Jf.
/8k f,
ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS,
VOL. II.
LOSDOH
PRINTED BY 8POTTISWOODE ASD CO.
NEW-STREET SQUARK
THE
ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE
ILLUSTRATED WITH
ESSAYS AND NOTES.
BY
SIB ALEXANDER GRANT, BART., M.A., LL.D.
DIRECTOR OP PUBLIC INSTRUCTION IX THE BOMBAY PRESIDENCY
AND FORMERLY FELLOW OF ORIEL COLLEGE, OXFORD.
SECOND EDITION, REVISED AND COMPLETED.
IN TWO VOLUMES.
VOLUME THE SECOND.
LONDON :
LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
1866.
Stack
Annex
8
430
Arc
Ittt
THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.
BOOKS HI. X.
VOL. II.
PLAN OF BOOK III.
IT has been already assumed without proof, that virtue implies
purpose (Eth. II. iv. 3, II. v. 4, II. vi. 15), and therefore of course
will and freedom. Before proceeding to the analysis of particular
virtues, Aristotle begins by examining the generic conception of the
Voluntary, with a view chiefly to the comprehension of its species,
Purpose.
The first five Chapters of Book III. are accordingly devoted to
this subject, and stand so much apart from what goes before and
after, that some have been led to the conclusion that they were
written as a separate treatise (see Essay I. p. 10). That several
parts of these chapters are unnecessarily repeated in BookV. c. xiii.,
and that certain points in them do not agree with the psychology of
Books VI. and VII. , is no argument against the present chapters
having formed part of Aristotle's original draft and conception of his
Ethics, but only tends to show that Books V. VI. VII. were written
later. It is more to the purpose to notice that in Chapter V. 10,
there is an apparent ignoring of the whole discussion upon the for-
mation of moral states which occupies the commencement of Book II.,
and that no allusion occurs to 'the mean' or to 'happiness.' On the
other hand, while we must attribute a sort of completeness in itself
and a sort of isolation to the account of the Voluntary, we must also
acknowledge that there is at all events great skill shown in the way
in which it is worked into the general ethical treatise by 21, 22
of the fifth chapter. And on the whole these chapters bear out the
theory which seems most natural with regard to the composition of
the Ethics (see Essay I. pp. 42, 43), as they both exhibit to some
degree the characteristics of a separate treatise, and also appear to
have been written in reference to the preconceived plan of the
entire work. The contents of these chapters are as follows :
B 2
IV PLAN OF BOOK III.
(1.) The general definition of the Voluntary. Ch. I.
(2.) The special account of Purpose, that it is distinct from desire,
wish, opinion; its relation to the process of deliberation. Ch.II. III.
(3.) Some consideration of the question whether Wish is for the
absolute or the apparent good. Ch. IV.
(4.) An attack upon the position that while virtue is free, vice is
involuntary. Ch. V.
The remainder of the book is occupied with a discussion of the
two first virtues upon Aristotle's list courage and temperance.
With regard to courage the following heads are treated of:
(1.) Its proper objects; Ch. VI. (2.) That it is a mean ; Ch. VII.
(3.) That true courage is to be distinguished from five spurious
kinds of courage ; Ch. VTII. (4.) That it is particularly related to
pain, and implies making great sacrifices for the sake of what is
noble ; Ch. IX. The objects and the nature of temperance are
treated of in Chapters X. and XI. And the book ends with two
remarks on intemperance : (1.) that it is more voluntary than
cowardice ; and, (2.) that its character is shown in its etymology ;
Ch. XII.
HGIKilN NIKOMAXEIiiN III.
psrris 8r) Trspi irahri r= xoii Trpd^sig oyerr^, xai en \
I ftsv roig XO'j<r/o< sTraivatv xai \J/^yo>v yivofJiivcov, sn I
8= TO? dxo'j<riois (rwyyvw'j.yg, sviors 8s xai s^souj TO Ixoti-
xa) axouenov dvayxoLiov iVa> Slop/era* roTf Trepi ap ST%
s xal TO?^ voJi.oQsTw<7i Trog rs 2
I. i 2 TT}S operas Si; jcoA.<<rets]
' Virtue then being concerned \vith
feelings and actions ; and praise and
blame being bestowed on those vhich
are voluntary, while pardon and
sometimes even pity are conceded to
the involuntary, it is surely necessary
for those who treat of virtue to define
the voluntary and involuntary; and
moreover this will be useful for legis-
lators with a view to their rewards
and punishments.' In the Eudemian
Ethics, which contain generally speak-
ing a reproduction of these Ethics, for
the most part compressed, but also
occasionally expanded and supple-
mented, we find (Eth. End., u. vi)
a more definite and reasoned state-
ment of the voluntariness of virtue
and vice, which is by far the best and
most ingenious part of the books that
certainly belong to Eudemus. His
reasoning is briefly as follows : All
ovfficu are apx a '> an( i ten ^ * reproduce
themselves ; and only those o.px<ni are
properly so called (Kiipiat) which are
primary causes of motion, as is espe-
cially the case with regard to immu-
table motions, whose cause is doubtless
Grod. Mathematical ap\ai are called
so only by analogy, not being causes
of motion. We have hitherto only
mentioned necessary consequences :
but there are many things which may
happen or may not, and whose causes
therefore must be, like themselves,
contingent. All human actions being
contingent, it is obvious that man is
a contingent cause, and that the reason
of the contingency in his actions is
his ability to will one way or the other,
as is farther manifest from our praise
. or blame of actions. A deeper ground
than that which Aristotle has taken
might surely have been found for the
position that morality implies freedom.
But though philosophy even before
Aristotle had dealt to some extent
with the ideas of necessity and free-
dom, it remained for the Stoics to
open the question more decisively;
and (for reasons elsewhere given) this
is one main point in which modern
systems may claim an advantage over
the ancient ones (see Essay VII.). It is
plain that the discussion of free-will
in this place is never metaphysical,
and rarely even psychological. An
appeal to language and common
opinions sums up nearly the whole.
lieiKilN NIKOMAXEIQN III.
[CHAP.
3 rag
xai rag xoXa<re/.
ev
, oTov ei
ocra 8e 8<
Soxei Se dxovcrta. elvoti ra
8s oS *j ap^^ ^a>9ev,
o Trpdrrfuv ~*\ o
xojuuVai TTOJ :g avQpWTrot xvpiot
xaxtov
oov e Tupavvo Trpoa'raTToi aa-%pov n
xvpiog wv yovscov xai TSXVCOV, xa) 7rpaavTO /Jtsv (rt
8' aTroQj/y^rxo/ev, ap,<$>i(rfir)Tr)(nv e%ei Trorspov
the agent, and is of such a nature
that the agent (or patient) contributes
nothing towards it ; as, for instance,
if a wind were to carry you to any
place, or men in whose power you are.'
'Apx"() seems here equivalent to apx^
Kiv4)<rfa>s, the efficient cause. Ari-
stotle attributes spontaneity eo de-
cisively to the individual act, that he
confines the term compulsion as only
applicable to cases of absolute physical
force, where a man's limbs are moved
or his body transported, as if he
were inanimate, by some external
power. The compulsion of threats,
fear, and such like, he will not call
compulsion without qualification, be-
cause still the individual acts under
it. He has already spoken of the life
of money-making as being jEtfauis T<J,
'in a sort compulsory' (Eth. i. v. 8).
With 6 -n-pdrruv jj 6 irdffxw cf. v. viii.
3 : iroAAa yap ruv <t>vfffi vvapxAvroiv
fl56res Koi irpdrTopfv Kal vaax.l JLfv
oTov rb yripav $ iaroQv^ffKfiv.
4 9 The cause of the act must be
entirely from without, for in some
cases men are forced, not to an act,
but to an alternative. They may do
what is grievous for the fear of what
is worse. Such acts, then, are of a
mixed character, partaking of the
nature both of voluntariness and
involuntariness. Relatively to the
moment, they come from the choice
and will of the individual. Ab-
stractedly and in themselves they
The scope of the argument is limited
to a political, as distinguished from a
theological point of view (awyjccuov
rols irepl ApeTTjs tiriffKOirovcri, Xf^l ffl P- ov
5e Kol TO?S vo/ioOeToOfft).
3 So/ce? 8e yjv<5^i6va] ' Now those
acts seem to be involuntary which are
done under compulsion or through
ignorance.' In asking what is the
Voluntary, Aristotle does not pursue
a speculative method of inquiry. Such
a method might have commenced with
the deep-lying ideas of personality
and consciousness, of the individuality
of the subject, &c. But he is content
with defining the voluntary by a con-
trast to the common notions (Santi) of
what constitutes an involuntary act.
It might be said that this is giving a
merely negative conception of freedom. .
But in fact the conception given is
positive, only the analysis of it is not
pushed very far. The voluntariness
of an act Aristotle represents to be
constituted .in this that the actor is
in every case the opx^, or cause of his
actions, except in cases of compulsion,
where there really is a superior opx^
(Kant's ' heteronomy ' ), or of ignor-
ance, where he does not know what
his action is, and can only be held to
be the cause of what he meant to do.
In what sense and how the individual
is an o.px"fi, is the point where Ari-
stotle stops short in the inquiry.
jS/oioi/ 5e &T] ' That is com-
pulsory, whose cause is external to
I.]
H6IKON NIKOMAXEmN III.
axov<ria e(TTtv ^ lxou<ria. TO/OUTOV 3e TI <rvfj.fia.ivst xou 5
TTSS} ra$ sv TOI$ ^iij.Mtriv sx$oXa aTrTvcbc fj.lv yap o-josis
a7ro$a?\./\.=Ta{ Ixcov, STTJ <ra)Tr t pia. 8' airou xal rcov
-yap
TOTS ors TTparrovTa/, TO 0= rsXoj TTJ 7Tpa.%=a)$ xara TOV
are contrary to the will But as
every act aims at something in refer-
ence to the particular moment, and
is thus entirely dependent on it, so
these must be judged as acts done and
chosen voluntarily, and according to
circumstances must obtain blame or
praise. There seems to be four cases
which Aristotle conceives as possible :
(i) Praise is deserved where pain or
degradation is endured for the sake of
some great and noble end ; (2) but
blame, where what is degrading is
endured without a sufficiently great
and noble end. (3) Pardon is con-
ceded where human nature succumbs,
under great extremities, to do what is
not right; (4) except the action be
such as no extremities ought to bring
a man to consent to, in which case
pardon is withheld. In these dis-
tinctions we may recognise a practical
and political wisdom such as might
be found in the speeches of Thucy-
dides, but the discussion does not rise
to the level of philosophy.
6 /ii/crol o>5eV] ' Now it may be
said that such actions are of a mixed
character, but they are more like
voluntary actions, for they are chosen
at the particular moment when they
are done, and the moral character of
an action depends on the circum-
stance of the moment ; hence also the
terms ' voluntary ' and ' involuntary '
must be predicated in reference to
the moment when a person is acting.
Now, in the supposed case (iv roiaincus
*-po|<n), the individual acts volun-
tarily; for the efficient cause of the
movement of the accessory limbs is
in himself, and where the cause is in a
person, it rests with him to act or not.
Therefore such things are voluntary,
though abstractedly perhaps, involun-
tary, for in themselves no one would
choose any of such things as these.'
rb 5e TeA.oj rf/s irp<|ea>j] The phrase
is general, not referring only to the
cases under dispute, but to action
universally. In this sense we may
translate TJJJ irpo|es 'of an action.'
TeAos is used here in a peculiar sense
to denote the ' moral character of an
action.' This sense arises out of a
combination of associations, ' final
cause,' and ' motive,' being combined
with ' end-in-itself,' ' perfection,'
'completeness.' A precisely similar
use of the word occurs, Eth. in. vii.
6 : Te'A.oy 8^ ircurijj evepyeias 6pifrcu
yap fKaTTov ftf rt\ei (on which see
note). The Paraphrast treats the
present passage as if the WAOS of an
action were different from the volun-
tariness of an action ; and as if the
argument were, 'because the character
of an action as good or bad is judged
in reference to the mind of the actor
at the moment of action, so also must
the voluntariness of an action be
judged.' "Eirel KO) T& eKOffrrjs irpa|ea>s
T6A.OJ KOTO rbv Kaipbv avrrjs fort, leal
a.Trb rov Kcupov i) aya6bv f) trovi}pbv
ylverai' Sxrre fcal rb (Kovawv, $ rb
aKovffiov, Karct rbv Kcupbv 8re TpaTTercu,
fitTijrfoif. Of course the interpreta-
tion of Muretus is wrong which attri-
8
IIOIKilN NIKOMAXEIiiN III.
[CuAr.
XO.IOQV simv.
xa
xai TO sxoyenov 8r) xai TO axowriov, OTS
Trpdrrsi 8s sxai/ xai yap ->j app^v; ToD
Ta opyavtxoi jW-sprj ev Ta? Toiat>Ta/ Trpa^str/v ev
8' SV CtUTtO 1} OifX^t >7r> OiltTtS Xa) TO TTpaV-
TE/V xa) ja^. sxou<r*a 873 Ta TOiauTa, a7T?.to 8' i'(ra> axou-
<r*a* ou8si yap av eXoiTO xaS' awTO T<OV TOIOUTCOV
7 ITT/ Ta7^ Trpa^so"! 8s Ta^ TMoatrauf SV/OTS xai
oroiv a.}<rypov TI rj XwTrrjpov V7ro[j.vio(riv CLVTI jo
xaXtov ' av 8' avaTraTciv, ^syovrai ' Ta yap a
uTOjasTvat sV< j,rj8sv< xaXa> r) jtxsTp/aj 4- >a ^ ou ' >7r>
8' 7Touvo$ fji>sv ou y/vsTai, (Tuyyva)]0t>j 8', oVai/ 8<a
Trpa^y) T/J a jtx^ 8sT, a T^V av5pa>7rjv>]i/ c^uo~/v wTrep
8 ju,7j8s/ av U7rofjt.sivott. svioi 8' ftreo oix S<TT<V avayx
aXXa jaaXXov aTroSavaTeov TraQo^T* ra 8s<voVaTa
yap TOV Eupi7r/8ou 'AXxjota/tova ysXoTa ^auvcrai Ta avay-
9 xaVavTa ja>jTpoxTov7](ra<. SCTT* 8s p^aXsTrov SJ//OTS 8/axpTvai
^oTov avTi TTO/OU alpsTeov xai T/ avTi T/VOJ iTTOjUsvsTe'ov,
IV/ 8s p^aXsTTfOTSpov sf^fJLsTvat roig yvaxrQiia-iv' a>s yap STT}
TO ^*oAu SO~T; Ta //.sv 7rpo<r8oxtt)/sva Xww^pa, a 8' avayxa-
xa
xa/
butes a merely popular and un-Aris-
totelian sense to T^AOJ ' actio termi-
natur eo ipso temporo quo agimus.'
8re irpdTTej] .The omission of -m,
especially after conjunctions like ,
8re, &c., is common in Aristotle,
though not peculiar to him. Cf. .E^.
in. ix. 5 : irA^y &J>' Sow TOU T\OIS
tydirrfTai. Pol. vii. xiii. 8 : Sffirep
et ToG KiOapi^tiv \a[4Trpbv Kal Ka\>s
a.l-rl<fro T^V \vpav (j.a\\ot> TTJS TC'X^JS.
ra opyaviK^ /ip?j] The 'subservient,'
or ' instrumental ' limbs. The modern
word ' organised,' which has grown out
of the Aristotelian conception of op-
yavtKbv au/jia, does not exactly repre-
sent it. ' Organisation ' implies mul-
teity in unity, the co-existence and
interjunction of physical parts under
a law of life. But in opyavmds
originally nothing more was implied
than ' that which is fitly framed as
an instrument,' according to Ari-
stotle's principle, that the body is the
means to the life, mind, or soul,
which is the end. Cf. DeAn. n. i. 6 :
fax^ tffnv ^vTf\ex fla ^ "'PWTTJ trcaparos
tpvaiKov fivvd/j.ci faty exovros. TOIOVTO
$(, t> &i> $ opya,viK6v. De Part. An.
I. i. 41 : ovrus Kal &rel rb ffufaa, upyavov
(fl>(K<i TWOS "ykp (cKCUTTOV TUV /JLOpliais,
6fj.oiws 8e Kal TO o\ui>), avdyKt] &pa.
ToiovSl tivai Kal ^K roiwvSl el ^Kfivo
&TTOJ.
8 Kal yap T'OV EvpiiriSou (ariTpo-
KTOvrjffai] ' For the things which com-
pelled the Alcmseon of Euripides to
kill his mother appear absurd,' i. c.
the curses threatened by Amphiaraus,
who, when departing for Thebes,
enjoined his son to put Eriphyle
to death. Aspasius preserves the
lines :
Md\urra niv /j.' iirfjp'
I.]
HOIKiiN NIKOMAXEmN. III.
al<r%pd, ofiev eTraivot xai \J/o'yo/ yivovrai rrspi
vrag r} [t,~f\. Ta 8>) TroTa <aTsov jS/aia j r\ a;
av T] OLirid. sv TOI<; SXTO^ ^ xai 6 Trpdrrcov jai]8sv
Ta< ; a 8s xaS' awTa jasv axouo~ia SO~T/, vov 8s xai
avr) Ttov8s alpsrd, xa< 75 app^^ sv T) TrpaTTOVTi, xa9'
axoutria SO~TI, vuv 8s xai avTi Ta>v8s sxouo~<a.
eo/xsv sxo'jir/o^' ai yap Trpd^sis sv roig xa & sxao~Ta,
sxou(Tia. ?ro7a 8' avT* TTO/COV aipsTsov, ou paoiov
yap 8<ad>opa*' slo"iv sv TO?^ xa6' sxao~Ta.
si 8s TI? Ta 7]8s'a xa* Ta xaXa <i)a/7i $/a<a sTva* (aj
e/a ' TOUTOJV yap
TravTa TrparTovcriv. xai ol jasv j3/a xa<
CtXOVTSJ XU7T7]p<O, 01 8s 8ia TO 7]8u Xai XaXoV jOtsS' TjSoVT]^.
ysAotov 8^ TO aiTiaa"3a/ TO.SXTO'J, aAXa jar] ayTov suQrjpaTov
cvTa WTTO Ttov TOIOUTCOV, xa) T&V jcxsv xaXaiv lauTo'v, T<OV 8'
Ta 7]8sa. eoixs 8^ TO /3/a<ov si'va* 06 s^coQsv 73
raura
yap s^eo ovra), Travra av enj o^rco
10 iroTa S' aj/ri iroicav atpfTfov, ov
fraSiov aTroSowai] There is something
careless about the composition here,
as these words repeat what has been
already said in the preceding section.
"Bern 8e x^ 7r ^" / ffiore SiaKpivcu iroiov
avrl iroiov alptrfoy.
1 1 i z In these sections Aristotle
guards his definition against a possible
misconception. Having defined the
compulsory to be that whose cause is
external, he disallows the supposition
that the two great inducements to all
action, the pleasant and the noble,
because external to us, make the
actions they induce compulsory. His
arguments against this supposition are:
(i) It would make all action com-
pulsory, and thus imply more than
any one would wish to support, (z)
Compulsory actions are painful ; those
done for the pleasant or the noble are
pleasurable. (3) It leaves out of ac-
count the internal susceptibility of the
agent (airrbv evOfiparov fora). His
VOL. II.
own definition, then, is sufficiently
qualified by the addition of the words,
' the person under compulsion in no-
wise consenting ' (jur/Sep ffvnf}a\\o(j.4t>ov
TOV fiiaffQevros).
TO. TjSea Kal ra K\(] Aspasius
reads TO ^Seet nal TO \vm\pA. The
commentators Victorius, Muretus,-
Giphanius, and Zell, get over the
difficulty by taking TO Ka\d. to mean
' non honesta, sed formosa, pulchra.'
It is plain, however, that the same
classification of inducements is here
referred to as that given Eth. n. iii.
7, the av^ipov being a means either
to the r;8u or the Ka\6r. The Ka\6v is
in short ' the noble,' or ' the good,
viewed as morally beautiful.' A con-
cise definition of it is given in Rhet.
I. ix. 3 : /coAbv (lev o3c e<fTiv, b ov 5i'
OUT& aipt-rliv ov tiraiverbv y, rj 8 OP
ayaBbv ov ri$b 77, on ayad6v. It is
used in the present passage not at all
emphatically, but simply to denote
that form of inducement which con-
10
IieiKflN NIKOMAXEIQN III.
[CHAP.
13 To 3c 6Y ctyvoiav ov% exouo~ioj> JOLSV OLTTOLV EO~TII/, axou-
6s TO eV/XoTrov xou Iv ju,TajasXs/a o yap 6Y ayi/o<av
^ag OTIOUV, [urfikv 6s tiv(r%epa.Iva)v ITT/ TYJ Trpa^si, exa>v
ou TTeVpap^ev, o ya jar) Y/$SI, ouS' a3 axtov, juwj hu7rovp.svo$
ys. TOO Sr) dY ayvoiav o [J.lv Iv jasTajasAs/a axa)t/ SoxsT, o
Ss jar; jW,STaju,sAo'jU.vo, ITTS} eVspos, IO-TOJ oip Ixaw *
14 yap &ja<$>p', ftehriov oi/ojaa ^X SiV '^ lov ' ZTepov ft
xal TO 8/' oiyvoiav TrpdrTsiv TOU ayvoouvTa 7rois?V o yap
rj opyi%o[j.svo$ ow SoxsT dY oiyvoiav TTpaTTeiv, a
sists in our wishing to do a thing
because it is right. A little examina-
tion shows that the writing here is
vague, for presently it is said to be
absurd to assign the cause of the good
things to oneself, and of the bad
things to pleasure (ourtaffBeu TUV
fifv KoAoJi/ ka.vr6v, TUV 5' alffxpuv TCI
^8^a) ; whereas consistently the 'good
things ' would have been assigned to
'the good' as an external cause by
those who maintained the position, ft
8^ TJS T& riSea K.T.X. Also would
Aristotle say that what is done 5j& rb
Ka\6v, is always done ptff TjSovrjs?
This goes strangely against Eth. m.
ix. 4 5, where the higher satisfaction
of the Ka\6v is represented as pur-
chased by great pain. There is a
vagueness also in the use of (Hata,
which first stands for that which
compels, and secondly for that which
is compelled. The principle, how-
ever, is well brought out, that the
objective inducement to an action
cannot be separated from the sub-
jective apprehension of this in the
wilL
13 ib 5 Si &yvoiai/ fyeiv f8jo']
' Now that which is done through
ignorance is always non -voluntary,
but it is involuntary only when
followed by pain, and when it is a
matter of regret. For he who has
done something through ignorance,
but without feeling any dislike at the
action, has not, it is true, acted
voluntarily, inasmuch as he did not
know he was doing it, but, on the
other hand, not involuntarily, since
he is not sorry. With regard, there-
fore, to actions done through ignor-
ance we may say that he who repents
has been an involuntary agent, while
him who does not repent we may
distinguish as having been a non-
voluntary one ; for where there is a
real difference, it is proper to have a
distinctive name.' Aristotle begins
the discussion of ignorance as modify-
ing volition by this refined distinction,
that an action may be done through
ignorance, and yet not against the will.
It may in short be neither with the
will nor against it. He then goes on
to consider the precise meaning of 5t'
&yvota>'.
14 1 6 trtpov 5' ioiKt aicovoius
trpdrrtt] 'There seems to be a farther
difference between acting through
ignorance and doing a thing in ignor-
ance. Common opinion pronounces
that the drunken or the angry man
acts not through ignorance, but in
consequence of drunkenness or anger,
and yet that he does not act wittingly,
but in ignorance. Without doubt
every depraved man is- in ignorance of
what he ought to do, and of that from
which he ought to refrain, and it is
I.]
H6IKON NIKOMAXEIliN III.
11
a n rwv si py fj.lv cov, ovx slows 6s a?\.X' ayvocov. ayvo=T ju,sv
v ;ra o fj.o^Tfpos a 05? Trparrsiv xou cov a^sxrsov, xai
but rather are all different ways for
expressing the same thing, being op-
posed to the TJ Kaff e/caoTa, tr ofs TJ
jrpa<y. This is the way in which the
Paraphrast understands the passage,
for he renders it : At 8fy roiavrai
irpd^is OVK f'tcrlv cucovcrioi' 77 yap tv rfj
-irpoaipecrei &-)'voia, T)TIS fffrlv atria, ruy
KaKiiav, OVK tffnv alria rov aKovatov,
a,\\a TTJS [j.oxff'npias. Ou yap rb Ka86\ov
irepl TT)S /U07js ayvotiv Bri irovi)p6v,
atriov yiverai rov aKovffiov, a\\a ri
ayvor)ffai /j,tptKus T^vSe rrjy fifOoSov
olov, <pepe tlirflv, OVK elS6Ta /J-^xpi irSffov
TTi6vTas tvi /j.f6veii>. Aristotle strictly
confines ignorance, as a cause of in-
voluntary action, to mistakes about
particulars. Before proceeding to this
particular ignorance, he separates from
it that kind of ignorance which is
faulty, because caused by the agent
himself. Of this there are two kinds,
the temporary, as for instance that
caused by intoxication, and the per-
manent, such as that caused by any
vicious habit. ' Ignorance of the uni-
versal' is not different from ' ignorance
of our real interest,' but serves to"
point the antithesis of ' ignorance of
the particular ' : nor is it opposed to
ignorance as shown in wrong moral
choice, but to ignorance of external
facts. It goes to constitute ignorance
in the purpose, for in every moral act
there is a universal conception, as well
as a particular application of this.
But Aristotle does not here enter upon
the psychology of the subject, as is
afterwards done, Eth. vn. iii. The word
ffv/jLtyepov is used, Polities, L ii. 1 1, to
include and denote all kinds of good, &
8e \6yos firl roi Sri\ovi> effrl rb <TVf4.<f>epov
KOI rb ^\a^ep6v, &ffrf Kal rb S'tKaiov
teal rb aSiKOV.
14 Sid ri rvv tlprifj.v(av] Some refer
2
in consequence of this error that men
become unjust, or bad generally.
But the term involuntary is not meant
to cover ignorance of man's true in-
terest. Ignorance which affects moral
choice, and ignorance of the universal,
are the causes, not of involuntary
action, but of wickedness, and it is
precisely for this ignorance that wicked
men are blamed. The ignorance
which causes involuntary action is
ignorance of particulars, which are
the circumstances and the objects of
actions. With regard to these parti-
culars, pity and pardon may be proper,
for the man who acts in ignorance of
some particular is an involuntary
agent.' The connexion of this some-
what compressed passage is as follows.
An act is involuntary when caused
by ignorance. But ignorance cannot
be said to be the cause of an act if
the individual be himself the cause of
the ignorance. In that case ignorance
rather accompanies the act (ayvoSiv
wpctTTei) than causes it (Si 1 ayvoiav
Trpdrrei). We see this ( r) in instances
of temporary oblivion, as from anger,
or wine ; (2) in those of a standing
moral ignorance or oblivion (et ra
ayvot'i rb crvfj.<pepov ?'; tv rfj irpoaipefffi
ayvoia r] Ka96\ov &yvoia). The only
ignorance, then, which is purely ex-
ternal to the agent, so as to take
away from him the responsibility of
the act, is some chance mistake with
regard to the particular facts of the
case. A great deal of trouble has
been expended upon the endeavour to
distinguish and explain the various
terms, ayvoovvra irpdrrfiv ayvofiv rb
ffVfJ.(f>fpOJS 71 fV rfj TTpoaipfffft ayVOia
ri Ka66\ov ayvoia. But a closer
examination shows that these different
terms are not opposed to each other,
12
HGIKflN NIKOMAXEIilN III.
[CHAP.
T/ 15 ev
oia TTJV ro/auTTjv cfyxapT/av aOixoi xa) oAeo xaxot yji/ovTa<.
1 5 TO 8' axov(riov ^ou^srai Xsysor^ai oux e)f T* ayvosT TO
$>spov ' o'j yctp rj sv T"J TT&oaipso'si ayvoia atria ToO a
aXXa T7J ju.op$jp'a, ou3' >j xaSoXou (vj/syovrai -yap
ys TauTr ; i>) aXX* >j xa6* xao~Ta, ev olj xa) Trspi a TJ 7Tp
<xp xa ' sXsoj xa< o-ityyvd)^' o yap
T* ayvoeot/ axou<r/o)^ Trparrsi. If
aura, r/va xa) ?roVa eerr/, T/J re
r/vi TrpaTTS*, ev/ors 8s xa) rAf
' <rJTr ; p/a, xai 7T<o?
ouv Taura ouSstj; av
J^ ous TOV TrparrovTa* ?ra)^ yap sauro'v 75 ; o
*, ayvo^o'eisv av T<J, olov Xs-yovre^ <$a<rj
oux el^s'vaj or* ctTropprjra ^[v, wo"7rep
o TOV xara-
eTvai co<T7rsp
So'pu, >] TOV
)^ ov o p^sp
TJ xai T/ xa/
oTov opyav<w, xai evsxa
olov Ts'txa
ra
oJr]5s/>j 8' av Ti xa< TOV uiov
T] MspoVij, xai e<r4>apaia'$ai TO
xjVo-Tjpiv
xa< SsT^ai
xa STT <ra)T>3p<a Trataj
too-Trsp oi axpo;=jp/o' ( ai/o/,
this to 1 1, ret ^8la (col ri KoXrf, but
it appears simply to mean ' not from
ignorance, but from one of the things
now specified,' ( e. drunkenness or
anger). Cf m> iii. II, r}>v eiprinivov
rpAirov, which refers to the passage
immediately preceding.
1 6 17 The particulars connected
with an action are as follows, (i)
The person doing it, about which
ignorance is impossible to the doer.
(2) The thing done, which may not
be known, e.g., JEschylus did not
know he was revealing the mysteries.
(3) The thing or person made the
object of the action (iff pi rl % iv
rivi), e.g., Merope did not know it was
her son. (4) The instrument, e.g.,
one might fancy one's spear had a
button on it. (5) The purpose, or
tendency of the act (%V(KO, -rives), e.g.,
one wishing to preserve might kill.
(6) The manner (*ws), e.g. one might
strike harder than one wished.
aScrirep AtVx^Aos T& />cmKt] Re-
ferring to the well-known story that
^Eschylus was summoned before the
Areopagus on the charge of having
revealed the mysteries, against which
charge he pleaded that he had never
himself been initiated.
wffirfp i] Mepcfa-Tj] This same incident
is alluded toby Aristotle in the Poetics,
C. xiv. 1 9 : KparioToj/ S rb rttevrcuov,
(i.e. T))V fie\\ovTa nois'lv n -ruv lurr)i<4-
(TTtav Si &yi>oiav, avayvcapiffat irpiv
iroifjffcu'), \fyw tit olov tv rf Kpff<j>6vrr)
T) Mtp6irri fji4\\ei ri>v vibv a.iroKrttvfiv,
airoKTflvei 8^ oC, a\\' avtyvapifffv.
Kal 5e?|oi ftov\upfvos, wairtp ol a.Kpo-
Xftpt6fj.tvot, irard^fifv &v~\ 'And
wishing to show the way, as those do
who box with the open hand, a man
might give another a blow.' Aspasius
I.]
oTj
av.
i 6
II61KUN NIKOMAXEIiiN III.
Trsp} Trai/Ta 8j TauTa rr}s ayvo/aj
13
? SV 18
ev
8ox=7
si/
xa
axoy<rou TOU
av sTvai o5 13
ol^ 13
xa
xttpiwrara 8'
o5 evsxoe.. rou 8r) xara 19
j er/ 8s7 rr ; v
/ V JJ
Asia. ovro^ 6 20
t ayvoiav, TO Ixo-jfTiov 8o^=isv
aura> et^oVi ra xaS' sxaerra l
f<ra)$ yap ou xaXto^ Xsysrat axoutna sft/ai 21
Trputrov fjilv yap ov&lv eri 2*
oyd' 01 7ra7o=^' glra23
TCOV 8/' e7TlQl>[J,lOlV XOU
ra xa?va /xsv beotMTMBf ra 8' aJtrp^pa axoucr/a)*; ; rj
Ivoj ys air/ou ovrog ; aro:rov 8= t(ro)g TO axouo~ia 24
v 8s? opsysa'Qai. 8=7 8e xai opyi^sa-Qai ITT/ TIO~<
Tr^UjasTv Tivtov, olov uyisias xa) p.ahrpzu)$. 8ox=78= 2 5
sv axo-jo-ia XuTrvjpa sTva, T 8g xaT* iptfafuout rj8=a.
IT/ 8= T/ %ia$>spsi TO) axouo-ia eTvat Ta xaTa Xoy*o-M.ov 75 Z 6
ra Ota 6ujU,ov TJ* 8*' s
rcov
TTOTSpQV
TCC
explains a.Kpoxftpif<rQat thus : lern rb
irvKTevetv 7) irayKpaTid^fiv irpbs frepov
&vtv ffufj.ir\OKris fj 8\cos &Kpais TCUS
X f P ff l M 61 "' oiAA^A.wj' 'yu/xi'iif'eo'flou, z.e. it
is what we call ' sparring.' This same
phrase 8i|ai fiou\6/j.evos was applied
before to ' the man who was showing
the catapult,' and was given as an
instance of one being ignorant of the
nature of his act. Here it is an
instance of ignorance of the tendency
of an act. The different kinds of
ignorance are not very distinct from
one another.
1 8 wept n-eiira 8r) ei/e/ca] 'Igno*
ranee then being concerned with all
these circumstances of the action, he
that was ignorant of some one of these
is held (So/ce?) to have acted invo-
luntarily, and especially (if ignorant)
with regard to the most important;
and the most important seem to be
the objects of the action * and the
tendency of it.' The words V ols are
used at the beginning of the section in
a general sense, as before ( 15); after-
wards they correspond with trepl rl KO!
eV rivi ( 1 6). There is an awkward-
ness about oS fveva. A person knows
with what end or view he is acting
(and this is what ou tveKa legitimately
expresses). But he is mistaken about
the means which he uses. Hence
wishing to produce one result he pro-
duces another. But what he mistakes,
is not the end (o5 tW/ca) but the means
(TO irpbs ri> rtAos). The phrase here
would imply that an action had an end,
or aim of its own (o5 eve/ca) independent
of the doer, in other words a ten-
dency, of which therefore the doer
might be ignorant.
20-27 Having separated off the
involuntary in its two forms of com-
pulsion and mistake, there remains to
us the conception of the voluntary, as
that whose cause is in an agent know-
ing the circumstances of the action.
14
NIKOMAXEmN III.
[CHAP.
27
; $fuxr /A=V yap
SIVOLI TO. aAoya Tra^
), Soxsi* Ss
ai 3s 7rf>a.si$
r TO n^
TOU
TOW T
XOU
This definition requires justification,
owing to a false notion (ou Ka\ws
Afyerai) that acts done from anger
or desire (which are ' in the agent ') are
involuntary. This notion is refuted
by the following arguments : ( i ) It
would prove too much, and would
make all the actions of brutes and of
children involuntary. (2) Some acts
prompted by desire or anger are right
and good. We must either call these
involuntary, or say that, while these are
voluntary, bad acts similarly prompted
are involuntary. Either supposition is
absurd. (3) There is a feeling of
obligation (8e), attaching sometimes to
these emotions ; we ought to desire
some things and be angry at some.
This feeling of ' ought ' implies free-
dom. (4) Acts prompted by desire
are pleasant ; involuntary acts, pain-
ful. (5) We have as strong a feeling
about errors of passion, as about errors
of reason, that they are to be eschewed
(<|>6i>KT(). The passions are as much
part of the man as the reason, there-
fore acts prompted by them are acts of
the man.
The polemic in these arguments does
not seem to be directed against any
philosophical school, but rather against
a popular error. Aristotle does not
deal with the maintainers of the
doctrine of necessity as a whole, but
only with those who, allowing that
half our actions are free, would argue
that the other half are not free. Such
reasoners are comparatively easy to
answer. The most important argu-
ment adduced by Aristotle is the third,
where he implies that the idea of
freedom is contained in that of duty.
He does not draw out this principle,
nor could he have done so without
anticipating the philosophy of later
times. The last argument seems to
come to this, that you cannot separate
a man from his passions, or say the
reason is the man's self and the
passions not. Elsewhere Aristotle
says 6 vovs awrbj tKaffros. And in
truth the relation of a man's de-
sires to his individuality might be
more deeply investigated than is here
done.
<ptvKTo. juej/ yhp &fn(pai~] This seems
a counterpart to the former argu-
ment, &TOTTOV laws rJ> aKovtria fyavai
$>v Se? dpfyeffBai. The passions are
proved to be voluntary on account of
the feeling of reprehension we have
for errors of passion. On the em-
phatic opposition between tf>evKr6v
and cupfr6v, cf. Eth. x. ii. 5.
II. Having given a generic
account of the voluntary, Aristotle
proceeds to examine the special
form of it which he calls vpoaiptffis.
This does not mean the will as a
whole (for which indeed, Aristotle
has no one name), but a par-
ticular exhibition of it, namely, a
conscious, determinate act of the
will. 'Purpose' or ' determination '
is perhaps the nearest word in our
language, but in fact no word exactly
corresponds. The contrasts and dis-
tinctions made in this chapter might
at first sem unnecessary, until we
observe that Aristotle is himself
founding a new psychology. The
L-IL]
NIKOMAXEmN III.
15
7rpoa.ipl(rsa)s eVsrcu 8<sX9s7v olxsiorarov yap slvai SoxsT
TYJ apSTY) xai jaaXXov ra ig3?j xpivsiv TCOV Trpa^-scov. y *
7Tpoaip(ris 8vj exov(rioy jasi/ QoiivsTai, ou TO.VTOV 8s, aXTw' ETT/
TO xo(><riov' rou jasv yap exouc'/ou xa) 7ra78s xai
a>a xo/vajver, Trpoaipsa-scog 8' ou, xai ra la/<vrj
exou<ria, [J.sv Xeyo/xsv, xara Trpoalpsviv 8' ou. a; 8s Xsyov- 3
TS aur^v sViSu/x/av ?j Q-jfJiov $ $otjA>jiT<v rf r/va So^av oux
eoixot(riv ooQa>$ Xeys/v. ou yap xoivov 75 7rpoaips(rig xa;
TCOV aXoajt^ sTriQvJiia. 8s xa) Qt>U,o^. xa* o
word irpoaipfffis only once occurs in
Plato, and then not in its present
psychological sense, but merely de-
noting ' selection ' or ' choice.' Par-
menides, p. 143 B: T'I olv ; eav irpoeKta-
fj.0a O.VTUIV 6tT /3ou\ei T^V ovffiav Kal
rb e-rfpov fire TT\V overlay Kal rb ev fire
rb ev Kal rb erepov, ap' OVK ev fKaffrri TTJ
Trpoaipeffei irpoa.ipovp.tQa. rive i> opQias
exet Ka\e"ta0ai afj.<porepw ; It is true
that the verb irpoaipf'tffBai is of fre-
quent occurrence in Plato, but gene-
rally in the sense of ' selecting ' or
' preferring,' and not ' purposing ' or
' determining.' As in other cases,
then, Aristotle takes up a floating
term from common language, and
gives it scientific definiteness, so that
it becomes henceforth a psychological
formula. His account of irpoaipeffts
in the present chapter is, that it is
a species of the voluntary (fKovcnov
fifv tya-ivtrai, ov Tav-rbv 8e, oAX" eirl
Tr\eoi> TO tKovffiov), and that it differs
from anger, desire, wish, and any
form of opinion, (i) It differs from
desire or anger as not being shared
by irrational creatures, as being often
opposed to desire, &c. (2) It is still
less like anger than like desire, anger
excluding the notion of purpose or
deliberate choice (^/cicrra 70^ ra Sta
8vfj.bi/ Kara irpoaipeffiv elvai Sofcel).
(3) It is not wish, because we often
wish for what is impossible, or beyond
our control, and because, speaking gene-
rally, wish is of the end, whereas pur-
pose is of the means, and restricts itself
to what is in our power. (4) Nor is it
opinion, which may be about anything,
the eternal or the impossible, and
which is characterised as true or false,
not, like purpose, as good or bad.
Nor is it opinion on matters of action.
For opinion on good and evil does not
constitute the moral character in the
way that purpose does ; again, the
use of these terms in common lan-
guage points out a difference between
purpose and opinion.
Purpose then, being a species of the
voluntary, implies also intellect (ne-ra,
\6yov Kal Siavoias') and deliberation.
It is a deliberate desire of what is
within our own power ($ov\fortK^i
Spelts ruv &/>' fytuV, Eih. in. iii. 19).
I o\K.ei6TaTov yap irpd^fuv] 'For
it seems most closely bound up with
virtue, and to be a better criterion of
moral character than even actions.'
Cf. Eth. x. viii. 5 : apQurpriTe'iTat 8e
ir6rep.ov Kvpttarepov rrjs ape-rrjs rj irpoai-
peais $ al irpdeis, &s ev a^ubolv O&TTJS.
The importance of this position as a
ground-work for the whole doctrine
of morality must be estimated by the
advance which is made in it beyond
what Plato had arrived at.
3 ot 8e AeyoKTes] There is a ten-
dency in Plato to merge the distinc-
tions of will and reason: whether
some of his school are here alluded
10
IieiKflN NIKOMAXEIftN III.
8' "
[CHAP.
jusv Trparrej, Trpoajpoyjaevoj; oy*
50' ai/a7ra?uj/ 7rpoa.ipov[j,vo$ fj.sv, 67n5yjouov 8' oy.
TrpoajpsVsj jaev eTnSy^u'a ei/avnoyra/, 7ri5yju./a 3' e7n
ou. xai yj jasv e7riQv[j.ia. yJ80 xai STnAuVou, ij 7rpoa/p(T/
6 8' OOT XyTTajpOy Oy6' r)5sOJ. QvfJ.O$ 8* TJ yjTTOV ' rjXKTTa
7 yap ra 8/a flu/xov xara 7rpoa/po~> eTvai SoxsT. aAAa ^v
ov8= fi
eor Ttov
ra
av y]A/9i& slvou
\ / V
xai _
ayToy TrpaySfiVTa av, olov uTroxpirr^v rivet vixav
*** ^V \ *** * *J*
9 (jkrcti ysverQai av 8<' ayroy. sr/ 8' y) fj.\v
etrri jtxaXXov, y) 8s Trpoa/pso-/^ TCOV Trpog TO TXo^,
xa) sv$a.i[Ji.oveiv fiov'hop.^a. fj.lv xa) $a[j.v, TrpoajpoyjtxsQa 8s
/ >c/^f \ y ' >
Asysiv ouv ct^ttoLsi* OAO>^ y^-P go/xsv TJ 7rpQQLips(ri$ TTZ&I
^ A* \ / *y \ <N\ 7* \ \ > ^c\ \
oox< Trspi TravTct eivoti, xot.1 ovbsv ^TTOV ?Tpj Ta atO/a xa/
Ta e<^' r t [jLiv xai TO> vj/y8s? xal a^y^s?
J xaxto xa* ayaSto, 13 7rpoa/po-i 8s
\ r 5, /&, > \ >/ >>\
ouv 6oc' lr ] TayTOV urtoc oyds
to, or whether it is a merely popular
confusion of terms that Aristotle
attacks, is not dear.
5 KO! irpoaiptcrei p.4v
tvco/TiovTai, tiri6v/jiia 5" tv
It might be said that desires are
really contrary to each other, and
contradict each other as much as
purpose contradicts any desire, e.^.,
the desire for money is thwarted by
that for pleasure. But the psychology
is not very explicit here, and Ari-
stotle seems to imply, without de-
finitely expressing it, that hi the
moral will there is an element con-
tradicting the desires in a manner
different from that in which one
desire interferes with another.
7 &ov\i)0is 5" ^OTI T
olov aJBavoiff(as] ' But wish is for im-
possibilities, as, for instance, immor-
tality." This is not a passage that
can be cited as an indication of
Aristotle's opinion with regard to a
future life. "Aflacewfa here means
' exemption from death,' and does not
touch the question as to the imperish-
ability of the souL It seems to have
been a stock instance of an impos-
sible wish. Dr. Cardwell quotes
Xenophon's SyOTposz'wm (i. 15): oth-e
ykp fytaye o~irovSd(rcu fev Svva.lfj.riv
/xoAAor, fyrfp aOdvaros yeveaOcu.
i i-i 3 6\ws ptv oliv fofitv] ' Now
that purpose is identical with opinion
as a whole, perhaps no one maintains
at all. But neither is it identical
with any special kind of opinion.
II. III.]
H6IM1N NIKOMAXEIiiN III.
17
' o'jOs rivt ' ro> yap 7rpoaipii<rQai rdya^d y ra xaxa
rivs$
rut os
r/
sVr/v r) T/W (rv[J.<$spsi rj
ou. xa 7rpoaipov[j.sfya
/OO'TO)V, So^a^bjasy 8s T
Xa|3stV 8' r) <>uys<V ou Travu
s
xaj
TO>
TCO
0013
xai
Xo'you
w ov
fJ.SV 7TpOaipS(7lS
>5co, v] 8s do*a TCO
TrpoaipovfAsQa [J.BV a [j.d'Xia'Ta iVjasv ayaSa oWa,
8s a ou Travu iVjasv. 8oxou<r/ TS ov% ol aurol TTJ
TS apiarra xai 8o^a^siV, aXX* evioi tio^d^siv ju,i
8<a xax/av 8* alpeia'Qai ov% a 8s7. fi 8s Trpoyivsrat 8o'^ais
Trpoaipsfrscug 73 TrapaxoXow^sT, ou8sv ftiafyspsi' ov TOUTO
o~xo7ToSjU,sv, aXX* si TauTo'v SO~T; 8o'^Ty T<V/. T/ ouv rj 16
Ti SO"T/V, S7TS<8^ Ttt>J/ s}prflJ.SV(OV Ovftsv J SXOIKTIOV fJt.Iv
8^ <$ia/vsTaj, TO 8' xo(xriov ou rrav Trpoaipsrov. aXX' apdij
ys TO 7rpo/3sj3ouXsyj.svov ; 73 yap 7rpoaips(ris
xai 8/avo/a^. o7roo"r y ^xa/vs<v 8' soixs xa}
TTpO Tp(l)V alpSTOV.
8s TTOTSpa TTSp} TTaVTCOV, XO,\ TTaV
again be reacted on by it ; ' but the
question is, are they identical ?
12 13 The arguments in these
sections consist in an appeal to lan-
guage we cannot speak of 'opining
to take,' &c.
fia\\ov ?} rip 5p0eDs] *TT is of course -I
not connected with /j.a\\ov. It simply
means 'or.' 'OpBws, which should
properly go with a verb, seems used
because the verb irpoaipe'ttrBai was
much commoner before Aristotle than
the abstract form irpoaiptffis. 'OpO-fj
is applied to opefis (the element of
desire in irpoat'p(m), Eth. \i. ii. 2.
III. Since Purpose implies delibe-
ration, 'this latter is now analysed, and
an account is given, first of its object,
secondly of its mode of operation.
The object of deliberation is deter-
mined by an exhaustive process. All
things are either eternal, or mutable ;
we do not deliberate about things
For in purposing what is good or bad
our moral character consists, not in
opining it. And we purpose to take
or avoid, or something of the kind,
but we opine what a thing is, or for
whom it is good, or how ; but we do
not exactly opine to take or avoid.
And while purpose is praised rather
by the epithets, " of the right object,"
or " rightly," opinion is praised by the
epithet "truly." And we purpose on
the one hand things that we know for
certain to be good, but we opine what
we do not exactly know for certain.'
ouSe TIV] i.e. purpose is not identical
with an opinion as to moral matters.
The first argument to prove this is cha-
racteristic of Aristotle as opposed to
Plato. He says, ' our moral character
does not consist in our opinions on good
and evil, but in the deliberate acts of
our will.' This is guarded afterwards
by the limitation ( 15) that ' opinion
may go to form purpose, and may
VOL. II. D
18
H9IKC1N NIKOMAXEION III.
[CHAP-
a AX*
vrrep o
av o vouv
av
Os TOJV ai'3/a.i/ oubstg
r/ OiajUsV^ ou xa/ TTJ
aXX* oios Trspi Ttov ev x/vr/re/,
OT<
as e xara raura ^Jvojusvajv, sr e aj/cryxr^ srs xa
>3 8<a T/va our lav aAXijv, olov TpoTaiv xa/ avaTo?>.a)V.
^ V- .. V., . IT >^ VV
ro>v aAXore aAXcoj, o/ov av%[jiwv xai o
, olov 3>j<raupou svpstrswg.
Ttv aTro
eternal. Of things mutable, we do
no# deliberate about those things
which are regulated by necessity, by
nature, or by chance. Hence it
remains that we deliberate about
mutable things within the power of
man, and not about all such, but
about those within our own power,
and not about ends, but about means,
and where there is room for question.
The mode of operation in deliberating
is a kind of analysis. Assuming as
desirable some end, we first ask what
means will immediately produce this
end, what again will produce that
means, and so on till we have brought
the last link of the iShain of causation
to ourselves, when we commence
acting at once, the last step in the
analysis being the first in the pro-
ductive process. If any step occurs
which is on the one hand necessary
for the given end, and on the other
hand unattainable by us, the chain
cannot be completed ; the deliberation
is relinquished. But if all the steps
are feasible, that which was indefinite
before at once becomes definite, and
purpose succeeds deliberation. A dis-
cussion of the nature of tv&ov\la as
related to <t>p6ini<ns occurs Eth. VL ix.,
but is evidently written quite inde-
pendently of the present chapter, on
which it improves by employing the
formula of the moral syllogism, and
by inquiring after the faculty which
perceives ends. We might have ex-
pected Aristotle to say that in the
deliberation which precedes an action
some account should always be taken
of the right or wrong of the action.
But here the only question is repre-
sented to be, how a given end is to be
obtained ? What action will serve as a
means to it ? Hence while the present
discussion must be considered a subtle
piece of elementary psychology, and of
great merit in the infancy of the science,
on the other hand it seems incomplete
as regards the theory of morals.
3 5 irfp} tie rS>v oi'SiW fvp4af<iii\
' No man deliberates about eternal
things, such as the universe, or the
incommensurability of the diagonal
and the side in a square ; nor indeed
about things in motion, if the motion
takes place invariably in the same
way, whether of necessity, or by
nature, or from any other cause, as in
the instance of the solstices and the
risings of the sun : nor about things
entirely variable, like droughts and
rains : nor about matter of chance,
like the finding of a treasure.' The
opposition to fa aitita is rcl Iv Kivi\aei.
The more exhaustive division of
objects would have been that which is
given Eth. VL i. 6, into ra
&\\tos J-x 6 "' and T& ^
But there is an absence of logical
formulae in the present book which is
observable. The instances here given
II.]
H9IK&N NIKOMAXEIQN III.
19
sl rcov dy%a)7ri>tti)v
oov
av
yap
xai TTGIV TO
|3otAsuoj/rai
raj cexpf^l$
olov 7T=pi
OLV Td()T(ov 0'jQlv 0*' qfJUQV. /So'jXsu^etfa os 7r=$ 7
Ttov e4>' ryjouv TTpaxrcov ' TaOra OH xa/ scrr Monroe., atria
) dvayxr^ xa< r-j^/r^ sri os vwg
Ttbv 8' av3pa>7r)!/ SXOKTTOI
T>V 3<' airtov Trpaxraiv. x
rtov s/rjoTVyOuov oix
(ou yap 0/(rTa^o ( arV Trtoj
0(ra yvzrai
r
r^tov,
xaxa
as, /rsp
\
xai
of the eternal are (i) the universe,
(2) a particular mathematical truth
that the diagonal of a square is in-
commensurate with its side. That the
universe is eternal, being uncreated,
indestructible, and, as a whole, immu-
table, was part of Aristotle's physical
philosophy. Cf. de C<elo i. x. 10:
"floV el -rb 8Aof ffcS^o <rwe;(es ov 6re
fj.ti' ovTcas <5re 5" e/ceiVajs SiaTiflerot /col
6idK6K(5<r/i7jTai, ^ Se TOU SAou ffvffraijis
tff-ri K&afios Kal ovpavos, OVK av 6 K&apos
yi-fuono KM (pdfipoiTO, a\\' at 8m9e<reiy
OIITOU. The above mathematical truth
is called ' eternal ' , De Gen. An. n.
\i. 1 5 : eirel (col rb rpiycavov f\fiv Sufflif
bpQous fcras oel *cal rb Trjv 8idfj.eTpov
a.ffv/j./j.erpov fivcu rpbs r)jv ic\fvpa.v
atSiov. It is mentioned, as one of
those things which philosophy begins
by wondering at, and ends by feeling
their universal necessity. Metaphys.
I. ii. I 5 : naJBairfp TWV Bavfjidruv Tavr6-
fj.<na. rois /t^iro) redeup^Kocrt -rr\v alriav,
i) iffpl TO.S rov rj\lov rpcnras ?) r^v TTJJ
5iap.fr pov a.av/j./jLerpia.v Qa.vu.a.ffr'bv yap
elvai SoKeT iracrij', el ri r$ eAax'""!"^ ^
fj.fr ptiTCU. SeT Se els Tovvav-riov awo-
rt\evr7jffai' ovdfv yap &v OVTU 6avfj.d-
fffiev av$]p yfufJ-eTpLK^s us el yevoiro i]
Sid/jLfrpos nerpTiT-fi. Two kinds of
eternity seem here placed in juxta-
positionone physical, the other ma-
thematical. But eternity or necessity
can only exist in relation to the laws
of the mind that perceives it. There-
fore we might say that these two
kinds of eternity find their meeting-
point in a metaphysic above the
division of the sciences. Aristotle
however is writing ov /car' aKpifieiav.
7 atria yap afSpcawov] ' For the
causes of things seem to be as follows,
nature, and necessity, and chance, and
again reason and all that depends on
man.' A similar classification of
causes is implied Eth. i. ix. 5, vi. iv. 4.
The relation of necessity and chance,
as causes, to nature, forms the subject
of Aristotle's Physics, Book u. Chapters
iv. ix. See Essay V. pp. 2.2,1 5.
8 ical vepl ypairreov\ 'And on
the one hand there is no deliberation
about sciences that are fixed and
complete in themselves, as for instance
about writing for we do not doubt
how we ought to write.' The aicpi&ets
^iri(Trrifj.ai here meant are not the
'exact sciences,' as we may judge
from the instance given. 'Axpi^s
seems equivalent to ' fixed ' (cf. the
note on Eth. i. vii. 18), and &rt<rri7joj
is used in a wavering sense, almost
equivalent to TexK>7, though the words
are immediately afterwards distin-
guished.
D 2
20
NIKOMAXEION III.
[CHAP.
oerto
v, xa] Trspi xvfispvyTixrjv /xaAXov TJ
9rJTTOv 8*v]xp//3a)Ta/, xa) ST* Trspi rtov XoiTrtov b
8s xa< Trsp} raj T%vct$ ^ raj 67no~TT)|Ua*
Sp) auTa 8<o-Tao|,sv. TO $ouAsuso~$a< 8s sv TOIC aj STT
TO TroAu, aS^Xoij 8s 7Tto a7To3yjo-Tai, xa< sv oTj a8jo'pjo-Tov
8s 7rapaAa/.x./3at>oju.si/ sl$ TO.
vTo7$ cog ov% ixat/o?
8' ou TTS^} TOV TsXtov aXXa Trsp} TCOI/ Trpoj Ta
OUTS yap larpos jSoyAsvsTa* si 6y<ao~j, OOTS
7TSJO-S/, OUTS 7TOAmXO Si SUVOjtX/aV TTOJ^O-S/, OUOS TtOV
ou8s/j Trspi TOU TsXouj* aXXa QSJJ.SVQI
Qia. rivcov errat Q-XOTTOUO-/, xa) 8<a
n t Trcbg xai
ev
o-3a< 8<a T<Voj parrot, xai xaXX<o~Ta S7r<o~xo7rouo-i, 81'
8* STT/TSXOU/XS'VOU 7T<OJ 8iOt TOUTOU SO~Tat XQ-XsTvO 8<flt
seo av shQaxrw STT) TO TrpcoToi/ OITIQV, o sv T^ supsVsi
sVvaTo'v SO~T*V ' o yap /3otAsoo'jU,Si/o soixs fyriiv xai
12 avaAusiv TOV s'iprjfj.svov TpoVov a>o~7rsp 8iaypajU,jU,a. Qatvsrai
8' 15 /*" ^ r J T7 30"'? ^ i"oto~a sTva/ /3ouAsuo-/, olov ai jU,a5>j/Jia-
rixai, r t 8s ^ouXsuo~/j :rao~a ^T>j<rij, xa< TO sVp^aTov sv TYJ
Trpcbrov slvat ev ry ysvsVs/. xav ]U,sv a8uvaTa>
1 1 otfre 7ekp Sitiypa^/io] ' The
physician does not deliberate whether
he is to cure, nor the orator whether
he is to persuade, nor the statesman
whether he is to "produce a good con-
stitution. The end is not the subject
of deliberation in any science. An
end being assumed, we consider how
and by what means it can be brought
about; if it appear that there are
more ways than one, we inquire which
is the easiest and best ; if it can be
accomplished by one means alone, we
inquire how this produces the end,
and by what it is itself produced,
until we come to that which as a
cause is first, but is the last thing to
be discovered ; for such deliberation
as we describe is like seeking the
solution of a geometrical problem by
analysis of the diagram.' The process
of deliberation is analytical, proceeding
backwards M r^v ipxV- It ends
with the ttpanov atriov, i. e. the indi-
vidual will. 'Will,' says Kant, 'is
that kind of causality attributed to
living agents, in so far as they are
possessed of reason, and freedom is
such a property of that causality as
enables them to originate events
independently of foreign determining
causes.' That each man is, as regards
his own acts, an originating cause not
determined by other causes, is Ari-
stotle's view throughout. Kant's de-
finition throws light upon this.
Ka.Kf'ivo'] Eefers to (v6s and S&
TOVTOV.
ttenrep StdypafJLfj.d] Aristotle com-
pares deliberation with the analysis
of mathematical problems. Given a
problem in geometry, e.g., to find the
method of constructing some figure.
Assume it as constructed, and draw it
III.]
H0IKON NIKOMAXEIQN III.
21
oov re
yap
rtov
ryretra< rs
o//,o/a> 8; xai s'v
Sia rivog. soixs
a^/Vravra/, olov si p^p^ara)!/ 8s7, raura 8s
' e'av 8s 8ovarov <$>aivr)Ta.i,
8s a 8;' Tj'^acov ysvo<r' aj>* ra
TTCO^ sVr/v ij yap ^p/
ra opyava, ore 8' ij pps/a aur&v. 14
"honroig ors |asv 8*' o5, ore 6s TTCOJ rj
eiprjra*, avQpwTros sJvai apy^ 15
^ Trspi rtov awrto Trpa^rtov, al 8s
8s
aXXa)v s'vsxa. oux av ouv snj /BouAsuroi/ ro
ra Trpo^ ra rs'Avj. ou8s 8rj ra xa5' sxa<rra, olov eJ
rouro ^ TrsTrsTrra/ ) 8sT' a\<rQri<reu)$ ya.o raOra.
si 8s asi 3ouXsuorsra<, sl^ et7rs;pov ^s*. ^ouXsurov 8s xai
Trpoa/psrov ro auro', TTA^V a$xopi<r[Jievov rf8ij ro TrooauptroV
ro yap s'x r% 3^^-% TrpoxpiQlv Trpoaipsrov strnv. Trausra;
yap sxao~roj ^raiv 7r<o Trpa^sj, orav eij awroi/ avayayv]
xoii aurou si ro 7jyoJ ( asvov rouro yap ro'
accordingly. See what condition is
immcdiatelynecessary, and what again
will produce this, &c.
14 rjTemM 5' Sja riVos] 'The
question is sometimes what instru-
ments are necessary, sometimes how
they are to be used ; and, speaking
generally, we have to find sometimes
the means by which, sometimes the
manner or the person by whom.'
Michelet makes a difficulty about eV
rots \onrots, explaining it ' in reliquis
categoriis ; ' but the Paraphrast ren-
ders it simply Koi airXcDs.
15 tot/ce 8}j eveKa] 'It seems,
therefore, that man is, as we have
said, the cause of his actions : that
deliberation is about the things to be
done by ourselves, and that actions
are means to something else.' In one
sense, and so far as deliberation is
concerned, action must be regarded
as a means. Cf. Rhetoric, i. vi. i :
crv/j.<t>fpoi/, f$ov\evovTat 8e 06
Tf'\ous d\Aa irepl Ttav irpbs
TO.VTO. 8' earl ra ffv/j.<p(povra Kara ras
irpdfis. But in another sense, and
from a moral point of view, each action
is an end-in-itself. Cf. Eth. vi. ii. 5 :
Ou reAos airAcSs r6 iroirjT6v. 'A\\a
rb irpaKrdv rj yap evirpatfa. reAos, i] 8*
?pe|ts TOVTOV.
1 6 eh airetpov 5}|ei] ' It will go on
to infinity ' impersonal. Cf. i. ii. i,
i. vii. 7.
17 iratJeTai yap irpoatpov/itecoj/]
'For every one stops inquiring how
he shall act, when he has brought
home the first link in the chain to
himself and to the guiding principle in
himself; that is to say, to that which
purposes.' Throughout these discus-
sions we find a striking clearness of
expression for some of the ordinary
phenomena of consciousness; on the
other hand, evident tokens that the
psychology is new and tentative ; and
again, a want of deeper inquiry into
the nature of personality and of the
will.
22
NIKOMAXEK1N III.
[CHAP.
i%7rpoaipM[J.evQV.
6s
) [typos e
Ttt>
o'tisSa
20 xpivavrsg opsyojtsa xara
TUTTO)
TOt T6?OJ.
4 'H 8s ^owXvjo-^ or< jttsv
TOL/TO xou ex rwv
iiTo' ol -yap /3a<j-/A=7 a. 7rpo~
OJ/TO Se rori Trpoctipsrov
xai >j 7rpoa.ip(ri$ av Hi)
sx TOU |3ouAsu<raer5a yap
T>JI/ /BooASuenv. 13 ^tev out/
, xoti Trspl TroTa sVr/, xa< or* rtov
TOU
SCTTV
1 8 8^\oy 5e 8^y] 'Now this
is exemplified from the old polities
which Homer depicted ; for the kings
used to announce to the people the
course they had selected.' Cf. the
conduct of Agamemnon, Iliad H. 53,
sqq. A modern illustration is furnished
by the French Parliaments, which
used to register the edicts presented
to them by the king as a matter of
course. The Paraphrast explains the
comparison by making the people re-
present the vpoatpfffis. Erery ykp
TOVS /3cW(Ati /U.CT& TV jSouXV rb irpo-
KpiOfV iirayyeAA.oKTOS rf S^yuy Sxrirep
?fj irpocupeffti, Sxrre vpaxO^'cu. The
people were required to acquiesce in
and carry out the decisions of the
kings, which else would have remained
unratified. So the reason announces
its decisions to the will or purpose,
. e. the active powers in the mind.
Metaphors of this sort never accu-
rately represent mental distinctions.
The present comparison has many
flaws. For the irpoaipfffts is here
called rb ijyo^tvov, which does not
answer to the people, distinguished
from the king. Again, it is the indi-
vidual (JficooToj), not the reason, that
announces his deliberations to the
leading part in himself. What consti-
tutes the individual as separate from
the will or purpose? And, is not
reason part of purpose, how then can
it be distinguished from it ?
19 Svros 5e ftov\tvaiv~\ 'If the
object of purpose is that, which, being
in our power, we desire after delibera-
tion, purpose will be a deliberate
desire of things in our power. After
deliberating we decide, and form a
desire in accordance with our delibera-
tion.' The Paraphrast here reads
Kara TTJJ/ $ov\i\(nv at the end of
this passage. There might seem to
be something plausible in the change,
because /3ou\eims is represented as
confining itself to means ; hence how
can we be said to desire Korck r^v
Pov\fv<rti>? Consistently, our desires
must depend on something else,
namely, jSovAijms deliberation is the
faculty for attaining them. On the
other hand, the phrases &ov\fvrov
optKTOv, and jSovXeimicT/ #/>, run
the consideration of means and ends
together.
IV. Hitherto every act has been
regarded as a means, and has been
accounted voluntary because origi-
nating in the individual. Delibera-
tion and purpose have been restricted
in their function to the mere choice
and taking of means. A great question
therefore remains to be mooted,
whence do we get our conception of
ends? What is the nature of the
faculty called 0ot;A77<rw, which has
been assumed to be the faculty of
ends ? Are we as free in the choice
III. IV.]
H9IKI1N NIKOMAXEI&N III.
23
6s
aya^oO.
s TOU
crujU.$a/vs/ Os Toi$ jasv TO /BouAvjrov raya- 2
of these, as we are in that of the
means ? Aristotle contents himself
with mentioning in the present chapter
that there are two extreme opinions,
the one (that of Plato) that wish is
always for the good ; the other (that
of the sophists) that it is for the
apparent good. He rejects both of
these, the tirst as contradicting facts,
the second as ignoring any true object
of wish. He takes a position between
them, that, abstractedly and ideally,
as appealing to the universal reason
(oirAcos fj.lv Kal /car' aAijSeiou') the good
is the object of wish, while to the
individual mind only what appears
good can seem desirable ; hence, al-
though the wise man, who is in accor-
dance with the universal reason, and
is its exponent in particular cases
(rdAijOes eV fKaffrois 6pa, Scrvep KOVWV
Kal fj.fTpov avritJv &v\ wishes for the
good alone, others are deceived by
false appearances and by pleasure,
and choose what is not truly good.
Aristotle for the present passes over
the important question, which is dis-
cussed in the next chapter, Does our
knowledge of what is good depend
upon our natural character? And if
so, how can vice and virtue be called
free ? The statement in 4, tKdartp
8e rb <f>aiv6fjLevov (0ou\ifr6i') is incon-
sistent with his usage of the word
0ouA.ij(m elsewhere ; see the pas-
sages quoted in next note.
I SoKfi 5 Tots fttv ayaBou dvat]
This doctrine is found stated at length
in the Gorgias of Plato, p. 466, sqq.
Polus having argued that the position
of a tyrant or orator is enviable,
because ' he can do what he wishes,'
Socrates answers that ' the tyrant or.
orator does nothing that he wishes : '
i yap, Si no>\e, eyi HOI TOUJ
p'fjropas Kal TOVS rvpavvovs 5vva<r6ai
/j.fv ft> rats ir6\ri fffiiKp6rarov' ovStv
yap Koielv 5>v fiov\ovrai, us eiros
eiTTf?V ' irOltlv [MflTOl 8 Tl &V airtOlS
5o?7 /SeXnoToi' elvat. Then follows an
account of /3ovA.Tj<m, that it is of ends
not means. Tl&rtpov olv aoi SoicoDcriv
oil ai>6panroi rovro /3o6\e<r6ai, t &v
TrpdrTdXTiv fKOffTore, 1j fKfivo ov fvtua
Trpd.TTOv<rt rovtf 6 Trpa.TTOVffH' ; By
which it can be demonstrated that
ouA.ijcris is of the absolute good.
The difference between Plato's account
and the one above is, that Plato dis-
tinguishes owA.ij(ns from 4iriBvp.ia,
while Aristotle does not. The &ov\i\-
(ns of Plato is the higher will or
desire of the Universal. In this
higher sense of the word wish, no
one wishes except for what is good,
that is, in his best moments, in the
deepest recesses of his nature, if the
true bearings of his wish be pointed
out to him. In this sense the wish
of the individual is in accordance with
universal reason, and is an expres-
sion of it. In a lower sense, we wish
with different parts of our nature, and
thus wish for all sorts of things, bad
as well as good. But to this latter
kind of wish the name ' desire' is ap-
propriate. The tenet Sri ayaBov /3ou-
Aij<rfs iffTiv is of great importance
for morals. It implies much that
modern systems would convey in other
terms, such as the ' supremacy of con-
science,' the 'autonomy of the will,'
&c. Elsewhere Aristotle distinctly
maintains it. Cf. Metaphys. xi. vii.
t, '. fb opeKrbv Kal ri> voiyrbv Kivfi uv
KivovMva.. Tovrwy Ta Trpana ra caret
(transcendentally the objects of reason
and of longing are identical). 'Eiri6v-
fitfritv fjLfv yap rb <paiv6ft.efov Ka\6v,
&ov\rfri>v 5e Tcpwrov rb tv Ka?.6r. In
24
H0IKON NIKOMAXEmN III.
[CHAP.
6ov XeyotKTJ ]U.rj slva.1 our ; Tov o ooAeraj o
alpovfj-svog (si yap s(TTai j3ouXr y rov, xai ayafioV ^v 8', si
erupts, xaxo'v), T0? 8' 5 TO $aivo[j,=vov ayaSov TO
s'youo-* /U,T) s7va< <wre< $ouX>3To'v, aXX' sxa<7Ta>
TO 8oxo5i/ ' aXAo 6* aAAto (>aivsTa<, xai el ovTwg STU^S,
4 ravoLvria. si 8s 8rj TauTa J.T) apsVxs/, apa Qarsov a
xa<
TO
TO)
, TO) 8s
[j,sv s5
TO
oa
irixpa xct
sxao~Ta* 6
xa)
sxao~T> e
ov <T7rouato TO xaT* aXry9s<av
' sp xa). STT< TCOV <rw{j.a.rwv
S<TTI TO. xaT* aXr^s/av
S7rtvo<roi$ srspa. oju,o/aj 8s xa<
a xa< ^aps / a xa<
sxao"Ta xpivsi op
xaAa xa/
<T7rou8a7o TO>
xa
auTaiv av. Toj
sxao~Toi opai/, a)o~7rsp
oXXoTf 8s ij a7raT>} 8ia T^V
yivevQai ' ou yap o3o~a ayadov c^a/vsTaj at
TO Tj'Su a5^ ayafio'v, T^V 8s XUTTIJV a>^ xaxov
, xa ev
yap s|-<v
6
xai
D Animd, in. x. 4, he makes the
wish (or will) side with reason, in
opposition to desire. 'H 7&p /3oi;A.ij<m
opeis Srav 5^ /cara rbj/ Xfyyto-^bf K i^-
rat, *fol KBTO &oi>\i]ffiv Kivtirat. ri 5"
op(is Kivti iropo rby \oyifffi.6i' ' 77 "yap
tiriBvula 8p(ls rls i<mv. In other
parts of the Ethics also (which may
hence be concluded to have been com-
posed at a different period from this
chapter) this distinction between )8oi>-
A^jffiy, the general wish, and any par-
ticular desire or determination, is ob-
served. Cf. Eth. v. ix. 6 : ovOfls yap
/SojAerai, ovS' 6 iKparfo, a\\a wapa
T)\V 0oij\r)ffiv irpdrrei. ofare yap &ov\(-
reu ovBtls ft ^ oterai flvcu tnriwSdtov.
Tin. xiii. 8 : TOVTO tie <rvfjiftatvfi 8to rb
pov\fcr6ai fitv irtti/ray ^ TOWS ir\dffrovs
ra Ka\d. irpocuptiffOat 5e ra u<pf\ifM.
rols 5t ToC (pa.ivofj.fvuv ayaQov] This
is a corollary of the doctrine of Prota-
goras. If the individual could only
know what ' seemed ' to him, he
could only wish for what seemed
good. Thus the objective distinction
between good and evil is done away
with (ffvu&alvti /u)j dvai <pdffti &ov\r}-
r6v). Cf. Metapkys. x. vi. I : "E/f6?i/os
(6 Tlpwray6pas} f<pri XO.VTGIV xprmdruv
fivai fifrpov HvOpuirov, ovdtv fTfpov
\tycav J) rb HOKOW fKaffrt/i TOVTO Kal
flvai Traytdis. rovrov of yiyvofttvou
rb avrb <rvu.fia.ivfi KaL elvai Kal yu?;
elrai, KOL KO.KOV Kal ayaObv flvai. Cf.
Essay II. pp. 91-3.
4 6 o-irov$aios yap fKatrTa xpivti
6pQS>s\ The good man is made here
again, as above (n. vi. 15), that
standard of right and wrong, that
exponent of the universal reason, by
which Aristotle escapes being forced
into an utterly relative system of
morals.
5 ov yap oiicra. ayaObv <f>aiveTai]
The ' pleasant ' is often characterised
IV. V.]
IIGIKilN NIKOMAXEION III.
"Ovrog Srj /SoiAvjToD fj.lv roD rsXouf, |3ouXsuT<ov o= xaj 5
Tiy/oa/prTaiy rtov 7rpo TO r=Ao, a< TT=P/ raura TTpd^sig xara
7rpoaips(nv av shv xai SKOUFIOI. al 0= Ttov apsrwv evspyzioii
7Tsp} raura. <>' T^iV 8= xa} ij apsrr oo/co 8s xa} 12
o^ocoy
iff Aristotle as ' the seeming good.'
Cf. -De Mot u Animal. \i. 5 : Set 5e
TiBtvai Kal rb <patv6fj.ei'ov ayadbv
ayaBov ^.tapav fX etv i Ka ^ T ^ ^^ '
<f>aiv6fj.evov yap effrtv a.ya86v.
V. Aristotle winds up his ac-
count of the voluntary, by arguing
that virtue and vice are free (i<f>' fi/riv
Se Kal 77 apfTri. dfioius 8e Kal
7] KOKI'O). As before remarked, this
must not be taken as a metaphysical
discussion of the question of free-will.
Partly, the question had never yet
been fully started ; partly, Aristotle
would have thought it foreign to
an ethical treatise ; partly, we find in
the present chapter that same ele-
mentary and tentative character
which marks the previous discussions
in this book. In dealing with one of
the real difficulties of the question at
the end of the chapter, Aristotle
contents himself with a very qualified
and moderate assertion of freedom,
which contrasts with the dogmatic
statements on the same subject in
the Ethics of Eudemus. The discus-
sion here is evidently suggested by,
and directed against, the doctrine
of the Platonists, that 'vice is in-
voluntary,' since it consists in ignor-
ance. The arguments are as follows :
(i) All action implies the possibility
of its contrary, hence if to act rightly
be in our power, to act wrongly must
be in our power also. (2) That an
individual is the originating cause of
his actions, is a conception which it is
difficult to get rid of. This implies
freedom. (3) "We all act as if vice
were free as well as virtue. It is
VOL. II.
punished by the state. Even for
ignorance and carelessness producing
vice, men are held to be respon-
sible. (4) Men must not charge
their acts upon their natural character
rather their character is produced
by their acts. (5) The analogy of
bodily infirmities shows us that if
some vices are congenital, some, at all
events, are self-produced. (6) The
great difficulty of the question is as
follows : if, as was said above (Chap-
ter IV.), we each of us desire what
seems good ; if our conception of the
end, that is, our idea of good, depends
not on our own willj but on nature,
or our character and tendency from
birth ; and if all our acts are deter-
mined by this conception of the end,
how can they be called free? Ari-
stotle answers by putting various
alternatives : (a) you may either
accept this position in its full extent.
It will then apply to virtue as well as
vice. Both will be equally under a~
law of nature. Neither will be
voluntary. But this the mind seems
to revolt against. (0) Or, you may
say that while the end is absolutely
determined, the means to it are all
free as springing from the will of the
individual. Thus, virtue and vice
are free, because all their parts are
free. (7) Or, you may modify the
doctrine by admitting that there is
something self-produced and self-
determined in the character as a
whole, and therefore in the idea of
good, which is to determine our
actions.
1-2 ovros 8)) ri KoKta] ' The
end then being the object of wish,
I1OIKON NIKOMAXEION III.
[CHAP.
3 TO
xaxia. ev 01$ yap eft r\[Jilv TO TrpaTTSiv, xa) TO |avj
TSIV, Xa< Iv ol$ TO jtATJ, XOU TO VO.I' W<TT el TO
oi/ <>' >3<'V SO~T/, xoit TO jarj TTpdrTeiv e
xa) si TO jtxrj Trparreiv xa?^ov ov s<>' i]jU.7y, xa/
V OiltT^pOV 0V <>' Tj'juTv. i <$' '
TTpoLTTStv xa} Ta ai<rp/f a, cju,o/a> Os xa) TO jar)
TS<I>, TOUTO 8' -^y TO ayaSoij ^a) xaxoV sTfai, '
4 TO eVjsjxsV/ xai cj'* '^ '? e^a/. TO 3s Xs'ys/v
s TO
TO
while the means are the objects of
deliberation and purpose, the actions
that are concerned with the means
must depend on purpose and must be
voluntary. But every calling out of
the virtues into play is concerned with
the means ; virtue accordingly is in our
power, and in like manner so is vice.'
al irfpl roDra irpd^fis] The wor4s
irfpl TO.VTO. are ambiguous. The
Paraphrast confines them to ' the
means,' which rendering is supported
by KdTct irpoaipfffiv &v (lev. Actions
were above said to be means (in. iii. 1 5 ).
a 5e Ttav apfrvv tvfpyfmi] This is
an unusual expression. We find it
again, Eth. x. iii. I : ou5 70^ CM TTJS
dpcrjjs lvtpyeia.1 irot<$TijTe's eiffiv. Ari-
stotle's usual formula is tvtpyeta KOT'
apfrijv, i.e. the evocation of the in-
ternal nature into consciousness or
action, under the regulation of the
moral law. He seems averse to con-
sidering oper^ as a Svvafiis, or latent
quality that might be so evoked. The
psychology of this passage is different
from that of Eth. vi. xii. 8-10.
Here it is said that /3o<5A7j<m gives us
the idea of the end, and that virtue
consists in irpoalpeffis and &ov\fv<rts
taking the means; there that virtue
gives the end, and an intellectual
faculty (<tp6niffis) the means.
2, if ails 'yap ty' i)^tv rb irpdrrttv
Kl rb M') irp(TTe<v] Elsewhere (Meta-
phys. vni. ii. 2) Aristotle states in more
philosophical form this first step in the
doctrine of free-will, namely, that
every psychical Swapis is a capacity of
contraries, see Essay IV. p. 187.
3 TOUTO 5" ?iv TO ayaOois /col Ko/cots
flvau] ' And this is, according to our
hypothesis, being good and bad.'
qv = ' is as we have said," referring to
the preceding section. Trendelenburg
in his paper on TO ri $i> tlvcu (Rhein-
isches Museum, 1828) tells us that
b.yaBo'is in the present passage is by
attraction to ri/jiiv. It is therefore to
be distinguished from the logical ex-
pression TO ayadu clccti, ' the essen-
tial idea of goodness.'
TO 5e \fyetv us aATjOer) 'But to
say that " No man prefers a crime or
spurns a bliss " seems half false and
half true.' The line here quoted,
on which the discussion in this chapter
turns, is of uncertain authorship. It
is quoted in the dialogue which bears
Plato's name, irtpl Ai/cafoi;. This
fragmentary dialogue is, in all proba-
bility, not Plato's, but of the Platonic
school (though Victorius ascribes it
to Plutarch). It stands pretty much
on a level with the ninth book of the
Laws (see Essay III. p. 166), and one
II6IM2N NIKOMAXEK1N III.
vvv
27
o*5
sov ) xa) rov oi.vQp(u7rov ou fyarsov a
yen/rjrrjv rtov Trpd^scov (o(T7rep xoti TSXVWV. si Se rotura 6
ej aXXa^ ap%a$ avayayiiv Trapa.
xa
v *Ji u '**' X(X ' aura
xou sxoucna. rouro/ eoixs papTupiia-
' aurfov rcov vofj.o^ra>v '
oug %pa)VTa$ /xo^Qrjpa, oVo/
airo/ airtoi, TOV$ $e TO. xa?>.a
ri"*
yap
XO.ITOI oa
can hardly doubt that it is referred to
here. Cf. p. 374 A: Ti6repov 8e e/cdj'-
ras oifet ex 6 "' T 2To rb ^5i/coi' TOUS
avdpianovs rj &KOVTO.S ; tiSe Se Xeyw,
eK6vras oifi a^iKf^f Ka\ aSiicovs tivai f)
&KOVTO.S ; 'EK<Was eytaye, & ^wKpares
TTovripol yap flffiv. 'l.it6vTas &pa av
oiei irovripovs elvai Kal oSi/cous avQpdo-
irovs ; 'TZycaye av 8' otf ; OUK, ejf ye TI
8e? ry TTOITJTJ^ irfi6ta6ai. Tloicf TTOJ^TJ; ;
"OffTis flirev
ovSels f Kiev trovripbs ovS" &K.W fiaKap.
TOI, Sco/cpares, e5
Aaia napoifj.ia. ex 6 '; ^ Tl
Sorrai aoiSoi. The answer to this is,
an argument to show that injustice is
81' djuafliW, and therefore involun-
tary. OUK &pa tyevffaro Tovrd ye
aoi56s. The original saying was pro-
bably a mere truism, irovnpds meaning
not ' wicked,' but ' wretched.' This
play on the word rendered the line
peculiarly suitable for the Platonic
argument.
5 yevvijTfyv T<av Trpd^ewv wffirep
Kal T6/ci/wj'] The analogy here given,
when looked at closely, does not imply
any very strong assertion of free-will
(though Aristotle meant it to be so).
For the father inherits, or receives by
nature, qualities that he transmits to
his children. Analogously the will
might be regarded as an effect, as well
as a cause, of circumstances.
7 TOVTOIS 5 s tfot/ce j'ojuofleraii'] 'This
seems to be supported by the testimony
both of individuals and of legislators
themselves.' The argument drawn
from the constitution of society, from
the fact of rewards and punishments,
goes so far as this. It proves that the
mind is of a nature to be acted on by
inducements. It, of course, does not
touch the metaphysical difficulty as to
the whole world being bound by a law
of necessity. But it proves an in-
stinctive belief existing in society,
exactly coincident with the position .
of Aristotle, that the individual is the
cause of particular acts. There is no
.natural tendency in criminals to dis-
claim responsibility for their crimes.
If they do so, it is not from an in-
stinctive feeling, but rather from a
sophisticated mind. As before said,
this fact is not sufficient to disprove a
metaphysical system which would
represent legislature, judge, criminal,
and the whole world, as forced to do
what they do by an irresistible suc-
cession of cause and effect. But
ethically and politically it is sufficient
to justify a practical assumption of
freedom. And in any system it must
at all events be taken account of.
E 2
28
119IKHN NIKOMAXEIQN III.
[ClIAP.
oi/ TO
rpsTTsrai TrpaTTsiv, w$ ovtisv TTpo epyou v TO
6spjaa/veo-$at y aAysiV $ TTSIVT^V r) aAX* OTIOUV TCOV
8 ou^sv yao rjTTov 7Tsi(ro[Ji.sQa aura, xai yap ITT avra> rat
> ~ ^'V 'V " T <NrJ^ / T
ayvosiv xoAaou<r/v, eav airiog sivai boxy] TTJJ ayvojaj, o<ov
sQvov(ri 8/7rXa TO, smri^ia' 73 yap p^^ " aura>'
-yap TOU JOL>J jasQuo'^va/, TOUTO 8' aunov rr)<; ayvoias.
XOU TOVS OLyVOOVVTOLg Tl TUiV SV TOl^ VO[J.Ol$ t O. 8=7 7rl(TTOL-
9 <r5a< xa) jt/,^ ^aXsTra e<rr<, xoXa^cu<r<v. o[Jt.oia)$ 3s xai
ev ro?^ aXXo/j, oVa 8*' ap.s\siav ayvosiv Soxou<r/v, w^ s:r' ay-
ayj/oetv* TOU yap STn/jtsX^^Tivat xvptoi. aXX'
e(TT/v tocTTs juuj sTTijOLsXTj^vaj. aXXa rou
yV<r$aj auro) aCtnoi ^(SvTsg avi{j.svco$ t xai TOU
r) axoXaorou^ sTvaj, oj jasv xaxoupyoyvTs^, oJ 8s sv
xou To7$ ToiovToi$ $idyovTe$' al yap irspl sxa<rra
at TOIOUTOU^ 7TO<OU(T/V. TOUTO 8s 85JXOV EX TO)V
vTwv TTpog r)vnvovv ayuivloiv rj Trpa^iV 8jaTsAoucr*
yap svspyovvTsg. TO jtxsv ouv ayvosTv OT< Ix TOU evspysiv
TTspi sxao-Ta a* e^st? yivovrai, xo/xi8^ avaio-QrjTou. ST<
8* aXoyov TOV a8ixouvTa jar) /SouXsirQa* a8ixov va< -^ TOV
axoAao~Ta/vovTa axoAao~Toi/. < 8s ju.^ ayvotov TI$ Trparrsi
8 StirXa rck ^
c, n. xii. 13 :
Cf.
niTTcocis v6ftu>v faifiiovpyos aAA.' ou
iroAiTffos' vdjuos 8' TSios aurov rd roiis
fjifOvotras, &/ Tinrrfifftaffi, ir\eio> frij.iai'
inroTiveiv Ttav V7]<f>6vron> Sick y&p ri>
ir\fiovs vfipifav fnfOvovras
rp&s rd
Drunkenness is self-caused
ignorance of right and wrong. (Cf.
Eth. in. i. 14). The law of Pittacus
is given in the Rhetoric to illustrate an
iWrcHns depending on an appeal to
authority, (n. xxv. 7) Ef TIS Iv
flirty Sri Tois pfOvovtrt Set
<lx it '> ayvoovvres "yctp a/JMpT
Ivtrratrts STI oC/couc <J ITiTTa/cos
ou -ycip &i/ /At
tav ris fj.(6vuv a/j
10 12 a/ ydp irepl WTa
avaurOJiTov] 'For the particular de-
velopments of the mind in each case
give people their character. This may
be illustrated by the case of those who
are practising for some contest or
action, for they keep on exercising
their powers. Now not to know that
the several states of mind arise from
particular developments of the powers
is absolute idiocy.' This passage con-
tains exactly the same theory of the
formation of moral states as that given
at the beginning of Book II. But it
is written independently of the former
passage in that separate way, which
must be called a marked peculiarity of
Aristotle's writings.
13 J-TJ 8' &\oyov a.K6\a.<rrov\
' Again it is absurd to say that he
who acts unjustly does not wish to be
unjust, or he who acts intemperately
V-]
HGIKtiN NIKOMAXEION III.
29
s cot/ so-Tai a&xo, sxcov aSixoc," av snj, ou jw/qv eav ye 14.
3ouXi]Ta<, a^<xo a>v TraixrsTOii xa) strra* Oixa<o* ou3= -yap
o voo-<ov uyi-fi$. xa) si ourwg STU^SV, exwv voo-sT, axpaTtoj
|3;oTeua>v xa) a7rsi$<ov roig larpoij. TOTS
otv
V00~sv
OUXSTJ tt)
(T7rp
TO
xai
xa p
xal
yap a
so-v
al
at Tot)
attrw. OVTW
ouxrn
xax/a<
xat
yap
xa
xa
xa<
yap av
ex 77X157%, aXXa
axoXao~/a^ 7ra av
xaxjcov a< Jc^' ^'
ex
TOJ> o 6<
TCOV S^ Trspi Toi6
ai Se jtx^ ec^'
ou.
si 8' OUTCO, xa) STT) TCOV aXTuov ai s7r/Ti/xaja=va< T>V xaxiaiv
*4>' vJjU-i'v av s?sv. si 8s TJ^ Xs'yoi OTI TravTS^ <>/ VTa* ToO 17
to be intemperate.' Aristotle would
not say himself that any one ' wished
to be intemperate,' that is, wished it
in the general, in the abstract, for its
own sake. But here he points out
that those who do not wish to be in-
temperate yet take the steps that
lead inevitably to this. He argues
that the means make the end free; the
outset, the conclusion ; the parts, the
whole. Afterwards ( 2z) he allows
that the general state is not so entirely
in our power as the particular act.
With regard to the former it is rather
true to say that we are responsible for
it, than that we choose it. A para-
dox then still remains, that men pro-
duce by voluntary acts that which
they do not wish. The resolution of
this is to be found in Eth. vn. iii.,
where it is shown that right moral
acting consists in allowing the act
of the moment to be sufficiently in-
fluenced by universal considera-
tions. Error and vice, on the con-
trary, consist in suffering the univer-
sal idea, the general conception of
what is good and desirable, to stand
in abeyance.
14 irpoen4v<f 5' ovKeri] ' But after
he has thrown his health awsy, he
has no longer a choice.' To 'give
away ' is the only sense in which
TTpo'ifffBat is used in the Ethics. Cf.
rv. i. 9, ix. i. 7, &c.
17 20 This complex argument
will be perhaps made most clear, if
divided into the following separate
members, (i) Et Se rts A^yoi avr$
is the general protasis. Suppose it
to be said that all aim at what appears
to them good, but that their ideas and
impressions are beyond their control,
being dependent in each case on the
character of the individual. (2) On
this an alternative follows : either (ei
30
HGIKflN NIKOMAXEIflN III.
[CHAP.
ctya^ou,
ou
TO/OUTO
TO
/tei' oSv af-nos) the individual is the
cause of his own character, and so
accordingly of his ideas, or (3) let us
see what the consequences will be if
we allow that the individual is not
the cause of his own character (ft 51
p-fi tixpufa). In this case no one
will be responsible for doing wrong :
wrong will reduce itself to mere
ignorance, the knowledge of the good
to a happy gift of nature. (4) But
these extreme deductions are over-
thrown ( 5t ravr* forty iiraxrS^iroTe)
by its being shown that they will
equally disprove the voluntariness of
virtue, as well as that of vice. (5)
The argument is concluded by
summing up the results of the pre-
vious discussions (rfre 8<j 6/j.oiuis
yap). In whatever sense virtue is
said to be free, whether as implying
that the idea of the end is in our
power, or only that there is something
free and individual in the taking of
means, in exactly the same sense
will vice be free, for these two
opposite terms stand on exactly the
same footing.
1 7 TT)S 8 fpavr curias oil Kvpiot]
' But are not masters of their impres :
sion.' Qavraaia is a special word, de-
noting something between sense and in-
tellect (Qavraffia yap Urtpov Kal oiVfMj-
<rtus Kal Siavmas avr-f) re ov ylyverat
&vtv ainfrfifftws, Kal avev ravrrjj OVK
Kffriv inr6\rityts. De An. m. iii. 5).
It denotes, in short, the sensuous im-
pression of an object. Aristotle says
that we may have a false (pavratrta
even where we have true opinions,
as, for instance, our Qavraala of the
sun makes it a foot in diameter,
while our belief is that the sun sur-
passes in magnitude the habitable
world (<t>aiv(TCU 5^ Kal tytvSrj, irepl
a\i}8r) S?x 6t > ^ ov
(palverai juep 6 9i\tos iroSiaios, irtirl-
arfUTOu V flvat pfifav TTJS O<KOII/XK>JS,
De An. m. iii. 15). *ewTacr/a is
closely allied with /j.vijfM/1, it belongs
to the same part of the mind (De
Memor. i. 9). Memory and <po v-
ravia, are something short of in-
tellect Aristotle attributed them to
the lower animals. Cf. Metaphys. i.
i. 3 : TCI fjLev olv &\\a rats (pavraaiais
fj Kal rals /u^TJ/xais-, ^uireipiaj 5*
fierfx et piKptv. Cf. also Eth. vii.
iii. ii. Brutes and the incontinent
are said to follow their fyavraaiai, De
An. in. iii. zi : KOI Sto rb ^fj./j.tvd.v Kal
6/j.oius elvaa. rats alffB-fjfffffi, iroAXi
KOT' avras irparrfi ra C< a , ra P* v ^ ia
rb /*.)) %X flv v v v , ^ < " / T * frnpfo, TO 8e
Sia rb ^jriKa\virrf(T6ai rbv vovv tviore
irdQfi t) v6crois fy virvcp, ailov ol avBpanroi.
Cf. Eth. vii. vii. 8. We find the
word ipavraffia not as yet settled into
a psychological formula in Plato's
Thcatetus, p. 152 B, where the doc-
trine of Protagoras is shown to imply
that everything is as it appears, and
that this appearing is identical with
sensation. 2. rb 5e ye <palverai aicrOa,-
vfffBai iffriv ; 0. 'Eon yap. 2.
Qavraffia apa Kal afodijffts ravrbv if
rf Bepfnois Kal itaffi rots TOIOI/TOIS, ola
yap alffOdverai fKOffros, roiavra
(Kaartf Kal KivSwtvfi flvai. Aristotle,
giving a scientific account of it in the
De Anima, separates it, as we have
seen, from sensation on the one hand,
and reason on the other. The term
does not correspond with any of our
regular psychological terms. In rela-
tion to the fancy and the imagination,
it represents the material for these,
the brain-images out of which the
creations of fancy (as well as the
phantasmagoria of dreams) are con-
H91IU1N NIKOMAXEIftN III.
31
j p,=v ov xa<TTO
eorr
aring, xa
Tr)$<$>avTa<rioi$ scrrai Truag auroi; ainog' si Oe JOITJ,
TOU xaxa TTQIBIV^ aXAa &' ayvoiav roO
*/, Ma TOUTOJV oio'|U,i/o aura) TO apurTov
73' Ss TOU TXou |<|>s<rig oux au$a/p=TOf, aXX
o\}/iv g^ovra, YJ xpivii xaXtog' xa/ TO XCCT'
i SO~TIV ey^urj^ to TOUTO xa/ut>
jU.syi(rTov xai xaXX/o~Tov, xai o Trap' srspou p.r) olov TS
= [j.aQ=iv, aXX' o/ov sC^u, TOJOUTOV ^2*, xai TO ew
TOUTO Trsc^uxevai 73 TsX=/a xa< aATjQiv^ av enj
raura
TO
Aa/3=v
xai TO
s
TauT eo~TiV
T
yap
xa TCO xxto, TO TsA
x=ira<, Ta 8s Ao<7ra
TOUT
7J ap=T7]
TOi
s Qalvsrai xa\
7TpaTTO'JO~<V
J>ai- 19
<T 67J TO
ojovSrj7TOT=, aAAa T; xai Trap' avrov <TTIV, S'ITS TO
jU,V TfXoj 4>yo~<xo'v, T> & Ta T^onra Trpdrrsiv sxovfricog TOV
o~7roua?ov 73' apsTTj sxotKriov eo~Tiv, ou^V TjTTOv xai 73' xax/a
IxoJcriov av 173 ' o^oicag yap xa) TJ> xaxto VTrdp^si TO o/'
auTov j/ Tau,' 7rpd{*<ri xa} e\ ju,7^ Iv TO> TS^SI. s
"heysrai, exov(rioi slviv al ap=Ta/(xa} yap Ttov
OLVTOl 0~JOtSV, Xai TO) 7TOJOJ TfVC Va< TO
OUV, 20
structed. Aristotle, not entering at
all into the philosophy of the imagi-
native faculties, merely speaks of
(pavraaia as furnishing a necessary
element to thought (poe/ ou/c etrriv
Sveu <f>avTdfffj.a,Tos, De Mem. i. 5).
From what has been said it is easy
to see the special appropriateness of
the word in the above passage to
denote an impression or idea of the
good received passively, and in itself
erroneous.
19 efre ST) Te'Xet] 'Whether,
then, the conception of the end, of
whatever kind, comes not to each
individual by nature, but something
also is contributed by himself (ri oi
irap" avr6v (<rnv), or whether the end
indeed is fixed by nature, but it is
through the good man's voluntarily
taking the means that virtue is volun-
tary ; in either case, I say, vice will
be not a whit less voluntary (than
virtue), for the bad man, exactly as
the good, has individuality (rJ> 8t'
avroj>)in the particular actions, if not
in the conception of the end.'
20 /col "yap T>I> efiav (rvvalrioi irtas
avrol eff^fv] ' For we are ourselves
joint causes, in a way, of our own
states of mind.' The word ffvvairios,
meaning not the primary, but a con-
comitant cause, is of not unfrequent
occurrence in Plato. Cf. Timaus, p.
46 D, where it is said of fire, &c.,
5o|a^TOi inrb r>v irXeiaTWV oi>
|wcuTia, d\\' cdfrta elvcu r<av irai'Tow.
On the general bearing of Aristotle's
32
II6IKON NIKOMAXEU1N III.
[CHAP.
, xa/ a xaxa/ xo<r/o/ av ssv'
o5v
p/ TO>V dpsrtov
OT/ jU,s<ror7jTV /<r/v, xa/ or/
yivovrai, xa/ OT/ Totrraiv 7rpaxT/xa/ '
xa/ Ixotxr/o/, xa/ ovrtog tag av o opQog "hoyog
s a/ Trdsi sxovvioi /o~/ xa/ ai
TO rs
xa/ OT/ <$>'
a exatrra, rav es
sxao"Ta 8s ij 7cpQ(T^s(rig ou ftHoptfMg, roa-TTSp STT rtov
(mutv ' aXX' on e^' TjjtxTi/ ^v ovTiog r) fj.rj oura)
238101 TOUTO lxou<Tioi.
rivsg sJo-} xa/ ?Tp/ 7roTa xa/ TTCO^' a^aa 8* gVra/
xa/
xa
treatment of the question of free will,
see Essay VII, pp. 316-18.
21 22 These sections form the
junction between the somewhat
isolated treatise on the Voluntary
and Aristotle's discussion of the
separate virtues. They bear marks
of having been added for the express
purpose of forming a junction. For
after a general statement of the theory
of virtue in section 21 there is a
resume of some points with regard to
the voluntariness of actions and habits,
which is just what a man might have
been likely to add after reading over
his own treatise, and thinking that it
required a word or two of elucidation.
22 ov\ &fj.otcas STJ appwffTiaiv]
But actions and habits are not equal-
ly voluntary, for we are masters of
our actions from the beginning to the
end because we know all the parti-
culars, but we can only control the
beginning of our habits, while the
gradual addition made by each parti-
cular step is unperceived, as is the
case also with illnesses.'
23 a.va.\a&6vrfs 5^ irepl *KC<TTTJS
fifty] ' Let us therefore resume
our discussion of the separate virtues,
stating what they are, with what
actions they are concerned, and in
what manner. It will at the same
time appear how many there are.'
On the assumed completeness of Ari-
stotle's list of the virtues, see note on
Eth. n. vii. i, and the plan of Book
IV. ; cf. also Eth. in. x. i, note.
KOl irp&rov irep} avSpeias] Aristotle's
admirable account of courage is to
some extent indebted to the observa-
tions of Plato, while in some points
again it is a protest against the Platonic
theory. In the Protagoras (pp. 349
35 1 > 359 3*> x ) courage is identified
with the science of the truly safe and the
truly dangerous. In the Laches (pp.
198 201) a refinement is made upon
this, and it is argued that, if danger
be 'future evil,' courage cannot be
the science of this, for a science
excludes all consideration of time, so,
if courage be a science at all, it must
be the science of good and evil
universally. Thus Plato merges
courage in that universal wise con-
sciousness, which he considered the
true ground of morality. In the
Republic (p. 430 B), courage is
said to be the maintenance of
V. VI.]
H9IKON NIKOMAXEIQN III.
33
"Or; [j,sv ovv
XOU TTpQTSpQV
s<rr
OT< TO.
XOiXOL ' 80 XOl TOV
Trporrftoxiav XO.XQV. <o/3ou|,sQa /xsv ouv
Travra oxsT o
voov
io sTva/
5avarov,
svja yap xa<
xa
TO
oov
right principles in spite of the dis-
tractions of danger. By Aristotle,
courage is more definitely fixed as a
condition of the moral side of man's
nature, and as implying not only a
consciousness, but a conscious choice
of the highest moral good. Its sphere
is limited to war, and thus a rather
special and restricted character is
given to the virtue. At the same
time a reverence is shown for the
nobleness of courage beyond what we
find in Plato. And deep human
observations are made which are in
the best style of Aristotle's moral
writing.
VL i-z itepi <p&fiovs Kal
TOLTO 8' ^<TT!V cos oTrAeos flirtiv naicd
Sib Kal rbv <j>6$ov iflfareu TrpoaSoKiav
KaKnv] These points are accepted from
Plato, cf. Prolog, p. 358 D: irpocrSo-
K'IW TIVO. \eyw KO.KOV TOVTO, efre (po/Sav
ftre Se'os Ka\c?T6. Laches, p. 1986:
yyovfjifBa, 5' ^fie?s Seiva juej/ elvcu & Kal
Seos Se vape^ei ov r
ovSe ret irap6vra riav /COKWC, a\Ai rck
irpoffSoKiafieva ' Se'os yap flvai irpoffSo-
Kiav /j.f\\ovTOS KO.KOU. . . . roinaiv 54 yt
T}]V 4iriffT-li/JLTjv avSpeiav irpoffayopevfts ;
KofjuSrj ye, The subject of the present
chapter is the proper sphere of courage.
^57 ical irp6rfpov, Eth. n. vii. 2.
3-8 (ftopov/jieQa fifis olv Kivtivvcp]
These sections contain a protest
against the doctrine represented in
the Laches, p. 191 D, E, where
VOL. II.
courage is extended to all those
objects which are here expressly ex-
cluded from it dangers by sea, ill-
ness, political conflicts, even the
encountering of temptation. BovArf-
juecos yap ffou TrvOfffBai ni) /uoVoi/ TOWS
4v T<f &ir\iTiK<p avSpdovs, a\\a Kal
TOVS tv T<f lirirtKcf Kal ev vfiiramt Tip
iro\t/jiiKcp diet, Kal fjrf) /j.6vov rovs tv ry
TroXifMf, dXAa Kal TOUS i>> rot's Trpbs T^IV
6d\arrav KIV$VVOLS dvSpeious Svras, Kal
Sffot ye irpbs v6ffovs Kal %<rot Trpbs
irew'os rj Kal irpbs ra iro\triKct.
avSpe'ioi eitri, Kal en ad /j.fy fj.6vov Scroi
irpbs Aun-as avSpe'toi flaw $ <p6fiovs,
aAAo al irpbs ^triQvfjuas rj Tjtiovas Seivol
/.idxetrOai, Kal fievovres % avaffTpefyovres
. . . elffl ydp irou Tires, 8> Adx~ns, Kal tv
TO?S Toiourojs avSpe'ioi. Aristotle treats
all such applications of the word
afSpeloj as merely metaphorical
(AeyeTOt 8' vir6 Tivtav avSpe'ios Kara
to these he opposes the
proper use of the word (Kvpteas S^i
\eyoir' oc, i o) as belonging peculiarly
to war.
evia ydp Set (fo/3e?cr0ai Kal KaAoV]
Cf. Eth. in. i. 24: Set 5 KO! opyifaOat
iirl Tiffi Kal e'iri9v(j.f'ii> nvtav, olov
vyteias Kal fj.a(M\fff<as. It admits of
discussion how much, independently
of a merely permissive attitude in
the will and reason, the instincts of
fear, anger, and desire, may be
positively called out and even created
by considerations and suggestions of
the reason, or how far their place
may be supplied by the reason itself.
34
IieiKilN NIKOMAXEIftN III.
[Ciup.
[j.v yap (>o/oU|asvo srrjjxv] xa ai]juuoy, e juuj <>o-
/3ot>jusvo ava/o~^yvTO. AsysTa/ 5' UTTO TIVCOV av8ps7o xara
|U=Ta$>opav ' spS< -yap TJ oftoiov no avSpsuo ' dfyoftog
4 yap T< xai 6 av8ps7o. irsvlav 8' ura> ou 8=7 (>o$s7o-5a<
ou8s voVov, ou' o?uo o<ra JU.TJ aTro xax/a jw-l^s ' airoi/.
aXX* ou8' o Trspi raora a^>o|3oj avftpiiog. Xsyojasv 8s xai
JioioT^ra' svioi yap sv
ovrsg
5 aTro^oXrjV eu&ap<ra>i; ^ou<r/. oy8s 8^ sf T/J vfipiv
xai '
ret
8'
yap
rtov ;<vav.
7 rs
A
av
8 sv
aya^ov OOTS xaxov eTvai.
/) ' X' \
vavarov TOV tv Travn o
>j
s< '
vj sv
TO/OUTO/
a sv
ev vo(rot$. sv Trr/v ov ;
8s oi s'v TroXs^aa)* sv p.syi<mp yap
9 xa) xaXX/<rr) x<v8uva). o/xoXoyo* 8s TOUTOIJ sicri xai ai
7roX<r< xai Trapd roig (j.ovdp%ois.
^ Xs'yo/r' av av8ps7o$ 6 Trep/ TOV xaXov'fiavarov
a8=^, xai oo~a fiavarov sV/<J>s'ps< vTroyuia ovra' roiaDra
8s /za/Uo-ra ra xara TTO'XS/AOV. ou /x^v aXXa xai sv
xai sv voiroig a8s)^ 6 av8p7o, oup^ OUTCO 8s j oi
oJ jaev yap a7rsyvioxa<n rr^v (rwTypiav xai TOV
TOV TOJOUTOV 8uo~^spa/voo<riv, o< 8s sus'X7T/8s^ sio~i
12 Trapd r)V spTreipiav. ajtxa 8s xai av8p/ovTaj sv oT^ e<TTiv
Tj 75 xaXov TO a7ro3avs7v* sv TaTf TO/auTa*^ 8s
It is n similar question which as dis-
cussed by Kant, How far is it .possible
to obey in a positive sense the injunc-
tion, ' love your enemies ' ?
6 (ttopfpftrrfiTov 5* 6 tfoyaros ' irtpas
ydp~\ See Essay V. p. 242.
10 12 Kvpiws irjrdpxft] ' He then
can be properly called brave who
is fearless about the noble kind of
death, and about things which sud-
denly (fnc&yvia. o**ra) bring on death,
and such are especially the affairs
of war. No doubt the brave man,
when he is upon the sea, or upon a
sickbed, will be brave : but his bravery
will not be that of a sailor. Lands-
men in danger of drowning give up
all hope of safety, and feel repugnance
at the thought of such a death;
while sailors are made confident by
VI VII. J H9IKQN NIKOMAXEK1N III.
35
To (is <>o/3rp " ou 7rd<ri p*\y TO airo, Xsyo/xsv os n xai J
sp avQpcoTTov. rot/To fjilv ouv TTOivrl <o/3fov TCO y=
/, ra 82 xar' avtypcuTrov o/a<sp?' (j-sysbsi xa) rco
xa) TJTTOV i[j.oi(os 8s xa) ra QctppaXta. o os ai/8p=7o
<>o3rrsTat j.\v o5v xa) TO,
= xa
-yap
xa/ rjrrov raura
Toa5ra <o/3=iV$a
or/ ou SsT, 13 3s on
T* reov
oscra/, xat er< rot ]W.y)
/. yivsrai 6s rtov
oyp^ cJ^ 0=7, 73 8s OT<
Os xai Trspi ra 6appaXsa. o /xs v v o5v 5
ouja=i/oj, xa) r 85? xa*
OTS, Ojtxo/a); os xa) 6appaiv, a'vOpsTo^' xar' aj'av yap, xa)
av o Xo'yo^, 7rd<r%si xa) Trparrsi o avSpsToj.
TOIOUTOJV
a 8s? xa) ou evsxa uTropvcuv xa
their experience. Besides, men put
forth their courage on occasions where
to die is helpful or glorious ; but in
death at sea or from sickness neither
of these qualities is to be found.'
This passage is a curious exemplifica-
tion of Athenian feeling. In spite of
the glorious traditions of Salami's,
the Athenians had never attained
those instincts which are inherited by
the descendants of the Norsemen
the feeling that 'the deck' is their
proper ' field of fame.'
VII. This chapter discusses courage
as being a mean state with regard to
daring and fearing. Setting aside
terrors which are too great for human
nature to bear, the brave man is calm
(aveKir\T)KTos), and endures or fears
all things in their due measure ac-
cording to the true standard, his aim
being to attain the noble. Thus he is
distinguished from the extremes by
whom these proportions are violated.
The extremes, by a refinement which
Aristotle does not extend to the other
virtues (cf. note on Eth. n. vii. 2),
are fourfold, (i) Deficiency of fear,
producing a character which has no
name. (2) Excess of fear = cowardice.
(3) Deficiency of daring = cowardice.
(4) Excess of daring = rashness. Two
of these terms are identical, and one
is nameless, so that the extremes
really reduce themselves to cowardice
and rashness (12). Some excellent
remarks are introduced on the cha-
racters of the boastful man and the
rash man.
I rb 8e (pofitpov 6appa\ea] Having
said where fear and courage are to be
looked for, we next observe that fear
admits of degrees, so that courage
is proportionate. ' Now the Fearful is
different to different persons, indepen-
dent of our calling some things fearful
beyond human endurance. These
latter are fearful to every man in his
senses, but dangers that are not
beyond human endurance differ both
in magnitude and in degree, a differ-
ence found also in the things that give
courage.'
6 TeAos 8e a.vSptlav~\ This diffi-
cult section must be taken in con-
nexion with what has gone before.
Aristotle is determining the charac-
F "2
36
NIKOMAXEIftN III.
[CHAP.
TO xara ryv ev. xa TO>
8= 7j dvdpeia xaXov. TOJOUTOI/ 8r) xai TO TS'XOJ
yap xao"Tov TO) TS^S/. xaAoG 8rj si/sxa o av(>peio$
7 xai TTpaTTS* Ta xara, rr t v avftpsiav. rtbv 8' t/
XO'J/TOJV o p.ev T>] a<$>o)3/a ava)VvJLO sfrai 8'
Trporspov on TroXXa (TT<v
hyriTos, 21
xa5a?rsp 4>ao~i TOUJ
8 67r3aXX)v Tr
v ev
av T/J ju,a*vo-
o~io"/xov
svai o
sxivo$
Ta tyofispa
xai 7rpoo"7ro/>3Tixoj
s^si, ovrcog
o 8s TO) Qappetv
8ox? 8s xai
<$aiv=-
sv
8/0
sv
owv
xa yap a
o 8s TO> <^o37o~Qa<
8s7 xal <Jj ou 8s?, xai
teristics of a brave act. He here says
that ' the End-in-itself, or perfection,
of a particular moral act will be
identical with that which belongs to
the formed moral character. The
End-in-itself for courage, as a whole,
is the idea of the noble. The idea of
the noble, therefore, must be that
End-in-itself which a man proposes to
himself in each separate act of
bravery in order to constitute it
brave.' In short, the meaning comes
to this, ' what makes an act truly
brave, is that, like the perfect state of
bravery, it aims at the noble.' The
term T'AO$ is used in a sense between
that of ' perfection ' and ' motive,' or
rather as implying both (see Essay
IV. p. 176, and cf. Eth. in. i. 6, note).
'E.vtpyfia, in n-rfoTjy ivtpytias, is op-
posed to {is as ' act ' to ' state.'
The phrase rb icara v)\v t\iv
occurs again in. ix. 3 : ov jtV
8dcfep &f flvat TO KOTO TTJV
re'Aos Tjtiv. The whole notion that a
moral act can only be considered good
when it exhibits the qualities of the
formed moral character has been
already brought forward, n. iv. 3.
<col T<j> avSpflt? 8e avSptiav] 'Now
to the brave man courage is some-
thing ideally noble (/coXdv). Of this
nature, then, must be the end of
courage, for it is the end of a thing
which in each case determines ita
character. Therefore the noble is the
end for the sake of which the brave
man endures and does whatever is
brave.' The argument is as follows :
Nobleness is what characterizes
bravery, therefore it is the end of
bravery (because final and formal
causes coincide), therefore it should
be the end of each brave act. The
above explanation agrees with that
given by the Paraphrast, except that
he does not appear to supply reAoj
with rb Korct T^P tiv. His words are,
rovro y&p T'\OS iffrl vdurris tvtpyflat
TTJJ Kar' aprr-f)", T& Jtarek rbv \6yov
rrjs ?a>j yivtffdai- olov at Kara 84-
Kaioavvi\v irpQfis re'Aos fgowi rb Kara
rbv \6yof T^S Jfftws T^J StKaiurrui/ris
irpdrTftrOcu Ka.1 til nark r
VII. VIIL] HGIKiiN NIKOMAXEIilN III.
37
rot. TQioiVTot. axoAouQs? airco. eAAs/TTSJ 8s xa; TOJ
aAX* ev rai Au7ra< iTrsp/SaXXcoy jaaXAov xara-
eV-nv. 8uo-sA7TJ 15 TJ o 8s/AoV* Travr
ftsirai. o 8' av^piiog evavTiwg' TO yap Qappsiv
TTsp* Taura ]W,sv oov. SO-T/I/ # re 8siAo xai o Qpa<rvs xai iz
b av8p=JO, %ia<$>opwg ft e%ov<ri Trpog aura,' ol p.\v -yap
i7repj3aXXoL>cri xa) sXAs/Trouff/v, 6 2s pea-tog e%ei xai to^
SsT* xa) of jasv 6pao~sT^ TrpOTrersTf, xa* |3ouXo'jasi/Oi ?rpo rcbv
x/v8uvajv sv auTo? 2' aC^iVravrai, of 8' aj/SpsTbi sv roT^
spy 01$ o^sTi, 1 , TrpoVspov 8' r]o~u^toi. xaSctTTfp o5v s^pvjra/, 13
rj av8ps/a jascro'rr^ eVr; ^epi SappaXsa xa; fyofispd, sv ajg
y xat or< xaXov afpsTra< xai UTTO^S'VS/, ^ OTJ al<r%pov
TO 8' aTroQi/T^xsiv <$>suyovTa Treviav y spcora ^' rt
oux av8ps/ou, aXAa jaaXXov 8s<XoO j,aAax/a yap
siv ra ETriVova, xa) oup^ or* xaXo^ U7rofj.svsi^ aAAa
xax&v.
Jo"T ]U,sv oov >j avSps/a TOIOUTO'V TJ, TisyovTa/ 8s xai 8
pai xara TTSVTS TpoVout,*, Trptorov ]U,sv >]
TO [J.TJ.
ro
Kara rbv \6yov "rfa e^fois TTJS
K.T.A..
1 3 Aristotle denounces suicide
committed on account of poverty, or
love, or anything grievous, as the act
rather of a coward than of a brave
man. Taking a broad human view of
life, he does not sympathise with or
discuss the sentimental deaths of the
Cynic philosophers (see Essay II. p.
130). Suicide was afterwards digni-
fied by the Stoics with the name
of f^ayoay^], 'ushering oneself out of
the world.'
VIIL This chapter discusses the
spurious kinds of courage, classified
under five heads. Of this classifica-
tion we find the germ in Plato's Pro-
tagoras, p. 351 A : 6dp<ros pev yap Kal
awb rt^i/Tts ytyverai avdptairois KO!
owrb BV/J.UV Tf Kal airb ftan'as, ILffirep 7)
5wa/.us\ avSpeia, 54 aTrb fyvffius Kal
TWV 4/u^aiy ylyvcrat. The
five shades (rprfTrot) mentioned by
Aristotle are (i) apparent courage
produced from a regard to the opinions
of society, (a) from experience of the
particular danger, ( 3 ) from anger, (4)
from a sanguine mind, (5) from ignor-
ance.
I vp&Toy fifV 7] TroAiTiK^j] This
phrase is to be found in Plato's
Republic, p. 430 c, where it probably
originates, but it is there used in a
different sense from the present.
Plato meant by the term 'civil
courage ' to distinguish the true
courage of a civilized man from all
merely brutal instincts. Ao/IV yap
fjioi rr,v 6pQ}jv 86av irepl rOiiv avruv
TOVTUV &vfv TrcuSeta? ytyovutav, T^I/ re
OripuaSri Kal avSpairoSutSii, ofae irdvv
v6fn.ifj.oy fiyttffOcu, &\\o re TI if a
\fyfts. 'AiroSe^ofMt rolvvv rovro
avSpelav flvai. Kal yap oTroSt'xou, fy
8' tyd, iroAjTi/CTjJ' yf, Kal 6p8G>s
38
NIKOMAXEIiiN III.
[CHAP.
ra ex rcov VO^JUDV
xa) 8/
oi TroTurai
8<a rag
7rap'oloJ 3s<Xo/ arijU-oi xa 01 av/
TOU$ 8s xa< *OjU,7j0 Tro/si", oTov TOV
xa rot. 01/5075 xa
v e7i/a<
svrifjioi. TOJOU-
xai TOV
xai
jac yuot Trpwroc \eyx "? v
Ecrwp yap 7ror <j)rjirt ivl Tpwffro-' ayopeuwi',
at>T>j jU-aXierra TY) Trporepov
ylvsrai ' 8<* alSai -ya^ xa< 8/a xaXou opsfyv
OT/
oTroSfff *. Aristotle meant by ' civil
courage' that daring which is
prompted, not by an independent
desire for the noble, but by a regard
to reputation, and to the fame or dis-
grace, and even punishment, awarded
by society to brave or cowardly
actions respectively.
5ia TO eK v6fi.(av eViTfyua] The laws
relating to cowardice are alluded to,
Eth. \. i. 14.
/col fiia TOVTO imifioi] 'And for
this cause men appear to be more
brave in communities where cowards
are held in dishonour, and the brave
in honour.' Aristotle does not actually
assert that real courage is capable of
cultivation by the influence of society.
But if we do not put too fine a mean-
ing on the word courage, there is no
doubt that it flourishes most in
warlike ages and communities. And,
in short, with all but the very few,
individual virtue generally springs
out of the feelings of society ; what is
first outward, afterwards takes root in
the mind.
2 roiobrovs 8i ^teto] 'Now just
such men does Homer depict, as, for
instance, Diomed and Hector, (when
he says.) " Polydamas will be the first
to cast a reproach at me," and so
Diomed, " Hector will some day,
haranguing among the Trojans, de-
clare, Tydides, by me terrified, fled to
the ships." ' Cf. Iliad xxn. 100, vni.
148, sq., where the line ends
fitvos 7/cTo v^as.
3 cl/uoicDTat 5* JWoj] ' But this
courage is most like the kind which
we have described, for it originates
in virtue, namely, in a sense of
honour (ou'Sw), in a desire for the
noble (since it aims at reputation),
and in a fear of dishonour as of some-
thing base.' On the nature of cuStas,
see Eth. rv. ix. and the note on n.
vii. 14. Most admirably does Ari-
stotle touch off here in a few words
the spirit of honour which is the
nearest approach to, and, at all
events in many of the relations of
life, the best substitute for, a genuine
morality. In reading his words, we
can hardly fail to be reminded of
Burke's magnificent lament over the
loss of the age of chivalry. ' The
unbought grace of life, the cheap
defence of nations, the nurse of manly
sentiment and heroic enterprise, is
gone ! It is gone, that sensibility of
principle, that chastity of honour,
VIII.]
HGIKflN NIKOMAXEIQN III.
39
^
rai 8' av Tij
vo'jg el$ rauro*
ayro 8u>o~* xa/
xa QuyriV ovou, ao"^pou ovrog
UTTO TCOV df>%rivT(o
oo~eo oy Oi' aloto aAa <
oy TO alo~ypoi/ a/\./\,a TO
of xupjoi, wfnrsp 6"ExTa>p
oy Se :' sywy a7rai'v0 ^ia^?je irruttrffov-a
ou ot apKiov iffaelrai tyvyitiv K\iva.q.
xai 01 7T^oo-TaTTOj/T=, xav avap/copcoo~/ TVTTTOVTSS TO ayro 5
xa< o Trio TCOV
xa* T<OV ToioyTtov
Trvrsg yap ai/ayxaoyo-jv.
ava.yx.TjV avtipsiov swat,
" ^' <J>~ ^V V ' ,
OTI xaXov. doxst de xa< TJ 6
which felt a stain like a wound, which
inspired courage whilst it mitigated
ferocity, which ennobled whatever it
touched, and under which vice itself
lost half its evil, by losing all its
grossness ' (Reflections on the Revolu-
tion in France, p. 149). Just as
Plato placed the philosopher above
the man of honour (OvfjuttiS^, cf.
Repub. p. 547-9), so Aristotle con-
ceives of a courage higher and purer
than that which emanates from the
spirit of honour.
4 ' Civil courage ' is of two kinds
(1) that which depends on honour,
(2) that which depends on fear. The
latter may remind us of the descrip-
tion given by Plato (Pkcedo, p. 68 D),
where he speaks of most men being
courageous from a sort of cowardice.
There is a vast falling off between the
first class and the second. To the
second belongs the spirit of Asiatic
slavery, which Burke contrasted with
the spirit of chivalry (I.e.). The
instances here given are the compul-
sory measures used by the princes in
the Trojan war to make the people
fight, and similar devices used by the
Persians, &c.
6 "EKTWP] This is a misquotation,
the words are those of Agamemnon
(Iliad, ir. 391), and stand thus in the
original: 'O^ 5e K ty&v airdvevOe
fjuixn 5 fdf\ovra vorfffca Mifj.vd&iv irapii
vrivffl Kopuvitriv, o& oi tirdra "Apiciov
tffiTf'iTCU <f>v~yffiv Kttfa? r)5' olwvovs.
TVHTOJTSS] As done by the Persians
at Thermopylae, Herod, vir. 223.
6 Soice? 8e eVrtv] ' Experience of
particular dangers is also accounted
a kind of courage ; which gave
Socrates occasion to think that courage
was a science. Different men have
experience in different dangers, and
regular soldiers in the dangers of
war. Now there are many unreal
shows of danger in warfare, and
professional soldiers, being perfectly
accustomed to these, appear brave,
because other men are deceived by
appearances.' The second cause (after
that of a regard for opinions) which
gives rise to a semblance of courage,
is experience, the quality of the prac-
tised veteran. The effects of this
may be analysed and subdivided into
(i) a familiarity with, and contempt
for, much that is seemingly, but not
really, terrible ; (2) a skill of weapons,
&c., giving both an offensive and a
defensive superiority (voirjacu /col /UT;
iraJdtiv /toAiora SWCMTCU &c rrjs e'jtr-
pfas).
40
H9IKON NIKOMAXEIftN III.
[CHAP.
su.7Tstpia >j Trsc/l sxaarrcx. av^psia rig sivar oQsv xou o
aj9>3 STT i(TTr)fj.r)v eTvai TVJV avftpeiav. TO/OUTOJ 3s
sv aAAo/, ev roif Trohspixo'ig ft ol o-rpaTiaiTai '
ap sivai TroAAaxeva roGTroXs'/xou, aju,aAKrra<ruj/=>|$a-
XO.G-IV ouroi QaivovTai &T) avSpsjo/, or/ oux iVa<7<v ol aAAo*
7 ola IFTIV. elra 7ro<7]<raj xa) /x>) Trabiiv jW.aAta'Ta Suvai/rai sx
T7) sfJL7rsip{a$, <)uvd[j.svQi pp>j<rQai ro7^ oTrXotj xa) roja
%-yovrsg OTTOIOL av iif] xa/ ?rpo ro 7ro^o-a< xa* ?rpo^ TO
Sflec Kal i SwKpetrr/s] Cf. Memorab.
in. ix. a, and Plato, Protag. p. 350,
where it is agreed that those who
dive most boldly are the professional
divers, those who fight most boldly
the professional soldiers, &c. This
empirical view of courage forms one
side, it is true, of the Socratic
doctrine, but by no means the whole
(see Essay II. p. 123), and the state-
ment about Socrates in the text is
accordingly unfair. The statement is
corrected by Eudemus in his Ethics
(m. i. 13), where he well sums up
the present part of the subject : v E<rrj
8" ftSri avSpeias iretne \ry6fj.eva naff
6ff.ot6rrrra TO, awra yap {nrofjLivovffiv,
a\\' ou Sia ra airrd. M/o pey woAtr(KT)
o"T7j S 3 tffrlv TI 8t" alSu oSffo. Afvrtpa
y i] ffrparidrriitri' OVTTJ Si l(t.irfiplav
Kal rb elSfVai, oi>x Sffirep ^faKp&Tits
e(fr;, T& Seivd, o\\' 8rt (Iffaffi) T&J
/3o-ri8(la.S T>V Sftvwf.
7ro\\a Kfvk TOV 7roXf'/xoi] This is
the reading of Bekker, supported by
a majority of the MSS., the Scholiast,
the Paraphrast, Casaubon, &c. It is
illustrated by Cicero, Epist. ad Att.
T. 20 :' Scis enim dici qusedam
iraviicd, dici item rek (cspck TOV woktfjiov,'
where the editio princeps (Romana)
has KOIV&, another instance of similar
confusion. Another reading, supported
by six MSS., is ret KO.IVO. TOV iroKfpov,
which would mean ' the surprises of
war.' The phrase occurs in Diodorus
Siculus, xx. 30 : dATjfles clvoi, 8r< roA.\a
ret KO.IVO. TOV vo\ffjiov. Cf. Thucyd.
HI. 30 : Kal fify airoKi'^ffWfj.ft' rbf KiV-
von'tffuvTfs OVK &\\o TI flfai rb
TOV 1TO\ffJ.OV % T)> TOIOVTOV, t> %
v Tf ourif <pv\dffffono
Kal rols iroAe/iiois tvopwv tirixeipoiri,
TrXfioT' kv bpOolTo: where also the
MSS. vary between KO.WOV and K.SVOV.
It would seem, then, that T& KW
TOV iro\efj.ov, and TO Kaivd TOV iroAs'yuou,
were both received formulae, only
with different senses. In the text
above, either phrase might have been
substituted for the other, according
as it was more familiar to the tran-
scriber. But TO, Kfvci alone makes
good sense, for while the soldiers
would get accustomed to the empty
show, the noise and pageantry of
war, it is not true to say that they
would get accustomed to the surprises
of war, these being exactly what not
even the experienced could calculate
upon. Perhaps there is no better
setting forth of the Kecii TOV iro\f(*.ov
than in the speech of Brasidas, Thu-
cyd. rv. 1 26, 4 : OVTOI 8e T^V jueAArjo-ic
fjifv fx ovffl TCHS aTrefpoir <f>o$tpd,v Kal
yap ir\-f)0ei ttyea>? Seit/ol Kal
a<f>6priToi, 1] Tf Sid
irpoer/ii'|ai S TOIS
inrofj.fi/ovcrtv aiira oi<% bfioloi.
avvt<apdK<uTiv\ The aw here seems to
mean not ' together,' or ' at a glance,'
but as in avyyivitxrKw, ffvvottia, &c.,
' intimately,' ' privily,' ' familiarly.'
VIII.]
NlKOMAXEIflN III.
41
XpriTTa
xai
yaxriv
(OfTTTSp OVV dvtoTT'h.OlS CO7rX<0"/Jt=VOJ 8
l rtiwTaig' xai yap sv roUg Toiovroig
ol dvbpsioTaTOi fJia^ipcoraToi elo-<v, aXX' ol
VWT=(; xai rot, <ra)jw.ara apHrra %OVTS$. ol 9
82 8=/Aoi yivovrai, orav uTrsprsivy o xivfivvog
xai ?y,=/7Tfovra< TO? TrXr^scri xai Ta? 7rapa(rxsva?s' TpioToi
yap $suyov(ri) ra 82 TroAiTixa psvovTa aTroQvr'jO-xsi, oirsp
xa.7r} rco 'J&pfJLOMD o"t>v/3>;. roT^ jasv yot;? ai<rvpoy TO <psu-
ysiv xai o QdvaTog rr\s Toiavryg arcoTTjplas alpsT
ol 8s xai s^ dpfflg sxivfivvsuov (og xpsiTrovg ovreg,
8= <$>suyov(ri, TOV ddvarov jtxaXXov rou al<r^pou Q
VQI ' o o' dv^psHos ou rotouTo^. xa/ TOV Qu[J.ov 8' e^"}
dvfipsiav sTTK^ipoutTiv ' dvfipsioi yap zlvai 8oxoDo~< xa)
6/a 6u ( aov a)(T7rsp TO. Qr t pia STT) TOT^ Tpuxravrag Qspopsv
OTI xdl ol avOp5?oi Qu[jt.osit>si$ ' Irr^TixwraToy yap o Qv
rottg xivSuvou^, o^sv xai "Ofiypos ' o-Qevog
6
u
eotxs
x t' x ^ > ' \,5.X5>>
< ' [J,svos xai Vvfjiov systps xai * 6p/jW,u 6
sv a
y/xou lyspviv xai bpp.r)v.
p1va$ pilvog ' xai ' s%z<rsv ajpa ' TravTa yap ra roiavra
9 of ffTpmitaTaL 8e
j] ' But
regular troops lose heart when the
danger is overpowering, and when they
aiv inferior in numbers and equipment.
In such cases they are the first to run
away, while citizen troops remain and
die, as actually happened at the Her-
maeum.'
eirl v<f 'Ep/uafy] Of this affair the
Scholiast gives the following account.
Coronea had been betrayed to one
Onomarchus of Phocis ; an engage-
ment took place in an open spot
called the Hermseum ; the Coronean
citizens were killed to a man, while
their Boeotian auxiliaries fled in a
panic. Td iroA.m/co, by a common
usage, is nearly eqiiivalent to of
TroAiTeu. Cf. JEsch. Pcrsee, i. Ta5e
fitv Hepcrta? iriffra, Ka\(ircu, &C.
STpoTt&Jraj, or mercenaries, in the time
of Aristotle had not a high name. As
common fighting men, the machines of |
VOL. II.
war, they are opposed to the indepen-
dent heroism of the brave man; see
below, m. ix. 6. The present passage
contrasts the courage of the man of
honour with the hardiness of the vete-
ran, which under any extraordinary
pressure gives way. ' Citizen courage '
in the instance mentioned cannot ex-
ternally be distinguished from the
very highest kind of courage.
10 Kai rbv Ovfjibv 8' opjuijj/]
' The spirit of anger, too, men
reckon as courage, and they who act
through anger (like brutes turning on
those who have wounded them), get
the character of being brave, because
the converse is true, and brave men
are spirited. The spirit of anger is
most keen for the encountering dan-
gers, and hence Homer wrote :
"(Apollo) put
spirit."
strength into his
G
42
IIOIKON NIKOMAXEIilN III.
[ClIAP.
dvQpsloi 8/a ro xaAov Tr^arToixriv, o 8s
auTo7$* TO, firjp/a Os 8;a AUTTTJV 8/a yap TO
<$>ofisi<r(iai) eVsi eav 75 ev u?a] 15 ev eXsi YJ, ou
TT poor p%ovr at. ou 813 s(TTiv dvfipsfa. 8ia TO UTT'
xa) 5uJtot5 s
TTpooptovTa, es* OUTOJ 75 xav o ovoi vpsioi
' TUTTTOpsvoi yap
xai ol aoivo) 8s 8/a Tr/v s7r/5u]U,/av ToA^T^a TroXXct (ipaxriv.
12 ou Srj fmv av^psTa Ta 8/' aXyij^ovo^ ^ 6ujU,ou J^sXayvo'^tsvot
TTpO^ TOV X/J/8t/V&V. 4' )t>0 "' xaj ' r ^' rr 3 ^' SOiXSV 7) 8/a TOV QujU.OV
/, xai 7rpoo"Xa/3oDo~a Trpoaipso'iv xai TO ot> evsxa av-
sTvai. xa< oi dv
" He roused up his strength and
spirit."
" Fierce strength in his nostrils."
" His blood boiled."
For all such things appear to signify
the awakening and outbreak of anger.'
These quotations are obviously made
from memory, and none of them, are
quite accurate. The first seems to be
compounded of //. xrv. 151, (j.eya
aOfvos l/ua\' iicdffTtp Kaptiiri, and XVI.
529, /ttVos 8e oj fjuoA 0UM<p. The
second appears to be meant for II. v.
470, &rpvve /x.eVos /cal 6v/jibt> eniiiTov.
The third is 6W. xxiv. 318, a.vb fivas
5 of ^S?) Api/ti/ jueVos irpufrrvtyf. The
last is not in Homer at all. This
passage illustrates the progress of
psychology towards distinctness, for it
is impossible to translate it simply into
English ; flu/id's means more than
anger, or than any one modern word,
for even with Aristotle it includes what
wo should call ' spirit.' But with
Homer it meant (i) life, (2) spirit, (3)
wrath, (4) heart, (5) mind. Aristotle
in quoting Homer fails to remember
this great indefiniteness, though there
is no doubt that in Homer a simple
and physical account is given of the
manifestations of courage.
12 <pvfft.Ktiira.Tti 8' %OIKCV elVai]
'Yet the sort that springs from angor
appears most natural, and with pur-
pose and motive added, it becomes
genuine courage.' Taking this sen-
tence in its context, it must be an
apology for the ai<8/>eja 5ia 8v/j.6v.
Aristotle had said that anger makes a
man brave only in the sense that a
hungry ass is brave, obeying the goads
of a blind instinct. He adds that the
instinct of anger is part of our nature
(cf. Eth. n. iii. 10, note, and VH. vi.
a), and that, rightly directed and
brought under the control of the will
and reason, it can be elevated into a
moral state. It is remarkable on what
a high level Aristotle places courage.
It must be entirely, he says, prompted
by a desire for what is morally beau-
tiful (of /ue/ ovi/ avSpf'toi 8:a -rb Ka\lv
irpdrroifftv') mere physical courage
is only an assistance in realising this
(6 8e Oi/fibs <rvvtpye! avrols), and the
prompting of anger, &c., will make
men pugnacious, but not brave (of 8e
Sia rafro fJia-x^lJ-fvoi ^0.^1(1.01 jteV, OVK
avtiptioi St ). Perhaps Aristotle makes
almost too great a separation behv< en
true courage and this 'spirited ele-
ment,' which must be its physical
basis. This is to be attributed (i) to
VIII.]
IIGIKflN NIKOHAXEIQN III.
43
Ti[j.a)>(i'j[j.svQi 8' rfoovraj' ol 8s 8/a
tj.dyifj.oi [J,sv, o-jx dvbpiioi 8s * O'J yap 6<a TO xaXov oy}' an; o
Ao'yoc;, aAAa 8ia TO 7ra9o<," TrapaTrAr/rjoi/ 8' s^ouo"/ T/.
ou8s STJ oi e'js'ATiOrt; OVTS av8prTo<* 8<a yap TO 7roX- T 3
xai 7roXAou vss/jxr;xs'i/a/ 5appouo~Ji/- si/
8s', OTI a ( a<>to $appaAso< ' aA/N.' oj
8/a Ta TrorirJtsva Qappa'hsoi, ol 8= Sia TO oiscrQcu xpzir-
. TOIOUTOV 8s 7ro/oyo~* J 4
oj
oav
ev
TO
xa; aapap^ov sva<
TO 15
sv
,' a\$vi&lois $>o$oig a^o^ov
7rpo8^Aoi* otTro %s(o$ ydp
ex 7raafrxsuT]' Ta Trpo^avvj ]U.ev yap xav sx Xoy<o~jtxou xa*
Xo'you TIC; TTposXoiTo, Ta 8' e^aifyvrig xaTa Tr^v s^<v.
av8p=To< 8s QaivovTcti xaj ol ayvooyvTSt;, xai slo~<v ou 16
Tro'ppro Ttov syX7r/8a)V, %slpov$ 8' oo~a> d^ico^ot. o-j8sv sp/ou-
o~<v ex/o/ 8e. 8<o xai ,svouo~/ T/va o'vov 01 8'
his high moral tone, (2) to his analy-
tical mode of treatment. In Shake-
speare, as in Homer, courage is attri-
buted to physical causes. It is made
sometimes to depend on the action of
the spleen, or it is connected with
the gall. Cf. -fiTz"^ 7bA, Act n.
Sc. i:
'Rash, inconsiderate, fiery volun-
taries,
With ladies' faces and fierce dragons'
spleens.'
And Hamlet, Act n. Sc. 2, quoted
below on VA. iv. v. 6.
1 3 1 5 The fourth kind of spurious
courage is that which arises from a
sanguine mind. This may be due to
prerious success, and gives a con-
fidence like courage, but also like
intoxication. Such confidence is
liable to a collapse.
1 5 Sib Ka} f|y] ' For this reason
it seems braver to be fearless and un-
troubled in sudden perils than in such
as may be anticipated. In the former
case a man is brave more by habit, or
in other words less by premeditation ;
for in foreseen dangers a man may
calculate and reason out the course to
be chosen, in sudden ones he must
depend upon his habitual character.'
This acute observation puts real cour-
age in opposition to the case of a man
puffed out with a sort of extraneous
confidence. Take a man on a siidden,
and you will find how brave he is.
While Aristotle makes courage a
quality of the moral will, he requires
that it should be a settled habit, and
a second nature of the mind, not pre-
pared consciously to meet a particular
emergency.
1 6 eLvSfloi 5e S'tfuwtais 'In the
G 2
44
IIOIKilN NIKOMAXEIQN III.
[CHAP.
r}7rotTr}[Jisvoi, sav yvuxriv on srzpov r\
'A
sioi
osp o pys
1 7 Aaxcoo-iv tog "S/ixixovioig. ol TS STJ
TroTo/ Tivsg, xa/ ol Qoxovvrsg ai/5p=?o/.
9 lisp* Qappy Ss xa)
7rspi7r<rovTg rog
gflrr/v, aAXa
aj/pea ou<ra
v :repi TO. ^o/
ev TovToig arapa^og xou Trspl TO.V& (og 3s7
2/xa/\.Xov ^ o Trspi Ta fiappaXea. TO> 8^ ra
yap
yap TO.
U7rofj.svsiv ij TOOV i^Secov a.7re%(rQa.i. ou jtx
o^s/v av eTvai TO xara TTJV avftpsiav rehog TJ^U, WTTO
o 8' a4>av/^s<r5a/, olov xav ro?^ yujtxt/ixoT^ aytocr* y/vs-
* ro?^ yap TruxroLig TO [j.sv rehog >J8u, ou fvsxa, o
xa< al -n^aa/, TO 8s T'JTT0"9a< aXysivo'v
, xai Xt>7r>jpov, xai ?ra 6 Trovog' 8ta 8s TO
* sTva/, ja/xpov ov TO o5 svsxa oiSsv r]3u tyaivsrai
last place, men appear brave from not
knowing their danger. Such persons
are not far removed from the sanguine,
but are inferior to them, because they
have no self-confidence, as the san-
guine have. This confidence makes
the sanguine to stand their ground
for a time ; while those who have
blundered into bravery, as soon as it
appears that the danger is other than
they suppose, take to their heels, as
was the case with the Argives, when
they fell in with some Lacedaemo-
nians whom they took for men of
fiicyon.' The last and poorest sem-
blance of courage is when something
daring is done unknowingly, and from
a mistake. The instance given is
mentioned by Xenophon (Hellenics,
iv. 10). Some Spartans assumed the
shields of some vanquished Sicy-
onians, and were at first contemp-
tuously encountered by the Argives,
who, when they discovered their for-
midable enemies, took to flight.
IX. This interesting chapter is on
the connection of courage with pain
and loss. The nobleness of courage
chiefly depends on the sacrifice which it
implies (^TT/A.I/JTOV 7) dc5pfa /cal Sitcauos
tircuvtirai). The brave man by en-
countering death consciously makes a
sacrifice of the greatest magnitude,
since he runs the risk of relinquishing
a life which is eminently valuable,
and, by reason of his virtue, full of
happiness. Courage, then, is not to
be called pleasurable, except as attain-
ing to a satisfaction above all plea-
sure, attaining, in short, to the end of
one's being (ov 5)j iv airdffcus rcus
SpeTCuy rb TjSfocs tvtpyeiv inrdpxft,
irA.Jjj' ty' 9(TOi> ToG rl\ovs ^dirrtrai).
The conscious heroism of the brave
man distinguishes him from the reck-
lessness of the mercenary; it dis-
qualifies him, indeed, from becoming
mere rank and file, a mere machine of
discipline.
3 ou nfy aX\A - ex*'"] ' Without
Vin. IX.] H9IKON NIKOMAXEIftN in.
45
si Svj TOJOUTO'V Itrn xai TO Trspi TI\V avbpsiav, o ju,sv
xai ra T^aJ ( aara 7\.u7rjpa TUJ av^psiw xai O.KOVTI
i, u7rQfj,svsi 8s ayra, on xaAov f, or* a}(r%pov TO jar^.
TTJV ap=Trjv l^y) Trdrrav xa/ si^a/^aovs-
err) T<O QavaTto AuTrrjQrjo-STai * TOJ TOJOUT<O
ayaQtov a
ouSsv
or TO sv T
<TTpQ$
yap ]W,a?ao~ra
(TTSps7rai
aiov, xa OUTO
v 8s roDro.
doubt the end that belongs to courage
is pleasant in itself, but this pleasant-
ness is neutralised by the attendant
circumstances, as happens likewise in
the contests of the arena. The end at
which the boxers aim, the garland and
the honours, is pleasant ; but the
blows, and indeed the whole exertion,
are painful and grievous to flesh and
blood ; so that by the multitude of
intervening pains the incentive, which
is small in itself, loses all appearance
of being pleasant.'
4 Kal Sa-cf alpetTcu] ' And in pro-
portion as a man possesses all excel-
lence, and the happier he is, so much
the more will he be pained at
death, for to such a one life is espe-
cially valuable, and he will con-
sciously be deprived of the greatest
blessings. And this is painful. But
he is not the less brave, nay, perhaps
even more, because he chooses the
noble in war in preference to those
other goods.' These last words may
remind us of the characteristic attri-
Imted by Wordsworth to his Happy
Warrior, who is ' more brave for this,
that he hath much to love.' The
whole of Wordsworth's description
may well be compared with that of
Aristotle :
' Who, if he be called upon to
face
Some awful moment to which Heaven
has joined
Great issues, good or bad for human
kind,
Is happy as a lover, and attired
With sudden brightness, like a man
inspired ;
And, through the heat of conflict,
keeps the law
In calmness made, and sees what he
foresaw ;
Or if an unexpected call succeed,
Come when it will, is equal to the
need:
He who, though thus endued as with
a sense
And faculty for storm and turbulence,
Is yet a soul whose master-bias leans
To homefelt pleasures and to gentle
scenes ;
Sweet images! which wheresoe'er ho
be
Are at his heart, and such fidelity
It is his darling passion to approve ;
More brave for this, that he hath
much to love.'
The consciousness of the sacrifice to
be made appears rather more promi-
nent in Aristotle's brave man than in
Wordsworth's. In saying this we
must not forget that the word ' sacri-
fice,' in the moral sense of the term,
expresses an idea that has grown
up in the human mind subsequently
to Aristotle. How nearly Aristotle,
by the force of his penetration,
realised it, the present chapter shows
most remarkably.
46
IIGIKflN NIKOMAXEIQN III.
[ClIAP.
5 avr' exstvwv a.lpiiTO.1. ov Srj Iv a.7rd(ra.i$ TOLI$ dpSTaft; TO
6 Trrsra/.
xpotTurrovg
rou rs
sTTov TUTTO) ys
IO Msra 3s ratjTTjv Trsp)
yap OUTOJ 7rpo TOU x<i/-
a xs3>j xaraXXarrot/ra/.
<p^<75a> * T/
ex rtbv s}py[j.eva)v.
5 ou 5^ ^airreTai] 'Therefore
it is not the case that in all the virtues
virtuous action is accompanied by
pleasure, except in so far as one
attains to the End-in-itself.' On the
import of this passage, see Essay IV.
p. 176. With tydwTerat, ns is to be
understood ; see above, in. i. 6, note.
6 ffrpaTtci>TO.s 8' Kara.\\6.TTOVTa.C\
' After all, perhaps it is true that it is
not brave men such as I have de-
scribed who will make the best mer-
cenaries, but fellows who, while they
are less brave, have nothing to
lose ; for these are ready for dangers,
and will sell their life for a trifling
sum.' See above, ch. viii. 9, note.
On the readiness of miserable wretches
for danger and death, cf. Shakespeare,
Macbeth, Act in. Sc. i :
Second Murderer. I am one, my
lioge,
Whom the vile blows and buffets of
the world
Have so incens'd, that I am reckless
what
I do, to spite the world.
First Murderer. And I another,
So weary with disasters, tugg'd with
fortune,
That I would set my life on any
chance,
To mend it, or be rid on't.
X. Mera 8 raim)v ap
let us speak of temperance, for .these
(namely, courage and temperance) seem
to be the excellencies of the irrational
parts of our nature.' This is almost
the only indication which Aristotle
gives of the system upon which he
lias arranged the several virtues in
order; he places together, and first
treats of, the development of the
lower and more instinctive qualities.
On the arrangement of the remaining
virtues see the plan of Book IV.
With regard to the first two, there is
a want of any distinct principle in
their arrangement. If it be said
that they are based on 6vfj.6s and
4vidv/ji'ia, and that Aristotle begins at
the bottom of the scale, why does he
not begin with a<e$poa\>vt\, since 0u-
/j.6s is higher than &rt0ujui'a (Eth. vn.
vi. i)? Again, as we have seen (ch.
viii. 12) 0wju<$s is here considered
rather as having an occasional con-
nection with courage than as being
the basis of it. But in fact Aristotle's
Ethics are very little psychological in
their character. In them psychology
and morals arc both in process of for-
mation ; we cannot therefore expect
in so tentative and unfinished a work
to find systematic arrangement. Ari-
stotle probably began his list of the
virtues with courage and temperance
because they were two of the Greek
cardinal virtues, and when he came
to temperance, he said ' this comes
IX. X.]
II91KON N1KOMAXEU1N ill.
47
yap Twv ahoyiov pspibv aurai slvai al apsrai. OTI fj.lv oZv
TTspi Tr t tiovas KI (T(o^po(Tuvrj,
xai ouv b[j.oia)$ (TT/ TSpt rag
avToit; 0= xa\ y axoXacr/a $a/yrai. TTS^I Troiag o5v rtov
al (rco/xarixa/, olov 0<Aor<jU./a </Xo^a$=<a ' exdrspog yap
next, since it also belongs to the irra-
tional part of our nature.'
TJ< a\($7&)j' ^tfpwi/] The instincts,
such as those of self-preservation, fear,
desire, &c., can only be capable of
excellence by being brought under a
law (/tecrJrTjs, \6yos~) of the intellect,
having no law in themselves. This
law of the intellect becomes the most
important part of the conception of
virtues, as form is more striking than
matter. In Plato the law is put for
virtue altogether, and thus, - as we
saw, he calls courage a science.
Similarly in the Ckarmidcs, where
temperance is discussed, the nearest
definition that is given is ' self-know-
ledge,' though it is shown that mere
' self-knowledge ' has no content, and
would be a useless blank ; therefore it
is implied that knowledge of the good
must be added to make the conception
complete.
It is the extreme opposite of Plato's
view to speak of temperance as 'a
virtue of the instincts ' (rwv a.\6y<nv
fifpSiv'); the word uta&riis however in
the next line implies what was omitted,
namely, ' under a law of the intellect.'
The formula of Aristotle attributes a
worth to the bodily instincts which
would be opposed to asceticism.
which, in spite of the false etymology
given in Plato's Cratylvs, 41 1 E, and
Eth. vr. v. 5, meant originally ' sound-
mindedness' (in German Besonnen-
heit), soon came to mean temperance
with regard to pleasures. In this
sense it is often popularly defined by
Plato, cf. Bepub. p. 430 E: K^tr/uoy vov
TIS i] trufypoavvri &TTI KO.\ ifiovuv nviav
Kai eTfiQvfjuiav tyKparem. Sympos. p. 196
C : e?foj yap 6fj.o\oye7rai ff(a<ppo<ruvr] rb
KpCLTflV fjSofUV /Col fTTLdv/MWI', &C. AH-
stotle's procedure in discussing it is
first to ascertain definitely its object.
Pleasures are either bodily or mental.
With mental pleasures temperance and
intemperance are not concerned. Nor
again with all bodily pleasures not
those of hearing, nor of smell; but
only the merely animal pleasures (Siv
Kal TO; AOITT& KoivtaveT) of touch
and taste. Even taste, as an object
of intemperance, reduces itself to
touch ; and with regard to touch we
must exclude the manly and human
satisfaction felt in exercise, &c. (chap-
ter xi.) Desires of the kind in
question are either common, or special
and acquired (tSioi. Kal firiOiToi) ; in
the former, excess is the only kind of
error possible ; in the latter all kinds
of errors are committed. The only
pains with which temperance and in-
temperance can be concerned are
pains arising from the want of certain
pleasures; these pains the intemperate
man feels to excess. While intempe-
rance thus consists in excess, there is
no such thing as deficiency in the
sense for the above-named pleasures ;
thus there is no name for the opposite
extreme to intemperance. In respect
of propriety, health, and fortune, and
with a regard to what is noble, the
temperate man preserves a balance.
2 8t7?p7)(T0a?<raz' Siapofas] 'We must
take a distinction between the bodily
48
IlOIKilN N1KOMAXEIQN III. [CiiAP.
YO-lpEl, 06 (JxXrjTiXOJ eO~TW, OU^SV TTaO'^OJ'TOJ TOU
* . <X / ( N\ \ \
01 6S TTSpl Tag
roiatrraf ijSoi'aj ours (rax$>pov=$ OUTS axoAaa"To/ Xs
<; xa
ou' ot TTSp TaaAXa oai /xr) (ra>|aar<xa elcriv'
xa/ Trspi rtbv TU^OVTCOV
a, axoAa<7Toy 8* ou
ouSs TOU^ XyTroujasvou^ 7ri %pr t [j,a<r iv
3 7T5/ 8e raj <ra)jU,arixaj enj ai/ r) e
ouSs rauraj* 01 yap ^aipovrsg To$
xa< (Tfflfj.ao'i xou "ypa.$jj, OUTS (ra)Q>povs$ OUTS
Xsyovrat ' xaiVoi So^s/sv av sTvai xa) coj 3s?
ooi/
s xa sv roj Trsp TV axo7]v * TOUJ yap
jU.=Xe(T<v r) uTroxptVsj ouSsJj axoAa-
Xeys/, oy TOUJ a)j Ss7 (Tio^povas. ouSe
Trspi r^v ofTjaTjv, TrXrjV xara (TUjU^s^rjxoj * TOUJ yap
povTa$ fJir^wv f) poScov ^ Qufj.ia.[j.a.Tiov oo"|U,aTj ou
axoXaa"Touj, aXXa jtxaXXov TOUJ ju,upa>v xa; oi|/a)i/ *
yap TOVTOI$ ol axoXaerTO/, on 8<a ToJra>v
i'Soi ' av T<J xa<
TO 8s rojouTOij p^
1 raura. oux eVn 8s ou8s roTj
axoAa<rroy TOUTO> -yap iri
%u>oi$ xard Tauraj
pleasures and such as are mental, like
ambition and the desire of knowledge.
