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EVOLUTION OF ETHICS

VOLUME I.

THE GREEK PHILOSOPHERS,
PROF. HYSLOP.

BROOKLYN ETHICAL ASSOCIATION.

THE ETHICS

OF THE

GREEK PHILOSOPHERS

SOCRATES, PLATO AND ARISTOTLE.

A LECTURE GIVEN BEFORE THE BROOKLYN ETHICAL ASSOCIATION,
SEASON OF 1896-1897,

PROF. JAMES H. HYSLOP,

PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND ETHICS, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

AUTHOR OF "ELEMENTS OF LOGIC," "ELEMENTS OF ETHICS," "HUME'S
TREATISE ON MORALS," " DEMOCRACY," AND " LESSONS IN LOGIC."

Edited by Chas. M Higgins, with portraits of the Philosophers,

together with extracts from their works, and Editorial Notes

to show their close relation to modern thought. Concluding

with a brief Life of Socrates.

PUBLISHED FOR THE

BROOKLYN ETHICAL ASSOCIATION,

CHARLES M. HIGGINS & CO.

NEW YORK— CHICAGO— LONDON,
1903.

BY
CHARLES M. HIGGINS,

Z. SIDNEY SAMPSON.

To Z. SIDNEY SAMPSON,

BORN NOV . 26th, 1842 ; DIED JULY 2gth, 1897.
THE SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE

BROOKLYN ETHICAL ASSOCIATION.

SERVING TWO TERMS, 1883-1884.
RE-ELECTED FOR THIRD TERM, 1897.

ESTEEMED AS A MAN : BELOVED AS A FRIEND :
HONORED AS AN ABLE OFFICER AND MEMBER.

PRESIDENTS OF THE BROOKLYN
ETHICAL ASSOCIATION.

PROF. FRANKLIN W. HOOPER,

1881-1882.
MR. Z. SIDNEY SAMPSON,

1883-1884.
DR. LEWIS G. JANES,

1885 to 1896.

MR. Z. SIDNEY SAMPSON,
1897.

MR. HENRY HOYT MOORE,
1898-1900.

CONTENTS.

PAGB

INTRODUCTION, » ' i-xi

PRELUDE. — " Foretastes and Keynotes from the Great Pa
gan Prophets," being choice texts from Socrates,
Plato and Aristotle, illustrating some of their best
thoughts on Religion, Ethics and Politics. . xn-xxiv

PREFACE, . xxv

GREEK PHILOSOPHY. — Its study a constant charm. Its
spontaneity, naturalness and penetration. Philoso
phers preceding the age of Socrates, Pythagoras,
Thales, Democritus, Anaxagoras and others, and
their influence on Socrates. Their cosmic specula
tions, moral and religious doctrines. Conceptions of
morality, harmony with natural law, similar to views
of Herbert Spencer and the Evolutionists, . . 1-13
SOCRATES, 430 B.C. — His environment, personality, method,
doctrines, and influence. Opposition to Skeptics and
Sophists. His sagacious assertion of Ignorance and
his ingenious and misunderstood doctrine of Knowl
edge as the basis of Virtue- A marvelous conversa
tionalist and profound reasoner. A great moral phi
losopher, opposed to all cosmic speculation or abstract
science, putting the stress on practical ethics or the
laws of true human conduct for happiness in this natu
ral L e and beatitude in the future supernatural life of
the oul. One of the greatest moral and religious
teachers of the world, pre-eminent in the teaching of
unworldliness and immortality in the Christian sense,
400 B. c. A unique personality — mystic, theistic, ra
tionalistic and utilitarian, the father of modern utilita
rian theories and of many ancient philosophic sects. 13-39
(a)

b CONTENTS.

PAGE

PLATO, 400 B.C. — The all-around genius in Philosophy and
abstract thought. The idealistic, transcendental and
universal scope and character of his philosophy. The
great pupil of Socrates, the mouthpiece and modifier
of his thought. His ideal State a communistic and so
cialistic " Republic," and an ancient high exponent of
modern "Civil Service Reform." Plato's Morality, or
right, an eternal absolute law, inherent in the nature
of things, not dependent on caprice or authority, hu
man or divine. Author of the Golden Rule, 400 B. c.
His impersonal pantheistic or monistic conceptions
of God and the Universe. Conception of immortality
and the soul, personal and impersonal — like the Ori
entals or Buddhists — involving pre-existence, reincar
nation and absorption. His ascetic and high moral
ideals — hater of the sensual and lover of the ideal ;
exalter of" Good " above " Pleasure." His deep in
fluence on Jewish and Christian sects, and on all sub
sequent thought, 39-54

ARISTOTLE, 350 B. c.— The rational world student, a natu
ral, moral and political philosopher in a pre-eminent
modern sense. Pupil of Plato and blender of the
Socratic and Platonic thought with his own original
and scientific rationalism. The great rationalist or sci
entist of the Greek schools and father of the modern
scientific and evolutionary methods. A great political
student, humanitarian, and democratic statesman of
the broadest type, harmonious with the best modern
standards, ... 54-67

PYTHAGORAS AND HIS SCHOOL, 500 B. c. — Sketch of his
life and work and outline of his doctrines, which had
deep influence on Socrates and Plato. The Pluralistic
and Unit conceptions of God. Incarnations, Pagan
and Christian. Lyman Abbott's idea, . . 68-74

CONTENTS.

APPENDIX.

Extracts from Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, with
Notes and Comments illustrating the correspondence
of ancient and modern thought.

EXTRACTS FROM PLATO.

PAGE

1. The Supreme God or Creator, and His Creation of

the Universe. . . . . . . . 75

2. Great Antiquity of Egypt, and her early influence on

ancient Greece. Tale of " The Lost Atlantis." 82
(^ The Principle of Universal Beneficent Love. From

Plato's Symposium. . . . • ./ . . 88

(4., Agathon and Socrates on Love. . . *>.'., 91
5. Plato and St. Paul paralleled in Hymn to Love. Paul

in i Cor. 13 (A. D. 57). Compared with Agathon

in the Symposium, B. C. 416. .... 102

(6j The Golden Rule. From Plato's Laws, 400 B. C. . 106

7. Return not evil for evil. Socrates' answer to Crito. 109

8. Good, not Pleasure, the supreme aim of Conduct. . in

9. Suicide Condemned. Socrates in the Phaedo. . . 112
10. A virtuous life, fearless death, and glorious hereafter

commended to all men. . • . . . 1 14

n. The soul's improvement, not worldly success, the true

aim of man's life. ....... 116

12. The true life, the life of the soul, not of the world

or the body. Socrates in the Phaedo. . . .118

13. Death is a good and not an evil. Socrates in the

the Apology .• . . . 120

1 4. The Immortality of the Soul and its future rewards

and punishments. Socrates in the Phaedo. . 122

15. Best texts from the Old Testament on Immortality

as compared to Plato's Phaedo 130

16. The Doctrine of Purgatory— Pagan and Christian. . 135

17. Reincarnation. . . 138

d CONTENTS.

PAGE

18. Mind inheres in and rules the universe. . .141

19. The Greek Conception of Soul and Deity. A Prime

Mover or Force, which is Self-Moved. . 144

20. The Universal Soul. . . . 145

21. The Platonic Doctrine of Ideas 147

22. The Socratic Utilitarian Theory of Ethics. . . 157

23. Socrates the Father of Modern Utilitarian Ethics. . 168

24. Influence of Socrates on Aristotle and Epicurus and

the substantial identity of their ethical doctrines. 169

25. The Hedonistic School of Aristippus— the false Epi

curean and perverter of Socratic Doctrine. . 172

26. Harmony of Herbert Spencer with the Socratic School

of Ethics. . . . 176

27. Socratic and Theistic Ethics — a comparison of the

Utilitarian and the Theistic Theories of Ethics. 179

EXTRACTS FROM ARISTOTLE.

28. Aristotle on the Idea of God. 182

29. Aristotle on the Theory of Evolution 186

30. Abstract of Aristotle's Theory of Ethics. . . . 193

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

31. The fundamental nature of a political state or govern

ment. Status of property. Socialistic and Indi
vidualistic considered 205

32. Citizens and States of various kinds considered.

The best form of government and the best citizen
discussed. • 210

33. The best constitution for a state. Preponderance

of the middle class recommended. . . . 231

34. Cause of Revolutions Considered. .... 235

35. Democracy analyzed and commended. . . . 243

36. The Best Life for Individuals and States . . . 251

37. Public Schools and Liberal Education, Gymnastics,

Music and Morals. 272

LIFE OF SOCRATES.

The nativity, parentage and training of Socrates, . . 286
His orig' 1 profession of sculptor abandoned to adopt the
ro1 ^1 moral philosopher, public reformer and teacher
of virtue, without fees, 287

CONTENTS. e

PAGB

His asceticism and voluntary poverty and his claim to divine
inspiration and a divine mission to mankind. His pro
phetic spirit and his spiritual attendant or " daemon." 288
The personal appearance, character and virtues of Socrates. 289

His wives and children, '. 295

The Masters and Teachers of Socrates, .... 297

His school and pupils, 298

Philosophic sects influenced by and formed from his teach
ings. Cynics, Stoics, Hedonists, Platonists, Aristotel
ians, etc. . . . .... . . . . 307

Writings of Socrates— Poetry and Tragedy, . . . 311

Socrates as a soldier — his military services and actions, . 312
His quarrel with the Sophists and Rhetoricians and cause

of his death, , 314

The trial of Socrates, 318

His imprisonment, . ... . . . . 325

After his death. Decline of Greece. Honors paid and re
morse and sorrow shown by Greeks and others, . 331

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

PAQH

1. Portrait of Z. Sidney Sampson, President Brooklyn

Ethical Association during this lecture course.
From photograph loaned by Mrs. Sampson. Frontispiece

2. Portrait of Prof. James H. Hyslop, .... xxv

3. Pouch Mansion, Brooklyn, N. Y. Lecture Hall of

Brooklyn Ethical Association, . . . .^ in

4. Studio House of Mrs. Ole Bull, Cambridge, Mass. . vin

5. Library Columbia University, ix

6. Head of Pythagoras, from an Ancient Cameo. Kind

ness of Open Court Pub. Co., Chicago, . . 4

7. Figure of Pythagoras. From Stanley's History of

Philosophy, London, 1701, 68

8. Head of Socrates. From Bust in Villa Albani. Kind

ness of Walter Thorp Co., of New York. From
World's Great Classics, xm

9. Figure of Socrates. From Stanley's History of Phi

losophy. London, 1701, 34

10. Head of Plato. From Bust in the Vatican. Kindness
of Walter Thorp Co., New York, publishers of

World's Great Classics xix

n. Figure of Plato. From Stanley's History of Philosophy. 49

12. Head of Aristotle. From a Sculpture in the Gal. Du

Capitole. Kindness of the Open Court Pub. Co.,
Chicago, . 231

13. Head of Aristotle. From Sculpture in Spada Palace,

Rome. Kindness of Walter Thorp Co. , New York.
Illustration from World's Great Classics, . . xxn

14. Figure of Aristotle. From statue in Spada Palace,

Rome. Kindness of Geo. Putnam's Sons ; plate
from "Alexander the Great," by Wheeler, . . 55

15. Figure of Aristotle. From Stanley's History of Phi

losophy, ........ 197

(g)

h ILLUSTRATIONS.

PAGB

16. Head of Epicurus. From Bust in Museo Capitolino,

Rome, 169

17. Figure of Epicurus. From Stanley's History of Phi

losophy, 176

18. Aristippus the "Hedonist." From Stanley's History

of Philosophy, 172

19. Empedocles — a pioneer of Evolution. From Stanley's

History of Philosophy, 191

20. Herbert Spencer. — The Modern Aristotle. From pho

tograph presented in 1894 to Dr. Lewis G. Janes,
President of The Brooklyn Ethical Association.
Kindness of Mrs. Janes, 178

21. Gateway of Mount Auburn Cemetery, Cambridge,

Mass., with its misconceived Scriptural text for
Immortality, 133

INTRODUCTION.

THE present lecture on The Ethics of the Greek Phi
losophers is one of a course on The Evolution of
Ethics delivered before the Brooklyn Ethical Associa
tion in the years 1896 and 1897. Some of these lectures
were also given at the Cambridge Conferences at " The
Studio House " of Mrs. Ole Bull in Cambridge, Mass.,
of which conferences the late Dr. Lewis G. Janes was
then director, having been previously President of The
Brooklyn Ethical Association for several terms. The
full list of these lectures is as follows : —

ORIGIN OF ETHICAL IDEAS,
Dr. Lewis G. Janes, M. A.

ETHICAL IDEAS OF THE HINDUS,
Swami Saradananda of India.

ETHICS OF ZOROASTER AND THE PARSIS,

Mr. Jehanghile Dossabhoy Cola, of Bombay, India.

ETHICS OF BUDDHISM,

Anagarika H. Dharmapala, of Colombo, Ceylon.

ETHICS OF THE CHINESE SAGES,

Prof. F. Huberty James, Imperial University, Peking

(i)

ii Introduction.

ETHICS OF THE GREEK PHILOSOPHERS,

Prof. Jas. H. Hyslop, Columbia University, New York

ETHICS OF THE STOICS AND EPICUREANS,

Rev. Merle St. Croix Wright of New York.

ETHICS OF THE HEBREWS,

Rabbi Joseph Silverman of New York.

ETHICS OF THE MOHAMMEDANS,

Mr. Z. Sidney Sampson of New York.

ETHICS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT,

Prof. Crawford Ho well Toy, D.D., of Harvard Uni
versity.

ETHICS OF THE GERMAN SCHOOLS,

Miss Anna Bo}rnton Thompson of Boston.

UTILITARIAN ETHICS,

Dr. Robert G. Eccles of Brooklyn and

Prof. Benjamin Underwood of Quincy, 111.

ETHICS OF EVOLUTION,

Rev. John C. Kimball of Sharon, Mass., and
M. Mangassarin of New York.

This series of lectures was proposed and arranged
chiefly by our former esteemed President, Mr. Z. Sidney
Sampson, whose death in 1897, followed by some changes
in the Association, has been one of the causes which
have helped to delay the publication, but it has now
devolved on the undersigned, a member of our Commit
tee on Comparative Religion, to edit and publish this
interesting series, which it is believed will be found to
be an important addition to the previous volumes of
lectures issued by the Association, as it contains perhaps
some of the best work of the Association and one which
is particularly harmonious with our title and scope, giv
ing as it does a complete outline or general comprehen-

POUCH MANSION, BROOKLYN, N. Y,

LECTURE HALL, BROOKLYN ETHICAL ASS'N.

Introduction. iii

sion of the history and philosophy of Ethics as shown
in the various schools or sects of the world.

Most of the lectures of the series as above listed are
now in plates ready for printing, and all of these lec
tures will be ultimately included in one large volume
which will be issued in due course, while some one or
more lectures will be issued in smaller special volumes
according as their special importance or popularity may
warrant.

The present lecture of Prof. Hyslop on The Ethics of
Socrates, Plato and Aristotle has been thought of suffi
cient individual importance and interest to form a little
volume by itself which is now issued as one of the first
of the series. And we think that a glance through this
little book will justify our estimate and show that Prof.
Hyslop is a great student and able expositor of the
teachings of that great trinity of Grecian intellect who
have probably left more effect on the thought and belief
of our European races and civilizations than any other
men in History. Prof. Hyslop has thus given us in this
little treatise a very comprehensive view of the general
character and special influence of each great thinker and
with a keen and clear analysis and easy presentation
has so distinguished and epitomized their distinctive
teachings that at one sitting we can get a fairly good
and general view of the three most influential philoso
phers of the past, putting in a popular, easily assimi
lable form what is generally regarded as a rather abstruse
subject.

To better illustrate the points in the lecture and more
clearly show the exact character of the ancient thought,
we have, with the assistance of Prof. Hyslop, selected
and arranged a series of quotations from the best trans-
lations of the works of the philosophers, which we have

iv Introduction.

included in the appendix, and which will demonstrate
the beauty, clearness and force of the actual thought of
these giants of the ancient intellectual world and prove
to us how much we are really their heirs and debtors
along so many lines of thought and influence. On the
subjects of The Nature and Constitution of the Uni
verse, on Matter and Spirit, Soul, Deity, Ethics and
Immortality, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle have proba
bly left on us a greater impression than all other men,
and will be found to have furnished most of the philo
sophical arguments which have been echoed and re
echoed, more or less consciously or unconsciously, by
others ever since that distant age when these great origi
nal thinkers or expounders first expressed or recorded
them, and with little real advance over these old think
ers. We therefore regard it of the greatest interest and
importance that men of the modern age should pay
more attention to the study of ancient thought and
appreciate far more than they do the great wrork done
by the old thinkers, as only in this way can we get a
correct view of our own age and understand what prog
ress we have really made ourselves, and in many cases
it will be a good check to our conceit, and a great help
to modest and truthful views to find that we have not
made as many or as great or as original contributions
to our " progress" as we may have imagined.

In this age of advancing womanhood, it is interesting
to look back to that brilliant age of Greece, when woman-
philosophers, poets, and rhetoricians, contended for
prizes with men and often won them on their merits, and
when we might see the greatest masculine intellects of
the day sitting at the feet of brilliantly educated women
and learning from them, Socrates for instance at the feet
of Diotima, the great Pythagorean woman-philosopher

Introduction. v

who taught him the true philosophy of the universal
principle of Beneficent and Creative Love, as is shown
in the extracts from the Symposium.

The names of Sappho, B. C. 600, and Myrtis and
Corinna, B. C. 500, are famous in the annals of poetry
and the history of Greece. Corinna was a great edu
cator as well as a great poetess, and the teacher of Pindar,
the chief lyric poet of Greece, over whom she won the
prize for poetry five times in public contests. Aspasia
to whom — whether rightly or wrongly — a questionable
name has been popularly attached, was, without ques
tion, a most brilliant and accomplished woman, a teacher
of philosophy and rhetoric in Athens and the composer
of the orations of Pericles, one of the greatest statesmen
of Greece, in the most brilliant period of her history.
It would be hard to find women in our own day of such
relative eminence in letters and public life, and this
striking fact should help to make the study of ancient
thought and ancient thinkers and writers attractive and
interesting to us at this da}r.

Special attention is also called to the extracts from the
Phsedo and other works on Virtue and the Immortality
of the Soul, giving the remarkable thoughts and argu
ments of Socrates and showing the exaltation of ideas,
and the clearness and beauty of the old Greek thought.
And these thoughts, it must be remembered, were re
corded nearly five hundred years before any part of the
New Testament was composed and will be found to give
a clearer statement of the main doctrines of the prevail
ing popular religions than can be found in the Old or
New Testaments themselves, such doctrines for example
as absorption in ideal virtue, abstraction from a worldly
life and living for a future state of perfection after

vi Introduction.

death ; Immortality of the Soul, Heaven, Purgatory, and
Hell, etc.

The ancient Egyptians, above all other peoples, seem
to have had the most elaborate and intense belief in
immortality of the soul, resurrection of the body and
future states of rewards and punishments, and from them
these doctrines seem to have spread to the races on both
shores of the Mediterranean. Indeed, modern investiga
tions have clearly shown the undoubted influence that
ancient Egypt had on ancient Greece in art, religion and
philosophy, and have also shown that Europe was
probably first peopled, or at least most influenced in its
civilization, from the adjacent Africa and not from the
distant India as had been the most popular theory for
many years.* The clear teaching of the Greek phi
losophers on immortality, etc., as now shown in the ex
tracts herein given, is therefore a good illustration of
this Egyptian influence long before the Christian era, as
the Greek teaching is almost identical with that which
was prevalent in ancient Egypt,f and the Greeks gen
erally acknowledged their debt to Egypt and Chaldea
for many of their ideas (see the extracts from the Timaeus
in the appendix).

It is also interesting to here note that in Aristotle we
will find the great prototype of the modern Scientific,
Rational, and Evolutionary Schools, as he had clearly
anticipated the modern ideas of Natural Development or
"Evolution," also "Utilitarianism" in Ethics and a
broad " Democracy " in Politics. Indeed, in reading
over the strong sentences of Aristotle, we will be often

* See works of Maspero, Petrie and others on Egypt. Also lectures of Amelia
B. Edwards (Harper & Bros.) and Prof. Sergi on The Mediterranean Race
(Scribner & Sons).

t See new translation of the Egyptian ' ' Book of the Dead " by E. A. Wallis
Budge of the British Museum— Open Court Pub. Co., Chicago.

Introduction. vii

struck with what we might call the remarkable modernity
of his thought, and in his Politics this is particularly
apparent, so that if we did not know the author we might
now and then suppose that we were looking over a
recent high-class political speech, an editorial in the
day's paper, or a magazine article from the latest
issue.

We therefore think it will be interesting and agreeably
surprising if the man of to-day will read over our ex
tracts from the Politics giving Aristotle's clear ideas on
Public Schools and the careful education of the young
on physical, mental and moral lines ; his remarkable
emphasis on the use of music in education and its ethical
values and dangers, etc. ; his denunciation of excessive
athletics in education and his exposure of the fallacy
that the professional athlete is necessarily a good physical
type, which some of our best modern authorities are only
now beginning to rediscover. It will be equally inter
esting and refreshing to note what is said on " business"
and "leisure" and on war and peace in his views on the
Best or Ideal Life, and the superiority of culture and
character or " goods of the soul " over mere wealth or
worldly success ; his condemnation of all government
except that based on the consent and for " the good of
the governed " and his denunciations of all wars of con
quest and the domination of one race by another through
mere force. All of this will be found to have an ex
tremely " advanced " or " modern " tone, yet it was
written nearly twenty-four centuries ago by a thinker
who was one of the highest products of an old civiliza
tion, which with all our modern conceit we must admit
was probably, in its best examples, characterized by as
high a standard in the physical, the ethical and the
artistic as the human creature has ever attained on earth.

viii Introduction.

We have therefore made the most extensive extracts
from the " Politics" because of this great general inter
est and because they contain so many points illustrating
the true principles of general or applied ethics as well
as of broad politics.

The little states of ancient Greece with their active
versatile peoples, their able statesmen and philosophers,
seem indeed to have experienced almost every phase and
kind of politics and form of government, and had thus
worked out for us the examples and problems of almost
every kind that we have since had or now have to deal
with in modern ethics and politics, and it will certainly
be both interesting and instructive for us to now look
over the treatment of these questions and problems by
one of the greatest political philosophers who lived
twenty-four centuries before us, and to note his criticisms
and commendations of the false and true in Ethics, in
Democracy and in Free Institutions from that distance
of time. In our natural "Anglo-Saxon " and "Teu
tonic" bias, we have been perhaps too much inclined to
accept the too popular idea that the main inspiration for
all our modern free institutions originated in " the for
ests of Germany" or on "the shores of the Baltic,"
forgetting that most of our modern institutions were first
thought out and most of our modern problems tested at
a much earlier age in a more complete way on the classic
shores of the Mediterranean from whence we have un
doubtedly also got so much of our speech, our thought
and our civilization.*

*In an old English History by Nath. Bacon, published in London in 1647, an
interesting theory of the origin of the Saxons is given, viz. , that they sprang
from some of the Macedonian legions of Alexander's army which penetrated to
the far north of Europe. If this should be true, we cou*d thus, after all, trace
the free institutions and liberal ideas of the Saxon directly back to the old
Greek period and to the broad influence of Aristotle, who was the tutor of
Alexander and the great political and ethical philosopher of the Macedonian
Court.

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Introduction. \ •/..

The central figure among the Greek Philosophers wa 9
however, the great old Master, Socrates, who for his hig
moral sense and wonderful reasoning powers was called
by his distinguished young pupil Alcibiades, the en
chanter and conqueror of all men in conversation or dis
putation, as expressed in the " Symposium." And it
must not be forgotten that Socrates was more eminent
in Moral Philosophy than in anything else, his work be
ing devoted chiefly to Ethics and but little to Physics, for
which latter he seems to have had more or less contempt.
Even the most superficial student cannot fail to notice a
remarkable parallel between Socrates and Christ in many
features connected with their life and death, and in their
character and teachings, so much so that Socrates might
properly be called the "Pagan Christian" if not the
" Pagan Christ," and the several extracts given in the
Appendix and in the inserts from the teachings of Soc
rates will, we think, show this resemblance or relation
at a glance. In his pure theistic conception of God and
the government of the Universe (which was not of
course uncommon in the Pagan world), in his vivid be
lief in the personal immortality of the soul and its future
states of probation, reward and punishment, his serious
belief in Divine Inspiration, his doctrine of Love, and
his earnest contention for a life of ideal virtue and un-
worldliness, he approached most closely to the belief of
the primitive Christian sect itself. And not only is it
strictly true to say, as before indicated, that the
Christian's own scripture nowhere contains such a clear,
distinct, and detailed account of their own doctrine of
the soul and its future, as can be found expressed in the
words of Socrates, but it is perhaps not too much to say
that no extant writing anywhere contains so good an
expression of these doctrines and of the philosophic

jr - t Introduction.

K<~v.

irguments in support of them as could be found in the
ivords of Socrates in Plato's Phaedo over four hundred
years before the appearance of the Christian sect.

Not only, therefore, is this old Greek Master found to
stand pre-eminent in the teaching and exposition of
some great religious doctrines, but a further notable and
most interesting fact, which should be more appreciated
by ethical students of our own day, is that Socrates also
seems to have been really the father of Modern Utilitari
an Ethics. This modernly revised ethical theory was
clearly outlined and developed by Socrates and after
wards was taught by Aristotle, the pupil of Socrates'
chief pupil — Plato — and later on was given a very full
expression by Epicurus, an immediate successor of Aris
totle, who, after Socrates, was probably the clearest ex
ponent of the Utilitarian school of ethics in ancient
times: And we have shown in the Appendix how iden
tical is the teaching of Socrates with the teaching of
that great master of the modern utilitarian school,
Herbert Spencer, in his Data of Ethics, a point which
should be more known and appreciated than it now
seems to be — and should add interest to the stud}^ of
those great pioneers of thought, the Greek Philosophers,
in which we hope this little work may be of some help.
To add a pictorial interest we have obtained and in
serted a number of portraits of the Greek philosophers,
some of which are seldom seen, to better acquaint our
readers, not only with the ancient thought, but writh the
personal appearance of the great thinkers themselves,
who have so deeply influenced the morals and the
thought of the human race.

We have also added a brief sketch of Pythagoras and
his school, the great predecessor of Socrates and Plato,
who had probably the greatest influence on their thought,

LIBRARY COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

Introduction. xi

and we have concluded the work with a life of Socrates
in condensed form to give a better idea of the great per
sonality who so dominated and influenced all later
schools of Greek thinking.

We have to thank the Open Court Publishing Co. of
Chicago, and also the Walter Thorp Co. and G. P-
Putnam's Sons of New York, for the use of some of
these portraits.

CHAS. M. HIGGINS,

Of Committee on Comparative Religion,

Brooklyn Ethical Association.

271 Ninth Street, Brooklyn, N. Y.,
May ist, 1903.

FORETASTES AND KEYNOTES

FROM

THE GREAT PAGAN PROPHETS

SOCRATES,

PLATO,
ARISTOTLE.

" Outside the sacred literature of the world, Socrates
Plato, and Aristotle were the main factors of civiliza
tion. They fulfilled a truly sublime mission in their
day and nation, for in the fourth century B. C. these
philosophers and their disciples made an end to the
more ancient materialism and built up those systems
of philosophy, including the natural sciences, which
have exercised so vast an influence upon the progress
of man, and still do in very many instances. They
were the great prophets of the human conscience in the
pagan world"

Davis — u Greek & Roman Stoicism."

(xii)

SOCRATES ON IMMORTALITY.

B. C. 399-

*• Then, Cebes, beyond question the soul is immortal and imper
ishable, and our souls will truly exist in another world!
. "But then, O my friends, if the soul is really immortal, what
care should be taken of her, not only in respect of the portion of
time which is called life, but of eternity ! And the danger of neg
lecting her from this point of view does indeed appear to be
awful. If death had only been the end of all, the wicked would
have a good bargain in dying, for they would have been happily
quit, not only of their body but of their own evil, together with
their souls. But now, as the soul plainly appears to be immortal,
there is no release or salvation from evil except the attainment of
the highest virtue and wisdom.

" Wherefore, Simmias, seeing all these things, what ought not we
to do, in order to obtain virtue and wisdom in this life ? Fair is
the prize and the hope great.

" Wherefore I say, let a man be of good cheer about his soul,
who has cast away the pleasures and ornaments of the body as alien
to him, and rather hurtful in their effects, and has followed after
the pleasures of knowledge in this life ; who has adorned the soul
^ in her own proper jewels, which are temperance, and justice, and
J courage, and nobility, and truth — in these arrayed she is ready to
l go on her journey below when her time comes."
* Plato's Ph&do.

THE SOCRATIC-UTILITARIAN THEORY OF
ETHICS.

4 ' Then I should say to them in my name and yours : Do you
think them evil for any other reason except that they end in pain
and rob us of other pleasures ? ' '

" And do you call them good because they occasion the greatest
immediate suffering and pain ; or because afterwards they bring
health and improvement of the bodily condition and the salvation
of states, and empires, and wealth."

" Are these things good for any other reason except that they
end in pleasure and get rid of and avert pain ? Are you looking
to any other standard but pleasure and pain when you call them
good?"

Plato's "Protagoras."

•

SOCRATES,

B. C. 468 to 399.

THE GREAT ANCIENT EXPONENT OF THE RELIGIOUS DOCTRINE

OF THE IMMORTAL SOUL, AND THE ETHICAL

DOCTRINE OF UTILITARIANISM.

(From bust iu Villa Albani. )

XIII

WISDOM AND KNOWLEDGE.
FOLLY AND IGNORANCE.

To be ignorant of ourselves, to seem to know those
things whereof we are ignorant, is next to madness. ,

The chief wisdom of man consists in not thinking
he understands those things which he doth not under
stand.

There is but one good, knowledge, one ill, ignorance.

Socrates 300, B. C.

XIV

CHARACTER AND SINCERITY.

There is no better way to glory than to endeavor
to be good as well as to seem such.

Good men must let the world see that their manners
are more firm than an oath.

In the life of man, as in an image, every part ought
to be beautiful.

An honest death is better than a dishonest life.

Socrates.

POLITICAL MORALITY.

They are not kings who are in possession of a
throne or come unjustly by it, but they who know how
to govern.

A king is ruler of willing subjects according to the
laws, a tyrant is ruler of subjects against their will,
not according to the laws, but arbitrarily.

That city is strongest which hath virtuous men;
that city is best wherein are proposed most rewards
of virtue. That city lives best which liveth according
to law and punisheth the unjust.

Faith should be kept more strictly with a city than
with private persons.
• Whatever inconvenience may ensue, nothing is to be

preferred before justice.

Socrates.

XVI

VIRTUE AND FILIAL DUTY.

Virtue is the beauty, vice the deformity of the soul.

The greatest of vices is ingratitude.

The greatest obligation is that to parents.

Socrates.

XVII

RELIGION.

The Gods are to be worshipped according to the law
of the city where a man lives.

The best way of worshipping God is to do what He
commands.

Our prayers should be for blessings in general, for
God knows best what is good for us, our offerings pro
portioned to our abilities, for He considers integrity
not munificence.

Socrates.

XVIII

PRUDENCE.

Be not forward in speech, for many times the tongue
has cut off the head.

When a man opens his mouth, his virtues are as
manifest as images in a temple.

In war, steel is better than gold: In life, wisdom
excelleth wealth.

When a woman saith she loveth thee, take heed of
these words more than when she revileth thee.

A young man's virtue is to do nothing too much.

Socrates.

PLATO, the great idealistic philosopher of the
Grecian schools, having the deepest influence on both
the religious and philosophic thought of Jewish and
Christian sects. It has been said of the great Jewish
Philosopher Philo — contemporary with Christ and the
Apostles — that he was so great a follower of Plato,
that it was a common saying among the ancients that
"either Plato Philonises or Philo Platonises." (See
Preface in the works of Philo Judaeus, translated by
C. D. Yonge.) St. Augustine^ one of the most learned
and influential of the Christian "Fathers" in his
" City of God" naively acknowledges that " none come
nearer to us than the Platonists"

It is interesting also to note that a mystic or divine
quality was imputed to Plato by his followers, similar
to that claimed for Christ, viz., that he was a divine
incarnation or super-human being. In the life of
Plato given in Stanley^ s History of Philosophy, he
states that: — "Plutarch, Suidas and others affirm it
to have been commonly reported at Athens that he
(Plato) was the son of Apollo, who appearing in a
vision to his mother, a woman of extraordinary
beauty — she thereupon conceived."

" He did not issue from a mortal bed.
" A God his sire, a Godlike life he led. ' '

"Some therefore affirmed he was born of a Virgin,
and it was a common speech among the Athenians that
Phcebus begat Esculapius and Plato, one to cure
bodies, the other souls."

The name "Plato" seems to mean broad, and was
given by his father Ariston, on account of the literal
or figurative " broadness" in the physical and mental
qualities of his gifted son. It will be seen in the
portraits that the brow on the handsome face of Plato
has the broadness and smoothness of a "plateau,"
which doubtless means the same as "Plato." And as
to the mental sense of the word, it is certain that few
thinkers were more elevated and extended in their
writings or so broad and profound in their thinking
as this immortal pupil of Socrates, hence the fitness
and beauty of his name " Plato."

PLATO,

B. C. 400.
From original marble bust in the Vatican.

xtx-

HONESTY AND RECIPROCITY.

u In the next place, dealings between man and man
require to be suitably regulated. The principle of
them is very simple: Thou shalt not touch that which
is mine, if thou canst help, or remove the least thing
which belongs to me without my consent; and may I,
being of sound mind, do to others as I would that they
should do to me"

Plates "Laws," 400 B. C.

THE ETERNAL.

"Now the beginning is unbegotten, for that which
is begotten has a beginning, but the beginning has no
beginning •, for if a beginning were begotten of some
thing, that would have no beginning. But that which
is unbegotten must also be indestructible ; for if be
ginning were destroyed, there could be no beginning
out of anything, or anything out of a beginning ; and
all things must have a beginning. And therefore the
self-moving is the beginning of motion; and this can
neither be destroyed nor begotten. But if the self-
moving is immortal, he who affirms that self-motion is
the very idea and essence of the soul will not be put to
confusion. But if the soul be trzdy affirmed to be the
self-moving, then must she also be without beginning
and immortal"

Plato^s Phczdrus,

XXI

CIVIC VIRTUE AND TRUE STATESMANSHIP.

" Facts easily prove that mankind do not acquire or
preserve virtue by the help of external goods, but ex
ternal goods by the help of virtue, and that happiness,
whether consisting in pleasure or virtzie, or both, is
more often found with those who are most highly culti
vated in their mind and in their character and have
only a moderate share of external goods, than among
those who possess external goods to a useless extent
but are deficient in higher qualities."

" Let us acknowledge then that each one has just so
much of happiness as he has of virtue and wisdom and
of virtuous and wise action. God is witness to us of
this truth, for He is happy and blessed, not by reason
of any external goods, but in Himself and by reason
of His own nature"

" Let us assume then that the best life, both for in
dividuals and states, is the life of virtue, having ex
ternal goods enough for the performance of good ac
tions. Now it is evident that the form of government
is best in which every man, whoever he is, can act for
the best and live happily."

Aristotle. 350 B. C.

XXII

LIFE AND PEACE.

" The whole of life is fitrther divided into two parts,
business and leisure, war and peace, and all actions
into those which are necessary and useful and those
which are honorable : there must be war for the sake
of peace, business for the sake of leisure, things useful
and necessary for the sake of things honorable. For
men must engage in business and go to war, but
leisure and peace are better ; they must do what is
useful and necessary, but what is honorable is better^
In such principles children and persons of every age
should be trained, whereas even the Hellenes of the
present day, who are reputed to be the best governed,
and the legislators who gave them their constitutions,
do not appear to have framed their governments with
regard to the best end, or to have given them laws and
education with a view to all the virtues, but in a
vulgar spirit have fallen back on those which promised
to be more useful and profitable"

" Facts as well as arguments prove that the legis
lator should direct all his military and other measures
to the provision of leisure and the establishment of
peace. For most of those military states are safe only
while they are at war, but fall when they have ac
quired their empire : like unused iron they rust in
time of peace. And for this the legislator is to blame,
he never having taught them how to lead the life of
peace"

Aristotle. B. C. 350.

A R IS TO TLE may be truly called the great systematic ra
tionalist or scientist of the Greek schools, a father of the modern
scientific method who taught — " First get your facts, then rea-
son on them." He was one of the pioneers in the theory of
" Evolution " and the " Utilitarian " theory of ethics, purely ra
tionalistic in his general lines of thought,' highly moral, and
scientific in his" ethics" and broadly democratic in his "Poli
tics" In theology, he might be called either a Theist or a Pan
theist.

GIST OF ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.
B. C. 350.

" The best of all things must be something final. If then there
be only one final end, this will be what we are seeking, or if there
be more than one, then the most final of them.

' ' Now that which is pursued as an end in itself is more final
than that which is pursued as means to something else, and that is
strictly final which is always chosen as an end in itself and never
as a means.

"Happiness or we If are seems more than anything else to answer
to this description ; for we always choose it for itself, and never
for the sake of something else.

' ' Virtue then is a kind of moderation in as much as it aims at
the mean or moderate amount. And it is a moderation in as much
as it comes in the middle or mean between two vices, one on the
side of excess, the other on the side of defect, and in as much as,
while these vices fall short of or exceed the due measure in feeling
and in action, it finds and chooses the 'mean.

1 ' Now that we have discussed the several kinds of virtue, it re
mains to give a summary account of happiness, since we are to
assume that it is the end of all that man does.

' ' As we have often said, that is truly valuable and pleasant
which is so to the perfect man. Now, the exercise of those trained
faculties which are proper to him is what each man finds most de
sirable ; what the perfect man finds most desirable, therefore, is
the exercise of virtue. Happiness, consequently, does not consist
in amusement, and indeed it is absurd to suppose that the end is
amusement, and that we toil and moil all our life long for the sake
of amusing ourselves. 77ie happy life is thought to be that which
exhibits virtue, and such a life must be serious and cannot consist
in amusement.

" But if happiness be the exercise of virtue, it is reasonable to
suppose that it will be the exercise of the highest virtue ; and that
it will be the virtue or excellence of the best part of us. Now that
part or faculty — call it reason or what you will— which seems
naturally to rule and take the lead, and to apprehend things noble
and divine — whether it be itself divine , or only the divine st part of
us — js the faculty the exercise of which, in its proper excellence,
will be perfect happiness. ' '

ARISTOTLE,

MORAL, POLITICAL AND NATURAL PHILOSOPHER,

B. C. 350.
From marble statue in Ppada Palace. Rome.

CONSENT OF THEGOVERNED.
RIGHT vs. MIGHT.

" Yet to a reflecting mind it imist appear very
strange that the statesman should be always consider
ing how he can dominate and tyrannize over others,
^tuhether they will or not. How can that which is not
even lawful be the business of the statesman or legis
lator f Unlawful it certainly is to rule without re
gard to justice, for there may be might where there is
no right"

" Yet many appear to think that a despotic govern
ment is a trite political form, and what men affirm to
be unjust and inexpedient in their own case they are
not ashamed of practicing towards others ; they de
mand justice for themselves, but where other men are
concerned they care nothing about it. Such behavior
is irrational."

' ' Neither is a city to be deemed happy or a legis
lator to be praised because he trains his citizens to
conquer and obtain domination over their neighbors,
for there is great evil in this. No such principle and
no law having this object is 'either statesmanlike, or
useful, or right. For the same things are best for in
dividuals and for states and these are the things which
the legislator should implant in the minds of his
citizens."

" Neither should men study war with a vieiv to the
enslavement of those who do not deserve to be enslaved,
but first of all they should provide against their en
slavement and in the second place obtain empire for
the good of the governed and not for the sake of ex
cising a general despotism"

Aristotle, B. C. 350.

THE DIVINE MISSION OF SOCRATES.

" For this is the command of God, as I would have
you know ; and I believe that to this day no greater
good has ever happened in the state than my service
to the God. For I do nothing but go about persuading
you all, old and young alike, not to take thought for
your persons or your properties, but first and chiefly
to care about the greatest improvement of the soul. I
tell you that virtue is not given by money, but that
from virtue come money and every other good of man,
public as well as private " * *

" I am that gadfly which God has given the state, and
all day long and in all places am always fastening
upon you, arousing and persuading and reproaching
you. * * * And that I am given to you by God
is proved by this : that if I had been like other men, I
should not have neglected all my own concerns, or
patiently seen the neglect of them during all these
years, and have been doing yours, coming to you in
dividually, like a father or elder brother, exhorting
you to regard virtue ; this, I say, would not be like
human nature. And had I gained anything, or if
my exhortations had been paid, there would have been
some sense in that ; but jiow, as you will perceive, not
even the impudence of my accusers dares to say that I
have ever exacted or sought pay of any one ; they have
no witness of that. And I have a witness of the truth

of what I say ; my poverty is a sufficient witness"
* * * *

"For if, O men of Athens, by force of persuasion
and entreaty, I could overpower your oaths, then I
should be teaching you to believe that there are no
Gods, and convict myself, in my own defense, of not
believing in them. But that is not the case ; for I
do believe that there are Gods, and in a far higher
sense than that in which any of my accusers believe in
them" From the Apology.

Prof, JAMES H HYSLOP,

XXV

PREFACE.

The lecture which is here published in book form was
an attempt to reduce the conceptions of Greek ethics to
the same terms as those in which modern problems in
this field express themselves. Too many philosophers
merely transliterate the language of antiquity instead of
translating it. The consequence is that we as often fail
to discover that in the past we are dealing with the same
intellectual and moral problems as in the present. I
have endeavored, therefore, to see the Greek thought on
ethics with the eyes of a modern student. How far I
have been successful must be left to others to decide.
But there seems to me a perennial lesson for serious
men and women in the efforts of Socrates, Plato and
Aristotle to reanimate while they modified the sturdy
morality which they thought produced the civilization
they saw on the decline. The Republic and the Laws of
Plato, and the Ethics and Politics of Aristotle are equally
good as missionary appeals to revivify the conscience of
the race as they are scientific treatises to enlighten its
intellect. They should be read with constant reference
to the problems that interest in social and political mo
rality. The selections from Plato and Aristotle which
have been made by the Editor and myself are designed
both to illustrate the conceptions of Greek philosophy
and to show their affinity with present day questions.

JAMES H. HYSLOP.
New York, March 26, 1903.

XXVI

PUBLISHERS NOTE.

The series of lectures on The Evolution of Ethics
will probably be issued in three volumes as follows :

Vol. i, The Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

Vol. 2, Origin of Ethical Ideas, Ethics of Evolution,
and Utilitarian Ethics.

Vol. 3 will probably contain all the remaining lectures
of the course.

We now ivSsue the volume on the Greek Philosophers
as the first of the series, not because the Greek systems
are necessarily first in order of importance or chronol
ogy, but because they properly deserve first place in our
regards, as we believe it cannot be denied that to the
Greek and Latin thinkers we are most indebted for the
greatest and most direct influence on our own political,
moral, religious and scientific thought.

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers,

BY PROF. JAS. H. HYSLOP.

The interest in Greek philosophy is perennial. It
resembles the immortality of Homer. The Iliad and the
Odyssey have not done more to stimulate and nourish
the imagination than the philosophers have done for the
understanding and the conscience. Whenever we wish
to discuss fundamental principles in philosophy and
literature, or the great outlines of theory in both depart
ments of thought, we return to Greece, and there we find
the object of our suit in all its simplicity and fascination.
Homer, like his own Cimmerian shades, is found only in
the twilight of fable, and philosophy, like epic poetry in
its antiquity, traces its origin to the confines of myth
ology. But in both branches of its intellectual activity
Greece reflects the naivete of childhood, until its problems
become well defined in the speculations of the later
schools. It is this very simplicity, however, that con
stitutes both the fascination and the value of Greek phil
osophic thought. It deals with first principles in a
way that seerns always and everywhere to characterize
the rise of philosophic reflection. The spontaneity and
naturalness of this development make it especia

2 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

attractive to all who enjoy an emancipation from the
artificial methods and burdensome shackles of scholastic
dogmatism. It goes direct to nature and fact for its data,
and keeps near enough to common experience to avoid
mere romancing, while it remains profound enough to
originate the spirit and methods of science and philoso
phy. This naturalness of Greek reflection was and is the
true genius of speculative inquiry, and naive as were
many of its thoughts, they exhibit a sagacity and pene
tration that astonishes us when we consider the character
of the period as compared with the advantages of our
own. The concrete form of these speculations often
seem odd and childish enough, but the general princi
ples at their basis were as profound and far reaching as
anything that can to-day boast of an origin in riper
reflection. Hence whenever we wish to divest ourselves of
the impediments adhering to existing formulas and illus
trations with their illusory associations we have only to
return to those sources of philosophy which, though they
border on the simplicity of childhood, have power to
stimulate inquiry in a way that is not rivaled by any
other race of thinkers. This is the one reason that Greece
is the great academic source of philosophic education and
culture.

The chief interest, however, with which we are here
occupied is that period of reflection which begins with
Socrates and ends with Aristotle. Not even all of the
aspects of this period will require our attention, but only
those which deal with its ethics.

It was an age of unexampled intellectual, as it was of
political, activity, both having been brought about by
the same causes : namely, the emancipation of the Greek
consciousness from the thralls of tradition, and the vic
tory over Persia at Marathon and Salamis. The former

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 3

secured intellectual, and the latter political, freedom, and
both a civilization without a rival at that time, and which
remained as long as the old morality retained its leaven
ing power. Greece became conscious of herself and of
her power in this emancipation of her people, and so
secured that spontaneity of action, intellectual and politi
cal, which is the only guarantee and protector of a great
civilization. Her strength against outside enemies gave
her self-reliance, and the taste of freedom fortified her
against hostile forces within. Besides all these there
was, of course, a variety of influences, social, literary,
and philosophical, which stimulated intellectual activity
of all kinds, and so supplemented the purely political
agencies in awakening Greek life to a consciousness
of its powers and vocation. There was a large class of .-fa-
people, aristocratic in possessions, tastes, and habits, and
with leisure, or free from toil and pain as the Greeks
expressed it, to lead a contemplative or reflective life.
This class set to thinking about things cosmic, personal,
and social, and the very first impulse opened up a fairy
land of wonders in nature that fascinated the imagination
like the discoveries of Columbus and the theories of
Darwin in later times. In thus opening up the secrets of
nature, the Greeks were stimulated in an inquiry as intoxi
cating as the gold fever of Peru and California. Trees,
plants, ocean, seasons, stars, numbers, elements, and all
animate or inanimate things were objects of mingled wor
ship and curiosity. A discovery in any of these fields was
the signal for the most impetuous and childish theories.
It was only natural, and though their systems were very
naive at first, they soon gave rise to problems which
have a perennial interest and an importance for every
individual who seeks a knowledge of nature as well as
culture. "Consider," says Mr. Alfred Benn, "the lively

4 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

emotions excited among an intelligent people at a time
when multiplication and division, squaring and cubing,
the rule of three, the construction and equivalence of
figures, with all their manifold applications to indus
try, commerce, fine art, and (military) tactics, were just
as strange and wonderful as electrical phenomena to
us; consider also the magical influence still commonly
attributed to particular numbers, and the intense eager
ness to obtain exact numerical statements, even when
they are of no practical value, exhibited by all who
are thrown back upon primitive ways of living, as, for
example, in Alpine traveling, or on board an Atlantic
steamer, and we shall cease to wonder that a mere form
of thought, a lifeless abstraction, should once have been
regarded as the solution of every problem, the cause of
all existence." What is said in this passage referring to
Pythagoras can also be said of Thales, Anaximander,
Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Anaxagoras. The physical
speculations of the Ionian school, the pantheistic con
ceptions of Anaximander and the two Eleatics, Xeno-
phanes and Parmenides, the dialectic of Zeno, the per
petual flux or evolution of Heraclitus, the naive atomic
theories of Empedocles and Democritus, and the theolog
ical system of Anaxagoras — all of these indicated an
intellectual fermentation of vast significance both in
their destructive influence upon traditional ideas and in
their constructive power for molding a new civilization.
But upon these influences I cannot dwell further, and
allude to them at all only to remark their importance in
a complete estimate of the period which I am to discuss
more carefully. I can only examine in the briefest com
pass possible the most general philosophic and moral
attitude of mind characterizing the whole period preced
ing Socrates.

PYTHAGORAS.

(569-471 . B. C )
From an ancient Cameo.

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 5

Preceding the Socratic period, which I am to consider,
there were two phases of intellectual development whose
characteristics require to be noticed in order to compre
hend rightly the new tendencies inaugurated by Socrates.
They may be called the philosophic and religious move
ments. Both of them terminate with the skepticism of
the sophists, who will come in for some consideration.
But the philosophic attitude of mind was characterized
by cosmic speculation. They were first attempts to
explain the universe and afterward endeavors to formu
late maxims for the regulation of conduct. The phe
nomena of nature were reduced to some kind of unity,
wnether of being or of motion, elements or substance,
and their action according to some definite law. When
ethical maxims were reached they took the form of in
junctions to conform conduct to this unity, to the law of
nature, to the harmony of the universe. It is important
to remark the conception of morality involved in such a
view of things. It is identical in general conception and
terms with that of Mr. Spencer and evolutionists usually,
in that it represents morality to be an adjustment to the
laws of nature, or in evolutionistic parlance, environ
ment. This conception and point of view make morality
external. It represents morality merely as action ad
justed to external forces and requires nothing but the
intelligence and prudence instigated by fear to achieve
it Such a thing as the Kantian good-will is either
unnecessary or unintelligible in this condition of mind.
Obedience to the fixed laws of the cosmos is the one
course that leads to the highest good, which to the Greek
was always pleasure, unless we except Plato and the
Stoics. It is hardly proper to say that this obedience
was a duty, or felt as a duty, because the very con
ception of moral obligation, born from the sense of a

6 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

conflict between one's own inclinations and the constraint
of conscience, which looked at an ideal above nature and
more especially characterized Christianity, was unknown
to the period of which I am treating. The sense of con
flict was often enough felt, but it was the sense of a con
flict between a weaker and a stronger power, and not
between human desires and a divine will preconceived
as just and benevolent The Greek consciousness or
belief was that man was a part of nature, not dualisti-
cally opposed to it, as either equal or inferior to it, and
this conception held the mind to the assumption of a
complete harmony between the ultimate order of the
iworld and man's interest. yThe highest good, therefore,
kvas conceived as man's interest in obedience to superior
•power, and not respect for its laws as the expression of a
personal will. Consequently, prudence became the
highest virtue, which was wise obedience to power, not
respect for moral personality. This prudence, therefore,
did not involve merit for good-will as distinct from
knowledge or intelligence, but threw the whole responsi
bility for virtue or excellence upon wisdom or knowl-
edge of the laws of nature. The good man was the wise
man; the man who knew the laws oFthe cosmos" and
obeyed them whether he had any respect for them or
not. The prudent (vorsichtiger) man was as good as the
religious saint, or even better, and had his rewards for
mere prudent self-interest quite equal those of the seekar
after eternal life. It was assumed that his will inevita
bly lay in the direction of the good, which was con
ceived as personal interest and pleasure, and all that any
one could be said to lack when he failed to achieve it, or
" virtue," was wisdom or rational knowledge of the uni
verse. Man's whole duty was to get a knowledge of
nature and to prudently adjust his conduct to its laws,

Ethics of the Greek Philosopher*. 7

not to seek an ideal above nature in some transcendental
state of existence. The ignorant man, if he ever attained
the good at all, merely stumbled upon it, but the rational
man who was conscious of what he aimed at was
"virtuous" for that reason. Consciousness or self-con
sciousness was the Greek's conception of virtue. Con
scientiousness is the increment which later thought adds
to that as the conception of morality, and so supple
ments knowledge by good-will as a condition of virtue.

In order to see the close relation between early phil
osophy and ethics we must keep in mind that both in
his speculative and practical reflections the pre-Socratic
thinker directed his attention to the external world.
Both his philosophy and his ethics were cosmic. To
state it more technically his point of view was cosmolog-
ical, that is, cosmocentric, as distinct from anthropologi
cal, that is, anthropocentric. This position favored
humility and obedience, as the anthropocentric view,
whatever its merits in other respects, often tends to an
exaggerated self-estimation. Nevertheless the Greek had
no humility and the later Christian had less pride. There
were other reasons for this fact. But the reference to
cosmic and external conditions, under the philosophic
impulse, was not accompanied or inspired by any sense of
fear, at least among the philosophers. The common mind
may have lived in terror of the forces of nature, because
it thought them the manifestation of lawless gods and
demons. But in the reflective stage of development this
fear was banished. This was probably because the
movement was controlled by the more philosophic minds
of Greece, who were in their times the ideals of calm and
dispassionate temperament, and hence the ethical con
sciousness represented by them was of the rational type,
duly exempt from fear and superstition on the one hand,

8 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

and from an exalted and exaggerated estimate of human
life on the other. Not being able to awaken the in
fluence of love for an impersonal law, as Christianity
awakened it for the law of an idealized personal Grod, the
ethics of the period under notice could have no other
motive than a calculating prudence, exempt from the
disturbing influence of fear, hope, and love. Its whole
principle was adjustment to an external order, and
morality was rational submission to it. There was no
high estimation placed upon man in any sense that his
good lay in conquering the world, but only in conform
ing to it. The point of view, as I have said, was cosmo-
centric, not anthropocentric, and this meant that man
must subordinate his life to the cosmos instead of sub
ordinating nature to himself. This same conception was
reflected in politics, in which the ethical norm was "pas
sive obedience " to authority minus the " divine right of
kings," though there are traces of even this idea, with
none of its idealization, however, as later civilization
tried to construe it. Bat morality in this conception
expressed a sense of limitation, and though the whole
movement was characterized by a calm and rational
view of this limitation, its tendency was to make the
Greek conscious of thwarted effort and restricted liberty
in the satisfaction of desire, and this he resented with all
the bitterness characteristic of a liberty-loving race.
Hence the universal lamentation at the hardness of fate,
though this weakness generally escaped the philosophers
whose habits of thought and action insured a mental
equilibrium that has fixed the popular conception of
their character for all time. They taught and practised
that balance of feeling and will which enables men to
battle with the storms of nature and destiny, and to seek
their highest good rather in obedience to cosmic laws

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 9

than in rebellion against them. The average Greek was
a born rebel, because he could respect neither nature nor
the gods, and it was a hard lesson to learn that the
cosmos had the first claim upon his allegiance. But this
necessity — for it was a necessity rather than a duty to
the Greek, because, on the one hand, he found neither per
sonality in nature nor morality in the gods, and on the
other, his own conception of the good did not transcend
personal interest — this necessity of submission to nature
was the whole ethical teaching of the philosophic move
ment previous to Socrates, and it was identical with the
religious attitude of mind in the same period, except
that the forces that exacted obedience were impersonal
and could not utilize all those associations which are
connected with the idea of personality. Though they
could not evoke love, as the human attitude of mind
toward them, they did not awaken in the philosophers
the sentiment of fear. The age and its necessities
taught the fatuity of cowardice and the benefits of
rational adjustment to nature.

The second intellectual movement which both pre
ceded and accompanied the philosophical was the relig
ious system of ideas. This founded all morality upon
the will of the gods. It was not reflective in its type,
but manifested those naive ideas regarding the basis of
morals which characterize all religious beliefs. It fos
tered the morality of fear. It was like the philosophical
movement in producing the sense of subjection to an
external law, or authority, but it was unlike that move
ment in its conception of the law to be obeyed. The
religious consciousness of that time obeyed divinities
that were the embodied genii of caprice and libertinism,
and hence it could live only under the domination of fear,
which such beings would inspire, especially that they

10 Ethics of the Greek Pldlosophers.

held men's life and fortune, in their hands. At first men
animated even nature with capricious laws and lived in
terror under it. Long after they had found the cosmos
a seat of fixed laws they still attributed to the gods the
caprice and wontonness that nature had shared at an
earlier time. No genuine morality is possible under
such a system. The calculations of prudence and virtue
are not possible where nature and the gods are not
regular, and to caprice the gods added personality with
out morality. Hence they could inspire nothing but
fear. On the other hand, the philosopher's cosmos was
the seat of irrevocable order, and he could learn to cal
culate its action, to sacrifice his desires to it for remoter
rewards, and to contemplate its course with equanimity,
while the religious mind had to quake and tremble before
the prospect of an arbitrary and unjust interference with
its plans, hopes, and aspirations. Nothing but super
stitious fear could exist under such a system of concep
tions, and man still remained the servant of external
agents, and his morality or conduct nothing more
than prudential obedience under restraint. The philo
sophic mind could cultivate an intellectual calm, the
calm of Fate, or the consciousness that the course of
things was inexorable, and that it could be propitiated
by neither fear, nor hope, nor love, but the religious
mind, having no fixed order with which to reckon, but
only a lot of capricious personal beings to propitiate,
could only lead a life of fear and terror. In the absence,
therefore, of the philosopher's calm and insight, the two
alternatives for man's regeneration were either to deny
the existence of the gods, or to moralize them. Skepti
cism did the former ; Christianity did the latter.

This skeptical tendency was represented by the
sophistic movement in which there were three factors

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 11

having much interest in the development of philosophy.
They were : (1} Itsdoctrine of the so-called relativity
of knowledge, ^offTntellectual and moral. (2) Its
agnosti cism, or even denial, regarding the existence_of_
TEe godsT (3) Its theory

the origin of~morafity! There was also in the school an
incipient recognition of the place occupied by pleasure
in the determination of conduct in so far as the indi
vidual is concerned. This might very well be called
the fourth factor in sophistic thought. All of them
exercised a profound influence upon current conceptions
of morality. The first led to a change from the cosmo-
logical to the anthropological point of view. The second
led to a denial of the religious consciousness and the
authority of the gods. The third and fourth in connection
with religious skepticism created a tendency toward
libertinism.

The meaning of the sophistic theory of the relativity
of knowledge was that all ideas and truths were relative
to the individual who perceived them. At this period
of reflection many of the Greeks, and more particularly
the sophists, became conscious of the contradictions
in human experience and beliefs. For instance, what
appeared hot to one man was cold to another ; what one
called large another called small ; what one called rigl
another called wrong. Differences of opinion seernec
irreconcilable. Every man appeared_tg_jmye nothing
but his own sensation. -3 tn ponsir]pr in his reflections anc
was without assurance that they were in any respec
like those of his neighbor. All this was expressed by*"
saying that all knowledge and ideas were relative and
none of them absolute, which was only to maintain that
there was no common measure of experience and truth,
that every idea was true, every act right for the man who

12 Ethics of t/te G reek Philosophers.

thought so. I cannot go fully into this doctrine at present,
but I hope I have made it clear that it was a most
radical skepticism in regard to all the beliefs of common
sense. The consequences of it are, or ought to be,
apparent to every one. It leaves every one free to follow
his own convictions and impulses without hindrance
except from superior power. There can be no appeal to
common ideas and principles, and reason can only mean
what each man thinks and believes for himself and with
out regard to others. The doctrine of conventionalism
carried the principles of skepticism still farther. After
denying the existence of the gods and their relation to
morality, and the existence of absolute truth, this doc
trine of conventionalism was an attempt to explain how
the actual code of moral practice came to be accepted
and to be a common one. There was no doubt about the
fact that a common code existed, but so far from being
the spontaneous adoption of the individuals in society
the sophists^ held that it was due to the passive conven
tion of citizens in obedience to the superior power of the
state, which in most cases was an arbitrary prince. With
the growing demand for individual and political liberty,
and the hatred against tyrannical rulers, this idea only
reinforced the individualism of sophistic psychology, and
tended to destroy the authority of the state in the esti
mation of the citizen who could claim upon the basis of
this philosophy the sole right to determine his own con
duct. When pleasure was set up as the positive motive
for every man's action, and each individual was regarded
as his own rightful judge of what was right or wrong, or
what pleasure he could pursue without the legitimacy of
hindrance or interference on the part of others, we can
well imagine what moral chaos must follow upon the
application of such a theory to social and political action.

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 13

Now Socrates originates the reaction against sophistic
doctrine in philosophy, ethics, and politics. In order to
understand what he accomplished and what he represents
in the history of thought, at least by way of suggestion,
we must examine three characteristics of the man :
(1) His method. (2) His doctrine. (3) His personality.

The method of Socrates begins with his attack upon
thesophists, which covered his ownjjretense of ignorance —
behind the keenest-. ofLinnii e n d o an d _ sati re against the
sophisms 'of these skeptical wiseacres. He did not queg^__
tion their theology, or rather anti-theological beliefs, as
the mam point of attack. He might have defended the
existence of the gods as the first position to be sustained
in the reconstruction of ethics. But he did not choose
this resource. Whatever belief in the gods he main
tained he held either as a pious opinion of his own or as
the terminus ad quern of his philosophical theories. But
avoiding the prior reconstruction of theology, he pushed
sophistic skepticism to its logical consequences and
directed his attack upon the sophists' boastful claim to
acknowledge of virtue and of the best means to attain it
He ridiculed their personal arrogance and resented their
conceited and ignorant claims to superior knowledge in
all matters of virtue. But in his argument with them
he showed great shrewdness and sagacity. He made no
pretensions to knowledge himself. He confessed that he
wjis_on]y_ajie£ke^ instead of asserting

anything that would require proof on his part, he carried 1
on his discussion? with the sophists bj a series of ques- u
tlona which shitted the obligation of assertion upon them v
and which were couched in a way to expose their igno
rance by exhibiting their contradictions while pretending
to be instructors of youth in matters of knowledge and
virtue. He asked for definition and meaning where the

14 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

ordinary man wanted facts. Consequently he had to deal
with conceptions, ideas, rather than with objects, external
things and laws. His process of induction, definition,
and dialectic argument turned on the clarification of
one's ideas, and the establishment of a real or certain, as
distinct from an illusory or uncertain, knowledge. His
object in this was, of course, to show the sophist that he
had not thought out his ideas to their consequences, and
that his contradictory conceptions, with his psychological
individualism, unfitted him to be the intellectual and
moral guide to the Athenian youth. But in the process
Socrates assumed and used a point of view of whose
significance he was not himself conscious. He began his
inquiries with ideas and not with things, and the conse
quence was that he completely reversed the point of view
from which the study of philosophy began. Instead of
looking primarily at the external world, or the objective
facts which skepticism denied or questioned, he forced
the sophist to discover in his individual ideas the
contradictions which this class hud found in general
knowledge, and consequently he compelled his opponent
either to admit his own confusion or to reconstruct his
view of knowledge. But in the intensity of his occupa
tion with mere ideas Socrates ceased to take an interest
in speculations about the cosmos. The sophists, of
course, prepared the way for this by their skepticism
in regard to the validity of sensory knowledge. But
they did not openly avow any contempt for physical
speculation. Socrates, however, ridiculed all attempts at
determining the nature of the stars, for instance, or
explaining the physical universe. He said he could learn
nothing from the study of nature. He did not care for
a walk along the river bank for the contemplation of the
trees, or for any study of physical phenomena. He was,

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 15

on the contrary, a complete agnostic in regard to the
possibility of physical science, as it was then called. Man
and his conceptions were his supreme interest, while a
knowledge of the physical world was ridiculed either as
impossible or as a hot-bed of fancies and illusions.
This position, of course, was only the logical conse
quence of sophistic psychology, though with Socrates
this attitude of mind was rather a matter of moral tem
perament than of logical reflection upon the philosophical
problems of the time. It was due to the intensity of his
interest in ideas which monopolized attention and tended
to turn men from the contemplation of the external
universe to reflection upon themselves. It was a quiet
substitution of the anthropocentric for the cosmocentric
point of view in the consideration of truth.

