 

(i.  e.  ijm.i 


Chap.  I.  Improvement  of  pK^aiion.  229" 

(i.  e.  quod  erat  prchandun?^  which  was  to  be  prov'd) ;  And 
the  Proof  here  given  refts  upon  that  Principle,  Things^  which 
agree  to  the  fame,  do  a!fo  ayrce  nmong  rhemfeives ;  but  it  is  a. 
little  more  nicely  and  fully  delivcr'd  in  ihc  Polition  fAgJ, 
"pag.  104,  thus.  Things  do  Jo  far  agree  together,  as  they  feve- 
rally  agree  to  the  felf-fame  Thing,  or  to  divers  in  the  Re- 
fpe£l;  wherein  thcfe  agree.  In  the  Cafe  before  m,  we  have 
the  felf-fame  Argent-fided  Body,  or  however  we  have  two 
fuch  Bodies  exactly  agreeing  as  to  all  their  Sides :  And 
whereas  thefe,  which  fo  agree,  or  indeed  the  fame  Argent 
Body  has  OR  on  one  fide  and  SABLE  on  the  other  adjoining 
to  it  upon  the  fame  Body,  it  therefore  muft  needs  be,  that 
the  Body,  which  is  in  one  relpecSt  OR,  muft  in  another  be 
alfo  SABLE,  which  was  the  Point  to  be  prov'd, 

§  6.  That  which  was  brought  for  Proof,  {vi::;.  the  Argent- 
fide  to  ihew  the  Agreement  of  the  OR  &  SABLE  to  the  fame 
Body,  fince  each  of  thefe  do  plainly  agree  to  that  fame  Body, 
to  which  the  Argent  belongs)  may  fitly  enough  be  call'd,  as 
the  Argument  generally  is  in  Logic,  the  Middle  Term,  as  ly- 
ing betwixt  the  two  other  Terms,  which  therefore  may  be 
named,  the  Extremes  :  And  on  fome  Accounts  it  were  (I 
think)  beft  placed  in  the  middle  betwixt  them,  thus. 

The  Body  G,  which  is  OR,  is  like  wife  ARGENTj 
"     But  the  fame  ARGENT-Body  is  alfo  SABLE : 

Therefore  the  Body  G,  which  is  UR,  is  alfo  SABLE, 

As  to  this  unufual  way  of  placing  the  Propofitions  I  fliall  af- 
terwards offer  fomewhat  farther :  In  the  mean  while  it  may- 
be of  Ufe  to  remark  fome  other  Points  from  the  Liftance  now 
before  i-s.     And  particularly, 

§  7.  That  the  differing  Confiderations,  under  which  the 
Body  G  h  or  rrightbe  taken,  can't  be  rightly  pronounced  one 
of  another ;  for  we  cannot  truly  fay,  that  OR  is  ARGENT, 
or  that  the  Argent-Side  is  the  Sable-lide  of  the  Body  ,G.-  bitt 
we  may  therefore  well  fay,  that  the  Body  pofited  as  at  G  is 
not  (formally  J  the  fame  thing,  as  in  rhe  Pofition  at  H  ;  zho 
it  be  the  ^:'f-fame  Body,  oiily  diverfly  pofued  to  the  Eye  ; 
or  bricliy  ui^ii  G  is  not  furmally  77,  and  it  may  be  thus  niade 
out, 

What  is  confider'd,  as  differing  in  any  rtfpeA  is  not  (for- 
mally) the  fame- 

The  Body  at  G  is  confiJcr'd,  cs  differir.R  in  fome  Refped 
iioiu  that  at  H: 

"J  herefore  the  Body  at  G  is  no;  (f  i::z  fame  a> 


230      An  Ejfay  for  the  Part  HI. 

Now  the  ftrft  propafitian  is  of  it  felf  fufficiently  Evident,  and 
the  next  may  be  thus  prov'd, 

The  Body  which  is  eonfider'd,  as  fhewing  it  felf  in  a  di|- 
fering  maniiei'  from  that  at  H,  is  conflder'd^  as  ditifering 
from  k  in  tbme  refped:  ; 

But  th{*  BodSjr  at  G  is  confider'd,  as  fhewing  it  felf  in  a 

differing  manner  from  that  at  H: 
Therefore  the  Body  at  G  is  confider'd  as  di^ering  in  Ibirie 

refpedt  from  that  at  H. 

And  Confequently, 

The  Body  at  G  is  not  (formally)  the  fame  as  at  H.  .Q.  E.  P. 

§  S.  To  carry  the  Inftance  before  us  yet  farther,  let  it 
mow  be  fuppos'd,  that  G  and  H  are  two  dirtind  Bodies,  and 
lo  ftx'd  in  dieting  places,  that  we  cannot  immediately  com- 
pare them  together,  but  have  the  moveable  Body  /,  which 
we  may  coiiTpare  with  each  of  them  :  "We  may  then  prove 
them  to  be  juft  aHke,  thus. 

Bodies  that  are  feveralJy  juft  like  the  fame  Body  are 

juft  like  each  other  ; 
But  G  &  H  are  Bodies,  which  are  feveralty  juft  like  the 

fame  Body ; 
Therefore  Gand  H  are  juft  like  each  other. 

Now  that  G  and  H  are  feverally  juft  like  the  fame  Body  ap- 
pears thus, 

The  Body  7  is  the  fame  Body  with  it  felf,  (Pof  (H)p,  1 00)5 
But  G  and  Hare  feverally  juft  like  the  Body  I; 
Therefore  G  and  H  are  feverally  juft  like  the  fame  Body. 

ThatG  and  H  are  indeed  feverally  juft  like  the  Body  J,  may 
thvisappear, 

If  G  and  H  have  each  of  their  Parts  lik<^  thofe  of  7,  and 
fo  put  together,  as  in  /,  then  they  are  feverally  juft 
like  the  Body  i; 

But  G  and  H  have  each  of  their  Parts  like  thofe  off,  and 
lb  put  together  as  in  f : 

Therefore  G  and  H  are  feverally  juft  like  the  Body  I. 

The  Confcquence  refts  upon  the  Self-Evident  Pofition 

I'Acjpag.  104, 


knd 


Chap.  I.  Improvement  of  Reafon.  231 


And  that  G  and  H  have  each  of  their  Parts  like  thofe  of  J,  and 
fo  put  together  as  in  J,  muft  be  made  to  appear  by  a  parti- 
cular Survey,  and  Comparing  of  thenj. 

§  p.  Only  once  more,  Suppofe  we  would  prove  that  fome 
one  or  other  of  the  Bodys,  G,  H,  J,  has  a  Side  that  is  VE^ 
(i.  e.  in  Heraldry  Grecn)^  which  is  not  yet  Evident  by  what 
appears  of  them  ;  but  we  are  credibly  told,  or  do  well  re- 
member, that  every  one  of  them  has  an  AZURE  (or  blew) 
Side,  and  that  one  of  the  Azure  Sides  joins  another,  which  is 
"I  GVLES  fi.  e.  Red),  and  that  this  is  adjoining  upon  a  Side 
which  is  VERT :     We  may  then  Argue  thus, 

All  the  Bodys,  G,  H,  7,  have  one  Side  AZUREfas^rfinJji 
But  one  or  other  of  the  AZURE  fided  Bodys  has  alfo  A 

fide  that  is  VERT  (as//): 
Therefore  one  or  other  of  the  Bodys  G,  H,  J,  his  a  Side 

that  is  VERT. 

And  the  Argument  is  Conclufive,  iho'  it  be  not  agreeable  to 
the  Rules  aliow'd  of  in  the  Schools  :  If  now  it  be  doubted^ 
whether  any  of  the  AZURE  fided  Bodies  amongft  G,HyI, 
be  alfo  VERT,  it  may  be  thus  made  our. 

One  or  other  of  the  AZURE-fided-Bodies  G,  H.  /,  has 
alfo  a  Side  adjoining  that  is  GULES  (as  ce) ; 

But  thrj  which  has  a  Side  GULES,  has  likewife  one  ad- 
joining to  it,  that  is  VERT  : 

Therefore  one  or  other  of  the  AZURE-Sided-Bodieshas 
alfo  a  Side  that  is  VERT. 

And  Confequently, 

One  or  other  of  the  Bodies  G,  H,  J,  has  a  Side  that  is 
VERT,  fi,  £.  P- 

And  this  Argument,  as  well  as  the  former,  is  conclufive,  tho* 
it  be  not  agreeable  to  the  Meafures  commonly  prefcrib'd  in 
Logic. 

§  10.  Now  Proof  is  to  Evince  the  Agreement  or  Difa- 
greement,  either  of  two  Enunciations  by  the  means  of  a  third, 
or  of  two  fingle  Terms,  whether  it  be  by  another  Enunciati- 
on, cr  by  a  third  Term,  fitted  and  rightly  appli'd  to  that 
PUrpcfc.  And, 


I,  As 


232 An  tjfay  for  the  Parf  111. 

I,  As  to  the  former  way  of  Proof,  it  ought  to  be  by  ah 
Enunciation  fail  ly  and  plainly  imply'd,  and  m  a  fort  offer- 
ing it  felf  in  the  Connexion  or  Disjunftionof  the  two  Enunci- 
ations, which  is  to  be  cleared  by  it :  It  fhould  not  therefore 
lie  far  but  of  Sight,  nor  Ihould  there  need  a  fecond  Enforce- 
ment :    Bjt, 

§  II.  TheProofof  the  Connexion  or  Disjunction,  ought 
to  be  difpatch'd  at  once,  as  if  I  were  to  prove,  that  if  the  Sun 
be  rijen,  or  where  the  Sun  u  rifer?,  it  is  Day.  'Tis  here  fairly 
imply'd,'  as  the  Bafis  of  the  Confequcnce  tr  Connexion,  that 
the  Sun's  being  rifcn  makes  Day ;  and  if  this  be  true,  there 
can  remain  no  reafonable  Doubt,  but  that  in  Cafe  the  Sun 
be  rifen,  or  where  it  is  rifen,  it  muft  be  Day ;  fo  that  the  on- 
ly remaining  Queftion  is  concerning  the  affura'd  Enunciation, 
whether  the  rifen  Sun  makes  Day  or  no' ;  and  not  at  all  about 
the  Confequence  from  th/it  10  its  being  thereupoji  Day. 

§  1 2.  It  may  be  obferv'd,  that  in  proving  the  Connexion 
or  Disjundlion  of  Enunciations,  we  do  not  ufually  mention 
the  double  Hypothetical  Proportion,  which  yet  is  undet- 
ftood ;  as  here.  If  the  rifen  Sun  makes  Day,  then  in  Cafe  the 
Sun  be  rifen  it  is  day ;  fince  the  Confequence  brought  for 
Proof,  is  or  ought  to  be  fo  firm  and  evident,  as  that  it  cannot 
be  fairly  deny'd  ;  but  that  ii  it  be,  a  Reafon  may  well  be  de- 
manded, upon  which  the  Difpute  may  farther  proceed  by 
ihewing  ^/m^  Reafon  to  be  either  aFallhood  in  it  feif,  or  not  to 
the  prcfent  Purpofe,  if  true.   .         , 

§  13.  Bit  tho' the, Hyp<^'thetical  Propofition  be  not  com- 
monly cxprefs'd  in  fuch  ajknid  of  Proof,  yet  it  is  refer'd  to, and 
really  deny'd,  when  the  Refpondent  denies  the  Cotijequcnt ;  as 
in  this  way  of  Arguing  (which  is  cali'd  an  Enthymemc)  the 
Rifen  Sun  makes  Day  ;  therefore  if  the  Sun  be  rifen,'  or 
where  he  is  rifen,  it  is  Day,  io  deny  the  Cojifcquent  were  in 
effedl  to  fay,  that  tho'  the  rifen  Sun  makes  day,  yet  'tis  not 
here  day,  tho'  the  Sun  be,  or  if  he  were,  rifen  here ;  which  if 
any  one  fliould  be  fo  abfur'd  as  to  fay,  the  Ground  of  his  do- 
ing it  might  juftly  be  demanded,  nor  could  any  thing  be  here 
affign'd,  which  would  be  both  true  and  to  the  Purpofe. 

§1  14.  Certain  it  is,  that  the  Connexion  of  Enunciations 
lies  too  opeHj  where  there  is  no  fuch  Point  imply'd  and  af- 
lignable,  as  will  fuffice  to  confirm  it  at  once,  provided  it  be 
but  true  in  it  felf;  And  in  makmg  that  out  (which  is  caU'd 
the  Antecedent  of  the  Enchymeme)  the  reafoning  may  proceed 
wiihoat  Intricacy  and  Perplexnefs,  which  muft  elle  be  in- 
volv'd  and  almoit  unintelligible,  if  the  Confequent,  or  a  fe- 
cond Coiifequence  were  to  beprov'd. 

f  !  5 .  Th? 


Ch;ip  I.  Ir,/pro7'ewer;t  of  ^^aion.  2^^ 

§  15.  1  he  Proof  of  Enunciations  Connected  may  be 
duly  made  by  contracting  both  into  one,  which  carries  in  it 
the  Force  of  both  ;  as,  in  the  Inftance  given,  to  prove,  rhac 
if  the  Sun  be  rifcn  it  is  day,  we  have  faid,  the  Rifen  Sua 
makes  Day.  '1  he  Inconfequence  or  Disjuncfbion  of  Enunci- 
ations, may  be  Jikcwife  made  out  by  an  Enunciation,  which 
contra(5ts  both  into  me,  which  is  Negative  ;  thus,  tbo*  it  be 
Light,  it  is  not  therefore  Day :  for  any  Light,  whatfoevei'does 
not  make  Day :     Hut, 

^  16.  We  mult  dlftinguifh  betwixt  the  Negation  of  a 
Confeqnencc,  and  the  Coiifequcnce  of  a  Negation :  That 
this  which  is  call'd  an  Ink-horn,  is  not  therefore  made  of  Hora, 
is  right  and  true  ;  but  it  would  be  very  falfe  to  infer,  that,  if 
it  be  call'd  an  Ink-horn,  it  is  therefore  not  made  of  Horn. 

The  Negation  of  a  Confequence  is  made  by  putting  the 
Negative  before  the  Illative  Particle,  but  after  th^  it  would 
make  a  Negative  Confequent. 

§  17.  1  here  may  be  a  Conjundion  or  Disjunction  of 
Negatives,  or  of  thofe  which  they  call  Infinite  Enunciations  ; 
Thus,  tho'  fuch  a  one  be  not  Wife,  yet  it  does  not  therefore 
follow,  that  he  is  not  Rich;  for  thofe,  who  are  not  Wife, may 
)  et  be  Rich  :  But  if  he  be  not  Wife,  it  follows,  that  he  is  noc 
fit  to  give  Advice  ;  for  they  muft  be  Wife  who  are  fit  to  do 
it.  Thofe  Enunciations  in  which  Infinite  or  Negative  Term* 
are  affirm'd  or  dcny'd,  may  likewife  be  joined  or  disjoin'd  in 
the  way  of  Inferring  :  Thus,  he  is  come  to  fuch  a  Pitch  in  his 
Non-age,  that  he  is  therefore  a  Non-fuch  :  Or  he  is  not  in  his 
Non-age,  yet  is  not  therefore  a  Non-fuch. 

§  18.  Tiie  Proof  of  fuch  Connexion  or  Disjunction  is 
fometimes  well  made  by  a  Propofition  fliev^ing  that  the  " 
Terms  of  one  Enunciation,  have,  or  have  not  the  like  Ha- 
bitude or  Refpe£l  to  each  other,  as  thofe  of  the  other  Enua- 
ciation;  E.Gr.  If  x  give  4,  3  will  give  6 ;  for  6  is  th'2. 
double  of  3,  as  4  is  of  X  ;  but  tho*  i  give  4,  3  will  not  give 
7  i  for  7  is  not  onl^  the  double  of  3  as  4  is  of  2. 


CHAR 


234  An  Effay  for  the  Part  II U 


§ 


CHAP.     II. 

•  ^X/^''^'^  ^^^^  farther  before  us  here,  is  to  confider  how 
**    Proof  may  be  Eftimated  in  Relation, 
II,   To  the  Agreement  or  Difagreement  of  fingle  Terms,' 
tvhich  may  be  midc  out  either  in  taking  them  both  together       i 
or  feverally. 

In  the  former  way  of  proving,  the  Propoficion  on  which 
we  ground  is  Conditional  or  Relative,  made  up  of  a  New 
Enunciation,  together  with  the  entire  Queftion,  or  its  Con- 
tradiftory :  And  here  the  Enunciation  brought  for  Proof, 
muft  be  true,  and  its  Connexion  firm  and  good,  to  make  the 
Argument  fo. 

§  2.  Thus  it  may  be  prov'd,  there  are  but  a  few  true 
Friends :  If  a  true  Friend  Ihould  be  ready,  on  fit  Occafion, 
to  die  for  his  Friend,  there  are  then  but  a  few  true  Friends; 
for  there  are  but  a  few  fo  difpos'd ;  or  thus,  there  are  but 
few  difpos'd  to  die  for  their  Friend ;  therefore,  but  a  few  true 
Friends;  If  every  true  Friend  Ihould  be  ready,  on  fit  Oc- 
cafion,  to  die  for  his  Friend  :  or  elfe  (in  rhe  moft  formal 
way  prcfcriVd  by  Logicians,  but  feldom  us'd  in  Speaking  or 
Writing)  thus, 

If  a  true  Friend  be  ready,  on  fit  Occafion,  to  die  for  his 

Friend,  there  arc  but  few  true  Friends  ; 
But  a  true  Friend  ihould  be  ready,  on  fit  Occafion,  to  die 

for  his  Friend  : 
Ergo  (therefore)  There  are  but  few  true  Friends. 

Or  to  fave  the  Trouble  of  repeating,  'tis  ufual  in  the  School? 
to  fay,  in  fuch  a  Cafe, 

But  the  Antecedent,  or  the  former  is  true : 
Ergo,  fo  is  the  Confequent,  or  the  latter. 

§  3.  In  all  the  ways  of  Arguing  out  this  Point,  there  is 
fomewhat  firft  fuppos'd,  as  connected  with  the  Qvieftion  or 
Point  to  be  prov'd,  and  then  aver'd,  as  what  is  Self-evident, 
or  has  been  provM,  or  at  leaft  may  be,  vi:{.  that  a  true  Friend 
Ihould  be  difpos'd  to  die  for  his  Friend,  and  thereupon  it  is 
undeniably  concluded,  there  are  but  few  true  Friends,  pro- 
vided the  thing  aver'd  be  true,  and  its  Connexion  with  the 
Queftvon  right :  The  latter  is  here  eafily  made  our,  by  far- 
^^  iher  Averring  what  lies  as  the  imply'd  Foundatioii  of  that 

6UJ.  "  i.    ■a  /^     _ 


Chap.  2.  Improvement  of  ^.tzion.  225 

Connexion,  vi^.  that  there  are  but  few  fo  difpofed  ;  and 
therefore,  if  true  Friends  muft  be  fo  difpos'd,  there  are  but 
few  of  then.  The  former  Remains  to  be  otherwife  made 
out,  vi:{,  that  a  true  Friend  muft  be  fo  difpos'd. 

§  4.  The  fame  Point  might  be  prov'd  by  fuppofing  its 
contradii5t:ory  and  loading  it  with  fomewhat  which  is  falfe, 
but  neceffarily  confequcnt  upon  it :  Thus,  if  there  be  many 
true  Friend*,  tliere  are  many  who  are  ready  to  die  for  their 
Friend  on  fie  Occafion ;  but  there  are  not  many  who  are 
fo  :  E.  There  are  not  many,  or  there  are  but  few  true 
Friends.  And  thus  wc  fee  the  Argument  holds  from  the 
Contradidhon  of  the  Confequent,  or  latter  Part  to  theCon- 
tradicftion  of  the  Antecedent,  or  foregoing  Part,  as  well  is 
from  the  /Averment  or  Alferting  of  the  former  to  that  of  the 
latter. 

§  5.  And  this  may  be  farther  feen  in  the  following  tn- 
ftances  : 

Where  Envying  end.  Strife  «-,   there  is  Confufion  and  every 

Evil  iVork^  J 
But  in  many  places  there  is  Envying  and  Strife : 
jB.   In  maliy  places  there  is  Confufion  and  every  Evil 

Work. 

t)r  we  niay  thus  Argue  from  the  Relative  Pofition, 

But  in  Heaven  there  is  not  Confufion  and  every  Evil 

Work  (nor  indeed  any ) ; 
E.  In  Heaven  there  is  not  Envying  and  Strife, 

Again, 

If  the  Dead  rife  not^  then  Chriji  dyd  in  vain  • 
But  Chrift  dy'd  not  in  vain  i 
E.  The  dead  fhall  rife. 

Farther,  our  Saviour  hath  faid, 

If  I  be  lifted  up,  I  will  draw  all  Men  to  me  ; 

But  he  was  lifted  up : 

£.  He  draws  to  him  all  Men,  Gentiles  as  well  as  Jew;. 
.  §  6.  But  the  Argument  will  not  hold  from  the  Corrra- 
1!  A  "  ^^^''^  Antecedent  to  that  of  the  Confequent,  oc  from 
the  Averring  of//..«  to  the  Averring  of  that;  unlefs  w^  do,  or 
at  leaft  might  add  a  Term  of  Reftridlion  to  the  Antecedent 
as  in  that  of  the  Apoftle,  If  ye  live  after  the  Flejh,  ye  fht'l  d-! 
(orPerifh  Eternally)  but  if  ye,  thro'  the  Spirii  40  mortijie  the 
^^^d^iof  the  Body,  je  fhall  live  iovhQEtQmiWyhkirsi   ,  whe,e 

Ra  it 


2^6 Aft  tjfay  for  the  Part  111. 

it  might  be  faid  on  both  hands  [only  in  Cafe]  you  do  fo  or 
fb,  you  fhall  fare  fo  orfo  :  Upon  which  it  might  be  afl'um'd 
and  concluded, 

But  ye  are  not  tending  to  Eternal  Death : 
E.  Ye  live  not  after  the  Fkrti. 

Or  on  the  contrary, 

But  ye  are  tending  to  Eternal  Death, 
£,  Ye  do  live  after  the  Flclh. 

And  as  to  the  other  part  of  the  fnppcfed  Cafe,  it  might  be 
argud, 

But  yc  are  in  the  way  to  Eternal  Life : 

E.  Ye  do  thro'  the  Spirit  mortifie  the  deeus  of  the  Body. 

Or  on  the  Contrary. 

But  ye  are  not  in  the  way  to  Eternal  I  ife : 
E,  Ye  do  not  thro'  the  Spirit  mortifie  the  deeds  of  the 
Body. 

§  7.  The  Ground  and  Reafon  of  this  whole  Matter  lies 
thus ;  If  the  Antecedent  be  a  Certain  Caufe  or  Etfetft,  or  Con- 
comitant of  the  Confequent  then  in  Cafe  the  former  be,  the 
Intter  muft  aifobe  ;  or  [(tins  be  not,  neither  is  tha^^  and  if 
the  former  were  irideed  an  m'y  Caufe,  a  wc  jfi  y  Effedt,  or 
iufcf  arable  Concomitant  of  the  latter  (fo  that  it  might  be  truly 
faid  \_only  if\  or  {only  where'},  it  is  thus  or  this,  it  muft  be 
Ijkewife  fo  or  fo.-  or  on  the  other  hand  {_'»')  if\  or  {jnily 
where}  'tis  rot  thus  or  thus,  neither  muft  it  be  fo  or  fo  • :  in 
fuch  Cafe,  if  the  former  be  not,  neither  is  tlie  latter  f  and  if 
the  latter  be  fo,  fo  muft:  alfo  the  former.  All  this  will  more 
plainly  appear  by  the  following  Inftance. 

§  8.  If  <7  be  always  followed  by  u  in  the  fame  Word, 
then  in  the  fame  Word,  where  ej  is,  there  nmft  alfo  be 
V ;  and  where  no  u  is  exprefs'd  or  underftood,  neither 
muft  there  be  rj:  and  whereas  it  ma^  be  truely  faid,  only 
%vherc  there  is  an  u  (expreis'd  or  underltood/  there  is  alfa 
a  q :  therefore  it  may  be  fubfum'd. 

Eat  in  the  "Word  C^ni.s]  there  is  no  «,  therefore  neither  is 
there  a  ^  ;  or  thus,  but  in  [QUEEN]  there  is  a  ?,  and  there- 
fore  there  is  alfo  an  u  :  But  it  cannot  be  truly  laid,  only 
vi'here  there  is  a  .Q^ there  is  an  V ;  therefore  it  can't  be  rightly 
argu'd  ti  at  in  [DUKE]  there  is  ro  </i  thi'icfore  neither  is 
there  an  « i  or  that  in  [Dutchefs]  there  is  an  w,  and  therefore 

alio 


I 


Chap  2.  Improvement  of  tveaion.  2^7 

alfo  a  f ;  fince  'tis  not  2,  alone,  which  isfollow'd,  or  accom- 
pany'd  with  U, 

§  p.  In  this  fort  of  Proof,  there  fhould  be  due  Care  taken,' 
that  the  Conreqoence  or  Connexion  lie  not  too  open  ;  but 
that  if  it  be  not  Self-evident,  it  may  at  leaft  be  made  good, 
at  once,  without  proceeding  to  prove  that  farther  Confe- 
quence,  by  which  the  firft  Confequence,  or  Connexion  is 
made  out,  as  may  fufiiciently  appear  by  what  has  been  faid  : 
And  upon  the  whole, 

§  10.  kn  Hjpthctical  or  I{elative^N2iy  oi  kvgvimg  (which 
maybecalFd  Cotijuncllve^  as  it  takes  the  Terms  of  theQpefti- 
on  both  together)  is  not  ordinarily  to  be  chofen,  but  rather 
that,  which  they  call  Categorical^  which  is  more  Abfolute 
and  Diredt ;  but  this  is  not  under  prefcnt  Confideration :  As 
to  what  we  are  now  upon  ;  it  may  be  obferv'd,  that  Relative 
and  Conditional  Arguments  are  much  of  the  fame  Na'-jore ; 
they  may  be  often  readily  turn'd,  cither  of  them  into  the 
other ;  and  tho'  they  begin  fomewhat  differently,  yet  they 
both  proceed  alike. 

^11.  What  has  been  here  obferv'd,  may  be  plainly  fecn 
in  the  following  Inftances. 

Becnufe  I  live  ffays  our  Saviour  y,  ye /hall  live  alfo^ 
Or,  If  Hive,  ye  Ihall  live  alfo; 
But  I  live  :    Therefore  ye  ihall  alfo  live, 

Again, 

H^ioere  I  /tw,  there  (halt  alfo  my  Servant  be  ; 
Or,  If  I  be  in  Heaven,  fo  fhall  my  Servant  alfo  be ; 
But  I  fliall  be  in  the  Heavenly  State  of  Happinefs  ai^l 

Glory  : 
E.  My  Servant  Ihall  be  in  the  like  State  with  me. 

On  the  other  hand, 

If  upon  my  not  going  away  the  Comforter  will  not  come; 
but  that,  if  I  depart,  I  Ihall  fend  him  unto  you ; 

It  is  then  expedient  for  youi,  that  I  go  away: 
Or,  Where  the  Cafes  is  fucb,  that  upon  my  not  going 
away,  the  Comforter  will  not  come;  but  that  upon 
my  departing,  I  Ihall  fend  him  unto  you  ;  it  mult 
there  for  in  that  Cafey  be  expedient  for  you,  chat  X 
go  away; 


R  i  And 


^258  An  tjjay  jortU  Part  III. 

And  fi«m  cither  of  thcfe  Ways  of  delivering  the  Propolition 
the  AlTumption  and  Conclulion  will  oe  both  as  follows. 

But  upon  vc\y  not  going  away,  the  Coinforter  \vill  not 
con:iei  whereas  upon  i«y  Departure  I  will  fend  hin\ 
untq  you : 

E.  If  is  expedien:  for  )  ou,  that  I  go  au'ay.  Q^  E.  P. 

§  1 2,  A  Conditional  or  Relative  way  of  reafoning  may 
beredi^c'd  to  that  which  is  more  Abfolure  ;  where  theCon- 
(ditiorial,  of  Relative  Enunciation  confilts  but  of  two  or  of 
three  diftind:  Terms ;  Loth  or  one  of  them  being  repeated 
to  make  up  four.     Thus  inftead  of  faying, 

If  V  always  follow  <2,,  then  V  may  well  be  underftood. 

But  the  former  is  true ;  And  therefore  lo  is  the  latter. 

Th?  fame  Point  may  be  thus  argu'd, 

A  Letter,  which  always  follows  another,   may  well  be 

underftood  in  that  other  ; 
But  the  Letter  ty  always  follows  the  Letter  Q^ ; 
£.  The  Letter  V  may  well  be  underftood  in  Q,. 

And  inftead  of  fa)  ing, 

As  Abrahtim  was  juftifv'd,  (owe  muft  be  juftifvVi  ; 

Bur  Abrahr.m  was  juftify'd  by  Faich  {H^jw.  IV.);  yet  not 
altogether widiout  Works,  (^-tOT.lL  11,21,23  > 

L.  We  are  to  be  juftify'd  by  Faith,  and  yeu  not  altoge- 
ther without  Works: 

It  ma  J  be  laid, 

Ab'Ahnyn^  and  we,  are  to  be  juftify'd  in  the  fame  way ; 
But  Abrahmn  was  juftify'd  by  Faith,  yen  nor  altogether 

without  Works : 
1^.  We  are  alfo  to  be  juftify'd  by  Faith,  yet  not  altoge- 
~  ther  without  Works. 

§  13.  But  where  there  are  four  fevcral  Terms  in  the 
Conditional,  or  Relative  Propofition  the  Enunciation,  which 
is  added  in  order  to  Proof,  being  wholly  diftindt  from  that, 
■which  was  to  be  prov'd) ;  in  fuch  Cafe  the  Reafoning  cannot 
eaJily,  if  at  all,  be  reduc'd  to  the  more  abfolute  Categorical 
Form ;  but  it  muft  generally  remain  Conditional  or  Relative, 
becaufe  the  two  alfumed  Terms  cannot  be  apply'd  at  once,  as 
one  common  Meafureto  the  Terms  of  the  Qjjeftion  feverally, 
-   .  .       .  to 


Chap.  5.  Improvement  of  Reaicn.  239 

to  fliew  their  Agreement  or  Difagreement :  And  yet  they 
may  be  perhaps  apply'd  one  after  the  other  in  two  diftinft 
Arguments,  as  may  be  fliewn  in  our  Procedure  upon  thepre- 
fenc  General  Head.     And  in  fome  Cafes  at  lealt, 

§  14.  There  may  be  away  of  comprizing  thetwo  Terms 
of  the  New  Enunciation  in  one  that  is  comphcated,  as  in 
the  forementioned  Inftance  it  might  be  faid. 

That  which  infer'd  the  Comforters  not  coming,  was  not 
exped  ient  for  our  Lord's  Difciples ; 

But  his  not  going  away  infer'd  the  Comforters  not  com- 
ing to  them : 

£.  Our  Lord's  not  going,  was  not  expedient  for  his 
Difciples. 

On  the  other  hand, 

That  which  infer'd  the  Comforter's  being  fent  was  expe- 
dient for  our  Lord's  Difciples; 

But  his  Departure  infer'd  the  Comfoner's  being  fent  un- 
to them  ; 

£.  His  Departure  was  expedient  for  our  Lord's  Difciples. 


CHAP.    III. 

§  r  DEfides  the  more  Simple  Conditional  or  Relative  way 
•■-'  of  Arguing,   there  may  be  in  this  Kind,    what  is 
more  Compouvded^    where  the  Propofition  is  either  fuch  as  we 
may  call  Coliecftive,  or  Diftributive,    And, 

I .  When  it  is  CollcHive^  'tis  ufually  term'd  an  Induciioni 
and  gathers  in  all  the  Sorts,  or  Parts,  or  Cafes,  that  it  may 
infer  fomewhat  as  to  the  Kind,  or  Whole,  which  is  firft  lup- 
pos'd,  and  thenaver'd  of  every  Part  or  Sort. 

§  2.  This  Kind  of  Argument  holds,  when  the  Indudion 
or  Emmciarion  is  full,  or  however  made  out,  by  fome  or 
other  Supplemental  Phrafc,  as  £.  gr.  [and  all  the  reft],  or 
Cand  there  is  no  Inftance  to  the  Contrary] :  provided  alfb,' 
that  what  is  Suppos'd  and  Aver'd  of  the  Sons  or  Parts  do  re- 
ally agree  or  difagree  to  them,  Materially  taken  in  refped:  of 
their  Nature,  not  formaUj  as  they  are  Sorts  or  Parts.  The 
concluding  Force  of  fuch  Argument  lies  in  this  evident  Prin-' 
ciple,  that  what  can  be  To  affirm'd  or  denied  of  each,  may  be 
accordingly  pronounc'd  of  AH,  or  of  the  Whole : 

R  4      '  §3.  Thus 


540  An  kiffay  pr  the  Part  III- 

§  3.    Thusir  holds,  that, 

Genefis,  Excdui,  Leviticv^,  and  the  other  Parts  of  our 
Bible  are  of  Divine  Original :     E.  So  is  the  Whole. 

And  again, 

Scholars,  Traders,  and  Soldiers,  are  Mortal ;  nor  can 
any  fort  of  Men,  or  any  cnc  Man  beproduc'd,  that  is 
not  fo  : 

£.  All  Men  are  Mortal. 

But  what  agrees  to  the  Sorts  or  Parts,  a<  they  are  contradi- 
Itinguilh'd  to  the  Kind  or  Wliole  cannot  agree  tliereto  .-  And 
tiiercfore  it  will  not  hold  good,  that  iince, 

The  Head,  Trunk,  and  I  imbsare  eachlefs  than  the  Body  : 
Therefore  the  whole  is  fo. 

bccaufe  tbnt  v^.i.\  fiid  of  them  as  Parts  formally  confiJer'd  j 
but  ic  mighcb^J^d., 

The  Head,  Trunk,  and  Limbs  are  made  up  of  fepara- 

bic  Particks  : 
Thercioie  the  whole  Bod)  is  made  up  of  fuch  Particles. 

.S-4.  k  is  to  be  ebferVd,  that  Indu£lions  are  commonly 
delivc;'d,  as  in  the  mentioned  Ini\ances,  in  the  Form  of  an 
Efithymcrn?^  or  -Argument,  vvhcre:n  one  Enunciation  is  to  be 
wndcrllood  as  ref-rv'd  ( v  t-*  &,uw)  in  the  Mind  of  him  that 
offers  ir,  anJ  erifily  fupply'd  by  others :  In  the  prelent  Cafe 
the  Prupoli'lon  wanrmg  to  make  the  Argument  entire  and 
expl.cire  is  of  this  Nature, 

If  (or  where)  each  feveral  Part  or  every  Sort  or  Cafe  is 
lb  or  lb,  the  Whole  nauft  likewife  be  fo  or  fo. 

As  in  the  following  Example, 

If  not  only  Perfonal  but  Real  Securities,  not  only  when 
we  have  to  do  with  Men  that  arc  Unable  or  Diihoneft, 
but  with  fuch  as  are  both  Able  and  Honeft,  be  liable  to 
ibme  Hazard  j  then  all  Securities  are  liat»le  to  feme 
hazard  :,  - 

But  Perfonal  and  Real  Sccvirities  from  Men,  who  are 
borh  Vbieand  Honeft,  as  well  as  from  thofe  who  are 
e  ther  DnaWe  or  Dilhoneft,  are  liable  to  fome  Hazard : 

E.  insecurities  are  liable  to  fcane  Hazard. 


2,  When 


chap.  3.  Improvement  of  Reafon.  241 


§  5.  2.  When  the  Conditional  or  Relative  Propofition  is 
Diftrilutive^  the  Diftribution  muft  be  proper  and  full  (as 
hath  been  (hewn,  Part  II.  Chap.  18.  §  10.)  and  then  the  Ar- 
gument proceeds,  either  by  (imple  Averring,orelfe  with  aRea- 
fon  fubjoin'd  to  each  Member  of  the  Disjund:ion  :  And  here, 

(  I.)  That  which  iimply  Avers,  do's  either  aflert  the  An- 
tecedent to  infer  the  Confequent;  or  rejeft  the  Confequent, 
that  it  may  alfo  reject  the  Antecedent,  either,  or  both  of 
which  may  be  Disjundive;  Here  the  Pisjundlion  muft  be 
rightly  made,  and  alfo  the  Antecedent  or  Confequent  rightly 
allerted,  or  reje£led  : 

§  6,    Thus  it  may  be  feen  in  the  following  Inftance, 

if  the  Money  paid  were  of  the  largeft  ufual  Coin,  Gold, 
or  Silver,  or  both ;  it  muft  be  either  Broad-pieces,  or 
Guineas,  or  Crowns,  or  of  two  of  the  Sorts,  or  of  all 
three. 

But  the  former  is  true :    E.  fo  is  the  latter. 
Or,  But  the  latter  is  falfe  :    E.  The  Former  is  fo  too. 

And  whereas  it  may  be  truly  faid,  that  only  in  ftich  Cafe  the 
Money  paid  muft  be  of  fuch  Sorts  y  we  may  thereupon  farther 
Argue  thus, 

Bur  the  Money  paid  was  not  of  the  largeft  ufual  Coin,^ 

Gold  or  Silver,  or  both  : 
£.  It  was  not  Broad-pieces,  Guineas,  or  Crowns,  01  of 

two  of  the  Sorts,  or.  of  all  thfee. 

Or  elfe  thus, 

iBut  it  was  in  y«ci  Pieces  :    £.  So  paid. 

§  7.  (i.)  What  is  commonly  call'd  a  Dilemma^  but  may 
Iconfift  of  more  Branches  than  two,  fubjoins  a  Reafin^  or  En- 
forcement to  the  feveral  Branches.  *Tis  granted  indeed,  that 
a  Dilemma,  properly  fo  call'd,  may  ordinarily  carry  with  it 
clearer  Evidence,  fince  a  Disjundlion  of  two  Parts  only, 
muft  make  them  more  diredly  Oppofitc,  and  better  to  illu- 
ftraie  each  other  ;  but  the  Argument  is  no  lefs  firm,  when- 
|ever  the  DisjundJion  is  right,  and  the  Enforcement  fufficienc 
ro  the  Purpofe  in  hand. 

§  8.  In  this  kind  of  Argument,  when  all  the  Parts  and  Cafes 
belonging  to  the  prefent  Matter  are  taken  up,  and  each  of 
them  fufficiently  refuted  or  coniirm'4,  the  Conclufion  muft  be 
good,  in  relationto  the  Whole.-    £.  Gr, 


Happinefs 


2-42.  An  bffav  for  the  Part  III 

Happinefsisnot  reafonably  to  be  expeded  in  this  Life: 
For  that  here  Things  muft  go  either  altogether  ill,  or 

well,  or  with  a  Mixture  of  both : 
If  Things  go  altogether  ///,   we  are  plainly  Wretchec 

and  Uneafie; 
If  altogether  TVffi7,  we  may  reafonably  fear  a  Change  foi 

the  \\'orfe ; 
If  there  be  a  Mixture  of  botb^  our  Satisfadion  muft  b( 

mix'd,  and  allay'd  with  its  Contrary. 

And  again, 

We  fhall  be  cx)mpletely  Happy  in  the  Heavenly  State: 
For  cither  we  (hall  there  have  no  farther  Defires,  or  \V( 

Ihallhave  them: 
If  nor,  then  we  fliall  enjoy  a  continual,  full,  andprefen 

Saii-facilion,- 
it  wl'  Ihall  have  farther  Defires,  we  (hall  have  withal  th< 

joyful  Experience  of  finding  them  continually  anfwer'c 

or  outdone,  together  with  the  moft  aflured  profpedt  o 

its  being  always  fo. 

^  9.  Thus  we  fee  this  manner  of  Arguing,  ferves  not  onlj 
for  a  Negative,  but  an  Affirmative  Qiieftion,  for  Confirma- 
tion, as  well  as  Confutation  ,•  and  there  is  always  a  Condi 
tional  or  Relative  Propofition  underftood,  the'  it  be  very  {q\ 
dom,  if  ever,  exprefs'd  ;  but  it  might  be  faid  in  the  Inftancc 
above,  that  if  things  muft  here  go  either  altogether  ill,  o] 
well,  or  with  a  Mixture  of  both,  we  cannot  reafonably  look  tc 
be  happy  in  this  World ;  Whether  we  (hall  have  farther  De 
fires  in  Heaven,  or  not  have  them,  we  (hall  either  way  be  Happ^ 
there  ;  as  has  appear'd  by  the  Reafons  added  to  the  fevera 
Branches  in  both  Examples. 

§10.  In  the  more  Abfolute  and  Pofitive  way  of  Reafon 
ing,  the  Terms  of  the  Queftion  are  in  fome  fort  aker'd,  th( 
Qiieftion  not  being  taken  juft  as  it  ftood  before;  And  it 
Terms  are  placed  either  in  the  fame  Enunciation  or  in  feve 
ral :  When  the  Terms  of  the  Queftion  are  fome  way  aker'd 
and  yet  put  in  the  fame  Enunciation,  the  Argument  is  wha 
they  commonly  call  DisjunRive,  from  its  firft  Propofition. 

§  II.  In  the  Disjundive  Propofition,  we  affirm  pofitive 
ly  and  directly  (not  Conditionally  or  Relatively),  yet  not  am 
one  thing  dererminately,  but  only  one  or  other  of  the  men 
tion^d  Attributes  of  one  or  other  of  the  mentioned  Subjects 
when  both  the  Terms  of  the  dueftion  are  Disjundtive. 

§11.1 


Chap  3.  Improvewent  of  Reafon.  145 

§  1 2.  In  this  kind  of  Argument  the  Predicate  of  the  Que- 
ftion,  together  with  one  or  more  alTumed  Terms  arc  dif- 
jun£livelv  affirm'd  of  the  Subjedt,  and  then  the  newly  af- 
fumed  Pare  is  either  deny'd,  to  infer  what  was  before  af- 
iirm'd,  or  elfc  affirm'd,  to  infer  what  was  before  den;,  'd :  Or, 
there  may  be  one  or  more  New  Terms  Disjundliveiy  added 
to  the  Subiect  of  the  Queftion  ;  and  the  Predicate  deny'd  of 
thofe  newly  alfumed  Subiects,  in  order  to  its  being  AfH^m'J 
of  the  other;  or  elfe  alfirm'd  of  an  alTumed  Subjed:,  ii  r- 
der  to  its  being  deny'd  of  that,  which  before  wastheSubj.:,:!: 
cf  the  Queftion. 

§  13.  To  make  this  way  of  Arguing  hold,  the  Disjundii- 
onmuft  be  right,  /.  e.  Proper  and  Perfed:;  and  what  is  af- 
firm'd  or  deny'd  as  to  the  part  alfum'd  muft  alfo  be  ti  ue :     As 

n  the  Argument  following,  to  (hew  that  Man  is  compounded 

fa  Soul  and  Body, 

Man  is  either  only  a  Spirit,   or  a  Body  alone  j   or  elfe 

Compounded  of  a  Soul  and  Body , 
But  he  is  not  only  a  Spirit,  nor  a  Body  alone : 
E.  He  is  compounded  of  a  Soul  and  Body. 

The  Disjun£lion  may  be  put  upon  the  Subjedt  thus, 

Either  the  Sun,   or  the  Moon,   or  fomething  elfe  is  the 
created  Fountain  of  Light. 

But  neither  the  Moon,  nor  any  thing  diftindt  from  ths 
Sun  and  Moon  is  the  Created  Fountain  of  Light. 

E.  The  Sun  is  that  Fountain  of  Light. 

§  1 4.  When  both  parts  of  the  Propofition  are  Disjun(ftive,the 
Conclufion  muft  have  cither  a  Disjundive  Subjed  or  Predicate^ 

Either  Silver  or  Gold  is  the  heavieft  or  lighteft  of  Metals ; 
But  Silver  is  neither  the  Heavieft  nor  the  lighteft  : 
E.  Gold  is  either  the  heavieft  or  the  lighteft  of  Metals. 

And  it  may  be  carry'd  on  to  what  is  determinate,  thus. 

But  Gold  is  not  the  lighteft  of  Metals: 
£.  It  is  the  heavieft. 

Or  we  may  conclude  the  foregoing  Argument  with  a  dif- 

]undive  Subjea,  in  this  Manner, 

But  neither  Silver  nor  Gold  are  the  lighteft  of  Mecals: 
E.  Either  Silver  or  Gold  is  the  heavieft  Metal. 

And  to  bring  the  Matter  to  a  Point, 

Silver  is  not  the  heavieft  Metal;    E.  Gold  is  io» 

§i$.Ic 


244  ^^  ^IP^y  f^^  ^^^^  ^^'^t  1^^' 

^  \<i'  it  is  fufficient  that  the  Subjedt  or  Predicate  of  the 
Queftion  make  a  part  of  the  Dis)Ufi<ftion  inSeiife  and  Mean- 
ing,  tho'  it  be  not  exprefs'd  therein ;  as  here. 

It  (i.  e.  the  Time)  is  one  of  the  Twelve  Hours  ; 
But  it  is  none  of  the  Nme  firft :  E.  One  of  the  Three  laft. 
Or,  None  of  the  Three  laft  :    £,  One  of  the  Nine  firft. 

Inftead  of  faying  more expUciteJy, 

It  is  either  one  of  the  Nine  firft  Hours,  or  of  the  three  lafi ; 
But  it  is  None  of,  ^c as  before. 

The  Predicate  of  the  Queftion,  or  Point  to  be  Concluded,  ^was 
to  be  found  exprelly  mention'd  only  in  the  Ccnclufion  of  the 
foregoing  Argument ;  yet  it  was  imply'd  in  the  Propoficion, 
when  it  was  faid.  It  ts  one  of  the  twelve  Hours,  for  all  the 
Twelve  comprize  both  the  Nine  firft,  and  Threelaft. 


CHAP.     IV. 

§  I.  \T7HEN  the  Terms  of  the  Queftion  are  fo  far  alter'd 
^  as  to  be  feparated  from  each  other,  and  placed  in 
diftindt  Enunciations  j  there  are  either  two  Enunciations  on- 
ly, or  more  than  two  to  infer  the  Condufion. 

W  hen  the  re  are  more  than  two  En '  i  nciations  to  infer  the  Con- 
dufion, there  is  one  or  more  intervening  betwixt  that,  which 
has  the  Subjed:  of  the  Queftion  fubje^fed  in  it,  and  that 
which  has  the  Predicate  of  the  Queftion  for  its  Predicate ; 
and  here  the  Predicate  of  the  foregoing  Enunciation  is  ftill 
made  the  Sul  jcA  of  the  following,  till  we  come  to  the  Con- 
dufion, wherein  the  laft  Predicate  is  attributed  to  the  firft 
Subjedt. 

§  z.  This  way  of  Reafoning  is  commonly  call'd  a  Sorites^ 
as  being  a  heap  of  Syllogifms  laid  together;  but  (it  plainly 
appears)  net  without  Order  and  Connexion ;  and  therefore 
it  might  rather  be  term'd,  a  Chain  of  Enunciations,  where- 
in the  following  do  (^u.)  take  hold  of  the  foregoing,  and  all 
together  draw  after  them  the  CoDclufion  :  And  here  every 
imin^iate  Connexion  fhould  be  either  Self-evident,  acknow- 
ledged, or  otherways  confirm'd ;  and  befides  this,  every  Pre- 
dication muft  refped;  the  Subjed  reduplicatively,  as  it  u 
fuch. 

§13.  And 


Chap.  4-  Improvement  of  ?y.tdiion,  245 


§  3.  And  thus  ic  is  in  that  Inftance,  {{om.  8.  29,  3  o-  Thofa 
who  are  fore-known  of  God  (as  benigfo)  were  predtruiuted ; 
Thefe  (as  fuch)  are  cali'd ;  Thcle  again  (as  being  fo)  are  ju- 
ftified;  And  iinaliy,  thefe  (as  fucb)  are  Glorified;  and  there- 
fore thofe  who  are  foreknown  of  God  arc  lure  to  be  Glorifi'd 
by  him. 

§  4,  The  Force  of  this  kind  of  Argument  lies  in  that  eve- 
ry following  lerm  is  conncded  with  the  foregoing  direAly 
and  according  to  its  Nature,  nocObliqviely  andbs  Accident  j 
as  when  they  fay,  he  that  drinks  well  (meaning  largely,  and 
to  Excefs)  Sleeps  well  (and  even  here  is  no  certain  or  direct 
Connexion);  he  that  Sleeps  well,  thinks  no  Evil;  He  that 
thinks  no  Evil  is  a  good  Man  :  £.  He  that  Drinks  well  (as 
before)  is  a  Good  Man. 

§  5.  A  Sorites  (or  Chain  of  Syliogifir.s)  is  refolvable 
into  a  Train  of  common  Categorical  Syllogifms,  as  in  ^pm. 
8.  1  hat  tljc  foreknown  (f  Gcd,  ai  e  fure  to  Uc glorif/d  is  thus  de- 
duced and  Confirmed.  The  Juftify'd  are  fure  to  be  Glorify'd  5 
but  the  foreknown  of  God  are  juftify'd  :  E'gc^  The  fore- 
known of  God  are  fure  to  be  Glorify 'd.  Now  'tis 
^en  as  fi.fficiently  Evident,  that  the  jujlify\i  are  Jure 
piB  be  Glo-  ify'd :  And  that  the  forek'^cven  of  God  are  jt^jiifyd^  is 
t^s  made  out,  the  Cali'd  are  Juftify'd;  but  the  Foreknown 
of  God  are  Cali'd  :  £.  Thefe  are  Juftify'd.  That  the  Cali'd 
are  Juftify'd  is  here  fuppos'd  to  need  no  Pioof,  or  to  have 
been  prov'd,  or  to  be  granted  ;  That  the  Forcknoven  of  God  are 
c<i^'W,  is  thus  evinced,  the  Prcdeftinated  are  Calfd;  but  the 
Foreknown  of  God  are  Predeltinated :  Therefore  the  Fore- 
known of  God  are  alfo  Cali'd.  Now  'tis  here  fuppos'd,  that 
neither  of  the  two  former  Enunciations  requires  any  Proo^ 
and  therefore,  that  the  whole  Argument  is  hnilh'd,  and  the 
Point  firft  intended  fufficiently  e\inc'd,  vi:{.  that  die  Fore- 
knoven  of  God  are  jure  to  be  Glorify  d^  fince  the  Juftify'd  are  fure 
to  be  Glorify 'd,  the  Cali'd  are  certainly  Juftify'd,  the  Prede- 
itinated  certainly  Cali'd,  and  the  Foreknown  certainly  Pre- 
deitinated. 

§  6.  When  there  are  only  two  Ennuneiations  to  infer  the 
Q^ieftion  'tis  what  may  be  cali'd  a  Simple  Categorical  Syllogifm^ 
in  which  a  new  Term,  brought  for  Proof,  is  placed  with  the 
Predicate  of  the  Queftion,  or  Mnjor  (becaufe  commonly  the 
larger)  Term  in  the  Major  Propcjjtion,  which  is  ufually  firft 
pkc'd,  and  fuppos'd  to  be  fo  always  by  the  Rules  commonly 
given  ;  the  lame  New  Term  is  alfo  put  together  with  the 
buDjecl  of  the  Queftion  (or  Minor  Term)  in  the  Minor  Prof* 
vjitio/i  or  Aliiimpiion. 

i  7.  The 


«■ t 

246  An  Ejjay  for  the  Part  ill 

§  7.  The  Middle  Term  is  as  a  kind  of  Meafure,  whid 
muft  agree  to  one  Term  of  the  Queftion  at  leaft,  and  being 
apply'd  to  the  other  Serves  to  Ihew  the  Agreement  or  Diia 
greement  of  the  Subjed:  and  Predicate ;  which  do  in  fuch 
fort  and  fo  far  Agree  with  each  other,  more  or  lefs,  and  alfo 
more  or  lefs  certainly,  according  as  they  do  both  Agree  widi 
the  Middle  Term  ;  or  elfe  they  difagree  one  of  them  from  the 
other,  according  as  one  of  them  is  difagreeing  from  the  mid-, 
die  Term,  in  fuch  refpedl  wherein  the  other  is  agreeing 
thereto. 

§  8.  And  as  this  new  afllimed  Term  is  fub]e(fled  or  pre 
dicated,  the  Syllogifm  is  faid  to  be  in  this  or  that  Figitre  ac- 
cording to  the  Memorative  Verfe. 

Suhjice,  fre ',  bis  pre  ;  bisfub;  pre^  fub  dato  quart^e. 

Which  may  be  thus  rendred  in  a  fort  of  Englijh  Hexameter, 

Subjeil,  pre ;  twice  pre ;  twice  fub ;  pre,  fubto  the  fourth 
give. 

The  Meaning  is,  that  the  middle  or  alfumedTerm  fliouldbe 
made  the  Subje£^  of  the  Major  Propolition,  and  Predicate  of 
the  Minor  in  the  fir  ft  Figure  ;  that  it  be  Predicated  in  both 
■  for  the  fecond  Figure ;  twice  fubjeded  in  the  third  ;  and 
that  it  be  firft  Predicated  then  fubjeded  for  the  fourth. 

This  laft  concludes  as  well  as  the  reft,  tho'  ordinarily  that 
manner  of  placing  the  middle  Term,  be  not  fo  well  fuited  to 
the  common  way  of  Speech,  and  therefore  appears  unnatu- 
ral, and  is  ufually  faid  to  be  indiredt,  whenas  fome  fort  of 
Matter  will  as  little  bear  to  be  put  into  fome  other  of  the  Fi- 
gures, fo  as  to  appear  Natural  and  Dire<ft. 

§  9.  We  are  commonly,  tho'  infenfibly  led  by  the  Mat 
ter  of  the  Queftion,  and  Ufage  of  Speech  to  form  oar  Argu- 
ment, in  this  or  that  Figure,  into  which  it  falls  more  readily, 
and  it  might  feem  that  the  firft  Figure,  if  we  alter  the  place- 
ing  of  the  Premifes,  putting  the  Minor  Propofition  firft, 
would  be  more  eafie  and  ready  than  the  ways  of  placing  novv 
us'd  in  the  Schools :  Thus  the  Subject  of  the  Qiieftion  would 
lead,  and  the  Predicate  follow  after,  as  they  do  in  the  Quefti- 
on it  felf,  and  the  Middle  Term  would  be  repeated  in  the 
Middle  Place  betwixt  them :    As  in  the  Inftance  here  giv'n, 

Some  Troubles  do  us  Good  j 
What  do's  us  Good  is  Good ; 
E.  Some  Troubles  are  Good. 

Sio.Thif 


l^hap. 4.  J mprove went  of  KQ2i(on.  247 


^  I  o.  This  way  of  Arguing  is  made  up  partly  cf  the  firft 
igure,  and  partly  of  the  fourth,  the  Middle  Term  [doing 
IS  Good]  being  fo  Subjeded  and  Predicated,  in  reference  to 
he  Terms  of  the  Queftion,  as  is  requir'd  by  the  firft  Figure  ; 
.nd  yet  firft  Predicated,  and  afterward  Subjeded,  as  the 
burth  might  feem  to  dired.  The  only  Fault,  which  I  have 
)bferv'd  in  this  way  of  placing  the  Premifes  {i.  e.  thofe 
iBunciations  from  which  the  Conclufion  is  drawn,  and 
ig  which  are  wont  to  be  put  before  it)  is,  that  The  Propojjtion, 
which  is  the  Foundation  of  the  Argument,  is  made  to  follow 
Mthe  other. 

'     §11.    In  the  Inftance  before  given,   C  ^^'^^'^^  ^t-'-f '«  <jo^^  » 
Gocd']^  is  indeed  the  Principle  or  Pofition from  or  upon  which 
we  Argue,  and  therefore  might  feem  to  Challenge  the  firft 
J>lace  in  the  Argument,   and  yet  in  common  Difcouife  and 
Writing,    it  is  generally  placed  laft  by  way  of  Reafon ; 
thus,   Some  Tiotibtes  are  Good',  for  that  i$  Jo,  which  do's  U!  Good: 
Or  thus,  Some  Troubles  are  Good  ;  for  they  do  us  Good.     In  the 
former,   the  Minor  Propofition  is  Underftood,  in  the  latter 
^  the  Major :     Nor   are  both  the  Premifes  wont  to  be  ex- 
^f  prefs'd,   either  in  Difcourfe,  or  Writing  ;   fince  the  Mind  is 
ijeft  pleas'd  to  have  lomewhac  imply 'd,    and  left  to  it  to  fup- 
ply,  and  that  the  feweft  Words  are  beft,  fo  they  do  but  fuf- 
ficiently  convey  the  Senfe. 

§  12.  In  Argumentative  Difcourfes,  where  any  Propofi- 
tion appears  very  Queftionable,  it  may  be  oftentimes  conve- 
nient immediately  to  fubjoin  its  Confirmation  by  way  of 
Reafon  in  the  Procedure  of  our  Difcourfe .-  This  Method  of 
Reafoning  fome  call  an  Epkhirema,  as  giving  a  Proof  out  of 
hand,  and  by  the  way,  as  in  the  following  Argument, 

That  which  is  notabfolutely  Good,  is  not  to  be  abfolute- 
ly  defir'd;  for  we  fhould  not  fo  defire  what  may  do  us 
Hurt  : 

But  outward  Profperity  is  not  abfolutely  Good  ;  for  it 
may  do  us  Hurt,  as  in  making  us  Proud,  Secure,  Z^c: 

E.  Outward  Profperity  is  not  to  be  abluiutely  defir'd. 

§  1 3.  But  if  we  fhould  tranfpofe  the  Premifes  putting  the 
Minor  Propofition  firft  •  the  Technical  H^t^rds  invented  to  ex- 
prefs  the  Quantity  and  Quality  of  the  three  Enunciations  in 
a  Syllogifm,  mult  alfo  have  their  two  firft  Syllables  tranfpos'd, 
unlefs  they  Ihould  happen  to  have  the  fame  Vowel,  as  in 
Bnrua:n,  Dar.pci,  zr\d  liuU'ari,  the  Defign  of  which,  toge- 
ther with  the  reft,  will  be  flicwn,  when  we  come  to  fpeak  cf 
the  M:cds,  or  Modes  and  Ways  cf  Argr.i:  g,  which  wii]  hold 
lii  the  fcveral  Figures,  ^  14.  But 


2_48 Jn  tjfay  for  the  Part  Jii 

§  14.  But  the  long  fixed  Cuftom  of  the  Schools  wil 
icarce  admit  a  New  Manner  of  placing  the  Premifes,  uniefs  i; 
could  infenfibly  Ilide^  in  ;  1  ihall  therefore  content  my  fch 
with  that  which  has  fo  long  obtain'd ;  and  taking  the  MciTJO- 
rative  Terms  of  Art  as  1  find  them,  l"hall  Oiew  the  Grcunds 
upon  which  they  iiand,  aifj  what  other  Modes  might  be  in 
feme  Cales  at  leaft  CoiKluTive,  and  what  may  ferve  inftead  of 
them  alL 


CHAP.     V. 

§  I.  "EVERY  of  the  Three  Enunciations  in  a  Sylfcgifm  of 
'*-'  whacfoever  Figure  muft  be  either  Afirmanve  or 
Negative,  and  the/  are  accounted  Particular,  or  Uni\erfal, 
according  as  the  Subjedt  in  them  is  taken  Particularly  or  Uni- 
verfally  ^  to  this  laft  the  Total  or  Sinpui'ar,  and  what  is  pro- 
perly Indefinite  muft  be  reckon'd,  as  being  of  a  like  Nature 
with  it,  and  to  be  directed  by  the  lame  Rules  and  Meafures  : 
As  to  ar»  Enunciation,  which  is  undetermin'd  only  in  Expref- 
fion,  it  muft  be  accounted  according  to  irs  true  Intend- 
ment, either  Unlverfal  or  Particular,  as  was  ihewn,  Part  11. 
Chap.  17.  §  10. 

§2.  The  Predicate  of  each  Enunciation,  is  always  fup- 
pos'd  to  be  t'nkje'j.ilt)  nken,if  deny'd  j  and  i'nrticuiaiiy,  when 
affirm'd  ;  fo  that  in  this  latter  Cafe,  it  ought  to  have  a  Nfte 
of  Univerfality  adiied,  if  it  be  Univcrlally  defign'd,  as  ic 
may  be  in  attributing  a  Property,  and  muft  be  in  giving  a  juft 
Definition,  or  a  right  Defcription,  for  thefe  ought  to  be  made 
Univerfal  when  the  Propofition  is  Converted,  and  fuch  Pre- 
dicate put  in  the  place  of  the  Subjetft. 

§  3.  Now  where  the  affirmed  Predicate  is  thus  Univer- 
fally  taken  ,  the  Argument  will  certainly  admit  of  being 
otherways  form'd,  then  according  to  the  ulual  allow'd  Mcods, 
or  Modes,  which  are  exprefs'd  for  brevity,  and  for  the  fake  of 
Memory  by  certain  Artificial  Words,  whereij^  the  Vovoel  of 
each  Syllable  (hews  whether  the  Enunciation,  to  which  it  re- 
lates (as  being  in  the  ufaal  placing  ift,  2d,  or  3d,)  is  to  be 
( in  th^  Figure  to  which  that  Mode  belciigsj  Affirmative  or 
Negative,  Univerfal  or  Particular,  underftandlng  them  ac= 
cording  to  the  Memorative  Rule,  thus, 


Chap.  5-  Improvement  of  ^^z{OTS,  249 

y^Jfnif  a,  negate,  vsrum  genaraliter  amh^ : 
y}JJ}rit  i,  negat  o;  fed  parn'ciilai  iter  eimboo 

,    Which  may  be  thus  given  in  EjtgUJh, 

A  do's  affirm,  and  £  deny  5 

Both  Univerfally : 
/  do's  affirm,  and  O  deny ; 

In  Part,  Uncertainly. 

§  4.  The  allowed  Modes  of  the  firft  Figure  (wherein  the 
Middle  Term,  is  fubjeAed  to  the  Predicate  of  the  Queftion, 
and  Predicated  of  its  Subjed j  may  be  remember'd  by  the 
Technical  Words  in  the  following  Verfe, 

B//RB^R.^,   CeL^RENT,  D^Rji,  FERIO,  to 

Sub^  and  ?ie  : 

Thofe  of  the  fecond  ("wherein  the  Middle  Term  is  Predi- 
cated of  both  the  Terms  of  the  Queftion)  by  a  like  fort  of 
Words  in  this, 

CES^RE,  C^^ESTRES,  festjno,  b^roco; 

to  iVDice  Pre  : 

Thofe  of  the  Third  (wherein  the  Middle  Term  is  fubjediei 
to  both  the  Terms  of  the  Queftion) ;  and  alfo  the  Modes  of 
the  Fourth  (in  which  the  Middle  Term  is  predicated  of  the 
Predicate,  and  fubjedted  to  the  Subjedt  of  the  Queftion) 
aay  be  more  eafily  call'd  to  Mind  by  the  Artificial  Words  in 
ine  three  following  Verfes, 

FeL/^PToN,  DlS^MlS,  D^TjS/,  BoC.lKDO, 

FERiSoN, 
Give  with  D^^R/iPTJ,  to  twice  Sub:     But  to  Pre,  and' 

Sub, 
B^RB;^RJ,  CaLLENTeS,  DiBaTiS,  FeSP^MO, 

FRESISOM. 

§  5.     In  and  by  the  Memorative  Terms  it  may  appear, 
chat  in  the  firft  Figure  the  Minor  Propofition  is  Affirrriarive, 
and  the  Major  Univerfal .-     In  the  2d,    that  one  of  the  Pre-,. 
miles  is  Negative,    and  the  Major  Univerfal;    Jn  the  3dj' 
that  the  Minor  is  Affirmative,  and  the  Conclufion  Parti cu- ', 
lar:     In  the  4th,   that  when  the  Major  is  Affirmative^   the 
Minor  is  Univerfal ;   when   the  Minor  is  Affirmative,   the  j 
^oncluf^on  is  Particular  j  and  that  the  Major  is  Univerfal, 
v'hco  the  Queftion  or  Cohclufion  is  Negative, 


250  An  tjfuy  for  the  Part  ill. 

§  6.  Now  whereas  it's  commonly  iaiJ  the  Enunciations  miift 
be  fo  and  fo  (as  in  the  Technical  Words  before  mencion'd), 
and  that  there  canbe  no  more  concluding  Moods  in  fuch  re- 
fpedive  Figures,  it  mull  be  undeillood  to*  be  fo  uponthf? 
forememion'd  Suppofition.s,  as  to  the  quantity  of  the  Predi- 
cate; for  otherwife,  where  tins  is  univcrfally  Affirm'd,  there 
may  be  ( E,  Gr.)  fuch  a  Mode  as  IT  Ahl  in  the  firft  Fi- 
gi're  ;  thus, 

J-       i  AU(jiiodTr'ilntcrum  eji  .■E.jitanguhon ; 
TA~^Om>ic  TrLin^uhtm  eft  [Onme)  TriLtterum  .- 
Lf,    jE.  AH<]uod  'Triangulum  fjl /E:jumgiilinn, 

In  Engl^jlo  thus, 

I-  )  Some  Three-fided-Figure  has  Equal  Angles ; 
TA-  >Every  Triangle  is  every  Thrcc-iided  Figure  : 
ll,  3  Therefore  fome  Triangle  has  Equal  Angles. 

Other  MckIcs  might,  no  doubt,  be  inftahc'd,  which  would' 
conclude  iii  fuch  or  fuch  peculiar  Matter  :  but  it  is  granted, 
that  only  thole  firit  mention'd  will  hold,  at  all  Adentures., 
in  whacfocver  Matter, 

§  7.  It  may  farther  appear  in  the  Technical  Words  be- 
fore, chat  in  any  Figure  whatever,  if  the  Premifes  be  Parri- 
C'l'ar  or  Negative,  the  Cop.clulion  is  alio  fo,  following  what 
they  commonly  call  ihe  Wealier  Part :  cind  alio  that  the  Pre- 
rail'b  are  not  both  of  them  Particular  or  Negative. 

^  8.  1  he  Foundations  of  all  thefc  Canons  r.rd  Rules  (fa 
briefly  con-.priz'd  or  iccar'd  in  the  Mcmorative  Words abovej 
a!'e  fuch  as  chefe, 

r.  That  the  Middle  cr  New  Term  mufV  be  the  felf-fame  ; 
and  tiiercfore  muft  be  once  at  lealt  L^mverfally  taken  :  And 
fo  it  Vv'as  in  the  New  Mode  [ITALI^  when  it  was  fa'd,  eve- 
ry Ihree-fided-Fig' re,  tho'  it  were  AfHrniarively  faid,  of 
Triangles ;  and  had  it  been  underftood, only  jmic  Three- lided - 
Figure  in  the  Minor,  as  it  was  exprcfs\i  in  the  Major,  it 
might  then  have  meant  two  diflincl  thing*,  and  fo  they 
might  have  been  two  diiYerirg  Mcafures:     And  thereture, 

•  $  p.  A  Middle  Term,  if  it  be  twice  particularly  taken, 
cannot  afcertain  any  thing  about  the  Terms  of  the  Queitirn, 
wliich  arc  feverally  Meafur'd  by  thofe,  perhaps,  differing 
MeaBrcs :  Whenas  if  you  take  a  Number  of  MeafurcSj  and 
be  able  to  fay,  that  .lii  of  them  agree  (/.  c.  e'cry,  or  any 
one  of  theiti  agrees)  to  This,  and  jomc  of  them  to  That,  it 
muft  then  be  certain  that  the  felf-fame  Meafure  agreed  both 
to  the  one  and  to  the  other,  and  conlequsndy  that  they  \yere 
both  alike  in  that  Refped.  S  i  o.  1.  'i  he 


Chip.  5-  Improvement  of  ^^^diion.  251 

§  10.  2.  The  Middle  Term  muft  agree  to  one  Term  of 
the  Queftionat  leaft,  elfe  'tis  noc  at  all  to  the  Purpofe,  nor 
can  (hew  either  their  Agreement  of  Difagreement ;  for  tho'  it 
be  the  felf-fame  Meafurc,  yet  if  it  agree  not  to  either  of  the 
things  Meafur'd  by  it ,  they  may  be  equal  or  nnequal* 
like  or  unlike,  for  any  thing  which  thence  appears :  And 
therefore  one  at  leaft  of  the  Premifes  muft  always  be  Affir- 
mative. 

V  ^  r  r.  9.  To  conclude  ah  Agreement  of  the  Terms,  /.  e. 
to  prove  an  Affirmative  Queftion,  or  infer  an  Affirmative 
Conclufion,  the  fame  Middle  Term  muft  agree  to  both,  fo 
that  both  the  Premifes  muft  be  Affirmative,  where  the  Con-. 
clufion  is  fo  ;  And  thjs  muft  be  fuch,  when  both  of  thole  are 
fuch.  On  the  other  hand,  to  infer  a  Negative  Conclufion, 
the  Midd  le  Term  muft  agree  only  to  one  1  erm  of  the  Quefti- 
on,  and  therefore  one  of  the  Premifes  muft  be  Negative,  and 
always  where  one  of  them  is  fb,  the  Coticlufion  muft  be  fo 
tooi  becaufe,  that  which  agreed  to  one  of  the  Terms  did 
not  agree  to  the  other;  and  therefore,  neither  muft  they 
agree  in  fuch  Refpedls.  But  from  two  Negative  Premifes,  no- 
thing can  be  concluded  any  more,  than  from  two  Enun- 
ciations, wherein  the  Middle  Term  is  twice  particularly 
taken. 

§  12.  4.  The  Af e^/ttw,  or  Middle  Term,  muft  Agree  or 
Difagree  to  the  felf-fame  Terms,  and  thofe  refpedively  {o. 
underftood  in  the  Premifes,  as  they  are  in  the  Q«eftion  or 
Conclufion  :  But  they  may  be  taken  with  a  difl^ring  Quan- 
tity, fo  it  be  not  more  largely  than  they  were  taken  in  the 
Premifes;  for  the  lefs  may  certainly  be  concluded,  where  the 
larger  might:  i.  e.  we  may  fafely  Conclude  that  oi  fome^ 
which  we  might  of  all,  provided  they  be  taken  on  both  hands 
Mntcrinlh^  not  Formr.l.h,  as  fome,  ot  oi  all;  i(Bnrhnrtt  in  the 
firft  Figure  do  conclude,  fo  muft  Bnrbari  in  the  fame,  tho'  k 
infer  not  nll^  which  might  be  infer'd. 

§  J  3.  5.  A  Predicate  when  deny'd,  is  always  to  be  un- 
derftood tJniverfally,  and  in  its  full  Extent ;  for  we  do 
iiot  indeed  deny  this  of  that,  unlefswe  deny  every  Kind  and 
Sort,  as  has  been  <}iewn,  Part  II.  Chap.  17.  §  5. 

To  thcfe  Grounds  of  Categorical  Argunienration,  which 
have  been  Specify 'd,  it  is  commonly  added  by  Logicians, 
who  take  notice  of  the  Quantity  of  the  Predicate,  as  a  fafe 
Suppofalj  that. 


§14.  6  A 


2^2  /iT2  tjjiiy  for  the  Part  \\\. 

§  14.  6.  A  Predicate  when  Aflirni'd  is  taken  Particular- 
]y,  and  fo  at  the  lead  it  always  is,  but  may  in  fome  Calcs  be 
underltood  fas  it  harh  been  lliewn)  Univerfally.  it  is  in  like 
manner  fuppos  d  for  the  greater  Security,  tliat, 

§  15.  7.  One  ot  rhe  Premifes  muft  alvvfays  be  Univer- 
fal;  yet  in  fome  fort  of  Matter,  both  may  be  Partict!  nv.  .;'? 
appears  by  this  Inftancc, 

Aliijucd  Nutritivum  cjl  Parns  ; 

Atiijuis  Pntm  eft  burns  .- 

E.  Allquod  Durum  eft  Stiiritk'WTU 

In  Engfifto  thus, 

Somewhat  Nourifiiing  is  Bread  ; 

Some  Bread  is  Hard  : 

Therefore  fomewliat  Hard  is  Nourilhing, 

And  thus  we  micht  have  a  New  Mode  [FILIIl  of  rhe  4'Ji 
Figure;  aiid  another  which  we  might  call  [blMlLIS^  of 
the  2d,  only  by  inverting  the  Minor,  thus,  feme  katd  thuig  is 
BrcrJ :  But  here  it  falls  out,  that  in  the  prelent  Matter, 
the  affirmed  Predicate  Bread  in  the  Major  is  univerfally  taken 
for  any  Bread  whatever  ;  and  it  mu6:  be  own'd.  that,  accor- 
ding to  the  more  ufual  wiy  of  Speaking,  it  (hould  rather  have 
been  faid,  all  Bread  is  Nounihing  ;  yet  it  holds  as  trnly,  tho' 
not  fo  Naturally  the  ether  way. 

§  /  6.  A  Syllogifm  mult  be  rigiit  as  to  its  Form,  in  v/hat- 
ever  Mode  or  Figure,  tho'  not  allow'd  in  the  Schools  j  if  we 
make  but  lure  to  compare  both  the  Terms  of"  theQiieftion,* 
with  the  fclf-fame  Middle  Term  ;  fc  joining  them  by  Affir- 
mation, ai  they  both  agree  with  it,  or  disjoining  them  by 
Negation, .«  one  of  them  difagrees  in  ihat  Refped;,  wherein 
the  other  agrees. 


§  '•  IX/E  h^^^  ^*^""  ^"^  Grounds  from  which  the  Icveral 
'*■'  foremention'd  Rules  may  be  demonttrated;  and 
upon  which  fo  many  of  the  64  podible  Pviodes  arc  rejeiited, 
as  either  not  concluding  or  not  fo  regularly.  Ihat  there 
might  otherwife  be  64  in  all,  may  eafily  thus  appear  A  (im- 
porting an  univerlal  Aihrmative  Propolition)  might  be  fol- 
iow'd  .)  ^,  Bj  I,  or  Q,  imporiing  fuch  or  fuch  a  Mmor  Pro- 
portion 


Chap  6.  1/^prove/p/ent  of  KquCou.  255 

pofition  or  AfTumption .-  Aiid  again,  E  might  be  foHow'd 
by  ^,  E,  /,  or  O  ;  fo  likewife  /  and  O .-  "  Now  aJI  tlicfe 
would  amount  to  1 6  feveral  Combinaticns  in  each  Figure  j 
and  therefore  to  4  times  1 6,  or  64  in  nil  .- 

§  2.  Jf  we  would  aherthe  placing  of  thePrcmifcs,  foasro 
put  the  Minor  Propotition  before  the  Maior,  the  Number  of 
Modes|might  be  doubled  and  encreas'd  to  liS;  B  x  even  of 
the  64  above  Specify'd  the  far  greater  part  isre^ccied,  fome 
upon  one,  fome  upon  others,  of  the  foremenrioiied  Grounds; 
fo  that  they  are  reduc'd  to  four  in  the  tirl^  Figure,  as  many 
more  in  the  fecond,  fix  in  the  third,  and  five  in  the  fourth  ; 
amounting  only  to  19  in  all.  The  purfuing  and  demor- 
llrating  of  cliefc  Makers  might  be  a  good  Exercif:,  and  may 
be  fcen  at  large  in  Ars  Cogitnndi. 

§  3.  In  that  Trcanife  there  is  recommended  one  general 
Ruic  for  difccrning  the  Goodnefs  of  a  Categorical  Syllogifm, 
without  having  recourfe  to  the  mentioned  Terms  of  hxt,  or 
the  Logical  Canons  imply'd  therein,  1;/:^.  by  obfeiving  whe- 
ther one  of  the  Premifes  contain  the  Conclufioil,  and  the  other 
Ihew,  that  it  do's  fo  by  applying  it : 

God  Commands  us  to  Honour  our  Rulers ; 

But  Queen  Anne  is  our  Ruler  : 

£.  God  Commands  usto  Honour  Her. 

Here  the  Major  Propofition  contains  the  Ccnclufion,  as  \]\z 
Minor  Ihews  by  applying  it  to  the  ^.ueen  ;  for  She  being  our 
Ruler,  God  Commands  us  to  Honour  Her  in  Particular, 
whilft  he  charges  us  to  Honour  our  Rulers  in  Genera!. 

§  4.  But  wc  conceive  it  may  be  a  Direiftion  of  fomewhat 
clearer  Import,  or  at  leaft  of  farther  Ufc,  that  we  fiiouid  fee 
to  the  Truth  of  the  Premifes  (whether  they  be  both  exprefs'd, 
or  one  of  them  imply'd)  and  likewife  obfer-v-e  whether  the 
Medium,  orthst  aifumed  Part,  which  is  not  in  the  Conclufi- 
on,  be  once  at  leaft  extcniively  taken,  and  really  have  thac 
Identity  or  Diverllty,  in  reference  to  what  is  truly  defign'd 
in  the  Conclufion,  which  by  the  Argument  is  pretended  or 
fuppos'd. 

§  5.  Now  in  the  forementioned  Proof,  that  we  fnould 
Honour  Queen  Anne,  it  will  be  found,  that  both  the  Premi- 
fes are  in  them.fcivcs  true,  and  we  may  likewife  cbferve,  thac 
I{iders  ov  Ri^ier,  which  are  the  Medivm,  being  not  menti- 
on'd  in  the  C'onclufion,  are  indeed  identify 'J,  as  the  Argument 
Snppofes,  with  what  is  tnily  defign'd  in  the  Cottclufion  .-  For 
firft,  aH  oUf  toilers  in  Genetal  are  fdentify'd  with  fuch  as 
QodQQmmmds  m  potJonow,  or  are  the  fame  whom  GodCom- 

§  3  mands 


254  An  tjfay  for  thu  Part  III. 

jnands  us  to  Honour.-  And  then  our  Rjiler,  or  one  of  cur 
Rulers  in  Particular,  is  identify 'd,  or  is  the  fame  with  C^ueeii 
Anne,  fo  that  upon  the  whole,  for  God  to  Command  us  to 
Honour  all  our  Rulers,  i.e.  each  of  them,  is  indeed  the  fame 
thing,  in  other  Words,  as  to  Command  us  to  Honour  Queen 
Jnnt,  who  is,  atleaftonc  of  them  :  And  to  fay,  vce  Jhou.d 
not  depend  upon  what  is  unccrtniv,  is  in  fome  Sort  the  fame 
thing  as  to  fay,  me  jhauld  not  depend  upon  ^Indent  Oral  Tradi- 
tion J  fince  it  u  uncertain. 

^  6.  Upon  this  way  of  Identification  it  appears,  that  an 
Argument  muft  be  good  ^whatever  bethc  Marrer  or  Manner 
cf  u  otherways)  where  the  Term  or  Terms,  which  are  not  in 
the  Oucftion,  arc  or  may  be  truly  and  fitly  Subftitutcd  initead 
of  the  Principal  Subjed,  or  Predicate,  orbothj  which  arc-in 
the  Qiieftion. 

§  7.  In  order  to  the  riglit  Application  of  this  Rule,  we 
muft  obferve,  that  what  is  of  the  fame  Kind,  and  at  lealt  once 
taken  in  its  full  Extent,  or  what  is  duly  related  to  the  Prin- 
cipal Terms  of  the  Quciiion,  with  a  juft  Correfpondency 
likewifc  to  the  reft,  or  10  what  is  incidental  in  it,  may  be 
fitly  fubftitnted  :  As  if  difcourfing  of  what  is  hard  and  brit- 
tle, and  of  its  being  melted ;  I  Ihould  fay.  Experiment  Ihews, 
that  what  is  fo  (i.  e.  fomevvliat  that  is  fo),  may  be  melted, 
and  that  this  appears  by  the  ijiftaiKC  of  GJafs. 

§  8.  The  Proof  here  is  good:  For  it  mav  be  obferv'd, 
(r.)  That  tho'  Experiment  be  mcntion'd  in  theQueftion,  yet 
that  was  not  the  Point  treated  of,  but  incidentally  brought  in. 
(i.)  1.  hsit  fomeveha't  hard  and  trittle  wzs  the  Principal  SubjeA, 
and  a  Capacity  of  being  melted,  the  Principal  AttributCc 
(5  )  That  G  afs  may  be  ptiy  fiibflitutcd  inftead  of  fomeihing 
hard  and  britrie,  as  being  fomewhat of  that  K.ind.  ,. 

§  p.  And  ^4.)  That  Glafs  is  alio  f> «,';  fubftitutcd  here; 
for  it  can  be  truly  faid  of  Giafs,  that  it  may  be  Melted,  and 
(5.)  It  is  here  taken  once,  at  leaft,  Unlverlaliy,  for  all  GJafs 
is  liard  and  brittle,  and  indeed  may  alfo  be  Melted  :  And 
Finally,  (6.)  That  the  Subftitution  is  in  a  way  of  Correfpon- 
dency to  Experiment,  both  in  Point  of  Fitnefs  and  Trutlj  j 
for  it  appears, .  by  Experiment,  that  Glafs  is  hard  and  brittle, 
and  alfo,  that  it  can  be  melted. 

§10.  A  double  Subftitution  may  be  us'd  as  a  (^ompen- 
dions  way  of  Arguing,  which  contrads  two  Categorical  Syl~ 
Jogifirs  into  one  Enthymeme^  or  the  Queftion  with  its  Con-; 
hrmaiion,  thus  it  may  be  laid,  God  Commands  us  to  Hc» 
rour  Queen  Anne :  For  he  Commands  us  to  be  fubjedb  to 
the  Higher  Powers  ( i.  e,  to  each  of  them).    No\v  one  of 

thcfe 


Chap.  6.  jMprove^/e^n  of  Kea.iGn,  255 

thefc  Powers  (included  in  the  general  Word)  is  fitly  Subfli- 
tirtcd  inftead  of  Qiicen  yinne  ,  the  Prin.cipal  Subje£l  in  the 
(^ncftion)  as  being  of  that  Kind  ;  and  alio  our  being  Sub]ccl 
is  fitly  put  inftead  o^ Honouring{i\\c  Principal  Predicate),  that 
being  one  wayatlcaft  of  Honouring ;  there  isalfo  atrLcCon- 
nexion  betwixt  each  of  the  fubftituled  Terms,  and  the  other 
Term  of  the  Qiiellion,  to  which  they  are  not  fubftituted ; 
and  linal'.y  a  Corrcfpondency  to  the  nicidental  PropoGtion, 
in  that  our  being  Subject  to  the  Higher  Powers,  as  they  are 
defcrib'd,  [{pm.  Xlil.  i,  1,  3,  cS'c  is  there  commandeid  of 
God. 

§  II,  Now  this  contraAed  Argument  may  be  form'd 
into  an  Hypothetical  Syllogifm  ;  thus,  if  God  Command  us 
to  be  fubicd:  to  fucb  Higher  Powers,  he  Commands  ns  to 
Honour  Queen  Anne ;  but  he  Commands  us  to  be  Subjedl  to 
fuch  Higher  Powers  :  £.  He  Commands  us  to  Honour  ^uccn 
Anne. 

§  12.  The  fame  contrad:ed  Argument  may  be  drawn 
our  into  two  Categorical  Syllogifms  in  this  Manner,  fuch 
Higher  Powers  as  thofe  deicribed,  Hom.  13.  are  by  God's 
Command  to  be  Honoured ;  But  Queen  Anne  is  fuch .-  E.  She 
is,  by  God's  Command,  to  be  Honour'd.  Ajid  to  Confirm 
the  Major,  thofe  we  are  by  God's  Command  to  be  Subjed:  to, 
are  by  his  Command  to  be  Honour'd ;  But  fuch  Higher  Pow- 
ers, we  are,  by  God's  Command,  to  be  Subjed:  to  :  There- 
fore fuch  Higher  Powers  are,  by  God's  Command,  to  be 
Honour'd. 

§  13.  Thus  wc  fee  how,  at  Icaft,  fome  Hypothetical 
Syllogifms  of  four  Terms,  may  yet  be  reduc'd  to  Categori- 
cal at  twice,  tho'  not  at  once,  and  of  this  I  Ihall  here  add 
one  farther  Inftance,  in  the  following  Argument;  The  Sea 
docs  not  boil ;  for  the  VifJo  in  it  are  72ot  ho'U'd.  Here  is  now  a 
double  Subftitution  upon  the  Ground  of  a  fit  Relation,  vIt^, 
of  the  Filli  in  the  Sea  to  it,  and  of  being  boil'd  to  boiling. 

§  14.  This  Argument  may  be  made  Hypothetical, 
thus. 

If  the  Sea  boil,  the  Filli  in  it  muft  be  boil'd  ; 
But  the  Fi(h  in  it  are  not  boil'd  : 
E.  The  Sea  it  felf  do's  not  boil. 

§  15.  The  fame  Argument  may  be  drawn  out  into  two 
Categorical  Syllogifms  in  the  manner  following, 


S  4  When 


2^6  An  tjjay  for  the  Fart  III. 

What  boils,  muft  boil  that,  which  in  it  is  capable  of  be- 
ing boil'd  by  it ; 

B'.!t  the  Sea  does  rot  boil  that  in  it,  which  would  be  capa- 
b'e  of  being  boil'd  by  it : 

XL.  The  Sea  do's  not  boil. 

To  confirm  the  Minor, 

The  Fi(h  in  the  Sea  would  be  capable  of  being  boil'd  by 
it,  if  it  boil'd; 

Pint  the  Sea  do's  not  boil  the  Fifh  in  it  : 

E.  It  boils  not  that  in  ir,  which  would  l  e  capable  of  be- 
ing boil'd  by  it. 


CHAP.     VII. 

§  r.  p  ROM  what  has  chicHy  rcfpedled  the  Manner  of  Ar~ 
■*-  guing,  I  now  proceed  to  fomfe  general  Remarks 
aboMt  the  Godnefs  of  Proof,  as  it  depends  rather  upon  the 
Matter  than  the  Form  or  Difpofition  of  the  Argument,  in 
which  Regard  it  has  been  found  very  various,  and  yc:  equally 
Conclufive,  tho'  not  equally  clear,  but  certain  it  is,  that  our 
Miftakes  do  generally  ^rift  from  miftaken  Pofitiojis,  or  a 
iniftaken  Application  of  fuch  as  are  right  in  thcmfi^lves. 

?>  a.  In  judging  therefore  of  Argument,  oar  chief  Bufi- 
pefs  is  to  fee,  that  the  Pofition  on  which  it  is  Grounded,  be 
true  in  ir  fcif,  and  really  to  the  prefenc  Purpofc  (i.  e.  to  the 
Point  moft  immediately  in  hand);  which  maybe  in  fome 
Meafurc  eftimated  by  what  has  been  faid  about  Identificati- 
on and  Subllitution  :  And  this  fecms  to  be  the  moft  Natv>ral 
and  ready  way  to  determine  of  a  Proof,  without  having  re- 
courfe  to  other  Logical  Forms  and  Rules.  This  duly  us'd 
and  apply'd,  might  llrve  for  the  detecting  of  fallacious  Ar- 
guments ;  but  to  give  wliat  farther  help  I  can,  it  may  be  of 
Ufe,  that  weiliouid  briefly  touch  upon  lome  Principal  Heads, 
■whether  o? Sophiftk/i!,  or  oimijlr.ken  Arguing.    And, 

§  3.  I.  From  unftated  or  ambiguous  "Words  or  Phrafes: 
As  when  we  pafs  without  our  own  Obfervation,  or  without 
Notice  given  to  others,  from  one  Senfe  of  fuch  Words  or 
Phrafes  to  another;  as  if  one  fhould  Reafon  thus,  the  love  of 
Money  ts  the  ^ct  ofnJlEvili  Therefore  it  is  not  at  all  to  be 
tldVd;  for  whatfoevcr  Meafcre  or  Kind  of  dcfjre  there  may 

be. 


Chap.  7.  Improvement  of  Keafon.  257 

be,  it  doth  ftill  proceed  from  Love  to  the  thing  defir'd  :  Now 
Love  is  here  differently  taken,  for  the  Natural  Affeilion,  ei- 
ther irregular  or  regular,  in  the  latter  place;  when  as  it  was 
intended  of  Inordinate  Affeiilion  in  the  former. 

§  4.  2.  From  a  Proof,  that  goes  befide  that  which  is  the 
very  Point  in  Queftion,  and  do's  rightly  conclude  only  as  to 
fomevv'hat  relating  thereto.  This  Sophifm  or  Miftake,  is 
commonly  call'd,  ih  Logic,  Ignorai-io  Elenchi,  as  mifTmg,  that 
which  is  che  Point  on  which  rhe  Queftion  turns  ;  as  if  in  ar- 
guing for  the  Overthrow  of  Popery,  one  fhould  go  to  dif- 
provc  the  DoArines  cf  Tranfubftantiation,  Purgatory,  cS'j, 
inftcad  of  Ihewing  that  there  is  no  decifivc  Power  in  Matters 
purely  Religious  vefted  by  Chrift  in  any  Man,  or  Number 
of  Men,  which  if  it  were,  muft  prefuppofe  an  Humane  In- 
fallibility, and  might  bid  fair  towards  the  warranting  of 
Perfecution  (or  what  fome  will  call  only  Profecution)  for 
Confcience  fake. 

§  5.  Or  Suppofe,  to  prove  Diocefan  Epifcopacy,  it 
iliould  bcHiewn,  that  there  was  anciently  a  Biihopover  Pref- 
byters  in  the  fame  Congregation  ;  or  where  they  had  how- 
ever one  Altar ;  i.  e.  one  place  only  within  fuch  a  Difirid: 
for  Celebrating  the  Lord's  Supper  together,  tho'  they  might 
meet  fomctimes  in  feveral  places  for  other  parts  of  Divine 
Worflup :  Or  fuppofe  in  arguing  for  or  againft  the  Baptizing 
of  Adult  Perfons  only ;  no  Proof  lliculd  be  brought  to  fricvv, 
either  that  there  were  or  were  not  Inftances  of  Baprifm  de- 
ny'd  or  delay 'd,  'till  the  Children  fhould  become  Capable  of 
tTiaking  their  own  Profeffion;  and  this,  for  that  very  Kea- 
fon:  Whenas  this  is  the  Point  upon  which  the  Matter  turcs 
as  to  Scriptural  Inftances.  To  detedk  this  Fallacy  or  avoid  it, 
the  very  Point  in  Queftion  (hould  be  carefully  fifted  out,  and 
feparately  ftated  from  what  is  not  in  Difpute. 