The man who has either of these feel-
ings takes pleasure in the object of
his desire without the body being at
all affected, but only tho mind.' The
writing is loose here, constituting a
(T^^/no irpbs rb (rijfjLa^/Jifvov. Transi-
tions as from <f>t\orifj.ia to <pi\6ri(j.os
are common. Cf. below, ch. xi. 3 :
5ib As'-yovTcu ovroi yaffrplfiLafiyoi, where
there is nothing preceding which an-
swers to yaarpinapyot, only a general
description of a course of action.
4 5 While Aristotle justly says
that the words temperance and intem-
perance do not apply to the pleasure
felt in colours, forms, painting,
music, and acting, it is strange that
he should have spoken of these at all
as bodily pleasures. Such a way of
speaking shows an early and immature
psychology.
6 Pleasures of smell are not the
objects of intemperance, except acci-
dentally, as by association, reminding
people of eating, &c. Eudemus
quotes a witty remark on the subject.
Eth. End. nr. ii. i o : ^u/teAws ^>TJ
'2rpar6vtKos rets per Kd\bi> oeit>, ras 5e
r,Sv.
7 Brutes, says Aristotle, have no
pleasures of hearing, or smell, or
sight, except accidental ones, namely
X.]
II0IKUN NIKOMAXEIQN III.
rag al<r3r/r=i rjooz/rj TrTujv xara
r>v
c
roO /3oo,
yf s8co8-7 or* 8' l
o-j05 yap ran;
rr jSpaxrsi*
' o TvlVov T>J 4 :
<TT/, Oia
v8' i8ajv y s'jpf/ov sAa^ov ^ aypiov cuya, aXX' or< fiopav
rmavrag 8^ rfiovas "Q (ra>^)po<rov7] xat 138
<ov xai TO, Xo/7ra ^toa xovcoveT, oS=v
a} Qr^tw^sis fyaivovrai' O.VTOU 8* si<r;!/
^aivovraj 8vj xa< T^ -ysu(rs/ ITTI [j.ixpov ^ 9
i' T?J yap y=u<rco^ lo-r<v ij xp'uris rtbv
V Oi TOL^ otvOUg $OXl'Jid%OVTS$ Xttl Tflt
ou TTavu 8= %ot.ipov<ri TOUTOIS, rl ou o
dbroAau<re/, ^ yivsrai
<
xai v
8to xa
xa) sv TTOTOI^ xai roTj
rov
when sounds or scents indicate to
them their prey or their food. It
may be questioned whether this is
absolutely true, whether, for instance,
brutes are not capable of some plea-
sure from musical sounds. This
appears to be the case with lizards
and snakes ; and horses are fond of
bells. It is said that the cat likes the
smell of mint. Dogs like the smell
of carrion, apparently for its own
sake, this being their taste. With
brutes the senses are the intellect, and
thus by the well-known law that as
an organ increases in fineness of per-
ception, it decreases in sensitiveness to
pleasure and pain, we may conceive
how it is that the fine perceptive
organs of brutes are to them in a less
degree the instruments of pleasure.
See Sir W. Hamilton, Beitf s Works,
pp. 880 and 886.
fvpwv eA.ew|>ov] This alludes to Homer,
11. in. 23 :
&ypiov 0170.
tvpuv T) t\a(f>ov Kfp
VOL. II.
10 Sib /col rji|oT({ TJS
The name of this glutton is recorded
by Eudemus (m. ii. 10), who para-
phrases the present passage as fol-
lows : Sib ol o\]/o<j>dyot OVK eHx oinM T V
epdvov, Sffirep $i\6evos 6 "Epf5-
|i8os. Athenseus mentions the same
story (vm. 26), quoting the verses
*A.<{{ew>s Toff, <J>s \tyovff", 6 Kvfrfipios
eva.To rpiwv ex flv ^-dpvyya, Trf)x fo * v -
Aristotle uses the word tpdpvyya here
in its loose sense for the ' throat,' as
\dpvy (which properly meant the top
of the windpipe) was also loosely em-
ployed by the ancients to mean the
whole throat. Speaking scientifically
Aristotle confined the term <pdpuy to
mean the trachea or windpipe, dis-
tinguishing it from the oesophagus or
gullet, cf. De Part. An. m. iii. i :
6 [*ev c&v <j)dpvy TOV irvevfuvros ei/e-
nev Tf((pvKff 6 5" oia<xpdyos t<nl Si"
ou j) rpo<p)i iropeverai els rijv Kot\iav.
The latter was the term properly
required above. Aristotle seems to
50
lieiKHN NIKOMAXEU1N III.
[ClIAP.
av
v yspdvov ysverQai, MS ybopsvos ry cityy. xoi~
TO>V alo-$r;o-a>i> xa6' fy TJ axoXa<r/a* xa)
8rro sJvcx.i t on oup Y
YJ a>a. TO 8 TOIOUTO/ aiew xai
8s. xai
xai
<, olov ai Iv
<voju,sva * ov yap
TO o-ijM,a 13 TOU axoAaa-TOu a^>5, aXXa Trsp/ Tiva /xepr ; .
1 1 Taiv 8' 7n$u/jutoi/ ai ftev xoivai 8oxouo-<v ?i/a, ai 8' iO<
xa) STTideroi. olov >] JOLSV T% rpo^s 4 :>UO "' X1 3"
7n9ujae7 6 evSerj? ^>3paj ^ 6yp Tpo($)7]$, OTS 8* a
euvvjc, <^>30~}v "'OjU-'j'jpo^, o veo xa< axjU-a^cov ' TO
2 ^ T0<ao~oe, OUXSTI Traj, ouSe Ttov awTtov. 0<o
r t fj.eTspov eJva.1. ou ju/ijv aAX* e^s< ye
T?pa yap Toi eo~T<v >8a xai
afj.a.pTavoua-1 xai $' Iv, ITT) TO TT^SIOV. TO, yap s&Qisiv TO.
f,, y7rsp|3a7;XJv O~T< TO
-Jj irivtiv scag
TCO
Trapa TO E
uVTjy. TO;OUTOI
4 Xiav av6pa7ro8tt8ei^. 7Tpi Se Ta^ i8/aj TOJIV ij
o
have considered that the pleasure of
gluttony was not in taste, of which the
tongue was the organ, but in the con-
tact of food with the passage of the
oesophagus.
XI. 1 Kol twfjy, ^Tjffic "O/xijpos]
Iliad, xxiv. 1 29 : /t/*TjjUVos oi/re TI
airov, OJ/r' euc^y, the remonstrance of
Thetis to Achilles. It ia plain what
tvfTJs means.
2 Sib rvx&vTtav\ 'Hence (this
choice of particular foods, &c.) appears
merely factitious. In reality, how-
ever, it has something natural in it,
for different things are pleasant to
different people, and all men have
their preferences.' Aristotle attributes
the very diversity of tastes to a law of
nature, which no doubt exists, and
to a wise purpose, else what a fearful
rivalry there would be in the world.
Some MSS. for vnaiv read THTIV. It
seems common for transcribers, when
they do not understand a sentence, to
play fast and loose with iroj and TIJ :
see below, Eth. \. \iL 4.
3 ycuTTpi/Mpyoi] - ' Greedy -bellies '
from ndpyos, cf. Homer, Od. xvni.
2, fj.fra 8" tirpeire yaffrtpi /j.dpyri and
Euripides, Cyclops 310, irdpts rb
ir\r)powTes ai>Tf)v] sc. r
which is to be supplied from yaurrpi-
fJMpyoi, according to the Aristotelian
mode of writing.
X. XL]
NIKOMAXEIQN III.
51
xai
no %ap=iv 01$ ^t,rj ;, r rto
/, 7) jtATJ (O$ 0=7, XOLTCt. TTOLVTOi 8* 01 aXo'AaO~TOJ UTTSp-
xa; yap pa/poyo~JV sv/o< ojg 1 ou 8=7
xa* e T/<r( 5=7 %aipiv rtbv TOiovrtav, jaaX
of TroXAo} pa<pou<r<v. ij jasv o5v Trspi ra^ rjoovac s
f; OTJ axo?^a(Tj'a xai \J/;xrov, OTjXov Trspi 8s
vf)&:ia$ rco <JTTO jasv s<v ?wy
73 0=7,
ra>
X'JTT^V OS 7TOi=7 aUTCO 7] TjOOi/rj), 8s (TCo4>fltt)V TtO JU.V)
=7o"5ai r^ ctTroyo'j'a xa< ra) a7ry=<75a< TOU TJOSO^. o jtxsv 6
ouv axoXaoro^ s^"^yju.s7 ruiv TJ'OS'OJV 7ravr)v ^ rtov
xa) aysra< WTTO T% S7riQv[j.ia$ CO<TTS OLVTI rwv
al:7ir6aj* 0<o xai XuTrsTrat xai aTroryy^avfov xat
aroVa) o' SGJXS TO
8s ?rspj r
vovroti' 06 yap
rj TO<auT7j avai<r5rjO-/a* xai yap ra Xoj?ra ^"aJa 0/axp/vs/ ra
(3p<o/Aara, xa} ro7^ jtxsv ^a/psx roTj 8* ou * si 8s TOJ i^rfiiv
etrriv rjou /xr^s 8<a(^sps< srspov sVs'pou, Tro'ppa) av SITJ TOU
av$p(07ro$ shai ' ov TSTSU^S 8' 6 TO/OUTO^ QvopaTOg Old TO
r)8ova^ xai T^TTOV
4 ^ ry /xaAAov, ^ fas o< iroXAcn]
It seems almost certain that is here
is an interpolation. It could not hare
been said that 'with regard to the
special pleasures men are called
" lovers of particular things " because
they like them as people in general do'
What Aristotle -wrote was, no doubt,
rj rif fia\\ov rj ol vo\\ol, ' or because
they like them more than people in
general ; ' cf. Eth. nr. \\. 4, tvatyovvres
(t.ft> t*\ T& .(Jia\\ov -fj ol iroAAoi,
fyfyovrfs 5 1 ^irt rb /ioAAoi' ^ Se?. The
copyist must hare taken ij of woAAoi
for a separate sentence, and so have
thought it necessary to insert is.
5 na.1 T)JV \v-ir>)v 8e noitl ainf T\
' And thus it is pleasure that
produces him his pain.' This is stated
as if it were a sort of disgraceful pa-
radox, which takes place in intem-
perance.
7 ow ird.w yivoirrai'] Aristotle,
from his experience as a Greek,
might hare been justified in asserting
that a deficiency in the sense for plea-
sures ' could hardly be said to exist.'
It is not so certain that the same
would be true in all periods of the
world. It is not so certain that the
monkish turn of mind does not oc-
casionally diminish to an unhappy
extent the natural and human feel-
ings, so as to impair the kindliness,
the geniality, and the good sense of
mankind.
ii 2
52
I16IKQN NIKOMAXEIilN III.
[CHAP.
8 /xrj TTCLVU ytvsvba.1. b 8s (rwQpiov jasVco^ Trsp} TOUT
oors yap r;8sTa< ol^ jaaTjora o axo'?ia<rTO, a
8uo-p?pa<W/, ou#' oAa> oT^ jarj 8s7 OUTS <r<o'8pa roiourvp
o'josv/, OUT' ctTTovrcov XuTrsiYai ou8* STriQvp.ii,
jtxaXXov ^ 8s7, ou8' on j,r) 8=7, 008' oAaj
* oo~a 8e 7rpo vyt'sidv e<mv ^ 7Tpo eus/
)v ops^srai [j.Tpia)$ xai a5c 8e7, xa< rcov
jw.^ fcjU,7ro8/a)V rouroij ovrcav v\ Trapa, TO xaXov ig wTrep T>JV
r>v<rioiv. o yap our>$ svcof jaaXAov ayaTra ra^ roiaura^
j~ia' b 8s (riofuv 06 TO<OUTO^ aXX* eo$ o
12
p 8/' T;8ov>5v, ^ 8s 8/a XU
TO
8s
TO s
TOU
8 Wo see how indefinite after all
Aristotle has left the standard of tem-
perance, he refers it merely to the
blank formula of &>s Se? and rb Ka\6v.
In so leaving it, however, he appeals
to a sense in each man's own mind.
There is a relative element to be con-
sidered, the health or fortune of the
individual (Trpbs vyitiav, ^ inrtp r^v
ovaiav}, and there is also something
that appears absolute amidst all that
is relative (rj> Ka.\6v).
6 7&p ovrws <ex uv ~\ This is an
awkward piece of writing. OUTWS
refers to those phrases which have
been negatived iropa rl Ka\bv $ inrtp
XII. Which is most voluntary,
cowardice or intemperance? a suitable
question to conclude a Book which
opened with a theory of the voluntary
and proceeded to discuss courage and
temperance. Thus fnr there is method.
Courage and temperance are con-
sidered very much throughout in re-
lation to each other, and here they arc
considered in relation to the voluntary.
On tin- other hand the subject of this
chapter is closely connected with the
theory of the formation of habits (Eth.
n. i. ii.), and also with the questions
mooted above (Eth. in. v.) as to the
voluntariness of vicious habits. Stand-
ing then as it does isolated, it forms an
instance of the immaturity of Ari-
stotle's moral investigations.
Intemperance is more voluntary
than cowardice, inasmuch as it con-
sists in choosing pleasure, while
cowardice is under a sort of compul-
sion, flying from pain. (2) Again it
is easier by practice to learn to resist
temptation, than it is to learn to with-
stand danger, for the opportunities are
frequent and free from risk. Hence
intemperance is the more disgraceful
of the two. (3) These vices are in a
peculiar way different from each
other, for cowardice as a whole is
more voluntary than its parts. In-
temperance as a whole is less volun-
tary than its parts.
The chapter ends with some re-
marks on the nature of aKoXatrta as
connected with its etymology.
2 KO.\ rj n^v AtJTrrj iroieT] ' And
while pain distwicts and overturns the
XL XII.] H9IK1N NIKOMAXEIQN III.
53
a
8 s IXOUQ-JOV
7rpo avra*
o/jioaj
/xsv
<'jo-<v, TJ 8= r]8oi/>j
ftirj xa) 7rov<8/<7TOTpoy. xai yap s
7T&X?\.a yap ev TO> $/<w Ta rojayra, xal 01
ITT} 8s TCOV QofizpSw avotTraJ^iv. fio^sts 8* ay
IXOUQ-JOV 13 8<A/a sTva/ TG? xa5' xa<7Tov
aAu7ro, raOra 8s 8ja XUTTTJV e^/o-
piTTTZiv xa) rd7^a aa-ffifjioviiv S/o xa} 6oxsT fiiaia s
rip o' axo?^a(TTto ava?ra?uv ra ju,sv xa5' exacra
e/ri5u ( aout/ri yap xa} opsyo/xsvco, TO 8' o?\.ov fyTTO
yap endu^ttci axoXacrro^ gTva/. TO 8' &vo ( aa TTJJ axoXao~/ac 5
xa} STT; Taj TraMixag aaapT/aj <$po/xsv l^oucri yap T/va
TTOTSpOV 8* aTTO TTOTEpOU XaX?Ta<, Ow6 = V TTpO^
<, 8^?\.ov 8' <m TO u<rTpov aTro TOU Trpo-
Tpoi>. oy xaxaj^ 8* so/xs [j.=Tsyr l vs%Qai ' xsxoXao-5a; yap 6
6? TO Taiv aJo-^pcov opsyo'jasvov xa/ TroXX^v au^rjo-iv e^ov,
8s jU,aX<o"Ta vj artfojua xai o 7rou$ ' xar' twi-
yap ^ctxri xa< Ta 7ra/8j'a, xa)
mental balance of him who expe-
riences it, pleasure does nothing of
the kind.' *uo-iy here denotes the
perfect or normal state: see above,
iYA. n. i. 3, note.
3 Soeie 5' SP e|ttrT7j(n'] 'But
cowardice is not equally voluntary
with (f. e. is more voluntary than) its
particular acts, for in itself it is pain-
less, while its particulars distract the
mind with pain.' It seems curious to
speak of cowardice in this abstract
way as distinct from all particular
acts of cowardice. It is, however,
true that cowardice is not, like in-
temperance, a growing chain upon
the mind. Each cowardly act, while
it leaves the mind irresolute and so
prone to fresh cowardice, on the other
hand brings experience and renders
the mind more familiar with danger.
Thus cowardice, which at first was
involuntary, tends to become more
and more voluntary and deliberate,
the more it is continued in ; but in-
temperance, which at first was volun-
tary, becomes the longer it lasts more
and more involuntary and a mere
bondage.
5 6 rb & ovofM. ope^is] ' Now
the name intemperance (or unre-
strainedness) we apply also to the
faults of children, for these havo
some resemblance to it. Which is
called from which, matters not for our
present purpose ; obviously that which
is later in conception is called from
that which is earlier. And it seems
no bad metaphor, for that which han-
kers after what is base, and which has
a mighty capacity for development, re-
quires to be chastened, and this is
just the character of desire and of the
child. Children live entirely by desire,
and have the longing for what is
pleasant most strongly.' Eudemus
(Eih. Eud. m. ii. i) commences his
account of intemperance with this
etymology. He points out that 0x6-
\aaros is capable of two meanings,
IIOIKON NIKOMAXEIflN III. [CHAP. XII.
xa
xa
T>
xai
=j TO
xav
xot
TO
ps^ig
svspysia
xa< TOI>
xa)
9
TO>
yo]U,V xa
TO 7rpo(TTayfj.a TOU
xaTa TOV Xo'yov.
o~t>ja4>a)VTv Tto
TO xaAo'v, xai s7TiQu[j,s7 o (Tfo
6= TCtTT/ Xa/ Xo'O^.
wv osi xai co
etvai
TO
p yap
^v, OUTO> xa< TO
TOU <rax>wo T0
OT -
' he that has not been chastened '
and ' ho that cannot be chastened.'
His account of the metaphor implied
in the word appears to be lost. He
says (3) 8i7pai|(ajU' irp6Tfpov iras
rV a.Ko\affiav ovofuiomes /J.fra<p4pofjie v,
but in "^. jFw^. n. iii., to which he
alludes, there is apparently a lacuna.
Aristotle declines to decide which is
the primary and which the metapho-
rical use of the word ; but there can
l>e no doubt that the punishment and
unrestrainedness of children is the
more concrete and the primary idea.
7 el oZv tvavTiovffOa.i\ ' If then
this thing be not obedient and sub-
jected to the governing element, it
will develop vastly ; for the longing
for what is pleasant is insatiable in
him that is foolish, and it seeks
satisfaction from all quarters ; and the
exercise of desire increases its native
powers, and if the desires grow great
and vehement, they expel all reasoning
in the end. Wherefore the desires
should be moderate and few, and no-
wise opposed to the law of reason.'
EinrfiSes is indefinite ; it might refer
either to ?j tiriBv^ia or 6 irats. Ari-
stotle speaking indistinctly had the
idea of tirt8vfj.(a most present to his
mind. Out of this etymology of
' intemperance ' ho develops anew
the relationship which ought to exist
between the passions and the reason.
The passions should be to the reason
as a child to his tutor. This analogy
was already suggested in Eth. i. xiii.
19 : StTrbv <-<TTCM (col T?> \dyov %x ov i T ^
fj.tv Kvpiws Ka.1 iv airrif, ri> S" &ffitfp
TOV TTdTptis O.KOV(fTlK6v Tt.
PLAN OF BOOK IV.
WITH only two exceptions, this Book follows faithfully the
programme drawn out in the seventh chapter of Book II.
These exceptions are, that it inverts the order of the social virtues
Truth, Wit, and Friendship ; and that, being at its close frag-
mentary or mutilated, it omits to discuss Indignation, and breaks
off in the middle of a discussion upon Modesty.
The only question, then, that arises, is can we find any logical
sequence in Aristotle's list of the virtues as given in Book II. and
followed out here ? There are various principles on which a classi-
fication of the virtues might have been made ; as, for instance, on
a principle of psychological division, it might have been shown how
the virtues are the proper development of man's nature in its
various parts. Or, again, with a view to education, the virtues
might have been arranged according to the most natural order of
inculcation. Or, again, in point of excellence, the greater virtues
might have taken precedence of the lesser ones. But no one broad
principle of this kind is to be found in the arrangement made by
Aristotle. It must always be remembered that his Ethics, while
tending to advance psychology very greatly, are not composed upon
a psychological system. Hence, though he said (Eth. m. x. 1) that
Temperance must succeed Courage, because these both consisted
in the regulation of the brute instincts, we do not find elsewhere
any reference to a classification of the parts of man's nature.
Aristotle, having clearly divided moral from intellectual excellence,
does not carry out the same sort of division in discussing moral
excellence. He seems to have taken up first the most prominent
and striking qualities, according to the common notions in Greece
Courage, Temperance, and Liberality. Liberality suggested to
50 PLAN OF BOOK IV.
him Magnificence Magnificence, High-mindedness ; and from this
he proceeded to distinguish the more ordinary quality of Ambition.
He then added, what had hitherto been omitted, the virtue of
regulation of the temper ; and pointed out that in social inter-
course three excellent qualities are produced by bringing the
demeanour under the control of the law of balance. Lastly, even
in the instinctive and untrained feelings of Modesty and Indig-
nation, this same law exhibits itself.
HOIKfiN NIKOMAXEI&N IV.
A ETOMEN 8 1 e^ri<
r\ Trsp p^praara jU,so-orrj' STraiVsrai yap
S oux ev T6? 7roXsja/xoj, ou8' ev oT^ o <ra
a5 Iv raVj xp/<rs(7<v, aATia Trsp} 8oV<v
S' Jv ry SoVsi. p^p^ara 8=
xai
sv 2
a(ro)Ta xa/
Trep
xa
/ 73
jtxsv
xa
TTpoeraTrrojasv asi
a<rojrav stris po[j.;v sviors (njfJLTr^sxovTsg' TOV$ -yap axpa- .
xat eJt; axoAacr/av Sa?rav>jpot^ a<rwroyg i xaXou^u-sv.
xai <t atJ ^ ' TaT01 8oxoOo-<v sTva<. TroXXa^ yap ajaa4
/a^ p/oy<nv. ou Sv; olxsicog Trpocrayopsuovrar jSouXs- 5
ra/ -yap ao"a>ro^ eTva/ o ev r* xaxov sp^cov, TO <$>&sipsiv rr/v
ov<rioiv' oi(rwros yap o 8*' aurov
I. i . Aristotle's excellent account
of liberality represents it as the
balance between illiberality and pro-
digality. On the characters pro-
duced by these different qualities the
most discriminating and happy re-
marks are made in the present chap-
ter.
i o65' ou ej/ TCUS Kpfcrein;'] ' Nor
again in decisions.' The Paraphrast
adds ScrTrep 6 Stream. Kpicm here is
used in a general sense ; it may or
may not be a legal decision. Cf. tfA.
v. vi. 4 : T; 7&p SIKTJ Kpi'crts roO SIKOUOI;
Kal TOI/ aS'iKou.
VOL. II.
5e /ieTpetrai]
we call "property" all things whose
Talue is measured by money.' In
other words 'all things with an ex-
changeable value.'
3 rV 8' affdirlaf Ka\ovpev~\ ' But
the term "prodigality" we sometimes
apply in a complicated sense, for we
call those who are incontinent and
who lavish money on intemperance
prodigals.' Exactly the same usage
has been confirmed in modern lan-
guage by the associations of the
parable of 'the Prodigal Son.'
5 ov 6?) oiKt'uts ^(cS
58
HGIKiiN NIKOMAXEIQN IV.
[CHAP.
rig KUTOV sivai xai TJ
fa
Toy
vp
eo~Ti T<OV
e xa/
exao~T<o 8'
o e%(ov TVJV Trspl TOUTO uptTJjV' xaJ TrXouYco
apKTTOi 6 ep^cov TTJV Trep} Ta
v 6 gXsuSsp/o^. %pr)<ri$ $ el
xai $00*1^* 73 8e Xr^/f xai >]
roy Ayy?pioy TO
8=T xai /AT) AajU./3avejv o$=v ou Or?,
yap dpTV) ftaAAOV TO ey Troistv $ TO U 7rao~pSiV, xal
Ta xaXa TTpdrrsiv jtxaAAOV TJ Ta a)<rppa JU.TJ Trparrsiv
8 oux ar;AOv 8' OT< Tjj jU,sv OoVet 7r=Ta< TO t5 Troiiiy xai TO
alo-^po7rpay<y. xaJ 13 %&pi$ T<*> 8<6o'/T<, oy TO) jar^ Aa/x-
9 $ai/ot/T/, xa) 6 STTOUVOS Ss jaaXAOv. xa; paov TO ^cuj
' This application of the name is im-
proper ; for " prodigal " ought to
denote a man who has one fault, the
habit of wasting his substance. The
word literally means " he who destroys
himself," and the wasting of one's
substance may well be thought a kind
of self-destruction, for life depends
upon substance. This accordingly is
the sense in which we take the word
"prodigality."' Aristotle attributes
some weight here to the etymology of
&a-teros, arguing that the man who
destroys his property, destroys him-
self, and he who destroys himself is
beyond salvation (Strewros). BouAercu
tli/at is exactly analogous to the En-
glish word ' means.' Cf. Eth. m. i. 15,
Tb 8' aKovfftuv /BouAfTcu \fyt<r6cu K.T.\.
In Eth. v. v. 14, /3o^A,TOi is used in
a slightly different sense to denote
not the ' meaning ' of a word, but a
'tendency' in things, 8/ua>s 8 &ov\trai
fJifVtlV jJ.U\\OV.
7 Liberality or ' the virtue con-
nected with property ' consists more
in right giving and spending than in
right receiving. The former is the
positive and active side, the latter is
the negative and passive side.
Giving is the ' use ' of money, receiving
and keeping is mere ' possession.'
And ' use ', as Aristotle tells us in the
Rhetoric (i. v. 7), constitutes wealth
proper, as being a sort of life and
reality (ti>4pytta'), which mere posses-
sion is not. "OAws S rb ir\oureiv
tffrlv Iv Ttf xpTJffdcu fj.a\\ot> t) iv rif
KfHrriffBai ' Kal ycip i} Ivipytui l<m rOav
TO'.OVTUV Kal fl XpTJf'S 1T\OVTOS.
3 OVK &$TI\OV 8' euVx/wpa?*"']
' It is not hard to see that giving is
an avenue to the doing of good and to
noble action, while in taking we only
receive a benefit or at most avoid a
base position.' Alffxptnrpa.yf'ti' here
seems to be on the analogy of evirpa-
yt7i>, and hence to have partly a pas-
sive, and at all events an indefinite
sense : see above, Eth. i. iv. 2, note.
AiKcuovptryla is used similarly Eth. v.
v. 17.
9 /col paov 8 a\\6rpiov~\ 'And
it is easier too to abstain from taking
I.]
H0IK&N NIKOMAXEmN IV.
59
TOW ouva/. TO yap oxsiov r^rrov
rj ou Aa ( a/3avouo-/ TO aAXoVpJov. xau s^s^s
' ot 8= U,r Aa
01 8s Xa/Aj3avovT ouS' g^atvouvrai Trai/y. <<Aouvra< Ssn
(T^SttOV fJL0.7^t(TTOL 01 steuQsptOl T<O!/ OtTT* a0ST?). CU$e'hl[JI.Ol
yap, ToSro S' Iv TYJ SoVs*. ai 3s xar' apsryv Trpd^Big J2
KoChai xcti rou xaXou evsxa. xoCi b eXsu5ep/oj ot>v ^a)<7<
rou xaAou sysxa xa) opSco^' olj yap Ss? xai oVa xai ors,
xa< ra/VAa ocra STrsrai TV) opQj) OoV=<. xa< raura TjSsVo^^
^ v aAu7ra)' TO yap xaT* apsTrjV TJ'OLI ^ aAuTrov, ^xto~Ta 2s
o OS otiovs MS W ^sT, 15 ja^ TOU xaXoc* svsxa 14
a 8/a TIV' aXX>]V alr/av, oux sAsuSspiOj aXX* aXXoj T/^
068' o XuTT^ptoj* jtxaAXov yap S'XOJT' at/ Ta
aX% 7rpa-a>, TO-JTO S' oux eAu9sp/oy.
: X7]\/Tat : 0^V |,r) Ssr OyS yap 0"T< TOU jU,7) T;jM,(OV-I5
TO, ^pr^aTO. r[ ToiawTTj Xvj\}/i^. oux av enj 3s ou8' 16
yap o~Ti TOU y
than it is to give; for men are less
willing to give away (^TTOJ/ irpu'ifvrai
fj.a\\ov) what is their own, than they
are to abstain from taking what
belongs to others.' MaAAov is redun-
dant, it goes to strengthen the com-
parative force of ^TTOV. Ou \a.p.p<f.-
vovffi corresponds to ju}; AajSeu' just
before, and makes up a positive notion
to ' abstain from . taking.' Aristotle
attributes to men in general a cha-
racter the reverse of that attributed by
Sallust to Catiline, ' alieni appetens,
sui profusus.'
II ot 8e Ao^jSai/oi/Tey oiiS' frrou-
vovv-rai irdw] ' But they who receive
are not praised at all.' flaw means
'quite': ov irdi>v in the sense of
' hardly ' is frequent in Aristotle ; cf.
Eth. HI. ii. 1213 : AojSeu/ ^ <f>vyeiv ov
RO.VV So^d^ofj.ei' 8oab//6j/ & ov irdvu
and ovSe irdw appears^to mean
' not at all,' the ouSe being joined with
the verb.
1 6 OVK Uv ej?j fvpyfTe?o~6ai] ' Nor
would he be ready to ask favours, for
it does not belong to the benefactor
to be easily a receiver of benefits.'
This is a manifestation of the spirit
which runs through the virtuous cha-
racters of Aristotle the spirit of man-
liness and nobility (avSpd>Sris not
(t>i\6Ka\os, cf. Eth. iv. iv. 3). It
appears most strongly in the cha-
racter of the high-minded man ; see
below, ch. iii. 24. The principle of
individuality, a sense of life and free
action (eVe'p-yeia), are with Aristotle the
basis of morality, and the first requisite
to nobleness seems to be self-respect.
Now, a slight difference in the way in
which this truth is stated will make
it appear a pure or a selfish principle.
Christianity says, ' It is more blessed
to give than to receive,' implying
that to gratify a feeling of love and
kindness is better than any pleasure
that the sense of gain could afford.
I 2
GO
IIGIKflN NIKOMAXEK1N IV.
[CHAP.
J 7 T=7o"$a/. oQsv 8s osi, Xrj\|/sra, olov ctTro TCOV lo/cwv
'jy a> xaXov aXX' cot; ai/ayxaibv, OTrcog evrj
it/Ct
1 8
1 9 TO 7p jU,yj
rj
TO
ev rvf SoVsj, COOTS xaraXsj7rs<v saurco =Xarra>*
TO
saoTov eeuspou. Kara
"Ksysron ' ou yap sv TCO
/ov, aXA* ev TV) TOU
s-lvai TOV Ta
eav ctTr
oi /x^
otirtipoi TS yap
But at the same time, if we analyse
the Christian sentiment of love and
charity, we cannot by any means
separate it from the development of
the personality of him that feels it.
For as all knowledge implies a sub-
ject as well as an object, so does
every moral act or feeling imply the
will and individuality of the actor. In
the Christian sentiment there is so
great a harmony between the object
and subject, that the subjective side
appears to be lost ; but in reality it is
only lost to be found again, it is di-
minished to be enhanced. Aristotle's
statement would be ' It is better to
give than to receive, because it is
more noble.' This has a slight ten-
dency to give too much weight to the
subjective side. In Aristotle's whole
account we do not find a word about
benevolence or love to others as
prompting acts of liberality. We find
no other motive but the ' splendour'
(Ka\6i>) of the acts themselves. What
is said in the present section verges
towards the selfish theory, which
would ascribe such acts to the love of
power inherent in man. In Hobbes
(Leviathan, Book i. Chap, xi.) we find
a bitter statement of the feelings with
which benefits may be received. ' To
have received from one, to whom we
think ourselves equal, greater benefits
than there is hope to requite, disposeth
to counterfeit love ; but really secret
hatred ; and puts a man into the
estate of a desperate debtor, that in
declining the sight of his creditor,
tacitly wishes him there, where he
might never see him more. For
benefits oblige, and obligation is
thraldom ; and unrequitable obligation,
perpetual thraldom, which is to one's
equal, hateful.' Cf. Eth. ix. vii.
17-19 Points in the character of
the liberal man : he will take care of
his own property in order that he
may have means for his liberality.
Hence, too, he will be discriminating
in the objects of his favours ; yet his
tendency is to forget himself, to give
largely, to leave hardly anything for
himself; yet again, liberality does
not depend on the largeness of the
gift, it is in proportion to the means
of the giver, a less gift may be more
liberal than a large one.
20 fafvOepiiarepoi 5 wojTjTaf] ' We
see that those are the most liberal who
HGIKiiN NIKOMAXEmN
61
evosiag,
TTOLVTSC; aya.7rco(ri
a.} ol
vsxa
ov TO. aurwv epya,
o yr>v$ xa. o Troiyrai. Tro-jTsjV 8* ou pctSjov rbv sXsu-
Qspiov, jU,rjT ArjTTTixov ovra ]U.r/r=
8e xai //.?) TJjacovra Si' aura ra
oVco. Oio xa) lyxaA=<Ta/ T
oi/T r[xj<7Ta TrAouTouV/v. (TVftfiotivtt o' oux
' ou yap oiov TS ypT/jOtar' f vciy
%%v), totfiFSQ ouS' STTI Ttov aXXcov. oy ja^v Swcrsi ys zz
ou SsTouS' ors jar] S=T, ouS' oo"a deXXa rojaura' ou yap
en Trparro; xara TTJV gXeuQspiorrjra, xa) si^ raura
oux av f^oi sl^ a Sri" ai/a?uVx/v. (ovTrsp yap 23
si'pTjra/, Xsu$*p<0 ecrriv 6 xara rrjv owcr/av SaTravtov xa<
s<t; a 3=T* o S' u7r=p0aXAcov
ou Xsyo^asv arrooroy^' TO yap
8o<r<ri xa*
xa
xai
XTr)(rsa)$ ou
Sa/rava/^
0001)$ Tr
xai
^a e
xa<
xa}
xa rayra
73 8s
a 7xa) oVa SsT, oftolcog Iv
^Sa>j' xai
yap TTSp) a^
yap r^ ITTISIXSI SoVsi 73 rofaur>5
Ivavr/a eerriv, al {j.\v ouv sTro'/xsvai y/yvoi/ra*
a/xa sv TO) aura), at 8' svotVTicti Sr^Xov )^ ou. lav 8s Trapa 25
TO 8sov xa) TO xaXtt)^ ^ Ol/ o~y ( a3a/vr) auTto ai/aX/o"X<v,
Ss xa/ wj SsV* TT]^ apsTT]^ yap xa<
have not themselves acquired their
property, but have inherited it ; for
they have never known what want is,
nor are they restrained by that love
of what we have ourselves produced,
which belongs to all men, and is well
exemplified in parents and poets.'
On the philosophy of this remark, cf.
.E 1 ^. rx. vii. 2-7. The remark itself
comes almost verbatim from Plato's
Republic, p. 330 B-C. Socrates asks
Cephalus whether he made his money
or inherited it, and gives as a reason
for the question, ou TO eVe/ca rip6/j.rjv,
fy 8' e'7a>, on /uoi e5oaj ou
- TOUTO 5 troiovinv
ais TO iroAu o? &v /x); ourol Krrjffcevrai
ol 5e KTTjffajUevoi 5iirA.f/ ^ ot ^AAot
do"irct^bvTai aura uffirep yap oi irotTjTal
TOI auT&Jj/ Troi^/J.ara KOI ol irarepes TOUS
irarSas a-yaTwffi, rauTjj re 6r? /cal
Xp~nfJ.aricdiJ.evoi -rrepl ra xp'?M aTa O"TOU-
So^buo'ti/, a>s tpyov kavriav, nal Kcnarfyv
Xptiav, TjVep of iiAAot.
21 With perfect good sense Ari-
stotle says that a very natural expla-
nation may be given of the common
railings you hear against fortune for
not making ' the right people ' (i.e.
the liberal) rich. People can't expect
G"2
NIKOMAXEIiiN IV.
[COAP.
26rf8so-$a/ xou Au7rs7o-$a< sty* oig 8=7 xat wg 8=7. xa/ su
27 t/7jro 8' sVrjv 6 eAsu5s'p<0 sj ^pv^uara
xs7o~$a/, jM.7) rijUtov ye ra ^pr^ara, xa/
s'/rt 8eov ju,] avaXaxrsv vj AuTroujasvo^ si ^X
28 xa) rto ^ijtuuy/^Y) oux apsa-xofJisvog. o 3' aa~a)Tog xa/ ei
rovTQig 8iaju,aprai/s<. OUTS yap rj'osrai <$>' ol 8s7 Q'J^s 5
29 Ss7 ours XuTTsirai* eVrai 8s 7rpoi'ouo-t Qavspwrepov.
8' -j^'jaTv OT< uTTsp/SoAa) xai fXX(A^ff$ s*o~<v T] durcoT
avsXsuQe^Ja, xa) sv8uo~/v,sv SoVs/ xa) X>]\{/si xai r^v S
yap slj T^V SoV<v rffisfLtv. ill ju-sv o5v a<ra>T/a TO)
xai JUT) Xa/x^a'vsiv uTrsp^a'XXsi, T> 8s Aa//./3a'vsjj/ sX
73 8' avsXsu9sp/a Ttp 8<8o'i/ai jtxev sAXsiVs/, rai
308' uTrsp^aXXsi, wA^f STT< p,ixpoig. TO. fjisv oZv ryg a.<ra)Ttag
oy Trdivu (ruvSua^srai ou yap pa8iov ]U.7]8ajU,o'5sv
7rao~/ 8<8o'va/ ra^scog yap STTI^SITTSI r\ ouo~/a
3 8j8o'vra, oiTrep xai 8oxoOo-<v atrcoroi sTvat, STTSJ o ys
8o^ssv av oi ^,<xp<o /SsXr/cov sTvat rou avsXsuQspou. eviarog
to be rich who have hardly any care
for money, and this is the characte-
ristic of the liberal.
26-27 ol evKoiv&vriTOS apeo"/((5-
juevos] ' Further, the liberal man is
easy to deal with in business transac-
tions ; for there is no difficulty in
cheating him, owing to his disregard
of money, and he is more annoyed at
having omitted any proper expense
than vexed at spending what is
needless, nor does he approve the pre-
cepts of Simonides.' These remarks
show a penetrating knowledge of
mankind, but they do not exhibit
liberality in the highest light. The
gratification of a personal feeling is
made rather too prominent, hence we
miss the beauty of 'charity seeketh
not her own.' With the present
passage we may compare the descrip-
tion of equity in the Rhetoric (r. xiii.
15-19), part of which is rb avixevOat
itiiKovftwov, Various sentiments are
attributed to Simonides, all testifying
to the solid advantage of riches. Cf.
Ar. Rhetoric, n. xvi. 2 : '66tv Kal rb
'SifMiiviSov ffprirai irepl rail' ffo^fov Kal
irXovffiuv irpbs T)JV ywcuKa T^V 'lepuivos
epopfiniv Torfpov yevfa-Bcu KpiiT-rov
ir\ovffiav 77 ffo<f>6v ' itXovffiov elirc'iv '
roJ/y <ro(povs yap e</)Tj opav eirl rats iS>v
irXovaiiov 6vpais StaTpifiovTas. Again
there is quoted from Plutarch a
saying that ' the money-chest is always
full, and the chest of the graces always
empty ; ' and another, that ' avarice is
the proper pleasure of old age.' On
the philosophy of Simonides, see
Essay II. pp. 624.
29 r<f \afj.dvetv piKpo'ts] ' Illibe-
rality exceeds in taking, only it must
be in petty matters.' Grasping on a
large scale gets another name than
illiberality ; cf. 41-42.
30 TO. nev o5v~avf\fvefpov~\ 'The
two sides of prodigality can hardly
exist together ; for it is not easy to
give to everybody and receive from
nobody ; private persons, whom alone
H0IKQN NIKOMAXEIQN IV.
63
T= yap O~T/ xou UTTO T$J
sV/ TO JU,<TOJ/ Suvarai Jx3s?v.
^=' yap TO, ToO
el Sv) ToSro sQurQsiy rf 7ra;f aAA) ]U.ra3aXo<, siVj ai/
>./",/ 5.' \ 7- 5, ~ \>-/l r A > s> ~
At7pJO Oaxrsi -yap o< Ost, xai ou Ar ; \J/Taj oasv ou MI.
8/0 xcu Soxs? oyjc sjva* c^avPvO^ TO 7560^' oy yap
' TO 67rep|3aXXe/v SiSo'vTa xai ja
6 TOUTOV TOV TpoVoV aO"fOTO^
o
@>avou<riv
-J^, o 8= ou5va, aXX* ouS' aurov.
TCOV ao-coTcof, xa5a?rp f&qrai, xa< Xa^a-ss
ft^ 8=7, xa) i<ri xaTa TOUTO av=Xu5po/.
ia TO $ou?\.=o-Qaj w.v avaX/o~X<v 34
we reckon prodigals, soon find their
substance failing them. Therefore the
prodigal man may well be thought in no
small degree superior to the illiberal.'
The commentators, from not seeing
the train of thought in this passage,
have made a difficulty about ewel,
which refers to the beginning of the
sentence, the intermediate clauses 06
yap paSiov eTwt being parenthetical.
With o'lirep Kal SoKovffiv, cf. 23.
31-32 Reasons are given why
the prodigal is better than the illiberal
man, namely, he may be cured by
time, or by the failure of his means.
His tendency to give is a principle
which requires only to be harmonised
to become a virtue. Lastly, he does
more good than the illiberal man.
Aristotle here is speaking of a better
sort of prodigality (TOVTOV rbv rptirov
StrwTos) which is only a slight over-
stepping of the bounds of liberality ;
but even with this restriction, it is
much to be doubted whether prodi-
gality does more good than illiberality.
From wise acts of liberality much
good may arise, but the common sort
of prodigality, as Aristotle himself
says, 35, being prompted by folly
I and vanity, almost invariably goes to
enrich the wrong people. If the case
be even not so bad as this, the solid
benefit which accrues from any ten-
dency to capitalize money may surely
be set against the chance good done
by money given away indiscriminately
or spent unproductively.
33 a\\' ol Tro\\ol ave\ev0poi^
'But most prodigals, as we have
implied already, take whence they
ought not, and in this way are illibe-
ral.' This is an instance of a pheno-
menon often to be observed in Ari-
stotle's virtues and vices, that the
'extremes meet' (cf. rv. vii. 15, n.
vii. 15). The rationale of this phe-
nomenon appears to be that the
extremes are both the result of the
same principle, they are both different
forms of selfishness. Selfishness can
equally produce prodigal giving and
meanness in receiving. Hence, if a
man be selfish, though his tendency
is to be prodigal, yet on occasion
selfishness, which is his governing
principle, will lead him to become
illiberal. The fact is noticed by Eude-
mus, Eth. Eud. m. vii. 1 2 : "Ecrrt 5"
epoii roTs axpois rb iniauv ^
64
II0IK&N NIKOMAXE1ON IV.
[Ciup.
3s TOUTO TTOISIV jU,^ 8uvao"5ar rap/u yap e
auTovg rot. v7rdp%ovT<x. avayxa^ovraj oSv srs
aaa Se xa) &a TO .Qsv TOU xaAou
xa
35 Ss 7r<0 75
eAsuSepJOJ
TOUTOU
yap
TO
aUTOig aspei. lOTTSp
a! 8oVs< atmov tfcfy* ou yap xaXa/,
Ivsxa, ow<$ to^ 8sT. aX/\.' EVICTS ov
xa/
ra
av
7rpo
va7\.<rxovTe$ xai ss rag axo-
sleri, xa* 8ja TO ju,^ ?rpo TO xaXov
aVoxX/vouo~<v. o' ttsv ouv
37 ' &7rifj,s7^siag slg TO [j,(rov xa) TO Ssov ac^>/xoir' av. 73
Soxs? yap TO yrjpoig xa<
TTOISIV. xa) o'ufj.&vso'TSpov
rr^g a&coTiag ' ol yap TroXXoi <
SOT/XO/. xa) 8<aTen/s< S 5 ETTI TroXw, xa<
oXXoi yap TpoVot 8oxouo-i T% a'vsX
ev OLO~< yap ouo"a, T^ T' eX?ve/\|x=< Trjj SoVsa)^ xa<
ol aurol
tKtlva, a\\-{]\ois,
TVOU 7f/eTai avrwv, ra Se
^er' aAA^Xeoj/ al eltrij' ^OT
OpaffvbtiXoi, Ka\ TO. fJ.ev &ffuroi ra 8e
ave\fvQepot Kal oAws dfcijuaAoi KO.KUS.
37 /cal ffvfj.<t>veffTepov SoTi/cof] 'This
vice runs more in our blood than
prodigality : the mass of men love to
keep money, rather than to give it.'
It may be doubted whether this as-
sertion is universally true. Would
it, for instance, be true of the Irish ?
Again, Aristotle hardly acknowledges
enough the kindness that exists among
men, and which made Kant wonder
that there was ' so much kindness
and so little justice ' in the world.
Aristotle, from his dislike to all that
is sordid, and his admiration for the
brilliant and noble qualities, takes
svai.
>) vrrsp-
perhaps too favourable a view of the
vice of prodigality. Its connexion
with vanity, selfishness, and often
utter heartlessness, he does not suffi-
ciently notice, nor does he observe
that lavish giving often proceeds from
the want of a faculty from an inca-
pacity for estimating the worth of
objects. Thus if illiberality be in-
compatible with a magnanimous spirit,
prodigality is incompatible with abso-
lute truth and justice.
38 Illiberality is widely spread,
and has many forms ; it contains two
elements excess of taking and defect
of giving ; but it does not always
manifest itself in its entirety (ov
ireuriv 6\6tc\7ipos vapayiyvtrai), some-
times one element exists separately
from the other.
I.]
RIKOMAXEZON IV.
65
SVIOT:
XOU o [J.v TY
= TT GoVsi eAXs/Trovcriv. of
\ - /
i y?u<rp/poj
yap sv ra<
Travrsg rr,
O'JX
o<
TCOV a(r%2u)V.
^ 4?a(r/ -ys
av
oxouo"! yap
tx^ TTOT'
7rpa>~<y.i. TO'jriov 0= xa) o xnfj.ivo7rp(rTr i g xa ?raf o
ro^* tovo^aacrra/ S' a?ro T?jj 67r=i/3oy\.% TOU jar^svi
ooo va<. ol 5* ay S/a 4 >0 '3 I/ CX-TTS^OVTOH rwv aAXorp/cov
ov potiiov TO OL-JTOV fj.lv Ta sTspwv XafjtjSavs/v, ra 8' awrou
jtxr/ a^fVxs/ oSv auroT-f TO /ir/rs ?vaja3av;iv ]W,r^T
ol o' au xara TTJV ?\.ij\{/<v UTrspftdh'hovcri rip Travro-
dv=iv xa) Trav, olov ol raj av=/\.su$pou epya.<ria$ sp-
i, TTopvoftocrxoi xai Trdvrsg ol TOIOUTOJ, xai rox^rrai
Travre^ yap OUTO< o5si/ oi 8s7Xa/x-
xai OTTOQ-QV Q'J 3=?. xoivov 3* eV aurtSg TJ aio~^po- 41
$aiv=Tai' wayrzg -yap svsxa xspSou^, xai TOUTOW
OJ/=/OTJ V7ro'j.svov<riv. TOV$ yap ra
s a oe7, ou
7ro'X=/^ TropSouvraj xai hpa
xara
oiov
rot/
39-40 ot /iev -yap oil Se?] ' Men
of one class, those who go by such
names as " stingy," " closefisted,"
" curmudgeons," all fall short in what
they give away, but they neither
covet their neighbours' goods, nor
wish to take them. With some of
them this arises from a certain sense
of equity and shrinking from what is
base : for their motive, either supposed
or professed, in being careful of their
means, is to prevent the possibility
of their being compelled by want to
do base actions. To this set belong
the "skinflint," and all his like, a
name derived from superlative un-
willingness to give to anybody. But
others again abstain from their neigh-
bours' goods through fear, since it is
VOL. II.
not easy to take what belongs to
others, and not have others take what
belongs to oneself they are content,
therefore, neither to take nor give.
A second class are excessive in taking
everything and from all quarters, as
for instance, those who ply illiberal
trades, brothel-keepers, and all such
like, and lenders of small sums at
high interest. For all these take
whence they ought not, and more than
they ought.' This passage falls into
two parts, of 5" o5 icora T^P \T)tyiv
corresponding to ol /tec yap eV TCUJ
Toiavrcus. There are two subordinate
divisions of the first part, namely,
of fjifv Sid TWO. fTnf'iKttav, and of 8' au
Sjct ipofiov.
G6
IIGIKON NIKOMAXEmN IV.
[CHAP.
4-3
xa/ o
xai a<r=fisi(; xai aO/xou. o /xsvro*
xa/ 6
xa ov/
i/=xa To5
g Ss
o
o
SVOLVTIOV
4-5 Xs
a<ra)Tav.
xa/
re -yap strr/ xaxov
ap.apTavQ'j(riv ^ xara
ouv sAsu^
2 Ao^sis S' av axoXowSov sTvai xa) Trspi
44. (tfityv T( ydp tffTl KOUcbl/ T^S
daotfrfas] Before ( 32) Aristotle
made the doubtfiil statement that
prodigality does more good than
illiberality. He now makes the
positively untrue statement that illi-
berality does more harm than prodi-
gality. His view is fallacious from
an ignorance of the principles of
political economy, and from not
looking at the question with sufficient
breadth. He regards prodigality as a
short-lived evil which will be cured
by time, and illiberality as inveterate.
But in their consequences it is rather
prodigality that is incurable, and
illiberality transitory. Illiberality
can always be remedied, and indeed
it brings its own remedy, for saving
produces wealth and capital, and
these lift a man naturally, and neces-
sarily into a more expensive style of
living, however much he may haggle
over details. But prodigality causes
personally, to the family, and to the
nation, a loss of resources which is
absolutely incurable.
II. Magnificence, the virtue next
discussed, is a higher kind of libe-
rality. It consists in spending money
on a great scale with propriety (tv
fieytdei irpeicovaa. 5a.ita.vij l(niv). Thus
there are two elements, greatness and
propriety. The greatness is relative,
being limited by the propriety, and
the propriety is relative to the per-
son, the circumstances, and the ob-
ject. Magnificence will of course
be prompted by a desire for what is
noble. There will be something
imaginative and striking about the
effect it produces (T& 5e fji(ya,\oTrpfires
6avfut<jT6y). Great and solemn occa-
sions will be its proper sphere, the
services of religion, the entertaining
of foreigners, public works, gifts, and
return -gifts. The well-born and
illustrious will be the proper persons
to exercise it. The house of the
magnificent man will be of suitable
splendour, everything he does will
show taste and propriety : even in a
gift to a child he will exhibit the idea
of magnificence. The vulgar man,
missing this happy nicety, will jar on
our taste with his excessive splendour
(\afjarpwfrou irapa /tieAos), his object
being evidently mere ostentation.
The petty man, on the other hand,
I.-IL]
II6IKQN NIKOMAXEK1N IV.
67
OJsXsv oxi -yap xa avrrj Trsp ^pr^j.ar rig psTi}
elvai. oup/ co(T7r=p r> TJ eAsu^ptoYr^ Qiarzivzi Trspl 7rd<ra$
rag Iv %c>r l tj.aL<ri 7rpdsi$, aAAa Trspi Tet oaTravypds p.ovov'
sv TOVTOIS $ VTTSps%=i T7] 5Au5p*oVr ; TO [j.sysbsi. xafyd-
irep yap rouvojtxa auTo 67roo~r >( ua/vs<, sv [JisyeQsi Tr
oa7rav>j SQ-T/V. TO os as-ys^o^ Tr^o't,' Ti * ou yap TO
6a7rdvr l ij.a Tpir t pdp^u> xdi dp^i^-wpio. TO TTpsVov 0^
xai ev < xa) 7T=p< a. o 8' sv [juxpdig $ sv p.Tpioig 3
* a^/av 6oi7ravcby ou "hiysrai fJLsyct'ho7rp=7rr l $, oiov TO
' ^-oXXaxi OoVxov fiXryTTr] * ' aXX* o ev jU,=-yaXo< ourcog.
b pt.lv yap ju.yaAo7T57rfy sXsySsp/o^, 6 3' eXsy^spJOj ou6sv
j jttst/4
xai aTTsipoxaJ^ia xai otrai To/auTa;, oup^ u7rs^6aXXouo~ai TO>
a
sv
ou
from timidity and constant fear of
expense, will be always below the
mark, and even after considerable
expense will mar the whole effect
by meanness in some point of de-
tail
2 rb S /xeyefloj a/>x'0f&'p<] 'Now
the greatness is relative, for there is
not the same expense for a trierarch
as for the head of a sacred legation.'
This latter office would of course
demand peculiar splendour. The
\fiTovfr)icu at Athens were exactly
fitted to exercise the magnificence of
the citizens.
rb irpfirov 5^j wpbs airr6v, Kal v $
nal repl a] ' The propriety accordingly
must be relative to the person, the
circumstances, and the object.' We
have here nearly the same categories
as were given, Eth. in. i. 16, where
the points connected with an action
are enumerated, ris T* 5^/ ical rl iced
irepl ri fj fv T'IVI fpdrrft. On the
suitableness of the person see below
12-14. The circumstances are
touched upon n, 15. The object
(which cannot be definitely sepa-
rated from the circumstances)
16-18.
iro\\dici $6ffKov oA^rp] Homer
Odyss. xvn. 420.
4. if Se wrepy3oA7j /Safavcri'a Koi
aireipoKO\la ital Seat roiavrai] ' The
corresponding excess is called " vul-
garity," and " bad taste," and the like.'
Bdvavffos is said to be derived from
fiavvos ' a forge ' and atiw. Thus it
means a metal-worker, or artisan.
From the contempt felt by the Athe-
nians for this kind of craft, fravavaos
came to imply 'mean,' 'vulgar,'
analogously to <t>oprui6s. In Aristotle's
Politics there is a definition of what
kind of work is strictly to be con-
sidered Pdvavffos (vm. ii. 4). Edvavffov
5" tpyov eiva.i 5e? TOVTO voitifav ical
T*yin\v ravrriv Kal fiaJdijffiv, Sffai irpbs
rca xpri\ffeis KCU TOS irpd^fis TOS TIJS
airtpydovT<u. rb crcD.ua
. The word /Sorai/cria is ex-
cellently applied here to denote vul
garity in expenditure,
K 2
68
NIKOMAXEIQN IV.
[CHAP.
5 7TpVVO[j.sva.l ' U(TTSpQV 8s TTSpl OLVTOtV SpOV[J,SV. 8s jU-Sya-
Ao7rp=7T7j sTTurrrtpovi eoixBV ' TO TrpSTTov yap huvarai 5=aj-
6 pSjo-a/ xai 8a7rav5jo-a< /xsyaXa ejUjasAcot,'. j<r7rsp -yap ev
appYJ snrojasv, 7] ej TaTj,* lyspyziotig opi%;Toti, xai cav <TTIV.
al 8rj TOU jUsyaAoTrpsTTOus 8a7rava* jUS-yaAat xa/ 7rps7rouo~a/.
ToiaSra 8r) xa* ra spya' otmo-yap srrrai jtxsya SaTravrjjtxa xat
TTpSTTOV T0> p7). COffTS TO jU-SV ffp^OV T^ SaTTOtlO^ Ct^JOV
3=7 eTva<, T^V 8s SaTrav^v ToO epyou, 73 xou uTrepfid'h.'hsiv.
7 Sa.Travrj'rei 8s Ta TO/ayTa o jasyaXoTTps^^j TOU xaXou evsxa'
8 xoivov -yap TOUTO Tarj apSTaTf . xa/ ST/ vJ8sa> xai
ov
xa
9 xaf 73 yap
xai 7rps7ra>8sVTaTOV,
10 5Xav/o"TOu
sTva< xai yap o
sv TOUTO<^ 8s TO /xsya TOU
xa) 7r> xaXX<o~Tov
v 73 TroVou xa< TTCO
TOV ja=yaAo7rp=7T7J
a 8=T xa) a> 8s?.
xa)
olov
xa a?ro
TO epyov 7roiri<rei jU.syaXo7rps7rso~TSpov. oy -yap >)
apT^ XT^aTo^ xa) spyou * xTi]jW,a jasv yap TO TrAs/-
O-TOU a^iov TijtAJtoTCtTOv, olov %pu(ro$, spyov 8s TO jtxs^a
5 6 Si /jityaXoirpfir^s ^ju^eA-is]
' The magnificent man is a kind of
artist, because he has an eye for the
becoming, and can spend great sums
tastefully.' The word iirurrfinovi here
conveys the association of those quali-
ties which were said to belong to a
perfect work of art, .Z&A. n. vi. 9 : E
orra> rb Ioi' 3
K.T.A.
6 &<rvfp 7tkp r<J> ep7y] 'For as
we said at the outset, a moral state is
determined by its acts and its objects.
Therefore the outlays of the magnifi-
cent man will be great and suitable.
And the works on which he employs
them will be of the same character,
for only thus it will be possible to
have a great outlay suitable to the
work.'
iv ix The allusion seems to be
generally to the beginning of Book II. ;
perhaps Eth. n. ii. 8 is the nearest
reference that can be given. But in
the present place Aristotle is not
speaking of the formation of habits
out of acts, but rather of moral habits
or states having a definite existence
and reality only in acts and in the
objective circumstances (wv ^ernV) to
which they (the moral states) refer.
This view regards a moral state as a
mere potentiality, which only attains
definite and conscious reality by
emerging into an act. The remark
is apparently made to account for a
concrete treatment of the virtue of
magnificence. We have above
noticed (Eth.' m. xii. 3 note) a sepa-
ration made between the habit and
the act, which looks much less philo-
sophical.
10 a.va.yKo.'iov 8); iv pcytdfi] 'It
II.]
IIOIMIN NIKOMAXEION IV.
69
xou xaXov. TOU yao TOJOUTOU r t saooict ^ay^ac-T^, TO
Sf $a'jjua<rTo'v. xai SO~T/V e^you apsrr]
sv
e<m
8s
rtov
oan
S ' T v V /I > /I ' V
ra T^aja, o<ov rot Trspi fjsoug ava3rj ( aara xou
3s xai oVa Trep; Trav TO
xaTao~x=uai xa
xai oa ?rpo TO
g TTOU %opr)ys7v O'IOVTOU $ii
errnav rr t v Tro'Xiv. sv a7rao~i
TOV TTpCLTTOVTOt a.VOL$:pSTai TO T
xou
)(T7rp
xa<
follows therefore that the magnificent
man must also be liberal, for the
liberal man spends what he ought
and in the way he ought. But it is
in these same particulars, which are
common to magnificence and liberality,
that the element of greatness which
there is in the magnificent man ap-
pears, as for example in vastness of
proportions, and with the same expense
he will make the result more splendid.
For a work is not to be esteemed for
the same qualities as a possession.
That possession is most prized which
is worth most, as for instance gold,
but that work which is great and
noble. When we contemplate such a
work, we admire ; but the magnificent
is always admirable ; and the highest
excellence of a work, as far as scale is
concerned, is magnificence.' The words
olov ptyeBos have vexed the commen-
tators. One device that has been
adopted is to omit the stop after jte'-
yeOos and to translate the passage,
' Sed in his magnum est magnifici,
veluti magnitudo liberalitatis circa
hsec (reading ravra) versantis ' (Mi-
chelet). Or, without altering the
punctuation, we might construe, taking
diov peytdos as epexegetic of rb /J.eya,
' But the greatness of the magnificent
man, as it were a certain grandeur of
scale, appears in these same particulars,
which are common to magnificence
and liberality.' But the point Ari-
stotle insists on is that magnificence
differs from liberality not in degree,
but in kind, being a display of more
genius and imagination on the same
objects, and thus with the same ex-
pense producing a more striking result.
He gives as an instance of the means
employed, ' vastness of size.' T<)
/j.eya is the moral greatness of the
magnificent man, this takes as its ex-
ponent /jityedos or physical bulk.
The Paraphrast carries out the com-
parison in the text rather neatly.
Olov, <epe eiire?;/, 0p<MreC<rc rb Qeiov
Sfrjcrav, & /j.fv e\fv6fpios 'Xfvffovv ri
aitevos TTOfftcrei, Kal Atflous TI/J.IOVS
fyKo\\T]ffei Tip ffKevei- 6 St fj.eya\o-
irpSTr^s vabv /jLfyav Kal /coAbj' oiKoSo-
fi^ffei t) avSpiavras avaariifffi ^ ytfyvpas
o'lKoSo/ji-flfffL $ &\\o TI fj.fya Kal 8av-
(j-affrbv Sta TTJS itrrjs Sairrfj'rjs epydfffrai.
Kal rb fj.\v TOV /j.eya\uiTpirovs tpyov
Kvpicas fpyov trrrat, rb Se TOV 3\ev6epiou
KTrifj.a. na\\ov 7) <epyov.
ii etxpiAori'/iTjTa] 'favourite ob-
jects of rivalry.' Dr. Cardwell (upon
2 above) quotes Lycurgus Orat.
contra Leocr. p. 167: Ov yiip et -m
$ Kfxop'fiyrjKe \afjnrpus
n irap' yfjiun' TOiavrrjs ^apiros
oAA' elf ris reTpiiipdpxi]K \a/j.irpws $
rei^Tj rfj irarpioi Trepu'SoAey, jj irpbs T^V
KOIVTJV <r<arr]piav ^/c f<av ISluv
70
IIOIKON NIKOMAXEIflN IV.
[CHAP.
a^ia yap 8sT TOUTOJV sTva/, xa/ JMTJ jU.6 vov TCO epya> aXXa xa/
13 TIO TTO/OUVT/ TTpSTTS/v. 6*o 7TV7j jMSV oux av s/Tj
7rp7Tj* ou yap SO-T/V a<>' cov TroAXa 8a:rav7jo-?/ Trp
o 8' sV/^s/ptov ijX/9/o' Trapa Tr,v a/av yap xa/ TO Osov,
I 4-xar* apsTr/v 8s TO opQwg. TrpsVs/ 8s xa/ ol^ Ta
8' auTtov ^ 8/a TCOV Trpoyovwv r] cov
xa
xa/
xa To^ suysj/s* xa<
TO<auTa' TravTa yap TauTa '
i5jU,aXio~Ta
oa
8s 18u
xat s T* TOJOUTOV, xa} eJ
xa< Trs)
o(ra
TI TraVa 73
8s L/
xa
psaj ' ou yap
Ta xo<va Ta
TtoTrXovTO)* xoV-
jU.sy<o~Ta yap xa
y/v=Ta/, olov yajoto^
ol sv a
, xa<
1 6 8s 8<opa ToTj ava97]jtxao~<v s'^
xa) oi'xov xaTa<rxsyao~a<76a<
juoj yap T<J xa; OOTO. xa/ Trsp/ TauTa ^uaXXov 8a?ravav
ocra 7roXu^po'v/a Ttov spywv xaXX/o~Ta yap TauTa. xa/ sv
I 7sxao~TO/^ TO TrpsTrov ou yap TauTa ap/xoTs/ SsoTf xa/ av-
Qp(oTroi$ , ou8' sv /spto xa/ Ta<^> * xa/ sV/ T<OV 8a7rav>j]W.aTa>v
sxao~Tov jasya sv TO> ys'vs/, xa/ p.syaXo7rps7rso-TaTov jtxsv TO
1 8 sv jasyaXto jasya, s'vTau^a 8s TO e'v TOUTOI jttsya. xa/
8/a<$)sps/ TO s'v TCO spyto jtxsya TOU ev TO> 8a7rav7j]u,aT/*
G-Qoupa. pisv yap r t X^xyQoe >j xaXX/o~T7j s^s/ jusyaXo'
7ra/8/xou 8wpou, >j 8s TOUTOW T/JU.TJ juixpov xa/ avs
i98/a TOUTO' S'O-T/ TOU jasyaXo7rps7ro, g'v (w av 7ro/>5 ysvs/,
14 irpe'irei 5e i|(a'^a] ' The under-
taking of such expenses is proper for
persons already distinguished by mag-
nificence, either in themselves, or their
ancestors, or their connections, and
for the noble, the illustrious, and such
like persons : for in all those cases
greatness and dignity are present.'
The use of irpovir<ipx eiv here to denote
that which exists already as an achieve-
ment in one's family is not unlike its
use, M. i. xi. 4, to denote those
events which in a play are supposed
to have been done before the com-
mencement of the action.
1 8 19 col $ia(p(p(i Sairw^/aTos]
'And the "greatness," which is ex-
hibited in the work, differs from the
" greatness " of the expense ; for th
most beautiful of balls or of bottles is
magnificent as a present to a child,
though its price be small and paltry.
Hence the magnificent man, whatever
kind of thing he be producing, will
II.]
NIKOMAXEIQN IV.
71
iroisiv' TO yap TOIOVTOV Q'JX sv<j7rspfi'h.r l Tov,
svov tear' a^iav TQV oaTravr^aarof. TO/O'JTO [j.\v ovv 020
6 8' WTrsp/SaAAaJv xa) $ava'j<ro ra> Trapa. TO
raiv SaTravT^aarajy TroAAa txvaTUtrxsJ xa<
olov spavHTTag ya.'j.ixtb$ l<rriu>v,
yopyyibv sv TYJ Traso^u) TropQvpav slcrfyspcov, OHTTrsp ol
xa) Travra ra ro<ayra TTOIY^SI oil TOU
TOV TrXourov
xai
a oaTravcoj/, 06 o' 0X170, TroXXa. o
Travra sAAfJi^/rj, xa< ra ^iyifrra avaChcuGrag Iv
TO xaXov a7ro/\.=T, xa) o rt av TTO^ jU,s?\.Aa>v,
oiv sAaKTTOv -avaAtt)(ra/ xa} raur' o3you,vo xai
produce it magnificently ; for the cha-
racter of such work is that it cannot
be easily outdone, its magnificence
being always in proportion to the
outlay.' The first part of this passage
is almost a repetition of what was
said 10, on the difference between
' greatness ' and ' costliness ' in a work
of art. The 'ball' and the 'bottle'
seem to have been common toys. Dr.
Fitzgerald compares the description
of Cupid's toy in Apollonius Ehodius,
Arg. in. 135, and Plato, Phcedo, p.
no B, wffirep at SajSe/cdinct/TOj ff<pcupcu t
TroiKl\r], xpaJ|UO<rt 8ieiA.7j/ijteVij. Also
Theophrastus' Characters, Ilepl ape-
o-Keios, where the &pefficos is said to
purchase Qvpiaicas TU>V ffrpoyyvKciw
\rjKvOovs Kal <T(j>cuyicrTi)piov.
20 roioCros iro\\] ' Such now is
the magnificent man, but he who ex-
ceeds and is vulgar exceeds because,
as was said before, he spends more
than is necessary. He spends much
upon trifles, and preserves no harmony
in his splendour; he entertains his
club-fellows with a wedding-feast, and
when he has charge of a comic chorus,
he makes them appear in purple, as
the Megarians do. In all this extra-
vagance he never aims at a noble end,
but only seeks to parade his riches, in
the hope of being stared at ; where
he should spend much, he draws his
purse-strings, where he should spend
little, he squanders.' The last sentence
shows that in vulgarity extremes meet,
selfishness prompting both too much
expense and too little, see above,
chap. i. 33 note. "With irapo pe\os
we may compare Shakspeare, Merry
Wives, Act i. sc. 3. ' His filching was
like an unskilful singer : he kept not
time.'
olov lpa.viffTa.s\ epavos being a club
where each member entertained in
turn, or an entertainment where each
guest contributed, it was of course
bad taste to eclipse the rest in splen-
dour.
&/ TTJ irap6ticp~\ The parode was the
first song of the chorus sung at its entry.
Naturally the comic chorus would not
require rich purple dresses. The ex-
pense of a comic chorus at Athens
appears to have been sixteen minse
(48^.), that of a tragic chorus thirty
minse (90^.); see Bentley on Phalaris,
72
II9IKQN NIKOMAXEKIN IV.
[CHAP.
jw,s/a> Troiitv ^ ^7.
e<r
aural xaxiai, ou JUTJV
fihafispa.} T<o 7rsXa eTva/ ju,r/rs X/av
3 ' H $e jotsyaAo^/u^/a Trsp) /xsyaXa jtxsv xa* sx
GUV at
Qia. TO
p. 360. The Megarians were noted
among the Greeks for stupidity.
Zi rt ^tev oSv a<rx'finot>es~\ 'Now
these (i.e. vulgarity and pettiness)
are vices, but they do not entail dis-
grace, because they are neither hurtful
to one's neighbour, nor are they very
unseemly.'
III. Aristotle's famous description
of the virtue of high-mindedness
(which he places as a mean between
vanity and want of spirit) throws
great light upon the whole bearing of
his moral system.
We must notice in it rather an
admiring picture of what is than an
investigation into what ought to be.
High-mindedness is nothing else than
a certain loftiness of spirit possessed
by great men. It can only (in its
fullest sense) belong to great men, for
unless accompanied by qualities su-
perior to those of the rest of the
world, it would be simply ridiculous.
Aristotle takes this loftiness of
spirit, and, considering it fine and
admirable, points out the various
traits in which it exhibits itself. And
nothing can be more subtle or felici-
tous than many of his observations on
this head. But it is plain that high-
mindedness, as here represented, is
not something which is prompted by
duty, rather it stands quite beside
the idea of duty. Greatness and the
sense of moral obligation are essen-
tially distinct, however much they
may accidentally coincide.
The high-minded man has all
virtues, says Aristotle ( 14 15).
But we find on nearer inspection that
this means that the high-minded man
is above all those minor interests
which might induce to vice ; he does
not care about money, so he will
never cheat, he does not value even
life very high, so he will not be a
coward. Here then there is no self-
subjection to a law. The high-minded
man does not avoid vice because it is
' wrong ' (in the modern sense), but
simply because it is unworthy of him.
Thus he is most essentially a law to
himself and above all other law. Ari-
stotle spoke of high-mindedness as
being a sort of culmination of the
virtues ( 16), and justly so, for it is
the culmination of his moral system.
As we before remarked (ch. i. 16,
note), his system is based on the idea
of self-respect. Loftiness of spirit is
the highest form of self-respect (jie-
yd\tav favrbv ofio?, &ios &v). This
principle goes a long way in elevating
the character and purifying the con-
duct, but its natural development is
also a dislike ( 24-26) of all limi-
tations of the individuality ; in short,
its natural development is a sort of
noble pride.
High-mindedness, however fine may
be the qualities that go to make it up,
is essentially not a human attitude.
As we have observed already, it is
something exceptional, and in Ari-
stotle's account of it we have a psycho-
logical portrait of a great man. Yet
still this account shows Aristotle not
to have been familiar with that con-
ception of ' moral goodness ' which has
arisen out of later associations.
II. -III.]
H9IKQN NIKOMAXEKiN IV.
73
o -yap
sv s7va<, TTSpl TTOia 8' S<TT} Trpwrov "hdficopsv. 8<a<>spsi z
8' ouQsv TTJV e&iv rj TOV Kara r\v s^/v (rxoTrsiV. 8oxsT 8s 3
/xsya?io\J/yp/0 slvaj o [j.zyaXcov auTov a^uov a^iog cov. o
yap /zrj xar' a^iav auTo TTOIIOV i}X*9tO, TCOV 8s xar' apSTvjv
jU,syaAo\J/y^o jasv ouv o
v 0.^10$ xai TOUTOJV a^iwv laurov 4
8' ot ev j,sys5=/ yap 73 j,sya^.o- S
Sp xal TO xotf^hog sv jasyaXa) crajjaar/, o! pixpoi
8' a(TTs7o/ xai (ru/jtjasrpo/, xa?vo) S' ou. o 8s jU,syaXft)v 6
laurov a^tov ava^iog (ov p^auvo^' 6 8s '
oy Tra^ ^oiuvog. 6 8' sXarrovcov >j a^iog
re jas^aAa>v sav rs jasrp/ajv, s'av rs xai pixpaw oi^iog cav STI
e\a.TTQV(uv a'jrov a^foT. xai ^.oChi<rra av fto^sisv o
a^iog' ri yap av STTO/S*, si ju,?) Tofrourcov rp a^iog ;
8^ o jasyaXo\f/uyo^ TCO jasv [AsysQsi axpog, TO> 8s
]U.s<ro^* Toy yap xar' a^iav aurov a^ioi. ol o y
Aoy<rt xal sXXsiVouffiv. si 8s 8^ /xsyaArov saurov
tov, xa) jU.aX/o-ra rtov jEMytOTOH^ Trspj sv p-dhurra av snj.
T] 8* a^/a Asysrai 7nso ra sxro^ ayaQa. fJisyurTov 8s TOUT' 10
av Q=ir)[j.sv o Tot$ Qsoig aTroj/sjU-Ojasv, xai 06 jaaTuerr'
o sv aia)j.aTi xa\ TO
lav 7
sVr/8
8s!*
a Siatytpei S' ovflei/ (TKOTreTj/] ' Now
it does not make the least difference
whether we consider the state of
mind, or the character that is pro-
duced by the state of mind.' The
procedure adopted by Aristotle
throughout is that of describing
virtues in the concrete, though in no
other case does he give so complete a
personality as in describing the high-
minded man. This procedure, while
it gives graphic liveliness to his dis-
cussions, tends to make us forget that
these virtues are not so much different
kinds of character as different elements
in the same character. A later de-
velopment of Aristotle's ethical system
calls attention to this point (cf. Eth.
vi. xiii. 6). It has been said that the
VOL. II.
picture of a highminded man here
given to us must have been taken
from life. Probably Aristotle traced
different manifestations of the high-
minded element in different people,
and has here combined them.
tf] ' For high-
mindedness implies greatness, just as
beauty implies a large body; little
people may be pretty and elegant, but
not beautiful.' This was the Greek
idea, cf. Politics, vn. iv. 8: r6ye /caAbv
4j> ir\-f)6fi Kal neyeOei etude ylveaQai.
Poetics, vii. 8 : rb yhp Ka\bv & fj.eye8ei
/col To|ei &rri. Cf. also the story of
Phye in Herodotus, i. c. 60. Against
such critics of beauty as the Greeks,
nothing is to be said.
74
H9IK11N NIKOMAXEIiiN IV.
[ClIAP.
b Os
TOIQVTOV 8' 7J T'jW-V ftlyiffTW yap 8>3 TOUTO TCOV SXTO
ayaQibv. Kepi n^as 8>) xa/ an^ia^ b /xgyaXo-vf/u^o't,' sVriv
a> Ssi*. xa< aveo 8s Aoyou <a/vovTa< oi /xsya7vo'\|/t>^oi
slvai ' T|U.7] yap |W,aAi<r6' oi jasyaAoj a/ou<rjv
* a^iav 8s'. 6 8s ju,jxpo'\}/u;0 sAAs/Trsi xai
1 3 7rpo sauTov xa) ?rpo TO TOU ju,eyaAo\{/upou a^iio^
Trpog saurov jaev yTre^aXAei, ou jU,^v rovye
6 8s /xsyaXoxJ/up^oi,', siTrsp TCOV jtxey/crrfov
av sftj * (teifyvos y&p <^ * o j
b apicrrog. rov w$ d?^r)Qib$ apa
<N A\ * \^'* ^l^S 1
6e< ayaoov sya<. xa* do^sis 6 av s<vai
j 5 sxatrry; apsTTJ jU-sya. ou
o"Sj'cravr/, ou8' aS/xsTv* T/VO^ yap svsxa
to oiQsv j,sya ; xa^' sxatrra 8' s
fyaivoir av b ju,yaAo'\}/u^o
oux en; 8' av oy8s T/ja% afyog tyauXog wv
yap d^Aov 73 T//XTJ, xai aTrovsjasrai ro?^ a
ouv 73 jU,syaXo\}/u^/a olov
|W,soi> yap awTa^ TTOIS?, xa< ou yivsrai avsu
sxs/veov. 8<a TOUTO p^aAsTrov T^ aXrjds/a
ro
lj T* av appo^oi
10 II roioCro*' 5' KOT* ajiav 8^]
' Such a prize is honour, which is the
greatest of all outward goods. There-
fore the highminded man bears him-
self as he ought with regard to honour
and dishonour. But why should we
prove what is obvious, that the study
of magnanimous minds is honour ?
And great men lay especial claim to
honour, yet according to their desert.'
Aristotle here fixes external honour
us the object with which high-
inindedness deals. Afterwards he
sets it above all external honour
( 17), &perr)s ybp irovreXovy OVK &v
yfvoiro d{/a rifffi. Honour is not
good enough, but the world has
nothing better to give.
15 uiiOa/jiws irapaffetaavri] 'It
would never suit the highminded man
to fly in ung'aceful haste.' Tapa-
cretfiv (i.e. rets j(f'ipa.s') meant 'to
work the hands in running.' Cf. De
Incess. Animal, iii. 4, where the
principle of the lever is shown to be
involved in this motion. Aib KOI ol
irft>ra6\oi
JarToi/ Ofovffi irapaffeiovTfs ras
X<*ipaS ")ivfTO.l flip T1S OUTfpflfflS tf TTJ
Kapwovs.
1 6 OtC fifV oltV A
'Now highmindedness appears to be,
as it were, a sort of crown of
the virtues ; it enhances them, and it
cannot come into existence without
them. Hence it is hard to be high-
minded in the true sense of the
term, for this is impossible without
accomplished excellence.' The word
' magnanimity ' is the conventional
III.]
HGIKftN NIKOMAXEIQN IV.
75
slvw ou yap olo'v rs avsv xahoxayaQiag. jua7u(rra [j*lv 17
oj/
cog
xa) ari^iag 6 jU,syaAo\}/uo sVr/, xa ITT)
T^atg xa VTTO raiv
oJx=ja)v ruyp/avcov vj xa<
yap TravrsAoug oux av ysvoiro a/a
Sc^sra/ 7= rep ju,^ e/^s/v auroi [Mt
8s Trapa ru>v TV%OVTCOV xou STT} pixpoUg ira^av oX/ycopr'crst *
ou yap TOUTOJV oi^iog. oftAUDg 8s xa< a,ripMtg ou yap
a/a>$ :repi aurov. jaaX^rra jU,sv ot>v etrr/v,
o ^uyaX(n|/t>^o$ Trepi r/jU-a^, oy ja^v aXXa xat
xa) 8uva(TTS/ai> xa) Traerav swrup^/av xat
s^si, o7T(u$ dv yivrjTai, xal our' euryp^tov
r' arup^tov 7rspj?\.u7rog > . ouSs ya^ 7T=p;
ov. al yap Suvarrrsiai xai o
strnv atpsra * oi youv e%ovTe$ aura
C0TflU
cog
ura) xa) raX?^a. 810 uTrepoVrai SOXOUCTJV stvai.
8s xa; ra wroy^ftaTa (rujtxjSaAXscr^a/ Trpo^ jasya
oi yap uyevs<V a^/oyvrai Tigris xai oj 8yva<rruovrsf ^ ot
* sv yTrspop^Trj yap, ro 8' ayaSa> y-rsps^ov TraV
ov. 8<o xa< ra ro<aura jaeyaXovf/u^orepoyj iroiei.
yap UTTO nvwv. xar' aX^Qsiav 8' 6 aya$o [j.ovog 20
ol 8' ai/su apsrvj^ ra roiaura aya^d ep/ovrej ours
representative of jue-yaAoifuxi'a, tut it
does not really answer to it. ' Mag-
nanimity ' often implies rather gene-
rosity, and what Aristotle calls eTrief-
Kfco, than that loftiness of spirit which
he attributes to the /*7aA(tyt;x oy -
The difficulty of finding English
words to answer to the terms of
Aristotle has given rise to a practice,
not to be commended, of constant-
ly using Greek terms while speaking
of the system of Aristotle. It is
better to paraphrase if we cannot
translate.
/cciAoKiryaei'as] This abstract noun
does not occur in Plato, who fre-
quently uses the words
Ka-ya0<k (-written separately) in the
common Athenian sense, denoting
very much what we mean by 'a
gentleman." By Aristotle the word
is used with no peculiar moral import ;
r&v tv fticp Ka\iav nayaffcav occurs
Eth. i. viii. 9, to denote generally
' what is noble and excellent in life.'
Eudemus appears to have developed
the idea of Ka\oKaya6ia, and to have
understood by it the perfection of
moral virtue combined with the ser-
vice and contemplation of God. Cf.
Eth. Eud. vni. iii. 15, and see Essay
i. p. 23.
L '2
7G
IIOIKiiN NIKOMAXEIflN IV.
psydhcov a^iwariv OUTS opQS)$ jasyaXo\|/u^o* Asyov-
rat. avsv yap dpsrr^s TravTsAoDg oix SQ-TI raura. uirzp-
owTai 8e xai ufipurTal xai ol ra TO<auTa e%ovTe$ dyabd
yiyvovrai. avsu yap apsT7J oil patiiov tyspsiv eajasXco^ ra
ou Suvajaevo/ 8s tyepsiv xai O/O'/ASVOJ TCOV
V7reps%eiv sxswcov /xev xara^povouonv, auroi 3' o r/
av Tupa><n TrpaTTOucriv. fj.ip.ovvTai yap TOV jU-syaAovf/u^ov
ofJioioi ovreg, TOUTO SE 8pi<r/v si/ ol^ 86vavrai ra jtxsv
ov xar apTi}V ou TrpaTTotxrj, xarapovoua-i 8s TO>V
zaaXXfov. 6 8s ]t*syaXo\J/y^o^ 8<xa/co^ xara^povsr (oo^a^si
23 yap a?v.ij$co), 01 8s TroXAo* Tt>po'vTa>. oux so-ri 8s
vo$ ouSs C^AoxA/Suvo^ 8;a TO oT^iya ripav, psya-
8s, xa; oTav x<j/8uvsuv], a($)s/8^ TOU ^/ou jf owx
ov TravTto^ ^v. xai olo^ su TrotsTv, euspysTOvpsvos
8' a!o~^uvTa/ TO jtxsv yap uTrspsp^ovTO^, TO 8' virsps^o-
pevov. xa* avTSuspysT/xo^ TrXs/ovtov ' otmo yap Trpoo"-
25 o<$>X7jo~si 6 vTrdp^ag xai strrai s5 TTSTrovQcbg. 8oxoO<r< 8s
xa jtxvvjjaovsueiv o5^ ai/ 7roirj<ra)(riv su, a>v 8' av
ou* sXaTTcoj/ yap 6 TraSajv sS TOU TroiTjoravTO^,
8' iTrsps^SiV. xai Ta ju,sv Tj'Ssco^ axous/, TCC 8' ar^8a>f * 8*0
xal T^V S'TIV ou Asysiv Ta^ euspys<rias TJ Au' ou8* oi
Adxcovss Trpog Tovg 'Aflijva/oo^, aAX* a 7rs7ro / v5so~av sS.
'But the highminded man despises
justly (for his estimate is true), but
most people do so at haphazard.'
Throughout, the great man is justified
in the high position he assumes by
reason of the correctness of his
estimate. Modern ideas of delicacy, to
say the least, would proscribe this
accuracy of self-appreciation, and the
claims founded upon it.
24 z6 He is glad to do a benefit
and ashamed to receive one ; he will
wipe out a favour by doing a greater
one in return; he will remember
those whom he has benefited, but
not those by 'whom he has been
benefited ; he will be in want of no
one ; he will serve any readily ; he
will be proud to the great, and easy
with the lowly, &c. On the principle
of independence, which appears here
in an extreme form, see above, note
on ch. i. 16.
Sib Kal ri]i> 0eVi'] Homer, Iliad i.
503 4. She only says
eftrore Sj{ at per' aSavvroiffiv ovr\ffa.
^ eirei ^ epycp.
ovS" ol AOKWVCS] This is said to
have been on the occasion of a The-
ban invasion into Laconia. Aspasius
quotes from Callisthenes a mention of
the circumstance. Xenophon is thought
to allude to the same event (Hell. vi.
v. 33), where, however, he makes the
Spartans enumerate their services.
in.]
H9IK&N NIKOMAXEION IV.
77
ers?!/ 26
os xai TO prfizvag Ss7o-$a ^
xai ?rpo /xsv TOU ev a^iw^art xai
/xsyav sTva/, 7Tpo 2s TOU fj,s(rov$ jasVp/ov ' TO>V jtxsv yap
yaXsTrov xai <rs[j,v6v, TOJV 6s pa6<ov, xaj sj/ sxsiv
s, sv Os TOU; r
r^'jpj^S(rQa<. xa s< ra
Is'va/, ^ ou 7rpcoTS'jou<riv aX?;0< xa) apyov sJvai xai
r OTTOU
xa
6s xa ovo 4 aa<rTa>j/. avayxaibv os 28
xa
ro yap
15
<>avspio'
xai
yap
o<ra
xai
ju-si/ TTpaxr/xov, ja
xai <avspo'/Ai<70i/
cj)o3o'jjtxs'vou. xai
xai Xs'ys<v xai Tr
TO xaTa<>pov7v.
*' slpcavsiav ' stpwva Ss Trpo
aXXov /x^ Suvao^ai ^v aXX*
Oio xai 7ravTS ol xo'Aaxs^ ^Tjxo xa 01 TaTrsi
o'jos Qa.ufj.afj'Tixos' ow5sv yap jasya CHIITIO etrriv.
jW,j/>jo-/xaxo ' ou yap jU,syaAo\J/upOu TO
TS xai xaxa, aXXa jUaXAov ?rapopav. ouS* avQpw-zi
OUTS yap Trspi awToS sps? OUTS Trspi sTepou *
OUTS yap Tva sTra/viJTa; jasAs/ aura) ou5' 07ra) 01 aXXo<
' owS' at) 7raivsTixo$ lo~Tiv * SiOTrsp ou^s xaxo-
ouSs Ttov s%Qpwv t si ju,^ ^' u^ptv. xai Trspi 32
at/ayxaiW ^ jajxptov ^x*o~Ta o/\.o^upT/xo^ xai
?rpo 29
yap,
ou8s 3
27 34 A list of characteristics
follows, completing the picture of the
lofty-minded man. He will not com-
pete for the common objects of
ambition 0"& r/xa) ; he will only
attempt great and important matters,
he will seem otherwise inactive; he
will be open in friendship and hatred ;
really straightforward and deeply
truthful, but reserved and ironical in
manner to common people. Will live
for his friend alone, will wonder at
nothing, will bear no malice, will be
no gossip (OUK a.v6piinro\6yos), will not
be anxious about trifles, and will care
more to possess that which is fine,
than that which is productive. His
movements are slow, his voice is
deep, and his diction stately.
28 tf/wj/o 5e irpbs TOUS iroAAous]
Bekker has introduced this reading
on the authority of one MS. alone ;
all the rest read flpau/fla. Etpowa is
not strictly grammatical, but it is in
accordance with the Aristotelian mode
of writing ; it comes in despite the
nominative a\rj8fvTiK6s, as a carrying
on of the accusatives before used,
ol d/yybj/ elvai Kal b\'f)u>v
&c.
78
KOIKQN NIKOMAXEION IV.
[CHAP.
33 (nrouaovTog yap OUTCOC; %EW Trsp} Tavra. xa.} olog
xsxT$j<r$a/ /xaAXoi/ ra xaAa xa) axapTra rtov xapTr/^uov xa)
34 a)<>e?UjU.a>v ' oiUTapxQDS 7&-P jW-aAXot/. xa) xivr^ig 8s /SpaSsTa
row jtxeyaXo^Jj^ou Soxei s7i/a<, xa) <>a>i/7J $aps7a, xa) As/
(TTa.mfj.os ' oJ yap (nrsu(mxog o Trsp) oX/ya (T7rou8aa)V,
ouos <rui>Toi/o 6 ]U,>j6sv fJisyoi olopevog ' 13 8' o^vQcuvia xon
3573 Ta%uTiis 8/a rourcov. TO/OUTO ju,=v oSv o jaeyaX&'-vJ/up^o^, 6
' AAajv p^aOvo^. ou xaxo)
ou yap xaxoTroioi
TI sx
eTj/a<
o j-gv a juxvo aio$ cuv
saurov a.7ro(rTpei wv o
^ a^<ouv saurov Ttov ayaStoi/, xa) ayvosTv 8' laurov
ro yap av ajv oi
/ ys of TOJOUTOJ 8oxouo-/v sTva*, aXXa jaa
TOU
ayaQcuv ye OVTCUV. ot)
35 oil KaKol T]/j.aprTift.tvoi 8]
' Now it is true that these again are
not bad, for they do no harm, but are
only in error.' Ov5e refers to ch. ii.
22. Vanity and want of spirit are,
like pettiness and vulgarity, not very
serious vices. Of the latter pair,
speaking of the qualities and not the
persons possessing them, he said they
are KOKI'CU, but not disgraceful.
& fj.ti> yap d-yaflajj'] 'For the
mean-spirited man, though worthy of
good things, deprives himself of his
deserts, and seems to be harmed by
not appreciating his claims, and by
ignorance of himself; else he would
have aimed at the good things he
had a claim to. Such characters, how-
ever, are not to be called foolish, but
it is rather their energy that is de-
ficient. Still this way of thinking
seems to have a bad effect upon the
character : for men's aims are regu-
lak'd by their opinions of their
merits, but these men draw back from
noble actions and pursuits, thinking
themselves unworthy ; and in the
same way they cut themselves off
from external advantages.' From
these considerations, and from the
whole tendency of his system, Ari-
stotle decides that want of spirit is
worse than vanity ( 37), and he also
asserts that it is more common.
Want of elevated aims, want of effort,
of will, of individuality, these are
indeed fatal deficiencies as regards
the attainment of what is fine and
noble in character. The conception
of ' humility' is of course quite
beside the system of Aristotle, but
we may observe that it does not come
into necessary collision with a con-
demnation of fjiiKpo^vxio: For this
latter implies a want of moral aspira-
tion. Now it is desirable to combine
with humility the greatest amount of
moral aspiration.
a\\a fj.a\\ov &KV"npo(~\ Another
reading, supported by several MSS.,
is votpoi, which the Scholiast explains
by SpijueTs al tirivoirrncot. The Para-
phrast, however, gives vtoOpol, which
supports the present reading. Hotpot
makes good sense, since it is true that
want of spirit often accompanies an
intellectual turn of mind, men's
' native hue of resolution ' being
III. IV.]
I /
1
H6IKiN NIKOMAXEK1N IV.
79
8s 8o'a 8oxsT xa/ p/pou TGIZIV ' sxao~TO/ yao
T&v xar' a^j'av, a^iVravra; 8s xa/ rcov Trpa
Tu>v xaXtov xa/ TCOV 7r/T7j8sujaaTcov a> ava^iQi ovrss,
8s xa/ Ttov SXTO aya^tov. o/ 8s p^auvo/ iJXftdibi xa/
ayi/oo3vTS, xa/ raur' nrf$atDf J$ yap a;/o
TO/ evrtfjuoig eTri^sipouo'iv, siren. e^sXs'y^ovrat * xai
xoo-^aouvrai xal (r^fj-ari xa) TO? TOJOUTO^, xa)
ra et>Tup7^/,ara (pavspa eivat aircov, xa<
of 8/a TOUTCOV T 1^^0-0 psvoi. avriri^srai 8e
a rj Ot/xox/u/a xaXXov rauvorrro * xa
37
p yjyvsra* jW.a?\.Xov xa) p^sTpov ea~Tiv. r) p^sv ovv ]U,sya- 38
\I/up//a TTsp) Ti[t,r t v earn jasya^Tjv, aio~7rep sipvjTa/.
' Eo/xs 8s xai TTsp) raurvjv siva< apsr^ T<, xaSaTrsp sv ro?^ 4
^ 8o^sisv av TrapaTrAvjO'/a^ ^X.~ iV ^P^S T ^ v
(Scnrsp xou ^ sXsuQsptorrj^ TTpo^ rrji/ j,ya-
8s ra [j,sTpia xa) ra ja/xpa 8iaTi5s'ao-/v >],a^ a5^ 8sT.
8' sv A75\|/s< xa* 8oVsi ^p^jaara)V [j.=<roTr)s e<rrJ xa/ 2
rs xa * XX4' l ft O^T> ^a* ev Tigris ops^si TO
8s7 xa) ^TTOV, xa} TO oQsv 8s7 xai co^ 8=7. TO'V TS 3
yap tpiT^ori^ov i^s-yof^sv co$ xa/ jaaXXov 73 8sT xa/ o5sv ow 8sT
rov TS
008* ITT) To/
TOV
' sicklied o'er with the pale cast of
thought.' Yet, on the other hand, it
is possible that voepoi has come to sup-
plant oKvripoi from a mistake arising
from a fancied antithesis to f)A.t'0ioj.
IV. Descending now from what
is extraordinary to the common level,
Aristotle discusses another virtue
which bears the same relation to high-
mindedness as liberality does to mag-
nificence, namely, the virtue of a
laudable ambition. This is concerned
with the desire for honour as it exists
in ordinary men. There is no name
for this virtue, but language testifies
to the existence of extremes, hence
we may infer a mean. There are two
words, ambitious and unambitious;
both these are made terms of reproach,
thus implying that there must be a
middle quality, in relation to which
they are each extremes. Again, both
are used as terms of praise, which
shows that each in turn lays claim to
the mean place, as setting itself off
against its opposite.
I KaOdirep ev TOIS irpcarois] Cf.
Eth. n. vii. 8. This expression might
seem to suggest that the present
passage was written after an interval ;
it is repeated in 4.
4 sort 8 s STC peaov] ' But some-
times we praise the ambitious man as
80
NIKOMAXEmN IV.
[CHAP.
tta
rov
xa
sv
on 7rova^eo TOU
ETT/ ro avTO asi <$spo[j.sv rov
oux
r 8=7. ai>a)i/uju,ou 8' ouVijf T% ju,o-oV>3TO,
d[j.<$>i(r@>r l T'Tv TO. axpa.' sv oJ$ 8' <TT/
5 sAXs/\|//^, xa< TO
/
soixsv
xa/
xa
S<TT< GTS xa/
ot}ra
6 o/x S= TOUT' eTva/ xa) 7Tpj Taj aAXaj apsrag.
(rQa.i 8' JvTaO^' oi axpo< Qaivovroii 8<a TO ju,^
TOV fJLS(TQV.
5 UpoLOTyg 8' 60-T/
manly and noble-spirited, and some-
times we praise the unambitious man
as moderate and soberminded, as
mentioned in our first remarks. Now
it is plain that as the term " loyer of
anything " is used in more senses than
one. we do not always apply the term
"lover of honour " to express the same
thing, but when we praise, we praise
that ambition which is more than
most men's, and when we blame, we
blame that which is greater than it
should be. The mean state having
no name, the extremes contend, as it
were, for this unoccupied ground ;
but still it exists : for where there is
excess and defect there must also be
a mean.'
6 toiKt 8i TOI/T' tlvai Koi irepl T&J
& \Xas fy>T<s] Cf. Eth. n. viii. 1-2.
V. The regulation of the temper
(uearfrrji Trtpl opyds) is the next
subject for discussion. Aristotle con-
fesses that there is no name for this,
but he provisionally calls it mildness,
though this term is also used to ex-
press a deficiency in the feeling of
anger. Excess in this feeling has
various forms, and accordingly various
names ; the passionate (opyi\oi), the
hasty (ixp6xo\oi\ the sulky (iriKpol), the
morose (xaA.rof), all come under the
same category as showing excessive
or ill-directed anger. Aristotle does
not here enter upon the philosophy of
anger, inquire its final cause, and in
accordance with this determine ita
right manifestation. He says it is
human to avenge oneself ( i a), and
not to resent certain things is slavish
(6) and a moral defect, hence
we must have a certain amount of
anger. This amount must be duly
regulated, but where the true mean is
cannot be laid down in the abstract
(oil pSSiov T<j> \6yy airoSouyeu) ; it
depends on the particular circum-
ra 8' e
8=7 xa)
IV. V.] IieiKQN NIKOMAXEmN IV. 81
TTjv TrpaorTjra <^spOj,sv, ?rpo TTJV XXsi\}/iv a7roxX/vou<rav,
TO jotst/ yap 7raSo eo-Ttv
8/a^spovTa. 6 w,sv ot>v
3/ J>\ \fj,~ Vrf \t/
STI os xai j^ 0j xai OT xai oo~ov
873 OUTO dv E'/TJ, 6rrrp r) TrpaoTT]^ sTraivsirai.
yap o Trpaog drdpoi^os slvai xai ju.7^ ay<r0a/ JTTO TOU
TraSoug', aXX* aJ av 6 Xo'yo^ Ta^vj, OUTO xa) TT/
xa/ STT! TOO~OWTOV p^povov
> \
7TJ
TroAAa xa)
^ s opyjojasvo, 3
sVa;vs7ra< ' 7rpae
8e Soxs?4
oi> yap
73
SCTTIV iW o TI Srj TTOTS, \|/sysra<.
j s^>' olj 8sT rjX/5/oi 8oxoDo"iv eTvai,
ors jM-vjS' oT^ 8s?* 8oxsT -yap oux
sTo-Sai, jU,7j opyi^opsvos TS oux s
yap
/ 01
Tva<
TO
O 8s
xa; TOU oxsiovg Trspiopav
stances, and must be left to the in-
tuitive judgment of the mind (ef TT?
al(T0ri(rei r) Kpuns).
36 )3ouAerai 7ap dySpaTroScoSes]
' For the term " mild man " means
one that should be dispassionate and
not carried away by his feeling, but
shouid be angry in the way, at the
things, and for so long a time, as the
mental standard may have appointed.
Yet this character seems rather to
incline to error on the side of de-
ficiency, for the mild man is more apt
to pardon than to resent. But the
deficiency is a moral fault (^eyereu),
whether it be called perhaps (TIS)
want of anger, or whatever else.
For men seem fools who do not feel
anger at things at which they ought
to feel it, or in the manner they ought,
or at the time they ought, or with the
persons they ought. Such a man
seems to be devoid of feeling and of
the sense of pain, and since nothing
provokes him, he seems not to know
how to defend himself: but to suffer
VOL. II.
insult or to stand by and see one's
friends insulted is servile.'
jSouAerat 70^ 6 Trpaos] Pov\erai ap-
pears to be used here in a doubtful
sense, something between ' the word
mild means,' &c., and 'the mild
man has a tendency to,' &c. ; cf. ch.
i. 5, note.
rb 8e TTpoifri\a.Ki^6iJt.fvov\ Had the
Ethics been composed on a psycho-
logical plan, what is said here might
hare been arranged under the head of
0v/j.6s, and would have been connected
with the relation of OvpAs to courage,
which is discussed above, Etk. m.
viii. xo-ia. The present passage is
admirably illustrated by Shakespeare's
Hamlet, Act II. Scene z :
' Am I a coward ?
Who calls me villain ? breaks my
pate across ?
Plucks off my beard and blows it in
my face ?
Tweaks me by the nose ? gives me the
lie i'the throat
M
82
IIGIKHN NIKOMAXEU1N IV.
[CHAP.
yvsrcti '
7 avSpaTroStoSsf. r y 8' uTrspjSoAr) xara Trat/ra
xa) yap olj ou 8s7, xa< <>' o* ou 6eT, xa/
xa) SaTTOi/, xa; TTAS/CO p^po'vot/ * ou ju,jj> aTrai/Ta ye TW
aurto U7rdp%ei. ou -yap av Suvair' svai * TO yap xaxov
xa< ea'jTo aTro'XXutn, xav oXo'xXr y pov ^, aC^o'prjTOV yivsTa/.
8 oi ]U.sv ouv opy/Xoi Tap^ea)p jtxsv opytZctVTCti xai olj ou 6e7
>,., >-s \ ^, A 5> ~ / jv r
xa< e<> oj^ ou Osi xai jaaAAov TJ o;*, TrauovTai Or Ta^ecoj
XCt/ /3sXTiO"TOV VOUO"iV. (TUfJ^pOLlVSl OLUTOlg TOUTOj OTi
ou xaTsyoucr;. TTJV opyrjV aXA* avTaTTo'iJOoao'JV ^ Qavspot
9 sieri &a T>JV o^uT^Ta, eTT* aTTOTrauovTai. wTrsppoA'r; o'
ol axpovoXoi o^sT^ xa< Trpo^ ?rav opy/Xoi xa/ ITTI
c^sv xai Touvojua. oi Ss Trixpoi ouo~8<aXuTo<, xa<
etVf can have nothing to do with the
principle given in the Rhetoric, n. ii.
i, that anger desires to make itself
manifestly felt, else we must have
had 17 (pai/epol &v t1i\ffav. The Para-
phrast simply renders ou Korexoucri
TTJV opyfiv, oiiSe KpfaTOvffiv, a.\\a e|ci-
yovTCU al a/xuforTat eiiflus.
9 oi awpdxoAoi] ' The hasty." The
older form of this word is aKpdxo\ot.
The etymology appears to be &pos
and x*^> as if 'on the point ' or
' extreme verge of anger." On the
same analogy we ' find the word
cLKpoffQah-fis, ' on the verge of being
overturned," 'ricketty,' cf. Plato,
Repub. p. 404 B. Plato speaks of
passionate and peevish people as
having become so through the ener-
vating of an originally noble and
spirited temperament. Cf. Rtpub.
p. 411 B 41 3: lav 8e BvfjioetSrj (^{
T}>V Bufji&v
ffjuitfSf
As deep as to the lungs ? Who does
me this ?
Ha ! why I should take it : for it
cannot be
But I am pigeon-liver'd, and lack
gall
To make oppression bitter."
7 TJ 8" uirepoA)j ylvrrai] ' Now
the excess is possible under all heads,
the wrong people, the wrong things,
more, quicker, longer, than is right.
However, these excesses cannot all
coexist in the same man. This would
be impossible. For evil destroys even
itself, and if it exist in its entirety,
it becomes unbearable.' Psychologi-
cal reasons might be assigned why
the same person cannot be passionate,
peevish, and sulky. But Aristotle
here gives an abstract generalization
that the different forms of evil are
mutually destructive, and that it is
only by tempering evil with a certain
admixture of good that its existence
can be borne.
8 <ru/x/3aiVei 5" airoirouovrm] ' This
happens because they do not keep in
their anger, but make immediate
reprisals, so that their anger is be-
trayed by their hastiness, and then
they are done.' The words $
a-irtipydffaro,
raxy fpfOi^oftev6v re Kal Karaff&fvvv-
fitvot'. a.Kp6xo\oi olv Kal opyi\ot avrl
6v/ju3(iSovs yryevriVTai, SuffKO\ias ffi.-
v\eot. K.T.\.
10 ol tie TTticpol <^>/\oj] 'But the
sulky are hard to bring round, and
are angry a long time, for they keep
in their wrath. Now there is a
H91KQN NIKOMAXEIQN IV.
83
vpo'i/ov opyt^wrai xars^o^xri yap TOV
8s yivtrai, oVai/ ai/Ta7ro8j8a> r] yap
Travel T?)S opy%, ^'Sov^v avTJ rrjj XuTrrj^ ^t,7rojotio~a *
TOUTOU 8s jar) yivo/xevou TO fidpog syowrtv ' oia.
yap TO jtxr) e7r/<aj/ sTj/at ouSs <rv[Jt.7rei(ii avToug oo8i,
ei/ awTco 81 Trsif/a/ TV)V opyr^v voovou 8sT. slo~i S
oJ roiouroi eauroig o^XvjpoVaTo* xai ToT-^
I- 1 ' ' rs
yap
xal
8s jaaAAov Trjv
yivsrai avQpaiTrixwTepov yap TO ri[JUDpiia~Qai.
TO o~UjU,j3/oov 01 p/aA=7roi %sipov$. o 8s xa< ^
TrpoVep ov ei'pvjTaj, xaf lx Ttov 7^syop,iva)V S^Xov * ou
yap paSiov 8iop/o~af TO TTCO^ xa) T/Q-J xa; ITT* TTOIOIC; xa}
TroVov p^po'vov opyurrsov, xai TO ]W,^p* T/VO^ opQ&s Trots?
rig rj apapTavsi. o jasv -yap jaixpov TrapsxjSa/vwv ou
OUT' ETT} TO jaaXXov OUT* 7ri TO TJTTOV. zviors
xa} Trpdovg Qapsv, xai
uvapsvovs ap%eiv. o 8^
Tra&sxfcaivcuv i^sxrog, oy paftiov TO)
ei/ yap TO?^ xaS' exourrot xa} ry aJo"9rjo~/
TO -s
xa
ov OT*
yap TOV$
Troov xa<
xa*
8=
TO. TO<at>Ta, a* 8' u
xa< STT/ pixpov jasv ytvopsvai
ITT) TroAu 8s o-<^o'8pa.
natural termination, when one has
wreaked one's resentment, since
revenge stops anger by substituting
a feeling of pleasure for that of pain.
But if this does not take place, these
people continue to feel their burden.
Their feeling is not manifest, and so
no one reasons them out of it, while
to digest it internally requires time.
Therefore such persons are exceedingly
vexatious both to themselves and to
their best friends.' An admirable
account of sulkiness, on which
nothing more need be said.
13 6 8e /cal tv TOIS Trp6repov elpyrai]
This refers to Eth. 11. ix. 7-9, which
passage is with some amplification
almost exactly repeated here. This
part of the Ethics is written with a
constant reference to Book II., and
yet as if the subject had been taken
up again to be worked out after an
interval.
M 2
84
IIGIKflN NIKOMAXEIQN IV. [CHAP
0)$ dvQXTOV. al fJ.lv OUV TTSpl TVJV
6 'Ev 3s TOU$ bfuhiouf xal TO> (ru^fy xai Ao'ycov xa\ Trpay-
fj.dra)V xoivfovsliv ol /xss/ apsa-xoi 8oxoD<rtv sTvca, 01 travra
xcu OU^EV avTiTsivovTsg,
' ol
rot5
xa
s<riv, oux
xa6' ^v a^ooe^sra/
s, ojtxocof e xa u<rp^?^avT. ovofj.cc ft ovx
yi TI, sows 8
o xara TV .(rrv e{-iv olov
on jtxev oov a*
xar or* r] ,w,0"T3 rourtov
4 a SrT xai a>j 8s7 otxo/icof Se
5j^ 4>/A/a, on avsu TrdQovs ea"r} xai roD (rrspysiv ols
sT* ou yap TO)
xa
auro
xa
'j yap
VI. The next subject is the regu-
lation of one's deportment in society,
with regard especially to complacency
or the reverse. This also is a balance
between extremes, avoiding on the
one side surliness (rb 56<rico\oi'\ and
on the other side the conduct both of
the weak assentor (ipetr/tos), and of
the interested flatterer (K<$AO). The
balance has no name, it is most like
friendship, but differs from it in being
devoid of affection, and being ex-
tended to all in proper degrees.
There is a slight departure here from
Book II. vii. 11-13, an< i ^ ma y be
said that the present treatment is an
improvement. Before (I.e.) it was
said, there are three virtues connected
with speech and action in society : the
first is about what is true, the others
about what is pleasant. But here the
quality which concerns the deport-
ment and whole spirit of a man in
society is rightly treated as most
generic, and placed first. In Book II.
the name tyiXia is unreservedly given
to the quality in question, but here no
name is assigned, and only a resem-
blance to friendship is pointed out.
5 ov yap ofwlws AuireTv] 'For it is
not fitting that we should pay the
same regard to familiars and to
strangers, nor again have we an
equal title to put them to pain.'
This latter clause is explained in
7~9 where it is laid down that
though the general object will be to
give pleasure, yet that a man must
bring himself to give pain on occa-
sion, with a view to important moral
consequences in the future. He
would, of course, feel himself more
bound to exercise this duty with
regard to friends. Qpov-ri&iv is a
V. VI.]
H9IKQN NIKOMAXEmN IV.
85
isiv, ou at) Xu/r=tV. xaoAo'u 6
8=7 OjU,<>a;<rsi, a.vaQ>ep(uv dis 7rpo TO
ov xai TO (rv[j.$pov (TTO%da-Tai row JUT; AUTTS?!/ T]
o-ui/r ; 8'Ji/=iv. SQJXS jasv yap 7rspi rj8oya xat /\.<j7ra sii/ai 7
ev TOCJ ofniT^iaig yivo>Jt,sva$ y TOVTCOV 8' oVa^ ju.sv aura)
J^UTTBIV. xoiv TO) 7rojoDvn 6* a.
vj j.<xpav, r) $Xri3rjv, rj '
pi'hrjo'si rog sv awjU-atri xa rot^
^ yrrov yva)pi[j.oic, opoicos 6s xai xara ra
sxa(TTOi aTrovstJ-cov TO TTpsVov, xa; xa6' airo
TO (ruvr y 6(jv=iv, "Kwirsiv 8'~ swXa
o, <rvv7ro[j.svog, Xsyco s T<O
xa* ^'80^% 8' evsxa
o p.sv oi>v aeVo
8s, Toti 8s o~uv7]8uvovTO^ 6 jaev TOU
/a^o'asvoj ^ 8*' aAXo T< aps<rxo^, o 8' O7ra> co^s
aurco ylyvr t ran e\g p^pr^aTa xai oo~
o 8s 7roi(ri ^iKraivwv e'lrai OT; 8uo~xoXoj xa}
TO)
general expression, implying as much
care to please, as care for the welfare
of the persons in question.
67 KaflrfAou Sutr^epaceT] ' We
have said generally that (the good man)
will associate with people as he ought,
but we may add (5) that, with a con-
stant reference to what is noble and
good, he will aim at not giving pain,
or at contributing pleasure. The
province of his virtue lies among the
pleasures and pains that arise out of
social intercourse, and wherever in
giving pleasure he would dishonour
or injure himself, he will make a
difficulty, and rather choose to give
pain than such gratification. And if
there be something which will bring,
to any considerable degree, disgrace or
harm on the doer, while opposition
will give him slight pain, he will not
approve it, but will show his repug-
nance.' (i) It may be derogatory to
oneself to show complacency. (2) It
may be hurtful to some member of the
company. These cautions show the
moral and thoughtful spirit by which
Aristotle would have conduct in
society regulated. The following
section prescribes the bearing of a
finished gentleman, giving to all their
due. It must not be forgotten that
Aristotle himself had played the
part, not only of a philosopher, but
also of a courtier.
9 Suo-KoXos] Eudemus uses the
word avQdS-ris to denote this character
(Eth. Eud. ni. vii. 4), in which he is
followed by Theophrastus ( Characters,
c. 15) and the author of the Magna
Moralia (i. xxix.). Eudemus makes
the mean state <r/tj><$Trjy, which is a
departure from the present treat-
ment.
86
II9IKQN NIKOMAXEION IV.
[CHAP.
6s xaj
jisv ra Trsp*
slva*
os $aiv=Tat rot. cixpa eauTO< diet. TO
ai/u)s/'jjaov elvau TO ](xeo~ov.
7 II sp} TO, aura 8s (rp^soo'v e<m xai 73 rr\s
aviuvu[J.o$ 8s xai aurj. ou p^sTpov
eTrsXflejV* ]U,aXAoi/ TS yap av sJos/vj/
TO ro, xaS' sxao-TOv 8<sA5o'vTS, xai ju.so-oVr,T
dperds 7rurTv(ra.i[J.V civ, erri 7ravTO>v oorcog spov <rvvK>ovTS(;
sv 8^ Tto eru^rjV o< jtxsv Trpoj vjOov^v xa< XUTT^V
uo'vTa>v fe xa) \{/
7rpd%s<ri xai TJ 7r
SoxsT 8rj 6 jU-sv aha^cov TrpotnroiyTixos Ttbv
3 sva< xca /x^ v7rap%ovTcov xai psi^ovcov 75 uTrap^sj, o 8s
sjp)v avaTraXiv dpviia-Qai TO. v7rdp%ovTOi % sXaTTto Tro^sTv,
4 6 8s jtxsVoj au6s'xao-ToV TJ eov aXij^suTixo^ xai Tto /3/to xai
VII. There follows another name-
less excellence closely connected with
the former, having still to do with
demeanour in society ; this, by a
curious formula, is termed the regu-
lation of boastfulness (^ TTJS oAafo-
vei'a? jte<r<{T7js). The boastful man lays
claim to honourable qualities which
he does not possess, or to a greater
degree than he possesses them (SoKtt
jrpotnroiTjriicbs rSiv fvS6^av flvai K.r.A,),
while the ironical man denies or
understates his own merits. The
balance between these two is found
in the straightforward character
(av6fKa(rr6s TJS), who in word and
deed neither diminishes nor exagge-
rates his own good qualities. In
Eth. n. vii. n, the provisional name
oA^Ofia was given to this virtue, but
here Aristotle points out that it is to
be distinguished from ' truth,' in the
more serious sense of the word, that
'truth' which makes the difference
between justice and injustice. What
he is at present concerned with is
merely a truthfulness of manner,
though he confesses ( 8) that this
has a moral worth (riej/rijs), and
that the man who is truthful in little
things will also be truthful in more
important affairs.
3 etptav] This is an excessively
difficult word to express in English.
' Ironical' has acquired an association
of bitterness and taunting, 'Dissem-
bler' of craft. If we render it by
' over-modest ' we trench upon the
qualities of the /ti/cp(tyux*> and imply
too much that is connected with the
whole character. Elptavtla as here
spoken of is simply an affair of the
manner; there appear to be two
forms of it, one that refined species
exhibited by Socrates, the other an
affectation of humility which is really
contemptible. There is perhaps no
one English word to express these
two forms, the only resource appears
to be to use the word ' Ironical ' in a
restricted sense. Etpui> in Theo-
phrastus (Cfiar. I.) is already used in
a worse sense than in Aristotle, to
denote one who dissembles for selfish
motives, and whose whole life is artifi-
cial and deceitful.
] probably from ovrb
'everything exactly as it is,'
VI VII. ] HeiKON N1KOMAXEIQN IV.
87
TO>
rot.
slvai
avrov, xou
<TTI os TO'JTCOV sxa(rra. xou svsx 5
OUTS jUfIo0 ours s
TlVOg TTOlilv XOU fM}8VO$. Xa<TTO 010$ E(TTl, TOJOCUTGt
XcyfJ xdi TTpdrrsi xou ovTto v), sctv jot,?] TJVO vsxa Tr^arrr.
' 6s TO jasy ij/ 5 ^ ? ^auXov xa ' il/fXTov, TO 8' 6
xaAov xa) 7raiV:Tov. OUTO) Ss xa< 6
/vsTo'c, 01
S' o aAa^cov.
TTsp) ToO
fysxrai,
85
sxarlpou 8 s
Q'J yap ?T5p; TOU
(rvvTsivii
ev 0!$ [Jirfisvog TOIOUTOU
V ^1(0 aAr;5 = <J< TO) TTjV I
av 6 TOiouTO^ 7risixri$ sva;
oT^ ju,7) S<a4>fp aXr^s
STI fj.a7\.Xdv. cag yap al(r%pov TO
o 7= xai xaS' awTo r)v\afi=iTO' o
xa sv
SJI/Oll.
xa/
xa
xou ev 01$
strl TO eXctTTOv 8s
TOJOUTO^
TOU ahrfioug OLTTOX^IVSI ' 9
and hence a ' matter-of-fact ' or
' straightforward ' man.
5 6 effri Sf oA.afto*'] ' Now it is
possible to practise both irony and
boastfulness either with or without
a particular motive. But in general a
man speaks, acts, and lives, in accord-
ance with his character, unless he
have a particular motive. Falsehood
is in itself base and reprehensible, and
truth is noble and praiseworthy. And
thus the truthful man, who occupies
the mean, is praiseworthy, while those
who strive to give a false impression
of themselves are both reprehensible,
and especially the boaster.' Aristotle
first appears to assert that both irony
and boastfulness are prompted gene-
rally by a particular motive, for, if it
were not so, men would be simple and
natural. Afterwards we are told that
boastfulness is a condition of the will
(^PTTJ irpocupeVfi), that it aims at either
gain or reputation, that irony may
spring from a motive of refinement,'
or again from vanity itself. These
things however may aim at reputation
and yet be instinctive, the desire for
reputation forming part of men's na-
tural impulses.
8 S6fie 8' &/ eVcuj>eT<fe] 'But
this character appears to possess a
moral excellence. For the lover of
truth, who adheres to what is true
even in things where it does not
matter, will be still more truthful in
affairs of importance, for he will
surely avoid a lie when it appears as
something base, when he avoided it
before merely for its own sake.' The
writing here is a little careless, since
above, all lies were declared to be
essentially base, but here a contrast
seems to be drawn between the
' white lie ' in society, and the base lie
in affairs of importance. It throws
great light upon the nature of Ari-
stotle's table of the so-called ' virtues '
88
IIQIKQN NIKOMAXEIflN IV.
[CHAP.
TO
roig
rtov
|U.|W,As'o-Tpov yap fyaivsrai
sTva. o Ss ps
s si/sxa <au?u.o /xsv soixsv (ou yap at/ s%aips rip
), ju,arao 8s QaivsTai jaaXXov T) xaxo'j
Tu'av
el &' svsxa
o aAaVov,
o 8s apyup/ou, ^ oVa e< a'pyupiov, fifr%y[j.ov(rTepo$. oux.
sv
Kara, rrv
ev
xa) TO) rojoVSs sTvai aXa^ov SCTT/V,
w
(T7rsp
xa
fj.v TO>
aura)
p^ap
cov o
o
xa a
8a
ra ro/aura 7rpo(r7rojouvrai
, ol 6s xsp8ou, <ov xai
sV-n ]U,TJ ovra, olov
etrr*
Trpoa-Troiovvrai ra
arpov. a TOOTO o
14. xa; aXa^bvrUOvrat * sVr* yap sv auroT^ ra elpyfj-evot. ol
8' iipwveg ITT/ TO sAarrov Asyovrs^ ^ap/sVrspoi ]U,sv ra
<$>aIvavTO.i ' oit yap xspSou^ svsxa 8oxouo-i Xsys/v,
to observe that he excludes from
them truth proper, and admits truth-
fulness of manner.
IO 12 6 Se /ieffoo K'p5ovs] 'But
the man who pretends to better qual-
ities than he really possesses, if he
has no motive, shows like a mean
man, for else he would not have de-
lighted in the falsehood, though he
seems foolish rather than bad. Sup-
posing there is a motive, if it be re-
putation or honour, the boaster is not
to be severely blamed, but if it be
money, directly or indirectly, his con-
duct is more discreditable. The boaster
is not constituted by a given faculty,
but by a particular condition of the
will ; for it is in accordance with his
moral state, and by reason of his
character, that he is a boaster, just as
a man is a liar, though the latter
takes pleasure in falsehood itself,
while the former aims at either repu-
tation or gain.'
fa>s & c Ao^wi/] This makes no sense.
The Paraphrast omits is altogether,
rendering the passage, fl 8e TWOS
evfKa irpoffiroif'iTcu, d /jitv 8<jjs t) TI/XTJV
oil \lav J/SKrby 6 a\a<tit>. To follow
his example seems the simplest
remedy. One of the MSS. omits 6,
which would give the sense ' he is not
very blameable considering that he is
a boaster.'
12 ov/c tv rrj Swd/j.ti a\\' fv Tp
wpoeupfVei] Cf. the well-known pas-
sage Phet. i. i. 14, where the Sophist
is said to be distinguished from the
Dialectician not intellectually but
morally, 6 ybp <r<x/>i<rTiKbj OVK Iv rp
8wd.fj.ei a\A.' tv ry irpoaipefffi.
1 3 This is a very happy observation,
that desire for reputation makes men
pretend to virtue, power and the like ;
but desire for gain makes them pretend
to useful arts the possession of which
cannot be tested; thus a man will
give himself out to be a clever sooth-
sayer or doctor.
14 15 o/ 8' etptavts a\aovu<6v]
VII.-VIIL] IieiK&N NIKOMAXEK1N IV.
89
ss TO oyxrjpov. /xaArra 8s xai OVTOI rot,
vTOii) oiov xoii ^(jaxpa.ri]g STTOISI. ol 8s KCU ra
[JLlXpOt XOil TO. QotVSpOt 7rpO(T7rOlOV[JiVOl
"Keyovrai xai suxaroi^povr/rot sicriv, xau sv/ors a
QaivBrai, oiov ~r\ rtbv Aoixtuvcov G"Qr)$' xoii yocp r t u
xou TJ "hiav /NAe<4/i ahafcovixov. ol 8= [Asr&iwg vpa)[j.svoi 16
TVJ elpfovzirx. xcx.} Tr&pi ra |Ur] /Uav efJiTTO^wv xai >at.v=poL slpw-
vsvo[j.svoi ^apisvTss (balvovTai. avr ixiia-Qai 8' o aXa^wv 17
C^a/i/srat rco a7\.rfisuTixa> %sipo)V yap.
8s xa) ava;rau(rsa)^ ev rco 3/<o, xai sv raury ; 8
' Ironical persons, in depreciating
themselves, exhibit it is true a certain
refinement of character, for they do
not appear to speak in that way for
the sake of gain, but to avoid pom-
posity. These persons are especially
given to disclaiming the possession of
honourable qualities, just as Socrates
used to do. But they -who make a
pretence about things petty and obvious
are called " affected fops," and are de-
spised by every one. Sometimes this
kind of conduct appears to be really
pretension, as in the case of the Laco-
nian dress ; for both the excess and
the extreme of deficiency are of the
nature of boasting.'
<t>eir)'OVTes rb b r yKf]p6v\ Cf. above
| 9 : e/x/ieAe'cTTepoi' yap (palyerai 8ja rb
eirax0f?s ras uTrepjSoAas flvai.
TO. evSo^a] Such as wisdom and
the like, cf. 2, where T& evSoa is
used in the same sense, an unusual
one in Aristotle. Cf. Eth. vn. i. 5,
and note.
oiov Kal SawptS-rns] On the Irony
of Socrates, see Vol. I., Essay II., p.
114.
15 Trpoffiroioti/jievoi] It is impos-
sible to understand this in the sense
of ' disclaiming ' which the context
requires. The Paraphrast supplies /*})
SvvavBat, and explains it very clearly,
as follows, its 8e ou /J.6vov ra fityd^a
TOL. II.
Kal 4V8oa aAAa Kal ra /ii/cpa airapve'irat,
Kal & SrjAtJs eaTi SwdfAfvos ravra.
TrpOiTTrojetraj ^t/r] SvvuffOxi. But irpocr-
Troiov/ji.fi'us can never have been con-
sciously meant to stand for this.
There must have been some slip
about the writing. Two of the MSS.
read ^ irpoffTroiov/j.fvoi. This sort of
variation in MSS. does not show what
was the original reading, but only that
the transcribers felt a difficulty.
VIII. I QijffT\s 8e TOIOVTUV a.Kovfiv\
' Rest also being a part of human life,
and an element of this being playful
diversion, we find here likewise the
sphere for a certain harmonious man-
ner of intercourse, and the possibility
of both speaking and hearing the right
sort of things in the right way ; though
there will be a difference as to whether
one is the speaker in such matters or
listens to what is said.'
Aristotle considers the virtue of wit
or tact (e^r* tiriSf^ios eir' evrpdweXos
Aeyerot) to be concerned with the
amusing and sportive element in
society, and to be a balance between
buffoonishness that sacrifices all pro-
priety to the ludicrous, and dulness
that is incapable of either making or
appreciating a joke. Aristotle does
not here enter into the philosophy of
the ludicrous, or inquire what is a
00
NIKOMAXEK1N IV.
[CHAP.
jusra 7ra8a, ooxeT xai evrauSa eli/at fyuTua
* ? a ^ Xs'ysjv xa) a>, 0,0.0/0)*; 8s x
0= xa< TO si/ TOIOVTOI$ ?\.sysiv 73 TOJOUTCOV a
aJ xa* 7Tp] raur' sVrlv U7r=pfio'h.r l rs xai
3 TOU fjLS(T(tv.
ust/ out/ ra>
row
xa
erroya^Ojtxsvot roD ycXarrat 7roi7^o~ai 73
rou
Os
ayro av
jU,7jQev ysXcTov TG? TS
xa* <rxXrjpo< Ooxoucriv stvai. ol o'
7rpoo~ayopsuovrai, olov eu-
oxou<r< xivr)(rei$ elvat,
os ra (riofj.oi.TOi ex raiv
TOU
xa< ra> crxtoTrrsiv jOtaXAov 73 3sT, xai of
Trpoo-aropsuovra* coV ^ap/svrsj. or/
58= 8ia4>spou<r/, xa/ oi ju,<xpo'j/, ex rtov e/^73 ( asva>t/
8' e'^< oixsibi/ xai 73
x^vsra<, OUTCO xat
joke and why it pleases. Nor does
he lay down any canons for the regu-
lation of wit, except such general ones
as that ' nothing should be said which
is unworthy of a gentleman ' (irrfTepuv
oSl/ T&J' fS OKWTTTOVTa bplffTfOV Ttf
\fytii> & irptiret (\ev6f pit? ;), that the
hearer must not be shocked, &c. On
the whole he leaves it indefinite, say-
ing that tastes differ, and the educated
man will be a law to himself. His
account of wit then is negative and
abstract, though perfectly just as far
as it goes.
SioyoryTJs fj.tra iraiStas] 8407607^
is the passing of time, hence ' diver-
sion.' Cf. Mttaphys. I. i. 15 : ir\ti6t><av
8' fvpiaKofitvcav Ttxviav, Kai TUV fj.\v
irpbs TavayKaim Ttav 8e irpbj Sta,y<i>y^i>
ovcrOav. Eth. x. vi. 3 : KaraQtvyovffi 8"
M rets Toiauroj 84a7ary4s TOIV svoai-
til TTO\\oi.
This name seems origi-
nally to have belonged to the vile
creatures who lay in wait at the
altars to purloin the offerings, and
hence to have been applied to those
who thought nothing too low for them,
buffoons who would descend to any-
thing.
3 of 8' 4<X|ueAj rck 1jOri~\ ' But they
whose jocularity is in good taste are
called men of elegant wit, as if it were
nimble, by a name that signifies uimble-
witted ; for such motions of wit seem
to belong to the moral character, and
characters, like bodies, are judged by
their movements.' Aristotle here calls
attention to the etymology of fvrpd-
irf\os, as he did before to that of
S(reoTos. Ch. i. 5.
4 4irnro\dovTos xaptfvres] ' But
as the ludicrous meets us at every
turn ( eViiroAa^oiroy, cf. Eth. i. iv. 4),
and most people take pleasure in sport
and jesting more than they ought,
even buffoons get the name of witty
just as though they were fine wits.'
VIII.]
H0IKON NIKOMAXEIQN IV.
91
Ss^/ou <rr} ToiccuTOi Xy=t> xoa O.XQUSIV o/a rco STTISIXSI xal
sfauQcplCO apfJ.OrrSl ' %(TTl yap riVOi TTpSTTOVra TCO TOlo(lTO>
Asys/v sv TTOLifiiag fJ-spsi xtx,i dxvusiv, xoti T] rou ihsuftspiou
Qspsi rr) roO at/0a7ro8rt)0oy, xai au rou TTSTrai-
xa* aTraiftsurov. i'^oj S' av rig xai ex. ribv 6
xou
roig s /xaXXoi/ 7]
raura Trpo^ su(r^^.o(ritvrjv. Trorspov 7
rov ew (TXCUTTTOVTOI rjpurTSQV no "hiyeiv a TTpsTrsi eXsu-
p, ^ Tew ju,^) hvTreiv TOV axouvvTa, rj xou rspTrsiv ; ^ xa;
s roto'jTov oiopurrov otXXo yap aXAco p,urr)Tov rs xcti
Tj'Su. ro;aura 3= xai axoucrsrai a yap UTTO^SVH axouaw, 8
raura xat 7roi=?v boxii. ou 8rj TTCCV 7rotrj<rei' ro yac 9
(rxtofj.iJ.oe. Xoj5op7]^a T/ <rr<v, oi 8s vo^^irai evta. Ao;8ops/V
' ' xa) (TXCOTTTSIV. 6 3 va/e* xa< 10
ro
ovTcog s/, oov vopog wv aurco. Totovrog
ouv o ftttrog i<rr/i, IIT* e-Tri^s^tog sir eurpaTrehog
o 3t
<rr row
xa< ours saurou
6 i'Soi 5' &i/ eucrx^/* 00 '^'''?''] ' This
we may see from a comparison of the
old and the new comedy. In the
former it is coarse language that pro-
vokes laughter, in the latter it is
rather inuendo ; which makes no small
difference with respect to decorum.'
This interesting remark is in accor-
dance with what we know from other
sources, of the comparative tameness
of the new comedy in relation to the
license of the old. Cf. Horace, A.P.
281 sqq.
9 ou 8); Tray ffKunrreiv^ ' There-
fore he will not give utterance to
every jest, for the jest is a sort of
reviling, and the lawgivers forbid
certain kinds of reviling they ought
doubtless to have forbidden (certain)
jests.' *Ei/a must be understood as
carried on from \oi8opeiiv to ffKunrreiv.
Aristotle could never have wished
that jesting altogether should be for-
bidden by the law.
6 877 xapieis faur$] ' This then
will be the attitude of the refined and
liberal man, he being as it were a law
to himself.' Aristotle usually escapes
from pure indefiniteness and relativity
by asserting that the standard in each
case is to be found in the good, the
wise, the refined man. This standard
is evidently tho expression of the
universal reason of man. It is not
to be supposed that wit, beauty, or
goodness are mere matters of taste,
as Aristotle would seem for a moment
to imply (^ KO,} r6ye roiovrov a.6piffrov;
&\\o yap &\\y fjnffr\r6v Tf Kal ^8u).
When he adds afterwards that the
educated man must be the standard
of appeal, he means that the laws of
reason must decide. And these
might, had Aristotle thought it worth
his while, have been more drawn out
in reference to the question under dis-
cussion.
10 12 These sections are an
N2
92
OUTS TCOV aXAo)V
NIKOMAXEIQN IV.
[CHAP.
si yiTuora TTQir^si, xai
a>v ou$si/ oiv S'ITTOI o %api=is, evia 8' ou8' av
%psio$' ovQsv yap
SoxsT 8s 13 ava7rauo-<
\ c "\ \ ' ~ n ' * * ~ *y
t ?j TraiOia sv ru> piai g/vai avayxaioi'. rp=J out/ aj
a.i sv ra> $/<o ja<ro / Tr;TS, el^i 3e 7ra<ra< T
xcu TTpa^scuv fCOivcovictv. Qia.t$>epQv<ri 8' on 7]
Trspi aX^siav SCTTJV, a< 8s Trspi TO TJ^U. Ttov 8e 7r=p<
7]'ooi/yji/ >j ftsv sv raTj 7rajS3U, 73* 8' ev raT? xara TOV a
almost verbal repetition of what was
said, <A. H. vii. u 13. They
appear like an afterthought as com-
pared with Eth. iv. vi. i.
We perhaps ought hardly to quit
the present subject without alluding
to the remarks which Aristotle has
elsewhere thrown out on the nature
of wit and of the ludicrous. The most
striking are Khet. n. xii. 16, where
he defines wit as ' chastened inso-
lence,' TI yap fuTpa.Trf\la, nfiraiSfVfj.fV'n
vfipis lat'iv, and his account of the
ludicrous, that it consists in a thing
being out of place, anomalous, ugly
and faulty, though not in such a way
as to cause any sense of apprehension
or pain. Poet. \. 2: Tb yap yt\oi6v
fffTLV ap.dprrifid n Kal ai<rxs avcaSwov
Kal ov ((>9apriK6v, dlov fvOvs rb ytKolov
nptiaontov alayjp&v TI Kal SteffTpafi/Atvov
&vev oSvirrjs. This definition, which is
to the highest degree penetrating, has
been made by Coleridge the text for
his admirable dissertations on wit and
humour. See Literary Remains,
Vol. I.
IX. I 2 ITtpi 8^ aloovs e?cai]
'Modesty we can scarcely with pro-
priety describe as a virtue ; for it has
more of the feeling than of the state.
It may, however, be denned as a kind
of fear of evil report ; and in its effects
it greatly resembles the fear of danger,
for persons who are ashamed blush,
and those who are in terror of death
grow pale. Both therefore appear to
be in a manner corporeal, which again
approximates them to feelings rather
than states.' Aristotle, following out
the programme given, Eth. n. vii.
14 15, arrives now at the place for
discussing two instances of the law
of the balance existing in the instinc-
tive feelings of the mind (v toty
irdBffft nfff6rifrfs~), namely modesty
and indignation. But from some
cause his work is interrupted here ;
indignation (tie^ais} is not treated of
at all, and the discussion on modesty
is left unfinished. There is no men-
tion of the extremes, shamelessness
(aixuffXyvTla) and shamefacedness
(/<aT<;rA7jis), which are specified in
Book II. (I. c.) and in Eth. End. in.
vii. 2. After stating that only to
certain ages is ' modesty ' suitable,
and that only in a certain provisional
sense (^ viroBtvews) can it be called a
virtue, the chapter abruptly ends, a
sentence having been added by some
later hand which gives an appear-
ance of finish to the book and
awkwardly connects it with the open-
ing of Book V.
vm. ix.]
' A >
7ra7=i yap
H0IKQN NIKOMAXEIQN IV.
93
'soixsv i] s^si. opi^srai yoOv <o'j3o TI$
6s TOJ TTS&I TO. bsiva. 4>o'j3o> ;rapa-a
fja.va.TOV <
TTO> eivat
slvai. o'j
o!o'/ji$a
epuSpa/voi/Taj yap ol
ol 8s rov
8r)
a.fj.&oTspa., oVsp 8oxs? 7
Trao-7) 8' rj?ux/a TO ;ra$0
TJ?UXOUTOU
ajU,apTaj/=iv, WTTO TT
xal STra/voujtxsv Ttov jotsv vstov TOU
' 3
8s
-yap
Ta< STT<
8' SO~T< Ta
s 5
s yap 7r<s/xou^ SO~TV >
<$>auXoi^' ou yap TrpaxTsot/ Ta
v xaT* aX^Qs/av alo"^pa Ta 8s xaTa
otj^sv 8iacJ>sps< ouSsVepa yap TrpaxTea, OJO~T' owx
TS'OV. c^auAoy 8s xa) TO sj'vai TOiouTov olov Trparrsiv TI 6
TO 8' OUTWg %W W(TT si 7Tpa^5/S T< T(OV
so"Qa/, xa) 8ia TOUT' oi<rQai STT/S/XT) sTva/,
O.T07TOV ETTi T0? SXOWO"/0/^ yap 7] ai8t6f, SXCOJ/ 8s S7TISI-
oy8s7TOTS Trpa^s/ Ta c^auXa. *TJ 8' ai/ ij ai8co^ s^ 7
sTTisixsg' si yap Trpa^a/, aier^uvoiT' av. oux
8s TOUTO Trsp} Taj apsTa^. si 8' 13 a.vai<r%vvTia.
xa) TO jar) ai8s?r3a< Ta aio~^pa TrpaTTsiv, oy^sv
TO TO/auTa TrarTovra a.l(ruvs<rQa,i STisixeg. oux 8
eo~Ti
-3 5 a5cS$ is the apprehension of
shame, joined of course with a capa-
city for strongly feeling it ; neither
modesty nor any other English word
seems adequately to convey the force
of cuStiy. Aristotle speaks of it as a
desirable quality in tender age, before
the character is formed. But in
maturer life the necessity for it, and
therefore its merit, ceases to exist.
It might be said that sensibility to
shame ought to be preserved with
regard to acts that are conventionally
(/caret 5o'|ay) and not really (/car'
aA.^0eiay) disgraceful; but Aristotle
says that any possibility of feeling
shame must be avoided altogether, so
that the former acts must not be done.
7 8 'Modesty can only be good
hypothetically : if a person were to do
so and so, he would be ashamed. But
this is not the way with the virtues.
Though shamelessness and the having
no sensibility about base acts is bad,
it does not follow that to do such
things and feel shame is good. Just
so continence is not a virtue, but a
sort of mixed quality.' 'E uj
'conditionally' is opposed to aTrAwy
'absolutely.' While the virtues are
absolutely good, modesty is only con-
ditionally so.
9-4
II9IKC1N NIKOMAXEIiiN IV. [CHAP. IX.
6* ouo' >)' syxpoLTSia jsrrj, a?vXct rig
i 8s Trssi aur5J ei/ TO?^ OVrs^ov
f os
Oe
OVK eari Si TOUTO irpl TOS operas]
The same formula occurs before, SA.
I. vii. 20 : iKavbv $v run rb STI Sfix^rjvat
Ka\ias, olov Kal irtpl raj afx^s.
f Seix^^fTat 6e irtpi aiir^s ^v TO
vtrrepov. Nw 8e irepl SjKaioeri/yrjs
ftirsa/jLfv Aristotle's MS. of the
fourth book having ended abruptly at
the word /UKT^, Nicomachus or the
editor, whoever he was, in all proba-
bility added these clauses in order to
give the book a seeming union with
the three Eudemian books which were
now to be grafted on.
PLAN OF BOOK V.
HITHERTO all has been perfectly coherent and regular in the
Ethics of Aristotle. Down to the ninth Chapter of Book IV.,
though all the parts may not have been composed at the same
time, yet all belong to the same plan, and bear every mark of
being the work of the same author. But the MS. of Book IV.
seems suddenly to have broken off in the middle of a subject.
Whether this was owing to mutilation, or to original incom-
pleteness, there is now no means of saying. What is clear to us
from internal evidence is, that the editor has at this point com-
menced supplying a lacuna ; and accordingly three whole books are
now introduced, which, though bearing a close resemblance to the
style of Aristotle, and probably conveying, with only slight modifi-
cations, his actual system, yet belong to the Ethics of Eudemus,
Aristotle's disciple, and thus have only an imperfect coherence with
the present work. The chief arguments by which it is demonstrated
that Books V., VI., VII., are only ' copies ' from Aristotle by one
of his school have been given, Essay I., pp. 33-43. These argu-
ments may be briefly recapitulated as follows.
(1.) It is established both by probability and by internal
evidence, that the Eudemian Ethics, and the Magna Moralia, are
not works of Aristotle, but expositions of his system by his disciple
.Eudemus and by some later Peripatetic.
(2.) The three books in question form part of the Eudemian, as
well as of the Nicomachean Ethics.
(3.) They belong naturally to the Eudemian Ethics and fit into
them without causing the slightest irregularity.
(4.) In the Nicomachean Ethics they are the cause of extreme
irregularity, and of collisions and discrepancies which would be a
disgrace to Aristotle as an author, if it could be supposed that he
96 PLAN OF BOOK V.
had allowed them to remain in a work written by himself as a
whole.
(5.) In style they possess all the peculiarities of Endemus as far
as his writing can be distinguished from that of Aristotle. These
peculiarities are a sort of confusion of expression, as if philosophical
thoughts were slurred in the repeating a want of method and a
frequent tautology a fondness for logical formulas and an
abundance of quotations from different kinds of literature.
(G.) In various philosophical questions, especially in psychology,
these books contain an advance beyond the point arrived at in
other parts of Aristotle's works, the Politics, the Nicomachean Ethics,
&c., but they are consistent with the views in the Eudemian Ethics.
This last argument is the most important, but also the most subtle,
and it can only be followed up in detail by a careful examination
of different passages as they occur.
(7.) Lastly, it may be said that there is no really strong argument
in favour of attributing these books to the direct authorship of
Aristotle, beyond a habit of belief which has depended on the
question never being mooted. All arguments drawn from apparent
quotations in the Politics, &c., on examination come to nothing.
The present Eudemian book on Justice bears probably the same
relation to Aristotle's theory of Justice now lost, as the Eudemian
theory of Pleasure in Book VII. bears to Aristotle's theory of
Pleasure given in Book X. The Eudemian books have all a
peculiar indistinctness which taxes the reader's thought to divine
their exact bearing. But on consideration, the outlines of a method
appear to show themselves through the mist. And accordingly,
the following parts may perhaps be discerned in Book V.
(1.) Justice having been denned to be 'a state of mind that wills
to do what is just,' the first part of the book is concerned with
determining, what is the just? (TO Sinaior as distinguished from SiKai-
oavvrf). The abstract principle of ' the just ' may either be iden-
tified with all law and therefore with all morality ; or it may be
restricted to its proper sense, fair dealing with regard to posses-
sions, &c. (TO 'iaov). In this restricted sense ' the just ' finds its
sphere either in distributions of the state, or in correcting the wrongs
done in dealings between man and man. Though justice is not
retaliation, yet in all commerce, &c., there is a sort of retaliation.
Ch. I. V. 16.
PLAN OF BOOK V. 97
(2.) Having settled the nature of ' the just,' it follows to discuss
'justice,' or this same principle manifested in the mind of the
individual. This part of the subject is very imperfectly carried
out. We miss the graphic impersonations of the virtues with
which the fourth book of Aristotle's Ethics is filled. We find
nothing but a few barren remarks on voluntariness as necessary to
make an act unjust, and deliberate purpose to constitute an unjust
character. There is a large digression here on the proper sense of the
word 'justice.' Justice, it is said, can only properly exist between
citizens; it is a mere metaphor to talk of justice in families, &c.
Ch. Y. 17. Ch. YIO.
(3.) A set of questions are added, the answers to which go to
supply deficiencies in the definition hitherto given of justice. The
leading question is, Can one be injured voluntarily ? and the answer
to this shows that justice implies a relation between two distinct
wills and interests. It is again repeated that justice must be a
settled state of the character ; thus the just man could not at will
be unjust. The subject is concluded by an assertion that justice is
essentially a human quality. Ch. IX.
(4.) An appendix follows on the nature of Equity, which is a
higher and finer justice, dealing with exceptional cases and acting
in the spirit not in the letter of the law. Ch. X.
(5.) Ch. XI. is evidently superfluous and out of place. It touches
on the already settled question, Can a man injure himself? The
Eudemian Ethics were probably never finished, and this is the only
account that can be given of the irregularity.
This book, imperfect as it is if we look at it as a whole, is yet full
of interesting suggestions, especially those in the fifth chapter on
subjects which belong to political economy. It disappoints the
reader, however, by seeming to approach questions, without abso-
lutely dealing with them. Thus in Ch. III., there is very nearly
a theory of the division of property ; in Ch. IY., there is nearly a
theory of punishment ; and in Ch. Y. nearly a theory of value and
price. No one can say, however, that these questions are really
met. There is considerable confusion in the treatment of cases of
' voluntary contracts,' and it is left entirely uncertain to what head
of justice these belong. But even were the political questions more
satisfactorily treated in this book, it must be said that the moral
view of justice as an individual virtue is left strangely deficient.
VOL. II. O
H0IK&N [EYAHMISN] V.
nEPI (is &jxajo<ru'vvj xai ao<x/a <rx?7TToi>,
re ,
2 eo"T/v 73 ojxaJO<ruj/>], xai TO 8/xa/ov T/VCOJ/ jascrov. 13 6;
j TJjaTv e<
bf>S)[J.sv
xara
wavrag
I. This chapter proposes and opens
the discussion upon the nature of
justice and injustice. The chief
points it contains are as follows, (i)
Justice and injustice must stand
opposed to each other, as being two
contrary states of mind. From the
nature of one, we may infer its
contrary the nature of the other, and
if the one term be used in a variety
of senses, the other term will be used
in a corresponding variety of senses.
(2) The term ' unjust man ' is used in
two senses, to denote one who is
lawless, and one who is unfair.
Therefore the term 'just' must
denote both lawful and fair. (3) The
lawful (rb v6fi.ifj.ov) is simply all that
the state has enacted for the welfare of
its citizens. Therefore, in one sense,
'justice' means fulfilling all the re-
quirements of law. Thus it is no-
thing else than perfect and consum-
mate virtue. In this general sense
justice is different from virtue only
in the point of view which one would
take in defining it.
i iroia neffSrris] Aristotle proposed
the question about the two kinds of
justice, ' in what sense are they mean
states?' a's /^ecr<$T7jT6S el<nv (Etk. H.
vii. 1 6), which is slightly different
from the above. Cf. ch. v. 17 of
this book.
2 fi 8e ffKffyis vpoeipjifjitvois]
1 And let our inquiry be according to
the same method as what has preceded.'
This probably refers to the way in
which the moral virtues have been
treated in the preceding Book of the
Eudemian Ethics. There is nothing
distinctive about this method, or diffe-
rent from the procedure of Aristotle.
What is most specially alluded to at
present must be the fixing of the
meaning of terms, which is now
resorted to with regard to justice,
and which was more or less employed
before. Cf. Eth. End. m. \. 13,
where the general method and the
style of the writing has great affinity
to the present opening. Ilepl tie
/jLeyahotyuxias IK ruv rots peya\o-
iStov (e conj. Bonitz. Ceteri afriov).
"Clairtp yap Kal ri &\\a Kara rj)/
ftiTviaatv KM. 6fioi6rr)Ta fi-fxP 1 " ro "
\avQavfiv ir6ppea irpoi6vra, Kal irtpl
CHAP. I.]
\sysiv
I-ieiKQN [EYAHMmN] V.
rcov
99
xa/
yap
yap
oixaioTrpayovcri xa) /SouXovrat TO. S/xaia* rov aurov
} Trsp] o.8/x/aj a4>' ?!$ aSjxoDo-* xa}
8*0 xa} TJjaJV Trpwrov a> sv TUTTO*
oubs yap rov avrov s^si rpoVov cV/ rs rtov STTJ- 4
xa} fivvd^scuv xai STTI Ttbv e^eiov,
IVOLVTUOV >
' 75 svavria rCov svavruuv ou, oiov aTro r%' uy<tag ou
ai ra svavria, aAXa ra iyisiva fj.ovov ' 7\.eyofj,sv
, orav jaj a> av o
|U,sv ouv yvcopl^srai TJ evavria e^ig OCTTO T% svai/- S
8= at s^s/j ctTro rtov inroxetp.ev(ov ' sdv r=
ia f, <$>av=pa, xau r\ xa%eta Qavspa yivsrat, xal
ra etj=xr;xa. s
yap T
ex. T&V SUSXTIXIUV rj svs^ia xa sx
yap l(mv 7] sus^ia 7rvxvoTT]$ (rapxo$, avdyxr} xcti TTJV
s<va/ jaavoTTjra <rapxo$ xa; TO susxrixov TO
sv <rapxi. axo/\.oiQs7 8' a)^ STTI TO TroXu, sav 6
a TrAsovavtot: "h*yt]Tai, xa) Sdrspa
oi' cara T$)J/
roO ovo/taTOS irpocrri'yopiav, Sxnrep sv
p.tj4Qei TLV\ ^VXTJS Kal 5wd.fj.fcas.
K.T.\.
4 oi/5e 7&/> Tbv avrbv ^Jyoz']
' (And I have specified them thus)
for it is not the same with developed
states as it is with sciences and
faculties. A faculty or a science
appears to be the same of contraries,
but a contrary state does not include
its contraries, as, for instance, from
health only healthful things and not
the contraries of health are produced.'
Tap refers to the mention of both
justice and injustice separately, and
as opposed to each other. The writer
accounts for this by saying that a
Sui/ojitts admits of contraries, but a
e|is not (see Vol. I. Essay IV. p.
187, 190). The style above is some-
what careless, for we first have eirjaT^/ujj
TCOV fvavriiav T\ avrfi, and then, to
answer to it, e|ts ^ evavrla rwv
fvavricav ov.
5 6 Though a state does not in-
clude its contrary, yet its contrary
may be inferred from it ; and the
state itself may be known by its par-
ticular manifestations (cnrb rS>v vieo-
Keifj.fvw'), just as a bodily condition is
known from the symptoms. If the
name of a state be used in more
senses than one (TrAeovoxcDs), it follows
usually that the name of its contrary-
will be used in more senses than one.
airb TO>V uTroKeififvcav] As we might
say, 'from its facts,' the faroKfiufva,
being the singular instances in which
a general notion is manifested. The
meaning is, that ret Si'/.-cua are to
SiKaiofftivri as good symptoms are to
good health. Tuv viroKeifievtav is an
instance of the logical formulae with
which the writing of Eudemus abounds.
o 2
100
H9IKON [EYAHMION] V.
[CHAP.
7 <r$ai, olot> el TO S/xouoi/, xa) TO aoixov. so<x= 6s TrXrOva-
Xs'-y=o-$aj TJ 8/xa<oo~Jv5 xa) vj aSixia, aXXa dia ro
jo~-
vsi xai
67r< TCOV TToppco 873X73 jtxctAXov * 7] -yap
>] xara TTJV iosav, oTov OTI xaAsrrou x?\.<
TS UTTO TGV aup^sva rtov %a)(t)v xa) ^ ra^ Qupa$
8 sj7\.7j4>3a> 8^ o ad;xo 7roo~a^to^ Xs-ysra/. SoxsT 65
7ra.pdvo[j,ot; atiixos sivai xai o TrXsovsxTV]? xa* o
^Aov OT< xai 6 8/xa<o so"Ta< o rs vop.ifji.og xai o
TO jfxsv Sixajov aca TO vop.i[j.ov xod TO iVov, TO 8
o TS
i. ii. 4 (4 f
oI5e irws
Cf. Ar.
7 lo/c 8 KA.eiowrij'] 'Now the
term "justice " appears to be used in
more senses than one, and so does the
term injustice, but, because there is
a close resemblance between the
ambiguous senses, the ambiguity
escapes notice, and the case is not the
same as with things widely differing,
where the ambiguity is comparatively
plain (8^A.7j /iaAAoc). A physical
difference appealing to the eye (/cari
rV lSecu>) is widest, as for instance
the word ' key ' is used ambiguously
to denote the clavicular bone of
animals, and that with which men
lock doors.' While the general
upshot of this passage is clear enough,
the writing is in itself very indistinct.
Hence in translation it has been
necessary to use expansion. To say
that ' their equivocation escapes notice
because it is close ' goes beyond the
legitimate bounds of compression.