But this agnosticism in physical science requires some
attention in the light of the criticism which is sometimes
directed against it. The contempt for physical science
which Socrates expressed sounds very strange in our
ears, especially after all the triumphs of modern inquiry
under that name. Had it been called metaphysics,
which it really was, there would be no protest against
his judgment by those who are inclined to ridicule him
for his opinion. But, as it is, Socrates' impeachment of
physical science is taken as a defense of the process of
burrowing in one's own reflections for a solution of the
world's mystery, like the Hindu sage who is said to solve
the riddle of the sphinx by sitting under his palm tree
and looking into his navel. Socrates here seems to
favor the scholastic method which science so vehemently
despises in philosophy, and which it illustrates so vigor
ously in the weaknesses of Hegelian language, namely,
the attempt to construe the whole universe from the
standpoint of self-consciousness.

J6 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

But accusations of this kind betray complete igno
rance of both the acuteness of Socrates and of the actual
conception of physical science which, he attacked. Mere
propositions are not safe guides in regard to the mean
ing of past ideas. 'The form of expression which literally
translates the past may conceal its real content. The
physical science of Socrates' time, as denominated in the
doctrines of Thales, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Democritus,
and Anaxagoras, along with others, was nothing but
a priori metaphysical speculation about the physical
universe, and deludes the average scientist of the
present day because he allows himself to be deceived
by the name and contents of ancient inquiry without
regarding the viciousness of ancient method. Moreover
the admirer of Mr. Spencer should not be counted among
the critics of Socrates. But physical science in Greece
was not an attempt to catalogue the facts of nature after
the method of modern scientific and inductive procedure,
and to suspend explanation until the laws and uniformi
ties of nature were adequately known, but it was a
resort to the widest and wildest speculation upon the
most meager data conceivable, and under conditions that
made it impossible to penetrate the mysteries of the
cosmos. The limitations of such knowledge, as suspected
by Socrates, were entirely justifiable suppositions, and
nothing would meet the modern condemnation of science
more readily than this a priori speculation about the uni
verse which Socrates eschewed, though with even better
reasons than he knew. It_ was rather a spontaneous
mterest in man and his conduct that animated Socrates

diy^rteH^hTrn from walching ^fliestare^tliari any
philosophic conception of the limitations of human
knowledge. His agnosticism was thus not against
physical science as we understand the term, namely, as

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 17

a process for empirically determining the laws of nature,
but against metaphysical efforts to construe the origin of
phenomena and of organic existence in terms of some
simple substance and by a purely speculative method.
This is precisely the contention of modern science,
which ought to claim Socrates as the father of empirical
inquiry in the field of physical phenomena, or at least as
no opponent of it, though he formulated no principles
by which the limitations of knowledge to phenomena
could be determined, instead of reproaching \\m with
the introspective method of studying nature. What
Socrates actually aimed at was identical with the prac
tical interests of present science, except that it was moral,
not physical. His object was to turn men to attainable
results, even if they were only the clarification of ideas
and the moralization of the will.

But the mere fact that he turned away from current
physical speculations and demanded an examination of
our logical conceptions, while he applied a dialectic use
of them against the sophistries of Protagoras, Prodicus,
Oorgias, and their class generally, created a new tend
ency, and a new point of view, the anthropocentric as
opposed to the cosmocentric, as they have already been
denominated. Besides its influence upon philosophic
method, which was to make it psychological and idealistic,
as distinct from the physical and realistic type of
thought, it established an entirely new direction for ethical
reflection. This too became subjective as against the
objective point of view in the older philosophy. Man
was turned in upon himself for a knowledge of the moral
law. Reflection upon himself and not upon external

'^- ' ^ m •••••—••« — »—• ^ •

nature became the method of determining one's duties.
The habit of self-analysis thus initiated and involved in
the criticism of one's conceptions transmitted its influence

18 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

to the desires, and they became objects of introspective
examination and regulation. The ethical conscious
ness thus turned away from the cosmological order of
nature to find the law of action and its promised reward
in the subject itself. The effect of this with its emphasis
upon the virtue of self-control, which is the index of
man's own responsibility for the good and not nature,
was to create in man a wholly new idea of himself,
namely, that sense of his dignity and worth which was
wholly impossible under the idea that he was merely an
instrument in the hands of Fate, of nature, or of the
ruler to accomplish some other end than his own. The
old cosmological ethics had taught submission, if not
humility, though it could not wholly prevent fear and
slavish obedience. The new psychological and anthropo
logical point of view awakened courage and self-confidence,
and with them reinforced the pride which an aristocratic
society had fostered, even when the order of nature
elicited no respect for itself. This pride could take
the direction of vanity, or of man's dignity, importance,
and moral mission in the universe, according to- the
character of the individual who maintained it. The last
was its form in Socrates and Plato, and it marked the
rise of that conception of man which no subsequent
morality has forgotten, and which no future ethics can
ignore, even when it is necessary to correct its aberra
tions, and though it is incumbent upon it not to ignore
the limitations which an eternal order places upon self-
estimation. "Know thyself," PvodQi Geavrov, is
an important maxim for a man who wishes to secure
self-control and for one who would possess the psycho
logical equipment for instructing and leading his fellows
in the path of truth and virtue ; but if it conduces only
to pride and vanity, an exaggerated sense of human

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 19

importance in the economy of nature, or to a demand for
liberty and impunity in conduct, it requires to be cor
rected by emphasizing that subordination to external
nature, or adjustment to the laws of the universe, which
the old cosmological point of view so effectively instilled,
and which checks transcendental aspirations, based upon
wishes instead of facts, by substituting obedience for
libertinism on the one hand, and impracticable idealism
with other-worldliness on the other. But self-examina
tion is necessary to avoid both extremes, and the method
of reflection which Socrates initiated supplied this want.
Somuch for the method of Socrates. But the most
interesting feature about his position is the con tent of his
doctrine. In spite of his departure from the cosmologi
cal method he adopted one of the fundamental ideasofthe
cosmological school. We have seen that the cosmocentric
point of view emphasizes the necessity of knowledge as a
condition of securing the fruits of prudence and of success
ful adjustment to nature. Obedience to the laws of
nature was the form of expression that this pre-Socratic
ethics assumed, but it demanded for its realization
rational knowledge. Socrates, presupposing the natural
prudence of men, took up this assumption of the cosmo
logical school and advanced it to the position of the
highest good. This was that knowledge is the one great
"virtue" (in Greek parlance, excellence) or condition of
moral life. The idea in its main features was thus not
entirely new, but in fact the distinctive doctrine of
Greek thought, though Socrates had raised it to the
supreme place, whereas before it had been one of many
ideals. The Greek admiidd knowledge on its own ac
count as well as for its utility, and hence Socrates only
kept within the limits of racial ideals when he chose one
of them for the pinnacle of an ethical system. But he

20 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

simply retained the main principle of the cosmological
period without its method or its object. Previous
thought assumed that men resented obedience to nature
and required adjustment of will to attain virtue. But
Socrates, assuming that the will was already set in the
direction of its desires, thought that the want of knowl
edge was the only reason for man's failure to attain the
object of desire. Hence he did not make "virtue" a
product of will alone but an object of the intellect,
wholly forgetting the attributes of will that constituted
morality for the majority of men, though realizing them
in his personal character, and remaining unconscious of
the maxim so often quoted from Ovid, as indicating the
frequent discord between knowledge and virtue :

Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.

But assuming that men would pursue the good or virtue
if they knew what it was, he made knowledge the highest
good and excused vice by tracing it merely to ignorance.
The two formulas which expressed his doctrine, and
which were paradoxical even to the Greeks, though less
so to them than to us, were, first, that "knowledge is
virtue," and second, that "no man is voluntarily bad."
Both of them should be examined carefully.

It seems exceedingly strange that any man should
advocate the proposition that knowledge is virtue.
Nothing appears more absurd than this real or apparent
identification of knowledge and morality. The dis
tinction between them is radical with us. But the fact
is that the whole paradoxical character of his formula
lies in the errors of translators. Stated in this literal, or
transliteral, manner it wholly conceals the real intention
of Socrates. Translators should know more of psychol
ogy and philosophy before they attempt to interpret the

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 21

Greeks for us, and I know of no better illustration of
their intellectual poverty as a rule than the usual
formula which they adopt to express the idea of Socrates,
confusing the conceptions and associations of the term
for us with the very different ideas of the Greeks.
" Virtue" with them was a general term for excellence of
any kind, whether physical, intellectual, or moral,
though there was at least a vague feeling that a decided
difference existed between physical and moral excellence.
Socrates, indeed, thought of this " virtue " or excellence,
namely, knowledge, as a good to be attained as a condi
tion of successfully pursuing personal and other interests,
but not as a quality of will, nor of the act attaining and
aiming at this end, and hence in order to obtain the true
conception of Socrates' doctrine we have to interpret his
11 virtue, " not as a quality of will or conduct, but as the
skill or intelligence required to obtain the good which
the individual was supposed to be seeking. Conse
quently, when he says that knowledge is " virtue, " he
means that it is the most important excellence or quality
of being which man can aim to attain. It stood for
Socrates as the summum bonum, in so far as it was the
necessary condition to the satisfaction of desire, though
he admitted or assumed that it was the means to the
good which all persons seek without the necessity of
being urged to do so, or without failure, namely, interest
or pleasure. With Socrates men's intentions were righk
and their failure to attain the object of volition was not
due to any moral depravity of will asjwe conceive the
matter, ]put was traceable to ignorance, and hence the
imperative duty rfto gain knowledge, if desire was to be
satisfied without miscarriage ; that is, if the good was to
be attained. This conception of his doctrine is not so
paradoxical as it seems in the usual form of statement,

22 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

f
because of two facts : (1) Because " virtue " is found to

mean excellence in general, and (2) Because Socrates
conceived knowledge as a means to an end already
sought, and not as the real ultimate good, though it
seemed to stand for this in his system.

This interpretation of the formula of Socrates is born
out by a similar examination of the second paradox in
his theory, namely, the proposition that " no man is
voluntarily bad." Ilere again translators are at fault
They have assumed too readily that both " bad " and
" voluntary " connote the same in English as in Greek, an
assumption which is totally false. In modern parlance,
itself due to conceptions and a history which we cannot
recount here, "bad" denotes either depravity of will, or
evil consequences, such as pain, or both ; and " voluntary "
expresses three facts, namely, consciousness, autonomy,
and purpose. But in Greek thought " bad ", denoted only
disagreeable results, and "voluntary" (excov) mere in
tention without reference or implication in regard to
autonomy. Consequently, to say in our phraseology
that " no man is voluntarily bad " is both to deny the
freedom of the will and to deny the idea of moral de
pravity of will. But if translators had said that Socrates
taught that no man intentionally or consciously sought
what he thought injurious to himself they would have
expressed exactly what Socrates meant, and the proposi
tion would not have appeared so paradoxical. The prop
osition seems absurd to us because, as I have said, it ap
pears to deny the freedom of the will on the one hand,
and the fact that man does consciously, if not purposely,
choose the worse act on the other. Bat if Socrates had
been told that his doctrine contradicted the freedom of
the will he would either have laughed at us or told us
that he could not understand such an accusation. The

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 23

fact is that " involuntary " is not the proper translation of
the Greek term for which it stands in the proposition.
The reason, or one reason at least, for this is that the
Greek language did not distinguish between will and
desire. The same term did service for both conceptions,
while modern philosophy makes the distinction between
choice and desire (organic or instinctive craving) so clear
that there is no illusion as to the meaning of the volun
tary and involuntary. The term desire, of course, is
equivocal. But no man to-day calls his desires voluntary
in so far as the term describes merely natural or consti
tutional appetites, but only when he conceives them as
conscious acts of decision or preference. When he con
trasts desire with will he means distinctly to imply that
desire is either an organic state of consciousness which
we find in experience to be an index of a want, or crav
ing minus the final act of excluding its alternative object
from possible election. The former has no element of
will in it, and the latter, though it may represent one
stage of consciousness involving will, can only be the
will in deliberation. But distinguishing as we do
between will and desire we can very well suppose that
a man can will what he does not desire. Socrates,
however, could not do this because psychology had not
yet sufficiently analyzed the phenomena of conation.
Neither he nor his contemporaries clearly saw the need
of this distinction, though they instinctively felt that there
was something paradoxical and illusory about his propo
sition, while they left the riddle where they found it
If, therefore, we attempt to bring out his meaning we
should read his formula so that it should express the
fact that no man purposely desires evil. This would
sound much less paradoxical, because we concede easily
enough in common parlance that men can act against

24 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

their desires and do wrong though they do not desire the
wrong on its own account Still there is something
equivocal in this statement, because we know or believe
that some men do desire what is wrong or evil. But
here again our word " evil " does duty for two different
conceptions which we at least try to distinguish clearly,
namely, physical evil and moral evil. Physical or non-
moral evil is conceived as some form of pain, or conse
quence that is opposed to desire, and moral evil as a per
version of will or quality of action in volition that
excites the resistance of conscience. Now Socrates could
conceive but one "evil," and this did not distinguish
between the physical and the moral ; that is, physical
and moral evil were the same thing, and the defect called
vice was a defect of knowledge. This evil or pain he
always conceived egoistically and for this reason did not
see the necessity or occasion for recognizing a prohibition
on anything that was not so related. We can say that a
man can desire the wrong, but not the evil, but Socrates,
not distinguishing between wrong and evil, could not
use both propositions, but had to choose between say
ing that man consciously desired evil and that man did
not consciously desire evil. Socrates was, of course,
asserting a truism in his doctrine when we understand
what he meant to maintain. With him there was no
evil, that is, moral evil, out of relation to consciousness
or intention, which is perfectly true. But his formula
for expressing this truth was equivocal. He did not
always distinguish between consciously doing what is
evil and consciously doing what we know to be evil.
Assujnjj^jyiejxlhal_^ never desire e^il^jthat desire and
will are the same, and that there is no eviljDut of relation
_tp__desireI jve earn _see what -the proposition of Socrates
meant to express. It was that no man consciously

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 25

desires what he knows to be evil or opposed to his per
sonal interests. The pain or evil which he considered as
opposed to desire always had a reference to the subject
of the act or volition. The wrong was always to himself,
and this was never purposive.

But then why did Socrates enunciate such a truiam?
The answer to this question is that he was aiming to assert,
in the interest of the importance which he attached

"to. knowledge, that all men sought the same object,
nameljL_theiL. own personal interest, but were ignorant

,_ofthe means of attaining it. He thus assumed, as every
Greek would assume in agreement with our Manchester
economists perhaps, that the highest good, in so far
as it is an object of desire, is known, this being his own
interest, but that, in so far as it was an object of knowl
edge, it is not always known. Socrates did not enter
into any inquiry to determine or prove what the highest
good, as the ultimate end of volition, should be, because
he assumed that this was both known and unquestion
able. This was a problem of later ethics. He wanted
to emphasize the fact that the failure to attain it was a
defect of knowledge in regard to the means, and not of
will. Socrates was in no respect a believer in total de
pravity, in so far as this characterized a bad will, but
the great sin of man, if sin it could be called, was igno
rance, the want of the intelligence and skill to attain the
good which he naturally sought. Hence Socrates said,
on the one hand, that no man consciously sought his
own injury, and on the other, as an explanation of the
evil which men actually suffered, that knowledge was
the one need which man required to supply in order to
satisfy the real object of his volition.

This analysis of the position of Socrates brings us to
two conclusions which it has been our object to show,

26 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

and which could not have been indicated clearly without
removing the paradoxes of his doctrine. They are : (1)
The purelypracj-^ and

(2) TheirNex^r?meTyniidividualistic character, at least in
respect of the reference of the good to be realized. Both
of these require further comments in order to understand
the fundamental trend of the Greek moral consciousness.
Socrates after all did not transcend sophistic doctrine
in his theory. He was himself a sophist in the best
sense of that term, which literally denoted a wise man,
but in the person of the later members of the school had
degenerated into a synonym for conceit and charlatan
wisdom. In regard to method, however, Socrates was a
sophist, and in both his psychological and ethical as
sumptions remained, at least for the sake of argument,
upon the level of the men whose doctrines he so critically
examined. He argued and debated precisely as they did,
and took the attitude of an instructor of youth T though
careful to exhibit more modesty, humility, and consistent
agnosticism than these purveyors of wisdom. In it all,
however, he was te^riblyin earnest, and less governed
by personal gain than the sophists whom Plato lam
pooned. It was only in a latent sympathy with the reli
gious conception of the world that he departed from the
skepticism of the sophists. But in spite of the religious
tinge of thought in his mind he did not start with this
doctrine as the basis of his ethics. He was too dexterous
a logician to be entrapped in this way. He made no
effort to combat sophistic skepticism by proving the
existence of the gods, nor did he try to show that moral
ity was founded in the will of such gods as he admitted
to exist. He kept silence upon this point, whether from
discretion or not it is not necessary to say, though it may
be a libel to suspect that Socrates had any discretion at

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 27

all. But he showed no tendency to revert to the old
religious view of morality. Nor did he question the
sophistic doctrines that every one must be the measure
of truth, and that pleasure or personal interest was the
real summum lonum for every man. With this settled
or assumed he had only to show, as already indicated,
what means were necessary to attain this good. Even
when he sought a definition of virtue itself he was not
trying to determine any other end in conduct than per
sonal happiness or satisfaction, but only to show the
form in which that happiness could be gained without
any admixture of evil. The Socratic morality, therefore,
was practical, not theoretical. He was bent on showing
men that the chief pcohlem was a knowledge, of the_
"_popd" as the means to the d paired fmrl. Hence he
could maintain that " virtue " could be taught, because it
was merely the problem of imparting knowledge of the
causal relation between certain acts and their conse
quences. It is only when we reach Plato and Aristotle
that we find a definite conscious effort to reconstruct
ethical theory from the point of view of the end of con
duct as well as the means. But Socrates was still a
sophist in the conception of both his ethics and his call
ing, namely, in considering himself an instructor respect
ing the means to a good already assumed rather than
respecting the correction of men's idea of this good,
though his method of criticizing conceptions led to this
very result. Nevertheless, his whole conception of the
ethical problem was that of a man who felt only the need
of educating the intellect in regard to the conditions
necessary for attaining a presupposed end. These he
conceived as knowledge, as the education of the logical
faculties, as the sharpening of the cognitive insight, as
nothing but clear ideas. Such a thing as a perverted

28 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

will he could not understand, but only a perverted intel
lect. TR^jJ-aanmftd thfl.t fl. ma.T\ will always dojfchft right, if
only be knows what lf- ^ This is true enough when the
man is conscientious, a condition of mind which includes
respect for the interests of others as well as self. But
when he regards nothing but his own interest, or per
sonal satisfaction in a form incompatible with the welfare
of others, though knowing what this good for others is,
there is much more than the education of the intellect
necessary. Socrates is here banking on the flexibility of
the will, which is ready to modify its ideal at the demand
of better insight, while the fact is that the form of our
ideal concretely conceived often requires as much modi
fication of the will to arrive at the true good as it does
education of the intellect or reason to see the way to it.
Hence Socrates gets no further in his conception of
ethics than the problem of educating the intellect. The
problem of u educating " the will he did not see, and
perhaps would not have seen or understood had it been
pointed out to him. He remained upon the general
level of the Greek consciousness of his time, which was
extravagantly absorbed in the pursuit of knowledge.
The Greek exaggerated the importance of reason, and
especially of speculative reason, so that a life of mere
knowledge seemed the only satisfaction necessary for the
attainment of perfection, the socio-economic system with
slavery on the one side and aristocratic habits and tastes
on the other favoring leisure and scientific pursuits as
the occupation of gentlemen. In such a civilization will
or action would not be idealized. Knowledge would
naturally be the highest good, or the excellence which
free men would estimate most highly, while the moral
virtues of will which we consider would be limited to
the dependent classes. Socrates, though nothing of an

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 29

aristocrat in his taste, person, or manners, remained by
this conception, which led to the contemplative rather
than the active life.

The second characteristic of the Socratic ethics is no
less interesting than the first. It is the individualistic
point of view assumed by him, if not in the means of
attaining self-satisfaction, certainly in the end which action
had to subserve. We have already remarked that Soc
rates did not transcend the sophistic view in his tacit
assumption that every man is governed in his conduct
by his own personal interest. This was a truism with
Socrates. The high tone of language employed about
virtue, which we understand from a changed point of
view, charging it with conceptions and implications of
later history, availed to conceal from the modern mind
either the naked individualism of his doctrine or the
complete absence of an altruistic object, though it recog
nized altruistic means to an egoistic end. Socrates never
thought of making the interest of others an end, but only
a means to one's own higher interest. In this way his
individualism was made objectively consistent with
social welfare. Modern ideas make others than the sub
ject ends in themselves, and not merely means to the
subject's interest That is, we treat justice as an end
and not merely as a means to personal welfare. But
Socrates, though he went beyond his contemporaries in
the recognition of the means to virtue, did not transcend
them in the motive which he advanced. Consequently,
in spite of the social content of his ethical position, it
was individualistic in its motive efficient. It may be
objected, of course, that this view is not pure individual
ism, and I do not care to insist too vehemently for the
position. But when we consider that, besides the indi
vidualistic motive in his doctrine, there was not a clear

30 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

consciousness in Socrates of the conflict between individ
ual and social interest, not ideally, but in fact, we can
understand both the paradox and the egoism of his theory.
He was understood by the average Greek to mean,
when he taught that justice would result in good to the
agent of it, that this good would be the satisfaction of the
personal interest which the individual sought without
regard to the welfare of others. This is well illustrated
by the question raised in Plato's "Kepublic," asking
whether justice always results in satisfying personal
interest. Socrates no doubt had an ideal that was calcu
lated to change the conception of his race, but his instinct
for practical ethics, and the desire to put his doctrine in
terms of common experience, made him appeal to con
ceptions that were lower than his ideal. Hence he was
not understood to maintain or admit a real conflict be
tween personal and social interest. The whole practical
effect of his position was to keep alive, not by his life,
but by his theory, the egoistic assumptions of the Greek
consciousness. The Greek ideal was: "Everyman for
himself and the devil take the hindmost" — the true naked
conception involved in the struggle for existence as con
ceived when we try to eliminate its moral character.
Socrates never thought to question such a view as inhu
man, nor to teach definitely that a sacrifice of one pleas
ure or ideal had to be made to secure another. The idea
of sacrifice for attaining the true good was not a Greek
conception, and Socrates did not inculcate it, so that his
individualism, though it was in its means identical with
the social ethics of later times, had for its motive and its
material results the same effect as that individualism
which passes for egoism and selfishness. His own
strength of will and respect for justice prevented him
from both appearing and being egoistic in his personal

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 31

and objective conduct, but his subjective psychology and
egoistic motive in ethical theory kept him within the
limits of his race, and, consciously or unconsciously,
favored personal interest as the only ultimate end of con
duct, as against all men being ends in themselves and
while invoking altruistic motives, represent the point of
view that still justifies the characterization of individual
ism in Socratic ethics.

But if this view of Socrates be correct, why is it that
he has created so much interest in subsequent ages ? If
his theory of virtue was so individualistic, and if he did
not transcend the moral consciousness of his age, which
was so individualistic in its motives and objects, why
has he been so universally admired, and why has his
doctrine been so extravagantly extolled? Why is he
regarded as so superior to his contemporaries?

The answer to this question lies in his personality, not
in his philosophy. Socrates, as a man, was either better
than his theory, or he gave it that meaning in his life and
conduct which it logically concealed. That is to say,
his theoretical doctrine did not give logical expression to
the ideas which his conduct embodied. It was his per
sonality that struck his comtemporaries, and that stands
out in the estimation of succeeding ages, giving the real
meaning to his formulas when his own conceptions did
not transcend the main trend of his time. Men see
character and interpret theories according to the conduct
with which theories are associated. Ideas are rightly
supposed either to express facts or to indicate the path
of virtue, and assuming that men really intend to pursue
the latter when pointed out, a theory pretending to di
rect the will into a presumably desired course will be
adjudged by its influence upon the man who proposes it
as a moral guide. Socrates had one of those interesting

32 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

personalities of the highest moral type, mixed also with
something of the grotesque, which was bound to attract
the attention of mankind, and it is to this that we must
trace both the extraordinary interest in the man and the
concealment of the real import of his doctrine. It was
his character rather than his logic that revolutionized
the subsequent conception of morality, and it may be
safe to say that it is always personality, and not abstract
philosophy, that creates mankind's conception of moral
conduct and the value of moral theory. Abstract philo
sophical dogmas have no meaning or influence upon the
majority until embodied in a personal life. Now Socra
tes was not individualistic in his conduct, whatever his
motives. His will always waited on his intellect, and
hence he was ever ready to do what he conceived to be
right and just, which he conceived to be his interest.
He refused to recognize any personal interest but that
which was consistent with justice or the welfare of
others. Hence he never appeared to be an egoist or the
subject of selfishness. With his fellows, personal interest
was often in conflict with that of others, and when the
good was proposed to any one it was conceivable only in
individualistic terms which assumed this conflict. But
Socrates felt no interest but that of justice, and in so
doing generalized the conception so that it was consist
ent with his will, while his fellows heard the conceptions
of an egoist and saw the volitions of an idealist. Thus
his personal life evoked veneration and gave meaning to
his appeal to interest, though his contemporaries could
not feel the identification of justice and interest which he
taught, because their interest was on the lower plane of
that individualism which could not transcend the conflict
between personal interest and that of others, or would not
extend the range of its objects, so that an individualistic

MODERATION AND CONTENTMENT.

We should refrain most from sordid unjust pleas-
ures.

Happiness consists not in luxury and pride. To
want nothing is divine, to want the least, next to
divine.

He is richest who is content with least, for content
ment is the riches of nature.

It is the property of God to need nothing, to need
least the nighest to God.

Socrates.

SOCRATES,

THIS PHILOSOPHIC TRAMP AND MORAL PREACHER OF ATHENS.
(See p. 33-34.)

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 35

lost in his logical acumen without caring for his appear
ance. In fact he was like the man who always wants to
talk politics with people who do not care a picayune
about them, or to ventilate some hobby like the schemes
which are to cure all the ills of humanity. He reminds
us of some too wise farmer who neglects his stock and
crops to sit on the fence all day, debating prohibition,
free silver, or the money power. Everywhere we meet
this type of man, and we inevitably set him down at
once as a crank and a bore, if we are very esthetic and
not very serious about life. And this habit brought
Socrates, as it does his modern after-type, into trouble
with his wife. Xantippe complained that Socrates
roamed the streets talking about philosophy when he
should have been at work supporting her and his chil
dren. We do not know that Xantippe supported
Socrates in his pedestrian philosophy and idleness on the
streets by washing, as is often the case with our modern
"dead beats," but the situation described has a marvel
ous resemblance to this very thing. Socrates, however,
grunted out a not very chivalrous excuse for himself,
reflecting on the temper of his other half, himself and the
age being impervious to the finer sentiments and duties
of a husband, and modern civilization sides with Xan
tippe. But neither Xantippe's rightful claims nor the
alleged acidity of her temper and observations deterred
Socrates from keeping up his life of dialectic mischief
with every one he could buttonhole on the street corners.
But he could not have succeeded in producing the
effect he did, had he not been as thick-skinned as he was
shrewd and talented, and inspired 'with lofty ideals
which shone out behind the covering of oddities, physi
cal and intellectual, in a way to defeat all concealment.
He laughed at his own defects, perfectly conscious of

36 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

the way lie was regarded by his countrymen, cynically
indifferent to it, a good-humored stolid Greek, who could
not be offended by any ridicule, nor silenced by any
criticism except that which led to his own conclusions.
He was an adept at the art of controversy, even when he
had no positive doctrine to defend, and if the Greeks
ever loved anything it was logical discussion. They
were forever at it, whether on the streets or the hustings,
and they liked a man, especially in this period of transi
tion from the age of belief to philosophic ideas, who
could either produce or solve logical puzzles without
discriminating too nicely about his manners and appear
ance. In this art Socrates showed unusual shrewdness,
because he insisted upon his ignorance, thus escaping
responsibility for any assertion whatever, though this pro
fession was ironical, and shifting the duty of proof upon
his antagonists. This made him a perfect master of the
true art of a skeptic, who shelters himself behind ques
tions while his informant must do all the asserting and
gets into deeper and deeper water with every question
that he tries to answer. Moreover the average Greeks of
common sense had felt the destructive influence of
sophistic and skeptical thought and did not like the
intellectual and moral confusion that it produced. They
were also no less impressed than Socrates with sophistic
conceit and pretension, and hence they looked on with
delight at the shafts of logic which this Silenus of a man
thrust into skeptical armor, and though he often pro
duced as much embarrassment in his hearers as he cured,
he created much satisfaction in the interest of truth and
morality by puzzling skepticism upon its own premises,
and this satisfaction was enough for a people who did
not want the paradoxes or logical tricks of the sophists
for their every-day philosophy. The Greeks had not

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 37

forgotten the logical legerdemain of Zeno, and though
they were not disposed to follow him in denying the
possibility of motion, they admired logic and were great
sticklers for the importance of its method and the con
sistency which it demanded. Hence, when they found
Socrates using it in his masterful way to make the con
fusion of the sophists worse confounded, they gave him
an enthusiastic hearing in spite of homely illustrations,
grotesque personal appearance, odd manners, and indif
ference to family obligations. He had a genius for em
barrassing charlatans in philosophy, and his own delight
was not less than his auditors' when he saw some over
confident antagonist writhing at the bottom of a syllo
gism for some indiscretion in starting an argument^ before
he had matured and mastered the conceptions which he
so glibly used.

But it was the moral character of Socrates, his strength
of will, that created the profoundest influence even upon
the pleasure-loving Greeks. They were not all of them
given to libertinism. A few choice spirits, even when
they saw no way out of sophistic logic on matters of
morality, felt their better instincts groping after an ideal
that involved neither slavish obedience to arbitrary
power nor unrestrained indulgence of passion. They
awaited only the voice of some one crying in the wilder
ness to enlist and encourage their moral natures, and
though they may have enjoyed most the keen, Damascus-
like thrusts of Socrates' logic against sophistic illusions
in morality, they were not wholly insensible to the
monitions of conscience, when any noble aspirations were
suggested in keeping with the best features of the civili
zation which they had already reached, and hence
Socrates, both in his personality and his method, awak
ened ideals that were in danger of suffocation under

38 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

skepticism and libertinism. Behind all his indifference
to ridicule, tolerance of others' opinions, and uncouth
manners, Socrates was a man of great moral earnestness,
and this fact did not escape the notice of the better men
who formed a part of his audience. The chief feature
of his character which struck the Athenians was
his strength of will, his splendid self-control, and hia
unselfish devotion to justice. At least they found in his
resolute purpose to do the right when he knew it his
political firmness against the majority in the Prytaneum
who wished to violate the law, his determined attach
ment to some ideal in the midst of every temptation that
might be used as an excuse for libertinism, his submis
sion to the law in the matter of his own sentence and
execution when offered an opportunity to escape, and
the perpetual moderation of his appetites — in all these
they found the traits of moral character which they had
learned to admire so much in such heroes as Solon,
Aristides, and others, who in firmness and constancy of
principle, and devotion to justice, which was the Greek
righteousness, were prototypes of Socrates in his com
mon life. The Greeks recognized a noble man when
they saw him quite as readily as we can, as is clearly
shown in many of their heroes, even if their general
standard of life was lower than ours. It was this moral
strength of will that struck the imagination and com
manded respect when his theory of virtue was either mis
understood or felt to be paradoxical and unsatisfactory.
Perfect self-control was his peculiar virtue. He did not
get tipsy at a banquet while his companions were often
said to be found under the table. Perhaps the cynic
and skeptic will say that his associates admired him
because he could drink more than they could without get
ting drunk, and if the Greek who wished that his throat

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 39

was a mile long when he drank good wine was a typical
man of his race, this cynical view might be plausible.
But with all deference to the pessimist's view of human
nature, many of the admirers of Socrates were possessed
of adequate self-control and of insight into the real
character of their master, which was as much morally as
it was physically constitutional, while those who were
themselves the victims of imprudence when they knew
the better course saw well enough in the midst of Soc
rates' geniality of temperament that the master spirit of
his life was a strong will thoroughly in subjection to
moral law. This was the ideal side of his character, and
it had the effect when contrasting Socrates with others
of eliciting a new analysis of the ethical problem, and a
new conception of morality, a conception that interpreted
it in terms of a righteous will instead of mere knowl
edge^

y^rlato more clearly than any one else saw the ideal
Socrates and painted him in colors which will never be
effaced from the memory of history. While he began
with admiration for his method and the place which he
assigned to knowledge as the highest " virtue," he went
far beyond Socrates in the conception and analysis of
morality, though he still left enough undone for the
critical and analytical power of Aristotle to secure an
equal immortality by a still profounder development of
ethical problems.

In estimating Platonic ethics we must ascertain his
point of departure from Socrates. Plato still remained
by the pyschological method of his master, but not by
the Socratic contempt for metaphysics. We have
already seen how Socrates treated the physical specula
tions of his predecessors, refusing to learn anything from
nature or to look at the external order of the world for

40 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

the moral ideal by which to govern his conduct. Not
so with Plato. He showed a profounder insight into all
the facts with which the human mind is called to deal.
He was an all-round genius, the beau ideal of his race.
It is hard to say whether his sympathies with art, which
was little less than the divinity of Greece, were any less
than his enthusiasm and power for the speculations of
abstract philosophy, a very rare combination of talents
and tastes in any age, and especially conspicuous and
striking in the disciple of Socrates, and which took the
form best calculated to throw all their splendid illumina
tion upon the conception and purpose of ethics. The
interest in metaphysics showed itself in his antagonism
to Heraclitus, whose doctrine of change and phenomenal
evanescence of everything resulted in the sophists' sub
jective psychology and conventional ethics, the denial of
any universal truths, and of any law for the individual
will except its own caprices, and in his attachment to the
ideas of Parmenides, who had emphasized the_import-
ance of the permanent, the universal, and the eternal in
the nature of things including human thought and
action. Plato took up the thought of the permanent
and worked it out as his own in the field of ethics as
Parmenides had done in the physical world, and we
have as a consequence two characteristics of his position :
(1) That morality expresses a law in the nature of
things, eternal and absolute, and in no way subject to
the caprice of power, divine or human. (2) The subor
dination of the individual to the whole, or the law of the
good which he found in nature as well as in man, and
the consequent importance of objective (physical) as well
as subjective (psychological) knowledge for the attain
ment of this end. The first of these positions was
Plato's answer to the sophists whose morality was the

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 41

whim of the moment; that is, no morality at all; and
the second was the doctrine in which we find Plato
transcending the pure individualism of his race, though
it coincides exactly with the universal civic ideal of
Greece, the sacrifice of the citizen to the state, and
explains the socialism of the Platonic Republic. This
tendency of his system requires for its understanding a
most careful examination of his general position.

Socrates, as we have seen, taught that knowledge was
necessary to virtue, but he assumed that the will was
already set in the direction of the good and that it
lacked only intelligence to guide it. That is to say, the
practical ethics of Socrates neglected the theoretical
problem of determining the end of morality, and was
employed about the means to an end which was assumed
to be known. But Plato early discovered that men were
very concrete in their choice of objects to realize, and
that the abstract idea of interest or pleasure drew no dis
tinction between vice and virtue. Consequently, he saw,
or believed he saw, that men were as ignorant of the
true e.nd-oLli£G as Socrates thought them in regard to the
right means to a presupposed interest, and so he set
about correcting the Socratic assumption that pleasure
or personal interest was the highest good, at least when
conceived as sacrificing the universal good. Both his
metaphysics and his psychology led him away from the
subordination of everything to the individual. His
metaphysics, which seized upon the permanent elements
in nature and mind as opposed to the transient, and the
ordinary Greek consciousness of the limitations placed
upon the arbitrary human will by the cosmos, taught
him to find in nature an order to which it was the chief
duty and^end of man to subject himself. This end he
called the Good, which he identified with God, regarding

42 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

God, however, as impersonal and as merely the
moral order of the world, a position that was reiterated
by Fichte in later times. Man's duty was to find out
this end and then to ascertain how he could attain it
Thus a double knowledge was required : first, a knowl
edge, reasoned and speculative in its nature, of this
eternal law, of the end, goal, destiny, state, or condition
which nature intended man to realize, and second, a
knowledge of the correct means to reach it. In the first
of these conceptions the human will is wholly subor
dinated to an end, which, if it is not outside itself in the
results attained, is outside of it in the way that duty is
presented to it, and so leads to that sacrifice of the
individual to the whole which is so prominent in the
Kepublic, and which prepares us for the Stoic pantheism
and the Neoplatonic absorption. An end that was not
pleasure, that was not consciousness of any kind, and
that involved a result out of relation to one's personal
identity, but that was an objective universe of law and
order, necessitated the complete sacrifice of the individual
to realize it.

Plato's psychological analysis led him no less certainly
in the same direction. He saw that pleasure was a
criterion that had no other meaning for the average
Greek than individual personal interest, and more
especially the interest of the moment. His predilection
for the idea of law, of an eternal order, set him about
reconstructing the internal principle of morality in
harmony with the cosmic order. All sensations and
feelings of sense being transient phenomena, while the
objects of reason were permanent realities, or facts of
highest worth on that account, he described the pursuit
of pleasure as the anarchic reign of passion and impulse.
To restrain these inclinations he proposed the imperial

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 43

authority of reason. His famous myth of the chariot drawn
by two unruly steeds but controlled by the charioteer
called reason brilliantly illustrates his conception of the
source of supreme power in the determination of virtue.
Keason was required, in this illustration, to restrain
passion and impulse, or better to guide them, the
idea that it restrains being in fact a conception of
later thought. And this view represents Plato's doctrine
of conscience. But with him conscience was not a
motive power or a sense of duty, an injunction imposed
upon the will, but it was a cognitive power to point
out the right way for impulse to attain the desirable
end. In spite of this view, however, Plato's very
illustration introduced the idea of a regulative function
for reason having the nature of will, as such control of
motive forces implied similar agency, and hence it was
only a short step to the idea of conscience combining the
functions of intellect and will, moving as well as direct
ing volition. With us conscience is insight plus motive,
the motive of duty and reverence for an ideal above and
beyond passion. With Plato reason was only insight
into the course which was a harmony between passion and
impulse, and it guided the man, not as an impelling
force, but as a chaperon that could furnish wisdom but
no power. This conception of it at once took it out of
the region of pleasure. The function of reason was to
furnish the abstract true, beautiful, and good, not to
move the will. In this Plato still remained by the con
ception of his master. He exalted the importance of
knowledge. But at this point he widened the range of
its power and objects. Reason or knowledge occupied
itself with the whole cosmos of facts, physical and
mental, and as Plato refused to recognize anything tran
sient, like feeling or pleasure, as the highest good, he

44 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

had to look beyond the individual for it, and he found it
in the eternal reality, law, or order behind phenomena, a
transcendental ideal condition of things independent of
sense and consciousness which only a mystical philoso
pher like Plato could see or find. But it was the end
which he thought nature had in view, independent of
the capricious pleasures of passion and impluse. These
anarchic tendencies could never discover it, but only
attain it after reason had seen the vision of its beauty.

But Plato, as Greek thinkers generally, was monistic
and pantheistic in his conception of nature and man, and
consequently when he saw reason in nature he assigned
it the same function there as in the regulation of the
passion, namely, the determination of order. Reason
in both the macrocosmos and the microcosmos was the
producer of order, and this object was not a mere feeling
in the former, so that man's chief end could not be a
pleasure. As the psychological good was the harmony
between the appetites and the metaphysical good the
harmony in nature, and as reason was the function for
determining it in both fields, ethics looked beyond
pleasure for the ideal, this being merely a transient and
subjective feeling, and had in this way to sacrifice the
individual psychologically as well as metaphysically.
The order of nature being an objective end for realiza
tion and demanding the subjection of the will, the whole
system subordinated man to an end other than himself, and
virtually demanded a self-sacrifice that no other system
of Greek ethics proposed. But he recognized that this
subordination brought man his true good, and nothing
was lost in the sacrifice. The only thing, however, that
mars this beautiful picture of Plato's ethics is the fact that
his system saw nothing of worth in the individual but
his conformity to law. Personality and consciousness

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 45

were sacrificed to an impersonal end. Plato recon
ciled tlie interests of man to the order of nature, but he
partly lost sight of the anthropological point of view
in getting his position. Consequently there was a tend
ency in his system to asceticism and mysticism which led
to the doctrine of absorption.

Perhaps we should be told that his doctrine of immor
tality recognized the worth of the individual and supple
mented the tendencies of the system to sacrifice man to
the whole. But the reply is that there is no better proof
of the subordination of the individual to an end not him
self than Plato's conception of immortality. This theory
may be very fine to those who imagine that it has any
resemblance to the Christian idea of it. Words are too
often a source of illusion and deception to those who do
not take the trouble to go deeper, and if they can only
enlist the support of philosophic language they are con
tent to live under a delusion. But Plato never dreamed
of a personal survival after death. Such a thing as the
retention of personal identity after the dissolution of the
body, the continuity of consciousness in all time, was as
absurd, or at least as discredited a possibility with him
as with the materialists whom he criticized. There was
no resemblance between the Christian and the Platonic
immortality. So far as the consciousness of the past is
concerned Plato's conception was in sympathy with the
materialists. But the substance of the soul, the subject
of consciousness survived, the present personal stream of
mental events not being a part of its essence or essential
activity, as it was conceived after the teaching of Chris
tianity on the one hand and Cartesian philosophy on the
other. This soul or substance of mind could pass into
any other embodiment and continue another life, upward
or downward according to its nature, just as the atom

46 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

can pass from one form of combination to another in
modern and ancient physics without destruction. But
no consciousness of its past is at all necessary to this
continuance. Such a conception involves the most tre
mendous self-sacrifice on the part of any man who should
regulate his conduct in reference to his soul's future in
which present consciousness could not participate by
way of memory and personal identity. To restrain pas
sion and impulse in order that my soul may not pass into
a brute form where I should never know the degrada
tion, is not a conception of immortality that would suc
ceed in prompting many to virtue, more especially a
Christian. There is scarcely any parallel to the demand
on unselfishness which is implied in the Platonic idea of
immortality, and hence again we find in this very feature
of his philosophy the most radical and far-reaching con
ception of the subordination of the individual to the
order of the cosmos which any one can imagine. Plato,
of course, was hardly conscious of this way of stating his
position, because the distinction between the selfish
and unselfish, the egoistic and altruistic, conception of
life was not yet drawn, and could hardly have been
drawn at his time. Greek philosophy was too monistic
to conceive any antagonism between man and nature,
between the individual and society. The interests of the
individual and of the whole were conceived by Socrates
and Plato as the same. This, of course, is true ideally
but not really, and the average Greek was the last to act
up to such a doctrine even when the philosophic trend of
his time forced the conviction of such a unity upon him.
It required the dualism of Christianity and Cartesianism
to develop the opposition between man and nature into
formal recognition, placing the greatest value upon the
individual, and with it the duty to respect one's neighbor

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 47

as one's self, the very condition of preserving any
morality at all, because dualism or pluralism tends to
establish the same opposition between individuals as
between man and nature, and in order to save ethics
must place the stress of morality upon making man, or
others, ends in themselves in lieu of insisting upon the
identity of their interests. But the method of reconciling
the individual and the whole by self-sacrifice, consciously
affirmed and formulated as above duty to self, does
not appear in Plato, and least of all in his conception
of immortality, in which the associations of the term
affected by later history connect it with the notion of
personal survival, while the idea of regulating conduct
with reference to the destiny of a being in whose life
no connection with the conscious past of the soul surviv
ing is to be found makes a demand upon unselfishness
which few men would venture to make on the race,
especially upon an average Greek who was a good
embodiment of the idea taught by the Manchester school
of political economists. But Plato makes it, and in his
conception returns in a different phraseology to that sac
rifice of the individual which had characterized the
cosmological type of thought. The peculiarity and
sublimity of the demand lies in the fact that the_sacrifice
has to be made without a personal and individual interest
in its object. In Christianity the demand for sacrifice in
behalf of others was attended with an individual interest
in the consequences of it. That is to say, Christianity
combined individualism and altruism in a way to secure
a general hearing. Plato demanded the sacrifice with
out satisfying individual interest, and hence his idea
of immortality cannot be considered as favoring the posi
tion that man is an end to himself.

But Plato shows none of the nightmare of terror which

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

troubled the average Greek when he reflected upon such
a fate, or such a sacrifice as this doctrine involved. Plato
was above all a philosopher and had learned to reconcile
himself to fact, to accept the judgment of his intellect in
regard to the law of nature as reflecting what is best for
the will. Hence his reconciliation was not that of a man
bent on obstinately displaying his courage against adverse
fortune, standing like an Athanasius contra mundum, or
a Stoic dying joyfully on a funeral pyre, but it was
that of a man who denied the opposition of nature to his
real welfare and loved it for its beauty and harmony.
He did not quarrel with Fate, because he saw in the
world's order a type of action to be imitated, and a
beauty and goodness to be worshiped. Hence rebellion
had no temptations for him as it had for the individ
ualist who, emancipated from the tyranny of the gods
and princes, set up his own will as the only thing to be
satisfied in the world. Plato loved what his intellect
told him was the good, and had no temptations which
had kept his race between the terror of the gods and the
anarchy of libertinism. Consequently he was the first
of the philosophers who both in his person and his
philosophy substituted respect for fear of the law as the
condition of virtue and of attaining the good which is
the same in man as in nature.

But Plato had his philosophic difficulties nevertheless.
Ha-found it jj^stmggla-for the__average man to realize the
ther there was a harmonybetween^man and
lature or not. His problemwas not completely~&Qlved
•pointed

was a_fac± to be reckoned
iization

EMERSON ON PLATO.

" In Plato you explore modern Europe in its causes
and seed — all that in thought which the history of
Europe embodies or has yet to embody. The well in
formed man finds himself anticipated — Plato is up
with him too. Nothing has escaped him. Every new
crop in the fertile harvest of reform, every fresh sug
gestion of modern humanity is there. Why should
not young men be educated on this book f It would
suffice for the tuition of the race — to test the under
standing and to express the reason. Who can over
estimate the images with which Plato has enriched the
minds of men, and which pass like bullion in the cur
rency of all nations ? Read the Ph<zdo, the Protago
ras, the Phczdrus, the Timczus, the Republic and the

Apology of Socrates.

Emersotfs Essay on Books

PLATO.

B. C. 427 to 347.
Prom Stanley's History.

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 49

lind to seek this orood and to make the sacrifices neces-

mn o se

*v^-«^ ___

sartcTrea

j-~-

problem was easy, but
the' practical one was j^ery jIifferent__^heEormeriad

the

will and secure itejermanent_adhesipn
Finding in man a hieraTcTij"ofconflictinJg
to^evilflie had ^g^HTscoveFa^way jtp_
contr^Fthem, to reduce them^EO"SuB5iissiiiT oTTo direct
will toward

for accom-
whosefunctionifc'^was to

plistjiing this~e

establish

objective reasoii
The passions were blind

of action without
were calculated "to turn

Lo a carnival_of debauch,
curbing their caprices lay in the
regujjitiyj^o^ it couTdrlufnTsh

no^m^ive^p>gwej^j^ insigaXTand directFye

ideasv impulse. having to^gacrificejts natural and immedi:
ate object for the good which reason discovered. In
his conception, therefore, the natural passions did not
have the good for their end, and though they remained
the motive efficient of the action suggested by reason,
their natural object had to be wholly sacrificed in the
attainment of the rational ideal. Here we see the ascetic
type of philosopher in Plato, and it is the ground of the
sympathy of Christianity with his system. -^[n_his view
virtue or the good could only be attained bjr heroic
the^ sublime though repressive restraints
hermit, sa^g^nc%nrite7^r^martyr. ^"o
quarter walTTxTbe given toimputse-rrr natural desire in
the ideal world. A merciless and rigid asceticism was
the only sure way to the paradise of the ideal. We find
in the ISTeoplatonist the logical outcome of this doctrine,
a hatred of the things of sense that turns into a morbid

50 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

and maudlin antipathy against the world that hardly
comports with the philosophic calm and admiration of
nature. It is true that the Neoplatonist only carried into
his ethics Plato's doctrine of matter as representing his
metaphysics of the cosmos and its depreciation of the
things of sense, showing the reductio absurdum of both
metaphysics and ethics which neither completed its
evolution nor found its recoil in Plato, because his
esthetic instincts on the one hand and his political
enthusiasm on the other were adequate restraints upon
pessimism and philosophic insanity.

It was the fact that Plato was a healthy human being,
coupled with the present prospect that Greece would
remain upon the high level of her accomplished civiliza
tion, that prevented his own action from being an absurd
concession to the popular idea of logic in the inter
pretation of his doctrine, or a rush of despair into the
transcendental as the only escape of a noble mind from
the vices of a dying world. His nature and insight were
proof against abstract logic, and however rigid might be
his theory in its conception of the opposition between
the life of sense and the life of reason, as alternatives, no
one knew better than he the limitations under which it
was applicable. This is strikingly reflected in his composi
tion of the " Laws " after he had written the " Republic."
He knew the conditions under which human nature had
to exist and work, and his own conduct, because of a
healthy and balanced nature, reflected the necessary con
cessions to sense in the world as we find it, though he
did not find it ideal. Plato enjoyed a banquet as well
as any one, but he enjoyed the philosophic ecstasy still
more, and he constructed his ideal world of opposition to
sensuous pleasures as the only clear way of getting virtue
appreciated at all, especially by a race that was little

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 51

disposed to transcend the world of sense for its ideals, as
is shown by its art. He probably saw that it was strength
of will in Socrates rather than knowledge or insight that
secured him the virtue he loved, and " sizing up " the aver
age Greek of his day as a possible or probable debauchee,he
told his fellow men who had weaker wills than Socrates
that they could not see or realize the glory of the true,
the beautiful, and the good until they had gained com
plete control of a sensuous life. Every reformer has to
tell the victim of vice that he has no hope of salvation
except in total abstinence. Not because it is necessarily
wrong to gratify sense at all, but because the individual
once addicted to intemperance must exhibit a weaker
will when the slightest concession is made to temptation
than when he absolutely rejects its solicitations. This
antithesis between pleasure and the good thus becomes a
necessary practical device for securing moral strength of
will, whatever be its theoretical defects in a world other
than the present one : and hence what was to Plato a practi
cal means for securing both a vision and a realization of
virtue in a people too much committed to the worship
of sense easily assumed the coloring of asceticism,
especially in an age when the political ideals of Athens
were sacrificed to the conservatism of Sparta and the
ambition of Macedonia.

It would take too much time to examine the " Republic "
and all that it means for a true estimate of Plato's genius.
Among our every -day men of the world it is called an
ideal and impractical scheme, a brilliant dream of a noble
but impossible mind, repeated from age to age, as the
OivitasDei of Augustine, More's "Utopia," Bacon's "New
Atlantis," or even Mr. Bellamy's "Looking Backward."
But this whole characterization of it with the insinuation
that it is a visionary idealism and representative of just

52 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

about what the public may expect of a philosopher, spinning
fancies out of his contemplative moods, is not wholly fair to
Plato. Most sensible readers of it will find little idealism
in it, and nothing Utopian, as those terms are under
stood, though it may be only a difference of ideals that
makes us hesitate to apply these terms to it. But whether
ideal or not, the scheme was communistic and socialistic,
and in respect of both the family and the individual runs
directly counter to all that evolution has produced in the
course of later history. But in spite of such provisions
and of its assumption of Hobbe's state of perpetual war
(not a very ideal condition for Utopia in our idea of it),
the " Kepublic " is not to be condemned by men who have
never studied it with care and who have not caught the
fundamental principle that lay at the basis of it. Plato
was undoubtedly hampered, as all men are, by the con
crete conceptions of his time in the attempt to give form
and body to his ideas, but his ideal of good government
was not much, if any, different from our own. The fii
man in the Jit place was the maxim upon .which he built.
He thoroughly believed in the doctrine of Carlyle, that
" the tools should belong to him who can handle them,"
and we to-day after more than one hundred years of repub
lican institutions are just learning the value of applying
this principle to the civil service. The " Kepublic " is only
a treatise on civil service reform. The conduct of men
like Alcibiades was a justification of Plato's intentions.
We may not be satisfied with the means by which he
would secure an ideal government, namely, the selection
of aristocratic philosophers for our rulers, and we may
perceive more readily than he the limitations of environ
ment under which all reconstructions of society must be
made, but if we lay too much emphasis upon this defect
we shall forget the crucial principle upon which all good

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 53

government must rest, namely, the intelligence and disinter
estedness of its riders. Mr. Pater calls attention to this
feature of Plato's doctrine, and it explains why Plato
chose philosophers for his ideal kings.

Philosophers may not be a very practical tribe to-day.
They are supposed, at least by the general public and
so-called practical men, to be a class of idealists who are
forever playing with purely abstract conceptions, and this
is often the case. But in Plato's time and before him they
were all-round .men of knowledge. They were intellec
tually and morally the best men in the community. We
have seen that it was the philosopher that had overcome
the terrors of Fate and counseled a life of calm respectful
obedience to the inflexible laws of nature. Everywhere
about them the common people were steeped in ignorance
and showed no disinterestedness even toward nature, much
less toward their fellow men, while their lives were a con
stant moral panic in the presence of both nature and the
gods. The philosophers, however, had not only attained
a superior knowledge of nature, but had also acquired
that disinterested temper of mind and will which can sup
press individualistic passions and interests identified with
the moment, and maintain a far-reaching insight and calm
faith in the ultimate beneficence of nature and justice.
Hence with their habits of will, on the one hand, involv
ing the sacrifice of libertine desires, and their superior
knowledge, on the other, involving a comprehensive view
of nature and man, it was only natural that Plato should
look to them for ideal prophets, priests, and kings ; if
only we refer to the arrogance and self-conceit of our
modern politicians who so unanimously laugh at the far
sightedness of the more intelligent classes, we shall obtain
abundant confirmation of Plato's insight into the social
need of every age for the intelligent and disinterested man

54 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

to guide its destiny, though we have not yet found, any
more than Plato, the proper way to secure his services.
Moreover both the existence of the " Laws " and an
occasional sense of humor and idealistic weakness con
sciously recognized even in the " Eepublic " itself show that
Plato was building for a world that he did not expect to
realize, and so was trying, as he did for the individual in
the sacrifice of the passions to the reason, to present for
the ruler an ideal which might stir the conscience of his
country, and to demand of its aristocracy, duties as well
as privileges.

Aristotle shows a wholly different type of intellect from
that of his master. He is more rigidly scientific. He is
almost, if not absolutely, without an esthetic sense, and
never indulges in humor. Plato was a typical Greek in
his esthetic appreciation, while he had as keen a sense of
humor, though it was lofty and refined, as any laughter-
loving man could demand. Aristotle had neither time
nor taste for the pleasantries of life, but was serious in
temperament, though not puritanical, and eliminating the
sentimental and emotional from his reflections he made him
self severely scientific in his study of philosophicalproblems,
so that when we come to read him we miss the literary charm,
the delicate touch of humor, and the brilliant play of imagi
nation and figure that confer immortality upon Plato, even
when much of his philosophy seems unintelligible or absurd.
But if we lose these characteristics when we come to the
disciple, we gain in thoroughn^. j and clearness of psycho
logical analysis and limitation to facts for knowledge and
the regulation of conduct. This fact must be appreciated
by an age which especially admires scientific method and
the severe elimination of literary embellishment and padding
from the discussion of profound philosophic problems,
and emotional interests from the determination of truth.

ARISTOTLE,

AFTER THE STATUE IN THE SPADA PALACE, ROME

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 55

Plato never separated metaphysics from ethics, but
Aristotle makes this separation the first step in his
procedure. He does not say that this is a necessary condi
tion of his system, nor does he discuss such a problem as
their relation. He simply writes on ethical science with
out alluding to metaphysics at all. One might imagine
that he had no interest in this recondite subject, or that
he knew nothing about it, if we had to judge him by his
treatise on ethics alone. But the fact is that no one in
antiquity wrote a more elaborate and profound system of
metaphysics than Aristotle, and we can wonder how he
could indulge his sense of the unity of science when he
came to deal with the theory of morality.

The explanation of the peculiarity just mentioned is
the fact that Aristotle was a true Socratic in ethics with
out sharing the contempt which Socrates had for specu
lative philosophy. He realized that, whatever man had
to consider in adjusting his conduct to cosmic law, he
must find in himself the spring to this adjustment and
the benefit that was to accrue from it, and not condition
the practical rules of life upon some prior system of
reflective philosophy which should be the result and not
the determinant of a moral life. Not that Aristotle
would deny a reflex influence from speculative doctrine
upon ethics, or a value for practical conduct in meta
physical theories, but only that both ethical science and
much of practical action are not dependent upon a prior
philosophic system of the external universe. Perhaps
his sense of the unity between man and nature was
stronger than that of the Greeks generally, so that in tacitly
abandoning the dualism of Plato he had no occasion to
determine morality by the transcendental goal which the
cosmos reserves for man's pursuit Hence, though he
recognized the necessity of metaphysics as the completion

56 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

of man's Knowledge, the unity between man and nature
made it unnecessary to condition ethics, at least of a prac
tical kind, and this was largely all that he sought, upon
a previously constructed system of metaphysics. In this
method he in reality followed the spirit of Socrates,
though he had emancipated himself from the contempt
which Socrates entertained for cosmic knowledge.

The first step, therefore, which Aristotle takes in the
discussion of the ethical problem is to show that all moral
action is determined wholly by reference to the end, or
the object at which the will aims, the rzXoS of volition.
lie would admit that the object of nature and that of the
human will ought to be the same, but he would, like Soc
rates, turn the mind to self-reflection for its determination
of this object rather than first deciding the purpose of
nature, as in Plato. Hence he says absolutely nothing
about cosrnological, theological, or conventional theories,
but rises at once into heights superior to all of them, while
at the same time asserting a criterion of ethical conduct
which can, in its first power at least, be determined within
the limits of the individual consciousness. Socrates and
Plato, by emphasizing human ignorance as the great sin,
practically left the impression that it was what men did
not know that determined the good or virtue, but
Aristotle, by putting the stress upon the end of volitions,
limited morality to what man could be conscious of. In
all of them it was an object to be known that determined
virtue, but in the former the knowledge of the object was
all that was necessary, while in the latter the intention was
the main desideratum. In this last conception ignorance
of the means played a minor part in virtue, so that virtue
became a quality of will rather than, or as well as, knowl
edge. Consequently the initial basis of ethics with
Aristotle took on a scientific form. If cosmological and

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 57

theological or conventional theories are to obtain any
standing after such an enunciation of principles, it will be
on the condition that their norm be capable of interpretation
as an end related to human welfare and volition, and not
either a blind limitation of man s liberty, the passive sub
mission to external law, or the non-purposive action that
may happen to realize objective good. The criterion of
Aristotle is first subjective, that is, determinable by human
consciousness, and then if objective forces have their
resultants expressible as possible ends of volition, they have
a recognizable place in ethics. But they cannot otherwise
obtain it, and we are left with the broad universal princi
ple that the final determinant of moral action, whether the
expression of divine or human agencies, must be an end,
or object aimed at, the quality of conduct being thus
determined by the will rather than by the intellect alone.
The law of nature, the will of the gods, or the decrees of
political authority and convention have no meaning or
relevancy in this conception unless they recognize ends
applicable to the volitions of the subject upon which
they are binding. Aristotle's predecessors would have
admitted as much had this analysis been presented to them.
But they were so bent upon emphasizing the importance
of speculative knowledge that they consciously or
unconsciously concealed the place which the will and
intentions had in morality.

But Aristotle is not on this account individualistic in his
conception of ethics. He recognizes, implicitly or explicitly,
that the ethical postulate must be within the reach of
scientific method, and thus be an object of purposive
intelligent consciousness which he finds in the individual
man. But lie does not thereby exclude from this
object the idea that it shall be an extra-personal fact. His
most general principle, affirmed or implied, is that, whatever

58 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

it is, it must be conceived as an end to the being who is to
realize it, and who is to be responsible for it only as
intending it. The individual supplies the knowledge and
the initiative, and receives the praise or blame, or, in other
words, has moral responsibility apportioned according to
the intention and not according to consequences beyond the
ken of consciousness. This, of course, is not the language
of Aristotle, but it is the meaning of his conception of
morality, in which he terminates before he completes
his analysis. The individualistic element, therefore, in
his system, though not egoistic in its intention, is found
in the part which the subject must play in the recognition
and initiation of the end, which last is not limited to a
subjective result, though always consistent with it, as con
ceived by Socrates. This extra-personal element he
recognizes in the end of action when lie comes to define it,
and he thus transcends the individualism of the sophists
who never admitted an extra-personal element at all.
Aristotle does not define the end as pleasure (rfdovff), nor
as comformity to nature, to convention, or to the will of
the gods, but as welfare (fydai juovia), which is sometimes
translated as happiness, but which ought to be translated
a well-ordered condition of being, or a well-organized and
disposed state of functions. Perhaps the conception
can be best expressed, at least approximately, by the
modern term perfection, which would mean for Aristotle
the proper condition of being for a healthy and harmonious
exercise of functions. This idea not only takes him
beyond the individualistic hedonism of the sophistic school,
because pleasure is not the only end for action, but
repeats in a psychological form that which had been given
a metaphysical and cosmological meaning -in Plato. Plato
recognized an extra- personal end to which the individual
was sacrificed, as we have seen, but it was not so clearly

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 59

reconciled with personal good as was the conception of
his disciple. Aristotle, however, in choosing welfare, or
perfection, interpreted as the ideal condition of organic
beings, prepared the way for the recognition of others as
ends in themselves, instead of their being mere means to
a personal end, as in Socrates, or means to an impersonal
end, as in Plato. This perfection could be either
or both personal and extra-personal. Moreover, inas
much as the end recognized by Aristotle was not a
transient feeling like pleasure, it reinstates Plato's con
ception of reality or permanence as the moral object of
volition, though it is made personal in the disciple, while
it was impersonal in the master. I mean by personal, of
course, a condition in man himself. Hence Aristotle
simply gives personal meaning to the Platonic reality.