§  ^.'  7y.  From  a  Proof,  which  fuppofes  the  Matter  in  Dif- 
pute, as  if  it  were  evident,  or  had  been  before  prov'd.  This 
fhey  call  P'etitio  principii,  or  begging  the  Queflion.  Thus 
many  tak-e  it  firft  for  granted,  Ali^tliould  be  of  one  way  in 
Religion,  or  that  they  can't  otherwifeLive  quietly,  or  Confult 
together  ^  but  that  even  Civil  Affairs  muft  undoubtedly  fuffer 
in  the  hands  of  fueh,ashave  fomediffereJit  Sentiments  in  Mat- 
ters of  Religion ;  And  thence  would  pretend,  that  either 
all  muft  be  forc'd  into  one  way,  or  all  but  one  fort  be  exclud- 
ed from  Publick  Affairs.  Nor  is  any  thing  more  common 
then  for  fome  to  fpeak  of  Orthodox  Principles,  as  lit  to  be 
maintain'^  and  encourag'd,  prefuming  ftill  their  own  to  be 
fuch,  '         It  giving  efficient  Proof,  orconfidering  that 

another 


Z^S  An  tffay  for  the  Part  llLp 

another  may  think  hlmfelf  Orthodox  j  and  chat  he  is  as  capa- 
ble of  proving  it. 

§  7.  4.  From  Caules  ill  afllgn'd  :  Thus  what  truly 
fprings  from  Self-confidence,  as  if  we  were  our  felves  Infal- 
lible, and  from  a  lelhl}i  perfecuting  Spirir,  which,  together, 
make  up  that  of  Popery,  is  commonly  afcrib' d  ro  the  diHl- 
rcnce  of  Sentiments  in  Rclir,ion,  and  broughc  as  an  Argu- 
menr,  that  they  are  not  to  be  tolerated .-  Nor  is  any  thing 
more  common  than  to  affign  what  is  only  an  Occalion,  as  the  |ir.< 
j^roper  Caufe  of  this  or  that. 

§  8.  5.  From  partial  and  imperfed:  Views,  or  incotn- 
plete  Enumerations :  When  Men  firft  prefuine  fach  and 
fuch  Parts  make  up  the  "Whole,  or  that  t'nc  Matter  muft  be  ei- 
ther fo  or  lb  ;  and  then  conclude  accordingl)  ;  whenas  there 
may  be  fome  part  over-look'd,  or  fbmc  omitted  Cafe,  and 
the  Truth  may  happen  to  lie  there. 

§  9.  6.  From  what  is  only  accidental,  and  not  arifing 
from  the  Nature  of  the  thing  ;  Sappofe,  that  the  Paflions 
are  wholly  to  be  Eradicated,  as  being  Perturbations  ; 
%vhenas  they  are  not  abfoluteiy  or  neceffarily  fo  j  but  only 
when  they  are  not  duly  govern'd.  Thus  fomc  cry  out  againit 
the  other  Sex,  or  againft  Wine,  or  Money ;  becaufe  they  prove 
hurtful,  when  they  are  not  right  in  themfelves,  or  not  regu- 
larly us'd. 

§  10.  7.  From  what  is  well  put  together,  to  what  is  ill 
divided;  or  from  what  is  well  divided  to  what  is  ill  put  to- 
gether :  God  indeed  juftifies  the  Ungodly  :  Our  Lord  made 
the  Blind  to  See,  (Ss ;  but  not  wbilft  they  are  or  were  fuch : 
Unbelievers  Ihall  not  fee  Life,  but  the  Wrath  of  God  abideth 
on  them  ;  yet  it  doth  not  therefore  hold,  as  to  the  Perfons, 
when  once  they  are  no  longer  Unbelievers, 

§  I  / «  8.  From  a  limited  Senfe,  to  what  is  larger  or  ab- 
folute  :  As  if  we  (hould  fay,  an  Ethiopian  is  White,  in  re- 
fpecl  of  his  Teeth ;  therefore  he  is  iimply  White ;  fuch  a 
Man  is  Learn'd  in  fome  few  Points  or  Parts  of  Literature  ; 
therefore  he  is  a  Learned  Man.'  ' 

§  1 2.  9.  From  fome  to  all ;  whenas  a  few  Inftances  will 
not  certainly  conclude  a  general  Point ;  nor  indeed  will  ma- 
ny, whilft  there  may  yet  lie  out  of  fight  fome  Exception  to 
it ;  but  it  is  very  Natural  for  Men  (as  the  Great  Lord  Verulam 
has  obferv'd)  to  haften  into  general  Deternunations,  before 
they  have  throughly  enough  furvey'd  particular  Inftances. 
Of  the  like  kind  is  an  Argument  from  a  Part  to  the  Whole, 
without  (hewing  that  there  is  a  like  Reafon  of  both :  As 
that  becaufe  a  thing  may  be  well  done  once,  or  rarely,   or 

upon 


^hap  7.  Improvement  of  Reafon.  25c) 


pon  Special   Occafion ;    therefore  it  may  be  done  conftant- 
y,orfreqi.'ently,  or  without  fuch  Occalion :  Or  becaufe  feme 

"f]  Part  and  Points  may  be  compl>'d  with;  therefore  the  Whole 

''  )f  what  is  requir'd  in  this  or  that  Cafe  ;  and  on  tlie  contra- 
■y,  bccaufe  this  or  that  may  not ;  therefore  nothing  may. 

§1'^.     10.  From  the  Reafon  of  Things  in  this  or  that  Par- 
:icular  Cafe,  to  what  is  allow  d  or  forbidden  by  Law  in  fuch 
~afe;    or  from  what  Ihould  be  in  Reafon  (as  we  tJ)ink)  the 
eaning  of  the  Law,   that  therefore  its  meaning  is  aAuaJly 
"0  ;  whcnas  the  I  etter  muA  cliiefly  be  follow'd  in  ftating  the 

''IjlDtendment  of  a  Law. 

^1  §  14.  1 1.  From  aSimiJitodeorParab'e,  toargue  beyond 
[what  the  Likcncls  or  Scope  will  juftifie :  Whenas  they  ought 
rather  to  be  firft  reduc'd  to  fome  general  Pofirion,  and  that 
to  be  made  the  Ground  of  Argument.     And  yet, 

§  15.  12.  There  may  be  a  Fallacy  or  Millake  in  pre- 
tending, or  fuppofing  a  difference  of  Cafes,  where  there  is 
none,  as  to  the  Point  in  hand.  This  Men  are  apt  to  run  in- 
to, when  they    are   piefs'd    with  unanfwerable  Argument, 

yjcoiichd  under  a  Similitude;  and  which  (it  may  be)  could  not 
have  been  fo  well  exprefs'd  another  way. 

§  16.  13.  From  a  true  Confequent  to  the  Tiuth  of  rJie 
Antecedent,  whereas  Truth  may  follow  from  Falftiood,  tho' 
this  cajinot  from  that:  As  if  it  fhould  be  faid,  Lcarniiig 
makes  Men  Contemptible,  Ignorance  is  Learning.  E.  ig- 
iiorance  inakes  Men  Contemptible.  Where  the  Ccnclunon 
is  reaJly  true  and  well  infer'd,  but  very  ill  prov'd,  becaufe 
the  Premifes  are  falfe :  So  if  we  Ihould  fay.  Angels  are  Ex- 
cellent Creatures ;  Men  are  Angels .-  E.  Men  are  excellent 
Creatures  :  Or,  whatever  can  be  broken  may  be  melted : 
Silver  can  be  broken.  £.  It  can  be  melted  ;  and  this  being 
true  J  therefore  "Whatever  can  bej  broken,  may  bef  melted, 
which  is  nevcrrhelefs  Falfe. 

1^  17.  14,  From  fome  Pointer  Pundlilio  being  falfe,  to 
uke  Advantage  of  denying  the  Truth  join'd  with  it ;  this 
may  indeed  be  done  v/ithout  downright  FaKliOod,  but  ofc  it 
is  not  fo  confident  with  Candour :  And  in  Arguing,  it  may 
be  very  dangerous  to  the  Point  we  would  maintain,  for  that 
when  we  wholly  deny  a  Propofition,  as  if  it  were  altogether 
falfe,  we  give  an  Advantage  to  the  Opponent,  to  make  it 
out  againft  us,  in  the  Senfe  wherein  it  is  True ;  and  fo  in  Ap- 
pearance to  carry  his  Caufe  againft  us :  Wc  fhould  therefore 
be  very  careful  to  deny  only  with  diilindion,  where  a  Propo- 
rtion is  in  fome  Senfe  true, 

%iZ.  15.  From 


26o  An  tljfay  for  the  Part  [Hi 

§  i8.  15.  From  bad  Proof  to  the  badnefs  of  the  Caufe, 
whetias  all  that  can  be  that  way  infer'd  is  on\j,  that  the 
Feint  is  not  well  made  out  by  fuch  Argument,  and  yet  may 
ncvcrthelefs  be  true,  and  othcrways  well  prov'd  ;  unlefs  the 
-Argument  brought  were  Fundamental,  and  indeed  the  only 
Foundation  on  which  that  Point  can  ftand  ;  as  in  the  folio . 
ing  Cafe  .-  What  is  of  a  pofitive  Nature  in  Religion,  n  . 
being  put  upon  a  Reafon  in  the  thing  it  felf,  ought  to  have  a 
■pofitive  Inftitution,  cither  cxprefs  or  imply 'd,  either  more. 
immediately  from  God,  or  from  thofe  who  ai'e  Authoriz'd 
by  him  for  fuch  Purpofe  :  If  therefore  nothing,  which  c 
be  brouglit  of  that-  Kind  will  hold,  otht-r  Arguments  will  - 
all  in  vain ;  fjppofc  it  were,  that  this  or  that  has  been  an  An- 
cient Ufage  in  the  Church,  or  has  generally  obtain'd,  ^c  ; 
when  thefe  and  the  like,  are  but  a  kind  of  Secondary  Proofs, 
Hvhich  may  do  well  by  way  of  Acccflion,  and  as  a  foit  of 
Butrrcffesj  but  need  foitiewhat  more  Fundamental  to  make 
tiiem  firm  and  Valid, 

§  19.  16.  It  may  be  of  good  ufe  (finally)  to  obferve  \\o^ 
Men  are  often  carried  wrong,  (i.)  By  unexamin'd  Afpcav- 
auc:s^  (2.)  Infufficient  Authority^  (^J  Uncertain  B^-port^  (^4.) 
Mere  Antiquity^  (5,^  An  Efpous'd  Hypothcjh,  (6.)  A  Biafs  of 
Intcre/L  {7.)  ?anicil  Afc^ion.  (S.)  Self-Conceit :  The  four 
laft  arc  not  wont  to  be  openly  profefs'd ;  but  are  yet  the  im- 
plied Force  and  Meaning  of  fome  lefs  obferved  Reafoning  in 
the  Minds  of  Men;  and  carry  them  perhaps  unawares  to  the 
fearching  out  all  that  can  plaufibly  be  faid  for  fuch  Opinion 
or  fuch  Anions,  and  to  take  it  for  conclufive  Argument. 

§  2o.  1  fliall  Clofe  the  prefent  General  with  fome  Re- 
marks, about  the  differing  Nature  and  Kinds  of  Proof 

r.  What  we  call  Difproving  or  Confuting,  is  commonly 
no  other  than  proving  the  Contradidtory  Pofition,  or  what 
implies  it,  unlefs  it  ihould  be  where  the  only  Foundation  of 
fome  Point  is  remov'd,  by  refuting  the  Proof  given  of  it. 

§  2f.  z.  Proof  may  be  either  Probable  or  Certain,  ac- 
cording as  the  Polition,  or  its  Apphcation  is,  from  which 
'tis  drawn,  and  when  either  of  them  is  only  probable,  it  will 
7uftifte  no  more  tlian  an  Opinion^  that  the  Matter  is  fo,  whe- 
ther It  be  bottom'd  upon  a  Reafon  or  Teftimony,  which 
arfe  but  probable,  tho'  Logicians  do  commonly  diftinguilh  be- 
tW'een  Opinion^  afid  fPumane  Faiths  but  there  is  a  fort  of  Hd- 
tnane  Faith  jtrftly  arifiiig  to  what  they  call  Mord  Certainty^ 
when  the  Matte*  cannot  be  tho't  ro'  be  otherwife,  without 
admitting  plain  Ablurdities :     And  it  is  certain  that  Hmtiane 

Tcilimony  has  various  Degrees  of  Crsditiliiy,  according  as 

-''--■  the 


Chap.  7'  Improvement  of  K^aion.  261 

he  Perfons  atteftipg  are,  ( i .)  More  or  lefs  knowing  in  the 
Matter,  (2.)  Mort  ov  Icis  Honcfi,  (3.)  More  or  Ick  ir?)pn,tia/f 
and  (4.)  As  they  arc  Originally  fexvsr  or  ttwre  in  Number, 
who  teltihe  of  their  own  Perfonal  Knowledge ;  efpecially  if 
(5.)  they  be  of  differing  Times,  Places,  Innerells  and  Opini- 
ons ;  particularly,  (6.)  if  they  be  interefted  to  the  contrary  j 
and  (7.)  if  it  appear,  they  have  not  concerted  their  Teflimo- 
ny  ;  as  it  may  be  reafonably  judg'd,  where  there  is  a  feem- 
i^g  Difagreement,  or  perhaps  a  real  one  in  fome  lefs  material 
Qrcumllances,  whiift  yet  they  agree  in  the  Main. 

§  22.  The  firmeit  Humane  Teftimony,  may  gi^'c  us  a 
p/jjicioit  Certainty ;  butmoftofall,  that  which  is,  and  fully, 
appears  to  be  Divine,  by  the  Nature  cf  the  thing  teflify'd,  to- 
gether with  other  fowc/^mwg-  Arguments  about  it,  and  amongft 
them  more  efpecially  Miraculous^  or  very  extraordinary  lVurl{s 
(not  counteradkd,  or  Hiewing  tbemfelves  plainly  Superior),  as 
alfo  Prediclions  of  contingent  Events  apply d  to  the  confirming 
of  what  is  declar'd  as  from  God  :  This  Evidence  do's  on 
ftiould  produce  what  they  call  a  Divine  Faith,  and  makes  the 
Matter  no  lefs  certain,  than  if  we  had  the  cleared  and  fkong- 
eft  Reafon  from  the  Nature  of  the  thing  it  felf,  which  would 
beget  (what  Logicians  call)  Science ;  and  of  which  they  fay, 
'tis  only  a  more  Evident,  not  a  more  certain  Affent  than  Di- 
vine Faith ;  but  this  has  as  evident  a  Reafon,  as  that,  tho' 
not  internal  to  the  thing  it  felf,  or  arifing  from  it :  The 
Ground  of  Science  is  Demonftracion  ;  and, 

§23.  3.  Demonftration  is  commonly  diftinguifh'd  into 
that  of  the  i-n,  and  oi  oTi  or  Deir.onlfration,  that  the  thing  is 
fo,  and  -whence  or  why  it  is  fo.  The  former  is  all  that  Mathe- 
maticians do  commonly  concern  tbemfelves  about ;  And  it 
may  be  made  from  any  Politinn  relating  to  the  thing  it  felf, 
which  is  certainly  true,  and  %vell  apply'd,  tho'  it  be  not  drawn 
from  the  very  Nature  and  Effence  of  the  thing,  but  from  fpme 
or  other  Necejjkiy  Antecedent ,  Concomitant^  or  Confiquetit^ 

§  24.  As  to  the  Demonfiratim  whence  or  why  a  thing  is  (o 
it  do's  not  conclude  more  than  that  it  is  fo  (and  therefore  it 
fliould  rather  be  call'd  the  Demonftration  by  the  cTii'T,  than  of 
it) ;  but  only  proves  it  from  the  Caufe  and  Reafon,  why  it 
miifi  hefo,  or  from  the  End  and  Purpcfe  for  which  it  is  ;  thus, 
Min  K  c.ijin'jic  of  Learning,  becauie  he  is  Pvational :  The 
Chryftairme  Humour  iiSiheEye,  muft  it  felf  be  void  of  Co- 
lour, as  being  to  adinit  all  Colours. 


I  he 


26z 


An  tjj'ay  for  the 


Part  III. 


The  former  fort  of  Demonftration  gives  equal  Certainty 
about  the  Thing  ;  but  tlie  lacter  a  greater  Satisfaction  to  the 
Mind,  in  fliewing,  not  only  that  it  is  fo,  but  why  it  is  fo,  or 
whence  it  comes  to  be  fo. 

§  25.4.  Proof  may  be  either  Compleat  or  Inchoate,  which 
muft  be  farther  carried  on  'till  it  be  brought,  either,  (i.)  to  a 
Self-evident  Point,  or  (2.,"  to  fonievvhat/'p/o*e  provd^  or,  (3.)  to 
\vhat  is  commonly  ovpn'il^  or  at  leaft,  (4.)  to  what  is  held  or. 
own'd  by  thofe  you  would  Sdtisfie  :  But  the  two  laft  ways 
of  Arguing,  do  not  properly  make  out  the  thing;  but  are 
only  fitted  to  convince/z/f/j  Perfons  v/hilft  the  thing  may  per- 
haps be  falfe. 

5.  It  is  either  Single  or  Complicated  ;  and  it  muft  be  com- 
plicated in  a  Multitude  of  Cafes,  wherein  feveral  Arguments 
to  the  fame  Point  muft  be  taken  together,  as  not  being  any  of 
them  fufficient  alone,  which  may  appear  in  the  Account  a  lit- 
tle before  given  of  Divine  Teftimony  :     Again, 

6.  It  may  be  dixeSt  or  indired:,  as  when  we  fliew  the  Ab- 
furdity  of  the  contradidlory  Point ;  or  that  the  Matter  cannot 
reafonably  be  taken  any  other  Way. 

§  26.  7.  There  is  Abfolute  and  Comparative  Proof :  For  we 
niuft,  in  very  many  Cafts,  compare  the  Evidence  on  both 
parts  of  the  Contradid:ion,  And  take  that  for  Truth,  which 
appears  to  have  the  Over- weight  after  due  Examination  : 
And  whereas  no  certain  Mark  can  here  be  given,  which  will 
Univerfally,  or  even  Generally  hold.  Men  Ihould  carefully 
State  and  Argue  both  parts  of  the  Contradiction,  and  carry 
the  Matter,  by  Prayer  to  God,  that  he  would  pieafe  to  guide 
them  in  judging  which  way  the  Scale  turn?,  or  limit  them 
by  his  Providence. 

8.  And  Finally,  Proof  may  be  accounted  either  Simply  or 
Refpedively  Good  ;  Not  being  perhaps  what  might  be 
wifh'd,  but  fuch  as  can  be  had  or  receiv'd  ;  and  may  be  call'd 
either  Proof  to  xht  Matter,  fach  as  it  admits,  or  totheMt/7, 
as  being  adapted  to  his  Capacity,  and  other  Circumftances  ^ 
diverfe  Things,  which  will  be  ofter'd  under  the  next  General, 
may  be  here  alfo  of  Ufe,  and  particularly  what  will  be  faid 
about  Proof,  which  is  purely  Rhetorical,  uotftrictl)  Logical. 


CH  APo 


;hap.  8.  Improvement  of  Kcaion.  265 


CHAP.     VIII. 


§>  t .  C  OME  PoiiTis  that  are  to  us  fufficienrly  Certain  by  the 
^  Proof  we  have  had  of  rhem,  yet  may  not  be  fo  ro 
others;  tho'  the  Terms  be  competently  underftcod  :  And 
many,  which  appear  probably  true  to  our  fclves  or  others, 
may  need  a  Confirmation  of  their  Truth,  or  the  Confutation 
of  that  appealing  Probability :  And  further  yet,  lb  me  of 
the  more  ipprov'd  and  confirmed  Troths  may  require  vari- 
ous ways  of  Pre  of,  to  fuit  the  various  Capacity  and  Furni- 
ture of  fo  many  feveral  Perfons  as  are  to  be  fatisfy'd  ;  and 
perhaps  alfo  a  more  abundant  Evidence  to  carry  the  Mind 
againft  an  impetuous  Stream  of  Oppoiition :  Our  Reafon  is 
therefore  farther  to  be  diredfed  and  affifted, 

II.  Rjghtly  to  mnkp  out  VDhnt  mny  be  fitly  fuppos'd  Truey  hut 
/ifpenrs  not  yet  fi.fficiently  Evident ^  by  Juch  Proof j  as  the  Matter 
will  ndmlt,  and  the  Occeifion  reijuirrs. 

§  1.  Proof  may  be  confider'd,  either  as  I^hetorical  only, 
or  as  firidlly  Lo^Jcal;  the  former,  as  'tis  commonly  us'd, 
do's  but  {Dicere  Cclorcs)  Colour  Matters  with  fome  kind  of 
plaulible  Difcourfc,  which  may  give  them  the  Appearance 
of  True  or  Falfe,  Good  or  Bad  .-  I  fay,  as  'tis  commonly 
ub'd,  or  rather  abus'd ;  for  Men  might  Argue  Rhetorically 
Jtnd  I  ogically  at  once,  making  the  Matter  and  Form  of  their 
Argument  Logically  conclulive,  as  well  as  the  Manner  and 
Drefs  Rhetorically  taking:  But  the  very  To/'/f)!^^  for  Heads 
of  Argument)  recommended  for  furnifhing  out  Te.^.)  Praife, 
Or  Difpraifc  in  Rhetorical  Difcourfe,  are  fome  of  them  plain- 
ly Inconclufive ;  as  fuppofe  from  a  Man's  Parentage,  Coun- 
try, Fame,  i^s. 

§  3.  The  Inftitntions  of  Pvhetorick  do -rot  rndeedrufual- 
ly  put  us  upon  chufing  fuch  Argumeius  only,  as  vt^ill  hold; 
nor  yet  do  they  allow  us  to  Ihew  v/here  they  fail  and  fall  (hort; 
but  rather  lead  ns  to  deliver  ihem  as  altogether  Cogent  and 
Vab.d,  tho' perhaps,  wirh  a  Artiiiciallnfinuaiion,  that  we 
pafs  tticin  over,  or  infi{t  not  on  them  ;  when  yet  the  Defign 
may  be  to  cany  Men  more  cfFedually  by  that  fide- Wind 
than  we  could  widi  one  that  is  foreright,  or  by  the  Argu- 
ments we  Profefs  to  Jay  more  ftrefs  upon.  It  may  indeed  be 
allow'd,  by  way  of  E::ercife,  to  fet  off  a  bad  Caufe  as  well 
as  wecan;  anda'fo  in  the  way  of  ferious  Bufinels,  to  give 
thole  hrc;ier  Rccomnicndauoas  to  a  good  Caufe,  vvhxh  tho* 

I  hey 


264  .Jr.  tjfay  for  the   ,  Part  \\\. 

they  are  not  fully  Conclufive,  yet  may  be  better  adapted  to 
the  Capacity  and  Difpolkioii  of  thofe  with  whom  we  may 
have  to  do,  than  fiich  as  arc  really  more  Cogent,  which  yer 
are  by  no  Meansto  be  omitted,  even  in  fiich  Cafe. 

§  4.  There  is  no  Queftion  to  be  made,  but  the  trueft 
Logic  may  well  confiilwith  the  beft  Rhetorick,or  rather  is  a 
rjeceflary  Requifice to  it:  For  a  juft  Rherorical  Difcourfc 
ought,  certainly,  to  have  Strcngtli  of  Rcafoning,  as  well  as 
Finenefs  of  Expreflion;  but  where  tLu  is  employ'd  to  cover 
and  carry  a  Caule  that  is  really  bad,  'tis  the  Bufinefs  of  Lo- 
gic to  detect  the  fmootli  and  plaufible,  but  Weak  and  Infuf- 
ficient  Proofs  of  fuch  Harrangues ;  and  by  ftripping  them  of 
their  Giuily  Plumes,  and  reducing  them  to  naked  Argument, 
to.  expofe  them  to  juft  Contcmptv  All  this  while  'tis  readily 
granted  that  Logic  it  felf  allows  of  probable  Evidence  in  ma- 
ny Cafes ;  but  then  'tis  to  be  us'd  and  admitted  only  as  Pro- 
bable, not  as  inconteftable  Proof  or  Demonftration. 

§  5.  But  leaving  Rhetorical  Invention,  Difpofition,  and 
Ornament  to  Rhetoricians,  what  I  would  here  endeavour  is 
a  more  Severe  and  Difficult  Matter,  Namely,  to  put  our 
Reafon  in  feme  convenient  way  for  the  readier  finding  our, 
and  regular  ufing  of  proper  Arguments.  It  muft  undoubted-. 
ly  be  confcfs'd,  that  a  great  and  mafterly  Genius  will  do  more 
in  this,  as  well  as  oiher  Refpecfls,  without  Logical  Inilrudti- 
ons,  than  fonie  can  ever  attain  to  by  them;  nor  is  it  here 
pretended  to  fupply  the  Avant  of  Knowledge  and  Judgment  by 
Artificial  Rules  and  Helps  ;  but  fuppofing  them  to  be  alrea- 
dy in  fomc  competent  Meafure  attain'd,  'tis  liop'd  they  may 
be  allifted  and  improv'd  by  what  is  here  attempted  in  a  more 
Natural  Method,  then  what  I  have  been  able  hitherto  to  meet 
with  in  Logical  Diredlions,  which  are  (I  think)  commonly 
laid  afide,  and  utterly  neglected  by  fuch  as  have  gone  thro' 
them ;  but  'tis  hoped  fomewhat  farther  may  be  done  ui  thi? 
Matter,  the'  not  all  that  were  to  be  delir'd. 

§  6.  I  Ihall  fi'fi  of  all  Ihew,  what  fort  of  Positions  are 
nor,  or  are  to  be  attempted,  and  how  far;  Secondly,  It  will 
be  briefly  intimated,  what  has  been  already  done  va  this 
Eifay  towards  the  fuggcfting  cf  Proof  in  divers  Points,  that 
ar&  of  feme  Importance;  Thirdly,  Some  Remarks  will  be 
ofFer'd  upon  fome  Principal  Forms  of  Enunciation,  in  Refe-, 
rence  to  Proof,  which  muil  be  made  agreeably  to  thofe 
Forms ;  Foiirthfy,  I  Ihall  proceed  to  conlider  the  various 
Subjedt-matter  of  Propoiiiians,  and  endeavour  to  Stare,' 
what  fortof  Proof  they  Require,  or  will  admit ;  and  Finally^' 
fliall  (hew  what  Method  of  Procedure  may  be  fitly  us'd  to- 
wards the  finding  out  of  Argum  -nts,  §  7, L  To 


Chap.  8.  Improvement  of  Keafon.  265 

^  7.  I.  To  the  firft  of  thefe,  wc  may  obferv e, 
I.  That  it  is  Labour  ioft,  or  worfe  than  fo,  to  attempt  the 
proving  wliat  is  inconliftent  with  it  feif  or  orherways  evident- 
ly FaKe,  unlefs  it  fhould  be  merely  and  profeffed'y  for  the 
Exercife  of  Wit  and  Fancy,  or  for  trying  the  Judgment  of 
another  ;  and  even  this  might  be  very  Dangerous  or  highly 
Inexpedient  in  fomc  Cafes,  ind  in  refpedl  of  fome  i-'erfons, 
efpecially  in  Points  of  MoraUty,  and  Reveal'd  Religion, 
where  Men  may  be  prone  to  take  InfeAion  from  a  Coloura- 
ble and  Plaulib'.e,  but  Fallacious  kind  of  Arguing:  Here  'ris 
only  the  contradidtory  Truths,  which  if  need  be,  are  to  be 
prov'd  or  coniirm'd  ;  I  fay,  if  need  be ;  for, 

§  8.  2.  "What  is  Self-evident,  is  not  to  be  attempted  i 
All  that  needs,  or  can  here,  be  done  for  others,  is  but  to  open 
the  Terms,  or  to  give  the  Matter  fome  various  Turns  of  Ex- 
preflion,  that  it  may  better  (hew  it  felf  to  fuch  as  would  not 
otherwife  difcern  its  undeniable  Evidence.     And, 

3.  We  are  not  at  every  Turn  to  be  proving  what  has  been  well 
prov'd;  for  tho'  it  might  perhaps  admit  of  farther  or  clearer 
Evidence,  vet  it  would  commonly  too  much  Embarrafs  the 
Procedure  of  Difcourfc,  and  render  fome  Arguments  endlefSj 
fhould  we  go  upon  the  proving  of  all  that  falls  in  our  way. 
We  muft  generally  content  our  felves  with  referring  to  Proof, 
otherways  given  of  fome  very  Important  Points  ;  as,  that 
there  is  a  God,  that  the  Scriptures  are  his  Word ;  That  there 
is  a  Providence,  a  Judgment  to  come,  and  a  future  Life, 
^c.  Nor  are  great  Matters  ordinarily  to  be  attempted  by  the 
By,  leaft  we  wrong  them  by  too  flight  and  weak  Evidence  ; 
but  they  are  rather  ro  be  folemnly  argued  in  fit  Seafon  ;  an4 
at  other  times  are  to  be  taken  for  granted,  however  anipflgft 
thofe  who  profefledly  own  them.     For  that, 

%  p.  4.  Confefled  Points  are  commonly  to  bepafs'^ovef 
Ivithout  Proof;  tho' even  fuch,  wherctheyareof  great  Mo- 
ment, are  fometime  or  other  to  be  induftrioufly  made  out,^ 
efpecially  to  thofe,  who  may  have  taken  them  up  without 
Confideration,  or  upon  flight  and  inftjfticient  Grounds ;  and 
fo  are  in  danger  to  give  them  little  Regard,  and  perhaps  to 
let  them  go  as  eaflly  as  they  took  them  up.     But, 

§10,  5.  Points  that  appear  Doubtful  ^^fiippofing  a  Ca- 
pacity for  them,  and  Concern  with  them)  arc  cliicily  to  be 
attempted,  and  indeed  to  be  attempted  only  ;  for  v.'e  are  not 
abfolutely  to  undertake  the  proving  of  them,  unlefs  it  Vv-ere 
by  way  of  Exercife,  as  in  the  Schools,  where  Difputing  is 
jTiade  a  Tryal  of  Skill,  and  ordinanly  of  Sharpnefsand  Quick- 
tiefs  j  rather  than  Solid  Judgment  :     But  all  Serious  Arguing. 

T  ftould 


2  6<^  An  til  ay  for  the  Fart  111. 

Jhonkl  be  either  for  the  Confirmation  of  what  ue  have  al- 
ready good  Reafon  to  take  for  True,  or  e]fe  an  Attempt  both 
vvays,  as  to  what  is  doubtful  to  dilcover  on  which  fide  the 
Truth  lies^,  initead  of  undertaking  to  make  out  or  refute  ci- 
ther this  or  that  part  of  the  Contradiiition.     And, 

s  T I .  When  \ve  are  upon  that,  which  is  to  us  Probable, 
tho'  an  Actenipt  may  be  made  for  proving  or  ccntiiming  it ; 
yet  it  fhoiild  be  with  due  Refcrve  and  carefal  Obfervation, 
as  we  proceed  therein,  whether  the  Truth  may  not  yet  lie  on 
the  other  fide  ;  not  with  a  fixed  Refoknion  of  going  on  to 
prove  what  we  have  Undertaken:  And  indeed  it  were  belt 
notro  inidertak.-  profelfedly  befijrc  others,  wliat  appeais  but 
Probable;  however  to  undertake  for  no  more  than  its  Proba>-. 
l  ility,  and  to  fubmit  the  Reafons  upon  which  wo  think  it  fo; 
not  engaging  our  felvcs  farther,  than  that  we  may  make 
aneallc,  fafe,  and  Honourable  Retreat. 

§  12.  7.  As  for  what  we  rake  to  be  cerrainh  fo,  whilft 
•yet  there  may  need  the  fr-rthcr  Proof,  which  fuch  a  fort  of 
^^atter  will  admit,  the  Confirmation  ot  fcch  a  Point  may  be 
more  abfohitely  attempted  ;  nor  lliould  we  fo  eafily  gi\e  it 
\tp  J  but  when  Objedlions  prefenr.  which  we  cannot  imme- 
diatelv  fclve,  we  ihoujd  take  them  profelfedly  into  farther 
Confideration,  rather  than  either  yield  the  Point,  or  pretend 

■  to  folve  them  off  hand  :  in  the  atrcmpting  of  which,  we  may 
•fe  in  Danger  to  ftrengthen  thar.  by  a  weak  Solution,  and  to 

Weaken  a  Cavfe,  which  iboulu  be  mainrain'd,  and  might 
pe  hap%  upoii  af:cr  Dcfiberation,  if  not  by  anfwering  the 
Objedtion  ;  yet  by  fhewing  there  is  no  Kecciiuy  it  Ihould  be 
-•anhver  d  for  the  fupporrirg  of  the  Matter  in  hand.  But 
I'.cre  we  fliould  Modehly  admit,  th;»r  we  may  poihUy  be  dc- 
(civ'd,  even  whilft  we  cannot  well  fee  how  we  llould  be  in 
the  wrong. 

§   13,     8.  As  to  what  we  delibera,tc!y  judge  to'have  been 

Didcniably  prov'd,    we  may  yet  more  boldly  attempt,   and 

•  iMeriiouUy  endeavour  the  Confirmation  of  it,  whenOccalion 

■■■reqviircs ;  and  ought  to  hold  it  llill,  tho'  neither  we  ourfelves 

r.or  others  (it  n^av  be)  can  anfwer  all  Cavils  agalnft  it,    or 

clear  up  all  the  DifHcuhies  about  it ;  fci  fuch  a  Point  ought, 

■  neverthchfs,    to  be  conftantly  mainrain'd,   unlefs  the  very 
Fciinviations    were  over-thrown,  on  which  it   flood;   and 

-  i«leed  the. only  Foundation  oil  which  it  could  poflib'y 
i'ftsnd. 


§14.  II.  As 


Chaps  Improvement  of  K.e3.{on,  267 

§  14.  II*  As  to  vvhai  help  has  been  already  laid  in  to- 
wards the  prefcnt  Undertaking,  it  may  be  of  lome  ufe  to  ob- 
ferve  that  in  the  Tieatife  thus  tar  carried  on,  befides  a  good 
Number  of  Principles  and  nearer  Deductions  from  them, 
which  have  been  given,  feveral  other  Politions-  have  been 
ciear'd,  which  may  ferve  as  a  kind  of  Secondary  Principles 
or  Deductions  for  the  Proof  of  many  important  Truths: 
And  more  particularly  'tis  hoped  Light  and  Proof  may  be 
drawn,  in  a  Num.ber  of  Queftions,  from  what  has  been  faid, 
I .  About  the  Nature  of  our  Thoughts,  and  the  Real  Ex- 
iftence  of  Things  without  us,  Part.  I.  Chap.  i.  asalfo  abouc 
the  various  ways  of  Thinking,  and  other  Matters  of  Tho'c 
in  a  more'  Familiar  and  lefs  Notional  way :  Chap.  2,  3, 
4  an<i  5. 

§  1 5.  2.  In  Relation  to  Entity,  Thing,  or  Somewhat  in 
General ;  efpecially  the  Creator  himfelf.  Chap.  6. 

3.  As  to  the  various  Degrees  and  Kinds  of  Created  Be- 
ings in  the  fundamental  Scale  of  Things,  Chap.  7.  which 
may  be  of  fome  Ufe  towards  our  more  diftinA  Apprehends 
ing  the  Terms  of  the  Queftion,  fo  as  to  difcern  what  there  is  of 
Subflance,  Accident,  Mode,  C^c.  according  to  the  Accounc  * 
there  given  of  them. 

§  1 6.  4.  In  Reference  to  Things,  as  they  do  more  com- 
tiionly  exift  in  cur  Ideas,  or  in  the  World ;  here  the  Secon-i 
dary  Scale,  or  that  of  Refultances  may  be  of  ufe,  and  will 
ferve  to  the  Qiieftions,  which  may  be  raifed  about  Combi- 
nations, Separations,  (^c  FiW?  Chap.  8 15. 

§  17.  5.  The  Set  of  Pofitions  and  more  immediate 
Deductions  (which  are  deliver'd,  Chap.  16.  and  in  chofe 
which  follow  to  the  end  of  the  firft  Part)  muft  be  of  great 
and  manifeft  Ufe  for  the  drawing  out  of  Argurvcnts,  or  clo- 
fing  the  Profecution  of  them,  which  if  carried  thro',  muft 
often  terminate  in  fome  or  other  of  thePofitions  or  Deducti- 
ons mentioned ;  and  here  Somewhat  farther  may  probably 
ftartinour  Minds,  upon  coniidering  thofe  Pofitions,  and  ob- 
ferving,  whether  any  of  them  will  ferve  to  the  proving  of 
whatwe  have  in  hand. 

§  18.  6,  "What  is  faid  about  the  right  Apprehending  of 
others  (Part  II.  Chap,  i,  2.)  may  be  of  Ufe  to.  make  cue 
the  Senfe  we  would  accordingly  put  upon  their  Exprefllons. 
And,    .... 

7-  What  is  offec'd  to  diredl  the  right  Exptv^fling  of  our 
own  Intendment  (Chap.  3.)  may  ferve  to  evince  the  Senfe 
deliver'd  by  us  againit  any,  that  would  mifconftrus  oui 
Word?, 

t  2,  S,  The 


76S  An  tjj ay  for  the  Pare  ill. 

8.  TheSecof  tnqnirics,  v.'hich  are  given,  Chap.  4,  5,6. 
may  be  very  like  to  fuqgcft  Matter  of  Argument,  when  they 
are  apply 'd  to  the  Terms  of  the  Qieftion. 

§  19.  p.  It  may  be  not  oniy  in  General  made  out,  that 
feme  things  are  to  us  Incoinprehenfible,  or  Unconcerniiig  ; 
Isut  of  what  fort  they  are  ;  and  even  in  Particular,  that  this 
Or  that  is  fo,  by  the  help  of  wharr  is  ofter'd,  Chap.  7.  And, 
That  neverthelefs  there  arc  fome  Points,  even  about  thofe 
things,  of  which  we  are  or  may  be  Capable,  and  with  which 
\\'^  are  or  may  be  concerned  ;  as  may  be  made  to  appear 
from  the  Inftanccs  given  or  intimated,  Chap.  8. 

^  2c;  Jo;  The  various  Importance  of  the  Things,  we 
are  c-apable  of  and  concern'd  with,  may  be  evinc'd  by  the 
help  of  what  is  delivcr'd.  Chap.  9,  10, 1 1.  where  there  arc 
divtrs  PoMrs  of  Prudence  fuggcfted,  and  fo  far  alfo  made 
our,  as  that  the  proving  them  more  fully,  may  be  no  great 
Bifficulty. 

§21.  1 1 .  What  is  faid  abont  (ingle  Apprehenfions,  and 
ri^e  Helps  given  rowards  forming  them  aright,  may  ferve  as 
Arguments  to  make  out  thofe  Enunciations,  which  only  draw 
^lem-out  into  a  more  ejtplicitc  Form  ;  and  it  is  befades  the 
very  Fund  and  Fountain  of  Evidence  in  other  Cafes,  for 
fl5dt  a-  Ji'rt  and  clear  Apprchenfion  of  the  Terms  in  many 
Queftions  will  fliew  their  Agreement  or  Difagreement  with- 
out niore  adot;  or  will,  however,  often  fuggcit  other  Ar- 
guments which  may  do  it.   Vide  Ghnp.  1  2, 1^,  14. 

§  22.  12.  Whar  is  oflercd  about  right  Judging  and  Pro- 
nouncing muft  undoubtedly  help  towards  the  Evincing  and 
Confirming  what  is  fb  Judged  and  Pronounced,  whether  of 
Enunciations  thcmfel\cs,  or  of  the  Subject  in  and  by  them, 
■vi:^.  that  fuch  an  Attribute  do's,  or  do's  not  belong  thereto, 
as  it  inay,  or  may  not  be  reducible  to  one  or  other  of  thole 
rdn-  Htad«,  that  ihew  whit  fort  of  Things  they  mult  be, 
which  can  be  rightly  affirm'd  j  and  as  the  Matter  of  the  Af- 
iirmatlve  or  Negative  Pofitionsis  agreeable  to  the  Rules  and 

Remarks  there  given  :     Vide  Chap.  X^ 19. 

§  23.  13.  What  is  deliver'd  abo'-it  Self-evidence,  and 
6nr  A<;quicfcing  therein,  may  ferve  tofurniili  us  witll  Argu- 
jnentin  divers  Cafes,  at  leaft,  to  fnew  that  Wie  do  not  need, 
«»r  ihGuldartetT.pt  to  give  farther  Proof ;  and"  it  itiay  alfo 
help  us  upon  good  Reafon  to  rejcCt  what  fome  would  per- 
I'la'^s  obri'tide  upon  ns  as  Self-e^'i'd^nt,  when  yet  it  do's  not- 
arif^i^.c-l4e^Aa:aAinrgi\''en-,  Chap.  20. 


J  4.  The 


Chap.  9.  iw\)rovement  of  Rcalcn.  269 

14.  The  Danger  of  Miftake,  and  irs  Importance,  as  they  ace 
ftated  and  lliewn,  Chap,  ii,  may  arford  Argumojit  for  the 
doubtfulnefs  of  fuch  Matters,  as  alfo  for  our  ufing  great  Care 
about  them,  and  infilling  upon  very  good  Evidence  and 
Proof  in  relation  to  them. 

^^  24.  15.  What  is  faid  about  eftimaring  Proof,  and  af- 
feming  accordingly  may  fuggeft  Reafons,  why  we  or  others 
fliould,  or  fhculd  nor,  admit  what  is  offer'd  as  Evidence  to 
this  or  that  Point ;  as  alfo  why  we  or  they  fhould  be  thereby 
carry \1  thus  far,  and  no  farther  in  our  Aifenc ;  and  it  may 
likewife  afford  feme  Afliilance  towards  the  finding  out  of 
proper  Arjiumenrs,  fo  far,  however,  as  to  put  us  in  the  way 
of  enquiring  after ///c/^,  and  that  we  may  more  readily  difcern 
them  upon  the  firll  Appearance  ;  nor  yet  be  impos'd  upon  b_y 
a  meer  Appearance  :  But  it  muft  very  plainly  guide  us  in 
the  way  of  ufing  fuch  Argumems  aright  in  this  or  chat  Form, 
and  Caution  us  againft  the  fallaciov  s  and  inUiIiicient  ways  of 
Arguing,  which  are  mention'd  in  the  preced  uig  Chapter. 


CHAP.     IX. 

§  I.  A  Ccording  to  the  differing  Make  and  Manner  of 
■^*-  Enunciations  j  the  Attempt  or  Undertaking  to 
prove  them  may  import  a  differing  Aim  and  Defign  ;  Now 
that  this  may  be  more  diftind;ly  apprehended,  and  clofely  at- 
tended to,  it  may  be  of  ufc  in  the  next  place. 

III.  To  offer  fuch  Obfervations  about  fome  of  the  varicqs 
Forms  of  Propofirions,  as  will  fhew  what  kind  of  Proof  they 
require,  or  what  is  the  very  thing  we  have  to  do,  when,  we 
go  to  prove  this  or  that  fort  of  Enunciation.     And, 

§  1.  I.  In  an  Hypothetical,  or  Relative  Propofition, 
where  there  are  two  Enunciations  conjoin'd  or  disjoin'd,  our 
Bufmefs  is  not  to  Prove  ©r  Difprove  eit4ier  of  them,  but  on^ 
ly ^l^eir  Gonjundfion  or  Disjunction:  And  we  are  hereto 
confider,  what  there  is  certainly  Antecedent,  Concomitanr, 
or  Cbnfcquent  to  the  Fundamental  Ppjnt,  which  neceilkrily 
infers  the  ofliicr;  or  whatsis  any  way^bclong'ng  to  the  latter, 
w.h;ch  pref\jpp()fes  thej^nvcr :  But,  to  eyin(je.l;hat  there  is  uo 
■ConRexi6.n^f  tlje  .tvyo'Enunciatian?,  .we  .n\uft  either,  (^i.) 
■thew,-by  waj  of  InduCiion,  that , there  is  nQtliing  cett,aifrly 
appertaining  to  the  foregoing  Enunciation,  which  do's  nc(;ef- 
'fe^ly4l>fei"J0rprefup|K3fe. the  following;  or  elfe  (2.)  That 

T  3  theje 


370  An  tjjay  for  the  Fare  III- 

there  is^  or  at  leaft  may  he  fomewhat  belonging  to  the  one 
iPoint,  which  cuts  btf  the  Confequence,  oi-  the  Vrefupporal  ot' 
the  other. 

■  §  3.  E.G'-.  If  there  be  a  God,  there  is  a  Providence  ; 
for  he  certainly  has  that  Wifdcm,  Power,  and  Goodncl'^^, 
tvhith  do  together  infer  it,  fincc  his  Wifdom  inuft  unqueftio- 
nably  Direft,  his  Power  enable,  and  Coodncfs  ir.cline  hiin 
to  manage  and  take  Care  of  the  World  he  has  made  :  But 
on  the  other  hand ;  tho'  there  be  a  Providence  (or  Divine 
Management),  v;h;ch  muft  be,  as  God  himfelf  is,  Ppweriul, 
Wife,  and  Good;  yet  this  doV.  not  neceffarily  infer  the  pre- 
fent  and  open  rev.'arding  of  Good  Men,  or  punidiing  cf  the 
Bad  ;  fince  there  m.ay  be  a  Secret  or  Future  Reward  and  Pu- 
jiifhment  fufficicnt  to  render  the  whole  CrndLi£l  ot  Affairs  ta- 
ken together  fuitabL*  to  the  Divine  Wifdonn,  Power  and 
Goodp.efs, 

'"  Tho' the  Sea  be  Brackifli,  its  Fi(h  truft  not  therefoie  be 
Salt ;  for  the  brackijli  Water  of  the  Sea  do's  not  heceiTarily 
enter,  as  an  Ineredient,  into  the  Compolirior.  ot  the  Filti  ; 
but  the  Saline  P.ircicles  may  be  feparatcd  in  Concodlion  or 
o:herways. 

As  to  the  Proof  of  fuch  Enunciations,  fume  farther  T  ight 
and  Help  may  be  drawn  from  wtut  has  been  faid  of  them, 
Chap.  I.  §  10,  GJ'r,  of  this  ^d  Part. 

§  4.  2.  As  to  Disjunctive  Propofirions  firft  of  all  the 
Disjundtion  it  felf,  whether  of  the  Sal  jed:or  Predicate,  or 
of  both  (it  r.ced  be),  is  to  be  made  cur  or  aTcnipiedby  fiicw- 
ing,  that  it  is  Proper  and  FbiII.  or  at  leaft  fufficient  to  the  prc- 
fent  Purpofe;  and  then  each  Branch  of  the  Disjunctive  Snb- 
jedl  is  to  be  effay'd  in  reference  to  every  Branch  of  the  Dif- 
jundtive  Predicate,  but  cnly  frme  part  thereof  to  be  prov'd  : 
And  therefore  the  Disjun£t:ve  Proportion  is  to  be  refolvM  in- 
to finiplc  Enunciations,  which  are  to  be  feverally  attempted, 
and  fome  or  other  of  them  prov'd,  as  the  Matter  or  Occal^- 
011  may  require. 

§  5.  Fortlie  Proof  of  this,  that  E?Gr. /T/V/jer  Go/</,  Silver,  or 
head,  are  the  heavlrj}  ?.ict,il,  or  the  hr.frji^  we  muft  (hew,  ( I .)  That 
Metal  is  fitly  attributed  to  each  of  the  Subje<5ts,  Gold,  Silver,  8c 
Lead ;  for  they  are  all  of  them  Malleable ,  or  may  be  hammer'd 
Out)  and  can  be  Melted;  (z.)  That  Heavy  may  be  afcribed  to 
fome  or  other  Metals  at  leaft ;  and  (g)  fo  may  Bafe ;  (4.)  That 
the  Enumeration  in  the  Predicate  is  at  leaft  fufficient  for  the 
Purpofe  to  which  it  is  brought,  fuppofing  that  the  Weight 
and  Worth  of  Metals  were  all  that  was  enquired  after  or 
;  treated  of  j  and  {';.)  The  Ei<umcration,in  the  Subjed:  of  the 


Chap.  9*  Improve ff/e»t  of  i\.ea[on.  zji 

Qiicftion,  is  alfo  fufficienc  for  the  Purpofe  to  which  it  is 
plainly  brought  ;  for  tliat  there  is  a  Subject  to  anfwer  one 
Member  of  the  Disjundiive  Predicate  at  leaft,  and  as  here 
the  Matter  ftands,  there  is  one  to  anfwer  each  of  them  ;  fjr 
f6.)  Gold  is  truly  the  heavieft  of  Metals,  as  appears  upon  com- 
paring its  Weight  and  Bulk  together,  with  thole  of  Silver, 
Lead,  CjJc ;  and  (7.)  Lead  is  indeed  the  Bafeft,  as  appearing 
by  Experiment  to  be  more  Drolfy,  and  by  common  '.iltimate, 
Jefs  valued  than  any  other  Mecal :  But  before  thef^  two  lalt 
Points  came  to  appear,  or  for  the  aiTiiring  of  them,  it  might 
be  attempted,  (S.j  Whether  Silver  were  the  heaviefl:  Metal, 
and  (9./  Whether  it  were  the  Bafeft,  as  alfo  ( i  c  Whether 
Gold  were  the  Bafeit  as  well  as  heavieft ,-  and,  Laftly,  whe- 
ther Lead  were  ihe  heavieft,  as  well  as  Bafeit  Metal :  And 
thus  all  the  Points  couch'd  in  the  Disjunctive  Enunciation 
would  be  fully  attempted,  and  fo  much  prov'd  as  is  requi(i:e, 
or  indeed  more  then  is  of  abfolute  Necellity. 

§  6.  3.  As  to  Conjundfive  Propofitions,  every  Subject 
muft  be  attempted  in  relation  to  every  Predicate,  and  Ihould 
be  prov'd  (if  need  be)  to  make  the  Enunciation  evidently 
true.  E.  G.  Gold,  Silver,  and  Copper  are  Metals,  nnd  ■  s'd  in 
our  Current  Coin;  here  we  muft  thus  proceed,  (i.)  Gold  is 
a  Metal;  for  it  is  Malleable  and  may  be  melted;  fo  is 
(2.)  Siber,  and  (3.)  Copper,  for  the  fame  Reafon ;  (4.)  GolJ 
is  us'd  in  our  current  Coin  i  fois(5.)  Silver,  and  (6.^  Cop- 
per, as  is  well  known  by  common  Obferv^tion,  and  thus 
the  Conjunctive  Enujiciation  is  prov'd  ?o  be  true. 

•5  7.  Bur  if  Lend  had  been  added  to  the  mention'd  Pro- 
polition,  it  would  upon  the  Attempt  have  appear'd,  (7,)  That 
Lead  is  indeed  a  Metal  as  well  as  the  reft;  but  (  8.)  That  it 
is  not  us'd  in  our  Current  Coin,  fince  no  good  Teftimony  can 
be  produced  fur  its  being  fo  us'd ;  and  upon  this  fmgle  Failure 
the  Enunciation,  That  Gold,  Silver^  Copper  and  Lead  arc  Me- 
tals, And  u.t'd  in  our  Current  Coin^  luuft  have  been  rejev5ted  as 
Falfe,  being  fo  put  together ;  tho*  all  the  Points  but  one  con- 
tain'd  in  it  were  True. 

§  8.  4,  A  Propofirion  that  is  partly  Disjunctive,  and 
partly  Conjunctive,  muft  be  rcfolv'd  and  elfay'd  according  to 
its  Compound-make.  It  it  were  faid,  EU.'jcr  Glafs  or  Iro?:  ts  . 
both  Mnllenble  nnd  Fnfiide  (or  may  be  Hammerd  out  and 
Melted) ;  here  is  a  Disjunftive  Subjedt  with  a  Conjunctive 
Predicate :  And  in  proving  the  Enunciation,  wc  mud-  at- 
tempt both  the  Predicates,  in  Reference  to  each  of  the  Sub- 
je(fts ;  and  make  it  out,  that  the  Predicates  are  both  found 
together  in  one  of  thofe  Subjeds :    Now  in  the  prefent  Cafe, 

T4  (i.)G]afs 


2^2  An  tjjay  for  the  Part  \U. 

(i.)  Glafs  is  fufible,  or  may  be  melted;  but  (i.)  it  is  not 
Malleable;  and  therefore, (3.)  Both  the  memion'd  Attributes 
belong  not  to  it:  But,  {4.J  Iron  is  Malleable,  C5.)  It  is 
Fulible;  and  therefore  (6.)  it  has  both  the  Qualities  toge- 
ther, as  appears  by  Experiment :  We  are  thus  to  carry  our 
Proof  to  all  that  is  Conjoin'd,  and  only  to  fome  part  of  what 
is  Disjoined. 

§  9.  5.  A  Propofition  otherwife  conrpounded  is  to  be  re- 
folv'd  into  the  feveral  Enunciations  of  which  it  is  made  up, 
ckch  of  which  is  to  be  attempted,  and  all  to  be  prov'd  to 
make  the  whole  as  it  ftands  together  a  juft  and  meafur'd  Truth. 
E.  Gr.  Learning  ts  highly  to  be  valued  ai  it  renders  Men  capable 
cf  more  eminent  tifcfulnefs:  In  refolving  fuch  complicated 
Enunciations,  we  mud  begin  with  what  is  Fundamental  and 
Principal,  proceeding  to  what  lies  next  it,  and  fo  on  thro'  the 
■whole;  as  here  ( I.)  Learning  renders  Men  capable  of  ufefulnefs, 
as  may  hz  prov'd  by  inftancing  in  feveral  Pares  of  Learning,  & 
Hieufcs  to  which  they  ferve;  (2.)  The  ufefulnefs  of  whichLear- 
tng  makes  Men  capable,  is  more  Eminent  than  what  they 
ebuld  ordinarily  attahi  to  without  it,  for  that  it  reaches  to 
tnore  and  Nobler  Purpofes  than  could  well  be  {erv'd  other- 
ways ;  (-s,.)  That  vvhich  gives  a  Capacity  for  ufefulnefs  is 
to  be  vaiii'd,  iivtcc  Ufefulflefs  it  felf,  and  the  Capacity  for  it 
%i-e  valuable  Things  ;  (4.)  What  gives  a  Capacity  for  Emi- 
yient  Ufefulnefs,  is  highly  to  be  Valued,  fincc  the  more  Bmi, 
^iit  Kind  and  Degree  of  ufefulnefs,  and  of  Capacity  for  it, 
is  proportion  ably  valuable. 

§  10.  Let  it  be  obferv'd,  that  where  there  are  indeed 
ffeny  diftincft  Points  of  an  Enunciation,  which  might  be  gone 
thro'  and  prov'd  or  atremptcd,  yet  it  will  not  be  always  Ne- 
'i^effary  or  Requifitc  to  take  them  feverally ;  forafmuch  iK 
'fome  of  them  may  be  Self-evident,  others  before  prov'd,  and 
'others  granted,  2:  leaft  by  thofe  with  whom  we  are  concern'd, 
%nd  'tis  commonly  fome  one  Point  only  in  the  Compound- 
"Ptopofition,  which  requires  to  be  prov'd  or  attempted :  Now 
in  fuch  Cafe,  that  muft  be  carefully  fingled  out,  and  it  were 
%eh  it  Ihould  be  feparately  ftated,  as  may  be  more  diftincflly 
fiiewn  afterwards. 

§11.    We  now  pafs  from  the  Manner  or  Form  of  Enun- 
(SKitiohs  to  fome  Remarks, 

ly,  As  to  the  Matti^r  of  Propofiribns,  according  to  whidi 
'the  Proof  may  or  muft  be  ditFering  ;   This  will  re^iuite  a  lar- 
ger handling.    And, 


if.  In 


Chap.  9.  Improvement  of  Realon.  175 

I.  In  Preference  to  the  Signification  of  Words  and  Sen- 
tences the  Proof  is  to  be  drawn,  in  the  Dead  Languages, 
from  their  Ufe  m  approved  Authors,  or  from  the  Analogy 
and  Proportion,  which  they  bear  thereto  j  In  the  Living 
Tongues  it  may  be  farther  taken  from  comnr^on  Ufage,  in 
fuch  Cafe  and  Circumftahces,  or  from  a  more  exprefs  Agree- 
ment among  fuch  as  may  coin  new  "Words  and  Phrafes,  or 
ufe  the  old  ones  in  an  uncommon  Senfe. 

§  11.  When  the  Meaning  of  any  Expreflion  is  declar'd  by 
what  is  previoufly  underftood  or  agreed,  it  becomes  a  kind 
of  Pojlulatuni,  or  a  Demand  not  to  be  deny'd,  that  it  be  fo 
taken  in  the  prcfent  Difcourfe,  at  leaft  till  there  be  fome  faijr 
Intimation  given  of  a  differing  Intendment  by  it :  And  what 
we  here  fay  of  Words  is  to  be  duly  apply'd  in  reference  to 
other  Expreflions  of  the  Mind. 

§  13.  2.  As  to  a  Man's  Tho'ts  and  inward  Sentiments, 
every  one  is  to  be  credited,  that  they  are  fo  or  fo,  as  he  fcri- 
oufly  profeffes,  unlefs  there  be  fome  apparent  Reafon  to  the 
contrary,  either  from  a  Perfon's  general  Charadler,  or  fome- 
what  in  the  particular  Cafe,  which  may  render  the  Profcflion 
Incredible,  Improbable,  or  Unfafe  to  be  depended  on. 

§  14.  3.  As  to  fecond  Notions,  in  relation  to  thefirft,  their 
A  greement  orDifagreement  is  to  be  prov'd  or  diTprov'd  by  the 
Account  given  of  thofe  fecond  Notions,  as  it  is  for  Subftance 
generally  agreed  amongft  Logicians ;  E.G.  That  a  Genm  or 
Kind  is  a  common  Nature,  or  rather  a  common  Idea,  which 
do's  or  may  agre-e,  to  feveral  Species  or  Sores  ;  the  Lox^cji  Sort 
a  common  Idea,  which  do's  or  may  agree  to  divers  Indivi- 
duals or  fingular  Beings .-  The  Singular  as  fuch,  that  which 
neither  do's  nor  can,  agree  to  more  then  one,  fo  as  to  be  ftridtly 
Identify 'd  with  them  in  every  Refpeft.  Thefe  Notional 
Ideas,  even  when  they  relate  to  the  feif-fame  Being,  under  a 
differing  Confideration,  are  not  in  themfelves  the  lame :  Nor 
■is  our  Idea  of  the  fame  -Divine  Nature,  en  varioitfy  Jubjijlin'r 
■"•in  the  Father,  Son,  and  Spirit,  ftridly  the  fame,;  Neith^ 
■would  the  Idea  of  one  Soul,  as  animating  three  feveral  Bo- 
dies be  wholly  the  fame. 

§15.    More  diredtlyto  theprefent  Purpofe,  itmighchere 
'be  ihewn,  that  the  mentioned  fecond  Notions  do-refpecflively 
^agree  to  Living  Creature,  to  Man,  and  to  this  or  that  Man  ; 
for  that  CLivirtg  Creature]  is  deijgn'd  to  exprefs  fuch  a  com- 
rmoh  Idea,  as  Logicians  intend  by  a  Genus  or  Kind  ,•    [Man] 
-fuch,  as  they  defign  by  a  Species  or  Sort;    and  [this  or  that 
^Man3  fuch,  as  they  mean  by  an  Individual  or  Singular.  Now 
I  call  Living  Creature,  Man,  and  this  or  that  Man  firjl  Noti- 
ons, 


o«j,  as  being  the  more  immediate  Ideas  of  Things themfelves, 
not  farther  Norions  advanc  d  upon  fuch  Ideas. 

§  1 6.     But  the  main  and  moft  material  Queftions,   which 
are  more  fully  to  be  treated  of  are, 

4.  About  the  Agreement  or  Difagreement  of  our  firft  No- 
tions, or  more  immediate  Apprehenfions  of  Things  them- 
felves :  £.  G.  Whether  this  or  that  Particular  Being  is  to  be 
iiccounted,  what  we  mean  by  a  Living  Creature^  or  by  Man^ 
Or  by  this  or  that  Man  (fuppofe  Adam  or  Mo/cs')  Yea  or  No  ? 
Whether  this,  that,  and  every  other  Triangle  (that  is  or 
might  bej  have  all  its  Aneles  together  equal  to  what  wc 
mean  by  two  riglic  ones  ?  Whether  the  taking  what  is  ano- 
thers,  without  his  Confcnt,  muft  in  every  Inftance  be  what 
we  intend  by  Stsz-JiTij,  or  unjuft  and  injurio'is  Taking? 
Whether  the  Lord  Jelus  Chrilt  be  God  in  a  ftriiTt  and  proper 
Senfe  ? 

The  three  foregoing  forts  of  Queftions  we  might  call  Ver- 
bal, MeTitnl  and  Kotionnl ;  this  fourth  may  fitly  be  named 
i^!?/?/,  and  it  requires  a  much  larger  handling  ;  we  Ihall 
therefore  proceed  upon  it  in  the  following  Chapter. 


CHAP.     X. 

§  I.  VT/HAT  T  Ihall  here  endeavour,  is  to  dired:  the  Evi- 
^  dence  proper  to  the  various  Kinds  of  Queitions 
which  may  be  call'd  i{cnli  and  they  are  chiefly  Mnthcmnticai, 
'Mord^  Natural,  and  Supernc.turnl-^  but  I  fhall  firft  obferve 
the  more  General  Affedtions,  whereby  fome  Points  are  con- 
tingent, others  NecelTary,  and  that  their  Proof  may  or  muft 
be  accordingly. 

I.  As  to  what  is  plainly  of  a  Contingent  Nature  fo  as  it 
might  be  or  not  be,  might  be  thus  or  otherwife,  our  Proof 
muft  either  ftop  at  Pcjfwility,  or  may  often  go  on  to  Probabi- 
lity^ or  fometimes  farther  advance  to  Certainty. 

§  2.  ((.)  To  evince  a  meer  PcJJlbility,  'tis  enough  to 
Ihew,  that  there  is  no  Contradi<ftion,  or  Inconliftency  in  the 
Matter  :  E.  G.  That  the  Moon  may  poffiblv  be  inhabited, 
for  there  is  nothing  appears  in  its  Make,  or  Place,  or  other- 
wife  inconiiftenr  v.-ith  irs  being  fo  :  And  here  it  may  be  fit  to 
begin  our  Enqu'ry  and  Proof  in  Points,  which  appear  doubt- 
fu!;  bur,  when- we  once  fee  thepofTibiliry  of  them,  we  may 
"•*->. "11  rro."-L"^' '^ra^c-npt  fa^''le".     And, 


C^hap.  TO.         Improvement  of  Realon.  275- 

^  ?.  ^2.)  Probnhility\sTC\zd,c  out  by  Ihewiiig,  that  there 
arc  the  iify.nl  Antecedents,  Concomitants,  or  Cotifequents  of 
this  or  that ;  That  there  are  Caufcs  fitted  and  difpos'd  fo  to 
Work  ;  Matter  fit  to  Work  upon  ;  proper  Means,  lufHcient 
Inducements,  and  the  like  ;  or  other  ulual  Marks  of  Truth, 
Duty,  cS'c.  when  a  Matter  comes  to  appear  probjble,  we 
may  infome  Cafes  carry  onr  Proof  yet  farther.     And, 

§  4.  (3.)  Certainty  is  either  more  Ab/olutc,  or  elCe  what 
rhey  call  Mpral  Certainty,  which  is  altogether  fufllcient  in  its 
Kind.  Al'folute  Ccrtn'mty  may  be  evinc'd  by  lliewing  that 
^here  are  the  Neceffary  Antecedents,  Concomitants,  or 
Confequents,  Caufes,  Effecls,  ijc.  of  this  or  that  \  or  that 
there  is  an  inf  iliible  Tcftimony  of  it.  Moral  Certainty  (as  hath 
been  ihewn)  concludes  that  it  is  fo.or  fp,  either  upon  Rcafon, 
which  cannot  fail,  but  in  fome  very  rarcfjngular  and  unlikely 
Cafe;  or  elfe  upon  Teftimony,  which,  tho'  it  be  not  Infallible, 
yet  cannot  be  tho't  Falfe  without  admitting  grofs  Abfurdities. 

Moft  Matters  of  Fa6t  are  contingencies,  and  what  is  faid 
about  them,  whether  by  way  of  HZ/Zo'^,  R^j)ort^  Qx  PredlciicUj 
muft  fall  under  one  or  other  ot  the  forementicned  Heads. 

§  1.  As  to  a  Single  Hlfiory  of  [{emote  Times  and  Places, 
unlefs  jt  be  Divinely  Infpir'd,  we  muft  look  for  little  more 
Proof,  than  that  the  Matter  carries  in  it  fcif  no  manifeft  Ab- 
furdity  or  Improbability  ;  and  chat  there  is  nothing  fufficient 
to  the  Contrary.  Where  there  are  more  Hijiories  fnoc  ex- 
tracted one  from  another)  relating  to  the  fame  Matter,  their 
Agreement  in  the  Main,  efpecially  if  there  be  fome  Circtin;- 
ilances  differing,  and  fecmingly  difagreeing,  may  farther  con- 
firm our  Affent  to  thofe  Points  in  wiiich  they  concur,  but: 
more  efpeciallv  if  they  were  written  by  intelligent,  Honeft, 
and  Inipartial  Perlons,  in  or  near  the  Places,  and  not  far  from 
the  Tin  es  to  which  they  refer;  it  greatly  Confirms  them, 
ifPublick  Records,  and  the  like  Autbentick  Teftimoiiies  be 
produced. 

Sacred  Hijiory  has  yet  more  to  be  faid  for  ir,  as  having  been 
fo  long  and  wonderoufly  preferved,  being  attefted  by  fueh 
Monuments  and  Miracles  credibly  related,  and  own'd  by  that 
very  People,  on  which  it  do's  fo  often  and  fo  highly  tc^qQc. 

§  6.  The  Reports  that  are  given  as  to  Matters  of  Facft  of 
late  or  prefent  Time,  but  perhaps  diftant  Places,  may  admic 
of  fufficient  Evidence  from  Living  Witneflcs  of  undoubted 
Credit,  and  the  Concurrent  Teftimony  of  fuch,  who  could 
iiot  confpire  together,  nor  could  indeed  have  any  Interelt  to 
impofe  upon  us  in  the  Matters  they  Report  j  efpecially  when 
tl^ir  Account  is  given  by  them  feparately  and  apart,  in  differ- 
ing 


iy^  An  t [fay  for  the  fart  Tlf. 

ing  Terms,  with  fomewhat  differins;  Circumftances,  and  ^hac 
xhere  is  no  Credible  Teltimony  ro  the  Contrary. 

§  7.  PrediHions  are  then  put  out  of  Doubt,  when  they 
are  fulfiird,  at  leaft  if  they  be  intirely  accompUfti'd,  not  on- 
ly in  their  firft  and  Literal  Meaning,  but  in  the  farther  and 
tnore  My fterious Import,  which  fome  of  rhem  appear  to  have 
in  facred  Writ ;  in  the  mean  while  their  abfolute  Certainty 
depends  upon  the  Marks  they  carry  with  them  of  Divine  In- 
spiration, as  alfo  in  the  Matter,  Atteftation,  and  Tendency 
of  them  :  What  is  but  Humanly  Prefag'd  or  Conjedur'd 
■may  yet  appear  Probable  upon  the  Conhderation  of  the  pre- 
fent  Pofture  and  Tendency  of  Things,  efpecially  when  there 
are  Judgments  Impending  according  to  Divine  Threatnings, 
or  Bleflings  aflur'd  by  the  Word  of  God,  which  yet  may  not 
'be  ahogether  certain  in  the  very  Kind,  tho*  fure  to  be  ful- 
fill'd  in  value  one  way  or  other. 

§  8.  2.  As  to  what  appears  to  be  of  a  Necejfary  Kind,  yet 
not  Self-evident ;  but  that  if  it  be  at  all,  it  neceflfarily  is,  or 
if  it  be  indeed /o,  it  is  neceffarily/o ;  fuch  fort  of  Pou^.ts  may 
be  prov'd,  or  at  lead  are  to  be  attempted  from  the  Nature  of 
Things ;  and  tho'  Proof  may  be  otherwife  given,  yet  this 
kind  of  Evidence  is  certainly  Preferable,  as  not  only  evincing, 
that  the  Thing  is  fo,  but  letting  us  into  the  Ground  and  Rea- 
fon  of  its  being  fo.  Now  what  is  NecelTary,  may  be  either 
Ahfohitely  or  Condifiondl'y  fuch ;  and  the  Condition  may  it 
felf  be  either  Neceflary  or  Contingent.    And, 

§  9.  r,  When  the  Thing  fuppos'd,  is  in  it  felf  a  Contin- 
gency, Avbat  is  neccffarily  connected  with  it  has  only  a  lower 
ton  of  Neceffity,  and  may  be  call'd  in  a  Senfe  Contingent, 
tho'  it  be'Necefiary  upon  the  Suppofition  of  fomewhat  elfe  : 
'Tis  altogether  plain,  that  the  moll  Accidental  Things  Ne- 
ceflarily  are  whiirt  they  are;  and  necelTarily  are  fuch,  whilft 
•they  arc  fuch;  for  a  Thing  cari't  pollibly  be  and  not  be,  or  be  fo 
or  not  be  fo  at  once.  Qiiecn  yinne  is  Ncceflarily  the  Minijier 
of  God  to  m  for  goody  while  She  Reigns  with  fo  Happy  a  Tem- 
'pcranire  of  Jiiftice  and  Clemency  ;  and  yet  She  is  not  Necef- 
Tarfly  fuch^  but  of  Choice  ;  fince  'tis  not  of  Natural  Ncc^ffi- 
ty,  but  from  Her  Gracious  and  lixcd  Inclination,  that  Her 
Adjuiniftration  is  fuch:  And  yet  with  that  Ipclinajieti  it 
'c!at>not  be  otherwife. 

"'^  I'lD.     z.'  When  the'TKingfu^posM  is  in  if  felf'Neceffa- 
vtyj'thefeis  an''^!gher'Kind;df~:Ncr..°n      in  wha^is  ncciJMy 
C6nne«iled  wiTh''it;  thus,  .i^jjoh  the A"dniitlion  of  atrxifihy  in 
ihe"God-head,T31vine^HonQur  wiirb-  nccdTarily  doeto  the 
'father,,  ro  thc-'^Qn,  '"^nd  to  tjie  Holy'Spirir,  as^behi^  ea«-h  of 


tkciii 
ii 


Chap.  lo.       improvement  oj  Ktziou.  277 

theiti  God  :  And  that  it  muft  be  Neceffarily  due  upon  that 
Conceflion,  appears  from  the  Nature  of  the  Thing,  but  that 
there  are  neceflarily  thofe  Three  in  One,  appears  not  with- 
out Supernatural  Revelation  ;  yet  this  appearing  thence  to  Ire, 
it  thereupon  farther  appears  from  the  Nature  of  the  Tiling, 
that  it  muft  Necejfariiy  be ;  for  what  God  is  in  himfelf,  he  Ne- 
ceflarily is ;  And  upon  Suppofition,  that  he  is,  %vho  indeed 
cannot  but  be,  he  alfo  is  molt  Holy,  Wife,  Powerful,  Juft, 
and  Good ;  for  thefe  Perfections  are  Neceflary  to  the  Nature 
and  Idea  of  a  Being  abfolutely  Perfe(il. 

§  1 1.     3.  What  is  abfolutely  Neceflary  has  a  Neccfllty  of 
the  Higheft  Kind,  and  if  fuch  a  Point  be  well  underftood,  it 
may  be  prov'd  by  the  moft  Dircdt  and  cogent  Reafoning ;  as 
that  God  has  alwnys  been,  /5,  nnd  /hall  he,   may  be  thus  evinc'd 
or  confirm'd ;     If  any  thing  now  is  fomething  always  has 
beeni  for  nothing  could  not  of  itfelf  ever  rife  into  being; 
that  fomething  now  is  I  cannot  doubt,  whoconfcioufly  know, 
that  I  my  felf  Ad,   and  am  equally  fure,   that  whiift  I  Ad 
(tho'  it  were  but  in  Thinking)  I  am ;   for  that  nothing  can't 
pollifeiy  do  any  thing :  And  farther,  if  there  be  now  an  Intelli- 
gent Being,  that  Underftands  and  Wills,   as  I  confcioufly 
know  there  is,    then  there  always  has  been  a  Being  of  that 
Kind ;    for  fomewhat  more  Excellent  could  not  arife  out  of 
what  was  lefs  Perfcd  :    Again,  What  could  not  but  be,  can- 
not but  ftill  be ;    for  fuch  Being  could  not  nuJlifie  himfelf 
without  being  Superiour  to  himfelf,   nor  indeed  without  his 
Exifting  and  not  txifting  at  once,  nor  could  he  be  nullify 'd by 
any  thing  inferior  to  himfelf,  or  but  equal,  if  any  fuch  could 
be. 

§  1 2.  Such  manner  of  Proof  may  (T  think  j  be  call'd  De- 
monltration,  tho'  it  be  not  of  a  Mathematical  fort,  (ince  it 
leaves  no  Place  for  our  calling  the  Matter  in  Queftion  with- 
out running  counter  to  what  we  cannot  poffibly  doubt  of, 
when  we  attend  thereto :  And  yet,  after  all,  we  may  doubt 
of  the  Thing  fo  prov'd,  fuppofe  the  Being  of  a  God ;  whiift 
we  attend  not  to  its  Evident  Connexion  with  feme  Self-evi- 
dent Point  •  or  it  may  be  obferve  not  the  Self- evidence  there- 
of; as  even  a  Mathematician  might  Queftion,  Whether  the 
three  Angles  of  a  right  lin'd  Triangle  be  equal  to  two  right 
ones,  if  he  had  forgot,  or  whiift  he  attends  not  to,  the  De- 
monftration;  or  retains  not  the  firm  and  undoubred  Remem- 
brance of  his  being  clearly  and  fully  fatisfied,  when  he  &w 
it  Dcmonftrated. 

§  13.     I  fhall  now  offer  fomewhat  farther  as  to  ihe  fort 
of  Proof,  which  may  be  admitted  o,  i$  requir  d  jby  the  Piin- 

cipal 


278 


ya'«  i^Jfay  for  the 


Part  m. 


cipal  Sorts  of  Etiunciations,  as  they  are  Mathematical,  Moral ^ 
'Natural^  or  Su-pematural. 

I .  Mathematical  Enunciations  are  fach  as  relate  purely  to 
Quantity,  vi:{,  to  Number  or  Meafure,  without  attendingi 
to  the  Things  Numbered  or  Mcafured,  i.  e.  to  thofe  Beings 
in  Nature,  or  other  Objetls  of  Tho't,  to  which  the  Num- 
bers or  Meafures  belong.  Now,  whereas  nothing  is  here 
taken  into  the  Qiieftion,  but  what  is  or  may  be  comprehended 
fuJJy  and  clearly  ^'as  being  only  what  our  Minds  have  firfl 
taken  up^' ;  it  thence  comes  to  pafs,  that  we  may  here  argue 
demonftratively  witli  the  greateft  Clearnefs  and  Cogency. 
And  in  fuch  matter  there  are  chiefly  three  Methods  of  Proof. 

§  1 4.     ( I .)  The  Arithmetical  Way ;  which  in  its  Operations 
reaches  only  to  the  Particular  or  Individual  Point  in  hand,  not 
to  others,  that  are  likewife  of  the  fame  Sort:  Tho'  indeed  the 
Rulesof  Working  do  or  fhould  go  farther,  and  as  being  General 
they  are  founded  in  Geometry,  and  may  need  a  Geometrical 
Demonftrarion.  The  Angles  of  this  or  that  Particular  Triangle 
may  be  ArithmeticaUy  demonftrated  equal  to  two  Rights,  by 
taking  the  Degrees  of  each  Angle,  and  fumming  them  up  to- 
gether, and  fothey  will  maketwice  poor  iSoDegreesi  butthis 
proves  nothing  in  Relation  to  any  other  Triangle.     There  is 
a  Noble  and  Known  Compendium  of  Arithmetical  Operation, 
by  the  Numbers  calfd  Logarithms    (  Vide  Part  I.  Chap.   5. 
^  «^. )  which  do  with  eafe  perform  thofe  things  by  Addition, 
Subftradion,  Bifedion,   Trifedion,    &c^  that  elfe  muft  be 
laboricully  done  by  Multiplication,  Divifion,  and  Extrad- 
ingof  the  Square  and  Cube-Roots,  dfc.  That  thofe  Numbers 
will  truly  perform  what  is  promis'd  from  them  is  made  out 
by  that  way  pf  Proo.^,  which  is  next  to  be  touch'd  upon,  vi:{. 
§   15.     (2.)  Geometrical  Demonjhation  :     In  this  the  Proof 

proceeds  only  upon  the  ge- 
neral Nature  of  tiic  Matter, 
abftrading  from  the  Par- 
ticular Circumftances  in  this 
or  that  Cafe  ;  tho'  it  may 
and  do's  commonly  ufe  a  Par 
ticular  Diagram  or  Draught 
to  aflift  the  Apprehenfion  by 
the  Imagination  :  To  I 
fiance  in  the  famous  Theo 
rem,  that  the  three  Angles 
of  a  right  lin'd  Triangle  are 
equal  to  two  Right  one?.  Lei  the  the  Figure  T  reprefent 
any  fort  of  righi-iin'd  Triangle  ('and  therefore  we  are  here  to 

attend' 


ht 


Chap.  10.        improvement  of  K^^ion.  279 

attend  only  to  irs  having  Three  ftraight  Sides,  and  Three  An- 
gles, not  to  its  particular  Shape  or  Size';   1  fav,   that  the 
Three  Angles  e,  z,  a,  taken  together  arc  equal  to  two  Rights, 
or  make  up   iSo  Degrees,  that  is  half  a  Circle:     For  the 
proving  of  this,  let  D  F  be  parallel  to  G  H  by  Conftru(ftion, 
or  fivhich  comes  all  to  one)    let  it  be  drawn  with  a  like  In- 
clination to  the  Crofs  Line  B  H,  or  G  G,  as  G  H,  has ;  for  fo 
D  F  muft  be  parallel,  or  not  inclining  to  G  H,  when  neither 
of  them  is  more  inclining  than  the  other  to  the  fame  Third 
Line :    Now  the  Angle  a  is  thsreforc  equal  to  «,  and  i  to  i  for 
the  fame  Reafon  ;   and  the  Angle  e  is  equal  to  5,  they  being 
the  Vertical  or  oppofite  Angles  made  by  the  Lines  B  I/,  and 
GC;  for  in  this  Cale  either  of  thofe  Angles  added  to  what  lies 
between  them  {vi:{.  e  added  ro  a.  0,  andfo  likewife  g  added  to 
ihe  fame  ^  0}  make  up  two  Rights ;  But  the  Angles  «, «,  /,  are 
all  of  them  together  equal  to  two  right  Angles  (yi:{.  thofe 
made  by  the|Line  i^  «  with  D  F,  Vid3  Part  L  Chap.  5.  §  6.)  ; 
and  therefore  the  Angles  /,  e,  n,  which  have  been  found  re- 
fped:ively  equal  to  ',  s,  a,    are  likewife  equal  to  two  Right 
Angles. 

Quod  ^rat  Demonfirandum ,    "Which    was  to  be  Demon- 
ftrated. 

There  is  yet  fartlier. 

§  16.  (3.)  Another  way  of  Dcmonflration,  call'd  ^Ige- 
hrnicnl  (which  is  in  a  Sort  compounded  of  the  Arithmetical 
and  Geometrical)  :  Herein  the  unknown  Quantity  in  a 
Qiieflion  is  cxprefs'd  by  fome  Mark,  and  therewithal  the 
Work  proceeds  according  to  the  Condition  and  Tenor  of  the 
Queftion,  till  fomewhat  known  is  at  laft  found  equal  to  what: 
was  unknown :  See  Part  L  Chap.  3.  §  7,  Cj'c.  1  fliallhere  add 
the  Algebraical  Working  of  this  Queftion,  What  is  that 
Number,  to  which  if  you  add  as  many,  half  as  many,  two 
and  an  half,  it  will  jiift  make  up  Twenty  :  Put  a  for  the' 
-  Number  fought,  lb  for  2,  and  c  for  20  ;  then,  according  to 
the  Tenor  of  the  Queftion,  the  Matter  will  ftand  thus, 

And  if  both  Sides  of  the  Equation  be  doubled,  to  take  out 
the  Divilion  by  two,  they  muft  be  equal  ftill  j    and  there- 

fjre, 

Andby  Tranfpcfiiion;   to  bring  the  known  Quantities  toge- 
ther 


2 8o  A»  Effay  for  the  Part  III. 

ther  on  one  Side  of  the  Equation,  it  will  be 

That  is,  according  to  the  Numbers  for  which  h  and  c  were 
put, 

5^-40  —  5,  or  s^^BS* 
and  therefore, 

BS^'?,  and  rt=:7: 

5 

Now  7  H-  7  -I-  3  2  H- 1  i  =^  20  :  And  thus  it  appears,  that 
there  is  fuch  a  Number  as  was  requir'd,  and  that  the  Number 
7  anfwcrs  the  Conditions  of  the  Queftion. 

%  17.  There  are  a  few  Self-evident  Principles,  Definitions, 
and  fome  other  PoJIuUt/r^  or  Demands,  to  which  Mathemati- 
cal Demonftrations  (if  completed)  do  finally  run  back,  or 
from  which  the  Points  to  be  prov'd  may  be  drawn  by  Succef- 
five  Inferences ,  as  we  may  Ihew  under  the  next  General 
Head.  Somewhat  may  be  farther  feet)  to  thefe  Points,  Part  I. 
Qiap.  5.  §  6. 

§  18.  2.  As  to  Mcrrt/ Queftions :  We  are  in  thefe  enquir- 
ing and  determining  of  what  is  Good  or  Bad;  i.  e.  Juftor 
Unjuft;  Right  or  Wrong:  The  Proof  arifes  here  out  of 
riglit  Principles  carefully  apply'd,  according  to  the  General 
Rcafen  of  Things,  with  fit  Allowance  for  tl^i  differing  Cir- 

.  cumftances  of  Perfons,  Times,  Places,  as  alfo  for  the  doing 
a  Thing  once,  fddom,  often,  wholly,  or  in  Part,  Gfc.  which 
frecmently  vary  the  Matter  from  Good  to  Bad,  or  from  Bad 
to  Good ;  only  this  laft  is  not  done,  but  when  thit  which  is 
fuperaddcd,  do's  either  fjpply  a  blameable  Deficiency,  or  al- 
ter fome  Point  by  Reafon  of  which  the  Matter  was  before 
Morally  Evil.  To  take  that  which  is  another's  without  his 
Knowledge,  is  not  always  Evil ;  for  his  reafonable  Confent 
may  fairly  be  prefum'd,  tho'  it  could  not  be  ask'd,  in  fome 
Cafes,  and  Circumftances :  Here  it  fhould  be  noted,  that 
Moral  Goot^  arifes  only  from  all  the  Neceflary  Caufes  duly 
confpiring  together ;  but  Evil  from  whatfoever  Deficiency  as 

-to  what  is  Pvight  and  Juil. 

.§  1 9.  3.  As  ;to  KatitrrA  Qyefuons,  touching  the  Being, 
Make,  Powers,  Caufes,  Effcds,  (5c.  of  Natural  Things, 
whether  as  they  are  found  in  Nature  it  fcif,  or  as  modeled  by 
Art;     There  is  here  (as  well  as  in  the  foregoing  Matter) 

-pLainiy  fncli  a  Mixture  of  Things  unknown  with  what  ,<ve 

"kyowj  as  makes  a  very  greatDifficoley  of  Reafoninginman^ 

Gafcji 


Chap.  II.         /wprove^ent  of  ^^iiCon.  281 

Cafes:  For  Phyfical  Qgcftions  we  had  need  be  furnilh'd 
(as  the  Great  Lord  f^'eruJnm  has  Ihewn)  with  a  large  Natural 
Hiftory  of  Obfervanons  and  Experiments  carefully  Made^ 
and  faithfiUly  Reported;  and  alfo  with  no  fniall Skill  to  Ar- 
gue rightly  from  their),  as  the  fame  excellent  Pejfon  farther 
Ihews  in  his  Kovum  Orzanum. 

§  20.  In  fuch  Queftions  we  muft,  {i.)  Ufe  our  own 
Senfes  according  to  the  Dictates  of  Rational  Obfervation 
and  Experience ;  (2.)  We  muft  give  Credit  to  knowing  and 
Honeft  Perfons  in  the  Regular  Ule  of  theirs ;  yet  taking  great 
Care  how  far  we  follow  them  in  the  Credit  tliey  may  have 
too  freely  given  to  orhers:  Ami  (3.)  We  (hould  fearch  out 
what  there  mi^ht  be  finguiar  in  the  Experiments  from  which 
we  would  Argue,  and  we  muft  make  fit  Alipwances  in  our 
Reafoning  from  them. 

§  n .  4.  As  to  Superntftural  Qiieftions,  which  may  be 
eall'd  in  the  Itricteft  Senfe  Theological,  we  muft  make  Su- 
pernatural Revelation  our  Ground,  judging  what  is  fo  by 
die  fureft  Marks  we  can,  and  Reafoning  thence  in  depen- 
dance  upon  the  Divine  Aid  in  a  regular  way,  but  efpecially 
in  QUI  Reafoning  ajjout  f«ch  Points  as  we  can  lefs  comprs^ 
nend. 


C  H  A  P.     XL 


\  I.  C  OME  fartlxer  AiTiftance  may  be  given  in  the  pttlkoc 
'^  Matter  by  offerijig  fomewhat,    ' 

,  y,  As  to  the  Methoil,  which  may  be  us'd  in  order, to  %h3 
findmg  out  of  Proof  and  carrying  it  on  'till  we  have  brought  i< 
to  what  is  Self-evident,  or  to  what  is  already  niiide  ou^"  ctf 
At  leaft  to  what  is  fpnfefs'd :    AajJ  we  may  here 

r'  P^^^^  ^^^^^^^^^eQpe.ftipnPri3po^<iedbe  hat- plain- 
iy  luch,  as  cannot,  or  need  not,  be  argued ;  drelfevvheciet 
U  IS  ojily;  tp  be  attempted ;  or  that  the  Prqpf  of  it  maV  be  u  ^- 
^errak^n:    r/</f  Chap.  8-  §  7— ii^:  '  '  /     . 

^  !^i.a.  W^ 


28i  A^  t J] ay  for  the  Fart  I U- 

:  §  2.  2.  We  (hould  carefully  determine  and  State,  what 
is  the  very  Point  in  Queftion,  to  which  wc  ihould  dircdl  our 
Attempt  or  Undertaking:     And  in  doing  this, 

3,  It  will  be  of  Ufe  to  narrow  the  Qi^eftion,  as  far  as  the 
Matter  and  Occafion  may  well  admit ;  io  that,  having  lefs  to 
prove,  it  may  be  the  eafier  and  better  made  out,  and  our  Point 
more  throughly  fccur'd,  vvhilft  the  Lines  of  Defence  are  not 
too  far  enlarg'd  :  Yet  nothing  muft  be  left  out  of  the 
Queftion,  which  is  NecelTary  to  what  we  would  attempt ot 
maintain  in  relation  thereto. 

§  3.  4.  We  may  then  obferve  (if  fuch  Hclp.be  needful 
to  us)  whether  the  Point  in  hand,  or  any  of  its  Parts,  or 
any  thing  relating  thereto,  be  touched  on  in  thisEiray,or  Dil"- 
cours'd  elfe  where  ;  And  briefly,  what  may  be  found  here  ot 
any  where  ro  put  our  Tho'ts  a  working,  when  they  are  at  a 
Hand,,  and  to  give  fomc  Light  and  Aififtance  towards  our 
Rcafoning  about  the  prefent  Matter.  Some  will  commonly  , 
r.ecd  to  Read  and  Cor.fult,  as  well  as  to  Confider.  And  it 
may  fometimes  be  requifite  to  carry  the  Subje*fl  and  Predi- 
cate of  the  Queftion  thro'  the  Topicl^s,  or  Logical  Heads  of 
Things  and  Pofitinns;  Taking  in  what  I,ight  we  can  about 
it  from  the  v/ays  cf  Thinking,  Pait  L  Chap.  2.  and  froiti 
the  other  Matters  of  TI>o't,  Chap.  3,  4,  5  ;  Remarking  alfo 
what  there  is  of  Subftance,  Accident,  Mode,  Mode  of  Mode, 
&c.  in  the  prefont  Gale :  What  of  Combination,  Separati- 
on, Relation,  cA';  And  Finally,  what  Alliance  the  Queftion 
in  hand  may  have  with  any  of  the  Principles  or  DcdutSlions,- 
Chap.  16.  c?c. 

§  4.  .Whathas  becnhere  diredbed,  is  to  be -done  by  rhofe 
who  have  real  Occaficii  for  it,  not  to  put  them  off  from 
Thinking,  but  rather  to  lead  them  into  it,  and  help  them  in 
it,  bybrmging  f.ich  a' Variety  of  Things  and  Notions  under 
View,  which  can  fcarccly  fail  to  fuggeft  fomcwhai,  that 
may  fet  the  Mind  ro  Work  and  carry  it  on,  till  it  meet  with 
what  may  fitly  ferve  o-ar  Purpofe  .•  Yet  it  is  to  be  done, 
xiot  fo  much  in  queft  of  Particular  Arguments,  as  to  give  us  a 
tetter  Acquaintance  with  the'  Terms  of  the  Queftion,  upoii 
a  juft  ^i}i.  clear  Appreheniioi>.  whereof.  Arguments. wiil  com- 
monly prefent  and  oficr  thcmfelves,  or  it  may  be  there  may 
aietd  no  m.ore  to  make  out  the  Point:  ,But  where  there  is 
Kjcni  and  Oixafion  for  Proof,  it  may  be  of  \JIq  to  lool;  aifo 

forward 


Chap.  II.  fwprovev/ent  of  Keafop..  285 

forward  into  the  next  General  Head,  about  Inferring  ;  finc^ 
that,  from  which  we  can  rightly  deduce  any  thing,  muft  be 
an  Argument  for  it.     Farther, 

,  §  5.  5.  Wc  may  confidcr  the  Manner  and  Form  of  the 
Queftion  in  order  to  the  fettling  whac  fort  of  Proof  will  be 
requifite  in  this  or  that  Cafe,  as  has  been  fhewn,  Chap.  p. 
But, 

6.  We  are  efpecialJy  to  obferve  the  Matter,  not  onlyj 
that  we  may  better  know  what  Proof  it  is  capable  of,  or  may 
require  (as  has  been  IhewnJ  but  alfo,  that  we  may  be  dired- 
ed,  where  and  how  to  feek  the  previous  Requifites  to  our 
Arguing  fuch  Point,  according  as  the  Qiieftion  may  be  either 
Mathematical/,  Moral,  Natiird,  or  Supernatural.  Nor  indeed 
is  it  Reafonably  to  be  tho't  a  Perfon  ftiould  ordinarily  be  able 
to  argue  well  about  the  more  difficult  Points  in  any  of  thefe 
Kinds,  till  he  has  more  folemnly  ftudied  the  Refpedive  Dif- 
ciplines  to  which  they  belong. 