Cf. the obscure and probably corrupt
passage above cited from Eth. End.
111. \. I : &<rirep yap Kal rck &AAa Kord
TV yeirvlaaiv Kal 6/jLoi6rr]Ta /J.(Xpl TOV
\av6avtiv ir6pp<i> irponfira.
Kard TV iSe'av ] This seems to mean
' in external form.' Cf. Eth. i. viii.
16 : 6 f
KA.ers] There is a pun attributed to
Philip of Macedon cf. Plutarch, Reg.
et Imp. Apophth., Philippi ix. which
it has been thought that Aristotle here
alludes to : TJS K\eifibs avry Kart-
ayeiffris Iv 7ro\e;it<j> /col TOU OepaTrfvovTos
larpov irdvToos ri Kaff rj/j.tpav ahovvros,
Aa/u/Jowe, I</>TJ, Sffa /SouAei, TI)C yap
8 ii The word 'unjust' is used
in three different senses to denote the
lawless man, the greedy man, and the
unfair man. The word 'just ' may
mean either the lawful man or the
fair man. In this statement there is
something illogical, for we notice at
once that there are only two senses of
the word 'just' to match the three
senses of ' unjust.' We find in 10,
that unfairness (T& avurov) is a generic
term, including both greediness (irAo-
ve|fa) and also the collateral notion of
selfishly avoiding evil. In short, to
divide ' unjust ' into lawless, greedy,
and unfair, is a cross division.
Evidently there are on each side
two terms: (i) justice is divided
into lawfulness or universal justice,
and (a) fairness about property, or
particular justice. Injustice is divided
into ( i ) lawlessness or universal in-
justice, and (2) unfairness about
property, or particular injustice.
I.]
I101IU1N [EYAHMIQN] V.
101
oa
afiixov TO 7ra.pvofJ.ov xa TO O.VKTOV. STTS s xa TrXsovs- 9
o aoixo$, Trepi Tct.ya.fta SCTTO.I, ou Travra, aXXa Trspi
euTuv/a xa) arup^/a, a sVri |U.=v cbr?;a> as/ aya$a',
nvi &' oux as/, oi 8' avSpojTrot raura siip^ovraj xai Siai-
xovo~iv $ii 8' ou, aXX* t/pso-5aj |Usi> ra a7rAto aya$a xat
ayafta. sivai, alpsi<rQa,i 8s TO. O.'JTO'IS aya$a. 6 8' 1
oux asi TO TrXsov ap=rraj, aXXa xa} TO iXatTOV STTI
xaxaiv'
xaxov
TOUTO SoxsT
ci xa< xoivov.
OT< Soxs xa TO
, TOU o' ayaQou SQ-T/V 73 TrXsovs^/a, 8ia
elva.1. S(TTI 8' dvurog' TOUTO yap
si 8' 6 7rapavo[J.o$ aS/xoc; yjv o 8e
OTI TrdvTa TO. vo^i^cx. S<TTI
S/xaia ' Ta TS
0~Ti, xai sxao"Toy TOVTWV ftlxaiov elvai Qo.fj.sv. ol 8s 13
vo'jtxoi a-yopuouo"i Trspi a^ravTeov, <TTo%o.%o[Jivoi ^ TOW
Y) <7U[j.<$>epQVTo$ 7rao~iv 73
9 ^Trel Se O7o0a] 'Now, since
the unjust man is greedy, he will be
concerned with things good, not all,
but the " goods of fortune," which
abstractedly are always goods, but
which are not so always to the in-
dividual. (Men pray for these and
follow after them, but they ought not
to do so; they ought to pray that
what are abstractedly goods may be
so to them, and they ought to choose
the things which are good for them.)'
The goods of fortune are those which
all men desire, though it is not certain
that they will prove goods to them.
The phrase rd cwrAws ayadd becomes a
set formula in this book, cf. ch. vi. 4 ;
ch. ix. 17. The difficulties con-
nected with prayer, arising out of
human ignorance, form the subject of
Plato's Second Alcibiades. They are
also alluded to, Laws, in. p. 687. At
the end of the Phcedrus is given the
prayer of Socrates (279 B) : 'fl <j>t\e
nw re Kal &\\ot '6<roi Tj)5e Beat, Soirfre
fj.oi K.a.\t yfvtaOai r&vSodfV Zl-faQtv 5'
'6ffa %(, TO?S tvrbs elval /uot (|>i'A<a.
ir\ovffiov 8e vopi^oifu rbv aofytiv ' rb 5e
Xpvffov irXriOos ftrj fiat Strnv /u^re (pfpeiv
fj.'flTe &yetv Svvair' &\\os ^ 6 a&fypiav.
12 15 In one sense all that is
lawful is just ; the law aiming at the
good of all, or of a part, of the citizens,
speaks on all subjects, and more or
less rightly enjoins the practice of all
the virtues. Justice, then, in this
sense, may be said to be the practice
of entire virtue towards one's neigh-
bour.
13 ffTO-)(a.6fJiVOl % TOV KOtvfj ffVfJi<pe-
POVTOS K.T.A..] Cf. Ar. Pol. ui. vii. 5 :
i) fjL^v yap Tvpavvls fffri ^.ova.p\ia. npbs
rb <rv/j.<pfpov -rb TOV p.ova.pxpvvros. i\ 5"
oKiyapxla. ?rpbs rb rcav evir6ptav, TJ Se
8r]/j.oKpcnia. irpbs TO nvfj.<pfpov TO T<av
o.ir6pa>v. The term vocoder IKTJ (| 12)
occurs again in the Eudemian book,
Eth. vi. viii. 2. The view given here
of law, which is expressed still more
strongly below, ch. xi. i, is quite
different from modern views. Law is
here represented as a positive system
102
HGIKiiN [EYAHMIQN] V.
[CHAP.
xar' apsTTjv >] XT' aXAov riva. rpoirov TOIOVTOV ' oj<rrs It/a
JOLSV rpoVov 8/xaja Xeyo^sv ra 7roir ; rixa xa)
uouju,ov/a xa TCOV popiatv aor% TYJ
14-Trpoo'TarTSi 8' o vo'^aoj xai ra rou avdpsio-j
OlOV jtATJ AS/TTSJV TrjV TOt^/V jOtlJ^S (^SU^SiV j.r^ plTTTSlV TO.
TUTTTSJV
olov
apsTa$ xa
5/v, xa Ta TOU
opoicog 8s xa) xara
x=Xeu>J/ ra 8' oL
ov 8* 6 a7T0'^so<acr/xevo^. aurrj jotsv ouv TJ
rri [j.sv S<TTI rtXf/ot, aXX' ou ctTrXto^ aXXa T
srs
xa
rouro
xpar(TT7j raiv ctpsridv slvai
pov.
(t)iough the instances quoted of its
formulae are all negative, ju); Aebrciy
T'))!' Ti|(i/, &c.), aiming at the regu-
lation of the whole of life, sometimes,
however, with a bias of class-interests,
and sometimes only roughly executed
(oire<rx 8io<r/ue'fos). This educational
and dogmatic character of the law
was really exemplified to the greatest
extent in the Spartan institutions.
Athens rather prided herself (accord-
ing to the wise remarks which Thucy-
dides puts into the mouth of Pericles)
on leaving greater liberty to the in-
dividual. But Plato and Aristotle
both made the mistake of wishing for
an entire state-control over individual
life.
14 TO ToD &c8f>cfov] Cf. Etk. in.
viii. i 2. Enactments of the kind
here mentioned form part of the
system given in Plato's Laws, pp.
943 4. Modern statutes of military
discipline against desertion, &c., fur-
nish an exact parallel to these ancient
laws, if we only consider that in the
Greek cities the whole state was
more or less regarded as an army.
1 5 at/TTj fitv olv trtpov] ' Now
this justice is complete virtue, not
absolutely, however, but in relation
to one's neighbour.' There is a
careless transition here from TO
f6/j.ifjM and TO Si/caia to y SiKcuoffvyri.
Correct writing would have required
^ KOTO ToDro 5i/caio(Tw/7j or a similar
phrase. Generally speaking, this first
part of the Book is about TO SiKcua as
distinguished from TJ Smaioffwri (see
Plan of Book V.). TeAtfo is here
used apparently with no trace of the
Aristotelian or philosophic sense, but
simply as denoting 'complete.'
15 20 Hence justice is often
thought the best of the virtues,
brighter than the evening or the
morning star, the sum of all other
excellence. It is the use of virtue,
and not in relation to oneself alone,
but also towards others. Hence it
has been defined ' others ' profit.' As
he is the worst man who is bad both
to himself and others, so he is the
best who is good to himself and to
others. This kind of justice is not a
part of virtue, but the whole ; it can
only be distinguished from virtue
when you come to define it, and dis-
cover that you must take a different
point of view for each.
HOIKflN [EYAHMIQN] V.
KOI
103
Qauu.aa-Tog'
XOtl
<TTiV. TSAsCt <TTIV, QTl Q sy(t)V aurrjV Xai 7TpO
ri apery ^pTjorSa/, aAX' ou fiovov x6'
yap sv asi/ rorj olxsioig TYJ dpsTJj $vva,VTai
<r5a;, ev Ss TO?L,- Trpoj erspov aouj/arouenv.
st) Soxs? e^=;v ro roO B/avro, IT< ap^ avfipa ^si^si '
7Tpo$ srspQv yap xa\ sv xoivtovia rfiy o ap^cav. 8ia 8= TO 17
auro rouro xot] aX?*.oTpiov ayaQov SoxsT s<vai TJ Oixa<oo~uvvj
rtov apsT&v, OTI Trpog srspov (mv' aXXa> yap ra
^spovra Trpdrrsi, ^ app^ovn ^ xoivcovto. xdxurToc; plv 18
6 xa< Trpo^ a'jTov xa] Trpog TOV$ <$>ihov$ ppam,si/o rrf
yp/a, apHrTog 8' oyp o Trpo^ auroi/ T>] aps-rJ] aXXa
srspov* rooro yap gpyov ^aXsTro'v. aurvj jtx,sv 001/19
73 Qixaiorovrj ou [J-spos ap=r%
evavria dtitxia {J*po$ xaxlag
psi T] ap=rrj xa/ '
0X15 a^er o~r/v, ow
xaxia. ri 8/a<>- 20
x rtov
otf0' 'iffnepos /C.T.A.] This may have
allusion to something in literature,
now lost. At all events it is a fine
saying.
iv Se SiKaiocrvvr)'] Given among the
verses of Theognis (147 sq.) in the
following couplet :
ev 8e SiKaioffiivri ffv\\i)P$r)V trad' aper-fi
'crnv,
iras Se T' av^jp ayaOos, Kvpve, 5'iKaios
ftav.
Trpbs erepov'] Fritzsche quotes Eurip.
Heracl. z :
O (lev S'lKUlOS TCIS TCfKOLS JT<pVK > avflp.
6 B" fls rb /cepSos \rjp-' fx uv o-veip.evov,
Kal a\iva\\d.cr<Tiv
And AT. Po. nr. xiii. 3 :
yap aper^v tlvai tya.jj.fv T^V 5iKcuoffvvr]v t
-iraffas avasyitaiov a.no\ovOfiv
1 6 apx^J iti'Spa] The same senti-
ment is expressed by Sophocles,
Antig. 175 sq.
17 a.\\6Tptov ayad6t>~\ Repeated
below, ch. vi. 6. Cf. Plato's
Rcpub. i. p. 343 c : ayvoe'is Srt r) pfv
SiKaioffvvr] Kal rb Sitcaiov a\\OTpiov
ayaObv rq> ovn, TOV KpelrTOf6s re Kal
apxovTOS ffv/j.(pfpov, o'lKeia 5e TOV
irei6oiJ.fi/ov re /cat vin/ipeTOWTOS ^Aa/Sr?
(see Vol. I. Essay II. p. 109). The
sophistical and sneering definition of
justice is here repeated without com-
ment, being accepted as a testimony
to the unselfish character of justice.
ao rf Se Siaipepti aperr)] ' But
what the difference is between virtue
and this kind of justice is clear from
what we have said already. They
are the same, only conceived diffe-
104
IieiKHN [ETAHMIQN] V.
[CHAP.
yap r aurrj, TO sva.t ou TO auro,
oVy 6/xaiO(Tov^, vj 05 Totals %t$ dt7r?ui>, dpT>j.
2 ZTJTOU/XSV 8s ys TTJV sv jeeps' dfST% 8jxa<o(ruv>jv eerri
xou
xar
OTI
rently ; viewed as a relation to others
the state is justice, viewed as a state
of the mind simply, it is virtue.'
rb 8* thai ov rb avr6] This logical
formula occurs again Eth. n. viii. i,
where it is said that wisdom and
politics are the same state of mind,
only their essence is differently con-
ceived (rb fifVTOi flvai ov Tavrbv
avrais). On the force of flvat, see
Eth. n. vi. 17, note. In both of
these Eudemian passages, where it is
said of two things that 'they are
the same, only their elvcu is diffe-
rent,' we must understand that the
results are the same, but the essential
nature, the causes, and what the
Germans would call the Grund-begriff t
or fundamental conception, are diffe-
rent. Thus the first idea about
justice (in the widest sense) is, that
it is a relation to others. The first
idea about virtue is, that it is a
regulation of the mind. There is a
slightly different application of the
formula, Arist. De Animd, m. ii. 4 :
}] 5e TOV alffdifTov tytpyeia Kal TTJS
aiV(Hj<ry 77 twrfi (lev fan KcH pia, rb
of tii>at ov rainof avrcus. 'Now the
consciousness of an object is identical
with and inseparable from the con-
sciousness of the sensation of it, but
yet in conception these differ from
each other fundamentally.' Here we
have two distinct sides or ' moments '
represented as, though logically dis-
tinct, yet inseparable.
Plato in discussing justice had first
to clear the subject of sophistical
notions, and to prove that justice did
not depend alone upon human insti-
tutions, but far more on the nature of
the human soul. Thus he concluded
by defining it to be a just balance in
the mind itself. The Aristotelian
starting-point is different. It is as-
sumed that justice proceeds from the
development of man's nature as a
'political creature.' Also it is assumed
that in political institutions there is
something which is absolute and not
merely conventional (Eth. v. vii.
i 5). Then the only question is,
what are the exact limits of justice
itself? To which the answer is, that
we may either regard it in the
broadest sense as including the whole
of right dealing with others, or, more
restrictedly, as right dealing in respect
of property and advantages of all
kinds.
II. This chapter consists of three
parts, (i) It brings arguments to
prove the existence of a particular
kind of injustice, relating chiefly to
property, from which the existence of
a particular kind of justice might also
be inferred, i 6. (2) It sets aside
universal justice as not being the
object of discussion to the present
book, 7 n. (3) It divides par-
ticular justice into two kinds, distri-
butive and corrective, iz 13.
i 6 The arguments brought to
prove the existence of a particular
kind of injustice reduce themselves
apparently to an appeal to language.
(i) We speak of the coward as
' doing wrongly ' (a5iKt') ; also we
speak of the man who takes more
than his share, as ' doing wrongly ; '
I.-II.]
II01K&N [BTAHMION] V.
105
}0/0t$ o svspyfov ajx;7 /-tsv,
rr t v
TJ oy
ov^sv, oToi/ o
s xara
a< xar'
' avsXsu5=pj'av orav 8s
XOCT' ois ( tt/aj/ TO>J/ TOIOUTOJV, a
xara 7rovr t plav 51 7= r/va (\
xai
Trapa TOJ/ vo/xov. er< el o jtxsv TOU x=p$a.iv=iv evzxot.4.
sv*i xa
aa or;
a=<, oov si eju,ofp/=u<rsi/, nr
xou
, ex^Tvoj 8' aSixof, axoXaa"ro^ 6' ow*
TO xspoaivziv. STI Trspl p.\v Toih\a 5
iv=rai 13 sTravac^opa STT/
s f
TOV 7rapot.a'Trr i v i si s
s saTasv s
s
the latter use of the terms is evidently
different from the former.
(z) A crime committed for the sake
of gain is called a ' wrong ' distinc-
tively, rather than by the name it
would have had, were this motive of
gain not present.
(3) While all other wrongs (aSid?-
jtaTa) are referred each to some evil
principle, such as cowardice, intem-
perance, and the like; acts of unjust
gain are referred to no other principle
except ' injustice,' which accordingly
must be used in a special sense and
denote a special vice in the mind.
The statement of the first of these
arguments in the text is extremely
confused. It is put in such a way
that it would as well prove any other
vice as irXeove#.a to be particular
injustice. Suppose we substituted
' idleness ' in the text for ' grasping ' ;
it would then be true to say, ' When a
man is idle, he often errs in none of
the other vices, certainly not in all,
but yet he acts with a certain faulti-
ness (for we blame him) and wrongly
VOL. II.
(/car' dStKi'oc). Hence there is a kind
of wrong separate from universal
injustice,' &c. However this is only
a matter of statement ; there is no
doubt that aSiKia with regard to pro-
perty means something special, and
different from &5t/cfa in the sense of
wrong-doing in general. In English
' injustice ' is not used to mean vice
generally ; though its opposite 'just '
is occasionally used in the transla-
tion of the Bible as equivalent to
' righteous,' and in a sense answer-
ing pretty nearly to that of v6fj.ip.os.
4 en tl 6 fj.ev Kfp5aiVc] 'Again
if one man commits an adultery for
the sake of gain, making a profit by
it, and another man does the same for
lust, lavishing money (irpoa-TiBfis) and
incurring loss; the latter would
rather be deemed intemperate than
covetous, the former would be called
unjust, but not intemperate ; evi-
dently because of his gaining by it.'
Fritzsche (upon i. 14) quotes Aeschines
Socraticus, n. 14 : Sonet 8' &v <roi
&v6p<airos fl /uoi^euet rds tS>v v4\as
106
H0IKON [EYAHMIQN] V.
[CHAP.
sV ouOrtuai/ po^ypiav aX/\.' r) STT'
p'fjV OTI (TTi rig ao<xj'a Trapa TT^I/ o?\.r y v
on b o/Tao sv no auTu> -yevei
TTJJ/
yap si/ Tto ?rpo sspov
r
raura
rj si TIVI
xa o
OtTTaVTOt TTSpl OfTCt <T7Tr)U?)a'lO$.
xa< or/ cVri
rr y i/ CCTTO
ovQij.otTt
TOO X
7 "Or*
xai srs'pa Trap a rr^v oXr^v apsrr^v, 3rjXov T/f Ss xa) birota
8 r*c, ?\.rj7rrov. tiuopia'T'xi Or; TO a^ixov TO TS
xai TO av*(TOV, TO os ftixaiov TO TS vo^i^ov xai TO
xaTa jtxsv oyj/ TO Trapavo^aov rj TrpoVspov sipr; ( av>j ao/x/a
9 !O~T/V. STTS* ^e TO av;o~ov xa< TO TrAsov ou TO.UTOV d?\./C
STSZQV tog f**p*S fpo oXov (TO jotsv yap TrAs'oj/ aVav
TO 6* OLVKTOV ou TTOLV TrXsov), xa/ TO a'o/xov xa) r]
ou Ta'jTa aXX* STfpa cx=/va)v, Ta /xsv w^ jw-sp'i T^ ^'
,- oXa* jtxepo^ yap atrrr; rj ao//a Trj^ oXrjj ajx'a, l
xai
KO! raCra
r" apyvply, a.SiKf'iv Uv 1) oS,
^(inoi wal T^S wdAeeos Kol
6 wirre rTrou8o?os] ' So that it
is plain that there is a particular kind
of injustice distinct from the uni-
versal kind, having the same name by
reason of a kindred nature (<rw<avv-
(uos), because its definition falls under
the same genus. For both have
their whole force consisting in a rela-
tion to others, but the one is con-
cerned with honour, property, or
safety (or by whatever one name one
might sum iip all such things), and is
prompted by the pleasure of gain,
but the other has to do with the
whole sphere of virtue.'
ffwuwpos'] What logic calls ' ana-
logous.' We before had the word
6/j.wwfj.la to denote ' equivocation '
(c. i. 7), see Eth. i. \i. 12, and note;
and cf. Ar. Categor. i. 3 : SwcScv/ua 5e
\fjfrat wi> r6 re ovofia Koivbv not 6
KO.7O. ToUfo/jia \6yos TTJS outrias 6 avr6s.
9 tirtl S St/ceuoffvj/Tjs] ' But as
(tntl) ' unequal ' and ' more ' are not
the same, but stand related to each
other as part to whole (for ' more ' is
a species of ' unequal '), so (/cal) the
unjust principle and habit belonging
respectively to the two kinds we have
mentioned are not the same but dif-
ferent, this from that, the one being as
part, the other as whole. For this injus-
tice (about property) is a part of uni-
versal injustice, and the correspondent
justice is a part of universal justice.'
The only way to give any meaning to
this indistinct passage is to consider
what is said about ' more ' and
'unequal' to have nothing to do with
irKtovi {('a, but simply to be an illustra-
tion of a part included Ly a whole.
Particular justice includes all the
generic qualities of universal justice,
II.]
IIOIKftN [EYAHMIQN] V.
107
spsi %ixoiirj(rdvr l $ xa\ Trep] TTJ Iv [Aspsi o&ixiag ASXTSOV,
TOU oixa/ou xal TOU ao/xot> axrauTtug. >j /x;v ouv Kara. 10
xa) ao<x/a T a=v
xa< TO tiixaiov 6s xcu TO ad^xov TO xara TOCU-
Tov * o~;s%v yap TO,
-yap
[j.o%fyrjpiav
exa-
=i o
rri$ o
TTpOg TO XOiVo. 7T=p<
Trsp
X6' SXOtO-TOV
) v<TT=pov Giopurrsov ' o'j yap fotog raurov
no less than as a particular virtue it
includes all the generic qualities of
universal virtue. Some MSS. read
&rel 8e rJ ^vicroj' /cal TO Trapdvofjiov,
from not understanding the force of
the illustration applied in re/. It is
no wonder that confusion should have
been caused when the writer was at
so little pains to avoid it.
10 ii We may set aside justice
in the wider sense as being identical
with the exercise of virtue, and also
the principle on which it depends
(cal rb S'tKaiof Se), this being simply
the inculcation of virtue by the state.
(The question as to whether private
education is the same as public,
whether the good man is the same as
the good citizen, may be discussed
hereafter). This seems to be the
train of thought, the whole of n.
being parenthetical. trxeS&i/ yap ra
Ti-oAAoi K.T.A.. is a mere repetition of
ch. i. 14.
TO 5e iroMjTiKa iravri] 'Now the
enactments productive of entire virtue
are those which have been made with
regard to education for public life.
With regard to individual education,
according to which one is not a good
citizen, but simply a good man, we
must afterwards determine whether it
belongs to polities or some other pro-
vince. For perhaps the idea of the
good man is not the same as that of
the citizen in every case.'
Sirrepov Siopurreoi''] This is an un-
fulfilled promise in the Eudemian
Ethics as they stand. Nor can this
exact question bs said to be touched
upon in the Nicom. Eth. In the
Politics Aristotle very decisively pro-
nounces that education should be all
public, i.e., under the control of
government and reduced to one
standard, cf. Pol vm. i. 3 : 'E-reJ 6'
tv rb Tt\os vfi Tr6\i irdffy, <j>a.vtpbv 2n
KOI rriv irai5eiai> jj.lav nal r^v aiir^i/
avayitcuov elvai irdvTuv Kal TO.VTTJS T^V
eiri/xeAeicw flvai KOIV^V Kal /x?J /car'
ISiav, bv Tp6irov vvv fKaffros eTrifj.fhf'iTai
TUV avrov TtKVbiv iSi'a re Kal
iS'iav, $;v &/ 8J|j?, SiSdcrKcav. He also
after a discussion pronounces that on
the whole the virtue of the man and
of the citizen is the same, cf. Pol. in.
iv. and in. xviii. Eudemus then in
the present place appears to depart to
some extent from the views of Ari-
stotle.
p2
108
[EYAHMION] V.
[ClIAP-
TO
aJ sJvat xa< jroX/Tjf] Travri. rv^g 8s xara
8/xa/oy sj> jus'
rcov
(sv rouro/j
SQ-TJ xa< avurov e%ew xa) <Vov Irspov STE'CIU), ev Of TO
^5amxo'j/. TOUTOU 8s (Etfpi] 8uo *
ra ]U,=v sxooo~<a so~r< ra '
ra ro<a8s olov 7Tpa(ri$ wvr\ 8
JyyJrj %pr]<ri$ Trapaxara^xTj fj.Iafya)(ri$ ' exovana. 8s As'ysrai,
ori 15 u-oyr\ ribv ^us/aAAayjaarajj/ TOVTWV sxouo~jof. ra>v
8' axouo~/)v ra jotsv XaS^aia, olov
xs/a TT^oaytoysja 8ouAa7ra-n
ra 8s /3/a/a, olov aix/a 8so~jOco^ Sa
xctxyyopia TT^OTrrjXax/o'ju.o'f.
JI7< \ >> i* 9 v> v \ \ V<N y
rjTrs/ 6 o T adtxo^ avisos xai TO ad/xov av<o~ov,
civSpi T' 07069; eli'Oj] ' The essen-
tial idea of a good man.' On this
formula, see SA. n. vi. 17, note.
jz 13 Particular justice is now
divided into distributive and correc-
tive justice. For all details connected
with these two forms, see the follow-
ing chapters. It must be observed
at present that there is some confusion
in the account at its outset, for 'vo-
luntary transactions ' (TO e/coucrio ffwaA-
Aa-yjuora) ' such as buying, selling,
lending, pledging, using, depositing,
and hiring,' are said to come under the
head of corrective justice, as well as
'involuntary transactions.' But this
is not entirely the case ; we find that
in all bargains the principle of
geometrical proportion comes in
(which does not belong to corrective
justice), and we find in fact that volun-
tary transactions are not touched upon
in the chapter which treats of cor-
rective justice. They are discussed
to some extent in chapter v., but
not assigned to any particular head.
III. This chapter, without for-
mally announcing its subject, treats
of distributive justice. The main
points with regard to it are as
follows. Justice implies equality, and
not only that two things are equal, but
also two persons between whom there
may be justice. Thus it is a geometrical
proportion in four terms ; if A and B
be persons, C and D lots to be
divided, then as A is to B, so must
C be to D. And a just distribution
will produce the result that A + C will
be to B + D in the same ratio as
A was to B originally. In other
words, distributive justice consists in
the distribution of property, honours,
&c., in the state, according to the
merits of each citizen.
With regard to this principle,
though the text is not explicit, yet
it appears to be ( i ) really applicable
in all cases of awards made by the
state, (a) ideally to be capable of a
wider application as a regulative
principle for the distribution of pro-
perty and all the distinctions of
society. As to the history of the
doctrine, we find it shadowed out by
II. III.]
[EVAHMIQN] V.
SO~T/ xa< TO
OTI xa [j.s(rov TI SCTTJ TOU avio j. TOUTO o SOT TO 2
Iv oTToia. yap Trpa^st ear) TO TrXs'oi/ x) TO eXaTTOv,
iVov. el ouv TO aflixov av/o-ov, TO 2/xaiov 3
Plato in the great idea of a harmony
and proportion ruling in the world, cf.
Gorgias, p. ^07 E.: <J>wl 8' 01 crotpoi,
S> KoAAi/cAejs, /cat ovpavbis nal yr/v Kal
Bfovs Kal avdpcinrovs rtjv KOivtuviav
ffvvextiv Kal <pi\iav Kcil xo;rp.i6rffTa Kal
ffuxppoffvinjv Kal SIKCUOTIJTO, Kal rb
o\ov rovro Sia ravra K.6a\iov Ka\ovffiv,
eratpe, OVK a.KOff/J.'iai', ot>5e a.KQ\aaiav .
ffv 3e fioi SoKfTs ou icpoat\iv Tbv vovv
TOVTOIS, Kal ravra ffopbs &v, aAAa
Kal ev 6eo"is Kal tv avBpwirois fj.fja
Siivarai' ffv 5e v\ove^iav otfi 5(?v
affKflv 7 fcnfj.fr pias yap d^fAe?y. There
is a still nearer approach to the pre-
sent doctrine in the Laws, p. 757 B,
where it is said that there are two
kinds of equality ; one is a mere
equality of number and measure, the
other is the ' award of Zeus,' the
equality of proportion. TV 5e
Kal apiffTrjv Iffdrrira ovKtn o-
Siov iravrl ISfTv. Atby yap Si] Kpiaris
fffri' Kal TOIS avBpwirois dei ffftiKpa
/jifv eirapKfi 1 iruv Se offov kv firapKeffy
ir6\effiv fj Kal IStiarais, irdfr' ayada
airfpyderai. rf (i.fv yap fifi^ovi
TA6i'o, rtji 5e tXarrovi <TfiiKp6rfpa
vffj.ei, fJLfrpta StSovffa irpbs rrjv avruv
<pvaiv (Karfpif Kal 8)j Kal TJ/XOS
(j.fioffi nfv Trpbs apfrljv ad jue^fouj"
TO?S Sf rouvavriov (governs dper^j re
Kal irai*eias rb vpfirov SKarepou
airovtfj.fi Kara \6yov.
It is remarkable that the terms
' distributive and corrective justice'
are not found in the Politics of Ari-
stotle, though this distinction and the
various points connected with it in
reality belong much more to political
than to ethical science. However,
though the name of distributive
justice does not occur, yet the idea of
it is fully developed in Politics^m.
c. iz. a passage from which it is not
improbable that the present chapter
may be partly taken, though an inter-
polated reference (/eoflcUep eiprjTcw -irpo-
rtpov (v rdis r)6iKois) gives the passage
in the Politics a fallacious appearance
of having been written later, and of
having accepted conclusions from the
present book. Far rather it is likely
that the conception of ' distributive
justice,' having been received as a con-
ception from Plato, and farther worked
out by Aristotle in his Politics, only
became stereotyped into a phrase in
the after- growth of his system, at the
end of his own life, or in the exposi-
tion of his views made by Eudemus.
It is in speaking of the ' oligarchical
and democratical principles of justice'
that Aristotle says : ( i ) irarres -yap
airrovrM SiKatov nv&s, d\Aa MXP'
rtvbs irpotpxovrai, Kal \tyovffiv ov TCO.V
rb Kvpltas SiKatov. OTov SoKfl tffov rb
SiKaiov e?va.i, Kal effnv, a\\' ov tratnv
aAAo rols fffois. Kal rb &VKTOV SoKt't
Zinaiov elvai. /col yap Iffnv, oA\' ou
TTMTIV, a\\a rols aviaois. ol Se TOUT*
a<paipovffi, rb ols, Kal Kptvovoi Kaxuis.
rb 8' afriov STI vtpl avriuv TJ Kpiffis '
ffxf&bv 8' 01 w\f7jroi (pai\oi Kpiral irtpl
riav oiKfteai'. "fltrr' firel rb Sixatoy
ntr tv, Kal Siripijrai rbv avrbv rpoicov
M re ruv TpaypAruv Kal ols, f KaBsi-
ttep (Iprrrai vpSrepov tv rols yOiKo'ii,
rV /*** T0 '' irpdyfjiaros iffOTijra
dno\oyovffi, riiv be oiis a/j.^ iffptfrovcrt.
The conclusion is (Pol. in. ix. 15)
that they who contribute most to the
joint-stock of virtue and good deeds
in the state are entitled to a larger
share in the control of affairs than
those who base their claims upon any
other kind of superiority.
110
I10IK&N [ETAHMION] V.
[CHAP.
'4-ffrov oVsp xai avBv Xo'you Soxsi" Traa-iv. STTS] 0= TO 7<rov
fj-svov, TO S/xouov fjisirov TJ at/ e'/>j. =VTJ os TO iVoi/ ev
avayxj TO/I/UJ/ TO 0/xa/ov /JtsVov TS xou
,
sTvai [xal
8' <TT}
TJ] xa} TMT/V xa} Y
v xa) eAaTTOv), rj o' iVoi/ EITT/,
slvat
xa} ev o^ Ta
dig xa) sv ol^
x=7va s%si ' si
xai Ta
5 y oe xaioi/, TKTIV. avayxvj apa TO (iixotiov sv
rs a 8/xa<ov Tvy%dvsi ov, 8
xa) r] a^T^ l(7Ta<
-yap exsva S^HJ Ta Iv ol^, OUTO> xa-
ovx 7<ra S^OUQ-JV, aXX* 6VTru5fv
oVav <ro/ x frra xr
ai
TOU XCIT
TOUTO SijXoV TO
XOLT
xaioj/ ev
V TWO. 8s7y
0^0X0.
o
ol 6*
8 5(jyv=iav, ol
o
0/xa/ov
aj5<o~TOXpaT/xo< tp STV.
T/. TO yap
STTIV cpa. TO
ou j,o'vov
i 4 These sections are full of
confused writing. It is said ' since
the unjust is unequal, there must be
a mean, which is equal ; justice must
be equal ; the equal is a mean, there-
fore justice must be a mean. As
being equal justice implies two terms,
as being a mean two extremes, as
being just two persons, therefore it
must be in four terms, &c.' The
general meaning is clear, but the
statement, especially in 4, is very
faulty. A confusion is made by the
introduction of the idea of /xe'ow with
regard to justice, which at the present
part of the argument was not required.
6 (I -yip j) tffoi, K.T.A.] Cf. Ar.
Pol. m. ix. i sq. I. c.
7 T in TOV dper^w] 'Again this
is clear from the principle of equality
according to standard; for all agree
that justice in distributions must be
according to standard, but men are
not unanimous in declaring the same
standard. While the democrats
declare liberty, those who are for an
oligarchy declare wealth or birth, and
those who arc for an aristocracy (in
the highest sense) declare virtue.'
This is apparently taken from the
saying in Aristotle's Pol. m. ix. 4 :
Ol /ttv yap &j/ KOT< TJ &VUTOI 2,aiv, olov
XpflfJ-affiv, 8A.s otovrai &VKTOI tlvai, ol
5' &c KOTO T 'trot, olov t\(v8fpta., JJAny
Jiroj. Cf. Ib. m. ix. 15. It is
observable that Aristotle (tt. cc.) twice
speaks of men being equal in point of
liberty, unequal in point of wealth or
virtue ; but the above writer confuses
this, and speaks of liberty being made
the standard for distinctions.
8 14 ia-riv Upa iyaJBov} ' The just
then is something proportionate. The
proportionate is not restricted to pure
number alone, but applies toeverything
that admits the idea of number. Pro-
portion is an equality of ratios, and
implies four terms at the least. Now
III.]
H0IKQN [EYAIIMIftN] V.
Ill
ava-
Aoy/a KTOTTJS so"T/ Aoyrov, xai sv TTTapo~<v s
7] ,!> o5j/ f)tr i pr l [ji.*vT] on sv
O"uvsyr;t,' ' TO> yap lv< a
; 13 TOO a :rpo TTJV TOU 3. OUT) xa; rj TOU 3 7J"po
TOU y. $}$ o5 v j TOU 3 siprjTat ' O><TT' lav rj roO |6
8/V, TtTTOtpa sVrai ra avaAoya. sVr< Ss xa) TO tii
sv TTTap(riv e\a.%{<TTOig, xai o Xoyo^ 6 cvtrog'
yap Saouoj, olj r? xa) a. sVraj apa wj o a opoj;
3, oJra>c o y Trpo? TOV 8, xai =vaX?\.a^ apa, >j o a
COCTTS xa TO oXoy TTOC; TO oXov
j rov n
y,
rov
apa TOU a opou TU> y xa) rj TOU 3 T( *> & &v%iut TO =v 12
/xaio'j/ 0"T/, xaj (Jt,S(TOV TO bixaiov TOUT' SO~T) TOU
TO avaXoyov. TO yip avaXoyov /jtscrov, TO 8s
xaXouVi s TTJV To<auT7jv avaXoy/av
it is plain that "discrete proportion"
is in four terms ; but so also is "con-
tinuous proportion," for it uses the
one of its terms as two, and names it
twice over, thus, as A is to B, so is
B to C. B then is twice named, and
if it be set down twice over, the pro-
portionate terms will be four. But
justice also implies four terms at
least, and an equality of ratios: for
the two persons and the two things
are divided in similar proportion.
(The formula) then will be, " as the
term A is to B, so is C to D;" and
aHernando, " as A is to C, so is B to
D," and so too the whole to the whole,
which the distribution couples, and if
the terms be thus united, it couples
them justly. The joining therefore
of A to C and of B to D in distribution
is just, and this justice is a mean
between violations of proportion. For
proportion is a mean, and the just is
proportionate. Mathematicians call
this kind of proportion geometrical,
for in geometrical proportion the whole
is to the whole as each separate term
is to each. This proportion is not
" continuous," for it has no one term
standing in a double relationship.
Now this justice is the proportionate,
and injustice is a violation of propor-
tion, which takes place either on the
side of more or less. And this is
actually the case, for he that does an
injury has more than his share, while
he that is injured has less than his
share of what is good.' This passage
gives a formula for distributive justice
in mathematical language, which
comes in short to this, that in all
awards of the state the result should
be proportionate to the separate worth
of the citizens.
8 /uowSi/coD opifywi)] ' number ex-
pressed in ciphers, ' abstract number,'
in German, unbenannte Zahl. Fritzsche
refers to Euclid El. vn. clef. i.
9 e'Av 7] roD 3] TI is indefinite and
probably meant to be so. It may
stand for <niy(j.-f), ypa^-f], or the like.
13 >ea> J ueTp(KTJj'] Cf. Plato, Gorgias,
p. 508, quoted above, p. 109.
112
IIOIKflN [EYAHMION] V.
[CHAP.
of fj.aQr/fj.aTixoi' ev ydp TJ) y(t)[j.sTpixr l (rv[j.fiaivst
xdi TO oXov 7rpo TO oAov OTrsp sxaTspov Trpog sxaTspov.
i4so"Ti o' O'j o~uvV7] (VJTt} TJ dvahoyia ' oi yap yvTa* sig
dptQfj.it> o'po, to xai o. TO [J.lv ouv bixaiov TOOTO TO a't/a-
Xoyov, TO 8' dfiixov TO Trapd TO dvdhoyov. yivzTai apa
TO fJ.\V 7T\OV TO > S^OLTTOV. OTTSp Xa) 7T/ TtOV
(rvfj.flaivsi ' o fj.lv ydp dtiixCov trheov ^', o
J 5AaTTov TOU dyaQov, ITT} 8= TOU xaxou avaTraXtv
yap Xo'yto ylv-Tat TO eXaTTov xaxoj/ Trpo? TO
O-T/ yap TO I'XaTTov xaxov
\J.C \>A/ \\
TO aipsTOV ayavov, xai TO
,lv oSv V sfi)0$ TOU SlXaiO'J TOUT* 0~T/V.
To ^ AOJTTOV j/ TO ^op6ajTixo'v, o yivsTai Iv
15 1 6 A repetition of ch. i. 10.
17
sv
TOU
TO
IV. This chapter is on corrective
justice, which is said to apply to the
transactions between men whether
voluntary or involuntary. Corrective
justice goes on a principle, not of geo-
metrical, but of arithmetical propor-
tion ; in other words it takes no ac-
count of persons, but treats the cases
with which it is concerned as cases of
unjust loss and gain, which have to be
reduced to the middle point of equality
between the parties. Justice is a
mean, and the judge a sort of imper-
sonation of justice, a mediator, or
equal divider. The operation of jus-
tice, bringing plaintiff and defendant
to an equality, may be illustrated
by the equalizing of two unequal lines.
The names, ' loss,' and ' gain,' are how-
ever often a mere metaphor borrowed
from commerce.
The term ' corrective justice ' (rb
SiopO(aTtK6>> or, as it is afterwards
called, 6, T& tiravopQen itcbv Slxa-iov)
is itself an unfortunate name, because
it appears only to lay down principles
for restitution, and therefore implies
wrong. Thus it has a tendency to
confine the view to ' involuntary trans-
actions,' instead of stat : ng what must
be the principle of the just in all the
dealings between man and man. In
the present chapter, it is remarkable
that although we are told at first that
' voluntary transactions ' belong to
corrective justice, yet all that is said
applies only to the ' involuntary trans-
actions ; ' and at last we are told that
the terms used are ' a metaphor from
voluntary transactions' as if these
were something quite distinct. It
may be said indeed that bargains, and
voluntary dealings in general, have
no respect of persons (icorck rrjv
bpiO/jiirr. ava\.), and thus have some-
thing in common with civil and
criminal law. Also that the next
chapter supplies some of the principles
for the regulation of commerce. In
short we might deduce some sort of
a theory from various suggestions in
the text. But the statement in the
text itself is undeniably confused.
i rb 8 \ottrbv IP] This excludes all
possibility of the writer having con-
ceived another kind of justice, to be
called ' catallactic' or some such name,
as it lias been sometimes fancied. Tb
SjajpflttTucbv 8iK. implies not merely
'regulative,' but strictly 'remedial'
III. IV.]
[EYAHMIQN] V.
113
xa
TO tiixaiov aAAo cMo$
xa rog axV*roif, TOUTO <= z
rou TrpOTs'pou. TO jU,si/ yap
Oiav:'j.r t TixQV bixaiov TCOV xowov asi Kara. rr t v aj/aAoy/j/
|(TT} TTJV sJpTjas'vvjv ' xa) yap a?ro ^pr^j.drwv xoivwv lav
yiyv^rai vj Siavo^Tj, ='<rrca xara TOV Ao'yov TOV auToi/ ovTrzp
S^OIKTI 7rpo aAA^Aa TO. slGrsvsj^SsWa' xa/ TO aoixov TO
dvTix=i>j(.svov TO) bixaitp TOUTO) Trapa TO avaXoyo'v s(TTiv.
TO o' sv TO?^ o'yvaXXayaotcrj 8ixa<of 5o~Ti ^otsj/ J'o'ov T/, xat 3
TO a.?)ixf)v avurov, aXX* oy xaTct TTJV avaXoyiav =x=ivqv
xaTa T^V a^A^rtxr^. ou5sv yap $fa$fpff, el
u8' si
TTJV
sJ o
xa e
a>o~Ts TO a^xov TOUTO avio~ov
o 8ixao~Tr ; ^ xa< yap oVav o ]U.sv
xa; xTe/vr) 6 ^' a^oSavvj, SiTrjprjTat TO :ra$o xai rj
slg a-vura ' aX?va Trsiparat Tj) ^jjOt/a i<rat%siv t a
s /3s-
o 8s
justice ; Si6p6a>fj.a is used to signify a
remedy in Arist. Po in. xiii. 23,
where it is said of ostracism, fle\Tiov
/tej/ oui' TOC vofJ.o6eri]v e| dp^^s OUTOJ
<7utTT^(rai TT))/ 7ro^iTi'cw Sxrre /ur/ Seltrflai
Toiai>TT)s jarpei'as Sevrepos 5e ir\ovs, &v
crvfApfj, iretpaffdcu rotovrif TIV\ Siopdia-
Han Siop8ovi>.
i rb fi.lv yap t'(rei'x6e'Ta] 'For
distributive justice deals always with
the goods of the state according to the
proportion we have described ; for if
the distribution be of comnlon goods,
it will be according to the proportion
which the different contributions bear
to one another.' T& ttVej/exfleWo is
thus explained by the Paraphrast,
ava\6yus fKiiffrtf Sidaxri nark T^IV a^lav
WOTOU Kal TT)I/ flffQopdv, $fl> ls rb
Koivbv ffvvrre\eafv tirtl ov iravrfs
Sfj.oioi, ovSe irdvTes dfMtws fiff<f>fpovtTn>.
Probably the remark in the text was
taken from Aristotle, Pol. m. ix. 15:
Si6irfp oiroi avi*.&a.\\ovTa.i ir\ei<rrov fls
VOL. II.
rffv rotavrriv Koiviaviav, TO&TOIS r^s
ir6\t(as fj.fr fffTi tr\f'iov.
3 Kara rrjv apifytTjTticV] This term
occurs Eth. n. ri. 7. 'Arithmetical
proportion ' denotes a middle term,
or point of equality, equidistant from
two extreme terms, thus, 6 is the
mean, according to arithmetical pro-
portion, between 4 and 8. In Eth.
II. (1-C-) it is called peaov rov irpdy-
/uaros, which implies that it has no
respect of persons. So corrective
justice is here said to regard each
case impersonally as an affair of loss
and gain, and between these it strikes
the middle point. It is the moral
worth of persons that is ignored (el
(irifiKris <pav\ov K. r. A.), for we find
afterwards, ch. \. 3 4, that a
consideration of the position and cir-
cumstances of persons does come in
to modify the estimate of the loss
sustained from an indignity, &c.
114
HGIKilN [EYAHMmN] V.
[CHAP.
SITTSIV STT
sir), TO x
TOI$
5 TOU x=poou. AsysTat yap tog
TOIOUTO<, xav el jU/>j TUTIV olxstov
6 eJov TO) TraTa^ai/T/, xai TJ ^ui'a TU> jraflovrV aXA* orav
ys jUSTpr;$r) TO 7ra$0, xaAirrai TO /xsv ?]<u./a TO 8s xsp8o.
<00"TS TOU jU,I/ 7TASj'oj/0 XOt) sAaTTOVOf TO iVoV jtAsVflV, TO 8s
xep8o xa< T] >5 ( a/a TO jtxsv TrXe'ov TO 8' sAaTTov s
TO jOtev ToO aya^ou TrXsov TOU xaxot* 8' sXotTTov
6* evavTiov ^jtxj'a 1 a5v ^v ]U.6<rov TO Jfo~ov, o
8/xouoy* aJo~TS TO eTTOtvopQwTixov 8/xa<oj/ av snj TO jtx
7 fypiag xai xspbovg. 8*0 xa) OTav ajU,4>io~3>3Ttoo~<v,
TOI/ 8<xao-T>jv xaTa^*(jyouo~<V TO 5' STT) TOV
TT/ TO 8/xa<ov* 6
TO
oov
TOU
TOU
8 8jxajou
8s
apa TJ TO 8/xa<ov, s'/Trsp xa< o
xa
TOUT
i)[JU<ril(t$
rpoo-s-
o TO jOtsov T|U)j.a
?Xs xai TOJ ehdrrovi
8e 8r^a 8<aips$r) TO oXov, TO'TS
9 Ta auTaiv, oTav Aa/3a>o-j TO i'o-ov. TO 8' iVoj/ fJLS(rov eo-T<
T% fj.si^Qvos xoii sXaTTOvoj xaTa T^V apiQ^Tixr^v avct-
"hoyiav. 8a TOUTO xai ovo/jt,asTai 8ixa<ov, OTJ 8/^a SO~T/V,
av it rig shot 8/a<ov, xa< o
7 )Toii<n 8iKa(TTi)' jue'aoi'] Cf.
Thucyd. iv. 83 : 'Appi&aios tirtKrjpv-
KfVfro, trotfios &v HpcuriSa /te<r<j>
8iKa<rr?J tirirpetrftv. Ar. Po^. rv. xii.
5 : iraj/TaxoO irieTT^Taros 6 8iaT7jT^y,
5taiT77Ti)5 8' 6 /x'<ros.
Min5ious] Used in rather a diffe-
rent senso, Po/. v. vi. 13: &> 8^ rp
9 S.ek ToCro SIXOTT^J] ' Hence, too,
justice gets its name, because it is a
dividing in twain (5fx), as though it
were written not S'txaiov, but 8(xoc,
and the judge is one who divides in
twain.' This etymology, though in-
genious, is false. The earlier notion
connected with Star; seems not to have
been one of decision, arbitration, or
justice, but rather of ' showing,' ' in-
struction,' ' rule,' ' manner.' The word
is derived from a root SIK-, which
appears in 8f(ni>v/ju, and the Latin
indtio, index, judex (the law-shower),
&c. Plato, in the Cratylus, p. 4iz D,
gives a sportive etymology of Siitaiov,
in accordance with the spirit of
the work. Justice is there said to
be the ' permeating,' tb Sia I6v, with a
K added for euphony. 'Eirel lirirpv-
trevd TO. &\\a irdvra Siau6v, TOUTO TO
oVnjua ^K\i}6ii opBus Slnaiov, flffro^ias
tvfKO. T7)c TOU K Svfafj.iv irpoff\afl6v.
IV.]
H6IKQN [EYAHMIQN] V.
115
yap Suo iVtov Ot$atf>iQyl a^ro Qarspou, 7rpo Qdrspov Ss 10
' 7rspe%;t (tdrspov si yap a$i}fic&]
05, ev) CCV [MOVOV VTTEpSlVSV. TOU |U.eVou
apa It//, xa) TO jOtsVov, a<>' ou a(>Y,ps$yj, Iv/'. TOUTCO apa"
yva)pioufj.*v TI TS a4>sAs?v 8=1" a?ro TOU TrXs'ov spOi/TG, xat
TI 7rpoo~6sjVaj rat sXarrov SVOJ/T** 3 ^asy yap TO jueVov
' TbvTo TrprxrQiivai 8s7 TO) eTiarrov sp^ovr/, co S'
OiTTQ TOU fJiSytfTTOV. iVai Ct/ <' WV 12
' aTro rvjj AA a^ftjplprda} TO AK,
Q(o rj] FF TO !<$>' a>v FA, COO-TS o?;ij 15 AFF
e%si TO) FA xai T> FZ. T?jf apa BB TCO
Ss xa) ETT) T<OV aAXcov TS^J/OJV TOUTO* avr ; -
V7rSp%:TOt.l
A A BB r
xa;
T^J KA u
FA.
yap
av, s jU. STTOISI TO TTOJOUV xai oo*ov xa oov,
xa) TO Trao-p^ov 6TO<r^ TOUTO xai TOO~OUTOI/ xa) TOIOUTOV.
eX^XuSr Ss Ta ovo'jaaTa TauTa, ^ TS ^V]fuae xa) TO xspSo^, "3
lxouo~/ou aXXa-yTJ^* TO jasv yap TrXsov sp^Jtv rj Ta
ex
10 12 &TOJ/ 7a/> rA] 'For, of
two equal lines, if a part be taken
from the one and added to the other,
that other will exceed the first by
twice this part; for if it had been
subtracted only from the one and not
added to the other, that other would
have exceeded the first by only once
this part. Therefore the line which
is added to exceeds the mean by once
the part added, and the mean exceeds
the line subtracted from by once the
part added. By this we learn what
we must take from the term which
has more, and what we must add to
that which has less. We must add
to that which has less the amount by
which the mean exceeds it, and we
must take from the largest term the
amount by which the mean is ex-
ceeded. Let AA, BB, and CC be equal
to one another ; from A A take AE, and
add CD to CC ; then the whole DCC
exceeds EA by CD and CZ ; and
therefore it exceeds BB by CD.' The
figure required is as follows :
E
A
B
c
D
fear* 8e TOJOUTOI/] This clause
exists in all the MSS. The Para-
phrast explains it here to signify that
the same principles of corrective
justice are applicable to the arts and
commerce, &c. But when the clause
is repeated with a different context in
the next chapter, the Paraphrast, no
doubt feeling a difficulty about the
repetition, does not again touch it.
In its present position the clause has
no meaning, in the next chapter it is
an important remark. All we can
say about its appearance here is that
it is an evidence of the same want of
completeness about the book which
shows itself in chapter xi., and also
in sundry other parts of the Eudemian
Ethics.
13 14 t\i'i\v6e Si uVrepoi/] 'Now
these names, "loss and gain," have
Q 2
116
II9IKQN [EYAHMIQN] V.
[CHAP.
xspfiaivsiv XsysTa/, TO 6 sXaTTOi/ ra>v e
la*, olov sv TO> ajj/sTcrdai xai TrajAsw xai sv
tbsiav sQtuxsv o vo'jaoc. oTav 6s /X^TS TrXsoj
aXX' auTa 81* auTtov yfvTjTaj, Ta awTtov <$>a<rii/
xai OWTS (^>j]aiouo~6at OOTS xspftaivsiv were xs'pSouj
xa) Vjja/a jU,s(rov TO ftixaiov e<m TCOV Trapa TO Ixou-
TO iVov e^siv xa/ Trporspov xai ua-rspov.
Aoxs? 6s' Ti<r< xai TO avrirreTrovbog stvai aTrXto^ S/xa/ov,
ol nuQayo'pstoi e^ao*av* CO^/^OVTO -yap aTr^toj TO
2 S/xa<ov TO avTiTTSTrov^og aXXto. TO 6* avTiTrs^oy^o^ oux
come from voluntary exchange. For
having more than one's own is called
"gaining," and having less than at
the commencement is called " losing,"
as, for instance, in buying and selling,
and all the other things in which the
law gives one immunity. But when
the things are neither more nor less,
but on a level (oiiro 81" a{nS>v~), then
men say they have their own, and
neither lose nor gam. Thus justice
is a mean between a sort of gain and
loss in involuntary things, it is the hav-
ing the same afterwards as before.'
iv 8<rois &8eicw] In commerce of all
kinds, the law allows one to gain as
much as one can. In involuntary
transactions, the law allows no gain
to be made, but brings things always
back to their level. This non-in-
terference of the law with bargains
becomes, if carried out, the principle
of free-trade.
oAA.' oiira Si 1 O.VTUV 7TjToi] This
has puzzled the commentators. Fe-
licianus interprets it ' sed sua cui-
que per se ipsa evaserint ; ' Argy-
ropulus, ' sed sua per se ipsa sunt
facta ; ' Lambinus, ' sed paria paribus
respondent.' What the phrase must
mean is plain, whether grammatically
it can mean this is another question.
It must mean ' neither more, nor less,
but equal to itself,' Perhaps it may
be construed ' but remain themsehvs
by means of reciprocity,' i. e. by mu-
tual giving and taking, totvruv being
equivalent to a
V. This chapter, commencing
with a critical notice of the Pytha-
gorean definition of justice, that
'justice is retaliation,' shows it to be
inadequate, and then goes off into an
interesting discussion upon the law
of retaliation as it exists in the state.
Proportionate retaliation, or an inter-
change of services, is said to be the
bond of society. The law of propor-
tion regulates exchange, and settles
the value of the most diverse products.
Money measures and expresses value,
and turns mere barter into commerce.
The chapter concludes with some
general remarks on the relation of
justice as a quality to the just as a
principle.
i So/ce? 8i &AAy] ' Now some
think that retaliation without further
qualifying (aw\ws) is justice, as the
Pythagoreans said, for they defined
justice simply as retaliation on one's
neighbour.' On the rude and in-
adequate attempts at definition made
by the Pythagoreans, cf. AT. Metaph.
I. v. 16: upi^ovr6 re yap tirnro\a'us,
ol 6ti trp<i>TCf> inrdpfcftfi' 6 Aej^Oels opus,
TOVT* flvat T)IV ouaiav rov trpdy /UOTOS
IV. V.]
II9IKQN [EYAHMIQN] V.
117
OUT' eV/ TO $ia.vs[j.r t Tixov 8/xatov OUT' e
KOLITOI fiw&WTCU ys TOUTO Xsy
TO
t KE 7ra0ot ra K' tptsf, 007 c' JQtla ytYotro.
oov s
xa TO 3
sv, 4
u -yap
/vryyvivai, xa) si ap^ovra.
^ao'i/ov 8=7 aXXa xai xoAaa-^vaj. ?T/ TO
TO axouVioy Oiatyspsi TroAu. aXX' sv jtx=j/ Ta7j xoivtoviaig 6
ofi\haxT ixaCig <rvvz%;i TO TOJOUTOV 8/xa<ov TO a
'^, xaT* avotf^oyiav xal jtxrj xaT* l(ro'T>)Ta* TO)
v -yap avaXoyoi/ <rufj.fj.svsi 13 TTo'X*^. -^ yap TO
' si 8s jar;, SouXfMt 8oxs7 sj'va<, el jar) a
TO su* el 8s jU,^, jU,STa8oo~i^ ou yivsrat, T^ /xsTaSoVs* 8s
ev6fj.iov, uffirfpflris olono ravrbv eivat
Snr\dffiov Kal r^]v 8w5o, Sidrt irpSnov
inrdpx ft T0 ^ s 5irl rb Snr\dcriov. Their
inadequate account of justice was
doubtless owing not only to an im-
perfect logical method, but also to the
immature political and social ideas of
the day. Demosthenes mentions a
law of retaliation given by Zaleucus
to the Locrians ( Timoor. p. 744) :
IOVTOS y&p avr69i v6/j.ov, tdv TU o<pda\-
eaurov. In the Mosaic code the same
rude principle appears, Exod. xxi. 24,
Levit. xxiv. zo, Dtuteron. xix. 21.
2 It is obvious that simple re-
taliation cannot be the principle of
distributive justice; the state does
not win battles for its generals, &c.
Nor is it that of corrective justice ; (i)
because the same treatment is diffe-
rent to different individuals ; (2)
because an involuntary harm must
not be requited like a voluntary one.
3 rb 'Po8o/idv0uoj] Necessarily a
primitive idea of justice.
d Kf irddoi] Of uncertain author-
ship, attributed to Hesiod.
4 olov el ap\rtv x a)) '] Cf. ch. iv. 3,
note. Hank is here looked at as a
kind of property. It is not a ques-
tion of individual goodness or bad-
ness, but an officer being struck
loses more than a common soldier
being struck in return, so that re-
taliation is in that case not justice.
6 oAA' iv fjitf ffvnfifi>ovffiv] '33ut
in commercial intercourse, at all
events, this kind of justice, namely,
retaliation, is the bond of union on
principles, not of equality, but pro-
portion, for by proportionate requital
the state is held together. Men seek
to requite either evil or good ; to omit
the one were slavery, to omit the
second were to fail in that mutual
interchange by which men are held
together.' On mutual need as the
basis for civil society, cf. Plato,
Repub. p. 369 B : ylyverai roivvv
ir6\is, tirfiSr) Tuy '\dvfi rjijuav fiscurTos
OVK alndpKijs, a\\a iro\\iav tvSerfs.
A. recognition of this principle might
be called the first dawning of political
economy ; from it several deductions
are made in the text above as to the
nature of value, price, and money.
These, though rudimentary, are abla
118'
IIGIKilN [EYAHMIQN] V.
[CHAP.
7 cro[j.fjt,vorj(riv. o xa
avTa.7ro$o<ri$ rj 1 TOUTO -yets i'oi
crai TS yap osi TO* %apura.[j.svto, xa< TraTuv auTOv oip^
8 ^ap/i'o/xsvov. TToisT 8e rrjt/ ai/T/o<nv TTJV xar' avaAoy/av
5> / / J fc" V S> ' 'x' * 4
] xara GiafJiSTpov rv^fugif, otov o/xo6o|.o Cf> to A, <TXUTO-
TO/AOt,' 6^' <W B, OlX/a 6(^' (O F, V7TO$r l [J.Ct <$)' <0 A. 3s? O'JV
?\.a/x3avsiv rot/ oixo3o'ju.ov Trapa. roD arxtfTOTMtou rot) sxs/vou
sp-you, xa/ aurov fxr/mo jU,Ta8<8&Vai TO awroy. eav o5v
Trptorov ^ TO xaTa TTJV avaXoy/av iVov, sTTa TO
6oj ytwrratt, ttrrau TO Xeyo'^asj/oy. el 8s ju,>j, oux
xpilrrov sJvou TO
and interesting, but the relation of
the law of value (rJ> MKO.IOV tv rcits
KO.V. TU?S i\A.) to the other kinds of
justice is not stated.
7 5b ^api^ei'oj'] 'Hence, too,
it is that men build a temple of the
Graces in their streets, that there
may be reciprocity. For this is the
property of grace, one must serve in
return one who has done a favour,
and again be in turn the first to
confer favours.' Pausanias (ix. 35)
says that the Athenians originally
worshipped two Graces, Auxo and
Hegemone ; afterwards, from Eteocles
the Boeotian, they learned to worship
three, and called them Euphrosyne,
Aglaia, and Thalia. There was a
statue of the three Graces (clothed),
the work of Socrates, which stood
before the entrance of the Acropolis.
Seneca (Bentf. i. 3) mentions with
some disdain the various symbolical
meanings which were supposed to be
expressed by the figures of the Graces,
and on which Chrysippus appears to
have written an elaborate treatise.
Of course no English word will
exactly answer to x^P LS -
8 iroir Si <r<S"{<*] 'Now the
joining of the diagonal of a square
gives us proportionate return.' The
diagram supposed to be drawn is as
follows :
Architect.
Shoemaker.
House.
Shoe*
The joining of the diagonal gives each
producer some of the other's work,
and thus an exchange is made, but
the respective value of the com-
modities must be first adjusted, else
there can be no fair exchange. What,
then, is the law of value? It is
enunciated a little later ( 10). Se?
roiwv rptnfrf)v. 'As an architect
(or a farmer it may be) is to a
shoemaker, so many shoes must there
be to a house or to corn.' That is,
the value of the product is determined
by the quality of the labour spent
upon it. The sort of comparison here
made between the quality of farmer
and shoemaker seems connected with
a Greek notion of personal dignity
and a dislike of ftavavaia. Such
feelings are opposed to the impartial
views of political economy, and are
H9IKQN
V.
119
$aTou, 8*7
STTJ 89'
epyov r TO aTpou, * ov rara
TOUTO xa) STT) TCOJ/ aA?uov rsp/vcov ayr^pouvTo -yap av, si
\*r\ ~ \ <y \? \ \ /
jarj 7roi< ro TTOfouv xa* otrov xa* o/ov, xa ro
7rao~y TOUTO xa< TOCTOUTOV xou TOJOUTOV. o-j
JaT^tov y/vTai xomuv/a, aAA* ^ JaTpou xa) yro>pyoO xai
o?^a> srspiov XKI MX fcant* a7^a ro-Jrout,' ^fj" i(ra<r^yai.
810 Travra <ry ( a3Aryra 8;? TTCO^ sva<, aiv O-T;V aXXayig. 10
C^' o ro vo'a*o"jU,' =Xry Ay^=, xai yiv-rai ircog fisvov ' Travra
yap [JiSTps'i, OHTTS xai rr t v uTrspoffiv xa) TVJV A?\=i-fyiv t ?roVa
arra S^ wTroOryjaar' /;o-ov olx/a 75 Tpo4>>]. o=T TO/VUV on-sp
yap
vatvia. TOUTO
Travra
e jar) (ra 73 7ra>, ox sra/.
TOUTO
< yap
73 ovx
TO
quite superseded by the law of supply
and demand. If it be asked what is
to determine the quality of labour, it
will soon be seen that quality resolves
itself into quantity, that the excellence
of labour must be measured also by
supply and demand. We cannot be
sure that we have above the full
statement of Aristotle's ideas upon
' value,' but if we have, they are
imperfect.
9 fffri 8e TOUTO cra(r(?T/t'cu] Cf.
ch. iv. ii, note. 'Now this is the
case with the other arts also (i.e.
beside those of the architect and shoe-
maker), for they would have been
destroyed if there had not been the
producer producing so much, and of a.
certain kind, and the consumer (TO
iraffxv} consuming just the same
quantity and quality. For out of two
physicians no commerce arises, but
out of a physician and a farmer it
does, and, in short, out of persons
who are different from one another,
and not equal ; these, then, require
to be brought to an equality.' The
division of labour, the mutual depen-
dence of the arts, and the correspon-
dence of supply and demand, are here
well stated. It is a pity that these
principles were not further carried
out. The terms iroiovv and irdffx ov
may probably have some reference to
the a.vrnrtirovQ6s, which is the subject
of the chapter.
1 1 oloif 5 inrd\Xay/jM TT}S XP ei/ay
TO v6fj.iff^ta ytyovf Kara ffwQ4)Kt}v]
' Now money is a sort of represen-
tative of demand conventionally esta-
blished.' This excellent definition
was not altogether new; Plato had
already said (Reptib. p. 371 B) :
ayopa. 8)j T]\iiv /col v6fju<r/j.a ^w/i/SoAoj/
TTJS dAAeryTjy tVe/cce yfiri] JTOJ IK TOVTOV.
The present chapter is disfigured by
repetitions. Thus cf. 15: TOVTO 5'
*' vKoQtfffus Sib vouicr.ua /caAerra/.
The saying ( 10) TO y(5^jo'/u' e'A^Aufle
ol ylverui wens pfaov, is repeated
120
[EYAHMIQN] V.
[CHAP.
Kara.
on o'
, W<TTS oTrsp
xou <a TOUTO rouvo ( aa s^;< Vbfj.tG-p.ot,
w srT, xaj s4>' iff*** /x.Ta/3a/\.sV
sVraj Svj at/T7T7ro:/5o, orav lo~a-
7J"po <rxuTOTo'|Uov, TO epyov TO TOU
TO TOU
ou
s-i ra$
ei
TO srepov oixpov.
OTI
oav
ETT' auTcov yi / yso~5a/. yswpyog A,
14: T? 8); v6/j.iffua. Sxrirfp n4rpov
frvu/j.frpa, irotrfffav lird&t. The law of
value is given twice, 10 and "11,
&c.
12 ffrai 5rj ii/T7re7roj'0({j yfvejflai]
'Retaliation, then, will take place
when the terms have been equalized,
and the production of the shoemaker
has been made to bear the same
relation to that of the farmer, as a
farmer himself does to a shoemaker.
We must not, however, bring the
parties to a diagram of proportion
after the exchange has taken place,
else one of the terms will have both
superiorities assigned to it. When
the parties have got their fair share
(8rav %x uffl T ^ afrrw*'), then are they
on an equal and mutual footing, it
having bren possible to establish this
kind of equality between them.'
This vexed passage appears to de-
scribe the steps in a commercial
transaction. There being a mutual
need between producers of a different
kind, their products require to be
equalized. This is done by reducing
the goods to a standard of inverse
proportion. As a farmer to a shoe-
maker, so shoes to corn ; thus, if a
farmer's labour be 5 times better
than a shoemaker's, then 5 pair of
shoes = a quarter of corn ; or if a pair
of shoos = 10 shillings, then a quarter
of corn = 50 shillings. When this
process of equalization has been
effected (&rav i<ra.<r6fj), then simple
retaliation, or ' tit for tat,' begins.
After an exchange has been made, or,
in short, after the price of an article
has once been expressed in money, it
is no longer the time to talk of ' the
quality of labour,' or for either side to
claim an advantage on this account.
If he did he would have ' both supe-
riorities,' or his superiority reckoned
twice over. Having enjoyed the
superiority of price already, in which
the quality of labour was an element,
he would now proceed to claim the
superiority of labour by itself, which
would thus be reckoned to him twice
over. "Orav i\\df(ai>rai can mean
nothing else than 'when they have
exchanged,' Zrav with the aorist im-
plying a completed act. It seems un-
necessary to say that the value of a
thing is not to be settled after it ia
sold. Rather it is after the goods
have come to market, and had a
market price put upon them, that
considerations of their production
must cease. The expression, there-
fore, is not clear, but the above inter-
pretation seems the most natural that
can be given of the passage. The
commentators, driven to extremity,
have resorted to violent measures, (i)
omitting ov with no authority of
MSS. ; (z) interpreting inQorfpas rcb
[EYAHMION] V.
121
B, TO spyov auTOu TO Jo-ao~ju.voi/ A. si 8' OUTO>
voii, oux av i\v xoivwvia. on 8' TJ ^ps/
SV Tl 0V, >o7 OTJ
, Tj 1 ajj.<$>OT=poi r) arepog, oux aAAaTTOVTai,
06 SVSJ a'JTOf SsTjTa/ TJ, 0/OV OiVoU, 8<8oWc4; (TITO'J
. 8s? apa TOUTO lo-ao~5rjvai. uTrsp 8s
si vuv jU,vj8=v SsTrai, ori s<TTi sav
TO vo],/o~jW.a oov syyurjTT^ s<r6i J ^a?v* SeT^ap TOUTO
sJvou Aa^sTv. Trao-^si jU,sv ouv xai TOUTO TO auro''
yap as)
A- 14
el 8s TOOTO, xoivcDvta. TO 8^ vo pur pat. wmrsp (ASTOQV
jasrpa Troirjcrav io~a^s< OUTS yap av ja^ ou(njg
ia ^v, OUT' aAAayrj JGTOTTJTO^ ^7) oixrys, our lo~OT"r}g
8ja4>spovra
8s
TOUTO 8
TOUTO yap
' both extremes,' z.e. excess
and deficiency; (3) asserting that the
principle enunciated is one not of
commerce, but of friendship, &c.
Fritzsche understands it as if o\\'
STCM/ exam were in opposition to 8ra//
oAAalau'Tcu, but we learn from ch.
iv. 8 what the former phrase must
mean, T({T <aali' !x e ' J/ T " O-VT&V, '6ro.v
\dpiaffi rb J'CTOJ'. Cf. also ch. iv. 14.
1 3 8rt 5' T; xP ei/a 'VacrOjjcai] ' And
that mutual want like a principle of
unity binds men together, this fact
demonstrates, namely, that when men
are not in want of each other, whether
both parties or one be thus indepen-
dent, they do not exchange; whereas,
when some one else wants the com-
modity that a man has (they effect an
exchange), one party wanting, for in-
stance, wine, and the other being will-
ing to give it for an export of corn :
and then an equality has to be brought
about.' Some MSS., and the Para-
VOL. II.
phrast, read fayuy-fiv, which would
invert the relation of the parties.
Ai$6vai Qaytiiyhv, ' to grant an ex-
portation,' occurs in Theophrast. Char.
xx. : SiSo/j.fvr]s eauT<j> f^aywyrjs v\r
a,Tf\eovs.
14 irrctp tie jtiaAA.oj'] ' But with a
view to future exchange, supposing
one does not want an article at present,
money is a security that one will be
able to get the article when one wants
it, for with money in his hand a man
must be entitled to take whatever he
wishes. It is true that money is
under the same law as other com-
modities; for its value fluctuates, but
still its tendency is to remain more
fixed than other things.' On these
excellent remarks nothing farther need
be said. The term eyyvriT-fis is quoted
from the sophist Lycophron by Ari-
stotle, Pol. in. ix. 8, in application to
the law.
1 5 TOUTO 8' e' virodefffG>s~] ' Conven-
122
H9IKS1N [EYAHMIQN] V.
fCHAP.
17
Trojsi (rufj.fj.sT pa ' fJiZTpsirai yap Travra v op. iff par i
A, fj.va7 Osxa B, XA/VTj F. TO STJ A TOU B r[jouo-u, ei
TTEVTS u,vwv d^ia TJ' olx/a, TJ trrov TJ' 8= xAivrj OexaTOi/ jU.epo^
TO F TOU B* ^TJAOV TOIVVV 7roVa/ xXTva* iVov olxta, OT<
ovTtog 7] aAAayij TJV Trplv TO vo'jU.<o~jaa eivai,
c>i -yap oudsv T^ xA?va< TTS'VTS CCVT/ oJx/a^, TJ
ai TTSVTS xXTvai.
T/ jOtej/ o5i/ TO a8/xov xa< r/ TO 8/xa<o'v l<rnv t
\ TOU a^/xsTv xal aO<xsTo-6ai TO ftsv yap TTASOJ/
TO 8' sAaTTov strriv. v\
TOV auTov TpoTrov TaTc TrpoTs^ov ac/sTaTc. aX?v' OT/
r r r
tionally' opposed to arrAais, cf. JWA.
rv. ix. 7. The merely conventional
character of money is strongly stated
by Aristotle, PoZ. i. ix. 1 1 : "Ore Se
TrdAiv ATJpos *?j/u fio/cel rb v6fjmr/jia ical
%-6/j.os ira.vTa.iraa i, (pvatt 8 1 ov6fv > '6n
fj'J
16 Srt 8' oSreos ^ i\A.o7/)] The
origin of commerce seems taken from
this place by Paulus, cf. Digest, i. De
Contr. Empt. : 'Origo emendi venden-
dique a permutationibus coepit; olim
enim non ita erat nummus, neque
aliud merx aliud pretium vocabatur,
sed unusquisque secundum necessita-
tom rerum ac temporum utilibus inu-
tilia permutabat, quando plerumque
evenit ut quod alteri superest alteri
desit ; sed quia hon semper nee facile
concurrebat ut, quum tu haberes quse
ego desiderarem, invicem egohaberem
quod tu accipere velles, electa materia
est cujus publica ac perpetua aesti-
matio diffieultatibus permutationum
requalitate quantitatis subveniret.'
17 rl fjLfv olv flpurai] 'We have
now stated what is the nature of the
unjust and the just abstractedly.' A
fresh division of the book commences
here ; after discussing the various
kinds of justice objectively, that is, as
principles which manifest themselves in
society, the writer proceeds to consider
justice subjectively, that is, as mani-
fested iu the character of individuals.
r) SiKaioTrpay'ia d8t/c?r6oi] ' Just
treatment is plainly a mean between
injuring and being injured.' Aouo-
irpayla. is formed on the analogy of
t\nrpa.yia. (cf. also alffxpoTrpa.yfit> Eth.
iv. i. 8), and as e5 irpdrrftv is used
ambiguously to denote both ' doing '
and 'faring well ' (cf. Eth. i. iv. 2), so
SiKaioirpa.yta, includes both the doing
and the receiving justice.
ij 5e StKcuoffvvri fj.fff6rrjs K.T.A.]
Justice is a mean state or balance in
a different sense from the other
virtues. It is not a balance in the
mind, but rather the will to comply
with what society and circumstances
pronounce to be fair (TOV (j.i'jov iariv).
Justice, according to this view, is com-
pliance with an external standard.
While in courage, temperance, and
the like, there is a blooming of the
individual character, each man being
a law to himself, in justice there is
an abnegation of individuality, in
obedience to a standard which is one
and the same for all. It must be
remembered that the account of
firttticeia. in this book supplements
that of justice and takes off from its
otherwise over-legal character.
V. VI.]
H6IKON [EYAHMIONJ V.
123
ecrrly vj 8' a8jx/a rwv axpwv. xcu 73 fj.lv 8/xa/oo-uvr; scrri
xa' r]v o 8/xaio ?v,='y=Toa TraxTixo Kara TTowsa'iv roS
jxoy, xa/
7Tpr>$ ST:pOV, (>V% 6UTJ fJOOTTS TOU ^SV OLlpSTOV TTASOV CC'JTCO
sAaTTOv 0= TO) ;r7.T;(r/&v, roy /3Aa/3=pou 8' a!/a7ra?uv, aXXa
TOU iVou Toy xar' avaXoy/ai/, o ( uoia> os xa) a?vA(o Trpo^
r) o' aO*x/a ro-jvavr/ov TOU ao/xoy. TOUTO 3'
^ xai =A?v=i\J/< TOU to^sXi'ao'j ^ x fihafispou
TO
xa s
xa =
73
rou
0s T(6v aXXeov TO jasv oXov ofjutltog, TO 6= Trotpa TO aya
^oi/, oTTOTSpcug sT'jyzv. TOU Os aO/xr^xaToj TO ( asv s
TO a6jxf?<r4ai' eo-T<, TO 8= [J.s7%ov TO ao/x=?y.
xat a5x/a^, T/? sxarspag S
TO-JTOV Toy TpoVov, o^oicog 8s xa) TTS^; TOU
xa5o'Xov.
* 8' O~TIV a8/xouvTa p.rj7r(o aOixov sTvai, 6 TroVa 6
s<rriv sxaTTry oeS/x/av, olov
=j xai
xa
1 8 Sib inrep/3o\)] dirorfpcas frvxt'']
' Hence too, injustice is an excess and
a defect, because it is a principle that
aims at excess and defect, in one's
own case the excess of what is benefi-
cial absolutely, and the defect of what
is hurtful ; but in the case of others,
while the general result will be simi-
lar, it will not matter in which of
these two ways proportion is violated.'
That is, an unjust award may be
made by giving a person too much
good as well as too little, and too
little evil as well as too much. In-
justice is here said to be an extreme
8n inrfpflo\ris effriv, just in the same
way as justice was before said to be a
mean state 8rt peaou tariv.
VI. This chapter, which is writ-
ten confusedly after the manner of
j Eudemus, apparently has for its object
j to restrict the term justice yet more
i definitely than has hitherto been
done. "We are now entering on the
i second division of the book, and the
i question is, what will constitute an
I individual unjust? This question
i tends to elucidate the nature of
justice and injustice as individual
i qualities. But before answering it,
there is a digression. It must be
remembered, says the writer, that we
are treating of justice in the plain
sense of the word, that is, civil justice,
not that metaphorical justice which
might be spoken of as existing in
families. On the nature of this justice,
proper or civil justice, and on the
metaphorical kinds, some remarks
are given.
R 2
124 II9IKJ3N [EYAHMION] V.
av (TwyyevoiTQ yvvaix] elbuog TO i
OUX r/V
8s
XX.\}/ =
ou
ou
O'JS
[Ciup.
TTpoai-
TO
xa< TT
O TO
ouv
4 8s? Os jarj X.at>9av/v OT/ TO V]TOU|Uvo'j/ ICTTJ xa/ TO a
8<xa;ov xai TO TroTuTixov 8/xa<ot>. TO-JTO 8s (TT<V sVi xo<-
vcovwv ^/ou TT^O^ TO sTvat avTapKsiav, eXt>5epav xa< ftraw ^
XT' avaXoy/av 15 xaT* dpiQ[j.ov' WITTS oVo/j javj eo~Tj TOU-
TO, oox SO~T< TOUTOI Tr^of aXXrJXou^ TO TroAiTixov
xai xa6'
g auTov$'
xa< vo[j.o$
73 yap
3 TrcSy juef oSp jrprfrepoc] The allu-
sion is to ch. v. 4 6, and the mean-
ing appears to be simply, in the variety
of cases that may occur, punishment
by simple retaliation will not do. The
sentence, however appears irrelevant.
4 Set Se /*?? KOT' opifljudj/] ' Now
we must not forget that the object of
our inquiry is at once justice in the
plain sense of the word (onAws) and
justice as existing in the state. But
this exists amongst those who live in
common, with a view to the supply of
their mutual wants, free and equal,
either proportionately or literally.'
Tb air\cas S'uccuov is opposed to /ca0'
6/j.oi6ri]Ta. It is not meant here to
separate rb air. $[K. from rb TTO\. Sin.,
rather it is implied that they are both
the same. The only justice that can
be called so without a figure of
speech is that between fellow-citizens,
who have mutual rights and some
sort of equality. Proportionate equal-
ity belongs to aristocracies and con-
stitutional governments, numerical or
exact equality to democracies. Cf.
Ar. Pol. vi. ii. 2 : ol y&p rb MKCUOV T&
ST^O-H/C^ rb Iffov ex*"' tori KO.T'
api8fj.bv a\\a /j^i Kar' atfav, -ro{trov tf
vvros rov Siitaiov rb ir\T)Qos avayxatov
flvai Kvpiov.
4 5 tffrt *yip S'tKaiov rvpavvos]
' For what is just exists among those
who live under a common law, and
law is where there is injustice, (for
legal judgment is a decision between
the just and the unjust). Now
wherever there is injustice there is
wrong dealing, but it does not follow
that where there is wrong dealing
there is injustice. Wrong dealing
consists in allotting oneself too much
absolute good and too little absolute
evil ; and hence it is that we do not
suffer a man to rule, but the imper-
sonal reason, for a man docs this for
himself (i.e. rules, cf. tTtpy iron?
below), and becomes a tyrant.' This
passage does not give the origin of
justice, but the signs by which you
may know it. Justice could not be
said to depend on law (especially as
law is said to depend on injustice, for
we should thus argue in a circle), but
where law exists you may know that
justice exists. The argument then is
that justice exists between citizens
who have a law with each other,
and not between father and children
between whom there is no law. Law
implies justice because it springs out
of cases where a sense of wrong has
been felt.
VL]
[EYAIIMKIN] V.
125
8/xrj xpiV/ TOU 8<xa/ou xau TOU a8<xou. Iv olg 8' a8ixja,
xa) ro a8jxsjv ev rovroig, ev otg 8e TO a8<xsi/, ou 7rao~<j/
a8ix/a* TOUTO 8' serr} TO TrXeov auTa> vspsiv rwv aTrXtoj
aya^tov, itotTTOV 8s Ttov aTrhtbg xaxcov 8<o oux stojasv 5
ap^siv avQp(i)7rov, aXXa TOV Xo'yov, OT< sauTw TOUTO TTO/S?
xa) yivBTai Tvpavvog. s<m 8' o app^eov <>uXa TOU 8<xa/oy,
e< 8s TOU Sfxai'ou, xa< TOU iVou. STTS) 8' ou^sv auTO) TT^SOV 5
SoxsT, eiVep 8/xaio^ ou ya/J vs ( ast TrXsov TOU aTrAto^
ou auTto, ei j.>j TT^OJ auTov avaXoyov (TT/V* 8o srspco
' teal 8/a TOUTO aXXoV;ov iTvai $>a<ri
xai Trporepov.
eog 1 , TOUTO 8s T<jU.rj xa} yipag' OTCO 8s ju,^ ixava
OUTOI yivovTai Tvpavvot. TO 8e 8so~7roT/xov 8
xa) TO TraTCfxov ou TauTov TOUTOJ^ aXX'
ou yap eo~T/v a8/x/a TTCO^ T. auTOu aTrhtbg, TO 8s
xai TO TSXVOV sw av TrJ^ixov xai ja^ %a)purQy,
TTpoaipiiTai (3X<XTTV 8109
ou8' apa a8/xov ou8s 8/xaiov
&vev
T<X
auTou
oux S<TTIV
auTov
8'
^ ofs S' aSitcia. /C.T.X.] This seems to
mean that law has not arisen merely
from the/tfc*! of unequal dealings (oSj-
Ke/), but from a sense of the violation
of a principle (aSi/c/a). Thus the prin-
ciple of justice is prior to all law and
not created out of it. TOUTO 5', z'.e. TO
o5i/ce2V. Following up this concep-
tion of the a priori character of justice,
the writer says we must be governed
not by a man, who may act selfishly,
but by an impersonal standard of the
right. That selfish rule is tyranny,
Aristotle asserts in Pol. m. vii. 5 : ^
fiev "}ckp Tvpavvis fort fjiovafxia. irpbs
TO <TV/J.(f>epOf TO TOU p.OVO.pXOVl'TOS, Cf.
also Po. in. xvi. 3 : TOP Spa v6/j.ov
iipxetv alperurepov fj.a\\ov i) raiv
troKnlav eva nvd. & fj.tv ofiv rbv
V 6ew Kal TOVS v6/J.ovs, 6 6'
&v0pcairov KfXfvaiv irpoffriQiiai Kal
6r]f>iov. 7) Te yap eiri.6vfj.ta TOIOVTOV,
KO.I
robs
aptffTOVs avSpas. fiiSirep
operas vovs 6 t>6fj.os e<nlv.
6 eirel 5' ovdfv yepas] The apo-
dosis to tirtl is fj.i(TBds &pa. From ov
yap to irpdrepov is parenthetical. ' But
since he does not seem to gain at all,
if he is a just man (for he does not
allot to himself more of the absolutely
good than to others, unless it be pro-
portional to his own merits, and hence
he acts for others, and justice thus is
said to be the good of others), we
must give him some reward, and this
comes in the shape of honour and
reverence.'
KaBdirep faexOi/i T& irp6rtpov\ The
reference is to ch. i. 17.
8 TO 8 Snoiov. ' Now the justice
of masters and parents is not identical
with what we have gone through
(TOVTOJS i.e. aw. Kal TTO\IT. SI'K.), but is
only analogous to it.'
9 8i6 apxfSai] 'Hence a man
cannot have a spirit of wrong towards
12C
116IKUN [EYAHMION] V.
[CHAP.
TO TroXmxo'i/ * xotTot vo/xov yap r^v, xoti sv di$ nrff$uaefl
sivai vopoi;' GOTO* 8' r\(rot.v dig V7rdp%si Ivorr^ TOV ap^siv
XGU ap%(rQ(x.i. 8<o juaAXov Trpof ^uvajxa <TT* 8/xooi/ >J
Trpoj; Ts'xva xai xT^aaTa' TOUTO -yap SO~T/ TO olxovojuuxoi/
Sixajov* srspQv 8s xai TOUTO Toy TTOTUTJXOU.
7 ToG 8s TTOXmXOU 8jXfll/Ot> TO jtXSV <uO~JXo'v StTTi TO OS
vojUixo'v, <uo-jxoi/ ju-sv TO 7ravTOt.%ou TT}v auTji> sp^ov SuvajU-Jv,
xa/ oy TO> 8oxsTv ij JU.T], vopuxov 8s o e< ap^rjf jtxsv ou^sv
< ovrfog ^ aXXtof, oVav 8s fltovTai, 8<a^s'ps, olov TO
himself; nor civil justice or injustice ;
for this is, as we have said (^y), ac-
cording to law and among those
who can naturally have law ; namely,
those, as we said (^(rw), who have an
equality of ruling and being ruled.'
VII. Continues the discussion as to
the nature of civil justice, in which
there are two elements, the natural
(<t>wrut6v) and the conventional (vofju-
n6v~). They are distinguished, and
arguments are brought against the
sophistical position that all justice is
merely conventional. The chapter
as above is not conveniently divided.
We need not have had a fresh com-
mencement with i, TOU 8t iroAiTi/coD,
which is a carrying on of the same
digression before made ; and we might
well have had the end of a chapter at
5, Kara Qvffiv y ipiffrti, after which
there is a return to the main question
as to justice and injustice in the acts
and the characters of individuals. In
his later edition Bekker makes one
undivided chapter including Chaps.
VI., VII.. VIII., of the present edition.
I TOV S( iro\trtKou Siaipfpti] ' Now
in civil justice there is a natural
element and a conventional element ;
that is natural which has the same
force everywhere, and does not depend
on being adopted or not adopted (T<
SoKeTi/ T} jt?j) ; while that is conventional
which at the outset does not matter
whether it be so or differently, but
when men have instituted it, then
matters.' The distinction here drawn
is like that between Wios and Koivbs
v6fj.os in Aristotle's EJutoric i. xiii.,
and also that between moral and
positive laws in modern treatises.
Natural justice is law because it is
right, conventional justice is right
because it is law. Ti> VOUIK&V is not
to be confused with rb i>6fjufiov (cf.
ch. i. 8), which is justice expressed
in the law, and which is nearly equi-
valent to iro\iTiKbv SIKCUOI/, containing
therefore both the natural and con-
ventional elements. In the early
stages of society all law is regarded
with equal reverence. Afterwards, in
the sceptical period, the merely con-
ventional character of many institu-
tions is felt, and doubt is thrown on
the validity of the whole fabric.
Afterwards the proper distinction is
made, and the existence of something
above all mere convention is recog-
nised. The idea of ' nature ' as form-
ing the basis of law, which was started
in the school of Aristotle, was after-
wards developed by the Stoics, and
still further drawn out by Cicero and
the Roman jurists. It became a
leading formula in the Roman law,
and hence has influenced the modern
school of continental jurists, until a
reaction was made against it by
Bentham.
VI. VIL]
[EYAHMION] V.
127
ovvai, 73 TO ouyot
\ TU)V Ha
xou ra ^yj
ro/ct'jra or/ TO
(ivs
siv
Jr Su
TO
C^UCTSJ BXWIJTW xa)
TO
Heptroug xa/s/, TO. 6e o/xa/a xivou/xeva bpwrnv. TOUTO ' 3
TO ywas Xtrj-poverflai] Herod, (vi. 79)
speaks of too minse as the ransom,
ai-Spa
rb aT7ct Ouetj/] Cf. Herod, n. 42 :
oVot jUev 5); A(bs &r]ftaitos 'ISpvi/rai
Ipbv $1 vofj.011 v]$aiov (Iffi, OVTOI fj.ev
vvv iravrfS o'itav aire^ttei/oi diyas
Qvovffi.
TO Oveiv BpaffiSa"] i.e. in Amphipolis,
cf. Thucyd. \. xi. : fcai TO Koiirbv ol
'A,U(|)j7roArTai irepifp^avrfs O.VTOV rb
/j.vriiJ.f'iof, &s ripcai re e'vTep.vovcri Kal
TiyUttf SeSaJKCKTii' aytavas Kal err^ffiovs
Ovffias vofj.iffa!'res rbv BpaJiSav ffciiTTJpa
2 SoKft 8e bpuffiv] ' Now some
think that all institutions are of this
character, because, while the natural
is fixed and has everywhere the same
force (as fire burns equally here and
in Persia), they see the rules of jus-
tice altered.' Kai Ii/0a8e Kal ev TOIS
Tlfpffats. This appears to have been
a common formula, cf. Plato, Minos, p.
315 E : 3y&> per (von'ifa) rd re Siitaia
SiKaia Kal ra aSiKa itSifca. OVKOVV /cal
vat. OVKOVV Kal tv Tlepffais ; Kal eV
Tlfptrais. In the same dialogue, p.
315, are given specimens of the diffe-
rent laws and customs in different
times and places (D): Mupi'a 8* &v rts
ex ot rotavra slirtiv. iro\\fy yap fvpv-
Xupia Trjs aTToSe/Jews, us oi/re j)fj.eis
Tlfjuv avrols ael Kara ravra vop.i^ofj.ey
ovre a\\^\ois ol avQpaiiroi. The variety
of customs and ideas is brought for-
ward by Locke and Paley to disprove
the existence of an innate 'moral
sense.' This variety is generally over-
stated, and the list of aberrations is
mainly obtained from the usages of
barbarous tribes. On the origin of
the opposition between 'nature' and
' convention,' and on the use made of
this by the Sophists, see Vol. I.
Essay II., p. 107-8.
3 ToDro 8' ov <pvffei] 'But this
is not the case (i.e. that justice is
mutable), though it is so to a certain
extent. May be among the gods
justice is immutable; but with us,
although there is somewhat that exists
by nature, yet all is mutable. Though
this does not do away with the dis-
tinction between what is by nature
and what is not by nature.' The
writing here is very compressed, a\\'
fffriv &s, i.e. TO St/caia KivovvraL, to
which also ovSafaces afterwards must
be referred. The answer given to the
sophistical argument against justice
consists in denying the premiss that
' what is by nature is immutable.'
This might be the case, it is answered,
in an ideal world (wapd yf TOIS fleotj),
but in our world laws are interrupted,
and the manifestation of them is less
perfect (Kivrj-rbv fjLfvroi irav). Again
' nature ' must be taken to mean not
only a law but a tendency (see note
on Eth. n. i. 3), as, for instance, the
right hand is ' naturally,' but not
always, stronger than the left, while
merely conventional institutions exhi-
bit no natural law (ov <f>vffei oAAa
128
OUX 0~T1!/ OVTO)$
[EYAHMIiiN] V.
[CHAP.
4 TO
S<TTIV tug. xairoi rrapa ys
* Trap' ijjouv o' sVri |U,V T< xai
(J.SVTOI TTaV. Ohti 0[Jt,(l)$ StTTi TO /-/.V QlHTSl
J. 7TOIOV OS 4>UO-i Ttt)V V^)S^O[J,SVa)V XOll
xa ' ""o^of ou aAAa vopixov xa} (ruvtyr t xy,
a^u^co XJVTJTO. OjUO/co, SjJXoy* xa< e^-/ Ttov aXXtov o
appoarei $iopur[j.o$' <$>v<rei yap TJ 8s/a xps
5 xa/roi evSs^sra/ T<va^ ajW,c$>iO=^/ou^ ysv<r3a<. ra
xara (ruvQxav xai ro <rvJi<>so
rou; fj.Tpoi$ ' ou yap 7ravTa%ov <ra ra ovypa xa
as/rw ou 8
a
= xa ra
0/xaa ou Taura Travra^oD,
6 jU,/a [Jiovov Travra^ou xara $()<nv 73 ap/o-rr]. riov 8s
xa} vojU,/jtxa)v sxao~Tov >j ra xa^o'Xou 7rpo ra xa^'
^s< ' ra ]0tv yap TrpaTropsva TroXXa, exsivcav o* xao~rov
V xa^o'Aou yap. 8<a4>pe< ^ TO a^ixr^a xal TO atitxov
a-uv6riKTi\ and are like weights and
measures, which entirely depend on
the convenience of men.
Trapa -ye TO?S 0eols] Of course there
is nothing theological in this allusion.
In <A. x. viii. 7, the notion of attri-
buting justice to the gods is ridiculed.
The present mention of the gods is
not meant to convey anything about
their nature, it merely contrasts a
divine or ideal state with the human
and actual. An exactly similar men-
tion of the gods is made below, ch. ix.
17-
4 ^8e'xTof rivets] Bekker reads
Tii/as, Zell and Cardwell irw-ras, all
without mentioning any variation in
their MSS. The latter of the two read-
ings is supported by the Paraphrast
and also by the author of the Magna
Moralia (i. xxxiv. ai): \eyia 8' olov
Tj7 dpiOTtpoE fitA.eTW/uei' Troj'Tes del
jSdAAeii', yivoift.eff h.v dju^iSf'^ioi. In
either case, the sense is nearly the
same, irdvras implying ' any one
out of all,' as above, Kivrfrbv. jueVroi
nav.
5 '6/j.oia raits /xeVpois] The meaning
appears to be, that measures differ in
size in the producing (ou ntv uvovvrcu)
and the consuming (ou 5e irwAouo-jf)
countries.
dfioius 6 aplffrri] 'So, too,
those institutions which are not based
on nature, but on human will, are not
the same in all places, for not even
are forms of government the same,
though there is one alone which for
all places is naturally the best.' From
the primary difference in governments
will follow manifold other differences
in conventional usages. For the
Aristotelian idea of the one best
government, see Politics m. vii., in.
xv., &c.
6 ttav 5e SiKoia'i/ Ka.06\ov ")dp]
' Now every just and lawful rule stands
like the universal in relation to the
particulars, for while actions are mani-
fold, the rule is one, being universal.'
VII. VIII.] IieiMlN [ETAHMIQN] V.
129
xai TO fttxilfaitfJUt xou TO 8/xaiov. ooixov fJt.lv yap SO~TI ry
<p(xTl rj T0t,{*l. TO O.VTO 8 = TOUTO, OTOtV TTpaV^Yj, aS/XTJjTXa
<TTI, Trplv 8s Trpa^TJvat, ouVo), aAX' aojxov. 6jaoja) 8s
xa} 8/xa/a)^aa. xaXsrra< 8s jaaAAov Sjxa/oTrpayrjjaa TO
xoivov, StxatCDfAat 8s TO 7ravo'p5a) ( u.a TOU a?>ixrifj.aTO$. xa$'
exao-Tov 8s auT>v TroTa T & xa) TroVa xa< ?rs} TroTa
, a8<xs? 8
TrpaTTvj
s/ oa, u&Tspov STrio~xs7rTsov.
"OvTiov 8s Tfot/ 8<xa/jv xai a8/xa>v T&V
v xa
axtot/ OUT
r, oVav sxwv T/
ji 1 OUTS 8*xa<o7Tj5aysT aXX xaTa
ei'vcu
7rpaTTOu(riv. a8/x7jjCta 8s xat
xo'j(ria> xa/ ' axouer/co * OTav yap
ase 8s xa< a8/xra TO'T'
(ourTai Ti
' ouco lav
p
,
's(7Tai TI a8/xov ],sv,
TO sxour<ov Trpoa-f). ?y.syo> 8' 3
/xsv, locnrsp xa TrpoTspov
o av T<
We hare a transition of subject now,
a return from the digression on civil
justice, to inquire into individual
responsibility, &c. The transition is
made by saying that the principles of
justice and injustice (rb SI'KCUOI/ and T&
#5i/coj/) are universals and differ from
just and unjust acts. At first the writer
makes Sucaion/jia stand to S'IKCLIOV, as o5(-
/c77/ia to &SIKOC. Afterwards he substi-
tutes SiKaioTTpdyrifj.a as a more correct
word, inasmuch as Sucai'wjua had another
special meaning to denote the setting
right of injustice legal satisfaction.
It is not improbable that Eudemus
here is correcting the phraseology of
Aristotle, who at all events in his
Rhetoric, i. xiii. i,uses Sixaiw/io as the
opposite of aSiKTj/ua, merely to denote
a just action. Ta 8* a.SiK-fi/j.ara no.vra
KM TO. SiKcucti/iaTa SieAeo/uej', /c. T. A.
VIII. The general principles of
justice having now been defined, the
question is what constitutes justice
and injustice in the individual? In
VOL. IT.
one word the will. This chapter
adds some needless remarks on the
nature of the voluntary, and distin-
guishes between the different stages
of a wrong done, according to the
amount of purpose which accompanied
it. The same act externally might
be a misfortune, if happening beyond
calculation ; a mistake, if through
carelessness; a wrong, if through
temptation ; the act of an unjust man,
if through deliberate villany ( 6 8).
This distinction is illustrated by the
legal view with regard to acts done in
anger ( 9 10). All voluntary just
acts are just. Some involuntary acts
are still unpardonable.
3 Aeyw 8" ttto-uffiov fj.et> } Sffirep Kal
irptiTtpov efprjraj] The reference is to
the Eudemian Ethics u. ix. i, where
voluntariness is defined to depend on
knowledge. 'ETrel 8e TOUT' exei re\os,
Kal oiirf T\ t opei ovre rp irpoatf. effei rb
tKOvffiov ccpicrrai, Aowrbj/ Srj 6piffcur8cu
TO, Kara. Stdvoiav. SoKti 8^ tvavriov
elva.1 T(> eKovffiov Tif axouaiy, Kol rJ>
130
IIOIKiiN [EYAHMION] V.
[CHAP.
xai p.r^ ayvofiw
to [J.r)T ou si/xa, ojov Tiva TUTTTSJ xa TIVI xa Tivog
svsxa, xaxsvcov sxa<rrov
xara ^ru/js^xo^ /x>y |3/a,
si rig XajSaJV TTJV ^s7pa auTou TUTTTOJ Tspov, oup^
exiov' ou yap ITT' auTu>. IfOs'^eraj 8s TOV TUTTTo^asvov
Trarspa sTva*, TOV 8' or/ jtxsv avQpuiTrog 13 T<OV Trapovrcuv Tig
yiv(o(rx$iv, OTI 8s rrar^p ayvos^v. o/jt,o/a) 8s TO TOJOUTOV
8/a>pjo~6a) xa) ITT} TOU ou svsxa, xa/ rrepi
TO 8rj ayvooujasvov, >j ^ ayvoou^tsvov jU,sv p,^ STT' awrto
ov, ^ 3/a, axouVtov* TroAAa yap xai Ttov <$Jo-s< U7rapp/o'v-
TWV sl8oVe^ xai 7rpa.TTOfj.sv xai
exoJo~Jov OUT' axoo<r*o'v SO~T<V, oTov TO
40~T< 8' oju,o/a> 67ri TCOV a8i'xwv xai TCOV 8<xa/cov xai TO
xaTa o'Uja^sjSvjxoV" xai yap av T^V TrapaxaTa^vjxryV a:ro-
8o/->] T<^ axa>v xai 8<a <$>oftov, ov OUTS 8/xaia 7rpdtTT/v OUTS
cov
8s xai TOV avayxa^o^afivov xai axovTa
jtx^ a7ro8i8oWa xaTa o'u[j.fi&r i xos c^aTeov aixj/ xa
5 a'8<xa 7rpaTTi/. Ttov 8e ixoviricDV TO.
7Tpa.TTOp.SV TO. 8' OU TTpOSAo'jU.SJ/0;, 7TpOS?vo'jaVOi ^U. = V 6Va
6 3ouXsucrajU,voJ, aTrpoa/pSTa 8e oo~a a7rpo0ou?vsuTa.
8^ ouo-tov /SXa^aJv TCOV v TaTg xoivcoviaig^ Ta jU.sv
TTpO-
fi'Sora ^ ftr ^ ^ ou eVewo T< 5'
d-yi/oou^rt (col ftp Kal y KOI 8, 5i' S^i'otaj',
^l^J KOTO (JVH$t$r}K6s.
wairep el TIS \a&u>v r^v x e <]f f.r.X.]
The same illustration is given in the
Eudemian Ethics n. viii. 10, where
the discussion has a great affinity to
the present chapter.
^irl TOU ou JVe/ca] See the note on
M. in. i. 1 8.
TroAAci 70^ airo6^<rKei'] ' Since we
knowingly both do and suffer many
of those things that happen to us by
nature, none of which are either volun-
tary or involuntary, as for instance
growing old or dying.' To constitute
voluntariness we must do knowingly
things that are within the sphere of
the will (ty JHUV). Physical things
are not within this sphere. It would
have been more accurate to say that
we do not do them. It is characte-
ristic of Eudemus to turn to the
consideration of physiological facts ;
see the notes below, on Eth. vu.
ch. xiv.
6 rptwv 8^ olffiav f)\af)(av reaf tv
rats Koivcavieus~\ ' Therefore there
being three kinds of harm that may
be done in the intercourse of men,'
&c. Heally four kinds are specified,
but the last (8ta poxQ'npicu') seems to
be an addition to the old list, con-
sisting of the misfortune, the error,
and the wrong, which division is to
be found in Aristotle's Rhetoric, i.
ch. xiii. The present discussion is
promised in Eth. Eud. n. x. 19: o/uo
VIIL
HGIKilN [EYAliMIilN] V.
131
ayvoiag aij.apTTjfj.aToc. SOTTIV, OTav /u.rrs ov jtxryrs o [J.r,TS to
jr* ou svsxa VTT shafts TraZy ^ -ya ou $aAs7v -q ou
f aXXa
]
ou svsxa
ov :
rourov
ay
svsxa
ij, o/ov oyp/ va rpaxnrj
co. orav jasv ovv Tr
va x
rj
Os
jotsv
QVIJ.OV xai
a'j.apTr l ij.a' aputpravei fj.v yap orav
arup^s? o' orav -a>5sv. orav 8s
aoixr l rj.a, olov ocra re 8<
avayxaTa ^ 4^ UC "' X( ^> O"^j3a/v=i roT*; av-
^^ \ O ' \f / >*N
TavTa yap pXa:rrovrs^ xa* a[j,apTavovTS<; aQi-
/Jtsv, xaj ao<xr yj aara s(mv, oy [J.SVTOI TTOI afiixot 8<a
s jrotnj^of ov ya^ 0;a ( ao^^r;^/av vj jSXa^' orav 9
xa) fnj(Qi)po$, (iio xa?uo ra
xpiv=Tai ' ou yap &p%t o 5u ( .a>
STI 8s ouSs Trspi row ysvetr^a/ ^ 10
Tre^i Toy SifxauW s^} ^aivojU,sv>)
p ao/xa r 0^715 so-riv. ou -yap too-Trsp ev roTj <rivaX-
roD y=vs<r5ai
rov STspov slvai jU.o^5r y po'v, av
0^,0/vO-youvrs^ 7r=p} roO
raura
S sx 7rpr>aips<r=co$,
sx 6u/xo5 o-jx
T<MCOV
o opyi(rag.
auro Opaxriv'
TTS^J rou
S/xaiov dtju4>r|3i]roDarip. o 3' 7r<j3oyXsuo-aj oyx
ajcrrs o /x=v oi'srai a6/x=ro-^ai, 6 8' oy. av o' sx
ao<xs?. xa; xara raur'
ra aOJxr^tara on
S' K Tovrtav <pavfpbi> Ka.1 5ri a/\cDs
Siopi^uvrai o? Ta-v iro.Qt\)ia.riav TO /uev
fKOVffia TO. 8* aicovffta TO 8* K irpovuias
vofjioBfrovffiv' tl yctp Kal /JL^J Sio.Kpi-
fiovffiv, oA\' airrovrai yf Try T^S
d\7)0ios * oXAo irepl fjitv TOVTUV
cpov/j.(i> tv TTJ iff pi tuv SiKaicav 4ri-
nettytt.
9 10 Sib KaAw? aSi/ce?] 'Hence
too acts done from anger are well
judged not to proceed from purpose, for
not he who acts in anger, but he who
provoked the anger is the beginner.
Again, the question is not about the
act having taken place or not, but
about the justice of it ; for anger
arises on the appearance of injustice.
It is not as in contracts, where men
dispute about the thing having been
done, and where (if the thing has
been done) one of the parties must be
a villain, unless they have done it in
forgetfulness. But (in the present
case) agreeing about the fact, they
dispute on which gide justice is.
Now he that has attacked another
cannot plead ignorance, so that (the
issue lies on this) one party thinks he
has been injured, the other denies it.
But if a man has harmed another on
purpose, he is guilty of injustice.'
Owing to the obscurity of expression,
s 2
132
IlOlKilN [ETAHMION] V.
T
S
[CllAf.
Ta
atAixog, OTO.V Trapa TO
3s xai /xaiO, OTOCV
s, av p.ovov excov 7rpctTTY ;
SO~TI o~t>yyva)j,ov*xa Ta 8' ou
yap ^ ]U,o'j/oi> dyvoovvTst; aXAa xai
Traa TO
axouo~i)v
oo~a
ayvoiav a/xap-
this passage has given great trouble
to the commentators. The context
is a carrying on of the distinction
between ofirfprrj^a, aSforyta, and
SSt/coc. What distinguishes these is
the amount of purpose they contain.
This, says the writer, is illustrated by
the way in which acts of anger are
treated legally. Such acts are not
denied, but the plea is that they were
caused by an injustice, that they did
not proceed from purpose, but were
caused by an injury which gave rise
to them. Thus the question is
moved off from the acts themselves,
and is entirely concerned with their
antecedents. Was it a real injustice
that gave rise to them? Whereas
with regard to harmful acts done on
purpose (ttv 5' ec vpocup. /SActyjj)
there is no doubt that in themselves
they constitute a wrong. The chief
difficulty is about the words 6 5'
jrj$ouAei/<ras O&K aryvoei, &ffTf 6 (itr
oJerai aSiKettrflcu, 6 8' otf. Who is
6 firtfiov\ev<Tas ? and who are 6 ^teV, 6
5' o&? Apparently OVK ayvoe? is
merely in reference to Sick A^OTJJ/.
Cases of anger differ from other civil
cases (tv roTs ffwaAAd-y/tuKn), (i) be-
cause the acts of anger are not
denied ; (2) because ignorance is not
pleaded to justify them. 'O lirifiov-
\tvffas, accordingly, must mean 'he
that made the attack,' though the
word is not very appropriate to
denote an attack made in anger. 'O
fj.tv refers to the same person, namely,
to him who, having done a violent act
in anger, now pleads that he was
injured before, which plea the one
who has suffered from his violence
denies. The sentence &v S 1 e' irpoatp.
is in contrast to the whole of the
preceding passage to all that is said
about deeds of anger. If it appears
to any impossible that 6 &nj8ot>A. can
refer to the angry man, there are
several other meanings that can be
assigned to it. (i) It may mean the
person who by an injury provokr-d
the attack, and then the second clause
would mean, ' so that the angry man
thinks he has suffered a wrong, the
unjust man does not.' (2) The first
clause may be parenthetical, the
'plotter' being contrasted with the
angry man, and the second clause may
be taken to mean ' so that the sufferer
thinks he is wronged, and the angry
man thinks he is not.' The first
clause would then have been inserted
to show that where, in cases of this
kind, intentional provocation has been
given, the parties are in the same
relation as in cases Iv rols ffwa.\\a.-y-
fuvrn>, i.e. one of them knows upon
which side justice is, because he is
conscious of his own wrong.
12 TU>V 5" cwcoiKTiW] The word is
used less sternly here than it is by
Aristotle in Eth. m. i. 21, &c., where
acts of passion are excluded from the
class of the involuntary. On the
difference between ayvoovmes and
5i' Ayvoicu', see Eth. in. i. 14, and note.
The view here given of physical
temptation as constituting an ex-
cuse for wrong acts is similar to
that in the later Eudemian Book, vir.
xiv. 6.
VIII. IX.] HOlKiiN [EYAIIMIQN] V. 133
ayvoiav,
raj/over/, (T'jyyva)[ji.wixd, o<ra os jitrj
Old 7rdfyo Qs
ou
r ' av Ti, SJ JXai/O> ttpWTOU TTSjSi TOU 9
si sf
mrtrn Ttjv
, 7} QfXovaav
IX. This chapter, by means of
mooting and answering certain diffi-
culties and objections with regard to
the nature of justice and injustice,
completes and deepens the conception
of them that has hitherto been given.
These questions are as follows : ( i )
Can one be injured voluntarily ?
i 2. (2) Is the recipient of an
injury always injured? 3 8. The
latter question is first generally
answered, and then, 9 13, it is
re-stated in the form of two other
questions, namely, Is the distributor
of an unjust distribution, or he that
gains by it, unjust ? and, Can a man
injure himself? By mooting these
points it is at once shown that justice
implies a relationship of two wills,
and that an act of injustice implies a
collision of two wills : a loss on one
side and a gain on the other. The
chapter ends with some remarks cor-
recting popular errors, and deepening
the conception of justice, (i) Justice
i.s no easy thing consisting in an
external act. It consists in an in-
ternal spirit, 14. (a) To know it is
not like knowing a set of facts. It
implies a knowledge of principles,
| 15. (3) The just man could not at
will act unjustly. The character of
the act depends on the state of mind,
1 6. (4) Justice is limited to a
human sphere, 17.
i airop-l}fffif $' &v K<Ws] ' Now
one might doubt whether we have
adequately defined being injured and
injuring; in the first place, whether
it be as Euripides says, in his strange
language, A. "I killed my mother,
and there's an end of it." B. " Was
it with the will of both, or was she
willing while you were unwilling?"
In short, is it as a matter of fact
possible that one should be volun-
tarily injured, or, on the contrary, is
that always involuntary, just as all
injuring is voluntary ? And is all in-
justice, like all injuring, to be summed
up under the one category or the
other, or is it sometimes voluntary
and sometimes involuntary? The same
may be said about being justly
treated, for all just doing is volun-
tary, so that it might be supposed
that being injured and being justly
treated would be opposed to each
other as to being voluntary or in-
voluntary correspondingly to the two
active terms (OJTIK. dfwtus Kaff
eKdrtpov). But it would be absurd to
say of being justly treated that it is
always voluntary, for some are treated
justly against their will.'
ei IKCLVUS ^ui)piara.i\ This shows the
purpose of the chapter,, to complete
the definition of justice and injustice
by looking at them on the passive
side.
<2(TTep Eupriri'&ijs] Wagner (Eur.
Fragm. p. 40) says the lines come
from the Alcnweon of Euripides.
The Scholiast refers them to the
131
HOIKliN [EYAIIMliiN] V.
[CiiAr.
Trospov yap cog avjto^ e<rriv sxwra aOJXsurai, oo
dxoixriov aVav, too-jrsp xai TO aQixsiv Trdv EXOIHTIOV* xai
apa Trdv OUTO) ^ exs/va>, w(nrsp xai TO ao<xsiV 7rav Ixou-
z o~ioi/, TJ TO jaev SXOIKTIQV TO 8' axouo~iov. bfjt.oia)$ os xai eVi
TOU 8/xa<ou<r5a< TO yap 8ixa<07rpay=iV Trdv SXOIKTIOV,
suAoyov aj>T<xsiV$a< ojaouof xa6' exdreov TO'
\\^ r- * * / */ V V .
i TO 6ixa<ou<roai EXOUQ-JOV axotxriov etvai. aroTrov 6
avfto^sie xa) STT} TOU Sixaiouo-9ai,eJ Trav IxouViot/ * s'wo* yap
3 S*xa<oyj/Ta< otvp^ IXO'VTSJ. e^-e/ xat To'Ss btaTropycreisv av TIJ,
TTorepov 6 TO a^txoj/ TrsTrovSaj^ atiixeiTai 7ra$ i] (aa-Trsp xai
eTri TOU TrpaTTS/v, xa< STTI TOU 7rao~vsiv SCTTIV ' xaTa O~U/JL-
jSs/^xo^ yap si/S=p^=Ta< eV dpfyoTspwy p.sra'h.ap.fidvsiv rCov
fiixatcov. O[JI.O'KO$ 8s 8>jAov OTI xai STTI Ttot/ a&txcov oi yap
TO Ta^/xa Trpdrrsw rut dbixslv ou^s TO aotxa ?ra-
TO) aSixsTo-Saj. o/xo/a)^ 8s xa) STT) TOU SixaioTrpaysTv
xai 8/xajouo~Qat aSu'vaTOi/ yap a'8/xsTo-fiai ja^ doixovvTot; rj
el 8' so~Tiv a^Xto TO
Bdlerophon. Wagner writes them as
a dialogue, supposing the persons to
be Alcmaeon and Phegeus. He con-
jectures Kore/cToi', which appears
more probable than the usual reading
Kareicra, and which accordingly has
been adopted in the above transla-
tion.
a The passive terms are not
opposed to each other in respect of
voluntariness in the way that might
be expected from the opposition be-
tween the active terms under which
they stand.
a5(Kt?<70at 5iKa.iuvff8ai.
For aJSiKfiffdai is always involuntary,
but SiicaiovaOai is not always volun-
tary. A man may be 'treated justly'
by being hanged.
3 Not every one who suffers what
is unjust is injured, for injury implies
intention on the part of the injuror.
Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. L xiii. 5 : &TT 5$j
aSiKtlffQui rb vrrb IKOVTOS TO. #5j/ca
4 6 el 8' <n\v Trparrff] ' Now if
to injure is simply defined "to hurt any
one willingly," and " willingly" means
"knowing the person, and the instru-
ment, and the manner," and the in-
continent man hurts himself willingly,
then it follows that one can be
willingly injured, and it will be pos-
sible to injure oneself. But this
was one of the points in question,
whether it is possible to injure oneself.
Again, one might from incontinence
be hurt willingly by another who was
acting willingly, so that in that way
it would be possible to be injured
willingly. But shall we not rather
say that the definition is not correct,
but that we must add to the formula
" hurt any one willingly, knowing
person, instrument, and manner,"
the terms " against that person's
wish ? " It is true one is hurt and
one suffers injustice willingly, but no
IX.]
IIG1KQN [EJfAHMION] V.
135
TO /3Xa7TT<nv sxovra r<va, TO ' exovra. s/SoVa xcu
< ai xa< coc, 6 8' dxpar^s sxa>v (SAaTTTs* auTO auro'v,
T' av dfiixo'iTo xa.} ev$s%oiro ctvrov aurov
S(TTI Ss xa; TOUTO sv TJ TCOJ/ dTropovpsvcov, el s
auYov auTov dfiixsiv. sn sxriov dv rig %C dxpatriav vir $
aAXou /SActTTTOJTO s*oWo, OHTT si'r ; dv SKOVT* d&ixsia-Qai. %
ovx ofto o SiourM aXXa Trpoa-Qsrsov TW
g TO ?rapa T^V ietHKW
ouv T<^ Ixoji/ xoiiTa^ixoe. Tracrvsi, a
8' oo&2$ Ixcov' ou^s}^ -yap |3ouAsTa/, ou' 6 dxpaTys
jrapa TTJV 3ouX7]o-<v Trpdrrsr OUTS yap j3ouXsTj ou^s
v " *? ^~<V > \ > ,\ ,/
^tv] OISTCLI sivcti (TTroudaiov, o T axpaT^j ou^ a olrrai
Trpdrreiv Trpdrrsi. o 8s Ta
8oOi/a/ TOV FAaOxov TOJ
cocrTrs
one is injured willingly. For no one
wishes (harm), nor does the incon-
tinent man, but he acts against his
wish. For no one wishes for what he
does not think to be good, and the
incontinent man does not what he
thinks to be good.'
4 aTrAcDs is opposed to /caret Trp6<r-
Oeaiv as implied in irpoaOtreov. Cf.
vn. iv. 2. 3.
T& /JA.an-reij'] Harm does not con-
stitute injustice without a violation
of the will. Cf. Ar. Shet. i. xiii. 6 :
avdyitri rbv aSiKovfjLfvov ft\dirrf<r6ai,
KOI axovffius f3\dirTeff9cu.
6 S' oKpar^s] The incontinent man
may harm himself, or be led into
ruin by others. The phenomena of
incontinence appear to have constantly
occupied the attention of Eudemus.
They not only form the main subject
of Eth. Book vn. (Eth. End. vi.),
but they are also mixed up with the
discussion on the voluntary. Eth.
End. n. viii.
6 oijre yap jSouAeroj K. r. X.] In
his inmost self every one wishes for
what lie thinks good. Thus the
incontinent man, following his desire,
acts against his own real wish. This
is the same point of view as is taken
in the Gorgias of Plato (p. 466 sqq.).-
It is rather different from that in
Eth. in. ch. iv. (on which see notes),
though the word atercu prevents an
absolute collision. The terms napa,
r^v &ov\i}aiv are rather awkwardly
introduced in the text, for it is said
they are necessary to turn mere harm
into injustice, but with regard to the
incontinent man, while acting volun-
tarily he receives ' harm against his
wish." Yet he is not injured volun-
tarily, because the terms ' against his
wish ' constitute him an involuntary
agent. In short, in this case irapi
TV PoJ\r)<ni> is made to qualify, not
the harm, but the voluntariness of
the recipient. There is a slight con-
fusion in the expression, but on the
whole the tendency here is to at-
tribute a less degree of voluntari-
ness to weak and foolish acts than
was done by Aristotle in his discus-
sions on the voluntary; Eth. in. i.
14, &c.
136
nux
[E3TAHM1ON] V.
ir aura* yap scrn TO
oux STT' auTto, aAAa TOV aSixoTi/Ta
8 Trsp) fJikv ovv TOU a&JX7o-Qa<, OT/ ou exooViov
[CHAP.
\ ?v > <S
TO 6 afn-
TTOT
6 vslfJiOig trapa rr^v d^iav TO TrXsTov rj o e^wv, xat si
9 SO-T/V auTov auTov aSixeiV' si yap sv^s^srai TO TrpoVepov
AsvSsi/ xa) o 8;avs/xa>v a&xsT aXX' oup^ 6 sp^aiv TO TrXsov, i
T/^ TrAeov erspio rj aura* vsp.si el(>a)$ xa< exwv, ovTog auTo^
awTOV aSixeT. OTrep 8oxouo~<v oi j,Tp/oi TTOISIV o yap
E7TISIX1)$ XaTTO>TlXoV SCTTIV, 7) OuSs TOUTO aTTAOUV ; CTSpOU
yap aya^oD, si STU^SV, sVXsovsxTs/, oTov So'^vjf r; ToO
ST< XusTai xai xara TOV %iopur[j.ov TOU a
yap ?rapa T^V
8*a ys TOOTO,
io(pavpov 8s xai OTI o 8iavjUO)v aoixsT, a/\.X' oup^ o TO
eveov ct/' oi yap w TO aSixov V7rdp%ei aSixfiT,
SXo'vTa TOUTO TO<M/* TOUTO 8* o9V 75 Otp^^ T%
n 0~T/v sv TOO 8<av],oj/T* otXTc' oux sv TO> Xa^xjSa
TO TTOisiv Xssrai, xai O~T/V a>j Ta
j TO
7)
xa TJ X e '
TTO/E? 8s Ta
STI s /xsj/ yvoCov expivsv, ox
Kara TO j/Oja/xov 8/xaiov ouS 1 a^ixoj 7]
O~TV
SO~TI
8' a>^ a8/xo^ ' srspov yap TO vofuxov 8/xaiov xa< TO
fil 8s yivw(rxa)v 'sxptvsv aS/xa)f, TrAsovfiXTE? xa)
8 13 ?rt 5' Sv vpoei\6fjit6a, Sv
effnv ttVeij'] ' But of the questions
which we determined on there remain
two to discuss,' namely, (i) whether
the distributor of an unjust distribu-
tion does the wrong, or he who gains
by it ? (a) Can a man injure himself,
as for instance by taking less than his
share ? These questions are as good
as answered already ; it is already
clear that no one can injure himself.
Again the act belongs to the distri-
butor and not to the receiver. If the
distributor acts from corrupt motives
he is unjust, if unconsciously and by
accident he is not unjust, though jus-
tice may have been violated by his
decision.
ii 12 ?T iirfl irpwrov] 'Again,
as the word doing is used in more
senses than one, and there is a sense
in which inanimate things kill or
one's hand or the slave who does his
master's bidding so the distributor
may be the instrument of doing injus-
tice, without himself injuring. Again,
if he decided in ignorance, in the eye
of the law he is not guilty of injuring,
nor is his decision unjust, though
from another point of view it is un-
just, for justice according to law is
distinct from abstract justice.' The
IX.]
H6IK&N [EYAHMIliN] V.
137
TO
*p TO pyvpiov
.e^ovrag TauTa Tro/srv
Se xa} TO yvaivat Ta J 5
%apiro$ ] Tipfopiag. wa-TTSp ovv xav si rig
O-JTO TOU a8/xrjM,aTO, xa) o 8<a raura xpivctg
TT^SOV s^si ' xa) yap sV' sxsivcov o rov aypov xpivac; oux
aypoi/ aXA* apyupov e AajSsv. o< 8' oivQpwTroi <>'
oi'ovra* eTva* TO a&xsiv, 810 xa< TO 8/xajov eTvai
TO S* oux SCTT/V* o-uyyevV$a jaei/ yap TYJ TOU ysirwog
7r<x.Ta^ai TOV TTAVJO~/OV xai Souj/ai TYJ
pafiiov xai STT' aJTo?, aAXa
OUTS &O.QIOV OUT' JTT' auTo^.
8/xaia xa< Ta a8;xa ouSsv o'lovrai (rofyov stvai, ori Trspl wv
ol vofj^oi "hsyoixriv ou va?v7rov (rvvisvai. aXX' ou TauT*
eo"Ti Ta S/xaia aXX' ^ xaTa ^yja/Ss/Srjxo'^, aXXa T&^ Trpotr-
ro[j,eva. xai 7ra> vSjao'/xeva 8ixa<a' TOUTO Se TrTcsov epyov 73
Ta uyisij/a sISsi/a/, ITTSI xaxs? jaeXi xa< oi'vov xai
xai xa0o"iv xai TO/XTJV eltisvai paSiov, aAXa TT(O Ss?
Trpo^ vyisiav xai T/VJ xai TTO'TS, TOO~OUTOV spyov oVov
sTvai. 8<' auTO Ss TOUTO xa/ ToO 8ixa/ot> o'tovrai slvai
TO a^txsTv, oVi ou6sv ^TTOV o 8/xaio^ aXXa xai
av sxao~Tov Trpa^aj TOUTOW xai yap
16
first case supposes the distributor to
act as the instrument of others, the
second that he makes a mistake
through ignorance. In the latter case
abstract justice (T^ irpSnov Si/cajoi/) is
violated, and yet legally (/caret T&
voniK6v) no injustice can be com-
plained of. irpwrov here appears used
analogously to irp<arri <t>i\ocro(pla, irpurr]
I/'\TJ, &c., to denote that which is most
real and necessary, and also most ab-
stract as being most removed from
individual modifications. The Para-
phrast and many of the commentators
understand 11 to refer to the receiver,
not to the distributor. It might also
be taken in a quite general sense, as
applying to all such subservient acts.
But it seems simplest to refer it to
the distributor.
14 17 These sections contain
remarks concluding the subject of jus-
VOL. II.
tice. As they correct popular errors
regarding its nature, they may be con-
sidered a continuation of the airoptcu,
with which the chapter commenced.
The views which are here combated
are (i) a shallow and external notion
about justice and injustice as if they
merely consisted in outward acts ; (2)
a sophistical opinion that to know jus-
tice merely consists in knowing the
details of the laws, cf. Etk. x. ix. 20 ;
(3) an opinion that justice implies its
contrary, as if it were an art (Svvafjus)
see above ch. i. 4. This opinion
would be a consequence of the Socratic
doctrine that justice is knowledge.
Plato saw what this doctrine led to
and drew out the paradoxical conclu-
sion, Eepul. p. 334 A, Hipp. Min. pp.
375-6. The Aristotelian theory that
justice is a moral state (e'ts) set the
difficulty at rest.
138
IIOIKQN [EYAIIMIQN] V.
[CHAP.
xa Traraa/, xa vopsiog rv
xat (rTGa.<$>*ig e$ oTTOTepotovv TpsvsiV. aXAa TO
xcu TO dttixeiv Q'J TO TauTa TrojsTv S<TT/, 7r? k rjv xcn.ro,
j3s$rjxo', aXXa TO coo) e^oj/Ta TauTa Trotiiv, io(nrsp xai TO
larpsvsiv xai TO (jyia^ziv ou TO TSjavsjv r, ^t,rj TSJJ.VSIV r\
$otp[j.axvsiv 75 jar; $>a.p[j.ax=viv <TTIV, aXXa TO
os Ta oixaia sv TOUTO< oJg ^rsrrn rutv aTrXt
sp^ouo"j 8' u7Tp)3oXjv ev TOUTOi^ xa< eXX<\{//v ' ToTj,' jW,sv yap
OUX SO~T*V UTTSp/Bo^-*) CtUTCOV, oToV ^0*0)^ ToT^ QsoTf, To7(,* 2'
ou^sv fj.opiov a>4^sA/jU.ov, ToTj aj/iaTfo^ xaxoTf, aXXa
\.a7TT/, TO?^ OS ]"-^p' TOG* SlOt TOUT* avfypWTTlVW llTTtV.
JO lisp} 3s eTTisixsIac; xai TOO S7rixouf,
7r/s/xs/a Tro Sixa/oeruvri/ TO '
sp^s/
TO
1 7 tort 8 ^<TTJV] ' Now the rela-
tions of justice exist between those
v. ho share in what are commonly
called goods, but with regard to them
can have both too much and too little.
For some cannot have too much, as
perhaps the gods ; and to others again
no portion is advantageous, but all
is hurtful I mean the utterly bad ;
while there is a class who can receive
goods up to a certain point. Hence
justice is human.' Two ideal states,
one of the absolutely good, the other
of the absolutely bad, are here
depicted in contrast to the condition
of human society. The idea of pro-
perty cannot of course be connected
with God (cf. Eth. x. viii. 7), who has
and is all good (cf. Eth. i. vi. 3, ix.
iv. 4) ; nor again with those who are
so degraded that they could not receive
any benefit at all from what are called
goods (cf. ch. i. 9). The passage is
a curious one, and may remind us of
the position assigned by Aristotle (cf.
Pol. i. ii. 14) to man in his social con-
dition, as something between the
beast and the god.
X. Some account of equity
forms a suitable comple-
ment to the theory of justice, and we
find the subject so treated in Ari-
stotle's Rhetoric, i. xiii., from which
it is not improbable that the present
chapter may be partly borrowed.
Professor Spengel is mistaken in say-
ing that this chapter is out of place,
being introduced into the midst of the
oiropi'ai on justice. Evidently it is
chapter xi., and not chapter x.,
that is out of place. Spengel thinks
that the words irepl 5e exifiKftas would
come in well after the words veSs /j.tv
Trp6T(fiov (which occur ch. vi.
3), as if first retaliation and then
equity should be discussed in relation
to justice. But it is evident that they
stand on a different footing, as treated
in this book. Retaliation is a principle
existing in justice and with certain
modifications constituting it ; equity
is something outside justice and cor-
recting it.
'Ernehceto has a close connexion with
what is called yvtbfj.i) (consideration),
Eth. vi. xi. i, cf. Rket. i. xiii. And
thus it is treated of by the author of
the Magna Moralia amongst the intel-
IX. X.]
II9IKQN [EYAIIMIQN] V.
139
TO
afOftcyoy <TTIV slTriiv OUTS ynp <u$ raurov a7r?\.<o oj
STBpov rut ysvsi <$>aiy=Tai <rxo7rov ( asvo^, xai ore fxs
eTTisixlg sTrajvou/xsv xa) avopa TOV TOJOUTOV, OKTTS xcu
ra aXXa STTOUVOVVTSS [J-=TCL$spo[j.sv GCVT) TOU aya6ot5
eV<=<X0~TS50V OTl /SsXTJGV Or^WVTSg ' OTS 8s TtO
axoAou4oyo-< <a/v=Ta/ aroTrov si TO sViSixs^ :rapa TO
OlXOtlOV Tl 6V STTGHV-To'v <7TIV ' r t yap TO 0/XaOV OU (TTTOU-
j>, -^ TO sV/s/xsj o*J oixaiov, si aXXo' ^ si a ( a<a>
TO.TO.
XOLi
TO ST
a?ravTa T^/OTTOV TJVCC
TO' TS
lectual qualities, and is coupled with
what he calls euYvwy^offiJia;, Magna
Moralia, n. i. i, sqq.
To us the contents of this chapter
appear natural and easy to appre-
hend. The idea of equity as the com-
plement of law and justice is to us
perfectly familiar, but the writer saw
a difficulty in saying how logically
(ry \6yif ajtoXovQovai) equity could be
praised if it contradicted j ustice. The
answer is well given above, that equity
is a higher and finer kind of justice
coining in where the law was too
coarse and general. The best illus-
tration of this conception is to be
found in the beautiful description
given in Rh(t. i. xiii. ' It is equity to
pardon human failings, and to look to
the lawgiver and not to the law ; to
the spirit and not to the letter ; to the
intention and not to the action ; to
the whole and not to the part ; to the
character of^the actor in the long
run and not in the present moment ;
to remember good rather than evil,
and good that one has received, rather
than good that one has done ; to bear
being injured (TO avfXfffBai O.SIKOV-
fitvov) ; to wish to settle a matter
by words rather than by deeds ;
lastly, to prefer arbitration to judge-
ment, for the arbitrator sees what is
equitable, but the judge x>nly the law,
and for this an arbitrator was first
appointed, in order that equity might
flourish.'
i &rf fiev ayaOov'] ' Sometimes we
praise what is equitable and the
equitable character in such a way,
that we transfer the term and use it
instead of the term good in praising
people for all other qualities besides.'
The word frifiicfis is constantly used
merely in the sense of ' good,' cf. Eth.
rv. ix. 7, ej forofleVews ^nst/ce's, and
above, ch. iv. 3, &c., but it is a mis-
take to consider this the later sense of
the word, as if 'equitable' were the
primary sense. 'Etrifiicfis (from flic6s)
first means 'customary.' as in Homer;
then 'seemly,' then 'good' in general;
afterwards it is probable than an asso-
ciation of ftxu, ' to yield,' became con-
nected with the word, and hence the
notion of moderation and of waiving
one's rights arose, and TO e-rteutes
was constantly contrasted with TO
S'IKCUOV. Thus in Hejod. ni. 53 :
iro\Aol T5f SIKCUUV ra firtfiKfffTfpa
xporiOfaai. Cf. Plato, Laws, p. 757 D :
TO yap Ti/ces Kal tv-fyvw/JLOV rov
TfKfov KOI aKpifiovs irapa Sticriv r^)v
6p6i]v &TTI ica.pa.TfQpa.vfffi.tvov, &C. Out
of this contrast the idea of equity was
developed.
T 2
uo
[EYAHMIQN] V.
[CHAP.
nvog ov shnov S<TTI xaiov, xa oup cog
ylvog ov fishnov e<m TOU Sixaiou. TCX.'JTOV apa Oixaiov xai
eirisixe$ t xai ap.fyo'iv (nrovfiaioiv OVTQIV xpsirrovro sirisixsg.
3 TTOisT <$ TTjV aTTOpj'aV OT* TO 7TI5IX 8/XaJOV ]U,1/ e<rT<V, OU
TO xaTa vofj-ov <!>, aXX' 7ravo'p5a)jaa vo/x/jaou
4 OITIOV 8' OT* o ju,sv votji0$ xa9o'?;ou Tra^ , Trep) sv/a>v 8'
olo'v TS opQa>$ el-reiv xa.Qo?\.ov. sv (tig ouv avayxTj
xaQo'Xou, jar) olo'v TS 8s opScoj, TO a> e?r< TO
vJ o vo'jtxo^, oix ayvocov TO a.fj,apTavo[jt,?vov xal
oiSsv TJTTOV opQibs' TO yap a ( aapTijjaa oux ev TCO
uS' ev TCO vojaoOeTy] aXX* ev T^ <uo~ei TOU
5 SQ-TJV ' u9o yap TOiaUTTJ 7] T<OV TTpaXTCOV uXlJ 0~TV.
ov Xlyy) ju,sv o vo'jtxo^ xaSo'Xou, (TUjW.3>J 8' ETT* TOUTOU Trap a
TO xaQo'Xow, TO'T opQa>$ *% sl > ^ JrapaXfMTfi o VO^O^STYIS
xa) r t [j.apTsv aTrXaJc elTrwv, sTravopQovv TO fXXei4>dffy, o xav
VOjU,0$T>J a^TO^ OVT(i)$ O.V ilTTOl X? TTOtpWV, Xai < r'o = <,
6 yojU.o^T>30~V av. 810 Sixa/ov jas'v <7T<, xa) &&TIOV rtvog
o/xa/ou, ou TOU aTrXaif aXXa TOU 8*a TO
xai S<TTIV avrr) 73 <>uo-< >j TOW 7r
eXX/7T/ S/a TO xafio'Xou.
vojtxou,
oCtTiov xai TOU
5a< vojtxov, wtrrs
aopo~Tou opurrog xa) c xavrov
TOUTO yap
xaTa vo'^aov fTva/, OT< 7Tp) iv/aw
TO!) yap
<*o~7Tp xa<
xavdtv ' Trpog yap TO
ju,5Tax/t/tTaj xa< ou ]U,V< o' xai/aij/, xa) TO
o^ Ta TrpayjaaTa. TI ]U,=v ouv eo-T/ TO STris
As<rfitag
TOU X/5
8 <jo~/xa
4 irepl eVicoc 5* ou
That law is necessarily imperfect and
unable to cope with details, Aristotle
constantly admits, cf. PoZrt. in. xi. 19 :
irepl 8(To' c^aSvcarot/o'ii' ot fd/io( Xcyeiv
axpiBus Sia rb ^ fidStov fivcu Ka06\ou
nfpinavraiv. Pol. n.Tiii. 23: ia.rtovhia.s
afjiapTias ndl -TIV vofioOtruv. Pol. in.
xv. 9 : ^t7)8e' irap^ rbv v6fiov irpdrrovrfs,
a\\* ^ irtpl v ^/cXeiirejj' &va7fra?ov
auroV.
6 werre ^(pifffMaros 5i] ' There are
some cases for which it is impossible
to legislate, yon require a special
decree to meet them.' The i^ci<r|ua,
like the exercise of equity, was a
remedy to make up the insufficiency
of laws. On its special character,
cf. ch. rii. i, and Eth. vi. viii. 2, see
also Arnold on Thucyd. in. 36.
7 roD yap vpdyfiara] ' For the
rule for what is indefinite must be
itself indefinite, like the leaden rule
in the Lesbian architecture the rule
is not fixed, but shifts itself according
to the shape of the stone, and so docs
X. XL]
H0IKQN [EYAHMIQN] V.
Ul
xou on 3/xaiov, xa< rivog 3=Xriov Oixa/ou, STJXOV. fyavspov
d' ex Touroy xa< o STrtsixr^ Tig s<rnv' o yap rcov TOJOUT>V
xa* 7rpaxT{x&> xa< o jar) axpj$oO/xaJO ITT} TO
?\.aTTamxo, xatVsp s%wv rov
e<rr/, xat rj ej atJrrj sTTieixsia.
oip srspa T/ e|f<.
IloVrpov 8' si/6sp=Tai eavrov aO/xsTv 73 ow, Qavspov sx 1 1
flmfutKOV' TO. fj.lv yap S(TTI rtbv Oixaicov TO. xara
V 6^0 rou i/&jtx,ou TSTa^jM-sva, o/ov oy x=Xsu=i
laurov o vo'jao^, a os jar) xs^sus/, aTrayopeusi*
er< orai/ Trapa TOV vo'^aov pXaarT^ ji} avT/^XaTTTtoj/, sxtov 2
aOiX:?, Ixtov o= o =Jow^ xai ov xa) >. 6 8s 8t' os>y^v saurov
Ixcov TOUTO Spa Trapa TOV op^ov Xo'yov, S oux la o'
* aotx?? apa. aX?va r/va ; 73 T^V TroAiv, aurov o* ou; 3
Ixcov yap 7ra<7"^=/, aoixsTraj 8' oJ5f)^ sx^ov. &o xa; T]
xa
pav
TCU gaurov
xa6' o aixo, 6/xo'vov4
the decree according to the nature of
the case." ' Lesbian architecture '
appears to have been a kind of Cyclo-
pian masonry, which may have
remained in Lesbos from the early
Pelasgian occupiers of the island.
Polygon stones were used in it, which
could not be measured by a straight
rule, cf. -iEsch. Fragm. 70,
OA.A.' 6 pev TIS
Kvp? tv Tpiycavois eKirfpcuvfTia pufyiols,
where Kujua means a waved moulding.
XI. This chapter, which is evidently
superfluous (cf. Vol. I., Essay I., page
41), discusses an already settled
question, Can a man injure himself?
There is no merit in the present dis-
cussion. Amidst the feeble reason-
ings and the repetitions which it pre-
sents, the only points the least inte-
resting are the view that is taken of
suicide, 2, 3, and the saying that it
is a mere metaphor to speak of justice
between the higher and lower parts of
a man.
i IK rcav flpi\nivu>v\ i.e. ch. i. iz
20. The question is complicated
by introducing a mention of universal
justice (T& Kara iracrav aper^jv'), and
the extraordinary assertion is made
that ' whatever the law does not com-
mand it forbids.' We might well ask,
Did the Athenian law command its
citizens to breathe, to eat, to sleep, &c. ?
i 3 The suicide sins against the
state, not against himself. This is
proved by the fact that the state
affixes infamy to the deed. In
^Eschines, Ctesiph. p. 636, 64, it is
mentioned that the hand of a suicide
was buried apart from himself. And
in Plato's Laws, ix. p. 873 c, sqq.,
regulations are kid down for the burial
of suicides. In the words aSiKti &pa.
oAA& TiVa ; there is a change of
meaning from the intransitive a8iKtii>,
to ' do wrong,' to the transitive verb
to ' injure.'
IIGlKilN [EYAHMION] V.
atitxwv xcu p. oA> Qoivhog, ox e<rr/v aOixr^ai savrcv.
TOUTO yap aXXo sxs/vou. SO~T/ yap irtug o a8*xo
ou6e xara rauriji/ aSixsT' a^aa yap av TU> aura) si'vj
$jo-5aj *a/ 7rpoo~xsTo-9a TO auro* TOUTO 3
% k ' >' s" > ?>' >
as* sv 7rXs*ocnv avayxvj eivai TO Oixaiov xai TO
5 IT* 3s sxouo~io'v TS xai s'x TTpoa/^sVsco^ xai TrpoVspov. o yap
8<OT/ S7ra9s, xa) TO auTO avT/Trouov ou SoxsT aO<xs?v * auTOj;
6 o' eauTo'v, Ta auTa a^aa xai 7rao-^s< xai TTO/S?. STI snj av
sxo'vTa d^xs?o~9a. Trpo^ &S TOUTO^, avsu Ttov xaTa
oOs)^ a^ixs?, jtxo^sus* 8* ot>Os/ T^v eauTou
jpU^S? TOI/ gaUTOU TOip^OV OtJSs XXs'TTTfii TOt laU
8s AueTat TO lauTov a3<xsiV xaTa TOV 8<opio"]u,ov TOV
i TOU exouo~/a> a^ixsTo~5aj. (^avspov os xat OTJ a/x(^o)
cf)auXa, xai TO a'5ixs?o~5a< xa; TO a^ixsTv TO jasv yap
TO 8s Trhsov e%ew eo~T< TOU jasVou xa< a>o~7rsp
/xsv sv iaTpix^, SUSXT/XOV 8s sv yujtxvao-T<x4] a'X?*.'
p^sTpov TO a6ixs7v TO ]usv yap aO<xs7v jotsra xax/at;
4 fi^ta 7&p SSocov] ' For it would
be thus possible for the same thing to
be gained and lost by the same person ;
but this is not possible, justice and
injustice must always take place be-
tween more persons than one,' cf.
ch. iii. 4.
6 ?Aws 5e \vtrcu K. T. \.] A verbal
repetition of what was said above,
ch. ix. 9.
79 The chapter ends by touch-
ing upon two points which hare an
apparent reference to Plato, (i) the
assertion that to injure is worse than
to be injured, which the writer here
qualifies with a consideration ; (a) the
conception of justice existing between
the different parts in the mind of an
individual, which is here pronounced
to be a metaphor.
Kal Siffittp yvfiva<rriKrj~\ This sen-
tence is parenthetical and elliptic.
The train of thought appears to be :
'Injuring and being injured are both
bad, they are both departures from
the mean, and it is (with justice) as
with health in medicine and good con-
dition in training,' namely, it is a
state of balance between excess and
defect, cf. Eth. n. ii. 6.
aAA' &/j.tas xfipov rb d5K7j'] This is
exactly the point which is urged by
Socrates in the Gorgias of Plato (p.
473 A, 509 c), and seems to his
hearers a paradox. It is qualified
above by the admission that being
injured might be in its consequences
(KOTO o-wi/37j/c<Jy) a worse evil than
injuring ; just as a stumble might
cause a man's death, and so be acci-
dentally worse than a pleurisy. Is it
then worse to be ruined by the cheat-
ing of others, or to cheat some one
of a sixpence ? The writer above
acknowledges that moral science will
maintain the severity of its verdict,
and say cheating is the worse
ovStv jucAei rfj T^XT " T - ^-)-
XL] HGIKilN [EYAHMION] V. 143
xa} -fysxTtv, xa} xaxiag ^ T% TsX=/a xa} air'X&g r) s*
(ou yap airav TO lxouo~/ov fJ.=Ta dbixiat;}, TO
cv
TO
7r
po$9
avso xaxiag xai dbtxiac. xatf auTO p.\v out/ TO
r ; TTO!/ c^auXov, xara (TUjU/Ss/Svjxoj 6' ou^sv xroXusi
s7va< xaxov. aAX* oJosv jU-sXs* TYJ rs^vvj, aAXa Tr
Tvsyst fj.si^a) VOQ-OV 7rpo(nrTa.{<r[j.a.TO$' XCIITOI
TTOTS QaTspov xara trv[*,fie@rqxo$ t si Trpoo-TrraiVai/ra
crvpfiaiy UTTO TWV TroX^a/fov Xr^Srjvat xa)
fj,sTa.$Qpa.v Ss xa) O^OIOT^TOL S<TTIV oux
auTov oixatov aXXa TCOV at>Tou TKTIV, ot> TTCCV 8s
TO S=o-7roTixov r) TO olxovo[J.ixov ' sv TOVTOIS yap
= TO Xoyov e^ov p-spog Tr\$ \|/yp/^g ?rp
a orj |3XsToucr< xai ^ox=T sTva* aS/x/a
, OTI ev TOUTO/ eo"T; Trdtr^siv n Trapa. rag
$' mmrep ouv ap^ovTi xai ap^Ojaevtp ej'va< T
dixaiov TI xai TouTOig. Trsp] p.sv ouv 8jx
aAXfov Ttov rj$jxo)V desTtuv $ia)6i<rSa) TOV TOOTTQV
TOUTOV.
TO
xa 10
course being depraved in mind is
the worst of all evils. It is not
this (&St/cos eli/cu), but a single act
of wrong (rb aStKeu/), that will bear
comparison with the evil of being
injured.
9 KOTO fj.ercupopa.is 5e TOUTOIS]
' Now metaphorically and by analogy
one is capable of justice, not towards
one's own self, but towards certain
parts of oneself, not every kind of
justice, but despotic or household jus-
tice. For in the theories alluded to
there is a separation made between
the reasonable and unreasonable part
of man's nature. Eegarding this,
people consider that one can have
injustice towards oneself, because these
separate parts may be made to suffer
something contrary to one's proper
tendencies ; so then, like ruler and
ruled, they have a sort of justice with
each other.'
ev TOVTOIS ykp TOIS \6yois] It can
hardly be doubted that there is a re-
ference here to Plato, Bepub. p. 441
A, 443 D, 432 A, &c. However, the
reference may be second hand, having
been first made by Aristotle. To deny
the appropriateness of the term 'jus-
tice' to express a harmony between
the different parts of man's nature
is unlike the point of view taken Etk.
rx. c. iv., where the friendship which
the good man has with himself is
described at length. Eudemus, how-
ever, was much busied with problems
as to the unity of the will, and pro-
bably advanced to some extent the
Peripatetic psychology.
PLAN OF BOOK VI.
to the contents of this Sixth Book, we see at once that
it includes two subjects, and that the intermixture of these
two has given rise to some little confusion. The questions are
(1) What is the moral standard ? (2) What are the intellectual
uperai ?
Commencing with the former question, the writer goes off into
the latter. And thus Wisdom (<ppov?j<rie) is treated of at some
length as a perfection of the moral intellect, but is hardly touched
upon with regard to its operation as the moral standard.
After the two above-mentioned questions have been proposed,
without any statement of their connexion, the discussion of the
intellectual aperai commences by a division of the reason into
scientific and calculative. Ch. I.
Truth 'is the object of both, but truth is divided into practical
and speculative. The former enters into and becomes an element
in the decisions of the will. Ch. II.
Truth of whatever kind is attained by only five organs of the
mind Science, Art, Wisdom, Reason, and Philosophy. These
then are severally discussed; and Philosophy, after being treated
independently, has Wisdom brought in again in contrast to
itself. Ch. III. VII.
The relation of Wisdom to Economy and Politics is then
discussed. Ch. VIII.
Prudence (ev/3ouX/a), Apprehension (o-w^o-tc), and Considerateness
(yvw^iTj), as being component elements of Wisdom, are severally
treated of, and some remarks are added on the natural and
intuitive character of these practical qualities. Ch. IX. XI.
The book ends by the statement and solution of difficulties with
PLAN OF BOOK VI. 145
regard to Wisdom and Philosophy, their respective use, and their
relation to each other in point of superiority.
With regard to the use of Wisdom some important though
not very clear remarks are made on its inseparable connexion
with Virtue. Though inseparable, it is not, however, identical
with Virtue, as Socrates wrongly asserted. In relation to
Philosophy, Wisdom is the means, while Philosophy is the
end. Ch. XII. XIII.
The upshot of the book, then, is, that it treats of the intellectual
aperal. These are two not Jive, as some would say, reckoning as
such the five organs of truth, nor again an indefinite number, as
Aristotle would seem to say, admitting ' Apprehension,' &c. (Eth. I.
xiii. 20) ; but two essentially, Philosophy and Wisdom. These are
contrasted with each other, but in such a way that Wisdom,
though the least excellent, is brought into prominence, and is the
real theme of the book. With all the discrepancies of statement
which we have already alluded to (Vol. I. Essay I. p. 40),
Wisdom comes out in its general outlines as the perfection of the
practical reason combined with the will ; as inseparable, if dis-
tinguishable, from Virtue itself. The picture of this quality and
of its growth in the mind is made the occasion of many interesting
remarks ; but the question how the mind acts in determining the
mean, and what is the nature of the moral standard, is left still
unanswered.
VOh. II.
H0IK&N [ETAHMmN] VI.
'T^IIEI Ss Tuy^avojtxsi/ Trporepov
i J /AsVoi/ alpslcrQai xai ]U,>) TTJV
8s?
TO
TO
TOUTO
ev
xai TT
o TOV Ao'yov
ov
STTITSIVSI xai avir)<riv j xa
I. This chapter states, though some-
what indefinitely, the question which
is to be answered in the ensuing book.
Keferring back to a previous mention
of 'the mean,' it proposes now to
discuss ' the right law ' by which the
mean is determined. For only to
know that action must be 'in the
mean, and according to the right
law,' is a mere blank formula which
requires filling up (ctAij(?(s fitv, ovQlv 5e
ffcupts). What then is the right
law, and what is the standard of it
(rfs T' la-rlv & opBbs \6yos Kal TOVTOV
TI'S Spos) ? In answering this question,
the procedure must be to discuss the
most perfect developments of the
intellectual faculties, for by so doing
we shall learn the proper function of
each (\T)7rrf ov Up' tuaTtpovTovTiavrisij
jSeAT^cTTT) ?($'a0TTj -yelp aper); ina-rtpov,
t] 8' aptr-f) irpbs T& itpyov rb otKtiov). As
the inner nature of man was before
divided into two parts, the rational
and irrational, so we may now sub-
divide the rational part into two
elements, the scientific and the cal-
culative, in accordance with the two
classes of objects which are presented
to the mind, and which we may con-
clude are dealt with by separate
faculties, namely, the permanent,
which is dealt with by the scientific
element in us, and the contingent,
which is the object of calculation or
deliberation.
flpriK6rti\ The reference is to Eth.
Eud. ii. v. I : tvd 8' inc6Ktirai aptr^i
tlvai i) TOtWTT) ?{jj a<p' %s irpcucriKol
TWV frtKriffreiv >col Kaff %v Upttrra
SidKeivrai irepl rb fit\TiffTOi>, /SeATjerroc
Sf teal &pLff70f rb KOTO -rbv 6p6bv \oyov,
TOVTO 8* forl rb /xe'ow inrep&o\ris Kal
t \\etyf us rrfs wpbs rjfias K.T.\.
iv irdurais ykp Xffyoj/] ' For in all
the states of mind which we have
described, as also in all others, there
is a certain mark to which he who is
in possession of ' the law ' (6 -rbv
'\6yov fx ut ') looks, and tightens or
relaxes (the strings) accordingly, and
there is a certain standard of those
mean states which we say are between
CHAP. L]
[EYAHMION] VI.