This conception of welfare took Aristotle directly away
from the asceticism of Plato. Welfare demanded some
concessions to sensuous objects ; the life of pure reason
did not. With Plato reason furnished the object of
action, and passion the motive power. With Aristotle
passion might furnish an object as well as motive, while
reason could furnish also an object of its own, but never
any motive, though it was always the only guide to the
rational, whether in the domain of sense or other func
tions. Hence, instead of sacrificing the desires to obtain
morality, Aristotle granted them a legitimate field of
activity and merely subordinated their gratification to the
o,ir^macy Of reasoiL Plato also insisted upon the suprem-
of reason, but it was a supremacy based upon the
il of all moral rights to desire. With Aristotle its
emacy was consistent with a legitimate function for
•e. Instead, therefore, of subordinating the indi-
al to the whole by requiring some transcendental
ition like the moral order of the universe as we found

60 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

it in Plato, we see in Aristotle that concessions are made
to the ends of sense, and the ideals of the concrete man.
Though Aristotle made a contemplative life the highest
ideal, this being for the Greeks of that time a speculative
or philosophic, as we should now call it a scientific, voca
tion, he admitted moral possibilities below this height
He allowed the natural functions of man to determine an
object for volition, and simply required that their proper
action be regulated by reason, whereas we should say
conscience, giving it both cognitive and motive power.
In this concession to the desires we see that Aristotle did
not require the inrmorkilj^ of the soul, a transcendental
survival from the toils of our prison house, in order to
realize morality, though this view did not antagonize or
deny the value of an ideal world beyond the grave. The
virtue of Aristotle lay in volition, not in the object
attained by it, though the good might lie beyond the
action in which virtue was realized. With Plato, as we
found, virtue was realized in the conscious attainment of
the good which lay beyond mere action and the will. But
with virtue consisting in the intention and the good in
some realizable perfection of the subject within the limits
of actual existence, Aristotle reinstates the value of the
individual which his master had sacrificed, and in doing
so he lays the foundation for opposition to both the
socialism and the pantheism of Plato, and finds an escape
from the temptation to build ideal republics, supported
upon the immolation of their citizens. But after the saner
attempt of Plato in the " Laws," he constructs his theory of
governmental institutions with greater reference to indi
vidual development as well as to the conditions of human
nature, and his work in this direction has remained monu
mental

The simple principle that determined the whole result

Elhic.s of the Greek Philosophers. 61

of his thought, in politics as well as ethics, was the doc
trine of the mean (yutcror^S'), as it was called. Armed
with Plato's conception of reason regulating passion, and
with the universal Greek notion of moderation, the
jj,rj6ev ayav, "nothing overmuch," Aristotle con
ceded desire not only a legitimate but an ethical func
tion, provided its satisfaction observed a mean between
excess and deficiency, and thus placed himself upon ter
restrial ground in his doctrine of morality, though not
displacing the ideal that might require a transcendental
world for its realization. He thus became the sanest and
healthiest type of the Greek philosophers, at least in his
scientific conception of the ethical problem, whatever we
may think of the practical difficulties involved in the
concession to the appetites, which, as Plato saw, could be
more easily controlled by abstinence than by moderation.
But with all such practical obstacles to its application
without insight and common sense, Aristotle's position
has the merit of theoretical accuracy, and of boldness in
recognizing that man must construct his ethical ideals
within the limits of realizable human ends, and that he
should- not run after will-o'-the-wisps in impossible
worlds. He saw that the conditions of man's present life
luid to be satisfied, whatever the hereafter might be, and
rightly regulated ; that conscience has for its object and
duty the restraint of passion and the direction of higher
desires instead of moaning over the limitations of sense
and longing for release from the body in order to gain
the reward of virtue. Thus the doctrine of the mean
kept Aristotle in the world of real life while it allowed
for any ideal condition that might come within the ken
of knowledge.

Other doctrines can only receive mention, as carrying the
analysis of ethical problems farther than his predecessors.

62 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

By the distinction between intellectual or natural and
moral or acquired virtues (excellences) Aristotle escaped
the paradoxes of Socrates and Plato about the identity
of virtue and knowledge, and the question whether
virtue could be taught. _Aristotle,l at least in effect,
maintained that the natural virtues or excellences
were constitutional perfections in the individual, while
the moral virtues were the direct product of the will.
Consequently he was enabled to maintain against his
masters the voluntary nature of vice, and ever since his
time the term " virtue " has denoted only a quality of
will, except in those survivals which speak of the " vir
tues " of medicine, etc. His outline of freedom and
responsibility, the distinction between the two ideas not
being explicitly drawn, can hardly be surpassed by any
modern writer. His conception of, moral^irtue, the term
moral being tautological to us owing to Aristotle's own
influence, was that of a confirmed habit of will, not any
fortuitously capricious motive. This view was a natural
consequence of the general conception of virtue as an
excellence of any kind in which it was most easily con
ceived as constitutional and static. Hence an individual
act which did not represent a habit, no matter what the
motive, could not be called a "virtue,'1 though the
Aristotelian distinction between natural and acquired
excellence finally led to the recognition of even individual
acts as morally good, and character came to stand for the
fixed nature of the will which makes it "virtuous." But
Aristotle's idea conceived moral merit as a quality of the
subject indicating some inner fixity of character, and
thus to some extent anticipated the position of Kant, who
insisted that morality essentially consists in the idea of
law, both as an imperative and as uniformity of action.
Aristotle, of course, did not recognize the notion of an

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 63

imperative, but he did remark the idea of uniformity
which puts the " virtue " in the will, whatever merit we
may come to assign to the volition itself.

Aristotle's treatment of the particular virtues is coldly
analytical, somewhat uninteresting to the modern mind,
and is carried out along the line of his principle ; namely,
the mean between excess and deficiency in the gratifica
tion of impulse. No special importance for us attaches
to this part of his work, except the length of the discus
sion on friendship, which, with the fact that quite as
much attention was given to it by Plato, raises the ques-
'tion whether it does not indicate the conscious necessity
for emphasis by the moralists of the time upon some of
the social virtues as a counter- influence to the naturally
egoistic tendencies of Greek life.

When it comes finally to a summary of the influence
which Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle exercised upon
modern ethical doctrines there is an interesting and com
plicated problem to solve. Each of these philosophers
appeals to a different type of mind. It was the person
ality of Socrates that gave him an influence upon after
ages more than his method ; for this latter had to be
developed by other hands before its usefulness could be
appreciated. His strength of will and martyrdom for his
convictions made him, as in the case of all men like him,
the center of interest for that class of hero-worshipers who
like moral courage better than mere intellectual insight,
and example better than precept Plato, on the other
hand, is attractive to all speculative minds of a mystical
sort and who delight in transcendental conceptions, the
airy visionary universe of pure thought, demanding those
empyrean flights of fancy which justify the description of
metaphysics as the poetry of reasW. Over these Plato
exercises an influence bordedj^on enchantment, and

64 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

scarcely any man with philosophic, literary, and humane
instincts of any kind can escape the magical charm which
he inspires. Aristotle, however, is the antithesis of this.
He was to some extent the moral contrast of Socrates and
the intellectual contrast of Plato. He was the embodi
ment of the strictly scientific mind, too prudent to die for
the sake of obstinacy, as his flight from Athens to avoid
a second disgrace to philosophy very well shows, and too
critical to indulge in poetical metaphysics. His moral
ideals involved no sacrifices like those of Socrates, and
his philosophy no passion like that of Plato. He was
coldly critical and scientific in method and temperament,
poised equally between the two extremes of moral enthu
siasm and speculative idealism. He is the philosopher of
/acfe, an example and the hero of those who ask no favors
of the universe but to know the truth, and no transcen
dental world to stimulate the inspiration and hopes of
their morality. The general influence of all of them,
however, lies in the spirit of reflective thinking which
they cultivated. This has not thrown much light on
modern practical issues, but only upon the theoretical
basis of morality. Whatever has been required for solv
ing the perplexities of theoretical ethics has received its
impulse from this school of thinkers. They furnish the
dry light of reason in the determination of what morality
is and means, but none of the warmth of feeling and
motive power which practical life demands, and though
this fact is no discredit to the work of scientific analysis,
which is always important, it indicates the limitations of
Greek speculation. Insight and truth are of primary
importance, though ineffective without power. Greek
consciousness was almost wholly scientific curiosity,
even when it toucl^L upon the moral issues of life,
and the shadows of ijj^aggerated worship of reason

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 65

still extend over all countries that have been molded by
its culture.

To measure its value, however, by its inefficiency upon
moral life in individual cases is to mistake both its
nature and its mission, though such an accusation of its
defects would be a pertinent criticism against those who
identified knowledge and virtue. But to him who had
distinguished, as Aristotle had done, between the specula
tive efforts of the intellect and the moral impulses and
products of the will, it was only a recognition of individ
ual responsibility for practical results to maintain that
philosophy only furnished enlightenment and not moral
character. Reason could point out the path of rectitude,
but it could not impel a man to take it, except at the
expense of that freedom which is as dear to the moralist
and philosopher as knowledge can be. The intellect could
supply the truth, but the will had to supply the moral
impulse. Nevertheless, the distance between light and
power is a short one, and the whole intellectual momen
tum of Greek thought, though circumscribed by the
horizon of mere knowledge or wisdom, expended its illu
minating power upon the speculative ideals of truth,
beauty, and courage, and halted only at the limits of that
moral enthusiasm which characterized the impulse of
Christianity. Plato and Aristotle were the highest
development of this tendency, though they represent the
obverse and reverse sides of human genius, both in
regard to the accomplishments and the spiritual influence
of speculative thought. Plato was the idealist, and
Aristotle was the realist. The one lived in the transcen
dental world of abstractions, and gained possession of
human aspirations by directing them into the fairy-land of
ideals; the other remained in the empirical world of con
crete facts, actual reality which chastened the speculative

66 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. •

impulses of reason by counseling the lessons of humility.
If philosophy ever betrays her genius in her incarna
tions, the characteristics thus described are even reflected
in the creations which sculpture has brought down to us of
these two men. Plato appears with his broad and elevated
brow, cheerful countenance, and speculative eye looking
dreamily into the great infinite of invisible existence, and
with ecstatic vision keeping watch over the gates of
immortality and God, as if he could utter the language of
Tennyson's " Ulysses " :

Yet all experience is an arcb where through
Gleams that untraveled world whose margin fades
Forever and forever as we more.

But Aristotle with frigid, resolute, and drawn features,
as if repressing the temptations of fancy, looks straight
into nature, and having no purpose,

To sail beyond the sunset, and the baths
Of all the western stars,

sternly represents man's messenger of fact within the
limits of reality. For him the abstractions of time and
eternity have no fascination, and he will follow no will-
o'-the-wisps into the bogs of transcendentalism. But
making the real not so bad, and the ideal not so fine as
IJlato, he circumscribes the objects of duty by the world
of .scientific facts, and hence the main virtue which his
philosophy was calculated to inspire was that of every
truly scientific mind ; namely, the courage to disenchant
the will of its demoniac passion for aspirations which
neglect the most important duties of actual life, and hence
to reconcile desire to the limitations of the world He
knew, to appropriate the language of Carlyle in reference
to Mt. Vesuvius, that " the earth, green as she looks, rests
everywhere on dread foundations were we further down,
and Pan, to whose music the nymphs dance, has a cry in

"Pythagoras was eminently a practical person, the
founder of a school of ascetics and socialists, a planter
of colonies, and nowise a man of abstract studies
alone"

Emerson's Essay on "Books"

PYTHAGORAS,

500 B. C.

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 67

him that can drive all men distracted " : and hence, as in
such conditions every man must choose between bravery
and death, the resources of virtue must lie in the cultiva
tion of knowledge and a resolute obedience to the laws
of nature. But Aristotle also knew that nature had her
compensations for the man whose moral consciousness, like
that of the Stoic, gathers its impulses from courage and
reverence for the actual world, and fearless of fate,
serenely assaults the illusions which one finds in the real
and the other in the ideal. He found both in nature, and
his cairn scientific spirit, with something of the vindictive
austerity of Stoicism and the brave humility of Spinoza,
demands of human life

One equal temper of heroic hearts,

Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will

To strive, to seek, to find and not to yield.

The passing of the gods under the aegis of skepticism
may be marked by a shadow, and hope may be frustrated
for a moment by the loss of its previous ideals, but the
recovery of self-possession and the consciousness that life
offers its best rewards to him who respects facts bring
with them the " everlasting yea " of Carlyle, the light of
truth and the power of virtue to shed their luster over
the speculations both of history and of hope.

JAMES H. HYSLOP.

Columbia University.

PYTHAGORAS AND HIS SCHOOL.

PYTHAGORAS was one of the greatest, if not the
greatest philosopher preceding the age of Socrates and
Plato, and had a deep influence on their thought. He
traveled over most of the known world to study the
wisdom of its sages and is presumed to have learned
much from the Brahmans of India, the Priests of
Chaldea and Egypt, and the Magi of Persia, and he lived
for many years in Babylon and Egypt before returning
to Greece and Italy.

He established most extensive religious or monastic
orders throughout Greece, Italy, and other Mediterranean
countries which in discipline and doctrine closely re
sembled the early Hindoo and later Christian orders.
For example, they practiced abstinence from animal
foods, and also, strange as it may seem, from beans. They
also observed celibacy, avoided bloody sacrifices, used a
special dress and believed in the reincarnation of souls,
like the Hindoo and Buddhist orders, and counselled a
life of great purity and moderation.

Pythagoras seems not only to have been a world-
student of Religion, Ethics and Philosophy, but also a
great Moral Reformer and Cosmic Philosopher, as well
as an able Politician. His religious confraternities of
men and women became so numerous and powerful in
Greece and Italy, and of such intellectual and political
influence, that they were considered a menace to the

(68)

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers, 69

state, and were finally suppressed as dangerous to it,
just as in a similar way Christian religious orders have
been suppressed in some European States in modern
times.

Pythagoras was also believed by his followers to be
more than human, or actually divine, a son of Apollo,
through a miraculous or divine conception by his
mother, and thus an incarnation of God in human form.
And it is also related of him that he rose from the dead
after a long burial.

These ideas of human deification or divine incarnation
were, however, not unusual in the beliefs, mythologies
or legends of the Mediterranean and Oriental races be
fore the time of Christ. And the same idea of divine
incarnation was indeed also applied to Plato, and of
course many of the Greek and Roman rulers were actu
ally declared to be incarnations of God and reverenced
as divine, for example, Alexander the Great, Nero, and
others.

The common belief held by the Mediterranean and
Oriental races in the pre-existence and eternal nature of
the soul and its repeated rebirths or reincarnations, to
gether with the general belief in the multiple personality
of God, as shown by their Polytheistic and Henotheistic
conceptions, as well as the popular belief in the close
personal relations existing between Gods and men — and
women too — led to the easy adoption of this doctrine
of miraculous conception and divine incarnations, as
one of the most simple and natural mental results
under the circumstances. And it is therefore not to
be wondered at that teachers of such unusual mental
and moral power as Pythagoras and Plato, and of such
deep and wide influence among men, should come to be
regarded as superhuman in nature and divinely engen-

yo Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

dered in origin where such mystic religious ideas were
commonly held.*

With regard to the conception of God held commonly
in the Pagan world, it is interesting to note that Prof.
James, the great religious philosopher of Harvard Uni
versity and a deep student of ancient philosophic con
ceptions, in his recent notable work, " Varieties of Re
ligious Experience," seems to make the remarkable ad
mission that he considers it rational to conceive God either
as " pluralistic " or as "one and only." This is practically
the conception of God held by the great philosophic
Pagans among the Hindoos, Chaldeans, Egyptians,
Greeks and Romans, who considered God as existing in
many manifestations or personifications, such as Jupiter,
Minerva, Neptune, Vesta, &c., or their equivalents, but
that these pluralistic personifications or manifestations
were really to be considered as all one in unison. Now
many things in unity is obviously a better conception of
God than mere "oneness" in itself: And we think it
must also be admitted that "Allness" is a better concep
tion of Infinity and Omnipotence than mere oneness,
and " Allness" certainly involves the conception of multi
tude primarily and unity or oneness secondarily. The
"All in All" or The Completeness of Everything are cer
tainly good conceptions of God, at least in the Pan
theistic sense; and all Theism necessarily involves more
or less Pantheism, so that we therefore think it is logic
ally indisputable to say with Prof. James and the old
Pagans, that it is rationally admissible to conceive God
either as "pluralistic" or as "one." At all events, the
Christian conception of multi-personifications in unity

* The Rev. Lyman Abbott in a serious address to the students of Yale College
some time ago, made a most remarkable statement in referring to the Christian
doctrine of Incarnation. He stated that he sometimes wondered if the Church
really believed that doctrine, and if he really believed it himself, but he was
certain on one point, that it was easier to believe that God could produce such
a mystery, than that men could have invented it. And this peculiar state
ment would seem to imply that men had never believed or ' ' invented " this
doctrine before the Christian Era !

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 71

is much nearer to the conceptions common to the philo
sophic Pagans than it is to the simple uncompromising
monotheism of the Jewish and Mohammedan worlds
who have so persistently rejected the Christian creed,
whereas the Greek, Latin, Coptic, Celtic, and Teutonic
races who were used to a multi or pluralistic conception,
are practically the only races who have ever adopted
that creed.

The Pythagorean conception of God and the soul is
briefly described in the following paragraphs, which we
take from Stanley's History of Philosophy, 1701. — Ed.
PYTHAGOREAN CONCEPTION OF GOD.

Pythagoras denned what God is, thus, A mind which
commeateth and is diffused through every part of the
world and through all nature, and from whom all ani
mals that are produced receive life.

God is one. He is not (as some conceive) out of the
world, but entire within Himself, in a complete circle
surveying all generations. He is the temperament of
all ages, the agent of His own powers and works, the
principle of all things, one, in heavenly luminary, and
Father of all things ; mind and animation of the whole,
the motion of all circles.

God (as Pythagoras learned of the Magi, who term
Him Oromasdes) in His body resembles light, in His
soul, truth.

He said that God only is wise.

He conceiveth that the first (being) God, is neither
sensible nor passible, but invisible and intelligible.

Next to the Supreme God, there are three kinds of in-
telligibles, gods, daemons, heroes. That Pythagoras thus
distinguished them, is manifest from his precept, that
we must in worship prefer gods before daemons, heroes
before men: But in Jamblichus, he seems either to ob
serve a different method, or to confound the terms:

72 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

teaching first of gods, then of heroes, last of daemons ;

which order perhaps is the same with that of the Golden

Verses,

First, as decreed, th' immortal gods adore
Thy oath keep ; next great heroes, then implore
Terrestrial daemons with due sacrifice.

By terrestrial daemons seems to be understood (not
princes, as Hierocles, but) the daemons themselves, con
fined to several offices upon earth ; for

All the air is full of souls, which are esteemed daemons
and heroes; from these are sent to men dreams and
presages of sickness and of health ; and not only to men,
but to sheep also, and to other cattle: to these certain
expiations and averrunciations, and all divinations,
cledons, and the like.

All the parts of the world above the moon are gov
erned according to Providence and firm order, and the
decree of God, which they follow, but those beneath the
moon by four causes : by God, by fate, by our election,
by fortune. For instance, to go aboard into a ship or
not, is in our power : storms and tempests to arise out of
calm is by fortune : for the ship being under water to be
preserved, is by the providence of God. Of fate, there
are many manners and differences, it differs from fortune,
as having a determination, order and consequence but
fortune is spontaneous and casual, as to proceed from a
boy to a youth, and orderly to pass through the other
degrees of age happens by one manner of fate.

Man is of affinity with the gods, by reason that he
participates of heat, wherefore God hath a providential
care of us. There is also a fate of all things in general
and in particular, the cause of their administration.

In Pythagoras his definition of the soul is a self-mov
ing number, Plutarch saith, he takes number for mind.
The mind is induced into the soul, ab extrinseco, from
without, by divine participation, delibated of the Uni
versal Divine Mind. For there is a soul intent and
commeant through the whole nature of things, from
which our souls are plucked. She is immortal, because
that from which she is taken is immortal ; yet not a God,
but the work of the eternal God. Thus Pythagoras ex-

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 73

ceedingly confirmed the opinion of his master Pherecides,
who first taught, that the souls of men are sempiternal.

The soul hath a twofold life, separate and in the body ;
her faculties are otherwise in anima, otherwise in animali.

The soul is incorruptible ; for when it goes out of the
body, it goes to the soul of the world, which is of the
same kind.*

When she goeth out upon the earth, she walketh in
the air like a body. Mercury is the keeper of souls, he
brings souls out of bodies in the earth and the sea ; of
which, those that are pure, he leadeth into an high place ;
the impure come not to them, nor to one another, but
are bound by the Furies in indissoluble chains.

A summary of the Pythagoric Doctrine is extant in
verse, entitled, the Golden Verses of Pythagoras ; or as
others say, of the Pythagoreans. For that, saith Hiero-
cles, as gold is the best and purest of metals, so these
are the best and most divine of verses.

THE GOLDEN VERSES OF PYTHAGORAS.

First, in their ranks, the Immortal Gods adore.
Thy oath keep ; next, great Heroes ; then implore
Terrestrial Daemons with due sacrifice.
Thy parents reverence, and near allies ;
Him that is first in virtue make thy friend,
And with observance his kind speech attend ;
Nor (to thy power) for light faults cast him by,
Thy pow'r is neighbor to necessity.

These know, and with intentive care pursue ;
But anger, sloth, and luxury subdue.

In sight of others or thy self forbear
What's ill ; but of thyself stand most in fear.
Let Justice all thy words and actions sway :
Nor from the even course of Reason stray :
For know, that all men are to die ordain'd,
And riches are as quickly lost as gain'd.
Crosses that happen by divine decree,
(If such thy lot) bear not impatiently.
Yet seek to remedy with all thy care,
And think the just have not the greatest share.
'Mongst men, discourses good and bad are spread,
Despise not those, nor be by these misled.
If any some notorious falsehood say,
Thou the report with equal judgment weigh.

* This idea seems to be identical with the Platonic and Buddhistic concep
tions of soul.— Ed.

74 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

Let not men's smoother promises invite,

Nor rougher threats from just resolves thee fright.

If ought thou shouldst attempt, first ponder it ;

Fools only inconsiderate acts commit ;

Nor do what afterwards thou mayest repent ;

First learn to know the thing on which th' art bent.

Thus thou a life shalt lead with joy replete.

Nor must thou care of outward health forget.
Such temp'rance use in exercise and diet,
As may preserve thee in a settled quiet.
Meats unprohibited, not curious, choose ;
Decline what any other may accuse.
The rash expense of vanity detest,
And sordidness : A mean in all is best.
Hurt not thyself; Before thou act, advise ;
Nor suffer sleep at night to close thine eyes,
Till thrice thy acts that day thou hast o'errun,
How slipt, what deeds, what duty left undone ?
Thus thy account summ'd up from first to last,
Grieve for the ill, joy for what good hath past.

These study, practice these, and these affect ;
To sacred virtue these thy steps direct.
Eternal Nature's fountain I attest,
Who the Tetractis on our souls imprest.
Before thy mind thou to this study bend,
Invoke the Gods to grant it a good end.
These if thy labour vanquish, thou shalt then
Know the connexure both of Gods and men ;
How everything proceeds, or by what staid,
And know (as far as fit to be survey'd)
Nature alike throughout ; that thou mayest learn
Not to hope hopeless things, but all discern ;
And know those wretches whose perverser wills
Draw down upon their head spontaneous ills ;
Unto the good that's nigh them, deaf and blind :
Some few the cure of these misfortunes find.
This only is the Fate that harms, and rolls,
Through miseries successive, human souls.
Within is a continual hidden fight
Which we to shun must study, not excite.
Great Jove ! how little trouble should we know,
If thou to all men wouldst their genius show !
But fear not thou ; men come of heav'nly race,
Taught by diviner Nature what t' embrace :
Which if pursu'd, thou all I nam'd shall gain,
And keep thy soul clear from thy body's stain.
In time of Pray'r and cleansing, meat's deni'd
Abstain from : thy mind's reins let reason guide :
Then, strip'd of flesh, up to free yEther soar,
A deathless God, Divine, mortal no more.

APPENDIX.

EXTRACTS FROM WORKS

PLATO AND ARISTOTLE.

ILLUSTRATING THE ETHICS OF THE GREEK PHILOSO
PHERS, SOCRATES, PLATO AND ARISTOTLE.

APPENDIX.

EXPLANATORY NOTE.

These extracts are taken from the following English
works : —

Jowett's Translation of Plato's Works, published by
Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1889.

Jowett's Politics of Aristotle, Oxford Edition, Claren
don Press, 1885.

Aristotle's Niomachean Ethics, Peter's Translation.

Aristotle's History of Animals, Cresswell's Translation,
Bohn Edition.

Aristotle's Metaphysics.

The paragraphs quoted in these extracts are all given
exactly as they appear in the translations, but not al
ways in complete continuity, that is, for purpose of con
densation many intervening clauses between several of
the paragraphs in the original have been omitted in our
extracts as being irrelevant or redundant or obscure.
The places where such omissions have been made have
not been indicated in our text, for the sake of smoother
appearance and easier reading, and the quotations have
thus been printed by us as if they were continuous or
uninterupted from the original, but we have been always
careful in our selection and arrangement of the quota
tions that the omitted phrases do not affect the sense
and context which has been everywhere carefully pre
served by a juxtaposition and succession substantially

as it is in the original.

(74b)

APPENDIX.

CONTENTS.

Extracts from Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, with
Notes and Comments illustrating the correspondence
of ancient and modern thought.

EXTRACTS FROM PLATO.

PAGE

1. The Supreme God or Creator and His Creation of

the Universe. • 75

2. Great Antiquity of Egypt, and her early influence on

ancient Greece. Tale of " The Lost Atlantis." 82

3. The Principle of Universal Beneficent Love. From

Plato's Symposium. . . . . . . 88

4. Agathon and Socrates on Love 91

5. Plato and St. Paul paralleled in Hymn to Love. Paul

in i Cor. 13 (A. D. 57). Compared with Agathon

in the Symposium, B. C 416. .... 102

6. The Golden Rule. From Plato's Laws, 400 B. C. . 106

7. Return not evil for evil. Socrates' answer to Crito. 109

8. Good, not Pleasure, the supreme aim of Conduct. . in

9. Suicide Condemned. Socrates in the Phaedo. . . 112
10. A virtuous life, fearless death, and glorious hereafter

commended to all men. . • . . . 114

n. The soul's improvement, not worldly success, the true

aim of man's life. . . . , . . .116

12. The true life, the life of the soul, not of the world

or the body. Socrates in the Phaedo. . . .118

13. Death is a good and not an evil. Socrates in the

the Apology I2o

14. The Immortality of the Soul and its future rewards

and punishments. Socrates in the Phaedo. . 122

15. Best texts from the Old Testament on Immortality

as compared to Plato's Phaedo 130

16. The Doctrine of Purgatory— Pagan and Christian. . 135

17. Reincarnation. 138

(74c)

CONTENTS. ^-CONTINUED.

PAGB

18. Mind inheres in and rules the universe. . . . 141

19. The Greek Conception of Soul and Deity. A Prime

Mover or Force, which is Self-Moved. . . . 144

20. The Universal Soul. 145

21. The Platonic Doctrine of Ideas 147

22. The Socratic Utilitarian Theory of Ethics. . 157

23. Socrates the Father of Modern Utilitarian Ethics. . 168

24. Influence of Socrates on Aristotle and Epicurus and

the substantial identity of their ethical do&rines. 169

25. The Hedonistic School of Aristippus— the false Epi

curean and perverter of Socratic Doctrine. . 172

26. Harmony of Herbert Spencer with the Socratic School

of Ethics. . . 176

27. Socratic and Theistic Ethics — a comparison of the

Utilitarian and the Theistic Theories of Ethics. 179

EXTRACTS FROM ARISTOTLE.

28. Aristotle on the Idea of God. . . . . .182

29. Aristotle on the Theory of Evolution. .... 186

30. Abstract of Aristotle's Theory of Ethics. . . . 193

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

31. The fundamental nature of a political state or govern

ment. Status of property. Socialistic and Indi
vidualistic considered 205

32. Citizens and States of various kinds considered.

The best form of government and the best citizen
discussed. . 210

33. The best constitution for a state. Preponderance

of the middle class recommended. . . . 231

34. Cause of Revolutions Considered. .... 235

35. Democracy analyzed and commended. . . . 243

36. The Best Life for Individuals and States . . .251

37. Public Schools and Liberal Education, Gymnastics,

Music and Morals. . . . .* . 272

THE SUPREME GOD OR CREATOR AND HIS

CREATION OF THE UNIVERSE.

FROM PLATO'S TIM^US.

Introductory Note : —

A CCORDING to the latest Biblical critics, the Book
f\ of Genesis is a literary mosaic made up of literary
fragments of various dates and authorships, and the
dates of its various parts vary from about 700 to 400 B. C.
Now it is very interesting to here note that the fol
lowing extract from Plato, giving the story of the Crea
tion, is not far from being contemporary with Genesis
itself, as it was written about 400 B. C. Note also the
reference to a great deluge in the tale of the lost Atlantis.
— C. M. H.

"Let me tell you then, why the Creator of the world
generated and created this universe. He was good, and
no goodness can ever have any jealousy of anything.
And being free from jealousy, He desired that all things
should be as like Himself as possible. This is the true
beginning of Creation and of the world, which we shall
do well in receiving on the testimony of wise men : God
desired that all things should be good and nothing bad
as far as this could be accomplished.

(75)

7 6 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

" Now that which is created is of necessity corporeal,
and also visible and tangible. And nothing is visible
when there is no fire, or tangible which is not solid, and
nothing is solid without earth. Wherefore also, God in
the beginning of creation made the body of the universe
to consist of fire and earth.*

" Now the Creation took up the whole of each of the
four elements ; for the Creator compounded the world
out of all the fire and all the water and all the air and
all the earth, leaving no part of any of them nor any
power of them outside. He intended, in the first place,
that the whole animal should be perfect, as far as pos
sible, and that the parts of which he was formed should
be perfect ; and that he should be one, leaving no
remnants out of which another such world might be
created ; and also, that he should be free from old age
and unaffected by disease.

" Such was the whole scheme of the eternal God about
the god that was to be, to whom He for all these reasons
gave a body, smooth, even, and in every direction
equidistant from a centre, entire and perfect, and formed
out of perfect bodies. And in the centre He put the soul,
which He diffused through the whole, and also spread
over all the body round about ; and He made one solitary
and only heaven a circle moving in a circle, having such
excellence as to be able to hold converse with itself, and
needing no other friendship or acquaintance. Having
these purposes in view He created the world to be a
blessed god.

" Now God did not make the soul after the body, al
though we have spoken of them in this order ; for when
He put them together He would never have allowed that
the elder should serve the younger, but this is what we

* " In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth."

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 77

say at random, because we ourselves too are very largely
affected by chance. Whereas He made the soul in origin
and excellence prior to and older than the body, to be
the ruler and mistress, of whom the body was to be the
subject. And the soul he made out of the following
elements and on this manner : He took of the unchange
able and indivisible essence, and also of the divisible and
corporeal which is generated, and He made a third sort
of intermediate essence out of them* both, partaking of
the nature of the same and of the other, and thus He
compounded a nature which was in a mean between the
indivisible and the divisible and corporeal. These three
elements he took and mingled them all in one form,
compressing the reluctant and unsociable nature of the
other into the same. And when He had mixed them with
the essence and out of all the three made one, He again
divided this whole into as many portions as was fitting,
eack of them containing an admixture of the same and
of the other and of the essence.

" Now when the Creator had framed the soul according
to His will, He formed within the mind the corporeal uni
verse, and brought them together, and united them from
center to center. The soul, interfused everywhere from
the center to the circumference of heaven, of which she
is the external envelopment, herself turning in herself,
began a divine beginning of never-ceasing and rational
life enduring throughout all time. The body of heaven
is visible, but the soul invisible, and partakes of reason
and harmony, and being made by the best of intelligible
and everlasting beings, is the best of things created.

" When the Father and Creator saw the image that He
had made of the eternal gods moving and living, he was
delighted, and in his joy determined to make His work
still more like the pattern ; and as the pattern was an

78 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

eternal creature, He sought to make the universe the
same as far as might be. Now the nature of the in
telligible being is eternal, and to bestow eternity on the
creature was wholly impossible. But He resolved to
make a moving image of eternity, and as He set in order
the heaven He made, this eternal image having a motion
according to number, while eternity rested in unity ; and
this is what we call time.

" Such was the mind and thought of God in the creation
of time. And in order to accomplish this creation, He
made the sun and moon and five other stars, which are
called the planets, to distinguish and preserve the num
bers of time, and when God made the bodies of these
several stars He gave them orbits in the circle of the
other.

" Until the creation of time, all things had been made
in the likeness of that which was their pattern, but in
so far as the universe did not as yet include within itself
all animals, there was a difference. This defect the
Creator supplied by fashioning them after the nature of
the pattern. And as the mind perceives ideas or species
of a certain nature and number in the ideal animal, He
thought that this created world ought to have them of a
like nature and number. There are four such ; one of
them is the heavenly race of the gods ; another, the race
of birds moving in the air; the third the watery species ;
and the fourth, the pedestrian and land animals. Of the
divine, He made the greater part out of fire, that they
might be the brightest and fairest to the sight, and He
made them after the likeness of the universe in the form
of a circle, and gave them to know and follow the best,
distributing them over the whole circumference of the
heaven, which was to be a true cosmos or glory spangled
with them.

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 79

"To tell of other divinities, and to know their origin,
is beyond us, and we must accept the traditions of the
men of old time who affirm themselves to be the off
spring of the gods, and they must surely have known
the truth about their own ancestors. How can we doubt
the word of the children of the gods ? Although they
give no probable or certain proofs, still, as they declare
that they are speaking of family traditions, we must be
lieve them in accordance to the law. In this manner,
then, according to them, the genealogy of these gods is
to be received and narrated.

" Now, when all of them, both those who visibly appear
in their revolutions as well as those other gods W7ho are
of a more retiring nature, had come into being, the
Creator of the universe spoke as follows : —

" Gods and sons of gods who are my works, and of
whom I am the Artificer and Father, my creations are
indissoluble, if so I will. All that is bound may be dis
solved, but only an evil being would wish to dissolve
that which is harmonious and happy. And although
being created, ye are not altogether immortal and indis
soluble, ye shall certainly not be dissolved, nor be liable
to the fate of death ; having in my will a greater and
mightier bond than those which bound you when ye
were created. And now, listen to my instructions :
Three tribes of mortal beings remain to be created, —
without them the universe will be incomplete, for it will
not have in it every kind of animal which a perfect
world ought to have. On the other hand, if they were
created and received life from me, they would be on an
equality with the gods. In order then that there may
be mortals, and that this universe may be truly univer
sal, do ye, according to your natures, betake yourselves
to the formation of animals, imitating the power which

8o Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

I showed in creating you. The divine and immortal
part of them, which is the guiding principle of those
who are willing to follow justice and the gods — of that
divine part I will myself give you the seed and begin
ning. And do you then weave together the mortal and
immortal, and make and beget living creatures, and give
them food, and make them to grow, and receive them
again in death. Thus He spake, and once more and in
the same manner poured the remains of the elements
into the cup in which he had previously mingled the
soul of the universe, no longer, however, pure as before,
but diluted to the second and third degree. And when
He had framed the universe He distributed souls equal in
number to the stars, and assigned each soul to a star;
and having placed them as in a chariot, He showed them
the nature of the universe, and the decrees of destiny
appointed for them, and told them that their first birth
would be one and the same for all, and that no one
should suffer at His hands ; and that they must be sown
in the vessels of the times severally adapted to them,
and then there would come forth the most religious of
animals ; and as human nature was of two kinds, the
superior race would hereafter be called man. Now, as
they were implanted in bodies by necessity, and objects
were always approaching or receding from them, in the
first place there was a necessity that they should have
one natural mode of perceiving external force ; in the
second place, they must have love, which is a mixture
of pleasure and pain ; also fear and anger, and the feel
ings which are akin or opposite to them ; if they con
quered these they would live righteously, and if they
were unconquered by them, unrighteously. Also, He
said, that he who lived well during his appointed time
would return to the habitation of his star, and there

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 81

have a blessed and suitable existence. But if he failed
in attaining this, in the second generation he would pass
into a woman, and should he not cease from evil in that
condition, he would be changed into some brute who
resembled him in his evil ways, and would not cease
from his toils and transformations until he followed the
original principle of sameness and likeness within him,
and overcame, by the help of reason, the later accretions
of turbulent and irrational elements composed of fire
and air and water and earth, and returned to the form of
his first and better nature. When He had given all
these laws to His creatures, that He might be guiltless
of their future evil, He sowed some of them in the earth,
and some in the moon, and some in the other stars which
are the measures of time ; and when He had sown them
He committed to the younger gods the fashioning of their
mortal bodies, and desired them to furnish what was
still lacking to the human soul, and make all the suit
able additions, and rule and pilot the mortal animal in
the best and wisest manner that they could, and avert
all but self -inflicted evils."

GREAT ANTIQUITY OF EGYPT AND HER EARLY

INFLUENCE ON ANCIENT GREECE. TALE

OF " THE LOST ATLANTIS."

FROM PLATO'S TIM^EUS.

"Then listen, Socrates, to a strange tale which is, how
ever, certainly true, as Solon, who was the wisest of the
seven sages, declared. He was a relative and a great
friend of my great-grandfather, Dropidas, as he himself
says in several of his poems : and Dropidas told Critias,
my grandfather, who remembered and told us : That
there were of old great and marvelous actions of the
Athenians, which have passed into oblivion through
time and the destruction of the human race, and one in
particular, which was the greatest of them all, the re
cital of which will be a suitable testimony of our grati
tude to you, and also a hymn of praise true and worthy
of the goddess, which may be sung by us at the festival
in her honor.

" Tell us, said the other, the whole story, and how and
from whom Solon heard this veritable tradition.

" He replied : At the head of the Egyptian Delta, where
the river Nile divides, there is a certain district which is
called the district of Sais, and the great city of the dis
trict is also called Sais, and is the city from which

Amasis the king was sprung. And the citizens have a

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Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 83

deity who is their foundress : she is called in the Egyptian
tongue Neith, and is asserted by them to be the same
whom the Hellenes called Athene. Now the citizens of
this city are great lovers of the Athenians, and say that
they are in some way related to them. Thither came
Solon, who was received by them with great honor ; and
he asked the priests, who were most skillful in such
matters, about antiquity, and made the discovery that
neither he nor any other Hellene knew anything worth
mentioning about the times of old. On one occasion,
when he was drawing them on to speak of antiquity, he
began to tell about the most ancient things in our part
of the world — about Phoroneus, who is called " the first,"
and about Niobe : and after the Deluge, to tell of the
lives of Deucalion and Pyrrha : and he traced the
genealogy of their descendants, and attempted to reckon
how many years old were the events of which he was
speaking, and to give the dates. Thereupon, one of the
priests, who was of a very great age, said : O Solon,
Solon, you Hellenes are but children, and there is never
an old man who is an Hellene. Solon hearing this, said,
What do you mean ? I mean to say, he replied, that in
mind you are all young : there is no old opinion handed
down among you by ancient tradition : nor any science
which is hoary with age. And I will tell you the reason
of this. There have been, and will be again, many de
structions of mankind arising out of many causes: the
greatest have been brought about by the agencies of fire
and water, and other lesser ones by innumerable other
causes. There is a story, which even you have preserved,
that once upon a time Phsethon, the son of Helios, hav
ing yoked the steeds in his father's chariot, because he
was not able to drive them in the path of his father,
burnt up all that was upon the earth, and was himself

84 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

destroyed by a thunderbolt. Now, this has the form of
a myth, but really signifies a declination of the bodies
moving around the earth and in the heavens, and a great
conflagration of things upon the earth recurring at long
intervals of time ; when this happens, those who live
upon the mountains and in dry and lofty places are more
liable to destruction than those who dwell by rivers or
on the sea-shore. And from this calamity the Nile, who
is our never-failing saviour, saves and delivers us.
When, on the other hand, the gods purge the earth with
a deluge of water, among you, herdsmen and shepherds
on the mountains are the survivors, whereas those of you
who live in cities are carried by the rivers into the sea.
But in this country, neither at that time nor at any other,
does the water come from above on the fields, having
always a tendency to come up from below, for which
reason the things preserved here are said to be the oldest.
The fact is, that wherever the extremity of winter frost
or of summer sun does not prevent, the human race is
always increasing at times, and at other times diminish
ing in numbers. And whatever happened either in your
country or in ours, or in any other region of which we are
informed — if any action which is noble or great or in any
other way remarkable, has taken place, all that has been
written down of old, and is preserved in our temples ;
whereas you and other nations are just being provided
with letters and the other things which States require ;
and then, at the usual period, the stream from heaven
descends like a pestilence, and leaves only those of you
who are destitute of letters and education ; and thus you
have to begin all over again as children, and know
nothing of what happened in ancient times, either among
us or among yourselves. As for those genealogies of
yours which you have recounted to us, Solon, they are

Ethics of the Greek Philosopher* 85

no better than the tales of children ; for in the first place
you remember one deluge only, whereas there were many
of them ; and in the next place, you do not know that
there dwelt in your land the fairest and noblest race of
men which ever lived, of whom you and your whole city
are but a seed or remnant. And this was unknown to
you, because for many generations the survivors of that
destruction died and made no sign. For there was a
time, Solon, before the great deluge of all, when the
city which now is Athens, was first in war and was pre
eminent for the excellence of her laws, and is said to
have performed the noblest deeds and to have had the
fairest constitution of any of which tradition tells, under
the face of heaven. Solon marveled at this, and earnestly
requested the priest to inform him exactly and in order
about these former citizens. You are welcome to hear
about them, Solon, said the priest, both for your own
sake and for that of the city, and above all, for the sake
of the goddess who is the common patron and protector
and educator of both our cities. She founded your city
a thousand years before ours, receiving from the Earth
and Hephaestus the seed of your race, and then she
founded ours, the constitution of which is set down in
our sacred registers as eight thousand years old. As
touching the citizens of nine thousand years ago, I will
briefly inform you of their laws and of the noblest of
their actions ; and the exact particulars of the whole we
will hereafter go through at our leisure in the sacred
registers themselves. If you compare these very laws
with your own you will find that many of ours are the
counterpart of yours as they were in the olden time. In
the first place, there is the caste of priests, which is
separated from all the others ; next there are the artificers,
who exercise their several crafts by themselves and with-

86 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

out admixture of any other ; and also there is the class
of shepherds and that of hunters, as well as that of hus
bandmen ; and you will observe, too, that the warriors in
Egypt are separated from all the other classes, and are
commanded by the law only to engage in war ; moreover,
the weapons with which they are equipped are shields
and spears, and this the goddess taught first among you,
and then in Asiatic countries, and we among the Asiatics
first adopted. Then as to wisdom, do you observe what
care the law took from the very first, searching out and
comprehending the whole order of things down to
prophecy and medicine (the latter with a view to health) ;
and out of these divine elements drawing what was need
ful for human life, and adding every sort of knowledge
which was connected with them. All this order and
arrangement the goddess first imparted to you when es
tablishing your city ; and she chose the spot of earth in
which you were born, because she saw that the happy
temperament of the seasons in that land would produce
the wisest of men. Wherefore the goddess who was a
lover both of war and of wisdom, selected, and first of
all settled that spot which was the most likely to pro
duce men likest herself. And there you dwelt, having
such laws as these and still better ones, and excelled all
mankind in all virtue as became the children and
disciples of the gods.

" Many great and wonderful deeds are recorded of your
State in our histories. But one of them exceeds all the
rest in greatness and valor. For these histories tell of
a mighty power which was aggressing wantonly against
the whole of Europe and Asia, and to which your city
put an end. This power came forth out of the Atlantic
Ocean, for in those days the Atlantic was navigable;'
and there was an island situated in front of the straits

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 87

which you call the columns of Heracles ; the island was
larger than Libya and Asia put together, and was the
way to other islands, and from the islands you might
pass through the whole of the opposite continent which
surrounded the true ocean ; for this sea which is within
the Straits of Heracles is only a harbor, having a narrow
entrance, but that other is a real sea, and the surround
ing land may be most truly called a continent. Now in
this island of Atlantis there was a great and wonderful
empire which had rule over the whole island and several
others, as well as over parts of the continent, and, be
sides these, they subjected the parts of Libya within the
columns of Heracles as far as Egypt, and of Europe as
far as Tyrrhenia. The vast power thus gathered into
one, endeavored to subdue at one blow our country and
yours and the whole of the land which was within the
straits ; and then, Solon, your country shone forth, in
the excellence of her virtue and strength, among all
mankind; for she was the first in courage and military
skill, and was the leader of the Hellenes. And when
the rest fell off from her, being compelled to stand alone
after having undergone the very extremity of danger,
she defeated and triumphed over the invaders, and pre
served from slavery those who were not yet subjected,
and freely liberated all the others who dwelt within the
limits of Heracles. But afterwards there occurred vio
lent earthquakes and floods ; and in a single day and
night of rain all your warlike men in a body sank into
the earth, and the island of Atlantis in like manner dis
appeared, and was sunk beneath the sea. And this is the
reason why the sea in those parts is impassable and im
penetrable, because there is such a quantity of shallow
mud in the way ; and this was caused by the subsidence
of the island."

THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSAL BENEFICENT
LOVE.

FROM PLATO'S SYMPOSIUM.

Introductory Note : — We have here assembled the best
parts of Plato's Symposium on the subject of Love to
show the beauty and profundity of much of the old
thought on this subject, and have thus given most of the
speeches of the tragic poet Agathon and of Socrates the
sculptor and philosopher. The moral as well as poetic
beauty of Agathon's analysis and remarks will be readily
noted, and it may recall to us the beautiful and famous
hymn to love or "Charity" given by St. Paul in ist
Corinthians, i3th Chapter. " Charity " and " love " are
of course interchangeable terms, and " love " is the term
which is now used by the translators in the late revised
version of the New Testament. As to the word " charity "
itself, it should also be noted that it is derived from the
Greek word " Charites " which is the Greek name of
the " three graces" who were believed to have presided
over all the kind and social relations and " graces " of
life. It will be noted in the parallel which we have
drawn farther on between the words of Paul and
Agathon, that practically identical thoughts or ideas ap
pear in each, Agathon being earlier by nearly five hun
dred years.

In the remarks of Socrates will be found the true

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Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 89

doctrine of " Platonic Love " which has popularly and
incorrectly been regarded as a pure or sexless love be
tween the sexes, whereas it does not necessarily involve
a friendship between the opposite sexes at all, but rather
between old men and youths, and relates particularly to
the influence of the great or creative souls in producing
a moral and intellectual offspring by influencing the
minds and characters of others for their good and chiefly
between old and young men. Note also the appearance
here of that remarkable character of whom little seems
to be known, viz., the Greek woman Diotima, who seems
to have been a great Pythagorean philosopher and also
a priestess of Zeus from the ancient democratic city of
Mautinea in the Greek state of Arcadia where women
had more freedom and independence than in the more
aristocratic state of Athens, and who it seems was the
teacher in philosophy of the great Socrates himself who
shows man)7 traces of the P}Tthagorean discipline and
doctrine in his mode of life and teachings. The discourse
between Socrates and Diotima is deeply interesting and
profound, and it will be seen that one of the remarkable
definitions which she gives of Love is that it is "the de
sire of the everlasting possession of the good." Another of
her remarkable statements is that, all desire of good and
happiness is due to the great and subtle power of love,
that love is only birth in beauty, whether of body or of
soul, and that love exists essentially for the purpose of
realizing immortality, as only by rebirth, whether of
body or soul, is immortality made a practical reality or
fact. Thus, physical man simply passes on his physical
life to his mortal children, and intellectual and soulful
man transmits his mental and moral attainments to his
disciples — his children of the soul — all through " the
great and subtle power of Love."

go Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

An illustration of the Socratic ethical doctrine that
" Knowledge " essentially constitutes Good or Virtue is
seen in Diotima's positive statement to Socrates that
" There is nothing which men love but the good."
Hence Socrates insisted that virtue can be taught for it
is essentially " knowledge," and that if men only knew
what " Good " was, they would always love and practice
it, and it is thus chiefly through pure "ignorance" that
they are not virtuous. Note also how this Socratic
ethical theory corresponds with the interesting statement
quoted in the extracts from Aristotle where he says, re
ferring to Plato, "And therefore as Plato says man needs
to be trained from his youth up to find pleasure and pain
in the right objects. This is what a sound education
means."— C. M. H.

AGATHON AND SOCRATES ON LOVE.
FROM PLATO'S SYMPOSIUM.

The ancient things of which Hesiod and Parmenides
speak, if they were done at all, were done of necessity
and not of love ; had love been in those days, there
would have been no chaining or mutilation of the gods,
or other violence but peace and sweetness, as there is
now in heaven, since the rule of Love began. Love is
young and also tender ; he ought to have a poet like
Homer to describe his tenderness, as Homer says of
Ate, that she is a goddess and tender : —

" Her feet are tender, for she sets her steps,
Not on the ground but on the heads of men :"

which is an excellent proof of her tenderness, because
she walks not upon the hard but upon the soft. Let us
adduce a similar proof of the tenderness of Love : for
he walks not upon the earth, nor yet upon the skulls
of men, which are hard enough, but in the hearts and
souls of men ; in them he walks and dwells and has his
home. Not in every soul without exception, for where
there is a hardness he departs, where there is softness
there he dwells ; and clinging always with his feet and
in all manner of ways in the softest of soft places, how
can he be other than the softest of all things ? And he

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92 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

is the youngest as well as the tenderest, and also he is
of flexile form ; for without flexure he could not enfold
all things, or wind his way into and out of every soul
of man without being discovered, if he were hard. And
a proof of his flexibility and symmetry of form is his
grace, which is universally admitted to be in an especial
manner the attribute of Love : ungrace and love are
always at war with one another. * * But I must
now speak of his virtue ; his greatest glory is that he
can neither do nor suffer wrong from any god or any
man : for he suffers not by force if he suffers, for force
comes not near him, neither does he act by force. For
all serve him of their own free-will, and where there is
love as well as obedience, there, as the laws which are
the lords of the city say, is justice. And not only is he
just but exceedingly temperate, for Temperance is the
acknowledged ruler of the pleasures and desires, and no
pleasure ever masters Love ; he is their master and they
are his servants ; and if he conquers them he must be
temperate indeed. As to courage, even the God of War
is no match for him ; he is the captive and Love is the
lord, for love, the love of Aphrodite, masters him, as the
tale runs : and the master is stronger than the servant.
And if he conquers the bravest of all he must be himself
the bravest. Of his courage and justice and temper
ance I have spoken ; but I have yet to speak of his wis
dom, and I must try to do my best, according to the
measure of my ability. For in the first place he is a
poet, (and here, like Eryximachus, I magnify my art,)
and he is also the source of poesy in others, which he
could not be if he were not himself a poet. And at the
touch of him every one becomes a poet, even though he
had no music in him before ; this also is a proof that
Love is a good poet and accomplished in all the musical

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 93

arts ; for no one can give to another that which he has
not himself, or teach that of which he has no knowl
edge.

And as to the artists, do we not know that he only of
them whom love inspires has the light of fame? — he
whom love touches not walks in darkness. Love set in
order the empire of the gods. And formerly, as I was
saying, dreadful deeds were done among the gods, be
cause of the rule of necessity ; but now since the birth
of Love, and from the love of the beautiful, has sprung
every good in heaven and earth. Therefore, Phaedrus,
I say of Love that he is the fairest and best in himself,
and the cause of what is fairest and best in all other
things. And I have a mind to say of him in verse that
he is the god who —

" Gives peace on earth and calms the stormy deep,
Who stills the waves and bids the sufferer sleep."

He makes men to be of one mind at a banquet such as
this, fulfilling them with affection and emptying them
of disaffection. In sacrifices, banquets, dances, he is our
lord, — supplying kindness and banishing unkindness,
giving friendship and forgiving enmity, the joy of the
good, the wonder of the wise, the amazement of the
gods ; desired by those who have no part in him, and
precious to those who have the better part in him ;
parent of delicacy, luxury, desire, fondness, softness,
grace ; careful of the good, uncareful of the evil. In
every word, work, wish, fear, — pilot, helper, defender,
savior ; glory of gods and men, leader best and brightest :
in whose footsteps let every man follow, chanting a
hymn and joining in that fair strain with which Love
charms the souls of gods and men. Such is the dis
course, Phaedrus, half playful, yet having a certain

94 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

measure of seriousness, which, according to my ability,

I dedicate to the God.

#*** * * * # *

Socrates then proceeded as follows : —

In the magnificent discourse which you have uttered,
I think that you were right, my dear Agathon, in saying
that you would begin with the nature of Love and then
afterwards speak of his works — that is a way of begin
ning which I very much approve.

And now I will take my leave of you, and rehearse
the tale of love which I heard once upon a time from
Diotima of Mantinea, who was a wise woman in this
and many other branches of knowledge. She was the
same who deferred the plague of Athens ten years by a
sacrifice, and was niy instructress in the art of love. In
the attempt which I am about to make I shall pursue
Agathon's method, and begin with his admissions
which are nearly if not quite the same which I made to
the wise woman when she questioned me : this will be
the easiest way, and I shall take both parts myself as
well I can. For, like Agathon, she spoke first of the
being and nature of Love, and then of his \vorks.

"What then is Love?" I asked; "Is he mortal?"
"No." "What then?" "As in the former instance,
he is neither mortal or immortal, but in a mean between
them." " What is he then, Diotima? " " He is a great
spirit, and like all that is spiritual he is intermediate
between the divine and the mortal." " And what is the
nature of this spiritual power?" I said. "This is the
power," she said, "which interprets and conveys to the
gods the prayers and sacrifices of men, and to men the
commands and rewards of the gods : and this power
spans the chasm which divides them, and in this all is
bound together, and through this the arts of the prophet

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 95

and the priest, their sacrifices and mysteries and charms,
and all prophecy and incantation, find their way. For
God mingles not with man ; and through this power all
the intercourse and speech of God with man, whether
awake or asleep, is carried on. The wisdom which un
derstands this is spiritual : all other wisdom, such as
that of arts or handicrafts, is mean and vulgar. Now
these spirits or intermediate powers are many and
divine, and one of them is Love."

" But all men, Socrates," she rejoined, " are not said
to love, but only some of them; and you say that all
men are always loving the same things." " I myself
wonder," I said, " why that is." " There is nothing to
wonder at," she replied ; " the reason is that one part of
love is separated off and receives the name of the whole,
but the other parts have other names." " Give an
example," I said. She answered me as follows : " There
is poetry, which, as you know, is complex and manifold.
And all creation or passage of non-being into being is
poetry or making, and the processes of all art are crea
tive ; and the masters of arts are all poets." " Very
true."- "Still, "she said, " you know that they are not
called poets, but have other names ; the generic term
' poetry ' is confined to that specific art which is sepa
rated off from the rest of poetry, and is concerned with
music and metre ; and this is what is called poetry, and
they who possess this kind of poetrjr are called poets."
11 Very true," I said. " And the same holds of love.
For you may say generally that all desire of good and
happiness is due to the great and subtle power of Love ;
but those who, having their affections set upon him, are
yet diverted into the paths of money -making or gym
nastic philosophy, are not called lovers, — the name of
the genus is reserved for those whose devotion takes

96 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

one form only, — they alone are said to love, or to be
lovers." " In that," I said, " I am of opinion that you
are right." "Yes," she said, " and you hear people say
that lovers are seeking for the half of themselves ; but I
say that they are seeking neither for the half, nor for
the whole, unless the half or the whole be also a good.
And they will cut off their own hands and feet and cast
them away, if they are evil ; for they love them not be
cause they are their own, but because they are good,
and dislike them not because they are another's, but
because they are evil. There is nothing which men love
but the good. Do you think that there is? " " Indeed,"
I answered, " I should say not." " Then," she said,
" the conclusion of the whole matter is, that men love
the good." " Yes," I said. " To which may be added
that they love the possession of the good ? " " Yes, that
may be added." " And not only the possession, but the
everlasting possession of the good?" "That maybe
added too." " Then love," she said, "may be described
generally as the love of the everlasting possession of
the good ? " " That is most true," I said.

" Then if this be the nature of love, can you tell me
further," she said, " what is the manner of the pursuit?
w7hat are they doing who show all this eagerness and
heat which is called love ? Answer me that." " Nay,
Diotima," I said, "if I had known I should not have
wondered at your wisdom, or have come to you to learn."
" Well," she said, " I will teach you ; love is only birth
in beauty, whether of body or soul."

" For love, Socrates, is not, as you imagine, the love
of the beautiful only." "What then?" " The love of
generation and birth in beauty." "Yes," I said. "Yes,
indeed," she replied. "But why of birth?" I said.
" Because to the mortal, birth is a sort of eternity and

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 97

immortality," she replied ; " and as has been already
admitted, all men will necessarily desire immortality
together with good, if love is of the everlasting posses
sion of the good."

All this she taught me at various times when she
spoke of love. And on another occasion she said to me,
"What is the reason, Socrates, of this love, and the
attendant desire ? See you not how all animals, birds
as well as beasts, in their desire of procreation, are in
agony when they take the infection of love ; this begins
with the desire of union, to which is added the care of
offspring, on behalf of whom the weakest are ready to
battle against the strongest even to the uttermost, and
to die for them, and will let themselves be tormented
with hunger or suffer anything in order to maintain
their offspring. Man may be supposed to do this from
reason ; but why should animals have these passionate
feelings? Can you tell me why?" Again I replied,
"that I did not know." She said to me : "And do you
expect ever to become a master in the art of love, if you
do not know this?" "But that," I said, " Diotima, is
the reason why I come to you, because, as I have told
you already, I am awrare that I want a teacher ; and I
wish that you would explain to me this and the other
mysteries of love." " Marvel not at this," she said, " if
you believe that love is of the immortal, as we have al
ready admitted ; for here again, and on the same principle
too, the mortal nature is seeking as far as is possible to
be everlasting and immortal : and this is only to be at
tained by generation, because the new is always left in
the place of the old. For even in the same individual
there is succession and not absolute unity : a man is
called the same : but yet in the short interval which
elapses between youth and age, and in which every

98 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

animal is said to have life and identity, he is undergoing
a perpetual process of loss and reparation — hair, flesh
bones, blood, and the whole body, are always changing.
And this is true, not only of the body, but also of the
soul,, whose habits, tempers, opinions, desires, pleasures,
pains, fears, never remain the same in any one of us, but
are always coming and going. And what is yet more
surprising is, that this is also true of knowledge ; and
not only does knowledge in general come and go, so that
in this respect we are never the same ; but particular
knowledge also experiences a like change. For what is
implied in the word 'recollection/ but the departure of
knowledge, which is ever being forgotten and is renewed
and preserved by recollection, appearing to be the same
although in reality new, according to that law of suc
cession by which all mortal things are preserved, not by
absolute sameness of existence, but by substitution, the
old worn-out mortality leaving another new and similar
one behind — unlike the immortal in this, which is always
the same and not another ? And in this way, Socrates,
the mortal body, or mortal anything, partakes of im
mortality ; but the immortal in another way. Marvel
not then at the love which all men have of their off
spring; for that universal love and interest is for the
sake of immortality."

"Men whose bodies only are creative, betake them
selves to women and beget children — this is the character
of their love ; their offspring, as they hope, will preserve
their memory and give them the blessedness and immor
tality which they desire in the future. But creative souls
—for there are men who are more creative in their souls
than in their bodies — conceive that which is proper for
the soul to conceive or retain. And what are these con
ceptions ? — wisdom and virtue in general. And such

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 99

creators are all poets and other artists who may be said
to have invention. But the greatest and fairest sort of
wisdom by far, is that which is concerned with the order
ing of states and families, and which is called temper
ance and justice. And he who in youth has the seed of
these implanted in him and is himself inspired, when he
comes to maturity, desires to beget and generate. And
he wanders about seeking beauty that he may beget off
spring — for in deformity he will beget nothing — and
embraces the beautiful rather than the deformed; and
when he finds a fair, and noble, and well-nurtured soul,
and there is union of the two in one person, he gladly
embraces him, and to such a one he is full of fair speech
about virtue and the nature and pursuits of a good man :
and he tries to educate him ; and at the touch and pres
ence of the beautiful he brings forth the beautiful which
he conceived long before, and the beautiful is ever pres
ent with him and in his memory even when absent, and
in company they tend that which he brings forth, and
they are bound together by a far nearer tie, and have a
closer friendship than those who beget mortal children,
for the children who are their common offspring are fairer
and more immortal. Who, when he thinks of Homer
and Hesiod and other great poets, would not rather have
their children than ordinary human ones ? Who would
not emulate them in the creation of children such as
theirs, which have preserved their memory and given
them everlasting glory ? Or who would not have such
children as Lycurgus left behind to be the saviors, not
only of Lacedaemon, but of Hellas, as one may say ?
There is Solon, too, who is the revered father of Athenian
laws ; and man}' others there are in many other places,
both among Hellenes and barbarians. All of them have
done many noble works, and have been the parents of

ioo Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

virtue of every kind, and many temples have been raised
in honor of their children, which were never raised in
honor of the mortal children of any one."

