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Descriptive Prospectus on Application.
THE ETHICS OF
THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
BY
Dr THEODOR von HAERING
PROFESSOR OF DOGMATICS AND ETHICS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF TUBINGEN
Translated from the Second German Edition by
JAMES S. HILL, B.D.
RECTOR OF STOWEY, SOMERSET
With an Introduction by
Rev. W. D. MORRISON, LL.D.
RECTOR OF MARYLEBONE
WILLL^MS AND NORGATE
14 HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON
NEW YORK: G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS
1909
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UmiAHY
UNIVEIISITY OF CALIFORiNU
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
Books on ethics abound, but scarcely books on Christian ethics.
When the qualifying word is added the supply is not so great.
It is commonly thought that ethics is a science that may be
examined and treated like any other science, apart from all
presuppositions that transcend the present life. Psychology
may pursue its way untrammelled by the hypothesis of a soul.
It seeks to explore mind by careful observation of mental processes
and physical experiments and inductive reasoning, and to reduce
the region of spiritual mystery to an exact science. Cannot
ethics proceed in an analogous way ? Whether this may be so
or not, certain it is that there is no accepted theory of ethics.
Ethics is based in metaphysics, and the metaphysical basis will
determine the character of the theory. This is shown in the
first part of the present work, and English students who desire
more information and instruction will find it in such works as
the Methods of Ethics of the late Professor Sidgwick, the Types
of Ethical Theot-y of the eloquent James Martineau. Mill's
utilitarianism will represent the hedonistic or eudaemonistic
point of view, while the evolutionist's theories are treated in
Spencer's Data of Ethics, Stephen's Science and Ethics, and
Alexander's Moral Order and Progress. Bradley's Ethical
Studies represent Hegelianism as conceived by him in an English
dress. There are many useful works of an introductory kind
which may be recommended, as Mackenzie's Manual of Ethics,
clearly written and useful, and Muirhead's Elements of Ethics,
with Sidgwick's History of Ethics.
In all such works, and many others easy to mention, old and
recent, the practical part is usually limited in range, if treated
at all. Dr Haering's work differs from all such treatises in that
vi TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE
it professes to be distinctively a work on Christian practice. It
assumes, as every Christian must, the existence of God, and the
unique character of Christ and the Christian religion. If
Christianity is a unique religion, and has its system of morality,
then the investigation of this system cannot but be a work of
both theoretical and practical importance.
Of especial importance must such a treatise be to the clergy-
man and Christian minister. It is not possible for him to fulfil
either his pastoral or preaching functions without dealing with
ethical problems. To do this effectively he must do it on
system. On what system ? There are large numbers of those
who hold the clerical office who have no acquaintance, or but
a limited acquaintance, with psychology, so needful for every
teacher. The subject is one more or less compulsory on the
secular teacher, and (one would suppose) needful for the spiritual
guide. Much more necessary is it to possess a coherent know-
ledge of ethics. Psychology may show us how to teach ; ethics,
what to teach.
It is true that the subjects with which the Christian minister
has to deal soar above the moral into the spiritual atmosphere,
and that, as commonly conceived, there are doctrines of pure
revelation on which he must dwell ; but it is also true that the
preacher, especially the * practical "" preacher, can scarcely select
a text in which there is not some moral duty that needs to be
enforced. In the ordinary course of his studies and pastoral
practice it will go hard if he has not to think out the bearings
of duty and thus slowly accumulate useful ethical knowledge.
But such knowledge is apt to be miscellaneous, incoherent,
guided by no principle, and lame accordingly ; or it is made up
of scraps which, when duly traced home, belong to different
and inconsistent systems, an incongioious mixture of Paley and
Butler and others. For all such students a systematised treatise
like the present will prove invaluable ; if not one with which it
is possible always to agree, yet one that will guide and stimulate,
and help to systematise thought.
The author is a Protestant of the * Evangelical Church "■ of
Germany, a State Church, under those peculiar conditions
which it is not easy for the English Churchman to understand.
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE vii
Roughly speaking, it is as if in England some of the communions
outside the Church of England were 'levelled up' into
'Establishment' and State recognition. The numerous Kirchen-
rechtlichen Abhandlungen show the complicacy and variety of
the conditions arising. From this it follows that the author
may be expected to deal with his subject from the strictest
Protestant point of view, and also, as he does towards the end,
touch on questions that are not of immediate interest to the
English Churchman. It may not thus be possible always to
agree with the author's statements or feel deep interest in his
particular problems, save as they serve to show how, under
varied conditions of Church life, ethical problems are constantly
arising everywhere and need the proper ethical equipment for
dealing with them. The whole work, therefore, is interesting
to the English reader, and the translator has done his best to
present it in as fair a form as a style occasionally difficult to
follow admits.
JAMES S. HILL.
Stowev Rectory,
Aumist I9O8.
INTRODUCTION.
As The Ethics of the Christian Life is the first volume of Pro-
fessor Haering's which has appeared before the English-speaking
public in a translation, it may be of interest to introduce it
with a few words as to the personality of its author. Dr
Haering was bom in Stuttgart in 1848, and after completing
his academic education at the Universities of Tubingen and
Berlin, he returned to Tiibingen for a short time, but soon
afterwards entered upon parochial work at Calw and Stuttgart.
In 1886 he was called to the Chair of Theology at Zurich,
where he succeeded Biedermann, one of HegePs most eminent
disciples. In 1889 Dr Haering left Switzerland for Gottingen,
taking the Chair left vacant by the death of Ritschl. Here
he remained till 1895, when he returned to Tubingen. Like
most of the younger school of German theologians. Professor
Haering has felt the influence of Ritschl, and has adopted
many of his theological methods, even when arriving at con-
clusions of his own. His principal works are the present
volume and a volume which he published two years ago on
the Christian Faith. In both of these works he has the
same object in view — to interpret the Gospel in the language
of the age and according to the needs of the age.
W. D. M.
CONTENTS.
INTRODUCTION.
1. The Term Ethics ....
2. The Problem of Ethics . .
3. Philosophical and Theological Ethics .
4. Division of the Subject
PAGE
1
2
3
4
PART I.
CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND ITS OPPONENTS.
Chapi'er I.
FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF ETHICS
1. Concerning Action
2. Concerning Moral Action
Its Value
Its Contents .
Its Form (the Moral Law)
Its Origin and Validity .
10
11
13
13
18
Chapter II.
THE OPPONENTS OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS.
1. The Opponents of all Morality as hitherto conceived .
The Devaluation of all Values .....
24
25
xn
CONTENTS
2. The Opponents of Definite Christian Ethics —
Utilitarian Ethics (Hedonism)
Evolutionary Ethics (Evolution)
Positivism ....
Pessimism ....
Mixed Systems
24
89
48
49
52
Chapter III.
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS.
1 . Reason of the Aversion to Christian Ethics
Course of the Argument
2. Conscience and Freedom
3. Conscience — Theories tested by Facts .
The Problem presented by the Facts
4. Freedom
and
Free
(1) Connection between Responsibility
dom .....
(2) Moral Freedom
(3) Objections to Freedom as defined
Arising from Facts .
Arising from the Idea of Causality
(4) The Meaning of Freedom
5. Morality and Religion
(1) Morality without Religion
(2) Christian Morality and Christian Faith
(3) The Truth of the Christian Faith .
(4) The Unsurpassed Superiority of Christian Ethics
57
63
64
64
72
76
77
79
84
85
89
92
95
97
100
lOS
104
CONTENTS xiii
PART II.
CHRISTIAN ETHICS AS A COHERENT SYSTEM.
Chapi'er IV.
PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS.
PAGE
1 . Evangelical and Roman Catholic Ethics . . . Ill
2. Evangelical Ethics in agreement with Scripture . Il6
Division of this Section . . . . . 123
Chapter V.
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD.
(Christ the Principle of Christian Ethics.) . 125
1. The Highest Good the Kingdom of God in Christ 127
2. The Fundamental Notion of the Kingdom of God . . 131
Love and Law ....... 138
3. Detailed Explanation, particularly in contrast to the
Kingdom of Sin 138-148
4. The Great Commandment of Love to God and our
Neighbour after the Example of Christ
(1) Meaning of the Law
(2) Form of the Law ....
(3) Contents of the Law
(4) The Example of Christ .
156
158
160
163
174
5. The Deepest Spring of Action, the Love of God in Christ
as Incentive and Motive Power (Faith and Works) 178
(1) Faith and Works 179
(2) Faith and Repentance 188
(3) Gi'ace and Freedom . . . . . 1 89
(4) The Reproach of Hedonism . . . . 19O
XIV
CONTENTS
Chapter VI.
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN, OR
CHRISTIAN PERSONALITY.
(Individual Ethics.)
Terminology and Division of Subject
1 . The Commencement of the New Life
2. The Development of the New Life
(1) Duty and Vocation .
(2) Fundamental Notions
(3) Conflict of Duties .
(4) Supererogatory Duties
(5) The Permissible
3. \^irtue and Character .
Sense of these notions, /;. 246 — And the Keynote
of the Christian Character, p. 250 — Blessedness,
p. 253 — Freedom, p. 255 — Honour, /;. 256 —
Humility, p. 262 — The Christian in conflict
with Sin (Temptation), p. 264 — Means of
Virtue, Asceticism, p. 272 — Vows, p. 277 —
Fasting, p. 280 — Prayer and Meditation, p.
280 — Sin in the Christian Life, p. 292 — Sin
and Assurance of Salvation, p. 297 — Christian
Perfection, p. 303
Certain Duties and Virtues .....
196
198
208
209
210
223
231
236
245
307
Chapter VII.
CHRISTIAN LIFE IN SOCIETY.
(Social Ethics.)
(1) Relation to Individual Ethics and Division 315
(2) The Notion of Civilised Society and Custom . 320
Marriage and the Family ...... 322
(1) The Christian Idea of Marriage and its Justi-
fication ........ 325
CONTENTS
XV
(2) Consequences and various Questions
(a) Chastity ....
(h) Family Life
(c) Legal Questions, Divorce, etc
(d) The Status of Woman
3. Friendship ......
Remarks introductory to the following notices of
different forms of society, and in particular the
idea of work ....
4. The Industrial Life — Work
(1) Theories of Political Economy
(2) The Social Question of the Day
(a) The Grievance ,
(6) The Indictment
(c) The Cosmic Theory at the Base
5. Judgment of Christian Ethics on Economic Theories
Application to the Questions of the Day
6. Science and Art ......
(1) The Intellectual Life — Science
Definitions ....
Value of Knowledge
(2) The Esthetic Life ....
Nature of the Beautiful : Productivity and
Receptivity in Art
(3) Christian Judgment : Art and Religion
(4) Companionship ....
7. The State
(1) Notion of
(2) Meaning of , . . .
(3) The Christian State in particular
Sunday ....
Oaths
The School ....
Patriotism ....
PACK
385
335
337
341
342
348
352
356
361
363
364
371
374
380
385
386
387
387
391
392
396
400
402
403
406
411
413
414
417
418
XVI
CONTENTS
(4) Certain Aspects of the State—
(a) Constitutional Law .
(6) Revolution
(c) Punishment (Capital)
(rf) International Law (War)
(e) Politics
8. The Church
(1) Nature of the Church
Need of a special Religious Community
Closer Definition of its Work
(2) General Meaning of Law for the Church .
(3) Important separate Questions connected with
Law ......
(a) Multiplicity of * the Churches '
(b) The Clerical Office ....
(c) The Constitution of the Church
(d) Church and State (the National Church)
(4) Special Questions affecting the Life of the
Church ......
The Effect of single Smaller Congregations —
(a) For closer Pastoi-al Oversight .
(b) Home Missions, Special Missions, Societies
for these
(c) The Supply of an Efficient Ministrj'
A Believing Ministry
The Question of the Faith .
(d) Foreign Missions
Conclusion : From Social to Individual Ethics
The Ethics of the Christian Life
INTRODUCTION.
The term ' Moral "' Philosophy is a translation of a Latin
word, and this in turn of a Greek word which properly
means the science of habits. The word is, however, now
usually taken to mean the science of morals, i.e. a body of
doctrine not on the way in which men are actually accustomed
to act, but what it is they ought to do and how they ought
to act. Ethics therefore defines the nature, meaninp^. and laws
of this important part of human lifp, thaf is^ nf ^orals., and
critically compares the various ideals.
In what then do the nature, meaning, and laws of Christian
Ethics consist.'^ How ought we to regulate our lives as
Christians ? It would be strange to speak of the seriousness
of the question. It concerns all. It concerns youth, acutely
aware of life, and living as though it had a thousand existences —
happy is he who early recognises its purpose! It is for him
who is near its goal, while he who is at life's zenith can only
make a right use of it who clearly realises what it is intended
for. And as the seriousness of the question is clear it would
be strange to dwell longer on its difficulty. For although
Christians do not doubt that they ought to order their lives
according to the will of God as revealed in Christ, yet in the
New Testament they are often exhorted to prove what that
will is ; which they can only learn in many a circuitous way.
And why has the doing of the will of God such significance at
1
2 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
all ? Why, alongside the question, What must we believe ?
is there that other, What ought we to do? — alongside the
Christian Faith the Christian Life ?
Especially serious and difficult for our day is the question as
to the Christian life. Everything is in a state of flux ; nothing
seems to stand firm, even among those who desire to take the
Gospel in earnest. For instance, they judge very variously as to
the relation of the Christian to the world. Ancient as the subject
is in itself, these varying judgments are connected with the fact
that old problems present themselves to us in wholly new
shapes, complicacy and urgency, and demand their solution on
the basis of Christian ideas. How does the Christian stand in
regard to the industrial battle ? How to a law M'hich touches
the boundary of art ^ How to the trial of a cleric on a
question of mere doctrine } Must or can all those points
remain unsettled because every one has enough to do to save
his own soul .? Surely, if it is only a matter of diversity of
opinion in respect of a truth which in its kernel is not con-
troverted. Now the question, How are we to order our life ? is
by no means answered only in the Christian sense. There are
foes all around us. One class of opponents will indeed for
the most part allow that to be considered good or evil which
Christians regard as such ; but it must be set free from any
belief in God. Now, can that be the same thing? Others
suppose they can give us an ethic better suited in moral
content to the needs of actual life than that of an obsolete
Christianity with its law of love. Lastly, the opinions are
increasing in number of those who deny any distinction what-
ever between good and evil ; or, more precisely, of those who
call evil that which has hitherto been regarded as good, and
call that good which has so far passed as evil. Consequently
the battle is not merely concerning the Christian faith on which
rests the Christian life, but about the regulation of the life on
Christian principles ; and the historical epoch in which we live
has grown in many respects similar to that in which the ancient
world was in conflict with the purer life of the early Christian
Church, and the Church brought forward the silencing argu-
ment of fact. Facts can only render modest services in this
INTRODUCTION 8
argument ; nevertheless, they are not contemptible. The
argument further must have close regard to the special situa-
tion which has just been pointed out. We may not present
Christian Ethics as if no other system were in existence.
This problem is not an isolated one, but to a considerable
degree touches the question as to the relation between philo-
sophical and theological ethics. It is therefore a matter of
prime consequence for the friends of the latter to remember that
it damages its own cause if it allows the fruits of philosophical
investigation to remain unused ; as, e.g.^ what human reflection
has worked out on the basal relations of ethics in regard to
Rule, Motive, Purpose of moral action. Theological Ethics
does thereby damage its own clearness as well as its capability of
being intelligible to others. The same thing is true if it decline
to carefully examine the varied conceptions with regard to its
fundamental concepts presented by history, or will not penetrate
into the rich history of moral ideals. It is only in this way that
Christian Ethics can comprehend its own ideal. Only, in both
these investigations it must be on its guard against unwittingly
appropriating or giving recognition to ideas at variance with
those grown on Gospel soil. In particular, its advocates must
not allow themselves to be swayed by the prejudice of their
opponents that philosophical knowledge stands on a surer founda-
tion than theirs because drawn from reason only. As if it must
not be decided what then, closely taken, reason is, and what
intrinsic right it has to decide the question : What is the Good ?
Thus from this point Christian Ethics sees itself referred to the
need of critical comparison and contrast with non-Christian
systems. In the absence of this the best treatment will find no
firm basis.
Therefore, in what follows we distinguish, as in architecture,
between a plan and its elaboration. Or, in other words, even
Christian Ethics stands in need of some defence (Apologetics)
against its foes ; mindful, of course, that the best defence is a
victorious attack. Such defence is naturally only possible if the
nature of the subject to be defended is accurately known. Now,
Doctrine (Dogmatics) and Morals (Ethics) are the two main
constituents of Christian teaching. On external grounds of
4 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
convenience they are separately treated, but they form one whole.
Doctrine shows us how the kingdom of God becomes to us an
assured personal possession, as God's gift by faith in Christ ;
Ethics how this faith is our incentive and motive power to
co-operation in the task, implicate in the gift, of realising the
' kingdom of God ' more and more for ourselves, so that it may
' come ' here in time and there in eternity. Or, Doctrine shows
us how our assured faith of salvation and divine adoption into
the kingdom of God is the work of God's love : Ethics how this
assured faith of salvation manifests its activity in love to God
and our neighbours. Thus Ethics rests entirely on Dogmatics,
and yet the latter is not complete in the former precisely because
the great gift of God has the special peculiarity of shaping itself
into a task. This must be more fully entered into later. Here
we only point out that Faith and Love form an indissoluble
unity, and it is as a whole that it must be brought into com-
parison and contrast with every opposing system of Faith and
Practice. For this battle Dogmatics and Ethics, in which the
Christian system is brought out in all its aspects, give us the
right weapon. The victory of the Christian system must be
grounded on its intrinsic superiority. But for our purpose
Apologetics must in inverse order be the foundation of Dogmatics
and Ethics, for it is only by comparison with opposing systems
that we can become acquainted with that superioritv which is
grounded in its nature. And if, as here is the case. Ethics is
separately treated, it is still impossible to dispense with the
Apologetic foundation. If this Apologetic basis were treated
independently as common to Dogmatics and Ethics, and prefaced
to both, then Ethics would immediately follow Dogmatics ; the
conclusion of Dogmatics would be the certainty of salvation by
faith, and this certainty the beginning of Ethics ; while that which
is usually treated as a final section of Dogmatics, Eschatology,
would form the conclusion of a complete presentation of the
Christian Faith and the Christian Life.
Part I
Christian Ethics and its Opponents
This part falls into three sections. The first is on the indispensable
fundamental concepts of Ethics generally. The second is on the
most important opponents of Christian Ethics. The third is on
the truth of Christian Ethics in contrast with opposing systems.
On the order of single portions of the exposition different opinions
may be held. For instance, the positions of our opponents would
be plainer if both the nature of the Christian Good, and the common
or related attitude in regard to Conscience and Freedom, could
have been earlier explained. But then other greater inconveniences,
and especially unprofitable repetitions, would arise.
CHAPTER I. .
FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL CONCEPTS.
Of Action.
What do the terms ' moral,"' ' the good,"" mean ? In such a
proverbial expression as ' Conscience is the chamber of justice '
a tiTith is proclaimed whose value cannot be overestimated, that
in actual life there is a common agreement widely prevalent as
to what we ought to do, and that the question rather is as to
our will to do it. But not only has that common agreement its
limits in the wide world and in the individual heart, as we are
constrained to confess at the outset ; but also the very fact that
we frequently do not will what we ought compels us to inquire
what is the nature of this remarkable 'ought' with which the
will is by no means always at one. In this, magniloquent
sentences and formal definitions do not help us. It may,
amongst other things, be quite correct to say that morality
consists in the submission of our personal life to absolute law.
But how much is there in such a proposition which in turn
needs explanation ? As good as all of it : Law, and Absolute
and Personal. Will all give the like explanation of such terms
and all agree to the whole proposition ? Examination, too, as
to the usage in ethics of the main concepts ' good ' and ' bad '
does not help us much, exciting in our minds as the words do so
many sensuous ideas; as, e.g., we speak of 'good' food and a
' good "■ conscience, a ' bad ' finger and a ' bad "* action. It is
thought that more will be gained by comparing moral action
with the other activities of the human soul ; what we call ' good '
with that which is named 'true,' 'beautiful,' 'just.' But how-
7
8 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
ever simple that may seem, still every one understands the same
words in a different sense, and the confusion only grows greater.
If, then, in such simple explanations there is much that is
indefinite, we may yet say to ourselves : This is only a search for
a path in the world of ethics ; it will of itself only disclose its
wealth when we have found a way of access for our reflection.
It is a presupposition grounded in the nature of the case that
our reflection must, as hitherto has been regarded as self-evident,
start with the inner life of the individual. Certainly every
system of ethics remains incomplete which does not somehow
shape itself into social ethics; but it is true that that which
merely begins at this point is obscure, provided the clearness of
every science depends on its commencing with a subject of
examination such as first presents itself and is intelligible.
The word ' action ' is of prime importance in the science of
ethics. Thus we may ask : What is the nature of ' moral action ' .?
For no one really denies that it is concerned with action. We
all are so far under the influence of the Gospel that we cannot
simply confound doing and knowing. " If ye know these things,
happy are ye if ye do them." It is possible to be very wise
and very learned and yet be a bad man. Good and bad do not
in the first line depend on knowledge (important as this must
be in and for itself as well as for action), but on 'feeling'
and * will.' Knowledge is the more complete the mo"3 closely
it apprehends its object, quite independently of the significance
which it has for us, for our weal or woe. But feeling and will
have to do with us more intimately, and with that which is for
us of value. But what sort of value is moral value .'' And still
more do good and bad depend on the will than on the
emotions, however certain it is that feeling and will cannot be
separated. ' You did not will ' to do it is an expression which
belongs to ethics ; while enthusiasm for the beautiful, or a want
of appreciation of it, is a matter of passive feeling and imagina-
tive power. To will what is good is naturally expected of all,
but not, or not with like insistence, that all should appreciate
the beautiful. ^Esthetics is not on the same level with ethics.
Meanwhile we may hope that the nature of moral action will
become somewhat clearer to us if we call to mind what we
FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL CONCEPTS 9
understand by ' action "* in general. Action clearly is a kind of
activity. Even the forces of nature work ; the most violent
changes are wrought by them. But they do not ' act.' Nay, it
is only with reserve that we allow the use of the word to
animals. To this notion there belongs conscious self-determina-
tion, reason, choice, in distinction from mere desire. If now we
emphasise in the definition ' working with conscious self-deter-
mination, with rational will,' the terms ' conscious,"* 'rational,""
a threefold question lies therein : Whereto ? How t Why ? or,
in other words, such ' working "" sets before itself a goal ; would
realise a purpose, in a definitive way and manner, according to
a rule (Norm) and from a definite spring of action (Motive).
If we emphasise in these words : ' working with conscious self-
determination, with rational will"" the term self-determination
( ' will ' or ' choice ' ), the question at once arises. What does that
import ? And we at once stumble on the mystery which will
accompany us through the whole of ethics, in the depths of
which our thoughts might overwhelm us, were it not a matter
much more close to our consciousness than to our cognition ; this
mystery of our self-activity, our self-determination, of the power
which we know as our innermost self, the kernel of our ego.
All this is, of course, no great advance in our knowledge. But it
is, so to speak, concerned only with raw material. He who
regards this as a trifling matter at the commencement will have
later on cause to repent his neglect. In these simple reflections
which have busied us, those fundamental concepts have their
origin which have always been important in ethics : Good,
Duty, Virtue. They correspond to the three words, End, Rule,
Motive. And here, in reference to these three, the following
propositions, still of course only in shadowy outline, may find
mention : Moral Good is the moral End considered as realised.
The moral rule impelling the single act of will to the realisation of
this end is called duty ; the moral motive considered as an
acquired power of the acting will is called virtue. The idea
'Thou oughtest,"* which turns on our decision, the idea, i.e.^
of responsibility and freedom, gains its clearness from the
fact that we give heed to that speciality of the will (its power
of decision), and allow it full play.
10 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
The plainer it becomes in this way what action is, the more
urgent grows the question : What is moral action ?
Moral Action.
The ' Value ' of Moral Action.
In order to get a clear answer we may in the quiet of our
own reflection employ a simple expedient. We ask ourselves
what is all that which men have called ' good ** and ' evil ' since
those words were used ? and how various are the things which
are so called even to-day ? And yet, in spite of all this variety,
what is meant at the bottom by the judgment, it is 'good""
or 'bad,' and at the moment we utter it? E.g. to care for
our own family, to provide for one's household, as the Scriptures
say, is most certainly moral action. Of course, understood in
an infinite variety of ways, if we realise to ourselves the long
history from the simplest family relationships to our own more
complicated ones. Infinitely diverse too, if we think of the way
and manner, the rules by which this care has been exercised, and
of the motives which have impelled thereto. Was not war once
regarded as a legitimate method ? Even amongst ourselves does
not judgment fluctuate as to what is proper in business profits ?
Just as various if we look at the motives. We may care for our
own for honour's sake, but also from self-sacrificing affection, with
complete self-denial ; and, indeed, just as well because we know
nothing higher than their relationship to us, as because we
consider them as belonging to the kingdom of God. Invol-
untarily are we compelled to apply the above-mentioned ethical
master ideas — End, Rule, Motive. And above all, that other
point of view thrusts itself forward : In what sense is such action
an affair of the will .? not merely of determination and steadfast-
ness, but also of responsibility and freedom ? But if this action,
however indefinite it seems, has been and is regarded as moral,
so there has been and is always the feeling present that it has
a unique value. Without perception of value there is no action
at all ; the ' end ' is somehow a ' Good.' It passes for * Moral,'
however — whether rightly or wrongly is not now in question —
because an especial value is ascribed to it. More precisely :
FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL CONCEFfS 11
As we can only speak of the value of an action in relation to the
doer of it, we mean that which, while in regard to his feeling
it is intelligible, is at the same time something transcendent
and absolute. What this feeling is can only be known through
personal submission and obedience by means of which the agent
first realises what that real value is. A unique dignity, a lofty
incomparable majesty, clings to the question : What is the
' Good ' ? And looking closer, we must repeat what is said
above — this dignity attaches to all the relations of this question,
to all aspects of moral action, to ' End,"* ' Rule,' ' Motive,"* as
to the marvellous depth of the expression ' I ought,'' of the
feeling, i.e., of obligation which lies in it. Nor is it needless
to insist once more on the truth that the distinction between
ethics and aesthetics lies in the fact that the former is a
question of the will. The two are, however, related in so
far as they each postulate a value transcendent and absolute,
while the latter makes its appeal to passive feeling and not
to the will.
Of course, by these assertions we are led into the midst of
the debate about ethical postulates. When, for instance, we
speak of value-feelings in treating of the nature of moral habi-
tudes, we find om"selves in lively conflict with those who consider
that Ave are sacrificing the uniqueness of the moral postulate ;
while, on the other hand, there are those who emphasise this point
of the feeling of value, because by co-ordinating moral action
with other actions which arise from desire — though it stands
in the highest category — they are able to understand it better.
Still, so much must be at once said : neither of these positions
takes sufficiently careful note of the immediately given facts
of consciousness — whatever may be the ultimate decision as to
their reality. This is only done when we have deducted nothing
from the proposition above enunciated, that no action without
perception of the value of the action can be thought of at
all. Even the greatest opponent of the idea that somehow
moral action is grounded in the realisation of a valuable end,
because, as he thinks, it thus sullies itself with the " serpent-trail
of the struggle for happiness "'' (Kant), is compelled to describe
the feeling of respect for moral law — which he (Kant) regards
n THE ETHICS OP THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
as the sole ground of moral action — in such a way that the
excluded value-perception is imperceptibly reinstated. And,
moreover, that subjection under merely formal law (which is
alone recognised by him) is not entirely devoid of moral
content, and consequently unfruitful for actual life, simply
because a definite end — such as the realisation of self, or the
social life of men in righteousness and love, or whatever other
ideal may be set up — dominates the consciousness of the
agent. If we think this away, then we are unable to understand
why that magisterial motto : " Act so that the principle of
thy action may be a principle of action to all others"
cannot be used in the sense of a sheer Egoism. This rule
contains the demand to act aright only if a rightly ordered
community is presupposed to be the highest end of our action.
But we may now really on good ground reject Kant's scruple,
that by recognition of that feeling of pleasure (which is bound
up with the moral demand) and of valuable 'End,' moral
action is hereby tarnished ; but we must not therefore grant
to his opponents the right to finally confound moral with
eudaemonic action. For not only are the value-feelings them-
selves of various value, which the advocates of eudaemonic
ethics allow, and name moral only certain definite value-
feelings — what they are we will presently examine ; but it is also
a mistake to place, without further inquiry, our percep^-ive value-
feelings in the same category with those value-feelings which
are purely subjective in their nature. In particular, it is still an
open question whether it is not the case that the existence of
such higher and exalted value-feelings can only be affirmed on
the ground of actual experience, or whether they are not really
the immediate delivery of consciousness — the validity of which
must later on be treated more fully. This much we unhesita-
tingly and emphatically affirm without any reserve : If the
ethics of the categorical imperative and teleological ethics —
as the points at issue may be formulated — were in irreconcilable
opposition, we should decide in favour of the former, and be forced
to find the true nature of morality merely in the harmony of the
will with prescribed duty (i.e. absolute law). But the net result
of our explanation is that no such alternative ' either,' ' or,' is
FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL CONCEPTS 13
found in the actual experience of the moral life ; and that
there are no discoverable reasons which compel us to assert
its existence. In all essential points the close examination of
the simplest formula of common speech : ' Thou shalt do this '
— any definite thing — will lead to an unabridged knowledge of
the subject-matter.
Content of Moral Action.
And now we are already in a position to define more closely
what is meant by the proposition : ' A feeling of absolute
value' which it is the work of the will to realise. First of all
we may again think of ' ends,' ' motives,' and ' rules ' of moral
action, and fix our attention more closely on the ' ends ' from
which rules and motives can be deduced, so far as they belong to
this and not to the other fundamental point of view summed
up in the phrase ' Thou shalt.' It is just as impossible to say
that all men naturally strive after the same moral ends as that
all regard their moral content as equally good. That God has
written in the hearts of all men, as men. His perfect will in
unmistakable impress — for a proof of which appeal is often
made to the witness of St Paul (Rom. ii. 14-16) — is by many,
strangely enough, always regarded as the Christian view. In
reply to this misapprehension, it is sufficient to point to the
pains the Apostle takes to exhort Christians to "prove what
the will of the liOrd is " ; still more, how impressively he
emphasises the truth that the perfect image of God has been first
exhibited in Christ, " the second man." Nay, his entire mission-
ary activity — just as in all such activity, in the past and at the
present time — is the best answer to that exaggeration. As
certainly as our missionaries are not deceived in their confidence
that in the most degraded nations they will find something in
the human heart which responds to their message of the royal
law of love, so sure is it that there exist alongside this prejudices,
errors, perversions of all sorts, so that the greatest moral horrors
(as we judge them) pass in the judgment of the heathen for
actions that are praiseworthy. The opinion that the imperative
' Thou shalt ' as an implicate of the mere possession of reason —
if this categorical imperative be brought into clear cognition —
14 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
suffices to tell us what is good and evil, in spite of the actu-
ally varying moral imperatives of individual nations, has
been proved to be untenable. We have already seen what
justifiable purpose lies at the basis of this opinion of Kant's,
but that it endeavours to deduce too much from ' Thou shalt,'
and that he puts into it this content in order to fetch it
out again.
The proposition that all men are by nature at one in their
judgment of what is good and evil — which is a heritage handed
over from the Stoic philosophy to Christianity — has been slowly
destroyed by conflict with irrefragable facts. The conflict has
not been destructive merely, though it often seemed like it.
Many wage this argumentative warfare with passion as if those
firmest principles of all human morality, which have endured
unimpugned through long centuries, were at stake and about to
be overthrown. Many rest in the assertion, " How often has that
at one time appeared good which at another time and to another
people has seemed evil ! "" But is there really nothing at all
which has some common element ? Are there not at least
common tendencies of the moral sense, common lines of
direction of the moral judgment ? We may name two in
particular.
First : That action anyhow passes for good which is not
simply an assertion of self-will, or a search for personal happiness,
but is, in contradistinction to this, a subordination of our
personal will, and an effort to secure another's good. Altruism
is often spoken of as an antithesis to Egoism, by which is meant
not the benefit of the personal ' I," but another's good. Only
let us realise the incalculable variety of the forms and gradations
in which such regard for another may appear. It is a far cry to
Christian love of our neighbour ; and yet in many of these
poor signs do we recognise something of the character of that
which in its completeness is Christian love. Among the lowest
races, in a sea of selfishness — yet how often is there a drop of
self-denying sacrifice glistening like a pearl ! And there are
broader streams of benevolence, sacrifice, self-denial among
highly-developed nations, such as Roman uprightness, German
love of fatherland, Buddhist pity ; many efforts, too, of the
FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL CONCEPTS 15
present time, which do not recognise the fount of love from
which the Christian draws.
Secondly : Every sort of mastery of a merely natural impulse
by feelings of personal self-regard, by self-respect and dignity,
in short by culture, passes for ' good.' Of course, all these ex-
pressions are taken from the higher stages, but in their final
meaning they are applicable to the lowest. The African despot
given up to licentious sensuality who conquers his agony in the
presence of a foe is a witness for this, and not merely the sage
who in India and Greece excites our admiration by his freedom
from the desire and passion of the passing moment. How much
these two primal relations of morals stand in the foreground,
how much they are connected with the sense of absolute worth,
is shown by that use of language in which the word ' moral '
describes mastery of a sensual impulse and particularly of that
which is extremely difficult to control, the sexual impulse ; and
again par excellence is used of our behaviour to our fellow-men.
This indicates the truth that he only can assume the right rela-
tion to another who has found his right attitude to himself, and
vke versa. And also we may here remember that the two great
root-stems of all moral action, individual and social, have their
origin in this double relation, and so it would be false to disjoin
them. In reality it is the union of them which will bring us
ever deeper into the nature of moral habitudes.
Two other fundamental characteristics are not so simple as
these to explain, namely, our lordship over external nature, and
reverence for and trust in a supreme power, God. The remark
must for the present suffice that it is self-evident that a relation
to God is only considered to belong to the sphere of ethics by
those who regard religion as something entitled to take front
rank in a Christian system. For such persons, faith, trust in
God, is the real ' Good.' It is from faith that there issues love
to our neighbours and self-conquest. But as to the other point,
rule over external nature, it is at least even now sufficiently
plain that it is a result as well as presupposition of om" self-
conquest, and that it finds its greatest value when used for
another's good. But we may not recognise all mastery of nature
as intrinsically good; otherwise we should be abolishing the
16 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
distinction between ethics and civilisation of which we must
soon speak.
Still, that we in some measure know of what sort the actions
are (as to content) with which our judgment that they are
moral actions is bound up, gives us no exhaustive ideas of what
the ' moral "" is. We said above (p. 8) that the sense of
absolute value belongs to certain actions not only in relation
to their content, but also essentially as they are the product
of our own self-determination. It is this mystery of the ' I
ought' that we must closely attend to. {Cf. Reischle et alii.)
This is the core of our question as to the special characteristic
of the moral life. And it is only in this way that what has
been said as to the content of the moral life can be rendered
quite clear. Our goodwill towards others, that discipline of
our own nature we cannot understand as moral action com-
pletely, unless we have first understood that we are to recognise
their value in our innermost will. It is easy for Christians to
distinguish this ' Thou shalt ' as moral law, and so to make it
clear that it is comparable with all other laws which we know
in the realm of moral action ; with those of law and custom
as with those of prudence and of natural inclination. The
more everyone selects examples from his immediate experience,
the clearer the matter becomes.
Let us take some example of self-conquest or of goodwill
towards others. So long as we can assign no other reason for
our conduct than that 'It is just my way,' and for the opposite
' I do not care to,' so long are we under the law of natural
impulse and Inclination. Of course, it is scarcely possible to
call that action a law which is subject to such fickleness. But
however fortuitous it may appear to the observer, for the agent
himself it is his nature as somehow determined, the law of
his action. To describe this, St Paul uses the illuminative
expression " the law in our members." If such a man is under
some external restraint, and cannot realise his wishes at the
moment, he experiences a discomfort similar to a disturbance
of his bodily health. At the same time, let us not forget how
nearly such action can, in outward seeming, be related to the
*Good.' It gives undoubtedly indications of a certain good-
FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL CONCEPTS 17
ness of disposition and of a natural moderation which rises
not a bit higher than the stages described. In virtue of this
content a shimmer of goodness radiates it ; but will anyone
name it ' Good "" ? We spontaneously place Prudence, which
acts by rule, in a higher position ; at least, if we think of the
effort which it presupposes to reach an end correspondent to
our personal inclination and our natural search for happiness.
A whole world artistically ordered owes its existence to the
wise calculation of utility, and there are many stones in this
building which, to the superficial observer, resemble the genuine
precious stones out of which the temple of the ' Good ' is
constructed. There is a business (let us say) famous on account
of a stability which has never been shaken. Unexpectedly a
crisis arises. It can be obviated, it seems, by a single false
report which its proprietor may spread. Yet inherited advan-
tages and acquired experiences unite in enabling him to form
the judgment that the probability of maintaining his position
by these means is less than the probability of the misfortune.
He forbears the lie ; all the world praises him ; a thousand
existences are saved with himself. Which is praised, the
prudence or the morality .? Of course only his prudence,
supposing the world to know why he acted thus and in no
other way. And he congratulates himself on his prudence ;
he has no inner witness that his action is ' good ' which makes
him happy. On the other hand, if he finds himself mistaken,
he is vexed over his false calculation ; he has no sense of guilt.
But the wealth of life from whose many resources we would
fain light upon the single ' value ' which we may dare call ' the
good' is far from being exhausted. Perhaps the calculating
skill of the supposed merchant is at an end, and because he
has made utility the highest aim of all his actions he is re-
solved to try the disingenuous means ; but thought of the law,
supported by the state, restrains him. He has the fear of
punishment. The man whom we are thus regarding at the
crisis of a decision may possibly have somehow reached the
•full conviction that he will not fall away from earthly righteous-
ness. But another motive may be a law to him — the respect
for custom, the firmly fixed judgment of society, of the special
%
18 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
circle or of the whole population to which he belongs. Perhaps
this is an urgent call, a law often binding with more strength
than the law of the state ; for how hard it is to bear the
disrespect of society ! how deadly its ban ! how sweet and
stimulating, how indispensable for innumerable persons, is their
honour ! In fact, the boundary line between the law of custom
and the law of morality is often imperceptible. And still,
although this respect for custom is not the highest of motives,
yet the door of morality has now been opened. Inclination,
Utility, Law, Custom — important as each one of these things
is in its place, and indispensable in the economy of life, nay,
valuable as means of training for that which is to be, as steps,
i.e.^ to higher things, all of them pale before the splendour of
the moral imperative, ' Thou shalt ' — the moral law.
