The ethical philosophy of Sidgwick; nine essays, critical and expository

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THE

ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY OF SIDGWICK

NINE ESSAYS, CRITICAL AND EXPOSITORY

F. H. HAYWARD, M.A., B.Sc. (Lond.), B.A. (Cantab.)

FELLOW OF THE COLLEGE OF PRECEPTORS

lS\TV

. OF ...^

LONDON

SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., LTD,

PATERNOSTER SQUARE, E.C,

1901

^Offfif

SOME HINTS TO THE STUDENT COM-
MENCING THE METHODS OF ETHICS.

The following dissertation was written by the
author when an " Advanced Student '* in the
University of Cambridge, and was accepted by the
University in June, 1901, as an "original contri-
bution to learning ". It was, therefore, in no
sense written for the elementary student of ethics.
There is, however, some ground for believing that
it may prove of assistance to such a student, and
with this object, among others, in view, it has been
published in book form.

The neophyte in ethics generally avoids the
Methodic for t he_ j^or k h as.^a- ., .hqL. _ undeserved
reputation for ...difficulty. Even those students
who have the temerity to commence its serious
perusal often become rapidly discouraged and fly
to text-books of a more popular type. The
reasons for this are not hard to find, and some
of them will be referred to at greater length in
the course of the dissertation. Briefly it may be
pointed out that among_lh£ chief -^diflirulties of
the Methods are its length : its avoidance of clap-

109323

VI HINTS TO STUDENTS.

trap rhetoric and of vivid and popular illustrations
(poetic and other) ; the absence of any strenuous
advocacy of some plausible constructive theory,
such as the elementary student impatiently de-
mands— in short, its unpartisan character (mistaken
by the superficial reader for colourlessness) ; lastly
the fact that some of the earliest chapters are by
no means the easiest, so that the student finds
himself overwhelmed with difficult problems from
the very first. The result is that m.any_rsaid£r^
never get beyond the first half-hundred pages-.

I Such a comparative neglect of a truly great
work like the Methods of Ethics is little short of
a philosophical disaster. The writer has had before
now to look over the papers of elementary students
of ethics. They contain much cheap and hackneyed
criticism of Mill, and much half-digested idealistic
dogma, but they show surprisingly little conscious-
ness of the real difficulties of the subject. The
present writer has no little sympathy with idealism,
and with the many excellent manuals which have
issued during the last decade from that school of
thought — so far as he has any ethical views at all
they are of an idealistic complexion. Nevertheless

, he avows his belief that there is no idealistic work
in existence which will bear comparison with the
non-idealistic Methods as a propaedeutic to the sub-
ject of ethics. In ethics, as perhaps in theology,

HINTS TO STUDENTS. Vll

a Jbap^ism of scepticism is an e^ and essential

initiation into its mysteries and problems, and the
individual who has escaped this initiation can never
expect to do more than play with the subject.
Hence in the interests of sound thinking all ethical
students should be urged to grapple with the
Methods^ well assured that they will spend their
time more profitably than by digesting a dozen
inferior works.

How should the student set about his task ?
He should perhaps begin with the first chapter
of the Methods^ for this contains some very im-
portant introductory matter. Thus in the very
first paragraph we find Sidgwick defending the
independence of ethics agam^ those. jy.hp, wo
reduce the"ouerht" to an " is." a naturalistic

school of writers whose influence is great and
perhaps increasing. In the same chapter we have
a clear statement of the three important ethical
methods which he proposes to examine, and a

•7 I characteristic avowal that all three are prima facie

4 j rational^

^ ' The next two chapters may be omitted on a first
reading ; chapter iii. is, as a matter of fact, im-
portant, but somewhat difficult for the beginner.
I ts_bjH;den isj h^^ " jQught .V .

Chapter iv. is extremely valuable. In it Sidg-
wick refutes psychological hedonismj this refu-

Vlll HINTS TO STUDENTS.

tation was really necessary for the establishment
of his own doctrine of ethical hedonism. If we
" ought " to seek happiness for self or othe_rs_
(ethical hedonism) it is implied that we do not
always do so. Chapter iv. should thus on no
account be overlooked.

The remaining chapters in the first book may
perhaps be omitted on a first reading.

The discussion of the common virtues in book
iii. may now be read by the student. The viil:::^
gar_dieoiy_of_moral obligation is a crude kind of
intuitionisjn; there are, it is supposed^a number of
distinct virtues^ justice, benevolence, veracity, etc.,
which men ought to practise. Sidgwick's discussion
of this " common sense " doctrine is admitted by
all critics to be extremely able, to be, in fact, the
most irrefutable part of his book. The student
may well spend much time over this discussion
(book iii., ch. iii.-x.). He will thus come to see
the weakness of popular intuitiqnis^^ and the
necessity for a sounder ethical theory. Chapter
xi^ book iii., is an admirable summary of this
attack by Sidgwick upon " common sense ".

It should, of course, be remembered (see preface

.to second edition, p. x.) that his criticism is not

directed against the practice of benevolence, courage,

etc., but only against the view that vulgar intui-

jtionism is adequate and satisfactory as a scientific

HINTS TO STUDENTS. tx

j ethical theory. " Common sense " is a valuable
guide, but it is not always infallible, nor yet is it
always even clear and consistent.

The student may now turn to the chapters on
egoism (book ii.). On the break-down of " com-
mon sense " men sometimes fly to egoism, for this
commends itself^ as simple^ and^consistent. Sidg-
wick examines this system on its merits ; finds
that it involves many practical difficulties, but
refuses to deny it a place in ethics. The last
chapter of this second book is valuable but diffi-
cult ; in it Sidgwick shows that evolutionary
science has not been able to remove the practical
d^fficulties^which surround egoism, and, mdeed,
hedonism generally. In other words he shows
that the boasted attempts of " scientific " writers
to come to the rescue of hedonism are not really
successful.

Perhaps the student had better now turn to the

JgLSj_book„ (an exposition of utilitarianism^ gr_ he
may, if he choose, grapple with the two central
chapters of the Methods^ chapters xiii^_and xiv.
of the third book. These two chapters repre-
sent Sidgwick's own views, and, togetHS^ wiBi
the concluding chapter of the fourth book, should
be studied with great care. The chapters on
utilitarianism (book iv., ch. i.-v.) are full of good,
but not specially striking, matter.

X HINTS TO STUDENTS.

Having followed some such order as that indi-
cated above, the student may now well begin again
at the first chapter and go through the whole work
systematically. If at any point he loses the drift
of the argument, a reference to the table of contents
at the beginning of the volume may afford some
help. But superficial reading will never suffice to
a grasp of the significance of Sidgwick's highly
balanced arguments. The book must be studied
again and again before its astonishing merits become
fully apparent. Unless this is done, the student
will inevitably be disappointed, and will crave for
a different kind of diet. The lesson which Sidg-
wick has to teach us is the difficult lesson of
openness of mind, of freedom from dogmatism :
— the lesson referred to by a recent able writer on
theological subjects when he says : " Some of the
qualities of Grote's work, impartiality, candour,
the determination neither to exaggerate nor to
undervalue have marked more recent philosophic
work at Cambridge ".^ The student must go to
Sidgwick, not for a mass of facts, but to acquire
a spirit, to learn a method, to distinguish sound
reasoning from unsound, to know " processes '*
rather than " results ".^

^ Exploratio Evangelica. Dr. Gardner. Preface.
'^Methods, p. 14.

HINTS TO STUDENTS. xi

The prefaces to Sidgwick's book, especially per-
haps the last, are instructive reading.

With respect to the following dissertation, the
writer is tempted to follow the admirable example
of Mr. Leslie Stephen {Science of Ethics, preface)
and obviate objections and criticisms by the "ex-
plicit and perfectly sincere admission'* that there n
is perhaps not a " single original thought in it
from beginning to end ".

Still, the task itself is in large measure an original
one, for scarcely any one.has. yet,, at tempted— to.
assess Sidgwick's ethical system as a whole, though
Mr. Bradley's spirited pamphlet is an approxima-
tion to such an assessment, and numerous isolated
criticisms, favourable or unfavourable, have ap-
peared in philosophical journals. In the opinion
of such competent critics as have passed judgment
upon the dissertation itself, its most valuable por-
tions (the word " original " would be perhaps out
of place) are those headed " The Incorrigibility of
Egoism," and " The Three Maxims of Philosoph-
ical Intuitionism Critically Considered ". Most
of the other chapters contain matter which is per-
fectly familiar to all experienced readers of ethics,
though to the elementary student some of it may
be fresh. The summaries of the criticisms to
which the Method of Ethics has been exposed,
especially Mr. Bradley's, will perhaps be useful

n/

xn HINTS TO STUDENTS.

as indicating the nature of present-day ethical
controversies.

It may be useful to give here a^^rief. nummary
of the positive doctrines of the Methods. This
may help to prevent the elementary student losing
his way amid the multiplicity of details which
he will have to encounter. The summary is re-
produced with permission from an article entitled
" Constructive Elements in the Ethical Philosophy
of Sidgwick/' contributed by the writer to the
Ethical World of 15th December, 1900.
•^ A. — The existence of a moral faculty.

(i) No ethical system is able to dispense
with an " ought ". " Oughtness " or " right-
ness " is an " ultimate and unanalysable "

/notion, and may be regarded as equivalent
to " reasonableness." in conduct. Each indi-
vidual has some conception of what is " right "
or " reasonable " for him to do, of what he
" ought " to do ; even though he may only
recognise that he '* ought " to seek his own
happiness, or to act consistently.

(2) The fact that we judge an act to be
'* right" or " reasonable," or that we "ought"
to do it, supplies a motive for doing it.

^B. — The summiim honum.

(3) The only thing ultimately good is happi-
ness or pleasure (" desirable consciousness ").

HINTS TO STUDENTS. Mil

(4) This is capable of rough quantitative
measurement and estimation.

(5) The summum bonum is, therefore,
greatest happiness.

(6) There are, however, many other things
commonly judged to be " good " in them-
selves, such as truth, virtue, beauty, and the
objects of our common desires.

(7) But none of these ends can be justified
to our reason "in a cool hour ** except as
sources of pleasure or happiness. Even virtue
or excellence of character is ultimately valuable
only as a source of happiness or pleasure.

C. — Egoistic hedonism.

(8) One's own personal "pleasure" or
" happiness " is a reasonable end of action.
We " ought " to seek our " happiness or
pleasure on the whole " and, in so seeking,
ought to regard " hereafter " as equally im-
portant with " now " (Maxim of Prudence).

(9) As a matter of fact, however, men
do not always or even usually aim directly
at pleasure or happiness ; their impulses are
directed primarily towards concrete objects,
actions, and ends (see (6)). Frequently, in-
deed, such impulses are in the long run actually
infelicific in their results, and are almost
always far more powerful than they would

XIV HINTS TO STUDENTS.

be if directed merely towards the pleasure
which results from the realisation of their
objects.

(lo) On the other hand, if men were to
aim always, in a cool and calculating manner,
at pleasure, their success would not be great
(Paradox of Hedonism).

(i i) Hence, considering both (9) and (10),
egoism dictates that we should to a large
extent cultivate disinterested impulses towards
virtue, benevolent action, etc., but not allow
such impulses to become so absorbing as to
lessen our chances of happiness.

(12) Thus egoism, though bristling with
many practical difficulties, and being at best
only rough and inexact, is yet a reasonable
method of ethics.

D. — Universalistic hedonism (utilitarianism).

(13) Reaspn_di.ctates- that, if it is right
or reasonable to seek our own happiness,
it is equally right and reasonable to seek

>that of others (Maxim of Benevolence).
The Practical Reason is no respecter of
persons. Utilitarianism ultimately rests upon
this intuitive judgment of the Practical
Reason.
E. — Relation of egoistic to universalistic hedon-
ism.

HINTS TO STUDENTS. J A L i,f£^; - xv

(14) Though to aim at one's own "pleasure
on the whole " does not often conflict with
the aiming at the pleasure of others, yet there
is the possibility of conflict.

(15) This conflict would, however, vanish
if there were a Divine Providence, which had
so adjusted the universe that by aiming at
general happiness we should inevitably realise
our own.

(16) But it is outside the scope of ethics
to investigate this theological hypothesis.
Without such an hypothesis, however, there
can be no final reconciliation between duty
to self and duty to others.

The important constructive propositions in the
\above are obviously (i), (2), (3), (8), (13), and
1(15) ; these are of a purely ethical character ; the
remainder are mainly psychological statements of
actual facts of consciousness. Obviously, also,
there are several distinct strands of thought run-
ning through the whole ; the strand which appears
under A and D is rationalistic, almost idealistic ;
that under B and C is hedonistic ; while the
remarkable conclusion arrived at under E is theo-
logical and extra-ethical.

In concluding these introductory remarks the
writer wishes to thank Professor Sorley for

XVI HINTS TO STUDENTS.

numerous suggestions and occasional criticisms.
Some of these have been embodied in the text,
but the majority appear in the form of footnotes.
He has also to thank his friend, Mr. A. E. Marley,
of the University of Cambridge, for assistance of
various kinds.

PREFACE.

The Methods of Ethics has been justly acclaimed
by the almost unanimous voice of contemporary
moralists as a notable work. " Few books to a
like degree constrain us to clear and exact think-
ing " (Gizycki).^ " A great book " was the verdict
of both Bain and Edgeworth, while the former
virtually challenged critics to find in it a single
fallacy,'^ and the latter did not " presume to estimate
the almost inestimable benefits which it has conferred
upon philosophy ".^ Even critics of an opposite
school have denominated it a " philosophical
classic "."^

There has been only one emphatic demurrer to
this chorus of praise. Mr. Bradley, while " far

^ International Journal of Ethics, 1890, p. 120.
^Mind, 1876, p. 177.
3 Old and Nezv Methods of Ethics.
*Rev. H. Rashdall in Mind, 1885, p. 200.
b

xviii PREFACE.

from wishing to deny to it (the Methods of Ethics)
a certain value," has complained of its obscurity
and of the fallaciousness of many of its reasonings.^
In what follows, an attempt has been made to
expound, estimate and criticise some of the most
striking aspects of Sidgwick's ethical philosophy
as put forward in this notable book.

To attempt a commentary, chapter by chapter,
upon the Methods of Ethics^ would be a thankless
and useless task. Most of the third book requires
no commentary whatever ; by common consent its
^chapters are so lucid, and the conclusions they
embody are, for the most part, so indisputable,
that even to point out their merits would be to
gild refined gold. Chapters iii.-xi. of that book
represent views which, thanks largely to Sidgwick
himself, would be accepted by a great majority of
reflective moralists, though few could have assessed
the value of common-sense morality in a way so
admirably fair and sagacious. Much also of the
second and fourth books is fairly straightforward.

1 Mr. Sid^kk's Hedonism,

PREFACE. xk

Controversies^ however, rise in connection with
matters introduced (someti mes lightly) in the first
book, such, for example, as free will, the " ulti-
jTiateness " and " unanalysability " of the notion
of " right," and the relation of pleasure to desire.
Sidgwick's views on the ethical importance (or
rather unimportance) of the evolution doctrine
have also given rise to controversy. To these im-
portant matters some attention has been devoted,
either directly or in stating the criticisms of others.
But even these questions are eclipsed in interest by
those which centre round the two concluding
chapters of the third book ^ and the last chapter of
the fourth. Th£se are the " co^nstmc^^
of Sidgwick's work. On one crucial point (the
relation between egoism and utilitarianism) the
interpretation brought forward in the following
pages conflicts with the usual view of Sidgwick's
work, but every attempt has been made by study
of early editions and of Sidgwick's contributions,
to Mind^ to ensure that the interpretation put
forward is the true one. If the interpretation be
erroneous, an excuse can be pleaded in the words

3tx PREFACE.

of Mr. Selby-Bigge {Mind, 1890, p. 93). "Of
the Methods of Ethics it is especially hard to be
critical : its very virtues have made it peculiarly
difficult to grasp, or at least to judge ; there are
so many candid admissions, so many able and
eloquent statements of the other side, so little
suppression of material facts, that many readers
have professed respectful failure to entirely under-
stand the author's views." Or, in the words of
another writer's description of the Methods of
Ethics, " It is often difficult to say towards which
side the discussion is tending, while assertions are
commonly guarded with ' it seems,' or * upon the
whole,' or similar modifying phrase. A condensed
statement (of the argument of the Methods) is
not easily attempted " (Calderwood, Handbook of
Moral Philosophy, fourteenth edition, p. 343).

It should also be pointed out that the sections
which follow are not continuous. They are separate
discussions of certain leading features of Sidgwick's
thought ; hence the connections between them are
sometimes but slight, and there is, in addition, a

PREFACE. XIX

certain amount of repetition and overlapping. No
one, in fact, can be more conscious of the defective
arrangement of the chapters and sections than the
author himself.

F. H. H.

GONVILLE AND CaIUS CoLLEGE,

Cambridge, England, 1901.

NOTE.

The following incident, narrated to the writer by Mr.
Oscar Browning, is significant : "The first word of my
book," said Sidgwick, who had just completed the Methods, and
who was conversing with Mr. Browning, " is * Ethics,^ the last
word is * failure'". The word "failure" disappeared from
the second and succeeding editions of the Methods ; but there
is every reason to believe that Sidgwick felt to the last the
enormous difficulty of ethical construction, more particularly
the_difficulty of reconciling or subordinating egoism to a more
comprehensive system.

CONTENTS.

Hints to Students

PAGE

V

Preface

xvii

CHAPTER I.

Some Characteristics of the Methods of Ethics and of
Sidgwicks Philosophy generally ....

CHAPTER II.

Sidgwick's Predecessors
(i) Mill

(2) Kant .

(3) Butler .

CHAPTER III.

Ethics and Evolution

(i) Moral Intuitions

(2) Desire ....

(3) Pleasure and Pain .

(4) Hedonism and Pleasure

CHAPTER IV.

Sidgwick's Treatment of the Free-will Problem

17
18

32

52
53
60

68

72

77

(i) Benevolence

(2) Prudence or Rational Egoism

(3) Justice or Equity

(4) Concluding Remarks

CHAPTER VII.

PAGE

XXIV CONTENTS.

CHAPTER V.

The Incorrigibility of Egoism ..... g

CHAPTER VI.

The Three Maxims of Philosophical Intuitionism
Critically Considered .

109

no
121

137
H3

Sidgwick and the Idealists . . . . . .150

(i) Sidgwick and Green . . . .151

(2) Sidgwick and Bradley . . . . 183

(3) Sidgwick's attack on Idealism . . . 204

CHAPTER VIII.

The Summum Bonum . . . . . . .216

CHAPTER IX.

Conclusion . . . . . . . .233

CHAPTER X.

Sidgwick's Critics . . . . . . .256

Bibliography ........ 269

CHAPTER I.

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE METHODS OF
ETHICS AND OF SIDGWICK'S PHILOSOPHY
GENERALLY.

" The philosophic mind of the modern world is now at the
ebb, with its constructive impulses comparatively feeble " (Sidg-
wick, M/W, 1900, p. 10).

In one of the ablest of recent English works on
ethics ^ it is said that " nothing is more striking
at the present time than the convergence of the
main opposing ethical theories ".

^goism^_we are told, is dead. ; the traditional
English utilitarianism (transformed by the evolu-
tionary idea) and the Kantian rigorism (trans-
formed by later idealists) are now meeting on the
common ground of the organic nature of society.
If this be true — and a demonstration of its partial
truth will form an element in the following dis-
cussions^— the words of Sidgwick which head
this section must be regarded as peculiar and

^ Professor Alexander, Moral Order and Progress y p. 5,
2 See section, " Sidgwick and Green",
1

^

2 SIDGWICK'S PHILOSOPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS.

paradoxical. In the face of the elaborate attempts '|
at idealistic and evolutionary construction which
have been made during the last few decades, how
is it possible to affirm that the constructive impulses
of the modern world are now "comparatively
feeble".?

No doubt Sidgwick is referring mainly to
metaphysical construction ; his words are cer-
tainly not true, prima facie^ in any emphatic sense
of ethics. Since 1870 quite a dozen works have
appeared on the idealistic side, several, such as
those of Bradley and Green, of an epoch-making
character, and definitely " constructive " in spirit.
Darwin, Spencer, Clifford, Stephen, Alexander,
have appeared as ethical evolutionists, again with
" constructive '' intentions ; while eminent repre-
sentatives of intuitionism and utilitarianism have
also published important works. England, the
chosen land of moral philosophy, shows no signs
of having lost her interest in the subject, and the
interest is not merely critical.

When we turn to metaphysics proper, Sidg-
wick's words are, to a large extent, true. Interest
in ontology has waned ; philosophers, distrustful
of being able to penetrate to the absolute, busy
themselves mainly with criticism and epistemology.
In spirit, if not in methods, they approve of the
modest aim which Locke, Kant, and many another

SIDGWICK'S PHILOSOPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS. 3

philosopher have set before themselves, the aim of
investigating the nature and limits of knowledge
rather than the nature of reality.

And yet " constructive impulses " are not by
any means dead even in the sphere of metaphysics ;
the existence of such a work as Appearance and
Reality sufficiently demonstrates this fact. How
comes it, then, that Sidgwick, in the last year of
his life, could speak so disparagingly of contem-
porary efforts at construction }

The reason probably was that he had a pro«-.
found distrust of the success of such efforts. He
had weighed them in the balances and had, he
believed, found them wanting.^ Philosophically
his hand was against almost every man's. In
1882 he had inyeighed. against the " incohereuce
of empirical philosophy".'^ Others, his contem-
poraries of the idealistic school, were inveighing
against it too ; was Sidgwick then an idealist }

1 " More thoroughly than any other man known to me,"
said the late Mr. F. W. H. Myers, " Sidgwick had exhausted
one after another the traditional creeds, the accredited specula-
tions ; had followed out even to their effacement in the jungle
the advertised pathways to truth. Long years of pondering
had begotten in him a mood of mind alike rare and precious ;
a scepticism profound and far-reaching, which yet had never
curdled into indifference nor frozen into despair" ("Memoir
pf Sidgwick," Proceedings of tk Society for Psychical Research),

'^Mind, 1882, p. 533,

4 SIDGWICK'S PHILOSOPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS.

\ln scarcely any possible sense of that much-used
and much-abused word can he be said to have
/been so. His latest words were an exposure of
what he regarded as the weakness of .Gr^^
metaphysics.^ There was another powerful school
of thought to which h.^ might have belonged, that
of the evolutionists ; but it is certain that, though
admitting the importance of the evolutionary idea
in many fields, he denied that it threw any great
light upon the ultimate jgroblenis of knowledge
and morality.

Evolutionary construction, idealistic construc-
tion and empiricist construction, all, he felt,
' were built upon sand, or upon unexplained pre-
suppositions.

Was he, then, a " critical " philosopher in the
Kantian sense } No doubt the^mlical element in
his work is extraordinarily prominent. His eye
saw instantly the weak points in plausible and pre-
tentious arguments. Out of the hundred or more
sections of the Methods of Ethics^ a very large
number (beginning with his favourite particles
" but," " still," " nor ")are purely critical ; dogma
after dogma is brought on the scene only to be
examined and rejected. A spirit of keen criticism
pervades everything Sidgwick has written ; and yet
we cannot call him a " critical philosopher "in the

'^Mind^ 1 90 1, p. 18.

SIDGWICK'S PHILOSOPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS. 5

narrower sense, — a philosopher who looks to Kant
as the bringer of new and important speculative
tidings. Some of his ablest criticism was directed
against the "Critical Philosophy" itself, not merely,
be it observed, against its details, but against its
fundamental principle that the criticism of know-
led^e mustjrecede full assurance of knowledge.
He protested against the Kantian " suspension of all
metaphysicians from their occupations until they
had shown the possibility of metaphysical know-
ledge ". " Unless the critical philosopher can first
explain how his knowledge is possible, he would
seem to be only a dogmatist of a new kind." ^
This last, indeed, is the conclusion at which he
finally arrives. " I do not see that we are likely
to gain by exchanging the natural and naive dogmas
of the older ' transcendent ' ontology, for the more
artificial and obscure, but no less unwarranted, dog-
mas of this newer ' transcendental ' psychology." ^
To classify Sidgwick is therefore no easy matter.
But one clue to his fundamental position is provided
by the phrase he invented to describe a possible
ethical theory, " philosophical intuitionism ". He
was convinced, and urged his conviction with
equal vigour against empiricism, evolutionism and
Kantianism, that we^haye^ in tJi£_lQng ^^^^y to jail

1 "A Criticism of the Critical Philosophy," Mindy 1883, p. 74.
^UU,,ip, 337.

6 SIDGWICK'S PHILOSOPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS.

back upon certain reflective and unanalysable con-
victions or Ji^^^^ of truth. EvolutlonT'is
powerless to subvert these. Evolutionists, like
other men, take something for granted unproved,
and have to rely finally upon such intuitions.
Criticism, too, cannot subvert them except at the
risk of subverting itself, for criticism like ey^olu-
tionism must take something for granted^

Sidgwick published no large work on meta-
physical questions ; hence there is considerable
difliculty, pending the publication of his meta-
physical lectures, in speaking with confidence as
to his ultimate positions. But if we are right in
laying emphasis upon the intuitional aspect of his
philosophy, then clearly he and Reid have a good
deal in common, though the keen critical spirit of
Sidgwick's work is far more prominent, and the
constructive element less prominent, than in the
work of his Scottish predecessor. It is notable
that he based his utilitarianism upon an intuition,
and he regarded this as his most important achieve-
ment.^

He may be said to have believed in a " common_
sense *' of a philosophic kind, a- kind very difi^erent,

1 See the Important and interesting preface to the sixth
edition of the Methods. " I had myself become ... an in-
tuitionist to a certain extent ... I was a utilitarian . . . but
on an intuitional basis ".

SIDGWICK'S PHILOSOPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS. 7

no doubt, from the vulgar " common sense "
which, in its moral pronouncements, he criticised
so severely. It is a '^ common sense '' whose
ultimate intuitions must be accepted without cavil,
and must neither be resolved away into an infinite
regress of cosmic conditions nor into an infinite
regress of hypostatised " criticisms ". He was
not a " common-sense " philosopher in the vulgar
acceptation of the phrase ; ^ in a more refined
acceptation, the phrase is not altogether inappro-
priate as applied to him, though " philosophical
intuitionist " or even " Cartesian rationalist "
(to whom " clearness and distinctness " are, with
due limitations, the ultimate criteria of truth),
are other designations which are spontaneously
suggested by certain aspects of his work. A more
precise " labelling " we need not attempt. Difiicult
as the " labelling *' of Green proved itself,^ the
task would be far more difficult in the case of
Sidgwick.

But it is necessary to turn to his more distinctly
ethical work. It suffices to have pointed out
with respect to his general philosophical attitude,

1" A criticism of the Critical Philosophy," Mind, 1883, p.
337. " I do not hold . . . that our common a pj'iori assump-
tions respecting empirical objects require no philosophical
justification."

^Mind, 1 90 1, p. 18.

8 SIDGWICK'S PHILOSOPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS.

the critical spirit which pervades his teaching, the
distrust of every pretentious and apparently homo-
geneous system of thought, the highly balanced
treatment of every question ; these qualities help
to throw light upon his statement that the " con-
structive impulses of the modern world are now
comparatively feeble ".

The critical spirit which he brought to bear
upon the systems of others enters also into his
/own attempts at construction. The Methods of
i Ethics does not present us with a comprehensive
land harmonious system of morality. Construction^
is begun, but at various points. " I have refrained
from expressly attempting any such complete and
final solution of the chief ethical difficulties and
controversies as would convert this exposition of
various methods into the development of a har-
monious system. At the same time I hope to
affiDrd aid towards the construction of such a
system." ^

The words just quoted afford an explanation
of the well-known fact that men have found a
difficulty in reaching the core and vital essence^
,of Sidgwick's work. His attitude is so judicial
and critical, at times even so negative, that
superficial readers fail to recognise the positive
and constructive elements which lie enshrined
'^Methods, p. 13.

SIDGWICK'S PHILOSOPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS. 9

amid the more negative and destructive. The
impression conveyed is that the philosopher was
more minded to pull down than to build up ;
that he was, indeed, reluctant to establish a
positive system of his own. The impression is,
in great measure, true. But still there are in the
Methods of Ethics the elements of a possible
system ; positive statements which are Sidgwick's
own, and not merely his as voicing some particular
" method ". These elements will presently be set
forth. Here it suffices to call attention to the
atmosghere^ ofcnticism which pervades his ethical
no less than his other work, and which provides
an explanation of the fact that many students
who open the Methods of Ethics with a resolution
to master its contents, relinquish their task in
bewilderment or despair before a dozen chapters
have been read. The, thought, though clear, is so
unimpassioned, so unpartisan, so elusive, so devoid
of " gripping " power, that the mind wearies of the
task. Popularity can, as a rule, best be won through
partisanship ; Sidgwick was too critical to be a
partisan ; hence his book is commonly regarded
with respect rather than with enthusiasm.

He is sometimes called an *' eclectic ". There
is a good deal of appropriateness in the designa-
tion, provided it be not interpreted as meaning a
shallow and unintelligent collector of ideas from

y

10 SIDGWICK'S PHILOSOPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS.

various sources. It is certain that the positive
conclusions at which Sidgwick arrived, however
few in number, were the result of intense and
long-continued thought. He was the very last
man to select principles indiscriminately from here
and from there in order somehow to build up a
system which would please all parties. If, so far
as he was a constructive philosopher, he was an ec-
lectic, he was certainly not a shallow one. Still the
Methods of Ethics has an eclectic appearance only
less prominent than its critical aspect. " There
are different views of the ultimate reasonableness
of conduct, implicit in the thought of ordinary
men," ^ and Sidgwick treated each of the different
views with such respect that his readers have
frequently found a difficulty in knowing to which
he himself most inclined. He even seems to have
reconciled himself, in part, to the existence of
prima facie contradictions, though he recognised
that philosophy cannot ultimately rest contented
with them. " System-making is pre-eminently the
affair of philosophy, and it cannot willingly toler-
ate inconsistencies : at least if it has to tolerate
them, as I sadly fear that it has, it can only
tolerate them as a physician tolerates a chronic
imperfection of health." " These words, again,

1 Methods, p. 6.

2uxhe Philosophy of Common Sense," Mind, 1895.

SIDGWICK'S PHILOSOPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS. 11

explain much of Sidgwick's work. Though
recognising that " system - building " was the
philosophic ideal, he had lost confidence in the
power of the human mind, in its present stage of
development, adequately to realise this ideal. He
would not follow the example of many philo-
sophers in hastily completing an apparently
homogeneous and imposing but really crude
and internally weak structure. " One of the
most fruitful sources of error in philosophy
has been overhasty synthesis and combination
without sufficient previous analysis of the ele-
ments combined." ^ He preferred to build a
little here, and a little there : to leave the whole
incomplete provided it were sound and thorough
.so far as it went. He even chose to admit a
prima facie contradiction rather than to get rid
of it by the expedient of denying what seemed
intuitively certain. Contradictions, he virtually
tells us, may be only apparent^; it would be fatal
to discredit the verdict of consciousness because
it lands us in them. Would not Sidgwick and
Hegel have found at this point something in
common .?

To an extent, then, Sidgwick appears as an
eclectic, but as a critical and discriminating one.

^ " The Relation of Ethics to Sociology," International
Journal of Ethic s^ vol. x., p. i8.

12 SIDGWICK'S PHILOSOPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS.

The summum bonum he borrows from hedonism ;

important rationalistic elements he takes from
Kant and Butler ; egoism and universalism each
receives recognition ; intuitionism too is found to
have an important function. The result is an ap-
parent absence of homogeneity. He has refrained
from trying " to convert the exposition of various
methods into the development of a harmonious
system," and indeed hedonism, though coming
out of the fire of his criticism triumphant, does
so only at the cost of many a scar.

One or two further characteristics of the Methods
of Ethics deserve mention. Every age has its
Zeitgeist, and the present owns allegiance to
the Zeitgeist of evolution. Even idealism has
joined hands with science, and worships at the
shrine with neophytic fervour. Sidgwick, as said
above, was not enamoured of the new cult. He
admitted, as all thinking men must, the importance
of the evolutionary idea for biological science, but
he strenuously resisted its intrusion into ethical
discussions except to a very limited and unimpor-
tant extent. The Zeitgeist had little or no in-
fluence upon him. He saw, as he thought, through
its proud and pretentious claims. Hence the
\ Methods of Ethics does not reflect the characteristic
ideas of its time ; it belongs to an age of indivi-
dualism rather than to an age of** social organism "

SIDGWICK'S PHILOSOPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS. 13

and " social tissue ''? This is no disparagement.
On the contrary, a work which boldly opposes
current ideas may possess peculiar claims upon our
attention. The Zeitgeist is not infallible.

Sidgwick resisted "idealism " too. His con-
troversies with Green and Bradley were every whit
as keen as those with Spencer and Stephen. Against
what he regarded as the vague and inconsequent
metaphysics of the former he protested as vigor-
ously as against the biological bias of the latter.

Thus, standing outside the prevalent ethical
tendencies of his time, distrusting them, engaged
in a constant criticism of their errors and omissions,
distrustful even of his own powers of construct-
ing a self-consistent ethical system, Sidgwick was
convinced that the most immediate task of philo-
sophy was the unambitious one of keeping close to
common notions, and making them clear, precise^
axid, as-iar as.., possible, hari^oi^ious. High-flying
metaphysics he could not but distrust Ambitious
and imposing systems, idealistic or naturalistic,
were for him but vulnerable and pretentious ob-
jects of criticism. Architectonic grandeur was no
aim for a nineteenth century philosopher, heir, no

1^ On page 374 of the first edition he " simplified the ques-
tion by supposing only a single sentient conscious being in the
universe," a " simplification " to which his idealistic opponents
strongly objected as being a return to fi kind of atomism.

14 SIDGWICK'S PHILOSOPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS.

doubt, of all the ages, and also to all the ruined
philosophies which have come down to him.

A German historian of philosophy has described
the typical English philosopher in the following
words. " He keeps as close as possible to pheno-
mena, and the principles which he uses in the
explanation of phenomena themselves lie in the
realm of concrete experience. He keeps constantly
in touch with the popular consciousness. His
reverence for reality . . . and his distrust of far-
reaching abstraction are strong.'' ^ English philo-
sophy has been, until recently, empiricist, and the
above words of Falckenberg aptly describe some of
its characteristics. Sidgwick was not an empiricist ^
except in a very wide and vague sense, but~fHe
words above quoted are a not altogether inap-
propriate description of his attitude. True, he
departs, when it is necessary to do so, from the
" popular consciousness " ; for the philosopher
must, after all, " seek unity of principle and
consistency of method at the risk of paradoxJV
But his departures are never in the direction

^ Falckenberg, English translation, p. 84.

2 " I think it impossible to establish the general truths of the
accepted sciences by processes of cogent inference on the basis
of merely particular premises " (" Criteria of Truth and
Error," Mind, 1900, p. 15. See also "Incoherence of the
Empirical Philosophy," Mind, 1882).

^Methods, p, 6.

SIDGWICK'S PHILOSOPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS. 15

of Spencerian " unknowables " or transcendental
" absolutes '\

Another characteristic of the Methods is notable,
the close--packedness. of, its thought Most modern
works on ethics are extremely diffuse. The student
has to wade through many a page before alighting
upon any striking or important statement. Green
is diffuse and repeats himself time after time ;
Kant's diffuseness is notorious, and evolutionary
moralists are, for the most part, still more guilty.
The whole of Spencer's Principles of Ethics could
be condensed, without important loss, into one-
tenth of its present space. No such condensation
is possible with Sidgwick's work. There is scarcely
a superfluous word. If thoughts and suggestions
can be regarded for the moment as entities capable
of enumeration, the Methods of Ethics probably
contains a greater number than any other ethical
work of the size that has ever been written. It
is a rich mine of thought from which moralists
will borrow (with or without acknowledgment) for
years to come.

Ethical works are not usually adorned with the
flowers of rhetoric and eloquence. The Methods
of Ethics is no exception. Though not devoid of
a kind of chaste dignity, it is too thoughtful and
argumentative to afford much pleasure of a purely
artistic kind. And yet Sidgwick's style occasion-

16 SIDGWICK'S PHILOSOPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS.

ally rises into real eloquence as in the following
passage {Methods^ p. 499).

" It seems scarcely extravagant to say that, amid
all the profuse waste of the means of happiness
which men commit, there is no imprudence more
flagrant than that of selfishness in the ordinary
sense of the term, that excessive concentration on
the individual's own happiness which renders it
impossible for him to feel any strong interest in
the pleasures and pains of others. The perpetual
prominence of self that hence results tends to
deprive all enjoyments of their keenness and zest,
and produce rapid satiety and ennui : the selfish
man misses the sense of elevation and enlargement
given by wide interests ; he misses the more secure
and serene satisfaction that attends continually on
activities directed towards ends more stable in
prospect than an individual's happiness can be ;
he misses the peculiar, rich sweetness, depending
upon a sort of complex reverberation of sympathy
which is always found in services rendered to
those whom we love and who are grateful. He
is made to feel in a thousand various ways, accord-
ing to the degree of refinement which his nature
has attained, the discord between the rhythms of
his own life and of that larger life of which his
own is but an insignificant fraction,"

CHAPTER II.

SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS.

** I identify a modification of Kantism with the missing
rational basis of the ethical utilitarianism of Bentham, as
expounded by J. S. Mill" (Sidgwick : M/W, 1877, p. 411).

*^ The jjualism of the practical reason ... I learnt . . .
from Butler's well-known Sermons" (preface to Methods of
Ethics J second edition).

" The rationality of self-regard seemed to me as undeniable
as the rationality of self-sacrifice " (" Autobiographical Note,"
Mindy 1 90 1, p. 289).

The statements quoted above and given by Sidg-
wick himself as expository of the sources of his
ethical philosophy will be of direct guidance in
tracing out the several distinct strands of thought
which it contains. The last of the three is inserted
for more than one reason. It represents a convic-
tion which Sidgwick firmly embraced, and which
despite the difficulties involved, he could never
remove from his own mind. It represents, more-
over, that aspect of his ethical system which has
been least recognised by his critics, and which by
many has been quite ignored. We shall return to
it again.

(17) 2

18 SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS.

The statements which head this section thus
indicate in a briet form the four chief sources of
the philosophy of the Methods. Those sources
are Mill, Kant, Butler, and, most important of all,
the convictions of Sidgwick himself.

(i) Mill.

Economists, logicians, moralists, theologians,
and sociologists are united jn the execution of one
task — the criticism of Mill. No feeling of com-
punction animates the breasts even of those who
owe him the most for providing them with much
easy and excellent " copy," and with many a text
for a lengthy and triumphant discussion.

It is unfair that Mill should be known to
numbers of students only through his inaccuracies
and inconsistencies, especially when these latter,
unlike those of many of his critics, are largely
matters of expression only. Mill, who was too
open-minded to ignore the varied sides of each
subject, made admissions which were verbally in-
consistent with each other, but which, by increased
carefulness of expression on his part, could have
been easily brought into harmonious unity.

That the much-criticised ethical work which

I Mill published in 1863 is full of loose and inexact

expressions, no one is likely to deny. It is not,

however, the purpose of this essay to point them

SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS. 19

out ; that has been done sufficiently often ; the
present task is to show, in brief words, the close
relation in which MilFs work stands to the Methods
of Ethics. The latter work is immeasurably the
more exact, ambitious and comprehensive, but it
will be found to be very largely based upon the
former. Certainly no other book exerted so early
and important a formative influence upon the evo-
lution of Sidgwick's system as Miirs Utilitarianism.

It may not be impertinent to point out that if
Sidgwick's style, admittedly lucid, easy, and well
adapted to the task of philosophical exposition,
was influenced by that of any predecessor, that
predecessor was probably Mill. Many pages of
Utilitarianism could be easily mistaken for pages
of the Methods of Ethics. In the latter we miss,
it is true, the hortatory element, but a comparison,
for example, of the discussions on justice will show
them to be not only similar in matter but marvel-
lously alike in style. (Pages 82-87 ^^ Utilitarian-\
ism are extraordinarily suggestive of Sidgwick.)

But style counts for little in philosophy ; simi-
larities of tone and feeling are far more important.
In our two writers we find the same openness
of mind, the same breadth of view, the same
intellectual and controversial honesty which will
rather admit inconsistencies into a system than
deny obvious facts. Sidgwick, it is true, had a

20 SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS.

keener vision than Mill for such inconsistencies.
While Mill was frequently unconscious of their
seriousness, Sidgwick faced them bravely even
at the imminent " risk of paradox ". But in both
writers there is an avoidance of the too common
practice of unconsciously though violently dis-
torting facts in order to fit them into favourite
theories. Mill's admissions of the " sense of
dignity," " quality of pleasures " and so forth,
I may be paralleled by Sidgwick's significant recog-
I nition of fundamental difficulties and paradoxes in
I his favourite system. Both writers were supremely
honest ; both were unwilling to sacrifice truth on
the altar of dialectical victory.

But subject-matter is more important in philo-
sophy than style, tone, or feeling. In Mill we
find a long list of doctrines subsequently developed
with increased skill and precision by the later
writer.

We find, of course, the hedonistic summum
honum. We find, too, the important admission
that man may knowingly follow the worse rather _
than the better fcaSD-^ (p. 14). We find that
genuine self-sacrifice is a reality and not a delusion
(pp. 22-23) ; that happiness should be the ultimate
end yet not the proximate duty (p. 54) ; that the
moral judgment is passed primarily on intentions
though also in a secondary sense on persons-aajd.

SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS. 21

theirjnotives (pp. 26, 27) ; that utilitarianism has
necessary limitations, and despite its theoretical
impartiality, dictates that the immediate social
environment has greater claims than distant in-
dividuals (p. 94). We find, too, as we should
expect, a recognition of the m^onsistencies, as well
as the practical value, of common morality, and
an appeal to utilitarianism to reconcile them (p.
38). We find, moreover, the a3mission, import-
tant in this evolutionary age, that questions of
the origin of the moral judgment should not
be intruded into a discussion of its validity, (p.
62).