" And the true order of going or being led by another
to the things of love, is to use the beauties of earth as
steps along which he mounts upwards for the sake of
that other beauty, going from one to two, and from two
to all fair forms, and from fair forms to fair actions, and
from fair actions to fair notions, until from fair notions
he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last
knows what the essence of beauty is. This, my dear
Socrates," said the stranger of Mantineia, " is that life
above all others which man should live, in the contem
plation of beauty absolute ; a beauty which, if you once
beheld, you would see not to be after the measure of
gold, and garments, and fair boys and youths, which,
when you now behold, you are in fond amazement, and
you and many a one are content to live seeing only and
conversing with them without meat or drink, if that
were possible — you only want to be with them and to
look at them. But what if man had eyes to see the true
beauty — the divine beauty, I mean, pure and clear and
unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality,
and all the colors and vanities of human life — thither
looking, and holding converse with the true beauty,
divine and simple, and bringing into being and educating
true creations of virtue and not idols only ? Do you not
see that in that communion only, beholding beauty with
the eye of the mind, he will be enabled to bring forth,
not images of beauty, but realities ; for he has hold, not
of an image, but of a reality, and bringing forth and
educating true virtue to become the friend of God and
be immortal, if mortal man may. Would that be an
ignoble life?"

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 101

Such, Phaedrus— and I speak not only to you, but to
all men — were the words of Diotima ; and I am persuaded
of their truth. And being persuaded of them, I try to
persuade others, that in the attainment of this end human
nature will not easily find a better helper than Love.
And therefore, also, I say that every man ought to honor
him as I myself honor him, and walk in his ways, and
exhort others to do the same, even as I praise the power
and spirit of love according to the measure of my ability,
now and ever.

PAUL AND PLATO PARALLELED.

—HYMN TO LOVE. —

Paul in I Corinthians, 13. Agathon in Plato's Sympo-
REVISED VERSION, smm, B. C.

About A. D. 57.

SECTION FIRST.

"If I speak with the
tongues of men and of an
gels, but have not love, I
am become sounding brass
or a clanging cymbal. And
if I have the gift of proph
ecy and know all mysteries
and all knowledge, and if I
have all faith so as to re
move mountains, but have
not love, I am nothing.

SECTION SECOND.

"And if I bestow all my
goods to feed the poor, and

SECTION FIRST.

"And as to the artists, do
we not know that he only
of them whom love inspires
has the light of fame? He
whom love touches not
walks in darkness. Love
set in order the empire of
the Gods. Therefore Phae-
drus I say of Love that he
is the fairest and best in
himself and the cause of
what is fairest and best in
all other things."

SECTION SECOND.
(Note. This thought of

Paul is not paralleled in
(102)

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

if I give my body to be Agathon, being simply a
burned, but have not love, denunciation of ostenta
tious or Pharisaic virtue
without real kindness or
charity in the heart. — Ed.)

it profiteth me nothing.

SECTION THIRD.

" Love suffereth long and
is kind, love envieth not,
love vaunteth not itself, is
not puffed up, doth not
behave itself unseemly,
seeketh not its own, is not
provoked, taketh not ac
count of evil, rejoiceth not
in unrighteousness, but re
joiceth with the truth, bear-
eth all things, believeth all
things, hopeth all things,
endureth all things.

SECTION THIRD.

' And I have a mind to
say of him in verse that he
is the god who

Gives peace on earth, and
calms the stormy deep,

Who stills the waves, and
bids the sufferer sleep.

He makes men to be of one
mind at a banquet such as
this, filling them with affec-
tion and emptying them of
disaffection. In sacrifices,
banquets, dances, he is our
lord, supplying kindness
and banishing unkindness,
giving friendship and for
giving enmity, the joy of
the good, the wonder of the
wise, the amazement of the
gods ; desired by those who
have no part in him and
precious to those who have
the better part in him, par
ent of delicacy, luxury,
desire, fondness, softness,
grace, careful of the good,
uncareful of the evil. ;•: :

104 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

SECTION FOURTH. SECTION FOURTH.

" Love never faileth . . "In every word, work,
. But now abideth faith, wish, fear — pilot, helper,
hope, love, these three, and defender, saviour, glory of
the greatest of these is love, gods and men, leader best
Follow after love. . ." and brightest in whose foot
steps let every man follow."

Note i. — Paul was an edu- Note 2. — Agathon was a

cated Greek-Jew and doubt- tragic poet of Athens, and

less familiar with Greek his beautiful encomium to

literature. He was a Ro- Love as recorded by Plato

man citizen and a resident is necessarily in a more

of the great Greek City of poetic and festive vein than

Tarsus in Asia Minor which that of Paul, as it was ut-

was a rival of Athens itself, tered at a banquet given to

His epistles contain many the great men of Athens on

phrases evidently taken the occasion of his winning

from old Greek works, the prize in poetry about

Several instances of these the year 41 6 B.C. Although

could be easily given, but Paul's encomium is more

it is not here necessary, serious and religious in tone

Suffice it to say that in the yet it will be noted that his

very Chapter of Corinthi- ideas are substantially iden-

ans from which we quote, tical with those of Agathon,

Paul uses the noted phrase and while it is not to be

"for now we see through presumed that Paul was a

a glass darkly," which will mere copier from Plato, yet

be found used by Socrates it is more than probable

in the Phaedo and in other that he was familiar with

places in exactly the same and influenced by the works

form and sense as used by of Plato, as his metaphysi-

Paul. — C. M. H. cal style indicates this, and

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 105

it is well known that learn
ed Jews in Alexandria and
Palestine and the cities of
Greece and Rome were fa
miliar with Plato's teach
ings and greatly influenced
by them.— C. M. H.

THE GOLDEN RULE.
FROM PLATO'S LAWS, BOOK XI, 400 B. C.

" In the next place, dealings between man and man
" require to be suitably regulated. The principle of them
" is very simple : Thou shalt not touch that which is
" mine, if thou canst help, or remove the least thing which
" belongs to me without my consent : and may I, being
" of sound mind, do to others as I would that they should
" do to me."

Note. This is a remarkably clear and positive state
ment of the famous Golden Rule, uttered about one hun
dred years after its statement by Confucius, and over
four hundred years before its statement by Jesus of
Nazareth. It is interesting also to here note the careful
and judicial or legal manner in which the rule is stated
by the philosophic Plato so as to avoid possible miscon
struction or perversion by the perverse mind. Observe
carefully the effect of the parenthetical qualifying clause
" being of sound mind " which seems like the careful
phrasing of a lawyer in the drawing of a statute, so as
to exclude misapplications and perversions of interpreta
tion, yet fully cover all proper cases. Now the principle
of the Golden Rule obviously is that of a broad reciprocal
justice and sympathy and a mutuality of self-interest,

which makes a man's own judgment of what he would

(106)

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 107

consider good and desirable for himself to be his standard
for his treatment of all other men.

Now no man " of sound mind" will really desire any
thing bad, injurious or vicious for himself, and hence to
make his judgment for self a sound and true one, the
man himself must first be of sound or normal mind and
desires and not one made abnormal by vice or excess or
insanity, otherwise he might, as in the case of the
abandoned drunkard, the libertine or madman, obey
literally the less carefully stated formula of Jesus — "All
things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye
even so to them " — and yet make a great moral perversion
of the pure and elevated intention of Jesus to justify a
vicious end. For example, the alcoholic or opium de
generate would gladly welcome an intoxication or drug
ging at the expense of some other man and return the
compliment with reciprocal good nature whenever he
could, thus literally obeying the loose and sweeping in
junction "All things whatsoever ye would that men should
do to you, do you even so to them."

But the judicial Plato evidently and clearly excludes
this perversion by the qualifying clause " being of sound
mind" as no man of " sound" mind could apply the rule
in this perverted way, while the man of vicious or mad
mind could readily apply the formula of Jesus literally
and justify himself by it, something as the witty Cocotte
did by quoting the words of Christ that " much would be
forgiven her because she had loved much."

It is also interesting to note that the negative form
in which the Golden Rule was given by Confucius one
hundred years before Plato and five hundred years before
Christ, and which Christian theologians c.nd apologists
usually try to show is inferior to the positive form of
Jesus, is not really inferior on examination, but if any-

io8 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

thing, legally and verbally superior, as it, like Plato's
form, excludes perversions or is less subject to perversion.
For example, Confucius' formula is as follows : " What
you do not like when done to yourself, do not do to others."*
Now this, it seems to us, is one of the best and simplest
statements of the Golden Rule ever given, and, like Plato's,
less open to perversion than Christ's, and a little reflec
tion will, we think, show the superiority and simplicity
of this Confucian or negative form over the Christian
formula. Thus, what men desire to be done to them
selves, as before indicated, is often very vicious, but what
they do not like to be done to themselves is almost al
ways a true evil to be avoided, and hence it is an obvi
ously sound, just and true reciprocal rule that what they
thus recognize as an evil to themselves they must avoid
doing to other men, and this will be sound and true in
almost all cases and not easily perverted, as is the more
carelessly expressed formula in the Sermon on the Mount.
Hence in basing the rule negatively on what one does
not like done to one's-self, rather than positively on what
one does like to be done to one's-self, it seems to be a sim
pler, safer and more judicious formula.

The form in which the rule has been stated by the
Confucian philosopher Mencius, who was contemporary
with Plato, is also very clear and simple, and is probably
nearest to the positive formula of Christ, viz., " If one
strives to treat others as he would be treated by them,
he will not fail to come near the perfect life."

This latter form is quoted in Prof. James' lecture on
The Ethics of The Chinese Sages, and is perhaps one of
the most beautiful forms of the positive statement of the
rule ever given. — C. M. H.

• See Legge's Chinese Classics, also Prof. James' lecture on Ethics of Chinese
Sages.

RETURN NOT EVIL FOR EVIL.
SOCRATES' ANSWER TO CRITO IN PLATO'S CRITO.

"Then we must do not wrong. Nor when injured,
injure in return, for we must injure no one at all."

"Then we ought not to retaliate or render evil for evil
to any one, whatever evil we may have suffered from him.
But I would have you consider, Crito, whether you
really meant what you were saying. For this opinion
has never been held, and never will be held, by any con
siderable number of persons ; and those who are agreed
and those who are not agreed upon this point have no
common ground, and can only despise one another when
they see how widely they differ. Tell me, then, whether
you agree with and assent to my first principle, that
neither injury nor retaliation, nor warding off evil by
evil is ever right. And shall that be the premise of our
argument ? Or do you decline and dissent from this ?
For this has been of old and is still my opinion ; but, if
you are of another opinion, let me hear what you have
to say. If, however, you remain of the same mind as
formerly, I will proceed to the next step.

" ' Listen, then, Socrates, to us who have brought you
up. Think not of life and children first, and of justice
afterwards, but of justice first, that you may be justi
fied before the princes of the world below. For neither

(109)

no Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

will you nor any that belong to you be happier or holier
or juster in this life, or happier in another, if you do as
Crito bids. Now you depart in innocence, a sufferer and
not a doer of evil ; a victim, not of the laws, but of men.
But if you go forth, returning evil for evil, and injury
for injury, breaking the covenants and agreements which
you have made with us, and wronging those whom you
ought least to wrong, that is to say, yourself, your
friends, your country, and us, we shall be angry with
you while you live, and our brethren, the laws in the
wrorld below, will receive you as an enemy ; for they
will know that you have done your best to destroy us.
Listen, then, to us and not to Crito.'

" This is the voice which I seem to hear murmuring
in my ears, like the sound of the flute in the ears of the
mystic ; that voice, I say, is humming in my ears, and
prevents me from hearing any other. And I know that
anything more which you may say will be vain. Yet
speak, if you have anything to say.

" CR. I have nothing to say, Socrates.

"Soc. Then let me follow the intimations of the
will of God."

GOOD, NOT !PLEA$UfcE, THE SUPREME AIM
OF CONDUCT.

FROM PLATO'S GORGIAS.

"Socrates. Because, if you remember, Polus and I
agreed that all our actions are to be done for the sake of
the good ; and will you agree with us in saying, that the
good is the end of all our actions, and that all our actions
are to be done for the sake of the good, and not the
good for the sake of them ? — will you give a third vote
for that proposition ?

"Cattias. I will.

"Socrates. Then pleasure as well as all else is for the
sake of good, and not good for the sake of pleasure ?

"Callias. To be sure."

(in)

SUICIDE CONDEMNED.

SOCRATES IN THE PH^EDO.

" Then he, or any man who has the spirit of philoso
phy, will be willing to die, though he will not take his
own life, for that is held not to be right.

" Then tell me, Socrates, why is suicide held not to be
right ? as I have certainly heard Philolaus affirm when
he was staying with us at Thebes ; and there are others
who say the same, although none of them has ever made
me understand him.

" But do your best, replied Socrates, and the day may
come when you will understand. I suppose that you
wonder why, as most things which are evil may be ac
cidentally good, this is to be the only exception (for
may not death, too, be better than life in some cases ?)
and why, when a man is better dead, he is not permitted
to be his own benefactor, but must wait for the hand of
another.

" I admit the appearance of inconsistency, replied
Socrates, but there may not be any real inconsistency
after all in this. There is a doctrine uttered in secret
that man is a prisoner who has no right to open the
door of his prison and run away ; this is a great mystery
which I do not quite understand. Yet I too believe that

(112)

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 113

the gods are our guardians, and that we are a possession
of theirs.

" And if one of your own possessions, an ox or an ass,
for example, took the liberty of putting himself out of
the way when you had given no intimation of your wish
that he should die, would you not be angry with him,
and would you not punish him if you could ?

" Then there may be reason in saying that a man
should wait, and not take his own life until God sum
mons him, as he is now summoning me."

A VIRTUOUS LIFE, FEARLESS DEATH, AND

GLORIOUS HEREAFTER, COMMENDED

TO ALL MEN.

SOCRATES IN THE GORGIAS.

" For no man but an utter fool and coward is afraid of
death itself, but he is afraid of doing wrong. For to go
to the world below, having a soul which is like a vessel
full of injustice, is the last and worst of all evils.

" Now I, Callicles, am persuaded of the truth of these
things, and I consider how I shall present my soul whole
and undefiled before the judge in that day. Renouncing
the honors at which the world aims, I desire only to
know the truth, and to live as well as I can, and when
the time comes, to die. And, to the utmost of my power,
I exhort all other men to do the same. And, in return
for your exhortation of me, I exhort you also to take
part in the great combat, which is the combat of life,
and greater than every other earthly conflict.

"Follow me then, and I will lead you where you will
be happy in life and after death, as your own argument
shows. And never mind if some one despises you as a
fool, and insults you, if he has a mind ; let him strike
you, by Zeus, and do you be of good cheer and do not

(114)

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 1 1 5

mind the insulting blow, for you will never come to any
harm in the practice of virtue, if you are a really good
and true man.

" Let us then, take this discourse as our guide, which
signifies to us, that the best way of life is to practice
justice and every virtue in life and death. This way let
us go ; and in this exhort all men to follow, not in that
way in which you trust and in which you exhort me to
follow you ; for that way, Callicles, is nothing worth."

THE SOUL'S IMPROVEMENT, NOT WORLDLY
SUCCESS, THE TRUE AIM OF MAN'S LIFE.

SOCRATES IN PLATO'S APOLOGY.

" Men of Athens, I honor and love you : but I shall
obey God rather than you, and while I have life and
strength I shall never cease from the practice and teach
ing of philosophy, exhorting any one whom I meet after
my manner, and convincing him, saying : O my friend,
why do you, who are a citizen of the great and mighty
and wise city of Athens, care so much about laying up
the greatest amount of money and honor and reputation,
and so little about wisdom and truth and the greatest
improvement of the soul, which you never regard or
heed at all ? Are you not ashamed of this ? And if the
person with whom I am arguing, says Yes, but I do care ;
I do not depart or let him go at once ; I interrogate and
examine and cross-examine him, and if I think that he
has no virtue, but only says that he has, I reproach him
with undervaluing the greater, and overvaluing the less.
And this I should say to every one whom I meet, young
and old, citizen and alien, but especially to the citizens,
inasmuch as they are my brethren. For this is the com
mand to God, as I would have you know ; and I believe

that to this day no greater good has ever happened in the

(116)

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 1 1 7

state than my service to the God. For I do nothing but
go about persuading you all, old and young alike, not to
take thought for your persons or your properties, but
first and chiefly to care about the greatest improvement
of the soul. I tell you that virtue is not given by money,
but that from virtue come money and every other good
of man, public as well as private. This is my teaching,
and if this is the doctrine which corrupts the youth, my
influence is ruinous indeed. But if anyone says that this
is not my teaching, he is speaking an untruth. Where
fore, O men of Athens, I say to you, do as Anytus bids
or not as Anytus bids, and either acquit me or not ; but
whatever you do, know that I shall never alter my ways,
not even if I have to die many times."

THE TRUE LIFE, THE LIFE OF THE SOUL, NOT
OF THE WORLD OR OF THE BODY.

SOCRATES IN THE PH^EDO.

" Whereas, Simmias, the rest of the world are of opinion
that a life which has no bodily pleasures and no part in
them, is not worth having : but that he who thinks
nothing of bodily pleasures is almost as though he were
dead.

" What again shall we say of the actual acquirement
of knowledge ? — is the body, if invited to share in the
inquiry, a hinderer or a helper ? I mean to say, have
sight and hearing any truth in them ? Are they not, as
the poets are always telling us, inaccurate witnesses ? and
yet, if even they are inaccurate and indistinct, what is to
be said of the other senses ? — for you will allow that they
are the best of them ?

" Then when does the soul attain truth ? — for in at
tempting to consider anything in company with the body
she is obviously deceived.

" Then must not existence be revealed to her in thought,
if at all?

" And thought is best when the mind is gathered into
herself and none of these things trouble her — neither

sounds nor sights nor pain nor any pleasure, — when she

(118)

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 119

has as little as possible to do with the body, and has no
bodily sense or feeling, but is aspiring after being ?

" And in this the philosopher dishonors the body ; his
soul runs away from the body and desires to be alone
and by herself ?

" In this present life, I reckon that we make the near
est approach to knowledge when we have the least pos
sible concern or interest in the body, and are not saturated
with the bodily nature, but remain pure until the hour
when God himself is pleased to release us. And then
the foolishness of the body will be cleared away and we
shall be pure and hold converse with other pure souls,
and know of ourselves the clear light everywhere : and
this is surely the light of truth. For no impure thing is
allowed to approach the pure. These are the sort of
words, Simmias, which the true lovers of wisdom can
not help saying to one another, and thinking. You will
agree with me in that ?

" But if this is true, O my friend, then there is great
hope that, going whither I go, I shall there be satisfied
with that which has been the chief concern of you and
me in our past lives. And now that the hour of depart
ure is appointed to me, this is the hope with which I
depart, and not I only, but every man who believes that
he has his mind purified.

"And what is purification but the separation of the soul
from the body, as I was saying before ; the habit of the
soul gathering and collecting herself into herself, out of
all the courses of the body ; the dwelling in her own
place alone, as in another life, so also in this, as far as
she can ; the release of the soul from the chains of the
body?"

DEATH IS A GOOD AND NOT AN EVIL.
SOCRATES IN THE ''APOLOGY."

" Let us reflect in another way, and we shall see that
there is great reason to hope that death is a good, for
one of two things : either death is a state of nothingness
and utter unconsciousness, or, as men say, there is a
change and migration of the soul from this world to
another. Now if you suppose that there is no con
sciousness, but a sleep like the sleep of him who is un
disturbed even by the sight of dreams, death will be an
unspeakable gain. For if a person were to select the
night in which his sleep was undisturbed even by dreams,
and were to compare with this the other days and nights
of his life, and then were to tell us how many days and
nights he had passed in the course of his life better, and
more pleasantly than this one, I think that any man, I
will not say a private man, but even the* great king will
not find many such days or nights, when compared with
the others. Now, if death is like this, I say that to die
is gain ; for eternity is then only a single night. But if
death is the journey to another place, and there, as men
say, all the dead are, what good, O my friends and
judges, can be greater than this ? If indeed when the
pilgrim arrives in the world below, he is delivered from
the professors of justice in this world, and finds the true
judges who are said to give judgment there, Minos and

(120)

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 121

Rhadamanthus and Aeacus and Triptolemus, and other
sons of God who were righteous in their own life, that
pilgrimage will be worth making. What would not a
man give if he might converse with Orpheus and
Musseus and Hesiod and Homer ? Nay, if this be true,
let me die again and again. I, too, shall have a wonder
ful interest in a place where I can converse with Pala-
medes, and Ajax the son of Telamon, and other heroes
of old, who have suffered death through an unjust judg
ment : and there will be no small pleasure, as I think,
in comparing my own sufferings with theirs. Above
all, I shall be able to continue my search into true and
false knowledge ; as in this world, so also in that ; I
shall find out who is wise, and who pretends to be wise,
and is not. What would not a man give, O judges, to
be able to examine the leader of the great Trojan ex
pedition : or Odysseus or Sisyphus, or numberless others,
men and women too ! What infinite delight would there
be in conversing with them and asking them questions !
For in that world they do not put a man to death for
this ; certainly not. For besides being happier in that
world than in this, they will be immortal, if what is
said is true.

"Wherefore, O judges, be of good cheer about death,
and know this of a truth — that no evil can happen to a
good man, either in life or after death. He and his are
not neglected by the gods ; nor has my own approaching
end happened by mere chance. But I see clearly that
to die and be released was better for me ; and therefore
the oracle gave no sign. For which reason, also, I am
not angry with my accusers or my condemners; they
have done me no harm, although neither of them meant
to do me any good ; and for this I may gently blame
them."

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL AND ITS

FUTURE REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS.

FROM PLATO'S PH^EDO.

Introductory Note. There can be found no text in
the Old or New Testament in which the doctrines of the
immortal soul and its future states, as believed in by the
majority of the Christian world, are so fully and clearly
set forth as in these extracts from Plato, written nearly
five hundred years before any book of the New Testa
ment was composed. All texts in the Old Testament
quoted for immortality and future state are very meager
and vague except a few texts in the later books such as
those from Ecclesiastes, 180 B. C., Daniel, 165 B. C.,
and Wisdom, 40 A. D., and it will thus be seen that
Plato's Phaedo is more than two hundred years older
than the earliest of these three Old Testament Books,
which contain the best texts on immortality. See supple
mentary notes on p. 130. — C. M. H.

(122)

SOCRATES ON IMMORTALITY.

CONVERSATION OF SOCRATES WITH HIS DISCIPLES

SIMMIAS AND CEDES IN HIS PRISON BEFORE HIS DEATH.

Date399,B. C

" Then reflect Cebes : is not the conclusion of the whole
matter this, — that the soul is in the very likeness of the
divine, and immortal, and intelligible, and uniform, and
indissoluble, and unchangeable ; and the body is in the
very likeness of the human, and mortal, and unintelligi
ble, and multiform, and dissoluble, and changeable?
Can this my dear Cebes, be denied ?

" And are we to suppose that the soul, which is invis
ible, in passing to the true Hades, which like her is in
visible, and pure, and noble, and on her way to the good
and wise God, whither, if God will, my .soul is also soon
to go, — that the soul, I repeat, if this be her nature and
origin, is blown away and perishes immediately, on
quitting the body, as the many say? That can never
be, my dear Simmias and Cebes. The truth rather is,
that the soul which is pure at departing draws after her
no bodily taint, having never voluntarily had connection
with the body, and which she is ever avoiding, herself
gathered into herself (for such abstraction has been the

(123)

124 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

study of her life). And what does this mean but that
she has been a true disciple of philosophy, and has
practiced how to die easily ? And is not philosophy the
practice of death ?

" That soul, I say, herself invisible, departs to the
invisible world, — to the divine and immortal and ration
al: thither arriving, she lives in bliss and is released
from the error and folly of men, their fears and wild
passions, and all other human ills, and forever dwells,
as they say of the initiated, in company with the gods ?
Is not this true, Cebes ?

" But the soul which has been polluted and is impure
at the time of her departure, and is the companion and
servant of the body always, and is in love with and
fascinated by the body and by the desires and pleasures
of the body, until she is led to believe that the truth only
exists in a bodily form, which a man may touch and see
and taste and use for the purposes of his lusts, — the
soul, I mean, accustomed to hate and fear and avoid the
intellectual principle, which to the bodily eye is dark
and invisible, and can be attained only by philosophy ;
do you suppose that such a soul as this will depart pure
and unalloyed ?

" And this, Cebes, is the reason why the true lovers of
knowledge are temperate and brave; and not for the
reason which the world gives.

" Certainly not ! For not in that way does the soul
of a philosopher reason ; she will not ask philosophy to
release her in order that when released she may deliver
herself up again to the thraldom of pleasures and pains
doing a work only to be undone again, weaving instead
of unweaving her Penelope's web. But she will make
herself a calm of passion, and follow Reason, and dwell
in her, beholding the true and divine (which is not mat-

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 125

ter of opinion), and thence derive nourishment. Thus
she seeks to live while she lives, and after death she
hopes to go to her own kindred and to be freed from
human ills. Never fear, Simmiasand Cebes, that a soul
which has been thus nurtured and has had these pursuits,
will at her departure from the body, be scattered and
blown away by the winds and be nowhere and nothing.

"There is nothing new, he said, in what I am about
to tell you ; but only what I have been always and
everywhere repeating in the previous discussion and on
other occasions : I want to show you the nature of that
cause which has occupied my thoughts, and I shall have
to go back to those familiar words which are in the
mouth of every one, and first of all assume that there
is an absolute beauty and goodness, and greatness, and
the like ; grant me this, and I hope to be able to show
you the nature of the cause, and to prove the immor
tality of the soul.

" Yes, replied Socrates, all men will agree that God,
and the essential form of life, and the immortal in gen
eral, will never perish.

" Then when death attacks a man, the mortal portion
of him may be supposed to die, but the immortal goes
out of the way of death and is preserved safe and sound ?

" Then, Cebes, beyond question, the soul is immortal
and imperishable, and our souls will truly exist in an
other world !

" But then, O my friends, if the soul is really im
mortal, what care should be taken of her, not only in
respect of the portion of time which is called life, but of
eternity ! And the danger of neglecting her from this
point of view does indeed appear to be awful. If death
had only been the end of all, the wicked would have had
a good bargain in dying, for they would have been

126 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

happily quit, not only of their body, but of their own
evil together with their souls. But now, as the soul
plainly appears to be immortal, there is no release or
salvation from evil except the attainment of the highest
virtue and wisdom. For the soul when on her progress
to the world below takes nothing with her but nurture
and education ; which are indeed said greatly to benefit
or greatly to injure the departed, at the very beginning
of his pilgrimage in the other world.

" For after death, as they say, the genius of each in
dividual, to whom he belonged in life, leads him to a
certain place in which the dead are gathered together
for judgment, whence they go into the world below, fol
lowing the guide, who is appointed to conduct them
from this world to the other : and when they have there
received their due, and remained their time, another
guide brings them back again after many revolutions of
ages. Now this journey to the other world is not, as
Aeschylus says in the Telephus, a single and straight
path, — no guide would be wanted for that, and no one
could miss a single path ; but there are many partings
of the road, and windings, as I must infer from the rites
and sacrifices which are offered to the gods below in
places where three ways meet on earth. The wise and
orderly soul is conscious of her situation, and follows
in the path ; but the soul which desires the body, and
which, as I was relating before, has long been fluttering
about the lifeless frame and the world of sight, is after
many struggles and many sufferings hardly and with
violence carried away by her attendant genius, and when
she arrives at the place where the other souls are gather
ed, if she be' impure and have done impure deeds, or been
concerned in foul murders or other crimes which are
the brothers of these, and the works of brothers in

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 127

crime, — from that soul every one flees and turns away ;
no one will be her companion, no one her guide, but
alone she wanders in extremity of evil until certain
times are fulfilled, and when they are fulfilled, she is
borne irresistibly to her own fitting habitation ; as every
pure and just soul which has passed through life in the
company and under the guidance of the gods, has also
her own proper home.

" Such is the nature of the other world ; and when the
dead arrive at the place to which the genius of each
severally conveys them, first of all, they have sentence
passed upon them, as they have lived well and piously
or not. And those who appear to have lived neither
well nor ill, go to the river Acheron, and mount such
conveyances as they can get, and are carried in them to
the lake, and there they dwell and are purified of their
evil deeds, and suffer the penalty of the wrongs which
they have done to others, and are absolved, and receive
the rewards of their good deeds according to their de
serts. But those who appear to be incurable by reason
of the greatness of their crimes — who have committed
many and terrible deeds of sacrilege, murders foul and
violent, or the like — such are hurled into Tartarus,
which is their suitable destiny, and they never come out.
Those again who have committed crimes, which, al
though great, are not unpardonable — who in a moment
of anger, for example, have done violence to a father or
a mother, and have repented for the remainder of their
lives, or who kave taken the life of another under the
like extenuating circumstances— these are plunged into
Tartarus, the pains of which they are compelled to un
dergo for a year, but at the end of the year the wave
casts them forth— mere homicides by way of Cocytus,
parricides and matricides by Pyriphlegethon— and they

128 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers,

are borne to the Acherusian lake, and there they lift up
their voices and call upon the victims whom they have
slain or wronged, to have pity on them, and to receive
them, and to let them come out of the river into the lake.
And if they prevail, then they come forth and cease from
their troubles ; but if not, they are carried back again
into Tartarus and from thence into the rivers unceasing
ly, until they obtain mercy from those whom they have
wronged, for that is the sentence inflicted upon them by
their judges. Those who are remarkable for having
led holy lives are released from this earthly prison, and
go to their pure home which is above, and dwell in the
purer earth; and those who have duly purified them
selves with philosophy, live henceforth altogether with
out the body, in mansions fairer far than these, which
may not be described, and of which the time would fail
me to tell.

" Wherefore, Simmias, seeing all these things, what
ought not we to do in order to obtain virtue and wisdom
in this life? Fair is the prize, and the hope great.

" I do not mean to affirm that the description which I
have given of the soul and her mansions is exactly
true — a man of sense ought hardly to say that. But I do
say that, inasmuch as the soul is shown to be immortal,
he may venture to think, not improperly or unworthily,
that something of the kind is true. The venture is a
glorious one, and he ought to comfort himself with
words like these, which is the reason why I lengthen
out the tale. Wherefore, I say, let a man be of good
cheer about his soul, who has cast away the pleasures
and ornaments of the body as alien to him, and rather
hurtful in their effects, and has followed after the
pleasures of knowledge in this life ; who has adorned
the soul in her own proper jewels, which are temperance,

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 129

and justice, and courage, and nobility, and truth — in
these arrayed, she is ready to go on her journey to the
world below, when her time comes. You, Simmiasand
Cebes, and all other men, will depart at some time or
other. Me already, as the tragic poet would say, the
voice of fate calls. Soon I must drink the poison."

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ON IMMORTALITY.

BEST TEXTS ON IMMORTALITY FROM THE OLD TESTA
MENT AS COMPARED WITH PLATO'S

The three clearest extracts from the Old Testament
on the Immortality of the Soul, referred to in the intro
ductory note, are as follows :

ist. — Daniel, Chapter XII, verses 2 and 3.

"And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall
awake, some to everlasting life and some to shame and everlast
ing contempt.

"And they that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the
firmament : and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars
forever and ever."

2nd. — Ecclesiastes, Chapter XII, verse 7.

" Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and the spirit
shall return unto God who gave it."

We have used the St. James Version in both quota
tions, above given, but the language and ideas are sub
stantially the same in both the Jewish and Douay ver
sions.

3rd. — The Book of Wisdom, Douay Version, Chapter
II, verses 23 and 24 :

" For God created man incorruptible and to the image of his
own likeness he made him-"

*' But by the envy of the devil death came into the world."

Chapter III, verses i, 2, 3, 4 :

44 But the souls of the just are in the hand of God, and the tor
ment of death shall not touch them."

4< In the sight of the unwise they seemed to die ; and their de
parture was taken for misery."

"And their going away from us for utter destruction : but they
are in peace." (130)

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 131

" And though in the sight of men they suffered torments, their
hope is full of immortality. "

Chapter V, verses 15, 1 6 and 17 :

" For the hope of the wicked is as dust, which is blown away
with the wind ; and as a thin froth which is dispersed by the storm ;
and as smoke that is scattered abroad by the wind ; and as the
remembrance of a guest of one day that passeth by."

" But the just shall live for evermore : and their reward is with
the Lord, and the care of them with the Most High."

" Therefore shall they receive a kingdom of glory, and a crown
of beauty at the hand of the Lord : for with his right hand he will
cover them ; and with his holy arm he will defend them."

Now it is interesting to note that the above texts are
perhaps the very best and clearest that can be found
anywhere in the Old Testament for the doctrine of the
immortality of the soul, and yet these best Hebrew texts
when compared to the Platonic texts already given are
obviously very vague and meagre and also of much later
date. Many other texts are quoted and used to prove
immortality by Jews and Christians from the Psalms and
from Job, Isaiah and Hosea, but they will all be found
to be much more vague and meagre than the Hebrew
texts now given and of very doubtful significance com
pared to them.

It will be now further interesting to consider the rela
tive dates of these best Hebrew7 texts in comparison with
that of the Platonic texts previously given. Thus
Ecclesiastes, which contains the text which is probably
most known and used as a proof for immortality, not
withstanding its very doubtful significance, dates only
from about 180 B. C., whereas Plato's Phsedo antedates
it by more than two hundred years. Daniel, which con
tains some very good texts for immortality, dates only
about 165 B. C., and Wisdom, which has some of the
best and clearest texts, dates actually within the
Christian Era, or about 40 A. D.*

'See " The Bible of To-Day,11 by John W. Chadwick.

132 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

How the Jewish people could have lived so long in
a land like Egypt, which was saturated with the doctrine
of immortality, without imbibing that doctrine, and how
they could have left this wonderful old land pre-eminent
in the doctrines of resurrection of the body and immor
tality of the soul, without taking these doctrines with
them, is somewhat of a mystery : But the best students
of the subject are, we think, now agreed that the old
Hebrews had no definite knowledge or belief in these
doctrines as the peoples all surrounding them had, such
as the Egyptians, Persians and Greeks. At least the
oldest Hebrew literature known to us, the old books of
the Bible, contain no evidence of this belief in immor
tality, but if anything rather an indication of positive
disbelief in it, as shown clearly in Job, Ecclesiastes and
elsewhere, whereas the contemporary literature of the
surrounding so-called pagan peoples is full of this doc
trine stated in the most clear, detailed and beautiful man
ner possible, as we have already seen in Plato's Phsedo.

Matthew Arnold, in his "Literature and Dogma" p.
68 has this to say of the status of the Old Testament on
Immortality :

" An impartial criticism will hardly find in the Old
Testament writers before the times of the Maccabees
(and certainly not in the passage usually quoted to prove
it) the set doctrine of the immortality of the soul or of
the resurrection of the dead. But by the time of the
Maccabees, when this passage of the book of Daniel was
written, in the second century before Christ, the Jews
have undoubtedly become familiar, not indeed with the
idea of immortality of the soul as the philosophers like
Plato conceived it, but with the notion of a resurrection
of the dead to take their trial for acceptance or rejection
in the Most High's judgment and Kingdom."

ECCLESIASTES, XII, 7.

" Stranger than this is the conceit that the purpose
of Ecclesiastes is to teach explicitly the doctrine of a
future state. 7^he strongest text for this position is
that which has been graven as a motto over the
entrance to Mount Auburn : —

THEN SHALL THE DUST RETURN TO THE EARTH,
AS IT WAS : AND THE SPIRIT SHALL RETURN
UNTO GOD WHO GAVE IT.

But what this text asserts is just the opposite of Im
mortality. * * What it asserts is the absorption
of the individual in God, the annihilation of all indi
vidual existence"

Dr. John W. Chadwick,

In "Bible of To-day."
(Seep,

GATE OP MT, AUBURN CEMETERY,

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.
With its misconceived text for Immortality

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 133

In that comprehensive little work, "The Bible of
To-day," p. 140, Dr. John White Chadwick makes this
scathing criticism on the generally false interpretation
and application of that vague but popular text from
Ecclesiastes :

" But your thorough-going apologist is never at a loss
for explanations. The object of Ecclesiastes, he informs
us, is to compel us to infer the doctrine of another life
from the futility of all enjoyment here. Stranger than
this is the conceit that the purpose of Ecclesiastes is to
teach explicitly the doctrine of a future life. The
strongest text for this position is that which has been
graven as a motto over the entrance to Mount Auburn.*
'Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and
the spirit shall return to God who gave it.' But what
this text asserts is just the opposite of immortality, as
every critic knows who is not consciously or unconscious
ly a special pleader. What it asserts is the absorption
of the individual in God, the annihilation of all individual
existence. Interpreting, as we are bound to do, the
more or less obscure statement, we must interpret this
by Chapter III, verses 19 and 20 : ' For that which be-
falleth the sons of men befalleth beasts ; even one thing
befalleth them ; as the one dieth so dieth the other. Yea,
they have all one breath; so that a man has no pre
eminence above a beast ; for all is vanity.' Read in the
light of these clear-shining words, the motto of Mount
Auburn is a denial of any personal immortality."

Now in view of the clear comparison here afforded
between the Platonic and the Hebrew texts, it is hardly
necessary to state that the Platonic texts will be found
to give not only the clearest and fullest possible state
ment of the doctrine of personal immortality of the soul,

* A beautiful cemetery near Boston, Mass.

134 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

and its different states of future rewards and punish
ments, but that practically no question exists as to the
meaning conveyed by these texts at any point as exists
even to some extent in the best Hebrew texts. And
another remarkable thing about these Platonic texts is
the fact that the doctrine there stated is in substance and
details substantially if not identically the same as that
held by the old Pharisees of Christ's day, and by the
Christians of our own times, particularly that oldest and
largest section of Christians known as the Roman Church.
And what is still more remarkable is that the doctrine of
immortal soul, Heaven, Purgatory and Hell as now be
lieved in by the majority of Christians is more fully and
clearly set forth in this work of Plato than can be found
in any part even of the New Testament itself, which was
not composed until about half a millennium after the
work of Plato was written.

From the clear and beautiful words of Socrates in
the Phaedo, it is also evident that these beliefs were not
at all new with him or with his age, but were a common
belief coming down from remote times, so that if any
thing seems clear from these facts it is the conclusion
that these doctrines of the Phaedo have been undoubtedly
transmitted as a heritage from the great old pagan* peoples
to the Jewish and Christian sects. — C. M. H.

* We use under protest this really absurd term "Pagan," and only in
deference to the now almost universal Christian custom or usage. This term,
originally meaning 1 1 rustic " or " villager, " is supposed to describe the more
ignorant, superstitious and idolatrous state of the rustic or peasant, as com
pared to the more rational and enlightened dweller in cities. Its general
application, however, to races like the Egyptians, Chinese, Hindoos, Greeks
and Romans, distinguished for their great intellectual and artistic culture
and their development of city life, seems to be a most absurd usage of
Christian custom, and it should have been displaced long ago by a term which
would be more correct and would more fitly describe those great civilized
Gentile races who have given us so much " enlightenment " in art, philosophy
and religion.

NOTE ON THE DOCTRINE OF PURGATORY.

In referring above to the doctrine of Purgatory, that
is, a probationary state of souls in the future life, which
is so clearly stated in the Phaedo, we cannot let this
occasion pass without an explanatory note to show the
relation of this great old Egyptian and Greek doc
trine to the doctrine now prevailing in the Christian
Church.

The first Christians must of course be regarded as truly
a sect of the Jews, and this sect arose at a time when the
Jews had been most surrounded and influenced by the
pagan civilizations of Persia, Greece and Rome, and it
also must not be forgotten that the great Jewish sect of
the Pharisees, which preceded the sect of Christians,
notwithstanding their severe denunciation by Christ,
were closely related to the early Christians in many
ways, and especially in the fact that both held almost
exactly the same belief as to immortality of the soul and
its future states in Heaven, Purgatory or Hell.* Hence
the belief of the old Pharisee as to the soul and its
future, was not only almost the same as that of the early
Christians, but substantially the same as that of the
Roman Church of to-day, and this, as we have already

* It has been suggested that the true derivation of " Pharisee" is from
"Parsee. " meaning the doctrine of the Parsees or Persians who believed in
immortality, resurrection, good and evil spirits, etc., and who influenced the
formation of this great Jewish sect to which both Christ and St. Paul belonged.

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136 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

indicated, was not substantially different from the com
mon belief held in the Greek-Roman world at the time
of Christ and substantially identical with the belief of
the old Greeks and Egyptians extending back to almost
prehistoric times.

While we are at this point, it might be well to refer
to " The Apostles Creed " for a moment, and note the
old Greek or Socratic doctrine it contains: — "He de
scended into Hell, the third day He rose again from the
dead; He ascended into Heaven." Now the Church
takes pains to explain that the " Hell " here referred to
is not the Hell of the damned, but the " limbo " or pre
paratory prison in which the redeemed souls are held
previous to their release and ascent to Heaven: How
this corresponds to the "Hades" or " Under World" of
the old Egyptians and Greeks and to the " earthly
prison" described by Socrates in the Phaedo, to which
the soul after the death of the body first "descends,"
and to the "pure home which is above," to which the
soul afterwards "ascends" and to "mansions fairer,"
etc., is obvious and needs no further remark. Note also
how the " seventh heaven " of which that Greek-
Christian-Jew, Paul, had a vision which he could not
even describe, corresponds to what Socrates hinted at.
Notwithstanding therefore the peculiar and fallacious
repugnance which the average Protestant displays to the
doctrine of purgatory as being in his mind unscriptural,
unhistoric and immoral, a little investigation and reflec
tion will show that it is neither one nor the other, but is
in fact a very old and respectable and morally comforting
doctrine and made trebly so by its undoubted prevalence
among ancient Jews and Christians, and above all among
the ancient, ethical pagans — Egyptians, Greeks and
Romans, who undoubtedly transmitted it to the Jews and

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 137

Christians. The modern Protestant is beginning at last
to full}7 recognize and appreciate this point, that is, the
morality, antiquity and orthodoxy of the doctrine of
purgatory or a probationary state of future life, as is
shown in such works as "Our Life After Death" by
Rev. Arthur Chambers, (Philadelphia, Geo. W. Jacobs
& Co.) which is a great Protestant plea for the sound
ness of the doctrine of Purgatory from an ethical,
historic and Christian standpoint. — C. M. H.

REINCARNATION.
FROM PLATO'S PHAEDRUS.

And there is a law of the goddess Retribution, that
the soul which attains any vision of truth in company
with the god is preserved from harm until the next
period, and he who always attains is always unharmed.
But when she is unable to follow, and fails to behold the
vision of truth, and through some ill-hap sinks beneath
the double load of forgetfulness and vice, and her
feathers fall from her and she drops to earth, then the
law ordains that this soul shall in the first generation
pass, not into that of any other animal, but only of man;
and the soul which has seen most of truth shall come to
the birth as a philosopher or artist, or musician or lover;
that which has seen truth in the second degree shall be
a righteous king or warrior or lord ; the soul which is
of the third class shall be a politician or economist or
trader ; the fourth shall be a lover of gymnastic toils or
a physician ; the fifth a prophet or hierophant ; to the
sixth a poet or imitator will be appropriate ; to the
seventh the life of an artisan or husbandman; to the
eighth that of a Sophist or demagogue ; to the ninth

that of a tyrant; all these are states of probation, in

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Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 139

which he who lives righteously improves, and he who
lives unrighteously deteriorates his lot.

Ten thousand years must elapse before the soul can
return to the place from whence she came, for she can
not grow her wings in less ; only the soul of a philoso
pher, guileless and true, or the soul of a lover, who is
not without philosophy, may acquire wings in the third
recurring period of a thousand years ; and if they choose
this life three times in succession, then they have their
wings given them, and go away at the end of three
thousand years. But the others receive judgment when
they have completed their first life, and after the judg
ment they go, some of them to the houses of correction
w7hich are under the earth, and are punished ; others to
some place in heaven whither they are lightly borne by
justice, and there they live in a manner worthy of the
life which they led here when in the form of men. And
at the end of the first thousand years the good souls and
also the evil souls both come to cast lots and choose
their second life, and they may take any that, they like.
And then the soul of the man may pass into the life of a
beast, or from the beast again into the man. But the
soul of him who has never seen the truth will not pass
into the human form, for man ought to have intelligence,
as they say, "secundum speciem," proceeding from
many particulars of sense to one conception of
reason; and this is the recollection of those things
which our soul once saw when in company with God —
when looking down from above on that which we now
call being and upwards towards the true being. And
therefore the mind of the philosopher alone has wings ;
and this is just; for he is always, according to the
measure of his abilities, clinging in recollection to those
things in which God abides, and in beholding which He

140 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

is what he is. And he who employs aright these mem
ories is ever being initiated into perfect mysteries and
alone becomes truly perfect. But, as he forgets earthly
interests and is rapt in the divine, the vulgar deem him
mad, and rebuke him ; they do not see that he is in
spired.

MIND INHERES IN AND RULES THE UNIVERSE.
FROM PLATO'S PHILEBUS.

SOCRATES. I must obey you, O Protarchus ; nor is the
task which you impose a difficult one ; but have I really,
as Philebus says, disconcerted you with my playful so
lemnity, in asking the question to what class mind and
knowledge belong?

Yet the answer is easy, as all philosophers are agreed
that mind is the king of heaven and earth ; in this way
truly they magnify themselves. And perhaps they are
right. But still I should like to consider the class of
mind, if you do not object, a little more fully.

Very good ; let us begin then, Protarchus, by asking
whether all this which they call the universe is left to
the guidance of an irrational and random chance, or, on
the contrary, as our fathers have declared, ordered and
governed by a marvelous intelligence and wisdom.

Shall we, then, agree with them of old time in main
taining this doctrine, — nor merely reasserting the notions
of others, without risk to ourselves, — but shall we ven
ture also to share in the risk, and bear the reproaches
which will await us, when an ingenious individual de
clares that all is disorder?

We see the elements which enter into the nature of
the bodies of all animals, fire, water, air, and, as the
storm-tossed sailor cries, " Land ahead," in the consti
tution of the world.

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142 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

Consider now that any one of the elements, as they
exist in us, is but a small fraction of them, and of a
mean sort, and not in any way pure, or having any
power worthy of its nature. One instance will prove
this of all of them ; there is a fire within us, and in the
universe.

And is not our fire small and weak and mean, but the
fire in the universe is wonderful in quantity and beauty,
and in every power that fire has?

And is that universal element nourished and generated
and ruled by our fire, or is the fire in you and me, and
in other animals, dependent on the universal fire?

PRO. That is a question that does not deserve an
answer.

Soc. Right ; and you would say the same, if I am
not mistaken, of the earth which is in animals and the
earth which is in the universe, and you would give a
similar reply about all the other elements ?

PRO. Why, how could any man who gave any other
be deemed in his senses ?

Soc. I do not think that he could, — but now go a
step further; when we see those elements of which we
have been speaking gathered up in one, do we not call
them a body ?

And the same may be said of the cosmos, which for
the same reason may be considered as a body, because
made up of the same elements.

But is our body nourished wholly by this body, or is
this body nourished by our body, thence deriving and
having the qualities of which we were just now
speaking?

May our body be said to have a soul ?

And whence comes that soul, my dear Protarchus,
unless the body of the universe, which contains elements

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 143

similar and fairer far, had also a soul ? Can there be
another source ?

Why yes, Protarchus, for surely we cannot imagine
that of the four elements, the finite, the infinite, the
composition of the two, and the cause or fourth element,
which enters into all things, giving to our bodies souls,
and the art of self-management, and of healing disease,
and operating in other ways to heal and organize, — that
this last, I say, should be called by all the names of
wisdom, and not imagine that while the other elements
equally exist in a larger form, both in the entire heaven,
and in great provinces of the heaven, only fairer and
purer, in this higher sphere the cause which is the
noblest and fairest of all natures has still no existence ?

But if that is not true, should we not be wiser in
assenting to that other argument, which says, as we have
often repeated, that there is in the universe a mighty
infinite and an adequate limit, as well as a cause of no
mean power, which orders and arranges years and
seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom
and mind ?

And wisdom and mind cannot exist without soul ?

PRO. Certainly not.

Soc. And in the divine nature of Zeus would you
not say that there is the soul and mind of a king, and
that the power of the cause engenders this ? And other
gods will have other noble attributes, whereby they love
severally to be called.

PRO. Very true.

Soc. Do not then suppose that these words are rashly
spoken by us, O Protarchus, for they are in harmony
with the testimony of those who said of old time that
mind rules the universe.

THE GREEK CONCEPTION OF SOUL AND DEITY.
FROM PLATO'S "PHAEDRUS."

"The soul is immortal, for that is immortal which is
ever in motion ; but that which moves and is moved by
another, in ceasing to move ceases also to live. There
fore, only that which is self-moving, never failing of
self, never ceases to move, and is the fountain and
beginning of motion to all that moves besides. Now, the
beginning is unbegotten, for that which is begotten has
a beginning, but the beginning has no beginning, for if
a beginning were begotten of something, that would
have no beginning. But that, which is unbegotten must
also be indestructible ; for if beginning were destroyed,
there could be no beginning out of anything, or any
thing out of a beginning ; and all things must have a
beginning. And therefore the self-moving is the begin
ning of motion ; and this can neither be destroy ed nor
begotten, for in that case the whole heavens and all
generation would collapse and stand still, and never
again have motion or birth. But if the self-moving is
immortal, he who affirms that self-motion is the very
idea and essence of the soul will not be put to confusion.
For the body which is moved from without is soulless;
but that which is moved from within has a soul, and
this is involved in the nature of the soul. But if the
soul be truly affirmed to be the self-moving, then must
she also be without beginning, and immortal. Enough
of the soul's immortality."

(i44)

THE UNIVERSAL SOUL.
FROM PLATO'S LAWS, BOOK X.

ATHENIAN. Nearly all of them, my friends, seem to be
ignorant of the nature and power of the soul, especially
in what relates to her origin ; they do not know that she
is among the first of bodies, and before them all, and is the
chief author of their changes and transpositions. And
if this is true, and if the soul is older than the body,
must not the things which are of the soul's kindred be
of necessity before those which appertain to the body ?

CLEINIAS. But why is the word " nature " wrong?

ATH. Because those who use the term mean to say
that nature is the first creative power ; but if the soul
turn out to be the primeval element and not fire or
air, then in the truest sense and beyond other things the
soul may be said to have a natural or creative power :
and this w'ould be true if you proved that the soul is
older than the body, but not otherwise.

Let us assume that there is a motion able to move
other things, but not to move itself, — that is one kind ;
and there is another kind which can move itself as
well as other things, working in composition and de
composition, by increase and diminution, and genera
tion and destruction, — that is also one of the many kinds
of motion.

Then we must say that self-motion being the ori
gin and beginning of motion, as well among things at
rest as among things in motion, is the eldest and might -

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146 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

iest principle of change, and that which is changed by
another and yet moves other is second.

And what is the definition of that which is named
"soul?" Can we conceive of any other than that
which has been already given — the motion which is self-
moved ?

Yes ; and if this is true, do we still maintain that
there is anything wanting in the proof that the soul
is the first origin and moving power of all that is, or has
been, or will be, and their contraries, when she has
been clearly shown to be the source of change and mo
tion in all things ?

Then we are right, and speak the most perfect and
absolute truth, when we say that the soul is prior to
the body, and that the body is second and conies after
wards, and is born to obey the soul which is the ruler?

In the next place, must we not of necessity admit that
the soul is the cause of good and evil, base and honor
able, just and unjust, and of all other opposites, if we
suppose her to be the cause of all things ?

CLE. Certainly.

ATH. And as the soul orders and inhabits, all things
moving every way, must we not say that she orders
also the heavens ?

CLE. Of course.

ATH. One soul or more ? More than one — I will an
swer for you ; at any rate we must not suppose that
there are less than two — one the author of good, and the
other of evil.*

* NOTE.— By referring to Aristotle' s idea of God as given on page 182, it will be
seen that he has substantially the same conception as above given in the
two preceding extracts from Plato, viz. a Motion which is self-moved or a
Prime Mover which is self -moved. Plato applies this conception to describe the
" Soul ' ' in general, while Aristotle applies it to describe God in particular, but
of course the "Universal Soul'1 or the "Soul of the Universe," as meant
by Plato, is only another name for ' ' God ' '—and Aristotle doubtless got his
conception from this source. — C. M. H.

THE PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF IDEAS.
FROM PLATO'S "THEAETETUS" AND " THE REPUBLIC."

Note: — The English word " idea" does not adequately
express what Plato meant by the Greek term of which it
is a translation. Associations and implications connected
with the development of the philosophy of Locke and
Berkeley, and perhaps German Idealism generally, give
the word a meaning that conceals the Platonic import
altogether. The Platonic " idea" was the equivalent of
the permanent or " universal" as opposed to the transient
or "individual." It appears throughout his system in
various forms and is variously represented in modern
conceptions by the terms "reality," "substance," "uni
versal," "essence," "subject," "absolute," "ultimate,"
" God," etc. It is not easy to select passages from his
works clearly representative of its wide meaning, as it did
duty for the fields of both metaphysic and the theory of
knowledge. It is most clearly developed in the Theaete-
tus, at least for its place in the theory of knowledge. In
the Phaedrus it is mythically treated. I select a passage
from the former dialogue as perhaps the best from which
to choose. Plato, as philosophers generally, starts with
sensations as the primordial elements of knowledge and

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148 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

proceeds to the discovery of supersensible mental states
which have as their objects the permanent in phe
nomena. — J. H. H.

" SOCRATES. The simple sensations which reach the
soul through the body are given at birth to men and
animals by nature, but their reflections on these and on
their relations to being and use, are slowly and hardly
gained, if they are ever gained, by education and long
experience.

" THEAETETUS. Assuredly.

" Soc. And can a man attain truth who fails of attain
ing being?

" THEAET. Impossible.

"Soc. And can he who misses the truth of anything
have a knowledge of that thing?

" THEAET. He cannot.

" Soc. Then knowledge does not consist in impres
sions of sense, but in reasoning about them ; in that
only, and not in the mere impression, truth and being
can be obtained ?

" THEAET. Clearly.

" Soc. And would you call the two processes by the
same name, when there is so great a difference between
them?

" THEAET. That will not be right.

"Soc. And what name would you give to seeing,
hearing, smelling, being cold and being hot ?

"THEAET. I should call all that perceiving — what
other name could be given them ?

''Soc. Perception would be the collective name of
them?

" THEAET. Certainly.

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 149

"Soc. Which, as we say, has no part in the attain
ment of truth any more than of being ?

"THEAET. Certainly not.

" Soc. And therefore cannot have any part in science
and knowledge?

" THEAET. No.

" Soc. Then perception, Theaetetus, can never be the
same as knowledge or science ?

"THEAET. That is evident, Socrates; and knowledge
is now most clearly proved to be different from per
ception.

"Soc. But the Original aim of our discussion was to
find out rather what knowledge is, than wrhat it is not ;
at the same time we have made some progress, for we
no longer seek for knowledge in perception at all, but
in that other process, however called, in which the mind
is alone and engaged with being."

Note: — In further discussing the question whether
"knowledge" coincided with "true opinion" Plato
advances to the examination of definition as the determin
ant of the former. He now makes Socrates start the
inquiry. — J. H. H.

"Soc. Knowledge is not attained until, combined
with true opinion, there is an enumeration of the elements
out of which anything is composed.

" THEAET. Yes.

" Soc. In the same general way, we might also have
true opinion about a wagon; but he who can describe
the essence by an enumeration of the hundred planks,
adds rational explanation to true opinion, and instead of
opinion has art and knowledge of the nature of a wagon,

150 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

in that he attains to a knowledge of the whole through
the elements.

" THEAET. Is not that your view, Socrates?

"Soc. I want to know what is your view, my friend,
and whether you admit the resolution of all things into
their elements to be a rational explanation of them, and
the consideration of them in syllables (elements) or
larger combinations of them to be irrational ; I should
like to know whether this is your view, that we may
examine it ?

" THEAET. That is quite my view.

"Soc. Well, and do you conceive that a man has
knowledge who thinks that the same attribute belongs
at one time to one thing, and at another time to another
thing, or that the same thing has different attributes at
different times ?

" THEAT. Assuredly not.

" Soc. Then, my friend, there is such a thing as
right opinion united with definition or explanation,
which does not as yet attain to the exactness of knowl
edge.

"THEAET. That seems to be true.

"Soc. But what have we gained? For this perfect
definition of knowledge is a dream only. And yet per
haps we had better not say that at present, for very
likely there may be found some one who will prefer the
third of the three explanations of the definition of
knowledge, one of which, as we said, must be adopted
by the definer.

"THEAET. You are right in reminding me of that;
for there is still one remaining : the first was the image
or expression of the mind in sound ; and that which has
just been mentioned is a way of reaching the whole by
an enumeration of the elements. What is the third way ?

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 151

" Soc. There is further, the popular notion of telling
the mark or sign of difference which distinguishes the
thing in question from all others.

" THEAET. Can you give me an example of such a
definition ?

"Soc. As, for example, in the case of the sun, I
think that you need only know that the sun is the
brightest of the heavenly bodies which revolves about
the earth.

" THEAET. Certainly.

"Soc. Understand why I say this: the reason is, as
I was saying, that if you get at the difference and dis
tinguishing characteristic of each thing, then, as many
persons say, 3^ou will get at the definition or explanation
of it; but will you lay hold of the common and not of
the characteristic notion, you will only have the defini
tion of those things to which this common quality
belongs.

"THEAET. I understand, and am of the opinion that
you are quite right in calling that a definition.

" Soc. But he, who having a right opinion about any
thing, can find out the difference which distinguishes it
from other things, will know that of which before he had
only had an opinion.

" THEAET. That is what we are maintaining.

"Soc. Nevertheless, Theaetetus, on a nearer view, I
find myself quite disappointed in the picture, which at
the distance was not so bad.

" THEAET. What do you mean ?

" Soc. I will endeavor to explain : I will suppose
myself to have a true opinion of you, and if to this I add
your definition, then I have knowledge, but if not, opin
ion only.

"THEAET. Yes.

152 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

" Soc. The definition was assumed to be the inter
pretation of your difference.

" THEAET. True.

" Soc. But when I had only opinion, I had no con
ception of your distinguishing characteristics ?

" THEAET. I suppose not.

" Soc. Then I must have conceived of some general
or common nature which no more belonged to you than
to another.

" THEAET. True.

" Soc. Tell me, now ; how in that case could I have
formed a judgment of you any more than of any one
else ? Suppose that I knew Theaetetus to be a man who
has nose, eyes, and mouth, and every member complete:
how could that enable me to distinguish Theaetetus
from Theodorus, or from some other unknown barbarian ?

" THEAET. Very true.

" Soc. Or if I had further known you, not only as
having nose and eyes, but as having a snub nose and
prominent eyes, should I have any more notion of you
than of myself and of others who resemble me?

11 THEAET. Certainly not.

"Soc. Surely I can have no conception of Theaetetus
until the distinction between your snub-nosedness and
the snub-nosedness of others, as well as the other pecu
liarities which distinguish you, have stamped their
memorial on my mind, so that when I meet you to
morrow the right impression may be recalled ?

"THEAET. Most true.

"Soc. Then right opinion implies the perception of
differences ?

"THEAET. That is evident.

"Soc. What, then, shall we say of adding reason or
explanation to right opinion ? If the meaning is that we

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 153

should form an opinion of the way in which something
differs from another thing, the proposal is ridiculous.

" THEAET. How so ?

" Soc. We are required to have a right opinion of
the differences which distinguish one thing from another
when we already have a right opinion of them, and so
we go round and round ; the revolution of the scytal, or
pestle, or any other rotatory engine, in the same circles,
is nothing to us ; and we may be truly described as the
blind leading the blind ; for to bid us add those things
which we already have, in order that we may learn what
we already think, is a rare sort of darkness.

"THEAET. Tell me, then ; what were you going to
say just now, when you asked the question?

" Soc. If, my boy, the argument, when speaking of
adding the definition, had used the word 'to know/ and
not merely * have an opinion ' of the difference, this
which is the best of all the definitions of knowledge
would have come to a pretty end, for to know is surely
to get knowledge.

" THEAET. True.

"Soc. Then when the question is asked, What is
knowledge? this fair argument will answer ' Right opin
ion with knowledge/ — knowledge, that is, of difference,
for this, as the said argument maintains, is the explana
tion or definition to be added.

" THEAET. That seems to be true.

"Soc. But how utterly foolish, when we are asking
what is knowledge, that the reply should only be, right
opinion with knowledge of difference or of anything.
And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither sensation nor
true opinion, nor yet definition and explanation accom
panying true opinion ?

" THEAET. I suppose not.

154 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

" Soc. And are you still in labor and travail, my dear
friend, or have you brought all that you have to say
about knowledge to the birth ?

" THEAET. I am sure, Socrates, that you have brought
a good deal more out of me than was ever in me.

' 'Soc. And does not my art show that you have
brought forth wind, and that the offspring of your brain
are not worth bringing up ?

"THEAET. Very true.

"Soc. But if, Theatetus, you have, or wish to have,
any more embryo thoughts, they will be all the better
for the present investigation, and if you have none, you
will be soberer and humbler and gentler to other men,
not fancying that you know what you do not know.
These are the limits of my art ; I can no further go, nor
do I know aught of the things which great and famous
men know, or have known, in this, or former ages. The
office of a mid-wife, I, like my mother, have received
from God ; she delivered women, and I deliver men ; but
they must be young, and noble, and fair."

(Plato's Dialogues: Theaetetus. Jowett Trans.)

Note : — There is a passage on dialectic in the Republic
which obtains its interest from its alliance with the
doctrine of Ideas, and which I here quote as follows : —
J. H. H.

" Dear Glaucon, I said, you will not be able to follow
me here, though I would do my best, and you should
behold, not an image only, but the absolute truth, but
that something like this is the truth I am confident.

" Certainly, he replied.

" And further, I must tell you that the power of

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 155

dialectic alone can reveal this, and only to one who is a
disciple of the previous sciences.

" Of that too, he said, you may be confident.

" And no one, I said, will argue that there is any other
process or way of comprehending all true existence ; for
the arts in general are referable to the wants or opinions
of men, or are cultivated for the sake of production and
construction, or for the care of such productions and
constructions; and as to the mathematical arts which, as
we were saying, have some apprehension of true being-
geometry and the like — they only dream about being,
but never can they behold the waking reality so long as
they leave the hypotheses which they use undisturbed,
and are unable to give an account of them. For when
a man knows not his own first principle, and when the
conclusion and intermediate steps are also constructed
out of he knows not what, how can he imagine that such
an arbitrary agreement will ever become science?

" Impossible, he said.