What is its characteristic? It asks no longer If? and
Whether ? It derives its validity from no external source, but it
demands absolutely (Kant's categorical imperative). To this
speciality of its requirement corresponds the effect which our
submission to absolute law or our resistance to it has in our
innermost self: it is something quite unique. Resistance to
absolute law is not punished by the natural displeasure which
desire denied awakens, nor by the feeling of disgust that we
have acted so stupidly, nor by the fear of punishment, nor by
the censure of society, but by the feeling of guilt — the severest
of all. I have lost my true worth, and I am compelled to con-
demn myself even though all the world should exculpate me.
On the other hand, accordance with absolute law does not
bring with it a natural complaisance; neither contentment at
the triumph of our own prudence, nor the enjoyment of others'
respect : it is rather an experience of ' value ' which carries with
it neither success nor misfortune. It is that experience of a
unique and incomparable dignity which consists in the unity
and freedom of the inner life — unity because no changing
circumstances of life determine his will who understands and
recognises the command ' Thou shalt.** In the midst of confusing
multiplicity he has realised himself as something ' whole,' and
has reached ' unity,' and he has gained an independence and
freedom so unique that it is to him inconceivable how others
FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL CONCEPTS 19
can misemploy this term for the unrestraint of impulse or the
prudent use of events and human beings which to him appears
to be servitude. All the more surprising is such an effect of
right action since obedience to an absolute command may
really be mere renunciation ; the pain of self-denial ; and that
sharpened by the fact that the urgency and reality of those
other volitional reasons may in the presence of 'Thou shalt'
appear as a powerless phantom-king.
This fundamental fact of the moral life we can comprehend
in no other way than by the thought that in it we really reach
our destiny, the deepest characteristic of our spiritual life — the
impulse to unity and freedom. As in a dream we strive after
it in a thousand purposeless ways so long as we only live for
the moment and for desire. Our enjoyment of the beautiful
carries us higher and deeper ; but even freedom of contemplation
is not the highest; 'eternal life' in the enjoyment of a work
of art is not the deepest peace of inner unity ; it is only ' the
good will ' that becomes both whole and free in its doing.
Such considerations bring us of themselves still deeper into
the marvel of the moral world. Is not this independence and
freedom of a human being standing in the stream of the
transitory his unity with the ultimate foundation of all reality
— with that reality which is of the highest value .? And does
it not hereby first attain its truth ? And further, while that
'Thou shalf depending on the determination of our will
involves our responsibility, we can do no other than unreservedly
accept the fact of this freedom ; or, again, give up what we have
asserted of the moral law. On this point we must, in order to
obviate confusion, observe that the word freedom is used in
another sense than just now — not of the internal sense of
independence, but of the freedom to decide. What this precisely
is we (in order to avoid repetitions) postpone to that part of
our treatise in which we must give a more connected account
of the tremendous question whether it is possible reasonably to
maintain the unlimited force of the imperative : ' Thou shalt.'
And for the same reason we must also consider how the moral
law asserts itself in that highly complicated phenomenon which
in our language we call the conscience. Our examination so
20 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
far has been nothing else but an attempt to illustrate those
separate aspects of moral action of which we for the most part
think when we speak of conscience.
Avoiding this kind of way of looking at the subject for the
present, we must be careful, in lespect of this imperative * Thou
shalt,' to avoid an exaggeration. We must not be understood
to assei-t that it is always and everywhere and in every man
felt to have equal force. It may often be a very insignificant
phenomenon, may so far as our judgment of moral content goes
even be an unmoral something by which, however, even in the
abandoned, or in those still very imperfect, there dawns a
presentiment of the majesty of the moral law in distinction
from those other powers — even that of custom — which bind him
the most strongly. There can, on the other hand, be a highly
developed social custom of wide prevalence without the single
individuals on whom it has influence experiencing the absolute
demand which the 'good' makes on them. It is plain that
'Thou shalt' cannot with like ease connect itself with any
content ; absolute law in the strictest sense can only be that
which is of universal application for individuals under all
circumstances of life, and still more for collective mankind. It
would be easy to work out the idea that between the two main
lines of the moral life, that is to say of self-discipline and
benevolence, and the form of absolute law an inner affinity
subsists; that with progress in respect to that content this
form of the moral law comes into continually clearer conscious-
ness ; but that it is only in union with the highest content
that ' Thou shalt ' becomes perfectly intelligible, or, in terms of
Christianity, that it is in conversion that it is truly realised.
All those main points of view of moral good, from which its
nature is plain, have been treated as simply as possible, and
perhaps become still plainer when attention is drawn to the
fact that these aspects are often not at all explicitly dis-
tinguished. And the reason of this is that, as a matter of fact,
they stand partly in an inner relationship to each other.
Prominence has already been given to the statement that
' norms ' and even ' motives ' in respect of their ascertained
content can easily be deduced from ' ends.' The norm, however,
FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL CONCEPTS 21
so far as there is bound up with it the sense of obligation,
stands in closer relation to the command, ' Thou shalt ' ; and
it cannot be gainsaid that personal subjection to an absolute
law is the highest moral spring of action. Other questions
having more immediate reference to motives may for the time
being be set aside — such as that whether motives become
active through special emotions, or by realisation of ideas of
value, and in particular how both these springs of action may
be interconnected ; and again how far motives must be, or
rather can be, both impulse to, and power for, moral action.
But while these internal relations between the various chief
points of view and their closer definition have justice done to
them in the course of our examination, it is a source of endless
confusion when they are not, so far as practicable, plainly
distinguished at the outset as we have above attempted to do.
In particular, it is only possible when these are thus presented
to test each ethical view as a whole, and to see whether and how
far it does justice to those points of view which are determining
factors in our knowledge of ethics. For if these have not all a
like claim to consideration, at any rate reasons ought to be
given for leaving them out of account. Instead of this, " new
outlines of a morality of the future" are appearing which
plainly show that their authors have no suspicion of the fulness
of these at least possible points of view.
All so far established has reference to the fundamental
concepts which throw light on the nature of ethics. We add
to our notice of this raw material of concepts just for the sake
of completion the following, with a view to later necessary
discussion. The much-used expressions, ' empirical,' ' intuitive ""
(idealistic) ethics, relate to the origin of morals. The first of
these seeks that origin in the experience of the individual, and
especially in that of nations ; the second does not necessarily
deny the value of experience, but lays stress on the view that,
in the last resort, we must assume the existence of an original
moral faculty in men. Two other terms, 'autonomous' and
' heteronomous ' ethics, relate to the basis on which the validity
of ethics rests. The first affirms that this basis is in the human
will itself; the second, that it is in something external, whether
« THE El'HICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
in God, or in some other authority in life, such as the Family,
the State, the Church, or the like. For the present it is enough
to ask whether this antithesis is not comprehended in a higher
unity. The Christian conception of morals plainly points to
this. Of course, the view taken of origin and validity depends
on that of the nature of ethics. Finally, there are those who
speak of the ' principle ' of ethics, and by this is meant that
which is the decisive thought in any intuition of the Good —
the Christian idea, for instance, or the Buddhist. But it is not
for the most part made clear by some under which of the above-
named points of view this decisive thought is contemplated,
whether, «.<?., under that of the highest end, motive, rule, or
under that of the imperative ' ought," or, as the subject really
requires, under all these points of view. This want of per-
spicuity veils the weak spot in any particular form of ethics, and
silence is maintained on it — for instance, on such a point as to
the motives of good action. For, as Schopenhauer says, " how
does any assertion about the Good help us if we cannot show
how it becomes operative ? ""
We may conclude our discussion of fundamental concepts by
an appeal to actual life. These notions gain colour if we grasp
the moral process in an event in which this process presents
itself to us most immediately and personally, such as the effect
on our own personality of morally exalted persons. W!.at is it
that we experience when we come into contact with a will
ruling over its natural impulses and strong enough to
dominate us ? which ministers to us of its goodness and serves
the world and time because devoted to the service of the
Eternal ? We are at once in a special manner humbled and
exalted as we stand face to face even with a stranger in whom
we seem yet to get a glimpse of our true nature, and are
confronted with the question whether we ourselves are now
willing what and how we ought to will. This experience,
which makes the life of the poorest rich, and without which the
richest are poor, we have attempted in these formulas to bring
in a preliminary way to the simplest possible expression.
Still, one net gain of these general explanations must be
insisted on. However much they still consistently stand in
FUNDAMENTAL ETHICAL CONCEPTS 23
need of closer definition, they have certainly advanced us
further than that conception of moral action according to
which it is merely reasonable action, the action of reason
on nature, which is Schleiermacher''s view. In fact, this does
not mark out the sphere of morals but of civilisation, the
conquest of nature whether for the ends of practical life or in
the intellectual region of science and art. We who live to-day
have been more urgently compelled than earlier generations
to recognise that the advance of civilisation is far from being
coterminous with the progress of the Good in the world ; nay,
that very much indeed that has the most incontrovertible
claim to the great name of the Good can only maintain itself
in antagonism to an immorally shaped civilisation — one of the
hardest tasks of Christian ethics. Civilisation and morals must
be sharply differentiated at the outset — and this quite apart
from the fact that in such an idea of ethics it cannot be made
at all clear in what respect moral action differs from other mental
activities. With this conviction another closely coheres : that,
if we are to be content to consider the will as a peculiar faculty
which arises in the self-development of our life, and not closely
investigate the meaning of the obligation 'Thou shalt,' ethics
cannot attain its proper dignity.
CHAPTER II.
OPPONENTS OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS.
We started with the thought that it is indispensably necessary
to compare critically and contrast the systems of our opponents.
In order to become acquainted with them all accurately we
should be obliged to take into consideration the whole of
those fundamental concepts noted in giving some provisional
account of ethics. We should be obliged to ask our opponents
to define End, Motive, Rule, as well as how they understand
the moral imperative ' ought," whether they assign it any value,
and to what extent. We must likewise hear what their opinion
is of the origin and value of morals. Such a procedure would
bring to light the immense variety of answers given to the
question : What is the Good ? The knowledge which would in
this way be elicited whether these fundamental concepts are
closely connected with each other, and in what way, would be
particularly instructive. Irrespective of the minuteness of this
procedure, it would, however, not clearly bring out the positions
of the most important of the opponents. Still, from which
of the many once more mentioned points of view are we to
commence our short review ? The moral imperative ' ought '
seems the most natural starting-point. But opponents often
boast of their advantage in being able to state the goal of
Christian action with more clearness than Christian ethics.
Besides, on the question of norms or rules — on that which
* ought "* to be done — there is less dispute ; for at any rate all
alike consider benevolence towards others and the conquest of
OPPONENTS OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 25
self as Good. That is, of course, only correct up to a certain
point ; even here the differences are much greater than at first
sight appears. Now, can we put the question of motives so far
in the rear as many do ? Often enough will the conviction arise
that so little can be said of these because we have so little that
is satisfactory to say. But let us follow our opponents into
the region in which they see their strength. And indeed in
this way we have, in the main, only to consider the resolute
opponents of Christian ethics. That which separates others
who are largely its friends, and do really admit the force
of the moral imperative 'Thou shalt,' can be dealt with in
the course of our proof of the truth of the Christian
position.
Still, the common conviction that men are right when they
surround the word ' Good ' with a special sanctity, and that,
in spite of all errors and failures, they are not, at the bottom,
deceived as to what at any rate should be named ' Good,'
does at least so far bring our opponents into unison with
Christian ethics. It was reserved to our generation to maintain
the opposite opinion and render it impressive and influential
in wide areas — in other words, to set up an ethical system
which can only claim this name, because, of course, it gives
some answer to the question : How are we to order our
lives ? but not because it would order them in accord with
the ' Good "" in a meaning in which this word is comparable
with the sense hitherto assigned to it. This great contradic-
tion not merely of Christian ethics, but of every possible
system of ethics (in any intelligible use of words), it is very
necessary that we should note attentively.
The Devaluation of All Values.
We do not suggest that ideas of this kind have never been
thought before. Socrates combated the Sophists on these
points ; they return again in the issue between Christianity
and the ancient heathen world, and also at the close of the
mediaeval period, in the renascence previously to the Reformation.
But more resolute, bolder, more reckless and influential than
26 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
such leaders, Friedrich Nietzsche sets himself " on the further
side of good and evil"; declares that the prevailing judgment
ou good and evil is a mere prejudice which has arisen from the
enslavement of the weak ; that it is an inversion of the original
judgment of men that the * Good' is what is strong, superior;
and he demands a return to the original conception, so that
mankind mav be raised on to a nevf, plane ; and the ' super-
man,' the goal of all desire, maj come; and in the eternal
ditnilarity of all things may come again and again. This, in
brief, is the content of Nietzsche's message, of his gospel, which,
appearing in a series of critical essays, he announced with the
tone of a prophet under the title ZarcUhti-ftras. L«t us try to
give some account, in his own words, of the meaning of this
message.
" Forward ! '^ he cries ; " even our old morality belongs to
comedy. Whoever would have peaceful slmnber used before
falling asleep to speak of 'good' and 'evil'! There is an old
delusion which is called good and evil ! The old tables must
be broken to pieces: 'Thou shalt not steal,' 'Thou shalt do
no murder'! Nay, do not spare thy neighbour! Good men
never speak the truth! Be coiuageous, impassive, scornful,
violent, then wisdom will love you ! Your love of your neigh-
bour is only a bad form of your love of yourself: rather do I
counsel you to flee from your neighbour, and to keep love at
the furthest distance."
Therefore good and evil in the usual sense is a delusion.
But how did this delusion arise? 'Good,' responds he in
answer, was once that which is strong, noble, mighty. Therefore
did the weak, justly oppressed, resist with the only weapon
they had. They made weakness into a virtue, proclaimed
submissiveness, good faith, love, and also self-conquest, con-
siderateness, moderation in the presence of reckless power
'good.' Weakness was tortured into merit, feebleness into
goodness, abjectness into humility, subjection into obedience.
At the goal salvation beckons as a reward ! The time will
come when weakness is strength ! It was the priests who led
the way in this devaluation of the term ' good,' for they were
not strong, certainly not the Jew-priests. It was thus this
OPPONENTS OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 27
slave-revolt in morals began. Christian love is but the most
alluring form of this slave-morality ! It was the man who let
himself be bound in social fetters, this fool, this yearning and
despairing prisoner, who invented *the evil conscience "* which
is in sooth the most dismal of diseases.
*'Yet there is healing. I teach you of the 'super-man.'
Your * mere man ■■ is something to be conquered ! What you
call happiness, virtue, reason is but poverty and sordid ease.
It is the grand contempt for these that fashions 'the higher
man.' Not your sin but your contentedness cries up to heaven !
^^^lat is good and what is bad only the man of master-will
knows. And it is he who makes human destiny, gives to the
earth its meaning, and shapes the future ! It is he who ordains
what is 'good"" and 'bad."" He will remodel everything that
' was ■' until his will says : I would have it so ; so do I will. O
will ! turning-point of every difficult}', spare me for a great
victory ! It is to this ' higher man "' and only to him, the man
of master-will, that that is good which is now called bad — the
three evils, sensuality, tyranny, selfishness ! Sensuality, the
fire which bums up the rabble, is to the free hearts, innocent
and free, the pleasure-ground of earth, the generous thank-
offering of the future to the present. Tyranny, the fiery com-age
of the hard-hearted, will then be like to generous aspiration !
And selfishness, the saving, wholesome selfishness, which springs
forth from the mighty soul of him of powerful frame, beautiful,
victorious, refi'eshing ! But the first-bom is ever a sacrifice !
It is a thorny path along which this man of master- will must
go ! Pleasure, comfort in the sense of the mass of men, is not
his lot."
This hope of the coming of the ' super-man "* is not fulfilled
once for all. The inextinguishable desire of life finds rest only
in the thoiight of eternal return — that desire for life which
glows in the song : —
O Mensch, gib Acht I
Was spricht die tiefe Mittemacht ?
Ich schlief, ich schUef.
Aus tiefem Traum bin ich erwacht.
Die Welt ist tief.
28 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
Und tiefer als der Tag gedacht
Tief ist ihr Weh.
Lixst — tiefer noch als Herzeleid.
Weh spricht : vergeh ! ^
" Surely all desire longs for eternity, longs for deep, deep eternity.
And the thought of return to life again which stills this desire
of life is this, that all things come back again and we with them,
and that we have already existed innumerable times, and all
things with us. Now I die and in an instant I am nothing.
But the tangle of causes in which I was inextricably involved
returns again. They will recreate me. I myself am a part of
the causes which perpetually repeat themselves. I do not return
to a new life but to this very self-same life, the eternal return
which I teach as the fate of all things and of all men.""
This allusion to Nietzsche could not be very brief. For his
influence cannot be underestimated by anyone who sees things
clearly at the present time and asks by what tendencies it is
moved. Remembering the personal fate of the originator, in
the mental gloom which settled upon him, double reticence is
imposed on our judgment. Even those who do not write of his
life's work from the Christian standpoint have called to mind his
own words : " My insight was too deep ; now 1 care for nothing.
Have I any harbour, any goal, whither my sail may carry me ?
Thy danger is no small one, thou free spirit, and wanderer ! Thou
hast lost the goal, and so hast lost thy way too ! "
If we look shortly at the subject-matter, the principles only,
it is allowed even by his admirers that his idea of eternal return
is presented with no perspicuity. Nietzsche saw in it salvation
from pessimism, but as a matter of fact it is an abyss of misery.
So far at least Nietzsche was not able to make his other
principle, that of the ' super-man," plainer. In his negations he
^ O man, give heed !
What says the deep midnight ?
I slept, I slept.
Out of a deep dream have I awaked.
The world is deep.
And deeper than the day declares.
Deep is its woe.
Desire — deeper than heart-sorrow.
Woe says : Perish !
OPPONENTS OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 29
is clear, in that " breaking to pieces of the old tables." But so far
as anything definite is said concerning his idea of the 'super-
man,' it is nothing fresh. It really lies altogether outside the
old ethical idea, but in one respect it is a first step to it — the
mastery of powerful natural impulses. Every advance beyond
this first step mankind has felt to be moral advance. On the
other hand, his " noble men," his " excellent men," are not in
their mutual intercourse devoid of esteem and respect, they are
not quite outside ' good ' and ' bad ' ; the eagles are only become
lambs as compared with eagles, the lion has among lions become
a child. There is still more recognition of the ' good "" in the
old meaning, and indeed in its Christian connotation, in the
honour given to suffering. " Comfort as you understand it,"
cries Zarathustras to the adherents of hedonistic ethics, " is
really no goal which can be regarded as an ' end.' The
discipline of sorrow, of great sorrow, know you not that this
discipline can alone exalt man ? " The earnestness of the
question by means of which the thought of eternal returns to
life is made to sink into their minds is quite reminiscent of the
' old tables.' It is, " What are we to do, that we may wish
to do it innumerable times ? " So much the more remarkable is
it that, with such a deep understanding of single sides of
Christian morals, he exhibits a passionate opposition to it as
founded on religion. ' God is dead.' The belief in the ' super-
man ' takes the place of belief in God ; it is, so to speak, religion
without God, against God. The real contradiction in this
whole prophesying comes out most clearly in this very point :
not perchance simply for the Christian judge, but in the pathetic
self-confessions of Zarathustras. " I do not know the blessed-
ness of receiving. It is my poverty that my hand never ceases
from giving. O misery of all givers ! O silence of all who
spread the light ! So great is the price which the ' super-man '
pays who says, '" God is dead ' ! Woe to him who has no home 1 "
All the more pressing is the question how to explain the
inordinate success of Nietzsche. Some have pointed to the force
of his utterances, the most intensely German of all German
literary styles {deutscheste DeutscK) since Goethe. It reminds
us, in fact, of his own saying : " Of all writings I love that which
30 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
a man has written with his blood."" It has also, without reason,
been said that the curt, fearless, oracular style suits the spoilt
and hurried taste of the present day, which indeed is only
receptive of a conception of the cosmos which shall be entertain-
ing. We must explore deeper sources than this. To begin
with, the sole dominance of the intellect in its poverty had
become oppressive ; the will to live awoke. The intellect had
announced ad nauseam its decision that all * value,' all that is, is
lost. So Nietzsche's desire of life was felt as a deliverance. Men
rejoiced to feel that the world was no longer emptied of meaning.
And others had likewise to the point of weariness extolled the
unprofitable life, devoid of content as it is, of mere happiness.
Thus many a young man was jubilant with the thought of ' the
super-man "" who dares to be what he is ; to whom the crown of
thorns which awaits the pioneer seemed more desirable than base
comfort or indifference. But of course innumerable persons
thought themselves of the number of the 'super-men' only
because they shunned the labour to become real men at least in
the present conditions. They forgot the saying of Goethe, the
author of this idea of the ' super-man ' : " Scarcely are you free
from the grossest illusion, scarcely are you master of your early
childish will, than you think you are ' super-man ' enough and
that you may neglect to fulfil the duty of a man."
Thus has Nietzsche produced many of those effects on which
he himself first poured out his Zarathustrian scorn and con-
tempt. Many runlets trickle down from his elevation into the
depths of practical materialism, of cultured and uncultured
coarseness, for which he felt such a deep and sovereign contempt.
Others again carry out his ideas not on the vulgar level, but
into the region of platitude, as, e.g., when they make their appeal
to him for the thought that by regulation of marriages the
' super-man ' may be bred. Consequently it is not easy rightly
to depict Nietzsche's influence. Still, even this short dissertation
would be too short if no notice whatever were taken of the
abundant traces of his ideas, or certainly of his style of thought,
in the latest literature. It is necessary besides to emphasise
most strongly that it is just in those poets who show these
traces the most evidently that other influences, which are in
OPPONENTS OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 31
part antagonistic, are operative. Most plainly, as is natural,
the negative side of the philosopher comes to light. It was in
himself the stronger, and it was the easiest to understand and
to use. Thus if Sudermann in Sodom's End says : " Wit is the
master of the world ; Wit represents to us nature, truth, morals.
Long live his majesty, Wit! " Or "there is no love, no duty,
only nerves. We live in a world in which nothing is holy, and
there is no sin ! You may do and dare all, for it clothes thee ! "
And how notable the following equivoque : " I want again to
know how an honest man feels. I want again to be able to
work. Give me a fetish in which I can believe."" Answer :
" Do believe in yourself." But he : " Ha ! ha ! in myself ! " Or
a saying like this : " Beasts are we all ; all that is of importance
is that our skin should be finely marked. And a specially fine
tiger of a beast is that which we call personality."
This last saying particularly reminds us of Nietzsche and his
' blonde beasts ' — the Germans in their savage power, before they
were infected with the ' slave-morals,' In the above context it
may at the same time serve as a proof how much better these
modern poets have succeeded in pouring scorn on the old
morality than in giving ideal shape to the idea of the ' super-
man.' These new people of Sodom go to destruction along with
the old Sodomite morality ; they are too weak to set up new
tables. And when one of Sudermann's or Gerard Hauptmann's
heroes makes the attempt, it remains an attempt only. Well
says Martha in The Home : " I am I, of myself I become what
I am ; ... if you had any suspicion what life is in the
grand style ! — the putting forth of every power, a taste of every
sort of guilt. Guilty we must be if we would grow. We must
become greater than our sins ! " Clear only in its negations is
this picture. And in the Submerged Bell all the grandilo-
quent language is unable to deceive us as to the inner weak-
ness of the ' Master Henry ' : the greater the expectation as to
the doings of the ' super-man,' the greater the disillusionment
because he is in fact no actual existent. Nay, even he who is
far greater, Ibsen himself, is only the prophet of a doubtful future ;
powerful in his destruction, poor in his constructiveness except
when he exhibits those goals which are like those ever sighed for of
32 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
old: when "truth and freedom are to be the pillars of the
coming social era,'' But this again shows us how one-sided it
would be to assert that there are more than points of contact
between these visionaries and Nietzsche. We shall consequently
meet them again in a wholly different context.
Our object has simply been, before setting before ourselves
the great variety of moral ideals which are in competition
with the Christian conception, strongly to emphasise the fact
that a powerful tendency of the present time runs counter to all
that has heretofore been regarded as 'good' and 'bad,' set
forth in the expression "devaluation of all values," "the
thither side of good and evil." If we do not, while we listen to
expressions of the opinions and spirit of the present time, always
hear something of this roaring surf which threatens to sweep
away all morality as an island in the ocean, then not only is our
observation incomplete, but we fail to have a full conception of
the seriousness of the conflict.
The Opponents of Definite Christian Ethics.
How we can find our way in the multitude of those views
which offer themselves as substitutes for the Christian system,
and even compatible with it so far as they do not aim at any
' devaluation of values ' in the sense spoken of, has been above
alluded to (p. 24 f.). Their advocates themselves see an ad-
vantage in being able to state the end of moral action clearly
and convincingly. Therefore let us consider what they have to
say on this point. The remaining criteria or points of view to
which we drew attention will of themselves receive their due
attention when we would discover what is to be understood by
the term Good. Thus : to what Goal is action or conduct to be
directed if ii is to be called Good ? Now it is the special feature
of modern ethics that it seeks this goal here and now, in the
world of our experience. The really chief objection to Christian
ethics is that, transcending this world, it sees the highest goal of
the moral life in the eternal kingdom of God. Consequently we
must commence with those exponents of modern ethics who treat
that characteristic mark which they boast as their advantage
OPPONENTS OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 33
with the most seriousness. Should it then appear that all by
no means confine themselves within this limit, but rather look
beyond this boundary, and instead of limiting the goal of action
to this world (immanent ethics) conceive of one that is above it
(transcendent ethics), then we possess a doubly welcome reason
for asking this question : Is it not possible that this trans-
cendence is an inseparable part of the nature of morality ? And
then still further, if this be so, is not the way and manner in
which Christians define this goal far preferable ? An important
difference is manifest in the first class of these most distinctively
modern systems, not only for the Christian observer, but one to
which prominence is given by their exponents ; and although as
a matter of fact it nowhere appears in a pure form, it is
important as regards the treatment of the subject-matter.
Namely, the following : — If the final End which we ought to
realise by moral action is one that belongs entirely to the
present, and is a part of our experience in this world only, then
it may either belong immediately to our inner life as the agents,
or it may lie in that which we realise by our action. We take
this now merely as an expression of a simple fact. Of course we
cannot make anything at all an End — there is nothing that we
can will to realise — which has no value for us. That is simply
impossible (p. 8). If, therefore, we have said the End which
we would realise by our action may lie outside us, that is not the
same as saying that this is something indifferent to us, but only
that it is not ' Good,' ' Moral,' merely for the sake of the value
which it has for the agent. In the other and first-mentioned
case this is exactly what is asserted. The agent cannot wish for
anything but his own pleasure, his happiness, his desire, however
variously the term is used : of course it is not merely sensuous
desire that is here thought of. But this is undeniable : if the
final Goal of moral action is the agent himself alone, that is self-
evidently the same as saying — the End is his happiness or
pleasure. Therefore it is that this view of ethics is called the
eudaemonic (hedonistic), the happiness- or pleasure -theory of
ethics ; the other, evolutionary ethics, or the ethics of de-
velopment. For according to the latter, vice versa^ the goal
of action is not merely the pleasure of the agent, but some-
3
S4 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
thing of value which somehow, independently of the agent, is
evolved by his action.
Hedonvitic Ethics.
Let us first of all consider the first, the eudaemonic (or
hedonistic) ethics. The ' End ' of moral action is happiness ;
that action in fact is good which realises this End.
It is not easy to present such a theory of ethics fairly. For
one thing, because, to begin with, it appears contradictory to
bind the Good and the Pleasant so closely together, whereas
we know that each one experiences, although involuntarily
and even unwillingly, how easily and frequently those two
claimants for pre-eminence disagree. We may on this refer to
the earlier examination of the conception of moral value-
feelings (p. 11). It is under the pressure of this objection
that the adherents of that view often try to do more to secure
themselves against it than is compatible with their foundation
principles. Mindful of this, we must begin with the proposition
that no serious friend of hedonistic ethics will assert that the
action which merely secures the pleasure, the happiness of the
moment is moral action : that would be nothing but mere
selfish action, naked egoism ; and with the other proposition,
that it is not isolated feelings of desire that are intended, but
an enduring condition, and, generally, not mere passive feelings
of desire, but satisfying exertion of all the powers as a whole.
Let us, to begin with, merely put a note of interrogation to
the second proposition, and ask, Is it clear ? While, as to the first,
it is thus explained : — Good is that which seeks the happiness of
the whole, or, more carefully expressed, with reference to that
which is more easily attainable, the greatest happiness of the
greatest possible number. In its place of origin, in England,
this is often called utilitarianism. We in Germany rather speak
of the "common welfare" theory (social eudaemonism), a term
which at the same time has respect to the closer definitions of
both the above propositions.
We may not deny a certain attractiveness in this system.
It has, for the judgment of the average man, something
illuminative in its simplicity, something attractive in its
OPPONENTS OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 35
considerateness. We cannot forget how exalted ethical science
has often enough been too little regardful of the desire of men
in their misery for some measure of assured well-being, and
this doctrine must many a time have appeared to be a weapon
in the struggle for happiness. And it is little marvel that the
originators of this utilitarian ethics were with such ideas
considered to be all but inspired men. Benthamism appeared
like a revelation ; and J. S. Mill attractively depicts how even
unbroken sensuous enjoyment, at its highest, could not be
compared with that feeling of social and intellectual value
which was summed up in the idea of "the greatest possible
happiness for the greatest possible number." But on such
utterances a judgment may follow which has to do, not with a
depreciation of noble endeavour, but with exact knowledge of
the real question at issue. Above all, the question forces itself
on us. What sort of circumstances and activities are they which
guarantee the greatest good, the highest happiness, the welfare
of all ? We might expect that, if the idea of morality is based
on that of happiness, then no sort of uncertainty could in any
way prevail as to what happiness is. That is indubitably not
the case. When this utilitarian ethics arose it had a very
strong inclination to connect happiness closely with cash. For
such a view there would probably be no small majority,
supposing the question as to the sense in which happiness
should be taken could be put to the vote. Doubtless by such
means the weak side of such ethics would stand out with
special clearness. Consequently we are assured that it is
self-evidently a question about the higher ideal value ; and one
of their spokesmen has said : " Better a discontented man than a
contented hog " ; or, " The need of needs is that a man should
prove himself worthy of that name." This form of closer defini-
tion does all honour to the hearts of the hedonistic moralists ;
but does it to the logic of their thinking ? For, even granted that
it is these higher ideal activities which most further our happiness,
it must still be asked more definitely : What then are they ?
How does it stand in regard to many discoveries and inventions ?
How with reference to enjoyment of noble music ? In this
difficult situation it is not surprising that very frequently it is
86 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
just a ciraUiat in definiendo that is described if we say : That is
moral which furthers the general welfare ; our welfare consists
in furthering the higher moral ' Goods.' At best we are helped
out of this fix by emphasising quite strongly that other relevant
self-interpretable proposition, that it is just the welfare of the
whole which, rightly understood, is the true happiness of the
individual. But supposing this assurance suffices, is it more
than an assertion, if in fact a wholly new position is not thus
taken up ?
If this idea of the ethically good (the general welfare) which,
in opposition to Christianity, is so highly praised for its simple
intelligibility and applicability amid this our earthly life, is in
no wise clearly definite in itself, the same thing is true also
of the moral rules (norms) which are deduced from it. An
example : — That the soldier may not forsake his post may be
deduced certainly from the point of view of the general welfare.
But that a man who, according to human calculation, is
indispensable for the general welfare should venture his life to
save a child cannot be so deduced. And yet probably for
most adherents of hedonism that would be a particularly good
action. Of course one may again explain this by saying that
unselfish love is the highest human feeling of pleasure.
But then the above question is raised in an acuter form, and
one quite inevitable, when we inquire as to the motives of the
action. The defect of the eudaemonistic standpoint comes into
a still more evident light than when we only have regard to the
end and norm. What is it that ought to impel each individual
to be zealous for the common good .? Perhaps the thought, ' If
I do not help, 1 shall not myself be helped.' This reflection
will only bring us forward a little way on the right path. It is
precisely in the most serious resolves that its powerlessness is
evidenced. At the bottom it is only a shift of utilitarianisin
that it expresses itself so undecidedly about the relation between
personal and others' welfare. At first it says grandly : Happi-
ness is the End, and everyone rightly thinks of his own. But
soon it is his own and another's as well. After a while: Of
course another's comes first ! Of course ? If this were said
to commence with, the strong predilection for it would dis-
OPPONENTS OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 37
appear. No ! if utilitarian hedonism is to be taken seriously it
must, as its more keen-sighted exponents do (as we have already
repeatedly mentioned), openly accept the conviction that from
its very commencement feelings of benevolence (altruistic
regards) are found in men, and not merely those which are
selfish. That benevolence can arise out of pure selfishness
can never be established. Limitation of selfishness through a
necessary regard for others may, but not actual benevolence.
But even this admission — which, however, is never really made —
does not suffice. For how far ought I to follow the impulse to
personal pleasure, how far that of benevolence to my neigh-
bour ? More precisely, how much of the former and how much
of the latter will most surely further the general welfare ? To
this clearly only a very complicated calculus could make answer.
Who can form it ? Scarcely the philosopher, even when he has
a sufficiently great self-confidence in his own skill. It is more
convenient to make appeal to the spirit of the community, to
its historical experience, which is handed on as a heritage to
each fresh generation, and especially to the great pioneer spirits.
But when this impossibility of a calculus is admitted, the
principle is given up that we can with direct certainty realise
from clear, strong motives a plain and intelligible End, the
greatest happiness of the greatest number of individuals.
History, the spirit of the times, the power dominating the
individual life — these ideas are all alien growths on this soil.
Such thoughts belong rather to the sphere of evolutionary
ethics.
It is scarcely necessary to make specially prominent how
little the cult of hedonism is suited to the experience of
obligation : ' Thou shalt ' ; and that therefore not only is not
that triad of principles (End, Motive, Norm) adequately defined,
but this is true also of the other point of view, that of the
absolute law. On the utilitarian principle the majesty of this
' Thou shalt ' is to be derived from a calculation of utility, from
the approval of society, the pressure of the state, the sanction
of religion as not yet fully developed : these are to be regarded
as the strands of the cord out of which the conscience is made
up. The reckoning will not tally even if we add the above-
S8 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
mentioned ideas (in part often little emphasised, in part taken
in another way), such as ' natural feelings of benevolence,"' ' great
men," * heredity.' It is, however, perfectly clear that the whole
basis of eudaemonism is too narrow : that human nature, on the
knowledge of which it is built, is not perfectly known in its
depths. Humanity does not consist of a totality of individuals
essentially alike : its manifold unity, its historical development,
its deepest nature is misinterpreted. For this evolutionary
ethics on which the hedonistic-utilitarian leans for help has
the keener eye. The former does of itself point to the latter,
and the boundaries of both are fluctuating.
It may be asked in advance in what circles the ethics of
hedonistic utilitarianism prevails, since, on account of its final
presuppositions, it might be thought that it can find no place
in a time when the idea of evolution is predominant ; and it
shares these presuppositions with the century of the Renascence,
which was dominated by the idea of the natural equality of all
men. Now it is certainly in process of retiring into the back-
ground where close thinking prevails, but not so much in the
immediate feeling of wider districts of human life. To many its
recommendation is its simplicity, which is more apparent than
real ; and still more the close relations of the happiness and
welfare theory to the economic question. So the great majority
of the social-democratic party shows a very great leanir.g to it.
And even the so-called ' Ethical Society "" is established for the
most part on the utilitarian ethic. Many of its adherents
verbally praise sacrifices for the good of others, which have a
resemblance to Christian love of our neighbour ; others demand
such righteousness in all human collective life as shall bring with
it perfect happiness. The claim that all this has a scientific
foundation, and that as contrasted with Christian ethics,
which has * only ' a religious foundation, is scarcely intelligible
at a time when, face to face with social eudaemonism, the
right of the single personality is advocated without limitation,
as by Nietzsche; and when, on the other hand, there is the
conviction that the evolutionary theory of ethics affords a much
safer foundation for the moral life.
OPPONENTS OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 39
Evolutionary Ethics.
Utilitarian hedonism, because it inscribes Happiness on its
banner, and we all are desirous of being happy and therefore feel
ourselves pleasingly affected when happiness is declared to be
the final goal of the moral life, is alluring ; yet it is really for
this reason that we feel indisposed to put faith in this message.
We at once feel that there is a difference between that which
is ' pleasant ' and that which is ' good,' and that the words
ought not to be too closely identified, however much we should
like them to be. We have this feeling also in regard to all
those enrichments of the connotation of ' the pleasant ' intro-
duced as quietly as possible by utilitarians. They almost all
originated in the evolution theory. We may provisionally
remark that the solution is found not in the idea of being
happy but of being ' something,' and we then at once feel that
we have made some approach to the true meaning of the Good,
however indefinite. It may perhaps be much too indefinite, but
still a step towards the truth. To become ' something ' aside
from the idea of ' being happy ' is an approach towards the com-
prehension of what is meant by ' moral.' ' To be something ' —
that calls us onwards and upwards, and we have a presentiment
of that transcendent value which, however much it is now our
possession, is still more than we have at present attained to,
and helps to raise us to that which we ought to be — to
' something ' right, whole, complete. Good.
Of course, when closely examined, this concept of evolution is
ambiguous, and exhibits numerous faults — so ambiguous that
it is patient of all the various meanings which the history of the
term has already given it. Evolution is an illuminative concept
when we think of the life of a plant which unfolds itself from
the seed and the root to the stems, leaves, flowers, and ripe
fruit, back to the seed again. This is a real ' becoming ' anew,
a growth from within in harmony with the nature wrapped up
in the seed. Evolution is a term applicable to all 'becoming'
in nature, to the formation of the solar system from nebulas,
the formation of the crust of the earth, the series of living
existences ; even to history, e.g. the development of Luther into
40 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
a Reformer, or of the German Empire, and to every realm of
the mental and moral life generally. We cannot speak of its
application to the moral life without calling to mind what the
connotative marks are which the idea must have, or rather,
which are almost everywhere taken for granted, when it is applied
to the remotest realms, as if there existed a common agreement
as to its meaning, an accurate, sharply defined notion of it.
ITiat this is not so is at once its charm and its danger. In its
general use, so various as it is, at the bottom there is merely the
assumption of gradual, progressive realisation of that which, with
definite powers, already exists in germ, whether this may concern
single forces or a definite whole of such forces, or finally the
totality of all forces. In this manifold application of this
notion, so little defined, the danger generally is great of conceal-
ing our want of actual knowledge by the use of a term. This is
true not only in relation to the idea of End, but also to that of
efficient cause, but most of all to the careless elimination of the
original idea inseparable from the notion of evolution, of a
causal unity at the base of this evolution, i.e. of design, power,
driving force (on these logical difficulties in the concept cf.