§  6.  7.  it  may  be  of  Ufe  to  go  with  fome  Deliberation 
over  the  Principal  Heads  or  Kinds  of  Argument,  at  ieaft  in 
our  Minds,  according  to  the  following  Scheme,  wherein,  for 
the  fake  of  Memory,  they  are  put  iii  meafur  d  Lines,  and 
under  the  feveral  Letters  of  their  common  Title,  MIDDLE 
TEI^MS,  which  (hew  the  Connection  or  Difunion  of  the 
Subject  and  Predicate. in  the  Queftion  j  w;^.  that  the  latter 
is  rightly  affirm'd,  or  dcny'd  of  the  former, 

§  7.  But  left  the  Memorative  Lines  here  given,  might 
be  of  themfelves  too  Dark  j  the  Senfe  and  Defign  of  theni 
is  farther  deliver'd  in  the  Notes,  that  follow  them,  to  be 
read  continu'dly  with  every  feveral  Verfe,  after  this  Man- 
ner, 

Mending  the  Queftion  s  Phrafe,  or  lefs  convenient  State— 
Making  it,  if  need  be,  clearer,  Jhorter  and  eafier  to  be  argud. 
Meafure,  apply'd,  and  fo  on. — 

But  there  is  no  NeceiFity  of  charging^  he  Memory  with 
any  thing  more  than  the  Meafur'd  Lines^  when  they  are  once    . 
fully  Underftood  by  the  J}«lp  of  thofe  Notes, 


W  %  ifthz- 


w  <  54  ^p  5i.^ 
-  3  p-Q.  3  3- 


^p-    2  ;<  D-^o^  ^S  S  ?3  S^.^^  :r_ 


3-  O    ^     r^    W--  r?     fei     '^     ^     n     p     ^    rv  ^^   ^       . 


•-•  2  °'  o 
t3«  S^5  ^«^ 

s-^  ?ri^  ?= 

P    •-•  '(  W  "JO 


■n 


fsi 


iltol^i^ 


i.-^ 


*  §5|  3  3  5 


**  a  !;  -^  ;? 


"^     S      M    63 

n  .^    o-c- 


^  ^  S~  *-►  ^  ^^  sr  ^.  *-  =k- 

^  §  R  =^- q^  1 5-  k^  s'  s  s^^''-^  "-^  4  ^I"^  r  ^ 
^  -  •    2^  ^    s^  s  )g-  ifa.  s.  5,  :i  uo  55L,-  g 

5 SI-  ^^liiir^il:^ 


^  2  =^.,  ~»  - 


I 


r*  2 


r'§ 


P?  J  ~ 


05 


I 


2  J*  ^  S.  __  s  ^"*     S  "^  *=>  Ek       n 


Chap.  II.         Improvement  of  ?<t2i{cr\.  28^ 

§  ro.  'Tis  not  defign'd  by  this  placing  of  the  Middle 
Terms  with  the  Subjed  and  Predicate  of  the  Qjieftion,  thac 
the  fcveral  forts  of  Arguments  here  mention'd,  are  all  to  be 
employ 'd  upon  one  Point ;  much  lefs,  that  they  are  to  follo\f 
one  another  in  fuch  Order  as  they  are  here  fet  down ;  yet  it 
has  fain  out  happily  enough,  that  we  are  hereby  minded  to 
begin  with  the  Mending  of  the  Queftion,  if  there  be  Occafion 
for  it;  and  of  this  fomewhat  farther  may  be  faid,  at  leaft 
by  way  of  Example :  And  alfo  that  we  fhould  in  the  next  place 
carefully  fee  ro  it,  that  we  hzvezMe/ifure  of  fome  of  the  men- 
tioned Sons,  which  is  right  in  itfelf,  and  fit  for  our  Purpofe,  as 
agreeing  to  one  Term  of  the  Queftion;  and  therefore  capable 
of  fliewing  the  Agreement,  or  Difagreementof  the  other. 

§11.  But  the  Meaning  is  by  thefe  mentioned  Heads  of 
Argument,  which  may  eafily  be  carry 'd  in  the  Mind,  to  lay 
before  it  fome  good  Number  of  the  more  confiderable  ways 
of  proving,  as  by  Injiance,  Liduciion,  Disjunciion^  8cc,  that 
we  may  not  eafiiy  mifs  of  finding  one  or  other  fort  of  Mid- 
dle Term,  which  may  fuggeft  a  particular  Medium  {qt  zhz 
prefent  Occafion ;  and  that,  if  the  Medium  we  have  taken 
iTiould  lie  fo  remote  from  one  or  both  the  Terms  of  the 
Queftion  (/'.  e.  if  its  Agreement  or  Difagreement  therewith 
be  fo  far  difputable)  as  to  require  farther  Proof,  we  may  then 
go  over  the  Set  of  Middle  Terms  again  in  quelt  of  another 
Medium  (whether  of  a  differing  Sort,  or  of  one,  we  had  taken 
before)  to  prove  the  M.yor  Propofition,  or  Mimr^  or  both  as 
there  may  be  Occafion  ;  and  thus  to  proceed, 'till  we  have  bro'c 
the  Matter  to  Uicli  an  Il^ie,  as  that  it  requires  no  farther  Proof. 
§  12.  The  Manner  of /:/jc  Procedure,  as  it  might  in  fome 
Cafe  happen,  is  xeprefented  in  the  following  Scheme;  where- 
in the  S,  which  is  repeated  Five  times  in  a  Hoping  Defccnt 
on  the  left  hand,  is  fof  the  Subjcd  of  the  Queftion;  and 
the  P  fo  repeated  on  the  right  hand,  for  its  Predicate:  The 
oft  repeated  E  Hands  for  that  Middle  Term,  which  follows 
E  in  the  Line  [  Explained  Words,  or  Things,  (3c.  ]  ^  $, 
And  it  is  underftood  to  be  the  Explication  or  Definition  of 
the  Subject,  or  of  the  Predicate  (eitjier  of  the  Word€>r:  of  ttie 
T'^i^g)  firft  placed  on  one  hand  with  the  SubjeA  of  die 
Queftion,  and  then  on  the  other  withit^  Piedicate :  But  in  tiie 
next  defcending  Step,  'tis  put  with  the  Middle  T^rm  D  (;'.  f. 
either  Disjundion,  Diftindlion,  Deduction  or  jDomand)  on 
one  fide,  and  with  R  (z.  c.  either  Reafon,  or  Relation)  on  the 
other,  to  make  out  one  of  the  Premifed  Propofitions  in  each 
of  thofe  Syllogifms  refpedtively  ;  the  other  Propofition  being 
njade  up  of  S  md  t>  in  the  former,  of  R  and  P  in  the 
latter.  U3  Sihe 


2  86 


An  t-JJay  for  the 


Part  II I 


Chap  12.        Improvement  of  K^di'ior],    .        287 

ing  this  Caution,  we  may  fafely  place  it  in  the  Middle,  firft 
as  the  Predicate  of  the  leading-Propofition^  then  as  the  Sub- 
jedt  of  that  which  follows  ;  as  is  done  in  the  foregoing 
Scheme. 

§  15.  The  beft  Method  of  Procedure  in  Arguing  is  to 
take  fuch  a  Middle  Term,  if  it  may  be,  as  lies  fo-near  either 
to  the  Subjed:,  or  to  the  Predicate  of  the  Qiieftion  (''.«".  which 
may  be  affirm' d  or  deny'd  with  fuch  Evidence  j  as  to  require 
no  Proof  on  one  Part;  that  fo  we  may  proceed  ftill  forward 
in  our  Argument,  as  having  only  one  of  the  Premifqs  to  be 
prov'd,  and  thus  we  (hall  not  need  to  go  back  again  for  the 
Confirming  of  the  other,  as  we  muft,  if  it  were  lefc  doubtful. 
Thus  if  R,  P  in  the  Scheme  before,  were  the  Terms  of  the 
Queftion  to  be  prov'd^  we  might  firft  take  M  for  our  Argu- 
ment concluding  R  and  P  from  R  ayid  M,  xoith  M  nnd  P  ; 
Now  let  R  ^nd  M  be  fuppofed  to  need  no  Proof;  To  make 
out  M  nnd  P,  we  take  S  and  conclude  it  from  M  nnd  S  voith 
S  nvd  P ;  and  now  fuppofing  neither  of  rhefe  to  require  Proof, 
the  Point  in  Queftion  is  then  fully  concluded. 

§  16.  That  Manner  of  Arguing,  which  fomexallthe 
Socraticalway,  ufes  not  any  formed  Syllogifms  ;  but  proceeds 
by  flaring,  Explaining,  and  Confirming,  as  there  is  Occafion  : 
Yet  it  do's  not  lefs  need  what  Ailiftance  may  be  given  by  the 
foregoing  Scheme,  or  otherwifc,  for  the  finding  out  of  proper 
Argument.  ■'  ■ 


CHAP.    XII. 

§  I  T"  HAT  the  Infirudions  given,  may  be  made  plainer 
^  and  cany'd  fomewhat  farther  ftill,  by  the  help  of 
an  Inftance,  let  us  fuppofe  the  Queftion  to  be,  that  Every 
Man,  who  has  the  Nature,  di  well  <ii  Kame^  beiyig  adult  and  of 
found  Mind,  has  the  more  Immedlnte  Power  -of  I{e^foning  about 
Piittirc  and  invijible  Things.     Now, 

I.  There  appears  not  any  thing  of  Inconfiftency  or  Faire-' 
hood  in  the  Point,  which  yet-  is  not  Self-evidentj  .but  feems 
to  be  fuch  as  we  may  not  only  attempt,  but  endeavour  to 
confirm. 

§  2.  2.  Tho'  it  be  not  formally  argud  in  this  Eflay;  yet 
fome  Light  and  Help  may  be  thence  probably  drawn  to- 
wards the  Arguing  of  it ;  By  reviewing,  if  need  be,  the 
more  obvious  Account  of  Things,  and  the  twofold  Scale 

r     ■"  U4  of 


a28  An^  tjjay  jor  the  ^AVt  III. 

of  Single  Terms,  with  the  Set  of  Principles,  and  more  im- 
jnediace  Dcdudtions,  to  f^e  what  there  nay  be  ot  the  Matter 
it  fe;t',  in  its  tuft  and  more  common  Notions  j  as  aUo  whar 
ofSubftance,  Accident,  Cc ;  or  of  Combination,  Scparaci- 
JOiif'^Cf  in  the  Terms  of  the  CiuefVion ;  and  whether  there  be 
any  Principle  or  Dedudiion,  which  may  (hew,  or  help  to- 
wards the  (liewing,  their  Connexion;  as  fuppole  it  were  the 
Positions  (Ct)  and  (Cu)  Pag.  109. 

■'§  3*  3-  The  Proportion  in  hand  being  plainly  compound- 
ed may  be,  for  the  more  diltind  Confideration  of  ir,  re- 
folv'd  Imo  the  more  fimple  tnimiiarions,  which  it  implies; 
as  that  fomewhat  has  only  the  Name  of  Man  (fuppofc  a 
Corps,  a  Pitflure,  or  Statue);  fomewhat  hasalfo  the  Nature 
(as  a  Jiving  Man);  fome  fuch  /.Ian  may  be  Adult,  and  of 
fdiind  Mind  ;  he  may  ha\ethe  Power  of  Rcafoning,  and 
that  about  Future,  and  about  Inviliblc  Things,  and  Pmally, 
ihat  in  fuchCalc  he  has  the  immediate  Power.     And, 

§  4.  4.  Whereas  the  Mentioned  Parriculars  do  chiefly 
belong  to  Sd::.rAl  Phiicjtfr),  largely  underftood,  fo  as  10 
ra^e  \n  PueuniAir.l;^^  and  Kmwa'  Tlieolo^y ',  therefore  we 
rtjay  have  rccourfe  to  thofe  Sciences,  to  make  our  felves 
more  fully  Matters  of  the  Point  in  hand:  Or  rather  we 
ihould  be  previoufly  furnilli'd  wnh  the  whole  compafs  of 
Learning  in  fome  Mealurc,  before  we  go  about  to  argue 
fuch  kind  of  Points ;  Nor  are  there  many  belides  Mathe- 
matical {^aeftions,  that^rc  continVl  within  one  Art  or  Science 

opjy.    But.  T,   r     TN  ^ 

§  5.  «;.  And  m.ore  diredly  to  the  Prefent  Dehgn,  we 
ST!ay  life  the  following  Method  of  Procedure :  Namely, 

r.  To  obferve  what  is  the  entire  Ihing  ipc.lcen  of,  and 
and  the  whole  iliat  i^  faid  of  it,  that  we  may  be  fure  to  know 
rcfpedtively,  both  what  the  Proportion  lays,  and  whereof  it 
affirms  or  dcnvs-;  Now  the  entire  Subjedl  is  \^evey  A-lan^ 
vt^ho  Ims  tie  S^^tuyc,  ai  vpcu  .is  i\Vwr,  hi^'g  Aduu\  and  (^f  foand 
}VI?«riI];  And  the  whole  Predicate  is  that  he  \^hiu  the  mo<e 
y^imed'.ctt  ?f^CY of  I^eafnif,^^ .ihout  afui Future  Invifibie Things^, 
'.I.  T'o  Remark  what  is  Principal  and  what  is  Acccifory  in 
the-Subjcdt  and  Predicate  ;  here  M A N  and  B^EASO  NIKG 
are  Principal,  as  being  indeed  the  Ba^s  and  Ground  Work 
of  all  thie  reft  on  either  hand. 

§  6.  3.  To  cal!  what  is  Acceffory  into  an  Order  and  Me- 
thod, JK>2ing  what  fort  of  Reference  the  feveral  Appcjidages 
fefpefSivciy  have  to  thtir  Principals,    And, 


UA-N 


Chap  II.  Improvement  of  K^iion.         i8q 

MAN  is  here  fet  forth,  as  having,  (i.)  That  Name,  and 
being  ufuaily  fignificd  by  that  Sound ,  or  thofe  Letters, 
amoiigft  us  J  and  (2.)  Together  with  it  the  Katwe  moft 
ufuaily  intended  by  it,  whatever  thr.t  be;  And  farther,  (3.) 
Such  AgCy  as  that  he  may  be  call'd  Adult,  ordinarily  about 
14^15,  or  16  Years;  and  likewife  at  fuch  Age  (^.)iSoimd 
Mind,  ox  the  free  Ufe  of  his  Under ftanding,  the  Brain  not 
being  craz'd  or  diforder'd^  as  in  violent  Fever-Fits,  or  by  a 
more  continued  Indifpofition  •  and  finally,  (5.)  That  it  is 
Ever;/ fuch  Man,  of  which  the  (^ueftion  Speaks,  without  ex- 
cepting any  one. 

§  f.  The  like  is  to  be  done  as  to  the  Predicate  :  And 
I^EASONING,  as  an  A^:,  is  here  fet  forth,  (i.;  by  the 
Matter  upon  which  it  proceeds,  vi:(.  Future  Things  confider'd 
before  hand,  as  what  may  or  jhall  be  ;  and  Invifible  Thingiy 
whether  Future  or  Prefent,  but  not  dilcernible  by  Sight,  or 
other  Corporeal  Senfe :  (z.)  By  the  Source  or  Spring  of  that 
Ad:,  the  Power  of  Reafoning ;  whatever  it  be,  which  is,  or 
gives  a  Capacity  for  that :  And,  (3.)  This  Power  has  the 
Attribute  pf  hmmdiate,  as  it  either  do's  not  admit,  or  at 
ieaft  do's  not  abfolutcly  need,  any  thing  to  intervene  betwixt 
it  and  the  Ad.  (4.)  This  Attribute  has  the  Mode  or  Cha- 
rafter  of  more  intimating  a  Comparifon  betwixt  the  Power, 
of  which  the  Quefticn  is  intended,  and  fome  other,  which 
lies  farther  removed  from  the  Ad,  as  (£.  Gr.)  the  Reafonable 
Soul  it  fcjf,  which  do's  not  Natursilly  enable  Men  to  fuch 
Reafoning  without  the  Intervention  of  a  fit  Age  and  Sound- 
nefs  of  Mind  :  ('5.)  And  laftly,  Some  is  here  imply "d  as  the 
Note  of  Quantify  defign'd,  i.  e.  /cwc  more  Immediate  Power, 
(£c.  viz.  fome,  or  ether,  not  every  Degree. 

§  8.  4.  To  Cut  off  what  ferves  barely  to  expound,  not 
at  all  to  hmir,  the  Senfe  of  that  to  which  it  is  added;  and 
fo  we  may  reduce  the  prefent  Queftion  thus.  Every  Man  being 
Adult  r.hd  of  Sound  Mind  boi  the  more  immediate  Povper  (f  ^a- 
jcnirig  about  Future  and  invifible  Things  ;  only  we  muft  heed- 
fuUy  keep  to  the  Meaning  which  was  direded  by  the  inci- 
dental Explicacory  Propolition,  lo  as  not  to  argue  about  a 
Man,  that  has  only  the  Name,  as  a  Corps,  Pidure  opStatue. 

§  9.  5.  If  there  had  been  any  Thing  in  rhe  (Queftion  Pro- 
pounded inconliftent  with  fomewhat  elle,  it  muft  have  been 
thrown  out ;  and  alfo  whatfoever  had  been  altogether  Syno- 
nynious,  or  plainly  included,  were  better  omitted,  than  re- 
tain'd:  if  therefore  it  had  been  laid,  Evoy  Hiarmne  Creature^ 
i4an,  Woman,  aad  Child  beirtg  Aduir,  8cc;  the  Queftion  ought 
to  have  been  reduc'd  to  what  ixnow  is  jCChildJ  being  incon- 
fiftert  with  [Adult],  and  the  reft  being  plainly  contain'd  in 
V  ~  '  •♦      §10,6,  We 


^po  An  Ejfay  for  the  Part  III. 

§  10.  6.  We  may  (however  for  the  prefent)  leave  out 
fuch  part  of  the  Qucftion,  as  is  plainly  carry'd,  if  we  make 
but  out  the  reft  ;  And  thns  we  might  leave  oxxiFuture  Things ; 
fincc  it  will  fo  naturally  follow  upon  the  Proof  relating  to 
thofe  which  are  hivifib.'e^  that  fuch  a  Man  muft  be  likewife 
Capable  of  feafoning  about  the  Future  Things,  which  are 
here  defign'd  in  Conjun£l-ion  with  thofe  that  are  invifible. 

§  IT.    7.  We  fliould  make  fure  we  are  well  appriz'd  of 
the  very  Point  in  Queftion  ;   fince  to  and  by  fh^tt^  Proof  muft 
be  fpecially  dircrtcd  :     And  the  rather,  bccaufe  £.  gr.  in  the 
prefent  Cafe,    fome  Perfon  might  poifibly  defign  to  have  it 
prov'd,  that  the  Power  of  Reafoning  about  invifible  Things, 
which  every  Man  being  Adult  and  of  Sound  Mind  is  allow'd 
to  have,    is  indeed  the  moic  immc-iiate  Yower,   or  whether, 
bis  being  well  awake,  and  excited  from  without,   be  not  yet' 
farther  reqaifite:     But  heve  the  Dijh'nction  and  Illation  im-' 
ply'd  mayfolveandfitisfie  the  Qiicftion,  for  whatever  may  be 
faid  as  to  Man's  being  well  awake- or  excited  from  without, 
it  will  ftill  hold,    that  his  being  Adult  and  of  found  Mind 
gives  a  mere  immediate  Power  than  what  he  had  before  in 
his  meet  Fundamental  Capacity  for  fuch  a  fort  of  Reafon- 
ing. 

§  12.  Another  might,  perhaps,  dclign  the  fame  Point, 
as  if  he  had  more  appolitely  put  the  Q.ueftion  ^H^hetber  the 
inore  immediate  Povecr  of  fuch  I{eafcnrng  in  Man  do's  generally 
prefupprfc  his  beiyig  Adult  nnd  cf  jhitnd  Mind;  or  whether  thefc 
be  neceffary  to  thnt^.  In  (hort,  alinoft  any  Point  of  the 
Queftion  before  propounded  might  be  unskilfully,  or  lefs 
beedfuUy,  defign'd  for  the  very  Point  in  Qjieftion;  and 
therefore  it  might  be  requifite,  if  there  were  Opportunity, 
to  ask  what  is  the  very  Thing  whereof  Proof  is  defirM  or  ex- 
pe<5ted:  Orclfc  we  muft  judge  of  that,  as  we  can,  by  the 
Tendency  of  the  foregoing  and  following  Difcourfc,  or  by 
the  known  Sentiments  of  thofe  with  whom  we  have  to  do, 
or  by  any  Circum (lances  of  Time,  Place,  &Cy  which  may 
ferve  to  guide  us :  And  if  need  be,  we  Ihould  accordingly 
redlifie  the  State  of  the  Queftion,  as  has  been  (hewn  in  fome 
Inftances  here  ;  and  if  there  be  divers  Points  in  Queftion  at 
once,  it  may  be  commonly  beft  to  State  and  Argue  them  fe- 
verally.    But, 

§  13.  8.  We  muft  purfue  the  proper  Conftrut?l:ion  of 
the  Queftion,  as  it  is  propounded  ;  where  there  is  ho  fuffici- 
cnt  Evidence  of  any  other  Intendment  than  what  is  therein 
exprefs'd  or  fairly  imply 'd,  and  thus  the  Point  in  hand  will 
be  a  complicated  Queftion,    made  up  of  the  feveral  foremen- 

tion'd 


Chap.  12.         Iv/proveff/ent  <?/  Fvearon.         29! 

rion'd  Particulars,  §  3,  in  the  order  there  fee  down  :     Our- 
Proof  muft  therefore  take  them  all  in,    even  as  far  as  the 
Notes  of  Quantity  exprefs'd  or  underftood,   if  any  be.     Yet 
this  hinders  not,  but  that 

■  §  14.  We  may  endeavour  the  'Melioration  or  mending  of 
the  Queftion,  by  putting  it  into  any  Form  or  Method,  which 
•may  render  it  eafier  to  be  prov'd :  And  here,  upon  confider- 
ingthe  %^yo«  of  Things,  we  may  alter  it  thus.  Every  Mai?, 
vpho  has  the  more  perfett  ufe  of  his  Vndcrjlnvding^  nmy  rcnjon 
about  Things^  which  fall  not  imivedintely  under  Senfi.  Here 
we  put  the  common  Rcajofi^  for  which  [Adult]  and  [of  Sound 
Mind]  were  added  to  [Man]  infteadof  theCharadersthem- 
felves,  and  f  Things  which  fall  not  immediately  under  Senfe] 
inftead  of  [Future  and  Invifible]  r/;<i/^  being  the  common  Na- 
ture of  them,  and  the  Reafon  of  their  being  mention'd  in  the 
<^ueftion.  For  Invifible  was  alfo  fo  intended  as  well  as  Fu- 
ture Things  J  now  this  Turn  of  the  Queftion  lies  clofer  and 
readier  for  Proof.    Or  clfe, 

'  §  15.  We  may  purfue  the  C^ueftion,  as  before  Propounded 
under  feveral  Propofitions,  gradually  proceeding,"  'rill  we 
come  up  to  the  whole,  as  it  ftands;  thus,  (i.)  The  Word 
[Man]  is  eommonly  imderftocd  of  fuch  a  Manner  of  Being  as 
/Idam  and  Eve  were,  and  their  Pofterity  ~are,  a'=  tray  ealily 
be  made  to  appear  by  fufficient  Tcl^ificntion,  or  good  Autho- 
rity. (2.)  The  Being  intended  by  that  Name  has  realiv  a 
Nature  endow'd  with  the  Power  of  Reafoning,  as  may  be 
fliewn  from  a  Number  of  Middle  Terms  j  not  cnly  that  it 
may  be  fo,  by  a  multitude  of  particular /??/?/7??rrj ;  but  that 
it  isfo,  by  an  InduBion  of  both  Sexes,  all  known  Ages  of  the 
World,  with  all  the  Conditions  and  Sorts  of  Men  ;  aifo  by 
Disjuri8io)?^  either  Man  muft  have  the  Power  of  Reafoning, 
or  be  merely  adted  by  fome  Rational  Agent,  but  he  is  not  fo 
acSed  ;  therefore  he  hzs  that  Power;  '^nd  hy.  DiJ}iti£tion, 
for  the  Mind,  which  is  peculiarly  the  Man  has  the  Power 
of  Reafoning,  tho'  the  Body  ha  e  not;  and  again ,  by  Dc 
Hiiciion,  thus,  foraething  cannot  fpiirig  fron i  othing ;  there- 
fore an  Ad:  fuppofes  an  Agent  endow'd  with  the  Power  of 
fo  Ading ;  and  therefore  Man  performing  the  Ad  of  Reafon- 
ing, muft  have  the  Power  whereby  he  might  be  capable  of 
fuch  an  Ad:  Now  thai  he  performs  that  AO:,  and  con(e- 
quently  has  the  Power,  ma;;  appear  many  ways,  and  indeed 
very  p'ainly  by  Argument  drawn  from  I'-tp,  being  given  by 
God  to  Man,  that  he  fl-.ould  govern  himlelf  by  the  Diitates 
of  Reafon  and  Religion  ;  as  alfo  from  that,  which  is  given, 
or  declared  by  fome  Men  to  others. 

§  16.  That 


Z92  An  h' (fay  for  the  Part  IIL 

§  16.    That  Man  has  the  Power  of  Reafoning,  may  be 

made  out  divers  other  ways,  as  by  Expl^inihg  the  Terms 
M?w,  I^cafoning^  Power ^  according  to  the  qfage  of  chpfe  Words, 
and  the  Nature  of  the  Things  defigned  by  them;  and  it 
might  be  made  to  appear  abundanily  by  the  Tcjiific/in'on  of 
M^titudes,  both  that  the  "Words  are  of  fuch  Import,  aruj 
that  Man  do's  accordingly  Apprehend,  Prove,  Infer,  &(:, 
\vhich  is  ftrongly  coiinrai'd  by  the  Experience  Men  have  in 
thcmfclves,  and  the  Experiment  they  make  on  others  by  Dif- 
courfe,  Enquiries,  G^r  .-  It  is  alfo  plain  by  the  I^^nfon  of 
Things  Man  mu^  luve  the  Power  of  Reafoning  ;  lince  h^ 
perforins  v,'hat  could  not  be  done  without  it ;  and  this  may 
be  iliewn  by  the  i{.'UtJon  which  Rational  Produ6kions  have 
to  the  A(fl  of  Reafoning,  and  this  again  to  the  Power,  as 
Effeuls  pref^ippofing  a  fuitable  and  Sufficient  Caufe, 

§  17.  Thofe  Rational  Prodiidtions,  which  evince  th? 
A^^  and  Power  of  Reafoning  in  Man,  do  fully  appear,  not 
only  by  Authentick  Memoric.l:^  and  vuidoubred  Mcmary-j  hu; 
alfo  by  preftnt  Scfifatio)?^  both  inward  in  the  Confcious 
Knowledge  Men  ha"  e  of  rheir  own  Internal  Dif-ourfes,  and 
outward  m  their  fenfible  Obfervation  of  the  External  Adlings 
and  Performances  of  others .-  And  if  we  make  but  a  Sttppo/al 
of  the  Concrsry,  how  many  and  great  Abfurdities  would  it 
infer;  but  on  the  other  hand,  liow  many  Suppofiiions  may 
we  eafiiy  make  and  maintain,  which  will  ftrongly  prove,  that 
Man  has  the  Power  of  Reafoning  ?  E.  Gr.  If  hjs  were  made 
after  the  Image  of  God,  in  Finowkdge ;  if  he  is  capable  of 
Mathemarica]  Pemonftratipns,  ^c  :  But  in  that  he  was 
made,  and  of  th:-/c  he  is  Capable,  therefore  he  h^  the  Power- 
of  Reafoning. 

§  18.  Thus  we  have  brought  in  moft  of  the  foremention^ 
ed  Sorts  of  Middle  Terms ;  and  fome  at  leaft  of  the  reft 
might  be  added,  for  we  might  argue,  even  the  prefent  Poinp 
from  the  Lnrger  to  the  Lefs^  (or  n  M^jo'i,  as  Logicians  arq 
wont  to  fpeak) ;  thus,  if  Man  be  Capable  of  Religion,  Ke  aex,^ 
tainly  has  the  Power  of  Reafoning,  but  the  former  is  true'; 
And  therefore  fo  is  the  latter.  Had  Man  been  truly  refeqi-? 
bled  to  any  Tliuig,  the  likenefs  might  have  been  fhewfl  by 
tiki  Attrih.  tcs ;  or  if  it  bad  been  laid,  Man  is  a  Species  ,of 
l,iving  Creatures,  or  that  ht  is  a  Combination,  &c,  Thofe 
Teyms  of  A.t  might  bave  been  open'd  and  pjrov'd  of  him  frocQ 
01C  Account  given  of  them  iiu  fhjs  Logical  Eflay  j  Finally, 
'€  it  had  been  faid,,  that  Man  is  ^not  ordinarily  Sevep  Faoi 
\r^  ;  war  commonly  jvi^bs  lijree  iiundned  Weight,  bat  is 
:j|ua'?K'  too  big  to  be  connup'^  ja  ^  Qt»trc  Pot ;   pr  th^tlloeie 

are 


thap.  li.        Improvement  oj  fVealon.  393 

arc  more  Men  in  the  World  than  Hairs  upon  any  one  Maii^ 
Head ;  there  had  then  been  Occafion  for  Mcajurs  of  dirfcring 
Sorts :  And  in  the  preferit  Cafe,  \ve  may  mcafure  the  Truth 
of  the  Aifertion  by  that  known  Principle,  that  where  ther<i 
is  the  Ad,  there  muft  alfo  be  the  Power  of  fo  Ading  ;  and 
finally,  that  this  be  taken  for  granted  is  a  fair  and  reafonable 
Demnnd. 

§  19.  Now  at  length,  to  proceed  yet  forward  towards 
the  Propofition  here  undertaken,  we  muft  add,  {3.)  That 
the  Power  of  I{ciiJoniti^  in  Jcytic  Mc7i  reaches  to  Future  and  Invi" 
fible  Things,  or  to  what  falls  not  immediately  under  Senfe  : 
And  this  might  eafdy  be  ihewn  by  divers  of  the  forementi- 
bned  Middle  Terms,  as  by  InJiAzice,  h,duflion,  Disjunciiony 
Explication,  Tefiification,  Experience^  8cc :  (4J  The  menti- 
oned Age  of  the  Man,  and  State  of  Mind  muft,  according 
to  the  B^efon  and  B^laticn  of  Things,  plainly  contribute  to 
carry  Mens  Reafoning  higher  and  farther,  which  might  be 
made  to  appear  from  divers  other  Topicks.    And, 

§  lo.     (5.J    Mens  having  the  more  perfed  Ufe  of  theit 
Underftanding  muft  evidently  giv€  thtm  the  more  immediate 
Power  of  fuch  higher  and  farther  Reafoning ;    fo  that  there 
needs  nothing  more  to  intervene  as  a  Power  fubjeded  in  Man, 
(6,  and  laftlyj  All  Men  whatfoever,   having  the  more  Per- 
fed  Ufe  of  their  Underftandings  have  the  more  Immediate, 
Power  of  Reafoning  about  Things  which  fall  not  immedi- 
ately under  Senfe ;     This  might  appear  even  by  Matheroad- 
cal  Menjurr.tion,  v'li.    by  TaIc  or  Count,    if  we  knew  but; 
every  fuch  Man  j    and  may  upon  Mending  the  State  of  th© 
Queftion  thus,    There  is  no  Ji,ch  A(//?w,  who  hath  nct^  8cc.   Or 
no  Infiance  can  be  brought  of  fuch  a  Man,   who  hath  not,  C^c, 
Alfo  an  JnduHion  may  here  be  made,  as  before,  of  both  Sexes, 
and  all  Sorts  :     And  again,  it  may  be  prov'd  by  Dis/tmHion^ 
for  either  all  fuch  Men  have  the  more  Immediate  PovVer, 
&c,  or  there  is  Jcme  fuch  Man,    who  needs  a  farther  Powec 
fubjeded  in  himfeif  j  but  there  is  no  fuch  Man,  who  Meeds  a 
farther  Power  fubjeded  in  himklf;   therefore  no  Juci.  Man 
but  has  the  more  immediate  Po\vtr  of  Reafoning  about 
Thinigs  which  falls  not  inomediately  under  Senfe,  and  parti- 
cularly about  Future  and  Invifible  1  hings :     And  thus  from 
molt  c^'  the  Specify 'd  Middle  Terms  We  might  proceed  to 
make  outthe  iyniverlaiit\  of  the  pttfcni  Qutluon. 

§  II.    FinaJy,    M  thefe  Methods  fhouid  not  i\iiffice,  it 
>f»  I  may  be  of  Ufe  in  order  to  the  niore  thorough  undeiltandin^ 
t  f  the  Qiicftion,  and  arguing  upon  it,    to  takt  up  the  leveral 
FaUiCUi.:rs  mefltioii'd    ^  6,  7,    in   the  OrUer  as  they  there 


2£4 An^t^ffay^for  the  Part  III. 

ftand  ;  and,  fo  f^r  as  there  is  Occafion,  to  make  fuch  Inqui- 
ries upon  them,  as  thefe,  (i.)  What  is  the  Meaning  of  the 
Word,  as  here  it  ftands  r  (i.)  To  what  Thing  is  that  Word 
afExed  P  Where  we  fhould  take  Care  to  afcertain  the  Siibjecl 
more  efpecially  by  fome  obvious  Mark,  which  tho'  it  declare 
nothing  of  the  Nature,  yet  fixes  the  Name  to  fomcthing 
certain,  (3.)  Wliat  is  the  Nature  of  the  T/j/w^,  to  which  Ix. 
relates .-  (4.)  What  is  there  neceflarily  ^ntecedem,  Co}jco77ii- 
tant,  or  Ccnfeijumt,  which  may  ferve  to  make  out  the  Rela- 
tion and  Confidcration,  wherein  the  thing  intended  here 
ftands.-  And,  (5.)  In  Reference  to  thefe  feveral  Enquiries, 
we  iliould  endeavour  to  call  to  Mind  what  we  have  obferv'd,' 
or  Read,  or  credibly  heard;  and,  if  need  be,  Should  not  only" 
difco^.rfc-  wirh  knowing  Pcrfons  about  ihem,  but  get  the  beft 
account  we  can  how  we  may  be  more  fully  inftrmiled. 

Some  farther  help  towards  Proving  may  be  drawn  from 
the  General  Head  about  Interring,  which  we  are  next  to  go 
upon. 


CHAP.     XIII. 

§  I   tOR  the  farther  Improvement  of  our  Reafori,  it  is 
^    to  be  directed  and  affiftcd, 

III,  Bjg'jtly  to  ififc;  Jo  that  what  is  inferred  may  evidently 
appear  to  be  n  ]uft  CcJifeijuoice  of  that  from  which  it  u  deduc'd' 
whether  it  be  immediately  or  more  remotely. 

§  2.  As  to  the  Ufefulnefs  of  Inferring  rightly,  and  the; 
good  Purpolesto  which  it  may  be  apply'd,  it  is  evident, 

I.  That  it  muit  furnifli  out  all  Hypothetical  Arguments, 
which  plainly  contain  an  Inference  or  Dedodtion,  thatfhould 
ordinarily  be  either  evident  in  it  felf,  or  capable  however  of 
being  prov'd  at  one  Remove  by  a  farther  Confequence,  which 
is  lb ;  left  we  run  into  the  Confulion,  which  has  been 
caution'd  againft.  Chap.  i.  §  10 — 14. 

§  3.  2.  It  might  in  many  Cafes  lave  the  greater  Trouble 
,of  feeking  out  Arguments  for  the  Proof  of  fuch  Points  as 
might  be  drawn  out  by  Inference;  at  leaft  by  lengthing  the 
Procefs  thereof.  This  Method  leems  to  have  been  aim'd  at 
in  Geometry,  bur  is  not  profecuted,  as  perhaps  it  might  be 
with  Advantage  ;  fappofe  in  fome  fuch  way  as  tliisj  let  it 
he  SL  Definieio*if  or  Demnndf  thai 

The 


Chap.  1 3-        Jwprj?vement  of  ?K.taion.  295" 

The  Angles  made  by  one  right  or  Rraight  Line  falling  up- 
on another,  fo  as  nor  co  incline  more  towards  one  end'oF  ic 
than  to  the  other,  are  Right  Angles  : 

Therefore,  where  Juch  a  Line  is  taken  or  fuppofed  fo  to  fall 
upon  Juch  other  Line,  the  Angles  are 
alfo  to  be  taken,    or    fuppos'd  to  be  €,       n 

Right   Angles:   Therefore,  if(£.  Gr.)  '         :       P- 

e /»  is  fuppos'd    to  be  a  Right  Line,  -f-S/ 

and  fo  to  fall  upon  c  d,  another  Right  0/7l        1 

Line,  the  Angle  /  is  then  to  be  taken  ^  "  '  U  '" 
for  a  Right  Angle,  and  the  Angles  g8c  h 
together  for  the  other  Right  Angle:  Therefore  the  Line  a  If 
inakes  two  Angles  with  c  d,  which  are  together  equal  to  two 
Rights;  (ince  the  Angle  0  contains  the  Right  Angle  /  with 
g^  which  is  part  of  the  other  Right,  and  that  the  other  Angle 
h  is  the  remaining  part  of  it :  And  therefore  the  Angles 
made  by  nnj  Lhie  falling  in  any  Sort  whatfoever  upon  a  Right 
Line,  muft  be  always  equal  to  two  Rights ;  fince  they  muft 
either  be  themfelves  Right  Angles,  or  admit  of  a  Line,  which 
ihall  divide  the  greater  Angle  into  one  Right  Angle,  and 
part  of  another,  and  that  the  lelTer  Angle  will  then  be  the 
remaining  part  of  the  other  Right  Angle,  as  it  is  in  the  Dia- 
gram refer'd  to  -^  and  would  be  ftil],  tho'  we  fiiould  fuppofe 
a  b  to  be  a  curve  Line. 

§  4.  To  give  another  Inftance  of  Mathematical-  De- 
dudion. 

Let  it  be  laid  down  as  an  Axiom,  that  thofe  Quantities  are 
in  themfelves  equal,  which,  being  feverally  added  to  the 
fame  or  to  equal  Quantities,  make  up  equal  Compounds : 

Therefore /o  zrefuch  Meafures,  Angles,  Figures,  Weights, 
'^c ;  and  omitting  the  reft  at  prefent,  we  may  proceed  in  rer 
latioh  to  Angles,  thus,  Thofe  Angles  are  therefore  equal, 
.which  being  feverally  added  to  the  fame  Angle  do  on  each 
hand  nnake  up  two  Rights : 


The 


296 


An  Ejjay  for  the 


Part  111. 


Therefore  the  Oppofite  Angles  made  by  two  Right  Lines 

crolTing  each  other  are  equal, 
fince  being  feverally  added 
to  the  Angle  or  Angles  lying 
betwixt  them  on  one  fide, 
they  do  feverally  therewith 
make  up  two  Rights  -,  as  for 
Example  s  taken  together 
with  a  f,  and  e  taken  toge- 
ther with  the  fame  a  0 : 
Now  this  has  appear'd  in 
the  Dedutflion  of  the  fore- 
going Sedlion  :  And  thus 
whatever  was  duly  infer'd  in  any  preceding  Dedudtion,  may 
berefer'd  to,  if  need  be,  to  make  out  the  Confcquence  in  any 
Step  of  one  that  follows. 

In  fome  fuch  manner  we  might  carry  on  a  Dedudiion,  till 
we  bring  out  the  Point,  which  has  been  Demonftrated  up- 
on this  Diagram,  Chap.  lo.  §  15.  and  fomewhat  of  alike 
Method  might  be  taken  in  fome  Qpeftions,  that  are  not  Ma- 
thematical. 

■  §  5.  3.  Farther  Points  of  Knowledge  may,  by  Inferring, 
t>e  gain'd  From  the  more  general  Principles,  and  neater  Con- 
clufions,  Part  I.  Chap.  16,  17,  C^c  ;  asaifo  from  whatever 
elfc  is  already  prov'd,  or  juftly  granted  ;  and  the  Procefs  may 
be  drawn  out  from  each  of  thofe  into  a  manifold  Train  and 
Series  of  Confequcnces,  whereof  fome  may  be  New  J3ifco\  e- 
ries  to  our  felvcs  or  others,  and  fome  others  of  them  may  be 
Points  happily  call'd  to  Mind,  with  this  Advantage,  that- 
they  are  at  the  fame  time  confirmed  by  their  being  in-  I 
fer'd. 

§  6.  4.  Such  a  Method  of  difcourfing  Manefs,  if  it 
be  rightly  manag'd,  may  preclude  and  forcclofe  Oppo- 
£tion  ;  fo  as  to  build  up  Truth,  like  Solomons  Temple, 
without  the  noife  of  Axes  and  Hammers  about  it.  And, 
,  5.  It  may  ferve  to  lead  Perfons;  more  eafily,  and  if  need  be^ 
uittWares,  into  the  Acknowledgment  of  that,  againft  which 
they  might  be  prejudic'd,  and  ready  to  Cavil  upon  whatfo- 
cver  Argument  lliould  be  profefledly  brought  in  Proof  or  De- 
fence thereof;  whenas  in  the  way  of  Succelfive  Inferences 
prudently  manag'd,  you  may,  in  Effed,  carry  the, _  Point 
you  have  in  view,  before  you  mention  it,  or  refer  direCtJy 


§7' Nor 


Chap.  19.        Improvement  0/  R.Q2i(on.  j^j 

§  7.  6.  Nor  can  we  in  this  way  eafily  flirie,  or  be  car- 
ry'd,  into  any  Thing  Falfe  or  Erroneous;  if  we  look  bat  well 
to  it,  that  the  Difcourle  do  really  proceed  from  fome  indubi- 
table Principle  or  certain  Conclufion  by  linquertionable  Infe- 
rence or  evident  Connexion  in  every  feveral  Step. 

§  8.  7  (To  add  no  more, I  it  is  a  known  and  approved  Me- 
thod of  overthrowing  plaufible  Falfhoods  ro  load  them  with 
more  manifeft  or  acknowledged  I'allhood  and  Abfurdity 
duly  infer'd  from  the  Tenets  weoppofe  ;  but  then  greac  Care 
IS  to  be  taken,  that  we  fix  them  only  on  thofe  Tenets  them- 
felves,  not  upon  the  Perfon«,  wlio  may  perhaps  innocently 
hold  them,  without  difcerning  whither  they  tendj  or,  ic 
may  be,  without  feeing  the  Confequence,  even  when  'tis 
ftiewn  them  :  And  tliis  we  (hould  alwavs  charitably  fuppofe 
of  hone'ft  Men,  unlefs  the  contrary  do  too  plainly  appear; 
but  efpecially  when  they  ferioufly  profels  the  Denial,  or 
even  Deteftation  of  fach  confequenc  FaUhoods  and  Abfur- 
dities. 

§  9.  As  to  the  matter  of  Inferring,  we  may  confider  what 
is  prtfuppofed  ;  what  is  thence  infer'd  ;  the  Illation  or  Infer- 
ring, in  it  felf;  the  particular  Gnmnd  or  Reafon  of  it;  laft- 
Jy,  and  more  at  large  Rules  and  Helps  for  the  better  perfor- 
mance thereof.     And, 

I.  As  to  that,  from  which  the  Inference  is  drawn,  we 
may  call  ic  the  Antecedent ;  and  do  here  confider  it  only  as 
prefuppos'd;  fof  it  is  not  nece(faril\  laid  down  as  Truth, 
but  may  be  indeed  a  Fallliood  which  we  are  deligning  to 
difprove  ashas  been  (hswn  by  the  Falfe  or  Abl'ur'd  Con- 
fcquences  ariling  from  ic.  There  is  commonly  no  more  than  one 
Propciition  or  Antecedent  expref^'d,  but  there  may  be  fome- 
times  more  than  one  exprefly  laid  down ;  as  if  we  fay.  Gold 
is  Yellow,  Snow  is  White,  and  Grafs  is  Green  ;  therefore 
Gold,  Snow  and  Grafs  are  divers  Things ;  or  therefore  they 
are  all  colour'd  ObieAs.  Now  what  is  prefuppos'd,  is  in- 
deed the  Antecedent  of  an  Enthymeme,  or  one  of  the  Pro- 
potirions  of  a  perfeil  Syilogifm,  the  other  being  underftood 
as  we  (hall  after  obferve. 

§  10.  1.  What  IS  infer'd,  is  the  conclufion  of  an  Enthy- 
meme,  which  might  b-  trade  a  perfed  Syllogilra  :  And  it 
may  cQnlilt  eith:r  wholly  of  the  fame  Terms  with  the  An- 
tecedent, but  othcrwife  difpos'd,  asm  the  way  of  Inverfion; 
or  of  two  Terms,  which  are  both  ditfermg  from  thofe  of  the 
Antecedent;  or  elfe  of  one  new  Term,  together  with  one 
taken  from  the  Antecedent,  and  this  kind  of  Inference  is  to 
be  hereattur  commonly  undctitood,   where  there  is  no  Inti- 

X  matiob 


2  5»8  '      An  t J] ay  for  the  Hart  I U- 

maciOn  givtn  of  aiiy  other  :  Now  the  two  latter  forts  of 
InFereuce  tfiay  be  tranifold,  even  in  the  firll  Degree  or  Seep 
of  lilatiiDn,  riiOch  more  in  the  farther  Procefs  :  For  as  the 
faine  Pofition  tnay  often  be'  inftr'd  from  fevcralSnppolitions, 
or  prov'd  by  divers  Arguments ;  fo,  many  differing,  tho'  not 
contrary,  Conclulions  may  be  immediately  drawn  from  the 
fame  Supposition, 

§  r  r.  5.  The  Illation,  or  the  Inferring  of  one  Point  from 
another,  which  is  uf^.ially  exprefs'd  by  [therefore  1  in  E>'g!i/h, 
imports  the  Connexion  of  the  Antecedent  and  Confcquent  ; 
which  muft  always  be  Neceflary,  and  Hiould  be  in  it  fetf 
uiidettiable,  tho'  the  Matter  infer'd  Le,  perhaps,  only  pro- 
bable ;  of^  it  may  b^e  falfe,  according  as  the  At)cecedent  is ; 
bnt  the  ConclufiMn  however,  if  falfe,  or  if  but  probably 
true,  muft  be  a  FalJliood,  or  a  Probability  nc.^ffnuy  filLw- 
ing  from  fuch  Antecedent ;  and  it  may  well  be  faid,  there  is 
n6  Confequence  at  all,  where  it  is  not  Necelfary^  as  if  we 
ihould  fay  fome  Perfons  have  an  Antipathy  to  Cheefe,  thcre- 
fWe  it  m.uft  be  really  hurtful  to  their  Bodies ;  now  it  may  in- 
deed be  fo  for  that  Rcafon,  if  they. know  it,  and  perhaps  if 
thdy  do  noti  yet' it  do's  n'ot  necclTirily  follow  frotn  their  hav- 
ing an  Ant'ipathy  to  it  ;  fince  'tis  highly  probable  it  m;ght  hz 
fo  mixt  and  compounded  with  o:hev  Ingredients,  as  to  have 
no  ill  Ef?e(ft  at  all :  For  that  evai  Poifun  it  fclf  may  be  tnadc 
harmlcfs,  or  Indeed  nfcfiil  by  being  fitly  Temper'd  and 
Cofrcdted.  •  Every  jail  and  im-xediate  Intercnce  might  fcem- 
x.<S  be  altogether  Self-evident,  fince  we  attend  not  to  any 
Point  ai;a  Ground  or  Rcafon  cf  the  Confequence;  and  yet 
upon  clofer  Conlidcration  it  will  be  found,  that, 

§  ri.  4"''  There  is  another  Enunciation  always  undcr- 
ftoocJ  to  every  Inference,  befidesthat  from  which  'tis  cxprclly 
drawn  :  For  there  is  a  Rcafon  or  Cojihmiat'.on  of  the  In- 
ferertceimply'd,  tho'  not  always  oblerv'J,  as  a  kind  of  Band 
or  Tie  betwixt  the  Antecedent  and  Confeqtient,  which  as 
fuch  is  involv'd  m  the  illative  Particle :  And  it  is  indeed  the 
other  Propofitionof  a  pcrfeA  Syllogifm,  but. fuch  as  is  com- 
monly fuppos'd  to  need  no  Proof:  'Tis  in  the  Force  and  Ver- 
tue  of  this  irnply'd  Encnciaticn  together  with  that,  which  is 
cxprefs'd  that  the  Conclufion  or  Inference  is  drawn  :  In  the 
mean  tvhiic  its  Connexion  with  them,  or  Refultance  from 
them  both  together,  •  is  or  llionld  b&Self-evident.  When  we 
faid,  GTals  is  Green,  Snow  is  White,  and  Gold  Yellow; 
therefore  all  of  them  are  Coloured  Objedls,  it  was  under- 
ftooJ  Cats  needing  iio  Prbof),  that  whatever  is  Green,  or 
.Whict,"  or  -Yellow,  is  a  Cokmrd'ObjeCt :  Or  if  we  infer, 
'■■'-•-■-■>'  X  that 


Chap.  1 3-  improvemertt  of  ^^.2.[or\.  299 

that  therefore  Grafs,  Snow  and  Gold  are  divers  Things,  'tis 
then  impjvjd,  that  the  things  which  are  of  differing  Colours 
are  divers  Things.     Therefore, 

§  13.  The  way  of  eKamininp;  an  Inference  is  to  flipply 
the  latent  Enunciation,  and  to  obferve,  whether  it  be  in- 
deed a  true  Axiom  ;  or  however  fome  P.olition,  which  really 
needs  no  Proof  (for  elfe  the  Inference  is  nor,  as  it  would 
feem,  an  imme;iiate  one) ;  or  at  leaft,  whether  it  can  be 
prov'd,  for  othcrwife  there  is  not  fo  much  as  a  dillant  Con- 
lequence  in  the  Cafe:  And  altho'  we  may  allow  a  remote 
inference  to  be  good  in  it  felf,  yet  it  is  not  fo  Proper  or  Con- 
venient in  a  continued  Series,  where  every  Step  ftiould  be 
fully  Evident  in  it  felf,  without  the  help  of  an  intervening 
Proof :  And  fo  it  will  be,  where  the  Inference  ftands  upon 
two  Enunciations,  whereof  that  imply 'd  do's  no  more  need 
a  Proof,  than  that  which  is  exprefs'd,  is  fuppos'd  to  do. 

§  14.  For  Inftance,  if  itbefaid,  The  Shadow  of  the 
Earth  may  reach  that  Face  of  the  Full-Moon,  which  is  to- 
wards us ;  therefore  fhe  may  be  to  us  Ecclips'd.  There  is  no 
need  to  prove  (to  fuch  as  underftand  the  Matter),  that  the 
intervening  Shadow  of  the  Earth  muft  Eclipfe  the  Moon  to 
us:  B'Jt  if  it  were  faid,  a  Bird  may  fly,  or  a  Cloud  jnter- 
pofe  betwixt  us  and  the  Moon  ;  therefore  fhe  may  be  Eclips'd, 
'tis  no  Confequence  at  all,  becaufe  fuch  Interpofure  cannot 
make  what  we  defign  by  an  Eclipfe:  It  would  not  be  an 
immediate  Inference,  if  we  fhould  fay,  the  Sun,  Earth,  and 
^Icon  may  be  in  a  Line ;  therefore  the  Moon  may  be  Eclips'd : 
I^or  the  Confequence  needs  this  Proof,  that  when  they  are 
in  a  Line  the  Shadow  of  the  Earth  will  reach  the  Moon. 

§  1 5.  What  has  been  faid  about  the  way  of  tilling  up  an 
Enthymeme,  and  turning  it  into  a  complete  Syllogifm,  may 
be  fufficient  to  put  us  in  the  way  of  fupplying  the  Enuncia- 
tion, which  is  imply'd  in  the  colleding  of  an  Inference ;  The 
Short  whereof  is,  that  fuch  Term  of  the  Antecedent,  as  is 
not  found  in  the  Confequent,  mufk  be  cpmbin'd  with  thnt 
Term  of  the  Confequent,  which  is  not  found  in  the  Antece- 
dent; and  Care  muft  be  always  taken,  that  the  Term,  which 
thus  will  be  repeated,  beat  leaftonce  taken  univerfally :  But  if 
both  the  Terms  cf  the  Confequent  be  differing  from  thofe. 
of  the  Antecedent ;  the  Antecedent  and  Confequent  are  then 
ro  be  put  together  in  an  Hypothetical  Enunciation. 

§  1 6.  In  the  infer'd  Inverfion  of  the  fame  Terms,  there 
is  always  fuppos'd  fome  fuch  Axiom  as  this  [if  Connex- 
ipns  and   Disjuj'dions  of  any  two  Terms  be  mutu:}!  ^..  h 

X  2.  rhev 


900  An  tjfay  for  the  Part  HI. 

tljey  may  be  inverted].  Thus  E.  Gr.  If  no  Man  be  a  Stone,  it 
follows,  that  no  Stone  is  a  Man:  And  if  every  Living  Creature 
have  fomewhat  of  free  Motion ;  then  at  lealt  fomewhaf, 
which  has  free  Motion,  muft  he  a  Living  Creature. 

§  17.  Let  it  be  always  remember'd,  that  in  the  way  of 
Inferring,  where  the  Syllcgifm  is  not  perfeded,  only  one 
Leg  is  ihewn  ;  but  that  there  is  really  another,  upon  which 
the  Point  infer'd  muft  ftand,  and  we  fhould  therefore  look 
well,  that  the  hidden  Leg  be  not  unfound ;  or  that  there  be 
not  a  kind  of  a  Cloven  Foot,  whilft  that,  which  is  expos'd 
to  view,  is  very  firm  and  entire;  for  we  may  reafonably  cx- 
pe£V,  that  in  Arguing,  the  beft  Leg  will  be  fee  forward  to 
Sight,  and  the  worfe,  if  any  be,  conccal'd. 


CHAP.     XIV. 

§  I.  "T  HE  propounded  Method  leads  ns  to  confidcr  in  the 
*■  laft  place,  and  much  more  largely, 
5.  Some  Roles  and  Helps,  which  may  direvil  and  adift  U8 
to  infer,  not  only  rightly,  but  with  greater  readinefs  :  And 
here  fomewhat  may  be  firft  obferv'd,in  relation  to  the  MIDDLE 
TEH^MS  under  the  foregoing  General  Head  about  Proof 

§  z.    Now  whatfcever  can  be  confirmed  by  any  Argu- 
mcnt  may  be  alfo  cohered  from  it,    and  accordingly  is  in 
l^aift  wlienever  the  Argument  is  form'd,    and  the  Conclulion 
drawn,    which  is  plainly  an  Inference  from  the  Premifes  ; 
and  ^s  Ji'ch  it  is  always  undeniable,    as  being  neccffary  and 
unavoidable  in  a  well  form'd  Syllogifm  ,    tho'  the  Premiles 
might  be  but  probable,  uncertain,  or  evidently  Falfe  :    For, 
•s  It  has  been  fuggeilcd,  an  Inference  may  be   fuji  when  it  is 
not  rrue  ;  e.  g.The  Sea  burns;  therefore  the  Ships  in  it  are  all 
on  Fire  :     Again,  it  may  be  alfo  True  where  the  Antecedent 
is  Falfe  ;  as  if  it  fhould  be  faid,  JcL  was  an  Hypocrite ;  there- 
fore Subjed:  to  fo  great  Calamities  :     And  farther,   it  muft 
always  be  confcijuentirJly  certain,    tho'  the  Antecedent  might 
be  in  it  felf  uncertain ;    as  a'l  Matter  whatfoever  is  in  it  felf 
the  fame;  therefore  all  Bodies  arc  the  fame  Matter  varioufly 
Moditied. 

§  3.  It  mnft  always  be  remem'red,  when  we  go  to  infer 
any  Thing  as  a  Truth,  fton.  any  of  the  forementioned  Middle 
Terms,  That  nothiiig  is  to  be  laid  dnwn  as  ihe  Antecedent, 
tor  may  bv  fomuch  as  imply'd,  bar  wJiat  is  true  and  needs  no 

Proof, 


Chap.  14.         Improvement  of  Reafcn.  501 

Proof,  as  being  either  Evidejit  in  it  felf,  or  already  prov'd 
or  granted,  or  at  leafl  fuppos'd ;  becaufe,  that  in  drawing 
Inferences,  we  ought  Itill  to  go  forward,  and  cannot  regular- 
ly take  up  any  thing  again  to  be  confirai'd,  when  we  have 
once  paCs'd  it  over. 

§  4.  All  the  mentioned  forts  of  M I DD L E  TERMS 
muft  plainly  afford  InfereiKes,  when  us'd  as  Arguments ; 
butour  prefent  Quefti^n  is,  what  fort  of  Inferences  they  will 
yield;  or  what  kind  of  Points  they  are  refpe*5tively  fitted  to 
argue,  and  the  anfwcring  of  this,  will  not  only  fubferve  our 
prefent  purpofe  of  inferring,  but  alfo  that  of  rightly  proving, 
as  it  may  give  us  Aim  under  which  Head  of  the  Middle 
Terms  we  are  more  efpecially  to  feek  the  Proof  of  our  Quefti.- 
on  according  as  the  Nature  of  it  may  be.     And, 

§  5.  I.  Tho'  in  ftrid:  Propriety  'tis  indeed  the  Queftion 
it  felf,  as  it  might  be  lefs  commodioully  worded  or  ftated, 
which  is  to  be  infer'd  from  the  fame,  as  better  adjufted;  yet 
thts  is  rather  robe  colIe<fted from  thr.t,  in  order  to  an  happier 
Procedure,  whecher  in  proving  or  inferring:  Since  no  Man 
fhould  draw  a  worfe  State  of  any  Point  from  a  better,  buf 
may  well  endeavour  to  introduce  a  better  for  the  making  cur, 
or  improving  of  a  worfe,  when  it  was  fo  laid  before  him: 
And  wc  may  fometimes  realonably  proceed,  as  by  rhe  way  of 
Inferring  from  a  Ihortcr  to  a  larger  State  of  the  Queitlon,  or 
to  any  way  of  patting  it,  which  might  lie  readier  for  Proof 
or  Inference, 

§  6.  z.  Meafure  or  Menfuration  muft  infer  or  conclude 
fomewhat  Menfurable,  as  being  of  a  Mathematical  kind, 
or  however  admittnig  of  [[more  and  lefs]]:  It  will  ferve  to  con- 
clude Things  E^unl  or  Vnequnl ,    Greater^  More,  Fcwer^  Lc//, 

§  7.  3.  An  hifimce  will  atleaft  infer  the  Poflibility,  that  a 
thing  may  be  fo,  and  that  there  is  no  Inconfiftency  therein 
in  like  Circumftances. 

4.  From  Induciion  may  be  infer'd.  that  tJie  whole  is  of 
fuch  a  Nature,  as  the  leveral  parts  are  found  to  be. 

§  8.  $.  Upon  a  right  Disjunclioriy  we  may  colleA  that 
what  is  of  fuch  a  kind  umft  belong  to  one  or  other  of  the 
3orcs,  Branches,  or  Parts,  and  cannot  properly  fall  under  two 
or  more  of  them  at  once. 

6.  Upon  a  juftDiftindion,  we  may  infer  what  is  agreeable 
to  the  Scnfc  duly  Itated  and  rejecfl  whatever  is  difagreeing. 
Man  properly  underftood  is  a  Living  Creature;  therefore  has 
Senfe,  ^c :  Man  improperly  taken,  may  be  an  Image  or 
Piv^ure,  and  therefore  as  fuch  is  without  Senfe,  z3c. 

X  3  §  9'  p-  Froitt 


50  2  An  hjjay  for  the  l^artllf. 

§  p.  7.  V com  z  DeduB.lr'n  rightly  made,  we  may  pro- 
ceed to  Avhatfoever  other  Dcdndt'on  can  be  made  according 
to  fome  Rules,  which  will  Ic  gi^en  in  the  farther  profecutioi^ 
of  thisGeneral  Head.  j 

8.  Upon  the  iairncfs  of  a  D-^niwJ^  we  may  colled:  not 
drily  what  is  fo  demanded,  but  alfo  whatfd^yer  lis  apparently 
conne^^ed  with  it.  ^'\ 

§  I  o.  9.  Frcin  L/'iVe  given,  or  declar-d  by  prbpfcr  Ind.  nf 
Authority,  that  fo  tlie Mitr'er  Itands,  or  is  like  fo  to  iffue; 
that  this  or  that  Perfon  is  Obnoxious,  or  Clear,  &s. 

10.  What  is  Lcjs  mny  be  infer'd  from  wlut  is  Lfi^gcr  and 
comprehends  it:  And  the  Li\snefs  oF  Things  from  L/^e  'At- 
tritutes  belonging th.erero. 

§  1 1.  II.  Upon. a  right  Exp'.icntic77  of  the  Terms  6f  ttie 
Queflion  we  may  colle^l  whatever  is  imply'd  therein,  or  cun- 
nedted  iherewirh. 

§  13.  From  a  fuHicient  T-;/?.'/z/r.''/.')7/,  we  may  gather  ei- 
ther, that  rhe  thing  is  fo  ;  or  that  however  the  Apprehenfion 
of  the  Credible  Perlons,  who  fn  teftilie  is  fuchj  and  that  it 
Ihould  be  either  Receiv'd  or  Difpro'v'd. 

13.  From  Terms  of  /ht,  dctermind  by  the  Art  to  which 
they  belong,  may  be  colledted,  that  in  this  or  that  Place  oi*' 
Manner  of  uling  they  are  well  or  ill  us'd,  rightly  or  wrong. 

§  13.  14.  From  £x/'-'/?V>/ci',  that  the  Maaer  is  poflible^ 
and  may  be  fo  again,  or  is  like  to  be  fo  in  f^-ch  like  Circuiii- 
ftanccs. 

i"^.  From  an  Ex^?r/m?w>,  well  made  and  ftated,  that  the 
Caufe  of  fuch  a  thing  is  (at  Tealt  probably^  fo,  or  the  Effed 
luch,  as  appeai'd  upon  Trial. 

.  §  14.     16.   Upon  a  like  R^.tfiyi  on  boih  fides,    we  may  fo 
/rfr  infer,  even  from  a  Similitude;    or  from  fome  like  Cafe  a 
like  Determination;  and  contrariwife  from  the  Contrary. 
.    17..  From  H^lntiov^  that  there  is  a  Correlate  together  with 
the  proper  Ground  of  fuch  Relation. 

§  15,  18,  From  a  remarkable  Mcmyri.t',  that  there  was 
fome  Occafion  for  it,  and  in  all  probability  fiich  is  it  im- 
ports, wh  cher  by  its  Make  or  fome  Infcription,  or  the  ge- 
neral Tradition  about  it. 

19.  From  certain  tvlem-^ry^  that  the  thing  was  really  fo,  or 
at  leaft  that  it  fo  appear'd  to  us 

§  16.  2o.  From  SoifarioT?^  that  there  is  fome  what  or 
0;iher  diftinci  from  that,  which  perceives  j  that  it  is  fuited  to 
the  Senfe  by  which  we  perceive  it,  and  is  to  be  accounted 
fiich  as  we  perceive  it,  wherc'there  is  no  fufficient  Rcafon  to 
the  Contrarv. 


Chap   14.         Improvement  of  ^tdiion. 


909 


zi.  A  Suppojinon  may  be  made  of  any  kinil  whatfoever, 
fo  the  Matter  be  not  inconfiftent  with  it  felf  and  the  Infe- 
rence thereupon  will  be  generally  according  to  fome  or  other 
of  the  foregoi!,ig  or  following  iJuggertions. 

§  17.  Whar  here  follows,  may  be  a  kind  of  general  .Rule 
for  Inferring,  v::{.  Things  that  are  under  fuch  Confiiderations 
identify  d  with  each  other  (as  lacing  indeed  ^n  fome  fort  the 
fame  Thing,  only  diverlly  confider'd)  may  like  wile  be  iden- 
tify "d  under  any  other  Coniiderations  belpnging  to  thern  :  If 
f/3»,  which  is  fo  nanfd  be  like  to  thr.t^  which  is  fo  nam' J 
(i,  e.  if  it  be  the  fame  thing  with  vphnt  refcmbhs,  or  n^hnc  rc- 
fcrnbicsht  the  fame  Thing  with  it);  then  it  follows,  that 
what  is  ijsre  is  like  to  what  is  there :  What  is  perhaps  biggpr^ 
yet  retcmb'es  whatis  lejs .-  Again,  alfo,  tha.t  tiJK  is  not  /-/'.t/, 
(.'".?.  is  nor  the  felr  fame  thing  with  it,tho'itbe  fame  with  what 
refembles  it,  and  indeed  becaufe  it  is  fo) :  And  farther,  that 
Vv/hat  is  fubjedted  in  this  is  therefore  not  fubje(5led  in  that  : 
What  touches  this,  do's  not  therefore  toucli  that ;  yetftillthe 
Thing  touched  by  a  third  refembles  that  which  perhaps  is  not 
touched  by  it:  And  (to  inftance  no  morej  that  which  is,  ic 
maybe,  divers  ways  unlike  is  yet  fome  way  like. 

§    J 8,      The    Sum    of  the  Matter,    as  to   the    forego-' 

ing  Rule,  is  this,  that  the 
Things  defignd  in  the 
Terms  of  the  Queftioa 
maybe  any  other  way  fee 
forth,  on  either  hand  fuc- 
cellively  ,  or  on  both  at 
once  ;  fo  we  keep  but  to 
the  fame  Tilings,  \vhich 
were  firlt  coniiuer'd  fo  or 
fo  in  the  Subjedi:,  and  fb 
or  fo  in  the  Predicate. 
This  may  be  better  con- 
ceived by  calling  our  Eye 
upon  the  Figures  in  the 
Margin,  the  fime  which 
were  employ'd  for  the  II- 
iuftrating  of  Proof,  Ch,  i. 
pag.  X28,  c^r.  where  the 
Terms  of  Heraldry  made 
Ufeof,viz.Oi^,  ^{(GENT 
&CC.  are  Explain' d  :  Now  let  G,  H,  and  J  befomany  fe- 
iveralBodiesjuftlikeeach  oiher,onIy  differently  turned  to  the 
Eic  i  the  Sides  Mark'd  v/ith  e,  being  Gules,  as  the  Figure  e,  e,  is  ; 

X  4  and 


504  r.n  tjjuy  for  the  Part  111. 

and  thofe  mark'd  with  /  V^-rt,  as  /,/  is.-  The  Propofitions 
or  Antecedents,  from  which  Ave  would  infer,  may  be  fuch  as 
thefe,  (i.j  G  and  H,  are  each  of  them  jnft  like  J,  (l.)  e,  f, 
has  fomewhat  of  Likenefs  to  each  of  thefe  Bodies;  and  (3)  fo 
has  /,/,  ^c.  The  Conclufion  or  Confeqncnces  rnay  be  fuch 
as  thefe  from  the  firft  Antecedent,  G  and  H  muft  be  juft  like 
each  other,  tho'  they  appearnot  io.-  Things  that  Jheve  not 
juft  like  each  other  may  yet  be  juft  like  a  third  :  That  which 
(hews  OB^  as  G,  is  neverthelcfs  juft  like  that  which  ftie  ws  nothing 
of  Oi^as  J:  And,  thofe  which  lliewno  A7;JJH^E(jls  neither 
G  nor  H  do)  are  yet  juft  hkeone  that  Ihews  an  A2^VE^E~ 
Sidc^  as  J  do's :  Again,  The  Upper  Bodies  are  juft  like 
that  which  is  placed  under  them ;  or  rather,  thofe  which 
are  farther  from  the  Eie,  are  juit  like  that  which  is 
nearer. 

§  19.  From  the  Second  Antecedent,  T^«Y  that  the  Paral- 
lellogram  e,  f,  has  fomewhat  of  Likenefs  to  the  Bodies 
•C.  ^.  ?>  (fince  they  arc  luppos'd  each  of  them  to  have  one 
Side  GV  L  ES,  AS  c,  e,  is  it  may  be  infer'd,  that  a  mere 
Surface  may  fome  way  rcfemble  a  Body:  And,  where  no- 
thin?  of  Likenefs  appears  to  us,  there  may  yet  be  fome  Re- 
fcmblance :  I'hefe,  and  the  like  Conclufions  might  alfo  be 
drawn  from  the  third  Antecedent  relating  to  /",/:  And  far- 
ther from  the  two  lirft  Antecedents  together,  we  might  infer 
fuch  Points  as  thefe.  Things  that  ire  juft  like  one  another, 
may  be  only  fomewhat  like  to  fome  other  Thing ;  And  the 
comparing  of  t^^:l:  with  this,  can  only  (hew,  that  they  agree 
fofar,  not  that  they  are  juft  alike.  And  whereas  the  fame 
Ccnclufion  may  be  drawn  from  the  firft  Antecedent  together 
with  the  third,  therefore  from  all  the  three  together  it  may 
be  coUedVed,  that  it's  all  one,  whether  we  compare  divers 
Things  with  the  fame,  or  with  thofe  which  agree :  And 
tha":  even  a  mere  Relative  Agreement  may  fomptimes  fuflice, 
tho*  the  things  differ  in  themfolves,  as  here  ^  ^  is  Gules^  and 
/,/  Vert ;  but  they  agree  in  being  each  of  the  fame  Colquy 
with  fome  one  Side  of  the  Bodies  G^  f/,  J, 


$2o/|s 


1 I     r 

Chap  14-  Improvement  of  Realon.  305 

^  20.  Ic  may  1  c  added  as  a  farther  General  Rule  for 
Inferring,  rhat  v;hatever  the  Confideiaticn,  under  which  the 
Predicate  i.-«  taken,  do's  contain,  or  has  ccnainly  Antecedent, 
Concomitant,  or  Confeqi.ent  to  it,  may  be  agreeably  in- 
fer'd  in  relation  to  the  Subject,  and  thrj^  Uiider  whatfoever 
Confideration  belongs  theiL  to :     As  in  the  Example  before : 

G,  17,  and  J  are  juft  like  each  other  j 

£.  Each  part  of  G,  H,  and  J  refpedively  are  juft  alike : 

Or,  One  of  them  cafily  night  be  taken  for  another  ; 
Or,  Some  Things  that  are  juft  alike,  may  appear  fbme- 

what  d  Ifcring  ■ 
Or,  Things  juft  alike  are  not  therefore  the  fame  : 
Or,  GjH,'\  &re  th^iifore  not  the  fixmc. 

The  laft  of  thcfe  is  the  Confeqnenceof  a  Negation  ;  G,  H^.J, 
being  alike,  are  therefore  not  the  fame:  That  next  forego- 
ing IS  the  Negation  of  a  Confequence  from  Things  being  juft 
alike  to  their  being  the  iame. 

§  21.  I  now  proceed  to  fome  more  Special  Rules  and 
Helps  wherein  I  jhali  endeavour  to  give  the  more  needful 
and  ufefuLDirediors,for  drawing  Inferences,  in  certain  mea- 
fur'd  Lines,  or  blank  Verfes  (being  generally  without 
Rhime)  under  the  levcral  Letters  of  the  Word  INFE- 
RENCES; that  they  may  be  more  ealily  remembred,  and 
fo  lie  ready  ar  hand  to  fuggeft  what  fort  of  Inferences  may 
be  drawn  from  Points  of  this  or  that  Nature. 

The  Senfe  and  ufe  of  the  enfuing  Cnnons  will  be  more  fully 
fliewn  in  fome  fllowing  Chapters,  where  the  Elucidations  are 
given  in  the  Sedions,  which  are  fee  under  their  Chapter, 
and  againft  that  Line  of  the  Table  here  given  to  which 
they  relate. 


§  iz.  Infer 


go6  An  tjjay  for  the  Part  III. 

^*4^22.  Chap.  I  "5. 

Secflion 
/•  Infer  •fihAt-tosIl  apply^,  Sure  Points  import.  i . 

\Jn\ertedYerms,  its  7f}'c/t>7t  Ifcferc^  vo'ill  bold.  2. 

'Included /ro?«Inclufi\e /o^4re>i  r-/V/j/,  4. 

Impjy'd  frmj  whut  implies  is  j'tf^lj  d-avcn.  5. 

lmpcliible/m?J  Inconliftency.  6. 

Inciin'd  Msn  arc^  ai  their  main  Courfc  inclines.        7. 

Kot Vw/>,.f  >s^o — :    Nothing/ all  Negatlv'es.  8. 

Name,  Nocion,  Nature  y/3ci/W/o^(?f/ie/'^o.    '  9. 

Notation  opctu,  fixes  mt,  the  Senfe.  i  o. 
Narrations,  not  Snjpici'cus,  hold  for  True. 

SForm  infer  J  Matter ;  Borh ,  the  X'-'i>.^  fo  Form'd.     1 1 . 
Foundations  /;7  ivA^rV  Built  thereon  appear  j  1 2. 

Thnt^  cfvphnt  Sort,  an'dfonietimes  xvur.t  they.  are. 
Foretold  i;  GOD,  Foreknown,  and  fo  Fultili'd.   13  = 
FrecJ  veh/:t  he  will  ivr,y  do  j  at  leaft  confents.  1 4 

Effeds  each  other,  as  before,  refped,  15. 

iVoen  a  Like,  Change  do  s  e.ich  of  them  affccl. 
Efficients,  Pow'rs,  Ads  and  Effeds  declare,  j  7; 

Kot  only  that,  but  what  they  were,  or  are. 
Efficiency,  not  bar/ d,  /jji  Like'Effedts.  i-8. 

13. 

>■{  Riglit,  vphat  a(;^rrrs  unto  its  proper  Rule.  i  9. 

I"~^     ^Related  fW^r^'j'jw/rr  ffe/V'Rditives; 
^      ^      j^nd  neither  Sidcy  a.s{\ich^fi'fi  is  or  lofTgcr  lives. 

jKtfernblznct  argues',  whe)re  the  Kea.(or\  holds.       ■  20. 
\:  Ratids  in  -tanous  roays  Right  FofwfJ  infer.  2 1 . 

u   :  Chap.  \6.  Sedion 

^ndi  have  or  feem  to  have  an  "Exc&Wtnce.  1. 

.Expedient]]  what  well /iw/wc'r^ /i  Good  End.  2. 

EtFedual]  what  nought  can,  or  do'sobjirufl. 

'Equals,  )«/?_/?/ ;  and  have,  as  fuch,  the  fame.  5. 

Exceeding]  has,  as  fuch,  fomc  greater  Claim. 

Neceffity's /row  Nature  J  Will,  notforc'd;  4,^. 

I  Neutral /owe^/wej,  and  abJolutelyVttt;  6. 

Led  mofily,  hutfometimes  hy  mere  NeceiHty.  7, 8. 

'NeedlefsJ  what  may  as  well'he' let  alone >  ■9« 

■  Never  infers  a  full  Eternity.  I  o- 

C  Concrete 


E 

N' 


Chap.  14-         Improver}? eht  of  Reafon.  507 

^24.  Chap,  1 6.  Section. 

•  Concrete  \vith  Abftrad ;  Conjugates  cgrec  1 1. 

)Ccntradidtori'JUS  H-amschr.nge  Fitlfe  with  True.  12. 
[Comviivious  Thi'72gs,  aifuch J  Contraries  c7<t/w.  13, 
,  Confcience  mull  be  comply'd  with,  or  convinc'd.  1 4. 

Ever]]  n  lo7ig  full  Time,  orjlricl  Eternity,  15. 

Exiltenr.e  nigues  Eflence  certainly ;  l^. 

Confidence  the»ce^  herxe  Pofribility.  } 

E(^entialsw2/J/^efo^e,  orro /^efuch.  17, 

Examples  ^e/rf/7,  wnriiy  Ic'adf  convince^  ^Hcite:  18. 

'' So  All,  what  on  IT  ^  as'fuch.  Adjunifis  4k^  Modes  19, 

I  Subje£h  ami  Subftance  fuitable  infer  •  20. 

!  Subfiftence  ?/j?r,  completed,  /.'rf< :    Modes,  Adls  ai. 

Suppofitum  C/o  Reasoning,  PerfonJ  claims.  22. 

I  Streams  of  themfelves  rife  ?/of  above  their  Spring.  23. 

■  Such  in  it  felf  more  fuch.     No  Like,  the  5ame.  24. 

,  ^imilkndes  infer  but  whnt^s  their  Sco^e.  Z^. 

I  Signs  have  the  Senfe,  xvhich  thcy^  xvho  ufe  them, fix.  x6.  ' 

Superior  Names /«c/i<Jt' Subordinate;  27. 

I  Subordinate  Natures /:// Superiour/o/'w.  a8. 

!  Stndy'd]  veelt  fearch'd,  fet,  fuited,  Ihort'ned  well.  2p. 

^Suf^citnt]fhould  not  need,  or  haiSu-p^ly.  30. 

§  25.  This  Table  oi Inferences  differs  in  Defign  from  that 
of  Middle  Terms,  which  Were  to  be  apply 'd  more  varioufly, 
and  in  fuch  Cafes  amongft  others,  where  one  or  both  of  the 
Premifes  might  need  to  be  confirm'd  by  farther  Middle 
Terms  j  but  the  Rules  and  Helps  here  given  for  Inferring  are 
intended. to  be^  or  to  ijvply  fo  many  undeniable  Politions  or 
Demands  at  leaft,  by  the  Light  and  Force  whereof  Inferences 
may  be  undeniably  drawn  in  a  number  of  particular  Cafes  ; 
ThePofition  or  Demand  it  felf,  ferving  to  make  one  of  the 
Premifes  ;  Namely,  that  which  isimply'd^  whilft  the  exprefs 
Antecedent  is  fuch  an  Application  thereof,  as  is  either  Self-evi- 
dent, before  prov'd,  or  granted,  or  fuppos'd,  fothat  we  may 
thence  proceed  to  a  farther  DedudHon  without  ftaying  j;o 
Confirm  either  of  thofe  Premifes,  on  which  our  prefenr  In- 
ference is  bottom'd.    And, 

§  26.-  It  may  be  farther  noted,  that  the  Meaning  of 
Words  is  a  kind  of  Demand,  which  cannot  be  deny'd  us, 
whilft  we  only  fet  down  what  Notion  we  or  others  have  de- 
termin'd  to  exprefs  by^fuch  a  Word :  Divers  of  thefe  De- 
mands we  have  intermix'd  in  the  foregoing  Table,  endea- 
vouring to  cliufc  out  fome  ufeful  Terms,    and  to  give  their 

Explica- 


5o8  ^»  ^#v  ^or  the  Part  III. 

Explication  by  way  of  Sample,  leaving  it  to  any,  who  may 
judge  it  rcquifite,  to  enlarge  the  Number, 


CHAP.    XV. 

^  I.  THAT  the  foregoing  Table  may  be  more  throughly 
*■  underftood,  and  the  Method  of  Infcring  farther 
carry'd  on,  the  Rules  and  Helps  fo  very  briefly  fuggefted  are 
mow  to  be  open'd  and  illuftrated  in  this  and  the  following 
Chapter.     And, 

I.  The  leading  Canon  in  the  Table  before  diredls,  that 
we  ground  our  Inference  upon  fome  fure  and  certain  Point, 
fuch  as  thofe  which  follow  are  fuppos'd  to  be  ('to  which  a 
Multitude  might,  no  doubt,  be  added)  and  that  the  Point  be 
well  apply'dto  ourprcfent  Purpofe  in  the  Antecedent ;  as  al- 
fo  that  its  Import  be  clofcly  purfu'd  in  the  Confeqiicnt  or  De- 
du£lion  :  Suppofe  we  take  it  for  a  Certain  and  Evident 
Truth,  that.  What  we  rcafonably  would,  others  Ihould  not  do 
to  us,  we  may  not  reafonably  do  to  them :  Now  this  would 
not  be  well  apply'd  in  the  Cale  of  Punirtiment  for  Immo-' 
rality,  which  a  deliberate  judgment  and  Confcience  muft  dif- 
-allow,  yetit  may  well  be  thus  apply'd, 

We  reafonably  would,  that  others  Ihould  not  attempt  to 
carry  us,  by  penal  Methods,  againft  our  delibertte 
judgment  and  Confcience  in  Matters  that  are  plainly 
conliftent  with  Cull  Peace: 

Therefore,  we  cannot  reafonably  do  fo  to  others. 

And  in  this  Conclufion  Vis  plain  we  infer  only  what  is  the 
manifeft  In.por:  of  that  implied  Point,  by  the  Light  and 
Force  whereof  we  draw  this  Inference  ;  thus  the  iirft  and 
principal  Rule  is  here  oblerv'd,  which  we  are  ftill  to  purfuein 
all  that  follow. 

f,  2.  2.  As  to  hivcyfioii  'tis  the  putting  of  the  Subjecfl:  in  the 
place  of  the  Predicate,  fo  far  at  leail  as  mayconlift  with  du« 
Form,  and  withthejuft  Meaning  of  the  Pn-pofition  which  is  to 
be  inverted  or  reciprocated  fo,  that  irmay  hold  good  as  an  Infe- 
rence from  irs  diredt  Antecedent:  The  Ground  of  this  Rule  is, 
that,  when  two  things  are  identify 'd  by  affirming  ordiverfified 
by  denying  one  of  the  other,  they  muft  needs  be  mutually  the 
fame  one  with  the  other,  or  divers  one  from  the  other,  accord- 
ing to  iheMeafure  or  Quantity  intended  (the' it  might  not  be 

'  exprefs'd) 


Chap.  15.        Improvement  of  Realon.  :509 

exprefs'd)  and  according  to  the  Form  and  Manner  of  fbeak- 
ing,  which  has  obtain'd,  or  which  the  Nature  of  the  Thing 
may  plainly  require:  Thus,  Man  is  Rational :  Ergo,  Some- 
what Rational  is  Man,  or  has  the  Humane  Nature.  Glafs 
is  not  Metal  (properly  fo  call'd) :  E.  No  Metal  is  Glafs,  or 
has  the  Nature  of  Glafs.  Some  Living  Crcatiares  have  Fins 
inttead  of  Feet:  E.  Somewhat  at  lealt,  which  has  Fins  in- 
ileadof  Feet,  is  a  Living  Creature,  oris  fome  fort  of  Living 
Creature. 

§  "i.  In  fome  Inverfions,  only  a  part  of  the  Predicate  is  to  be 
tranfpos'd,  as  a  Star  refembles  a  Spark;  E.  A  Spark  refem- 
bles  a  Star;  and  thus  in  fome  other  Similar  Relations,  parti- 
cularly fuch  as  are  of  a  voluntary  Nature  ;  for  it  will  not 
hold,  thatlince  ^^  is  a  Friend  or  Lover  of  B :  Therefore  B  is 
a  Friend  or  Lover  of  J  ;  but  even  here  the  Inverfion  may  be 
rightly  made  by  vvay  of  Correfpondency,  thus,  B  has  A  for 
his  Friend  or  Lover.  Diflimilar  Relatives  are  to  be  inverted 
by  the  Mention  of  the  Correfponding  Relation,  thus, 
Alexander  was  the  Son  of  Philip:  E.  Philip  was  the  Father 
oi  Alexander  'y  and  there  is  alwa\s  fomewhat  reciprocally  an- 
fwering  to  whatever  can  be  dire(fl:ly  Predicated. 

§  4.  3.  As  to  what  is  Included  'tis  plain  it  muft  follow 
from  what  includes  it :  What  is  a  part  of  ariy  Negative  or 
Aftirmative  may  be  alfo  it  felf  affirm'd  or  deny'd.  If  all  Men 
are  Rational,  then  fome  Men  are  certainly  lo  ;  If  Gold  be 
theheavieft  Metal,  a  Guinea  mull  be  the  heavieft  Coin  of  that 
fize  ;  But  what  is  faid  of  the  Inchifive  Point,  ./.<  fuch^  can- 
not be  infer'd  of  what  is  included  ;  nor  indeed  can  any  one 
of  the  mentioned  Points  in  the  Table  of  Inferences  be  col- 
kdVed  from  its  Correlate, /orw^//^  confider'd,  but  only  mate- 
rially as  the  thing  which  has  fuch  a  Denomination  .-  A  Whole 
concludes  all  the  Parts;  but  a  Parr,  being  not  the  Whole, 
cannot  do  fo  :  Yet  if  the  Whole  be  of  fuch  a  Nature,  each 
Part  muft  partake  fomewhat  of  that  Nature  :  Man  includes 
Body  and  Soul,  therefore  even  the  Body  has,  oris,  fomewhat 
that  belongs  to  Man. 

§  5.  4.  As  to  Implicatic?!,^  there  are  feveral  of  the  more 
noted  Branches  belonging  to  it  fpecif)*d  under  the  following 
Heads;  But  it  was  tho't  fit  to  gi  e  it  alfo  thus  in  the  gene- 
ral to  fupply  what  might  otherwifc  be  omitted  :  Now"  that 
may  be  faid  to  imply  a  Point,  which  intimates  and  luggefts 
it  to  the  Mind,  by  reafon  of  !ome  or  other  Relation,  or 
Connexion:  As  if  it  be  now  Nine  of  the  Ch  ck,  'tis  inti- 
mated, that  Eight  has  bcQn  pad  a  whole  Hour,  fmce  it  fo 
long  precedes  Nine. 

6.  5.  What- 


3IO An  tpy  for  the    PdrcllT. 

§  6.  5.  Whatfoever  hlnconfifient'inilkl^^  miift  needs 
be  impoffible  both  as  to  its  Exiftence  and  Eirence  or  Idea  : 
It  can  neither  be,  nor  be  conceiv'd,  fince  the  one  Part  of  ic 
denies,  and  Logically  dcftrqys  the  other.  Thus  an  Entita- 
tive  Extenfion  without  Qiiantitative  ;  luch  as  the  Papifts  af- 
cribe  to  the  Body  of  our  Saviour  in  the  leaft.  Crumb  of  a 
Confecrated  Wafer)  is  impo.flible  3  fince  it  muft  be  an  Ex- 
tenfion without  Extenfion. 

But  there  is  alfo  a  relative  Inconfiftency,  whence  it  may 
be  infcr'd,  that  the  Thing  is  impolFiblc  to  be  in  luch  or  fuch 
Circumllanccs  with  which  it  is  inconfiftent. 

§  7.  6.  Mens  Inclinations  may  very  juftly  be  collected 
from  what  they  moft  commonly  A (51  or  Speak,  efpecially 
when  they  are  left  to  lake  their  own  Courfc  ;  but  it  would 
by  no  Means  tollow,  that  a  Man  is  habitually  Temperate 
or  Charitable,  becaufe  he  may  fometimes  peiform  an  Adl 
of  Temperance  or  Charity. 

§  8.  7.  Every  Kegntlvc  neceffarily  imports,  that  the 
Subjetft  is  not  fuch  in  any  proper  Sort  or  Senfe  j  if  a  Perfon 
be  not  Learned,  he  mult  have  no  fort  of  Learning  ufualJy  fo 
call'd  :  But  if  indeed  [learned]  were  taken,  as  it  often  is, 
for  one  that  is  generally  and  eminently  fo  ;  then  the 
Inference  can  only  be  made,  that  he  wanes  feme  fuch  part  of 
Learning,  ox  fuel]  n  degree  at  Icafl,  as  fiiould  make  him  emi- 
nently Learned. 

8.  Whereas  Nothing  neither  is,  nor  has,  ncr  can  do,  not 
fuffer  any  thing  j  all  that  can  be" faid  of  it,  ir.uit  be  Negative, 
and  is  in  a  manner  cndlefs ;  fince  every  thing  whatfoever 
may  be  denied  of  Nothing. 

§  9.  9.  The  Nttmc^  if  proper  and  rightly  given,  infers 
the  Notioti  or  Idea,  wliich  has  been  affixM  thereto  j '  and  this, 
if  rightly  form'd,  that  the  Katitre  of  the  Thing  or  Objedt  is' 
in  fome  good  Degree  correfponding  thereto.  Tis  certain 
thofe  three  fhould  go  together  and  inter  each  other.  And 
tho'  thro'  the  Abufe  or  Deficiency  of  Laiig;iage,  and  Imper- 
fedlion  of  Man's  Underllaridirg,  'tis  often  otherwife,  yet  the 
Inference  will  always  hold,  that  wherever  there  is  Juci:i  a 
'Nature J  we  ought  to  have,  as  near  as  well  may  be,  fuch  n 
Notion;  and  to  exprefs  it  by  ^  Xdwr,  Avhich  may  fitly  lead 
to  that  Notion  and  Nature:  And  alfo,  that  every  Name  or 
expreffive  Word  muft  have  fonic  Notion  belo^iging  to  it  ; 
ard  the  Notion,  ferae  Nature  a£rual  or  poifible,  to  which  it 
relates. 


ir'  lo.The 


i^hap.  IS"-        improvement  of  Vs^^^ou.  311 

^  lo.  10.  The  No  f  fit  ion  or  Et'nmdcgy  of  a  Word,  may 
be  of  Ufe  for  our  better  underftanJing  both  rhe  Name  it 
iclf,  and  Nature  o'i  the  thing,  or  Tome  what  about  it;  yet 
we  are  not  thence  only  to  take  our  Mealuresas  to  either ;  but 
rather  to  underftand  the  Word,  as  ulage  has  alrer'd,  enlarg'd, 
or  reftrain'd  its  Import ;  thus  [Protcitanc]  is  not  whoever 
do's  proteft  in  what!ocver  Cafe ;  but,  according  to  Ulage, 
it  is  one,  who  owning  Chriftianlty  protefts  againft  Popery. 
An  bikj-oiii  is  for  ////^,  yet  is  not  always  made,  as  it  might  at 
firft  more  con  ftantly  be,  o(  Horn. 

II.  Whatever  Narration  i$  given  in  Hiftory  or otherwife, 
wiil  infer,  that  the  thing  was  probably  fo,  Avhere  there  is  no 
Reafon  to  fuipeCt  tlie  contrary. 

§  1 1.  12.  There  can  be  no  Form  or  diftinguilliing  Cha- 
ra-iier,  where  there  is  no  Matter.^  or  common  Nature  to  be 
thereby  diftingnilh'd;  nor  can  there  be  fuch  a  fort  of  Form, 
where  there  is  no  Capable  Matter:  Yet  it  follows  not  that 
God  miift  have  fomething  in  his  Nature,  which  is  juft  of  the 
like  Kind  with  ours,  but  only  that  we  are  under  a  Necellity 
of  fo  ccnceiving  him  :  And  it  feems  as  if  indeed  nothing, 
v/hereof  we  have  any  clear  and  dif lind:  Id^a,  could,  according 
to  our  manner  of  Apprehending,  be  Avithout  a  common  di- 
ftinguiftiing  Nature,  and  therefore  our  moft  fimple  Notions 
appear  to  be  indiftin£l  and  imperfedt. 