147
evrv
XOLI
Xo'yov. <TT/ 8s TO ftsv siTrsTv
xa< yap sv TOO
7r*o~T>3/A>j, TOUT' ar; jtxj/
apsv evcti
xara TOV o^ov
\s jtxev, ouSev z
TOWTO s p.ovov
OTJ OUTS
ov rig
eiSsnj TrXsov, olov Trola 8=7 7Tpoo"4>p e o~$aJ Trpo^ TO o~cojaa,
/3ot/A?j
excess and deficiency, being in accor-
dance with the right law.' 'E-n-jretpf j
KO! avitiffiv is a metaphor from tuning
the strings of a lyre. Cf. Plato,
Lysis, p. 209 B : *coi eirejSav, o>s
lylffj.aa., T^V \vpav Ao/Sjjs, ou SiaKia-
\vovffi fff otfff 6 irar^ip ov(? i}
e-jrirtivai re Kal avtivat fyv b.v
ruv T(ofSS>v. Pktsdo, p. 98 c : /col ra
fj.ev offra fffrl ffrtpfd, Kal Sjo<|)iias ex fl
X^plj a*"* a.\\r)\cav, TO, 8e vevpa ola
tiriTfiviffdcu Kal avitcrQcu. This meta-
phor is not quite in accordance with
that other metaphor of 'looking to
the mark,' but in fact the term
ffKoir6s seems to have become so
regular a formula with Eudemus as
to have lost its metaphorical asso-
ciation. By Aristotle ffiunrtis was
used as a pure metaphor, the appli-
cation of which was borrowed from
Plato (cf. Eth. i. ii. 2, note). But in
the writing of Eudemus it seems used
as a scientific term equivalent to
re'Aos ; cf. Eth. End. n. x. 20 : errel
8e fiov\eveTcu atl 6 fiov\fv6n.fvos eVea
TIVOS, Koi ecr-rl <TKOir6s TIS oei T<
Pov\evopfv<p trpbs i>v aKotei ri> irvjj.-
<pepov, irepl /xti/ TOU re\ovs ovdels
f$ov\evfrai. Ib. n. xi. 1 : \tyo/j.fv tie
irpoa.TropJiffa.i'TfS, "Effn yap rbv (i*v
OKOirbv opObv flvat, & Se rols irpbs rbv
ffKoirbv SiafMprdvfW ^an 8e rbv (j.fv
r)fj.aprriff0at, Ta 8e irpbs eKetvov
In like manner the use of Zpos by
Eudumus is quite different from
anything that we find in Aristotle,
and is no doubt an innovation. Cf.
Eth. End. n. \. 8 (which is especially
referred to in the present passage),
ris 8' 6 opObs \6yos Kal irpbs T'IVO. Se?
Spov airo/3AeVorras \eyfiv rb \isaov,
vffrepov finffKfTrTfoi'. Ib. vin. iii. 12 :
Se? Tiva tlvai Spov KO\ rfis e|es Kal
trjs alpefffws Kal vepl (pvyrjs xP 7 lf jLarfav
ir\-f]dovs Kal b\iy6rrfros Kal TWIT
evrvxrinaTuv. Ib. vm. iii. 1 5 (quoted
VoL I. p. 23).
2 tffn Sf (race's] 'Now to say
this is to say what is true enough,
but not explicit. 1 This same expres-
sion, with the same illustration of the
medical art, is repeated th. Eud.
vm. iii.' 13: tv ^ev rols irp6repov
^Xe'x^i? rb us & \6yos' rovro 5' tarlv
wffirep &v ef TJS ei> rois irepl r)jv rpo<p^v
elireiev &>s f] larptif^ Kal 6 \6yos TOUTTJI.
rovro 8' a\t}6es jj.ev, ou erodes 8.
Cf. Ib. I. vi. 2 : K yap rtav oATjfl&Js fj.ev
\eyofjLfvav ov ffcu^coy 8e irpotouerjv effrai
Kal rb <ra<f>us. Throughout the Etide-
mian Ethics one can trace an inclina-
tion to make small corrections and
improvements upon Aristotle. Cf.
the notes on Eth. in. viii. 6 and
\. vii. 7. In the present place there
is an apparent protest against the
indefiniteness and relativity of Ari-
stotle's moral theory of ' the mean '
and 'the law.' Eudemus does not
seem (according to the statement here)
content to give greater explicitness to
the idea of the ' law ' by the develop-
u 2
148
ei rig s
3 sp^tov.
II0IK&N [EYAHMION] VI.
[CUAP.
on oa~a 13 larpixr) x=Asu?j xai wg o ra^rr/v
8eT xa/ Trspl rat; Tr\$ \f/upyJ ss' jar) jao'vov
a xa) Oi(opi(rp.svov ri$ r
TOUT
xai
apsrag
rag
u
5 TrptoTov SiTrovTsc,
ovv rcv
, Trsp; Se Ttov XOJTTCOI', Trspi
OVTW<;. TTporspov fj.\v ouv
/ .' " \\
TO TS Aoyov %ov xai TO
e 7Tsp TOU Xoyov s^ovrog TOV avrov TpoTrov
xai uTroxsiVQtt) 8uo Ta Xo'yov sp^ovTa, sv /xsv w
Ta TOfauYa Ttov ovrcav otrcov at ap%a] fir) ev$e%ovTai
y
t> ei
ment of the idea of the wise man
who is its impersonation. But he asks
(separating ffnoir6s and 8pos from
the \6yos) 'What is the mark to
which one possessing the law must
look ? ' What is the standard of the
law ? In reality these questions get no
answer. They only cloud the subject
Ly introducing a confusion of formulae.
4 rcLs fifv flvai TOV tfQovs l^ayuev]
Cf. Eth. Eud. n. i. 18 : aprrijs 8'
tltiri Svo, i} p.fv T)0i/o; i\ 5 Sjaj/OTjTtK^
ftraivovft.fi' yap ov fi6i>ov TOVS SiKaiovs,
a.\\a KO\ rovs ffwtroits Kal TOVS
ffo<f>ovs.
5 irpoTfpov fjLfv ovv f\^0i) 5u'
Ti/a] Cf. Eth. Eud. n. i. 15 : 6rel 5'
Svo ntpri *j/ux^ y T " hdy
ov T~bv avrbf Se Tp6itov ft.
afj.<t>w, a/VAo rb /J.fv T<jj tiriTaTTfiv rb
Se T(J> irfiOeirOat Kal aKOvfiv iretyvKtvat
(I Se TI i<TT\v irfptas &\oyov, afyttcrBw
TOVTO T}> /j.6piov. It will be seen that
in the passage quoted Eudemus did
not exactly divide man's nature into
two parts, 'rational and irrational,'
but said that these are ' two parts par-
taking of reason' in different ways.
Thus he gave a compressed summaryof
the results of Aristotle's discussion In
Eth. i. ch. xiii. But here he speaks as
if he had repeated verbatim the popular
division into rational and irrational
which was provisionally accepted by
Aristotle. Thus, by a slip of the
memory, he confuses his own state-
ment with Aristotle's.
Kal inroitfiffQcii ouroTs] ' And let
us suppose that the parts possessing
reason are two, one by which we
apprehend such existences as depend
on necessary principles, and one by
which we apprehend contingent
matter, for to objects differing in
genus there must be different mem-
bers of the mind severally adapted,
if it be true that these members
obtain their knowledge by reason o.f a
certain resemblance to and affinity
with the object of knowledge.' We
have here a division of the mind in
accordance with a division of the ob-
jects of which the mind is cognizant.
And as a justification of this we have
the assumption that knowledge implies
a resemblance and affinity between
object and subject. With regard to
this, Aristotle (De Animd, i. ii. 10)
says that ' those philosophers who
wished to account for knowledge and
perception identified the ^>vx"fi with
I.]
H9IKON [EYAHMION] VI.
149
*<\\r\tN/ \ \ \ ~ /
SVrJI/, SV OS tO Ta sVOrVCt^XSVa * 7T50 "&? TOL TtO "VSVSl
STSza. xai Ttov rr\s \J/up/r]f fj.opitov ST=pov TO> ysvsi TO 7rpo
sxaTspov TrsctwxoV, <7rsp xa6' o/AOfoVijTa Ttva xa* olxs/o'-
TvjTa rj yyuxng wTrap^si a-JTO?^ . Xsys<r5a> 0s TOUTOJV TO 6
xa) Aoy/so-$ai Ta-jTov, oy^si^ Os jSouXsusTai Trsp} Ttov jW,^
the principles of things, because like
is known by like.' "Oo-ot 8* eni TO
yiv<affxeiv Kal rb alffOdvea&ai T<av ointav
(airo\firou(ni''), OUTOI 8e \eyovffi T^V
fyvxyv TOJ opx^s, of juev irAeious TTOIOVV-
Tes. of Se ui'af Tavrnv. &inrep 'Euire-
tiva.i Se
iri /j.v yap yaiav OTrwjrajuev, vSart 8'
CSaip,
aldept 8' alBepa. fnav, drop irupl irpp
otSrjAoi',
ffTopyfj 8e aropyi]v, vtiitos Se re veiitel
\vyptp.
rbv avrbv Se rp6irov Kal Tl\d.TU>v
Trotf'i- yit><affKecr9ai yap Ttf ouoiy TO
n/j.oioi', ra Se irptiyfiara fK rial' apx^v
flvai. Sir W. Hamilton says (Dis-
cussions on Philosophy, p. 60) : ' Some
philosophers (as Anaxagoras, Hera-
clitus, Alcmseon) maintained that
knowledge implied even a contrariety
of subject and object. But since the
time of Empedocles, no opinion has
been more universally admitted than
that the relation of knowledge inferred
the analogy of existence. This analogy
may be supposed in two potences.
What knows and what is known are
either, first, similar, or second, the
same; and if the general principle
be true, the latter is the more philo-
sophical.' The fact is, that every act
of knowledge is a unity of contra-
dictions. It would be absurd to deny
that the subject is contrary to the
object, and it would be equally
absurd to deny that the subject is the
same as the object. As Empedocles
says, the mind only knows fire by
being fire, but, on the other hand, if,
in knowing fire, the mind only were
fire, and were not contrary to fire,
then to know fire would only be to
add fire to fire. But it is qua ' know-
ing ' that the mind is contrary to its
object, not qua knowing any par-
ticular object. Thus from the diver-
sity of objects we are justified in con-
cluding a diversity in the mind. But
we must be sure that objects are
really different from one another in
genus (rep yevei erepa), before we coi}-
clude the existence of different parts,
faculties, or elements corresponding to
them, else we may attribute to diffe-
rent principles in the mind phenomena
that were only modifications of each
other, and not by any means implying
a diversity of principle.
6 \eyetr8ta Se x oin " oy ] ' Of these
let one be called the ' scientific,' the
other the ' calculative ' part, for deli-
berating and calculating are the same,
and no one deliberates about neces-
sary matter. The calculative part,
then, is one division of the rational.'
The psychology here is an advance in
dogmatic clearness of statement be-
yond what we find in the writings of
Aristotle. The terms TO tiriffrrinwi-
KoV and TO \oyiaTu<6v are not opposed
to each other in the De Anima. Aoyi-
<TTJKoV has not there taken the definite
meaning which it wears in the present
book. Bather it is used in a general
150
[EYAHMIQN] VI.
[CHAP.
T >] /3sAT/<rr>] ?* * aorj
apery 7rpo ro spyov TO oJxsTov.
TWa 8' 6<rT<j> ev TV) %}/w^
ev n
TQUTIUV
sxarepov, >j 8'
Ta xvia
sense to denote 'rational.' Thus in
asking how the tyvxh is to be divided,
Aristotle says (Dc An. m. ix. a) : *x
5' awopiav ev9i>s irws re Set ;u<5pia Ae-yeip
TTJS <J>ux*) $ Ka ^ lr <5< ra ' TpoVoi/ 7<p viva.
Sireipa 4>afy6ra< t Kal oil fj,6vov 8. rives
Xeyovffi 5ioploi>rfS, \ojiffrtKbv Kal
Ov/MKbv teal firiOvfj.r]TiK6v (i.e. Plato, Re-
pub, pp. 436 441), 04 5e Tb \6yov x o "
K<d rb &\oyov. Cf. Ib. in. ix. 5 : iv
Ttf \oyiffrtKf yap i) fiovKyffis yivfrcu.
Ib. III. x. TO : (pavraffia 8 itaffa i)
Aoyto-TJKi) TJ euV0j/Td}. Cf. Topics,
v. v. 4, where in stating the various
ways in which the logical property
may be predicated of a substance, it is
said, ^ oirAws Kcc0a7rep fjjow TO (fiir, %
KO.T' &\\o, icaBdiTfp \J'ux^ s T0 <?>f<5' / tMO>' )
v) oij TO irpwroj', KaBditfp \oyiffriKOu TO
<pp6vi[nov (<pp6vtfiov and XoyiffriKov
being here both used most probably
in a general sense for ' wisdom ' and
' reason ' ). Again, TO ino'T)fu>i'iKdV is
used, not as here opposed to TO XOYJOT.,
but generally. De Anim. in. xi. 3 :
TO S' ^7Tio-Tj/xo'JKbv ou Kti/e?Toi oA\i
/^fVet. However, the distinction here
given is already prepared in the De
Animd, and is even stated (though
less dogmatically) in a place which
was probably borrowed by the present
writer. Ib. in. x. z : vovs 8 6 eVe/ci
TOU \oyi6iJifvos Kal & irpaKTiKdV 810-
<f>fpfi 8e TOW 6fti>pi)TiKov rtf re\(i.
ovBels 5i &ov\tfarai, K. T. A.] Cf.
Eth. Eud. n. x. 9 : wep! S< ouSets
tut oiiS' lyxfipiiafit fiov\eveaOcu /u^
n'yi'owj'. ITtpl wr 5' ^j/S x*TOt /tjy fj.6vov
TO fU'ai KO! fir?, &\Aa KO! Tb $uv\ev-
Oui Toit avOpdnroit. We before
observed (cf. JStfA. in. iii. 3, note)
that Aristotle, in the parallel passage,
did not use the terms T& ^vSex^^ffa
and TO M 1 ) eV8fx<^M ' /0 - To combine
logical with psychological formula is
the characteristic of Eudemus.
IL The last chapter having
divided the reason into scientific and
calculative, the present chapter pro-
ceeds to bridge over the interval
between the intellect and moral
action. This is done by assuming
three principles in man sensation,
reason, and desire. Sensation merges
into the other two, and then it is
shown that in purpose, the cause of
action, there is the meeting point of
desire and reason, not of the pure or
speculative reason (answering to the
' scientific part ' of the last chapter),
but the practical reason aiming at an
end (which answers to the 'calcu-
lative part' in the former division).
Thus there are two kinds of truth,
one pure, the other having a relation
to the will, and ' agreeing with right
desire.' This distinction is a great
step towards answering the question
with which the present book is con-
cerned. Truth having been divided
into pure and practical, it only re-
mains to see the forms under which
the mind deals with these two kinds,
and the highest developments of the
mind will be disclosed, arranged
under a twofold head.
i T/JI'O 8' forty] Cf. Ar. De Animd,
in. X. I : <pcuve-rai 8 ye Svo ravra
Kivovvra, 9) opt<? ^ vovs, tt Tts r^v
I. II.]
HGIKftN [EYAHMIQN] VI.
151
> TOVTCDV 73
= ra> ra
, 7rpa.%:(*) 3= JMTJ xoiya>v=iV. iVri 3' oVep ev Oiavola.
, TOUT' ev ops^si fiiw^is xou
xa*
ops^ig /3ooA=uTJX7], 8s7 8<a raDra TO'V rs Xoyov aXTj^TJ
xou rryv ops^iv opbyv, eirrep rj irpocuotirt$ (TTrouoa/a, xai ra
rov ju.si/ 4^^ va ' T7 3 1 ' ^ biwxsiv. GLUTY) [j.lv ovv 13
xai vj oChrftna. TrpaxTixrj. rr^ 8s
,7jS= 7roir ; T/X7]^ TO
' TOUTO -y
xou s^yov, TOU os 7rpaxT<xoO xa) iavor^rjxou 73
S^OIKTOC. Tji ops^si T-T, op$y. TTpd^sajg fj.lv
73'
nOeitj us v6ijcjivTiva. ' ....
&fj.(pca &pa TCLVTO. KivririKa Kara, T&KOV,
vovs Kal ope|is. Nous Se 6 eVe/ca TOW
\o7t^(5^i'os /cal 6 irpa/rrtKoV Siatpepei
Se TOU decapT)TiKov T<f Te\fi. .... Kal
^ <t>avraffta Se orav xtvfj ov Kivfi &vev
operas. It is highly probable that
Eudenms had this passage before his
eyes. The only alteration he has
made is to substitute al<r6i)<ris for
Qairaffia, and to speak of the deter-
minators of truth and action as three,
with one merged in the other two, in-
stead of calling them two with a third
implied. TOVTWV 8' i] c&ffQi\<ns K. r. \.
answers to KO! ij <pa.vra.ffia. K.r,\.
1 57)Aof 8e ry ra, 9i)pia irpd^ecos
ju)j Koiv<avflv~\ The definite meaning of
irparreiv and irpa^is to denote ' moral
action ' appears perhaps rather more
strongly in Eudenms than in Aristotle.
Cf. Eth. Eud. n. vi. 2 : irpbs 8e rovrois
S y &vOp<oTros KO.I vpd^fwv rivwv tarty
apX^I \t-f>vov ruiv fyfuiv ' rfav yap &\\oiv
ovOev ftiroifjifv &^ irpdrreiv. Ib. n. viii.
6 : ov yap (papey rb iraiSiov irpdrrtiv,
oiiSe TO drjpiov, oAA 1 '6rav ^5?j 5ia A.O-
yiff/j.bv irp&rrovra,.
oVep V Stavolcf. K.T.A.] All this is a
compressed result of Aristotle's dis-
cussions, De Animd, in. x. xi.
eVetS^ TJ r,diK.r, aptrf,] Cf. Eth. Eud.
II. x. 28 : avdyKrj rolvuv TV aperi)t>
elvai TV riOiKTiv tiv irpoaiperiKTii'
(j.fff6rrfTOS rrjs irpbs rffJLM eV ^SeVt Kal
\inrripdis.
TJ 5t irpoaipfffis] Cf. Eth. Eud. n.
x. 14 : SijAoj/ STI TI vpoaipeffis fj.ei> effriv
opeis rSiv t<p' avry /3ov\evriicb.
ToV Te \6yoi> a\7)6TJ elvai Kal rr\v
opfiv bpQriv] ' The decision of the
reason must be true, and the desire-
must be right.' The terminology
here used is rather more accurate
than that of Aristotle, De An. in. x.
4 : vovs fjiev olv iras bpf)6s upeis 5e Kal
(pavraaia Kal bpQri Kal OVK bpQi). Cf.
Eth. in. ii. 13, where it is said that
bp66s is the proper epithet for purpose
(i.e. as a function of the will),
for the functions of the intellect.
4 5 irpdf<us fj.fi/ ovv oV
' Now of moral action purpose is thn
cause (I mean the efficient cause, not
the final), and the efficient cause of
purpose is desire, and that reason
152
I161KUN [ETAHMION] VI.
[CHAP.
xa "hoyog o evexa
vov xa< Oiotvoiag OUT' oivsv rJSjxSjj,' ecrrlv escog r vpooupurtg*
suTrpOL^ia. 'yap KOU TO IvavTiov sv 7Tpd~i O.VEV Otavoias xaj
5 7]$ou oyx SCTTIV. S/avo/a 8' auryj oufiev xjvs?, aXX* TJ svsxa
rot*
ei/sxa yap TOU TTOIS? ?ra 6 TTOIIOV, xa* ou TS?\.O$ a
Ti Xa< TIVO$ TO TTOlTjTOV. OtXXa TO TTpOLXTOV ' 7J
TeAo, T] o' opei$ TOVTOV 8/0 ^ opxr<xoj
rj 7rpoaip(ri$ 75 opsfys $ia.vor)Tixy, xa) 15 ro/aur^
f t/ fi > It <\\ \ J/1V If
o a.v>jpu)7ro$. oux SFTI Os irpoaipeTov ovvsv ysyovog, oiov
which takes cognisance of an end.
Hence purpose can neither be sepa-
rated from intellect and thought, nor
from a particular state of the moral
nature. Well-doing and its contrary
imply thought and moral character.
Now thought by itself moves nothing,
only thought aiming at an end, that
is, practical thought. This controls
the productive thought as well, since
he that produces, produces for the sake
of some end, and the thing produced is
not an end in and for itself, but is only
an end relatively and belongs to some-
thing. But the thing done is an End-
in-itself, since well-doing is an end,
and this is what we desire. Hence
purpose may be defined as desiring
reason, or as rational desire, and such
it principle as this is man.' We have
here a resume of Aristotle's views in
De Animfi., I. c. Another division of
the intellect, however, is introduced,
that into practical, productive, and
speculative, which is to be found im-
plied in Eth. i. i. i, and is stated Me-
taphys. v. i. 5 : &ffre t iracra Stdvoia fy
TrpaKTJ/o) i) 7roiT)TJK)v >) 6(d>pr)riKri K.T.\.
It is here shown that the productive
faculties of man are subordinate to
the practical thought, since no artist
produces anything purely and solely
for its own sake; however much he
may seem to do so, still his art as a
part of his life falls under the control
of his will and reason.
Stdvoia 8' avrr) ovdtv Kivfi, aAA' rj
evftcd TOW] There is a slight confusion
here. Aristotle had said (De An. in.
ix. 10, in. x. 2, ra. x. 4), that the
reason dealing with ends differed from
the speculative reason, that reason
neither speculative nor practical was
the moving cause of action (m. ix. 10 :
a\Act ju.^c oiiSe -rb Xaywrucbv *col 6 a-
\ov/jLffos vovs ffT\v 6 KIVUV 6 fj.fi> yap
OewpTjTiKbs ovOtv voti npaKr6v ouS*
orav Ottapy n TOIWTOV K. T. A..), and
that intellect could not move any-
thing without desire conjoined (ra. x.
4 : vSv 8e 6 fj.tv vovs ol Qaivtrai KIVUV
&vtv op'eo>s), but Eudemus mixes up
these points. He said that ' thought
by itself moves nothing,' and then as
if in opposition to thought by itself
he puts ' but practical thought does.'
He should have said ' practical thought
plus desire.'
/col irpaKTtK-ri] Kol is used here
denoting identity. Cf. Eth. v. vi. 4 :
ri> oirXwy S'iKatov Kal rb iroKiTtKbv
UKO.IOV. AT. De An. ni. x. 2 : vovs Se o
tvfKd TOV \oyi6/j.fvus Kal o irpaKTiitos.
iurpafa] On the ambiguity of this
term, cf. Eth. i. iv. 2, note.
6 OUK tff-ri Se TTpoaiptrbv ovQtv
ytyov6s] ' Now nothing that is past is
ever the object of purpose.' This
iL in.]
[EYAHMIQN] VI.
153
TrpoaipsiTai
TTSp} TOV
oy, TO ol
oios yap
ro
JU.TJ -
xai
fjiovov yap avrov (cat 0toe orcptcnccrac,
ayivT}Ta. Troitiv aaa av i] TrtTrpay^eVa.
a.uL<$>r>Tpa)v &T) r&v vor^ixtbv popicov ahrfisia TO epyov.
xaQ' a$ o5v ^uxXjora s=J d?\rfiz'j<rsi exaTsov aural
<TTO) 6rj olj aXr^fjsi ij ^^^ To> xara^avai 15 a
7Tt/T= TOV
TOCUTa
assertion, with the quotation from
Agathon to illustrate it, appears cer-
tainly to be a digression. The nature
of purpose had been quite sufficiently
explained already, especially in refe-
rence to the present context. How-
ever, to exclude the past, and circum-
stances which though contingent-
have become historical, from the
sphere of deliberation, is an addition
to Aristotle's list of exclusions (Eth.
in. iii. i 10), and on this account
probably Eudemns was glad to intro-
duce the above remarks.
III. This chapter proposes to con-
sider the two parts of the reason
(scientific and calculative) from a
fresh point of view (fy>|ci^ei>oj iroXiv).
It accordingly gives a list of five
modes under which the mind attains
truth ; namely, art, science, wisdom,
philosophy, and reason. It then pro-
ceeds to give some account of science.
This account will be found to be a
mere cento of remarks from the logical
writings of Aristotle. The chief
points specified are as follows.
Science deals only with necessary
matter. It is demonstrative, starting
from truths already known, and pro-
VOL. II.
ceeding by means of induction or
syllogism. Its premises are obtained
by induction, but they must be more
certain than the conclusion, else the
knowledge of the conclusion will be
not scientific, but merely accidental.
i irfvre rbv ipifyuiv] It seems in
the highest degree probable that this
list was suggested by a passage in Ari-
stotle's Post. Analytics (i. xxxiii. 8),
where, after a discussion on the diffe-
rence between science and opinion, it
is said : ra Se Xonrci irws 5e? Siavft/jLai
4irl re Siaroi'as /cal vov Kcd iriffTr]fj.rjs
KcH T'x^?y *al <f>povri<re<i>s Kal ffo<pias,
rck /j.v (pvffiKTfs TO Se riQucrjs Bfwptas
/uaAAoi/ tffrlv. It will be observed
that Aristotle in this passage does not
propose six terms to be distinguished
from each other, but three pairs of
terms which are to be separately dis-
cussed, part of them (i.e. probably
the two first pairs) by psychology
(<t>v<riKris 6fiapias), and part of them
(i.e. ffoipia and <f>p(Jioj<rjj) by ethics.
Eudemus, taking up the whole list,
has omitted Sidvoia, which he does
not distinguish from vows, and has
given the rest as an exhaustive
division of the modes by which the
mind apprehends trath. By BO doing
154
II9IKS1N [EYAIIMIflN] VI.
[CHAP.
<roc>/a vouj* u
fj.v
s
yap
xa
xa
ya.p
OTOC.V
TOU swpsv
apa eVri TO
< s S<TTIV
apa* ra yap
ovra a.7r?uZ> rravrtx. at&ia., TO. 8' a/oia, a
I xou oc<
xai ro
he has made a cross division, for
ao<t>ia does not stand apart from vovs
and l-ruTT-finn, but includes them, and
surely so complex an idea as 'philo-
sophy ' ought not to be placed on the
same level with the intuitions of the
reason, the simplest and deepest
forms of the mind. In ch. vi. 2,
however, the logical exhaustiveness of
the division is made the only ground
for proving that the principles of
science are apprehended by reason.
conception and opinion may be false.'
This is suggested probably by Ar.
Post. Anal. n. xix. 7 : 'Eirel 5i ru>v
TTfpl T^IV Sidvotav eeuv, ats a\ijOtvo/j.ei>,
al fitv del d\Tj9eTs flffiv, al 5e eViSf'xoj/-
Tot rb iJ/eDSos, oTov 8d{a KO! fi.oyifffi.6s,
aATjflij 5' del Vi<TT7i/j Kal vovs, K. r. \.
In Ar. Zte. An. m. iii. 7, inr6\^ts
is used in so general a sense for the
apprehensions of the mind as to in-
clude eVjdT^Tj, 8<f|a, and <pp6vr]tns.
If opposed (as here) to scientific cer-
tainty, it comes to very much the
same as 5d|a.
'Now
ex
Os 7ra
7ra<ra
what science is, will be clear from the
following considerations, if we wish
to speak exactly and not be misled by
resemblances. We all conceive that
what we know is necessarily what it
is if it be so only contingently, as
soon as it is out of our ken, we can-
not tell whether it be so or not.
Therefore the object of science is
necessary matter.'
rats b^oil>rt]aiv\ i.e., the various
analogical and inaccurate uses of the
word 'knowledge.' 'EITJCTT^TJ is to
be defined ourXwy and not Kaff
6/j.ot6r7]ra, cf. Eth. \. \\. 4. The
present passage is taken from Post.
Anal. i. ii. i : 'EnlffraffBai Se olo/j.fd'
fKaffrov oirXeDs 8roi/ ii\v r' atriai?
oldcufOa yivdiffKtiv Si' fa ri>
ZTI ^Kfivov alrla fart, Kal
Oai Tovr 1 a\\tas txftv. u
ov air\<as tffrlv
rovr' a5wa-
fw ruv 6fwptiv~\ ' Out of the reach
of our observation.' Qeup. here re-
tains more of its original sense of
' seeing ' than generally ; cf. e.g. ch. i.
5 : fv /j.tv y 6fiapovfA.tv TO rotavra
K.T.\. Eth. i. vii. 21. In the follow-
ing chapter, 4, Otwptiv is used for
to ' consider,' or ' speculate,' though
not in the special sense of philoso-
phical speculation.
T& S' dfSia K. T. X.] For a specimen
of 'things eternal' cf. Eth. in. iii. 3,
and see note.
3 TI 58u/rH) ffv\\oyi(rfjLy~\ 'Again
all science appears capable of being
imparted by demonstration, and the
matter of science appears capable of
in.]
neimN [EYAHMHIN] vi.
155
xoii sv rou; avaT^unxoiig
sv ' 13
73
73 jU.V Svj
rav
apa. a.p%ot e wv o
'S(TTI <ruX?voyjOY*,o * eTTCfj-Yoyvj apa. v] juev apa
arrows ixTix-fj, xcci oVa aXAa 7rpor8iopojU,s9a sj
orav yap
being so apprehended. But all de-
monstration depends on pre-existent
knowledge (as we say in analytics
also), for it proceeds either by induc-
tion or syllogism.'
ucrirep A.e'yoyuei>] This is a general
mode of expression, not a particular
reference ; some MSS. however read
e\fyofj.ev. Eudemus, as we know,
wrote a book on analytics (cf. Vol. I.,
Essay I. p. 21). In his Ethics, n. vi.
5, he speaks, as here, generally of
analytics, 5rj\ov 5' & 7n;(eipoO/iej' %TI
avayKawv, e'/c T&V a.va\vriK<av. In the
present passage he is borrowing, not
quoting, from the opening of Ari-
stotle's Post. Anal. Tlacra SiSatr/caAia
/col iracra /j.d9r)ffis SiavorjriK^] e'/c Trpoi)-
?rap^ou(rr)S yivcrai yvcaaews. It is the
first proof of knowing a thing, to be
able to impart it, cf. Metaphys. i. i.
12: SAws Te crrt/j.etoi> TOV flS6ros rb
Svvcurdai SiSdffKfiv fffriv. Hence, by
association with the idea of science,
SiSacr/faAi'a comes to be almost iden-
tical with demonstration, cf. Sophist.
Elench. ii. i : "EoTt 5)j TU>V v Ty
Sia\fjfa6ai \6ytev reTTapa 7eVrj, 8j5a-
(TKa\tKol teal 5ia\enTiKO\ Kai ntipaffriKol
Kal fpiiTTiKui, SiSaffxahiKol /j.ei> ol K
TUV oiK.fliai' upxwv eKa-rrov fj.aQ'fifj.aros
Kal OVK tic rav TOV a.iroKpu>oii.ivou So|c!?c
ffvK\oyi6iJ.ei>oi, Sfl yap Triffreveivrbv
pavBdvovTa. Cf. ib. x. u.
r] fJLev yap 81" eitaywyrjs K. r. A.] This
is taken from Post, Anal. i. i. z :
where Aristotle, having said that all
demonstration depends on previous
x
knowledge, adds that this is true with
regard to the mathematics, and also
in dialectical arguments, dpoitas Se
Kal trepl rovs \6yovs o't re Sia <rv\\o-
ytfffj.S>v Kal ol 5i' firaycayris' a/J.<j)6Tepoi
yap Sia irpoyiyvaa'KO^.tvoiv irotovvrai
T^V StSaffKaAiav, of fj.lv Aa/xjSdi'Oj'Tes
&s irapa ^vvtevrouv, ol Se Seucvvvres rb
Kad6\ov Sia. TOV SijAoj/ eivcu "rb KO0'
eicacnov. AVhat Aristotle had said
of dialectical arguments, Eudemus
applies to science, which he accord-
ingly asserts to be sometimes induc-
tive. His further assertion that the
principles of deductive science are
obtained by induction is inconsistent
with the conclusion of ch. vi., though
it agrees with Ar. Post. Anal. n. xix.
6. In fact firaycayTi seems to be used
by Aristotle in the Post. Anal, as
equivalent to that amount of expe-
rience which is the condition, not the
cause, of necessary truths. Cf. ib. i.
i. 4.
4 T) juei/ ava\vTiicots~] ' Science,
then, is a demonstrative state of mind,
with all the other qualifications which
we add in analytics.' Cf. Ar. Post.
Anal. i. ii. z : 'AvdyKt] Kal rfyv airoSei-
KTIK))V eiriffTi]^.T/]v e'| a\7]6oi>v T' elvai
Kal irpdnwv Kal a^ecruiv Kal yvcapi-
/juiiTepwv Kal irpoTepiav Kal alrlwv TOV
ffvfj.Trepdo-fj.aTos. Aristotle, in his
account of science, represents it from
its objective side as a deduction of
ideas rather than as a state of mind,
ftrav yap n<rTTj i ujj['] ' For a man
knows when he is convinced, and is
156
H9IK&N [EYAHMmN] VI.
r /v * ' / r
\ s\ ^ \
xaTa erujaf
[CHAP
p [J.v ovv
Too 3' i/8
TGV rpoTrov TOUTOJ/.
v SO~T T< xai
STSpQV
XCU
7rO7J<7/ X
xcu
7nO~TtJOjU.SV s
TrpaxTiXTj srspov earn r^g [JLSTO.
r/xrjf s^scog. 8/0 OU^E Trspts^ovrai vir aXXr^Xcov OIT yap
3 >) 7rpa,i~i iroiri<ng oyrs TJ Tro/ijtr/^ Trpafyg s<rriv. efts} 8' 13
xai
7TO/7]TiX>3, X<
OUTS
(TTV, OUTS TOiOtUTTJ
,' OU jOtSTOt
OU T^V1J, TOtUTOV !/
sure of the premises ; since if he is
not more sure of them than of the
conclusion, the knowledge which he
has will be only accidental' Taken
from Pos. Anal. I. ii. I : 'ETrfoTcwrOai
Se ol6fj.(ff eKaffrov an-Aws, aAAo ^ rbv
ffo^nffriKbv rp6itov Kara ffv^tjSejSTjwdj,
K. T. \. To know results without the
proofs Aristotle called 'accidental'
knowledge, and this mode of know-
ledge he attributed to the Sophists;
cf. Metaphys. \. ii., &c.
iriff-rfvri~\ Cf. Sophist. Elench. ii. i
(I.e.) : Sf"iyapirtffr(v(tv rbv fnavftdvovra.
Infra, ch. viii. 6 : TCI fiej/ ou irjoTeiW--
ffiv ol ffot, a\\a \iyovffiv.
IV. Eudemus altered the list of
mental operations given by Aristotle
(Post. Anal. I.e.) only by the position
of vovj, which in first stating his list
Eudemus places at the end, probably
because, having separated it from
Sidvoia, he was uncertain about its
admission ; afterwards he discusses it
before ffofyia., as being prior to it in
order of time. The list then appears
in Aristotle, tiidvoia i/oSj, ^irwr-Hj/xT;
T/ X J/r '> <>P<^l<ns ffoty'ia; in Eudemus,
i-niff-rit^n, TfX^li <f>p6rn<ris, ffo<pla,
foCs (afterwards vovs, ffo<f>la). This
chapter, in treating of art, gives but
a scanty account, apparently bor-
rowed from different passages in the
Metaphysics of Aristotle. Art, like
action, belongs to the sphere of the
contingent, but its difference from
action is universally recognised
(viaTfvofMfv Kal TOIS ^. \6y.). As
shown by an instance, it consists in ' a
productive state of mind in harmony
with a true law.' It has to do with
producing and contriving the produc-
tion of things that fall neither under the
law of nature nor necessity. Eather
art deals with the same objects as
chance, by which it is often assisted.
I 2 TOU 8' ^vSe^oyiteVoK A^yois]
' Now contingent matter includes the
objects both of production and action,
but production and action are diffe-
rent. On this point even popular
notions sufficiently bear us out."
With regard to f^careptKol \6yoi, cf.
Eth. i. xiii. 9, and see VoL I. Essays,
Appendix B, pp. 328-33*.
3 iirfl 8' iroiijTi/rij] 'But since
architecture is an art, and may be
denned as (8*tp) a certain state of
mind rationally (nrra \6yov) pro-
ductive, and there is no art which is
not a rationally productive state of
III. IV.]
II9IKQN [EYAHMIQN] VI.
157
rs%vr} xa
7ra<ra
ptra Ao'you aXr^ou^ Troivj-nxT]. eo-n 8= 4-
7V=<rti/, xa) TO Te%vd%5iv, xat Qswps'iv
OTTO) aj/ ysvyrai n rcov ev%e%o[JLva)V xal eivai xai
xaj (ov *j ap^r) EV ra> TTOIOVVTI aXXa |U,rj Iv ra>
OUTS -yap rcov 1 avayxTj^ oWa>v 75 ywofisvcov 13 T%vy strriv,
otirs TIOI/ xara $u<r*v sv aurdig yap cyotMTJ raDra TTJV
JTTS; 8e 7ro/i)<r^ xa) Trpd^ig srspov, avayxrj
sivai. xdi Tpovov TIVOL 5
mind, nor again any such state which
is not an art : art must be the same
as " productive state of mind rightly
directed." ' The procedure here is to
take a species of art, and, abstracting
what is peculiar, to leave the generic
conception remaining, which thus is
taken as the definition of the genus.
efjrep] A logical formula implying
identity, convertibility of terms, cf.
Eth. VTI. xiii. i : ov yap Ui> <pairi 'dirtp
Ka.6v TI ftvai r^jv ^Soi^jj'.
ofrre roiaim) $j ov Tfx vr i\ This is a
slight discrepancy from Aristotle,
who speaks of three modes of produc-
tion, art, faculty, and thought, with-
out, however, specifying the difference
between them, Metaphys. vi. vii. 3 .
iraffai 8' ela\v al irot^fffis rj airb Ti\vi\s
i) atrb 5vi>d/j.ews -fj airb Stavoias. Ib.
X. vii. 3 : 7rojijTiijs fj.\v yap ev rtf
TTOIOUVTI Kal OV Ttf TTOWVfJL^Vlf T^S Klffj-
ffews fi o.px~n, Kal TOUT' lffT\v fire
TfXint TIS eifr* &\\rj TIS 5vva/i.is.
4 ttrrl Se irotovfj.evqi] ' Now all
art is about creation, and the con-
triving and considering how some-
thing may be created of those things
whose existence is contingent, and
whose efficient cause exists in the
producer and not in the thing pro-
duced.' There is not any distinction
intended between Te-xya&iv and
Gfiaffiv. The absence of the article
before Oewpeiv shows that these
belong to the same idea ; they are
both only an expansion of the term
yeveffiv, and are not to be separated
from it, as if the writer was describing
different stages in the process of
art. We find re-xi'd^fiv used by Ari-
stotle simply in the sense of 'con-
triving,' Pol. i. xi. 12 : ctju^oVepof yap
eavTots frf'xyaffav yfVfffOai fj.ovoirui\lav
Ib. vi. v. 8 : r^xvaffTiov o$v OTTOS tu>
eviropia yefotro xpoVios.
3>v rj apx^i /C.T.\.] Taken from Ari-
stotle, Metaphys. x. vii. 3 (I.e.). Cf.
V. i. 5 : ruv fjiev iroir)7iK<ev eV TJ?
iroiovvTt i] apxh % vovs fj Tfx v ~n % Swapis
TIS, T&V Se irpattTiKaiv Iv T$ irpoTTOVTt
^ irpoaipeffis. There is the same
classification of causes here as in Eth.
in. iii. 7, into nature, necessity,
chance, and the human intellect. On
Aristotle's conception of nature, see
Vol. I. Essay V. pp. 221-6.
5 Kal Tpfaov nva ffX vr i\ 'And
in a way chance and art are concerned
with the same objects." Eudemus,
taking this observation from Aristotle,
illustrates it, after his own fashion,
with a quotation from Agathon. Cf.
Metaphys. \i. vii. 4 : rovruv (TTOI-/I-
<rf<av) 8e rives yiyvovrai Kal airb TO.VTO-
fidrov Kal OTTO rv^ns Trapair\r]O't(as
Sxrirep tv rots aTrb (pvffews yiyvopfvois.
Cf. Ib. VL ix. i, where the following
question is started : a-irop^a-eie 5" av ns
Sia ri ra /j.ev yiyverai Kal rtyyri Kal airb
ravroftdrov, olov vyieia, ra 5' off, oiov
o/c('a. The answer is, that there is a
158
IIGIKftN [EYAIIMIQN] VI.
[CHAP.
TO. aura scrnv >]
xai vj TJ^J/>J, xa.Qa.7Tsp xou 'A-
6 vj fj.lv ovv
rig
S<TTIV.
5 Hep} 8s
av Xa/3oijU,;v,
principle of self-movement in the
matter to be operated on in the one
case, but not in the other. That the
devices of art are often suggested,
and its results assisted, by chance,
need not be confirmed by examples ;
but while art is thus assisted by
chance, on the other hand, it is the
main object of art to eliminate chance.
Cf. Metaphys. I. i. 5 : y M" 7/>
eiuiirfipia Tf-xy^v tiroiiifftv, caf <f>Ti<rl
ITaiAos, bpQSis \eyuv, rj 5" airtipia
ri/x-ny. The theory of art is but
meagre in the -writings of Aristotle.
His great defect with regard to the
subject is, his not having entered
into the philosophy of the imagination.
Yet still he gives us remarks of far
greater interest than what is contained
in the brief resumk of Eudemus, cf.
especiallythe saving, Metaphys. vi. vii.
4, that ' all things are done by art,
of which the idea exists in the mind,'
orrb rfxvris Se yiyvercu '6<T(av rb elSos tv
Ty tyvxfj, and add Post. Anal. n. xix.
4 : K 5" 4/j.irfipias ^ IK iravrbs Tipffj.'fi-
ffai/Tos TOW Ka66\uu Iv rrj '|" ; XI'> TO ''
vbj iropo TOI jroXXet, & &c tv ftircurtv fv
ivy tnfivots rb aitr6,
firKTT-fijjirjs, tav fiev iff pi yiveaiv,
tav $( irfpi rb ov,
V. Wisdom (^p^vrjffiy) is next dis-
cussed. Its nature we learn from the
use of the word ' wise ' (<}>p6vifM>i) to
denote those who take good counsel
with regard to the general ordering of
life. This subject admits of no
scientific demonstration ; again, it is
different from art. We see the quality
of ' wisdom ' exemplified in such men
as Pericles, who know what is good
for themselves and others. This
knowledge and insight is preserved
by temperance, which hence gets its
name (ffaxppoffvvri}. Art admits of
degrees of excellence, but ' wisdom '
does not. Voluntary error in art is
better than non-voluntary, but the
reverse in ' wisdom,' which thus is
shown to be more than a mere quality
of the intellect, it becomes part of
ourselves (4>povfiffews OVK tffTt \-fiOij).
i wfpl 6^ <J>poHj(rea>s] From Socrates
to Eudemus we may trace a distinct
progress with regard to the doctrine
of <(>p6vriffis. Socrates said ' virtue is
knowledge ' (^irtTT^/tij). Plato first
' virtue is,' afterwards ' virtue implies
wisdom ' (<pp&in\ffis\ Cf. Meno, p.
98 D : StSaKrbv ?5o|e/ flvat, fl <ppo-
vijcris >) aperij. Tkecetet. p. 176 B:
6/j.olaxris Se (T<JJ Oecp) SiKaiuv ical &fftoi>
juercfc <ppoyf)ffeca^ yfveff6cu. Phcedo, p.
69 A: iittivo fji6vov rb co/uitr/ia op86v,
bvff oi> Sf? Hiravra ravra Kara\\dr-
TfffBau, (ppdvriffis, Kal TOVTOV fiev irdvra
KO.I juerA Toinov uvovfjitva. re Kal iriirpa-
ffK6/j.fva Ttf urn y, Kal avSptla Kal
ffdKppoffvfri Kal StKaioffvvi], Kal v\-
\-flfi8t)v aXTjfl^s aper^i y /Afro, (p'pov-ficreus,
Kal Kpoffytyvofiffuv Kal
IV. V.]
I19IKON [EYAHMION] VI.
150
Ttvotg
TO
&*vfctWFCta$CU Trspl ra aurto ayaba.
ov Kara, pepog, oloi/ TTOIOL Trpog ttyieiav
TTQIO. Trpog TO e3 %yv. (rr^iiov $ on
Trspi ri $pwlpuo$ Xgyo^sv, OTOLV Trpog reXog TI O-TTOV-
eu AoyiVcovTai, cov JW.TJ S
efy <$povi[j.og o fiou\eunxo$.
cal riSovuiv Kal <p6fi(av Kal Ttav &\\tav
TrdvTcatf TUV TOIOVTIOV '
<t>povf]fffci>s Kal a\\a,TT6/j.ei>a avrl
\tav, /u^J ffKiaypcufiia. TIS y r) TOLO.VTI)
ap6T7) Kai Ttf UVTI a.vftpo.iTo5<at>i)s. This
' wisdom,' however, he defined as the
contemplation of the absolute (Pheedo,
p. 79 D), and thus identified the
moral consciousness with philosophy
(see Vol. I. Essay III. p. 144 5).
Aristotle, as we hare already seen
(Post. Anal. i. xxxiii. 8, quoted on ch.
iii. i), proposed as a subject for dis-
cussion the distinction between <f>p6vri-
<ris and cro<J>ia. With him <t>p6vr]cTis was
gradually coming to assume its dis-
tinctive meaning as practical wisdom ;
but this was not always clearly
marked. Cf. Topics, v. vi. 10, where
it is said to be the essential property
of tppdvrjais (wisdom) to be the highest
condition of the reasoning faculty (rb
\o-yiffriK6v~), just as it is of temperance
to be the highest condition of the
appetitive part. In another place of
the Topics (iv. ii. 2) it is incidentally
mentioned that some think <ppovT)rns
to be both a virtue and also a science,
but that it is not universally conceded
to be a science. Ao/ce? yap eVi'ois TJ
Kal ovfierfpov TUSV yevum vir' ovSfrepov
TTfpie^faOai ov JUTJC farb ird^rcav yt
t!i>at. In the Politics, in. iv. 17, it
is said to be the only virtue properly
belonging to a ruler. 'H 5e <j>p6vriffis
&O\OVTOS JfSjos aper)] /J.6f>] ' ras yap
&\\as ZoiKfv avayKOiov tivai KOLVO.S Kal
TUIV apxofj.fv<i>v Kal vGiv apxAvroov.
'Apxo/J,fvov 8e ye OVK fffriv aper^j
<pp6vr)(jis, a\\a 86a aAij^s. Thus it
is used for practical wisdom, but in a
broad general sense, with reference to
state affairs rather than to individual
life, implying, however, an absolute
consciousness as opposed to 0X77677$
5J|a. Frequently Aristotle uses <pp6-
vrj<ns simply to denote 'thought' or
' wisdom,' without reference to its
sphere. Cf. Eth. i. vi. n, i. viii. 6,
&c. Finally, it appears in its dis-
tinctive sense, De An. i. ii. 9. 'Anaxa-
goras says that all animals possess
vovs, they certainly do not all possess
equally the reason that gives " wis-
dom."' ov (palverat 5' 3 ye Kara <pp6-
VT]ffiv \ey6fnevos vovs traaiv 6/j.oiois
vnapxeiv. Rhet. I. ix. 13: <pp6vr}ffis
5' tffrlj/ aper^) Siavo(as, Kaff V e5
PovXeveffBat Svvavrai irfpl ayaQSov Kal
KO.KOIV TUV dpTj/jifftai' els evSaifioviav.
Eth. x. viii. 3, where there is a con-
trast between the life of contempla-
tion and of practical virtue, (pp6^rj<ris
is spoken of as inseparably connected
with the latter, while the happiness
of contemplation by the pure reason
is something apart. In the present
book we have the Eudemian expo-
sition and development of Aristotle's
theory, which entirely contrasts <pp6-
vi\ais with a-otpla, and limits the
former to the regulation of individual
life.
3 Pou\everai 6' ovtieis] A verbal
160
IIGIKQN [EYAHMIQN] VI.
[CHAP,
, oufls Ttov
, wv
aVo'-
is (Travra yap svSs^erai xai aXXcoj e^s<v, xai oux so"T<
Trsp/ rtov e avayxyg OJ/TOJV), oux av 05 >]
<$>povr t (ri<; STTKJ "rrjja^ ouSs TS^VTJ, e^/o'T^jU.r} j.sv OTI
TO TrpaxTQV aXX<of X SIV ^ T ^X vr ) ^ T
)^ xa/ 7roi75(Ta)^. Xs/7rsra< apa
jasra Xo'you Trpaxnxrjv Trspt ra av9ptt>:ra) aya^a xat
xaxa' r>jf jtxsv yap Troj^trsa)^ erspov TO Te'Ao, T% Ss
Trpa^sws oix av enj SO~T< yap auTj >) euTTpa^/a TeXo^ . S/a
TOUTO n^pixXsa xai TOU^ TOIOIJTOU Q>povt'[j.ous olo
eJvai, on TO. avrdis ayaQa xa) Ta TO?$ avQpwTrotg Su
slvai 8s Toiovrovg yyov[j.zQa, TOV$ o*xovo]U,
v9sV X< T7JV 0~O)^)pOO"tJV73V TOOTtO
6 yop=vo[j.v TO) ovop.it.Ti, cog (ra)%ov(ra.v TTJV cj>po'vvjo"/v.
fts T^V ToiauTTjv uTTo^ij^iV. ou yap a7rao~av
xa
repetition of ch. i. 6. Cf. .KA. Strf.
IT. x. 9 (.c.).
4 T?)J j^ej/ 7ap] A repetition of ch.
" 5-
5 5ia TO)TO iroXtTiicoiJs] ' Hence
we consider such men as Pericles
" wise," because they have a faculty of
perceiving what is good for themselves
and good for men in general. And
we attribute the same character to
those who have a turn for the manage-
ment of households and of state af-
fairs.' On <pp6vriffis as a quality for
the ruler of a state, cf. Ar. Pol. in. iv.
1 7 (I. c.), and on the connexion estab-
lished by Eudemus between wisdom for
the individual, for the family, and for
the state, see below, ch. viii, i , note.
(v6(v W7r(5\r)i|(tv] ' Hence it is that
we call temperance by its present
name (avtypoa'bvTf) as preserving wis-
dom (ff<t>ov<ra.v fijv <(>p6i/i]ffiv), and
this is the kind of conception which it
preserves,' i.e., a moral conception
(iff pi TO irpaKTov) about the right and
wrong, or, as it is here put, about
' the end ' (rb o5 /eca) of actions.
The false etymology here given comes
from Plato's Cratylus, p. 41 1 n,
where, after a sportive derivation of
<f>p6rn<rts, that of ffuxf>poavvi\ is added :
'H <j>p&VT)ffis <j>opas "yip <TTI Kcd pov
vo4}ffts. Elrj 8' &P KO! uvi\tnv \nro\a.-
fitiv (papas- a\\' o$v irepl 7* -rb (ptpfaOai
iaTiv. (I Sf ftov\ei, TJ yvtafjn] iravrdiraffi
Sri\oi ^ovrjs ffictytv nal vw/j.->ifriv rb
yap i/cii/uac KO! rb ffKOTrtiv radrSy. ei
8e jSouAei, avrb fi v6i}ffis TOV v4ov (ffrlv
tffis ' -rb Sf vfa fivai TO. Sira <n)fj.a(vfi
ad tlvat TOVTOV o5v ^<>lfff0at
v(6tffiv. ov yap vAriats rb apxalov
V avrl TOV TJ el tSei \tyfw
Svo vt6eo~iv. ffQxppoffvvri 5< ffdmjpia ou
fvv 8)) tffKtp.ii.tQa, typovrifftias. Of
course ffuxppoo-vvij merely means
' sound-mindedness.' On the apxal
uv see below, ch. xii. 10,
note, and VoL I. Essay IV. p. 217
218.
H91K&N [EYAHMmN] VI.
161
TO >u XOt TO
OT* TO
rag TT&p TO TrpaxTov. at [v yap ap^ou TWV Trpaxrav TO
TO>
alpsHo-Qai TravTa xai TrpaTTSiv ' S&TI yap TJ
svai
psTa Xoyou aAvjQyj, Trepi Ta avQpcoTrwa ayaQa 7rpaxTixi!]V.
aXXa /x^v Te^vyg jasv so-riv apsTTj, <$>povrj(Ta)$ S' oux SO~TIV' 7
teal sv /xsv T%vfj o excov a^apTavcuv alpTWTspo<;, Trsp] 8s
rjTTOV, toa"7rp xai Trspi Tag apsTag. SvjXov ouv
OtpSTV] T/J 0"T' "* 0^
7 oAA^ jtiV Te'xt">j] ' It must be
added that while in art there are
degrees of excellence, there are none
in wisdom ; and while in art he that
errs voluntarily is the better, he that
does so in wisdom is the worse, as is
the case with the virtues also. There-
fore it is plain that wisdom is a sort
of virtue, and not an art.' ^Hr-rov,
as contrasted with aipeTurepos, stands
for r)TTov alperds. The phrase aptr^i
-TfXvns occurs again ch. vii. i.
The present passage probably has
reference to Topics, iv. ii. 2 (l-c-}>
SoKfi yap eviois TJ <ppovriffis aptrfi re
Kal 4iuffTTi[j.ri elvai, where firtffT'fi/j.-ri
answers to Tf\vr} in the place before
us. To say that there are no degrees
of excellence in ' wisdom ' gives it an
absolute character, just as it is said that
there are degrees in the understand-
ing, but not in the reason. Common
language would admit of degrees in
wisdom. Cf. Ar. Metaphys. i. i. 2 :
Siot TOI/TO ravra <f>povi(J.coTfpa, Kal fiadr]-
TiKiSirepa. riav ju.^ SwajueVw /j.vr)fj.oi>fven>
effrlv. De An. i. ii. 9, I. c. But here
' wisdom ' is considered as something
ideal, just as afterwards, ch. xiii.
6, it is said to imply all the virtues.
6 fK&v a/jiaprdvuv] Eiidemus seems
often inclined to betake himself to
VOL. II.
a small antagonism against Platonic
doctrines ; whether in detail this was
original, or borrowed from oral re-
marks or lost writings of Aristotle,
we cannot tell. Cf. Eth. v. ix. 16,
v. xi. 9, vi. xiii. 3, &c. Here there
seems to be an allusion to the So-
cratico-Platonic paradox which forms
the subject of the Hippias Minor,
that to do injustice voluntarily was
better than doing it involuntarily (see
Vol. I. Essay II. p. 125). Here the
contrary is assumed with regard to
' wisdom,' and the conclusion drawn
is, that wisdom is not an art, in other
words (as is said more distinctly
afterwards), not merely intellectual.
If wisdom were merely intellectual,
then voluntary error in action would
not be error at all, because knowledge
would remain behind unimpaired ;
but if wisdom is a state of the will as
well as of the intellect, then voluntary
error, as implying a defect of the will,
is the worst kind of error. The worst
kind of error, morally, is thought to
be sinning against knowledge, know-
ing the right and doing the wrong,
which some philosophers deny to be
possible. See below, Book vn. ch.
iii.
8 8voii> 8' fcrriy] 'And as there
1G2
IieiKflN [EYAHMIQN] VI.
[CHAP.
'jy$J Ttov Xoyov SVOVTIOJ/, ^arspou av eiVy apsrrj, TOO
* 7] T yOtp 8o^a TTSpi TO 6VOyOjU,VG
xai 73 <bpQVT/'j6'i. aXXa /XTJI/ ouO ^'? jUSTa
o-n
TrJ jU-ev To/aur^g 1
er<
e7n<3"T>2ja>j Trspi T<OV
sr/v
are two parts of man's nature which
possess reason, wisdom will be the
highest state of one of these, namely,
the opiniative part, for opinion and
wisdom both deal with the contin-
gent. We must add that it is not
merely an intellectual state (|iy IJHTO.
\6yov), the proof of which is that
while such states admit forgetfulness,
wisdom does not.' Tb $oa<TTiK<lv
answers to rb \oytffT i6v, ch. i. 6.
That opinion deals with contingent
matter, we are told, AT. Post. Anal.
I. xxx i ii. Z : \tiirfTCU S6av tlvai -n-fpl
rb ctATjflfs fJ.fv TJ -tf/eCSoy, sVSsx'V 6 *' *' ^
Kai &A.ACOS fX tv - After associating
opinion with wisdom, the writer
separates them just as Aristotle sepa-
rates -Kpoalpfais from 5da, Eth. ni.
ii. ii. In the present passage there
is a great want of clearness. We are
told that wisdom is an excellence, or
highest state, of a part of the intel-
lect. Hence we should naturally
conclude that it was \6yos TIJ (cf. ch.
xiii. 5), but the formula throughout
used is, that wisdom is |<$ M eT k
\6yov. This formula is itself an in-
accuracy, since it implies not a state
of intellect, but a state of the will
under the law of the intellect (see
Vol. I. Essay I. p. 39). But on the
top of this another inaccuracy is laid,
for we are now told that -wisdom is
not simply a ?ts ^tTck \6yov, by which
the writer evidently means to say,
that wisdom is not a mere state of
the intellect. It may be indeed true
that the moral intellect cannot be
separated from the will and personality
(cf. ch. xii. 10), but what is to be
complained of is, that the formulae
used for expressing all the truths con-
nected with this subject are so very
imperfect. Merit \6you is used in
the present place probably to mf-an
nothing more than 'rational.' Cf.
Eth. Eud. viir. ii. 3 : od yhp &\oyos rj
<j>p6vncrts, a\\' exe \6yov 5a ri ovrca
irpaTTti. It is used differently ch.
iv. 3, and again ch. vi. i.
<T7jMoi/ 5 1 STI AfjflTj] Cf. Eth. I. x.
i o : where it is said that ' the moments
of virtuous consciousness in the mind
are more abiding than the sciences,'
and see note. To (f>p6vi)ffis in the
Platonic and general sense, of course
forgetfulness might attach. Cf . Laws,
p. 732 B : wdfj.vriffis 8' lirrlv
<ppoirl]fft<iis 7roA
VI. This chapter treats of reason,
but goes no further into the subject
than as follows, science implies prin-
ciples, and we cannot apprehend these
principles by science itself nor by three
out of the other four modes of mind
which give us truth. It therefore
remains, on the grounds of exhaustive
division, that reason must be the
organ by which we apprehend first
principles.
On examination it will be found that
the contents of the chapter are bor-
rowed almost verbatim from Aristotle's
Post. Analyt. n. xix. 7 : 'EireJ 8e TU>V
iff pi 7 V Siavoiav feuiv, ofs a\i/t8evo/jLfv,
cu pkv it\ aATjOeTs tlfflv, at 8e &ri8e'-
V.VIL]
IIGIKflN [EYAHMION] VI.
163
xa/ rwv
xai
OVTCUV, el(r] 8' apya) TCOV a7ro=<XTtov
(^sra Xoyou yap 73 STTKTT^^J, rr\$
row s7n<rTy;Toi our v
TO |U,sv yap
ou(rai Trspl ra evSsp^o^
TOUTCUV S.<TTIV ' TOW yap
s(mv. si Srj ol^ a
Trsp; ra JU.T) sv^e
*%stVj nricrT^fj^ xa/
rourcov 8e rail/ rpiwv [Jt,yQlv v$e%srai slvai
sj ours rsvvr] OUTS
a7ro3=/XTOV, a 8s Tuyva-
svicov
xa
xa)
xa
zw OLTTQ-
8/a\}/su-
xa
e Ss r
pa
rcov
85 <ro</ai/ gv re rate; re^vaig TOI$ a.xpiQs(TTaTOi
XOVTO.I Tb ij/eDSos, oloi' 8j|a al \oytff/j.6s,
a\T]6ri S' oei eirta'T'fi/j.r) real vovs, (cal
oiiSef (TriffT^fJiriS aKpifttarepov &\\o
yews i5 vofis, of 5' dpx a ^ T '5'' aTroSerieaii/
)'v<i>pi/j.tf>Tepai, eirtar'fifj.rj 6' aTraera ^era
elfrj, eireJ 5' ov8fi> a
7} j/ofi',
v, e/c
irovffL Kal '6rt diroSei^eais ap%r; ou/c dirj-
8ei|(s, COO-T' ou5' eiri(n^fj.iis ^iriffrii^T].
El oiiv juijSei/ &A\o irop' tiriffT-fi/j.i]v
flans Uxofitv a,\riOes, vovs hv eJrj &T{-
trr^/xrjs ctpx 1 *?- Aristotle argues that
principles must be apprehended either
by science or reason ; they cannot be
apprehended by science, therefore they
must be by reason. Eudemus, it will
be observed, follows this mode of
arguing, only he applies it to all the
five organs of truth, which he had
before arbitrarily laid down as an ex-
haustive list. In following implicitly
the passage above cited, he has ignored
for the time the earlier part of the same
chapter, in which Aristotle attributes
the origin of universals rather to induc-
tion ; ib. 6 : Ar)A.oi/ 8)7 STJ T^^lv ret
jrpSna. tiraywyfj -yvupifiv a.va-)Kauov.
Kal yap Kal aftrftycris otiria rb Ka06\ov
Y2
ejUTrote?. Also he is at variance with
his own statement above, ch. iii. 3.
/jifra \6yov yap i) eirto'T^jyurj] ' For
science implies inference.' This is
evidently the meaning of the present
sentence, taken as it is from Post.
Anal. I.e. A6yos is frequently used
to denote 'inference.' Cf. ch. viii.
9:6 /j.ei> yap vovs Ttav Spcav, ai> OVK
COT* \6yos : xi. 4, ruv effxaruv vovs
tffrl Kal ou \6yos, &c.
ouSe Si] effTiv] ' Nor of course
does philosophy apprehend these prin-
ciples, for it is the part of the philo-
sopher to possess demonstration about
some things.' It need hardly be said
that this is a very poor ground for
establishing the point in question.
VII. What 'philosophy' is may
be learnt from the use of the word
<ro<p6s, as applied to the arts. It
denotes ' nicety,' ' subtlety,' ' exact-
ness.' Philosophy, then, is the most
subtle of the sciences. It embraces
not only deductions, but also prin-
ciples. It is 'a science of the highest
objects with the head on.' It is
above all practical wisdom and science.
It is one and permanent, while they
164
HQIKflN [EYAHMIflN] VI.
[CHAP.
rag
oov
xai
rivag
COO~T
on >]
/ai/ TJ OTJ apsrr^ re%vr)$ e<rriv eivni fie
xara
v no
sty 13
rov <T ovr' tip ffKairrrjpa deal Qiaav ovr' apor^pa
OVT a\\wc rt aotydv.
av rav
3 <ro<$ia. 8s? aca TOV (ro^)ov ]U,^ jttovov ra ex rtov a
sl^svai, aXXa xai TTfpi ra^ ap%oi$ aKrfisusiv.
y (ro<$)/a vou xa< 7r<(rTT;aT5, (oo-Trsp xs^aX^v
>jjU.73 T<OV TifJ-icordrcav. OLTOTTOV yap si rig rr^
are manifold, relative, and change-
able. It is higher, as the cosmos is
higher than man. Philosophy and
not wisdom was the reputed property
of men like Thales and Anaxagoras,
who were thought to know strange
and out-of-the-way, but useless things.
On the other hand, wisdom (<pp6vriffis)
is good counsel about human things.
It implies knowledge of particulars as
well as of universals. Indeed, the
knowledge of the particular gained
by experience is its most important
element, though it includes the
universal also, and in its own sphere,
namely, that of action, it is supreme
and paramount (apxirfKrovHcfi).
1 2 TV Se ao(piav ffo(f>ia\ ' The
term ffoQta we apply in the arts to
those who are the most finished
artists, as, for instance, we call
Phidias a consummate (<ro<f><fc) sculp-
tor, and Polycletus a consummate
statuary, and in this application we
mean nothing else by aofyia. than the
highest excellence in art. But we
conceive that some men possess the
quality .in a general and not a
particular way 'nor in aught else
accomplished,' as Homer says in
the Margitcs
1 Not skilled to dig or plough the gods
have made him,
Nor in aught else accomplished.'
We may argue, then, that ffofyia, in
the sense of philosophy, is the most
consummate of the sciences.' On the
meaning of a.Kp(p(ta as applied to the
arts, and on the transition of meaning
when it is applied to philosophy, see
Eth. i. vii. 1 8, note, and n. vi. 9,
note.
3 COOT' tin TiniurdTuv] ' So that
philosophy must be the union of
reason and science, as it were a
science of the highest objects with its
head on." This excellent definition
does not appear to have anything in
Aristotle exactly answering to it.
There are two chief places where
Aristotle treats of ffoQla, namely,
Metaphysics, Book i. i. ii., and ib.
Book x. ch. i. vii. Metaphys.
Book i. opens by showing an ascend-
ing scale in knowledge, perception,
experience, art, and the theoretic
sciences, or philosophy. Of philo-
sophy we are told that it is the
science of first causes, it is most
universal, most exact, and most en-
tirely sought for its own sake, &c.
H0IKQN [EYAHMIQN] VI.
165
t ryv zwyviv <T7roua<OTaT7jv o=ra; sivai, s
aZHTTOV T&V BV TiO XO&fUtt OivdpU)7TOg (TTIV. SI 8?) u
[J.SV xai aya^ov erspov av5pa>7ro< xai lp$u<n, TO 8=
xa* u$u TauTov as/, xai TO ero^oi/ TauTov TTOLVTSS
4
otv
, Qpovipov 8= srspov TO yap Trsp} avro sxao~Ta e5
(Jlfetf. i. ii. 2 6). Philosophy begins
in wonder, wonder at first about
things near at hand, afterwards about
the sun, moon, and stars, and the
creation of the universe (Ib. 9). It
ends in certainty and a sense of the
necessity of certain truths (Ib. 16).
We may see that this account is per-
fectly general it does not distinguish
in philosophy between mathematics,
physics, and metaphysics. It even
attributes a practical scope to philo-
sophy, saying that philosophy, by
taking cognisance of the good, deter-
mines the object of the other sciences
(/6. 7), apxiKdrraTr) 8e -rlav firiffTT)-
IAUV, Kal pa\\ov apx>K7] TTJS urrrjpe-
rowrjs, ri yvcapt^ovffa rivos ei/fKev ftin
irpaKTeov (Kaarov ' rovro 8' ecrri. raya-
6bv 4v fKaffTois, 8\<as Se rb &PKITOV tv
Ty tpvfffi TrofTj?. From a certain
immaturity thus shown, it would be
difficult to believe that the account in
Metaphys. Book i. was written after
that in the present chapter of the Ethics.
In Metaphys. Book x. the subject is
taken up anew, and treated much more
fully. Physics, practical science,
and mathematics, are now separated
from philosophy proper. Ib. i. 4:
ovSe irepl TOJ ev roTs <pvariKois fipr)/J.fvas
om'os T\\V rjTOVfji.(VT]V eirjo'T^/iT/v
Oertov. Ofrrt yap irfpl rb ov evftcw
TOIOVTOV yap Ta.ya.Q6v, TOVTO 5" ev rots
inrd.pxft Kal rots olaiv ev
Ib. i. 7: ouSe /^V irepl T&
Ka xiapiarbv yap avruv
ovOev. These, however, are branches
of philosophy, Ib. iv. 3 : Sib Kal ravrriv
(T$IV (pvaiKJjv) Kal T^V ^taOrjjUOTi/cV
^>ias flvai Oertov.
Cf. Met. in. iii. 4 : ecrrt 8 tro<pla ns
Kal rj (pvfftKri, a\\' ov trpuni\. Hence
we get the famous division of specu-
lative sciences, Met. x. vii. 9 : $TJ\OV
Toivvv '6n rpia -yeVij T<av 0fcap7friKuv
ftri!TTrifj.uv tcrri, (pvffiicf], /j.aOrifj.aTiKi],
9fo\oyticfi. ReXriffTOV juev oliv rb TCOV
OecapTjriKwv firiffT7ifj.(av ytvos, rovrwv 8'
avrwv rj Tc\evraia \exdfi<Ta- irepl -rb
rifjiHSararov yap Jerri raiv uvreav, fie\-
r'uav 8t Kal xeipwv eKdrnri \eyerat
KOTO rb oiKfiov kiriari}r6v. Philosophy,
then, in the highest sense, may be
called theology, or the science of the
divine, that is, of pure, transcen-
dental (xcopterHj), immutable being.
It is the science of being qua being
(TOU OVTOS j; iiv tiriariifiji). Eudemus,
following in the wake of this discus-
sion, has adopted as much of its
results as suited his purpose. He
speaks of philosophy as having the
highest objects (rwv Tifjuurdruv, cf.
Met. x. vii. 9, I.e.), but he does not
distinguish its different branches.
He includes in it both physical and
mathematical ideas ( 4, rb S tevicbv
Kal ev8i> ravrbv aft : ib. e S>v 6 K6fffjios
ffvveartiKfv), though he uses ffcxpos
once in its special sense to denote a
metaphysical, as opposed to mathe-
matical or physical, philosopher. Ch.
viii. 6 : jua07j/uaTjicJ>s fj.ev irais yfi>oir'
&v, <ro<pbs 5' ?j <pvffiKbs otf. In short,
his object is rather to .contrast philo-
sophy with practical thought than
exactly to define it. His attribut-
ing to it a union of intuition with
reasoning seems however a happy
result of his present method of dis-
cussion.
166
IIGIKflN [EYAIIMmN] VI.
[CHAP.
Qstopovv i^oiisv av zlvai <$>povi[j.ov, xa) TOUTW e
aura. 3io xa< TCOV $r y p/a)j/ swa typovipd Qa&iv s7va<, o<ra
TOV aurwv fiiov s^ovTOt, $alv=Tai SuvajOuv TrpovorjTJx^v.
8s xa< OT; oux av S/'TJ ij <ro(>/a xa) vj TroAmxv) >J
si yap TTJV Trepi ra aJc^eX/jaa ra ai-roTt,' spouo"/
''ai/, TTO^AOU sVovraj <ro<$>iai ou yap jU./a Trsp* TO a?rav-
aya^ov TCOV ^a>wv, aXX' erepa Trspi sxaerrov, si jarj xai
ft/a TrspJ Travrcov Ttov ovrcov. si 8* ort /SsXTJO-rov
TUJV aXXtov ^a>a>v, oySsv fitatyepsi xai yap avQpeo-
TTOU aXXa TroXu Qsiorspa TTJV <$)tj<rif, olov Qavspwrara ys
sx
on 13
xai
o 'Ava^ayopav xa; 0aA?]V xa/
<$>povt[JLOv$ 8' ou Q>a<riv slvai, orav
* trvftfyipOiff sauToi'j, xa< Trspirra fj.lv xai
4 t 8' 3ri jEJe
4 And if it be said that man is the
best of the animals, this will make
no difference, for there are besides
other things far diviner in their
nature than man, such as, to quote
the most obvious instance, the parts
out of which the symmetry of the
heavens is composed.' On the Aristo-
telian view of man's position in the
scale of dignity in the universe, see
VoL I. Essay V. p. 226-9. On Ari-
stotle's doctrine of the divine nature
of the stars, &c., cf. De Ccelo, i. ii. 9 :
*Ec re 5)j Tofauv <t>cu>fpbv ZTI ire<pvKf
TIS otffi'a (Tajjuaros &\\rj trapb. T&S Iv-
-ravQa. (rvoriia'tis, Oftortpa KO.I irporfpa
TOVTOIV airdvruv (this has given rise to
the notion of the 'quintessence'). Ib. i.
ii. 11, which repeats the same. Ib. n.
iii. 2 : a EKcurr6v Iffrtv, Siv Iffriv <tpyov,
eVeKO roO itpyov. &eov 5' Ivtpytia
aOavaffta rovro 8' l<n\ fa)] atSios.
"fi<rr' ivdymi ry Qtltf Kiinjcriv a'iSiov
fit'. "Ewtl 5' 6 ovpavbt TOIOVTOS
ydp rt Qtiov) Siet TOVTO ?x e * T ^
ffu/j.a,
K\>K\tf ael. Cf. Metaphys. xi. viii. 5 :
"H re yop TWV &ffTpcaif <pv<ns oi'Sios ouffia
m. 76. x. vi. 8 : *O\coy 8' &TOVOV
IK -rov (palveaOai ra Sevpo fjLf7a^d\\ovra
KOI /uTjSfTrore Siafitvovra Iv ro7s aurols,
lit TOVTOIV Iff pi TTJS OA.TJ0610S T'JjJ' KpiaiV
irotf'iffBat. Ae? 7^p 6 TUV del /cara
Toura tyointav xal /XT/Se/xiai/ fnfra^o\^v
8" ^trrl ret /caret rbj/ K6fffj.ov.
5 Sib 'A'aa7<5pa' /col aX^v] Cf.
<A. x. viii. 1 1 ; Plato, Tke&tetus, p.
174 A : "flffirep ital &a\r^v acrrpovo-
Hovvra, 2> QtdSwpt, Kal &vta fi\firoi>Ta,
Vf<r6vra tls <pptap, Qparrd ns 4fj.fj.e\)is
Kal xaplfffffa, 6fpa.Tra.ivls airoffK^ai
\tyercu, ws ret (itv v ovpavf irpoOv-
fj.olro flStvcu, rcV 8' tfjL-npotrOev aurov
KO! iropa TroSay \av6dvoi ouroV.
Tourbv 8e apicd cKcafj.fj.a fal jrdvras
8troj eV <pi\o<ro<piq Sidyovffi. On the
other hand, Aristotle (Politics, i. xi.
9) tells a story of Thales turning his
philosophy to practical account, fore-
seeing by astronomical observations
that there would be a good crop of
olives, buying up the crop in Miletus
VIIL]
IIGIKiiN [EYAHMIQN] VI.
167
xa p/aXs7ra xa
o', on ou ra avfytoTTiva aya^a. $qrw<rttl, TJ 56
TTsp] TO. avbpwTTiva xai Trspi aw sVr< |3oyA'j<ra-
TOU yap Qpovipov jaaX/frra TOUT' 'spyov zivai Qxx.rj.sv.
TO
ra
xa
aya^ov. o S' otTrXco^ eo^ouXo^ o TOU a&i<rTOv
rcov TrpotxT&v (rTft^a.o~Tixoy xaru. TOV Xoy;<r/xov.
eo"T)y ] ^povr^iris ribv xaSoXou jtxovov, aAXa S=T xai Ta7
' sxaa"Ta yviupi^siv TrpaxTixr) yap,
xa6' xa<TTa. 8<o xa) Iv/o/ oux '
xai sv roig a>.Xo<^ o<
OT/ T xoua ='j7r=7rTa xla xa
Trp^tg
srspcav sl^orcav
si yao
ayvoo, o 7ron)(rsi uysiav,
xovQa xa) uyisiva 7roir)<rst
OT/ T<X
73 8s
6' av
*a si/Ta
05a a
xa<
beforehand, and baring sold at his
own price, TroAAo xpTj.uctTa (nMA.e'|aiTa
ViSe?^aj ort {>d5i6i> fffri -n\o\nfiv TOIS
<{>t\off6<pois, h.v pov\(i>vTa.i, a\\' ov
TOUT' etTTl irepl ?> eriroi/SafoutrJi'.
6 )8ouAuTot 5 s outefs] A repe-
tition for the third time of the same
remark, cf. ch. i. 6, ch. v. 3.
7 Owing to its practical character,
wisdom (<pp6vn<ris') necessarily implies
a knowledge of particulars. The par-
ticular, indeed, would seem for action
the, more important element, as appears
also in other things, if we compare
science with empirical knowledge.
Sib Ka\ evioi ou* e5($Tes] Cf. AT.
Met. i. i. 7 8 (whence this passage
may probably be borrowed), irpby fj.fv
ouv TO Trpdrreiv fpiretpia Tt\vris oiiSev
SoKfl Siatptpfiv, oAA.o *cctl juaAAoi/ ^ITJ-
P&riov 8' ST
e/ajretpia
Ka66\ov, at 8e irpe|6(j /caJ at yevtfftis
iraffai irepl ri> Ka.ff eKaaroV elffiv.
VIII. This chapter fulfils a promise
made before in the Eudemian Ethics
(i. riii. 1 8), by distinguishing wisdom
from other modifications of the same
practical thought, namely, economy
and the various forms of politics.
This distinction would at first sight
tend to reduce wisdom to mere
egotism ( 3, SoKe'i jtoAioV elvat rj
jrepl auToy KO.} eva. 4 : TO airry
ei'SeVtu), and thus to isolate the in-
dividual within himself. In order to
obviate this, the writer brings forward
arguments to show that the welfare
of the individual is bound up with
that of the family and the state ( 4).
He urges the difficulty of knowing
one's own interest, hence concluding
that wisdom is no mere instinct of
selfishness. Wisdom implies a wide
experience, on which account boys
168 HeiKflN [EYAIIMIQN] VI.
S^'f, TO [J.SVTOI sJvOLl 0V TO.VTOV OLVTOUg. T%
[CHAP.
r 6s a> ra
' exaora TO xo/vov s^si oi/ojaa, TroAmxr; aurrj 8; Trpax-
rj xai 3otAUT<x7} * TO yap xf/T^' "] 0101 Trpaxrov a> TO
cannot attain to it, no more than they
can to philosophy, though they are
often clever in mathematics ( 5 6).
Wisdom is a sort of deduction with a
universal and a particular element
(7), and yet we must distinguish it
from science on this very account,
that it deals with particulars ( 8).
It is the opposite to reason, which is
of first principles, while wisdom is
rather an intuition of particular facts
(analogous to apprehending a mathe-
matical figure). At all events, one
form of wisdom is of this character.
i 3 fffrt Si SuccuTTiK-fi] ' Now
politics and wisdom are really the
same faculty of mind, though they
form quite distinct conceptions. Wis-
dom dealing with the state is divided
into first, legislation, which is the
master- spirit as it were; and secondly,
politics in detail, which is practical as
being deliberative (for a ' measure ' is
like the practical application of a
general principle) and which usurps
the common name of politics ; hence
too they who are concerned with par-
ticular measures alone get the name of
politicians, for these alone act, like
workmen under a master. Just so
that appears to be especially wisdom
which is concerned with the indivi-
dual self. And this kind usurps the
common name of wisdom, while the
other kinds I have alluded to may be
specified as first, economy ; second,
legislation ; and third, politics (in the
restricted sense), which may be sub-
divided into the deliberative and the
judicial.' This distinction was pro-
mised before, Eth. End. i. viii. 8 :
"ClffTt TOUT' &v efrj avrb rb ayaObv rb
Tf\os TWI> avdpdnrtf npa.KTtav. TOUTO
8* 3<nl rb inrb r^v Kupiav iraffcay. AUTTJ
8* to-rl iroAtTtK^ Kal OIKOVO/JUK)) Kol
<j>p6tn)ffis. bioupfpovffi yap oSrai at
eis irpby TOS &\\as rtf roiavrou fTveu '
irpbs 8' a\\-fi\as t1 TI Sicupfpovfftv,
vffTepov \eKTfov. It would appear
that Eudemus by a sort of afterthought
united the conception of <t>p6vri(ns,
which was developed later, to that of
iroAmK^ to which Aristotle had as-
signed the apprehension of the chief
good for man (cf. Eth. r. ii. 5). But
in so doing he had to bring together
two different things; for tppdvrjais was
a psychological term expressing a
faculty of the mind, but iro\iriK-f] was
merely one of the divisions of the
sciences. In order to make them com-
mensurate, Eudemus alters the signi-
fication of iroATJK^. He treats it as a
state of mind (?{s), as a mode of
<pp6yijffis, dealing with the state either
universally or in details. From the
same later point of view he adds also
O'IKOVOHIK^ ; cf. Ar. Pol. i. iii. i : 'Eird
$( (pavfpbf ^| vv fnopiatv i) ir<{Ais ffvvt-
<TTTJK', iu>xy Kalov irtpl oiKovo^las dirfiv
irp6rfpov, &C.
a ws rJ> <TXTO'] The ^(pifffjia, or
particular measure is here compared
to the minor term in a syllogism, i. e.
it constitutes the application of a
general principle. Cf. Eth. v. x. 6.
On the use of iayw* ov ^ n ^Ina
purely technical and logical sense, cf.
^ 9 : Ar. Mit. x. i. 9: iras yap
\6yos Kal ituffa SITJO'TIJ^.TJ TUV KofloAou
VIIL]
H9IKON [EYAHMIQN] VI.
169
yap TrpaTTOvvw OVTOI (v<nrsp ol %eipors%va.i SoxsT 8s xai 3
4>poW;0-/ jM-aA/or' sJvai y Trspl aurov xal sva. xoii e%si
aur>j TO Jtoivov ovof^Oij $>povr}(ri$ ' exeivwv 8s ij j,V oixovo/x/a
73 8s vo/AoSser/a vj 8s TroXirixrj, xou rat>Tj 13 /xsv $ouAs
13 8s S/xafrr/x-q. 5t*8o /xsv oOf TJ av enj yva)(Ta)$ TO
xai 8oxsT o ra
al oii raSj/ l<f)(&Tu>v. Post. Anal. i. i.
4 : ou 8jct TO fieaoy rb ^a-)(a.Tov yj/<api-
ferot.
3 The classification here intended is
as follows, 0poV7j<m or wisdom being
Wisdom
first a general term and including
politics with the other faculties men-
tioned, and sesond a special kind
contrasted with the other faculties
About oneself About the family
i i
About the State
i
'Wisdom' Economy
Politics
1
Universal
apXiTtKrovucfy
In detail
1
Legislation
'Polities'
1
Deliberative
4 eTSos juev oSi/ iroXirelas] ' Now
it must be considered a species of
knowledge to know one's own interest,
but this is widely different (from true
wisdom). A man who knows his
own concerns and occupies himself
with these is commonly thought wise,
while politicians are thought med-
dlesome fellows, and hence Euripides
wrote :
Small wisdom was it in me to
aspire,
When well I might, mixed with the
common herd,
Enjoy a lot full equal with the best.
But ah ! how full of vanity is man !
The restless meddling spirits in the
state
VOL. II.
Judicial
Are gaped at still and made the
country's gods.
Men with these selfish principles seek
their own advantage, and this, they
consider, is what they have to do.
From this notion the idea has grown
that they are the wise. And yet,
perhaps, the welfare of the individual
is inseparable from the regulation of
the household and from the existence
of a state.'
T& avTtf eJSeVaj] Fritzsche reads TO
T& avry with the authority of two
MSS., adding ' Ceterum in hac quoque
prsefractA orationis brevitate qui mul-
tum Eudemi Moralia diurna noctur-
naque manu volutavit Euderni stilum
agnoscat necesse est.'
170
HBIKilN [EYAHMION] VI.
[CHAP.
et/ai, o
C a)
To7(Tt
iraprjv
)}[>lt) fJ.rifJt.rti) OTpClTOV
rove yap irtpiaoovq KO.I TI Trpafffforrac
yets TO ctuTofg ayctbov, xai olovrai TOUTO SsTv
ex TauTrj o5v TTJJ oo'?j e^r^uSs TO T
./ / V > X \e~v
<f>povi[j.ou$ stvcti ' xaTO* io~w^ oux eo~T/ TO adroit ev
xa
a
xa<
yivovrai xa/ o"o^o/ Ta TOiauTa, <>po'v/jao 8' oi 8ox=7
o"5a/. a/V/ov S' OTI Ttov xa5' 6xao~Ta go~T<v rj
ylvsrai yvc'opifjia. e Efj-Treipias, veo$ 8' sfJiTrstpog o-x
ya2> p/po'vou 7ro<=T TTJV epLTretptav ' eTrsi xai TOUT' av
ysvoir' av,
<rx\J/aiTo, Sta T/ 8^
xo\v*pdyfwvfs~\ This is often opposed
to ra awroC Trparrfiv. Cf. Plato,
Gorgias p. 526 c: <f\o<rApou rtk ouroD
iv T$ &l<p. Repub. p. 433 A: r3 ra
auroD irpoTTf iv cal /t}) jroXtnrpayftovcTi'.
Eir/)iir(57jj] In the Philoctetes ; the
later lines are thus filled up by
Wagner, Fragm. Eur. p. 401 :
?<roj/ n(TO.ff\tiv rtf ff(Xfxardrtp Tu^fijj ;
ovSfv yap o\nw yavpov us a.vr]p t(pv.
rovs fitv irfpiffaovs Kcd Ti irpdiffffovTas
The Scholiast and Paraphrast both
conjecture ZeDi /Mfffi to govern
Tfpiffffovs. This would give no metre,
and only a very inferior sense.
4 5 lr yfyc o-0cu] ' Moreover the
directing one's own affairs is by no
means simple, it is a subject for much
consideration. In proof whereof we
may allege that while boys learn
geometry and mathematics, and be-
come clever in such things, no boy
seems to attain to " wisdom." ' The
writer is arguing against the identi-
fication of ' wisdom ' with an instinct
of selfishness. If it were so simple,
why should not boys possess it ? Si6ri
is for 8ri, as in Eth. Eud. vii. x. 20 :
AITIOI' 5e roD (ulxfaOai, SIOTI Ka\\iuf
fitv y r)8iKT] <f>i\ia, avayKtuorfpa it fj
Xpijtrift.ri. Cf. Ar. Meteor, m. iii. 5 :
2rjfif?ov 5e TOVTOV Si6ri irrtvOey yiyve-
rtu & &KU.OS &0fv kv y Kvpia ylyyijrai
Sicwrjrcwris. Jb. I. xiii. 23 : T<5 re into
raits opfffiv <tx flv T ^ s irTjyas fiaprvpti
SIOTI -r<f ffvppeiv fV o\iyov /cat Kara
fiiKpbv fK ro\\ay vorlStev StaSiSct'triv 6
f6wos KO! yiyvovrai ovrus eu royal rSav
6 crofbs 8' t) fvffiKbs 06} ' But not a
metaphysician or physical philoso-
pher.' 2o<p6s is here used in a dis-
tinctive sense, ' philosopher,' par
excellence, with a science above physics
VIII. ]
IieiKiiN [EYAHMIQN] VI.
171
STI ij
r\ TTSOI TO
xou rex. p,v ou
7ri(TT=(>ovcriv ol vsoi aXXa Asyouo-*v, rtov 8s TO ri l(rnv oux
Trsp/ TO xa$o'Aot> ev T<O 3u^su-
exarrTov ' vj yap OTJ Travrct TO. 7
^ OT; ToS/ j3apuo~Ta$/ju>v. OT/
, <av=po'v ' TOW yap s<r^aTou 8
TO a TTpaXTOV TOiOUTO!/. OiVTl-
TCOV OpCOV, O)V OUX <7T< 9
8' TJ $ptna}<rJ (tux c
0~T/V, (OO~7T=p s'
TCO I/O). 6
and mathematics, cf. ch. vii. 3,
note.
# STI #577X0?] ' The reason surely
is that the former matters (*'. e. mathe-
matics) are abstract, while the prin-
ciples of the latter (physics and philo-
sophy) are got by experience ; thus
boys repeat truths of the latter kind,
without being really convinced of
them ; while the nature of the other
subjects is easy to comprehend.'
Si' a<pa.ipefff<as~\ The form in Aristotle
is either ev dipaipeVei or ^| d^aipeVewy.
He constantly applies these terms to
denote the mathematics. The locus
classicus on this subject is Metaphys.
X. iii. 7 : KaBi-nep 8' 6 /ua07j^aT/c6s
itfpl TO, e dc|>atp(r6ci)s TT^V Qtiapiav
iroielrcu, irepif\hi> y&p iravra rd
alaOriTO, Ofcapt'i, olov /Stipos Kal t<ou(f>6-
TTjra Kal ffK\r]p6rr)ra /col rovvwriov, %TI
5e /cal depfj.6rr)ra KO! \f/v^p6rr]Ta Kal ras
&\\as ras aiaQTjras fvaiTuixrets, fj.6vov
8e Kara.\f'nrt TO iroir'bv Kal ffvvex^,
K.T.\. Cf. De Ccelo, ni. i. u : 5ia TO
rek fiti> t a<patp( crews \eyeff6ai T&
a 8 QvffiKa IK irpocrQe-
De Anima, in. vii. 10 : ofrrcoTct
ffpfva voei, Srav vorj tuftya.
-iriffTtiiovfft] Cf. ch. iii. 4, note,
and Eth. vn. iii. 8 : ol irp&Tov /j.a96vres
ffvi/tipovcri fnei> robs \6yovs, laaai
8' o(/7rai.
7 Another argument to prove the
complex and difficult character of
' wisdom ' is that it implies a kind of
syllogism, wherein both the major
premiss and the minor equally admit
of error.
TO ^apvirTadfj.a (JSoTO <j>av\a] This
was probably a medical notion of the
day. Cf. Problems, i. xiii. where a
similar superstition is maintained :
Aid TI TO ra vSara /j.fTa/3d\\tit> voataSis
(f>a.ffiv tlfai, TO 8e rbi> aepa off ;
SSaros fJ.fv iro\\a ftS-rj effrl Kal SiaQopa
K00' OUTO, d;poy 5e otf, &are Kal rovro
atnov.
8 STI 8' TOJOI/TOI/] ' But (though
implying a syllogism) it is plain that
wisdom is not science, for it deals
with the particular, as we have said,
the action being of this kind.'
9 ai/TiKeiTai elSos] ' To reason,
indeed, it forms the opposite pole;
for while reason deals with those
terms which are above all infe-
rence, wisdom on the other hand
deals with the particular, which is
below demonstration, and is appre-
hended by perception ; not the per-
ception of the separate senses, but
analogous to that faculty by which
we perceive that the immediate object
presented to us in mathematics is a
triangle. For on this side also de-
monstration must cease. However
it is rather this particular mode of
wisdom which is a perception, the
other presents a different form.'
wriKfirai fj.fv 8); T< vif~\ Having
z 2
172
H9IK&N [ETAHMION] VI.
[CHAP.
o
oa
on TO ev
alluded to the syllogistic nature of
wisdom, the writer seems to have
been reminded to distinguish it from
science; and thus, having before
(ch. v. 8: ch. vii. 6) con-
trasted it with art and philosophy, he
is led on to finish the round by
placing it in contrast with reason.
^X ^ T ^ 1 ' *8i'a>f, oAA' ola alff0av6-
fifOa] This is the same as Aristotle's
famous distinction between the ' sepa-
rate senses ' and the ' common sense.'
His own words are clear on the
point, cf. De Animd, n. vi. 2 : Atyu
8' fi>iov /j.(v (aia&rjrbv') t> fi^i tvSfXfrat
trtpa alaOyfffi alffBdvfffdai, Kal trtpl
$> n^i tvStxerai airaTTjOijj'ai, 0101* fyts
Xpuparos Kal aKoii ^6(pov Kal yfvffis
Xv/j.ov. Ta fj.fi> olv ToiaDra \tytTdi
?8ta fudffTOv, Koivk Sf Klmiffis, ijpf^.la,
apid/j.6s, <rxw a ) pfyfOos' ra yap
TOiavra ovSffjuas fffrlv tSia, a\\a xutva
jrdffcus' KO! yap atprj Kimjffis TIS fffnv
alffOrfr^ Kal otyft. It will be seen
that figure (<rxi)/i) is one of the
objects of the ' common sense ; ' the
text gives as an instance of this the
perception of a triangle. In De An.
in. i. 6, Aristotle adds ' unity ' to the
list of ' common sensibles,' but he
reduces them all to modifications
of the perception of motion : ravra
yap irdma Kivfafi aiff8av6(j.e6a, olov
HfytOos Kiv^fffi. "flo-re ol ffx^^o.'
ptyfOos yap n T& <r\rina. Tb 8'
ilpffwvv T$ fi.ii tivflffdof & 8' aptO/jibs
rp aircxpacrei rod arvvf^ovs, K.T.\. He
admits (De An. n. vi. 4) that ' com-
mon sensibles ' can scarcely be said to
be apprehended by sense at all, ruv Si
naff aura alffOrjTtat' TO. f&ia icvpius
iffrlv alffOrrrd, cf. Ib. m. i. 6, where
it is said these are apprehended ac-
cidentally or concomitantly by the
senses. This is surely the true view ;
we see in the apprehension of number,
figure, and the like, not an operation
of sense, but the mind putting its own
forms and categories, i. e. itself, on
the external object. It would follow
then that the senses cannot really be
separated from the mind ; the senses
and the mind each contribute an
element to every knowledge. Ari-
stotle's doctrine of KOIV^J affffhjffis would
go far, if carried out, to modify his
doctrine of the simple and innate cha-
racter of the senses, e.g. sight (cf.
Eth. n. L 4), and would prevent its
absolute collision with Berkeley's
Theory of Vision. On the general
subject of KOIV. o&ffO. see Sir W.
Hamilton, BeicCs Works, pp. 828-*
830.
8r ri iv rots (t.a3rtfi.ariKOis fffx a - rov
rpiy<vov\ This has been frequently
understood to mean that ' the ulti-
mate or simplest possible figure is a
triangle.' But the Paraphrast does
not so explain it ; his words are rovrov
8c ruv Tp6frov Kal ol ^LaOr)fj.ariKol rb
alffdrirbv yivdfficovffi rpiytavov, K.r.\.
And referring to Ar. Post. Analyt. i.
i. 4, we find exactly this instance
given of & particular knowledge, the
result of observation, ori jttc yap iron
rpiycavov *X fl Suffix op6a"is laas,
Trpojj'Ser Sri 8e r6$e rb tv r$ fi/j.Mv-
K\lcf rpiycav6v ttrriv, afia iiray6nft>os
iyvdipifffv. The term ^trxarov is used
in the very next line : Mtav yap
rovrov rbv rp6irov rj (iddr)ffls fan, Kal
ov Sia rov p.tffov rb foxBTOv yvtapltrai.
It is true that in different places Ari-
stotle uses tffxarov in different senses,
as denoting with various applications
VIII. IX.] HGIKflN [EYAHMIQN] VI. 173
O.UTI} jaaAAov aiVflijenj *j"q c^poWjcns, ex=iVT]$ 8' aXXo
To fyrsiv 8e xau TO ^ouXeufcr^a/ ftiafyepsi' TO yap 3 u ~ 9
;us<rQai V]TfV Ti eo"T/v. SsVSs Xa/Ss^ xa< Trsp) si
, TTorspov 7rt(TTrj[J.r) Tig r) So'^a 13 stVTO^/a ^ x
n ysvog.
^asv &r) oux strrtv' ou yap
rs
the end of a series, thus cf. Zte. ^?z.
in. x. 2, where it means ' final
cause,' .EVA. in. iii. n, 'the last step
in analysis ; ' Metaph. vi. iii. 6,
' matter,' &c. But in the place
before us rb <-<rxaToj/ has been already
appropriated to the logical meaning
of ' particular,' ' minor term,' ' imme-
diate truth,' cf. z and 8.
ffT^trerat jap /caice?] 'For on that
side too (i. e. in dealing with an
object of the sense as well as an in-
tuition of reason) demonstration must
stop.' "iffraaQai is a common logical
form, it is opposed to irpoievai es
&Ttfipov, and is frequently impersonal,
cf. Post. Anal. i. iii. i : afivvarov yap
TO, aireipa SjeAOew'. Elf re lirrarai Kal
i, K.T.\. Met. n. iv. 22, &c.
<l>p6vT\<ns\ Three of Bekker's MSS.
read ^ (pp6vr)ffis, and this seems most
natural, and to give the best sense
(though ^ is supported by the Para-
phrast). What the writer means is
apparently to add that only one kind
of wisdom can be called analogous to
the apprehension of a triangle ; BUTTJ
refers to fi tcad' e'/caora <pp6vtiffis, men-
tioned above, ch. vii. 7 : 8? &fj.<pia
eX eiV $1 TavTTjy fJ.a\\ov. There is
another kind (^Kflvrjs), namely, the
possession of universal ideas (riav
Kafi&\ov) (I.e.), which is of a different
nature.
IX. This chapter commences the
examination of a set of faculties
cognate to wisdom, or forming part
of it. The first of these is good
counsel (evftov\la). This, says the
writer, is to be distinguished from
science, which does not deliberate ;
from guessing (evffToxia), which is too
quick; from sagacity (ayxivoia), which
is a kind of guessing; and from
opinion, which is too definite. It is,
then, a certain Tightness of thought,
it chooses the right means to a good
end. The conception of this end
wisdom itself must supply. There is
a great assumption here of the manner
of Aristotle. The chapter seems
formed after Eth. in. ii. ; 6 reminds
us of many similar passages in Book
IV., and 7 is after the manner of
Eth. i. iii. 5. There is an advance
upon Aristotle's account of delibera-
tion (Eth. m. iii.) in two points, (i)
the process is illustrated here by the
logical formula of the syllogism, -(z)
there is a mention here of the faculty
whereby ends are apprehended, which
Aristotle had left unnoticed. See
Eth. in. iii. i, note.
i It is an abrupt, awkward com-
mencement of the chapter to say,
' enquiring and deliberating are diffe-
rent, for deliberating is a species of
enquiring.' But what is meant appa-
rently is, to bring ' good counsel '
under the head of enquiring, which
separates it at once from both science
and opinion.
171 IieiKflN [EYAHMION] VI. [CHAP.
yap Xo'you xcti rot^u n 73 stIo~TO^a, 3oi/AsuovTai 6s
/ASV st ra^u ra
3 /3ouXsu<r(3aJ $5 |3pa*isaj. STI 73' ayy/vo/a srspov xoti 73'
su/SouA/a* sVr 0* socrro^/a T< T] dy%tvoia. outs STJ %oi*cx.
73' su/3ouA/a oJSsjOua. aXX* STTS) o joisj/ xaxtoj
a/jt-aprai/s/, 6 ' s5 op5a> /SouAsusra/, ^5jXov or*
7J SU/3oyX/a S<TT/l>, OUT* S7n<TTr'j,73 OS OUTS 3o^>3 ' e7TKTTrj[J.Tr)$
oux sVr<v opQoTTjj (ou^s -yap df^apTidJ, 8o'^>j 8'
dhrftsia.' ajaa Ss xa) wpurrai ^'013 ?rav ou oo^a
ecrr/v. a?^,Xa jw.vji' ou^' ai/su Xoyou 73 sJ/3ouX/a. Siavoiaj
apa XsiVsTai ' aurrj yap OUTTO) $d<ri$' xal yap r\ 3o^a ou
aXAa <>acn T/J ^73, 6 8s /SotAswo'/xsvo^, saj/ TS s5
2 0cwrl irpdrrftv ptv Sttv raxv
K. T. \.] Fritzsche quotes Isocr. Demon.
P- 9> c - 35 : ^ov\(iiov /iei> jBpoSewy
frriTe'A.61 Se To^e'i'S TO S^avro. Herod.
vii. 49 : oi/ty> 5^; OPTW &/ eltrj ipiffror,
vi ett).
3 scrrt 6' euffTOxfa ny
This is announced by Aristotle, Postf.
-4/. i. xxxiv. i, in the very next
line to that passage on the distinction
of the organs of truth, which appa-
rently suggested so much of the sub-
jects of the present book, 7] 5' etyxh''"^
ttJTIV (VffTO^ia. TIS ill affKelTTCp \p6vif
roO /jifrrov. In more general terms
a7x^' a is denned by Plato, Charmides,
p. 1 60 A, as ojurrjy Tts T?)J <|ux^ s -
^irKTT^^iTjs /xev Ao-yffeTai] ' Now
in science there is no such thing as
" rightness," for there is no such
thing as wrongness. In opinion, on
the other hand, Tightness is truth.
And besides, whatever we have an
opinion about is already decided.
But good counsel is not by any means
beyond questioning (Svew \6yov).
Therefore it remains that good coun-
sel is a Tightness of the operation of
thought (Siewofas), for this does not
amount to decision. Opinion is not
an inquiry, but is already a kind of
decision. On the other hand, he that
deliberates, whether well or ill, is
inquiring after something and calcu-
lating.'
fwiffr-ftfjais] This is said here just
as it was before said, ch. v. 7, that
there were no degrees of excellence in
wisdom.
5d{7js 5'] Cf. Eth. in. ii. 13, and
above, ch. ii. 2., note.
Stavoias apo] Plato, Eepub. p. 511
D, proposed to confine the term Stdvota
to the discursive understanding as
opposed to yoOy, the intuitive and
speculative reason, tiidvomv 8 /caAeii/
/XOt 5o/<?S T^IV T(6V yfUfJifTplKWV Tf Kal
T&IV TWV TOIOVTUV flV CtAA.' Oil VOW, d)S
/jLtra^v ri SdjTjs re Kal vov T^V Sidvotav
olffav. Aristotle probably had the same
distinction in view, Post. Anal. i. xxxiii.
9 (/. c.), TtSj 87 SiavcTyuai liri T Siavoias
Kal vov. But he did not maintain the
distinction in his works, and certainly
it is not observed by Eudemus in the
present book, where both vovs Trpax-
nicos and Siaroia OtcapriTiicfi are spoken
of. In the place before us tidvoia
apparently means the exercise of
reason, a process of thought. _
IX.]
HOlKiiN [EYAIIMmN] VI.
175
xa) o 4>atiAo o Trpor/-
COPTS oQtb
av TS xaxtoi,* (ouXsur^ra/, TJTS r<
op&^TYfg rig sfTTiv TI s'j$o'j?ua |3ouX$jf' oo TJ
TTptbrov ri xa/ Trsp) r/. ETrei 8' 13 op$o'rr;
8>j?\.ov on oJ 7ra<ra* o yap
Qsrai IftsTv IK rou
=/3ouAu/Avo, xaxov
TO sO /3s|3ou?\.Do-6a< ' 73 yap
, T] ayaQov TSVXTWTJ. aAX* g(rn xa) roJrou 5
UOsT (ruXXoyTjatt> rwp/so, xa) o jtxst/ os? 7roir t (rai TU^SJV,
VCvJ V >-_\ I >- \ / r/ ? r/ > JINJ
ou o ou, aAAa ysy^^ rov jU,eo~ov opov eva/ * a>o~T ooo
TTW cu^ouX/a, x6' r]v ou Ss? /xev Twyp^aj/si, ou (J.SVTOI
4 eirel 8' /3e/80uA.eDer(?ai] ' But
since the term " rightness " is used in
more senses than one, it is plain that
" good counsel" does not answer to all
the senses. For the incontinent or
bad man will obtain, by his calcula-
tion, what he proposes to himself,
so that he will have deliberated
rightly, yet secured a great evil.
Whereas, to have deliberated well is
generally thought (SoKr) to be a good.'
ir\tova-xG>i\ i. e. Rightness of means,
either respective, or irrespective, of
rightness in the end ; or, again,
rightness of end (5), whatever may
have been the means.
6 yap a.Kpar'fts] It would seem rather
the abandoned man (d/cdAcwTOs) who
by calculation attains bad ends. The
incontinent man would not generally
have deliberation attributed to him,
cf. Eth. VH. ii. 2. But the characters
cannot be kept very distinct.
JSeTv] Perhaps iSetv may be taken
here as equivalent to something like
ffnoirw. The Scholiast offers the fol-
lowing loose explanation : ft ykp 6
aKpa.T$)s Kal air\us 6 <pa,v\os irporide-
rai, us reAoy iStiir, tfroi (TKcif/acrdat
Swois aiiroD tirtTi;erc K.T.A.
8o/ce? &' aya.Q6v] Fritzsche quotes
Herod, vii. 10: rb yap e3 /3ouAeJe<r0ai
KfpSos (j-fyiffrov fvpiffKw 46i>. Sopho-
cles, Antig. 1050: KpaTurrov Krufidrtav
fv&ou\ia. Isocr. Denwn.p. 9. c. 35 :
Tjyov KpariffTov flvai Trapa /utv TWC 6fji/
fVTVx'iav, irapa Se rm.iav av-rSiv ev/3ov\iav.
5 a\\' Zffri fivcu] ' But, further,
it is possible to obtain what is good
by a false syllogism ; to obtain what
one ought to do, not however by the
right means, but with a false middle
term.' Great indefiniteness is intro-
duced here by the word itoirjffai. We
could not surely be said ' to obtain
what we ought to do ' by the wrong
means. Doing a thing is means not
end (cf. Eth. m. iii. 15), or if looked
at as end, it is end inseparable from
the means. Again, it is an inaccu-
racy to speak of a ' false middle term.'
Falsehood or truth is the attribute of
a proposition not a term, cf. De Inter-
pret, i. 3 : ire pi yap ffvvBfffiv Kal Sial-
pefflv IffTi ri> fyfvSos Kal r\> a\ri6es.
If the conception of the end be right
and yet the syllogism wrong, it follows
that the minor premiss must be false,
thus :
Preservation of health is good :
Abstinence from intellectual labour is
preservation of health :
the result of which syllogism will be
the preservation of health, but by the
sacrifice of mental culture.
17G
II0IKQN [EYAHMIQN] VI.
[CHAP.
STJ
6 o< ou s6si. sri sffn TTOAUJ/ ^povov
TOV 8s Tvu. ouxouv ou8' exsivi) TTw evfioifoia, a.
7 TJ xara TO eo^e^/jaov, xai o3 8s? xal co^ xa< OTS.
aTrXto^ 73 TTOO^ TO TsXo^ TO a7rAtt> xaTop3ouo~a, 73' 8s
TTpo'^ TJ TSXOJ. Si 67J TtOV QpOVlfJ.O)V TO SU
73' su3 u ^' a 6 "3 av opfloTTj^ 73' xaTa TO o-ujac^spov
TsAo^, ou r) <ppovr l (ric; aXTjoTj
IO "Eo~T 8s xai 73 (ruvso"/^ xa<
xai ao~uvsYou, oua oAtoj; TO auTo S7no~T7}jU/v3 73
T<
6 7 The writer first raises good
counsel to the rank of one of the vir-
tues, by the mention of all the quali-
fications necessary; afterwards he
seems to modify this by saying that,
besides the absolute good counsel
which aims at the absolute end, there
is also siich a thing as relative good
counsel aiming at relative ends.
One might have thought that it was
unnecessary to give so separate a
psychological existence to excellence
in deliberation. However, the quality
here described answers more nearly
than <pp6rt)ffis to what we call ' pru-
dence.' $p6m)<ris, we are here told,
is the conception of ends, and after-
wards (ch. xii. 9) it is shown to be
the faculty of means. In truth, it is
both, according to the Aristotelian
views (as far as we can discern them) ;
it implies both prudence (fi>fiov\la),
and also a certain moral condition
(optTT)), and it is implied by both of
them. As compared with the one it
is of ends, and as compared with the
other it is of means.
X. This chapter treats of another
faculty which forms an element in
wisdom, and yet may be distinguished
from it, namely, apprehension (afof-
<m). Apprehension is not mere
opinion (else all would possess it),
nor is it a science, for it deals with no
separate class of objects whether
necessary or contingent (ofrrt -yap irtpl
TWV lid OVTWV Kol &KiviiTu>v i] fftWcn's
taTiv, oi/re irepl rSiv yiyvofifvuv drou-
ovii). It deals with all that can be
matter of human deliberation, in
short, with the same objects as wis-
dom. But wisdom commands, it is
concerned with right action, in short>
it belongs to the will as well as
to reason. But apprehension only
judges, it is merely intellectual. It
is neither the having nor the getting
wisdom, but rather it is the applica-
tion of one's knowledge to give a
meaning to the dicta of wisdom. It
is 'understanding,' as its name im-
plies, or 'taking in' ((rwieVat), when
another speaks. The word appears
to mean ' combination,' ' joining one
thing to another."
Aristotle had spoken of <rvvf<ns as
one of the intellectual excellencies,
Etk. I. xiii. 20 : ffo<f>iai> (jikv KOL\ abvtaw
Hal (pporqcnv Siavo^rtKas. Eudemus
does not apply the term 4pr^ to this,
or to any of the other intellectual
qualities which he treats of, except
wisdom and philosophy. He gives
here a psychological account of tnJve-
<ns, the operation of which he con-
fines to intellectual insight with regard
to moral subjects, apprehension of
IX. X.]
[EYAHMmN] VI.
177
yap av r^trav crvvsTol) OUTS rig [JLLO. TO>V xaTa
olov laTpixy Trsp} vyisivwv r) ysa)[j.*Tpia
[j.sysQov$ ' OUTS yap Trsp} rcov as} OVTCOV xai axivyTcov
(ruvso~is l(TTiv OU'T Trsp} TCOV yiyvopevcov OTOUOUV,
Trsp/ o>v aTropya-sisv civ rig xa} /3ouAsuo~a<TO. 8<o 7rsp< ret
aura jaev ry $povr)(rei SFTIV, oux e<rri 8s raurov <ruvso"j
xa/ <$>povr}(7i$ YI fj.lv yap t$>povrj(ri$ liriTaxrixri sa-riv ' T/Z
yap 5? Trpdrrsiv y py, TO rsAof aur?jf e<7r/v * 75 8s
xpiTixi) [J.MOV TavTov yap
TO} xa} sv<rvvsTOi. S<TTI $'
core TO Xaja|3avij/ rf <ruv(ri$
(rvvisvat, orav p^p^ra
TJJ 80^75 STT/ ro xpivsiv Trep TOVTCOV Trsp wv y
<$>povr)(ri<; (rriv, aXXoy hsyovTog, xa} xpiveiv xaXcoj' TO
sixrvvso'ia
(Titvs-
w(nrsp TO
ovTtug sv Tip
the meaning of moral dicta and
critical judgment thereon. That
there is such a faculty of apprehen-
sion, and of sympathetic or critical
understanding, quite distinct from
moral goodness in people, the expe-
rience of life seems to show.
The author of the Magna Moralia
gives a much inferior account of
ffweffis (i. xxxv. 17), making its cha-
racteristic to be that it deals with
small matters, trepl /Mipuv re nal v
fniKpols f] Kplffn.
I Sib Ttfpl TO. afrra. fjifv rfj <poi''7j(rei]
It is used nearly equivalently to
(t>p6vi)(ns by Thucyd. i. 140: At/cotaJTOts
Kotvfj 56affus, fy &pa TL Kal ff<t>a\\<a-
fjifOa,, ^ot]Qflv, fy /j.rjSe KaropOovvras ri)s
vveat(as fj-erairoif'ta'dai.
z ri /j.ev yap <pp6vtiffis eirtraKTin-f)
(niv r/ Se ffvveffit KpniK^i fj.6vov\ The
opposition of these terms is taken
from Plato, Politicus, p. 259 E
260 c, where it is argued that the
arithmetician (Xo-yicn-^s) is content
with a knowledge and judgment about
numbers, whereas the architect (apxt-
TCKTUV} must go on to apply his know-
VOL. II. A
ledge by directing the workmen thus
that all science may be divided under
the two heads of critical and manda-
tory. (260 A) OUKOVV yv taff-riKol fj.tv at
irovrat TT; \oyitrTtKrj, Kpiffei 8e Kal tiri-
rci|et $ta<pfp*rov a\\-tiXoiv TOUT* T&>
yevee ;<pa(vf(r6oi>. 'Ap' olv <rvp.Traaj]s
TrjS yiKuxrTiKrjs el -rb [iei> eiriTOiCTt/cbv
fiepos, Tb Se Kpirtitbv Siaipovfuvot
irpoa'fl'iroifj.fy, ffjLfie\ws tip <patfjLfi>
SiypriffBat ; Kara ye T)]V pd)v 56av.
3 a\\' &ffirep rb jj.avQa.veiv \eyerai
crvvievai '6rav xprjrat rrj eirur-rriftp]
The word /j.av6ai/eii/ was ambiguous in
Greek, it meant either to ' learn ' or
to ' understand.' The Sophists used
to play on this ambiguity, arguing
that one could ' learn what one knew
already.' Cf. Ar. Soph. Elench. iv. i,
2, which illustrates the present pas-
sage : EiVl Se iropa /j.ev T^V 6p.uwfj.lav
ol TototSe TO>V \6ycav, olov Srt fj.avQa-
vovaiv ol eiriaTafnevoi TO yap airo-
ffTOf*aTi6[H(i>a /j.av6dvovvtv ol ypap.fia-
riKot. Tb yap fj.avQa.veiv 6/j.<Jivvfi.ot>, "r6
re fwievcu xp&fj.ei'oi' rp ^TTiffT^ftj? Kal
rb
178
[EYAHMIQN] VI.
[CHAP.
4 yap s Tto xa?uo ravTov. xa
(TVVS(ri$, Xatf TjV SV(TVVSTQl, SX TT}$ SV TO)
yap TO fj.avQa.vetv (rvvtevai TroKKaxig.
II 'H 8s xaAou/Ai5 7Vtt>jU,7j, xaS* ^v zvyvaifJiovag xa}
<>a,V yva)[J.7)V, T] TOU 7ns/xou eVri xp'urig op^y. <rr l [j.iiov
8s' TOV yap 7njxrj jOtaXiOTa Qapsv slvai (rvyyva)[j.ovixov t
S^' J"a (ruyyvw^v. 73 SE <r\jyyvu)^.t]
rou eV<<xou oO>. o9 8' > rou
xa STTisixg TO
8s Tra<rai a.\ s%s
yap vu)tV xa\
iv xa
roue; auToug sm&spovTes yvdopyv s
rauro
V xa] vovv
xa vovv ^815 xat
aurai TO>V
(rvara>v sJcri xa/ rtov xa6' sxaorov, xa) sv /xv TO)
XI. This chapter (which is not
conveniently divided as it stands)
opens with a mention of the quality
of considerateness (yt><6fj.ij), and pro-
ceeds to point out how various quali-
ties unite in wisdom, and what are
the natural and intuitive elements
which it contains.
i 77 8e Ka\ovfj.ftrr) yvdijja{\ By the
progress of psychology, this term came
to bear the special meaning of ' consi-
derateness.' At first it meant know-
ledge in general, cf. Theognis, w.
? 9 5 sq.
8' ovStv &fj.ftvoi> ain]p t%fi avrbs
OuS' ayvtanoffvirns, Kvpv,
In Thucydides it bore a variety of
significations, especially when used in
the plural, standing for almost any-
thing mental, ' minds ' as opposed to
bodies, ' thoughts ' as opposed to
deeds ; ' feelings,' ' principles,' ' max-
ims,' &c. In Aristotle's Rhetoric, n.
xxi. 2 15, yvu>ft.i} is used for a moral
maxim (such as those of the so-called
Gnomic Poets) ; so also, for all
popular sayings, Soph. El. xvii. 17.
It was probably from the association
of ffvyyvt&fjiii that yv<i>fj.i] came to have
its distinctive meaning. The author
of the Magna Moralia calls it evyrai-
(j.offvi>ii, and makes it a sort of passive
form of ^Jnef/ceia (n. ii. i) : Kern ptv
o5c ou/c &vfv tirieiKelas ?'; tvyvcajj-oovtrr)
rb fiev yap Kplvau. rov fvyvii>/j.oi>os t fb 8e
STJ irpdmiv KOTO, rfji/ Kplffiv rov
truuetSs,
In the text above, it is said that
' considerateness is a right judgment
of the equitable man.' ' Pardon is a
right critical considerateness of the
equitable man.'
op9^] 8" >) ToC a\Tj0oCj] ' Now by a
right judgment is meant a true one.'
This must be the import of the sen-
tence, but the writer says not oAijfl^T,
but rov a\r)9ovs probably ' by attrac-
tion ' to rov iirtfiKovs. But it is an
inaccuracy of language to speak of ' a
true man ' in the sense of ' a man
whose judgment is true.' Eudemus,
as we have seen (ch. ii. 2, note),
is inclined to confine the application
of opOds to acts of the desire and will.
2 tla-l 8 &\\ov] 'Now all the
(above-mentioned) conditions of mind
X. XI.]
IieiKilN [EYAHMIiiN] VI.
179
elvai TTSpl wv o ^povi[j.og, <rvvsro$ xa\ svyvfopcuv 73
(j.(uv ' rot. yap eTTisixTf] xoiva rwv ayaQtbv aTrdvrcov s<rrlv ev
TO) TTpOg aAAOV. SfTTt OS TCOV Xa6' Xa(TTa XO.} rwV S(T%a- 3
7ra.vrot.ra. TTpaxrd' xal yap rov <$>povi[j.ov $ii yivuMrxsiv
xai ] cruvscr*^ xai 73 yvro^avj Trsp) ra Trpaxra, ravra
8' e(r%ara. xa< o vouc rtov <rpaTa>y JTT' a^Qorspa xa) 4
yap TCOV TTpwrwv opcov xa} rwv eV^arajv i/owj <rr) xa* ou
xai 6 jU-sv xara rag a7ro8s/=< rcov ax/vTjrajv opcov
naturally tend to the same point ; we
apply (eirKpepovTfs') the terms consi-
derateness, apprehension, wisdom, and
reason to the same persons, and say
(\tyofjLfv) that they have considerate-
ness, that they have attained to (^8?j)
reason that they are wise that they
are apprehensive. For all these
faculties deal with immediate truths
(TWV eVxaTwj') and particulars ; and
it is by being able to judge of those
matters with which the wise man is
concerned, that a man is apprehen-
sive, considerate, or forgiving. Equity
extends itself over all the forms of
good which consist in a relation to
one's neighbour.'
vovv ^8?j] What this means is not
quite clear. It may refer to what is
said in 6, j}8e ri ri\iKia vovv ex 6 '-
Thus it might be nearly equivalent to
our saying of a person that he had
' attained to years of discretion.' Or
again, it may refer to the moment of
action, and ^877 would be thus equiva-
lent to the French voila. ' There is
reason exhibited.' "HS?/ is used
similarly to denote the present
moment, Eth. End. n. viii. 1 1 : Kai
yap 6 eyKparev6fj,evos \\nreirat irapa
TTJJ/ firi6v/j.iav irp&ntav ijSri, Kai ^atpfi
T))V air' e\iri$os r]Sovf)f, art vartpov
vyiatvtav.
ra yap eTrtejKTj] This is said because
yvufjLTi and ffvyyvufjnj are acts of
equity. Cf. Eth. v. x. i, note.
A A
4 5 Kai & vovs rwv c<TX&T<av
v oi/s] ' And reason is of the ultimates
at both ends of the series. Both the
first and the last terms are appre-
hended, not by inference, but by
reason. On the one hand, the scien-
tific and demonstrative reason (6 /j.ev
Kara ras a7ro5et|6is) apprehends those
terms which are immutable and
primary. And on the other hand,
the practical reason (6 eV TOWS irpaic-
TIKO?S) apprehends the particular
(eVxoTov) and contingent truth, and
the minor premiss. For these con-
stitute the sources of our idea of the
end, the universal being developed
out of the particulars. Of these par-
ticulars, then, one must have percep-
tion, and this perception is reason^
The writer having before (in 3) con-
nected the faculties of ' apprehension,'
&c., with wisdom, on the ground of
their all being concerned with par-
ticulars (fo-xora), proceeds to include
reason (vovs} under the same category,
and says that this apprehends lo-x^Ta
at both ends of the series. But now
comes in a piece of confusion which
is thoroughly Eudemian, for he goes
on to say that the scientific reason
apprehends first truths or principles
(cf. ch. vi.), while the practical
reason apprehends last terms or par-
ticulars. To mix up considerations
of the scientific reason with the
present discussion is to introduce
what is entirely irrelevant. We see
2
180 IieiKilN [EYAIIMlflN] VI. [CHAP.
xa} TrpwTwv, o 8' sv ra7$ TTpaxTixafg TOO er^aTou xa\
yao TOU ov
5 svsxa aural ' sx rtov xa$' exaa"Ta yap TO xaSoAou. TOUTCOV
8/0 xa/
6 s;/e<v xa erui/stnt/ xa< vov. (TTjjU-eov or/ xa<
xiai olojasfia axoAouSsTi/, xa* >j|8s rj rfhixia vouv sp^si xai
cog r% ^^s^ ? curias ov(rri$. S/o xa) app^^ xcu
here a bringing together of two things
which were before placed in contrast
with each other (ch. viii. 9), namely,
the reason which apprehends first
principles, and wisdom apprehending
particular facts (^(TX^TWJ/). In the
present passage, what was before
called wisdom (<ppovi)ffis) is called
reason (vovs), and it is said that
reason is the faculty which perceives
or apprehends the particukr in moral
subjects (fv TCUS irpanriKius). This,
then, is the main purport of the
present remarks. Setting aside as
irrelevant what is said of the scien-
tific reason, we learn that the moral
judgment is intuitive, that moral in-
tuitions are to be attributed to the
reason, and that out of these par-
ticular intuitions the moral universal
grows up. When stripped of its
ambiguities of statement, the sense of
the passage becomes unexceptionable.
We may compare it with the in-
cidental observations of Aristotle,
Eth. I. iv. 7 : 'Apx^J 7^P T & STI ' fal el
Touro <pa.lvoi.TO apicovvTcas, oiiSei/ irpoir-
St-fiffti rov Sirfri. 6 8e TOIOVTOS ^ e% 6t
^ X<j3ot &i/ apx&s paHtais. Ib. vii. 20 :
iKa.v'bv Zv rtffi rb 8rt StixQrivai Ka\ws,
olov Kal irepl rcks apxds rb 8" on
irpioTov /col apx'h. The expression of
Eudemus is not so strong as that of
Aristotle. Eudemus says IK run Kaff
e/coTTa TO KaOoA-ju. while Aristotle
said apxh TO 8ri. The latter must be
true if reason be the organ by which
the fact is apprehended, for reason is
in itself universal, and whatever it
apprehends must be of the nature of
the universal.
apxal yap rov ov tvtKa. ourat] This
is similar in form of expression to ch.
iii. 3 : fi ju^y STJ eTrccyo^}) apx'fl tvri
KO.I rov Ka66\ov. On ov (vtKa see
below, ch. xii. 10, note.
aSrri 8' &rr! vovs~\ To say that
' reason is a perception of particulars '
is only the counterpart of Aristotle's
saying that we can have 'a perception
of universals.' Eth. i. vii. 20 : riav
&PX0V ou pfv cuo-Q-ficret Ottapovvrai. Ari-
stotle expresses the intuitive character
of reason by saying that it ' touches '
its object. Cf. Metaphys. vm. x. 5 :
rb fj.ev Qiyflv Kal <pdi>at aArjfley ....
rb 8" ayvoelv ^ Qiyydvfiv. Ib. xi. vii.
8 : avrbj' 8e voti 6 vovs /caret fj.tr d.\i\tyiv
rov voyrov vorjrbs yap ylyverai
diyydviav Kal vo>v, &<rre ravrbv vovs
Kal j/oTjroV. That reason, while it is
on the one hand intuitive, is on the
other hand developed by experience,
we learn from the discussions in Post.
Anal. ii. ch. xix. The same is ex-
pressed above in the saying that
' reason is the beginning and the end.'
5 6 8(b Kal <pv<rtKa bpQus~\
' Hence it is that these faculties are
thought to come naturally, and that
although no one without conscious
effort (<pv<rei) gets to be a philosopher,
men do get naturally to have con-
siderateness, and apprehension, and
XI. XII.] 1IOIKON [EYAHMIiiN] VI.
181
vovg ' K TQJTWV yap at a7rojf,* xa rrsp TOVTWV.
3s7 7rpO(T%lV TtOV [J.7TlpO)V XOil 7rpIT^i>TpU)V ^ Cb/ 50 "
yiftfOV raug avaTToGzlxTois QOKTSO-I xau (io^ais ou% TJTTOV TWV
(t)v' Sia -yap TO e%siv ex r% ifwtpia$ o^aa o'pco-
op$a>. TI ijt.lv oov IcrTtv ij <poyij<n xa) 75 ero<>/a, xaJ 7
r/va sxarepa Tuyp^avst or)<ra, xa* or/ aXAou
av
aurtov
etriv. 12
reason. A proof of this is, that we
think they ought successively to appear
as age advances, and ("we say that)
such and such an age possesses reason
and considerateness, as if these things
came from nature. Hence reason is
the beginning and the end, the matter
of premises and conclusions is the
same. Thus we must pay regard to
the unproved assertions and opinions
of the elderly and experienced, or of
the wise, no less than to demonstra-
tions. For, from having obtained
the eye of ' old experience,' they see
aright.' In these excellent remarks
the subject is brought round again
to the contrast between philosophy
and wisdom. The former never
comes naturally, but the latter does.
The nature of reason, and its growth
in the mind, is illustrated by the
common fact of the respect paid to
age.
TOVTUV (cal irepl rointov~\ Cf. Eth.
I. iii. 4 : irepl roiovrosv ai e/c TOIOVTUV
\eyoirras. The ' subject ' of the
demonstration is the conclusion, cf.
Eth. I. viii. I : ~S,KfKTfov . . . ov \i6vov
eVc TOV ffvfj.TTfpdfffiaT05 Kal &v 6 \6yos.
ofj.pa] Cf. Eth. i. vi. 12 : ws yap eV
ffti>nmi &J/is, tv tyvxji vovs. Plato,
Eepub. p. 533 D : tv Pop&6py 0ap-
j8apiK(J! rivl rb TTJS <J"'X'} S W
Ka.TOpwpvytJ.fvov fyf/JM f\K(i Kal avdyet
XII. In this and the following
chapter, by mooting the question, of
what use are wisdom and philosophy ?
the writer shows the relation of the
two qualities to each other, and the
inseparable connexion existing be-
tween wisdom and virtue. The fol-
lowing difficulties are first stated.
(1) Philosophy is not practical, it does
not consider at all the means to
happiness, how then can it be useful ?
(2) Wisdom, on the other hand,
though it treats of happiness, might
be said to be mere knowledge. It
might be said that a man no more acts
well from having this knowledge of
the good, than he is well from having
a knowledge of medicine. (3) Or
again, if wisdom be useful for telling
us how to be good, why not get this
advice from others ? Why should it
be necessary to have wisdom, any
more than it is to learn medicine,
when one can go to a doctor ? (4) If
philosophy be better than wisdom,
how is it that the latter controls the
former? The answer to question (i)
is, that both philosophy and wisdom
are good in themselves, and desirable
as being perfections of our nature,
even, though they were not useful as
means to anything beyond. But they
are not without results. Philosophy,
if it does not serve as an instrument
to happiness, is identical with happi-
182
[EYAHMIQN] VI.
[CiiAr.
TOUTO
yap ear/ ygi/eVsa)^), >] Os
svs/, aAAa T/VO svsxa 8s7 auT%, fftrcp vj
rj 7Tp* ra Sixaia xa/ xaAa xa< ayaSa av#pa>7ru>,
0* serriv a rou ayafloG eVriv aj/8po 7rpaTT<v, outisv
s 7TpaxTiXtt>TSpoi TO> si^sWi aura
ap
srai
ra
ra>
scog slvou Xsyerai
TTJJ/ Jarpjxvjv xa)
s(Tfj.sv. si 8s /x^ Tourtov %dpiv $>povi[j.ov SSTS'OV aXXa
vstrSaj, TO? o5(ri (nrou$aioi<; ovdlv av si'vj xprja-ipos, STI
ouOs TOU; /x^ e^outriv oi^sv yap 8<o/<re/ aurou^ ep^fi'V ^
T* o< av r'txTv (S<nrs xoii
ness itself. Questions (2) and (3) are
answered by showing the relation of
wisdom to virtue. Virtue gires the
right aim, and wisdom the right
means. They are inseparable from
one another. "Wisdom without virtue
would be mere cleverness apt to
degenerate into cunning, and virtue
without wisdom would be a mere gift
of nature, a generous instinct capable
of perversion. While thus inseparable
from virtue, wisdom is not to be
identified with it. In this respect
an advance has been made beyond the
crude formula of Socrates. Wisdom
accompanies the virtues, and is a sort
of centre-point to them all (fi/ta rrj
Qpoirfjfffi /J.M oCffjj irafftu virtipovffiv,
xiii. 6). Question (4) is easily an-
swered, since wisdom rather ministers
to philosophy than thinks of controll-
ing it.
I oi>5juias ydp iffn yevffffus]
Suggested perhaps by Eth. x. vii. 5,
where it is said of the OfuprrrtK^ Ivtp-
ytta ouSic ykp for* ourijf ylvfrcu
rapa. rb Bfiiiprjffai. Ib. 7 : SoKfi . . .
irap' aur^iv ovSfvos 4<pifffOau Tf\ovs.
(iirtp rj nev <pp6rriffls Iffnv fi trtpl ri
SiKcua Kal Ka\a Kal ayada avOpuTrip]
' If wisdom be that which is concerned
with things just and noble and good
for man.' 'H is indefinite, being
probably feminine on account of the
preceding <pp6in)<ris. This passage is
the first that asserts strongly the
moral nature of wisdom. We are
told here that wisdom takes cognizance
of the just and the noble ; before it
was only said to be concerned with
what was good (irepl TO avQpdnrtva.
aya6d, ch. \. 6). These conclud-
ing discussions about <pp6njffts show
the inadequacy of the term 'prudence,'
by which it has been so often trans-
lated, really to represent it.
ovSfv S( ir pour iK<aT pot rep eiStvai
airrd] The answer to this objection
has virtually been already given, ch.
v. 8 : where tppdvriffis was said not
to be a merely intellectual quality.
2 fi Se (j.^i TrdBtffOai] 'But sup-
pose we assume that a man is wise
not for this object (i.e. mere know-
ledge of virtue), but with a view to
becoming (virtuous), we must then
concede that to those who are virtuous
wisdom will be of no use ; but neither
will it be so to those who have not
got (virtue), for there will be no
difference whether they have (wisdom)
themselves, or follow the advice of
XII.]
IieiKiiN [ETAHMIQN] VI.
183
yap
ou
yV. TTpOg 8s TOUTO/ CtTOTTOV O.V SlVOLl $0%ISV, 3
ei %sipa)v r% orocfc/a^ ou<ra xvpiwrspa, aurrtf stTTai ij -yap
7rojou<ra app< *o STTITOLTTSI irspi sxacrrov. Trspt 8>j
rourtov hXTov * vui/ jOtev yap ifjropqrai Trsp) aurtov [JLQVOV.
ovv Aeyojasv or< xa6' a'jrag avayxaiov alpsra4
xai el ^r) 7ro<ou<r< JUTJ^SV ju-TjSsrepa aurtov. STTSITOC. xa.} 5
^tsv, oJ^ to^ larpixr) Ss vyisiav, aXX* a>^ 73 uylsia,
ia. ev$aifj.oviot.v ' pepos yap o5(ra
TO) sj(rQot.i TrojsT xa) ra> li/spysTv suOa//jtova. sn 6
others possessing it.' The compres-
sion used here is quite in the style of
Eudemus, and so is the confusion
caused by the careless writing in rot's
juij fxovffiv ovBev yap Sioifffi avrovs
fX lv > where ex owr " / an d ex 6 " 7 appear
to refer to two different things.
3 et \eipwTT\s ffotyias ovcraKvpiiarfpa
avrrjs tarai] This difficulty may have
been partly suggested by the promi-
nent position assigned to wisdom in
the present book (cf. ch. vii. 7 : efij
8" iy T1S KCll eiToOflo OpXlTfKTCWK^),
partly by the authoritative character
attributed to politics by Aristotle,
Eth. i. ii. 4 6 : S6fie 8" &/ TT}S
roiauTT} 5" ^ iroAtTJK'Jj <t>aiverat K. r. A.
Cf. Plato on the Paffi\iid] rt'xi^),
Euthydem. p. 291 B, quoted Vol. I.
Essay III. p. 140.
4 Wisdom and philosophy cannot
be otherwise than desirable, as they
are the best state of the human mind.
And the mind must necessarily
(avuyKaiov) desire its own best state.
5 fit fir a evSaipova] 'Further-
more they do produce happiness
philosophy produces it, not in the
way that medicine produces health,
but rather it operates like health
itself. Being a part of the entire
well-being (rfjs SA.TJS operas) of man,
it makes one happy by the con-
sciousness of possessing it.'
TTJS SA.IJS operas] This phrase, which
never occurs in the writings of Ari-
stotle, is frequent in those of Eude-
mus. Cf. Eth. End. n. i. 9 : KO.\ e<m
fail K&1 T\ea KO! areA^jj, teal aper^
uffavrias (T? fjLfV yhp S\rj, rf 8e fMopiov).
Ib. 14: 5ib Koi &\\o elf TI p.6pwf tcrri
<faix^ s . <fi v r ^> Qpeirriicdv, TI TOUTOV
aperij OVK tffri /j.6piov TTJS 5Ar?s aptTijs.
Eth. End. iv. (Nic. v.) ii. 7 : Sri /icy
o$v flffl 5iKaw<rvvai ir\eiovs, Kal Sri
tern ris Kal ertpa irapa T)JJ/ 8Arj)/ apfr^v,
SfjAoj/. Ib. 10 : fi fjikv abv KOTO, rty
This conception Eudemus came to
identify with KoXoKayaQla, Eth. End.
VIII. iii. i : Kara [ifpos fn.fi> ovv irtpl
fKdffrrjs aptrris ftprirai irp6repov 4irfl
8e x"^ 5 Sifi\ofjii> r^jv tivvafjuv ainiav,
Ka\ irtpl rrjs aperJjs SiapQpwTfov TTJS IK
rovrwv, fy (Ka\ov/j.fv ^87; Ka\oKaya-
6iay.
r$ f^ftrBai Kal fvfpyfiv~\ 'Evfpytiv
added on to ilxfffOai expresses the
fruition, as well as the possession, of
philosophy. It implies that philo-
sophy exists not only in, but for, the
mind. See Vol. I. Essay IV. pp.
193-196.
6 rt rovrov\ ' Again, man's
proper function is discharged by an
184
TO
IIGIKilN [EYAIIMIilN] VI.
XOtTO. T^V <J
[CHAP.
xou
xa\ rr t v rfitxyv
75 [J.sv yot-P apsTTJ rov (TXOTTOV Trots? opwo'v, TJ 8s
TO. Trpog TOUTOV. rou 8s TSTapTou popiov
OUX <mV CtpSTTJ TOiaUTTJ, TOU fyjSTTT/XOU ' OU$SV
7 STT aurio Trpdrreiv 13 JU,TJ TTpdrrsiv. Trspl 85 TOU ju,
?va TTpaxrtxwrspovs 6ia TTJV <$>povr l (riv ra>v
^/xa/cov, jtuxpov avwQsv apxreov, Aa3ovra
(o<T7rep yap xai ra S/xa/a Xsyojtxjv TrpaTTovrag nva$ OUTTCO
ixauou eTvai, olov TOUJ ra UTTO rtov vo'jacov Tsra.yfj.iva.
7roiovvra$ ^ axovra^ ^ 8t' ciyvoiav 73 1' srspov n xai /JLTJ
' a (xa/ro< 7rpdrrov(rl ys a 8sT xa< o(ra ^pr) TOJ/
SOIXSV, S(TTl TO TTtO^ %OVTa TTpCtTTSJV
S T ^ \ '
6 o^ov 6<a TToaisfriv
exao~Ta eoo~T
8 xa<
TO
ov 7rpoap=<riv
7Te4>UX TTpGtT-
accordance with wisdom and moral
virtue. For virtue makes the aim
right, and wisdom the means to the
attainment of this.' The conception
of rb Kjryov is taken from AT. -EM.
i. vii. 10. The rest of the psychology
here is different from that of Aristotle
(see ^A. ni. v. i, note), but is
identical with that adopted by Eude-
mus in his earlier books. Cf. ^A.
.EW. ii. xi. I : Tovrtiiv 5e
\fy<a/j.v ir6Tfpoi> f] aper))
itoifl T$IV irpoatpfffiv Kol rb reAos op66v,
ovrus SiffTt ou evfica Set irpoaiptiaOcu,
J) Sxnrep SoKti TKTI, rbv A^or. "Etrrt
5e TOUTO ejKpdreta afjrn yb.p ov
Stcupdeipfi ritv \6yov. y E<m 8" aptr^i
Kai tyKpdrfia erepov. A.fKTtov 5"
Sffrepov irfpl canwv (this refers to
ch. v. 6, where, however, artaippo-
ffwi) is substituted for fryKparfia).
Ib. 3 : ir6rfpov 5* ^ iper^j irote? rbv
ffucnrbv ^ ra irpby rbv ffKOir6v ; Ti6f-
fieOa 8^j 8r rbv ffKoir&v, 8Jri TOVTOV OVK
tern ffv\\oyi(r/j.bs ou8e A<$<yos. 75. 6,
quoted below.
roD 8 -Tf-rdprov K.T.\.~\ Cf. J5XA. SZ.
n. i. 14 (I.e.). There is apparently
an attempt here to bring tinder one
view the functions of the different
parts of human nature, in relation to
morality. On irp&rrfi, see ch. ii.
2, note.
7 The first step to prove the use
and practical necessity of wisdom, is
to show that moral action implies con-
sciousness and a conscious purpose.
8 rty fi.ev Swdfifus] ' Now virtue
makes the purpose right, but the
means to this (tfcra ^Kfimjs tvtKa -xf-
<pvicf n-paTTeaOai) do not belong to
virtue, but to another faculty.' There
is some confusion here in speaking of
the means to a purpose, irpoaiptffts
itself being in the Aristotelian psycho-
logy a faculty of means ; but cf. Eth.
Eud. n. xi. 5 6, where irpoaipfa-is is
said to imply both end and means,
and whence the present passage is
repeated almost verbatim. *EffT< yap
traaa itpoaipeffis TIJ/OS ACO! fvticd rifos.
Ou ft^v oZv tvfica. rb fj.fffof iariv, ov
curia, r) aperi] -rb (rtf, Fritzsche, e
conj.) fpoaipfiaQii uv tVe/co. "Effn
XII.]
HOIKilN [EYAHMIQN] VI.
185
oux scrri TTfi apSTTjS aXX srspas ouva|,=eo. ASXTSOJ/
tyforspov Trsp] aurcov. eVn 875 TJ Suva- 9
r t v xaXou<n SSJVOTTJTCI* auT>j ' sVr< ro/aur^ axrrs TO.
7rpo$ TOV yTTOTcSs'vra (rxo/rov (TuvTsivovTot. 8uva<r$a/ raDra
xa.} Twy%dvsiv a'jrSiV. av fj.lv ouv o erxo7rci Y
S7rouv=rrj so^Tiv, av 8s cauXo, Travoupy/a' 8/0 xai
roue <$>poviij.r)v$ <$5ivoo xa) 7ravo<jpyo'j <$a[j.sv sJvai. S<TTI 10
8' TJ ^poyi}<ri$ oop^ >] Sfjvorr^, aXX' oux avsu T
Taurr ; . >] 8' l^ij r) o^an rouro) yivsrai
oux avsu afTr 5 sirra/ r= xa)
ot -yap
T roiovfis
(itvToi, r\ irpoaipeffis ov TOVTOV, a\\a
TCJOV TOVTOV fVfKa. Tb fj.ev ovv Tvyxd-
vtiv TOVTUV &\\rjs Svvdu-fws, Saa eveica
rod reAous Se? irpa/TTeiv TOV Se Tb
TeAos opObi' elvai rrjs TrpoaipeVewy, o5 -^
curia.
8 10 KfKTfov 8' a7a0Jj/] ' But
we must speak on the point with a
more exact attention. There is a cer-
tain faculty which is called " clever-
ness," this is of a nature to perform
and to hit upon the means that con-
duce to any given aim. Now if the
aim be good, this faculty is praise-
worthy, but if bad, it turns to cun-
ning. Hence both wise men and cun-
ning men get the name of " clever."
Now wisdom is not cleverness, but it
is not without a faculty of the kind.
But this eye of the mind attains its full
condition not without virtue, as we
have already stated, and as is clear,
for the syllogisms of action have as
their major premiss " Since such and
such is the end and the best " (being
whatever it is, something for the
sake of argument, it matters not
what). But this (major premiss) can-
not be apprehended except by the
good man ; for vice distorts (the mind),
and makes it false with regard to the
principles of action. Hence it is
VOL. II. B
evident that one cannot possess wis-
dom unless he be good.'
Kal TOVS (ppovifiovs Seivovs KO! irav-
ovpyovs <pap.ev elvou] We should have
expected TOUJ iravovpyovs. That want
of clearness of mind which is charac-
teristic of Eudemus shows itself in his
use of the article, cf. ch. xi. 6 : TWV
^fiiretpcev Kal Trpefffivrfptav f t typovi^w,
where one would have expected TWV
(ppovi/j.cai'.
Fritzsche quotes Plato, The&tet. p.
1 77 A : ttv fji^] ava\\ay>(ri TTJS Setv6-
TTfros TavTO, S^i Kal KO.miica.aiv us
Sfivol Kal iravovpyoi ia>oifrtav nvuv
aKovffovTai. Demosth. 01. i. p. 9 :
iravovpyos tav Kal Seipbs avOptairos
Trpayfj.affi xpiiaaaQcu.
10 us ftpriTai re] Ch. ii. 4: Sib
ovr' &vev vov Kal Stavoias, oth' aveu
i]6iKris IOT\V f^fttis i) itftoatpeffis. Eth.
Eud. 11. xi. 5 : Sick T^V aperty by opObv
ftf) Tb Tf\OS K. T. X.
ot yap ffv\\o"yi(TiJU>l ruv irpaicrwv]
The form of the practical syllogism is
similarly given, Eth. Eud. 11. xi. 4 :
&ffwep yap TOMS flewpTjTiKots at inroOe-
aeis ap\ai, ovTta KO\ ra?s irotijTiKais rb
Tf\os apxii Kal vir6deffis ' tiretSij Set
r6Se iyiaiveiv, avdyKT) roSl {nrdpai, ei
fff-rat e/ceTj/o,' wVirep tKft, ' et tort rb
Tpiyoovov 5uo opQai. avdymi roSl elvat,'
Ti
186
IieiKilN [EYAIIMK1N] VI.
[CHAP.
TO TeAo xa< ro ap/orov, o
TO Tuo'v. TOUTO o' el
s ov. e<rra) yap
TO) aa^aj ou ai
XSTTTSOV
xa Trep apsT%' xa -yap 73 ap=Tr)
r) 4>poi/ij<r* 7rpo TTJV 8ff<i/oT7jTa* ou
OUTO) xa< > >u<r<XT asTy Tr
rpoj
xupav.
SoxsT
yap
T<OV
On the doctrine of the practical syllo-
gism, see Vol. I. Essay IV. pp. 212
219. It was there doubted whether
Aristotle was himself the author of
this formula which appears in the
Eudemian Ethics, and in the probably
spurious treatise De Motu Animalium.
But, in fact, one passage, at all events,
iu the De Animd, proves that Ari-
stotle had himself applied the syllo-
gistic form to the process which the
mind goes through in forming a prac-
tical resolution, though Eudemus
undoubtedly carried out the application
farther and used it more constantly;
cf. De An. m. xi. 4 : 'Eir*l 8" ^ ft\v
Ka06\ov \nr6\iffyis Kcii \6yos, TJ 8 TOV
Kaff fKaffra (if fjikvyh.p Aryet ZTI Sf7rbi/
roiovrov rb Toi6vt>f irpdrrftv, r) 8e STI
f6Sf -rb vvv TOtdvSf, Kayia $1 rot6ffSf)
^5rj afrrjj Ktvt?
"H &/j.<pa>, i\\' i
T) $' Of.
XIII. 2eirT/oi> 8^) Kuplati] ' We
must consider then, over again, the
nature of virtue. For there is a rela-
tion in virtue analogous to that borne
by wisdom to cleverness. Clever-
ness, though not the same as wisdom,
is similar to it, and this is the way
in which natural virtue stands related
to virtue proper.' The doctrine of
the natural element in virtue was
clearly given by Aristotle, cf. Eth. x.
is.. 6 8: riveirBai 8' ayaOovs otovrai,
ol fj.fi/ (pvffft, vl 8* e6fi, ol Sf SiSax??.
T5 (tfV ofiv TT)S <f>Vfff(t>S SfJAoj' d)J OVK
4<t>' iyj.1v inrdpxft, a.\\a did nvas 6fias
alrias TOIS us a\T)0aJs evrv^tatv virdp-
X Ae< 8^ rb i?0os irpoirjrapx*"' wwr
OIKIUOV T^S itpeTrjs, ffrtpyov rb Ka\bv
Kal Svff\fpai)>ov rb aiffxpAv. In the
present passage, the analogy between
the development of the reason and of
the moral will is well drawn out. At
first, there is the intellectual faculty,
cleverness, undetermined as yet for
good or bad, but requiring a right
direction to be given to its aims.
This the moral feelings can alone
supply. On the other side, there is
the generous instinct, the impulse to
bravery, justice, and the like, but this
is deficient in consciousness and in
the idea of a law, which reason can
alone supply. The joint development
of these two sides gives, on the one
hand, wisdom, on the other hand,
virtue, in its complete and proper
form. What there is difficult or
strange in the doctrine, is, that virtue
has apparently assigned to it the in-
tellectual function of apprehending
the end of action. This appears an
inversion. 'Apfr-f) seems now to have
changed places with A<fyjj. But, at
all events, the point is clearly esta-
blished that an intellectual side and a
moral side are entirely inseparable.
XII. -XIII.] HeiKliN [EYAHMIilN] VI.
187
xai yap oxaioj xa (ray
^o^sv evQvs sx ysverris' aXX' O/A)
srspov ri TO xupicog dyaftov xai -ra TO<auTa aAXov rpoVov
U7rdp%eiv ' xai yap 7raio~} xa\ Qyploig al Qwixdi V7rdp%owriv
eei$, aAX* avsu vou 3Aa$spai Qai'vovrai ouvai. TrX^v
TOO-OWTOV soixsv bpao-Qai, on (0(nrsp (TU)^.an Io-%upi5 dvev
o\J/50) xivov[j.sva> o~UjU.$aj'vsi o-<>a/\.Xso"5af lo~%vpa>s Sia TO
JU.TJ s^s/v o\{/<v, OWTOJ xa svTauQa' eav 8s Xa^T) vou^, ev^
TO) TTpdrrsiv %ta<$>spei. 75 8' e OjU,o/a oura TOT' so~Tai
dpsTrj. coo~T xaQdrrep STT} TOO 8o^ao~TJXou Suo
s'/^vj, SsjvoVr^ xat Qpovya-ts, O-JTCO xai ITTI TOW >]3<xou
Suo S<TTJ', TO ju,sv dpsTy 4>yo~jx^ TO 8' 73 xup/a, xai TOUTOJV
73 xvpia oy yiverai avsu QpovYja-scus. SioVsp T/VSJ: 4>ao"< 3
KO! 7p iraiffl ape-H)] 'For the
natural dispositions belong both to
children and beasts, butwithoutreason
they appear harmful. At least this
seems evident, that as a strong
body, if moved without sight, comes
into violent collisions because it has not
sight to guide it, so is it in mental
things ((inavQa*). If the natural
qualifications have reason added to
them, they then excel in action, and the
state, which (before) was a semblance of
virtue, now becomes virtue in the true
sense of the term.' 4>uirj/cal e'S is
used inaccurately for QvfftKal SiaBe-
areisy cf. Eth. n. vii. 6, note. On the
moral qualities of brutes Aristotle
often speaks ; cf. Hist. An. i. i. ; ix.
i. &c. The ' courage ' of brutes, being
undirected, is no doubt harmful, so
the generosity, &c., of boys. That
fine natures are capable of the worst
perversion, is an opinion to be found
stated in Plato's Republic, p. 491 E:
OVKOVV, ^v 8" eyco, 3 'A8ei.fjia.VTf, Kal
T&S ijo^cis OUTW <(>>/j.ev ras ftNpveoTcJ-
ras Ka/CTjy ?rai5a7a>7as rv)(o{iffa.3 Sm-
<f>ep6vr<os KOKO.S yitveffOai ; i) olei rb,
ol rfyv &Kpa/rov
B B
fK <pav\ris, a\\' OVK K vtavi-
/CTJS tyvfftuis rpCHpfj SjoAojue'rijJ yiyve-
a6ai, a.ffdtvri S^ fyvffiv p.ryd.\u>v ofce
ofrrf ncutav atrlaf wore effe-
ff6ai
3 5 SiSirep juera \6yov~\ ' Hence
it is that some say that all the virtues
are wisdoms ; and thus Socrates was
partly right and partly wrong in his
investigations. He was wrong in
thinking the virtues wisdoms, but
perfectly right in thinking that they
were inseparable from wisdom. The
same point is testified to by the fact
that, at present, persons, when they
wish to define virtue, add the terms
" state (specifying the particular ob-
ject), according to the right law."
And that law is right which is in
accordance with wisdom. All men
therefore seem to have a presentiment
that a particular state in accordance
with wisdom is virtue. But a little
alteration is necessary. Not merely
the state according to the right law,
but that which is conscious of (/t T )
the right law constitutes virtue. Now
in such matters wisdom is right law.
Socrates then considered that the
2
188 IIGIKflN [EYAHMIftN] VI.
7ra<ra T t dpsrdc <$>povr)<ri(; sJvai, xa.} S
on
[CHAP.
rvj fj.lv
COSTO sTvai 7ra<ra rag apsra, ^'jaa
4 <>pov73Vsa>, xaXco eXsysv. <r>j|W,7oi/
orav o
yap
or/
oux avsu
xa< Trpog a er/, TTJI/ xara TOV
o KO.ro. rv <>ovv<nv. eoixauri 8
xa* yap vuv
\v eiv,
Xoyov *
xara
s or* 13
5 <$>povr l <riv. $si SE fuxpov jU.5Ta$rjvaj ou yap ju-ovov 13
xara TOV opQov Xoyov, aXX' ^ c ]U,sra TOU op^ou Xoyoo s^j;
apsTrj S<TTIV. opQoj 8s Xoyo^ Trep} TCOV TO/OUTWV 73'
e(rr<j/. ^wxpctTrjj jw,sv ouv Xoyou^ ra^ apera^ <wsr
6 (s7ri(rrv3j,a^ yap sTvai TraVas), ri^S 8e jotsra Xoyou.
o3v ex rtov slpTfj^svatv OTI ov% olov re ayaSoi/ e7i/a
avzv
avsu
v
virtues were laws (for he defined
them all as sciences), but we consider
that they are conscious of a law.'
/cal ScDKpiTTjs] On the doctrine of
Socrates that 'virtue is science,' see
Vol. I. Essay II. pp. 122 124. In
Eth. HI. viii. 6, the phrase is Z0fi> Kal
6 Satpe&Tijy, on which Bishop Fitz-
gerald remarks that by prefixing the
article Aristotle appears to have in-
dicated the Socrates of Plato's dia-
logues, the dramatic, and not the
historical, philosopher. Thus speak-
ing similarly of characters in books,
Aristotle says, Eth. ra. viii. a, rbv
Kal rbv "Exropo. Jb. n. ix. 3,
ii. ix. 6, irpbs ryv 'E\4vjjv.
And contrariwise of real persons he
speaks without the article. Eth. i. iv. 5,
E5 >yap KCU Tl\&riav ijir6pfi. Ib. I. v. 3,
6/j.otOTraOf'iv SapSafaTrdAy. I. vi. 8,
<HJ 8i; Kal STrevtrtinros. i. x. I, KOTO
StSAwi/o. All through the first book
of the Metaphysics, when writing the
history of philosophy, Aristotle speaks
of the different philosophers without
the article, and so too elsewhere in
contrasting Socrates with Plato, &c.