Sigwarfs Logic). Still more fateful for ethics is something
else, though, for the most part, merely for the present tendencies
of thought. To a greater extent than ever before the conscious-
ness of the exhaustless wealth of the forces which the world
of our experience discovers to us has come to our generation.
The pressure of this world is so involuntarily powerful that it
easily becomes overwhelming and gains the sole dominance over
our souls.
This world becomes unconsciously the ' be all and the end all ' ;
it fills up the pleice of God ; it is even the Infinite, not merely
in the sense in which it, without doubt, presents itself to us as
such, but as the Absolute ; for a personal God there seems to be
no longer room. And indeed there is only the universe, if it
is taken in detail and as a whole in the light of the theory
of evolution. Overwhelmed by it, to the modern consciousness
it seems as if by this magic word — which at least appears to
open up long-veiled secrets — the final secret itself had been
brought to light, and in the discovery of the laws of develop-
OPPONENTS OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 41
ment the riddle of the world was solved. This tendency
of thought puts itself forward in opposition to Christian faith
in a double direction : a double direction is especially strange
and repugnant in this matter. Namely, it is at once opposed to
the idea that a personal God, distinct from the world, works
on the world and in the world ; and that in the course of
cosmic process any phenomenon is of surpassing importance or
eternal significance. The two theses are naturally connected,
and at the bottom are finally based on that grave defect in the
development theory, the want of precise definition, the indeter-
minateness of the use of the term evolution. Evolution has
had its greatest triumphs in the realm of nature. It is con-
ceivable that it could be so applied in the spiritual sphere as
it has approved itself in the other ; and even the methods of
investigation carried over, as improved, from one sphere to the
other. Conceivable but not warrantable ; because the whole
hypothesis rests on an imperfect insight into the nature of
knowledge. But it is just this that is of decisive importance in
ethics. Does not the word development contain in itself, as
a matter of course, ideas which, however valuable in another
realm and in another context, directly contradict the nature of
the moral will .? Is not, e.g.^ that imperative so often alluded
to, ' Thou shalt,' put into the background or given an
imperfect connotation .? Is not this so when under the pressure
of the common idea of development, of the point of view of the
gradual progressive ' Becoming "* ; that is, in fact, in the kingdom
of nature it stands in the fore-front of our consciousness .? Is
not the possibility of an inner transformation essentially a
strange idea to the worshipper of the modern evolutionary
theory "^
Still the question here is not yet about our verdict on
evolutionary ethics, but to give a short exposition of its nature.
When it is said : ' The end of moral action is the development
of the moral capacity,' of course not much is said so far ; for
every capacity can develop itself. In fact, the most varied
content has been accepted for the idea of evolution : and,
indeed, both for that of the individual and for that of mankind.
Accordingly the ethics of the individual and of universal
42 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
evolutionism are phrases used. To the first class all those belong
who inscribe on their banner the perfection of personality, how-
ever varied their thoughts of this perfectibility. In particular,
the Stoics grandly regarded it as the independence of the wise
man of all external circumstances, as the independence of a
person face to face with nature ; in which thought we clearly
again discover the one mark of the moral, of which we spoke,
and in fact pui-sued with so much zeal that we were logically
led much further, namely, to the unreserved recognition of an
' Absolute I^w' and of an 'End' lying above and outside the
world. Otherwise this Stoic independence, while we admire it,
gives us the impression of want of content and of something
unreal.
For us to-day that form of perfectibility which concerns the
individual is the most important, and which we find embodied in
the arresting splendour of the highest genius, Goethe, in his
youth, and made intelligible to all by his poetic creation. The
ideal is a nature cultured to a fine personality, in the fulness
of his life, the harmonious self-realisation of the individual in
the wealth of his nature (the individualistic-aesthetic ideal).
The phrase 'good and bad, like nature '' reminds us without
giving us any explanation of the questionings which arise as soon
as we seriously try to distinguish the natural from the moral.
The fii-st part of Faust will for ever remain the great memorial
of this ideal, i.e. one side of Faust. The picture of him exhibits
quite different features, and the deeply pathetic 'judged,'^
'saved' in the prison scene is itself a profound Christian judg-
ment on that ideal, when it puts itself forward as the highest.
' The allusion is to the close of the first part of Faust :
Margaret.
Thine am I, Father ! O shut not the gate
Of mercy on me !
Ye angels ! ye most holy spirits ! now
Encamp around me ! and protect me now !
Henry, I tremble when I think on thee.
Mephistophehs.
She is judged !
Voice (from above).
Is saved !
Blackie's translation.— Tr.
OPPONENTS OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 43
Of course in this way the first part ends with a great question,
and the answer which the second gives is not a definitely
Christian one, however much Christian influences make
themselves felt even there. Or, more precisely, the individual,
evolutionary ethics does in Goethe merge in that other, the
form above mentioned, in the idea of universal evolution. It
is on mankind as a whole that attention is fixed, on the wealth
of its development up to now. From it there falls light on
further progress : Forward ! cries this solution, in all the realms
of creative mind ! To contribute his share to this general
progress is the task and the pleasure of the individual. Let
the words of our poet be a witness of that : —
The world is wide and life is broad.
Years of striving, apart all fraud.
Often seek we for its meaning,
On each fresh solution leaning.
All the past of good it gives me,
All the new truth freely take we.
Glad in mind and pure in will
The goal of life advances still.
West and East, the ancient and the modern, nature and spirit,
all existence is comprehended in the idea of a great develop-
ment. There have been immense alterations in men's modes
of thought and life since the death of Goethe. But it is
impossible to overestimate the influence of the evolutionary
hypothesis on moral conceptions even for our generation. We
must for the present refrain from more than noting how by
its indefiniteness it exactly fits in with this change. Many
individual forms once famous, in which it shaped itself — e.g.
Hegel's philosophy — are gone ; the tendency to be antithetic
to Christianity (as regards the points above mentioned) remains,
and has increased in many respects. In the exuberant rhetoric
on the occasion of the Goethe commemoration, the keynote was,
as a matter of fact, the glorification of the evolutionary
hypothesis. It is to this that the vow refers : " Thy teaching
we will honour, thou great one, thou exalted one, the
unsurpassed and unsurpassable, comparable to no other earthly
being ! "
44 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
Leaving such rhetorical flights of festal poetry, the
evolution theory has in sober scientific earnest found a
significant explanation in the ethics of Wundt. The ethical
end is the development of mankind in its entire psychical
being, as this works out in the great social activities of
Religion, Science, Art, Community, State. It is an unending
task at which mankind labours ; the sense of its development
is consciously felt only at intervals ; its impulse is ever to rise
above itself to higher stages. The seat of this development,
i.e. the final operative force, is the collective will. Prevailing
over the individual will, it creates and sets forth new ' Ends '
(' Heterogeneous Ends '). There is no need to point out the
grandeur of this conception. This is quite another end than
that of the greatest possible happiness of the greatest possible
number. There is no need ingeniously to explain away all
that so far has been regarded as exalted and noble, or recognise
it stealthily, and an infinite perspective is opened up. Accord-
ingly, the rules of action become more definite, and they are
vastly more nearly related to those of Christian ethics.
Naturally, the highest summits reached by the present are
the true starting-points for future development ; while a
special advantage is, at least to begin with, the emphasis laid
on the will as the vehicle of development. By this it becomes
intelligible to the individual how it is that those dominating
motives are serviceable. But the more willingly we recognise
this the less is it possible to suppress a doubt. If, that is to
say, the collective will is the absolute lord of the individual
will, then this latter disappears as an independent entity. The
individual will is only a form of the collective will ; nay, in the
end it is appearance contrasted with reality. It thinks it
decides, and the decision is really imposed from without. It
does not act, it is acted on. That is, the moral life is a really
remarkable compound bit of the life of nature : ' Thou shalt '
and ' I will "" are lost. This we must at any rate assert, although
the proof of it can only be adduced later on. What is more,
this glitter of grandeur is dimmed by that by which at first
the moral end was illumined. This happens directly we
seriously reflect that in the last resort the ideal remains a
OPPONENTS OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 46
great unknown something. It will never show itself complete
in the course of development to any generation.
Development pushes on,irrestrainable, infinite. This 'infinite'
has double meaning. It blinds us so long as we regard it as
synonymous with 'absolute.' But it cannot help becoming
clearer to us that it means without end^ and the absolute
without goal. At this point the great question is suggested
whether the moral end ought to be limited to this world,
whether the final word of wisdom is the ethics of the present
life, the ethics which makes this ' Immanence ' its base. Here
we may just call to mind two sayings of Goethe, the great
originator and, so to speak, saint of this moral philosophy.
The first stands in the suppressed epilogue to the second part of
Faust : " Man's life is like a poem ; it has certainly its com-
mencement and its end, but yet it is not a whole." The second
runs : " How stale and flat is such a life if all its activity, all its
driving leads continually to fresh activity, and at the end no
desirable end accomplished rewards you ! " It would indeed be
insipid to call the great, glorious ends, Country, Knowledge,
Art, ' flat ' ; but is it not necessitated that there must be a
' final desirable end ' when work for them with continually
fresh courage and ever like faithfulness is possible .''
It is not all the representatives of the evolutionary ethics
who are to be so named to-day who have conceived and
elaborated their principles like the above-named philosopher.
Some have no more than an inclination for this essentially
eudaemonistic ethics to lean on the evolutionary theory.
Others follow openly and with pride the flag of evolution, and
do in fact give to their principles a special turn or colour
according to the special department of life in which their
activity lies. For one the principle of evolution receives an
aesthetic stamp ; for another the love of country fills the soul
as the highest end of life. At the present time two particular
types of the evolutionary ethics are widely spread and popular.
One of these is determined by natural science, the other by
political economy. Marx and Engel saw in the evolution of
economic conditions, in the production and the use of economic
products, the core of all evolution. The evolution of all other
46 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN IJFE
forms of activity is only an associated phenomenon of the
former. Even art and religion are therefore only reflex
phenomena of the battle for bread, the means of living. This
is the science of brotherhood, the single infallible panacea in
the circles of social democracy— or, to speak more accurately,
that so called by their leaders, for the masses favour utilitarian
. hedonism. But these ideas of Marx excited them to the con-
flict. Everything is to be made to turn on the alteration of
present industrial conditions.
Monism.
Often the industrial is associated with the natural science
basis, and this latter is on its own account a great power,
especially in the upper ten thousand. Not infrequently the
system of ethics influenced by science and erected on this
foundation is called Monism, a term emphasising the unity of
the spiritual and the natural in the cosmic process, in which
unity the former is subsumed under the latter. Thus all is
natural in agreement with the tendency of the day, proud of
its great scientific achievements in the mastery of nature. In
this direction goes, e.g., the influential work of Spencer, whom
Darwin called 'our great philosopher. "" To others the term
Monism is merely a grand name for the materialism which is
no longer attractive, or a veil for general obscur'.ty in final
questions (cf. HaeckePs Riddle of the Universe). A difference
which grows more marked has here arisen. The evolutionary
ethics associated with scientific concepts had at first an intellig-
ible leaning to recognise unregarding brute force in the battle of
existence, even in the sphere of human life, therefore inclined
to favour egoism and to derive from that the ever-weak impulse
to benevolence. Others in an increasing number consider
benevolence a product of the battle of selfish interests which
has thus grown into a law of human life. ' You cannot go
back to a stage that is passed and won,"" it is proclaimed to
those who draw such a conclusion from the evolutionary
theory : * the sympathetic-altruistic social sense, once created,
is eternal and rises to ever-fresh developments.' ' I am not
justified in doing just as I like because I can." ' The personal
OPPONENTS OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 47
ego has become wide as the world ; the love of our neighbour
stands high over all,' Occasionally in this circle the voices are
heard of those who seek to bind the idea of development with
that of real freedom ; or anyhow sing psalms over its development
in individuals which, if taken seriously, must lead to the
recognition of a degraded idea of responsibility in any adequate
sense. Strong words may be heard about that misconceived
determinism which leads to a fatalistic disregard of personal
veracity, and results in the unfruitful worship of the idols
of evolution.
From this it is intelligible that there are not wanting those
who attempt to reconcile monistic and Christian ethics, who
with more cleverness than clearness explain the idea of evolution
as essentially similar to the following of Christ, the core of all
religion. That is useful, say they, which helps the individual ;
good, that which is for the common welfare. And it is by
evolution that this ' good ' is victorious ; this morality is the
development of our nature. Drunkenness will cease like slavery.
We are only at the commencement. The true, the good, and
the beautiful are that Self which is more than we are. It will
be achieved. We shall consciously become one with the All
good or with the ' moral All.' Our power will hereby grow in
an unsuspected way, the duration of existence will increase, nay,
the dream of eternal life become an actuality ; a man without
this hope is like an eagle with its wings clipped. At the com-
manding word of science religion will rise from its bier, it is not
dead (Powell). But the development theory and the Christian
faith have been made to approach each other with more modesty ;
in England the literature increases which makes use of the
heading ' Christianity and Evolution.' We shall need to make
up our minds under what sole conditions a real, honourable
peace is possible : the merely clever institution of a relation
between terms is little helpful, as, e.g., the juxtaposition of
original sin and evolution in the proposition that we bring the
ape and the tiger with us into the world as a result of evolution.
Again, it is to be emphasised that the indefiniteness of the
concept evolution allows of very various moral ideals, and that
it is scarcely by more than a courteous etiquette that very
48 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
varied and contradictory ideas are recommended to the modern
consciousness. Especially has that double tendency in ethics
under the influence of physical science a not inconsiderable
counterpart in present-day literature. Besides the tones which
clearly recall Nietzsche, and in part are more intimately con-
nected with the idea of heredity, right on to the extreme that
we do not properly speaking live, but are creatures indwelt by
phantom spirits, there are other commingling tones which
laud love as the highest bloom so far of evolution, and as the
ripening fruit, by its own inherent force, of the future, e.g. —
"How shall I call it.? — self-sacrifice, self- suppress! on .^^ It is
somewhat that has to do with self, or rather is the antithesis of
it. That impresses me, and so you can make much out of me "
(Sudermann) ; " and everything is indeed forgiven thee but that
one thing, that thou hast no will " (Ibsen).
Positivism.
Positivism is the next most nearly allied to the ethics so far
treated, the evolutionary. This peculiarly employed term is
intended to mean that only facts of observation ought to give
answer to the question : How are we to order our life ? This
so far nobody at all will deny, and the definition will be better
understood by the converse : the facts only, with express exclusion
of any inquiry as to the final Why .'' Wherefore H What the
meaning of this is will be made clear by comparison with
evolutionary ethics. The evolution idea remains undefined in
its system, and many of its most logical exponents speak in the
plainest possible way, and with a kind of enthusiasm, of the
unattainability of any knowledge of final ends, and of how
much of obscurity there is in the ' whence,"* the past. Positive
ethics says : Let us stand aloof from the unascertainable, let us
shake ourselves free from the pursuit of the impossible and so
employ our whole energy on the attainable. Let us determine
the laws of conduct from the facts accessible. Not only are the
gods dethroned, but also science, with its search for final causes
and a final end, metaphysics as well as theology. Both these are
dissolved by the third — the only science is the knowledge of the
laws of actual life and activity, biology, i.e., in reference to the
OPPONENTS OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 49
individual, sociology in relation to mankind. Mankind ' con-
tinued long to want ' until it turned from the ' ought to be ' to
what really is. Ethics thus becomes social statistics, a theory of
the self-ordering of society. The solution runs : Reverence the
men of knowledge, and down with parties 1 The faith which we
favour is a demonstrable one, when all the hollow idols of the
old morality, such as freedom, lie on the ground. Now, what is
the content of this demonstrable belief? Order and love, the
sacrifice of the strong for the weak, reverence of the weak for
the strong — in short, an altruistic realism. Providence, the
moral ordering of the world, find their seat in the souls of men.
The highest law which the science of sociology finds is the law of
the organic union of mankind. Thus far positive ethics has
designated itself the rehabilitation of Christian ethics without
God. Man, the known nature of mankind, humanity, becomes
men's God. So in the definition of the ethical norm this ethics
has a point of contact with the Christian system. Love of our
neighbour is often attractively lauded. Important authors like
George Eliot, Loti, have, not without success, pleaded its cause.
And what is more, it has not failed in works of mercy. In the
French home of Positivism (Auguste Comte, Littre) homes for
the poorest of the poor, for children suffering from incurable
maladies, the result of social neglect, have been founded under its
auspices. Whether that law of the social organism can really
be derived from facts of observation only ; whether it really is
so plain as its adherents think, and further, how it may be carried
out in individual wills, unless these are made into mere involun-
tary tools of a natural necessity ; whether, finally, ethics can stop
short of a clear, known, final End, — all these questions are here
only noticed in passing.
Pessimism.
As ' Positive "" ethics becomes most easily intelligible from the
defects of the evolutionary, and is, so to speak, an abbreviated
form of this system, so that the two often enough intermingle,
and especially where the originally French principles of Positivism
have found entrance into England and Germany ; so we can
best grasp the one more remaining system, that of conscious
60 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
Pessimism^ from the main defects of all the ideals so far con-
sideretl, and as we have seen them appear as competitors for the
approval of our generation. We must revert to the point, on
the divergence of opinion on the determination of the moral
goal, some seeking it in this world, and others in that which
transcends it. The competitors so far considered of Christian
ethics all belong to the first class. But no art can juggle away
many unsolved questions by this means. Let us reconsider
how End, Norm, Motive were defined ; further, how the impera-
tive 'Thou shalt' found in these systems no recognition — every-
where questionings of this sort. One system criticised another,
and then suffered a similar fate itself. It is intelligible even
apart from Christian ethics how that, contemporaneously with
them all, the appeal to that which is independent of this world
was not wholly silenced. And indeed, irrespective of Chris-
tianity, in the sense of a negation of the world. The tendencies
described all found their support in love of life filled with the
faith that the goal was attainable at which they aimed,
and that it was worthy of self-sacrifice. Of course other wefts
in the web repeatedly showed themselves, but optimism pre-
vailed ; what was dark might perhaps be interpreted as the
intensity of bright light. On the other hand, he who purposely
directed his attention to defects, and as a result doubted whether
a goal belonging to the inner being could be the final goal of
human endeavour, and he who at the same time, for whatever
reason, declined the supersensual goal which the Christian faith
regards as characteristic of moral action, were logically forced to
the ethics of pessimism. This says : The extinction of existence,
as worthless, is the true End of moral action. Not only is there
unalterably far less pleasure in the world than pain (consequently
all eudaemonistic (hedonistic) forms of ethics precarious), but
also all the much-belauded ' goods ' of evolutionary ethics dis-
appear on close consideration. In its innermost core society is
ever growing worse. Honour without virtue, reason without
wisdom, satiety without happiness, are its stamp, on which, too,
there is more of evil than of virtue. ' Cheap and nasty ' is the
main principle of human action. Man is a compound of wicked-
ness and stupidity in which the latter predominates in the
OPPONENTS OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 51
masses, and the former in men of position. These resemble
wolves, those sheep ; they are companionable from vanity,
sympathetic from selfishness, honest from fear, pacific from
cowardice, benevolent from superstition (Schopenhauer). Of
course it is possible to paint in less glaring colours ; but it is a
feature common to and significant of the whole of the ethics of
pessimism that it puts its finger on the weak places of its
opponents, that it does not allow itself to be blinded by big
words about high aims, and particularly that it brings to the
forefront more strongly the neglected question as to the inner-
most motives of action. It holds an annihilating mirror in
front of superficial temporal happiness. But yet it has always
itself been helpless when confronted with the reproach, that in
reality it is not a doctrine of human action but its annihilation ;
and that it remains utterly inconceivable what sort of connec-
tion must subsist between that in the highest decree trans-
cendent End, nihilism, and the individual actual Ends which
are to be the means of its realisation. To throw up this life
voluntarily, or passively to await its cessation, appears to be the
solitary clear result of this wisdom of the worthlessness of
existence. And on motives for such action pessimism has
nothing convincing to say. How could the idea of that worth-
lessness conquer the pressing impulse of the moment, whatever
worthless End it would pursue ? Even the much-praised thought
of ' in harmony with the Infinite,' in the consciousness of which
we feel ourselves free from the illusion of existence (E. von
Hartmann), will not be proved powerful enough for that ;
although he who hesitates agreement is warned that he is
proving himself a despiser of the food of the gods, which is too
fine for his appreciation. He who, finally, admits that the
principle is indeed comfortless, but would regard it as a necessity,
is in duty bound to the proof that the pessimistic verdict on the
world and on moral action in particular is necessary ; a proof
which neither has been nor can be produced in the nature of the
case — quite irrespective of the fact that the enthusiastic adherents
of this pessimism are most numerous amongst the so-called
' well-to-do,' and do in actual life frequently behave in
accordance with a wholly different verdict on the world and on
52 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
men — a witness to the inextinguishable pressure of existence in
human society.
Mixed Systems.
Our survey of the main views on ethics which struggle with
the Christian system for mastery over the minds of men of our
time would be quite incomplete if we were not to mention in
conclusion two other points, the first of which relates to the in-
numerable indefinite combinations into which these main views
are worked up. These do not in themselves invariably exhibit a
sharply defined outline. Equally difficult of apprehension is the
mixture of views found in the manifold actualities of life. We
might even speak of an ethics of the average man or of an
unethical average opinion. Frequently enough we find in the
same issue of a daily paper the greatest contradictions reposing
peacefully side by side — praise of truth and of lying, of sacrifice
and of selfishness. In commemorative leading articles we find
appreciation of the value of self-sacrifice for the individual and
for the nation, while at the bottom of the paper, in the
feuilleton, incense is burnt to lust. In this the journal is a
mirror of the times ; a sign of the times is also the luxuriant
growth of ever new mageizines, in which each one promises to
settle this problem of civilisation of the present day finally and
for ever : often also combining the most contradictory contents.
And in actual life, alongside the hard battle for bare bread is
the search for happiness, i.e. for money, and both intertwined
in all stages of society ; stories of the old nobility, how honour
is often dishonoured by high and low ; the recreation of many
nothing else but enervating work. Alongside this the
humblest fulfilment of duty without reward ; eyes eager and
hearts pulsating with desire for all that is noble in every
position and calling of life.
The second point for the needful completion of our review is
a glad reference to the wide circles and eminent names of those
who have a cordial regard for Christian ethics, but cannot and
will not be considered as acknowledged adherents. To render an
impartial judgment on them is thus especially difficult. Their
antagonism to any alliance partly depends on their adoption of
OPPONENTS OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 53
a wonderful metamorphosis of the content of all Christian
ethics, while they yet consider themselves as its true repre-
sentatives,— we may mention perhaps Tolstoy ; partly also that
they agree to the Christian morality with considerable
reservations as to the Christian faith, — we may think of many
noble representatives of philosophy, statesmanship, historical
science, physical science, literature. Nothing would be more
unchristian than to pass an excluding judgment on these
persons ; scarcely anything more perplexing, for the reason
that it is impossible to apply any definite test to their views.
But in a connected way and without repetition it is only
possible to examine them in the course of the treatment to
which our subject leads.
CHAPTER III.
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS.
We have made some acquaintance with our opponents. Our
review resembled progress through a picture-gallery where works
of very various styles are brought together. If we reflect that it
is not a question of works of art, but on the moral shaping of
our lives, then our first impression will be a depressing one. And
that not merely for the Christian. Opinions widely spread
recognise a great danger in the fact that, to a surprising degree,
our generation is lacking in unity of conviction. And indeed
who can deny that many of those difficulties which consume the
energies of men of this generation arise from this — that there is
no longer any common certainty as to the final Ends, Rules, and
Motives of our action ? For example, many social disputes were
once less pressing and acute because rich and poor, high and low,
in possession of common needs, not only assembled together in
the same church, but also recognised the word which they
listened to there £is the unquestioned basis for their most secret
emotions, their will and thought ; although their logical con-
sequences were not always acted on in actual life. Still, they
breathed an atmosphere, so to speak, of final convictions. At
present these are themselves so various that often enough one
person does not any longer understand another, and does not even
take any trouble to arrive at such understanding. Each one looks
at things in his own way. Oddly enough, too, every fresh origin-
ator of a new view of the cosmos claims that his is for the whole
world, and demands its attention. It is easily conceivable how
in such claims the promise is often in inverse proportion to its
54
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 55
fulfilment. So far, however, as one system notices another, it is
often keener in its criticism than convincing in its constructive-
ness. In the general estimate, therefore, the doubt continually
deepens whether any truth and conviction can be gained in final
questions, since every displaced cosmic theory is succeeded by a
superfluity of newly offered ones. It is only in one point that
any number of persons are completely agreed, and that is that
the Christian ethic has lost its certainty.
An unbiassed observer might really get another impression as
to that certainty : not only because, as a matter of fact, the
moral ideal of Christianity, so often said to be dead, still exerts
an immense silent influence, but also on account of its intrinsic
character if it is only even superficially compared with its famous
rivals. These mostly emphasise one of those points of view
which pressed on our attention in considering the moral
habitudes, but it cannot be concealed how many others are
neglected. On the other hand, how complete in itself and yet,
on all sides, rich in its bearings is the Principle of Christian
ethics ! And if that is mainly only an external, formal advantage,
yet in regard to content it affords a presumption in favour of
Christian ethics. That is to say, it really avoids the defects
which overwhelm the others and with which they have been
reproached not merely from the standpoint of Christianity —
the difficulties which result from the assumption of a merely
temporal ' End ' and optimistic tendencies ; and also not
removed by the transcendental negations of the pessimistic ethics.
Is it not possible that the Christian system, with its supersensual
and positive ethical End, may unite the advantages of the others,
and eliminate their failures ? And may not its answer on the
origin and validity of ethics likewise surpass that of the others ?
Wherefore, then, considering this possibility, the courteously
cool or sometimes passionate rejection of it ?
Now certainly an accurate knowledge of the nature of
Christian ethics must form the foundation of a fitting proof
of its truth. It is only on a close understanding of its unique
character that we can base arguments for its truth. So far as
that goes, all that is said later on concerning the Christian
life is the setting forth of a demonstration of the peerless
66 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
superiority of Christian ethics. A passing and brief reference
to the master-ideas will leave us in no doubt where the real
difficulty lies, and to what points a defence and logical argu-
ments must be directed. Let us use the criteria or points
of view once more mentioned which continually come to the
front when we seek to know what morality really is, what
its origin, and what constitutes its validity. The highest End
of Christian good action is the kingdom of God^ The kingdom
of God is the fellowship of created spirits with the personal
God of love and with each other in love, realised in the divine
self-revelation through Christ. This highest End is now to be
partially realised under our present earthly conditions, and
completely in another world. The highest A^07-m or Rule of
life is that supreme command of love to God and our neigh-
bour including all other commands in itself. The Norm is
determined by the End. The deepest Motive is tlie.love evoked
by divine love. In this lies the incentive and motive power to
the fulfilment of that supreme command by which the highest
end, divine sonship in the kingdom of God, is realised. The
unique feeling of obligation, 'ought,'' * Thou shalt,' is accentuated
in connection with these master-principles more urgently than
in any other ethical system, and yet without exaggeration, as
so easily happens in the case of the others when the subject is
taken seriously. Pondering this uniqueness, the friend of
Christian ethics cannot help asking in what other system these
often-mentioned relations have fuller justice done to them, more
simply, plainly, deeply, or more coherently : — The individual and
the community, utility and evolution, this world and the next,
the glorification of this world or the renunciation of it; as
well as all sides of morals, our relation to our neighbour, to
our own nature, to the world outside of us, to God ; and all so
consistent that End and Rule and Motive are contained in the
one word Love ; even that bitter word : * Thou shalt ' acquires
a more cheerful and stimulating sound without the sacrifice
of its seriousness, but rather gaining fulness of truth — true
obedience and submission which is real freedom and independ-
ence. To its adherents. Christian ethics so surveyed seems to
be the completion of the others. For does it not combine the
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 57
truth of the empirical and intuitional theories in regard to the
origin of ethical ideas ? It is indeed the ethics of experience,
of a grand history which has its goal in Christ, its centre and
its source in Christ ; a history, too, whose final reason, law, and
goal is the living, personal God, who has so endowed and
equipped men that they ripen for their eternal destiny by
means of that history. And the validity of ethics rests both
on their own personal will and on the will of God in insepar-
able synthesis, so that what are called the autonomy and the
heteronomy of the will find a uniting principle in which
freedom and dependency are one as in no other way whatever.
I^ast and not least, Christian ethics can frankly recognise the
contradiction between the ideal and the actual, between the
imperative ' Thou shalt ' and the ' I cannot,' because it knows
how it is overcome. Elsewhere this gloomy fact is passed over
with as much haste as possible, apprehended for the most part
inadequately, or contradictory judgments are allowed to suffice ;
but here evil may be called evil, because a 'good wilP is
recognised, which has exercised a constraining power over the
most evil, the redeeming love of God as the expression of the
will of God in Christ. This is more consolatory and truer than
that judgment of evil given by pessimism, which is the only
other earnest one. Certainly the principles of Christian
morality call forth some fresh and serious doubts on which we
must shortly dwell. But for its friends this does not destroy
the joy they feel in the contemplation of its grandeur, and only
provokes their zeal to gain an understanding of its truth.
The Aversion to Christian Ethics.
Whence, in despite of this, arises the widespread and deep
aversion to Christian ethics ? We shall gain the most accurate
and most valuable answer if we do not, first and foremost, give
heed only to acknowledged opponents, with some of whom we
have already formed acquaintance ; but, at present, confine our
attention to those parties and names which we have spoken of
as for the most part friendly. Whatever it is that they object
to will be worthy of our closest attention. It is noteworthy
58 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN IJFE
how many among them agree in the classification and character-
isation of ethical theory. They distinguish Greek ethics as
that of an aesthetic naturalism, and Christian morality as that
of the revival of supernatural motive in ethics ; modern ethics
beginning with the Renascence as a resumption of the Greek
ideal deepened and broadened by the progress of civilisation.
Ethical philosophers, whose views differ greatly, agree in this
view, and to many proof of it seems to be hardly necessary.
In innumerable utterances of present-day opinion this verdict
on Christian ethics is treated as if obviously true. The Christian
ideal is regarded as a break in the continuity of development
resumed at the Renascence, enriched by Christian influences.
It is worthy of remark that Kant is for the most part regarded
as giving pause to this continuous development, however much
his services to ethics are praised. This we note, that inexorable
categorical imperative, the ' ought ' of this philosopher, gets
buried under the eulogies they bestow on him. They find that
principle just as distasteful as the seriousness of the super-
natural motive in Christian ethics.
This representation of Christian ethics vaguely outlined is
neither correct nor consistent. It is not correct ; for it rests
on the implied, though neither proved nor provable, assumption
that the Roman Catholic view of Christian ethics is the truly
Christian one. Some examples may be given. It is raid that
the whole of the ' cardinal virtues ■* of the ancient moralists have
been depreciated by Christianity. For the Greeks, insight,
wisdom, was the sum-total of th&«ioral life ; the wise man was the
good man ; the sum of life is knowledge. But the Gospel praises
the ' poor in spirit ' as ' blessed,' and triumphantly asks, ' Where
are the wise ? ' * Has not God chosen the foolish things of this
world ? ' Just so with the second great virtue — courage. In
ancient ethics, manly courage, foe against foe ; in the Gospel,
the praise of gentleness, of meekness, of renunciation of rights
without limit and at any cost, even to 'turning the other
cheek'; military service and the bearing of arms practised
with an evil conscience. It is equally so with the third virtue,
' temperance ' or self-restraint. In its stead there are the fearful
sayings about ' plucking out ' your ' eye,' ' cutting off your right
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 69
hand,"" ' taking up the cross."" Finally, thei*e is no sense of justice
recognised; the life of the state and social life are regarded
with mistrust and only endured on account of indispensable
needs ; in fact, it is the kingdom of the ' Prince of this world,""
of the *liar and murderer from the begiiming,"" of Mammon.
Besides, there is everywhere a limitation of the natural to the
point of annihilation ; love, they say, is the antithesis of all
noblesse oblige ; the whole tone of human feeling is altered ;
there is no joyous pride, only contrition and humility ; no
joy and honour, but submission to grace is to be accepted.
Indeed, if that were really the whole of Christian ethics it
would deserve, after all its long prevalence, to retire before the
more luminous beginnings of Greek wisdom ; and it would be
the task of this generation to carry this on according to the
needs of the richer civilisation of the present day, taught by the
experience of centuries. And as there lives the Greek in every
wholly and fully cultured man, we all feel, at least in the bloom
of our youthful aspiration, that picture is a trial to us. But
it does not strike at real Christianity, as it shines out in the
person of Christ ; it strikes at the monastic ideal, and even at
that only on one side of it.
Without pursuing this here, we have next to affirm the
opinion that such a description is not justifiable, and to add
the further one, that it is not consistently carried through,
inasmuch as it is immediately allowed that a series of important
ideas have become the property of the consciousness of our
time by means of Christianity, and that these must not be
lost. In a fine way this has been shown with regard to three
such ideas, those of suffering, sin, sacrifice (Paulsen). Suffering
is ennobled by Christianity ; as a means of education we cannot
eliminate it from our deepest convictions without impoverish-
ment. Sin and guilt are something ineradicably real ; we cannot
comfortably depart this life with the confession : " Without
repentance I die, as I lived without guilt."""" The hymns
" O Lamm Gottes unschuldig " (' Thou spotless Lamb of God "")
and "Wenn ich einmal soil schieden"" ('When I hence must
go "") have a far wider influence than on acknowledged Christians
only. " Finally, the world lives by the voluntary sacrificial death
60 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
of the innocent. Isaiah liii. is the right text for a sermon on
the history of the world." We are compelled to say that
such deeply moving words on the value of Christian ethics
cannot be made to harmonise with the above-mentioned view.
It bursts the framework ; for the Gospel is something else,
higher, deeper than, so regarded, it appeared to be. What at
first seemed to be so repellent will reveal itself to the penetrat-
ing intelligence as the needful bitterness of the husk if the
sweet kernel which is its life is to remain uninjured.
If now that verdict so far, when closely examined, is neither
justifiable nor logical because it allows itself to be offended by
that ' other-worldliness,"" by the transcendence of Christian
ethics, it must be just this that is the stumbling-block. And
it is on this the deepest reason of their opposition rests, viz.
that in the Christian faith these two things are taken in earnest
— the combination of the living, personal God of holy love with
the idea of ' other-worldliness.' If this transcendence is confined
to the horizon of thought merely, and is regarded as solely a
denial of the finite, then they will allow it to pass as an
intellectual idea, and as one which is really at bottom harmless.
Further, if God and man pass over into one another in pan-
theistic fashion and coalesce, who is there, say they, who wishes
seriously to combat a poetic illustration of reality ? It is
different with the Christian faith in God with its pressing,
(many say) its obtrusive claim on the whole life without
exception and without reservation, on the whole heart, soul, and
strength.
It is precisely in this aversion or aloofness from the definite
Christian idea of God that we may discern the true character
of the intellectual sway of that which is called by the very
indefinite name of the * modern consciousness,^ so far as this
name may be taken to designate anything intelligible ; or, more
precisely, if we wish to grasp the sense which it has in the
vocabulary of the day in its relation to Christian ethics. For
in a thousand respects every man now living is a ' modern
man'; but the expression used with such emphasis and self-
consciousness is intended to express a certain definite opinion
on final questions as the only one justifiable and the only one
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 61
that is of present importance. And the more closely we
troubled ourselves as to the origin and nature of this modern
consciousness, the more would the above general definition seem
justified. It is not the place here to ask from what sources
the stream has flowed. In such a voyage of discovery of origins
it would be necessary to go back to the last centuries of the
mediaeval period, when the human mind grew conscious of itself
as antithetic to all around it ; it would be necessary to follow
up further all the manifold devious paths by which emancipated
mind conquered the world, the secrets of the inner conscience
and faith as well as the outer phenomena of discoveries and
inventions. But its two main springs, the idealistic and realistic,
we find at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the
nineteenth centuries — the time when, after the great revolution,
and ,the creation of a new state, without any history, in the
New World, undreamt-of changes were consummated, as in a
jtorm, on the one hand in philosophy, art, and religion, and
on the other hand in physical science, technology, politics ; which
makes it intelligible how those who were affected by them
designated their attitude ' modern ' in a far deeper sense than
former generations when referring to the times preceding them.
It is difficult for us, standing in the midst of this current, to
decide whether in our estimate of these epochs and their
meaning we have the right perspective. We may recognise
one thing that concerns us here. This high estimate of the
human mind which is likewise a note of the modern conscious-
ness reaches back in its last roots to the word and deed of
those who regarded the soul as of more value than the worlds.
And when this is the case now there ever lives the conviction
that divine sonship in the kingdom of God preserves an unsur-
passable value, but only as a freely accepted gift through that
much - contemned ' grace ' ; while on the contrary all self-
deification of the human soul is the destruction of a right
estimate of life as a whole. In other words, the Christian
judgment on the modern consciousness will never allow that
in its deepest and best it is not of Christian origin, though now
erring and straying far from home in a world which, made into
a god, can never be God ; it is thus that it is in its sensitiveness
est THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
for every impression full of true feeling, and still, in the midst
of its infinitely increasing wealth, discontented. There therefore
might be repeated all that has already been said on the
evolutionary theory of ethics. For this theory is the general
favourite of the modem consciousness, and not simply a form
of modern ethics. So it is needful once more to bring into
prominence how various are the incongruous elements of this
modern consciousness. Not merely is it stronger in its negation
of Christian ethics than in any lucid explanation of what it
would substitute — as is in part confessed by its spokesmen in
impressive terms — as, e.g.^ Ibsen : " My task is that of inquiry ;
to answer is not my part."" It is more important to note that
thorough-going investigators into the realities of this great
world and into the deep places of human life, with their
intelligence k^nly alert for reality, encounter the hard facts
of sin and guilt, and that not merely as an interesting problem,
which for purposes of poetry or as a subject of psychical analysis
cannot be dispensed with ; — no, but because it awakens a desire
for redemption. Thus, then, responsibility is not an explicable
delusion, or a mere idea on which we may write books, in order
to provide the means of discussing the subject more fully among
one''s personal acquaintances ; and consequently the will is not
merely a compound phenomenon resolvable into nerve-irritations,
but the power of moral decision in regard to something of
real value. And this value reaches upward into an eternal
invisible world which is beyond the twilight boundary of the
visible. Let us recall some sayings of this sort : — " Upward !
on to the mountain"'s top, to the stars and to the great silences !