§12,13.  Whatever  mult,  as  a  kind  otFoundatioriy  necelfarily 
beprcfuppr.s'dtoan)  Pointis  juftJy  inferredfrom  it;  fhatthere 
are  the  Ncceffary  Grounds  and  Reafonsofa  Thing  may  becol- 
leiffcd  from  the  Thing  it  felf :  And  as,  where  there  is  a  Building, 
we  may  conclude  that  there  is  a  Balis  or  Foundation,  and  that 
fach  as  is  fu.^cientto  iupport  it  whih^  it  frauds;  fo  we  may 
conclude  there  isto  every  Truth,  which  is  not  Primary  andSelf- 
evident^fome  orother  Fundamental  Reafon  on  which  it  ftands, 
fuch  as  can  fupport  it,  and  that  it  is  never  quite  overthrown 
till  its  Foum'arinn  be  deftroy'd.  Sometimes  we  may  colled: 
whnt  is  the  vjry  Ground  of  this  or  that  from  the  Thing  it  felf; 
as,  If  thu  be  a  Tranrgreinonj  then  there  is  a  Law  againft 
it. 

§  1 3.  14.  Tho'  it  will  not  always  hold  amongft  Men,  or 
perhaps  Angels,  that  what  is  foretold  was  therefore  properly 
rorekfioven,  tho'  it  fliould  tall  out  accordingly  (for  it  might 
in  them  be  only  a  ConjcdurCy ;  yet  it  hoJds  in  reference  to 
God,  that  he  mi ift  ha >e  certainly  foreknown  whatever  he 
foretells ;  and  that  it  lliall  always  be  in  fuch  way  and  man- 
ner/w//?.'A/  as  it  was  foretold  or  foreknown;  whether  in  a  way, 
which  to  us  cjppears  Contingent,    oi"  which  is  Voluntary,  or 

altogether 


312  An  tjjay  for  the  Part  ill. 

altogether  Neceffary,  or  made  up  of  thefe  together :  k%  alfo 
what  is  literally  tbrecold,  or  myftically,  or  both  at  once,  is 
fare  to  be  accordingly  fu  fiU'd  :  And  thus  it  may  be  col- 
lefled,  that  Impenitent  Sinners,  living  and  dying  f'lch,  fo.ill 
be  dejhoy'd  vpirh  an  evcrlnfil/.g  Deftrucitcv^  f^oni  tne  Picjence  of 
the  Lord,  /ind  the  Glory  cf  his  Povoei  •  bvicaufe  this  is  nOt  only 
ihrcamed  i6  them,  but  foretold  concerning  them  j  2  T^heJ]'. 
i.S,p. 

§  [4.  15.  Freedom  or  Liberty  is  moft  commonly  under- 
flood  as  belonging  not  fo  much  to  the  Will  of  M^^n,  as  to  the 
Men  themfelves,  who  will  or  chufe;  A  Man  may  be  well 
enoiiph  fatisfy'd  to  continue  v/ith  the  Company,  where  he  is 
ih':t  in,  and  not  Free  or  at  Liberty  to  leave  it,  if  he  would. 
The  more  aofolute  Freedom  is  that  of  being  unreltrain'd 
fn  m  acfting  this  thing  or  that,  this  way  or  that,  as  we  plcafe  ; 
but  fuch  a  Liberty  fails  to  the  Lot  of  very  few,  an.l  in  fome 
Senfe  to  no  created  Being  whartoever  ;  and  therefore  the 
Freedom  of  Creatures  is  mollly  founded  in  their  free  Confenc 
to  fuch  Rcikiclions  or  Obligations,  as  they  are  under. 

frec-l^f'il/j  or  Moral  Freedom  feemsto  be,  when  rhe  Will 
ftands  inclin'd  to  follow  the  more  deliberate  Apprchcnfion, 
as  to  what  might  appear  juft  and  right  in  the  Cafe ;  and 
that  it  ordinarily  yields  not  it  fclf  to  be  carrv'd  orhcrways 
by  a  prefcnt  Determination,  which  is  not  fo  duly  and  impar- 
tially weigh'd. 

§1^.  16.  The  fcveral  Eifecls,  or  various  Produce  of  n 
lil'e  F.jjxieyicy  have  the  (ame  Habitude  and  Refpedl  towards 
each  other,  which  the  Things  themfelves  had  bef  re  the 
Chr.ti^ie  {o  pal-ling  on  them  ;  whether  it  were  that  of  L^nltke, 
or  1  ike.  Equal  or  L"^nequal,  Better  or  Worfe,  Greater  or 
Lefs,  CJ'".  in  refpecl  of  each  other.  Thus,  if  equai  or  unc- 
qual  Numbers  ha\e  the  fame  Number  added  or  fubfiraci^ed, 
they  will  agree  or  differ  as  before  ;  and  alfo  if  they  be  muiri- 
ply'd  or  divided  by  the  fame  Number  they  willftill  hold  rhe 
lame  Pre  portion  tu  each  other;  4  is  a  third  of  1 1,  fo  is  twice 
4  (/.  r.  S)  a  third  of  twice  iz  {i.  e.  of  14) ;  and  alfo  haif  4,.^ 
OT  z,  is  a  third  of  ha  f  12,  or  6. 

S>  f6.  Nor  wili  this  Rwle  ho':d  only  in  Numbers,  Line';, 
Superficies.  Bodies,  (^r  other  thmgs  of  a  Maihemaiical  Nr- 
ciire  ;  brt  if  prudently  appK'd,  it  wil'  lerve  in  a  in  'Iritude 
of  ot^e*-  Cafe>= :  A  Learned  Man  is  jreferabl  to  a  M:  n  ui;- 
1  arn^-d,  fupp'  lirg  'hem  othei'^  ay>  to^v  l  :  tiicre!'o:e  fijch  1 
Per  on  rris'd  to  an  Lllote,  or  Poit  of  He  jiour,  is  a.fo  prefera- 
ble to  '-he  other  ioadvap.c'd. 

§  17.  17.  Wher«j 


Chap.  15'        improvement  of^  Reafon.  gii 

§17.1  7.  Where  there  is  an  Ejfeci,  or  a  New  Thing  (which 
before  was  not),  there  muft  be^  or  at  leai!  muft  have  been  an 
Efficient;  an  Ac}  do's  alfo  infer  an  Agent,  and  Power,  to  be 
or  have  been  :  Likewife  the  Efficient  and  Power  muft  be, 
or  muft  have  been  fuitabJe  to  the  Effedt  and  Adt,  and  fuffici- 
ent  to  produce  them,  as  being  Equal  at  leaft,  if  not  Superi- 
'^r  to  them.  Thus  EifeCts  and  A6ts  difcovcr  and  declare  the 
refpedlive  Efficients  and  Powers,  both,  that  they  are  or  were, 
and  fomewhat  alfo  of  their  Nature,  or  of  their  Charadter, 
Vet, 

^18.  1 8.  An  Efficient  do's  not  always  produce  an  Etlec^ 
of  its  own  Nature  or  Kind  (inftead  of  that  it  may  be  much 
inferior,  tho'  it  canno:  be  Superior)-  nor  have  like  Efficients 
always  like  Effects :  But  the  Efficiency,  or  Energy  and  Force, 
together  with  the  Way  and  Manner  of  applying  it,  muft 
undoubtedly  produce  Effccis  /^V,  or  anfwering  to,  it  felf ; 
and  like  Efficiencies  will  have  like  Ejfetls,  vi^.  fuch  as  fhall 
refemble  each  other,  if  there  be  no  fufficient  Bar  or  Hin- 
drance in  the  way ;  A  more  perfeA  manner  of  working 
will  otherways  bring  forth  what  is  more  Perfect,  and  a  de- 
fedlive  Operation,  that  which  is  deficient. 

§  1 9.  19.  Whatever  agrees  to  its  proper  Ride  and  Mea- 
fnre  muft  be  in  fuch  Sort  Rj^ht .-  And  as  fuch  may  be  in- 
fer'd  ;  that  is  in  a  Senfe  Lawful,  which  is  according  to  Law; 
Juft,  which  is  agreeable  to  Juftice,  (3c. 

2o.  Whatever  do's  in  any  Kind  import  I{eU'ion  or  Refe- 
rence to  fomewhat  elfe,  ahVays  fuppofes  there  is  fomewhac 
to  which  it  ftands  related  and  refer'd :  This  Rule  may  ferve 
for  a  general  Supplement  as  to  what  may  be  here  omitted,  in 
particular,  of  the  Logical  Notions  and  Refpedts,  under 
which  Things  are  confider'd.  Tis  certain,  that  no  Rela- 
tive, fo  coniider'd,  can  be  without  its  Correlate;  and  there- 
fore he  who  is  a  Father  has  a  Child;  nor  was  he  a  Father  till 
he  had  one,  tho'  he  did  exift  before :  Nor  are  the  Perfons, 
who  furvive  their  Parents,  any  longer  to  be  accounted  pro- 
perly Sons  or  Daughters. 

§  20.  21.  'Tis  commonly  faid,  thaz  I{;fem!^la7tces  or  Si- 
militude do  only  illuftrate  and  Explain,  but  will  not  ferv<? 
as  Arguments  to  make  out  the  Point  to  which  they  are  bro't ; 
and  'tis  fo  far  True,  as  that  there  is  indeed  no  reafoning  from 
them,  but  where  there  is  a  like  Reafon  on  both  Sides :  If 
Flr^ii  he  as  the  Sun  among  the  Po;ts,-  he  muft  far  excel  rh« 
reft  ;  for  there  is  plainly  fuppos'd  a  like  Habitude  of  the  Sun' 
to  other  Luminarys,  and  of  a  more  excellent  Poet  to  luch  ai 
are  far  inferior ;    yet  it  will  not  follow,  that  other  Poics 

Y  bjit,^.. 


gi4.  An  tjj'ay  for  the  Part  ill. 

borrow  from  F/i-^/Zj  becaufe  feme  other  Luminaries  certainly 
do  fo  from  the  Sun  ;  for  here  is  not  a  like  Reafon,  fince  it 
vas  never  intended  to  compare  Vergil  aijd  the  Sun  in  all  re- 
fpeds  whatfocvcr. 

§  21.  2Z.  The  P^<t//w  or  Proportions  of  Things  will  af- 
ford B^ght  Inferences  in  many  various  ways  of  Turning 
them  :  As  by  Multiplication  the  firlt  and  fourth  Term  will 
produce  what  is  equal  to  the  fccond  and  third  (See  Fart  I. 
Chap.  5.  §  8,  9  :  The  fame  Proportion  wi;l  continue,  if 
all  the  Terms  be  doubled,  orhalv'd;  tripled,  or  thirded, 
£>c  J    fuppofe  a  is  to   Z"  as  c   to  d,    it   will  follow,    that 

4<T  :  4^  : :  4c  :  4^/'  and  that 
a'.h      : :  c     id 

.44        44 

We  may  likewife  infer  by  Tranfpofition  divers  ways,  and 
ntay  fee  the  Reafon  of  the  Conlequence,  if  we  confider  a  as 
the  Whole,  b  as  its  Part,  and  alio  c  as  another  whole,  d  as 
its  like  Part,  whether  it  were  an  half  or  third,  or  any  other  j 
and  'he  Truth  of  each  particular  Dedu(5lion  may  eafily  be 
ihewn  in  particular  Infiances  by  putting  Numbers  of /«c/r 
Proportion  (e.  gr.  4:2:16;  3)  inftead  of  the  Letters : 

a  :  b  ::  c  :d;  Therefore  a:c::b:d; 
ar  d  b  :  a  :  :  d  :  : ;  and  alfo  b  :  d::  r.:  c; 
rnd  c  :  A  '.  :  d  '.  by  likewife  c  :  d  ::  a:b; 
i.nd  d:  b  : :  c  :  n;  and laftly  d  :c  ::  b:  a; 

There  are  many  other  Methods  of  inferring,  fome  of  which- 
may  be  feen  in  the  following  Inflances,  n  :  b:  :  c  :d  i  there- 
fore, 

a  '\-b:  b  :  :c  ~\-  d  :  4,  and  a  -\~ 

a  — b  :  b  ::  c- —  d  :  d,  and  a  — 

/i-\-b  :  a — b  : :   c~\- 

Kach  of  thefe  may  have  their  Terms  tranfpos'd,  as  before,  f> 
that  the  five  Inferences  may  be  rais'd  to  8x<;^=4C'.  Alfo  New 
Terms  might  be  affmi'd,  and  divers  Methods  purfu'd  widi 
them  which  we  Ihall  not  ftay  10  mention. 
'  The  remaining  part  of  the  Elucidations  upon  what  yetre- 
Bhains  of  the  preceding  Table  of  Inferences  will  be  giveii  in 
che  following  Chapter,  wherein  the  Fundamental  Pofitions 
or  Grounds  vipon  which  the  Inference  goes,  are  to  be  ftill 
riumber'd  on. 

CHAPJ 


[: 

a  : 

:  c  ~ 

-d: 

c; 

b: 

a  : 

:  c  — 

~d: 

f; 

d 

.  c  — 

-d 

(^n, ni6  /wr"'^7;ew<-.vtY-'f  K'^ilon,  7t>^ 


CHAP.     XVL 


§  I.  TCJOW   to  proceed  upon   the   mentioned   Pofitl- 

23.  Whatever  is  propos'd  as  an  End  is  alvvays  prcfum'd 
to  have  fomewhat  in  it  defirable,  and  to  equal  or  excel  the 
Means  which  are  us'd  for  obtaining  ir.  This  may  therefore 
ftill  be  concluded,  when  a  Man  is  profecuting  any  Defign, 
that,  if  he  confider  of  it,  he  reckons,  it  would,  when  od= 
tain'd,  anfwer  his  Care,  Coft,  and  Trouble. 

§  2.  24.  To  make  a  thing  ExpuHent,  it  muft  be  6ctcd  to 
reach  fome  really  good  E>?^^  and  muft  anfwer  it  vpell,  that 
we  may  not  be  Lowers  upon  our  ob-iaining  it  in  f  ;ch  a  Way  g 
as  we  muft  always  be  in  the  Ufe  of  iU  Means,  becaufe  what 
can  be  got  by  them,  will  never  countervail  the  Damage  we 
muft  thereupon  fultain  in  forfeiting  the  Smiles  of  Heaven, 
and  perhaps  the  Peace  of  onr  own  Minds.         '^  > 

i").  Ejfcthml  Means  or  Operations  are  fuch  as  reach  their 
End;^  but  efpecially  thofe  which  cannot  fajl  of  <-  omg  fo, 
whllft  there  is  no  fufficient  Power,  that  can  or  will  oppofe 
them. 

;  §  3.  26.  Equ/iHty  muft  imply  exa(5Hy  anfwering;  tho* 
likenefs  do's  not  infer  exacflly  like  :  What  is  in  any  Degree 
greater  or  lefs,  (.annot  be  juUlycall'd  E^«d/. 

zj.  Equa's  muft  needs  have,  in  the  Refpe£l  wherein  they 
are  fo,  the/^r^-  Parts  or  Degrees ;  and  alfo  the  (cme  Th  ngs 
muft  be  equal,  or  unequal  ro  each  of  them  :  Nor  is  there 
any  Latitude  in  Equality ;  Things  can't  be  more  or  lefs  equal. 
,  2S.  Whatever  Exceeds  any  thing,  muft  have,  in  that  Re- 
fpedt,  more  or  greater  Parts  or  Degrees ;  but  it  will  not  cer- 
tamly  hold,  that  it  muft  therefore  be  of  greater  Weight,  or 
Worth,  or  Ufe  ;  yet  it  muft  outdo  other  things  in  fuch  Re- 
gards, as  are  either  included, in,  or  certainly  conjoin'd  with 
that,  wherein  it  exceeds  them.  .  •- 

§  4.  29.  Necejjfitymz  fome  way  or  Other  be  infer'd  from 
'Nature:  As,  that  the  Thing  or  Perfon  is,  by  means  of  the 
Natural  Make  or  Eflence  belonging  thereto,  certainly  deter-; 
min'd  this  way  or  that :  E.  Gr.  Fire  has  fuch  a  Nature  asr 
th.ic  being  put  to  proper  Fuel,  it  burns  ;  and  the  Fuel  is  of 
fuch  a  Nature  as  to  be  burned  by  it,,  if  laid  thereto  j  wherC; 
there  is  nothing  to  obftrudt,  or  over  power  the  Tendency  of 
Natjirej  and  iho'  free  Agents\do  nut  SkfSt  this  or  tha^  under 

X  %  abfoi  I  _■ 


3l6  An  tjfay  for  the  Fan:  ill. 


rbfolute  Neceflity,  yet  they  may  Naturally  indine  fo  to  ac?t; 
ajid,  upon  Suppolition  they  do  a(^,  will  be  like  to  do  it  in 
fuch  a  Sort ;  from  fuch  Principles,  for  fuch  Purpofc^„  and 
in  (uch  a  Manner,  as  their  Natural  Difpofition  leads  to, 
■where  there  is  nothing  of  fufficient Power  to  carry  them  other- 
wife. 

§  <5.  30.  Volunt.try  Agents  (as  has  been  intimated)  are 
jiot  under  any  proper  Force  or  Conftraint  in  their  Adtings, 
butchoofe  for  themlelvcs,  either  more  abfolutely,  or  upo: 
5uch  a  kind  of  Choice  as  the  State  of  the  Cafe  affords ;  ar^i 
a  Man  may  be  faid  in  fome  fort,  willingly  to  caft  away  hi.. 
Goods  in  a  Storm  at  Sea,  who  choofes  to  do  fo  for  the  Secii- 
rity  of  his  Life:  But  what  we  nioft  properly  choofe,  Vv\ 
itand  incUned  to,  in  and  for  it  felf,  without  any  fuch  Enforc- 
ing Circumftances,  or  however,  without  being  purely  moved 
by  the  Confideration  thereof. 

§  6.  31.  There  may  be  in  fome  Cafes  a  mere  Aijlliy. 
Freedom,  however,  according  to  common  Apprehcnflou  , 
where  there  is  indeed  nothing  at  all,  or  nothing  obf-Tv'd  to 
incline  the  Choice  this  way  rather  than  that  •  he  that  ads 
in  fuch  a  Cafe  has  an  Arbitrary  Power  of  doing  this  rather 
than  that,  for  no  other  Reafon,  but  becaufc  he  will.  There 
feems  to  be  in  perfed:  Kentrality^  or  not  inclining  either  wa> , 
the  moft  Abfolute  Freedom  (as  if  I  were  offer'd  two  Guineas 
juft  alike,  of  which  1  mult  take  only  one);  but  it  is  not  the 
moft  Eafie  or  Eligible  f-^rt  of  Liberty,  wherein  1  am  put  to 
A(lt  Arbitrarily  without  Reafon  to  guide  me.     Bur, 

§  7.  3Z.  The  l^ViU  (or  rather,  he  who  Wills)  is  more' 
generally  led  by  iome  real  or  appearing  Good  ;  ror  is  there- 
fore the  lefs  Free;  fince  its  'Sutural  Liberty  feems  to  ftand  in 
a  Man's  choof  ng,  as  for  the  prcfcnt  he  thinks  fit .-  Tho'  there 
is  fomewhat  m.ore  requir'd  to  a  \Ior^.i\  or  Theological  Free 
Will,  whereby  a  Man  is  capable  of  guiding  and  govvrning- 
his  Choice  according  to  judgment  and  Confoience  ;  fo  as  not 
to  be  carry'd  by  prefcnt  Appearances  and  inordinate  Affefti- 
ons  contrary  to  his  more  cool  and  deliberate  Sentiments,  and 
perhaps  againft  his  former  Purpoies  or  Refolutions. 

§  8.  55.  The  Will  maybe  foiiictimcs /e<Y  by  a  kind  of 
Kecejfity,  i.  e.  when  we  would  not  chufe  what  is  in  it  felf, 
and  o:herwife  undefirable,  were  there  not  fome  Circum- 
ftances  preiiing  us  thereto,  as  has  been  inftane'd.  for  fome 
greater  Advantage  to  our  fclves  or  others. 


§  9.  34.  \Vl:at- 


Chap.  1 6.         Improvement  of  Realcn.  317 

^  y.  34.  Whatever  may  be  as  veell  Jet  alone,  is  moft  ap-: 
parenrly  n::dlcfs^  and  abfolutely  fo ;  many  other  Things  may 
be  comparatively  needlefs,  and  ai  well  let  alone,  in  order  to 
this  or  that  Purpofe ;  as  fome  at  leal't  of  the  Ornaments  of 
Sj)eech,  where  a  Man's  Bufinefs  is  only  to  inttrudt. 

§  10.  35.  If  it  be  faid,  this  or  that  (hall  never  ^x\i,  it 
may  be  juftly  colleded,  that  it  fhall  hold  not  only  for  a  very 
long  Time,  but  to  a  proper  and  full  Eternity .-  '1  hus,  Where 
their  Worm  di^tb  tiot,  nnd  the  Fire  is  not  rjuenched  (Mark  9.  44, 
46,  48.)  could  not  hold,  if  after  a  long  time  this  lliould  be 
quenched,  and  f/^^Mliould  die. 

§  ir.  36.  Wherever  there  hxhe  Alfiracl,  or  qualifying 
Attribute,  there  mult  be  the  Concrete,  or  qualify 'd  Subjed: ; 
and  where  this  is,  thnt  muft  always  be :  He,  that  has  Piety, 
■s  Pious:  And  who  is  Pious  or  Godly,  muft  have  Piety. 
There  may  be  Concrete  and  Abftradl,  where  the  Words 
us'd  are  not  Conjugates,  tho'  the  Senfe  be  of  Kin  ;  as  if  I  fay, 
hethar  has  Prudence  is  a  Wife  Man.  This  leads  on  to  ano- 
ther Rule  of  like  Nature,  but  larger  Extent,  w'j^.   that, 

37.  Conjugntcs,  or  Words  of  the  fame  Stock,  have  fomc 
Agreement  in  their  Senfe  and  Meaning ;  as  being  indeed  fun- 
damentally the  fame,  bnt  varioufly  borm'd  :  The  moft  no- 
table arc  the  Abftracit  Subftantive;  the  Concrete  A(Jje(5live,^ 
or  Subilantivc  ;  the  Verb,  fignifying  with  Time ;  and  the' 
Adverb  fome  way  qualifying  and  determining  the  Significa^ 
tion  of  the  Verb,  or  Noun  :  And  thefe  are  link'd  together, 
fo  that  one  is  wont  to  draw  or  infer  another ;  He,  who  has 
Wifdom,  is  Wife,  and  us  [uch^  Speaks  and  Adts  WiJ'ely. 

§  12.  38.  Contradiction,  or  the  denying  of  what  is  af- 
firm'd,  and  affirming  of  what  is  deny'd,  if  it  be  not  carry'd 
up  into  flat  Contrariety,  always  turns  a  Truth  into  a  Fallhood, 
or  this  into  '■(ut ;  fince  both  Parts  cannot  be  at  once  either 
True  or  Falfe  ;  That  all  Men  are  Honeft  is  a  Fallhood  ;  Not 
all  Men  a're  Honeft,  or  fome  Men  are  not  Honeft,  is  a  Truth  | 
but  if  we  Ihould  fay,  no  Man  is  Honeft,  'tis  more  than  a 
Contradidlion ;  and  may  be  as  falfe,  as  that  all  Men  are 
fo. 

§  13.  39.  ^'hzt  is  Contrnry  his,  as  fuch,  Contrary  Affe^^i" 
ons,  Effeds,  (^c:  Heat,  aifuch,  implies  Motion;  therefore 
Cold,  aifuch,  infers  Reft:  The  former  tends  to  dilate  and 
feparatej  therefore  the  Utter,  to  contrail  and  confoli- 
date. 


Y5  §1414^.  What 


3'.S  ■An.rj]^yjort:.'e  Fart  III. 

§  14.  40.  What  a  Man,  after  iuft  Deliberation,  do's  in 
his  C(?«yc/V;;cc  apprehend  to  be  his  Duty,  he  muftdo  ;  unlefs 
he  can  come  to  fee  otherwife  ;  for  he  would  elfe  condemn 
himf  Jf  in  that  which  he  a  lows.  Yet  Men  may  be  re- 
ftrain'd  fiom  adling  iniunoully,  contrary  to  the  Light,  which 
jhey  may  be  rcafonably  fuppos'd  to  ha-  e,  or  very  eaiily 
might  attain;  but  fuch  Suppofil  is  very  caurioufly  to  be 
made,  both  as  to  the  A»ft  bcmg'really  Injurious,  and  alfo  as 
to  its  being  contrary  to  fuch  Light,  fir-ce'tis  to  be  made  at- 
the  Peril  of  him,  who  fo  Suppofes. 

§  15  4'.  EVEK^  is  not  always  us'd  to  fignifie  a  proper 
^r\d  ihifi  Eteintty  ;  but  lo.necimes  to  eaprefs  only  a  long  and 
full  Time,  i.  e.  to  the  end  of  fome  far  diftant  Period  Se6 
what  has  been  faid  about  ^.El'KI^,  NumS.  35.  ^10. 

§  1 6.  41.  Nothing  can  Ex'Jlj  which  has  no  Ejfcnce  or 
Nature  to  exift;  but  there  may  be  an  idea  or  Coufiftent  Na- 
ture, which  doth  nor  therefore  cxiit :     Yet, 

In  whatever  exifts ,  or  where  there  is  an  Eflence , 
which  can  be  conceiv'd,  there  is  cerrainly  a  Cj«/;/!^fW9  ;  for 
Contradidtious  Lhings  can  neither  be,  nor.  be  conceiv'd  to- 
gether.    And, 

43.  Whatever  Nature  is  conjijl^nt  with  it  felf,  and  with 
what  elfe  muft  of  Necedity  be,  may  alio  p^fliriy  cxifi;  for 
t&thi<i  there  needs  no  more,  than  that  one  Part  of  the  Thing 
do  not  impugn  or  deltroy  another,  and  that  it  ma/  be  conli- 
ftently  With  that  which  muji  be. 

§1^.  44.  That  may  be  infer'd  as  E/Z'/ifw/to  any  thing, 
wiXho'Jt  which  it  cannot  be  conceiv'd,  however,  not  under 
this  or  that  Conlideration :  Thus  the  Sonl  is  plainly  effcn" 
^Itp  Man  :  And  Blacknefs  no  Icfs  Ellential  to  a  Natural 
Bifvopan^  as  Hich. 

'  %  iS.  45.. What  is  well  Exrmplify'd  is  thereby  open'd, 
and  eafier  to  be  apprehended :  Examples  of  what  is  Cen- 
iuT  d  Or  fnnilh'd,  ought  to  warn  us ;  Tho;c  of  what  is  Com- 
Ihehded  or  Rewarded,  fnould  incline  and  lead  us;  both  the 
Sorts  may  infer,  that  we  fhould  be  exci  ed  and  mov'd  to 
avoid  the  Evil,  or  follow  the  Good  Example. 
'51^.  46.  From  one  confider'd  rts  J;«:/^  an  Inference  will 
|i?)Q  to  nff  thr.-t  arc  JlcJ: ;  (i  Quatenus  ad  ■  Omne  valet' 
Cofijc'iuetrtii) ;  therefore  what  any  One  AS  SVCH,  either 
ii»,  cjj^ys^  or  do's  J  or  uyidcrgocjy.inay  '^e  eoncluded  of  ^i;,i., 
fla'f  are  SUCH, 


§  20.  47  An 


Chap  1 6.        I/^prove/^/cnt  of  ^(i2Lion.  319 

^  20.  47.  An  AdjunB^  not  only  infers  a  Suhjed  to  which 
it  muft  belong,  but  a  SubjeA  Suited  to,  and  Capable  of  fuch 
an  Adjunct :  kSts  of  Clemency  and  G/mj?,  in  itridt  Speak- 
ing, belong  to  Sovereign  Princes,  not  to  Subjeiis. 

48.  What  has  the  Nature  of  an  Accident  or  Mode,  muft 
at  the  bottom  be  fupported  by  fome  Suhjiancc;  and  it  muft  ba 
fuch  as  isfuitcd  and  agreeable  to  the  Accident  or  iViode,  and 
that  even  where  the  Mode  may  immediately  bel  ng  only  to 
fome  Accident  or  Mode  ;  Thus,  Liberty,  tho'  iomctimes 
afcrib'd  immediately  to  the  Will,  has  yet  a  Subftance,  and 
this  (as  we  have  good  Reafon  to  conclude)  a  Spirit  for  its 
Bafis  and  Support. 

§  21.  49.  A  Subftance^  which  is  completed  znd  finiih'J, 
of  (as  the  Schools  call  it)  ultimated,  is  faid  to  Subfij},  as 
well  astoExift,  having  all  that,  which  belongs  to  its  com- 
plete Exiftence. 

§  12.  50.  \  fublifting  Subftance,  which  is  otherwife 
call'd  a  Suppofjtum^  receives  the  Denomination  of  whatever 
the  Being  has  or  do's,  tho'  it  may  be  only  in  or  by  a  Pare  of 
it  felf :  Thus  a  Clock  has  Teeth  ;  tho'  they  belong  imme- 
diately to  no  other  Part  but  its  Wheels ;  and  it  is  faid  to 
move  or  go,  tho'  a  confiderable  part  of  it  ftands  ftill ;  and 
in  that  Senfe  it  might  alfo  be  faid  to  ftand,  or  keep  its  place, 
whiiltit  goes. 

51.  A  Suppofitum,  or  fubfiiling  Subftance,  which  ran 
fo  [{eafon  as  Man  do'b  (i,  e.  /',  as  to  be  capable  of  P.eligion) 
is  what  we  call  a  P EH^SO  N :  And  therefore  we  allow  not 
Brute  Creatures  (tho'  ihiy  (hould  have  fome  kind  of  Reafon) 
to  have  a  Perfonal  Subfiftence  :  The  Perfon  receives  the 
Denomination  ariftng  from  what  he  ha<:,  or  do's ;  tho'  it  were 
only  in  or  by  a  Part :  Thus  the  Man  is  faid  to  be  Strong, 
when  his  Body  is  firmly  compared  ;  and  to  ftrike,  tho*  he 
perform  it  only  with  his  Hand  ;  nor  is  ftriking  ufua'ly  at- 
tributed to  the  Hand,  but  to  the  Man. 

§  1'^.  52.  As  Streams,  literally  taken,  rife  not  higher 
than  the  Spring,  or  Fountain  Head,  without  external  Force; 
fo  neither  do  other  Caufes  produce  what  is  more  Noble  and 
Excellent  than  themfelves  ;  if  they  be  not  carried  above 
themfelves  by  fome  Superior  Influence  ;  As  when  Men  do 
certainly  predict  contingent  Futurities ;  or,  in  a  Senfe,  per- 
form what  is  Miraculous ;  We  may  be  fare  there  can  be  no 
Perfed:ion  in  any  Creature,  but  there  is  fomewhat  equal  or 
higher  then  it  in  the  Creatour;  fince  there  could  be  no  Su- 
|>arior  Influence  10  advance  his  Work  above  hioifeif. 

Y  4  §  24. 53iTHat 


3 20  An  tjjay  for  the  Part  ill. 

§-  24.  53.  That,  which  i<i  fuch  in  it  icif\  may  well  hf^ 
accounted  more  Juch,  than  what  is  fo,  by  verrue  of  f<.mewhat 
eJle.  Thus  Wine  is  Wronger  than  the  Water,  Vv  hich  it  makes 
in  fome  degree  ftrong  by  mixing  with  it :  And  Fii  e  it  felf 
hotter  than  the  Red-hot  Iron,  tho'  this  burn  things  n  ore  for- 
cibly; Since  'tis  from  the  Fire  it  has  its  Biirning  Quality, 
tho'  intorc'd  and  ftrcngthen'd  by  the  Solidity  of  its  Matter, 
when  fome  parts  of  it  are  once  put  into  fuch  a  Motion. 

54.  Likenef.\  and  even  l^arity  or  Equality  fnppofes  the 
things  compar'd  to  be  divers  in  fome  or  other  Refpecl  ;  and 
tho'  they  might  be  the  fame  numerical  Being  continu'd,  yet 
they  are  diverfly  conlider'd,  when  compar'd  :  As  the  Paper 
written  upon  has  fome  likeneis  to  what  it  was  belore ;  but 
is  compar'd  with  it  felf  under  differing  Conliderations. 

§  15.  55.  Parables,  Fables,  or  other  Similitudes  are  not 
to  be  drawn  beyond  the  Scope  and  Defifn,  for  which  they 
Virere  brought  :  Since  no  Similitude  mult  necelfarily  run 
fas  we  cotrmonly  fay)  upon  a!l-four ;  tho' it  muft  indeed 
have  fomewhac  to  ftand  upon  ;  and  fo  far  it  may  be  rcalon'd 
from. 

§  26.  56.  To  get  the  Soifc  or  Meaning  of  a  Sign  is  only 
to  find  out  what  the  Pcrfon  u(ing  it  intended  by  it,  or  how 
Men  have,  tacitely  at  leaft,  fixd  and  agreed  the  Import  of  it^ 
And  when  this  is  found  there  can  remain  no  farther  Difpuce, 
unlefs  it  were,  whether  it  be  a  Commodious  way  for  the  ex-, 
prelfmg  of  fuch  a  Meaning. 

§  17.  57.  Menhave  invented  general  and  Superior  N/imcs 
and  Terms,  wherein  they  have  intended  ro  coniprize  divers 
others  in  one  5  and  therefore  when  the  more  general  Term  is 
us'd,  the  Subordinntc  are  included  :  Thus,  he  that  fpeaks  of 
Silver,  meaning  Silver  Coin,  is  to  be  underftood  as  compre- 
hending whatfoever  pieces  are  ufually  Coin'd,  CrOwns,  half-- 
Crowns,  Shillings,  i^c.         .     ,     ■      .    . 

§  a8.  ^8.  bvery  Subordintite  Katu  e  (viz.  that  of  fome 
,  lower  Kind  or  Sort,  or  of  the  Particulars  under  them)  infers 
a'd  xh^  Superior^  cr  more  general  Natures,  that  are  directly 
m  the  Line  above  iv.  F.  Gr.  This  particular  Shilling  has 
the  Nature  of  Coin,  of  Silver,  of  Metal,  of  mix'd  Body,  of 
Matter,  ofSubffance,  and  of  fomewhat  real  and  exifting. 

§  29.  59.  We  may  conclude,  thnt  to  be  a  veell  jiudyd 
Writing  or  Tifcourfe,  where  the  Matter  has  been  Searcht  and 
fifted  out,  as  far  as  well  might  be ;  what  is  deliver'd  fo  Set, 
a,nd  methodiz'd,  as  that  one  Point  may  give  Light  and 
Strength,  to  another ;  like  wife  both  the  Matter  drawn  forth 
tfid  the  manner  of  declaring  it,  fuited  to  Perfons  and 
.   ,  Oceafionsj: 


Chap   17.  Improvement  of  Realon.  321 

Occafions;  and  Finally,  that  no  more  is  faid  than  was  re- 
qiiifite  111  the  Circumftances,  and  yet  nothing  Material  omir- 
ted,  which  was  fo  ;  whilft  he  that  Speaks  or  Writes  has  xpcU 
confider'd  what  not  to  fay,  as  well  as  what  to  fay. 

§  'io.  60.  That  may  be  juftly  accoviuKd  ft iffici en t,  which 
iS  fuch,  both  in  Quality  and  Quantity,  that  in  Reafon  there 
needs  norhing  more,  tho'  it  may  be  fome  fort  of  Men  muft 
have  more,  that  it  may  be  Satisfactory  or  Eft'edlual  to  them, 
if  indeed  any  thing  would  be  fo  .-  But  befides,  the  Grace 
or  other  Provifion  may  be  call'd  fufficient,  which  tho'  it  will 
need  a  continual  Supply,  yet  has  that  fupply  aflur'd  by  Pro- 
mife,  in  the  regular  Ufe  of  proper  Means. 
•  §  31.  Thus  I  have  cndeavour'd  to  fingle  out,  as  near  as 
I  could,  thofe  Rules  and  Helps  for  inferring,  which  might  be 
Jefs  Subjc<5t  to  Obje(ftions,  and  of  greater  Ufe,  out  of  many 
more  which  might  have  been  added,  and  may  at  Pleafure  be 
fought  in  I  ogicks  or  other  Tradls,  which  deliver  the  more 
general  Canons,  Axioms,  or  Principles  ;  but  fome  of  them 
fo  embarafs'd  as  hardly  to  carry  any  undifputed  Senle  worth 
ourinferting  here  ;  yet  no  doubt  but  fome  of  thofe  we  have 
mentioned  may  be  liable  to  fome  Exception;  and  many 
others  might  be  added  to  good  Purpofe ;  but  that  mult  be 
left  to  other  Hands.        • 


CHAP.     XVII. 

§  I.  IT7HAT  has  been  once  well  Prov'd  or  duly  Colledi- 
^  ed,  or  that  is  acknowledg'd,  or  held  by  others, 
and  indeed  all  other  Matters,  are  (lb  far  as  we  can)  to  be 
improv'd  to  fome  good  Purpofe  .-  And  therefore  our  Reafon 
is  to  be  guided  and  help'd, 

I V>  Rlg^-'^^J'  fo  ^'>^^^  ^nd  apply  to  Vfe  and  Service,  vohnt  ought 
to  he,  or  h  cap ti hie  of  being,  Jo  direRed  and  apply' d.  And  in- 
deed there  is  fcarcely  any  thing,  of  whatfoever  Kind,  but  is 
improvable  to  fome  or  other  good  Purpofe  ;  if  we  fet  our 
felves  to  confider  it,  and  take  in  requifue  Help  for  the  di- 
recting and  applying  it  accordingly. 

^  1.  In  the  General,  by  VJe  and  Service,  here  is  meant 
whatever  may  appear,  when  all  things  are  duly  confider'd, 
to  be  of  Real  Advantage  in  it  felf,  or  really  tending  to  what 
isfo:  t{ig^)tly  to  direii  thereto,  is  to  determine  juftly,  both, 
tfwhat  VJe  or  Service  this  or  that  may  be,  and  alfo  in  what 

iVfiy: 


32  2  An  tjfay  for  the  Pare  III. 

H^ay:     And  rightly  to  npply,  is  adlually  to  employ  it  upon 
Occafion,  To  as  may  beft  anfwer  that  Ufeor  Service. 

Now  fome Things  undoubtedly  ought  to  he  fo  directed  and 
apply'd,  when  there  is  a  fair  Occafion  and  fit  Opportunity  ; 
whereas  others  may  feem  to  remain  at  l-iberty,  and  that  we 
axe  not  however  fo  plainly  oblig'd,  in  Point  of  Duty  to  God, 
our  felves,  or  others.     But, 

§  3.  Sometimes  things  arc  capable  of  ferving  even  fome 
good  Purpofe,  to  which  they  cannot  be  innocenrly  eniploy'd, 
fincethey  cannot  anfwer  it,  but  in  a  way  that  is  faulcy^  or, 
at  the  beft,  to  be  juftly  fafpeifled  ;  And  what  might  be  iavf- 
fully  directed  or  apply'd,  not  only  to  fuch  a  Purpofe,  but  in 
a  way,  that  wou'd  reach  that  End,  yet  may  not  always  pru- 
dently be  fo  dircded  or  apply'd;  whenasour  diredting  others 
about  it,  may  be  perhaps  inconvenient,  or  the  applying  it 
inexpedient,  either  in  refpedt  of  the  Purpofe,  which  may 
not  anfwer  the  Coft,  or  Time,  or  Trovible  ;  or  elfe  of  the 
way  to  attain  it,  which  may  be  inconvenient  in  it  lelf,  or 
draw  f)me  Inconvenience  after  it  greater  than  the  Advan- 
tage, which  is  like  to  accrue. 

§  4.  Having  taken  this  general  Survey  of  the  prefent 
Matter ;  we  proceed  to  confider  it  more  diftindlly  ;  F/V/?,  as 
it  may  be  purfu'd  more  at  large,  and  then  with  particular 
Relation  to  this  Eflfay. 

Under  the  former  Branch,  fome  Light  may  be  given  as  to 
the  Courfe  we  fhould  take  in  an  Atfair  of  fuch  Confequencc 
and  Compafs,  that  we  may  be  able  in  fome  Meafure  rightly 
to  direct  and  apply  Things  to  their  proper  Ufe  and  Service  ; 
alfo,  whither  thefe  are  to  be  refer'd,  namely,  to  what  Per- 
ian^  or  to  whit  farther  Purpofe ;  then  of  what  Kind  the  Ufe 
and  Service  is  to  be;  laftly,  and  more  particularly,  what 
Sort  of  Things  ough:  to  be,cr  may  be  fo  directed,  or  apply'd, 
and  to  what  Special  Purpofe. 

§  5.  I.  As  to  the  way,  wherein  we  may  come  to  fome 
Faculty  of  dueding  and  applying  things  rightly  to  Ufe  and 
Service  •     We  Ilia  1  be  in  a  very  likely  Method  to  attain  it, 

I,  If  we  (hall  endeavour  by  continual, fervent,  and  believ- 
ing Addreflfes  to  the  Throne  of  Grace,  to  engage  the  beft  of 
Monitors  and  Helpers  for  fo  great  a  Purpofe ;  even  that  Spirit, 
which  fsr.-cheth  fill  things,  who  eafily  Can,  and  will  (fofaras 
God  fees  fit),  infallibly  guide  and  powerfully  aflift  us,  both, 
in  dire(^ing  and  applying  every  thing  to  it's  proper  Service, 
in  the  fitteft  Seafon,  and  to  the  \&9i  Advantage.  But  then, 
as  he  req  Jures  us,  we  muft  ioin  to  fuch  Prayer  the  Ufe  of 
t  ther  fuitabk  Means.    And  therefore, 

§  6. 1,  We 


Chap.  17.         Improvement  of  EVeafon.  525 

§  6.  1,  We  fhould  have  often  in  cur  Mouths,  and  oft'ner 
in  our  Tho'ts,  upon  every  frefh  Occafion,  that  Ihorr,  but  im- 
portant Queftioii  CVI  BOKO?  \_To  what  good  End^  or  for 
What  good  Vfe  is  thu  or  thnt  ?]  which,  as  it  would  call  us  off 
from  many  vain  Amufements,  fo  it  might  often  ferve  out  of 
the  Enter  to  b'ivg  forth  Meat,  and  to  recover  fomewhat  worth 
our  while  from  the  great  Devourers  of  our  Time  and  1  ho't : 

She  very  FJint,  thus  ftruck,  might  afford  both  Light  and 
eat ;  and  even  the  Rock,  fo  fmitten,  would  fometimes  pour 
0ut  Streams  to  accompany  and  accommodate  our  PalTage 
through  this  Lower  World  to  that  above.     And, 

§  7.  3.  We  could  not  eafi'y  mifsof  fomewhat  worth  our 
Pains,  if  at  fometime  we  would  but  fet  our  felves  more  fo- 
lemnly  to  anfwer  the  mentioned  Enquiry,  upon  feme  f  ch 
Occafions,  as  may  be  moft  confiderable,  either  by  their  Con- 
tinual Prefence,  or  Conftant  Returns,  or  more  than  common 
Circumftanccs. 
11  Our  Sins,  our  Wants,  our  Natural  Faculties,  as  well  as 
the  Poor  and  Afflidled  in  this  Wpi  Id,  are  always  with  ms  j  and 
|f  wehad  well  fix'd  fome  Material  Improvement,  by  way  of 
InftruAicn,  orotherwife,  to  be  made  upon  thefe  and  the  like 
(landing  Occafions;  how  fmall  foeverit  might  feem,  yet  as 
'a  continual  Stream,  it  would  be  of  unfpeakable  Service. 

§  8.  We  have  the  Anniverfary  Circle  of  Spring,  and  Sum- 
,mer,  Autumn,  and  Winter ;  the  monrhiy  Circuit  of  the 
;Newand  Full  Moon,  with  her  firft  and  laft  Qi-arters ;  and 
indeed  rhedaiiy  returns  of  Midnight,  Morning,  Noon,  and 
;l\ight;  together  with  the  hourly  Faffing  bell  of  1  ime  de- 
parting from  us,  for  as  fuch  we  iray,  nor  unfitly,  confider 
the  Itnking  of  the  Clock  :  Now  if  to  each  of  thefe,  and 
other  like  Occunents,  we  did  but  affix  fome  one  Inlirudlive 
Remark,  or  Accountable  Ufe,  how  mightily  would  i he  Stock 
be  growing  ftill  upon  oi  r  Hands,  together  with  cur  Skill  for 
lihe  fai  ther  Improv  ement  of  it !     And, 

§  9.    To  thefe  fhould  be  added  a  more  than  ordinary  Con- 

leratioTi  of  what  is  more  lingular  2nd  uncommon,  as  it  may 
"prefen'  it  felf,  or  is  paifi;  p  withm  the  compafs  of  our  Know- 
ledge in  the  World;  whether  Abroad  or  nearer  heme, amongft 
jFrien  s,  or  in  our  Familic'N,  or  perhaps  in  our  Bodies,  or  in 
our  Minds.  Ard  if  thus  we  do.  to  how  great  an  Amount 
lavft  it  arife,  within  the  Age  ot  Man,  or  even  in  fome  few 
Years .-^  And  in  fome  fuch  way,  how  j'obably  might  we 
eome,  as  by  a  kind  of  Natural  Inftinft  to  imitate  or  outdo 
iIk  Sliilful  and  induftrious  Bee,  in  pa.henng  the  pureft  Ho- 
ney, not  only  from  every  Flower,  but  even  from  the  mofl 
\  noxious 


514  An  tjfay  (or   the  Part  III. 

noxious  Weeds  ?  And  of  this  we  may  giv;  feme  little  Speci- 
men under  one  of  the  following  Heads  :  But  to  liniih  that 
we  are  now  upon, 

^10.  4.  We  (hould  carefully  commit  to  Memory,  or 
rather  \  if  it  mav  be  '  to  Writing  the  more  confiderable  Ule 
and  Service  of  this  or  that,  in  order  to  our  reviewing  it  of- 
ten, till  the  Mind  iliould  be  deeply  pofTelTed  with  it,  and  even 
habituated  to  ir,  upon  fuch  or  fuch  Occalion;  And  thus 
whatever  is  obfcrvable  Standing  or  Paillng  either  in  the  lefTf 
World  within  us,  or  in  the  greater  about  us,  might  fer-.  c  as 
a  Monitor  and  Remembrancer  to  us  of  fomewhat  ufeful  to 
be  thereupon  confider'd,  or  faid,  or  done  by  our  fclves,  or  tc 
be  recommended  to  others. 

§   1 1.     We  proceed  in  the  next  place  to  confider, 

n,  l-V'oither  the  Ulc  and  Service  of  Things  is  to  be  refer'd  ; 
i.  e.  to  what  Perfon,  or  to  what  farther  Purpofe :  and  cer- 
tain'y  it  fhould  be  deligned  every  way,  fo  far  as  may  be; 
efpccially  for  fuch  Ferlons  and  to  fuch  farther  P^rpofes,  as 
we  are  more  peculiarly  obliged  to  regard.  Wc  llioald  un- 
doubtedly do  all  the  good  we  regularly  car  ;  and  make 
every  thing,  we  are  concerned  with,  as  exteniively  Ufeful 
as  it  is  well  Capable  of  being,  or  we  of  making  it. 

Now  various  Petions  and  Purpofes  may  be  fervM,  with- 
out Interfering  on':  with  another,  where  they  are  Subordi- 
nate and  Subfervient  fome  of  then  to  others,  or  that  they  are 
otherwife  ConneAed,  or  at  the  Icaft  Confiftera  one  with  ano- 
ther.    Thus, 

§  !J.  Whatever  is  a  real  acceptable  Service  to  the  Ho- 
nour and  Inrereft  of  God,  is  fo  far  a  Service  alfo  to  hisUni- 
verfal  Church;  and  even  to  that  Happy  r-ar:  thereof  which 
is  Triumphing  above,  as  well  as  to  that  which  is  yet  Mili- 
tating here  below  againd  the  Worid,  the  Flefli,  and  the 
Devil:  The  fubduing  or  weakning  of  '/i::'/e  Enemies  is  an 
undeniable  Advantage  to  it,  and  unqu.ftionably  pleafing  to 
God,  CO  Good  Angels,  to  glorified  Spirits,  and  to  Good  Men, 
fo  far  as  they  are  fuch  and  do  rightly  underftand  the  Mat- 
ter :  'Tis  alfo  of  real  Advantage  to  Mankind  in  general,  as 
well  as  to  particular  Societies  and  Perfons,  whether  they  fee 
it  or  not. 

§15.  He  that  truly  ferves  the  Publick,  is  really  ferving 
his  Private  Intereft  too,  at  leaft  more  diftantly,  and  in  the 
Main.  A  real  Service  regularly  done  for  a  Man's  Family,  or 
Friend,  or  for  the  Po3r,  or  to  Strangers,  nay  even  to  Crea- 
tures below  him,  may  oc  will  fome  way  or  other  redound  to 
his  Perfonal  Advantage. 

Every 


Jhap.  17.       Improvement  of  Reaion.  325 

Every  one  is  indeed  neareft  10  himlelf,  and  principally 
:barg'd  with  his  own  more  immediate  Coneernments  j  yet 
it  was  the  Language  of  an  accurfcd  Caiv,  to  lay,  Am  I  my 
Bnti:ii^s  keeper^  and  as  no  Man,  or  Society  of  Men,  do's  or 
:an  itand  alone,  it  is  incumbent  both  on  every  Man,  and  on 
every  Body  of  Men,  to  look^  yict  on  their  own  Things  only^  hut 
al/o  on  tic  things  cf  others:  Yea  in fome  particular  Inftan- 
ces,  and  at  foroe  times,  they  mult  in  a  fort  overlook  their 
own  things  in  looking  to  thofe  of  others  ;  and  this,  that  rhey 
may  more  eifcdtvally  look  alfo  to  their  own,  in  the  final 
Iffue,  and  in  the  Main.  We  fhould  therefore  carry  things 
p  the  higheft  and  fartheft  Ufe  which  may  be  well  at- 
ItainM. 

§  14.  But,  whereas  we  muft  often  be  limited  by  the  Na- 
ture of  Things  themfclves,  and  by  our  own  Incapacity,  or 
livant  of  Oppcrtunity  ;  we  ought  therefore  firft  and  Chiefly 
jto  dired;  our  Aim,  as  we  ftand  more  Specially  obliged ;  re- 
tferring  the  Ufe  and  Service  of  things  to  fuch  Perfoos  and 
Purpofes,  as  are  in  themfclves  more  Valuable,  where  we  are 
at  Liberty  to  make  our  EJedtion  j  or  otherwife,  to  thofe  we 
^re  more  ccncern'd  with,  in  Point  of  Relation,  Condition,  or 
other  Indication  of  our  Duty. 

15.  Ill,  As  to  the  Ufe  or  Service  it  felf,  at  which  we 
are  to  aim,  it  mu^^  be  fome  good  Purpofe,  whereof  the  Thing 
is  Capable  in  a  Lawful  and  Prudent  Way.  That  is  undoub- 
edly  a  gc  d  and  vahialle  Purpofe,  which  will  ferve  to  the 
beft  and  great t  it,  (t'?:(.)  the  Piealing  of  God,  fo  as  to  have  at 
prefent  a  rea  and  well  alfured  Intereft  in  his  peculiar  Fa- 
vour, and  thai  we  may  co;ne  at  laft  to  the  full  Enjoyment  of 
it  in  endleis  and  inconceivable  Felicity. 

§  16.  I  (hall  here  briefly  mention  fome  general  and  more 
bbfervab'e  Purpofes,  at  which  we  ought  to  aim,  oratleaft 
may,  where  there  is  nothing  to  render  it  unlawful  or  inexpe- 
dient.    And, 

I.  The  more  immediate  Honour  of  God  in  Reprefenting 
im  to  our  (elves  or  others  molt  worthy  to  be  Admir'd,  and 
dor'd  j  to  be  Lov'd  and  Fear'dT  to  be  FoUow'd  and  Sub- 
mitted to;  to  be  Hoped  in  and  Depended  on ;  in  a  word,  to 
e  ta.^en  as  our  Guide,  and  Ruler  ;  as  our  Defenfe,  and  Sa- 
vio.i!,  as  ovr  1  crticr,  ana  Happmefs,  upon  the  Tertijs  de- 
:Ja.ed  n\  his  VVcrd. 


17.2.  The 


3i6  An  tjjay  for  the  Part  III. 

§  /  7.  2.  The  more  Special  Honour  of  the  Father,  Son 
and  Holy  Spirit,  as  they  ftand  related  to  each  other,  fo  far 
as  we  may  be  capable  of  apprehending  the  Union  and  Di- 
ftincftion  amongft  them  ;  but  more  efpecialJy,  as  they  are  re- 
prefented,  as  having  feverally  feme  peculiar  Relations  to  us, 
and  Concernment  with  us. 

§  18.  3.  Retrieving,  Securing,  and  Promoting  the  In- 
tereft  of  God,  and  of  the  ever-blelTed  Trinity,  as  far  as  we 
can  ill  the  World  by  all  fit  means  and  Methods ;  ufmg  none 
that  are  like  to  do  more  Hurt  than  Good;  as  the  Attempts 
tod'f.-v,  but  efpecially  to /Vr/i;/',  Men  againft  their Confcience 
or  befide  it  commonly  are,  where  their  Pradtice  is  not  plainly 
one  of  thofe  Evils,  which  the  Civil  Power  is  fitted  and  ap- 
pointed of  God  to  Punifh  or  Reftrain  j  nor  do's  the  Principle 
really  held  manifeftly  lead  to  any  of  them .-  And  here  inftead 
of  fuch  unwarranted,  hurtful,  or  dangerous  Means  (which 
ever  have  and  are  ever  like  ten  times  to  dilletie  the  Truth 
for  their  ferving  it  once,  \i  really  they  ever  did,  or  can  do  it 
at  all)  we  Oiould  firft  employ  preparatory  Counfcl  and  Cau- 
tion, then  Clear  and  Cogent  Arguments,  together  with 
all  the  Winning  Methods,  which  are  fair  in  themfelves,  and 
fit  in  fiich  a  Cafe  ;  that  Men  may  be  rarried,  not  only  into 
an  outward  Compliance,  but  inward  Perfuafion  and  right 
Principles.  Here  we  muft  diredt  our  Aim,  and  fuit  our  Ar- 
guments with  other  Means,  to  the  recovering,  confirming, 
and  advancing  that  Kingdom  of  God,  which  Jinudcth  not  in 
Ments  or  Dfitd^s  { whether  to  be  obferved  or  avoided) ;  hut  in 
Kjghteoiifnejs,  ^nd  Pence,  and  Joy  in  the  Holy  Ghofi. 

§  19.  4.  The  Common  Good  of  Man-kind;  i.e.  not 
only  their  Salvation,  which  has  been  already  rouch'd  on ;  but 
alfo  their  Temporal  Safety,  Peace,  Profperity,  and  Im- 
provement. 

5.  The  Publick  Good  of  the  Civil  Society  ^  ns  alfo  the 
Welfare  of  any  lelfer  Subordinate  Body,  to  which  we  may 
more  particularly  belong,  and  this  in  all  the  forementioned 
Refpe(5^s. 

6.  The  more  Private  and  Perfonal  Improvement  and  Ad- 
vantage of  our  felves  and  others,  in  refpedt  of  Mind,  Body, 
Eftate,  Intereft,   Reputation,  G^c. 

§  20.  7.  Theealing  of  Pains  and  Trouble-  the  favingof 
Time  and  Charges,  ©c  in  pcrfomung  what  lies  upon  us  or 
others  to  do.    And  to- name  no  more. 


8.  The 


Chap.  1 8.        Improvement  of  Kt^aion,  327 

8.  The  regular  Entertaining  and  Diverting  our  felvesor 
others:  And  we  fhould  here  obferve,  that  the  Ufe  or  Ser- 
vice, which  is  of  greater  Concern  is  to  be  prefcr'd  according 
to  the  hghc  which  may  be  drawn  from  Part  II.  C.  9, 10,  m. 

§  21.  Upon  the  whole,  we  are  to  improve  Things  for 
the  regular  Preventing,  Removing,  or  Abating  of  whatfoevct 
Evil,  whether  Morm  and  Culpable  or  Natural  and  Penal ;  as 
alfo  for  the  lawful  Attaining,  Securing,  or  Advancing  of 
whatfoever  real  Good,  whether  Moral  or  Natural,  for  the 
Prefent,  or  for  the  Future. 


CHAP.    XVIII. 

§  I .  TT  H  E  Method  propounded,  leads  us  now  to  Gon- 
*    fider, 

IV,  What  ought  or  may  be  improv'd  ;  aud  to  what  Ufe 
or  Service  more  particularly  :  'Tis  certain,  every  thing  that 
can  lawfully  and  pn  dentiy  be  directed  and  applied  to  fuch 
and  fach  Purpofes,  fhould  be  accordingly  us'd  ;  but  efpecially 
what  i'i  more  peculiarly  intrufted  with  us  for  Improvement  ; 
and  \^hcre  any  Special  Improvement  is  charged  upon  us  by  a 
competent  Authority. 

§  2,  I  (hall  here  mention  fome  obfervable  Inftances  of 
Things,  with  fome  more  Singular  Ufe,  to  which  they  may 
be  diredt'  d  and  apply'd.     And, 

T.  Even  Sinful  Difpofitions,  Adings,  OmifTions,  and  De- 
feats, ought  to  be  obferv'd,  and  improv'd  to  make  and  keep 
us  Scnlible,  what  need  we  have  of  pardoning  Mercy,  of  re- 
newing and  prcferving  Grace,  and  of  all  the  Means  thereof: 
what  Caufe  there  is  to  be  Penitent,  Believing,  Humble, 
Warchlu!,  Prayerful,  Diligent,  Self-denying,  Patient,  For- 
bearing, and  Forgiving 

2.  What  appears  of  the  like  Nature  in  others,  fhould  ferye 
to  lliew  IS  how  ill  it  looks,  how  unbecoming,  for  the  ex- 
citing a  jultlnd'gnation  againlt  fuch  kmd  of  Evils,  efpecially 
in  our  leives ;  and  at  the  fame  time  to  move  our  Compaflion 
to vvard<;  others ;  to  engage  our  Prayers  and  Endeavours  with, 
or  for  them,  or  both  ways  ;  as  alfo,  that  we  rtiould,fo  far  as 
ma,  wcil  be,  keep  a  lafe  and  Ht  diftance  from  Contagious  or 
Scandalous  Company  ;  likewifc  to  ufe  due  Guard  and  Cau- 
tion ui  the  Conveifcand  Concerns,  we  have  even  with  fuch, 
as  we  may  j  iftiy  believe,  or  mult  charitably  hope,  are  truly 
Goo!.  §3.  3.  Nat  J- 


928  An  Ejfay  for  the  Pare  li!. 

§  3.  3.  Natural  Deformities  or  Deficiencies  in  our 
Selves,  may  lead  us  to  confider,  with  Shame  and  Grief,  the 
firft  mentioned  Evils,  that  are  fo  much  worfe  than  thefe  ; 
and  whereby  we  have  deferv'd  much  worfe  at  the  Hands  vi 
our  Maker.  They  fhould  alfo  ftir  us  up  to  fupply  and  bal- 
lance  what  is  amifs  or  wanting  in  that  kind,  by  fomc  more 
than  common  Acquirements  and  Improvements  otherways : 
And  certainly  they  (hould  teach  us  rather  to  pity  than  deride 
or  defpile  others  upon  any  fuch  Account. 

4.  What  there  may  be  in  others  of  a  like  Nature,  (hould 
make  ns  the  more  Contented,  if  any  thing  of  fuch  a  kind 
has  fain  to  our  Lot  alfo,  and  the  more  Thankful,  where  it 
is  otherwife :  But  efpccially  we  Ihould  be  excited,  as  we 
have  Opportunity  and  Capacity  for  ir,  to  the  Relieving  and 
Helping  thofe,  who  labour  under  fuch  Difadvantages 

What  has  beenfaid  upon  the  two  lafl  Heads,  may  be  eafi- 
ly  appl^'d  and  carry'd  much  farther  in  relation  to  whatfoever 
other  Troubles  may  acftually  be  upon  our  feh  es  or  others. 

§  4.  5.  What  only  threatens  us,  ftiould  put  us  upon  the 
beft  Methods  for  Prevention,  or  Mitigation;  or  elfe  that 
we  may  be  more  capable  of  Bearing  and  Improving  what 
may  come  upon  us :  But  we  lliould  not  here  forget  that  fo 
benevolent  Caution  and  Charge  of  our  Bleffed  Saviour,  that 
vee  tal{e  no  (perplexing)  Thought  for  the  Morrow  j  nor  that  other 
by  the  Apoftle,  that  >pj  Jloould  be  (folicitouflyj  careful  in  no- 
thing J  but  in  every  thing  by  Grayer  and  Supplication  with  Thankj- 
givingy  Jhould  make  kjioxvn  our  I{cqu:fls  unto  God. 

6.  As  to  others  in  the  like  Cafe,  we  may  ufe  the  time  of 
their  Danger  and  Fear,  as  well  as  that  of  prefent  Difirefs  or 
Trouble,  to  oblige  them  by  Expreirions  and  Inltances  of  our 
Concernment  for  them  ;  as  alio,  to  move  them  upon  fuch 
Occafion,  or  at  fuch  Tune,  to  what  is  proper  and  fit  to  be 
done,  efpecially  to  fuch  good  AAions,  as  they  would  inore 
hardly,  if  at  all,  be  perfwaded  to  at  other  Scafon;. 

§  <5.  7.  Whatever  of  Good  there  may  be  in  us,  or  done, 
or  enjoyed  by  us,  (hould  be  improv'd  into  the  farther  Appre- 
henfion  of  Divine  Goodnefs,  and  a  more  firm  Bclict  that  God 
is  in  Chrift ;  as  alfo  into  all  fit  Methods  of  acknowledging 
the  Obligations  we  can  never  fully  anfwcr  to  God,  and  like- 
wife  thofe  we  may  lie  under  to  fuch  as  he  has  made  the  wil- 
ling Infiruments  of  his  Kmdnfs  to  us;  and  fo  has  recom- 
mend .^d  them  to  our  Love  auu  Gratitude. 


3.  Wha: 


Chap.  iS.        iniprovi:f}2ent  of  Realon.  529 

8./What  thcfe  Is  of  the  fame  kind,  with  others,  (hould  carry 
tlie  mcncioned  Apprehenlion  and. Belief  yet  farther  with  us; 
and  oiight  to  be  impfov'd  with  them,  as  there  is  Opportun'.tyj 
f<.'r  the  Piirpofes  before  Specif) 'd.  , 

What  there  is  Praife  worthy  in  others,  we  fhould  own  and 
endeavour  to  Imitate,  with  juft  Allowance  for  what  there 
may  be  of  differing  Circumifances  between  us  and  them. 

<»  6,  5?.  Fit  and  proper  Ufe  both  may  and  (hould  be 
made  of  thofe,  who  are  at  our  Command,  or  under  our  In- 
fluence J  efpeciaJJy  to  ferve  fuch  good  Purpofes  for  which 
they  ftand  fitted  and  inclin'd,  or  any  other  td  which  they 
fairJy  may  be  over-ruled  or  perfwaded. 

Particularly  Servants  are  to  be  kept  in  their  Place  and  to 
their  Bufinefs,  yet  not  to  be  created  like  Slaves ;  nor  even 
Slaves  themfelves,  as  if  they  had  not  Humane  Souls. 

§  7.  10.  As  to  Time,  it  ihould  be  carefully  fill'd  op  with 
fomcwhat,  which  may  be  Accountable ;  and  therefote  we 
fhould  be  frequently  calling  our  felves  and  others  under  our 
Care  to  an  Account  about  it :  And  it  may  be  highly  jequi- 
fite  every  Morning,  fo  far  as  we  can,  to  lay  cut  the  Bulinefe 
of  the  following  Diy,  and  every  Evening  to  review,  what 
has  been  done,  and  in  what  Manner. 

.  1 1 .  As  to  Opportunities,  they  ihould  be  fpeedily  embrac'd, 
for  the  good  and  rcquifite  Purpofes,  to  which  they  are  re- 
fpediively  fuited. 

§  S.  ■  12.  As  to  Eftate,  We  thould  Honour  God  with  our 
Subftance,  in  fome  fit  Proportion  to  what  we  Jo  and  may  al- 
liiwour  felves  to  lay  out,  in  other  ways,  or  to  lay  up  for  out 
felves  or  ours.  ... 

More  particularly  as  to.  Money,  we  (hould  fee  that  welofe 
not  the  Improvement  of  it,  left  we  Ihould  be  known  to  have 
it,  or  for  feair  of  lofing  it,  unlefs  it  were  in  feme  uncommon 
Circumftances. 

As  to  Goods,  that  we  keep  them  not  only  for  Shew,  in- 
ftead  of  Ufe,  fo  as  to  want  them  vvhilft  we  ha.e  them, 

13.  As  to  Furniture,  that  we  really  want  not  in  Stock  or 
Money,  what  we  may,  perhaps,  have  in  Jewels,  Plate,  or 
other  Urenfils  J  efpeciaily  if  they  ihould  be  iuch  as  are  \.m- 
fuitable  CO  us  or  needlefs  for  us. 

§  p.  14.  As  to  inferiour  Living  Creatures  about  us"^/that 
'.ve  abufe  them  not  iriftead  of  ufing  them  agreeably  to  their 
Nature  and  Place;  or  that  we  our  felves  be  not  en&av'd  to 
them  by  an  exceflive  Eftimation,  and  Attendanc^e,  infteaJof 
being  ferved  by  them  i  yet  not  to  be  Tyrants  6j^x  them  or 
f^y/'r/rf/i  Task-Mafters,  •'  ^-t 

^  §  JO,  1 3.  A'-. 


350  r.n  Ljjuy  for  the  Fart  III. 

<§  lo.  15.  As  CO  our  Natural  Powers,  chat  the  Eye,  Ear, 
Tongue.  Hands,  Feer,  and  alfo  our  Underftanding,  Judg- 
ment, Conlcience,  Will,  and  Aftedions,  Phantafie,  Memo- 
ry, (^c.  lie  not  Idle  when  there  is  juft  Occafion  tor  them, 
and  that  they  be  not  employed  to  unwarrantable,  inferiour, 
or  »:'nfaitable  Purpofcs,  when  they  might  and  (hould  be  us'd 
for  the  (erving  of  Ends,  which  are  not  only  Good  in  them- 
felves,  but  fuch  as  are  more  Noble,  or  however,  titter  for 
us,  or  better  fuiced  to  the  Time,  Place,  and  ether  Circum- 
ftances. 

§  II.  16.  As  to  Good  and  ufeful  Habits,  that  they  be 
not  loft  or  damag'd  for  want  of  Ufe,  nor  proflituted  to  any 
ill  Purpofes  by  Abufe. 

17.  As  to  the  Knowledge  and  Notions  we  have,  particu- 
larly fuch  as  we  take  to  be  more  certainly  R)ght ;  That 
they  be  not  impar'd  or  loft  for  want  of  being  imparted,  and 
improv'd  according  to  what  may  be  grafted  upon  them,  when 
once  they  arethroughlyEttablilh'd;  or  as  ro  the  real  Advantage 
which  might  be  made  of  them  in  our  Adting  agreeably  to 
them. 

§  12.  18.  As  to  what  we  obferve  or  hear  of  Publick  or 
Private  Occurences,  that  are  in  any  kind  confideral  le  ;  that 
we  fail  not  to  make  the  beft  Remarks  avc  can  thereon,  and  ro 
prefervefuchasmay  be  of  Future  Ufe,  by  minuting  down  fo 
much  of  them,  as  may  bring  them  to  mind  upon  the  Review, 
which  we  fhould  oblige  our  felves  to  take  of  them  at  feme 
fit  Scal'ons. 

§  13.  19.  As  to  cur  Converfe  with  others ;  that  we  flill 
endeavour  to  be  gaining  fomewhat  from  them  of  what  they 
may  be  knowing m,  or  improving  both  our  felves  and  them 
by  imparting  to  them. 

§  14.  20.  In  the  laft  place,  As  to  what  we  Read  j  thar 
we  employ  fome  Tho't  upon  it,  as  it  may  require  and  de- 
ferve :  1  hat  we  lay  up  for  Ufe  what  is  wortii  the  i^oring, 
taking  Care  to  review  it  at  proper  Timts,  and  to  ufe  it  upon 
Occafion.  But  as  to  the  Ufe  of  Books,  I  fhali  fpeak  more 
particularly  when  I  come  to  treat  of  the  itated  Puifuit  of  ufe- 
ful Knowledge  under  the  conclvding  General. 


€HAP. 


Chap.  1 9.  lmprove.ment  of  tiealon.  93  r 


CHAP.     XIX. 


§  I.  \17  HAT  has  been  farther  defign  d,  as  to  the  prefenc 
^  Way  of  uling  our  Reafon,  is  more  fpecially  to 
Ihew  how  this  Elfay  may  be  rightly  diredled  and  apply 'd  to 
Ufe  and  Service  :  And  as  to  the  whole  of  it  we  may  find 
fomewhat  in  the  Introdu(5lion  more  particularly,  §  igi. 
page  vi. 

The  firft  Part  of  it  is  to  be  read,  reviewed,  and  as  far  as 
well  may  be  remember'd,  that  we  may  be  furniih'd  with  a 
Methodical  Set  of  General  and  approved  Notions  about  the 
different  Sorts  of  Things,  which  may  come  under  Confide- 
rarion,  Vid.  P.  I.  C.  i.  §  i,  pag.  1. 

§  2.  The  more  general  Ufe  of  the  Account  given  of 
Tho't  and  Tilings,  Part  I.  Chap,  i,  2, 3, 4,  5.  is  briefly  fhewn. 
Chap.  2.  §  3.  pag.  7.  and  what  is  there  delivered,  §8,  p,  10, 
1 1 .  may  fetve  more  particularly  for  Inftrud:ion,  Caution, 
and  Afliftance  in  relation  to  Memory. 

Some  more  Special  Service,  to  which  the  Account  of 
Tho'ts  and  Things  is  applicable,  may  be  feen,  Part  I.  C.  2, 
§  13.  pag.  10.  fomewhat  of  that  kind  is  alfo  intimated,  not 
only  in  Relation  to  thofe,  but  likewife  with  Reference  to  the 
more  Abitiadl  Notions,  which  follow  them  (Chap.  6,  ©"c. 
to  the  1*5  inclufivcly  Vide  P.  II.  Ch.  4.  §  2,  3.  p.  141.  and 
indeed  ir,ore  or  iefs  thro'  the  whole  General  Head  about  En- 
quiries ;  and  of  what  Service  they  may  be  in  relation  to  Proof 
is  more  exprefly  ihew n,  P.  III.  Ch.  8.  §  14,  15,  16.  p.  267. 
andCh.  11.  §  3.  p.  182. 

§  3.  As  to  the  Ufe  of  the  Pofitions,  deliver'd,  P.  I,  C  i  (5, 
17,  oc.  fomewhat  is  there  briefly  fug  gelled,  Ch.  i6,6.p.99, 
and  P.  III.  Ch.  8.  §  17.  p.  267.  as  alfo,  Ch.  u.  s  3.  p.  282. 
The  General  Heads ,  P.  II.  and  III.  which  ftiew 
the  feverai  ways  of  uling  our  Reafon,  wherem  they  are  to  di- 
redt and aflift  [Vide  Introduciio7i,%  21,  ^'-., p,  vii)  do  plainly 
tell  us  the  peculiar  Service,  to  which  they  are  mainly  defign'd 
and  fitted  ;  yet  what  is  deliver'd  upon  them  may  likewife  oe 
applicable  to  fome  other  Purpofes,    and  more  particularly  to 

that  of  Proof,  as  is  Ihewn,  Part  IIL  Chap.  .8  §  1 8, -24, 

page  267,  G^c, 


Z  a  "What 


532  An  t^Jfay  for  the  Part  HI. 

'  - 

What  we  are  now  upon,  plainly  enough  declares  the  Ufe 
to  be  made  of  ir,  and  fo  will  the  feveral  Branches  of  that 
comprehenlive  General,  which  is  to  finifh  this  ElTay. 

§4,  Burl  would  endeavour  yet  more  directly  and  diftindlly 
tofliewin  what  way  this  Treatife  might  be  moft  advantagiouf- 
lyperus'd;  and  how  a  Learner  might  employ  himfelf  uponit, 
or  aboLic  it,  fo  as  to  have  it  (ink  deep  into  his  Mind,  and  there 
to  be  fo  firmly  retain'd,  that  it  may  be  throughly  digefted, 
and  infenfibly  llide  as  it  were  into  the  Veins  and  Arteries, 
Nerves,  and  Mufcles ;  fo  as  it  n-ay  lerve  with  the  Divine 
Concurrence,  to  give  a  regular  ftrong  and  vigorous  Pulfe, 
and  Motion  to  our  Reafon,  in  the  various  ways  ot  iifing  it, 
which  have  been  hitherto  mention'd,  and  will  be,  under  the 
concluding  Head,  and  indeed  to  all,  which  might  be  farther 
fpecify'd. 

§  5.    As  to  the  moft  Advantagious  way  of  pernfing  this 
Effay  it  may  feem  to  be  thus, 

I.  That  the  Reader  be  well  apprized  of  its  more  general 
Katare  and  Delign,  together  with  its  Method,  by  going  firil 
more  curforily,  and  after  f if  need  be"  more  deliberately, 
over  the  Introdudion  j  then  taking  (in  a  loofe  Paper,  or  ra- 
ther in  a  Table- Book,  which  may  lie  before  him  afterwards, 
when  he  is  reading  forwards )  fome  Memomrdtwi  of  what 
was  not  clear  to  him :  And  this  may  be  ufefuUy  done  at  ihe 
fecond  Reading  of  any  following  Divifion.     For, 

§  6.  1.  He  may  fo  read  over  again  each  diftindl  Portion 
orthisElTay  'where  he  finds  Occalion,  cither  for  the  better 
undcrftanding,  or  fixing  of  it^  before  he  proceed  to  that 
which  follows  :  And  this  is  to  be  done,  if  i:  may  be,  before 
the  Matter  is  worn  off  his  Mind ;  tho'  he  fliould  not  perhaps 
immediately  return  upon  ir,  fo  foon  as  ever  he  has  got  once 
through  it;  but  rather,  when  his  Mind  isfrelh. 

The  Chapter  about  Tho'ts,  as  leading  to  Things,  may  be 
ilnis  diftindly  read  and  reviewed  (tv-.  Chap.  1.)  and  lo 
Chap,  2.  about  the  varions  wa'. s  of  Thinking;  likewile 
Chap,  the  3d  the  4th.  and  the  5th  may  be  per  s'd  in  the  lame 
manner,  or  however,  fuch  diltin(ft  parts  of  them  as  may  re- 
quire it :  Chap,  the  6th,  or  fomewhar  of  it,  may  perhaps 
demand  m.cre  than  one  Review,  as  opening  the  way  to  all 
that  fol'^'Wsin  the  firft  Part ;  yet  if  fome  Tilings  in  it  ihould 
fiill  remain  Dark,  xhey  may  be  better  underftood,  when  he 
has  gone  forward. 


§  7.  3.  The 


Chap.  19-        Improvement  of  K^diiGn.  93^ 

^  7.  3,  The  Reader  fliould  carry  along  with  him  rhe 
Remembrance,  that  in  the  Chapters  following  to  the  i6rh, 
the  Matters  treated  are  the  more  'Soticnnt  Confidemtions^  under 
which  Things  may  be  taken,  either  fundamentally  and  par- 
tially in  the  Sotionnl  Elcvisnts,  which  go  to  make  them  up 
(Chap.  7  )  or  formally  and  totally  in  the  Notioi.tl  Charader, 
which  belongs  to  them  as  they  may  be  obfervably,  either 
combine!^  oi  (cpnrnted^  OV  nbjlrndcd,  OV  t\(t  relntcd,  or  finally, 
Exprcjjive  of  fomewhat  elfe  :  The  two  firft  Charadtens  n:iay 
be  read  and  review'd,  if  there  be  Occafion,  in  Chap.  8.  both 
together;  and  the  latter,  each  of  them  feverally,  in  the 
Chapters  reipcdively  belonging  to  each:  And  perhaps  it 
might  be  moft  convenient  to  take  the  Chapters,  each  by  it 
felf,  reviling  one,  before  he  proceed  to  another,  in  regard  of 
that  Variety  of  nice  and  critical  Matter,  which  fome  of  them 
at  leaft  contain. 

The  like  Advice  may  be  not  unfitly  given  in  reference  to 
the  Five  Chapters  of  Pofitions  which  conclude  the  firft 
Part. 

§  8.  4.  As  to  the  General  Heads  relating  to  the  fevcral 
ways  of  ufing  our  Reafon,  wherein  it  is  to  be  directed  and 
afliftcd,  it  were  beft,  that  one  of  them  be  read  through,  be- 
fore it  be  review'd,  tho'  it  fliould  make  divers  ChaD:ers ;  un- 
lefs  it  be  very  long,  and  confift  of  Branches  that  are  very 
diftindt  and  clear  of  one  another  ;  as  the  Cafe  will  be  m  the 
following  Head  about  Condudt,  and  may  be  found  in  t^af 
we  are  here  upon,  as  alfo  in  fome  of  the  foregoing  :  It  may 
then  be  more  convenient,  (efpecially  if  there  were  a  conside- 
rable Variety  of  critical  Matter,  or  what  fhould  appear  lefs 
plain)  to  return  upon  one  diftinA  Branch  of  fach  General 
Head,  before  the  Reader  go  forward  to  another ;  that  fo  the 
Mind  may  be  in  fome  meafure  polfeftof  the  foregoing  Points, 
and  better  prepar'd  to  take  in  thofe  which  follow.  And 
indeed, 

§  9.  5.  It  would  not  be  convenient  to  proceed  farther  ac 
once  than  that  the  Mind  may  be  Capable  of  giving  a  clofe 
Attention  without  too  much  Fatigue. 

6.  It  might  be  commonly  beft  to  read  fo  much  as  is  fit,  to- 
wards Evening,  and  to  review  it  next  Morning,  without 
ftaying  at  all  the  firft  time,  or  very  long  upon  the  fecond 
Reading,  to  mufe  upon  what  may  ftill  be  obfcure ;  but  only 
taking  fome  Account  of  it  (as  has  been  dire<fled),  at  leaft, 
where  it  is  j  that  it  may  be  farther  confider'd  in  tit  Seafon. 


Z  3  §  I®.  7. If 


^54  An  tffjj/ for  the  Part  HI. 

§  lo,  7.  If  the  Reader  Ihall  meet  with  the  Explication 
of  any  Term,  which  was  before  Dark  or  Doubtful  to  liim,  it 
m'ght  be  ofUfe  to  note,  it  down  together  with  the  Place, 
which  clear'd  the  Senfe  thereof  ro  hifn,  that  lie  may  have  re- 
courfeto  it,  if  there  Ihould  be  OccaOon  :  And  it  would  cer- 
tainly be  of  Advaiitage,  that  he  ihonjd  take  fome  Memoran- 
dum of  any  thing  iv.iaterial,  which  occurs  to  his  Mind  upon 
his  reading  this  or  that  Pallage,  referring  ic  to  that  winch 
it  has  Relation  to,  that  it  mav  be  farther  conlider'd,  when  he 
ftiall  return  again  to  that  Place.     For, 

§  II.  8.  After  he  has  gone  over  the  whole  Eflay  in  fuch 
manner,  as  has  been  directed,  it  may  be  requifite  to  perufe 
it  all  onward,  as  it  lies  bctore  him  ;  more  particnJarly  confi- 
dering  what  was  not  clear  to  him,  eitlier  i  pon  his  firit  read- 
ing or  reviling,  and  taking,  wi.hal,  peculiar  Notice  of  what 
might  feem  more  remarkable  in  it  felf ;  or  of  greater  Ufe  to 
him,  drawing  out  fome  fuch  Initru^ftions,  and  applying  them 
to  ufe  as  Occafion  may  offer. 

§  II.  9.  It  may  be  of  Advantage,  upon  farther  reading 
to  take  Occalion  from  the  References,  which  arc  miade  in 
fome  parts  of  this  Trearife  to  others  to  call  over  the  Matters 
referr'd  to,  at  Icaft  fome  of  the  prin.ipal  StriAures  of  them,  as 
far  as  may  well  be  done  by  Memory  ;  or  however  to  review 
fuch  Paffages,  as  ha\c  been  either  marked  in  the  B^ok  or 
drawn  out  of  it.' 

§  13.     10.  Some  Parts  or  Paffages  might  be  to  good  Pur- 
pofe,  and  with  no  great  Pains,    committed  to  Memory,   in 
order  to  their  lying  readier  in  the  Mind  for  Ule :     Such  I 
mean,  as  contain  in  a  very  few  Words,  what  would  be  of  im- 
portant and  continual  Service,  efpecially  to  one  who  is  in  fuch 
or  fuch  Circumftances;    as  feme  of  the  Policions  well  chofen 
out  might  certainly  prove,    and  alfo  (ome  Sets  of  Heads  to 
this  or  that  Point,   fuppole  ic  were  that  fuccindl  Account  ot 
Moral  Virtues,  Parti.  Chap.  4.  §  10,  11,  12,13,  p.  31,32. 
pr  the  Set  of  Enquiries  as  it  may  be  found,  P.I.  C.  5.  §  14,  j  5, 
1 6.  p.  41.  efpecially  if  that  and  this  be  reduc'd  to  a  few  Me- 
morative  Lines,  as  the  Tables  of  M/^/i/i?  Terms  &nd  Inferences 
are. 

§  14.  II.  It  will  undoubtedly  turn  to  Account;  if  the 
Reader  (hall  oblige  himfelf  to  take  all  the  Opportunities  and 
Occafions  he  fairly  can,  to  be  looking  into  luch  Parts  of  this 
Elfay,  as  the  Matter  may  diretft,  and  trying  what  it  may 
fuggeft  to  the  Point  or  Purpofe  in  hand :  It  has  been  con- 
find  within  fuch  narrow  Limits  for  this  amongft  other  Rea- 
fon.s,   th-'t  bein^  portable,   thcv  who  v.-ould,   micht  have  it 

fti'i 


Chap  20.        Impro've went  of  Ktdiion.  3^5 

ftill  at  hand  to  fill  up  the  Vacancies  of  Time,  and  to  be  Con- 
fulted  upon  emergent  Occafions  ;  and  the'  'tis  by  no  means 
to  be  expelled,  that  iofhould  be  capable  of  furnilhins;  a  ready 
Anfwer  to  every  Queftion  ;  yet  fomewhat  may  probably  be 
got  by  it,  tho'  we  niifs  of  what  we  feek  for.  But  to  conclude 
tliis  Point. 

§  1 5.  1 2.  It  muft  be  ftill  a  farther  Improvement  for  fuch 
as  have  Capacity  and  Leafure  to  make  their  Animadvcrlions 
and  Remarks,  both  upon  the  Exprelfion  and  Matter,  m 
Wrinng,  thic  they  may  be  afterwards  farther  confider'J, 
correiSlcd,  and  carry'd  on  to  greater Perfediion  :  Thus  what 
is  dark  in  this  Ellay  might  be  clcar'd  and  illuftrated  ;  v.'hat  is 
doubrful,  fix'd  ;  what  is  miltaken,  fct  right ;  what  is  r;j^hc 
and  true,  farther  contirmM  ;  what  is  wanting,  fupply'd; 
what  is  fuperflaous  retrenched  j  farther  Dcdudions  miizlu  be 
made,  and  Suggeftions  improv'd  to  the  rendring  this  Work 
much  more  Complere,  and  the  Perfon  fo  emplov'd  upon  it 
yet  more  Accomplifh'd ;  for  fuch  an  Exercife  of  Tho't  aboiic 
lb  great  a  Variety  of  Matters,  that  are  cerrainly  diiEcuIt  and 
momentous  could  not  fail  to  do  it,  how  well  foever  he  m:ght 
be  furnilh'd  already ;  or  how  ill  foever  they  may  be  treated 
here. 

This  fitly  leads  to  what  was  farther  delign'd  in  reference 
to  this  Eflay,  and  is  to  be  profecuted  in  the  two  enluing 
Chapters. 


C  H  A  P.     XX. 

^  I .  W^HAT  I  would  farther  do  as  to  the  prefent  General 
Head,  is  to  Ihew,  how  a  Learner  may  be  employ'd 
upon  this  Eflay,  or  with  reference  to  it,  f  >  as  to  improve 
himfelf  by  it.  Now  'tis  beyond  Queftion,  that  it  is  a  much 
eafierand  fpeedier  way  to  the  underftanding  of  this  Trearife, 
for  a  Learner  to  be  engag'd  in  hearing  it  read  to  him,  than 
that  he  Ihould  be  put  to  read  it  firit  himlelf;  yet  a  more  than 
ordinary  Capacity,  with  more  than  common  Application, 
might  certainly  mafterit  in  time,  and  make  it  more  his  ';wn 
by  how  much  :he  greater  Pains  he  would  beftow  upon  it. 
He  ought  in  that  Cafe  to  purfue  the  Method  prefcrib'd  in 
the  foregoing  Chapter  as  faft  and  as  far  as  he  can,  and  Ihould. 
take  in  what  Help  he  can  by  Technical  Vocabularys,  and  by- 
Enquiries  of  others  as  he  has  Opportunity. 

Z  4  §2.He  ■ 


?36  ^in  tjjuy  for  the  Part  111 

§  2,  He,  who  has  farther  Aififtance,  (hould  improve  it 
fcy  hearing  artentiveiy,  talking  Miiuncs  at  Lcdturcs,  or  after; 
tevievviiig  and  recollecting':  And  he  would  do  well  to  draw 
our  v^liat  hefuppofes  himfelf  roundcrliand,inhisown  Words, 
charging  upon  his  Memory  only  principal  Heads,  or  briefer 
hiiits  ot  rJie  Matter  ;  but, 

'  At  a  farther  going  over,  he  fnoul  J  endeavour  to  under- 
ftand  the  Who'.e^  and  to  get  all  the  S'nmin^,  r.r  the  entire 
Scheme  into  his^  Mind  ;  hovvevcr  ro  proceed  therein  as  far  as 
he  well  can.     And, 

:  §  3.  After  this  he  may,  for  Exercife,  pitch  upon  fome- 
whar.  firft  in  this  Kfl'av;  and  then  in  o^her  Treatifes  of  vari- 
ous Kinds:  Suppofe  it  were  fuch  Parts  or  Paragraphs  as 
may  anpcarmore  A-latefial  than  others  for  him  to  be  through- 
ly acquainted  with,  '  in  order  to  a  clearer  Underltanding, 
furcr  RemcnibrancCj  better  Imitation,  or  other  valuable  Die 
thereof. 