The only exceptions to this rule are
the cases of renewed mention. Cf.
Met. xn. iv. 5 : Ai5o y&p fan? H TIS
ov airoSott] 'SiQJKpdrfi SiKaias 'AAA' 6
fj.fi> SwKpctrrjs K. T. \. But in discuss-
ing Plato's Republic and Laws (Pol.
n. L vi.), Aristotle invariably speaks
of 6 5o)fcpaT7)s, 01 rov SuKpdrovs \6yoi,
&c., as referring not to a real but to
a represented personage. Assuming
that Eudemus has followed the same
rule, we may conclude that here and
in Eth. vn. ii. I, SwKpdVr/s peis yap
o, Ib. vn. iii. 14, ft 4firti
s, the actual and historical
Socrates is designated.
Kal yap vvv ira.in(s~\ i.e. since the
establishment of the Peripatetic doc-
trine. Eudemus refines upon the
usual Peripatetic formula, substituting
/iTtk \6yov for KOTO \6yov. On the
meaning of this alteration see Eth. i.
vii. 14, note.
6 aAAo KO! 6 \6yos {ntdp^ovffiv~\
XIIL]
H6IKQN [EYAHMmN] VI.
189
OTJ ptt)pjoVTO.i a
oi aperai' ou -yap avrog
srcti ' TOUTO yap xara jasv raj <>u<r/xa
, xaQ' a 8s a:r?\.u> XeyeTai ayaSo'f, oux e
yap TTJ <$>povr)(rsi ^10. ov<ry 7rao~a<
xav el /x^ 7rpaxT<xy) ?jv, OTJ sSet av
?^ 8/a TO rou
u apsrv
ra Trpo^ TO
' eo"T/ T
j, xat or* oux so"Ta< 13 7rpoapeo~i^ op
S' aveu apSTrjj* j jW.sv yap ro rsXog' 73 8s
Tro/st" Trpdrrstv. aXXa ja^v ouSe xup/a 8
Ss TOU fisJirlovog jaop/ou, a)o~7rsp ouSs
' ow yap p^p^Tai atJT 1 ^, aAX* opa
oZv evsxa STCirarre ahh' oux sxsiv.
ysvrjTa* '
"TI opoiov xav if n$ ryv TCQ^ITIX^V c^anj otp%siv TCOV
OTJ 7TITaTTl TTS) TTCtVTa TOt V T
' Thus the opinion is refuted of him
who would argue that the virtues are
separated from one another, that the
same man is not equally gifted by
nature for all the virtues, so that he
will acquire one now and another
later. This is possible with regard to
natural good qualities, but not so with
regard to those which constitute a
good man absolutely; for together
with wisdom, which is one, all the
virtues will be in his possession.' The
same perfect character is attributed
to wisdom below, Eth. \n. ii. 5 :
ye 6 <f>p6vifj.os' rS>v "yckp
v TIS /coi rds S\\as <cX<ev
aperds. The theory is, that he who
has wisdom can do no wrong. It
will be seen how nearly this ap-
proaches to the Stoical idea of the
' wise man.'
7 This section is a mere repetition,
in Eudemian fashion, of what has
gone before, ch. xii. 4, 10 ; Eth.
Eud. n. xi. 6 (I.e.'). Cf. also ch. ii.
4: 5ib odr' &vev vov Kal Siavolas
O&T' &vfv ijBiKrjs tffrlv 6|etos fi
irpoaipeffis.
8 The relation of wisdom to philo-
sophy is clearly stated by the author
of the Magna Moralia, who para-
phrases the present passage (M. M.
I.xxxv. 32), T) (ppSirriffts Siffitfp ^iriT
TS &rn rfjs ffocpias, /col irap
Kal rb iroittv rb
ffa ra irdOr} Kal ravra
aru<f>poviov<ra.
PLAN OF BOOK VII.
last of the Nicomacho-Eudemian Books consists of two parts,
-L of which the one is a necessary complement to Aristotle's ethical
system ; the other superfluous, being little more than a modi-
fication of Aristotle's (far superior) treatise on Pleasure.
Part I. having enumerated the moral states which are above,
below, and between virtue and vice, mentions six ordinary opinions
on these states (Ch. I.), points out the difficult questions to which
these opinions give rise (Ch. II.), and proceeds to elucidate them.
In Ch. III. the question is discussed, How is incontinence com-
patible with a knowledge of the right ?
In Ch. IV. the question, Whether incontinence is confined to
any definite object-matter ?
Chs. V. and VI., pursuing the same inquiry, treat of certain
morbid and unnatural kinds of incontinence, and of incontinence
(analogously so called) in the matter of anger.
Ch. VII. compares generally incontinence with intemperance, treats
of the subordinate forms of the intermediate moral states (endurance,
softness, &c.), and traces incontinence to two separate sources in the
character.
Ch. VIII. continues the comparison between intemperance and
incontinence, reverts to two questions before mooted , namely :
(1) Is intemperance more curable than incontinence? (2) Is in-
continence to be regarded as absolutely bad ? and gives a negative
answer to both.
Ch. IX. 1-4 discusses the question mooted in Ch. II., Does
continence consist in sticking to an opinion or purpose, right or
wrong ? In answering this question, a good distinction is drawn
between obstinacy and continence.
Ch. IX. 5 Ch. X. winds up the previous discussions and
PLAN OF BOOK VII. 191
formally settles the remaining questions of Ch. II. Is intemperance
the same as incontinence ? Can the wise man be incontinent ?
These chapters form, as we have said, a necessary complement
to the Aristotelian ethical system, taking a more practical point of
view (aXXriv dpx>l^ than that which would divide mankind simply
into the virtuous and the vicious. Moral systems in general have
perhaps too much neglected this field of the intermediate states ;
and general language has not definitely adopted the distinction
between the ' intemperate ' and the ' incontinent,' as the use of
these English words at once testifies, for we are evidently obliged to
give a certain special and technical meaning to the word ' intempe-
rate ' in order to make it stand as the representative of txKoXaoroe.
A subtle, but not always clear, psychology is employed to explain
the phenomena of moral weakness, and it is observable that
physical and medical considerations are prominently appealed to
throughout this book. The remarks on bestiality, cretinism, or
morbid depravity (0/pio'rj;c) here made have attracted the notice of
modern writers on the psychology of insanity (as for instance Dr.
Thomas Mayo).* And the interesting allusions here made to the
melancholic, or bilious, temperament might be illustrated, not only
from Aristotle's Problems, but also from Burton's Anatomy of
Melancholy. The chief thing that we have to complain of in this
book is the too vague way in which incontinence is treated. For
the sake of forming a more definite notion of the standard of Greek
morality, we could have wished a graphic portrait of the continent
man, in the style of Aristotle's fourth Book. As it is, we must be
content to know that the continent man yields to temptation less,
and the incontinent man more, than people in general.
* ' Now according to this view of the subject, we have a class of persons,
differing from the majority of mankind in their incapacity for moral
distinction, differing from the insane, in not labouring under any suspension
of the power of will. On the first of these grounds, they have a right to a
place in our system of mental pathology. On the last, they must constitute a
distinct head from insanity. I am not at present considering this class
generally ; I exclude indeed that section of persons, in whom the absence of
principle is obviated by the harmlessness of their tendencies. I am speaking
of persons destitute of the moral faculty, and also vicious in their propensities.
For these I have borrowed the designation given to them by Aristotle : and I
call them brutal.' Mayo, Elements of the Pathology of the Human Mind,
p. 127.
192 PLAN OF BOOK VII.
Part II. consists of that superfluous treatise on Pleasure, the
authorship of which has been so much disputed. While professing
to treat of pleasure as falling under the philosophy of human life,
the writer seems to confine himself almost entirely to a refutation of
three positions maintained by the Platonic school : 1st. That
pleasure is in no sense a good. 2nd. That most pleasures (i.e.
physical pleasures) are bad. 3rd. That no pleasure can be the
chief good.
The first and third of these positions are refuted in Chs. XII. and
XIII., and the second in Ch. XIV. The subject is treated in this
book under a more physiological and practical aspect than in the
tenth book of the Nicomachean work.
HOIKfiN [ETAHMIflN] VII.
META Ss raura XSXTSOV,
or/ Tail/ TrsJ ret IJ^TJ
xota-ia.
rpa orv S
svavrla roig
yap
E,XTOpos
7rojr;cvx|aevou
* xax/a
rot, svavra roig p.sv u<r< 8$j/\.a' TO
TO 8' syxparstotv xaAoujtxsv * 7T|20 8s TTJJ/
av ap^oTTOi "hsyeiv rr,v vTrep ?jju.a
T/va xa) fis/av, (O(nrsp "O^pog Trspl
TOV Hpiotpov on <r$o'fysa ^v
I. This chapter proposes a new
field of inquiry (&AA.TIV apxhv) in
Ethics, namely to consider those
intermediate states, continence and
incontinence, together with their sub-
ordinate forms (softness, luxury, and
endurance), which are ' neither identi-
cal with virtue and vice, nor yet
wholly distinct from them.' After
an enumeration of the moral states
above, below, and between, virtue and
vice, the writer announces that his
method of inquiry will be, as else-
where, to collect current opinions on
the subject, to raise doubts and ob-
jections to them, and by a process of
sifting to reject such existing opinions
as are untenable, and to leave a residue
of ' sufficiently demonstrated ' theory.
He accordingly mentions six com-
mon notions about the states in ques-
tion.
i T& 8' fvamla K. T.\.] A scale of
the moral states is here drawn out,
which stands as follows: i. Divine
VOL. II. C
virtue, or pure reason, z. Virtue
(afterwards called temperance, <rw-
fypoainnj), or the perfect harmony of
passion subjugated to reason. 3.
Continence, or the mastery of reason
over passion after a struggle. 4. In-
continence, or the mastery of passion
over reason, after a struggle. 5. Vice
(afterwards called cuco\aaia, intem-
perance), or the perfect harmony of
reason subjugated to passion. 6.
Bestiality, or pure passion. It is
remarkable that the terms au>$poa\nn\
and a.Ko\curia, which in this book
certainly supply the place of aper-fi
and Koxla, are actually introduced
extremely late. Cf. ch. v. 9.
rip<alici\v rivd] Cf. Arist. Pol. vn.
xiv. 2, where the gods and heroes are
mentioned as excelling men. Dr.
Hampden, in his Hampton Lectures,
mentions that, in the canonisation of
a Eoman Catholic Saint, it was cus-
tomary to declare that he had gradu-
ated ' in heroico gradu virtutis.'
O
194
IieiKflN [E3TAHMIQN] VII.
[CHAP.
ei
dvrjTOV TTCU'C tpptvai aXXct tieolo.
<$>a(riv, ej ai/0pJ7ra>v yivovrai 0eoi 8'
< av sfo 8r?>.ov on TJ -rJ) $>}-
) yap
xaxa ou
3 afi%, 13 8' sVepo'v T* yevoj xax/aj. ITTS) 8s <r7raviov xai
TO QsTov avSpa sTvat, xa^dbrep o! Aaxa>j/e^ iiwQatn
psusjv, orav a-yao-Qtoo-j <r<^o'3pa TOU (<re7o avrj
oura) xai o ^p/toS^^ sv TO<^ avtydiTroig (nraviog.
8' Iv ToTj 3ap|3apoi <rr/v, yivsTot-t svia xai 8<a voVouj
' xa) TOUJ 8ia xax/av 8s raiv avQpu)7ra)V
sTT^uo-^'j^oD/xsv. aXXa Trspi ^,sv
u<rrepov TTQI-^TSOV riva
8s xaxj'aj sipyjTai Trporspov ' Trepi 8s axpao-/a^ xai
xai rpu^)^ Xexreov, xai Trspi syxpare/aj xa<
ours yap wj Trepi Ttov auTtov e^swv T^ apsT^ xa}
5 plot. sxctTspaf avr&v UTTOXTJTTTS'OV, oo^' co^ eVspov ys'vo^. 8s?
xai
ot>5e ^K6] .K. xxiv. 258.
3 of Attawvej] Apparently taken
from the .Mrco of Plato, p. 99 D.
4 uo-repoi'] z. e. in chapter v.
irpfctpov t1pirra.i\ Cf. EM. *w^. n.
x. 28, &c.
5 8<r 8' &fftffp iic\ TUV &\\cav *(co-
vwy] ' Our course must be, as elsewhere,
to state existing ideas (rck <patv6/j.tt>a),
and, having gone through the doubts
(which these ideas suggest), to esta-
blish thus if possible all, but if not
all, anyhow the greater number and
the most important of the ideas which
are generally admitted (IcSofa) about
these conditions of mind. For if the
difficulties be resolved and at the
same time the generally admitted ideas
be suffered to stand, the thing will be
established sufficiently.' This passage
is obscure, chiefly on account of the
ambiguity in the words &? ykp \vijrcd
Tf ret Svffxtpri Kal Ka,ra\etvrirai rck
tv5oa. Two meanings might be
attributed to Xirtirai TO; $vffx f pTJ, which
might either refer (i) to the rejection
of ideas that involved a difficulty ; or
(z) to the clearing up of difficulties
attaching to any of the popular ideas.
The former interpretation would seem
best to suit the context, and to be
justified by the actual procedure of
subsequent chapters, and accordingly
the following is the way In which the
passage is rendered by the Paraphrast.
Atyta/jiev 8^J irtpl avraiv Kara -rbv rp6irov
Kaff ftf Kal irtpl TOJI/ &\\uv ttiro^tv
4K6riff6/Jie6a yap rovs SoKOvvTas irepl
ainiav \6yovs, wv Tobs /j.}) ffvuPaivovras
es, rovs fJM\iffr
Kal OVTWS tffTai <pavfpbs & irepl avrwv
\6yos. But on looking below we find
a sentence answering to, and in fact
repeating, the present one in such a
way that we cannot help taking it as
a decisive guide as to what is here
meant. After a statement of the
iieiKilN [ETAHMION] VII.
195
8', (ocnrBp STT*
a irsp ravra ra
xvpuvrara ' lav yap
?v=/7rr y Ta* ra svQo^a, 8s
AOXSJ" 8>j rj TS syxpdrsia
xa/ rcov sVajVzTtov s7va, T]
T = xa '
, T&ivrag TO. <$>aivo[j.sva xa} Trpwrov
ouro> (isixvuvat fj.a7^t<TTa jasv Travra ra
si 8= ja^, Ta TrAsTcrra xat
TS ra Ova-%spi) xa} xara-
v av si>] ixai/tof.
xaprssia TU>V (nrovOaiajv 6
dxpa(ria re xal jU.aAax/a
xai o
TOV
xa o
axpaTr t g xa
Joto^ or<
cr/
xa TOV
xa
oux
xa} xapTspixov, TOV 8s TOJOUTOV 01 ( asv Travra
o
various ideas, and of the difficulties
which they suggest, the writer adds al
fjii> oZv airopiau roiavrai rives avfiftai-
voixjiv, Tovrotv 5e ra fj.ev avf\eiv Sel, ra
8e KoTaA.tireli' ri yap \vffis rrjs diropias
tvptals tar iv (ii. iz). The words
before us, Aurrrai ra Suerxef"), corre-
spond with ra juej/ avt\eit> (riav airopiiav)
and with T\ Xvais TIJS avopias. It is to
be observed, however, that K&ra\nefiv
is used in the one place to refer to the
popular ideas, and in the other to the
objections (airopfeu) urged against those
ideas, ret (pauvonena, as shown by what
follows, is here equivalent to ri
Ae-yo/iera in 7, the common sayings
and ideas of men. It is used in the
same sense, Eth. Eud. i. vi. i : vftpartov
5e repl rovrtav *avr<av forf'tv rrjv tciffnv
8ia riav \oycav, fJMprvpiois KO! irapa-
6 7 The common ideas are now
enumerated. They are six in number :
(1) ' That continence and endur-
ance are morally good, while inconti-
nence and softness are morally bad.'
(2) ' That the continent man is he
who sticks to his opinion, while the
incontinent man is he who departs
from his opinion.'
(3) ' That the incontinent man errs
cc 2
through his peculiar state, knowing
all the while that he is doing wrong ;
while owing to this knowledge the
continent man abstains.'
(4) ' That temperance is the same as
continence, and in like manner incon-
tinence is sometimes confused with
intemperance.'
(5) 'It is occasionally maintained
that wise and clever men may be
incontinent.'
(6) ' That there is such a thing as
incontinence of other things beside
pleasure, e.g. of anger, of honour, and
of gain.'
6 Soice? 5^ . T. A.] Cf. Xenophon,
Memorab. i. \. 4-5, where it is said
that Socrates considered tyKpartia, the
foundation of the virtues. (Cf. Ib. rv.
T. i, iv. v. 3-7, ii.) *
Kal rbv au<ppoia pfv eynparrj Kal
KaprepiK6v^ The distinction between
ffdxppoffvtrri, iynpdrfia, and Koprtpta,
was not accurately maintained either
by Xenophon or Plato ; cf. Memorab.
rv. v. 7, n. i. i, &c. Plato, Gorgias,
p. 49 1 D : icias eavrov &px.ovra \tyfis ;
ovfiev TtoHtiKov, a\\' Sxnrfp ol iro\\ol,
ffoxppova. ovra Kal tyKparrj avrbv eavrov,
ruv r/Sovuv KOI eiriOvftiuv af>\ovra riav
3v eoirry. Sep. p. 430 E : n6ffpos TTOV
196
[EYAHMIQN] VII.
[CHAP.
8' ou, xai rov axoXatrroi/ axpar?) xai TOV axpoiTri axoAa-
7 cTTov (Ttryxsyujaei/co^, oi 8* sTspovg eTva* <$>a<riv. TOV 6s
<$>povi[J.QV ore jasv ou 4 !ao "' J/ ef&epea"Qa< sTva/ axpaTTJ, OTS
6 s * ev/ot> $>povt[J.ov$ ovTag xai 8s<vou axparsig elvoti. en
axpaTi$ hsyovTOU xou Sujaou xai T/JW.% xai xep^oug. TO.
jt/,sv GUI/ Xsyo'jU,gya raur' S<TT/V.
2 'A7ropr)(Tis 8' av TJ$ 7ra> w7roAajU,/3avet)V opQwg axpa.Tve-
rai rig. e7rurT(iJ,Vov .v ovv OL <ao"i TJVS olo'v TS
T<S . . . ^ ffttxfifoffvvn iffrl Kal riSoviav
TiVtav Kal 4iri6u(jii(av tyKparfia.
rbv o.Ko\a.<r-rov oKpor^] Fritzsche
refers to Xen. 3fem. rv. v. 6 sqq., and
for the opposite comparison to Xen.
Mem. n. i. i : &&KH irporpfirfiv TOI)S
trwojn-as d<r/cr' fyKpdrfiav Ppeorov /col
iroToD Kal Aaxvefas Kal UJTI/OU Kal plyovs
Kal 6cA7roi;s Kal ir6vov. yvovs ydp nva.
irpbs TO ToiaDra, K.T.A..
7 a/cpai-fls \iyovrai Kal BV/J.OV Kal
TijiiTjs KOI K*p5ous] Cf. Plato, Z^<7. ix.
p. 869 A. Isocr. Demon, p. 6 : wp' 3>v
acr/cti iravTcav, KfpSovs,
opyys,
II. This chapter contains a state-
ment of the objections and difficulties
which may be raised against the above-
mentioned ideas.
i 4 state the difficulties which
attach to the third-mentioned idea
that the incontinent man sins against
knowledge. How is this possible ?
how can one know the best and not
do it ? Socrates denied the possibility
of incontinence altogether, making it
convertible with ignorance ; but with
what kind of ignorance remains to be
asked. Others confess that it is not
knowledge which is perverted in the
mind of the incontinent, but only
opinion, i.e. a vague and weak con-
viction.
5 Continuing the same subject,
introduces also an objection to idea (5)
that the wise man may be incon-
tinent. Some fancy that wisdom
(though not knowledge in the scientific
sense) may coexist with incontinence.
But this shows a misconception of the
nature of wisdom. The wise man can
do no wrong.
6 Contains an objection to idea (4).
How can continence be the same as
temperance, since the former implies
evil desires to be controlled, but the
latter is a harmonious state of the
moral nature ?
7 10 Show the difficulties and
absurdities which attach to idea (2),
that continence consists in sticking to
your opinion. If so it must be bad
sometimes ; Neoptolemus was incon-
tinent ; folly and incontinence com-
bined will produce right actions ; the
abandoned man will be a more hopeful
character than the incontinent, &c.
ii Urges against the sixth of the
ideas, that the term ' incontinence '
cannot be indiscriminately relative to
wealth, honour, &c. There must be
some absolute conception of incon-
tinence, independent of these qualifi-
cations.
I 'AiropVjfffie 8* &yvoia.v~\ ' Now
one might raise the question, how it
is that a person with right conceptions
comes to act incontinently. That a
man who had absolute knowledge
should do so, some say would be
impossible, for it would be a strange
I.-IL]
[EYAIIMmN] VII.
197
OVK f<pr) aKpaffiav eivcu, \eyci>i> on ovOels
eiSois TO, KO.KO. of i, Kaicd flffty e\oir' &v.
Cf. Plato Protag. p. 357 E: ^ 8e e|a-
yap 7no-Trj/ r JUj vouo-?j, (t)g tpsro
xparsHv xdi Trepi&xsiv avrov w&Trsp avSpaVoSov. "2,
Trj uikv ydp oT^fog s^d^sro Trpog rov Aoyov wg oux
dxpa(riag ' ouQsva ydp 67roAa]txj3avovra Trpdrrsiv Trapa TO
i/, aXXa *' ayvo^av. O6ro jasv oOv 6
>Tj <$>ajvoja='j/oi svapyco^, xa) Seov i
\f/l ^>V /f / / r
TO Traoo^, et o* ayvoiav, T
OT/ yap oux o'tsrat ys 6 axpaTsuo'-aevoj ^piv sv TO) ^-aSs/ ys-
vsa~Qai, tyavspov. sltr] Se TIVS^ o) Ta pt.lv <rvy%wpov(ri rd 3
thing, as Socrates thought, if know-
ledge were there, that anything else
should master him and twist him about
like a slave. Socrates in short was
totally opposed to the idea, (arguing)
as if incontinence did not exist at all,
for he said no one with a conception
of what was best could act differently
from that best, but he could only so
act through ignorance.' On this
doctrine of Socrates, and on its con-
nection with the rest of his ethical
views, see Vol. I. Essay II. p. 125.
The omission of the article before
2top(iT7js seems to show that the real
man, and not the personage of Plato's
dialogues, is referred to, (see above,
note on Eth. vi. xiii. 3), but yet the
words of the passage before us have
obvious reference to Plato's Protagoras,
P. 352 B : SoKfl Sf TOtS TTOAAOIS Iff pi
eVjtr'Hj/iiTjs roiovrov Tt, OVK lo"x\>Pv ouS'
Trepl roiavrov avrov ovros Siavoovvrai,
a\\' evovffys iro\\aKis a,v6pu>T<i> e"irt-
(TT^/urjs, ou T^jy iTLO~T'{]/j.r]v avTOv &p%eu/,
oAA.' &\\o ri, rare (*ev OvfjLov, Tore Se
TiSovfy', Tore Se \\nri\v, eViore 8e epiara,
TroAXcC/cis Se <pofiov 9 aTe^vusStuvoovfjievoi
itepl TT)S eirTT^jU.7)s, &airep irepl dpSpa-
irJSou, 7repteA.KO/*eVr)s inrb TUV &\\uv
andfTiav.
8\aii tfidxeTo] This is repeated in
strong terms by the author of the
Magna Moralia, n. vi. 2: SoxcpaTTjs
ju.ej' ovv o Trpecr/SuTTjs avripfi 8\ws al
TTOV Kal avrol '&TI d/ua0ia irpdrrerai, &C.
2 OVTOS p.tt> olv<pav(p6v\ ' Now
this reasoning is manifestly at variance
with experience, and we require to
ask with regard to the state, supposing
it to arise from ignorance, what man-
ner of ignorance it is that takes place,
for it is plain that the person who acts
incontinently does not at all events
think (that he must so act) before
he gets into the particular state.'
fcaij/o/xeVois here refers no doubt to
the actual facts of life, and accordingly
the rendering of the Paraphrast is,
ovros Se 6 \6yos tvwrios tcrrl rois
<t>avepois. And yet there is probably
some allusion also to the ^cui/tS/xero
mentioned above (i. 5) ; we may re-
present the double allusion of the
word by translating it ' experience,'
comparing with it also the use of ra
vTrdpxpvTa, Eth. I. viii. I.
OUK otrrai yf~\ There seems to be
an ellipsis of Sew trpdrreiv tk irpdrrei.
Cf. below, iii. z : 6 8' OVK oitercu /xeV,
Si&j/cet Se. The writer argues that if
incontinence be ignorance, it is a pe-
culiar kind of ignorance, au ignorance
that comes on (yiverat'), not a consistent
ignorance ; for the incontinent person
does not think ignorantly, i. e. wrongly,
before the time of temptation.
198 IieiKflN [EYAHMION] VII. [CHAP.
8' ou* TO j.i/ yap eVKrT^aijs 1 pt.rfilv sTvai xpsirrov
~ \ SA A' ' \v
yOUO~<. TO OS jU.Tjysi/a TTpOLTTSlV TTOipOL TO
o/xoAoyouo-j, xai 8ia TOUTO TOV a;
4^ot/Ta xpaTS?o~Qa< UTTO TO>V 7j8ovcbv a!
s<ys 8o'a xai ]U,^ STTIO"^^^, /u,Tj8' io~pUpa 6:
aXX* TjpSjaa/a, xa^aTrsp si/ TOU;
TCO /xrj (Jisvsiv Iv
T-T] As [j.o%Qr)pia. ou o-uyyi/a^
5 \{/sxTtov. <$>povr)<rea)$ apa avTiTejvo'jo'T]^ ' auTij yap
poVaTov. a^Ty,' OLTOTTOV' s'o-Tai yap o auTo^ a^aa
xa< axpaT^f, ^>rjo~s<s 8' ou8' av sl^ Qpovlpou slvat TO TTDCLT-
TEIV sxoWa TO. c^auXoVaTa. ?rpo 8s TOUTO/^ 8s8s<XTa/ Trpo'-
Tspov OTi TrpaxT/xo'f ys o <$>pwi[Jios' Ttov yap o~p^aTa)v T/^
6 xat Taj aXXaj sp^cov apsTaj. ST/ si jU,sv ev TO> nridu/uua^
V V NA' * ' / > V *'A.
syxpaT^ ou8' o syxpaTTj^ (raxfipwv ' OUTS yap TO ayav o~ro-
Qpovog OUTS TO <|5auXa^ e^siv. aXXa '/Jtvjv 8sT ys * ei JM.SV
yap vp>50~Ta} a< sV<5ujiua/, 4>auXi] >] xa)Auouo~a s^<^ |U,yj axo-
)s7v, oo~S' >j eyxpaTSja ou 7rao~a o~7rou8a/a* si 8' ao~$s.
xai ja^ c^auAai, ou5sj/ o~Sj,vo'v, ou8' si cf)auXat xai ao~6s-
7 vsjj, ouQsv ju,eya. ET< si 7rao~^j 8o'^>j SjU,jw,sj>srjxoi/ 7rosT ij
' xa) TYI ^suSsr* xa) si
. vm. i. 10 : /to! 6p0ws
s, &\\' Sri
OIIK op06v. Plato, Protag. p. 352 D:
aiffxpdv lffTt ffo<(>tav Kal ^irtffT^/xiji' /a)j
ou^l iroiTou/ KpdTtffTOV (pdyai elvai -rStv
avtipuTrfiiav irpayfjidrtav.
5 irpbs 8e Toiirois apereis] 'And
besides, it has been previously de-
monstrated that the wise man is
emphatically (ye) one who acts, for
his province is to deal with particulars,
and he possesses also all the virtues.'
xp6rtpov, cf. ^A. vi. vii. 7, vi. viii. 8 ;
rwr 4<Txa.T<av is here the genitive of
the object, as, in the place last quoted,
KCU Tiis 4\Xas x & "' pTas] Cf. Eth.
vi. xiii. 6 ; KCL\ rAs &AA.as is equivalent
to Ktd aS 7r(<ros. See the note on .Z&A.
11. i. 4.
7 The rough and hasty conception
of continence which would confound
it with obstinacy is here refuted by
showing that absurdities would follow
from it. Continence would be some-
times an evil, and incontinence some-
times a good. From this point of view
the conduct of Neoptolemus, (who first
promised to deceive Philoctetes, and
afterwards abandoned the design as
unworthy), must be called incontinent
and at the same time right. The full
reference here given to the Pkiloctetes
of Sophocles is more in the style of
II.]
IIOIKilN [EYAHMIflN] VII. 199
axpao~/a, olov o
axpoi(ria sxtrraTixov, serraj rig
SV Ttt)
r) WTTO TOU
o. STI o
yap TO Trap
TO
/a
oai/
o
Eudemus than of Aristotle. The al-
lusion is repeated below, c. ix. 4.
For the sake of observing more accu-
rately the ' noble incontinence ' of
Neoptolemus, it is worth while to
quote at length the passage referred
to (Soph. Phil. 895916).
N. innrai' ri STJT' &i/ 5p/j.' eyiSo TOVV-
OeVSe ye ;
4>. rt S" fffnv, Si TTOI ; TTOI TTOT' e{e/3rjs
\6ytp ;
N. OVK o?5' Sirot XP'? T&Tropof Tpeirtiv
fir os.
*. oiropely Se TOU ffv ; /i)j ^- e V> *
TtKVOV, TttSe.
N. dA\' ffSd.5' ^8?j roDSe TO
4>. ou ^j (re vff^epeia TOU
<eTTflfffl> &ffTf (J.'fl fJL &yflV VO.VTTIV TJ J
N. SITOJ/TO tiv(T\epfia, rr]v avrov fyvffiv
Srav Mirtev Tts 5p$ TO /
Spas ouSe (Jwyj/ers, t<rd\bv &vSp f
N. olffxpos Qavovfiai ' TOUT' aviSiuai
noAai.
$. otfitovv %v oTs "ye Spas ^v oTs S'
auSas OKvSs.
N. w Zeu, T( Sparrw; Sevrepov \T]<j>6<a
Ka(Js,
Kpvir-rwv ff 6. ^ Set Kol \fywi>
>. ocijp 85', JUT; '7111) Ka/cbs yvwurjv t<pw,
trpoSovs p ?oi6 na.K\nrciiv rbv ir\ovi>
N. Ajiriijj' /xe>/ ou/c e^arye Aurrjpws Se /n^
irf(j.iru> fff
TaAai.
*. Tl 1TOT6 \eyflS, U TfKVOV, US Oil
/j.avddv<o.
N. ouSeV ffe Kpui|/w. Se? yap ^s Tpolav
fff ir\eiv
irpbs TOVS 'AXCUOVS Kal -rbv 'Arpti-
Scov ffr6\ov.
8 9 Tt 6 ffofyianiibs KO.KO, irpd-
Jet] ' Again (if we accept the above-
mentioned definition of continence)
the sophistical argument [though
lying] will cause us perplexity. For
from the sophists wishing to confute,
and at the same time astonish (irop<-
5oa ^\tyxttv), in order that on suc-
ceeding they may establish a reputation
for power, they construct a piece of
reasoning which perplexes, since the
intellect is fettered, on the one hand
not wishing to abide by a conclusion
which does not please, and, on the
other hand, being unable to get loose,
from having no means of breaking
the chain of argument. Now from
one of their reasonings it ensues that
folly together with incontinence will
make up virtue ; for (he who possesses
these qualities) does the reverse of
what he conceives (he ought) by
reason of his incontinence, but he
conceives good to be bad and that he
ought not to do it, and thus he will
do what is good and not what is bad.'
In the Oxford edition of Bekker
(1837) there is a misprint of ft-tveiv
Hfv 8^. The Berlin edition of Bekker,
like all other editions, reads pcvftv fi.ev
p-fl. The MSS. appear to vary with
regard to fifv (which by some of them
is omitted), but not with regard to M.
200
HOIKftN [ETAHMION] VII.
[CHAP.
yivsrai ' osftsrai yap r[ 8iavoia, orav jasve<v [JLSV jar) $ou-
8a TO jar) dpscrxsiv TO <ruja7re^ai/$s'i/, Trpo'isvai 8s jar)
/vo Ao'you rj a<>poo-uj/rj jasTa dxpourias apsTr/ rdvavrta yap
(uv uTTO^aja/Savsj Oia Tr)v dxpacriav, w7roXaja/3avfi 6s
xaxa sTva* xou ou 8rTv -rrpaTTeiv, COO~TS Taya^a xai
seeing this, ignores the word J/u8J-
/xej/oj altogether. Supposing, how-
ever, that it be allowed to stand,
we must interpret it in a logical sense,
not as if it had anything to do with
the fallacy of Eubulides. The ex-
planation of it is to be found in the
Sophist. Elench. of Aristotle, iii. 1-2,
where it is said that the aims of the
Sophists and Eristics are five in
number, %\eyxos Kal ifitvSos nal irapd-
Soov Kal ao\oiKicr/j.bs (making one talk
bad grammar) itai irtiiirTw rb iroir\ffai
aSoXeo-x^trcu (making one repeat the
same thing over and over) . . . ndXurra
(lev yap irpoaipow-rai QalvtaBat t\y-
Xovrfs, Sfvrfpov 8 tyfvSdfjLevov TI Set-
Kvvvai, rplrov tis vapdSo^ov &ytiv, K.r.\.
In the above passage we see that the
writer has brought together two of
these separate terms, speaking of
jropo8o|o 3\tyx ( "'- It is possible that
he may also have qualified the ' so-
phistical reasoning* with another of
these logical formulae, though, as
before said, its addition presents an
awkward appearance. On the eristic
of the Sophists, see Vol. I. Essay II.
pp. 99-100.
SeSerai i] Sidvoia] Cf. Ar. Metaph.
II. i. 2 : Xve'tf 8' OUK eanv ayvoovvras
rbv $ecrfi.6v dAX' ^ T7)y Staco/as aironia
5ri\ol rovro irtpl rov irpdy paras' rj yap
airopt'i TavTTi irapairKi)criov irtirovOf TO?J
SeScjucVots aovvaruv yap a/j.(poT(p<as
fpof\Bflv els rb irp&aQev. If we grant
the premiss that continence is sticking
to an opinion of whatever kind, we
cannot ' get loose ' from the conclusion
forced upon us by the Sophists.
The great difficulty in the passage
before us is caused by the word ^ei>5<5-
/uei/os. This is explained either to be
( i ) an additional adjective to b trospi-
ffTJKby \6yos, in which position it has
an awkward appearance, or (a) to refer
to the well-known puzzle of Eubulides
the Megarian, which was called 6
fy(vS6fi.fvos, and in logic books ' Men-
tiens ' or ' the liar.' The puzzle was
as follows: 'If a man says that he
lies, does he lie or speak the truth ? '
to which of course no simple answer
can be given. He may lie, and yet
speak the truth in saying that he lies ;
for if he lies in saying that he lies, then
he speaks the truth. This was a speci-
men of the ' eristic ' of the Megarians,
which consisted to a great extent in
drawing out the difficulties that beset
the common forms of language. Chry-
sippus wrote six books on the puzzle
of ' the Liar ; ' and Philetas of Cos
is said to have died of vexation from
failing to solve it. Hegel ( Geschichte
der Philos. n. 117) compares it to the
squaring of the circle. But clearly
this puzzle has nothing to do with the
subject under discussion in the text.
Indeed one might almost fancy that
the word ty(v$6nevos was an inter-
polation which had crept in owing to
the occurrence of the words 8& rb
\\nrf't(T6ai ^tuS^jMcos in the line before.
The acquaintance of the copyist with
the fallacy ' Mentions ' might have
tended to shroud the mistake. Evi-
dently the words ovu&aivti 5' & nvos
\6yov are an explanation of 6 ao(f>i-
<TTicbs Aifyos, and the Paraphrast,
II. III. 1
H9IKON [EYAHMI&N] VII.
201
TO. xaxa Trps
ra rjos'a xai T
Ao7/o-/xov aXX
av.
"
oTav TO uoa>p
en o TOO TrsTrsln'oii TrpaTTcov xau iw- 10
ipo^svog fisXrtwv dv fto^sisv rou ^
;' axpafriav sui'aro'rspoj yap Sia TO
o S' axTT svoo$ TV} ?rapoj/jua ev r
s
en s
yap fJLTi] eTTSTrsHTTQ a TTpaTTSJ, fJ.TOL7Ti(rfjig av
VVV OS TTSTTSHTfJiSVOS OUOsI/ TJTTOV CtAXa TTpaTTSJ.
\/ > /IXNJ/ /t
)to~*a so~r* xa.i syxpaTS/a, TI^ o
\ < / 3f \ > ^
yap ct7rao~a^ sys* Ta^ axpao~ia^,
ai jasv oyv a.7ropiai roiauTOLi nvsg
TotJTcov 8s Ta jtxsv avsXsTv 8s? ra 8s 12
75 yap Xuo~< Tijf drropias vp=(ri$ S<TTIV.
\ v t / <>/*y\~
V OUV (TXS7TTSQV TTOTSpOV ltiOT$ T] OK,
TroTa TOV ax^aTi xai TGI/
nvag
II
ptOTOV ]U,S
?
lo ert 6 T< &\Aa irparrei] 'Again
he who on conviction and with full
purpose acts and pursues pleasure
would seem to be in a better state
than he who does so not from reason-
ing, but from incontinence ; for (the
former) is more curable, since there is
a possibility of changing his con-
victions, whereas the incontinent man
is open to the saying " When water
chokes, what must one take to wash it
down ? " Had he not been convinced
before with regard to his actions,
there might have been a hope of his
mind being enlightened and his
ceasing so to act ; but as it is, with
all the conviction in the world, he
still acts contrary to it.' This is a
reductzo ad absurdum of the saying
that incontinence means never acting
on your consiction, and that continence
means sticking to your conviction. If
it were so, intemperance (cocoAao-ia)
would seem to be a sort of continence,
and, on the other hand, incontinence
would seem incurable. The reverse,
however, of all this is true. See below
ch. viii.
el fj.tv yap ^ &rrej<rro] Some MSS.
VOL. II. D
omit fj.^i, which is not to be wondered
at, as there is a transition of meaning
in the use of ^ireiretoro : (i) the in-
temperate man is said to act T
icfirf'tffdai, i.e. with a wrong conviction,
thinking bad to be good ; (2) the in-
continent man acts ov T< Treirelcrflcu,
not by reason of a conviction that he
ought to do as he does ; (3) the
incontinent man irtveiffrai & irpdrrfi,
has a full conviction with regard to
what he does (i.e. that it is wrong),
but does not abide by that conviction.
12 at /j.tv o3i> tartv] 'This then
is the kind of difficulties which arise ;
part of them we must explain away
(a.vf\fur), while we leave part un-
answered, for resolving a difficulty is
finding something out.' Cf, Ar. Mcta-
phys. it. i. a : e<rrt 5e -rois fviropTJcrai
flovhofjifrois irpo&pyov rJ> Jtairopfjtroi
(v-aAdiy r) yap vffrfpov eviropla \i>ffis
TUV irp6repoi/ airopovfj.ei'cav tffrl, \vetv
8' OVK f(mj> ayvoovvTas vbv $ecr(4.6i>,
See above, ch. i. 5, note.
III. This chapter discusses that
which is really the most important
and interesting question with regard
202
H0IKQN [ETAHMION] VII.
[ClIAP.
s Trorepoj/ Trsp Troav i}6ovr]v xa
TJ TTSp/ Tivct$ a.$a)pur[j.va$ i xai rov syxparSj xai TOJ> xap-
TSptXOV, TTOTSpQV OLUTOg $ STSpOg S(TTIV' G[J.(>l(ti$ &S XOLl
rwv aAAcov oVa <ruyysi>5) T% $=a>p/a SCTT} Taur>j.
' j/ 6 exaTr xai 6
ot
8s
TTO
TSp
ov TO)
e7vou
ou aXXa Tto )
o axpot-
STTSIT si Trsl
TTO.VT e<rTiv i ax^a<Ta xa 73 eyx^arsia 13 ou* cure yap
) Travr' serrlv 6 a7r?uo a
ours TO) 7rpe raura
oXa<r
7TpOOt.lpOUp.VO$,
Trsp a:rep axo-
(rairov yap av
TO TTOipOV
to incontinence and the whole nature
of the moral will, namely, how is it
possible to know the right and yet do
the wrong ? It treats of the third of
the popular opinions mentioned above
(ch. i. 6), and the difficulties arising
out of the same(ch. ii. 1-4). The
commencement of the chapter is rather
confused, as it touches on, without
discussing, the nature of the object-
matter of continence and incontinence,
&c. With 3 the main question is
opened, namely the relation of know-
ledge to incontinence, and a. pre-
liminary step is taken by the assertion
that it makes no difference whether it
be right opinion or knowledge which
the incontinent man possesses, since
opinion may be held quite as strongly
as knowledge.
In 5 8 it is shown that the real
point to be ascertained is, what is
meant by knowing or having know-
ledge. A man may have knowledge
which is in abeyance, either because
he does not apply a minor premiss to
his general principle, or because he is
under the influence of sleep, wine,
madness, or the like.
9 1 4 A more intimate examination
tells us that there may be two syllo-
gisms in the mind, the one leading to
continence and the other to incon-
tinence. The former is not drawn
out, but remains in want of a minor
premiss ; the latter through the in-
stincts of sense and desire becomes
realised and is acted on. However,
the former knowledge cannot be said
to have been present in a complete
form to the mind, and therefore
Socrates was not wrong in denying
that knowledge of the right could
exist, and yet be overborne.
i a There is something awkward
in the way in which the questions to
be discussed in succeeding chapters
are here propounded. The writer
might have made it his &px*l r *i*
ffictyetas to consider what is the exact
point of difference between continence
and incontinence, but as a matter of
fact he has not done so. There is a
want of art in the sudden announce-
ment (6 fjLtv yap Hytrcu K. r. X.) of the
distinction between intemperance and
incontinence. The same want of art,
proceeding from whatever cause, marks
III.]
HGIKflN [EYAHMION] VII.
203
o
oux oJWaj jU-sv, 6<a>xs< os. Trspi fjisv ovv TOU Oo'^av aAry$5j 3
jar) gTnorr^vjv sTva* Trap' r]v axparsuovra;, ouSsv Oia-
7TpO TOV XoyOV SVlOl yap TtOV Qoa%OVTO)V OU OJO-Ttt-
' ' e\ ouv <a TO >Jp?j.a 4
svwv Trapa TTJV
Trpd^OlHTlV, OU^SV 0101(751 7nO-Tr^aV} ^Q^g' SVtOl
oio=v rjTTOi/ oij %o%d%oti(riv r) irspoi dt$ STTI-
6* 'HpaxXsiro^. aXX* ITTS* 8/p/to^ Asyo^asv 5
TO g7T<TTao~ai (xa< yap o ep^tov jtxsv ow %pw[j.svo$ 8s TyJ
o %pa)[j.svos ^sysrai 7r/(TTa<7^a/), 8jo/cri
jU,^ QsfDpOVVTOt. 8= a ]U,^ ? TTpOLTTslV TOU
TOVTO yap 8ox=T
8ia
yap
<rravrai
5
TO
jU.V
the whole of these two sections, and
the main business of the chapter only
commences with section 3.
3 4 irepl fitv olv ToD Sc^av oAi)0^
K.T.A.] Cf. above ch. ii. 3 4. We
must dismiss any idea that the pheno-
mena of incontinence can be explained
by saying that the incontinent man
has only moral opinions, and that
opinions are weak. 'Heraclitus shows'
that opinions may be as strongly held
as scientific certainties. Of course
neither Aristotle nor his school would
wish to do away with the distinction
which Plato had established between
8<$|a and 7rrT^juri. It is only as
connected with the will, and as form-
ing a ground for action, that opinion
can be considered as strong as science.
SrjAo? 5" 'Hpd*cA.eiTos] Heraclitus had
a reputation with the ancients for
pride and dogmatism ; cf. Diog. Laert.
ix. i. 5 : IJKovffe re ouSej'bs aAA,' a.in'bv
?<?) Si&craffBcu Kal fj.aBe'iv iravra trap'
tavrov. Ib. IX. i. I : fifya\6<t>pu>v 8e
ytyovf irap bvrivaovv /col irjrfp6irTr)s, a>9
Kal fK TOV ffvyypdfi./j.aros avrov STJAOC
iv $ (p-nfff iroAu/io0i77 voov ov 5i5o<r/cC
'HirioSov yap av e'5(8o|e Kal Hv6ay6priv,
aS0is re cifvo<pavfd re Kal 'EKaraiov.
elvai yap ev rb ffo<pby ^irlffraffBai yvca-
tyre ol
(ii]v
trdvrtav.
5 aAA' firel St^cDs Qftaptav] ' But
since we use the term ' knowing ' in
two senses, both to denote the man
who possesses without applying, and
the man who applies knowledge, there
will be a difference between doing
what is wrong, when you have the
knowledge but do not attend to it,
and doing the same when you have
the knowledge and pay attention to it.
The latter case seems strange, but
not so if you act without attending.'
This distinction between the posses-
sion and the application of knowledge,
which is of the utmost importance
for explaining moral weakness, was
perhaps first started by Plato in. the
Thetetetus, pp. 197-198, where he
introduces his famous image of the
pigeon-house. Every knowledge once
acquired by the mind is like a bird
caught and placed in a pigeon-house ;
it is possessed, but not available, till
it be chased within the enclosure and
captured anew.
fj.il flewpaujra] Beupe'iy is used to
express 'direct observation,' just as
in Eth. vi. iii. i. : Srav ?a> rou dtupflv
i> 2
204
HBlKiiN [EYAHMiilN] VII.
[CHAP.
6 jU.7)
[J.SV
s(OpU)V. STl STTS
Ct[J.<$>OTf>CtS OuQsV
TO<OV-
TpOTTOJ TCOV 7rpOTCt(T)V,
SI TTpOLTTSlV TTapa T7)V S7TJ<TTT;-
xa$o'AOU XX /Jl] TY) XaTO.
yap T<X xa$' sxao~Ta. Sia^eps* 3e xai TO
" TO jw.ei/ yap ec^' sauToO TO 6' sVi TOU
oTot/ OT< TravTi av5pa>7Tu> <7vfj.$epsi TO.
vQpwTroc; TJ OT< ^pov TO TOio'vos aXX* e<
r) oux svs< "^ owx svspye*". xara rs
00~OV, O)0"T SoXfiTl/ OUTO) fJiSV flWMU
8s flaij,ao-To'v. ST< TO
TpoVov
sv TOJ yap ff^s'V jw-ei' j",^ ^p^o~6a/ 8=
o-T6 xai e^e'V TTOJ? xa} jtx^
olov TOV xaQfoSovTa xai fj.ouv6fj.evov xai olva)[j.ivov.
/JtTjV OWTO) ^tariQsvrai ol ev
yap xa) eTr/Qu/a/at
xai TO
aTOTrov,
xai ev<a TCOV TO<-
6 Irt ^irei 0au^offT(5'] ' Again
since the premisses (in a syllogism)
are of two modes, nothing hinders a
man acting against knowledge, al-
though he possesses both these, if he
apply only the uniTersal premiss, but
not the particular, for it is particulars
which are the objects of action. More-
over there is a distinction which may
be made in the universal itself; part
of it applies to the subject (if lawroD),
and part to the object (^irl TOV Trp&y-
JUOTOS), for instance (you may have
the universal) " dry things are good
for all men," and (the minor premiss)
" this is a man," or " such and such
is dry ; " but (the farther knowledge)
that " this object is such and such,"
the person either has not or it is not
realised. According then to these
different mode of the premisses there
will be an immense difference (in the
way one knows), so that there is
nothing paradoxical in (the incontinent
man) " knowing " in the way I have
specified, but that he should know
otherwise would be marvellous.' This
section well points out the number of
particular applications which have to
be made before a general moral prin-
ciple can be realised and acted on.
Else it remains in abeyance, and the
man who possesses it may yet act
against it.
7 iv T$ 7etp %X (tv olvoit.4vov\ ' For
in the case of having and not using we
see that the having (rV ?{"') becomes
quite a different thing, so that in such
cases a man has (knowledge) after a
manner, and has it not, as for instance
in sleep, in madness, and in drunken-
ness.' l|s is used here simply as the
verbal noun of t\<a, as it is in a
passage of Plato, already alluded to,
which the writer possibly had before
his mind, Tkecetetus, p. 197 A: ajd}-
KOO.S o5v 6 vvv \eyovfft rb fwiaraa'Ocu ;
"Iffws" oil ftttnoi $v ye T<f
/j.vrtfMv(vw. *Ein<rT^/t7jj trov H
BUT 6 flvcu.
III.]
xai
UeiKON [EYAHMIQN] VII.
TTOJOUCnV.
20a
. TO 8s Asystv TQvg hoyoyg TOU a?ro 8
rttTTTj|*ij$ ou^sv (rrjasTov* xou yap ol Iv TO!$ TraQsri
a7ro3:/<=j xctl eTTTj Xs'
ou7rrt>* = yap
ro'Jrto Se v^ovou SsT*
8 rb Se \eyeiv aKpareuo/ieVous]
'Now repeating the words which
belong to knowledge is no sign, for
those also who are in the states I have
mentioned repeat demonstrations and
verses of Empedocles, and those who
are beginning to learn string the words
together without yet understanding
them ; for (to be understood) a thing
must grow up in the mind, and for
this time is required. So in short we
must suppose that men in a state of
incontinence speak just like actors.'
This is an extremely subtle observa-
tion. The writer having said that
passion is like sleep or madness,
which make one know and yet not
know at the same time, proceeds to
remark that men acting incontinently
will often speak as if they were fully
aware of the nature of their acts.
They will say at the very moment of
yielding to temptation, ' I know I
ought not to do this.' But such words
are no sign that the knowledge is
really felt and realised ; they are
only like the verses of Empedocles
which a man might mutter in his
sleep ; they are like the repetition of
a schoolboy's task ; they are hollow .
like the ranting of an actor.
ewrbTT/ye'irKrHjyiiTjs] ' That are caused
by, are the results of, science.' Cf.
Met. I. iv. 4: a\\' ofrre liteivoi airJ>
7ri<rHj/js, ' they do it not because of
science,' and see below, ix. ix. 6.
av
01 npSnov juafltWes] Cf. Eth. vi.
viii. 6.
9 ii en KO! 8e /xHj/xTji/] 'Again
in the following manner one might
psychologically consider the cause.
There is first a general belief, and
secondly a particular belief, which is
no longer under the domain of reason,
but under that of sense. Now when
out of these two a third is created, it
is a necessity that the mind should on
the one hand assert the conclusion,
and in the sphere of practice should
straightway carry it out. As for
instance, if (there be the general pro-
position) " one ought to taste all that
is sweet," and the particular one "this
thing is sweet," it is a necessity that
he who is able, and is not hindered,
should at once proceed to act upon
the knowledge. When therefore there
is in the mind one universal which
forbids tasting, but another which
says, " all that is sweet is pleasant,"
(having a minor) " this thing is sweet,"
and thus the second universal is
realised, and supposing that desire
happen to be there ; (in this case) the
first universal says, " avoid this," but
desire leads us on (to take it), from
the power which it has of setting in
motion every one of our organs. Thus
the result is that one is incontinent
under the sanction as it were of reason
and belief, and a belief too which is
opposed not directly but only acciden-
206
H61KQN [EYAUMION] VII.
[CHAP.
ryv arav. 73 fji.v yap
, 13 srspa
xvoia ' orav
8e jou'a
ftsv Cravat TTJV
olov, si 7rat>TO
T< T<OV '
auTaj/, avayxTj TO
i> 8e raTj 7roj7jTixa? Trparrsiv evQ
-ysusa-Saj Osi*, TOUT) 8e yAuxu to
TOV SuvctU,evov xai
TOUTO xa TrpaTTSiv. oTav oi/ TJ
uso~9a/, 73' &, OT/ ?rav TO
TOUT* 8s yXuxu (auTTj Vpys7) Tu 8' s
73
TOUTO, 73
xao~Tov SuvaTa* TOJV (j-opicov '
<rvfjt.fiot.ivei 'JTTO
si/ou(ra,
yap
tally (to the true knowledge). For
it is desire, and not the intellectual
belief, which is opposed to the right
law. And this consideration leads us
to see why it is that brutes are not
incontinent, namely, because they haye
no conception of universals, but only
an image and a memory of parti-
culars.'
This passage gives an admirable
explanation of the way in which a
man under temptation may ignore his
moral principles. Action (as the
writer implies) always depends on a
syllogism in the mind, and, if a minor
premiss were applied to the right
moral principle, wrong action could
never take place. But it is equally
true that the man who acts wrongly
does so under some sort of shadow of
reason. The story of the temptation
of Eve is typical of all similar cases
of yielding. There are always ar-
guments and considerations on which
the mind, self-deceived and blinded by
desire, may form a syllogism. And,
as the writer observes, the misleading
principle thus applied is not directly
false or contrary to what is right. The
saying ' sweet things are pleasant ' is
not in itself contrary to the principle
' intemperance is to be avoided.' Ac-
cidentally and in their effects the two
propositions are brought into collision,
though not originally opposed.
<pvffiKu>s] Perhaps 'psychologically*
is the most representative translation
which we can give of this word in the
present passage. Psychology was, as
we know, considered as a branch of
physics by Aristotle, see Vol. I. Essay
V. p. 237, and cf. Eth. ix. ix. 7.
^8?;] A circumlocution is necessary
to express what was probably here
meant by this word. Cf. Eth. \i. xi. 2.
ZvQa. juiv] i. e. in the sphere of the
reason, to which tv 5e TCUS ifoiirrutais
is opposed. For the latter phrase we
should have expected to find TOUT
irpoKriKcus, a formula which occurs
Etk. vi. xi. 4. But in the Etidemian
Ethics, n. xi. 4, exactly the same
usage is found : &<nrep ybp rats Otwpri-
TiKaTy CM \nro6tfftis ap^af, OUTCD Kal Tory
woiTjTiKaly rb rt'Xos ipx^l Ka ^ vit6Q*<iis.
It is not easy to say what substantive
is understood. Perhaps al vpcucrtKal
(or iroiTjTiKai) twurTTJfuu was the origi-
nal phrase.
O.VO.JKI) irpdrrftv fiiBvs] On the
doctrine of the practical syllogism, see
Vol. I. Essay IV. pp. 212-219.
ruv poplar'] i. e. ' the parts of the
body.' This is mixing up a physical
explanation with the account of mental
phenomena. The same thing is done
III.]
H0IK&N [EYAHMIQN] VII.
207
oux
xa orj axparsusa-ai, oux svavriag e
xara <rujU/3/3?jxo. TJ yap STriQufLiot. svavr/a,
^ ^' a ) rt ? op3> Xoyo> w(TT xai Sia TOUTO ra
axparvj, on oux ep^si ra>v xa^oAou 67roAv]\}/iv, aXXa rail/
exaerra avTa<ria.v xa) jav^javjv. TTCO 8
xal TTO^IV yivsrai S7n(rr^p.cov o axpari^, 6
xa; Trsp} o\va)[j.vov xai xaQeu^ovro^ xa} oux
roti 7ra9ou, ov SsT Trapa r<ov <J>uo-<oXoyaJV axous/v.
' 15 TsXsura/a Trporao-i^ So^a re aJo"^ToC xai 13
rcov Trpd^ecuv, raurijv ^ oux s^et o ev TJ 7raQe< cov,
in the Peripatetic treatise De Motu
Animalium ; cf. especially with the
present passage Ib. viii. 5 : 5ii TOUTO
8' ajua ais (7r6?v j/oel 8rt iropevreov /cal
TTOpfVfTCU, kv fj.'f] Tl eflTToSifr) fTfpOV.
ra Mf" yo,p bpya.vi.Ka. /ue'pr; irapamcevd^fi
eVtTrjSeiaJS ra Trd0r;, ^ S' ope|iy ra 7rc{077,
T^I/ S' upe^iv T\ (pWTaaia.' avTt] Se
yiverai fy 8ia voijffecas % 5t' aiffdijcreus.
1 1 The mere intellectual knowledge
that a thing is pleasant is not opposed
to the moral law. It is only when
this knowledge has become desire,
i.e. part of the will, which implies
acting, that an opposition is felt.
Brutes act on desire, but their in-
tellectual apprehension being entirely
of particulars, there is a harmony
between desire and the data of per-
ception which prevents our attributing
incontinence to brutes. It might be
said that there are dawnings of the
moral faculty, traces of a sense of
right and wrong, in some animals,
for instance, dogs ; but the writer
here does not enter upon the subject.
On the meaning given by Aristotle to
<pavTajia, see note on Eth. in. v. 17.
12 'Now to explain how the ob-
livion (&yvoLa) of the incontinent man
is stopped, and how he comes again to
the use of his knowledge, requires no
special account peculiar to this con-
dition, but the same account as is to
be given about (the recovery of) the
intoxicated man or the sleeper, for
which we must inquire of the physio-
logists.' The most interesting relic
of the speculations of the old physio-
logists upon the above question which
has come down to us, is the account
given by Sextus Empiricus (Adv. Math,
VH. 129) of the opinion of Heraclitus,
who thought that our rationality de-
pended upon our communion through
the senses with the universal reason
that surrounds us ; in sleep we become
foolish because cut off from all com-
munication with this, except through
the act of breathing alone, but on
awaking we are again replenished.
TOUTOJ' 8^j T\>V Oflov K6yov Kaff 'Hpa-
K\(ITOV 81" avatTVorjs ff-a6.ffa.vTfs voepol [/
ytv6fj.eOa,, KoJ ei/ \nrvois \ri6cuoi, Kara 8e
%yfp<riv icaXiv ZfjUppoves. fr yap rots
Sirvois iJ.vffdvTCiu/ TWV a.l<r6i]TiKcov v6ptav,
X<pieTat TTJS irpbs rb irepiexov ffv/ji<pvtas \
6 tv ^JUH/ vov s, u6vi}s TT)S Kara avairvofyv ;
us ffta^ofJifVT^s, olovel TU>OS\
Tepov ?x e HVTlHovtitfyv Hvvajj.iv. ev Sf
ypiiyop6ffi iraXiv Sia T&V aiffOrjTiiccay
irdpwv, &ffirep Sid Tivtav BvplStnv irpo-
ictyas Kal T
13 14 tird 8' ai<r07)TiKijs] 'But
the minor premiss being a belief with
regard to perception of the senses
208
IIG1KHN [EYAHMIQN] VII.
75 o6Vo) sve/ wg oux r t v TO s^siv sTricrraar^ai a
wcnrsp o oivcOjOtevoj TO. 'Eja7r=SoxAeou, xai $ia TO
jW.?j3' STrKTTr^ovixov o/xo/coj sTt/ai 8oxs<V TU>
(T%aTOV opov. xai soixev o e^rsi S
lvai
xa
[ClIAP.
/
T^eytiv
xcc6o'-
TO
TO
, aXT^a TTJ aio~$r;TixSJ. TTS^I jtxsv oSv TOU elooVa
xa) :ra>^ elooa
and being what determines action,
this is either not possessed by a man
in the condition we have been describ-
ing, or he possesses it in a way in which,
as we said (is OVK fy\ possession
is not knowledge, but is only a form
of words, like the drunken man spout-
ing Empedocles. And since the minor
term is not universal and has not the
same scientific character as the uni-
versal, the question raised by Socrates
seems really (cal) to be substantiated.
For it is not knowledge properly so
called that is present when the con-
dition arises, nor is it this which is
twisted about by the condition of
mind that comes on, but only per-
ceptional knowledge.' This section
winds up the discussion of the com-
patibility of knowledge with incon-
tinence. The first sentence is clear
enough, but there is some little ob-
scurity in the saying that perceptional
knowledge is present in incontinence,
and is overborne by passion. What
is meant apparently is, that passion
prevents that perception which would
cause the moral principle existent in
the mind to be realised. Hence, in
short, there is a moral oblivion, and it
is quite true that Socrates was justified
in saying that incontinence could not
take place if knowledge of the right
were really present to the conscious-
ness of the actor.
Lambinus,
followed by Fritzsche, places a full
stop before these words, and connects
them with /cal $OIK*V & ScoKpctTrjs. This
punctuation has been adopted in the
above translation as making far better
sense. It must be confessed, however,
that the Paraphrast favours the punc-
tuation of Bekker. The occurrence
of Kal before ZoiKev would naturally
lead to a full stop being placed after
Zpov, but it might still be justified, as
merely giving emphasis to eoixe erti/x-
fiaivfiv, cf. ch. x. a : 5ib KO! 8oKov<riv
More K. T. A. Eth. in. viii. 6 : &9tv /col
6 Sco/fpciTTjy. Ib. 10, 89fv Kal"O/j.rjpos.
T\ Tf\evraia irpAraa is] This phrase
is equivalent to ^ frfpa. irp&Tcuris, Eth.
vi. xi. 4. The minor premiss is so
called as containing the ?(TX<*TOS opos,
or minor term, which is mentioned
shortly after.
ws ou/c fa] With this use of the past
tense cf. Eth. v. vi. 9 : /caret v6^ov ybp
%i>, 'for this is, as we have said,
according to law.'
it ^f/jret] This is sometimes trans-
lated 'what Socrates meant,' for which
the Greek would have been t> 1j6(\f or
4fiov\(TO \tyetv. t> ^fet must mean
' the questionings ' or ' doubts ' of
Socrates, i. e. as to the possibili ty of
acting against knowledge. Cf. Eth. i.
iv. 5 : E5 yap Kal T\\.d.T<av rjitApti TOVTO
Kal 4^f)ret.
TTJsaiV0ij'n/fTjs] The phrase olaQ^riK^
would to some philosophers
III. IV.]
IIGIIU1N [E1TAHMIQN] VII.
209
Ylorspov ' s<rrl rig a7rAto obepttnjj TJ Trdvrsg xara JU.E- 4
pog, xal el eVr/, Trspl Troid e<m, XSXTSOV s$>s%. or/ ]U.si/ ouv
Treat 7]ovet xal "hvTrag elcnv o7 r' syxpariig xa} xaprsoixoi
ol axparsig xa} jaaAaxoi, tfyavsow, STTSI ' scrrt ret z
dvayxafa rcov TTOIOUVTWV T^OI/^V, ra 8' alpsrd ^asv xa6'
e%ovra 8' iTrepjSoXr'j/, dvayxafa p.lv ra (rayfj.arixd.
Ss ra Tojaura, ra rs srsp) rr^v rpo^^v xal rr y v rtbv
a<$po(>i(ria)V %psiotv, xa) ra To/aura roiv crw/xarixcov 7r=p}
a r^v axo/\.ao"/av IdcjUJS* xa) r^v (rwQpoa-vvriv. ra 8' avay-
xa?a jasv ou, aipsra Ss xa6' aura. Xfyco 8' olov v/xrjv r<-
jarjt/ TrXourov xa) ra ro/aura rtov ayaQtov xa) rj^sa-v.
jasv ouv TT^O^ rcturct Trapa rov op^ov Xo'yov u
be a contradiction in terms, as they
would hold that sensible things cannot
be known. A doctrine was attributed
to Speusippus, of which we may be
here reminded, viz. that besides science
there is 'scientific perception.' Cf.
Sextus Empiricus adv. Math. \ii. 145 :
SireutrtTnTOs 5e, eirel rSiv irpa.jfJia.rtav ra,
juei/ ai<r07jTa ra Se MOIJTO, rcuj/juei' VOTITW
KptT'fipioi' eAelec elvai rb^ eiri(mj/ji.ovt-
Kbv \6yov, Ttav 8e o.lff6t]TSiv rijf eiri-
iK^v alfftiriffiv, fincrTrifj.oviK^v 5e
iv U7rei'\7|(pe KaOetrrtii'at T^JV /uera-
y \6yov dArj-
IV. This chapter discusses the
question mooted above (ch. i. 7, ch.
ii. n), as to whether incontinence
is an absolute term, having a definite
object-matter, or is merely relative.
The answer is very simple. Pleasure
is divided into necessary and desirable
( 2), or into good, bad, and indifferent
(5). Incontinence, in an absolute
sense, applies only to the necessary or
bodily pleasures. It has then the
same range of objects as were before
.assigned to Temperance and Intem-
perance, and differs from Intemper-
ance chiefly in that it goes against the
VOL. II. E
reason and the will, instead of carry-
ing them on its side. Having thus
laid down a definite notion of Incon-
tinence as something absolute and
positive, it is easy to see that the idea
and the term may be applied in a sort
of analogous sense to mean an ill-
control of the desires for other kinds of
pleasures also, beside the bodily plea-
sures, e.g. wealth or honour. In such
applications we must recollect that the
use of the word Incontinence is meta-
phorical.
2 Trepl a, rrjv aKoKauiav eOefnev Kal
r^v <T<a<ppo3vvnv~\ Cf. Eth. Eud. in. ii.
5 : 'Eirel 8' 6 au&piav fffrl irepl fjSovds,
avdyicr) Kal irepl eindv^iias ritas aurbi>
elvai. Ae? 8); Aa/3etV irepl rivas. Ou yap
irepl irdffas ov5e irepl airavra ra, rjSea 6
ffuxppcav e"rrriv, aAAa rfj fjiev 56y irtpl
Svo r<av alffOririay, irfpi re rb yevffrbv
Kal rb airrSv, rfj 8" a\rideia irepl rb
atrr6v, K. r. A. This is of course taken
from Eth. Nic. in. x. 3-8.
rovs fj.tv ovv] Here commences the
apodosis to eVsl .8' tcrl, which is a
complicated sentence with two paren-
theses (Ae-yco 8e rd roiavra, ffoxppo-
avvt\v) and (Ae'yco 8" olov ^Setoi/).
rovs fjLev erepos ?iv] ' Those then
who with regard to these latter objects
E
210
IIOIKilN [EYAHMinN] VII.
[Ciup.
rov Iv aurolg ctTrXcof [JLSV ou Asyojaev axpare?,
8s TO vpvj/xarwv axpa,Tei$ xai xepooyf xai rifj^s xai
8' ot5 a> lrspoi> xai xa$' Ojao/oV^Ta Xsyojt
avQpcuTrog o TO. 'OXujaTna vsvixyxtog' exsi'vco yap o
oyo^ TOU iS/ou juuxpa> S/sC^spsv aXX' 0|U.a) srspo vjV.
8s* >j /xsv yap axpatr/a \f/sysra< oup^ a> ajU,apr/a
fjt.ovov aXXa xa* a> xax/a TJ r] aTrXaij o3<ra ^ xara T<
TWV S TTSp) Tflt^ <TfO[Jia.TlXa.$ OLTTO-
TOJ/ <ra)4>pova xai axo^ao"Tov, 6
ju,r] TO) 7rpoajpsT(r5ai rail/ TS vj8sojv 8iaxa>v
xa) TCOV XuTrijptov cfjsoywv, Trs/vrjj xai 8/\|/>jj xai a
xa< \/(jou xa< 7raj/ra>i/ TCOV Tre* av xai
3 f*s'pO, TOUTOIV 8'
(/.c. good pleasures) transgress that
right law which they have within
themselves, we do not call simply
" incontinent," but we add a qualify-
ing term (TtpoanQ tints) and speak of
them as incontinent of wealth, gain,
honour, rage, not as absolutely in-
continent, because they are different
from this and are only called incon-
tinent by analogy, as in the phrase
"Man that has been victor at Olym-
pia ; " there the general conception (of
man) differed but little from the
special conception of the individual in
question, and yet still it was different.'
The meaning of this passage is clear,
not so however that of the illustration
which closes it. It is plain that the
word aicpa.T-f)s when spoken of in rela-
tion to anger, money, &c., hafe a some-
what different sense from the unquali-
fied term anpar-fis, which implies a
certain moral weakness with regard to
bodily indulgence. But what is meant
by saying that &v6puiros d rek 'OAiVwria
i>eviKT)Kus is different from the general
conception Man? There appear to be
only two explanations possible: (i)
that supported by the Scholiast on this
place and also the Scholiast on Eth.
\. i., by Alexander Aphrod. ad
Topica i. xvi., by Suidas, and by Eus-
tathius on Iliad, X. p. 847; namely,
that there was a certain Olympionices
whose name was "A<0pa>iros. It might
be said that this name 'AvOpuiros was
not more distinct from the general
term 'Man,' than the term oKpa-Hjs
in the phrase irpari)s Ovpov is from
the general conception of incontinence.
The historical tenses Si4<ptptv and
rrepoy fy are in favour of this inter-
pretation. (2) It might be argued
that these very tenses had given rise
to a conjectural fiction about a person
called "PwBpunros. The Paraphrast
takes no notice of the tradition, and
treats the illustration as a logical one,
which would come merely to this, ' the
conception of an individual implies
a certain diversity from the conception
of the genus.' If this be accepted, the
past tenses of the verbs must be un-
derstood to mean a reference to some
previous logical discourse with which
the school was familiar. In short the
passage must be considered to bear
traces of being a scrap from some
oral lecture a hypothesis not to be
entirely set aside with regard to parts
of the Ethics of Aristotle.
IV.]
II9IKQN [EYAHMIQN] VII.
211
i/ xa
oy xara 7ToV5=o-ii/ on T
7Tpo=o-ii/, on Trspi Ta<$s, xa6a7r?p
. (rr t fj.s7(iV Os xai yap jaaXaxoi J^ywrai ?r=pi 4
Trs sxsvtov o otuftetuiv. xai o<a TOUT st
iQsts
TOV axpaTTj xa TOV otxoflurrov Tisftsv xa yxpaT xa
oux ixflvcov ovbiva, 6<a TO ^=pi ra? avra.$
r t oovag xai Xurraj s/yax ' ol o' s/o-} ^asv Trsp) raura,
MT/y, aXX' 01 ( asv Trpoaipoyvrai oi ^* oy
Oio fxaXXov axoXatrrov av s?7roijW,=v, o(m$
qpsfia $MXCI raj uTrspfto'has x u <=uy=*
, r, rourov ocrrig oia TO S7rt6u^,siv (r^o'opa* T
7p av sxiivog TTOL^G-SIZV, si TrpotrysvoiTO arifopJa vzoivixri
xa) 7r=p} T^ TOJV ai/ayxa/cov svosiag IMTTTI urjptpa ; e7r=I 0= 5
Ttov fvidufucov xa) TOJV T^oovtov a< jasv el<ri TO) ye'i/s< xaXtov
xai <77royoa/cov TUJV yap rpicov svia. $'j<r=i alprTa, T o'
fMtrria TO'JTo>v, Ta 6s jtxsTa^y, xa^ctTrsp Ois/Xo ( a=v TrpoVrpov,
olov p^pr^aaTa xai xspoo^ xat v/xij xai n^r\' Trpog aTravTa
Ss xai Ta TOIOLVTO, xa) Ta /xsTa^y oi TOJ 7rd(r%?iv xai
xai <iXs7v \J/=ovTa/, a^Xa TO)
3 Kara Ttp6ffQeaa>~\ See note on .KA.
ii. iii. 5.
tcaBdirep opyT)$~\ Fritzsche quotes
Thucyd. m. 84 : -^ av&poneeia (pvats
curpaTJ/s /ii' opyr/s oZffa Kpeiffauv 8e
TflO SlKCUOV.
4 oAA.' OUK fKfivow oirSevaJ z. . not
one of those mentioned in z, who
are immoderate in giving way to a
fondness for riches, honour, &c.
5ib pa\\ov a.K6\MTov K. T.A.] It is
more intemperate to pursue luxury,
&c., in cold blood, than to do so under
the influence of passion. It shows
that luxury has become more a part
of the mind itself.
5 6 The remainder of this chapter
is little more than a repetition of what
has gone before. Indulgence in the
good pleasures is no harm, except it
be to excess ; even excess in them is
rather folly than vice, and is not to
E K
be called by the name of incontinence,
except as a sort of metaphor.
&rel Se vTrfppd\\fiv\ 'Now since
some desires and pleasures are in
their kind noble and good according
to our former division of pleasures
into the naturally desirable, the
naturally detestable, and the inter-
mediate as for instance, wealth, gain,
victory, and honour (are noble and
good) ; with regard then to all such,
and the intermediate pleasures, men
are not blamed for feeling, desiring,
and loving them, but for some sort of
excess in them.' The present division
of pleasures can hardly be said to have
been made ' before,' though it can be
harmonized with that given above in
2. The <pi'ffet alperd (of which
wealth and honour are specimens)
answer to the alpera. /j.tv xaO' a&rd
(^oina. 5' \nrepfio\4]v ; while TO
2
212
H0IK&N [EYAHMmNJ VII.
[CHAP-
8/0
cxroi
TI
7ra.pa TOV Xo'yov v] xparoDvTa/ rj OUUXOIKTI TWV
xa/ aya^tov, olov ol Trspi T/^avjt/ ^taXXoi/ ^
5? o~7rou8aoi/TS ij TTSp/ Tgxva xa/ yovs? ' xa* yap raura
ayaScov, xa/ STra/t/oui/Ta* o/ Trep/ raura (nrott^d^ovTss
0~T/ TJ UTTSp/SoXvj Xa/ EV TOVTOlg, 5* Tig 600~7Tp
jaapOJTO xa/ Trpo^ TOUJ Ssou^, 15 wa'Trsp ^arupog o
7rjxaAoujU,st<0 Trep) TOV Trarepa* Aia>/ yap
Ttov apsrutv sxao~Tov
ai
eo-r< dia TO
' ' (^auXai 8s xa
8s ouSs axpao~/a ' rj yap axpao~/a ou povov <
xa/ TaJv \J/sxTa>j/ scrrlv. 8/' ojao/oVrjTa 8= TOU
riTiQevTss rvjv axpao~/av Trsp} sxao~TOu Xeyouo-<v, olov
xaxov JaTpov xa< xaxov uVoxp/TTyv, ov aVXcoj oyx av S'ITTOISV
xaxov' aj>o~7rp ouj/ otjiS* svTau^a, 8ia TO JUT) xax/av siva/
, aXXa TO> avaXoyov o^ao/av, OUTO) SrjAov
vTjv axpa<r/av xa< eyxpaTS/aj/ sfva/
uTa T>) (ra)<$>po(rvvy xa/ TYJ axoXao~/a,
xa5' ojaoioVijTa Xsyojtxsv * 8/0 xai 7rpoo~T/6svTS^
a>o"7T6p T//A% xa) xs'pSouj tyauizv.
sv/a jasj/ r]8s'a ^>uo-s/, xai TOUTCOJ/ Ta
OT/ xaxs
^T/^ SO~T/
TTsp* 8s
axpaT?) u^
'ETTS) 8'
here correspond with the 'necessary
or bodily pleasures ' of the former
passage. The writer has here intro-
duced a mention of pleasures ' naturally
detestable,' by which must be meant
the bestial pleasures which are dis-
cussed in the following chapter. The
formula ra 5" barrio, TO 8e juera^, is
used by Eudemus in .EtfA. .&. 11. x.
24: aA\a /)v CKtiffTOv ye <j>dupa KOL
StavTpo<f>ri OVK els rb rvxdv, ^^.A.' ts Ta
fvavrla ica. TO /iToJ<;. Later in the
present book (ch. xiv. a) there is
a mention made of pleasures which are
not only good in themselves, but do
not admit of excess.
SttTupos 6 <f>j\o7rarp] Of this per-
sonage nothing is known. The story
given by the Scholiast is, as Fritzsche
observes, not worth repeating.
(i> oSv] This is an ana-
coluthon. The sentence ought to
form an apodosis and supply a verb to
Sib Ztroi (jLfv K.T.K. We therefore
require poxBripol /JLCV OVK tlffi, &c.
6 Si' 6noi6rirra Se] The writer seems
here to make a mistake about the
history of the word a/cpar^s, just as
before (Eth. v. x. i) about the history
of the word tirifiKfo. 'Ajcparfo in a
limited and special sense, to denote
want of control over a particular set
of desires, is certainly later than the
general use of the word, as in the
phrase o/tpoTijs opyrjs, &c. Hence the
latter is not to be regarded (histori-
cally) as a metaphorical extension of
the former.
V, This chapter discusses those
IV. V.]
[EYAHMIQNJ VII.
213
ra 0= xara ys'vrj xa) Zip to v xa) av5pu>7ra)V, ra o' oux
TO. [j.lv oia Trr^axrsis T & ^ &' $>J yi'vsrai, TO.
gem xai TTS^I TOUTO>J/ exacrra
. As'yco o= ra 6r,pja)0"sj, oloj/
TVJJ/ avpo)7roy v syov<ri ra.$ xuou<ra ai/a<rp/ou(rav TO.
TrajoYa xaT<r5/sJV, TJ o?oj %aip=iv $a.<r\v lvibv$ ran/ a7r>j-
yplW[J.SV(DV TTSp} TOV Ho'j/TOJ/, TOUJ /XSV CO[JLOl$ T0t>^ OS CtV-
Y, Tov$ Os ra TTaiOa Oo.v==iv aJ^r^oig slg
'jwj/iav, ^ TO 7Tp< <&d?\.apiv hsyofj.svov. aurai jotsv 6ij- 3
al Ss Ja TS voVou ivovroii xa)
kinds of incontinence which are some-
thing more than incontinence, being
morbid or bestial. Certain pleasures
are specified which imply a depravity
either of nature or habits. A sort of
classification of these is suggested, but
the whole style of the chapter is care-
less and inaccurate.
i ri 5* ?] 'Now while some
things are natural pleasures, either
absolutely so, or relatively to the
different races of animals and men,
other pleasures are not natural, but
depend on physical defects or habits
or depravity of the nature; and we
may see moral conditions correspond-
ing to each of these latter kinds.'
The apodosis to &rl is ecm KO! vepl
TOVTWV. The things which are 'plea-
sures absolutely ' are for instance life
and consciousness ; while it depends
on the constitution of the race whether
it be pleasant to live on land or water,
&c. In this passage <f>v<ris is used in
two senses, (i) Qvfffi = in accordance
with the entire constitution of things,
not only what is, but what ought to
be. (This corresponds with head V.
in the note on Eth. n. i. 3.) (2)
<pvaeis means individual natures, not
as they ought to be, but as they are.
(See the same note, head IV.)
a TOS 07;pj:i'5eis] i.e. ?ets.
'The female.' The
word &vQptaifos (in the feminine) was
applied contemptuously, as for in-
stance to female slaves. Here it de-
notes the monstrous nature of the
person in question, who was not to be
called ' a woman." Perhaps for the
same reason it was applied by Hero-
dotus to the gigantic Phye. Book i.
ch. 60 : Koi ev rf &crreT irfiOoufvoi r^v
yvvaiKa elvcu aiurriv - TTJV 6fbt> Kpoatv-
XOi>r6 Tf TT[V &i6f>cnrrov /cat 48tKorro riiy
Heiffi<7TpaTov. "Who was the monster
alluded to in the text is not known.
It appears a mere fiction of the Scho-
liast to connect her with the Lamia
mentioned by Horace, A. P. 340.
TOWS 5e TO. ircuSia $aveitiv oAAVjAois
els fvu>xla~\ 'And others (they say)
lend their children to each other (in
turn) to be served up as a banquet.'
Cf. 2 Kings vi. 26-29, where the
same horrible arrangement is said to
have been made under the compulsion
of famine. The shores of the Black
Sea seem to have had a character for
cannibalism. Cf. Ar. Pol. vm. iv. 3 :
jroAAcl 5' effrl -riav eQviav & vpbs rb
KTfiniv Kai irpbs rqv avOpuirotpayiav
ti/Xepus ex el > KaQdirep TUV irepl rbv
rb iTfpi &d.\apiv K&y6pevov\ Some
story now lost, which is apparently
referred to again in 7.
3 cu 5e Sid rt i>6trous at Sf voai\-
214
[BYAHMION] VII.
[CHAP.
'pa xaQi;ps(><ra$ xoii
TO
pi%a>v
xa
STJ
i(T7rsp o TTjV jtATjTspa xai;ps><ra$ xo aywv, xa o TOL>
olov
xal
S(TlV ' TOlg
fj.lv yap $>v<rei rdig 8' s% sQovg (rvfji.fiaivova'iv, oTov roT^ uftpi-
4.ofJ.VOl$ SX 7Ta/8a)V. 0(701$ jJ.lv OUV <u<jrj GtJT/a, TOUTOUg
jusv ov$si$ av efasiev axpaTsis, wtrTrsp ouQs rag yvvauxac,
OTI ovx OTrviovariv aXX* OTru/ovraj a)<raura) 8s xai Tot$
TO J.SV GUV ssiv sxacrroc.
TOVTCOV %co TCUV opcuv (TT\ TT^ xax/a, x5a7Tsp xai 73
pioryt;' TO 8' sp^ovTa xpaTsTv 75 xpaTs7o-flai oup^
axpao~a aXX' ij xa5' ojU,oioVr;Ta, xa^aTrep xa/ TOV Trepi
6l)[J.OV$ %OVTO. TOUTOV TOV TpOTTOV ToO TTa^OWf, OtXpaTT) 8' Oy
XSXTSOV. jratra yap 67rsp^aXXouo~a xai a^potruvvj xai 8st-
X/a xai axoXa<r/a xa/ p/aXsTroVrj^ ai jtxsv dijpfco$(f$ ai 8s
6 vo(T>]]U,aTfo8s^ slo~/v o JOLSV yap c^uo~si rotovrog oJog 8s-
xav \/o<(nr W-w, Qiwor 8si?v/av 8siXo r o
juarw5$] These clauses are a repe-
tition of each other, the style is un-
finished.
TJ TeDv a<f)po5iiri'wj' TO?S Sppetrj/] It is
important to observe here the strong
terms in which the unnatural character
of these practices is denounced. An
equally strong and more explicit
passage occurs in the Laws of Plato,
p. 636 B, where the advantages and
disadvantages of the gymnasia and
syssitia are discussed : Kol 81) teal
iraXaibv vSfu^ov Soicfi rovro rJ &n-Hj-
Sfvua. /cara (pvaiv ras irepl ra iuppofiiffta.
^Sov^r oil fj.6vov avOpeinrwv a\\a Kal
Oripitov Sit<p0apK(vai. Kal rovrwv ras
v/jifrepas ir6\fis (Sparta and Crete)
irpdrTas &v TIS olriipTo xal 8<ro TUV
Kal efre iraf^ovTO rfre <nrou5<i^b>Ta
Ivvoiiv 5T T(i TotaCra, fvvoijrtov 8rj rp
e^jXtdy Kal T5 Tiv appfvtay Qvfftt els
Koivoivlav lovtrri rrjs ytvirfffews y trepl
ravra TJ^OVT) Kari tpvartv a.TroS(56<rdai
(mail, appsvwy 6 1 irpbs &pp(vas ^ 0i}\eiaii'
irpoj 0rj\ftas irapd (pvcrtv KdlruwpdiTtiiv
ri> r6\iJ.7}/jia. (Ivai 81' aKpdrfiav fi$ovfj$.
4 5 offots m n^v olv \eitTfov~\
'Where nature is the cause, one cannot
call people incontinent, just as no one
would find fault with women for being
not male but female ; and it is the
same with those who by habit have
superinduced a morbid condition. To
possess, indeed, any of these tendencies
is beyond the pale of vice, just as bes-
tiality is ; and if a person possesses
them, his subduing them or being sub-
dued by them is a matter not of simple
incontinence (or continence), but is the
analogous kind, exactly as a man who
is in this condition with regard to his
angry passions may be called (incon-
tinent of anger), but not simply in-
continent.' What the writer here
implies is quite true, that morality
requires for its sphere certain natural
conditions of body and mind. In
states that are entirely morbid,
whether originally so or from the
V. VI.]
H6IIU1N [EYAHMIQN] VII.
215
8s rr t v yaA?jv c8s3/si Old voVov * xa/ riov dfypovwv of jasv IK
a>o~7rs0 svia yev>5 riuv TToppw fiapfidpoiv, ol 8s 8ia voVouj,
OIQV rag s7nAr;7TTixa, ^ ^.aviag voo-7j|U,aTtt>8sj. rourcov 7
8'so-T/jasv '=%siv nvd SV/OTS jotovov, |W/rj Kpariia-Qai 8s, As'^aj
8s oiov =1 tpdhapis xarii^sv ITT^^WV 7ra<8/ot> (Jia^sTv r
;rpo^ a4^poS/(r/a)v aroTroi/ ijSoyijy* eVr< 8s xai xparsTo-Qaj,
jar) jao'j/ov 'iy^w. aj&Trsp ouv xai fMjf&^pfa rj p.sv xar'8
avfyjeoTTov aTrXto^ Xsysrai jao^9i]p/a, r 8s Kara Tr^oVSstr/v,
on ftr)pia)?>r)S TJ vo<rr l [Jia.Tio?>r)$ ) aTrXcu^ 8,' ou, TOV aurov
8?jXov or< xai dxpoieria <TT}V y [JLSV Qypiwftrjs y 8s
TrXtot,' 8s 73 xara rr ; v avQpwTrivyv dxohaviav
. or/ jtxsv o5v dxpa<ria xai eyxpars/a SO~TJ jtxo'vov
arrsp axoXao-/a xa< (TioQ>po(ruvr l , xal on Trsp} rd 9
sVrlv aXXo st'8o^ axpao~/a^, Xs^o'jtxsvov Kara fj*sra-
Ka\ ov% ctTrAoj^, 8^XoV
8s xa) -jgrrov ala-^pd aKpavia r^ TOU 5wjW,ot5 ^ ">]' 6
tBvfUmVy Q=a)pi)<ru)[j.v. SOIKS ydp o (typos axous/v
TI TOO Xo'you, TrapaKOvsiv 8s, Ka^dwsp oj rays?^ raw
8/axo'va>v of rrlv axou<ra< Trav TO
o
s
av
8ta
oix
xa
nt. 8' axoJo~aj, o
7r
po
effects of an ill-regulated life, the
distinctions of right and wrong are no
longer applicable. Cf. ch. vii. 7.
7 < $d\apts KOTerj^ej/] ' Had Pha-
laris refrained.' With this use of
KOTx, cf. Aristoph. Peace, 944,
where it is applied to a wind lulling :
6e60ei> Karex.fi
rpOTros atipa.
ea-, 782 :
And Soph.
VI. It having been repeatedly laid
down that there are some kinds of
incontinence not simply to be called
so without a qualification, there now
follows a comparison of some of these
kinds, from a moral point of view, with
incontinence proper. Incontinence of
anger is not so bad as incontinence of
lust, (i) because there is more sem-
blance of reason in anger; (2) because
anger is more a matter of constitu-
tion ; (3) it admits of less deliberate
purpose ; (4) because anger is exercised
under a sort of pain, and not in
wantonness. As to the rest, inconti-
nence which exceeds the pale of
human weakness is more horrible, but
at the same time is rarer, and less
mischievous, than vice.
216
IIGIKflN [EYAIIMION] VII.
[CHAP.
yoip
on
eS^Xoxrev, o 8' (5o~7rsp <ruXXo'yra i u.vo on 8s? rcS
TOJOUTIO TroXsjU-eTv p^aA?7ra/vt 8] euSuf 13 8' ETrivujCtMt, eav
jU.ovov eftrr, on r'8o 6 ^070^ ^ >j afrdtyTf?,
oiVo?vay<r<v. coo^' o ju,sv 5u|U.o axoXouQs? TO>
8' eVjOujU,/a ou. alo"p/a;v ouv ' o fj.sv yoip rot) Qujaou a
rou "hoyou Trwg Tjrrarai, o 8s T% e7ri9uju,/a xai ou TOU
i 6 ntv 7&p Xjyos o{/] ' For first
(jatc) reason or fancy tells that there
is insult or slight, and then (anger)
drawing a sort of conclusion, " I must
fight with such and such," forthwith
rages accordingly. But desire, if
reason or sense merely assert that a
thing is pleasant, rushes to the enjoy-
ment of it; so that anger in a way
follows reason, but desire does not.'
IwTacn'a here seems nearly to cor-
respond to our word ' fancy,' which
has of course grown out of the Greek
term, though it has come to imply
widely different associations. We are
told in Ar. De An. in. iii. 15 that
0ai/ra<7j'a may be mistaken. See the
note on Eth. m. v. 1 7.
The present passage might seem
discrepant from ch. iii. i o, Sxrre ffvp-
Qa'ii'ti inrb \6yov Trees Kol 8J|rjs a.Kpa-
rtveffQcu, where incontinence is said to
have some sort of reasoning in what
it does. And if the comparison were
exactly carried out, it would probably
appear that incontinent anger had no
more reason in it than incontinent
desire. But it is true that anger is
fundamentally based on an idea of
justice, however wild that idea may
be. Hence there is a peculiar force
in irv\\oyiffd.fj.fvos 8ri 8T. And hence
too anger is a less immediately selfish
passion than desire. It is less de-
basing in the long run to the character.
On anger, cf. Eth. v. viii. 10: oiiSe
Trtpl rov *ytvt<rQai i)
a\\a irepl TOV SiKaiov firl <f>aiyo/Jievri
yap afiiKia ^ opy/i eartv : and Ar. Rhet.
n. ii. I : *E<rra> S^i opy)) opfis fitra
Ai/TTTjy Tifitupias <pa.ivofj.firQS 810 (pouvo-
fjifvyv b\iy<i>pla.v. The illustrations in
the text comparing anger to an over-
hasty servant who runs off before he
has heard half the message, or to a
dog who barks without waiting to see
who it is, are most admirable.
2 The next plea urged in favour of
anger is that it is more natural (or, we
might say, constitutional) than desire :
in support of which two humorous
stories are told in the text (see Vol. I.
Essay III. p. 165). The argiiment
appears somewhat contradictory to
Eth. ii. iii. 10: tn 8e x aAire ^ Te P<" /
^SoJ/j; fi.dxfffScu r5 Bvfjy, Ka.Qa.irfp (prjo-lv
'HpaK\ftTos. However, when we look
closely at the text, we find that it is
' excessive and unnecessary desire '
with which anger is here compared
(rZv fttiOvfittai' r'wv TT/S ujrep/3o\Tjs xa.1
TWV i/d) avaynaiuv). This no doubt
makes the above assertion true, but it
gives a new conception of incontinence,
as compared with the mention of
hvaynaia. TJSt'a, c. iv. 2. It sets incon-
tinence too much in the light of
Oripdrris, But indeed the vagueness
of the term arpa<n'a, and the uncer-
tainty as to what it exactly implies,
must be felt throughout the present
discussions.
"With regard to anger, it is true
that hot temper is frequently consti-
VI.]
H9IKHN [EYAHMIQN] VII.
217
xo<va TraVi, xa e oov xoivai'
xa) r) p/a7\.7roV>j Ttov S7ri^u[J.ia)v TCOV
Ttov /AT) avayxa/cov, (t (TTTsp o a7To?\.oyo'_Y./,=vo OTI TOV
TUTTTG/. ' xa) yas ourog ' e^ 1 } ' TOV sauroi7 xaxsTvoj rev
sv,' xa) TO 3rou8/ov osi^ag ' xai ouro sas ' s<^rj, ' orav
o~uy7=vs^ -yap r' ( a?v.' xa) 6 l?>.xoasvoj UTTO
TOU uJoy 7rau=(r6ai fXfXfVS TT^OC raT^ bvpai$' xotiyap aitrog
TOV Trarspa [Jii%pi$ evrau^a. sr dtiixwTSpot ol 3
o P.SV o5v Qujaa>0r y j oux s;r/|3owXo, ou3' 6
o^, aXXa $avspo$' 13 3' STTiQupia., xa^aVsp TTJV
KOu yap /a/Trpoyevouf *
ypog '
vdov TTVKO. Trtp <f>porfovrog.
alo~^ta)v v; dxpa(ria
TTsp TOV Su/xo'v eo~T<, xa) a7r/va7^ dxpao-ia xa) xax/a 7ra>.
xa
6TI
TTOICOV
tutional. It appears more difficult to
tame down and eradicate, even with
the help of time, than other passions.
The Stoics gave peculiar attention to
its control. *
3 erj dSiKwrepoi Kcucia irftis] 'Again
there is more wrong where there is
more craft. The angry man and
anger are not crafty, but open ; while
lust is crafty, as they say Aphrodite
is,
" The wily Cyprian goddess."
And Homer sings of her embroidered
girdle (that on it is wrought)
"Allurement which can steal the wise
man's sense."
So that if this kind of incontinence is
more wrongful than incontinence of
anger, it is also worse, and thus
deserves to be called by the simple
name " incontinence," and amounts to a
sort of vice.'
VOL. II. F
5oAo7rX<J(cou] From some lyric poet.
Muretus compares the fragment of
Sappho :
noiKi\60pov' aBdvar' 'A-ppoH'ira,
Hcu Aita 5oAo7r/\OK6. Klffffoftai ere.
f'bv Keffrbv ladvra "Oyur/poj] Iliad,
xiv. 214-217 :
'H, nal airb <rrfi6ff<(>iy l\vffwro Keffrbv
1/j.dvra,
HoiKi\ot>' tvOa 8e of 6f\Kr~l]pici Trdvra
TfTVKTO '
"Evff tvi fjiev (pi\6TT]S, tv 8' "ftepoj, lv 8*
oapiaros
ndpQaffif, T\ T' efcAei^e v6ov TTVKCI irep
(ppoveSirav.
4 Incontinence of desire is full
of wantonness and exultation, while
anger implies pain and suffering.
This argument is similar to that used,
Eth. in. xii. 2, to prove that in-
temperance is more voluntary than
cowardice.
218
[EYAHMIiiN] VII.
[CHAP.
e ouv
raura oxa>Tpa, xa< TJ xpa<ra TJ
5 8/ s7n$u/A/av ou -yap stmv ev Sujouo v&pig. tog fj.lv roivuv
a\(r%i(ov TJ TTsp) S7n9ujaa dxpao'/a rrjj ?rsp/ TOV 6uj(xov, xa/
OTJ s(TTiv if s'yxpaTs/a xa) 73 dxpa<ria Trsp] e7riQu[j.iag xai
6s
a
a =
XTJTTTSOV. wa-Trsp yap spTjra/ xar ap^a^, a ju,sv
xai ra> 7t/i xa) ra> jtxsye^s
xa)
Trsp raj 7rpa>rac <rjpo(rv73 xa* axoXa<ria p.ovov svriv
xai Ta Qypiot. ours crtoc^pova owr* axoXa<rra Xeyoasv
75 xara jU,sra<>opav xai si TJVI oXco^ aAXo ?rpo^ a?\.X
^>S5si ysvog TCUV ^tntov Cfipsi xa< criv(x.fj.fopia. xa) rto
ou yap fp^
4>u(Ta)^, cocTTrsp ol
8s QypiQTyg xax/at,', (^ojSspforspov 8s' oy yap 8<s'-
6 8' vftpifav fj-eff ^Soj^s] 'While he '
who wantons acts with pleasure.'
There seems to be a double meaning
in this passage to the word vfipiei,
exactly as there might be to our word
' wantonness.' It first means ' to act
insolently ' or ' wantonly ' in a general
sense, and second, it means to ' act
wantonly' in a particular sense, t.e.
lasciviously.
6 avrSn/ 8e TO^TOU/ TOS 8ia</>opas
XrprreW] z'.e. the difference between
continence and incontinence, which
with other things is treated of in the
next chapter. There is a want of
method about the sequence of different
parts in this book. The reference
which follows, &o"iffp flprirai /car' op^aj
only goes back to ch. v. i, and gives
colour to a suspicion that the book may
have been put together out of separate
pieces, and perhaps lectures, one of
which may have commenced with the
fifth chapter.
Sib KO.I ret 6r)p(a ivflpcSirwi/] 'Hence
we do net call brutes either temperate
or intemperate, except by a metaphor,
and where it happens that one whole
race of animals in comparison with
another is remarkable for wantonness
it may be (-rivi), or lechery, or voracity ;
for (animals) have no purpose or rea-
soning, but are beside themselves like
madmen.' Different races of animals
have good or bad moral characteristics
ascribed to them. The goat, the ass,
and the monkey have a bad reputation
for wantonness, and the shark, &c., for
voracity. It is not quite clear what
is meant by ^eVrrj/fe TTJS $vat<as.
Perhaps it may best be taken to imply
not that animals transgress their own
nature, but simply that they get into
a state of ecstasy, like madmen, and
have no senses nor any principle
which would justify their being called
either temperate or intemperate.
7 c \arrov 8e Oijpiov] ' Now bes-
tiality is less evil than vice, but it is
more fearful, for in it the good principle
is not corrupted, as in a man, but does
not exist. Therefore (comparing bes-
VI. VII.]
iiN [ETAHMIOHJ vii.
219
TO
xxtov
, (f)G~7rsp sv TCO dvfypwTTto, CI/\.A' oux
v o~U|
yap
TO
i/ ao/xav 7rpo av
sxdrspov xdxioy' [JLUpioTrhdaria yap dv xaxa
os
^ r TS axoXao~a xa< 13 (rtofypo-
s(TTi [Jt.lv nvrwg s^-tv OKTTS >JT-
xa) wv of TroAAoi xps/TTouy, SO"T< 8s xpariiv xdl
WV 01 TTOXXO/ V5TTOf>* TOUTOJV 8* 6 JU.SV TTSpl TJ^OVOt^ dxpUTr^
o ' syxparr^, b 8= 7T=p/ XuTra^ aaTiaxo^ 6 3s xaprspixog.
tj.:Tav rj TO>V 7rX/<TTa)V ^'^, xav si
tiality with vice) is like comparing
what is inanimate with a living thing,
and asking which is worse. Evil is
always less harmful when it has no
guiding principle, and reason is the
guiding principle. So it is just like
comparing injustice with an unjust
man ; each is in a different sense
worse. A bad man will do ten thou-
sandfold more evil than a beast.'
fx] sc. T& Ortpiov. The whole
passage is briefly expressed, but
perhaps requires no further comment.
VII. This chapter, after a general
comparison between intemperance and
incontinence ( 1-3), makes some
remarks on endurance, softness, and
childishness ( 4-7) ; and ends by
distinguishing two kinds of inconti-
nence, of which the one proceeds from
impetuosity, the other from weakness
of character.
i Trp6rfpov] Eth. Eud. m. ii. 6. Cf.
above ch. iv. 2.
t<m /iv xeipovs] ' It is possible to
be in such a state as to yield to things
that most men are superior to, and
again it is possible to overcome things
that most men yield to. Of those
who possess these opposite dispositions,
with regard to pleasures, the first is
an incontinent man, and the second a
continent man ; with regard to pains,
the first is soft and the second en-
during. But the state of the majority
of mankind lies between these op-
posites, albeit men verge rather to the
side of the worse.' Moral designations
may be fixed either in relation to the
standard of what is, or of what ought
to be. Cf. Eth. m. xi. 4 : TUV y&p
ols /J.^1 8?, 1} ry fj.a\\ov ^ ot
Ib. rv. iv. 4 : fTcaivovmts fift> &rl T&
(na\\ov r) ol iroAAoi, ^tyoirrts 5" tfl rb
fia\\ov $ S7. The above passage
fixes the terms 'continent' and 'in-
continent ' relatively to what, is, as
implying more or less continence than
people in general have. And yet
there is evidently some reference
beside to the standard of what ought
to be, else it could not be said that
people in general verge rather to the
worse side. To represent the majority
of mankind as possessing a mediocre
moral character, neither eminently
2
220
[EYAIlMIilN] VII.
[CHAP.
2 Trpog rag %sipou$. &TTZI o SVIOLI rwv rjoovtov avayxaiai euriv
al 8' ot5 xai ^XP 1 T1I/0 V a * &' vTrspfiohcti ou, ou8' at eX-
8s xa/ TTS^J 7riQuj.ia$ ssi xcu
8/a>xa)j/ rcbv
aura^ xai
yap TOUTOV JU.TJ svai
OKTT* avlarog' o yap ajasTa^sX^roj av/aro^. 6
aVTiX/jU.I/0, 8s fJ.(TO$ (T(O$pa)V. 6jUO/0> 8= Xi 6 i^ 5 ^-
r) 81' ^rrav aXXa 8<a Trpoai-
ycov raj;
3 p=<riv. T&V 8s ]u,
>j8ovrji/, 6 8s 8<a TO
good nor bad, but inclining to weak-
ness, was in accordance with the
Greek point of view. Widely dif-
ferent from this was what may be
called the Semitic point of view,
which, regarding man with greater
religions earnestness, attributed to
him 'desperate wickedness.' The
latter feeling was not confined to the
Jews and to the pages of the Bible,
but in some degree made itself known
to the world in the Stoical philosophy.
See Essay VI. p. a6i &c.
2 txfl 5" fviai A>faros] 'Now as
some pleasures are necessary, but
others are not to be called so, as
being (KO!) only necessary in cer-
tain degrees, while their excesses or
deficiencies are not necessary, (and
the same division holds with regard to
desires and pains), he who pursues
excessive pleasures, or who pursues
pleasures not in themselves excessive
in an excessive way, and does so from
deliberate purpose, with no ulterior
aim beyond the pleasures themselves,
is abandoned (OK^XCWTOJ), (and he
may well be called so), for it stands
to reason (avdyicq) that he is not likely
to repent, and so he is incurable ; for
without repentance there is no cure.'
ovtf oi &Atyej] This might seem
superfluous. But what is meant is,
that in some pleasures the /ttVov is
good and necessary. Cf. below, 6 5'
^AAeiTTeoy & avriKfi/JifVOS.
rj ica.8' uirep/BoAas T} Sict irpoaipetru']
The Paraphrast well expresses the
meaning of this passage as follows :
6 fiv rets vjrfpjSoAas SIWKUV riavijSovwv,
Kcd fj ras (pvafi neyfaas ad frjrcDi'
T&S <(>vffei /itrpi'a? i
icas vtr' OUTOJC, dXAa fierairpoaipftTfcas tV
auras rpe'^wv, ou Si' aAAo n, S6^av,
<pipe eiirtiv, tl ictptios, aAAo auraj Si'
tavrds, A(c<5Aa(TToj. It is plain that
^ before Sia trpoaipfffiv in the text
must be a mistake. One of Bekker's
MSS. reads Kal which would be very
easily changed into ^. especially with
the clause ^ Kaff inrfp^oKas preced-
ing. It would answer also to the
expansion of the Paraphrast, oi>x AK<{-
uej'os K.T. A.
avdymj yip] If a man with deliberate
purpose pursues pleasure for its own
sake, he is not likely to repent of his
course, therefore he is aWAairros.
This is the first intimation we have
had that an unrepe'nting character
belongs to ' intemperance ' ; it is an
irregular argument, unless we regard
it as laying some stress on the ety-
mology of the word &K6\a<rTos. Cf.
Eth. HI. xii. 5-7, rv. i. 5.
VII.]
II9IKHN [EYAHMIOH] VII.
221
pfov s
si
s Tig
a S7r<
ri
$yju.tov, xai si JU.TJ opyi6[j.vo$ TVTTTOI 19
opypmvo$' r yap ov nroet v
ytpwv
TOJV
zi wv
s^$st/TO)v TO ( asv
oorrixUTOU &= Ta>4
^/,sv eucparff o ryxpttTijy, TOJ o? ^uxXaxm 6 xctprtptxog TO
^t.=v yap xctpT=ps?v scrriv sv TO) dvrs^siv, ^ S* eyxsaTsia ev
Tto xpaT=7v, srepov 6s TO CCVTS^H/V xa) xpaT=7v, too"7r?2> xa<
TO jtx^ >3TTao~5ai TOU v/xav* S/o xai alpsraiTspov syxpa-
TSIO, xarspiois S<TTIV, 6 ' sXXs/Trcov Trpoj a oj TroXXoi xai s
xai Tpu^tov* xai
U^^ fMtXflfci/a T/ SO~T/V oj eXxsi TO ijtxctTiov, Tva
rr\v aVo TOU ottpstv XUTT^V, xai fJt,ifJLOUfj.svos T v
oyx otzrai afaiog sivai, a5x/co o[J.oio$ cov. bpouoc; 6
avTiT=vouo~< xat 6u'j/avTaj,
3 Serre Sicupfpovffiv aAAT)Accj/] 'So
that they are distinct from one
another,' z. e. on the one hand the
reprobate (o/c<$A.a<TTos), in his two forms
of systematically seeking pleasure, and
of systematically avoiding pain ; and
on the other hand the morally weak,
whether in the form of yielding to the
allurements of pleasure (airports), or
flying from the pressure of pain
(jioAaKcJs). The comparison is not
between the two forms of the /t/j
trpocupovfj.et>oi, but these are together
contrasted with etKoXacria.
iro^ri 5' &P 5o|eje] A repetition of
ch. iv. 4, on which see note.
TWV STJ \fxO* vr(at ' T ^ A**'' M*^*^"*
eTSoy n<i\\ov, 6 5' dc<JXoTTos] The
temptation is great to refer -row 8);
AexStrrow to TWI/ ^ jrpoaipov/ueVwj/,
and to read a/cpor^s for a/cdAaoros,
taking the sentence in connection with
what follows. Wilkinson does so
without any variation of the MSS. to
justify him, although the Paraphrast
has a/cpoT^s. But when we consider
(i) the unanimity of MSS.; (2) that
na\axia has been already distinguished
from aKpaffia, in i ; (3) the import
of /iSAAov, we shall be led to see that
the sentence comes in, though rather
in a disjointed way, to wind up the
comparison here made generally be-
tween incontinence and intemperance,
(cf. ch. vi. 5, and above, i ). In-
continence may be said to be more
like a kind of softness, while deter-
minate vice is something different.
MaAoKia, according to this interpre-
tation, is used here in a general sense,
in the next section with a special and
limited import.
4 Continence, it is argued, is finer
than endurance, just as victory is finer
than holding out. This argument is
not sound, since continence is in
reality nothing more than holding out
against temptation. To noble natures
continence would doubtless cause a
greater struggle than mere endurance
of pains, and in this sense it might be
called finer.
568" f\\f'ivuv 'ouoios &v~\ 'Now
he who faints before things against
which most men hold out and are
strong, he is soft and luxurious, (for
222
HOlKilN [EYAIIMIflN] VII.
[CHAP.
xa
ou yap s
xai u7T5p|3aAAouo-toj> TJ^OVCOV r'rraraj TJ
, aXXa rruyyvtojaov/xov, si avr<TSJv<ov, camrsp o
> o
Kapx/vou sv T~^ 'AXoTTY) Kspxuajv, xai axrTrsp o
TTSipfufJisvoi TOV -ysAwra aSpoov sxxaypaouo~<v, o/ov <ruvs-
TTSTS H=J>oc>avr), aXX' s* TJ
)
siVy rouTiov TTcrcti xa
8uvara< avriTsivstv,
olov sv
ij ^aa^ax/a S/ct TO ys
7 appsv 8<o~T>jxsv. 8oxer8s xai 6
^ -yap
xa) toj TO
TO
sT
avftrfg
svai,
ava-
8 strrv. axpourias & TO jusv TrpoTrsTS/a TO 3
yap 0ouXsuo~a|U-svoj oux s'jaju.s'voto~jv ol^ s'
o
luxury, it may be added, is a kind of
softness), he for instance who trails
his cloak, rather than have the trouble
of lifting it, and who imitates the
languor of an invalid, without seeing
that it is miserable to be like one who
is miserable.' This passage is some-
what in the style of the Characters of
Theophrastus. To illustrate the affec-
tation of weakness described above,
Coray quotes from Athenseus a story
of the Sybarites, one of whom said
that he had been in the fields, and
that ' to see the men digging had given
him a rupture.' To which his friend
replied, that ' the very mention of it
gave him a pain in his side.'
6 & &fo$(KTov *IA.OKT^TTJJ] A play
by Theodectes the rhetorician, a friend
of Aristotle's. Fritzsche quotes Cicero
Tusc. n. vii. 19 : Adspice Philoctetam,
cui concedendum est gementi : ipsum
enim Herculem viderat in (Eta magni-
tudine dolorum ejulantem, &c.
KopiVou] Of this tragic poet no-
thing appears to be known.
Etvotpdrrtf] Giphanius finds in
Seneca, De Ira, ii. ^, a mention of
Xenophantus as a musician of Alex-
ander the Great.
olov iv Tols 2iKv0iav &affi\tiiffiv ri
Sid. rb -yeVos] Aspasius for
oc>' reads Tltpauv. But the com-
mentators refer us to Herodotus I.
105 : tolai 5e -rSiv 'SKvBewv ffv^ffcurt
rb Ipbv rb iv ' A(raAwj'i xol TO'HTI roirriev
del licyovoiffi vf<TKT]tyf V flebf 6^\eav
vovaov Sxrrt O/AO \f-yovai rf ol 2*cuOat
8ia rovr6 ffQtas voattiv. Hippocrates
gives a description of this malady,
which appears to have been a kind of
impotence (De Aer. Aq. et Loc. vi.
108): tvvov)(la.i ytvovrat Kal yvvaiKt'ia
tpydotncu Kal us aiyvvdtxts 5ia.\tyotrrai
re 6/uoias, Kahfvvral T ol roioinoi
' This impotency Hippo-
crates ascribes to venesection, but he
mentions that the natives believed it
to be a judgment from the gods. It
is said that traces of the disease are
still found among the inhabitants of
Southern Russia.' Mr. Rawlinson's
Herodotus, Vol. I. p. 248.
Kal is TO 0ri\v] Cf. c. \. 4.
8 anpacrias S( Qa.vrcuriq.'] ' Now
incontinence is sometimes impetuosity
VII.]
[EYAHMIQN] VII.
223
TO.I
o
, cl 2s <a TO jUrj /3oi*Ay<7a<r$aj ayovrai UTTO TOU TTO.-
gi/joj yap, wcnrsp TrpoyapyaJ^ia-avTeg o-j
OUTCO xa} 7rpoa7$o',asi/oi xa) Trpoi'BoWsf xa)
$ ectuTovg xa) T&V Aoyj<T|aov oup ^rrtovrai
u, our' av rjou T) our' dv Xi/7r]pov. jU.aTua'Ta 3' of o^s
sXay^o?axoi rr^v TrpoTTSTr) axpaviav eioOv
v yap 3<a rrjv ra^urTJra, of 3s 8ja TTJI/
avaasj/0'j<n TOV Xoyov, S<a ro axoXouSrjrixoi gj'vai rr
and sometimes weakness. Some men,
when they have deliberated, do not
abide by their deliberations, owing to
the state into which they are thrown,
(and this is weakness) : while others,
from never having deliberated, are
curried away by their feelings. Some
on the contrary, like the beginners in
a tickling match, who cannot be
tickled, having prescience, and fore-
sight, and having roused up them-
selves and their reason beforehand,
are not overcome by their feelings,
whether pleasant or painfuL It is
especially persons of a quick or bilious
temperament who are subject to the
impetuous kind of incontinence, for
the one through the rapidity, and the
other through the intensity, of their
nature, do not wait to see what is the
law of right, because they are apt to
follow impressions.'
&yjrfp ol TrpoyapyaXiffavres] The
Paraphrast understands tavrovs, ren-
dering the passage Siairep TO. irporpi-
fievra. Kal irpo'Yapyc.\ff8tvTa /ueAij oil
yapya\iovTai. And two of Bekker's
MSS. read ol -irpoyapyaKiffQevrfs. It
might be possible by previous tickling
to exhaust the irritability of the
cuticle, but this would not be a usual
process, and in one of the Problems
attributed to Aristotle (xxxv. vi.) it
is discussed, ' Why cannot a man
tickle himself ? ' To which the answer
is, 'For the same reason that he
can hardly be tickled by anybody else
if he knows that it is going to happen.
For laughter implies a sudden revul-
sion and a surprise.' Surely this is
exactly what is meant in the text.
ol oe?s /col jUAo7xoXi/col] An ac-
count which seems at first sight the
opposite of this is given by the author
of the Magna Moralia (n. vi. 43) :
'EiVrj p.fv ovv (the impetuous kind of
incontinence) 0118" kv \la.v SS^ftev flvai
fyfKT'fi Kal y&p Iv rots ffirovSaiois TJ
roiavTT) fyyiveTcu, Iv TOLS Qfppo'is Kal
ev<pvcriv TJ Se (the weak kind) Iv rots
\l/vxpots Kal /jLe\ayxk lKO ? s , ' 1 8e roiovrot
tytKTot. If however we consult the
curious disquisition on (jif\ayxo\iKot
and the yu.eA.otya xM? i Q AT. Problems,
xxx. i., we shall see that both pas-
sionate impetuosity and cold sluggish-
ness were considered by the ancient
physiologist to be different manifesta-
tions of the same strange temperament.
Ib. xxx. i. 1 8 : "O<rois 8e iv rr} <pv<rei
ffvvfffrri Kpaffis roiavrrj, tv6vs ovrot ra
fjOti ylvovrai travruSairoi, aAAos Kar'
\fyuxpa ^fujrap^ei, vcaOpol Kal fitepol , 8<rois
Se \tav TToAA^J Kal 6fpfj.-f], fJMViKol Kal
fvtpvf'is Kal 2p<oTiKol Kal eu/j/7jToi wpbs
rovs 6vfj.ovs Kal ras tiriQv/jtias, tviot Se
Kal \d\oi ^oA.Aoi'. With the moderns
the term ' melancholy ' is restricted to
the cold and dejected mood ; while the
ancients much more commonly ap-
plied the term fj.f\ayxo*iK6s to denote
224
II9IKQN [EYAHMIQN] VII.
[CHAP.
fJ.v
* sp.p.evsi yap TY Trpoaipeorer axparr^g ps
nag. Sio ou^ oxrTrsp r)7ropr)<ra[J!.sv, oora> xa< e^<,
6 jU-sv av'aro 5 b 3' larog' sotxs yap 73 jOtsv JU-O^^TJ-
p/a T<OJ> vf)crr l [j.dra)v olov vfteptp xai 4>$*Vsj, iy 8' axpa<r/a
roig sTri'XrjTTTixois' >} ]W.si/ yap <ruvsp7], 13 8' oi (rnvs^g TTO-
i/Tjp/a. xa* ohwg S' srspov TO yevoj axpar/aj xa/ xa-
x/aj" 15 as v yap xax/a Aav$aj/s, >j S' axpairia ou XavSavsi.
e TOUT^OV /3s/N.r/ou ot exo-Tarixoi ^ oi TOV Xo
yap
warmth, passion, and eccentricity of
genius. Cf. Plato, Bepub. 573 c :
Tupowifcbj 5e, ^v 5" yci, c?
re ical tyio-riKbs Kal fjie\ayxo\iKbs
TO.I. Cf. also Ar. Probl. xi. xxxviii : rb
TJ ^avraffitj, aito\ovd('it> raxws rb
fj.e\ayx^ lK bv ?"* ^OTtV. In the lan-
guage of our own day, ' The passionate
heart of the poet is whirl'd into folly
and vice.' For more remarks on
fjL(\aiva x^> 8eo below.
VIII. This chapter is not separated
by any marked logical boundary from
the preceding one. Rather it is a
continuation of the same subject, as it
goes on comparing incontinence with
intemperance. Two previously mooted
questions are now discussed, namely,
is intemperance more curable than
incontinence ? (which is answered in
the negative), and, is incontinence to
be regarded as absolutely bad ? (See
above ch. i. 6). This is also an-
swered in the negative.
i ""Ecrrj 5" 6 fAv &.K6\.affros, Staittp
i\f\0n, ov fiTajA.7jTiK<$s] Cf. c. vii.
2. The continuity of the subject is
preserved, if we consider that the
writer, having mentioned the various
ways in which incontinent people sub-
mit to temptation, next reflects that,
after yielding, these are all repentant
(/j.fTafj.f\r]riKbs was), while the in-
temperate man forms a contrast to
them, and is unrepentant.
Sib oi>x &a-irepi]Tropiicra./j.fv] Cf. ch. ii.
10. Intemperance, which is a cor-
ruption of the will, is like a chronic
disorder, while incontinence, which is
a temporary derangement of the will,
is like an epileptic seizure.
i] 7etp Kcucia \avddvft} As being a
false sort of harmony in the mind, in
which no struggle is felt.
2 avrwv Se ^i/teVoj/Tej 8] ' Now,
looking at incontinence itself and the
two kinds of it which I have men-
tioned, those people who are carried
away are better than the sort who are
in possession of "the law" but do not
abide by it.' As said before, the
thread of reasoning goes on con-
tinuously from the end of the pre-
ceding chapter (according to Bekker's
division), and so there is nothing re-
markable in the writer's now reverting
to the two kinds of incontinence, as
if he had never digressed from dis-
cussing them. Of ^Ka-rartKol here
answers to the o|e?y Kal n(\ayxo\tKol
(ol) fty irpuirfrr) aKpcuriav tlfflv a.Kpa-
Ttiy. The words $KffTa<ris, ^Kffrrjvai,
and iKff-raTin6s, are frequently used in
the Problems, (I.e.) in connection with
the nf\ayxo^iKot. Cf. Ib. xxx. i. 3 :
VIII. j
I181KQN [EYAHMIGN] VII.
225
i, xal oux fi7rpoj3ouXsyro/ (vtnrsp arspor
yap o aucpanfa SO-TJ ro7$ rap/u |U,=4u<rxo//,VOf xa) UTT' oTuyou
oi'vou xai ?vaTTOj/o rj a> < ToXXoi. or/ jw,=v ouv xax/a >j 3
axfauriifiC oux sVr/, 4^ av5 p ' !/ - a^-Xa TTVJ iVaj' TO ft=v yap
Trapa 7rpooc.ips(riv TO = xara 7rpoaips<riv l<rnv. ou //.r/v
' QIJ.OIOV ys xara raj 7rpa^=ig aio-Trsp TO AVJ/AO^O'XOU <
'
d. S7TS/
3<a>xs;v
xat
Xoyov o~a)jaaT<xa^ Tj^oj/a^, o' 3s 7rsVsio"Ta*
eit/ai olo 8oxstv auTa^, sxitvos (Jt.lv out/
oO 5 ou* 7] ya^s apsTT) xa} 73 jao^Srjp/a T^V <*PX*1 V
ta TO
a TOV
TO
where it is said of Ajax,
4yevero ira.vT\ws (i.e. mad). Cf. above
ch. vi. 6. 'EKITTOTIK^S is used presently
( 5) in a different sense to express
'departing from' a purpose, as also
before, ch. i. 6, and ii. 7.
ot' r^v Arf-yoy ex XTS ] On this phrase
see i" 1 ^. vi. i. i, and note.
Spows yap ot iroAAof] 'For the man
who is weakly incontinent is like those
who are soon intoxicated, and by a
small quantity of wine, less than in-
toxicates people in general.' 'O d^pa-
TJ7s seems used in this sentence as if
specially applicable to the weak kind
of incontinence. It is in contrast to
tKtrra.TiK.6s. Weakness is worse than
being carried away by passion, for it
is acting against warning, and with
less temptation.
3 Incontinence is not vice, though
it resembles vice in what it does (/caret
ras irp<|ets), but it goes against the
will, while vice goes with the will.
It is like the saying of Demodocus
against the Milesians. ' The Milesians
are not fools, but they act just as if
they were fools.' The incontinent are
not bad, but they do wrong.
Arj/ioSo/cou] This was an epigram-
VOL. II. G
matist of the island of Leros, not far
from Miletus. Some of his epigrams
against different cities are preserved
in the Anthology.
aSifcoOtri] In the general sense ' do
wrong.' Cf. Eth. \. ii. z.
4 f) yap aper)] eiwrior] ' For virtue
on the one hand preserves, while
vice destroys, the major premiss. Now
the end is in action just what the
hypotheses are in mathematics, namely,
a major premiss on which everything
depends; hence, neither in the one
case nor in the other is it the chain of
inference (6 \6yos) that demonstrates
the major premiss, but in the case
of action (evravda) it is virtue either
natural or acquired to which a right
opinion with regard to the major
premiss is due. He who possesses
this is temperate, while the contrary
person is intemperate.' This passage
comes in as a final argument against
the notion that incontinence is more
curable than intemperance. In the
latter the fountain-head-of action (the
dpx'j) is destroyed. While the tem-
perate man has in himself the source
of all good action, the intemperate
man is the direct opposite, and the
a
226
IIOIKiiN [EYAI1MIQN] VII.
[CHAP.
psi y 3s <ra>si, \v 8s TOUS 7rpd=<ri TO ou evsxa app^rj, warrrsp
EV rug jua5r;ju.arxoT a\ vTroQsirsis' OUTS by sxs? 6 Xoyo
33a<rxa?uxo rtov ap^tov OUTS svraGSa, aXX' apsrv) TJ $u-
o-ix) r) eSiarTT] rou op5oos7v Trspi Trjv apffiv. ^w^>p(t)V fJ.lv
s oSv 6 TOJOUTOJ,', axoXa<rTO 8' o ivoufrlog. S<TTI 8s T 8<a
7ra9o xa-TO.Tixo$ Trapa TOV opSov Xoyov, ov to^rs fj.lv ^ATJ
xara TOV opSov Xoyov xparsT TO TraSoj, a><TT 8'
roiourov olov 7TS7rsr(r^at Sicoxsii/ avs'orjv OSH/ raj To<aj-
ou xparsT* OUTO'J <TTIV o axparr^, ^sXr/toj/ rou
incontinent man is something inter-
mediate.
^ 5^ o-^Cej] cf. E 1 ^. vi. v. 6, where
almost all the ideas which occur above
arc given, even the reference to mathe-
matical axioms. Ib. ch. xii. 10:
where a still more explicit statement
is made of the relation of virtue to
the practical syllogism.
at inroBffffis] This term is used
precisely in the same way in the
Eudemian Ethics, n. x. 20: vcpl nev
70V Tf\OVS OvOfls PoV\fVTCU, O\\O,TOVT'
larlv apxb xal vTr60effis, Siffirep Iv THUS
5e irepl avruv ti> p.tv TO?S
xeus, Iv tie ToTs ava\vriKois Si'
(i.e. the Analytics of Eude-
mus). Cf. Ib. ch. xi. 4: &<rirfpyap
rats OfiapriTiKcus au v-ircQfffds apx a ^>
OVTU Kal -raits iroir)TiKais rb re Acs apx^l
Kal vvdQeffts. In Eth. End. vn. ii. 4,
vit6f)fffis is used as equivalent to
3) *" pi rovTuif . . . irfipu-
Ttov Siopltrcu, \a$ov<ji
. . . TOVTOV Se Siwpjj/xeVoi;
inr6Qt<fiv trepav. Plato, Bepub. p. 510
511, reproaches mathematics with
always resting on hypotheses of which
they can give no account. P. 510 c :
uluai fdp ffe fiotvai STI ol irepl Tar
yttafifTpias Tf KO! \oyifffiovs Kal T&
Tojauro irpayfJMTfv6fietoi, inro6ffi.ei>oi r6
re irepiTrby Kal rb apnov Kal ra axhuara
al ytaviiav rpi-na elfSij Kal &\\a rovrui/
a5eA4>a naff SKOCTTT/V /x^OoSo*', TaDro/ut^
w$ etScfres, 7roir)<rd(j.evoi viroQffffis avrd,
oi>8Va \6yov oJ/re oi/rors oj/re &\\ois
fri a^iovffi irepl avTcov SiSofai ais irorr2
tpavtptot', IK rovruv 8* apxop-fvoi rh.
\otira ^5rj 8itWer TeAeirrcoertj'
yov/j.f>>cas 3nl TOVTO, ov av tirl
Aristotle, Post. Analyt. i. ii. 7,
defines thesis or assumption as an
immediate syllogistic principle, in-
demonstrable, but not (as the axioms
are) a necessary antecedent to all
reasoning. He divides theses into
hypotheses and definitions, which
differ in that the former assert exist-
ence or non-existence, while the latter
do not. The hypothesis then is a
peculiar principle (ol/cei'o apx^l), and
differs from an axiom, (i) in that it
varies in the different sciences; (2)
in that it is wanting in recognisable
necessity. (Cf. Post. Anal. i. x. 6 :
oi>K tffn 5* inr6Qris . . . t> avdyKri
flvai St avrb Kal SoKflv iLvdyKif). The
Aristotelian hypothesis is however
widely different from the hypothesis
of the moderns, which means in short
little more than a conjecture. For
more particulars on this subject see
Mr. Poste's Logic of Science (Oxford,
1850), p. 139 143.
rov opfloSofetv] By what the gram-
marians call zeugma, this genitive
goes with TWC apxuv, as governed by
5t8ew/caAiK({s. One would have ex-
pected atria.
VIII. IX.] H9IKQN [EYAHMKiN] VII.
227
o~)=Tai yap TO =A-
TJO-TOV, TJ oipx^- <*^ %' ivotrrfa;, b s^=vsri>iog xou oux
extrrarixbg 3/a ys TO iraQog. Qctvspw OTJ sx TOUTCOV OTJ 13
[Jilv o"7rot>Sa/a e<, vj 0= C^auAij.
Tlorspov ovv syxpa.Tr)$ e<rriv b o/rotojouv Xo'ya) xa) OTTO<-
aoyj/ 7rpoa.ip=a-i e^-^vcav 13 b TYJ op^Y), xa) axparr)^ o
bTTOiaouv jw.7] [j.[j.va)v TTpootipsfrsi xcii OTOMDOtjy Xoyto ^ o
TO) \|/syS=T Ao'ya) xa< TY 7rpoa/pso~eJ T^ jarj op^y
5 &AA.OS 5' evas/rlos K.T. \.~\ Incon-
tinence having been shown to be an
intermediate state not so bad as in-
temperance, it is here added, that
the true opposite to the incontinent
man is he
' Who, through the heat of conflict,
keeps the law
In calmness made, and sees what he
foresaw ; '
i. e. not the temperate but the conti-
nent. And though incontinence is
not absolutely bad, yet relatively, if
you compare it with its opposite, you
must call one bad and the other good.
IX. The first part of this chapter
( i 4) takes up again the question
before started (ch. i. 6,ch.ii. 7 10),
Does continence consist in sticking to
any opinion and purpose, whether
wrong or right? After some refine-
ments, which are perhaps unnecessary,
as to the continent man 'accidentally'
or ' non-essentially ' maintaining a
wrong opinion, a good distinction is
given between obstinacy and conti-
nence. Obstinate people
p.ovfs), if not mere dullards (ot
Kol ot &jpoiKot), are self-opinionated,
which state of mind is rather inconti-
nence than continence, for it is a
yielding to the desire for victory and
self-assertion. The continent man on
the other hand is not at all deaf to
the voice of persuasion, it is only the
voice of passion when opposed to
reason which he resists. Nor is a
man to be called incontinent if he
deserts a resolution, even for the sake
of pleasure. Since Neoptolemus de-
serted his resolution to deceive, in
order to obtain the noble pleasure of
preserving his honour.
I. ij 6 T$ v^euSe? \6y<? Kal TJJ irpoai-
pftrei TJ? ftr; op6fj~\ Various solutions
have been proposed for the difficulty in-
volved in this sentence. (i)Aspasius,
followed by Argyropulus, Fritzsche,
&c., think that f/j./j.4v<m> is to be
understood as carried on from fir]
e/j.fj.fi>cav in the line before. But this
will not do. The a/cpar-fts cannot be
said to ' abide by a false opinion.'
(2) Some understand the clause as
applying to cases like those of Neo-
ptolemus. ' Is a man incontinent who
does not stick to a false opinion ? '
But all this is implied in 6 &iroia.ovv
K. r. \. And moreover this interpre-
tation would give a new sense to ^,
making it a particle of opposition
instead of a particle of contrast, which
is required for the sake of correspon-
dence with the opening sentence. (3)
One of Bekker's MSS. reads r<p ^
((/ei/Se? \6yy KO.\ -rfj wpoatpfffei TTJ
opOjj. This is a very natural correc-
tion to make, and it seems followed by
O 2
228
II9IKQN [EYAIIMION] VII.
[ClIAT.
awro
01 opoiov
8s TO> aA7j9=? Ao'ya> xa) T>J op^y) TrpoajpsVei
o jtxsv lfj.fjt.svst o 8' oux Sjtxjasvri ; ej yap TJ ro8) 8ia To8i
alpslrai $ 8*a>xs/, xa5' aura jtxsv TOUTO 8ja>xs xau alpsTra/,
Kara (TUjU0ff/&}X&f 8s TO irporepw. a7TAto 8s AsyojU-sv TO
xa5' airo, o><rr S<TT( just/ > oTroiaouv 80^ o /xsv s^asvei
o 8' e^tVraraj, a7rAto 8s o TYJ aA>j$s7. sl<n 8s rvs xa<
\ ~ 5, ft, < _
e[j.[ji,svsTixoi TY oo^r), ou
8u(T7rs<(rTOJ xa< oux sujtcsraTrsJO
rto syxpaTS?, wffTrsp o aa'WTog TCO sXsu3?puo xa) o
TO) QappaXsw, slcr} 8' srepoi Kara TroXXa. 6 jtxev yap 8ia
7ra$o xa< sVi0yjOi/av oy jasra^aXXs/, o iyxpotrqf) sVs*
orav Tt>^rj, sVrat o syxpar^ ' o 8s oup^ OTTO
SdfA/a^ ys Xaja)3avou<r<, xa) uyovrott
3 WTTO TCOV >j8oi/c7)v. elo"} 8s l(r%vpoyva)[j.ovB$ ol
xai ol afj.a.Qs'is xoti ol oiypoixoi, ol fj.lv iStoyvcojtxovs^ 8t' 7380-
v^v xai AUTTTJV * xpupowri yap v/xcovrs^, sav JOLTJ jasraTrst-
xai Xi7roDvra<, s'av axupa ra aurtov ^ aJ<T7rep
ra aJors jU.aX?vov rji axpaTst* so/xaer/v 13 rm
4 syxpars?. elo-i 8s TIV?^ o'i TO?^ 8o'^ao~/v owx g fJ.fJ.svov(r iv ou
8*' axpa<r/av, olov Iv Tto ^iXoxnjT|j TJ SO<OXASOU o
the Paraphrast, who has i /u); ipp.evtav
-rrj opQij. But since the correction is
so natural, why should such a pre-
ponderance of MSS. have failed to
adopt it? Though the sense ab-
solutely requires some such reading,
it seems better to conclude that there
is some original confusion in the
text. The author may have carelessly
written as above, from a mistaken
antithesis to ^ 6 TJJ 6/)0j7 in the former
sentence.
Kara <ruju|8$ijKbs 5e rb irp6-repov~\
One chooses the means ' accidentally."
This is a mere illustration of the
import of naff aur6 and ffvufie&riKAs.
The whole paragraph seems perfectly
irrelevant. It may be compared with
Eth. v. xi. 8 : /ca6' avrb /j.iv oSv rb
8'
Ka.ic6v, which is a weak qualification
of the moral principle, that to injuro
is worse than to be injured.
z fcairep It Hcrcaros K.T. A.] The
same illustrations are coupled together
in the Eudemian Ethics m. vii. 14 :
rb 6fioi6Tfpov ^}TTOV (vaaniov QcuvtTat,
oiov ttfirovQf rb Bpdrros irpbs rb 6dpffos
Kal atTuria irpbs ^\fv6fpi6Ti)ra.
6 8^ oi>x ^5oc tlj'] ' But the obsti- n
nate man (is immovable) not from the
influence of reason, for such men
assuredly admit desires, and many of
them are carried away by the allure-
ment of pleasures.' The curious
phrase firiOufj.ias Aoju/3d^oixrt occurs
in the Eudemian Ethics, in. ii. 13:
irdmfs ybp rovrots <pvarfi re x a ^P ovffl i
4 olov iv T<f *iAo/cT^T?] See above
ch. ii. 7, note.
IX.]
IIGIKliN [EYAHMIQN] VII.
xa/TOi Si' j8ovjv oix svs[J,ivsv,
xaArjv ' TO yap ahyQevsiv aurto xaXov rv, sVfArSTj 8'
TOU 'O8u<ro-a> \J/uSo-$ai. Oi yap ?ra o 8*' vj'Sovrjt/ T/
Trparrcoj/ our' axoAa(TTO OUTS 4>auXo our' a'xparrj, aXX'
o Si' alo-p^pav.
'ETTS/ 8' o~Ti T< xai ro/oDro^ olo TJTTOV >j SsT TO? <ro)- S
[J.O.TIXOIS p^a/pcov, xa< oux sfj.fj.svwv TCO Xo'ya* T?) TO/OUTO^,
TOUTOU xai rou a'xparou^ jU,eo"oj 6 lyxpar^j* o ^xsv yap
axparr) oux s[j,fj.svsi ra> Xoyco SJGC TO jaaXXo'v Ti, OUTO^ 8s
oia TO T^TTO'V T/ * o S' syxpaTrj^ sp.fj.svsi x/xi ou= Si' srspov
p.srafid'h.hsi. As? Ss, siVsp 13 gyxpaTSia (TTrouSaTov, afj,$>o-
1 ^ ' ft* j^ '-^ ^ * \ A '
T=pa Ta^ evavrias s^sig <pauAaj sjvai, ojo"7rsp xai <pai-
vovTai ' aXXa Sia TO T^V sTspav ev oX/yoi^ xai o'Aiydxig
slvai <$>a.vspdv, w(T7rep 73 <reo^poo-6vrj TV) axoXao-/a Soxe?
SVOLVTIOV slvai povov, WTO) xot 7] syxpaTSia TY| axpatria.
i 8= xa6' o'jU,oioVr]Ta TroXXa "hiysraiy xou 13 eyxpaT<a 73' 6
5 ch. x. 5. In his later edition
Bekker makes this portion of the text
into a separate chapter, which seems
a better arrangement. We have now
a winding up of the previous dis-
cussions. Continence is not only the
contrary of incontinence, but is also
a sort of mean. It bears an analogy
to temperance, but must not be iden-
tified with it. Neither must incon-
tinence and intemperance be con-
founded (see above ch. i. 6). Nor
must it be thought possible that the
wise man can be incontinent, though
the clever man may (see ch. i. 7).
Incontinence is like sleep or drunken-
ness, not a state of wakeful knowledge
(see ch. iii. 6-8). Its acts are
voluntary, but yet it is not absolutely
wicked, since it implies no deliberate
purpose. The incontinent man is
like a state which has good laws, but
does not act upon them. The bad
man like a state with a bad code,
which she carries out. Both the
terms incontinence and continence are
used comparatively, as implying more
firmness than is common, or less. Of the
two kinds of incontinence, that which
is caused by passion is more curable
than that caused by weakness, that
which proceeds from habit is more
curable than that which is natural.
5 KO! ovSe Si' frepov /uero/SaAAej]
This is an Atticism for /col 8t" ovSfre-
pot>. The attempt to make continence
into ' a mean ' can hardly be called
successful. It can only be done by
assuming the same H\\trfyis for this
quality as for temperance. You will
have one set of terms, a/coAatrta,
(raxppoffvvri, ayaicrBrjffla, and another
set aKpaala, ejKpdreia, a.va.ia6i)ffla. It
is plain that eyicpdrtia is not a mean,
in the sense of being a balance, or
harmony of the mind. It is only
imperfect temperance, it is temperance
in the act of forming.
6 f] eyKpdrfta f] rov ffdifypovos Ku.ff
6fj.oi6TijTa T\KoXov()-nKev\ ' The " con-
tinence" of the temperate man has
come to be called so derivatively
(yjKoA.oMjj/cej') and by analogy.'
230
II9IKI1N [EYAHMmN] VII.
[CHAP.
rot
sTva< TOV
TO 7^0^
xa5' o'jUO/oYryTa vjxoAouSrjxsv ' 6 TS
-vfizv ?rapa TOV Ao'yov <a rag
rfiovag TTOISIV xa) o <ra><pa)V, aXX* o jaev %(ov o ft oux
(>aJAa e7n0U|U./a, xa) o jM,v TOIOVTOS olo |U.) 7j
Trapa TOV Ao'yov, o &' olo r^so-Sa* aAXa ju,rj
7 QJJ.OIOI 8s xa) o axpaT7j xa) 6 axo'Aao~TO, srspov [j.lv
ot/rs, dptyorepoi 8s ra (rajjuarixa TJos'a SKOXO-JQ-IV, a?\.X' o
xa) olofjisvos SsTv, o 8' oux olopsvog.
ajU.a <$>povi[j.ov xa) axpar
ajaa yap <$>povi[j.os xa)
i ou T<O =io='vi
xa) To> TrpaxTixo^* o 8' axpaT7j ou TrpaxT/xo'^. TOV
6s Ssjvov ouSsv xcoAust axpaT^ elvai' 8<o xa) Soxot5o~<v
EV/OTS $>povi[j,oi ju,sv sTva/ T/VSJ dxpOLTtif 3s, &a TO T^V
8s<voT7jTa SiaC^epsiv T%' (J)pov^<rsfo^ TOV slprjjOisvov Tpo;rov
sv ToTf TrproTO/^ Xo'yo/^, xa) xaTa jttsv TOV Xo'yov 770^
3 sva<, 8/a4>psiv xaTa T>JV 7rpoa/pso~iv. otj 2^ a>^
o iSi^ xa) Qscopcuv, aXX* > 6 xa^suScov ^ oivto-
]U,svoj. xa) Ixcov jasv (TpoVov yap Tiva i^co^ xa) o TroisT
xa) ou fivsxa), TrovTjpoj 3' ow 73 yap 7rpoajpso-< STTISJXTJ^*
' ' X) OUX aSiXO * OU a 7T/3otAO' 6
X. I aua ^ctp (pp6vtfjios Kal ffvov-
5o?os rb ^6oy St'Sei/crea fiy] Cf. ch. ii.
5. tfA. vi. xiii. 6.
a rbv (Ipijfj.fi'ov Tp6iroi> Iv rots irp<S>-
TOIS \6yois] Cf. EM. vi. xii. 89. The
phrase & TO?S irpdnois is used by
Aristotle, EVA. nr. iv. i, 4, in refer-
ence to the Second Book of Ethics.
It must mean something more than
irp6repov, one would think. It seems
to point to a sort of interval between
the later passage and that referred
to. Cf. ch. i. I
3 (cal Iffwi/ ju^] Cf. EVA. v. ix. 4-6,
where the question is discussed, Does
the incontinent man voluntarily do
wrong and injury to himself as well
as harm ?
irpoa.lpffit rtiK j /)*] Tlp
here must mean the general state of
the will. It is only one form of
incontinence, which errs against a
definitely formed purpose. Inconti-
nence is always irapk TV jSovXrjenr (cf.
Eth. \. ix. 6) ; in passionate natures
it is &vtv irpoaipefffus. The Aristo-
telian psychology seems however to
have admitted the formation of vpoai-
p4atis which are not carried out into
action, and the question thus arose,
Are purposes or actions most decisive
as constituting virtue ? See Eth. m.
ii. i, note, and Eth. x. viii. 5.
Staff r)fjLnr6viipos~\ ' So that he is only
half depraved." This epithet occurs
in Ar. Pol. v. xi. 34 : ?rt 5' avrbv
(the monarch) StaKflffOat (avayKaiov')
Kar&, rb $605 tfroi KoAfas irpbt aptr^v fj
i)IJ.tXpi)a'Tov ovra, KO! ^ ttoi/rjpbv aAA.'
IX. X.]
II81KON [EYAILMION] VII.
231
ovx e[j.[j.sv=Tixo$ mg av
o s
xai soixs
TroAsi
]U,V aavTa ra sovra xai
Ss
// 7TO\tC /3oV\0', J VOfjLWV OVCtV fJll
o 8s
jasv roj
eyxparsiot
7rovr}poi$ 8= %pa)[j.evy). 4
TO UTr
? ra>v 7rX=/(7TfO!/
,
j. euiaroTspK, s TCOV axpa.-
<ruov v o< /jtsXa-yp^oXixo axparsyovTaj, TCOV ^ouXsuojagvwv
e[j.[j.svovT(ov 81, xa) 01 8j' sQio-^toD axparsig rtbv
srax/v^frat <$>u<rea}$' 8/a
TOUTO xa) TO !5o p/a?v7rov, ort T^
si
soixsv cotTTTS xa
[jLe\lrr)i>
t, ^/Xt, nu 3^
tirat.
T* asv owi/ s(TTiv =yxpars<a xa* ri axpa.(ria. xai TI xaprspia 5
xai TI //.aXax/a, xai :ra>^ ffOtform a* ss/ auTai
rjfj.iv6vrjpov. In Plato, Repub. p. 352
c, the term ri/ju^xfaipoi is used, in
proving that there must be honour
even among thieves.
oil -yap 7r(/3ouAos] Though lust as
compared with anger is called ri/8ou-
AOJ (cf. ch. vi. 3), yet it is true on the
other hand that the incontinent man
is not a designing character.
6 8e ^eAa-yx ^"^*! Cf. above ch. vii.
8, ch. viii. z.
Sxrirtp > Ai'aaj'Spt'5ijs] A Rhodian
comic poet, who is said to have satirized
the Athenians. Aristotle mentions one
of his plays, the Yepovronavia. (Bhet. m.
xii. 3). Also a famous saying of his (75.
in. xi. 8), 'Avo|o'5pi5ou ri
oy 7
rplv Ooyarou 5pai/
And another witticism (Ib. m. x. 7).
Cf. Athenseus, Deipnos., nt. 1 6.
4 TTJJ rwj' Tr\fiffT(ev Si/rauecus] Cf.
ch. vii. i, note.
Sxrirep /col EJ/T/VOJ] An elegiac and
gnomic poet of Paros, who appears to
have been a contemporary and friend
of Socrates.
' Habit sticketh long and fast,
Second nature 'tis at last.'
' That which is acquired by
culture and habit.' That habit is
' second nature,' we are told by
Aristotle, De Mem. ii. 16 : Smrep yap
(pvffis ijSti rb Z0os, Sib & iroAActais
tvvoovfj.fi> ra-^v &.vamfj.vri(rK6fJie6a' &<r-
TTfp ")ap (pvatt rdSe fj.fr a r6Se (ffriv,
ovrta Kal eVf pyeia rb 8 7ro\A<wciS <j>v<rii>
TTOltl.
232
[EYAIlMIftN] VII.
[CHAP.
TOU ryv
1 Hspi Ss 7]3ovTJ xai XUTTTJJ
(><Aoo-o4>&uvro * OUTO yap
o /3yN.7rovT sxa<TTov TO //.six
2 Asyo/xsv. ST< 8s xa) TCOJ/ ava.yxa.icov e7n<rx\|/a<rQcu Trspi
xaxov TO
XI. "We now come to a treatise
upon the nature of Pleasure. With
regard to the authorship and character
of this treatise see the remarks in
Vol. I. Essay -I. pp. 34 and 38, and
Essay III. p. 145. A notable scholium,
discovered by Professor Brandis in
the Vatican, and quoted by Spengel
and Fritzsche, attributes it to Eude-
mus, though in a merely conjectural
way ; see below ch. xiii. a, note.
In the outset of the Eudemian Ethics,
a discussion on Pleasure is promised
in terms which correspond both to
the contents and the position of the
present chapters. (Eth. Eud. i. v. 1 1 .)
rovrwv 5' (i.e. with regard to the
three kinds of life) TJ jt/ vepl ra
ata/j.ara Kal ras airo\avffis fjo'ovri, Kal
ris Kal irola ris yivtrai Kal Sia riixav,
oiiK SSrjAoj/, Sxrr' ov rives elcrl Sfi
rirfiv avrds, a\\' fl avvreivovffl ri
irpbs flSatfjioviav ^ /u. 1 ^, Kal irwj ffvvrel-
vovffi, Kal ir6rfpov tl St"i irpoffdirTfiv T<
rjv Ka\as i)8ovds Tivas, ravras 5e?
irpoffdirTtiv, ft Tobraiv fitv &\\ov nva
Tp6irov ai/dyKij Koivwvtlv, frtpai 8* fl<rli>
rjSoval SC &s ei>\6yus ototnat rbi/ u5ai-
fj.ofa C')*' T/Se'ws Kal fj.^ (J.6vov &\u7ra>y.
a\\a Ttfpl n\v TOVTUV Sffrtpov tiriiTKf-
Trreov, vfpl 5' operas Kal <ppovf)ffas
irpurov 6eft)p^(rw/uf. It is quite in
agreement with the terms of this pro-
gramme that the present treatise is
prominently concerned with the dis-
cussion of bodily pleasure (^ iff pi ra
(TtijuaTO Kal ras airo\avfftis rjSovfi). At
the close of the Eudemian Ethics there
is also a reference backward to these
chapters (Eth. Eud. vra. iii. n) : tol
irepl ytiorns 8' ttpT)Tai itoi&v TI Kal irws
ayaBof, Kal Sri rd re air\us r/Se'a Kal
Ka\d, Kal rd (yt) air\>s ayada 7/5^a. oil
ylverai Se rjSov}] /UTJ tv irpd^a ' Sia rovro
6 oATjflws tvSal/juav Kal ^Siffra Cr)(Te, Kal
rovro ov fj.drriv ol avQ^wnoi a^iovffiv.
(Cf. this Book, ch. xii. 3, and 7 ;
ch. xiii. 2.)
I 2 ire pi 5e rtSovTJs x a 'P 6U/ ]
' Pleasure and pain are subjects which
come within the scope of him who
makes politics a philosophy, for he
has to frame the idea of that supreme
end, in reference to which we call
things absolutely good and bad. Also
these are quite necessary for us to
consider, since we have laid down the
principle that moral virtue and vice
are concerned with pains and pleasures,
and since people in general hold that
pleasure is involved in happiness,
whence they have given the happy
man his name (paKdpios from xa'V'")-'
There are three reasons given here
for discussing pleasure ; (i) Because
it has claims to be ' the end.' (Cf. Eth.
Eud. n. i. i, where as a reason for
discussing psychology it is said, <pp6-
vi)<Tis yap Kal aper)] Kal rjSov^) Iv ^vyJQ,
3>v tvia f) irdina re'Aos elvai SoKf'i iruffiv}.
(z) From the connection before shown
to exist between pleasure and mo-
rality, cf. Eth. Eud. n. iv. 2-4.
(3) Because the idea of pleasure is
involved in the common idea of
happiness, as shown by the etymology
(a false one) of /uafcaptoy.
^pXiTe'/cTwi' TOW TAous] i.e. to con-
ceive in a grand and liberal way,
independently of details, that supreme
human good at which a state should
aim. Cf. Eth. i. xiii. 1-3, and i. i. 4,
note.
air\us \fyon*v~\ There is some con-
XL]
IieiKilN [EYAHMIQN] VII.
233
rr t v TS yap apsryv xa rr t v xaxiav TTJV
xal rfiovag sbzy.sv, xal TTJJ/ s'
oi 7rX=7<rro;
a?ro rot
O-JTS
10 xa TOV
roig p.=v ovv Oox
'JT= xara
aya^o
ov xa
sv s
Tvai
rprov, e x
[Ay Iv3=^r<r5a< eTvat TO api(rrov
( asv o-jx ayaSo'v, on Tracra ij'oov^ yivitri$ SCTTIV
6= y='v=<r^ <r'jyy
oloi> 0'jo=jU,/a oixoSo' ( ar y (ri^ olx/a. STI o
rag rfiwag. STI 6 <$>pwitj.ag TO a?\,t7rov
STi jU,7ro'o/oi/ TO) ctpovsTv ai Tj'oova/, xai ofrco
v, olov T^V Ttov d$>po?)i<ri(ov' ou&iva yap av %vva<r(iai
ri sv avrr). STJ TSVVTJ ou5=jOt<'a I^OVTJ^' xairoi Tcav
rVOTj$ spyov. ST; Traioia xa} Qypia SKOXSI rag
rfiwdg. ToO 3= JU,TJ 7ra<rag (nrovQatag, OTI eio-i xal 5
ov TO
fusion in this expression, for though
things are called good in reference to
the supreme end, yet they are not
called so absolutely. All such goods
are merely means, and therefore goods
relatively. What is here meant is
more definitely expressed in "^. #<Z.
I. viii. 1 8, STI 6' afrjop T& reAos TWJ/
yap rb Tf\os roAAo Sfucvvovffiv,
STI fKaa-rov airriav ayaOdv aXnov yelp
rb ov tvfKa.
peff TI^OVTJS) The first sentence of
the Eudemian Etkies asserts that
happiness is not only most good and
beautiful, but also most pleasurable ;
this is taken, of course, from Eth. Nic.
i. viii. 4.
3 5 The writer now mentions
three existing opinions with regard to
pleasure, and the arguments by which
they are supported.
i That pleasure is in no sense a
good.
VOL. II. H
(o) because it is a state of be-
coming (yevtffis) :
(/3) because the temperate man
avoids pleasures ;
(7) because the wise man aims
not at pleasure, but at a
painless condition ;
(5) because pleasure hinders
thought ;
() because there is no art of
pleasure ;
(Q because children and brutes
follow pleasure.
2 That some pleasures may be
good but that most are bad ; sup-
ported by instances of morbid and
hurtful pleasures.
3 That pleasure is at all events not
the chief good ; because it is not an
end-in-itself, but a state of becoming.
rot's (i.ev o3> So/ce?] The opinions
stated here are negative. The writer
in all probability had before him
Aristotle's treatise on Pleasure (Eth.
234
HGlKilN [EYAIlMinN] VII.
[CHAP.
en
TCOJ/
ij6ov>j, on
ov. oi o O'j
a?vXa yeiwrif, ra jusi/ ot)v
I 2 r/ Ori 8' 0!> <rvfj.fia.ivsi 3/a raura /XTJ
TO ap;<TTov, sx Ttoi/fls &5jXov. TTptorov /xsv, ETTsi TO
raur e<mv.
X. i.-v.). He deviates from it slightly,
and exhibits that kind of differences
which might be expected under the
circumstances. He does not, like
Aristotle, state the positive view
(held by Eudoxus) that pleasure is
the chief good, but commences with
the opinions of the objectors to this
view (i. e. Speusippus and the Plato-
nists of his school). The principal
argument which he attributes to them
(that pleasure is a yevtais) is given,
though not in such a definite form,
Eth. x. iii. 4. Argument (f) appears
to be implied in the objection against
Eudoxus which is mentioned Eth. x.
ii. 4. Argument (e) maybe the same
perhaps as that given Eth. x. iii. 2
(that pleasure is a.6ptffTov~). The
other arguments are not taken from
Aristotle ; they may perhaps have
been derived from the books of Speu-
sippus on this subject (irtpl ^SoKrjr a',
' Apl(n UTTTOS a'. See Vol. I. Essay III.
p. 1 68).