— I or falsehood — one of us must yield. For himself alone
there is no one. Empty space itself fill with something that
resembles love ! " These are of course often only very indefinite
words, but the deep aspiration which is a ' note ' of them brings
us further. If this be so, surely it is possible that Christ may
again become something more than a temporal deity, and His
cross more than a symbol of the rejuvenescence of the forces
of nature ; He may as a conscience be a companion in the mill
as well as on the summits of life, and not merely as a ' vision,''
but in the actual presence of His Person.
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 63
Line of Argument.
According to the proverb, ' It is proper to learn from your
foe,' we are confronted with the task of proving" that the chief
objection of the modern consciousness to Christian ethics —
which is to its supernatural character — is unfounded ; of demon-
strating that its indissoluble union with faith in God is its
greatest advantage. It would, however, not be a suitable course
to take to address ourselves at on eg to this problem and to deal
with it separately. For many do not at all acknowledge the
close connection of morality and religion — that is to say, of
Christian morality and Christian faith — who yet do emphasise
the distinction between the moral and the natural. This is the
case not merely with Kant, who, in this point, stands so close
to the Christian ethical position that he is subject to the same
condemnation on the part of many moderns for having broken into
the ' normal moral evolution of humanity.' Briefly, the acknow-
ledgment of an Absolute unites the Christian ethics with that of
many of its opponents, who, however, will not admit it as super-
natural in the sense of a religion ; and to a certain degree this is
so with all who at all speak of the ' Good,' ' the moral ' in
earnest. If it is shown in the long run that to be consistent they
must go further, the review of their position serves likewise for
the explanation of more important and more difficult ideas.
And without doubt the course of proof is to a great extent
common. In the main the question at issue is on the already
defined principle of morals, and at its highest the notion of an
absolute law (p. 12). The main point now is to consider it
closely, to examine the foundation of its claim, and to
invalidate the objections raised to it. In this argument every-
thing must start from the question of Freedom^ which was above
merely mentioned (p. 19) ; and instead of the term ' moral law '
which was also merely then mentioned, comes in that of Conscience
not yet expounded. When this problem is solved we shall have
the right basis for further examination how far morality and
religion are interconnected, and why they properly belong to
each other. In this second examination the first will find its
conclusion. The friends of the ethics of the imperative ' Thou
64 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
shalt ' will then be fuUy convinced that it is consistent to take
a second step. And then finally we are in a position to make it
clear why the adherents of Christian ethics look upon it as peer-
less, and that they are right even in a conviction which challenges
so much.
Conscience and Freedom.
Above all, the concept or notion of conscience demands close
consideration. It has already been remarked that tlie question
is essentially one that concerns the same main point as the
nature of morals, particularly of the absolute moral law (p. 19).
But not only does the notion of conscience demand the most
areful investigation because it plays a very great part in the
common speech of actual moral life (how frequently is conscience
spoken of ! how seldom the absolute moral law !) ; but also for
the reason that by its explanation the other becomes plainer ; and
especially because a series of objections whicli it is thought may
be victoriously raised against the idea of a * conscience ' makes it
evident on what point the greatest force in the defence of ethics
must be directed, and what it is possible to give up to
attack. For this purpose it will be useful to briefly pass in
review the most important theories of conscience, so that they
may serve to illustrate each other, and, in the end, the decisive
question may emerge.
As is so often the case, the juxtaposition of the most extreme
views is illuminative. We also may find that at single points
there are many bridges which afford a passage from one system
to another and back again. On the one side, quite in accordance
with a right view, as they themselves often proudly assever-
ate, stand the enthusiastic devotees of conscience, who cannot
give it enough praise in explaining its nature, origin, and
significance.
Nature of Conscience.
As to its nature. To those above alluded to conscience is — as
to what first of all concerns its form — a clear consciousness of
good and evil, accompanied by a feeling of absolute obligation,
and correspondent therewith (each according to his conduct) of a
feeling of pain or approval which is unique. This conscious-
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 65
ness exhibits its power in two ways. First of all, it 'precedes '
our action, in order to regulate it, commanding or forbicftiing.
In short, it is an inner infallible guide. Secondly, it follows 'our
action, judges it, praising or punishing, as a good or evil con-
science; 't is an unescapable, internal judge. How gorgeously
have both these ideas been depicted in lively colours ! — without
at once coming to grips and passing judgment at once on this
doctrine of conscience, we may say, depicted in such colours
and tones as have been learnt from life ; to the greatest
poets an inexhaustible theme, for the simplest minds intelligible
and impressive. As far as regards the content of this law-
giving and judging conscience, it is considered to be essentially
the same at all times and in all persons ; while the Christian
command of love to God and our neighbour is merely its simplest
expression. Of course it is not denied that there are obscura-
tions of this clear light. This is explained by sin. This is
the cause of the waywardness of conscience, but despite this way-
wardness the original clearness of its witness shines forth with
brightness. While such great things are affirmed of the nature
of conscience, things too high could not be said of its origin.
It was God's voice in men — if the thought of God must nojt
intrude into ethical theory, then it is the voice of the pure.
' practical reason "* itself. Nay, many were inclined to accepjt
a special faculty of the soul as the throne of so exalted a
revelation. If we seek to know who were the sponsors of this
doctrine of conscience, we must for its beginnings go back to
the mixture of nationalities in the Roman Empire, at which
time the anciently venerated moral ideals suffered dissolution ;
the old basis was changed from an outward to an inward
authority. The idea of a common human nature, not fully
defined, was formulated. It was to this, e.g., that St Paul
appealed in his mission preaching, although he exhibits no
sympathy with the other proposition. These conceptions
became elaborated in the theology of the Church, and attained
definiteness in the Middle Ages. After becoming a part of
Church teaching in connection with the idea, so widely popular,
of the common natural equality of all men, this view was
shattered by the Renascence. Yet the doctrine of conscience
5
66 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
_now gained a new significance. It became generally regarded,
and is indeed still regarded by many, as the immovable
foundation of morality, a basis for which no proof is requisite,
and for that very reason as the principal ground of theistic
belief and its weightiest evidence. The conscience witnesses of
God within with far more assurance than the book of nature,
and this demonstrable 'theism thus becomes a starting-point
for the mysteries of a definite Christian faith. The law of
conscience convinces of sin ; the world perishes without the
atonement ; it is on the ground of conscience that it is reasonable
to believe in redemption. A conclusion the reverse of this
was drawn at the Renascence. For it, the conscience has such
a secure supremacy that the doubtful mysteries of the Christian
faith may be neglected, the accusations of conscience need not
be taken too seriously, and no redemption by a God-man is
necessary. But for wide circles the supremacy of conscience
had already been shattered. Let us fix our attention on the
confessed opponents of this ethical theory so far described.
It has often been called idealistic (intuitional), while the
rival theory is named the purely empirical. The distinction
arises from the diverse views of the origin of conscience, and
each is taken to express such a valuation of it as is grounded
in its nature. Thus, on the one part there is a deep reverence for
the clear, infallible law and judicial authority in our o'vn bosom
which can only be worthily spoken of as the presence of God in
men, or likewise as the most real and most inalienable, as well
as the highest dignity of man — the last support of all genuine
manhood. On the other part, the inclination to dethrone this
royalty by casting doubt on the dignity of its origin, the clear-
ness of its decisions and demands, the compass and power of
its influence. That which seemed so simple, and self-explanatory
in its simplicity, is drawn into the complex phenomena of every-
day life and the vortex of history.
It is not, first of all, the purely empiristic teaching concerning
conscience which now concerns us so much as its criticism of
the above-mentioned intuitional theory. It is initially possible,
however, that the empiricists may have weighty objections to
allege against its doctrine, drawn from the ' experience ' from
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 67
which their name is taken. Nay, we must at once acknowledge
they are largely right in their criticism. The description of
conscience which we have given may be derived from what is
a true estimate — that a crown is at stake, in reality the moral
dignity of human nature ; yet the description may be inaccurate.
It is possible that its advocates have forgotten that the inter-
lacing of moral with natural (or non-moral) elements in the
account of its origin, and the apparent insignificance of its
kingdom, is no counter-proof of its reality, independence, and
majesty. In fact, the theory does not in manifold ways accord
with experience. The phenomena of conscience, forn^ftlly^
regarded, are much more complex: imagination and judgment,
impulse and fancy, frames of mind and emotions are frequently
confusingly intertwined, and consequently the distinction be-
tween the antecedent pronouncement of conscience and its
subsequent judgment, its hortative and warning, its accusing
and approving functions, is drawn out too sharply and not
accurately. For everyone knows how much there is of
uncertainty in the deliverances of an evil conscience after the
deed, as in its warning voice before the action. It is clear
that facts contradict the assertion that conscience everywhere
makes the same essential demands. Language is a plain enough
witness of this when we speak of the artistic, the commercial
conscience, or of the Greek, the Buddhist, the Christian moral
sense. It varies also according to nationality, times, positions,
and, not least of all, persons. For that I can only follow my
own conscience is at the least recognised in Evangelical
ethics. What a multiplicity of questions lies in a word so
quickly uttered ! In any case, as a matter of fact, conscience is
a whole with a very varied content. And it is not sufficient to
look upon sin as a sufficient cause. It may be so to a large
extent ; that it is not the only one is shown by any adequate
apprehension of the meaning of the Sermon on the Mount, with
its ' I say unto you,' for anyhow each of these constitutes a
new commandment. If thus the nature of conscience is not
accurately described, still less is its origin properly accounted
for. Finally, we have no interest in defending it merely on the
ground of the importance of this doctrine ; especially since
68 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
history has shown that, once a weapon in the armoury of
Christian belief, it can just as easily be used for controverting it.
Still it is worth remembering that the design of the theory and
its main principle may be right, even although its detailed
elaboration is sacrificed to its foes. The theory advanced by
these opponents is just as little, yea, still less, satisfactory.
It is summed up in the idea that the so-called phenomena of
conscience are illusory and are temporarily essential for the
advancement of mankind on the path of its development.
With a true insight into their origin they will slowly disappear.
As a concession to facts it is openly allowed that, at present
(merely in relation to the present and for the consciousness of
the individual), there is a difference between what is good and
useful and what is hurtful and evil. But it is merely losing
your way in a cul-de-sac, it is said, to stop short at the con-
sciousness of the individual and suppose that in this way
conscience can be undei'stood. We must go deep down into
the secrets of history. This teaches ^ us murder was originally
merely an injury ; it was education and heredity that made it
wicked. This transformation was completed in even greater
degree and with constantly increasing refinement. Out of little
particles of conscience, so to speak, larger masses have been
formed, until finally you get the immense, mighty whole of
conscience. So the blood-feud was weakened to compensation
made to the injured neighbour, then paid to the next-of-kin.
This compensation was changed to legal punishment, and so
on to the elaborated and detailed system of jurisprudence of
our present civilisation. However the judgments of praise or
blame on the part of conscience arose, they will disappear with
the explanation of its origin. It has, we are assured, done no
essential mischief, and even so far accomplished some little good ;
after a sufficient space of time it will pass away until the deep-
rooted prejudice disappears from every mind. Others, again,
explained this history of conscience less by a natural and necessary
evolution than as a result of conscious design. Conscience is a
powerful instrument, now for the strong and now for the weak,
and the elimination of conscience a condition of human advance
* Paley has a famous passage in his Moral Philosophy to the same effect. — Tr.
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 69
to a higher stage. But in the present connection this distinc-
tion is of little importance.
Is this type of doctrine of conscience, resting on the experience
to which it makes appeal, justifiable .'' We do not need to seek
for an answer direct from the Christian standpoint. It is, at
least in part, at once given to us by those who, in crucial points,
stand closer to it than its definitively Christian exponents.
First let us hear what they have to allege against this theory of
conscience, and then see what they would put in its place. If
there then remains an unsatisfactory residuum, we shall once
more have to resume our search ; and conscience under such
varied illumination, showing ever more clearly its greatness,
cannot but exhibit to us the determining issues on which all
assurance with respect to it depends. It is plain that those who
place conscience so low and make it merely a transitory illusion
have not taken sufficiently careful note of its operations. It is
certainly easily intelligible that certain rules of action which
originated in reflection on that which may be beneficial or
detrimental, have been impressed by teachers on the rising
generation, or by the guide on those he leads, without their
having any consciousness of the ground on which such rules
rest. It is an undeniable fact that the human will can be
largely influenced. Nay, indubitably this phenomenon of history
has often been of the greatest importance. These stages in the
formation of conscience may have happened in the manifold way
depicted by some, e.g. the repression of blood-feud may be to a
great extent founded on its injurious consequences. The real
problem, however, would be to show how, through education,
habit, heredity, such rules of behaviour have so become a part
of our conscience as to give rise to that form of consciousness
we' experience when we are speaking of ' our conscience."" It is
admitted by those who thus solve the problem of conscience
that it is a different experience which we have when we say this
action is 'good,"" than when we are content with the judgment
that it is beneficial, or when we simply act in accordance with
the rules which have been impressed on us, or do something
because it has become to us a self-explanatory habit. There-
fore the most peculiar feature of the operation of conscience
70 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
is not explained, namely, the fact that I ascribe to the resolves
of conscience a pre-eminent value in comparison with all
reflections on use, law, custom, and appreciate my own worth
according as I have obeyed or disobeyed the monition of
conscience. Now, what is it in this feeling of worthiness or
unworthiness which depends on my accord with my conscience
or my disagreement with it ?
This problem many now attack in good earnest who in their
judgment do not only yield the palm to that theory first above
mentioned, but generally speaking remain in close alliance with
it : — I mean those who unite the idealistic or intuitional with the
empiristic interpretation of conscience, giving greater weight to
the latter element. They say that the phenomena of conscience
cannot be explained as a transitory illusion ; they are rather
a permanent and highly important means for the realisation of
the moral end. While they agree on this matter, they, of
course, separate when they come to the interpretation of
conscience ; and general differences, such as we have encountered
as existing between hedonistic and evolutionary ethics, as well
as transitions from one view to the other, are here met with in
the actual treatment (p. 24). Sometimes the conscience is
considered as an abiding and indispensable means for the further-
ance of the general well-being ; sometimes as a step forward in
the development of the individual ; and, in an especial manner,
for the evolution of human beings as a whole. The first group
sees the final reason and justification of the phenomena of
conscience in the carefully calculated utility which rules of
action sanctioned by conscience and protected by a peculiar
inviolability have for the general well-being. By the reflections
which thus arise, this group sees itself necessitated to accept
the thought of original moral feelings of self-respect and
benevolence which assert themselves in actual experience and
which we call conscience. Besides this, they silently borrow
something from the ideas of the second group, and willingly
speak of the gradual spread of such feelings through the whole
mass of mankind. It is, of course, obviously much more natural
for this second group not only strongly to emphasise at the
outset the existence of such higher feelings, such ideal feelings,
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 71
but especially to lay stress on the supremacy of the collective
over the individual will, so that it is the former that carries out
in the latter whatever is of ' value. "*
On this latter assumption the objection that, by this theory,
the most important element in conscience is wholly disregarded,
does at the least disappear. It does thus recognise an absolute
value realised by the mysterious might of the collective will. So
far as the individual will is consentient to the collective will the
agent experiences a unique moral advance in life, which we all
know when we follow conscience, and a blighting condemnation
when we have resisted it. Resisted — we use the expression in-
voluntarily. The adherents of this doctrine of conscience also
employ the expression. But can it be justified ? Is not conscience
too strong, too personal, too conscious of freedom for those ex-
planations ? Or, in another way the operation of conscience is
more closely noted than in the above — the feeling of absolute
value is recognised, but yet not completely, not in its whole
depth. It is not exhausted in speaking of the achievement of
absolute value by the will, or perhaps saying that disinterested
actions, in distinction from those that are self-regarding, give
a permanent satisfaction, and that this is the reason of its
victory in the battle of the inner life. Due regard must be
paid to the idea that the will intends to decide for what is of
absolute value — that it recognises this value in a personal
decision. It is only when this feeling of freedom is recognised
that the life of the conscience is completely described. This is
not yet the assertion that there is such a thing as ' moral
freedom,"' which is a proposition that must first be proven.
StiU, the feelings of freedom belong to the complete description
of the phenomenon to be proved. We merely ask for the present :
May not the difficulties by which this idea of freedom are
complicated arise from the reason that our inspection breaks off
before we get quite to the end ? And is it not further possible
that the disinclination, often scarcely disguised, to the idea of
conscience at all arises from a cause which is at bottom the
complexity of the idea of freedom ?
In order to get a clear answer we have to contemplate the
facts of conscience still closer ; in doing this we are brought to
72 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
the theory which is a combination of the empiristic (or intui-
tional) with the idealistic, in which now the latter element is
predominant. And first of all as the form of the phenomenon
rather than its content. The simplest introspection may prove
to everyone that an evil conscience after the deed is far away
the clearest deliverance of conscience, and so, according to
the above-mentioned terminology of the old doctrine, is the
judicial, retrospective conscience. Next to this in order of clear-
ness is the judgment, ' You ought not to do that,' before the
action, and so is the prospective, monitory conscience. So un-
deniably do these experiences stand in the foreground, and as
a matter of fax:t the first in front of the second, that ethical
philosophers of importance will not recognise the so-called
sanctioning conscience at all ; a good conscience is for them
only the absence of an evil one. Who is there who never knew
that feeling of great, of unique joy which makes its appearance
after a right resolve, especially if it has cost a struggle ? and
even before the resolve, who has not heard that quiet, true voice
which as by the presence of a friend or of a father blesses us
with a feeling of home-like security so long as the readiness to
follow it prevails ? But such recollections are indeed a witness
that the most urgent tone of conscience is, * You ought to have
done difFerently.' This presupposed, we can in the operations
of conscience distinguish three relations. The first esr;3ntially
concerns the world of imagination. In the imagination of a
specific fact (whether of ideas, words, deeds is here indifferent)
there is associated the imagination of its opposite. Thus with
the cognition of the way in which we have acted there is
associated the relative idea of how we ought to have acted ; on
the other hand, when we are on the point of acting we have the
idea of how we ought not to act, and the converse how we ought
to act. The Priest and the Levite "passed by on the other
side." Now, if the thought of this conduct of either of them
occurred to them again, perhaps quite undesired, possibly whilst
being admired in Jerusalem for pious deeds of charity ; close by
the im£ige of himself hastening away for safety, each sees another
in which he is stopping to afford succour to the wounded man.
y\ce versa, the Samaritan, alongside the picture of how he saves
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAxN ETHICS 73
his neighbour, sees another of how he might have taken care of
himself. Similarly, when we put ourselves into the required
situations we find that it is not after the fact but before the
action that this feeling arises ; that is to say, with our imagina-
tion of a completed action that of the contrary possibility in-
variably associates itself. The second part of this phenomenon
of conscience belongs essentially to the emotional nature. That
feeling of pleasure or displeasure repeatedly to be mentioned
which is so peculiar, and even unique, associates itself with the
imagination of an action past or future ; it cleaves right closely
to it, but it is all the same independent of it in so far as its
consequences in relation to the external world are concerned.
Its consequences in relation to the agent by which he feels his
self-respect injured or helped, confirmed or denied, vivified or
blighted are related to self alone — but this ' self alone "" is every-
thing (p. 16). The Samaritan staked his life, and in so doing
gained a life that is worthy of being so called. The Priest and
the Levite saved their life and lost it. Many specifics for this
deepest of all ills have been discovered, praised, used. Immense
efforts have been directed to this end. It remains unattainable
as long as there is a ' conscience "* which even when it slumbers
spontaneously wakes up again. Evangelical ethics stands on
the conviction that it is aware of the way which alone can be
taken save at the expense of conscience, which does not lull it
to sleep but makes it keener. But what is the most painful
thing in this feeling of smart ? Here on this second character-
istic of the nature of the processes of conscience there appears a
third which is in this connection of the most importance. Those
before mentioned are recognised by the above-named exponents
of conscience ; but the one now to be mentioned is a burning
question in the decisive contest. It belongs to the sphere of
Will. This is the mystery of the world. Every action is my
own. My 'ego' cannot declare itself as something separate
from its own doings. If this were otherwise, it would be utterly
impossible to speak in any strict sense of a recognition of an
absolute law if this recognition was an independent something
outside the purview of the will. We are now evidently at the
point which was above seen from a distance. All the ways of
74 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
regarding the subject run up into the great questions of
responsibility and freedom.
Before we expound these we must complete our consideration
of the way in which the conscience asserts itself in experience
by expressly mentioning that only the great common marks
should be brought into prominence, for the experiences of
human consciences are as indefinitely numerous as individual
men, both as regards their original and acquired strength,
bias and composition of their mental faculties. And for the
sake of clearness a single operation of conscience has been
considered, while in actual life it is just that bent of mind
which is formed of the individual phenomena which is of the
greatest importance. We may reflect on the pathetic picture
of a human being burdened by the ceaseless pressure of
conscience ; or on the inspiring vision of the peace of con-
science which we see embodied in Jesus, Then the mis-
conception scarcely needs to be averted that, in that which
has been advanced, we maintain the existence in all cases of
an equal functional endowment of conscience. It is rather
in the battle of life, in the inconceivably manifold chances and
changes of life, that the individual is led to such experiences.
But certainly this is on the basis of a definite groundwork of
the complex interaction of thoughts, feelings, and exercises
of will-power which is marked by the presentiment of some
absolute value for which it is bound to decide.
Finally, a brief reference may again be made as to the content
of judgments of conscience. Christian ethics has no cause
whatever to belittle in this the immense influence of history ;
it sees in Christ in ' the fulness of time ' the express image of
God ; it believes in the living God, who as the God of order
gradually realises in time His eternal counsel. What it must
needs desire in reference to content are those ideal feelings
which, as we saw, are discerned as soon as our reflection on
these fundamental moral problems goes deep enough.
This whole examination of conscience ought to serve to
closely define that one main subject to which any justification
of Christian ethics is compelled conformably with the subject
to direct itself ; namely, to that uncompromising 'Thou shalt'
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 75
which is a stumbling-block to the modern consciousness, and
which many will yet not sacrifice, who still definitely share
with Christian ethics a belief in the other great stumbling-
block of this consciousness, the union of morality with religion.
At present we are plainly enough cured of that delusion,
once and still widely spread, that conscience is in itself an
unambiguous whole, quite clear in itself; even requiring no
proof; in a position to bear the whole edifice of morality.
On the contrary, we are compelled to confess that the examina-
tion of conscience calls forth many difficult questions which
tend to shatter the validity of morality and have been actually
used for that very purpose, e.g. the largely changing content
of conscience. But we have surely found more than this. Not
indeed an impregnable rock, but a fact which, the more we
investigate it the more does it appear to be worthy of
justification, which the more entirely we let it pass for just
what it is does it also show what it is that is in need of
justification, and gives such a determining element as is
demanded for this purpose — namely, that imperative 'Thou
shalf in its full sense, or that absolute moral law. And
indeed it is such imperative in this inseparable combination
with the consciousness of personal moral freedom the neglect
of which appeared to us as a defect in so many investigations
of conscience. Our immediate task is to find a foundation
for the moral law, and with it at the same time for that which
is inseparable from it, moral freedom. Still more. Even
the method of a possible foundation is already suggested to us.
The question is not as to the explanation of the moral law and
freedom in the sense that we would show from what causes
our subjection to the moral law arises. That would be self-
contradictory, provided that this subjection is a fact of our
freedom. It is rather our task to show what significance, for
the individual and for mankind, such a moral law only
effectuating itself in freedom possesses, and then how the
objections raised against this idea of freedom can be overcome.
76 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LtFE
Freedom.
We may begin either with the moral law or freedom. But the
idea of freedom is so great an offence to the modern consciousness
that whatever we may choose to say about the significance of
personal sacrifice for the 'good' is either not listened to, or
receives a false interpretation, so long as the antagonistic bias
against freedom is not destroyed. By this course what we have
to say on the meaning of the imperative ' Thou shalt ' comes
into a clearer light. We recognise that the simple idea to
which this justification amounts is only capable of proof accord-
ing to the nature of the subject, and in all simplicity.
It is self-evident that we must first of all say exactly what we
understand by the ' freedom '' which we wish to secure against
objections. There is, however, a still more immediate problem.
The whole difficulty, that is, would fall away altogether if a
proof were gained that we have no compelling reason to speak
of freedom merely on account of that imperative ' Thou shalt."*
Shortly put, is there a necessary connection between responsibility
and freedom ? In our doctrine of conscience (p. 72) it appeared
that, if the will of the agent is not recognised as final and
decisive, we have no exhaustive account of the real phenomenon.
It appeared to us to be insufficient to emphasise the feeling of
the obligation of the moral law, the absolute imperative 'Thou
shtdt,' and its unique inner effect, according as we submit to it
or not ; rather were we led on to the thought of responsibility
in the strict sense there spoken of, how it includes the idea of
actual freedom, not merely the idea of " an agent acting under
the impression of freedom."" But we are always again hearing
the decided assertion : it is precisely when responsibility is
completely recognised that there is no possibility of freedom
open ; it is only the denier of freedom who can speak of
responsibility. For when freedom is assumed, where is the
' subject,' ' the person ' whose personality and whose actions can
be judged } As he is free to act in any way at any moment,
a person with a 'free wiir would be incapable of feeling
responsible for his actions ; in such a complete indeterminateness
there is no action of which he could affirm, It is my own ; there
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 77
would be no tree able to bring forth fruit ; this uncertainty in
his resolves is the antithesis of responsibility. Teachers, for
example, have on the instigation of this self-same idea declared
that their art would founder on this unknown free will incapable
of the influence of motives, which never offers to another a firm
hold on which it is possible to trust, and with which we can
reckon. We are compelled to have regard to these and similar
objections if in what is hereafter said we are to understand what
freedom means. We see from them that this notion can be
defined contradictorily and confusedly in reference to the idea
of responsibility on account of which that of freedom is asserted.
But as to the truth of the proposition that freedom and
responsibility are mutually exclusive, unfavourable judgment in
regard to it is awakened by the circumstance that cool writers,
intelligent and sober, grow excited over it. Probably they find
it necessary thus to strengthen their faith in their assertion that
it is an absolutely necessitated, determined will that alone can
feel responsible for its actions — these not being really its own
doings, but mere ' happenings ' to it. For how, it is asked, can
the following propositions be refuted } We cannot be considered
accountable for action in which our consciousness of personal
agency is suspended. Organic existence is a slow process of
evolution ending in man. The consequences of this are : ' I '
was born with this or that character, and had such and such
guardians, teachers, instructors. Teaching and example
operated just according to the relation which I — this product
of evolution — bore to them. And it has thus come to pass that
I at this moment have this feeling of compassion or that of
delight at another's misfortune. The whole of the cosmic
process must have run another course for me to have any other_
different feeling in ever so small a degree. And just so, that
I now speak thus with reference to freedom and responsibility is
necessitated, and if the reader is not convinced it is equally a
matter of necessity. When 1 say, ' I Avill write,' or ' I will not
allow myself to be convinced,"* I act also under this law of
necessity. Any such resolve of the will is a necessarily
determined action — determined by the sum-total of all causes
and effects. Now, we cannot be considered accountable for action
78 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
thus arising in which consciousness of personal agency is
suspended (Ree). This is refreshing clearness. Of course it is
said in order to lessen the impression produced by this clearness
— so says the materialist ; but the modern monist is not involved
in this consequence. He says, if we only recognise the
uniqueness of this mental (psychical) process, and its inexplica-
bility on grounds merely naturalistic, i.e. mechanical, and its
complete inner unity, i.e. its empirical character (see below), then
the strongest determinism, the conviction of the absolutely
necessitated nature of all such psychical phenomena, is quite
compatible with a recognition of responsibility and accounta-
bility, as also of guilt and repentance, of the evil and the
good conscience — nay, renders these facts intelligible. Mere
shifts ! For the question at issue is not at all as to the different
modes of its activity, whether it is mechanical or psychical
causation, but whether that activity is necessitated. But if it
should be said that the result of voluntary action, precisely
described, is determined by psychical causes as distinguished
from mechanical activities, while it is not contained in these
causes and is the production of something new (Wundt), then the
dreaded idea of freedom which had just been ceremoniously dis-
missed is modestly allowed to enter by a side door For surely a
determined result arising from precisely determined causes is
contained in those very causes. Such attempts are consequently
proofs of the fact that the proposition is justifiable when it
is affirmed that responsibility and freedom are indissolubly
associated. It is thus no more than a mere oracular utterance
when we are told that we ought not to say, ' I could have acted
differently,' and also, * I could not have acted differently,' but
simply, ' I am not the person I ought to be.' This is the
continual effort to disguise the real point, and while strongly
emphasising, ' I was under obligation to act so or thus,' that is,
' I was bound ' to veil or forget to note the corresponding
proposition, ' I was to blame for acting differently from what I
ought ' ; which is to say, ' I was the originator of action which
might have been differently performed by me.' Now it is on
this latter in connection with the former, and not merely on
the first alone, that the feeling of responsibility depends. Assent
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 79
to the actual state of the case is more easily obtained if we make
it quite clear that it is by no means the same thing to recognise
the intimate connection between responsibility and freedom, and
to recognise that these two intimately connected concepts really
denote some actual reality and are not merely illusory. Of the
nature of freedom we are not now treating, but insisting on this
connection, and that he who recognises responsibility must
affirm freedom as well. And for this the greatest antagonist of
freedom gives a quite unexpected witness. To think of " the
feeling of responsibility," says Schopenhauer, "for what we do,
our accountability for our actions, without self-contradiction,
without allowing : ' I can do what I will,' i.e. without freedom,
passes my power of comprehension." Since, then, Schopenhauer
must in denying freedom deny responsibility, he denies the latter
only for this world of space and time, and takes refuge in a
freedom which is independent of this world as is its final
reason. Whether this idea is not self-contradictory is not now
our question ; but merely the confession of the greatest
antagonist of freedom is to us of importance, that the sacrifice
of freedom can only be made by the sacrifice of responsibility.
It is still possible for the objection to be raised that Christian
ethics ought to be very cautious (as it has so far happened)
about entering the lists for freedom, since surely St Paul and
all the Reformers have borne witness to the great might of
grace and to the helplessness of the human will. Luther,
e.g., says : " If anyone affirms that it passes his understanding
how to reconcile the omnipotence of God and the moral freedom
of men," he answers, " It passes my comprehension too " ; that is
to say, our Reformers have recognised the relation of grace to
freedom in the strict sense as an impenetrable mystery, without
casting aside either the one or the other. Calvin, e.g., main-
tained both that Adam fell because God so ordained it, and
that Adam fell by his own fault. But many now appeal to the
Reformers who are not able to recognise the fact of freedom,
and so regard guilt ultimately as an illusion.
But what do we understand by the freedom which it is
purposed to justify against its foes ? The path to an answer is
so far indicated to us by what has been said, and what it is can
80 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
now be in all respects made unmistakable. It is not for any
and every reason, but for the sake of responsibility, that our
freedom is important, ^fherefore at the outset it is to us
very much a matter of indifference what has been maintained
of the nature of freedom. It is indifferent that it is sometimes
too much and sometimes too little, because, as often happens
in such cases, that which is too much is where the real issue is
concerned, too little, and vice versa. We already know that the
freedom we mean is not the capability of deciding at any
moment for any conceivable, especially for one of two antaggn-
istic possibilities without motive. Our opponents are very
willing to saddle us with this notion, in order to show that it
is impossible to speak of the responsibility of a will so in-
determinate, capable of any transformation at any second,
which so conceived cannot be regarded as a ' will "" at all.
Because we grant this at once, those pictures, all more or less
humorous, of a will which finds its historically famous type in
the domestic friend with the grey coat who died of hunger
between trusses of hay, because, in a complete state of indecision,
he was incapable of adventuring his motionless tongue on either
of them, do not affect us at all. It is more important to
delimit the freedom of moral resolve against the ' too little,'
against the assertion of mere self-activity or spontaneity,
absence of external incentive, while at the same ti'ne it is
maintained that compulsion, necessity as to the inner course of
our presentations, emotions, volitions, is just as complete as in
the movement of the heavenly bodies. Clear, conscious reflec-
tion and voluntary determination may be at the same time
emphasised in strong expressions : still stronger is the appear-
ance that it is the real freedom that is confessed (for which we
are concerned) when reference is made to the fact that this
psychical or intellectual freedom (as it is called) is developed
in the life of the individual, that the immature child does not
possess it, nor an imbecile, because it is inseparable from the
clear self-consciousness which can alone present to the mind
its entire rich content. But this self-consciousness itself is
conceived of as a completely determined unit, just as deter-
mined as the external world with which it stands in a nexus
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 81
of causation ; and accordingly reflection and decision are
necessarily determined, however much they present themselves
to our consciousness in the forms of our psychical life as our
very own. We have the feeling that we ourselves determine,
but in reality we are determined. We think that we act ; in
reality we are acted upon through and through. Certainly this
psychical freedom is the necessary presupposition of moral
freedom ; we do not ascribe the latter to the immature or to
the imbecile, because they do not possess the former. But
psychical freedom is not the same as moral freedom. What is
the difference between them ? No more and no less, we maintain,
than what is essential to preserve the integrity of responsibility
undiminished. And that is the power to submit to, or to resist,
an intelligible ' ought "* ; to say yes or no when a moral com-
mand, that is, an absolute demand, is made on the decision of
the ego. Then, moreover, we really understand (as has been
already so frequently affirmed) to some degree, perhaps, why it is
that obedience or disobedience to a categorical imperative, an
absolute command, has as its consequence generally a special
feeling of pleasure or displeasure ; but not its whole uniqueness,
not why I must stand alone as the doer of the deed, and in the
case of transgression know myself guilty, and find the keenest
sting of guiltiness in this feeling that I was not under compul-
sion, but could have done differently, instead, finally, of being
able to console myself with the reflection that somehow I was
subjected to a fate and to cruel necessity. If we define moral
freedom — which, taken as an isolated expression, is of varied
connotation — thus : ' I can will what I will : I can will what
ought to be but not what must be nor even what can be : I can
begin a new series starting with my volition — it is to be under-
stood in the assigned sense. But it is essential to examine more
in detail the point at issue into which all such concepts run up,
which, put in brief form, are so easily misunderstood.
Our opponents, for instance, think that their game is an easy
one when they point out that all action is determined by
motives, and that the advocate of freedom ignores this most
certain of all psychological facts. By this assertion they
cpndemn him for a mistake which he has not at all committed,
6
82 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
The acknowledged moral imperative is without doubt a motive,
and even conceivably the strongest of all : we know at once the
majesty of the 'ought' and the unparalleled self-condemnation
with which it threatens us : we know also that it is no tyrant
which demands blind obedience, but a monarch whose service is
freedom — our true life, which is alone worth living. But the
question is whether the force of this motive is only felt accord-
ing to the determined character, training, habit of the agent
(according, that is, to his empiiical character) on the one hand,
or according to external circumstances on the other hand ; or
whether the agent has the power residing within himself to give
to that motive a strengthened force, the preponderance over
all those resisting inclinations and impulses which are the
product of the above-mentioned factors ; whether he has merely
the power to maintain and develop himself as he is, in his given
nature, or to renounce and deny that given nature in order that
by the death of the natural Self he may gain his true life.
Differently expressed : there is of course no action without its
motive ; but the question is how the determination of motive
arises and how one becomes the decisive factor. The more
plainly a moral action comes to the focus of consciousness,
the more clearly is it seen that the final motive is the absolute
imperative in the recognition of which we reach our true destiny.
But with this, with this consciousness of an intelligible main
motive, there is associated the feeling of freedom, the feeling
that we allow it to prevail as a main motive because we so
resolved without compulsion ; the feeling that we have given it
the predominance over other motives in doing what we could
have done otherwise. Our opponents unwittingly bear witness
that the experience is rightly described in such sentences by
resorting to hyperbole, and speak, e.g.., of the strengthening of
the motive by the agents, or praise their obedience to the
moral imperative as if they could have acted differently. The
totality of the circumstances (they say) are of course not in our
power ; but all the more earnestly ought we to attend to those
factors of moral activity which are in our power ; we ought to
apply ourselves to strengthen moral motive as far as possible ;
to transform our individuality, and the like. This sort of
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 83
demand — understood as an unbiassed reader will understand
it — -says just what we have above asserted. But shall we
not say : Why their illusive speeches ? For what is the real
meaning when it is said : ' We ought to strengthen motive as
much as possible,' and silently think : ' but that is impossible "■ ;
or, ' We ought to pay serious attention to the factors which are
in our control,' and silently think as well : ' Those on which the
matter really hinges, are, however, not in our power."* In the
sense which has been now precisely delimited, the advocates of
freedom should openly admit even the expression ' freedom of
choice ' ; no cheap sneer ought to restrain us, or else there will
ever be an ambiguity. In the moment of moral resolve he who
makes the decision is " not under the compulsion of any external
or internal circumstances as by an irrefragable necessity to
affirm a determined possibility, but he decides independently
for one of the various possibilities " (Sigwart).
In this place again we are justified in declining all exaggera-
tions, even those which emerge in the recognition of the correct
principle that freedom is solely maintained for the sake of
responsibility, and is consequently but the freedom of moral
resolve. Even to this there is often granted a greater extension
than is compatible with experience, just because the idea of
responsibility is extended further than its nature permits.
There is not only no such thing as responsibility in the strict
sense for the actions of another, except so far as they may have
been conditioned by my free act or have become my own ; but
also that is an exaggeration as unavoidable as it is dangerous
that I am responsible in the full sense for every one of my
own actions, and accordingly free in respect of it. Christian
ethics especially has no need whatever to depreciate what its
greatest exponents have said on the slavery of the natural will,
and of the curse of evil action which must beget fresh evil, and
just as little of its boast of its life in the Spirit, of its joy in
the Good. Nay, still further, no single moral resolve is made by
a naked ego, void of content, but by a personality already
determined — determined in all stages on the side of evil and of
good. It is impossible for any formula to include the wealth
of life in this respect. The art of the poet embodies for us
84 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
some surprising and especially attractive cases ; but life is
richer than the greatest art. In the Christian doctrine of sin,
especially of 'offences,'*' we shall have to recollect this. As to how
much responsibility, and corespondently how much freedom in
the sense above defined, each person has, no individual Christian,
acccording to the testimony of St Paul, is in a position to pass
an impartial judgment on himself. The most penetrating self-
judgment finds its issue in the word : " He that judgeth me is
the Lord"(l Cor. iv. 3). Nevertheless, a moral judgment on
the character of others as of ourselves lies on the assumption
that somehow, at some time and under some sort of circum-
stances, everyone is responsible, and on that account on the
whole free — this much-misemployed word so understood as to
mean that he by his own resolve can accept or reject the
intelligible moral imperative. Granted, as we must later be
convinced, that the most important act of freedom is the
acceptance of the divine work of redemption (inclusive of all
the preparations for it) which frees the enslaved will, then
all that is so far adduced is valid, and that in the plainest
possible way.