" Then dialectic, and dialectic alone, goes to a principle,
and is the only science which does away with hypotheses
in order to establish them ; the eye of the soul, which is
literally buried in some outlandish slough, is by her
taught to look upwards ; and she uses as handmaids, in
the work of conversion, the sciences which we have been
discussing. Custom terms them sciences, but they ought
to have some other name, implying greater clearness than
opinion and less clearness than science : and this in our
previous sketch, was called understanding. But there is
no use in our disputing about names when we have
realities of such importance to consider.

" No, he said, any name will do which expresses the
thought clearly.

"At any rate, we are satisfied, as before, to have four

156 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

divisions, two for intellect and two for opinion ; and to
call the first division science, the second understanding,
the third belief, and the fourth knowledge of shadows:
opinion being concerned with generation, and intellect
with true being; and then to make a proportion: — as
being is to generation, so is pure intellect to opinion : and,
as science is to belief, so is understanding to knowledge
of shadows.

"But let us leave the further distribution and division
of the objects of opinion and of intellect, which will be
a long inquiry many times longer than this has been.

" As far as I understand, he said, I agree.

"And do you also agree, I said, in describing the
dialectician as one who has a conception of the essence
of each thing? And may he who is unable to acquire
and impart this conception, in whatever degree he fails,
in that degree also be said to fail in intelligence? Will
you admit that ?

"Yes, he said; how can I deny that?

"And you would say the same of the conception of
the good? Until a person is able to abstract and define
the idea of the good, and unless he can run the gauntlet
of all objections, and is ready to disprove them, not by
appeals to opinion, but to true existence, never faltering
at any step of the argument — unless he can do all this,
you would say that he knows neither absolute good nor
any other good ; he apprehends only a shadow, which
is given by opinion and not by knowledge; dream
ing and slumbering in this life, before he is well awake,
here he arrives at the world below, and finally has his
quietus."

Plato's Republic, Book VII. (Jowett's Trans.)

THE SOCRATIC UTILITARIAN THEORY OF
ETHICS.

Brief : — Pleasure is essentially Good, and Pain essen
tially Evil. Virtue is simply the right choice of pleasures
and pains, and for this right choice " knowledge " or
" wisdom " is necessary. Hence Virtue, in the last
analysis, is essentially knowledge or wisdom, and vice
essentially ignorance or foolishness. — See Supplementary
Notes at end of extract. — C. M. H.

FROM DIALOGUE OF SOCRATES WITH PROTAGORAS,
IN PLATO'S "PROTAGORAS."

"You would admit, Protagoras, that some men live
well and others ill ?

" He agreed to this.

"And do you think that a man lives well who lives in
pain and grief?

" He does not.

" But if he lives pieasantly to the end of his life, don't
you think that in that case he will have lived well?

" I do.

" Then to live pleasantly is a good, and to live un
pleasantly an evil ?

" Yes, he said, if the pleasure be good and honorable.

158 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

"And do you, Protagoras, like the rest of the world,
call some pleasant things evil and some painful things
good ? — for lam rather disposed to say that things are
good in as far as they are pleasant, if they have no con
sequences of another sort, and in as far as they are
painful they are bad.

" I do not know, Socrates, he said, whether I can ven
ture to assert in that unqualified manner that the pleas
ant is the good and the painful the evil. Having regard
not only to my present answer, but also to the rest of
my life, I shall be safer, if I am not mistaken, in saying
that there are some pleasant things which are not good,
and that there are some painful things which are good,
and some which are not good, and that there are some
which are neither good nor evil.

"And you would call pleasant, I said, the things
which participate in pleasure or create pleasure ?

" Certainly, he said.

" Then my meaning is, that in as far as they are
pleasant they are good ; and my question would imply
that pleasure is a good in itself.

"According to your favorite mode of speech, Socrates,
let us inquire about this, he said ; and if the result of
the inquiry is to show that pleasure and good are really
the same, then we will agree ; but if not, then we will
argue.

" Having seen what your opinion is about good and
pleasure, I am minded to say to you : Uncover your
mind to me Protagoras, and reveal your opinion about
knowledge, that I may know whether you agree with
the rest of the world. Now the rest of the world are of
opinion that knowledge is a principle not of strength, or
of rule, or of command : their notion is that a man may
have knowledge, and yet that the knowledge which is in

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 159

him may be overmastered by anger, or pleasure, or
pain, or love, or perhaps fear, — just as if knowledge
were a slave, and might be dragged about anyhow.
Now is that your view7 ? or do you think that knowledge
is a noble and commanding thing, which cannot be
overcome, and will not allow a man, if he only knows
the difference of good and evil, to do anything which is
contrary to knowledge, but that wisdom will have
strength to help him ?

" I agree with you, Socrates, said Protagoras ; and not
only that but I, above all other men, am bound to say
that wisdom and knowledge are the highest of human
things.

" Good, I said, and true. But are you aware that the
majority of the world are of another mind ; and that men
are commonly supposed to know the things which are
best, and not to do them when they might? And most
persons of whom I have asked the reason of this have
said, that those who did thus were overcome by pain, or
pleasure, or some of those affections which I was now
mentioning.

" Yes, Socrates, he replied ; and that is not the only
point about which mankind are in error.

" Suppose, then, that you and I endeavor to instruct
and inform them what is the nature of this affection,
which is called by them being overcome by pleasure,
and which, as they declare, is the reason why they know
the better and choose the worse. When we say to them :
Friends, you are mistaken, and are saying what is not
true, they would reply ; Socrates and Protagoras, if this
affection of the soul is not to be described as being over
come by pleasure, what is it, and how do you call it?
Tell us that.

"When men are overcome by eating and drinking

160 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

and other sensual desires which are pleasant, and they,
knowing them to be evil, nevertheless indulge in them,
is not that what you would call being overcome by
pleasure? That they will admit. And suppose that
you and I were to go on and ask them again : In what
way do you say that they are evil, — in that they are
pleasant and give pleasure at the moment, or because
they cause disease and poverty and other like evils in
the future? Would they still be evil, if they had no
attendant evil consequences, simply because they give
the consciousness of pleasure of whatever nature?
Would they not answer that they are not evil on ac
count of the pleasure which is immediately given by
them, but on account of the after consequences — diseases
and the like?

" I believe, said Protagoras, that the world in general
would give that answer.

"And in causing diseases do they not cause pain ? and
in causing poverty do they not cause pain ; they would
agree to that also, if I am not mistaken ?

" Protagoras assented.

" Then I should say to them, in my name and yours :
Do you think them evil for any other reason, except
that they end in pain and rob us of other pleasures ? —
that again they would admit.

"We both of us thought that they would.

'* And that I should take the question from the opposite
point of view, and say: Friends, when you speak of
goods being painful, do you mean remedial goods, such
as gymnastic exercises and military services, and the
physician's use of burning, cutting, drugging, and starv
ing ? Are these the things which are good but painful ?—
they would assent to that ?

"He agreed.

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 161

" And do you call them good because they occasion the
greatest immediate suffering and pain ; or because, after
wards, they bring health and improvement of the bodily
condition and the salvation of states, and empires, and
wealth?— they would agree to that, if I am not mistaken?

"He assented.

" Are these things good for any other reason except
that they end in pleasure, and get rid of and avert pain ?
Are you looking to any other standard but pleasure and
pain when you call them good? — they would acknowl
edge that they were not ?

"I think that they would, said Protagoras.

"And do you not pursue after pleasure as a good, and
avoid pain as an evil ?

"He assented.

" Then you think that pain is an evil and pleasure is
a good ; and even pleasure you deem an evil, when it
robs you of greater pleasures than it gives, or causes
greater pain than the pleasures which it has. If, how
ever, you call pleasure an evil in relation to some other
end or standard, you will be able to show us that stand
ard. But you have none to show.

"I do not think that they have, said Protagoras.

" And have you not a similar way of speaking about
pain ? You call pain a good when it takes away greater
pains than those which it has, or gives pleasures greater
than the pains ; for I say that if you have some standard
other than pleasure and pain to which you refer when
you call actual pain a good, you can show what that is.
But you cannot.

" That is true, said Protagoras.

"Suppose again, I said, that the world says to me:
Why do you spend many words and speak in many ways
on this subject ? Excuse me, friends, I should reply ;

1 62 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

but in the first place there is a difficulty in explaining the
meaning of the expression ' overcome by pleasure ; '
and the whole argument turns upon this. And even
now, if you see any possible way in which evil can be
explained as other than pain, or good as other than
pleasure, you may still retract. But I suppose that you
are satisfied at having a life of pleasure which is without
pain. And if you are satisfied, and if you are unable to
show any good or evil which does not end in pleasure
and pain, hear the consequences. — If this is true, then I
say that the argument is absurd which affirms that a man
often does evil knowingly, when he might abstain, be
cause he is seduced and amazed by pleasure ; or again,
when you say that a man knowingly refuses to do what
is good because he is overcome at the moment by pleas
ure. Now that this is ridiculous will be evident if only
we give up the use of various names, such as pleasant
and painful, and good and evil. As there are two things,
let us call them by two names, — first, good and evil, and
then pleasant and painful. Assuming this, let us go on
to say that a man does evil knowing that he does evil.
But some one will ask, Why ? Because he is overcome,
is the first answer. And by what is he overcome ? the
inquirer will proceed to ask. And we shall not be able
to reply, ' By pleasure,' for the name of pleasure has
been exchanged for that of good. In our answer, then,
we shall only say that he is overcome. ' By what?' he
will reiterate. By the good, we shall have to reply; in
deed we shall. Nay, but our questioner will rejoin with
a laugh, if he.be one of the swaggering sort, That is too
ridiculous, that a man should do what he knows to be
evil when he ought not, because he is overcome by good.
Is that, he will ask, because the good was worthy or not
worthy of conquering the evil ? And in answer to that

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 163

we shall clearly reply, Because it was not worthy : for
if it had been worthy, then he who, as we say, was over
come by pleasure, would not have been wrong. But
how, he will reply, can the good be unworthy of the evil,
or the evil of the good? Is not the real explanation that
they are out of proportion to one another, either as
greater and smaller, or more and fewer ? This we cannot
deny. And when you speak of being overcome, — what
do you mean, he will say, but that you choose the greater
evil in exchange for the lesser good ? This being the
case, let us now substitute the names of pleasure and
pain, and say, not as before, that a man does what is evil
knowingly, but that he does what is painful knowingly,
and because he is overcome by pleasure, which is un
worthy to overcome. And what measure is there of the
relations of pleasure to pain other than excess and defect,
which means that they become greater and smaller, and
more and fewer, and differ in degree ? For if any one
says, ' Yes, Socrates, but immediate pleasure differs
widely from future pleasure and pain,' — to that I should
reply : And do they differ in any other way except by
reason of pleasure and pain ? There can be no other
measure of them. And do you, like a skillful weigher,
put into the balance the pleasures and the pains, near
and distant, and weigh them, and then say which out
weighs the other ? If you weigh pleasures against pleas
ures, you, of course, take the more and greater ; or if
you weigh pains against pains, you take the fewer and
the less ; or if pleasures against pains, then you choose
that course of action in which the painful is exceeded by
the pleasant, whether the distant by the near, or the near
by the distant ; and you avoid that course of action in
which the pleasant is exceeded by the painful. Would

164 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

you not admit, my friends, that this is true ? I am con
fident that they cannot deny this.

" He agreed with me.

" Now supposing that happiness consisted in making
and taking large things, what would be the saving
principle of human life ? Would the art of measuring
be the saving principle, or would the power of appear
ance ? Is not the latter that deceiving art which makes
us wander up and down and take the things at one time
of which we repent at another, both in our actions and
in our choice of things, great and small ? But the art of
measurement is that which would do away with the effect
of appearances, and, showing the truth, would fain teach
the soul at last to find rest in the truth, and would thus
save our life. Would not mankind generally acknowl
edge that the art which accomplishes this is the art of
measurement ?

"Yes, he said, the art of measurement.

"Suppose, again, the salvation of human life to depend
on the choice of odd and even, and on the knowledge of
when men ought to choose the greater or less, either in
reference to themselves or to each other, whether near
or at a distance ; what would be the saving principle of
our lives? Would not knowledge? — a knowledge of
measuring, when the question is one of excess and defect,
and a knowledge of number, when the question is of odd
and even? The world will acknowledge that, will
they not?

" Protagoras admitted that they would.

"Well, then, I say to them, my friends; seeing that
the salvation of human life has been found to consist in
the right choice of pleasures and pains, — in the choice of
the more and the fewer and the greater and the less, and
the nearer and remoter, must not this measuring be a

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 165

consideration of excess and defect and equality in rela
tion to each other ?

"That is undeniably true.

"And this, as possessing measure, must undeniably
also be an art and science ?

"They will agree to that.

" The nature of that art or science, will be a matter of
future consideration ; the demonstration of the existence
of such a science is a sufficient answer to the question
which you asked of me and Protagoras. At the time
when you asked the question, if you remember, both of
us were agreeing that there was nothing mightier than
knowledge, and that knowledge, in whatever existing,
must have the advantage over pleasure and all other
things ; and then you said that pleasure often got the
advantage even over a man who has knowledge; and we
refused to allow this, and you said : O Protagoras and
Socrates, if this state is not to be called being overcome
by pleasure, tell us what it is ; what would you call it?
If we had immediately and at the time answered " Igno
rance," you would have laughed at us. But now, in
laughing at us, you will be laughing at yourselves: for
you also admitted that men err in their choice of pleas
ures and pains ; that is, in their choice of good and evil,
from defect of knowledge ; and you admitted further that
they err, not only from defect of knowledge in general,
but of that particular knowledge which is called measur
ing. And you are also aware that the erring act which
is done without knowledge is done in ignorance. This,
therefore, is the meaning of being overcome by pleas
ure, — ignorance, and that the greatest.

"Then you agree, I said, that the pleasant is the good,
and the painful evil ?

"Are not all actions, the tendency of which is to make

1 66 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

life painless and pleasant, honorable and useful ? The
honorable work is also useful and good ?

" This was admitted.

" Then, if the pleasant is the good, nobody does any
thing under the idea or conviction that some other thing
would be better and is also attainable, when he might do
the better. And this inferiority of a man to himself is
merely ignorance, as the superiority of a man to himself
is wisdom.

" They all assented.

" And is not ignorance the having a false opinion and
being deceived about important matters ?

" To that they also unanimously assented.

" Then, no man voluntarily pursues evil, or that which
he thinks to be evil. To prefer evil to good is not in
human nature ; and when a man is compelled to choose
one of two evils, no one will choose the greater when he
might have the less.

" All of us agreed to every word of this.

" My only object, I said, in continuing the discussion,
has been the desire to ascertain the relations of virtue
and the essential nature of virtue ; for if this were clear,
I am very sure that the other controversy which has
been carried on at great length by both of us — you affirm
ing and I denying, that virtue can be taught — would also
have become clear. The result of our discussion appears
to me to be singular. For if the argument had a human
voice, that voice would be heard laughing at us and say
ing : Protagoras and Socrates, you are strange beings ;
there are you who were saying that virtue cannot be
taught, contradicting yourself now in the attempt to show
that all things are knowledge, including justice, and
temperance, and courage, — which tends to show that
virtue can certainly be taught ; for if virtue were other

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 167

than knowledge, as Protagoras attempted to show, then
clearly virtue cannot be taught ; but if virtue is entirely
knowledge, as you, Socrates, are seeking to show, then I
cannot but suppose that virtue is capable of being taught.
Protagoras, on the other hand, who started by saying
that it might be taught, is now eager to show that it is
anything rather than knowledge ; and if this is true, it
must be quite incapable of being taught "

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES.

SOCRATES THE FATHER OF MODERN OR
UTILITARIAN ETHICS.

The preceding extract from the dialogue of Socrates
with Protagoras, should have great interest for students
of ethics, as it presents in probably the earliest and most
complete form the great modern theory of ethics known
as the Utilitarian and Spencerian theory, which is, as
may be here seen, simply a revival of one of the old
Greek schools of ethics. This theory, that pleasure is
essentially good and pain essentially evil, has probably
no better and clearer statement anywhere than in this
extract from Socrates recorded by Plato about 400 B. C.
The same theory was later used with modifications by
Aristotle, 350 B. C., who copied many ideas from Plato
and Socrates, and will be found freely in Aristotle's
Ethics, as shown in the extracts given farther on,
where he distinctly teaches that Virtue is that course of
conduct which secures or leads to a beneficent final result
or "end" which is desirable in itself as such final end
and not merely as a " means " to something else. Hence
he distinctly states that " The best of all things must be
something final," and that " Happiness or welfare seems

more than anything else to answer to this description,

(168)

EPICURUS) the much maligned and misunder
stood " Philosopher of the Garden" was a great advo
cate of the moderate and simple life, and, after Soc
rates, one of the clearest exponents of the. true rational
theory of Pleasure — the modern utilitarian or u Spen-
cerian " theory of ethics. He was a Deist in religion,
but a disbeliever in immortality, a consistent rational
ist and materialist in general thought, and a great
exponent of the "atomic" theory of matter in a Uni
verse governed by fixed laws.

GIST OF EPICUREAN ETHICS.

" Yet some there are, who, with great flourishes,
have so discoursed against pleasure itself, as if it were
something ill in its own nature, and consequently not
appertaining to wisdom and felicity."

u When, therefore, we say in general terms, pleas
ure is the end of happy life, we are far from meaning
the pleasures of luxurious persons, or of others, as
some, either through ignorance, dissent, or ill will, in
terpret. We mean no more but this — Not pained in
body nor troubled in mind."

"For it is not perpetual feasting and drinking, not
the conversation of beautiful women ; not rarities of
fish, nor any dainties of a profuse table, that make a
happy life ; but reason, with sobriety and a serene
mind"

" Concerning Temperance, we must first observe
that it is desired not for its own sake, but for that it
procureth pleasure, that is, brings peace to the minds
of men, pleasing and soothing them with a kind of
concord."

" Hence it is understood that Temperance is to be
desired, not for that it avoids some pleasures, but be
cause he who refrains from them declines troubles,
which being avoided he obtains greater pleasures.
Which it so doth that the action becomes honest and
decent, and we may clearly understand that the same
men may be lovers both of pleasure and of decency."

EPICURUS,

B. C. 300.
From bu>t in Museo Cap'tolino, Rome,

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 169

for we always choose it for itself and never for the sake
of something else." After Aristotle, Epicurus (about
300 B. C.) fully adopted and clearly taught this doctrine,
which, therefore, also came to be called the " Epicurean"
theory, and under that name has been probably the most
maligned and misunderstood theory that has ever been
held in the history of ethics, particularly during the
Christian era and among Christian peoples, where it has
been persistently misrepresented or misunderstood.
Thus the term "Epicure" or "Epicurean" has come to
mean in a gross sense a mere glutton or sensualist, and
in a more exact sense a person of most elaborate and re
fined tastes in sensuous delights and indulgences : And
Epicureanism is regarded as a system of moral philosophy
which simply places " virtue " or "good" as consisting
essentially in a life of mere pleasure or sensuous in
dulgence. The truth is, however, that Epicurus was a
man of the greatest simplicity and moderation — the
"philosopher of the Garden " — who boasted of his ability
to live on the simple products of his own little field, of
the entire sufficiency of " barley cakes and water" for all
the needs of life, and on his capacity to properly live on
a mere "obolus" — one cent — a day ! Not only this, he
denounced in the clearest terms a life of so-called " pleas
ure" or sensuous indulgence and showed that this was
the very course best calculated to produce an overplus
of pain and prevent the attainment of the truly happy
life with the overplus or true balance of pleasure, and
the minimum of pain which temperance and right living
inevitably bring.

In order to clearly show what this true Epicureanism
is, and how it follows on the lines laid down by Socrates
and Aristotle, we will here quote a few paragraphs from
the ethics of Epicurus :

170 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

"For the end of life, by the tacit consent of all men, is
felicity.

" Therefore, before we inquire whether felicity really
consists in pleasure, we must show, that pleasure is in
its own nature good, as its contrary, pain, is in its own
nature ill.

"There needs not therefore any reasoning to prove,
that pleasure is to be desired, pain to be shunned ; for"
this is manifest to our sense, as that fire is hot, snow
white, honey sweet. We need no arguments to prove
this, it is enough that we give notice of it.

"First, therefore, we must consider of felicity no
otherwise than as of health ; it being manifest, that the
state, in which the mind is free from perturbation, the
body from pain, is no other than the perfect health of the
whole man.

"Yet some there are, who, with great flourishes, have
so discoursed against pleasure itself, as if it were some
thing ill in its own nature, and consequently not apper
taining to wisdom and felicity.

"When, therefore, we say in general terms, pleasure
is the end of happy life, we are far from meaning the
pleasures of luxurious persons, or of others, as some,
either through ignorance, dissent, or ill will, interpret.
We mean 110 more but this, (to repeat it once more) Not
pained in body, nor troubled in mind.

" For it is not perpetual feasting and drinking ; not the
conversation of beautiful women ; not rarities of fish, nor
any other dainties of a profuse table, that make a happy
life ; but reason, with sobriety, and a serene mind.

"Others condemn, and exclaim on us, for affirming,
that the virtues are of such a nature, as that they con
duce to pleasure or felicity, as if we meant that pleasure
which is obscene and infamous, but let them rail as they

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 171

please. For as they make virtue the chief good, so do
we. But if the discourse be of living happily, or felicity,
why should not this be a good superior to virtue, to the
attainment whereof virtue itself is but subservient?

" For while nature is our guide, whatsoever we do
tends to this, that we neither be pained in body nor
troubled in mind ; and as soon as we have attained this,
all disturbances of the mind are quieted, and there is
nothing beyond it that we can aim at to complete the
good, both of our soul and body ; for that absolute good
of human nature is contained in the peace of the soul
and the body.

"Hence is manifest, when I formerly said, A sober or
well ordered reason procures a pleasant and happy life ;
we are to understand, that it procures it by means of the
virtues which it ingenerates and preserves.

" By this you find why I conceive, that the virtues are
connatural to a happy life, and that it is impossible to
separate happy life from them. All other things, as
being frail and mortal, are transitory, separable from
true and constant pleasure ; only virtue, as being a per
petual and immortal good, is inseparable from it."
(From History of Philosophy, by Thos. Stanley,
London, 1701).

Now a little consideration will show that what Aristotle
meant by the final end, "happiness" or "welfare" is
exactly what Socrates before him and Epicurus after
him meant by " pleasure." And in the last analysis it
will be found, we think, to be an irrefutable proposition
that " pleasure" is the essence of what we call " happi
ness " or well-being, and " pain " the essence of what we
term tinhappiness or ill-being, as demonstrated in the
cogent reasonings of Socrates with Protagoras twenty-

172 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

four centuries ago in the clear and simple argument of
that great rationalist, Epicurus, two centuries later, no
less than in the almost identical and unanswerable rea
sonings of that great Socratic and Epicurean rationalist
of our own day — Herbert Spencer, in his Data of Ethics.
But opponents of this great ancient and modern school
of rational ethics will persist in misunderstanding and
misapplying this great decisive term " pleasure " as the
true test of the final Tightness of conduct, and one of the
first men responsible for bringing about this confusion
was probably the first great " Hedonist," Aristippus, a
pupil of Socrates, who grossly misapplied the Socratic
ethical theory that " pleasure " was the only good and
pain the only evil, to mean merely the initial or immediate
pleasure of an act, without any regard to the ultimate,
final or actual pleasure when all the results and conse
quences of the initial act had been duly allowed for and
adjusted. This is the great error of the so-called " He
donistic school " which has too long been mistaken for
the true . " Epicurean " or utilitarian school. Hence,
when the term " pleasure " is used in a philosophical,
ethical sense, it will be obvious that it must be under
stood not only in the positive form, but also, and even
much more so, in the negative form, that is, in absence
from pain or disturbance, "not pained in body nor
troubled in mind " as Epicurus says, for it is undeniable
that this negative form of pleasure, the mere tranquil
quiescent state, free from pain, which a state of normal
simple health gives, is absolutely the chief and greatest
element of a normal, moral, happy or wrell adjusted life,
and not mere tense, positive pleasures, gratifications or
indulgences. And in this logical view of the matter we
can therefore readily recognize the real soundness of the
great Socratic theory that " knowledge" or "wisdom " is

o
-V

ARISTIPPUS might probably be called the original
"Hedonist," the perverter of the Socratic doctrine of
" Pleasure" as the greatest good, and the exponent of
the voluptuous theory of ethics, which afterwards came
to be incorrectly called "Epicureanism" but which
was really a false Epicureanism. True Epicurean
ism is the doctrine of rational moderation resulting not
in the greatest immediate delight but in the greatest
ultimate utility or final permanent pleasure. (See p.
169, &c.

SKETCH OF ARISTIPPUS.

FROM STANLEY'S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

From Cyrene Aristippus went first to Athens, in
vited by the fame of Socrates, concerning whom he fell
into discourse with Ischomachus, meeting him casually
at the Olympic Games, and inquiring what disputes
they were wherewith Socrates prevailed so much upon
the yoiing men, he received from him some little seeds
and scatterings thereof, wherewith he was so passion
ately affected, that he grew pale and lean, till, to
assuage his fervent thirst, he took a voyage to Athens^
and there drunk at the fountain, satisfying himself
with the person, his discourse and philosophy, the end
whereof was to know our evils and to acquit ourselves
of them. Aristotle said, philosophy doth harm to those
who misinterpret things well said. Aristippus chiefly
delighted with the more voluptuous disputes of Soc
rates, asserted pleasure to be the ultimate end wherein
all happiness doth consist.

Hi's life was agreeable to the opinion, which he em
ployed in luxury, sweet unguents, rich garments,
wine and women ; maintained by a course as different
from the precepts and practice of Socrates as the things
themselves were. For, notwithstanding he had a good
estate (and three country seats) he first of the Socratic
disciples took money for teaching. Which Socrates
observing, asked him how he came to have so much.
He replied, "How came you to have so little?" A
further dislike of this course Socrates expressed, when
Aristippus sending him twenty min<z, he returned it,
saying, his Dczmon would not suffer him to take it.

ARI3TIPPUS

THE lt HEDONIST'1 OR FALSE EPICUREAN.

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 173

the essence of virtue, and that a true resultant in actual
final pleasure or happiness is the test of what is virtuous,
for it is obvious that a true wisdom or knowledge of
causes and effects is necessary to determine how to
abstain and how to indulge so as to result in the highest
degree of ultimate pleasure or happiness, positive or
negative.

The neglect, therefore, to duly weigh and consider this
aspect of negative pleasure and to regard the relation of
initial and ultimate pleasure in striking a true resultant or
balance, will be found to be one of the great errors which
the critics of the utilitarian theory of ethics constantly
fall into, and it is time that this error was abandoned by
ethical reasoners, for we think that if " pleasure " be
considered both in the positive and negative aspects, and
in the broad sense, and the adjustment made between
initial and ultimate pleasures, and a true balance struck,
then the dicta of Socratic-Epicurean or Utilitarian ethics,
that conduct is good or bad simply because it tends to
produce pleasure or pain, happiness or unhappiness, wel
fare or injury, is simply impregnable, ethically, logically
and philosophically, and the opposite theory that regards
"virtue" itself as the " end" of ethics, and not "health,"
"pleasure," "happiness" or " welfare," is clearly irra
tional and a reductio ad absurdum as it is simply prefer
ring the " means" to the " end."

A most interesting point, however, to be noted, just
at this connection, is that not only is the modern
utilitarian theory of ethics found stated in the teachings
of Socrates in the most clear and positive manner, as
above shown, but the distinctions here pointed out of
the necessity of making a true adjustment of all the
consequences or results of the act, for pain Or pleasure,
to strike the true resultant or actual balance of pleasure

174 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

which must determine the real character of the act as
" good " or " virtuous," is also as clearly set forth by that
" Wizard of Conversation," the great old Socrates — the
real father of modern rational ethics. Let us therefore,
here juxtapose a few telling paragraphs from the dialogue
of Socrates, and we will readily see how clearly these
points and distinctions are brought out :

:f Then you think that pain is an evil and pleasure is
a good ; and even pleasure you deem an evil when it robs
you of greater pleasures than it gives, or causes greater
pain than the pleasures which it has : If, however, you
call pleasure an evil in relation to some other end or
standard, you will be able to show us that standard.
But you have none to show.

" Would they still be evil if they had no attendant evil
consequences simply because they give the consciousness
of pleasure of whatever nature ? Would they not an
swer that they are not evil on account of the pleasure
which is immediately given by them, but on account of
the after consequences — diseases and the like.

"And have you not a similar way of speaking about
pain ? You call pain a good when it takes away greater
pains than those which it has or gives pleasures greater
than the pains ; for I say that if you have some standards
other than pleasure and pain to which you refer when
you call actual pain a good, you can show what that is.
But you cannot.

" If you weigh pleasures against pleasures, }^ou, of
course, take the more and greater ; or if you weigh pains
against pains, you take the fewer and the less; or if
pleasures against pains, then you choose that course of
action in which the painful is exceeded by the pleasant,
whether the* distant by the near or the near by the dis
tant, and you avoid that course of action in which the

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 175

pleasant is exceeded by the painful. Would you not
admit, my friends, that this is true ? I am confident that
they cannot deny this.

" But now in laughing at us you will be laughing at
yourselves, for you also admitted that men err in their
choice of pleasures and pains ; that is, in their choice of
good and evil, from defect of knowledge, and you ad
mitted further that they err not only from defect of
knowledge in general, but of that particular knowledge
which is called measuring.

"Then I should say to them in my name and yours:
Do you think them evil for any other reason except that
they end in pain and rob us of other pleasures?

"And do you call them good because they occasion
the greatest immediate suffering and pain ; or because
afterwards they bring health and improvement of the
bodily condition and the salvation of states, and empires,
and wealth ?

" Are these things good for any other reason except
that they end in pleasure and get rid of and avert pain ?
Are you looking to any other standard but pleasure and
pain when you call them good?"

Note again how the clear-thinking Epicurus voices the
Socratic theory of the true ethics of pleasure in his dis
course on " Temperance : " —

" Concerning Temperance we must first observe that
it is desired not for its own sake but for that it procureth
pleasure, that is, brings peace to the minds of men,
pleasing and soothing them with a kind of concord.

" But most men not able to hold and keep to what they
have resolved on, being vanquished and debilitated by
the appearance of present pleasure, resign themselves to
the fetters of lust, not foreseeing what will follow. But

176 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

they who enjoy pleasures so that no pain shall ensue,
and who preserve their judgment constant, nor are over
come by pleasure, to the doing of what they know ought
not to be done, these men obtain the greatest pleasure by
pretermitting pleasure: They also many times suffer
some pain to prevent falling into greater.

" Hence it is understood that Temperance is to be de
sired, not for that it avoids some pleasures, but because
he who refrains from them declines troubles, which being
avoided he obtains greater pleasures. Which it so doth
that the action becomes honest and decent and we may
clearly understand that the same men may be lovers
both of pleasure and of decency."
(History of Philosophy, Thos. Stanley, London, 1701.)

Now it only remains to be shown how identical is the
standpoint of Herbert Spencer in his Data of Ethics with
that of Socrates in his dialogue with Protagoras, and
how absolutely similar the arguments and challenges are
in both cases, to demonstrate the truth of the statement
in Prof. Hyslop's lecture that the ethical philosophy of
the Socratic period is identical with modern evolutionary
philosophy, and this is particularly true of the Socratic
school itself, as shown by Socrates, Aristotle and Epi
curus, in the extracts already given.

Let us, therefore, now compare a few test paragraphs
from Spencer's Data of Ethics with the paragraphs just
quoted from Socrates and Epicurus, and we will see that
the identity of thought is absolute : —

"Thus there is no escape from the admission that in
calling good the conduct which subserves life, and bad
the conduct which hinders or destroys it, and in so im
plying that life is a blessing and not a curse, we are in-

THE VOLUPTUOUS (?) "PLEASURES" OF THE
REAL EPICURUS.

" For my part, when I eat coarse bread and drink
water, or sometimes augment my commons with a
little Cytheridian Cheese, (^.vhen I have a mind to
feast extraordinarily], I take great delight in it, and
bid defiance to those pleasures which accompany the
usual magnificence of feasts ; so that if I have but
bread, or barley-cakes and water, I am furnished to
content even with Jove himself in point of felicity"

" For my part, truly (that I may with modesty in
stance myself} I am content, and highly pleased with
the plants and fruits of my own little gardens ; and
will, that this inscription be set over the Gate,
Stranger, here you may stay ; here the Supreme Good
is pleasure ; the Master of this little house is hospit
able, friendly, and will entertain you with polenta,
and afford you water plentifzilly , and will ask you,
how you like your entertainment f These little
Gardens invite not hunger, but satisfy it ; nor increase
thirst with drinks, but extinguish it with the natural
and pleasant remedy."

" In this pleasure I have grown old, finding by ac
count, that my diet amounts not fully to an obolus a
day, and yet some days there are, in which I abate
somewhat even of that, to make trial, whether I want
any thing of full and perfect pleasure, or how much,
and whether it be worth great labour"

(u Polenta "—a thick cereal mush ; ' ' obolus " —one cent. )

EPIGURU3 IN HIS GARDEN,

From Stanley's History.

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 177

evitably asserting that conduct is good or bad according
as its total effects are pleasurable or painful.

" Omitting people of this class (Devil Worshippers),
if there are any, as beyond or beneath argument, we find
that all others avowedly or tacitly hold that the final
justification for maintaining life, can only be the recep
tion from it of a surplus of pleasurable feeling over pain
ful feeling ; and that goodness or badness can be ascribed
to acts which subserve life or hinder life, only on this
supposition.

" Using, then, as our tests, these most pronounced
forms of good and bad conduct, we find it unquestion
able that our ideas of their goodness and badness really
originate from our consciousness of the certainty or
probability that they will produce pleasures or pains
somewhere.

" Unless it is asserted that courage and chastity could
still be thought of as virtues though thus productive of
misery, it must be admitted that the conceptions of
virtue cannot be separated from the conception of happi
ness-producing conduct ; and that as this holds of all the
virtues, however otherwise unlike, it is from their con-
ducivness to happiness that they come to be classed as
virtues.

"So that no school can avoid taking for the ultimate
moral aim a desirable state of feeling called by whatever
name — gratification, enjoyment, happiness. Pleasure
somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings, is an
inexpugnable element of the conception. It is as much
a necessary form of moral intuition as space is a neces
sary form of intellectual intuition."

Now we think it will be readily admitted on com
parison that the point of view and the argument of the
old Greek thinkers could not be any nearer to that of our

1 78 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

modern rationalists, unless the very words themselves
were identical. Note, for example, how alike are the
concluding keynotes in both Socrates and Spencer. Thus
Socrates asks twenty-four centuries ago, " Are these
things good for any other reason except that they end
in pleasure and get rid of and avert pain ? Are you look
ing to any other standard but pleasure and pain when
you call them good?" And Spencer thus agrees with
and answers Socrates over a gap of twenty-four centuries
as follows : — "We find it unquestionable that our ideas
of their goodness and badness really originate from our
consciousness of the certainty or probability that they
will produce pleasure or pain somewhere. It must be
admitted that the conceptions of virtue cannot be sepa
rated from the conception of happiness-producing con
duct. So that no school can avoid taking for the ultimate
moral aim a desirable state of feeling called by whatever
name, gratification, enjoyment, happiness. Pleasure
somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings, is an
inexpugnable element of the conception."

Thus we find an absolute unity in the basic ethical
philosophy of the greatest thinkers among the highest
civilizations of the past with the teachings of the greatest
scientific moralists of our own day, and this fact should
certainly lead us to give more honor and credit to these
grand old ethical " pagans" than they generally get in
popular estimation, and it should also increase our respect
for the modern evolutionary and utilitarian school of
ethics as being not only natural and rational, but simple
and practical, and combining the dicta of a consensus of
some of the greatest moral intellects in past and present
times.— C. M. H.

HERBERT SPENCER. Born at Derby, England,
April 2j, 1820. The great modern exponent of
Evolution and the Utilitarian Theory of Ethics.
The oldest living philosopher and the greatest
rationalistic thinker of the nineteenth century — the
Socrates, Aristotle and Epicurus of our day.

GIST OF SPENCERIAN ETHICS, A. D., 1893.

Thus there is no escape from the admission that in
calling good the conduct which siibserves life, and bad
the conduct which hinders or destroys it, and in so
implying that life is a blessing and not a ctirse, we are
inevitably asserting that conduct is good or bad ac
cording as its total effects are pleasurable or painful.

Using, then, as our tests, these most pronounced
forms of good and bad conduct, we find it unquestion
able that our ideas of their goodness and badness
really originate from our consciousness of the cer
tainty or probability that they will prodiice pleasures
or pains somewhere.

Unless it is asserted that courage and chastity could
still be thought of as virtues though thus productive
of misery, it must be admitted that the conceptions
of virtue cannot be separated from the conception of
happiness-producing conduct ; and that as this holds
of all the virtues, however otherwise unlike, it is from
their conduciveness to happiness that they come to be
classed as virtues.

So that no school can avoid taking for the ultimate
moral aim a desirable state of feeling called by
whatever name — gratification, enjoyment, happiness.
Pleasure somewhere, at some time, to some being or
beings, is an inexpugnable element of the conception.
It is as much a necessary form of moral intuition as
space is a necessary form of intellectual intuition.
Spencer* s Data of Ethics, Edition 1897.

HERBERT SPENCER,

From a photograph presented by Mr. Spencer to Dr. Lewis G. Janes.

SOCRATES AND THEIST1C ETHICS.

The chief opponent of the Socratic-Epicurean or
Utilitarian School of Ethics, has always been, as it now
is, what may be termed the " Theistic School of Ethics."
And by "Theistic" we mean that school — under what
ever religious or denominational name it may assume
from time to time in the world's history — which holds
that the true standard and motive for human conduct is
accordance with the "Will of God" or that course of con
duct in man which may be held to harmonize with the
" pleasure" or "desire" of the Infinite and contribute
primarily or essentially to the "honor" and "glory" of
God, and not primarily and essentially to the pleasure,
welfare or utility of man.

As, however, the Theistic School of Ethics is essen
tially religious and dogmatic in its character and origin,
it cannot be expected to show to logical or philosophic
advantage with that humane utilitarian system which, as
we have shown, has been developed rationally from a
natural and logical basis by some of the greatest and
most reverent minds of the world in past and present
times, and who have thereby placed ethics on a rational,
natural and self-commending basis as distinct from the
purely arbitrary and dogmatic ground of Theistic Schools.
And it is very interesting to here note that our old friend,

(i79)

i8o Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

Socrates, who we have already found to be the real
father of the modern utilitarian school of rational ethics,
was yet one of the greatest Theists among the Pagan
philosophers, and in many features of his religious belief,
as we have already shown, very closely approached the
belief of the Jew and Christian of apostolic days. And
yet, again, this great philosophic and religious Socrates
—the almost Christian Pagan — saw nothing derogatory
to his Theistic conception of God and the government of
the Universe in founding the true motive-basis of ethics
or good conduct in man on the ground primarily and
essentially of benefit, utility, pleasure, happiness, or
welfare, to man himself and not primarily on the " will,"
" pleasure," " honor," or "glory " of God as in the purely
Theistic system of ethics formulated both before and
since the days of Socrates.

Now to found the motive-basis for good conduct in
man on the ground primarily of "benefit" to an "Infinite
and All-Perfect Being," instead of primarily on benefit
to man himself, would to the logical and rational utili
tarian seem not only extravagant and essentially irrever
ent and absurd, but as a vain and childish attempt to
patronize the Infinite. For, obviously, "The Infinite"
stands in no need of "benefits" from man, but man does
very much need the great benefits which right conduct
can confer upon himself. Hence it is reverently believed
that there can be no higher, more sane, or more practical
ground for human ethics than that of "enlightened self-
interest " for one's-self and one's neighbor on the great
lines of Prudence, Justice and Fortitude, which form the
trinity of practical Virtue.

Not only do the greatest philosophers of the Greek
and Roman civilizations agree with the ethics of our
modern rationalists as already shown, but it is further

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 181

interesting to note that a still more ancient and extensive
rational school — the Confucianists of China — is also in
full accord with them. Thus the Chinese Sages teach
these clear utilitarian doctrines :

" The senses and the mind are what Heaven has given
us. To preserve our mental constitution and nourish
our nature is the way to serve Heaven."

" To give one's-self earnestly to the duties due to men,
and while respecting spiritual beings to keep aloof from
them, may be called Wisdom."

" The doctrine of our Master is to be true to the prin
ciples of our nature and the benevolent exercise of them
to others — this and nothing more." *

Now the foregoing texts give us a pure utilitarianism
in the Chinese form which is as true and rational in tone
as anything expressed by Socrates, Epicurus or Herbert
Spencer, and when taken in connection with what we
have quoted from the Greek Philosophers, proves how
wide and deep is the philosophic support for the utili
tarian theory in ancient as well as in modern thought.

Even that great old ethical Hebrew, the prophet Micah,
who was almost contemporary with Confucius, may be
claimed also as a true utilitarian in Ethics, as is shown
in that grand little verse which may be said to be one of
the purest pieces of ethics in the Old Testament :

" What doth the Lord require of thee but to do justly,
and to love mercy, and to walk humbly."f In this we
have a purely ethical creed, sufficient for the regulation
of any life— Justice, Kindness, Simplicity and Reason
ableness — and it is purely utilitarian, as it concerns itself
primarily and directly with benefit to man. — C. M. H.

•See Legge's Chinese Classics, and Prof. James' Ethics of Chinese Sages,
t Micah, VI. 8. King James Version.

ARISTOTLE ON THE IDEA OF GOD.

Note: — This extract is taken from Aristotle's Meta
physics.

After having presented the arguments for the exist
ence of God as the first cause of the world's order, Aris
totle proceeds to describe His nature more definitely in
a separate chapter. The argument consists in the ne
cessity of a prime mover as the condition of the world's
motion which is supposed to be circular. — J. H. H.

" Since this is the fact of the case, and since, if it is
not so, the world must have originated from chaos and
nothing, which difficulties are removed by the above
supposition, there exists something which never ceases
to move and which moves in a circle. This is evident,
both from reason and from the facts of observation.
Consequently the first heaven is eternal and there exists
something that moves it, and as that which is both
moved and moving stands between these, there must also
exist something which moves without being moved,
which is eternal and a self-existent reality. It imparts
motion thus. The appetitive and the conscious move
without being moved. Both are in their origin one and

the same. For that which appears as pleasant is desired

(182)

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers, 183

and the original object of the will is that which appears
pleasant. We desire it because it is pleasant, but it does
not appear pleasant because it is beautiful. The begin
ning is thought. Reason, however, is moved by the
thought of the intelligible. But the intelligible is in
itself only a series of things of like kind, and in this is
the independent first cause, and from it comes the simple
and actual. The one and the simple are nevertheless
not the same. The one is that which indicates a limit ;
the simple is that which indicates quality. But the
pleasant and that which is desirable on its own account,
is also found in this series, and the first cause is always
the highest or something like it. Also the final cause
exists in the unmoved, and is shown in this division
itself. For the final cause is contained in something.
The one is or exists already, the other does not. The
final cause moves as a thing that is desired. The moved
imparts motion to other things. When now anything
is moved it is such that it might have been otherwise.
Circular motion is the first form and if this is actual this
motion cannot occur otherwise than in space, although
this is not according to its nature in itself. But if a
moving cause which is itself unmoved but active, be
assumed, it is impossible that its conduct should be
otherwise. Motion is the first step in evolution and this
first motion is circular and was caused by the first mover.
For this reason must the first mover be necessarily ex
istent, and in so far as it is necessary it is also noble, and
with this constitutes the first principle. Necessity or
the necessary has two meanings. One of them is that
which is effected by some power against a natural
impulse. Then there is one which denotes that without
which the good cannot take place, and finally, it denotes
that which cannot be otherwise, that which is absolutely.

184 Rthics of the Greek Philosophers.

On such a first cause depends both the heavens and the
order of physical nature. His life is of such excellence
that we can only realize it for a limited period. But
this Being remains always so. For us this is impossible,
but not for this Supreme Being for whom also pleasure
is activity. For this reason also consciousness, per
ception, and thought are the most pleasant. Hopes
and recollection, however, are effected through these.
Thought belongs to God as his best attribute and the
highest degree of thought belongs to the best Being in
the highest degree. Reason knows itself by compre
hending or participating in its object. It is through this
comprehension and reflection that it becomes a thinking
Being, so that Reason and the object thought are one
and the same : for reason is that which can comprehend
the thinkable and the real or existent. It is active in as
much as it has this within itself. What Reason seems
to possess as divine, God also has in a higher degree,
and this intuitive thought is the noblest and best. If
now God is always so excellent in his nature, as we are
only at times and for a limited period, and this quality
is worthy of reverence, so it is still more to be reverenced
when it is possessed by God in a higher degree. This
is the fact in his case. He is the seat of life : for the
activity of Reason is life and the nature of God is activity.
We say of Divinity that it is the eternal and most ex
cellent form of life, so that this quality must belong to
the eternal and uninterrupted existence of the Godhead."

Note : — It will be observed that Aristotle's conception
of God as above given is substantially the same as Plato's
conception of " Soul," as given in the extract from the
Phaedrus and the Laws on pages 144-5, the "Universal
Soul" or the "Soul of the Universe" being of course

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 185

only another name for " the Deity." And it is plain that
Aristotle got his conception of God from the Platonic
conception of soul, which in both cases is declared to be
in essence Motion which is self-moved.

For further light on Aristotle's conception of God,
see the last paragraphs given in the abstract of his
Ethics.— C. M. H.

ARISTOTLE ON THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.

Note : — This extract is taken from Aristotle's "His
tory of Animals," Cresswell's Translation, Bohn Edition.
J. H. H.

"Nature passes so gradually from inanimate to ani
mate things, that from their continuity their boundary
and the intermediate forms are indistinct or indeter
minate. The race of plants succeeds immediately that
of inanimate objects, and these differ from each other in
the proportion of life in which they participate; for com
pared with other objects appear to possess life, though
when compared with animals, they appear inanimate.

"The change from plants to animals, however, is
gradual, as I before observed. For a person might ques
tion to which of these classes some marine objects be
long: for many of them are attached to the rocks and
perish as soon as they are separated from it. The pinnae
(mollusk) are attached to the rocks, the solens (shell
fish) cannot live after they are taken away from their
localities ; and, on the whole, all the testacea resemble
plants, if we compare them with locomotive animals.
Some of them appear to have no sensation ; in others it

is very dull. The body of some of them is naturally

(186)

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 187

flesh-like, as in those called tethides (gastropod) ; and
the Medusae and the sponges entirely resemble plants.
The progress is always gradual by which one appears
to have more life and motion than another."

Note : — In that very interesting and informing work
" From the Greeks to Darwin," by Prof. Osborn of
Columbia University, we quote the following paragraphs
which will show the great contribution which Aristotle
has made to the Evolution Theory as one of its early
pioneers. — C. M. H.

" With Aristotle (384-322 B. C.) we enter a new world.
He towered above his predecessors, and by the force of
his own genius created Natural History. In his own
words, lately quoted by Romanes, we learn that the cen
turies preceding him yielded him nothing but vague
speculation :—

"I found no basis prepared; no models to copy. . . .
Mine is the first step, and therefore a small one, though
worked out with much thought and hard labor. It must
be looked at as a first step and judged with indulgence.
You, my readers, or hearers of my lectures, if you think
I have done as much as can fairly be required for an
initiatory start, as compared with more advanced depart
ments of theory, will acknowledge what I have achieved
and pardon what I have left for others to accomplish.'
******

" He was attracted to natural history by his boyhood
life upon the seashore, and the main parts of his ideas
upon Evolution were evidently drawn from his own ob
servations upon the gradations between marine plants
and the lower and higher forms of marine animals. He
was the first to conceive of a genetic series, and his con-

1 88 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

ception of a single chain of evolution from the polyps
to man was never fully replaced until the beginning of
this century. It appeared over and over again in differ
ent guises. In all his philosophy of Nature, Aristotle
was guided partly by his preconceived opinions derived
from Plato and Socrates, and parti)7 by convictions de
rived from his own observations upon the wonderful
order and perfection of the Universe. His ' perfecting
principle ' in Nature is only one of a score of his legacies
to later speculation upon Evolution causation. Many
of our later writers are Aristotelians without apparently
being conscious of it.

******
"We can pass leniently by errors which are strewn
among such grand contributions to Biology and to the
very foundation-stones of the Evolution idea.

******

"While Plato had relied upon intuitions as the main
ground of true knowledge, Aristotle relied upon experi
ment and induction. ' We must not/ he said, ' accept
a general principle from logic only, but must prove its
application to each fact ; for it is in facts that we must
seek general principles, and these must always accord
with facts. Experience furnishes the particular facts
from which induction is the pathway to general laws '
(History of Animals, 1.6.) He held that errors do not
arise because the senses are false media, but because we
put false interpretations upon their testimony.

" Aristotle's theories as to the origin and succession of
life went far beyond what he could have reached by the
legitimate application of his professed method of pro
cedure. Having now briefly considered the materials of
his knowledge, let us carefully examine how he put his
facts together into an Evolution system which had the

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 189

teachings of Plato and Socrates for its primary philo
sophical basis.

" Aristotle believed in a complete gradation in Nature,
a progressive development corresponding with the pro
gressive life of the soul. Nature, he says, proceeds con
stantly by the aid of gradual transitions from the most
imperfect to the most perfect, while the numerous
analogies which we find in the various parts of the ani
mal scale, show that all is governed by the same laws,—
in other words, Nature is a unit as to its causation. The
lowest stage is the inorganic, and this passes into the
organic by direct metamorphosis, matter being trans
formed into life. Plants are animate as compared with
minerals, and inanimate as compared with animals ; they
have powers of nourishment and reproduction, but no
feeling or sensibility. Then come the plant-animals, or
Zoophytes ; these are the marine creatures, such as
sponges and sea anemones, which leave the observer most
in doubt, for they grow upon rocks and die if detached.
(Polyps, Aristotle wrongly thought were plants, while
sponges he rightly considered animals). The third step
taken by Nature is the development of animals with
sensibility, — hence desire for food and other needs of life,
and hence locomotion to fulfil these desires. Here was
a more complex and energetic form of the original life.
Man is the highest point of one long and continuous
ascent; other animals have the faculty of thought; man
alone generalizes and forms abstractions; he is physically
superior in his erect position, in his purest and largest
blood supply, largest brain, and highest temperature.
* * *

" Aristotle perceived a most marvelous adaptation in
the arrangement of the world, and felt compelled to as
sume Intelligent Design as the primary cause of things,

I go Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

by the perfection and regularity which he observed in
Nature. Nothing, he held, which occurs regularly, can
be the result of accident. This perfection is the outcome
of an all-pervading movement, which we should, in nine
teenth-century language, speak of as an ' internal per
fecting tendency.' In Aristotle's conception of ' move
ment,' as outlined in his Physics, we find something very
analogous to our modern biological conception of trans
formation in development, for he analyzes 'movement*
as every change, as every realization of what is possible,
consisting in: (a) Substantial movement, origin and
decay, as we should now sa)% development and degenera
tion ; (b) Quantitative movement, addition and subtrac
tion, or, in modern terms, the gain and loss of parts; (c)
Qualitative movement, or the transition of one material
into another, in metamorphosis and change of function ;
(d) Local movement, or change of place, in the trans
position of parts.

" Thus Aristotle thought out the four essential features
of Evolution as a process ; but we have found no evi
dence that he actually applied this conception to the
development of organisms or of organs, as we do now
in the light of our modern knowledge of the actual stages
of Evolution. This enables us to understand Aristotle's
view of Nature as the principle of motion and rest com.
prised in his four Causes. Here again he is more or
less metaphysical. The first is the ' physical Material
cause,' or matter itself ; the second is the ' physical
Formal cause,' or the forces of the ' perfecting principle ; '
the third is the 'abstract Final cause,' the fitness, adapta
tion, or purpose, the good of each and all ; the fourth,
presiding over all, is the ' Efficient cause,' the Prime

Mover, or God.

* * * . * * * *

EMPEDOCLES,

B.C. 450.
One of the Pioneers of Evolution. (See P. 1W.)

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 191

"Whether or not Aristotle viewed the Prime Mover
as sustaining his laws or as having preordained them,
he certainly does not believe in Special Creation, either
of adaptations or of organisms, nor in the interference of
the Prime Mover in Nature ; the struggle towards per
fection is a natural process, as where he says : ' It is due
to the resistance of matter to form that Nature can
only rise by degrees from lower to higher types.' There
is, therefore, no doubt that he was not a teleologist in
the ordinary sense ; at the very heart of his theory of
Evolution was this ' internal perfecting tendency,' driv
ing organisms progressively forward into more perfect
types. He viewed man as the flower of Nature, towards
which all had been tending, the crowning end, purpose,
or final cause. His theory was then anthropocentric :
1 plants are evidently for the sake of animals, and animals
for the sake of man ; thus Nature, which does nothing
in vain, has done all things for the sake of man.'

" Aristotle's view is brought out clearly and emphatic
ally in the most striking passage of all his writings
where he undertakes to refute Empedocles. This is of
the greatest interest to-day, because Aristotle clearly
states and rejects a theory of the origin or adaptive
structures in animals altogether similar to that of
Darwin.

******

"These passages seem to contain absolute evidence
that Aristotle had substantially the modern conception
of the Evolution of life, from a primordial, soft mass of
living matter to the most perfect forms, and that even
in these he believed Evolution was incomplete, for they
were progressing to higher forms. His argument of the
analogy between the operation of natural law, rather
than of chance, in the lifeless and in the living world, is

1 92 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

a perfectly logical one, and his consequent rejection of
the hypothesis of the Survival of the Fittest, a sound
induction from his own limited knowledge of Nature.
It seems perfectly clear that he placed all under second
ary natural laws. If he had accepted Etnpedocles'
hypothesis, he would have been the literal prophet of
Darwinism."

ABSTRACT OF ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

Note: — After indicating that the ground of what is
right is the end, as distinguished from the theories of
earlier writers, Aristotle defines this end as follows: —
J. H. H.

"The best of all things must be something final. If
then there be only one final end, this will be what we
are seeking, or if there be more than one, then the most
final of them.

"Now that which is pursued as an end in itself is more
final than that which is pursued as means to something
else, and that is strictly final which is always chosen as
an end in itself and never as a means.

"Happiness or welfare seems more than anything else
to answer to this description; for wre always choose it for
itself, and never for the sake of something else.

" But a still more precise definition is needed. This
will be gained by asking, what is the function of man?
For as the good or excellence of a piper or a sculptor,
or the practiser of any art, and generally of those who
have any function or business to do, lies in that function,
so man's good would seem to lie in his function, if he
has one. What then is it ?

(i93)

194 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

"The function of man is exercise of his vital faculties
on one side in obedience to reason, and on the other with
reason. Man's function then being, as we say, a kind
of life or exercise of his faculties, the good man's function
is to do this well and nobly.

" Nothing human is so constant as the exercise of our
faculties. The highest of these exercises are the most
abiding, because the happy are occupied with them most
of all and most continuously. The happy man, then, as
we define him, will have this required property of con
stancy, and all through life will preserve his character;
for he will be occupied continually, or with the least
possible interruption, in excellent deeds and excellent
speculations : and whatever his fortune be he will take
it in the noblest fashion, and bear himself always and
in all things suitably, since he is truly good and ' four
square without a flaw.'

" But the dispensations of fortune are many, some
great, some small. The small ones, whether good or
evil, plainly are of no weight in the scale. But the great
ones, when numerous, will make life happier if they be
good; for they help to give a grace to life themselves,
and their use is noble and good. But if they be evil,
they will enfeeble and spoil happiness, for they bring
pain, and often impede the exercise of our faculties.

" But nevertheless true worth shines out even here, in
the calm endurance of many great misfortunes, not
through insensibility, but through nobility and greatness
of soul. And if it is what man does that determines the
character of his life, then no happy man will become
afflicted ; for he will never do what is hateful and base.
For we hold that the man who is truly good and wise
will bear with dignity whatever fortune sends, and will
always make the best of his circumstances, as a good

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 195

general will turn the forces at his command to the best
account." Nic. Eth. Book I.

" Excellence being of these two kinds, intellectual and
moral, intellectual excellence owes its birth and growth
mainly to instruction, and so requires time and experi
ence, while moral excellence is the result of habit or
custom. From this it is plain that none of the moral
excellences or virtues is implanted in us by nature: for
that which is by nature cannot be altered by training.
For instance, a stone naturally tends to fall downwards,
and you could not train it to rise upwards, though you
tried to do so by throwing it up ten thousand times, nor
could you train fire to move downwards, nor accustom
anything which naturally behaves in one way to behave
in another way. The virtues then come neither by
nature nor against nature, but nature gives the capacity
for acquiring them, and this is developed by training.

" Both virtues and vices result from and are formed
by the same acts in which they manifest themselves, as
is the case with the arts also. It is by harping that good
harpers and bad harpers alike are produced ; and so with
builders and the rest. Indeed, if it were not so, they
would not want anybody to teach them, but would all be
born either good or bad at their trades. And it is just
the same with the virtues also. It is by our conduct in
our intercourse with other men that we become just or
unjust, and by acting in circumstances of danger, and
training ourselves to feel fear and confidence, that we
become courageous or cowardly. In a word, the several
habits or characters are formed by the same kind of acts
as those which they produce.

" The pleasure or pain that accompanies the acts must
be taken as a test of the formed habit or character. He
who abstains from the pleasures of the body and rejoices

196 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

in abstinence, is temperate, while he who is vexed at
having to abstain, is profligate. It is pleasure that moves
us to do what is base, and pain moves us to refrain from
what is noble. And therefore, as Plato says, man needs
to be so trained from his youth up as to find pleasure
and pain in the right objects. This is what a sound
education means.

" Virtue, then, has to do with feelings or passions and
with outward acts in which excess is wrong and de
ficiency is also blamed, but the mean is praised and is
right — both of which are characteristics of virtue.
Virtue, then, is a kind of moderation in as much as it
aims at the mean or moderate amount. And it is a
moderation in as much as it comes in the middle or mean
between two vices, one on the side of excess, the other
on the side of defect, and in as much as, while these vices
fall short of or exceed the due measure in feeling and in
action, it finds and chooses the mean." Nic. Eth.
Book II.

" Virtue, as we have seen, has to do with feelings and
actions. Now praise or blame is given only to what is
voluntary: that which is involuntary receives pardon,
and sometimes pity.

" It seems, therefore, that a clear distinction between
the voluntary and the involuntary is necessary for those
who are investigating the nature of virtue, and will also
help legislators in assigning rewards and punishments.
That is generally held to be involuntary which is done
under compulsion or through ignorance. (That is
voluntary which is intentional and done with knowl
edge.)

" Now that we have distinguished voluntary from in
voluntary acts, our next task is to discuss choice or pur
pose. For it seems to be most intimately connected with

THE TRUE LIFE OF REASON AND
RIGHTEOUSNESS.

" This exercise of faculty must be the highest pos
sible ; for reason is the highest of our faculties, and of
all knowable things those that reason deals with are
the highest.

" The exercise of reason seems to be superior in
seriousness, and to aim at no end beside itself, and to
have its proper pleasure. Its exercise seems further
to be self-sufficient and inexhaustible, and to have all
the other characteristics ascribed to happiness. A life
that realised this idea would be something more than
human ; for it would not be the expression of mart s
nature, but of some divine element in that nature — the
exercise of which is as far superior to the exercise of
the other kind of virtue as this divine element is su
perior to our compound nature. If then reason be di
vine as compared with man, the life which consists in
the exercise of reason zvill also be divine in comparison
with human life. Nevertheless, instead of listening
to those who advise us as men and mortals not to lift
our thoughts above what is human and mortal, we
ought rather, as far as possible, to put off our mor
tality and make every effort to live in the exercise of
the highest of our facilities ; for though it be but a
small part of us, yet in power and value it far sur
passes all the rest. And indeed this part would seem
to constitute our true self, since it is the sovereign and
the better part. It would be strange, then, if a man
were to prefer the life of something else to the life of
his true self. ' '

From Aristotle** s Ethics.

B. C.35o.

ARISTOTLE

THE "PERIPATETIC" PHILOSOPHER-WALKING AS HE TAUGHT.
(From Stanley's History.)

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 197

virtue, and to be a surer test of character than virtue
itself.

" It seems that choosing is willing, but that the two
terms are not identical, willing being the wider. For
children and animals have will, but not choice or pur
pose: and acts done upon the spur of the moment are
said to be voluntary, but not to be done with deliberate
purpose.

" We have seen that, while we wish for the end, we de
liberate upon and choose the means thereto. Actions
that are concerned with means will be guided by choice,
and so will be voluntary. But the acts in which the
virtues are manifested are concerned with means.

" Therefore, virtue depends upon ourselves : and vice
likewise. For where it lies with us to do, it lies with us
not to do. Where we can say no, we can say yes. If
then the doing of a deed, which is noble, lies with us,
the not doing it, which is disgraceful, also lies with us.

" If these statements commend themselves to us, and if
we are unable to trace our acts to any other sources than
those that depend upon ourselves, then that whose source
is within us must depend upon us and be voluntary.
This seems to be attested by each one of us in private
life, and also by the legislators ; for they correct and
punish those that do evil, except when it is done under
compulsion, or through ignorance for which the agent is
not responsible, and honor those that do noble deeds.

" I say * ignorance for which the agent is not re
sponsible,' for the ignorance itself is punished by the
law, if the agent appears to be responsible for his defect
ive knowledge. Ignorance of any of the ordinances of
the law, which a man ought to know, and easily can
know, does not avert punishment. And so in other
cases, where ignorance seems to be the result of negli-

198 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

gence, the offender is punished, since it lay with him to
remove this ignorance, for he might have taken the req
uisite trouble.

" It might be objected that it was the man's character
not to take the trouble.

"We reply that men are themselves responsible for ac
quiring such a character by a dissolute life, and for being
unjust or profligate in consequence of repeated acts of
wrong, or of spending their time in drinking, and so on.
For it is repeated acts of a particular kind that give a
man a particular character.

" We see, then, that of the vices of the body it is those
that depend on ourselves that are censured, while those
that do not depend upon ourselves are not censured.
And if this be so, then in other fields also those vices
that are blamed must depend upon ourselves.

" Some people may perhaps object to this. 'All men/
they may say, ' desire that which appears good to them,
but cannot control this appearance ; a man's character,
whatever it be, decides what shall appear to him to be
the end.'