The second view belongs probably
to a more moderate section of the
Older Academy. It st.ill however
requires qualification, and to this ef-
fect the writer argues below, in ch.
xii.
The third view, that pleasure,
however good, cannot be the chief
good, was held by both Plato and
Aristotle (though the argument by
which it is supported, STJ oi> rt\os
a\\a yvf<ris, was Plato's alone, cf.
PhiMius p. 53 c, 54 A, &c. Eth. x. ii.
3, x. iii. 8-13). Eudemus, identifying
pleasure with happiness, denies this,
ch. xii. i, ch. xiii. z.
XII. The arguments used in this
chapter are as follows: (i) Before
deciding on the goodness or badness of
pleasure, a distinction has to be made
between absolute and relative good-
ness or badness, and then various
degrees have to be admitted among the
relati ve kinds of goodness, i. (2) We
mxist allow that real pleasure consists
in life itself (ivtpytta), not what merely
produces life (ytveais). Hence all the
arguments founded on defining plea-
sure to be a yeixffis fall to the ground.
Those processes which restore nature
are only pleasures in a subsidiary and
accidental way. And even in them
what is pleasant is the life (ivipyfia)
which accompanies them, 2-3. (3")
Some pleasures may be morbid or
they may hinder thought ; but this
only proves thatyVom one point of
view they are not good '. but again the
pleasures of thought are an assistance
to thought, 4-5. (4) There is no
art of pleasure, because art is of
conditions, not of functions, not of
life itself, 6. (5) The arguments
about the wise man, the temperate
man, and the child (ch. xi. 4), all
apply merely to the inferior and sub-
sidiary, that is the bodily, pleasures,
7-
The course of procedure here is like
that in Eth. x. ii.-iii., where the
objections of the school of Speusippus
are answered before Aristotle gives
his own theory of the nature of plea-
sure. The arguments above are rather
confused in statement. Those in i
are apparently meant to answer the
assertion that no pleasure is good,
XL XII.]
H8IKQN [EYAHMIQN] VII.
235
(TO fj.lv yap
, xa a <>fjo"s< xa
al xivfi<ri$ xa\ al
ysvscrsic, xa} al Qafoai Soxoucroa slvai al (J.ev
TW 8' ou aXX' alpsral TO>QS, evtai 8' ouds
a TTOTS xa) oA/yov %pwov, alp-ra} 8' 06'' al 6* ouS*
aAAa &aivovro, o<rai JU.STCC AUTTT^ xa< larpsfag
o*ov at rcov xap^vovrtav. STI STTS} rou aya^oD TO a
oire Ka0' ayrb oi/re Kara crv,a/36/8rjKoy.
The writer wishes first to urge that
pleasure may be relatively good, if not
absolutely so ; he afterwards goes on
to maintain that it is absolutely good.
Other passages of Eudemus bear a
similarity to this, cf. Eth. End. in. i.
7 : ctAA' icrcos rb ^>0/3fpbc Ae^erai, {afftrep
Kal rb fiSv Kttl raya.06v, Six^>s. ra /uev
<yap aTrAwy, ra 5e nvt /u.ti/ Kal ^8a /cal
O7a0a fff-riv, tatKus S' ou, a\\a TOVVO.V-
T'IOV <f>av\a. Kal oi>x ^Sea, 8aa TO?S
irovrjpins u><p\ifj.a., Kal offa ^5ta roTj
7rai5;ois 77 TroiSi'a. vii. ii. 4-7, &C.
I '6n S' ou (TUyUjSaiVej icauj'rfj'Taii']
' But that it does not follow from
these arguments that (pleasure) is
not a good, nor even that it is not the
chief good, will be eeen from the
following considerations. First, the
term ' good ' has a double import, it
means either the absolute or the
relative good ; in accordance with this
distinction, different constitutions and
states will be either absolutely or
relatively good, and so too the pro-
cesses of charge and transition (which
produce them). Thus some of these
processes which appear bad may be
so in the abstract (airAws), while they
are not so relatively (nvl), but are
desirable for the particular indivi-
dual. Others again cannot be called
desirable even for the particular
individual, except on occasion and for
a short time ; others are not pleasures
at all, but only seem so, being accom-
panied by pain and being (merely) for
the sake of relief, as for instance the
pleasures of the sick.'
2 ert eirel aTrb TOVTUV] ' Secondly,
" good" may be either a state or the
operation of a state, and so the pro-
cesses which restore any one to his
normal state (frwradiv eiv) are plea-
surable (not in themselves, but) acci-
dentally (and by association). In
fact there is an operation or vital
action in desire, namely that of the
powers in us which remain unimpaired
(TT}S inro\o'nrov ?ecos Kal (f>vae<as).
(And it may be proved that pleasure
depends not on want and desire, but
on vital action), because there are
pleasures which do not imply want and
desire, as for instance the pleasures
of thought, which take place when the
nature is in no respect deficient. A
proof (that the processes before-men-
tioned are only accidentally pleasur-
able) is to be found in the fact that
men do not find delight in the same
pleasure while their nature is being
recruited (di/aTrArjpoyjue'tTjr) and when
it is in a settled condition, but when
it is settled they delight in things
which are absolutely pleasant, and
during the other process in things
that are even quite the reverse ; as in
sharp and bitter things, which are not
naturally nor abstractedly pleasant.
Nor is the enjoyment of them natural,
for as pleasant things, regarded ob-
jectively (ra -^Sf'a), are to one another,
so are the subjective feelings which
these excite (ritiwai).'
u 2
236
IIGIKftN [EYAHMION] VII.
[CHAP.
[j.v svspysia. TO o ss> xarot,
s}$ rr t v Qutrtx^v e^iv rfiiiai sl<riv. e<rri ft y Ivspysiot ev
raig e7n$uju,i'ai rr\g UTTO^QITTQH s^suig xai <u<rsa)i,', STTS*
xa) ai/=u XUTTVJS xa< 7n5u ( a/a s]<r}v rfiovai, oJov al TOU
ftswpiiv svspysicti, rSJ 4>u(rsa) ooix st/osou^ oua-rjg. (rr^ziov
8' or* ou TO) aurto %aipO'j<riv rfisT ai/a7r7.r / ^ou ] Uj>Tj rs
xa) xa5:<TTr;XL/a^, aXXa xa^sa-njxu/as jtxsv
7y'sV/v, dva.TrhrjpovfJt.svriS 8s xai roTg evavTioig' xai
so"i x} TTtxpoig %aipov(riVj tbv ou8sv ours <^u<r=i r/^t;
a><rr' ou3' vj'Sova/- to^ yap ra y)o='a rp^
oura> xa) a* r)3ovaJ ai aTro rou'rmv.
3 er< oux ai/ayxvj srspov n slvai fishriov rr^g 7)oi/5J,
This passage is expressed so ellip-
tically as to require several links of
thought to be supplied. In the above
translation this has been attempted.
A bare rendering of the sentences into
English would leave them utterly un-
intelligible.
ou Ka6iffra(rtu] i. e. al Kiviifftis Kal al
ytvfffeis, carried on from the previous
section. The argument is that it is
only life and the vital action (<pv<rtK^
'is Kat rai/T7;s tvfpyeia) which is good
and pleasant ; the restorative processes
are only secondarily, non-essentially,
and by a sort of inference, pleasant.
The words KaOitnaffai and KaOfarriKvias
correspond with the term Kardcrraffis,
which is used of pleasure in Ar.
Rfutoric, i. xi. i : Kardmaffa a8p6a
Kal aladr)r^i (Is TV \ncdpx ovao - v <t>v<riv.
Tfjs \nro\oi-Kov es] The argument
goes on to add that even in these re-
storative processes there is vital action
(frfWfia), namely of those organs that
remain unimpaired. The Paraphrast
and others understand i>iro\oiirov to
mean 'deficient,' and as being equi-
valent to ^5oDs in the next line.
But the above translation is not only
more suitable to the doctrine of the
Peripatetics, (see Vol. I. Essay IV.
p. 199), but it is borne out by c. xiv-
| 7 : h(")<a 5< Kara <ri>/*/3e7}Kbs rjSfa
ra larpevovra- '6ri yap ffupfialvti larpfv-
fffOat rov vicofJLtvovros irytovs TrpdTrom6s
TI, Sia TOVTO i]Sv 5.JKer tivoi. Cf. Eth.
X. iii. 6.
oe'<rt ol iriKpois] Mentioned as an
instance of things only pleasant during
a morbid condition of the body. Cf.
Eth. x. iii. 8.
3 ITJ ou< avdyKti eari 5' frepo^]
' Moreover it does not follow that
these must be something better than
pleasure, as some argue, in the same
way that the end is better than the
process which leads to it. For all
pleasures are not transition-states
nor the accompaniments of such, but
they are rather life itself and the end
itself. They do not result from our
coming to our powers (yivop.tvaiv\ but
from our using those powers (xp *-
Hfvwv); and it is not true that all
pleasures have an end separate from
them ; this is only true of such as are
felt by persons in the process of being
restored to their normal condition.
Hence it is not right to define plea-
sure as a "sensible transition," but
rather we should call it " a vital
action of one's natural state," and
XII.]
[EYAHMIQN] VII.
237
TO
xca
Kara.
avr s rou
V svspysiav
aj/rjU.7ro'o/o~-
Sox=7 8= yzvscriq rig sivai, on xupitu$ dyaQov
instead of "sensible," "unimpeded."
Now pleasure appears to people to be
a transition-process from its being
good in the full sense of the term, for
people confound the ideas of process
and action, whereas they are distinct.'
oJo-Trtp rives tpaffi] In all probability
the school, and perhaps the actual
writings, of Speusippus, are here al-
luded to. Nowhere in Plato do the
exact words of this definition of plea-
sure occur (yeveffis els <f>vcriv al<r9r)Tf]),
but they represent his views, though
perhaps carried rather farther. The
present section places in opposition to
each other the theories of the Platonic
and the Aristotelian school, of whom
the one considered pleasure to be a
relief from pain, a return from depres-
sion, an addition to the vital powers ;
the other considered it to be the play of
life itself, the flow of life outward
rather than anything received. On
these two divergent theories see Vol.
I. Essay IV. pp. 197-201. The same
subject may be found worked out at
greater length, and with interesting
notices of the opinions held by later
philosophers, in Sir W. Hamilton's
Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. n. lect.
xliii. pp. 444-475.
dAAa fj.a\\ot> \eKreov evepyeia.v\ Ari-
stotle when writing accurately dis-
tinguishes pleasure from the moments
of life and consciousness (evepyeiai),
from which it is inseparable. Cf. Eth.
*s.. \. 6: al 6e X^Sopol) trvviyyvs rats
evepyeicus, Kal a.8i6piffroi ourias Sxrre
exeiv afJ.<(>i(r&r]rT)ffu> el ravr6f emiv i)
fi>tp~/eiu rfj rjfiovrj. ov fi^v eoiice ye ri
^Soj/Jj Siavnia tlvai ovS" a1ff6i]a is ' &roirov
ydp a.\\a Sia rb yu,?j x u p' l ^ fff ^ ai ^>o.iverai
nffi ravrov. He however does not
more specifically define it than as
eirtyiyv6fj.ev6v ri rt\os (rrj ecepyeiot),
Eth. x. iv. 8, &c. Eudemus does not
preserve the distinction, but simply
says that pleasure should be defined
as 'the unimpeded play of life.' Ari-
stotle himself occasionally writes in
this way ; cf. Metaphys. xi. vii. 7 : eirel
KO.) rj rjSovTj evepyeia. rovrov. The term
evepyeia, besides other associations, im-
plies consciousness, as has been shown
in Vol. I. Essay III. pp. 193-196.
SoKei 8e yeveffis ris elvai, Sri Kvp'uas
aya86i>] At first sight there appears
to be a contradiction in saying that
pleasure is thought not to be a good,
because it is d.yeveais (ch. xi. 4) ; and
that it is thought to be a yeveffis
because it is a good. The explanation
is that the latter clause refers not to
the Platonists, but to the Cyrenaics.
The Cyrenaics, who considered plea-
sure the chief good, defined it as an
equable process in the soul.' Plato
accepted this definition, and turned it
against them, arguing that by the very
terms used the Cyrenaics had proved
pleasure not to be the chief good.
The Platonists then were originally
238
IieiKilN [EYAHMIQN] VII.
[CHAP.
4 yctp svspysioiv yevsGiv OIOVTOU eivott, SO~TJ o srspw. TO o
elva.1 Qa.u'Xots ^ Tl votfroby evia rjosoc, TO auro xai OTI
vytsiva svia <>auAa TT^O^ %pr l [j.ctTicru.ov, Tauryj ouv
ay.$w, a AX* ou <pauAa xara 7; TOUTO, e/rs/ xa) TO
5 7TOTS jSXctTTTS/ 7rpO Uy/<at/, e/JtTTOO^SI 02 OUTS
'' =
j fltTTO TOU dsWpSlV XOLl [J.a.V%Ot.VlV
6 ty;(t)psTv xa} [JLa.vQa.vs iv. TO 8s rs^vyg p.1] eli/ai
xa
sTvai, TO 3= TOV <r<o$povaL
xa TOV
TOV
xa TO
indebted for their definitiou of pleasure
(atV07jT?) yti/eiris) to the Cyrenaies.
See Vol. I. Essay II. pp. I3Z-I33.
4 5 rj> 5' eiVai ^auA.as^juai'flai'etf]
' To say that pleasures are bad because
some pleasant things are unhealthy is
like saying (health is bad) because
some healthy things are bad for
money making. From that point of
view it is true they are both bad, but
they are not on account of this in-
cidental badness bad simpliciter ; since
even thought is sometimes injurious
to health, and neither wisdom nor
any other state of mind is impeded
by its own pleasure, but only by
foreign pleasures; for the pleasures
of learning and thought will make
one learn and think more.' The ar-
gument here is that a thing good in
itself may be relatively bad, e.g.
health, and thought itself. One good
may clash with another, and be from
that point of view (Tatfrjj) bad. The
writing is elliptical ; we might have
expected kirXws to be added to (pav\a.
The last clause in section 5, which
asserts that a mental function is rather
assisted than impaired by its own
proper pleasure, is taken from Ar.
Eih. x. v. 2-3. No<re6577 seems to mean
' producing disease,' cf. ch. xi. 5 :
as voffrjfj.a.rii>^Ti]s before (ch. v. 3, &c.)
means ' produced by disease.' $purf)tre i
is evidently used above as the verbal
noun of <ppovftv, in the general sense
of 'thought,' and not in the restricted
sense which is given to it in Book vi.
Cf. Eth. i. vi. 1 1 : Eth. End. u. i. i
(quoted above).
6 rb 5e T'XHJS K.T.X.] Cf. ch. xi.
4. An answer is now given to an
argument probably occurring in the
works of Speusippus. This argument,
if fairly represented here, must have
had a false major premiss, namely,
' All that is good is the subject of art.'
The answer consists of two different
pleas; (i) pleasure, like life, is above
art, which can only deal with the
conditions tending to these things.
(2) In another sense there are arts of
pleasure, e.g. the cook's or the per-
fumer's art.
7 Most of the arguments against
pleasure ignore the distinction bet ween
different kinds of pleasures, the one
kind being of the nature of life, and
the end, and therefore good in them-
selves ( 3); the other kind being
XII XIII.] I19IKON [EYAHMmN] VII.
239
TO.
o
ovx
xa ra
p sipr l rex.i
al rfiwai,
J, xai
xa
-yap a
^v on xa) ] A'JTTJJ xaxo'v oaoXoysrra/, xaj
7] jU,=v ya.2 a7rXa>f xaxov, 13 3s TO> TTYJ e (
connected with inferior conditions of
our nature, with pain, want, &c., and
being therefore only secondarily and
accidentally good ( 2). This latter
kind, and excess in them, are made
the ground of reproaches against
pleasure in general.
XIII. In this chapter, after refut-
ing ( i) the objection of Speusippus
(that pleasure may be the opposite of
pain without being a good), Eudemus
urges the claims of pleasure, of the
highest kind, to be considered the
chief good, because from the terms of
its definition it is inseparable from
and indeed identical with happiness
(2). It is a mere paradox to talk
of a man being happy in torture, &c.
Happiness requires prosperity, that an
' unimpeded function ' may be obtained ,
i.e. pleasure, though there must not
be too much prosperity, else happiness
is 'impeded' in another way ( 3-4).
The instinct of all creatures testifies
to pleasure being the chief good (5);
and it is a mistake to think that
bodily pleasure is the only kind that
exists ( 6). In short that pleasure
is necessary for happiness proves that
it is a good ( 7).
i a\\a fiTi? ^8o^v] ' But we may
go further it is universally agreed
that pain is an evil, and detestable
for it is either absolutely an evil, or
is so relatively as impeding the in-
dividual in some way or other. But
that which is contrary to the detest-
able in that very point which makes
it detestable and evil, is good. There-
fore it follows that pleasure must be
a good. For the answer of Speusippus
to this argument does not hold, that
" (pleasure is contrary to pain and to
the absence of pain) in the same way
that the greater is contrary to the less,
and also to the equal." For no one
could ever say that pleasure is iden-
tical with any form of evil.' That
pleasure is a good because it is the
contrary of pain, is an argument at-
tributed to Eudoxus, Eth. x. ii. 2.
Aristotle there (Ib. 5) mentions the
answer to it, and refutes that answer
as above. Eudemus, in accordance
with his usual style, adds the name of
Speusippus. Aulus Gellius, rx. 5,
mentions this doctrine : ' Speusippus
vetusque omnis Academia voluptatem
et dolorem duo mala esse dicunt op-
posita inter sese : bonum autem esse
quod utriusque medium foret.' Ac-
cordingly, the neutral state between
pain and pleasure would have to be
regarded as good. Aristotle and
Eudemus reply that the point of con-
trariety between pain and pleasure is
that the one is <f>fUKr6v, and the other
alpfr6i>, therefore the one must be
considered an evil, the other a good.
240
IIOIKflN [EYAIIMIQN] VII.
[CHAP.
<rnxr). TJ 8s fysuxrtp TO evavriov f t QZVXTOV TS xou xaxo'v,
I if f \ t<\ \ t f, r ? t
ov. avayxr] ovv TTJV TJOOVT^V a.ya'jny TI eivai. w$
TrsiHriTTTTos eXusv, oil crvpfiaivsi y Atj<n, aurtftp TO
v rto iT^arrovi xai TO>
XaXOV TJ S?J/ai TVJV
}8oj/r;V Tiva sTt/ai, si ev*ai <aua< ifovai, teirvtp xa
TWO. svicov 4)auXcov oucrfov. *<rcog 3s xa/ a
evavriov ' ou -yap av
oLpltTTOV T' OU6
uXa< iSovai, teirvt
xotiov
<TTIV
srs
8:rp KOK(5'Tt] Cf. J5XA. vi. iv. 3, note.
We are probably to understand TIJ,
with the Paraphrast and Scholiast.
Speusippus would have said that plea-
sure is an evil. Cf. Eth. x. ii. 5.
2 &piffrov r' oiiStv iccoAt'ei] This
admission is directly contrary to the
conclusions of Aristotle (cf. Eth. x.
iii. 13). It is to be explained as an
after development of the system of
Aristotle, and an attempt to bring
different parts of that system into
harmony with each other. Aristotle
having used the same formula (tvtp-
7fa) to express both pleasure and
happiness, Eudemus from the force of
the terms identifies them. In this he
is quite justified, for it is impossible
to distinguish the highest kind of plea-
sure or joy from happiness, especially
if we consider peace (ivepytia rfjs
aKivrtntas) to be a mode of joy. It is
in accordance with the rest of the
Eudemian Ethics to speak in this way
of pleasure as being an essential ele-
ment in, and as inseparable from,
happiness. Cf. Eth. Eud. i. i. 6-7, i.
v. ii-i2 (quoted above), vni. iii. n,
&c. See Vol. I. Essay IV. 200.
The Vatican scholium on this pas-
sage speaks of it as being merely
dialectical (but this is from an un-
willingness to recognise the discre-
pancy between Books vn. and x). It
proceeds to attribute the present trea-
tise conjecturally to Eudemus. Am
fj.tv ovv Tovriav SoKt? rav-rbv curoQai-
Vfff6at Tayadbv ical r^v ySoirfiv ou /UT/J/
ovrtas ex l > oAAa irpbs ruiis Xtyovra.'i
ytmrn> fli/at f) (j>avhas nvas Ttav rjSuyiav,
&s Kal Si' ainb rb /tt}j tlvai aiiT^v rb aya-
0bi> ttrryiyvfrai HO! lirixfiptt eVSo'^wj is
fvbv avrfyv rb &PKJTOV \tyfiv, ^Trel tv yf
TO?S 'NtKOfj.axfiots tvQtv Siei\Krai Kal
irtpl riSovrjs 'AptffTorf\r]S tro^ais ffpqKfi/
ai>T7jv /JL^I ravrbv flvai TJJ fv$ai/j.oi>i<f,
a\\a, napa.KoXovdeiv SxJirtp ro7s a/f/uaioiy
T$)V 8>pa.v. aijfj.fiui' Sf TOV /JL^J eTi/at TOVT'
"ApurroTeAour aAA' EiiS^juou fb v i<$
.' (Book X.) \eyetv irepl rjSovris aiy
ovSfirai irtpl auTTjs BuiArypfrov. ir\^v
tire EvS-finov ravra. tffnv eJV' 'ApicrroTe-
Aouy, 4v56j-<as ffyijTat. Sia TOVTO \fyerat
rb &PIOTOV TjSovi) tin ffvv rf apiary Kal
axupurrov avrov. rainy 5' bpoXoyti Kal
TO fffis. This, which is a remarkably
favourable specimen of the Scholia,
may serve to show the wavering and
unprofitable character of these com-
mentaries.
&>'<nrep Kal &n<rr^/uiji'] This must not
be taken very strictly, since pleasure
and knowledge cannot both be the
chief good. Both however may be
considered as forms of the absolute
good. Cf. Eth. i. vii. 5. The article is
omitted at first with &pt<rroi>, but is
added below. Knowledge is good,
though some tilings it is better not to
know.
.
XIII.]
II9IKON .[EYAHMinN] 'VIL
241
civ jj avspTToburrog, alpsrcuraT^v etvai TOUTO 6' l<rr\v
73001/77. WCTTS ef>] av Tig rfiwr} TO a.pi(TTQVj TCOV TTOA/UOV
rjoovtov <>au/Uov ou<rtov, si eru^?v, a7r?uo. xai 8/a TOUTO
TOV s^ai^ovoc. Tj'Sut/ oi'oj/rai 3/ov e/i/a/, xat /
-yap evspysia.
73 su(ia.t[J.ovia rtov
6 sv^ai^cuv rwv sv
xa Ttbv exrog xou rr\g TOV>J$, 07ra> j
raura. oj os rov rcojast/ov xal rot/ u(rru^a< jtxs- 3
TrspiTriTTTOvra suSa/^ova tydarxovreg sivaj, av
o'^, ^ Ixo'vrr^ ^ axovrec ou^sv Xsyou<7/v. 8<a 2e TO 4-
7rpo(j-$si(r(ia.i rys Tv%r)$ SoxsT T/CT) TawTov
TYJ suOa/jaov/a, oux o5<ra, STTS* xai auTrj
/cal f(j.Tr\enovcri T)\V ySovfyv (Is T))V
fvSaifj.oi'iav, ev\6y<as] Cf. E^A. EWrf. I.
v. 1 1 (which passage is here referred
to): e-repat 5" ettrlv ^So^ai 81' &s ei/\6yias
ofovrai rbv evSa.ifJ.ova T)J/ ^Seais Kal ^r;
(J.&VOV aKvnias.
T(av tv erwjUOTi a-yafla'i' al Tajy ewrbs
Kal TTJS TUX^S] This is the principle
with regard to happiness which is laid
down in .BfA. ^i'c. i. viii. 15-17. It
was afterwards considered character-
istic of the Peripatetic School. Cf.
Cicero, De Fin. IL \i. 19: 'Aristoteles
virtutis usum cum vitse perfectse pros-
peritate conjnnxit.'
3 01 5e J*fyovtnv~\ 'But they who
allege that he who is being racked on
the wheel, or he that is plunged in
great calamities, is happy, provided he
be virtuous, talk nonsense, whether
intentionally or not.' Cf. Eth. Nic.
i. \. 6. The words eKtWes ovSfv
\fyov<riv answer to (i ^ Qtcriv Sto-
<f>v\d.TrJcv in that place. The paradox
alluded to was maintained by the
Cynics, and afterwards by the Stoics
(who denied that pain was an evil). Cf.
Cicero, Tusc. \. ix. 24 : Theophrastus
quum statuisset verbera, tormenta,
TOL. II. I
cruciatus, patrise eversiones, exsilia,
orbitates, magnam vim habere ad
male misereque vivendum, non est
ausus elate et ample loqui, quum
humiliter demisseque sentiret. Vex-
atur autem ab omnibus primum in "eo
libro quern scripeit de vita beata, in
quo multa disputat, quamobrem is,
qui torqueatur, qui crucietur, beatus
esse non possit : in eo etiam putatur
dicere in rotam beatam vitam non
escendere' (quoted by Fritzsche). Cf.
also Cicero, Paradoxa, ii.
4 Taiirbv eiva.i i) MTV^'IO] Cf. Eth.
End. i. i. 4 : if) Sjo fvyjiv ' "fo\\ol yap
Ta.\>T6v (pavus elvai rrjv fuficu/j.oi>iav Kal
r))v evrux' iav - This, together with the
present passage, is taken from Eth.
Nic. i. viii. 17.
A. more forcible expression of what is
said Eth. x. viii. 9 : ov yap evrfj inrep-
/3oA rj TO aSrapKts K. r. \.
Kal tff<as auTTjs] 'And perhaps
(when it is overweening), we should
no longer call it prosperity; for the
standard of prosperity consists in its
being conducive to happiness.' The
use of the term '6pos here is by itself
242
II9IKON [ETAHMION] VII.
[CHAP.
5 Trpog -yap
o' aVavTa xai 5r ; pi'a xai a.vQpa)7rou$ TVJV ij
TOU stva/ TTO> TO apKTTov auTT^v.
<fr///uT7 <T ov ri ye 7ra^t7ra' ctTroXXurai, ?'/'' ru'a Xaoi
TToXXot . . .
n
'/'
>J
ou sig r t op/art) OUT'
6 aXX ETrs ou^ 7j aur OUTS
?0~T/V OUTS dOXSi", OUO* TJ'Wvjl'
[JisvTOi Tra.vr=$. iVa>^ 8s xai ^KOXOIKTIV oyy ^v
ou8' ^v ai/ 4 5a '' l/ ) aXXa rr;v aitrr^' TTOLVTO. yap
s/j TI Qr?ov. aAX* six^ 0417 "' T ^y '
al (j-foaTixai rova\ 3<a TO
almost a conclusive sign that this is
the -writing of Eudemus. Cf. Eth. vi.
i. i, note; and Vol. I. Essay I. p. zz
5 Kol rb buaKtiv S' Oerof] ' In short
that all things pursue pleasure, both
beasts and men, is a proof that it is
in some sort the chief good,
" For mankind's universal voice can
not
Be wholly vain and false."
Since however there is no one nature
or state which is, or is thought to be,
the best for all, so neither do they all
pursue the same pleasure, but still
they all pursue pleasure. Nay, per-
haps unconsciously they are pursuing,
not what they think, or would declare,
but (in reality) the same ; for all things
have within them by nature a divine
instinct.' This is said, Eth. x. ii. r, to
have been the argument of Eudoxus:
$ero tlvai 5ia rb vivff dpav ^tefieva,
OUT?)? Kal f\\oya Kal &\oya. Ib. 4,
Aristotle justifies the argument against
objectors in much the same terms as
those adopted in the toxt.
%!> TIW \aol iroAAof] sc. 4>T)ju.tfown.
Ilesiod, Works and Days, v. 761. Cf.
FAh. x. ii. 4 : 8 )&/> itaffi SoKt"i, TOVT'
tlval <pa/j.v.
lews 8i Kol] Perhaps by a mys-
terious instinct all creatures, in seek-
ing life and joy, seek under different
manifestations one and the same prin-
ciple of good. Cf. the dream-images
in Goethe's Faust :
' Einige glimmen
Ueber die Hohen,
Andere schwimmen
Ueber die Seen,
Andere schweben
Alle zum Leben ;
Alle zur Ferae
Liebender Sterne,
Seliger Huld.'
Aristotle, Eth. x. ii. 4 (which is tin-
source of the above passage), does not
go so far as to make all creatures aim
at the same good, faces S Kal Iv rois
<tav\ois 4<rrt TI tyvffiitbv ayadbv Kpelr-
TOV t) Ka6" avrd, 8 e^Urou TOV oiiceiou
ay ado v.
a\\' fl\ij<pa.(Ti otovTcu. tlval] ' But
bodily pleasures have usurped the
possession of the name of pleasure,
from men's most often resorting to
them, and from all men partaking of
them ; hence because these are the
only pleasures they know of, they
think they are the only ones which
exist.' irapa^d.\\(iv appears to mean
' lay themselves alongside,' ' apply
themselves to.'
XIII. XIV.]
sg
[BYAHMIQN] VII.
xcu TTavrag {JLSTS^SLV aurcov
243
TO
ovv -yvcop[j.ov$ eivai raurag 1
oovrai elvai.
Se xotJi or/, el ]arj TJ^OVTJ aya^ov a< vj evepysia, 7
ovx. ecrrai TJV vjoeaj^ rov euoaijaova* TIVO$ yap svsxa Osoi
av aur^f, siVjp JUTJ aya^o'j/, aAXa xai Xy7rrjpto
TJV ; ours xaxov yap GOT' ayaQov ij AUTTT]
aurre 8/a r/ av c^suyoj ; oue S^ 7j^/a)v o /Si'ot; 6 TOU
el jar y xai at tvsfrystai avrov.
3= S^ TCOV CT'tO^XCtTiXCOV TJ^OI/COV STT/CrXSTTTSOV
or* eviou ys ii^ovai aipsTcti frc^oSpa, oiov al
7 Qavfpbv Se auroO] ' Finally it is
pliiin that unless pleasure and the
action of life are a good, the happy
man cannot live pleasurably. For
why should he need pleasure, if it be
not a good, and if it be possible for
him to live painfully ? (and it will be
possible), for pain will be neither evil
nor good, unless pleasure is ; so why
should he avoid it ? and hence it will
follow that the life of the good man
will not be more pleasurable than
that of the bad man, if his moments
of action are not more pleasurable.'
This is a reductio ad absurdum of the
position that pleasure is not a good.
We shall be reduced to think (i) that
the happy man may live devoid of
pleasure ; for nothing that is not good
can form part of happiness or even
he may live a life of pain, which is
the contrary of pleasure ; (a) that the.
good man will have no more pleasure
than the bad man, unless pleasure
attaches to good acts, in which case
it will be part of the good.
XIV. Hitherto Eudemus has fol-
lowed the lead of Aristotle, only in
one respect making a slight develop-
ment of his conclusions. He now
discusses a subject untouched by Ari-
stotle, but which he had proposed to
himself in his first book ; cf. Eth. Eud.
I. \. II : ir&Tepov, fl Set irpoffdirreiv T$
?iv KC.KO.S -tjSovds rivas, TO.VTO.S (i.e. r&s
<ro>yUcmKOs) 8el TrpoffairTeiv, rj rointav
fjifv &\\av riva. rpoiroi/ avay/oj KOivcavtlv
o\Aa irept fj.tv Tov-rcav vcntpov Vi-
(TKeirTtov. Assuming that there are
higher pleasures, and that pleasure
in the highest form is identical with
happiness and the chief good, what is
to be said of bodily pleasure ? is it an
evil or a good ? and why is it that
men indulge in it so much ? To this
twofold problem the answers are,
Bodily pleasure is in itself a good, as
being the contrary of pain ; but it is
only good under certain limits, as it
admits of excess, and the excess is
bad ( 2). There are various reasons
why bodily pleasure recommends itself
to human nature, (i) It expels the
sense of pain, and hence as an ano-
dyne is universally desired from a
physical law, for life is full of labour,
and the ordinary functions of the
senses are laborious acts, only miti-
gated by custom, 4, 5. (2) The
period of youth especially craves after-
physical pleasure. (3) There are
special cases where it is in a way
necessary, namely, where peculiarities
of temperament render- men constitu-
tionally depressed and in want of a
sort of relief, 4, 6. (4) From
the mixture of the material with the
2
244 IIGIKiiN [EYAlIMlftN] VII. [CHAP.
xaXa/, aAX' ot>^ ai o-)jU.aT/xai xai Trsp] a$ b axoXao"TOc,*.
J o/a TI o5v ai svavriai XuTrai fioydi^da/; xaxto yap aya6ot/
svavTiov. 13 OUTO>J dyaQai ai avayxaTai, OTI xai TO ^trj
xaxov
yap
SO~TIV ; Xp* To
0<T(t)V [AY] TTI TOU
<TO)V ft SCTT1, Xttl
3s o"a)jaar<xtov aya^tov scr-nt/ u
T(5 ^/ttixsjv rigv fartp&QKrjV so-nv, aXX* ou ra^ at/ayxa/a^'
yap yaloowrl rrtog xa< o\}/o/^ xa} oivoi$ xa) a<^po-
, aAX* ou^ ro^ 8=r. evavTitos 8* STTI T% Xtfan)^* ou
yap T-^V UTrsp^oX^v 4>suye/, aXX* ?Xa* ou yap SOTI T^[
.^ XUTTVJ svavria aAX* ^ ra> ftiwxovTt rr^v
3 'ETTSI 8' oy jtx.ot/ov SsT ra'X>j5sj elTrsTv aXXa xa< TO airtov
rou \|/su8ou^' TOUTO yap <ro/A$ ( ^A Ta ' Trpo^ rrji/
orav yap euXoyoj/ <^>av^ TO 8<a TI
owx v
spiritual in us, we are unable to con-
tinue perpetually delighting in one
pure pleasure, that is, the pleasure of
thoiight. God alone is capable of
this ; to us, through a fault in our
nature (oi> 70^ OITA.TJ ouS' ^TnttK^s),
change appears sweet, because lower
and contradictory elements in us re-
quire to be allowed their due action, 8.
i roif \67oi/(T(v] i.e. that section of
the Platonists referred to above, ch.
xi. 3 : ruts 8' efioi juiv elccu, eu Se
' But right bodily pleasures admit of ex-
cess, and the bad man (is bad) in that
he seeks that excess, instead of seeking
such pleasures as are necessary. All
men find delight in moat, and wine,
and love, though not all according to
the proper law. And reversely all
men avoid pain (tvavrluis 5' M TTJS
AtfjrT)?). -A- I ^ !in does not avoid the
excess of pain, but pain in general.
Pain is not contrary to the excess of
pleasure, except to him who pursues
the excess of pleasure.' This argu-
ment goes to prove that bodily pleasure
is in itself good ; only when in excess
is it evil. On the other hand all pain
is evil. Pleasure and pain then are
opposite terms, the one being good
and the other evil. To make the
doctrine of Speusippus (ch. xiii. i)
hold good, it would be necessary to
make pain and the excess of pleasure
opposite terms. But they are not so,
except perhaps in the mind of the in-
temperate man, who thinks that the
only alternative is between excessive
pleasure and a painful sensation.
3 This section is not logically con-
tinuous with what immediately pre-
cedes. It no longer deals with the
opinion of the Platonists that bodily
pleasure is an evil, but takes up
another question already partly anti-
cipated, ch. xiii. 6 : namely, How is
the vulgsir error to be accounted for,
which gives so much prominence to
physical pleasure in the scale of plea-
sures ?
XIV.]
H9IK&N [EYAHMKIN] VII.
245
ri fyaivovroti al o~a> ( aaTJxaj vjOovai alp
J(XV OUV 7) OTJ SXXpOUSJ TTjV AUTT/JV XOCi
ua-r t s larps/a, rrjv
xai o?\.aj r^
o-(opai 8s y/voi/rai cu iarpsta/, S/o xai 8/coxovraj,
Trapa TO svavriov <$>a.lv=a-Qou. xa} oy (TTrouOai'ov
TCt4
TO
/a QUO rara, wffTrsp sp^ra/, en a |,?i/
slcri Trpd^sis, rj ex ysvsrr]S, <jo<nrep Qrjpiov^ vj 81'
o/ov at rcov c^aJXajv avSpcoTrcov. c^t 8' tarpeTai, on
xara
xovrai
ro
out/
) sva/ UTTO rcov a
>- 5
4 TTpurov <ai'i'e<r0ai] ' The first
reason is that it drives out pain.
When overwhelmed with pain, as a
remedy men seek excessive pleasure,
and in short bodily pleasure. Now
remedies are naturally violent, and
they are adopted because they seem
to match (irapa) their opposites.' On
the opinion that remedies are the
opposites of the diseases to be cured,
cf. Eth. n. iii. 4.
Kal ou ffirov^cuov Srj <rrrou8arotj ' It
is on account of these two causes, then,
that pleasure is thought not to be a
good ; first, that some pleasures, as we
have said before (ch. v. i.), are the ac-
tions of a depraved nature,wh ether con-
genital, like that of a beast, or acquired,
like that of depraved men ; secondly,
that other pleasures are remedies, im-
plying imperfection, since a normal
condition (ex*'") is better than the
process of arriving at that condition,
and some pleasures take place while
we are arriving at a complete state of
being, hence they are only inferentially
and not directly (K<XT& (rv^jSe^r/Kbs)
good.' This paragraph reverts paren-
thetically to the opinion of the Pla-
tonists.
5 6 en SiiaKoyrai yivovrai] The
argument is now resumed from the
sentence ending epaivecrQai. 'Another
reason why physical pleasure is sought,
is its comparatively coarse and violent
character, which suits those who require
strong excitement. And indeed such
men even create in themselves certain
artificial thirsts for pleasure. If this
does not hurt their health, it is no
harm. Such men are incapable of en-
joying the purer and simpler pleasures,
and a neutral state of the sensations
is to many painful by a law of nature.
For the living creature ever travails,
as the physiological books testify,
telling us that the acts of seeing and
hearing are laborious, only that we
are accustomed to them (so they say).
So also the young, in the first place,
owing to the principle of growth in
them, are like those who are intoxi-
cated, and youth is pleasant in itself.
And again those of bilious nature are
ever in need of an anodyne. Their
body is continually fretted by reason
of their temperament, and they are
ever in vehement desire. Now pleasure,
be it the opposite of a given pain, or
be it what it may, provided it be strong
1I9IKON [EYAHMJON] VII.
[CHAP.
viov %aip:iv avroi youv avroig 8/\{/a nvag Trapacrxsuot.-
OTOLV [j.sv oZv a/3Aa|3s7c, avsTTiri^nr/Tov, orav 8s
<aD/\.oV OUTS yap %ou(riv srspa e<>' olg
TO TS jaTj^eYepoi/ 7roAAo7f AUTT^POV
as} yap TTOVS? TO w>ov, ajtTTrsp xa) of
TO opav xa TO axo<Js;v
6 opoicog 8' ev
I/SOTTJT/
QixsivTat xa
TVJV
as* Sf
a Tr y v au
rj vsoYvj.
w<T7rsf> o
01 8s asXa-
as* fevraJ arpsag' xa -yap TO o~to ( aa
s? 8ia T^V xpatriv, xai as] sv opi^si
a sl(riv. e^sXauvsz os ij^ov^ XUTTVJV TJ T' Ivavria xai
eav 19 'ur%vpa' xat 8a TauTa axo'XaorToi xa<
yivoi/Tai. at 8' aveu AUTTCOV ovx e%ov<riv vTrsp-
enough, drives out that pain. And
hence persons of the bilious tempera-
ment become intemperate and vicious.'
This passage gives two reasons to
explain why a neutral state of the
sensations is distasteful, first a general
reason : that the laborious action of
the human faculties calls for allevia-
tion ; second, a special reason : that
certain periods of life and certain tem-
peraments produce a craving after
physical indulgence.
8iJ,as nvds] Fritzsche, after the
Scholiast, understands this literally,
that some men make themselves
thirsty to enjoy the pleasure of
drinking. But the use of the plural
seems to indicate that we should
rather follow the Paraphrast, and the
majority of the commentators, in
understanding it generally of artificial
desires for pleasure, eVur/cei/oo-Tal
ftnOvn'icu, as the Paraphrast calls
them.
&lj.oius 5' tv fj.fv K.r. \.~] The best
commentary on this passage will be
found in Aristotle's Problems, bk. xxx.
ch. i., where a frequent comparison is
made between the effects of wine,
youth, and the melancholy (or bilious)
temperament, in producing desire. Cf.
5:6 yap divos 6 iro\vs fJLoKiara. </>at-
verai na.pa.aKfva.^tiv TOIOIITOVS o'lous
A^yofifv TOUS p.f\ayx^ tK0 ^ s f^vtu. 10:
KOI 6 olvos Se irfei>;uaTa>57js T-fyv Suj/etjujv.
8<& 8<j tffn rV tpvffiv &fj.ota 8 re divos
Ka\ rj Kpacris, K.T.\. Cf. Prob. IV. xxx. :
% Sri irvevfjiaTtaSeis, K.T.\. The Scho-
liast gives a vapid explanation of the
words #a7rp ol olv<afi.ivot in the passage
before us. Evidently, all that is
meant is to compare the de-nrcs of
youth with those of drunkenness, and
of the melancholy temperament. We
may compare the lines of Goethe :
' Trunken miissen wir alle sein ;
Jugend ist Trunkeuheit olme Wein.'
The principle of ai^r/ins in youth is
represented as producing the same
results as the humours (x^
s 77 TTJJ ^e
in the bilioxis temperament.
7 8 at 8' &vtv \uTTcait ^ITJ;IKTJS]
' The pleasures unpreceded by pain do
not admit of excess, they are essen-
tially and not accidentally pleasures.
XIV.]
II6IKQN [EYAIIMIQN] VII.
247
aurai os ai rcbv QVTSI rfisaw xai ( arj xara <TUJ,-
Xsya> o= xara (TUJ*pspl}Xd rjoi'a ra lar^suo
yap (rvpfiaivzi larpzvscrQai TOW UTTO[J.VOVTO$ u
' "> V ~ 5>\ 5. ~ l ? J. ' <N> f > / A
rjg TJ, Oia rouro TJOU oox=i stva/ <uo~s/ 6 7j6sa, a
Troiii TTpa^iv TY}S ToioVos c^oVscog 1 . oux as) S' oy5:i/ 75% 8
TO auTo OJa TO ( a>) cbrTaji/ ijucov eTvai TTJV c^Jcr<j/, a/\.X'
sviivai n noii srspav, xao cf>5ai5Ta, tocrTS aj/ T/ Qarspov
TOUTO TT STSp(X. $(/(TJ TTOiGO, QtUfTlV, OTOiV S' Jcra^,
00X5? OU^' T^'^U TO TT^aTTo'aSVOV 7T=i =}' TOU 7J
si'^, as) >] auTr) 7rpa^i$ Tjo/Wrj eo-Tai. 8<o o
as) j,/'av xai a7r?vrji/ jfottptt ^oovrjv ou yap
ivtoytia a/\.Xa xai axiv>50-/a^, xa
(TT}V r} Iv xivr t (rsi. ja=
/, xara TOV 7ro<r y T^v, Sia Trovypiav TWO.'
yap av$pc>7rot; super dfiohot; b 7rovr}po$, xai ij
9
OUTS
ot)j/ syxpaTSjaj xa axpacraj xa* /rsp
By the accidental pleasures, I mean
such as are of the nature of a remedy.
Because, when it happens that we are
relieved, owing to some operation of
that part in us which continues sound,
the result is a sensation of pleasure.
By the natural pleasures, I mean
those which produce the action of any
given nature. The same thing is
never continuously pleasant to us, be-
cause our nature is not simple, but
there is in us a second element, by
reason of which we are destructible.
Thus, when the one element is in
action, it thwarts the tendencies of
the second element. And when the
two elements are balanced, the result
appears neither painful, nor pleasant.
If there is any being whose nature is
simple, the same mode of action will
be continuously and in the highest
degree pleasurable to him. Hence
God enjoys everlastingly one pure
pleasure. For there is a function not
only of motion, but of rest ; and
pleasure consists rather in tranquillity
than in motion. " Change," as the
poet says, "is the sweetest of all
things," on account of a certain fault
in our nature. The bad man is fond
of change, and of the same cha-
racter is the nature which requires
change ; it is not simple or good.'
In the above passage we see a re-
production, and to some extent a
carrying out, of Aristotle's doctrines
in the tenth Book of the Ethics, cf.
especially ch. iv. 9 : ITws oSv ovSels
avvf^Sis {{Serai ; fj K<ifj.vfi ; iravra yap
ra av6pdaireia. aSware? erwexcSs tvtpyeiv.
On the comparison between the com-
pound nature of man and the purely
divine nature of God, cf. ch. vii. 8 : 6
8e TOIOVTOS tiv eft; jStos Kpf'iTTtav fj KO.T'
&v6ptaitov ov yap 77 &v0puit6s t<mi>
ovrca fZitafffTcu, a\\' y Qfl6v TI tv avrif
vtrdpxei '6<rcf 8e 5ia<f>epet rovro rov
ffvvQsTOv, TOTovrtf Koi % (fepyfia TTJS
/caret TV &\\TJV aper^c.
248
IIGIKiiN [EYAIIMmN] VII. [CHAP. XIV.
xa
eipvj
ra/
ra
xaxa*
xai
Os
ra
It is to be remarked that the
present Book, which commences with
a mention of Otia. fyfrfi, or the opera-
tion of reason unalloyed by passion,
ends with a mention of Oeia ^8o>^,
which is the consciousness of the
same.
\\onrbv ipo\>(ifv~\ See Vol. I. Essay
I. p. 32.
PLAN OF BOOKS VIII. IX.
A RISTOTLE'S treatise on Friendship, here contained, is quite
X-i- continuous. The division of it into two books is merely arti-
ficial. There is really no break between the end of Book VIII.
and the beginning of Book IX. The words irfpl juev ovv TOVTUV tirl
Toffovrov eipiiadw (VIII. xiv. 4), introduced to create a division, are
evidently from an Editor's and not from the Author's hand.
The use of the phrase iv cipxy (VIII. ix. 1, VIII. xiii. 1, IX. iii.
1), in reference to the earlier chapters of Book VIII., has led some
persons to suppose that this was originally an independent treatise.
But nothing is more clear than that it was written to form a part of
Aristotle's work on ethics. Besides general expressions of the
author's purpose to confine himself to an ethical point of view
(see VIII. i. 7, IX. ii. 2), we find direct quotations of, or references
to, the first books of the Nicomachean Ethics. (Compare IX. ix. 5
with Eth. Nic. I. vii. 14 ; and I. viii. 13, and IX. iv.. 2 r with Eth.
Nic. III. iv. 5,)
The present treatise has a close connection with the first three
books of the Nicomachean Ethics. But it is remarkable that it has
no connection with Books V., VI., VII. Friendship is here treated
in relation to Happiness and in relation to Justice. What is said of
Happiness forms the complement to Eth. Nic. Book I., but what is
said of Justice has no reference to Eth. Nic. Book V. ; rather it
appears written tentatively, perhaps before the Politics of Aristotle,
from which the theories of Eth. Nic. Book V. seem to have been
derived. (See VIIL vi. 6, VIII. vii. 2-3, VIII. ix., x., IX. i. 1-2.)
Again, it is equally striking that there is no reference to Book
VII. in the parts of this treatise where the phenomena of vice are
discussed (see IX. iv. 8-9, IX. viii. 6). Indeed the views taken
VOL. II. K K
OF BOOKS VIII IX.
here are inconsistent with those of Book VII., which contain a
more rigid analysis. (Compare IX. iv. 8 with VII. viii. 1.)
The style of these two Books is certainly unlike that of Books V.,
VI., VII., while it bears a close similarity with that of Eth. Nic. I.
and X. Not one of the ' Eudemian ' forms of expression is to be
found here.
The treatise on Friendship may be roughly divided into three
parts :
I. On the different kinds of Friendship, and on the nature of the
highest and truest type, VIII. i.-viii.
II. On the connection of Friendship with Justice, (1) as arising
(with certain exceptions, see c. xii.) out of political relationships, or
coinciding with them ; (2) as implying obligations to be repaid,
VIII. ix. IX. iii.
III. On other questions connected with the nature of Friend-
ship, and especially on its relation to Happiness, IX. iv.-xii.
Though the treatise is continuous, yet it is easy to see that the
writer's views became deeper and more definite as he advanced.
(Thus compare IX. vi. with VIII. i. 4 ; IX. x. with VIII. i. 5 ;
and VIII. vi. 2-3, VIII. viii. 7 with VIII. i. 6.)
At the same time we see what a powerful instrument was the
Aristotelian analysis for producing clearness of view. By an
analysis of the objects of liking (TO (f>iXT)r6f, VIII. ii. 1), Aristotle
clears away all the vagueness which the Lysis of Plato had left
around the nature of Friendship. By an application of his own
philosophical form ivipyua (IX. vii. 4-6, IX. ix. 5-6, IX. xii. 1),
he obtains a profound theory of the operation of the highest kind
of Friendship in relation to human happiness.
H0IKGN NIKOMAXEIliN VIII.
M
ETA 8s raura Trspl $rtJa$ STTOIT av 8<X5sTi/* <TTI
yap apery rig r^ [J.ST" apsrrjf, %ri 8' avayxajoYaroy
TOV 3/o v* avsu yap 0/?\.a)v ou8=i IAOJT^ av v]v, I'p/rov ra
aya$a Travra* xa) yap 7rAoyrou<ri xat aa xai
8ox=7
ocrto
rof>
yiyvzrai jU,a?uo'Ta xat sTraivsrajTarrj
Trtof av rrjpr^r/rj xai crco^otr' av=u
7r/\,=/a)i>, ro<rour<p STTKrtyahsG'Tspa. sv 7T=via rs
Aoj7ra7i; $va-TV%iaig [Mvyv oi'ovrai xara^uyrjv
xai vsoi^ 8s 7rpo TO avoL^aorr^rov xai
xa] TO e'h.hs'iTrov rr\s Trpa^scag
' sv
I. The discussion of Friendship is
justified here (analogously to the way
in which the discussion of the volun-
tary is justified, Eth. m. i. i-z) /rs^,
on the ground of its connection with
virtue, secondly, on the ground that it
is a means to happiness (a.vajKat6ra-
TOV) in all conditions of life. As a
commencement of the discussion, Ari-
stotle mentions the difficulties raised
on the subject in the Lysis of Plato :
Does friendship depend on similarity
or on contrast ? Can bad men be
friends to each other? and he adds
another : Is there only one species of
friendship, or are there more? Ari-
stotle by his own analysis of the like-
able (rb <f>t\rjr6v) immediately cuts
straight through these difficulties.
rty fj per' operas] "We have
of course nothing here to do with that
nameless excellence, mentioned Eth.
iv. vi. 4, which is said to resemble
<t>i\ia, and which in the Eudemian
Ethics, and the Magna Moralia, is
brought into the list of virtues, under
the name of <(>i\ia, as a mean between
Xfy>a and KO\a.Ktia.
ri yap o^eAoj <pi\ovs~\ 'For what
is the use of that sort of abundance,
if one is deprived of the power of
doing good, which is exercised most
especially, and in its most praise-
worthy form, towards friends ? '
2 ffvv re Sv' 4pxofj.tvia] The saying
of Diomede when about to penetrate
the Trojan camp, II. x. 224 :
KK 2
252
NIKOMAXEIQN VIII.
[CHAP.
3 xa yot.0 formal xai Trpdai uvaT COT spot. QIHTSI T svu-
Trocp^siv soixs 7rpn$ TO ysyswr^svov Tip ysvvrj(ravTi xai
TT&O$ TO yevvr^trav TO> yevvvj^svr/, ov [J.QVOV kv
a?\.Aa xai ev opvuri xai TOI$
ojuo0vi<n Trpog aAAvjAa, xai
TOV$ $>i"havQpa)7rou$ eTrouvovpev. ffioi ft av rig xai sv
a>$ olxiiov aTrag avfya)7ro$ avQpaiTTtn xai
xa) oi
soixe s xv
aaXXov ?rgp<
rj ya^; o/xovoia oao/o'v r*
C^xA/a s
soixsv eva<
lj.ah.uTT e
xa. TT^V crTo.(riv
,
oocrav
5 ( aaAo"ra
eva*
xa TWV
ov [J,QVW S' ava-yxaTo'v
r=
t SoxsT rtov xa?uov ei> TI sivai, xai svioi
oYovTai avopag ayaSoo^ sivai xai <^>/Xou^.
6 A<a ( a<>j<rj37jT=7Tai 3s Trs^i auTvjj oux oX/ya. o<
^rw T Sv" epxofJ.tv(a, Kai T irpb 6 roD
STrira-s KfpSos ty /lofj/os 8' thrtp T
j o^<rjj,
nAA.a re o/ Ppaffffuv re vdoj, AsrrTj 5f
T JttfjTIX.
Tlic words here quoto.d had become
proverbial. Of. Plato ^4/c*6. n. 140 A ;
Prof (iff. 348 c.
3 TO?S Oyuo60/'6tr] This word is ap-
plied here to brutes as well as men.
In the same sense i>^.ayfviffiv is used,
/ft A. #M?. VH. \. 3, and auTvevrj, Ar.
/?Af<. i. xi. 15.
t5oi 5' Si' TIS <p f\ov] ' And in tra-
velling too one may see how near and
dear every man is to man,' Le. one
may see this both as a matter of gene-
ral observation, and as oneself meet-
ing with kindness and hospitality.
4 Ka.1 ol rojuofle'Toi] Cf. the speech
of Lysias in Plato's Ph<e<lni8.
Kal ruiv fiKoiW 5o/c] 'And the
height of justice appears to be of the
nature of friendship.' Under the
words riav StKaiuv rJ> juaAiffra equity
(T?> tirifuces) appears to be meant. Cf.
Eth. v. x. 6-8.
5 a.\\a nai Ka\6v'\ This is repeating
in other words that friendship is dper^
m. The distinction betv. een a.vo.yK.diov
and KaXAv is common in Aristotle, and
the one term suggests the other. Cf.
Eth. ix. xi. i.
fj re iro\v<pi\ia So/ce?] ' To have
many friends is commonly thought to
be something noble.' This popular
opinion is considerably qualified on
further examination, cf. Eth. ix. x. 6.
nal fvioi <j> I'AOWS] ' And some think
that the term " good friend " is con-
vertible with that of "good man."'
Cf. a similar form of expression, Elk.
V. ii. 1 1 : oti yap tfftas Tavrbv avSpi T'
&.ya.6<? tlvat nal iro\lrri iravri.
6 5ia^i(7/877TtTTaj] The questions
mentioned here are raised in the Lysis
II6IKON NIKOMAXEIQN VIII.
253
yap o/AOJorryTa nva Ti
, cSci/ TOV Ojicojov <>a<nz/ cog TOV ^
xa
TTOT/ xo?\.o<<sV, xa* oVa roiaura* o
auriv
ava)T=ov
vavrag
IVOLI. xa Trspj
xa) 4>ucr;xror5poi/,
(is'i
icrav sav s
p
0'jpa.vov
=<ro^ ro avri^ouv (rvu.<$ipov xai sx
ota.&=pr,vT(ov xa?v?aVrr;v ap[j.oviav xat Travra xar'
lvz<rba.i ' s& Ivavriag 0= TOUTO/ a?v.7io; xs xai
' TO -yap o^jto;ov roy O/JLO/OU e^/;o"^a<. ra ^as
raiv aTropr^JLaraiv a$si(rQco (ou -yap oixsia
) oVa o' lorlv avQpwjrixa xai a
ra fj^rj xai ra Tra^vj, raur' sTrifrxs^fOjas^a, olov
pov sv Travi yiy'Tcx.1 ^iX/a ^ oyp/ oTov r=
oOv 7
of Plato, pp. 214-215. (214 A) Ae'yo
Se (flj TTOiJJTOt) 7TWS TBl/TO, O)S
atJ TOI rbv bfjiotov &yei debs cos rJi/ 6fjLotov
Kal iroie? yvcapt/jLov . . . UVK.OVV KCU
T0?y TeSf ao(pcara.T<i:v ffvyypdfj.fj.acriv
fvrervxriKas TO.VT' O.VTO. Xeyovfriv, Srt
T^I SfWLov T <S bjj.ol(f acay/crj del <t>i\ov
fli'ai : elffl Se TOV OUTOL ol irfpl tyvffftas
re Kal TOV n\ov Sia\ey6,u.evoi Kai ypd-
<f>ovTfs.a.\iiQii,e<p-n, \eyfis . . . (2150)
""HSTj irore TOU tfKovcra. \eyovros, nal
&pri waij.ifj.vfia'Ko/j.ai, OTI rb juej/ opoiov
Tip ofioitf /cal 01 ayaQol rols ayaOols
Tro\e/j.tcaTaroi flfv ' Kal 8 !; if at Tbv'H(rloSqi>
firriyfTO ^tdprvpa, \ty<av cLs &pa
Kal Kepafjitvs Kepa/Jif'i Ko-rtfi /cal
Kai raA\a 5r? irai/ra ovrws ftpri avay-
Kalov flvat fj.d\iffTa ra 6/j.oi6rara Trpbs
a <f>96vov re (cal (|)iXoi'6iKfos wal
4/j.it'nr\a(r6ai, TO. 8" dvoj
<t>i\ias ... TO 70^ sVaj'TJ
fvavTKardry flvat fj.d\icrra <p(Kov. tirtdu-
fj.e'iv yap TOV Totovrov eKaarov, aAA.' o'j
TOV ouoiov Tb fJ.( yap rjpbv vypov, rb
^ :
8e tyvxpbv Oepjj.ov, TO Se iriKpbv y\VKeos,
rb 8e 6ji> a,/jL^\fos, Tb 8e netbi/ ir\ii-
fdiffftas, Kal Tb irA/fjpes 8e Kei><io~e<as.
Which of the two views is true, is not
dcided in the Lysis, where however
it is laid down that friendship cannot
consist in pure contrariety.
al irepl avT(av <pvo-iK<aTpov~\ 'And
about these very questions some in-
quire in a more deep and philoso-
phical way,' i.e. not limiting their view
to the phenomena of friendship itself,
but bringing in the analogies of the
physical world. Aristotle sets aside
such speculations as not belonging to
ethics ; he remarks parenthetically
below (Eth. viii. viii. 7), that the con-
trary in nature does not desire its
extreme contrary, but the mean.
EuptirfSTjs] The verses occur in a
fragment of an uncertain play, which
is preserved by Athenseus, xin. p. 599.
TO dpTiJoui/ avft<i>4pov\ 'The opposing
conduces,' a play on words character-
istic of the oracular style of Hera-
clitus.
7 i) oi>x ol6v T fioxOripovs iWas]
This question is started in the Lysis,
254
H01KON NIKOMAXEIftN VIII.
[CHAP.
xa
TO
yap
). o< jasv yap sv oo ( asvoi, or/
xai TO ^JTTOJ/, ou^ jxava> 7r=7rurTsvxa.(ri
TO juaAXov xa) TO TJTTOV xai Ta eVspa TU>
8' UTrsp auTcuv /XTrpoo~6sv.
2 Ta^a 8* av yevoiro Trsp] avruiv $a.vspov yva)pi<r{lsvT(>$
TOU <>jA7jTou' 8oxs7 yap ou Tray ^iXturd^u aXXa TO c^iAyj-
TO'V, TOUTO ?' sTva/ ayaSov ^ 15% ^ yp^<r/jaov. oo'^si= 8' av
eJvat 8<' 06 yivsrai otyaQdv TI r) TJOOVJ^, a)<TTr
snj rayadoy TS xa/ TO TJ'OU coV TXij. TroVspov
<uAouo"it' ^ TO aiToT^ aya^o'v ; 8ia4>ttjv=r yap
TauTa. opoicog 6s xai 7r=pi TO TJOU. 8ox=7 2= TO
xao-To^, xa} sivat aTrAto^ p.=v rayty.-
8s TO sxa(TT). C^^XsT 8' sxa<rTO oi
a TO <$>a,ivo[j.=vov. 8tojVs* 8' oyOr'i/ *
0"Tai yap TO C^/XTJTOJ/ $>aivo[j.vov. rpiwv 8' OVTCOV 8/' a
aya^ov
p. 214 D: TOVTO roivvv a.lvlTrovTO.i, ais
/xoi 8o/coi/<rt!', cS eralpe, of T& '6/j.oiov Tif
(/uo/o! tyi\ov \fyoiTs, &>s 6 ayaObs Tip
ayaOtf fj.6vos fj.6v(p <pi\os, & 8 Ka/cbs oi^r'
y oS/re KOUC<J> ouSe'irore tts
ol fj.ev yap ev ol6fi.evot K. r. X.] ' For
they who think that there is only one
species of friendship, because it admits
of degrees, trust to an insufficient
proof. For things also that differ in
species admit of degrees. But we
have spoke.n about them before.' Ari-
stotle immediately proceeds to show
that there are three distinct species of
friendship, in accordance with the
three objects of liking. He also says
that the friendships for pleasure or
profit are less friendships than that
for the good (?irr6v tlaiv, viu. vi. 7).
All three kinds admit of the idea
(\6yos) of friendship, thus they are
comparable in point of degree. Cf.
Ar. Categ. viii. 36 : airAws 8^, &i> ^
Tou afjupdrtpa. rbv rou TrpoKtipevov
\6yov, ov ^7j0Tj<reTa< rb trtpov rov tr^pov
MA.Aof. As there is no place in the
Ethics where Aristotle has discussed
this logical question before, a Scholiast
says with regard to the last words of
the paragraph ; <-oiKf 8i flprjtrOai iv
Tciis lKireirruc6ffi T<OV tiiKOfia^tiuiv.
But most probably the words ttpijTai
8' inrep avriav are the interpolation of
a copyist, who was perhaps thinking
vaguely of Eth. n. viii. 5, to which the
commentators generally refer. These
words spoil the grammar of the sen-
tence, as irfpl avruv is used in the
next line with a different reference.
II. a Wrepoc -olv avrois a.-)a66v~\
Aristotle here guards himself against
the appearance of having admitted the
Platonic theory, that the absolute good
is always the object of human desire.
Cf. Eth. in. iv. i, and note.
(7Toi yb.p $aj.v6nevov~\ ' For in that
case the object of liking will be an
apparent and not an. absolute object.'
II III.]
IieiKiiN NIKOMAXEION VIII.
TCOV a\J/u0)
255
ou
exsvwv
dycttyov
yap io~a; rco oi'va) /3ouA=o"3a<
c .(rQoti /SouXsrai aurov, i'v
8e7i/ /3otjX?o-$a< Taya$a e
bs 8e |3ouXojM.VOU oOVco raya^a euvoy^ XfyoiMTli*, sav ^
rayro xa/ Trap' sxs/voy yiyvT}Tai ' svvoiotv yap sv avn-
sfsxa.
4
yap
8s STTisixiig eivxi r; ^ptj<r/jttdw^' rouro 8 Tairov xav exsivwv
rig TraQoi ?rpoc rourov. SUVQJ ^ev ouv ouroi Qalvwrai
^/Xowj 8s TTtof av Tic siVo< Xav5afoj/ra co^
savrois ; 8s? apa syvosTv aXArjXo/^ xai 3ou?y.s<75aj
/ji^ Aav^avovra^ 8t' s'v ri rtov slpyfjisvcov.
j 8s raura aXXrjXcov f/'^si * xat ai 4)/Xr;^-s/^ apa 3
vou<ra. ol s
oj
raya^a a
TO vprj(ri[j.ov <$>i-
, aAA* YJ yiyvsrai
8s xai oj 8t' r)8o-
roi)$
ou xa6' avrovg
TI avToig Trap" aXXrjAfov ayafio'v. o
vrjv* oy yap TO> Troiovg nvag slvai
, a?y.X' or/ rjos/if auroig. of TS 8^ 8ia TO
TO avT(ji$ aaQov o~Teoyo~/, xa) o *
vov ye
III. i Tavry ri <f>t\ovffiV^ ' Accord-
ing to the particular mode of their
friendship.' The differences of mode
are specified afterwards.
ov Ka9' avrovs <j>iKovffiv~\ 'Do not
love each other for their very selves.'
This phrase naff airrovs is rather a
logical formula than an ordinary
grammatical combination. It seems
to have arisen from naff avr6, 'the
absolute.' Cf. vm. iii. 7, and the use
of Si' aurovy, vm. iv. 6, ix. i. 7.
3 TJ; rwv atyvxwv] Suggested by the
Lysis of Plato, p. 212 D, where olvos
is mentioned as an object of liking :
ouS' &pa <f>i\iiriroi elcriv, ovs hv ol 'Imroi
av (j>t\6i<vv4s yf Kal <f>i\oi^oi K.T.\.
4. rj TOVTOJ'] ' Or must we add the
proviso that it be not unknown ? For
many are kindly disposed to men
whom they have never seen, but whom
they suppose to be good or useful, and
one of these latter might reciprocate
the same feeling.' TOVTOV, being sub-
stituted for the plural wuAAof, gives
definiteness. Cf. ix. i. 4: TOVTOIS
256 neiKiiN NIKOMAXEIilN VIII. [CHAP.
rfiv, xai oujs TJ o <>jXot^asvo' o~Tiv, dt
73 yOus. xard irt*jtt0j37)XO TS 8rj at Q/ihiai aura/
ou yap 73 (rT<f o(nrsp f<rr)v 6 <$<?\.o'j ( asi/o, raurTrj
' 73 ropi^owrw ol \^v dyaQov n ol 8' rjdovijv.
3 su8/aAuTo 8*3 ai ro/aurat slo*/, JU.TJ SjafigvoWfov auraiv 6-
|U,o/a>V savyap {JL^XSTI rfisig rj %pr}(n[j.ot uxri, Travovrai $i-
ra 8s ^pr^ip-ov ou Sia/xsj/sj, aAX' aAXors a/\.Ao
aTroXuSsvro^ ouv 8*' o <^tXo< vjcrav,
4 xa) ^' Qihtot, vug ouVrj^ T% c^/X/aj Trpoj Ixs^j/a.
8' ev roTi; 7ro?(r^orai4,' 73 Toiaurrj SoxsTc^iXi'a y/v=(r5a< (ou yap
TO 7381* ol Tr;XixouTo< 8i(oxouo"/v aAXa TO coc^sXijaov), xai TCOV
sv axja-^ xal j/sa>v oo~o< TO o"yjU,4>spov 8<axou<nv. ou Travu
8' oi TO<OUTO< ou8s o~u^too~t JOIST' a?vXTjX(ov sviors yap ouo'
^sovTOLi ryg ToiauTi}$ o ( a/Xia^, lav
TOO~OUTOV yap eio"<v 7)8 sl '
. ii$ Taurag 8= xai
r t 8s Ttov veVov $i"h.ia 8/' r'8ovr)v sTvai SoxsT* xara
7rdQo$ yap OWTOI to<nj xai jaaX<o"Ta (iKoxovirt TO v)8u avrdis
xa) TO Trapo'v TTJ Y)Xix/a^ 8s |,STa7ri7rTouo"rjj xai Ta Tj'osa
yivsrai srepa.. 8jo ra^lws yiyvwrai Qfaot xai Trauovrai*
yap Tto 7)8=7 T] <*X/a jasTaTr/TTTs/, T% 8s TOauTr^
Tav=7a 73' jU,STa|3oXrj. xal spcoTixo) 8' oi vso* * xara
yap xai 81' 73801/73^ TO TroXu TTJJ
xa) T0t.%ia)$ TravovTai, TroXXax/^
(rvvr)[j.pvsiv 8s xat Q-U^TJV oyTO/
Taj ' y/vsTa< yap aitTotg TO xaTa 4>/X/av OUTCOJ.
6 TeAe/ia 8' <rTiv T] T>V ayaOtos' Qi'hia xal
o/xo/cov ' OUTO/ yap T<iya5a b
o/' ayaQo) 8* elo"i x
TO? c^/Xo;j sxsivwv svsxa (JidhurTa c^/Xoi * 8*'
yap ouTcog s^oon, xai O'j xa.ro,
Kal oux ^ 5 <f jAau/xei'ds tffnv, a\\'
-os ^ ^Sus] The reading surely
should be ftr-rip, ' not by reason of the
existence of the person who is loved,
but by reason of his being useful or
pleasant.' The personal existence of
the friend is, according to Aristotle,
the chief blessing of friendship. Cf.
ix. ix. I o : 5); T< /ta/copfy T& eli/ai
alpirov tffri Kaff airro, ayaGbv rfj
<pi\ov arii>, ol 6 <j>l\os TUV alprruv
III.]
NIKOMAXEIQN VIII.
257
fiia.fj.ivsi o'jv TJ TOUTCOV Qihicx. swg av aya5oj UMTIV, rj 8'
apsTrj fj.ovip.oy. xai s<rnv exdrspog a Xto ayaQo$ xati
oi yap aya$o< xcti arrows ayaSoi xai aXX^Xo/j
8s xai rfiiig' xa< yap a7rAto oi
xaj
s<rw
al olxifai 7rpd>;si$ xa< at ro;ayra/, rtov aya^tov os ai
ct'jra) r] opoiai. >] rojaurij 8s <^>/X/a fj.ovifj.QS sttT^oycog 7
7ra<ra
yap
1' aya^o'v S
xa ra
si ra s
o/7ra, TO
o= Taura
uTYj yap o
xai TO
8= xai -
jtxaXto-ra xai ap/crTTj. (nra.via.<; 8' eixo^
slvai ' oXyoi yap 01 TO/OUTO/. ST/ Os TTGorro
xa< G-'Jvrftzictg' xara. rr,v 7rapoi ( a/av yap oyx O~T/V
6 e/catTTO) 7^p 5/tojoi] ' For to
every man his own actions and those
similar to them are pleasurable, and
the actions of the good are (to the
good) identical (with their own actions)
or similar.' The friend being after
ego, the delight of friendship is that
it gives an increased sense of ex-
istence.
7 ffwdirrei] Neuter, asin vni. iv. 5 :
ov irdvv 5' avrai avvair'Tovcnv.
Ttaffa. yap riva] ' For every friend-
ship is for good or for pleasure ; either
absolute, or else relative to him who
feels the friendship, and only bearing
a certain resemblance to the absolutely
good or pleasurable.' The comma
should surely be omitted after T^
(fuXowri. Aristotle is not here saying
(as the commentators fancy) that every
friendship implies similarity. But
that every friendship, whether the
genuine type or one of the secondary
and reflected species, aims at either
good or pleasure. This is made clear
by the next chapter, 4 : irp<iTwj p.tv
TOL. II. L
cal Kvpicas T}/V ruv ayaBiav 77 ayadoi,
TOS 8e Aoiiras Kaff o/ioi^TT/ro.
TOUTT; 7&/> o,uoio KOL ra A.ore, rrf T
air\us aya.8bv Kal r]5v airXws forty]
' For the other kinds of friendship
moreover are resemblances of this
(the perfect kind), and the absolutely
good is also absolutely pleasurable.'
This passage has vexed the commen-
tators. Zell thinks that Sfioia may be
referred to Kaff b\tailm\Ta. nva. in the
previous sentence (which he mistakes),
and explains, 'In this kind of friend-
ship there is similarity and all the
other requisite qualities.' But we
surely then should have expected T*
SfjLoia. Cardwell, following Giphanius,
Zwinger, and the Scholiast, reada
TOUTT? yap 8/10101 Kal TU Aoirra. ' In
this kind of friendship, men are simi-
lar, et coetera.' The common reading,
as above explained, seems borne out
by the opening of the next chapter,
i] 5e Sia rb r]Su ouoioiua ravrrjs KX*'-
Cf. vm. vi. 7. "O/noja here is in op-
position to TavTy Kaff avrovs.
L
258 HeiKClN NIKOMAXEION VIII. [CHAP.
otji8' aTToSs'^ao^aj 8vj TrpoVspov ou8' s7va
9 exarspog sxarspio $>a.v*) <$>i"h.yTo$ xa} Tno-Teo&j. oi 8s
ra <><?uxa 7rpo aAA?j?>.ou 7roiovvre$ $ouAot/Ta<
>''Xo' iTvai, oux sJo-} 8s, si JU,Y) xa} CA>JTO/, xa} TOUT'
o' ou. aOYrj jtxsv ouv xa xaTa TOV p^povov xa XTCC Ta
^ojTra TeXe/a e<TTi, xa< xaTa TravTa TauTa yivsrai xai
o/xoja IxaTSpw Trap' IxaTspoy, oTrsp SsT TO? <$>/Xo/^
^V
TT <JA ^. V \ 5>.\ / / V \\e
H 6s 6/a TO >j6y o/Aoicojaa TauT7j sp^s/ * xat yap 01
rjSsT^ aXX^Xo<^. o[j.oiwg 8s xai 75 8<a TO ppr/rij.oi> xa}
yap ToiouTOi aAX7^oi ol ayaQo/. jW.aXi<TTa Os xai sv TOU-
al <j?ua/ 8/a^tsvouo~<v, OTav TO auTo yiyvyTai Trap 1
oTov >j8ov>3, xc " /*^ j*oyov OVTCOS aXXa xa< aTro
Tot) auTou, oTov TO? euTpa^s'Xo<f, xa< jU.^ to^ spoKTry xa;
vio' ov yap STTI TO?^ auTo7<; TjSovTai OUTOJ, aXX* o ju,=v
sxsTvov, 6 8s Qspa7Tvo[j.svo$ WTTO Tou spao~ToG ' Xij-
8s T% ropat; SVJOTS xa< vj <>/X/a Xr^ys; * T) jU.si' yap
73 o\J/<, TO) 8' ou y/vsTai rj 5spa7rs/a. ?roX-
T% (rvvyQsiat; Ta 7j5>) <TTSO-
of 8s ju,^ TO >j8y avT<xaTaXXaT-
TO ^p-^cri[j.ov svToTj spcorixoT^ xa< slo~/v TJTTOV
xai 8*a]U.s'vouo~iv. o< 8s 8<a TO %pr<ri[j.ov ovrsg c^j'
ou yap
; 8' aS 8jaAEi/ouo~jj/ lav sx T (rvvQsiat Ta
TO
xai s'Tneixs/V c^auXoi^ xa* jU,r;8Tspov OTTOJOJOUV, 8*'
8 rows \eyofj.(vovs fiAas] ' The salt
of the proverb,' cf. JE^A. "?. vii. ii.
35: 5ib s irapoifilav fafavOtv 6 /ue5i/x-
i/os Ttiv aXwr. Cicero, Lalius, ch. xix. :
Verumque illud est quod dicitur, multos
modi os salis simul edendos esse, ut
amicitise munua expletum sit.
oii5' arro5e'|a(T0aj 8^ <^L\ous] ' Nor
indeed can they be satisfied that they
are friends at all.' Cf. vm. v. 3:0?
8' O7ro8e'x"^i'oi aAA^Aowy. ix. iii. 3 :
5" oiroSex?7Tot ois o'ya0<Jj'. Xen.
Mem. IT. i. i : aTroSe'xeerflai 2w/tpoT7j'.
9 ct ^ fcra(n/] 'Unless they are
likeable (by one another), and are
assured of this.'
IV. a coJ ej(rlj' ^TTOV Sia/xeVouo'ij']
' Are both friends in a less degree
and are (less) abiding.'
Kal /uijSeTfpop <5iroiyow>] 'And he who
is neither good nor bad may be a friend
Ill IV.] HOIKflN NIKOMAXEIQN VIII.
259
or/
ou ol yap xaxo ou %aipov<riv
y/yvo/To. xa)
os T] rtov 3
CLUTtOV
TTSp TOU V
xai TO TT/o-reusiv Iv TO ( JTO<, xai TO prfisT; or* oiv
sv
srs
paig
y/v=o"5aj.
S yap
o
Ta
xa TOU^ /a TO p/pV 4
at TTo'Xs/^ (SoxoufT/ yap ai (rv[Jt,[j.a%iai
s'vsxa TOU o"yacovTO^, xai '
s xa
7rAs*a), xaj Trpatrcug pJkv xai xup/a> Tr^v TO>V aya^toi/ ^
aya^o/, Ta^ 3s honras xa6' o^o/oVrjTa >j yap ayaQo'v T<
xai OM.OIOV, TaoTY] 4//Xoi xai yap TO vjOu aya6ov TOU;
?ravu S' aurai o~vva.7rTQu<riv, ou^ y/vovTa/ 5
6int TO vprjcr/jOtov xa/ Sia TO 7306 ' oi yap
'j[j.$@>r)xa$. slg Taurot. $s
r l $ ol JLSV 4)auXo/ iVovTa* 6
of auToi
either to the good or to the bad, or
to him who is neither one nor the
other.' For the word juTjSe'repos to
express a neutral or intermediate
state, cf. .EtfA. vn. xiv. 5 : rb litfif-rtpov,
' that which is neither pleasure, nor
pain.'
3 /coi /uJnj Se 7iVe<r0aj] ' And in
short the friendship of the good is
alone incapable of being disturbed by
accusations. For it is not easy (for
the good) to believe any person about
a man whom they have long proved.
And the sayings about "having faith,"
and that (the friend) "never could
wrong one," and all the other points
which are demanded in ideal friend-
ship, are realised in the friendship of
the good. But in the other kinds
nothing prevents disturbances from
accusations (ra roiavra) arising.' AJ-
/3d\\(iv is ' to set two people by the
ears.' Cf. Plato, Pepub. p. 498 c :
L I.
$i\ovs yeyoi/6ras.
4 77 7&p 0,70.661' ri Kal Sfj-oiov, ravry
tf>i\oi] ' For so far as (these kinds of
friendship exhibit) something good and
resembling the good, so far (those who
exercise them) are friends.' The com-
mentators are again deceived by the
word Sfjioiov, taking it to mean ' simi-
larity of character.' See above ch. iii.
7, note.
5 ov ira.vv <ruju/36j3r/K<Js] ' But the
above-mentioned kinds of friendship
do not always coincide. Nor do the
same men become friends for the sake
of the useful, as for the sake of the
pleasant. For thi ngs only accidentally
connected are not always found to-
gether.' On (TU|uj8ej3TjK<k, cf. Ar. Met.
IV. XXX. I : (Tii/i#e/8r)/cbs \tyerai &
virdpxet ueV rivi na.1 ct\ij0 tlwftv, ov
fj.fvroi oij ' ej avd.yKr)s otfr' (irl rb iroAu,
See also b e low, 6.
2
260
HeiKilN NIKOMAXEIflN VIII.
[CHAP.
15 TO ppryo-<juoj/, rauTy) opoioi CVT*$, o
8' ayaQol 81* airouj cfc/Xoi v) yap ayaSo/. OUTOJ JU.EV o5v
8s xaTa <ruu,/3s/37xo xa} TU> wj.oi-
5 "QfTTrep 8' 7ri Ttov apSTwv ol fj.lv xa5'
fvspys/av ayaSo* Xeyovra/, oura) xai ITT;
yap (rv%a)VT$ ^ottpQiKTiv aXX^Xo/^ xa<
ol 8e
01 = xar
oi txsv
ouro) pouo"iv ajrr svspyiv
u 8aXuou(T< r^v tyfaictv an-Xtoj, aXXa
2011 QoLivovToti 8' oud' ol 7rpS(r3tJra< ou5' 01
u -yap ev
v rat
T< TO
TO
ou8s TO>
oux e
01 yap TOTTOI
svspysiav. eav
SoxeT
8s
o
l 8'
yap r
8e TOU
S$ 8e,
yap
cog TO
v yap
o
psusiv 8e xa) ol /u,axap<oi * j,ova)Tai jas
8s JU.ST'
opsyovrai,
yap sTvai
8oxs? gys/v.
4 Ma7.io~Ta
ayafiov
ouv eo"T<
8oxs? yap
8u !xao~Tto
13 TCOV ayaQaiv,
]ttsv xai aipsTov TO
8s TO auTaJ TOiouTOV o 8'
6 ravrri 1'ifj.oioi orrts] 'In this re-
spect (i.e. as affording and seeking
pleasure or utility) being like (the
good).'
V. I ol St KaQfvSovTfs ivtpyfiav]
' But those who are asleep, or who are
separated by the intervals of space, do
not exercise friendship, though they
have all the disposition to exercise it.
For the intervals of space do not de-
stroy friendship, but only its exercise.'
This is of course a most inadequate
translation of tufpyt'tv and
These words must be understood by a
study of Aristotle's forms of thought.
See Vol. I. Essay IV. On the tvepyeia
of friendship, cf. Eth. rx. ix.
3 ol airoSfx^p-fvoi oAA^Xous] ' They
who are satisfied with one another.'
Cf. above, vm. iii. 3.
Zirep fi traipiK^i SoKe? tx*"*] ' And
this (i.e. pleasure and sympathy)
seems the property/of companionship.'
4. 6 8' oTfaObs T<f ayaBcp 5j* &ft<f><a
ravrtt] ' Now thr good man (is a
8'
261
IV. VI.] II0IK&N NIKOMAXEmN VIII.
ayaQo ra> aya5a> 8*'
13 8s $>i"h.ia s^si ' 73
TO. a\J/up
TJ' 8e 7rpoa/po-i
Qi'hovfj.evoig sxsivwv svexa, ou xara
yjj/crai
', xai TO
TO> TJ/isif* XsysTai yap
(TTpv<$>vo7s xai 7rpso~3uT/xoTf rjTTdv yivETou 73
oo~co 8uo~xoAa>Tpo/ slo~i xa/ TJTTOV Ta?j 0|Ui?ua/ yai
TauTa yap 8oxs? jaaTuc'T' ej'va* <^<Aixa xai TroiTjT/xa
8<o Vs'oi jU,=v y/vovTai c^/Xoi Tap^u, Trpscr^uTa/ 8' ou* ou yap
av w.ri ya/pcoa~<v * bino'icuc 8' ou8' ot
o yap
Ixars-
lv 8s 6
friend) to the good man for the sake
of both these things,' (i. e. the
absolutely good and the absolutely
pleasant).
5 ?ote 8" e'lewj] 'Loving is like
an emotion, but friendship like a
settled disposition of the mind. For
loving exists just as well towards
inanimate objects ; but when men
reciprocate friendship it implies pur-
pose, and purpose proceeds from a
settled disposition of the mind.' In
Eth. rv. vi. 5 (cf. ii. v. z), Aristotle
makes friendship to be an emotion, or
characterized by emotion. The present
passage does not in the least contradict
this, as '|<s, or a settled disposition of
mind, is merely the result of regulated
emotions, and the tendency to repro-
duce them.
77 8e irpoaipecris, K. r.A..] In Eth. ni.
ii. I , Aristotle speaks of ' purpose ' as
the test of character; ib. u, as
constituting character ; ib. z, as not
acting suddenly ; ib. 17, as implying
reason and forethought.
fKdrfpos ^5e?] ' Each of the two
then loves that which is a personal
good to himself, and he makes an
equal return both in wishing good
and in (actual) pleasure/ Zell, fol-
lowing two MSS., reads etdfi. But
Bekker's reading (rjSe'i) appears pre-
ferable : ( i ) because iaov ftSei would
not be a natural expression ; it con-
founds degree with kind ; we should
expect ravrbv Y5et : (2) because ^5e?
gives very good sense, since it is
one thing to reciprocate the motives
or feelings of friendship, and another
to give your friend the same amount of
pleasure as he gives you.
\eyercu Iff6rr\s\ ' For equality is
said to constitute friendship.' A
Pythagorean saying, connecting moral
ideas with the ideas of number. Cf.
Diog. Laert. vm. i. 8 : tTire' re irpuros
Tifiaios) KOLva T& (f>l\ii>i> flvaf
VI. i This section is an awkward
repetition of what has been said
before, ch. v. 2. This, however,
merely shows that we have probably
the unconnected draft of Aristotle's
treatise on Friendship.
2C2
HOIKQN NIKOMAXEIQN VIII.
[CHAP.
o TOJOUTOJ eui/oi
Taj yap rayafya. xou a
v e<rtv
el$ rag
TO
<>/Xoj 3' ou
a
eoixs yap
oux evt>s%Tai, <x><nr=p ou spav
TO TOJOUTO 8= 7rpo si/a 7rl$vxe
TW auT<p apsVxsii/ o-^)&opa o-j
aya7ou^ sivai. S=r os xa) ifMreipiont
xai sv trwrrfituf ysvsaQou, o 7rofy%a\s7rov. 8/a TO
.ov Ss xai TO rJSu ToXXoT^ ap(rxeiv svos^srai ' TroXXo)
4 yap oi TOIOUTO<, xa< ev ohtyio %povtp al U7nr)p;<ria.i. TOVTCOV
soixs 4><A/a 13 Sia TO rJSu, OTV TauTa i:r' a/x-
xa) youfanrw aXXr;Xo/^ rj TO?^ auTo?^, olaj
Ttov vstov eJcriv ai ^iX/ai* jtx,a?vXov ^ap ev TauTai^ TO sAsu-
Qspiov. ij Ss 8<a TO %pr t (ri[j.(iV ayopaiwv. xou ol p.axa-
pioi = %prjff[Jia)v
yap (3ouXoVT
<ruve%a>$ 8'
osv
TO
av UTro/x.n/,
auTo TO aya-
' 2 iro\\o?s elvot] ' It is not possible
to be a friend to many men on the
footing of the perfect kind of friend-
ship, just as one cannot be in love
with many at the same time. For
(the perfect friendship) is a sort of
excess of feeling, which naturally
arises towards one person alone;
again, it is not easy for many persons
to be intensely pleasing to the same
individual, and perhaps not easy that
many should be good.' inrfpflo^ here
would be nearly represented by the
French word abandon ; it implies
the throwing away of limits and
restraints, a giving up of one's whole
self. Cf. ix. iv. 6 : y inrfpfto\^ TTJS
tpi\tas rfj irpbj aurbf 6/idtoDrat. Of
course there is an association of
Aristotelian ideas (/tetrdrrjy, liAAenJy,
&c.) in the term. It is repeated Eth.
ix. x. 5, where the question of the
plurality of friendships is carefully
gone into.
3 wo\\ois apiffKfiv ^v5f'xTOj] We
should have expected vo\\oi>s rjfuv
apecTKfiv, on the analogy of the last
sentence, iro\\ovs r<p avr$ apfffKeiv,
but the writing seems careless and
the expression is inverted.
ol TotoDroi] i.e. the useful and the
pleasant. Cf. 6, where rowvrot again
takes its sense from the context.
4. ayopatuv] 'Of mercenary persons."
Cf. Ar. Pol. rv. iv. 10 : \tyca 5* a-yopeuW
(jrArjflos) rb irep\ ray irpdfffis Kal ras
uvas /col T&S fyiropias Kal Kain)\(ia.s
Siarpl^ov. Ib. vi. iv. 12: 6 yap filos
<pav\os, Kal ovdtv fpyov JXCT' aperrji &v
fi.*Ta.\fipieTai Tb ir\fi9os r6 re TCOV
f$ai/avff(ai> Kal rl> Ttav ayopaicav avOptawwv
Kol rb 6i)TiK.6v.
Xp^ffip-'t'v fjifv ovSfv Sfomcu] i.e.
Happiness by its definition implies a
sufficiency of external means, Eth. i.
viii. 15.
ou5' aurb rb 0706^1', ft \ujnjpbv]
This sentence is trap' \nr6voiav, in other
VL]
6> >
OV, Si
OUTttl
H0IKON NIKOMAXEUIN VIII.
263
yap
ovra,
auroj oa s ro?
of 8' si/ 5
yap auro? siV; %pya'i[j.oi xai 1 srtpot >j8e*, a{JL<$>cu 8'
of auroi ou Travu' ours yap TjSsT^ JW.ST' apsrrig ty\TW(riv OUTS
%pr t (ri[Jt.ov$ el$ ra xaAa, aXXa roy jU,5V eurpaTreXou^ TOU
ijoso^ s^i/e.asvoi, rou^ Ss Ssivou^ Trpa^at ro sTrira^sv ' raura
8' ou ?ravu y/vsrat si/ TO> aurar ^'^uj 8s xa) yp750~i^ao^
cfyxa s'/prjrai oTl o 0"7rou8a7o' aXX' V7repe%6vri Qvyivsrai o
Tojouro ^/Ao^, av ju,^ xai TV) apery uiFtpifflTCtt ' si 8s
oux l(ra.%si avaXoyot/ uTrsps^o'jasvo^. ou ?ravu 8' slco
* 8'
ouv a
yyvsraf
xo
sv KTOT^TJ * ra yap aura 7
x srspov
words, a joke. It is a contradiction in
terms to speak of the Absolute Good
as painful. Cf. Ar. .ff^e. i. vi. 2 :
"Ecrra) 8); di'yafi&j/ f> &P avr5 lauroC eVe/ca
?| alpfr6i', Kal ov eVe/ca SA\o alpov/j.f6a,
KOI ou eipierai irdvra $1 irai/ra ra aJftr-
6r](Tiv t-^ovra r) vovv, 77 et Aa/3ot j/oui/
ifal ou ira,p6vros eS Sia/ceirat /cal avrdp-
KUS ex *> K - T - ^ l
Set 5' ifercos a&T(s] ' And perhaps
(in seeking friends) one ought (to
require) that even good men should
have this qualification (i.e. pleasant-
ness), and moreover not in a merely
universal way, but relatively to one-
self.'
5 of 8* fv TCUS <pi\.ois] ' Great
potentates ' (cf. Eth. i. v. 3) ' however
seem to make use of their friends
separately ; ' i. e. they keep two sets of
friends, one for profit or business, and
another for pleasure.
6 ySvs 8e yivfffBat] ' Now we
have already said that the good man
is both pleasant and useful at once.
But svich a man does not become a
friend to his superior (in rank), unless
lie bo surpassed (by that superior) in
virtue also. Else, he does not find
himself in that position of equality
which is produced by superiority in
proportion to merit. Such persons,
however (as potentates who surpass
the good in virtue), are not produced
every day.' The commentators have
strangely interpreted this passage,
making wrepex^rot take for its nomi-
native 6 inrepexcav, as though Aristotle
had said that a good man would not
be a friend to a potentate, if that
potentate had superior moral qualities ;
and as though ' equality ' were
produced by one man having
all the merit and another all the
power. On the contrary, Aristotle
would have said that 'proportionate
equality' is produced, according to
the principles of distributive justice, by
each man having in proportion to his
merits, cf. Eth. v. iii. 6, Pol. in. ix. 15.
There is no sense of inequality pro-
duced by the position of a man socially
exalted in intellect and character ;
inequality is felt when a fool or a villain
occupies a high social position. "laa^ej
is doubtless intransitive, and avd\oyoi/
264
NIKOMAXEION VIII.
[CHAP.
dvP sripov aVTixot.Ta.'h.ha.TTovTOii, oJov vj'Sovrjv OLVT ft>
on 8' rJTTOV iuriv aurai al (filial xa* ju.svouo~jj/,
8oxouo~i 8s xal 8t' ojCtoioVijTa xa< avo ( ao/or^
TS xa< oux sTvaj $*XMU* xa6' OjU-OiorijTa yap
apsTTJi/ Qawovrai <>j?u'aj (TJ JOLSV -yap TO 15
auTa 8* U7rdp%=t xaxe/vy;), TO> 8
xaJ jOto'yjjaov eTvat, mdrag 8s Ta.%ea)$ ju,=ra7r/7TTs<v
TS 8/a<$>sps<v TroXXo?^, ou C^a/t/ovTai tyihicti 8i' avo-
xaT
s TO
7
TO
oov
$ioti$>epov(ri 8' auT< xa)
Texva xa/
eo~Ti
uov xcu oXcoj 7rpso~|3uTSpa) rrpog
TTOLVTI a.p
X^Xoiv ' ou yap 13 aT yovsuo"<
app^ouo"! Trpo^ app^o/xsvou^, aX?\.' ouSs
7r
po$
xa< ta)
o^ Trarspa, ou
xa} yuva/xi 7rpo avSpa. eTepa yap lxao"Ta>
xai TO epyov, eVepa 8s xa) 8' a
2 srspai ouv xa at 4)iAo-ei^ xa a< <><Xai. TauTa
8^ OUTS y<y vsTa* sxaTSpa) Trapa Qarepov ours 8sT
orav 8s yovsuo~i ]a=v rexvot d7rovsp.fi a 8sT TO?^ yevi/rjo"ao~i,
yoviig 8s uisVtv a 8sT ToTf TSXVOI^, p.ovt[j.og y TWV
8'
olov TOV dfjisvo) ]U,aX?y.ov
xa/ Ttov
xa TV X><r<v s
xa) TOV
xao~Tov oju,oa)j oTav yap
y/yvrjTa, TO'TS ytyvsTa/ 7ra>f
sTva* Soxs?.
8s TO
7rpa>Ta) TO
* a^/av, TO 8s
xaTa 7roo~ov
sv TS
yap
8ixa/o/ xai sv
TTOO~OV
TO 8s
sv 8e
* a^/av8su-
adverbial. For this intransitive use
of iVa^w, cf. xiii. i : !<rabTj ra?y
Cf. vin. iii. 4-3
VII. 2 ArrfAo^oj' 8"] The same
principle of distributive justice, main-
tained above in 6 of the last chapter,
is again appealed to. Where friends
are not equal, their friendship must be
regulated by proportion.
3 ovx fyoltas SewT/pws] ' But
equality seems to stand differently in
justice and in friendship. In justice,
VII.]
H6IKQN NIKOMAXEIQN VIII.
265
. orfXoy o', sav TroXu Ojao-rr^ua yiyvr t rai a^STr^ 73
r] z-jTroziag r t rwo$ aXXow o-j ya.z STI i?oi slcriy,
out aioOcriv. a^avsVraTOv 6= TOUT' STT} TOJJ/ 6=a>v '
ap O'J
xou ST* Ttov /3a<7<As'a>j/ ' GU'OS yap ro-jroig u^iovo-iv sTvai
&favi ol TToXv xaraO=sVrso<, o f J6= ToT aj<rrot r) (ro^co-
TOt.TOl$
HCTTiV
oov
01
rtov aya^tov, olov 5=ouj
oyos 3rj aya-5a * oi
or/ o
o
si ofy
sxs/vov svsxa, Itsyffltf av 6sot o;o TTOT' s<rr)v sx;
= oyr; ouX<r=ra; ra
ou vavra ' a'jra) yap [Jta&urff
proportionate equality is primary, and
quantitative equality secondary; in
friendship, quantitative equality is the
first, and proportionate equality the
second consideration.' Distributive
justice begins by presupposing in-
equalities between man and man, and
by proportionate assignments it equal-
izes these. Justice, however, cares
little about bringing men to quantita-
tive or exact equality. The latter j
kind of equality at all events is aimed
at only in democracies, while the pro-
portionate equality belongs to aristo-
cracies and constitutional governments,
cf. Ar. Pol. vi. ii. 2. Friendship on
the other hand begins by presupposing
equality between the parties, and
though a certain amount of inequality
may be made up by proportionate
assignment of affection, &c., yet a
wide interval of inequality will render
friendship altogether impossible.
4 -rKfTitnov yap ovroi] The reading
trbtiffTuv in the Oxford reprint of
Bekker's edition (1837) is a misprint.
VOL. II. M M
The original Berlin edition has
ir\fi(rrov.
5 aKptfirts OVKCTI] ' In such cases
there is no exact definition up to what
point friendship is possible; for though
many (advantages) be taken away
(from the one side), friendship still
abides ; but when (the one friend) is
far removed from the other, as, for
instance, God is from man, there is
no friendship any longer.'
6 %9tv *al To-yafla] ' From this
the question has arisen whether friends
wish for their friends the greatest of
all goods, as for instance to be gods.
For having attained this, they would
no longer at all be friends to those
who formed the wish, and therefore
no advantage to them, for friends
are an advantage. If then it has
been rightly stated that the friend
wishes all that is good to his friend
for that friend's sake, it will Le
necessary for that friend to remain as
he is, and then he will wish for him,
being a man, the greatest goods.
260
8 O*
HGIKftN NIKOMAXEION VIII.
[CHAP.
= o
-yap <$>faot; o xoAa, TJ 7rpo<r7ro<jTa<
xai
TO s (
2 OoxsT TOU TJjU.ao'Qa/, ou 8rj o; TroAAo} $>ISVTOU. o-J oY airo
8' o/xa<r<v ajptV$a TTJV ri\t.r\v^ aAAa xara
ya/pouo"/ yap ol [J.ev TroXXoi UTTO Ttov sv
ri[j.a)fj.svoi 8*a rfyv gA7r/8a olovrai yap Tus<raj Trap
aurtov, av TOU Ss'toi/raj a>^ 8^ (TTj^xe/to TJ suTads/ot^ p^ct''-
' TCOV 7r/e/xtoi/ xa/ sJSorajv op=-
olxsiav '
' yctipoutri 6?j orj etriv ayaSoj,
p/(T<. TO) <$>iX7cr6af 81 xa6' airo
av xp<TTOv fiTvai roy Ti/xa<r6a, xa
aiprrj eTva;. SoxsT 8' Iv TO>
ra> <^<X?(rQa i'va/. (rr^siov 8' ai ^rsps^ TCO
xa/
eav
xav
T
vtaj yap S/Soacri ra lauraiv Tpsfys
xavov
v opaxr/v s 7rpaTTOi/Ta, xa airai <
eotxzv
After all, perhaps he will not wish
him to have everything. For every one
especially wishes for himself what is
good.' Under the words airopfirai /j.^
vor' ov is included a question both as
to fact and cause. OvSe 7^ denies
the fact and states the cause, which is
that if we wished our friend to become
a god, we should wish him to be in a
position where he can no longer be
our friend. The last sentence (ns
8' ov iraj/ra) qualifies the previous
statement, and guards against the
notion that any human friendship can
be utterly disinterested and selfless.
The same topic is fully discussed in
the eighth chapter of Book IX.
VIII. i 2 Though the essence of
friendship consists rather in loving
than in being loved, the mass of men
prefer the latter, as ministering to
their vanity. Being loved is akin to
being honoured. Parenthetically it
may be observed, that honour is sought
not for itself but on account of things
variously associated with it (Kara o-u/u-
e0r)K<{s). (i) To be honoured by
the great affords a hope of promotion.
(2) To be honoured by the wise and
good is an evidence to men of their
own merits. Thus honour is desired
as a means to the consciousness of
virtue. Cf. Eth. i. v. 5 : to'iKaffi TT^V
TI^IJV SiuKfif Iva iriffTtvuaiv tavrovs
ayaJSovs flvcu rfrovfft yovv inrb TUIV
<f>pov'in<av TifjLaaQa.i, KO! trap' dts yiyvu-
ffKOVTCU, KO.I fir' OpeTTJ.
3 The active spirit of love, as
opposed to the passive gratification of
being loved, is exemplified by the
case of mothers, who give their children
VIII.]
II0IKUN NIKOMAXEItiN VIII.
267
<j.rf)\v wv
tt a7rov=[j.(i) f n
v ayvot-4-
v TO>
xa raw
sy
royro yivsrat xar' a/av, o6ro< ftWt/Kfti </Aoi xai 19
$i?Ja. O'JTOJ o' av xai of OLVKTOI jU-aXicrr' 5isv <>/Aoi '5
yas a'f. r) o' \(rr>rr t g xai o^Qiorr^ ^i^orr t g, xa;
orr t g, xa
yapovrsc;
auTovg xai 7rpo^ ctXXYyXoyg pwtowri) xa) oy'rs osovroti
UTrypsTovrri roiaura, aXX* a>^ siTrcTv xai 0<a-
rcov aya^ov yap ju,r/r' OI>JTOV$ afj.apra.vsiv ^TS
roig $1X01$ eTriTpsTrsiv. ol 2= fj.o%Qijpo} TO jotsv fiefiaiov oux
Ivu<riy* o-jos yap ayToTc 3<aa=voy(rjv ZfJiotoi ovreg ' sir
5 p/po'vov y/yvovTa< (^/Xo<, p^a/povrsj TV) aXhr^cav
oi j/p^trip.oi 2s xai 750=?^ STT) TrXeiov 8<ajU,svou- 6
CTJV ' sVo^ ya^ av Tro&iZwmv rjoova^ >] 5^>=>v
e^ svavricov os jU-aX/fTTa jic=v oox=7 >] oia TO
o5 yap
o av
xa?\.ov xa<
sAxo* xai lpa<TT^v xa) spa)ju,svov, xai
. o<o tyalvovrai xa) ol spafTTai y=XoToi
ovrag iVtoj a^uuTSw, {Jirfikv 8s TOIOUTOV
iVaj^ 6= o-jo' e^/STai TO svavrlov ToD svavriou xa5' 7
', aXXa xara <rv[Ji.fi=firixos. "^ 8' opsj-is TOU JW,<TOU SGTTIV '
to be brought up by other persons,
and go on loving them, though not
even recognised by them.
4 5 It is this active spirit of love
which constitutes the virtue of friend-
ship, and which causes us to praise
those who are of a friendly disposition.
This then explains what wa* above
stated merely as a fact, EtfA. vm. i. 5.
The same spirit serves as the equal-
ising principle in unequal friendships,
greater merit being met by greater love.
5 7 Friendship is based on equality
and similarity, especially the friend-
ship of the good. Friendships for the
sake of pleasure or profit seem rather
based on contrariety, as for instance
on the contrariety of riches and
poverty. But, after all, one would
say not that the contrary seeks its
contrary, but that the contrary seeks
the mean.
5 fjui\i(TTa fifv TJ r&v Kar' aperriv
6noi6rris] Cf. the Lysis of Plato, p.
214, quoted above upon ch. i. 6.
TUV ayafiiav firiTpfTrtiv] ' For the
good will neither do wrong them-
selves, nor permit their friends to do
it.'
7 ope^is TOO jueVow] This phrase is
in accordance with the pantheistic
side of Aristotle's philosophy, attri-
M 2
268
IIOIKQN NIKOMAXEION VIII.
[CHAP.
TOUTO a a.-aov t oov TCO
xa) TO> Qs
o~$> * xa)
9 "Eojxs 6=, xa5a7Tp Is/ ot-p%jj s
roTt; auroig &1vai rj TS (><A/a xa/ TO SixatoV ev a7raTY, yap
xoivwviot 3ox=r T< 8/xa<ot/ stva/ xai
youv
xa
xa
s xa
TO S/xaiov. xa) 73 Jfapot(J.ia ( xotva. ra
opQvbg' Iv xooMovict yap **] 4^'^' a ' eo~T/ 8' aos
xa) s~aipoi$ Trai/Ta xo<va, ToT^ o' aAXo/ a$a)ptG~[j.va, xa)
7rXs/) To7^ 8' eXaTTro* xa) yap Ttov fythtibv al
ai 6' ^TTOV. 8<a^>^?/ 8s xa) Ta 8/xa/a' oy
xa)
, o>j.oito$ 8s xa) ITT) T<OV a.
xa) TCC
xa aur(riv aavsi Tt
p.v
erou
poig
xa
oov
xa)
xa
xa
Trarsa.
8s
TO 8/xa<ov, to
at 8s
eoxao~i
n Ttov
TOV
^
o
TIJ/J
xa 13
=
buting to nature a desire for the good.
Cf. De Anima, II. iv. 3 : irdv-ra yap
fKeivov (TOV fiefow) optyeTai, Kaiceivov
tvfKa irpaTTfi 8<ra irpdrTfi Kara <pvffiv.
Eth. x. ii. 4 : 5f<ra>s 8 /cal iv rots
<J>auAois iffri TI <pvffiicbv ayadbv KptiTrov
fj Kaff avrd, & f<t>ifTcu TOV oiiceiov
ayadov.
IX. I ^v opx??] ^*- vm. i. 4.
irepl TOUTO KOI ^v TOJJ auToIs] ' About
the same things, and in the same
persons.' Cf. .EYA. v. iii. 5 : ofs re
jap Sixaiov rvyx^ffi uv, Svo &TTI, ol
iv ols ra vpdynaTa, Svo. Pol. in. ix. 3 :
TTJP fjLtv TOV irpdyfiaTOS \airrrfTa. 6f*.o\o-
yovffi, T^IV 5e ols dju<J>i(rj37jToC(r.
3 Atjfo~6ai 8< StriKoma] ' Justice
of necessity becomes more binding as
friendship becomes closer, for they
exist in the same subjects, and are
coextensive in their application.'
4 ai 8e Koivuviai fiiov] ' All com-
munities are like parts of the political
community; for (the members of
them) unite with a view to some ad-
vantage, and to providing some of the
conveniences of life.'
VIII. X.] H9IKQN NIKOMAXEIQN VIII.
269
(tiiv xa\ bia.u.ivsiv' TO'JToy yap xai ol vo ( uo5=VaJ crrop/a^ov-
ra/, xa) 6/xa;o'y &a<riv sivai TO xoivy o-u,uCp='sov. aJ ju.=v 5
ot)v aXXai xoivwvioii xara pcpq TOV <rv[j,$s2ovTog sQis
oiov 7r?\.a)Tr ; 2= fj,\v roO xara TOI/ TrAoOv Trpof
r t TI TOIQVTOV, truer par iwrai $e TOU xara TOV
rav
ouoicog ol xal
xou or^aora*. via*
8e
xa
' aura/ WTTO rr^v 7roXiTix>jv so/xa<r/j>
rs
=^ xa/ Trs
=c, xa<
at -yap
' ou yap TOO
t, a?\A' si
TatiT
xa
truvooo; Qaivovrai yiv;a~Qai fj.sra rag r&v xapTrtbv
olov uTrap^ai' pa^icra, yap Iv TOUTOIS
aj^o?^. Tratrai orj Qaivovrai al xoivaiviai p.opia
eivai' axo?voy5r/rouo-* 0= al roiavrai
oov
8' SO-TIV sfovj Tp/a, /o-ai Se xai 7rap=x3ao-^, 10
TOUTCOV. elo~; 3* at itsv
5 OJCWOITWI' /cal fpaviffruv] Cardwell
refers for illustration of these terms
to Demosthenes, pp. 313, Z3; 4.03, 19;
I3S5> 3; I* 1 ?, '4-
By omitting, with Fritzsche, Eek-
ker's full stop after awoualas, and by
placing the words ou 70^ T^ )3'<' in
a parenthesis, we see that the parti-
ciples irojoDcres, airovtiioims, troj'i-
forres are to he referred to Koivavoi,
as implied in /co/fuiviwr above. The
passage which speaks of men ' award-
ing honour to the gods, while providing
recreation and pleasure for themselves,'
is highly characteristic of the Greek
religion. This sort of thing can
perhaps be best understood in the
present day by those who have seen
the religious festivals of the Hindoos.
Cf. Plato's Republic, p. 364 B : 0iricus
re Kal eircfSdis fJ.f9' rfiovGiv T Kai
toprSiv.
X. This chapter, containing a classi-
fication of forms of government and of
the perversions to which they are
exposed, can hardly have been written
after the Politics of Aristotle. It has
rather the appearance of a first essay,
the conclusions of which were after-
wards worked out into detail, and
partly modified. Thus Aristotle in
the Politics by no means concedes the
position that monarchy is the best
form of government. He argues, Pol.
in. xv. 4-16, that it is better for a
270
NIKOMAXEIQN VIII.
[CHAP.
TS xa.i apMTTOXptXTUt, rpirr) 8' vj arro rifj,^fj.dr(ov^ r^v TI-
[j.oxpaTixr)V "hsysiv oJxfTov <a/vsra, TroTurs/av 8' aurv/v
2 sla>9aer<v 01 TrAsTVroj xaAsiV. TOUTIOV Os
s
8s TrAsToTov* 6 jast> yap rupavvoj TO sauTtS o-Ujactspoi/
i, o 8s /3ao"<Asu TO T&V dp%o[j.V(vv. ou -yap sV-n
6 jar; avTOLpxyg xai 7ra<ri rolg aya^oTj U7rsp
o 3s roouro ouSsvo^ Trpoo-SsTra* ra toc^s'X<jW,a o5v
jotsv bux at/ o"xo7ro/>3, ro?^ 8' ap^Ojas'voi^* 6 yap ju,
state to be governed by good laws
than by the best individual will ;
further on, Po. ni. xvii., he qualifies
this by admitting that for some peoples
monarchy is better suited.
i TropeK^tiffeis] ' Perversions ' or
' abnormal growths ' ; cf. P0 in. vi.
n, where a form of government is
pronounced to be normal as long as it
aims at the public good, abnormal
when its end is private interest :
0ai/pV roivvv cos offai fj.lv Tro\iretcu rb
KOivrj ffvutpfpov tTKoirovaiv, avrai fifv
opOal Tvyxa- vov<Tlv oScrai KOTO rb onrAcos
St/caioi', Sffoi 8e rb rrtytrtpov ptivov T>V
a.p\ovriav, rjfj.aprrinti>ai iracrai Kal irape/c-
/3d<reis TWV bpQiav iro\ntitav SfffiroriKai
yap, TI 5e ir($Ais Koivuvla TU>V I\ev9fpuv
ia-riv.
iroXiTfiav 5* ourV fldtBcuriv oiir\e?rrTOi
/caAe?^] ' But most people are accus-
tomed to term it " a constitution." '
The word wo\irfia was used by the
Greeks in a restricted sense, just as
the word ' constitution ' is in English,
to denote a balanced form of govern-
ment. Cf. Ar. Pol. in. vii. 3 : '6rav 5e
rb rA7J0os irpbs rb KOivbv iro\iTtvr)Tzi
ffv/j, fpov, Ka\tiTCU rb KOtvbv ovofia
irarrSiv TUIV iroAiTfiwi/, iro\JT(a. Ari-
stotle does not use the word in the
Politics to denote a timocracy. In
the ninth chapter of Book IV. he uses
it to denote a mixed form between
oligarchy and democracy. He also
uses it to express his own ideal of a
state, which was far from being a
timocracy.
2 i> y&p fir] roiovros K\tjptaTbs &v TIS
eft? fiatri\fvs~\ ' For he who had not
these qualifications would be a sort of
ballot-box king.' It is difficult to ex-
press the word K\t\p<ar6s, which as
coupled with jSotnAtus is certainly
meant to be contemptuous. Aristotle
does not appear to mean any definite
form of monarchy, so we learn nothing
from Pol. in. xiv., to which the com-
mentators refer us. Aristotle here
says that the genuine king must be
independent in property and position,
and above all his subjects in this re-
spect. Externally wanting nothing
for himself, he will administer the
state for the good of his subjects. If
this is not the case, he will be no
genuine king, but a parvenu, K\rip(ar6s
TIJ, like a person who had been raised
to the throne by the contingency of
lot, and therefore insecure in his posi-
tion, with perhaps only a temporary
tenure of office. The word apiaQovs
is coupled with /*)> KArjpwrcij, (as an
epithet of Trejrapxuw)) Pol. n. xi. 7.
It is possible that in the present pas-
sage a notion of ' paid services ' may
be implied. If so, 'hireling monarch'
would express the terms under notice.
X.] H9IKQN NIKOMAXEIQN VIII. 271
av rig s
TO yap lauTa yaoy (tiwxsi. xa
ITTJ Taurr y or/ p^=<^/(rrr; XOLXHTTOV Qs TO svavrov TO> 3
[j.=TafiaiV;i 0* Ix fia(ri?isia$ el$
yap SCTTI fjiovap^iag r]
xaxa TCOV pj/ovTwv, o; v=[j,rjv<n ro
Trapa. rr t v d^iav, xa.1 TruvTO, r} ra TrXsro-Ta
xai rag dp%oi$ dsi TOI$ auToig, Trip]
voi TO TrXouTsrv o?v.fyoi <jr) a^voyo~/ xai
TltiV 7n<X50TTaTO)V. X OT] TlfJ.OXpOt.Tiag
s f>r j ij.oxpaTiav (rvvopoi yap s\<riv auTar Trhrfiovs yap
xa} r] Ti[j.oxpaTia slvai, xa\ iVot TravTi^ oi lv TO>
. Tjx/o-Ta 6 fj.o^r t pov SGTIV r] 6rjfj.oxpaTia' sirl
"<*> Trapsxfiaivct TO TT^ 7roXTf/aj
CO$ al TrohiTSi
yap rjuTUi xa* pao~Ta [ASTaaivoixriv. i t u.oico[j.aTa
xa) o/ov 7rapaOs/7 ( aaTa Xa^o< T/ av xai v Tat^ olxiai$.
r] fjiiv yap ~aTpb$ TT^OJ ui=7j xoiviovia
rryr^a' T<UV TEXVCUV yap TO) TraTpt p-s
xai "Oprtpog TOV A/a TraTepa TrpcxrayopsvEi TraTpixr) yap
ii/at. sv Tlspa-aig <? r) ToS
yap (u$ 6ouXo/^ TO? uio~<v.
xai T] 00"7TOTOu TTpo^ douXou^' * TO yap TOT)
<TV[J.$pOV ev auTV] TTpOLTTSTai. aUTT) jU.V OUV
yap al apyai OidQopoi. avQprj$ (ts xa} yuvaixog dpHTTO- 5
y $alv=Tai ' xaT a^iav yap o avr^p ap%ei, xal Trsp}
a 8*7 TOV avSpa* oo~a 8= yuvaixi ap ( ao'^=i, exsivy
Trac/a Trjv a^iav yap avTO TTOISI, xa.} ovy 3)
au.siv(t)v. lv/OT 0s ap^oiuriv al yuvaixsg STrix^poi ov<rai'
those who differ should be governed
differently.' And therefore the Persian
system is wrong, which governs child-
ren as if they were the same as slaves.
5 yvpoffcc? eiri(c\Tjpo( ovaon\ The
Greek feeling about ' heiresses ' is
strongly expressed in a fragment of
Menander (LV.).
5.JTIS ywcuit' fvinXTipov tiriQviJ.fi Kafitiif
ie\o\rrovaav, ijroi fj^viv fKrivfi Qfiav,
fl &ov\tr' a.rvxftv, fJMicdpios Ka\ovfj.fvos.
272
NIKOMAXEmN VIII.
[CHAP.
ov 8>j yivovrai XOLT aperyv al dp%ai, aXAa 8*a
6 xai 8uva]ouv, xaftaTTSp sv Taig ohtyap^iais. Ti[j.oxpaTixj)
ft soixsv j rtov a8sA<tov * JVoi 7/5, 7r?ajv '
rfKixlaus 8/aXXaTTOuo-<!/* Sio'zrsp av TroXu
$ia$>spa)friv, OUXSTI aOeAcJxxrj yivsTat rj <t>j?ua.
asv ev raTj a3so-7roro/f rtov o*xi}<rea>y
e^ iVou), xa) sv al^ a<rOsvy^ 6 ap%cov xai
OS
xai TO 8/xa<ov, jSacriX?? ( asv Trpot, 1 rou^
ev U7repo%rj suspystfiag' su yap TTOJS? TOL>
' ayaQo$ cav sTrifj.s'hiiTai aurtov, 7i/'
vomits Trpofidrcov' oQsv xai
7rojja=j/a
st as ra>
s
slirsv.
i rcov
TOO
xai
Trpnyovoi$
s Taura
3 Xs
rov
Toiavrr) s xa rj
ariog
xai
<i>u<r=< rs
vl&v xai Trpoyovoi sxyovcov xai /3aa"<A=u^ /3a<r/-
ev urrspop/^ 82 al 4>/X/ai aurai, 810 xai
ri[j.u)VTai ol yovsig. xai TO 8/xatov 8>j ev TOUTOI^ oi
4a?\.Xa TO xaT* d^iav OUTW yap xai r] 4>iX/a. xai ai
8s TTpoj -yuj/aTxa rj auTrj fyi'hiat. xai V dpio-TOxparia' xar*
dperyv ydp, xai T<O dpsivovi 7r?\.sov ayaSo'v, xai TO ap/w'o
Ssxao~T(p' OUTOJ 8e xai TO S/xaiov. >J 8s Ttov a8sXc^t6v T>]
SOIXBV' foot yap xai TjTuxuoTai, 01 TOiouToi 8'
xo " bftorfisis <*>$ eVi TO TroXu. soixe 8>j
xai 73 xard rr t v T^oxparix^v' 5 /o~oj -ya^ oj
$ouAovTai xai sTrisixs'ig slvai ' sv [J.spsi 8^ TO ap^=<
6 = iVou otmo 8^ xai rj <$)i?v/a. ev 8s Tait, 1 Trapsxfid
(Ju<T7rsp xai TO 8/xaiov 7ri pixpov etrTiv, OVTM xai 73
xa
XI. 3 v inrepoxfj 70^6?$] 'All
these friendships imply superiority on
the one side, and hence it is that
parents are honoured,' . c. because
superiority demands honour, as well
as love.
5 foot >ap elvai] ' For it is the
part of the citizens (in a timocracy) to
live equally and equitably with one
another.' To understand the full
meaning of ^inej/cels, see the fine pas-
sage from 7?Ae<. i. xiii., translated in
the note on Eth. Y. x. i., and cf. ix. x.
6. &ovKov^a.l expresses a natural tend-
ency, cf. vm. x. 3 : Tr\iiQovs -)&p POV-
Aeraj al -^ Tiij.oKpa.ria tlvat.
X. XII.] HeiKliN NIKOMAXEION VIII.
273
i0Tf, xal TfXKrra sv Ty ^e/ptVryj ' ev rupavvibi yap ouftlv i]
[juxpov <>j?u'a. ev 01$ yap fj.rfilv xotvov Itrn rtp a
xa} rco apyo|UV>, ouSs <>t/ua' QUO? yap Sixaiov
olov rsyvirj] Trpog opyavdv xal yv%Jl 7rpo$ <ra>|txa xal
OSO-TTOTT] Trpog SouAoj/ ' aJctsXsTrai jasv yap Travra raura
VTTO rwv %pa)[j.evwv, <$>i7\ia 3' oux sVri TTpog ra
ouOs S/xa/ov. a/>.X' oy^e TT^O^ I'TTTTOV ^ jSouv, ou^s
^ SouAo. oy^sv yot|2 xoivov so~Tiv ' o yap
ov opyavov, TO 0* opyavov a\}/y^o^ So'J7vo.
oov 8ouAo, o-j^ Icrr/ 4>iX/a ?rpo^ aurov, ^ 8' ai/
^a/ ri 8/xaiov Trai/ri avQroTra) Tro^ Trdvra rov
a
* ofrov avQpa)7ro$. STTJ [j.ixpov Sr) xoc) ev rai rupavvKTiv 8
xa) TO ftixaiov, ev Se ra?
yap ra xoiva Vo<^ o5o-v.
a e
xo/vcova jaev otv
' av r<^ rr^v TS
xa)
<rrv
'12
xa TV
/, xa)
oov yap xa$' 6jao-
Xoy/av r/va Qaivovrai shai. slg Tavrac; Ss rd^sisv av
rig xa} TTJV ^-vixyv. xa} y (ruyyevixy Ss Qaivsrai
e*Tj sTvat, riprri<rQai Se 7rao~a ex r% 7rarp<x?jf oi
jusv yap (TTepyov<ri ra re'xva o>^ eaurcov r/ ovra, ra s
rexva TOUJ yoveT*; a> aTr' sxsivcov TI ovra. ^uaAXov S'
iVao-;v 01 yovs7<r ra e^ auratv $ ra ysvvrfiivra ori zx rou-
6 u<f>f\f'tTai SlKaiov] 'For though
all these things receive benefit from
those who make use of them, yet
neither friendship nor justice is pos-
sible toward inanimate objects.' The
corresponding passage in theEudemian
Ethics serves as a commentary on this :
Eth. Eud. VII. X. 4 ffvpfia-ivfi 8e Kal
avrb rb [e conj. Bonitz] upyavov rtju.e-
epyov, eKfivov yap eVe/ceV an. The
instrument receives just so much care
from its master, as will keep it in
proper condition for the exercise of
VOL. II. N
its functions. The slave, who is
treated not as a person but as a thing,
receives the same kind of attention.
Friendship and justice imply the re-
cognition of personality, they imply
treating men not as instruments, but
as ends in themselves. On the slavery
of the body to the soul, cf. AT. Pol. i.
v. 6-8.
XII. i a<j>i:picrfie 5" av TIS] In say-
ing that all friendships imply com-
munity of interests, an exception is to
be made of the friendships of relations
N
274
HGIKflN NIKOMAXEIflN VIII.
[CHAP.
TOJV, xai jaaXXoi/ (ruvtoxslwTai TO a<>' oy TO> ysvvr^s'vTJ vj
TO ysvo'|U,sj/ov T(5 Troi^fravn TO yap e* ayToy olxstov T>
' J. V r >^\ A A \f> A c ~ ~V > / Sj''fl v
a< oy, oiov oooy i] ypit- y or/out/ TO> S%OVTI ' sxsivcp o ovvev
TO a<' oy, >j TJTTOV. xai TU> TrXrj^gi 8s Toy p^po'voy * OJ
8s 8^?\.ov xa<
5v rsxva
(rvvs<riv y acr/v XaovTa. ex
8<' a cJxXoya-/ jaaXXov ai f^rjT
i'hova'iv a>g savrovg (roc. yap !
TCOV oiov Tpo< ayTOi TCO xsp^ropiVQa/), rsxva 8s yove
aTr' exsivtov TreQuxora, aSsAc^o) 8' aXXr^oy^ Tto sx
Tre^uxcvai 13 yap ?rpo exeTva TauTO
sT* o3st/ cj^ao"' TayTov al^aa xa/ p/^av xai Ta TOI-
4- auTa. si(T* 8^ TayTo' TT) xa) ev 8iryp7]as'vo<^. jasya 8s Trpo^
xa< TO <ruvToov xa< TO
yap
xa o
8s xa<
truvcoxfiicovrou * T) yap a^o Ttov ayTtov sTva.
ex
y/-
yvovTai 8' oi jU.sv oJxs/oVspo oi 8' aXXoTp/coTspoj TOJ
>\/ \> \-S- >/Mt\\
5 yy^ ij Troppa) TOV ap^rjyov s<va/. so~Ti 6 13 jtxsv ?rpo^
4><Xia TS'XVOI^, xa) av5pa>7ro/^ ?rpo Ssou^, ajf Trpo
xai yTTspsp/ov* sy yap TrsTrojvjxao"* Ta /x,s'yio~Ta* Toy yap
eivai xa) Tpa0>jvai a^Tio/, xa} ysvojasvoj^ Toy 7ra*8sy$r,i/aj.
6 s^si 8s xai TO >j8y xai TO p^pr]o"<jtxov 13 TOJayT>3 ^(
Xov Ttov odvfiaiv, oo~ai xa) xoivorspog o |3i'o aaroTj fc
eo~Ti 8s xa< sv T a8X<>ix a?rs xai sv TT sTaiix xa)
a?rsp xa sv
ev
STTJSIXSO"<, xa
sv TOI, %
oo~to
oxejospo* xa sx yevsT yTrap^ouo"; crTSpyoi/TSf
, xai ocrto 6|U.oy;$ sVTepoj oi sx T(OV ayTtov xai <ryvTpoc>oi
and companions, which depend on
feeling rather than on any sort of
compact.
3 ^ 7&p irpbs tKtiva Ta(rr6Tris o\\^-
Xois ToiiTOTrott?] 'For their identity
with the parents identifies them with
one another.' lutiva. is in the neuter
gender on account of the words &
TOJC ainSiv to which it immediately
refers.
4 dpetj'wl 5e tTvot] 'But cousins
and all other relations get their bond
of unity from these (i. e. the brothers) ;
for (it depends) on their coming from
the same stock. Relations are more
or less closely united to one another,
in proportion as their common an-
cestor is more or less near.'
5 irpbs Otovs oiJ irpbs byadbv Kal
inrfpfXO"] Cf. Eth. vin. vii. 4, IX. i. 7,
XII. XIII. ] H0IKQN NIKOMAXEION VIII.
275
xai TroiiosyvTBg o^ouog' xa Y\ Kara rov %povov ox/ i ao~a
xa} fisfiaioTaT'r). avaXoyov 8s xa} ev roig Xoi- 7
T&V <ruyy=vcov rot. Q/i'Xixd. av^cn 8s KOI yvvaix}
xa.ro, >6(rw uTrdp^siv avQp(07rog yap ry <$>u(T
aAAof TJ TToTuTixo'v, oVo> TTpoVspov xa} avayxai-
orspov olxia TTO'ASO)^ xa.} rsxvoTroua xoivorspov rdig %&>oi$.
TT/ rotrourov 73 xoivtovia so"r/v, 01 8'
p.v ovv
av^pfoTTo* oy U.OVQV
xa/ rtoj/ sj rov 3/0?'
STEpa av^pog xa.}
TO xoivov TiQevrsg TO.
ra epya, xa)
yap
' 7rapx(iu<riv o3
S/a TauTa 8s xai TO
slvai t)(jxii xa} TO ipu sv TUT*j T^ i\ia. eirj 8'
apsTv^v, el eTrieixsig shv I(TT/ yap sxarspou a
%aipoisv av TO) TOJOUTOJ.
slvai ' 8<o 3aTTov oJ arexvoi
xotvov ayafyov a/xc^oTv, (ruvssi s TO
av xa *
=T >ca)
s Ta rexva.
T<X yap rxva
TO 8s TTOJ^ 8
tyalvsrai TO> c>/?uo
i TOV sraipov xai TOV
TpiTTtov 8' outrcov
i xa6' Ixao-Tvv TOJV
8s
TOV (^/Xov xai TOV o
yap
xa^aTrep si/
sv J^O'TTJT/ Qfacov OVTCOV TCOV 8e
v (xcu, -yap o^oiiug aya^o) ^/Xoi y/vovra/
&c. Aristotle throughout these books
speaks of "the gods" from the point
of view of the popular religion.
7 irp6Tpov Kal avaryKa^npov oiKta
iro'Aews] In point of time the family
is prior to the state, but in point of
idea (Acfyp) an< ^ essentially ((pvati)
the state is prior; Cf. Ar. Po/. i. ii.
12 : Kal irpArfpov S^ TjJ <pvffei TroAis ^
otKia real e/caJTOS ^wc ta-riv. Tb yap
'A\ov irp6repov a.va.'yKCUQV elvai TOV
/j.epovs ' aiaipovfj-evov yap rov S\ov OVK
eerrat irous ouSe x e 'Pi 6 ' M^/ 6fj.ci>vv/.i.cas.
Aristotle argues that, without the
idea of the 'state,' the terms 'man'
and ' family ' would lose their mean-
ing. Thus the .idea of family pre-
N
supposes that of the state, which will
accordingly be prior. In the same
way, the family is more necessary as
a means, the state as an end.
firapKovffiv ovv iSia~\ ' They help
one another therefore, bringing what
they each have separately into the
common stock.' Fritzsche quotes
the saying of Ischomachus to his
wife in the (Economics of Xenophon
(vii. 13.) vvv 5)) OIKOS fj/jui' oSe Koiv6s
<TTIV. 'Eyda re ydp, '6ffa /J.OL effnv,
axavTa ets rb Koivbv aTro^aivca, ni) re
Sffa, rjvfyKta, Ttdvra ets rb KOIV^V ffore-
Qr\Kas.
XIII. i eV a
N 2
270
I10IK11N N1KOMAXEIQN VIII.
[CHAP.
8s xai
xa<
Ta >>5
8s? rto
TCO avaAoyov
rai 8s Ta lyx/V^aaTa xai ai
^ jU,aXTra
et)
rouro yap apsrr^s xa/
oyx sfrrtv eyxA^jaara ouos
st) TTojouvra ow8s)^ Suer^epa/vsi,
su 8pa>v. 6 8'
oux av yxaXo/?j TO>
3 $>i*rai. ou
xai 8ia TO
vrst;), Tout;
a7ro<oovaj. yyi/=-
i sv TY xaTa TO
oJ ja=v
roro o
' TOV
eav
>' sxarspoc; yap row
sv roi^ 8<' TJ'^OV^V a'jaa yap
ivsroLi od opsyovrai, el rto
' at/ QaivoiTo xa o syxaAtov ra>
TO ^pTjer/jaov
asi TOU
oiovrcii TOU
xa<
ron
TS^* oi 8' su 7roioDi/T ou 8uvat/Tai eTrapxsTv Too-auTa o<ra)t> oi
7rdo-%e)VTs$ 8sovTa/. soixf 8s, xa5a;rsp TO 8/xaio'v !O~T< 8<T-
TOI/, TO jtxsv aypa<ov TO 8e xaTa vo'jtxov, xai TTJJ xaTa TO
2 o68h Svaxfpaivft, d\\' ^av p
^apitjs i/u^rerat e5 Spc] ' No one
takes it ill, but (every one), if he be of
gentle mind, pays him back in good
deeds.' The subject to a/itJverat is
implied in oii5fs. Fritzsche quotes
Horace *Sa i. i. i.
A'e/wo quam sibi sortem
Seu ratio dederit, seu forsobjecerit, ill&
Contentus vivat, laudtt diversa se-
quentes.
xopfejs has nothing to do with ' grati-
tude.' It means much the same as is
conveyed in the word ' gentleman." Cf.
jKA. I. V. 4 : of 8e xapt'ejres cal irpait-
Tt/cof. iv. viii. 9 : x a p( fis Ka ^ ttevQtpos.
5 ?o<K SiaA.uaii'Tot] ' Now as jus-
tice is twofold, the one unwritten, the
other according to law, so also of
utilitarian friendship there appear to
be two branches, the one moral, and
the other legal. The complaints then
(which arise) chiefly take place when
men do not conclude their connection
in the same branch in which they
commenced it.' (Twa\\dTTfiv is to
make a contract, $ia\vf<r0ai to wind
up a contract by the mutual perform-
ance of the terms. Men who consider
that they have entered upon a so-
called friendship with a fixed stipula-
tion (vo/juicf)) of certain advantages to
be received, will complain if the fixed
stipulation is denied, and only a gene-
ral moral obligation (^0we^) to render
services is admitted.
XIII.]
HeiKiiN NIKOMAXEK1N VIII.
277
a TJ' ^/,sj> rfiixr) TJ' Os voajxrj sivai. yi
fna'Aia-y orav JU.TJ xara rrjv
xai OiaAutovTaj. <rr< Or] VO^JXTJ juiv 73 STTJ 6
;, 73' joist/ TrafATTaj/ ayopa/a sx pSJpo / ^slpa, 73' 8=
pa slg Xp r ' VQV i x&
sv TayTy] TO o^^/ATj^a xoyx
SoATjv sp/si * <o Trap' ev/o< oux
oiovrai oslv (TTspysiv rou$ xara TTIO-TIV crvv-
. 73' 8' TJ'^JXTJ o'jx 7ri faTGig, aXX* a)V c^/Xco 7
rjor^Trors a?v.Xo. xojU./^=o"Sa< $s a^iof TO ?<rov
TrXeov, ai oy osotoxto^ aAXa ^pr^as. ov% opoitDg 8s 8
xcu ^a?;uo'a=vo sxaXsVei. TOUTO 8s
TO
r t
T<X
0= TO.
iva
s TO
6 IdTt o-woA\o|aj'Tas] 'That which
is on stated conditions then is legal
(utilitarian friendship). One sort of
it is wholly commercial, implying
payment on the spot ('K \eipbs els
Xelpa) ; another is more liberal, allow-
ing time (els xP& vov \ but still on the
understanding of a specified return.
In this then the debt is plain and un-
doubted, but the delay which it admits
of is friendly. Hence in some states
no suits are allowed in cases of this
kind, but men think that those who
hare contracted ou faith should abide
(by the issue).' a.va.&oK'h in commerce
answers to ' credit,' cf. Plato's Laws,
xi. p. 915 D: /w/5" etrl avafroXri ttpafftv
fj.T)5e av^v Troie'iffdai. Or it may an-
swer to buying or selling for future
delivery. Qt\uc6v ('of the nature of
friendship') stands here as a pre-
dicate. Cf. Eth. vm. i. 4: TO>V Siicaltev
T<> /j.d\iffra <f>i\iKbv elvau 5o/cet.
1 8 TJ 5' 7j0</; eiffpyerelffQcu] ' On
the other hand the moral (branch of
utilitarian friendship) is not on stated
conditions, but the gift, or whatever
else it be, is made as if to a friend.
Yet (the giver) claims to get as much,
or more, as though he had not given
but lent. And if he does not come
off in the connection as well as he
commenced, he will complain. Now
this (sort of disappointment) takes
place because all or most men wish
that which is noble, but practically
choose that which is expedient. It is
noble to do good not with a view
to receive it back, but it is expedient
to be benefited.' This passage dis-
criminately exposes a sort of vacilla-
tion between disinterestedness and
self-interest, which occurs in utili-
tarian friendships. A man at one
moment thinks vaguely (&ov\ercu) of
aiming at the noble, and makes a gift
as if he expected no return. But
presently the more definite bent of his
mind (trpoalpeffts) reverts to the profit-
able, and he claims to get back as good
as he gave. On the distinction be-
tween &ou\e<rda.t and irpoaipfloQcu cf.
Eth. in. iv. i, v. ix. 6, and the notes.
9 Swanevcp STJ i) yu^] 'If one is
able then one ought to pay back the
full value of what one has received ;
278
NIKOMAXEIftN VIII.
[ClIAP.
or) avraTrooorsov TVJV a^iav tov Tra5sv, xat SXWTI ' axovra
yap <$>i7*.QV o
xa
auro TOUTO 3ptovro* xot.Qot.7rsp oSv STT}
oiahuTsov. xai fyx.oAoy^<rai 3' av
aoui/arouvra 3' ouS' 6 8oi ij^uoersv av aJ<rr' si
STrifrxsTrrsov 6>' o5
xai
loSTTi
07T> 7Ti
p
rawrijv
/XT],
TOU Tra^ovro^ co'4>sXs/a jujr
TTJV avraTroSofr/v, ^ T^ TOU
ol [JLSV yap
Tra
Toiavra
xsivo^ xa\
srspcav T^afisiv, xaTa<r[j.ixpi%QVTS$' ol 8' avarra'hiv ra /xs-
, xai a Trap' aXAa>v oux ^v, xa) ev
ap' o5v 8<a juev TO pp?"r
13 ro TraQovro^ ro^eXsia pirpov
o^, xa< errapxzi aurco jj xo/xtou-
TO(raitTr} oui/
, xa) aTroSorsov
xai TrXsov xaXX/ov yap. ev Ss ra? xar' apsr^
Trapa rtov evspysr&v a [tixpa v\v
T^afisiv,
T<OV Trap
j ^ r
<ri[j.(iV
l<rriv
73 sTrixoupa
aurc o<rov
for one must not make a man a friend
against his will (i.e. treat him as if he
were disinterested, when he did not
really mean to be so). (One must
act) as if one had made a mistake at
the outset, and had received a benefit
from one whom one ought not to have
received it from, that is to say not
from a friend, or from some one doing
a friendly action ; one must conclude
the business therefore as if one had
been benefited on stated conditions.
And (in this case) one would stipulate
to repay to the best of one's ability ;
if one were unable, not even the giver
could demand it ; so in short, if one is
able, one should repay. But one
ought to consider at the outset by
whom one is benefited, and on what
terms, so that one may agree to ac-
cept those terms, or not.' The words
Kl fi<6vTi are omitted in the above
translation. They are left out by two
of the MSS., and while they merely
interrupt the sense of the passage,
they may easily be conceived to have
arisen out of the following words
&KOVTO. 7&p. The passage prescribes
the mode of dealing with a person who
having conferred a benefit (as described
in the last section) expects a return
for it. The accusative case 8ia/iap-
r6vra. is governed by the verbal ad-
jective StaKvreov which follows, cf. Eth.
VII. i. 1 : \tKreov
Some editions read 6fj.o\oyTj<rcu
5' kv, which the commentators explain
to be governed by Set, as implied in
the verbal adjectives avratruSoTfov,
5ia.\vre?v.
1 1 ap' oZv TrAeov] ' Surely, as the
friendship is for the sake of utility,
XIII. XIV. ] IieiKiiN NIKOMAXEIQN VIII.
279
Tpu> o soixzv r t rou
p xa< roD 7)dou$ sv TY; TrpoaipiVsj
TO
8= xa) Iv T? xa6' VTTrpop/ryV <iA/a/' a^iot 'I 4
yap exaTpo 7T?\.sov sj/siv, orav 0= ro'Jro y/yv>jTa<, 6\aXu-
Ta/ ij <*?Ja. oiWai yap o TS 0XT/a>y Trpoo-r/ttsiv
s
o o
.%psiov yap ovra ot
e^f ;v ' Xrjro'jpy/av r= yap y/i/5<7#at xa;
xar' a^/av rcov spytov e<TTa* ra Ix
yap, xaSaTTSp sv ^pr /t aarwv xoiycoy/a TrXsTov
vfj.fia?^'ho[j.=voi 7r7^s7rjv, OVTCO Sz'tv xa) sv r
^<; xa; o p/s/pwv avaTraXtv </Aou yap aya^oo sTvai TO
IvossViw* TI yar>, 4>a<r/v, 0^5X09
zv y= jtxsXX
a< 6sTv sxarspro
ou TOU au
Cj TO) o' evossT xtf&wg
73 T<^ ys'paj,
6' %%iv TOUTO xa< ev
yap Tifj.a.Ta.1 o /XTJ^SJ/ ayaSov TO) xo<va> 7ro
yap 6/OoTaj TO> TO xo/vov s-JspysToOvT/, TJ*
yap itrnv apa. p^pij/jiaT/i'so'^ai a7ro TO>V xotvtov xai T/ ( aa-
yap TO
0=
sx
a TO>
yap
TO
p/a>j/ ' TO XOJVGV
8s xoivo'v. ov
the benefit accruing to the recipient
is the gauge (of what is to be repaid).
For he (the recipient) is the asking
party, and (the other) assists him on
the understanding that he will receive
the same value. The assistance ren-
dered then is exactly so much as the
recipient has been benefited ; and he
ought therefore to repay as much as
he has reaped, or more.'
XI\ r . i 5ja4>e'pojTeu] 'Men have
differences' in those friendships which
are contracted between a superior and
an inferior. Aristotle says that these
differences ought to be settled by both
parties respectively getting more than
each other; the one receiving more
money or good, the other receiving
more honour.
3 ou -yap.fffrii' uiro/tevet] 'For it
is not allowable that a man should at
once gain money, and honour out of
the public, for no one endures to have
the inferior position in all points.'
This notion, that the state-officers
should have either pay or honour, but
not both, is expressed before, Eth.
\. vi. 6-7. It is drawn from the
Athenian ideas of liberty and equality,
but is hardly in accordance with the
practice of the modern world.
280
NlKOMAXEIftN VIII. [CHAP. XIV.
TCO
poloxco %py[j.aTa' TO xar tav yap STravuri xa
rrjv <><?uav, xaQaTrsp itpyrai. OUTOJ by xa< roig
o/juTajTeov, xai rto el$ p/pr^ara ]<>= Ao^em r] e<
Ti^avjv avTaTToSoTs'ov, avra7ro3<06j/ra TO ev%;%o[jLvov.
varov a i <X<a e^irsj' oi TO XT' aiav ' o
yap ij <<
SV 7TCt(TJ, Xa
yovi$' ouSsit; yap av 7TOT6 Tr)V a^/av a
Ss o QspaTTeiKov sTTisixrjj stvat OoxsT. 8<o xav Oo'-
x e^slva.1 t>Ia> TraTspa a7T/7ra(r5a, TraTpi 8' ulo'v
yap aTTO^oTsov, ouQgv 8s 7ro/i5ra^ a^/ov TCOV
Se'Spaxev, COCTT' aei oc
ia a$*iva.i ' xai TCU TraTp)
TTOT' av aTroo-Trjvai
pl$ yap T% <tuo~ix
S/ajQsiVQa/. Tto 8e 4)
) OVTI * eu
, ot; o<
ap,a 8' iV> o
rjpioL '
ou
TO
yap oj TroXXoi
TOO~OUTOV
4 direiircurOaj] ' To disown.' Card-
well quotes Herodotus i. 59 : 3f TS of
Tiry^cti/ei ^c ircus, TOUTOC direi'ira<r0a(.
Demosthenes 1006. 21 : (6 v6(ios) rovs
yovfas irate? Kvpiovs ov /jdvov Oferftcu
^|a\6?i^a( t af /3uvAuvrai, KCU airoKrjpv^ai.
\oip\s 7ctp Siwfiercreat] ' For inde-
pendently of natural affection, it is a
human instinct not to reject the assist-
ance (which he might derive from
his son).' SicodfiffOai is used in the
same sense, Eth. ix. xi. 6.
trepi p.\v <&v TOtTwv ftrl roffOVTOV
elpilff&ai] This has every appearance
of being the interpolation of an editor.
There is no real division between
Books VIII. and IX. They follow
each other continuously without any
break in the subject. The editor who
divided one treatise into two books
has added the above artificial division.
H0IKGN NIKOMAXEIilN IX.
E N
os roug dvo[j.oiosir>=<ri tyt^'ioug TO ava
XCLI (rw^si r^v <j?u'av, x
oov
xal sv TYJ TTO?UT/XV ra>
ai/Ti Ttov
xa/
xai TOJC
ju.=v oui/
7TpO TOUTO 6>J TTOLVTOC,
xoivw fj.=Tpov TO
=Tai, JtOl TO'JTtt)
xa 2
' SV
8' 6 p(up.vo OTI TrpoTE&ov
vuv ou^sv sViTsXsT. a~v[ji&aivsi Se Ta TO/auTa, S
ayjisvov 4^'^75) ^ ^'^ T0
oe a
wv svsxa ec^/Xouv ou yap aurovg s&Tepyov aXXa Ta
8/0
xa* a
I. In heterogeneous friendships,
equality is to be obtained by the rule
of proportion. The same rule holds
good in political economj, where the
most heterogeneous products are
equalized against one another. In
political economy there is the conve-
nience of a common standard, money,
by which products may be measured.
In friendship there is, unfortunately,
no such standard.
1 apo/wioeiSeVi] This is not quite the
same as rats naff viftpo-^v (f>i\iais. It
implies relationships in which the two
parties have respectively different
objects in view, as for instance, in the
VOL. II. O
case of the employer and the employed,
the tpcapfvos and the tyacrTfa, &c.
Ka6dwep efyrjTat] Cf. Eth. vm. xiii. I .
Iv TTJ iro\jn/c7j] By the modern
division of sciences, Political Economy
has been raised into separate existence,
so as in its method to be entirely
independent of, and in its results
subordinate to, Politics. On the Ari-
stotelian theory of the law of value in
exchange, see Eth. v. v. 8, and note.
3 i) Se rSiv Tjfloij'] 'Moral friendship'
or ' friendship based on character,'
the same as y /car' aperiji' <t>i\ta. Cf.
Eth. vm. xiii. n : eV 5e TOUS fear'
aperJjj' TJJS aptTTjs jap Ka\ rov ijBovs,
O
282
IIOIKflN NIKOMAXEK1N IX.
[CHAP.
8s xai orav tTtpot ytyvyrai owTMg xa ' l^ <**v V*"
' opoiov yas TU> [J.rfilv yiyvsvQai, ZTOLV o5 E^ISTOU
olov xa) rto xiQaptpQtfi b s7rasAXoc,=i/o xa<
ofj.sivov aVsisv, ro<rotmo 7rAs/> '
jtxsv ov exdrepog TOUTO e@ouAsro, Ixav&s - v sJ^sv' si 8' o
jasv Ts'p\{/iv 6 8s xcp$0, xa o ju,=v ep^sj o 8s ]u,7], oix av sivj
TO xara T^V xoivcov/av xaXcoj tov yap dsojitsvoj
xa* 7rpo<rsvs<
5 TVJV aia.v 8s TTorspov
; o yap
xa ' n
TTOTS, Ti[j.Tfl(rai TOV
sr, TOU Trpoi'fjasvou T) Toy
soix' STTirpsTrsiV EXS/V<O.
TTOISIV' ors yap 8<8as/sv ao^-
8oxs7 aia sVi-
/f.r. A. Of course the above terms
have nothing to do with the ' moral '
branch of utilitarian friendship, men-
tioned tfA. vin. xiii. 5. 7.
4 oTw 6<l>jj] ' As in the case of him
who promises (a reward) to the harper,
and " the better he sang, the more he
should have," but when the man next
morning demands the fulfilment of
his promises, said that " he had paid
pleasure for pleasure," ' (i.e. the plea-
sure of hope, for the pleasure of
hearing music). The present tenses
firayyf\\6/j.fvos, airaiToDpri, seem to
imply an oft-repeated and current
story. The story itself is repeated by
Plutarch (De Alexandri Fortuna, ir. i )
where the trick is attributed to Diony-
(pafft, KtdapwSov rivos
aKovcav tirt)'Yytl\aTO Swpecti/ avrcS rd-
XCLVTOV TJ7 5* vffrepata TOV a.v6p<aitov
tlirev,
tftpau S^tvos urrb ffov irap' tc
6vov, ttfippava Ka.yt!> (re TaTr
&<rre rbv ma&bv Siv fre/wres
i'es fvQvs, ai
fc6fj.fi os 5c6<7i] ' For a man
sets his mind on the things he happens
to want, and for the sake of that he
will give what he himself possesses.'
The beginning of the sentence (3>v yap
Stofjitvos) is a general statement, the
words xaKflvov ye contain an applica-
tion of the general statement to a
particular case.
5 T))V atlav $e TOCTOVTOJ/] ' But
whose part is it to settle the value (of
a benefit), is it the part of the giver
in the first instance, or of the reci-
pient ? (One would say it was the part
of him who was the recipient in the first
instance) for the giver seems to leave it
to the other. Which they mention
Protagoras as doing, for whenever he
taught anything he used to bid the
learner estimate " how much worth he
thinks he has learnt," and he used to
take exactly so much.' o irpoJf/jttvos is
used in a peculiar sense here to denote
' qui prior donum dedit,' in opposition
to o irpo\a.&uv (or 6 trpof\o>v, 8), ' qui
prior ab altero accepit.' Protagoras
was said to be the first philosopher
who taught for money. He probably
found it not disadvantageous to assume
a high and liberal attitude towards
his pupils. On the wealth which he
amassed by teaching, see Plato's Memo,
p. 91 D, and above, Vol. I. Essay II.
p. 80.
I10IKON NIKOMAXEK1N IX.
283
TO
TO apyuptov, etra
yivov-
Taj ' o-j yap 7nTAoDo~JV a a> j aoAo'y7]o~av. roSro 8' f<reo$ 7
?ro/5?v oi <ro$uo~Ta{ avayxa^bvTa* &a TO fM$tVCt dv Sovvaj
apyupiov aiv 7r<VTavTa*. OUTOJ jasv ot)j/ cov eAa$ov TOJ/
]U.^ 7ro{o3vT, sIxoV)^ s'v 5yxA
ylyvsrat 8tOj,oXoy/a T% c7rot>a o
o-j yap 7rp
yx av
yap
XT' apSTigi/ 4)<Xi'a. TTJV a^fti^r^ TS TTOJTJTSOV xaTa T^
yap TO
73
6 7 ^V TO<S TOIOWTOtS ^T
' In such matters some like the prin-
ciple of " a stated wage." Those,
however, who take the money before-
hand, and then do nothing of what
they promised, are naturally blamed
in consequence of their excessive pro-
mises, for they do not fulfil what they
agreed. But this course the Sophists
are perhaps obliged to adopt, because
no one would be likely to give money
for the things which they know.'
Protagoras had no fixed price for his
teaching, he left it to the pupil.
I5ut some people prefer having terms
settled beforehand, fniffObs tlpr)/j.evos,
as it is called in the line of Hesiod
( Works and Days, \. 368) : MiffObs 8'
avSpl <(>i\(f e/prj,ueVoj &PKIOS fffrw. It
is the perversion of this when men
take the money beforehand, and then
fail in performing that which was paid
for. The Sophists (says Aristotle
with severe irony) are perhaps obliged
to insist on payment beforehand, on
account of the utter worthlessness of
their teaching. Aristotle contrasts
the conduct of Protagoras (of whom
he speaks honourably) with that of
' the Sophists ' after the profession
had become regularly settled.
7 iv ols Sf <t>i\ia\ ' But supposing
there is no agreement with regard to
the service rendered then, in the
first place (ol (nei>), with regard to'
those, who give purely for personal
reasons, we have said that they are
free from all chance of complaint ; for
this is the mode of virtuous friendship.'
Si' avrous is more of a logical than a
grammatical formula, and would be
represented by per se in Latin. Thi.
phrase and Kaff avrovs are frequently
iised by Aristotle to characterise the
highest kind of friendship, which is
an ' absolute ' feeling. Eth. vin. iii. i :
ol filv o$v Sia rJ> xpyv-W Qihovvrfs
oAATjAovs ou Kaff airrovs <f>i\ov(riv. In
the following section, tni TIVI, ' for
some external object,' is contrasted
with Si' O.VTOVS, ' that which looks to
the personal character alone.' Cf. ix.
x. 6 : St' aptT^v 5e /cal Si' ainobs
(^>iA.(a) OVK tffri irpbs iroAAovy.
ovru 8' toiKt Mey^6(Jiei>ov] 'And
thus it seems that they ought to act,
who are made partakers in philosophy
(i.e. they should measure the benefit
ot>2
28-1
NIKOMAXEION IX.
[CHAP.