However cautiously the idea of freedom may be circumscribed
and bounded, not merely for the sake of antagonists, but
for its own sake, it still offers sufficient opportunity for attack.
How are we to set in order the most important arguments
against freedom, in order to put them to the proof,? It is said
there can be no freedom ; the assumption violates a law of
thought. And it is said there is none; for facts are against
it. Which objection is the more terrifying ? It appears to be
the first, so far as it excludes from the circle of those with
whom we can seriously treat the advocates of freedom, what-
ever one may say as to facts. It appears to be the second, for
facts are irrefutable. But possibly the question is as to facts
which are only dangerous on a fixed interpretation, and perhaps
the unthinkableness is too hastily affirmed just because other
facts are not allowed their due weight, but are too hastily inter-
preted in harmony with an apparently self-intelligible idea.
* ' Offences ' in the sense of leading others into sin, as in St Matt, xviii. 6, 7
and parallels. See below, pp. 88, ijo. • ' /»
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 85
Let us begin with facts. Two groups require notice : special
and surprising facts of statistics of morality, of hypnotism, of
heredity ; and general facts observable in every psychical process.
Let us put the last first. For, supposing the reasons can be
given why xve think we are free to act ; supposing freedom can
be proved to be an illusion, then the whole question is settled.
No one torments himself with a mysterious process when it is
shown that it contains no mystery. Possibly this is also the
case with regard to the feeling of freedom. The assertion is
not sufficient that our feeling of freedom is essentially more
unassailable than any other fact (Lichtenberg). And really
many believe that they can show how the illusion of freedom
arises. With more acumen and brevity than others Schopenhauer
has attempted to give this proof. He shows that the question
ought to be put precisely thus : Can I will, what I will ? Not :
Can I do what I will ? It is obvious that the latter may be
affirmed ; but the affirmation is valueless, for how can a
voluntary agent do any other than he wills ? But that the
first is to be denied, viz. that we can will what we will, or
freely and of ourselves bring about a decision as between two
possible courses. This Schopenhauer endeavours to establish by
a close analysis of the so-called free action, namely, by an
analysis of motives. His picture of the holiday-maker who
reflects on the possibilities of his free decision is famous. " I
can — he possibly says to himself — either go a walk or I can go
to my club, or from the top of a tower admire the sunset, can go
to the theatre, visit a friend, can run off to the city gate and
never return ; but none of that will I do, but I will voluntarily go
home to my wife.'"' That is, says Schopenhauer, as if the water
in the pond spoke and said : " I can go into the waves as high as
a house — yea, into the stormy sea ; I can go rapidly down — yea,
in the stream ; I can tumble spurtling from the height — yea, in
a waterfall ; I can mount up freely into the air — ^yea, in the
fountain ; I can pass off into steam — yea, at 80° Reaumur ;
but none of that will I do, but I shall remain quietly in the
crystal pond." That is, that 'can' is never present as an
actual thing, unless quite definite causes are present ; but then
that is just the same as necessity. Precisely so with the man
86 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
with his evening oft'. The motives which he can present to
himself for the one or the other conclusion — for the walk, or
the theatre, or the home-going — are not a whit less compulsory
than the mechanical causes which keep the water in the pond
or raise it in the air, or boil it into steam. The difference
between internal motives and external causes is only that those
are thoughts which we imagine to ourselves in the form of
reflection one after another. This is the one chief cause of
the illusion of freedom, viz. our failing insight into the
compulsory power of motives. The other lies in our not
knowing precisely the second factor in the calculation, or at
least only gradually learning to know it, namely, the determined
mental habitude, the determined bias of the will — the ' empirical
character' — on which those motives light, which is itself formed
by disposition, education, habit. According to the difference
in the bias of the will, will be the difference of the impression
made by these motives ; but always an absolutely necessary one.
Accordingly, if in the above example of reflection the person
saw a denier of freedom standing by, he would apply himself
possibly to giving a demonstration of freedom instead of going
home or to the theatre. But this would only be the case if the
idea of refuting the foe of freedom was for his mental habitude
a stronger motive than those motives which should plead for
the other possibilities : absolutely necessary is the resolve also
in this as in all other cases. It is not always that we are able
to complete the calculation, because, in thinking retrospectively
of a decision made, we cannot name all the motives in their
order of strength, nor the several items which made up at that
moment our empirical character; but the imperfection of the
calculation is, it is said, no ground for denying the daylight
clearness of the idea.
Now, as far as the idea is as clear as daylight we have already
recognised it and used it in order to make plain the nature
of moral freedom (p. 80). That motives may operate like
mechanical forces as causes is indubitable, and the recollection
of the effects of a cry of ' Fire ! ^ in a crowded theatre is merely
a clear illustration. We have further emphasised that no
resolve can happen without operating motives ; nor forgotten
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 87
that these likewise owe their different methods of exhibition
to the disposition of the individual. Nor have we under-
estimated the importance of the empirical character. And
this so little that we should have nothing to object to in the
example given, if it were made complete by the inclusion of a
moral action in the strict sense. Suppose in the course of
reflection on the holiday occasion referred to, instead of the
continual series of pleasant alternatives, there was the case of
a poor invalid some distance outside the city to be visited,
involving an unpleasant renunciation of all enjoyment of the
off" evening, then we would consider our philosopher right if
he said : If he goes to the invalid friend, then the moral motive
of compassion becomes the strongest for him because that
emotion is grounded in his character ; and another person with
other innate or acquired bias of will would just as certainly
not visit the sick. But Schopenhauer's whole statement could
only suffice as a proof against freedom if it were already proved
that the decision in favour of one motive in preference to
the other is excluded, which even our opponents from their
point of view, with their contradictory hyperbolic utterances,
are grudgingly inclined to recognise as the really decisive
constituent of our personal experience (p. 82). And we may
once more refer to the fact that it is just the most acute
antagonist of freedom who is not finally content with that
reply. That is, so soon as the feeling of responsibility is brought
into the question, he says that responsibility without freedom
is quite beyond his comprehension. Accordingly he betakes
himself to the shift of a timeless freedom (p. 80). The cir-
cumstantial exposition now considered, which has been so often
admired and often repeated with less of grace, is therefore only
a little drama, which for a while, like dazzling fireworks, makes
you forget how deep is the darkness in which this most ancient
of problems, that of freedom, still remains. What we do gain
is a deeper insight into the nature of the psychological processes
with which a free resolve is involved. It is not shown that
there is no such thing. The facts admit another interpretation,
and even demand it, unless responsibility is to be a mere empty
delusion. The force of motives in their connection with the
88 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
already existent bias of will may be fuUy recognised, and yet
we may assert that the ego can carry the motive of the moral
imperative against all other motives and in opposition to the
existent character, if it were only in single moments ; if it
were only then perhaps when, as the Christian says, the gracious
will of God lays hold on the human will.
Are the other facts which are said to contradict freedom of
more force? They contradict on a whole only a notion of
freedom arbitrarily set up, and do not reject as unintelligible
that which for the sake of the moral life alone is dear to us.
The inheritance of certain dispositions, and in fact heredity in
all departments of the psychical life, Christian ethics can fully
accept, as well as the influences of human society and of external
circumstances. How much more difficult or easier the battle
of morality may be for one in comparison with his neighbour
can only be imperfectly determined by themselves or by their
immediate earthly judges. That they, despite all other weights,
can of themselves cast another weight into the scale the feeling of
responsibility convinces them precisely when they allow it its
due force, without exaggeration and without concealment ; and
where they are in doubt they appeal to the omniscient. Also
the much-vaunted calculations of statistics of morality are not
in need of any sort of clever manipulation. They do give
valuable peeps into the power of social circumstances, the
interlacing relations of all with all who have been previously
or contemporaneously similarly situated ; therefore into the
significance of the world and of ' offence ' in the sense of the
Holy Scriptures. The tabulated statistics, which exhibit for
great groups and spaces of time a similar number of crimes,
would only be a proof against the freedom of the will if they
comprehended such actions as were carried into execution in
like situations by a like number of men, i.e. in equally gi-eat
temptation (want, power of resistance, etc.), and an equal
number of external occasions for the crimes in question. It is
clear that this cannot be asserted in reference to the mere figures
of cases lumped together. Lately, hypnotism has often been
vaunted as a proof against freedom. It was curious when, from
the theological side, joy was loudly expressed that, through this
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 89
influence on the soul-life, drunkards hitherto irreclaimable could
be ' converted.' It was not less curious when doctors believed
that they could now at last give the death-blow to the idea
of freedom. Both ought to have been aware that that sort of
phenomenon only sums up facts little known before or regarded,
of the way in which the influence of another's will may make
itself felt, and nothing more.
CaiLsality and Freedom.
The only really formidable antagonist of the freedom of the
will is not any fact. Facts are only adverse by the impugnable
interpretation set on them. It is rather the uninterrupted
cohesion of all reality, i.e. the idea of universal causality. It
has been possible to come to an understanding so far in regard
to all other objections, and we do come across many utterances
which go further in the way of reconciliation than logical con-
sistency allows (p. 82). But in the rear of all these objections
there stands that which is derived from causality, which is
supposed fatal to all explanation. " If there were freedom,"
says Schopenhauer, "the intellect would cease its activity at
the moment of its acquirement, for causality as a law is the
commonest ' form ' of the thinking faculty."" " There can be
no freedom ; a causeless occurrence, an occurrence not adequately
grounded, is a contradiction in terms."
When our opponents call causality a law of thought, what
they mean to say is : Thought is unable to conceive of any
reality otherwise than that — as a necessary effect of its causes,
and in turn a cause of fresh necessary effects — it is an absolutely
determined whole in the uninterrupted cohesion of all reality.
It is then self-evident that there can be no free actions. Or, to
put it in other words, they make what is unthinkable the
same thing as the inexplicable, and have in this intelligible way
renounced freedom. But is it correct to say that causality
thus understood is a law of our thinking .? This much only is
correct, that without understanding it in this sense any know-
ledge having a constraining force for a sound mind, i.e. any
empirically scientific knowledge reducible to universal pro-
positions, is impossible. That is to say, this interpretation of
90 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
causality is not an axiom of thought but a postulate in our
search for the uninterrupted correlation of our knowledge
(Sigwart, Loffk, ii. 21).
Of course so powerful is the impression of the causal nexus
in the kingdom of nature, and at the same time so intimately
intertwined with our inner moral life, that this admission that
the idea of free determination is not unreasonable will always
seem a mere empty possibility to him who has not amved at
a clear idea of the importance of such freedom. For indeed
the recognition of this freedom finally involves nothing less
than that the whole knowledge of nature, however firmly
compact and irrefragable, does not embrace all that really
exists ; nor even in its own department all that actually is, in
all its respects — not, that is, in the whole depth of its reality ;
that there is still another world beyond that which we can
reckon and measure, even the world of freedom, which exhibits
itself as transcendent. In other words, the recognition of
freedom is the rejection of the monism of which the modern
consciousness is so proud (p. 46). This is a price which only
he will pay who recognises the surpassing value for which it
is not too high a price. Above this strong law of causality
in the given sense there is a stronger; the freedom which we
assert must show itself to be this stronger one. It must so
manage its cause as to show what depends on it, what its
value is, what is at stake, if men are forced to bid farewell to
it as to an old delusion. If the opponent seeks to depreciate
this value in any way, its advocates must put the matter in a
clear light. Here too honesty is the best policy. The more
we can concede to them, the more will what remains, though
apparently little, be shown to be all-important.
Our opponents often emphasise that this feeling of moral
obligation united to this feeling of freedom has, in the centuries
of its rule, accomplished little enough. As all storks do not
sacrifice themselves for their offspring, but only those which are
impelled to it by their necessarily determined nature, so has it
been, spite of all talk of duty and freedom, with men so far ;
and will continue to be in the future, even when these sermon-
isings on responsibility and freedom are a thing of the past.
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 91
Even progress will not be stopped when this happens. Out of
the actual needs of human society new rules, better and more
serviceable to the needs of the common life, will continually
develop ; the individual will be forced to follow them, partly
consciously as the result of education, partly unconsciously by
the still more potent influence of heredity. Even then a sort
of feeling of responsibility will not be quite absent ; while
yet the imagination that we could act differently than we do
will naturally disappear. But human society is in any case in
need of laws ; to maintain these is the purpose of punish-
ment ; the idea and sensation of punishment is then the still
possible effective sense of responsibility, and the normal motive
for human conduct is found in the sphere of law. When this
is not present, the doctor must be called in, for men without
this feeling of responsibility are mentally incapable. No ob-
jection need be raised that by the feeling of responsibility
something different from that heretofore accepted is understood :
why may not mankind, arrived at a new stage, be suffered to
give a new connotation to old terms, and use them in a new
sense ? Why not, say they, go a step further .? Let us allow
that those rules of conduct which are essential to human society
do so operate — such was once the machinery of the world —
that such actions as are not in accordance therewith are
accompanied by that remarkable feeling of pain which has
hitherto been called a feeling of guilt, in the sense that the
guilty person is the voluntary author of his own action. Of
course (they continue) that appears to us as really a gross
illusion ; but certainly we may assume the possibility, and for
the previously explained reasons grant that it is at the least a
possibility, that it is just in this way the sense of ' oughtness,'
the deepest meaning and highest ' value ' are achieved. Our
opponents shall not say that we are not initially able to follow
their thought, so little are we in need, on the contrary, of
keeping back any question whatever. E.g.^ the advocates of
freedom, however it may be limited, do not doubt that its
decisions for ' the good ' are by no means unimportant in their
totality. Only it is self-evident that this is not demonstrable to
the opponents of freedom.
9« THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAxN LIFE
But if we followed their boldest thoughts into their most
secret recesses, what could we object to them, what ought we
to retain, in spite of all, in order to hold aloft the banner of
freedom ? One thing, only one thing, would be different in a
humanity which had seen through the great delusion of freedom,
and regulated its action in this new lucid apprehension of the
delusion it had seen through. One thing would be different,
and that the thing in which they had so far seen the highest
attainable ; in which they realised their true self — that feeling
of self-hood which has its origin in subjection to an absolute
'ought,' by means of a personal act held to be free. Goethe
has put the confession of faith of the determinist in finely
chiselled words : " So must you be : you cannot escape from
self : thus said long ago sybils and prophets : and no time and
no force can dismember the impressed form which so long as
it lives, develops."
Tlie same Goethe has done homage to the majesty of the
ethical point of view in contradistinction to the aesthetical
consideration in the confession : — " When a man endures the
hardest, and puts constraint on himself, then you may point to
him joyfully and say — that is the man, that is himself," and —
Never let thy courage falter,
Let the crowd drift idly by ;
Who never with his task will palter
Can accomplish all that's high.
That would no longer be true. Then the greatest of evils,
which is guilt, this man of the future would no longer know
in the old sense. But the capacity for this feeling humanity
has long considered to be an attestation of its dignity. Then
on this point also there prevails, far beyond the circle of those
who openly take up the cross of freedom, a silent agreement.
Theoretical deniers of freedom, who cannot do enough to
ridicule belief in freedom as the acme of folly, do when any
occasion of self-judgment arises act as if there were such a
thing as freedom. This is seen from the fact that they grow
angry if they are treated as if there were no freedom ; they
feel such treatment as an indignity. And what is true of
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 93
individuals is true of mankind as a whole. Doubtless man
can exist without any belief in freedom, but not without a
loss of that which, however blurred and obscure, he has regarded
as a dignity belonging to human nature. Are we to allow
ourselves to be lowered to the position of mere marionettes
on the stage of life ? Even hero-worship, often strange enough,
is a kind of irregular craving for the idea of liberty. Strange,
if we do homage to men of genius, at festivals held in their
honour, while on the same occasions we are assured they are
the product of necessity. And yet in this there lies an
unconscious protest against the devastating scepticism which
denies freedom.
Why is it so ? What we propounded at the outset is now
intelligible. Our mental life has its specialty in a mainly
unconscious striving for self-realisation, for independence of
the nature within us and outside us. It presses forward to
this goal in many ways — in the conquest of external nature,
in the spiritual nature by means of art and science ; but in no
way so deep and high, so mightily and inwardly concentrated,
as in the activities we designate as moral, in the full recognition
of an absolute law as a fact sui generis. It is in this that man
is raised above the diverse events of the external world, and
also of the multiplicity of his own natural impulses, and reaches
an inner unity, and raises himself above all limitation of
freedom. And it has likewise already been made clear that
this freedom reaches its goal in communion with others. Here
it is pertinent once more to emphasise the point from which
we started out. This demonstration of the importance which
belongs to freedom and moral law is no actual proof, cannot,
and is not intended to be so, in the sense that the unwilling
can be compelled by it. The only possible proof which is to be
wished for in the interests of the subject is contained in the
demand that the moral law should be recognised by acting
the part of a free man, and thus freedom itself be experienced
as a reality. But this appeal is no shift of embarrassment.
This culminating justification of the absolute law, of the
' ought,' of responsibility, of freedom, or, differently expressed,
of conscience, fits in exactly with the subject which needs
94 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
justification, and may with good conscience be said to l)e
complete. It is shown that the idea of ' ought ' is inseparable
from responsibility ; the idea of responsibility from that of
freedom ; and how this latter is to be understood in such way
that no well-founded objections can be raised against it. More
the advocates of freedom cannot desire for themselves. " He
is happy who can only be sufficiently assured that there exists
no proof of its impossibility" (Kant). And then we realised
to ourselves what it is that depends on the meaning of that
' ought "■ which is inseparable from freedom of the will ; which
is nothing less than the personal dignity of the individual and
the dignity of human nature. From all these premisses there
arises the unavoidable conclusion found in the summons and
appeal to use that freedom, for there is no other way of reaching
a conviction of its reality. A parable of this foundation truth
of the moral life intinides upon our attention, which in its core
is as old as the experience of this truth itself, but acquires
new significance in the fierce battle on this question of free
volition. A wanderer has lost his way on the mountains, and
his companions ; a return is impossible, and in front of him
is the yawning abyss. A bold spring is his only chance. But
first he demands proof of its feasibility. Then he must perish.
The importance of the leap, if it succeeded, was clear to him,
and he could be convinced ' that no proof of its impossibility
exists.' But he wanted more, impossible in the nature of the
case. So he made his choice, refusing to put the matter to the
test, to his own undoing. Perhaps we may say that there is
an increasing readiness to agree with such reflections, and, at
the least, to make it quite plain that if there is a moral life
it can be of no other kind than this ; and that life in the deepest
sense is valueless if there is no moral life of this kind. We
hear it again and again more openly said on this question of
free volition : It is usually only insoluble problems that are
thus never-ending. And it is little likely that the kind of
assertion will long continue which says: The believers in free
volition are the half-convinced persons who, in their uncertainty,
seek support in those whom they suppose to be absolutely
great, while the wholly convinced, standing with their feet
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 95
firmly planted on a full reality, though subject to outward
changes, have no need of such idols. The heat shown in the
battle for this conviction scarcely beseems the subject. Happily,
however, in such personal devotion to an ideal there is a point
of unity for all who will personally battle for the good, however
they may contend as to its meaning.
With such thoughts we stand without perceiving it on the
threshold of the second problem which we must add to an
apologetic of Christian ethics, and that is the justification of a
connection between morality and religion.
Morality and Religion.
This connection is the really deepest offence which the
modern consciousness takes to Christian ethics (p. 50 fF). By
the idea of a personal God of holy love, all ethical principles
become so transcendently, so supersensuously defined, that
modern ethics — essentially psychological and of this world —
discovers a feeling of antagonism, all the deeper because it is
not always conscious of it. We kept this antagonism in the
background, because a common agreement on another import-
ant point with a system of ethics not distinctively Christian,
seemed possible and advantageous. That point was in reference
to the great questions of the moral law and freedom, as well as
its immediate experience in the phenomena of conscience.
But this very investigation now points beyond itself to the
connection between the moral and the religious. For that
' ought "" understood in its depth makes the question unavoidable
— is it really intelligible if we stop within the circle of our
mental life ? is not the moral, so to speak, something towering
over us ? If we, possessing a responsible personality and recog-
nising an absolute law, are raised above the nature which is in us
and outside us, is this prodigy, this break with the woild, this
unity with its correspondent freedom, this dignity of personality
and of a realm of persons anything reasonable in itself if we
stop with self? We have already seen above that that absolute
' ought ' has not any content you please ; and that it can only
be properly understood when united with a quite definite
96 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
content, and one that is the highest conceivable (p. 26).
Submission to the monastic ideal does not lead to real unity
and freedom of the inner life ; certain though it be that it has
been recognised innumerable times as an absolute command to
be aimed at. But how are we to define that highest conceivable
content, and what is its origin ? Christian ethics believes that
it has the satisfying answer in the Christian idea of God ; and
judges that even those friends of the imperative ' ought,"" who
hold back from the religious conception of it, can find no
unimpeachable reason for the common ' Goods '' (so far defended),
except in this theistic belief. But as soon as this name of God
is mentioned, those who have so far been friends are accustomed
with notable promptness to unite with our opponents, and
assure us that the idea of God endangers morality. The many
various objections which are heard all end finally in hetero-
nomy^ and eudaemonism. Religious ethics asserts that the
validity of our ideas of good and evil is dependent on external
authority, in fact, on the will of God ; while, as a matter of
fact, the decisive truth is that man is a law to himself, and in
this finds the unity of his inner life. Religious ethics conse-
quently is enslaving and insecure. Eudaemonism (or hedonism),
not troubling itself about a law presented by the will, maintains
that the Good to be aimed at is not internal harmony but
sensuous happiness, even if it is that of the so-called 'other
world/ The reference to the prospect of reward or punishment
disturbs, it is said, the purity of moral motive, and deeply
injures true moral power, however much it may at first sight
appear to be an incentive. It would carry us too far to examine
all these objections in the light of all the criteria or points of
view named. In any case we are forced to ask, is modern
ethics, when in earnest, so free and independent of that belief
as it declares that it is when it criticises Christian ethics for
associating it with its scheme ? And so far as it is free, is it
logical ? After that we can without prejudice examine and
^ Heteronomy is a term used by Kant as a designation for a false principle of
morals such as receives acknowledgment when personal desire determines the
right for us instead of moral law. ' Autonomy of the Reason ' is the recognition
of moral law as the absolute law of life. — Tr, (Kant, Kritik c(er fraktischen
Vemunft.)
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 97
pass judgment on this synthesis, this connection of Christian
faith with Christian ethics.
Morality without Religion.
Is there really any such thing as religion without morality,
or morality without religion ? As a matter of fact, in the
history of humanity both have entered into the most manifold
unions, and these still persist alongside one another to-day, as
the reports of travellers and missionaries as well as what we
find around us show. And it is equally the case that both
past history and present experience afford examples of how such
unions become dissolved. At one time it is the gods who
determine what is Good ; at another time what is then regarded
as Good is put under their protection, and they themselves
become idealised forms, and examples of what is Good. In
what various ways that can be represented in the varying stages
of religious and moral development ! But these questions,
attractive and important as they are, do not concern us now.
It is rather the question as to the inner connection between
morality and religion. The task is difficult, because it is not
easy to keep the investigation on a purely scientific level. If
we note how frequently and deeply it employs the conversation
of neighbours and the silent communings of our own minds, we
shall recognise how easily personal inclination and dislike,
desire and anxiety mingle. The question becomes more
difficult through the impressive warning against judging others
which is given by Christian ethics, and in general by reason
of the real earnestness with which it lays stress on the
worthlessness of religion without a moral standard. It is not
he who says " Lord, Lord,"" but " he who does the will of my
Father in heaven," who may expect to enter into the kingdom
of God. Certainly this speaks of morality with a religious
sanction, but yet we have a clear warning not prematurely,
externally, and hypocritically to unite and confound the moral
and the religious. In Church history is written the most
forcible comment on this word. On the other hand, the
readiness to give morality its full recognition even when it
appears to be separated from the religious motive, has often
98 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
been so great as to justify the use of the saying : " Be not
righteous overmuch." That saying of our Lord Himself points
the right way, which is to examine facts without preconcep-
tions, and then only to draw the general inferences which they
suggest.
The facts point to the distinction between individual and
the larger groups of human society. History has handed down
no example of whole nations firmly and permanently maintain-
ing high moral ideals disconnected from religious belief. But
doubtless there are individuals who without any religious
belief gain the respect of upright Christians ; by their moral
life perhaps put them to shame. Particularly is that so in a
complex civilisation. Therefore, in the middle of the nineteenth
century the expression 'unconscious Christianity' found so
much vogue. From such facts can anything conclusive be
drawn as to the connection of morality and religion .? Shall we
conclude that the moral life without Christianity lives on the
reflex influence and the unconscious influence of Christian faith ?
or, vice versa^ that they are the preludes of a future humanity
whose morality is independent of religion .?
It is said : " Nothing Utopian influences the mind of a moral
agent ; the phantasy of God neither inflames him nor blinds
him." " The forces which move men are known, calculable, and
are the rule and reason of his endeavours ; the sacred majesty
of life is felt." We must pause at such high-flown utterances
of atheistic morality, and perhaps at the form which they have
talien in the ethics of positivism. For in the absence of
effective action and in the absence of a worthy content of action
any comparison whatever with Christian ethics would fail.
So we may leave this exalted language without corrective
criticism. We merely ask whether it is quite intelligible in
the absence of any definite judgment as to the course of the
world in reference to this moral endeavour, and in the absence
of any judgment whether it has been successful ; and if so, in
what degree, and whether permanently or only for the time
being. Now, there are many who answer this question
quite openly something as follows : We do not know whether
evolution will work out to a tragedy or a comedy, and we
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 99
cannot alter it. We only see a portion and not the consumma-
tion. Why do not all give the like answer ? Clearly? from the
standpoint of irreligious morality, this is the only consistent
answer. For a definite judgment would be a judgment on the
world and the purpose of the world, and therefore a theory of
the universe ; in short, a faith, perhaps not the Christian faith,
but some sort of one. This would be to admit that the
morality in question is not independent of religion, and yet
that it is independent was the very proposition asserted. But
why this great aversion to plain and open utterance, or, anyhow,
why so much reserve ? Indeed, why so many poetic expressions
like 'sacred majesty of life,' 'eternal powers of human
nature ' ? It may possibly arise from a secret longing for a safe
foundation for this boasted independent morality.
We may most speedily arrive at some explanation of this
question by separating it entirely from the question as to the
religious motives of action. The Christian not only sees no
reason to oppose the anxiety felt as to introducing the idea of
God too prematurely and in the wrong place, and thus disturb-
ing the purity of moral action, but can understand this
feeling most unreservedly, and express it most vigorously. For
the hunger after righteousness to which Jesus promises satisfac-
tion is not quieted by the unnourishing bread of a self-invented
religion which he who thus hungers hastily oiFers to himself.
His hunger is really a hunger which only righteousness can
satisfy. Therefore the question simply is whether the man
who desires the ' Good ' and the Good only can reasonably be
without some judgment on the reason and purpose of the
world, without a theory of the universe. Even Kant, who so
sternly shut out theistic belief from a consideration of this
question of the ethical springs of action, did not demand that
the moral man should refrain from any question whatever as to
the realisation of the Good. So it is too openly a contradiction
to speak of an absolute ' ought "■ in reference to the realisation
of the highest End, and notwithstanding, to declare that it is
indifferent whether it is realisable or not, whether in respect of
good and evil ' reality ' is indifferent or not. Almost innumer-
able checks confront the idea that absolute Good is realisable.
100 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
Would that it were merely checks from external nature !
Would that the most oppressive were not in ourselves, in our
will which has heard the command of duty ! This is the line
of thought whose simple convincing power misleads so many
representatives of atheistic ethics to half-mystical expressions,
and the point in which they are antagonistic to religion. A
melancholy resignation is often some sort of compensation for
that from which they shrink, and which yet forces itself on
their attention. This finds utterance in their confessions :
"Denial makes the bosom heave."" But yet we may say
that it is essentially the contradiction of Christian ethics
in which they are living; what they call independent ethics
and free from religion is itself the offspring of antagonism
to the religious system. That which they could consistently
assert of co-operation for the general welfare, or the progress
of mankind, is less than their language seems to imply. And
the reason is that some glimmer of light from the kingdom of
God, which they consign to the land of dreams, falls on them ;
and the voice of duty in the individuals which they derive from
His relationship to His family borrows its impressive earnestness
from the old truly absolute ' ought ' of Christian morality.
But this verdict leads us further to the relation between —
Christian Morality and the Christian Religion.
If then morality without religion is shown to be not con-
sistently thinkable, then it is at once settled that a purely
sceptical attitude towards the question of a theory of the
world is not tenable. But this attitude is, in the decisive point
to which we just drew attention, that of irreligious ethics. It
is only real conviction which can dispose of that difficulty.
And we must really draw attention to the fact that the general
admission that ethics and a world-theory belong together is
insufficient. We must go deep down to the insight that to a
definite moral idea a definite faith corresponds — to the Christian
ideal the Christian faith in God. Or, to connect this with
what has gone before (pp. 33 fF., 38 ff., 48 ff.), if we are once
for all quite convinced why it is that an ethics which does
not transcend this world ('immanent ethics') remains full of
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 101
contradictions, and that is because it only gives an uncertain
answer to the ' why ' and ' wherefore ' of the world, it is then clear,
right down to the ground, that the pessimistic theory of the world
does not logically accord with real moral action — such moral
action, I mean, as is directed to one End that is attainable, and
does not consist of the destruction of existence, in fact,
annihilation. Rather the faith that is demanded by ethics is
that the reason and purpose of the world is the ' Good,' the
noblest characteristic of that true reality, the Absolute, God.
This is not a matter of irresistible demonstration, as the
acceptance of even the hypothesis is the result of a free volition
(p. 370 ff.) ; but the idea is irrefutable provided that the absolute-
ness of the ' ought ' is accepted unreservedly, and made clear in
its entire significance, consequently irrefutable as a postulate of
the moral consciousness. (On the insufficiency of the postulate
itself cf. the following section). And it is important to
emphasise that aU pantheistic uncertainty must be kept apart
from this idea of God. Perhaps we may not say that it is
merely for our human point of view that the ' Good ' is the
highest quality of the Absolute. Such an explanation is quite
conceivable on account of the closely connected difficulties
which, to our thought, grow out of the idea of a God of
personal goodness. But it contradicts the purpose for which
in our present argument the idea of God has been introduced.
Where shall we find the unconditioned ' ought ' if in the
Absolute the antithesis of good and evil is destroyed, and evil
is only the necessary shadow of the good ^ And how is the
commandment of love to assert itself against the might of the
stronger ? It was significant that some years ago, when a plan
was formed to afford help to the poorest classes in London by
a great organisation of charitable aid, it even met with the
contradiction that these starvelings had no right to live.
Here two beliefs encountered one another ; two sorts of belief
in regard to final reality. Is there in its innermost core that
which is 'good,' or are good and evil only our human point
of view ? Such a foe of the waifs of society, among those who
think like this, was not devoid of sympathetic recognition of
the glory of goodness, but his sympathy was bounded by the
102 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
final idea he had of the plan of the work. In it goodness was
for him merely a beautiful illusion, not an all-mastering reality.
The perception of this is so much the more important because
an unclear recognition of the ' good ' as the reason and goal of
the world, or, so to speak, a half-belief in the essential goodness
of the Absolute, often appears in the ornamented rhetoric of
poetry, and so disguises its defects, as for instance in many of
the exponents of evolutional ethics. It is surely not fortuitous
that in the great optimists, like Goethe, deep doubt as to the
progress of the good finds utterance ; and it is merely hushing
up this when stress is laid on the unused-up sources of energy
of the country population .as means by which the effete cities,
full of moral azote, may be rejuvenated. So it is quite clear
that many adherents of the modern ethics above delineated
have more frequently asserted than proved the existence of
progressive development. They exist to a great degree on the
heritage of Christian theism without adequately recognising
its uniqueness, and so are always in danger of succumbing to
pessimistic ideas.
Therefore the connection of morality with religion is no
reasonable reproach to Christian ethics. On the contrary, the
unavoidable question as to the realisation of the ' good ' demands
that every system of ethics should have its final reasons, its
cosmic theory, its faith, i.e. every system that wishes somehow
to distinguish between the moral and the natural, and has any
apprehension of something higher than itself. It cannot push
that question aside as irrelevant ; which is as much as to say, it
cannot permanently be consciously atheistic, it must have the
courage to venture to grasp the supersensual. And this grasp
cannot be on empty space, on nothing : pessimistic ethics is a
self-contradiction. But there exists also a superficial faith in
the power of the good in all kinds of forms. This may indeed
suffice for an indefinite moral endeavour. A whole series of
stages of moral and religious doctrine corresponding therewith
may be shown to exist. This is the case even within Christianity,
as, e.g., the God of the Renascence idea of piety — the indulgent,
all-loving Father — clearly belongs to a morality of the universal-
benevolence type, i.e. a form of utilitarianism. A look into the
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 105
depth of that ' ought ' and up to the heights of a supersensual
world should be a recollection of and return to a God of
redeeming love. Guilt and grace are mutual implicates. And
thus every step in the illustration of Christian ethics becomes
also an advance in knowledge of the inseparability of Christian
morality from an unabridged Christian faith. Then it becomes
lucidly clear — what would be merely wearisome to enumerate —
how all the aspects of the Christian ' goods ' are determined by
the Christian faith — all those fundamental relations which we
have had to consider from the beginning. It is not by any
means merely the question, Will the Christian ' good "" triumph ?
that finds its answer in a Christian belief in God. It is on
this faith that the content of this definite morality which is
distinct from every other is founded, its Ends and Rules. From
this flow its Motives ; out of this that ' ought ' has its wholly
unique tone. It is on this account that the elaboration of
these ideas will first give a convincing refutation of the
objections which modern ethics raises against ethics based on
religion, and particularly against ethics so entirely based on
religion as is the Christian system.
We have now spoken of the close connection of morality
and religion.
With regard to
The Truth of the Christian Faith
nobbing decisive is so far proved. For a demand, i.e. a
postulate, never proves that it will be satisfying, just as the
coherence even of the greatest ideas proves nothing as to their
reality ; and as religion itself has never sought to find its basis
in the reasonableness of its data, but has offered itself as a
reality to experience. 'J.'his is the point where the justification
of ethics (whose principles we would delineate) depends on
dogmatics, or in which both merge in the wider scope of
apologetics (p. 4). We do not mean that apologetics can
adduce an irresistible proof of the existence of God, but it can
show what are the limits generally within which such proof can
be given, which are not drawn by the arbitrary desire of the
believer, or even of the man of good moral intention, but by
104 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
the character of the cognition and of our cognitive faculty itself.
Further, it is by no means only the Christian faith, but every
faith, every conviction as to the reason and purpose of the
world, which has its roots in our emotional and voluntative
nature. But this faith need fear no objection on its part arising
from the inner limitation of its cognitive faculty, as it rather of
its own self offers a reasonable answer to the final questions of
cognition. And in fact it is precisely the moral will which, with
good reason, is primarily interested in the shaping of a final
conviction, and consequently ethics is the mainstay of a genuine
apologetic. But in such investigations the question again arises
afresh, and all the more urgently, just so far as we can be con-
vinced that the idea of God is not our idea merely, but is the
highest reality ; and then such an apologetic can show in its
wider scope that only the self-revelation of this God can bring
us to a conviction of His existence, show us what those character-
istics are which the idea carries to gain our confidence, and how
the religious history of mankind, and more especially that
embraced in Jesus Christ, is able to produce in us the conviction
of a revelation deserving of our confidence. It is not on the
indifferent, but on him alone who desires the reality of the
highest worth, in harmony with the special claim it makes on
him, for him who hiingers after righteousness, that this con-
fidence is wrought by means of that deepest of reciprocal actions
(which we either already know, or it is our duty to experience)
between our moral effort and the God who in Christ works in
us ' to will and to do.' But still, the third and last task comes
before us in order to justify Christian ethics, and that is —
The Unsurpassability of Christian Ethics.
Its opponents might agree with all that has been so far said,
in the sense that the propositions on the moral law and freedom,
as well as the obligatoriness of Christian morality, are in them-
selves consistent; but yet the fundamental doubt is not thus
met, whether this Christian morality is in itself really the best.
It is precisely the knowledge which has just been emphasised,
that every moral conviction corresponds logically to a religious
conviction of a like kind, which tends to strengthen this doubt.
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 105
This can only be satisfactorily overcome by a double demonstra-
tion. First, that no moral ideal which has so far appeared in
history surpasses that of Christianity in inner content and in
practical feasibility. Secondly, that it can never be surpassed
in the future.
A good part of the first proof has already been given, and it
is only needful to expressly recall what was said in the light of
the point of view with which we are now concerned. We have
already found a standard of judgment (pp. 6, 28). The palm is
due to that moral ideal which guarantees most securely the
inner independency of our personality, and binds mankind into
a unity of such personalities. This goal is attained by the
recognition of the absolute law. But, we said, it is not any
content that is proper for a truly absolute ' ought "*; e.g., the
adherents of the ideal of the common welfare, the utilitarians,
could not convincingly show how far every individual ought to
recognise in it a demand absolutely binding on his will. In the
same way, the ideal of the complete cultivation of all our natural
powers is not independent of a variety of presuppositions ; it is
compelled to take into account favourable endowment, fortunate
circumstances, and how all alike are not favoured. How could
the demand depending on such conditions be absolute and
applicable to all ? But this doubt generally and without reserve
arises with respect to all moral systems as they came into vogue
either before or after the Christian morality, and appear to-day
as its rivals. The short review of the most important which
occupied our attention earlier could easily be completed for our
present purpose ; e.g., alongside the ideal of modern aestheticism
more fully carried out would be that of the self-satisfied philoso-
pher ; alongside that of utilitarian hedonism that of socialism,
Athenian or Spartan ideals of citizenship ; and with pessimism
would appear the Buddhistic self-negation with its pity often
compared to Christian love. And then it would appear how
these ideals, measured by that standard, have each of them a
special value and each of them a special limitation : e.g., how the
most glorious philanthropy which regards country and state as
the highest good, or the most comprehensive utilitarianism, does
not guarantee tlie full freedom of personality ; how the most
lOG THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
exalted stoic philosopher or the individuality of the most richly
artistic temperament sundered from the duties and life of the
community grows narrow and poor ; how self-abnegation when
it becomes self-effacement is not the true solution. And now,
on the contrary, Christian morality ? It counts nothing trifling
which is truly good in all these ideals ; it recognises heroes of
self-denial and heroes of citizenship, pioneers of civilisation and
creators of commerce ; but all this is not the highest, but of the
kingdom of God only a portion : a proving of our self-sacrificing
love of our neighbour on the basis and in the power of an
experienced love of God, in which alone true freedom is found —
the freedom of the sons of God in the eternal kingdom of God.