The crisis of each book is similar. Mill's
"proof" of utilitarianism has often been exposed
and ridiculed. " Each person's happiness is a good
to that person, and the general happiness, therefore,
a good to the aggregate of all persons" (p. ^2)-
No doubt there will be found here, if we choose to
be severe, a "fallacy of composition" ; an aggregate
has no sensorium. But are we to assume that
Mill was ignorant of this.^^ We may admit the
clumsiness and the logical and verbal inaccuracy
of his so-called " proof," but are we, till the end
of time, to parade as monstra horrida and as terrors
to logical evil-doers, slip-shod statements which
are, after all, capable of a rational interpretation }
Surely his "proof" when charitably interpreted

22 SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS.

and when deprived of its hedonistic flavouring,
comes to much the same thing as Sidgwick's maxim_
of benevolence. The practical reason, we are
-virtually told, is no respecter of persons. The
basis of his "proof" (a "proof" which Mill
admits to be not a logical one and which should
not be treated as if it claimed to be such) is prob-
ably found on page 24. "As between his own
^jhappiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires
Ithe agent to be as strictly impartial as a disin-
[terested and benevolent spectator." If so then
the " general happiness " is, in a distributive sense,
a good to the aggregate of all men.^

In both, again, we have the admission, so signi-
ficant in writers with a hedonistic leaning, that
perfect contentment may not rouse our ethical
approval ; the " contented pig " is a hete noir for
each of our writers (p. 14). In Mill we have the
confusion between the two meanings of " desirable "
(p. ^-^^ and by Sidgwick, according to some of his
critics,^ the same confusion, with its consequent
petitio principii, is repeated, at any rate in his first
edition. In both we have (to mention a minor
but interesting point) the legitimacy, under special^
conditions, of unveracity emphatically brought out
(p. 34). In both we have an absence of shallow
eighteenth century optimism, and yet no very
1 Mr. Bradley.

SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS. 23

definite traces of the more recent pessimistic move-
ment (pp. 14, 18).

Above all, their treatment of the problem of
justice is extremely similar. Sidgwick's, of course,
is immeasurably the fuller and more exact, but
every element referred to by him in the classical
fifth chapter of the third book will be found in a
cruder and less exact form in the last chapter of
MilFs Utilitarianism.

(2) Kant.

Sidgwick tells us in the autobiographical frag-
ment ^ which appeared in Mind of April, 1901, that
he became impressed with the truth and import-
ance of Kant's fundamental principle at a definite
period in his philosophic growth. MilFs Utili-
tarianism had been found to be lacking in cogency
and intuitive certainty ; it gave no clear reason
why a man should sacrifice his own pleasure for that
of others. Kant's maxim, " Act from a principle
that you can will to be a universal law," seemed to
supply the intuitive basis for which Sidgwick was
seeking. Owing, however, to a conviction of the
incorrigibility of moral egoism, he subsequently
came to feel that Kant's maxim was " inadequate "
on the ground that " it did not settle finally the
subordination of self-interest to duty ". Still, it
^ Now the preface to the sixth edition of the Methods.

24 SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS.

remained as a supreme canon of one side of
Sidgwick's system, the orthodox utilitarian side.

The categorical imperative of Kant thus^xeap-
pears in Sidgwick in the form of the maxim of
equity, one of the three maxims of philosophical
intuitionism, and perhaps the most important.^
r In other directio ns the influence of Kant upon Sidg-
wick was also of considerable importance, though it
was in certain respects so similar to that of Butler
that the two cannot always be distinguished.

Thus the emphasis laid by Sidgwick on
" rationality " of conduct is distinctly suggestive
of the Konigsburg thinker ; both philosophers
invariably interpret " right " in the sense of
" rational ". Critics ^ have severely attacked Sidg-
wick*s treatment of the question thus raised, but
into the merits of the controversy we cannot now
enter ; his treatment is indeed but slight, and
contrasts with the lengthy argument by which
Kant sought to establish the claims of reason.
We shall, however, see some grounds for believ-
ing that Sidg wick's view was based, at least in
part, upon an abstract view of things not unsimilar
to that of Kant. The point upon which we now
insist is that both writers equated " I'ight '^with
" rational," and that this was somewhat significant
in the case of a hedonist like Sidgwick.

^ Methods, book iii., ch. xiii. ^ £^g^^ yi^^ Bradley.

SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS. 25

But it is interesting to note that he comes back
to hedonism by a strange and unfamiliar route.
" It is right or reasonable (i.e.y I ought) to seek
my own happmess!" In this dictum, perhaps the
most important and fundamental in Sidgwick's
work, there is a curious_fusion of the rationalistic^
with the _ hedoriistic^ a fusion which he learnt
neither from Kant (who would have denied the
proposition) nor from the hedonists (who would
probably object to its form).

Again when we hear from Sidgwick that the
notion of *' oup^htness " or ."n&htness " must be
taken as " ultimate and unanalysable," ^ we seem
again to be breathing an anti- hedonistic atmo-
sphere.^ Orthodox hedonists would scarcely admit
that the notion is " ultimate," and the few who
would admit it to be " unanalysable " would only do
so on the ground that a meaningless notion is no
notion at all, and therefore certainly unanalysable.
Hedonists ^ object as a rule to the word " ought " :
it is for them an intruder from other and more

^ Methods, p. 34.

2 Professor Sorley considers the above words too strong ;
hedonists, he says, can give a perfectly valid meaning to the
" ought " ; the word stands for the claims which society has
upon us. This, no doubt is true, but cannot, be applied to
the egoistic form of hedonism, only to the utilitarian. The
above statement is true of Bentham, who held that the word
"ought" "ought to be abolished".

26 SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS.

unscientific systems of ethics. They contend that
if there is any validity in the notion of " ought-
ness "it is capable of further analysis into " con-
duciveness to happiness ". Sidgwick, therefore,

Iin identifying *' oughtness " or " rightness " with
" reasonableness " and maintaining that the notion
represented by these words is fundamental to
ethics, is far removed, verbally at least, from the
position of orthodox hedonism. Even if we only
admit that we " ought " to seek our own in-
dividual happiness, or that we " ought " to act on
some consistent plan, egoistic or other, still this
'* ought " has, according to Sidgwick, a rigorous
stringency, an ultimate and unanalysable quality.
The admission is thus interesting and important,
though whether the alliance ejfFected between this
" ultimate " notion and hedonism is satisfactory,
and whether " oughtness " can* really be applied
to egoistic pleasure-seeking, will have to be con-
sidered later on. Here it suffices to point out
that this semi-jural view with its emphasis on
" ought " is Kantian and stoical rather than hedon-
jistic.

Sidgwick takes a still further step in his apo-
theosis of reason when he admits that reason can
' act as a motive to the will. This, as Professor
Sorley points out,^ is really the question of ques-
^ Ethics ofNaturalisniy pp. 16-17.

/

SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS. 27

tions in ethics, and any intelligible doctrine of the
freedom of the will must have as its basis the orig-
inative power of reason. " When I speak of the
cognition or judgment that ' X ought to be done *
. . . as a ' dictate ' or * precept ' of reason to the
persons to whom it relates, I imply that in rational
beings as such this cognition gives an impulse or
motive to action " ^ {Methods^ p. 34). Kant's
view is similar to this, but far more sweeping and
emph^c. According to him all moral action has
to sprit%. ultimately from reason, the immediate
motive being reverence for the dictates of the"
latter. But alike in Kant and in Sidgwick the
exact nature of the connection between reason on
the one side and action on the other is not very

clear, though the connection is obviously of the
nature of refined feeling. Kant's view has been

often criticised, and Mr. Bradley has undertaken the
same duty in the case of Sidgwick.^ But it must be
confessed that the subject is an extremely difficult
jOne. How exactly can mere reason pass into
[action.'^ The answer probably is that there is
no mere reason ; that all action springs out of
some interest, which, though dependent (to use
Herbartian language) upon the nature of the

^The first edition lays greater stress upon this "desire to do
what is right and reasonable as such " than later editions.
^Mr. Sidgwick' s Hedonism.

/

28 SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS.

presentations which exist in the agent's " circle
of thought," is more than mere cognitive reason.
The besetting danger of idealism is to exalt to the
chief seat a reason which is divorced from the rest
of consciousness ; a danger no less serious than
the hedonistic exaltation of mere feeling. This
question (which Kant declared " insoluble " ^) is
too difficult and abstruse to deal with here.

Some light is thrown upon this problem of the
place of reason in moral action by recognising the
significance of Kant'sntemHnoTogy — a terminology
subsequently adopted by Sidgwick. The Methods
of Ethics in its first even more than in its later
form, contains the words "objective," ".universal,"
" intrinsic," as applied to moral truth. Reason
is defined as the " faculty of apprehending universal
truth " (p. 2tS^ ^^^^ edition). Acting rationallyTs"
I acting " from an impulse in harmony with an in-

itellectual apprehension of an objective rule, or
intrinsically desirable end " (p. 43, first edition).
We find similar language in Kant. " That reason
may give laws it is necessary that it should only
need to presuppose itself because rules are ob-
jectively and universally valid only when they
hold without any contingent subjective conditions,
which distinguish one rational being from another "
(Abbot., p. 107). Some of Sidg wick's critics
1 Abbot, p. 165.

SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS. 29

(notably Mr. Bradley) have attacked his doctrine
of " objective " Tightness on the ground that Jt im-
plies a complete abstraction from ordinary moral
f^cts ; that it reduces each individual to an X, and
then affirms that what holds between such phan-
tom individuals is " universal " and " objective '\
The charge cannot be rebutted ; the point of
view is undoubtedly an abstract one as is most
explicitly confessed in the above words of Kant.
But whether this abstractness is or is not a serious
blemish we need not here decide ; the question will
await us farther on. It suffices here to point out
. that, alike for Kant and for Sidgwick, the ultimate
I moral intuitions are based upon an abstract, almost
\ a mathematical view of the moral universe.

One other Kantian doctrine, important though
not exactly distinctive, reappears in Sidgwick.
Each philosopher has somehow to extricate himself
from an antinomy of the practical reason. The
antinomies are not formally identical in the two
cases, though the similarity between them is con-
siderable. Kant's antinomy consists in the difficulty
that while duty ought to be done for duty's sake
and apart from all consideration of reward, yet
ultimate good must include not only dutifulness
or virtue but happiness. As he expresses it in the
Critique of the Practical Reason,^ virtue is the
^ Abbot's translation, p. 206.

30 SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS.

supreme good, but virtue and happiness combined
constitute the perfect or complete good. Sidg-
wick's antinomy differs from this in its resolute
affirmation of the rationality and duty of egoism
(an affirmation we cannot find in Kant except as
remotely and with difficulty deducible from his
doctrine of the perfect good). In the Methods of
\ Ethics the duty of egoism and the duty of uni-
^Iversalism have somehow to be reconciled.
» The solution of their antinomies is found by
\both writers in the postulates of God and Immor-
(tality. If, however, we are to judge from the
closing paragraphs of the Methods^ its author's
confidence in his own postulates was less firm and
unwavering than that of the Konigsburg thinker.
Those paragraphs open up long vistas of scepticism.
It is said that Sidgwick's connection with the
Psychical Research Society was due to his deep
conviction that, apart from belief in a future life,
the moral cosmos would be reduced to chaos.
He became prominent among that small group of
persons who, a decade or so ago, began the careful
investigation of the obscure subjects of hypnotism,
apparitions, and so forth, subjects which have ap-
peared trivial or grotesque to many, but which to
Sidgwick seemed fraught with great significance.
The above are the most obvious parallels between
Sidgwick and Kant. A few others will be men-

SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS. 31

tioned, but owing to the fact that even moralists
of the most diverse schools have many doctrines
in common, there is always, for the individual who
seeks to trace out the influence of one writer on
another, some danger of lapsing into pedantry, if
not of doing serious injustice to the later of the
two writers. Still a few other points may be
mentioned in which agreement, if not influence, is
manifest.

The perfectionistic ideal of morality is con-
demned by Kant and Sidgwick, and for identical
reasons. " Ends must first be given relatively to
which only can the notion of perfection be the
determining principle of the will." The whole
discussion ^ of ethical ends, inserted in the Critique
of the Practical Reason^ is deserving of comparison
with Sidgwick's, and the treatment of such ques-
tions as talent and the theological view of ethics is
similar to their treatment by our writer.^

Moreover we find Kant refusing to accept the
" moral sense " basis for morality on the ground
that the pleasures and pains of this " sense " already
imply precedent virtue.^ We find him rejecting
the qualitative theory of pleasure, and holding (as
Sidgwick also holds) that hedonism to be consistent

^Abbot's translation, pp. 129-30.

^Methods, pp. 79, 395.

3 Abbot, p. 128 ; Methods^ pp. 26-28.

32 SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS.

must be quantitative.^ Moreover, his emphasis
upon freedom may possibly have influenced Sidg-
wick, though the latter philosopher has discovered
some serious flaws in Kant's treatment of the
question. Again when Kant's rigorism lapses
momentarily, he makes dangerous advances in the
hedonistic and utilitarian directions (he admits the
" happiness of others " as an end which is also a
duty ^), and he speaks without utter condemnation
of rational self-love^ {vernunftige Selbstliebe)^ a
phrase which reminds us of Sidgwick.

We may, however, certainly conclude that the
Kantian element in Sidgwick's philosophy though
important is not great in amount. The equity
(principle, as Sidgwick himself has pointed out, is
(undeniably Kantian, and the same may be said
of the imposing rationalistic terminology of the
Methods. But beyond this it would be unsafe to
assert positive influence. In ethics there is much
common ground.

(3) Butler.
If we seriously try to assess influence (a task
easily carried to an extreme) we shall conclude
that neither from Mill nor from Kant did Sidg-

1 Abbot, pp. iio-ii. ^3U.yp.2()6.

^ Ibid., p. 165 : "Pure practical reason only checks selfish-
ness ... so far as to limit it to the condition of agreement
with the moral law, and then it is called rational self-love ".

SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS. 33

wick learn to the full extent the moderation, the
calm reasonableness, the many-sidedness which are
such distinctive characteristics of the Methods of
Ethics. Nor from them did he acquire the power
of keen psychological analysis which is one of his
greatest merits. Kant in his moral works was too
violent a partisan of reason to see with perfect
clearness the deficiencies of a purely rationalistic
ethic ; the sceptical wound inflicted by the first
Critique was too serious for half measures ;
morality had somehow to be preserved, and
rigorism presented itself as a desperate though
apparently adequate remedy. Mill in his ethical
work posed both as partisan and as philanthropist,
and neither mood was favourable to calm analysis.
We must assess the influence of Butler at a
higher rate. The Sermons of the "cleaFminded
ecclesiastic who in 1747 had the refusal of the
primacy of England, are unique in the English
language. To turn from them to the ethical
works (many of them very able) of his con-
temporaries, each with some favourite theory to
maintain at all costs, is to breathe another atmo-
sphere. So free are they from sectarian or 1
philosophical bias, that the orthodox have long
questioned their soundness, and philosophers
themselves have been puzzled how to classify or
label them. Every school of thought seems in

34 SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS.

them to get its due. Theological assumptions
are, no doubt, introduced, but they are not
obtruded.

Within the wide framework provided by Butler's
ethics the contributions of Mill and Kant could
find a sort of resting-place.

What are the distinctive features in Butler
which reappear in Sidgwick.^*

I. Both writers are in a sense hedonists.
" Nothing,'* says Butler, " can be of consequence
to mankind or any creature but happiness "
(Sermon 12). His interpretation of this some-
what ambiguous term is, however, to be noted.
The pursuit of " gay amusement " and " high
enjoyments " is a sure way to disappointment ;
our endeavour should rather be to escape misery,
keep free from uneasiness, pain, and sorrow, or
to get relief and mitigation of them ; our aim,
indeed, should be " peace and tranquillity of
mind " (Sermon 6).

II. A far more characteristic feature of Butler's
system is the inclusion within it of several dis-
tinguishable (if not distinct) ethical springs of
action. This recognition of various springs of
action was of course no new discovery ; but the
recognition of them as ethical and authoritative
was somewhat novel and certainly important. Tri
Butler we find, as prima facie ruling principles,

SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS. 35

self-JLovej^benjeyolence and conscience. But benev-
olence soon loses its prima facie supremacy ; its
pretensions, indeed, to rank as a ruling principle ^
were never very well grounded. By Sidgwick,
too, beneyolence as a separate virtue is found to
be hopelessly vague, while as a ruling principle Jt
comes to coincide with one of the chief maxims^
of philosophical intuitionism. After reduction,
there remain for Butler, conscience (including be-
nevolence ^ ) and self-love ; for Sidgwick rational
utilitarianism and rational egoism, these two latter
being complementary phases of philosophical in-
tuitionism.

III. We thus have a dualism in each of our
writers. But dualisms are notoriously unstable.
It is of the highest interest to note that when
an attempt is made to reduce, or to suggest a
reduction of, this dualism to a monism, the more
disinterested member is sacrificed. Egoism alone
remains unchallenged. " There can no access

^ As distinct from a particular affection. " Every particular
affection, benevolence among the rest, is subservient to self-love "
(Sermon ii).

2 " When benevolence is said to be the sum of virtues it is
not spoken of as a blind propension, but as a principle in
reasonable creatures, and so to be directed by their reason ;
for reason and reflection comes into our notion of a moral
agent" (Sermon 12). Here benevolence and conscience (a
principle of " reflection ") almost or quite coincide.

36 SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS.

be had to the understanding but by convincing
men that the course of life we would persuade
them to is not contrary to their interest. . . .
When we sit down in a cool hour we justify to
ourselves . . . (no) pursuit, till we are convinced
that it will be for our happiness, or at least not
contrary to it. Our ideas of happiness and
misery are of all our ideas the nearest and most
important to us . . . and ough?^ to prevail over
(all others) ... if there should ever be, as it is
impossible there ever should be, any inconsistence
between them" (Sermon ii).^

Butler, like Sidgwick, introduces the Deus ex
machina to keep firm the connection between duty
and self-interest, i.e.^ to maintain a thoroughgoing
regoism. " Consideration of the divine sanctions
of religion is our only security of persevering in
our duty, in cases of great temptation " (Sermon
12). "In the common course of life, there is
seldom any inconsistency between our duty and
what is called interest. . . . But whatever ex-
ceptions there are to this, which are much fewer
than they are commonly thought, all shall be set
right at the final distribution of things. It is
a manifest absurdity to suppose evil prevailing

1 " Self-love and benevolence, virtue and interest, are not to
be opposed, but only to be distinguished from each other"
(Preface).

SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS. 37

finally over good'* (Sermon 3). The two moralists
lean for solution to a future life, though Butler's
faith rises the higher. Of Sidgwick more anon.

It may be objected that on Butler's view con-
science is supreme over self-love (vide Preface to
Sermons) as bearing " marks of authority " over
all other principles. But, as he afterwards ex-
plains, the author] ty of conscience^ if t^^
principle were obviously anti-egoistic, could not
be maintained ; its authority depends on the fact
that its dictates are clear and precise, while those
of egoism are always open to practical difficulties
springing from our limited knowledge. " No
man can be certain in any circumstances that
vice is his interest in the present world, much
less can he^Fcertatn against another." In other
words, conscience, as a practical guide to action,
is superior to egoistic calculation ; but, unless
i ultimately coincident with a perfectly enlightened
egoism, it would have no authority. The same
view reappears in Sidgwick ; the disinterested pur-
suit of truth, virtue, etc., and practical obedience
to the rules of common sense morality irrespective
of egoistic calculation are to be approved ; but
the approval is due to the belief that they are
means to the maxim of gratification.^ Destroy this

^ The whole paragraph In Butler's preface beginning with
the reference to Lord Shaftesbury's inquiry, is cardinal to his

38 SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS.

belief and their practical value would disappear.
Egoism must in the long run be victorious, though
as a practical method it has many difficulties to^
face.

IV. The constant emphasis which Sidgwick lay^
upon reason as a practical faculty is paralleled by a
similar emphasis in Butler. For both writers reason,
in its practical aspect, has a double function : {a)
it points out what is right ; {¥) it gives a motive to
the performance of what is right. " As the form
of the body is a composition of various parts ; so
likewise our inward structure is not simple or
uniform, but a composition of various passions,
appetites, affections, together with rationality ;
including in this last both the discernment of
what is right, and a disposition to regulate our-
selves by it" (Sermon 12). "Every affection,
as distinct from a principle of reason, may rise
too high, and be beyond its just proportion ''
(Sermon 6). Throughout Butler we find the
..same identification of jthe n^/f/ and the reasonable,
which is so distinctive a terminological feature oT
Sidgwick's work ; conscience is nothing but the
principle which dictates what is right or reasonable

system, and strongly suggests Sidgwick's treatment of the dualism
of practical reason. The " two contrary obligations " of Butler
correspond to the " division of practical reason against itself"
to which Sidgwick refers in his closing chapter.

SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS. 39

This, it is true, does not carry us far, and Butler's
delineation of the faculty must be admitted to be
extremely inadequate. The maxims it dictates are
not by any means systematically set forth. Apart
however from its detailed dictates, reason involves,
as was seen, a " disposition to regulate ourselves by
it^" a general abhorrence of what is base and liking
of what is fair and just " which takes its turn
amongst the other motives of action " (Preface).
" That your conscience approves of and attests to
a course of action is itself alone an obligation "
(Sermon 3). And yet Butler's strong common
sense prevented him from laying undue stress
upon an undoubted vera causa. " Reason alone
is not in reality a sufficient motive in such a
creature as man " (Sermon 5).

This function of the moral reason reappears in
Sidgwick in the form of a desire to do " what is
right and reasonable as such ".

The task of delineating the characteristics of
this faculty was no easier for Sidgwick than for
his predecessor. That we have such a faculty
Butler was convinced, and its importance is found
to be emphasised far more in the (later) Disserta-
tion than in the (earlier) Sermons, " whether called
conscience, moral reason, moral sense, or divine
reason ; whether considered as a sentiment of the
understanding, or as a perception of the heart or,

40 SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS.

which seems the truth, as including both " (Disser-
tation). This wide and j)erhap,5.yague jneaning
of practical reason reappears in Sidgwick^.. and
(rightly or not) was one of the chief grounds
upon which Bradley criticised the Methods of Ethics.
The practical reason is evidently, in many cases,
immediate in its operation ; " in all common
ordinary cases we see intuitively at first view what
is our duty, what is the honest part. This is the
ground of the observation that the first thought is
often the best " (Sermon 7).

In another of its operations, however, the
guidance of reason is more indirect, as when, for
example, it dictates that the future be not discounted
in favour of the present. " When men go against
their reason, and contradict a more important
interest at a distance for one nearer though of less
consideration ; if this be the whole of the case, all
that can be said is, that strong passions, some kind
of brute force within, prevails over the principle
of rationality " (Sermon 7). This " principle of
rationality " is obviously identical with one oT
Sidgwick's great constructive principles, that of
prudence. But man may not only discount the
ffuture in favour of the present ; he may also
/discount the welfare of others in favour of his
'own. Here again reason steps on the scene as a
practical faculty, and raises a protest against the

SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS. 41

self-partiality which is at the basis of most wrong-
. doing. " Vice in general consists in having an
unreasonable and too great regard to ourselves in
comparison of others" (Sermon lo). Hence the
practical value of the golden rule, directing us to
put ourselves on an equality with others. " Sub-
stitute another for yourself, when you take a survey
of any part of your behaviour or consider what is
proper and fit and reasonable for you to do upon
any occasion ". Another application of the same
rule may be expressed : " Substitute yourself in
the room of another : consider yourself as the
person affected by such a behaviour, or towards
whom such an action is done" (Sermon lo).
" The principle of benevolence would be an advocate
jpnthin,.our own breasts, to take care of the interests
of our fellow-creatures in all the interfering and
competitions which cannot but be, from the imper-
fection ofour nature, and the state we are in. It
would . . . hinder men from forming so strong a
notion of private good, exclusive of the good of
others, as we commonly do " (Sermon 12).

Thus in Butler we have maxims corresponding
closely to those of equity and benevolence in the
system of Sidgwick.

V. The presence of a cates^or ical * * practical
j:eaaQn_" carries with it an important implication.
Video melioraproboque, deteriora sequor^ represents no

42 SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS.

delusion but a psychological fact. Hedonism, while

not denying the existence of a state corresponding

to this famous confession, tends to underestimate

. its significance. Sidgwick, closely acquainted with

j Butler and Kant, never lost sight of it.^ " Nothing,"

Butler had said, " is more common than to see

men give themselves up to a passion or an affection

to their known prejudice and ruin, and in direct

contradiction to manifest and real interest " (Sermon

ii). There is a world of difference between this

jview and the corresponding hedonistic one that

moral obliquity is only miscalculation.

VI. Perhaps more important than any of the
above is Butler's refutation of psychological hedon-
ism. " Particular affections rest in the external
things themselves'' (Sermon ii), while self-love,
quite a distinct principle, seeks things only as a
means of happiness or good. He protests against
t " the confusion of calling actions interested which
/ are done in contradiction to the most manifest
/ known interest, merely for the gratification of a
I present passion " (Preface to Sermons). The pur-
suit of external objects may be "no otherwise
interested, than as every action of every creature
must, from the nature of the thing, be ; for no one
can act but from a desire, or choice, or preference

^ See, for example, his essay on " Unreasonable Action " in
Practical Ethics.

SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS. 43

of his own " ^ {ibid,). Instead of our desires being
normally for pleasure they are frequently not even
proportional in intensity to the pleasure that results
from their gratification. " Our hopes and fears
and pursuits are in degrees beyond all proportion
to the known value of the things they respect "
(Sermon 7).

This recognition that the majority of our im-
pulses are, strictly speaking, neither disinterested
nor interested, but are directed towards a variety
of ends, some personal and private, others not, is
a distinctive feature of Sidgwick's admirable chapter
on " Pleasure and Desire '\ On one point the
later writer diverges from the earlier. Butler, he
says, has overstated the case, for^desire does not
always precede pleasure. Otherwise there is sub-
stantial agreement between them.

VII. How easy for Butler, had he been a
violent partisan, to have overestimated the value
of his doctrine of desire ! Having shown, against
Hobbes, that self-love is, in a vast number of
cases, not the impelling motive to action, how
easy to have altogether denied it a place in the
moral life ! This, indeed, was the step taken by

* Cf. Sidgwick's words : " Egoism, if we merely understand
by it a method that aims at self-realisation, seems to be a form
into which almost any ethical system can be thrown " {Methods ^
P- 95)-

44 SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS.

Kant. Butler's moderation prevented him from
arriving at any such sweeping conclusion. He
I still admits, as we have seen, the existence of
I self-love proper and even assigns it a high place,
I theoretically^ indeed, the highest place, in his hier-
^;archy of principles. "Interest^ one's own happi-
ness, is a manifest obligation " (Preface). " Self-
love in its due degree is as just and morally
good as any affection whatever" {ibid.). Thus,
occupying a middle position between Hobbes (who
reduced every impulse to self-love) and Kant (who
denied to self-love any moral value), Butler
admits it to an honoured place, but denies it to
be the only human impulse. Then arises the ques-
tion of the mutual relations of self-love and the
numerous extra-regarding impulses ; and Butler
here alights upon the important fact denomin-
ated by Sidgwick the " Paradox of Hedonism ".
" Immoderate self-love does very ill consult its
own interest : and how much soever a paradox
it may appear, it is certainly true, that even from
self-love we should endeavour to get over all in-
ordinate regard to, and consideration of ourselves "
(Sermon ii). Self-love indeed, should be self-
limiting for its own sake, and lead to a " due
regard and suitable provision " for particular
passions and affections (Sermon 12). In all
this the two writers are absolutely agreed.

SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS. 45

A few minor points.

VIII. JUtUkarianisiiv^despite its emphasis upon
the equal claims of all men to happiness, is prac-^
ticaUy seiyimiting. The claims of our immediate
environment are more pressings because more easily-
satisfied, than those of distant humanity. The

'^ strong common sense of both of our writers saw
this. " That part of mankind, that part of our
country, which comes under our immediate notice,
acquaintance, and influence " has unusually im-
perative claims upon us.

IX. One of the most crucial matters dealt
with by Sidgwick in his chapter on the " Sum-
mum Bonum " is the relation of the hedonistic^
summum bonum to the other possible ends of„
human effort. Is Jcngwledge to be sought for^
its own sake, or is its pursuit to be strictly
limited T)y its hedonic results } Are we to seek
it ruat caelum ? or, if less hedonic than " generally
accredited fictions," are we to choose the latter?
Sidgwick, as is well known, here adhered consist-
ently to the hedonistic view, in spite of the enormous
difficulties which such a view has to face at this
point. Again we are reminded of Butler. " Know-
ledge is not our proper happiness. . . . It is the
gaining, not the having of it, which is the enter-
tainment of the mind. ... If (men's) discoveries
. . . tend to render life less unhappy, and pro-

46 SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS.

mote its satisfactions then they are most usefully
employed ; but bringing things to light, alone
and of itself, is of no manner of use any other-
wise than as an entertainment or diversion "
(Sermon 15).

X. Moralists who lay stress upon sympathy
as a chief if not the only basis of morality, and
rely upon its extension as a solution of the problem
of reconciling self-interest with duty, often fail
to remember that sympathy rnay in some cases
diminish rather than increase happiness. Rightly,
therefore, does Sidgwick in his concluding chapter
reject it as a means of solving the final crux of
ethics, and here again the calm dispassionateness
of Butler may have been operative. " Since in
such a creature as man, compassion or sorrow for
the distress of others, seems so far necessarily con-
nected with joy in their prosperity, as that whoever
rejoices in one must unavoidably compassionate the
other ; there cannot be that delight or satisfaction,
which appears to be so considerable, without the
inconveniences, whatever they are, of compassion "
(Sermon 5). Connected with this is the very
moderate optimism of the two writers which con-
trasts so powerfully with the ethical dreams of
Spencer. " This world was not intended to be a
state of any great satisfaction or high enjoyment "
(Sermon 6).

SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS. 47

There are however a few superficial and unim-
portant differences between the ethical systems of
Butler and Sidgwick. Butler never ceased to
believe that certain acts were to be condemned or
approved apart from their consequences. " We
are constituted so as to condemn falsehood, un-
provoked violence, injustice, and to approve of
benevolence to some preferably to others, ab-
stracted from all consideration which conduct is
like best to produce an overbalance of happiness
or misery " {Dissertation^ ii. — " Analogy *'). Here
the influence of the intellectualist school of moral -^
ists is evident : we are reminded of Clarke's
doctrine of the " eternal and necessary differ-
ences and relations of things," and the " fitnesses "
which exist between one being and another. Sidg-
wick, on the contrary, while admitting that many
of our common moral judgments take no explicit
account of consequences, would contend that
ultimately there can be no grounds for judging
of the rightness or wrongness of actions except
their consequences, considered from a utilitarian
I point of view. Butler's most explicit rejection
of this latter doctrine is to be found in his
Dissertation. In this the intuitional or moral
sense view is brought out with far greater ex-
plicitness than in the earlier Sermons. " Acting,
conduct, behaviour, abstracted from all regard

48 SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS.

to what is, in fact and event, the consequence of
it, is itself the natural object of the moral dis-
cernment ; as speculative truth is of speculative
reason." " The faculty within us approves of
prudent actions and disapproves of imprudent
ones . . . as such^ and considered distinctly from
the happiness or misery which they occasion."

Contrast with this, Butler's earlier view. " That
there is a public end and interest which each par-
ticular is obliged to promote, is the sum of morals "
.(Sermon 9). " The common virtues and the
I common vices of mankind may be traced up to
^ benevolence or the want of it " (Sermon 12).^
/ It is interesting, too, to notice that while for
/ Sidgwick the search for a satisfactory ethical theory
I was evidently one involving long and difficult
\ reflection, for Butler " morality and religion must
be somewhat plain and easy to be understood :
it must appeal to what we call common sense
as distinguished from superior capacity and im-
provement ".

In the sermon " Upon the Love of God " Butler
broaches in faint outline a view which finds no

^ In a note to this sermon Butler makes a transition towards
his later view. He contends that many of our dispositions are
morally approved or disapproved independently of their utili-
tarian or anti-utilitarian tendencies. But he still appears to
regard them as having ultimately a utilitarian justification.

SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS. 49

place in the constructive philosophy of Sidgwick,
and which, indeed, Sidgwick constantly opposed
on the ground of its vagueness. We refer to,
the perfectionistic view with its emphasis upon
self-realisation and full development of function.
^^There is a capacity in the nature of man which
neither riches, nor honours, nor sensual gratifica-
tions, nor anything in this world can perfectly
fill up or satisfy, there is a deeper and more
essential want than any of these things can be the
supply of; yet surely there is a possibility of
somewhat which may fill up our capacities of
happiness ; somewhat in which our souls may find
rest : somewhat which may be to us that satis-
factory good we are inquiring after." In this
passage, so suggestive of Green's Prolegomena,
Sidgwick would, no doubt, have found much with
which to disagree. " Capacity " and " faculty "
and " satisfaction " and " finding rest " are, he
would tell us, ethically unmeaning, except on a
frank admission of the hedonistic doctrine.

The preceding examination of Mill, Kant and

Butler is liable to misinterpretation. From the

fact that many of Sidgwick's doctrines are to be

found in these three moralists it might be argued

that he has no claim to be called an independent

moralist. Such an argument is, however, almost

4

50 SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS.

too trivial to notice. No modern moralist can be
original in the strict sense ; he cannot promulgate
absolutely new doctrines. But he can be original
in tone, in spirit, in arrangement, in method.
This Sidgwick was. At any rate it is certain that
if we deny originality to the Methods of Ethics we
shall have to deny it to almost, if not quite, all
modern ethical works. Moreover, the critical
element in the Methods of Ethics^ an element of
enormous value and importance, is markedly
^original.

Summarising, it may be said that, so far as
positive influence can safely be traced. Mill created
in Sidgwick a sympathy with utilitarian hedon-
ism ; Kant provided him with the germ of the
important formal part of his system (by this is
meant his abstract intuitional maxims), and also
with an imposing rationalistic and juristic ter-
minology (" right," " reasonable," " objective,"
" universal," etc.) ; while Sidgwick's conviction
of the incorrigibility of moral egoism received con-
firmation from Butler. In Butler too he found
a dualism similar to that at which he had himself
arrived, and from the bishop he also derived his
conviction of the scientific inaccuracy of psycho-
logical hedonism. But the various elements,
whether thought out de novo, as many were, or
whether cautiously and scrupulously accepted from

SIDGWICK'S PREDECESSORS. 51

previous writers, were all fused into one or the
other side of the remarkable dualistic system
which is presented to us in the Methods of Ethics^
and they now appear before us stamped with a new
and remarkable impress.

CHAPTER III.
ETHICS AND EVOLUTION.

} "Ultimate ends are not, as such, phenomena, or laws or
I conditions of phenomena : to investigate them as if they were
} seems as futile as if one inquired whether they were square or
^ round" (Sidgwick, MzW, 1886, p. 217).

Did not the phrase suggest disparagement, Sidg-
wick's ethical system might be said to be " pre-
evolutionary ". Though he wrote at a time when
the notion of development had ceased to be novel,
and was already recognised as of great cosmical
importance, few traces of the positive influence
of that notion can be found in his work. His
settled conviction was that the field of ethical
thought must be kept free from the invasion
of naturalistic ideas and methods. We find an
emphatic expression of this conviction in the first
edition of the Methods^ and though his view
became modified in succeeding years,^ he was to
the end consistent in minimising the ethical im-
portance and sceptical in accepting the ethical
conclusions of evolutionary philosophy.

^ See preface to the second edition.
(52)

ETHICS AND EVOLUTION. 53

Several problems, more or less distinct, are sug-
gested for consideration in this connection.

t I. Does the theory of development affect in any
• '^^y (^'K"> ^^^^ ^^ discredit) our existing moral
I intuitions ?

To this Sidgwick's answer is an emphatic
negative.

Tn the first edition of the Methods (p. 185) he
draws a specific distinction between the existence,
the validity, and the origin of moral intuitions.
It is quite illegitimate, he virtually tells us^ to infer,
that a moral judgment is valid because it exists,
or because it is " original " or " innate " in the
individual : it may, on appeal to some higher
m tuition or judgment, be discredited. It is equally
illegitimate to throw suspicion upon a moral judg-
ment because it has been " evolved ". The first
is the besetting error of popular intuitionism, the
second that of modern " scientific '' writers.

" The illegitimacy of this inference ^ will, I
think, be allowed as soon as it is clearly contem-
plated. It has been encouraged partly by an
infelicitous transference of the language and con-
ceptions of chemistry to psychology. In chemistry

^ That an " evolved " judgment is necessarily of only doubt-
ful value.

54 ETHICS AND EVOLUTION.

we regard the antecedents (elements) as still exist-
ing in and constituting the consequent (compound)
because the latter corresponds to the former in
some of its properties (weight, etc.), and because
we can generally cause the compound to disappear
and obtain the elements in its place. But there is
nothing similar to this in the formation of new
mental phenomena by what Mill calls " mental
chemistry " and therefore this term seems inap-
propriate. The new mental fact is in no respect
correspondent to its antecedents nor can it be
resolved into them : nor does the fact that these
antecedents have pre-existed render the consequent
illusory and unreal. . . . Why should our earliest
beliefs and perceptions be more trustworthy than
our latest, supposing the two to differ.? The
truths of the higher mathematics are among our
most secure intellectual possessions, yet the power
of apprehending these is rarely developed until the
mind has reached maturity. ... It is hard to see
why a different view should be taken in the case
of moral intuitions.''

That there is much truth in this argument, and
that its vigorous affirmation is apt and timely in
face of excessive evolutionary pretensions,^ few

^ As for example : " Morals are relative, not absolute ; there
is no fixed standard of right and wrong by which the actions
of all men throughout all time are measured " (Clodd, Sto?-y of

ETHICS AND EVOLUTION. 55

ethical students are likely to deny. Man is bound
to assume, or at least always ^^j^j" assume, that truth
can be known, whatever be the process by which
he comes to its apprehension. The errors and
superstitions of the past give us, no doubt, grounds

I for caution and scepticism ; " the liability to error
is more equally distributed among human beings
than the consciousness of such liability ".^ Still,
however " conscious of such liability " we may
become, we cannot fall back on thorough agnos-
ticism. The latter view (as idealist writers have
pointed out time upon time), is self-destructive.
If every " evolved '' mental state or belief is
necessarily open to doubt and suspicion, then
the doctrine of evolution, and even agnosticism
itself, are both insecure. Truth must be examined
(yi^ J tSL^ merits,- natv-i^ii^its Jineage. So farSidg^
wick's protest against overweening evolutionism is
valid.

But from the first, his view has been vigorously

the Creation, p. 220). Doubtless the standard is, in one sense,
not " fixed," and yet it must have some element of permanence,
or all presen'-day judgments (Mr. Clodd's included) are based
on quicksands. The art of Raphael is an advance on that of
Cimabue ; evolutionism is an advance on Ionic hylozoism ; such
admissions as these imply a standard which is regarded as, in
part, permanent. Mr. Alexander's treatment of this subject is
good {Moral Order and Progress).
'^ Mind, 1900, p. 10.

56 ETHICS AND EVOLUTION.

attacked. Sir Frederick Pollock ^ took up the
"^ cudgels on behalf of evolutionism, contending that
the knowledge of how a faculty originated does
give us some grounds for trusting or distrusting
it^ If we are satisfied that the course of develop-
ment is " in the right direction " ^ we have prima
facie evidence in favour of the beliefs and judgments
which have been developed.

One of the ablest of early critics of the Methods
was Mr. Alfred Barratt^ author of Physical Ethics,
In the second volume of Mind under the title,
" The ' Suppression ' of Egoism," he contributed
what, with one exception, was the keenest criticism
to which Sidgwick's work has ever been exposed.
To some extent, as will afterwards be shown, he
misunderstood the book_he_3r^-xriticisingj_ still
our concern, at present, is not with the difficult
question of egoism, but with the possibility of a
naturalistic interpretation of ethics such as was ad-
vocated by Mr. Barratt and strongly opposed by
fSidgwick. " A belief," says Barratt, "cannot be
more valid than its data, and therefore if we dis-
cover the origin of our present beliefs, we shall
have, at any rate, a maximum measure of their
validity. . . . The scientific system of ethics . . .

iM/W, 1876, p. 334.

2 But what is the " right " direction ? Does not this assume
the point at issue X

ETHICS AND EVOLUTION. 57

shows you why you ought to aim at pleasure by
proving that you do so aim, and that ' ought to '
is compounded out of ' is '. . . . Science proves
hedonism^ but proves it in the egoistic form." ^
Against all such sweeping naturalistic interpreta-
, tions of ethics Sidgwick's words hold good. " Eth-
ical conclusions can only be logically reached by
starting with ethical premisses." '^ The " beliefs "
to which Mr. Barratt refers can only be " unrea-
soned " or " unexamined " beliefs, the prejudices
of race, class or creed, our childish inheritances
and superstitions. Against these, the evolutionary
and historical school of writers may legitimately

1 "The 'Suppression' of Egoism," Mind, 1877, p. 167. M.
Guyau also opposes Sidgwick on this important question.
" Selon nous, la question qui parait ici secondaire a M. Henri
Sidgwick est au contraire la principale. Si I'ecole de I'associa-
tion ou celle de revolution me montre dans mes sentiments
moraux de simples transformations de I'instinct, si elle diss^que
ma pretendue conscience morale et la r^sout en des elements
purement physique, si elle reduit en meme temps l^autorite des
lois morales a la force de I'habitude, de I'heredite, de I'instinct,
comment soutenir que cette autorite subsiste neanmoins pleine et
entiere, et que I'opinion qui ram^ne I'origine des sentiments
moraux a une transformation de I'egoTsme est compatible avec
la doctrine intuitive comme avec la doctrine utilitaire, comme
avec la doctrine egoiste ? " {La Morale Anglais e Contemporaine,
deuxi^me edition, pp. 145-46).

2 Mr. Barratt on "The 'Suppression' of Egoism," Mind, 1877,
pp. 411-IZ.

58 ETHICS AND EVOLUTION.

direct their artillery. But they and we are alike
bound to assume something as valid. The epis-
temological certainty of certain principles is the
basis of all investigation, and it is puerile to quarrel
with our fundamental intuitions on the ground that
they may be erroneous. Once we have directed
the clear light of the discursive or intuitive reason
upon any field of possible knowledge, the verdict
is, for the time, final, and no account of the " evo-
lution " of the reasoning faculty is in place. Any
other standpoint than this involves us in the sloughs
of Pyrrhonism, from which neither moral intui-
tions, nor evolutionary theories, nor even "physical
ethics " can ever emerge to stand upon secure
foundations. If the philosopher has to examine
every factor which has entered in a formative
manner into his present beliefs, every early influ-
ence, every sociological stimulus, he may as well at
once abandon the hopeless task of philosophising.
Still more true is this if he has to take account
of the numberless ages of the world's evolution.