" If, I answer, each man be in some way responsible for
his habits of character, then in some way he must be
responsible for this appearance also. But if this be not
the case, then a man is not responsible for, or is not the
cause of, his own evil doing, but it is through ignorance
of the end that he does evil.

" Now supposing this to be true, how will virtue be any
more voluntary than vice? For whether it be nature or
anything else that determines what shall appear to be the
end, it is determined in the same way for both alike, for
the good man as well as the bad, and both alike refer all
their acts of whatever kind, to it.

"And so whether we hold that it is not merely nature

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 199

that decides what appears to each to be the end, but that
the man himself contributes something; or whether we
hold that the end is fixed by nature, but that virtue is
voluntary, in as much as the good man voluntarily takes
the steps to that end — in either case vice will be just as
voluntary as virtue, for self is active in the bad man just
as much as in the good man, in choosing the particular
acts at least, if not in determining the end.

" We have thus described in outline the nature of the
virtues in general, viz., that they are forms of modera
tion or modes of observing the mean, and that they are
habits or trained faculties ; and we have shown what
produces them, and how they themselves issue in the
performance of the same acts which produce them, and
that they depend on ourselves and are voluntary, and
that they follow the guidance of right reason.

" But our particular acts are not voluntary in the same
sense as our habits. We are masters of our acts from
beginning to end, when we know the particular circum
stances; but we are masters of the beginnings only of
our habits or characters, while their, growth by gradual
steps is imperceptible, like the growth of disease. In as
much, however, as it lay with us to employ our faculties
in this way, the resulting characters are on that account
voluntary." Nic. Eth. Book III.

" We have now to inquire about justice and injustice,
and to ask what sort of acts they are concerned with,
and in what sense justice observes the mean, and what
are the extremes whose mean is that which is just.

"We see that all men intend by justice to signify the
sort of habit or character that makes men apt to do what
is lawful, and which further makes them act lawfully
and wish what is lawful or just. By injustice they in
tend in like manner to signify the sort of character that

2OO Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

makes men act unlawfully and wish what is unlawful
or unjust.

" Plainly, then, a just man will be ( i ) a law-abiding and
(2) a fair man. A just thing, then, will be (i) that
which is in accordance with law, (2) that which is fair;
and the unjust thing will be (i) that which is contrary
to law, and (2) that which is unfair.

"Now the laws prescribe about all manner of things,
aiming at the common interest of all, or of the best men,
or of those who are supreme in the state ; and so in one
sense we apply the term 'just' to whatever tends to pro
duce and preserve the happiness of the community, and
the several elements of that happiness. The law bids
us to display courage (as not to leave our ranks, or to
run, or throw away our arms), and temperance, (as not
to commit adultery or outrage), and gentleness, (as not
to strike or revile our neighbors), and so on with all the
other virtues and vices.

"Justice, then, in this sense of the word, is complete
virtue, with the addition that it is displayed toward
others. On this account it is often spoken of as the chief
of the virtues, and such that ' neither evening nor morn
ing star is so lovely ; ' and the saying has become
proverbial, 'Justice sums up all virtues in itself.'

"It is complete virtue because it is the exhibition of
complete excellence : it is also complete because he that
has it is able to exhibit virtue in dealing with his neigh
bors, and not merely in his private affairs ; for there are
many who can be virtuous at home, but fail in dealing
with their neighbors. This is the reason why people
commend the saying of Bias : ' Office will show the man ; '
for he that is in office ipso facto stands in relation to
others and has dealings with them.

"This too is the reason why justice alone of all the

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 201

virtues is thought to be another's good, as implying this
relation to others: for it is another's interest that justice
aims at — the interest, namely, of the ruler or of our
fellow-citizens.

" We have next to speak of equity and of that which
is equitable, and to inquire how equity is related to jus
tice, and how that which is equitable to that which is just.
For, on consideration, they do not seem to be absolutely
identical, nor yet generically different. At one time we
praise that which is equitable and the equitable man,
and even use the word metaphorically as a term of praise
synonymous with good, showing that we consider that
the more equitable a thing is the better it is. At another
time we reflect and find it strange that what is equitable
should be praiseworthy, if it be different from what is
just; for, we argue, if it be something else, either what
is just is not good, or what is equitable is not good; if
both be good, they are the same.

" But what obscures the matter is that, though what
is equitable is just, it is not identical with, but a correc
tion of, that which is just according to law. The reason
for this is that every law is laid down in general terms,
while there are matters about which it is impossible to
speak correctly in general terms. Where, then, it is nec
essary to speak in general terms, but impossible to do so
correctly, the legislator lays down that which holds good
for the majority of cases, being quite aware that it does
not hold good for all. What is equitable, then, is just,
and better than what is just in one sense of the word-
not better than what is absolutely just, but better than
that which fails through its lack of qualification. And
the essence of what is equitable is that it is an amend
ment of the law, in those points where it fails through
the generality of its language." Nic. Eth. Book V.

2O2 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

" Now that we have discussed the several kinds of
virtue, it remains to give a summary account of happi
ness, since we are to assume that it is the end of all that
man does.

"As we have often said, that is truly valuable and
pleasant which is so to the perfect man. Now, the ex
ercise of those trained faculties which are proper to him
is what each man finds most desirable ; what the perfect
man finds most desirable, therefore, is the exercise of
virtue. Happiness, consequently, does not consist in
amusement, and, indeed, it is absurd to suppose that the
end is amusement, and that we toil and moil all our life
long for the sake of amusing ourselves. The happy life
is thought to be that which exhibits virtue ; and such a
life must be serious and cannot consist in amusement.

" But if happiness be the exercise of virtue, it is rea
sonable to suppose that it will be the exercise of the
highest virtue, and that it will be the virtue or excellence
of the best part of us. Now that part or faculty — call it
reason or what you will — which seems naturally to rule
and take the lead, and to apprehend things noble and
divine — whether it be itself divine, or only the divinest
part of us — is the faculty, the exercise of which, in its
proper excellence, will be perfect happiness.

" That this consists in the contemplative life we have
already said. This exercise of faculty must be the high
est possible ; for reason is the highest of our faculties,
and of all knowable things those that reason deals with
are the highest. We think too, that pleasure ought to
be one of the ingredients of happiness ; but of all virtu
ous exercises it is allowed that the pleasantest is the
exercise of wisdom. At least philosophy is thought to
have pleasures that are admirable in purity and stead
fastness. What is called self-sufficiency will be most of

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 203

all found in the reflective life. The necessaries of life,
indeed, are needed by the wise man as well as by the just
man and others ; but, when these have been provided in
due quantity, the just man further needs further persons
towards whom, and along with whom, he may act justly,
while the wise man is able to contemplate even by him
self, and the wiser he is the more he is able to do this.

" The exercise of reason seems to be superior in seri
ousness, and to aim at no end besides itself, and to have
its proper pleasure. Its exercise seems further to be
self-sufficient and inexhaustible, and to have all the other
characteristics ascribed to happiness. A life that realized
this idea would be something more than human ; for it
would not be the expression of man's nature, but of some
divine element in that nature — the exercise of which is
as far superior to the exercise of the other kind of virtue,
as this divine element is superior to our compound
nature. If then reason be divine as compared with man,
the life which consists in the exercise of reason will also
be divine in comparison with human life. Nevertheless,
instead of listening to those who advise us as men and
mortals, not to lift our thoughts above what is human
and mortal, we ought rather, as far as possible, to put
off our mortality and make every effort to live in the
exercise of the highest of our faculties ; for though it be
but a small part of us, yet in power and value it far sur
passes all the rest. And indeed, this part would seem to
constitute our true self, since it is the sovereign and the
better part. It would be strange, then, if a man were
to prefer the life of something else to the life of his true
self.

"The life that consists in the exercise of the other
kind of virtue is happy in a secondary sense; for the
manifestation of moral virtue is emphatically human.

204 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

Justice, I mean, and courage and the other moral virtues
(contrasted with the intellectual) are displayed in our
relations towards one another by the observance, in every
case, of what is due in contracts and services, and all
sorts of outward acts as well as in our inward feelings.
All these seem to be emphatically human affairs. But
the happiness which consists in the exercise of the
reason, is separate from our lower nature.

"That perfect happiness is some kind of speculative
or reflective activity may also be shown in the following
way :

" It is always supposed that the gods are, of all beings,
the most blessed and happy; but what kind of actions
shall we ascribe to them ? Acts of justice? Surely it is
ridiculous to conceive the gods engaged in trade and re
storing deposits, and so on. Or acts of courage? Can
we conceive them enduring fearful risks and facing
danger because it is noble to do so ? Or acts of liberality ?
But to whom are they to give? Is it not absurd to sup
pose that they have any money or anything of the kind?
And what could acts of temperance mean with them ?
Surely it would be an insult to praise them for having
no evil desires. In short, if we were to go through the
whole list, we should find that all action is petty and
unworthy of the gods.

" And yet it is universally supposed that they live,
and therefore that they exert their powers ; for we can
not suppose that they are sleeping like Endymion.
Now if a being lives, and action cannot be ascribed to
him, still less production, what remains but contempla
tion? It follows, then, that the divine life, which sur
passes all others in blessedness, consists in contempla
tion." Nic. Eth. Book X.

FROM ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

BOOKS i and 2.

TliE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF A POLITICAL
STATE OR GOVERNMENT.

STATUS OF PROPERTY — SOCIALISTIC AND
INDIVIDUALISTIC CONSIDERED.

"Every state is a community of some kind, and every
community is established with a view to some good ; for
mankind always act in order to obtain that which they
think good. But, if all communities aim at some good,
the state or political community, which is the highest of
all, and which embraces all the rest, aims, and in a
greater degree than any other, at the highest good.

"The family is the association established by nature
for the supply of men's every day wants, and the mem
bers of it are called by Charondas ' companions of the
cupboard,' and by Epimenides the Cretan, 'companions
of the manger.' But when several families are united,
and the association aims at something more than the
supply of daily needs, then comes into existence the
village.

" When several villages are united in a single com
munity, perfect and large enough to be nearly or quite
self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating
in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for
the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier

(205)

206 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the
end of them, and the (completed) nature is the end.
For what each thing is when fully developed, we call
its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse,
or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing
is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the
best.

" Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of na
ture, and that man is by nature a political animal. And
he who by nature and not by mere accident is without
a state, is either above humanity, or below it ; he is the

4 Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one,'

whom Homer denounces — the outcast who is a lover of
war; he may be compared to a bird which flies alone.

" Now the reason why man is more of a political ani
mal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evi
dent. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain,
and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with
the gift of speech.

"And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has
any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the
association of living beings who have this sense makes
a family and a state.

" The proof that the state is a creation of nature and
prior to the individual is that the individual, when
isolated, is not self-sufficing ; and therefore he is like a
part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to
live in society, or who has no need because he is suffi
cient for himself, must be either a beast or a god : he is
no part of a state. A social instinct is implanted in all
men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state
was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when per
fected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from
law and justice, he is the worst of all ; since armed in-

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 207

justice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth
with the arms of intelligence and with moral qualities
which he may use for the worst ends. Wherefore, if he
have not virtue, he is the most unholy and the most
savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony.
But justice is the bond of men in states, and the ad
ministration of justice, which is the determination of
what is just, is the principle of order in political society.

" The relations of husband and wife, parent and child,
their several virtues, what in their intercourse with one
another is good, and what is evil, and how we may
pursue the good and escape the evil, will have to be dis
cussed when we speak of the different forms of govern
ment. For, inasmuch as every family is a part of a
state, and these relationships are the parts of a family,
the virtue of the part must have regard to the virtue of
the whole. And therefore women and children must be *•/
trained by education with an eye to the state, if the
virtues of either of them are supposed to make any dif
ference in the virtues of the state. And they must make
a difference: for the children grow up to be citizens, and
half the free persons in a state are wonen.

"Next let us consider what should be our arrangements
about property : should the citizens of the perfect state
have their possessions in common or not?

" Property should be in a certain sense common, but, as
a general rule, private ; for, when everyone has a distinct
interest, men will not complain of one another, and they
will make more progress, because every one will be at
tending to his own business. And yet among the good,
and in respect of use, 'Friends,' as the proverb says,
'will have all things common.'

" No one, when men have all things in common, w7ill
any longer set an example of liberality or do any liberal

208 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

action ; for liberality consists in the use which is made
of property.

"Such legislation may have a specious appearance of
benevolence; men readily listen to it, and are easily in
duced to believe that in some wonderful manner every
body will become everybody's friend, especially when
some one is heard denouncing the evils now existing in
states, suits about contracts, convictions for perjury,
flatteries of rich men and the like, which are said to
arise out of the possession of private property. These
evils, however, are due to a very different cause — the
wickedness of human nature. Indeed, we see that there
is more quarreling among those who have all things in
common, though there are not many of them when com
pared with the vast numbers who have private property.

" Some, indeed, say that the best constitution is a com
bination of all existing forms, and they praise the
Lacedaemonian because it is made up of oligarchy,
monarchy, and democracy, the king forming the mon
archy, and the council of elders the oligarchy, while the
democratic element is represented by the Ephors; for
the Ephors are selected from the people. Others, how
ever, declare the Ephoralty to be a tyranny, and find the
element of democracy in the common meals and in the
habits of daily life. In the Laws,* it is maintained that
the best state is made up of democracy and tyranny,
which are either not constitutions at all, or are the worst
of all. But they are nearer the truth who combine many
forms; for the state is better which is made up of more
numerous elements. The constitution proposed in the
Laws has no element of monarchy at all ; it is nothing
but oligarchy and democracy, leaning rather to oligarchy.

"Jn the opinion of some, the regulation of property is
the chief point of all, that being the question upon which

* Plato1 s ' ' Laws " is here referred to.

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 209

all revolutions turn. This danger was recognized by
Phaleas of Chalcedon, who was the first to affirm that
the citizens of a state ought to have equal possessions.
He thought that in a new colony the equalization might
be accomplished without difficulty, not so easily when
a state was already established ; and that then the short
est way of compassing the desired end would be for the
rich to give and not to receive marriage portions, and
for the poor not to give but to receive them.

" Plato in the Laws was of opinion that, to a certain
extent, accumulation should be allowed, forbidding, as
I have already observed, any citizen to possess more
than five times the minimum qualification. But those
who make such laws should remember what they are
apt to forget, — that the legislator who fixes the amount
of property should also fix the number of children ; for,
if the children are too many for the property, the law
must be broken. And, besides the violation of the law,
it is a bad thing that many from being rich should be
come poor ; for men of ruined fortunes are sure to stir
up revolutions. That the equalization of property
exercises an influence on political society was clearly
understood even by some of the old legislators. Laws
were made by Solon and others prohibiting an individual
from possessing as much land as he pleased ; and there
are other laws in states which forbid the sale of property :
among the Locrians, for example, there is a law that a
man is not to sell his property unless he can prove un
mistakably that some misfortune has befallen him.
Again, there have been laws which enjoin the preserva
tion of the original lots. Such a law existed in the
island of Leucas, and the abrogation of it made the con
stitution too democratic, for the rulers no longer had the
prescribed qualification."

FROM ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS,
BOOK III.

CITIZENS AND STATES OF VARIOUS KINDS CONSIDERED.

THE BEST FORMS OF GOVERNMENT AND

THE BEST CITIZEN DISCUSSED.

" He who would inquire into the nature and various
kinds of government must first of all determine ' What is
a state? ' At present this is a disputed question. But a
state is composite, and, like any other whole, made up
of many parts — these are the citizens, who compose it.
It is evident, therefore, that we must begin by asking,
Who is the citizen, and what is the meaning of the term ?
For here again there may be a difference of opinion.
He who is a citizen in a democracy will often not be a
citizen in an oligarchy.

"But the citizen, whom we are seeking to define, is a
citizen in the strictest sense, against whom no such ex
ception can be taken, and his special characteristic is
that he shares in the administration of justice, and in
offices.

" The citizen then of necessity differs under each form
of government ; and our definition is best adapted to the
citizens of a democracy; but not necessarily to other
states.

" He who has the power to take part in the deliberative

or judicial administration of any state is said by us to

(210)

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 211

be a citizen of that state ; and speaking generally, a state
is a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of life.

" But in practice a citizen is defined to be one of whom
both the parents are citizens; others insist on going
further back ; say to two or three or more grandparents.
This is a short and practical definition ; but there are
some who raise the further question : How this third or
fourth ancestor came to be a citizen ? Gorgias of
Leontina, partly because he was in a difficulty, partly
in irony, said — ' Mortars are made by the mortar-makers,
and the citizens of Larissa are also a manufactured
article, made, like the kettles which bear their name,
by the magistrates.' Yet the question is really simple,
for, if according to the definition just given they shared
in the government, they were citizens. (This is a better
definition than the other). For the words, 'born of a
father or mother, who is a citizen,' cannot possibly
apply to the first inhabitants or founders of a state.

"It has been well said that 'he who has never learned
to obey cannot be a good commander.' The two are
not the same, but the good citizen ought to be capable
of both ; he should know how to govern like a freeman,
and how to obey like a freeman — these are the virtues
of a citizen. And, although the temperance and justice
of a ruler are distinct from those of a subject, the virtue
of a good man will include both : for the good man, who
is free and also a subject, will not have one virtue only,
say justice — but he will have distinct kinds of virtue,
the one qualifying him to rule, the other to obey, and
differing as the temperance and courage of men and
women differ.

"Since there are many forms of government, there must
be many varieties of citizens, and especially of citizens
who are subjects; so that under some governments the

212 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

mechanic and the laborer will be citizens, but not in
others, as, for example, in aristocracy or the so-called
government of the best (if there be such an one), in
which honors are given according to virtue and merit;
for no man can practice virtue who is living the life of a
mechanic or laborer. In oligarchies the qualification
for office is high, and therefore no laborer can ever be
a citizen ; but a mechanic may, for many of them are
rich. At Thebes there was a law that no man could
hold office who had not retired from business for ten
years. In many states the law goes to the length of
admitting aliens ; for in some democracies a man is a
citizen though his mother only be a citizen (and his
father an alien) ; and a similar principle is applied to
illegitimate children ; the law is relaxed when there is a
dearth of population. But when the number of citizens
increases, first the children of a male or a female slave
are excluded ; then those whose mothers only are citizens ;
and at last the right of citizenship is confined to those
whose fathers and mothers are both citizens.

" Hence, as is evident, there are different kinds of
citizens; and he is a citizen in the highest sense who
shares in the honors of the state. In the poems of
Homer (Achilles complains of Agamemnon treating
him) 'like some dishonored stranger,' for he who is ex
cluded from the honors of the state is no better than an
alien. But when this exclusion is concealed, then the
object is to deceive the inhabitants.

" Having determined these questions, we have next to
consider whether there is only one form of government
or many, and if many, what they are, and how many,
and what are the differences between them.

"A constitution is the arrangement of magistracies in
a state, especially of the highest of all. The govern-

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 213

ment is everywhere sovereign in the state, and the con
stitution is in fact the government. For example, in
democracies the people are supreme, but in oligarchies,
the few; and, therefore, we say that these two forms of
government are different ; and so in other cases.

" First, let us consider what is the purpose of a state,
and how many forms of government there are by which
human society is regulated. We have already said, in
the former part of this treatise, when drawing a dis
tinction between household management and the rule
of a master, that man is by nature a political animal.
And therefore, men, even when they do not require one
another's help, desire to live together all the same, and
are in fact brought together by their common interests
in proportion as they severally attain to any measure of
well-being. This is certainly the chief end, both of in
dividuals and of states. And also for the sake of mere
life (in which there is possibly some" noble element)
mankind meet together and maintain the political com
munity, so long as the evils of existence do not greatly
overbalance the good. And we all see that men cling
to life even in the midst of misfortune, seeming to find
in it a natural sweetness and happiness.

"There is no difficulty in distinguishing the various
kinds of authority ; they have been often defined already
in popular works. The rule of a master, although the
slave by nature and the master by nature, have in reality
the same interests, is nevertheless exercised primarily
with a view to the interest of the master, but acciden
tally considers the slave, since, if the slave perish, the
rule of the master perishes with him. On the other
hand, the government of a wife and children and of a
household, which we have called household-management,
is exercised in the first instance for the good of the

214 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

governed or for the common good of both parties, but
essentially for the good of the governed.

" Having determined these points, we have next to
consider how many forms of government there are, and
what the>r are ; and in the first place what are the true
forms, for when they are determined the perversions of
them will at once be apparent. The words constitution
and government have the same meaning, and the gov
ernment, which is the supreme authority in states, must
be in the hands of one, or of a few, or of many. The
true forms of government, therefore, are those in which
the one, or the few, or the many, govern with a view to
the common interest; but governments which rule with
a view to the private interest, whether of the one, or of
the few, or of the many, are perversions. For citizens,
if they are truly citizens, ought to participate in the ad
vantages of a state. Of forms of government in which
one rules, we call that which regards the common in
terests, kingship or royalty ; that in which more than
one, but not many, rule, aristocracy (the rule of the
best) ; and it is so called, either because the rulers are
the best men, or because they have at heart the best in
terests of the state and of the citizens. But when the
citizens at large administer the state for the common in
terest, the government is called by the generic name, —
a constitution. And there is a reason for this use of
language. One man or a few may excel in virtue; but
of virtue there are many kinds : and as the number in
creases it becomes more difficult for them to attain per
fection in every kind, though they may in military virtue,
for this is found in the masses. Hence, in a constitu
tional government the fighting-men have the supreme
pow7er, and those who possess arms are the citizens.

"Of the above-mentioned forms, the perversions areas

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 215

follows: — of royalty, tyranny ; of aristocracy, oligarchy ;
of constitutional government, democracy. For tyranny
is a kind of monarchy which has in view the interests
of the monarch only; oligarchy has in view the interest
of the wealthy ; democracy, of the needy ; none of them
the common good of all.

"The argument seems to show that, whether in oli
garchies or in democracies, the number of the governing
body, whether the greater number, as in a democracy,
or the smaller number, as in an oligarchy, is an accident
due to the fact that the rich everywhere are few, and
the poor numerous. But if so, there is a misapprehen
sion of the causes of the difference between them. For
the real difference between democracy and oligarchy is
poverty and wealth. Wherever men rule by reason of
their wealth, whether they be few or many, that is an
oligarchy, and where the poor rule, that is a democracy.
But as a fact the rich are few and the poor many ; for
few are well-to-do, whereas, freedom is enjoyed by all,
and wealth and freedom are the grounds on which the
oligarchical and democratical parties respectively claim
power in the state.

"Let us begin by considering the common definitions
of oligarchy and democracy, and what is justice oli
garchical and democratical. For all men cling to justice
of some kind, but their conceptions are imperfect and
they do not express the whole idea. For example, jus
tice is thought by them to be, and is, equality, not, how
ever, for all, but only for equals. And inequality is
thought to be, and is, justice; neither is this for all, but
only for unequals. When the persons are omitted, then
men judge erroneously. The reason is that they are
passing judgment on themselves, and most people are
bad judges in their own case.

216 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

" But a state exists for the sake of a good life, and not
for the sake of life only: if life only were the object,
slaves and brute animals might form a state, but they
cannot, for they have no share in happiness or in a life
of free choice. Nor does a state exist for the sake of
alliance and security from injustice, nor yet for the sake
of exchange and mutual intercourse ; for then the
Tyrrhenians and the Carthaginians, and all who have
commercial treaties with one another, would be the
citizens of one state.

"Whereas, those who are for good government take
into consideration (the larger question of) virtue and
vice in states. Whence it may be further inferred that
virtue must be the serious care of a state which truly
deserves the name; for (without this ethical end) the
community becomes a mere alliance which differs only
in place from alliances of w?hich the members live apart ;
and law is only a convention, ' a surety to one another
of justice,' as the sophist Lycophron says, and has no
real power to make the citizens good and just.

" It is clear, then, that a state is not a mere society,
having a common place, established for the prevention
of crime and for the sake of exchange. These are con
ditions without wrhich a state cannot exist; but all of
them together do not constitute a state, which is a com
munity of well-being in families and aggregations of
families, for the sake of a perfect and self-sufficing life.
Such a community can only be established among those
who live in the same place and intermarry. Hence arise
in cities family connections, brotherhoods, common
sacrifices, amusements which draw men together. They
are created by friendship, for friendship is the motive of
society. The end is the good life, and these are the
means towards it. And the state is the union of families

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 217

and villages having for an end a perfect and self-suffic
ing life, by which we mean a happy and honorable life.

" Our conclusion, then, is that political society exists
for the sake of noble actions, and not of mere companion
ship. And they who contribute most to such a society
have a greater share in it than those who have the same
or a greater freedom or nobility of birth but are inferior
to them in political virtue; or than those who exceed
them in wealth but are surpassed by them in virtue.

" From what has been said it will be clearly seen that
all the partisans of different forms of government speak
of a part of justice only.

" There is also a doubt as to what is to be the supreme
power in the state: — Is it the multitude? Or the
wealthy ? Or the good ? Or the one best man ? Or a
tyrant? Any of these alternatives seems to involve
disagreeable consequences. If the poor, for example,
because they are more in number, divide among them
selves the property of the rich, — is not this unjust ? No,
by heaven (will be the reply), for the lawful authority
(i. e.y the people) willed it. But if this is not injustice,
pray what is? Again, when (in the first division) all
has been taken, and the majority divide anew the prop
erty of the minority, is it not evident, if this goes on,
that they will ruin the state ? Yet surely, virtue is not
the ruin of those who possess her, nor is justice destruc
tive of a state ; and therefore this law of confiscation
clearly cannot be just. If it were, all the acts of a tyrant
must of necessity be just; for he only coerces other men
by superior power, just as the multitude coerce the rich.
But is it just then that the few and the wealthy should
be the rulers? And what if they, in like manner, rob
and plunder the people, — is this just? If so, the other
case (z. e., the case of the majority plundering the

218 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

minority) will likewise be just. But there can be no
doubt that all these things are wrong and unjust.

" Most of these questions may be reserved for another
occasion. The principle that the multitude ought to be
supreme rather than the few best is capable of a satis
factory explanation, and, though not free from difficulty,
yet seems to contain an element of truth. For the many,
of whom each individual is but an ordinary person,
when they meet together may very likely be better than
the few good, if regarded not individually but collective
ly, just as a feast to which many contribute, is better
than a dinner provided out of a single purse. For each
individual among the many has a share of virtue and
prudence, and when they meet together they become in
a manner one man, who has many feet, and hands, and
senses ; that is, a figure of their mind and disposition.
Hence the many are better judges than a single man of
music and poetry ; for some understand one part, and
some another, and among them, they understand the
whole. There is a similar combination of qualities in
good men, who differ from any individual of the many,
as the beautiful are said to differ from those who are
not beautiful, and works of art from realities, because
in them the scattered elements are combined, although,
if taken separately, the eye of one person or some other
feature in another person, would be fairer than in the
picture. Whether this principle can apply to every
democracy, and to all bodies of men, is not clear. Or
rather, by heaven, in some cases it is impossible of ap
plication ; for the argument would equally hold about
brutes ; and wherein, it will be asked, do some men differ
from brutes? But there may be bodies of men about
whom our statement is nevertheless true. And if so,
the difficulty which has been already raised, and also

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 219

another which is akin to it — viz., what power should be
assigned to the mass of freemen and citizens, who are
not rich and have no personal merit — are both solved.
There is still a danger in allowing them to share the
great offices of state, for their folly will lead them into
error, and their dishonesty into crime. But there is a
danger also in not letting them share, for a state, in
which many poor men are excluded from office will nec
essarily be full of enemies. The only way of escape is
to assign to them some deliberative and judicial
functions. For this reason Solon and certain other
legislators give them the power of electing to offices, and
of calling the magistrates to account, but they do not
allow them to hold office singly. When they meet to
gether their perceptions are quite good enough, and
combined with the better class they are useful to the
state (just as impure food when mixed with what is
pure, sometimes makes the entire mass more wholesome
than a small quantity of the pure would be), but each
individual, left to himself, forms an imperfect judgment.
" Now, does not the same principle apply to elections?
For a right election can only be made by those who
have knowledge ; a geometrician, for example, will
choose rightly in matters of geometry, or a pilot in mat
ters of steering; and, even if there be some occupations
and arts with which private persons are familiar, they
certainly cannot judge better than those who know.
So that, according to this argument, neither the election
of magistrates, nor the calling of them to account, should
be intrusted to the many. Yet possibly these objections
are to a great extent met by our old answer, that if the
people are not utterly degraded, although individually
they may bo worse judges than those who have special
knowledge — as a body they are as good or better. More-

22O Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

over, there are some artists whose works are judged of
solely, or in the best manner, not by themselves, but by
those who do not possess the art ; for example, the
knowledge of the house is not limited to the builder only ;
the user, or, in other words, the master, of the house
will even be a better judge than the builder, just as the
pilot will judge better of a rudder than the carpenter,
and the guest will judge better of a feast than the cook.

" In all sciences and arts the end is a good, and especi
ally and above all in the highest of all — this is the
political science of which the good is justice, in other
words, the common interest. All men think justice to
be a sort of equality ; and to a certain extent they agree
in the philosophical distinctions which have been laid
down by us about Ethics. For they admit that justice
is a thing having relation to persons, and that equals
ought to have equality. But there still remains a ques
tion ; equality or inequality of what ? Here is a difficulty
which the political philosopher has to resolve. For
very likely some persons will say that offices of state
ought to be unequally distributed according to superior
excellence, in whatever respect, of the citizen, although
there is no other difference between him and the rest of
the community ; for that those who differ in any one
respect have different rights and claims. But, surely, if
this is true, the complexion or height of a man, or any
other advantage, will be a reason for his obtaining a
greater share of political rights.

"But since no such comparison can be made, it is evi
dent that there is good reason, why in politics men do
not ground their claim to office on every sort of in
equality any more than in the arts. For if some be
slow, and others swift, that is no reason why the one
should have little and the others much ; it is in gymnastic

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 221

contests that such excellence is rewarded. Whereas the
rival claims of candidates for office can only be based on
the possession of elements which enter into the com
position of a state, (such as wealth, virtue, etc.) And
therefore the noble, or free-born, or rich, may with good
reason claim office; for holders of offices must be free
men and taxpayers ; a state can be no more composed
entirely of poor men than entirely of slaves. But if
wealth and freedom are necessary elements, justice and
valor are equally so ; for without the former a state
cannot exist at all, without the latter, not well.

" If the existence of the state is alone to be considered,
then it would seem that all, or some at least, of these
claims are just; but, if we take into account a good life,
as I have already said, education and virtue have su
perior claims. As, however, those who are equal in one
thing ought not to be equal in all, nor those who are
unequal in one thing to be unequal in all, it is certain
that all forms of government which rest on either of
these principles are perversions. All men have a claim
in a certain sense, as I have already admitted, but they
have not an absolute claim. The rich claim because
they have a greater share in the land, and land is the
common element of the state ; also they are generally
more trustworthy in contracts. The free claim under
the same title as the noble; for they are nearly akin.
And the noble are citizens in a truer sense than the
ignoble, since good birth is always valued in a man's
own home and country. Another reason is, that those
who are sprung from better ancestors are likely to be
better men, for nobility is excellence of race. Virtue,
too, may be truly said to have a claim, for justice has
been acknowledged by us to be a social virtue, and it
implies all others. Again, the many may urge their

222 Ethics $f the Greek Philosophers.

claim against the few ; for, when taken collectively, and
compared with the few, they are stronger and richer and
better. But, what if the good, the rich, the noble, and
the other classes who make up a state, are all living to
gether in the same city, will there, or will there not, be
any doubt who shall rule? — No doubt at all in determin
ing who ought to rule in each of the above-mentioned
forms of government. For states are characterized by
differences in their governing bodies — one of them has
a government of the rich, another of the virtuous, and
so on. But a difficulty arises when all these elements
co-exist. How are we to decide? Suppose the virtuous
to be very few in number ; may we consider their
numbers in relation to their duties, and ask whether
they are enough to administer the state, or must they
be so many as will make up a state? Objections may
be urged against all the aspirants to political power.
For those who found their claims on wealth or family
have no basis of justice; on this principle, if any one
person were richer than all the rest, it is clear that he
ought to be the ruler of them. In like manner he who
is very distinguished by his birth ought to have the
superiority over all those who claim on the ground that
they are free-born. In an aristocracy, or government of
the best, a like difficulty occurs about virtue ; for if one
citizen be better than the other members of the govern
ment, however good they may be, he too, upon the same
principle of justice, should rule over them. And if the
people are to be supreme because they are stronger than
the few, then if one man, or more than one, but not a
majority, is stronger than the many, they ought to rule,
and not the many.

"All these considerations appear to show that none of
the principles on which men claim to rule, and hold all

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 223

other men in subjection to them, are strictly right. To
those who claim to be masters of the state on the ground
of their virtue or their wealth, the many might fairly
answer that they themselves are often better and richer
than the few — I do not say individually, but collectively.
And another ingenious objection which is sometimes
put forward may be met in a similar manner. Some
persons doubt whether the legislator who desires to
make the justest laws ought to legislate with a view to
the good of the higher classes or of the many, when the
case which we have mentioned occurs (i. e. when all the
elements co-exist.) Now what is just or right is to be
interpreted in the sense of "what is equal;" and that
which is right in the sense of being equal is to be con
sidered with reference to the advantage of the state, and
the common good of the citizens. And a citizen is one
who shares in governing and being governed. He
differs under different forms of government, but in the
best state he is one who is able and willing to be
governed and to govern with a view to the life of virtue.
" If, however, there be some one person, or more than
one, although not enough to make up the full comple
ment of a state, whose virtue is so pre-eminent that the
virtues or the political power of all the rest admit of no
comparison with his or theirs, he or they can be no
longer regarded as part of a state; for justice will not
be done to the superior, if he is reckoned only as the
equal of those who are so far inferior to him in virtue
and in political power. Such an one may truly be
deemed a God among men. Hence we see that legisla
tion is necessarily concerned only with those who are
equal in birth and in power ; and that for men of pre
eminent virtue there is no law— they are themselves a
law. Any one would be ridiculous who attempted to

224 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers,

make laws for them. And for this reason democratic
states have instituted ostracism ; equality is above all
things their aim, and therefore they ostracise and banish
from the city for a time those who seem to predominate
too much through their wealth, or the number of their
friends, or through any other political influence.

" The problem is a universal one, and equally concerns
all forms of government, true as well as false; for,
although perverted forms with a view to their own in
terests may adopt this policy, those which seek the
common interest do so likewise.

" Hence where there is an acknowledged superiority the
argument in favor of ostracism is based upon a kind of
political justice. It would certainly be better that the
legislator should, from the first so order his state as to
have no need of such a remedy. But if the need arises,
the next best thing is that he should endeavor to correct
the evil by this or some similar measure. The principle,
however, has not been fairly applied in states ; for, in
stead of looking to the public good, they have used
ostracism for factious purposes. It is true that under
perverted forms of government, and from their special
point of view, such a measure is just and expedient, but
it is also clear that it is not absolutely just. In the
perfect state there would be great doubts about the use
of it, not when applied to excess in strength, wealth,
popularity, or the like, but when used against some one
who is pre-eminent in virtue, — what is to be done with
him? Mankind will not say that such an one is to be
expelled and exiled; on the other hand, he ought not
to be a subject — that would be as if in the division of
the empire of the Gods, the other Gods should claim to
rule over Zeus. The only alternative is that all should
joyfully obey such a ruler, according to what seems to

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 225

be the order of nature, and that men like him should be
kings in their state for life.

"The preceding discussion, by a natural transition,
leads to the consideration of royalty, which we admit to
be one of the true forms of government. Let us see
whether, in order to be well governed, a state or country
should be under the rule of a king or under some other
form of government; and whether monarchy, although
good for some, may not be bad for others. But first we
must determine whether there is one species of royalty
or many. It is easy to see that there are many, and that
the manner of government is not the same in all of them.

" These, then, are the four kinds of royalty. First the
monarchy of the heroic ages; this was exercised over
voluntary subjects, but limited to certain functions; the
king was a general and a judge, and had the control of
religion. The second is that of the barbarians, which is
an hereditary despotic government in accordance with
law. A third is the power of the so-called Aesymnete
or Dictator ; this is an elective tyranny. The fourth is
the Lacedaemonian, which is in fact a generalship, he
reditary and perpetual. These four forms differ from
one another in the manner which I have described.

" There is a fifth form of kingly rule in which one has
the disposal of all, just as each tribe or each state has
the disposal of the public property; this form corre
sponds to the control of a household. For as household
management is the kingly rule of a house, so kingly rule
is the household management of a city, or of a nation,
or of many nations.

" Of these forms we need only consider two, the
Lacedaemonian and the absolute royalty ; for most of the
others lie in a region between them, having less power
than the last, and more than the first. Thus the inquiry

226 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

is reduced to two points: first, is it advantageous to the
state that there should be a perpetual general, and if so,
should the office be confined to one family, or open to
the citizens in turn ? Secondly, is it well that a single
man should have the supreme power in all things? The
first question falls under the head of laws rather than of
constitutions; for perpetual generalship might equally
exist under any form of government, so that this matter
may be dismissed for the present. The other kind of
royalty is a sort of constitution ; this we have now to
consider, and briefly to run over the difficulties involved
in it. We will begin by inquiring whether it is more
advantageous to be ruled by the best man or by the best
laws.

" The advocates of royalty maintain that the laws speak
only in general terms, and cannot provide for circum
stances; and that for any science to abide by written
rules is absurd. Even in Egypt the physician is allowed
to alter his treatment after the fourth day, but if sooner,
he takes the risk. Hence it is argued that a govern
ment acting according to written laws is plainly not the
best. Yet surely the ruler cannot dispense with the
general principle which exists in law ; and he is a better
ruler who is free from passion than he who is passionate.
Whereas the law is passionless, passion must ever sway
the heart of man.

" Yes, some one will answer, but then on the other hand
an individual will be better able to advise in particular
cases. (To whom we in turn make reply:) A king
must legislate, and laws must be passed, but these laws
will have no authority when they miss the mark, though
in all other cases retaining their authority. (Yet a
further question remains behind :) When the law can
not determine a point at all, or not well, should the one

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 227

best man, or should all, decide? According to our pres
ent practice assemblies meet, sit in judgment, deliberate
and decide, and their judgments all relate to individual
cases. Now any member of the assembly, taken sepa
rately, is certainly inferior to the wise man. But the
state is made up of many individuals. And as a feast
to which all the guests contribute is better than a
banquet furnished by a single man, so a multitude is a
better judge of many things than any individual.

" Again, the many are more incorruptible than the few;
they are like the greater quantity of water which is less
easily corrupted than a little. The individual is liable
to be overcome by anger or by some other passion, and
then his judgment is necessarily perverted; but it is
hardly to be supposed that a great number of persons
would all get into a passion and go wrong at the same
moment. Let us assume that they are freemen, never
acting in violation of the law, but filling up the gaps
which the law is obliged to leave. Or, if such virtue is
scarcely attainable by the multitude, we need only sup
pose that the majority are good men and good citizens,
and ask which will be the more incorruptible, the one
good ruler, or the many who are all good? Will not
the many? But, you will say, there may be parties
among them, whereas the one man is not divided against
himself. To which we may answer that their character
is as good as his. If we call the rule of many men, who
are all of them good, aristocracy, and the rule of one
man royalty, then aristocracy will be better for states
than royalty, whether the government is supported by
force or not, provided only that a number of men equal
in virtue, can be found.

" The first governments were kingships, probably for
this reason, because of old, when cities were small, men

228 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

of eminent virtue were few. They were made kings
because they were benefactors, and benefits can only be
bestowed by good men. But when many persons equal
in merit arose, no longer enduring the pre-eminence of
one, they desired to have a commonwealth, and set up a
constitution. The ruling class soon deteriorated and
enriched themselves out of the public treasury ; riches
became the path to honor, and so oligarchies naturally
grew up. These passed into tyrannies and tyrannies
into democracies; for love of gain in the ruling classes
was always tending to diminish their number, and so to
strengthen the masses, who in the end set upon their
masters and established democracies. Since cities have
increased in size, no other form of government appears
to be any longer possible.

" Now, absolute monarchy, or the arbitrary rule of a
sovereign over all the citizens, in a city which consists
of equals, is thought by some to be quite contrary to
nature ; it is argued that those who are by nature equals
must have the same natural right and worth, and that
for unequals to have an equal share, or for equals to
have an unequal share, in the offices of state, is as bad
as for different bodily constitutions to have the same
food and clothing or the same different. Wherefore, it
is thought to be just, that among equals every one be
ruled as well as rule, and that all should have their turn.
We thus arrive at law ; for an order of succession implies
law. And the rule of the law is preferable to that of
any individual. On the same principle, even if it be
better for certain individuals to govern, they should be
made only guardians and ministers of the law.

" He who bids the law rule, may be deemed to bid God
and Reason alone rule, but he who bids man rule adds
an element of the beast ; for desire is a wild beast, and

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 229

passion perverts the minds of rulers, even when they
are the best of men. The law is reason unaffected by
desire.

"Hence it is evident, that in seeking for justice men
seek for the mean or neutral, and the law is the mean.
Again, customary laws have more weight, and relate to
more important matters, than written laws, and a man
may be a safer ruler than the written law, but not safer
than the customary law.

"If, as I said before, the good man has a right to rule
because he is better, then two good men are better than
one: this is the old saying.

"Now, from what has been said, it is manifest that,
where men are alike and equal, it is neither expedient
nor just that one man should be lord of all, whether
there are laws or whether there are no laws, but he him
self is in the place of law. Neither should a good man
be lord over good men, or a bad man over bad; nor, even
if he excels in virtue, should he have a right to rule, un
less in a particular case, which I have already mentioned,
and to which I will once more recur. But first of all, I
must determine what natures are suited for royalties,
and what for an aristocracy, and what for a constitution
al government.

"A people who are by nature capable of producing a
race superior in virtue and political talent are fitted for
kingly government; and a people submitting to be ruled
as freemen by men whose virtue renders them capable
of political command are adapted for aD aristocracy ;
while the people who are suited for constitutional free
dom, are those among whom there naturally exists a
warlike multitude able to rule and to obey in turn by a
law which gives office to the well-to-do according to
their desert.

230 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

" We maintain that the true forms of government are
three, and that the best must be that which is ad
ministered by the best, and in which there is one man,
or a whole family, or many persons, excelling in virtue,
and both rulers and subjects are fitted, the one to rule,
the others to be ruled, in such a manner as to attain the
most eligible life. We showed at the commencement of
our inquiry that the virtue of the good man is neces
sarily the same as the virtue of the citizen of the perfect
state. Clearly then in the same manner, and by the
same means through which a man becomes truly good,
he will frame a state (which will be truly good) whether
aristocratical, or under kingly rule, and the same educa
tion and same habits will be found to make a good man,
and a good statesman and king."

THE BEST CONSTITUTION FOR A STATE.

PREPONDERANCE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS RECOMMENDED.

FROM ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS, BOOK IV.

" We have now to enquire what is the best constitution
for most states, and the best life for most men, neither
assuming a standard of virtue which is above ordinary
persons, nor an education which is exceptionally favored
by nature and circumstances, nor yet an ideal state
which is an aspiration only, but having regard to the
life in which the majority are able to share, and to the
form of government which states in general can attain.
As to those aristocracies, as they are called, of which we
were just now speaking, they either lie beyond the pos
sibilities of the greater number of states, or they ap
proximate to the so-called constitutional government,
and therefore need no separate discussion. And in fact
the conclusion at which we arrive respecting all these
forms rests upon the same grounds. For if it has been
truly said in the Ethics that the happy life is the life
according to unimpeded virtue, and that virtue is a mean,
then the life which is in a mean, and in a mean attain
able by every one, must be the best. And the same
principles of virtue and vice are characteristic of cities
and of constitutions ; for the constitution is in a figure

the life of the city.

(231)

232 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

"Now in all states there are three elements; one class is
very rich, another very poor, and a third in a mean. It
is admitted that moderation and the mean are best, and
therefore it will clearly be best to possess the gifts of
fortune in moderation ; for in that condition of life men
are most ready to listen to reason. But a city ought to
be composed, as far as possible, of equals and similars;
and these are generally the middle classes. Wherefore,
the city which is composed of middle-class citizens is
necessarily best governed; they are, as we say, the
natural elements of a state. And this is the class of
citizens which is most secure in a state, for they do not,
like the poor, covet their neighbors' goods ; nor do others
covet theirs, as the poor covet the goods of the rich ; and
as they neither plot against others, nor are themselves
plotted against, they pass through life safely. Wisely
then, did Phocylides pray, —

"Many things are best in the mean; I desire to be of
a middle condition in my city."

"Thus it is manifest that the best political community
is formed by citizens of the middle class, and that those
states are likely to be well-administered, in which the
middle class is large, and larger if possible, than both
the other classes, or at any rate, than either singly ; for
the addition of the middle class turns the scale, and
prevents either of the extremes from being dominant.
Great, then, is the good fortune of a state in which the
citizens have a moderate and sufficient property; for
where some possess much, and the others nothing, there
may arise an extreme democracy, or a pure oligarchy ;
or a tyranny may grow out of either extreme, — either
out of the most rampant democracy, or out of an oli
garchy ; but it is not so likely to arise out of a middle
and nearly equal condition. I will explain the reason

THE BEST AND SAFEST GOVERNMENT.

A DEMOCRACY WITH THE MIDDLE CLASS PREPON
DERATING.

" The mean condition of states is clearly best, for no
other is free from faction ; and where the middle class
is large there are least likely to be factions and dis
sensions. For a similar reason, large states are less
liable to faction than small ones, because in them the
middle class is large ; whereas in small states it is
easy to divide all the citizens into two classes who are
either rich or poor, and to leave nothing in the middle.
And democracies are safer and more permanent than
oligarchies, because they have a middle class which is
more numerous and has a greater share in the gov
ernment ; for when there is no middle class and the
poor greatly exceed in number, troubles arise, and the
state soon comes to an end. A proof of the superiority
of the middle class is that the best legislators have been
of a middle condition ; for example, Solon, as his own
verses testify ; and Lycurgus, for he was not a King ;
and Charondas, and almost all legislators."

Aristotle'* s Politics-

ARISTOTLE.

B. C. 350.
From a Sculpture in the Gal. Du Capitole.

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 233

of this hereafter, when I speak of the revolutions of
states. The mean condition of states is clearly best, for
no other is free from faction ; and where the middle class
is large, there are least likely to be factions and dissen
sions. For a similar reason large states are less liable
to faction than small ones, because in them the middle
class is large ; whereas in small states it is easy to divide
all the citizens into two classes who are either rich or
poor, and to leave nothing in the middle. And
democracies are safer and more permanent than oli
garchies, because they have a middle class which is more
numerous and has a greater share in the government;
for when there is no middle class, and the poor greatly
exceed in number, troubles arise, and the state soon
comes to an end. A proof of the superiority of the
middle class is that the best legislators have been of a
middle condition ; for example, Solon, as his own verses
testify; and Lycurgus, for he was not a king; and
Charondas, and almost all legislators.

" We have now to consider what, and what kind of gov
ernment is suitable, to what, and what kind of men. I
may begin by assuming, as a general principle common
to all governments, that the portion of the state which
desires permanence ought to be stronger than that which
desires the reverse. Now every city is composed of
quality and quantity. By quality I mean freedom,
wealth, education, good birth, and by quantity, su
periority of numbers. Quality may exist in one of the
classes which make up the state, and quantity in the
other. For example, the meanly-born may be more in
number than the well-born, or the poor than the rich,
yet they may not so much exceed in quantity as they fall
short in quality ; and therefore there must be a com
parison of quantity and quality. Where the number of

234 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

the poor is more than proportioned to the wealth of the
rich, there will naturally be a democracy, varying in
form with the sort of people who compose it in each
case. If, for example, the husbandmen exceed in num
ber, the first form of democracy will then arise; if the
artisans and laboring class, the last; and so with the
intermediate forms. But where the rich and the notables
exceed in quality more than they fall short in quantity,
there oligarchy arises, similarly assuming various forms
according to the kind of superiority possessed by the
oligarchs.

" The legislator should always include the middle class
in his government; if he makes his laws oligarchical, to
the middle class let him look; if he makes them demo-
cratical, he should equally by his laws try to attach this
class to the state. There only can the government ever
be stable where the middle class exceeds one or both of
the others, and in that case there will be no fear that the
rich will unite with the poor against the rulers. For
neither of them will ever be willing to serve the other,
and if they look for some form of government more suit
able to both, they will find none better than this, for the
rich and the poor will never consent to rule in turn, be
cause they mi.strust one another. The arbiter is always
the one trusted, and he who is in the middle is an arbiter.
The more perfect the admixture of the political elements,
the more lasting will be the state. Many even of those
who desire to form aristocratical governments make a
mistake, not only in giving too much power to the rich,
but in attempting to overreach the people. There comes
a time when, out of a false good there arises a true evil,
since the encroachments of the rich are more destructive
to the state than those of the people."

EXTRACTS FROM ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS,

BOOK V.
CAUSE OF REVOLUTIONS.

" Still democracy appears to be safer and less liable to
revolution than oligarchy. For in oligarchies there is
the double danger of the oligarchs falling out among
themselves and also with the people ; but in democracies
there is only the danger of a quarrel with the oligarchs.
No dissension worth mentioning arises among the people
themselves. And we may further remark that a gov
ernment which is composed of the middle class, more
nearly approximates to democracy than to oligarchy,
and is the safest of the imperfect forms of government.

" In considering how dissensions and political revolu
tions arise, we must first of all ascertain the beginnings
and causes of them which affect constitutions generally.
They may be said to be three in number; and we have
now to give an outline of each. We want to know ( i )
what is the feeling? and (2) what are the motives of
those who make them? (3) whence arise political dis
turbances and quarrels? The universal and chief cause
of this revolutionary feeling has been already mentioned ;
viz., the desire of equality, wrhen men think that they
are equal to others who have more than themselves ; or,
again, the desire of inequality and superiority, when
conceiving themselves to be superior they think that

(235)

236 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

they have, not more, but the same or less than their in
feriors; pretensions which may, and may not, be just.
Inferiors revolt in order that they may be equal, and
equals that they may be superior. Such is the state of
mind which creates revolutions. The motives for mak
ing them are the desire of gain and honor, or the fear of
dishonor and loss ; the authors of them want to divert
punishment or dishonor from themselves or their friends.
The causes and reasons of these motives and dispo
sitions which are excited in men, about the things which
I have mentioned, viewed in one way, may be regarded
as seven, and in another, as more than seven. Two of
them have been already noticed; but they act in a
different manner, for men are excited against one an
other by the love of gain and honor — not, as in the case
which I have just supposed, in order to obtain them for
themselves, but at seeing others, justly or unjustly, en
grossing them. Other causes are insolence, fear, love of
superiority, contempt, disproportionate increase in some
part of the state ; causes of another sort are election
intrigues, carelessness, neglect about trifles, dissimilarity
of elements.

"Political revolutions also spring from a disproportion
ate increase in any part of the state. For as a body is
made up of many members, and every member ought to
grow in proportion, that symmetry may be preserved ;
but loses its nature if the foot be four cubits long and
the rest of the body two spans; and, should the abnormal
increase be one of quality as well as of quantity, may
even take the form of another animal : even so a state
has many parts, of which some one may often grow im
perceptibly ; for example, the number of poor in de
mocracies and in constitutional states. And this dis
proportion may sometimes happen by an accident, as at

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 237

Tarentum, from a defeat in which many of the notables
were slain in a battle with the lapygians just after the
Persian War, the constitutional government in conse
quence becoming a democracy; or, as was the case at
Argos, where, after the battle at Hebdomk, the Argives,
having been cut to pieces by Cleomenes the Lacedae
monian, were compelled to admit to citizenship some of
their perioeci ; and at Athens, when, after frequent de
feats of their infantry in the times of the Peloponnesian
War, the notables were reduced in number, because the
soldiers had to be taken from the roll of citizens.
Revolutions arise from this cause in democracies as well
as in other forms of government, but not to so great an
extent. When the rich grow numerous or properties
increase, the form of government changes into an oli
garchy or a government of families. Forms of govern
ment also change — sometimes even without revolution,
owing to election contests, as at Hersea (where, instead
of electing their magistrates, they took them by lot, be
cause the electors were in the habit of choosing their
own partisans) ; or owing to carelessness, when disloyal
persons are allowed to find their way into the highest
offices, as at Oreum, where, upon the accession of
Heracleodorus to office, the oligarchy was overthrown,
and changed by him into a constitutional and demo-
cratical government.

"Another cause of revolution is difference of races
which do not at once acquire a common spirit; for a
state is not the growth of a day, neither is it a multitude
brought together by accident. Hence the reception of
strangers in colonies, either at the time of their founda
tion or afterwards, has generally produced revolution ;
for example, the Achseans who joined the Troezenians
in the foundation of Sybaris, being the more numerous,

238 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

afterwards expelled them; hence the curse fell upon
Sybaris. At Thurii the Sybarites quarreled with their
fellow-colonists; thinking that the land belonged to
them, they wanted too much of it and were driven out.
At Byzantium the new colonists were detected in a con
spiracy, and were expelled by force of arms; the people
of Antissa, who had received the Chian exiles, fought
with them, and drove them out ; and the Zancleans, after
having received the Samians, were driven by them out
of their own city. The citizens of Apollonia on the
Euxine, after the introduction of a fresh body of colon
ists, had a revolution ; the Syracusans, after the expul
sion of their tyrants, having admitted strangers and
mercenaries to the rights of citizenship, quarreled and
came to blows; the people of Amphipolis, having re
ceived Chalcidian colonists, were nearly all expelled by
them.

"Now, in oligarchies the masses make revolution under
the idea that they are unjustly treated, becau.se, as I said
before, they are equals, and have not an equal share, and
in democracies the notables revolt, because they are not
equals, and yet have only an equal share.

"Again, the situation of cities is a cause of revolution
when the country is not naturally adapted to preserve
the unity of the state. For example, the Chytrians at
Clazomenae did not agree with the people of the island ;
and the people of Colophon quarreled with the Notians ;
at Athens, too, the inhabitants of the Piraeus are more
democratic than those who live in the city. For just as
in war, the impediment of a ditch, though ever so small,
may break a regiment, so every cause of difference, how
ever slight, makes a breach in a city. The greatest
opposition is confessedly that of virtue and vice ; next
comes that of wealth and poverty ; and there are other

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 239

antagonistic elements, greater or less, of which one is
this difference of place.

" Governments also change into oligarchy or into de
mocracy or into a constitutional government, because
the magistrates, or some other section of the state, in
crease in power or renown. Thus at Athens the reputa
tion gained by the court of the Areopagus, in the Persian
War, seemed to tighten the reins of government. On
the other hand, the victory of Salamis, which was gained
by the common people who served in the fleet, and won
for the Athenians the empire of the sea, strengthened
the democracy. At Argos, the notables, having dis
tinguished themselves against the Lacedaemonians in the
battle of Mantinea, attempted to put down the democracy.
At Syracuse, the people having been the chief authors
of the victory in the war with the Athenians, changed
the constitutional government into democracy. At
Chalcis, the people, uniting with the notables, killed
Phoxus the tyrant, and then seized the government. At
Ambracia, the people, in like manner, having joined
with the conspirators in expelling the tyrant Periander,
transferred the government to themselves. And gen
erally, it should be remembered that those who have
secured power to the state, whether private citizens, or
magistrates, or tribes, or any other part or section of the
state, are apt to cause revolutions. For either envy of
their greatness draws others into rebellion, or they them
selves, in their pride of superiority, are unwilling to
remain on a level with others.

" Revolutions break out when opposite parties, e.g., the
rich and the poor, are equally balanced, and there is
little or nothing between them ; for, if either party were
manifestly superior, the other would not risk an attack
upon them. And, for this reason, those who are eminent

240 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

in virtue do not stir up insurrections, being always a
minority. Such are the beginnings and causes of the
disturbances and revolutions to which every form of
government is liable.

"Revolutions in democracies are generally caused by
the intemperance of demagogues, who either in their
private capacity lay information against rich men until
they compel them to combine, (for a common danger
unites even the bitterest enemies), or coming forward in
public they stir up the people against them. The truth
of this remark is proved by a variety of examples. At
Cos the democracy was overthrown because wicked
demagogues arose, and the notables combined. At
Rhodes the demagogues not only provided pay for the
multitude, but prevented them from making good to the
trierarchs the sums which had been expended by them ;
and they, in consequence of the suits which were brought
against them, were compelled to combine and put down
the democracy. The democracy at Heraclea was over
thrown shortly after the foundation of the colony by the
injustice of the demagogues, which drove out the
notables, who came back in a body and put an end to
the democracy. Much in the same manner the de
mocracy at Megara was overturned ; there the dema
gogues drove out many of the notables in order that
they might be able to confiscate their property. At
length the exiles, becoming numerous, returned, and
engaging and defeating the people, established an oli
garchy. . The same thing happened with the democracy
of Cyme which was overthrown by Thrasymachus.
And we may observe that in most states the changes
have been of this character. For sometimes the dema
gogues, in order to curry favor with the people, wrong
the notables and so force them to combine; either they

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 241

make a division of their property, or diminish their in
comes by the imposition of public services, and some
times they bring accusations against the rich that they
may have their wealth to confiscate.

"Of old, the demagogue was also a general, and then
democracies changed into tyrannies. Most of the ancient
tyrants were originally demagogues. They are not so
now, but they were then ; and the reason is, that they
were generals and not orators, for oratory had not yet
come into fashion. Whereas in our day, when the art
of rhetoric has made such progress, the orators lead the
people, but their ignorance of military matters prevents
them from usurping power ; at any rate instances to the
contrary are few and slight. Formerly tyrannies were
more common than they now are, because great power
was often placed in the hands of individuals; thus a
tyranny arose at Miletus out of the office of the Prytanis,
who had supreme authority in many important matters.
Moreover, in those days, when cities were not large, the
people dwelt in the fields, busy at their work ; and their
chiefs, if they possessed any military talent, seized the
opportunity, and winning the confidence of the masses
by professing their hatred of the wealthy, they succeeded
in obtaining the tyranny. Thus at Athens Peisistratus
led a faction against the men of the plain, and Theagenes
at Megara slaughtered the cattle of the wealthy, which
he found by the river side where they put them to graze.
Dionysius, again, was thought worthy of the tyranny
because he denounced Daphnaeus and the rich; his
enmity to the notables won for him the confidence of
the people. Changes also take place from the ancient
to the latest form of democracy ; for where there is a
popular election of the magistrates and no property
qualification, the aspirants for office get hold of the

242 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

people, and contrive at last even to set them above the
laws. A more or less complete cure for this state of
things is for the separate tribes, and not the whole people,
to elect the magistrates.

" These are the principal causes of revolutions in de
mocracies."

EXTRACTS FROM ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

BOOK VI.
DEMOCRACY ANALYZED AND COMMENDED.

"The basis of a democratic state is liberty; which ac
cording to the common opinion of men, can only be en
joyed in such a state; — this they affirm to be the great
end of every democracy. One principle of liberty is for
all to rule and be ruled in turn, and indeed democratic
justice is the application of numerical not proportionate
equality; whence it follows that the majority must be
supreme, and that whatever the majority approve must
be the end and the just. Every citizen, it is said, must
have equality, and therefore in a democracy the poor
have more power than the rich, because there are more
of them, and the will of the majority is supreme. This,
then, is one note of liberty which all democrats affirm to
be the principle of their state. Another is that a man
should live as he likes. This, they say, is the privilege
of a freeman, and, on the other hand, not to live as a
man likes is the mark of a slave. This is the second
characteristic of democracy, whence has arisen the claim
of men to be ruled by none, if possible, or, if this is im
possible, to rule and be ruled in turn ; and so it coincides
with the freedom based upon equality (which was the

first characteristic.)

(243)

244 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

"These are points common to all democracies; but
democracy and demos in their truest form are based upon
the recognized principle of democratic justice, that all
should count equally ; for equality implies that the rich
should have no more share in the government than the
poor, and should not be the only rulers, but that all
should rule equally according to their numbers. And
in this way men think that they will secure equality and
freedom in their state.

"Next comes the question, how is this equality to be
obtained? Is the qualification to be so distributed that
five hundred rich shall be equal to a thousand poor ?
and shall we give the thousand a power equal to that of
the five hundred? or, if this is not to be the mode, ought
we, still retaining the same ratio, to take equal numbers
from each and give them the control of the elections
and of the courts ? — Which, according to the democratical
notion, is the juster form of the constitution, — this or
one based on numbers only ? Democrats say that justice
is that to which the majority agree, oligarchs that to
which the wealthier class; in their opinion the decision
should be given according to the amount of property.
In both principles there is some inequality and injustice.
For if justice is the will of the few, any one person who
has more wrealth than all the rest of his class put to
gether, ought, upon the oligarchical principle, to have
the sole power — but this would be tyranny; or if justice
is the will of the majority, as I was before saying, they
will unjustly confiscate the property of the wealthy
minority. To find a principle of equality in which they
both agree we must inquire into their respective ideas of
justice.

44 Now they agree in saying that whatever is decided by
the majority of the citizens is to be deemed law. Grant-

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 245

ed : — but not without some reserve ; since there are two
classes out of which a state is composed, — the poor and
the rich, — that is to be deemed law, on which both or
the greater part of both agree ; and if they disagree, that
which is approved by the greater number, and by those
who have the higher qualification. For example, sup
pose that there are ten rich and twenty poor, and some
measure is approved by six of the rich and is dis
approved by fifteen of the poor, and the remaining four
of the rich join with the party of the poor, and the re
maining five of the poor with that of the rich ; in such
a case the will of those whose qualifications, when both
sides are added up, are the greatest, should prevail. If
they turn out to be equal, there is no greater difficulty
than at present, when, if the assembly or the courts are
divided, recourse is had to the lot, or to some similar
expedient. But, although it may be difficult in theory
to know what is just and equal, the practical difficulty
of inducing those to forbear who can, if they like, en
croach is far greater, for the weaker are always asking
for equality and justice, but the stronger care for none
of these things.