Even in reference to the realisation of this ideal. Christian
ethics has no need to shun comparison. Certainly it is a
favourite topic of many opponents to scoff at its small success
in the course of so many centiu-ies. Those who are just,
however, not only admit that its effects reach out far beyond
the circle of its confessed adherents, and ought to be valued and
not lost ; but also cannot deny that it has shown itself effective
under all conceivable circumstances : in the change of the times
when battling with the ancient world as when rooting itself
in the spirit of the Teutonic peoples ; in missions among
uncivilised races in every generation and race ; in every condition
of culture.
But is this decisive in regard to the future of Christian
ethics ? Is it for ever ? If it is the highest so far, is it on
that account unsurpassable ? And if we are not able to conceive
of anything above it, because for an ideal that possibly seems
higher we must suppose quite another nature than that which
we now possess, what does that prove.? Is it not the case
that in all the departments of human activity, when, in the
imagination of individuals and of mankind, they think they
have reached the summit, this has been chided as false ? Never-
theless the Christian Church puts forth this claim for its ethics,
and the recognition of that claim and the recognition of
Christian ethics appear to it one and the same thing. For in
the recognition of its ideal it experiences an inner freedom
which carries within it the pledge of eternity ; just because it
THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 107
cannot separate itself from the certainty that the realisation of
this ideal is only just at its initial stage, and that by an inner
necessity it points to other conditions of existence. It is its
much-scorned religious character that the Christian has to
thank for this certainty that it is unsurpassable. Because the
Christian task has its grounds in the gift of God, and this gift
is personal communion with an eternal personal God, the task
is as eternal as God Himself, and yet is complete at every
moment of its realisation. Of course, this certainty is staked
on personal experience, but how could it be otherwise in any
system of ethics deserving the name ? And for whom can this
kind of proof be of value but for those who have travelled
some distance on the way recommended by this ethics ? Just
on that account this latter consideration cannot be condemned
as an overweening requirement. The Christian Church sets
up this claim for itself from the inner compulsion of its
faith. But it keeps itself quite free from coercion of others ;
they are not to be led by delusion to this summit on which
the infinite perspective oversteps the horizon, but to be invited
step by step to enter upon the path which leads to the summit.
But it would be false modesty if Christian ethics were to
divest itself of this high feeling of its peerlessness. It is still
the Christian faith in God to which it owes its superiority,
and this faith has from the commencement been the ground and
object of its special boast, in which there is no hurtful sting
of vain conceit {cf. p. 54 fF.).
Part II.
Christian Ethics as a Coherent Whole.
This part falls into three sections. They treat of the nature of
the Christian ' Good ' ; of its realisation in the Christian personality
(individual ethics) and in human society (social ethics). As a
preliminary, the distinction between Evangelical and Roman
Catholic ethics is defined, and it is shown how far in Evangelical
ethics the Holy Scriptures is the supreme rule.
CHAPTER IV.
PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS.
Evangelical and Roman Catholic Ethics.
Wherever mention has so far been made of the Christian life
it has been tacitly meant in the sense of Evangelical Christianity,
and this is not less the case in what follows. This method of
statement must, however, be justified, namely, that Evangelical
Christianity is distinguished from that which is ' Catholic ' not
merely in faith but in life, and indeed ' why ' and ' how,' both
with reference to the former and to the latter.
An example or two at the outset. We know how Luther
judged of his Christian life before and after the great event, his
"justification before God by grace through faith" ; how in him
was repeated in new circumstances the experience of St Paul,
" What was gain to me I counted loss for Christ." What then
appeared to him good is now sin, and the reverse. This example
is so significant because he could claim the testimony of his
opponents that, measured by their standard, he had been really
good ; that if any monk had deserved heaven by the works of
the law, this was true of him (we merely note in passing the
words ' law,' ' works,' ' desert'), and that in his monastic life
apart from the world. Or we might compare the doings of
the sisters of mercy with those of our Evangelical deaconesses.
For even when every suspicion of depreciation is excluded the
comparison becomes all the more instructive. Or we may
realise for ourselves the difference between Evangelical and
Catholic educational methods especially where, through historical
conditions, there exists a considerable similarity of external
112 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
arrangements, as in seminarial instruction and the like. Let
us reflect in this matter on the earlier-mentioned criteria of
good action as to its End, Rule, Motive ; on the ' ought ' and
the ground of the validity of and the origin of this imperative.
What a multitude of differences among those external actions
so similar as to be scarcely distinguishable ! If it should be
said that these examples are ingeniously selected, it is surely
sufficient to point to the common daily life, if we are at the
same time ready to allow the outward to guide us in judging
of the inward ; and this outward life speaks an intelligible
language. If we seek out comprehensive phrases we may say
that the moral action of the Roman Catholic is legalistic
and that it is not independent, and so of course it is also
fragmentary and external ; and in this connection it is plain,
though a matter of surprise to us, that it is counted as meri-
torious. This is in relation to its form. In relation to its
content it appears to us to be afraid of the world, ascetic ; and
let us carefully note that this means that for the sake of this
method it distinguishes a twofold morality — one which is in-
tended for all, and a higher standard which is for the ' perfect.""
Can it be wondered at that where such a great distinction is
made the verdict on it wavers now to this side and now to that ?
You get no ethics which deserves the name. To Roman Catholics
the Evangelical ethics seems irreligious, impious, godleso. They
find much which in their eyes seems most important almost
non-existent with us ; to another, that which they recognise
appears really to fail in what is the best, the holiest, true
devotion. And so it may seem to them that we do not take
our morality seriously when sacrifice, devotion, submission, are
wanting and single actions are left free to be done or not by
the indefiniteness of that ' ought.' Conversely, it often seems
to us that their piety is not truly ethical in its character.
However much occasion we may find for reflection and in
individual cases for shamefacedness, ready as we may know
ourselves to be for self-criticism, their subjection under a law
which is not the law of the will appears to us to be without
real ethical value. Its encompassing the whole life with a net
of prescriptions requiring fulfilment occasionally amounts to
PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS 113
carrying out the individual will against God's will. And that,
in our opinion, is the very antithesis of true religion, for which
no resplendent appearance of self-sacrifice and unworldliness
can be a substitute.
It is further undeniable that a difference in judgment which
goes down so deep as this two-sided morality can only have its
roots in a fundamentally different conception of Christianity,
if indeed both sides are really Christian morality, that is, a
morality based on and defined by the Christian religion ; and
we have previously seen that the special nature of every ethics
answers to its religious character. What is this difference in
religious experience .? The Evangelical Christian feels blessed
in a humbly thankful trust in the present free love of God in
Christ ; in this personal communion with a personal God he
attains his destiny. And it is precisely in this faith that he
finds his incentive and motive power to love God and his
neighbour, because God, who receives him into communion with
Himself, is Love ; and thus no personal communion and no
blessedness of the same sort can exist without a participation
in the like love, and in fact love with all the natural faculties
which God has given him, and in all the natural circumstances
in which He places him ; for the thought that God is the
omnipotent ruler of the world is taken in all earnestness. There
is the full recognition of human sin and guilt without pre-
judice, and, what is more, with a strict recognition of them as
a real contradiction to the true destiny of man. This is the
whole morality of the Evangelical Christian, namely, love, which
as a matter of experience springs out of faith in God. There
is here no room for a law external to the will. We know well
enough that moral life is a battle, and that the will of God to
which we submit ourselves is our salvation, the realisation of
our true destiny, which cannot be a burden. And if this will
claims the whole life as its domain where duty is concerned,
where is the moment in which it could withdraw itself .f^ In the
smallest as in the greatest events this will is operative, and there
is for it nothing else but God''s world in which everything is
good in so far as it is the means for the realisation of the will
of God. It is otherwise with the Roman Catholic Christian.
■■ 8 '■
114 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
The salvation which is offered to him is supernatural in the
sense that it is something which is external to his nature. For
it is not personal communion with a personal God whose
innermost mystery of holy love has been revealed, but the
impartation of heavenly powers, a participation in the ineffable
mystery of the divine life, which is certainly righteousness and
goodness ; but this type of goodness does not represent the
innermost nature of God. How can it possibly be otherwise
but that the will of this God, so conceived, issues in a separation
from all creaturely good, the suppression of natural desire and
of the social intercourses of life ? It is an ideal which, of course,
is only realisable by specially gifted persons. Such a content
can only find its point of contact with the will in the form of
an outward law ; it is, in fact, a something standing side by side
with our will and foreign to it. And the further claim is that
the same Church which has the control of the means of grace
has the regulation of all moral endeavour; and step by step,
hour by hour, this must be regulated by its sacred authority.
It is impossible to be independent in good, and at the same time
there is a false appearance of independence in representing the
human will as co-operating with secret divine grace in the
performance of meritorious works. The heroes of the Roman
Church, who in a glow of devotion fit themselves for miracles
of self-sacrifice, never attain that moral independency which we
call personal life in the good. Their piety is not the personal
subjection to the personal will of God, and so their morality is
not that personal freedom of which we speak.
And thus it becomes intelligible why each chai-acteristic
example of moral endeavour exhibits the marks which we
placed in juxtaposition at the outset; and also why it is, as we
explained, that the verdict wavers on the subject, and why we
generally find it so hard to understand one another. It is not
merely a question of phrases ; they often sound so similar as to
be interchangeable. Thus it is said, "The new law, the law
of Christ given through the Church, is like the law of nature
in its subjectivity, freedom, vitality, and yet is above it.'^ Have
we not also boasted of this subjectivity, freedom, and vitality
of the moral law of action in our Evangelical sense ? But for
PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS 115
the Catholic Christian all that depends on subjection to the
rightly constituted Church. Nor do we recognise, as they do,
that 'law of nature' as 'an innate and inalienable basis of
moral thought "* by which we are brought to the conviction of
the divine constitution of the Church.
The Protestant intellectual basis of ethics has not only need
to justify itself in contrast with the Roman Catholic as that
which is truly Christian, but, curiously enough, also against the
modern consciousness, which is largely inclined to regard the
Catholic view of morality as that which is primitively Christian
and to let it pass for that which is alone genuinely Christian, and
on that account all the more resolute in discarding it. They
regard the Reformation ethics not merely as a breach with
Rome but with Christianity ; as the first great step to its
separation from it ; and as paving the way for a purely secular
ethics. It is comprehensible why Rome collects all such
opinions zealously, and uses them in its own favour. The full
exposition alone can demonstrate that these views do not fit in
with the facts of the subject. But it is, in advance, intelligible
why the present age, no longer believing in itself, feeling help-
less in the severe conflict of real life and especially of its political
life, is crying out for a rehabilitation of Christian morality, and
is more ready to find support in the Roman Catholic than to
trust to the Evangelical view. The yearning for an appreciable
authority finds satisfaction in the former, while it has grown
accustomed to see in the latter the first beginnings of free-
thinking and revolution. With Rome's political friends, them-
selves sceptically inclined and only valuing the faith of the
masses as means for their ends, are associated the sentimental
Romanticists, whose fanaticism in allowing themselves without
realising it to become tools in the service of that designing
party seems more harmless than it really is. If hereby on both
sides the Catholic morality is frequently appraised as the more
popular, the more intelligible to the masses, and the more
effective for their purposes, it must be remembered that a
different colouring is given to it according as it is in the position
to work itself out in a purely Catholic district or is in a
situation of severe rivalry with Protestant influences. The
116 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
convinced Evangelical has no need to deny that his own moral
convictions make larger demands on will-power, if his ethics is
not, where this is deficient, to carry with it dangers to which
the Catholic system is not so readily open. But in this fact he
sees merely an indirect proof of its fundamental superiority.
Ought Evangelical ethics to take into consideration the
difference between Lutheran and Reformed 'i The answer will be
different according as each one judges as to the difference in the
way of understanding the Gospel. And he who is inclined to
regard this for the time being as a question of significance will
not be able to speak so confidently on this subject as in the
case where the point in debate is the position of the law in
Evangelical ethics, and of the basis of moral action in justifying
faith.
Another question closely connected with the Evangelical system
of morals needs to be answered as a further preliminary. What
is the standard to which appeal must be made in judging the
statements of this system .? Generally speaking, the answer
cannot be doubtful : Divine revelation, on which our religion
rests, which settles its character, as it is the ground of its truth ;
therefore, more particularly, the Holy Scriptures, which contain
the decisive testimonies of the faith. This follows simply from
the close association of Christian ethics with the Christian
religion as both are understood by the Evangelical Church.
Because these two things are so inseparably conjoined the
Holy Scriptures are not only the rule and standard of doctrine
but also of morality. Just as little is reason assigned a place as
judge in the Evangelical system of ethics as it is arbiter in
doctrine. Hence we introduced a proof of the truth of Christian
ethics in order that this appeal might not seem to be delusive and
fanciful, and certainly not a fetter or a hindrance but an appeal
reasonable in itself, and intelligible from the nature of ethics
and indeed of this ethics. This excludes the permissibility of
assigning to religious experience the right of final decision in
moral questions, if this means religious experience disjoined
from divine revelation, if we mean by religious experience some-
thing different from belief in revelation. The Evangelical
conception of ethics assunies that ev?n the Chiirch is not
PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS 117
superior to the Scriptures. The Catholic idea of legalistic
subjection to the Church appears to us unethical. Therefore
we cannot advocate a system of ethics which finds its supreme
rule in the letter of Confessions of faith (i.e. creeds). Are we not
ourselves, however, in danger of getting into a similar condition of
external servitude to the Holy Scriptures ? And if we save
ourselves from that, are we not in danger of falling hopelessly
into the unlimited caprice of mere pious experience.? These
questions are generally explained more with reference to questions
of belief than those of ethics. If the same danger happens in
either case, both are required. We enter upon this question in
the case of ethics not with a series of general propositions but
by giving simple examples, from which the most needful state-
ments may be derived.
One of the chief questions is the difference between the Old
and the New Testaments. He who would deny this difference
has need to ask himself the question whether he, as a Christian,
can appropriate the language of many of the so-called ' cursing
psalms "* and use them in prayer in their original meaning ; and
if so, whether that meaning would agree with the spirit of Him
who on the cross prayed for his enemies, and whether he would
not have first of all to bring them to Christ's cross and there
transform them. It is true that to persecuted Christians like
the Puritans and the Huguenots in dire need they have often
enough proved a consolation and an inspiration ; but Christian
consolation and Christian inspiration can they be only through
such transmutation under the cross. How much misery of
conscience did it bring the Reformers when they undertook to
condone the bigamy of the Landgraf of Hesse by appeal to the
history of the patriarchs ? How far was Christian opinion per-
turbed when the execution of Servetus was justified from the Old
Testament ? Both to the joy of Rome, inasmuch as when
occasion needed it could represent its own thoroughly doubtful
morality as the stronger, and at the same time declare that the
supreme jurisdiction of the Church over the Bible was plainly
inevitable ; and on another occasion, inasmuch as it found a
welcome precedent for the persecution of Protestants in its own
camp. But it is equally certain that ethics would suffer loss
118 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
without the most ample use of the Old Testament. Ethics
would not only be deprived of an inexhaustibly rich profusion
of illustrations, of a unique picture-book, but also of a great aid
in the education of individuals and of society in the full mean-
ing of Christian morality itself. For just as this is built up on
the foundation of the preparatory revelation, so individuals and
nations repeat in their own case these histories of a progressive
revelation. Without the figure of Abraham, simple as was his
shepherd life, and yet as inexhaustibly profound as the starry
firmament ; without the main pillars of simple reverence for
God, and trust in Him, of love to those nearest to them, as
these things are embodied in those narratives of the Old
Testament, there could be no understanding of the New ; with-
out absorbed study of the prophets, no deep consideration of
their fulfilment. Even quite apart from definite Christian
ethics, we should be compelled to take to heart what the great
Goethe, the connoisseur of human nature, witnesses to the
influence of the Old Testament on the elemental basis of his
own most characteristic culture. In his distracted life and his
hap-hazard acquisition of knowledge he found help there in
concentrating his mind and his emotions into tranquil activity,
and ' found himself whether in the greatest isolation or in the
best society. The more dissipating our present-day life is, right
on from our early start in it, the more need is there for this
home of the heart.
If we can without serious difficulty sum up all that has been
so far' said, in the proposition that no constituent part of
Christian morality can be founded solely on the Old Testament,
but that the great importance claimed for it can only be main-
tained on the ground of the New Testament^ yet when we turn
to this, new and serious difficulties confront us. Most persons
will admit, of course, that every single precept given by the first
disciples is not applicable as a part of Christian ethics for all
times, as soon as they are reminded of such details as those in
Corinthians (1 Cor. xi. 4) of praying with the head covered or
uncovered. Where more important matters are in question this
admission is made less readily and less generally, as possibly in
the opinions of St Paul on marriage and the status of women.
PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS 119
But the admission that is made, small as it is, cannot but suggest
caution in the enunciation of universal propositions, even with
the good design of laying down an immovable foundation for
the Christian life. That word, " If they keep my saying, they
will keep yours," stands in need of elucidation. The Lord who
calls Himself the 'Truth' does not ask us to veil any fact.
And that word does not mean the Apostles only, although it
refers to them in an especial degree, as the original recipients
of His words, chosen to be such by Him, trained by Him, and
filled with His Spirit, as well as intellectually capable. But,
it might be said, so much the more certainly is every word of
Jesus Himself regulative for Christian ethics, and its whole
compass to be ruled by His words alone. But to take literally
His saying as to those who " make themselves eunuchs for the
kingdom of heaven's sake" is rightly regarded among us as an
immoral perversion, and that as to offering the other cheek as
comparatively harmless. Where is the boundary-line between
the literal and the genuine spiritual meaning ? Now, the whole
problem as to how far the words of the Lord are the supreme
standard of Christian ethics demands a much wider setting.
And on this account : a multitude of serious moral questions
occupies our attention which did not concern early Christianity
at all, or not in the same way. Not in the same way, because
at first the whole energy of the Church, even in its outward
attitude to daily life, was bound to be directed to its chiefest
anxiety for the coming of the Kingdom more entirely than was
the case later. Not as if this anxiety ought ever to be less than
its chiefest anxiety, but still it is in a different way as determined
by the course of history, which is under divine guidance, how-
ever much affected by human sin. Thus, in the Epistle to
Philemon it is perfectly clear that the slave was in Christian
judgment intended to be regarded as something more than a
slave, and it is equally clear that at first the institution of
slavery remained untouched. The same thing is true of the
position of woman ; of the appeal to the secular law on the part
of the Christian; and of engaging in public life generally.
However we may determine as to details, the fact which is of
importance for us here remains just the same : that a series of
120 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
moral problems did not concern the early Church in the same
way as it does us. There are others with which they were
scarcely concerned at all. For instance, commercial life of course
stood in need of direct illumination from the Christian faith, as
the Epistles to the Thessalonians show. But asocial question — in
the same sense as for us in this day of machinery, when not only
has slavery been abolished, but also feudal service and every
legal form of personal dependence — did not exist for the early
Church, because no such conditions existed in its day. Just so
is it in relation to the Church. It is thus clear that moral
commands cannot be directly taken from isolated sayings of the
New Testament. This is practically impossible on account of
the actual character of the New Testament.
But still more. It ought not to be othenoise. No moral
command ought to be directly taken from an isolated saying
of the New Testament. If we were to assert this we should
abandon the idea of the conformity of our whole daily life to
Scripture requirement. Clearly so for those particular depart-
ments of it which lay outside its horizon, and, looked at more
closely, even for those which were then already important, since
in the course of history certainly one period never corresponds
exactly to another ; and even where there is an apparent
similarity there is a different undercurrent and another
colouring. In truth, on this presupposition Christian ethics
would not be unsurpassable as the Christian Church is convinced
is the case. For as it is surely undeniable that history offers
new problems, these could only be regarded as indifferently cared
for if they were not from the outset considered in the utmost
detail. It is only if by faith in Christ there can be to each
generation, in its special need, a certainty what the will of God
revealed in Christ means for it and desires from it, that the will
of God can ever prevail. It is one of the encouraging features
of the present time that almost on every side the principle is
admitted that it is only in this way that our life can be
Christianly ruled, and only thus with complete earnestness. In
the department of doctrine, Christianity has many more
opponents ; in ethics it is impossible to live consistently without
it, and life is stronger than a preconceived idea. Ethics con-
PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS 121
sequently helps doctrine to reach a purer form. This truth
might probably be more universally accepted, and still more
pleasing would be such general sanction, if its exponents were at
all times ready and ever more ready to learn from the foe a
reverential attitude towards the Holy Scriptures ; if they
would think no saying unimportant, and seek to ascertain the
permanent value of that which was spoken for the occasion.
By this means, in fact, that which appears to be merely indifferent
grows significant without any limitation of required freedom ;
rather, on the contrary, strengthening and increasing it.
This freedom, moreover, cannot be given up without giving up
the essence of Christian morals. There can be no other kind
of scriptural conformity at all that does not mean disturbing
and perverting the Gospel, which in the Scriptures bears witness
to the grace of God, and to the morality conjoined with it.
For we at the outset arrived at the conclusion that moral
action is action according to an absolute law which the will
can recognise as its own ; in the fulfilment of which men attain
their true destiny, freedom from all the world within and
without. That for the Christian the will of God is the ' Good **
has not appeared to us as a contradiction of this freedom, but
as its completion. The service of God is 'perfect freedom. "^
But that is only true if this service is not mere self-subjection
to a number of isolated commands, but one that issues from a
confidence in the will of God revealed in its innermost nature.
Certainly we must accept with gratitude all single precepts
met with in the New Testament which are so clearly conceived,
so plainly shaped by the Spirit who created the Word that it is
at once clear to us that every other utterance, when tested by
these precepts, is inferior to them in force and point. But the
duty of proving " what is that good and perfect and acceptable
will of God " we have not carried out until such a saying has
been made clear to us in its connection with the central truth
of the Gospel, and we, in applying it independently to our
particular circumstances, can determine what it now means for
us. " This is the will of God in Christ for you," says St Paul,
when he gives the last decision from which there is no longer
any appeal. Therefore he says ' the will,' the one all-embracing
122 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
will. Every student of the Scriptures recognises that the
Apostle, filled with the Spirit, did in faith receive from that
great will of God those striking words to the Thessalonians
on the necessity of work, and those to the Corinthians on
purity and Church unity. It is only following his example if
we say : From the principles of the Christian ' Good,' as it is
made certain to faith from the revelation in Christ, we have,
likewise in faith, to derive all the single propositions of ethics
and to test them by it. " Let every one be like minded "" with
Jesus Christ (Phil. ii. 5), and " Whatsoever is not of faith is sin ""
(Rom. xiv. 23). This is the true conformity to Scripture of
Evangelical ethics.
Of course it is not merely the Roman Church that scoffs at
this ' secure insecurity,"" and offers, by its infallibility, to every
halting Christian soul at the confessional box a certainty which
cannot deceive. Even amongst ourselves the complaint is still
heard that the appeal to Scripture is liable to be arbitrary ;
that as a matter of fact in such appeal we import our own ideas
into the Scripture, and that it is always exposed to this danger.
For example, in the question whether our present Church polity
(or changes in it) is conformable to Scripture, only one thing,
it is said, can save us from perplexing fallacy, and that the
unreserved following out of all the demands of the New
Testament literally. We will not here raise the question
whether the grandiloquent proposals of those who make them-
selves heard on this question are practicable — nor whether
they are at all possible ; whether, for instance, the Church of
Corinth or the Church of Jerusalem, with or without a
community of goods, should be taken as model ; or whether
any such formal arrangements, viewed as obligatory, are in
accordance with the genius of Christianity. We desire now
mther to point out with insistence that our principle is not
meant to imply that anyone who chooses has the right to
derive from a principle of Christianity — just as he is pleased
to take it — rules for the regulation of the life of the Christian
Church. As the Evangelical Christian judges, it is rather the
case that by the method of freedom of faith the principle taken
from Holy Scripture becomes continually more clearly under-
PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS 123
stood in the course of history, works itself out into continually
clearer distinctness. We may add that the' confidence in
which believers are established in the promise of a Spirit who
should "lead them into all truth*" has never been deceived.
Did not St Augustine under diverse circumstances more clearly
understand the Gospel than anyone between him and St Paul 't
Yet he gained that knowledge from St Paul's writings. And
Luther under the guidance of St Augustine dived deeper than
he into the meaning of St Paul's doctrine of justification.
Each time this deep insight into God's gift corresponded to a
deep insight into the problem inseparable from it ; the progress
of faith answering to the progress of the Christian life. Thus
occupation of our thought with that objection which we called
the conformity of Evangelical ethics to the Holy Scripture
serves only to a better comprehension of its true meaning. Of
course the actual proof is, in this connection, reserved as to
whether we have not ingeniously forced what was a matter of
historical development into the origins ; that is to say, whether
the idea of individuality and the results of civilisation ought
not to be acknowledged to be a completely new attainment of
history. On that we must speak later in treating of the idea
of the highest good, of civilisation, of character, etc. Therefore
we are fully conscious of the danger of artificial Scripture proof
even on this point. But the fundamental principle above spoken
of follows simply from that which has been explained as to the
connection of the Christian life with Christian faith. And we
may at once say that even those who raise this objection insist
that those wider developments of Christian morality have their
base finally in the Christian idea of God ; and for them this idea
of God depends on the revelation in Christ. Now we have its
regulative testimony in the Holy Scripture. What objection,
then — leaving out details — ought to be raised to the notion
thus set up of a Scripture proof ?
The Division of the SuBJEcr-MATrBR.
The formal divisions of Christian ethics are not nearly so
much settled by tradition as those of doctrinal theology. So
much the more must we have regard to the fact that it is most
124 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
agi*eeable to the nature of the subject to treat it in the simplest
way possible. ' Bearing this in mind, we are justified in dis-
tinguishing between individual and social ethics. That is, the
ethical forms of the personal life, and of social life on Christian
principles, have each their separate divisions. Of course,
where it is a question of alternative courses of action, ' either,^
' or,"* the whole subject-matter must be treated from the point
of view of individual ethics, by reason of the unique value
which every human soul has in the view of Christian ethics.
But this ' either,*" ' or ** is not existent ; and it merely produces
an impression of artificiality if the groups, ' family,' ' state,"* and
the like, are considered as merely theatres of activity for
individual persons. But this procedure essentially fails to
estimate the real value which society, without depreciation of
the individual, finds as a Christian community of those who are
adopted into the kingdom of God. Of course, when we come
to details, various sorts of difficulties arise from this mode of
dividing the subject. To follow them out is more interesting
from the point of view of methodology than helpful in treat-
ment. It may be sufficient to remark that the whole of the
subject-matter appertaining to individual and social ethics is
not treated so that no gaps are left, in a way that a complete
treatment might demand. For instance, art is treated in the
section on social ethics only. The alternative proposal to
consider the whole subject-matter from the point of view of
what the ethical ' Good ' is, and to determine the value of each
moral 'good"* both for the individual and for society, would
make it difficult to do full justice to the other aspects of the
subject, which concern Norm and Motive. It is, in fact, asking
that these two divisions of individual and social ethics should
be treated closely together, and grounded in one delineation
of the innermost essence of the Christian Good. But so far
that has only been done cursorily — once, in order to help us to
compare the Christian ethical ideal with others, and again, in
order to set ethics of the Evangelical kind in contrast with the
Roman Catholic system. To do this explicitly is our next task.
CHAPTER V.
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD.
Christ the ' Principle ' of Christian Ethics.
When we asked what it really is that constitutes the ' Good/
or what is the principle of ethics, we found that the considera-
tion of it in various aspects was helpful to us in understanding
the term ' Good "* in those various significations which are
frequently not clearly distinguished. These we must recall.
We refer to those questions : What is the ' Good,' considered
from the point of view of its End, Rule, Motive, and the
imperative ' Thou shalt ' ? The other questions, What is its
Origin ? and what its validity ? are, in their relation to
Christian ethics, most closely associated on account of the
connection that exists between Christian morality and Christian
faith. Our love of God and of our neighbour in the
kingdom of God, which has its origin in God's love to us,
depends wholly and entirely on that exhibition of His love
which is found in the revelation of His love in Christ. This
is the foundation on which it rests ; which gives it its value ;
which wholly and entirely determines its End, its Norm ; from
which arises all possibility of its existence, and which is the
impulse and energy of it in its commencement, continuance, and
completion. Even the imperative 'Thou shalt' is something
wholly unique, and it is so on account of the fact that the will
to which it appeals is a will which has apprehended the love
of God, and has been able to understand and apprehend that
love, because it has long previously wrestled with that ' Thou
shalt.' Therefore we are able and are compelled to maintain
126 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
that, rightly regarded, Christ is the principle of Chrvttiaii ethics^
and that too when we take the term ' principle ** in all the
relations just referred to. The New Testament expresses this
truth in the plainest manner by the use of every possible
preposition in connection with Christ. ' Of,' ' out of,' ' through,'
'to,' 'according to,' 'on account of,' 'in' Christ all Christian
men act, believe, love, live, and die. All the moral action of
Christian men is referred to Christ as the personal source of
the highest ' Good.' To win Christ is the same as to win a
'jewel,' 'life,' 'the kingdom.' All that the Christian does, he
does after Christ's example. He aims at conformity to Christ
and to be fashioned after His image. It is ' in Christ,' i.e.
impelled and strengthened by Him, that the goal can be reached
in such a way. Therefore it is Christ who is the pre-eminent
' Thou shalt ' to Christians, because He not only points out the
goal, the way and the source of power, but He Himself is all
these things. To lay hold of Christ is to lay hold of true
freedom, while to resist Him is the greatest and, ultimately
regarded, the only sin. All this implies that because He
reveals the only good God, and because by our trust in Him
God actually gives Himself to our experience (that is to say, is
operative in us, producing greater trust in Him), this Christian
faith in this God is inseparably one with the Christian moral
life, as was shown to some extent previously (p. 100 ff.), and must
now be treated in detail.
One aspect of this faith must be specially emphasised.
Christ occupies this unique position in Christian ethics inasmuch
as it is one and the same person who is the historic Christ and
the glorified Saviour. His historic life is such as to awaken
our confidence that He is not confined within earthly bounds ;
that as the glorified Saviour He is eternally perfecting what has
already been begun in His earthly life. It is thus that the pre-
eminence of Christian ethics depends on Him. Every appli-
cation of it to new circumstances, the whole development of it
on earth, and in conditions of existence which transcend all that
is earthly, find in Him their reason and support, their measure
and end. It is He who unites those spatial and temporal
conditions which for our present knowledge are incompre-
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 127
hensible. To explain and assign reasons for this significance
of Christ's person for ethics forms part of the subject-matter
of doctrinal theology ; but its real character would be imperfectly
conceived if we did not at the outset give due prominence to
this thought, or if in our subsequent treatment we lost sight of
it in any way. Of course it would be tediously circumstantial
to be constantly repeating the idea.
The further arrangement of our thoughts is conditioned by
this idea. It is under this presupposition that we are sure that
nothing essential will be omitted when we speak of ' End,' of
the highest Good of Christian moral actions, of the highest Norm
which corresponds to this end, and of the Motive for its
realisation as all alike inseparable from Christ. For it is by
this method that it is made clear that the Christian life rests
completely and fully on the foundation of the Christian Jhith,
since this Christian faith is itself, in respect of its innermost
nature, moral faith. That is to say, it is the faith that men,
who are engaged in a moral contest, who 'hunger after right-
eousness,' have in the gracious self-revelation of the only good,
God, the perfect Father in Christ, who bestows salvation on
them by filling them with the righteousness for which they
hunger (St Matt. v. 6).
The Highest Good is the Kingdom of God.
All action has an end at which it aims ; all moral action is
the endeavour to realise moral ends, and whenever it has
attained the higher stage it embraces in itself all individual
ends in one single highest ' Good,' to the realisation of which
the highest value is assigned. We have already shown by the
most important examples of present-day thought how variously
the highest Good is defined. We have so far used the term
' Kingdom of God ' for the ' highest Good ' of Christian ethics.
Following the New Testament, other terms too have been
employed : ' self-denial,' ' repentance,' ' crucifixion of the flesh.'
These awaken the feeling that abnegation of the natural life is
the essence of Christian ethics, whereas they only express one
part of it. Other terms, such as ' self-realisation,' ' holiness,'
'likeness to God,' are too indefinite, or have likewise too
128 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
individual a reference, and do not also regard the community of
individuals. Next to ' Kingdom of God,' the most suitable
may possibly be ' divine adoption,' or ' the realisation in love
of justification by faith'; and especially this latter, by which
ethics directly joins itself on to doctrine ; and the Evan-
gelical standpoint at once stands out clearly, except that
in this the individual is too much in the foreground. With
the term ' Kingdom of God ' the individual is recognised more
surely in his full importance, for the Kingdom of God is the
kingdom of the children of God ; while, on the other hand, the
term 'divine adoption' or justification gives full recognition
to the collective whole. And he will especially have a
preference for the use of the term ' Kingdom of God,' as the
highest ' Good ' in ethics, who in dogmatics sees the nature of
our religion most compactly comprehended in the same word.
Of course it is possible that a doubt may arise : if religion is
concerned with dependence on God, while ethics somehow with
self-activity, ought the same notion to be supreme in both ? Now,
it was maintained to begin with, and subsequently repeated, that
the reason of the special interconnection of faith and life,
such as characterises Christianity, lies in the nature of our
religion as of our ethics ; and in it there also lies the reason for
the fact that the term ' Kingdom of God ' has so unique and
twofold a suitability for being the fundamental idea of doctrine
and of ethics.
But it has been declared with considerable emphasis that we
cannot j ustify the employment of the term ' Kingdom of God '
in ethics at any rate from the New Testament. In the lips of
Jesus Christ it means, it is said, the Sovereignty of God, which,
by the mighty power of God, will in the future dawn upon us
from heaven. In a wider sense it means that inexpressible
fulness of all the best 'Goods.' Thus its realisation is not
exactly a human problem ; it is not an ideal which they
realise by their activity ; certainly not of such sort as that its
true nature consists in the establishment of a great communion
of love. This objection, so far as it concerns us, may be set aside
most convincingly rather by asking whether the ideas which we
sum up in the term ' Kingdom of God ' aj-e in unison with the
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 129
whole character of Christ's teaching than by entering in detail
on the tedious question as to what sense He attached to the
term ' Kingdom of God.' At all events we do, on the whole,
best satisfy the requirement as to its Scripture use and Scripture
proof by maintaining that it is really a Gospel use. There can,
however, be no doubt on the subject: the great 'gift of God,'
as it is always called, and described in manifold ways so as to
express its varied inexhaustibility — as, e.g..^ 'fellowship with
God,' ' born of God,' ' dwelling in God,' ' eternal life,' ' know-
ledge of God,' ' fear of God,' ' trust in God,' ' love of God,'
'righteousness,' 'salvation,' 'peace,' 'joy,' 'glory' — this gift is
of such a kind that it is of itself a task to be performed. More
closely : it is said with much insistence that first of all the
Kingdom (God's work and the gift of gifts) is only shared in
by those in whom it is real, who desire to fulfil God's will, and
in fact can only be regarded as the reward of such fulfilment.
That might certainly in and for itself be a very external relation
between ' gift ' and ' task,' and does indeed forbid us distinguish-
ing both by the same term, ' Kingdom of God.' But in what
does the ' gift ' consist ? Not in material comfort but in
true righteousness; in doing the will of God, which becomes
active in our will ; in fellowship with the Father who is per-
fect, with God who is love ; and in communion with all the
children of this Father. This is the condition to which the
gift is attached. Both are therefore of the same nature and
consequently inseparable. Luther hits the sense of the New
Testament with his sayings : " The Kingdom of God is nothing
else than being full of all virtue " ; " To take pleasure in God's
law is salvation " ; " The accomplishment of His good will in us is
life " ; " God living and ruling in us is the enjoyment of the
highest good." And it is instructive to contemplate under this
aspect those other terms, too, which express the highest Good.
Unless we make clear to ourselves this inseparability, because
they are pairs, of ' gift ' and ' task,' we cannot understand them
at all. But still more : earnestly as Jesus insists that it means
striving after righteousness, and that its result is the possession
of rigliteousness, He leaves it in no doubt that this would be for
ever in vain if God did not bestow it ; that prevailing courage
9
130 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
for the struggle has its source in the power of the joyful news
of that which God does. Conversely, as unreservedly as He
offers this gift as a present only, so emphatically does he
accentuate that no one can rejoice in the gift who will not
attempt the task ; that he who has received forgiving love
without stint, should without stint practise forgiving love ;
that the very condition for understanding this task is to receive
the gift ; for spiritual poverty is itself a yearning for the coming
of the Kingdom, a personal hunger after the ' Good ' of
righteousness. In this deepest sense the ' gift ' does on account
of its nature become a 'task/ This at the same time settles
that other disputed question, so far as it relates to ethics —
whether the Kingdom of God is only something in the future.
It is much the same thing as asking whether the term denotes
any reality in this world. On account of its nature the
Kingdom of God is already a present reality where men believe
on the Father and love the brethren. That in this way the
Kingdom of God is, with regard to its earliest beginnings,
realised under earthly relations is indubitable ; but Christianity
in its fulness does not really know of any other kingdom except
that which springs out of eternity and stretches out into
eternity.
Now this justification of the notion 'Kingdom of God' as
a comprehensive expression for the highest Goal of moral
endeavour, the highest Good of Christian ethics, is, at the same
time, the justification of what was, at the commencement,
asserted with regard to the distinction and interconnection
between doctrine and ethics (p. 4). Both have the Kingdom
of God as their subject, but the former looks at it as a 'gift,'
which, however, is certainly necessary for the performance of
the ' task " ; the latter regards it as a ' task ' which is wholly
grounded on the ' gift.' But the deepest reason why ' gift ' and
'task' are so especially one lies in the deepest nature of
Christianity— in the fact that it is the perfect moral religion ;
in which phrase at one time the emphasis is on ' religion,' and
at another time on ' moral,' but so that the former is the noun
and the latter the adjective. Why.? Because our God, the
Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who in Him is ' our Father,'
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 131
is the alone ' Good,' God the perfect Father (St Matt. v. 48,
xix. 17) wlio is love (1 John iv. 8).