In crossing swords with these and other advo-
cates of naturalistic ethics, and in espousing the
cause of man's present-day ultimate convictions,
|Sidgwick reveals himself as the protagonist of in-
jtuitionism. We cannot, he would say, get behind
.our ultimate intuitions ; these must be assurned
^without proof. It is interesting to note (this has

ETHICS AND EVOLUTION. 59

been already pointed out) how he directs this
vigorous intuitionary fusillade not only against
evolutionary philosophers but also against a very
different foe, the critical philosophy.^ " How/'
he would say, " can knowledg^e criticise itself ?
Must it not assume its own j^aiyity It is

interesting also to see how closely he here ap-
proaches to one of the cardinal doctrines of his
antagonist Green. The words placed at the head
of this section remind us powerfully of the Oxford
professor's bold challenge, " Can the knowledge
of nature be itself a part or product of nature .f* "
Differing among themselves on certain matters of
detail, Green and Sidgwick presented a united
front against those who attempted to subvert the
fundamental facts of knowledge and morality on
the ground that these facts were the products of
evolution.

It must, however, be conceded to Sidgwick's
opponents that the historical method is of con-
siderable use as atleasT~a~~pfOpsedeutrc to ethiea;-
To trace the growth of false beliefs and prejudices,"
to trace the course of evolution, to trace the in-
fluence upon morality of the sociological factor, all
this cannot fail to clarify our ethical vision. The
historical method is not useless, though its use for

1 "A Criticism of the Critical Philosophy," Mind, 1883, pp.
69, 313-

60 ETHICS AND EVOLUTION.

directly ethical purposes may have been grossly
exaggerated. Some further reference to this ques-
tion will be made in the following section.

11. The psychological nature of desire. Are all
desires desires for pleasure ? Does evolution throw
light upon this question ?

The question whether all desires are directed__
towards pleasure has been so frequently debated
by English psychologists and moralists that only
a very brief treatment of this undeniably impor-
tant problem will here be attempted. We are
sometimes told that ethics and her sister studies
are unprogressive ; that the same elementary pro-
blems are being discussed to-day as were discussed
by ancient Greek and by early English moralists.
But there can, at any rate, be no doubt as to the
substantial advance which has been made in the
treatment of the present limited problem, and this
increased clearness and correctness is due, in large
measure, to Sidgwick himself. Even the ter-
minology which has been generally accepted for
use in this branch of philosophy is due to him.

" The two elements of MilFs view which I
am accustomed to distinguish as psychological
hedonism [that each man does seek his own happi-
ness] and ethical hedonism [that each man ought

ETHICS AND EVOLUTION. 61

to seek the general happiness] both attracted me,
and I did not at first perceive their incoherence "
(Preface to sixth edition of the Methods : Mind^
April, 1 90 1, p. 287). Fortunately, however, the
perception of their incoherence at last occurred,
and, as a result, we find presented to us in the
Methods of Ethics^ the somewhat novel spectacle
of an emphatic denial of psychological hedonism
accompanying an approval of ethical hedonism.
There are many moralists who refuse to accept the
latter element of Sidgwick's teaching, while accept-
ing with gratitude the former. There are few,
indeed, who will deny that our philosopher has
placed psychological hedonism in the limbo of
exploded heresies, from which its future release is
highly improbable.

Man does not normally aim at pleasure. Sidg-
wfck, it is generally supposed, learnt this important
fact from his master, Butler,^ though there is every
reason to believe that such a keen introspectionist
may have discovered it unaided. It is obvious
that he has treated the question in a far more
precise and scientific manner than was possible to
his predecessor of a century before. " Butler," he
says, " has certainly overstated his case, . . . for
many pleasures . . . occur to me without any

^ The preface to the sixth edition of the Method's, puts this
point now beyond doubt.

62 ETHICS AND EVOLUTION.

preceptible relation to previous desires. . . . But
... it appears to me that throughout the whole
scale of my impulses, sensual, emotional and intel-

j lectual alike, I can distinguish desires of which the
object is something other than my own pleasure "
(^Methods, p. 46). A man normally desires /A/;7^j,
not pleasure ; the latter is a phenomenon which
arises subsequently, but which would never arise
at all were there not initial desires for objects
other than it. Having once been experienced, the
pleasure may, no doubt, stimulate to future activity ;
it may give rise to a " secondary desire '* (p. 47),
which, however, is quite distinct in nature from
the primary desires for objects.

Now all this is important. If hedonism is the
true system of ethics, we should expect it to be, to
a considerable extent at least, in conformity with

\ psychological facts. We should, of course, also'

I expect it to go beyond these and prescribe an ought ;

' still of any two ethical theories, the one which
stands in fullest agreement with the normal facts
of life, must, other things being equal, be regarded
as the more satisfactory. By this test hedonism
stands condemned. Man's normal life is not
regulated on an approximately hedonistic plan.

This fact becomes obvious when Sidgwick's
acute analysis of desire is examined in detail. An
objector on the hedonistic side might claim that

ETHICS AND EVOLUTION. 63

though a desire is per se a desire for an ohject and
iot a desire for pleasure, yet the intensity of
satisfaction which arises when the desire is realised
I is proportional to the intensity of the desire itself.
Thus the intensity of the desire would be at least
symbolic of the intensity of the attainable pleasure.
But no. PkasuraWeiiess-is-Jiat-a.-sinaple„i^^
of the intensity of desire. " I do not judge pleasures
to be greater and less exactly in proportion as they
exercise more or less influence in stimulating the
will to actions tending to sustain or produce them "
{Methods^ p. 126). "Mr. Bain's identification
lof * pleasure and pain ' with motive power does
jnot appear to me to accord with experience " (p.
127).

In short, human nature is not built upon a
^sd-Qlligtifin SChXtinai. P^sire, on Sidg wick's view,
"is not desire for pleasure^ neither is it aversion
from pain ; further, it is in itself neither necessarily,
painful nor pleasurable ; ^ still less is its intensity
proportional to the intensity of the pleasure of
satisfaction, or of the pain of deprivation. Es^slliS-
logical hedonism, in short, is a fiction.

Mr. Alfred Barratt was not satisfied with Sidg-
wick's argument, and maintained that, despite
certain disturbing causes (such disturbing causes

^ Mr. Marshall has criticised Sidgwick here: M/W, 1892
passim.

64 ETHICS AND EVOLUTION.

are not unknown to physical science) human action
is really hedonistic. " I reasonably assume that
motives follow laws analogous to those of other
forces." " I know pleasure to be a motive, and I
know no other." ^ No doubt the idea of a distant
pleasure is far weaker than that of an immediate
one, and no doubt also the effects of habit may
interfere to prevent the law of strict proportion-
ality from apparently holding good. But, he says,
similar interferences have to be recognised in other
matters, and yet scientific laws are, after all, valid.
Habit, for example, may be compared to the
friction which prevents the easy working of a
lever ; the feeble effect of distant pleasures may
be illustrative of a law similar to that of inverse
squares ; yet in spite of such facts as these, the
fundamental law may be that of proportionality
between pleasure and desire. The attraction of
two electrical charges obeys the law of propor-
tionality, a law not suppressed by the other law,
that of distances, nor by the existence of friction.
Sidgwick's answer to this would probably be
that a law of strict proportionality, subject to
such enormously important exceptions as those
admitted by Mr. Barratt, has no claim to be
called a " law " at all. If habit and futurity in-
troduce deviations ; if, moreover, as Barratt goes
iMzW, 1877, p. 167.

ETHICS AND EVOLUTION. 65

on to admit, means may be substituted for ends,
and thus a third deviation from the '* law " be
introduced, why not also admit " fixed ideas '' and
" sympathy" and action from purely ideal motives?
The law of strict proportionality can scarcely be
called a law unless it is universal, or at any rate
has only a few unimportant and easily explicable
exceptions. But inasmuch as the above admissions
are numerous and important, our "law" is obviously
more honoured in the breach than the observance,
if indeed it has any existence whatever. And in
any case Mr. Barratt's argument is virtually an
appeal to subconsciousness.

" Hedonism," says Mr. Barratt, " asserts that
original impulses were all directed towards pleasure,
and that any impulses otherwise directed are derived
from these by * association of ideas '." He explains,
however, that by this he does not mean that the
primitive attitude was subjective ; there was no
separation of object and subject ; the first object
jof desire is a " pleased state " not a " pleasant
object" or a " pleased subject".

But Sidgwick the iconoclast, the ruthless ex-
poser of plausibilities, could " find no evidence that
even tends to prove this (associational doctrine) ;
... so far as there is any difference it seems to
be in the opposite direction, as the actions of

children being more instinctive and less reflective

5

66 ETHICS AND EVOLUTION.

are more prompted by extra-regarding impulse,
and less by conscious aim at pleasure." " No
doubt/' here perhaps Sidgwick is answering the
last words quoted above, " the two kinds of
impulse, as we trace back the development of
consciousness, gradually become indistinguishable :
but this obviously does not justify us in identify-
ing with either of the two the more indefinite
impulse out of which both have been developed.
But even supposing it were found," here follows
his familiar and favourite appeal to the facts of
present-day existence, " that our earliest appetites
were all merely appetites for pleasure it would
have little bearing on the present question. What
I am concerned to maintain is that men do not
now normally desire pleasure alone " {Methods^ pp.

53-54);

A similar answer would, no doubt, be returned
to critics like Mr. Stephen, who, while admitting
{Frazers Magazine^ March, 1875) that man^s
conscious motive in acting may not be pleasure,
appears to maintain that, when subconsciousness
is also taken into account, motive may always be
hedonistic. Mr. Stephen, in fact, falls back on
subconsciousness alike for the purpose of establish-
ing determinism^ and for the purpose of establishing
psychological hedonism. Different critics will, no
^ See following chapter.

ETHICS AND EVOLUTION. 67

doubt, differ in opinion as to the amount of value
possessed by this argument. To Sidgwick, whose
constant stress was laid upon the clear verdict of
self-consciousness, its value appeared extremely
small.

If indeed it could be proved that originally all
action was hedonistic, and that at the present
time all animal action is hedonistic, would not
this proof have considerable ethical importance .f*
Probably so. It would throw light upon the ulti-
mate nature of reality, and the nature of reality
is an important question for ethics as for other
studies. If reality is hedonistic there would be a
-prima facie irrationality in man being non-hedon-
istic and thus refusing to be a " self-conscious
agent in the evolution of the universe ". In short,
the existence, at low levels, of psychological hedon-
ism would so far tend in favour of ethical hedonism
as to throw an onus probandi upon its opponents ;
this, no doubt, is the reason for the otherwise
inexplicable appeal of various hedonistic writers
to primitive instincts and to subconsciousness.
Sidgwick's refutation of psychological hedonism is
therefore significant. Neither at high nor at low
levels is man necessarily hedonistic ; nature, too,
on this question is silent or ambiguous, and thus
the way is cleared for a careful and deliberate
acceptance of any genuinely ethical doctrine whkh

68 ETHICS AND EVOLUTION.

the intuitive reason may sanction, even, perchance,
^ of ethical hedonism itself.

\^^ ///. fVkat are the causes of pleasure and pain ?

g^X" The question of the relation and supposed pro-

^ portionality between desire on the one hand and
pleasure and pain on the other having been settled,
a wider question is immediately suggested. What
are the cause^^of pleasure and pain ? Here again
evolutionists have, with much flourish of trumpets,
descended into the controversial arena, only to
receive defeat from the simple but effective critical
weapons of Sidgwick.

Since the time of Aristotle many attempts have
been made to demonstrate some definite relation
between pleasure and pain and the conditions of
the physical organism. Aristotle's theory is sub-
stantially the same as that which many modern
evolutionists still favour.

" Aristotle conceived the feeling of pleasure as
linked with every natural and normal activity of
life, and this conception is still the most general
and most probable." ^ The vista of speculation
thus opened up is, however, closed byj)idgwick,
so far, at any rate, as ethics is concerned. " There
is at present, so far as I can judge, no^^tisfactorily

1 HofFding, Psych/ogyy English translation, p. 272.

ETHICS AND EVOLUTION. 69

established general theory of the causes of pleasure
andpam^; and such theories as have gained a
certain degree of acceptance, as partially true or
probable, are certainly not adapted for the practical
application that we here require." ^ These words
summarise his whole position. The hedonistic and
^ algonistic doctrines of evolutionary philosophers
are doubtful in theory and useless in practice.

Take, for example, Spencer's doctrine that pains
are the psychical concomitants of excessive or
deficient actions of organs, while pleasures are the
concomitants of medium activities. It is true, as
Sidgwick points out (Methods, p. 183), that many
intense actions or sensations are painful, but " in
none of these cases does it seem clear that pain
supervenes through a mere intensification in degree
of the action of the organ in question ; and not
rather through some change in the kind of action
— some inchoate disintegration or disorganisation ".
In still worse plight is Wundt's view,^ that all
sensations are pleasant at certain intensities, and
only pass into unpleasantness as the intensity
increases ; on the contrary, says .jaur. xritk^ome
sensations are never pleasant whatever their in-

"^ Methods J p. 178.

2 A view to which Professor James also inclines {Text-book of
Psychology, p. 17). Most cautious recent psychologists support
Sidgwick's view, e.g.. Dr. Stout {Manual, pp. 217-18, first edition).

vT^O^'

/,

70 ETHICS AND EVOLUTION.

tensity, hence their unpleasantness is due, not
to their quantitative nature, but to some quali-
tative peculiarity in the corresponding nervous
action. The pains arising from disease, from
the destruction of some organ, from improper (as
distinguished from insufficient) food, and from
emotional causes, seem to be explicable only by
qualitative not quantitative considerations. Con-
nected with this view is Sidgwick's treatment of
desire. Desire, he considers, is not necessarily
painful ; it may be keen, and yet on the whole
pleasant.^ Only when actual destruction of tissue
commences does desire give rise to a really painful
state.

But whether we regard the causes of pain as
qualitative or quantitative, in either case our
theories are ethically useless, " since we have no
general means of ascertaining independently jof_
our experience of pain itself, what nervous actions
are excessive or disorganised " (M^'/Z/o^/j-, p. 185).
How ludicrous, then, appear at the present stage
of knowledge the proud attempts to deduce " from

(the laws of life and the conditions of existence,
what kinds of actions necessarily tend to produce
unhappiness " ; we have, after all, to fall back upon
the plain, rough-and-ready, old-fashioned method

^ A view opposed by Mr. Marshall (see controversy in Mind,
1892).

ETHICS AND EVOLUTION. 71

of empirical hedonism ! Even admitting that
pleasure, like virtue, resides somewhere in the
mean, " it must be admitted that this proposition
gives no practical directions for attaining it ".

There is no need to follow out into its details
Sidgwick's keen and discriminating criticism of
the various modifications of Aristotle's view put
forward by modern evolutionary writers. His
negative treatment of this question probably can-
not be improved upon in the present state of our
knowledge. No doubt evolutionists are on the
track of important discoveries, and their patient
attempts to ascertain the precise conditions of
pleasure and pain will some day yield valuable
fruit. But Sidgwick's discussion has shown clearly
enough that the subject is enormously profound
and complex. A formula may hold good for the
simpler pleasures of the senses, and yet fail utterly
when applied to appetitive pleasures, or be absolutely
grotesque when applied to aesthetic pleasures or to
the pleasures of " conscience " or affection. The
scientific formulas dealing with this subject have
hitherto proved themselves adequate only to the
explanation of limited groups of facts ; when
applied to the entire group they are found to be
utterly and even ludicrously inadequate, to be
nothing but examples of those " overhasty attempts
at construction " which Sidgwick loved to expose.

72 ETHICS AND EVOLUTION.

IV. Can hedonism be buttressed up by the substitu-
tion of-"- preservation^' ''''quantity of life ^"^ '•''health^''
or any such criterion^ for ''''pleasure'' as the im-
mediate object of pursuit?

The last section has touched in brief upon
the various scientific attempts to trace out some
causal relation between pleasure and pain on
the one side, and physiological conditions on the
other. We have seen that in the present state
of physiology, a science crowded with unsolved
and enormously complex problems,^ we have no
knowledge of any causal relation which is even
approximately universal. Is it not possible, how-
ever, after retracing our steps to a more definitely
psychical standpoint, to borrow from science
some guidance .? Does not the doctrine of evolu-
tion suggest that " preservation " or " survival,"
perhaps even " health " or " equilibrium " may
\\ be good working aims of a rational creature,
^^ conscious of his origin .? He may still remain

a hedonist by conviction ; but can he not get
rid of the difficulties in applying hedonism to
practice, by aiming not directly at pleasure but at
one of these other ends ^.

^ Consider in this relation the highly interesting recent
revival of vitalism — a revival which shows that physiologists
are becoming more and more convinced of the almost over-
whelming difficulties of their subject.

ETHICS AND EVOLUTION. 73

By a process of natural selection, all beings which
in seeking^leasuxe^.^^^ ways jnjur ious to

self _or othersjjtej^ while those which

seek pleasure in healthy and beneficial actions,
tend to live, flourish and leave offspring. Hence
there has arisen a kind of _^^rTespai]LdeJice-.,..he=-
tween pleaSLur.e.and4)reservation. A pleasant act is
generally a beneficial act ; pain is usually symbolic
of injury. Why then, dropping pleasure as our
immediate object of pursuit, should we not aim
directly at preservation and still remain hedonists .?
^Such is Spencer's argument (quoted pp. 190-91,
Methods of Ethics).

Sidgwick is as merciless to this as to the
other ethico-scientific constructions. A disadvan-
tage, he points out, is not necessarily got rid of
/ by natural selection ; it may be counterbalanced
I by other concomitant advantages. Hence the
pleasurableness . of an experience is not an
absolute indication that this expenence is , pre-
servative or beneficial. Common a -posteriori
observation, moreover, bears out this a priori
view. Men constantly find pleasure in forms of
unhealthy conduct, or in forms of conduct
which have no material tendency to preserve life.
X Natural selection, in fact, though a highly im-
1 portant vera causa, must not be elevated into a
sole cause, and its importance is regularly diminish-

74 ETHICS AND EVOLUTION.

ing with the progress of society {Methods^ pp.

I9i;92).

Similarly with Mr. Stephen's view that the
" health " or " efficiency " of the social organism
should be taken as the practically ultimate aim
{Methods^ pp. 469-71). This view is unsatis-
factory for at least two reasons. Preservation
may be possible without any important degree of
happiness being attained ; while many important
pleasures are not preservative in tendency, e.g.^
those of an ci^sthetic kind. Similarly, there are many
pains which are not, to any important degree, de-
structive of the individual or of society. In short
preservation and happiness are not proportional.

But Mr. Stephen's view is unsatisfactory for a
second reason. " Social health " is claimed to

" satisfy the conditions of a scientific criterion "
as being far more precise and applicable to social
problems than the criterion of happiness. But in
. point of fact it is not so, and cannot be so until
^ sociology is in a more satisfactory state. Inasmuch
as Mr. Stephen criticises adversely the present state
of sociology, it is hard to see how he can bring
forward such claims on behalf of " social health "
as a working criterion.

Will " quantity of life'* serve our purpose
better } Not at all. It is not clear that intense or
full life is on the average necessarily the happiest.

ETHICS AND EVOLUTION. 75

But even if this were so it does not follow that we
shall gain maximum pleasure by aiming merely at
intensity of consciousness ; for many intense states
are neutral. or. even- very. painful {Methods ^^p. 192).
Suppose, however, we include in " quantity of
life " not only intensity but also multiplicity and
variety. Suppose, in other words, we aim at self-
development. But although there is a measure of
truth in the view that a harmony or balance of
functions is conducive to happiness, yet this har-
mony is a very elastic one. " The point where
concentration ought to stop, and where dissipation
begins, varies from man to man " (^Methods, pp.

192-93)-'

Or suppose again that we act on the maxim,

" Give free play to impulse." on the ground that

impulse has, through the operation of natural

selection, become a good guide to the hedonic

goal. This view again contains an element of

truth, but it is incapable of becoming a satisfactory

guide to action. For (^d) the impulses fostered by

natural selection tend to race preservation rather

than to the pleasure of the individual ; (^) conscious

comparison and inference are at least as likely to

^ A similar argument is worked out in opposition to those
who take development of the social organism (not merely
development of the individual) as the practical end {Methods,
P- 470-

76 ETHICS AND EVOLUTION.

be safe guides as impulse, and in many cases are
found to be so.

Hence " we seem forced to conclude that there is
no scientific short cut to the ascertainment of the
right means to the individual's happiness : every
[attempt to find a ' high priori road ' to this goal
brings us back inevitably to the empirical method"
{Methods, p. 195).^

^ The preceding chapter is a mere resum^ of Sidgwick's
arguments and possesses no originality whatever. But it
will serve a useful purpose if it calls attention to the
extraordinary keenness of Sidgwick's critical weapons, which
were never used more effectively than against the evolutionary
moralists. Chapter vi. of the second book of the Methods is,
indeed, a typical and admirable example of the negative side of
Sidgwick's teaching.

CHAPTER IV.

SIDGWICK'S TREATMENT OF THE FREE-WILL
PROBLEM.

"The q uesti^n offree- will . . . can hardly be passed with-
out some sort of struggle, even by those who — like myself —
seek to evade the sphinx rather than to solve her riddle "
(Sidgwick, Min^, 1888, p. 405).

SiDG wick's view of the place in ethics of the
free-will question was a somewhat unusual one ;
he_regarded it as of no fundamental importance
to the constructive moralist. Ethical speculation
concerning the rightness and wrongness of actions,
was, according to him, unaffected by the discussion
and decision of this thorny problem ; its settle-
ment need not, therefore, be demanded of the
moral philosopher.

In conformity with this conviction of the ethical
unimportance of the question, Sidgwick's treatment
'thereof is necessarily scanty. He illumines what
may be called the fringe of the subject with some
lucid discussion, but only two paragraphs of his
work are devoted to a frontal attack upon the
problem itself.

(77)

78 SIDGWICK'S TREATMENT OF

A comparison of the first with all later editions
of the Methods brings out an interesting change of
exposition. In the first, after reviewing the many
deterministic arguments and fully admitting their
cogency, he nevertheless ranged himself _on J he_
libertarian side.^ *' This almost overwhelming
(deterministic) proof seems more than balanced by
a single argument on the other side : the immedi-
ate ajffirmation of consciousness in the moment of
deliberate volition. It is impossible for me to
think, at such a moment, that my volition is
completely determined by my formed character
and the motives acting upon it " (first edition,
p. 51). Influenced possibly by Mr. Stephen's
criticism {Fraxer's Magazine, March, 1875) ^^
saw fit to withdraw this definite pronouncement in
favour of libertarianism ; for in the second and
subsequent editions, though emphasis is still laid
upon the libertarian verdict of self-consciousness,
an^attitude of strict impartiality on the question
as a whole is maintained. The passage above
quoted appears in the following modified form :
"Against the formidable array of cumulative
evidence ofi^ered for determinism there is to be
set the immediate affirmation of consciousness

^ On page 45 (first edition) he says, however, " The * Free-
dom of the Will' presents itself to me as an unsolved problem
, , , I am forced tQ suspend my judgment on the question ",

THE FREE-WILL PROBLEM. 79

in the moment of deliberate action. Certainly
when I have a distinct consciousness of choosing
between alternatives of conduct, one of which I
conceive as right or reasonable, I find it impos-
sible not to think that I can now choose to do
what I so conceive" (p. 65).
, This solitary though undeniably powerful and
/time-honoured argument from self-consciousness
I has be^n, as we should expect, seized upon by
■libertarians^ (Martineau, 'Types of Ethical Theory^
vol. ii, p. 40, third edition ; Maher, Psychology^ p.
410, fourth edition) and vigorously attacked by
determinists (Stephen, Frazers Magazine^ March,
1875). ^^^ argument probably cannot be admitted
as flawless if regarded (which it should not be) as
a final pronouncement. " My conviction of free

I choice may be illusory," " Sidgwick admitted.
The real question is whether self-consciousness
is a reliable and omniscient witness ; if it is not,
it cannot pronounce a volition to be free in
an absolute or cosmic sense. Until introspection

1 One libertarian, however, Professor Calderwood, writing with
the third edition of the Methods before him, regards Sidgwick
as predominantly a determinist {Handbook^ fourteenth edition,
pp. 193-203). The "balancing" proclivities of Sidgwick's
mind seem fated to make his interpreters differ among them-
selves.

2 " I cannot believe it to be illusorv," he had said in the first
edition (p. 51).

80 SIDGWICK'S TREATMENT OF

can penetrate into the remotest abysses of motive
and impulse, its witness is not infallible. We can-
not fully know ourselves. " Mr. Sidgwick's appeal
to the consciousness is therefore an appeal to a
judge not in possession of the necessary facts "
(L. Stephen, Frazers Magazine, March, 1875).^
This inherent defect in the adduced testimony
was not brought out with sufficient clearness in
the first edition, though even there the existence of
latent factors in volition was not ignored (footnote,
p. 46).

Sidgwick's subsequent expositions are, however,
free from any reproach on this ground. " If I
knew my own nature I might see it to be pre-
determined that, being so constituted and in
such circumstances I should act " in a certain
way (p. (i^^. If Spinoza had been a favourite
philosopher of Sidgwick this point might perhaps
have received greater attention, for it was Spinoza
who first explained satisfactorily the apparent
cogency of the libertarian witness of self-con-
sciousness. " Men think themselves free inas-
much as they are conscious of their volitions

1 Similarly Fowler {Principles of Mora/s, pp. '^^o-'^i) : "It
may be replied that ... I am not sufficiently acquainted with
all the springs of action, and their relative force ". Hence " the
antinomy is not really resolved in either direction by Professor
Sidgwick's argument ".

THE FREE-WILL PROBLEM. 81

and desires and never even dream, in their ignor-
ance, of the causes which have disposed them so
to wish and desire." ^ Clifford, in like manner,
has contended that the appeal to introspection
involves an inconsistency ; self-consciousness is
supposed to be competent to assure me of the
non-existence of something which, by hypothesis,
is not in my consciousness, i.e.^ the subconscious
influences ; "^ or, in the words of one of the ablest
of recent expositors of determinism, " self-con-
sciousness necessarily coincides with its effect —
the completed activity. . . . The causes which
set this activity in motion necessarily precede
self-consciousness." ^

The a£pealJxL.sd£rCOiisdQUSnessJ.s, therefore, to
some extent a superficial appeal. And yet it has a

"^ Ethics J book i., appendix (Elwes' translation), p- 75.

^Fortnightly Review, Dec, 1875.

2 Riehl, Science and Metaphysics (English translation), p. 212.
Again, Edgeworth, in the course of an able and sympathetic
examination of Sidgwick's Ethics, remarks : " If both motive
and action are not cause and effect, but co-effects of the same
physical causes, then we should (not) . . . expect action to have
conscious motive as an invariable antecedent or concomitant.
If the cause of action is not in consciousness, then action may
obey the lavir of causation, though consciousness discerns no
cause ; the doctrine of necessity is not damaged, though even
a Sidgwick may have swept the universe of consciousness with
the microscope of introspection, and found not everywhere a
cause" {JSlew and Old Methods of Ethics, p. 25).

6

82 SIDGWICK'S TREATMENT OF

*? validity of its own. The superficial view is a per-
fectly true view so far as it goes. In the words of
the writer we have just quoted, " the will must
appear free to the actor, i.e.^ from the standpoint
of subjective experience. ... In order to see the
dependence of the will on its causes we must sup-
plement subjective experience with objective." ^
This appearance of freedom — determinists would
say " illusion " of freedom — is of great ethical
importance, is, indeed, the characteristic feature
of the moral life. The numerous arguments,
ethical and psychological, which, since the time
of Leibnitz, have been based upon the hypothesis
of subconsciousness — it is upon subconsciousness
f that the determinist has to fall back — are always
open to the objection raised by Locke,-^ and though
this objection has, apparently, an ever-diminishing
degree of force for the modern mind, it is, at
any rate, useful in checking unnecessary excursions
into what is, after all, in some measure a terra
incognita. Again, an appeal to subconsciousness
may be made in the libertarian interest ; for if in
its recesses an exemplification of the law of rigid
causality may be concealed, pluralists may con-
tend that an exemplification of absolute spontaneity
or caprice may equally well be hidden. In short,
the direct appeal to subconsciousness as such is
^ Riehl, p. 206. 2 Essay, book ii., chap, i., p. 9 et seq.

THE FREE-WILL PROBLEM. 83

an appeal from which no answer...oL either kind«
can be obtained. Reasons may be alleged in
favour of certain processes occurring below the
threshold, just as the scientist may allege reasons
for the existence of infra-red or ultra-violet rays
of " light " even if these latter were not capable of
producing photographic or thermometric effects.
/But the distinctive features of the moral life are.
features of which we are acutely conscious^ and to
this extent the libertarian appeal to self-conscious-
ness is far more conclusive than the deterministic
appeal to something outside self-consciousness.

Sidgwick's one argument in favour of libertarian-
ism has, therefore, a validity of its own. Freedom
is a notion absolutely essential to the existence of
the moral life. The ethical world is the world
of (apparent) freedom. Viewed from the cosmic
standpoint, this freedom may be illusory. Viewed
from the ethical standpoint it is an indispensable
postulate. " I ought, therefore I can." The
^conscious acceptance of the view that freedom is
1 illusory would, as Sidgwick clearly pointed out,
Vundamentally revolutionise our moral notions.
" I cannot conceive myself seeing this (that my
freedom is illusory) without at the same time
conceiving my whole conception of what I now
call ' my ' action fundamentally altered : I cannot
conceive that if I contemplated the actions of my

84 SIDGWIGK'S TREATMENT OF

organism in this light, I should refer them to my
* self ' ... in the sense in which I now refer
them." '

Ethics, in short, deals with what liey; ahnve, the.
threshold of consciousness. Whatever impulses
may enter from below, they have no interest for
ethics proper until the moment when they have
so entered. Their past history, their connection
with physiological and ancestral facts, are, strictly
speaking, extra-ethical. One case no doubt is
important, the case of the passing downwards of
a set of actions from the conscious to the uncon-
scious region — in other words, the formation of
habit ; this is crucial as suggesting a possible clue
to the origin of all instincts and impulses. But
otherwise ethics has no direct concern with what
lies outside of consciousness. For facts lying
above the threshold, " freedom " is a necessary
form which cannot be sublated. This, as We have
seen, is admitted by thoughtful determinists, and
Sidgwick's treatment of the problem is therefore
justified.

It would be a departure from the plan of these
essays (which is to expound and assess, and only
occasionally to supplement certain of Sidgwick's
doctrines) to go much further into the mazes of
the free-will problem. In Jthe last resort the
1 Methods y p. 66.

THE FREE-WILL PROBLEM. 85

question, perhaps, becomes one of monism v.
pluralism. Of recent years there has been a
distinct revival of pluralism^ in philosophy, and
with it, as we should expect, of libertarianism.
But a Spinozistic monism is still all powerful in
scientific circles, and highly influential in philo-
sophical circles ; and time only will show whether
the revived Leibnitzian pluralism (some such view
appears to be favoured by writers like Professors
James and Ward) will win its way. It certainly
appears probable that the increased stress which is
i daily being laid upon the active side of conscious-
ness,'-^ and upon the implications of the moral life,
may result in a profound change of attitude on
the part of philosophy.

The length of the controversy between deter-
minists and libertarians should suggest at least one
reflection to the combatants. Both views must in
I some form or other, be true ; both views must in
\ their cruder forms, be false. Libertarianism must
be^false if it means lawlessness ; if it means that
" you are ' accountable ' because you are a wholly
* unaccountable' creature" (Bradley, Ethical Studies^
p. ii). Nowhere in the universe must there be a
chink or cranny where primaeval chaos can retain
a foothold. Philosophers who approach ethics

^ See, e.g.y James's Will to Believe and Other Essays.
2 See article "Pragmatism," Mindy October, i^oo.

86 SIDGWICK'S TREATMENT OF

from the side of natural science are usually so
impressed by this universality of the causal principle
that they denounce " freedom " as an illusion.
From their standpoint it must indeed necessarily
appear as an illusion. From the inner standpoint
" freedom " appears as an undeniable fact, and
determinism itself as a delusion and impossibility.
Nay, freedom may assert itself as a new motive ;
the interesting psychological fact of volition for the
sake of proving one's freedom, contains, we should
hope, enough of comfort to satisfy both parties,
and indicates that there is, perhaps, no real opposi-
tion between the conflicting views. It certainly
cannot be brushed aside so easily as Maimon ^ and
other determinists would like.

It is, at any rate, an interesting fact that the
most ethereal and idealistic of all English poets
was a determinist. The mystical language of
Shelley's Prometheus Unbound is not always easy
to interpret, but there can be little doubt that the
third semichorus of Act ii.. Scene ii. is an ex-
pression, in words of the highest poetic beauty, of
the faith that consciousness of freedom is quite
conformable with a wider cosmic determinism.

The most important of the criticisms which
have been passed upon Sidgwick's treatment of the
free-will problem, has now been dealt with at
1 The Illusion of Free Will

THE FREE-WILL PROBLEM. 87

sufficient length. Only one further criticism need
here be referred to, for Professor Fowler {Mind,
1890, p. 89 ; Principles of Morals, p. 331) can
scarcely be called a critic so far as this question is
concerned ; he is in substantial agreement with
Sidgwick as to the., ethical unimportance of the
coatroiversy, and is not an extremist in its soluh-
tion. But Mr. Sdby Bigge {Mind, 1890, p. 93)
maintains that the moralist cannot, after all, treat
the question lightly. Upon Sidgwick's own con-
fession our moral notions (represented by the
terminology " ought," " self," etc.) would have
to be thoroughly revolutionised if determinism
were accepted. How, then, can the question be
indifferent .? Martineau {'Types of Ethical Theory,
pp. 42-43) is of the same opinion.

As to the " immediate affirmation of conscious-
ness in the moment of deliberate action," Mr.
Selby Bigge would be sorry to rest libertarianism
upon so narrow a basis, and one of which deter-
minists have given so good an account. He would
prefer to base libertarianism upon the existence of
the moral law ; this, as Kant maintained, is the
only and the sufficient ratio cognoscendi of freedom.
Mr. Selby Bigge also complains that Sidgwick in-
terprets libertarianism in the sense of non-deter-
mination by any laws : whereas in his own opinion
we^are determined by moral laws. He^oSJects to

88 SIDGWICK'S TREATMENT OF

what he regards as Sidgwick's error in applying
the libertarian conception to the present and the
deterministic conception to the future; in the
critic's view time has nothing to do with the case ;
we apply the libertarian conception when we are
considering what ought to happen, the deterministic
when we are considering what will happen.

Mr. Selby Bigge's remarks are from the Kantian
standpoint. His leading practical conclusion is
that because men think themselves free they are
called upon to obey the moral law, a conclusion
which, as we have seen, is not really foreign to
Sidgwick's own results.

Finally, it may be pointed out that in Sidgwick's
exposition of the consciousness of freedom there is
a slight mconsistenii^y. After properly objecting
to the Kantian identification of rational with free
action and pointing out that freedom is manifested^
as clearly in deliberate irrational action as in
j.eliberate rational action, his appeal on behalf
of freedom to the witness of self-consciousness
is based on this very identification. " Certainly
when I have a distinct consciousness of choosing
between alternatives of conduct, one of which I
conceive as right or reasonable, I find it impossible
not to think that I can now choose to do what I
so conceive," etc.^ Here, presumably, a special
1 Methods, p. 65.

THE FREE-WILL PROBLEM. 89

kind of " freedom " is attached to rational action,
and Sidgwick himself appears in the strange guise
of the " disciple of Kant " ^ who said that a man
"is a free agent in so far as he acts jjnder the_
guidance of reason " .

Still, this identification of free with rational
action does not, it appears, invalidate in anyj^a^L
the argument of the author j the witness of self-
consciousness is just as valid (or invalid) when it
testifies to a deliberate choice of irratianaLcQjadu£.t
as when it testifies to a deliberate choice of the
opposite. Why, then, is rational choice singled
out by Kant, Sidgwick, and numberless other
authors as specially " free " ? Probably for the
reason given by James (Psychology, vol. ii., p. 548) :
" We feel, in all hard cases of volition, as if the
line taken . . . were the line of greater resistance ".
But Sidgwick would admit that a deliberate choice
of the irrational and sensual is per se as " free " a
choice as that of the rational and ideal, though less
striking to the moral imagination. He was firmly
convinced that the Socratic view, 6tl ovSeU eKMv
aixaprdvei was erroneous ; " wilful sin "is a, fact ^
though a less common one than is sometimes sup-

^ Condemned on p. 58, and in the appendix to the sixth
edition of the Methods.

2 " Unreasonable Action," Mind, 1893, p. 174 (reprinted in
Practical Ethics).

90 THE FREE-WILL PROBLEM.

posed, and if so, it is, as its name implies, an exem-
plification of " free will ". But " wilful sin " is
less dramatically interesting than resistance to
" temptation " ; in the latter case, as James points
out, we speak of " conquering and overcoming our
impulses and temptation, but the sluggard, the
drunkard, the coward, never talk of their conduct
in that way or say they resist their energy, over-
come their sobriety, conquer their courage, and so
forth ". Thus the deliberate wrong-doer is re-
garded rather as relaxing than as tightening the
fibres of his being ; he is " letting himself go,"
and his choice of evil, though "free" and deliberate
is not commonly regarded as so strikingly " free "
as virtuous conduct in face of severe temptation.
But metaphysically the " freedom " is the same in
each case, and no one has done so much as Sidg-
wick to make clear this fact.^

^ See Mind, 1888, p. 405, where Sidgwick points out the
confusion between the two meanings of " Freedom ". This
article is now the appendix to the Methods.

CHAPTER V.

THE INCORRIGIBILITY OF EGOISM.

" A dubious guidance to a
despicable^ end appears to be
all that the hedonistic calculus
has to offer " (Methods of Ethics,
p. 200).

Maxim of Rational Benevo-
lence. " Each one is morally
bound to regard the good of any
other individual as much as his
own, except in so far as he judges
it to be less, when impartially
viewed, or less certainly know-
able or attainable by him "
{Methods, p. 382).

" There are strong grounds
for holding that a system of
morality, satisfactory to the
moral consciousness of man-
kind in general, cannot be con-
structed on the basis of simple
egoism" {Methods, p. 119).

" I do not find in my moral
consciousness any intuition that
the performance of duty will
be adequately rewarded and its
violation punished. ... It is
... a matter of life and death
to the practical reason that this
premiss should be somehow
obtained " {Methods, iv., last
chapter, sec. 5, first edition).

"A man may . . . hold
that his own happiness is an end
which it is irrational for him

to sacrifice to any other. . . .
This view ... is that which I
myself hold " {Methods, p. 496).
" I find it impossible ^ not
to admit the 'authority ' of self- \
love, or the * rationality^ of /
seeking one's own individual
happiness" {Methods, p. 199).

That Sidgwick was a utilitarian seems to be taken

for granted.

1 " Ignoble " (sixth edition). 2 « Difiicult " (sixth edition).
(91)

1/

92 THE INCORRIGIBILITY OF EGOISM.

No doubt there is a utilitarian element in the
Methods of Ethics, No doubt the author, on the
strength of this element, sometimes explicitly calls
himself a utilitarian.^ But, according to the present
writer*s interpretation of Sidgwick's work, its utili-
tarianism is but a thin veneer over an underlying and
invincible egoism.^ The author whose life was an
exemplification of absolute and almost hyper-
sensitive altruism, presents to careful readers of
his book a most emphatic defence of self-love.

But from the date of the first publication of the
Methods this point has seemed, to many critics,
doubtful or obscure. Many indeed have com-
pletely failed to recognise the importance attached
by Sidgwick to egoism. As recently as the present
year (1901) a discussion among students of philo-
sophy in Sidgwick's own university revealed the
fact that the cleavage of opinion is as distinct as
ever, despite the increased explicitness of successive
editions of the Methods. One section of readers
claims that egoism has been refuted and suppressed,
another that it is an integral — -nay fundamental —

^ International "Journal of Ethics, vol. x., p. 18.

^ Professor Sorley considers these words too strong, as prob-
ably they are. He admits that the case for Sidgwick's egoism
is made out in the present chapter, but considers that sufficient
justice has not been done to the exquisite balance of the two
sides of the system presented to us in the Methods.

THE INCORRIGIBILITY OF EGOISM. 93

element in Sidgwick's system. When, indeed, the
conflicting statements which head this section are
studied and contrasted, a prima facie justification
for the divergence of opinion becomes obvious.

The former of the two views — that egoism has
been refuted and suppressed — though, the writer
is convinced, a mistaken view, is of sufficient
interest and importance to deserve definite con-
sideration and refutation, in addition to the nega-
tive refutation which an exposition of the true view
will involve.

Those who regard Sidgwick as a thorough-
going utilitarian TontenTThat (to use his own
words), egoism gives but a " despicable end," and
that in_his exposition of the maxims of philosophic^
/ intuitionism (book iii., ch. xiii.) the rationality of
regarding the welfare of others equally with one's_
own is explicitly enounced. Hence self-sacrifice
is morally demanded in case of definite conflict
between the greater good of others and the lesser
good of self. The fourth book, they contend, is
but a detailed amplification of the maxim of
rational benevolence, and is conceived in a
thoroughly anti-egoistic spirit.

But what of the 'iDualisrnof the Practical
Reason " if this simple and easy utilitarian mter-
pretation of the Methods be adopted.^ The
dualism, it would be replied, is no real dualism

94 THE INCORRIGIBILITY OF EGOISM.

lat all. Man knows his duty. Utilitarianism and
M f intuitionism have been shown to harmonise into
la system, while egoism has been shown to be
I irrational, immoral and impossible. The admission
of a dualism is but a concession to the hardness of
heart of the immoral egoist. For him, as for all
men, there is but one criterion of duty ; but if he
will not be convinced, if he will not admit the
claims of morality, how can we appeal to him
except through his selfish instincts } The dualism
is therefore only a practical one, not one of specu-
lative ethics ; moral duty, interpreted in a utili-
tarian manner, stands opposed to immoral self-love.
Sufficient interest may still attach to egoism to
lead us to examine the relations between it and
the other and only sound method of ethics, but
the examination is unessential ; it is a work,
though an ' interesting one, of supererogation.
/Ethics has to investigate the nature of duty, not
/ to provide sanctions for its performance by the
I immoral. There is no theoretical need to try to
\ " square '* ^ egoism (an immoral system) with the
true view, though there is much practical need
of such a reconciliation. This, they say, is the
reason for the introduction of a theological postu-
late at the end of the Methods of Ethics.