■  §  /;.i  I  fnall,  by  way  o{ Spccimoi,  refer  to  the  I'ltroJuciion  of 
this  Logictil  Efj^iy,  finceit  is  fit  the  Learner  (libuld  well  appre- 
hend, v'vhat  he  is  aiming  at,  upon  what  Grounds,  in  what 
Way,  and  with  what  kind  of  Profpcd:.  This  1  Ihall  rather 
do,  that  I  may  not  only  more  Specially  diredl  the  pradVical 
f  fe  of  feveral  Parts  of  this  Effay,  but  that  the  Reader  may 
^e  led,  ss  it  were,  by  the  hand,  to  apply  them  accordingly  : 
as  I  fliall  lliow  by  way  of  Inftance.     And, 

§  5.  I.  As  to  what  more  immediately  prcfents  it  felf,  we 
may  enquire  what  it  is,  and  whether,  and  how  far  we  may 
proceed  upon  it  r  And  here  it  may  be  obferv'd', 
;  1 .  7lia:  we  Confciouily  know,  nor  can  doubt  of  it  if  v/e 
wpuU),  ^^^^  ^''^  ^'"'^  fniiicways  ai3'.(51:cd,  when  we  are  fo ; 
Supp^jle  in  thinking  of  fo;ne  Intellcdlual  Subjeft,  or  imagin- 
ing toburfelves  lome  or  other  Senlible  Attributes,  or  in  more 
imaicdiatc  Percepticn  by  one  or  more  of  the  Organs  of  Scnfe : 
But  then  it  is  to  be!  confider'd  in  which  of  thefe  ways  wc  are 
afiecfted  in  the  prefent  Cafe;  as  E.  gr.  If  I  think  of  the 
mcnrion'd  IntroduRion ;  or  if  I  Ihould  defignediy  fet  my  felf 
to  imagine  that  I  felt  the  Paper  with  my  Hand  ;  or  faw  it, 
and  th£  Wtiting  on  it  with  my  Eye  ;  or  heard  it  read  out  to 
me:  ■  Or  Finally,  that  I  am  (0 affe£led  (as  I  verily  believe) 
Sii  and  through:  the  prefent  ufe  of  my  Touch,  or  Sight,  01 
Hcarij'ig,  nor  would  it  be  difficult  to  determine  by  which 
.^f-'shefco    And  in  fach  Cafe, 


§6.1.  We 


Chap  20.  Improvewent  of  Realon.  337 

§  6.  2.  We  tray  readily  and  ftrongly  conclude,  that  we 
really  are,  who  are  fpme  way  atfeded,  and  that  we  are  or 
have  Beings  capable  of  fuch  Imprcirion  orMotion :  So  that, 
upon  our  Confidering  e.  gr.  of  the  Intrcduciicn,  or  fetting  our 
feJves  to  Imagine  it,  or  perceiving  it  by  fome  ouiwa.d  Senfe, 
we  may  fitly  refle(fl  upon  our  fclves  as  real  Beings,  endow'd 
with  the  Powers  or  Faculties  of  confidering,  Imagining,  and 
Perceiving,  as  we  call  them.     But  then, 

§  7.  3-  It  might  (according  to  the  Sceptical  Notion?, 
which  forre  do  rather  profefs  than  believe)  admit  of  Quefti- 
cn,  whether  there  be  any  thing  really  diftind:  from  the  Be- 
ings that  are  fo  affecfted  ;  or  however,  whether  there  be  any 
thing  exifting  without  us,  upon  the  Prefence,  or  by  Means 
whereof,  wc  are  fo  aflc6:ed  ;  And  in  the  prefent  Inftance,  whe- 
ther the  Paper  we  feem  to  feci,  or  the  Writing  we  believe  our 
felves  to  fee,  or  the  found  wc  fuppofc  our  feives  to  hear,  -be 
things  reallv  exifting,  or  only  a  kind  of  Dream  or  Vifionary  Ap- 
pearance :  The  contrary  whereof  is  in  the  General  argued,  P.  J. 
C.  I.  §  i^jCcp.  5,c^c.  andmay  be  cafily  hereapply'd.  Yet, 

§  8.  4,  There  may  be  a  much  more  Reafonable  Enquiry, 
whether  our  Perceptions,  Imaginations,  or  Conceptions  do 
indeed  reprefent  things,  as  they  are  in  themfelves,  or  only 
notifie  to  us,  that  there  is  fomewhat  or  other  diftind:  from 
thofe  inward  Notices,  and  that  by  Means  of  the  Ob.ed:  wc 
are  fo  or  fo  afle^ed,  according  as  our  Creatour  faw  tit  to 
frame  our  Exteriour  Organs,  or  Internal  Faculties:  And 
in  the  prefent  Cafe  the  Qiieftion  would  be,  whether  the  In- 
telledual  Matter,  or  Meaning,  of  the  IntroduHion,  be  in  it 
fclf  really  fuch,  or  only  fo  conceiv'd,  agreeably  to  the  Na- 
tural Make  of  our  Minds  ?  And  whether  the  Paper  and  Let- 
ters thereon  have  indeed  fuch  Colour  and  Figure,  or  are  only 
fo  perceiv'd  or  imagin'd  according  to  the  Make  of  our  Eye, 
or  Temperature  of  the  Brain :  Now  to  this  and  the  two 
firft  Points,  as  well  as  to  that  Immediately  preceding,  fome- 
what may  be  eafily  drawn  from  the  mentioned  Chapter, 
§  10,  12,  ^c.    However, 

§  9.  5.  All  due  Care  mull  be  taken,  that  our  Concepti- 
ons, Imaginations,  and  Perceptions  may  be  genuine  and 
agreeable  to  Nature,  no  ways  diftorted  or  altered ;  And 
therefore  that  the  Diltance,  Medium,  exterior  Organ,  Brain, 
or  Mind,  be  not  in  any  fuch  manner  ill-difpos'd,  as  that  the 
Objed  muft,  or  probably  would  be  misjudg'd  in  fuch  Cafe 
and  Circuraftances:  We  fiiould  not  therefore  go  to  take  an 
account  of  the  Paper  it  felf  by  Feeling,  •  if  it  were  newly 
fanded,  or  our  Hands  numm'd  with  Cold  j  nor  of  that,  and 

the 


g-jS  An  tffay  for  the  Pare  III. 

the  \^riting  upon  it,  with  an  Eye  infe£led  by  the  Jaundice; 
or  through  a  GJafs,  that  is  varioufly  cut ;  or  at  a  Diftance, 
which  is,  a:  leait  tor  us,  too  fmall  or  too  great:  Norfhould 
we  pretend  to  an  exacl  Reprefentation  of  it  by  Imagination, 
when  we  have  not  fccn  it  perhaps  of  a  long  time,  or  have 
feen  (incethata  muUirude  oFprinted  Papers  lomewhat  like  it, 
yet  differing  from  ir :  Nor  Finally  (hould  we  take  upon  us 
to  derermine  of  the  Stile  or  Senfe  in  a  Language,  or  about  a 
Matter,  which  we  are  not  fufHciently  acquainted  with  ;  or 
when  we  were  drowiie  or  delirious.  And  here  we  may  have 
recourfe  to  Pare  II.  Chap.  14.  §  10,  <3c.  page  i8S 

<i  lo.  Biic  when  we  find  the  Appearance  to  be  fuch  as  we 
and  others,  fo  far  a^  we  know,  are  generally  led  and  limited 
to  by  the  Make  of  Humane  Nature,  we  dicn  may  fafely  pro- 
ceed upon  it,  and  indeed  mult  of  Neccllicy,if  we  will  go  anv 
farther  with  the  Matter;  And  therefore  taking  the  Object 
as  we  difcern  ir,  wc  may  conlider  it  under  thcSenlible,  Ima- 
ginative, or  In'elledlual  Appearance.     And, 

^   II.     We  are  in  the  next  Place  to  Conlider, 

II,  ThefenlV-ole  Appearance  (if  any  fuch  there  be j  of  the 
ObjeA,  or  what  Preception  we  have  of  it  by  the  outward 
Senfes;  and  whereas  this  is  reprefented,  and  in  a  Sort  re- 
peated, in  the  Imaginative  Idea,  fo  far  as  it  is  right,  there  is 
therefore  ho  need  to  take  any  diftmdl  Account  of  this ;  but 
only  of  that  fro  n  which  it  isCopy'd :  We  are  therefore  here  to 
attend  to  what  is  aclrually  difi.o\  er'd  or  may  be  yet  farther  dif- 
coverablebyany  cftheSenf:s.     And, 

§  12.  (1..  Bv  the  Smell  where  there  may  beany  thing 
proper  tor  i:  to  take  notice  of;  (2.)  By  the  Talk,  where  that 
may  be  fitly,  fafelv,  and  to  purpole  us'd  :  But  there  is  no- 
thing in  the  prefent  Inftance,  vi:{.  that  of  the  Introdudion, 
obfervably  fuited  to  either  of  thefe ;  and  therefore  we  pro- 
ceed, '3.;  By  th?  Touch,  where  that  can  be  well  us'd  ;  nor 
is  there  any  thing  more  in  the  prefent  Cafe  difcoverable  by 
it,  befides  lomewhat  of  the  Make  of  the  Paper,  and  Manner 
of  the  Leaf. 

§  11-  We  go  on  therefore  to  examine  the  Objed:,  (4.)  by 
the  Ear  ;  and  thus  the  Introduclion,  or  other  part  of  this  EfTay, 
if  i:  were  plainly  and  properly  read  out  to  us,  would  be 
found  to  confift,  af  nudible,  in  a  number  of  Articulate  Sounds, 
•with  various  Pauies,  Accents,  and  Cadencies:  And,  (5.)  by 
the  Eye  we  Ihould  find  in  the  fame  ObjcA,  ai  'vifihle,  fome 
conftJerable  variety  of  Marks,  vi:{.  differing  Letters,  Points, 
and  Figures;  and  ia  far  greater  Ninnber  of  particular  Com- 
rina-ions  made  of  them  in  the  feveral  Words,  Claufcs,  Pe- 
riods, 


Chap.  20.  Ir/iprovement  of  [\.ealon.  539 

riods,    Seilions,   £>c ;    of  the   Introdudtion  ;  or  fuppofe  ic 
were  of  the  concluding  General  Head. 

^14.  HI,  The  Intelle£lual  Appearance,  or  Confidera- 
tion  of  Objedis,  will  carry  us  into  a  far  greater  Length  then 
either  of  the  f  Jtegoing  Heads,  tho*  wo  Ihould  limi:  our  felves 
only  to  the  Inftance  of  Difccuife,  and  by  way  of  parricular 
Specimen,  to  the  Introduction,  or  to  the  finilhing  part  of  this 
Elfay.  And  i.  It  may  eafily  appear  to  one  that  is  in  forre 
good  mealure  acquainted  with  the  Language,  and  Argument 
treated  of,  that  the  forementioned  Marks  were  indeed  Signs^ 
which  had  their  more  immediate  Reference, by  urage,to  arti- 
culate Soui.ds,  as  thofe  agai^i  to  Notions  or  Ideas,  and  thefe 
to  the  things  we  fo  conceive  PL  C.  14,  i5.p83,G'c.)  and 
that  the  fe\  eral  Letters  or  Words  fo  put  together  (?.  ^^J  in 
the  Introduction  or  Conclufion,  do  with  the  Points  and  Num- 
bers make  a  Difcourfe.     Therefore, 

§  I  5.  1.  We  may  go  upon  the  feveral  Words  of  the  Dif- 
courfe propos'd,  giving  the  I  ogical  Notions  belonging  to 
their  Grammatical  Names  refpedively,  as  the  Word  may  be 
an  Article,  Noun-Subftantive,  &c  ;  and  fometimes  more 
than  one  of  thefe,  if  taken  by  it  felf  alone.  Here  we  may 
Confuit  and  ufe  the  Logical  Account  given  of  Words  in  the 
foremention'd  Chap.  15.  page  93.     And, 

In  the  prcfcnt  Example,  the  Word  {[Reafon]  feparately 
taken,  without  the  Reference  or  Connexion  it  has  in  the  ve- 
ry beginning  of  the  Introduction,  §1,  page  i.  may  be  ei- 
rher  a  Koun-Subftantive,  expreiTmg  what  is  or  may  be  the 
Subje(5t  of  fome  Attribute,  or  elfe  a  Verb,  affirming  Some- 
what, &c.  See  the  mentioned  Chap.  15.  §  i,  8. 

§  1 6.  Again  [is]  feparately  taken,  may  be  eithera  Verb- 
Subftantive  affirming  Exiltence;  or  a  Verb-Adjc6tive,  inti- 
maring  the  Addition  of  fome  or  other  Attribute  to  fome  Sin- 
gular, not  Plural,  Subject;  and  which  is  a  Subjeft  fpoken 
of,  not  Iwch  as  is  fuppos'd  to  fpeak,  or  to  be  fpoken  to. 

Thus  the  Words  may  at  firft  be  taken  all  of  them  in  order, 
as  they  lie;  and  after  fome  time,  only  the  Sorts,  which  have 
lefs  frequently  occur'd,  may  be  Logically  accounted  for. 

In  this  kind  of  Praxis  or  Exercife,  the  Learner  may  pro- 
ceed till  he  has  made  the  Logical  Notions  of  the  feveral  Sorts 
of  Words  very  ready  and  familiar  to  him. 

§  17.  3.  We  may  refume  the  feveral  Words,  ftill  fepa- 
rately taken,  and  confider  them  according  to  the  particular 
and  various  Meaning  they  have,  or  might  have;  referring 
them  to  their  proper  place  in  the  Account  of  Tho'ts  or  Things 
as  confider'd  in  themfelves^  P.  I.  Chap.i,  3:  4, 5.  or  accor- 
ding 


t40  An  bffay  for  the  Hart  III. 

ding  to  a  more  Notional  Confideracion  of  them,  Chap.  7,  8, 
^c,  to  15,  inclufively.     And, 

This  Manner  of  Praxis  may  ferve  very  much  to  enlarge 
our  Apprehenlion,  as  to  the  various  Import,  which  the  fame 
Word  may  have  in  diiferent  Places,  under  the  fame  or  dif- 
fering Grammatical  Names. 

§  18.  Thus,  E.Gr.  [Reafon]  the  Verb,  may  fignifie  to 
Rcafon  out  or  Infer  ;  to  Reafon  or  Prove  :  to  Reafon  with  or 
perfwade;  to  Reafon  againft  or  Confute.  And  thefe  are  fo 
msny  variou.>  Actions  which  may  be  refer'd  to  P.  I.C.  7.  §  11. 
p.  <;4  '  Alfo  [Reafon]  the  Noun-Subftantive,  may  fignifie  the 
Faculry  or  Reafoning  Power  it  lelf ;  or  the  Produce  thereof,  a 
Reafon,  or  the  Objedlive  E\  idence,  as  when  we  fay  this  or 
that  has  Reafon  in  it ;  or  elfc  Mathematically,  the  Propor- 
tion of  one  Quantity  to  another:  or  Phylica'ly,  the  Caufe 
whence  this  or  that  is  fo ;  or  Morally  the  Principle  from 
wh.ch  a  Man  Ai5ts,  or  the  end  for  which  ;  Thefe  may  be 
varioufly  refer'd  to  this  or  that  Head  of  the  firft  or  fecond 
Scale  ;  and  there  may  be  perhaps  farther  Senfes  of  the  Word 
under  both  rhe  Grammatical  Confiderations.     But, 

§  \g.  Tho'  we  cannot  eafily  think  of  every  various  Im- 
port, nor  perhaps  be  able  to  find  them  all  in  any  Vocabula- 
ry, or  Didrionary  ;  yet  it  muft  hz  not  a  little  improving  to 
the  Learner,  to  go  as  far  as  he  can  this  way  for  the  prefent ; 
and  he  would  thus  find  the  Stock  continually  growing  upon 
hi<"  Hands  fo  that  he  might  be  like  to  attain  a  much  grca- 
.cr  Kcadinefs  and  Exadtnefs  both  in  Undcrftanding,  and 
ufing  the  Words  of  that  Language  wherein  he  (hould  fo  Ex- 
erciie  himfelf :  And  tho'  it  were  commonly  beft  to  try  how 
far  we  can  go  without  the  help  cf  Vocabularies,  yet  they 
may  be  at  Iraft  afterwards  ufefully  confulted  ;  efpecially  up- 
on Particle*:,  and  other  Words,  with  which  we  are  not  fo 
well  acq.iainted. 

§  lo.  4.  When  any  Word  occurs,  whereof  we  have  little 
or  nothing  more  at  prefent  bcfides  the  Gramyjintkr.l  Name, 
and  Logical  Notion  belonging  thereto,  we  may  try  if  the 
Set  of  Enquiries  Part II.  C.  4.  §  r4,c3'c,p.  143.J  will  fuggeft 
any  thing  farther ;  or  we  may  confuk  Didionarys,  Lexicons, 
C^:.  and  particularly,  as  to  Terms  of  Art,  the  Lexicon  Tech- 
nicwn  Mngnuin^  compos'd  by  the  Ingenious  Mr.  Harris  i  or 
el  fe  apply,  if  we  have  Opportunity,  to  Perfons  them.felves, 
who  are  more  generally  knowing  in  fach  Language  and  in 
fu^h  kind  of  things,  according  to  the  Dire£lion,  Part  If. 
Chap.*?.  §  18, p.  152. 

§li,Snppofe 


Chap.  20.        Improvement  oj  Realon.  541 

§  21.  Suppofe  it  were  the  Word  [Schen.e]]  in  the  Intro- 
duClion,  §  4,  about  which  wc  were  at  a  lol's,  and  all  we 
knew  of  it  was  only,  that,  being  a  Subltantive,  it  muft  in 
general  fignifie  either  a  Subftance,  01  what  is  confider'd  how- 
ever as  fonnewhat,  which  do's  or  may,  in  a  manner,  fi  blift 
under  fome  or  other  Attribute,  as  there  itis  put  with  that  ot" 
Corderly]  :  Now  we  may  try  whether  the  niention'd  En- 
quiries will  intimate  any  thing  fuitablc  to  the  Place  or  Cir- 
cumftances,  wherein  the  word  there  Itands ;  or  eifc  we  may 
endeavour  otherways,  as  above,  to  infoim  our  lel\cs  more 
particularly  about  the  Scnfe  or  Senfes  it  ma  have;  but  ef- 
pecially  we  (hould  fee  what  Light  may  be  drawn  as  to  the 
Meaning  of  it  in  that  place,  from  anv  thing  there  preceding, 
attending,  or  following  it  :  V.di  Part  II.  Chap.  z.  page 
125?,  GJc. 

§  22.  5 .  Upon  our  having  fome  competent  Apprehenfion 
as  to  the  Import  of  the  feveral  Words,  we  may  proceed  to- 
wards making  fome  Jucgment  about  fuch  of  the  things  there- 
by fignified,  as  appear  to  be  more  confiderable  •  endeavouring 
to  State  and  Determine,  as  near  as  we  can,  the  following 
Points  in  reference  to  them. 

(i .)  Whether  this  or  that  fingle  Theme  be  not  above  our 
Reach,  according  to  what  is  deli\  er'd  ,  Part  II.  Chap.  7. 
page  I  "5  2,  ©'r.  As  e.  gr.  Ai^n  and  Brutes  ;  mention  d  in  the 
Introduilion,  §1.)  in  refped:  of  their  inmoft  and  fundamen- 
tal Elfence,  or  of  that  Bemg  which  lies  unknown  at  the  bot- 
tom of  all  the  Attributions  thereto  given;  and  much  moreour 
Crcatour,  (there  alfo  mentioned)  as  to  his  Infinite  Perfecflions. 

§  23.  (2.J  What  there  may  yet  be  even  in  fuch  Things, 
or  about  them,  that  lies  within  our  Reach,  vi:^.  certain  Re- 
lations, or  other  Attributes  belonging  to  the  mentioned  Sub- 
je£ts ;  as  Reafon,  Arguing,  Inferring,  ^c.  to  Man,  fome- 
what  like,  but  of  a  far  lower  Nature  to  fome,  at  leaft,  among 
the  Brutes ;  Creating,  Suftaining,  ^c.  to  our  Creatour,  Vide 
Part  II.   Chap.  8.  page  1 57,  c5c. 

(3  }  Whether  we  have  a  Concern  to  Underftand  or  Eifec^ 
this  or  that ;  As,  to  comprehend  either  our  Creator,  or  per- 
fedly  to  underltand  Mav,  or  any  of  the  Brute  Creatures^  or 
that  we  Ihould  endeavour  to  make  any  fuch  kind  of  Being. 

§  24.  (4}  Of  what  Importance,  that  may  be,  which  wc 
arc  not  altogether  incapable  of,  or  unconcerned  with  :  And 
her.:  we  may  attempt  to  lay  the  Ufes  of  our  Reafon  (menti- 
on d  in  the  Introdudtion,  §  i,  and  21,  22  )  as  near  as  we  can 
in  order,  accoraing  to  the  difl'ering  Importance  they  may  be 
of :     And  this  we  may  do  either  defcending  from  the  higheit. 


342 An  tjjay  for  the  Parr  1 1  \. 

or  afcending  from  the  loweft,    flill  applying  the  Rule   »nd 
Realbns given,  Part  II.  Cap.  9,  10,  11.  page  \6i,^c. 

And  farther,  by  way  of  Exercife,  we  may  more  particu- 
larly State  and  prove,  of  what  Importance  it  is,  that  our  in- 
firm and  depraved  Reafon  Ihould  have  all  the  farther  Diredi- 
on  and  Help,  which  can  be  given  it  by  this  EfTay,  or  other- 
wife  -y  as  is  intimated  in  the  Introdudion,  §  2. 


§ 


CHAP.     XXI. 

I.  TTHUS   far  we  have  taken  words  wiih  their  Import 
*    feparately  ;    But  that  we   may  better  underitanJ 
continu'd  Difcourfe,  we  now  proceed, 

6.  To  confider  Words  in  their  Logical,  as  well  as  Gram- 
matical, Connexion :  And  here  we  may  either  take  all  the 
"Words  before  us,  as  they  are,  or  might  be  plac'd  in  the 
plaineft  Gramrrtatical  Order  5  and  we  may  fometimes  vary 
the  Form  of  the  Claufc  or  Sentence,  in  compliance  with  the 
more  proper  Logical  way  of  delivering  that  Senfe  .-  Or  elfe 
we  may  fingle  out  here  and  there  fome  Principal  Words  to  be 
explain'd  and  ftated,  according  to  the  Senfe  in  which  they 
ought  to  be  taken,  where  tliey  ftand  fo  connected  and  refer'd. 
And  we  may  here  proceed  by  the  following  Steps, 

fi.)  We  iho'jld  give  an  Account  of  the  Words  as  they 
ftand  in  Conjundtion  wiih  others,  what  is  their  determinate 
Import ;  and  why  they  fhould  be  fo  underftood,  which  may 
be  done  in  fome  fuch  way  as  this,  upon  the  Intrcdudicyi^ 

§  2.  C  Reafon  3  muft  here  mean  the  Power ,  or 
Faculty  of  Reafoning,  not  the  Acft  or  EtfeA  j  fince  it  is  fo 
limited  by  its  being  Konunative  to  the  Verb,  and  efpecially 
by  the  following  Explication:  [is]  being  a  Verb  of  fuch 
Number  and  Perfon,  aftirms  of  Reafon,  that  which  follows, 
(yi:^.)  its  being  [taken J,  or  underftood,  not  indeed  always, 
but  [ofr],  or  in  the  more  frequent  Ufe  of  the  Word,  [more 
ftricJily]  i.  e.  in  a  narrower  Senfe,  or  which  is  however  fo, 
compar'd  with  what  is  atrer wards  mcntion'd,  [for]  ;.  c.  as 
fignifying  [the  Power]  vi:^^__  that  particular  and  dv: terminate 
Ability  or  Capacity  [of],  /.  e.  w-hich  can  produce  the  Ad  of 
[argvnng]  or  proving  fome  Point  by  fome  other,  [or]  .'.  e.  if 
not  that  Ad  then  tlie  following,  {vi:{^  that  of  [Inferring], 
or  deducing  one  Point  from  another,  [onlyj  i.  c.  the  one  or 
otiicrof  the  mentioned  Ads,  without  any  othtr  which  is  not 
included  m  one  of  thofe.  §  3-  Here 


Chap.  21.        Improvement  of  ?^t3iiou.  343 

§  3.  Here  we  may  pafs  over  the  Adverfative  Particle 
[But1 ;  and  lliould  vary  the  Form  of  that  which  follows  next, 
and  iriftead  ct"  [what  I  am  here  attempting],  we  may  give 
the  Senfe  in  a  more  Logical  Form,  by  putting  that,  which  is 
really  the  Subjed:  of  the  Propofuion,  hrit,  and  more  expref- 
ly,  thus,  [Reafon,  which  I  am  attempting  to  cultivate  and 
improve,  is  here  to  be  taken  more  largely  for  that  difcerning 
Faculty,  (^c.l  And  upon  the  Senfe  thus  exprefs'd,  we  may 
go  on  wich  the  Praxis,  as  before  ;  laying  before  us  what  is 
offer'd.  Part  II.  Chap,  i,  2.  page  125,  CJ'c  about  raking 
righth  what  others  deliver.  We  fhould  next  proceed  to 
draw  out  the  fevcral  Points  affirm'd  or  deny'd.    And, 

§  4.  (i.)  We  may  draw  out  the  more  exprefs  Enunciati- 
on?, adding  the  Charadters  refpedively  belonging  to  them  ; 
Thus,  that  [Reafon  is  taken  oft  more  flridtly  for  the  Power 
of  Arguing  or  Inferring  only]  is  a  Propof.fion  Affirmative, 
Indefinite,  Complex,  according  to  Part  11.  Chap.  16,  17, 
1 8.  page  194,  d^c.  Again,  that  [Reafon  which  is  attempted 
here  to  be  cultivated,  and  improved,  is  to  be  underftood  in  a 
larger  Senfe]  is  another  like  Propofiticn,  but  which  has  an 
Incidental  one  in  it,  defcribing  and  determining  Reafon,  the 
Subjedl  of  the  Enunciation  ,  a*  being  the  ObjeA  about 
which  we  are  Converfant  in  this  Effay,  to  cultivate  and  im- 
prove it:  Here  we  may  refer  to  Part  II.  Chap.  16.  §  11, 
12.  page  197. 

§  %.  C3.)  Complex  Enunciations  may  be refolv'd into  the 
Simple  Propofitions,  which  are  contain'd  and  couch'd  in 
them ;  as  that  [Reafon  is  taken  oft  more  ftridly,  than  in 
fome  other  Cafes,]  that  [Arguing  or  Inferring,  whether  ei- 
ther of  them  alone,  or  both  together,  carry  aftridferor  nar- 
rower Senfe  than  the  Word  I{c.ifon  fometimes  is  to  be  taken 
in]  ;  Particularly  that  [fuch  a  Senfe  of  it  is  ftrider  than  that, 
which  is  here  given  to  it]  ;  for  that  [Reafon  is  here  taken  for 
the  difcerning  Faculty,  cJ':.]  ;  And  agaiji,  that  [Reafon,  fo 
Underftood  more  at  large,  is  the  Subject  or  Obje<5t,  about 
which  thisElfay  is  Converfant] ;  and  that  [the  cultivating  of 
Reafon,  fo  taken,  is  the  thing  here  defign'd],  G?c. 

§  6.  (4.  ■  Some  at  leaf!  of  the  fimple  or  of  the  more  com- 
plex Propollrions,  may  be  open'd,  by  Ihewing  diftin£tly, 
what  is  the  Subject  or  Thing  Ipoken  of  in  them ;  what  the 
Predicate;  of  what  Words  and  Ideas  this  or  that  is  made  up; 
And  laftly  by  wiiat  and  how  they  are  conjoined  or  disjoin'd  j 
i.  e,  what  is  the  Copula  deny'd  or  affirm'd. 


344  ^«  ^Py  for,  the  Part  I  J!. 

I  fliall  only  touch  by  way  of  Example  upon  the  Subject 
in  that  Complex  Propofition,  [What  I  am  here  attempting, 
C^c]  or  as  it  fhouJd  rather  be  Logically  \  aried  [That,  which 
I  am  here  attempting,  CJc]  Now  the  Subied:  muft  be  not 
[1 1,  as  it  might  (eem,  but  [Realon],  this  being  the  Matter 
in  Hand,  and  to  be  underftood  in  the  Relative  [WhatJ,  or 
[that  which],  and  it  is  here  defcrib'd  and  derermin'd,  as  be- 
ing the  O^/Vt-f  of  an  Attempt,  which  (Attempt)  is /jr^?  made, 
7.  e.  in  this  Elfay :  the  Defign  and  End  wherec^f  is  to  culti- 
vate, G^c.  Thus  one  Word,  and  Notioii  with  it,  is  fLperad- 
ded  to  another,  to  make  up  the  intended  Subjedt.  We  may 
now  proceed, 

§  7.  7.  To  take  the  Enunciations  in  pieces,  and  to  look  in- 
to the  feveral  Terms  thereof,  with  relation  to  the  more  Simple 
Ideas  intimated  or  underftood  in  the  Subjedts  and  Predicates 
of  the  Difcourle  under  Confideration  ;  In  what  Senfe,  and 
how  far  they  may  be  accounted  right,  according  to  Part  II. 
C.13.  §  z,-!!5'cp.i8i,G>c:  And  farther  we  may  here  endeavour, 
as  accurately  as  we  can,  to  form  our  own  fingle  Appr..henfi- 
ons  of  the  feveral  more  confiderable  Things  or  Obje£ls  of 
Tho't,  mentioned  in  what  we  are  upon. 

And  here  we  may  take  Notice,  where  it  is  that  we  Iiave 
little  or  nothing  more  than  the  dark  and  general  Apprehen- 
fion,  that  this  or  that  is  a  Being  or  Somewhat ;  and  alfo 
whtre  the  Ideas  are  Inadequate  or  Adequate,  Elfentiai  or 
Extra-eifential,  ^c.  according  to  the  mentioned  Chap.  13. 

§  8.  Now  a  ?ynxK  of  this  kind  might  be  made,  upon  the 
moreobfervaUie  Simple  Themes  in  the  IntroduClion,  after 
the  manner  here  following, 

Reafon]  is  the  Principal  Siibje£f,  or  the  Theme  mainly 
Treated  of,  §  i.  the  In^.port  of  the  Naync  is  diftinguilh'd  into 
a  ftridter  Senfe,  wherein. the  Word  is  frequently  taken,  and 
a  larger  which  is  here  defign'd  {Vide  Part  II.  Chap.  19.  §  1 2. 
page  iij.v  The  Things  as  here  intended,  is  not  llri£tly  de- 
fin'd,  but  rather  dcfcrib'J  {j/ide  ibid  §  14 — 19),  by  the  Cha- 
ra(5ter  of  its  being  a  Vr.culty  or  Power  (whether  Adlive,  Paf- 
iive,  or  both  together,  T'/We  Parti  C.  ro,  §  9,  ro-p.  73).  and  ' 
that  Faculty  dijccming,  minding  and  objerving  things  (Part  I. 
Chap.  2.  §  14.  page  10  ;  Reafon  as  here  delignd  is  farther 
defcrib'd  by  divers  Relations  it  has,  ri:{^  to  Man,  as  A'b- 
jeclcd  /«him,  commonly  mads  his  dljiinguljhing  Charniicr,  and 
plainly  gives  him  a  Cnpncity  far  Superior  to  that  of  Brutes  ;  as 
aifo  to  the  feveral  Ads  mcntion'd  as  produced  by  means  there- 
of, vi:{.  Examining,  Recbifying,  Confirming,  Reflecting, 
(^c-j  Vide  Part  1.  Chap.  13.  53,  9.  F^S^'^Sj  86= 


Chap.  2  1.         i.^iprovement  of  ^Qdkior,.  545 

§  9.  If  in  our  Praxis  v/e  would  give  an  Account  of  Rea- 
fov,  in  th.'  more  Notional  way  ;  we  mighc  fay,  'tis  a  firaple 
Theme,  and  as  fuch,  a  Thing  (or  Subjed  of  Tho'c)  f^paraceiy 
taken ;  that  ic  is  ^rJ^  Fcjitive,  and  Pcrma-iient:,  yet  is  not 
the  Subftance  of  the  Mind,  but  an  Accident  belonging  to  it, 
by  means  whereof  it  can  produce  thofe  A^s,  or  tranfient  Ac- 
cidjnts  before  mention'd,  together  with  the  more  permanent: 
EJfccis  thence  proceeding,  fuch  as  habitual  t^nowledge,  Trea- 
tifes,  &c.  Here  fee  Part  I.  Chap.  6.  §  9.  page  48,  49,  with 
Chap.  7.  §  2,  4,  1 1,  12,  and  Chap.  13.  §  9,  lO.  page  86. 
I(e^/cn  is  alfo  here  an  abjimiled  Attribute,  and  the  Object  about 
which  this  Elfay  is  converfant.  Vide  Vsxtl.  Chap.  10.  §6. 
,^page72. 

§  10.  In  fome  fuch  way  we  might  give  an  Accoant  of 
"Man,  either  more  plainly,  according  to  what  is  faid  of  Spi- 
rit, Body,  Compounds,  Plants  and  Animals,  P.I.  C.  3.  §  2, 
4,7,21.  p.  i7,«S?c;  or,moreNodonally,P.I.C.9.§8,9.p.68.  and 
Chap.  8.  §  5.  page.  61 :  Likewife  of  Brutes,  according  to 
what  is  faid  of  Animals,  Part  I.  Chap.  3.  §  21.  page  25  j 
and  Chap.  9.  §  10.  page  68. 

Some  Account  may  be  given  of  our  Creator  from  what  is 
offer'd.  Part  I.  Chap.  6.  §  8,  9,  lo,  n,  1 2.  page  48, G?c; 
and  likewife  of  Exnmining^  Reciifyingf  Confirming^  Abfimci- 
ing,  P^"flcciing,  with  other  Operations  of  the  Mindy  as  alfo  of 
ScnJ:  and  Imaghiation  from  what  is  fuggefled,  l?arc  I.  Chap.  2. 
page  7,  G/c.  and  clfewhere  in  divers  places,  laftly,  to  name 
no  more,  of  the  Means  invented  and  employ  d  to  reprefent  our 
Conceptions  to  others,  mv.ch  might  be  drav/n  out  from  Part  I. 
Chap.  14,  15.  page  88,  ©'c-  and  from  Part  II.  Chap,  i,  2, 3. 
page  125,  l^c. 

Thus  the  Praxis  might  be  carry 'd  on  upon  all  the  conCde- 
rable  (ingle  Themes  throughout  the  Introdudion  or  other 
p^art  of  this  Treanfe  ;  or  thro'  fome  Seled  Portions  of  the 
C;allic  Authors  or  others. 

§  1 1.  8.  We  may  now  farther  proceed  to  make  a  Judg- 
ment, as  we  can  upon  the  Matter  of  the  Enunciations  ex- 
prefs\i  or  impiy'd  in  what  we  are  upon.     And, 

(i.)  Which  of  them  maybe  fuiHciently  evident,  and  to 
be  acquiefccd  in,  according  to  Part  II.  C.  20.  page  zi6,<3c. 

Here  wc  may  obferve,  whether  any,  and  wliich  of  the 
Principles,  or  nearer  Dedudions  (Part  I.  Chap,  1 6,  ^c),  are 
brought  in,  or  built  upon:  Thus  when 'tis  faid,  we  are  Capable 
of  Examining,  &c,  and  that,  ri>e  can  form  ab/iraFt  and  general 
No- ions,  refled,  ^c,  it  is  all  along  fuppos'd,  that  we  ibme- 
times  do  fo  j   thjt  what  we  adually  do,  we  mult  bi  capable 

A  a  o. 


5^-6  An  rjjky  for  the  Part  ill. 

of  doing,  fince  there  is  no  Attribute,  but  as  fuch  implies  a 
Subied:  Capable  oi  ir,  to  which  it  is  or  may  be  attributed, 
rV.rV  Polirion,    N)  page.  loi. 

(2.)  Welhould  alfo  fee  whether  any  of  the  Enunciations 
is  to  be  rejcdtcd  as  apparently  Falfe,  and  needing  no  other 
Conrutation,  than  what  it  carries  in  it  felf,  at  lealt  upon  its 
being  open'd  by  a  juft  Explicjition,  which  we  fliocld  accor- 
ding! .give. 

(^ )  V/e  are  likewife  10  obferve,  where  there  may  be  a 
danrer  of  Mtftake  in  what  is  laid,  and  of  what  Confc- 
quence  the  Matter  is,  if  miitakcn,  according  to  Part  II. 
Chap.  II.  pagc:Lii,  (£c. 

§  II.  9.  V/e  may  next  confidcr  the  Particles,  which 
few  theF<elation  of  dricClaule,  Period,  Paragraph,  (3c.  to 
another;  Taking  Notice  fcmcrimes  of  their  various  Import, 
and  explaining  them  according  to  the  detenunate  Senfe, 
thev  oup.ht  to  have  in  this  or  that  way  of  u^Jng  them. 

Thus  in  the  begirninp  uf  the  Introdi^clion,  ("andl  notes, 
that  /^"rf/ w  is  taken  for  the  Power  of  Argu  i  g  as  well  as  for 
thaicl  Inferring,  or  for  ihe  Power  of  peiforminjr  ioth  thcfe 
Afls,  the' w;thout  admiiting  i:  to  rcferto  an  other,  or  how- 
ever wiuhoi't  r.ttending  vo  it,  that  it  do's  :o  :  [bur]  intin.arcs, 
that  it  is  not  here  taK,en  in  fo  narrow  a  Senfe, ..  but  on  the 
contrary  wi:h  a  larger  Import :  fand"',  as  it  is  n-xc  afrcr  us'd, 
intimates,  that,  bcfidesthe  Defign  of  Cuitiv;iting  or  berier- 
ing  the  Ufe,  we  may  already  ha-c  of  our  Rcafon  to  fome 
Points,  there  is  alfo  in  this  Eilay,  a  favther  Aiai  at  improv- 
ing ic  to  fome  other  Purpofcs.  [But  V  which  b..gins  the  next 
Scftion,-  fhews,  that  notwirhuanuing  the  Accf'unr  given  of 
H'-'manc  P  eatoii  in  the  foregoing  Paragraph,  there'  ftill  need- 
ed help  to  draw  forth  the  mentioned  Power  and  Capacities 
into  Exercife,  or  to  bring  them  to  perform  berter  ;  and 
^whereas],  which  imediately  follows,  intimates,  that  the 
natural  Weaknefs  of  our  Reafon  m  its  earlier  Ufe,  together 
with  its  being  fo  dark'iied,  and  dep.av'd,  and  fo  liable  to  be 
carry'd  away,  c^r,  give  fuihcient  Evidence  and  Proof,  that 
it  ftands  in  need  of  all  the  Advances  that  can  from  time  to 
time  be  made  for  irs  Diredlion  and  Afiiftance :  And  [There- 
fore] flie^vs  that  the  Apprehenfion  of  this  need  induced  the 
Author  to  add  this  New  Effay  to  the  n  ml-er  of,  {5'f. 

Here  the  Account  oiCon[imiriions,  Part  I.  Chap.  i^.  §  iz. 
page  95,  may  be  of  feme  Ufe ;  but  there  may  yet  be  Occali- 
cn  CO  confuk  Books  that  Treat  more  deftgnedly  of  Particles. 

§  13.  lu.  The 


"7^ — • < I  ^— ^^^M^^BW 

Chap.2i.  Improvement  of '^t2i{QU.  ^^7 

S>  13.  10.  The  Claufes,  Periods,  Paragraphs,  ^c,  to 
which  the  mentioned  Particles  are  apply'd,  muft  be  accor- 
dingly eitimated  in  Relation  to  each  other,  as  being  fome- 
times  Equipollent  and  Synonymous  ;  fometimes  conirary ; 
P.  II.  C.  1 8.  §  6,  (bmetimes  they  are  to  be  confider' d,  one 
as  the  Queftion,  the  other  as  the  Argument  or  Proof;  And 
fometimes  one  as  the  Pofition,  the  other  as  an  Inference  from 
it,  nor  need  we  farther  co  cxemplifie  this  Matter. 

§  1 4.  1 1 .  If  Proof  be  any  where  offer'd  in  Logical  Form, 
we  may  obferve  the  Sort  and  Manner  of  the  Argament,  ac- 
cording to  what  is  delivered,  P.  ill.  Ch.  i.  §  10,  c^'c,  page 
231, G^c,  Ch.  i.  §  1,4,6.  Ch.  3.  §  1, 1,4,  5,7,  n,  \z,  IT. 
Ch.  4.  §  I,  4,  6:  And  as  to  the  Cntegon'c^n  Form,  what  : . 
the  Figure,  §  8  ;  and  what  the  Mood  or  Mode,  Cb.  5.^3,  4, 
j  5,6,15.   more  efpecially,   whether  the  Rules  be  anfv/er'd, 

',  which  are  given,  §  8 ■ — 15,   at  leaft  the  tive  firft  of 

them;  or  however  that  one  Charadier,  '^i'^;  or  the  Ru!q 
laid  down,  Ch.  6.  §3,  or  dfe  ^Lar,  vvh-ch  there  follows^ 
§  4.  6. 

If  the  Argument  be  not  in  Logical  Form,  it  may  be  an 
Exercife  of  fome  Service  to  put  it  into  Form ;  or  to  bring  in 
to  thtf^  which  is  acco''nted  more  pcrfeA  j  as  by  filling  up 
the  Enthymeme  (F^de  Part  III.  Ch-  3.  §  4-  page  240,  and 
Ch.  13.  §15.  page  299),  by  turning  the  Relncive,  or  Hy^ 
pothetical  Argument  into  Categorical  (J^ie  Part  III.  Ch,  3. 
§  12-  page  238,  and  Ch- 6-  §  n — 15.  pag;i5f ':.  and  by 
drawing  out  the  Serines  into  a  Train  of  common  Syilogirms, 
as  is  done,  PartllL  Ch.  4.  §  5.  p  24';. 

But  the  main  Bufinefs,  in  refpedi:  oJ-' Proof,  is  to  ferto  the 
Matter  of  it,  whether  there  be  not  fome  tallacy  or  Miftake, 
particularly  whether  any,  and  which,  of  thofe  that  are  fpe- 
cify'd,  Part  lU.  Ch.  7.  p.  256,  cj?c.- 

It  may  here  be  confider'd  from  what  Logical  Head,  the 
Proof  was  taken  ;  whether  it  were  any,  and  \vhich,  of  rhofe 
that  are  given,  Part  III.  Ch.  1 1.  §  8,  p,  p.  2i  ;. 

§15.  12.  Inferences  are  likev/ife  to  be  well  Confider'd; 
The  reafcning  or  Syllogifm  they  depend  on  is,  if  need  re- 
quire, to  be  filled  up;  And  the  Dedudiion  judged  of,  and 
accounted  for,  according  to  Chap.  13,  14,  c^.\ 

And  here  it  may  be  ufefully  obferv'd,  whether  this  or  that 
Inference  were  drawn  according  to  any,  and  which,  of  the 
Ru  ciihat  are  fpecify'd,  P.  HI.  Ch.  14.  §  22,25,  ^4*  P-  3°^  • 
or  by  any  of  the  Middle  Terms,  Ch.  1 1.  §  8,  9. 


Aa  a  §  16. 


^■48  ^'^'^  ^JJh  for  the  Fart  liL 

§  16.  13.  Where  Proof  appears  needful,  or  farther  Proof 
requiluc,  or  even  by  way  of  Exercife,  we  may  try  what  we 
can  do  at  provnig  this  or  that  Point;  and  at  carrying  our 
Proof  upon  various  Qucftions,  if  not  upon  the  fame,  thro'  all 
the  forts  of  Middle  Terms  rjicntion'd,  P.  III.  Qi.  1 1,  §  8,  9. 
p.  284.  And  alfo  we  fliouid  fet  our  felves  to  difprove,  where 
it  ma;   be  needful  or  convenient. 

Here  we  may  fee  whether  fomc  of  the  Pofitions  in  the  In- 
trocu(5tion,  GDnch'fion,  or  elfcwhere  may  not  be  reduced  to 
fome  or  other  of  the  Principles  or  nearer  Dcdudions,  P.  I. 
Ch.  16,  ^c. 

§  17.  14.  We  may  laftly  farther  make  Trial  how  many 
feveral  Points  we  can  Infer  more  immediately  from  this  or 
that  i  n-  dhow  far  we  can  carry  on  this  or  that  particular 
Train  of  Ded^dlions  ;  noting  down,  at  Icall,  what  more 
confiderable  Pofitions  we  meet  with  in  this  way.  And  this 
is  an  Exerclic  higlily  requifice  for  thofe  who  are  defieifd  to 
the  more  Learned  Profeirions,.  and  even  for  Men  of  more 
than  ordinary  Bi'finefs. 

Hero  we  may  Pradiicc  upon  the  diredlive  Pvules  for  draw- 
ini^  Inferences,  P  III.  Ch.  14.  §  22,  23,  24.  p.  306.  as  they 
are  exPiain'd  i"n  the  Chapter  and  Se(51:ion  there  rcfcr'dto; 
And  alio  we  might  proceed  upon  fome  SeledtPofitions  of  P.  I. 
Ch.  16,  CfV,  to  fee  how  far  we  could  carry  them  ;  /.  c.  to 
hriw  ly.any  fevera!  Points,  and  to  what  length  of  Deduiflion 
upon  'ofncof  thofc  Points. 

>  \%.  It  might  be  lefs  Jrkfome,  and  probably  not  lefs 
V't'-fui,  cv  (pcrhap:)  ir.ore  for  the  Learners  Advantage  in 
feme  RefpeCt,  that  divers  Parts  or  Palfages  of  tiiis  Eifay 
Itiould  he  {ingled  out  here  and  there  for  the  Subied;  or 
Gro'nid-work  of  the  feveral  Exercifcs  here  recommended  y 
r:nd  they  fliould  be  fuchas  more  defer.-e  or  need  ro  be  very 
diitiixTcly  coniidcr'd  :  or  eife,  that  he  Ihould  take  fome  fuch 
Parts  as  he  would  more  efpecialJy  apply  to  EJle,  that  lie  may 
rhiTs  review  them  more  deliberately 

§  19.  To  all  that  has  been  dircded,  I  m.ighc  add,  that 
it  would  cerrainly  be  for  the  Learners  Advantage,  that  he 
Ihould  add  Examples  to  the  feveral  Politions,  as  is  already 
done  to  fome  of  them  J  P- i.  Ch  16,  i7,{s^c:  Alfo,  that 
he  Hiould  frequently  try  how  he  can  carry  fome  or  other  Single 

Theme  through  all  the  Predicables,  P.  II.  Ch.  1 5.  §  13 ■ 

21-  p-  191,  Gi'c,  as  he  may  there  find  it  exemplify'd  in  the 
Inftance  of  the  Sun .-  And  laftly,  that  he  fliould  be  cxercis'd 
in  fctcingdown  the  various  good  Ufes  and  Purpofes  to  which 
th'.N  or  that  may  be  apply 'd,  and  in  what  way  it  may  belt 
cr.:v,erth^m.  "  §  20.  And 


Chap.  22.         Improvement  of  Reafon.  :^4^ 

§  20.  And  whereas  the  great  Ufe  and  Service,  to  which 
we  (hould  diredt  and  apply  whatever  can  be  fo  improv'd,  is 
that  of  Good  Condtid,  I  (hail  conclude  the  whole  Eflay  with 
that  moft  prad:ica][  and  extenfive  General- 


CHAP.    XXII. 

(}  I .  /"AU  R  Reafon  is  in  the  laft  place  here  to  be  directed 
^•"  and  aiTifted  more  at  large,  that  it  may  betcer  ferve 
this  great  Purpofe, 

V,  I{i;i,l-tiy  to  cfjudti^.  Our  Jclves  /tnd  our  /Affairs  ;  7720  :  -^  ar- 
ticular!}  inth^vony  of  Lenmino^,     And, 

Hereiro.al!  briefly  Treat  (;f  the  feveral  following  Point^x'/;:;;. 
Firft,of  Conducl  in  General ;  then  of  Condudling  our  fcivcs, 
as  alio  the  common  Affairs  of  Life,  and  Special  Undertak- 
ings j  mo'.'c  particularly  the  ftated  purfuit  of  ufeftil  Know- 
ledge, with  other  Improvements,  and  the  dra\A7ing  of  therci 
out  in  regular  Difcourfes  and  other  Solemn  Performances 

§  2.  Under  this  General  Head  of  Conduct  are  laid  to- 
gether feveral  Things  of  a  very  ditfering  Nature  ;  and  which 
would  each  of  them  require  a  diftind:  Treatife,  to  handle 
them  fully,  yet  it's  hop'd,  the  more  brief  Intimations,  which 
are  all  that  can  be  pretended  to  here,  will  be  in  tbctnpiv-:s  of 
fonie  Ufe,  and  it  may  be  fome  v/ay  the  more,  f^r  their  be- 
ing fo  fhort  and  few  :  They  may  however  carry  the  ("onl;- 
clering  Mind  a  great  way  farther,  than  they  go  themfelves ; 
and  mull  be  at  leaft  a  fit  Preparative  for  Converfation  upon 
furh  Heads,  and  a  proper  IntroduAion  to  the  reading  of 
f  u:h  Authors,  as  may  Treat  of  them  purpofely  and  more 
largely. 

§3.1  Ihall  not  here  confine  my  felf  within  the  Compafs 
of  what  is  commonly  accounted  to  appertain  to  Learning.; 
nor  will  the  U(e  of  Reafon,  indiversofchofe  Matters,  which 
are  to  be  confider'd,  proceed  upon  the  more  common  Logi- 
cal Notions.  But  farely  Men  ot  Letters,  as  well  as  others, 
Ihould  not  be  un  inllruftcd  for  common  Converfation,  and 
the  prudent  Management  of  thofe  A-ffairs,  which  will  fall 
Upon  them  as  well  as  others;  and  which  none  can,  or  will 
©rdinarily  attend  and  order  for  them,  with  that  Application 
and  Advantage,  as  they  might  for  themfelves:  And  it  is 
plainly  of  continual  Concernment,  that  we  fliould  be  able 
rightly  and  readily  to  lay  and  purfue  the  Affairs  of  this  Life, 

A  a  3  whethe?. 


350  Jin  tjfay  for  the  Part  Ijl- 

^vhether  they  be  Matrers  of  daily,  or  of  lefs  frequent  Occur- 
rence. 

§4'  Men  of  Learning,  without  fomcwhat:  of  Skill  this 
way,  will  be  like  to  faU  under  theReprcach  of  being  me^e 
Scho..r:.',  almoft  unfir  for  common  ConvcrCe,  uncapable  of 
affording  Advice  or  Help  to  thofc  about  them,  and  unfur- 
niih'd  for  managing rherrTelves  and  their  Affairs  with  ccmpe- 
tcnt  D  Ttrcrcn-  And  iho'  it  is  true,  that  fuch  as  are  vers'd  in 
Bulintfs  will  be  like  to  outdo  thofe,  \v\\o  may  have  the  beft 
Rules  and  Heips,  vvirhoi  t  like  Exercife  and  Experience;  yet, 
£s  it  may  nov  be  ^jnpleafirg  to  the  former,  to  fee  Ton  e  of  their 
own  Meafu-es  co  le(5led,  more  dilUndtly  ftated  and  con- 
firm'd,  and  laid  before  them  by  v^ay  uf  Remembrance ;  fo  it 
"will  ]icr  be  unprofitable  to  the  intter^  to  have  fome  general 
Aim  given  them  rewards  the  m<re  prudent  and  becoming 
Condu<5t  of  themfelves,  and  the  Affairs  they  may  have  in 
pommori  "vviih  others-  Nor  can  it  mere  properly  be  done  in 
the  way  of  general  Intimation-S  than  in  fuch  an  Effay  as 
this'         ■     ■- 

'  i  5.  Now,  I,  That  is  right  ConduA  in  the  general, 
whereby  we  fteaddy  purfue  the  beft  End  wc  can  fitly  pro- 
pound to  our  ielves  jn  any  Matter,  by  the  beft  Means,  and 
according  to  the  beft  Meafures      A  nd, 

;  ''I'j  Ihere  can  be  no  proper  Cond'  A  at  all,  without  firft 
fixing  an  End;  elfe  vvhatfoevcr  may  come  of  our  Manage- 
ment is  all  Contingency  and  Chance,  not  the  F.ffedl  of  Con- 
duit and  Delign :  Nor  can  our  Condud.  be  right,  if  we 
have  not  an  Eye  to  the  bsji  End'  Our  fartheft  Defign  in 
every  thiiig  muft  be  that  which  is  abfolvtely  beft,  the  Glory 
6f  God  in  our  own  Felicity;  and  even  our  nearer  End  muft 
be  the  he/}  in  that  kind,  the  beft  which  is  attainable  in  fuch 
Cafe  or  Circumftances  :  And  here  it  is  fairly  imply'd  and 
intended,  that  it  (hould  be  not  only  feeming'y,  but  really 
goo(Jy  i.  c.  Juft  and  lawful  in  ii  felf,  and  like  to  be  of  real 
Service  to  our  feives  or  others  ;  at  Icaft  in  the  Iflue,  if  not  for 
the  Prefent- 

§6.  (1)  The  Means  we  ufe  for  attaining  fuch  End,  muft 
alfo  be  gocri;  abfolutely  fc,  i.  e  Juft  and  Lawful,  in  them= 
ielves,  and  Ukewife  relatively  good,  /'.  e»  proper  and  fitted 
to  reach  Our  End;  and  they  ftiould  be  indeed  the  hefi,  that 
Can  be  had  or  us'd  in  fuch  Cafe  and  Circumftances,  'vi:(.  the 
fureft,  the  m^ft  effedive,  the  fpeedieft,  the  ealieft,  and  leaft; 
expenfive ;  i  hefe  Charad:ers  are  to  be  diftindkly  confider'd, 
and  in  the  Order  wherein  they  are  given  :  No  finful  Mean: 
are  ever  to  be  us'd  ;   fince,   tho*  r:hey  mioht  perhaps  anfwci 


Chap  22.        Improvement  of  K^2i^on.  55  f 

fome  lower  Defign,  yet  it  would  not  be  without  the  Damage 
or  Hazard  of  our  higher  Concernments ;  Amongft  Means 
that  are  Innocent,  we  fhoi.ld  obfcrve,  which  are  lureft  or 
likeft  to  reach  our  End ;  amongil  thofe  chat  arc  eqnallv  furc, 
or  like  to  reach  it,  which  are  moft  EfFe6tive,  and  like  to  do 
it  moft  thoroughly  ;  of  thefe  again,  which  will  be  chc  ipee- 
dieft;  of  thefe,  which  the  Ealieft  ;  and  finally,  aiiv  r.gft 
thefe,  which  will  be  lead  Expenfive :  Yet  rhis  Order  of 
Enquiry  fhould  be  fomewhat  alter'd  in  fome  Cafes,  and  by 
fome  Pcrfons;  E.  Gr.  a  Man,  who  has  but  lictie  to  Jay  out, 
niuftbe  more  fparing  of  his  Money  than  of  his  Pains. 

§  7.  (3.)  Means  are  to  be  usM  acco;dmg  to  the  heft 
Mcajures  we  have,  or  can  attain ;  without  lofinf?  ox.r  Oppi.r- 
tuniry,  or  bcftowing  more  Pains,  Time,  and  Coft.  rha.nv;!! 
probably  be  anfwer'd-  We  are  to  apply  the  Mean>  in  luch 
Way  and  Manner,  ai  fuch  Time,  in  fuch  Place,  and  other 
Circumftances,  as  that  they  may  be  moft  like  fully  to  reach 
our  End,  and  that  with  the  beft  Advantage,  takin?  in  r,ll 
that  can  well  be  corapafs'd,  and  ferving  higher  Purpofcs^  as 
&r  as  may  be^  whilft  we  are  profecuting  lower  Ends- 

§  8.  Before  we  proceed  to  the  feveral  Parts  of  Condu'A 
fpecify'd  :  I  Ihall  here  farther  add  fome  general  Rules, 
which  may  be  common  to  them  all-     And, 

r.  We  (hould  make  fure  to  begin,  proceed,  and  end,  with 
God  :  So  ro  do  is  not  l;rfs  the  udng  of  our  Reafon  for  irs  be- 
ing a  Diftate  of  Religion ;  nor  is  it  unfit  to  appear  in  Logic, 
becaufc  it  has  irs  Principal  Place  in  Theology;  whenas  it  is 
undoubtedly  the  Voice  of  Reafon  it  felf,  that  we  Ihould  ufe 
our  Reafon  and  other  Faculties  in  Subordination  to  hun,  iti 
whom  wc  live,  and  mov?,  nnd  have  our  Beings  i  e.  with  his 
Leave  and  Allowance  ;  as  alfo  with  Dependance  on  him  fur 
his  needful  AlTil^ance;  and  finally,  with  due  Regard  to  the 
plealing  of  him  by  our  ferious  Deiire  and  Endeavour  to  pro- 
mote his  Honour  and  Service. 

§  9.  How  ealily,  and  to  us  infenfibly,  can  the  Author  of 
our  Beings  throw  in  fome  ufefal  Suggeftion,  or  give  an  happy 
Turn  to  our  Tho'ts,  and  alfo  to  theirs  with  whom  we  are 
concc'n'd  ?  This  we  may  reafonably  Hope,  and  he  will 
certainly  do,  fo  far  as  he  fees  fitteft  and  belt ;  if  we  be  care- 
ful to  approve  our  Defigns  and  Undertakings  to  him  ;  and 
that  we  both  lay  and  purfiie  them  with  a  regular  Dependance 
on  him,  a  real  Defire  to  engage  him  with  u%  and  fincere 
Concern,  that  v/e  may  not  fail  to  pleafe  him :  Whenas,  on 
the  contrary, 

A  a  4  §10.  They 


352  rljt  tjjay  for  the  Part  111. 

§  I  o-  They  who  nithely  lean  to  their  own,  or  o' her  Mens 
Underftandirgs,  and  vebolly  re!y  on  the  Terlcd  Courfe  of 
things,  have  the  juitcft  Ca'^fe  to  fear  their  being  akogether 
jert  of  Gcd  to  t?-ke  up  ^■iftakes,  and  to  proceed  rhcrcon  ; 
and  that  they  (hould  reafon  fo  much;  woiTe  to  the  Point  in 
hand,  as  they  may  reafon  better  and  more  juftly  from  mi- 
ilaken  Ground?  :  But  if  fuch  kind  of  Perfons  fliould  happen 
or  be  help'd  rightly  to  lay  and  pnrfue  their  Defifns,  il?ey 
may  therein  pro*  c  much  more  unhappy,,  than  if  they  had 
been  brought  by  Difappcintir.ent  better  to  know  themftlves, 
and  the  God  in  wbrjc  hnnd  n  their  Bicc'h,  dud  vehofs  are  all 
their  wnys. 

§  11.  Tis  very  well  known,  that  Natural  Reafon  led 
even  Heathens  to  fay,  'e»  Ai;3>-^a''c;^',u-:5«,  and  A  Jcve  Principi- 
//???,  That  they  ouphr  and  wonid  begin  wi:h  God  :  Shall 
not  Ciirlftians  go  farther  yet,  fo  as  to  proceed,  and  end  with 
him  too  ?  Do's  it  not  apparently  and  highly  concern  us  to 
Pradlice  agreeably  to  that  ExccHcnr  Prater,  Avhich  is  fo  fre- 
quently us'd  in  the  Licvrgy  and  Worfliip  of  the  Church  of 
England^ 

"■'  Prevent  us,  O  Lord,  in  all  our  Doings  with  thy  moft 
*'  Gracious  Favour,  and  farther  us  with  chy  continual  Help  ; 
*'  that  in  all  our  Works  begun,  continu'd,  and  ended  in 
*"  thee,  we  may  glorifieihy  Holy  Name,  and  finally,  by  thy 
**  Aiercy,  obtain  everlafting  Lite,  thro'  Jefus  Chrift  our  Lord. 

§  12.  The  Sacked  Scriptures  do  plainly  tell  us,  that  of 
God  nr<d  thro'  hirr,  ntidtohim^  are  all  things^  who  therefjrc 
tio\s  indifputably  claim  that  to  h':m  jl-icidd  be  GJoy  for  ever  j 
and  to  him  it  will  undoubtedly  be,  whether  we  defign  it  or 
no  ;  but  little  to  our  Comfort  or  AJvaiirage,  unlefs  we  have 
ir.ade  it  our  ferious  Aim,  and  diligent  Endeavour,  that  it 
might  be  fo- 

The  Method  here  recommended,  is  not  to  hinder,  but  ra- 
ther to  excite,  engage,  encourage,  and  enable  us  to  thebeft: 
Ufc  we  can  any  ways  make  of  our  Reafon,  and  of  the  fitteft 
Means  and  Meafarcs,  in  laying  andpurfuinghoneftDefigns; 
fince  only  in  tliis  way  we  regularly  can,  and  in  this  we  juftly 
may,  depend  on  God  for  his  Afliftance,  who  is  the  Author  of  ^ 
univerfal  Nature,  and  will  have  us  ufe  the  Powders  he  has 
given  us,  and  the  Helps  he  aflfords  us  -,  but  not  without  an 
Eye  to  himfelf 

§  1 3.  2  It  is  a  farther  Dictate  even  of  common  Reafon, 
that  they,  who  have  fuch  a  Book  as  the  Bible,  or  can  procure 
it,  Ihould  heedfuUy  Confult  it,  and  thofe  (ifneedbej,  who 
snay  help  them  rightly  to  undeifland  and  apply  it,    ^nd  thus 

to 


Chap   22.  Improvef7ient  of  K^diion.  35  :j 

to  do,  not  only  upon  particular  Occafions,  but  in  a  more  con- 
tinued Courfc  of  Reading  and  Attending  it  with  the  Special 
Obfervance,  which  is  due  thereto,  according  to  the  proper 
Inlcription  put  by  a  Worthy   Minifter   deceas'd   upon  his 

Bible; 

allies  Lihros  ut  Judex  lego,  hune  ut  Jiidicem. 

(Of  other  Books  I  Judge,  this  as  my  Judge  regard.) 

And  that  he  did  fo  indeed,  may  be  feen  in  the  Account  given 
of  Mr.  'John  0'<ifi:!Jj  in  the  Abridgment  of  Mr.  Baxter's 
Life,  by  the  Judicious  Air.  C.ilniv.y. 

§  14.  It  might  here  be  of  Excellent  Service  to  draw  our, 
or  atleaft  to  mark,  what  we  find  more  fuitable  and  needful 
for  us,  in  refpeft  of  our  Condition  and  Affairs,  frequently 
reviewing  what  we  have  fo  noted,  and  applying  it  to  Ufe, 
as  Occafion  prcfents:  More  particularly  the  Book  of  Pro- 
verbs fhould  be  confider'd,  as  affording  a  number  of  in- 
ftrud:ive  Remarks  about  Men  and  Things,  and  even  of  Se- 
cular Atlairs,  as  well  as  thofe  of  Religion  :  Seme  few  of 
which,  with  other  obfcrvable  Sentences  of  Sacred  Writ,  are 
here  and  there  produc'd,  in  this  Eifay,  by  way  of  Inftance. 

§  15.  And,  whereas  Reafon  tells  us,  that  God  is  to  be 
regarded  in  all  our  Management,  Scriptural  Revelation 
thould  lead  us  to  regard  the  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Spirit 
more  diftijidly,  and  yet  jointly,  without  perplexing  our 
felves  about  the  Accurate  ftate  of  that  infcrutable  Unity  and 
Triplicity,  which  belongs  to  them  :  More  particularly, 
that  we  fhould  have  an  Eye  to  the  Father,  as  the  Original 
and  Spring  of  all  Good  Things,  fo  as  pecuharly  tofeek  them 
from  him,  and  to  depend  on  him  for  them  j  as  alfo  to  the 
Son  of  God,  who  is  likewife  Man,  as  our  Mediator  and 
Way  to  the  Father,  doing  nil  in  the  name  of  the  Lord  Jcfus 
giving  ThfDtks  to  God  n>?d  the  Fnther  by  him  j  Nor  may  the 
Holy  Spirit  be  negleded  or  refifted,  but  is  to  be  earneftly 
and  believingly  asked  of  the  Father,  for  the  fake  of  Chriii ; 
and  muft  be  heedfully  regarded  by  us  in  the  Sacred  Scrip- 
tures, and  what  is  agreeable  thereto. 

§  1 6.  What  Reafon  it  f  If  fays  upon  this,  and  the  preced- 
ing Head,  has  been  folemnly  own'd  with  Shame  and  Grief, 
at  laft,  by  fom.e,  who  had  bent  their  Wit  and  Parts  againft 
it,  as  may  be  feen  in  the  Account  of  the  lare  Earl  of  Rochcfter, 
and  particularly  in  the  Paper  Signed  with  his  Hand,  as 
follows, 

«  For 


354  ^^  ^Jf'^y  for  the  Pare  III. 

"  FOR  the  Benefit  of  all  thofe,  whom  I  have  drawn  into 
"  Sin  by  niy  Example  and  Encouragement,  I  leave  ro  the 
**  World  this  my  laft  Declaration,  which  I  deliver  in  the  Pre- 
*'  fence  of  the  Great  God,  who  knows  the  Secrets  of  all 
"  Hearts,  and  before  whom  I  am  now  appearing  to  be 
''  Judged, 

'*  1  har,  from  the  bottom  of  my  Soul,  I  deteft  and  abhor 
*'  the  whole  Courfe  of  my  former  wicked  Life;  that  I  can 
*'  never  fufficiemly  admire  the  Goodnefs  of  God,  who  has 
"  given  me  a  lively  Senfe  of  my  Pernicious  Opinions,  and 
"  vile  Practices,  by  which  I  have  hitherto  liv'd  without 
**  Hope,  and  without  God  in  the  Wor'd  ;  have  been  an 
*'  open  Enemy  to  Jejm  Chrijl,  doing  the  utmoft  defpite  to  the 
"  Holy  Spirit  rf  Grnco^;  and  that  the  greateft  Tcftimony  of 
"  my  Charity  to  fuch  is  to  warn  them  in  the  Name  of  God, 
"  and,  as  they  regard  the  Welfare  of  their  Immortal  Sonis, 
**  no  more  to  deny  his  Being,  or  his  Providence,  or  defpife 
"  his  Goodnefs;  no  more  to  make  a  Mock  of  Sin,  orcontemn 
**  the  Pure  and  Excellent  Religion  of  my  ever  blefled  Re- 
"  deemer,  thro'  whofe  Merits  alone,  I,  one  of  the  Greateft  of 
"  Sinners,   do  yet  hope  for  Mercy  and  Forgivenefs,  Amen. 

DecUr'd  in  the  Prefence  of 
^  Anne  Rochcfter, 

Robert  Parfons.  J.ROCHESTER. 

I  might  add  the  Penitential  Letter  by  Sir  DuncombColcheJler^ 
which,  to  his  lafting  Honour,  is  made  Publick  :  Bi't  I  fhall 
only  Subjoin  fome  part  of  a  Letter  from  the  Earl  of  Mnrl^ 
borough^  whody'din  a  Sea  Fight,  Anno  1665,  to  Sir  Hugh 
Pollxrd. 

SIR, 

« 1  am  in  Health  enough  of  Body,  and 

"  thro'  the  Mercy  of  God,  in  Jefus  Chrift,  well  difpos'd  in 
*'  Mind.  -This  I  premife,  that  you  may  be  fatisfy'd,  that 
**  what  I  write  proceeds  not  from  any  fantaftick  Terror  of 

*'  Mind,  but  from  a  Sober  Rcfolution,   (3c. 

**  there  is  a  certain  Thing  that  goes  up  and  down  in  the 
**  World,  call'd  I^eligion,  drefs'd  and  prefentcd  Fantaftically, 
"  and  toPurpofebad  enough,  which  yet  by  fuch  evil  Deahng 
"■*  iofeth  not  its  Being.  The  Great  and  Good  God  hath  not 
*'  Jeft  it  without  a  WitneG,   more  or  lefs,   fooner  or  later, 

in  every  Man  s  Bofom,    to  dired  us  in  the  Purfuit  of  it ; 

arxlforrheavoidinc  of  thoCe  inextricable  Difficnities  and 

"  F-tmg'o-  , 


cc 


Chap.  2x.  Improvement  of  Keafon.  355" 

*'  Entanglemenrs,  our  own  frail  Reafon  would  perplex  us 
**  withal,   God  in  his  infinite  Mercy,    has  given  us  his  Holy 

**  Word 1  confefs  to  God  and  you,    I  have 

**  been  a  great  Neg]e6ler,  an(',  I  fear,  Defpifer  of  it  (God 
**  of  his  intinite  Mercy,  Pardon  me  that  dreadful  Fault  J  ; 
"  but  when  1  retired  my  felf  from  the  Noife  and  deceitful 
"  Vanities  of  the  World,  I  found  no  true  Comfort  in  any 
"  other  Refolution,  than  what  I  had  from  thence.  I  com- 
*'  mend  the  fame,  fr-m  the  bottom  of  my  Heart,  to  your 
"  (1  hope,  happy)  t'le.  Dear  Sir  Hiigh^  Jet  us  be  more 
**  Generous,  than  to  believe  we  die  like  Beaflsthat  Perilh ; 
"  but  with  a  Chnftian,  Manly,  brave  Ambition,  let  us  look 

*'  to  what  is  Eternal. The  only  Great  and  Holy  God, 

^'  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Ghoft,  direcSt  you  to  an  happy  End 
"  of  your  Life,  and  fend  us  a  joyful  Relurrediion. 

This  Letter  He,  in  a  Poftcript,  defir'd  might  be  commu- 
nicated to  his  Friends  and  others. 

Old  James^  near  the  Coaft  of  Holland, 
the  i^xh  of  ^pril,  1665, 

<S  17.  Now  taking  along  with  us  the  only  Wife  God  and  his 
infallible  Word,  we  Ihall  be  the  more  capable  of  proceeding 
to  what  follows.     And, 

3.  We  muft  apply  our  felvcs  carefully  to  ftate  what  is  the 
very  thing  we  are  more  immediately  aiming  at  in  any  t)efign, 
and  in  every  part  of  our  Condudt  and  Management,  at  the 
fame  time  heedfully  obferving  whether  it  be  morally  Good, 
or  at  the  leaft  lawful  for  us  to  purfue,  /.  e.  whether  it  will 
plainly  fubferve  our  highcft  Intcreft,  as  being  pleafmg  to  God, 
or  that  it  is  however  undeniably  coniiftent  with  it,  as  being 
no  way  difpleafing  to  him. 

And,  we  are  yet  farther  to  confider  whether  it  be  Neccf- 
fary  to  our  Principal  End,  or  fuch  as  may  be  omitted  without 
-  any  Danger  thereto  ;  and  likewlfe  without  prefent  Damage 
in  any  Kind ;  or  if  not,  whether  any  thing  may  be  fub- 
(iitured  in  the  place  thereof,  which,  with  lefs  Trouble  and 
Time,  or  with  lefs  Coft  and  Pains  may  equally  ferve  to 
guard  againft  the  Dangers  or  Damage  which  would  accrue  by 
our  omitting  fuch  Undertaking. 

If  the  Defign  be  not  Matter  of  certain  Duty  or  evident 
Ncceffity,  bur  only  of  fenfible  Pleafure,  cr  Secular  Advan- 
tage, we  fhould  confider  well,  if  what  can  be  reafonably  ex- 
peded  from  it,  will  be  like  to  anfwer  what  there  muft  be 
laid  out  of  Time,  or  Coft,  or  Fains  upon  it;  otherwife  we 
fticuld  either  wholly  defift  from  it,   or  wait  feme  happy  Jun- 

(flure 


55^  Jfi  t'fay  for  the  Part  I H. 

dlure  for  it,  which  may  render  it  more  eafily  attainable  : 
And  thus  we  may  alfo  Poftpohe  fuch  other  Defigns  as  will 
bear  a  Delay,  where  ic  may  give  fome  probable  Advan- 
tage. 

§  1 8.  4.  When,  upon  Confideration,  it  appears  that 
the  Defign  is  fuch  as  innocently  may,  or  which  ought  to  be 
purfu'u,  our  next  Bulinefs  is  to  adjult  the  Importance  of  it, 
according  to  what  has  been  laid  in  for  thatPurpofe,  P.ll.  C.9, 
10, 1 1  ;  as  alfo  what  Danger  there  may  be  of  our  maftaking 
about  the  Matter,  and  of  what  confequence  a  Miltake  wou'd 
probably  be:  Here  we  are  ro  take  in  Light  and  Help  from 
what  has  been  farther  laid  in,  Pare  11,  Chap.  11,  Thefe 
Points  are  to  be  duly  fetled,  that  we  may  Proportion  cur 
Care  and  Pains,  as  the  Matter  deferves  and  requires. 

And  here  we  Ihould  obferve,  that  what  is  our  more  pecu- 
liar Bufincfs  muft  be  mainly  intended  and  piirfu'd  ;  yet  even 
that  muft  not  fo  far  engrofs  our  Time  and  Tho't  as  to  exclude 
what  is  otherwifc  Incumbent  on  us,  or  of  Concernment  to 
us ;  no,  nor  fuch  Relaxation  from  the  prefcnt  Affair,  as  may 
be  convenient  for  us.  'lis  a  great  Point  of  Prudence  and 
good  Management  to  fiiut  out  nothing  which  ought  to  be  at- 
tended, and  to  give  to  every  thing  its  proper  Place  in  our  At- 
tendance and  juft  Proportion  of  it. 

§  19.  5.  Upon  a  Jutland  determinate  State  of  the  very 
thing,  which  is  and  ought  to  be  intended,  and  of  its  Impor- 
tance, we  fhould  proceed  to  fix  fuch  main  fubordinate  Inten- 
tions, as  may  reach  our  farther  Aim,  and  if  it  may  well  be, 
ferve  fome.  other  good  Purpofe  alfo  by  the  way.    Here, 

(i.)  We  fhould  look  to  it,  that  we  have  ftill  in  our  Eie  a 
juft  and  determinate  State  of  what  we  do,  and  innocently 
may,  Defign  j  fince  the  End  muft  diredt  both  the  Means  to 
be  ufed,  and  alfo  the  Meafures  of  ufing  them  :  And  if  ihnt 
Ihould  be  miftaken  in  any  RefpeA,  it  may  be  like,  fo  far,  to 
mifguide  us  in  choofing  or  applying  them  ;  and  fo  much  the 
more,  as  we  (hall  better  Judge  what  is  moft  adapted  to  fnch 
miftaken  Purpofe ;  or  if  we  have  not  a  very  clear,  diftind, 
and  determinate  Apprehenlion  of  what  we  are  defigning,  all 
our  Procedure  muft  be  dark  and  confus'd ;  and  fo  much 
liker  to  be  wrong  than  right,  as  there  are  more  ways  of 
miifing  our  Point,  than  for  obtaining  it.  He  that  would  go 
to  x<i-^cnftlcy  muft  know  whether  it  be  that  Under-L7we  in 
Stiiifonlpyire,  Or  that  upon  the  Tyne  in  Northumberlnnd.  We 
(hould  take  all  polfible  Care  that  we  be  not  ("as  Men  often- 
times are)  fo  eagerly  bent  upon  our  Defigns,  as  to  rulh  into 
the  Purfu'c  before  we  have  carefully  ftated  apd  determined 

what- 


Chap.  2  2.        im\;rovement  of  Reaion.  357 

what  is  the  very  thim_  we  would  be  at :  Nor  fliould  we  think 
it  wailed  Time  to  make  the  Matter  very  clear  and  dilhndt  to 
our  own  Mmds,  and  to  fix  it  upon  them. 

§  20.  \Vc  may  then  iafely  proceed,  (2.'  To  the  fubor- 
dinate  Intentions,  which  muft  of  NeceiTity  be  purfued,  or 
(hould  be,  for  the  better  obtaining  of  our  End,  or  for  taking 
in  fome  Advantage  by  the  way,  which  may  be  either  Sub- 
fervient  to  our  farther  Purpofe,  or  at  leaft  confident  with  it. 
He  that  would  go  to  NcvccrJJ-le  upon  Tyne,  murt  allow  Time 
and  lay  orher  Matters  accordingly;  he  fliou!d  alfo  fix  conve- 
nient Stages,  and  efpecially  the  Places,  where  he  may  have 
any  valuable  Occafions,  whether  lying  diredly  in  the  way, 
or  which  may  be  taken  in  conliftently  with  his  Delign  tor 
Nevfc.iJUe  ar.d  Bufip^efs  there. 

Here  we  (hould  well  confidcr,  what  are  the  Tnconvenien- 
cies,  or  Dangers  incident  to  the  purfuit  of  fucb  a  Defign,  or 
of  this  in  particular,  and  how  we  may  guard  againft  them ; 
alfo  what  Advantages  may  be  drawn  in,  and  how  we  may 
hope  to  compafs  them      But, 

§  21.  (?■)  'Tis  only  the  main  fubordinate  Intentions  we 
are  to  fix  at  once,  before  we  enter  upon  ad:nal  Purfuit;  to 
aim  at  more  would  endanger  Confulion,  as  well  as  if  we  did 
not  fix  fo  much .-  Nor  ,  4.)  ihould  thefe  Intentions  be  fo 
unalterably  fix'd,  as  not  to  be  vari'd  ,  upon  juft  Occalion, 
and  unforefeen  Emergencies ;  whether  for  the  avoiding  fome 
confiderable  Inconvenience,  or  for  the  compaffing  fome  va- 
luable Advaiitage  by  the  way  ;  whcnas  we  may  and  ought  to 
deiift,  even  from  our  farther  Delign,  where  it  is  not  of  ab- 
folute  Neccflity  in  it  felf,  nor  a  Duty  incumbent  on  us  in 
fuch  a  State  of  things,  and  that  our  proceeding  in  it  would 
be  like  to  -lo  more  Hurt  than  Good. 

§  22.  6.  In  Matters  of  great  Importance,  the  Defign  it 
felf,  with  the  Scheme  and  Train  thus  laid,  fhould  be  re- 
view'd  and  reconfider'd  (if  the  Cafe  will  allow  it)  at  fome 
diflant  Time,  when  our  Tho'ts  are  more  cool  and  ledate; 
and  it  may  be  requifite  fometimes  to  Confult  upon  it :  Now 
for  fuch  Purpoles  as  thefe  it  rnight  be  belt  to  write  down 
feme  Minutes  about  it,  with  Queries  thereupon,  and  Reafons 
on  eithf  r  lide  to  be  deliberately  weigh'd  by  our  felves  and  by 
others  likewife,  if  it  be  convenient. 

§23.  7.  When  we  enter  upon  adual  Profecution,  we 
lliouid  confider  only  the  firlt  nearer  Intention,  as  if  it  were  all 
we  dclipncii ;  that  fo  we  may  h.ivc  but  one  thing  to  attend  at 
cnce.     Yet, 


35^ ^«  tjfay  for  t/je Part  III. 

8.  We  muft  carefully  fee,  thar  neither  fuch  nearer  Inten- 
tion, nor  the  Means  for  artempting  it,  be  any  ways  unfuita- 
ble,  either  in  themfeives  or  in  our  manner  of  ufing  them,  to 
any  of  our  farther  Intentions;  much  more,  that  they  be  not 
detrimental  or  dangerous  to  our  fartheft  and  principal  End. 
It  muft  always  be  i\  Conduct  to  ufe  any  Politicks  difagree- 
ing  to  Honelty  ;  fince  we  fhould  thereby  endanger  our  high- 
eft  Concernments  in  the  purfuit  of  fomewhar  lower.  And 
here, 

9.  We  (hould  take  Care,  we  do  not  proceed  upon  any 
thing  as  a  Principle  or  Meafarc,  before  it  have  been,  feme 
time  or  other,  well  confidcr'd,  and  examined. 

§  14.  10.  We  ihould  take  in  what  Help  may  be  well 
had  from  Men  of  Skill  in  Avhat  we  are  defigning,  and  well 
aflfe£led  both  to  it,  and  us  ;  as  alfo  from  the  belt  Authors, 
which  purpofely  treat  thereof;  and  from  any  cccafional  In- 
timations :  We  (hould  like  wife  endeavour  to  prociire  what- 
ever Agents,  or  Inftrumcnt>  may  ferve  to  expedite  the  Matter, 
or  to  perform  it  with  Advantage. 

Here  let  it  be  remembred,  that  much  Reading  and  Con- 
verfe,  with  Obfcrvation,  tends  to  make  a  Man  F«/7;  much 
Writing,  with  Care,  to  render  him  Accurate;  and  often 
Speaking,  efpeciaily  before  his  Superiors,  to  give  him  4//"«- 
ranc^,  and  to  make  him  F(Cir.dy. 

We  Ihoiijd  alfo  Exercile  o.ir  Memory  >n  ways  that  are  fafe 
and  I  feful ;  It  may  be  both  try 'd  and  improved  by  calluig 
over  without  Book,  what  we  have  noted  down  ;  but  we 
fliQuld  not  rrai\  thereto  more  than  we  muft  needs. 

§  2 "5.  Upon  the  whole,  our  Conduct  muft  be  allowed 
to  be  good,  and  fuch  as  will  reach  the  fartheft  End  [vl:^.  the 
Di>ine  Favour,  and  our  own  F'lijity  therein),  whether  we 
compafs  our  more  iminediate  Auii  or  not ;  if,  with  an  Eye 
to  our  being  accepted  of  God  thro*  Chrift,  and  with  a  regu- 
lar Djpendance  on  him  to  a.Uft  us  by  his  Spirit,  we  careful- 
ly fee  to  it,  that  what  we  allow  our  felves  to  delign,  and  pur- 
fue,  be  at  leaft  innocent,  and  2M0  fuch  as  we  ought,  or  rea- 
lonably  may,  both  Jo  Defign,  and  fo  Purfue;  Ani,  that  if 
xvs  rnijs  cf  our  Aim^  it  be  mi  turd  any  Fault  of  ours ^  common  In' 
firmltics  excepted. 

§  26.  Here  it  is  to  be  obferv'd,  that  we  may  be  oblig'd, 
even  in  Duty,  to  attempt  and  endeavour  what  we  are  not, 
in  chat  refpecl,  obliged  to  Hffed: ;  and  therefore  may  very 
we  ]  arquit  our  felves  in  refpcd  of  Managemcnr,  wh.-re  yet 
v/c  fad  of  Succefs.  But  lee  it  always  be  reir.ember'd,  that 
wa.ie  we  fall  (hortof  what  is  oar  unq-.cftion.-'.ble  Duty,  no: 

cnly 


Chap.  2^.        improvement  of  Realon.  35-^ 

only  to  defign,  but  alfo  to  attain  (fuppofe  it  were  the  Com- 
mand of  O'.T  Pairions  or  the  hkc)  ;  there  mull  cerrainjy  be 
fomewhat  faulty  on  our  Pare :  Either  we  do  not  ul'e  a  right 
Condui^t  for  thatPurpofe,  or  perhaps  we  defeat  it  by  allowing 
our  felves  in  fomething  elle  which  is  difpieafmg  to  God,  tho' 
it  may  not  be  obfcrv  ed  by  us. 

§  27.  We  mull  theref  re  take  heed,  that  we  do  not  .iny 
vf,iy  provoke  God,  that  he  fhould  leave  us  to  Difapp  intir.ents, 
and  that  we  do  not  either  ftir  up  others,  or  open  a  wa^  ^^>r 
them  to  ol-ftr.  €t  oi:r  Pr  cetdi;  gs  by  car.}  r.gtii,  c-  for  wai.. 
of  due  Ca.tion  -n  reference  to  them,  whether  !n  oiu  beuig 
too  open,  and  trufting  them  too  far,  orotherwife. 


CHAP.     XXIII. 

§  I.  O  Avin?  been  fo  large  upon  Conducl  in  General;  I 
*•  ^  Ihail  not  attempt  any  thing  in  reference  lO  the  fol- 
lowing Heads,  farther  than  to  give  fome  Light  and  Help  to- 
wards the  daring  and  determining,  what  is  to  be  ftcclauy  de~ 
yj^>/Vunder  e-.jh  of  them;  and  tofuggeftfome  of  the  more 
NeccfTary  fubordinate  Intentions  and  principal  Means  for 
the  better  Prof.cunon  of  fuch  Uefign. 

§  1.  Our  Affairs  are  not  like  to  be  fo  rightly  manag'd,  if 
we  do  not  regvlarly  govern  our  felves,  both  under  a  more 
Abfoiute  and  Relative  vJonfideration.     Now  to  proceed, 

II,  As  to  the  Condudt  of  our  Jelvcs^  under  a  more  abfoiute 
Confiderarion,  what  we  are  here  to  aim  at,  is  >cgu!nr  Sntif- 
faclion,  whhrer./o.'u'L>ie  Acceptation,  znd  rcalVfefuhtefs. 

Sntisfaiiion  to  our  felvcs,  is  what  we  may,  and  cannot  but, 
defign  in  the  Conduft  of  our  felves ;  only  it  mult  be  a  regular 
Satisfailion,  of  which  a  good  Account  can  be  given ;  it  muft 
be  fuch,  as  is  conliftent  with  it  felf,  wherein  we  go  not  about 
to  facisfte  our  felves  in  fome  particular  and  for  the  prefent, 
tho'  ii  be  with  the  Certainty  or  Danger  of  drawing  upon  our 
ftlves  a  greater  Diflatisfadtion. 

§  3.  For  the  lame  Reafon,as  well  as  in  point  of  Duty,  we 
(hoiild  aim  at  Acceptntiai  with  others  :  For  will  they  not  elfe 
be  like  to  difquiet  us,  if  we  ftudy  not  their  Quiet .^  And 
mult  they  not  be  very  capable  of  doing  it,  who  are  fo  many 
;  to  one,  ortothefew,  whom  we  do  perhaps  alone  regard,  yec 
we  Ihould  not  aim  at  other  Acceptation,  than  what  is  retjjc- 
nable^  both  in  the  Mn^Jurcy   and  efpecially  the  Ivlnttcr  of  it : 

Yea. 


^6o  An  Ejfay  for  the  Parr  III. 

Yea,  we  may  reafonably  abate  of  our  Inclination,  and  in 
(bme  Points  even  of  our  Intereft,  that  we  may  be  the  better 
accepted.  He  that  is  for  getting  all  he  poifibly  can,  tho'  in 
a  way  which  is  nordilhoneft,  v/iil  be  almolt  fureto  get  fome- 
what  more  than  he  Defires,  I  mean  the  Envy  and  Ill-will  of 
many:  Evey  one  of  tis  Jhould  plc.ije  Im'K^ighbcur  (Rom.  15. 2. j 
but  it  muft  be  for  his  gnod  to  Edificntifit!^  not  for  his  hurt,  or  in 
any  tendency  towards  his  Ruine  or  DeltrudUon,  much  lefs  to 
our  own. 

§  4.  Vf:fulnefs,  is  therefore  to  be  mainly  dcfign'd,  in 
order,  not  only  to  reafonable  Acceptation  with  others  (tince 
for  ngccd^  and  ufeful  Man,  J.yne  veould  even  dnrc  to  dh^  Rom 
5.7),  but  alfo  for  regular  Sarisfad:ion  to oorfelvcs  fand  thus,  . 
good  M.tn  Jhall,  in  feme  refpedl,  be  fatisfi'-d  from  hlnifelfy 
Prov.  14.  14!';  But  then  it  fliould  be  red  Ufefulncfs,  fuch  as 
is  truly  to  the  Honour  of  God,  and  of  fome  real  Advantage 
to  our  felves  or  others :  'Tis  indeed  an  Apoftoli:k.  Canon 
and  Command,  thnt  if  tiny  would  not  worli^,  neither  Jhould  he 
ent^  (z  Their.  3.  10);  and,  thnt  Chrijlians  lenrn  to  maintnih 
good  PVorkj  for  nccejjcry  'Vjcs^  that  they  he  r.ot  uyifrnltful^  Tic. 
3.  M. 

§  5.     Here  fomewhat  more  general  is  firft  to  be  ofFerM, 
before  I  proceed  to  Particulars :    And, 

1 .  We  ihould  make  lure  to  keep  the  Mean,  where  there 
may  be  Extremes ;  yet  rather  inclining  towards  that  Extreme, 
which  appears,  when  all  things  have  been  duly  weigh'd,  to 
be  kfs  faulty  and  more  fafe.  This  is  a  Riale  which,  if  well 
underftood  and  carefully  pnrfu'd,  may  be  of  aliroft  infinite 
Service,  not  only  as  to  things  of  a  Moral  Nature,  but  in 
thofe  of  a  very  differing  kind.  For  there  are  very  few  things,' 
which  admit  not  of  extremes,  both  in  Defedl  and  Excels ; 
and  tho'  we  cannot  love  God,  or  really  ferve  him  too  much, 
yet  we  may  poflibly  overftrain  both  Body  and  Mmd  in  our 
Endeavours  this  way ;  But  this  will  certainly  be  lefs  faulty  i 
and  more  fafe,  than  if  we  Ihould  allow  our  felves  to  incline 
towards  the  other  Extreme  of  loving  and  lerving  him  below 
the  ucmoftof  our  Power. 

§  6.  The  M:f.)!^  which  we  are  here  upon,  is  not  the  \  ery 
Middle  betwixt  the  Extremes  ;  nor  will  the  fame  Extremej 
be  always  lefs  faulty  or  more  fafe  ;  but  fometimes  the  one, 
and  fometimes  the  other,  as  Circuniftanccs  alter.  Health  is 
to  be  more  or  lefs  regarded,  according  as  the  danger  of  it 
appears  to  be  greater  or  lefs,  upon  Conlideration  of  the  Air 
Diet,  Bulinefs,  and  ether  CircunifTanc.'i> :  But  where  w.- 
may  hope  to  rea^h  I'ome  very  vaiuA.  ic  End  by  taking  lefs 

car«; 


Chap.  23.        improvement  /?/  Keafon.  ^61 

care  of  our  Healrh,  that  is  in  (iicH  Cafe  the  lefs,  faulty  and 
fafer  Extreme,  the'  commonly  'tis  the  other,  which  is  fo. 
,  §  7i  2.  We  OioulJ  carefully  redeem  the  Time  from  need- 
Icfs,  arid  lefs  valuable  Occafions,  which  may  be  let  alone  j 
as  alfo  by  Diligence  and  Difpatch  in  what  is  incumbent  on 
ijs.  They  are  to  this  Purpofe  very  inftruiflive  Mottos  whicn 
were  put  upon  two  Dials,  by  the  forementioned  Minifter  j  the 
oi\t  in  Lnt  in  y 

Emcre  nonpotes^  fotes  I{editherc. 

fYou  cannot  Purchafe  Time,  but  may  Redeem). 

The  other  in  Englf/h^ 

To  SHEPJ^,  K  minc'i  to  USE,  is  thine] 

We  fiiculd  therefore  take  care  to  have  fomewhat  ufeful 
and  diverting  (till  in  hand,  and  every  where  ready  fif  it  may 
be)  to  fill  up  the. Vacancies  of  Time  ;  fome  fuch  Employ- 
ment neither  Men  of  Letters  nor  of  Bufinefs  can  eafily  want, 
if  they  will  but  carry  with  them  a  Table-Book  to  write  in, 
or  fomewhat  portable  to  read    And,  , 

^.  Opportunity  muft  be  diligently  watch'd  and  improv'd,' 
vii^.  fuch  Scafons  and .  concurring  Circumftances,  in  whicli 
we  may  beft  perform  what  wc  have  to  do :  Tide  ftays  not 
for  any  Man,  no  more  than  T/wc.  • 

,  ^  8.  4.  We  (hould  endeavour  fo  to  accuflom  our  felves,' 
that  we  may  need  as  little  in  any  kind  as  pofTible  ;  efteeming 
it  a  greater  Happinefs  not  to  want  fome  things,  than  to  have 
them,  as  the  Philofopher,  who  pafling  thro'  a  Market,  wai 
plcas'd  ro  fee  fo  great  a  Variety. of  Things,  whereof  he  had 
ho  need.  We  (hould  therefore  carefully  avoid  the  making  of 
any  thing  neceffary  to  our  felves  by  Cuftom  :  He,  who  ufes 
himfelf  fo  nicely  and  tenderly,  as  to  need  all  he  has,  is  in' 
very  great  Danger,  on  many  Occafions ,  not  to  have  all 
he  will  need  ;  and  that  of  the  Pious  Mr.  Herbert  (hould  nOE 
here  be  forgotten, 

The  Man,  who  needs  five  hundred  Pounds  to  live, 
Is  full  as  Poor,  as  he  that  needs  buc  five. 

We  may  do  well  in  the  ordering  of  our  felves  to  ufe  {brne  al- 
lowable Variation  ;  tho*  we  mufl  ufually  proceed  by  Rule>, 
which  are  fit  to  be  commonly  obferv'd ;  fuppofe  it  were//j<t* 
of  eating  at  fet  Hours,  and  fo  many  times  a  Day;  but  it 
ifnight  prove  very  inconvenient  to  be  fo.ty'd  up  by  Cuftom  to 
luch  Rules,  that  we  could  not  eafily  vary  from  them  upon  jult 
^^ccafion.  B  b  §  9. 5.v>ui 


q62  An  Ejfay  for  the  l^art  111. 

§  9.  5.  Our  Sufpicions  are  to  be  us'd  as  true,  yet  bridled 
as  falfe;  for  we  fliould  not  take  them  as  certain  our  felves ;; 
much  lels  Ihould  we  report  them  as  fach  to  others ;  or  indeed 
fo  much  as  menrion  them  without  NecelTity  :  And  yet  we 
(hould  provide,  as  well  as  we  can,  without  too  great  Obfer- 
yation,  againft  what  may  be  reafonably  fufpeded. 

§10.  6.  That  of  St.  JnmeSy  Chap,  i .  ver.  i  p.  is  indeed 
an  Admonition  of  excellent  Ufe,  Let  every  Man  be  Jmft  to 
Hear,  (comparatively)  Jlcw  to  Speak^  (low  to  VVrath,  which 
would  give  a  mighty  Advantage  to  an  Antsgonift  :  But,  if 
we  muft  fpeak  before  we  have  heard  others,  yet  it  were  beft, 
where  it  may  be  done,  to  indent  for  Liberty  to  rlefurhe  and 
amend  what  we  have  faid,  if  Occafion  be. 