And now, if without the consideration of isolated sayings it
is proved from the subject-matter that the idea of the
Kingdom of God, the fellowship of created spirits with the God
of holy love, and with each other, indicates the highest aim of
Christian moral endeavour, as the content of the Christian
faith, so it may be affirmed that there are not wanting various
single statements in the New Testament, in the words of the
Lord as well as of His Apostles, which teach it. And because
such express words, as well as the entire witness of the New
Testament, are available for a clear understanding among
Christians of the highest moral ' Good,' it is essential to define
the idea of the Kingdom of God in detail. Previously to, and
apart from, the elaboration of individual and social ethics the
term remains a blank idea compared with the immediate
feeling of value which it possesses for the Christian in its New
Testament presentation, and its rich illustration in history
and life. It is sufficient to insist on some specially important
characteristics of the concept ' Kingdom of God.' Because it
is perfect communion with God and man, and rests on the
basis of God's love to us, and so everywhere presupposes
it, it is essential that this idea of love should be at once
so far expounded that its further connotation may not be
obscure, and its importance for Christian ethics left in no
doubt. ^Its importance consists in its relation to the highest
Good in the supreme command and the deepest of all motives.
In Christian ethics love is the 'be-all and end-all,' and this
fact awakens at once an impression of its special unity and
independent wholeness. Where is there another system of
ethics which could express so simply by a word the End, the
Norm, the Motive of moral action ?
Love is the endeavour of a society of sentient beings to
realise from good-will and benevolence, by surrender on the
one part and appropriation on the other, some common Ends.
In its final ground it is benevolence and surrender, altruism
and self-renunciation ; for pleasure without benevolence would
be selfishness, and benevolence without pleasure would be the
132 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
cold fulfilment of duty. Anyhow, there is a strong tendency
in common language to give currency to this clear connotation
of the concept ' Love/ The longer we consider it the more do
we feel that it is an inaccuracy to speak of love of nature, of
plants, of animals. And just because the object of such love
is not a sentient being, or certainly is not such in the sense of
one in common with whom we should realise a common End ;
and when we nevertheless speak of love in such a connection,
we assign feeling to that which is incapable of it, and conscious-
ness to that devoid of it ; and so make it an object of actual
love in our imagination, or with some sort of conviction that
its true nature is hidden from superficial observation. But how
heterogeneously conceived is such a notion of love so defined !
Yet not more heterogeneous than that which we call natural
and religious love. Only what this means must be accurately
conceived. Both the pleasure and benevolence, as well as the
common End which love desires to realise, may be of a natural
or moral kind — and that, too, not only at every conceivable
stage, but also in every possible combination. The fii'st ; for
the common Ends form a richly articulated whole : e.g., help
in the guidance of our personal life stands higher than help in
the advancement of a single part of our vocation. It is true
also that benevolence and pleasure have degrees of strength
and persistency without the lower being necessarily non-moral.
The second is true inasmuch as I can from purely natural
benevolence and pleasure help another in a moral End, or even
from moral motive assist him in a natural End. If we have
so far only made clear by some examples what a fulness of
possibilities real life exhibits (say) in friendship, we have
nevertheless gained a conviction of the inexhaustible fulness
which that simple formula comprehends. And it is also clear
that the higher love, as ethically determined, stands so much
the higher, the higher those moral ends are which are striven
for in common ; and so much the purer is that benevolence
and good pleasure — that is to say, the more purely benevolence
and good pleasure are determined by that absolute ' ought.'
And this can be the case not merely in the form of a moral
struggle, but also so that it becomes, as is said, a second nature
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 13S
(see further on Individual Ethics). But that such love must be
persistent and fill the whole soul requires no proof. In the
degree in which this is the case, benevolence rises to self-
sacrifice, and in this way pleasure attains its highest conceivable
satisfaction. And, in fact, whether it happens that love is
understood or resisted, or it meets with indifference and
resistance, it is by this very means that it grows to maturity.
For the whole secret of love is that to give is to receive ;
sacrifice is gain. This is the unsung song of the poet, the
never-exhausted thought of the philosopher, the real wonder
of the moral world, but nowhere more simply and grandly
uttered than in the saying that "he who loses his life shall
find it," to life eternal (St Matt. xvi. 25).
It is to Him who spoke this word that Christian faith, and
with it Christian ethics, owes the privilege of seeing in the
developed idea of love an essential attribute of God. This idea
is an expression for the reality of God in Jesus Christ exhibited
to faith ; and all that may now adorn itself in the world with
the name of love appears to the Christian Church as an effluence
of the love of God revealed in Christ. Men know what love
truly is because they experience the love of God (1 John iv. 10).
Therefore for Christianity the proposition, ' God is love,' is
not somehow a metaphorical designation which must be supported
and explained by mystical ideas of God as 'the reason and
purpose of the world,' as the ' Unconditioned ' ; nor is love a
mere attribute of the ' Absolute.' It is rather that this
indefinite idea, ' reason and purpose of the world,' this idea of
the ' Absolute ' — a term capable of varied connotation — and
also the idea of ' absolute personality,' have for the Christian the
definite content — Love. Those ideas are needful statements of
our knowledge of God, and it is the task of theology to make
clear that they are summed up in the proposition, ' God is love.'
But we may — nay, we must — confine the given connotative
marks of the 'love' of God within the sole limits obvious to
Christians, so that we do not wipe out the distinction between
Creator and creature. Love between God and man is founded
in its commencement, continuance, and completion in the freedom
of the divine love. In this meaning the Father is called the
154 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
* Father which is in heaven,'' and God''s love said to be ' holy,'
exalted above the world. Under this reservation there need be
no dread of anthropomorphism conceivable ; inasmuch as, when
we speak in fact of a common End of His pleasure and His
benevolence, we can only speak of these things in the terms
which express our own inner experience. It would endanger
religion to omit this reservation — that is to say, it would endanger
the moral value of the notion, since it would then become a mere
empty expression : ' God is love.' Therefore we understand
why we cannot speak otherwise of God. Of course we think of
Him after our image because we are made in His, and because
made in the living consciousness that (again to speak humanly)
the inner life of God in its formal relations must be to us a
mystery, however certainly the meaning of this inner life has
been intelligibly made known. And we can prove that those
who scoff at this Christian knowledge of God, on account of
these limitations, do not afford in our view anything more
satisfactory with their idea of an unconditioned absolute.
What may faith then indicate as the purpose which in the
fellowship of love is common to us and God.-^ Certainly not
something merely natural but ethical. Consequently it does
not speak of the love of God to the natural world, but to a
nature spiritual and moral. With more particularity, this End of
the Kingdom of God is the fellowship of created spirits, who,
blessed in the love of God, do on this ground love God and one
another as comprehended in Christ. Here in truth there
appears to be some obscurity. To love means the furtherance
of some common End ; the highest common End is the Kingdom
of God, i.e. the fellowship of love. But the truth is, only in
this way does it become quite clear that our God is love. As
Luther says : " If anyone would paint God and make it like the
original, he must form such an image as is neither artistic nor
human, and indeed neither angelical nor heavenly, but just God
Himself." The gods which men form for themselves are gods in
the immeasurability of their selfish enjoyment. The true God
who reveals Himself to us is God in that He loves and will
give and offer Himself, will pour Himself out and naturally in
the inconceivable fulness of His divine reality, in order that
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 135
those who are taken into His fellowship and receive gifts from
Him may be made rich by giving, by acts of liberality and
sacrifice, and thus be like to Him, and in Him find their true
life again, in the whole fulness of the capacities bestowed on
them ; not that this fulness of power constitutes the essential
nature of our God, but His love, and this love is in reality our
new true being. Just as we may be allowed to speak of a
common End of God and of man because God is love, so also
the other marks of the notion of love, benevolence, and good
pleasure have their highest reality in God's love. It would be
necessary to write out the Holy Scriptures to exhaust the
characters which are comprehended in this proposition : ' God is
love.' This love is His blessedness. There with especial
frequency the steadfastness of His love is insisted on. It is ' for
ever and ever,' ' before the foundation of the world,' ' God is
faithful.' And the accumulation of comparisons, that He loves
as Father, Mother, Friend, Bridegroom, and more than all of
them, helps us to feel that no such earthly imagery exhausts the
personal inner reality and many-sidedness of the divine love.
The last-named comparison reminds us how the love of God is
perfected in the conquest of human indifference and hostility.
It leaves freedom for erring and straying, and follows the most
perplexing unfolding of character with longanimity and patience ;
but it reveals itself most gloriously in love to those at enmity
with Him — enmity of the keenest sort, inasmuch as the enemies
are sons, who are able to know what love is, and yet refuse its
return ; and this love even to death becomes the source of a
trustful return of love (2 Cor. v. 15). Its really conscious
rejection is the morally necessary end of all possible fellowship
in love : true love will sacrifice itself to overcome opposition,
but it cannot force itself on others, it cannot compel love ; for
this would no longer be love.
We must ever keep in mind this ideal concept of love as it is
only reached in the Christian faith when Christian ethics is
spoken of as the highest End of the Kingdom of God, the
kingdom of love. It grows clearer from step to step why there
can be no higher moral End, and why at every stage its realisa-
tion is salvation ; and there is no other End which is so completely
136 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
Good and so entirely 'the Good' {cf. later the exposition of
separate sides of this concept, and on the keynote of the
Christian character).
''Legal Right.''
If love is the holy of holies of the Christian moral world,
and on that account needed to be discussed at the very beginning
when determining its nature and treating of the notion of the
highest Good, here the fore-court of this holy of holies
demands brief attention, i.e. the idea of Legal Right. For a more
particular examination all the conditions fail us at present, but
it must be mentioned in order that the whole context to which it
belongs may not be obscure. For this purpose it is sufficient that
we set forth only so much as is admitted of the much-debated and
stillby no means unanimously conceived notion of legal Right.
We therefore mean by legal Right the publicly recognised order-
ing of the common life of men by the delimitation of individual
claims and of the free use of their powers so that respect for all
others is incumbent upon each, and at the same time that to
each one also is guaranteed the respect due to himself (whether
and how far definite possessions are assured by this may now be
left out of consideration). By the development of the notion
of love it has already been made plain that Law is not the final
word, and cannot be the highest thought of Christian ethics,
that every over-val nation of systems of Law is only possible
at the expense of the Kingdom of God. In this latter is found
intrinsic value, unity, freedom ; in the former there is externality,
multiplicity, coercion. The defect we found in so many systems
of utilitarian ethics is that they can by their endeavours issue
in nothing higher than mere justice, which in the absence of
a deeper foundation and a dominant End becomes in reality
often enough merely complete injustice; for how without a
secure standard is it to be determined what is right, and make
this operative in the absence of love ? But in Christian
ethics more essential at the outset is the battle against the
under-valuation of legal Right Legal Right is the indispens-
able presupposition of the fellowship of love, and of the greatest
possible exercise of love in compass of influence and intrinsic
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 157
contents. This is only conceivable for a multitude of individually
diverse human beings existing in space and time under the
presupposition of fixed rules of intercourse and of recognised
limits of the arbitrary will of individuals. We should, so to
speak, not be able to perform any actual action from love if we
were obliged in every single case to fix first of all its conditions.
Everyday life presents innumerable proofs of this simple truth.
The teacher could not influence his scholar at the right place,
and at the right time; and just as little the artisan, the mer-
chant, the artist bring his contribution to the highest good, in
the absence of Law. Multiplicity of details and incalculable
conditions blasting every ' good will ' would burden our inter-
course in the absence of Law. Love would fall to pieces in
mere attempts, in essays dependent on accident, to realise itself
in love. Love needs for its successful activity a certain unre-
strained freedom of movement and a field of action in some
measure prearranged, while of course it is not denied that it is
able to win thoroughly effective victories in battle with the
most inimical circumstances ; by service apparently unworthy of
it ; by the most insignificant preparatory work ; by the clearing
away of thorns and undergrowth. But not without reason in
the same Acts of the Apostles which shows how the love of
Christ triumphed over unrighteous persecution is it boasted,
" Then the Church had rest and was edified.'''' Yet in this End
so far treated the significance of legal Right for Christian ethics
is not yet exhausted. It is not merely a presupposition in the
external way thus far intended. No ! It is also a trainer in
love, even when it is only a task-master. The necessity of
paying regard to others, the necessity of recognising the claims
of others, is a school for the moral will, without which it always
remains unskilful in showing real love to others. Consequently
it is clear that a system of Law does not owe its origin to sin ;
but, however much its genesis may be bound up with the re-
quirements of utility, its final ground is moral feeling, the idea
of moral fellowship ; and consequently the validity of Right
has its deepest root in the feeling of an absolute value.
After having shown that the Kingdom of God is the highest
aim of Christian moral endeavour and the highest ' Good,"* and
1S8 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
for the sake of explaining it defined the notion of love, which
lastly made necessary a passing reference to the notion of Right,
we now draw express attention to some of the most important
aspects of the idea — Kingdom of God.
'File * Kingdom of God."
In showing that the fundamental relations which must
necessarily be taken into account in any consideration of the
idea of the greatest * Good ' form an inner unity (although
they often appear as contraries), we have made at the same
time a contribution to the demonstration that Christian ethics
is the highest, inasmuch as it avoids the failures of the other
great systems, and combines their deficiencies into a higher
unity (p. 106). That above all holds good because what is
' moral "* implicates a definite relation to one''s personal as well
as to external nature, and to other human beings ; and if the
ethical system in question has somehow a connection with
religion, it has a relation to God also (p. 15). If we make
it clear to ourselves what is the judgment of Christian ethics on
this, we then also find a satisfactory answer to further questions ;
for instance, how to conceive the relationship between the
temporal and eternal character of the highest Good, and how
to determine the relation of the individual to s(x;iety. Finally,
it is a feature of the Christian doctrine of the highest Good
that it does not need in any of these directions to throw a veil
over a fact generally curtly dismissed, the contradiction to the
highest ' Good,' in the existence of evil and sin.
Our highest good, the Kingdom of God, includes all the
above relations, to God, to ourselves, to our neighbour, to the
world. When we remember how otherwise it is now our own
improvement, now the good of another, now God's honour, now
His sovereignty over the world which is emphasised, then we
do find remarkable the ease with which they are all recognised
in the Christian conception of the highest 'Good.' Let any-
one attempt to think any of them away, and every sound
Christian feeling rises in resistance. But it is still more re-
markable how the variety is combined into a unity. In the
harmony of these four fundamental notes the leading ones are
THE NATURE OP THE CHRISTIAN GOOD J 59
the Great God and our neighbour. Among these God's love
stands in the fore-front. ' One thing is needful ' ; the greatest
of all ' Goods ' is God. But love to God is not by any means
what it ought to be without love of our neighbour. God is
indeed love ; love does not exist without fellowship in His
innermost purpose ; he who loves God loves his brother whom
God loves. God's love has as its End His Kingdom, which is
the union of the many so that they may be one with Him, and
with one another. Therefore it is that he who has fellowship
with God aims at the Kingdom of God. This fundamental
truth is, with complete intention, made the subject of a whole
epistle of the New Testament, the first Epistle of St John. E-g-')
we read (iv. 12), if we love one another, " God abideth in us, and
His love is perfected in us." Whether we are to understand
' His love "" of God's love to us or our love to God, in either case
the significance above mentioned of brotherly love is given to
it. God's love to us, which awakens our love to Him, finds its
completion in our loving one another ; and our fellowship with
God is such that we really love those whom He loves, and as
He loves. This love to one another is not a second something
superadded to our love to God, but the latter completes itself in
the former, and is not existent where the former is not. But
who can love God and his neighbour without mastering his
own nature, and through it the world outside of him ? without
becoming a person, without gaining a uniting centre and
spiritual independence of the many disintegrating and antagon-
istic impulses and the immeasurable torrent of changing impres-
sions from the external world ? Without being a ' person,' and
desiring to be such more and more, it is impossible to understand
another, to help him, or to personally, minister to his well-
being. And to love God, who is a Spirit, is only possible for a
being endowed with a spirit who desires to be spiritual. And
reversely : who can find for himself and in relation to the world
gain the freedom of personality without love to God and his
neighbour ?
In this special unity of the various fundamental relations of
ethics in the highest Good of the Kingdom of God we have
ground for asserting that it overcomes the antithesis of trans-
140 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFEi
cendental ethics and immanent ethics which was of so much
importance in the review of the main systems of ethics which
are at variance with the Christian conception. It insists more
strongly than any other system that the greatest 'Good' is
above this world ; for God, with whom our fellowship in love
is the highest Good, is believed in with all sincerity, not merely
as the ' unity of the world,' as its ' reason and purpose,' but
as plainly distinct from it, and nevertheless finally Himself in
the light of a deeper meditation. There is no room for worldly
blessedness ; it is only acceptance in that blessedness of the
only blessed God which is worthy of that title. And it only
becomes actual in men who desire God as nothing but the
highest Good ; for whom the wealth of this world pales beside
God ; whose desire aims in such a way at complete fellowship
with God, that every earthly advance, however great, in that
direction sharpens the longing for its completeness. We can-
not weaken the meaning of any of the New Testament sayings
which emphasise this truth without sacrificing the essence of
Christian morality. It is just on this point that it is of
importance not merely to understand but to recognise personally
the indispensability and the indestructibility of the sayings of
Jesus, impressive enough by their paradoxical form, such as the
' plucking out the eye.' He who has his highest good in that
which is above the world, and carries it through as the highest
in his struggles with the world, knows that he is also called to
that even in the most unlikely place.
And there is just as little room for avoidance of the world as
for finding our happiness in it. This avoidance, closely taken,
only suits that idea which makes cessation of existence the end
of endeavour ; the end of Christian morality is the saving of
the soul in God's love, and life in this love. Therefore is that
utterance, " All things are yours 'j)(l C^r. iii. 21), as unlimited
as that,."! counted all things but loss "(Phil. iii. 7). For the
reasons now repeatedly given, God, who is the highest Good,
is the God of omnipotent love, by whom, through whom, and
for whom are all things (Rom. xi. 36), whose the world is,
and whose world wholly and fully serves the purpose of His
love — indirectly so far as it contains creatures who find their
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 141
destiny in His love ; directly so far as it helps them in the
realisation of their end, and in this faith knows no bounds.
Once more that series holds good : God, neighbour, the
personal and external nature. But particularly in its attitude
to the latter does it become especially clear how remote the
Christian moral Good stands from avoidance of the world.
Nowhere else is the natural so completely subordinated as here,
but also in no other system of ethics is there such complete
freedom given ; and if that subordination is recognised so un-
reservedly recognised. This attitude is only possible if God is
God in the Christian acceptation. Only if the highest End of
endeavour is the experience of God's love in mutual love, and
indeed of a certain endeavour carried to its accomplishment
despite all struggles on the basis of that great gift of the
love of God — only then can all else be estimated at its true
value and neither depreciated nor overestimated ; for it is
worth just so much as it signifies for that highest ' Good."" No
human caprice decides this, but its existence in a world which
for faith is God's world, in which all that God has created
has its own special value. Without such a highest Good, life
is merely dying of thirst for life ; small and great forsake the
world as disillusionised conquerors ; with it, life is a struggle
which carries within it the pledge of eternal fulfilment.
Certainly in its detailed application to the complex questions
as to the significance of civilisation in Christian morality this
idea yields many a difficult problem. So much the more is it
needful to make it clear in advance how it results from the
Christian notion of the highest Good.
That this is a reality we may see in the picture of One who
strives for nothing else but to live obedient to the Father, in
that Father's love, and who has a firmer footing in this world
than any other, while he strives after what is beyond it ; who is
not of this world and has not his highest Good in this world,
but rather is ready at every moment to renounce the whole
world and deny himself if the Father so wills ; but for whom on
that very account the smallest thing is great and eternity is
present in the midst of time ; whose life, without anxiety, without
disgust, with no mere resignation, without ennui, is a trustful
142 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
activity, a gi-eat victory of life springing from and issuing in
eternal life. He is not intended merely as a pattern or as
virtue for our imitation, but as a reality of the highest Good
for us in the same sense as St Paul's 'to win Christ "■ can be
compared with ' the Kingdom of God,' ' to inherit life/
There are two words, much misused yet indispensable, which
may pass muster as a kind of proof whether the asserted higher
unity of the temporal and eternal, of God and the world, in
the Christian idea of the highest Good has a truly Christian
meaning. I mean the terms mysticism and eschatology. The
first of these, of course, merely refers to one of the relations now
in question, to the expression of which it has attained through a
long course of history. The point now in question is not whether
there is such a thing as the immediate influence of the divine on
the human spirit, nor even whether any operation of God has
of itself given its form to the historic revelation, but rather
whether a direct fellowship between God and man apart from
his relation to the world may be asserted or rjot. Indubitably,
yes ; but only in the sense so far carefully delimited. The very
heart of the highest Good for Christian ethics would be taken from
it if we in any way weakened the idea that God is Himself the
final End of our effort, and that love to God on the basis of His
love to us is the one and all. But it is love to God, whose nature
is love, whose eternal love no one can in love understand and
experience save by entering into the service of His love, where,
and as, and when He wills, i.e. always, everywhere, and with
the whole heart in the actual world which He created and gave
to us ; involved in this reality we have the certainty that the
eternal love of God will ever open up new and still greater
realities of life, in the experience of His love for ever and ever.
The other word, however, eschatology, does explicitly emphasise
the last-mentioned fact, that the present world is only an
incomplete stage, a transition : inexpressibly important, for
without faithfulness in that there is no higher stage, and
certainly not the stage of completeness ; not the stage of com-
pleteness if we consider that it is perfected only above the present
measure of our experience, and do not still assume the same
conditions of existence. Therefore, courageous work in this
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 143
world because ' it is God's will ' ; restless activity in the peace
of God's love for no moment of this activity is indifferent, or it
would not exist at all as certainly as God is God. And there
must be no illusion of an earthly perfection. If, in the
beginning of a new century, Lavater utters the greeting :
" Kingdom of God, the ardent desire of all the good, wilt thou
come with the new era ? " there is yet a glance raised above
the earthly course of time. So the most faithful champions
can without disillusion pass to their rest, and others step into
the vacant places, with ever-old, ever-new courage. No
imaginative picture of a kingdom of God fulfilled on earth
scorns their energy, and cripples it if it postpones their hope ;
but faith in the really eternal Kingdom of God which is not
confined within the boundaries of our present earthly experience
is the ' victory which overcometh the world.' But once more
this faith cleaves to Christ who is exalted above this world
because He while here overcame it.
And in the same way the highest Good of Christian ethics
surpasses the other systems, in that it is raised above the other-
wise irreconcilable opposition of individualism and socialism.
These words are understood in the quite general meaning
which forms the basis of their application in the whole of
individual and social ethics, and which may be simply defined
thus : Individualism subordinates society to the individual ;
socialism, the individual to society.
In this most general sense socialism exists in all departments.
It dominates Plato's view of the state : the rearing and
education of children is arranged by the state. In changed
historical conditions, to Hegel the state appears as realised
moral reason. In that most general sense the Roman Catholic
conception of the Church is socialistic : it has a constituted
society, a sacred language, and demands the sacrifice of conviction
for the saice of the unity of the Church — e.g.^ after the Vatican's
decree of infallibility. In social life the word is especially
familiar, but here its proper sense is in reference to the means
of production ; the individual should be subordinated to the
collective whole. But quite apart from such spheres of its
application, the term socialism generally means such a mode of
144 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
thought as implicates that the individual with his claims
should be subordinated to the whole, to society. In the survey
of modern competitors with the system of Christian ethics
we frequently uttered the reflection that in the utilitarian ethics
as in many forms of evolutionary theories the individual does
not get his share of consideration.
And we also discovered the contrary in egoistic ethics of the
most varied kind, such as the ideal of aestheticism — the indi-
vidual personality fitting itself for artistic production ; and also
that of the self-contented philosopher. Energetic champions
of Christian ethics have championed systems thoroughly egoistic.
" Society," says Vinet, " is not an organism, but only an arrange-
ment." " The individual,"" says Kierkegaard, " is in truth the
only subject of ethics." And as above socialism, so now
individualism in all its special spheres claims attention.
There is an individualistic conception of marriage according to
which it has its value for the married pair but not for society ;
of the state too, according to which it is merely the guardian of
the rights of the individual ; of a state confederacy like that of
the ancient German ' Bund,*" which was much more than a
federal state. Individualistic Church organisations are, as the
name shows, such as that of the Independents in Holland and
England ; and even the Evangelical Church of Germany is, on
the whole, properly understood, individualistic in comparison
with the Romish Church. In the economic question, Adam
Smith is the protagonist of our modern socialists.
In reality there can be no such thing as pure socialism or
pure individualism. The more thoroughly both are carried
out, the plainer do their imperfections become, and the
more easily does the one change into the other. In history
they alternate in very strange proportions ; mostly so that the
predominance of the individualistic becomes a tyranny, and
that of the socialistic poor and vapid ; and also in such a way
that each of these sets of epithets may be applied to each.
Are we at the present time more socialistic ? It is often asserted,
and many reasons seem to favour the idea. But the whole
democratisation, not merely and not even chiefly, of national and
social life, but still more of general opinion, is rather an effort
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 145
for equality on the part of individuals who consider themselves
equals than a real equalisation in a well-articulated society ;
and consequently the individuals who overtop others, or think
they do, assert themselves in their way with the utmost possible
lack of restraint, without regard to society. But, generally
speaking, that inner unity which is at all periods esteemed
essential, and therefore is said to be ' longed for,' between the
individual and society has on the whole remained but an ideal,
except in so far as definitely Christian influences have made
themselves felt. For instance, the 'human society*' of the
Stoics, which has real points of contact with one side of our
conception of the highest Good, in so far as it means human
fellowship in love, has only touched reality to the degree that
fellowship with God is its type, its motive power and reason.
The ancient and famous comparison of the human body St Paul,
as is known, appropriated, but he used it in a deeper meaning
than before, and above all so that now what was regarded as an
ideal obligation became a real one, because this brotherhood
was made an actual fact, and by faith in God the Father in
Christ the Kingdom of God was so far realised. In the Kingdom
of God the quarrel between the individual and society is made
up. For the individual knows that God loves him, and he
loves God ; he possesses and strives after the greatest Good in
its innermost core ; he has personal fellowship with a personal
God. But he obtains this privilege only when and because
he is connected closely with all others who believe in and love
the God who loves him ; for it is only in the unifying love
of all to each that God finds that reciprocal love which fully
corresponds to His everlasting love as Creator, in its whole
compass, and in the completeness of all its relations. On that
account there is no contradiction in it, because each individual
who is conscious that it is by God's love that he is awakened
to the love of God, loves God in such a way that it is imputed
to God when the love of created spirits is said to be a really
personal love in return for God's eternal love as Creator. It is
not that the love of the individual is as such something
imperfect in itself; its limitation arises from man's position
as a created being, and he overcomes that limitation, so far
10
146 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN IJFE
as is possible, by the maintenance of his life in the fellowship
of all who love God.
It becomes, moreover, quite plain from this reflection how
immense the value of the individual really is. In the absence
of the higher unity, Christianity would have to be recognised
as individualism. This truth is most simply and impressively
expressed in St Luke (xv. 6), " Rejoice with m^,"" ''Mi/ sheep which
was lost " ; and Luther has rightly emphasised the meaning of
'me' and 'mine,"* without falling on any contradiction to the
' us "" and ' our ' of the Lord's Prayer. In the difficult questions
arising in detailed ethics, we shall often need to call to mind
this great principle. The individual is for God of so great
value that it is not proper to allow, even apparently, that the
individual gains his value only through society, and not rather
that the progress of all social movements depends on individual
personalities ; all the forms of exaggerating the value of
corporate action and of social programmes have light thrown
on them by recognising this. And the individual who has his
value for the community only possesses this value because, by
God's love, he is a ' whole ' in himself, and is a growing person-
ality, and as such knows that he is hidden away in God from
the fate of earthly perishableness {v. 'Character"). Carlyle
says : " Men speak too much about the world. Each one of us
here, let the world go how it will, has he not a life c^ his own
to lead ? One life, a little gleam of time between two eternities.
. . . The world's being saved will not save us. . . . We must
look to ourselves. . . . And on the whole ... I never heard of
'worlds' being 'saved' in any other way."^ Only in a world
of heroes can there be faithful obedience to heroic ideals.
When these principles, both in relation to transcendent
ethics and immanent ethics and in reference to socialism and
individualism, are acknowledged in the Christian Good, the
objection that it is only with difficulty that either that notion
of individuality which is most strongly insisted on in the sequel,
or the recognition of the blessings of civilisation, can be
naturally derived from the original sources of our religion, falls
to the ground ; as does the assertion that they ought rather to
' Carlyle, ' Hero as Man of L-etters,' Lecture V., Lectures on Heroes.
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 147
be exclusively regarded as new elements of Christian ethics and
as a gain of modern life. The question, so far as ethics is
concerned, is at the bottom a simple one : either the
positions taken have their reason in the nature of the Christian
Good or not. A proof from isolated passages of Scripture
would be unnatural. So this is not attempted either here or
subsequently, but has, on the contrary, been once for all
disclaimed.
One result only of what has so far been said may be insisted
on briefly. That is, our idea of the highest Good represents an
actual whole of graduated aims, i.e. it is a system inasmuch as
it binds into a common unity all the main lines of moral effort,
transcends all that is otherwise called temporal and eternal, and
in addition reconciles all that is otherwise irreconcilable, in the
claims of the individual and of society, and finally embraces in
an articulated whole all the details of all conceivable moral
Ends. Our conception of the highest End includes, in itself,
all others in such a way that it finds reality in all of them ; and
it lays hold, not only of that which is above all individual life,
but that which is greater than its totality, God, regarded as
really distinct from the world. The special sphere in which
every individual can make his contribution to the realisation of
the highest Good, his contribution to ' the coming of the
Kingdom of God,"" and in which he is ever growing into a
completer personality, is his moral, is his right moral vocation.
So that this fundamental notion of individual ethics has its
immediate source in a clearly apprehended idea of the highest
Good, and does, besides, guard Christian social ethics against all
triviality, for all that was ever a real summons to the earthly
realisation of the highest End has permanent value even under
new conditions of existence. Christian morality does not
irritate the merchant or the artist with an oracular deliverance
that his work has importance for this world only {cf. Richter's
Life), and this because it recognises a highest End in so strict
a sense that it is able to realise itself in every sort of End
{cf. above on the transcendence and immanence of the ethical
ideal).
It would be instructive to consider the various aspects of the
148 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
Kingdom of God, as the highest Good in their inner coherence.
For it is plain enough that they condition one another. God,
neighbour, self, and the world are so bound together in the
Christian notion of the Good because this is both transcendental
and immanental — is, that is, both above us and in us ; and it is
only because this is so that the statement above of the unity of
graduated Ends holds good. Similarly, the individual and
society are, at bottom, only one, as we Christians think, because
our ' Good ' embraces both the temporal and the eternal, as
contrasted, e.g.^ with the philosopher of the Platonic state,
who concerns himself with the mundane affairs of the multitude
only when conpelled, and until he can once more soar into the
empyrean of thought. Only one other important consequence
may be expressly mentioned, which arises from all that has so
far been said, and that is its universality, since this highest
good is realisable by everyone. Distinctions of sex, age, endow-
ment, nationality, social position are not hindrances to the
realisation of this Good, are indeed only the means by which
it may fashion itself in an innumerable variety of forms. The
deep conviction which the greatest of Christian missionaries of
the early Church had of this certain truth was clearly one of
the strongest sources of his power (Gal. iii. 28 ; Eph. i.-iv.).
Sin.
But this whole idea of our highest Good remains essentially
imperfect if we do not take into our purview its relation to
human sin. The Kingdom of God, according to Christian faith,
is only gradually realised. That is, with the notion of the
faith as existing under earthly conditions, and given in a way
suited to creatures, its realisation might still conceivably be an
uninterrupted progression ; but on the contrary its progress is
through and in spite of resistance. It is the task of dogmatics
to develop the nature of sin in various aspects and the ideas
of Christian belief as to its origin. In this subject of ethics
we have merely to illustrate the point that the Kingdom of
God is realised in thorough-going opposition to a ' kingdom of
sin ' (Schleiermacher), to the ' world ' in the Scripture phrase.
The term * world "' has a long history behind it, which answers
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 149
closely to that of the term ' Kingdom of God.' If the idea of
the ' Church ' arose out of the original sense of the term
'Kingdom of God' so 'world** came to mean all mankind not
received into the Church. And to the ' Church,*" in the special
sense used then of the clergy and monks, was opposed the
term 'laity.** If the pietists of the Evangelical Church call
their circle, with its special aims and tasks, the ' Kingdom of
God,*" then the ' world ' to them is the less earnest members of
the Church, who do not participate in their works. Just as
little as the term ' Kingdom of God ** was understood by those
who used these special historical and peculiar significations,
just as little do we now correctly" use the word 'world.**
Its importance for us is merely as the antithesis of the term
' Kingdom of God ' in the meaning so far explained.
Sglf-preservation and self-assertion are natural. This natural
desire is only evil, and in relation to God sinful, when
maintained against the absolute demand to realise the moral
End ; and it stands in antagonism to it because it seeks to carry
out its natural aims, and not to gain the true End by denial
of the merely natural life. The world is the sum-total of all
the human beings who act in opposition to the highest End ;
it is the reciprocal action of evil wills, and, in fact, inclusive of
all the conditions which result from their activities. The latter
may not be excluded, as the notion of ' offence "* (aKavSaXov)
to be presently considered shows. For instance, take the
nmltiplicity of the arrangements in a modern city, whose whole
existence makes up an enormous portion of the ' world,' even
considered apart from the human beings, engaged in various
activities, but not yet won for the Kingdom of God, who are really
only products and, so to speak, mere precipitates of its activity.
"All is fruit, and all is seed.**** We are accustomed to put
^Jlesh ' next to the ' world.** This term too has its history.
There was even a period when it was understood to import
almost entirely the sense-iinpiilae^ in the narrowest meaning,
whereas ^t^_Paul had. expressly ^ conceited iL_±o inrhida not
merely envy and hate^but also a perverted relation _2L men to
God^ ' In other respects it is in its way a term as wide as ' world.**
In its use it is applied to individuals in the world, and not
150 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
merely in reference to their actual sinfulness, but also as
referring to their weakness and frailty ; by which their suscepti-
bility to worldly influences, and their participation in that
reciprocal action above spoken of, is made intelligible though
not excusable. In this latter respect the term ' flesh ' has
not got so definite an ethical impress as ' world "■ ; it does not so
exclusively denote a definite anti-moral power, as is illustrated
by the saying, "The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak."
Another reason is, that to no one who has found in the
Kingdom of God the highest goal of his endeavour, who is in his
earthly development ruled only by this highest aim in all the
various decisions of his will, and more, who, ruled by the spirit,
has still to combat the flesh — to none such do the Kingdom of
God and the world stand as two external antagonistic powers,
but the separation between the Kingdom of God and the world
exists in every individual soul. What this means it is the
business of individual ethics to define more closely. In the
same way, in every social circle the Kingdom of God and the
world stand alongside each other and mutually influence one
another.
As to the form in which the reciprocal action spoken of
exhibits itself, the Holy Scripture denotes it by the term
' offence ' {a-KavSaXov). The woe of Jesus Christ (St Matt,
xviii. 7) is pronounced against the world because of ' offences,'
because it is a world in which there are occasions of stumbling
and temptations to evil. In looking at the interlacing influences
of evil wills on one another, and the intermingling of good and
evil in the individual self, it is possible to distinguish the
character of the ' offence ' which is given by considering how
far those who give it are evil, and how far they are good.
The first kind of ' offence,' which is by far the most inclusive,
may be regarded in the most varied points of view, and thus
serve to make us aware in some measure of the inexhaustibility
of the subject. For instance, such an * offence' maybe caused
by wicked design— arising from jealousy of another's higher
position, or the desire to draw another into the like depths of
sin, as often happens amongst the young, — or from indifference —
as when no respect is paid in our action or speech to the feelings
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 151
of others, as when in Rome the 'strong' gave offence to the
weak by their use of justifiable liberty in eating and drinking
(Rom. xiv.); or from a supposed good design — as when St
Peter, when he would restrain Jesus Christ from the path of
suffering, and the Lord sees in this very thing an attack of
Satan. In all these cases the evil, the sin to which the ' offence '
leads, is of very various sort. It is either to what is essentially
the same sin — as when the impure word calls forth impure
fancies — or the selfish deed incites to its repetition. Or it is
to retaliation of evil which is itself evil — as possibly a scoff at
religious truth may, instead of a return of love on the part of
its defenders, call forth an unloving reply, a sinful witness
instead of a genuine martyrdom. Most frequently, however, an
tjjff'ence'' in the general meaning is that which leads tg a de-
preciation of the power of goodness in those who are ' offended."'
The ideals of youth wither in the hard battle of life ; the
demands made on their own will-power, as on that of others,
imperceptibly lessen. We are silent at words which once would
have excited indignation. We think we are grown wiser, when
in truth we have grown more indifferent, and by this want of
moral tone we do now offend others in ever-increasing degree
and ever-widening circles. For the most part this happens
when persons of high position have no inkling of an idea
that their * good form ' (according to the average opinion of
the world) is a subtle poison to numberless persons, who have
not the courage of resistance and to withdraw themselves from
this immeasurable ' offence ' which surrounds them like the • ~^
air. We only feel what this world of 'offences'* is, in its / \,»r^
whole immeasurability, when we, reverting to this point, take
note of the fact that it is by no means merely those indi- '•.•rr/*^*
vidual persons who are evil that give ' offence ' ; but also those ' ^^ «.. ^
who are good do, with what is good, give offence to the evil . , ,
in that great interaction of influences. Namely, so far as * *'
they exert influence on evil persons, who are at the least
themselves so far good that they do in some degree feel the
value and the intrinsic Tightness of the 'good,' and in whom
now their antagonism to the good is merely strengthened, if
they at any crisis have not the power to give themselves
152 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
up to it, or not the moral courage to free themselves by action ;
and especially by seeking the renewal of their weak will in the
strength of the divine will. Commerce, art, science, home,
school, state, and church yield speaking testimonies of this kind
of 'offence.' The purest intention, the most upright will of
him who is fullest of insight, the most amiable act, may give
'offence,' call forth or increase or complete resistance to
goodness. The same sun which expands the blossoms and
ripens the fruit helps the development of the seeds of disease
and of feverous miasma. It is enough to point out that the
Pharisees were offended at the miraculous cure of the sick
(St Matt. XV. 12); John the Baptist at the unostentatious
course of the activity of Jesus, which was the only good way
of action (Matt. xi. 6) ; the disciples at the sufferings imposed
on Him by a divine necessity, and not prevented by divine
interposition (St Matt. xxvi. 31), so that the cross itself was
an ' offence ' unparalleled (1 Cor. i. 23). So that by this we
can understand Luther's pregnant saying : " Offence here,
offence there, necessity knows no law and has no ' offence,' "
as a way of speaking of the existence of evil in the arrangements
of a God of love.