When asked how the reconciliation of the two
^ The writer's word, not Sidgwick's.

THE INCORRIGIBILITY OF EGOISM. 95

contradictory systems can be, on their interpreta-
tion, " a matter of life and death to the practical
reason," advocates of this view repeat that for
practical purposes a reconciliation between the
mundane ethics of duty and ideal ethics may
certainly be necessary in order to give us an
absolutely complete view of the moral universe.
In an ideal system the virtuous individual, by
obtaining an adequate reward, must be seen to
have been in the long run (though all unknowing)
the soundest egoist. But, after all, the construc-
tion of Utopias in which duty and happiness never
collide is not the main work of the moral philo-
sopher. Having ascertained the true criterion of
moral action — universal happiness — his chief labour
^ is done.

In short, egoism, according to this view, is an
immoral doctrine, and has no scientific place in
Sidgwick's system.

The present writer cannot possibly agree with
this interpretation, despite the fact that so acute a
critic and so close a friend of Sidgwick's as Mr.
Leslie Stephen appears to hold it.^

^"A sufficient criterion of morality could be found in the
* greatest happiness' principle ; but the difficulty was to discover
a sufficient * sanction ' " (Mr. Leslie Stephen on " Henry Sidg-
wick," Mind, Jan., 1901). It should be pointed out, however,
that the original title of the last chapter of the Methods was

96 THE INCORRIGIBILITY OF EGOISM.

Egoism in the Methods cf Ethics is neither a
defeated foe of utilitarianism, with whom parley
is a matter merely of condescension and not of
right, nor is it a savage rebel somehow to be tamed
by an appeal to his brutal instincts. It is a_
civilised power whose authority and existence
must be maintained and recognised, nay^ whose
aufhority must be, in the long run, supreme over
all rivals.

The mistaken interpretation of Sidgwick^s atti-
tude is, as said before, no new one. One of the
ablest criticisms ^ to which the first edition of the
Methods was subjected proceeded on the assumption
that an attempt had been made therein to " sup-
press " egoism, and Mr. Bradley and other critics
made the same assumption. Again, the fact that
Sidgwick is dubbed " utilitarian " by almost general
consent and without any searching of heart, bears
witness to the fact that the triumphant egoism of
the Methods has been undetected. Nay, Sidgwick,
as pointed out above, even calls himself by this
/name. And yet a thorough-going utilitarian in-
terpretation would destroy the real significance of

"The Sanctions of Utilitarianism ". Mr. Stephen's view is not
seriously incorrect when the first edition is considered. Of this
more anon.

1 " The * Suppression ' of Egoism," by the late Mr. Alfred
Barratt, M/W, 1877, p. 167.

/

THE INCORRIGIBILITY OF EGOISM. 97

i his work. Many of its merits would, of course,
still remain ; its psychological power, its analytical
and critical acumen, its transparent sincerity. But
its most striking and original feature would be

(gone. That feature is the " Dualism of the Prac-
tical Reason," and the basis of this is the existence
of an incorrigible though moral egoism.

The true interpretation is that nowherejti the
Methods of Ethics is egoism overthrown, though
as_a_^actical system its difficulties are_unsp.aringlz^
pointed out. To the very end the author regards
it as a system equally r^l;inna1j from a mundane
point of view, with universalism, and, frpjnaxosmijc
pointof view.>jQlQre rational.,^ Universalism must
be provedjo be egoism in disguise, or ethics cannot
be completely rationalised ; this proof is therefore
a matter of" life and death," not merely for common
practical morality (many might admit this), but
for the practical reason itself. A man who deliber-
ately sacrificed his happiness for others, knowing
or believing that the sacrifice was and always
would be real and uncompensated, would be not

1 " The result of Sidgwick's recognition of three methods of
ethics . . . is . . . apart from his theological assumption . . .
intuitional hedonism . . . not intuitional utilitarianism. With
the theological postulate, it is, in the last analysis, rational
egoism" (Professor Seth, "The Ethical System of Henry
Sidgwick," Mind, April,' 1901).

7

98 THE INCORRIGIBILITY OF EGOISM.

merely foolish, or fanatical, but, from one point
of view, immoral.

The striking statement which heads the present

section may first be considered. " A dubious

guidance to a despicable end a^^^r^ to be all

that the hedonistic calculus has to offer." This

declaration, coming at the end of an examination

of egoistic hedonism and standing at the point

of transition to intuitionism, has been regarded

by many readers as indicating Sidgwick's final

attitude towards the first system. And yet on

a careful examination of the opening words of the

third book, it will be found that the declaration

is probably not that of the author, but of the

author as voicing common judgments. How

jDOSsibly could Sidgwick admit the " authority "

/of self-love, the "rationality" of seeking one's

( own individual happiness, and in the same para-

\graph denounce happiness as a " despicable end " ?

Nay, in the very declaration itself the word

" appears " is notable.

It should be pointed out as explanatory, to some

degree, of the misinterpretation of the work, that

/ the egoistic element in the Methods of Ethics

I became more pronounced in later editions than

I it was in the first. With diminishing stress upon

the " impulse to do what is reasonable as such "

came increasingjtress upon the " authority of self-

THE INCORRIGIBILITY OF EGOISM. 99

love ". Indeed a number of passages in the first
edition could easily lend themselves to the inter-
pretation of Mr. Stephen and the other critics who
regard Sidgwick's concluding chapter merely as
an attempted appeal to immoral egoism to be
utilitarian on egoistic principles. " It may be
granted that we seem to have proved in chapter
ii. (book iv.) that it is reasonable to take the
/greatest happiness of the greatest number as the
f ultimate end of action. But in order that this
proof may have any practical effect, a man must
have a certain impulse to do what is reasonable as

(such : and many persons will say, and probably
with truth, that if such a wish exists in them at
all it is feeble in comparison with other impulses :
and that they require, some much stxonger,.induce-
ment to do what is right than this highly abstract
and refine3~"desire^' {Methods, last cHapter, § i,
first edition)? Passages of this kind bear out Mr.
Stephen's interpretation, that while Sidgwick re-
garded utilitarianism as alone moral, and egoism
as thoroughly immoral, he considered that there
I was a practical necessity for inducing the immoral
egoist to be a utilitarian, and that such an induce-
ment was only possible in the form of sanctions,
i.e., appeals to his egoism. But no such passage
can be found in later editions. Egoism equally
with utilitarianism appears there as " right and

100 THE INCORRIGIBILITY OF EGOISM.

reasonable," nay, as so much more reasonable than

its rival that unless the latter can somehow be

" squared " with the former, " it would seem neces-

^^j^ sary to abandon the idea of rationalising morality

{completely " {Methods, p. 507). " The relation, of

rational egoism to rational benevolence is . . . the

profoundest problem of ethics. My final view (on

this) is given in the last chapter of this treatise "

{Methods, p. 387, note). If these words mean

anything they mean that two systems of morality

are in conflict ; not a moral system with an im-

sjj" moral. It is not a question, as Mr. Stephen

xj^ fe/ thinks, of how the egoist can be induced by sanc-

j6 rfV'5^ tions to act in a utilitarian fashion, but whether he

^X^\qJ ought ever to sacrifice himself for others ; whether

^ '^ ^ I it would not be, for him, wicked and immoral, so

f/ 'to do.

Sidgwick can scarcely be said to have seriously
changed his view as to the relations of the two
systems, for the admission of the " rightness " of
egoism is found in the first edition, and even in the
same chapter from which we have just now quoted.
He declares as he draws his discussion to a close
that " we cannot but admit, with Butler, that jt^ is
ultimately reasonable to seek one's own happmessj^'
{Methods iv., last paragraph, first edition). But
later editions bear witness to an increasing explicit-
ness of conviction that egoism is to be reckoned

K

THE INCORRIGIBILITY OF EGOISM. 101

with, not as an immoral stumbling-block in the
way of the performance of the right and reasonable,
but as itself right and reasonable.

The following are Sidgwick's remarks upon the
possibility of a " proof" of utilitarianism addressed
to the egoist.^

" If the egoist strictly confines himself to stating
his conviction that he ought to take his own happi-
ness or pleasure as his ultimate end there seems
n£ opening for any line of reasoning to lead him
to universalistic hedonism as a first principle ; it
h cannot be proved that the difference between his own
I happiness and another s happiness is not for him all
\ important. In this case all that the utilitarian can
do is to effect as far as possible a reconciliation
between the two principles, by expounding to the

(egoist the sanctions (as they are usually called) of
rules deduced from the universalistic principle, i.e.^
by pointing out the pleasures and pains that may
\ be expected to accrue to the egoist himself from
the observance and violation respectively of such

^ The italicised words are extremely important, but are, be
it noted, found only in the first edition.

Again, "I can conceive no possible way of meeting this
(egoistic) objection except ... by exhibiting the necessary
universality of the ultimate end as recognised by reason : by
showing that the fact that I am I cannot make my happiness
intrinsically more desirable . . . than the happiness of any
other person " (Book iii., ch. xiii., § 5, first edition).

102

THE INCORRIGIBILITY OF EGOISM.

rules. It is obvious that such an exposition has
no tendency to make him accept the greatest
happiness of the greatest number as hi^^iltimate
end ; but only as a means to the end of his own
happiness. It is therefore totally different from
a proof (as above explained) of universalistic
hedonism. When, however, the egoist puts. forward
implicitly or explicitly the proposition that his
happiness or pleasure is good (^or objectively desir-
able^^ not only for him but from the point of view
of the universe ... it then becomes relevant to
point out to him that his happiness cannot be a
more important part of good, taken univ^ersally,
than the equal happiness of any other person {the
mere fact that he is he can have nothing to do with
its objective desirability or goodness^ " {Methods^ p.
420).

The issues lie before us now with perfect clear-
ness. If we can induce the egoist to admit that
the mere fact that " he is he " is an indifferent fact
and that there is something " objectively desirable "
apart from his own personality, then utili tar ianism_
is " proved ". But if the egoist is obstinate and
refuses to admit " objective or intrinsic desirability,"
if he clings — and his name implies that he will — to
his own egoistic feelings and interests, then there
is no possible transition for him to utilitarianism.
Be it observed that he is not immoral in so refusing,

u THE INCORRIGIBILITY OF EGOISM. 103

for pEe^afioffMty {i.e., the morality]! of self-love

has been repeatedly admitted.

Now it is obvious that such a refusal is the
only possible course open to an egoist. For him
to admit " objective desirability " in the sense of
desirability apart from his own personality would
be to admit that he is not and never has been an
egoist at all. To ask him to admit the fact that
** he is he *' to be an indifferent fact, would be to
demand exactly the last thing he would be willing
to admit. He is by hypothesis an egoisJL: his
individuality is, for him, of supreme importance,
and he finds encouragement for his egoism in the
declarations of respectable moralists like Butler
and Sidgwick who both admit that it is right and
reasonable to seek one's own happiness. If, then,
the only transition to utilitarianism is by getting
/ /the egoist to renounce his egoism (i.e., his egoistic
I morality) there can be no transition at all. Sidg-
^wick in his first edition seemed almost^ to hold
that this transition was possible. But further
reflection, stimulated perhaps by the criticisms of
Barratt and Bradley, appears to have convinced
him of its difficulty if not impossibility.

The most notable of all his declarations on this

^ " Almost." The long paragraph quoted above is extremely
balanced and non-committal. But if there is any leaning it is,
apparently, to the utilitarian side.

/

104 THE INCORRIGIBILITY OF EGOISM.

question was made in reply to a critic who, unlike
so many of Sidgwick's readers, had detected the
underlying egoism of his system. Professor
Gizycki was a thorough-going utilitarian, and as

such he objected to the admission of the rationality
of egoism, and to the consequent disastrous. dualism
of the practical reason. " Professor Sidgwick has
not proved that the method of egoism, beside

(being a possible method, and one often in actual
use, is also an ethical method " (^International
Journal of Ethics^ 1890, p. 120),

Sidgwick in response^ " suppHes the mjssing^^^^
!ment"XM/W, 1889, pp. 483-85) : "The distinc-
tion between any one individual and any other is
\^ real, and fundamental, and consequently ' I ' am

concerned with the quality of my existence as an
individual in a sense fundamentally important, in
which I am not concerned with the quality of the
existence of other individuals. If this be admitted,
' the proposition that this distinction is to be taken
as fundamental in determining the ultimate end
of rational action for an individual cannot be
disproved ; and to me this proposition seems self-
evident although it prima facie contradicts the
equally self-evident proposition that my good is
no more to be regarded than the good of another.'*

^To Gizycki's more elaborate criticism, Vlerteljahrsschrift
fUr Wissenschaftliche Philosophie, 1880, p. 114.

THE INCORRIGIBILITY OF EGOISM. 105

This same explicit pronouncement is repeated in
the later editions of the Methods^ though the form
is in a very slight degree weakened {Methods^ pp.
495-96). Its effect is decisive. Egoism, admittedly
moral2_£^^«£/Jbe^ot^id of.

If there is nothing seriously inappropriate in
combining statements found in the first edition
with statements found in the last, the demonstra-
tion that Sidgwick was not, except in a superficial
sense, a utilitarian, is complete.

{a) "I can conceive no possible way of meeting
this (egoistic) objection except by . . . showing
that the fact that * I am I ' cannot make my happi-
ness intrinsically more desirable . . . than the
happiness of any other person " (iii., ch. xiii., § 5,
first edition). For the egoist " the mere fact that
' he is he * can have nothing to do with . . .
objective desirability or goodness."

{h) " * I ' am concerned with the quality of my
existence as an individual in a sense, fundament-
allyjmportant, in which I am not j:once^^^
the quality of the (existence of other individuals "
{Mind, 1889, pp. 483-85, and Methods, p. 496).

The ^ ' proof ' * of uydH tar ianism is therefore use-
less. The only way out of egoism is [by {a)\ to
admit that the ''I" is negligible. But [by {p)\
the " I " cannot be neglected, and thus the " only
possible way " is barred. " Pray admit," says the

106 THE INCORRIGIBILITY OF EGOISM.

/)jf^ l^ one voice, '' that your personality is of no im-
portance for morality ; pray admit that the fact
that ' you are you ' can be ignored." *' No," says
the other yoirg; " the fact that 'I am I ' is of
^ fundamental importance, come what may to con-
sistency."

^Egoism can be ethically suppressed in two ways,
though they are perhaps only superficially distinct.
I It can be shown to be based on a delusive convic-
I tion of the ethical importance of personality, or it
' can be condemned as immoral. In a following
chapter the latter attempt will be made. The
present business is to point out that Sidgwick
accepted neither mode of suppressing egoism.
Egoism is not immoral (" I ought to seek my own
Kappiness, ' self-love Ts "rational"), personality is
not a delusion negligible by ethics (" I am con-
cerned with the quality of my existence in a
fundamentally important sense ").

Objectors may perhaps urge that egoism in
Sidgwick*s system has been taken up and absorbed
into the maxim of benevolence. The__rights^jof
self^_they would say, are adequately safeguarded
when the self is recognised as ^//^ among other
selves of equal value, and-.-it-4& this which the
maxim of benevolence emphatically declares. Such
is not the present writer's interpretation of the
Methods. No doubt the self does get, as we shall

'M

THE INCORRIGIBILITY OF EGOISM. 107

later see, a very large measure of protection from
the maxim of benevolence. But it is deposed to a
position of mere equality with other selves, and on
interpretation of the maxim would permit us to
say that " I am concerned with the quality of my
I existence ... in a sense ... in which I am not
concerned with the quality of the existence of
other individuals. . . ."

The only conclusion we can draw is that egoism
in Sidgwick's philosophy comes out finally incor-
rigible, unscathed and triumphant. Entrenched
in its proud position of moral authority it can bid
defiance to the solitary maxim of benevolence ;
nay, as we shall hereafter show, there lie already
within the camp of its supposed rival the seeds of
egoistic treason.^

1 Professor Sorley has raised the following question. Is
Sidgwick's egoism only a form of the Kantian doctrine that,
while self-sacrifice is ratiQnal-fQjLXh£-.individital,.y£t, unless .on
taking a cosmic view we can see this self-sacrifice to be, after
all, compensated, the moral universe must be admitted to possess
aj^aw ^ or is Sidgwick's an absolute egoism which declares that
always and everywhere self-sacrifice is immoral ? The two views
are somewhat difficult to distinguish, though it is clear that
Kant held to the former and yet regarded himself as by no
means an egoist. Certain expressions in the last chapter of the
Methods of Ethics will bear the Kantian interpretation, but there
is some ground for holding that Sidgwick, when speaking with
his egoistic voice, sometimes went to the extreme length of the

108 THE INCORRIGIBILITY OF EGOISM.

second view. " A man . . . may hold that his own happiness is
an end which it is irrational for him to sacrifice toanij "oTher.
. . . This view ... is that which I myself hold" {Methods,
p. 496). M. Guyau also interprets Sidgwick in the latter sense.
" Selon ce philosophy, la sanction, au lieu d'etre comme pour
Kant une consequence du * devoir,' en est plutot une condition sine
qua non. Je ne puis sacrifier mon interet personnel dans la vie
presente si je ne con^ois pas ce sacrifice comme devant etre
amplement compense plus tard " {La Moral Anglaise Contem-
poraine, z^ edition, p. 148).

CHAPTER VL

THE THREE MAXIMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL
INTUITIONISM CRITICALLY CONSIDERED.

The last chapter has been expository rather than
critical. It is time to probe deeper into the
questions at stake.

An objector may retort, after reading what
precedes, " Egoism or no egoism, Sidgwick calls
himself a utilitarian, and brings forward a maxim
of * rational benevolence'. It is wasted labour to
describe him as an egoist." But no one wishes to
depict him as a pure egoist, for there is undoubtedly
in his philosophy a utilitarian element. The aim
has been but to show that this utilitarian element
has a powerful ethical adversary to overcome.
Egoism is extraordinarily well entrenched in the
Methods.

With the exception of the occasional affirmations
of the rationality of egoism and the delineation of
the summum honum in hedonistic terms, the most
important constructive part of the Methods is the,
thirteenth chapter of the third book. There we
find presented to us three important maxims which

(109)

^.-.

110 THE THREE MAXIMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL

Sidgwick regarded as intuitively certain, and these
it is necessary to examine with care.

Maxim of Rational Egoism^ Prudence^ or Self-
love. — This prescribes ^Vrftipartialj concern for all
parts of one's conscious life ". " Hereafter (as
such) is to be regarded neither less nor more than
now."

1 Maxim of Rational Benevolence. — " One is mor-
ally bound to regard the good of any other indi-
vidual as much as one's own, except in so far as
we judge it to be less when 44iipirJLialIpviewed, or
less certainly knowable or attainable."

^7 Maxim of Justice or Equity. — " If a kind of
conduct that is right (or wrong) for me is not
right (or wrong) for some one else, it must be on
the ground of some difference between the two
cases other than the fact that he and I are different
persons."

{a) The Maxim of Benevolence.

This maxim, intuitional in nature and utilitarian
in result, has peculiar interest when considered in
the light of the preceding chapter. It is supposed
by many of Sidgwick' s readers to get rid of egoism
and for this reason it had better be examined
before the other two.

In itself it is a model of clearness, and possesses
^ all the precision of a mathematical axiom. It may

INTUITIONISM CRITICALLY CONSIDERED. Ill

be regarded as based on the doc^ne_x£,lhe- iini-
formity of space. An ego here, an ego there, an
ego yonder — why favour one more than another ?
Why seek the good of the nearest ego at the
expense of the farthest ? Why seek my own good
rather than his ? Mere difference of spatial position
ought not to count with a rational being. The
mere fact that " I am I " cannot be considered as
important.

The maxim in its abstractness is gertainly posT
sessed of yalidilXi. The objection could, no doubt,
be raised that the good of an embryo statesman
may really be more important than the good of a
confirmed Hooligan ; that to do good to {e.g., to
educate) a budding genius is really more important
than to do a similar good to a nincompoop. The
objection is not without practical interest, but it
does not overthrow Sidgwick's maxim itself. The
latter, as he repeatedly pointed out, is purely
abstract. WJien^ human beings are considered qua^

man beings, and all individual differences are
ignored, the maxim certainly holds good. One
concrete sugar-plum may not be equal to another
in value, but_all sugar-plums in the abstract are
equal, and in the same way all human beings in
the abstract are equal. " One is morally bound to
regard the good of any other individual as much
as one's own, except in so far as we judge it to

1^^

112 THE THREE MAXIMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL

be less, when impartially viewed, or less certainly
knowable or attainable."

Yet despite the absence of ambiguity in the
statement of the maxim, it has probably been
widely misunderstood, and its name is certainly
somewhat unfortunate. " Benevolence " means^
for most men, conduct beneficial to oihezL.Xh3J;i
the agent ; benevolence to oneself would usually be
called by another name. And yet the maxim"
A commands the latter as well as the former kind
\of conduct. Occasionally it may dictate self-
sacrifice ; more frequently it will ally itself with
egoism. This becomes obvious when it is remem-
bered that the maxim does not sublate or ignore
the agent's self, but merely reduces it to a position
of equality with other selves. After a careful
consideration of the respective goods to self and
others which alternative courses of conduct will
bring about, the man has to choose.,.whichever
good, ia the. greater. Such a rational choice may
sometimes be in favour of the agent, sometimes in
favour of others ; it may be " selfish " or " self-
sacrificing " ; but so long as the greater good is
sincerely chosen, the conduct of the agent is moral.
When the " goods " are apparently equal, the
agent's choice is, presumably, a matter of ethical
indifference.

It is clear, then, that the maxim of beneyolencc

INTUITIONISM CRITICALLY CONSIDERED. 113

is not one of altruism. It represents no bias
whatever towards the side of self-sacrifice. To
sacrifice oneself for others without a conviction that
by such a sacrifice they will receive a greater good
than is lost by the self-sacrificer, would be absolutely
immoral, as a violation of the principle of strict
equality among the egos. The maxim will thus
condemn a vast number of acts of fantastic or
impulsive self-sacrifice. It may become a powerful
ally of egoism, and certainly contains far more
comfort for the egoist than for the altruist.

/^For, be it observed, one has only to consider
the good of others as much ^7~one*s~owh. TKe
thousand acts of heroic self-forgetfulness and self-
abnegation with which school books and military
records abound, are, in face of the maxim of
benevolence, instances of atrocious though well-
meant immorality. They cannot be approved even
on the ground of useful example, for how can
fantastic acts of self-sacrifice, in themselves immoral,
exert any influence except in the direction of
immorality ^ Nowhere in Sidgwick's system are
we told that the good of others should be considered
more than our own ; the self is therefore left in
a tolerably secure position ; egoism applauds, and
even benevolence is ever ready to smile a moderate
i approval.

There is another very considerable source of

/

114 THE THREE MAXIMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL

comfort for the egoist. The knowledge of the

agent has to play a considerable and decisive_part

in all choice. The merely, prbblernatic good of

another must not weigh against the more certain

good of self ; to let it do so is to be immoral ; if

^ /the good of another be " less certainly knowable "

jijK*! than the good of the agent, the maxim of benevo-

^ Vjence bids him choose his own good. Take, for

example, the case of a man who sacrifices his own

comforts and prospects in order to save a relative

from temptations and possible ruin ; such a choice

is immoral unless there is a fair certainty that the

relative will thus reap more good than the agent

piloses. The self-sacrificer is, we may assume, fairly

'^ certain of his own future prospects ; unless he is

at least equally certain that by his sacrifice he can

acquire for His weaker relative the same or a greater

amount of prosperity, he must not sacrifice himself ;

if he does he is immoral, and is, moreover, setting

an immoral example. Similarly the man who leads

a " forlorn hope " is immoral unless fairly certain

that the sacrifice of his life will result in a greater

good to others than the remainder of his life will

be to himself.^ The medical man who performs

^ Professor Sorley considers that the use of the word " im-
moral " in this connection is too strong. No doubt it is stronger
than can be sanctioned by the tone and spirit of the Methods of
Ethics, but not, in the opinion of the writer, stronger than can

♦^^ Jon

INTUITIONISM CRITICALLY CONSIDERED. 115

upon a patient, as a last resource, an operation
which in previous cases has occasionally proved
successful but which is nevertheless full of danger
to himself, is immoral unless he recognises that
the chance of saving his patient is greater than the
chance of losing his own life. The " patriot " who
^ces the possibility of life-long imprisonment in

U^ ^./brder to bring about some social or political change,
' is immoral unless he believes the chances are in

y

favour of success. In each case, be it observed,
morality is violated at two points ; egoistic morality
is obviously violated, and benevolent morality is
violated too. The self-sacrificers can therefore
^ • I justify their conduct by an appeal to no valid
» ' principle whatever. They defy the moral principle
of egoism (it is right to seek my own happiness) ;
they defy the principle of rational benevolence (all
egos are to be considered as of equal value). What
punishment is severe enough for the depravity of
such self-sacrificers.^

It has now been shown, perhaps at wearisome
length, that the maxim of benevolence is no very
formidable obstacle to egoism. Occasionally^no
doubt, the two will conflict, and then we have a
" jualisriL". But more often benevolence will 15e"

be sanctioned by the logical implications of that work. The
whole object of the present section is to find out the /ogicai
results of the maxim of benevolence.

116 THE THREE MAXIMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL

^ on the side of egoism, and it always must be so
except in the comparatively few cases where self-
sacrifice will, with apparent inevitableness, lead to
\^ good greater than, or at least equal to, the loss
^ ^\suffered by the agent. All fantastic acts of self-
\ '^x^V ^^^^^^^^ dictated by a mere chance of producing
^^^x^<X .greater good to others than is possible to oneself,
r V nay, all acts of self-sacrifice which are not carefully
^ thought out beforehand, are violations of this
important principle.^

"Rational benevolence '*_ recognises, two_. and
^ly two criminals. The first is the selfish man,
who sacrifices the greater good of others to obtain
his own lesser good. The second is the self-
sacrificer who negates his own greater or more
certain_ good for the sake of the lesser or less
certain good of another. The two criminals oflFend
the maxim in an equal degree ; each violates the
principle that all egos are to be regarded as
absolutely equal in the eyes of reason.

At this point the lesson of the previous chapter
must be repeated. Absolute,^ egoism^, this -tLaie_
still remains nioral. The " Two Voices " of

1 See Methods, p. 333 (first paragraph). Also pp. 348-49.
** It would be held . . . that we are not bound ... to run any
risk, unless the chance of additional benefit to be gained for
another outweighs the cost and chance of loss to ourselves if we
fail."

INTUITIONISM CRITICALLY CONSIDERED. 117

Tennyson's poem have their analogue in the two
voices of Sidgwick's ethics. The one voice pro-
claims, " I am I. My happiness is an end which
it is irrational for me to sacrifice to any other.
Egos are not of equal value ; mine has peculiar
\ claims. * This distinction is to be taken as funda-
mental ' " (Methods, p. 496). The other voice says
" One ego is equal to another ; I must be im-
partial ".

There is an interesting analogy between the
controversy thus initiated, and the psychological
controversy as to the nature of space. Philosophy
has long found difficulty in the latter problem, but
her perplexities now seem likely to be diminished
by a recognition of the distinction which Professor
Ward has done so much to elucidate (article,
y^W"" Psychology," Encyclopedia Britannica^ p. t^'}^^

"^s^^ Naturalism and Agnosticism^ vol. ii., p. 138, et seq.).

^i^£L Perceptual space is not homogeneous. Located as
it is around a percipient, it has peculiar relations to
him. An inch in his immediate neighbourhood
is very different perceptually from an inch at a
distance. " It is from this psychological, per-
spective space, with its absolute origin in the
' here ' of the percipient, each successive shell as
we recede from this centre differing in character-
istics and ordinates and even dimensions, and
differing largely by reason of the different move-

¥

118 THE THREE MAXIMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL

ments to which it is correlated — from this concrete

spatial scheme it is, I say, that the abstract space

of Euclid has been elaborated." Egoism corre-

I sponds, we might venture to say, to ..a theor^^

J perceptual space, rational benevolexuce .tQ-a~theor-y-~.

I of conceptual space. For this doctrine, space and

its contained egos are everywhere uniform in

value ; for that doctrine one ego is a centre around

which all others are spatially arranged, and from

which each takes its peculiar value. Which, for

ethics, is the truer view is a profoundly difficult

question.^

Here it suffices to observe that each view is
based upon a perfectly valid mode of thought, the
one upon a concrete " perceptual " mode, the other
upon an abstract " conceptual " mode.

To sum up. Egoism, ah initio admitted to
be moral or rational (for personality is an abso-
lutely fundamental notion) remains, on Sidgwirk's
principles virtually unrefuted. Rational benevo-
lence is also moral, though based upon a more

1 Here again the problem suggested by the clash of principles
in Sidgwick's work appears in the same form, and contempora-
neously, to Professor Seth and to the present writer (see Mind,
April, 1 90 1, p. 187). Is the abstract, quantitative method the
true one fo,r..ethi.c§.? If so, Sidgwick's three maxims have great

I value. Or are its problems of a concrete, qualitative kind ? Is
personality an essential factor ? Is orientation around a "self"
\ to be ignored or not ?

INTUITIONISM CRITICALLY CONSIDERED. 119

abstract view of the universe. The two principles
may occasionally conflict ; in that case the agent
necessarily violates one moral principle in obeying
jthe other. But more frequently rational benevo-
lence will ally itself with egoism ; the claims of
the agent's ego have, indeed, never been denied by
the maxim itself, though they have been placed on
an equality with those of other egos. Moreover,
owing to the far greater uncertainty which attaches
to seeking the good of others than attaches to
seeking one's own good, the latter object of search
must generally, even on the principle of rational
benevolence, be chosen. Thus egoism remains
almost invincible ; its only possible opponent has
been found to be, in large measure, a friend in
disguise.

A critic may reasonably ask : " Is it possible
that the logical result of Sidgwick's ethics is a
condemnation of the majority of ' noble ' acts of
uncalculating self-sacrifice ? Would he not approve
of such acts on the ground that, however fantastic
when considered on their own merits, they tend in a
felicific direction ; that they set a good example of
utilitarian conduct even though, in particular cases
they may be condemned as foolish, ascetic, or
hyper-altruistic ? " No doubt a certain amount of
allowance must be made for this consideration
(see Methods^ pp. 428-29) but only because of the

120 THE THREE MAXIMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL

uncertainty of the results of conduct. A " foolish "
act of self-sacrifice may turn out socially useful,
hence we must not condemn such acts too readily.
But if there were no doubt as to the " foolisljness "
of an act of self-sacrifice, if it were certain \ha.t
the self-sacrificer would lose more than society
would gain, he must undoubtedly be condemned
as immoral by virtue of the maxim of benevolence.
The argument from example is not to the point.
Examples of foolish self-abnegation can only
encourage further foolish self-abnegation, and this
is immoral.

It remains therefore to be seen whether, im-
pregnable from without, egoism is not vulnerable
from within. "I ought to seek my own happi-
ness " has, so far, been allowed to pass unchallenged.
Sidgwick never questioned its validity, and the
proposition has, no doubt, much on the surface
to recommend it. But the consequences of its
admission have proved disastrous. In the despair^
ing words which close the MetJiods of Ethics we are

iface to face with a " fundamental contradict! on."
which threatens to pr.event_i^.from '^rationaJising^
morality completely"; " In . . . cases of a re-
cognised conflict between self-interest^ and duty,
practical reason being divided against itself, would
cease to be a motive on either side."
1 A moral principle, be it noted.

INTUITIONISM CRITICALLY CONSIDERED. 121

It is time, then, to call in question the hitherto
unchallenged claims of moral egoism.

(J?) The Maxim of Prudence or Rational
Egoism.

The present writer has become convinced that
Sidgwick's maxim of prudence contains two ele-
ments of an absolutely diverse character, and that
iinlessTiese are distinguished nothing but con-
fusion can result.

In various parts of the Methods of Ethics we
find such affirmations as the following : —

" I find it impossible not to admit the ' authority '
of self-love, or the ' rationali^tl of seeking one's
own individual happiness" (p. 199).

" The rationality of egoism I find it impossible
not to admit " (p. 200 note).

" We cannot but admit, with Butler, that it is
ultimately reasonable to seek one's own happiness "
(last paragraph, first edition).

In the chapter on " Philosophical Intuitionism "
we also find given as intuitively certain a maxim
denominated one of " prudence " or " rational
egoism" and prescribing " impartial concerii- ibr
all parts of one's conscious life ". " Hereafter (as
such) is to be regarded neither, less nor more than
now."

122 THE THREE MAXIMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL

An examination of the above statements will
reveal the presence of two elements.

First, a genuinely egoistic principle. _ '* I ought

to seek my happiness or good."

Secondly, another principle not necessarily ego-
istic at all. "Impartial concern for all parts or
moments of conscious life ought to be given."

In the Methods of Ethics some confusion is
present owing to these two elements not being
definitely distinguished. An attempt will be made
in what follows to show : —

(i) That the genuinely egoistic mavim j<; only
"~^ doubtfully valid^ for the word " good " or " happi-
ness " covers a serious ambiguity.

(2) That the second maxim is valid for the

' same reason that the maxim of benevolence is

[ valid (time and space are both conceptually uni-

^ form) ; but this maxim has no special reference to

egoism, and is equally applicable to benevolent

morality.

I.

In what precedes it has been seen that there is

jin Sidgwick's system a utilitarian element based

I upon the principle of impartiality or eguality.

There is also a more fundamental element based

J upon an exactly opposite principle, that of parti-

I ality or egoism ; my good is of first importance m^

^^ * virtue of the fact of personality. Between absolute

INTUITIONISM CRITICALLY CONSIDERED. 123

contradictories there can be no peace. I ought to
be partial ; I ought to be impartial.

Here then is j,_ dualism ; the " profoundest
problem _of^ ethics '* faces us. But dualisms are
notoriously unstable, and though in many parts of
the Methods of Ethics a ^rima facie equilibrium of
the two contradictories is preserved^ the discrimin-
ating reader will discover that the balance really
inclines to the egoistic side.^ The closing chapter
of the Methods is an attempt to ascertain how
utilitarianism is to be ultimately justified at the
sovereign bar of egoism ; the ultimate justification
of self-sacrifice, interpreted hedonistically, seems
never to have been contemplated. If this be true,
then e^ism is absolutely fundamental to Sidgwick's
ethics ; standing on its firm foundations a man
can declare, " It is /^treasonable to be impartial, it
i.sj^reasonable to sacrifice myself". Unless, when
the final account is made up, the balance incline to
the egoistic side, " cosmos is reduced to chaos,"

^ It is interesting to note that Sidgwick's master, Bishop
Butler, is open to a similar difficulty of interpretation. Thus
Fowler, after quoting the famous egoistic passage in the eleventh
sermon, says {Principles of Morals, p. 63, note) : "This passage,
which places self-love on even a higher level than conscience,
appears to me to be plainly inconsistent with Butler's pre-
dominant conception of benevolence and self-love as co-ordinate
principles of our nature, both alike being regarded as under the
supreme governance of conscience or reflection ".

124 THE THREE MAXIMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL

for uncompensated self-sacrifice at the call of utili-
tarian duty is an offence to the moral consciousness
of egoism, however pleasing to the moral con-
sciousness of the less fundamentally moral principle
of utilitarianism.

Shall we then accept egoism frankly and un-
reservedly and refuse to be distracted by the rival
principle? If we do, we shall at least obtain
consistency of method. Or shall we deny that
egoism is a moral system .^^ We shall then have
to oppose ourselves to the proposition of Butler
that " interest, one's own happiness, is a manifest
obligation," a proposition accepted unreservedly
by Sidgwick from his cautious and moderate-
minded predecessor. Each horn of the dilemma
has its difficulty, but the present writer proposes
to seize the latter of the two.

We have to examine the proposition, " I ought
to seek my own happiness," and to see whether it
is in any sense valid. The conclusion at which
the present writer arrives is that if by '^happiness "
is here meant pleasure considered ^^r.^_and as a
purely subjective element — considered in fact quite
apart from all circumstances and results — this pro-
position is a most violent and gross case of abuse
of language. The "ought^Ms, absolutely out of
place. What is meant is, " I should like to have
pleasure, pleasure is pleasing," statements which

INTUITIONISM CRITICALLY CONSIDERED. 125

are valid (and tautologous) but which have nothing
to do with morality except to stand as examples of
what morality is not. We have no right whatever
to subsdtu^ "ought " for " like " and thus make
a sham moral maxim. " I ought to increase my
happiness " {jc. my pleasure) is a mere perversion
of speech unless — which is probable — more is meant
than meets the ear.

And yet there must be some validity in a
maxim which to Butler, Sidgwick and many other
writers has seemed self-evident.

Instead of considering the somewhat abstract
maxim, " I ought to seek my happiness," let us
for clearness' sake, examine a specialised form
of the same, even at the risk of indulging in
apparent trivialities.

If a voluptuary were heard to declare that he
"ought to go to the theatre," the statement —
coming from such a source — would probably strike
his hearers as ridiculous. In the mouth of a
mere " pleasure-seeker " (if there is such), the
word " ought," when applied to his pursuits, has
absolutely no appropriateness whatever. To use
it in place of the word " like " is merely to play
fast and loose with words and with moral dis-
tinctions.

But suppose a worthy citizen be heard to declare
"I ought to go to the theatre to-night," the

126 THE THREE MAXIMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL

Statement, though somewhat condensed and ob-
scure, may carry a certain intelligibility ; it will
not mean merely " I like ". If the worthy citizen
means merely " like " he has no right to say
" ought ". But he probably means what he
says. He ought to go.

He may mean : —

(i) "My life has become monotonous. My
functions as man and citizen are suffering from
too close application to business ; my health is
giving way ; it is a duty to my own self-dexeiop-
ment that I should have a change of thought ;
tHe stimulus of the theatre will be not only
pleasant (in itself a non-moral consideration)
but will favourably react upon my life-work."

This is most probably what the worthy citizen
means. Or he may mean : —

(2) "I have neglected my family ; they have
their claims upon me ; I ought not to be so self-
absorbed and mopish ; I ought to be happier for
their sake. I will take them to a place of amuse-
ment." Pleasure, though it may be in one case
immoral and in another unmoral, may in this
case be synTLbQli_c_ of _ _ and conconiitant with the
highest morality.

Or he may mean : —

(3) " There is an elevating play being acted
to-night. It is my dAity--t0--^encQurage_,exceUeni:_-

(NTUITIONISM CRITICALLY CONSIDERED. 127

performances, and to discourage by my absence
the lower forms of drama. I ought to go to-
night."

These, then, are intelligible interpretations, and
there may be others. A man will never be
found to be merely an egoistic hedonist when he
uses the word " ought," even though he may
be making statements superficially hedonistic in
appearance such as " I ought to take a holiday,"
** I ought to marry," " I ought to get more
enjoyment out of life," " I ought to seek my
happiness ". He will never use the word "ought"
if he is regarding " pleasure for pleasure's sake " ;
he will use the word " like ". " Ought " always
implies some purpose connected with the higher
Iivmg oT self and others ; in short some ideal of ^
^social and personal excellence.-^

"i ought to seek my happiness " is therefore

^ Professor Seth supports this view. "The point of view of /ijj ly^
dutj^ is always, it seems to me, the point of view of society, ^'^
never that of the mere individual. * Duties to oneself ' are ,,. . .
duties to society " (" The Ethical System of Henry Sidgwick,"
Mtndy April, 1901). Similarly Professor Alexander, Moral
Order and Progress, book ii., chap, ii. " Self-regarding Acts are
Social," and Wundt, Ethics, vol. iii., p. 78 (English translation),
"The individual end can be moral only when it is the im-
mediate but not the ultimate object ; in other words, the
agent's own personality as such is never the true object of
morality ".

128 THE THREE MAXIMS OF PHILOSOPHIC

V

valid but not in a sense which justifies egoistic
hedonism. If it means " I ought to consult my
own pleasure merely for the sake of pleasure "
it is probably the most violent of all perversions
of language. Its exact negative is generally re-
garded as true. But if we adhere to the ordinary
sense of the word " happiness " (the feeling which
accompanies the normal activity of a " healthy
^j3^* mind in a healthy body " ^) there is no great
^^ \)X\ inappropriateness in saying that we " ought " to
^3 ^}JB^J^^ ^t- The happiness of each is involved

in the happiness of others, the happiness of others
in the happiness of each. As Sidgwick truly says,
" any material loss of happiness by any one indi-
vidual is likely to affect some others without
their consent, to some not inconsiderable extent "
(Methods, p. 476). What a pity Sidgwick did
not follow out further this justification of the
egoistic doctrine !

Happi ness then, is a duty ;_. we ought Jx>.. seek, it^.
but only the happiness which accompanies or^
corresponds to the activity of a " healthy mind
in a healthy body," in short, a state which many
moralists would prefer to call " perfection " or
" self-realisation ".

Pleasure per se, pleasure in abstraction from cir-
cumstances, is the most absolutely " subjective
^Methods of Ethic s^ P- 92.

INTUITIONISM CRITICALLY CONSIDERED. 129

of all things. Now, inasmuch as '^_ought "
and " right " imply an " objective " standard, it
is difficult to see how any " oughtness " can
attach to pleasure so considered ; it is difficult
to see how one can rationally make the affirma-
tion, " I ought to seek my own pleasure ". But
call pleasure " happiness " and the ambiguity and
comprehensiveness of the latter word come to the
rescue. '' I ought to seek my happiness " is fairly
plausible.

The point is so fundamental that it deserves,
even at the risk of repetition, a little further con-
sideration.

Any other interpretation than the above involves
us in difficulties. " I ought to seek my own
pleasure," it is said. Now if " like " is sub-
stituted for " ought " we have a proposition of
which no critic can deny the force. Is the sub-
stitution legitimate ? Either " ought " = " like "
or it does not. If it does, why use the some-
what mysterious " ought " for the matter-of-fact
and unambiguous " like '' ^ If it does not, what
new element does jthe " ought^" introduce ,o
I and above the " like " ? On the first alternative
The "ought" is no longer " ultimate and un-
analysable," and, moreover, it has absolutely
nothing of the " objectivity " which is claimed
for moral truth ; there is certainly nothing

130 THE THREE MAXIMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL

" objective " about " like ". The first alternative
is therefore difficult to maintain in view of Sidg-
wick's general attitude. But the second alterna-
tive (that " ought " means something more than
or different from " like ") drives us on to some
non-egoistic or non-hedonistic view of ethics.
The " ought " must represent the claims of
some wider self than the self of momentary
feeling, of some wider system, personal or social,
than the to-and-fro movement of sensible im-
pulses.