7.  We  Ihould  forbear  to  fpeak,  where  it  can  probably  do 
-  no  Good,  but  may  do  Hurt  j  or  is  like  to  do  more  hurt  than 
Good.  Our  common  Difcourfe  Ihould  rather  be  of  Things ^ 
than  of  Verfons  j  and  as  to  thefe,  rather  the  good^  that  can  be 
truly  fpoken  of  them  than  the  had ;  But  Silence  is  more 
commonly  our  Security  j  for  a  Man  to  hold  hit  Tongue,  is 
indeed  to  hold  his  Peace  in  a  farther  Senfe,  than  is  ufually 
given  to  this  EngHfh  Idiom. 

§  1 1.  8.  We  Ihould  watciifully  avoid  what  is  really  Hu- 
mour and  Fancy ;  as  E.  Gr.  being  mightily  pleas'd  or  dif- 
pleas'd  with  trifling  Matters,  and  laying  great  weight  upon. , 
them ;  which  would  tend  not  only  to  difparage  us  ;  but  alfc 
to  expofe  us  to  be  play'd  upon  by  fuch  as  would  perhaps  hu- 
mour us  to  ferve  their  bafe  or  ill  Defigns  upon  us :     Yet, 

9.  Some  things  of  fmallcr  Confideraiion  in  themfelves,  ar? 
to  be  greatly  regarded  for  the  fake  of  what  may  be  depending', 
thereon  j  fuch  as  the  due  Compofure  of  the  Countenance  j ' 
becoming  Geltures  of  the  Body;    courteous  Behaviour;  a 
civil  and  handfom  way  oFSpeaking  ;    a  Voice  well  modufd ;  ^ 
a  jufi;  Pronunciation  and  Orthography,  and  the  like:  Which' 
SLie  generally  much  efteem'd ;  and  fome  of  them  perhaps  be- 
yond their  intrinfick  Value. 

,  Now  the  better  to  fecure  fach  Points  aS  thefe,  and  other^ 
before  mentioned, 

§  1 2.  10.  It  may  be  rcquifitfc,  as  early  as  we  can,  to  en- 
gage fome  prudent  and  careful  MonitOur;  Auchorizing  him 
to  ufe  fome  kind  of  Severity,  if  needful,  towards  us;  and 
always  thankfully  accepting  from  him  his  faithful  Difcharg^ 
of  the  Truft  repofed  in  him. 


Chip^:}        \  [wprovement  of  ^^?[on.  :<6-' 

:  Many  other  Obfervations  of  general  and  ex'^enlive  Dfe 
mTght  be  added;  but  1  leave  them  to  be  colledted,  eirher 
from  this  Eflay,  or  others,  or  from  the  more  folemn  Dif- 
courfes,  which  refer  to  the  Condud:  of. our  fclves;  and  lliall 
add  only  fome  few  ftridures  upon  the  Particulars,  which  re- 
roain.to  be  ipoken  to. 

•  §  \%.  Now  the  right  Coridudt  of  our  felves,  under  the  more 
abfofute  Confideratioa  we  are  here  upon,  do's  maui'y  or 
wholly  confift  in  the  well  ordering  of  our  Bodies,  of  onr 
Mind':,  and  of  both  together  in  refpeft  of  external  Cir- 
cumftances.  .. 

We  may  reafonably  endeavour  to  relieve  or  ft  cure,  as  alfi 
to  gratifieor  recommend  our  felves  in  refpcdl  of  our  Bodies, 
or  Minds,  or  outward  Condition,  by  all  fuch  Means  and 
Methods  as  are  not  Evil  in  themfelves,  nor  like  to  do  more 
Hurt  than  Good,  to  others,  or  to  our  felves,  in  point  of  cer- 
tain Damage,  real  Danger,  inward  or  outward  Difquiet- 
itient ;  or  however  in  refpecft  of  Dif-reputation,  as  expofing 
us  juftly  to  the  Cenfure  or  Sufpicion  of  the  Wifeft  and  Bcft, 
This  General  Rule  may  be  apply'd  in  a  multitude  of  Cafes ; 
but  I  (tiall  offer  fomewhat  farther  in  relation  to  the  following 
Particulars. 

§  14.  "What  is  for  external  Ornament  Ihould  be  v^^ithin 
the  Compafs  of  our  Station  and  Condition  •,  avoiding  what- 
foever  may  be  any  way  Scandalous. 

'  Our  Cloathig  lliould  be  rather  comely  and  Commodious, 
than  over  Curious  or  Coftly  ;  free  from  Sordidnefs  and  af » 
fefted  Singularity. 

§  15.  Our  Food  Ihould  be  carefully,  tho'  not  fcrupuloufly, 
guided  by  heedful  Obfervation,  and  repeated  Experience, 
with  the  genferal  Advice  of  a  Phyfician,  who  is  Skilful  and 
Faithful,  and  fiich  an  one,  if  it  may  be,  as  has  been  well  ac- 
quainted with  .our  Conltitution  and  Cafe  for  fome  confidera-, 
b|c  Time. 

Our  Diet  fhould  be  fuired,  both  in  refpecS:  of  Quality  and 
Quantity,  to  the  ftrength  Or  weaknefs  of  our  Conftitution/ 
to  our  more  adive  or  fedentary  Life,  as  alfo  to  the  Climat.', 
Air,  Seafon,  .and  other  Circumftances :  Some  Difcafes, 
even  of  the  Mind,  are  to  be  in  part  corrected  in  the,  Body, 
and  in  fome  Meafure  by  proper  and  fiutahle  Food. 

A  fimpler  and  plainer  Diet  is  commonly  to  be  us'd,  ratner 
:han  that  Variety  and  thofc  forts  of  Mixtures,  which  may  b: 
ike  to  prejudice  Digeftion,   whdrt  they  carry  the  A ppctic-' 
jc'yond  it  in  Qjiantrty,  and  miy  be  like  to  Vender  the  Qus.li:y-^ 
Tikewils  leis  agic table  to  Natuf-f  j  for  that  fo  many  didfj ii%' 

Bb  a  »  i.V 


^6jr  An  i^Jfay  for  the  Part  HI. 

fores  may  require  differing  Degrees  of  Digeftion.  The  Great 
I^ord  Vcrulnyn  commends  the  interchangeable  Ufe  of  Mode- 
vatc  Eating,  Fafting,  and  full  Feeding  :  But  ordinarily  that 
which  follows  here  will  hold, 

S^pe,  f/irimi,  lefiif,  riunqunm  fatv^  Aurca  1  ex  ep. 

Eat  oft ;  but  fparirgly,  and  fiowly  feed  ; 
Ne'r  cloy  thy  felf,  a  Golden  Rule  indeed, 

§  \6.  Here  the  Infciiption  put  by  the  Miniftcr  who  has 
been  more  than  oi^cc  mention'<1,  upon  his  Knife  may  be  a  good 
Jykmcntc^ 

Nonui  cdam,  vivo  •  feu  m  vivam,  cJo 

([  live  rot  to  eat,  but 'ect  to  live). 

And  we  ftiould  endeavour  to  manage  it  (o,   that  \\x  may  not 
only  Breathe,   but  Liic  ijidecJ,  v'.^.  m  Healrh  and  Strength, 
free  from  tormenting  Pains   and  noifoui  Didenipers,    Avith 
manageable  Vigour,  and  uleful  Activity  ;  that  our  Bodies  may 
be  the  ready  and  obfequious  Inftrumcnts  of  our  Minus,  for  all 
good  Furpt-fes;  but  efpecially  thofc  to  wh'ch  weftand  peculi- 
arly oblig'd,  whether  in  the  A6live  orConrcmplarive  Life ;  and 
tins  Ir.ttc.  rndoubrcdly  requires  a  good  Supply  of  Spirits ;  tho' 
it  \A  ilj  hardly  admit  the  more  grofs  and  pleritiful  fort  of  Feed- 
ipg  :  Yet  a  due  Relaxation  of  the  Mind,  and  the  Ufe  of  mo 
derrtcExercife,  before  cur  Frir.o.pal  Meals,  and  af:er  them  ^ 
together  with  a  cheartul  Spnit  {yiv-ng  Tonnkj  in  cvey  thlfr^, 
according  to;  he  Charge,   i  Thcif,  5.  iS.)    may  greatly  help 
both  the  Apfctitc  and  Digcilion. 

§  17.     Sitting  Divcrtifcments  may  fecm  to  be  more  pro-     • 
per  and  ufcf^d  for  thofe,    who  are  crnimonly  engaged  in' 
flirting  Bulinefs;   but  fuch  as  coni;ft  in  Motion,    for  the  Se- 
dentar)  •,   and  thcri-fore  tho'  Chefs  may  be  very  agreeable  to 
the  G-nius  of  a  Scholar,    yet  Walking,  Bowling,    c2^j,  are    ; 
rrnch  better  fitted  for  relaxing  the  Brain,  and  Itirring  the  x 
Bleed.  _  _  j 

But  certainly  Recrearicns  onghi  not  to  engage  the  Mind  ] 
too  deeply  alout  Winning  or  Lofing  ;    ai'id  therefore  Merv  1 
ihculd  content  tiiemfehes  to  Fla}  fcr  lirtle  or  nothii  g  ;  how- 
ever fcr  what  is  jo  to  them:     And  it  were  belt,    if  they  ■ 
would  endeavour  to  find  out  ,'as  oftentimes  they  niight,  lome' 
\cry  agreeable  Bulineis,   which  miglit  be  to  them  a  iiiitable 
Paftime,  without  the  iofs  of  Time  :     More  particularly,    _^ 

§  iS.  Gentle-' 


Chap.  13'         h}fprovef/2£nt  of  K^2i{Gr\.  :^65 

§  1 8.  Gentlemen,  who  are  rot  under  the  NccclTity  of 
fuppordng  tliemfelves  and  Families  by  their  own  liiJultry, 
Ihould  take  Care  they  make  not  meer  Divertilenicnc  their 
Bufinefs,  and  fo  a  very  Toil  of  Pleafare,  in  a  worfe  than  ihe 
proverbial  Senfe;  whenas  they  might  and  ought  to  fix  upon 
fomewhat  Ufeful  and  Generous,  for  their  itatei  Employ- 
ment ;  which  would  make  for  the  Improvement  of  their 
Minds,  Encrcafe  of  their  Eftates,  the  Good  of  iheir  N-igh- 
bours,  the  Advancement  of  Knowledge  and  Virme.;  and  be 
of  common  Service  to  their  Country,  or  to  the  Worl  J. 

§  19.  Ph^fick  and  Surgery  fhouldbe  fparinglyiis'd,  yet  with 
convenient  Speeil,  whenfirft  it  appears  probable  to.theSki.ful 
and  Faithful,  that  Nature  cannot  well  relieve  it  felf  n-ithouc  > 
them  ;  for  tbnt  is  otherwife  the  beft  Helper ;  efpccially  if  it  be 
but  freed  from  fome  Impediments,  and  prudendy  ailiftcJ  in 
the  way,  wherein  it  frames  to  Work,  for  its  own  Relief, 
provided  that  be  not  ExcelTive  :  But,  when  we  fee  n:ed  of 
fomewhat  farther  ftill,  we  (hould  take  Care  to  go,  as  near  as 
may  be,  to  the  bottom  of  the  Cafe,  fo  as  to  comokte  tiie  • 
Cure,  and  prevent  a  more  dangerous  Relapfe :  But  if  this 
ftiould  befall  us,  theutmoft  Care  muft  then  be  fpeedily  us'd  : 
And  it  may  be  a  good  InftruAion  with  reference  to  Health, 
that  we  be  not  III  too  late,  nor  Well  too  foon. 

§  20.  As  to  our  Minds,  we  (hould  endeavour  to  furniili 
the  Underftanding  and  Memory  with  ufeful  Knowledge  ; 
rot  negledling  what  may  give  us  Acceptation  with  others : 
efpccially  we  Ihould  more  throughly  acquaint  our  fclvcs.with 
that,  which  moft  concerns  us  in  refpedl  of  the  prefent  and 
future  Life. 

An  Acquaintance  with  Hiftory  and  Geography,  and  v.'ith 
the  prefent  ftate  of  Affairs,  as  al(o  a  good  CoUedion  of  in- 
Itrudlive  Fables,  with  their  Morals,  and  of  the  beft  Vro- 
verbs  in  divers  Languages,  with  the  juft  Explication  of  thera, 
^where  that  is  needful},  may  be  of  fingula?  Uic,  and  no 
fmall  ALCCompliftiment :  And  even  fome  pro.verbi  al  Sentences, 
which  appear  Extravagant  at  firft,  may  yet  have  fotne  thi:ig 
at  the  bottom  worth  our  Notice  ;'  thn<;,  {jx  Yovma  Saint,  an 
Old  Devil]  may  fpeak  the  Danger  of  Young  Men's  declin- 
ing from  what  is  Good,  whither  it  tends,  and  where  it's  like 
to  lifue. 

Some  competent  Knowledge  of  the  Laws  under  which  we 
live  may  be  requifite,  both  for  our  own  fakes,  aai  for  the 
Service  of  our  Friends  and  Neighbours. 


Bb  3  I    [§2i.The 


-,o6  An  tjjuy  for  the  Pare  III. 

§  21.  The  due  regulating  of  oi^.r  Inciinatioiii  is  a  Mat- 
ter of  the  higheft  Importance;  nor  is  Light  alone  (as  1  con- 
cetie)  lufficreiic  for  that  Enii  ;  the  Force  of  Reafon  and  Ar- 
gument, how  cogentfoevcr,  h^is  often  prov'd,  by  it  felf  alone, 
Tnetfcftusl;  nor  ^et  will  a  n,ei'e  confcraincd  Exercife  of  Vir- 
tuous Aiflions  recVifie  an  Evil  Dirpofuion  ;  nor  tinaily,  ttat^ 
■which  is  ciiofen  only  nponTonie  lower  Dehgn  than  the  pleafing 
of  God,  and  being  happy  in  his  peculiar  Favour. 

§  ii.  I  here  muft  be  a  Principle  wirliin,  capable  of  the 
'tn^elt  Di'cernment,  and  of  being  mov'd^.by  the  Fear  and 
Li)ve  of  God,  enabling  us  to  chijc  the  things  wh.'ch  pienje.him^ 
and  ft.'  to  t^kc  hold  of  his  Covenmit,  and,  therewithal,  of  his 
oinnipotent  .Strength  ;  tiiat  we  may  be  able  ro  ftem  the  im- 
perubus  I  ide  of  our  own  irregular  Defires  (not  only  thofe  of 
the  Fleih,  but  liken  ife  of  the  Mind)^  to  move  againif  a  Stream 
fo  very  flrongand  violent,  as  is  th^j  Couifcvfthii  H^oi.'d ;.  and 
ihnt  in  direct  Oppofitioji  to  the  StujinsandTempefts,  which 
may  be  raisM  againft  ,us,  both  whithui  an4  without  by  the 
yrivce-  of  the  Pcwcr  of  the  Air  ^  and  belides,  againlt  the  in- 
veigling Ailurerr.ents,  which  ofien  j:rove  of -greater  Force 
than  tiiofe  :  We  fhall  therefore  plainly  need  a  greater  Spirif. 
Ss'ithf  and  in  usy  thnn  hcyiu4tii  in  the  VVofld. 

§  23.  Tot  that  we  muft  believinglyi  and  earneftJy  Pray; 
to  that  wc  muft  readily  yiel^d  our  felvcs,  and  ferior.fly  endea- 
vour to  CO  operate  therewith  by  Confiideration,  Hearing, 
Kead;ng,  ferious  Converfe,  diligent  Attendance  on  every 
Divine  irtftitution,  together  v/ith' futtable  Pra(5lice;  and  iij 
all  by  the  Firercife  of  Faith  in' our  Great  Mediatour. 

^24.  We  muft  prefs  upon  our  Itlind  and  Confcience  the 
higher  Arguments,  which  ought  to  move  us ;  taking  in  alJL 
the  good  Confidcrations,  that  ivill  in  any  Meafure  do  it, 
with  becoming  Shame  and  Grief,  if  the  former  can  fcarcely 
ftir  us  at  ail,  and  that  both  t()gethcr  (hould  carry  us  no  farther; 
bat  trufting  in  the  Divine  Goodnefs  and  Faithfulnefs,  that 
we  (liall  y>t  be  more  faJJjr  aififted  and  fucceeded  in  our 
waiting  upon  God;  and  certainly  be  accepted,  through  his 
Infinite  Mercy,  for  the  Merits  of  our  Saviour,  io  as  at  the 
laft  to  be  optnly  acquitted,  and  folemnly  call'd  10 enters  at  good. 
/indfr.ithfui  Servants^  into  the  Jo^  of  our  Lord. 


CHAP, 


Chap  24*       *  Improvement  of  Ktz{on.  567 


CHAP.    XXIV. 


^  I.  COME  Intimailons  have  been  given,  howwefhould 
**^  order  our  fclves  more  nbfilutely ;  before  I  proceed  to 
Ihew  how  we  fliould  Manage  our  Affairs  and  Undertakings, 
we  may  next  confider, 

III.  How  we  fliould  relativsly  condutft  and  behave  out 
felves  in  fome  Special  Refpedls ;  and  that.  Particularly, 

'  I .  We  muft  folemnly  oblige  our  felves,  and  ufe  our  ut- 
moft  Care,  and  beft  Endeavours  to  carry  towards  GOD,  as 
Becomes  us  to  a  Being  of  Univerfal  and  Infinite  Perfedtion, 
who  is  our  Creator,  our  Abfolute  Owner,  our  Supreme  Ru- 
ler, our  moft  Gracious  and  Merciful  Benefadtor,  our  Chief 
Good,  and  ultimate  End  J  paying,  withal,  fuch  peculiar  Re- 
gards to  the  Fatljef,  Son,  and  Holy  Spirit,  as  mayrefpedtive- 
iy  anfwer  their  Special  and  diftint^  Relationsto  us,  and  Con- 
cernment with  us,  acJcording  to  Scriptural  Revelation  ; 
which  is  to  be  obferv'd,  as  the  moft  certain,  and  complete 
Rule,  both  of  Natural  and  Inftituted  Religion. 

§  2.  2.  As  to  good  and  bad  Angels,  we  are  to  judge  of 
them  according  to  the  Scriptural  Difcovery ;  and  agreeably 
thereto  we  muft  Honour  and  Love  the  former,  deteft,  re- 
fift,  and  as  far  as  may  be  avoid  the  latter :  Vet  neither  may 
we  rail  on  thefe,  or  charge  them  without  fufficient  Evidei^ce; 
nor  yet  pay  any  thing  of  Divine  Homage  or  Honour  to  thojc  j 
nor  are  we  to  feek  our  Help  from  either  of  them. 

As  to  departed  Souls,  we  are  neither  to  determine  any 
thing;  about  them,  nor  concern  our  felves  with  them,  but  as 
the  Word  and  Providence  of  God  may  plainly  lead,  upoh 
ftrift  Enquiry,  rogethcr  with  juft  Deliberation,  and  the  beft 
Advice  %ve  can  have. 

§  3.  3.  A  due  Behaviour  towards  our  felves  confifts  in 
Thinking  rightly  of  our  felves,  and  therefore  humbly,  yec 
not  injurioufly  ;  alfo  in  Speaking,  as  is  right  and  fit,  both 
of,  and  for  our  felves,  upon  juft  Occafion  ;  and  farther  yet, 
in  a£ting  every  way  towards  our  felves,  and  upon  our  own 
Account,  as  may  beft  promote  our  real  Intereft,  in  order  to 
our  higheft  Felicity  ;  or  however  confiftently  with  it. 

§  4.  4.  As  to  other  Men ;  we  muft  love  our  Neighbour^ 
tho'  not  always  equally  with  our  felves,  yet  as  truly  as 
our  felves  J  and  therefore  muft  Think,  and  Speak,  and 
Ad  agreeably  in  relation  to  him,  as  it  has  been  (hewn  we 

B  b  4  ought 


■96d  An  tjfay  for  the        *         Part  III'. 

<5ughtto  do  in  reference  to  our  felves  j  obferving  th:it  excel- 
len:  Caution  of  the  Moralift,  Qucd  tibi  fieri  nrn  vk,  alteri  ne 
fcccrii:  Do  net  to  others^  -^hxt  ^ynu  .' rtjalojubly)  wouU!,  thfy 
fhou'.d  not  do  to  you,  '(].  d.  Injure  not  any,  whereas  you  reafo- 
mbly  would,  that  none  lliould  Injuie  you  ;  nor  fhonld  you 
fyifer  them  to  do  it,  when  you  can  /'I'm;  prevent  them  ;■  But 
here  it  muft  be'oblcrv'd,  that,  what  may  be  call'd  an  Harm, 
is  notalways^ninjufy,  }iVi'j?.alway3  rcafonabJy  to  be  nill'd 
by  us  to  our  fdves.  "  Yet,''*  *^r'   '*'■ 

■  §  5.  Thatappiovcd  Rule,  which  is  fo  plainly  a  Dli^ate 
of  rhcL^w  of  Nacore,  do's  (I  conceive)  as  plainly  forbid  the 
uii!!g  any  penal  Method  to  dri-e  Men  fioniwhat  they  ap- 
prehend to  be  their  Duty  towards  God,  or  even  to  put  thein 
fas  fome  would  have  it)  upon  confideiing  better ;  whillt  their 
Confc'encedo's  not  evidently  lead  to  any  fuih  maniftfl  hijwy 
either  to 'God  or  Man,  as  might  rank  them  amongft  the 
Hvil  dos):^  intended,  I{om.  i  ^.  who  are  to  be  punlfli'<i  or  re- 
trained by  the  Magiftrate;  nor  .yex  brii^s  tbcm  within  the 
true  Reafon  of  the  only  Penal  Luw  about  Religiori,  v/hich 
Godhimfelf  faw  fit  toena£l  and  cntruft  in  the  hands  of  Men; 
vi:{.  againti.grofs  Idolatry,  and  fuch  as  ihonld  entice  others 
thereto;  which,  under  the  JcK':jh  Theocracy,  muft  be  the  re- 
nor.ncing  their  Allegiance  to  God,  vv'ho  was  fo  peculiarly 
their  King,"  and  indeed  their  Civil  Lawgiver;  who  ap- 
pointed chat  Nation  to  be  thus  vifibly  diftinguifh'd  from  the 
reft  of  the  World,  'till  SHIlOH  jhoiddcome,  and  thit  pecu- 
liar Ftrfrn  oP  Government,  together  with  the  Special  Occa- 
fien  and  Uie  thereof,  llrou'd  thereupon  ceafe. 

§6.  Now  who  Man  can  find  the  Man,  oriiumberof  Men» 
to  whom  he  cj(n  even  at  prefent  )^'^<^%'^  it  reafonablc  to  fay 
pf  T  ("fiould  happen;  how.Confcicntior.'llv  focvcr,  to  differ,  in 
a  Point  that  is  piirely  'Relirjous,  from  what  you  do,  or  (ome- 
tinie  may,  talc'e  to  be  i  Certain  and  Important  Truth  ;  fpare 
rotto  efrdcavoiirmy  Conviiflion  by  Incapacities,  or  other 
Penal  Methods3;  whcnas  he  knows,  that  no  Natural  Force, 
oi^Civi!  Atithoiity,  or  greater  Learning,  or  Number,  no  nor 
unfeigned  Piety,  can  render  them  Infallible ;  and  alfo,  that, 
if  he  Ihould  really  need  to  be  fet  Right,  fi.\ch  a  Method  would 
be^  more  fitted  to  make  him  an' Hypocrite  than  a  real  Con- 
veVr,  arid  fo,  rather  hateful  to  God  than  accepted  by  him. 
"Wc  Ibnxld  nor  therefore  take  upoii  us,  if  wc  were  in  Autho- 
nty,  wichpur  plainer  Commilfion  fron\  God,  than  has  been 
yet  produce!  {for  that  at  Jiyb  "ii.  zj,  28.  and  other  like  Al- 
Ici^ationj:,  may  be  fairjy  Anfwcr'd),  to  ufe  that  Method  with 
; : i- *r?,  whipN  it\  f.  \i? -y ery  Corrciencfes  ""A'cJ  wpitld  judge  unfit. 


Chap.  24.  Improvement  of  Reafon.  369 

unrcafonable,  and  plainly  Injurious,  not  only  to  us,  but  to  the 
Divine  Prcrogacive,  when  it  Ihouldbe  bro't  hometoourfelvts. 

§  7.  But  our  blefled  Lord  has  carry'd  the  forementioned 
Caution  yet  higher  in  thnt  fo  Divine  Command,  fVbatfoever 
ye  would  that  others  Jhould  do  to  you,  do  you  even  fo  to  thent, 
which  he  confirms  by  adding,  for  this  is  the  Law  nnd  the 
Prophets-,  q,  d.  the  Sum  and  Subftance  of  what  they  charge 
upon  us  in  relation  tp  our  Neighbour  :  The  meaning  plain- 
ly is,  that  we  (hould  fuppofe  our  felves  to  be  in  the  Cafe  of 
another,  and  thereupon  well  confider,  what  we  might  recjona- 
hly  expedl  from  him,  were  he  in  our  prefent  Cafe ;  and  that 
we  fhould  adl  accordingly. 

As  to  the  Special  Duties  of  particular  Relations,!  fhall  not 
enter  into  them  more  diftindtly,  but  leave  them  under  the 
Diredipn  of  the  General  Rules,  that  have  been  mention'd 
here,  and  to  the  Special  Inftru£lions,  which  are  to  be  found 
in  the  Sacred  Scriptures,  aijd  Treatifes  agreeable  thereto. 
And,  to  proceed, 

§  8i  5.  We  fhould  make  our  Convcrfe  ufeful  and  agree- 
able, as  far  as  innocently  and  prudently  we  may,  to  our 
Company,  not  only  admitting,  but  inviting  and  drawing  in 
every  one  to  bear  a  part  in  Converfation,  and  to  fpeak  of 
what  may  be  moft  agreeable  tothemfelvcs  and  to  the  relt. 

To  make  Converle  more  ufeful  it  were  commonly  beft, 
ic  (hould  be  dire£ted  to  fome  particular  valuable  Point  of 
Knowledge  or  Prad:ice,  and  notrunloofe  ;  nor  go  too  hafti- 
ly  from  one  thing  to  another,  before  we  have  brought  the 
Matter  in  hand  to  any  Iflue  j  neither  fiiould  we  ordinarily 
let  things  pafs,  which  we  conceive  to  be  wrong,  without  a 
^  mode  ft  and  prudent  Oppofition;  nor  yet  (which  would  be 
much  worfe  frt  or  allow  our  felves  to  Wrangle  about  every 
thing  ;  or  abfolutely  to  take  this  or  that  fide,  v/ithout  en- 
deavouring to  iielp  out  our  Antagonift,  as  they  fliould  do, 
who  heartily  delign  to  find  out  the  Truth,  and  fix  it,  rather 
than  to  carry  their  Point. 

§  9.  6.  We  fhould  not  make  even  the  meaneft  Perfon 
needlefly  our  Enemy ;  and  where  we  nnift  oppofe  others, 
we  fhould  not  farther  provoke  them,  than  is  altogether  Ne- 
ceflary.  As  to  the  Refentment  of  what  others  fay  or  do 
agalnft  us  injurioufly,  we  Ihould  carefully  remember  and  ob- 
fervc,  that  to  be  eafily  provok'd,  and  never,  or  very  hardly 
reconcil'd  is  Diabolical ;  to  be  eafily  provok'd,  and  eafily 
Reconciled  is  Humane ;  but  to  be  hardly  provok'd  and  eafi- 
ly Reconcil'd  is  Divine :  We  ihould  not  take  any  Offence, 
■where  that  which  is,  faid  or  done  may  as  well  be  taken  by  a 

better 


370  An  tjfay  for  the  Part  III. 

better  Handle  as  by  a  worfe  ;  nor  always  appear  to  bemov'd^ 
where  there  may  be  indeed  juft  Caufe,  but  it  would  be  like 
to  do  more  harm  than  good  ;  yet  ordinarily  we  may  foftly 
intimate,  that  we  fee  the  ill  Treatment,  but  can  eafily  pafs 
it  bv,  where  the  Matter  is  tolerable  ;  and  that  we  are  in-^ 
eJin'd,  upon  reafonable  Terms,  to  forgive  what  is  othiirwifc, 
and  fo  to  forget  Injuries,  as  not  to  return  them,  nor  carry  ill 
to  others,  whilft  yet  we  retain  a  cautionary  Remembrance  of 
the,ii,  fo  as  not  to  fubjecfl  our  felves  to  the  like  or  greater, 
where  we  may  fairly  avoid  them. 

§  I  o.  7.  Reproof  is  to  be  given  only  where  there  is  fome 
Hopes  of  doing  good  thereby  ;  at  leaft  for  the  vindicating  of 
our  own  Charadrer,  and  that  others  be  not  farther  hard'ned 
by  our  Silence  :  And  we  (hould  make  it  as  gentle  as  will 
confift  with  faithfulnefs.  Penal  Corredlions  are  more  fpar- 
ingly  to  be  us'd,  yet  doubtlefs  ought  to  be  employ'd,  where 
other  Methods  prove  ineffectual ;  fince  ff^^r  tnuj}  not  fufferjin 
vpon  our  Brother^  if  in  any  fit  way  we  can  reclaim  him,  no? 
ftould  run  the  manifeft  hazard  of  berrlng  fin  for  him  (as  the 
Marginal  Reading  \%)  upon  our  Negled:. 

§  f  I.  8.  We  muft  always  be  ready  to  pay  what  Refpecft 
may  be  due  to  others ;  modeftly  declining  what  plainly  be- 
longs not  to  our  felves,  and  courteoufly  receiving  what  it 
may  become  us  to  admit  of. 

As  we  (hould  not  eafily  accept  all  Offers  of  Kindnefs,  fo 
neither  (hould  we  defpife  the  loweft,  nor  refufe  any  without 
a  thankful  Acknowledgment,  nor  yet  receive  them  without 
making  fuch  Returns  upon  fit  Occafions,  as  may  be  proper 
for  us  towards  the  Perfon  who  confers  them :  'Tis  a  known 
faying.  Qui  /iccipit  Benencium^  ferdidit  LilmMtem,  He  that 
receives  a  Courrefie,  has,  in  fome  degree,  fold  his  Liberty; 
and  I  may  add.  He  that  makes  a  fuitable  Return,  has  re- 
deem'd  it  back  again,    by  quitting  Scores. 

The  farther  Direction  of  our  Behaviour  towards  others, 
may  be  given  in  part  under  that  Branch,  which  will  refer  to 
our  Conducting  of  fuch  as  may  be  fpecially  committed  to 
us;  but  muft  otherwife  be  left  to  Treatifes  of  Divinity, 
Ethicks,  Politicks,  (3c. 

§  1 1.  9.  As  to  inferiour  Creatures  about  us  in  any  Kind, 
God  has  indeed  given  us  a  Dominion  over  them,  and  we 
fhould  by  no  means  fet  up  any,  or  all  of  them  together,  as  _ 
owr  Lords;  -much  lefs  (hould  we  make  them  our  Gods^  by 
loving,  fearing,  or  depending  on  them,  (or  indeed  on  any 
Sunenor  Creatures)  as  if  tliey  were  more  than  Creatures : 
Yet  rn  rhe  other  hand,  our  Dominion  over  them  is  not  to  be 

alcoge- 


Chap.  24-         Improvement  of  Keafon.  ^yi 

altogether  Arbitrary,  being  limited  by  him,  who  is  the  on- 
ly aofoJute  Lord  over  us  and  them.  "We  muft  therefore  ufe 
.them  as  his,  for  his  Honour  and  Service;  for  real  Good  to 
outfelvesand  others,  efpecially  for  the  common  Advantage, 
according  to  what  God  has  fitted  them  for;  not  tyrannizing 
over  the  Brute-Creatures  about  us,  but  carrying  it  towards 
them,  as  the  Righteoiu  Man,  who  regardeth  the  life  of  his  Beaft^ 
Prov.  I  z.  I  o.  (and  this  the  Sacred  Scriptures  intimate,  as  a 
Point  of  Morality,  tho'  they  undertake  not  Philofophy) ; 
we  ihould  therefore  allow  them  convenient  Food  and  Reft  ; 
defending  them  alfo  from  fuch  Infults  of  their  fellow  Crea- 
tures, as  would  ferveto  no  good  Purpofe,  rather  than  merely 
to  divert  our  felves  therewith :  Tho*  ic  is  not  to  be  doubted, 
•but  a  lawful  Ufe  may  be  made  of  the  Natural  Enmity  in 
fome  of  them  towards  others,  and  that  it  may  afford  fome 
ufeful  Obfervations  and  Remarks. 

.  §  13-  I  o.  Our  External Circumftances  maybe  (' I.)  fuch, 
as  are  determined  for  us  by  an  over- ruling  Providence  ;  and 
here  our  bufinefs  is  to  fall  in  therewith,  quietly  to  fubmit  to 
feeming  or  real  Inconveniences,  where  there  is  no  clear  way 
for  our  avoiding  them;  and  we  Ihould  indeed  believe  they 
may  be  fo  long  needful  or  fitteft  for  us:  In  the  mean  while 
we  are  gratefully  to  obferve,  accept  and  ufe  what  we  orher- 
wa>s  have  that  is  agreeable,  or  may  fetve  in  an  innocent  way 
to  alleviate  our  Troubles.    But, 

Whilft  we  fet  our  felves  to  make  the  bcft  we  can  of  our 
prefent  Condition,  we  are  yet  fubmiflively  to  feek,  andchear- 
fuUy  to  take,  what  Courfe  would  really  make  for  our  De- 
liverance J  but  carefully  (hunning  what  may  probably  lead 
irtto  farther  and  greater  Inconvenience. 

§  14.  In  Circumftances,  that  are  juftly  pleafing  to  us, 
we  Ihould  be  thankful  to  God  and  to  the  Inftruments  he 
makes  ufe  of  for  our  good  ;  but  fufpicious  of  our  felves,  left 
we  Ihould  pervert  a  profperous  Condition  to  our  own  or 
i)thers  Hurt  j  or  fet  our  Hearts  too  much  on  prefent  things  or 
think  of  refting  in  them  :  We  (hould  rather  look  and 
provide  for  Viciffitudes;  but  without  the  difquieting  Sollici- 
tude  which  would  rob  us  of  our  prefent  Comfort,  and  God 
of  the  Praifes  due  to  him.  Here  that  needful  Admonition, 
Pfal.  6 z.  10.  is  to  be  carefully  minded,  If  riches  encreafe,  fet 
not  your  heart i  upon  themi  together  with  fo  wife  and  kind  a 
Charge,  as  that  of  our  Redeemer,  Mat.  6.  ^4.  Take  no  thought 
for  the  Morrow  ;  for  the  Morrow  (haHtake  though  for  the  thi7igs 
of  it  felf:  fufficient  unto  the  Day  ^  the  evil  thereof. 

§  i^.  Again 


572  An  bffay  for  the  Part  IH. 

§  15.      Again,    (r-)    Oar  Circumftances  may   in  fome 
Cafes  be  fuch  as  are  allotted  or  allowed  to  us  by  Men;   who 
j-nay  either  have  a  juft  Authority  over  us,  and  fuch  as  comes 
fully  up  to  the  particular  Cafe ;  here  we  are  unqueftionably  to 
fubmit  as  to  a  Divine  Appointment  and  Difpofal:  or  elfethey 
may  ufurp  a  Power  which  belongs  not  to  them ;  and  this  either 
without  any  real  Title  to  govern  us  at  all ;   and  they  are 
then  to  be  regarded  no  farther  than  Prudence  may  require, 
for  the  averting  fome  greater  Evil,  or  procurine  fome  greater 
Good  to  our  k'lves  or  others:     Or  elle  they  only  want  a  pro- 
per and  juft  Authority  for  the  ordering  of  fa:h  particular 
Matter,  or  for  the  doing  it  in  fuch  a  Manner;  and  here,  tho* 
we  may  not  be  bound  to  yield  in  Point  of  Confcience,  as  to  a 
DifpofaJ  by  Divine  Gommiffion  ;   yet  we  may  be  under  an 
Obligation,  even  of  Duty,  quietly  to  fubmit  in  Deference  to 
the  Perfon,  and  more  general  CommilTion  of  the  Magiftrate ; 
fuppoling  him  ftiJl  to  maintain  the  Charadler  of  being,  in 
other  Refpe<fls,  and  upon  the  whole,  the  Mlmfier  of  God  to  us 
for  good ^  or  fuch  however  to  the  Publick,    the  Peace  whereof 
we  neither  fafely  can,  nor  indeed  lawfully  may  go  about  to 
difturb  upon  an  Account  that  is  merely  Private :     And  to 
fuch  Submillion  we  are  bound  in  Duty  to  the  Civil  Society, 
whereof  we  are  Members,   and  to  which  we  have  engaged 
our  felves,    to  fecure  and  promote  the  Publick  Tranquillity 
and  Welfare,  tho'  we  might  happen  to  fall  under  fome  perfo- 
nal  and  private  Hardfhips. 

§  16.  Yet  farther,  (3.)  Thereare  Circumftances,  where- 
of we  our  felves  have  the  Ordering,  at  leaft  in  fome  good 
Meafure;  as  £.  ^r.  the  chufing  of  our  ftated  Bufinefs,  the 
Place  of  our  Abode,  and  fome  of  our  Relatives  j  as  namely^ 
for  Service,  or  in  Marriage.  •  •' '  , 

Now  we  are  here  to  govern  our  felves  upon  the  due  Con- 
lideration  of  all  that  is  Material  in  reference  to  any  of  thefe, 
by  the  forcmentioncd  Intentions  of  regular  Satisfadion,  rea- 
fonable  Acceptation,  and  real  Ufefulnefs;  fixing  upon  what 
is  iikeft  to  anfwer  thefe  nearer  Purpofes  in  fubferviency  to, 
cr  confiftently  with,  our  farther  and  higher  Interefts. 

§  17.  As  to  our  ftated  Bufinefs,  fomewhat  has  been  faid 
a,lready  in  the  General,  Pan  II.  Chap.  10.  §  12.  page  170. 
But  it  may  be  obferv'd  a  little  more  particularly,  that  we 
iTiouId  Confider,  whether  we  have  ftrength  and  fitnefs  of 
Body,  or  a  Make,  and  Capacity  of  Mind,  for  this  or  that 
Buhnefs;  whether  we  have  laid  in  the  requifite  Furniture, 
or  may  hope  to-  do  it  in  fit  Time,  whether  it  lie  not  fo  very 
':o''s  to  oor  Inclination,    as  that  it  muft  be  like  to  prove  a 

[continual 


Chap.  24'       I^/provewtrjt  of  Reaioi).  573 

continual  and  intolerable  Burthen ;  more  efpecially,  wliether 
we  may  hope  to  be  Safe  and  Uieful  in  fi'ch  way  of  Living,' 
and  that  it  may  be  like  to  afford  what  is  Needful  apd  Con- 
venient for  us. 

§  18.  The  Place  of  our  Abode  is  mainly  to  be  deter- 
min'd  by  the  Confideration  of  real  Advantages  and  reafma- 
ble  Satisfadlicn  to  our  felves  and  thofe  we  are  obliged  Speci- 
ally to  regard  in  a  Cafe  of  that  KatiTe  :  The  Place  fhot-ld 
be  as  near  as  we  can  fuited  to  our  Corftitu'-icn  in  Point  of 
Health,  as  alfo  to  our  Condition  and  Bulinels ;  a  fuitable 
Neighbourhood  and  Society  is  much  to  be  defir'd  ;  but  we 
(hou/'d  by  no  means  pitch,  where  we  may  not  hope  to  Enjoy 
the  Prefence  of  God  in  feme  good  Meafure.   . 

Such  are  to  be  chofen  for  Servants,   as  are  like  to  prove   ' 
Faithful,   Skilful,   Tradable,    and  Quiet ;  how  we  Ihould 
carry  towards  them  may  be  feen  in  part.  Chap.  18.    §  6. 
page  329. 

§  1 9.  As  to  the  Choice  of  a  Perfon  for  Marriage,  which 
fliould  not  be  too  early,  I  ftall  infift  fomewhat  farther ;  fince 
it  is  a  Matter  of  fo  very  great  Confequence,  both  inrefped 
of  this  World  and  the  other.  We  (hould  therefore  take 
heed  of  being  entangled  before  we  have  well  confidered  j  In 
cafe  of  being  fuddenly  taken  with  any  one,  it  were  moft  ad- 
vifable,  firft  to  cool  a  little  upon  the  Matter,  before  it  be 
purfu'd;  and  then  not  to  purfue  it  haftily  beyond  a  Safe  and 
Honourable  Retreat ;  but  carefully  to  avoid  rafti  and  Solemn 
Engagements;  and  indeed  to  take  what  Care  we  can  that 
Affdions  be  not  engag'd  on  either  hand  without  the  Con- 
currence of  our  Father  in  Heaven,  and  Parents  upon  Earth,- 
who  tho'  they  may  not  impofe  their  own  Choice  upon  Chil- 
dren, yet  may  fairly  claim  a  Negative  upon  theirs,  where  tliey 
jfee  plain  and  weighty  Reafon  for  it. 

We  fliould  be  very  watchful  that  we  fell  not  our  felves  for 
fecular  Advantage;  and  that  we  be  not  ruin'd  in  point  of 
Eitate,  Reputation,  or  folid  Ccntcnrmcnt,  for  the  pleafing  of 
our  Fancy  wirhBeaury,  or  Wit,  or  Titular  Honour, 

§  20.  We  rauft  always  remember,  a  good  Wife  for  Huf- 
band;  is  from  the  Lord  by  a  more  peculiar  Providence ;  that 
the  Divine  Cmnifcicnce  alone  can  fufficiently  guide  our 
Choice ;  and  that  his  Prefence  alone  can  make  it  happy,  how 
wifely  fcever  it  might  fcem  to  be  made:  Both  Parties 
Ihould  theri  fore  carefully  fee  to  it,  as  far  as  pdflibly  they  can, 
that  they  be  mdccd  God's  r.)?d  e/ich  other's  Choice ;  not  only 
each  others  Choice  without  ccnftraint  on  either  fide,  but 
each  of  rhe;n  Jikewife  chclcn  out  for  the  other  by  the  Special 

P'.ovxdeiice 


374 Ant£ayforthe Part  III. 

^roidence  of  God ;    and  it  were  greatly  to  be  defir'd,  they 
(hould  be  fuch  as  he  has  chofen  for  himfelf. 

§  zii  We  fhould  endeavour  to  be  reafonably  fure  of  a 
good  and  fuitable  Natural  Difpofition,  together  with  fome- 
what  of  an  agreeable  Education,  Opinion,  and  manner  of 
Living  J  and  that  the  Perfon  be  fuch  as  we  can  truly  love  for 
Reafons,  which  we  need  not  be  alham'd  to  own. 

A  Wife  (hould  have  Prudence  enough  to  fubmit,  as  becomes 
her,  when  her  Realons  have  been  modeftly  offer'd  :  An  Huf- 
band  (hould  be  qualify 'd  to  Govern  as  becomes  him,  with 
AfFedrion,  Prudence,  and  Gentlenefs. 

The  Converfation,  in  order  to  Marriage,  ought  carefully 
to  be  manag'd  with  inofFenlive  Freedom  ;  and  fo  as  to  keep 
our  Minds  open  to  farther  Lights  and  that  we  may  fubmit  our 
Defires  to  the  manifeft  Leadings,  and  Sovereign  Difpofals  of 
Providence. 

§  iz.  It  remains,  thatfomethingbefpecially  addedas  to 
that  Condudl  of  our  felves,  which  has  relation  to  thofe  we 
are  peculiarly  engag'd,  or  would  endeavour,  to  Conducil : 
And  here,  upon  a  right  ftatc  of  the  Defign  we  would  purfue, 
we  Ihouid  carefully  fee,  that  it  be  not  only  good  in  it  felf, 
but  that  it  can  be  made  plainly  to  appear  fuch  alfo  to  them, 
fo  as  none  may  feeCaufe,  or  have  the  Confidence  to  periwade 
them  other  wife  j  and  even  where  it  may  be  requifite  to  con- 
ceal from  them  what  we  are  really  defigning,  yet  we  lliould 
take  all  poflible  Care  it  may  not  have  an  ill  Appearance  to 
them,  if  difcover'd,  but  efpecially  when  atcain'd. 

We  muft  carefully  endeavour,  not  fo  much  in  Words,  as 
by  our  Carriage,  that  thofe  whom  we  would  Conduct  may 
be  fully  fatisfy'd  of  our  Integrity  and  good  Affedtions  to- 
wards them,  and  as  far  as  may  be  alfo  of  our  Ability  and 
Prudence. 

§  2^.  The  Means  and  Meafures  we  would  ufe  ought  to 
be  adapted,  as  near  as  we  can,  to  their  Capacity,  Genius, 
Inclination,  and  acknowledged  Intereft,  or  at  leaft  to  what  is 
truly  fo:  And  we  muft  Work,  as  far  as  well  may  be,  by 
the  Principles,  Notions,  Acquaintance,  and  Confidents  they 
have  already  j  yet  without  approving  them,  where  they  are 
really  bad;  but  rather  endeavouring  by  the  f weft  Steps, 
rho'  perhaps  they  niuft  be  flow,  to  draw  them  off  from  thofe  ■ 
that  are  fuch,  chiefly  by  fublticar  ng  bttter  in  their  Place,  and 
vfing  fit  Endeavours  to  carry  tliem  by  degrees  to  admit  of 
fuch  as  are  truly  y.;/?,  or  rathci'  lO  e.ubraci  them,  as  of  their 
Oivn  Accord. 

24.  We 


Chap.  24-        Improvement  of  ?K.^2i{ou,  375 

^  14.  We  muft  take  heed  of  pretending  to  an  Authority 
we  have  not  over  others,  or  of  ftraining  what  we  have  ; 
yet  this  muft  be  ftudiouUy,  but  cautioully  maintain'd  ;  fpar- 
ingly  us'd,  but  refolvedly  infilted  on,  when  once  we  have 
engag'd  it;  unlefs  there  Ihou Id  appear  fome  weighty  Rea- 
fon  to  the  contrary,  which  then  we  fhould  produce,  if  we 
fitly  may,  as  the  Ground  of  our  departing  from  what  we 
had  infifted  on  j  but  that  is  to  be  done  fo  far  only  and  in 
fuch  a  fort  as  will  beft  confift  with  the  fecuring  of  our 
Authority,  and  other  valuable  Ends. 

A  ftrid  Impaniality  is  to  be  generally  obferv'd  in  our  Be- 
haviour towards  fuch  as  may  ftand  in  like  Relation  to  us,  or 
who  may  feem  to  have  a  like  Claim  from  usj  and  par- 
ticularly towards  Children,  Servants,  Scholars,  ci  Sub- 
je<fts. 

§  15.  The  Bufinefs,  Learning,  or  other  Matters,  in  which 
others  are  to  be  condud^ed,  fhovid  be  made  as  eafle  and  plea- 
fani  to  them  as  weH  may  be.  The  harder  and  eafier  Farts 
fhbuld  be  interwoven,  that  both  the  Mind  and  Body  may  be 
alcernately  intended  and  relax 'd:  All  is  to  be  manag'd 
with  as  little  Severity  as  well  may  be.  And  therefore  the 
more  gentle  Methods  are  firft  to  be  try'd,  fuch  as  Advifing, 
Encouraging,  Expoftulating,  Charging,  Reprimanding,  and 
1  Threatning ;  if  thefe  alone  will  not  do,  we  are  then  to  join 
fome  of  the  feverer  Methods  with  them  in  the  way  of  a  gra- 
I  dual. Advance  :  Here  Shame  is  to  be  firft  try'd  ;  then  the 
wiiholding,  or  withdrawing  what  would  be  pleafing  and  en- 
couraging ;  Blows  are  not  ordinarily  to  be  us'd  v/icbout  the 
laft  Necelfity  ;  nor  is  mere  Weaknefs  to  be  punilh'd  , 
but  Wilfulnefs,  or  palpable  Negligence  and  Carelefnefs  ; 
nor  is  every  Fault,  that  might  deferve  it  to  be  prefently 
charged  and  punilh'd,  but  rather  to  be  remember'd  and  call'd 
over  upon  Occafion  of  fome  greater  Offence ;  and  then  Ih- 
ftrudtlon  (hould  both  precede  and  follow  Corredkion ;  this 
jlhould  be  begun  in  due  Time,  that  there  may  need  the  lels 
of  it;  and  leffcr  Faults  are  to  be  fuitably  chaftiz'd  for  the 
prevention  of  greater.    But  then, 

§  26.  What  is  well  ought  to  be  obferv'd,  own  d  arid 
ncourag'd  ;  and  we  Ihould,  as  far  as  poUible,  engage  all 
about  us  to  carry  towards  thofe  who  are  under  our  Condm^, 
as  we  our  fdves  fee  requifite  to  do:  But  great  Regard  is  to 
jC  had  of  the  diftcriiig  Tempers  of  thofe  with  whom  we  are 
jonccrn'd  ;  and  diligent  Obfeivation  to  be  made  what  fort 
-jf  Methods  work  moft  kindly  and  effeduaily  svich  this  or 
hat  Fc.  fun. 

lo 


3  7  <^  -^'^  ^Ifay  for  the  Part  1 1 1. 

In  our  Reafoning  with  thofe  whom  we  ^vould  conduft,  the 
higher  and  mere  generous  Motives  are  fitft  arid  frequently  to 
be  try'd ;  but  if  they  wiJl  not  reach  the  good  Purpofe  at 
which  we  aim,  or  not  fo  fully  ;  thofe  of  a  loV/er  Nature  muft 
ht  added,  and  the  Compliance  is  to  be  approv'd,  on  whatfo- 
ever  tillowable  Grounds  it  might  proceed  :  Yet  we  are  to  be 
flill  recommending  to  them  thofe  which  ate  preferable,  as 
being  truly  the  nobleft  and  beft. 


CHAP.    XXV. 

§  I.  CROM  the  Condudt  of  our  felves,  we  proceed  to 
*■    that  of  our  fecular  Bufinefs  and  Concerns.    Now, 

IV.  As  to  the  jnorc  common  Affdirs  of  Life,  Management 
feems  chiefly  to  refpeft  the  ftated  ways  of  Getting,  Secviring^ 
Improving,  and  Employing  xvhat  we  maty  call  our  Eftatej 
or  Means  of  Subiiflence  in  this  World. 

Here  we  fhould  be  careful  to  fet  due  Bourids  to  our  De^ 
lircs,  Piirfuiis,  and  Cares,  remeftibring  that  of  Solomon^ 
Ecdef.  5.  1  o.  Hs  that  Icvrth  Silver  f,on!l  not  be  fntisfied  vpith 
SilverfVor  he  that  loveth  Abundance  xvith  Encretijc-^  and  alfo  thtit 
of  a  greater  than  SolomoVy  Luke  iz.  1^.  Take  heed  and  bewars 
efCovetottjncfs  :  for  a  Mans  Life  csnfijlcth  not  in  the  Abundance 
of  the  things,  which  he  pnjjejfeth. 

§  2.  We  ihould  account  cur  felves  in  fomc  fort  I{ichl 
when  we  have  more  than  for  NecefTity :  efpecially  if  we: 
have  to  live,  and  to  give;  nor  only  to  lay  out,  but  fome- 
what  to  lay  up,  proportionably  to  our  Rarik  and  Station. 

In  order  to  this  we  ihould  have  fome  flated  way  of  Bufi- 
nefsj  and  ought  to  ufc  Diligence  therein:  We  fliould  not 
do  by  another  hand  what  wc  may  well  enough  do  by  our 
own  ;  nor  delay  till  to  Morrow  what  might  as  well  be  done 
to  Day :  Nor  fhould  we  defpife  fmaller  things,  either  in 
Point  of  Lofs,  when  it  might  as  well  be  avoided  j  or  of  Gain 
which  might  as  well  be  had. 

We  fhould  not  fpare  what  might  ht  fpcnt  with  probable 
Advantage  ;  nor  fpend  what  may  be  fpar'd  without  Sin,  or 
Shame,  or  greater  Lofs,  or  mamt'eft  Hazard. 

§  5.  We  mult  not  make  our  Adventures  beyond  what 
our  greater  Certainties  may  be  like  to  fupport,  in  cafe  the 
<).thf r  jhould  mifcarry. 

We 


Cheap.  2).         hrf^rovement  of  K.t2i{ou.  577 

We  are  to  count  the  Coft  of  expenfive  Undertakings,  and 
that  with  fuch  farther  Allowances  as  experienced  Perfons 
have  found  to  berequifite  :<  And  our  expected  Gain  ought  to 
be  coinputed  with  fome  like  Abatement.  We  fliould,  in 
Prudence  as  well  as  Duty,  leave  ojf  Cortejition  before  it  bs 
medl'-d  rvitl:^  Prov.  7.  14.  before  we  be  folemnly  engaged  in 
it ;  and  this  in  refpeifl  of  Law,  as  well  as  inthe  Conflidls  of 
other  Kinds;  wc  ihould  be  willing  even  to  buy  our  Peace, 
and  reckon  it  no  ill  Penny-worth  at  what  the  Ccnteft  would 
be  like  to  coft  us,  preferring,  what  they  call  a  Leah  Agree- 
ment, to  a  Fatter  VerdiA,  if  it  were  fu^e  to  be  got. 

§  4.  Wc  ought  to  ufe  our  Credit  fparingly,  and  to  an- 
Twer  it,  as  near  as  may  be,  pun£liially ;  appearing  however 
at  our  time  to  anfwer  for  any  uruvoidable  Delay. 

Our  Promifes  Ihould  be  flow,  but  our  Performance  fure  ; 
and  if  it  may  be  fpeedy  too.  The  Favours  we  have  to  be- 
ftow  fliould  be  kept  free  and  uningaged,  as  long  as  conveni- 
ently may  be,  whilft  yet  we  may  intimate  our  kind  Inten- 
tions, but  with  Care  we  inake  not  EnemJes  by  raifing  Ex- 
pedtations ,  which  we  might  be  in  Danger  not  to  An- 
fwer. 

§  5.  We  fliould  purchafe  Service,  where  we  can  have  it 
at  a  moderate  Rare,  rather  than  fell  our  Liberty  by  accepting 
it  gratis ;  yet  neither  muft  we  be  fo  very  fhy  of  admitting  it, 
as  10  create  a  Sufpicion  of  our  being  Haughty,  or  ill-natur'd, 
or  backward  to  do  the  like  for  others. 

As  near  as  well  may  be  we  Ihould  Buy  with,  and  Sell  for, 
ready  iVAmey,  contenting  our  felves  with  a  fmall,  but  cer- 
tain, Profit,  as  knowing  that  lighter  Cains,  with  quick  Re- 
turns, are  like  to  make  the  heavier  Purfe:  If  by  means  of 
our  greater  Stock,  or  other  Advantages,  we  could  under-fell 
all  about  us,  and  fo  engrofs  the  Bufinefs  to  our  felves,  we 
Ihould  take  care  we  go  not  about,  in  this  or  other  ways,  to 
raife  our  felves  upon  the  manifeft  Ruin  of  others :  tho'  we 
may  indeed  reduce  them  to  a  fair  and  reafonable  way  of 
Dealing. 

§  6.  We  fliould  be  ready  to  give  all  fit  Affurances  in  Law, 
and  to  do  it  early,  that  we  may  create  the  greater  Confidence 
in  others,  and  that  we  may  alfo  take  the  like  with  the  better 
Grace  from  others;  yet  looking  ftiU  upon  approved  Honefty, 
together  with  Ability,  as  rhe  only  firm  Security  ;  but  whilft 
we  may,  and  Ihould  profefs  chiefly  to  depend  on  thofe;  yet 
rhe  uncertainty  of  his  Life  to  whom  we  give  Credit,  and  of 
their  proving  altogether  like  him,  who  may  happen  to  come 
in  his  Place,  may  be  a  very  reafonable  and  jnotfenlive  Ap  iu- 

Cc 


— ' ■ -  -     -  ■  ■    —      ■   . —      -■■■.-_  ^^ 

37S An  tjjay  for  the  Pan  III. 

gy  for  our  deliring  the  fpeedieft  Securit)-,  in  Cafe  it  fhould 
iiotbeofier'd. 

§  7.  All  our  Appoinrments,  efpecially  in  the  wa^  ofBufi- 
nefs,  fhouJd  be  caurioufly  made,  (with  fit  A  lowance  for 
the  Difference  of  Clc  cks,  or  Watches) ;  and  they  are  to  be 
carefully  oblerv'd  :  Kor  fhould  we  eafily  iet  in,  or  continue 
a  Difcourfe,  which  would  be  like  to  fiiut  out  Matters  of  Im- 
portance, or  ht  wcver  to  ftraiten  them  in  point  of  Time. 

As  to  what  may  not  be  fo  fith  rcckon'd  amonglt  the  more 
common  Affairs  of  Life,  fomewhat  may  be  ofer'd  under  the 
nexrHead.    And. 

§  8.  V.  F.r  tl:ie  right  Conducing  of  any  more  Special 
and  Solemn  Undertaking,  I  (hall  ji  f  give  fome  Uired:ioas 
in  common,  and  then  proceed  to  r/hat  may  be  ;;.ore  peculiar 
to  lome  particular  Matters,  and  el'pecially  fuch  as  relate  to 
Learning.  We  muft  here  fee  that  we  ncgledt  not  the  moft 
Genera]  Inftrudlions,  vl:{.  thofe  about  Engaging  Ciod  wirh 
«s,  abont  bating  the  very  Pomt  at  which  we  would  or(hou!d 
6iore  precifely  aim,  as  alfo  about  Snbo  d'nn'-e  Int/nr'ons^ 
£2?c;  alio  that  we  take  along  with  us  Uich  of  the  more  Speci- 
al Irt  niations  already  given,  as  may  be  requilite  to  at:end 
our  Undertaki:?g,  and  we  Oiould  farther  cbferve  foaie  I'uch 
Meafure>,  as  thole  which  follow. 

§  p.  1.  Left  our  Dcfign,  tlio'  we  fuppofe  it  really  good 
and  fit  to  be  purfu'd,  Ihould  yet  be  mifconftru'd,  difiehih'd, 
expofed.  fr  cppos'd,  it  is  not  to  be  opened  farther  than  the 
flatter  p'ainly  requires,  in  order  to  proper  Advice,  and  need- 
ful or  convenient  Aiiiftancc, 

Wiiere  Sccrefie  isrequjfirc,  we  (hould  keep  the  fafeft  di- 
ilance,  we  well  can,  from  any  Difcourfe  of  that  Atiair;  or 
however  muft  lock  that  we  come  nor  any  way  near  to  the 
Point  we  would  conceal :  Therefore  fhould  endeavour  early 
to  rircvcnt  or  divert  fuch  Erquirics  or  Difcourfe,  as  might 
border  upon  it,  or  lead  to  it :  But  Care  muft  be  taken,  that 
we  create  not  a  Sufpicion  by  appearing  Shie;  rather  we 
fh  mid  frankly  communicate  what  may  be  fafcand  fir,  with 
an  Air  of  unreferv'd  Opennefs;  yet  paifing  withal  fmcothly 
away  to  what  may  be  fufficienrly  remote,  as  by  a  fair  Occafi- 
on  from  fome  thing  which  was  faid,  or  that  otherways  acci- 
dentally prefents. 

§10.  It  might  be  fomewhat  of  a  Guard  and  Security 
againl^  having  our  Silence,  or  Refulal  to  anfwer,  juftly  con- 
ilru'd  into  a  cenain  determinate  Senie  ;  if  we  take  all  fie 
Oceafions  to  profefs,  and  make  it  frequently  our  Pradice, 
to  leave  uie  World  to  conjecture,  or  prefume,  as  they  pleafe  ; 

where 


jw^'rovtMfKt  of  RtcHOn.  "^jq 

where  wetahiy  co'-^id,  and  may  appear  really  conccrn'd  to 
rcfolve  the  Queftion,  for  the  gaining  of  Rcpntacion, avoiding 
Reproach,  or  upon  feme  other  nianifeft  Reafon. 

But  if  Truth  cannot  be  conceal'd  without  fpeaking  what 
W  know  to  be  Fah'e,  we  ought  to  fubmir,  as  to  the  provi- 
dence of  God,  committing  the  Iflfue  to  him,  whilft  we  are 
complying  wiih  his  Charge  to  f':iw  al!  /Ipfsarance  of  Evi:^ 
J  Theff.  5, 12.  Ful  Pofition  (Gx)  and  (Gy)  p.  r  17. 

§  1 1.  2.  Ev'ry  th  ng  is  not  t3  be  prefumcd  Eafie  or  Fea- 
sible, which  may  fo  appear  in  Speculation ;  whereas  fom^ 
fuch  Things  may  be  found  quite  otherwife,  when  it  comes 
to  PracT-ice  :  Nor  yet  on  the  other  hand  fhould  we  defpair, 
or  defpond  about  ev'ry  thing  which  may  feem  extremely 
Difficult,  and  hardly  poHlble ;  as  feme  things  have  (hewn, 
till  they  have  been  try'd  and  purfu'd  in  feme  repeated  At- 
tempts. For  who  coold  eafily  have  perfwaded  himfelf  that 
it  were  poHible  to  have  printed  oft  fo  many  Broadiides  of  the 
very  fmalicft  I  etters ;  or  fo  many  Copies  of  the  largeft  and 
fincft  Copper-Cuts,  without  fo  much  as  a  fingle  Blor,  or 
any  thing  of  a  Blank,  when  yet  we  may  fee  it  often  fo  iri 
Fad? 

.    We  Ihouid  here  make  rhe  befl  Enquiries  we  can  of  Perfon.';,' 
»A?ho  are  converfnntin  Affairs  of  fuch  a  Nature  as  th^.t  may  b? 
to  which  onr^Dcfign  relates,   that  fo  we  may  the  better  dif- 
cern,    vi'hat  may  be  prudently  attempted,    and  where  we 
ought  to  dclilt ;    but  then  we  lirouid  fee,   as  near  as  may  be, 
that  thofe  we  Confult  have  no  Biafs  of  Interelt,    or  Inclinati- 
on to  luggcft  what  might  gvide  us  wrong. 
•  §  12.     3.  The  actual  Profecution  of  our  X^ndertaking 
fliould  be  delay 'd,  as  lon^  as  may  be  Safe  and  Convenient, 
for  the  rakuig  in  what  Light  we  can,  before  we  enter  upon  it, 
yet  fome  Hazard  is  to  be  run,   where  there  wonid  probably 
be  more  Harm  or  Danger  in  our  Delaying,  than  in  adventur- 
ing to  begin  bei^:>re  we  have  fully  fatisf)'d  a'l  the  Enquiries 
we  would  dcfire  to  make. 

.  $  T9.  4.  V/hen  we  enter  upon  fomc  difncuk  and  doubt- 
ful Undenaking,  we  fliould  endeavour,  if  it  may  be,  to  fe- 
Cure  to  our  felves  a  way  of  Retreat,  with  Safety  and  Ho- 
nour, or  however,  Vv'ith  as  little  Inconvenience,  ?s  the  Cafe 
will  admit;  and  therefore  we  Ihou'd  not  ordinarily  appear  to. 
be  fit  ly  befit  upon  f  ch  Defign;  but  rather  to  be  making 
only  u  me  Trial  ^  and  Eifay  ;  and  indeed  we  ftioald  be  really 
ivilJnp.  to  retreat,  if  fom,^  weighty  h<afon(houJd  prefentup- 
)n  our  beginjiing  or  rrdcceding  to  acl,  v;hkh  v/e  couiJ  noi, 
ir  hoWev^r  did  jnot  fee  before.         , 

t  z  -;  §  14.  ir.Fi: 


t[ 


^80  /in  tjjay  for  the  Kart  lU. 

§  14,  5.  Fit  Allowances  are  to  be  made,  both  in  the 
laying,  and  puriuirof  our  Uudertakings  for  unforeleen  Dit- 
ficukies  and  Obitrudlions,  in  refpcdl  of  the  Time,  Colt, 
Pains,  and  Help,  which  may  be  found  needful  beyond  wliat 
Tve  could  certainly  determine  beforLli.md.  Our  Computa- 
rion  in  thefe  Rcipcdts ought  notto  be  100  flrait,  nor  ouv  Un- 
dervakinjj  too  large  ;  for  it  vvou'd  be  Imprudent  to  expert,  that 
ev'ry  thing  Ihould  tall  out  juil  aa  we  could  wiili,  or  as  we 
fi^ppofe  might  be  rcafcnabiy  hop'd  ;  we  lliDukl  iherefore  pro- 
vuic  for  the  worft  that  probably  t.an  be,  and  if  it  fall  out 
better,  the  Harm  will  not  be  io  great  as  on  the  other  hand. 

§  IS.  0,  We  Ihould  beforehand  fct  due  Bounds  to  our 
Experiments  and  Attempts,  and  obfcrve  iheni  afterwards 
with  Heady  Refolr.tion  (unlefs  there  Ihould  be  very  manifeft 
Rca'.on  to  the  contrary  ',  that  we  be  not  drawji  iji,  and  car- 
r)'d  on,  100  far  in  thecagcrnefs  of  Puifuir,  and  merely  thro* 
unwilingnefs  tofufier  a  Difgrace  or  a  Defeat :     Yet. 

7.  A  Nery  great  pvobability  cf  retrieving  our  Difappoint- 
j-nCit  may  be  alJow'u  to  carry  us  liito  foiiie  farther  A-trcmpc 
provided  it  be  not  like  to  ovcrltrain,  or  hnk  us  beyond  reco- 
very in  Cafe  it  ihould  milcarry. 

§   16.     S.  We  Ihould  not,  profelTedly  or  openly  however, 
carry  our  Aim  and  Endeavours  beyond  what  wc  may  hope 
toobca'ij  from  others,    left  v\e  fall  ihoit  of  what  paight  be 
had  by  jcacb.ing  a:  more.     We  mult  take  care  n..t  to  difo- 
b.ij-'e    hofc,    whom  we  may  have  Occalion  to  apply  so,  by 
n  aknig  our  Idler  Suits  too  frequent,    or  prdling  the  great 
to  tar,   or  in  an  rn^ecoijv.ng  Manner.     Nothing  i^  to  W 
csk'd  of  any  cne,    but  wiiat  may   j^ro'rably  be  within  the 
ccmpafscf  his  Power  and  Skill ;  nor  is  any  thing  ordinarily 
to  be  requeltcd,   or  expecled  from  Great  Men,    other  than 
A.l  at  their  In.'hiaiion  and  Intereft,   with  the  particular  De 
fi^i  s  they  have  m  View,    may  lead  t'nem  to  do,   oc  heartily 
to  endeavour  :     Yet  what  is  not  certainly  /'■  uiay  fonietimesi 
I  e  warily  artemp^tcd  with  them,  by  ht  Perfons,    in  the  mo~ 
agreeable  way,   and  at  proper  Seafuns  (the  moliia  Tcwpovi 
Tmii,    whenihey  ure  hkelt  10  give  the  Zvlatter  a  fair  Hear 
ing);  but  it  is  not  to  be  t&o  vehemciitly  loUicited ;  nor  IhouL 
-we  appear  too  deeply  to  refent  its  being  ntgled:ed,    iho'  per 
•  haps  undertaken  j    efpecially  where  our  Keientments  wouJ 
be  to  tliein  ii.fignihcant,  or  would  be  like  to  turn,  e-juaiiy  ai 
kalt,  to  car  own  Difadvantage. 


X^'hca 


Cliap.  25.  Improvement  of  Realon.  ::;|8i 

When  we  move  only  what  it  is  their  Intereft  to  fall  in 
wi--Ji,  we  Ihould  make  furc,  as  far  as  "vvcll  we  can,  that  it  be 
I'l  appreh?ncleci,  whilft  yet  we  are  to  feek  it  as  a  private  Fa- 
vour, or  pub 'ick  Service,  or  the  I'ke;  and  now  and  then  upon 
fair  Occalions  they  may  be  (bftly  reminded  by  feme  Intima- 
tion of  our  Dcpciidance  on  them,  or  that  we  are  puriuing 
their  DireAions,  kj>.  thof-e  we  muit  follow  ;  or  delire  their 
farther  Inltradtions  i^pon  what  may  be  ftrongiy  Objevited, 
cr  upon  any  new  KmergencJes:  We  muft, o  :.•  uive%  lk-  fully 
Malters  of  what  we  would  re;  refenc,  and  ihciild  fo  prepare 
the  Matter,  that  we  may  make  it  as  eafie  and'ihort  as  pofiible, 
laying  ir,  if  need  be,  in  writing  before  :hem,  and  pmting  no 
more  Trouble  upon  them  than  what  is  unavoidable. 

§  17.     9.    What  can  be  conveniently  done  more  imme-   , 
diately  by  our  felves  (as  has  been  intimated  before)  ih  uid 
not  ordinarily  be  committed  to  another,    nor  our   Matter 
opened    farther   than   the    Occalion    do's   plainly    require. 
But, 

Where  the  Undertaking  cannot  be  carry'd  fo  certain- 
ly, and  advanragtoufly,  or  eafily,  by  our  felves  alone,  we 
fhotild  take  in  the  litieft  Help  we  can  have,  /.  c,  the  moit 
h.ncft  and  beft  affecfled  to  the  Matter  it  felf,  and  to  our  fcK  es 
among  fuch  as  are  intelligent  Perlons,  Men  of  Intermit  and 
Influence  where  the  Cafe  requires  it) ;  and  who  are  coiiJi- 
"erate,  fteady,  and  diligent;  nor  are  we  to  ufe  a  greater 
umber  than  is  needful,  in  order  to  fare  Advice,  and  ef- 
feftnal  Profccution. 

I  o  Where  we  have  others  to  afllft  us,  we  (hould  carefully 
:l:vide  the  Undertaking,  if  it  may  be,  fo  that  we  our  felves 
ind  our  Partners  may  be  fevcrally  charg'd  with  the  Part  for 
•vvhich  we  and  they  are  really  beft  fitted ;  and  tho'  one  is  not 
o  enter  into  anothers  Province,  yet  they  lliould  both  flaredly 
■t.eet  together,  and  occafionally  confer  with  each  other,  as 
;|ie  Ca'e  may  rf^qiMre. 

§  1 8.  !  I.  Where  we  are  to  confuk  or  otherwife  tranfacl: 
my  Matter  by  an  Intcmunclw  or  Agent^  we  fhould  chufe 
imongft  the  torementioned  Aflbciates,  or  other  like  Perfuns, 
Dne  or  two  who  by  Inclination,  Intereft,  and  other  Circiim- 
ftances  will  be  like  to  prove  intirely  Faithful  to  us,  and  as 
icceptable  as  well  may  be  to  thofe  unto  whom  we  would  ap- 
Dly ;  but,  if  it  may  be,  not  depending  on  them,  or  exped:- 
.ng  from  them,  on  account  of  himfeJf  or  others :  We  muft 
lot  fay  or  do  any  thing,  which  might  import  a  low  Efteem, 
|)r  Suspicion  of  the  Perfon  we  employ  j  we  are  not  to  inter- 
ere,  or  unnccelfarily  to  join  our  felves  with  him  in  what  is 

C  c  3  comniittefi 


582  ^        An  hffay  for  the  Part  III. 

committed  to  him,  mucli  lefs  to  fct  him  qviite  afide  in  any 
Part  thereof  without  forne  luch  Reafon  as  n-ight  be  fatif- 
faClory  even  to  Inm,  or  that  the  ullng  him  farther  would 
probably  be  of  worie  Conkqucnce  than  the  dirmilTing  of 
him.     Yet, 

"  §  19.  12.  That  we  lay  not  our  felves,  or  our  Friends 
any  way  hable  to  be  pra<5tis'd  upon  by  oiir  Agent,  or  thio' 
him  by  Inch,  as  may  have  the  Afcendant  over  bim,  it  nnay  in 
iomc  Cafes  be  fit,  with  all  due  Caution  and  Prudence,  to 
feek  or  take  a  fair  Opportuni'y  and  UccaGon  to  teprcftjit, 
6-if  own  Matter  more  immediately  by  our  felves,  that  we 
may  rjjo  fee  with  our  own  E'>es,  and  hear  with  our  own 
Ears,  as  weii  asthofe  of  our  x\genr;  or  if  this  cannot  lo,  con- 
veniently be  ;  then-  to  ufe  fomc  firther  way  of  Intcrcoiirfc  ; 
Suppofe  by  Occa<i'"nal  Difcourfe  wuh  fomc  Intimate  Ac- 
quainrance  of  the  Perfon,  to  whom  w.  are  applying,  buc 
without  an  cxprefs  IDefire,  tha*-  he  Ihould  addreb  him  tor  us, 
yet  intimating,  that  we  are  feniiblc  of  the  goo.i  Ccrrefpon- 
<ience  betwixt  them,  and  esprefling  only  f^h  thincs,  as  \Ve 
may  dc  iuerately  v^ilh  Ihoald  be  carry 'd  by  the  Confident 
10  his  Friend,  for  the  Service  of  our  main  Defign  :  But  here 
■^ve  fhould  duly  confider  what  PariicuUrs  are  the  titielt  to  be 
thus  entrufted,  and  in  this  way  convcy'd  ;  and  when  there 
has  been  Time  and  Opportunity  for  that^  we  ftiould  fanher 
Convcrfe  about  the  Matter  before  Difcours'd,  obferving  and 
improving  what  may  be  for  our  Purpofe  5  and  watchftdly 
looking  that  we  be  not  plaid  upun. 

But  it  were  probably  bcft  ro  let  our  Agent  know  from  the 
firft,  that  for  the  carrying  of  cur  Point  more  efte^t-ually  thro', 
we  n)av  perhaps  make  our  Applicaiion  by  more  ihan  one 
fingle  Hand,  as  opportunity  may  fairly  prcfent,  but  that  oar 
chitf  Depend ance  is  upon  his  Negotiation. 
:  ^20.  Where  an  Affair  is  ro  be  iffiiM  by  a  Bi'dy  of  Men, 
or  however  by  a  conlkieralile  Number,  we  muft  make  as  lute 
as  wc.can  of  fjch  as  are  the  Leading  Perfons  amongft  them, 
endeavouring  to  engage  them  to  ufe  their  Intcreft  wuh  others, 
vet  nor  neglediing,  after  that,  to  make  a  dirtinift  Application, 
if  it  may  be,  to  every  one  of  the  rtftj  whofe  Prefence  and 
ConcviTcnce  may  be  Necefbry,  as  well  as  that  the  proper 
Pcjricns  ihould  move. and  argue  the  Matter :  Here  we  Ihould 
labour  to  fecure  a  good  Majority,  and  to  fee,  when  the  Time 
comes,  that  they  fail  not  to  attend  ;  nor  Ihould  he,  whofe 
Affair  is  in  hand  be  out  of  the  way,  unlefs  there  be  Special 
Reafon.  for  i: ;  tho'  in  things  of  this  Nature,  he  may  general- 
1-^  tii;d  it-  requitire  to  en-ploy  fomc  Nvmiber  to  Sollicite,  who 

are 


Chip  26.        lmproveme?2t  of  K.t2i{on.  38^ 

are  acquainted  with  thofe  we  would  engage,  and  know  the 
litteil  Manner  of  applying  to  them. 


CHAP.   XXVI. 

§  I .  TT/^  HAT   was  more  particularly  Defign'd  is  now  --o 

be  confider'd,  vl:{  The  ftated  purfuic  of  ufefiil 
Knowlc  'ge  wi:h  other  Improvemenrs,  and  the  drawing  of 
them  oat  more  folemnly  in  regular  Difcourfe,  or  other  fui- 
table  Performances.    And, 

VI.  As  to  the  ftnted  Pufuit  of  ufeful  Kjtovciledge  voith  other 
Improvcm  nts :  By  ufeful  Knowledge,  is  to  be  underftood 
fuch  an  Acquaintaace  with  Words^  and  Things,  and  ''erfons 
as  may  be  like  m  re  immediarelj  to  fervc  fome  val'ublc  '^ur- 
pofe,  an: I  alfo  to  fubferve  ihe  beft  and  greateft;  fa.  h  kind 
of  Knowledge  as  may  \n  b-me  way  or  other  anfwer  the  Time, 
and  Coit,  and  Pains  beftow'd  about  it. 

§  2.  By  the  ftated  Pwfuit  thereof,  is  defign'd  a  more 
fix'd  and  or.~erly  Application  to  the  ufe  of  proper  Means  and 
Methods  for  getting,  fecuring,  and  enlarging  fuch  kuid  of 
Knowledge. 

There  are,  befides  this,  other  and  farther  Improvements 
both  of  Mind  and  Body,  fuch  as  the  ufeful  and  commenda- 
ble Habits  of  Virtue,  and  of  Art ;  and  however  thofe,  vehich 
flccompnny  Salvation^  are  not  fo  properly  acq^ir'd  by  Indaftry 
and  Exercife,  yet  they  are  in  this  way  to  be  atcain'il ;  nor  can 
it  be  regularly  expcdfed,  that  the  Giver  of  every  good  and  perfe^ 
Gift  ftiould  communicate  theni  to  the  Slothful  and  Negligent: 
Neither  are  fuch  as  thefe  like  to  compafs  even  tho^  lower 
Acccmplilhrncncs,  whichda  fo  plainly  req^uir^  a  diligent  and 
continu'd  Purfuit.  ■  ' 

§  3.  But  whereas  Knowledge  is  a  oeceflary  Requiftte  to 
other  Improvements,  and  that  it  lies  more  fully  in  our  way, 
I  fhallfpeak  more  diredl-ly  to  that,  and  only  glance  at  others 
in  fome  Suggeftions,  which  eafily  may  be  apply'd  to  the 
more  immediate  Purfuit  of  thofe  other  Attainments,  to  which 
ufeful  Knowledge  has  at  leaft  a  more  diftant  Tendency.  It 
muft  here  unqu^ftionably  be  of  the  greateft  ufe  very  heedful- 
Jy  to  confider  what  is  delivered  by  Solomon,  but  certainly  frona 
a  Greater  than  himfelf,  Prov.  2.  i,  2,  9, 4,  5,  6,  7.  My  Son, 
if  thou  wilt  receive  my  H'brds,  and  hide  my  Commandments  veith 
theCffo  tb (ft  thou  incline  thine  Ear  unto  Wifdom^  and  apply  thine 

C  C  4  llear^ 


3^4  ^^  ^jJ'^y  J^^  ^^•'^  P^rt  III. 

Heart  to  imderjianding  ;  Tta  if  thou  crycfl  r.ftsr  IQiovpleef^e,  and 
lift  eft  up  thy  Voice  for  Vnderfl  ending  ;  Jf  thou  feekrft  her  oi  Sil- 
ver^ and  fearchefi  for  her  ai  for  bid  Trerifures  :  Then  fha/t  thcu 
underfiandths  fear  rf  the  Lord,  and  find  the  knoveledge  of  God  : 
For  the  Lord  giveth  fj-^ifdom ;  out  of  his  Mciith  comsth  I^novp- 
hdge  and  ZJnuerJtauding  ;  He  layeth  up  found  iVifdom  for  the 
Righteous-;  He  n  nYiuckier  to  them^  who  xvlk  uprightly. 

§  4.  What  has  been  already  otfer'd  about  Conduift  h 
here  to  hz  ie\'iew'd  5  ai:d  much  uf  it  may  be  cer'ainly  ac- 
tommodatedand  apply'd',  without  any  great  Difltculty,  to  the 
pLirpoie  now  in  hand  ;  \  Ihall  therefore  proceed  to  fomething 
more  peculiar :     And, 

'  I.  The  Foundations  of  Knowledge,  with  other  Improve- 
ments, are  ro  be  carefully  laid  ;  and  rhar  as  fure  and  large 
^s  well  may  be.  I:  is  altogether  fit  thst  the  uiidoubred  Prin- 
ciples of  Religion  he,  taken  in  early  by  all.  And  even 
thofe  who  are  not  fitting  for  a  learned  Employment,  ihould 
j'et  te  led  into  fon-e  Acq'.'aintancc  ,  if  it  might  be,  with  the 
Hlemcnts  and  Ri'diments  cf  am -'re  exren'.ive  Knowledge; 
inch  however  as  ha- e  the  profpcA  of  greater  Eftates,  or  are 
dtp.oned  to  nioie.  than  comnxn  Bufiners,  ought  not  to  want 
thetirounds  ot  Language  in  General,  nor  fomewhat  of  the 
particular  Languages,  which  may  be  cf  Special  Uft.\  It  is 
highly  fit,  they  ihould  be  acquainted  with  the  Globe  and 
Maps,  and  wi?h  fomething  farther  than  thofe  can  fhcw  about 
the  Principal  Couirries  and  Places  thro'  the  W.irid,  or  how- 
ever nearer  Home,  as  to  their  p-cfent  S^a-^e,  Religion  snd 
Government,  and  hkewifc Tome  Leading  Points  of  Hiflory, 
together  w/ch  the  Series  and  Courfe  of  its  principal  Parrs, 
fach  as'  the  Scriptural,'  and  that  of  the  four  Grand  Monar- 
chies ;  as  alfo  what  wc  may  be  Ipccially  concern'd  to  know, 
as  to'  our  own  or  lome  other  Country ;  and  the  more  obfer- 
vablc  Divi(:cns  in  Chronoiof  y  are  here  to  betaken  in-  TheCe- 
kfHal  Cilobe  or  Sphere,  is  iij.ewife  to  be  confider'd  j  alfofome- 
what  of  Allronomy  and  Navigation,  Arithmetickand  Geome- 
try, together  w  ithfome  principal  Strid;ures  of  the  other  Learn- 
ed Sciences  and  Ar's,  are  to  be  learn'd  and  fix'din  the  Mind. 

§  5.  it  has  beei^  endeavour'd  in  this  Effay,  to  lay  inthofe 
ccmmion  Foundations  of  Knowledge,  which  may  ferve  in 
fome  Meafvre  both  to  turnilli,  and  farther  to  prepare*  the 
Muid  for  a  more  extenfive  Improvement;  But  the  whole 
ot  what  is  here  deli^er'd,  is  not  by  1  earners  to  be  grafp'd  or 
attempted  at  once;  only  the  general  Scheme,  with  fome  of 
ii-\c  more  remarkable  Particulars  are  to  be  fixed  on  at  firft ; 
and  this  according  to  the  beft  Direction  he  can  have  for  the 
■'■,vn]\r"r  c  t  thcm  oi'.t,       :  :  They 


Chap   26.  iMprovewent  of  Realon.  385 

They,  who  would  go  upon  any  other  kind  of  Improve- 
ment, which  falls  not  fo  diredtlv  under  our  prefcnt  Conlide- 
raiion,  ought  to  endeavour  iirft  to  get  the  more  general 
Grounds  of  it,  before  they  proceed  to  the  finifhing  of  fome 
particular  Branch  or  P^rt. 

'  §  6.  2.  The  Foundations  of  Knowledge  and  other  Im- 
provements ought  to  be  always  carefully  f  cur'J,  tho'  they 
are  j-)Ot  to  be  laid  again  ,  and  indeed  for  this  very  Reafon, 
that  there  may  be  no  Occaiion  for  it.  It  would  therefore  be 
Jlequifue  to  allot  fome  time  on  purpofe  for  the  reviewing 
of  them  ;  and,  as  has  been  intimated  that  it  fhou  d  re- 
tiflrn  within  a  reafonable  Compafs,  as  in  locking  over  fome 
proper  Abftradls  or  Epiromes  once  a  Year. 

§  7.  3.  The  SuperftrudiTe  is  tobe  carry'd  on,  equally, 
if  it.  may  well  be  done,  to  fome  farther  Degree ;  fo  as  to 
make  an  Advance  upon-  the  feveral  Parts  and  Points  of  Know- 
ledge we  have  gain'd.  But  very  few  can  ordinarily  hrpe  to 
carry  on  a  very  large  compal's  of  Knowledge  to  any  conlide- 
rable  Height ;  the  moft  will  be  obliged  to  limit  their  farther 
purfuit  with  a  fpecial  £ye  to  what  they  are  defigning  for, 
and  are  like  to  be  more  peculiarly  engaged  in.    Yet, 

There  are  fome,  who  may  and  ought  to  proceed  upon  the 
whole  Foundation,  to  carry  on  their  Improvement  ftill  fome 
Degrees  higher  towards  perfe(fling  the  Languages,  as  alfo  to 
get  a  more  particular  and  exadt  Acquaintance  with  Geogra- 
phy, Hiftory,  Chronology,  Mathemaricks,  CS'c. 

§  8.  There  feems  to  be  a  threefold  Gradation  commonly 
roquiiite  to  the  finilhing  of  what  we  would  Complete  ;  as  in 
Painting,  the  main  Sketches  and  Mafter-Lines  are  firfl  to  be 
ftruck  our,  then  the  dead  Colours  laid  on,  and  iaftly  the 
Live-rouches  and  finiihing  Strokes  are  to  be  added:  But  if 
our  Circumftances  will  not  admit  of  taking  fo  large  a  Com- 
pafs, and  advancing  fo  far  upon  it,  we  muft  then  content  our 
felves  to  Hop  at  the  fecond  Degree  for  the  rroft  part,  and  on- 
ly to  proceed  in  what  is  like  to  be,  to  m^  of  greater  Neceffi- 
ty  or  Ufe ;  fuppofe  in  relation  to  Divinity,  Law,  Medicine, 
or  what  elfe  we  are  defigning.     And, 

Such  as  intend  Divinity  Ihould  make  fure  to  be  very  much 
Converfant  with  the  Bible,  and  thnt  in  the  Original  Hebrew 
and  Greel{;  as  thofe  who  are  for  Law  muA  employ  the  greater 
part  of  their  Time  upon  Statutes,  Records,  Cafes,  &c ;  and  fuch 
as  are  for  Medicine  and  Surgery,  upon  the  Confideration  of 
Humane  Body,  Herbs  and  Drugs,  Methods  of  Operation, 
and  thofe  particular  Accounts  in  the  way  of  Pradice,  which 
">  are 


^86  An  Ejfuy  for  the  Part  III. 

are  faiihfully  and  judicio'ifly  given :  But  a  good  Meafure  of 
Logical  Acutenels  and  Judgment  appears  highly  reqalfice  to 
them  all,  and  that  therefore  the  more  general  Improement 
ofourReafr>n  is  co  be  carry'd  to foirie  conliderable  Height; 
togethei-  With  that,  E-'hlckj  are  ro  be  more  thoroughly  pur- 
fu'd,  in  order  to  T-'eohgy  ;  the  Civil  Law,  to  prepare  the  way 
for  cu>  0^^' ;  and  a  Mathematical  Satural  PhiUjop/.y  with  Ex- 
periment, in  order  to  i^edicinr. 

§  9.  4.  As  to  the  Choice  of  Inftruv^ors,  and  the  Atten- 
dance to  be  gi  en  to  t;hem  (which  miift  be  abfolutely  needful 
tor  m oft,  an]  may  be  very  ufeful  for  all  Beginners);  th^y 
ihould  commonly  be  divers  for  things  that  are  very  ditfering  ; 
fince  f.w  or  iK>nc  are  fafficient'y  furniJh'd  or  fitted  for  the 
Provinces  and  Parrs  of  Knowledge,  which  lie  far  wide  of 
each   other. 

Now  Inftrudlors  muft  be  at  leaft  competently  Skilful,  not 
only  ui  the  Matter  to  be  raught,  but  cfpecially  in  the  Method 
of  teaching;  they  are  to  be  f-ch  as  both  can  and  will  apply 
rhemfelves  v^ith  Diligence  and  Concern,  to  ertcdl  wliai  they 
Undertake,  adapting  their  way,  as  n.ar  as  they  can,  to  thi  va- 
rious Difpolii ions  and  Cipacities  of  thotcthcy  Inftruiit ;  who 
therefore  fliould  not  be  fo  very  Numerous ;  but  that  they  may 
admit  of  being  more  diftinftly  obferv'd  and  attended  to. 

Where  the  Learner  is  to  Live,  or  to  be  very  Converfant, 
with  the  Teacher,  particular  care  ihould  be  taken,  that,  if 
pcllible,  there  might  be  nothing  in  him,  or  about  him,  which 
would  be  of  ill  Example,  or  like  to  create  a  prejudice  in  the 
Learner.  Somewhat  more  particular  has  been  already  offer 'd 
in  Reference  to  inch  Inftriid:ors,  as  are  to  carry  Perfons  on 
to  the  higher  Parts  of  Learning,  and  Points  of  Knowledge, 
Vide  ?.  IL  Chap  2.  §  7.  page  130. 

§  10.  The  Leai-ner  Ihould  attend  both  conftantly  ai;^ 
carefully  ;  but  when  he  may  happen  to  be  unavoidably  hin- 
dred,  he  muft  endeavour  to  retrieve  the  Lofs,  and  fetch  it 
up  again  by  a  doubled  Induftry  afterwards.  He  (hould 
heedfully  liften  to  his  Ihftradtors,  and  be  willingly  led  by 
irtiore  experienced  Guides ;  fo  far,  however,  believing  them, 
as  to  refcilve  upon  the  Trial  or  Confideration  of  the  Matter, 
^nd  to  go  through  with  it,  before  he  prefume  to  determine 
againft  them,  as  if  he  were  already  fo  much  Wifer  than 
they,  that  even  at  the  firft  View,  or  upon  a  very  little 
Tho'c,  he  could  difcern  the  Infignificancy,  Weaknefs,  or 
Miftake,  of  what  is  offer'd  by  his  Teacher,  perhaps  after  long 
and  rcpv^ated  Confideration,  ftrid  Obfervation,  and  his  own 
H^ipe.-iencc.     The  Learner  (hould  employ  and  exercife  his 

Memory, 


Chap.  26.         Improvement  of  Reafon.  '^Zj 

Memory,  but  not  rely  too  much  upon  it ;  how  good  foever 
it  may  be,  he  ought  to  commit  the  ptincipal  Inftrudrions  given 
him  to  wruing  or  at  leaft  fo  much  thereof,  as  may  bring  thetn 
to  Remembrance ;  and  he  Jhould  cati^f uUy  review  the  Mi- 
nutes, whihl  the  Mactcr  is  frefli  upon  hi^  Mmd,  drawing  out 
what  is  moft  ccnliderable  more  at  lart^e  in  his  own  Words, 
as  he  apprehended  the  niean'.ng  ;  C(  nferring  upon  it  with  his 
Inftrudor  or  Airociates  j  and  iinall;  fee  ting  down  the  cleareft 
Rcfulc  he  can  come  to,  that  he  may  have  reconrfe  thereto 
afterwards  to  examine,  apply  to  Ufe,  or  improve  it  far- 
ther. 