Qd-
o~a> xavoVj xa-nrsp xa Trpog zovg xa Trpog yov-u;,
8 TO sv
STTI TIVI
> i ~ > >./ v .\
c.v sivai, si bs TOVTO
zisv av rov
<N ~ > i ~ >
ooxouo~av a[j.q>oiv xar
vo/, ou JU.OJ/QV
xa
TOVTOV
9 vov,
rspov svai
rou iVou
yap olxsTa xai a
e^Xsr' av, TOGTOUTOV dvTihoifiwv s^si
V xouyapsv TOI$ cuvioig OVTCO <$oiiv=Ta.i
T' elarj pojuoi rtov txdwriatv erujaj3oXa/a>v S/xaj
SfOV, ^ STT/tTTr U(T, SiaXu^TjVa* TTpO^ TOUTOV XOityd-
co yap sTrsrpacbSrj, rourov o}crai Sixaio-
rou iirtTptyotVTOS. ra 7ro?i.Aa yap oy
ol S%OVTS$ xa) ol )3ouXo'jU,svoj X3V ra
>a.lvsTau TroAXoO aia.
yivsTO.1 Trpog TOFOVTOV ofrov av rar-
y roo"ouroy
o
1 'Airopioiv 3' e^st xai ra roia^s, olov Tro'rspa 3s? Travra
raj Trarpi ot.7rovsfji.siv xa< 3Tfj3f<rda<, 75 xa/xvovra ^asv lar^co
TTSJO-reov, orrparrjyov 2s %stpoTovr)Tov TOV 7roX= ( a<xo'v '
o'j.oi(o$ Ss c^/Aa> jU,aXXov fj (TTrou^aiw uirqosT'qTeov, xa) susp-
s'-nrj avTCLTroSoTsov %dpiv
Ira^co orsov sav
2 d[j.<$)oiv //,>) svSsp
dp
ouv Travra ra ro;aura axp/-
pa8*ov ; TroXXa^ yap xai TravToiag
e%et $ia<$>opa.s xai pryiQii xai fjuxporyri xa} TCO xaXto
received by the intention of their
teacher), for the worth of philosophy
is not measured against money, and
no amount of honour can balance it.
But, perhaps, as also towards the gods
and one's parents, it is enough if one
gives what one can.' Aristotle, per-
haps mindful of the twenty years which
he passed in the school of Plato, places
very highly the spiritual dignity of
teaching in philosophy. After eot/ce,
SeiV irotai' is to be understood.
8 /t)j TOIOUTT/S 8' oi/(TT/s] ' In the
second place, when the gift is not of
this kind,' z'.e. not St' avrovs.
T'bv irpoe'xoFTo] ' The first recipient,'
see above 5.
8 9 /col ^ckp ^j/ e:o'c6jTjrrej'] ' For
this is what is done in the market
('. e. the buyer, who is the recipient,
settles the price) ; and in some places
it is the law that there must be no
actions on voluntary contracts, it being
right that one should conclude with a
person whom one has trusted on the
same terms as those on which one
entered on the contract with him.'
Cf. Etk. vin. xiii. 6 : Koivsavflv here is
used in the same sense as <rwa\\dTTeti>
there.
I.-IL]
IlGIMiN WKOMAXEIQN IX.
285
xo a.va.yxan. QTI
a?Jr i 'hov. xa\ rag ju
/ arroOOTSov
TOUT as/, oiov TCO
ou Travra rco aurcS ctTroOorsov, oux 3
evspysviac a.VTa.7ro?>OT=ov (og STTI TO
Taipoi$, xai oJCTTrsp 3ai/=<oy, to
eroiipu) Sorsov. iVa) o' ouos 4-
n Trapa Av y o-r(ov TroYcpov Toy
aTrairouvri 3s aTroSoreov, TJ rov TFOtrtpot
sjs -yap av xai lauroS jaaXXov rov
cTrsp ouv ttpriTOti) xadoXoci jW,sv TO o^s/Ar^ua. a^"o3oTov, eav 5
6* uTrspTSivy] 73 ootTI^ T> xaAw r; Tto avayxijtico, Trpo^ TOCUT'
e47rox?UTov * svloTS yap outf <TT}V iVoi/ TO TT^V TrpouVap^Tjv
a^u./\}/ao-5aJ, STTSiOav 6 j,:i/ erTrouSaTov siSai^ et) 7ro<7]o-Tr), TO>
0= 73 arraToSo<ri$ yiyvrjrai, ov O'ISTOII fJLQ%frqpbit elvai. ouos
yap TCO Savs/oravTi sviors exiTiSavcKTreov ' 6 j,=v -yap
o d' o
aJ Trapa
^f, O'JX ((TOD TO OLtfUOfML' UT S^il jU,V jOtT] OUTfO^ o'lOVTOil
6s, O\JK av 6o'^a<=v aTOTra TrotsHv. oVsp ouv TroXAax^ 6
fi'prjTa/, oi ^sp) Ta Tra^vj xai Ta^ Trpd^sig Ao'yo* of
eypwrt TO (opur[j.svov TOI$ Trspi a <cr;v. or* ^asv ouv
uTa TraVjf a7roSoTov, oud^ T<W TraTp) TravTa,
5 87Tp o5r efjoTjTai iroterv] ' As I
have said then, as a general rule the
debt should be repaid, but if the
giving (to some one else) prepon-
derates in moral glory, or in the
urgency of the case (over repaying),
one must incline to this ; for some-
times it is not even an equal thing to
requite the former favour, (namely)
when the one man knowing the other
to be good has benefited him, but on
the other hand, the repayment has to
be made to one whom one thinks to
be a scoundrel. For sometimes a
man ought not even to lend money in
return to one who has lent money to
him. For Ac lent it to one who is
good, thinking to get it back again,
but the other does not hope to get it
back again from a villain. If this be
the real state of the case, the claim is
of course not equal : and even if it be
not, but the parties only think so, such
conduct does not seem unreasonable.'
This and the other casuistical questions
here discussed have very little interest.
vide 3.
' that which was pre-
existing,' here ' primary obligation.'
Cf. Eth. VIII. xiv. 4: ovdfv iroi^cras
i'. Eth. IV. ii. 14 :
os Ta Toiara
6 ^J.ev^tp 8e] These words, by
carelessness of writing, refer to the
same subject.
erre r-Avvv eftr* X t P*" M^] This
double protasis, instead of having as
usual only one, has a double apodosis.
6 Sirep afiv iroAActats elpijTCu] Cf.
Eth. I. iii. i ; n. ii. 3, and above 2.
286
IlOIMiN NIKOMAXEION IX.
[CHAP.
yov=uo~< xal
exdfTToi$ ra olxs?a
oyra>
7 o'ji= rin u usTaJ, Q'JX a
a'jjAc^ou,' xa) Taipoi$ xai
xa} TO. ap ( aorTovra aTroj
fjt.lv yap
yap xoivov TO yi/0 xa} ai ?rsp} TOUTO Or) Trpd^si^'
oi'ovra*
xa
ra
8/a rauro.
ETrapxeiv, w$
xaXAiov ov 13
suo"/ xaQaTrsp
xa<
xa rot ard/f TOU
sl^ rauT* eTrapxsiv. xai TI^V
ou ?ra<rav Se* ouos yap rrjv
ou^' a5 rrjv TOU troc^ou :g TOU
(T T partly (>t y aXXa TJV Trarpixr^v, op.ol(os 3s xa)
9 pixr,v. xa) TravTi 8e TO> Trpsar/SuTspw
r'X<x/av, uTravaa-Taa'ei xai xaraxTuVst xai
Trp^g srafpnvs 8' a5 xa) a8=X<^ouf Trappy a- /ai/ xai
xojvor^ra. xa/ <rvyyevi(ri 8^ xa) QuheTai$ xa)
xa) ro7c XoiTroT^ a7ra(riv dsi TrsipiTsov TO oJxsTo
xa) o~uyxp/v=jv Ta sxao~To<j uTrdp^ovra XT'
loxai apSTTjV *] ^p^criv. TWV fjisv ouv bfJioysvtbv paatv
xp/o~;f, TCOV 8e ftiatyspovTwv epytofisvTlpa. ou JU,TJV ^/a
TOWTO CtTTOO-TaTSOV, CtAX* O)^ V SV^S^TJTa/, OUTO)
3 "^P J ^' dtropiav xai Trspi TOU 8<aXyso-Qa< Ta
ia TO
otiSe T^S Ail Oueraj] ' Not even to
Xous are all things indiscriminately
sacrificed.' It is given as an illustration
of conventional right, J?M. v. vii. i,
that goats and not sheep are sacrificed
to Zeus.
7 Kol eis ri K^STJ 8& rourd] ' And
for the same reason men think that
relations ought especially to meet at
funeral ceremonies.'
8 rpo^rjj ^Trop/cer^] 'To furnish sub-
sistence.' Fritzsche quotes Xenophon,
Memor. n. vi. 23 : SWCH/TCU Se KO!
Xprindruv ov n6vov Koivwvf'iv, aAAot
KO! tirapKf'ii' aA\^Aos.
9 vwa.va<ndfff t xol KarcwcAiVet] 'Ris-
ing up to greet them, and conducting
them to the seat of honour.' Cf.
Plato Eepub. p. 425 A : fftyds rt -rSiv
vtvrripiav irapa irpfffftuTtpots, &j vptirei,
Kal KaraK\t<reis ical {nravatrrdfffts.
IO Ttav fj.fi> <&v 6fjioyfvii>v pdtav TJ
Kpiffii~\ i.e. It is easy to compare a
relation with a relation, a tribesman
with a tribesman, &c., but to compare
a tribesman with a relation would be
more troublesome.
III. I irpfcs TO&S ju
' Who do not continue the same.' Cf.
Eth. x. iii. 3 : aAX' acif/xeVrj Siaftivti
ttas riv6s.
tyKa\tfffit 5' ^0os] 'But one might
complain, if a man who liked one for
II III.] HGIKiiN NIKOMAXEIQN IX. 287
ro vj<u <>jAou ovrac, oral/ jUTjxsrt raur'
xs/va>!/ yas> r)o~av c>/Ao<
ro |U,rj <>AsiV. syxaAso~5JS 8' a
ro ffiog ' oTrsp yap si/ otpy^ siVo^asv, ?rAr7o~rai 8/a^opaf
~; 4//Ao<^, orav jU,^ Oj,o<r^ oia>vra<
oral/ jU-si/ ouv 8<a\}/suo~^ r< xa)
A=io~ya< 8ia ro r;5oc, ju,rjflsi/ roioDr&v Ixs/voti Trparrot/roc,
saurov aiTitor' av orav 8' UTTO r% sxs/vo'j
aTrarrjS^, 8/xatov syxaAsTv r< a7rarv50"avri t xa)
>w V / Q>^' r ' V ' r
ro fo j u,io~|Ua x<pOv3Auouo~iv, oo"co ?r=pf r^ouajrspov TTJ
sav 8' a7ro8=yr]ra< j aya^o'v, ysvrjraj 8s 3
xa\ Soxv], ap' eri ^lArjrsov ; ^ oi Sui/aro'v,
'v oura
jU,vj ?rav
ours 0T* <)iAo7rovrov -yap
>' ep^rai ori ro o^aotov rco u[Mt<o
Aursov ; r) oy 7rao-
/av ; 7ravo'p3ajo-/v S' s
dp
ro
o/xs/o'rspov. Oo{*=ts ' av o
ou yap rto ro/ourco c^iAo^ TJV ' aA?vO<fo^e'vra ouv a
av(x.orto(rc<.i a^iVrarai. si 8' 6 ^asv ftiapisvoi 6 S' s^is<xso~-
rspog ysvotro xaj 7ro?vU ^iaAAarrot r-yj apsrv], .^a
$/Xa>, ^ oix svOs'^srai ; sv /A=yaAr ; 8s 8<ao-rao-<
profit, or pleasure, pretended to like
one for his character.'
8TTp 7ap eV apx?] This observation,
that ' differences arise, when men
are not really friends to each other
in the way they think,' has never
been exactly made before. The com-
mentators variously refer us to XA.
vm. iii. 3, vin. iv. i, and ix. i. 4,
none of which passages corre-
spond.
2 STOP ^f y oSv 5to>|/ucrl^ TIS] ' When-
ever one is mistaken,' . e. by his own
misconception. Cf. Ar. Metaph. in.
iii. 7 : /Se/ScuoTcfo-ij 8' apx^/ "'a (r ''''' 7re ; i
V SiaiJ-eiKrflljrai d5w'aroc. The word
8ia\)/v(r6Tj answers to Sia/ji.apr6vTa in
Eth. vm. xiii. 9.
KtpSijteuovaii''] To counterfeit friend-
ship, says Aristotle, is worse than
counterfeiting the coinage. The com-
mentators quote Theognis, vv. 119
sqq., where the same maxim occurs.
3 ot>Tf Se <f>i\T)reov irotn}pbv oSre Sei]
The MSS. vary extremely about the
reading of this passage, in which there
is evidently something wrong, otfre
5el is at all events an interpolation.
Fritzsche thinks that the whole is a
double gloss upon <t>i\oir6t>r)pov.
t-nav6p6<i><nv 5' tx ovffl ] ' To those
who are capable of restoration.'
288
NIKOMAXEION IX.
[CHAP.
, oov sv roug 7rajjxai
v <ajaevoj rr t v Oidvoiav 7rou$ I 8' ai/r^p iir t otog
e yap o
av ssi/
ls
avrig
ap=(rxop.svoi
otj8s yap Trsp/
OtVSU 3= TOUTO)!/ OUX 7
5 <ru|W./3iouv yap oup olo'v re. sipvjTa/ 8s 7rep< rourtov.
oSv oi^sv aXXo/orepov ?rpo^ aur&v SXTZOV $ el
4
; r) 8s7
S, xoii xaQoarsp
/^scrQai, otmo xai
7rpoyyevy[J,Vir)V
/a 75
Ta ^'^'^a 8s ra
jai/=av
a
ysva^voig
orav
TI
81'
xa
at
TOV
soixsv sx Tiv TTpoj eauTov
yap <>/Aoi/ rov jSouXojutsvov xa) Trparrovra raya^a ^ ra
exs/vou evsxa, ^ TOV 3ouXo'jUevov eTva/ xa) ^r)v
aurou vapiv OTrsp a/ Crepes TTpog TO. rsxva
ot 7rpoo"xsxpouxoVef. 01 8s TOV
>J TOV <ruva?iyoui/Ta xa<
8s xai TGUTO Trsp)
8s
saurov 8s TOUTO>V sxacrrov rto S'TT/H/XS?
xa< rtov
xai raura
TJ
4 fiveti S TOUTWV ou/c ^i/ <f>i\ovs flvai]
'But without these things it is not
possible, as we said, that they should
be friends.' On this use of the past
tense V in reference to what has
been previously said by the writer,
cf. Metaph. xi. \'\. 1 : ^ret 5* ijtray rpels
ovaiai. Eth. m. v. 3 : TOVTO 8' ^v TO
a-ya0o?$ cal KO.KOIS tlcat. v. i. 12: ^irel
5' 6 napdvofj.os &<>IKOS ?/v, &c. Aristotle
is here referring to Eth. \iu. iii. 9 ;
vin. v. 3.
IV. I <firp aj /jLtirepes irpoffKtKfov-
K<Jrcs] ' Which mothers feel towards
their children, and which friends who
have had a rupture (feel towards each
other),' i.e. they quite disinterestedly,
sinco in the latter case intercourse is
precluded, wish each other to live. On
the disinterested feeling of mothers,
cf. Eth. vm. viii. 3. On the use of
TrpoffKpovfiv, cf. Politics, n. v. 4 : oj ir\('i-
ffTui Sia<pep6/j,tvoi IK TUV tv iroa\ ttal
(K fjuKpwv irpoffKpovovrts oAX^Xoiy. fn
Se tiav 6fpa-ir6vT<ei> TOVTOIS ^d\iafa
irpoffKpovofjLfv, o?s irAt Iff-ra. irpoffxpdntOa
irpbs TOJ Siaicovias TOJ tyicvK\iovs.
2 irpbs iavrbv efvaj] ' The good
man has every one of these feelings
towards himself, and other men have
them in so far as they set up to be
good ; ' (i. e. wherever they fall short
in these feelings, they fall short also
in their attempt to be good). 'For,
as we have said, virtue and the good
man are the standard for everything.'
Cf. Eth. in. iv. 5 ; x. v. 10.
III. IV.]
II0IKQN NIKOMAXEIQN IX.
280
5a?r
eo/xs yap, xa
sTva<.
r y roiourot
sp sprjTa/, [Aerpov exourrtp r\ apsTrj xa
oyro yap ojU,oyva) ( aovi' sauraJ, xa/ rail/ 3
a<jTu>v ops'ysTa/ Kara TraVav TT)V -v!/y^r;v, xa< j3u^sTa< 3>j
eayrco TayaSa xa< ra Qaivopsva. xoii TTpdrrsi (TOW yap
aya^ou Taya^ov OfaTrovsiV) xa) saurou si/sxa' TOU -yap
OTrsp Ixaoroj iva< SoxsT. xa< ?jv 3s
laurov xai o"a)s<r$a<, xai p,aX<(rra TOUTO ou
yap TO> <77rou3auo TO sTva/. '
eaura>
Travr'
i vu
<v xsvo TO ysvo^asvov, sp^s< yap xa vuv o
, aXX* <ov o TI TTOT' s<rriv. $6sis 8' av TO
aXi<TTa. <rtvOiays<v TS o TOIOVTO$ s
yap auTo Troiii' Ttov TS yap TrsTTpay-
ai ]U.v7Jj,a/, xai TCOV
ai TOiauTa* o' rJosTa/. xai fisaj
^ 3<avoj'a, (ruvaXysT TS xa) (ruvvjSsT
yap scrTi TO auTO XuTrrjpo'v TS xat TJ^U, xai oyx
XXo* ajasTa/jtsXvjToj yap ai siTrsTv. Ttp o^ ?rpo
]U,sj/ sxa<TTa TOVTCUV wTrapysjv TO> sTr^sixs?, Trpoj os TOV
sp^s/j/ J(T7rsp Trpo^ sauTo'v (SO~T< yap o
), xai 73 ^>X/a TOUT>I/ sTva/ TI 3oxs7, xai
4 e/fa<7TOS 8' eoirry ^ofjAerat /ta-
Afo-ra] ' But every man wishes what
is good/or himself. No one, on con-
dition of becoming another man, chooses
that that new thing, which he should
become, should possess everything,
(for God has now all good) ; but
(every man desires to possess what is
good) remaining his present self. And
the thinking faculty would appear to
be each man's proper self, or more so
than anything else.' The usual punc-
tuation of this passage has been altered
to obtain the above translation, which
has been suggested to the annotator,
and which seems to give a more natural
explanation of the text than has been
arrived at by the commentators, who
universally explain a\\' &v S TI iror'
VOL. II. P
Ivriv to refer to the unchangeableness
or to the personality of God. If the
passage be read as above, it will be
seen that the words &v 8 TJ iror' tffriv
are in opposition to yfv6/jifvos 5' SAAos.
Aristotle says that to every man his
personality is what is dear to him, he
would not relinquish this to gain all
the world, for by relinquishing it he
would not gain anything. With a
changed personality, he would no more
possess any good thing, than he now
possesses it because God possesses all
good. All his wishes are made on the
basis of being still what he is. The
good man, who fosters his thinking
faculty, most of all takes care of his
proper self.
290
IIOIKilN NIKOMAXEIftN IX.
[CHAP.
6 rautf v7rdp%si. Trpos OL'JTQV 8s Trorspw <TTIV ^ ovx *e<rri
,/a, a<^s/(r6a> STTI TOU Trapovrog ' Oo^sis 8* av T&vTy
X/a, *^ <TT< 6uo T] 7rXieo Ix Ttov slprjfj.svcov t xai OTI
7 y 6?rp3oX^ T>] QihioLg Ty Trpog airov ojttojoura/.
fie TO.
xa
ap' o3v
xai
vov<riv
os
yap auro^, xa repcov
oTov oj axparsrf alpouvroLi yap O.VT} TU>V
6 irpis avrbi' 5e 6/ioioDrai] 'But
whether friendship towards oneself is,
or is not, possible, we may leave un-
decided for the present. It would
seem to ie possible in so far as two or
more of the above mentioned conditions
exist, and because the extreme of
friendship resembles one's feelings
towards oneself.' Several commen-
tators explain p &rrl Svo t) irXej'w to
mean ' in so far as man consists of
two or more parts,' and fa -rStv fipi)-
Htvuv they would translate ' in ac-
cordance with what we have before
said,' referring to Eth. i. xiii. 9. In
this sense the passage would be a
parallel one to Eth. v. xi. 9. But it
is clear from the next section that iic
riav fiprinevuv refers to the definitions
of friendship, given in i of this
chapter. cupdffBa is used as in Eth.
vin. i. 7, VIH. viii. 7. We are not
here referred to the subsequent dis-
cussion in Eth. ix. viii., where by no
means the same subject is renewed.
8 2x e 5bf 8e oiiOf rots QavAois
eaurouj] ' But one might almost say
that these things do not appertain to
the bad at all. For they are at variance
with themselves, and desire one set
of things while they wish another,
just like the incontinent; instead of
what seems to them to be good they
choose the pleasant though it is hurt-
ful ; and others through cowardice
and want of spirit abstain from doing
what they think to be best for them-
selves ; and they who through wicked-
ness have committed many crimes hate
their life, and fly from it, and put an
end to themselves.' The 'desire' of
the wicked, as being of the particular
and subject to the domination of
the senses (Eth. vn. iii. 9), is at
variance with their ' wish,' which is of
the universal and implies a conception
of the good. Cf. Eth. v. ix. 6, vm.
xiii. 8. The description of bad men
given here ignores and is at variance
with the conclusions of Book vn. In
that book the strength, and here the
weakness, of vice is represented. Thus
in Eth. vn. viii. the bad man is de-
scribed as unrepentant, abiding by his
purpose ( i), having the major pre-
miss of his mind corrupted ( 4), and
therefore having no wish for the good,
even in the universal. The account
in Book vn., which makes ewtoAaat'a
or abandoned vice free from all weak-
ness, is more theoretical and less drawn
from nature than the above descrip-
tion. All that is said here has a close
relation to, and was probably suggested
by, the words in the Lysis of Plato, p.
2140: TOUJ 8e KOKOVS, <fafp ital \fye-rcu
IV. V.]
IIGIKftN NIKOMAXEmN IX.
291
ra ijOea $Aa$=a OVTOL'
SOXOUVTOJV eoiuroTg ayaQibv stvai a
ol 8' a.u otot. Ss/A/av xai apyiav a^ia-Tavrai TOU
TSJV a ofcvrai eavrdis j3s?\.T<(TTa sivou ' (fig 6s TroXAa xai
TTsVpaxTai 8/a TVJV jaop^^p/av, fj.uroua'i TS xou
TO rjv xa< ava/poGViv lauTOU. VjToGV/ TS of
ers
pa.
yap
xa(f
ou^sv TS
S
xa utrvsptov, xa
erspcuv
ouQlv
o
TO
TO
S'
si -yap avrtv >
s^o'jasvov nvtov,
xai TO p.sv ^supo TO 8' sx?<r sT^xst
el 3s ^ olo'v TS a/x,a Xu7rsTo~9a< xai ^
jtxsTa [juxpov ye
Tj^sa Ta
ys^ouo~/v
on
ou 8^ fyaivsrai o
-Qai 8ia TO
xa< oux av
-yap o*
ou
uSe
TO
yap
xa
sauTov
'H
yvsrai yap swa xa
\ t * * 7 "
xou Trsiparsov eTTisixr) sivai OUTCO
> ' ^o* xa} sTspa)
soixsv, oy ]U.rjv S<TT/ ys
po^ ayvcoTaj xa)
f o/jioiovs /^r)5* avTois
el^ot, oAA" f(j.TT\-i]KTOvs re Kol afffadi^f)-
TOVS.
9 10 <rTaffteiyf(i.ov<nv~\ 'For
their soul is in tumult, the one part of
it, through viciousness, grieves at ab-
staining from certain things, but the
other part is pleased (at this abstin-
ence), and the one pulls this way, the
other that way, as though tearing (the
man) in pieces. If it is not possible
to feel pain and pleasure at the same
moment, at all events after a little
while (the bad man) is pained that he
felt pleasure, and he " could have
wished that those pleasures had not
p p
happened to him ; " for the wicked are
full of repentance.' This picture of
the mental struggles of the bad does
not recal either the phraseology or
the doctrines of Book vn., where
fioxG-npla is contrasted with, and op-
posed to, axpouria (cf. vn. viii. I ). The
metaphor aTaai^ei occurs repeatedly
in Plato's Republic, cf. i. p. 352 A:
(?; aSiKia) & evl tvovaa, icpGnov fifv
O&VVO.TOV avrbv irpaTTtiv irotJifffi ffTaatd-
foiro Kal ot>x bpovoovvra. avrbv eaurtf,
eirfira fxflpbj/ Kl eavry KO! TOIS Sinaiois.
Cf. Eth. i. xiii. 15.
V. 'H 8" tijvoia OKoAowflel] 'No\T
292
H0IKQN NIKOMAXEIilN IX.
ow. xa TTporspov
raur
2 <>j?\.>5irej Ss recur' axoXouds?. xai 73 ]a=v
73 8' svvoia xai ex 7Tpo<r7raj'o'., oloi/ xa)
[CHAP.
//.sra
xa
at/
suvot yivovrai xou
3 soixs
eva (txnrs TOO
yap
r o<a TTJ<;
epa, o oe
TO) s^s* ou^sv jtxaAXov epa, aX?^' orav xai airovra.
good-will is like friendship, but yet it
is not friendship, for goodwill is exer-
cised both towards unknown persons,
and when its own existence is unknown
(to the object), which is not the case
with friendship. But all this has been
said already. It is not even the same
as loving ; for it exhibits neither viol-
ence nor longing, which are the ac-
companiments of loving.' The Saxon
word ' Good- will,' and not the Latin
' Benevolence,' which is too abstract
and general, is the representative ,of
tSvoia. Goodwill, says Aristotle, is
engendered by the appearance of noble
qualities, it is rapidly conceived, but
is passive in its character, and is only
the prelude of friendship. There being
no correspondent adjective to the sub-
stantive ' Good-will,' we must express
ti5(/oi by 'Well-disposed.' Just as in
Eth. in. the cognate faculties to Pur-
pose, and in Eth. \i. the cognate
qualities to Wisdom are discussed, so
Aristotle here introduces a discussion
of the feelings which are cognate to
Friendship.
Kai irp6rfpov 8^] vin. ii. 3-4.
Sidraff iv] ' Intensity,' ' straining,'
' violence.' In the previous section
Sia.TfTa.fj.ev<as means ' strenuously.' Cf.
Ar. Polit. vii. xvii. 6 : T&S Siardo-eu
TUV iraiSwv Ko.1 K\av6/j.ovs, ' the violent
passions and cryings of children,'
z T; 8' evi'oia crvpfiaivti] While
loving implies acquaintance and fami-
liarity, good-will is conceived instan-
taneously ; thus men conceive good-
will towards particular competitors in
the games from their appearance, and
are inclined to wish them success.
3 Good-will, says Aristotle, is the
prelude of Friendship, just as the
pleasure of the eye is the prelude of
love. This however does not consti-
tute love. The test of love is longing
for a person in absence. Cf. Ar. Rhet.
I. xi. 1 1 : where the same test is given.
In accordance with the unhappy no-
tions of the Greeks, axAvraia here put
in the masculine gender.
rj Sio. TTJS oij/eais] In Plato's Cratylus,
p. 420 A, it is suggested that "Epeas is
derived from flffptw. "Epus Sri flaptt
Q<a8fv Kal otiK olittla. tffrlv i] po^j oXnt\
rip e^ovrj, a\A* faflffaxTos Sick TUV
0/j.fjidruv, Sto ravra ctirb rov tiffptiv tffpos
T& ye itaXaibv ^/caXelro. Cf. Shakspeare
Merchant of Venice, Act ni. Sc. ii.
' It is engendered in the eyes,
By gazing fed.'
And Borneo and Juliet, Act I. Sc. iii.
'I'll look to like, if looking liking move.'
ou T^IV 8ia rb what/iav] ' Goodwill '
is essentially disinterested in its cha-
racter.
V. VI.]
NIKOMAXEK1N IX.
293
- xa
?>>? \
oiov T eiva.1 JW.TJ
OUTO>
e
01
xa
V
envoi
yap
' av ouactf, ouo' o
eui/oi, (rufJiTTpaaisv av ouactf, ouo oyisv yTrp
oio u.sTaQ>pu)V (ban] T< ai/ aurrjv ctpyrjv eTvai
ypovt^ofJisvyv 6s xai sl^ o'yv^soxv a,<$ixvo<j[j.ivr)V
,_/ > v?-\ v ' 'S> v ^ 5>v \ fj. /
4><?uav, ou TT^V o<a TO pprj<r<jaov ouos TTJV Oia TO rjou'
yap euyoia. ITT\ TOVTOI$ ytvsrai. o jaev yap suspys
av6' tov 7T7rov9ev aTTOvs^asi TTJV euvotav, Ta 8/xa<a Sptov o
OS /SouXo'jCCHVo'^ T<v' SUTTpaySlVj gy\.7T/3a SVCOV SyTTOp/aj 8l'
exs/vou, oux sox' euvovs exstvtp sJvou, aXXa jaaX?^.ov l
xaQonrsp ovtis 0^o?,
8' >] suvoia, 81' apsTvjV xai sTrisixsidv nva y/j/Tat, 4
> $)avY) xaXo'j T<^ ^ aj/8ps7o TJ' T/ TOIOUTOV,
STTI TCOV aytovJo~Tc6v
O
yap
TO
TOUTO
sisv av. ou8s TOU^ Trepi OTOUOUV Ojaoyvaj/xovovTag
<poi<riv, oiov TOV$ Trspi rtov oupav/cov (oi yap
TTsp) TOUTOJV ofj.ovos'iv^ aXAa Ta^ Trohsig bp.ovosiv
orai/ 7re0< Ttov (TUjac^spoWcov o^oyvay^ovaxri xa/
7rpoa.ipwvTai xai 7rparrto(ri TO, xoivy So'^avTa. Trepi Ta 2
TrpaxTa 8^ Oj,ovooSo~iv, xa* TOUTOJV Trspi Ta ev
Ta svSsp^o'jU,va apfyoiv U7rap%siv TJ ^ao-iv, olov at
&Taj/ 7rao~i Soxr Ta^ ap^ag alpsrag slvai, y
, Y oip^siv IliTTaxo'v, OTS xa) at>To^ rj
xa
VI. I <j>t\ixbv Se 6/xo5o|/a] 'Un-
animity also appears to be of the
nature of friendship ; therefore it is
not the same as agreement of opinion.'
On ^(AtKbr, cf. JEfcA. vm. i. 4 ; vm.
xiii. 6.
oiW robs Trepl TV oupaj/fwj'] Cf. S/^.
ni. iii. 3 : irepl 8e rcDj' di'Sfwx ouSels
(SouAfueroi, oTor irepl TOU K^fffnov. Ari-
stotle arrives at his definition of <5jU(Wia
inductively, saying that we do not find
the name applied to agreement of
opinion in general, nor again to agree-
ment of opinion about every particular
subject, but we do find it used of states
whose citizens are unanimous on the
measures to be adopted for the common
weal. Hence we get the idea that
unanimity is 'political friendship.' Cf.
Eth. vm. i. 4, where 6fi6voia is used
as the opposite of <JTcJ<m.
2. ^ itpx 6 "' HtTTa/crfi', ore ol curbs
$ee\(t>] ' Or (if all agree) that Pittacus
shall rule, (supposing this to be) during
the period when he himself was willing
to rule.' Pittacus, having held his
294
NIKOMAXEIftN IX.
[CHAP.
oav
8' I
sauTov
wa'Trsp o sv raig >oiv-
i'er<rai, TTao-/aWni/ * ou yap e<r5' ojaovosiV TO auro Ixa-
Tspoj/ evvosTv 68>j7roT, aXXa TO si/ TU> auTto, olov oVav xai
o 8rjjao xai oJ 7riixis rov$ a,pi<rTous cip%eiv. OUTCO -yap
TraVi ylyvsrai ou sfyievrat. TTO?UTJX>J 8= </X/a c^a/vsTa/
r) o^to'vo/a, ycaQdirep xcti "heysrar Trep} TO. <rup.$f,WTa. yap
3 so-Tt xai Ta s)^ TOV ^/ov avryXOVTa. STTJ S' >j TOiaurr)
o^ovQia. sv TU$ 7riix(nv owTO/ yap xai gauTo?^ 6/Jtovoouo-<
xai aXX>]7.oi^, STT} T&V ayTtov OVTS^ a>^ elTrsJV' T<OV TO/-
OUTOJV
ju,eve<
T Ttt
xa ou fJt,Ta.ppii
< Tflt <
e xa
TS bfjiovoiiv
xai raig
STT) jtx/xpo'v, xaQa.7Tp xoti
s$>ie[j.evQv$ Iv rolg a)^=X//xo/<;, sv 8s
sa^Tto 8'
s'sTae/ xai
efva/,
TauTa TOV
(rv
yap rypovvTcov TO xoivov
TO?^ <rra(na%tv,
8s jOtTj /3oyXojU.VOU Ta 8/xa*a
7 Oi 8* evspysTou roug fafymflir<Jt$ 8oxoDo~i
xai
a.vsi ovv a-
elective monarchy for ten years, re-
signed. Had the citizens o/Ver this
period wished him to reign, his own
will would have been wanting to make
unanimity in the state.
ot &/ TCUS "froic/o-ffeus] Eteocles and
Polynices. Cf. Eurip. Phanissce, w.
588, sqq.
Tb ovrb (Karfpov tvvotlv dS^rorf]
The commentators illustrate this by
the joke of the man who said ' that he
and his wife had always perfectly
agreed in wishing to govern the
house.'
3 ^T! TWV avrwv tines, ij eiirtlV]
'Being on the same moorings, as it
were,' as opposed to the ebbings and
flowings of a Euripus. Cf. Demos-
thenes, De Corona, p. 319, 281, OVK
, sc.
o-yKi/pos.
4 This is a picture of the discord
produced by evil passions, where every
one grasping at the larger share in
good things, and shirking his part in
labours and services, watches (^{eToj)
his neighbour to prevent him encroach-
ing. Thus men force each other to
do what is right, while unwilling to
do it themselves.
VII. Aristotle says, it is noticed
as something extraordinary (us iropck
A 6yoi> tiriirre'iTcu) that benefactors
seem to love those, to whom they
have done a kindness, more than the
benefited persons love them. The
common explanation of the paradox
VI. VIL]
H0IK&N NIKOMAXEmN IX.
295
yivo[j.svov sTnjrsira*. Toig fjt.v ovv
>ajV=rai, on ol fj.lv oQsfaovG'i Toig Ss o4>=/A=Tai xa$a-
sp o5i/ ITT) TO>V Savs/cov o< ^.si/ ofysfaovTsg jSouAovra* jar;
S> V S> ' V
, oi 6s 6avJTavT xai
a<
*? ?*
eiva/ o/
row;
rag %piTag, Toig oyx sTva* emp.s'h.ss TO
fj.lv ovv TO-% oiv <$O.IYJ raura heyeiv OLVTOUS sx
Q;a)[JLvou$) loixs 8' a.v^pa)7rix(D' afj.vrjfj.ovss -yap ol
xa) jaaXXov eu 7ra<r^s<v ^ TTOISIV sfyisvrai. fto^eie 2
8' av QiHTixwTspov slvai TO a'tTiov, xa} oup^ ofj.oiov TIO Trep]
Tovg SaveiVavra^ * oJ yap <rri 4^'^"'? Trepi exsivovg, aXAa
rou o~a)%?(rQat fiov'h.rjfris T*l$ xofj.tiyg svsxa ' ol 8' su
oTaS, XOLV
av. OTrsp 3
Trag yap TO olxsTov
av
8' iVeoj TOUTO Trspi
sg uo~Tspov
xa STTI rtov
epyov dyaTra
Sjaif/up^ou ysvofj.evov
WTTO TOLI epyou
o-vfj.@aiv;r vTrepayaTT&o-i yap OIITOI TO. olxsfa
is, that benefactors look forward to
obtaining a return for their kindness,
they thus cherish the persons of those
who are indebted to them. This sel-
fish theory views mankind on the dark
side (e irocTjpoiJ Oewfj.evovs), but is not
altogether devoid of truth. A deeper
(fyvffiK&repov) reason however may be
assigned for the phenomenon in ques-
tion, namely, that as we can only be
said to exist when we are conscious of
our vital powers (laplv eVepyei'ot), so
anything which gives or increases the
sense of those powers is dear to us.
The benefited person stands to the
benefactor in the relation of a work
to the artist, he is an exponent of the
benefactor's self, and is thus regarded
with feelings of affection, as being
associated by the benefactor with the
sense of his own existence (ffTepyei 8)j
rb epyov, Si6n Kal rb elfaj). These
feelings of course cannot be recipro-
cated by the benefited person. Again,
the benefactor associates an idea of
the noble (rb Ka\6i>) with the recipient
of his good deeds ; the other associates
with him only an idea of the profit-
able, and this is a less loveable idea,
especially when viewed in the past,
and become a matter of memory.
Again, the active part taken by the
benefactor has more affinity to the
active principle of loving.
TOIS fj.ev ailv irAefcrTots] This ex-
planation is put by Thncydides (n. 40)
into the mouth of Pericles :
Tfpos St 6 Spdffas rfyv X<*p
6if>ei\ofj.finf)v Si' evvuias $ 8e'8co/ce
6 S"
ajuj8A.ure/jos, et
, ctAA' eis 6<j>ei\rif^a rty
The words IK trovnpov
Qfw/j.evovs seem to have been taken
296
IIGIKilN NIKOMAXEIiiN IX.
[CHAP.
too~7rsp Tsxva. - TO/OUTOJ
TO rtov svspysTutV TO yap sv TTSTTOV^OS spyov SO~T}V
TOUTO 8>j ayotTruxri jOtaXXov r) TO spyov TOV Troiry-
TOUTOU 8' CL{TIOV oTi TO sTi/ou TraViv alpSTov xctl
s(T(j.sv 8* svspysia.' TU> yjv yap xai Trpdrreiv.
evspysiqc. 8>j 6 ?rojrjo~a TO spyov SO~TI 7ra) o~Tspysi 8j TO
/, 8<oV/ xa) TO sJvat. TOUTO 8s &VQ-IXOV o -yap SO~T<
TO spyov jtxTjvysi. ctjU.a 8e xa) T7
^tsv svepyeTy xaXov TO xaTa T^V Trpa^iv, O><TTS %aip=iv ev
to TOUTO, TO) 8s TraQo'vTi oy^ev xaXov ev TO)
siVsp, o-v[j.<$>epov TOUTO 8' ^TTOV 7380 xa
8' (TT< TOU JU,V TTOipOVTOg 7] SVSpyStOi, TOU 8s
TOU 8s ysyevyfjisvov r, ^vy^y. ffiurTov 8s TO
7]8s7a
out of some iambic or trochaic verse
of the Sicilian poet, but the verse
itself has not been preserved.
4 TOIOUT<|I> 8)j /jvi5ei] ' The case of
benefactors seems then something of
the same kind. For the object bene-
fited is their " work ; " they love this
therefore more than the work loves
him who made it. The cause of this
is that existence is desired and loved
by all, but we exist by consciousness,
that is to say by living and acting.
Thus he whe has made the work in
question exists consciously, and there-
fore he loves the work, because he
loves his existence. And this is a
principle of nature ; for that which
exists potentially, the work proves
to exist actually.' On this mode
of paraphrasing tvtpytia, see Vol.
I. Essay IV. Any work of art,
or creation of the mind, or moral
achievement, is here said to shew us
externally to ourselves. It causes us
to exist Ivepytlq, that is, not only in
ourselves, but for ourselves. It thus
becomes a union of the objective and
the subjective. And the philosophical
principle explains a whole class of ho-
mogeneous facts, not only the feelings
of benefactors towards the benefited,
but of poets towards their poems, of
parents, and especially mothers, to-
wards their children ; and of those
who have made fortunes towards their
property. These facts were brought
together, without being analysed, by
Plato, cf. Republic, p. 330 B-C, and
Eth. rv. i. 20.
tvtpytia S}; wwj] Many commen-
tators understand these words to
mean, 'Therefore by means of con-
scious activity the maker is in a sense
his work,' in which they are supported
by Eustratius and the Paraphrast.
This would not materially alter the
general drift of the passage.
6 T)5f7a 8' trrrl JW>};UTJ] ' Now of
the present the living reality is sweet,
of the future the hope, of the past the
memory.' In two clauses of this
sentence subjective words are used
(eA.irts and /j.vfi/j.ij'), but tvepytia in the
remaining clause hovers between the
objective and the subjective. Cf. Ar.
J)e Memoria, i. 4, where aXoOijffis is
used in an analogous sentence : rov
rov 5t
VII VIII.] H6IKQN NIKOMAXEIflN IX.
297
evs&ysiav, xa <><Ar y Tov (tfj.oiwg. rtp jasv ouv 7r=7rojr r
XO'TJ [j.5vsi TO spyov (TO xaAov yap 7roAuppo'i/ov), TCO os
TO %prj(ri[Jiov TrapQi^srai. y TS jtxv^rj TCOV ju,ev
sia, Ttov 8= %ptyr{fjuov ou Trdvu y TJTTOI/ 15 7rpoo~-
oox/a 8' ai/aTraAjv s^s/v foixev. xai 13 |.ef
eoixsv, TO c^/AsTo-Sai 2s Tip 7rd(r%=iv. roig u
8?) 7Tp< Tr^v Trpa^iv sTTsrai TO 4)/X57v xal
STJ Ss Ta 7ri7To'va>^ ysvotjisva Travrsg
olov xai T ^r t ^.ara oi xT^o~a/x=voi Ttov
3oxs? 8^ TO JOLSV su 7rao~^=tv OLTTOVOV sivai,
eu TTOISIV spyS)%$. 8/a TauTa S= xai a/
xvoTspar sTriTrovwTepa yap y yswqtrig t xai
OTI awTtiov. ^o'sis 8' av TOUTO xai
TO
8e xai TTOTS^OV 8=7 c^iXsTv sauTov jU,aAio~Ta 8
aAXov Tiva* sTriTifj.wa'i yap TO?^ gauTou jM,aX/o~Ta aya-
xai co ev aio~^po) c^iXauTOu^ a^oxaXouo~<, 8oxs7
T o jtxsv <ba^? eauTou p^ap/j/ TravTa TTpaTTs/v, xa< oVcp
av p.o%$r}pOTEpos TTJ, TOO-QUTO) jtxaXXov* eyxaXouo"/ 8^ aura>
OT< ou#ev a^' sauTou Trpdrrsi ' 6 8' STrisixr^ 8<a TO xaAoi/,
xai oo"to av /3sXT/a>i/ Y ; , jaaXXov Sia TO xaXov, xai (>/Aou
evsxa ' TO o* a^Tou ira.pir)<riv. roig "Xoyoig 8s TOUTO*^ Ta z
VIII. In this interesting chapter,
Aristotle discusses the difficulty as to
' whether one ought to love oneself es-
pecially, or some one else.' On the one
hand, ' self- loving ' is used as a term of
reproach ; on the other hand, one's
feelings towards oneself are made the
standard for one's feelings towards
friends. These two points of view re-
quire reconciliation, which may be ef-
fected by a distinction of terms. For
the word ' self' has two senses the
lower and the higher self, the one con-
sisting in appetites and passions, the
other in the intellect and the higher
moral faculties. He that gratifies his
lower self at the expense of others is
' self-loving ' in the bad sense of the
term. He that ministers to his higher
VOL. II. Q
self promotes at the same time the good
of others, and is worthy of all praise.
Such self-love as this may lead a man
even to die for his friends or for his
country. A man, grasping at the
noble, may give up honour, power,
life itself ; and thus the greatest self-
sacrifice will be identical with the
greatest self-love. These considera-
tions show in what sense one ought,
and in what sense one ought not, to
'love oneself.'
1 us Iv aiffxw] 'As a term of
reproach.'
ovBkv cuff favrov Trpdrrei] ' He does
nothing apart from himself.' ' Nihil
a suis rationibus alienum.'
2 rots \6yois Se owe a\6yu>s] 'With
these theories men's actions, not un-
298
TOV
a)
TauTa
xa rot
IIOIKflN NIKOMAXEIQN IX. [CIIAP.
', 4>/Xo 8s jW,aX3"Ta 6 |3oi*Xo-
i Taya$a sxs/vou sv=xa, xa} el ^.t]^slg
8* inrdpysi jU-aXtTT* awTto ?rpof avTov,
6
or/ dbr' aitrou TTCLVTO. rot. 4>/X<xa xa}
xa; a Trapoijtxa*
8s
7ra<ro
TO '
xa
awrov
xai
70 vu
xa
xoiva ra
eyyiov.
' jaaX<o"Ta yap
laurov. aTropiirai 8
xa} ' lo~orr^
TravTa yap Tat>Ta
a'jT<w,
sixoVa)^
ouv
TOU
& oarov
TO
xa/
avrov$ xaXouo~i
p/pr]|U,ao~< xa} TI{J.OLIS xa}
TOUTOJV yap of TroXXo} opsyovTaj
TO
rv
8*7 Ttov Xo'ycov
xa} TT^ c
exaTepoj
ovei8o^ ayovreg
a7rovsp.ovTag TO TrXsTov sv
xa} !o~7rou8axa<r<
apio~Ta
xa
810
so~< xa} TO> a
8<o xa} 73 7rpoo~7]yop/a
0~TIV. 01 8r)
\ f.
c xai
TOIOUTO* 8'
aTro TOU
5
8s
o
*.'}
e yap T< as
TTOLVTWV
} <$>iAauTou, oux
8/xa<a TrpaTTSiv
Ta (rcoQpovot. ^ oTrojaout/ aXXa TCOV xaTa Ta^ apsTaj, xa}
oAco asi TO xaXov savnS TrspiTrojoiro, ouQ=}<; eps? TOUTOV
A '-, '5-^1'^* 5- 'A" <> * c ~ ~. _ ?
6 cpiXauTOj/ oude \f/esi. oo^sis 6 ai/ o TOIOUTO^ ^oiaXAov s/vai
4>/AauTO* oiTTOvspsi youv sauTO) Ta xaXXio-Ta xa}
aya^a, xa} %api%Tai lauTou TO> xupia)TaTa>, xa}
reasonably, are at variance.' To the
list of the meanings of the word S^w
given in the note on <A. i. vii. u,
we must add the above use of ret epya
to mean ' actions ' as opposed to theory.
Cf. jfftA.^x. i. 3 : of 7ap irtpl TWI/ &
TOIS TToOecrt (cai TO? j rr/)<{{<n X^of ?irr6it
tlfft iriffTol TWV tpywv. x. viii. 12:
5' dATjfles ^v TO?J irpaKrois IK rai/
KO! rov filov icplvfTcu. Aristotle saj r s
that men do not ' act ' as if they con-
sidered self-love to be wholly bad, and
he proves this by quoting popular pro-
verbs, which support the contrary view.
VIII. ]
NIKOMAXEION IX.
299
TOUTOJ
'-
jttaXUTT <va< ooxt xai ;rav
W(T7r=p 8 = XOLl 3TdXf$ TO XVpl(t)TO.T(>V
, ' f \
o (rucrrr^a, wcio xai
' xa} 4>fXaVTO$ or t jaa?u<rra o royro ayaTrtoi/ xa}
TGUTO) p/apjo'jUvoc. xa} syxparr^ 3s xa} dxparr^
rai TCO xpariiv TOV vo-jv ^ /xr^ a> TOUTOU sxaffrou
xa) EXOUGTICOS ra U.STOC.
ouS' exaerToj s<mv r t u.d-
xai OTI 6 7r<s/xfj ,a?a(rTa TOUT'
Xo'yov
oy, xa) tiiafysptov TOFOVTOV "oVoj/ TO
Toy xara rra^o^, xa) o^sye(r5a< Toy xaXoy -^ Toy
ouv
Tct
TTO(.VTS$
xa 7ra<voyo~iv ' Trvrwv os a^at ?^Xa)jasva>v T
TO
irvr
Ss
Ta sovTa xa* oa exa<TTa> Ta
r av
TO>V
e<7rsp *
COOTS TOJ/
xa
TrpoiTTcov xa TOW; aXXoy^ eo>^>5<r< TOV = ftov-
oy Ss? /3Aa\}/s< yap xa) sayTov xa}
a65<r/v S7rop.svos. TO> [AO^r/pai [j.\v
a Os7 TrpoiTTSiv xa} a Trpdrrst ' o 8' ITTJS/X^C, a Os
xa} Trpdrrei' Troig yotp vov$ alpzlrai TO
o 8' sTTisixrfg 7r=iQap%i ra> va>. d'h.rfiss 8=
Toy 9
xa TO TCOV
xdv SsVy
xa}
svexa TroXXa Trpdrrsiv xdi
xa
6 fitrirfp 6e /col ir<5Ais
' But as the predominant part (in a
state) seems before all things to ie
the state, and as the predominant
part in every other system seems to
6e that system, so (the predominant
part in man seems, above all things,
to 6e) man.' Cf. EM. x. vii. 9 : S<*
8" 6v /col elvcu etcocTTOj roDro, tfrrep rb
Kvpwv (col Sjueivoc. On the uses of the
word Kvpios cf. note on JEW. i. ii. 4.
in the above passage rb Kvpidararov
xcti ohcog rd
means the 'most absolute,' the 'ruling'
part. Cf. AT. Politics, m. vii. 2 :
iro\irfvfj.a 8* &rrl rb nvpiov ruv w6\ecey,
avdymj 5" c?f at Kvpiov ?} eva ^ oA/'yous ^
TOUS woAAous.
7 etVep ^ o/3T^ roioOrrfv ^<rrij']
' If virtue is one of the greatest of
goods.'
8-1 o The sentiments expressed in
these sections may be compared with
the elevated description of the self-
sacrifice of the brave man, in Eth. ni.
Q 2
300
H0IKHN NIKOMAXEK1N IX.
[CHAP.
<rv[j.fiaivei' alpovvTat 8r)
* to
7Tpi7roiov[j.svo$ lauTto ro xaAo'v
o~4>o'8pa jUaXXov IXOJT' av TJ TroXuv ijpljtt*,
eviavrov % TTO'AX' err) ruovra) xa)
xa} jU.sya
8' u7repa7roQvif)(rxov<ri TOUT' 'l
xaAov sauToT^. xal -^pr^ara irpooivT* av
Xyj^ovrai oi C^/Xo/ ' yiyvsrai yap TO> ]U.sv
, aurto 8s TO xaXo'v ' TO 8>) jasT^ov a-ya^ov
si. xa} Trsp} r^ag 8s xa) ap%a$ o auTO
yap rip </Xa> Tat>Ta 7rporj<rTai' xaXov yap
TOUTO xai eTrajvsTo'v. slxoVa^ 8^ SoxsT O*7rou8a7ot;
avTi TravTrov alpou[j.svo$ TO xaXc'v. evfis^srai 8s
'> ~i'^ Ji A VV '^.
Trpa^sig TJ cp>iX> 7rpo<so-9a<, xa/ s<va< xaAX/ov TO
Trpa^ai TO a*Tiov TCO (J)/A(o ysvso-Qa<. ev TraVj
STT DUVET 01$ o o-7Tou8aTo <$>ct.ivsTai sauTa) Tou xaXou
oura> jasv ouv <i'AauTov sTva* 8s?, x
* cog 8' oi TroXXo/, oi pf>].
8e xa) Trsi TOV su8a/.ova si 8
TOU;
ix. 4-5. But we may particularly
note here the delicacy of thought
which suggests that the good man
may on occasion give up to his friend
the doing of noble acts, and thus
acquire to himself a still greater
nobility. A comparison is sometimes
instituted between the <pt\avria of Ari-
stotle and the ' self-love ' of Bishop
Butler. But the ' self-love ' described
by Butler is a creeping quality, it
deals with means rather than with
ends, and considers the ' interest ' of
man in this world or the next. Ari-
stotle's 4>jAaurt'a is simply a devotion
to what is great and noble.
IX. Does the happy man, who is
all-sufficient in himself, need friends,
or not ? To prove the affirmative of
this question, Aristotle uses the fol-
lowing arguments.
I A priori, we might assume that,
as happiness is the sum of all human
goods, the possession of friends, one
of the greatest of external goods,
would necessarily be included ( z).
z Friends will be required by the
happy man, not so much as the givers,
but rather as the recipients, of kind-
ness ( z).
3 We might assume also that the
happy man should neither be con-
demned to be a solitary, nor to live
with strangers and chance people (3).
4 Those who take the negative side
in the question have an unworthy
conception of friends, as persons af-
fording profit or pleasure. The happy
man is almost independent of such
( 4), but yet he may want friends in
a higher sense. Happiness consists
in the play of life (frtpytta), and he
that sees before his eyes the virtuous
VIII. IX.] HGIKflN NIKOMAXEK1N IX.
301
xou avTapx;(riv'
OVV OVTOLg
ovra TTQ
yap auro?^ raya&d' auYapx=j
'Qai, TQV 8s <A01/, TOV OLVTbV
a 81* aurou aSuvareT* o'Ssv TO
8' aroTrio TO TTO.VT a.7rovs[J.ovTa$ Ta.ya.Qa TOO suSa/- z
U>j dbro^SoW/, o 8ox=7 Ttov exTO ayaftduv
sivai. si TS 0/Xou
, xai JCTT/ TOL> ayafiou
Tv xaXX<ov 3' su 7roi=7j/
apsrris TO euep-
rcav si) TTSUTO-
T(OV
xa TCOV
OLTOTTOV
- 3
TravT
usg yap
ayaSa* TTOX/T/XOV yap o avQpa)7ro$ xat
xai TW suSa/jaov* 8^ TOtiS' V7rdp%ei' TO.
yap TJ) (>u<rej dyafla
xa) STTISIX&V xpsiTTov $ /X,ST' ofyvsicov xal r&v
a cts of a friend has a delightful sense
of the play of life, seeing harmonious
action and identifying it with himself
(fViei/te?s al oiKfias, 5).
5 Again, the sympathy and excite-
ment of friends enables a man to
prolong that vivid action and glow of
the mind which is the essence of
happiness ( 5-6).
6 It also confirms him in the prac-
tice of virtue ( 6-7).
7 Finally, a deeper reason may be
assigned for the necessity of friends
to the happy man ; it depends on our
love of life. That sympathetic con-
sciousness (ffwaur6dve(T6ai) which we
have of a friend's existence, by means
of intercourse with him, is, only, in a
secondary degree (irapcwrA^o'ioc), the
same as the sense of our own existence.
I a.\na.pKf<nv\ The quality avrdpicfta
is claimed for happiness, Eth. i. vii. 6,
where Aristotle guards himself against
the supposition that it implies a lonely
life, rb ykp T\eioy ayaffbv aUrapKfs
elvat SoKe?. ri> 8" afaapites \eyofifv
OVK dVTCjS fJLOVU Tlf >VTi ft'lOV /UOCCUTTJC,
oAA.a KOJ yovevffi /cat Tfxvots Kal yvrcuicl
Kal $\o>s TOIS <fi(\ois Kal iro^lrats,
fireiS^i (pvcrei jroXiriicbs HvOponros.
'6-rav 6 8ai'/ua>j/] from the Orestes of
Euripides, 665, sqq. :
TOVS <pt\ovs
fv rois KO.KOIS XP^I TOIS <p(\oiffiv u<f>e\eiv '
Srav 5' 6 Salfj.o>v e3 SiSf, ri Set <pt\wv ;
apKfi 70^ aurbs 6 Bfbs axpeA.ej/ QfXuv.
z airoveiJLOVTas\ ' Us who allot,' cf.
Eth. i. vii. 8, where happiness is said
to be rt\fi6v n Kal atirapKes. The
fonn of expression here used is similar
tothatin^A. I. x. z:*tirovr6yfvavTf-
\US &TOTTOV, &\\U>S T Kdl TOIS \fJOVfflV
ri/^iv evepyeidv Tiva. rrjv (vSat/j.ovlav ;
NIKOMAXEIQN IX.
[CHAP.
4 o~vvr l [j.ep;viv' fist apa no evfiaipovi $/Xe0y. ri wv Xeyou-
xoii Try aXr y 5suou<riV ; ^ on oi 7roX?\,o)
(riv o
oiovrai
orj
8*
TO >]y,
ETTSKTOLXTOO
ou SoxeT 8s7
e' ev
e(TTiv, 73
a)<r7rep
xa) evsp-yefv, TOU
xa$' auTTjv, xa.Qa.7rep sv v-
oixsjov Ttov ijSeajv, Qsoopeiv 8s
N xa) T^ sxsivwv T
; ra>v TO/OUTCOV
ratafia V7rdp%ei
rfivg yot.p o /3/o cov ou$i/
ou bsopevog 8e TCOJ/ TO/OUTO>V
TO 8' oux S<TTIV iVajf aXvj-
on 73 euSa/jtxov/a svspysid rig
svspysta 8r;Xov or/ yivsrai xa)
T/. si 8e TO euSaijaoveu' O~T}V ev Tto
svspysiot <r^ouSa/a xa) rsa
(TT/ 8e xaJ TO
TOUJ
rag ol
rfiiiai roig
<^uo~si TjSsa. 6 [taxdpiog
-yap spouo~< Ta
4 tirdffdKTov ^SoyTjs] ' Adventitious
pleasure,' 'pleasure introduced from
without,' cf. .E^A. i. viii. i a : ou5t v 5))
TrposSelrat TTJS ^Sov^y i jSfoy OIITWJ'
waTrfp irepidirrov rw6s, a\\' x 6 ' T V
^Sov^j' &/ tauT^. Cf. ifA. x. vii. 3.
The word ^ire/o-a/cros occurs in Plato's
Cratylus, p. 420 B, quoted above in
the note on rx. v. 3.
5 iv &pxfi ^o<"'] ' For we said at
the outset (Eth. i. vii. 14) that happi-
ness is a certain function of the con-
sciousness, and it is plain that this
arises in us, and does not exist in us
like a possession. But if being happy
consists in the play of life, and the
actions of the good man are good and
essentially pleasurable, as we said
before (Eth. i. viii. 13), and also the
sense of a thing being identified with
oneself is one of the sources of plea-
sure, but we are able to contemplate
our neighbours better than ourselves,
and their actions better than our own,
then the actions of good men being
their friends are pleasurable to the
good ; for (such actions) contain both
the two elements that are essentially
pleasurable. The supremely happy
man then will require friends of this
character, if he wishes to contemplate
actions which are good and also identi-
fied with himself: and such are the
actions of the good man being his friend.
Again, men think that the happy man
ought to live pleastirably, whereas
life is painful to the solitary man, for
by oneself it is difficult to maintain
long a vivid state of the mind, but
with others and in relation to others
this is easier."
The first part of this sentence con-
tains a complex protasis, to which
the apodosis is at rwv <rirovSai<at> 5^,
K.T.A..
TOU 8' fryaOov ij tvepyfia] In the
passage referred to (Eth. i. viii. 13)
the words are at KO.T' aprrty irpdfis,
which may justify the above trans-
lation.
&/ji<f>u> ykp exovfft] Some of the com-
mentators take &n<f>a> as though it
were the nominative case to fx ov <n
and meant 'both the good man and
IX.]
IIOIKON NIKOMAXEIC1N IX.
303
TOJOUTCOV Ss^G-sraj, siVfp Qewpsiv Trpoaipiirai ?rpa-
irisixiig xai olx=ia.$' Toiaurcti $ al TOU
ovrog. o'lovrai TS 6=7y TJOSOJJ ^v TOJ/
,ei/ ouv ^aXsTroj o j3/o$ * ou yap paotov xa6' aurov
i/=py=7v a-uvs^cag, [Astf srepwv 3= xa) Trpof aAAoy paov.
I'tTTai oZv 73 Vpy=ja (ruvs^rcrrspa, r]0s7a oC<ra xa' aurv?v, 6
o 3:7 7Tp) TOV [j.ctxapiov slvai ' o yap (T7roL8a7o, TJ
rat
av
sx
sivai ' TO yap T**] c^^ " 2 ' aya^ov sipTjraj on T>
aya6ov xa< ^'6u S ' '
aura' TO 8= ^v opovrcti
his friend.' But it would be irrelevant
to speak of the feelings of the friend.
The question is, what advantage does
the happy man get out of having
friends ? &/^>a> here evidently applies
to TOS TJ? 4><5cret TjSea, as is further
proved by the words e'Triej/ctts KOI
oj/ceias in the next sentence ; it refers
to what has gone before, rov S" ayaOov
olKftov ruiv r)8w.
6 7 & yap ffirovSaios <p-t]<nv\ The
good man, feeling the same sort of
pleasure in the moral acts reciprocated
between himself and his friend which
the musical man feels in good music,
will prolong and enjoy that recipro-
cation, and aa Theognis says 'will
learn what is good by associating with
the good.' The advantage here attri-
buted to friendship is that, by adding
the element of pleasure to the best
functions of our nature, it assists and
developes them. Cf. Eth. x. v. 2 :
ffvvav^fi yap T)]V evpyeiai> ^ oiKfia
ijSotrfj bfnoitas Se Kal ol <pi\6/j.ovcroi Kal
<pt\ouco$6fi.oi. Kal Ttav &\\<av fKounoi
firi5i56affiv fls rb oiKfwv tpyov xaipovrS
OUT Cf.
KaBaurfp 6 /j.ovainl>s~\ On the ' moral
sense ' in its analogy to the ' musical
ear,' cf. Eth. x. iii. 10.
7 rb Se TJJ/ poeTc] ' People define
" living " m the case of animals by the
power of sensation, in the case of men
by the power of sensation or thought.
But the word " power " has its whole
meaning in reference to the exercise
of that power, and the distinctive part
of the conception lies in the "exercise."
Thus the act of living appears distinc-
tively to be an act of perceiving or
thinking.' The train of reasoning in
this latter part of the chapter is, that
life consists in consciousness ; life is
good and sweet ; consciousness is
intensified, and life therefore is made
better and sweeter, by intercourse with
friends.
Toty Cy's] On the ascending scale
of life from the plant to the man, cf. De
Animd, n. iii. 1-9, Eth. i. vii. ix, and
Vol. I. Essay V.
304
NIKOMAXEIftN IX.
[CHAP.
vj 8= (iuva[j.i$ el$ r ^ v svspysiav avdysTat. TO os xup/ov ev
TYJ svspysia soixs OTJ TO Y}V sTvat xupttog TO al<r5ai>(r5a< Y]
vosTv. TO 8s %f)V TCOV xaS' auTO dya.Qa>v xal Y$<I>V (upKT-
[J.SVOV yap, TO ft (opHTfisvov rri$ TayaSou <>uo-a>. TO 8s TY
ayaSoi/ xai TO) eTTieixs?' StoVsp so<x Traviv
ou 8sT 8s Aa/.*3avJi/ p.o%Qr)pa.y eor ; v xai Sff$
ouS* ev XtJ7raj* aopKTTOS yap rj TOiauTrj, x
auTYJ. ev TO?^ e%o[j.svoi$ 8s Tre^i T%
4)av=p(OTSpov. si 8' auTo TO ^v a-yaSov xa)
(loixs 8= xai sx TOU TravTatg opeys<rQoti auTOu, xai jaaXi
isixi$ xoi paxoipiovs ' TouToi^ yap 6 /3/o ap=To>-
xai 73 TOUTOJV jW,axapia>TaT>3 ^>^), o 8* optov OT<
aio-6avTj xa) o axourov OT< axouei xai o fioi%i%cov OTI
i^si, xai 7r< TCOV aX?y.a>v OjW,o/toj o~Ti T< TO
Tct
^ S 8wajus Jj T)J' tvepyeiav avd-
yerat] Cf. Metaphysics, Tin. ix. 5 :
5i6irep wine Ttatnv fjSv tlvai] 'Where-
fore it appears to be sweet to all,' i.e.
of course ordinary individuals love life,
in which there is a certain physical
sweetness, cf. Ar. Politics, m. vi. 5 :
ATJA.OV 5 1 us Kdprepovffi iro\\riv KOKOTfd-
rov ^fji/, us eVoucrijs rubs evT}/j.epias iy
avrcp Kal yhvicvTijTOS ipwrinrii. This
Greek view of the sweetness of life
contrasts with the philosophy of the
Hindoos, which represents life as a
burden, and individuality as a curse.
8 Ou 5el 6e <pavfpuTfpoi'~\ ' But one
must not take (as an instance) a vicious
and corrupt life, nor one in pain ; for
such a life is unharmonised, like its
characteristics. In the following dis-
course the nature of pain will be made
more clear.'
adpiffros] 'Unlimited;' 'without
law, balance, order, harmony.' On
the use made by Aristotle of this
Pythagorean formula, see Eth. n. vi.
14, and Vol. I. Essay IV. p. 202-3.
'Ev To?j ^xA* e/ '" )ts ] We have here an
unfulfilled promise, like that in Eth.
i. vii. 7 : for in ' the following book '
there is nothing on the ' unlimited ' or
' unharmonised ' nature of pain. The
sentence may possibly be an interpo-
lation.
9 Et 5 1 aM rb fjjv aya6bi>] This is
the beginning of a complex protasis,
which goes on prolonging itself, & 5'
6puv TO 5' 8V cdij6av6fji(8a, &c., till
at last it finds its apodosis in 10:
Kddairep olv rb ainbv tlvai cdpfr6v (<rriv
eKOffrcf, OVTW Kal TO TOV <ptb.o>>, ^ irapa-
Kal M TUV &X\(nv votiv~\ ' And with
respect to all the other functions, in
like manner there is something which
perceives that we are exercising them,
so then we can perceive that we per-
ceive, and think that we think. But
this (perceiving) that we perceive or
think, is perceiving that we exist ;
for existing, as we said( 7), consists
in perceiving or thinking.' fvepyovfitv
is here used in a purely objective
sense ; the tvfpytia. is here distin-
guished from the consciousness which
necessarily accompanies it, and with
IX. X.]
HeiKON NIKOMAXEIQN IX.
305
[ASVOV OTI YpyOV[J.sV t a>0~T ao-aVOl[^ v OTI
xai vooijasv OTI voov[j,v. TO 8' OTI a.lirQot.vo[j,sQa. $ vooOj,sv,
rr > r \ \ ? ? ' ' /j * < >?>
OTI svfJLSV. TO yap sivai r t v ai(r l jav(rvoii i\ vosiv. TO 6
alarQdvQ-Qai OTI YJ, T&V rfiscov xdtf avTO' <>uo-j yap
aya^ov fay, TO 8' dyaQov V7tdp%ov sv satrj
s TO
OTI TO
slvai dya^ov STTIV ct,vTo1g xoti TJOW* eruvajo~3ai/o'ju,i/o< yap
TQV xa.y O.VTO dyaQov rfi
<r7roo6a7o, xai Trpog TOV
&G-TIV.
TO
xcti TO TOV
v 8/a TO a
8=7
wg 8s Troog saurov ys< 10
STSpog yap avTog o <^i"hog
ivai aip=Tov> I<TTIV lxao~Tto,
7rapa7T?*>r)<ri(os. TO 8' slvai ^f
aya^ou OVTO^. ^' 8s
<rvvaio~Qdvs(rQai apa
OTI SO~TIV, TOUTO 8s yivoiT av ev Tto
xai 8javo/aj * OVTW yap av
dvft pWTTCOV Xs-ySO"9ai, Xfltl OU^
TO V TO> aUTO) VjU,SO~Sa<. Si
5>\~ /VS" e/ Ar/A\~
d>j TO) ]U.axap<a> TO evai aipsTov &CTTI xaa at>To, ayavov Ty
t^tiKTSi ov xa) 7j8u, 7rapa7r7^.r l (7iov 8s xai TO TOW
xai o </Xo TCOV alpsTcav av enj.
TOUTO
apa TaJ si8aijU.ovryO-ovT<
^Ap' ouv (o^ 7rXs/o~Tou^ 45/Xou^ ^-OIIJTSOV, ^ xaSaTrsp ITTI IO
xa TOU
xa< xoivcovsiv
TO GTU^TjV 7TJ TCOV
S7T1 TtOV
o 8' S<TTIV
which it is frequently identified. See
Vol. I. Essay IV. The absolute unity
of existence with thought here laid
down anticipates the ' cogito ergo sum '
of Descartes.
10 'SvvaiffddveffQai-vefj.etrBai] 'There-
fore we ought to have a sympathetic
consciousness of the existence of our
friend, and this can arise by means
of living together with him, and shar-
ing words and thought with him, which
is the true meaning of "living to-
gether " in the case of men ; it does
TOL. H. R
not mean, as with cattle, simply herd-
ing in the same spot.' This view of
the importance of 'intercourse,' and
of the advantages to be derived from
it, is repeated and summarized in ch.
xii., and forms the conclusion of the
treatise.
X. The question of the plurality of
friends is brought under analysis in
this chapter. The number of one's
friends for use or for pleasure is shown
to be limited by convenience. The
K
306
IIG1IU1N NIKOMAXEION IX.
[CHAP.
xa*
bo^sisv av apao's/v TO
psriiv sV/Trovov, xai oup ixavo o |3<0
TS/V. oi 7rX/ou 8r) Ttov 7rpo TOV
Trepiepyoi xai sfJiTrofiioi 7rpo TO xaAa>
xa< oi Trpo
TO r]8uo~jU,a.
8s apxouo-iv
TOUJ 8e (TTrou
xai
OUTS yap ex Ssxa av
etvai ]U.^r' a3
pri<riv xat
-yap avSuTTT]-
TOUTO TrpaT-
/3/ov ixava)$
ouQev o5v SsT
, xa^ctTrep ev
TroVepov TrXs/o--
av
OUX SffTW
V T,
wTrcuv ysvoir
SO~T/I/. TO 8s
TTCtV TO (J.eTO.v TIVIOV
ov xai
o
IN/
4 yap sdoxsi
xai
? <f7>
efvaj, OT< 6
' oux
o<ov TS ?roX-
. IVi 8s
number of one's friends, properly so
called, is shown to be limited by one's
incapacity to feel the highest kind of
affection (incep$o\4) TIS <{ii\ias) for many
individuals, and by the practical diffi-
culties which would attend a close
intercourse ((ru^v) with many persons
at once, who would also have to asso-
ciate harmoniously with each other.
On the whole the question is answered
in the negative.
1 fyfj.e\S>s flpriffOcu] 'Neatly ex-
pressed.'
JU^T iro\t{en>oj] From Hesiod,
Works and Days, 713.
/uTjSe iro\vtivov jttrjS' &etvov Ka\frdcu.
The line is untranslateable into
English, as we have no word (like the
German GastfreuncT) to express both
' host,' and ' guest,' as {ei/os does.
2 This section may be said to re-
tract, upon further consideration, what
was admitted, Etk. vin. vi. 3 :
teal rb ^5J iro\\ois &
70^ of roiovroi,
i
This reading, adopted by
Bekker from a majority of MSS., is
surprising ; iita.vS>s ireplepyoi would not
be a natural phrase, whereas the con-
text really requires ot wAsfow 5$j ruv
irpibs r"bv ointtov fiiov iKaviav.
3 otfre ykp ir6\is foriv] ' For a
state could not consist of ten men,
nor again if consisting of a hundred
thousand does it still continue to be
a state.' This extremely limited idea
of the size of a state is based on the
Greek notion that each citizen must
personally take part in the adminis-
tration of affairs. On this hypothesis,
a state consisting of a hundred thou-
sand citizens might easily appear un-
wieldy. Aristotle in the Politics, vir.
iv. 9, represents the state as aji organ-
ism of limited size. &m TI /col it6\tai
fMfjeBovs /jLerpov, Sxrirtp KaL rS>v &\\<av
vdvrav, %<pa>v, <pvrooi>, opydvuv Kal yap
TOVTCHV fKCUTTOV 0#T6 KlaV fJUKpljV O$Tt
Kuril fityeOos vv
SvvafjiLV, K.T.\.
X.]
H6IKQN NIKOMAXEION IX.
307
JUST
TO truj/aXystv
svai, s
<ruvr i [j.sp=vsiv ' TOUTO 8' spyS>ti=$ Iv
s ylvsrai xal TO (ruyyot.ip=iv xa} 5
' slxog yao (TU^TTITTTSIV
/ TO
xavoi' oos
ooi
fio^sisv oiv
ij yap T/^ etva* fiofasrou
eo/x= xa TT/ Ttov
xarot, rr t v
TOUTO 8s
OUTO> 8'
aTtov ' ou yyvwrai yap
ai 8' v[j.vov[j,vai Iv
xa)
xai
Sidirep oiS" epop TrAeidvwj'] This is
almost a verbatim repetition of .EfcA.
vm. vi 2, which passage contains the
germ of the present chapter.
6 OI/TCO 8* TOIOUTOUS] ' And this
seems to be practically the case ; for
we do not find that people have many
friends (together) on the footing of
companionship. And the classical
friendships of story are recorded to
have been between pairs. But they
who have many friends, and who asso-
ciate familiarly with all, seem to be
friends to none, except in a civil way,
and men call them "over-complaisant."
In a civil way indeed it is possible to
be a friend to many without being
over-complaisant, but being really
kind ; but on a moral and personal
footing this is not possible in relation
to many ; one must be content to find
even a few worthy of this.'
eirl TWC wfxvy/udTwv] Opposed to
TO?S \6yois implied in rb \e^0ev
above. Cf. the use of r& fpya, Eth.
ix. viii. 2.
ercupjKV] Cf. Eth. vm. xii. 1-6,
and vm. v. 3. ' Companionship,'
R
which Aristotle compares to the feel-
ing between brothers, is much more
akin to the perfect and ideal friend-
ship than it is to either of the lower
forms of friendship (for gain or for
pleasure). It is essentially based on
personal considerations (Si' avrovs),
though not necessarily on moral con-
siderations (5t' OffT^v).
at 8' vfj.vovfj.tvai'] Fritzsche quotes
Plutarch De Am. Mult. 2 : rbv fiaKpbv
KaL Tra.Xa.ibv alwva /japrvpa afjM TOV
\6yov K.a.1 <rv(J.pov\ov Aa/S^uey, tv y
Kara fetryos <f>i\tas \tyoyrat &i]ff(vs Kal
TleipiOovs, 'Ax'^Ati/s KO! naVpoKAos,
'Ope'oTTjs Kal nuAaSrjs, Qitwias Kal
Aa.p.uv, 'ETTOjUtveij'Sas Kal rieAoTriSas.
ol 8e iro\v<pi\oi ovSevl SoKovfftv
eivai <pi\oi\ Cf. Eudemian Ethics, vrr.
xii. 17 : rb ^ijreiv fifuv Kal t6xf<r6cu
iroAAous tpt\ovs, a/ua 6e Xeyeiv is ovQels
<f>i\os $ iroAAol <pi\ot, &/j.(f>oa \eyerai
6p0us, which sentence reconciles the
above passage with Eth. vm. i. 5. In
an external way (XOATJKWS) a man
should have many friends, personally
(Si' avrovs) a few.
dpTKows] Cf. Eth. u. vii. 13, rv. vi. 9.
R 2
308
H0IKHN NIKOMAXEIflN IX.
[CHAP.
o TS
yap
aru-
:roXAo7 sTva* fyfaov xai JU.TJ apsa-xov oWa, a
7j * 8*' apsryv 8s xai 8*' auToti oux
ayaTTTjTov 8s xai oAi'yoi> supsfv
8* s
yioug ; ej/ ap.Qo'iv yap s
vouvre^ Sgovra* eTTJxoup/a^, 0? T' SUTU^OUVTS^ <ru]u.|3/co>/ xa<
ov^ eu 7roirj(roiKriv' ^ouXovTa* ^ap ew fy/av. avay-
xaiorepov p.lv 8^ ev ra7g aru^/a/?, 810 T&V ^pr^/juuov
IvrauSa 8s7, xaXXiov 8* sj/ raj uru^/a<^, 810 xai TOU
sTTisixsis %-r)Tov<riv TOUTOU^ yap alpsroiTspov susp-ysrsiv
xa) jasra Totrrajv 8<aysiv. SOT/ yap xai ij
aur^ Ttov (Jj/Xtov >]8sra xai
^ovTdi yap ol Xu7Tou]asvo< <ruvayouvr)i/ rcov
xav a7ropr)<reisv rig Trorepov wffTrep fidpoug ju,TaXa/x$a-
voi*o"jv, ^ TOUTO jtxsv ou, 7j 7rapou<r/a S' aurtov iJSeia o5o"a
xa) 75 svvoia. TOU trovaXysTv sXarrco T^V XyTrTjv Trots?, si
fj.\v ouv 8a raura ^ 8*' aXXo TJ xwQi^ovTOii, a.<$>=i<rQu) '
8* o5v QaivsTcu TO Xs^Qe'v. eo/xs 8' 73 7rapou<r/a
v
aurtov eiva*. auro jasj/ yap TO opav
i;8u, aAXco^ re xa) aTu^ouvT/, xa< yivtra/ T/^ 7r/xoup/a
Trpo^ TO ju,^ Xu7re7o~9a< Trapa/xyQrjTixoi/ yap o $>fao$ xai
T>) o\|/s xai TO> Xo'ya>, sav rj STTiOs^iog' o*3s yap TO
4 xai J4>' olj 7^8gTai xai Xt>7re7Taj. TO 8s
yap
oi
Cf.
. ix. i 7, and
5t' au
note.
Towifrous] i.e. capable of being
made personal friends.
XI. The question whether friends
are most needed in adversity or pros-
perity is here answered by saying,
that in adversity friendship is more
necessary, and in prosperity more
glorious. Some remarks are added
on the exact operation of friendship
in alleviating sorrow, and some practi-
cal rules are deduced.
Z Sifficfp Qdpovs /
' Whether they take part of the burden,
as it were.' This is the ordinary me-
taphor. Cf. Xenophon, Memor. u.
vii. I. (2o>KpdTTjy) 'Aflffrapx^v if ore
6puv ffKvQpuirws ?x<"ra' ecu/cas, f<pri, S>
'ApiffTdpxf, /Sapeajs (ptptiv n ' ~xp)) 6
TOU fidpovs ft.traSiS6vai TO?S <pl\ois.
"iff us yap &i> ri <rt nal ^/ieTs Kov^laai^v.
Aristotle hints at, without fully giving,
a more psychological account of the
operation of friendship in adversity.
ns] Cf. Eth. in. i. 6, iv. ix. 8.
X. XI.] H6IKQN NIKOMAXEIflN IX.
309
auTot, xaV py uTrspreivr) -rJ) aXuTr/a, rr^v exsivoig yvo-
TS
ou
7rpo<ri*rai 8/a TO ju-ijS* auTof sTva* dpqyqrjxqg * yuvaia
8s xa* o/ TOJOOTO* av8p= roig (ru<rrevotj(n p^a/pouo-/, xa;
xa
or* TOV
13 v
rtov <Xa>v TrapQiKTia Tr t v rs 8iaya)yy)v >j'8;Tav s^s/ xai TTJV
evvoiav OTI rfiovTai STT] TOI$ aurov ayafyoTs. 8<o So^siev av
ov yap sTva< xaXo'v sJ^ 8=
jasraS/Oo'va* yap toV ^x*(rra Ssi" rtov xaxtov,
TO
jtxsyaX'
aJ4' ls ^ r / (rll/ ' <va< avaTraXtv i
xai ?rpo-
8s
' a^a^oTv yap xaAXiov xai ijSiov),
sv 7rpo3oj,a)^ (xa) yap
s/av 8s <roXa/a)^' ow
/iJ; inreftreiyri rfj a\VTr'ia.
s] ' And (such a one), unless
he be excessively impassive, cannot
endure the pain which is brought
upon them; and altogether he does
not like sympathetic wailers, not being
given to wailing himself.' The words
K&C /*$? K.T.A. have troubled the com-
mentators. The Paraphrast explains
them as if meaning : ' And unless
(the sympathetic presence of friends)
be exceedingly painless to them.' But
evidently the clause is brought in
in reference to ot dj>8pa>3eis. ' Manly
natures ' are not at all unlikely to be
somewhat blunt and callous, and de-
ficient in sensibility for the feelings of
others. One might almost fancy that
Aristotle was thinking of the Ajax of
Sophocles, w. 319, 3 zo:
irpbj /&/> KO.KOV re /col ftapv^vxov y6ovs
-rotovaS 1 ael itor' avSpbs f^riytlr' fX lv -
5 oXts e>(J> SvtTTvx&y] These words
are not to be found in any extant play
or fragment. The nearest approach
to them is in Sophocles, (Ed. Tyr.
1 06 1 : o\is voffovfr' &y<&.
6 <pi\ovykp fiSioi''] 'For it behoves
a friend to benefit (his friends), and
especially those who are in need, and
to (benefit) them when they have not
asked. For this is nobler and sweeter
for both parties.' With al rb, e5
troiflv is to be repeated. Some editions,
against the MSS., read KO! rods.
310
NIKOMAXEIflN IX.
[CHAP.
yap xaAov TO
sv TO>
upiia-Qai to<sAs7o~5a/. 8o';ai> 8'
rQa.i 1(7(0$ su/VajSvjreov ' SVIOTS yap
TJ' 7rapouo~*a 8>j Ttov <>/Aa)V ev
tyaivsrai.
12 ^Ap* ouv, wtnrep TOI$ spuxri TO opav
eo~T< xai jotaAXov alpovvrai TauTTjv TTJI/ a}'(rQr)<riv TJ rag
"honrdg, a>$ Kara, ravrrjv ^oC^urra TOU 'spwrog ovrog xai
xa; TO? fyfaotg alpsrduTarov I<TTI TO
yap ij 4)tX/a. xai aJj Trpoj gauTov e^',
GOTO) Xai TTpO^ TOV (^)/XOV. TTSp} aUTOI/ 8' >] aiV67JO~<f OT/
eo~TiV aipsTi^* xa) Trepi rov fyfaov 815. TJ 8' evspysia yive-
rai avTotg sv ra> <ru^5ji/, WTT > slxvTcog TOUTOU
2 xai o TI TTOT' eo~Tiv exd<TTOi$ TO e7va< rj otJ p^ap/v
TO >jv, ej/ TOUTCO jU-STa TCOI/ <>/?uov ^ouXovTat
ol Jilv o~ujU.7T/vouo"<v, oi 8e o~uyxu3suouo"v, aXXoi 8s
xai o-uyxuj/*)7ouo~jv TJ (ru/x<$>iXoo~o^oDo~iv,
exao~TOi ev TOUTJ (rvvyfjispsuovTes o T/ Trsp jtxaXio-Ta aya-
TTUXTI TO>V sv rip /3/a)' o~u^7]v yap ^ouXo'^asvo* jotsTa Ttov
c^/Aa)V, rauTa 7ro<ouo"i xai TOUTCOV xo/i/ajvouo~iv oT<; o'tovrai
3 O-UTJV. yivsrai ouv TJ' jasv Ttov <J)atJAwv ^<X/a jU,o^Orjpa*
yap 4>au7i)v dfisfiaioi ovrsg, xai jOto^Qrjpoi 8s
Sdlai/8' <ri>/u0<)u'j/] 'Butane should
beware perhaps of getting the reputa-
tion of churlishness in rejecting (bene-
fits) ; for this sometimes happens.'
0178/0 answers to the ' insuavis, acer-
bus' of Horace, SW. L iii. 85.
XII. In conclusion, the best thing
in friendship is intercourse. This
gives vividness to the pursuits of
life ; and when good men have inter-
course with each other, they mutually
strengthen and increase the good that
is in them.
I 7; 5* tvfpyfia ylvtrcu aiiTois tv rtf
<rvnv] 'But it is by living together
that they attain the fulness of life.'
The word ivtpyfia. here has evident
reference to 17 a1ffdi)ffts Sri t<rrw in
the preceding sentence. Zell and
Card well follow some of the MSS in
reading avrfjs, i. e. rrjs alaOTjfftus.
But 77 tvepyua. stands naturally alone
(cf. Eth. ES. ix. 6), meaning ' the vivid
sense of life.' And a similar collo-
cation occurs Eth. vni. iii. 5 : ylvtrat
Kara fyiXiav oi5rwj.
3 Koivwvovat y&p aAX^\oy] ' For,
being of an unstable nature, they
have fellowship in evil, and become
bad by assimilation to each other.'
Cf. Eth. ix. i. 7 : raits <(>i\offo(plas
Koivonrf}ffaaiv. The word a&tfiaioi
here is not connected with the use of
Ptflaiov in Eth. vm. viii. 5 : Ot 5e
(j.ox&npol rb /j.tv /SfjBaioc OVK ^ovaiv.
Aristotle is not talking here of the in-
stability of the friendship between bad
men, but of its evil results mutually.
Throughout the treatise on Friendship
XI. XII.] II9IKHN NIKOMAXEU1N IX.
yivovrai Ojaojoujasvoi
311
73 8s rcov STTISIX&V ST
8e xai
xa
rovrai yap Trap
ov olj apeVxovra/,
p.et> yap a?r'
TOCTOUTOV
CtV 4
he speaks of the weakness of vice (cf.
note on ix. iv. 9), and here he says
that bad men, from the weakness and
instability of their natures, imbibe
evil example.
airofidTTovrat apeff/copTou] ' For
they take the stamp of one another in
those things -which they like.' Cf.
Aristophanes, Bants, v. 1040.
80fV 71 'fJ.^1 0pV aTro(Jiaa/j.finri TroAAis
aperas liro(t\mv.
la8\G>v fj.tv yap] On this passage of
Theognis, which is referred to above,
Eth. ix. ix. 7, see Vol. I. Essay II.
p. 61. It is after Aristotle's manner
to end a treatise with a line of poetry ;
cf. Metaphysics, xi. x. 14, where the
book ends with the verse
OiiK 0706^1' iro\vKoipa.viri' eTs Kolpavos
etrrw.
Accordingly the unnecessary para-
graph trepl (lev oSv (pi\las K.T. \. is pro-
bably the interpolation of an editor.
PLAN OF BOOK X.
THIS Book, beginning with a treatise on Pleasure, (which subject is
introduced (1) because of its connection with Morals ; (2) because
of the controversies about it), and rising from the critical examination
of extreme views to Aristotle's own theory of Pleasure, namely, that
it is the sense of the Vital Functions, or in other words, of the
harmonious action of some one faculty ; proceeds, almost without
transition, to declare that Happiness in the truest sense of the term
must consist in the action of the highest faculty, and that, this
highest faculty being Intellect, Philosophy must, beyond all com-
parison with anything else, whether idle amusement or even the
exercise of the moral virtues, constitute Happiness, or that practical
Chief Good which is the end of Man, and the province of the
ethical branch of Politics.
Thus far this branch of Science, having obtained a definite con-
ception, might be thought to be complete. But it still remains to
ask whether something cannot be added towards its practical realiza-
tion, and, as habits of life are clearly necessary for the attainment of
human excellence, on which the Chief Good depends, it follows that
we shall require such domestic institutions as may be favourable to
the cultivation of human excellence. These institutions, whether of
public or private ordinance, can only be rightly conceived after a
scientific study of the principles of Legislation, i.e. of Politics in
its highest form. To this then Aristotle proposes to address himself,
considering it to be a branch of science which has hitherto been
neglected. He roughly sketches out the plan of his work on
Politics, with a transition to which the ethical treatise concludes.
This tenth book then shows us the Ethics as a rounded whole.
It is written in close connection with Book I. (cf. X. vi. 1.), and it
sums up referentially the contents of Books I., II., III., IV., VIH.,
IX. But while the Ethics are thus rounded off in their beginning
PLAN OF BOOK X. 313
and end, and as to part of their contents, it is clear on the other
hand that they contain a lacuna which has been artificially filled up.
Book IV., as we have already seen, ends in an abrupt and almost
fragmentary manner. And then follow three Books which, we may
say decisively, have no literary connection with the other parts of
the Nicomachean Ethics, while they stand in close relation to the
whole of the Eudemian Ethics, of which in almost all MSS. they
form a part. Those persons who believe the whole of the Eude-
mian Ethics to be as entirely the writing of Aristotle as Book X. of
the Nicomachean Ethics, as the Politics, or as Book I. of the Meta-
physics, must at all events admit that there is some reason to say
that the Nicomacho-Eudemian Books (Eth. V. VI. VII.) were
written separately from, and in all probability later than, the rest of
the Nicomachean Ethics. Those who consider that the Eudemian
treatise, as a whole, gives us the thoughts of Aristotle conveyed in
the words of Eudemus, will probably conclude that the same
account is to be given of the disputed books.
VOL. II. S S
H0IKJQN NIKOMAXEIflN X.
META 8s Tavra. irspi r$WT}$ 1<ray$ STTSTOH
Ai<rTa yap 8oxsT <ruva)xs<totr9a< T
7raj8sJot<n TOU vsovg olaxi^ovTeg TjSovJj xai XUTTT^. ooxsi
8e xa) Trpog T>JI/ TOU 7jSou apsTi}V psyuTTOv sJvat TO %atpsiv
asryv re xai
01$ 8s7 xa [j-ureiv a SsT* iarsi/sf yap raura ia TTOLVTOS
TOU 0/ou, poTrrjv s^ovra xai
TOV su3a//xova 3/ov* Ta jasv
iv. UTrsp 8s Ttov TOIOVTWV yxKTT* a.v
TTOLGSTSOV eTva/, aXXco^ Te xai TroATajv c^o'vTaiv
' ol p.sv yap rayaQov rj8ovr)V X^youcriv, 01
oi
8' !
OOT(0
svavrias
OJ
J 8s
T01/
xai si
yap TOUJ TroXXouj TTpo^ auTrjV xa) 8o'jXsu'rv
7^ } 810 8s?v sit, 1 ro'jvavTiov ciysiv e
yap av ovrcog
I. The treatise on Pleasure opens
analogously to that on the Voluntary
(^A. in. i. i), and that on Friendship
(vin. i. i, 6), justifying the introduction
of the subject, ( i ) as connected with
Ethics, (2) as haying been made matter
of controversy.
i fjid\i<rrayap ^uwj/] 'For it seems
to be most intimately connected with
the human race.' Omni sed non soli,
see below \. 8.
Sib ircu$f6ov(ri K.r. A.] This is all
taken from Plato's Laws, n. p. 653.
See note on Eth. n. iii. 2, where the
passage is quoted.
irpbs r))v roD VI&GVS aperV] Some
MSS. read ipxV, which it is strange
that the commentators should have
thought a natural reading, supported
by 01 /j.tv TTJS <ppofi)ffi<i>s opxai (below,
viii. 3). Because (ppovriffis is regarded
by Aristotle as a syllogism, or set of
syllogisms, having apx ai/ or major
premisses, it does not follow that
the phrase ij rov tfOovs h-pxh is ad-
missible.
a ol fjiev ykp /ut'ffoi'] ' For some
call pleasure the chief good, others on
the contrary call it exceedingly evil,
(of these latter) some perhaps believing
it to be so. but others thinking it for
the interests of morality to declare
pleasure to be an evil, even if it be
not so, because most men incline to-
CHAP. I.]
H6IKQN NIKOMAXEIiiN X.
315
STT TO IJLZ<TOV. [J.v TTOTS o oi> xaAo> TOUTO Xsy=raj. ol 3
yap TTSOI rtbv sv roig 7rdQ?a~i xoii raig 7rpa=<ri Xo'yoi TJTTO'V
sl(ri TTKTTOI Tibv 'spycuv' oTOiv ovv d<a<>a)i/toa'J roig Kara
rr t v
6 -yap -fysycnv
Jv ftoxsi TTpog
7rpo<rai/apou-
*i$ TTOT' s<$is{j,svo$, CLTTQ-
cog TotavrrjV ou<ray aTraa-av' TO
siv yap
rcov Xo'y
sivai aXXa
SOT/ rcov TroXXtov. eo/xa<r<v ouv oi
' rpo^ TO slSsW
TOV j3/ov* (ryya)8o< yap OI/TS
tear
Ttov
oi/
, TO\ 8'
wards it, and are enslaved to plea-
sures, and so one ought to lead men
in the opposite direction, for thus
they will arrive at the mean.'
In all probability Aristotle here
alludes immediately to two sections of
the Platonists, (i) the party repre-
sented by Eudoxus, whose arguments
are quoted ; (z) that headed by Speu-
sippus, whose anti-hedonistic argu-
ments were contained in two books
mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, under
the titles Tlfpl rjSo^Tjs a!' 'Ap^rTjinros
a'., and which are now passed under
review. Under the class of those
who ' call pleasure the chief good,'
Aristotle less directly refers to Ari-
stippus, who, though he belonged to
a bygone era, still lived in the pages
of Plato's Philebus, and in the book
of Speusippus bearing his name.
f\6e?v yap fjifffov] Cf. Eth. n. ix.
5, where it is said that by going
counter to one's natural bias one may
attain the mean. Aristotle does not
approve of this being done by means
of a sacrifice of truth.
3 \i.i\ irore \eyerai] ' But perhaps
this is not rightly said.' Cf. Plato,
Meno, p. 89 c : oAAct /*$/ TOVTO ov
KO.K&S &>uo\oyh<rau.fv. This use of
juirjirore became very common in the
later Greek.
6 yap tyeyuv TroAXaJp] ' For he who
blames pleasure (unreservedly), and
yet is seen occasionally desiring it, is
thought to incline towards it as being
altogether good ; for ordinary persons
cannot discriminate.' roiavrriv here,'
as ToioOros does frequently in Ari-
stotle, takes its sense from the con-
text. Cf. Eth. vm. vi. 6, x. ii. 4, &c.
From what is above stated we learn
that, the decline of philosophy having
commenced, some of the Platonists
enunciated theories which were meant
to be practically useful, rather than
true. Thus they overstated what they
believed to be the truth about plea-
sure, in order to counteract men's
universal tendency towards it. Ari-
stotle ' doubts whether this is good
policy.' Their whole theory is likely
to be upset by their occasionally
indulging in the higher kinds of
pleasure.
TOUJ ([wuWas] ' Those who com-
prehend them,' i.e. appreciating the
truth of the theories, as shown by
their agreement with men's actions.
Cf. Eth. vi. x. i, note. On rots Hpyois
cf. ix. viii. 2.
8 8 2
SIR
HGIKflN NIKOMAXEU1N X.
[CHAP.
ouv TT/V TjSoi/TjV Ta.yrx.fav twsr' evaj Oia TO
7rav6' opav <$is[j,sva auTTjc, xai eXXoya xa) aXoya' ev
Trcttri 3' elvai TO alpsrov 57njx=, xa) TO /xaTuo-Ta xpaTi-
O~TOV* TO 8r) TravT* STT/ TC^TO <$>sps(rQoii [j.r,vv=iv tog 7ra<ri
TOUTO ap<o~ToV fxao~Tov yap TO auTto ayaSov s6p/o~xjv,
xa) Tpo4>?]v ' TO STJ TJVXO-JI/ ayaSo'v, xai ou TTCCVT'
sTva<. STTIG'TSVOVTO 8' oi
15 o/
TOU r|$ou apsTrjv
-yap
II. Thischaptercontainsthegrounds
on which Eudoxus ' used to think that
pleasure is the chief good ' ; and an
examination of three objections, which
had been started to those reasonings.
The arguments of Eudoxus are, (i)
that all things seek pleasure, (2) that
pain is essentially (/catf' auro) an object
of aversion, and therefore pleasure, its
contrary, must be essentially an object
of desire, (3) that pleasure is always
desired as an end-in-itself, and not as
a means to anything, (4) that pleasure,
when added to any other good, makes
it more desirable. The objections to
these arguments are, (i) the opinion
of Plato (which serves as an objection
to argument 4th), that the chief good
must be incapable of being added to
any other good, and so made better.
This objection Aristotle allows as
valid. (2) An objection to the ist
argument, probably suggested by
Plato's Philebus, p. 67, and repeated
by Speusippus, that the testimony
of irrational creatures is of no value.
This objection is disallowed. (3) The
counter-argument of Speusippus to the
and argument of Eudoxus, that not
pleasure, but the neutral state, is the
true contrary to pain. This is refuted.
i rb aipcrbv tiriftKts~\ We have here
a quotation of the very words of Eu-
doxus. In 4, Aristotle generally
approves of the present argument.
His whole conclusion is to be found
Eth. x. iii. 13: that Eudoxus was
more right than his opponents, but
wrong in not discriminating between
the different kinds of pleasure, and in
going so far as to say that pleasure is
the chief good. The term rJ alpfr6v,
in opposition to rb q>tvin6v, seems to
have played a great part in the rea-
sonings of Eudoxus. It is admitted
by Plato, Philebus, p. 20, as a neces-
sary attribute of the chief good, and
so also by Aristotle, Eth. i. vii. 8 ; x.
ii. 4. Here it is implied in the word
tylerai. It appears simply to mean
' that which is a reasonable object of
desire,' cf. Eth. vin. viii. 2 : ij <f>i\ia
naff avrtiv alpfri), and x. iii. 13, riSofi)
ov traffa. alpfrii. As implying will
and choice, it is applicable in a rela-
tive, as well as an absolute sense, to
means as well as to ends. Book in.
of the Topics contains hints on the
method of dealing with this term, and
throws light on its use, which fluc-
tuates between a reference to the good,
the useful, and the pleasant (cf. Top.
m. iii. 7).
tiriffTtvovTO 8' of \6yot] This is a
pleasing allusion to the personal
character of Eudoxus of Cnidus, who
lived about 366 B.C., and who enjoyed
great fame as an astronomer. He
appears to have introduced the sphere
from Egypt into Greece. The poem
of Aratus is a versification of his
^ai.v6^va. Certain stories in Diogenes
would leave the impression that, being
Plato's pupil, he quarreled with bis
II.]
HeiKilN XIKOMAXEIQN X.
317
raura Xsys
o' (O=T' slvai
airo TraVi
3' s
ex TOU s
rr t v yap A'J7rr,v xa6'
Touvai/T/ov alp=Tov.
srsoit
TOIGUTOV
yap sTrspcurv rivog evsxot.
oixruv
sotxs
slvai
i, wg
rv y v rovrv. Trpo^riefttvr^V T= orcoouv T<OV
alpsTiorspov TTOISIV, olov TO> OjxaJOTrpaystV xai
v ' XOLI ay^f <r5a 8r) TO ayaSov airo avrto.
ys o Xoyo^ rtov ayaSaiv ayrrjv a7ro4>a/v<v, 3
roioura>
evai rov
xa
si or t oix sa~Tiv r^ovrj rayaQoV alpsTw-spov yap
j.=ra <$pQvr t (rs(o(; >j ^mp/^, st 3= TO
x siva Tr^v TJ'OOVT/V TayaSo'v* ouOj/o^
a'jro rayafcv alpsrwTspov yivsa~Qai.
av en o
master. Aristotle (or, as Diogenes
says, 'Nieomachus') is the only
authority for his ethical opinions.
2 8 yu-fj 5i' erepo^] The end is better
than the means, but this does not
prove anything as to the comparative
superiority of pleasure to the rest of
the whole class of ends. Thus the
argument of Eudoxus overshot the
mark. A similar argument of his is
mentioned with careless approbation,
Eth. i. xii. 5 : AOKC? KO.\U>S ffwi\yopriffcu,
says Aristotle, ' Eudoxus is thought
to have pleaded well' in favour of
pleasure being the chief good, because
it is never praised. This argument
would only prove that it belongs to
the class of TCI TIUIO.
TrpoffTiOffjifVTip] It is suggested as a
commonplace of reasoning, Topics,
in. ii. 2, that you may say ' Justice
and courage are better with pleasure
than without.'
3 iravyap x^P^] ' For that " every
good is better in combination with
another good than alone." This is
indeed the very argument by which
Plato proves pleasure not to be the
highest good. For the pleasant life
is more desirable with wisdom than
without.' Cf. Pkilebus, pp. zi-22 :
where however the proposition ovSwos
irpo<rTf6fvTos yiveaOcu is not to be
found. Plato only argued that, as the
highest conception of human good im-
plied a combination of both pleasure
and knowledge, pleasure separately
could not be the chief good. It is
a deduction of Aristotle's from the
terms ixcu'bv Kcd re\eov, used by Plato,
that the chief good is incapable of
addition or improvement. Cf. Topics,
in. ii. z : where it is said that the
end plus the means cannot be called
more desirable than the end by itself,
cf. Eth. i. vii. 8, where the same
318
NIKOMAXEION X.
[CHAP.
4T<7>v xaQ' auTO ayaStov alpsrcarspov y/MTai. TI ouv e
TO/OUTOV, o3 xai y[J.siS xoiva)vov[j.v ; TOJOUTOV
rai. ol ft evi<rTa/x.svo< a> oux aya$ov ou i
jU-T] ou^sv hsycoo-iv o yap TraV/ 8oxs7, TOUT' elva/
avaipwv Tauryv TTJV TT'UTTIV ou Trdvv Trurrorspa spei'
lv yap rd dvor^ra wpsysro auTtuv, i;t> ai/ T< TO X?yo-
V, si Ss xat Ta (po'v/ju,a, TTCOJ "hsyoisv av n ; ?o~a)^ Ss
ev TO Qau'h.ms ea-ri TI fyunxov ayaQov xpsirrov 19
avrd, * sfyisrai TOU oixs/oy aya$oD. oix ^oixs 8=
o
si
Trspi TOU IvavTtou
Xe7eo~5a<. ou yap c^ao"iv, si
sJvai
xaxov eo~TJ, TT)V Tjovv dyaQov
yap xat xaxov xaxtS xa) aaiat TO>
raura ou xax<J>, oi JU.YJV 7rtys T&V
yap ovrwv xaxcov xa) (}ieuxTa s'Sei a]U,(>a>
a>v 8s
avTixe(rai
ii(rQ
o$ xaxov
8^ xa< avTixsirai.
O6 /X^V oi8' J jU,7J TtOV TTOtOT^TCOV <TT/V
3 TOUT' ouSs Ttov aya^toV ouSs yap al T>J aps
svspysiai
opinion seems to be conveyed, though
that interpretation of the passage has
been disputed.
4 rf ofo ^irifjjTrTOi] ' What is
there then which has these character-
istics (i.e. supreme goodness without
the capability of addition^ which we
men can partake of? For such is the
very object of our enquiries.' That
is, not a transcendental good, but
something to be practically realised.
Cf. Eth. i. vi. 13.
'6 yap Troo-i So/eel] This acceptance
of the testimony of instinct occurs
also in the Eudemian book, Eth. vu.
xiii. 5.
6 5' a.vaipwi>~\ Probably Speusippus,
taking up a suggestion from Plato,
Philebus, p. 67.
TO?S (pauAois] In the neuter gender,
' the lower creatures ; ' alluding to
the 6i\pia mentioned by Plato, Phile-
bus, 1. c.
5 o& yap 4>a<nv\ As we learn from
the Eudemian book, Eth. vu. xiii. i,
Speusippus was the author of this
objection.
III. Aristotle investigates remain-
ing arguments used by the Platonists
to prove that pleasure is not a good ;
1 i ) that it is ' not a quality.' This
argument would prove too much, as it
would be equally decisive against
happiness, or the actions of virtue;
(2) that it is ' unlimited.' But (a)
in one sense this will apply to virtue
also, (6) in another sense it is only
applicable to the 'mixed pleasures,'
which are analogous to health, i.e. a
proportion variable according to cir-
cumstances ; (3) that it is ' not final '
II. -III.]
HeiKiiN NIKOMAXEIQN X.
319
Trv
TO
s TO
etva<, OT< SS
xa TO TJTTOV. s< jotsv otv sx TOU 7]$
-/, xa) 7T=p* TT)V 8jxaioo"tW;j/ xa)
apsrdg, xcttf at, 1 evapy&s <ao~< ]U.aXXov xai rJTTov
7rojou urrap^sjv xaTa Ta a^STa, <TTai TO
6/xaioj yap s)<n jaaXXov xai avfy/fToj, serTi Os
xai <To<>fOJ/s7i/
r]oova?, ]u,^ TTOT' ou
xa
xa< TJTTOJ/.
TO amov, av
s
or perfect, but in some sort ' a transi-
tion.' Against which Aristotle argues,
(a) that it cannot be a motion because
not admitting the idea of speed, (i)
that it cannot be a creation, because
not capable of being resolved into its
component parts, (c) that it cannot be
a filling up, for this is merely cor-
poreal, and even in the case of bodily
pleasure it is not the body that feels ;
(4) that there are many disgraceful
pleasures. To which it may be an-
swered, that pleasures differ in kind,
and even if some be bad, others may
be absolutely good.
1 fl /JL)I rail/ JTOIOTTJTOIJ'] This seems
to be the only record of an argument,
probably occurring in the works of
Speusippus, that ' pleasure is not a
good, because it is not a quality.' It
points to the moralising tendency,
above noticed, of this school of Pla-
tonists, as if they said that no-
thing could be called ' good ' which
did not form part of man's moral cha-
racter.
2 et fifv olv ex rov ?i5fff6ai] Plea-
sure may be said to admit of degrees ;
first, in reference to men's different
capacities of feeling it, but in this
respect it will stand on the same
footing as courage and justice.
et 5' eV TOJS ySovcus fUKTat] ' In
the second place, if (they predicate
this attribute of " unlimited " as
existing, not in the recipients of
pleasure, but) in the pleasures them-
selves, perhaps they omit to state the
reason of the fact, namely, that while
some pleasures are unmixed, others
are mixed.' Plato in the Philebus
divides pleasures into mixed and un-
mixed. Of each he makes three
classes. Mixed pleasures are (i)
bodily pleasures, the restoration of
harmony in the animal frame, where
the bodily pain of want or desire is
mixed up with the bodily pleasure of
gratification ; (2) the pleasure of ex-
pecting this restoration, where the
bodily pain of want is mixed up with
the mental pleasure of the idea of
relief; (3) the pleasure which we feel
in the. ludicrous, where the mental
pain of seeing the un-beautiful is
mixed with the mental pleasure of
laughing at^it. The unmixed plea-
sures, i. e. in which no pain is implied,
are (i) those of smell; (2) those of
sight and hearing; (3) those that be-
long to the intellect. Of these two
classes Plato confines the attribute of
afjLfTpla, ' want of measure,' to the
first class. The unmixed or pure
pleasures necessarily possess fynfrpia,
cf. Phileh. p. 52 c. The same doc-
trine is given Eth. vn. xiv. 6 : at F
&vev \\nra>v (^Soval) OIIK txovffiv irtfp-
&o\'(]v. Speusippus, forgetful of this
distinction, appears to have made
oMerpia (o6piffrov flvai) a universal
predicate of pleasure.
320
3ai
IieiKiiN NIKOMAXEIQN X.
a{j.iysi$ al s p.ixra. r yap XO>AUSJ,
wpur^ivri oucra Ss^srai TO jU,a?t.Aov xai TO TJTTOV,
xai TTJJ/ TJ^ovvji/ ; ou yap TJ auTj trvfAfttTftfa sv
Troi(riv eo~Tiv ou3' sv TIO
xa<
TO/OUTOV TJ xa TO
4TAs*o'i/ TS Ta-yaSov T/Q=i/T,
ou
\
o~v* 7ra<r-v] -yap oixsiov
\>\ B '
xai e< W,> xao
as, aAA a.vis[j.svr)
jtxaAAov xai T^TTOV.
sv?>e%STai slvai.
8e Xiao's/ ^ xa) Ta^
x/vrjo-iv xat ys'i/so-iv a.7ro$a.ivsiv
^.jir
6 soixao"<
5>-.
doxs*
? '
eft/a* xj/v]-
XOO~/AOU,
-
aAAo
3 rf 70^ KcoAtyei K. T.X.] Even the
mixed pleasures, says Aristotle, admit
the idea of proportion (arvfj.ntrpla),
just as health is a proportion, though
u relative and variable one, of the
elements in the human body. In the
Topics, vi. ii. i, the words j? w-yfeia
given as an instance of an ambiguous
definition, ffu^erpfa being used in
more senses than one.
ou 7&p JJTTOV] ' Health is not the
same proportion of elements in all
men, nor even in the same man always,
but witli a certain laxity of variation
it still remains health, though admit-
ting of difference in the degrees (ac-
cording to which the elements are
compounded).'
4 rt\fi6v re rayadbv ridevrfs K.T. A.]
Plato, in the Philebus, p. 53 c, ac-
cepted the doctrine of the Cyrenaics,
is ael yevtffls la-riv (rj ^5oHj), and
then, by the contrast of means and
end, ytveais and ovaia, he proved that
pleasure could not be the chief good.
As said above, Vol. I. Essay IV. p.
198, Plato seems to have recognised
a class of pleasures above those which
were mere states of transition, but to
have had no formula to express them.
Speusippus probably applied the ar-
gument drawn from the Cyrenaic
definition not merely ad homines, as
Plato had done, but as if absolutely
valid.
oiov TJJ TOU KoVjuoi/] i. e. OVK tan.
rdxos Kal PpaSvrfc K.a.0' aln"f]v. 'All
motion has speed and slowness pro-
perly belonging to it, if not relatively
to itself, as for instance the motion
of the universe has no speed or
slowness in itself (because it moves
equably), at all events in relation to
other things.' Aristotle argues that
though it is possible ' to be pleased '
(rirr6r)vat fj.(ra^d\\ftv eh TjSovTiv)
more or less quickly, it is not possible
to ' feel pleasure ' (ijSejflot) either
quickly or slowly. This argument
seems a verbal one, like some of those
in Eth. i. vi. against Plato's doctrine
of ideas. If pleasure be identified
with xivTiffis, the argument holds good.
But if it only be held to have the
same relation to KiVijerjs as Aristotle
himself makes it have to tvepyfia, Eth.
x. viii. 4, the argument falls to the
ground. This argument and the one
in 6 really only apply to the
want of a sufficiently subjective for-
mula to express pleasure. If pleasure
were defined as ' the consciousness of
a transition,' there might then be
degrees of speed in the transition,
though not in the consciousness of it.
III.] H9IKQN NIKOMAXEIiiN X.
rr 8' 7]8ovr| rouro)!/ ou8srspoi
8'
321
LSV yap
STspov, /3a8/sii/ 8s KOU al>^z(
ja=ra/3aXX5<v jasv ouv su; r^r/
<rr/v evs
xou TTOLVTCC TO. roiaura.
xa)
TO
8s xar' aurrjv oux eVr/ ra^sa)^, Asya>
is TC 7r<o ctt/ si'*] ; 8oxs? yap oux ex rou 5
e ou
TOUTO OiaAuscroa/. xai 06 yivscrig rj ^
. xai hsyoixri %s rr\v
etVa/, T^V 8* TJ^OV^V a
TOUTOU 73 AUTTTJ
siav rou xara 6
raura 8s <ra)-
SO-TJ ra Tra^vj. t 875 e<rrf rou xara 0ucr/v
73 TJ^OVTJ, Iv ai ava7rX7jpa)(r/^, TOWT' ay xai
TO (raijaa apa.' ou 8oxs? 8s' ou8' sorriv apa ava-
75 7)801/73, aXXa yivopsvyg fj.lv avot7r'h.r)p(0(r(o$
rf8oir' aV r^', xa} rs/xvo'iasvo^ Au7ro?ro. 73 8o^a 8'
Aristotle's real objection to the term
KiVr]<m lies deeper than these mere
dialectical skirmishings, and has been
explained, Vol. I. Essay IV., p. 197-9.
5 yevftris re (/>0opo] ' And how
can it be a creation ? For it does
not seem to be the case that anything
can be created out of anything; a
thing is resolved into that out of
which it is created. And (as the
Platonists say) pain is the destruction
of that of which pleasure is the crea-
tion.' This elliptical argument seems
to require for its conclusion, 'Where
then are the elements out of which
our perfect nature (ova-la) is created
by the process called pleasure, and
into which it is resolved by the de-
structive process called pain ? ' We
find pain called a destruction in the
Philebtis, p. 31 E: Styos 8' aS QBopa.
Kai \inrri Kal \vffts, T] 5e roD vypov
tr&Kiv rb typavOev ir\i}povaa. SiW/xis
fiSovfi. Aristotle, arguing polemically,
says, ' Where then are the elements
with which the creative and the de-
structive process must begin and end? '
VOL. II. T
He afterwards reasonably substitutes
evepyeia for yeveffis as a better formula,
but the above polemic seems not to
have much value.
6 0118' eari.v &pa \VTTOITO] ' Neither
is pleasure therefore a replenishment,
though one may feel pleasure while
replenishment is taking place, just as
one may feel pain while one is being
cut.' Pleasure, says Aristotle, may
be synchronous with replenishment,
but cannot be identical with it, for
pleasure is a state of the mind, and
not of the body, cf. Eth. i. viii. 10 : rb
fjiev yap $}8e<70ai ^<av tyuxiKwv. All that
is proved here is that a more sub-
jective formula than aj/OTrA^pceo-is is
required to express the nature of
pleasure. Plato had used the formula
7rATjpai(rjs, Philebus, p. 3 1 E, and Speu-
sippus probably repeated it.
Te/W/xevos] The "words ro/j.al Kal
Kaufffis were commonly used by Plato,
as instances of bodily pain. Cf.
Timaus, p. 65 u : rat/ret 8' a5 irfpl ras
Kavfffts Kal TOjuas ToC fftap.a.TOS yiyv6-
(tevd eoTt /caTo8r)Ao.
322
IIGIKilN NIKOMAXEIflN X.
[CHAP
xal
(ioxsi yeyvr}<rQai ex TWV Trspi TTJV rpo$>r}V
ijSovaJP' evSssIi,' yap yivopsvovs xai 7rpoAu7rTj$VTa ^0<r9a<
7 TV} ai/aTrXijptoo-f/. TOUTO 8' ou Trep* 7ra<ra$ o-uju,$a/i/=j rag
ij'8ova' aXuTTOJ yap eJo~/v a7 TS jaa^aaTixa) xa) Ttoi/
xara Ta aicrdrjcre^ ai 8/a TTJ oa-<$>prj<r0)g, xcti axoa-
s xa) 6pa ( uaTa ?roXXa xa) javrjjaaj xa<
av
oux
o yevoir av
7roviS/<rTOL^ rtov >j'3ov<ov
* ou yap / roTj
aurtx xai
xa.Qa.7rep ou Ta TO?^ xa ( avou<r/v uyisiva
5 Xsuxa ra
15 oura> XEyoir' av, on
OU jU,^J/ OtTTO y TOUTO)J/, OJCTTTsp xa< TO
, TTpoSoWi 8' ou, xa) TO iiyictivsiv, oi ja^v OTJOUJ/
TO) ?8< 8*a4>pou<rjv a ifSovai' srspa-i yap
al aTTo T&v xaXtov Ttov CCTTO Ttov alo~^ptov, xai oux O~TJV
TTJV TOU Sixa/ou JUT; ovTa Sixa/ov 0^8= TTJV TOU
u,^ ovTa jU,ouo~/xo'i/, o 4 ao/a> xai ITT; Ttov a.A.'Xwv.
os 8ox? xa/ o 4)/Xoj, erepos u>v TOU xo'Aaxo,
oux ouo-av ayaftov TIJV 7j'8oi/^v ^ 8/a^o'pou^ /fOi ' o
Trpoj rayaftov bfju'h.siiv 8ox7, 6 Trpo^ >J
7 iXvrroi ycip elc
K.T. A..] This is all admitted in so
many words by Plato, Phileb. p. 52
A: TJ 5)) roivvv rovrots (i.e. to the
pleasures of smell, sight and hearing)
jrpoaQiaiifv rajirepl Tt/uae^/tOTO^5ov(s,
i &pa SofcoDcrii/ ^^Tv aurat ireiVas /xei/
/ui; ex 6 "' TO ^ ft-o.v9d.vtiv
8 irpbs Si rots irpoQtpovTas K. T.A.]
This argument of the Platonists is
quoted AYA. vu. xi. 5.
IO TV TOD /iOI/(T(KoD] Cf. ^A. IX.
ix. 6; x. iv. 10. The arguments here
given to prove that pleasures differ in
kind are () that some men are in-
capable of feeling certain pleasures;
(6) that the flatterer is different from
the friend; (c) that the pleasures of
childhood differ from those of maturity.
The whole reasoning is repeated in
better form in chap. V.
1 1 f/j.(jiavlfii> 5t So/cet xal 6 <pi\os]
The term ' friend ' is used here in a
distinctive sense to denote ' the true
friend,' just as it is in Eth. vm. xiii.
9 : &KOVTO. yap <pi\ov ofr irotrjToi'.
Common language, which contrasts
the flatterer, who ministers pleasure,
from the friend, who ministers good,
testifies to the non-identity of pleasure
(in all forms) with good.
III. IV.] HGIKiiN NIKOMAXEmN X.
<\ / ^ \5J^ ~ t \ rr
QVsioi^sToii, TOV o sTratvoiKTiv w$ Trpog STS
T' av eXoiTO ~~
OS <$>' 0/ T
/ 7TOHOV Ti TCOV
:/. 7Tp) TroXXa TS
* j,7j?|U/av ITTI^SOQI TJ&OVTJV, olov opav,
\ 5 \>/ >^>I./
Ta*; apsTas sysiv. si
323
ov xa
, ouSsv 8ia4)pei'
onr* aurtbv
ours 7ra<ra
TOIJTO/
yap av rara xa/ j avj
or* jaev ouv ours raya^ov 7313
v], SvjAov eoixev sTvat, xat OT/ sl<r/
alpsrai xatf auras $ia$>spoo(rai TO> si'S=< ^ ac^' tov.
Ta /xsv ouv Xsyo'jasva Trsp* T% TjSovvj^ xa) XuTrrj^ jxai/ct>
T/ 3' so"T/v 75 TToTov Ti, xaTa^avs<rTepov -ysvoiT* av CCTT' 4
yap > '
12 Trepl iroXX( re] If pleasure, ac-
cording to Eudoxus, were the chief
good, all pursuits would be prized in
proportion to their affording pleasure,
but this Aristotle shows not to be the
IV. Having finished his critical
remarks on existing theories (T
\ey6/j.eva,') about pleasure, Aristotle
proceeds synthetically to state his own
views, as follows : (i) Pleasure is, like
sight, something whole and entire, not
gradually arrived at, but a moment
of consciousness, at once perfect, in-
dependent of the conditions of time,
i -4. (z) It arises from any faculty
obtaining its proper object, but is
better in proportion to the excellence
of the faculty exercised, 5-7. (3)
It is thus the perfection of our func-
tions, but is distinct from the functions,
themselves, 8. (4) It cannot be
continuously maintained, owing to the
weakness of our powers, our func-
tions being soon blunted by fatigue,
9- (S) Pleasure, in short, results
from the sense of life, and is insepa-
x
rably connected with the idea of life,
I rf 8' effrlv fl irolov TI] Cf. Eth. II.
v. I : /xera Se raDra TI tanv rj aptr^i
ffKfirreov. Ib. vi. i : 8e? Se (d) i*.6vov
OVTUS eiirfiv, STI eis, a\\a /col iroia Tty.
The genus (rl tari) of pleasure here
given is that it is o\ov n, one of those
moments of consciousness which are
complete in themselves ; the differentia
(ito16v T) is that it results from the
exercise of any faculty upon its proper
object. It may be said that this defi-
nition would leave pleasure undefined ;
but in fact it is a simple sensation,
not admitting of entire explication.
f) fjLtv o'pacns] Modern researches in
optics would tend to modify this view
of the entirely simple nature of an act
of sight. But it may be conceded
that any 'process ' which takes place
in sight is too swift to be noticed by
the mind. Cf. Locke, Essay on the
Human Understanding, book II. c.
xiv. 10. ' Such a part of duration
as this, wherein we perceive no suc-
cession, is that which we may call an
instant, and is that which takes up
T 2
324
IIGIKilN NIKOMAXEION X.
[CHAP.
T/voy,
SV
vouv p^po'vov rsXs/a slvau' ou -yap SCTTIV sv^sr^g ovbsvog, o
elg uo~Tpov ysvo'/xsvov reXs/aiirsi auTrjV TO eTSoj. TO;-
8' Io<x xa/ 73 TJ^OVTJ' oXov yap Tt s<rn, xa xar'
%povov "hafioi rig av rfiovriv rj s^' JrXf/ai
5As>5rjo-Tai TO
sv ppo'i/a> -yap TraVa XVTJO~/ xa
7]
OLTTCLVTl
TOU p^po'vou 7ra<raj ctT=Xe?^, xai srspoii rio
xai a.\"hr{h<DV ' 73 yap Ttoj/
xiovog pafi><u(r(u$, xa* auTai
73 jtxsv TOU vaou TsXs/a*
P.SVQV' 73 8s T^J
[j.Epou$ yap IxaTepa. TO>
TtO
TOUTO).
srspct rr^g TOU
TOU vaou Trotr^sfog. xai
yap evSsr^f 7rpo TO TTpoxsi-
< TOU TpiyXu<>ou aTeXr^'
/ out/ 6/a>souo~j, xai oux
v Tto eyoEi,
xa l^ri
xa< TCOV
xa* TauTTjj
< yap
ai xaT
irosv TTO,
ai'hvig xa/
the time of only one idea in our minds
without the succession of another,
wherein therefore we perceive no suc-
cession at all.'
a SjJirep Siravri] ' Therefore it is
not a process ; for every process is
under conditions of time and aims at
some end, as for instance, the (process
of) architecture is perfect, when it has
effected what it aims at. May we not
say (^) then that it is perfect in the
particular (TOUTOI) time viewed as a
whole ? But in the separate parts of
the time occupied all processes are im-
perfect, and are different in species,
both from the whole process, and from
each other. For the collection of the
stones is different from the fluting of
the pillars, and both from the making
of the temple. And the making the
temple is a perfect process, for it wants
nothing towards its proposed object ;
but that of the basement and the
triglyph are imperfect, for they are
each the making of a part. Therefore
they differ in species, and it is not
possible to find a process perfect in
species in any time whatsoever, unless
it be in the time occupied viewed as a
whole." With Michelet, who follows
two MSS., fi has been omitted above
before rovrtp. The reading ^ Tovrep
makes no sense, unless one which
would be opposed to what is said
afterwards (OVK (<mv iv brtfovvK. T. A.).
The form t) with a question, used for
conveying Aristotle's opinion on any
subject, occurs again in 9 of this
chapter, ^ Ka^vti ; In the illustration
given, two of the processes mentioned
are merely preparatory, the collection
of the stones for building, and the
fluting of the pillars before they are
set up ; two others are substantive
parts of the building, the laying of
the foundation (the first act), and the
adding the triglyph, which was a
fluted tablet added as an ornament to
IV.]
II9IKHN NIKOMAXEION X.
325
TO. TOiavra. ov jaovov 3' OUTO>, aAAa xai Iv
|3aO/<rsJ * TO ya2 TTO'^SV ?ro7 ou raurov i> TCO
sv Tto Jeeps') * a * " Tpa) fJ-epsi xai sTSpco, oios TO 6<s
TTJV ypaajuwjv TT^VOS xaxs/vrjV ou jaovov yap ypapft
/, aXAa xa< ev TO'TTO) ot)o~av, sv srspco d'
Si' axp*j3s/a jU.sv ooi> 7Tpi xivf t <rsa)g sv
SOJXr 3' OUX V CtTTOCVT/ ^pOV<O T=?\. = /Ct SJVa/,
aTsX=i xai (>ia<>ov(ra.i TO> e'/3=i elVe TO
TO 4-
^ srspai r av eTsv aXX7]Xcov, xa/ TO>V
i;
TO
o?\.a)v Ti xa TsXsajv i roovv. o=j= av TOUTO xa
TOU jU.^ sv?>s%(rQct
yap ej/ TO> vuv oXov Ti. sx TOUTWV 8s S^Xov xai OT< ou
xaAai^ Xsyouo-/ xivr^iv $ yevstrw elvai TYJV TjSov^v, ou
yap TravTwv TauTa XsysTa/, aXXa TCOV jw,sp;o"Ttov xa< jU,r ;
the frieze (perhaps the last act in the
creation of the temple). The creation
of the temple as a whole, regarded in
the whole time which it occupies, is
alone to be regarded as a perfect
process.
3 4 6fj.olus 5e eTSoj] ' So too in
the case of walking, and all other
processes. For if passage be a pro-
cess from place to place, even of this
there are different species, flying,
walking, jumping, and the like. And
not only this, but even in walking
itself (there are different species), for
the whence and the whither are not
the same in the whole course and in
the part of the course, and in one part
and the other part ; nor is it the same
thing to cross this line and that. For
a person not only passes a line, but a
line in space, and this line is in dif-
ferent space from that line. We have
treated exactly of process elsewhere,
but it seems not to be perfect in every
time, but the majority of processes
seem imperfect and differing in species,
if the whence and the whither con-
stitute a differentia. But pleasure
seems perfect in kind in any time
(of its existence) whatsoever.' Every
process, says Aristotle, is under con-
ditions of time, and its parts being
under a law of succession are essen-
tially different from each other; the
va-repov is different from the irp6repov,
the beginning, middle, and end, differ
essentially from one another. In
pleasure nothing of the kind is to be
found. One moment of pleasure does
not lead up, as a preparative, to an-
other more advanced moment. Plea-
sure, when felt, is, ipso facto, complete.
V &\\ots flpTfTai] This refers gene-
rally to the Physics of Aristotle. See
especially Books IV. and V.
OVK iv SiraiTi] ' Non in quolibet
temporV this is of course different
from lv aircwrt T< xpdry -rovrtf, and
Iv T(f airami, in the preceding section.
(v drtfovv] ' In quolibet,' but above,
OVK tffriv Iv &rcfow means ' in nullo
potest.'
4 $T)\OV olv ijSovfi] ' It is clear
then that (process and pleasure) must
IieiKflN NIKOMAXEmN X.
yap of '
TOV
8s 7rao-7j 7rpo TO
6lO.XSl[J.Vr)$ TTpOf TO XfltA-
TO/OUTOV yap jaaX/o~T'
g "hsysiv svspysliv, r)
TO
326 II9IK&N NIKOMAXEmN X. [CHAP.
>\ j> \
UOS 07J
" oXov yap n. a\v
rpyouo-7jf, rz"hei(ng 8s
TO)V OTTO T7JI/
8oxs7 73' TsAs/a svspysia'
eariv 73' Ivspysia rov apKrra 8<axs/j,vou
TUTTOV TU)V U^' aUT^V. aUTTJ 8' V TSAsiOTaTT; nj XttJ
7j'8/o~T73* xaTa 7rao~av yap ala-ftrjcriv S&TIV Tj'SovTj', 6
xa< 8/ai/o<av xa Qswpiav, rfii<rrri 8' 73'
TaTTj 8' 73' TOU u IVOVTOC TT^OC TO o"^"ou8aioVaTov Ttov
xv. r ^
6 <' aifTrjV. TS^S/OJ* 8s TTJV svspysiav 73' 7380^73'. ou TOJ/
\ r\\ / r* tN.
CtUTOV 6 TpQTTQV 7J T 7JOOV7J TAf/0? XCt/ TO 6ti(T77}TOV T
xa; r a/<r3750"/c, 0~7roi/Sa7a ovra, a)(T7rsp ouS' r 6y/fia xai
/ / r * *
7 o larpot; bfAOuog atria <rri ToD vyiaiveiv. xatf s
8' a'i<rQri<riv on yivsrai 73*80^3, 877^
fj.ara xa) axouo~juaTa fTva* 73'8sa.
jaaXicrTa, S7rsi8av rf TS a^firjo"/^ Y
TOIOUTOV svspyy' roiovrwv 8' ovrwv TOU TS
TOU alo"5avojas'vou, as) e&rai 7380^73 i
8 7roi7]o~ovTOj xat TOU 7r/o~o ( avou.
Ti T?vOJ, oToV T0i CtXjW.a/0/^ 7j' Wpa ' Sft) CtV
o5v TO TS VOTJTOV 7j aJo-flrjTOV -^ olov 8sT xa) TO
85
v yap op~
8s xa/ OT/
xa< ?rpo^
XCU
ys TOU
TTJV svsp-
be different from one another, and
that pleasure belongs to the class of
things whole and perfect/
6 TeAecoT 5i fryiofvcu'] 'Pleasure
renders the exercise of a faculty per-
fect, but not in the same way in which
the goodness of the faculty itself and
of its object does so, just as health
and the physician are in different ways
the cause of one's being well ; ' t. e.
pleasure is the formal, and not the
efficient^ cause of a perfect function.
' Cause ' in this Aristotelian usage
becomes equivalent to ' result.' The
illustration used here is given also,
with a slight confusion of terms, in
the Eudemian book, Eth. \i. xii. 5.
"EireiTa /col iroiovai fj.tv, 011% us larpucri
8i {tylttav, a\\' a>r TJ vylfia.
j rotoinuv 5' fivrttv treiffo^tvov]
'But if the object and the percipient
be in this (highest) condition, there
always will be pleasure as long as
subject and object remain.' The re-
lative terms rb TTOIOW and rb irtiaxov
take their meaning from the way in
which they are applied. Thus, Eth. v.
v. 9, they are used for ' producer and
IV.]
II9IKQN NIKOMAXEIftN X.
327
Qsoopovv, y (TTai sv Trf svspysia TJ TJooviq' O/AO/OJV yap
xoa TTpoj aAXy]Aa rov aurov TpoTrov s^ovrcoi/ rot> TS
xa) rou TrojTjTixoy rairo 7r<>uxs
sj<o rfosTaj ; TJ xdpi.vsi iravra yap 9
ra dvQpcoTTSia a8uvaT? <rvvs%tb$ svspysfv. o'j yiverai
ouv ou8' )j$oy?}' cVsTca yap TVJ si/spys/a. I'wa Ss
xaiva ovra, v&rspov Os ov% bfjioicog S/a ravTO' TO
yap TrpwTov 7rapaxsxXr]rai TJ Sjavoia xai
Trspl aura svspysl, ata-Trsp Kara r^v o-fyiv ol e
ja=T7rs/ra 8' oy TOJOIU'TTJ 73 svspysia aXXa
S/o xa) 7] TJ^OV^ ctjaaupoyra/. opsyscrftai 8s
olTjSs/i] T/J av aTravra^, ore xa< rot> ^v airavrsg
73 8s ^>^ evspysid rig sari, xai sxa<rTO$ Trspi raura
svspyii a xai \).VLhi<TT ayaTra, oTov 6
7Tspt ra /AsXvj, 6 8s $&6jU$|$if$ TYJ 8favo/a
ra Qso)pr}[JLaTa, ovra) 8s xai raiv "honr&v exafrrog.
8'
TO
ra^ evspyeiag, xai TO i^v 8s, 06 opsyovTai.
yap sxaVTo)
, alpSTOV 0V. TTOTSpOV 8s 8<0t T7JJ> TjSflVrjV TO ^TJV
sQa ? 8/a TO Vv TV 78ov>V asjVQco sv TO>
consumer.' Here ri TTOIOVV is used
for the percipient, rb trdcr-^ov for the
object perceived.
8 bfjLoicav ycip ovraiv ^iVetrOat] ' For
from similar pairs of relatives, bear-
ing the same relation to one another,
z. e. the active and passive, the same
result is naturally produced.' This
appears to be an abstract and a priori
way of stating the universality of
pleasure attendant on the harmony
between a faculty and its proper
object.
9 irws o3i> ayuavpoDrcu] 'How is it
then that no one is continuously in a
state of pleasure ? The reason must be
that one grows weary. For all human
things are incapable of continuous
activity. Pleasure therefore ceases to be
produced, for it depends on the activity
of the faculties. It is on this same
account that some things please us
while they are new, but afterwards
not in the same way. For at first
the intellect is excited and acts strenu-
ously on the objects in question (as
in the case of sight, when one first
fixes one's glance) but afterwards
the, action is not equally vivid, but
relaxed, and so one's pleasure also
fades.' On this doctrine, cf. Vol. I.
Essay IV. and Ar. Metaph. viir. viii.
1 8, there quoted, p. 201.
10 It is natural to say that all
desire pleasure, from its inseparable
connection with the sense of life, and
with each of the vital functions.
Thus far Eudoxus was right, but he
was wrong in not recognizing a differ-
ence in kind between different plea-
sures, and this point is demonstrated
in the ensuing chapter.
328
II9IKON N1KOMAXEIQN X.
[CHAP.
Trapovri.
TOLVTCH. <$>at.ivzTai xa*
avsu TS yap evepysiag ou yivsrai
7J60J/7J, TraVav TS svspysiav reXeio? >j
xa ra
a< ra>
eripuiv olopsQa
a< ra
iv ' ra -yap srspa TCO
OUTW yap
olov wa xai
xai ypafyri xai ayaAjaara xa/ o/x/a xa) <rx=Do.
$ia$spov<ra.<; rip e^ei OTTO
xa
a
$iavolct.$ rS)v xara ra^ aJ(r5v]O'e^ xa} aura) aXA^Afov
xar' sTSoj* xa< ai rsAs/oStraj 8^ vj^ova/. Qavsiy ft av TOVTO
xa) ex TOU o"uvtoxeco<75a< raiv ig^ovaiv Ka<rT7jv T
$v Ty\.s/o7. eruvay^e/ ya^ T^V evspysiav y oJxea
V. Pleasures may be thought to
differ in kind, (i) Because our
several functions (mental and others)
differ from each other in kind, and
things different in kind are perfected
by things different in kind, 1-2.
(2) Because while its own pleasure
promotes any particular exercise
of the faculties, an alien pleasure
impedes it, 2-5. (3) Because the
human functions differ from each
other in a moral point of view, and
the pleasures therefore which are so
closely connected with them as almost
to be identical must differ in the same
way from each other, 6-7. (4)
Creatures different in kind must have,
and by common consent do have,
different pleasures, 8. (5) The
pleasures of man when in a morbid
state must differ from the pleasures
of man when in a healthy state. As
a corollary to the last argument it
may be added, that reasonings against
pleasure from a reference to the mor-
bid pleasures have no weight. The
answer to them would be, that such are
not pleasures at all.
I Kal T& (ptxriKct Ka! rck wrb re^^rjs]
The tvfpytiai here mentioned appear to
be taken as equivalent to rc
Thus we have the classification of
things capable of being made perfect,
into nature, art, and morality. Cf.
Eth. in. iii. j] '. atria yap Soicoucnv
flvai <pv<TiS KOI avayict) Kal ?vx r l> % TL '*
vovs Kal irav rb Si' avOpcairov.
2 tyav et'rj 5' TeXeiot] ' This would
also seem to be shown by the intimate
connection existing between each
pleasure and the function which it
perfects.' Cf. Eth. x. i. i : /toAioTa 70^
8o(cr ffvvtfKfLUtrQai T$ ytvti T]fJ.uv.
Pleasure, generally speaking, is proper
to the human race ; from another point
of view, each function has its own
proper pleasure, and the pleasure
'proper' to one function is 'alien'
to other functions. This distinction
of olKtia and a\\orpla riSovfi was per-
haps suggested by a passage in the
Republic of Plato, ix. 587 A, where
these terms are used, though not with
quite the same application. It is
there said that in the philosopher
each part of his soul does its proper
work and attains its proper pleasure ;
but when some lower passion has the
predominance, that passion, causing
disturbance, does not itself attain its
I16IKON NIKOMAXEIQN X.
329
yap xaa~ra xpivovcri xa s"axpiov<riv o j,s
evspyovvTsg, oiov ys(0[j.sTpixo} yivovrai ol youpovrs$
TO> ysoj^asTpsTv, xa\ xaravoov(Tiv xao~ra ju.aAAoi/, bp-oicog
6s XOLI ol $i'Xo[ji.oi>(roi xai (^>t?^oixo^o^oi xa) rcov a/\.Xa)v
xacrroi 7ri%i?)oa.(riv slg TO olxiiov epyov p/a/povrs aura).
(ruvoLD^oixri Ss aj TJOova/, ra Os o-uj/auovTa olxsHa. ro7g
srspoig os r> si'^si xai ra ois?a srspa r> si'osi. ?r/ Ss 3
roSr dv t^avsiY/ ex rou raj ac^' srepcov '
ev^pysaig sJvoti' o yap
sav
rvjv
TOU;
ro^, ( aaX?\,ov ^
v\ xot.ro. rrjV av7^T}Tixt}v ovv rOovrj TVJV Trsp* TOV
svspysiav Qdsipsi. b[j.oia)$ 8s TOUTO xa) STT) rcov
o~u^t(3a<V;/, orav dtjaa Trspi Suo sj/spyrj' 73 yap
srs'pav ixxpoJfi, xav TroAo
coVrs ]U.r y S' svspysiv xara rvjv srspav.
OTOJOUV a~$>o()p(x. oit Trdvv ^pto^asv srspov,
h'hoig ^pp.oc. aps(rxo[j.svoi, xa\ sv
=a.Tpcji$ ol TpayT/]fJiaTi%ovTS$, orav 4)atXoj oi aycovity-
isvoi (<ri, TOTS frahurT auro $p(u(riv. ITTS) 3' 73 jtxsv olxsioc 5
axpioi rag s
Trots?, al ft ahhorpiai hvpaivovrai, SrjXov
u Qio-ra(riv' (r%?)ov yap al a^^orpiai rj
oVsp ai oJxsTai AuTra* * <^>Qsipou<ri yap ra$ Vpy;ia$ al
>~-~ r / v'^k > ?'^ > ' '
oixziai XtiTrai, o/ov e< rai ro ypaq>iv 7jo4j xai sTn
TO Xoy/^s<r5ai ' 6 jtxsv yap ou ypac^s*, 6 8' oy
ryg vspysia$. trvftfiotlVSt 8^ Trepi
73
own pleasure, and compels the other
faculties to pursue a pleasure which is
alien to them : 8rai/ 8e &pa. TWV ereptav
rt Kpar^ffri, inrap^fi avry fMrjre T)]V
tavrov ySovfyv ffvptffKiv Tti re &\\a
avayKa^fiV aA.A.orpfai' /cal /u^ oA7)0Tj
QaKpifrovffiv} ' They work out.' Cf.
note on Eth. i. vii. 18. The word
QaKpifiovi' is used transitively Eth. i.
xii. 7, and below, x. v. 5, where from
the analogy of the arts it means to
VOL. II. U
'give the last finish to.' It is used
intransitively Eth. i. vi. 1 3 : Qaicpifiovv
virep Tofauv, ' to refine.'
4 Kal tv rots dedrpois Sputriv]
'And those who munch sweetmeats
in the theatres do so especially when
the actors are bad.' This is one of
those illustrations from common life,
which are richly strewed about the
writings of Aristotle ; the art of
making which he perhaps learnt first
from Plato.
U
330
HGIKftN NIKeMAXEUlN X.
[CHAP.
yap
g TQVVOLVTIOV airo rwv OJXSKOV yftovtov rs xai
olxeiai 8' sJ<r)v ai ITT) 7"r) i/=pys/a xa6' OCUTTJV y/vo-
a/. ai 8' aXXorp<a Tj^ova} eipTjrat art 7rapa:rAr/r<ov
TYJ AuTrrj TTOiovtriv QftsipotKri yap,
ou<ra>i/ Ss Ttov evzpyeidov E7n/Xa xa/
jixsv alpsrutv outrtov rcuv 6s ^swxTaJv TO>V
spoto"i xa< ai Tj'Sova/* xa6' exao"T>j
r)^ovr] i<TTiv. y jtxsv oSv ry) o"7rot>5a/a olxs/a f
75* 8s TY] 4 ia ^71 jU-o^^pa* xa) yap ai 7r<$u|U./oc/ T>V /xsv
xaXa>v sTraivsra/, rtov 8' aJtr^pcov %|/ffXTOU. olxsjo'rspaj 6*
evsf>ysiai$ ai ev auraTj Tj^ova) rtov opc^s rov ai ja=v
xa) TO?J %povoi$ xa) TYJ (^>tj<r<, ai 8;
xai aOiop/^T '
s TCLUTQV S(TTIV 7J IvZ
J^OV^ fiioivoitx. slvon oio'
ya'p' aXXa 8<a TO jw,^ ^ropi^-<r3at <$>a
o5v ai svspysiai i'rspai, xa} ai Tj
, xa} axorj xai
^ 8/a4>gpou<rj xai ai Tj^ovaj, xa} TOUTCOV ai Trspi
8/avojav, xa} sxarspai aXX>jXa)j/. Soxs? 8' iva
co ^outp xa} 7]'oj/rj oJxs/a, (o(nrsp xa} spyov TJ yap
xara rr/v svsp-ysiav. xa} e<>' sxa<rr(o 85 Q-copcjvvTi TOUT'
av ctavsi'vj * Irepa yap JTTTOU TJ^OV^ xai xut/oj xa} av5pa>-
TTOU, xa^dtTTSp 'HpaxXsiroj <$>y;<r/v ovov <rupjU.ar' av eXsV5a/
yap ppu<rou rpo<$>^ ovo/^.
o/vs y= ij
ySlO. T7) VJOOVT. OU
aiV$7j<r<* aroTrov
a
6 7 (col dSjdptffTot ToiiTJi/] 'And
they are so indivisible as to raise a
doubt whether the function is not
identical with the pleasure attached
to it. And yet pleasure can hardly
be thought or perception, this would
be absurd ; but through their not
being separated, some persons fancy
them to be identical.' To ' divide '
and to ' distinguish ' are, as Coleridge
tells us, two different things. Plea-
sure, though not divided, should be
distinguished, from the vital functions.
The author of the Eudemian books,
however, EfcA. vn. xii. 3, identified
them, and we might well ask Ari-
stotle why happiness, any more than
pleasure, should be identified with
i] On the superior
purity of sight, hearing, and smell
over taste, cf. Plato, Philebus, p. 51,
and Elk. m. x. 3-11.
8 &ffirep Kal tpyov~\ Cf. Plato.
Republic, p. 352 E : T Apa GUP roOro &/
flei'rjs al firirou ol &\Aou brovovv ffjyov,
6 &i/ ?J ytiova' (Keiv(/> irotfj ris $ &piffTa ;
KaBdirtp 'Hpdn\ftTOS XP U(T ^ 1 '] ' As
V.] HeiKflN NIKOMAXEIQN X. 331
MV TWV STtpatv rat sJ'ori Gia.&=pf>'j(riv s^os/, rag 3; Ttov
a<tioi(^op0'js y?voyeij/ elvou. 8*aX?^aTTG'j(ri 8* ow 9
STTI ~ys TWV avfyp(O7T(vv ' TO. yap aura TOV$ [Jt.lv
T=27T:l TOU 0= XuTTiT, X< T0? jtArf /^JTTVJSa KC/Ll fJ.lfTYjTOi
e(TTi Toig os Tj'os'a xa< v^^vTyTa. xaj ITTI yA'jx=a>v 05 TOUTO
TO. aura 6ox=7 TOO TTU^STTOVT* xaj Tot>
ov s/va/ rco a<r^=v=r xai TO> suzxrixtp.
8= TOUTO xai s^' srspcov <rvu.fia.iv=i. OoxsT 8' s
rctls ToirrjTQis slvai TO ^ ail/& ', asvoi/ Tt " 0" 7I ' & ' J ^ a ' <0 -
si 3= TOUTO xaXoij X='y=Tat, xot.Qa.7rsp OOXEI, xal s(TTtv
av a< TO'TO> <>a*voU,;j/ai xa
ri ? TO>
)5opai xai
' rosa o-jx S<TTIV, aAXa TO-JTOI$ xa OUTCO o/axs/-
rag p,\v oSv
sva Ooxou<ra>j/ TT&jav 11 Tva arsov To a
slvai ; T^ sx TCOV svspysiibv Sr^Xov ; TauTa/ yap
ai r/jwot.i. SIT ouv ju./a a"Tiv sirs TTASJOO^ ai TOU
xai jotaxa^/ou av^poV, aJ TaoTa^ TsXio5(rai rj^&vai
Heraclitus says that "an ass would ! Karek rV cuffOTjcriv ovSeirore yap -rb
prefer hay to gold," ' the reason j OVT^ ipaivfrai rots /j.fv y\vKv, TOIS 5e
being that he is an ass. This saying j TOVVOVT'IOV, H.TI Sit>8apfj.fvoiif /col XeXw-
of Heraclitus, vrhich reminds us of the i ySTi.ucVcuc TWV trtptav rb tufdifrrtpioy
-iEsopic fable of the Cock and the | cal Kpir-fipiov T>V Ax^ e/l/Ta "' x v i*** v -
Jewel, was probably meant to satirize j TOUTOU 5* OJTOS rotoirrou TOUS erfpovs
the low desires of the human race, j fttv \nro\rfirTeov p-trpov elveu, TOU$ 5*
It forms the pendant to that other Irepows oux WO\IJ*TM'. 6/jioiais tie
saying, 'Zeus looks on the wisest man rovro Ae-yea <col ^il a-fa0ou toJ KCUCOU,
as we look on an ape.' *ol KaAov Kid CU<TX/>O/, cal TW^ iAAwf
10 eir-rip IK^TOU fj.fr poi> f] aperJj Kal ; T y roioirrtav. Those who are vicious
6 crya86s] That there is a definite | and corrupt are to be pronounced not
standard of pleasure and of taste, as I to be right judges of what is good or
of other apparently variable things, is pleasant. Their pleasures are to be
most clearly laid down in Aristotle's , pronounced not pleasures at alL Cf.
discussion upon the saying of Prot- : Plato, Philebus, p. 40 c : tyfvbtffiv &pa
agoras, that 'man is the measure of all ^Sovcus TO iroAAa of irovijpol x a *P ovfflv >
things.' Cf. Metaphysics, x. vi. 6 : O f 5' fcyaflol TWV w6p&wu>v a\tj0efftv.
5 TOWT' **c TWV yi
u u 2
IIBIRilN NIKOMAXEIQN X.
[CHAP.
?\,yo/vr' av avQowTrov rfinvau slvai, al 8s Xo/Tra/ tevrsowc
xa/ 7ro?\.Aoo-rtt>, wTTrsp at evlpys/a/.
8 rtov Tree/I rag apsrac rs xa/
i * r *
AOITTOV Trsp/ eu8a/|U,ov/a ru?ra)
\ /i ~
^SjtXV rtOV
*7rpo?ipr)[j.va (ruvro[j.a)rspo$ av sJyj 6 Xo'yo^.
8' or/ oyx sVr/v ^/?' xa/ yap ra>
ra [j-syurra. si 8rj raura ja^ apsVxs/, aXXa
/j svspysidv riva Qsrsov, xaQaTrep sv rolg vrporspov fiprj-
a/psra/, a/ 8s xa6' aurdg y OIJAOV or/ r^v uOa/ ( a,ov/av raiv
xa5' aurag alpsrwv nvd ftzrsov xa/ oy rtov 8/' a'XXo* ou8ivo
3 yap v8sr^ vj
lrrlv a/psra/, acfc* c<iv jarj^sv eTT/^r/rs/'ra/ ?rapa rrjV zvs
ro/aora/ 8' sTva/ 8oxouo-/t/ al xar* apsryv Trpa-ts ' ra
yap xaXa xa/ o~7rouoa7a Trparrsiv raw 8/' aura alpsrtov.
xa) rtov 7ra/S/iv 8s a/ Tj'osTa/' ou yap 8/' srfpa aurat;
aipoyvra/' fihaTrrovrai yap an' auraiv jaaXXov T| <y<$>Xoui/-
ra/, a/xsXouvre^ rcov o"to/xara)v xa/ r% xry(rsa)$. xara-
8' sV/ raj ro/auraj 8/aya)yaj raiv st>8a/jaoi//-
VI. Aristotle having concluded his
treatise upon the nature of pleasure
reverts now to the general question of
the nature of happiness, or the chief
good for man. He takes up from the
first book the following fundamental
propositions : ( i ) that happiness must
lie a development (eWp7ia) and not
a state (e'Jis) of the faculties ; (2) that
it must be final and satisfying; (5)
that it must consist in some develop-
ment of the faculties sought for its
own sake. The remainder of the
chapter is occupied with excluding
games and amusements from the
above definition. Though exercises
of the faculties sought for their own
sake, these are (a) patronised by un-
worthy judges, tyrants, children,
and the like ; (6) after all, they are
rather the means to working, than
ends in themselves; (c) they do not
represent the higher faculties in man.
1 tiprmfvuiv 8e TUSV irtpl T&J operefr
re KO) <pi\tas ical rjSovds] Cf. Eth. I.
xiii. i, where the analysis of oprrV), or
human excellence (the most important
part of the conception of happiness,
Eth. i. x. 9) is introduced ; Eth. vin.
i. i, where the discussion of friendship,
partly as connected with virtue and
partly as an external blessing, is
justified ; Eth. x. i. i , where a treatise
on pleasure is added on account of
the human interest of the topic, and
the controversies which have been
raised about it.
2 eiirontv 5' grt K.T.A.] Cf. Eth. I.
vii. 13; i. v. 6.
3 T>V fvSatfJOfi^ofifi'cev^ ' Of those
VI.] HGIKflN NIKOMAXEION X. 333
ol ToXXoi, (>M trapa roig rvpdvvoig syoox^aouo-iv ol
sv rafg roiavraig otaytoyalg s'jTpa-=Aoj wv yap ifyierrou,
sv TouToi Trazzj/fj'JG'i (T$oig a-jrovg T)0ri f>*ov~ai os TOIOU-
;> r>. \ -y > >. \ ~ ? 5\\\
Troy. doxsi [j.*v ovv sydaiaovjxa raura sivai bia TO rovg
sv Ouva(TTSiaig v TO'jroig a/ro<rp/o?\.arji/, ovosv os foiog
ol TOIOVTOI s}o~iv' o'j yap sv TOO 6uva<TT='Js*v TJ
o' o voii, a4>' cov a* O"7roy6a?ai evspysia.1 ' oy6' si
OUTOI OVTSJ r]ooi/r^ sfaixpivovs xou shsuQspiov STT}
rag <rco ( u.aT<xa^ xaTa^=uyoyo'/v, 8/a ToyTO Ta'JTa^
a.lp;T(oTspa.g slvai ' xa< -yap o< TroiiQsg roc. Trap'
xpaTKTTOi oiovTO.1 slvai. svXoyov 15,
av6pd<riv srspct. $aiv=Tai TJ ( a
xai iTTisixfV/v. xa^aTTfp o5v TroXXaxij c
xai riijua xal r]$sa SO-TI Ta TO> <T7rouoa/a> TO/auTa
=xao-Tcp 8s >] xaTa T^V o<x?/av s^<v aJpiTcoTaTij svspystoi,
xcti rip mrou$flti<D OS Y] xaTa Tr^y ap=T7jv. oyx EV 7ra<8<a 6
a^a ^ S'jOa^uov /a * xa) yap OLTOTTOV TO rshog slvai Trai^tdv,
xai 7rpayaaTsus<7Sai xai xaxo^-a6sTv TOV 0/ov a?rai/Ta Toy
TraiZsiv yjtw. aVavTa -yap a>^ g/Trs^i/ sTspou svsxa
alpovfLS&a 7rXr y v T% suOataovj'a^ rehog yap at>Tr y . (TTTOU-
od^ziv 3s xai TrovsTv Tratiiag X<ipiv r^ityiov Qaivsrai xal
X/av TraiOixo'v * TraiZziv o* OTTCO^ (TTrouOa^jg, xaT* ' Ava^ap-
cr<y, opQtbg %=iv Sox;?' ava7rauo~si yap "o/xsv
sj 6s <ruvz%wg Trov-lv avaTrauVstoj
who are called happy,' cf. EM. i. ix.