It seems to the present writer that the greatest
defect of the Methods of Ethics is the absence of
any examination of this fundamental principle of
egoism. It is extraordinary that, in face of the
enormous difficulties which the presence of this
principle introduced into his system, Sidgwick
never made an attempt to probe it to its roots.
" The rationality of egoism I find it impossible
not to admit ; " it is with bald statements of this
character that the reader has for the most part to
be content. Only once did Sidgwick venture on
a justification of the egoistic position, and this
justification, as was seen in the preceding chapter,
he based on the fact that the personality of the
agent is something, for the agent himself^ absolutely
unique. This is a valid argument, no doubt, but
jt is certainly one requiring to be followed out into

INTUITIONISM CRITICALLY CONSIDERED. 131

greater detail than Sidgwick ever attempted. " I
find it impossible not to admit the ' rationality ' of
seeking one*s own individual happiness." Again
we have a bald statement concluding with a word
which Sidgwick had himself clearly shown to bear
at least three interpretations ! (Methods, pp. 92-93).
A whole book we find devoted to an examination
of egoism as a method ; but only a few words^ and
those originally inserted in a journal, to an ex-
amination of its fundamental postulate, though
the latter was accepted by himself! ^

Some reason for the unsatisfactory nature of
Sidgwick's treatment of the egoistic postulate will
perhaps be found in the following section, in which
an attempt will be made to show that ^Sidgw;ick
confused egoisdc witjh pruden^ conduct^ and
came to transfer the undoubted rationality and
obligatoriness of the latter to the former.

To sum up. On the present writer's interpre-
[jtation, egoism is immoral when logical, and moral
y when illogical. If it means " I ought to seek my
own personal pleasure for its own sake " it is im-
moral. If it goes beyond the merely personal
feelings of the subject, if, in other words, it affirms
" I ought to seek my happiness, my welfare, my
true good " (all these notions stand for something
more than merely subjective feeling), then egoism
is, in a very real sense, moral, but it can then

132 THE THREE MAXIMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL

scarcely be called genuine egoism. "All our
impulses, high and low, sensual and moral alike,
are so far similarly related to self, that ... we
tend to identify ourselves with each as it arises.
Thus . . . egoism ... is a notion equally ap-
plicable to all varieties of external behaviour, and
a common form into which any moral system may
be thrown." ^

Can a suppression of the latter and wider kind
of egoism (we might call it egoistic eudaemonismf)
be ever morally demanded in the interests of others?
Is a man ever called upon to sacrifice his true wel-
fare, his self-development, at the call of a wjder
duty .^ This is a difficult question which the
present writer will make no attempt to solve. Is
a man called upon to sacrifice his personal feelings
of pleasure ^ Often, surely.

II.

But egoism is not yet done with ; indeed what
Sidgwick regarded as the essential elemen|;,in. Jhe..
"rational" form of the doctrine has not been
touched upon at all. The proposition "I ought-
to seek my own happiness "is not by any means

'^Methods J p. 95-

2 The revival of the useful Aristotelian word " Eudasmonism "
by Professor James Seth and others is a step in the right direc-
tion, though hedonists will, no doubt, regard it as a step back-
wards into vagueness.

INTUITIONISM CRITICALLY CONSIDERED. 133

identical with the maxim of rational egoism,
prudence or self-love as set forth in the chapter
entitled " Philosophical Intuitionism '\ The maxim
of rational egoism appears as a refinement upon
the other, and its essential principle is, according
to Sidgwick, "jm£a£tial_^jicern^
one^s qQnscious life " ; in other words, it dictates
that " hereafter as such, is to be regarded neither
less nor more than now '\

An obvious criticism is now suggested. Why

I is this latter principle regarded as egoistic ? The
parent who ignores his child's future welfare and
indulges in an unwise and exaggerated regard for
its present, is surely in need of a warning that
" hereafter as such, is not to be regarded less than
now," and yet the parent cannot appropriately be
. accused of egoism. " Impartial concern for all
parts of conscious life is as necessary for benev-

i olent as for egoistic conduct. In what way does
it hold less good for conduct towards others than
for that towards oneself .f* . . . Ought not all men to
consider the future generations, and not say, * Apres
nous le deluge ' ? " ^ In short not only is there no^
antagonism between the " maxim, of prudence " —
miscalled an " egoistic " maxim — and that of be-
nevolence, but the non-egoistic essence of the former
is necessary for the completeness of the latter.
^Gizycki, International Journal of Ethics, vol. i, p. 120.

J

134 THE THREE MAXIMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL

The real basis of egoism is not in the least, " I
ought to have impartial concern for all parts of
my conscious life," for it is equally obvious that,
whether my concern is for my own or for others*
welfare, my concern should be impartial as respects
" hereafter " and " now ". Prudence and egoism
are not identical, and though the distinction is
faintly recognised in the Methods (p. 381), where
a transition from the egoistic to the rationally
egoistic principle is effected (" the proposition that
one ought to aim . . . "), the recognition is in-
adequate : nowhere does Sidgwick point out that
impartial concern for all time is not necessarily
egoistic. The genuine maxim of egoism is " I
ought (it is reasonable for me) to seek my own
happiness,'' and this, whether self-evident or not
is a very different and far more important maxim
than the other. Many moralists would accept the
self-evidence of the maxim of prudence and, in-
deed, would extend its essential principle (" impartial
concern for all parts of conscious life ") to the
maxim of benevolence also, while they would
strenuously deny the genuinely egoistic principle
to be moral, at any rate in the hedonistic sense.

Can it be that ^Sidgwick never clearly distin-
guished between " egoism " proper, and " impartial
concern for all parts of conscious life " } Appar-
ently so. He appears to consider that "rational

INTUITIONISM CRITICALLY CONSIDERED. 135

egoism" j^pH "rational benevolence " can come
into, conflict {Methods, p. 386, note 4). Such a
conflict is certainly possible if by rational egoism
is meant jthe doctrine that " I ought to seek in a
special sense my own pleasure ". But if mere
" impartial concern for all parts of conscious life "
(omitting the " my ") is egoismj^^nd impartial
concern for all egos is benevolence, there is no
possible conflict between the two principles. The
one prescribes impartiality in time ; the other im-
partiality in space. A has to consider as strictly
equal, (i) each moment of A's own future and
present life ; (2) each moment of B*s future and
present life. So much is implied if not expressed,
in the maxim of " prudence ". But (3) A has to
consider as strictly equal A's life and .B.'.s. This
follows from the maxim of benevolence which
puts the good of all egos on an equality. Here,
surely, there is no ethical difficulty whatever.
Mathematics have saved us. A's conscious life
= B*s conscious life (maxim of benevolence).
Each moment of A's conscious life is equal. Each
moment of B's is equal (maxim of " prudence ").
^ Hence a moment of A's life = a moment of B's.
^J? jif our action is ever momentarily checked by the
Lsi)M apparent equality of two goods, whichever we
4j(H finally choose is a matter of jndifFerence, for no
' ^e'^important ethical question whatever is involved.

136 THE THREE MAXIMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL

There is no conflict of principles any more than
when we choose by haphazard one of two tarts
each equally good.

It is clear, then, that to denominate the maxim
that " impartial concern should be given to all
moments of conscious life '' a maxim of" prudence '*
is not altogether appropriate unless " prudence "
is interpreted universalistically ; and to call it a
maxim of " self-love " or " egoism " is still more
inappropriate. Only when the " my " is introduced

does genuine egoism appear on the scene. If it
be admitted that " I ought to seek my own pleas-
ure," there is certainly now the possibility of a
genuine conflict of moral principles, for this latter
one may conflict with the maxim of benevolence
with its declaration of the equality of all egos.
Sidgwick*s enunciation of the maxim of prudence
or self-love apparently combines an egoistic ele-
ment with a non-egoistic mathematical element ;
it demands "4^npartia]} concern for all parts of

'^^e's^ conscious life ; " here the " one's *^ maI£eT"air
otherwise non-egoistic maxim into an egoistic one.
To summarise. " I ought to seek my own
happiness " is in appearance and intention a truly
egoistic maxim ; whe ther Jt^ is self-evident or not
was discussed in the preceding section. " Impartial

"concern ought to be given to all moments of con-
scious life " is not egoistic at all, and can scarcely

INTUITIONISM CRITICALLY CONSIDERED. 137

even be called prudential. It is as applicable to
consideration for the welfare of others as to con-
sideration for one's own welfare. Sidgwick's
maxim of " prudence " or " self-love " is a blend
1 of these two. The mathematical rigorism of the
; " impartiality " principle, is combined with a more
: doubtful egoistic principle. The basis of the one
element lies in a mathematical view of the uni-
formity of time ; the basis of the other element
lies in a conviction of the importance of person-
ality {Mind, 1889, p. 473 et seq. and Methods^
pp. 495-96). Each element is thus based on solid
foundations, but the fact that the foundations are
double and not single, though deducible from the
Methods^ was never properly recognised by the
author.

(r) The Maxim of Justice or Equity.

" If a kind of conduct that is right (or wrong)
for me is not right (or wrong) for some one else,
it must be on the ground of some diiFerence be-
tween the two cases other than the fact that he
and I are different persons."

In the first edition of the Methods of Ethics
Sidgwick laid great stress upon the j\objiectivity "
df right and wrong. What exactly did this term
mean ^ His critics have answered that it means
merely " abstractness ". " We strip the end of

138 THE THREE MAXIMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL

all reference to any one person and it thus becomes
a pursuit of no one in particular, and that means,
somehow, what is imperative on all alike ! " (Brad-
ley, Mr. SidgwicFs Hedonism).

This interpretation cannot be regarded as unfair.
Sidgwick specifically admitted that his three " ab-
solute practical principles, the truth of which is
manifest . . . are of too abstract a nature, and
too universal in their scope, to enable us to ascer-
tain by immediate application of them what we
ought to do in any particular case" (p. 379).
We have seen that this abstractness undoubtedly
belongs to the maxim of benevolence ; we shall
find that it equally belongs to the maxim of justice
enunciated above.

" One man," says the apostle, " esteemeth one
day above another ; another esteemeth every day
alike" (Romans xiv. 5). What guidance will
the maxim of justice or equity afford in the case
of such a conflict of opinion? Mr. A is con-
vinced that he ought to " keep the Sabbath " ;
being convinced of this, he is also of opinion that
Mr. B ought to keep it, for mere numerical dif-
ference of personality does not alter obligation.
But Mr. B is no respecter of Sabbaths, for he
"esteemeth every day alike". Thus while Mr.
B says, " I ought not to keep the Sabbath," Mr.
A says, " You ought to keep it ".

INTUITIONISM CRITICALLY CONSIDERED. 139

Here, then, is a formidable difficulty. What
are the " diiFerences between the two cases " which
the maxim of equity allows as valid grounds for
differences of conduct .^^ External circumstances
may, no doubt, " alter cases " as a well-known
proverb asserts, and as our maxim implies ; yet
the latter gives us no guidance as to what exactly^
those allowable external circumstances are, 3ut-
when we come to internal circumstances, namely
jdifferences of character and opinion, the exact
iap£licatiQn_ of the maxim is far more obscure.

Are we to admit such differences as valid
grounds for differences of conduct } If so, it is
right for A to keep the Sabbath, and right for B
not to keep it. Or are we to ignore such internal
differences ? In that case it is right for B to keep
! the Sabbath, though he is personally convinced
{ that he ought not to do so.

Take another case. I am convinced, we will
suppose, that it is " right '* for me to increase my
usefulness by taking orders in the Church, despite
the fact that in doing so I shall have to affirm a
belief in certain doctrines which I do not really
believe. Whatever is right for me cannot be
wrong — for — another, qua — another. — True, the
" other " may be unsuited for clerical duties ; and
this fact may make similar conduct on his part
" wrong ". But suppose the two cases are exactly

140 THE THREE MAXIMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL

similar except that, while I am convinced that
increased usefulness overbalances unveracity, he is
convinced that veracity is an absolute duty. Then
if our maxim admits that such circumstances alter
the case, what is right for me is wrong for him ;
[ if it does not admit this, then what he feels to be
wrong to do is the very thing which in my opinion
he ought to do.

It is clear, then, that the maxim of equity is not
Qf_any_ serious practical value. If we like to
abstract from each man his peculiarities of char-
acter, opinion and circumstance — if we like to
reduce each individual to an abstract X — then the
maxim holds good. What is right for X is right
for Y, for Y and X are only numerically distinct.
But is this abstract way of dealing with moral
problems of any use whatever ^

It is interesting to note that Kant's famous
enunciation of the equity principle is, as we should
expect from its close resemblance to the one we
have been discussing, open to exactly the same
criticism. " Act on a maxim that you can will to
be law universal." Brutus is meditating the
assassination of Caesar. His projected act, to be
moral, must be capable of being universalised.
Nov^ assassination in the abstract cannot well be
universalised, and it was this stringent view._that
Kant was specially anxious to maintain. But his

INTUITIONISM CRITICALLY CONSIDERED. 141

doctrine can be interpreted in another and much
less stringent sense. '' The difference between the
two might be illustrated, for instance, in the case
of stealing. According to the former interpreta-
tion, stealing must in all cases be condemned,
because its principle cannot be universalised. Ac-
cording to the latter interpretation it would be
necessary, in each particular instance in which
there is a temptation to steal, to consider whether
it is possible to will that every human being should
steal, whrn placedjmder precisely similar conditions'^
Similarly Brutus might very well will that as-
sassination under the circumstances of the caSe (the
tyrant's position and character, the state of the
nation, etc.) might be universalised ; he might
regard it as a duty binding on all men. But this
interpretation of the maxim would obviously be
a lax and dangerous one, and the same may be
said of Sidgwick's equity principle which will be
found to correspond closely to this laxer inter-
pretation of the categorical imperative.

To systematise. The Kantian principle is sus-
ceptible prima facie of two interpretations.

{a) Acts like assassination, ** Sabbath-breaking,"
lying, are always and under all circumstances wrong
(or right). This absolute and abstract interpre-
tation represents Kant's view most accurately.
1 Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, third edition, p. 193.

142 THE THREE MAXIMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL

(^) Acts like assassination, etc., may t)£._xigtt
under certain definite external circumstances^^.^.,
great tyranny) and wrong under certain others^
This is the laxer interpretation of Kant's maxim,
and apparently comes close to Sidgwick's principle
of equity. The latter admits " 4i^rences_between
cases ".

But when " internal circumstances " are con-
sidered in addition to " external," a further
difficulty arises. We have then the two following
alternatives.

(cj An act like assassination may be right
under certain external circumstances (e.g., great
tyranny) provided all men hold the same opinions
as myself. This case virtually coincides with
(^) ; internal and external circumstances are sup-
posed identical throughout the whole series of
cases.

(^€2) Inasmuch as some people are convinced
that assassination under certain external circum-
stances may be advantageously universalised, while
others deny this, the latter fact has to be con-
sidered by the former class of individuals as
constituting a new circumstance. They cannot
will assassination under the given external cir-
cumstances to be always a universal law, for to do
so would be to will that others should violate their
own interpretation of the categorical imperative.

INTUITIONISM CRITICALLY CONSIDERED. 143

Neither can the latter class condemn assassination,
for to do so would be to will that the former class
should refrain from doing what they regard as
right. Thus there is a complete deadlock unless
each party will make allowance for the personal
opinions of the other. But to do this is to change\ >
our " objective " criterion to a " subjective " oney
{cf. Bradley, Mr. Sidgwick's Hedonism).

It is clear, then, that from such a purely abstract
maxim as that of equity not much real guidance
can be obtained. To point this out is not to pass
adverse criticism upon Sidgwick, for he himself
was conscious of the abstractness of the maxim,
and has admitted that it " merely throws a definite
onus probandi on the man who applies to another
a treatment of which he would complain if applied
to himself" (p. 380). In short, whatever value
the maxim possesses is negative, as checking parti-
ality ; and the same, of course, may be said "of
iGjit's famous proposition.

Concluding Remarks on the Three
Maxims.

Professor Seth {Mind, April, 1901) has made
some suggestive remarks as to the relations of the
three maxims of philosophical intuitionism. "^Ajy^^
three are principles of the distribution of the good
gr happiness, and the common mark of all is that

144 THE THREE MAXIMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL

impa£tiaJlity which is of the essence of justice/*
the latter lying (to use Sidgwick's words) " in dis-
tributing good or evil impartially according to
right rules ". Professor Seth therefore considers
that Sidgwick's statement " suggests, if it does not
imply, that both prudence and benevolence^ are
transcended _in the principle of justice, of which
they are only the special applications," though
benevolence is a larger application of the principle
than prudence. "If prudence be made an absolute
principle, or co-ordinated with benevolence, it is
found to contradict not merely the latter principle,
but justice also/'

With a reservation respecting the last remark,
this treatment of the question can be accepted.
It should be remembered that though Sidgwick
and his interpreter Professor Seth both regard the
maxim of " prudence " as liable to conflict with
that of " benevolence," such a conflict is really
impossible if the essence of prudence is " impartial
concern for all parts (in time) of conscious life ".
How can impartiality towards life in time conflict
with impartiality towards life in space ?

Professor Seth recognises — which few others
have done — that egoism in Sidgwick's system is
powerfully entrenched, and that only by a denial
of the morality of this egoism can his system be
rendered coherent (see MW, p. 182). These

INTUITIONISM CRITICALLY CONSIDERED. 145

positions the present writer has tried to establish
in the preceding pages.

The following appears, on a final survey, to be
the relationship of the three maxims.

(i) They are, for the most part, based upon
a highly abstract view of the moral universe ;
a view expressible in some such form as, " In
regarding conscious life we should be impartial ". ^
This principle Sidgwick appears to consider as
the essence of justice.

(2) One application of this principle may be
named, somewhat inaptly, ".prudence " ; "^mpar-
^al concern should be had for all parts, y^hether
mw_or_^hereafter^ of conscious life "... (not, of
course, mine only, but that of all men). It is just
to be impartial as regards time.

(3) A second application of justice may be,
again somewhat inaptly, named " benevolence " ;
" impartial concern should be given for all parts,
whether here or there^oi conscTous" lite ". AlT
egos are, in the abstract, equal in value. It is
just to be impartial as regards space.

Now there is no possible conflict between either
of these three principles. TJieir abstractness saves
them.

Only in one place, and there with momentous
results, does Sidgwick fall back on a more con-
crete view. That is in his treatment of egoism.

146 THE THREE MAXIMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL

He drops at one point, as we have seen, his

abstract way of regarding mankind, and declares

that " I am concerned with the quality of my

\existence as an individual, in a sense, funda-

I mentally important, in which I am not concerned

/with the quality of the existence of other indi-

j viduals '\ But this_ statement contradicts point-

blank^the principle of eq egos. The

, concrete view, the view which takes account of

/ / I personality, is hopelessly in conflict with the

\ abstract view. But, it may be asked, why should
we not add yet another principle to the list?
Why not add, " We are concerned with the quality
of our present existence in a sense, fundamentally
important, in which we are not concerned with the
quality of future existence " ; in other words, why
not express in philosophic language the exhortation
" Let us eat, drink, and be merry, and seize the
passing hour " ^ This concrete principle would
stand opposed to the " prudential '' maxim in the
same manner as the declaration above quoted
stands opposed to the maxim of benevolence.
The " square of opposition " would then be
complete.

The question is, which attitude, the concrete or
the abstract, is the true one ?

The neo-Hegelians answer, " The concrete," and
for this reason, despite inevitable defects in their

INTUITIONISM CRITICALLY CONSIDERED. 147

expositions, their treatment of moral problems
is perhaps more satisfactory than that of any other
group of moralists. The abstoct jnathema^^^^^^
method of ethics, — the attempt to enunciate
maxims which are based upon the uniformity of
space and time, — the X, Y, Z, method which puts
all personalities on a level and ignores perspective,
— can probably never aiFord a ,true_ in terpxe taction
of moral facts. In_ethiea..i^.ia_l|iejtaphysic^
mathematical method has had its day.

The concepts of "organism," "development" and
so forth — biological concepts — are far more likely
to prove fruitful than the mathematical concepts of
unit, space and time. In Sidgwick's ethics the two
kinds of concepts are struggling for the mastery,
but the mathematical are uppermost. Among his
idealistic opponents the opposite view prevails.

The discussion of Sidgwick's three famous

i maxims must now be concluded. There is every
reason to believe that he looked upon them as the
most valuable positive part of his system, the
U^ f9£H^.5?.L V?^Uon^l basis for ethical construction.
Combined with the material element provided in
the fourteenth chapter these maxims were regarded
as providing us with rational egoistic hedonism,
and rational universalistic hedonism, while the
mutual relations of these two systems were left
for a final chapter.

148 THE THREE MAXIMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL

The result of the preceding investigation is
to show that the three maxims have undoubtedly
a solid basis of truth, but that their mutual
relations, and the validity of one of the three
(egoism), are not exactly such as Sidgwick himself
supposed.

Addendum.

The present chapter may be concluded with a
quotation not without interest in this connection.
A writer is expounding Sidgwick's standpoint.

" Besonders leicht seien wir geneigt, uns fiir ein
kleineres, aber gegenwartiges Angenehmes zu Un-
gunsten eines grosseren kiinftigen zu entscheiden.
Vor solchen Ubereilungen habe uns praktische
Weisheit zu schiitzen. Diese halte uns die beiden
Regeln stets klar vor, die die Vernunft gebe. * Du
soUst nicht eine gegenwartige kleinere Lust vor
einer grosseren kiinftigen bevorzugen.' Das sei
das eine unserer sittlichen Vernunftgebote, die ganz
richtige Kegel des Eudamonismus. Daneben gebe
es noch ein zweites, das ebenso durch sich selbst
einleuchte. ' Du sollst nicht deine eigne geringere
Lust der grosseren eines Mitmenschen vor ziehen.'
Sidgwick vertritt damit den Standpunkt eines utili-
taristischen Intuitionismus." ^

"^ Psychologie des Willens %ur Grundlegung de?- Ethik, H.
Schwartz (Engelmann, Leipsig, 1900).

INTUITIONISM CRITICALLY CONSIDERED. 149

It is obvious from the above that Sidgwick's
work has more than a merely insular interest.
When German moralists condescend to quote and
discuss English results, those results are probably
worthy of some respect

CHAPTER VII.

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

SiDG wick's opposition to ethical evolutionists
was paralleled by his opposition to another school
of thinkers, thoJdealistic, Transcendental, Hegelian
or Neo-Kantian School ^ which, during the later
decades of the nineteenth century attained an im-
portance second only to the evolutionary. The
consideration of his relations to these writers may
serve to throw some light upon his own views and
upon the tendencies in the ethical thought of his
time. Considered from the standpoint of moral
philosophy, the two most important writers of
the school were jGfreen and Bradley^ and with
these Sidgwick came controversially into collision.
Green's Prolegomena is probably the only powerful
rival to Sidgwick's Methods for the premier posi-
tion in modern English ethical literature, while
Mr. Bradley's Ethical Studies which appeared in
1876 and his important pamphlet entitled Mr.
SidgwicJzs Hedonism^ which appeared in 1877
(both marked by a brilliance and vivacity which
1 All these adjectives are more or less unsatisfactory.

(150)

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 151

Green's work never attained), are also notable as
historically prior to the Prolegomena and a fortiori
to the host of minor writings which have recently
come from the same school.

The views of Green and Bradley are virtually
identical, but in the following exposition of the
relations between Sidgwick's system and that of ^

the idealists, Green will be taken as the conciliatory, \ p^
and Bradley as the bellicose representative of the ^
latter. This may serve to give a personal interest
to discussions which are otherwise not always easy
to follow. In the first of the following sections
an attempt will be made to show the amount of
agreement, in the second, the amount of divergence
between Sidgwick on the one side and Green and
Bradley respectively on the other, while the third
section will deal with a few questions not con-
sidered in the preceding two.

(i) Sidgwick and Green.

The names of Sidgwick and Green appear likely
to go down to posterity as representative names in
the sphere of English ethical thought during the
latter half of the nineteenth century. This repre-
sentative character is due to several causes. The
two men were almost contemporaries by birth,
though Green died in 1882 and Sidgwick eighteen
years later. Green was an Oxford man, while

152 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

Sidgwick hailed from Cambridge ; Oxford, the
home of " movements " and " revivals," Cambridge,
the home of science and criticism, found in these
writers no unworthy types of their spirit and
life.^ Above all, the philosophical oppositions of
a thoughtful age seem to have been reflected and
focussed in the persons of Sidgwick ^dMGrreen.
j The former, we are told, represented the older and
I more distinctively " English '' school of utilitarian-
> ism, the latter the transcendentalist irruption whose
i beginning is usually dated from the publication in
j 1 865 of the Secret of HegeL The contrast between
them thus seems at first sight violent and pro-
nounced.

The following examination will, however, show
that, contrary to common opinion, these writers
are, throughout a considerable region of ethical
thought, in agreement. Led astray by the asso-
ciations of the words " idealist," " hedonist," and
so forth, men of our age have exemplified anew
the power of some of those " idols " against which
Bacon warned the men of his. The terminology
has suggested far-reaching differences of standpoint,
and thus underlying agreements have been un-
noticed. Moreover, the mutual criticisms in which

1 Green's grist, as an Oxford don once said, has gone to the
Ritualistic mill ; Sidgwick's grist was of a more intangible kind,
and if to any definite mill, has gone, perhaps, to the sceptical.

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 153

the two philosophers engaged have been still more
instrumental in conveying an impression of wide
divergence. It is no wonder, therefore, that a
reader who does not take the trouble to compare
attentively the philosophical pronouncements of
our two writers, is unable even to suspect the
existence of any substantial agreement between
them. But it will be found that they present a
long series of coincidences of thought and expres-
sion, and the inference may therefore be drawn
that the state of ethics is, after all, not so cha-
otic and parlous as is commonly supposed. It is
probably true that the science can never make
substantial progress so long as only differences of
standpoint are emphasised. Now if it be the case
that two writers, equally eminent for practical
devotion to humanity, clearness of mental vision,
and freedom from theological or anti-theological
bias, have, after approaching ethics from opposite
sides, arrived at similar conclusions on many
matters, it is surely right to assume that some
progress has been made, and we may infer, in
addition, that the progress of the future is likely
to be along the line of such agreement. At least
there cannot fail to be some service in marshalling
side by side the views of two such important
moralists as Sidgwick and Green.

(i) Each, denies the existence of *^ psychological

154

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

hedonism " as a primary or common fact of life.
MerTdo not necessarily, or even usually, act from
mere desire for pleasure per se. To call attention
to this is not to flog a dead horse, for psycho-
logical hedonism still survives in certain philo-
sophical circles.

"There are desires, what-
ever their history, which are
not desires for pleasure " (Pro-
legomena, p. 1 1 7).

" There are many objects of
desire which are not imagined
pleasures" {ibid., p. 233).

"It appears to me that
throughout the whole scale of
my impulses, sensual, emotional,
and intellectual alike, I can
distinguish desires of which
the object is something other
ithan pleasure" {Methods, p.
46).

(2) And yet, , though the desire for pleasure
is not a primary impulse, it may exist as a secon^
dary or derivative impulse, supplementing the,
primary desires for objects. On this matter our
two writers are follQwers..i)fJButler, who declared
that " self-love and the several particular passions
and appetites are in themselves totally different "
and yet " the two principles are frequently mixed
together, and run up into each other" (Sermon i,
note).

" Hunger is frequently and " It is true that any interest

naturally accompanied with or desire for an object may

anticipation of the pleasure of come to be reinforced by desire

eating, but careful introspection for the pleasure which, reflect-

seems to show that the two are ing upon past analogous ex-

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

155

by no means inseparable. And
even when they occur together
the pleasure seems properly the
object not of the primary ap-
petite but of a secondary desire
which can be distinguished
from the former" {Methods,
P- 47)-

perience, the subject of the
interest may expect as inci-
dental to its satisfaction. In
this way * cool self-love ' . . .
may combine with * particular
desires or propensions ' " {Pro-
legomena, p. 1 68).

} (3) With respect to the relation between the

j primary desires for objects and the secondary or

\ derivative desire for pleasure, the two philosophers

\ unite in warning us against the undue predominance

f of the latter. If men would be happy they must

not aim too consciously and deliberately at the

hedonistic goal. Sidgwick names this fact the

" fundamental paradox of hedonism " (p. 49).

" Of our active enjoyments
generally . . . it may certainly
be said that we cannot attain
them, at least in their highest
degree, so long as we keep our
main conscious aim concen-
trated upon them " {Methods,

P- 49)-

" The impulse towards pleas-
ure, if too predominant, defeats
its own aim " {Methods, p. 49).

" Just as far as * cool self-
love ' in the sense of a calcula-
ting pursuit of pleasure becomes
dominant and supersedes parti-
cular interests, the chances of
pleasure are really lost " {Pro-
legomena, p. 168).

" A transfer of (his) interest
from (the) objects to (the)
pleasure would be its destruc-
tion" {Prolegomena, Tp. 251).

(4) "But," an objector may urge, "we have
not yet advanced beyond the mere truisms of

156 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

ethics." Still, psychological facts, whether truistic
or not, are important. However, to advance into
more disputed territory : —

" Can pleasure per se be an object of thought .^^ "
In answering this question the two authors appear
to have crossed swords. Sidgwick answered " Yes,"
Green answered "No". But it is important to be
sure of what the question means, as the definition
of the summum honum will perhaps be found to
hang on the answer.

Can we^in thought, abstract pleasure from_its
conditions, or is it, on the contrary, so deeply
imbedded and involved in each concrete pleasurable
state, that it cannot be regarded apart from its
concomitants } When, for example, we anticipate
the pleasurable state which we call " social inter-
course," and contrast it with the pleasurable state
! which we call " athletic exercise," is it really
possible for us to abstract in thought from the
concrete states the feeling element, the " pleasure
per se " as we may call it, and compare the two
amounts.? Or is each of the concrete states so
definitely an organic whole that such abstraction
is impossible }

As said above, Sidgwick and Green appear at
first sight to have taken opposite sides on this
question. But on careful examination of their
statements an astonishing amount of agreement

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 157

between them will be discovered ; each makes

such concessions to the other view that in the ^

result all serious divergence is absent. ^

Green affirms that " pleasure as feeling, in dis-*joi^
tinction from its conditions which are not feelings,
cannot be conceived ". To this Sidgwick replies
with some force that though an angle cannot be
" conceived " apart from sides, yet we can without
difficulty compare the magnitudes of different
angles and yet make no explicit reference to the
sides. In the same way we can, by a process of
abstraction, compare the pleasurableness of two„
states without considering the other factors. But

\ he concedes that this process of abstraction and
comparison is not possible " to the extent which

(hedonists sometimes seem to assume as normal ".

Continuing his reply to Green, he proceeds as
follows : —

"It seems sufficient to answer that in several
parts of this very treatise (the Prolegomena to
Ethics) arguments respecting pleasure. are^xarried
on which are only intelligible if this distinction^
between pleasure and the facts conditioning it is
thoroughly grasped and steadily contemplated by
the understanding : and we may add that the
distinction is carried by Green to a degree of
subtlety far beyond that which ordinary hedonism
requires, as {e.g,)^ when * pleasure ' is distinguished

158 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

from the ' satisfaction ' involved in the consciousness
of attainment. Nor are these arguments merely-
critical and negative in respect of the possibility
of measuring pleasure : we find for instance that
Green has no doubt that certain measures * needed
in order to supply conditions favourable to good
character, tend also to make life more pleasant on
the whole '; and again that ' it is easy to show that
an overbalance of pain would on the whole result
to those capable of being affected by it ' from the
neglect of certain duties. In these cases it would
jseem that pleasure and pain, in distinction from
Ithe facts conditioning them, being conceived capable
j — in whatever degree — of quantitative measure-
ment, cannot but be * objects of the understanding' "
{Methods, p. 130, fifth edition, note ; in the sixth
edition see pp. 132-33).

Here, doubtless, Sidgwick is verbally victorious.
In the Prolegomena to Ethics we find many expres-
sions with a distinctly hedonistic sound. Not only
does Greeii^reiter ate that man's conduct is directed
_toJ^seJf-^atisfactio.n " — a phrase which a hedonist
can easily interpret as meaning " pleasure " ; — not
only does he speak of " a pleasure-seeking tendency "
by which we are " really affected " (p. 254), and of
" self-sophistications born of the pleasure-seeking
impulse" (p. 350), but he even admits, now and
then, that pleasures are capable of quantitative

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 159

comparison. The truth of the whole matter seems
to be (and here the two writers are in full agree-
ment) that though nonnallyj^ as Green time after
time points out, the pleasurableness of a conscious
state is so embedded in the state that it cannot be
completely abstracted in thought, yet this pleasur-
ableness can in a rough sort of manner be estimated,
and compared with the pleasurableness of another
concrete state. Still, the comparison is difficult,
artificial and incapable of scientific exactness.

" When,'' says Sidgwick, " I reflect on my
pleasures and pains and endeavour to compare
them in respect of intensity, it is only to a very
limited extent that I can obtain clear and definite
results from such comparisons " {Methods^ pp.

142-43)-

Thus the mutual concessions of our two authors

have resulted in almost perfect agreement.

This discussion has an important bearing on the

question of the nature of the summum honum,

(5) Connected with the question just discussed
is another " Can pleasures be summed? " Rather
it might be said this question is the last one under
another form, for if pleasure be no object of
thought and cannot be quantitatively estimated,
any process of summation is obviously impossible.
If, on the other hand, it is admitted that though

160 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

mathematical exactness is here not to be expected,
the pleasure-values of different conscious states
differ in intensity and duration, itj_s_hard to deny
that a conceptual process of summation of a rough
sort is possible.

Though Green denies at one moment the
possibility of such a summation, he admits, at
another, everything that the hedonist can reason-
ably ask.

He tells us, that though a series of pleasant
feelings cannot be enjoyed or imagined en bloc yet
they can be " added together in thought, though
not," he continues, " in enjoyment or in imagina-
tion of enjoyment" (p. 236). "Undoubtedly a
man may think of himself as enjoying many
pleasures in succession, may desire their successive
enjoyment, and, reflecting on his desire, esteem the
enjoyment a good " (p. 243).

Again he says : " Desire for a sum or series of
pleasures is only possible so far as upon sundry
desires each excited by unagination of a particular
pleasure, there supervenes in a man a desire not
excited by any such imagination, a desire for self-
satisfaction ... a desire to satisfy himself in their
successive enjoyment" (p. 236).

In admitting all this and yet denying that
pleasures can be summed Green appears as over-
subtle. His contention, obscurely expressed, ap-

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 161

pears to be that a passing succession or sum of
feelings is devoid of unit)^ or wholeness. " To
/say that ultimate good is a greatest possible sum of
I pleasures ... is to say that ij is an end which for
ever recedes^ which is not only unattainable but
from the nature of the case can never be more
nearly approached" (p. 401). But the hedonist
isjiol.,disturbe-d-irL. the JeastJjy.. such a^
especially when Green himself puts forward a
summum bonum open prima facie to the same
objections ; perfection surely cannot be attained
at a leap. The real truth underlying Green's
clumsily expressed doctrine that ** pleasures cannot
, be summed " is that in pleasure taken by itself
i there is no principle of development : that the
pleasure of to-day is not improved or aided by the
pleasure of yesterday ; the two could be reversed
in time without detriment. This is not true of
two similar acts done conscientiously at different
times. The one operates upon the nature of the
other. " We prepare ourselves for sudden deeds "
says George Eliot, " by the reiterated choice of
good or evil, that gradually determines character."
The same idea is expressed by Herbart in his
doctrine of the " Memory of the Will ". In other
words, to reverse in time the places of two virtuous
acts would involve all the difference between pro-
gress and retrogression, while to reverse the places

11

162 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

of two " doses " (so to speak) of pleasure would be
a matter of indifference. The concept of progress
is alien to pure hedonism. Hedonism is atomic
rather than organic.

The conclusion, then, is that though Green
maintains officially that " pleasures cannot be
summed," he makes such concessions to the
opposite side as to deprive his contention of much
of its logical value. Pleasures can in a rough and
inexact manner be " added together in thought " ;
this he admits, and this admission is enough for
the hedonist. Sidgwick is therefore right in dis-
missing Green's criticism as not pertinent. " I
cannot see," he says, " that the possibility of
\ realising the hedonistic end is at all affected by the
I necessity of realising it in successive parts." The
whole question probably lies deeper. Can *' mere
' feeling " constitute the summum bonum ? Green's
answer to this question was, perhaps, his most
important achievement, and having answered it in
the^ negative, it was not worth time and trouble to
discuss with his opponents whether mere pleasure
can be treated quantitatively. Once a hedonist
has so far lost touch with reality as to worship the
phantom of " pleasure per se^' he will not scruple
to talk of " summation " and " maxima " especially
when the redoubtable opponent of hedonism gives
away, in unguarded moments, his own entire case.

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 163

(6) We pass on to the much-debated question
of the so-called "quality " of p1pa<;nrp<^, Is the
judgment of common sense valid that certain
pleasures are " low " or '* coarse," and others
"high" or "refined". Now lla_.pkaJMr£-2L\s>
really a complex state involving conative and
cognitive as well as feeling elements. Wheri7
therefore, we speak of an " elevated pleasure," does
the elevation pertain to the affective or to the other
factors ^ Is it the pleasurableness that is higher in
quality? Both our writers answer the question
in the negative, and in almost the same language.

"Whgiij3iie-ldnd-of.pl€a&ure "No one can doubt that

is^judged_to be~<jualitativel^ pleasures admit of distinctions

suggjdflX-JjQ-. another although in quality according to the jon-

less pleasant, it is not really the dit'ions under which they arise ^

feeling itself that is preferred, {Prolegomena, p. 169. Italics

/"but something in the objective ours).

\conditions under which it arJs^" MM^ti^ y^wrurvuurv jHrvtAM^ ru>r ^~

(Methods^p. izg. Italics ours). C^^^^^ t^cncd oj^ ^SiUkM^fi^ - .

Coming from Sidgwick this admission is re-
markable, as exemplifying anew the difficulty of
considering pleasure per se. Here, as he admits,
is an important practical judgment_jdir^<^<'^<^ n^^^
^ towards the mere pleasurableness of a state^, b.ut
towards its non-hedonistic conditions. Yet when
he comes "to discuss the nature of the summum
bonum he has to turn his back upon this admission.
" Mere pleasure " is elevated to the highest ethical

164 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

throne ; its various objective conditions are ignored,
and, as a consequence, all distinctions of quality
vanish. " Pushpin is as good as poetry." ^

Many critics would regard this as an inconsis-
tency in his thought. Whatever summum bonum
be adopted it ought not, they would say,.jQ.jlo,
serious violence to common notions. IfJ^ quality
of pleasures " is an essential element in the moral^
judgments of common sense, it cannot be safely
disregarded in framing a conception of the highest
good. And yet to admit quality is really to be
faithless to the pleasure theory. Sidgwick, rightly
or wrongly, preferred to run the risk of opposition
to common sense rather than to sacrifice hedonism.^
Thus, despite the unrivalled excellence of his psy-
chological analysis of moral notions, his summum
bonum stands aloof from the results thus attained ;

^The hedonistic justification of "quality" of pleasures is,
of course, that the " refined " pleasures are more lasting, less
liable to painful concomitants or after-effects, etc. But it is a
question whether this is not a strained interpretation of the
judgment of common sense. Common sense feels that there
is something more in the fact than this explanation allows.

2 Contrast the two following statements : —

" The philosopher seeks unity of principle and consistency
of method at the risk of paradox" (Sidgwick, Methods^ p. 6).

" Never, except on a misunderstanding, has the moral con-
sciousness in any case acquiesced in hedonism " (Bradley, Ethical
Studies y p. 8i).

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 165

while in Green's treatise, despite the laxity of its
terminology, the wearisomeness of its iterations,
and the artificiality of many of its distinctions,
we have really a closer approximation of theory
to fact.

(7) Hedonism seems fated by some evil provi-
dence to provide the world with bad psychology ;
how otherwise are we to explain the fact that
► hedonistic writers have so often assumed the
intensityJoFa^ desire to be propprtional to the
pleasure of its satisfaction ? It is surely one of
the commonest experiences of life that powerful
desires may, when gratified, yield quite dispropor-
tionate pleasure, while on the other hand we have
many " pleasant surprises " following upon no desire
whatever. Only by a confusion can psychological
hedonists justify their claim that men normally
seek the greatest pleasure. Their case can, to
some extent, be rendered more plausible by taking
into consideration the pain of baffled desire, but
even then there is ample evidence that this pain is
not proportional to the desire ; as Sidgwick says :
. " Desire and aversion may be intense without
I being distinctly either pleasurable or painful. . . .
In any case . . . they are certainly not painful in
proportion to their intensity" (p. 185, note, fifth
edition). The truth seems to be that our whole

166 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

hierarchy of impulses is constructed on a plan
which, for a hedonist, would appear clumsy in the
extreme. Like a famous King of Portugal, hedon-
ists must feel that if present at creation they could
have given Providence a few good hints. This

iwant of correspondence between impulse and re-
sultant^ pleasure is admitted by both our writers^
though the admission is far more significant in the
case of Sidgwick than in that of Green.

"It seems to me that ex- "Our common experience

citing pleasures are liable to is that the objects with which
exercise, even when actually we seek to satisfy ourselves do
felt, a volitional stimulus out not turn out capable of satisfy-
of proportion to their intensity ing us" {Prolegomena^ p. 165).
as pleasures" {Methods, p. 127).
-— " Sympathy . . . may cause
impulses to altruistic action of
which the force is quite out of
proportion to the sympathetic
pleasure (or relief from pain)
which such action seems likely
to secure to the agent " {Methods,
p. 497, note).

(8) Psychological hedonism is thus rejected by
both of our writers, though each^would admit that
pleasure of a sort arises from the jrealisation of
desire, But psychological hedonism is a perti-
nacious foe. Driven from one of its strongholds
in the ambiguities of the word " pleasure," it often
takes refuge in a still more inaccessible region, that

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 167

of the moral feelings. Even the martyr at the
stake, we are told, and the Crucified on the cross
were, after all, hedonists, for to choose any other
course than those which they pursued would have
subjected them to the tortures of a discontented
conscience. In other words genuine self-renuncia-
tion has no existence in the system of the psycho-
logical hedonist.

The question here raised is not only one of
subtlety but one of fundamental importance. We
must not cast aside, without extremely cogent
reasons, the convictions of common sense and the
asseverations of the world's highest moral con-
sciousness. Is psychological hedonism really right
in holding that the voluptuary and the martyr
are distinguishable only by incidentals and not by
essentials ?