"Of the four kinds of democracy, as was said in the
previous discussion, the best is that which comes first in
order; it is also the oldest of them all. I am speaking
of them according to the natural classification of their
inhabitants. For the best material of democracy is an
agricultural population ; there is no difficulty in forming
a democracy where the mass of the people live by agri
culture or tending of cattle. Being poor, they have no
leisure, and therefore do not often attend the assembly,
and not having the necessaries of life they are always at
work, and do not covet the property of others. Indeed,
they find their employment pleasanter than the cares of

246 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

government or office where no great gains can be made
out of them, for the many are more desirous of gain
than of honor. A proof is that even the ancient tyrannies
were patiently endured by them, as they still endure oli
garchies, if they are allowed to work and are not de
prived of their property ; for some of them grow quickly
rich and the others are well enough off. Moreover,
they have the power of electing the magistrates and
calling them to account ; their ambition, if they have
any, is thus satisfied; and in some democracies, although
they do not all share in the appointment of offices, ex
cept through representatives elected in turn out of the
whole people, as at Mantinea; — yet, if they have the
power of deliberating, the many are contented. Even
this form of government may be regarded as a de
mocracy, and was such at Mantinea. Hence it is both
expedient and customary in such a democracy that all
should elect to offices, and conduct scrutinies, and sit in
the law-courts, but that the great offices should be filled
up by election and from persons having a qualification;
the greater requiring a greater qualification, or, if there
be no offices for which a qualification is required, then
those who are marked out by special ability should be
appointed. Under such a form of government the
citizens are sure to be governed well, (for the offices will
always be held by the best persons; the people are will
ing enough to elect them and are not jealous of the
good). The good and the notables will then be satisfied,
for they will not be governed by men who are their in
feriors, and the persons elected will rule justly, because
others will call them to account. Every man should be
responsible to others, nor should any one be allowed to
do just as he pleases; for where absolute freedom is al
lowed there is nothing to restrain the evil which is in-

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 247

herent in every man. But the principle of responsibility
secures that which is the greatest good in states ; the
right persons rule and are prevented from doing wrong,
and the people have their due. It is evident that this is
the best kind of democracy, and why? Because the
people are drawn from a certain class.

"Next best to an agricultural, and in many respects
similar, are a pastoral people, who live by their flocks ;
they are the best trained of any for war, robust in body
and able to camp out, the people of whom other de
mocracies consist are far inferior to them, for their life
is inferior ; there is no room for moral excellence in any
of their employments, whether they be mechanics or
traders or laborers.

"The last form of democracy, that in which all .share
alike, is one which cannot be borne by all states, and
will not last long unless well regulated by laws and
customs. The more general causes which tend to de
stroy this or other kinds of government have now been
pretty fully considered. In order to constitute such a
democracy and strengthen the people, the leaders have
been in the habit of including as many as they can, and
making citizens not only of those who are legitimate,
but even of the illegitimate, and of those who have only
one parent, a citizen, whether father or mother; for
nothing of this sort comes amiss to such a democracy.
This is the way in which demagogues proceed. Where
as the right thing would be to make no more additions
when the number of the commonalty exceeds that of
the notables or of the middle class, — beyond this not to
go. When in excess of this point the state becomes dis
orderly, and the notables grow excited and impatient of
the democracy, as in the insurrection at Cyrene ; for no
notice is taken of a little evil, but when it increases it
strikes the eye.

248 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

" The mere establishment of a democracy is not the
only or principal business of the legislator, or of those
who wish to create such a state, for any state, however
badly constituted, may last one, two, or three days; a far
greater difficulty is the preservation of it. The legis
lator should therefore endeavor to have a firm foundation
according to the principles already laid down concerning
the preservation and destruction of states; he should
guard against the destructive elements, and should make
laws, whether written or unwritten, which will contain
all the preservatives of states. He must not think the
truly democratical or oligarchical measure to be that
which will give the greatest amount of democracy or oli
garchy, but that which will make them last longest. The
demagogues of our own day often get property confis
cated in the law-courts to please the people. But those
who have the welfare of the state at heart should counter
act them, and make a law that the property of the con
demned which goes into the treasury, should not be
public but sacred. Thus offenders will be as much
afraid, for they will be punished all the same, and the
people, having nothing to gain, will not be so ready to
condemn the accused. Care should also be taken that
state trials are as few as possible, and heavy penalties
should be inflicted on those who bring groundless accu
sations ; for it is the practice to indict, not members of
the popular party, but the notables, although the citizens
ought to be all equally attached to the state, or at any
rate should not regard their rulers as enemies.

" Now, since in the last and worst form of democracy
the citizens are very numerous, and can hardly be made
to assemble unless they are paid, and to pay them when
there are no revenues, presses hardly upon the notables
(for the money must be obtained by a property-tax and

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 249

confiscations and corrupt practices of the courts, things
which have before now overthrown many democracies) ;
where, I say, there are no revenues, the government
should hold few assemblies, and the law-courts should
consist of many persons, but sit for a few days only.
This system has two advantages : first, the rich do not
fear the expense, even although they are unpaid them
selves when the poor are paid : and secondly, causes are
better tried, for wealthy persons, although they do not
like to be long absent from their own affairs, do not mind
going for a few days to the law-courts. Where there
are revenues the demagogues should not be allowed,
after their manner, to distribute the surplus; the poor
are always receiving and always wanting more and more,
for such help is like water poured into a leaky cask.
Yet the true friend of the people should see that they be
not too poor, for extreme poverty lowers the character
of the democracy ; measures also should be taken which
will give them lasting prosperity ; and as this is equalty
the interest of all classes, the proceeds of the public
revenues should be accumulated and distributed among
them, if possible, in such quantities as may enable them
to purchase a little farm, or at any rate, make a begin
ning in trade and husbandry. And if this benevolence
cannot be extended to all, money should be distributed
in turn according to tribes or other divisions, and in the
meantime the rich should pay the fee for the attendance
of the poor at the necessary assemblies ; and should in
return be excused from useless public services. By
administering the state in this spirit the Carthaginians
retain the affections of the people; their policy is from
time to time to send some of them into their dependent
towns, where they grow rich. It is also worthy of a
generous and sensible nobility to divide the poor amongst

250 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

them, and give them the means of going to work. The
example of the people of Tarentum is also well deserv
ing of imitation, for, by sharing the use of their own
property with the poor, they gain their good will.
Moreover, they divide all their offices into two classes,
one-half of them being elected by vote, the other by lot;
the latter, that the people may participate in them, and
the former, that the state may be better administered.
A like result may be gained by dividing the same offices,
so as to have two classes of magistrates, one chosen by
vote, the other by lot."

EXTRACTS FROM ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

BOOK VII.
THE BEST LIFE FOR INDIVIDUALS AND STATES.

"He who would duly enquire about the best form
of a state ought first to determine which is the most eli
gible life.

"Assuming that enough has been already said in
exoteric discourses concerning the best life, we will now
only repeat the statements contained in them. Certainly
no one will dispute the propriety of that partition of
goods which separates them into three classes, viz., ex
ternal goods, goods of the body, arid goods of the soul,
or deny that the happy man must have all three. These
propositions are universally acknowledged as soon as
they are uttered, but men differ about the degree or
relative superiority of this or that good. Some think
that a very moderate amount of virtue is enough, but set
no limit to their desires of wealth, property, power, repu
tation, and the like. To whom we reply by an appeal
to facts, which easily prove that mankind do not ac
quire or preserve virtue by the help of external goods,
but external goods by the help of virtue, and that happi
ness, whether consisting in pleasure or virtue, or both,
is more often found with those who are most highly

(251)

252 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

cultivated in their mind and in their character, and have
only a moderate share of external goods, than among
those who possess external goods to a useless extent,
but are deficient in higher qualities ; and this is not only
matter of experience, but, if reflected upon, will easily
appear to be in accordance with reason. For, \vhereas
external goods have a limit, like any other instrument,
and all things useful are of such a nature that where
there is too much of them they must either do harm, or
at any rate be of no use to their possessors, every good
of the vSoul, the greater it is, is also of greater use, if the
epithet, useful as well as noble, is appropriate to such
subjects.

"Let us acknowledge then that each one has just so
much of happiness as he has of virtue and wisdom, and
of virtuous and wise action. God is a witness to us of
this truth, for he is happy and blessed, not by reason of
any external good, but in himself and by reason of his
own nature. And herein of necessity lies the difference
between good fortune and happiness; for external goods
come of themselves, and chance is the author of them,
but no one is just or temperate by or through chance.
In like manner, and by a similar train of argument, the
happy state may be shown to be that which is (morally)
best, and which acts rightly ; and rightly it cannot act
without doing right actions, and neither individual or
state can do right actions without virtue and wisdom.
Thus the courage, justice, and wisdom of a state have
the same form and nature as the qualities which give
the individual who possesses them the name of just, wise,
or temperate.

<( Let us assume then that the best life, both for in
dividuals and states, is the life of virtue, having external
goods enough for the performance of good actions. If

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 253

there are any who controvert our assertion, we will in
this treatise pass them over, and consider their objec
tions hereafter.

" Now it is evident that the form of government is best
in which every man, whoever he is, can act for the best
and live happily. But even those who agree in thinking
that the life of virtue is the most eligible, raise a ques
tion, whether the life of business and politics is, or is
not, more eligible than one which is wholly independent
of external goods, I mean than a contemplative life,
which by some is maintained to be the only one worthy
of a philosopher. For these two lives — the life of the
philosopher and the life of the statesman — appear to
have been preferred by those who have been most keen
in the pursuit of virtue, both in our own and in other
ages. Which is the better is a question of no small
moment ; for the wise man, like the wise state, will nec
essarily regulate his life according to the best end.
There are some who think that while a despotic rule over
others is the greatest injustice, to exercise a constitu
tional rule over them, even though not unjust, is a great
impediment to a man's individual well-being. Others
take an opposite view ; they maintain that the true life
of man is the practical and political, and that every
virtue admits of being practiced, quite as much by states
men and rulers as by private individuals. Others, again,
are of opinion that arbitrary and tyrannical rule alone
consists with happiness ; indeed, in some states the en
tire aim of the laws is to give men despotic power over
their neighbors. And, therefore, although in most cities
the laws may be said general \y to be in a chaotic state,
still, if they aim at anything, they aim at the mainte
nance of power : thus in LacedLemon and Crete the system
of education and the greater part of the laws are framed

254 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

with a view to war. And in all nations which are able
to gratify their ambition, military power is held in
esteem, for example, among the Scythians and Persians
and Thracians and Celts. In some nations there are
even laws tending to stimulate the war-like virtues, as
at Carthage, where we are told that men obtain the
honor of wearing as many rings as they have served
campaigns. There was once a law in Macedonia that
he who had not killed an enemy should wear a halter,
and among the Scythians no one who had not slain his
man was allowed to drink out of the cup which was
handed round at a certain feast. Among the Iberians,
, a war-like nation, the number of enemies whom a man
has slain is indicated by the number of obelisks which
are fixed in the earth round his tomb ; and there are
numerous practices among other nations of a like kind,
some of them established by law and others by custom.
Yet to a reflecting mind it must appear very strange that
the statesman should be always considering how he can
dominate and tyrannize over others, whether they will
or not. How can that which is not even lawful be the
business of the statesman or the legislator? Unlawful
it certainly is to rule without regard to justice, for there
may be might where there is no right. The other arts
and sciences offer no parallel ; a physician is not ex
pected to persuade or coerce his patients, nor a pilot the
passengers in his ship. Yet many appear to think that
a despotic government is a true political form, and what
men affirm to be unjust and inexpedient in their own
case they are not ashamed of practising towards others;
they demand justice for themselves, but where other men
are concerned they care nothing about it. Such be
havior is irrational; unless the one party is born to
command, and the other born to serve, in which case

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 255

men have a right to command, not indeed all their
fellows, but only those who are intended to be subjects ;
just as we ought not to hunt mankind, whether for food
or sacrifice, but only the animals which are intended for
food or sacrifice, that is to say, such wild animals as are
eatable. And surely there may be a city happy in isola
tion, which we will assume to be well-governed (for it
is quite possible that a city thus isolated might be well-
administered and have good laws) ; but such a city
would not be constituted with any view to war or the
conquest of enemies, — all that sort of thing must be ex
cluded. Hence we see very plainly that warlike pur
suits, although generally to be deemed honorable, are
not the supreme end of all things, but only means. And
the good lawgiver should enquire how states and races
of men and communities may participate in a good life,
and in the happiness which is attainable by them. His
enactments will not be always the same ; and where there
are neighbors he will have to deal with them according
to their characters, and to see what duties are to be per
formed towards each. The end at which the best form
of government should aim may be properly made a matter
of future consideration.

" Let us now address those who, while they agree that
the life of virtue is the most eligible, differ about the
manner of practising it. For some renounce political
power, and think that the life of the freeman is different
from the life of the statesman and the best of all ; but
others think the life of the statesman best. The argu
ment of the latter is, that he who does nothing, cannot
do well, and that virtuous activity is identical with happi
ness. To both we say : ' You are partly right and
partly wrong.' The first class are right in affirming
that the life of the freeman is better than the life of the

256 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

despot; for there is nothing grand or noble in having
the use of a slave, in so far as he is a slave ; or in issuing
commands about necessary things. But it is an error to
suppose that every sort of rule is despotic like that of a
master over slaves, for there is as great a difference be
tween the rule over freemen and the rule over slaves, as
there is between slavery by nature and freedom by na
ture, about which I have said enough at the commence
ment of this treatise. And it is equally a mistake to
place inactivity above action, for happiness is activity,
and the actions of the just and wise are the realization
of much that is noble.

" But perhaps some one, accepting these premises, may
still maintain that supreme power is the best of all things,
because the possessors of it are able to perform the great
est number of noble actions. If so, the man who is able
to rule, instead of giving up anything to his neighbor,
ought rather to take away his power; and the father
should make no account of his son, nor the son of his
father, nor friend of friend ; they should not bestow a
thought on one another in comparison with this higher
object, for the best is the most eligible, and ' doing weir
is the best. There might be some truth in such a view
if we assume that robbers and plunderers attain the chief
good. But this can never be; and hence we infer the
view to be false. For the actions of a ruler cannot really
be honorable, unless he is as much superior to other men
as a husband is to a wife, or a father to his children, or
a master to his slaves. And therefore he who violates
the law can never recover by any success, however great,
what he has already lost in departing from virtue. For
equals share alike in the honorable and the just, as is
just and equal. But that the unequal should be given
to equals, and the unlike to those who are like, is con-

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 257

trary to nature, and nothing which is contrary to nature
is good. If, therefore, there is any one superior in virtue
and in the power of performing the best actions, him we
ought to follow and obey, but he must have the capacity
for action as well as virtue.

" If we are right in our view, and happiness is assumed
to be virtuous activity, the active life will be the best,
both for the city collectively, and for individuals. Not
that a life of action must necessarily have relation to
others, as some persons think, nor are these ideas only
to be regarded as practical which are pursued for the
sake of practical results, but much more the thoughts
and contemplations which are independent and complete
in themselves; since virtuous activity, and therefore
action, is an end, and even in the case of external actions,
the directing mind is most truly said to act. Neither,
again, is it necessary that states which are cut off from
others and choose to live alone, should be inactive; for
there may be activity also in the parts ; there are many
ways in which the members of a state act upon one an
other. The same thing is equally true of every indi
vidual. If this were otherwise, God and the universe,
who have no external actions over and above their own
energies, would be far enough from perfection. Hence
it is evident that the same life is best for each individual,
and for states, and for mankind collectively.

'"Thus far by way of introduction. In what has pre
ceded I have discussed other forms of government ; in
what remains the first point to be considered is what
should be the conditions of the ideal or perfect state; fojr
the perfect state cannot exist without a due supply of
the means of life. And therefore we must pre-suppose
many purely imaginary conditions, but nothing impos
sible. There will be, a certain number of citizens, a

258 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

country in which to place them, and the like. As the
weaver or shipbuilder or any other artisan must have
the material proper for his work (and in proportion as
this is better prepared, so will the result of his art be
nobler), so the statesman or legislator must also have
the materials suited to him.

"First among the materials required by the statesman
is population : he will consider what should be the num
ber and character of the citizens, and then what should
be the size and character of the country. Most persons
think that a state in order to be happy, ought to be
large: but even if they are right, they have no idea what
is a large and what is a small state.

" Moreover, experience shows that a very populous
city can rarely, if ever, be well governed ; since all cities
which have a reputation for good government have a
limit of population. We may argue on grounds of rea
son, and the same result will follow. For law is order,
and good law is good order ; but a very great multitude
cannot be orderly ; to introduce order into the unlimited
is the work of a divine power — of such a power as holds
together the universe. Beauty is realized in number
and magnitude, and the state which combines magnitude
with good order, must necessarily be the most beautiful.
To the size of states there is a limit, as there is to other
things, plants, animals, implements ; for none of these
retain their natural power when they are too large or too
small, but they either wholly lose their nature or are
spoiled.

" A state then only begins to exist when it has attained
a population sufficient for a good life in the political
community : it may indeed somewhat exceed this number.
But, as I was saying, there must be a limit. What
should be the limit will be easily ascertained by experi-

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 259

ence. For both governors and governed have duties to
be performed ; the special functions of a governor are
to command and to judge. But if the citizens of a state
are to judge and to distribute offices according to merit,
then they must know each other's characters ; where they
do not possess this knowledge, both the election to offices
and the decision of lawsuits will go wrong. When the
population is very large they are manifestly settled at
haphazard, which clearly ought not to be. Besides, in
an overpopulous state foreigners and metics will readily
acquire the rights of citizens, for who will find them out ?
Clearly then the best limit of the population of a state is
the largest number which suffices for the purposes of
life, and can be taken in at a single view. Enough con
cerning the size of a city.

" Having spoken of the number of the citizens, we will
proceed to speak of what should be their character.
This is a subject which can be easily understood by any
one who casts his eye on the more celebrated states of
Hellas, and generally on the distribution of races in the
habitable world. Those who live in a cold climate and
in (northern) Europe are full of spirit, but wanting in
intelligence and skill; and therefore they keep their
freedom, but have no political organization, and are in
capable of ruling over others. Whereas the natives of
Asia are intelligent and inventive, but they are wanting
in spirit, and therefore they are always in a state of sub
jection and slavery. But the Hellenic race, which is
situated between them, is likewise intermediate in charac
ter, being high-spirited and also intelligent. Hence it
continues free, and is the best-governed of any nation,
and, if it could be formed into one state, would be able
to rule the world.

" We must see also, how jmany things are indispensible

260 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

to the existence of a state, for what we call the parts of
a state will be found among them. Let us then enumer
ate the^functions of a state, and we shall easily elicit
what we want :

"First, there must be jood ; secondly, arts, for life re
quires many instruments ; thirdly, there must be jarrgs,
for the members of a community have need of them in
order to maintain authority both against disobedient
subjects and against external assailants ; fourthly, there
must be a certain amount of revenue, both for internal
needs, and for the purposes of war ; fifthly, or rather
first, there must be a care of religion, which is commonly
called worship; sixthly, and most necessary of all, there
must be a power of deciding what is for the public inter
est, and what is just in men's dealings with one another.

" These are the things which every state may be said
to need. For a state is not a mere aggregate of persons,
but a union of them sufficing for the purposes of life;
and if any of these things be wanting, it is simply im
possible that the community can be self-sufficing. A
state then should be framed with a view to the fulfil
ment of these functions.

" It is no new or recent discovery of political philoso
phers, that the state ought to be divided into classes, and
that the warriors should be separated from the husband
men. The system has continued in Egypt and in Crete
to this day, and was established, as tradition says, by a
law of Sesostris in Egypt and of Minos in Crete. The
institution of common tables also appears to be of
ancient date, being in Crete as old as the reign of Minos,
and in Italy far older. The Italian historians say that
there was a certain Italus king of Oenotria, from whom
the Oenotrians were called Italians, and who gave the
name of Italy to the promontory of Europe lying be-

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 261

tween the Scylletic and Lametic Gulfs, which are distant
from one another only half-a-day's journey. They say
that this Italus converted the Oenotrians from shepherds
into husbandmen, and besides other laws which he gave
them, was the founder of their common meals ; even in
our day some who are derived from him retain this in
stitution and certain other laws of his. On the side of
Italy towards Tyrrhenia dwelt the Opici, who are now,
as of old, called Ausones ; and on the side towards
lapygia and the Ionian Gulf, in the district called
Syrtis, the Chones, who are likewise of Oenotrian race.
From this part of the world originally came the institu
tion of common tables ; the separation into castes (which
was much older) from Egypt, for the reign of Sesostris
is of far greater antiquity than that of Minos. It is true,
indeed, that these, and many other things, have been in
vented several times over in the course of ages, or rather,
times without number ; for necessity may be supposed
to have taught men the inventions which were abso
lutely required, and when these were provided, it was
natural that other things which would adorn and enrich
life should grow up by degrees. And we may infer that
in political institutions the same rule holds. Egypt
witnesses to the antiquity of all things, for the Egyptians
appear to be of all people the most ancient ; and they
have laws and a regular constitution (existing from
time immemorial). We should therefore make the best use
of what has been already discovered, and try to supply
defects.

"Special care should be taken of the health of the in
habitants, which will depend chiefly on the healthiness
of the locality and of the quarter to which they are ex
posed, and secondly, on the use of pure water ; this latter
point is by no means a secondary consideration. For

262 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.,

the elements which we use most and oftenest for the
support of the body contribute most to health, and
among these are water and air. Wherefore, in all wise
states, if there is a want of pure water, and the supply,
is not all equally good, the drinking water ought to be
separated from that which is used for other purposes.

" Returning to the constitution itself, let us seek to
determine out of what and what sort of elements the
state which is to be happy and well-governed should be
\ composed. There are two things in which all well-being
consists, one of them is the choice of a right end and
aim of action, and the other the discovery of the actions
which are means towards it ; for the means and the end
may agree or disagree. Sometimes the right end is set
before men, but in practice they fail to attain it ; in other
cases they are successful in all the means, but they pro
pose to themselves a bad end, and sometimes they fail in
both.

" The happiness and well-being which all men mani
festly desire, some have the power of attaining, but to
others, from some accident or defect of nature, the at
tainment of them is not granted ; for a good life requires
a supply of external goods, in a less degree when men
are in a good state, in a greater degree when the)7 are in
a lower state. Others again, who possess the condition
of happiness, go utterly wrong from the first in the pur
suit of it. But since our object is to discover the best
form of government, that, namely, under which a city
will be best governed, and since the city is best governed
which has the greatest opportunity of obtaining happi
ness, it is evident that we must clearly ascertain the
nature of happiness.

"We have said in the Ethics, if the arguments there
adduced are of any value, that happiness is the realiza-

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 263

tion and perfect exercise of virtue, and this not con
ditional, but absolute. And I used the term ' conditional '
to express that which is indispensible, and 'absolute' to
express that which is good in itself. Take the case of
just actions; just punishments and chastisements do in
deed spring from a good principle, but they are good
only because we cannot do without them — it would be
better that neither individuals nor states should need
anything of the sort — but actions which aim at honor
and advantage are absolutely the best. The conditional
action is only the choice of a lesser evil ; whereas these
are the foundation and creation of good. A good man
may make the best even of poverty and disease, and the
other ills of life ; but he can only obtain happiness under
the opposite conditions. As we have already said in the
Ethics, the good man is he to whom, because he is
virtuous, the absolute good is his good. It is also plain
that his use of other goods must be virtuous and in the
absolute sense good. This makes men fancy that ex
ternal goods are the cause of happiness, yet we might as
well say that a brilliant performance on the lyre was to
be attributed to the instrument and not to the skill of
the performer.

"It follows then from what has been said that some
things the legislator must find ready to his hand in a
state, others he must provide. And therefore we can
only say : May our state be constituted in such a manner
as to be blessed with the goods of which fortune disposes
(for we acknowledge her power) : whereas virtue and
goodness in the state are not a matter of chance but the
result of knowledge and purpose. A city can be virtu
ous only when the citizens who have a share in the
government are virtuous, and in our state all the citizens
share in the government ; let us then enquire how a man

264 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

jbecomes virtuous. For even if we could suppose all the
citizens to be virtuous, and not each of them, yet the
latter would be better, for in the virtue of each the virtue
of all is involved.

" There are three things which make men good and
virtuous : these are nature, habit, reason. In the first
place, every one must be born a man and not some other
animal ; in the second place, he must have a certain
character, both of body and soul. But some qualities
there is no use in having at birth, for they are altered
by habit, and there are some gifts of nature which may
be turned by habit to good or bad. Most animals lead
a life of nature, although in lesser particulars some
are influenced by habit as well. Man has reason in ad
dition, and man only. Wherefore nature, habit, reason,
must be in harmony with one another ; (for they do not
always agree) ; men do many things against habit and
nature, if reason persuades them that they ought. We
have already determined what natures are likely to be
most easily moulded by the hands of the legislator. All
else is the work of education ; we learn some things by
habit and some by instruction.

" Now the soul of man is divided into two parts, one
of which has reason in itself, and the other, not having
reason in itself, is able to obey reason. And we call a
man good because he has the virtues of these two parts.
In which of them the end is more likely to be found is
no matter of doubt to those who adopt our division ; for
in the world both of nature and of art the inferior always
exists for the sake of the better or superior, and the
better or superior is that which has reason. The reason
too, in our ordinary way of speaking, is divided into two
parts, for there is a practical and a speculative reason,
and there must be a corresponding division of actions ;

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 265

the actions of the naturally better principle are to be
preferred by those who have it in their power to attain
to both or to all, for that is always to every one the most
eligible which is the highest attainable by him. The
whole of life is further divided into two parts, business
and leisure, war and peace, and all actions into those
which are necessary and useful, and those which are
honorable. And the preference given to one or the other
class of actions must necessarily be like the preference
given to one or other part of the soul and its actions
over the other; there must be war for the sake of peace,
business for the sake of leisure, things useful and neces
sary for the sake of things honorable. All these points
the statesman shoiild keep in view when he frames his
laws ; he should consider the parts of the soul and their
functions, and above all, the better and the end ; he
should also remember the diversities of human lives and
actions. For men must engage in business and go to
war, but leisure and peace are better ; they must do what
is necessary and useful, but what is honorable is better.
In such principles children and persons of every age
which requires education should be trained. Whereas
even the Hellenes of the present day, who are reputed to
be best governed, and the legislators who gave them
their constitutions, do not appear to have framed their
governments with a regard to the best end, or to have
given them laws and education with a view to all the
virtues, but in a vulgar spirit have fallen back on those
which promised to be more useful and profitable. Many
modern writers have taken a similar view; they com
mend the Lacedaemonian constitution, and praise the
legislator for making conquest and war his sole aim, a
doctrine which may be refuted by argument and has long
ago been refuted by facts. For most men desire empire

266 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

in the hope of accumulating the goods of fortune ; and
on this ground Thibron and all those who have written
about the Lacedaemonian constitution have praised their
legislator, because the Lacedaemonians, by a training in
hardships, gained great power. But surely they are not
a happy people now that their empire has passed away,
nor was their legislator right. How ridiculous is the
result, if, while they are continuing in the observance of
his laws, and no one interferes with them, they have lost
the better part of life. These writers further err about
the sort of government which the legislator should ap
prove, for the government of freemen is noble, and im
plies more virtue than despotic government. Neither is
a city to be deemed happy or a legislator to be praised
because he trains his citizens to conquer and obtain
dominion over their neighbors, for there is great evil in
this. On a similar principle any citizen who could,
would obviously try to obtain the power in his own
state, — the crime which the Lacedaemonians accuse King
Pausanias of attempting, although he had so great
honor already. No such principle and no law having
this object, is either statesmanlike or useful or right.
For the same things are best both for individuals and
for states, and these are the things which the legislator
ought to implant in the minds of his citizens. Neither
should men study war with a view to the enslavement of
those who do not deserve to be enslaved ; but first of all
they should provide against their enslavement, and in
the second place obtain empire for the good of the gov
erned, and not for the sake of exercising a general
despotism, and in the third place they should seek to be
masters only over those who deserve to be slaves.
Facts, as well as arguments, prove that the legislator
should direct all his military and other measures to the

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 267

provision of leisure and the establishment of peace. For
most of these military states are safe only while they are
at war, but fall when they have acquired their empire ;
like unused iron they rust in time of peace. And for
this the legislator is to blame, he never having taught
them how to lead the life of peace.

" Since the end of individuals and of states is the same,
the end of the best man and of the best state must also
[be the same; it is therefore evident that there ought to
jexist in both of them the virtues of leisure, for peace, as
has been often repeated, is the end of war, and leisure of
toil. But leisure and cultivation may be promoted, not
only by those virtues which are practised in leisure, but
also by some of those which are useful to business.
For many necessaries of life have to be supplied before
we can have leisure. Therefore a city must be tem
perate and brave, and able to endure: for truly, as the
proverb says, ' There is no leisure for slaves,' and those
who cannot face danger like men are the slaves of any
invader. Courage and endurance are required for busi
ness and philosophy for leisure, temperance and justice
for both, more especially in times of peace and leisure,
for war compels men to be just and temperate, whereas
the enjoyment of good fortune and the leisure \vhich
comes with peace tends to make them insolent. Those,
then, who seem to be the best-off, and to be in the pos
session of every good, have special need of justice and
temperance — for example, those (if such there be, as the
poets say), who dwell in the Islands of the Blest ; they
above all will need philosophy and temperance and jus
tice, and all the more the more leisure they have, living
in the midst of abundance. There is no difficulty in
seeing why the state that would be happy and good ought
to have these virtues. If it be disgraceful in men not

268 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

to be able to use the goods of life, it is peculiarly dis
graceful not to be able to use them in time of peace, — to
show excellent qualities in action and war, and when
they have peace and leisure to be no better than slaves.
Wherefore, we should not practice virtue after the man
ner of the Lacedaemonians. For they, while agreeing
with other men in their conception of the highest goods,
differ from the rest of mankind in thinking that they
are to be obtained by the practice of a single virtue.
And since these goods and the enjoyment of them are
clearly greater than the enjoyment derived from the
virtues of which they are the end, we must now consider
how and by what means they are to be attained.

"We have already determined that nature and habit
and reason are required, and what should be the charac
ter of the citizens has also been defined by us. But we
have still to consider whether the training of early life
is to be that of reason or habit, for these two must accord,
and when in accord they will then form the best of har
monies. Reason may make mistakes and fail in attain
ing the highest ideal of life, and there may be a like evil
influence of habit. Thus much is clear in the first place,
that, as in all other things, birth implies some antecedent
principle, and that the end of anything has a beginning
in some former end. Now, in men reason and mind are
the end towards which nature strives, so that the birth
and moral discipline of the citizens ought to be ordered
with a view to them. In the second place, as the soul
and body are two, we see also that there are two parts
of the soul, the rational and the irrational, and two cor
responding states — reason and appetite. And as the
body is prior in order of generation to the soul, so the
irrational is prior to the rational. The proof is that
anger and will and desire are implanted in children from

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 269

their very birth, but reason and understanding, are de
veloped as they grow older. Wherefore, the care of the
body ought to precede that of the soul, and the training
of the appetitive part should follow ; none the less our
care of it must be for the sake of the reason, and our care
of the body for the sake of the soul. Since the legislator
should begin by considering how the frames of the
children whom he is rearing may be as good as possible,
his first care will be about marriage — at what age should
his citizens marry, and who are fit to marry ?

" Women should marry when they are about eighteen
years of age, and men at seven and thirty; then they are
in the prime of life, and the decline in the powers of both
will coincide. Further, the children, if their birth takes
place at the time that may reasonably be expected, will
succeed in their prime, when the fathers are already in
the decline of life, and have nearly reached their term of
three-score years and t'en.

" What constitution in the parent is most advantageous
to the offspring is a subject which we will hereafter con
sider when we speak of the education of children, and
we will only make a few general remarks at present.
The temperament of an athlete is not suited to the life
of a citizen, or to health, or to the procreation of children,
any more than the valetudinarian or exhausted constitu
tion, but one which is in a mean between them. A
man's constitution should be inured to labor, but not to
labor which is excessive or of one sort only, such as is
practiced by athletes; he should be capable of all the
actions of a freeman. These remarks apply equally to
both parents.

"After the children have been born, the manner of
rearing of them may be supposed to have a great effect
on their bodily strength. To accustom children to the

270 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

cold from their earliest years is also an excellent practice,
which greatly conduces to health, and hardens them for
military service. Hence many barbarians have a custom
of plunging their children at birth into a cold stream:
others, like the Celts, clothe them in a light wrapper
only. For human nature should be early habituated to
endure all which by habit it can be made to endure ; but
the process must be gradual. And children, from their
natural warmth, may be easily trained to bear cold. Such
care should attend them in the first stage of life.

" The next period lasts to the age of five; during this
no demand should be made upon the child for study or
labor, lest its growth be impeded ; and there should be
sufficient motion to prevent the limbs from being inactive.
This can be secured, among other ways, by amusement,
but the amusement should not be vulgar or tiring or
riotous. The Directors of Education, as they are termed,
should be careful what tales or stories the children hear,
for the sports of children are designed to prepare the
way for the business of later life, and should be for the
most part imitations of the occupations which they will
hereafter pursue in earnest. Those are wrong who (like
Plato) in the Laws attempt to check the loud crying and
screaming of children, for these contribute towards their
growth, and, in a like manner, exercise their bodies.
Straining the voice has an effect similar to that produced
by the retention of the breath in violent exertions. Be
sides other duties, the Directors of Education should
have an eye to their bringing up, and should take care
that they are left as little as possible with slaves. For
until they are seven years old they must live at home;
and therefore, even at this early age, all that is mean and
low should be banished from their sight and hearing.
Indeed, there is nothing which the legislator should be

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 271

more careful to drive away than indecency of speech,
for the light utterance of shameful words is akin to
shameful actions. The young especially should never
be allowed to repeat or hear anything of the sort. A
freeman who is found saying or doing what is forbidden,
if he be too young as yet to have the privilege of a place
at the public tables, should be disgraced and beaten, and
an elder person degraded as his slavish conduct deserves.
And since we do not allow improper language, clearly
we should also banish pictures or tales which are in
decent. Let the rulers take care that there be no image
or picture representing unseemly actions, except in the
temples of those Gods at whose festivals the law permits
even ribaldry, and whom the law also permits to be wor
shipped by persons of mature age on behalf of them
selves, their children, and their wives. But the legis
lator should not allow youth to be hearers of satirical
Iambic verses or spectators of comedy until they are of
an age to sit at the public tables and to drink strong
wine; by that time education will have armed them
against the evil influences of such representations.

"And therefore, youth should be kept strangers to all
that is bad, and especially all things which suggest vice
or hate. When the five years have passed away, during
the two following years they must look on at the pursuits
which they are hereafter to learn. There are two periods
of life into which education has to be divided, from seven
to the age of puberty, and onwards to the age of one
and twenty. (The poets) who divide ages by sevens,
are not always right : we should rather adhere to the
divisions actually made by nature ; for the deficiencies
of nature are what art and education seek to fill up."

EXTRACTS FROM ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

BOOK VIII.

PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND LIBERAL EDUCATION,
GYMNASTICS, Music AND MORALS.

" And since the whole city has one end, it is manifest
that education should be one and the same for all, and
that it should be public, and not private, — not as at
present, when every one looks after his own children
separately, and gives them .separate instruction of the
sort which he thinks best ; the training in things which
are of common interest should be the same for all.
Neither must wre suppose that any one of the citizens be
longs to himself, for they all belong to the state, and are
each of them a part of the state, and the care of each
part is inseparable from the care of the whole. In this
particular the Lacedaemonians are to be praised, for they
take the greatest pains about their children, and make
education the business of the state.

''That education should be regulated by law and
should be an affair of state is not to be denied, but what
should be the character of this public education, and
how young persons should be educated, are questions
which remain to be considered. For mankind are by

no means agreed about the things to be taught, whether

(272)

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 273

we look to virtue or the best life. Neither is it clear
whether education is more concerned with intellectual
or with moral virtue. The existing practice is perplex
ing ; no one knows on what principle we should proceed —
should the useful in life, or should virtue, or should the
higher knowledge, be the aim of our training; all three
opinions have been entertained. Again, about the
means there is no agreement ; for different persons, start
ing with different ideas about the nature of virtue,
naturally disagree about the practice of it. There can
be no doubt that children should be taught those use
ful things which are really necessary, but not all things ;
for occupations are divided into liberal and illiberal ; and
to young children should be imparted only such kinds
of knowledge as will be useful to them without vulgar
izing them. And any occupation, art or science, which
makes the body or soul or mind of the freeman less fit
for the practice or exercise of virtue, is vulgar; where
fore, we call those arts vulgar which tend to deform the
body, and likewise all paid employments, for they ab
sorb and degrade the mind. There are also some liberal
arts quite proper for a freeman to acquire, but only in a
certain degree, and if he attend to them too closely, in
order to attain perfection in them, the same evil effects
will follow. The object, also, which a man sets before
him makes a great difference ; if he does or learns any
thing for his own sake or for the sake of his friends, or
with a view to excellence, the action will not appear
illiberal ; but if done for the sake of others, the very
same action will be thought menial and servile. The
received subjects of instruction, as I have already re
marked, are partly of a liberal and partly of an illiberal
character.

"The customary branches of education are in number,

274 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

four; they are — (i) reading and writing, (2) gymnastic
exercises, (3) music, to which is sometimes added (4)
drawing. Of these, reading and writing and drawing
are regarded as useful for the purposes of life in a variety
of ways, and gymnastic exercises are thought to infuse
courage. Concerning music a doubt may be raised — in
our own day most men cultivate it for the sake of
pleasure, but originally it was included in education,
because nature herself, as has been often said, requires
that we should be able, not only to work well, but to use
leisure well; for, as I must repeat once and again, the
first principle of all action is leisure. Both are required,
but leisure is better than occupation ; and therefore the
question must be asked in good earnest, what ought we
to do when at leisure? Clearly we ought not to be
amusing ourselves, for then amusement would be the end
of life. But if this is inconceivable, and yet amid seri-
.ous occupations amusement is needed more than at other
times (for he who is hard at work has need of relaxation,
and amusement gives relaxation, w7hereas occupation is
always accompanied with exertion and effort), at suitable
times we should introduce amusements, and they should
be our medicines, for the emotion which they create in
the soul is a relaxation and from the pleasure we obtain
rest. Leisure of itself gives pleasure and happiness and
enjoyment of life, which are experienced, not by the busy
man, but by those who have leisure. For he who is
occupied has in view some end which he has not attained ;
but happiness is an end which all men deem to be ac
companied with pleasure and not with pain. This
pleasure, however, is regarded differently by different
persons, and varies according to the habit of individuals;
the pleasure of the best man is the best, and springs from
the noblest sources. It is clear then, that there are

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 275

branches of learning and education which we must study
with a view to the enjoyment of leisure, and these are
to be valued for their own sake; whereas, those kinds of
knowledge which are useful in business are to be deemed
necessary, and exist for the sake of other things. And
therefore our fathers admitted music into education, not
on the ground either of its necessity or utility, for it is
not necessary, nor indeed useful in the same manner as
reading and writing, which are useful in money-making,
in the management of a household, in the acquisition of
knowledge and in political life, nor like drawing, useful
for a more correct judgment of the works of artists, nor
again, like gymnastics, which give health and strength;
for neither of these is to be gained from music. There
remains, then, the use of music for intellectual enjoy
ment in leisure; which appears to have been the reason
of its introduction, this being one of the wa)rs in which
it is thought that a freeman should pass his leisure.

"Of those states which in our own day seem to take
the greatest care of children, some aim at producing in
them an athletic habit, but they only injure their forms
and stunt their growth. Although the Lacedaemonians
have not fallen into this mistake, yet they brutalize their
children by laborious exercises which they think will
make them courageous. But in truth, as we have often
repeated, education should not be exclusively directed to
this or to any other single end. And even if we suppose
the Lacedaemonians to be right in their end, they do not
attain it. For among barbarians and among animals
courage is found associated, not with the greatest ferocity,
but with a gentle and lion-like temper. There are many
races who are ready enough to kill and eat men such as
the Achaeans and Heniochi, who both live about the
Black Sea; and there are other inland tribes, as bad or

276 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

worse, who all live by plunder, but have no courage. It
is notorious that the Lacedaemonians, while they were
themselves assiduous in their laborious drill, were su
perior to others, but now they are beaten both in war and
gymnastic exercises. For their ancient superiority did
not depend on their mode of training their youth, but only
on the circumstance that they trained them at a time
when others did not. Hence we may infer that what is
noble, not what is brutal, should have the first place; no
wolf or other wild animal will face a really noble danger;
such dangers are for the brave man. And parents who
devote their children to gymnastics while they neglect
their necessary education, in reality vulgarize them ; for
they make them useful to the state in one quality only,
and even in this the argument proves them to be inferior
to others. We should judge the Lacedaemonians not
from what they have been, but from what they are; for
now they have rivals who compete with their education ;
formerly they had none.

" It is an admitted principle, that gymnastic exercises
should be employed in education, and that for children
they should be of a lighter kind, avoiding severe
regimen or painful toil, lest the growth of the body be
impaired. The evil of excessive training in early years
is strikingly proved by the example of the Olympic
victors; for not more than two or three of them have
gained a prize both as boys and as men ; their early train
ing and severe gymnastic exercises exhausted their con
stitutions. When boyhood is over, three years should
be spent in other studies ; the period of life which follows
may then be devoted to hard exercise and strict regimen.
Men ought not to labor at the same time with their
minds and with their bodies ; for the two kinds of
labor are opposed to one another, the labor of the

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 277

body impedes the mind, and the labor of the mind the
body.

" Concerning music there are some questions which we
have already raised ; these we may now resume and carry
further.

"The first question is whether music is or is not to be
a part of education. Of the three things mentioned in
our discussion, which is it ? — Education or amusement
or intellectual enjoyment, for it may be reckoned under
all three, and seems to share in the nature of all of them.
Amusement is for the sake of relaxation, and relaxation
is of necessity sweet, for it is the remedy of pain caused
by toil, and intellectual enjoyment is universally acknowl
edged to contain an element, not only of the noble but of
the pleasant, for happiness is made up of both. All men
agree that music is one of the pleasantest things, whether
with or without song ; as Musaeus says,

' Song is to mortals of all things the sweetest.'

" Hence, and with good reason it is introduced into
social gatherings and entertainments, because it makes
the hearts of men glad ; so that on this ground alone we
may assume that the young ought to be trained in it.
For innocent pleasures are not only in harmony with
the perfect end of life, but they also provide relaxation.
And whereas men rarely attain the end, but often rest by
the way and amuse themselves, not only with a view to
some good, but also for the pleasure's sake, it may be
well for them at times to find a refreshment in music.
It sometimes happens that men make amusement the
end, for the end probably contains some element of
pleasure, though not any ordinary or lower pleasure ; but
they mistake the lower for the higher, and in seeking for
the one find the other, since every pleasure has a like
ness to the end of action. For the end is not eligible,

278 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

nor do the pleasures which we have described exist, for
the sake of any future good but of the past, that is to
say, they are the alleviation of past toils and pains. And
we may infer this to be the reason why men seek happi
ness from common pleasures. But music is pursued,
not only as an alleviation of past toil, but also as pro
viding recreation. And who can say whether, having
this use, it may not also have a nobler one ? In addition
to this common pleasure, felt and shared in by all (for
the pleasure given by music is natural, and therefore
adapted to all ages and characters), may it not have also
some influence over the character and the soul ? It must
have such an influence if characters are affected by it.
And that they are so affected is proved by the power
which the songs of Olympus and of many others exer
cise ; for beyond question they inspire enthusiasm, and
enthusiasm is an emotion of the ethical part of the soul.
Besides, when men hear imitations, even unaccompanied
by melody or rhythm, their feelings move in sympathy.
Since then music is a pleasure, and virtue consists in
rejoicing and loving and hating aright, there is clearly
nothing which we are so much concerned to acquire and
to cultivate as the power of forming right judgments,
and of taking delight in good dispositions and noble
actions. Rhythm and melody supply imitations of anger
and gentleness, and also of courage and temperance, and
of virtues and vices in general, which hardly fall short
of the actual affections, as we know from our own ex
perience, for in listening to such strains our souls under
go a change. The habit of feeling pleasure or pain at
mere representations is not far removed from the same
feeling about realities ; for example, if any one delights
in the sight of a statue for its beauty only, it necessarily
follows that the sight of the original will be pleasant to

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 279

him. No other sense, such as taste or touch, has any
resemblance to moral qualities ; in sight only there is a
little, for figures are to some extent of a moral character,
and (so far) all participate in the feeling about them.
Again, figures and colors are not imitations, but signs of
moral habits, indications which the body gives of states
of feeling. The connection of them with morals is slight,
but in so far as there is any, young men should be taught
to look, not at the works of Pauson, but at those of
Polygnotus, or any other painter or statuary who ex
presses moral ideas. On the other hand, even in mere
melodies there is an imitation of character, for the
musical modes differ essentially from one another, and
those who hear them are differently affected by each.
Some of them make men sad and grave, like the so-called
Mixolydian, others enfeeble the mind, like the relaxed
harmonies, others, again, produce a moderate and settled
temper, which appears to be the peculiar effect of the
Dorian ; the Phrygian inspires enthusiasm. The whole
subject has been well treated by philosophical writers
on this branch of education, and they confirm their
arguments by facts. The same principles apply to
rhythms ; some have a character of rest, others of motion,
and of these latter again, some have a more vulgar,
others a nobler movement. Enough has been said to
show that music has a power of forming the character,
and should, therefore, be introduced into the education
of the young. The study is suited to the stage of youth,
for young persons wTill not, if they can help, endure any
thing which is not sweetened by pleasure, and music has
a natural sweetness. There seems to be in us a sort of
affinity to harmonies and rhythms, which makes some
philosophers say that the soul is a harmony, others, that
she possesses harmony.

280 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

" And now we have to determine the question which
has been already raised, whether children should be
themselves taught to sing and play, or not. Clearly,
there is a considerable difference made in the character
by the actual practice of the art. It is difficult, if not
impossible, for those who do not perform to be judges of
the performance of others. Besides, children should
have something to do, and the rattle of Archytas, which
people give to their children in order to amuse them and
prevent them from breaking anything in the house, was
a capital invention, for a young thing cannot be quiet.
The rattle is a toy suited to the infant mind, and
(musical) education is a rattle or toy for children of a
larger growth. We conclude then that they should be
taught music in such a way as to become not only critics
but performers.

"The question, what is or is not, suitable for different
ages may be easily answered; nor is there any difficulty
in meeting the objection of those who say that the study
of music is vulgar. We reply (i) in the first place, that
they who are to be judges must also be performers, and
that they should begin to practice early, although when
they are older they may be spared the execution ; they
must have learned to appreciate what is good and to de
light in it, thanks to the knowledge which they acquired
in their youth. As to (2) the vulgarizing effect which
music is supposed to exercise, this is a question (of
degree), which we shall have no difficulty in determining,
when we have considered to what extent freemen who
are being trained to political virtue, should pursue the
art, what melodies and what rhythms they should be
allowed to use, and what instruments should be em
ployed in teaching them to play, for even the instrument
makes a difference. The answer to the objection turns

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 281

upon these distinctions; for it is quite possible that cer
tain methods of teaching and learning music do really
have a degrading effect. It is evident then that the
learning of music ought not to impede the business of
riper years, or to degrade the body or render it unfit for
civil or military duties, whether for the early practice or
for the later study of them.

"The right measure will be attained if students of
music stop short of the arts which are practised in pro
fessional contests, and do not seek to acquire those fan
tastic marvels of execution which are now the fashion
in such contests, and from these have passed into edu
cation. Let the young pursue their studies until they
are able to feel delight in noble melodies and rhythms,
and not merely in that common part of music in which
every slave or child, and even some animals find pleasure.

"From these principles we may also infer what instru
ments should be used. The flute, or any other instru
ment which requires great skill, as for example the harp,
ought not to be admitted into education, but only such
as will make intelligent students of music or of the other
parts of education. Besides, the flute is not an instru
ment which has a good moral effect ; it is too exciting.
The proper time for using it is when the performance
aims, not at instruction, but at the relief of the passions.
And there is a further objection ; the impediment which
the flute presents to the use of the voice detracts from
its educational value. The ancients were therefore right
in forbidding the flute to youths and freemen, although
they had once allowed it. For when their wealth gave
them greater leisure, and they had loftier notions of ex
cellence, being also elated with their success, both before
and after the Persian War, with more zeal than discern
ment they pursued every kind of knowledge, and so they

282 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

introduced the flute into education. At Lacedsemon
there was a Choragus who led the Chorus with a flute,
and at Athens the instrument became so popular that
most freemen could play upon it. The popularity is
shown by the tablet which Thrasippus dedicated when
he furnished the Chorus to Ecphantides. Later experi
ence enabled men to judge what was, or was not, really
conducive to virtue, and they rejected both the flute and
several other old-fashioned instruments, such as the
Lydian harp, the many-stringed lyre, the 'heptagon,'
' triangle,' ' sambuca,' and the like — which are intended
only to give pleasure to the hearer, and require extra
ordinary skill of hand. There is a meaning also in the
myth of the ancients, which tells how Athene invented
the flute and then threw it away. It was not a bad idea
of theirs, that the Goddess disliked the instrument be
cause it made the face ugly ; but with still more reason
may we say that she rejected it because the acquirement
of flute-playing contributes nothing to the mind, since
to Athene we ascribe both knowledge and art.

"Thus then we reject the professional instruments and
also the professional mode of education in music — and
by professional we mean that which is adopted in con
tests, for in this the performer practises the art, not for
the sake of his own improvement, but in order to give
pleasure, and that of a vulgar sort, to his hearers. For
this reason the execution of such music is not the part
of a freeman but of a paid performer, and the result is
that the performers are vulgarized, for the end at which
they aim is bad. The vulgarity of the spectator tends
to lower the character of the music and therefore of the
performers : they look to him — he makes them what they
are, and fashions even their bodies by the movements
which he expects them to exhibit.

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 283

" We have also to consider rhythms and harmonies.
Shall we use them all in education or make a distinction?
and shall the distinction be that which is made by those
who are engaged in education, or shall it be some other?
For we see that music is produced by melody and rhythm,
and we ought to know what influence these have respect
ively on education, and whether we should prefer ex
cellence in melody or excellence in rhythm. But as the
subject has been very well treated by many musicians of
the present day, and also by philosophers who have had
considerable experience of musical education, to these
we would refer the more exact student of the subject ;
we shall only speak of it now after the manner of the
legislator, having regard to general principles.

" We accept the division of melodies proposed by cer
tain philosophers into ethical melodies, melodies of action,
and passionate or inspiring melodies, each having, as they
say, a mode or harmony corresponding to it. But we
maintain further that music should be studied, not for
the sake of one, but of many benefits, that is to say, with
a view to (i) education, (2) purification (the word ' puri
fication ' we use at present without explanation, but when
hereafter we speak of poetry, wre will treat the subject
with more precision); music may also serve (3) for in
tellectual enjoyment, for relaxation and for recreation
after exertion. It is clear, therefore, that all the har
monies must be employed by us, but not all of them in
the same manner. In education ethical melodies are to
be preferred, but we may listen to the melodies of action
and passion when they are performed by others. For
feelings such as pity and fear, or, again, enthusiasm, ex
ist very strongly in some souls, and have more or less
influence over all. Some persons fall into a religious
frenzy, whom we see disenthralled by the use of mystic

284 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

melodies, which bring healing and purification to the
soul. Those who are influenced by pity or fear, and
every emotional nature, have a like experience, others,
in their degree are stirred by something which specially
affects them, and all are in a manner purified, and their
souls lightened and delighted. The melodies of purifica
tion likewise give an innocent pleasure to mankind.
Such are the harmonies and the melodies in which those
who perform music at the theatre should be invited to
compete. But since the spectators are of two kinds — the
one free and educated, and the other a vulgar crowd
composed of mechanics, laborers, and the like — there
ought to be contests and exhibitions instituted for the
relaxation of the second class also. And the melodies
will correspond to their minds ; for as their minds are
perverted from the natural state, so there are exaggerated
and corrupted harmonies which are in like manner a per
version. A man receives pleasure from what is natural
to him, and therefore professional musicians may be
allowed to practice this lower sort of music before an
audience of a lower type. But, for the purposes of edu
cation, as I have already said, those modes and melodies
should be employed which are ethical, such as the Dorian ;
though we may include any others which are approved
by philosophers who have had a musical education. The
Socrates of the Republic is wrong in retaining only the
Phrygian mode along with the Dorian, and the more so
because he rejects the flute; for the Phrygian is to the
modes what the flute is to musical instruments — both of
them are exciting and emotional. Poetry proves this,
for Bacchic frenzy and all similar emotions are most
suitably expressed by the flute, and are better set to the
Phrygian than to any other harmony. The dithyramb,
for example, is acknowledged to be Phrygian, a fact of

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 285

which the connoisseurs of music offer many proofs,
saying, among other things, that Philoxenus, having at
tempted to compose his tales as a dithyramb in the
Dorian mode, found it impossible, and fell back into the
more appropriate Phrygian. All men agree that the
Dorian music is the gravest and manliest. And, whereas
we say that the extremes should be avoided and the
mean followed, and whereas the Dorian is a mean between
the other harmonies (the Phrygian and the Lydian), it
is evident that our youth should be taught the Dorian
music.

"Two principles have to be kept in view, what is pos
sible, what is becoming : at these every man ought to
aim. But even these are relative to age ; the old, who
have lost their powers, cannot very well sing the severe
melodies, and nature herself seems to suggest that their
songs should be of the more relaxed kind. Wherefore,
the musicians likewise blame Socrates, and with justice,
for rejecting the relaxed harmonies in education under
the idea that they are intoxicating, not in the ordinary
sense of intoxication (for wine rather tends to excite
men), but because they have no strength in them. And
so with a view to a time of life when men begin to grow
old, they ought to practice the gentler harmonies and
melodies as well as the others. And if there be any
harmony, such as the Lydian above all others appears
to be, which is suited to children of tender age, and pos
sesses the elements both of order and of education, clearly
(we ought to use it, for) education should be based upon
three principles — the_mean, the possible, the becoming,
these three."

LIFE OF SOCRATES,

CONDENSED FROM

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY,

THOMAS STANLEY.

LONDON, 1701,
BY CHAS. M. HlGGlNS.

CHARLES M. HIGGINS £ CO.
NEW YORK — CHICAGO — LONDON.
1903.

LIFE OF SOCRATES. 2850!

CONTENTS.

PAGE

The nativity, parentage and training of Socrates, . . 286
His original profession of sculptor abandoned to adopt the
role of moral philosopher, public reformer and teacher
of virtue, without fees, ...... 287

The Masters and Teachers of Socrates, .... 297

His school and pupils, 298

Philosophic sects influenced by and formed from his teach
ings. Cynics, Stoics, Hedonists, Platonists, Aristotel
ians, etc. 307

Writings of Socrates— Poetry and Tragedy, . . . 311
Socrates as a soldier — his military services and actions, . 312
His quarrel with the Sophists and Rhetoricians and cause

of his death, , 314

The trial of Socrates, 318

His imprisonment, . 325

After his death. Decline of Greece. Honors paid and re
morse and sorrow shown by Greeks and others . 331

I
4?

LIFE OF SOCRATES.

"The great English philosopher, John Stuart Mill,
has somewhere observed that mankind cannot be too
often reminded that there was once a man of the name
of Socrates."

Prof. Harnack— " What is Christianity?"

"Drink Socrates with Jove, next whom enthroned,
By Gods, and Wisdom's self, as wisest own'd.
Thee the Athenians gave a poisonous draught,
But first thy wisdom from your lips they quaffed."

Note : — In this condensation we have preserved as far
as possible the quaint language, punctuation, and obso
lete words of this deep and interesting old book of two
centuries ago.

C. M. H.

LIFE OF SOCRATES.

CONDENSED FROM STANLEY'S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY,
LONDON, 1701.

Socrates was by country an Athenian, born at Alopece,
a town belonging to the Antiochian Tribe.

His parents were very mean ; Sophroniscus (an Athen
ian) his father, a statuary or carver of images in stone;
Phaenareta, his mother, a midwife, a woman of a bold,
generous and quick spirit, as is implied by the character
Plato gives her, of which professions of his parents,
he is observed to have been so far from feeling ashamed,
that he often took occasion to mention them.
^ The day of Socrates' birth was the sixth of the month
Thargelion (about May 20) memorable for the birth of
Diana. The day following, viz., the seventh of this
month, was the birthday of Plato, both of which were
kept with much solemnity by the Greek philosophers
(even to the time of Plotinus) as is affirmed by Plutarch.

Plutarch saith that as soon as he was born, Sophron
iscus, his father, consulting the oracle, was by it advised
to suffer his son to do what he pleased, never compelling
him to do what he disliked, nor diverting him from that
whereto he was inclined ; to give thanks for him by
sacrifice to Jupiter Agorseus and the muses ; to be no
farther solicitous for him, he had one guide of his life
within him, better than five hundred masters.

But his father, not observant of the oracle's direction,
applied him to his own trade of carving statues, contrary
to his inclination, whereupon some have argued him of
disobedience, reporting that oftentimes, when his father
bade him work, he refused, and went away, following
his own will. (286)

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 287

His father dying, left him fourscore minse, which, be
ing entrusted with a friend for improvement, they mis
carried. This loss, by which he was reduced to incredi
ble poverty, Socrates passed over with silence, but was
thereupon necessitated to continue his trade for ordinary
subsistence. Duris, Pausanias, and the Scholiast of
Aristophanes affirm three statues of the Graces clothed
(for so they were most anciently made, not naked) set
up before the entrance into the tower at Athens, were his
work. Pausanias implieth as much of a statue of Mer
cury in the same place ; which Pliny seems not to have
understood, who saith, they were made by a certain per
son named Socrates, but not the painter. But being
naturally averse to this profession, he only followed it
when necessity enforced him.

These intermissions from his trade were bestowed
upon philosophy ; whereunto he was naturally addicted,
which being observed by Crito^ a rich philosopher of
Athens, he took him from his shop, being much in love
Vwith his candor and ingenuity, and instructed, or rather
gave him the means to be instructed by others ; taking
so much care of him, that he never suffered him to want
necessaries. And though his poverty was at first so
great as to be brought by some into a proverb, yet he
became at last, as Demetrius affirms, master of a house,
and fourscore rninse, which Crito put out to interest :
But his mind (saith Libanius) was raised far above his
fortune, and more to the advantage of his country ; not
aiming at wealth, or the acquisition thereof by sordid
arts, he considered that of all things which man can call
his, the soul is the chief ; that he only is truly happy who
purifies that from vice ; that the only means conducing
thereto, is wisdom, in pursuit whereof he neglected all
other ways of profit and pleasure.

288 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

We have alleged the universal consent of authors,
that Socrates possessed the spirit of prophecy and was
inspired and accompanied by a divine or spiritual at
tendant; yet is there some disagreement concerning the
name, more concerning the nature of it.

It is commonly named his " daemon ", by which title,
he himself owned it: Plato sometimes calls it his
guardian; Apuleius his God, because (saith Saint
Augustine) the name of daemon at last grows odious.*
But we must observe, that he did not account it a God,
but sent from God, and in that sense affirmed the signs
to come from God, to wit, by mediation of this spirit.
This, besides other places, we may argue from his first
epistle, where he speaks of the sign itself ; he useth the
word daemon, when of the advice, whereof that sign was
the instrument, he names God. Thus are we to under
stand these, and all other places of the same nature in
Plato, where Socrates, speaking of the daemon, saith, if
it pleases God, you shall learn much, and the sign from
God did not offer to stay me.

Others confine this prescience within the soul of Soc
rates himself, that he said, his genius advised him, they
interpret it, as we usually say, his mind gave him, or so
inclined him : in this sense indeed daemon is not seldom
taken ; but this is inconsistent with the description
which Socrates gives of a voice and signs ab exteriore,
besides, this knowledge is not above human nature.

Some conceive it to be one of those spirits which have
a particular care of men ; which Maximus Tyrius, and
Apuleius describe in such manner, that they want only
the name of a good angel.

* By this Augustine probably meant that the word " daemon, ' ' had come to
mean, as it now does with us, an evil spirit only, whereas originally the term
daemon or demon, was applied to a spiritual being either good or evil. Thus
in a similar way practically the same word or term was originally used either
for God or devil . For example, the word ' * deuce ' ' we now apply to the great
evil spirit or devil only, whereas we apply the term ' ' Deus ' ' to the great good
spirit or God. yet both words, as may be seen, are substantially identical.— Ed.

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 289

But there want not those who give it that appellation :
Lactanius having proved that God sends angels to guard
mankind, adds, and Socrates affirmed there was a daemon
constantly near him, which kept him company from a
child, by whose beck and instruction he guided his life.
Eusebius upon these words of the Psalmist, " He hath
given his angels charge over thee, that they should keep
tnee in all thy ways." We learn out of Scripture (saith
he) that every man hath a guardian appointed him from
above ; and Plato doubteth not to write in this manner :
All souls having chosen a condition of living, they pro
ceed in order thereto, being moved by the daemon, which
is proper to every one, and is sent along with them to
preserve them in this life, and to perfect those things
whereof they have made choice. And immediately after ;
you may believe, saith he, that Socrates means this,
when he often affirmed that he was governed by a
daemon. More plainly Eugubinus, the daemon of Soc
rates, saith he, mentioned so often by Plato (seeing that
Socrates was a good man, and exhorted all men to virtue,
and by the daemon was always excited to that which was
good) may perhaps not unjustly be thought his angel,
as that which appeared to Baalam the prophet, and di
verted him from his wickedness. But, Ficinus expressly ;
if you are not pleased, saith he, speaking of this spirit,
to call the familiar guide of a man his spirit, call it if
you please, his good angel.

OF HIS PERSON AND VIRTUES.

As to his person, he was very unhandsome, of a melan
choly complexion, bald, a flat nose, eyes sticking out, a
severe downcast look, difficult in speech, and too concise,
his language rough and careless, but more efficacious
than all the eloquence of Themistocles, Pericles, or any

290 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers,

other ; so acute that he could maintain either side in any
question, therefore is reproached by Aristophanes as
having two languages, whereof one was to defend
wrong ; fervent in dispute, often so transported, that he
would beat himself, and tear his beard, to the derision
of the standers-by, which he took quietly : patient to be
reargued; sometimes he covered his face in discourse,
that he might not be diverted by any object of sight : his
constitution strong and hardy, which he preserved such,
by taking diligent care of his health ; well bearing cold,
hunger, and upon occasion, excess of wine without dis
turbance : his habit the same in winter as in summer,
having but one garment a year ; no shoes, his diet spar
ing. In fine, his countenance promised so little, that
Zopyrus a physiognomist who undertook to discover the
dispositions of men by their looks said he was stupid,
because there were obstructions in his jugular parts;
adding, he was given to women and many other vices ;
whereat Alcibiades and other friends of his that were
present, knowing, him free from those imputations, fell
a laughing, but Socrates justified his skill, answering,
he was by nature prone to those vices, but suppressed
his inclinations by reason, whence Alcibiades used to
say, he resembled the image of Silenus as he did indeed
in his countenance, baldness, and flat nose carved on the
outside of little boxes, sitting and playing on a pipe ; for
as those boxes within held images of the Gods, so was
he adorned with chastity, integrity, and all inward
beauty, ravished, as Plutarch saith, with a divine zeal to
virtue, in all kinds whereof Xenophon, Laertius and
others, assert these instances.