§  ir.  The  Heads,  which  follow,  are  of  Co  great  Confi- 
deration  in  the  Atfair  of  L  earning,  that  I  Ihali  chufe  to  rank 
and  number  them  on  with  the  principal  branches  of  Condutit. 
And, 

VII.  As  to  the  Choice  and  Ufe  of  Books  in  the  purfuit  of 
Knowledge  and  other  Improvements  ;  it  may  perhaps  be  of 
lervicc  to  Jav  before  us  the  Catalogues  of  iome  famous  i  i- 
brarys,  as  of  the  Bodlcynv,  &c ;  or  rather  of  the  more  Curi- 
ous Collecftions,  that  are  reafonablv  efteem'd  to  have  been 
made  with  more  than  common  Judgment ;  hut  efpecia'Jy  the 
moft  j  ft  and  impartial  Catalogues  of  the  Principal  and  5e- 
led  Authors  in  this  or  that  Kind,  upon  this  or  that  Matter, 
and  to  this  or  that  Point ;  not  barely  that  we  may  know  and 
be  able  to  info  m  others,  that  there  are  fuch  Books,  but  that 
we  may,  upon  Occafion,  have  recourfe  thereto :  We  fhould 
yet  more  particularly  acquaint  our  felves  with  the  Authors, 
that  are  generally  reputed  to  give  a  fair  and  true  Character 
and  Account  of  other  Authors  and  their  Writings;  Wc 
jhould  alfo  confer,  as  we  have  Occafion  and  Opportunity^ 
with  thofe  who  may  he  like  to  inform  us,  about  the  Cha- 
rader  of  this  or  that  Writer,  the  Nature  and  Manner  of  his 
Writing,  the  Matter  of  flich  particular  Treatife,  the  way 
wherein  'tis  manag'd;  and  what  there  is  in  this  or  that  Book 
more  obfervable  j  but  we  may  commonly  farther  depend  up- 
on the  Report  as  to  Matter  of  Fad,  than  in  Point  of  Judg- 
ment, Opinion  or  Cenfure  ;  here  great  Allowances  arc  ge- 
nerally to  be  made,  for  the  Capacity,  Sentiments,  Difpofiti- 
on  and  Judgment  of  the  Pcrfon,  who  gives  the  Acc(;unt ; 
and  perhaps  alio  for  the  regard  he  might  have  to  thofe  who 
receive  or  hear  it:  And  therefore,  if  we  our  lebes  have 
Skill  and  Leifure  fufiicient,  it  muft  be  commonly  fureft  and 
beft  for  us,  to  fee  with  our  own  E)es,  and  even  then  we 
Ihould  take  all  poflible  Care  to  bring  them  as  clear  as  may  be 
of  Prejudice  and  PrepofelTion  to  the  fcanning  of  what  we 
Ihould  look  into,  §  1 2.  Some 


38b  'Jin  '  IJav  iot   the  Kart  111. 

§  12.  Some  guefs  may  be  ordinarily  made  at  the  Im- 
foit  and  Delignof  a  Book  by  its  Title,  and  fometitnes  at  the 
Manner  of  it ;  which  may  perhaps  be  confuted,  or  carry'd 
farther,  upon  pcrufing  the  Preface,  or  what  is  Intro.uid:ory  j 
and  farther  yet  b'.  the  Contents,  if  any  be  ;  hut  it  will  be 
much  iuvTT  llill,  if  we  (hall  look  into  the  Book  it  felF,  here 
and  there,  as  we  may  be  pointed  to  famewhat  o'lfervable  by 
what  we  may  ^x\<\  in  the  Indc.x\  or  Titles  of  Chapters,  or 
in  the  Margin  ; '  or,  wh;'re  we  want  fach  Direction,  we  may 
try  the  Book  by  divers  Openings  at  Adventure,  obferving, 
whether  we  iuoregene'-ally  fall  upnnfoniewhat  val  lahle,  or 
what  is  otherwife  ;  and  probibly  it  mvill  be  bvt  an  indifferent 
liiook,  which  affords  bat  one  Pr:7[e,  efpccially  if  that  ihould 
not  be  very  Confiderablc,  to  divers  i)/.i«4.%  and.  it  maybe 
fome  down-right  Biots^  as  of  man'fell  Error ,  Ignorance, 
Dulnc's,  Inaccu  acy,  Sophiftry,  Hailing,  &•:. 

%  13.  Di^fionarys,  with  other  Books,  whicli  are  Alpha- 
betical.y  difpos'd,  arc  for  the  moft  part  only  to  be  confulted 
upon  Occaiion,  and  fo  the  generality  of  Conimentatnrs, 
whether  upon  the  Sacred  Scripture,  or  other  Author'^ ;  for 
i  muif  be  lefs  biading  and  more  improving  to  the  Mind,  iirft 
to  try  by  its  felf  what  we  can  make  of  the  Text,,  and  afccr  to 
confult  Commentators  in  order  to  conciff,  fupply,  or  con- 
Jirm  our  Apprchenfions, 

k}  14.  Ihofe  Books,  which  we  may  call  FmiAnmcnMl^ 
are  noc  only  to  be  more  carefully  read,  but  review'd  as  has 
been  intimated.  The  more  Common  Syftems  of  the  Arts  and 
Sciences  are  ordinarily  to  be  once  at  lead  perus'd,  tho'  they 
might  feem  iefs  ufeful,  chat  fo  we  may  not  appear  wholly  to 
dcipife,  nor  yet  be  ignorant  of,  what  is  generally  known: 
But  then  we  ihould  be  fare  to  lake  in  alfo  the  bcjt  we  can 
ineet  with  belidcs,  and  f/jrt.%  as  far  as  well  may  be  in  the 
IVmci pal  various  Forms  of  Lcgick,  Ethicks,  Phyficks,  Me- 
dians, i3c :  Nor  fhouid  v/e  be  bigotred  to  New  or  Old,  to 
this  or  that,  fo  as  to  imagine,  ev'ry  thing  mui't  be  altogether 
v'glit,  oi"  altogether  wrojig  in  either  ;  n  ir  lliould  we  indeed 
re'eif  or  embrace  any  thing  purely  for  its  being  Antienc  or 
Modor  1,  agreeable  to  this  or  the  contrary  Hypothcfis,  to  this 
t.r  that  fallible  Author,  (3c:  We  fiiould  rather  endeavour 
i; )  cull  out  from  any  of  them  whatever  may  approve  it  felf 
yight  upon  impartial  Confideration. 

Per  fed  Syllems  arc  fcarce  to  be  expeded  ip  any  Art  or 
Science;  nor  are  thofe  that pafs  under  the  name  to  be  too 
fij  depended  on  rf.< ///-/';  and  whiht  the  Wriiings,  that  are 
call'dEtiays,  pretend  no:  to  completenefs,    yet  they  are  not 

there-. 


Chap.  26.        ir/iprovemtfit  oj  Keaion.  '^^<^ 

therefore  to  be  neglecled  ;  but  rather  ro  be  hcedfully  read,  as 
what  may  afford  ibnie  hints  at  Icaft,  which  arc  vahiable,  and 
may  be  foinetimts  more  contJderabie,  than  what  we  can 
find  in  the  more  let  and  fo!e;nn  Treatifes  upon  this  or  that 
Subjed.  ; 

§   15.     Books  ihac  give  an  Orca (ion,  and  withal  Tome  af- 
(iftance,  to  Tho'r,  nny  be  really  of  greater  Ufe  to  u«,  than 
thofe  which  Dif  ourfe  Things  more  diflufely,    and  at  large, 
leaving  little  or  nothing  to  the  Mind,    but  only  cutting  out 
Work  for  the  Memory  ;    which  yet  can  worle  retain,   what: 
we  have  barely  read  without  finding  juit  Occalion  to  confider 
or  think  about  it  :     And  therefore  thole  Writers  ic-an  htteft 
to  be  thofen,  at  leaft  by  ivlcn  of  Tho'r,    who  appear  bv  their 
Concifenefs,    Clearnefs  and  Strength  to  have  given  the  i<c- 
fult  of  deep  and  deliberate  Tho'r,  rather  than  thofe  who 
fcem  to  have  put  down  the  very  Courfe  and  Train  of  their 
Thinking  U[;on  a  difficult  or  important  Subjedt ;    for  one, 
that  has  gone  to  fucli  a  Place  thro'  various  Windings,   may 
afterwards  find  and  be  able  to  direct  a  lliorter  and  plainer  , 
Way.     On  fuch  Accounts,  as  well  as  to  fpare  time  for  far- 
ther Purpofes,  fome  fhorcer  Tradts  are  much  to  be  prefer'd 
to  fome  of  the  more  Voluminous  Treatifes ;    but  then  they 
muft  be  read  with  heedful  Attention  and  Obfcrvation. 

§  16.  Where  it  will  be  like  to  anfwer  the  Time  and 
Pains,  larger  Books  may  be  Epitomiz'dor  abridg'd,  perhaps 
by  a  Method  more  Contrad:,  but  ordinarily  that  of  the 
Treatife  it  felf  is  to  be  prefervM  ;  we  muft  draw  out  only 
v;hat  is  more  Material,  in  brief  Intimations,  or  in  fuch  gene- 
ral Terms,  as  may  comprize,  at  leaft,  the  chief  Particulars  ; 
and  if  the  Epitome  ihould  be  too  obfcure  to  inftrud  others, 
yet  it  may  be  capable  of  leminding  thofe,  who  have  read  the 
Author  at  large,  or  however  thePerfon  himfelf,  who  has  fo 
contradled  it. 

§  17.  Some  Books,  or  particular  Paffages,  that  are  ob- 
fcure,  may  be  worth  the  Time  and  Trouble  of  an  Explica- 
tion  or  Paraphrafe,  in  order  to  their  being  more  clearly  un- 
clerftood,and  the  fenfe  of  them  more  fully  taken  by  others  j  oi- 
that  we  may  fet  the  Meaning  moie  plainly  before  our  leives, 
and  lix  it  L  etter  in  our -Minds  j  or  even  by  way  of  Exercilt, 
that  we  n.ay  get  the  happy  Faculty  of  delivering  our  Tho'is 
Avith  the  grcarcft  Clearnefs :  Now  aji  Author  is  to  be  cy- 
puunVi  by  fuhitinnirg  Words  or  Pliraies,  that  ate  better 
knowa,  and  01  more  determinate  in  poit,  caLing  if  need  be, 
a  gr.atei  ccmpals  of  pjprdlion  •  end  op.rung  th ;  k-j's  evidcii.-. 
or   more  <..iliicult  Connexions  ct  oii.  C.iU..:e,  ^cm;u  ;i..c.    , ,- 


89°  ^^  ^j]^y  pr  the  Parr  111. 

Sedlion  with  another.  This  may  be  done  either  more  locfly 
for  our  own  Ufe,  or  with  greater  Exaftnefs  for  others.  And 
often  times  inffead  of  a  continu'd  Explication  or  Paraphrafe, 
or  elfe  together  with  this  latter,  we  may  make  Notes  here 
and  there,  either  in  the  Margin  of  our  Author,  or  rather  in 
one  that  is  purpoll)'  interleav'd,  or  in  fomc  other  Book  pro- 
vided for  that  Ufe. 

§  1 8.  Book<:,  that  require  and  may  be  like  to  anfwer  it, 
are  firft  to  be  curforily  read,  and  then  more  deliberately  ; 
and  in  fome  Tr^atifcs  we  (hould  not  ftay  to  Mafter  every  Dif- 
ficulty at  the  firft  going  over  ;  fome  of  which  perhaps  would 
vanilli  of  themfelves upon  a  fecond  Reading:  But  what  we 
cannot  then  reach  may  be  mark'd,  or  rather  drawn  out 
into  a  Table-Book,  as  matter  of  afcer-confideration  or  En- 
quiry. 

Where  the  Method  of  a  Book  or  Difcourfe  is  Cryprical, 
or  not  laid  fufficiently  open,  or  that  we  defirc  to  acquaint 
our  felves  more  throiighly  with  the  Matter  and  Way  of  Ma- 
nagement therein,  we  may  fet  our  felves  to  draw  an  Anaiyjis 
ofit,  or  a  Table  of  the  Divilions  and  Subdivifions,  onwhichu 
if  proceeds;  and  in  order  thereto,  we  muft  firit  go  thro'  the 
whole,  or  hoiyever  fome  djltmdi:  Branch  thereof,  to  make 
our  felves  foTar  MaRcrsof  it,  that  we  may  coniprize  it  in  our 
Minds,  and  obferve,  what  is  the  principal  Point  or  Argu- 
ment, how  rhe  Difcourfe  upon  it  is  divided,  or  upon  wliat 
diftin£V  Heads  it  goes ;  as  alfo  how  thcfe  are  f^verailv  profc- 
cutcd,  vi-:^.  under  what  Diftributions,  from  what  Heads  of 
Explication,  llluftration,  Confirmation,  ^c  ;  and  finally 
what  diftind:  Points  are  deduc'd  from  any  of  them,  or  to 
what  Purpofes  they  are  feverally  dircciled  and  refer 'd. 

§  I  p.  All  thefo,  from  the  Argument  or  Subjed:  it  fdf^' 
down  to  the  loweA  Particulars,  are  cither  only  to  be  mention'd 
as  falling  under  fuch  Divifions,  Subdivifions,  and  farther 
Diilributions  rcfpcftively  (as  may  be  feen  P.I.  Chap.  6.  §  p. 
p.  48.  and  P.  II.  Chap.  15.  §  i  u,  &c.  p.  191);  or  elfe  to 
be  placed  in  a  formed  Sdieme  ffomewhat  after  the  Maniier,' 
as  thiit  in  P.m.  Chap.  1 1.  §  13.  p.  a86),  with  Brachets  of 
fo  large  an  extent  at  the  firft  and  in  the  nearer  Divilions,  that 
there  may  be  Room  for  the  utmoft  Branches  at  laft  :  And 
they  may  be  lay'd  out  by  the  help  of  a  Biack-Lead  Pencil ; 
the  Marks  whereof  may  be  alter'd,  and  if  need  be  finally 
taken  out  by  rubbing  v/uh  the  Crumb  of  Br.ad. 


$  IcWbat 


Chap.  26.        If^provemcnt  of  K^3{on.  391 

§  20.  "What  is  in  it  felf  Remarkable,  or  capable  of  being 
tisM  as  a  Principle,  Example,  Proof,  Illuftrarion,  (^c  ^  or 
in  the  '•*  ay  of  Council,  Caution,  or  the  like,  Ihould  be  drawn 
into  a  Commm-placc-Book;  and  it  is  at  Jeaft  highly  requifite  to 
be  don^',  for  tome  conliderable  time  however,  in  the  Courfe 
of  our  Studies. 

And  for  this  purpofe  it  has  appear'd,  upon  long  Confide- 
raiicn,  and  frequent  conferring  about  it,  not  Avichout  fome 
Experience  of  it,  the  moft  convenient  Methoci,  that  we 
fliould  be  provided  with  a  kind  of  Univerfal  Ind  x  (iuch  as 
may  be  Ihortly  publilli'd  upon  Writing-paper,  with  fome- 
what  of  a  Specimen^  and  brief  Inftrudrions  (hewing  how  it  is 
to  be  us'd)and  that  in  a  diftindlBock  we  Ihould  conrinnedly 
take  what  we  think  fit  out  of  the  Author  we  arc  reading,  or 
out  of  divers,  if  we  have  more  in  hand  at  once,  making  one 
or  more  Reference^,  in  the  mentioned  Index,  to  this  or  that 
particular  Matter  noted  in  our  Common-place-Book ;  and  this 
may  be  very  readily  done  in  the  way,  which  will  be  diredled, 
and  eafijy  apprehended  from  the  Index  and  Specimen  de- 
lign'd,  to  which  I  refer  the  Reader. 

§  21.  In  this  way  of  common-placing,  what  we  take 
out  of  the  fame  Book  will  all  be  together,  and  may  be  ar  any 
time  review'd,  fo  as  to  bring  to  Mind  the  Subftance  of  ir, 
or  the  prmcipal  Matters  contained  in  it;  thus  it  may  be  (if 
we  fee  fie)  Epitomiz'd  or  Explain'd,  and  yet  we  Ihall  be  able 
to  find  things  under  their  feveral  Heads  in  the  Index,  whence 
we  may  go  to  as  many  Authors  as  we  have  made  Collediors 
from,  or  have  refer'd  more  immediately  to  in  the  Index  it 
felf.  _  . 

If,  whilft  we  have  one  Author  in  hand,  we  would  alfo 
be  colleciting  from  another,  'tis  only  leaving  room  at  a  g:  cfs 
for  the  former  ;  but  rather  too  little  than  too  much  ;  fince  we 
can  eafily  refer  this  forward  to  fome  other  part  of  the  Ojm- 
mon-place-Book,  if  need  be,  for  th^  finifhing  of  it. 

§  22.  B^oks  which  have  very  particular  Contents  or 
good  Indexes  will  lefs  need  to  be  abftradled,  or  Common- 
placed ;  and  if  we  be  ftrait'ned  in  time,  we  may  enter  lome- 
what  of  the  Index  it  fel(  more  immediately  into  our  general 
Index :  And  in  reading  fuch  i\uthors,  it  will  not  be  ordi- 
narily proper  to  draw  out  more  than  fome  remarkable  Paf- 
lages,  to  which  the  Index  of  the  Book  it  felf  Avould  not  lead 
us  by  the  Titles,  i.r  cler  which  we  mav  fitly  pur  them  in  our 
Corrmon- placing  of  them;  for  the  fame  Thing  will  often  be 
capable  oi  being  well  refer'd  to  divers  ether  Points  ?.nd  Pur- 
pofts  bcfides  thai  for  which  it  was  biottj:hc  by  the  Auihcr ; 

ara 


992  A»  tjfay  for  the  Parr  HI. 

and  the  way  of  Reference  is  therefore  made  fo  very  ready, 
that  we  might  not  be  at  a  (land,  under  what  one  Head  of  the 
General  Index,  to  place  this  or  that  Paflage,  but  might  eaJiJy 
put  it  under  the  feveral  Titles,  which  offer  themfelves  to  our 
Mind. 

Some  Pages  in  our  Common-place-book  may  be  aiTign'd 
to  what  occurs,  that  is  remarkable,  in  Converfation,  or  oc- 
cafional  Reading,  or  that  ochcrways  prefents  it  felf  to  our 
Minds. 

Till  Judgment  be  well  ripened  it  were  bell  to  offer  our  Ob- 
fervations  and  Colleclions  to  be  perus'd  by  the  moll  pro- 
per Judges  we  can  engage,  in  order  to  their  being  aker'dand 
amended,  before  we  enter  them  into  our  Common-place- 
Book. 

§  23.  It  would  generally  be  convenient  to  have  ftated 
times  for  this  and  that  more  lolemn  kind  of  Study,  leaving 
fuch  Readnig  as  we  may  call  a  Pleafure  or  Divertirement,  ra- 
ther than  ouiBafinefs,  to  fill  up  Vacancies. 

It  is  fit  we  lliould  get  fome  Tafte  of  Poetry  by  reading  an<l 
obferving  well  fome  [tltdi  Poems  of  the  Moderns,  as  well  as 
of  the  Ancients,  Whicli  may  ferve  to  enliven  and  elevate 
Tho't;  and  to  prevent  our  being  grofly  impos'd  upon,  or  ex- 
pofing  our  felves,  by  what  is  really  contemptible,  in  thaC 
kind.     But, 

We  muftrake  heed  of  running  into  a  kind  of  Poetical  Stile 
inftead  of  what  is  truly  Omtorlcnl:  We  Ihould  endeavour  to 
form  our  ExprciFion  by  being  very  Converfant  with  Authors," 
who  fpeak  ]ufilv,  properly,  gracefully,  and  with  Spirit,  but 
without  Affeiflation ;  yet  we  muft  rather  aini  atcorredbing 
what  is  any  way  certainlv  faulty  in  our  own  Manner  of  Ex- 
prellion,  than  at  the  direct  Imitation  of  another's,  how  tak- 
ing foever,  to  which  our  Genius  do's  not  lead;  Iqj^wefhould 
but  ape  it,  and  expofe  our  felves. 

§  24.  Books  that  arc  really  dangerous  to  our  Mor^/j,  and 
and  efpecially  where  we  may  be  more  difpos'd  to  take  the 
Infection  from  them,  are  carefully  ro  be  (hun'd  ;  nor  fhould 
iwe  affeft  the  Kjiowiedge,  both,  of  Good  nnd  Evil  \  futh  ail 
over- prying  Curiofity  was  the  Snare  of  our  firlt  Mother 
Eve,  and  the  Bane  of  Huinane  Race  j  and  'tis  commonly  the 
way  of  becoming  Wife  too  late. 

The  dark  and  unaccountable  Methods  o?  Aftrology  zrc  much' 
rather  to  be  let  alone  than  tamper'd  with;  fincc  by  themfelvei 
I  hey  naither  can  elfedt,  nor  determine  any  thing  (lee  the  Po 
litions  {Dn)  and  (Do),  p.  1  ic)  j  and,  wheie  there  is  neither  i 
Ka^urai  Aptitude,  nor  a  Divine  Inftituiion,  it  would  lookt6o[ 

m 

I 


Ghap.  27.         improvement  of  Rcafon.  502 

like  the  inviting  of  Diabolical  Affiftancc,  by  ufing  his  My- 
fteries,  and  confulting  his  Oracles :  If  any  Help  be  this  way 
^ot,or  Knowledge  gain'd,  it  muftbe  too  dear,  or  however  too 
dangerous  a  Purchafe  j  and  he  that  thus  encrenfeth  IQiowledge 
oft  -ncrenfeth  Sono-ve  by  coming  to  know  what  had  beien  more 
happily  unknown,  and  perhaps  had  otherwife  never  been. 

It  is  highly  requifite  Men  Ihould  firft  be  well  acquainted  wirfi 
what  is  generally  acknowledg'd  for  Truth,  as  a!fo  that  they 
Ihould  be  otherways  competently  furnifh'd,  and  their  Judg- 
ment ripened, before  they  lanch  into  the  reading  of  Corttrover- 
fie;  nor  then  ihould  they  too  haftily  determine  for  this  Side  or 
that ;  but  efpecially  they  (hould  very  carefully  fee  they  be 
not  biafs'd  by  Education,  Friends,  Inclination,  or  Intereft, 
to  Read,  or  mind,  only  what  makes  for  fuch  an  Opinion  ot 
Party. 


GHAP.   XXVII. 

§  I.  "COR  the  more  thorough  and' effe(ftual  Purfuit of  ufe- 
*-  ful  Knowledge,  and  other  improvements,  we  are 
farther  to  confider  fomewhat, 

VIII,  As  to  the  Choice  artd  Ufe  of  Exercifi:  It  is  ceirtain 
'we  come  to  kriow  things  more  perfectly  and  to  better  Etfedt 
by  Pradlice,  than  we  could  ever  do  bv  mere  Speculation, 
Reading,  or  Difcourfe  :  We  are  therefore  to  be  making  fie 
Attempts,  in  order  to  our  being  more  thro'ly  Skill'd,  efpeci- 
ally in  what  is  of  a  practical  Nature. 

Nothing  is  plainer  than  ti^^at  by  Speaking  we  learn  to 
Speak;  by  Writing  to  Write;  by  Difputing  to  Difpute  ; 
and  in  a  Word,  to  perform  things  well  by  proper  and  repeat- 
ed Endeavours  fo  to  perform  them :  But  Care  mnft  be  taken, 
that  neither,  the  Mind  nor  Body  be  over-adted!  And  tho* 
it  may  be  of  very  good  Ufe  to  put  them  fometimes  upon  ex- 
erting themfelvcs  to  the  fartheft,  yet  neither  of  them  muft 
be  kept  continually  bent,  nor  Ihould  be  at  any  time  over- 
ftrain'd  j  That  of  the  Poet  is  to  be  well  cdnfider'd  and  ob- 
ferv'd, 

Verfate  diit,  quid  ferre  recufent^ 


^id  valeant  Humeri 

your  Force  and  Genius  carefully  Survey  t 

Sfce  what  they  cannot  Anfwer;  what  they  may.    .. 

13  d  ^  i.E^ercife 


994  ^^  t.jfayjorjhe^ Part  III. 

§  1.  Exercife  is  indeed  highly  Requifite,  or  altogether 
Neceflary,  to  be  intermixed  with  Inftrudtions,  but  then  it 
fhould  be  duly  fuited  to  the  Learners  Ability  and  Attain- 
ments, as  they  may  be  advancing  from  time  to  time:  Kew 
limine  IS  not  to  be  put  into  old  Bottles :  Young  Beginners  are 
not  to  be  put  upon  too  difficult  Service;  yet  neither  are  they 
to  keep  at  a  Stay,  but  muft  be-going  fiiil  onward  to  Per- 
feftion. 

§  3 .  To  inftance  a  little  in  the  Matter  of  Language ;  af- 
ter we  have  fome  Acquainta,nce  with  the  principal  Points  of 
the  Accidence  and  Grammar,  and  have  got  a  competent 
Stock  of  the  mcftufualWprds,  with  Skill  enough  to  fearchout 
the  reft  in  a  Didiionary,  we  may  take  Words  that  are  joyned 
in  Synt/ix,  and  try  to  refolve  them  back  into  their  Themes  ; 
or  the  Themei  themfelves,  as  they  are  put  together  in  the 
Vejlibii'um  Tcchntcuni,  and  form  them  into  Concord,  firft  in 
Writing  and  then  in  extempore  Reading.  After  this,  plain 
verbal  Tranflation  may  be  lifefully  pfadtisM,  fir/1  from  fome 
other  Language  into  our  Mother-Tongue,  and  then  the  Tran- 
flation back  again  into  the  former  Language,  and  into  the 
fame  Wprds,  as  near  as  may  well  be  done  by  the  conjoined 
Force  of  Memory  and  Judgrneiit. 

§  4.  Exaiuples  may  next  be  compos'd, '  or  fought  our^ 
by  the  Learner  to  anfwer  inofe  principal  Grammar-Rules, 
with  which  he  is  acquainted ;  '  and  he  may  after  proceed  in 
like  manner  with  thofe  that  remain  ;  which  are  fuppos'd  to 
be  of  lefs  frequent  Ufe.    •  . 

He  is  then  to  acquaint  hirpfelf  with  the  Idioms  and  proper 
Ufe  of  Particles,  which  may  be  done  partly  by  fome  Ge- 
neral Rules  and  Obfervations  about  them,  but  chiefly  from 
approved  Authors  ;  and  here  the  Sentences  of  that  kind,  col- 
!e(^ed  from  them  in  the  Latin  and  Greek  Tongues,  may  be 
rcnder'd  forward  and  backward,  'till  they  are  made  very 
familiar ;  and  then  fome  other  Inftances  may  be  compos'd 
sgreeably  to  tlicm. 

§  5.  3y- this  time  at  fartheft  the  Learner  fiiould  be  ef- 
faying,  as  there  is  Opportunity,  to  Converfe  in  the  Language 
he  would  get,  and  if  it  may  be  with  fuch  as  can  fpeak  it 
better  than  himfelf.    .  i      ,i- 

In  reading  approved  Authors,  Ihc  may,  with  Advantaga> 
draw  out,  or  mark  the  moft  exprelfive  and  elegant  Turns  ; 
and  Ihould  endeavour  in  his  Bifccurfe  and  Compofures,  af- 
terwards to  ufe  or  imitate  what  he  has  thus  lay'd  in,  but 
without  Atfc£lation  or  unnatural  Straining ;  rather  contenting 
himfelf  for  the  greater  part  with  vOllat  is  plain,''  to  it  be  but '. 
proper  and  exprefTive.  §6,In-i 


Chap. 27-  improvewtvt  nf  }^^d\OT\.  ^(^.^ 


■> 


^  6.  Inventive  Exercifcs  are  not  tobeimpcs'd,  nor  very 
far  attempted,  till  fomewhat  of  a  competent  Furniture  has 
been  firiV  laid  in  by  Converfe,  Obfervation,  and  Reading  ; 
for  we  may  not  hope  to  create  or  form  Difcourfes  out  of 
nothing  pre-exiftent  in  the  Mind :  And  what  we  caJl  In- 
vention can  generally  be  no  other  than  the  Dividing,  Com- 
pounding, or  othervs/ife  Ordering  of  the  Notions  we  have 
taken  in ;  But,  when  Perfons  are  come  to  be  Ripe  for  thisj 
they  may  begin  with  Dialogues  in  Imitation  of  Emjmiis^ 
Lucian,  8cc;  and  then  proceed  to  familiar  Epiftles/after  the 
Cobles  oiT^xt-ir  and Cicrro.  t.    •    .,; 

§7.  Little  is  to  be  done  at  making  Verfes,  unlefs' there 
he  fomewhat  of  a  peculiar  Genius  for  it;  norls  much  to  be 
made  of  particular  Arguments  in  the  way  of  Themes,  as  they 
are  commonly  call'd,  or  Orations,  without  more  of  furni- 
ture and  Judgment,  than  commonly  falls  to  the  -(hare  of 
School-boys  ;  befides,  that  fomewhat  of  Logick  feems  alto- 
<gether  requifite  for  the  well-performing  of  th.-m,  as  it  confef- 
"ledly  isfor  the  forcmentioned  Exercifesof  Explaining,  Par^- 
phrazing,'  'Abftra(5Vihg,  and  ColfeAing,  which  have  beefj 
opened  under  the  foregoing  Head,  as  properly  belonging  to 
^Tie  Ufe  of  Aiithor3.  ■'•-,    '     ' 

^  §  8.  As  to  the  pradtxr.l  Ufe  of  this  EITly,  i  great  deal 
4ias  been  already  faid,  Chap.  19,  lo,  21.  page  331,  &c  : 
•and  yet  it  may  not  he  untit  to  mention  here  very  briefly,  fome 
peculiar  forts  of  Exercife  upon  the  feveral  getieral.Heads  of 
which  it  treats  :  As  (i.  to  excriMiffie  rh'e  various  wiays  of 
Thinking,  P.I.C.2.  2.)  to  refer aBMj^atrers  in' fome  fliort 
Difcoiirfe  to  their  proper  place,  r^^m:the  more  obvious  Ac- 
count  of  Things,  C.  3,  4,  •;  ;  zniX^erw arcs  in  that  which 

is  more  Notional  and  Nice,  Cj6.' -1$.     (3.)   To  exem- 

plifie  the  feveral  Polition":,  C.  "f^&c.  (4.  *  To  apply  what 
-is  deliver'd,  P  II.  C.  r,  z.  to  the  interpreting  fone  Portion 
of  an  obfcure  and  difficult  Av.thor,  and  to  exprtfs  fom!e  Nice 
and  difficul""  Matter  in  a  plain  and  obviou^  M.  nner  accord- 
ing to  C.  3  (5.)  to  lift  and  canvas  a  Fbint  propo  .ndcd,  by 
proper  Enquiries, as  in  C,;.  ~yc.[6')  to  ifete  how  fir  thefevec^l 
Themes  in  a  Difcourlc  may  lie  within  cur  Compaf:,  and 
how  far  without,  as  C.  7,  8,  and  ■'].)  to  lay  tliem  a^  --ear  a^ 
we  cari  in-order,  according  t;o  C.  9,'  io,"  i  r.  (3;  ^  to  eHimate 
what  Account  is  given,  or  whar  Idea  we  .have  of .  afiy 
of  them,  as  C.  12,  13,  14.  ^.nd  to  purlue.  the  Directions 
giv'n,  p.  J  88,'  189,  as'  far,  as  may  be  in  reference  to  tins  or 
that  in  particular,  (9. '  to  give  an  Accouni:  of  the  \ev^::oX?Q- 
Ccioris  in  21  DikouHc  aicorliing.to  the  Vth,  Vlth,  an.i  Vllth^ 

t>  d  2  Gener^ 


59^  An  tjf ay  for  the  Part  HI. 

General  Heads,  C.  15 ii  :  cr  to  carry  fome  finglc  Theme 

thro'  all  the  Predicables,    p.  192,   C?c.    (10.)    To  eftimate 
Proof  offer'd  in  a  Difcourfe,  according  to  P.  III.  C.  i ,  CS?c. 
(1 1  v'  To  CDake  our,  confirm,  or  difprove  what  inay  require 
it  as,  C.  8.  ©"<:.  or  to  carry  one  or  more  Points  thro'  all  the 
forts  of  middle  Terms,  p  284.   ( 1 1.)  To  give  an  Account  of 
.  Inferences  accordingto  C.  13.  Cf^c;  reducing  them,  if  it  may 
be,  to  fome  Head  in  the  Table  of  Inferences,  p.  306,  307. 
('13J   To  Ihew  fome  or  other  Ufe  or  Service  to  which  the 
Things  or  Point  mention  d  may  be  dire(5ted,   and  in  what 
way,  according  ro  C.  17,  ^c.   ('14.)  Specially  to  oblige  our 
felves  to  the  oblerving  this  or  that  particular  Branch  ot  Con- 
duA,  as  it  has  been,  or  may  be  dire(Sted,  under  the  prefenc 
General  Head. 

§9.  Exercifcs,in  whatever  kind,  are  generally  no  other  than 
Eflays  and  Attemps  towards  the  Performing  what  we  have  in 
Defign  ;  and  they  are  then  likelt  happily  to  fucceed,  when 
they  are  made  by  Pans,  and  in  the  way  of  gradual  Advance, 
by  repeated  and  continued  Adls  'till  one  ftcp  be  fo  tar  ma- 
fter'd  and  gain'd,  that  we  may  fafely  proceed  to  another  ; 
flill  endeavouring  to  do  the  very  bcft  we  can  at  prefent,  and 
emulating  thofe,  who  perform  that  part  better  than  we  have 
yet  attain'd  to  do. 

§  10.  Few  Perfons  are  wont  to  proceed  with  the  like 
DiTpatch  and  Eafe  all  alone  by  thtmfelves,  as  in  proper  So- 
ciety :     Something  is  therefore  to  be  faid, 

I  A,  As  to  the  Choice.j^nd  Ufe  of  Company  in  the  purfuit . 
of  ufcfiil  Knowlcdge,^|«ther  Improvements ;    'tis  certain. 


tie  that  walks  with  mffjmeti,  not  ot  inere  Neceflity,  but 
Choice,  is  already  fo  far  H^'fit  and  like  to  grow  daily  iVJer^ 
he  that  Converfes  with  ftie  Skilful  will  be  getting  Skill ;  and. 
He  that  choofes  to  accompany  with  the  Virtuous  and  Good, 
di  fi,ch^  has  himfelf  fomewhat  of  Virtue  and  Goodncfs  at 
prefent,  and  is  in  the  ready  way  to  improve  it. 

For  the  getting  or  perfeciting  of  Language,  we  Ihould  be 
very  converfant  with  luch  as  are  very  perfect  in  it;  or  how- 
ever with  thofe  who  are  aiming  at  it,  and  bent  upon  it,  with 
fuch  we  Ihould  be  difcourfing,  notonly  of  it,  but  in  it  too,  as 
much  as  well  may  be. 

§  1 1.  Having  lay'd  in  fome  general  Notions,  or  Enqui- 
ries about  the  moil:  confiderable  Sub;e(fls,  we  ma^  then  be, 
capable  <  f  engaging  thofe,  who  are  more  expert  therein  tol.! 
be  fpcaking  of  th;m;  nor  Ihould  we  defi)iie  thofe  Matters 
which  are  of  an  interior  Nature,  but  may  be  neveithcleis  one 
way  or  other  of  lingular  Ufe. 

§iz.We- 


Chap.  27.         Iwprovement  of  Reafcn.  397 

§  1 2.  We  ftiould  endeavour  to  have  always  fomewhat  or 
other  CO  impart,  which  maybe  agreeable  and  ufeful  to  thofe, 
with  whom  we  Converfe;  and  we  (houldbe,  in  thisrefped; 
alfo,  willing  and  ready  to  communicHte;  which  will  not  only 
fix  and  improve  what  we  our  felves  had  before,  but  may  ferve, 
as  water  pour'd  into  a  Pump,  to  draw  out  more  from  others- 
and  we  fhould  Ihew  our  felves  at  leaft  equally  willing  to  hear 
as  to  fpeak. 

§  13.  Two  or  three,  who  are  impartial  Lo'vers  of  Truth, 
who  will  fpeak  and  keep  to  the  Point  in  hand,  and  are  defi- 
rous  to  help  one  another  in  finding  out  the  Truth,  clearing 
it  up,  and  confirming  it,  may  be  greatly  ufeful  to  each  other, 
in  the  fifting  out  of  doubtful  Queftions,  the  affoyling  of 
Difficulties,  the  Starting  and  Arguing  what  is  Nice  and  Cu- 
rious ;  as  alfo  in  Redtifying,  Clearing,  and  Confirming  each 
others  Apprehenfions ;  whilft  each  of  them  lies  open  to  Con- 
vi<3ion,  and  is  ready  to  acknowledge  as  right  what  he  can 
fee  to  be  fo;  being  likewife  careful  and  capable  to  dif- 
cern  what  is  really  fo,  when  it  comes  to  be  fct  in  a  proper 
Light. 

§  14.  A  larger  Conjnndtion  of  hands,  that  are  compe- 
tently fit  may  be  eafily  Capable  of  a  much  greater  Difpatch 
in  the  purfuit  of  Knowledge  ;  if  they  (hall  fomewhat  like 
xhe  I^oyal  Society)  diftribute  amongft  them  the  fcveral  Parts 
and  Points  thereof,  to  be  more  throughly  fearched  our,  and 
if  it  may  be  to  have  two  or  three  fevcrally  engaged  upon  the 
Dame  Matter,  and  all  to  be  employ 'd  according  as  ihe  Geni- 
us, Capacity,  and  Condition  of  each  may  lead:  The  Dif- 
coveries  or  Improvements  made  by  any  of  them,  to  be  fub- 
jeAedto  the  Confideration  of  all,  as  far  as  well  may  be,  be- 
fore they  (hould  be  publifh'd,  if  at  all  ]  for  perhaps  it  were 
better  to  referve  fome  Things,  till  they  might  be  farther  ri- 
pened and  improved  into  fome  ihing,  which  would  better  bear 
the  Publick  View. 

§  1 5.  Finally  the  reading  a  confiderable  Number  of  Au^ 
thors,  efpecially  to  this  or  that  Point,  may  be  done  with 
greater  Difpatch,  with  greater  Eafe,  and  with  more  Advan- 
tage too,  by  a  number  of  fit  Perfons,  who  fhould  each  of 
them  take  his  Author  and  communicate  to  all,  what  he  finds 
moft  obfervable :  And  alio  one  aixl  the  fame  Book,  which 
might  need  or  deferve  it,  would  be  probably  read  to  better 
Purpofe,  if  fcveral  Students  (hould  feverally  perufc  it,  and 
bring  their  Obfervations  in  Writing  to  be  laid  before  fome 
I  Perfon,  who  were  a  Mafter  both  of  the  Argument  and  of  that 
Author  j  orliowever,  thofe  who  have  read  it  lliould,  loge- 

Dd  3  gecber^ 


39^  An  t-]fuy  jor  the  Part  III. 

ther,  confer  upon  the  feveral  Qbfervations,  and  agree,  at 
leaft  by  a  Majority  of  Voices,  which  of  them  fliould  ftand, 
which  ihould  be  altered,  or,  wiiat  were  to  be  added,  that  fo 
the}'  might  each  infert  them  after  fuch  Amendments  into 
their  relpeclive  Common-place-Jiooks  j  where  every  one 
would  ll:illhave  the  Liberty  of  expunging  altering  or  adding, 
if  he  fhould  i<:t  manifeil  Reafon  to  vary  from  the  Majority 
of  thofe,  who  had  together  with  him  infpeded  the  Obfer- 
vations. 


CHAP.     XXVIII. 

§  I ,  TT"  H  E  Method  propounded,   brings  us  now  to  confi- 

-■■  der  of  drawing  out  ufeful  Knowledge,  and  other 
Improvements  xnoxt  Jolemnly  indie  way  oi Regular  Dijcourfe^ 
or  other  Hk."  Pe^formnnces. 

Befides  the  Occafional  Exercifes  requiiite  for  the  Attain- 
ment of  Knowledge  and  other  Improvements,  there  is  after- 
wards a  more  folcmn  Ule  of  them,  when  they  are  in  fome 
good  meafure  artain'd,  and  which  alfo  tends  to  a  farther  Ad- 
vance therein ;  for  they  are  not,  even  then,  come  to  an  ab- 
folute  Pcrfedion. 

§  2.  Our  Knowledge  and  other  Improvements  are  more 
folemn'i)  drawn  out,  when  upon  Special  Occalion,  and  with 
Special  Application,  we  are  uiing  them  in  the  higher  Degree 
we  have  attained.  Now  Knowledge  is  more«efpeciaUy  drawn 
out  in  Difcourfc,  as  other  Improvements  may  be  in  other 
fuitabl-:  Performances.  By  B^piiar  Difcourfe  is  here  intend- 
ed, fuch  as  follows  th.:  Rules  of  Art  or  thofe  Leadings  of  Na- 
ture in  its  higheft  Advances,  from  which  fuch  Rules  are  taken  j 
And  this  is  what  I  Ihail  here  diredtly  treat  of. 

§  3 .  As  to  other  /%  Performances,  which  are  alfo  folemu  and 
regular,  tho'  perhaps  they  may  not  have  fuch  particular  fetled 
Rules,  I  fhall,  at  moft,  but  obliquely  glance  upon  them  ;  or 
rather  leave  them  to  what  Light  and  Help  may  be  drawn 
from  the  Account  of  ConduQ-  in  general,  with  other  Sug- 
geftions  under  the  feveral  Branches  of  it,  thjs  far  deliver'd  ; 
and  efpecially  fiom  ciie  Treatifes,  which  may  refer  more  di- 
redJy  to  them,  cr  the  Perfons,  who  are  peculiarly  vers'd  and 
Skilful  in  them;  a?,  E.G.  in  the Publick  Admimftration  of 
Juftice,  the  Leading  of  an  Army,  the  DirexSting  of  a  Siege, 
theDifpoijng  of  an  Attack,  Laying  ths  Defign  and  Plan  of  a 

Battle. 


Chap  28.        Improvement  of  K.Q2i{ox\.  5^^ 

Battle,  as  alfo  the  more  Heroick  A£ls  of  Piety  and  Virtue, 
the  more  Eminent  and  Curious  Works  of  Art,  ©"c. 

§4.  Difcourfe may  be  confider'd,  either  as  internal  (that 
of  the  Mind)  or  external  fthat  ot  the  Man) :  This  latter  is 
generally  performed,  tither  by  the  Tongue,  or  by  the  Pen ; 
and  in  feveral  differing  Kinds,  which  may  be  either  for  more 
Private  Ufe,  or  Publick  View. '   And  now, 

X,  As  to  Internal  Dijcourfe,  or  that  of  the  Mind  alone, 
what  I  here  defign,  is  the  {blcmn  Application  of  our  Tho'ts 
to  this  or  that  Matter  in  the  way  of  more  fixed  Confidera- 
tion,  Study  or  Meditation :  And  even  thus  the  Knowledge, 
which  was  before  latent  in  the  Memory,  or  in  the  Habit 
(which  is  not  juft  the  fame  thing  with  that,  tho'  nearly  ally'd, 
and  greatly  aided  by  it)  is  drawn  out  into  A6t  and  Exercife, 
and  fome  way  fet  forth  in  View  before  the  Mind  it  fclf,  either 
that  it  may  get  out  fomething  from  that  Stock  in  reference  to 
what  we  have  under  prcfent  Confideration ;  or  for  the  better 
fixing  and  improving  what  is  already  known  ;  it  may  be 
likewife,  in  order  to  fuitable  Affedlions,  as  alfo  for  exciting, 
engaging  and  encouraging  correfpondent  Actions :  To  thefe 
feveral  Points  and  Purpofes,  we  may  confider  of  fome  Argu- 
ment or  Subjed-,  either  for  our  felves  alone,  or  for  others,  or 
for  both.  ''  '^    '  - 

§  5.  Now  that  muft  be  the  beft  way  of  thinking  upon 
any  Subjed,  which  is  likeft  to  reach  the  Purpofe,  or  Purpofes 
(as  fome  of  them  may  lie  in  order  to  others),  which  we  do  ot 
ftoiald  propound  to  our  felves  in  our  confideringof  it. 

Some  Points  may  feem  to  be  fufficiently  anfwcr'd  in  their 
being  barely  known ;  and  we  muft  perhaps  content  our  felves 
to  look  no  farther  than  thnt^  whilft  we  are  fearching  them 
out :  Yet  there  may  be  fit  Reafon  and  Occafion  for  thinking 
farther  of  them,  with  a  dire£l  Aim  at  the  raifing  or  promoting 
fuitable  Aftcf^ions ;  fo  the  Works  of  Nature  and  Myfteries  of 
Scripture  are  to  be  confider'd. 

§  6.  And  where  the  Subjedt-matter  of  Tho't  may  feem 
to  call  for  nothing  beyond  the  AfFedtions  j  nor  Ihould  we, 
perhaps,  be  looking,  farther,  whilft  we  are  intent  upon 
moving  or  heightning  thefe  j  yet. even  fijch  things  may,  anii 
in  due  Seafon  ought  to  be  confider'd,  in  order  to  fome  or  other 
fuitable  Adtion  :  Thus  the  Goodnefs  of  God  in  the  Works 
of  Creation  and  Providence,  theLove  of  Chrift  in  thofe  of 
Redemption  and  Inrerceflion,  together  with  the  Gracious 
Gondefcentions  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  Scriptural  Revelation 
and  SpirltualRegeneration,  are  more  immediately  fitted, 
cpcn  their  being  duly  confider'd;  to  raife  Ad.miration,  Shame, 

D  d  4  '  Lbvt, 


4-00  An  Ljfdy  for  the  Part  III- 

Love,  Hope,  (£c  \  yet  they  arc  farther  to  be  conrcm placed  in 
order  ro  fuch  a  Carriage  and  Pra(5tife  as  may  thereupon  ap- 
pear to  become  us.  'Tis  certain  that  A(ftion,efpecially  fuch  as 
is  lefs  agreeable  to  ns  in  our  depraved  State,  \yill  npt  proceed 
fo  well,  unlefs  the  AffeAions  be  in  fome  degree  ftirr'd  and  en- 
gag'd  J  nor  will  thefe  be  any  thing  fteady,  abiding,  or  ef- 
feftive,  unlefs  they  are  bottoin'd  in  a  folid  and  well  grounded 
Knowledge. 

§  7.  There  are  fome  very  differing  Ways  of  managing  our 
Tho'ts  in  what  is  commonly  known  by  the  name  of  Medita- 
tic7i.  One  is  the  attempting  to  find  out,  or  at  leaft  to  pur- 
fiJe  f  ime  Method  of  thinking,  not  only  with  a  more  particu- 
lar Defign,  but  alfo  upon  fome  determinate  Subject;  this 
appears  to  require  a  much  greater  Capacity,  Skill  and  Furni- 
ture, or  a  farther  Afliftance,  than  is  commonly  to  be  foun4> 
or  perhaps  ordinarily  to  be  expected. 

Another  way  may  be  our  endeavouring  to  lay  together 
whacfoever  various  Tho'ts  are  fitted  to  anfwer  the  deligned 
End  ;  this  has  indeed  fomewhat  Jefs  of  difficulty  than  the  for- 
mer, yet  Teems  to  require  at  leafl  a  Stock  and  Furniture  be- 
yond vyhat  is  to  be  generally  looked  for  amongft  Perfons  of 
lower  Abiiiries  or  greater  Avocations :,  But, 
'  §  8.  There  is  yet  another  fort  of  Meditation,  which 
feems  to  be  mucl^  more  practicable  by  the  Generality;  and 
may  be,  no  doubt,  of  excellent  Ufe  to,  them  and  others,  'tis 
that  of  fetting  our  febes  to  make  fit  Enquiries  and  Remarks 
upon  what  we  fee,  or  hear,  or  read,  or  remember,  joyning 
therewith  a  fcrious  Endeavour  to  turn  it  to  the  beft  Improve- 
ment we  can,  for  our  own  and  others  Good  :  Thus  we 
take  iji  the  Help  of  what  might  be  call'd  a  Compafs  for  the 
eaiier  Peering  of  our  fliidluating  Tho'ts.  And  this,  when  ap- 
ply'd  ro  Religion,  feems  to  be  no  improper  Account  of  the 
good  Man's  Charader,  vvho  is  laid  to  have  his  Delight  in  the 
Livp  of  the  Lor{l,  and  therein  to  meditate  Dny  and  Night. 
■  §  9.  Yet  the  other  Ways,  before  mention'd,  may  beufe- 
fijily  attempted  j  firft,  the  latter  of  them  as  more  eafie), 
and  then  the  former ;  provided  the  Brain  or  Mind  be  not 
therein  prefs'd  beyond  what  they  can  well  and  fafely  bear; 
nor  the  Confcience  enfnar'd,  as  if  ordinary  Perfons  were 
commonly  and  abfolurely  bound  to  fuch  Extraordinary  Me- 
thods: Which  might  perhaps  be  more  fuccesfully  Effay'd 
by  fome,  if  taking  a  Pen  or  Pencil,  (and  this  laft  might  be 
done  even  Walking),  they  fhall  put  down,  Hints  of  what 
may  occur  to  their  Minds  upon  the  Matter  proposed,  and  af- 
terwards review  them  with  Endeavour  to  amplilie  and  im- 
pove  them  farther.  >        .        ...  yj^^ 


Chap  28.  Improvement  of  Realon.  401 

This  is  a  Method  which  may  (I  conceive)  be  recommended 
as  needful  or  ufeful  for  the  greater  part  of  Students,  the  bet- 
ter to  fix  and  intend  their  Tho'ts ;  as  alfo  to  carry  ihcm  far- 
ther on  in  their  Purfuit  of  this  or  that  Point. 

I  fhall  not  here  add  any  thing  farther  as  to  internal  Dif- 
courfe  or  Confideration;  fince  it  has  thus  far  been  the  great 
Bufinefs  of  this  Logical  Eflay  to  guide  us  in  Thinking. 

§  10.  As  to  External  Dijcourfe^  it  may  be  either  more 
free,  or  fixed  and  fet :    And  here, 

XI.  The  Difcourfe^  which  is  to  be  more  free  And  f^x,  may 
yet  require,  or  well  admit  of  fome  few  general  Dire<Sion$, 
tho'  it  fliould  not  too  nearly  refemble  a  more  fet  Compofure. 
'Tis  certain  we  ftiould  be  well  acquainted  with  the  Matter 
of  which  we  would  fpcak  in  fuch  ExprelFion,  as  may  then 
occur  without  being  previoufly  fix'd ;  yet  we  may  and  (hould, 
if  there  be  Opportunity,  determine  and  confider  beforehand 
of  feme  fit  Heads  to  proceed  upon  :  But  we  JhouJd  take  a 
very  Special  Care  that  the  Mind  and  Body  may  be  in  a  fie 
andfuitable  Difpofition  to  what  we  arc  going  upon. 

§  1 1.  I  (hall  here  a  little  more  particularly  fpeak  about 
the  way  of  Binding  proper  Authors  to  others  :  Now  the 
Author  to  be  thus  read,  IhouJd  be  fuch,  as  may  deferve  and  need 
it :  And  in  relation  to  the  Arts  and  Sciences  it  ought  com- 
monly to  be  what  is  not  very  long  in  the  whole,  but  however 
it  (hould  be  Ihort  and  concife  in  what  is  faid  upon  Par- 
ticulars. 

InIReading,an  Account  is  to  be  given  of  the  more  materia! 
Words,  and  Ways  of  Speaking  ;  what  is  dark  is  to  be  open- 
ed, and  alfo  illuftrated,  if  need  be,  with  Examples,  C2?c; 
the  Senfe  of  what  might  appear  dubious  is  to  be  fix'd  ;  what 
is  over  concife  is  to  be  drawn  out  more  at  large  ;  where  va- 
rious things  are  cJofely  laid  together,  they  are  to  be  taken  in 
pieces  and  opened  by  Parts.     Yet, 

What  is  more  diffufe,  or  copioufly  handled  is  to  be  con- 
traAed  and  fuqim'd  up ;  and  what  has  been  long  in  going 
thro'  (hould  be  re-capitulated,  or  briefly  call'd  over,  as  to  the 
Main  of  it :  VVhere  any  thing  ufeful  and  obfervable  is  ini- 
ply'd,  it  ought  to  be  more  cxprcfly  drawn  out. 

§  I  zl  What  is  mofl:  material  in  it  felf,  or  for  the  Learners, 
is  to  be  particularly  recommended,  and  indeed  prefs'd  upon 
them,  where  it  is  of  great  Importance.  The  Strength  and 
Cogency,  or  Weaknefs and  Deficiency  cf  /.cafons  and  Ar- 
guments ofifer'd  (hopld  be  made  plainly  to  appear :  What  is 
wanting-  m  refped  of  Proof  or  Matter  is  to  be  olfcrv'd,  and 
V.ipply'd ;  wliat  is  Right,  to  be  Ccnfirm'd  ;  what  is  Wrong, 
Confuted.  '        .  ^jf^, 


402  An  tjjay  for  the  Part  lil. 

Alfo  the  Ufe  of  things  is  to  be  diredled  and  exemplify *d; 
ihe  Method  and  Order,  v/ith  the  Goodnefs  or  Defecfts  there- 
of, where  it  may  be  of  Service,  is  to  be  fheu-n ;  and  a  Scheme 
thereof  to  be  given  by  him  that  Reads,  or  rather  attempted 
by  the  Learners,  where  it  tray  be  worth  the  ivhile. 

Finally  differing  Editions,  or  other  noted  Authors  may  be 
compar'd  wi^h  that,  which  is  in  hand,  by  Vv^ay  of  Elucidati- 
on, Confirmation,  or  farthc Improvement. 

§  13.  But  the  Thing  here  mainly  defign'd,  is  to  five 
feme  general  Diredlion  about  formed  Compofr.res :  And  I 
ihallconclude  this  Chapter  with  foraewhat  which  Im'ghtcall 
Preliminary  to  the  nft.     Now, 

Xil.  Logic  is  certainly  to  have  a  very  confide :abl'.-  hand 
in  the  Compofmg  of  Dif  ourfesjtho'  not  without  the  concur- 
rent AlTiftanceot  ether  Difciplines,  and  often  times  of  I'ome 
very  differing  Furniture,  befidcs,  from  the  Knowledge  of 
Men  and  Things. 

The  Superiour  Part,  or  what  I  might  call  the  Soul  and  Life 
of  a  more  Noble  Compofare  is  indeed  from  Moral  Philofo- 
phy,  or  rather  from  Theology ;  whilft  the  Bones  and  Sineivs, 
Blood  and  Spirits,  together  wirh  the  Difpofition  and  Order 
of  the  Whole,  are  from  Logic;  A  Variety  of  Obiervations, 
Reading  and  Experience  niay,  or  ftiould  come  in  to  Fleih, 
and  fill  it  up ;  finally  Grammar  muft  cover  it  all  oyer  as 
with  an  cuter  Skin  ;  and  Rheiorick  is  in  fome  Cafes  to  be 
cmploy'd  to  give  the  Features  and  Colour,  Mein  and  Ge- 
fture,  which  may  render  it  outwardly  beautiful  and  tak- 
ing. 

§  14  The  particular  JAattcr,  the  Method,  and  the  Mdw- 
7ier  of  a  Difcourfe  are  to  be  carefally  adapted  to  the  more 
fimple  or  complex  Dcfi^ji  v;t  have,  or  ought  to  have,  agreea- 
bly to  the  Siitjett  we  take  in  hand,  and  the  Ohiigntions  we  are 
under,  in  point  of  Duty  or  Intereft,  if  not  to  undertake  it, 
yet  however,  upcn  our  Undertaking  it  :  Whether  the  De- 
iign  be  to  InJlruH^  or  Entertain  ;  "  to  Confirjv,  or  Refute  ;  to  j 
Convince^  or  Perfrnade^  &rc  ;  or  that  divers  of  thefe  Furpofes 
are  to  be  ferv'd  at  once  or  fome  of  them  in  order  to  others  • 
whether  in  a  more  Prkate,  or  Publick.  way ;  and  this  eirher 
.with  the  Month,  or  by  the  I'rcfs :  Somev/hat  is  to  be  oblerv'd 
in  reference  to  each  of  thcfe  Points. 

§  15..  As  ro  the  M  W T T£  /^  of  a  Difcourfe,  it  nyift  be 
fuitablcto  the  Sulyct,  and  felcCLed  with  a  Special  Eye  to  the 
Defign:  Kovv  we  can  Icarccly  fail  of  fome  Choice  of  Mat- 
ter, if  we  fhall  fet  our  Tho'ts  to  Work  upon  the  SubjeA  we 
take  inhr.:ui  in  iuch  of  ihe  ways  of  Thinking  (meiidon'd  P.  L  ' 

Chap.  a. 

I 


Chap.  28.         Improvement  of  Reafon.  405 

Chap;  X.)  as  it  may  plainly  require,  or  will  admit,  or  that 
we  can  manage ;  and  if  going  into  the  more  obvious  Ac- 
count of  Things  fChap.  3,  4,  5.)  vvc  try  what  fomething  or 
other  there  may  fuggelt ;  and  farther,  if  we  fee  what  Light 
may  be  tirawn  from  the  more  Notional  Conlideration  of 
Things  in  the  Chapters  following  to  the  i  jtb  j  or  from  the 
Pofitions,  thence  to  the  end  of  the  firft  Part. 

§  16.  If  our  Subjedt  were  a  Sentence  taken  from  fome 
Author,  it  may  be  fome  what  might  arife  from,  P.  II.  Chap. 
I,  a;  or,  whatfoever  it  might  be,  from  the  Head  of  Enquiry, 
Chap.  4,  i^r,  or  from  that,  which  (hews  where  we  cannot 
proceed,  and  how  far  we  may,  C.  7,  8  :  or  we  may  adjuft 
the  Importance  of  our  prcfent  Argument  from  C.  9,  &c  ; 
and  Eftimate  the  Apprehenfions  we  or  others  have  of  it  from 
C.  12,  (3c:  Farther  we  may  go  thro'  the  various  Heads  of 
Things,  which  may  be  predicated  or  affirm'd,  either  of  the 
entire  Subjeft  all  together,  or  feparately  of  its  Parts,  C.  1 5, 
and  judge  of  what  is  pronounc'd,  from  this  and  fome  follow- 
ing Chapters :  Alfo  the  fufficient  Evidence  of  the  Matter, 
or  danger  of  Miftake  about  it  may  be  ftiewn  from  C.  20,  zi  ; 
If  there  be  any  thing  of  Reafon  or  Proof  aflign'd.it  may  be  efti- 
ed  from  P.  HI.  C.  : ,  cj'c ;  or  Proof  and  Inferences  may  be 
drawn  from  the  general  Heads  about  them,  efpecially  from 
the  Tables  of  Middle  Terms  and  Inferences,  p.  284,  and 
'io6:  Some  or  other  Ufes  of  the  prefent  Subjed:  may  be 
ailign'd  from  C.  17,  iS:  but  the  Choice  and  Ufe  of  Books, 
Company,  C/<r,  diredled  under  the  Head  of  Conduit,  can- 
not niifs  of  afFordhig  Matter  to  the  Argument  in  hand. 

§  17.  Thus  when  we  have  carefully  fix'd  and  ftated  the 
Defign,  we  would  and  ftiould  parfue  in  the  Management  of 
fuchaPoinr,  and  in  foch  Circumftances  ;  wc  may  acquaint 
ourfclves  with  the  Argument  or  Subjedt,  by  Obferving,  Con- 
(idering,  Reading,  and  Converfing  about  it :  Andwefhould 
then  endeavour  to  form  the  general  Plan  and  Scheme,  laying 
down,  however,  fome  leading  Notions  and  Notices,  with 
fome  of  the  chief  Divifions  and  Subdivifions  of  what  we  are 
going"  upon  j  which  yet  we  muft  be  willing  afterwards  to 
alter  for  the  better,  as  much  as  may  conveniently  be  done. 

§  18.  And  now  under  fome  of  the  Principal  Heads,  we 
fhculd  endeavour  to  lay  in  a  good  Collection  of  proper  and 
fuitable  Matter,  anfwcring  the  Subject,  and  comportmg  both 
with  our  main  Defign,  and  with  the  other  feveral  Views  we 
have,  and  v/hich  we  may  reafonably  take  in  along  with  that ; 
We  Ihould  therefore  minute  down  whatever  of  that  Nature 
may  any  ways  Occur:'  But  then  we  n  uft  prv.dcntly  confi- 
'  •  .   ■      dcr. 


404  -^^'^  tilf'iy  for  the  Part  III. 

der,  not  only  what  to  fay,  but  what  not  to  (ay  ;  and  there-^ 
fore  (hould  omit  what  may  be  fpar'd  without  fpoiling,  or  en- 
gering  our  Defign ;  efpecially  what  could  fcarce  be  added 
without  the  hazzard  of  its  being  thereby  embarafs'd  and  en- 
cumber'd. 


CHAP.     XXIX. 

§  I.  riTHAT  has  been  only  touch'd  upon  towards  the 
'*'  clofe  of  the  foregoing  Chapter,  in  reference  to 
more  folemn  Compofurcs  is  in  this,  and  thofe  which  follow, 
to  be  diftindily  confidcr'd ;     And  here, 

As  to  MET  HOD,  the  W^^o?v/ is  originally  Greek,  and 
imports  an  ordered  iVay,  wherein  one  Part  regularly  follows 
another :  And,  agreeably  to  this  Etimology  of  the  Kama, 
Mcth.d  fas  to  the  Thing  it  felf )  is  not  the  putting  things  to- 
gether as  it  may  happen,  without  Contrivance,  or  with  de- 
lign  to  render  the  Matter  perplex  and  intricate  (rho'  the 
"Word  might  be  improperly  and  abufivcly  fo  taken),  but  it 
may  be  thus  drfcribd,  that  it  is  fuch  a  Difpofition,  or  laying 
of  Things,  as  aofwcrs  feme  Relation  they  have  to  each  other, 
and  may  be  of  ufe  to  carry  on  the  Point  in  Hand  more  eafily 
and  efFeiSually,  and  particularly  in  a  Difcourfe  to  help  the 
Underftanding  and  Memory  :  It  may  be  in  fome  fort  dcfind, 
fthe  convenient  Placing  of  Things  in  relation  to  each 
otherj 

§  a.  Method  may  or  muft  be  fomewhat  various  according 
to  what  is  upon  our  Hands  and  in  our  Eye:  That  Difpofi- 
tion of  our  Matter  is  in  general  to  be  chofen,  which  beft 
will  lerye  to  prevent  ncedlefs  Repetitions  and  Prolixnefs  ; 
as  alfo  to  lay  things  in  the  Order,  wherem  they  may  give 
the  fu'ileft  Light,  and  greateft  Force,  to  each  other;  and 
which  may  help  the  ^4emory  to.  r? t^iR  them  more  firmly,  and 
to  recollc£l  them  more  eafily. 

Bcaiuy,  Fleafure,  and  Surprize  are  but  of  lower  Confide- 
radon,  that  may  very  well  be  attended  to,  where  the  Matter 
we  'le  upon  is  of  lefs  Importance,  or  that  higher  Aims 
may  be  fabferv'd,  or  at  leaft  not  obftcuiiied,  by  our  varying 
from  a  ftrider  Method,  more  or  lefs,  as  the  Orator,  Poet, 
or  other  Author  may  fee  fir. 

3.  Orators 


Chap.  29.       Improvement  of  Realon.  405 

§  3.  Orators  are  more  commonly  to  give  fonie  general 
Aim  as  tp  the  Method,  wherein  they  deiign  to  proceed ;  But 
Poets,  in  their  £/»/c  Poetry  efpecially,  muft  rather  itudioufly 
conceal  it ;  that  fo  they  may  render  their  Matter  more  fur- 
prizing,  and  the  Readers  Mind  more  eager,  whilft  he  can 
fcarcely  guefs  what  he  is  to  look  for  next ;  and  that  he  may 
afterwards  admire  the  Strudure  and  Contrivance,     Bur, 

§  4.   The  Stricter  Method  laysthings  in  the  Order  where- 
in it  finds  them  to  lie  {Vide  Part.  I.  Chap.  13.  §  5.  p.  85}. 
£.  G.  either  downward  or  upward  (as  in  the  Genealogy  from 
Abraham  down  to  Jofefh  in  St.  Matthew;    and  in  that  from 
Jofefh  up  to  jidcim  in  St.  Luke):   forward  or  backward  (as 
a,  c,  I,  0, «,  or,  II,  0,  i\  e,  a) ;  and  this  may  be  either  (i.)  as 
Things  lie  in  NaturCy   or  as  they  may  be  one  above  or  below 
another  ;  and  fo  we  may  proceed  from  Inferior  Creatures 
to  the  Superior,  or  from  thefetothofe  ;  as  if  we  fhould  treat 
of  God,    Angels,  Men,  Brutes,  C5'c,  or  in  the  contrary  Or- 
der ;     As  alfo  from  Caufes  to  their  immediate  and  remote 
Effefls,   or  backward  from  the  latter  to  the  former  j   I  will 
hcnr  the  Hc.wens,  fays  God,  and  they  Jhali hear  the  Enrth,  r.nd 
the  Enrth  Jhall  henr  the  Corn  and  the  H^mCj  and  the  Oyl,  nvdth:y 
/hall  hear  Ifrael:    Again,  from  the  Subftance  to  the  Accidenr, 
Mode,  GJ'c,  or  from  the  latter  to  the  former:     And,  to  name 
no  more,  from  the  whole  to  the  Divifions  and  Subdivilions, 
or  back  again  ;  as  from  a  Guinea  to  an  half  Guinea,  Crown  , 
half  Crown,  Shilling,  Six-pence,  G^cj  or  from  the  lower  to 
the  higher. 

§  5.  Or  elfe  wc  may  proceed,  (2.)  as  things  lie  in  Kcticrt^ 
or  in  the  way  of  Conception,  forward  or  backward :  Sup- 
pofe  it  were  from  Individuals,  confider'd  as  fuch,  to  the 
Sorts  and  Kinds,  and  Higher  Kmds  of  things,  or  from  thefe 
downward  to  thofe :  From  what  was  counted  firft,  onward 
to  the  iaft ;  or  from  thence  backward  to  the  firrt :  From  the 
End  and  Subordinate  Intentions  onward  to  the  loweft  Means, 
or  from  the  latter  to  the  former :  And  all  this  may  be  called 
Natural  Order :    But, 

That  v.hich  is  termed  Arbitrary  Method  fhifrs  this  placing, 
and  takes,  it  may  be,  firll  what  lay  in  the  Middle,  then  gc's 
perhaps  to  the  end,  and  thence  backward  to  the  Begmning, 
as  theTho'r,  Occafion,  or  Defign  may  lead. 

§  6.  Method  may  be  confider'd,  in  rciation  to  rhe  Matter 
which  is  to  be  difpos'd  and  order'd,  .as  that  which  h.\s  been 
commonly  fuppos'd  more  agreeable  to  Speculative,  or  to 
Pra^ilical  Things.  • 

What 


4^6  An  Lffay  for  the  Part  III. 

What  is  of  a  Speculative  Nature  is  commonly  deliver'd 
in  that,  which  they  call  the  Synthcticnl  Method,  defcending 
from  Generals.to  Particulars,  as  from  a  kind  of  Principles  to  the 
things  Compounded  of  them :  But  it  were  very  polTible, 
without  breach  of  good  Order,  to  proceed  otherwile ;  as, 
£.  gr.  in  Phvficks  to  begin  with  an  Individual  Man,  fuppofe 
Adam  ;  andi  to  obferve  what  he  had  peculiar  to  himfelf ; 
what  in  comnion  with  other  Men ;  what  they  have  in  com- 
mon with  other  Animals  j  and  thefe  again  with  inanimate 
Creatures,  (3:.    And, 

It  might  deferve  fome  Confideration,  whether  this  Way 
would  not  carry  more  of  Plainnefs  and  fatisfadlory  Evidence 
with  it,  than  to  begin  with  Generals,  which  perhaps  are  not 
well  adjufted,  or  do  nor,  however,  fufficiently  appear  to  be 
fo  :  Certainly,  what  we  have  inftanc'd  is  the  more  Natural 
Way  ;  and  that  which  muft  firft  have  been  taken,  to  form  the 
Abftradl  Notions  of  Sorts,  and  Kinds,  and  higher  Kinds. 

§  7.  The  Annlyticnl  Method,  which  proceeds  from  the 
End  to  the  Subordinate  Intentions,  and  to  the  lower  Means, 
is,  and  ought  to  bejobfcrv'd  in  fixing  the  more  general  Points, 
when  we  treat  of  Pradlical  Matters ;  yet  there  will  be  found 
a  very  plain  Mixture  of  what  is  otherwife  :  And  that  we 
neither  commonly  do,  nor  ought  to  lay  things  altogether 
backward  from  the  fartheft  End  to  the  loweft  Means,  tho' 
every  thing  is  or  fhould  be  laid  with  an  Eye,  both,  to  the 
nearer  and  farther  Defigns,  we  have  in  View;  and  it  were 
fit  the  nearer  fhould  be  commonly  mention  d,  that  we  may 
ftill  know,  not  only  what  we  have  to  attend,  but  why,  and 
for  what  Special  Purpofe :  Nor  can-  a  Man  well  begin  with 
the  Means  and  nearer  Intentions,  till  he  has  taken  a  more  ge- 
neral Survey  of  the  Matter  from  Beginning  to  End. 

§  8.  To  make  this  matter  more  plain  and  obvious  by  a 
familiar  liluftration,  Who  could  tell  whether  he  muft  go  to 
Bdr?2ef,  thence  to  St.  AibanSy  Dunjlnblc,  &c ;  unlefs  he  firft  knew, 
whriher  he  were  laftly  defign  d  ;  and  had  fome  |;eneral  Ap- 
prehenfion,  as  by  a  Map,  or  otherwife,  of  fome  Principal 
Places  in  the  Way ;  as  fuppofe  he  were  intending  to  Noff /w^- 
/;/!??.',  and  found  by  a  general  Map  of  England,  or  upon  Erh- 
quiry,  that  Dunjtablcy  Northamptcn,  and  Leictftcr  lay  in  the 
Road  to  his  Journeys  End :  Yet  he  would  not,  after  he  had 
fix'd  thofe  Principal  S':ages,  firft  begin  to  fearchour,  or  en- 
quire more  particularly,  the  fartheft  part  of  his  Way,  as  from 
Leicefler  CO  .\:^t:ngham,  but  raiher  the  neareft :  And  hercpon, 
asking  the  way,  or  looking  into  fome  n  ore  Particular  Map, 
fi-;  would  find  that  St.  Aikvu  was  his  way  to  DW'JtrMc  ;   nor 

Would 


"Chap.  29.        Improvement  of  ^^^iou.  407 

would  he  then  firft  enquire  from  St.  Albans  thither,  but  ra- 
ther from  London  to  St.  A ihans;  where  he  would  find  Burnet 
in  his  way  ',  and  new  we  may  fuppofe  him  firft  of  a]lto  take 
the  moft  particular  Account  of  his  way  thither,  and  that  he 
would  thereupon  determine  to  Ho/Zoivrty,  Iflingtcn,  High- 
gate,  8cc. 

And  if  he  were  to  direct  another,  he  might  moft  conve- 
niently do  it  by  mentioning,  firlt  of  alJ,  the  Principal  Stages 
of  the  whole  Journey  j  then  the  moft  notable  Towns  of  the 
firft  Stage,  and  fo  onward  to  the  laft.     And, 

§  9.    Somewhat  afcer  this  kind  of  Procedure,  the  Method 
of  any  Special  Undertaking,   particularly  that  of  a  folemn 
Difcourfe,   is  firft  to  be  more  generally  laid  in  fome  of  the 
main  Subordinate  Points,  beginnmg  with  the  farrheft  Defipn 
and  Proceeding  fro  i.  what  iies  nearer  to  it  to  what  is  more 
and  more  remote  from  it,  according  to  the  Order  of  Intenti- 
on :    But  the  finiihing  ot  the  ftvcral  Parts,   is  to  be  after- 
wards carry'd  on  in  the  Order  of  Exeiution,  beginning  with 
,   that,  which  is  firft  to  be  effefted :   only  if  this,    or  any  other 
(Branch  of  the  Undertaking  ihould  appear  to  be  of  a  large 
Extent,   it  would  then  be  requifite  to  take  a  general  Survey 
thereof,  and  fo  to  fix  ihc  incermcdiate  Points,   as  before,   in 
the  Order  of  Intention  ;   but  when  once  we  can  eafily  fee 
what  is  firft  to  be  done,  what  next,  and  fo  on,  for  the  reach- 
ing fome  nearer  Dcfign,    we  muft  then  proceed  according- 
ly.    But  then, 
J        §  10.     In  our  Procec!..re  we  fliouid  be  able  to  fee,  and  ic 
{  may  fometimcs  be  lequifitetolhew,  the  Reference,  and  Suita- 
blenefs  of  cacii  particular  Means   to   the  next  foregoing  In- 
tention, either  among  thofe,  which  we  firft  of  ail  fetled,  or 
ot  thofe,   which  might  next  be  fix'd,  towards  the  finilhhig  of 
J  this  or  that  more  general  Part:  And  it  Ihould  always  be  remcm- 
-j  bred,  that  fo  much  the  grearer  Exadnels  is  to  be  us'djaccord- 
ing  as  the  intermediate  Points  arc  more  remote  from  what  is 
ultimately  defign'df' and  we  Inould  take  all  polTibie  Care, 
that  every  particular  Means  do  indeed  he,  as  diredrly  as  well 
may  be,  in  the  way  to  rhr.t  End,    which  in  the  prefent  Un- 
dertaking, we' have  ultimately  fix'd. 
,,^        §  II.     To  treat  this  Matter  a  little  more  particulady," 
-i   What  we  would  Difcourfe  of  may  be  introduod,  for  the 
grearer  Solemnity,  or  by  way  of  Inducement,  if  Occaiion  be, 
with  fomewhar,  which  may  be  botli  Acceptable,  and  like  to 
ferve  our  Purpofe :     And  then  the  Argument  in  hand  is  to 
be  firft  more  briefly  opened  in  the  General,    both  as  to  the 
"Words,    and  Thing  it  felt;   and  we  are  alfo  to  diftinguilh 
:;1  '.,  thereupo-i. 


4o8  An  Ejfay  for  the.  Part  III. 

thereupon,  if  need  require :  The  very  Point  we  undertake, 
or  effay  muft  be  accurately  and  precifely  ftated,  then  more 
fully  ope  ned ;  and  where  there  might  be  danger  of  Miftake, 
filch  p.  lints  as  ly  very  near,  and  look  very  like  it,  are  to  be 
exprefly  fet  afide,  as  not  being  our  prefent  Biifinefs,  nor  be- 
longing to  the  Matter  under  Confideration  :  Welhouldnext 
proceed  to  fome  nriore  general  Divilion  of  the  Argument,  or 
of  the  Difcourfe  upon  it,  or  of  both  ;  either  exprefly  decla- 
ring or  fairly  fiiggefting,  the  more  general,  or  principal 
Branches  of  our  Intended  Method  ;  that  we  may  be  better 
apprehended  in  our  after  ProcedurCj  and  what  wc  offer  there- 
in more  eafily  remembered. 

§.  '1.  We  are  then  to  enter  upon  the  firft  of  thole 
Branrhes  giving  what  maybe  reqvifitefor  the  Opening, 
and  Arguing  thereof  in  general,  before  we  go  to  divide  it, 
(if  need  be  or  to  declare  the  Method  of  purfuing  it  j  and 
this  is  not  commonly  to  be  done  at  all,  when  we  come  to 
the  lower  Subdivilions ;  fince  it  will  fcarce  be  neceffary  then, 
and  might  tather  prejudice  thanplcafe,  or  profit  the  moft  of 
thofe,  who  may  be  fome  way  concerned  with  the  Difcourfe  : 
So  much  we  fliould  every  where  fay  in  the  general,  as  may 
favethe  Time  and  Trouble  of  repeating  it  under  the  Parti- 
culars; or  that  may  fervc  to  give  fuch  an  Apprehenfion  of 
the  Matter,  as  is  proper  for  our  Purp.jfe  •  but  if  we  ihould 
proceed  on  ftill  to  farther  Particulars  at  a  confiderable  di- 
flance  from  the  more  general  Heads  to  which  they  belong,  it 
may  be  very  requifite  to  refer  more  exprefly  to  what  has  been 
faid  before  j  and  it  may  be  here  and  there  fit  to  recapitulate  ; 
or  however  briefly  to  touch  upon  what  was  moft  Material  in 
the  foregoing  Difcourfe,  efpeclally  where  there  would  be  dan- 
gre  that  the  Reference,  we  have  thither,  might  othervfrife  be 
overlook'd,  and  that  this  would  be  prejudicial  to  the  Mat- 
ter in  hand. 

§  13.  Things  that  are  lefs  Complex  fliouId  more  generally 
go  before  the  more  Compounded ;  the  Eafier  before  the 
Harder  ;  and  the  Slighter  before  the  Greater  and  more 
Weighty,  unlefs  the  Nature  of  the  Defign  (hould  require  it 
to  be  otherwife  ;  as  if  we  would  engage  Men  to  abftain  not 
only  from  fome  Greater  Evil,  but  alfofrom  what  is  Lefs,  yea 
from  the  very  Leaft,  and  indeed  from  all  Appearance  of  it  ; 
or  when  we  would  perfwade  them  not  only  to  Greater,  and 
more  Manifeft  Duties,  but  even  to  the  Leaft,  and  to  fuch 
Things  as  are  fafer  and  better  done  than  omitted,  tho*  it 
might  feemthat  the  Abfolute  Duty  or  Neceflity  thereof  wefc 
not  fulficiemlY  made  out,. 

§  14.  Bd€ 


J  1  .  —^ 

thap.  29.        improvement  of  iiealbn.  ^09 

§  14.  But  even  in  fuch  Inftances  there  is  ftiJI  a  real  Ad- 
vance, if  the  Matter  be  duly  confider'd ;  for  'tis  a  yet  greater 
thing,  if  we  add  the  avoiding  of  leffer  Evils  to  that  of  the 
greater;  and  the  difcharge  of  lefs,  or  lefs  certain  Duties  to 
others;  for  it  is  plain,  that  the  leaft  thing  fuperadded  to  the 
greater,  or  fubftraded  from  it,  makes  a  Procedure  on>vard> 
in  the  one  or  other  Way :  But  that  lefs  which  is  included  in 
the  greater,  that  precedes,  would  be  very  ridiculoully  menti- 
oned after;  as  if  it  were  faid,  He  gave  a  Guinea,  an  A.ngeJ,  a 
Crown,  an  Half-Crown,  a  Shilling,  yea  a  Six-Pence ;  uii- 
!cfs  it  were  intended,  that  the  latter  were  fo  much  more,  itill 
added  to  the  foregoing. 

§  15.  Moft  of  the  Rules  of  Method  muft,  upon  Occafion, 
give  way  to  what  is  more  Macetial,  or  that  is  fo,  however,  to 
our  Purpofe ;  and  where  I  can  reafonably  hope  to  prevail  on 
ibme,  it  may  be  on  moft,  by  a  weaker  Motive,  more  than 
by  what  is  much  ftronger  in  it  felf,  I  may  or  ought  to  put 
the  weaker  laft,  in  order  to  its  being  better  remembred  and 
regarded. 

Where  little  depends  upon  the  placing,  it  might  look  beftj 
and  be  in  fome  relpe^s  the  moft  Convenient,  to  put  that  laft 
of  all  (at  leaft  to  do  fo  in  a  lower  and  more  particular  bet  of 
Heads ^,  which  requires  tne  largeft  Handling*  and  cfnecially 
if  it  muft  have  any  confiderable  Number  of  Subdivifions : 

§  16.  We  Ihould  carefully  avoid  too  long  a  Train  of  DI* 
vifions,  and  Subdivifions;  and  therefore  ihould  for  the  moft 
part  only  to  refer  to  the  feveral  Subordinate  Branches  of  jt 
Dichotomy  (which  is  on  fome  Accounts  preferable  to  a  Dtvifion 
into  more  than  two  parts),  whilft  we  are  palling  along  in  one 
and  the  fame  Set  of  Heads,  ftill  ntimber'd  on  (as  may  be  {^^\\ 
by  comparing  §  9.  in  Chap.  6.  Part  I.  with  the  ten  Heads 
in  Chap.  7:  and  alfo  in  the  ten  Predicables,  Part  II.  C.  5. 
^  10— —z  I,);  or  in  a  more  continued  Series  of  Difcourfe 
(fas  in  the  Account,  which  has  here  been  given  of  Method)  j 
this  is  indeed  more  Oratorical,  and  commonly  more  pleafingj 
out  theexprefsnumbringof  diftindt  Matters  is  gene  ally  more 
UfefuU,  as  it  may  ferve  to  engage  Obfervation,  and  help  Re- 
tolledlion  ;  yfet  Care  fhould  be  taken  that  we  do  not  CKceed 
either  in  the  Number  of  the  feveral  Sets  of  Heads,  or  in  that 
of  any  one. 

It  may  be  an  Exercife  of  no  very  great  Difficulcy,  and  of 
fome  goodUfe,  if  the  Learner  (hall  obfer^'e,  what  is  rhe  Mi?- 
thcil  of  :his  Chapter  a'^-ouc  ME  FHO  D,  adJ;ng  the  Figures 
that  v^ere  purpofely  omitted  in  it ;  and  efpecialiy,  if  he  dravi/ 

£  e    '  a 


4IO  An  tjjay  for  the  Part  111. 

a  Scheme  of  it  with  Brachetsj   Vide  Chap.  26.  §  18,  19, 

page  jpo* 


CHAP.    XXX. 

§  I.'  "^"HAT  which  remain?,  will  require  a  fuller  Confi- 
■     deration,  and  another  Chapter  befides  this  :  now 
under  the  laft  General  Branch  of  Condud,  it  is  to  be  ob- 
ferv'd, 

As  to  the  MANKEFi^  of  a  Difcourfe ,  which  we 
might  call  its  Drefs  or  Guarb;  or  the  way  of  Addrefs,  wheij 
'tis  direcfted  to  any  Perfon  ;  Care  muft  be  taken,  that  the 
Senfe  we  would  convey  be  exprefs'd  truly  and  juftly ;  eafily 
and  clearly ;  and  as  far  as  well  may  be  acceptably  j  but  how- 
ever fuitably  to  thofe  Confrderations,  that  are  chiefly  to  guide 
and  govern  it.    Now  we  muft  fee, 

I .  That  the  Senfe  we  would  convey  be  trui/  a?id  fitly 
exprefs'd  ;  that  if  Polfible,  what  we  deliver  might  not  lie 
open  to  Mifcomlrudlion,  at  leaft  when  it  comes  to  be  duly 
weigh'd  and  confider'd ;  we  Hiould  therefore  take  care  to 
make  oiir  fclves  Mailers  <to  a  good  Degree  ho\\.'ever),  both 
of  the  Matter  it  felf^  whereof  wc  would  treat,  and  alio  of 
the  Language,  wherein  we  would  Jo  :r,  at  leaft  in  reiatiod 
to  that  Matter:  Ihis  muit  be  done  by  Gonverling,  Read- 
ing, and  Writing  much  about  it.     And, 

§  2,  If  is  almoft  abfolutejy  Neccflary,  in  order  to  th^ 
juft  cxprefiing  of  our  Tho'ts  upon  any  conliderable  Subjeift, 
that  we  lliould  have  frequently  fct  our  ielvcs  to  put  at  ieaft 
the  Rcfulc  of  them  into  Words,  nor  only  in  Speaking,  but  iri 
Wriring;  offering  it  to  others,  and  trying  whether  the  Ex- 
preffion  would  lead  them  into  the  Tho'ts  thereby  defign  d ; 
as  alfo  reviewing  it  our  fclves  at  fome  conliderable  difiance 
of  rime ;  or  at  leafl,  when  we  had  cooFd  upon  the  Matter  : 
and  both  thefe  Ways  were  iii  to  be  taken,  if  it  may  be,  with 
our  folemn  Difcourles  :  in  which  we  are  to  ilrike  out  Am- 
biguous Words  and  Plirafes,  or  well  to  fix  their  Meaning  ; 
and  otherwife  to  aher  or  add;  till  we  and  o:hers  may  reafo- 
nabiy  conclude,  that  the  intended  Senfe  is  effe(5l'Jaily  fecur'd, 
and  can  hardly  be  mifs'd,  by  fuch  as  fcall  be  really  defirous, 
or  willing,  to  take  usrigh.t :  But  this  Point  has  been  already 
treated  fomewhat  more  particularly  in  the  I'd.  Fart  of  this 
fcfay    Chap.  3.    And  whereas  there  may  be  foir-e  danger  of 

olf-uring 


Chap.^o-         Improvement  of  Realon.  41 1 

obfcuring  the  Senfe,  we  would  fo  fully  guard,  and  are  en- 
deavouring to  fecure  and  afcertain  5  therefore  we  muft  far- 
ther fee, 

.  §  3.  ?.  That  our  Meaning  be  eaftly  andclenrty  exprefs'd, 
fo  far  4s  the  Matter  and  Circumftances  will  admit  j  that  it 
hiay  be  readily  taken,  if  poflible,  by  thofe  of  very  mean  Ca- 

Racity^  and  who  knew  beforehand  little  ot  nothing  of  the 
latter  9  we  fliould  therefore  accuftomour  felves  to  Converfe 
about  it  with  fuch,  and  to  try,  whether  they  underftand. 
What  we  take  to  be  plainly  expre&'d,  pr  where,  and  at  what 
they  ftick,  and  how  we  can  help  them  over  the  Difficulty. 

Terms  of  Art,  and  Words  of  uncommon  Ufage,  are  by  no 
means  to  be  affeded,  rather  to  be  induftrioully  avoided  ; 
but  where  they  muft  be  ufed,  they  fhould  be  either  fonnal- 
-  ly  explain'd,  or  however  join'd  fometime  with  fuch  Exprefli- 
ons  as  may  carry  eVen  thofe  who  knew  them  not  before  into 
the  Meaning  of  tbem. . 

§  4.  We  fhotild  take  heed  of  running  into  very  long  Pe- 
riod^; and  ought  cautioufly  to  ufe  fuch  Particles,  as  rercr  to 
fomewhat  forward,  and  it  may  be  far  diftanr,  2is  fmce,  where^ 
iat,  forrfmuch  tii,  &s,  fome  of  which  are  feldom  allov/able, 
but  in  the  Forms  of  Law  :  Nor  fhould  we  ccnimoniy  place 
any  longer  Claufe  betwixt  the  Parts  of  a  Sentence,  but  rather 
throw  it  into  a  diftind:  one,  by  it  felf ;  we  ihould  not  need- 
Icily  hold  the  Mind  in  fufpence,  by  referring  a  greater  num- 
ber of  Claufes  to  fome  following  Verb,  or  Noun,  Cj?r,  which 
might  have  been  pur  firlt,  or  in  the  middle ;  and  a  Pro- 
u^eugifhn,  or  a  Me!^o:(eugma  is  eaficr  taken  than  a  Hjfp.- 
::(eiigma. 

§  5 .  We  are  farther  to  fhun  the  Ufe  of  Relatives,  which 
would  lie  far  diftant  from  that  ro  which  they  relate  5  efpeci- 
ally  where  they  would  be  dubious  too  by  reafon  of  fome 
nearer  Antecedent,  whereto  they  might  be  refer'd ;  in 
fuch  Cafes  the  Noun  it  felf  fhould  rather  be  repeated. 

Tho*  we  may  or  fhould  often  leave  to  the  Mmd  what  it  can 
enfiiy  lupply  ;  yet  we  rnuft  take  heed  of  over-hold  Omiflions  j 
and  alfo  of  ufing  Serltehces  too  Concife,  by  laying  a  great 
deal  of  Senfe  very  clofe  together,  where  it  may  well  be  avoid- 
ed. 

Yet  after  all,  we  muft  take  heed  of  making  a  Difcourfe 
lefs  plain  to  fome,  or  however  too  prolix  for  moft,  by  en- 
deavouring to  bring  it  down  to  every  ones  Capacity. 


^<,3.The 


412  An  tffay  for  the  Part  HI. 

§  6.  3.  The  Manner  of  a  Difcourfe  ftiould  be  made  as 
Acceptable,  as  can  well  confift  with  what  is  more  to  be  re- 
garded. To  entertain  Men  for  their  Advantage  is  niuch  to 
be  defir'd  and  endeavour'd,  *Tis  a  very  Juft,  as  well  as 
known,  Obfervation  of  the  Poet, 

Omnc  tulit  funclum^  qui  mifctiit  utile  dulci.  , 

Who  makes  Inftru^ion  pleafe,  and  Pleafure  teach. 
Ail  Ends  and  Purpofes  do's  fully  reach. 

And  if  fome  things  will  not  admit  of  Ornainent,  as  the  fame 
Author  has  well  remark'd, 

Ornari  ^s  ipfa  negtit^  contenta  Doceri. 

Some  Things,  for  Ornamental  Drefs  unfir^ 
Inftrucitive  Piainnefs  only  will  admit. 

Yet  there  mny  be  no  neceiTicy  of  being  Rude  and  BarbafotlJj 
even  where  it  might  look  Ridiculous  to  aim  at  being  Quaint 
and  Elegant :  There  may  be  a  fufficient  Piainnefs  without 
Ruftic  Homelinefs,  and  familiar  Expreflion,  without  flatnefa 
of  Tho'r. 

§  7.  Even  the  Arts  and  Sciences  themfelves  may,  fome  of 
them  at  leaft,  admit  of  fuch  kind  of  Inftances,  and  Uluftra- 
tions,  with  occafional  Obfervations,  Citations,  &c,  as  may 
Ibmewhat  enliven  Difcourfcs  of  that  Nature  :  And  where 
there  is  no  Room  or  Scope  for  the  making  fome  fort  of  Ar- 
guments pleafing  ;  yet  they  may  be  made  however  lefs  dif- 
pleaftng  to  the  moft,  or  to  the  Wifeft  and  Beft,  by  our  avoid- 
ing v/hac  would  nceciiefly  offend  ;  and)  in  that  Refpeiit,  be 
like  to  do  more  Hurt  than  it  would  otherways  do  Good. 

But  after  all,   we  fhould  take  Care  that  the  Sauce  and 
Garnifhing  fpoil  not  the  Meat  ;  a^s  may  feem  to  be  intimated 
by  that  Excellent  Remark  of  the  celebrated  Orator,  if  1  rightly 
remember,  "hlcrito  fufpicayida  sji  Omtorin^  ^u^Sui  facit  Admira- 
tin::ir^  -pttihs  ^uam  Argumenti  j  *Tis  a  fort  of  Oratory  juftly 
to  be  fufpedled,    which,  infccad  of  carryiiig  the  Mind  into 
Things,   rather  detains  it  in  fruiclcfs  or  unfeafonable  Admira:- 
tS&no^i\\tlVords:  and,  v/here  the  traeft  Eloquence  has  that 
Efi'evfl',  it  is  really  hurtful,  according  to  that  of  Seneca,  Nocet 
iUif  E:oqucr:tia^  qnibui  nrn  I\eruvi  facit  Cupiditatcm,  fed  fui. 
'  §  S.   4.  And  laftiy,  We  are  efpecially  to  fee,  that  the  Maff- 
-     nrr  of  ovr  Difcourfe  be  duly  fuited  to  what  Ihould  chiefly 
Ginde  and  Govern  it,  more  particularly. 