It is clear that Sidgwick found this problem an
unusually difficult one, for he gives us no very
emphatic pronouncement upon it. It may, indeed,
be admitted that Jiuman motives^ notably the
motives of those persons whom he describes as
possessed of " especially refined moral suscepti-
bilities,'* are so complex and subtle, that exact
analysis, .evgn in one's own case, is extremely
difficult. The interplay of the forces of egoism
and altruism (to use a misleading mechanical
metaphor) baffles the keenest self-inquisitor.

168 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

But it may here be objected in limine that Sidg-
wick, being a utilitarian, must necessarily have
maintained the ethical duty of pccasio^^
sacrifice. If the moral man is called upon to
work for the " greatest happiness of the greatest
number," he must, at times, sacrifice his own.
This, however, is not the point here under dis-
cussion. We are now dealing only with the
.psychological nature of supposed self-sacrifice, riot
with the ethical demand for self-sacrifice. The
question is not " Ought a man ever to sacrifice
himself.? " but " When a man thinks he is sacrific-
ing himself is his sacrifice ultimately real.^* Does
he not get a subtle compensation in the form of
the pleasure of a good conscience } "

The tendency of Sidgwick's thought was in the
direction of admitting self-sacrifice to be a reality
and not a delusion, and the same may be said of
Green.

"Most men are so consti- "The character and activ-

tuted as to feel far more keenly ity of the altruistic enthusiast,

pleasures (and pains) arising under ordinary conditions of

from some other source than temperament and circumstance,

their conscience " {Methods, p. is not preponderatingly pleas-

175). ure-giving to the agent himself"

{Pj-olegomena, p. 299).

If so, then apparent cases of self-sacrifice are,
for most men, real and not illusory.

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

169

"It does not follow . . .
that he (the man animated by
the desire for goodness) would
not have had more enjoyment
on the whole if the dominant
desire had been different, and
if he had been free to take his
fill of the innocent pleasures
from which it has withheld
him. According to all appear-
ances and any fair interpreta-
tion of them, he certainly
would have had more" {Pro-
legomena, p. 298).

" A man who embraces the
principle of rational egoism
cuts himself off from the special
pleasure that attends (this) ab-
solute sacrifice and suppression
of self. But however exquisite
this may be, the pitch of emo-
tional exaltatioti and refinement
necessary to attain it is com-
paratively so rare that it is
scarcely included in men's
common estimate of happi-
ness" {Methods, p. 138).

"We perhaps admire as
virtuous a man who gives up
his own happiness for another's
sake, even when the happiness
that he confers is clearly less
than that which he resigns "
{Methods, pp. 431-32).

Sidgwick, then, seems to allow of the possible
existence of absolute self-renunciation, though as
a comparatively rare phenomenon. Some readers
may perhaps read an undertone of scepticism in
his references to this subject, but on the whole
they appear to represent the bond fide convictions
of a cautious mind. If this interpretation be
correct it provides a new indication of how far he
had departed from the traditions of" psychological
hedonism ". " Apparent self-sacrifice " would be
admitted by most moralists to exist ; many would

/

/

170 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

go farther and declare that what appears as self-
sacrifice is, at times, morally demanded. Sidgwick
makes it clear that this self-sacrifice may be real
I and not only apparent : that even the rewards of
j conscience may not suffice to balance the 1oss._oJL
[ happiness incurred by the self-sacrificer.

Thus the last card of psychological hedonism
has been played. The " internal sanction " equally
with the " external " (as found in terrestrial society)
is an inadequate sanction for duty.

What^ofGreen ? Strange to say the " idealist "
is, at this point, as difficult to interpret as the
" hedonist *'. Green's constant stress upon " self-
realisation " has suggested to many of his critics
that he was really an upholder of a subtle form of
egoistic hedonism, and the charge cannot be alto-
gether dismissed as unfounded, iloffieivei;, in one
fairly explicit part of the Prolegomena (quoted
above) we are told that the higher life may involve
loss of pleasure on the whole. Doubtless the
" internal sanction " is a somewhat disturbing
and incalculable factor, ever diminishing the in-
tensity of self-sacrifice, and always suggesting to
hedonists the possibility that any apparent self-
renunciation is, in a subtle way, merely a form of
self-seeking. Both of our writers speak with
caution, but their final conclusions appear to be
much the same ; the " internal sanction " being.

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 171

as a rule, comparatively weak, self-sacrifice may be
real and not merely apparent.

(9) Connected with this question of self-sacrifice
is a wider and more far-reaching one. Time was
when ethical discussions were pervaded by a more
or less flashy optimism such as we find in the
works of Shaftesbury, in Butler's first sermon on
Human Nature, in the Essay on Man, and in its
prototype the 'Theodicee. Virtue was an infallible
passport to maximum pleasure. Everything must
be right. We live in the best of all possible
worlds.

No thinking man can, at the present day, accept
this sanguine view without some reserve and
hesitation. The existence of a definite school of
philosophical pessimists, and the discovery of the
principle of natural selection with all that is in-
volved in that principle, have, between them, made
us less dogmatic, less positive, less cheerfully
confident, and more willing to think out ethical
problems without making assumptions as to ulti-
mate destinies. It is a remarkable fact that both of
our writers sound at this point a note of philo-
sophical caution and scepticism. Sid^wick^ndeed^
admits in his last chapter (perhaps the most
remarkable in his book) that ethics contains, prima
facie, a fundamental contradiction. Egoisnx-aad

172 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

Utilitarianism, duty to self and duty to others,
'^^ may, at times, conflict ; and in such cases _of
.(> conflict pure ethics stands powerless. The dutiful

man cannot be sure that his dutifulness will always
bring its reward, or his self-sacrifice a compensation.
One hypothesis only, says the philosopher, will
remove this possible conflict of principles, the
hypothesis of a Divine and Rewarding Providence ;
yet that hypothesis lies beyond the sphere of pure
ethics and is not capable of very clear demonstra-
tion. He brushes aside the ultimate theological
problem, not of course as unimportant, but as
virtually insoluble. How serious a matter this is
for pure hedonism need scarcely be pointed out.
To any philosopher who interprets the summum
honum in terms of pleasure, the pessimistic doubt
is disintegrating and fatal.

The whole system of our " We may speculate, in-

beliefs as to the intrinsic reason- deed, on the possibility of a

ableness of conduct must fall, state of things in which the

without a hypothesis unveri- most entire devotion to the

fiable by experience reconciling service of mankind shall be

the individual with the uni- compatible with the widest

versal reason, without the belief experience of pleasure on the

in some form or other, that the part of the devoted person,

moral order which we see im- . . . All speculation of this

perfectly realised in this actual kind, however, provokes much

world is yet actually perfect, counter speculation. ... It

If we reject this belief . . . may very well be that the

the cosmos of duty is really desire for human perfection

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 173

reduced to a chaos : and the . . . may never be destined to

prolonged effort of the human carry men, even in its fullest

intellect to frame a perfect ideal satisfaction, into a state of pure

of rational conduct is seen to enjoyment, or into one in

have been foredoomed to in- which they will be exempt

evitable failure " (last words of from large demands for the

the first edition of the Methods), rejection of possible pleasure "

{Prolegomena, pp. 297-98).

" I am not myself an optimist," repeated Sidgwick
towards the close of his life.^ Green might have
echoed the words, if by " optimist " were meant
. one who believes, as Spencer does, that the human
I race is moving towards a goal of pleasure unalloyed
with pain. Pain must be assumed to have its
meaning, and cannot be brushed aside as a transitory
shadow upon the moral universe. No philosophy
can claim to have fully explained or justified its
existence, but philosophies certainly differ in the
degrees of success with which they appropriate
this eternal fact. For hedonism it is a terribly
severe stumbling-block ; for perfectionism it is far
less severe ; in a dim sort of way the perfectionist
can see that pain has sometimes, if not always, a
character-building function, and that either the
sufferer or the sufferer's friends may be morally
strengthened by its presence. Most or all of the
moral virtues would lose their place and meaning
if a condition of unalloyed or even predominant
^ International Journal of Ethic Sy vol. x., p. 19.

174 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

bliss prevailed ; self-denial and benevolence, for
example, would be evaporated away. Perfectionism,
we may truly say, fits in far better with actual
moral phenomena than hedonism can ever do.
This may not be an insuperable obstacle to the
latter doctrine ; thg philosopher may (to use Sidg-
wick's important and oft-quoted words) --^-seek-
.^^^ unity of principle at the risk of paradox '\ Still,
the more serious the conflict between a moral theory
and common moral facts, the more pressing should
be the demand for rigorous proof of the former.
To sum up. The problem of pain (and
pessimism) is, at first glance, the same for each of
our two writers. But on reflection we see that its
seriousness is far greater for. the hedonist than for
the perfectionist. Tg Sidgwick it suggested ,..a
message of philosophic despair. The good man,
dutiful, self-sacrificing, daily losing pleasure, has
no secure place in the hedonistic universe ; hence
arises an imperious demand for a future life to
compensate for the ills of this. To Green, who
steadfastly refused to accept mere pleasure as an
ultimate good, the problem raised by pessimism
was of less fundamental importance. To him the
perfection of man, the development of human
tapabilities, was the summum honum^ a happy state,
doubtless, yet not necessarily a state of intense, or
constant, or unalloyed pleasure. Pain was not, on

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 175

his view, necessarily an evil, nor pleasure necessarily
a good, nor the preponderance of pleasure over
pain the summum bonum. Hence, whatever vague-
ness may, rightly or wrongly, be brought as a
charge against "idealism," the latter system certainly
avoids somewhat better than hedonism the difficulty
of facing the doubt whether, perchance, the uni-
verse is not out of conformity with hedonistic
principles. Whatever difficulties may confront the
advocates of a perfectionistic standard, they are
small compared with those which face hedonists
when ultimate problems appear on the scene.

(lo) Another matter. " Surely,'' it may be
said, " the doctrine of a ' self-conditioning and self-
distinguishing consciousness ' upon which Green
loves to dwell and which, indeed, he takes as the
basis of his system, is a doctrine foreign to Sidg-
wick's thought. Here surely there is opposition,
or at least contrast."

Not at all ! Superficially there certainly is a
contrast. *' Self-consciousness " is a rare word in
the Methods of Ethics^ while it appears on almost
every page of the Prolegomena. But Sidgwick was,
after all, too keen an introspectionist to fall head-
long into Hume's error by denying the fundamental
fact upon which Green laid such emphasis. Here
and there, indeed, he affirms the moral importance

176 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

of " self-consciousness " in words which might be
interchanged with those of Green.

Thus, after admitting in his chapter on the will,
that our conviction of freedom may be illusory, he
proceeds as follows : —

" I cannot conceive myself seeing this, without
at the same time conceiving my whole conception
of what I now call ^^j'^ction fundamentally altered.
I cannot conceive that if I contemplated the actions
of my organism in this light I should refer them
to my ' self,' i.e.^ to the mind so contemplating "
{Methods, p. ^G).

Compare the following : —

" In the case of such voli- " A want only becomes a

tions as are pre-eminently the motive so far as upon the want
objects of moral condemnation there supervenes the presenta-
and approbation, the psychical tion of the want by a self-
fact * volition ' seems to include conscious subject to himself"
— besides intention or repre- {Prolegomena, pp. 93-94).
sentation of the results of action
— also the consciousness of self^
as choosing, resofvlng, deter-
mining these results " {Methods,
p. 61).

Nay, even in the smaller details of expres-
sion we find an agreement. The " identification "
of self with a desired object (a phrase we are
wont to regard as Green's own) is found in the
Methods.

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 177

" All our impulses high and " The ego identifies„Jtself_

low, sensual and moral alike, with some desire, and sets itself

are so far similarly related to to bring into real existence the

self, that ... we tend to ideal object, of which the con-

identify ourselves with each as sciousness is involved in the

it arises" (M^//5o^/, pp. 90-91). desire" {Prolegomena^ p. 106).

And the Methods of Ethics is not the only place
in which we find Sidgwick, incidentally, no doubt,
yet emphatically, laying stress upon self-conscious-
ness.

" I admit the proposition that self-consciousness
' must be able to accompany all my Vorstellungen '
as one of which reflection shows the contradictory
to be inconceivable. I cannot conceive a feeling,
thought or volition, as mine without conceiving
it as referred to a permanent, identical self" ("A
Criticism of the Critical Philosophy," Mind, 1883,
p. 326).

(11) The moment^self-consciousness isadrnitted- —
as an important and fundameiitaHact^awhole series
of questions is suggested. Thus, we are led at
once to ask whether the " scientific " or " natural-
istic " interpretation of mental and moral facts is
, adequate. Can the universe be explained from
I below .^ _JC^^ psychical life be built up out of
Imental atoms united by association.? Can the
ipourse of past events give us a moral standard ;
can the is give us an ought; can moral effort be

12

/

f

178 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

explained (or explained away) by the course of
naturalistic evolution ? Qrj^s^aiLaltgrnatiye^ must
we explain many, if not all facts, from above^Jrom^
the standpoint of self-consciousness and ^^^^^^
ledge ?

BoJ:h of _gur writers accepted...thj£.se,cond alterna-
tix^^.w Neither denied importance of the doctrine of
evolution, but both refused to allow the intellectual
and moral life of man to be swamped by the advance
of purely naturalistic ideas. This fact is perhaps

^ most obvious in the case of Green ; the whole of
the first book of the Prolegomena is a laboured
protest against the attempt to explain naturalistic-
ally the fact of knowledge, " Can the knowledge
of nature be itself a part or product of nature.'^ "
he asks, and his answer is an emphatic negative.
The later books of the Prolegomena are a still more
elaborate defence of the facts of the moral life
against similar attacks, and the result of the
inquiries they contain is that morality involv^§.^

j\ " non-natural " principle of self-consciousness, jl^
principle which is not capable of being explained

j by the facts of inorganic or merely sentient nature^
Quotations from the Prolegomena are here unneces-
sary. The most superficial reading of that work
is sufficient to confirm the above statements relative
to its tenor.

Scarcely less vigorous is Sidgwick's defence of

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 179

psychical life. One of the most characteristic
features of his philosophy is its protest against
evolutionary attempts to explain moral facts and
judgments as mere results of non-moral laws. The
moral, he held, cannot^ be >:proiduced> out of the
non-moral. " The theory of evolution . . . has
little or no bearing on ethics" (JVLind, 1876, p.
52, ^/ seq.).

" ^^timate ends are not, as such, phenomena,
or laws or conditions of phenomena. . . . How
can an iliquiry into the history of our beliefs affect
our view of their truth or falsehood ^ . , . The
historian ^ who pronounces on the ' relative truth '
of any current beliefs, implicitly claims to know
the really valid practical principles partially hidden
from the holders of such beliefs : and my point is
that the study of the historical sequence of beliefs
cannot by itself give him this knowledge " ^ {Mind,
1886, p. 217). "I cannot see how the mere
ascertainment that certain apparently self-evident
judgments have been caused in known and deter-
minate ways, can be in itself a valid ground for
distrusting this class of apparent cognitions. . . .
No general demonstration of the derivedness or
developedness of our moral faculty can supply an

1 Or, of course, the evolutionist.

2 As Green would say, " Can the knowledge of nature be
itself a part or product of nature ? "

180 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

adequate reason for distrusting it " [Methods^ pp.
212-13).

Green and Sidgwick are thus at one in defending
the claims of self-consciousness against the assaults
of overenthusiastic adherents of the historical and
/evolutionary schools. Truth is truth, and right
is right ; the dicta of self-consciousness cannot be
sublated except by falling back upon some other
dicta from the same source. We must stop some-
where ; something must be taken for granted ;
self-consciousness and its intuitions constitute the
final court of appeal to which even history and
evolution have to ^e brought.

Of the two philosophers Green laid the greater
stress upon history and evolution, but neither was
willing to abnegate the claims of the self to the
paramount position in thought and morality.

(12) There is some temptation to carry out the
comparison between the two writers still further.
It might be shown that on the free-will question
there is perhaps, in the long run, a good deaI~of^
agreement between them. Green's emphasis on
" free will " has lulled no careful readers into
forgetfulness of the real determinism of the Pro-
legomena. Green's protest was not against deterj
minisnii . but .against mechanical determinism,^ the
view which explains human action by the categories

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 181

of force, resultant, etc. ; self-consciousness is so
unique a fact that such categories as these become
meaningless when applied to its operations. But
if " free " means " chaotic " or " unaccountable "
then, according to Green, the self is not free.
" The action is as necessarily related to the character
and circumstances as any event to the sum of its
conditions " ^ {Prolegomena^ p. 1 12).

Spiritual determinism is probably all that morality
and common sense require ; for Bradley has turned
the tables upon libertarians and shown ^ that com-
mon_sense is, to some extent, on the deterministic
side, and not so entirely devoted to libertarianism
as is sometimes supposed. Sidgwick's discussion
of the question, though different in form from
Green's, is perhaps much the same in result.^
Determinism, he tells us, has a strong case, but
self-consciousness, including the consciousness of
freedom, are facts which on his view cannot be
got rid of. Combining * the two results we should

1 Similarly Bradley {Ethical Studies , p. 20), "Though I
consider the phrase * result ' inaccurate and here misleading, I
do not deny that the character of a man does follow, as a result,
from his natural endowment together with his environment ".

2 Ethical Studies, Essay I.

2 See, however, what follows below.

^ Sidgwick kept the two standpoints apart, and never effected
the combination above mentioned. Still the result of such a
combination would probably be as above indicated.

182 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

arrive at a spiritual determinism not unlike that j)£
Green, a determinism shorn of many of its terrors,
but apparently not yet satisfactory to libertarians.^
Whether ultimately satisfactory or not, this theory
certainly marks an advance beyond the crude stand-
points of two opposed views, both (alas !) still in-
fluential ; the view of the popular theologian with
his chaotic principle of libertarianism according to
which " you are ' accountable ' because you are a
wholly ' unaccountable ' creature " ; ^ and the view
of the materialist with his principle of blind fatalism.^
(13) One might go farther and call attention
• to the very considerable amount of agreement
shown by our two writers on such matters as the
"^ object. „Qf..,^iTipraL judgment (motives or inten-
tions.'*) ;* the existence of wilful wrong-doing (the
denial of which runs through many systems from

^ Seth's Ethical Principles, p. 391.

2 Bradley's Ethical Studies, p. 1 1 .

3 Professor Sorley is unable to accept the above statement as
to the relations of Sidgwick and Green on the free-will question.
While, on his view, Green maintains a spiritualistic determinism,
Sidgwick, when speaking with his libertarian voice, maintains a
form of absolute indeterminism. This, no doubt, is true ; but all
that the present writer is concerned to show is that if Sidgwick
had chosen to synthesise his two views he must have arrived
at a position not unlike Green's. This, of course, he never did.

* Compare Prolegomena, pp. 318-22, and Methods, p. 204, et
passim.

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 183

that of Socrates onwards) ; ^ and the function of
reason as more than ancillary (compare Sidgwick's
statement that reason gives an Jmgijlse_orjm£t^
to action with Green's statement that reason has
the_initiatiy£.in the bettering of life). ^

Compare in like manner the two following state-
ments in both of which the influence of Kant is
noticeable : —

^;

" Whatever action any of " The * better reason ' which

s judges to be jnght^ for himself presents itself to him as a law
he implicitly judges to be rjght for himself will present itself
for all similar persons in similar to him as equally a law for
circumstances " {Methods, p. them ; and as a law for them
379). on the same ground and in the

same sense as it is a law for
him" {Prolegomena^ p. 213).

(2) SiDGWICK AND BrADLEY.

/ It is interesting to note that within a year of
I the time when Bain ^ was expressing an enthu-
l siastic approval of the Methods of Ethics^ praising
its " logical rigour," and challenging critics to
detect a fallacy in its pages, Mr. Bradley had
accused Sidgwick of petitio principii and ignoratio
elenchi^ had declared the Methods to be an "ob-

1 Compare Prolegomena, p. 185, and Methods, p. 59, and
Practical Ethics (" Unreasonable Action ").
"^ Methods, p. 36 ; Prolegomena, p. 187.
^Mind, 1876, p. 177.

184 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

scure " work, " not easy to understand," and had
apologised for the length of his own criticism ^ on
the ground that it was " hard to discuss a man's
opinions when you do not know what they are ".

Rumour may often be a lying jade, but there
is no reason why we should in this case refuse
credence to her testimony that no criticism ever
passed upon the Methods roused so deep a feeling
in its author as Bradley's pamphlet.^

The controversy began with a brief criticism _
of the Methods inserted at the end of the-third..-
chapter of Ethical Studies. Sidgwick responded,
with a criticism of the latter work,^ Bradley._
replied,^ and Sidgwick again followed.^ But
skirmishes gave place to more serious work when
Bradley wrote the pamphlet entitled Mr. Sidg-
wick's Hedonism^ an elaborate and violent attack
upon Sidgwick's leading principles ; its undoubted
ability is however marred by an almost complete
refusal to recognise the undoubted merits of the
Methods of Ethics. No reply was ever made to

1 Mr. Sidgwick's Hedonism (pub. H. S. King).

2 Sidgwick himself was not remiss, during the earlier stages
of the controversy, in responding to Mr. Bradley's slap-dash
methods. Ethical Studies abounds in " debating-club rhetoric "
and in "uncritical dogmatism".

^Mindy 1876, p. 545. ^Ibid., 1877, p. 122.

^Ibid,, 1877, p. 125.

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 185

this pamphlet, and though there are signs that it
influenced later editions of his work, Sidgwick's
only reference to it (preface to the second edition,
p. xi.) ignores its title and its author.

So important is this criticism for a right under-
standing of the controversies between the utilitarian
and idealistic schools, that the writer has preferred
to summarise it here and now instead of relegating
it to the last chapter.

(i) The word " reason " is used in the Methods^
of Ethics ambiguously. It appears to have a nar-
rower meaning (faculty of apprehending universale
truth) and a wider (faculty of cognising objective.^
truth) ; in the latter use it is analogous to per-
ception of particular objects. But how far is
the latter process " potentially universal " ^ Does
reason_really apprehend the individual or only^
the general }

(2) " The moral reason is a spring of action/*
What does this mean ? How does an intellectual
apprehension ^passrnovej^ into action? Is there
need of some adventitious desire to make reason
practical ^. If so, is reason a " spring of action " at
all .? The difficulties which surround the Kantian
dualism of reason and feeling are here apparent.

( 3 ) Mill's confusion between the " d??!^.^:^] ^
as equivalent to " desired," and the "desirable"
as^quivalent to " that which we ought to jdesire J^^

186 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

appears again, though it is more veiled, in Sidg-
wick's pages ; he thus repeats Mill's " audacious
petitio principii ". Sidgwick's argument runs some-
what as follows : —

(^) Pleasure is " feeling that is desirable._jcimr
sidered merely as feeling " (here " desirable "
strictly means only " desired "). But (J?) the good
is " desirable " (what " ought to be desired ") ;
(J) hence pleasure is the good., Sidgwick has
in {a) illegitimately and implicitly introduced the
idea of " oughtness " which, as applied to pleasure,
is the very thing he had to prove. He never
clearly distinguishes between the two meanings
of I' desirable," ^ hence this word " can pass eitheJL
for pleasant or good and so is a ready means of
identifying these terms ".

(4) There is another confusion ; " pleasure " is
sometimes identified with " most pleasant^con-^
sciousness'' or "desirable conscious life," at other
times with a mere feeling or quality of a feeling ;
hence an i^oratio elenchi. Sidgwick ought to
prove that mere pleasure or agreeable feeling is
the ultimate good ; he actually proves this of
" desirable conscious life ". Many non-hedonists
would be willing to accept " desirable conscious
life," for this must include thought and action

1 Sidgwick replied that he was quite aware of the distinction
at the time he wrote the first edition (see p. 388).

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 187

as well as feeling. The phrase " desirable con-
scious life '' as used by Sidgwick involves both a
petitio principii (in the word " desirable ") and an
ignoratio elenchi (in the phrase " conscious life " ).
The moral is " that a good definition saves argu-
ment ".

(5) The hedonistic end,^ " the sum of pleasures
valued in proportion to^their pleasantness," as-
sumes that the " calculus " is possible * in reality,
as Sidgwick himself shows in certain parts of his
treatise, it is impossible.

(6) The phrase " greatest sum " is utterly am-
biguous. The good must be a whole, not an
aggregate, (a) If by the " greatest sum " we
mean an' infinite quantity, this is a self-contra-
dictory idea, and stands for something unrealis-
able ; how can we approximate to an endless sum .?
(J?) If by the *' greatest sum" we mean a finite
series, then this is attainable, but only at death ;
and when we further apply the motion to all
humanity greater difficulties arise, (c) If by the
" greatest sum " we mean a co-existing aggregate,
our end will be that at any time the sentienFworld^
may be having the greatest possible quantity of
happiness. But what does " greatest possible "

^ In an appendix Bradley emphasises the point that the
question is not whether we can aim at the hedonistic end
but whether we can get it.

-t

188 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

mean ? Apparently it means " greatest possible
under all the conditions/' one of the conditions
being that our energy is directed towards increase
of happiness. If then we suppose that at a given
period of the world's history energy has been
so far as was possible directed towards gaining
pleasure, then the summum bonum is now realised
however small the surplus of pleasure. Every
failure to get perfect happiness is so much vice
in oneself or others. If all had done and did
their duty we should all be perfectly happy even
though there might be only a small surplus of
pleasure over pain. (^d) It will not do to take
mere increase of pleasure as the end. {e) Again
if we admit " freewill " (as Sidgwick appears to
do) further difficulties face us ; an element of
chance enters ; \ye can never tell what is^jthe^
"greatest possible". In short, "if our author
has ever asked himself the meaning of ' the sum '
he has at present not imparted his answer to the
public ".

(7) Again, how^cajiJJie^^rgat^st^imTjje a " reaj_
end of reason " .f* Does reaspix . give--J2ierelyL_tlie^
abstraction of pleasure in general, or in ..addidon_^
the notions of "amount" and "others".^ What,
exactly does reason give ? Apparently the " ob-
jectivity " of the end means its abstractedness ;
we strip from it all reference to any one person and

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 189

it thus becomes a pursuit of no one in particular
and that means, somehow, what is imperative on
all alike!

(8) All may admit that ultimate good must
enter somehow into relation to consciousness.
But is pleasantness really the end? Sidgwick

jalnswers this in the affirmative ^ elective rela-
jtions (truth, etc.) are not intrinsically desirable.
But, says our critic, this does not prove that
pleasantness only is the end. Because A is not
desirable without B we have no right to say that
B by itself is desirable. Pleasure may be a factor \ y
in the summum honum and yet not he the only thing t
good. " The thesis to be proved is that mere
pleasure is the end. Mr. Sidgwick writes ' con-
scious life ' for pleasure and adds ' desirable '
(which means end) to the definition. The crown-
ing phrase ' desirable conscious life ' combines
petitio principii and ignoratio elenchiT

(9) Sidgwick's supposition of a single sentient
conscious being in the universe^ who decides that

^C*^ nothing can be ultimately " good " except his own

happiness is not to the point, {a) The supposition

is an impossible one. {F) The end for all need not

be a multiple of the end for an isolated unit, (c)

I " good " which is " objective " would be impossible

/ witlijQnl^L_one iridividiial. (^ So far as our im-

^ A supposition omitted from later editions of the Methods,

190 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

agination can picture the unit in isolation, pleasure
is not obviously the absolutely good for such a unit.
" It does not appear to me that the pleasantness,
in its abstraction, is even an end."

Given maintenance or heightening of function
on one side with the same or less pleasure ; giverl
on the other side lowering of function with the
same or more pleasure, which ought you to take }
If what we call progress entailed increase of pain
ought we to progress } Bradley says " Yes " ;
Hedonism fails if "Yes" is the answer. But in
reality the separation is illegitimate ; our end is virtue
-f pleasure. To say. Function is the end, is by no
means to say. Pleasure is not good. Life without
pleasure is inconceivable.

(10) Hence Sidgwick's argument that there is

I a latent hedonism in common morality is not to
the point : it merely establishes the thesis, " virtue
in general is pleasant ".

( 1 1 ) Sidgwick's attempt to suppress egoism (in
Bradley's opinion the only consistent hedonism)
by argument is futile. The two maxims of equity
and benevolence are mere tautology, for, by definj-^
tion, the " reasonable " is what holds in abstraction

.-^.^from the individual.. What is good for X is good
for X, what is right for X is right for X. We
have only reiterated the postulates which the egoist
denies, there is nothing " objectively desirable "

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 191

for him ; he has no " ought " except as regards
means. Sidgwick's attempt to suppress egoism
suppresses personality (" you " and " me ") and
on the same ground reduces pleasure and pain to
illusions.^

(12) Sidgwick's view of ethics is a jural view
and will be found, when carrieH^'oilt^ to^'^come To"
something like Jesuitry. Ethics has to apply
general rules to every particular case, and when
complete there will be no possible collision among
the rules. But while law, says Bradley, treats each
case as an abstraction, jnoralityjias to take account
of all the circumstances (previous life of the man
etc.). Either, then, the moralist has to give up
his code at a certain point, or to attempt to get
every possible complication within its clauses^

Sidgwick accepts the latter alternatiye.^ In any
given circumstances there must_.be some one thing
that might to be Hoqp (May there not conceiv-
ably be two courses equally conducive to the
greatest surplus } ^) But circumstances alter cases,
and differences of " nature and character " have

^ " Mr. Sidgwick hopes the egoist will be good enough to
admit that something is objectively desirable as an end. If
the egoist does so, he is * suppressed ' certainly, and deserves to
be. But will he do so ? " {Ethical Studies, p. 1 16).

2 "Yes," admitted Sidgwick in a note added to the third
edition.

192 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

to be considered. " Exceptions " are allowable
because they are not really exceptions, . but-jddi-
tions to the code*^. There is also another class of
exceptions which utilitarianism will admit ; an act
which, if universally adopted, might be inexpedient,
may yet be right for the individual if not likely to
be widely imitated. " The opinion that secrecy
may render an action right which would not other-
wise be so, should itself be kept comparatively
secret ; and similarly it seems expedient that the
doctrine that esoteric morality is expedient should
itself be kept esoteric." All this, apparently, must
be inserted in the code ! Does it not come to
this that any act is moral to me if I have a sincere
belief that it will increase happiness ? Thus we
have arrived at mere individualism : th£-.Qfojectiye^
criterion has become subjective, what we " think "
objective (/.f., conducive to happiness). What
about the right course which is the " same for
all " ?

(13) Sidgwick's suggested reconciliation of
egoism and utilitarianism by means of the re-
wards and punishments of a possible future life
is unsatisfactory. We have no means of judging
/^from what we do in human communities for the
/ sake of the good, to that which is good and right
\ to be done in the universe. " We do not and
cannot know the conditions there. If any one

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 193

wishes to maintain that because advantage and
disadvantage do not coincide with virtue and
vice, therefore the government of the world is
not moral, he must be prepared to show that if
he were in power, he could produce less evil and
more good than there is by going on a law of
rewards and punishments." The device of re-^
wards and punishments does^not remove evil from
the universe. Moral evil would still remain plus
its punishment, so long as stupidity and impulse
remain. What is an " adequate " reward ? What
are the rules of payment ^.

Again, Is punishment merely to be threatened ?
We are too stupid. Is it to be inflicted ^ What
good will that do .? Again, Do I deserve a reward
for doing my duty, etc., etc. ^

The demand for rewards and punishments rests

on a true moral judgment, but it is not an absolute

demand. " We take the analogy of human society

and then we emphasise one moral law which holds

there, forgetting wholly the highest law."

I "If the highest moral law is not a law providing

for the distribution of advantage and disadvantage,

i then the conceptions of justice and desert are in-

\ applicable there and must be overruled." The

highest law is, " Do the most good" and this

may override all lower laws. To adjust pro-

portionably reward and punishment to virtue

13

194 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

and vice would do more harm than good ; it
n would produce less virtue and more vice.

J^ .. (i), (7) The first of the above criticisms may
r'h^ have been justified by certain obscurities in the
^ first edition of the Methods, but it has compara-
tively little force if directed against the work in its
later form. With Sidgwick the " universality "
or " objectivity^ of moral truth is based (if
the previous exposition has been correct) upon an
abstract view of the moral univejrse,jvJTtuallyju^p^^
the uniformity of space and tinje. The same
remark applies to the seventh criticism. The
practical reason, according to Sidgwick, not only
proyides^us with the three maxims of philosophical
intuitionism (maxims which have no special refer-
ence to " pleasure," and which are applicable how-
ever we define ultimate good), but when these
maxims come to be applied to the hedonistic end,
they compel us to treat it in a strictly quantitative
or mathematical manner. Hence we get the notion
of a " greatest sum " by combining the view that
all time is equally important (maxim of prudence)
with the view that the various personalities scattered
through space are equally important (maxim of
benevolence).

(2) The second criticism is undoubtedly of
weight, though it tells against some other systems

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 195

as well as against the one now being considered.
How do cognitions pass into action ? More
especially, how do abstract cognitions or intuitions,
such as those of prudence or benevolence, pass into
action? Js^regsiin. really "practical" at all, or is
it not, rather (as hedonists generally assert), the
" slave oLthe passions," and devoid of any origin-
ative power in the world of conduct ? Sidgwick
tells us that a moral cop^nition " gives an impulse
or motij/e to action " {Methods^ p. 30) ; in other
Twords he assumes, but without entering into the
\ psychology of the process involved, that reason is
/ " practical " as well as " speculative ".

Greenes long argument in book ii., chapter ii. of
the Prolegomena is in protest against a 'l^faculty "
doctrine which first separates " intellect '' froni
"jvill" and then puzzles itself over the problem
how the one can influence the other. The whole
question belongs to psychology, and is likely to
remain perplexing until that science is in a more
satisfactory state than it is at present. Herbart's
solution would, no doubt, be thorough and com-
prehensive enough, if only it were true — a reduction
of the active and appetitive side of mental life to
the presentative — a reduction of desire, aversion
and action to a mere movement of presentations
backward or forward in consciousness. But despite
the enormous value of this theory for pedagogical

196

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

purposes, it is probably false as an ultimate solution
of the problems of mental life. Still, we know
that ideas ^0 influence conduct ; cognitions, even
abstract^cognitions, do pass into action ; there is a^

practical as well as a speculative reason. But the
exact relation between the cognitiva.-and, the jemQ=
tional or active sides of our nature ; the psychology
of " cognitions of right " ; even the psychology
of pathological " fixed ideas " (which often pass
into vigorous action), these are questions still
somewhat obscure. The faculty doctrine adds a
new difficulty for every one it removes ; a sensa-
tional atomism such as that of Locke or Herbart
is unable to explain satisfactorily the active side
of life ; while the view of writers like Green, who
lay stress upon mental life as an organic and self-
conscious unity, cannot be altogether acquitted of
the charge of vagueness. Bradley's challenge, " Is,
reason_a^*_ spring of actio nj.jt_allj " is, no doubt,
pertinent, but at present Sidgwick's treatment of
this question, however slight and superficial, may
perhaps, faute de mieux, be accepted as fairly satis-
factory.

(3) Bradley's third criticism is an extremely
serious one. Sidgwick is accused oi petitio principii.
He had to prove that pleasure was the good (what
we ought to aim at), but he only succeeded in this

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 197

by making use of the ambiguous word ** desirable,'*
one of whose meanings involves the very notion
of " ought," while the other does not. Hence a
fallacy of petitio principii^ or perhaps rather of
" four terms ".

If the preceding discussion on the maxim of
prudence or egoism has been correct, the root of
the difficulty lies in the inadeguacy^f Sidgwick's
treatment of that maxim. He constantly tells us
that it is right for each person to seek his own
happiness ; in other words, happiness is something
" desirable^* in the sense of " what ought to be
desired or sought ". But it is at least equally true
to say that happiness is " desirable " in the sense
of " desired"; in other words we should." like" to
have happiness. Are, or are not, these meanings
confused in Sidgwick's treatment of the question ?
The present writer thinks that they are ; and if
so Mr. Bradley's criticism is justified. The point
has been, however, already argued at sufficient
length in the preceding discussion on the maxim
of egoism. The difficulty is to get the notion of
I" ought " attached to the notion of *' pleasure,*''
and the ambiguous" woMs^^appiri ess ^' and"^ desir-
able " are, doubtless, excellent means of bringing
about the attachment.

(4) The phrase " desirable consciousness" must

198 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

surely have struck many readers of the Methods of
Ethics as a somewhat peculiar and unfamiliar one,
one which might harbour (whether it actually does
or not) a number of ambiguities. Bradley asserts
that such is actually the case, and roundly accuses
Sidgwick of a fallacy of ignoratio elenchi in his use
of the phrase. Sidgwick had to pjoj^ihat j^leasure^
was the only ultimate good ; he actually proves
that " desirable consciousness," a concrete, complex
state of pleasurable existence, is the only ultimate
good.

Bradley's objection is chiefly of interest as calling
/attention to a possible flaw in Sidgwick's attack
/ upon the perfectionistic standard. Hedonists would
admit that " mere pleasure " — pleasure apart from
conscious life — is not only not the summum bonum
but is not even conceivable. They virtually
contend for " pleasurable conscious life," and
they are certainly wise in doing so. But they
forget to allow their opponents a similar grace.
Sidgwick, for example, shows with apparent co-
gency ^ that " mere virtue " — virtue devaidLjSLf
pleasure to self or others— still more emphatically,
virtue accompanied by extreme pain — cannot be
regarded as, in and for.-itselfi..gi)ad,„, In other '"
words, he makes abstraction from virtuous con-
sciousness of one of its essential characteristics —
1 Methods, p. 392 f.

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 199

the feeling of high satisfaction commonly called
the pleasure ^^He" moral sense'* — arid then he
triumphantly affirms, " the remainder is, in itself,
worthless ". Surely Mr. Rashdall is right in
pointing out that moralists of the idealistic school
mean by virtue " virtuous consciousness,'* a total
concrete state of well-being. They have, at any
rate, as much right to take shelter within its ample
recesses, as Sidgwick within those of the phrase
" desirable consciousness '\ The point will come
up again.

(5), (6) Mr. Bradley has spent much time, both
in his Ethical Studies and in the pamphlet here re-
ferred to, in criticising the hedonistic conception
o£a " sum "or '^greatest sum "of pleasures. His
arguments are ingenious and forcible, and should
be read by all students of ethics,^ but they do not
seem to the present writer absolutely conclusive. A
" sum " of fleeting feelings is, no doubt, an obscure
conception ; a " greatest possible sum " is worse
still. But though the mathematical terminology
can be objected to, the hedonistic cpnception is^
after all, fairly intelligible, at any rate as intelligible

^ For those to whom Mr. Bradley's ethical works (unfor-
tunately out of print) are unavailable, Professor Mackenzie's
Introduction to Social Philosophy, p. 204 f., gives a clear summary
of the present argument.

y

200 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

as the rival conception of perfection or self-realisa-
tion which involves an admitted circle.^ Hence
the present writer has no intention of following
Mr. Bradley's subtle arguments on the " sum of
pleasures ** doctrine. The brief summary above
given must suffice, and a few remarks have also
been proffered on this subject in the preceding
section on Green.

(8) Bradley's best argument is undoubtedly the
one in which he shows that pleasure may have
an honoured place in the perfectionistic summum_
bonum^ while not occupying the throne itself. _
" Pleasure may be a factor in the summum honum
and yet not be the only thing good." The
hardness of a diamond may be one of its most
valuable qualities, so valuable that a soft diamond
(did such exist) would be a mass of worthless car-
bon, and yet this quality of hardness may not be the
only valuable one possessed by the gem. The hard-
ness may be valuable only when accompanied by
brilliance and purity. Pleasure, in like manner,
may be admitted as good, but only when it is
a quality in a total state recognised, on other
grounds, as " good," " noble " or so forth.
The pleasure accompanying the deeds of the
philanthropist or of the honest mechanic may

^ Green's Prolegomena^ p. 205.

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 201

be " good " ; the pleasure of the sensualist may
be " bad " ; while there may be pleasure of other
kinds which, prima facie at any rate, appears
morally neutral. In the same way the hardness
of a diamond is good, while the hardness of a
boiled egg or of a penny bun may be " bad ".
In short, pleasure may be good or bad according
to circumstances. The i3ealistic school of writers
vehemently contend that we must abandon hedon-
ism and take for our summum honum a wider, fuller,
more concrete notion than " pleasure " before we
can attain to a true view even of pleasure itself.
Sidgwick's phrase " desirable consciousness," may
be thought to point in this very direction.

Bradley's succeeding arguments, (9), (10), (n),
(12), need little comment. The eleventh is based
on the view that Sidgwick had tried to " suppress "
egoism, a view which, if the preceding discussions
are valid, is a mistaken one. The twelfth (an
accusation of Jesuitry against Sidgwick's utili-
tarianism) will meet us again and will be found
to be well established.

(13) Bradley's last objection has been fre-
quently urged and by no one more emphatically
than by Guyau.^ " La morale vient en somme
se suspendre tout entiere a une conception re-

^ Gizycki raises the same objection. See Ch. 10 of this work.

202 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

ligeuse ; cette conception elle me me, si on essaie
de la formuler plus nettement que M. Sidgwick,
ne pourra aboutir qu'a la notion d'un dieu utilitaire,
voulant pour toutes ses creatures la plus grande
somme de plaisirs, mais ne pouvant la distribuer
des cette vie, et uniquement occupe dans Teternite
a corriger les miseres de ce monde (miseres qu'il
a du lui-meme contribuer a produire). Cette
conception d'un dieu impuissant ou repentant
est-elle plus soutenable que la doctrine religieuse
vulgaire? . . . Un dieu utilitaire, ne voulant
que le plaisir de ses creatures et leur prodiguant
les soufFrances, ne serait-il pas une absurdite
vivante ? . . . Sa seule conclusion logique serait
une pure negation; s'iP evite cette negation,
c'est qu'il n'a pas eu le courage de faire porter
sa critique de la morale sur le point essentiel,
sur I'origine meme du sentiment moral et de
ces ' desirs eleves ' qu'il invoque en terminant.
Un souhait ou un desir n'est pas une raison ;
il peut y avoir opposition entre un desir instinctif
et une negation rationelle, sans qu'il y ait au coeur
meme de la pensee humaine cette ' contradicUon
fondamentale ' qui epouvante M. Sidgwick, et qui
le fait se refugier dans un acte de foi. La con-
tradiction, si elle existe, ne se trouve que dans son
propre systeme." ^

^ Professor Sidgwick. ^ La Morale Anglaise Contemporaire.