3 - 4
4 iyfuo-roi] This reminds one of
the saying about greedy and corrupt
kings, in Hesiod, JPbr&s aw
TV. 40, sq. :
' These things are fancied to be
,., .- ,. v v vifKioi' ovSf fffaffiv 8ffq> irKtov riuiffv
constitutives of happiness because
monarchs spend their leisure in them.
n n i ou5' oo'bj' ^v uoAovr; re eal aa<bo8f\ca
But perhaps after all monarchs are
j j? '^.i- -_i
no evidence, for neither nrtue nor
reason, on which the higher functions g ofi(f ^ ^^ fipa . eMa , /a]
of man depend, are involved in kingly ^ the whole of Ae nt ^
power. Cf. /A. i. \. 7, where it is ., . ^ %-
we may compare the interesting dis-
said that brutish pleasures 'obtain i . ,, ... .
I cussion in Ar. Politics, vni. v. 12-14.
consideration ' owing to potentates, ^ ., , . - ,.
' On the relation of amusements to
who have everything at their command, *. IT i T -n -nr
J ' happiness, see Vol. I. Essay IV.
devoting themselves to such.
334 H6IKON NIKOMAXE1QN X. [CHAP.
8rj TAo 73 avd7rau<rig ' yivsrai yap evsxa TTJ
8ox=7 8' o suoaj'jaaji/ 3' xar' dpsTr^v slvai' OUTOJ 6s
7 <77roL;87)i;, aXX* oux ev 7ra<8/a. 3=Xr/a> T Xs'yojas^ ra
(nrovdciiot. raiv ysXojcov xa< rcov jtxsra 7ra<6ia^, xai TOU
as* xai jtxop/ou xa* a.v^p(i)7rou cnrouOaioTSpav rrjv
' 73' 8s ro jSsAr/ovo^ xpsiTTcov xa} ev%ai[j.ovix<o-
Tspa TjOrj. aTroXaua's/e r av TCOV o~(ofj.aTixcov '
o TUVCOV xa} av8pa?ro8ov oup^ TJTTOV r&u apiorrou.
ov yap si/ ra? ro<aura<^ 8/ayroya7j TJ' s^ai^ovia
xar' ap&TrjV evspyeiaig, xaQaTrep xa} Trpors
K* 8' S<TT}V r) evoai[j.ovia. xar* ap=T7jt/ svspysia,
xara r^v xpariVr^v auTTj 8' av si'vj row a^/Vrou.
8^ vouj TOUTO siV= a'XAo Ti o 8rj xara <u<rjy 8oxeT a
xai rlysTa-Qai xa) si/i/o/av sj^e'v Trsp} xaXcov xal fteituv
Qiiov ov xai auro e^Te rtov tv ij'jtuv TO 6=<oVarov,
Kara. T^V olxsiav aperr^v eoj ai/ 73 rsXsa suai-
or 8' s(rri SstoTixr iirou. OaoXoouasvov 8=
sre
TOUTOU
8 u5at^o'i'os 8' oiiSeh /3foi/] 'Forno
one allows a slave to share in happi-
ness, any more than in the social life
of a citizen.' In Politics, i. xiii. 1 3, it
is said that the slave, as distinguished
from the artisan, is Kou/wi'bs C*')*) '..
he ' lives with the family,' but he is
not Kou'eKj'bs /3iou, he does not share in
the career of his master.
VII. Aristotle's argument now cul-
minates in the declaration that happi-
ness, in the highest sense, consists in
philosophy; (i) because this is the
function of the most excellent part of
our nature ; (2) because it most admits
of continuance ; (3) because it affords
most pure and solid pleasure ; (4) be-
cause it has pre-eminently the charac-
ter of being self-sufficient ; (5) because
it is above all things an end-in-itself,
and not a means to ulterior results ;
(6) because it is a sort of repose, and
as it were the fruit of our exertions.
It is indeed something higher, than
man regarded as a composite being,
and is only attainable by him through
virtue of a divine element which is in
him. But we must not listen to those
who would preach down our divine as-
pirations. On the contrary we should
encourage them, and endeavour to live
in harmony with our noblest part,
which is in fact our proper self.
i eJfre Qtlov Ofidrarov] ' Whether
it be absolutely divine, or relatively
speaking the divinest thing in our na-
ture.' Philosophy is said in the Me-
taphysics, i. ii. 14, to be most divine
in two ways, first, as being kindred to
the thought of God ; second, as being
knowledge of things divine, roiainri
8 Six&s &v eti} fjiAfOV ' TJV -re -yap
K&I> T ry Ttav Oflwt/ fit}. Cf. the note on
Eth. i. ii. 8.
VI. Vll.] HeiKilN NIKOMAXEION X.
335
T<OV sv
TOUT' a.v %rj;i=v slvai xai TO? 7TpoT=pov XOLI TOJ
TS yap OLurr) strnv vj svspysiot' xai yap o
xa) r<ov yvaxrTfov, Trep) a o vou. ST* 3s
ftswpsiv re yap 6uva t a=5a a-ui/=ptof jaaAAot/
TTpoLTTetv oTioOi/, olo'jU-sQa. Ts SsTv r'^ovTjV 7rapa|U,|U,7yQai 3
6= TCOV xar' apsTvjv evspysitbv TJ
</>, eyAoyov os TOJ
?/va<. ^ r* X
]aa/Vio"T' av SITJ rtoj/
xa'uov KOI (ro$o$ xai
0=
rtov
aurapxsia ^-fpl TTJV Qsw- 4
-yap TTpoj TO ?)v avay-
xa) ol XO/TTO) Oe'ot/Tou,
* 6 jasv Qixaiog
z 8n 5' tcrrl QeaipijTtKi], eljorjTai] It
is difficult to point out a precise pas-
sage corresponding to this reference
(cf. EW. IX. iii. i, where a similar
vague reference occurs). But perhaps
it partly is meant to recal Eth. i. xiii.
20 : Siop^eroj 5e Kal j) apfrfy Kara v))v
dicupopav TO.VTTIV \eyo/jiv yap avriav TO.S
liev SiavoryriKas ras 5e T)0i/caj, partly
/A. i. v. 7 : Tpiros 5' effrlv 6 Qeiapji-
Tiit6s, irepl ou T^\V etrlffK^iv tv TOIS
eTro/ueVojs iToir}u6/j.e8a. There is nothing
in Book VI. which corresponds.
3 eftKoyov Se elvai] ' And it is rea-
sonable to suppose that those who know
pass their time more pleasantly than
those who are enquiring.' This is op-
posed to the often repeated saying
that ' the search for truth is more pre-
cious than truth itself.' Thus Bishop
Butler says, 'Knowledge is not our
proper happiness. Whoever will in
the least attend to the thing will see,
that it is the gaining, not the having
of it, which is the entertainment of
the mind. Indeed, if the proper hap-
piness of man consisted in knowledge
considered as a possession or treasure,
men who are possessed of the largest
share would have a very ill time of it ;
as they would be infinitely more sen-
sible than others of their poverty in
this respect. Thus he who increases
knowledge would eminently increase
sorrow.' (Sermon XV.) In one respect
these two views are reconcileable ;
for Aristotle never meant to say that
the e's or KTrjffir TTJS acxpias consti-
tutes happiness, but the ivtpyeta Kara.
T^V <ro(piav, ' the play of the mind un-
der the guidance of philosophy.' He
contrasts the peace and repose of con-
viction with the restlessness of doubt.
In the same spirit Bacon said (Essay i.),
' Certainly, it is heaven upon earth to
have a man's mind move in charity,
rest in providence, and turn upon the
poles of truth.' But in another re-
spect the views of Aristotle are irrecon-
cileable with those above quoted from
Butler. The one over-states, nearly
as much as the other under -states, the
blessings of knowledge. And Ari-
stotle strangely leaves out of account
that sense of ignorance which the
wisest man will always retain. His
statement is chargeable with philo-
sophic pride, which, as we have said
(Vol. I. Essay III. p. 165), Socrates
and Plato were free from.
336 IIOIKiiN NIKOMAXEK1N X. [CHAP.
ou 8/xaJOTrpayrjVs/ xai (j.s(f iov, ofjioiios &* * a '
fuv xai o ai/8ps7o xai rtov aXXaw Exa<rrog, 6 8s
xai *a6' auTov aJv Syvarai $sa>psV, xai oVco av
<ro4>tt>TspO y jW-aAAoi/ fishnov 8' 7o~a> truvspyouf
aAX' Ojtuoj aurapxea-rarog. 8o'aj T' av auTTj
aitrr^v ayairaLvQai' ou^sv -yap CCTT' aurv)^ y/VfTfltl Trapa TO
OL7TO 8s TtOV
TTrpJ-
a TTOipa. rvjv TTpa^iv. 8ox? rs TJ eu8ai]U,ov/a ev TY^
sTvai a7p/oXoujU,=5a yap it/a o-j^o/\.aa)ju,sv, xat
aya)jU.:V. TOV jtxsv ouv
sv roTj 7roX<rixo?^ 2 sv ro?^ Tro^sfjuxofs 73 svsoy'ia'
al 8s Trepj raura Trpd^stg 8oxou<nv acrp/oXoj sTvai, ai ]txsv
7roA/-uxa< xai TravTzKtos' ou8s/j ya^ cupsirai TO jroXtfifTf
TOU TroXsjU-sTv svsxa, ou8s Trapaa-xsuaZsi ?ro'Xs]aov 8o'^a<
av TravTsAaJ^ fjuaifyovog rig elvai, s) TOUJ C^/Xou; TTO-
/oug 1 TrojoTTo, <W jaap^aj xa} (f>ovo< yrywiJTO. l<rT< 8s
) 73 TOU TToXiTixou a<r^oXo^, xai Trap' atJTo TO TroXiTsu-
spiTToto'j/xs'vTj 8uvao~Ts/a^ xai T//xa^ 73 TT/V ys su8a<-
auTto xai ToT^ TroXiTai^, erepotv ourrotv ri^g ?roX<-
7 Tixr]j, T^V xa) ^TyTOU^asv STJAOV rj gTspav o5<rat/. si 8v^
TCOV jasv xaTa Ta^ ap-rag Trpa^swv al TroXiT/xa) xai
xaXXsi xa< jtxsys'Qs/ 7rpos'^ouo~/v, auTai 8'
xai rXou$ T/VOJ sQisvrou xai ou 81'
alpsral s)o"/v, 73' 8s TOU vou Ivspysia o~;rou8^ TS
8oxs" $sa)p7jT<xy) ou<ra, xa< Trap' auryv ou8svo ^)/s
ep/siv TS T^OVTJV olxs/av, auTr^ 8s <ryvau^s<
, xai TO avrapxsg 8>) xai <rp/oXao~T<xov xai
aVpuTov co av9pa)Tr>, xai oo~a aXXa TO> juaxapia) otrovc?
fx=Ta<, xara ravrr t v rr t v ivspysiav fyatverai ovra. T;
av efr av
6 tori Se KO! ^ ToO iroAiTiKoD
f-rfpav oS<rav] 'But moreover the
(function) of the politician also is
the exercise of the political art ; nay
we are in search of this happiness
plainly as something distinct.' ffo<pia,
restless, and beyond mere administra- I while producing happiness, is identical
tion it aims at power and distinctions, with it ; but ito\nud\ is to happiness
or, if happiness for the man himself as means to end. Cf. Eth. VI. xii. 5 :
and his citizens, at all events a happi- j ovx <>s larpiK^i vjittav, aAA' wsfj vyteia,
ness which is something distinct from OVTUS ri <ro<pla (iroteT) tvSai/juii'lai'. The
VII.]
NIKOMAXEmN X.
337
y rsXstov * o'josv yap aTsAsj scrrt rtov
o os TOJOUTOJ av sfj /3/o xpsftTfoii TJ xar' 8
a'i/5pa>7rov ' o'j yap YI a'ySpojTro's scrr/v OUTO) ftiw<7STai, aAA'
Y, 6sib'v n ey ayrto 'J7rap%=i ' ocrcp 6= biotQspsi TOUTO rot?
G-uy$Toi, TO<70UT<o xa* 73 syspys/a TVJ'S xara TTjy aAAijy aps-
rr y y. =1 orj 6=iGt/ o you 7T0 Toy av5pa>yrov, xai o xara
TOUTOV 3/oj 6:<"ot; Trpo^ roy avfyioTTtvov Stiav. o'j p/pr) 3s
xara rou^ Trapajyoyvra^ oafQpanrtva Qpoviiv dvQpcuTroy ovra
o-jO ^VTyTa TOV ^vr^rov, aAX' =4^' oo'o*' svos^=ra< a3avar/^=iv
xai Travra Troiiiiv rrpog TO r,v xara TO xpaTKrrov rutv ev
xai ra>
s yap xa ra> oyxo> pixpov S<TTI, vvpi.si xa
TTOAU /jia?\.Xov ^ayrojv uTTspsp^s/. oo^sis 8' av xa< sj'vai 9
TOg TO'JTO, S^TTrp TO XVplOV XOtl O.U.:IVOV O.T07TOV CiVV
av, si /jt^ TOV afjiTou /3iov alpoiro aXXa TIVOJ
words V /cal ^rjrovf,Lev may be referred
to .E/A. i. ii. 9 : ^ /iej' oSv /ie'0o5os
rovrtav ety'terai, troXniKT] -ris ovffa.
8 /caro TOUS ira/>eu'oD'Tas] The mo-
ralists, says Aristotle, take a shallow
view in bidding us tame down our as-
pirations to our mortal condition. Cf.
7i'//. ii. xxi. 6, where the gnome,
0paTa xpj) rbv Ovarbv tppovflv, is quoted
from Epicharmus. Isocrates {Ad Dem.
p. 9 b) gives asort of reconciliation of the
views : addvara fj.ev <f>povei r<p
\f/v^os ilvai ' 6vr]TO, Se rf ffvuticrpcas TWV
inrapx6vTwv axo\avfiv, which reminds
one of George Herbert's quaint lines :
' Pitch thy behaviour low, thy projects
high:
So shalt thou humble and magnani-
mous be :
Sink not in spirit: who aimeth at
the sky
Shoots higher much than he that
means a tree.
A grain of glorie mixt with humble-
nesse
Cures both a fever and lethargick-
nesse.'
(i -yap /coi Tip uyKCf u
VOL. II.
' For
though (this noblest part) be small in
proportionate bulk, yet in power and
dignity it far surpasses all the other
parts of our nature.' Aristotle here
signifies that the divine particle (vovs)
bears a small proportion to the whole
of our composite nature. And in ac-
cordance with this he elsewhere in-
timates that only at short and rare
intervals can man enjoy the fruition
of his diviner nature. Cf. Metaph.
XI. vii. 9 : et ovv ov-rtas e5 ex*'< " s ^*^ J
irore, 6 Ofbs ati, Qa.\>\iwr{>v. Pol. vin.
avBpunrois okiydicis yiyvfffdai. With
which we may compare the saying of
Spinoza (De Intellectus Emendaiione,
II.), that at first he found himself
only able to rest in the idea of ' the
truly good' for short intervals, yet
that these intervals became longer
and more frequent as he went on. ' Et
quamvis in initio haec intervalla essent
rara et per admodum exiguum tem-
porisdurarent, postquam tamen Verum
Bonum magis ac magis mihi innotuit,
intervalla ista frequentiora et longiora
fuerunt.' Aristotle idealises these
moments of the philosopher, suppos-
X X
338
N1KOMAXEION X.
[CHAP.
TO
TS 7rpt>T=pov OLffMO'St xa vvv ' TO yap
XGCJ
2 =
TU> vpWTTlp > XaTOL TOV VOVV
i<ffa avQptoTrog. ovrog apa xa}
A=UTspu)$ 8' 6 xaTa. TTJV aXXryV
evspyziai dvQpwTrixat' fiixaia
Ta XCCTO. Tag 1 a&STa^ TT^O
xa) ziaig xa) Trpd^
S TO TT/SSTTOV s
a/ro
lTTSp TODTO
aj -ya^ XT
xai dvQpiia xai
7T&aTTOij.sv sv
TravTOiotig sv TS
xa
<ra)[j.a.To$ 6oxs, xa
' TOU ^5oy^ a.p*rr\.
apT xa/
xa r
r] 4>poi/r/r=; ?
gf TO S' op^ov T(OJ/ Tjf/txcov Kara ryv
(ru-
g them to extend throughout life,
reAei'a 5); cvSat/uopia OUTIJ &^ t^Tj
OptairOv, \a/3av
VIII. Aristotle, pursuing his theme,
declares further the paramount excel-
lence of the philosophic life, by show-
ing that the life of practical morality
holds a merely secondary place, (i)
because it is bound up with man's
composite nature, that is, with the
passions ; (i) because it is more de-
pendent on external circumstances ;
(3) because such a life cannot possibly
be attributed to the gods. He adds
that though the philosopher will cer-
tainly require a degree of external
prosperity, this will only be a very
Jnoderate degree, as the sayings of
ancient sages testify. And if there
be any providence of the gods watch-
ing over men, it may be presumed
that this will especially watch over the
philosopher, who loves and honours
that which is divine.
3 <rvvtfVKTai tit apfyxojrjKaf] 'Wis-
dom moreover seems inseparably con-
nected with excellence of the moral
nature, and this with wisdom, since
the major premisses of wisdom are in
accordance with the moral virtues,
and ' the right ' in morals is that
which is in accordance with wisdom.
But as wisdom and moral virtue are
bound up with the passions, they
must be concerned with our composite
nature ; and the virtues of the com-
posite nature must be purely human.'
And therefore secondary to philosophy,
which is more than human. This
passage appears to contain the germ
of much that is expanded in the
Eudemian books, cf. Eth. vi. xii.
9-16; xiii. 4. But we may observe,
ist, that wisdom (<pp6vn<ns) is here as
if for the first time coming forward
in opposition to philosophy (<ro<f>ia),
and not in that recognised opposition
which would have been the case, had
Book VI. been previously writti-n ;
and, that there is no reference to any
previous discussions on the moral
syllogism.
crwtfvK-rai~\ Wisdom and moral
virtue are here said to be reciprocally
connected, just as it is said of pleasure
VII. VIII.] IieiKON NIKOMAXEmN X.
339
vrfpTTfiJilvai 3* aurai xoii rolg 7ra$=<n rrsp} r
l=V Oil 6S TOU (T'JvQsTOV OLp'TOU dvQpCOTTlXai. XOU /3/0
8r) o xar' auras xat TJ e^on^ovta. TJ Ss roO voy xs%(upur-
[Asvy TOVOUTOV yap Trspl avrijs slprjff-Qa)' (iiaxpiftiixrai -yap
/jtsT^ov TOU 7rpoxzi[j.voy MTT/V, So'^s/s o' av xa) T?J
e xai
TO
xa s~
o 7roX<r<xo^, xai
rojaura* fj.ixpr>v -yap av r< oiacpni' TTpog os raj
TroXw dioKTci. ro) j.=v yap eXsvQzpico SST^TSJ
TO
ra
ra>
(ai ya
= xa o
TO) avtpsiip 8= Ouvaju.>,
xai rto <
s7r<r=X=7 rt riv xara rr
' TTU>$ yap
r 7rpoa.ips(TL$ y a
sig, a)$ sv
sv
Ut(Tl X.a
TCO
and life, chap. iv. n : ro*{cvxfai
/AC*' 7t/) raGra ^aicerai /cal xwpKr/j.bv
all Se'xeaOcu.
rb a-vydfTov] Cf. chap. vii. 8. The
term occurs repeatedly in the Pfaedo
of Plato, cf. p. 86 A : WT); 5' ^ Afya
/cal a: ^o/jSal aa>/j.ara re KO! ffu/j.a.TOfi5rj
Kal ^vvQcra Kal yeuSr) eVrl ai roO
6vr]TOv Zvyyevri. Cf. SA. vn. xiv. 8.
4 Ttav /xev ->ap ftforyitc^w Sioicrei]
' For though on the one hand both
(the philosopher and the practical
man) will have an equal need of the
ordinary means of life, even if the
practical man takes more trouble about
the concerns of the body and aucli
like for there will be but little
difference in this respect on the other
hand there will be a wide difference
with regard to the discharge of their
respective functions.' The term $
Tro\iTix6s here appears to be used in
opposition to 6 <ro<p6s ( 13), not as
distinctively indicating ' the politician,'
but as representing the whole class of
the active virtues, which are subse-
quently analysed. Thus, Eth. i. v. 4,
we find ol %apiei>TfS ical fpaKTiKol
given as equivalents for ol iroKniKoi.
ry nvSptiif 8e 5uya,uews] Swajas here
seems used in a sense exactly cor-
responding to 'physical power.' In
modern warfare, a weak body may
often be accompanied by the highest
personal courage, but in the ancient
mode of fighting this would have been
impossible or useless.
Ttf cr^tppovi eov(Ttas] ' The temperate
man will require full liberty of grati-
fication.' Cf. Eth. i. v. 3 : 5io T& iro\\uvs
Sa.vatrd\y. vin. vi. 5 : ol 5' iv rcut
x 2
15 id
NIKOMAXEU1N X.
[CHAP.
a?>.X
o'
Ttuv ToiovT(t)v Trpog ye TTJV evspysiav %pska
xa) e[JL7rrj()ia S<TT< Trpog ys rr t v QeeoptaV
eo~TJ xa< TrXsiWi O"JYJ, alps'irou TO, xar'
7 0Tf,(TSTOil OOV TCOV TOJO'JTCOV 7TpO TO ai/5pa>7TStJ0-$a/.
TeXe/a ev?iai[j.ovia. on OraiMTlxtj T/ SO~T/I/ si/spyi/
s'vTsD^si/ av ^>avsir t . TOU fisout; yap jU-aX/crra t>
Qa.fj.sv j.axaioij xcti stja'U.ovaj eTvai' Trans os
xa
ycscov auro^ ; Trorspa raj
(TuvaXXarrovrs^ xa)
xa* o<ra roiaura ; aXXa Taj, 1 ai/fyss/ow;, uTro^
ra tyofispa xa/ xivSuvsuovraj, or; xaXo'v ; 73
epiovg ; T/VI &e 860<rou(7<v; aroTrov 8' sJ xa) e
v6[j.KrfJia y TI TOIOVTOV. al 8s (reufypovsg T/ dv =7=
^ tyoprixog o STraivog, Zn oox s%ov(rt Qavhas e7ri5
3/=^/ou<r/ 3s Travra <^a/voir' av ra Trspi raj 7rpdj~i$
xai ava^/a $su>v. aXXa jarjv ^v TS Travrsg uTrer/^
aitrovs xai st/spysTv apa' oi yap S^ xa6=uosiv too-Trsp TOJ/
'Ev8y^./a)va. T) S^ %o)vri rou Trparrsiv a4^a<poip.lvou,
en Os /xa?<.Xov TOU 7ro<sTv, T* Xs/Trsrat TrX^v ftzw&ia. ; (OGTT=
73 TOU QeoO evspysia, ^axapioVryTi (>ia$>spov(ra.,
av snj. xa* TCOI/ avftpwirivcov $r) $ TavTy c-uy
i/ 8s xa) TO ja^ psrsj/eiv TO.
TsXs/toj. TO?J /xsv yap 6so? aTraj o
' ' T/
jaaxapjoj,
tovfflais. The use of the article, and
of the plural number, makes a slight
difference in signification.
7 Sie|(oD(ri 8e Oewc] ' And if we
went through all the virtues, we should
see that whatever relates to moral
action is petty and unworthy of the
gods.' Aristotle argues here that we
cannot attribute morality to the Deity
without foiling into mere anthropo-
morphism ; but it might be replied
that there is the same difficulty in
conceiving of God as engaged in
philosophic thought. Aristotle him-
self felt this difficulty, and elsewhere
defined the thought of God as ' the
thinking upon thought' (Metaph. xi.
ix. 4), which would not only deprive
the Deity of all those fatherly and
tender functions, which the human
race is prone to attribute to Him ;
but would also remove Him from the
conditions of all human thinking. If
it be conceded that the life of God is
only analogous to that of the philoso-
pher ; we might then ask, why not also
analogous to the life of the good man ?
Plato, by placing the ' idea of justice '
in the supra-sensible world, allowed a
more than mortal interest to morality.
VIII.]
NIKOMAXEIilN X.
341
rtov 8' aAXcoj/ (^wcov ouolv
s> o<rov 6
xa} vj svOKipovia, xat oi fjuxAAov V7rdp%si TO $sa)ps?v, xai
, ou xaTa o-UjU.j3=/3?jxo aAAa xaTa r^v ftteoplouf
yap xaf auTY t v TJaj'a. OHTT' nj av 73 suSa/^ov/a
rig. o=r)<r< 8= xa< r% SXTQS svrjpt.;pia$ avQpcoTrcp 9
oy yap avTaf/xrtf y (^6(7 ig Trpog TO Qswpsiv, aXXa 8s7
xa< TO o~<OjU,a uyiatvsiv xoti Tpofyyv xai Tr)v AOITT^V Qspct-
Trsiav uTrapyeiv. ou jtxTjv OJ^TSOV ys 7roX?y.a)V xa) ^.sya7\a)v
ftsr)<rsa~Qa.i TOV v&ot.i[j.ovr)rrovTa, si jU/sg sv^s^srai oivsu
exrog ayaStov [j.axdpiov slvai ' ou yip sv ry uTrep-
TO aurapxsg ou8* >] 7rpai, SUVCCTOV OS xa; ju,^
ra 7% xai Qa^drr^g 7rpd.TTSiv rot, xaXa* xa/ yapio
a.7ro [Atrpiant SuvaiT' av T/J Trpdrrsiv xaTa T^V aps-
T>JV. TOUTO 8' SCTTW JSsTv vapya>$' ol yap Iftitora
(i\)Va<rriov ou% TJTTOV Soxoutrf Ta iTrjsixT] Trpdrrsiv,
xa< jaaAXov. Ixavov 05 riMrau? uTrapvsiv * eo~Ta* yap o
ToO xaTa Trjv ac=TV]V sv=pyouvTo^. xa) ^o- n
roig sxrog x=%f)pY l -yr)u.ivovg, TTSTrpayoTa^ 3s T
, fV <WSTO, xa< |3|3tXTa$ (rco&poycog sv$s%sTai
yap p.*Tpia xexTypsvovg TTpdrrsiy a ticl. soixs 8s xat
And he speaks of the just man, by the
practice of virtue, being ' made like to
God.' .Sfp. 6 1 3 A, quoted below.
10 Aristotle seems to lose no op-
portunity of expressing his contempt
for great potentates. ' Keason is not
implied in kingly power,' Eth. x. \i.
4. ' One may do noble deeds without
ruling over land and sea,' &c. We
may again refer to George Herbert,
who in his verses on Church Musick
says,
' Now I in you without a bodie move,
Rising and falling with your wings ;
We both together sweetly live and
love,
Yet say sometimes, God kelp poore
kings.'
iKai/bv Se TOirauO' virdpxfti'] i. e. TO.
fj.4rpia, referring to airb T&V /uerpiW
above.
Kara r^v apeT^i/] i. e. whether philo-
sophic or moral excellence.
1 1 Kal ~2,&\<ov 5e] Referring to the
well-known story in Herodotus, i. c.
30, sq., where Solon pronounces Tellus,
the Athenian citizen, to have been the
happiest man he had ever known.
ec IK 8e /cal 'Ava^aySpas i.6vov\
' Anaxagoras moreover seems not to
have conceived of " the happy man "
as a rich man or a potentate, when he
said that he should not be surprised
if (his "happy man") appeared a
strange person to the crowd, for they
judge by externals, having no sense
342
IIGIKilN NIKOMAXEIQN X.
[CHAP.
7r?\,ouo-/oi/ oyfls 'jvarrrv uTroasiv rov
, sltraJv or* oux dv (ta<j[Jt.a.o'i;v e'l rig aroTrog
? 7ro/\.Ao?" ouroiyolp xpivrjvcrt TOI$ SXTO$, TOVTWV
alfrQot.vrjp.evoi p.wov. <rup.<$)<t)v{iv fir) roig "hriyoig lolxaviv
oil TO>V rro$a>v (io^oti. TT'KTTIV fj? s v o5v xa) ra TOfaDra
j^t T/va, TO 8' ahifilg lv TO* Trpaxrois sx ru>v epyaw xa}
TOU |3/OU XptVSTai ' SV TOUTOlg ya.0 TO Xl>plOV. (TXQTrilV OT)
a) TOV
spyois
6 Ss xarot. vow ev~pyii>v xou
TOUTOV dzpaTTzvatv xoti $taxsi[j,~vo<; a-purra xoti dso^iTtf^*?
TOiTog soixsv sivoti ' si yap T/g STrip.i'hsia rcttv dvQpcoTTivcuv
UTTO 5=<ov yiVrTaj, (ocTTTSp tiox*?, xou iiY) oLv swXoyov YCtioti*
of aught beside.' Anaxagoras, being
asked to define " the happy man,"
said that his opinion, if he declared it,
would be thought paradoxical.
12 avfKptatff'iv 8rJ vTroA/jjTTTfW] 'The
opinions of the philosophers appear
then to coincide with our arguments.
Authority of this kind affords a certain
ground of belief. But truth in prac-
tical matters is settled by an appeal
to facts and human life, for in them
rests the decision. We ought then to
consider previous sayings with a re-
ference to facts and life: if those
sayings agree with facts, we should
accept them, if they differ, we must
undertake a discussion of the subject.'
Cf. Eth. i. nii. i.
1 3 6fo<f>t\f<rTa.Tos toiKev flfai] The
term Oeo^jAijs occurs repeatedly in
Plato; cf. especially the interesting
passage in Eepiiblic, p. 61 3 A : where it
is said that " all things work together"
for the good of those whom the gods
love. ovrcas &pa uTro\rfjrrfOv irepl TOV
SiKaiov a,v5p6s, tdv T' tv irtvii} yiyvr)Tat
(dv T' fv v6aots fj rtvi &\\<p riav SOKOVV-
Ttav KO.KUV, d>s Tovr<f roCra ets ayaOov
n r\evTfifffi faJKTt ^ Kal a.iro(ia.v6vTi'
ov yap 5rj inr6 yt Qeiav wore a/j.f\eiTat
bs &v irpoBvft.f'iriOa.i tOi\r} SIKOIOS ylveffBai
Kal eiriTtfifviav apT7)v (Is 'oaov ^uvcnltv
a.v6ptairtf &[Aoiovff6ai 6f<f.
el ydp TIS &>rirep Sonet] ' For if
there be any care of human affairs by
the gods, as men think there is.' We
may compare Shakspeare's
' If powers divine
Behold our human actions, as they
do.'
Aristotle expresses here no opinion,
one way or the other, as to the reality
of a Divine Providence. SoKel merely
indicates that an opinion is held ; the
word is frequently used to indicate a
false opinion or fancy. Cf. Eth. vn.
xii. 3 : SoKfi Se yeiffffis ns tlnai. OTI
Kvptcas ayaftSv. x. vi. 3 : So/eel /j.ev ouv
e&ScufJ.oviKa. raCro tivai, Sri K.T.\.
Plato had said that moral virtue (see
the last note) placed men peculiarly
under the care of the gods. Aristotle,
differing from Plato in his conception
of the Deity, says, if there be any care
of men by the gods, it must surely be
extended in an especial degree not
to the just man, but to the philosopher,
since philosophy is most akin to the
life of the Deity Himself.
VIII. IX.] IieiKiiN N1KOMAXEIQN X.
343
TS avTQvg TU> ap/<rr<o, xai T> <ryyysi/fO"Tar) (rouro 8'
av s'/vj o voy^) xaj Toy aya7ra)VTa$ jU-aXiTra ToyYo xa)
TJ/juoi/Taf avTsUTToiz'tv tog T&V c/Aa>v auroig sTri^sXoy
xou opbcog TS xai xaXa> TrpdrravTag. on 5s Travra
TO> (ro<io jU.aAr6' y7rap^/, oyx a^vjXov. 5
TOV ayrov 3' elxo xa* syoa^aovlfrrarov rs xav
S'/TJ o cro4>o /-/.aA/oV sy3a/|,a>v.
Ap oyv el 7T=pi TOUTWV xa< T>V apsrcov, T< 3= xa) 9
?u'af xa; r]oovvjj Ixavios tfpynu rdig ru-rroig, rsT^og
ziv oi?]T*ov TTJI/ 7rpoalp(riv, $ xaQa7r=p Xsysra/, oyx
iV sv roT^ TrpaxroT^ rsTiog TO Q=(opr)a~ot.i ^Kacrra. xa)
yvcova/, aX?.a ^aaXXov TO TTOOLTTSIV aura ; oj^s S^ 7Tpi 2
K&J/ OUTCBS] ' Even on this supposi-
tion.' It seems probable that Ari-
stotle had in his mind the very words
of Plato, above quoted.
IX. The theory of human life now
being complete, Aristotle asks if any-
thing more is wanting ? The answer
is Yes, since theory is not by itself
enough to make men good. For virtue
three things are required, nature,
teaching, and custom. The first is
beyond man's control ; the second may
be identified with theory, which we
have now supplied ; the third requires
institutions for the regulation of life,
which may either be ( i ) of public, or
(2) of private ordinance. As a fact,
the state too much neglects (14) the
arrangement of daily life, and there-
fore private individuals must address
themselves to the task, in a scientific
spirit, and must first learn the princi-
ples of legislation. Whence are these
principles to be learnt? On the one
hand we find that practical politicians
neither write nor speak on the prin-
ciples of their art. On the other
hand the Sophists, who profess to teach
politics, are far from understanding
even what it is, and their mode of
teaching is merely empirical. So far
from imparting principles, they go to
work in an eclectic way, collecting
laws, which are mere results, lying,
as it were, on the surface. Legis-
lation, as a science, has in short been
neglected hitherto, and must now be
essayed. We must enter at once upon
the whole theory of the state, examin-
ing former speculations, and existing
constitutions, and developing a con-
ception of the bestform of government.
According to the sequence of ideas
in this chapter, it would appear that
the connecting link between ethics
and politics is to be found in the
word e6os, custom, or mode of life.
As custom has great influence upon
men's power of attaining virtue and
the chief good, and on the other hand
as the institutions of individual life
have a close connection with those of
the state, it follows that politics arc
the complement of ethics.
1 a.\\a /j.a\\ov rb irpdrreiv aura]
Under the head of 'doing' are of
course included the functions of
thought, which, as we have just been
told, are the highest forms of action
in man. Cf. Pol. vn. iii. 8 : oAAo rbv
irpanTiKov OVK ava.jKa.7ov flvat irpbs
314
IIGIKQN NIKOMAXEIflN X.
[CHAP.
XO.VGV TO esvai,
3 paToj>, ^ si irtug aAXajj ayaSo) y<vo/jt,s5a. eJ ju.i> ovv
r ; a-av oj Ao'yoi oivrapxeig TTpoj TO 7roi7Jo-ai 7rjjx=7j, TroA-
AOUJ at/ jU.JO"5oyj xa/ jotsyaAouj o*xa/a>j efytpov xaTa TOV
0oyv/v, xa} eO< av TOUTOUJ TropKroirQai . vvv os <^a/vov-
rai 7rporp\}/ao'Qai jasv xa) Trapop/xTjcrai TCOJ/ vsaiv TOUJ
, Qog r
v ex
4 TroAXou^ aOuvarsTv Trpo^ xaXoxayaS/av 7rporp='- k {/a<rSa/ * ou
yap 7r<
rov
TO
xa
8= xaXou xai a>j aXr^toj TJ'OSOJ ouo' evvoiav s%ov<riv, ay;y-
5 <TTO< OVTSJ. TOUJ 3r) TOJOUTOuj T/J otf Xoyoj jasTappu^-
oi yap olov T= 73 oi pao/ov Ta sx 7ra?\.aioS
i xaTc/?\.7jjtAjU.sva Xoyto jU.
(TT\V 1
6 ooxoy ( aV y/v=(r6a<
' 01 ].sv <U7;, 0{ s/, o s 0/Oa. TO
ouv T>]j 5uo"0)j 6rjXov coj oux '
ziag air lag roig a>
ertpovs, Kaddirep olovral rives, oi>5e rets
Sia^oi'os eTyai fiSvas rovras irpa/criKas
raj TOW aTro/SaiKSpTwv x c 'P" / y^vojj.fva.s
fK TUV Trpdrrtiv, a\\<i TTO\V ua\\ov TO.S
avTOTt\f'ts Kal ras avroov tvfKfv 6f(apias
Kal Siworiueis. So too under apeT^j,
o-o^x'a is included as its highest form.
3 voXXofc &i* /ito-eoijj The saying
of Theognis (v. 432) was that the
Asclepiadse would have deserved great
reward had they known how to heal
the minds of men.
EJ 6' 'AcncATjinoScm TOUTO eSuwe 0edy,
'Ia<r0ai KaKiJTT/TO ol aTTjpas (pptvas
avSpwv,
ITo\Aoi<y &> jUjaOous K
The last line is quoted in the
of Plato, p. 95 E, to indicate that
Theognis held teaching inefficacious
to produce virtue. Aristotle borrows
the application. On Theognis see Vol.
I. Essay II.
KUTOK^X^OV K TTJJ dpeTTJs] ' Under
the influence of virtue.' This word,
which is also written
seems derived from Ko
a reduplication. In Ar.
we find KaraKo^x'M ' wpbi,
vii. 4, KaraKwx'^ ' vir6.
5 T ^)f va\aiou TOIS ijB
/iVa] ' What has long been fastened
in the character.'
6 TO?J 'S oA.7j0a>y euTi/xf'o'JJ'] ' To
those who are in the most ideal sense
of the term to be called fortunate.'
Cf. Eth. ra. \. 17: al rb (I al rb
re'x"*', with
Po. 11. ix. 8,
and ib. vni.
X.] H9IKQN NIKOMAXEK1N X.
uTrapvsi ' o 8s Xoyog xa) vj' 8;oa VTJ
345
TTOT oox sv
po TO xaAet> %apsiv xat
TT}V Qps-fyovfrav TO fT7rspp.a. ou yap av axodorsis Ao'you 7
o f j' at) (rvvslir) o xara 7ra(3o aiv TOV 8'
ovra> e%ovTa TTOJJ olov rs jasTa7r?<rai ; oXto^ T' ou SoxsT
ttxtllt TO ?ra$o a?^Xa (3/a. Ss? 8r) TO ^[Qo^ Trpo'j- 8
TTtug oixiiav T% apsTT)^, (TTspyov TO xaXov xat
TO ala-^pov. IK veou 8' 0170)7% o
TO yap (ra)<$)pov(u$ xoCi xoipTSpixws
KhM$ TS xoti vsoi$. %io v
xai TO. 7r/Tr;Ssuj,aTa owx eo~Ta
-yivofisvot. oup^ ixavov S'
TJOU TO^ ?roX-
r^ TTSC) TravTa Toy fiiov ol yap
73 Xo'yaj 7T5ap^ouo~< xa) ^^.iais 73
TO)
7Ti TTJV
xa
TOU
TOUTO TTfCpVKGVai 7) Tf\fia Kttl
av C^TJ fixpv'ia.
9 o&x ''"wki' 8' rbv ^foc] ' It is
not enough perhaps that, while young,
people should meet with right nurture
and superintendence, but, as when
grown up they must practise the things
in question, and accustom themselves
to them, so we shall need laws about
these things, and in general about the
whole of life.' In a spirit the very
opposite of this remark, Pericles is
reported (Thucyd. n. 37) to have
boasted of the freedom enjoyed by
the Athenians from all vexatious in-
terference with the daily conduct of
individuals: t\fv6epa>s 8e TC re wpbs
rb KOIVOV TroXireuo/iey Kal es rfyv irpbs
VOL. II. T
u\\-fl\ovs T&V /cofl' rinepar fTH
fj.d.T<av inroil/iav, ov 5t' op^^y T&J/ T
t Ka9" riSov-fiv TI 8p^, exovres,
a&fiiovs fjifv A.u7r77pcts Se rp oi^et
SJ^as irpoffriQe^evoi. On the one hand
Thucydides praised the free system of
Athens ; on the other hand Aristotle
praised the organised and educational
system of Sparta; see below 13,
and cf. Eth. i. xiii. 3, and note. He
was probably led into this political
mistake, partly by the state of society
in Athens itself, partly by the influence
of Plato, from whom he imbibed the
essential idea of communism, which
is, that the state should arrange as
much as possible, instead of as little
as possible.
3tG II6IKHN NIKOMAXEION X. [CHAP.
S xa Tifj.capag sTriTivai, TOV
siv' TOV [j,lv yap sTristxij xai Trpoj TO xaXov
, TOV 8s <auXot> r^ovrj
. 810 xai 4>ao~i 8e7v
y/vso~$J raj X'jTraj al jaaTuo
si 8' ouy, xa.Qa.7rsz>
s7 xa) s
xa< jU^r' axovra.
7jd' SXOVTOI. TTpaTTSiv TO, c^auXa, TauTa 3s y/yvo<T' av
fiiQv(j.evoi$ xaTa T*va vot>v xai ra^tv opQrjV, s%ov<rav \<ryjjv.
>j jasv ouv TTOLTpixri TTpovTafyg oux e%si TO Irr^upov ou^s TO
avayxaTov, oi^s 8^ oXa>^ 7)
^ T<VO^ ToiouToy* o 8s vof
cuv CCTTO TIVOJ Qpovrjfrews xai vow. xai T<OV
rovg va.VTi<iV[t.ivwg rott$ bpf
xav opQcbg UTO 8ptoo*<V 6 8s VO'/AO^ oyx S<TTW sTr
IITOLTTWV TO STTlSlXeg. SV jU-o'vY) 8s T^ AaXS^at[J.(tvla)V
JU,ST' oX/ya)v 6 vojW,oQsTijj STrifAz'hsia
TS xa< sV/TJ^sujOiaTaiv ev 8s
s^TjaeXTjTai Trsp) Ttov TO/OWTWJ', xa
to$ $ouXsTa<, xuxAa)7T/xif QsfJLUTTsvcuv 7ra/8a)i/ 738*
i4-xpaTio~Tov jtxsv GUI/ TO y/yvso'Sa/ xowyv eTrt/Jt.ehsiav xoi
opdr^v xa) 8pav OCUTO 8uvao~5af xowy 8' et-otfj.shovfj.evtuv
exd<TTu> 8o^s/sv av irpoa-yxsiv rdig a-$>Tepoi$ rsxvoig xai
$1X01$ s\$ dpsTyv (ru/x^aXXso-Qai, 7] Trpoatpsta-Qai ys.
8' ai/ TOUTO 8uvao~Qai $6sisv ex T<OV elpr}[j.eva)v
yevapsvog' at fj.lv yap xoiva]
13 KvK\o>iriK>s~\ Referring to Homer, i opinion,' which in so many respects,
Odyss. ix. 1 14 : : and more naturally, supplies the place
of legislation.
14 Kal fipav curb SvvatTdai] ' And
oiiS _....,.,_.. ,
that it should hare power to effect the
object in question.' This apparently
Aristotle considers that any people refers to 12: ft fjitv o%v irar^jic^
among whom the state does not settle j irp6ffTais OVK l"x ^b 'urxvphr K.T.\.
by law the customs of daily life is j pfaiara 8' yevofjitfos] 'But from
unworthy to be called a society at all. ! what we hare said it would appear
He ignores that element called public , that a person would best be able to
IX.] II8IKftN NIKOMAXEIQN X. 347
ori bid j>o' ( ao>v yiyvwrai, SJTlttxsTg ft al o<a TCOV
0*' av si$ r) TTO?VAO
xou yjtj.va.frTix.riS xou TV
w(T7r=p yap sv raug 7ro7\.s(riv tVHTYVSi rd
xai rot. s'^rj, ovro) xa} sv olxtouf ol Trarp
xai ra idi], xa) 6TI jaaAXov ^ia r^v (rvyysvsiav
=pyTiK$' &pwirap%ov<rt yap (rTSpyov
^ (^tMrei. STI 8= xai (>ia$*pov<riv al xatf sxarrov X S
OU, <T T= 7TVXTIXOS ^(T(Ug Oil TTOITI
i
TO xa
\fiiag rr^g STTi/xsAS/a^ yivo^vr^g' jaaXXov ya5 Toy
Trporrfyopo'j Tuy^avsi sxarrrog. aXA' eTTiaEAr^H/rj jiciv
api<TTa xa'f ev xa\ ItTpvg xa\ yv;jLvarrTr t g XOLI -rag
o TO xa^o'Xou sio^o^ OTJ 7rarr<v ^ TO? ToioTTSs * TOU
yets ai 7r(7T^jaa< hsyovrai rs xa\ slviv. G'J [J.r t v
ovra, T=5=aa=yov 8* dxpifiuig rd
vovra e> sxfrrw i e/xTrsipav, xabaTrsp xal larpol SJ/JQ*
v eauTtov apHrroi svai, eTSpu) oysv av
rai. ouosv 8' ^Trov iVa^ Tto ys ^ouXo.asvco T=V-
o yei/s^bai xal Q=a)prjTixa> ITT] TO x
OTI ^-sp/ Tou5' ai STno-TrjUca. rd%a 3s xa) Tto 17
do this (t. e. to help his children and ; for. That the family is a deduction
friends towards virtue) after learning
the principles of legislation.' As we
find from M. vi. viii. z, legislation
was considered by Aristotle to be the
superior (dpx <T * /CTOI '" c ^) form of poli-
from the state, which is prior in point
of idea, we know to have been Ari-
stotle's opinion, Pol. i. ii. 12.
1 6 oil fJLijv a\\a fj.ireipiav] ' And
yet perhaps nothing hinders a man
tical thought. A person possessing. | even without scientific knowledge
the general principles of scientific | treating well some particular case,
legislation (see below, 16) would : from an accurate observation, empiri-
be best able to deduce rules for the
guidance of his family, and at the
same time to allow of such exceptions
cally, of what results on each thing
being tried.' Cf. Metaph. i. i. 7 :
irpbs fJLfv ailv rb irparrfiv f/j.irftpla,
as individual peculiarities might call i TC^I^JS oi>5e^ SOKC? Sia^epeiv, iAAa
v y 2
348 H9IKQN NIKOMAXEIilN X. [CHAP.
Troiiiv, sirs
rsvea-Qai, si
aya^oi yvo/jw,3' av. ovnva yap otiv xai rov 7Tpor-
/ r* ^ ^ t H 1>5 +< N'-fc*'-'?*
TOU jdOTOf, (V(T7rSp S7T iaTp<X^f Xa/ TtOV AO<7T(OV O)V
ETTijalAsia T/^ xa) c^povijo'if . ap' ouv jW-sra TOWTO
TTCO^ vo[j.oQsrixos ye'i/ojr' av T<t,% ^
?r/ rtov aAAaJV, Trapa rtov 7roX<r*xa7v ;
\ J'N / J fw *5* A > rf i.
yap OOXI T7J TTOXJTiXTJ^ (Va<.
:ric xai TOJIV XoiTraJv 5
sv j,=v yap TOJ^ a?vXo/^ ol
TS vv(JiEi$ 7rapa<o xa< svspyouvr*^ aTr aurcv,
olov iarpoi xa* ypa^s?^* Ta 8s TroXirixa 7rayye?\.?\.ovra<
ju,sv 8<0a<rxe<v of (ro^^rra/, Trparrsi 8' aurtov oo
ol 7roXiTio'jU,rVo/, o'i 8o^aiv av 8uvajast rtvi rouro
xa/ ( a7Tip/a ]U.aXAov ^ 8ai/o/a' ot<T yap
' TtOV TOiOUTO>V <$>O.iVOVTOt.l (
T xa< 8yW.7o<xou^ ou8' a3
TCOV (i?\.<ov.
yap ra?^ 7roX<r<v oi^sivw ovfev xarfiXtTrov av
auroit; uTrdp^ai 7rposAo<vr' av ^txaXAov rr^ Toiot.vTr)g
]U,>j, o'jS! 8^ ro7^ ^iXraro/^. oi J&MJV ]U.jxpov y
if] sfJLTrsipioi (Tyja/riaXX'TQaj o f J5 yap ly/yvovr' av
10 TTSpi 7TOAITIX.T(1$ SlOSVO.1 TrptHTOZlV SOIXSV (J.7TSlpl(X.$. TiOV
vouoBfrovffris ri 5e? irpdTTftv Kal
dpiafntv rows
.Treipias \6yov
1 7 $VTiva yhp ativ Kal rbi/ TrpnreOevTCt]
'Any one you like to propose.' Cf.
Eth.i. iii. 8 : rf irpoTiOffjieQa., ' what we
propose to ourselves.'
1 8 fjL6piov yap '5c$K6! T^J
eT^ai] ' For, as we said, legislation is
generally considered to be a branch
of politics.' This probably refers to
EYA. I. ii. 7 : xP a) A t/>/r ? s ^e Taurij? rats
rfauv aTre'
/uev 8(Sao'/c6H' ot
^>t(TTof] Cf. Plato, Meno, p. 95 B: of
fftxpunal aot ovroi, olirep /j.6i>oi tira.y)(\-
KOVTO.I, SoKovffi Si8dTKa\ot tli'ai aperjjs ;
The whole of the present discussion
on the teaching of political science is
evidently suggested by that on the
teaching of virtue in the Meno, where
it was shown that the great statesmen
do not attempt to teach their sons
virtue, and that the Sophists, who
IX.]
IieiKftN NIKOMAXEIQN X.
349
ol 7rayy=XXo'/j<,voj "hiav Qaivovrai Tro'ppa) sJvai
TOU <$jOai* oAa> yap O'j0= TroTo'v ri SCTTIV rj Trep] TroTa
}'o~ao~JV oy yap av TTJV avrr^y rij prjTopixrj o'Jos y=/pto
T/=-<rav, outi' av UJOJ/TO paOiov eTva/ TO vo ( ao5T7J<rat <rova-
yayos/TJ
TU>V
xa/ TO
sv
jtxsy<o~Tov,
v' ol yap erj.7rsipoi Trspl exarrTcx. xpivovo~iv
xa 7ro?a TTOO< o~uva05J'
=y =J sO 15
a.7rspoi$
7T7ro/*jTa< TO
TO
01 6=
av
apa-TO'j$ xpivai ; o- yap
. xa/To<
, aXXa xai
lxao~Tou^,
sx
ys /^'y/v ou (J.OVQV rot.
av xai a;t; ,6=7 ^fsaTr
profess to teach it, are doubtful in-
structors.
20 <u 5e vofjiOi eoiKcunj'] ' But laws
are as it were the results of political
science.' Aristotle's account of the
Sophists' method of teaching politics
is precisely analogous to his account
of the way in which they taught
dialectic. He here speaks of their
taking a shallow view of politics, and
making it an inferior branch of rhe-
toric ; and he adds that they adopted
a superficial eclecticism, making col-
lections of laws without touching upon
the principles from which legislation
must depend. They thus imparted
mere results, which to those who are
uninstructed in principles are wholly
useless. In the same way (Soph,
Elench. xxxiii. 1 6) he says they gave
various specimens of argument to be
learnt by heart, and that this was no
more use than if a person who under-
took to teach shoemaking were to
provide his pupils with an assortment
of shoes. Affyows -yap of /
ot 8e fpcaTi)riKovs fSiSoffav tnnia.vda.vtiy,
5 oDs irA6j<7To/cis efj.Tf(irrtiv tfi\Qrjaav
tKarepoi TOVS a\\-fi\o>v \6yovs. Aio'-ep
TOXI ^f* &T^I/OS S' ^v ^ StScur/caAta
TOS fiavQavowi tap aurvv ov yap
Textrrjya\\iiTaaTrbTfis Te'^j^jy StSdjrey
iratSeueti' irKt\ayi$a.vov, Strirep &v e)f rts
tinaTrift:ijv tydtrKiav irapaSaxreiv t-nl rb
yttiySei' Trovtiv TOVS irdScK, elra (TKVTO-
To.uHtV per /irj SiSduTKoi, /xrj5' 88ev
Sw^trereu iropifaaBai TO. roiavra, SOI'TJ
Se iro\\a. yevi\ Kcunotia.iriav inroStjadriav.
21 ov yap tyaivovrat ?{ej] 'For
men do not appear to learn the
physician's art from treatises, though
(they who write such treatises) aim at
stating not only anodes of treatment,
but how people can be cured and how
each person is to be treated, according
to a classification of habits (of body).'
avyypafjLfj.drtai' here is frequently trans-
lated ' prescriptions,' but, from what
Aristotle says about them, clearly some-
thing more is meant. In the Minos
350
II9IKQN NIKOMAXElilN X.
[CHAP.
av7rurTr l [j.o(nv
<>i/ al
T/ xot.Aw$
TO
svai
xa/ rwv
xa run;
rag jasi/ 3uva ( as'vo/p dsw^r\(rai xa<
xa) 7ro7a TTO/O/ '
oux av
sixruvsrwrspot ft el$ raura T^' av ys'vo/vro
TrapaXiTTOvrajv ouv Ttov Trporspcov OLvsps'jvyrov TO
1J
TCt
2 3
xarat. [J.?po$ eiprjrai xaXtoj WTTO TCOV 7rpoysvs<nspMv
which bears Plato's name we find
(ruyypd/j.fjLara used as a generic word,
of which several species, larpiKa., yewp-
yiKd, /jiayeipiKa., &c., are mentioned,
and are compared (as here) with
' laws.' Cf. Minos, p. 3160 sqq. : ^877
Trure tvervxfs ^vyypd^fiart irepl vyif'tas
t&v Ka^iv6fTiev ; "Eycaye. 'larpiwa Spa
al JOTfiiKol vm'ML raw ro T^ <Tvyypdfj.fj.a,Ta
ttrrl ia raJc larptav ; 'laTpiwa faevroi.
f A/)' oi)" Kat ra yfiapyiK& ffvyypd/j.fj.ara
yf&pyiKol VOU.OL eiViV ; K. T X. The
(Tvyypd/j./uMra here mentioned were
perhaps 'reports of cases,' or mono-
graphs on particular diseases.
7o?s 8" &vfv ytVoij'To] ' But those
who without proper training study
such things would not be able
to judge of them correctly (except
indeed by natural ability), though
they might gain an appreciative
faculty with regard to the subject.'
4s here denotes the state of mind
formed by scientific training. Such a
training especially produces 'judg-
ment ' (rb Kplveiv KaAcSs). Cf. Pol. ill.
xi . 14: tftTTaj yap tVaaro s fiitv -^flpwv
/cpjT^js T&V eib&T<av. Eth. i. iii. 5, and
note. This kind of judgment, as
bc-ing deep and original, is distin-
guished above from vuveais, the pu\\ <T
of appreciation, but in Eth. \\. x. z
avi/f<Tis is called Kptrticfi, in a lower
sense, and as contrasted with wisdom,
which is irpa/tTiKij.
22 itapa.\nt6vTiav ouV] One must be
struck with the disdainful way in
which Aristotle here quite sets aside
the Republic and Laws of Plato, by
which he had been himself so much
influenced, as if they were not to be
reckoned as even attempts at founding
the science of politics. Below, he
alludes to them as ' perhaps on some
particular points having made good
remarks.'
Ttptarov /xev ovv\ A rough outline of
the Politics is here given, as Aristotle
conceived it before writing it. The
sketch is so very general that it omits
the subject of Book I., and yet critics
have thought that this passage may
be taken as evidence of what the order
of books in Aristotle's Politics should
be.
K ruv ffwiiyfj.fv(M>v iroXtreitS/] 'From
my collection of constitutions.' Cf.
Cicero, De Finibus, \.\\: ' Omnium
fere civitatum, non Grseciae &olum, scd
etiam barbarise, ab Aristotele mores,
H91KON NIKOMAXEIQN X. 351
rot. Troa (rtosi xa <>=ip=i rag TTOXSJ xa TO.
TCOV 7ro7.iT=<u>i/, xai Oia, rivets airing a\ fj.sv
al 8s ro'jvavriov TroT^irsuovron' dswp^svrwv yap
Tav' av jOuxAAov cruvtOo^asv xai 7ro<a TrciXirsia
xai TTwg sxacrrv] Tap^5=*<ra, xal T/<TI vopoig xai
instituta, disciplinas ; a Theophrasto | KOI, apiaroKpariKal, ical rvpavviKctt. The
leges etiam cognovimus.' Diogenes fragments of this work have been
Laertius, in his list of the works of
collected by C. F. Neumann, and may
Aristotle, mentions (v. i. 12) : iro\irf?ai > be found in the Oxford reprint of
v6\uv SpotV Seo^yaiv QTJKOVTCI KoL . Bekker's edition of Aristotle.
tKO.r6v, noil I5iq 8r]fj.OKpa,TiKa(, o\i-,apxi- '
INDEX VEKBORUM.
ABEBAIOI IX. xii. 3.
ap\a0t~is VII. xiv. 5.
ayaObs I. iii. 5. vii. 17. viii. 12. x. 11.
xiii. 12. II. iii. 7, 10. iv. 5. vi. 3. IV.
iii. 15, 20. V. ii. 11. VI. xiii. 6. VII.
i. 1. xiii. 3. VIII. iii. 6. v. 4, 5. xi. 1.
X. v. 1 0. aya6r] II. i. 5. dya8bt> I.
ii. 1, 7. iv. 1. v. 1,8. vi. 2. 5, 6, 11,
13. vii. 1, 6, 15, 17. viii. 9. x. 3, 13.
xi. 5. xii. 2. xiii. 5. II. vi. 2, 14. III.
iv. 2, 3, 5, 6. v. 17. vi. 6. ix. 6. IV.
iii. 14. V. i. 10, 17. iii. 17. vi. 6. VI.
vii. 4, 6. viii. 4. ix. 4. xii. 7, 10. xiii.
1,6. VII. xi. 1, 3, 4. xii. 1, 3. xiii.
1, 7. xiv. 2. VIII. ii. 1, 2. iii. 1, 2, 7.
iv. 4. v. 4, 5. vi. 4. viii. 7. x. 2. xi. 4.
xii. 5, 7. xiv. 3. IX. iii. 3. iv. 3. viii.
7, 9. ix. 7, 8, 9, 10. X. ii. 1, 2, 4, 5.
iii. 2, 11. ix. 11. ayaBov I. i. 1. iv.
1. vi. 8, 15. xi. 5. III. iv. 1. v. 17.
V. i. 10. iii. 14. 15. iv. 6. vi. 6. ix.9.
x. 1. VI. ix. 4. xii. 1. VII. xii. 2.
VIII. iii. 4. xiii. 2. xiv. 1. IX. iv. 3.
ix. 1, 5, 7, 9, 10. X. ii. 3, 4. aya6y
III. ii. 10. v. 18. IV. iii. 19. V. il 11.
VI. xii. 10. VIII. v. 4. xiv. 1. ayaOol
1. viii. 16. II. i. 6, 7. ii, 1. v. 5. vi.9.
VIII. iii. 6. iv. 1, 4, 5. v. 1. viii. 2.
xiii. 1. IX. ix. 9. X. ix. 1, 17. ayaBal
I. viii. 13. VII. xii. 7. xiv. 2. IX. iv.
5. ayaOa. I. iv. 4. vi. 11, 14. viii. 2.
III. ii. 13. IV. iii. 10, 20, 21. V. i. 9.
VI. v. 1, 4, 5, 6. vii. 5. xii. 1. xiv. 9.
VIII. i. 1 . v. 5. vii. 7. IX. viii. 6, 9.
ix. 3. ayaBaiv I. vi. 4, 7, 10, 14. vii.
8. viii. 2, 3, 15. ix. 7. xii. 4, 5. IV.
iii. 10, 35. V. vi. 4. ix. 17. xi. 2.
VII. iv. 2, 5. xiii. 2. xiv. 2. VIII. iii.
6. iv 3, 4. v. 4, 5. vii. 6. viii. 5. x. 2.
IX. iv. 8. viii. 7. ix. I, 7. X. ii. 2, 3.
iii. 1. viii. 9. ayaOovs I. v. 5. ix. 8.
VOL. II.
x. 4. xiii. 2. II. i. 5. VIII. i. 5. iv. 2.
vi. 2, 4. ayadois I. x. 15. III. v. 3.
IV. iii. 15. VIII. vii. 4. x. 2. IX. ix.
5, 7. xi. 5.
'AydOav VI. ii. 6. iv. 5.
&ya\fj.a X. v. 1.
aya\f*aToiroi(f I. vii. 10.
'Ayafj.f/j.vova VIII. xi. 1.
&yav VII. ii. 6.
ayonrot III. xi. 8. IX. vii. 3. viii. 6. X.
iv. 10. ayavuffi I. v. 2. IV. i. 20.
VIII. Hi. 1. vii. 2. viii. 1. IX. xii. 2.
ayairat> III. x. 11. ayaTriav IX. iii. 1.
viii. 6. ayairuvTas X. viii. 13. aya-
TTjflenj IX. vii. 3. ayatrarai I. v. 8.
ayairaffQai X. vii. 5. a.yairu>fi.fva I.
vi. 8. ayairoi/Jifvais X. ix 10.
a.yaTrt]rbv I. iii. 4. IX. x. 6. X. ix. 5,
20.
ayairriTdTaTov IX. xii. 2.
ayaff6a>(Tt VII. i. 3.
VI. ii. 6. ayevvrtra VI. iii. 2.
iCs IV. i. 31. ayevves IV. iii. 26.
ayfvffroi X. vi. 4. ix. 4.
o-yvoe? III. i. 14, 15. V. viii. 10. dy-
voovffi IX. vi. 1. ayvooi VI. vii. 7.
d-ypo^jcreje III. i. 17. ayvoeiv I. vi. 15.
III. v. 8, 9. IV. iii. 35. V. viii. 3.
ayvoSiv III. i. 14, 16. v. 12. V. viii. 3.
ix. 12. x. 3. ayvoovvTfs III. viii. 16.
IV. iii. 36. V. viii. 12. ayvoovvvas
III. i. 14. v. 8. VI. iii. 5. ayvoi\ffas
III. i. 18. a.yvoovfj.vov V. viii. 3.
&yvoia. III. i. 15. VII. iii. 12. ayvotas
III. i. 18. v. 8. V. viii. 6. VII. ii. 2.
Hyvoiav I. iv. 3. III. i. 3, 13, 14, 19,
20. v. 7, 17. V.viii. 12. xii. 7. VII.
ii. 1, 2. VIII. viii. 3.
a7ftSras IV. vi. 5. IX. v. 1.
ayopala VIII. xiii. 6. ayopaiuv VIII.
vi. 4.
i;
INDEX VERBORUM.
dyopfvwv III. viii. 2. dyopevovffi V. i. 13.
&ypa<f)ov VIII. xiii 5. aypd^uv X. ix.
14.
&7ptos IV. viii. 10. Hyptov III. x. 7.
&7pio< IV. viii. 3.
aypoittia II. vii. 13.
&ypoiicos II. vii. 13. HypoiKot II. ii. 7.
VII. ix. 3.
aypbv V. ix. 3.
ayujui'ao-i'ac III. v. 15. i^x^ 01 * VI.
ix. 3.
7?' VII. iii. 10. &yetv V. v. 12. X. i. 2.
frycOjitei/ X. vii. 6. &yovrfs IX. viii. 4.
&7ou<ra II. vi. 9. &yerat III. xi. 6.
VII. iii. 2. vii. 3. &yovrai VII. vii 8.
ix. 2. ayo/j.fv<ai> VII. xii. 3. ^x" a '
I. iv. 6. II. iii. 8. HyevBai III. xi. 3.
VII. ix. 6.
aytayris X. ix. 8. a77V X. vii. 3.
ayiaai III. viii. 8.
aycaviav III. v. 11.
ay&vto/j.fvot I. viii. 9. X. v. 4.
aycaviffras IX. v. 2. ayuviffriav IX. v.
4.
a5V III. vi. 10.
SSeiai/ V. iv. 13.
aSficaffToi II. ix. 6.
o.8e\<titK)) VIII. x. 6. xii. 4. dSeA^u/cj?
VIII. xii. 6.
d5eA<f> VIII. ix. 3. a5f\<pol VIII. xii.
3. aSf\<pwv VIII. x. 6. xi. 5. dSeA-
<f>o?s VIII. ix. 2. IX. ii. 7. a5f\(povs
IX. ii. 9.
d8e<T7rjTois VIII. x. 6.
IV. i. 8. vi. 3. VI. viii. 4. 6.
IX. ii. 3, 6. viii. 5, 6. x. 4. X. viii.
13. 5rjAoi X. viii. 4. aSfaois III.
iii. 10.
id^ATjTos VIII. iv. 3. a5id&\i]Tov VIII.
vi. 7.
Sia^o'/jous X. v. 8.
5(/crc II. vi. 19. IV. iii. 15. V. v. 17,
18. vi. 4. viii. 4. ix. 1. 3, 4, 8, 9, 14,
16. xi. 1, 5, 6, 7. aSiKfiV. ii. 2. iv. 3.
vi. 2. viii. 1, 1L. ix. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.
xi. 2, 4, 6. d5iKj<raj V. xi. 4. VIII.
iv. 3. aSiKova-i V. i. 3. viii. 8. VII.
viii. 3. aSiK&v V. iii. 14. vi, 1. viii.
11. xi. 4. aSiKouvros V. ix. 3. d8j-
KOVVTI V. xi. 3. dSi/roiWa III. v. 13.
V. vi. 1. ix. 7. d5(Ke?Tot V. v. 3. ix.
3, 6, 7, 9. xi. 3. O.SIKOITO V. ix. 4.
dS(K6?(70at IV. i. 26. V. v. 17, 18. viii.
10. ix. 1, 3, 5, 7, 8. xi. 5, 6, 7, 8.
a$u(ov/j.(vos V. v. 1 4.
dSiKTjjua V. vii. 7. viii. 2, 8. d8wcV aTOS
V. v. 18. vii. 7. ix. 13. dSi/cr^ora
V. ii. 5. vi. 1. viii. 8, 1 1. d5t/ojjuaTi'
V. xi. 6.
dSiKi'a V, i. 7, 19. ii. 3, 6,8, 9, 10. v.
17, 18. vi. 4, 8, 9. xi. 9. a5i;ci'as V.
1. 1, 3. ii. 1, 9. v. 19. xi. 7. dSiiciav
IV. vii. 7. V. ii. 2. 5. vi. 1. VII.
vii. 7. oSHffa V. viii. 10.
H'IKOS III. v. 13, 14. V. i. 8, 9, 10, 12.
11. 4. iii. 1. vi. 1, 2. viii. 8, 1 1. ix. 12.
xi. 4. VII. x. 3. &5woi> III. v. 13.
V. i. 7,8. ii. 3,8,9, 10. iii. 1, 3, 14.
iv. 2, 3, 4. v. 17. vi. 1, 9. vii. 7. viii.
2. ix. 3, 10. xi. 4. VN. vi. 7. dStKOv
V. ii. 3, 9. v. 18, 19. vi. 4. d5fo v III.
v. 14. &SIKOI II. 1, 7. III. 5. 14. V.
viii. 8. VII. viii. 3. dS'iKwv V. viii.
1, 4. ix. 3. dS'iKots V. viii. 1. &5iKa
V.I, 3. viii. 4. ix. 3, 6, 11,15. VIII.
ix. 3. dS'iKovs III. v. 10. IV i. 42.
dSiKWTfpa VII. vi. 3, 4. dS'iKtos V. ix.
12, 13.
a5i6punov III. iii. 10. X. v. 6.
d5oAf'(7xaj III. x. 2.
a5oi'as IV. ix. 1. d5o|(W III. vi. 3.
dSwafiia. IV. i. 37.
afivvaTfi IX. ix. 1. X. iv. 9. aSuvarouffi
V. i. 15. X. v. 3. fovvaTtlv X. x. 3.
aSwarowTa VIII. xiii. 9. aSvyarovv-
res X. vi. 6.
dStWrof I. viii. 15. V. v. 15. ix. 3. x. 6.
xi. 4. VI. xii. 10. aSwdry III. iii. 13.
dSiWro III. ii. 10. a^vvdruv III. ii.
7. VI. v. 3. vii. 6.
del I. vii. 8, 11. II. ii. 23. vi. 18. III.
iii. 4, 8, 16. IV. iii. 14. iv.4. V. i. 10.
ii. 5. iv. 2. v. 14. ix. 10. xi. 4. VI.
vii. 4. x. 1. VII. iii. 2. vii. 7. xiv.
5, 6. VIII. x. 3. xiii. 4. xiv. 4. IX.
ii. 4, 9. viii 5. X. iii. 3. iv. 7. vi. 7.
9<Tje IX. i. 4.
dj5J)s II. vii. 13. oTj8 X. v. 5. oTjSj'os
IX. xi. 6 drjSws IV. iii. 25.
aQavaalas III. ii. 7.
aOavari^eiv X. vii. 8.
'Aflr/raious IV. iii. 25.
d0A?7TV HI^ ii 8. dflArjTdl III. viii. 8.
&6\ios I. x. 4, 13, 14. VII. vii. 5. d0AiV
VII. vii. 5. &6\tov I. x. 8. IX. iv. 10.
d0A(a' I. xiii. 12. a6\iws I. ix. 14.
a.0\o0fT<ui> 1. iv. 5.
lQ\ov I. ix. 3. IV. iii. 10, 15.
a9p6ov VII. vii. 6.
al7alll. x. 7. V. vii. 1.
IXDEX VERBOEDM.
Ill
IV. ix. 7. aiSov/j.evos II. vii.
14.
II. vii. 14. III. vi. 3.
IV. ix. 3.
alSiov I. vi. 6. Vl.iii. 2. ofSialll. ii. 10.
VL iii. 2. aiSiiav III. iii. 3.
a<5<l>s II. vii. 14. IV. ix. 6, 7. alSovs
IV. ix. 1, 3. aj5o?X. ix. 4. aiSailll. :
viii. 3, 4.
aiKta V. ii. 13.
afca III. viii. 10. VIII. xii. 3.
alpfffiv II. iii. 7. atpfffeis II. iii. 7.
ai'perbs IX. ix. 7. oiper)/ VIII. viii. 2 .
IX. xi. 6. xii. 1. X iii. 13. a/pei-bc
I. vii. 4, 8. III. ii. 17. xii. 1. V. iii.
16. VIII. v. 4. IX. vii. 4." ix. 9, 10.
X. ii. 1, 2. iv. 10. atperov V. v. 17.
alperriv X. ii. 2. aiperal III. i. 6. VII.
xii. 1. xiv. 1. X. iii. 9, 13. vi. 2, 3.
vii. 7. atpei-a III. i. 10. IV. iii. 18.
VII. iv. 2, 5. aipfTtZv I. vii. 4. VII.
iv. 5. IX. ix. 10. X. v. 6. vi. 2, 3.
alperas VI. xii. 4. IX. vi. 2. alperia-
repos III. viii. 9. VI. v. 7. eupeTco-
repoi/ I. vii. 8. VII. vii. 4. IX. xi. 1.
X. ii. 2, 3. alpfTtarepav I. vii. 8. eupe-
Tunepat VII. xiv. 3. aipercorepa I.
i. 4. cupeTWTe'pas X. vi. 4. aiperw-
Taroj IX. ix. 9. cupeT&>TaT?j X. vi. 5.
alpfrcararov IX. xii. 1. a/per WTCITTJV
I. vii. 8. VII. xiii. 2.
afpen-at I. vii. 5. II. vi. 8. III. vii. 13.
ix. 4. V. i. 10. VII. ix. 1. IX. iv. 4.
viii. 8. X. vii. 6. atpotWai III. iv. 6.
IX. iv. 8. viii. 9. xii. 1,2. X. vi. 3.
uipOiTO X. vii. 9. atpovpeda I. ii. 1.
vii. 3, 5. X. ii. 2. iv. 11. vi. 6. *Ao(-
juefla I. vii. 5. X. iii. 12. eAocro III.
i. 6. IV. i. 14. VIII. i. 1. IX. viii. 9.
ix. 3. X. iii. 12. (\fa6cu X. v. 8.
alpftaBai II. vii. 16. III. ii. 13. xi. 6.
V. i. 9. VI. i. 1. v. 6. VIII. viii. 2.
alpov/j-evos III. iv. 2. IV. vi. 8. IX.
viii. 10. alpovfj.ei'oi' IX. iv. 1. eupotfyte-
voi X. ii. 5. aip^crerai III. v. 17.
oupereop III. i. 9, 10.
alptiv VII. vii. 5.
aiffddve-TM IX. ix. 9. cuVflai/ffytefla VI.
viii. 9. IX. ix. 9. alffOdveaOai IV. v.
6. IX. ix. 7, 9, 10. xi. 4. alffQavo-
Hfvip I. x. 3. cd(rda.i>6fjifvov IX. ix. 9.
ai<T6av6/j.ei>oi X. viii. 11. tfffdtro III.
x. 7.
afcr0/)<n$ VI. ii. 1, 2. viii. 9. VII. iii. 9.
vi. 1. IX. ix. 10. X. iv. 6, 7. v. 7.
aiaOrifffcas III. iii. 16. IX. ix. 7. X.
iv. 5. aiV0TJ(m IV. v. 13. VII. v. 6.
aXrrQriffiv III. x. 4. VI. ii. 2. xi. 4.
VIII. xii. 2. IX. xii. 1. X. i. 3 iv. 5-
7. aiffBricreis X. iii. 7. v. 2. aiaB-fj-
fff<av II. i. 4. III. x. 10.
aiV07?Tj/c$; I. vii. 12. aiVfljj-n/cfjs VII.
iii. 13.
alffOrjTT] VII xi. 4. alffOrjrbv X. iv. 5,
6, 8. aurtfrjToD VII. iii. 13. X. iv. 7.
aiff6r)T^v VII xii. 3.
alffxpoKtpSeia IV. i. 41.
alcrxfCKfpSels IV. i. 43.
ai<TXpo\oyia IV. viii. 5.
aiffxpoirpa.yt'iv IV. i. 8.
atVxpbp III. i. 4, 7. v. 2. vL 3. vii. 13.
viii. 4, 9, 14. ix. 4. IV. i. 39. vii. 7.
VII. vii. 3. VIII. vii. 6. X. ix. 4, 8.
ajVxpa III. i. 9, 23. v. 3. IV. i. 7. iii.
15. ix. 5, 7. VII. vi. 1. wcrxpal VII.
xi. 5. alarxpov II. iii. 7. III. viii. 3, 9.
alffxpf IX. viii. 1. aiffxpav VII. ix. 4.
cucrxpw X. v. 11. altrx'^v VII. vi. 1,
3, 5. a?JX" 7Ta HI- i- 7. aiffxicrTuv
X. iii. 12. aiffxp&v HI. i. 11. xii. 6.
IV. i. 39. ix. 5. X. iii. 10. v. 6. ar-
Xpots III. v. 15.
A(Vx"Aos III. i. 1 7.
oiVx^'T? IV. ix. 4.
ot(rxwf"ai IV. iii. 24. alvxyvoiTo IV.
^ ix. 7. alffxvveffQai IV. ix. 6, 7. attr-
XtW/icvoi IV. ix. 2. aiVxw"eoc IV.
ix. 5.
aurxw'rj^'S IV. ix. 3.
cu-rrjTi/cta IV. i. 16.
aJri'a II. viii. 8. III. i. 10, 15, VII. v. 4.
X. iv. 6. alrjos II. viii. 7. V. viii. 7.
VI. xi. 6. X. ix. 6, 23. aiiriav I. vii.
20. ix. 6, 10. II. vii. 9. III. iii. 4. IV.
i. 14. VII. iii. 9. atr/ot III. iii. 7.
erfnos III. v. 8, 17. VIII. xi. 2. IX. xi.
4. oiTiou III. i. 23. alricf I. x. 10.
afriov I. iv. 4. xii. 8. xiii. 11. III.
iii. 11. v. 8. V. x. 4, 6. VI. viii. 5.
VII. xiv. 3. IX. vii. 2, 4. viii. 10. X.
iii. 2. alrlois IX. ii. 8. afoot III. v.
7, 10. VIII. xii. 5.
alrtaffOai III. i. 11. aiVupro IX. iii 2.
al<pt>i$iois III. viii. 15.
&Kapira IV. iii. 33.
d/V5wot III. xii. 2.
aKivrjffias VII. xiv. 8.
V. vii. 2. a.Kivf)r<av VI. x. 1,4.
IX. xi. 6.
oic,up VIII. i. 2. iii. 4.
a 2
IV
INDEX VEEBORUM.
X. iv. 8.
&Kfj.dfav III. xi. 1.
O.KO^I X. v. 7. dicojj X. iv. 10.
III. x. 4.
ai<o\affia II. vii. 3. viii. 6, 8. III. x. 1,
8, 10. xi. 5. xii. 1. VII. v. 5, 9. vi. 6.
vii. 1. ctKoAacrfa? III. v. 15. xii. 5.
IV. i. 35. oKoAoo-i'ij VII. iii. 2. iv. 6.
ix. 5. OKoAcKriew II. viii. 8. IV. i. 3.
V. ii. 5. VII. iv. 2. v. 8.
a,Ko\affratveiv II. vi. 19. aKoAcwrraiVoiTa
III. v. 13.
aK6\affTos II. ii. 7. iii. 1. viii. 2. III. xi.
5, 6. xii. 4. V. ii. 4. VII. iii. 2. vii.
2, 3, 7. viii. 1. ix. 4, 7. xii. 7. xiv. 1.
aKo\dffTov III. x. 6. VII. viii. 5. O.KO-
AdcTTip III. v. 14. xii. 4. cuc^Aao'TOJ'
II. viii. 2. III. v. 13. VH. i. 6. iv. 3,
4. OKdAaon-ot II. i. 7. III. x. 2, 3, 5,
9. xi. 4. IV. i. 35. VII. xiv. 6. d/cdAa-
<rra VII. vi. 6. a.KO\6.<novs III. v. 10.
x. 2, 4, 5.
a)toAou0r III. vii. 10. V. i. 6. VII. i. 6-
vi. 1. IX. v. 1. a.Ko\ovOovfft II. i. 8.
V. x. 1. TJfcoAoMvjKe VII. ix. 6. O.KO-
\ov6riffovffi VII. xii. 1. VIII. ix. 6.
o/coAou0r' VI. iii. 2. xi. 6. VII. ii. 6.
vi. 2.
ctKoAoi/flTjTi/cbs I. iii. 6. a.KO\ov6TfriKol
VII. vii. 8.
a.K6\ov6ov IV. ii. 1.
O.KOVCFIOV III. i. 1, 6, 13, 15. V. v. 5. viii.
3 ix. 1, 2. aKouffiov III. i. 15, 19,20.
ii. 1. aKovcricf V. viii. 2. aKovffia. III.
i. 3, 6, 10, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27. V. ii.
13. aicovffiuv V. ii. 13. viii. 12.
aKovffiois III. i. 1. V. iv. 1. OKovffitas
III. i. 16, 23.
a.Kovffft.a.ra X. iv. 7.
aKovei IV. iii. 25. IX. ix. 9. &Kovovai
II. iv. 6. ojtovimv I. iv. 7. IV. viii. 8.
IX. ix. 9. O.KOVOVTO. IV. viii. 7. aKovetv
IV. viii. 1, 5. VII. iil 12. vi. 1. xiv.
5. aKovffdTU I. iv. 7. cucovcrai II.
1. 4. IV. viii. 10. VII. vi. 1. aKovaas
VII. vi. 1. aKovartie X ix. 7. eucov-
fffrai I. ill. 6. IV. viii. 8. a.Kova-6-
fj.evov I. iv. 6. axovffTiKbti I. xiii. 9.
aKparria. VII. i. 1, 6. ii. 7, 11. iii. 2. iv.
2, 6. v. 5, 8, 9. vi. 1, 3, 4, 5. viii.
1,3. x. 4, 5. aKpcwias VII. i. 4. ii.
1, 9, 11. v. 9. vii. 8. viii. 1. xiv. 9.
aKpaaia VII. ix. 5. arcpaffiav V. ix. 5.
VII. ii. 9, 10. iv. 6. vii. 6, 8. ix. 4.
a.Kpa.ffMi' VII. x. 4.
aKpartverai VII. ii. 1. dnparevovrai
VII. iii. 3. x. 4. d(cpaTtW0ai VII.
iii. 10, 14. oKpaTeixfyxevoj VII. ii. 2.
dtcparfvofufvovs VII. iii. 8.
aKparfc III. ii. 4. V. ix. 4, 6. VI. ix. 4.
VII. i. 6. ii. 5, 10, 11. iii. 1, 2, 12.
iv. 1, 3. vi. 1. vii. 1, 8. viii. 1, 2, 5.
ix. 1, 4, 5, 7. x. 2, 3. IX viii. 6. ac-
paroGs I. xiii. 15. VII. vii. 3. ix. 5.
oKpa-rfi VII. vii. 4. ix. 3. aKparij VII.
1. 6. ii. 3. Hi. 11. iv. 4, 6. v. 5. x. 1, 2.
aKpartls IV. i. 3. VII. i. 7. iii. 7. iv.
2. v. 4. viii. 3. x. 2, 4. IX. iv. 8.
dicpaTuv I. xiii. 15. aKparea-i I. iii. 7.
a/fporais III. v. 14.
VIII. vii. 5. aVp^Ses I. iii. 1, 4.
II. ii. 4. ofcp(e?s III. iii. 8. o'/cpi/3e-
ffTfpov II. vii. 5. aKpt&effTfpa II. vi. 9.
a/cpi/3e<TTCiTi7 VI. vii. 2. aKpi/SecrroTOis
VI. vii. 1.
dicpt0etaj> I. vii. 18. aKpijSeias X. iv. 3.
aKpij8oS/Kcuo? V. x. 8.
dKpi&o\oyia IV. ii. 8. dicpifio\oyf'iffdai
VL iii. 2.
oKpi/3s II. ii. 3. VTL iii. 3. IX. ii. 2.
X. ix. 16.
a/cpodyuara X. iii. 7.
d/cpoar^s I. iii. 5. dfcpooroD I. iii. 8. X.
ix. 6.
fapos IV. iii. 8. &npot> II. vi. 20. viii. 7.
V. v. 12. Hiepoi II. vii. 8. viii. 3. IV.
iv. 6. &Kpcu II. viii. 1. &Kpuv II. vi.
5. vii. 10. ix. 3. IV. v. 1. V. v. 17.
&rpa II. vii. 11. IV. iv. 4. vi. 9.
axpois II. viii. 4, 5. tfucpais II. viii. 1.
dKp6rarov I. iv. 1.
afcpor^s II. vi. 17.
&Kptas II. ix. 4.
i III. i. 17.
IV. v. 9.
&Kvpa VII. ix. 3.
dAo^oxe/a II. vii. 12. IV. vii. 15. dAab-
vtias IV. vii. 1.
d\a.oi>fv6fj.evot IV. vii. 1 3. d\aov(vovrcu
IV. rii. 13.
oAa(WK&i' IV. vii. 15.
dAa^ II. vii. 12. III. vii. 8. IV. vii.
2, 6, 11, 12, 17.
oAaj VIII. iii. 8.
fayfiv III v. 7. aA-ye? IX. iv. 9. aA-
yovfft III. viii. 12.
a\yeii>bi> III. ix. 3.
a\yrjS6vos III. viii 11, 12.
dAt'as VII. iv. 3.
II. vi. 7.
INDEX VERBORUM.
oAr,0eia II. vii. 12. VI. ii. 2, 3, 6. ix. 3.
oA7)0ei'as I. vi. 1. IV. iii. 28. VI. ii. 1.
oAij0ia IV. iii. 16. V. v. 11, 15. IX.
ii. 5. a\r)deiav I. vi. 1. xiii. 2. III.
iv. 4. v. 17. IV. iii. 20. viii. J2. ix. 5.
X. ii. 1.
aArj0euei IV. vii. 7. VI. iii. 1. a\iiOfvo/j.tv
VI. vi. 2. a\T]0fvov<ri IX. viii. 3. ix.
4. aXtjeeveiv VI. vii. 3. VII. ix. 4.
a\r)0v<ai> IV. vii. 8. a\ij6fvotnos IV.
vii. 7. a\t]9fvot>TS X. ii. 5. aAij-
6tvot>T<ev IV. vii. 1. a\T)0tv(Ti IV.
vii. 8. VI. ii. 6.
a\t]9eimicbs IV. vii. 1. aAT)0eir(K9> IV.
vii. 17. dA7j0eimKoD IV. vii. 6.
a\r)6^s II. vii. 13. ix. 7. aAij0 II. vii.
11, 12. IV. vii. 6. VI. i. 2. VII. xiv.
3. IX viii. 9. ix. 5. X. viii. 12. aArj-
6fts X. i. 2. a\ri6ovs IV. vii. 9. VI.
iv. 3, 6. xi. 1. oA.rj0et VII. ix. 1. xiv.
2. X. vii. 2. aArj0ij III. v. 17. VI.
ii. 2. v. 6. VII. iii. 3.
oArj&j'Tj III. v. 17. a\r)6ivccTfpoi II.
vii. 1.
d\r)6a>s IV. iii. 14, 22. V. ix. I. VI. i. 3.
VIII. iv. 3. IX. x. 6. X. ix. 3, 4, 6.
OAT)-"; IV. iii. 3.
fix** I. v. 6. xiii. 14. IX. xi. 5. X. i. 4.
a\i(TKca. taAai/coTj IX. ii. 4.
aA^ III. vi. 12.
'A\Kfj.aicava. III. i. 8.
aAAa /col I. vii. 6. viii. 8. xiii. 6. II. ii.
8. iv. 3, 4. vL 1. vii. 1. III. vi. 11.
VI. xiii. 6. VII. iv. 2. x. 2. xiii. 7.
xiv. 3, 8. VIII i. 3, 5. iv. 1. xii. 7.
IX. i. 8. X. i. 4. iv. 3. viii. 8. ix. 21.
aAAa pfv VI. xiii. 3.
aAAo wv I. vi. 6. viii. 13. III. ii. 7. V.
ii. 2. VI. v. 7, 8. ix. 2, 3. VIL ii. 4, 6.
iii. 7. xiii. 1. X. viii. 7.
dAAa/4 HI- i- 11-
oAA' ^ IV. iii. 27, 29. V. ii. 5. viii. 1, 4.
ix. 15. VII. vi. 6.
aAAaT^ V. v. 10, 11, 14, 15, 16. dAAa-pjs
V. iv. 13. v. 14, 15.
aAAaKTi/caTs V. v. 6.
TOPTai V. v. 13. a\\d<avrai V. v.
13.
XA^Aaiv II. vii. 11. viii. 4, 5. V. v. 11.
VI. iv. 2. xiii. 6. VII. vii. 3. VIII.
iii. i. 4. iv. 1,2. v. 3. vii. 1. viii. 5.
x. 4. IX. xii. 3. X. iv. 2, 4. v. 2, 7.
aAATJAojs II. viii. 4. VII. v. 2. VIII.
i. 6. ii. 4. iii. 1, 6. iv. 1, 4. v. 1. vi.
1, 4, 7. viii. 6. ix. 2. xii. 3, 7. xiii. 4. ;
IX. vi. 3. x. 4. xii. 3. aAATJAtus II.
viiL 1. V. iv. 12. aAA^Aous V. vi. 4.
VIII. iii. 1, 9. iv. 2, 3. viii. 5. xii 3,
6. xiii. 2. IX iii. 4. vi. 1, 4. xii. 3.
X. viii. 1. oAA^Aos II. vii. 11. VII.
x. 5. #AA7?Aa II. viii. 4. V. iv. 2.
xi. 9. VII. xii. 2. VIII. i. 3. X.
iv. 8.
fiAAos I. vi. 8. IV. i. 14. VII. viii. 5.
IX. iv. 4, 5. X ix. 1 5. SAAT; I. xiii.
15. V. ii. 3, 6. aAAo I. i. 5. iv. 3.
vi. 10, 12. vii. 2, 4, 5. ix. 2, 9. xi. 6.
xiii. 15. II. i. 2. ix. 8. III. iv. 3. v.
7. ix. 6. IV. vi. 9. viii. 7. V. iv. 2.
x. 1, 2. xi. 4. VI. v. 3. vii. 1, 2, 9.
ix. 1. VII. ii. 1. v. 9. vi. 6. VIII.
iii. 3. viii. 6. xiii. 7. IX iv. 5. viii.
6. xi. 2. X. ii. 3. iii. 4. vi. 2. vii. 1.
ftAAou I. iv. 7. v. 8. II. iv. 2. V. ix.
5. VI. x. 3. xi. 7. VIII. vii. 4. X.
vii. 9. AA7js I. vi. 13. ix. 3. III. v.
15. IV. vii. 7. VIL xii. 6. &AA?
1. vi. 12. vii. 1. III. iv. 3. IV. viii.
7. V. i. 17. v. 1, 18. oAAj? I. vii. 2.
oAAoi' I. vi. 8. x. 1. IV. iii. 29. viii.
12. V. i. 13. ii. 10. v. 17, 18. xi.
2. VI. xiii. 1. VIL iii. 7. VIII. ix. 3.
IX viii. 1. aAATjj' I. xiii. 11. III. iii.
4. IV. i. 13,35. VII. i. 1. X. vii.
8. viii. 1. aAAot I. iv. 3. II. ix. 4.
III. viii. 6. IV. iii. 28, 31. VIII. i. 6.
vi. 5. IX. xii. 2. &AAcu I. i. 4. vii.
21. II. ii. L vii. 6, 11. VIII. ix. 5.
aAAa I. ii. 1. xii. 5. II. iii. 5. iv. 3.
v. 2. ix. 4. III. ii. 2. xii. 3. IV. i.
22. V. viii. 8. x. 1. VI. iii. 4. vii.
4. VII. ii. 10. VIII. iv. 3. IX. iv. 8.
X. v. 4. vii. 7. viii. 1. &AAai/I. ii. 7.
viii. 12. xii. 2. II. i. 4. ii. 7, 8. vii.
11. viiL 3. IBL iii. 15. iv. 4. v. 16.
xi. 6, 8. IV. i. 21. iii. 21. viii. 10. V.
ii. 12. iv. 12. v. 9, 18. vi. 2. vii. 4.
VI. i. 1. vii. 4. Vn. i. 5. ii. 4. iii. 1.
VIII. vii. 2. ix. 2. xiii. 10. IX. 9. X.
iii. 10. v. 2, 4. vii. 4. viii. 4, 8. ix. 18.
aAAoiS I. vii. 19. viii. 6. III. v. 9. viii.
6. x. 7. V.-v. 13. VI. vii. 7. xii. 2.
VIII. vi. 7. viii. 7. ix. 2. xii. 7. X. iv.
3 v. 4. aAAajs VIII. ix. 1. X. ix. 18.
aAAovs I. x. 13. III. x. 6. IX. viii.
7. ix. 5. X. ix. 18. aAAas II. ii. 2.
iv. 3. ffl. v. 6. x. 2. IV. iv. 6. V.
L 14. ii. 1. VI. i. 2. VII. ii. 5. xiv.
5. X. iii. 2.
aAAws I. vii. 21. viiL 9. ix. 1. II. i. 2.
VI
INDEX VERBOEUM.
iii. 5. IV. i. 31. V. vii. 1, 4. VI. i.
5, 6. iii. 2. iv. 1,6. v. 3, 8. vi. 1, 2.
vii. 2, 6. VII. ii. 6. X. is.. 2.
SAAcos Tf Kal I. vi. 1. x. 2. IV. iii. 30.
IX. xi. 3. X. i. 2. ix. 8.
&AAo0i II. vii. 16.
a.\\oTf in. iii. 5. VHL iii. 3. IX. iv.
5.
aAAotcofleWa IX. iii. 3.
aAAoidrepoj' IX. iii. 5.
dAAoTpiai VII. xii. 5. X. v. 5. aAA(S-
Tptov I.xiii. 14. IV. i. 9, 17. V. vi 6.
d\\orpi<av IV. i. 39. d\\orpt(arfpa
VIII. viii. 7. d\\oTpid>Tfpoi VIII. xii.
4.
aActyicTTOi VII. v. 6.
&\oyov I. xiii. 9, 18. III. v. 13. V. xi.
9. VI. i. 5. d\6yov I. xiii. 11. d\6ycp
IX. viii. 4. &\oya III. i. 27. X. ii. 1.
d\6y<i>v III. ii. 3. x. 1. d\6yo>s IV. i.
21. IX. viii. 2.
'A\6irri VII. vii. 6.
d\6xov X. ix. 13.
S,\ats X. iv. 3.
dAi/Trfa IX xi. 4. aXviclav VII. xii. 7.
&\wos III xii. 3. &\viroi> IV. i. 13.
VII. xii. 4, 7. SAt^roi IV. vi. 1. X.
iii. 7.
aAuTTtcs IV. i. 13.
dAuoTreAes VIII. xiv. 4.
a/ta III. v. 23. vi. 12. IV. i. 3, 24, 34.
V. viii. 2. xi. 4, 5. VI. ix. 3. xiii 6.
VII. iii. 9. x. 1. VIII. iii. 5. iv. 2.
vi. 2, 6. ix. 3. xiii. 3. xiv. 3, 4. IX.
iv. 10. vii. 5 x. 5. X. v. 4.
duaefr VIII. viii. 6. dfJLaOf'is VH/ix. 3.
a l uaprdvovfft II. i. 5. III. xi. 3, 4. IV.
i. 44. V. viii. 12 VII. vi. 1. aftap-
rdvovTfs V. viii. 8. u.fnaprdvtav VI. v.
7. Ttiid.pTO.Vft> VI. xiii. 3. r/fiaprfv
V. x. 5. afMprdvfiv II. vi. 14, 18. ix.
5. IV. v. 4. ix. 3. VIII. viii. 5.
afiapTavfTai II. vi. 12, 20. a^ap-rdvo-
Hfvov V. x 4. duapTija -<tyie0a II. ix.
6. d/taprrjOeVra III. i. 26. o^aprai'et
IV. v. 13. V. viii. 7. VI. ix. 3. VP-
rr)/j.tvoi IV. iii. 35. TtHP.priiiJ.fvrt VIII.
x. 4.
a/xdprrj/ta V. viii. 7. x. 4. a/xapT^aros
V. x. 6. a-fnapTrifMTo, V. viii. 6.
o/iopTTjrtKbs II. iii. 7.
a/jiapTia VI. viii 7. ix. 3. VII. iv. 2.
anaprtas III. xii. 5. afjutprlav III. i.
14. a.fj.apriuv III. vii. 4.
dfj.a.vpovra.1 X. iv. 9.
d/j.ftya.ff6ai IX. ii. 5.
dfitlvuv II. vi. 9. VIII. x. 5. xiii. 1.
Hfifivov III. ii. 14. IX. x. 4. X. vii.
9. ix. 19. dfj-fivovi VIII. xi. 4. dfj-fivta
VIII. vii. 2.
dfJ.f \fiav III. v. 15.
dfj.f \r,ff ft IV. i. 17. dut\ovvTfs X. vi. 3.
dfifTaKLvriTois II. iv. 3.
dnfTa/j.f\riTos VII. vii. 2. IX. iv. 5.
dfi.rixa.vov VII. iii. 7.
djucyets X. iii. 2.
au.i\\tap.fv(av VIII. xiii. 2. IX. viiL 7.
dfj.vr)fiovfs IX. vii. 1.
dfj.oi$ri IX. i. 1, 9. d/j,oif3r]v IX. i. 7.
dfj-vvrrat VIII. xiii. 2.
dfj.WTiKbs IV. v. 6.
dfi<pi\oyov VIII. xiii. 6.
dfJ.<j>Kr/3riTti VII. ii. 2. dfj,(ptff^riTovcnv I.
iv. 2. dfj.<piff!3riTiieffiv V. iv. 7. dpcpiff-
$r)Tfiv IV. iv. 4. dfj.tpiff^riTf'iTai V.
viii. 9. IX. ix. 1. X. viii. 5. dn<f>iff-
PrrrriTfov III. v. 5.
d/jupHrfMirriffis I. vi. 8. d/j.<ptffftrjTriffiv I.
x. 3. IU. i. 4. V. viii. 10. VIII.
xiii. 10. X. i. 2. v. 6.
dfj.<f>oTfpoi IV. i. 43. vii. 6. V. v. 13.
VII. ix. 7. dfj.<p6rfpa II. vi. 10. IV.
1. 24. iv. 5. ix. 2. VI. xi. 4. VIII.
viii. 3. d/j.(poTfpa.s V. v. 12. VII. iii.
6. ix. 5. dfj,<f>oTfpwf V. ix. 3. VI.
ii. 6.
&n<pca II. vi. 13. viii. 4. III. i. 26. viii.
13. ix. 2. IV. i. 24. iii. 20. iv. 1.
V. ii. 6. vii. 4. x. 1. xi. 7. VI. vii. 7.
VII. xii. 4. VIII. v. 4. vi. 5. x. 2.
IX. ii. 1. ix. 5. X. ii. 5. &/j.(poiv I.
vi. 1. V. x. 2. VI. ii. 6. VII. iii. 2.
VIII. vi. 4, 7. xii. 7. IX. i. 3, 8. vi.
2. viii. 2. xi. 1, 6. X. ii. 5. viii.
4, 5.
Uv cum infin. III. ii. 8. cum indie. V.
xi. 4.
&c pro faa> III. viii. 11. V. viii. 2, 10,
11. VI. xii. 9. VII. vi. 1. VIII. ii.
3. viii. 2.
dva III. viii. 10.
dva&o\riv VIII. xiii. 6.
;/ III. i. 11 dvayKd&vfft III.
viii. 4. dvayKO.fyfj.fvov V. viii. 4.
dvayKa&fifvovs III. viii. 4. aVtry-
KdCo"Tot III. i. 9. IV. i 34. IX. i.
7. dva.yKdffa.VTu III. i. 8. dvayKOff-
6>ffi IV. i. 39. dvayKaffOfjvat III. i.
8. aVay/cafffleVras III. i. 9.
INDEX VERBOKUM.
Vll
dvayKaffTiKT]v X. ix. 12.
dvaytcdiov I. ix. 7. II. ii. 1. iii. 9. IIL
1. 1. IV. i. 17. ii. 10. iii. 28. xii. 4.
VII. vi. 2. xi. 2. xiii. 2. V1IL i. 5.
IX. i. 8. X ix. 12. avayKaiy IX. ii.
2, 5. avayxaicu VII. vii. 2. xiv. 2.
X. vi. 2. dj'07/cai'as VII. xiv. 2.
avayKaia IV. viii. 1. V. viii. 8. VII.
iv. 2. avayKaitav IV. iii. 32. VII.
iv. 4. X. vii. 4. viii. 4. avayKatArtpov
VIII. xii. 7. IX. xi. 1. avaytcaidTaTOv
VIIL i. 1.
aifdyici) III. iii. 7. V. i. 5. iii. 4. viii. 10.
x. 3. xi. 4. VI. iv. 6. v. 6. VII. iii.
9. vii. 2. xii. 3. xiii. 1. avdyKrjs I.
viii. 9. Ill iii. 4. VI. iii. 2. iv. 4.
v. 3. vi. 1. XL iii. 12. avdymj V. iii.
5. X. ix. 6. avdyKTjv III. viii. 5.
avaypfyat I. vii. 17.
avdyfTcu IX. ix. 7. 0^07075 III. iii. 17.
avayayeiv III. v. 6.
ava9r,iM3.ra IV. ii. 1 1. ava.6iift.affi IV. ii.
15.
avaipeiv I. vi. 1. dcaipe? X. ii. 3. d^aj-
povffi IX. iv. 8. avaipiav X. ii. 4.
aveAeti' VII. ii. 12. ayppowro V. iv.
12. v. 9.
dvaiff9rjaia II. viii. 6. III. xi. 8.
avaiaOrrros II. ii. 7. vii. 3. viii. 2. avaiff-
07/TOt/ 111. v. 12. avaiffOrrrov II. viii.
2.
avatffxvrria II. vi. 18. IV. ix. 7.
dvaiVxi/JTos II. vii. 14. III. vi. 3.
avaicvK\f?ff6ai I. x. 7.
aj/oAa/3oJ'Ts I. iv. 1. III. v. 23. ava\a~
flovffi X. iv. 1. vi. 1. aPaAajSeip III.
v. 14.
a.va\yr\ffiav I. x. 12.
avd\yTjros III. vii. 7.
dva\iaK(i IV. ii. 20. ava\tffKfiv IV. i.
22, 25, 34. ii. 20. ava\l<rKovrts IV.
i. 35. twiAaxre IV. i. 27. dvoAcitrcu
IV. ii. 21. dva\xrai IV. ii. 20. dva-
Xttfo-as IV. i. 22. ii. 21.
dva\oyla V. iii. 8, 14. dva\oyta* V. v.
12. dvaAo-yicw I. vi. 12. V. iii. 13.
iv. 2, 3, 9. v. 6, 8, 18. vi. 4.
dvd\ayor II. i. 6. viii. 3. V. iii. 8, 12,
14. iv. 2. v. 6, 18. vi 6. viii. 11.
VII. iv. 6. VIII. vi. 6. vii. 2. xii. 7.
IX. i. 1. dvd\aya V. iii. 9.
ova\vetv III. iii. 11.
dvaXwei III. iii. 12.
dva\vriKOts VI. iii. 3, 4.
VIII. i. 2.
dvanivovffi VII vii. 8.
dfafj.t/j.vr,ffKovrai IX. iv. 9.
dvdi>LVT]ais III. x. 5.
'Apo^eryJpas X. viii. 11. 'Avaay6pav
VI. vii. 5.
'Aya|av8pi57js VII. x. 3.
dfojios IV. iii. 6. dvd^ioi IV. iii. 35.
dvd^ia X. viii. 7.
aya^i'tos II. vii. 15.
dvdira\iv I. iv. 5. III. i. 7. IV. vii. 3.
V. iii. 15. v. 17. VIII. xiii. 10. xiv.
I. IX. vii. 6. xi. 6.
aVdirawm IV. viii. 11. VII. vii. 7. X.
vii. 6. dvairavfffias IV. viii. 1. X.
vii. 6. dvairavafi X. vi. 6. dvairav-
fffis VIII. ix. 5.
dvair\T)pu(Tis III. xi. 3. X. iii. 6, 7.
dvair\T]p(ti<rtci>s X. iii. 6. dvaTr\ijp<aafi
X. iii. 6. dva.Tc\i]p<a<nv X. iii. 6.
dvair\ripovfjifVT]s VII. xii. 2.
dvavoSeiKTois VI. xi. 6.
dvaarp4<peaQaL II. i. 7.
dvaa"xiovaav VII. v. 2.
dvaaioaai IX. iii. 3.
dvaBrifffi III. viii. 2.
dva-ro\uv III. iii. 4.
dvatyeptev IV. vi. 6. dvaQepovres III. v.
18. dvatpepeaBat I. xii. 5. dva<pf-
ptrat IV. ii. 12. IX. L 2. dva<pfp6-
H'.voi L xii. 3.
dva(f>opa<; I. xii. 3.
'AvdxapaLv X. vi. 6.
dvaxo>p<a(Ti X. viii. 5.
dvSpdiroSov VII. ii. 1. X. vi. 8. dvSpa-
iroSif X. vi. 8.
df5pa7ro5c53es IV. v. 6. acSpairoScJSoi/?
IV. viii. 5. ovSpoTToSaJSeis I. v. 3.
III. x. 8. xi. 3.
iVSpei'a II. ii. 7. vii. 2. III. vii. 6, 13.
viii. 6, 11, 12. ix. 1, 2. dvSptlas II.
11. 7, 9. vi. 20. III. v. 23. vii. 8- ix.
7. xi. 5. dvSpeta II. viii. 6, 7. dv-
Speiar I. iii. 3. II. viii. 5. III. vii. 6.
viii. 6, 10. ix. 3, 4.
dvSpfios II. iii. 1. viii. 2. III. vi. vii.
viii. 9. ix. 1, 4. V. ix. 16. IX. v. 4.
X. vii. 4. dvSpelou I. xiii. 17. 111. vii.
13. viii. 14. V. i. 14. dvfyficp III.
vi. 3. vii. 6. iz. 4. X. viii. 4. dv-
Spt?ov I. xii. 2. II. viii. 3. III. viii.
5. avSpftoi II. i. 4, 7. ii. 9. III. vii.
12. viii. 1, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17.
ix. 2. VL xiii. 1. X. iii. 2. dvSpela
II. i. 4. III. viii. 12. X. viii. 1.
dvSpfiovs III. ix. 6. X. viii. 7. dr-
Vlll
INDEX VERBORUM.
Speiorepov III. viii. 15. dfSpfi6Taroi
III. viii. 1, 8.
dvSpiavToiroibv VI. vii. 1.
dv$pioyrarlll. vi. 12.
dvSpofyovia II. vi. 18.
dvSpcaSt] IV. iv. 4. dvSpuSfis II. ix. 7.
IV. v. 13. IX. xi. 4.
avSpuBevTas X. ix. 9.
dvf-yK\riTOi IX. i. 7.
dvfSr]v VII. viii. 5.
aveKir\r)KTOs III. vii. 2.
dvf\ev8epia II. vii. 4. IV. i. 3, 29, 37,
44. dve\eveeplas IV. i. 38. dvf\fv-
6fptw IV. i. 3. V. ii. 2.
dvthfvdepos II. vii. 4. viii. 2. dpeAfu-
0ep u IV. i. 31, 32. dve\fi>6fpot> IV.
ii. 18. dvt AeMepoi IVl i. 33, 43.
dvf\ev6ff>uv IV. i. 43. dvf\fv6fpovs
IV. i. 37, 40, 42.
dve/j.ir6Si(TTOS VII. xiii. 2. dve
VII. xii. 3. xiii. 2.
avfiriffr-rt/jLova X. ix. 16. dv
X. ix. 21.
dvfirtri/ji.riToi' VII. xiv. 5.
dvfpevvtjrov X. ix. 22.
fo^o I. vii. 14. viii. 6. x. 11. II. v. 4.
IV. iii. 11, 16, 20. v. 11 vi. 5. V. iii.
3. viii. 7. xi. 6, 7. VI. ii. 4. viii. 4.
ix 2, 3. xii. 10. xiii. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7. VII.
xii. 2. xiv. 7. VIII. i. 1. IX. iii. 4.
X. iv. 11. viii. 9. ix. 21.
dvxrOai IV. v. 6.
dvefyiol VIII. xii. 4.
dvTjyyeAAoi/ III. iii. 18.
dvriuft VIII. i. 7. dvfiKovTa IX. vi. 2.
avV I. iv. 7. V. ii. 11. VII i. 3. Vi. 2.
VIII. x. 5. IX. iii. 4. avSpbs I. vii.
14. VI. xii. 1. VII. i. 1. VIII. x.
5. xi. 4. X. v. 11. ix. 12. avSpl V.
ii. 11. VIII. vii. 1. xii. 7,8. IX. i. 6.
HvSpa. V. x. I. VII. i. 3. VIII. vii. 1.
x. 5. &v8pes I. viii. 7. IX. xi. 4.
avSpuv I. xii. 4. avSpdfft X. vi. 4.
&i>8pas I.vi. 1. VIII. i. 5.
av6KTfov IV. v. 14.
avOpdK<at> VII. v. 3.
avOpdnrfia X. iv. 9. ix. 22.
a.v9p(0irfvf<r6ai X. viii. 6.
V. viii. 12. VIII. xiv. 4.
iK^ III. xi. 7. &v6p<oiriK$ IX.
vii. 1. a,v8punriKrjs I. xiii. 14. av0p<o-
TTtKal X. viii. 1, 3. avdptoTriKa III. i.
27. X. viii. 1. avdpuiriKwv III. iii.
6. avOpuTriKtarepov IV. v. 12.
av8p<Snrivos I. ix. 9. avOpwirivoi' I. ii. 7.
vii. 15. xiii. 5. V. ix. 17. X. vii. 8.
avdptairiviris I. xiii. 5. avOptoirlvy I.
xiii. 12. avdpuir'uviv I. xiii. 5, 6. III.
1. 7. VII. v. 8. a.v6p<air(v(av I. ix. 2.
x. 10. X. vi. 1. viii. 7. ^vOpiatnva
V. vii. 5. VI. v. 6. vii. 5, 6. X. vii.
8. avOpdirivat VII. vi. 6.
o.vQp(oiroX6yos IV. iii. 30.
HvOpwiros I. vi. 5. vii. 6. II. vi. 3. III.
iii. 15. vii. 2. xi. 7. V. viii. 3. VI.
ii. 5. vii. 3, 4. xii. 1. VII. iii. 6. iv.
2. vii. 7. xiv. 8. VIII. i. 3. xi. 7. xii.
7. IX. viii. 6. ix. 3. X. vii. 8, 9. viii.
6. avQpdiirov I. vi. 5, 16. vii. 10, 11,
14. II. vi. 3. III. i. 27. iii. 7. VI.
vii. 4. X. v. 8, 11. vi. 7. vii. 7.
av6piaw<f I. vi. 5, 13. vii. 10. III. viii.
14. VI. v. 4. vii. 6. xii. 1. VII. iii.
6. vii. 7. VIII. i. 3. vii. 6. xi. 7.
IX. ix. 7. X. vii. 7, 9. viii. 8. &vdpto-
TTOV I. x. 3. III. v. 5. vii. 1. V.vi. 5.
VII. v. 2, 8. vii. 7. X. vii. 8. &>
eptairoi III. i. 3. viii. 12. x. 10. V. i.
9. ix. 14. VIII. iv. 4. xii. 7. a.vQp6-
iruv I. x. 1. III. iii. 7. VII. i. 2, 3.
v. 1,2. vi. 6. xiv. 4. IX. ix. 10. x.
3. X. v. 9, 10. viii. 13. ix. 12. av-
Opdnrois I. ix. 2. IV. i. 37. ii. 16. V.
viii. 8. VI. vii. 4. VII. i. 3. iii. 7.
VIII. i. 3. xii. 5. X. viii. 8. oj-flpcJ-
iroiffi VII. x. 4. dvQptairovs I. x. 16.
II. i. 7. VII. xiii. 5.
dvOvirripfTfiv IX. x. 2. a.vQvTrf]pfrri<rai
. V. v. 7.
dviaros IV. i. 37. VII. vii. 2. viii. 1.
dvidrots IX. iii. 3. dvidrovs X. ix.
10.
dvidrus V. ix. 17.
dvit]<n VI. i. 1. dvet/j.et>Tfi X. iii. 3.
dveifj-evus II. v. 2.
&VUTOS V.I. 11. iii. 1. dviffov V. iii. 1,
3. &VUTOV V. i. 8. ii. 8, 9, 12. iii. 1.
" iv. 1, 3, 4. &VHTOI VIII. viii. 5. &VUTO.
V. iv. 4, 8. dviffois VIII. xiv. 3.
dvifovs VIII. xiii..l.
drfarof IV. iii. 3. dvoriTcp III. xii. 7.
dv6rjTa X. ii. 4.
oco,uoio6i5e'tn IX. i. 1.
dvofnoiSrepov II. viii. 7.
dvonodTTis II. viii. 5. dvo(M>i6rriTa VIII.
vi. 7.
dj'cii'TjTos I. iii. 7.
dv6ir\ots III. viii. 8.
dvopyri<ria II. vii. 10.
dv6pyi<rros II. vii. 1 0.
IXDEX VERBORCM.
IX
cLvocriovpycov IX. iv. 7.
dvTairoSiSf IV. V. 10. avrairofiiScaffi
VIII. v. 5. dvTatroSowcu IX. vii. 1.
a.vTa.iro'SoTfov VIII. xiii. 9. xiv. 3.
IX. ii. 1, 3, 5.
dvTa.ir65offis V. v. 7. IX. ii. 5. avrair6-
Socrtv VIII. xiii. 10. IX. i. 8. dvr-
airoSofffis X. viii. 4.
dvrevfpyeTiKbs IV. iii. 24.
uj'Tei/Trojerj' X. viii. 13.
dvTtxfiv VII. vii. 4, 6.
diri III. i. 7, 9. 10. ix. 4. xi. 6. IV. v.
10. V. v. 16. x. i. dvff S>v IX. v.
3.
dvTifrdivov I. xiii. 16.
dvTt@\a.TrTiav V. xi. 2.
avTiSuveicrTfov IX. ii. 5.
dvriSofftv V. v. 8.
di/TiSeapf'irai VIII. viii. 6.
dvTiKaTO\\dTTOifrai VIII. vi. 7. dvri-
Kara\\arr6fj.tvoi VIII. iv. 2.
curi/ceiTou II. viii. 6. VI. viii. 9. VII. vii.
4. X. ii. 5. ajrfoewTai II. viii. 1.
amiKflaQat IV. iv. 6. vi. 9. vii. 17. ix.
2. X. ii. 5. a.tTiK(i/j.evos VII. vii. 2.
a.VTiKeifj.fvas X. ix. 5. dvn/cej/teVajj'
IV. i. 45. V. iv. 3.
cb'TiAa/3u>j' IX. i. 8.
avTi&vv VIII. i. 6.
aT7ro0j7 VIII. xiii. 8. aj'TjirtTrovflbs V.
v. I, 2, 6, 8, 12. vi. 3. avriireitov-
Oivai V. V. 12. avrnrfirovOoffi VIII.
11. 3.
ai>riir\Triy7Jvai V. iv. 4.
a.vTnroif?v V. v. 6. dvTiirojTjffet V. v. 6.
cu'Ti-iroiui' V. xi. 5.
avTiTfivei I. xiii. 15. avTrreiVowra VII.
ii. 4. driTei'oir7S VII. ii. 5. O.VTI-
rtivovai VII. vii. 5. avriTeivuv VII.
vii. 6. aiTirfiveiif VII. vii. 6. avriTei-
vovTfs IV. vi. 1, 2.
avrniOffjifv II. viii. 7. IV. v. 12. dcTj-
TtOfrai, IV. iii. 37. eurmflejuVi; VII.
i. 2.
dfTKfuAowri VIII. v. 5. a.VTi<f>i\iTai
IX. i. 2. arrKpiXewecu VIII. viii. 3.
a.VTuf>i\i]<ns VIII. ii. 3. iii. 1.
Sj'w II. i. 2. avwrtpoi/ VIII. i. 6. K^w-
0ec VI. iii. 1. xii. 7. VII. vi. 2.
wuvvfios II. vii. 2, 8. III. vii. 7. IV.
iv. 5. vii. 1. o.vwvvp.a. II. vii. 2, 11.
III. vii. 7. CLVUVV/MV IV. iv. 4. v. 1.
ai>iavv/j.ov IV. v. 1. vi. 9. dfwtai/xoi II.
vii. 8. avtavvfiuav II. vii. 10.
dt'aJ)e\aJ5 I. iii. 6.
VOL. II.
Sleiz/oy IX. x. 1.
a('a IV. i. 2. ii. 12. iii. 10, 17. V. v.
15. IX. i. 5, 7, 9. a|as III. xi. 8.
a|iW I. x. 4. IV. ii. 3, 13, 19. iii. 3,
8, 11,35. V. iii. 7. ix. 8. VIII. vii.
2, 3. viii. 4. x. 3, 5. xi. 3. xiii. 9.
xiv. 3, 4. IX. i. 1,5,8.
*os IV. iii. 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 14, 15, 17, 35.
Qiov III. ix. 4. IV. ii. 6, 10, 23.
VIII. xiv. 4. IX. i. 9. 64101 IV. i.
21. iii. 36. VIII. vii. 4. xiii. 4.
aior IV. iii. 7, 8, 9. VIII. xiii. 7. xiv.
1. Qiovvres VIII. viii. 6. Qiovv II.
vi. 19. IV. iii. 35. VIII. xiv. 2.
^|i'axre VIII. xiii. 9. d^iiaffavras IX.
xi. 6. d|oC<n IV. iii. 11. VIII. vii. 4.
diovrcu IV. iii. 20. VIII. iv. 3.
aiouvTcu IV. iii. 19. aiwv IV. iii.
3, 4, 6. a|icoToi' VIII. viii. 6.
d|i'aV"< HI. viii. 16. IV. ii. 14. iii. 12.
IX. ii. 5. ataifj.a.Ta IV. ii. 15. atu>-
fMTi IV. iii. 10, 26. vi. 8.
a|iWrot VII. viii. 3.
aopyTjiria IV. v. 5.
aopiffros V. x. 7. IX. ix. 8. aop'orrov
V. x. 7. MpiffTov IV. viii. 7. X. iii. 2.
airayopeva V. xi. 1. aTrcryopeucor V. i. 14.
aTrtry^ncta. ainjyptianfi/tav VII. v. 2.
aTra-yoi'Tes II. ix. 5.
airadeias II. iii. 5.
diratSayiayriros IV. i. 36.
ciTraiSeuToi; IV. viii. 5.
ciTroiToDvTi IX. i. 4. ii 4. dirauTtjT'tov I.
vii. 20. dirouTTjTe'ot II. ii. 3.
oTraj/eufle III. viii. 4.
diravrwo-j VIII. vi. 1. airavr^v IX ii. 7.
cbrapi'oiWai IV. vii. 14.
avapxa.1 VIII. ix. 5.
awaT-fiffafTi IX. iii. 2. diroT7j0p IX. iii.
2. ri-n-a.Tiifj.fvoi III. viii. 16.
aTroTTj III. iv. 5.
aireiGiav III. v. 14. &.Ttei6ovai X. ix. 10.
airfiiraffOai VIII. xiv. 4.
aTreipo/coA/a II. vi. 6. IV. ii. 4.
foreipos I. iii. 5. Hittipov I. ii. 1. vii. 7.
III. iii. 16. areipov II. vi 14. dirti-
po IV. i. 20.
awepamov I. xi. 2.
dire'xov II. vi. 5. airexovra. II. viii. 5, 7.
airex^rat IV. i. 39. &irfXfff0cu I. ii.
7. III. ix. 4. airexoMefla H. iii. 1.
direx<Wo* II. ii. 7. iii. 1. IV. viii.
10. farexdp-evoi' IX. iv. 9.
djTlCTTOWTJ III. iii. 10.
OS III. xii. 7.
INDEX VERBORUM.
air\ij VII. v. 5. xiv. 8. airXovv V. ix. j
9. a*-Ar/v VII. xiv. 8.
air\<us I. iii. 5. iv. 5. vii. 4, 14. xi. 5.
II. iii. 5. v. 3, 5. vi. 14, 18. vii. 16. j
III. i. 5, 6, 10. vi. 2. V. i. 9, 10, 15,
20. ii. 11. iv. 5. v. 1, 18. vi. 4, 6, 8.
ix. 4, 9, 17. x. 1, 5, 6. xi. 4, 7. VI.
ii. 5. iii. 2. vii. 6. x. 7. xiii. 6. VII.
ii. 11. iii. 2. iv. 1,2, 3, 6. v. 1, 8, 9.
vi. 3. viii. 5. ix. 1. x. 5. xii. 1,7.
xiii. 1,2. VIII. ii. 2. iii. 6, 7. iv. 5.
v. 1, 4.
airb. aep' O.VTOV IX. viii. 1.
airo0aii>ovai IV. vi. 8. a.irofta'ivov VII.
vii. 2. airoftaivovTos I. vii. 5. OTTO-
#7)<reTai III. iii. 10.
airo$d\\fTai III. i. 5.
a7ro/3Ae7rcw VI. i. 1.
7To/3oAV III. vi. 4.
o.Troyiv(affK<a. avtyvtaictun III. vi. 11.
uTroy6vovs I. vii. 7. airoyAvwv I. x. 3.
xi. 1.
anrofieiKTiKTj VI. iii. 4.
atroSeiKTbv VI. vi. 1. airoSfiKTUV VI.
vi. 1.
a7r<i5e<|is VI. v. 3. airoSfi^fcas VI. v. 3.
a7ro5i|i' VI. vi. 1. airoSfQfts I. iii.
4. VI. xi. 4, 6. VII. iii. 8. OTTO-
5ei|ewj' VI. xi. 6.
UTroSfxeffBai I. iii. 4. cwroSe'xeTCU IV. vi.
5. d-jro5ex<W'' ' VIII. v. 3. owo-
Se'^opTai IX. viii. 7. dTro5ex 7 7 TOU IX.
iii. 3. diro5e'eTai IV. iii. 17. vi. 3, 7.
O7ro5e|a(76oj VIII. iii. 8. diroSeKTeW I.
iii. 8. iv. 8. X. viii. 12.
curoSi'SojUez/ II. i. 4. VI. vii. 1. dwo-
SiScaffi II. vi. 2. VIII. x. 5. a7ro58<fa(Ti
1. iv. 2. IV. v. 8. diroSjSiWa V. viii.
4. VIII. xiv. 3. airoStSoWas X. viii.
7. oTroSiSJfcu II. i. 8. IX. ix. 1. aTro-
5aJcrei II. vi. 3. diroSuxrfiv VIII. xiii.
9. oTroSonj V. viii. 4. VIII. xiv. 4.
diroSovvai III. i. 10. IV. v. 13. ajro-
Se5u>Kfvai IX. i. 4. ajroSoreoc VIII.
xiii. 9,11. xiv. 4. IX. ii. 3, 4, 5, 6.
oTroSe'SoTaj IV. vi. 4.
dirodavaTtov III. i. 8.
diro9vi)<TK. ifv III. i. 4. diroBdvri I. x. 2.
V. iv. 4. a7ro0avs' III. vi. 2. V. xi.
8. a7ro(Mj<r;ceii/ III. vii. 13. V. viii.
2. diroQviia Kti III. viii. 9.
urro/caAoC(n IX. viii. 1. dtroKa\ovvTfs
II. ix. 7.
aTroKAiVej IV. vii. 19. diroK\lvovort IV.
i. 35. diroK\ivov<ra.v IV. v. 1. diro-
K\(vfiv II. ix. 9. X. i. 3. diroK\niov
IX. ii. 5.
diroKreifat III. i. 17. dwoKrwyvvai V.
xi. 1.
dno\av(ns IV. vii. 13. oirjAauffet III.
ix. 9. aTrdAawrij' VII. vi. 1. oiro-
\av<Tfis VII. iv. 3.
a7roAau<rTi/cbj' I. v. 2.
cbrffAauew VIII. xiv. 1. airoKavuv II.
ii. 7. a7roAau<r(e X. vi. 8.
a.TtoKnc6vT<av IX. iii. 1.
d;rdAAin IV. v. 7. oTroAe? IV. ii. 21.
a.ir<a\ovTo I. iii. 3. oiroAAi/Tcu VII.
xiii. 5. diroAAv/xei'oj IV. i. 5.
airo\oy6v/j.fi>os VII. vi. 2.
dTTo\v6fvTos VIII. iii. 3.
diro/jidTrovTat IX. xii. 3.
d-irofj.vr)/j.ovfv(iv IV. iii. 30.
lnrovf/j.fi IX. v. 3. viii. 6, 9. dirovtuofjifv
IV. iii. 10. diroi>ffj.ovfft VIII. xiv. .'!.
oVovs'/u?? VIII. vii. 2. dirovf/jLcnat VIII.
viii. 3. dirovinfiv IV. iii. 17. IX. ii.
1, 9. dirovepwi' IV. vi. 8. aTiwe'-
Hov-Tfs VIII. ix. 5. dirovfuovras IX.
vjii. 5. ix. 2. oiror?/uat X. viii. 7.
diroj'e'^i6TOJ IV. iii. 15. VIII. xi. 2.
X. vii. 7. a.irovf/j.7]T(ov IX. ii. 7. iii. 5.
&ITOVOV IX. vii. 7.
aVcWa IX. v. 3. dir6ma>v III. xi. 8.
ajroirauoirat IV. v. 8.
anoirffj.ir6iJ.fvot II. ix. 6.
a.iropf'irai I. ix. 1. VIII vii. 6. IX. viii.
1, 2. airopov^vuv V. ix. 4. riir6pfi
I. iv. 5. a.iropr]fffif I. vi. 5. II. iv. 1.
V. ix. 1. VIL ii. 1. IX. xi. 2. avo-
pi)8(i> I. x. 6. ijiTop-fjOTi VII. ix. 1.
ij-n-dpijrai VI. xii. 3. Tjirop^rajuev VII.
viii. 2.
aTropri/j.dT(ai> VIII. i. 7.
airopla V. x. 2. VII. ii. 8. aaroplas IV.
-i. 31." VII. ii. 12. diroptaj/ I. x 4.
V. x. 3. IX. ii. 1. iii. 1. airoptai
VII. ii. 12.
&iropoi> I. vi. 16.
dir^Tjra III. i. 17.
airoffTareov IX. ii. 10.
etiro TTtpfirai III. ix. 4. diraiTTep^iraj
VIII. ix. 3. iirf<TTfpr]fffv V. iv. 3.
VI. x. 1. airotrrfpfi IV. iii. 35.
airooT'fifiaffi I. x. 4.
07ro<TToActs IV. ii. 15.
aTreo'XfSjao'/ieJ'oy V. i 14.
airoaxoXd^fw X. vi. 3.
diroTeAe? II. vi. 2. dnroreAfu' I. viii. 9.
aVoTeAfrrai IV. ix. 2. VI. xii. G.
INDEX VERBOKUM.
XI
dTrorpstrofTos X. ix. 7.
aTTo-TptycurOai II. iii. 8.
diroTvyxdvuii> III. xi. 6. diroTvx.f'ii' II.
vi. 14.
dirovffta III. xi 5. VIII. v. 1.
dirofpad'eii' X. i. 2. ii. 3. iii. 4. dirorpai-
vovTfs I. x. 8. aTTf^aiffTo X. viii. 11.
aire<pyvat>TO I. i. 1.
dirofyavis VI. ii. 2.
dirocpdvai VI. iii. 1.
aVoxcopet'j' II. ix. 3.
aVpay/^opcos VI. viii. 4.
aTrpoKTew' I. v. 6.
aTrpfirri IV. viii. 7.
dirpoaipeTa. V. viii. 5. dirpoaipeTUS II.
v. 4.
dirpopovAevra V. viii. 5. aVpo)3oyAevTOi
VII. viii. 2.
dirpoffrjyopia VIII. v. 1.
aVcofloCi'Taj II. viii. 3.
op VI. vii. 2.
&ptt I iii. 5. vi. 11, 12. vii. 12. viii. 14.
11, i. 3. iii. 6. vi. 13, 15. ix. 10. IV.
iii. 14. V. i. 8. ii. 3, 4. iii. 5, 8, 11,
12, 14. iv. 7, 10, 11, 12. v. 11, 13.
vi. 7, 9. ix. 1. x. 2. xi. 2. VI. i. 7.
iii. 2, 3, 4. v. 4. vii. 3. ix. 3. VII. ii.
5. VIII. ii. 4. iii. 1. IX. ix. 3, 10.
X. iii. 6. vi. 6. vii. 9. viii. 7, 13. ix. 23.
apa III. iv. 4. IX. iii. 3, 4.
opa ye I. x. 2. III. ii. 17.
ap olv I. ii. 2. VIII. xiii. 11. IX. ii. 2.
iii. 3. iv. 7. x. 1 xii. 1. X. ix. 1, 18.
'Apyeloi III. viii. 16.
apyia. I. xiii. 13. apylav IX. iv. 8.
dpybv I. vii. 11. IV. iii. 27. apy^v IX.
v. 3.
apyvpiov II. ix. 9. IV. vii. 11. V. ix.
13, 14. IX. i. 6, 7. apyvpiov IV. vii.
11.
apeffKos II. vii. 13. IV. vii. 9. &peaKov
IX. x. 6. ape<TKOi IV. vi. 1. aptffKovs
IX. x. 6.
aptffKfi III. iv. 4. IV. i. 39. IX. i. 6. j
X. vi. 2. apecrKovtn IX. iv. 7. ape-
aKovrai IX. xii. 3. ap(ffK6/j.ei>os IV.
j. 27. apfffitfofvoi IX. iii. 4. X. v. 4.
apeVKeiv VII. ii. 8. VIII. vi. 2, 3.
apcrii I. v. 5. viii. 6. xiii. 12, 20. II. i.
6. ii. 1. "i. 1,3, 6, 10, 11. v. 1, 6.
vii. 14. ix. 1. III. v. 1, 17, 19. IV.
ii. 1, 10. iv. 1. ix. 8. V. i. 15,18,20.
VI. i. 7. ii. 2. v. 7, 3. vii. 1. xi. 7,
xii. 6, 8. xiii. 1, 2, 4, 5. VII. i. 2.
viii. 4. VIII. i. 1. iii. 6. vii. 1. viii. 4.
I
xii. 7. IX. iv. 2. viii. 7. X. v. 10. vi.
4 viii. 2. ctpeT'/js I. ix. 3, 10. xii. G.
xiii. 1, 5, 14. ILL 1. vi. 11, 12, 14.
viii. 1. III. i. 1. IV. i. 7, 24, 25. iii.
15, 17, 21. vii. 7. ix. 1. V. i. 15, 19.
ii. 1, 10, 11. VI. xii. 5, 8, 10. xiii. 1,
6, 7. VII. i. 2. VIII. i. 1. vi. 5. vii.
4. xiii. 2, 11. xiv. 2. IX. i. 7. ix. 2.
7. X. iii. i. viii. 5. ix. 1, 3, 5, 8.
aperfj I. v. 5. II. iii. 10. IV. iii. 14.
V. i. 15, 18. VII. i. 4. VIII. vi. 6.
IX. iii. 4. X. viii. 3. ctperV I. v. 6.
vii. 5, 14, 15. viii. 8, 10, 11, 13, 17.
ix. 3, 4, 7. x. 9, 10, 11, 15. xii. 2.
xiii. 1, 6. II. vi. 16. III. viii. 3. ix. 4.
IV. i. 6, 12, 13. ii. 13. iii. 3, 21. V.
ii. 7, 10. iii. 7. xi. 1. xii. 6. VI. xiii.
4, 7. VII. i. 1. xi. 2. VIII. iii. 6.
viii. 5 x. 5. xi. 4. xii. 7. xiii. 2, 11.
xiv. 3. IX. i. 7, 9. v. 4. ix. 6. x. 6
.X. i. 1. ii. 1, 3. vi. 5, 8. vii. 1, 3, 8.
viii. 1, 4, 6, 10. ix. 8, 14. opera! J.
vi. 3. vii. 15. II. i. 3. iii. 3. v. 3, 4,
6. III. v. 20. x. 1. VI. ii. 6. xii. 1.
xiii. 6. X. viii. 3. aperuv II. i. 2, 7.
ii. 7, 9. iv. 3. vii. 16. III. v. 1, 21.
IV. iii. 16. V. i. 15, 17. xi.10. VIII.
v. 1. X. vii. 6. ix. 1. aperais III. ix.
5. IV. ii. 7. V. v. 17. operas I. xiii.'
20. II. i. 4. ii. 2. iii. 5. iv. 3. v. 3, 4.
IV. iv. 6. vii. 1. ix. 7. V. i. 14. VI.
i. 4. v. 7. xii. 4. xiii. 3, 5, 6. VII. ii.
5. IX. viii. 6. X. iii. 2, 12. vi. 1.
vii. 7. viii. 1.
dpifyte'co. riptd/j.TjfjL^i'ov VI. viii. 4.
dpi6/j.r]TiKrjv II. vi. 7. V. iv. 3, 9.
t) V. iii. 8. ctpifytijJ V. iii. 14.
V. vi. 4. VI. iii. 1. IX. ix. 3.
c pi0/j.>i/ 1. vi. 2.
apuTreiaiv I. xii. 5.
dpKTTepa I. xiii. 15.
&piffros IV. iii. 14. V. i. 18. dpiVrr;
V. vii. 6. VII. xiii. 6. VIII. iii. 7.
&pur-rov I. ii. 1. vii. 3, 9-. viii. 9, 14.
ix. 3, 8. II. vi. 11, 17. III. v. 17.
VI. vii. 3. xii. 10. VII. xi. 3, 5. xii.
1. xiii. 2, 5. X. ii. 1. aplvrov VI.
vii. 6. X. vi. 8. vii. 1. apiffrcp X.
viii. 13. apiffTijv I vii. 15. viii. 14.
ix. 6. apKTToi X. ix. 16. apitrrcav I.
xii. 4. apia-Tois V. i. 13. VIII. vii. 4.
apiffrais I. viii. 14. aplffrovs IX.
vi. 2. X. ix. 20. Uptffra III. ii. 14.
iii. 6. viii. 8. IV. i. 6. IX. viii. 4. X.
iv. 5. viii. 13. ix. 15.
2
Xll
INDEX VERBOKUM.
. VIII. x. 1. apicrroKparias
VIII. x. 3. apiaroKparia VIII. xi. 4.
apiaTOKpaTiKi) VIII. x. 4. apicrroKpa.-
Ttxol V. iii. 7.
d/>/ce? II. iv. 3. apKOvvi IX. x. 2. apKov-
/j.fvoi II. vii. 5.
aptiovvTcas I. iv. 7. xiii. 9.
&pKiov III. viii. 4.
a/jjurffej III. ii. 9. IV. ii. 16. vi. 5. ix. 3.
VIII. x. 5. IX. xi. 6. ap;uoC< IV. iii.
15. apfMo^ov VIII. xi. 4. apfd^iv
IX. x. 2. ap/i(5ffi V. vii. 4. IX. x. 1.
X. vii. 9.
VIII. i. 6.
i IV. viii. 5 X. ix. 21. apfj.6r-
TOI VII. i. 1. apu^TTOfra IX. ii. 7.
dpj/eur0ai IV. vii. 3.
apoTijpa, VI. vii. 2.
apirayi] V. ii. 13.
d^e? VII. vii. 6. &p'pe<ri VII. v. 3.
apptaa-TMf III. v. 22.
dprdofnai. ijprrjffGai VIII. xii. 2.
&PTOS III. iii. 16.
aprvovrfs III. x. 9.
apx 1 *"*' VIII. ix. 5. apxaiuv III. iii. 18.
apx') I iv. 7. vii. 20, 23. III. i. 3, 6,
10, 12, 20. iii. 13, 15. v. 8, 14. V.
i. 16. ii. 13. viii. 7. ix. 10. VI. ii. 2,
4. iii. 3 iv. 4. v. 6. xi. 6. VII. iii. 2.
vii. 7. viii. 4, 5. VIII x 4. IX. v. 3.
apX?!* I. xiii. 4. III. v. 14, 22. viii. 9.
V. ir. 13. vii. 1. v. 6. vi. 1. VIII. ix.
4. X. iv. 1. apxp I. ix. 8. IV. ii. 6.
VIII. ix. 1. xiii. 1, 9. IX. iii. 1. ix. 5.
dpxV I. xii. 8. III. iii. 17. v. 5. V.
v. 4. vi. 1. VI. iv. 4. xii. 7, 10. VII.
i. 1. vi. 7. viii. 4. X. i. 1. apxa.1
] II. v. 6. VI. i. 5. iii. 3, 4. v. 6. vi.
1. viii. 5. xi. 4. VIII. x. 4, 5. X.
viii. 3. a.px&v I- iv. 5. vii. 21. VI.
vi. 2. vii. 3. viii. 4. apxus I. iv. 5,
6. vii. 20. II. ii. 3. III. v. 6. VI.
vii. 3. xi. 6. xii. 10. VII. vi. 6. VIII.
i. 1. x. 3. IX. vi. 2. viii. 10.
-PX r rft> v VIII. xii. 4.
apx^^pv IV. ii. 2.
apxtKbv VIII. xi. 2.
apXireKTomit)) VI. vii. 7. viii. 2. dpx<-
TfKTOVlKriS I. ii. 4. a.pX.lT*KTOVlK<uV
I. i. 4.
opxirfKTWv VII. xi. 1.
tpxovffi VIII. vii. 1. x. 3, 5. &pt<u V.
v. 7. fy>X*' V. viii. 9. VI. ii. 5. xii.
3. VIII. x. 5. &p X fi" IV. v. 13. V.
vi. 5, 9. VI. xiii. 8. VIII. xi. 5. IX.
vi. 2. X. vii. 1. &pxfffOai V. vi. 9.
&PX"" V. i. 16. vi. 5. VIII. x. 6.
&pxomi V. i. 17. xi. 9. VIII. vii. 1.
xi. 6. &PXOVTO. V. v. 4. Hpxpv III.
xii. 7. apx<jfTtav III. viii. 4. VIII.
x. 3. &PXOVTUS X. viii. 10. apicrfov
I. iv. 5. VI. xii. 7. ap^d/jLtvoi VI. iii.
1. X. ix. 23. &pxofJ-tvov VIII. vii. 1.
apxofifvtf II. vi. 7. V. xi. 9. VIII.
xi. 5. a.pxofiti'tov VIII. x. 2. d/>xM 6 '-
POis VIII. x. 2. apxoiJ.tvous VIII. vii. 1.
oo-ejSers IV. i. 42.
aaOevfia VII. vii. 8. aadtveiav III. v.
15. VIII. i. 2.
ao-fle^s VIII. x. 6. affBfVfi X. v. 9.
&ff6evtts IV. iii. 26. VII. ii. 6.
curiffffrtpa VII. vi. 7.
aa-m'a X. ix. 15.
s IX. ix. 7. &<TKr\(Tiv I. is. 3.
v I. ix. 1.
V. ii. 2. ix. 16.
affffa. VI. ii. 6.
d(7Troj IV. iii. 5.
a.ffv/*fiiTpoi III. iii. 3.
ocrwecrfa VI. x. 1.
affwerovs VI. x. 1.
a.<TWT]6fis IV. vi. 5.
atr^xxAwy I. x. 3.
III. xii. 3.
Tiv IV. vi. 7.
IV. ii. 22. aa'X'n/J-oi'fffrfpus
IV. vii. 11.
&arxo\os X. vii. 6. S<rxoAo X. vii. 6, 7.
d(rxo\oi;jit&a X. vii. 6.
arruTta II. vii. 4. IV. i. 3, 29. ewram'as
IV. i. 30, 37, 44. affurit}. II. viii. 5.
aauTiav IV. i. 35, 44.
&<r<aros II. vii. 4. viii. 2. IV. i. 5, 23, 28,
32, 36. VII. ix. 2. farorrov II. viii. 2.
turarot IV. i. 30. lurdnuv IV. i. 33.
IV. i. 13, 23.
os III. ix. 1. IV. v. 3. ardpaxov
III. viii. 15.
&T(Ki>os I. viii. 16. &T(KVOI VIII. xii. 7.
OTX))J X. iv. 2. areXty X. vii. 7. drt-
A?J X. iii. 4. iv. 2, 3. art\fffTfpa I.
v. 6.
arepoj V. v. 13. firepoi VII. viii. 2.
dr6x"'a VI. iv. 6.
arfx^us I. xiii. 15.
cntfila V. xi. 3. dn^iay IV. iii. 10, 17
dn/xiat I. x. 3.
UTI,UOI III. viii. 1.
OTOITOJ X. viii. 11. STOTOI' I. x. 2, 5, 7.
III. i. 24, 27. IV. ix. 6. V. ix. 2. x. 1.
INDEX VERBORUM.
Xlll
VI. vii. 3. xii.3. VII. ii. 5. Hi. 6. v. 7.
IX. iii. 1,3. ix.3. X. v. 7. vi. 6. vii. 9.
viii. 7. ar&ircf IX. ix. 2. STOTTW IX.
ii. 5.
a.r6ir'j>s V. ix. 1.
arpvTov X. vii. 7.
OTTO V. v. 10.
ciTt>x V. viii. 7. arvxtav IV. iii. 18.
foyxovrraj IX. ix. 2. aTuxoiWi IX.
xi. 3. arvxovfTfs IX. xi. 1. aruxovv-
T-as IX. xi. 6.
a.Tvx.r)/*aV. viii. 7. arvxrif^drtav I. x. 14.
<XTt/x<? V. i. 9. aTtixfa" IV. iii. 18.
ari/xias I. x. 12. IX. xi. 5. arvxiais
IX. ix. 2. xi. 1, 4.
aS I. iv. 7. III. i. 13. iv.3. IV. i. 1,39,
40. iii. 31. vi. 5. IX. ii. 8, 9. iv. 8.
avBaipfros III. v. 17.
avQexaffTos IV. vii. 4.
avXovvros X. v. 3.
av\T)Tfj I. vii. 10.
av\rjriKfj X. v. 3. ouATjriK^i/ X. v. 3.
awAous I. vii. 3.
atf| II. ii. 6 atfeer0cu I. xiii. 11.
VIII. ix. 3. X. ii. 2. iii. 4. av^erai
II. iii. 1 1.
atfrffiv II. i. 1. VII. xiv. 6. VIII. ix. 3.
avi)<reis II. ii. 8.
avt)TiK$)t> I. vii. 12.
avrdpKfia X. vii 4. avrapKfias I. vii. 6.
aindpKeiav V. vi. 4.
auTop/ojs VIII. x. 2. X. vi. 2. viii. 9.
aijTapKfs I. vii. 6, 7, 8. X. vii. 7. viii.
9. aurdpKOvs IV. iii. 33. aindpittis
III. iii. 8. IX. ix. 1. av-rdpufai IX.
ix. 1. avrapKiffTaros X. vii. 4.
aure I. iv. 7.
avroavBpiaitcf I. vi. 5.
avToeKaffTov I. vi. 5.
avr6/j.a,rov X. ix. 21.
ai/xfva. V. i. 7.
avxpuv III. iii. 5.
atpaiptafois VI. viii. 6.
afyaipuv V. iv. 4. a(pti\e V. iv. 8. d$e-
Aeli' II. vi. 9. V. iv. 11. d(paipov/j.tvu>t>
VIII. vii. 5. d<J>ajpe0ei<T7/y VIII. i. 1.
d<paipe6fj V. iv. 10. dtyripeQt) V. iv. 10.
d<pr,priTM. V. iv. 12. d<pypria8a.i V. xi.
4. d<pripf]p.fv<f X. viii. 7. d<paipe?<r0cu
I. xi. 5. a<f>ypr\VTa.i III. x. 11.
atpaves I. x. *15. atpavuv II. ii. 6.
a(pcw'Eff0ai III. ix. 3.
cuptitiiis IV. iii. 23.
a<p(KTfov III. i. 14.
d<pf\Kfiv II. ix. 5.
a<r; III. x. 8. owpfjs HI. x. 9, 11. VII.
vii. 1. X. v. 7. a<p?; III. x. 18. a<pV
VII. iv. 3.
&cpeapra VI. iii. 2.
d(pifvat VIII. xiv. 4. acper^ai III. i. 17.
V. ix. 16. d<pfvri III. v. 14. dtpfiffSai
I. v. 8. V. ii. 10. VIII. i. 7. viii. 7.
IX. iv. 6. xi. 2. X. iv. 11. dQereov
I. vi. 13.
d<ptKvov[j.evT]v IX. v. 3. d<piKoiTo IV. i.
36. dffHKTai I. vii. 2.
d(pi\lav III. vi. 3.
%Aoi/ I. xi. 1. IX. x. 1.
o^iAoTijUi'a IV. iv. 5. d<pi\oTi/j.ia>> IV.
iv. 5.
a'<iA<5T(yUO? II. vii. 8. d<pi\6rip.ov IV. iv.
3, 4.
dcpiffrarai IX. iii. 3. dc/HorcwTat III.
iii. 13. vii. 12. viii. 11. IV. iii. 35.
IX. iv. 8. dcpfffrciffi IV. iv. 1. aTTo-
<TT?}i'ai VIII. xiv. 4. dfpfff-rriKe II.
viii. 5.
d<pofiiq II. vii. 2.
&7>o0os III. vi. 3, 4. &o0oj/ III. viii. 15.
d<p6pTiTov IV. v. 7.
d(f>op((Ta,i II. ix. 8. d<p(api<r/jifvov III. iii.
17. d(popicro>fji.fv III. x. 1. d(p<apiff-
fjifva. VIII. ix. 2. d(poptffTfov I. vii. 12.
d<popi<T(ie VIII. xii. 1. d<p<epiffp.ivas
VII. iii. 1.
dcppoSiffiots III. x. 9. VII. xiv. 2. a<J>po-
5ri&>j' VII. iii. 7. iv. 2. v. 3, 7. xii. 4.
'A<ppo5irrjv VII. vi. 3.
dtypoavvTi VII. ii. 2. v. 5.
d<pp6v<ai> VII. v. 6.
dtyvfffTepois X. ix. 10.
os II. iii. 1. IV. i. 27.
I. viii. 15.
pe?os IV. viii. 10. dxpffov VIII. xiv.
1. dxpfi X. ix. 21.
yios I. iv. 7.
a'xwpKTTa I. xiii. 10.
&<f uxos VIII. xi. 6. &tyvxov VII. vii. 7.
fi4/i/X a V. ix. 11. VIII. v. 5. xi. 6.
wl/rixw VIII. ii. 3.
B.
y3a5t'Ct IX. ix. 9. jSaS.'^ II. ii. 8. IX.
ix. 9. j3a5i'eii/ V. i. 4. X. iii. 4.
0a5ij; V. i. 4. PaSurrtov X. ix. 16.
pdSuns X. iv. 3. jSaSiaewy X. iv. 3.
Patiiffft X. iv. 3.
/SdAArjToi I. iv. 7. f)a\fw III. v. 14.
V. viii. 6.
XIV
IXDEX VERBOKUM.
pdvavtros IV. ii. 20. fJavavaia II. vii. 6.
IV. ii. 4.
PapPdpcev VII. v. 6. Qappdpois VII. i. 3.
&dpos IV. v. 10. &dpovs IX. xi. 2.
#a/>e?a IV. iii. 34. 0ap?a III. iv. 4.
PapvcrraB/jLOV VI. viii. 7. ftapvcr-raOua
VI. viii. 7.
flatnAeia VIII. x. 1, 2, 4. jSoffiAftas
VIII. x. 2, 3, 4.
Pa<rt\evs VIII. x. 2, 3. xi. 2. &affi\f<as
X. is. 12. j8cwrAet VIII. xi. 1. 0a-
o-iAsrs III. iii. 18. /SewjAfW VIII. vii.
4. Pacri\fvffi VII. vii. 6.
@aai\tvofj.fvcai> VIII. xi. 2. j8a(T(Aevo-
yueVou? VIII. xi. 1.
ftzvicoiravovpyoi IV. vii. 15.
Ptfiaiov VIII. viii. 5. fiffiatep X. vii. 3.
0e/8aioTOTij VIII. xii. 6.
ea$TT?s I. x. 10.
fcfraiGiffai VIII. viii. 2.
Pepatws II. iv. 3.
/SeAriW I. xiii. 7. II. iii. 5. IV. i. 31,
32. iii. 14. VII. ii. 10. viii. 5. IX.
viii. 1. &e\riovos VI. xiii. 8. X. vi. 7.
/SeArfw I. 'i. 2. xiii. 3. IX. xi. 4. X. vi.
7. peKTiov I. vi. 1, 14. ix. 5. xii. 4.
xiii. 1. II. iii. 10. III. i. 13. V. x. 1,
2,6,8. VII ii. 3. xii. 3. xiv.4. \HI.
xiv. 1. IX. iii 3. X. ix. 1, 22. /SeA-
rlovs VII. viii. 2. IX. xii. 3. X. v. 5.
ix. 17.
\TtaTov I. ix. 2. IV. v. 10. VI. vii.
4. VII. ii. 1. viii. 5. IX. viii. 8.
fcK-rlffrr, VI. i. 7. VIII. 10. 2. X.
iv. 5. $f\rlffTta VIII. x. 2. jS^A-
TKTTO I. xiii. 15. IX. iv. 8. &t\Tiff-
TUSV II. iii. 6.
/3ia III. i. 3, 11, 20. v. 7. V. viii. 3.
X. ix. 8.
pta<T8fVTos III. i. 12.
piatos I. v. 6. Piaia. III. i. 10, 11. V.
ii. 13. /Sioiov III. i. 3, 12.
/3/os I viii. 10, 12. x. 9. VII. xiii. 7.
VIII. xii. 6. IX. ix. 4, 5,9. x. 2. X.
vi. 6. vii. 8, 9. viii. 3, 8, 10. piov I.
v. 4, 6. ix. 10. x. 4, 11. xiii. 12. IV.
iii. 23. V. vi. 4. X. i. 1. iii. 12. vi.
2, 8. vii. 7. viii. 12. /3t> I. vii. 16.
\i\\. 9 II. iii. 8. vii. 13. III. xii. 2.
IV. vii. 4, 7. viii. 1, 11, 12. IX. xii.
2. P'tov I. ii. 2. iii. 5. v. 2, 3. vii. 6,
7. ix. 11. x. 12,15. xi. 3. II. vii. 11.
III. ix. 6. VI. vii. 4. VII. xii. 7.
xiii. 2 VIII. i. 1. ix. 4. 5. xii. 7.
IX. vi. 2. x. 2. X. i. 1,2,4. ii. 3. vi.
2, 6. vii. 8, 9. viii. 12. ix. 9. /3iW
I. v. 1.
ftiorevcai' III. v. 14.
&e@MK6Ti I. x. 4. /3ef}i<ai<6Tas X. viii.
II. fiicaffat IX. viii. 9. fiiovuivoi?
X. ix. 11. ftiufffTcu X. vii. 8. i&>-
tr6/j.evov I. x. 15.
/3\a&fpbv IV. vi. 7. 0Aa/8cpoG V. v. 18.
/8Aa/8epal IV. ii.22. 