J.  to 


Chap.  30.        lf/jprovemef7t  of  Kealon.  413 

I.  To  the  Perfon  fpeaking  in  ic,  whether  it  be  the  Autlior 
himfelf,  or  feme  other  who  is  introduced  by  him  :  He  muft 
confider  what  will  become  bis  Charad:cr,or  may  be  how- 
ever well  confiftenc  with  it ;  fince  th,it  may  come  well  from 
one,  which  will  not  from  another.  We  fhould  not  alfeiit 
Imitation  too  far,  but  cultivate  the  Stile,  to  which  our  Ge- 
nius leads.  If  another  be  introduced,  he  muft  be  made  to 
fpeak  like  himfelf;  but  we  muft  take  heed  of  Perfonating 
too  far,  what  is  Profane  or  Immoral. 

§  9.  z.  Difcourfe  muft  be  fuited,  as  far  as  well  may  be, 
to  thofe,  unto  whom  it  is  more  dircd;!y  addrefs'd,  and  e^en 
to  fuch  as  may  obferve  it  :  Too  much  Care  and  Pains  about 
Accuracy  in  Matter,  or  Method,  or  Manner ^  would  it^deed  be 
worfe  than  loft  upon  fome ;  for  it  might  be  Lke  to  render  a 
Difcourfe  fo  much  the  lefs  accepted  with  them ;  we  muft 
however  labour  to  approve  our  felvcs  to  the  higheft  Judge  ; 
as  alfo  to  our  own  Minds,  and  to  thofe  who  may  be  proper 
Judges ;  And  by  what  is  more  Judicious  and  ConeA  fome- 
what  may  be  done  in  Time,  by  flow  degrees,  towards  alter- 
ing of  Mens  Tafl:e  and  Relifli  for  the  better.  In  the  mean 
while  we  muft  endeavour,  as  far  as  well  may  be,  to  fait  our 
Difcourfes  to  the  generality  of  fuch  as  are  like  to  be  concerned 
with  them,  always  remembring,  that  thofe  of  an  higher 
Form  may  more  eafily  ftoop,  than  thofe  of  a  lower  can 
rife;  yet  we  may  allow  our  felves,  at  fome  times,  in  fome 
Cafes  and  Particulars,  to  fliooc  a  little  over  the  Heads  of  the 
latter  to  the  former.    But, 

§  I  o.  We  are  to  confider,  not  only  the  Size  of  Mens  Un- 
derftandings,  but  alfo  the  Biafs  of  their  Education,  Inclina- 
tion, and  real  or  fuppofed  Interefls  j  more  particularly  their 
Special  Cafe  and  Condition. 

We  may  at  fome  Times,  and  in  fome  Cafes,  addrefs  our 
fehes  more  peculiarly  toPerfons  of  fuch  a  Degree,  fuch  kind 
of  Bufinefs,  fuch  Relation,  Age,  or  Condition,  Cjc,  with 
fome  peculiar  Advantage,  in  that  they  will  be  like  more 
carefully  to  attend,  and  to  take  themfelves  more  nearly  con- 
cern'd  in  what  is,fo  fpecially  direcSted  to  them.  Alfo  fome 
fort  of  Characters  may  be  fo  drawn  to  the  Life,  in  fit  Parti- 
culars, as  that  fome  Perfons  cannnot  but  fee  their  own  Face? 
in  the  Glafs ;  but  then  they  muft  fcarcely  be  the  worft  of 
Charadlers,  or  not  drawn  at  the  very  worft;  however,  not 
ib  as  to  expofe  them  to  others,  left  the  Perfonr,  moft  concern'd, 
iniiead  of  getting  any  good  thereby,  Ihould  only  be  cxafpc- 
xated  fo  as  to  break  the  Glafs,  or  Spit  upon  it,  and  to  fall 
foul  on  him  who  holds  it  to  them. 

E  e  3  §  1 1.  3.  We 


4f4  ^«  ^Ifiy  pr  the  PartllL 

§  II.  3.  We  muft  prudently  fuit  our  Difcourfes  to  the 
Circumft^nces  of  Time,  remembi  ingthat  of  Solomon^  Ecclef.  3. 
1 1.  Every  thing  «  made  beautiful  in  its  Time.  And  however  the 
prefent  Mode  may  not  be,  perhaps,  really  beft  in  it  ielf,  yet 
it  may  be  fitteft  in  many  Cafes  for  thofe  of  the  prefent  Age : 
Nor  will  antiquated  Words  or  Phrafesbe  fo  "well  underftood  5 
pur  Expreflion  is  therefore  to  be  model'd  according  to  the 
prefent  way  of  fpeaking.  And  it  is  plain  that  the  preferit 
ftate  of  Perfons  and  Things  may  often  afford  a  very  conveni- 
ent Handle,  and  give  us  a  very  peculiar  Advantage  for  fome 
good  Purpofes. 

§  I  %.  4.  Nor  muft  the  Place  be  akogether  unconfider'd : 
.We  may  commonly  ufe  fomewhatmore  of  Freedom,  at  a  IM- 
ftance  rhan  upon  the  Spot,  or  with  what  lies  nearer  handj 
yet  (till  remembring,  that  Great  Men  have  often  the  pecu- 
liar Faculty  of  Hearing,  and  teaching  others  tdo,  a  great 
ways  oft".  '  •    ■'       ■  = 

As  ro  the  particular  Place  in  which  we  fpeak,  or  Country 
where  we  write,  much  may  depend  thereon,  in  reference  to 
the  hlntter^  fince  it  may  in  fome  fort  dire(5t  what  is  fit  and 
proper  J  but  there  may  be  much  more  in  refpedt  of  the  Man- 
ve>\  that  is  to  be  us'd,  both  in  regard  of  the  Cuftoms  or 
Fa£>s  to  which  we  may  refer,  and  alfo  of  the  Laoguage  ot 
Dialed,  in  which  wc  fhould  exprefs  our  felves. 

§  1 3.  5.  The  Argument  or  Subjeds  we  are  upon,  ought 
to  be  more  particularly  regarded,  as  to  their  differing  Na- 
ture, and  rhe  various  Degrees  of  their  Importance,  alfo  as 
they  may  be  more  or  lefs  Serious,  or  Certain,  or  Safe,  (^c  ; 
and  likewife  in  refpedl  of  the  more  peculiar  FormsorPhrafes^ 
which  may  belong  thereto,  and  muft  ordinarily  not  be  omit- 
ted there ;  tho'  they  are  fparingly  to  be  us'd  elfewhere. 

§  14.  When  we  are  to  lay  the  firft  Foundations  of  any 
particular  Knowledge  or  Praftife,  it  fhould  be  done  with  al| 
the  Plainnefs,  Strength,  and  Evidence  which  the  Matter  cart 
well  admit  of:  And  it  may  be  of  Ufe  to  lay  in  rhe  fureft 
aind  clear-eft  Principles,  which  are  peculiar  to  any  of  the  Arts 
or  Sciences  in  rhe  Entrance  of  each  of  them  refpectively. 
The  Superftrudlure  is  to  be  firmly  laid  on  fuch  Foundations; 
nor  muft  weartempt  thefinilhing  of  the  Whole,  or  even  any 
confiderable  Part,  without  a  becoming  Modefty  and  Diffi- 
dence, as  thofe  who  know  there  is  nothing  altogether  per- 
fed.  .  ■       -     •  -■        ■ 


§  1 5.  Mathe- 


Chap  9 1 .        Improvement  of  Reafon.  415 

^  i^.  Mathematical  Points  are  to  be  treated  with  the 
utmoft  Accuracy  and  demonftrative  Evidence  j  thofe  of  a 
Moral  Nature  with  *|^udent  Conflderation  of  Circumftan- 
ces,  comparing  the  weight  of  Argument  on  either  fide  : 
Natural  Things  are  to  be  Difcours'd  from  Obfervation  and 
Experiment,  agreeably  to  the  Nature  and  Evidence  thereof; 
Hiftorical  Matters,  from  Authentick  Monuments  and  good 
Auiliority  ;  thofe  of  Medicine,  from  Anatomy  and  Experi- 
ence, with  the  fevered  Reafoning  thereupon  ;  thofe  of  Law, 
from  Statutes,  Inftitutions,  Precedents,  Cafes,  Reports,  Re- 
cords, Writings,  Witnefs,  (§s. 

§  1 6.  Finally,  to  mention  no  more,  Points  of  Divinity 
are  to  be  treated  according  to  the  Books  of  Scripture  and 
Nature  without  us,  together  with  Reafon  and  Confcience 
within  ;  and  we  are  to  take  in  what  Light  we  can  from  the 
beft  Antiquity,  Eccleiiaftical  Hiftory,  Councils,  Fathers, 
Schoolmen,  Commentators,  Cafuifts,  Polemical  and  Pra(5^i- 
cal  Writers,  &c. 

But  that  which  muft  more  particularly  govern  and  deter- 
mine the  Manner  of  a  Difcourfe  requires  much  more  to  be 
faid  to  it,  and  is  to  be  the  Argument  of  the  following  Chap- 
ter, which  will  conclude  this  Eifay. 


CHAP.     XXXI. 

^  I.  'T'HE  Dgfign  and  End  of  a  Difcourfe  is  here  to  be 
*  more  particularly  confider^d,  as  what  is  chiefly  tp 
direA  the  Manner  of  it.    Now, 

6.  The  End  or  Defign  may  be  either  that  of  the  Difcourfe 
it  felf,  or  fome  farther  Purpofe  to  which  we  may  refer  it  ; 
whether  it  be  what  we  openly  profefs  therein,  on  what  we 
may  fee  fit  to  keep  more  Private ;  whether  it  be  our  maia 
Defign,  or  fomewhat  which  is  taken  in  along  with  it :  All 
thefe  muft  have  the  Conlrderation  refpe£lively  due  to  them 
according  to  their  Place  and  Value. 

Here  I  would  bring  down  fomewhat  of  the  more  General 
Suggeftions  already  given  to  feveral  confiderable  Purpofes, 
which  may  be  defign'd,  and  (hall  perhaps  add  fomewhat 
more  peculiar  10  them.    And, 


Ec4  §2. 1.  For 


416  An  tjj ay  for  the  Part  IIU 

§  1.  I.  For  Infiruciing  or  informing  rightly  and  well,  .it 
is  highly  requifite,  chat  what  we  oifer  fhould  be  throughly 
weigh'd  and  examined,  not  flightly  taken  up;  and  we  are 
carefully  to  fee,  that  we  out  felvcs  have  indeed  a  clear  Ap- 
prehenfion  of  che  Matter,  we  would  impart  to  others  :  We 
Ihould  make  as  fare  as  we  can,  that  the  Terms  we  ufe  be 
plainly  open'd,  and  juftly  limited  ;  and  alfo,  that  the  Things 
intended  by  them  be  fo  defcrib'd^  as  to  diftinguifli  them  from 
what  would  be  likeft  to  impofe  upon  others ;  and,  if  it  may 
he,  fo  dcfind,  as  that  the  Summary  Account  and  Funda- 
mental Attributes  thereof  may  be  clearly  and  briefly  fet 
fonh. 

§  3«  Where  there  may  be  Occafion  for  it,  we  (hould 
take  the  Matter  in  pieces,  and  fpeak  to  it  by  parts,  yet  noe 
forgetting  the  Relation  one  part  has  to  another.  We  Ihould 
endeavour  to  deduce  the  PoUtions,  we  affert,  from  plaia 
and  undeniable  Principles,  by  ealie  and  evident  Confequen- 
ces ;  however,  that  nothing  be  reprefented,  as  altogether 
Certain,  which  is  not  fo  made  out,  or  has  not  been  ;  tho* 
ive  may  recommend  fome  Points  as  very  probably  true„ 
where  either  this  muft  be  fo,  or  that  concradicftory  PoUtioi^ 
which  is  plainly  lefs  probable. 

We  fhould  lee,  that  what  we  offer  be  indeed  to  the  Point 
in  hand,  and  be  made  to  appear  fo ;  that  in  the  feveral  Part? 
and  Procedure,  one  thing  ferve  to  prepare  and  open  the  way 
for  anorher ;  that  our  intet^ded  Senfe  be  juftly  and  clearly  de- 
livered: And  in  ail,  we  muft  have  a  fpecial  Eye  to  the 
more  general  Capacity  and  Attainments  of  fuch  as  are  to  be 
InftruCtcd. 

§  4.  2.  For  Entertitin:ng^  there  fhould  be  fomewhat, 
which  i?,  or  may  appear  to  be,  AVrp,  and,  as  far  as  may  well 
be,  azree/ilfly  furp,i:^iy)g  ;  if  not  ill  the  Things,  or  Notions 
themfelves,  yet  in  the  v>  ay  of  our  bringing  them  in,  or  of 
our  Explaining,  lUuftraring,  Exemplifying,  andUting,  or  Ap- 
plying thtm :  Souievvhat  there  ihould  be,  here  and  there» 
not  too  cciKinu'dly,  or  over  frequently,  which  may  awaken 
and  engage  the  Mind  afrcJli,  in  feme  or  other  of  the  follow- 
ing VVa  s  (where  the  Matter  and  other  Circumftances  will, 
adtnit  of  them  \  as  by  fome  obfervable  Sentence,  Hiftory, 
Parable,  or  Fable;  fo:ne  Singular  and  extraordinary  Re- 
mark; o:  a  more  than  corr.nion  jniS^",  and  X'eh.'incncy  of 
JBxpreffioaupon  fit  OccaGoas. 


Wc 


Chap.  31.  Improve  me  fit  of  Region.         417 

We  may  venture  fometimes,  when  the  Matter  will  plain- 
ly bear  it,  upon  the  ratting  of  an  Expc<^ation,  whether  by 
the  more  dired  undertaking  of  fomewhat  very  Confiderable, 
or  by  a  manifeft  Procedure  towards  it  9  but  here  a  Angular 
Care  muft  be  taken,  that  what  we  have  to  bring  out  may 
be  like  fully  to  anfwer  the  raifed  Expedation  j  and  more  ef- 
pecially,  if  we  fliould  hold  the  Reader  or  Hearer  any  thing 
long  in  Sufpence. 

§  5.  3.  As  to  the  Confirming  or  Refuting  a  particular  Sen- 
timent or  Opinion,  I  might  refer  the  Reader  to  what  has  been 
faid  before  about  proving  and  difproving  :  But  for  the  doing 
it  in  a  folemn  Difcourfe,  and  in  relation  to  fome  other, 
fomewhat  more  peculiar  is  to  be  direded ;  and  here  we  muft 
make  our  felves  Matters  of  the  Difcourfe  we  would  confirm, 
or  refute  by  Reading,  and  if  need  be  Reviewing  it ;  alfo  by 
Recapitulating,  and,  where  there  is  Occaflon,  referring  the 
Matter  of  it  to  fit  and  proper  Heads,  which  may  be  done 
■without  much  copying,  only  by  References  to  the  Pages  and 
firft  Words. 

We  muft  accurately  ftate  the  Point  we  would  confirm  or 
refute,  where  our  Author  may  have  negleded  it,  or  mils'd 
in  doing  it.  In  our  pafling  along,  we  fliould  carefully  ob- 
ferve  what  are  the  Principles,  or  Principal  Arguments,  upon 
which  the  Author  Proceeds ;  how  they  are  purfu'd,  and  what 
^here  is  which  may  be  reduc'd  thereto ;  Nor  fhould  we  en- 
gage our  felves  too  haftily  or  too  far,  whether  in  Confirming 
or  Refuting. 

§  6.  Where  we  may  fee  Reafon  to  undertake  the  0)n- 
firmation,  orVindicationof  a  Dilcourfe,  the' ic  were  indeed 
our  own,  we  Ihould  generally  do  ic  only  for  the  Subftance  and 
in  the  main  Defign.  And  here  muft  endeavour  to  fupply  the' 
want  of  Proof,  where  it  is  Needful ;  alfo  to  carry  on  what  is 
left  Imperfect,  and  clear  up  what  is  Dark;  ihewing  the 
Force  of  what  might  appear  lefs  Cogent;  and  difmilling 
what  might  be  Irnp/oper,  or  Inconclufive,  wichcbe  beft  Incer- 
pretatio/i  and  Apology  it  is  capable  of;  as  by  ihewing  how 
plaufible  the  Appearance  was,  or  what  might  be  the  thing  in- 
tended, and  how  little  mifs'd :  But  we  fliould  never  go  abou: 
to  juftifie  what  is  really  a  Miftakc,  whenas  a  Frank  and  In- 
genuous Acknowledgment  would  in  the  main  coirniend  the 
Perfon  and  his  Caufe'to  all  fit  Judges,  rather  than  caft  a  Blc- 
mifli  upon  either ;  vvhilft  both  woiild  be  like  to  fuffcr  ly  a 
v/eak  Defence.         --    .      . 


§  -.  !•: 


41 8  An  tffay  for  the  Part  III. 

§  7.  In  order  to  refute  or  overthrow  a  Difeourfe,  we 
fhould  carefully  obferve,  whether  there  be  not  fomething 
wrong  at  the  bottom,  which  our  Antagonift  proceeds  upon, 
as  if  it  were  an  undoubted  Principle  j  or  where  and  how  he 
mifconftrues  or  ill-applies  what  is  otherways  Right ;  as  alfo 
where  things  are  taken  for  granted,  which  ought  to  have 
been  proved,  or  that  what  is  offer'd  for  Proof  is  not  to  the 
Point,  or  is  Inconclufive. 

We  (hould  not  commonly  follow  an  Author,  at  leaft  if  h^ 
were  not  very  Methodical,  ftep  by  ftep ;  nor  fall  to  peeling 
the  Bark,  or  lopping  off  Branches,  inftead  of  ftriking  at  the 
Root,  by  fpeakine  to  that,  on  which  he  grounds  and  bot- 
toms his  Difeourfe ;  And  we  fhould  help  out  his  Meaning 
and  Defign,  where  we  can  fee  it,  'rather  than  catch  at  flips 
of  Expreflion.  Nor  ihould  we  trouble  the  World,  or  our 
felves  with  Remarks  upon  what  do's  little  or  nothing  affedt 
the  Principal  Merits  of  the  Caufe ;  unlefs  it  might  be  reafo- 
nable  and  fit  we  fhould  endeavour  to  expofe  our  Antagonift. 
as  Weak,  Iiifolent,  or  Unfair,  where  the  Reputation  or  Ap- 
pearance of  his  having  a  better  Charader  might  be  of  mif- 
chievous  Confcquence  :  'Tis  certain,  however,  we  our 
felves  Ihould  carefully  abftain  from  any  thing,  which  might 
be  Impertinent,  Infolent,  or  Unfair. 

§  8.  4.  Where  we  may  reafonably  aim,  not  only  at  Re- 
futing, but  Ccnviming^  we  muft  be  furc  to  falHn,  as  far  as. 
well  and  fafely  we  may,  vmh  thofe  who  differ  from  us,  com-, 
mendmg  what  is  right  and  well ;  giving  every  tiding  the  belV 
ConArudion  it  will  bear;  exc^fing,  what  is  miftaken,  as, 
far  as  we  fairly  can  ;  obferving  what  might  probably  miflead, 
even  a  Perfon  of  Judgment  and  Integrity  in  fuch  a  Cafe  ; 
rot  imputing  to  them  the  Abfur'd  or  III  Confequences  of 
th.ir  Opinion^  where  they  are  either  difclaim'd,  cir  not  evi- 
dently held;  nor  laying  greater  Strefs  upon  the  difference 
berAvixt  them  and  us  than  it  really  will  bear ;  upon  the  whole, 
uling  the  fotiefl  Expreifions  we  can,  together  with  the  ftrong- 
efi  Argnnrients,  and  making  it  appear,  that  we  differ  not  from, 
them  out  of  Choice,  but  upon  a  kind  of  Fprce,  as  being  con- 
ifrain'd  by  the  Evidence  of  Truth.    But, 

«5  9.  If  Education,  Reputation,  Secular  Advantage,  or 
any  other  Confideration,  which  is  forreign  to  the  Merits  oC 
j^hc  Caule,  lie  againft  us ;  it  is  highly  reqnifite  we  fhould 
cr.cieavour  to  obviate  fuch  povv'crful  Prejudices  iathemolV 
ctfetfli^al,  but  inoffenfive  way;  And  it  would  be  very  im- 
pri  den:  to  proceed,  as  if  nothing  aiore  than  the  Reafon  and 
Evidence  of  things  were  needful  to  convince -Men  in  fuch  a 

Cafe. 


Chap,  ^i-         Iwprovcwent  of  Reafon.         419 

.Cafe.  Now  it  may,  perhaps,  be  leaft  offenfive  and  moft  ef- 
feAual,  it  we  can  truly  reprefenc  what  method  we  our  felves 
have  feen  'equilite  to  take  with  our  own  Minds,  to  poize 
and  ballance  them  againft  wha'tfoever  prejudice  might  fway 
chem  this  way  or  that ;  that  fo  we  might  be  capable  of  mak- 
ing a  more  impartial  and  jnbiafs'd  Judgment  upon  the  Rea- 
fon  and  Argument  on  either  S^de  of'^the  Queftion ;  and  that, 
when  we  were  come  to  fuch  a  Temper,  as  that  we  could  fub- 
mit  to  whatever  Inconveniences  might  attend  the  changing 
of  our  Sentiment,  vve  ftill  found  our  felves  oblig'd  to  abide 
by  it  upon  that  over-weight  of  Argument,  which  we  offer  to 
be  confider'd  with  (grae  like  Precaution,  fo  far  hov.'ever  as 
there  may  be  like  Occafion  for  it. 

§10,  5.  For  the  AjjcBhig  of  others  in  any  fCind,  we 
jhould  endeavour  to  be,  and  to  Ihew  our  felves  afFedcd  '\n 
like  manner,  according  to  that  of  the  Poet, 


^rimum  ifji  tibi 


-SivK  meflere^  Dokndum  efi 


AVhich  we  may  thus  enlarge  to  oi^r  piefentPurpofe, 

."Who  would  my  Palfions  move,  his  own  niuft  raife, 
And  give  them  vent  in  Nature's  ufual  Ways. 

"We  Ihoull  therefore  ufe  the  moft  Natural  Ways  of  fpeaking 
in  fuch  Cafe,  fo  far  as  they  may  confift  with  the  Nature  and 
Solemnity  of  out  Difcourfe ;  here  efpeciaJly  remembring, 
(^Artii  eft  celare  Artem),  that  it  is  the  Principal  Art  to  Con- 
ceal  our  Art. 

Defcriptions  ought,  for  the  moving  of  AfFedlions,  to  be. 
made  as  near  the  Life  as  may  be,  by  our  copying  from  tht 
Life  fuch  kind  of  Circumftances,  as  have  been  mcJre  obferva- 
fele  and  moving  upon  like  Occafions  :  But  this  Matter  is 
left  to  the  Inftitutions  of  Oratory,  which  are  likewife  to  be 
confulted  upon  the  following  Head.     And, 

§11.  6.  As  to  Perfwading,  tho'  it  has  to  do  chiefly  v;ich 
the  Judgment ;  yet  we  fliould  endeavour,  that  the  Affedions 
of  Hope  and  Fear  may  be  brought  to  comport  with  the  N^- 
ture  of  the  Thing  it  feif  to  which  we  would  perfwade,  or 
from  which  we  would  diffwade  ;  and  likewife  with  a  due 
Confideration  of  the  Principles,  and  the  Attendant Sy  and  Con- 
fequents,  which  are  certain  or  probable  in  fuch  a  Cafe.  Nqt 
muft  we  ufe  only  the  Arguments,  which  ought  in  Reafon  to 
Work  beft,  but  alfo  thofe  which  are  Ukeft  to  have  the  defireJ 
Effecfl  upon  the  generality  of  them  we  have  to  do  v/ithal,  as 
of  fuch  a  Temper,   and  in  fuch  CircumRances ;   pro- 

Vldu;? 


42 O  An  Effky  for  the  Part  III. 

vided  ftill,  we  ufe  no  Motives,   which  carry  in  them  any 
thing  Dilhoneft  or  Diflionourable. 

§  1 2.  The  Intereft,  which  lies  neareft  both  in  Point  of 
Time,  and  to  the  Perfons  themfelves,  or  to  their  Families 
and  Friends,  is  commonly  like  to  move  them  moft;  tho'  it 
might  be  far  from  being  moft  confiderable,  either  in  it  felf,or 
in  its  Confequences,  to  them  who  are  fo  affeded  with  it :  we 
Ihould  argue  from  the  nearer  Intereft,  as  far  as  the  Cafe  will 
bear;  and  where t/j/^f  may  lie  againftour  Defign,wemuftdraw 
in  all  we  can,  from  every  Point  and  Quarter,  towards  the  baU 
lancing  of  it  with  fomewhac,  that  is  at  leaft  equally  near  j 
and  where  we  ftill  fall  ihort,  we  are  to  Labour  fo  much  the 
more  to  bring  Men  up  to  a  lively  Apprehenfion  of  the  greater 
Advantage  or  Dammage  at  a  diftance,  and  to  a  juft  Per= 
fwafion  of  its  being  altogether  Certain,  or  very  likely  to  ac- 
crue. 

§  13.  The  moft  forcible  Examples,  which  will  ordinari- 
ly be  thofe  that  come  neareft  to  the  Perfon  and  Cafe,  Ihould 
be  fet  before  him,,  and  improved  by  the  ftrongeft  and  cleareft 
Reafoning  from  them. 

Such  Objections,  as  Men  are  generally  fure  to  make,  muft 
be  exprelly  taken  up,  juftly  Reprefemed,  and  folidly  An- 
fwer'd  J  others  commonly  ought  not  to  be  fo  much  asmen- 
cion'd ;  and  we  muft  always  take  care  of  railing  a  DifiSculty, 
we  cannot  effcdtually  lay. 

Finally  we  fhould  endeavour  to  find,  if  there  be  any  more 
tender  Part  in  refped  cf  Confcience,  Honour,  ^c,  and  (hould 
^>ringour  Reafoning,  if  it  may  be,  to  touch  and  faften  there. 
JBut  the  farther  P^ofecution  of  thefe  Points  we  muft  leave  to 
fuch  as  treat  of  them  more  profeifedly,  and  diftinftly. 

§  14.  As  to  thofe  folcmn  Difcourfes,  which  are  to  be  de- 
liver'd  by  the  Mouth,  we  muft  carefiflly  endeavour  that  they 
be  compos'd  v/ith  the  greateft  poflible  Clearnefs ;  that  fo  they 
may  be  readily  taken,  and  apprehended,  as  faft  as  they  are 
fpoken  5  and  for  this  Reafon  they  fliould  not  be  too  Concife 
or  Set,  but  open  and  free  :  But  then,  being  here  more  li- 
mitted  in  time,  we  muft  very  carefully  Seledt  what  is  of 
greateft  Neceftity  and  Ufe  ;  omitting  much  that  might  other- 
wife  be  faid.  Since,  even  in  Difcourfes  from  the  Pulpit,  an 
intirc  SubjeA  often  muft  be  finifh'd  at  once ;  and  it  is  highly 
fit,  that  at  leaft  fome  confiderabie  Branch  Ihculd  alwa)  s  be 
<iiipatch'd  in  a  fingle  Sermon. 


§!3.  A 


Chap.  3 1.        Improvement  of  IXt^^on.  421 

§  15.  Avery  fingular  and  early  Care  (hould  be  taken 
that  the  Voice  be  well  form'd  ;  that  our  Pronunciation  be 
dear,  and  conveniently  ftrong,  but  not  unbecomingly  loud  5 
that  Paufes  and  Cadencies  be  duly  obferv'd,  that  is  naturally 
and  agreeably  to  what  Men  generally  ufe  in  their  common 
Converfation ;  as  alfo  that  Accents  be  rightly  plac'd,  and 
the  Emphalis  laid  where  indeed  it  lies,  according  to  the  true 
Senfe  andDefign  of  the  Matter. 

Our  Gefture  and  Behaviour  muft  be  no  ways  Uncouth  or 
Odd,  nor  yet  too  Formal  and  Starch'd  ;  but  Natural,  Eafie, 
and  Becoming. 

§  1 6.  For  the  better  fecuring  fuch  Points  as  thefe  (which  tha' 
they  feem  little  in  themfeh  es,  yet  may  be  very  great  in  their 
ConfequenceSy  it  is  plainly  requifite,  not  only  to  attend  with 
Care  to  fuch  particular  Rules  as  may  be  given  about  them, 
but  that  we  Ihould  befpeak  the  ftri6t  (Dbfervation  of  fome  pru- 
dent and  faithful  Monitor,  efpecially  upon  our  firft  fetting 
out,  and  for  fome  time  after. 

§  17.  As  to  what  we  wou'd  publifh  to  the  World,  it 
fhould  generally  be  fomething  uncommon,  and  well  ftudy'd, 
according  to  that  Memorative  Line,  which  is  the  laft  but 
one  in  the  Table  of  Inference«,  C.  14.  §  24.  p.  307,  and  the 
Explication  given  of  it,  C.  16.  §  29.  p.  320.  Difcourfes  that 
are  fuch,  in  feme  Meafure,  feem  to  be  in  a  fort  due  to  Man- 
kind, or  to  our  Country. 

The  Argument  of  which  wc  Writre,  and  the  Manner  of 
treating  it  (hould  be  agreeable  to  rhe  Genius  of  the  Age,  as 
far  as  well  may  be  ;  yet  not  without  iome  prudent  Endea- 
vour, where  there  is  great  and  manifeft  Occation,  foftly  and 
infenfibly  to  carry  Men  into  juftei  Sentiments,  and  a  better 
Difpofiiion  ;  not  oppofing  our  felves  too  dirediy  to  general 
.  Mifapprehenfton,  but  rather  ufing  all  the  innocent  and  fafe 
Compliance,  which  may  enable  us  more  eafily  and  effectual- 
ly to  collect  it,  tho'  by  flow  Degrees. 

The  more  material  Subftantives  may  be  begun,  according 
to  the  Modern  way,  with  Capital  Letters,  and  alfo  the  moft 
confiderablc  Ad'edtives,  but  Verbs  with  fmall;  unlefs  in 
fome  peculiar  Cafe :  The  Change  of  the  Chara(5ler  into" 
tvbat  is  altogether  CAPITAL,  or  to  Italic]^,  or  from  this 
to  Roman,  or  into  <Engl!(h,  is  to  be  fparingly  us'd,  that  fo 
it  may  be  moreoblerv'd  when  'tis  emplby'd  to  mark  cut  feme 
Principal,  or  very  Material,  or  diftinCtive  Words,  or  a  more 
important  Emphalis. 


1?.  A 


422 An  hffay  for  the  Part  J II. 

§  1 8.  A  free  and  eafie  way  of  Writing  is  juftly  to  be 
endeavour'd ;  a  moderate  Stay  is  commonly  to  be  made  up- 
on what  is  obrervable,  that  the  Reader  may  more  certainly, 
as  well  as  eafily,  take  the  Tho't,  and  that  it  may  be  more 
deeply  regarded,  and  more  firmly  retain'd :  But  we  are 
not  ordinarily  to  hang  very  long  upon  a  Point ;  rather  it 
fliould  fo  be  treated,  that  the  Mind  may  leave  it,  or  even 
immediately  return  upon  it,  with  an  Appetite;  and  that 
what  is  offer'd  to  it,  may  be  like  to  put  the  Readers  Tho'ts 
in  Motion,  and  carry  them  yet  a  good  way  farther  in  the 
frefent  Matter.  In  Ihort,  the  more  immediate  Tho'ts  ought 
to  be  fmoothly  and  eafily  convev'd,  without  Shock  or  Trou- 
ble to  the  Mind,  and  yet  Ihould  not  be  barren  or  empty, 
but  pregnant  with  Senfe,  and  leading  to  farther  Notions  re- 
lating to  the  Point  in  hand. 

§  1 9.  The  Particulars  v(7e  deliver  upon  ariy  more  Gene- 
ral Head  Ihould  rather  be  well  chofen,  than  numerous ;  biit 
yet  fome  Choice  is  to  be  ofF(^r'dj  and  this  is  to  be  done  in 
Writing,  rather  than  in  Speaking  ;  fince  the  Reader  eafily 
may  Ctho'  the  Hearer  cannot)  either  wholly  pafs,  or  flightly 
run  oyerj  what  he  cares  not  to  concern  himfelf  withal:  And 
it  has  been  with  this  Confideration,  that  divers  things  have 
bsen  put  into  this  Eflay,  which  fome  might  be  incapable  of; 
as  alfo  what  others  would  not  need  ;  together  with  fome 
Things,  which  fome  may  perhaps  defpife,  or  difrelifh  :  Yet 
fureiy  that  Gueft  would  not  be  over-civil  10  himfelf,  but 
guilty  of  intolerable  Rudenefs  to  every  Body  eife,  who 
Ihould  find  fault  with  the  Variety  of  Difhes  at  a  Feaft, 
where  a  numerous  Gjmpany  were  to  be  entertain  d,  befides 
himfelf. 

The  World  (hould  be  very  fparingly  troubled  with  Con- 
troverfial  Appeals ;  but  efpecially  with  the  Perfonal  and 
Private  Matters,  that  are  too  commonly  drawn  in  upon  fuch 
Occafions. 

§.  20.  Where  the  Sentiments  and  Affairs  of  others  are 
undertaken  to  be  rfeprefented  and  tranfaded  for  them,  or 
that  they  have  at  leaft  a  common  Concern  in  the  Matter  of 
a  Difcourfe,  it  feems  to  be  a  piece  of  Juftice,  and  is  certain- 
ly a  point  of  Prudence,  that  before  it  be  publilh'd  it  fhoulcf 
be  communicated  to  fome  fit  PerfoDS,  who  are  fo  concern- 
ed in  it,  if  there  be  not  fome  peculiar  Reafon  to  the  con" 
trarv. 


Chap.  3  T .       Improvement  of  Realon.  42  5 

And  in  raoft  Cafes  it  is  altogether  fit  we  (hould  purfue  that 
excellent  Advice  given  by  the  Poet, 


'Si  quid  tamen  dim 


Scrifferu^  in  Mctii  defcendat  JudicK  aures, 

£t  Patrtf^  &NoJiraf:  Konumqifrematur  in  annum-. 

lAemhrnms  imh  fofitts  delere  licebit 

f^odnon  ediderii :  Nefcit  Vox  mijfn  reverti, 

which  may  be  thus  Paraphras'd, 

Let  fome  juft  Critic k,  what  you  "Write  Survey, 
And  Friends  well  pick'd :  To  publifli  long  delay : 
The  private  Copy  ftill  admits  your  Pen,  *) 

As  you  fee  Caufc,  to  change,  da(h  out,  put  in  :  > 

But  what's  once  got  abroad  knows  no  way  back  agen  ) 

§  21 .  Things  that  arc  Difficult,  efpecially  when  they  are  like- 
wife  of  Moment,  Ihould  not  be  offer'd  to  the  Publidc  in  the 
way  of  pofitivc  Determination,  but  rather  in  ^/^j^^  of  Enquiry 
and  Attempt,  with  the  Ufe  of  proper  Methods  for  engag- 
ing friendly  Remarks  to  be  privately  tranfmitted  to  us,  in 
order  to  fuch  Amendments  and  Improvements,  as  we  may 
fee  fit ;  which  we  are  to  promife,  if  there  be  Occafion  and 
Opportunity,  in  the  way  of  Supplemental  Obfervations , 
for  the  Accomodation  of  thofe  who  fhall  have  the  Treatife  it 
felf,  as  publilh'd  at  prefent. 

It  may  fometimes  be  proper  and  convenient  to  fignifie  to 
the  World  beforehand,  that  we  fhall  be  ready  to  welcome 
any  farther  Light,  which  may  be  offered,  tho"  it  fhould  be  in 
the  way  of  Publick  Animadverfion  ;  and  even  publickly  to 
acknowledge  any  confiderable  Miftake,  we  can  come  to  fee  ; 
if  we  have  a  fit  Opportunity,  and  can  apprehend  it  like  to 
do  more  Good  than  Hurt,  upon  the  whole  Account :  And  in 
fome  Cafes  it  may  be  prudent  to  add,  that  we  fhall  not  think 
fit  to  trouble  the  World,  or  our  felves  with  Anfwering  to 
what  may  appear  evidently  Captious  or  Trivial,  if  any  thing 
of  that  Nature  Ihould  be  pubUlh'd  in  Oppofition  to  what  we 
have  advanc'd. 

§  Z2.  And  now,  to  fhut  up  all,  that  None  may  be  lofl  of 
bewilder'd  in  fo  great  a  Variety  of  Matter,  or  of  the  Sug- 
geftions  ofTer'd,  thro'  this  whole  EJfay^  to  fo  many  feveral 
Points  and  Purpofes,  it  is  earneftly  recommended  to  the 
Reader,  that  he  ftiould  carefully  iingle  out,  from  time  to 
time,  as  his  Circum  dances  and  Occalions  may  require,  fuch 
Qbfervationb  and  Inftnu^ions,  as  may  be  to  him  of  greater 

Necelfity 


"I m^^^^mi^ 

424  An  Effay  for  the  Part  1 1 1 . 

Ncceflity  or  Service  than  the  reft ;  taking  all  fit  ways  t6 
make  chem  as  far  as  poilible  his  own,  and  that  he  may  hattf 
them  continually  at  hand  for  Ufe :  Always  rcmembring, 
that  a  few  Notions  well  improved,  and  fome  few  cenain 
Rules,  duly  apply'd  and  heedfuUy  obferv'd,  are  much  to  be 
prefer  d  to  a  far  greater  Number,  even  tho'  we  (hould  fup- 
pofe  them  alfo  better,  lying  by  him  unregarded  and  neg- 
leaed. 


T>Ei  Gratia, 
T>Eo  Gloria. 


LIGHT 

FR.OM   GOD   FLOWS  3 
MAY  IT  TO 

GOD 

ASCEND: 

H  IS 
GRACEy  THE  AUTHOR5 

AND  His  PKAISE, 

THE  End. 


an  Ode,  withaut  Phhru. 

Under  th' Aufpicious  KfiiGA'of  ANNE  the moft Serene, 

The  Glorious  Trophies  of  Her  Conquering  Arms, 

And  Influential  Beams, 

HONOUR  AND  SAFEGUARD 

Are  the  humble  Pray 'r,  and  Hope 

Of  this  new  Logical  Essay, 

^Which,  after  GOD,  is  Sacred  to  HER  Majcfty ; 

To  REASON  yet  fubmitting  with  all  juft  DEVOIR, 

To  be  by  THAT  Corred, 

Whofe  Voice  DJVINE,  with  GOD's,  commands  the  QjJEENj 
By  which  alone  the  QjLJEEN  do's,  under  HE AV'N,  command. 

This  PVE^K  ATTEMPT,  but  for  GI{_EAT  REASQN's  AID, 

Where  'tis  fubfervient  to  that  POWER  OPP/<ESS'D, 

May  it  not  meet  A  FBpPFN  from  HER,  who  is 

TH'  ETER^NAL  KBASO^'s  AfP'FVL  SUBSTITUTE; 

I(EDEBMING  WISDOM'sFoi.LowER,STILL  THE  SAME- 

A  Woman,  who  with  more  than  Manly  Reasom  a<3s ; 

GREATERthan  HAvGffrr  Lewis  flil'dTHE  GREAT  : 

REASONS  of  State  at  Home,  ^nd  Europei  Grand  AFFAIRS 

"Who  doihfo  joftly  Arbitrate: 

To  REASON  gainft  all  TYiiANNOVS  INSULTS 

rh'  INVINCIBLE  PROTECTRESS  T 

TheBand,Head,  Soul  of  UNION,  REASOKs  great  RefokJ 

Bleffing,  with  Forreign  STATES  and  PO^E!{S, 

Her  KINGDOMS  of  our  Fortunate  BRITISH  Ifle, 

Which,  at  Hei"  Call,  and  by  Her  Condud.  now 

Are  fully  Joyn'd  at  laft,  and  grow  entirely  One  ;  ^ 

For  REASONSgreat  and  good  ELIZABETH  E{EVIV'0^ 

/   Crown'd  with  yet  larger  Ppwer  ar^d  more  Succefs, 

Her  Reign  and  Vh-rues  more  Correct  (Surprizing  Prodigy!) ,[ 

Henccby /ILL  HERS,  whoni  REASON  guides,  WOOi^'O  ,-4 

All  Dutiful  Regard  She  to  her  F^TH£i<_  bore. 

Yet  more  to  HEAV'N,  and  Reason  not.UNiusT  to  FAITH; 

DEFENDER  OF  THE  FAITH  byi  REASON  Justifyd  : 

ASISTElRWonhyof  j^e.IiteBIpftPAlR,     -, 

Wirh  REASON'S  Fuli;fee  VOTE 

Filling  the  THRONE',  from  w^iich TKey  to  a  HIGHER rofe  . 

WILLI  A  M  and  MARY  both  VUITED  ar?  in  ANNE^     ' 

Who  moKthan  EMULATES  the  dtORlES  of  tHeir  Reigu- 


:.fub  ANNi^^  ^ERENISS IMJE  Anf^iciis, 

■  /!  Lauris  ejus  Vidricibm, 

Vuluiiq;  iimul  Propitio, 
DECUS  ET  TUTAMEN 
Supplex  petit,  fperacque 

TeNTAMEN   hoc  LOGICUM, 

;  /fi  'EJUS  Majefiati,  port  DEUM,  Sacrum ; 
.JllOydU  71  ,   Se  tatncn  caftigandum  . 

Subjiciens  (quo  ^ai-  left'Obfequio)  RATIONI, 
jMHHLr )  Qu«,  cum  DEG,  fola  imperat  REGlN^ ; 
•hotrnxnc-Qua,  fub  DEO,  fola  fuis  imperat  REGINA. 

,ai  A  ^  ^'^Opufculam  hoc  R ATIONI  Subfldia  ferens, 

jQ'iii  •    Qpatenus  eidem  non  fuerit  abfohumi 

t  '  •  ■ '  Ne  dedignetur  : 

;  3TIMPERATRIX  JEVfTE^JE  RATIONIS  VrCARIA  ; 

SEMPER  EADEM  sos?ir/n:oTQs  AOXOli  iMn/}ri{ix. 

i  •  - "  Fcctnini  R ATTOl^E  pollens  plufqviam  yirili ; 
:  TAa:^^LuD'oric6  M^gnolong^  MAJOR--://',/.^. 
RATHSPsUM  int^r  Brttannos  Civilium,'  et-EuROP/E  fimdl, 
AKBliKk'}EQ;UlSSIM^_;  " y  ,•    ;^  ,  -  • 
<"  R^tlONIS  tontra^^'jf.yrannldem  oranigenam 

PKOPUGNATHi^C  IhTIcflsh'MA-f^  ^L:. .., - 
t^ft)NIS,  cum  RATIONE;  Vinculum,  Capujc,  ^nlma, 
.■  >  •       Non  Exteris'taiitiim  Gentibu^^  r  y,i  -,  H 
,-j[\l  H<5tiin  et  Suis  BRIT/\NNIi£"R^egDis,  j;^  i.V/ 
7/0.1    -  Ejus  Moiia  ac  Dudu  .  ..•'•■   ,• 

TrrUnamperutusConlblidatis,  et  Coalefcentibujs:   •    ' 
ALTEB^  A  tandem, 'RatiohiJDus  ben^  mulcis,  ELIZA  BETHA- 

-    ;  Regno  autera  et  Vldoriis  Auctior, 

ImoVirtutib'us  et  Rcgimine^''quis  nonftupcat?)  Emendatior, 

Hinc  Subditis,  RATIONE  fana  utentibus,  Antiq^^ior  habita  ; 

PATRIS  ut  maxim^  Amans,  atque  Audiens, 

<  -Ma^s  tamen  DEI,  et  BIationis  Fidei  non  diffonae  ;    -  d 

FIDEIQTTE  exindeRATIONIconfonae  DEFENSOR  : 

GULIELMO  et  MARIA  Soror  DIGNISSIMA, 
AcEORUJ^pEM,  fumtnacum  Ratione,5UCCESSOR  ; 
.  ~^niidtiiJ?iCum  fit  UNA  Utriusque      ^.>. 
'  -Plufquam  iEMUL AtRIX  FelicifTima. 


;:)flT 


AN 

APPENDIX. 


'HAT  has  been  ofTer'd  fomcwhat  more  largely 
aboVft  things,  as  the  Objeds  of  Tho't,  in  the  2d, 
34j  4th,  and  3  th  Chapters  of  the  Firft  Part  of  the 
foregoing  Effay,  is  here  moft  contradly  deliver'd  in  the  fol- 
lowing Meafur'd  Lines  ;  which  ('tis  hop'd)  may  be  eafily  ap- 
prehended, after  the  Pefufal  of  the  larger  Account  in  Profe, 
or  at  leaft,  upon  a  more  immediate  Confulting  of  the  Places' 
here  refer'd  to,  in  the  Margin :  And  'tis  not  doubted,  but 
the  following  Hints  may  fuffice  for  the  calling  over  a  much 
larger  Inventory  of  Things  and  Notions, than  was  attempted 
07  defisn'4  ui  ^^  ipencioned  Chapters^ 

Some  peculiar  Branches  and  Parts  of  the  Summary  here 
fubjoin' d,  may  be  committed  to  Memory,  particularly, 
tha/c  about  the  H^aj/s  ef  Thinking,  together  with  the  Set  of  En- 
^uiriesy  and  Five  or  Six  Lines  about  S/j/m/,  BodietsLnd  Com- 
founds  I  to  which  fuch  other  Paragraphs  may  be  farther  ad- 
ded, as  any  oi?e  fhall  conceive  to  be  of  greateft  Ufa  to  Him- 
fe^.  But  by  9  frequent  Review  the  Whole  may  be  made 
Familiar,  ihQ'  no  part  of  it  Ihould  be  charg'd  upon  Me- 
mory. 

It  will  however,  in  this  inoft  contraded  Formi  lie  fome- 
what  readier  to  be  usM  upon  Occafion,  as  is  diredted  in  the 
'A|)ftr^  it  fel^  which  naay  be  had  by  it  felf  alone,  if  fome 
Ihpttlddefire  to  Jiave  it  always  at  hand,  as  a  prompcuary: 
Andipi  the  like  purpofe  the  Memprative-Lines  about  Mid- 
dle Terms^  .^i^Ji^trtnui frehc^e. fubjoined  to  it. 


Fr  The 


Appendix. 

Chap.  II.  Sedion 
*T~  HE  lefs  ^nd  greater  PP'orld  in  Miniature,  ^    2 

>.  "*     Thit  to  it J:lf\  nnd  this  more  fufy  to  Enure  ;  ?    5 

ylnd  to  that  C  E\^TEIidMV,  xvhere  it/hallHESTfecure.) 

/^L^/^ Thoughts  themfelves,and'Thing's,as  in  tbofe  Draughts  4. 

^^  M'itlduprejented,  are  the  QbjsFIs  cf  our  "Thought  ri       y  5,6 

That  voe'then  tbhil^  and  What,  voe  then  well  knoxv  :  '.[        ^       7 

ylnd^  often^  can I{epeati  hut  areleffSutr,  mor'e Slov^"*-     -^-        8 

In   what's  Locfc,  Nice,   Confus'd,  Long,    Minded  lefs  ;  9 

Kot  late,  or  oft,  Call'd  o*er  ;  in  Age,  what  is  more  frefh:. 

Writing  fuppUcs    imprints,  prompts  Memory  ;,..  ^, 

So  R^fereyjce,  Tcl(ens,Vfe,'  Place  ',  or  a  clos'd',fix'a^$ye'K 

■  HOM^,  ami  OE'  M^HAT  h^enthin\,  we  here  woufd fh)) 

C€tf]pn:^e,  ContraR,  SeleFf,  Difpcfel  dni  Treat  ibciH^Jo  j 

That  we  tnay  Lodge,  I\eview,'^eCiire'pur  StOTt*  ;'[■['''■  .If^'f-^?/!'^- 

Z->fc  Heads,  T^aihs,  (^ueries^  Hints,  heie^ivn,  in^ie0  '^'^^4^  ''- 

rii  Ways  f>f  Thot  to  th\$,  or  thzt^.pply;       '■   '• '  "  ^■''^-  '';')';  "^^'t 

Its    K'H  ^ort^,  noted  M^t^i,''Par'ts,  ^ehtives  defcrtfj;'y-  '^''^ 

Uk:y  VnlikeyOatrfe.  EffeBs-  and 'ivha^ 'Inks  h^  my^!^'  -'''^ 
.     "  l^.o  j;rTiiiRi  -^:  1.^!  .- "  ;  :1     ■,  .,:  .  .:  !  '  :>«;  wolbt  out 

H'efrme-vihiy- v^\nd , :  and  al^preheJTd:,  whilfl'  ivt  ■  " '['-  -' ;' ■' ■  V'-  I4.'  ' 
PEliCEJVE  what Senfe  convefs Cfcel,tafte', fmell,  ft<f^,<>r4fce,'  I «$ '-' 
By  proper  O^gavs,  Nerves,  and  Spirits  tf^erel^-^  '  , 
Orhy  lllieinward  Motions,  ^iffo^ii-yiKrf,-'''  i  "rwlu^aq  srriofU^ 
JM.^G/N£'[r€prefent,  coneeit,- feign,  drtatrt]  i-  '•  .'^'fii'''Ui  ^ 
Or  properly  CONCEIVE  fmthitelkHual  T/jfw^,-..'^'''  truodn^o^'T 
Nof  o/y«e/j'kind^  •o>'  «of  determin-dTojJ — '^  'ij'  ^'^;'^  hrin  V'^*»"\V 
^j  fAyf  »j///?  altvfiys'be,  whidh  Senfe  or  Phanjie 'p}OVi>-(  *~'^  >  ...-•'."."•i\ 
rf^///r  Mind''«i«4ncorporeaI  Tifei>^J,  andGtrierilkpp'^i^:^'  'l'-^'-^ 
iVmt  Siafh;^F^cHrrs,  Follows,  or  Eliei  w,  feenis  .  •  '■'^  .18.!^ 
C lift  in,  Imprefs' d*,  Withdraven^'vr ,  ai'intommon  />y>ii»i>^- ^ ''"'''• '^ 
-Owing  to  cafuni  Motions  in  the  Brain,  •  [^  '''^ 

5o  predifpos''d:  hut  Tho'ts  are,  by  US,  for  the  main  lO 

Form'd,  Tii>hiljt>^e  rooje,  glance,  p>orf^' turn,  fc an ^  <fef^fFi'|  ■•■>'  ""- 
Kar.onlyfmplymew,  but  onthofe  WAdws  refieii  ^     i-;;i!  .,  V^';'"'^ 
I{efer,  compnrc,<abftraB,  nanie^  Jign,  diijoin,  coniieB\'  -'jr^io  - 
Dijhngulfk,  '  Fix;  D^fcribei;   Definie,  Divide ;  :'•'     **;' 

Statc,SEE,Hcld,Arnj,Deett},Guffs,Dduht,Argue,Pf^eigh,beeidflll'^ 
Sujpend;  Stand,' Cktnge;  Oh/eh,  Solve,  Slight  ^  -^pph  '         M 
Believe,  Confent,  Depend  I  Miflrufi,  Diffent -,  Aim,Eie.       25 
.   3udge,  I{ate ;  Will,  Nil! ;  Lik^e,  Diflike  ;  F/z>,  IVlJh  ;  F^4r,  26 
Hfl/'f  ;  Tiuft,  defpair  j  Jo;,  Grieve  ;  Defign,  Adhere  ^  xS 


PiVO* 


Appendix. 

•  <''.-^i  .III  .'•£;;«"■  Chap.  II.  Seilion 

fity^Envy;  Chnrge^  Ac<]uit'^  jipprovf,   Admire} 
J?refag^^  R^<a(\  Prop0und^  Scek^  FJnd  ;  Pinfur^  I{ctire  ; 
Sufpofcj  Infer  ;  Mifi^tke^  raid -to  Take  right.  Enquire, 
^  (       Xkii.  ^^fiy  rvith  diver i  others,  :mny  be  done  \ 

By  fVordsj  and  fame  hx  AQiiins  ;  not  in  Thp't  Alone  :    '  . 

M-^hnt  farther  may  employ  w^  here  youl.  fee^ 

Either  SnTermf  difiin^^  or  by  Synonymic  j 
In  G^niraJs  couched,  or  Spsci/illy,  drawn  forth  ' 

Some  briery  Op'ned,  aief^r^^ter  No/f,  Vfe^  fVorth. 

I  ,  jCt->  Ttvs^  ,  Ghap.  III.  Sedlon 

SPlI(rrSrs>e!l  know  they  Tfjinkfare  P leas' d,  Pain'd,  Move:  1^3 
Scripture,  andvehnt  they  do,  their  btiug,  SoilS^Getdws prove. 
BODIES  how  Felt,  their  Tafie,_  Smell,  Sound jShew^  U^hi,  4^5, 6 
Shnpe^Si:{e,Hue,'Texture,Pores  j  Parts ?novd,faJ}Joqfe  ;  Garb,Site. 
COMPQVNDS  of  hothior  one,  how  made^  unmade :  "j     1 

All  Beings  thefe  Kjnds  compri:^e,  whofe  Sorts  are  here  ejfaid  jS     8 
Their  Chief  Parfs^  JV^^r/;/,  Appendagfes  togetljer  laid:         } 

ThePf^orkspf  Natur^^  Creaturci,  Providence  ■: 
Humane  Affair s^    Emjuirjes,  Points  of  Eminence 
Here  follow,  with  Aim  givn^  whatmay  be  drawn  out  hence. 
Bodies,  -ai  are  their  euh^d  Diameters,    ,  /,■  9 

rAnd  Di fiance  Scjuar^d    (but  here  the  greatenjefs  infers) 
Tend  to  each  other,  taught  by  SkJU  Divine  j 

Whence  the  H^orlds  parts  each  k^ep  their  place,  Orb,  Motion,  Line. 
What  HEAVNS ;  WHO  there ;  Stars  greater,  lgfs,confus'd,  i  o 
ZJnform'd,  or  formed  in  Sets,    with  various  Names  long  us^d, 
Feignd  Shapes,  and  Powr^s  ;  chiefly  the  twelve  kiiown  Signs, 
How  with  the  reft  gone  flowly  back^:  Poles ^  Orbs,  Points,  Lines.  1 1 
Conceiv'd,  as  what  the  Stars  and  Planets  /how, 
Woilfi  they  are  feen  ?iow  here,  now  there  ;  Jome  high,  feme  low : 
Tet  daily  on  the  fame  South-Line  appear,  y 

Near  the  fame  Time  and  Plyce,  as  lafi  before  they  were^     > 
*    And  each,  at  their  fet  Periods,  in  the  fame  Point  there,     j 
Twelve  Moons,  eleven  Days,  five  Hours,  one  fifth 
The  Sun  requires:  The  MOON,  when^tvJ,do's  mofiiy  fhift     i% 
To  let  his  Beams  pafs  by  ;  when  Full,  i evade 
Her  own  Ecclipfe  from  Earth^s  prcjccied,  threat''ning  Shade:  .-  • 
Fcur^  Wc'el{s,  and  thrice  twelve  Hctirs,  with  three  fourths  n^ore 
I{cpcat  her  Varying  Forms  all  over,  di  before. 

(jiit  Saturn,  hcrw  with  tivc  he  rounds  the  Skje,  ...      ')  1 5 

Jove  with  four  Guards ;  and  how  Mars,  Venus,    Mercury.  > 
ComQcs{rareSigljts}rvhat,h:)W  viad:,movd,whcnie, whither  w    )  i  4 

Ft  1 


Appendix. 

^^        I     i.i.    ■■■  -         ■     ■,.-  ,^.  ,       ,     ,.,„     ,  .    ..,,,    -     ■■    ^    Mii..,.i  I    I  ^ 

'  Chap.  m.  Scaion 

<.   ^ther,  aidgrejfer  AIK^',  what  in  this  flies,  li 

tVith  Plutnes,  or  Skjnny  M^ing :  Fogs,  Mlfts^  and  Steam  that  rifi, 
ForcdupiyHetit,    condensed  in  Clouds -ly  Cold    '        'r 
(Driv*n  by  thin  d  Air,  vehich  (hoots  in  Winds ^thdt'Jhifi  Vthold)^ 
Full  fraught  fomettmes  with  Nitrvw  Particles,      ; 
iVhence  Sulphur^  byfomeJmeirtColiifionfird,  expetts 
Fierce  Light' nings^  with  loud  Thunders  rolling  Voice  ^ 
But  oft'ner  Clouds' comprefs'd,   o^rchnrgd,    without  fuch  'Noif^, 
Dijfolve  tonkin-  which,  freezing,  falls  in  SnoWf 
Bt^  Drops  in  Hail;  Hoar-frofi  from  dewy  Mijis  may  grow. 
■    Hew  ftio6ti|ig  Stars  kindle^  run  on,  expire  ;  iC 

Pf^th  falling'^  wdndring  Lights,  and  other,  til{e,  lii^t'^r(l-^\  ^■ 
Whence^  their  Sulphureottf,  or  Oily  'Steams. 
fJow  Light's  refleHed, inter mix*di  refraHed  Beamsl 
Onlcie  Air  above,  and  Dewie  f{tiin, 
P/j/wf  Halos,  Rain-bows,  andnewSunf,  cr  Mooiit  do  feign* 

Pffhether  oUr  EAT(TH  be  like  4  Ball,  or  Bowl,  1 7 

PPhich  round  its  conftant  ^a;w,  and  the  Sun  doth  roU; 
lyhofe  Turn  to  Him  makes  Day,  on  from  Him  Night  ; 

H^i If} yearly  She  furrcunds  that  central  fixed  Light, 

In  a  vfsji  Curve  j  which  yet,  to  Stars  on  high, 

f^ujl  be  but  di  a  Point,  or  Earth  HeavnsPole  muji  fly. 

Pf^j^r  Climes,  what  longeft  Day,  whatSeai,  what  Lands,    18 
Known  or  unknown;  wh/it  Hills,  Plains,  Poirtts,Bays,B^cks,orSands  j 
J  Iks,  Contineut :     How  Europe,  Afia, 
■Ho^  parched  ATcick  lies,  andhowAmtncz  ! 
WK>ilt  Parts  each  ha>,  how  bounded,  how  far  Wide 
0£i\i  E.(\uiv\o€i\:i\-\mc,  its  North  or  Southern  Side  ^ 
H^nnt  Longitude  of  this  Meridinn-line, 
Counting  due  Eeifl^  from  that,  which  th'  Azores  definel 

How  SEA,  next  under,  to  the  Moon  inclin'd,  l^ 

While  that  jujl  Oppofite,  more  dijiant,  lags  behind. 
Twice  in  five  times  five  Hours  do's,  both  ways,  rife  ; 
Springs  high'r,  when  Sol  to  th''  New,  or  Full  draws  not  crofs'WiJe^' 
As  in  Neap-Tides,  but  in  one  Line;  fill  high'r,  ^ 

When  He's  en  Wintei's  Brinks,  near  th'  Equinoxes,  nigher^     > 
An.ifo  with  Full  end  New  more  frongly  do's  ccnfpire  ;  j 

Bat  fmksths  Quarters  jnore;     Pafl  Southing  Moon, 
(At  Midnight,  when  foe's  count  cd  Full;  when  New,  at  Noon) 
Three  Hours  to  London-Bridge  High-Wnfer  brings. 
Three  Quarters  later  fill  each  Day;  but  various  Tilings 
Alter  elf  where  the  Tide,  and  here  Jcm:times  ; 
W'jich  varies  yet  far  more  in  feme  far-d'Jiant  Climes. 

What 


il 


Chap.  III.  Sedfioh 
iV)  Fat  f  by  Po/^'O'j^f  OTff,  ao 

for  cyey  Ljcuvrjt^anii  *u  c^vf  uvi^jui*^    V9p(tt'Tfl[0YC       ' 

Lakes  J^vexs,Bri^gesyLa7id,BathfSynw^^ 

Wbatelfe  of  Anctent'NqtejtftntcrtArhe  I  .' 

IVhat  Sorts  oJFi^and  FowJ,  %afis^-  InfcHf,  B^pfjies^  Game  :  ' 
f0iat*i  ratty  JirAnge^  nice,  which  this  or  thtit  Plate  owns, 
tVhat  GTSlin,Sjbr«.^j,TreeJ,Fruits,  Ueths^Drugs^nerals^QXAWy 
Bovt  they  agrecy  how  differ y  what  their  Vfe  ;         , '  ■ '  -1  -     [Stones, 
litm  valuQ,  got^  afpl/dy  improvjd^  with  what  traiiici* 

Plants,  Animals,  of  this  and  that  degree^    .,  -  r/ ',;,  • '.     .  .,.^ 
How  Organi:(d,  what  diffrence^  what Analogiei"  ■  .      ■'  ' 
^ot^ HeadjTninlt^  Limbs '; 'Leap'^i'.i^f2d^ Sj^ivs  •  'Fihr'esy  ^rves  ; 
^fify  ChyJeJSeei^pruit  j  'Bud^^'Bkdh'/r^.gs,  Emhios^Co'ais  -.what 
Tdtal^fy  'fit,jirn rfly  fajs.  ^ood^  Ait, "^^uices,  Blood  ;   .'       /.  [jervn 
TVfnch  Veins' to  th^  Heart  returhyWrb  ^rtyic}  driiwri\  Ba(i,(j6od5 
As  Birth^ Air^  Food^  I^ejiy  Motionyl^htiught may  caufe ^    ■     .  . 
SkJI/yFdilure',  Aifcidents,  fyJixt'Mechr.nick.Laviis: 
flejh,  Bones  Jcints, Gnrds,  Ties,  Mufcles^  Brain ;  where^whence^ 
Wh'ntferv'es  tli'c  Humane  Soul  i'^  ^eAs'ning^  Motion,  Scnfe  ; 
yyhich  GOD  may  l^oxvj  enjoys'  its.  chiefs  Jure  Excellence. 

^'  ■      '  '^^"'\**^        Chap.lV.  Sedtipn. 

The'Wotks  o^Crtzinres,  dHjfrm  Nature  tak^e  I, 

Their  Matter,  otily  give  feme. differing  Turn,  or  Mak^^i 
iVhilfi  they  JO' K,feparate,  force  ^  nOr  barely  try. 
But  Ailivesy  \vith  EffeEi^  to  Pajjivej  da  apply. 
Hence  H^ax,  Combs j  Honey,  Silk-,  TVeh^  Burroughs  Nejl : 
Ciothes,Glafs^'Pilcs,Furniture;Fields,Gardens,Trees^Food,drcJl;Z 
"MttchirteS,-  Bddkj,  Msd^cines,  Tnjiruments ;  by  Art, 
Or  fame  ftrange\n*^in€t  form' d:^  which  Nature  doth  impart. 
Here  Thought,  Help,  Matter^  Labour ^  Cojl  requi)  'd  ^ 

Weigh  wiih'fiie'Cr edit.  Service,  Profit  thence  cirfir'd  ;  > 

"HovfYiH^ttobd  obtain'd  I  what  Ballance,  j/ «:ci;7z//rV.        j 

Beings  Made,  Sujlain'd,  Redeem'd,  "L-W,  i^«/V,  Born  (lill,  2 
By  the  moji  Pow'rfut,  gocd,  W:fe,JuJ},  fixt^  Sov' reign  WiJl. 
Strang?  Workj,  wl)oJe  Kjnd,  Sup:rior  Force,  Djign  4 

Speak^them  true  Miracles,  nnd  Proofs  of  Truth  Divine. 
T^atue  invertfrl,    c>-,   its  C-^urfe  maintain  d  ; 


GOD^s  re/ill 'Word  fulfill'd,  /V/j'  Heav'ns,/Iir,  l^Vatcr^  Ltnd -, 
Lil(e  from  its  Like  by  Sad,  Graft,  Slip,  Eg^s  laid,  retain  d. 
Lots,  tbac  are  Sacred,  Civil,  Ludicrous  ;  < 

l^'hat  elfe  fure  Caufes  has,  tho  itjeem  Chan:e  tj  us. 

F  f  3  Tht 


^^pjBsadix. 


T&e  Rife,  Turns,  Falls  of  Per/qn'Sf' Families^  • 


Sacred^  or  Civil  bodies,  ForinSyiitnd  Po'ltiieSf  '■ . : '  i' '     ,  > 

l!iyvfMfii,fnore obvious ^ennSfyrfpiddeh  Energies^       '.^V 

ff^/.'i^lJ}'^od  rejirnins,  renem'jJmop^^^^ 

At  Helm  fo  over-rule,  rphai  Iflljey/Qll -pexmix.^  i    : 

T/'^  Humbled  ^rf>T.f,  f/jc  Harclch'(i'2'oiPj,  or  l>re.al(sjl[^   .    -^-^ 

f^1jt}(i'Earth-juakc,  Storyn,  Fire^Swo^d^ Plague,Dhifhju^.Angeii: 

\/lD'AM  rvith  £1%  hox^  made;  Je%cd,fmd,fell,    "  6'lJpea/{sl 

By  Fruit  fprbid^ii,  iv//yj  THEIR^^a  frey  to  Sin,  Death,  Hell^  ' 

Tet  thro'  the  SEED  foreHiewrt  ','h'ruitd^  7'ais'd;  -they  nfay   '   '      "^ 

Be^frecd,  advanc'd  at  la/}.^in  Gpd^s^/ippoititedTpny..    , 

Hdw  thohii  Word  and  SV7l(tr  fal/e  DeUjci''.'r^'\^    ,      % 

Lofijlxir  Adoj-ers-,  hove}:JU)^dL^^  .'       ,C'V''' '.\''  "'^^ 

Plnijh*dj  gave  voay  to  Chriftiao  Lighti  which  fprehdy;  \  .'i    i    ■  "^  T 

ylndfiaS prevail i  hovo  CHI^ISTjh/tlljudiethe'QJdick^iindDeddfy 

piSolvQthff  fVorld.CiQV/DSairtfSy  and CtiA'thcGuSUt^eadX 

Tf1jat'jM&ti\CmEF  GOOD ;  Health,  Stores,  Friends,  tjonor^ 
Ple^fmes  of  Phanfe,  Scnfc,  Mind ,  Virtue,  or  all  thefe  ?     8  .  ^Efife^ 
God's  Favour  hove  Jecurdi  which  ivillfecure     ■'./    ''.  1  "^  _  ^ 
ff^'j.rtt^s  good  for' uf,  nor  only  help  Ills  well  t'cndur'e^      ,  Vv- 
But  turn  the  [pl'fi  to  Beft,  and  make  what's  Better  fure,^ 
Judg(nent-^<Hi>/o?7wV,  thnt  it  may  rightly  lend,  g 

'WiUfollow  ready  •  both  by  falViGns  Oe  obcy'd. 
How  Goodnefs  counts  .u  Good,  what  is  Sincere;  '  ^ 

Tho't  cant,  ai  throughly  fuch,  the  Eie  ofjujiice  bear  j  • .  * 

M'^hilft  aught  u  wanting,  or  Jll-Join*d  thereto^ 
However  tnanag'd  elfe  ;  whateer  be/ides  ipe  do, 

IVhatMEAK  true  Prudence  Jhews,from  what  attends^      i  o  ' 
Leads,  Follows;  P e> foil s, Things;  what  beft  ma)  reach  beji  Ends. 
How  kept  in  A3ing  ;  while  there's  no  Excefs, 
In  real'  Vii  tue,  more  than  in  true  Happinefs. 
A  jujl  and  therefore  Moderate  Eftimate  .  n'i 

Of  Men  andThings  :  A  duCythehce  humble^  modeft  I{ate  -—.  S- 
Ofoitr  own  ?arti,Grace,ABs,  Acquirctnems,  Biirh,  Name,  State.} 
Pfl:at  Thought,  Prayer^  Conduti,  Company'i  like  to  ma^e  1 1 

C'JT.tcfited,  Frugal,  Tcjnperate,  Chajic,  Fix'd,  H-^e II- Awake, 

biduflrio^:.  Patient,  Bold,  Brave,  Pious,  Kjnd,  • J>   .  .  ■^'■ 

Meek,  Cotntecw,  Pnithful,  Tue;  a  large,  impartial  Mind,  Sij' 
To  wi-  at's  Fit,  Grateful,  Free,  Juf,  Merciful,  EncJiii'd.       ) 

G.  d's,  Natuies,  L./rF^ of  Naticrt;,  [{ealm,  Timc,Placeyi^l 

Hla:  w  if  ten-  of  i.nwrit  J\ul.s,  Cufoms ;  in  t^hat  Cafe  : 


Appendix. 

,      ,    *■      ...     Chap.  IV.  SeaiQtt 
What*f  Bidi  Forhidi  T/i,  P/fiw/,  (^rM,  Ben^fj  ;  ,   X4 

'Cou/jSi  TermSyCMufe,  Par  tie/.  Proof,  Oathsy  Bills,  Pleas,  Anfvfert, 
Forms ;  Covmnts.  m^s.  Gifts ^  Delft ^  Securities ;  [PVrih} 

Condemns. 

Who  cluim],  htiie^ferve,  in  what  Sort,  Station,  or  Degree  ; 
Hoxf  mzde,  their  Namss^Markj,  PVcrk,,  E^fpencc, Suffoxt^ Pm\ 
jLeaigues,  Treaties,  Embajfies,  Peace,  Trflffcli  r  Arhi's,      iy  VFe/i, 
Mep-iC6in^Stofes,Sons,Cam}S,ShifS,Fight,Stegc,p^tU^ 

Dealings /4/r,  fguf,falfe -,  bought,  Jlldycha'ng' dare  ay:"  ''yi^ 
TitjJ},  Vf6,kettirns^  Notes-,  Difcouilt  i /«^f , '^flw,  rf <i^  P^^V/'l' 
Bound  j  Time  fervdj gtvp '^  F/ee,hifd;f3.i^dL,  let-forTear.f; 
tTr  Lives jHaru'ots,!^i7icf,IicntiVtee-holditaid 
^3iTeSfW/}oldale_/l{eta!c  -^  Bad,  Gofd^BrJ^^'^^^  j      -ipX 

0yight-,Meafure,,T/iil)StdcksjomdyA(^:^^^^ 
&r.jn,  Ha:{aid,  Lojs  i  Efi/uiV,  Stockrjoh.^  CcVi^oi^d,Tbrbear^'y 

.  Chap.  y.  S^aion 
•"PVhat''s  Taught,  and  Leatnc,  ly  th'  by,  or  folcnmly.y  "  "^  i 
By  Pattern,  P)?.th'cel  ^ule-,  Alone,  in  Company : 
To  I^eadj  Write,  Count,  Met£,  Sail,  Wcik^,  Trade,  Sing,  Play, 
Ty'ahce,  Pence,  I{ide ;  Games, Tongues,  Sci'qnces^dlnd  Arts  ytbcy^^ 
VfTenchitig,  Reading,  Noting^  Stud^,Prayj,[\'^/i^''':\fr'^, 
'Piftcurfc,  Dijputc,  Behaviow^  P^oicc,  Self-C'cndii^'i  CiJit\_^'^ 
tif  State,  Churchy  A I  rny,  Kavy,  Corr.f  any',  )        '/•."'   ""J" 

Thfs  c^  tint  Special  Bujmejs,  Perfon,  Family;  >  -':  ';'.l  J-^j^^ 
Thedijfering  Pvz<2i\ctih  Law,  Phyficky  Surgery,\^  .*\  vn^^j  wil 
Ty^d  Skill,  Care,  Faithfulnefs  do  ivlen  ccmmendi '■  '  ;  VV^VvT 
But  feme,  oi  yet  lejs  us  d,  can  ayid  will  bej}  attend.  ''  '"' ''  .,. 
hV^^SEI{  andMEAi>viE  joinM  with  Notes  high,  lowi. .  | 
In  fit,^  hajlo  Parts;  Aiis  fiat,  Jharf,  Jcft -,  Time,  Jwift^prj^fiWi 
AppJy'd  to  T.yne,  Weighty  Motion,  [wict  drives,  draws,  '"\'  r^- 
StiJ.s,guidcs,tnkcs  (jf,iui  nssFoice^Vbir.gi  mc'idJf'V^ygivcitslu^^ 

To  Sight,  bur,,  Sta,:,,  b.als.  Lend,  Sea;  to  di'u'd  -^ —''i'' 

Ivlaci  i7n s,  Foi is,  Buiui.  h^i ,  to  wir.t  elj-c  [n .Ore,  lelsj  aj^iii  :  > 
Al  ftradcd,  n kn  i  a,c  Cc:,7,t,  oi  Mcajufe  we  rejpea,  '■'.      ) 4 

K^r.a,   Note,  Ju  fur.H,    r.dd,    muttip/j)^   divii.t,  ■        '  ^  "  ' 
Lo.e:,  Fl^incs,  boo.iiS,  S.ji..  ui,LUi.^,  ^■(.ts,w^n.  I{arict  {ry'd 


/.  ..y{  j  CEapT.  Sedion 

fWJ'lPar^  Vulgar,  D^Q^^  ^, ^    ^^^. ^  ^,^^^ 


'jTw/^ff  taken,  SquaiisjfJsrWjCubes  ^  ha^v^^^ihirie^^^fiii'iefi^j:^ 
But  Gftter^l  jPtf»)?fi.Gedirietry  rnuji  Jhowy  '  '   .  - "    '  y"  'i 

As  tiey  ffom' Axioms,  Cr/tnts,  and  Defimtms  flo^{'-  ;'-:^''^*^'^3"^J 
O/- Algebra,  which  Tp'ith  Marias  for  Tcrtnf  unknown,  •^r-r^y'^^,^ 
Sf4tfis,  equates,  Suhjlhutes^pygrks^tics^j^fohs,  o»/% Vj  .  "^ 
'JSt^wh^t  wai  fought  m^^hfifromSmexohat  'e^uafjhmkl  J^'^.^r, 

'  'f$^itT6i)i(jifiU(p^4tPf^ords^howus''^^  their  Acci^yrih)Ao^ 
'Bov(rSprun^^Char^d,'^pc\e^  Wrot^Turr^dyWhat  anciWhaf  ](lii^  ^ 
0«ff,  or  wjorff  Sentences,  diJiinH,  pntirCy  ([Scnfc :  li 

Setf-evidentygrantedyprovdf  or  fuch  Hi  proof  require, 
^eor/,  /ewg;  i/tf?-)^,  c/ffiir ;  loofe^  clofe\  falfe,  true  j  WMJt,  W/T?"} 
Jn  -proper,  lit'ral  Terms,  or  Figurative  Difguife :  '       ., 

T^e  Parts  (mVjb  Points,  Marias ^  Nuinbers)i  which  refer,  ".'  ''H 
As  ^ejfiofi,  Anfwer,  Cafe  put,  what  jhould  draw,  deter ; 

Pjrqof,  I{eflfon,  Inference,  Opening,  Similie  •, ^ 

Ifijat  other  Si^ns  of  Tbo'i  ;  what  fort,  and  what  the  Key  j>  1 3 
ihw  fought  for  Emhlemyihort'handy  or  Cryptographic,    j 

'J ''"The  fottowing  ^EBJES  make,  if  need  require,  14 

On  Themes  pajs'd  oer,  or  where  jou  farther  Light  dcfire. 

Whether,  Who^  TJ'hat,  iVdch,  U^ere,  ff  1)enct,TVhitf}er,  P0rfy 
When,  Bow-long, Bow ;  By  fVfjom, VJ^oat  T^ arrant,  I{ight,  PVhercby, 
l^itb  Whom,  what  County  ?owers,Bent,I{ef,Change;B^lation,  Ty  , 
How  cau/d,  held,  nuITd,  fail'd,  anfwer'd  i  what,  and  how  1 5 
Done,  f aid,  born^had,  rcfe'd:  iVhat  Bahits  once,  what  now, 
Of  Virtue,  Vice,  or  SkJH,  Mind,  Tvfigue,  Feet,  Bandj 
How  come  by,  l^pt,  advanc'd,  or  leffened,  loft,  regain  d? 

iVtiat  leads,  attends,  hai,  dos,  K  like  t'enfue,  1 6 

Or  mujl,  or  maj  atleafi :  iVoat'sCommon,  B^re,  Old,  Nei»i 
VVith  Nature,  or  bcjide,  againft,  above  ; 
How  Judgment  jlands,  how  "Will  inclines,  and  Paffions  move\ 
JVnat  pleafes,  grieves,  offends ;  wherein,  and  whence ; 
HotO  remedy d,  how  endurd,  and  what  the  ^ccompence ; 

Amongft  all  theft,  Thotfhould  he  mainly  bent  17 

On  Points,  that  are  more  Needful,  Ufeful,  Excellent. 


In 


Appendix. 

Chap.V.  Sedioa 
In  rthais bur  Bufinefs  vith  the  Chief  to  Vy :  —  ■_  1 9"^ 

To  )^MP»  hov)  Plants, Brute8,Mcnr;ye,/jvff,f/^»'oe,  change J/iil^Dy:  V 
Phantwns }/o»MV,/fff <ir<ijr<ftS0uUjFiV«<//,Angdsj^/je w»o/2  HIGif,  I . 
Thr€C-One;  their  Naure^  differing  State,  Capacity ,     ■  y 

^ork^  Jims,  Concern  with  us  :  from  fure  Theology,  I 

ylnd  tight  pivine  to  draw  the  beft  Difcovery,         -    r  j- 

Whac  SPJHJT,  FA1TH,C0VR^E  lead  up  toreigneterxially.J 

To  fill  th'  Account,  look,  what  each  Point  implies;  '       i|[ 
H^at  borders 'j  fronts  i  prTfidyJrom  one,  orrmrt  arife, 
0/:Fiftions,  fanher  Notions,  <?»•  Realities^.  ^;.'-  ' 

The  Table  of  MIDDLE  TERMS,  or  Heads  of  Argih 
ment,  which  hasjome  brief  Notes  added  to  it^ 
P.m.  Chap.  II.  §  8,^.  Page  1284. 


N 


The  STJBJECTlby  theft  MI0.DXE.TER.MS 

by  xh^^.  \    claims  or  difclaims  the  P  R  E  D  I C  A  T  E  ; 

Mei^ipf  che  Qu^pn^s^hrs^^i  Mf  lets  convenient  Stated- 
Meafure,  apply'd,  containing}  Tale,  Weight,  Principlei 
'nftancc,  what  may  or  muft  be,  (hews,  in  the  like  Cafe.' 
Indn.dicn  proves'the  Whole  from  all  Softs,  Cafes,  Parts.' 
Oisjundtion  fays  'tis  r^wf  i  iince  'tis  not  fo^  nor  fo.'  -  u, 
Diftirftioncleara^icr  gua^s  by  ftiewing'^J^ointshoIdJ 
Dedu(5tions  rightly  Made  from  tincontefted  Grounds.— 
Demands,  wmch  fai-ly  claim*  that  this  or -that  befo.— 
Larger  proves  Lefs  j  Like  Attributes,  Things  yo//«r  Like.' 
Lawgiver?,  <3rdtd&t*d  by  fit  Authority.  >■ 

Explained  Words,  or  Things,  which  tothePcnnt  relate. 
Terms  of  each  Artarefix'd,  and  proved  bj  their  Art. 
Teftification  by  Sufficient  Evidence.         '  — ' 
Expenenee,  "What  to  tfe-,^  oi*  others  hath  '^ctor'd.-— — 
Experiment  well  made,  and  warily  apply'd. 


Claitt**,  or  1  ;itclaims) 
the  PREDICATE. 


Reafon  of  Things  the  lame,  or  feme  way  Differing.— — 
Keladonlhewsirs  Ground  This,  that ;  Rule,  what  is  right. 
Mem'ry,  when  found,  alTures  what  clearly  it  retains. 
Memorials  prove  the  very  Fadts,  or  Somewhat  like.— — . 
Senfe  ■■,  what  we'r  Confcions  of,  or  certainly  Perceive. 
Suppofal;  whence  is  drawn  what  touches  the  Debate. 


§  ii.  In- 


A.ppendiic. 


j  thy: proceed^  zohich  arc  explained  m  the  ^'dPdrr  Jot 
1 0e  iJWej^ping  Effay,  in^  /^  Chapters  i7>iri^^S^|H 
<  crns-herd  rej^r^d  to.         " "  ■';  ?        '        : '  c'-^tO-oj-i-.i' 


.•■»..-v\V\  n-^  ./    _.,',  ,  Chap. i ^.  ,"SeHio4 
J.  /^ Infer rph/t(^'Y^dllaypJ}^ii^.ti^■e:P^1ttts  impdu.. ,  ';     \\"ir 

I- "^ ' ■  \ Irivehetf  T eriUs,  '.a  niirknt bdfcrr'e^  volUhoU,    - " ^ '  -^'  ^^ 
JlncXuA^A  from  Inclusive  foHQvpsjlght.  .  .  .    .;  4 

J  Iiiiply'd  /^o)>;  rvhnt  imp|ieS  KllpfdrAm?,  ;'",?'  5 
:/^Iihpofltbre//"''6ra  Inconfilfenci,  .  ;•  '  . ^[_'. . -^'"; ..^  6 
^IncIifl'^'Hjfn  ^/r,  at;  ?'/^lf/r>«/^7w  ittttr/einaihes.''       7 

•Not  /w/f'-j  No—:  Nothing,  ^sill  Negatives. 8 

I'Name^  Notion,  Nature  jfho'wld'td^et'her^di^''^  ^  *-  '''  -^ 
\'i>ioj2itioXi  ppmSf  fixes ncc-^  the Scnie.  •  .  '.'"  .inSC'lo 
..Narr^rtions,  -not  Sifpeious^,  ^oixifpr  ,Ti!ue.,S 

F       Form /«/>>- J  Matter;  Both, /^/.'^  T-Zw^ /^  Form'd.     11 
^FounJatiohs  ^)  w/j^M^uilt  thereon  appear  >'   '  '   rs| 
<    '/Itjaf,  -^fvobat  Sort,  a}idfimethncsvph/:iy^he)i-arx^  ■ 

EfSedAejCcb  other,  as  before,  refped,     • /jr,;,  t|!  15 
•,  f^^/i}?-LUi€  Change  do'j.^f^ch  of  them  ^^ff,c  j  ^-j. 
Efficients,  Powers,  A(Sts .'«««' Effects  declj^e.'-.   ri-  ^j  \ 
.;  )]s>r  p»«ly  thaii,  />/(;/  whax;f/?e)'  wfrf,  a>^  -^juir/v ; j     ,1 
JEfliicienciy^  not  bfirrd:^  A/i  Like  EfFe<its.:.  ,^,^,.(^1     I't 

VJip^%^,whntagreesuntoitspQp'ep'^yi\e,.,\n':j-  ]\  I 
R'E^atqd  ^/j/«^i  »«/lfr  ^/je/r  Relativesr  :'':'■  'I 
Apd  neither  S^ide^  as  fuch,  fi<jl  »,  or  /ow^«r  litues. ,  ■ 
Refemblance  ^r^ttw,  w^f''fff/j^Rea,fonW^j.  j,  10 
Ratios  in  various  wayi  Right  Points  infer, ,    . ,       i    zt 

Chap.  1 6.  Seiiliori 

Ends  have  or  feem  to  have  an  Excellence.  l- 

\  Expedient]  vohat  well  nnfvpers  a  Good  End.  Z 
Effed:\ia]2  "cvhat  nought  can,  or  do's  objiruc}. 

'Equiih  juji  fit -^  and  have,  as  fuch,  the/am;.  5 
txceeding]  ^'<«,  as  fuch,  Jome  greater  Claim, 

Necefllry's  from  Nature ,  Will,  not  fore  d  •,  4,5, 

'^^c\\ix2L\jOt7ietlmeSy  and  abfolutely^iCf.,  o, 

)      l^c^  jn-JHy,  but  fomctimcs  by  mere  V.^QtSi\.^>  'fi% 

Kecdk{s]  what  7?iay  as  xvill  be  Ut  alofK'.  9 

Never  i?trc's  a  full  Eternity.  ^  ^  j 

§14.  Con- 


c 

E 


S 


Appendix. 

Chap.  1 6.  Seftion 

Concrete  with  AbftraA ;  Conjugates  r.grre.  1 1 

Contradi£torious  Turns  chnnge  Fal/e  with  True.  I  x 

Contrarious  1 /j/w^^,  asfuch^  Contraries  c/<jiw.  13 

Confcience  muft  be  comply'd  with,  orconvinc'd.  14 

EverJ  a  long  full  Time,  orJlriB  Eternity.  1 5 

I  Exiftence  argues  EfTence  cert/iinly ;  lo 

Confiftence  thence,  hence  Poflibility, 

Eflfentials >w/iJ^ff  to  be,  or  to  be  fuch.  17 

Examples  teach^  vedrn,  lead,  convince^  excite.  iS 

'So  All,  what  one,  as  fuch.  Adjun(fls  and  Modes  19 

Subjedis  and  Subftance  fuitable  itifer ;  20 

Subfiftence  r/jzj-,  completed,  har.  Modes,  A<5ls  21 

Suppofitum  {_fo  Reas'ning,  Perfon]]  claims.  zz 

Streams  ef  them/elves  rife  not  above  their  Spring.  1  j 

Such  in  it  felf  more  fuch.     No  Like,  the  Same.  24 

Similitudes  infer  but  what's  their  Scope.  25 

Signs  have  the  Senfe,  which  they,  who  ufe  them,  fix.  26 

Superior  Names  include  Subordinate  :  27 

Subordinate  Natures  all  Superiour/o/w.  28 

Study'd]  weS  fearch'd,  fct,  fuited,  (hon'ned  well.  29 

SuflGicient]  f^ott^^  »ot  need,  or  has  Supply.  3  o 


FINIS. 


ti 


0  ,(!:■•.•;  '.'•,<  :rr: 03  od  finm 


,5'T'iT  lltii 


["t>'." 


or 


r*   n?  ' 


Vi  i  A 


Ibl  3i  ax  ?^  Q-nl  S  .a  ,cr  -acmi 


1  A  ^-  ... 

'.-7    o    .-vl 


10  4^n&n 


j    .fuLI  i'  .G  ,rc£. 
b.j'lrJj:  »^p  a  ^Xf-2  -!•:  j.^  /A   ,ob  fs.  .0 

ir'I'jnbocO  :r  /A  ,'b?«£:l 
ii:i:-hiPA  ftF.  c.:  .'A .;--rl     [y   . 

,et  v7on  bi  G  ,Tr- j  T  noqj 

'..;.    .     -Ypi.G  , 


.<! 


I  t^f*  i^z 


The  more  confjderahle  Miftakes,  r^htch  have  been  ehfervii, 
may  be  thus  CorreEled^ 


In  the  Introduc2:ion, 

^  I .  Line  1 1  r,  form  ab- 
ftrad 

P-  ii  Difttince  zi  Scheme 
In  the  Eflay, 

Puge.  a,  £>.  3  to  a  very 

3 ,  /).  1 2, 1 9  Thinking  of 
D.i6infirm  D.i7themj 

«),  D.  23  Think  ; 
,  » ,v~-  9?  ^-  ^^  retain,  in 
D.  25  helpful, 

I  o,  D.  37  Feeling  unufual 

n ,  £>.  5  more  or  lef* 
D.  6  perfedly, 
Z).6Prefent; 
D.  36  times,  injedied, 
c/t/?  ;w,  or  ftirred 

14,  D.  3  Point,  if  D.  4 
ft  and,  or 

i5,D.  23  do,  D.  34  re- 
maining, 

19,0,40,41  Sunhasnot 
left  Pifces^  when 
Jirikcout  is  enter'd 
upon  Taurus, 
--  «  20,  D.  19  Years  (the 
'  ^  21,  D.  28,  29  Vapours, 


12  ? 

18  ^ 

22  I 

a6^ 


^8  ^ 
32. 

33 -c 

34-^ 
35  2 


t:^ 


becoming 

firil{e  out    and  thind 
24,  D.   II    be  not  all 
31,  D.3can,  D.  iSthefe 
34,  D.  4, 5  Jury,  a  Ma- 
jority  of  which 
dnjhout    of  17,11 
^r  s"     D.  22  Legiflators 
!?  2  43.  D,  7  of  Will 
3^  ^48,D.  II  differing 
30  J,49, 0-  I  p  intervening  : 
=*^  ^  58,0.45  Difference 

5  9, 0. 3  Subftantiality  it 
felf; 

61,  D.  44  inward 

62,  D.8  C  omprifal  D.  1 3 
Coincidence  Dijl.  16 
joining  D.  24  Qoih 

63,0. 42  divided 


40  >: 

41  § 
41  S 
43  I 

46  :? 


67,  Dijiance^i  individuating 

72,  D.  6  In-  D  28  in  it  felf 

73,  D.  43  objeded 

74,  D'  44  emitted 

79,  D.  37  Capacity  D.  39  refcr- 
90,  D.  2 S  Curve,  ([ring 

1 34,  D.  32  Quantitative 
'39»  ^«  32  Sovereign 
143,  D.  ■i'^re^d  (li) 
181,  D.  2,  3  Repetition 
185,0.  14  hereupon  conceive 

Great 
i^'iyD.  1 2  Heaven  J 
1 96, 0-  1 1  Subjed  is  not,  or  is 
198,  O.  2,  3  incidental^    with 

which  O.  5,  6  Predicates 

the  former  being  a 
2oi,  O.  2o  frotenfivb 
2o2,  D.  14  Identity, 
232,  D.  36  abfurd 
237, 0.  39  Cafe  is 
250,  D.  34  tho'  it  was 
256,  D.  23Goodnef$ 
263,  D.  39  an  Artificial 
277,  O  16  now  is, 
284,  line  J  'tis  not  yj, 

line  %o  knorPy  what 
288,  Dift,  3 1 ,  32  of,  and  the 

O.  37  apout  Future  and 
294,  O.  41  lengthening 
303,  O.  16  be  the  fame 
3 1 3, 0.  38,  39  Similitudes 
327,  O.  44  Scandalous 
338, 0. 10,  II  orif  we  were     | 

363,  O.  9  abfolute  D.  27  our 
Clcathing 

364.  O.  1 3  Memento 
368,  O.  30  Now  who  can 

0. 3 1  he  could  even 
395,  O.  20,  2t  PataphraCii§ 
3  97, 0. 24    ( fomewhac 
400,  O  46,  47  improve 
403,  D  22, 23  eftimated 
404, 0.  3, 4  endangering 
406,  O.  36  whither 
409,  D.  29  only  refer 


*^  ^-  ?  ^,0. 2C5^c.  tho'  rather  )  410,0. 15  Gaib 


-,*>.V=^';i 


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