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 203

The criticisms of Bradley and of Guyau seem
absolutely conclusive against the form of the theo-
logical solution proffered by Sidgwick. Should
the human mind ever succeed in penetrating to
|a standpoint from which the universe will appear
as absolutely rational, that standpoint will, almost
certainly, not be a hedonistic one. fain is every-
vyhere about us.;, the course of mundane progress
gives no clear indications that it is ever likely to
vanish from the earth ; while, if we make the
assumption of a future life, we must accept one
of two alternatives. Either that life will be one
in which feeling is altogether absent ^ or if feeling
be not absent, pain, though not perhaps physical
pain, is as likely to prevail as pleasure. Neither
alternative can satisfy a hedonist.

As pointed out in the preceding section, the
perfection istic theory, though not without its own
difficulties, gives a better interpretation of the pain
enigma than hedonism can ever do. Perfectionism
can find a place for a certain amount of suffering
even here and now ; it has, moreover, no serious
objection to the continuance of that amount either
in this or in any other possible world. Doubtless
much of the pain we daily observe or experience
seems absolutely purposeless and enigmatical ; but

^A view strongly suggested by the James-Lange theory of
emotion.

204 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

all does not. Perfectionism therefore can rise to
a theistic view without serious difficulty ; but the
hedonist who sees in all pain so much failure,
must surely be gifted with a faith passing that
of the saints and martyrs if he can soar to the
conception of a hedonisic God who, in spite of
the failures of his rule over human creatures in
this life, will yet succeed in redressing the adverse
balance in another. The adverse balance in this
life, observe, has on the one theory been nothing
but absolute loss ; it may not have been absolute
loss, on the other view ; it may have conduced to
what is of supreme importance, the growth of
character.

Are Guyau's words too strong } Is not Sidg-
wick's hedonistic deity " une ahsurditd vivante ? "

(3) Sidgwick's Attack on Idealism.

After a perusal of the preceding elaborate attack
upon Sidgwick's ethical doctrines, the reader may
naturally ask whether our author remained passive,
or whether he responded to the challenge thrown
down by his idealistic critics.

To Bradley's furious pamphlet he never replied,
and even the controversy which preceded its appear-
ance {Mind, 1876-77) remains valuable not for the
ethical conclusions which it elucidated but mainly
as an armoury for polemical epithets.

\

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 205

With Green and over Green, however, Sidgwick
carried on an intermittent discussion. We have
seen that in many respects the two writers were
not far apart. Still, they belonged to different
schools and some conflict of opinion was inevitable.
Thus we find that the years 1874-75 Sidgwick
criticised, in the pages of the Academy^ the im-
portant work then being published by Green and
Grose, their standard edition of the writings of
Hume. In 1877 there followed a brief contro-
I versy between the two men over the " sum of
I pleasures " doctrine ; the substance of this now
(appears in the Methods. Green died in 1882, and
his Prolegomena^ containing a criticism of some of
Sidgwick's views, were published in the following
year. In^i8J4,,Sidgwick contributed an extremely
j iijiportant article to Mind^ under the title of
" Green's Ethics ". The last lecture that Sidgwick
ever gave was on the philosophy of the great Oxford
\ teacher, and this has recently been published in
Mind}

In the Methods^ as above indicated, we find a
number of somewhat important references to Green.
The most weighty of these deal with the questions
of the conceivability of pleasure apart from its
conditions, and of the intelligibility of the phrase
" sum of pleasures '^ {Methods, pp. 132-35). Refer-
i"The Philosophy of T. H. Green," Mind, 1901, p. 18.

206 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

ence has already been made in a preceding section
to these controversies, and the conclusion arrived
at was that the amount of real difference of stand-
point is much smaller than commonly supposed.
Elsewhere in the Methods Sidgwick criticises Green^
definitions of happiness (p. 93) and of motive
(p. 363), but in each of these cases the main
interest is only terminological.

His two articles in Mind are, however, of great
interest, and some of the most important points
therein raised will here be considered. Inasmuch,
however, as they involve metaphysical considera-
tions, their treatment will be extremely slight.

Green's system is obviously based upon meJtar.
physics, according to Sidgwick upon false meta-
physics. Green, we are told, has argued that
\because finite minds are similar to the Divine Mind
in having like it a unifying and combining charac-
' ^er, therefore there is identity between them ; each
nan's consciousness is a form of the eternal con-
sciousness itself. In the words of Professor Seth,
who here echoes the same objection. Green has
" transformed the logical identity of type.in.to a
numerical identity of existence " ; ^ he has swallowed
up human personality in the Divine and given us
nothing but a pantheism. But the answer to this
criticism is quite obvious. Green was not a pan-
J Hegelianim and Personality, p. 29,

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 207

theist ; he never taught that human personality
must so lapse into an ocean of divinity as to lose
its own characteristic features.

That each, who seems a separate whole, *

Should move his rounds, and fusing all
The skirts of self again, should fall,

Remerging in the general soul.

On the contrary he was most emphatic in his
defence of human and divine personality.

Eternal form shall still divide
The eternal soul from all beside.

His maintenance of this doctrine may not have
been absolutely unswerving, but it undoubtedly
represents the predominant side of his thought.
The great problem of the metaphysics of the
present day, as Professor Ward once remarked to
the writer, is, How can the claims of the Many
be preserved along with the claims of the One ^
Spinoza sacrificed the Many to the One, Liebnitz
the One to the Many ; philosophers of the future
have to avoid both dangers. Though Green's
system of philosophy leaves the exact relations of
the Many to the One undelineated, it is certain that
he did not commit the first of the errors above
mentioned. Personality, human and divine, was
the keynote of his teaching.

More conclusive in appearance is Sidgwick's
criticism of certain others of Green's doctrines,

208 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

Each man's consciousness is a " realisation " or
" reproduction " of the divine consciousness. Sidg-
wick pertinently asks which of these apparently
inconsistent alternatives we are really expected by
Green to accept. The latter, no doubt, is most
prominent in his thought. The author of the
Prolegomena was convinced that there is one Divine
Eternal Spirit who really is all that the human
spirit can become ; but why then did he use the
word " realise " and thus reduce God and nature
to potential existence ^ The word '' reproduce "
certainly stands for Green's predominant view ;
God is the ideal of the human spirit, but he is
an ideal completely " realised " already, though
not in human consciousness. Sidgwick's criticism
of the joint use of the terms " realise " and " repro-
duce '' has thus much force for those who are not
convinced, on other grounds, of the tenability of
Green's system, but for those who feel that the
moral ideal must possess both static and dynamic
qualities — must stand for reality as well as ideality
— Green's terminology, with all its difficulties, will
not present itself as altogether absurd.

Sidgwick makes a further criticism. Spirit is
described as_a,^Qn-natural principle which con-
stitutes nature by a system of relations which result
from its action as thinking, but is itself, joot-detejCT-
mined^^ythese relations. But Green conceives

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 209

spirit as one and many (God and finite beings) ;
he conceives of these as having relations of likeness
and yet of difference ; he regards spirit as " self-
distinguishing," " self-objectifying," and " combin-
ing ". But he is here employing words denoting
relations of quantity, identity, and so forth, relations
which he also uses in describing phenomena. How
then can spirit be " non-natural " ?

Green^s_ answer would doubtless be that the
categories of unity, likeness, etc., which we use
both in describing spirit and in describing natural
phenomena are in either case the work of spirit.
Spirit conceives phenomena under these categories,
and, when it reflects upon its own nature, it has
to employ the same .categories. But these latter
are nevertheless of spiritual origin whether applied
to nature or refiexly to sel£ Green, in fact, would
contend that he has rather spiritualised nature than
naturalised spirit by the employment of the cate-
gories of unity, identity, and so forth.

According to him, however, spirit is " not in
time," and yet, as Sidgwick points out, he fre-
quently describes it as " already " in a certain
state, and as abiding '^for ever". Again it is
" not a cause," and yet he speaks of it as a
" source of the relations which constitute nature,"
and as "using the animal organism for its vehicle".

He distinguishes Divine from natural casualtty, and

14

210 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

makes the former a mere unifying principle, whose
only character is found in synthesising the manifold
of nature. But if so, how can this merely unifying
or synthesising principle become a moral ideal of
perfection to human beings .f* How can it be a
moral ideal at all ? unification surely is as present
in the lives of sinners as in those of saints. In
short there is no bridge between Green's meta-
physics and his ethics.

To some extent the edge of this last criticism
can be turned by pointing out that, on Green's
view, the Divine Spirit, though described in the
first book of the Prolegomena in purely intel-
lectualistic language, is so described merely for
convenience of exposition. Later on in the work
Green advances beyond the purely intellectualistic
standpoint which he had only emphasised as a
convenient starting-place in the idealistic demon-
stration. Still, when we begin to endow the Divine
Spirit with other qualities than the intellectual —
when we add qualities involving desire — our ideal
^ begins to appear sadly human, and the difficulties
revealed by Mansel in his famous Bampton Lectures
crowd in apace. Green's metaphysics may be ad-
mitted to be imperfect — what system of meta-
physics is not ? But a system which is based upon
the notion of a realm of self-conscious personalities,
in close relations with one supreme self-conscious

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 211

personality, may at any rate be claimed to solve
as many difficulties as it raises. It is at least as
satisfactory as the metaphysical torso at the end of
the Methods,

To answer all the criticisms directed against
Green's system would evidently involve a lengthy
excursion into the metaphysical region, a task be-
yond the limits of the present work. No doubt
Green was right in basing ethics on metaphysics,
for, however scrupulously we may attempt to avoid
questions of the latter kind, we shall find ourselves
ultimately driven to their consideration. Through-
out the Methods there is a deliberate attempt at
avoiding metaphysics, yet the author is finally
I compelled to appeal to theological and metaphysical
I considerations. But in the present volume no
serious attempt will be made to discuss problems
of this kind, though in a work which professedly
deals with the controversies between Sidgwick and
his contemporaries some passing reference had
necessarily to be made to Sidg wick's articles on
Green.

A rdsumd has now been given of the 1901 article
in Mind. More directly ethical was the earlier one,
though even in this we find that Sidgwick ex-
pressed his dissatisfaction with the metaphysical
basis of Green's system, and criticised it on similar
lines to the above. He asks, as also in his later

212 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

K article, how we can possibly get an " ideal of
I holiness " out of a combining, self-distinguishing
land self-objectifying agency, an agency of a
purely intellectual character. Green doubtless
would answer, as pointed out above, that for him
the Divine Spirit is more than an " eternal intellect
out of time," and that though in book i. of his
Prolegomena he dealt exclusively with the intel-
lectual aspect of the Divine Spirit he did not in
that book exhaust its attributes.

Again Sidgwick complains that Green holds up
at one time a moral ideal in which men can find
I " rest," or " abiding satisfaction " — a state quite
different from that of our present life with its
constant emergence of desire, — while from certain
other aspects of his philosophy we should expect
that the presence of the animal organism would
be absolutely essential for his conception of the
good and that this latter would consist in " some
combination of natural desires modified by self-
consciousness ".

Green's answer to this (whether satisfactory or
not must be left to the judgment of his readers)

would be to insist that all such " desires " as are

...^"»"

possessed by moral beings already involve sejf:
consciousness, and are different in toto from the
mere blind impulses which we attribute to animals.
Green would object to any " combination " doctrine

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 213

as savouring of the presentationalism or atomism
against which he waged war.

Sidgwick undoubtedly puts his finger on an
apparently weak place in Green's argument when
he criticises the " finding rest " doctrine of the
latter philosopher. Does Green postulate a future
life.^ Even if he does, this scarcely gives us an
ethical end here and now, for the present life shows
us no "rest". If, on the contrary, the "rest" is
I to be realised in a society of persons on this earth,
I where is the transition from the egoistic to the
mniversalistic side of Green's doctrine ^ Is " a
better state of humanity " identical with a " better
state of myself".? Why should I sacrifice my
good to that of others ?

Green's answer, as expressed by one of his
followers,^ is, " Because they are not other. A
society in which the individuals composing it can
only get their own good each at the expense of
some one else — a society, in other words, of atomic
units — is not a human society at all." Green's
j'view of society was clearly an organic one, Sidg-
^ wick's was atomic. It has been shown in preceding
chapters that our author found enormous difficulty
in getting rid of egoism, and curiously enough it
is this very difficulty he here challenges Green to

1 T/ie Philosophy of T. H. Green, by W. H. Fairbrother,
p. 183.

214 SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS.

solve. From his own atomic view the task was
impossible, and he claimed that it was equally
impossible from the idealistic point of view, that
of the " social organism ". But surely this is not
so. For an individual who regards as the moral
ideal a concrete though only half revealed state of
perfection — a state necessarily social — there is no
serious theoretical difficulty in the moral demand
for sacrifice of " self" (one's own personal feelings
of gratification) in the interests of a wider social
" self". But for a hedonist the sacrifice of personal
gratification always remains a difficulty. Ought he
to sacrifice himself.^ We may surely conclude that
Green's system is more satisfactory at this point
than the rival view, though the claim that the
idealistic ideal is one involving " rest " seems much
more difficult to maintain.

In Green there are, according to his critic, two
conflicting moral ideals, one a pagan or neo-pagan
ideal including artistic and scientific as well as
strictly moral perfection ; the other a stoically and
puritanically narrow ideal of merely moral perfec-
tion.^ The latter of these is, no doubt, realisable
without competition ; the former is not. A person
who aims at the fullest development of all his

^ It is interesting to note that Herbartianism is being attacked
at the present day on similar grounds. See Natorp : Herbart,
Pestalozzi und die hautigen J uf gab en der Erziehungskhre,

SIDGWICK AND THE IDEALISTS. 215

faculties will probably have to do so at the expense
of other persons.

This is by far the most serious ethical objection
to Green's doctrine, and there can be little doubt
as to the inadequacy of his treatment of it, an
inadequacy due to the fact that the Prolegomena
were never completed. The editor's footnote on
page 3 1 2 of that work is the official answer to Sidg-
wick's criticism, and with that the admirer of Green
has to be content.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE SUMMUM BONUM.

" The common judgment that a thing is * good ' does not
on reflection appear to be ecjuivalent to a judgment that^it is
directly or indirectly pleasant " {Methods of Ethics, table of con-
tents, book i., ch. ix.)-

"We can only justifj^to ourselves the importance that we_
attach, .to , • • objects by considering (their.) conducivenesv-in
one way or another, to the happiness of sentient beings"
{Methods of Ethics, p. 401).

The student who for the first time sees the
above two statements in close proximity may feel
bewilderment at the contradiction they seem to
involve. A frank admission that "good " does not
mean " pleasant " is followed by an affirmation that
objects are " good " only so far as_conducive to
happiness. But on examination, the logical con-
tradiction, though not the ethical paradox, is seen
to vanish. The first statement reflects the super-
ficial judgments of common thought, the second
the reflective and analytical judgment of the philo^
sopher who, having swept his glance around the

cosmos in search for a summum bonum^ has at last

(216)

THE SUMMUM BONUM. 217

been successful, but only at the cost of a challenge
to common sense.

It will be an easy, perhaps a trivial task to point
out these and similar difficulties in the Methods of
Ethics considered as a constructive work. Of such
difficulties no one could be more conscious than
Sidgwick himself ; the words we have quoted
represent but one case among many in which he
brings out into deliberate and sharp prominence
the difficulties inherent in the task of ethical con-
struction. Unsympathetic readers might even be
tempted to suggest that he revelled in the marshal-
ling of insoluble problems and felt a positive delight
in the clash of contradictions. Far otherwise was
probably the truth.^ But certain it is that despite
his acceptance of ethical hedonism he made no
I attempt to minimise or conceal its paradoxes. He
preferred to bring them out into extraordinary
clearness. " The readiness to admit every diffi-
culty " ^ was, as Caird pointed out, one of his
leading characteristics.

The present task is not to deal with such diffi-
culties as surround the hedonistic calculus or the
transition from egoism to utilitarianism, but with

1 See Mind, 1 889, p. 483, where he speaks of his ** prolonged
effort to effect a complete systematisation of our common ethical
thought" and his failure.

'^Academy, 12th June, 1875.

218 THE SUMMUM BONUM.

those which surround the exact formulation of the
summum bonum^ which task is, after all, the central
problem of ethics. What is it that is ultimately
good, good per se^ good as an end and not merely
as a means ? Is it pleasure, or happiness, or per-
fection, or virtue (whatever these words may*
mean) ? Is it to include contemplation of beauty,
and search for truth ? Is it some simple state, or
some complex whole? What, in short, is the
summum honum ? The question has been touched
upon in the two preceding chapters, but its im-
portance is so great that it may well claim a
chapter to itself.

Ignoring minor theories of ultimate good, we
may confine our attention to the two which at
present divide moralists into somewhat sharply
opposed classes.
I One class of minds will contend, with Sidgwick,
I that the pleasurableness of existence is its only
iquality of ultimate value. That conduct commonly
denominated " virtuous " is worthless unless pro-
ductive of pleasure to self or others. That truth
and beauty, like virtue, are, in the long run,
valueless unless pleasant. That error which is
pleasant is ultimately better than truth which is
I unpleasant. That, in short, the summum honum
is pleasure only.

The other class will contend, with Bradley, that to^

/

THE SUMMUM B0iVC7^*'===^=**^ 219

lay this stress upon pleasure is to lay stress upon an
abstraction. That pkasure, no doubt, is generally
good, but that it is to be judged along with the
whole concrete state in which it occurs. That
higher functioning has to be chosen even if, as
often happens, its pleasurableness is less than that
of lower functioning. That, in short, not pleasure

f but the more concrete notion of self-realisation or
perfection lies at the basis of the moral life and

i moral judgments.

" Questions of ultimate ends do not admit ofAj
proof." Mill never spoke truer words than these.^ ^^{\0
The view adopted by each thinker^with respect to ^
the final justification of conduct, is to a large
extent dependent upon non-rational considerations,
upon such factors as early training and congenital^ y\
characteristics, certainly not upon demonstrative
proof. And yet these factors can scarcely be
allowed for. Yet upon them depends to a large ex-
tent the thinker*s ultimate metaphysical view, and
upon this latter, in turn, hangs his ethical theory.

Still, the impossibility of arriving at a final
consensus does not deter moralists from attacking
the central problem of their science, and, as Sidgwick
has not hesitated to give a careful and somewhat
lengthy defence of ethical hedonism, no discussion
of his philosophy would be complete without a some-
what more detailed consideration of his arguments.

220 THE SUM MUM BONUM.

They are contained in the fourteenth chapter of
the third book, the most important chapter in the
Methods of Ethics.

In the thirteenth chapter Sidgwick had enunciated
the three maxims of philosophical intuitionism.
Those maxims have been already examined, and
while not denying them a certain value and a very;
large measure of self-evidence we hav^ seen that
they are highly abstract/ and therefore of little
positive though of considerable negative ethical
value. We have seen that this abstractness is
fully recognised by the author himself. He was
therefore naturally driven on to an examination
of the central ethical problem. What is, after all,
the good which has to be distributed impartially
and in conformity with the three maxims we have
been enunciating ^

Sidgwick's argument is a close and forcible one.
Perhaps the device of parallel columns may be
useful for the purpose of following it, step by step,
and providing such criticisms as a supporter of
Green or Bradley would be likely to adduce.
Some of the points have been already touched
upon in previous sections, especially in chapter
vii.

^ The only exception is in the maxim of egoism, one element
of which is based on a concrete, perspective, personal view of
things.

THE SUMMUM BONUM.

221

Sidgwick's Argument.

(i) The good cannot be
virtue in the vulgar_sense, i.e.y
conformity to common rules
of morality. For the validity
of these rests in the long run
upon the three maxims of
philosophical intuitionism, and
these latter prescribe seeking
the "good," v^rhose meaning
is therefore still unexplained.

(2) Neither can we fall
back upon a kind of " aesthetic
intuitionism," and regard the
good as manifested in such vir-
tuous conduct as we approve
by trained insight. Such virtu-
ous conduct will still be found
to Involve the notion of doing

(3) Nor can we fall back on
the plan of defining the good
as_ virtue regarded not as a
quality of conduct or action,
Eiit as a qualit\' of character
(" be this," not merely " do
this "). Character with its
faculties and dispositions alwr.ys
implies the production of some
result, some feelTng' or act
which is brought about by
the "faculty," etc.

Reply.

(i) Certainly, the good
transcends the common rules
of morality, though these latter
are expressions of it. The
moral ideal, as shown by Green
in the Prolegomena^ is constantly
leading to an advance beyond
them towards new and fuller
expressions of itself.

(2) Certainly. The "moral
sense " is not adequate to the
fulness of the ideal.

(3) No moralist would
dream of regarding a mere
faculty, one that never passes
into action, as good. But is
there any such thing ? Is not
a mere faculty or disposition
a pure abstraction ? Virtue
is an ivepyiia not a Svva/xis.
Sidgwick*s argument is sound
But unnecessary.

222

THE SUM MUM BONUM.

(4) Nor can we fall back
upon subjectivism and say that
the good is conscientiousness
or subjective rightness. For
to ignore the objective side
of conduct — its external effects
— would be to do violence
to common sense.

(5) It is also clear that the
good cannot consist in the
talents, gifts, or graces which
are commonly included under
the notion of excellence or
perfection. For none of these
are valuable except when actual-
ised in conscious life.

(6)_Shalljvve^then_say that

(4) Nevertheless conscienti-
ousness is ja _ most_ important
feature of virtuous action.
" The one unconditional good
is the good will ; this must be
the end by reference to which
we estimate the effects of an
action " {Prolegomena, p. 316,
et seq.y where this subject is
thoroughly discussed). "There
is no reason to doubt that the
jood or evil in the motive of
m action is exactly measured
)y the good or evil in its con-
sequences as rightly estimated
— estimated, that is, in their
bearing on the production of
a good will or the perfecting
of mankind" (pp. 320-21).
The good will must not be
merely formal, it must have
reference to society ; still un-
less the motive of the act be
good, the act is not virtuous.

(5) Butwhat right have you
to abstract these talents, etc.,
from their " actualisation in
conscious life " ? Of course
they have no value as mere
potentialities — if there is any
mere potentiality (see Leibnitz,
Nouveaux Essais, preface).

(6) Certainly it must be

THE SUMMUM BO NUM.

223

uljiisate good = desirable con-
scious life, desirable conscious-
ness ?

(a) Itcertainly must be
consciousness. For mere phy-
sical or physiological processes
cannot be regarded as in
themselves either "good" or
" bad," but only in reference to
their conscious results or con-
comitants.

(6) Neither can mere self-
preservation or the preservation
of the race be ultimately good
unless the consciousness of the
" preserved " individuals be pre-
dominantly happy or desirable.

(c) Nor can " virtuous con-
sciousness" be good if accom-
paniedT)y torture or misery.

" conscious life " of a sort. But
"desirable" is an ambiguous
and dangerous word.

(^) Granted. "The rational
soul in seeking an ultimate
good necessarily seeks it as a
state of its own being " (Green,
Prolegomena, p. 414).

{b) Granted, unless happi-
ness is interpreted in a strictly
hedonistic and quantitative
manner. The consciousness
must be of the nature of " self-
realisation " and therefore be
in a sense, " happiness ". But
its goodness does not consist
merely in its pleasantness.

{c) The supposition of "vir-
tue" accompanied by torture
or misery is a far-fetched and
artificial one. Putting aside
the question w^hether the vir-
tuous man is ever called upon
for an absolute self-sacrifice, it
is certain that the reductio ad
absurdum in the opposite column
(r) does not prove that pleasure
in the abstract is the ultimate
good.

(7) Ultimate good then is (7) "Apart from feeling,'

224

THE SUMMUM BO NUM.

"desirable consciousness". But
consciousness includes cogni-
tion and volition as well as
fQpling. Are these desirable
apart from feeling ? No.
They are "quite neutral in
respect of desirability".

For (taking the case of the
cognition of truth), (a) though
a man may prefer the cognition
of truth to the belief in fictions
in spite of the fact that the
former state may be more
painful than the latter, yet in
this case he is not judging the
conscious state as such. His
judgment is directed to the
"objective relations" between
his mind and other things.

(/^) Similarly a man may
have a " predominant aver-
sion " to slavery, even though
the life of slavery might con-
ceivably be pleasanter than one
of freedom and penury ; or he
may prefer contemplation of
beauty or pursuit of virtue even
though, as states of conscious-
ness, these are less pleasant than
certain other states.

But "admitting that we
have actual experience of such

again this illegitimate abstrac-
tion ! What right has any
one to separate cognition and
volition from its accompany-
ing feeling ? May not the
moral judgment be passed on J
the whole concrete state ? '

But surely the fact — just
admitted by Sidgwick — that we
have strong impulses towards
the apprehension. af-.Jxuth,
conformity to virtue, etc^ even
when we recognise, that- tjiese
may be painful, js a serious
stumbliag-block in . the-w-ay^of
accepting mere pleasure as the-
summum bonum. Does it not
seem probable that the summum^
bonum is wider and more com-
prehensive ? Using Sidgwick's
own words when enunciating
(in order to condemn) this
view, "We may take * con-
scious life ' in a wide sense so
as to include the objective
relations of the conscious being
implied in our notions of
virtue, truth, beauty, freedom "
(p. 400).

%

THE SUMMUM BONUM.

225

preferences as have just been
described, of which the ultimate
object is something that is not
merely consciousness. . . .,

" Yet (c) when we * sit down
in a cool hour' we can only
justify to ourselves the import-
ance that we attach to any of
these objects by considering its
conduciveness to the happiness
of sentient beings" (p. 401).

But to prove that virtue
apart from pleasure is not
"good," does not prove that
pleasure alone is good (see
Bradley's criticism in the pre-
ceding chapter).

(8) Another argument in
favour of accepting pleasure as
the summum bonum (in addition
to the argument just given, and
based upon the intuitive judg-
ment) is to be drawn from a
" comprehensive comparison of
the ordinary judgments of
mankind ". Common sense
hesitates to approve of the
pursuit of really fruitless know-
Ie3ge ; as for knowledge ap-
parently fruitless, common sense
recognises that there is always
the chance of this not being
the case, and at any rate its
pursuit gives pleasure. There
is even the possibility of
"virtue" (fanaticism is sup-
posed to be "virtuous" in a
sense) conflicting with happi-

(8) Inasmuch as the " pre-
dominant aversions " to error,
slavery, etc., mentioned above,
are, presumably, aversions of
"common sense," it is some-
what strange to contend now
that common sense approves of
knowledge only so far as it is
fruitful {i.e.y pleasure-produc-
ing). To say that " it is para-
doxical to maintain that any
degree of freedom . . . would
still be commonly regarded as
desirable even if ... it had
no tendency to promote the
general happiness " is again to
make a completely artificial
abstraction of happiness from
freedom. Again, in these cases,
as in the still more important
case of virtue, common sense,

15

226 THE SUMMUM BONUM.

ness, and in such a case com- as Sidgwick admits, is doubtful
mon sense hardly recommends and ambiguous ; and its verdict
the further cultivation of the is certainly as much against as
former ; the same may be said for the hedonistic position,
of "freedom". The case of
beauty is simpler, for this ideal
is, roughly speaking, approved
by common sense in proportion
to the degree in which it is
productive of pleasure.

Such is Sidgwick's famous argument in favour of
ethical hedonism, and such are, in brief form, the
answers which those who are unconvinced by his
reasonings adduce in favour of the opposite view.
It is obvious to all that if ethical hedonism is to be
based upon an argument so delicately poised as the
one we have been considering, its position is the reverse
of secure. Sidgwick has done for this doctrine what
Plato did for his idealistic metaphysics, he has shown
that the opposing arguments are almost — if not
quite — as strong as the arguments in its favour.

The Methods of Ethics is a hedonistic work, and
yet it is, perhaps, more dangerous to hedonism than
any hostile work has ever been. No writer has
1 shown a fuller consciousness than Sidgwick of the
lenormous difficulties which face the moralist when
attempting to erect ethics upon hedonistic founda-
*tions. He brings out obstacles, paradoxes, and
inconsistencies into the light of day ; he glosses

THE SUMMUM BONUM. 227

over no difficulty, he refuses to bridge gaps and
fill lacunae by doubtful means. And yet, though
conscious as few even of the opponents of
hedonism have ever been, of the seriousness of its
demerits, he concludes that this system, faute de
mieux^ is the only possible one. We have seen the
argument by which he arrives at this conclusion.
We have now to consider the result, and the
consequences to ethics of its acceptance.

Is the reasoning of chapter xiv., book iii., valid ^
Is it true that the only element of existence
possessing ultimate worth is pleasurable feeling?
Is it the case that virtuous conduct, unless pleasant
or conducive to the pleasure of self or others, is
worthless.? Do we admit that error which is
pleasant is better than truth which is unpleasant .?

Before admitting conclusions so momentous, we
must scrutinise carefully the reasoning by which
they have been attained. It is obviously based
upon methods of exclusion, abstraction, and reductio
ad ahsurdum. UUimate^^ood^says Sidgwick,
canno^^onsist merely in " virtue,'V for this always
implies the doing of "good" ; benevolence, for
example, is the doing of " good " to certain in-
dividuals, or the promotion of their " well-being '*.
But admitting this argument to be, in a sense, valid,
thorough-going hedonism is not really established.
For (i) the good or well-being which is promote^

y

228 THE SUM MUM BONUM.

by benevolence need not be mere pleasure, though
It frequently is so ; (2) the benevolence itself may
be. judged as good. There is no inconsistency in
saying " it is good to be benevolent, i.e., to do
good," for the good in each case may be interpreted
perfectionistically. The individual who benevo-
lently helps on the self-development or perfection
of others may be, ipso facto., forwarding his own.
No doubt benevolent action is often predominantly
hedonistic ; philanthropists frequently (too fre-
quently indeed) aim at the mere giving of pleasure
to the objects of their sympathy rather than at
their elevation or development ; but it must be
remembered that pleasure and development are,
generally speaking, not incompatible. The re-
formers who advocate the education of the " lower
classes " may point, and justly, to the refined
pleasures which follow upon education, though it
is only a shallow optimism which would claim that
improved education was always accompanied by
increased pleasure. Thus there is sufficient cor-
I respondence between the perfectionistic and the
I hedonistic ideals to explain the frequent confusion
of the standpoints.^ To ask, " Is higher function-

1 Bradley, Ethical Studies, p. 119. " Pleasure is the psychical
accompaniment of exercise of function and a distinction is
required in order to think of function apart from some pleasure.
Perhaps there is really no such thing."

THE SUMMUM BONUM. 229

ing apart from pleasure, good ? " is to ask an
unmeaninff question, for all tunctioning involves""
some pleasure. But there is a more moderately
expressed question which we must ask. When
the choice lies between higher functioning accom-
panied by less pleasure, and lower functioning
[accompanied by more pleasure, which ought we
\ to choose ? It is only in answering such a question
^ as this that there is much practical divergence
between the two theories. Perfectionists can
nearly always, if they choose, draw support from
a vague non-quantitative hedonism, though their
consistency in doing so depends upon the view
they adopt on the question whether pleasure is a
low kind of good or whether it is, in itself, neither
good nor bad. Upon the latter question they
seem not altogether agreed. Bradley {Ethical
Studies, pp. 118-27), while doubting whether
pleasure per se or pain per se can be conceived,
appears to hold that they may be admitted to.
be, in a relative sort of way, forms of good and
evlTres^ctively. The latter view is also Mr. Rash-
daD/s (7l??!S7i?8 5 , pp. 207-8) ; pleasure, or relief
from pain, is good, but only in a subordinate
sense ; good in the highest sense is self-realisation.^
Green's view, on the other hand, appears to be of
a rather more stoical character.

Sidgwick's argument that virtue cannot be the

I

i

230 THE SUM MUM BO NUM.

ultimate good because all virtue implies doing or
producing good, is based upon an abstraction of
the act from its consequences, and is therefore
\regarded by many critics as not conclusive. His
opponents would contend that the "benevolent''
act has to be considered as a concrete whole and
that when so considered it is morally approved on
the grounds : (i) that even though the benevolent
man may merely aim at conferring pleasure, this
latter may be admitted as " good " in a secondary
sense ; (2) that the benevolent man frequently aims
at more than pleasure, as, for example when he
contributes towards the improved education of
the working classes ; in such a case the good
aimed at is to be interpreted perfectionistically
rather than hedonistically ; (3) tjiat the benevolent
act not only confers good but is in itself good.
Only by Sidgwick drawing a sharp line between
the subjective and objective sides of an act —
between its performance and its consequences —
is his conclusion possible. His argument, in short,
is based upon abstraction.

The same objection applies to his succeeding
argument against the view that the good consists
in character and its faculties, habits, or disposi-
tions (Methods, p. 393). Probably no writer
has really ever regarded character in the jJbstract
(/.<?., apart from its activities), as being good

THE SUM MUM BONUM. 231

in any absolute sense. But character realised
in action may be admitted to be good ; in any

other sense it is probably unmeaning. Tlie
sleeping man is neither good nor bad. Aristotle
long ago made it clear that virtue cannot be a
mere 8wa/xts.
I The final argument by which Sidgwick attempts
to show that pleasure is the only ultimate good is
again an argument based upon abstraction and
exclusion. We^jiave- tn evrlnHe plea<^nrp frnjli^

virtue and_ t hen„ask„Qurselvev Jl Js, the.-l^ now^
good?,"/ But, as Bradley has pointed out^ to
prove that A is valueless apart from B does
not make B, when taken alone, valuable. The
real value may lie in the complex and, concrete
whole which includes both A and B.^ Virtue
apart from pleasure of a certain kind is incon- ^
ceJA^ble.

The argument could be equally well turned
against hedonism itself. Is pleasure taken in^
abstraction good } ^ To answer is really impossible.
We have no right to put asunder elements which
are organically connected as parts of the same

'^Methods, p. 397.

2 To take a concrete case. If by any possibility mankind
could be made really happier by being transformed into pigs,
ought we to choose such a transformation ? Mill says " No,"
and Sidgwick apparently (p. 1 1 1) says the same.

232 THE SUMMUM BONUM,

phenomenon. A certain degree of pleasure will
always accompany virtuous activity ; jto abstract
the one from the other is misleading. But if we
(^0 abstract, it is not by any means clear that the
answer is in favour of hedonism.

CHAPTER IX.

CONCLUSION.

We will conclude with a presentation, in brief
form, of the general position in which the hedonism
of the Methods of Ethics finds itself.

There may be some inappropriateness in adopt-
ing, during the course of an ethical discussion, one
of the leading methods of inductive science, and
treating hedonism as an hypothesis to be tested
by its agreement with certain facts and postulates.
" Questions of ultimate ends do not admit of
proof ; " still there are certain postulates which
an ethical theory may be expected to satisfy to
an extent.

These postulates (which remotely suggest New-
ton's famous laws of philosophising and their later
developments) may be expressed as follows : —

(i) The meaning of the theory should be clear,
precise, and unmistakable.

(2) The theory should be in approximate agree-
I merU_ with iJ^ moral judgments of men^.

Of two theories, otherwise equally satisfactory,

(233)

234 CONCLUSION.

the one which is the more conformable with
common sense is to be preferred.

(3) It should be intonally. . cojisistent ..ajid^SQ-
herent.

(4) It should give guidance, and the man who
acts upon it most thoroughly ought to be the man
who most realises the goal he has in view.

( 1 ) Now it is by apparently satisfying the first of
these requirements that hedonism has won a large
measure of favour. " Pleasure " is a word com-
paratively unambiguous in meaning, and though on
examination it is found to be not by any means
really unambiguous, and the notion of pleasure
apart from its conditions is a difficult one to form
and use, still hedonism will always bear an appear-
ance of plausibility in virtue of the apparent clear-
ness and precision of its summum bonum. How
vague appears the notion of perfection or self-
realisation when contrasted with that of pleasure !

(2) Hedonism is far less successful in satisfying
the second requirement. True, Sidgwick lays some
stress upon the implicit hedonism of common sense
when he is discussing (in book iii.) the common
virtues. He shows that the happiness of mankind
is frequently the criterion by which the morality
of acts is judged, and in a still more central portion

CONCLUSION. 235

of the same book (chapter xiv.) he again appeals
to the verdict of common sense as being condemna-
tory of the pursuit of truth and similar ends except
so far as such pursuit is hedonistically justifiable.
But his views on the concordance or discordance
of common sense with hedonism are fortunately
not dogmatic ; and, indeed, common sense is so
ambiguous that dogmatism as to its utterances
would be out of place. Still, on the whole, Sidg-
wick is bound to admit a discordance.

Thus we find that the implicit hedonism to
which he appeals more th^n onc;:^ is^ afteiTall^^^^
a pure hedonism at all. Happiness, as he clearly
pointed out in an early part of his book, is
commonly interpreted in a sense very different
from the quantitative one of thorough-going
hedonism ; it is characterised as " the feeling which
accompanies the normal activity of a healthy mind
in aT'HealtEy body" {Methods^ p. 92). Here we
Have obviously a standard which is partly if not
iWhoUy perfectionistic ; for " healthy mind " and
I" healthy body " are phrases strangely suggestive
of the self-realisation doctrine. Hence the argu-
ment based on the implicit hedonism of common
sense is not conclusive, for the " hedonism " may
be, and probably is, of aeudaemonistic or qualitative
kind, and may differ from the perfectionism or
idealism of some writers only in laying a little

236 CONCLUSION.

more emphasis on the pleasure aspect. It is in-
teresting to note that Green too has appealed to
common sense (the common sense of the Greeks)
in the interests of perfectionism, and his appeal
seems quite as successful as the one from the
hedonistic side. It is at least clear that the vulgar
notion of " well-being " which lies at the basis of
common judgments is not precisely a hedonistic^
notion, though, no doubt, it contains a hedonistic
element.^

The appeal to common sense in the chapter on
" Ultimate Good " is again somewhat inconclusive
in result; as Sidgwick himself admits, it "obviously
cannot be made completely cogent since . . .
several cultivated persons do habitually judge that
knowledge, art, etc. — not to speak of virtue — are
ends independently of the pleasure derived from
them ". The fact that " common sense is most
impressed with the value of knowledge when its
* fruitfulness * has been demonstrated *' may be
perfectly true, and yet have very little force against
the moderate and non-ascetic perfectionism of the
Green and Bradley school, for pleasure may be
admitted as a subordinate good. The crucial case
is that of knowledge connected indissolubly with
pain, but such a case is so removed from the

1 Bradley's Ethical Studies and his pamphlet on Sidgwick's
hedonism bring out this point with great clearness.

CONCLUSION. 237

ordinary sphere of possibility that it is useless for
ethical purposes. Hedonism has no right to base
itself upon such extreme cases. If such an attempt
is made the result will certainly be fatal to itself,
for the "^ontenfcd pig " (the classical example of
" pleasure " divorced from " perfection ") will then
have to be ethically approvedj contrary alike to the
judgment of Mill {Utilitarianism^ p. 14) and ap-
parently to that of Sidgwick also {Methods^ p. 1 1 1).
Let us, however, accept the challenge and take
the extreme case into momentary consideration.
Suppose that if the whole sphere of truth could
be known it would confirm in every detail the
gloomiest convictions of the pessimist. Suppose
that at the heart of things there lie a blind
mechanism or a void abyss, and that the ideals and
aspirations of mankind can be seen by the clear-
sighted philosopher to be but self-begotten delu-
sions. Suppose that the rude awakening described
in Matthew- Arnold's most heart-searching poem
is to be the fate of all who think ; that the fond
hopes of man are found to be, as Mycerinus
thought he had found them, " mere phantoms "
of a heart which is ever : —

Stringing vain words of powers we cannot see,
Blind divinations of a will supreme ;
Lost labour ! when the circumambient gloom
But hides, if gods, gods careless of our doom.

238 CONCLUSION.

Suppose the very worst. Will the philosophic
moral man whose vision has revealed to him not
the Celestial City which the pilgrims thought they
saw from the Delectable Mountains, but a vacuum
or a soulless fatalism, think it his duty to keep the
frightful truth from mankind ? Will he say, " At
whatever cost of deception men must be kept in
enjoyment " ? Perhaps he may. The case is
admittedly an extreme one, and difficult of solution.
But the verdict of the moral consciousnessis.-JiQt
obviously on the side of hedonism.. Many men
would surely say, " Let mankind know the truth
however dark it may be ".

The case will, at any rate, serve to bring out

the implications of hedonisrn. Lf weLar£^l.Q..acc^t

the, latter, theory, "truth for truth's sake" can no
longer be a maxim for any moral man ; it will
have to be replaced by "truth so far as pleasant,
beyond that, ignorance and deception ". What is
the crowning excellence of the Methods of Ethics ?
The love of truth which breathes from every page.
But on the hedonistic theory that quality is no
longer an excellence, except in very moderate de-
grees. Does the last chapter of the Methods of
Ethics conduce to happiness.^ On the contrary,
coming at the end of a book which is unique for
its judicial and scientific calm and for the confidence
which it inspire? in its hard-won conclusions, this

CONCLUSION. 239

chapter is far more chilling and disintegrating in
its tendency than if it had appeared in the work of
a blatant atheist. Truth at all costs — truth whether
pleasant or unpleasant — was the motto of the writer
of the Methods. And yet this motto is opposed to
the hedonistic system which it is the main positive
business of the book to erect, for in the chapter on
the summum honum we are virtually told that the
moment truth becomes really and inevitably un-
pleasant it must be avoided and concealed.

The above argument is to some extent, no doubt,
an argumentum ad populum. To make the Methods
of Ethics pass sentence upon itself may be thought
to be but a poor device. But the argument will
serve the purpose of bringing out the implications
of hedonism when the latter system is rendered,
as Sidgwick's keen mind helped to render it,
i h thorough-going. Hedonism, when consistent, must
^ \become in a most evil sense, Jesuitry. The State
will deceive the people for their good, and the
philosopher will hide his opinions not only from
the multitude but from his fellow philosophers lest
he may confirm them in their gloomy results.
" To do evil that good may come," will be no
longer an intelligible phrase, and will certainly raise
no feeling of disapprobation.

" But surely," it may be objected, " hedonism
does not, when consistently worked out, become

240 CONCLUSION.

Jesuitry and deception ? Was not Mill a hedonist ?
was not Sidgwick the very incarnation of truth-
fulness, the Cambridge champion of intellectual
honesty, the Fellow of Trinity who resigned his
Fellowship from conscientious conviction ? " Yes,
Mill and Sidgwick were, to a degree which few
men have attained, intellectually honest. And yet
the implications of the Methods of Ethics are such
as have been indicated. If we are consistent with
our hedonism we must cease at a certain point to
be " honest " and " veracious " in the common
sense of the latter words.