He was so wise, that he never erred in judging betwixt
better and worse, nor thereto needed any other help :
Yet he constantly professed, that he only knew that he

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers, 291

knew nothing : for which reason he was by the oracle o ;*.
Apollo at Delphi, declared of all men the most wise in
this manner to Charephon, many witnesses being

present : —

Wise Sophocles, wiser Euripedes,
But wisest of all men is Socrates.

Apollo (saith Cicero) conceiving the only wisdom of
mankind to consist in not thinking themselves to know
those things whereof they are ignorant. This oracle,
though he were nothing exalted with it himself, pro
cured him much envy.

He was so religious, that he never did anything with
out advising, first with the Gods, never was known to
attempt or speak any impiety.

He bore a reverence to the Gods, not human, but such
as transcended the greatest fear : some say it was out of
his great reverence to the divinity that he used to swear
by a cock, a dog, and a plain tree (under which they
used to sit) though it were interpreted atheism.

He was constant, and a lover of the public good, as
appears in his acquitting the ten captains, in his denying
thirty tyrants to fetch Leon in, his refusing to escape
out of prison, and reproving such as grieved for his
death. Xantippe used to say, that when the state was
oppressed with a thousand miseries, he always went
abroad and came home with the same look, never more
cheerful, or more troubled, for he bore a mind smooth
and cheerful upon all occasions, far remote from grief,
and above all, fear : in his declining age, falling sick, he
was asked by one that came to visit him, how he did ?
Very well (saith he) either way; if I live, I shall have
more emulation, if I die, more praise.

He was so temperate, that he never preferred that
which is pleasant before that which is wholesome. He

292 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

never did eat more than appetite (which was his sauce)
made delightful ; all drink was pleasing to him, because
he never drank but when he was thirsty, and then with
such temperate caution, that he poured out the first
draught of water upon the ground, and if he were at
any time invited to a feast, he, which to others is very
difficult, with much ease took care not to eat more than
consisted with his health, whereof he was very careful,
because the exercises of the soul depend thereon and in
order thereto, used to walk constantly before meals,
whereupon being asked by one that observed it, what
he did, I get broth, saith he, for my supper. To this
temperance it is imputed, though Athens were often in
his time visited with the pestilence, he alone escaped it.
He was so frugal, that how little soever he had, it was
always enough. Wanting the means to live splendidly,
he taught not anxiously how to acquire more, but how
to accommodate his manner of life to that which he had,
wherewith he was so contented, that he affirmed himself
to come nearest the gods, because he wanted least. See
ing the great variety of things exposed to sale, he would
say to himself, how7 many things there are that I need
not ; and often had in his mouth these verses,

Purple, which gold and gems adorn,
Is by tragedians to be worn.

Alcibiades ambitiously munificent, sent him many
great presents : Xantippe admiring their value, desired
him to accept them : We (answered Socrates) will con
test in liberality with Alcibiades, not accepting, by a
kind of munificence what he hath sent us.

To the same, who offered him a large plot of ground
to build a house upon : and if I wanted shoes (saith he)
would you give me leather to make them ? But deserve
I not to be derided if I accepted it ?

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 293

He slighted Archelaus, King of Macedonia, and
Scopas, son of Cranonias, and Euriloeus, son of Larisae-
us, not accepting their money nor going to them.
Archelaus sending to him to desire his company, he said,
he would not go to one, from whom he should receive
benefits, which he could not equal with return. To Per-
diccas, who demanded why he would not come to him,
he answered, lest I die the most ignoble death, that is
lest I receive a benefit which I cannot requite.
/ Coming home late one night from a feast, some wild
young men knowing of his return, lay in wait for him,
attired like furies, with vizards and torches, whereby
they used to affright such as they met ; Socrates as soon
as he saw them, nothing troubled, made a stand, and fell
to questioning them, according to his usual manner, as
if he had been in the Lyceum or Academy.

He despised those that cavilled at him. Being told
that such an one had reviled him behind his back : Let
him beat me, saith he, whilst I am not by: And that
another spoke ill of him : He hath not yet learned, said
he, to speak well.

Being kicked by an insolent young fellow, and seeing,
those that were with him much incensed, ready to pursue
him, he said, what if an ass kick me, would you have me
kick again, or sue him ? But the fellow escaped not
unpunished, for every one reproached him for this in
solence, and called him the reviler, so that at last for
vexation he hanged himself.

Another striking him a box on the ear, he said no
more, but that it was hard a man knew not when to go
abroad with a helmet.

Another fell upon him with much violence, which he
endured without the least disturbance, suffering him to
vent his anger, which he did so long, till he made his

294 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

face all swelled and bruised. Whensoever he perceived
himself to grow incensed with any of his friends,

Before the storm arose,
He to the harbor goes.

He used to moderate his voice, to look smilingly and
moderately upon them, reserving himself untainted with
passion, by recourse to the contrary.

He taught not such as conversed with him to be
covetous, for he took no money of his scholars, therein
expressing his own liberality.

Hunger or want could never force him to flatter any :
Yet was he very complaisant and facete in company : as
he one day openly at dinner reproved one of his friends
somewhat harshly. Plato said to him, had not this been
better told in private? Socrates immediately answered,
and had you not done better, if you had told me so in
private ? Being demanded what countryman he was, he
answered, neither of Athens, nor Greece, but of the
world. Sometimes he would feast in a fine robe, as
Plato describes him, and when the time allowed, learned
to sing, saying, it was no shame to learn anything which
one knew not: He also danced every day, conceiving
that exercise healthful ; nor was he ashamed to play with
little children.

He was so just, that he never in the least wronged
any man, but on the contrary, benefited all such as con
versed with him, as much as he could.

His continence was invincible : He despised the
beauty of Alcibiades, derided Theodota and Caliste, two
eminent courtezans of that time.

He took great delight in the conversation of good
men ; to such he communicated whatsoever he knew ;
with them he studied the writings of the ancient wise
men, selecting what was good out of them.

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 295

His WIVES AND CHILDREN.

He had two wives, the first Xantippe, a citizen's
daughter of Athens, as Theodoret affirms.

She was (according to the character A. Gellius gives
her) curst, froward, chiding and scolding always both
day and night, and for that reason he chose her, as he
professed to Antisthenes, from observing, that they who
would be excellent in horsemanship, chose the roughest
horses, knowing, if they are able to manage them, they
may easily rule others : He, desirous to use much con
versation with men, took her to wife, knowing, if he
could bear with her, he might easily converse with all
men. To Alcibiades, who said, her scolding was intoler
able, he professed it was nothing to him, being used to
it, like such as live in the continual noise of a mill: be
sides, saith he, cannot you endure the cackling of hens ?
But they, answered Alcibiades, bring me eggs and
chickens : and my Xantippe, replies Socrates, children.

Of her impatience and his sufferance, there are several
instances : one day before some of his friends, she fell
into the usual extravagancies of her passion, whereupon
he not answering anything, went forth with them, but
was no sooner out at the door, when she, running up
into the chamber, threw down water upon his head,
whereat turning to his friends, did I not tell you, saith
he, that after so much thunder we should have rain ?

Having brought Euthydemus from the Palaestrae to
dine with him, Xantippe running to the table, angry,
overturned it ; Euthydemus, much troubled, rose up, and
would have gone away, when Socrates said : did not a
hen the other day, the very same thing at your house,
yet I was not angry thereat ?

His other wife was named Myrto, niece to Lysimachus,

296 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

daughter of Aristedes, not the just, as Laertius, and
from him Suida's, affirms, but another of that name, the
third from" him, as is observed by Athenaeus, for the
two daughters of Aristides the Just, could not but be of
great age before the yyth 'Olympiad, wherein Socrates
was born, long before which time Aristides died an old
man in exile ; for that Themistocles died the second
year of the yyth Olympiad is certain, and as ^Emilius
Probus affirms, Aristides died four years before The
mistocles was banished from Athens, hereupon Plutarch
more cautiously calls her not the daughter, but niece of
Aristides.

Some, because Xantippe (as is manifest from Plato)
outlived him, believe he was first mar-ried to Myrto, but
that he had both these wives at the same time, which is
attested by Demetrius Phalereus, Aristoxenus (to whom
Athenaeus saith, that Aristotle gave the ground) Cal-
isthenes and Porphyrius : whence Aristippus in his
epistle to his daughter Myrto, advised her to go to
Athens, and above all to honor Xantippe and Myrto,
and to live with them as he with Socrates.

The occasion, whereupon the Athenians, who from the
time of Cecrops had strictly observed single marriage,
allowed bigamy, in the time of Socrates, was this ; in the
second year of the 8yth Olympiad and the third of the
88th, Athens was visited extremely with the pestilence,
which attended by war and famine occasioned so great
a scarcity of men, that they made an edict it might be
lawful for any that would to take two wives. Euripedes
made use of this indulgence, and that Socrates also did
so, is attested by Satyrus the peripatetic, and Hierony-
mus the Rhodian, who recorded the Order; to which
Athenseus imputes the silence of the comic poets in this
particular, who omitted no grounds of reproach. Plu-

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 297

tarch implies, that he took her out of charity, for

a widow (without any portion or dowry) extremely in
want.

Porphyrus reports, that when these two (Xantippe
and Myrto) quarrelled, they would at last fall both upon
Socrates, and beat him, because he stood by and never
parted them, but laughed as well when they fought with
him, as with one another.

By Xantippe he had a son, named Lamprocles, who
could not brook her impatience so well as his father,
and being vexed by her into disobedience, was reclaimed
by Socrates ; he died young, as may be gathered from
Plutarch, who saith, Timarchus of Chseronea, dying
very young, desired earnestly of Socrates that he might
be buried near his son Lamprocles, who died but few
days before, being his dear friend, and of the same age.
It appears from Plato, that he had more sons by her, for
in his Apology he mentions three, two grown men, the
other a child, which seems to be the same, brought by
Xantippe to him in prison the day of his death, and as
Plutarch describes it, held in her lap.

By Myrto he had two sons : the eldest Sophroniscus,
the youngest Menedemus, or Menexenus, though some
say he had Menedemus by Xantippe.

THE TEACHERS OF SOCRATES.

The first master of Socrates was Anaxagoras. Aris-
toneus saith, that as soon as Anaxagoras left the city,
Socrates applied himself to Archelaus, which, according
to Porphyrius, was in the seventeenth year of his age.
Of him he was much beloved, and traveled with him to
Samos, to Pytho, and to the Isthmus.

He was pupil likewise to Damon, whom Plato calls a
most pleasing teacher of Music, and all other things that

298 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

he would teach himself, to young men. Damon was
pupil to Agathocles, master to Pericles, Clinias and
others ; intimate with Prodicus. He was banished by
the unjust ostracism of the Athenians for his excellence
in music.

To these teachers add Diotyma and Aspasia, women
excellently learned, the first supposed to have been in
spired with a prophetical spirit. By her Socrates
affirmed that he was instructed concerning love, by
corporeal beauty to find out that of the soul; of the
angelical mind, of God. See Plato's Phaedrus, and that
long discourse in his Symposium upon this subject,
which Socrates confesseth to be owing to her.

Aspasia was a famous Milesian woman, not only ex
cellent herself in rhetoric, but brought many scholars to
great perfection in it, of whom were Pericles the Atheni
an and (as himself acknowledgeth) Socrates.

Of Euenus he learned poetry, of Ichomachus, hus
bandry, of Theodorus Geometry.

Aristagoras a Melian, is named likewise as his master.

His SCHOOL AND PUPILS.

That Socrates had a proper school, may be argued
from Aristophanes, who derided some particulars in it,
and calls it his Phrontisterium.

Plato and Phsedrus mention as places frequented by
him and his auditors, the academy Lycaeum, and a pleas
ant meadow without the city on the side of the River
Ilissus.

Xenophon affirms, he was continually abroad, that in
the morning he visited the places of public walking and
exercise ; when it was full, the forum; and the rest of
the day he sought out the most populous meetings,
where he disputed openly for every one to hear.

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 299

He did only teach, saith Plutarch, when the benches
were prepared, and himself in the chair, or in set hours
of reading and discourse, or appointments of walking
with his friends, but even when he played, when he ate
or drank, when he was in the camp or market ; finally,
when he was in prison ; thus he made every place a
school of virtue.

His manner of teaching was answerable to his opinion,
that the soul pre-existent to the body, in her first sepa
rate condition, endowed with perfect knowledge, by
immersion into matter, became stupefied, and in a
manner lost, until awakened by discourse from sensible
objects ; whereby by degrees she recovers her first
knowledge ; for this reason he taught only by irony and
induction: In this irony (saith Cicero) and dissimula
tion he far exceeded all men in pleasantness and
urbanity.

Induction is by Cicero defined a manner of discourse,
which gains the assent of him with whom it is held, to
things not doubtful, by which assents it causeth that he
yield to a doubtful thing, by reason of the likeness it
hath to those things whereunto he assented : This kind
of speech Socrates most used, because he would not him
self use any argument of persuasion, but rather chose
to work something out of that which was granted by
him with whom he disputed, which he, by reason of that
which he already yielded unto, must necessarily approve ;
of which he gives a large example in Plato's Meno.

For this reason he used to say, his skill had some
affinity with that of his mother, he being like a midwife'
though barren (as he modestly affirms) in himself, en
deavored with a particular gift in assisting others, to
bring forth what they had within themselves ; and this
was one reason why he refused to take money, affirming

300 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

that he knew nothing himself, and that he was never
master to any.

These disputes of Socrates were committed to writing
by his scholars, wherein Xenophon gave example to the
rest, in doing it first, with most punctualness, as Plato
with most liberty, intermixing so much of his own, that
it is not easy to distinguish the master from the scholar:
whence Socrates hearing him recite his Lysis, said, how
many things doth this young man feign of me?
OF His PHILOSOPHY.

Porphyrius, who traduced Socrates, affirms, he was
ingenious in nothing, unlearned in all, scarce able to
write, which, when upon any occasion he did, it was to
derision, and that he could read no better than a stam
mering schoolboy: To which we shall oppose these
authorities : Xenophon who attests he was excellent in
all kinds of learning, instanceth in Arithmetic, Geome
try, and Astrology; Plato, in Natural Philosophy;
Idomeneus, in Rhetoric : Laertius in medicine : in a
word, Cicero avers, that by the testimony of learned
men, and the judgment of all Greece, as well in wisdom,
acuteness, politeness and subtlety, as in eloquence,
variety and copiousness, to whatsoever part he gave him
self, he was without exception Prince of all.

Noting how little advantage speculation brought to the
life and conversation of mankind, Socrates opposed all
pure science or speculative philosophy, and applied him
self almost purely to practical ethics. He first, saith
Cicero, called philosophy away from things involved by
nature in secrecy, wherein, until his time all philoso
phers had been employed, and brought her to common
life, to inquire of virtues and vices, good and evil.

Man, who was the sole subject of his philosophy, hav
ing a twofold relation of divine speculation and human

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 301

conversation, his doctrines were in the former respect
metaphysical, in the latter moral.

His metaphysical opinions may be thus collected and
abridged out of Plato, Xenophon, Plutarch and others.

Philosophy is the way to true happiness, the offices
whereof are two, to contemplate God, and to abstract the
soul from corporeal sense.

There are three principles of all things, God, Matter,
and Ideas ; God is the universal intellect ; matter the
subject of generation and corruption; idea is an incor
poreal substance, the intellect of God ; God the Intellect
of the World.

God is one, perfect in Himself, giving the being, and
well-being of every creature ; what He is (saith he) I
know not, what He is not, I know.

That God, not chance, made the world and all crea
tures ; that He will reward such as please Him, and
punish such as displease Him. That God is such and
so great that He at once sees all, hears all, is every
where, and orders all. This is the sum of his discourse
with Aristodemus, to which we may annex what is cited
under his name (if not mistaken) by Stobaeus.

Care, if by care ought may effected be ;

If not, why car'st thou, when God cares for thee ?

He held, that the Gods know all things, said, done, or
silently desired.

The soul is immortal, for what is always movable is
immortal.

The soul is pre-existent to the body, endued with
knowledge of eternal ideas. Thus is all her learning
only reminiscence, a recovery of her first knowledge.

The body being compounded, that is, made up of sev
eral combined elements, is, like all material compounds,
destructible, and is therefore dissolved by death : The

302 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

soul, being simple or of the nature of an element, is, like
all elements, indestructible, and is therefore incapable of
corruption, and passeth into another life. The souls of
men are divine, to whom, when they go out of the body,
the way of their return to Heaven is open, which to the
best and most just is the most expedite.

The souls of the good after death, are in a happy
estate, united to God in a blessed inaccessible place ; the
bad, in convenient places, suffer condign punishment.

To do good, is the best course of life, therein fortune
hath share.

They are best, and best pleasing to God, who do
anything, with any art or calling ; who followeth none,
is useless, to the public, and hated of God.

He taught everywhere, that a just man and a happy,
were all one, and used to curse him who first by opinion
divided honesty and profit (which are coherent by na
ture) as having done an impious act, for they are truly
wicked who separate profitable and just, which depends
on law. The Stoics have followed him so far, that what
soever is honest, the same they esteem profitable.

Being demanded by Gorgius, if he accounted not the
great King of Persia happy ? I know not, answered he,
how he is furnished with learning and virtue; as con
ceiving that true happiness consisteth in these two, not
in the frail gifts of fortune.

He said he wondered at those who carve images of
stone, that they take such care to make stones resemble
men, whilst they neglect, and suffer themselves to re
semble stones.

He advised young men to behold themselves every
day in a glass, that if they were beautiful, they might
study to deserve it; if deformed, to supply or hide it by
learning.

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 303

He said, to begin well is not a small thing, but de
pending on a small moment.

He said, virtue was the beauty, vice the deformity of
the soul.

He said, outward beauty was a sign of inward beauty,
and therefore chose such auditors.

In the life of man, as in an image, every part ought
to be beautiful.

To one who demanded what nobility is, he answered,
a good temper of soul and body.

He said, the office of a wise man is to discern what is
good and honest, and to shun that which is dishonest.

Justice and every other virtue is wisdom.

To be ignorant of ourselves, to seem to know those
things whereof we are ignorant, is next to madness.

That a pious person is rightly defined, such a one as
knows what is lawful as to the God^; just, he that knows
what is lawful to men ; that a man is wise as far as he
knows; that what is profitable is fair to that whereto it is
profitable.

He conceived the only wisdom of man to consist in
not thinking he understands those things which he doth
not understand.

He affirmed, there is but one good thing, knowledge ;
one ill, ignorance; but that riches and nobility had no
thing in them of worth, but on the contrary all evils.

When a man openeth his mouth, his virtues are as
manifest, as images in a temple.

Being demanded what wisdom was, he answered, the
composure of the soul ; being demanded who were wise,
they, said he, who do not easily err.

He said, be not forward in speech, for many times the
tongue hath cut off the head.

In war, steel is better than gold ; in life, wisdom ex-
celleth wealth.

304 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

That the greatest of vices is ingratitude ; the greatest
of obligations, that to parents ; that a disobedient son the
Gods will not bless, nor men love.

Our prayers should be for blessings in general, for
God knows best what is good for us; our offerings pro
portioned to our abilities, for He considers integrity, not
munificence.

He said (with the Pythian Oracle) that the Gods are
to be worshipped according to the law of the city where
a man lives, they who do otherwise, he thought super
stitious and vain.

The best way of worshipping God is to do what He
commands.

That a man ought to inure himself to voluntary labor
and sufferance, so as what shall be imposed by necessity,
may appear in him not compulsive but free ; that soft
ways of living in pleasures beget no good constitution
of body, nor knowledge of the mind ; that tolerance
raiseth us to high attempts, is the effect of his discourse
with Aristippus.

He said, Death resembled either a deep sleep, or a
long journey out of our native country, or an absolute
annihilation of soul and body, examining all which he
affirmed, death to be in none of those respects evil ; as
to the first, saith Plutarch, it is not ill with those that
sleep, and we esteem that sleep sweetest which is deep
est; and if we look on it as a journey, it is rather a
blessing, for thereby we are freed from the slavery and
affections of the flesh which possess and infatuate the
mind ; in the last respect, it makes us insensible of ill
and pain, as well as of good and pleasure.

He said, an honest death is better than a dishonest life.

That happiness consists not in luxury and pride, that
to want nothing is divine, to want the least next to

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 305

divine, is the conclusion of his discourse with Antipho.
Being demanded whom he thought richest, he an
swered, him who is contented with least, for content is
the riches of nature. It is the property of God to need
nothing; to need least, nighest to God.

That health of body ought diligently to be preserved,
as that whereon all knowledge of the soul depends, is
the sum of his discourse with Epigenes.

He advised one that complained he had no delight in
his meat, to refrain from eating, whereby his diet would
become more pleasant, cheap and wholesome.

He said, the hungry wanted no sauce, the thirsty no
choice of wines.

He commended quiet and leisure above all things.

Being asked what was a young man's virtue, he an
swered, to do nothing too much.

He said, we ought not to seek pleasures in others, but
in ourselves, the body being predisposed according as it
ought.

Being demanded from what things we ought to re
frain most, he answered, from sordid unjust pleasures.

When a woman saith she loveth thee, take heed of
those w7ords, more than when she revileth thee.

There is no better way to glory than to endeavor to
be good, as well as to seem such.

Good men must let the world see that their manners
are more firm than an oath.

They are not kings, he said, who are in possession of
a throne, or come unjustly by it, but they who know
how to govern.

A king is a ruler of willing subjects according to the
laws, a tyrant is a ruler of subjects against their will,
not according to the laws, but arbitrary.

The offices of a good citizen are in peace, to enrich the

306 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

commonwealth, in war to subdue the enemies thereof,
in embassy to make friends of foes, in sedition to ap
pease the people by eloquence.

Being demanded, what city was strongest, he said, that
which hath good men.

Being demanded, what city is best, he said, that where
in are proposed most rewards of virtue.

Being demanded, what city lives best, he said, that
which liveth according to law, and punisheth the unjust.
His SCHOLARS AND AUDITORS.

Whereas (saith Cicero) many springing from Soc
rates by reason that out of his several various disputes
diffused everywhere, one laid hold of one thing, another
of another ; there were some, as it were, so many several
families differing amongst themselves, much disjoined
and disagreeing, yet all these philosophers would be
called, and conceived themselves to be the Socratics : of
these were

Plato, from whom came Aristotle and Xenocrates, the
first taking the name of Peripatetic, the other of
Academic.

Ajtiisthenes, who chiefly affected the patience and
hardiness in Socrates, his discourse, from whom came
first the Cynics, then the Stoics.

Arjstippus, who was more delighted with his more
voluptuous disputations, from him sprung the Cyrenaic
Philosophy.

Others there were who likewise called themselves
Socratics, but their sects by the strength and arguments
of the former, are broken and quite extinct : such were

Phse,do, an Elean, who instituted a particular school,
from him called Eliack, which afterwards was called
Eretriack, from Menedemus, who taught at Eretria,
from him Pyrrho, thence the Pyrrhonians.

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 307

Euclid of Megara, institutor of the Megaric school, so
named from Clinomachus, his disciple, called the dia
lectic, ending in Zeno, the Citian, who introduced the
Stoic.

The Herillians are named also, as a sect that would
be called Socratic. To these recited by Cicero, Suidas
adds

Bryso of Heraclea, who, together with Euclid, in
vented disputative logic.

Theodorus, surnamed the -Atheist, who invented a
peculiar sect called Theodorean, the opinion which he
taught was indifference.

Other disciples of Socrates there were, who followed
his philosophy, not appropriating out of it any par
ticular sect, and therefore most properly deserve the
title of Socratics, such are Crito, Chserephon, Xenophon
^Eschines, Simias, Cebes, Glauco, and Terpsion.

The last kind of his auditors were those who made no
profession of philosophy, of whom were

Critias and Alcibiades, who afterwards proved the
most ambitious spirits of the Athenians, but it was dis
covered in neither whilst they conversed with Socrates,
either that their youth was not capable of expressing
their vice, or that they cunningly complied (as Xeno
phon conjectures) with Socrates, in hopes of being by
his conversation enabled to manage their former designs,
which as soon as they attempted they left off their friend
ship with Socrates. Critias fell from him and converted
his affection into hate, because he reproved his love to
Euthydemus; Alcibiades, naturally dissolute, was re
claimed by Socrates, and continued such whilst he con
versed with him. He was of form so exquisite as gave
occasion to some to calumniate the friendship betwixt
him and Socrates, to which effect Aristoxenus is cited

308 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

by Laertius and Athenaeus, and some verses of Aspasia
by the latter ; his vindication we refer to Plato and
Xenophon.

Of Socrates his instructions to Alcibiades there are
these instances.

He told him he was nothing of what a man ought to
be, that he had no advantage by the greatness of his
birth above an ordinary porter; whereat Alcibiades,
much troubled, with tears besought him to instruct him
in virtue, and to reform his vices.

Perceiving Alcibiades to be exceedingly proud of his
riches and lands, he showed him a map of the world,
and bade him find Attica therein ; which done, he de
sired that he would show him his own lands, he an
swered, that they were not there. Do you boast, re
plies Socrates, of that which you see is no (considerable)
part of the earth ?

Alcibiades being by reason of his youth bashful and
fearful to make an oration to the people, Socrates thus
encouraged him. Do you not esteem (saith he) that
shoemaker (naming him) an inconsiderable fellow?
Alcibiades assenting; and so likewise (continues he)
that crier and that tent-maker? Alcibiades granting
this, doth not, saith he, the Athenian Commonwealth
consist of these ? If you contemn them single, fear
them not in an Assembly. To these add

The four sons of Crito the philosopher; the eldest,
Critobolus, exceeding handsome and rich, but by Soc
rates (who valued his own estate at five minae) demon
strated to be poorer than himself.

The second Aermogenes, who falling into poverty,
Socrates persuaded Diodorus his friend, to entertain.

The third, Epigenes, a young man of an infirm body,
whom Socrates advised to study his own health, as that

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 309

wherein consisted the well-being and knowledge of his
mind.

The youngest, Cresippus.

Of poets, Euripides (as the writer of his life affirms)
and Euenus.

Of orators, Lysias, eminent in that kind easy to be un
derstood, hard to be imitated, he came to Athens in the
second year of the 82 rid Olympiad. Lysis, whom of re
fractory he made pliant, and Isocrates, of whom when
very young, Socrates presaged great things.

In the number of his scholars and auditors were also

Adirnantus and Glauco, sons to Aristo, brothers to
Plato: and Charmides, son of Glauco. Glauco, before
he was twenty years old, had taken upon him to be an
orator, and aimed at some great office in the common
wealth, not to be wrought off from this fancy which
made him eve^where appear ridiculous, until addressed
by some friends to Socrates, who made him acknowledge
his own error and ignorance of that which he had un
dertaken. On the contrary, his son Glauco, of excellent
parts, fit for any office in the commonwealth, 3^et timor
ously shunning all public affairs, was by Socrates in
duced to undertake the magistracy.

Nicostratus, son of Theidotides and his brother
Theodotus.

./Eantodorus, and his brother Apollodorus.

Lysanias, father of ./Eschines.

Chaerecrates, brother to Chserephon, betwixt whom
there was a great quarrel, but reconciled by Socrates.

Paralus, son of Demodocus, whose brother was
Theages.

Antipho, a Cephisiean, father of Epigenes : with whom
he discoursed of self-indulgence, teaching gratis, and of
veracity in Xenophon.

310 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

Eumares, a Phliasian, and Xenomedes, an Athe
nian.

Besides these, there are with whom Socrates dis
coursed and instructed,

Aristodemus, surnamed the little, who would not
sacrifice, pray, or use divination, but derided all such as
did, was by Socrates convinced.

Aristarchus troubled that he had a charge of kindred
lying upon him, by Socrates converted to a willing lib
erality towards them.

Eutherus, who returning from travel, his lands taken
away, Iris father having left him nothing, chose rather
to follow a trade than to apply himself to friends, but
diverted by Socrates.

Diodorus, whom Socrates persuaded to take Herrno-
genes.

Enthydemus, who had collected many sentences of
poets and sophists, thought he excelled all his equals,
and hoped no less of his superiors, who was by Socrates
constrained to acknowledge his own error and ignorance,
and departed much troubled.

Hippias, an Elean, with whom Socrates discoursed of
justice.

Nicomedes, Pericles, and Iphicrates, with whom he
discoursed concerning the office of a General. Into the
last he infused courage, by showing him the cocks of
Midas brustling against those of Callias.

Thesetetus, disputing of Knowledge, he dismissed, in
spired as it were with divine wisdom.

Euthyphron^who intended to accuse his own father,
he dissuaded.

With Pharrhasius, a painter, Clito, a statuary, and
Pistias, an armorer, he disputes in Xenophon concern
ing their several arts.

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 311

. His WRITINGS.

They who affirm that Socrates wrote nothing (as
Cicero, Plutarch, Dion, Chrysostom, Aristides, Origen,
and others) mean in respect to his philosophy, in which
kind he never wrote anything himself, but what he dis
coursed was committed to writing by Xenophon, Plato
and others of his scholars. Hence the works of Plato
(particularly Phsedo) went under the name of Socrates,
and are so cited by Aristotle ; but that some things were
written by Socrates himself, is evident from those who
affirm.

He wrote, together with Euripides, and aided him in
making tragedies, whence Mnesilochus.

The Phrygians is Euripides new play
But Socrates gave it the best array.

And again, Euripides is steered by Socrates and
Callias.

Now thou with pride and self-conceit o'erflow'st ;
But all the cause to Socrates thou owest.

Hither refer we that of Cicero, who saith, when
Euripides raade his play Orestes, Socrates revoked the
three first verses. He wrote also some fables of JEsop
in verse, not very elegant, mentioned by Plato, Plutarch,
and Laertius, beginning thus:

To those who dwelt in Corinth, ^Esop said,
Virtue with vulgar wisdom be not weigh'd.

A paean or hymn in honor of Apollo and Diana : One
that went under his name, beginning thus:

Daelian Apollo, and thou fair,
Diana, hail ; immortal pair.

is by Dyonisidorus denied to be his : This is mentioned
also by Plato, to which some add

The Encomium of Gryllus, son of Xenophon, slain
in the Mantinean Fight, which the disagreement of times
will not allow ; more certain it is he framed

312 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers,

Dialogues, which he gave to .Eschines, seeing him in
want, that he might get money by them ; to these add

Epistles, some whereof are published by Leo Allatius;
that he writ more is implied by Arrian and Athenaeus.
His MILITARY ACTIONS.

It is observed by many, that Socrates little affected
travel, his life being wholly spent at home, saving when
he went out in military service.

In the second year of the eighty-sixth Olympiad broke
forth a war, the greatest that ever happened amongst the
Grecians, betwixt the Lacedemonians and the Athenians.
In this war was Socrates thrice personally engaged;
first at the siege of Polydaea. Here Alcibiades, his com
rade, attests, Socrates outwent all soldiers in hardiness;
and if at any time, saith he, as it often happens in war,
the provisions failed, there was none could bear the want
of meat and drink like him, yet on the other side in
times of feasting, he only seemed to enjoy them, and
though of himself he would not drink, yet being invited,
he far out-drank all others, and which is strangest of
all, never any man saw him drunk. The excesses of
cold in the winter, which in that country are extraor
dinary, he as wonderfully endured, when the frost was
so sharp, that very few durst go out of their tents, and
those wrapping their legs and thighs in skins and furs,
he went along with them, having no more clothes than
those he usually wore. He walked barefooted upon the
ice with less tenderness than others in shoes, to the
wonder of the soldiers, who thought themselves re
proached by his hardiness. His contemplative rapture
at the same time was no less worthy admiration ; he fell
into a deep contemplation one morning, and continued
all the while standing in the same posture ; at noon it
was taken notice of by the soldiers ; who told it from

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 313

one another, that Socrates had stood still in the same
place all that morning: in the evening some Ionian
soldiers wrapping themselves warm, came and lay down
by him in the open field, to watch if he would continue
all night in the same posture, which he did, until the
morning, and as soon as the sun arose, saluted it, and
retired. Of these kind of raptures A. Gellius saith he
had many. We must not omit how he behaved himself
there in fight ; seeing his friend Alcibiades deeply en
gaged, and much wounded, he stepped before him, de
fended him and his arms from the enemy, and brought
him safely off. Nor was his modesty inferior to his love
or courage, for whereas after the battle, the generals
were to bestow an honorable reward upon him that had
fought best, the judges assigned it to Socrates, he de
clined it, and by his earnest intercession, procured that
it might be conferred upon Alcibiades.

The second action of Socrates was in the first year of
the eighty-ninth Olympiad at Delium, a town in Boetia.
Socrates in this engagement behaved himself with his
accustomed valor (so well, that Laches confesseth, if the
rest had fought like him, they had not lost the day) and
care of his friends ; for seeing Xenophon unhorsed in
the flight, and thrown down on the ground (himself like
wise having his horse slain under him, fought on foot)
he took him upon his shoulders and carried him many a
stadia, and defended him till they gave over the pursuit.
And being thus at the loss of the day, with others dis
persed in flight (amongst whom was Laches the Archon,
and Alcibiades) in the constant slowness of his retreat
expressed a courage far above Laches, frequently look
ing back and round about, as greedy to be revenged of
the enemy, if any should pursue them ; which was the
means that brought him off more safely, for they who

314 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

express least fear in their retreat, are less subject to be
assaulted, than such as repose their confidence in flying.

His FALLING OUT WITH THE SOPHISTS AND WITH
ANYTUS. THE CAUSE OF HIS DEATH,

The Sophists, masters of language in those times,
saith Cicero (whereof was Gorgius of Lecontium, Thra-
simachus of Chalcedon, Protagoras of Abdera, Prodicus
a Cian, Hippias an Elian, and many others) professed
in arrogant words to teach, how an inferior cause (such
was their phrase) might by speaking, be made superior,
and used a sweet fluent kind of rhetoric, argute in sen
tence, lofty in words, fitter for ostentation than pleading,
for the schools and academies, rather than the forum,
were so highly esteemed, that wheresoever they came,
they could persuade the young men to forsake all other
conversation for theirs. These Socrates opposed; and
often by his subtlety of disputing, retelling their prin
ciples, with his accustomed interrogatories, demonstrated
that they were indeed much beneath the esteem they
had gained, that they themselves understood nothing of
that which they undertook to teach others; he withdrew
the young men from their empty conversation: these,
who till then had been looked upon as angels for wit and
eloquence, he proved to be vain affecters of words,
ignorant of those things which they professed, and had
more need to give money to be taught, than to take (as
they used) money for teaching. The Athenians taken
with these reproofs which Socrates gave them, derided
them, and excited their children to the study of solid
virtue.

Another quarrel Socrates had of long continuance, for
it was the occasion of his death, but begun many years
before, with Anytus, an orator by profession, privately

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 315

maintained and enriched by leather-dressers : He had put
two of his sons to Socrates to be taught, but not being
pleased, that whilst they were in that way, they had not
learned so much, as to be able thereby to get their living;
he took them from Socrates, and put them to that trade
which himself was ashamed to own; wherewith Socrates
being much displeased in respect of the two youths,
whose ruin he presaged, (and truly, for they fell after
wards into debaucheries which occasioned it) spared not
to reproach Anytus in discoursing to his scholars, telling
them, that the trade of dressing leather was not fit to be
spoken of amongst young men, for they who benefit
themselves by any art, cherish and profess it, as
Acumenus Physic, Damon and Connus Music ; even
Anytus, whilst his sons were his scholars, was not
ashamed of that which they learned, though it were not
sufficient to maintain them by pleading ; but for himself,
he gloried that he walked invisible with Pluto's Helmet,
or Gyges's Ring, concealing from the people the true
means of his subsistence, which indeed was by dressing
leather, which was not just; to be ashamed of the trade,
and not of the profit ; for he ought to own this, or to
disclaim that.

Anytus (saith ^Elian) to answer this reproach, studied
all occasions and ways of revenge; but feared the
Athenians, doubting if he should accuse Socrates, how
they would take it, his name being in high esteem for
many respects, chiefly for opposing the Sophists, who
neither taught nor knew any solid learning. He advised
with Melitus, a young man, an orator, unknown to Soc
rates, described by Plato, with long plain hair, a high
nose, and a thin beard, one that for a drachm might be
bought into anything, by whose counsel he begins by
making trial in lesser things, to found how the Athen-

316 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

ians would entertain a charge against his life ; for to
have accused him upon the very first, he conceived un
safe, as well for the reason already mentioned, as lest
the friends and followers of Socrates should divert the
anger of the judges upon himself, for falsely accusing a
person so far from being guilty of any wrong to the
state, that he was the only ornament thereof. To this
end he suborns Aristophanes, a comic poet, whose only
business was to raise mirth, to bring Socrates upon the
stage, taxing him with crimes which most men knew
him free from, impertinent discourse, making an ill
cause by argument seem good, introducing new and
strange deities, whilst himself believed and reverenced
none ; hereby to insinuate an ill opinion of him, even into
those who most frequented him. Aristophanes taking
this theme, interweaves it with much abusive mirth ; the
best of the Grecians was his subject, not Cleon, the
Lacedaemonians, the Thebans, or Pericles himself, but a
person dear to all the Gods, especially Apollo. At first
(by reason of the novelty of the thing, the unusual per
sonating of Socrates upon the stage) the Athenians,
who expected nothing less, were struck with wonder.
Then (being naturally envious, apt to detract from the
best persons, not only of such as bore office in the com
monwealth, but any that were eminent for learning and
virtue) they begun to be taken with the Clouds (so was
the play named) and cried up the actor that personated
Socrates with more applause than ever any before, giv
ing him with many shouts the victory, and sending word
to the judges, that they should set down no name but
that of Aristophanes. Socrates came seldom to the
theatre, unless when Euripides contested with any new
tragedian, there, or in the Pyrseum, then he went, for he
affected the wisdom, goodness, and sweetness of his

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 317

verse ; sometimes Alcibiades and Critias would invite
him to a comedy, and in a manner compel him ; for he
was so far from esteeming comedians, that he contemned
them as lying, abusing, and unprofitable; whereat they
were much displeased : These (with other things sug
gested by Anytus and Melitus) wrere the ground of
Aristophanes in his comedy, who, it is likely, got a great
sum of money by it, they being eager in prosecution of
their design, and he prepared by want, and malice, to
receive their impression : In fine, the play got extraor
dinary credit, that of Cratonus being verified.

The theatre was then
Fill'd with malicious men.

It being at that time the feast of Bacchus, a multitude
of Grecians went to see the play : Socrates being per
sonated on the stage and often named, (nor was it much
the players should represent him, for the potters fre
quently did it upon their stone jugs) the strangers that
were present (not knowing whom the comedy abused)
raised a hum and whisper, everyone asking who that
Socrates was, which he observing (for he came not
thither by chance, but because he knew himself should
be abused in the play, had chosen the most conspicuous
seat in the theatre) to put the strangers out of doubt,
he rose up, and all the while the play lasted, continued
in that posture (laughing). One that was present asked
him if it did not vex him to see himself brought upon
the stage. Not at all (answered he) methinks I am at
a feast where every one enjoys me. This comedy was
first acted when Isarchus was Archon, Cratinus Victor
in the first year of the eighty-ninth Olympiad : Aristo
phanes being by some reprehended for it, to vindicate
himself, caused it to be acted again the year following
Amintas being Archon, but with worse order than at first

3i 8 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

Amipsias also (another comic poet) derided him thus
in Tribune.

O Socrates, the best of few, the vainest
Of many men ; and art thou come amongst us?
Where is thy gown ? did not this great misfortune
Befall thee by the leather-dresser's help ?

His TRIAL.

Many years passed since the first falling out betwixt
Socrates and Anytus, during which time one continued
openly reproving, the other, secretly undermining, until
at length Anytus seeing the time suit with his design,
procured Melitus to prefer a bill against him to the
Senate in these terms.

Melitus, son of Melitus, a Pythean, accuseth Socrates,
son of Sophroniscus, an Alopecian. Socrates, violates
the law, not believing the Deities which this city be-
lieveth, but introducing other new Gods. He violates
the law likewise in corrupting youth ; the punishment
death.

This Bill being preferred upon oath, Crito became
bound to the Judges for his appearance at the day of
trial. Soon after Anytus sent privately to him, desiring
him to forbear the mention of his trade, and assuring
him that he would thereupon withdraw his action ; but
Socrates returned answer, that he would never forbear
speaking truth as long as he lived, that he would always
use the same speeches concerning him ; that his accusa
tion was not of force enough to make him refrain from
speaking those things which he thought himself before
obliged to say.

The interval of time betwixt his accusation and trial,
he employed in his usual philosophical exercises, not
taking any care to provide his defence, for which being
observed and questioned by Hermogenes, son of Hip-

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 319

ponicus, I provide apology enough (saith he) in consid
ering and pursuing the constant course of my life ;
Hermogenes demanding how that could be, because
(saith he) I never did any unjust act, which I conceive
the best apology. But we often see judges (saith
Hermogenes) overswayed by rhetoric, to condemn the
innocent, and acquit the guilty. The truth is, replied
Socrates, going about to make my apology, I was twice
withheld by the daemon, whereat Hermogenes wonder
ing, is it strange (continues he) that God should think
it fit for me to die at this time ? Hitherto no man hath
lived more uprightly, which as it is now my greatest
comfort, so it was the greatest delight to myself and
friends ; if I live longer, I know I must undergo what is
proper to old age, defects of hearing and sight, slowness
to apprehend, aptness to forget, how can I then be
pleased to live longer and grow worse : it is likely God
in His love to me hath ordained that I should die in the
most convenient age, and by the gentlest means ; for if I
die by sentence I am allowed the benefit of the most
easy kind of death ; I shall give my friends the least
trouble, I shall do nothing unseemly before those that
are present, and shall depart sound in body and soul ;
is not this very desirable ? God with much reason for
bids me to make any defence. If I could effect it, I
should only stay longer to be taken away by the torment
of diseases, and imperfections of age, which truly Her
mogenes I desire not ; if when I give an account of my
actions towards God and men, the judges think fit to
condemn me, I will rather choose to die than beg of
them a life worse than death.

Other friends used the same persuasions to him with
assurance of victory. Lysias, an excellent orator, of
fered him an oration, which he had written in his de-

320 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

fence, desiring him if he thought good to make use of it
at his trial ; Socrates perused it, and told him, that it
was a good one, but not fit for him. Lysias asking how
that could be? Why (saith he) may not a garment or
shoes be rich, yet not fit for me ? If you should bring
me Sicionian shoes, I would not wear them though they
were fit for my feet, because they are effeminate : He
conceived the oration to be ingenious and eloquent, but
not stout and manly ; for though it were very bitter
against the judges, yet was it more rhetorical than be
came a philosopher.

The da)' of trial being come, Anytus, Lyco, and Meli-
tus prepared to accuse him, one in behalf of the people,
the second of the orators, the last of the poets. Melitus
first went up into the chair proper for that purpose, and
there spoke an oration which was in itself mean enough,
but withal delivered so unhappily and schoolboy like,
that sometimes he was out with fear, and turned about
to be prompted like a player, enough to beget laughter
even in those that were most concerned in so serious a
cause.

That Socrates persuaded his auditors to contemn the
received laws, saying it was fit only for fools to be gov
erned by a bean (meaning the votes of the Senate
counted by beans.)

That he was intimately conversant with Critias and
Alcibiades, one most covetous and violent in the oli
garchy, the other ambitious of tyranny.

That he taught disrespect and disobedience to parents,
telling his scholars he would make them wiser than
their fathers, and that it was lawful for any one to bind
his father if he were mad, and for those that were the
more wise, to do as much to those that were less wise.

That he taught also disrespect of all other kinsmen,

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 321

saying they were not useful to the sick, or to the ac
cused, the first being in more need of a physician, the
latter of an orator ; that the goodwill of unable friends
was nothing worth, that only the most knowing persons
were most worthy of honor ; by which means he would
arrogate all respect to himself.

That he selected out of the poets some ill places, and
perverted others that were not so, to excite his friends to
impious actions.

That he often repeated and misinterpreted these words
of Homer, as if the poet allowed the poor to be beaten.

When he a Prince, or some great person meets,
Such with soft language kindly thus he greets ;
Happy above the reach of fear are you ;
Sit down, and bid your followers do so too.
But of the lower sort when any speaks,
Forth these words with blows his anger breaks,
Be quiet ; to thy betters wretch submit ;
For action and advice alike unfit.

Melitus (his oration ended) came down; next him
came Anytus with a long malicious speech, and last of
all Lyco with all the artifice of rhetoric concluded the
accusation.

Socrates would not (as was the custom) procure an
advocate to plead for him ; all the while his accusers
were speaking, he seemed to employ his mind about
nothing less : as soon as they had done, he went up into
the chair, (in which action he observed that the daemon
did not withhold him) and with an angry smile begun
this unpremeditated answer, not as a suppliant, or guilty
person, but as if master of the judges themselves, with a
free contumacy proceeding not from pride, but the great
ness of his mind.

But I wonder first (Athenians) how Melitus came by
this knowledge, that (as he saith) I do not worship
those Gods the city worships ? Others have seen me,

322 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

(and so might Melitus if he had pleased) sacrifice at
common festivals on the public altars ; how do I intro
duce new Deities when I profess to be directed in all my
actions by the voice of God ? They who observe the
notes of birds, or answers of men, are guided by the
voice : none doubts of thunder whether it be loud or
oraculous. Doth not the priestess on the tripod convey
to us by voice what the God delivers to her ? And that
He foreknows events, communicating them to whom
pleaseth him, all men (as well as I) believe and profess.
Others call those that foretell events, augurs, soothsay
ers, and diviners, I the daemon, and (I conceive) more
religiously than they who ascribe a divine power to
birds. That I am no impostor herein, many can attest
who have asked my advice, and never found it fail.
Here there arose a murmur in the Senate, some not be
lieving, others envying what he said, that he should
surpass them in such a particular favor of the Deity :
Let such as are incredulous hear this also to confirm
their opinion that I am not favored of the Gods ; when
Chaerephon in the presence of many witnesses, ques
tioned the Delphian Oracle concerning me, Apollo an
swered, that no man was more free, more just, or more
wise ; (here another murmur arose amongst the judges :
he proceeded.) Yet the same God said more of Ly-
curgus the Lacedaemonian Law-giver, that he knew not
whether to call him a God or a Man ; me he compared
not with the Gods, though he gave me the priority
amongst men. But trust not the God herein, consider
me exactly yourselves; whom know you less a servant
to corporeal pleasures, whom more free? I accept not
either rewards or gifts ; who more just than he who
conforms himself to the present time, as he needs not
the help of any other ; who will say he deserves not the

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 323

title of wise, who since he was able, never desisted to
learn by enquiry all good possible : and that I took not
this pains in vain, is evident in that, many citizens and
strangers studious of virtue, prefer my conversation
above all others: What is the reason that though all
men know I have no wealth to requite them, so many
desire to oblige me by gifts ? That I require no return
from any, yet engage so many ? That when the city
being besieged, every one lamented his condition, I was
no more moved than when it was most flourishing?
That whilst others lay out money on outward things to
please themselves, I furnish myself, from within myself,
with things that please me better. If none can disprove
what I have said, deserve I not the commendations both
of Gods and men? And yet you Melitus pretend that
with these instructions I corrupt youth; every one
knows what it is to corrupt youth : can you name but
one that I of religious have made impious, of modest,
impudent, of frugal, prodigal, of sober, debauched, of
hardy, effiminate, or the like ? But I know those, an
swered Melitus, whom you have persuaded to be more
obedient to you than to their own parents. That as far
as concerns instruction, replied Socrates, I confess this
they know to be my proper care : For their health men
obey physicians before their parents, in lawsuits coun
sellors before their kindred ; do you not in war prefer
the most experienced soldiers to command before your
own allies ? Yes, answers Melitus, 'tis fit we should ;
and do you think it reason, then, replies Socrates, if
others are preferred for such things as they are excellent
in, that because in the opinion of some, I have an ad
vantage beyond others in educating youth, which is the
greatest benefit amongst men, I ought therefore to die ?
Anytus and Melitus (saith he, addressing himself to the

324 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

judges) may procure my death, hurt me they cannot:
To fear death is to seem wise, and not to be so ; for it is
to pretend to understand that which we understand not :
No man knows what death is, whether it be not the
greatest happiness that can arrive to a man, and yet all
fear and shun it as if they were sure it were the greatest
misfortune.

This and more (saith Xenophon) was said both by
himself and his friends, but the judges were so little
pleased with his unusual manner of pleading, that as
Plato went up into the chair, and began a speech in these
words, Though I, Athenians, am the youngest of those
that come up in this place, they all cried out, of those
that go down, which he thereupon was constrained to
do, and they proceeding to vote, Socrates was cast by
281 voices; it was the custom of Athens, as Cicero ob
serves, when any one was cast, if the fault were not
capital, to impose a pecuniary mulct ; when the judges
had voted in that manner, the guilty person was asked
the highest rate whereat he estimated his offence ; the
judges, willing to favor Socrates, propounded that de
mand to him, he answered 25 (or as Eubulides saith)
100 drachms, nor would he suffer his friends, Plato,
Crito, Critobolus, and Apollodorus (who desired him to
estimate it at 50 minse, promising to undertake the sum)
to pay anything for him, saying, that to pay a penalty
was to own an offence, and telling the judges that (for
what he stood accused) he deserved the highest honors
and rewards, and daily sustenance at the public charge
out of the Prytanaeum, which was the greatest honor
that was amongst the Grecians; with this answer the
judges were so exasperated, that they condemned him
to death by eighty votes more.

The sentence being past, he could not forbear smiling,

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 325

and turning to his friends, saith thus, They who have
suborned false witnesses against me, and they who have
born such testimonies, are doubtless conscious to them
selves of great impiety and injustice; but as for me,
what should more deject me now than before I wras con
demned, being nothing the more guilty ; they could not
prove I named any new Gods for Jupiter, Juno, and the
rest, or swore by such : how did I corrupt young men
by inuring them to sufferance and frugality? Of
capital offences, as Sacrilege, Theft, and Treason, my
very adversaries acquit me; which makes me wonder
how I come to be condemned to die ; yet that I die un
justly will not trouble me, it is not a reproach to me,
but to those who condemned me ; I am much satisfied
with the example of Palamedes, who suffered death in
the like manner; he is much more commended than
Ulysses the procurer of his death. I know both future
and past times will witness, I never hurt or injured any,
but on the contrary, have advantaged all that conversed
writh me to my utmost ability, communicating what good
I could, gratis. This said, he went away, his carriage
answerable to his words, his eyes, gesture, and gait ex
pressing much cheerfulness.

His IMPRISONMENT.

Socrates (saith Seneca) \vith the same resolved look,
wherewith he singly opposed the thirty tyrants, entered
the prison, and took away all ignominy from the place,
which could not be a prison whilst he was there: Here
(being fettered by the eleven officers) he continued
thirty days after he was condemned upon this occasion :
The ship which carried Theseus and fourteen more per
sons into Greet; he vowed if they got safe home (as it
fortuned they did) to dedicate to Apollo, and to send it
every year with a present to Delos, which custom the

326 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

Athenians religiously observed ; before the solemnity,
they used to lustrate their city, and all condemned per
sons were reprieved till it returned from Delos, which
sometimes, the wind not serving, was a long time. The
priest of Apollo began the solemnity, by crowning the
poop of the ship, which happening the day before Soc
rates was condemned, occasioned his lying in prison so
long after.

In this interval he was visited by his friend, with
whom he passed the time in dispute after his usual
manner : he was often solicited by them to an escape,
some of them offered to carry him away by force, which
he not only refused, but derided, asking, if they knew
any place out of Attica, whither death could not come.
Crito, two days before his death, came very early in the
morning to him to the same purpose, having by his fre
quent visits and gifts gained some interest in the jailor,
but finding him asleep, sat still by him, admiring the
soundness of his sleep, the happy equality of his mind;
as soon as he waked, he told him that he came to bring
sad news, if not such to him, yet to all his friends, that
the ship would certainly be at home to-morrow at
furthest (some that came from Suuium affirming they
had left it there) but that in all likelihood it would
come that day, and he should die the next. In good
time be it, answered Socrates, but I do not believe it will
come to-day ; for the day following I must die, as they
say, who have the power in their hands; but that I shall
not die to-morrow, but the day after, I guess by a dream
I had this night, that a woman very beautiful, in a white
garment, saluted me by my name, saying

Thou, ere three days are told,
Rich Phithya shalt behold.

(The same relation, according to Laertius, he made to

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 327

J^schines.) This occasion Crito took to persuade him to
save himself, which he pressed with many arguments ;
that his friends would be accused of covetousness, as
more desirous to spare their wealth, than to redeem him ;
that it might be effected with little trouble and expense
to them who were provided for it; that himself was rich
enough to do it, or if not, Simmias, Cebes, and others
would join with him ; that he ought not voluntarily to
thrust himself into destruction, when he might avoid it;
that he should leave his children in an uncertain mean
estate ; that it would not be construed constancy, but
want of courage. Consider well these reasons, saith he,
or rather (for it is now no time to stand considering)
be persuaded, what is to be done, must be done this
night, or it will be too late. Socrates answered, that his
cheerful readiness to relieve him was much to be es
teemed, if agreeable to justice, otherwise, the less just,
the more blamable : that opinion and censure ought not
to be regarded, but truth and equity ; that wrong must
not be requited with wrong; that faith should be kept
more strictly with a city than with private persons ; that
he had voluntarily subjected himself to the laws of his
country, by living under their government, and to vio
late them at last, were great injustice : That by breaking
prison, he should not only draw his friends into many
inconveniences, but himself also into many dangers,
only to live and die in exile; that in such a condition,
he should be nothing more capable to bring up his
children well, but dying honestly, his friends would take
the more care of them : That whatsoever inconvenience
might ensue, nothing was to be preferred before justice;
that if he should escape by treachery, the remainder of
his life would be never the more happy, nor himself
after death better entertained in the next world. These

328 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

things (saith he) I hear like the Corybantian Pipes, the
sound of these words makes me deaf to every thing else ;
therefore, whatever you shall say to the contrary, will
be to no purpose ; but if you have any other business,
speak. Crito answering, he had not any else: as for this
then (concludes he) speak no more of it, let us go the
way which God points out to us. * * *

Let every one, therefore, prepare for this journey
against the time that fate shall call him away: you
Simmias, Cebes, and the rest here present shall go at
your appointed hour, me fate now summons (as the
tragedian saith), and perhaps it is time that I go into
the bath, for I think it best to wash before I take the
poison, that I may save the women the labor of washing
me when I am dead. *****

I cannot persuade Crito, saith he, that I am any thing
more than the carcass you will anon behold, and there
fore he takes this care for my interment; it seems that
what even now I told him that as soon as I have taken
the poison, I shall go to the joys of the blessed, hath
been to little purpose ; he was my bail, bound to the
judges for my appearance, you must now be my sureties
to him that I am departed ; let him not say that Socrates
is carried to the grave, or laid under ground, for know,
dear Crito, such a mistake were a wrong to my soul ; be
not dejected, tell the world my body only is buried, and
that after what manner thou pleasest. This said, he
arose and retired into an inward room, taking Crito
with him, leaving us discoursing upon our own misery,
shortly to be deprived like orphans of so dear a father.
After his bathing, came his wife and the other women
of his family with his sons, two of them children, one a
youth ; when he had taken order with these about his
domestic affairs, he dismissed them and came out to us.

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 329

It was now sunset, (for he had staid long within)
when the officer entered, and after a little pause said: " I
have not, Socrates observed that carriage in you which
I have found in others, but as I thought you the most
generous, the mildest and best of all men that ever came
into this place, so I now see you hate me not, for that
whereof others are the cause : you know the message I
bring, farewell; bear what you cannot remedy:" With
that he departed weeping; "Fare thee well," (said Soc
rates) "I will:" "How civil is this man! I found him
the same all the time of my imprisonment, he would
often visit me, discourse with me, used me always
courteously, and now see how kindty he weeps for me :
but come Crito, let us do as he bids us, if the poison be
ready, let it be brought in;" "The sun is yet scarce set,"
answers Crito: " others take it late after a plentiful sup
per and full cups; make not so much haste, there is
time enough," he replies, " They who do so think they
gain time, but what shall I gain by drinking it late?
Only deceive myself as covetous of life, and sparing of
that which is no longer mine; pray let it be as I say: "
Then Crito sent one of the attendants, who immediately
returned, and with him the man that was to administer
the poison, bringing a cup in his hand, to whom Soc
rates said, "Prithee honest friend (for thou art well
versed in these businesses) what must I do?" "No
thing," said he, "but as soon as you have drunk, walk
till you find your legs begin to fail, then lie down," and
in so saying, he gave him the cup. Socrates took it
cheerfully, not changing either countenance or color,
and looking pleasantly upon him, demanded whether he
might spill any of it in libation, who answered, he
had made no more than would just serve; "yet," saith
Socrates, " I may pray to God, and will, that my passage

330 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

hence may be happy, which I beseech Him to grant,"
and in the same instant drank it off easily without any
disturbance; many of us who till now had refrained
from tears, when we saw him put the cup to his mouth
and drink off the poison, were not able to contain any
longer ; which Socrates observing, friend (saith fce)
what mean you ? For this reason I sent away the
women lest they should be so unquiet : I have heard
we should die with gratulation and applause, be quiet
then and take it patiently. These words made us with
shame suppress our tears ; when he had walked a while,
perceiving his legs to fail, he lay down on his back as
the executioner directed him, who looking on his feet
pinched them hard, asked him if he felt it, he answered
no, he did the like to his legs, and showing us how
every part successively grew cold and stiff, told us when
that chillness came at his heart he would die; not long
after he spake these last words, O Crito, I owe JBscu-
lapius a cock, pay it, neglect it not. It shall be done,
saith Crito ; will you have any thing else ? He made no
answer, lay still a while, then stretched himself forth;
with that the executioner uncovered him, his eyes were
set, Crito closed them. This (saith Plato) was the
end of the best, the wisest, and most just of men : a
story, which Cicero professeth, he never read wihout
tears.

Aristotle saith, that a Magus coming from Syria to
Athens, not only reprehended Socrates for many things,
but foretold him also that he should die a violent death.

Laertius closeth his life with this epigram,

Drink Socrates with Jove, next whom enthron'd,
By Gods, and Wisdom's self as wisest own'd.
Thee the Athenians gave a pois'nous draught.
But first thy wisdom from your lips they quaft.

Ethics of the ^Greek Philosophers. 331

WHAT HAPPENED AFTER His DEATH.

He was buried with tears and much solemnity (con
trary to his own direction) by his friends, amongst
whom the excessive grief of Plato is observed by Plu
tarch, and the mourning habit of Isocrates : As soon as
they had performed that last service, fearing the cruelty
of the tyrants, they stole out of the city, the greater part
to Megara to Euclid, where they were kindly received,
the rest to other parts.

Soon after, a Lacedaemonian youth, who had never
more acquaintance with Socrates than what fame gave
him, took a journey to Athens, intending to become his
disciple ; being come as far as the City Gates, and ready
to enter with joy, to be so near the end at which he
aimed, instead of Socrates, he meets there the news of
his death, whereat he was so troubled, that he would
not go within the City Gates, but enquiring the place
where he was buried, went thither, and breaks forth into
a passionate discourse, accompanied with many tears,
to the enclosed dead body ; when night was come, he fell
asleep upon the sepulchre; the next morning, affection
ately kissing the dust that lay upon it, and with
much passion taking leave of the place, he returned to
Megara.

Suidas tells a like story, (for that there were more
examples than one of this kind, Libanius implies) of a
Chian named Crysas, W7ho coming to Athens to hear
Socrates, went to his tomb, and slept there, to whom
Socrates appeared in a dream, and discoursed with him;
with which only satisfaction he went directly home
again.

By these accidents the Athenians were awakened into
a sense of their injustice, considering they were ob-

332 Ethics of the Greek Philosophers.

noxious to the censure of the Lacedaemonians by extra
ordinary crimes, whose children were so affectionate to
the philosophers whom they had murdered, as to take
such long journeys to see Socrates, whom they \vould not
keep when he was with them ; hereat they became so
exasperated, that they were ready to tear those wicked
men that were the occasion of his death piecemeal with
their teeth, the whole city cried out, they disclaimed the
act, and that the authors thereof ought to be put to
death. Antisthenes furthered their rage by this means.
Some young men of Pontus invited to Athens by the
fame of Socrates, met with Antisthenes, who carried
them to Anytus, telling them he was much wiser than
Socrates; whereupon those that were present, with much
indignation, turned Anytus out of the city : thence he
went to Heraclea, where some say the citizens also ex
pelled him, others that they stoned him to death. Meli-
tus was by the Athenians condemned and put to death,
others affirm the like of all his accusers without trial.
Plutarch, that they so much hated them, as they would
not suffer them to kindle fire at their houses, they would
riot answer them any question, they would not wash
with them, but threw away the water they had touched
as impure, until unable to brook this hatred, they
hanged themselves.

In further testimony of their penitence, they called
home his friends to their former liberty of meeting, they
forbade public spectacles of games and wrestling for a
time, they caused his statue, made in brass by Lysippus,
to be set up in the Pompeum, and (a plague ensuing,
which they imputed to the injustice of this act) they
made an order that no man should mention Socrates
publicly, or on the theatre, that so they might forget
what they had done: Euripides (restrained by this order

Ethics of the Greek Philosophers. 333

from doing it directly) reproached them overtly in a
tragedy, named Palamedes (in whom he alluded to Soc
rates) particularly in these verses,

A Philomele ne'r mischief knew,
Is slain, alas ! is slain by you.

At which words, all the spectators understanding they
were meant of Socrates, fell a weeping.

The death of this sole person (saith Eunapius)
brought a general calamity upon the city ; for it may
easily be collected by computation of times, that from
thenceforward the Athenians did nothing considera
ble, but the city by degrees decayed, and with it all
Greece.

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