Thus we are told in the fourth book : " On
utilitarian principles, it may be right to do and
privately recommend, under certain circumstances,
what it would not be right to advocate openly ; it
may be right to teach openly to one set of persons
what it would be wrong to teach to others ; it may
be conceivably right to do, if it can be done with
comparative secrecy, what it would be wrong to
do in the face of the world ; and even, if perfect
secrecy can be reasonably expected, what it would
be wrong to recommend by private advice or
example. . . . The utilitarian conclusion, carefully
stated, would seem to be this, that the opinion that
secrecy may render an action right which would
not otherwise be so, should itself be kept compara-
tively secret" {Methods, pp. 487-88).

CONCLUSION. 241

Whether such admissions as these are easily
conformable with the intuitive maxim of equity
we need not here discuss. The present point is

that hedonisiii^wJien„. carn,^^ ^ out XQ its logical

conclusions, is violently opposed to common sense.
Sidgwick admits this when he denominates the
above conclusions " paradoxical," and the same
admission is made when he declares in an earlier
portion of his work that " the common judgment
that a thing is * good ' does not on reflection appear
to be equivalent to a judgment that it is directly
or indirectly pleasant " (Table of Contents, book i.,
ch. ix.).

Thus despite the fact that an appeal to the im-
plicit hedonism of common sense is not only
possible but is frequently made, the result of the
appeal is, in large measure, to confirm eudaemonism
if not perfectionism.

The same result follows from an examination of
the qualitatiy^^e^SMpf^^^ a view certainly

held by common sense, but completely foreign to
consistent hedonism. When we judge certain
pleasures to be " high " and certain others to be
" low " we are obviously not orthodox hedonists ;
our judgment is not being passed upon the pleasure-
element itself but upon " something in the objective
conditions under which it arises " {Methods^ p. 129).
In" other words the judgment implies something

16

242 CONCLUSION.

wider, more concrete, than mere feeling, though
the latter element is, no doubt, to be included
within the wider ideal. Unless, therefore, we are
to reject entirely the deeply grounded judgment of
common sense that " pleasures " differ in " quality "
as well as in intensity, we cannot accept quantitative
hedonism. If we refuse to reject this judgment,
we are bound to accept a eudaemonistic or even,
perhaps, a perfectionistic standard of ethics. No
doubt hedonism can give an interpretation, though
a strained one, of the quality doctrine ; the
" higher " pleasures are more permanent and un-
diluted than the " lower " ones. But common
sense, in approving of the " higher " means more
than this.

Hedonism, we are bound finally to conclude,
is not in harmony with common sense. Still this
conclusion cannot be regarded as absolutely fatal to
an ethical theory, for no theory can be expected to
be, at all points, in harmony with the vague,
unreasoned, moral conclusions of the vulgar. It is
bound to go occasionally beyond, sometimes even
to contradict them.

(3) The third criterion of a moral theory is its
internal coherence and consistency.

To point out at great length the internal diffi-
culties of hedonism will be unnecessary in view of

CONCLUSION. 243

the preceding discussions on the relations between
egoism and utilitarianism. It has been seen that
each of these systems_2resented itself to Sidgwick "?
as rational, and that a conflict between the two was
therefore inevitable. But a hedonism which con-
tains a " fundamental contradiction " — to use the
emphatic closing words of the Methods of Ethics
(p. 506) — a hedonism which cannot be resolved
into a monism but must ever content itself with
being dualistic, surely stands condemned. The
advocates of the pleasure-theory have always failed
at this point. Many and various have been their
attempts to bridge over the yawning chasm between
the claims of the one and those of the many, and
no one has done more than Sidgwick to show the
failure of all such attempts.^ Is it not probable
that the pleasure-ideal is too narrow to allow of
the sublation of this dualism } If the moral end is
pleasure (a purely subjective phenomenon) must
there not ever be an opposition, or at least a
dangerous contrast, between the pleasure of this
[person and the pleasure of that .? " No," it may
[be answered, " pleasure may be shared." But is
I this true of pleasure in the hedonistic sense —
pleasure as subjective feeling.'' Obviously not.
Concrete pleasures, those of recreation, art, etc.,
can, no doubt, be shared, but such " pleasures "
1 See last chapter of the Methods.

244 CONCLUSION.

are complex social functions, not merely subjective
feelings.^ It is obvious that if we adopt so narrow
and personal a moral ideal as mere feeling ^ we
must expect conflicts and contradictions.

The problem arises whether, if we enlarge our
ideal to eudaemonistic or perfectionistic dimensions,
we shall get rid of such difficulties as these. Sidg-
wick boldly avowed that we shall not. Seven years
before the first edition of the Methods appeared,
he criticised the " culture " doctrine of Matthew
Arnold on exactly similar grounds to those upon
which he criticised, eighteen years later, the very
similar self-realisation doctrine of Green. He saw
the beauty of the wider ideal ; he saw that it tended
towards a destruction of the embarrassing conflict
between the meum and the tuum^^ but nevertheless
he detected in it the possibility of a conflict of a
somewhat diff^erent kind. " The impulse towards
perfection in a man of culture is not practically

1 For the ambiguity which lurks in the word " pleasure " s^e^
Mackenzie's Manual of Ethics, p. 72 (third ed.). Sidgwick has
pointed out another ambiguity {Methods, p. 44).

2 Something, by the way, least distinctive of man, and com-
mon to him and the brutes {Ethical Studies, p. 113).

3 " While the happiness of others cannot be a rational object
of pursuit to the man whose true end is happiness, the good of
others may be ... to a being whose end is something other
than happiness conceived of as a mere pleasure" (Rashdall,
" Prof. Sidgwick's Utilitarianism," Mind, 1885, p. 222).

CONCLUSION. 245

limited to himself, but tends to expand in infinitely
increasing circles. . . . And if it were possible
that all men under all circumstances should feel
. . . that there is no conflict, no antagonism, be-
tween the full development of the individual and
the progress of the world — I should be loth to hint
at any jar or discord in this harmonious movement.
But . . . life shows us the conflict and discord :
on one side are the claims of harmonious self-
development, on the other the cries of struggling
humanity.'' ^ In his article on Green's Ethics ^ he
gave expression to the same fear. " How," he
would say, " is the conscientious man to decide in
the event of a conflict between (for example) his
artistic development and his duty to his family ?
Self-development bids him be an artist ; for that
profession he is manifestly endowed by nature ;
why then refuse in the name of narrow and petty
family duty to answer to the trumpet-call of the
perfectionistic philosophy? Is not self-realisation
(in this case artistic self-realisation) the supreme
standard of conduct ? And yet if he listen to this
voice will he not be condemned by the same per-
fectionistic philosophy for neglect of family duty ?
In short, is there not in this philosophy a dualism

^ " The Prophet of Culture," MacmillatCs Magazine, August,
1867,

2MzW, 1884, p. 169.

246 CONCLUSION.

quite as serious as that which destroys the unity of
the pleasure doctrine ? " ^

The difficulty has not been overlooked by
idealistic writers.^ No moral philosophy, it must
be admitted, is competent to solve every problem,
or to adjust with unerring accuracy the respective
claims of two competing goods. But there can be
little question that the perplexity which is atten-
dant on the hedonistic dualism is far greater tHaii
that which arises from the rival theory. It suffices
here to have pointed out a difficulty recognised
by Sidgwick in the perfectionistic scheme, a diffi-
culty which may tend to soften our condemnation
of hedonism though without removing it. Our
present business is not to solve perfectionistic
puzzles, but to point out the internal anarchy of
the pleasure theory. The existence of such an
anarchy is absolutely undoubted.

(4) Our fourth criterion is a practical one.
Which theory gives the better guidance to its
devotees ?

The self-realisation or perfectionistic doctrine has,
no doubt, to face some serious practical difficulties,
such, for example, as those presented by unfavourable

^ These words are not Sidgwick's own, but represent his
argument.

2 Green's Prolegomena, p. 415 ^nd passim.

CONCLUSION. 247

social conditions, and by the crowning problem of
death. It is not clear how a youth who is con-
demned to live in a slum, or to labour daily at
degrading, mechanical or humdrum work, or to
die of consumption while yet in his teens, can
"realise himself" or even approximate to "per-
fection ". But it is equally clear that similar
difficulties and others in addition surround the
hedonistic rule of life. The hedonist, too, may
die young ; he, too, may live amid unfavourable
social surroundings ; he may find the production
of happiness for self and others as difficult a task
as the perfectionist finds his. No doubt some
happiness is within the reach of all, but whether
the hedonist can gain or dispense the greatest
possible amount of that commodity is a difficult if
not an unmeaning question. The ambiguities of
the phrase " greatest possible " have been already
noticed in the rdsumd of Bradley's criticism.

But on one point, at least, hedonism is glaringly
at fault. It has its own peculiar " paradox," a
paradox so important as to amount, in the opinion
of some moralists, almost to a refutation. That
a deliberate, conscious, consistent pursuit of pleasure
should be the worst possible plan of operations for
the hedonist, is certainly a strange and damaging
fact. That the best way to attain pleasure is
to forget all about it, and to busy oneself in a

248 CONCLUSION.

disinterested pursuit of virtue, etc., for their own
sakes^ — this is scarcely what we should expect if
the hedonistic scheme were rooted and grounded
in truth. Again we may admit that an argument
of this kind, taken alone, is quite inadequate to
refute such a theory as the one we are discussing.
The moralist seeks ** unity of principle and con-
sistency of method at the risk of paradox" ;^ that
hedonism has its " fundamental paradox " is there-
fore no insuperable objection to its truth, though
it increases the need for rigorous proof on other
grounds. Still, for hedonism to have to fall back
at times upon perfectionism is not complimentary
to the former system. " The fullest development
of happy life for each individual seems to require
that he should have other external objects of interest
^besides the happiness of conscious beings.^ And
j thus we may conclude that the pursuit of the ideal
objects before mentioned, virtue, truth, freedom,
beauty, etc., for their own sakes^ is indirectly and
secondarily, though not primarily and absolutely,
rational." * In other words we must try to think
and act as perfectionists, in order to realise the
hedonistic end ! Is not this a most impressive

1 Whether our method is egoistic {Methods, p. 137), or
utilitarian {Methodsy p. 406).

2 Methods, p. 6. ^ Or, of course, of himself.

^Methods, pp. 405-6.

CONCLUSION. 249

argument in favour of perfectionism ? Does it
not confirm to the uttermost the arguments of
Green that it is a far better practical guide than
hedonism ? ^

The difficulties which follow upon the attempt
to obtain guidance from the latter doctrine have
been repeatedly pointed out by the idealistic school.
But the fullest consciousness of these difficulties
is obtained not from a study of the ponderous
verbosities of the Prolegomena^ or the scintillating
epigrams of Ethical Studies^ but by inwardly digest-
ing the fourth book of Sidgwick's Methods. No
other writer has ever worked out with such patient
and unfailing skill the mode of application of
utilitarianism to the solution of present-day prob-
lems. At first sight an inconsistency of treatment
is to be detected. Sidgwick, as we have seen, saw
the necessity, on utilitarian grounds, of maintaining
the disinterested {i.e.^ 'prima facie non-utilitarian)
love of virtue, beauty, etc. ; in other words per-
fectionism was to j)e^ in lar^e measure, the practical
guide to the utilitarian end. We might have
expected, therefore, that the fourth book would
be on perfectionistic lines. Instead of this we
are brought back to the ordinary method of com-
paring pleasure-results. " If he wishes to guide
himself reasonably on utilitarian principles, the
^ Prolegomena, book iv.

250 CONCLUSION.

individual must . . . use the empirical method
we have examined in book ii. " {Methods^ p. 476).
But the inconsistency is only apparent. The
1 pursuit of virtue, beauty, truth, etc., is to be
I disinterested only to a certain limited extent.
p " When the pursuit of any of these ends involves
an apparent sacrifice of happiness in other ways,
I the practical question whether under these circum-
/ I stances such pursuit ought to be maintained or
\ abandoned seems always decided by an application,
\ however rough, of the method of pure empirical
/hedonism" [Methods^ p. 477). This cumbrous
machinery of wheels within wheels, of non-hedon-
istic impulses moving within and limited by a
wider, semi-latent, but ever-ready-to-appear-on-
the-scene hedonistic principle — is scarcely such
as to commend itself to an impartial spectator.
Thorough-going hedonism in theory and practice
we can understand ; theoretical hedonism combined
with perfectionistic practice, that too, we can under-
stand ; but must there not be a flaw in this hybrid
system which bids us seek virtue disinterestedly
but with interested intentions, seek it disinterestedly
up to a point, and then no more.'* Is not ethics
in a parlous state if she is reduced in practice to
" make-believe " .^

The meaning of a preceding statement that
" the Methods of Ethics is more dangerous to

CONCLUSION. 251

hedonism than any hostile work has ever been "
is perhaps now clear. Sidgwick has followed out
the system into its remotest ramifications and
has shown, not, perhaps, its impossibility, but its
unwieldiness and incompetence to afford practical
guidance except of the roughest kind.

It is, of course, when applied to perplexing and
intricate moral problems that the practical value
of an ethical system can be tested. Take for
example the problem of vivisection. Before the
hedonist can decide as to the morality or immorality
of this practice, he must be able to know with
approximate exactness a multitude of details. He
must have decided the question as to the nature
of animal pain, whether it is really so intense as
that of human beings, or whether, owing to the
lower degree of consciousness possessed by brutes,
it is comparatively negligible. He must be able
to estimate the probability of physiological experi-
ments seriously diminishing the sum-total of disease
and suffering. He must take into consideration
the mental anguish of sensitive persons who hear
the records of vivisections and are distressed by
them. He must consider the existence, in greater
or less degree, of such feelings in the vivisectors
themselves. He must estimate the danger of
vivisection reacting upon the general moral tone
of the nation or of a portion of it, and thus possibly

252 CONCLUSION.

diminishing in an indirect way the amount of he-
donic feeling. He must consider, too, the pleasure
of research, the pain of alienated sympathy, in fact
the whole problem of the relation between the
search for truth and the increase of happiness.

All these estimates are necessary before hedonism
can decide the simple question whether vivisection
is moral. Is it not clear that a perfectionistic
theory is more likely to give direct and intelligible
guidance than a theory which only takes account
of the most fluctuating and incalculable of human
(or rather organic) phenomena — feelings of pleasure
and pain.f^

Listen to the practical difficulties which face the
utilitarian when he is meditating a social reform.
'^n the first place, as his own happiness and that
of others connected with him form a part of the
universal end at which he aims, he must consider
the importance to himself and them of the penalties
of social disapprobation which he will incur ; taking
into account, besides the immediate pain of this
disapprobation, its indirect effect in diminishing
his power of serving society and promoting the
general happiness in other ways*' {Methods^ p. 497).
Where, we wonder, would have been human pro-
gress if the reformers of the past had thought of
all this.f* Are not Green's words obviously and
entirely true } " Our inquirer will find it difficult

CONCLUSION. 253

to assure himself that, by any interference with
usage or resistance to his own inclination, he can
make the balance of human pleasures as against
human pains greater than it is " (^Prolegomena^ pp.
373-74). He will become "less confident in any
methods of increasing the enjoyments of mankind,
and in consequence more ready to let things take
their course " {ibid., p. 379). Utilitarianism, when
carried out consistently, will result in social and
moral stagnation.

Listen again. "It is possible that the new rule,
though it would be more felicific than the old one,
if it could get itself equally established, may be not
so likely to be adopted, or if adopted, not so likely
to be obeyed, by the mass of the community. . . .
It is easier to pull down than to build up ; easier
to weaken or destroy the restraining force that a
moral rule, habitually and generally obeyed, has
over men's minds, than to substitute for it a new
restraining habit. . . . And again, such destructive
effect must be considered not only in respect of
the particular rule violated, but of all other rules.
. . . Nor must we neglect the reaction which any
breach with customary morality will have on the
agent's own mind."^ For similar reasons it is
necessary, we are told, to consider the danger of
losing the sympathy of our fellows in making our
1 Methods, pp. 479-80.

254 CONCLUSION.

innovations ; not only, if we lose this sympathy,
do we lose much happiness, but we also lose the
support, afforded by their sympathy, to our moral
convictions. " Through this twofold operation
of sympathy it becomes practically much easier for
most men to conform to a moral rule established
in the society to which they belong than to one
made by themselves" {Methods, p. 481).

These quotations are given to illustrate at the
same time the rigorous and thorough-going char-
acter of Sidgwick's delineation of the hedonistic
method, and the enormous difficulties involved in
the practical application of that method to moral
problems. It is abundantly clear that utilitarian
hedonism will rarely be on the side of progress,
for all attempts at reform involve disturbance of
convictions, alienation of sympathy and (worst
of all) inevitable uncertainty as to the effects of
the reform, if carried out, upon human happiness.
The utilitarian will therefore rarely endeavour to
create new tastes and new wants ; he can never be
certain that they will really add to the total of
hedonic feeling. There are thus good reasons for
the alliance which some writers have proclaimed,
between utilitarianism and the " adaptation to en-
vironment " doctrine. The parasite is " adapted,"
and presumably enjoys himself. Utilitarianism, if
carried out to its logical consequences, would breed

CONCLUSION. 255

parasites. Rarely, if ever, would it be on the side
of reform or of the " elevation " of man. Hedonic
feeling is too firmly united to the status quo for
utilitarianism to advocate any serious changes.

Here we must conclude. The case for hedonism
presented in the Methods of Ethics^ though not a
hopeless one, is certainly the reverse of promising.
A theory based upon the view that ultimate good
consists in feeling — a phenomenon least distinctive
of man, a phenomenon dependent upon ever-
varying conditions, and under the sway of habit,
opinion, error and other extraneous factors — a
theory of this kind encounters so many difficulties
that even the skill of a Sidgwick cannot make it
look attractive.

CHAPTER X.

SIDGWICK'S CRITICS.

A NUMBER of criticisms of Sidgwick's work have
been referred to in the preceding pages, and the
appended bibliography contains a list, as complete
as the writer has been able to make it, of all such
criticisms as have appeared in periodicals. Here
follow, in a very condensed form, a few of the
most important. Criticisms, favourable or other-
wise, which have appeared in standard ethical
works have been for the most part omitted, as
easily accessible to all students of ethics.

Leslie Stephen : Frazers^ March, 1875 (evo-
lutionist). 5idgwick/s defence of liber tar ianism is
not satisfactory as it ignores sub-consciousnesa*^
For the same reason his disproof of psychological
hedonism is unsatisfactory ; our pleasure-motives
may be below the threshold of consciousness. —
Reason cannot directly prompt to action. What^
/does Sidgwick mean by " reasonable " conduct_L
Reason must have materials to work upon. — The
maxim of equity is unsatisfactory. To admit that
differences of '' nature and character '* alter the

(256)

SIDGWICK'S CRITICS. 257

morality of an action is to obliterate the distinction
between right and wrong. The word " objective "
is ambiguflus. In the maxim of benevolence what
does " intrinsically desirable " mean ? If a thing
is desirable it must be so to sonie definite person
or persons.

Edward Caird : Academy^ i2th June, 1875
(idealist). Sidgwick does not distinguish clearly
enough the desires of a self-conscious and rational
being from the appetites of animals. — Sidgwick
sterns sometimes almost to regard reason as con-
stituting a motive and determining an end, but on
the whole he seems to conceive reason as merely
talcing up and stamping with 'approval some of the^
matter presented by the passions.^ — Pleasure in
abstraction from its condi tiojas . cannot _bej:hesu^^^^
ject of a judgment at all. — The maxim of equity
is superfluous and eveiTlautological. " What is
right for me is right for all " ; this implies that
we know the "right" already apart from its
universality. With Sidgwick objectivity == uni-
versality.— Maxim of benevolence. The mere
universalising of desire, leaving it what it was in
the natural man, would not produce a higher ideal
than Carlyle's universal Paradise of Pigswash.

Alexander Bain : Mind^ 1876, p. 177 (utili-
tarian). [An almost entirely favourable review.]

The hedonistic calculus is not so difficult as
17

258 SIDGWICK'S CRITICS.

Sidgwick represents it ; men can allow for bias,
perturbations, etc. — There should be more refer-
ence to the " social organism," rather than to the
" greatest number " of individuals ; society as an
organism can exert a greater claim upon our self-
sacrifice than a number of units can exert. Still,
we cannot get altruism out of egoism {vide Sidg-
wick's last chapter) ; it has its own justification.

In his Emotions and the Will Bain passes some
criticism upon Sidgwick's treatment of the free-will
question. But on the whole the two writers are in
close agreement.

Alfred Barratt : Mind^ '^^11 •> P- 167 (evolu-
tionist).

[An able criticism from the side of egoism and
evolution, but based on the erroneous view that
(Sidgwick had tried or professed to " suppress "
egoism.]

The historical antecedents of the moral faculty
are of importance.__ " I doubt the validity of your
moral faculty and in order to determine that I
must compare it with my other faculties. A
belief cannot be more valid than its data, and
therefore if we discover the origin of our present
beliefs we shall have at any rate a maximum
measure of their validity." How can mere in-
terrogation of a faculty give " objective " good ;
unless some reason for or explanation of this

SIDGWICK'S CRITICS. 259

" good " can be given we are driven back on to
subjectivism. " The scientific system of ethics
... shows you why you ought to aim at pleasure,
by proving that you do so aim and that ' ought
to ' is compounded out of * is \ . . . Science
proves hedonism but proves it in the egoistic
form. — Where is the vicious circle in * follow
Nature ' ? It means, * Be a self-conscious agent
in the evolution of the universe '." — [Barratt's
argument in favour of the proportionality of
desire and pleasure has been dealt with elsewhere.]
— If Mr. Sidgwick feels an " aversion " to egoism,
and regards it as " ignoble " and " despicable,"
he should remember that there is at least nothing
noble in an unreasoning aversion. [A criticism
beside the mark if Sidgwick is, in large measure,
an egoist.] — The^rule of_eguij;y,Js only valid if
interpreted in the sense that mere difference of
individuality in moral agents, as in atoms, does
not affect the result, which is precisely similar
under all similar conditions. But if the internal
natures of the individuals are not included under

the conditions, the axiom is not valid. It cannot
then be right to tell a lie to a lunatic. — Sidgwick's
maxim of benevolence is on a par with his equity
maxim. His error is traceable to the words
" intrinsically desirable ". Desire must be felt by
somebody. Sidgwick seems to have convinced

260 SIDGWICK'S CRITICS.

himself that good is something " objective " and
)" universal " and then to have argued that this
must mean something independent of all indi-
viduals altogether. . . . The laws of nutrition
are clearly objective and universal, but surely Mr.
Sidgwick would not agree that because my dinner
is not "intrinsically" more worthy of digestion
than another's, therefore it is reasonable for me to
digest all men's dinners. [Sidgwick's terminology
was made less ambiguous in his later editions.]
'^Why should the egoist submit to Mr. Sidgwick's
request (in the chapter on the " Proof of Utilitarian-
ism ") to speak of something as " objectively "
desirable.'^ Even if the "proof" were admitted
it would be a deduction from egoism, and the
latter must still remain valid. At most the voice
of reason would be divided. [This is exactly
hat Sidgwick avers.] Barratt agrees that hedon-
ism of some kind is the verdict of reason, and
hat egoism is the form of hedonism which
eason originally dictates. But universal egoism
is not utilitarianism, and no logical jugglery will
make one out of the other. " Desirable," " in-
trinsic," " objective," are dangerous and ambiguous
words.

Sidgwick replied {Mind, 1877, p. 411): "I do
not consider the principle of rational egoism to
have been confuted, but only contradicted ". As

SIDGWICK'S CRITICS. 261

to the physical method of establishing ethics,
" ethical conclusions can only be logically reached
by starting with ethical premisses ".

Barratt replied {Mind, 1877, p. 452) : " I do
not see how Mr. Sidgwick reconciles the * dualism \
of the practical reason ' with the ' postulate of the |
practical reason/ " that " two conflicting rules of I
action cannot both be reasonable ". 1

Henry Calderwood : Mind, 1876, p. 197.
[An attempt to state the intuitional position in a
clearer manner than Sidgwick had done.] Moral
intuitions are not the same as moral judgments ;
the latter may be erroneous ; the former are not.
Hence the weakness of Sidgwick's attack. Men's
applications of their intuitions to concrete cases
may be erroneous, but the moral intuitions them-
selves are valid^__-^^u; u^v iM^kii^

In his Handbook (pp. 193-203, fourteenth edi-
tion) Professor Calderwood criticises Sidg wick's
" determinism " on the ground that it is inconsistent
with his admission of the importance of " delibera-
tion " and " consciousness of self as choosing " ;
such admissions as these require for their expla-
nation a " metaphysical doctrine of freedom ".
[Professor Calderwood has perhaps not fully
appreciated Sidgwick's highly balanced treatment
of this question ; Sidgwick admits the consciousness
of freedom and of " self" as choosing.]

/

262 SIDGWICK'S CRITICS.

/' F. H. Bradley's important criticism has been
dealt with in another place.

F. Y. Edge WORTH : New and Old Methods of
Ethics (pub., James Parker and Co., 1877).

[This pamphlet is a criticism — in large measure
favourable — of the Methods of Ethics ^ and is also,
to some extent, a reply to Mr. Barratt's Physical
Ethics and to his attack upon Sidgwick.]

The case of non-hedonistic desire may possibly
be explained by ancestral habit ; " the dim re-
membrance of ancestral pleasures . . . produces
that propension of which Butler speaks, dispro-
portionate to (distinct) expectation and (personal)
experience of pleasure. — Sidgwick's attack upon
the view that the earlier Q egoistic) kind of conduct
is somehow better than later kinds is not quite
so conclusive as he thinks. It is vain to recommend
a course of conduct not tending to the agent's
pleasure if it can be shown that never in the past
has such action so tended. Here then is a real
negative criterion, and one which is fatal to asceti-
cism.— Barratt's objections to the maxim of equity
would be equally fatal to the proposition " mathe-
matical judgments are the same for all persons, the
data being the same ". — Sidgwick is not guilty of
jugglery " in trying to make utilitarianism out of
egoism, for his logic is not addressed to the pure
egoist ". — It is a little unfortunate, but perhaps

SIDGWICK'S CRITICS. 263

inevitable that the terms "right," "reasonable,"

etc. , should be employed in connection with egoism.

— The^rgumieiitmJaKOiir-jQ£iree-win,^^b upon

the verdict of self-consciousness, is not conclusive ;

we cannot expect action to be always preceded by

conscious motive. — Sidgwick's estimate of the value

of authority as a criterion of the greatest pleasure

is perhaps too low. — It is conceivable that the

egoist's greatest pleasure might, in certain cases,

consist in the contemplated pleasures of others.

[Mr. Edgeworth concludes with a careful and

lengthy mathematical working out of the results

of quantitative hedonism. His conclusions may

be summarised : " With regard to the theory of

distribution, there is no indication that, at any rate

between classes so nearly in the same order of

evolution as the modern Aryan races, a law of

distribution other than equality is to be wished.

The more highly evolved class is to be privileged

when there is a great interval. . . . With regard

to the theory of population there should be a limit

to the number. ... If number and quality should

ultimately come into competition, as seems to be

not impossible, then the indefinite improvement

of quality is no longer to be wished. . . . Not

the most cultivated coterie, not the most numerous

proletariate, but a happy middle class shall inherit

the earth."]

y

264 SIDGWICK'S CRITICS.

G. VON GizYCKi : Vierteljahrsschrift fur JVissen-
schaftliche Philosophies 1880, p. 114.

Like many other critics of Sidgwick, Gizycki
objects to his denial of the importance of a know-
ledge of origins. " Dass die frage nach Natur und
Ursprung des Gewissens oder der * moral faculty '
eine. . . . Bedeutung nicht habe, kann ich ihm
durchans nicht zugeben." If Sidgwick had only
analysed conscience or the moral faculty as exactly
as he had done in the case of desire, he would not
so easily have identified " moral " with " reason-
able ". — Gizycki notices that, despite the many
difficulties inherent in egoism, Sidgwick does not
reject that system. " Unser Autor ist aber weit
davon entfernt, dieser Schwierigkeiten wegen —
die er sicherlich nicht als zu gering darstellt — die
Methode des hedonistischen Calculus zu verwerfen."
— As for the three maxims, Sidgwick's work is
highly valuable. ** Es ist kein geringes Verdienst
des Verfassers, diese logische Elemente des moral-
ischen Bewusstseins klar und pracis festgestellt zu
haben."

Gizycki's greatest criticism of Sidgwick is directed
4\ against the " rationality " of egoism and against
the resulting " dualism " and chaos. " Wie kommt
der Verfasser zu diesem trostlosen Schlussresultate ?
Nur dadurch, dass er jene selbst-evidente Intuition,
* dass blosse Prioritat und posterioritat in der Zeit

SIDGWICK'S CRITICS. 265

kein verniinf tiger Grund ist, das Bewusstsein des
einen Moments mehr zu beriicksichtigen, als das
eines andern,' — als einen Zureichenden rationalen
Beweisgrund des Egoismus als solchen ansieht ;
wozu er nicht das mindeste Recht hat." The
intuition is not egoistic at all and cannot conflict
with the principle of benevolence. " Nur dies
folgen kann, das die Methode des Egoismus un-
bedingt zu verwerfen ist." — No doubt we have
*' ein machtiges Bediirfniss des Gemiiths " that
good and evil deeds may be ultimately rewarded
or punished appropriately. But no ethical " dual-
ism of the practical reason " can be founded upon
such a *' Bediirfniss ". i.

Sidgwick<-repIiea>(M/W, 1889, pp. 483-85) in ^'^T^
the very important article entitled, " Some Funda- /
mental Ethical Controversies," during the course
of which he reaffirmed, with great emphasis, the
*' rationality " of egoism.

In the International Journal of Ethics^ October,
1890, p. 120, Gizycki repeated his criticism of
Sidg wick's " egoism ".

Rev. H. Rash d all : " Professor Sidgwick's
Utilitarianism," Mind, 1 8 85, p. 200. [A thorough-
going criticism from the idealistic side, though Mr.
Rashdall is not sufficiently conscious of the egoistic
undercurrents in Sidgwick's philosophy.]

The fundamental question raised by Professor

266 SIDGWICK'S CRITICS.

ISidgwick's position is the logical compatibility of
a rationalistic theory of duty with a hedonistic
conception of the true good. The central difficulty
of his position is the assignment of a different end
to the individual and to the race. It is pronounced
reasonable for A to sacrifice his happiness for B,
but he must regard B as living only for his own
happiness. — To say that pleasure must be the
ultimate end because a life spent on a desert island
could (apparently) have no other object, is to seek
to arrive at the true end of man by abstracting
him from the conditions which make him man.
If we admit that altruism is rational we must
modify our conception of ultimate good ; it must
be not mere happiness but social or moral happi-
ness, including the willingness to do what is " right
and reasonable as such ". In fact there are prima
facie two ultimate goods, happiness and conformity
to reason. — Sidgwick's theological postulate at the
end of the Methods can get but little support from
hedonism. Can a universe be rational in which
the end is only pleasure, and yet in which reason^
daily prompts to the sacrifice of pleasure } " Man
is so far a rational being that he is capable of
preferring the rational to the pleasant. Surely,
then, the reasonableness of such a preference cannot
be dependent on its ultimately turning ouF'that he
has, after all, preferred the very thing which his

SIDGWICK'S CRITICS. 267

love of the reasonable led him to reject. Mr.
Rashdall, therefore, regards ultiniate_gpod „ as ^m
clusive_5LLxationality--Xif.xjoiiduct (virtue) not as
jnere pleasure. Sidg wick's argument against the
character-theory of ethics is not satisfactory, but
no one holds such a theory. "A 'virtue' or
' faculty ' is, of course (as Professor Sidgwick urges),
a mere abstraction, but only in the sense in which
pleasure is an abstraction also." By " virtue "
we mean " virtuous consciousness," just as by
" pleasure " Professor Sidgwick means " pleasurable
consciousness ".

M. GuYAu : La Morale Anglais e Contempo-
raine^ 2^ edition.

M. Guyau like Professor Gizycki supports Bar-
ratt's contention that the question of the d?r/^./«_
of the moral faculty is of fundamentalimportance*.
He also criticises severely the introduction in the
last chapter of the Methods of a deus ex machina.
The conception of a utilitarian Deity correcting
in a future life his failures in this, is in a worse
plight than the ordinary religious doctrine which
represents the pains of the present life as " une sorte
de monnaie avec laquelle on achete la moralite
supreme seul bien veritable ". We must not draw
arguments from hopes and desires ; " un souhait
ou un desir n'est pas une raison ".

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

SIDGWICK'S WORKS AND THE CRITICISMS THEY
HAVE CALLED FORTH.

The bibliography which follows is as complete as the writer
has been able to make it ; though there are, no doubt, omissions,
they are not, he hopes, of a serious character.

The articles which have no name prefixed are by Sidgwick
himself. An asterisk indicates an important article or criticism
generally on ethics but occasionally on other subjects.
The following abbreviations are used : —
M. = Mind.

J. = International Journal of Ethics,
A, = Academy.
F. = Fortnightly Review.
Mac, = Macmillan^s Magazine.
C. = Contemporary Review.
Sidgwick's separately published works are : —
/ The Methods of Ethics, ist ed., 1874 ; 6th ed., 1901.
The Principles of Political Economy, ist ed., 1883 ; 2nd ed.,
1887.
"g < The Scope and Method of Economic Science, 1885.

Outlines of the History of Ethics, ist ed., 1886; 2nd ed.,

1892.
The Elements of Politics, ist ed., 1891 ; 2nd ed., 1897.

.S ( Practical Ethics : a Collection of Addresses and Essays, 1898.*
"o j (Two of these essays are also published in Ethics and

S j Religion and most of them had already appeared in

I [ M. and J.)

(269)

270 BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Three lectures : (i) "The Scope of Philosophy " ; (2) "The
Relation of Philosophy to Psychology" ; (3) "The Scope of
Metaphysics " (pub. Cambridge University Press). Sidgwick's
addresses to the Psychical Research Society are published in the
Proceedings of that Society.
1861.

"Ranke's History of England^'' Mac, May, p. 85.

"Alexis de Tocqueville," Mac, November, p. 37.
1867.

/ *"The Prophet of Culture" (Matthevi^ Arnold), Mac,
August, p. 271.

1871.

•"Verification of Beliefs," C, July, p. 582.
1872.

"Pleasure and Desire," C, April, p. 662.
1873.

" Review of Spencer's Principles of Psychology," A., ist April.

" John Stuart Mill," A., i 5th May.

" Review of Mansel's Letters, Lectures, and Reviews," A.,
1 5th July.

" Review of J. F. Stephen's Liberty, Equality, and Fra-
ternity," A., 1st August.

Spencer : "Reply to Sidgwick," F., December, p. 715.

1874.

" Review of Green and Grose's edition of Hume's Treatise,"

A,, 30th May.
1875.

■* Stephen : " Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics," Frazer, March,

p. 306.
Carpenter : " On the Doctrine of Human Automatism,"

C, May.
Clifford : " Right and Wrong," F., December, p. 770.
Cairo : "Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics," A., 12th June.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 271

" Review of Green and Grose's edition of Hume's Essays"

J.y yth August.
HiNTON : "Free Will," A., 23rd October.
1876.

• " The Theory of Evolution in its Application to Practice,"

M., p. 52.
* Bain : "Mr. Sidgvi^ick's Methods of Ethics" M., p. 177.
t Calderwood : " Mr. Sidgwick on Intuitionism," M., p.

197.
' "Philosophy at Cambridge," Af., p. 235.
' Pollock : "Evolution and Ethics (Reply)," Af., p. 334.
"Bradley's Ethical Studies," M., p. 545.
" Professor Calderwood on Intuitionism in Morals," Af .,

p. 563.
"Idle Fellowships," C, April, p. 678.
HiNTON : " On the Basis of Morals," C, April, p. 780.
877.

"Hedonism and Ultimate Good," M., p. 27.

Bradley : " Mr. Sidgwick on Ethical Studies (Reply)," M.,

p. 122.
Reply, M., p. 125.

• * Barratt : "The * Suppression ' of Egoism," M., p. 167.
♦"Review of Grote's Treatise on Moral Ideals" Af., p. 239.

* Green : " Hedonism and Ultimate Good (Reply)," Af .,

p. 266.
Pollock : Happiness or Welfare (Reply)," A/., p. 269.
" Mr. Barratt on the ' Suppression ' of Egoism (Reply)," Af .,

p. 411.
Barratt : "Ethics and Politics," Af., p. 452.

* Bradley : Mr. Sidgzvick^s Hedonism (pub. H. S. King).
"Bentham and Benthamism," F., May, p. 627.

* Edgeworth : New and Old Method of Ethics (pub. James

Parker & Co.).

272 BIBLIOGRAPHY.

\

1878.

Barratt : "Ethics and Psychogony, M., p. 277.
1879.
^ "The Establishment of Ethical First Principles," M., p.

106.
- " The So-called Idealism of Kant," M., p. 408.
• •— *- Cairo : Reply, M., p. 557.

^ " Review of Guyau's La Morale Anglaise Contemporaine"

M., p. 582.
"Economic Method," F., February, p. 301.

- "What is Money ?" F., April, p. 563.

"The Wages Fund Theory," F., September, p. 401.
1880.

G. VON GizYCKi : " Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics" Viertel-

jahrsschriftfiir Wissenschaftliche Philosophie, p. 114.
" On Historical Psychology," Nineteenth Century ^ February,

P- 353-
" Kant's Refutation of Idealism," Af ., p. 1 1 1 .
— ^ Cairo: Reply, M., p. 115.

-> " Review of Fouillee's Videe moderne du Droit en Allemagne,

en Angleterre, et en France ^^ M., p. 135.
< "Mr. Spencer's Ethical System," M., p. 216.
1881.

Spencer : " Replies to Criticisms on the Data of Ethics,"
M., p. 82.
1882.

- GuRNEY : "The Utilitarian * Ought,' " Af., p. 349.

" On the Fundamental Doctrines of Descartes," M., p.

*" Incoherence of Empirical Philosophy," M., p. 533.
J "Stephen's Mence of Ethics^'' M., p. 572.
1883.

Bain : "On Some Points in Ethics," M., p. 48.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 273

^ * " A Criticism of the Critical Philosophy, I.," M. p. 69.

/ Adamson : Reply, M., p. 251.

/MoNCK : Reply, M., p. 255.

— * " A Criticism of the Critical Philosophy, II.," iVf ., p. 3 1 3.
«. " Kant's View of Mathematical Premisses and Reasonings
(Reply),"iVf, p. 421.

- Adamson : Reply, M., p. 424.
" MoNCK : Reply, M., p. 576.

1884.

* "Green's Ethics," M., p. 169.
1885.

^ * Rashdall : " Professor Sidgwick's Utilitarianism," M., p.
200.

" '^ Fowler's Progressive Morality" M., p. 266.

*- " Martineau's Types of Ethical Theory" Af ., p. 426.

^ Fowler : Reply, M ., p. 48 1 .

«^Martineau : Reply, Af., p. 628.
1886.

- Reply, M., p. 142.

"^ Martineau : Reply, M., p. 145.

*"The Historical Method," M., p. 203.
"Wallace on Sidgwick's History of Ethics" M., p. 570.
■^ Sutherland : " An Alleged Gap in Mill's Utilitarianism,"
M., p. 597.
1887

^" Idiopsychological Ethics," M., p. 31.
i888.

* " The Kantian Conception of Free-will," M., p. 405.
1889.
•• Seth : "The Evolution of Morality," A/., p. 27.
" * " Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies," A/., p. 473.
1890.
* Fowler : Reply, A/., p. 89.
18

274 BIBLIOGRAPHY.

- Selby-Bigge : Reply, il/., p. 93.

^ "The Morality of Strife," 7., vol. i., p. i.

- *GiZYCKi : "Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics" J., vol. i., p.

120.

■89I-

_ Ritchie : " Sidgwick's Elements of Politics^'' J.^ vol. ii., "
p. 254.
1892.

J " The Feeling-tone of Desire and Aversion (Reply)," M.y
p. 94.

« "Spencer's Justice," M., p. 107.

«. Marshall : "The Definition of Desire (Reply)," M., p.
400.
1893.

^ "My Station and Its Duties," J., vol. iv., p. i.

' " Unreasonable Action," M., p. 1 74.
*» Mackenzie : " Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics" J., vol. iv.,

p. 512.
1894.

^ "Luxury," J., vol. v., p. i.

^ Marshall : "Unreasonable Action (Reply)," M., p. 105.

^ "A Dialogue on Time and Common Sense," M., p. 441.
1895.

n/ "The Philosophy of Common Sense," M., p. 145.

J * "The Ethics of Religious Conformity," J., vol. vi., p.

273-
^ Seth : " Is Pleasure the Summum Bonum ?" J., vol. vi., p.

459-
^ "Theory and Practice,"M., p. 370.

1896.

Rashdall : " Professor Sidgwick on the Ethics of Religious
^ Conformity " (Reply to (2) above), J., vol., vii., p.

137.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 275

1897.

•'* Macmillan : " Sidgwick and Schopenhauer on the
Foundation of Morality," J., vol. viii., p. 490.
' BosANQUET : " Sidgwick's Practical Ethics" J., vol. viii.,

P- 390-
1898.

- Moore : " Freedom," il/., p. 1 79.

- Ritchie : ^^ S\di%w\ckh Practical Ethics^" M.^ p. 535.
1899.

•^ " The Relation of Ethics to Sociology," J., vol. x., p. i.
1900.

J *" Criteria of Truth and Error," M., p. 8.

- Pollock : '* Henry Sidgwick," Pilot, 1 5th September.

« Masterman : " Henry Sidgwick," Commonwealth, October,
p. 292.

— Peile : " Reminiscences of Henry Sidgwick," Cambridge

Ret'iezv, 25 th October.
■** "Professor Sidgwick's Writings," Cambridge Review, 6th

December.
•^ Hayward : " Constructive Elements in the Ethical Philo-
sophy of Sidgwick," Ethical World, 1 5 th December.
1901.

^ Stephen : "Henry Sidgwick," M., p. i.

- "The Philosophy of T. H. Green," M., p. 18.

'^Sorley : "Henry Sidgwick," J., p. 168. S

■^Hayward : " The Real Significance of Sidgwick's Ethics," R

7.»p. 175-

Seth : "The Ethical System of Henry Sidgwick," M., p.
172.
The references, critical and other, to Sidgwick in contem-
porary ethical and philosophical works are too numerous to
mention.

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