This whole thought will be still more convincing if we
remember that the notion ' world ' is on all sides the antithesis
of the term ' Kingdom of God.' As the latter is in its inner-
most core the fellowship of love with God, so the deepest
nature of the world is its 'sin' considered in respect of its
relation to religion ; in all its stages, from indifference to
enmity, to which the Holy Scriptures give so many names,
and even more illustrative personal examples. As in the
Kingdom of God our right attitude to our neighbours follows
from a right relation to God, so in the world lovelessness in all
its forms and degrees arises from a wrong relation to Him.
And finally, it is just the same in reference to our own personal
nature and that of others in all conceivable combinations of
our relation to God and our neighbour. Nor is tiie parallel
less strong in reference to immanental and transcendental ethics,
to individualism and socialism, as well as the system of Ends
above spoken of — all are dislocated and disordered. Thoroughly
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 153
complex and incapable of disentanglement by human judgment
is this whole we call the ' world,' because, as we are compelled
to say, there are no clear boundary-lines which separate the
world and the Kingdom of God. The points of contact run
through each, through the innermost feeling and volition of
those who belong to the world or to the Kingdom of God,
only discerned by the Reader of all hearts. The adversaries of
the Christian ethical ideals note with sharp-sighted acuteness
how close is the mixture of good and evil even in those very
spheres which stand especially near to the holy of holies of
the Kingdom of God — as, for instance, the worldliness by which
the Church is often characterised — so that to them there often
appears to be nothing left of the actual Kingdom of the ' Good.'
The consideration of the question. What is the world ? does of
itself lead us on to ask still closer what importance this idea
has for Christian ethics.
It has the greatest conceivable importance, for there is no
other ethical system in which evil is so unreservedly and in so
unvarnished a way recognised as the antithesis of the good, and
in which still further this deep knowledge of evil is itself only
intelligible from a strong faith in the victory of the good. It is
by our apprehension, in their whole depth, of the mysteries which
lurk in the notions of the ' world ' and of ' offences ' that the
depth of the idea of the ' Kingdom of God,' and more, the depth
of its reality, grows clear. Evil is only made fully manifest by
its antithesis to the good. In this there is a witness to its
power, but still more to the power of the good which is strong
enough to overcome the evil that is thus fully revealed. The
Biblical expression that sin is a ' lie ' excellently expresses this
point, for that expression is far from saying that it is not a
reality, but rather says that it does not possess a final, the
highest reality, which is the ' Good ' — or to express it by its
antithesis, it is not ' the truth.' In this way it expresses with
surpassing simplicity that it is only the ' good ' in its deepest
ground that is of the most ' value.' The ' world,' the kingdom
of sin. is a fearful reality, and yet has only a specious show of,
reality compared with the Kingdom of God. It proves itself to
be this most notably by the fact that it borrows the appearance
154 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
of the Good, that it deludes itself with the idea that it ought to
strive to attain 'goods' (that are only such in appearance) by
following inviolable commandments (that are only inviolable in
appearance) from motives that are good merely in appearance.
But the pretence is ever dissolving, and will one day finally
disappear.
The grandeur of this faith becomes quite plain if we still
further reflect that — as doctrinal theology makes clear and
establishes — the ' kingdom of sin " is by no manner of means a
necessary by-product in the development of the Kingdom of
God, or an indispensable means for its actualisation, as a
shadow is the inevitable concomitant of light. Sin is not a ' lie '
in the sense that it only seems to us to be sin, and disappears
in the light of deeper reflection. Sin and guilt are distinguished
from ' necessary incompleteness "■ more strongly in the Christian
cosmic view than in any other. If pharisaic Judaism considered
itself capable of reckoning up individual guilt, and of regarding
evil in the mass as the punishment which God inflicts, yet in its
deepest ground such views of sin and guilt were not taken quite
in earnest. Still less is this so with the Buddhist notions of sin
and guilt. Exaggeration and depreciation go hand in hand,
hither and thither, in all shapes in the world outside Christian-
ity. The true idea of the Kingdom of God excludes either of
these, however often, in the course of the history of Christian
doctrine, the old influences again make themselves felt. The
idea of the ' world ' as the antithesis of the Kingdom of God cuts
away all false excuses and unreal self-accusation alike. The
want of self-realisation is not sin. God who is love will not
force men into the fellowship of this Kingdom, but draw them,
\^n their free love. Sin is the resistance of the human will to
the will of a God of love. And in the kingdom of sin all sin is not
the guilt of the individual, however certain it is that there can
be no world of ' offences ' without human guilt. Guilt concerns
sin which the individual could have avoided ; but who is there
who dare say that he is personally without guilt, and is in no
need of forgiving grace, as he needed delivering grace for all his
sins ? And who can minify his guilt, who has but once honestly
shunned all half-real exaggeration of it, and knows that it is
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 155
God alone who sees through the mysterious interaction of wills
in the kingdom of sin, and yet that the man himself is in his
actions involved in it, even if those actions were only those of
the inner life, and only consisted of non-compliance with
obligation, and above all merely of ungrateful and unprayerful
non-compliance ? This qualifying word ' merely,' which satisfies
the superficial, is a trouble to the upright. Sin is no mere
'veneer'; it is rather a perversion of personality. The turbid
dregs rise to the surface when in unwary moments habitual
* propriety gives way before passion {cf. Individual Ethics). It is
to this kingdom of sin, known and recognised for what it really
is, without exaggeration and without diminution, and, as experi-
ence shows it to be, a most powerful reality, that the Kingdom of
God stands victoriously opposed — in combat certainly, but in
victorious combat, because it is Christ who wins the victory.
For this reason Christian_.ethics is at once pessimistic and
optimistic, but, as we found was the case with the other
reconcilable antitheses, so here, in such way that even these are
bound together into a really higher unity. The Christian who
in his conduct aims at the highest 'Good' of the Kingdom of
God has outgrown the self-deception of the ordinary superficial
optimism. He can keep in sight the realities in which pessimism
grounds itself, and go even deeper down still than it. For he
is a convinced optimist for adequate reasons, because he knows
the highest existent reality when and so far as he has his place
in the Kingdom of God, and in all knows by experience what
the coming of God's Kingdom means. Hence a unique unifor-
mity of feeling and judgment associates together, down through
the centuries, all who have been convinced by this Christian
optimism. Not as if they were unmoved by the waves of
the world, which must draw around them most closely for the
highest Good's sake. It is not meant that the colour of their
feeling, or the absolute content of their judgment, was the same ;
for what a difference there is between the martyrs of the
second century, Augustine, the Reformei's, the quietists of the
period of the Renascence and ' the War of Deliverance ' I But
the one thing that unites them in feeling and judgment is the
certainty that they had that a good time was coming ; and by
156 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
that they never merely meant an earthly future, but eternity.
For the Kingdom of God is eternal. They see through all
illusions, even those which on this earth surround the Good ; but
they do not undervalue and depreciate what is good, however
mixed up with illusions. No single moral good seems to them
to be trifling because it is not the highest of all ; but they do
not promulgate it as the highest Good, deluding themselves and
others. And they labour for this highest Good with the whole
force of their personality, and have the earnest faith that their
work is not without recognition. Nor do they grieve over the
small measure of their success, for they know that their work, as
they are themselves, is hidden in the omnipotent love of God.
The Chief Commandment is Love to God and our
Neighbour after the Example of Christ.
In. the same way that we define the highest End of moral
action, so also do we that of the supreme Rule, or the law of
moral conduct. And that as well according to its form as
according to its content. For the mode and manner of my
action is necessarily controlled by the End which I propose to
myself If the Kingdom of God is the highest Good, and this
Kingdom is pure love, because God is love, then the all-
dominating Rule can only be uttered in one word — love ! The
fellowship of love can only be advanced by love. And this
Christian ' Thou shalt ' has a quite special ring about it ; it is an
absolute command of a quite special sort, the love of God in the
Kingdom of God is the foundation of our love, and the source of
its power. There is no other moral law which is for the
Christian so absolute in its requirements as this. The chief
commandment for the Buddhist, whose aim is Nirvana, is
different from this because the End proposed is different, how-
ever similar to Christian love much of its pity may seem ; and
he cannot feel how severe and at the same time attractive that
command is in the absence of the background of motive : " Let
us love one another because He first loved us.'' Hence the
whole meaning which belongs to the idea of Right is different in
each system of ethics just according as the highest End proposed
is differently conceived Again, we dare not forget that in
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 157
Christian ethics everything depends wholly and entirely on
Christ, since He is, as explained before, in the most compre-
hensive sense, its principle (p. 125). That is to say that in
relation to our present problem Christ is the personal ideal
embodiment of the Christian moral law ; the supreme com-
mandment of the Kingdom of God is for us the example of
Christ.
We may find an aid to clearness in speaking of all these chief
questions of the meaning of Right as a term in Ethics by
recollecting that this most important point of view in all ethical
reflection has at one time been exaggerated, and at another
time had too little importance conceded to it. Now, as Christians
we are convinced that Christian ethics offers more than either
of these partial views ; that it rises above legalism which is the
exaggeration, and antinomianism which is the undervaluation, of
law; and that its real value naturally finds expression in the
statements which explain the law in its form and content. The
genuine Christian moral attitude towards the law receives
illustration from the fact that in the Christian Church at one
time legalistic influences have been predominant, and at another
time antinomianism. We are obliged to call the Roman
Catholic conception of morals legalistic. The Council of Trent
expressly anathematised the proposition that ' Christ is not
a law-giver.' Legalistic too is that obedience to the letter of
the law of many sectaries during the first struggles of the
Evangelical Church, against which even the Augsburg Con-
fession of Faith pronounces its disapproval (Art. 6, 16, 20).^
Legalistic are many statements and methods of thought of the old
pietism as they are discussed in Spener''s Theological Reflections.^
Not only did the ancient Church, on the other hand, charge
its Gnostic opponents with antinomianism, but also Rome the
^ See pp. 170, 174, 178, Sylloge Confessionum. Clarendon Press, Oxon. , 1827.
— Tr.
2 The works alluded to were published by Spener in 1700-1702 in 4 vols. ; and
(after his death) in 1711, 3 vols. : Theologische Bedenken. Spener (1635- 1705) was
the originator of the Pietists in the Lutheran Church, whom Tholuck speaks of as
"one of the most spotless and purest among the distinguished persons in the
Lutheran Church in the seventeenth century," as well as the most useflil. See
Tholuck, Geschichte des Pietismus, — Tr.
158 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
Reformers, and the Reformers the sectaries, when under the title
of the 'freedom of the spirit' they praised what was really
carnal licentiousness. That aesthetic personal culture which in
the name of artistic originality casts aside ordinary morality is
antinomianism. These few examples show how very various are
the applications of the terms legalism and antinomianism. In
the main and on the whole it is clear that up to the time of the
Reformation Christian ethics, according to the judgment of the
Reformed Church, was inclined to the former, and the Evan-
gelicals, in the opinion of their Roman opponents, appear to lapse
into the latter ; while it, on its own part, claims to be a return to
the Gospel which stands clear of these contradictions. As to
the reason why legalism appeared so early in Christianity and
endured so long, later researches have shown that it is scarcely
accurate to find it in Jewish pharisaic elements, or in the reflex
influence generally of the Old Testament, and on the other hand
to assign all that is antinomian to the influences of Greek
civilisation. This Greek world was in another way inclined to
see in Christianity the new law which leads to life.
The Meaning of the Law.
This may in Christian ethics be shortly put thus : If we
look back to the doctrine of the highest Good, and especially
to that of the deepest Motive of action, we shall se*» that by
the conception of the Kingdom of God, as already set forth,
all idea of a meritorious attainment of the highest Good by
fulfilling the law is excluded (against all legalism) ; equally so
is that idea that it can become a personal possession without
fulfilling the law (against all antinomianism). If we have
rightly defined our highest Good (p. 127), if the Kingdom of God,
the fellowship of love to God and our neighbour, is the aim of
our endeavour, by reason of God's love to us, and if it is thus
a continually increasing task to be performed, arising out of a
gift bestowed, how can it then be said that we merit the
love of God ? Does a child merit the love of its parents ? It
is able to love because it is loved. But it is equally true to
say that the child can only really experience the love of its
parents in loving fellowship with them by returning their love.
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 159
And further, another side of the same truth is important. Can
we earn a 'good' which is of another sort than the act by
which we earn it ? If the highest Good, the goal of moral
endeavour, were a heaven of earthly delight, there would be a
sense in which it could be spoken of as something to be earned.
But if it is fellowship in love with God and man, if the new
heavens and the new earth are that wherein dwelleth righteous-
ness, if, that is to say, endeavour and aim are of the same kind,
then every step on the way forwards is an attainment of the goal,
and the ultimate goal cannot possibly be reached in any other
way. But there is no sense in speaking of desert in connection
with it. In each respect the Roman Catholic doctrine of the
meaning of the law is a perversion of the Gospel, however much
it may insist that merit is only possible on the ground of grace.
Since it asserts along with this that eternal life is the reward
of merit, it injures the idea of the free grace of God, which St
Paul speaks of : " Otherwise grace is no more grace " (Rom. xi. 6).
And in addition, eternal life must in its nature necessarily be
something different from that which constitutes the character
of moral action ; or, so far as both are really homogeneous, it is
merely in the negation of this world, renunciation of its claims,
reception into the ineffable divine nature, concerning which
nothing definite can be affirmed, except that the real divinity
of this ideal at any rate is not that which consists of love.
On the other hand, of course, we of the Evangelical faith have
not always unreservedly acknowledged that without the per-
formance of the divine will, without the fulfilment of the law,
there is positively no salvation. Just because the goal striven
for is of the same character as the rule of conduct which guides
on the way, and just because grace is grace, and the fellowship
with God opened to us is the fellowship of love, there is no
participation in this highest Good in the absence of obedience.
In their aversion to legalism the Evangelical Churches, at any
rate the Lutheran Church, have not always in this matter
kept themselves free from antinomianism. They rejected the
extraordinary proposition that good works are detrimental to
salvation, and insisted that there is no genuine faith without
works ; but they shunned the statement that they are necessary
160 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
to salvation, even in the quite indispensable and quite innocuous
sense which follows from what has been thus far explained {cf.
Formula of Concord, 2 pt., 4. 24 ff.). If salvation is the salvation
of God who is love, it cannot be separated from love. Other-
wise there arises a contradiction (which is only with difficulty
concealed) to clear statements of the New Testament which
once and again connect plainly salvation with the performance
of good works {cf. St James i. 25 and St Matt. xxv. 1 ff.).
Without this admission, too, it is not easy to think of the
highest Good as ethical. In individual ethics it is to be shown
more particularly how little insistence on this truth detracts in
any degree from the full meaning of free grace and ' salvation
by faith only.' And here too the significance of the law will
grow plainer if we speak of the form of the law.
Form of the Laxv.
Here again the Evangelical doctrine on the antithesis between
legalism and antinomianism is maintained. Two important
points are in question : — Firsts the law of God, as it concerns
Christians, is not a number of single commandments, which
have been once for all established in a statutory form, which
demand single good works, but the entire will of lifld* which
demands from every individual in his own personal circumstances
a special good character and a special mode of life vhich is a
unity in itself (c/! ' Duty,' ' Calling," ' Virtue,' ' Character,' below),
and by means of which each makes his contribution towards the
realisation of the Kingdom of God. This is opposed to all that is
merely legalistic in its nature — e.g.^ to the 264 prohibitions and
the 284 precepts of the rabbis, the 10 divine and 9 ecclesiastical
precepts of the Eastern Church, the 10 commandments and 5
ecclesiastical precepts of the Roman Church. What a simplifica-
tion there is in the answer of Jesus Christ recorded in St Mark
xii. 29 ; in the word of St Paul, Rom. xiii. 8 ff. ; and the
* new commandment ' of St John xiii. 34 ff. ! And let us think
too of the ' work ' which Jesus finished, and in which His work
is perfected ; of the work for which St Paul relinquishes all, and
in which he becomes the Paul we know ; which in the most in-
significant calling gives an eternal value to the obscurest life !
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 161
And further, as opposed to all antinomianism, the divine law is in
the infinite variety of its application to every individual life and
in its illimitable suitability to the exigencies of changing times
by no means a mere indeterminate Norm, but one set in sharply
defined outline, as, e.g. , is shown by St Mark xii. 29 ff. In fact,
it is only thus that it can be an all-embracing Norm, applicable
to every individual situation, and yet a definite rule of moral
conduct.
Secondly., the law is not a demand which is heterogeneous
to and in antagonism to the will of the Christian, which turns
on blind obedience, and seeks to ensure this obedience by the
fear of punishment and hope of reward ; but a demand which
makes its appeal to the true nature and destiny of man. It is
man's own law, which is the known way to the End known to be
the best End, " the image of that which he ought to be." This
is against all legalism, or in this particular case hetero-legalism,
as if the moral law could be something heterogeneous to the
human will. But again it is against all antinomianism. This
law of the ' Good ' is not carried out by a kind of naturally
necessitated action, but turns on a responsible will, on a real
' Thou shalt,"" and this at all stages of the Christian life right on
to the last test of faithfulness. And in fact only thus can it be
a moral command which is concerned with a will.
Both propositions on the unity and definiteness, the subject-
ivity and inviolability of the law are essentially and mutually
interdependent. A law which is recognised by the inner man
must be a unity ; and the reverse. And we must think of this
when we assert that in Christian morality everything depends
on the disposition, and it is on this account that it is a right-
eousness which is better than that of the scribes and Pharisees
that Jesus Christ demands in every true man.
The true knowledge of these propositions, inseparable as they
are from the principles of Evangelical ethics, and powerfully as
Luther has borne testimony to them as one who had become free
from the law, and had embraced the law of Christ (1 Cor. xi.
21), has not always found unambiguous expression. The first of
these principles, e.g.., is prejudiced by the reformed idea of the
Sabbath commandment. The greatest respect for the English
11
162 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
method of its observance, which has become a national habit, the
niost yearning desire to secure this blessing in a suitable form for
our own country of Germany, must not be allowed to prevent
us declaring that to ground it on the Decalogue is not strictly
Evangelical. Not merely because in that case, to be consistent,
the seventh day must be observed, since there can be no
changing and strained interpretation of single portions of a
valid commandment, which is to be literally followed. Rather
is it to be interpreted in the light of the ' freedom ' with which
Christ has made us 'free' (Gal. v. 1), and the fact that the
observance of Sabbath days is expressly considered superfluous
(Cor. iii. 16). This reason is also decisive against the attempt
to trace the observation of Sunday back to the Mosaic law,
and to secure it as a constituent part of the original order of
God at the creation ; supposing that anyone now finds a single
express commandment in the narrative at all. All such mist
scatters before the clear sunshine of Luther''s explanation
(Catechism, iii. 78 ff.) how the observance of Sunday flows as
an external arrangement from obedience to the command of
love to our neighbour, and how the true sanctity of Sunday as
a means for the furtherance of the spiritual life obtains a safer
guarantee than by any reliance on the letter of the law. In
regard to our second proposition, the latest confession of the
Lutheran Church has not given a wholly adequate expression
to the Evangelical principle of Luther ; but as regards this
* third use of the law,' as it is styled, it may be spoken of more
particularly in connection with the doctrine of sanctification.
All that is to be said of the form of the law is embraced in
the words of the royal law of freedom (St James ii. 8, 12), or
of the law of the Spirit (Rom. viii. 2). Freedom from the
multiplicity of single precepts and from all external coercion,
but freedom for the good and in the good, which constitutes
our true destiny, is really royal. The natural man, the flesh, is
enslaved under the yoke of a law foreign to his true nature,
torturing him with a thousand demands. The Spirit which is
from God, fellowship with whom is our aim, brings the scattered
fragments into a unity, and changes force to freedom. And
all that which systems of ethics previously to Christianity, or
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 163
external to it, have imagined of the nature of the absolute law
here finds its fulfilment. Hence here once more that which was
said at the beginning of the nature of ethics must be called to
mind (p. 10). But why ?
Content of the Law.
The answer to the question only becomes clear by considering
what this content is. If we have above rightly stated the
highest Good of Christian ethics, there can be no doubt as to
the content of the highest Norm. It is love of God and our
neighbour (St Mark xii. 29 ff.). For so. End and way, the Good
to be striven for and the Rule of endeavour, generally correspond
to each other. But this correspondence is, on account of the
nature of its highest Good, the closest in Christian ethics. How
then could the kingdom of love become real by any other kind
of action than by love ? For instance, by this it is impossible
that all action should be mere denial of the natural impulses,
action essentially ascetic, though it is as certain as the kingdom
of heaven itself that its supreme commandment must be directed
with sharp severity against all unspiritual worldliness- The
only question_that raises a difficulty is whether we can .alojigaidfiL
love of God and our neighbour speak of love of self^ Occasion
for this question is given by the commandment, " Love thy
neighbour as thyself," and in the history of Christian ethics it
has been much discussed. One thing is clear anyhow, and that
is, that love of self cannot be spoken of precisely in the same
sense as love of our neighbour, for love presupposes fellowship
between different persons. At the same time it is easy to
understand that self-denial for the sake of some personal high
purpose has moral value. We condemn him who throws himself
away in uncontrolled, blind obedience for another"'s will and
pleasure just the same as we do the selfish man. If we ask more
particularly as to the measure and manner in which each one
ought to realise himself, and, so to speak, love himself, no answer
can be given different from that which follows from the axioms
on the relations between society and the individual (p. 141).
We can neither injure our own personality from love to another,
without injury to that other, nor put social considerations in
164 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
the background from self-love without injury to oneself. If
the latter is immediately obvious, the former is confirmed a
thousand times over in daily life. If Jesus Christ, through a
weak sentimental love to all the world, had not asserted Himself
in His battle with the Pharisees, He would have endangered His
incomparable life-work, His unique life-work. He was hated
because He would not call evil good, and overcame hate by
love ; but the contempt which falls on him who does not know
what he means would have rendered this victory impossible.
Or in the limited circle of domestic training, compliance under
all circumstances and renunciation of personal self-respect out
of pretended love is destructive of moral influence ; it is only
apparently love. So marvellously are the individual and society
bound together in the kingdom of love that both can only
reach their goal in union with one another. Genuine self-love,
if the equivocal term must be used, is then the will of each man
to become a satisfactory member of the Kingdom of God, a
moral personality in fellowship with God and his neighbour,
and to train himself so to be.
In this way it becomes clear that the idea of self-love does
not belong here at all ; it is no side-piece to the love of God
and our neighbour ; rather, in so far as it possesses an unin-
pugnable meaning, it has already been elucidated when we
settled the relation between the individual and sociecy. Here
the only question with which we are concerned is that love to
God and to our neighbour cannot be thought of disconnected
from a right relation to our own nature and to a nature
external to us ; but for this purpose the phrase self-love is
plainly as unsuitable as possible.
Lave to God is the supreme command as certainly as that
God is the chief Good, and therefore love with the whole heart.
Nothing else can take the place of this love ; everything else
gains its value from it. St Paul says that renunciation of
property and giving our body to be burned is worthless without
love to our neighbour; but the same thing is true if this is
not also love to God — of course an impossibility if we under-
stand what Christian love of our neighbour means (see below).
Whatever that is glorious was said of love, when we spoke of
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 165
God's love to us (p. 133) ; of whom it is said, " God is love."
The same is true in a figure of our love to Him called forth by
His love to us. Here is unequalled satisfaction and unparalleled
self-sacrifice ; here is a true fellowship which aims at the same
single, grand End, the eternal God ; and of this eternal love
stooping to the bounds of time, we ourselves are partakers in
time and in eternity : " As He is, so are we in this world.'"
Hence all descriptions of love to God are merely weak words,
even that well-known explanation : " To love God is to take
God as the chief Good ; to cleave to Him with our hearts ;
to be ever mindful of Him ; to be ever desiring Him ; to find
the greatest satisfaction in Him ; to give ourselves up wholly
to Him ; and to be ever zealous for His honour."
But against this explanation doubts have been raised by
those who question the notion of love to God generally, or
certainly essentially delimit it. Nay, it has been said that the
Holy Scriptures keep the notion of the love of God in the
background, and not without reason. This latter statement
is, of course, in view of St Mark xii. 29 f. and Rom. viii. 28,
somewhat extraordinary, and completely so if we take St John's
first Epistle into account. But, notwithstanding, the warning
to be careful is not without reason. The doubt in the final
ground touches a point which we have been obliged to pay
regard to when speaking of the chief Good. These doubts
take their rise in the anxious fear lest a false mysticism may
foist itself into Christian ethics (p. 142). In this place this
objection has a twofold significance. First, thus : It is said
that love to God consists according to its nature not in any
direct relation to God, but on the one hand in our love to our
neighbour, and on the other hand in a devout attitude to all the
events of life, in childlike trust in God's paternal Providence.
But this is going right back to the explanation of the question,
What is loving God ? And on this point there can be no
disagreement that a love to God which is not love to our
neighbour, and which does not, in humility and patience,
make the best use of God's ways, is a hypocritical imagination.
On this point much has already been said, and will be often
said in the application. It is hence quite in order if all the
166 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
separate aspects of love to God are expounded in a closer
examination, and determined in their mutual relations. But,
all this presupposed, there still remains the inalienable right to
insist how, in the words ' love to God,' the real question is as to
an actual personal fellowship with God whose nature is love ;
and how it is in this alone that the reason is found for a trustful
acceptance of divine providences, and the duty of loving our
neighbour. Both have a meaning, because the Christian is
permitted to love God who first loved him ; he is allowed to
aim at this most valuable reality — but how poor are such
expressions ! — personally to make a personal return of love for
the love personally shown to him ; a love *' directed not to the
gifts but the source of the gifts" (St Augustine). And this
is so because he " regards God as the chief Good, and can find
in Him the highest happiness "" ; and what more is mentioned
in that explanation, which in its final statement reminds us,
as forcibly as needfully, how brave also that love to God, if it
is to be really genuine, must be in its zeal for the honour of
the holy divine love.
And this last remark may at the same time show that also
the other side of this objection, that the expression 'love
to God"* has a false, mystical ring in it, can be disposed of.
Many are afraid that by its use the essential distance between
God and the creature is obliterated, and that a falsely con-
fident and flippant idea of sensuous love degrades the purity
of the relationship between God and man. Hence, it is
said, instead of speaking of love to God, generally it would
be preferable to speak of trust in God. In reference to this
anxiety it may simply be said, misuse need not prevent the
right use. According to the verdict of Church history, the
misuse has been manifold ; there has been a predilection for
the use of falsely interpreted words of the Song of Solomon.
But it is possible to misuse the term faith. Not merely a cold
vagueness, but also irreverential confidence in the compelling
power of prayer, have been allowed to be called faith. Allow-
ing that love to God still remains an invincible idea, on this
very account, because without injury to the deepest reverence,
and indeed rather by means of reverence that humbles and
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 167
exalts, the truth receives unmistakable expression, how fervent
without sentimentality is that love to God which lives in this
genuine feeling: "This is my joy ! that I draw near to God"!
He who would deny that, may be invited to rewrite the Psalter
as the hymn-book of the Christian Church of all times accord-
ing to his principles. Certainly, it will always be a special
touchstone of the modesty of devotional language, whether those
who use it fear, love, and trust God always in the right place,
and employ none of these terms separate from their inner
connection with each other. For, rightly understood, all trust,
all faith even as mere acceptance, is a readiness to receive, a
drawing nigh to God because He draws nigh to us, a response
to His word. All love to God, even the highest conceivable
joy in Him, abides in confidence and self-giving; neither faith
nor love is ever without reverence and reverential humility in
view of His ' unspeakable gift.' Hence, in harmony with this
(reverential) loving faith and (reverential) believing love are
spoken of. But here in ethics, where the question is as to
the realisation of our God-given destiny, we speak, follow-
ing the words of Jesus Christ, of love to God ; of belief in
doctrine when it explains how all our doing is grounded in
God's work for us. Hence we have later on to speak in
detail of the relation between 'faith and works,' i.e. of how
far then the love of God as the experience of faith is a
motive to the love of God and our neighbour and the source
of its power.
The last consideration may also remind us in what especial
sense the expression 'love to Christ' is justifiable in Evangelical
ethics. Facts — like those periods in the history of the Mora-
vians which proved to be times of sifting — show with especial
clearness the close danger in both the respects above discussed.
If we are conscious of its possession, and are ever mindful that
love to Christ is love to Him in whose love humanly brought
near to us and His love to the death the love of the Father is
now operative in us, we dare not measure out and narrow down
the peculiar force and fervour of such love by paltry precepts.
Its charter of freedom is the question, " Lovest thou Me more
than these ? " (St John xxi. 15).
168 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
The command of love to our neighbour (St Mark xii. 29 ff.)
is called the second commandment, and like unto the first of
love to God. Instead of many commandments there is only
one, and that can only be love to God. But with this love to
our neighbour is so closely connected that only as the com-
panion to the first can it be called the second commandment ;
which, on account of its inner relationship and even unity with
the first, is not really a second; and, surely with reason, is
together with the first called the ' only commandment,' in order
that it may suffer no misinterpretation, but acquiescence in its
true tenor. After what we have said as to the highest Good
(p. 138), this state of the matter needs no fresh explanation.
God is love, and this is the irrefragable reason why we have
received such a command that " he who loves God should love
his brother also." But the mode and measure, the compass, of
Christian love to other men we have still to explain with more
particularity.
In respect of its Mode, Christian love is fellowship for the
advancement of the highest common End, i.e. the Kingdom of
God; its reason is not found in natural benevolence and
beneficence so far as the person beloved and the person loving
are ' the natural man,' with rich or poor gifts, and in necessities
of whatsoever sort ; but in that benevolence and beneficence
which have a Christian moral quality ; because each or^a knows
that he, with the object of his love, has been called by the love
of God to an eternal fellowship of love ; called, too, each in his
special natural endowment, through the multiplicity of the
forms of which an immeasurably rich and articulated whole of
associated men can, in the love of God, arise. This Christian
love is, therefore, in the way it exhibits itself, essentially
different from all that has, in the moral history of mankind,
borne the name of love, because its End and Motive are different.
It is a long, tortuous path from that obscure benevolence and
sympathy, joined with selfishness and struggling emotions, to
Christian love, which in its innermost core is care for souls,
advancement in that " eternal share in His abiding place." Even
a high stage of this moral development is that sense of wisdom
which says : "When injured, be reconciled ; but if treated with
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 169
contumely, revenge yourself! Bear trifles from your neighbour,
but it is slavish to put up with base treatment ; but blame-
worthy not to be moderate in revenge." There are deeper tones
than these, as the Platonic word : " It is better to suffer than to
do wrong," or the Sophoclean : " It is not for mutual hate, but
for mutual love that I am here." These are almost prophecies
of Christian love of our neighbour. No Christian will under-
value the Buddhist pity ; and in the humanity of modem society
he sees fruit fi'om the same root, and a continual and needful
spur to his own perfection ; and more, a wholesome mirror of
shamefaced self-examination. But how far the greatest of these
sayings are behind the full content of the Christian conception
of love, this humanity itself shows when it counts with much
assurance on persons who are Christianly disposed for the
performance of many of its services of love, while it perhaps
ridicules their faith. Other services are left entirely to them
because this humanity finds in them nothing which has sense or
value for it ; apart altogether from the idea of power to perform
such deeds as the succour of those who have fallen by the fault
of society, the castaways of society — the salvation of the lost
into a new and eternal life. Christian love of our neighbour is,
as to its character, wholly determined by God's love to us ; it
has here not merely its reason and motive power, on which we
must speak when dealing with Motives, but also its example.
In its warmth and clearness it is that of the great sun of love
which rises on the evil and the good, in order that all may be
perfect as the Father in heaven (St Matt. v. 48).
The measure of our Christian love to our neighbour is only
intelligible in this same way. It cannot be defined more simply,
deeply, inexhaustibly than in the saying of the great command-
ment in St Mark xii. 29, " as thyself." The final motive of self
cannot be more severely condemned while yet the indispensable
right of the real self is recognised. But this negation of egoism,
and at the same time of all exclusive and indeed impossible self-
sacrifice, has meaning only because in the chief Good, and on
that account also in the chief commandment, as we saw, society
and the individual no longer separate themselves as antagonistic
to each other, but become truly one in God; and can only
170 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
possess and love God when they become mutually united in
love, blessed in the service of self-denial.
It is no otherwise with the extent of Christian love of our
neighbour. It is in real earnest universal love of mankind, and
knows no distinction of race, age, position, nationality, religion,
or of natural gifts (Gal. iii. 28 ff.). Nevertheless the term ' love
of our neighbour ^ has a quite pre-eminent significance. It is
not merely only the most cheerful but also the most accurate
conceivable. For it is a reminder that the universal love of
mankind can only become real for every individual in every
single item of his action in his special situation, in a quite
special way, if quite distinct human beings in their special
position are in need of his love and can be reached by it. It
is the enduring protest against mere phrases, the continual
demand to give the case of the individual amid the encircling
millions individual care in real earnest. It is just this modern
humanity that is in danger of treating in a way that is at
bottom loveless individual specimens of the human race, for
whose love, elevation, and advancement it professes enthusiasm.
Universal love of mankind " often draws the line at the un-
washed." That saying wards off self-deception and the decep-
tion of others, as found in St Luke (x. 29, 36), " Who is neighbour
to him who fell among thieves 't *" Properly understood, every-
one has neighbours in space and time. He is, too, a true
neighbour to them by his loving action. These must be led to
experience it, and, as the result of the experience on their part,
be ready where and how they can to help others in the best way.
Thus Jesus became neighbour to His disciples, and awoke in
them a love which 'constrains' them without reserve to His
service (2 Cor. v. 14). It is not by a " mass of love that
He combated the misery of men," but He exercised on one
person after another that love which put and solved the
question of eternal life, and which overcame the world. Social
ethics has to show how all our natural moral relations and all
forms of society, family, friend, nation, place, and all that is
material, offer occasions for such Christian love. Every merely
general proposition is poor compared with this wealth.
The inexhaustibility of this love of our neighbour is revealed
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 171
by a glance at the manifold stages of its realisation. The two
limits are brotherly love and love of our enemy. When the
love of our neighbour is understood and returned, it finds its
completion in brotherly love, of whose praise the New Testament
is full. To maintain and to renew it in new forms is a pressing
problem of the present time. Rejected Christian love finds its
completion in the love of our enemy — that indispensable proof
whether our love corresponds to its divine type. He who loves
his foe holds energetically to his design to advance another in
the highest End even when he, so far as in him lies, runs counter
to our highest End ; to help him in his endeavours even, if so it
must be, by the sacrifice of his own natural life — and herein he
maintains and gains his true life. When we have thoughtfully
considered the idea of God's love (p. 1 64), then all this is seen to
be indisputable. For instance, the idea that the demand to love
our enemy is to be conceived on an eschatological basis, because
in the near dissolution of all earthly society even the antagonism
of our enemies does of itself cease to be an evil, is the greatest
conceivable misconception of the word of Jesus Christ. This
would be no ethical foundation even for the lower stages of moral
development. It is of most service to the introduction of the
Christian ideal into actual life to bear in mind at present how far
between these two limits it moves hither and thither, how far
in general righteousness is from being the norm which is still
to be realised. But if such righteousness does not issue from
and aim at love, this latter still remains for Christians among
its high ideals.
Inasmuch, however, as the commandment of love to God and
our neighbour cannot be fulfilled in the absence of a right
relation to our own nature and to external nature, we have
now in this place to speak, although briefly, of the attitude
of the Christian to his oxon nature and to that of the xcorld.
The moral culture of the natural powers of our minds, in
thinking, willing, and feeling; their continuous and unified
employment in the realisation of Ends ; their control by the
sense of personal dignity, even if only obscurely felt, had to be
mentioned at the outset when the question under consideration
was that of the one chief regulative principle of all moral life.
172 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
How these powers of the soul are collected into a unity is explained
in our treatment of the Christian character. Their relation to
the physical life, the normal attitude of the Christian to it,
requires notice in our present context. What this attitude
should be, will again be most clearly shown by contrasting the
overestimate and underestimate of its value. The overestimate
is seen in a twofold form, that found in Grecian aestheticism,
and that in modern materialism, however far these intellectual
tendencies are distinct and separate. In the former we find
unrestrained aestheticism, the absorption of the powers of body
and soul with objects of beauty ; in the latter, what we call
spirit is merely the combined effect of * force,' which is one with
matter, according to those who, weary of pure thought, are
worshippers of physical science posing as an explanation of the
cosmos. As to the underestimate, this may appear in the form
of Buddhistic or monastic asceticism, or as spiritualism of some
sort. The Christian, in spite of all the unsolved mysteries
(2 Cor. V. 1), which he realises more personally than those who do
not know the highest life by faith in the omnipotent love of the
Father, knows that his body is (apart from sin) (1 Cor. xv.
45 ff.) the God-designed instrument and outward embodiment
of the soul, and designed to be a temple of the Holy Ghost
(1 Cor. vi. 3 ft'.). The highest life is not the physical, sensuous
life, but that of the personality ; but the former is the divinely
intended means of realising the latter. God and the Christian
who loves his neighbour are to bring this instrument to the
fullest perfection ; and also here it is true that, the more com-
plete is the subordination of all means to the highest End, the
more does the special significance of these means for this End
become clear. Bodily exercise (1 Tim. iv. 8) "profiteth a
little," i.e. compared with discipline in godliness ; but that it
is important in its sphere is repeatedly insisted on in the
New Testament, often in the same contexts which warn against
excess (1 Tim. v. 23; Col. ii. 23). This bodily exercise
is according to its nature as much discipline as a means
of health, a check to sensual impulse as well as its proper
satisfaction and education. A warning like that of Rom. xiii.
14, " Make provision for the flesh, (but) not to fulfil its lusts,""
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 173
is applicable to both deviations from the right way, that of
depriving the natural life of its divinely ordered rights, and that
of asserting them at the expense of the chief Good. The saying
of Rothe has a deep meaning : " Sinful man has too much and too
little sensualness." In the kingdom of sin the physical life is
sick in all forms and degrees, with and without the fault of the
individual person. Depression and excitement, insensitiveness
and sensibility, strangely intermingled, alternate in the same man.
These frames of mind intrude even into the holy of holies of
prayer. Who is there who is not weak in some point ? There
are many who would found a society in which the word ' nerves '
should never again be uttered. Anxiety for the maintenance of
bodily health lays hold of them like an infectious disorder ; the
doctor takes the place of the pastor (understood not merely in
an official sense). But with this anxiety there is conjoined a
readiness to live regardless of health in eagerness for enjoyment,
in the most reckless accumulation of business engagements, and
so undermine health, and then seek its restoration by unnatural
means ; while even noble attempts at counteracting this
tendency are in part scarcely less artificial. There is a want
of " soundness in the good will,"" as Rothe says. If that were
present the bodily appetites would largely adjust themselves; if
not, there would be the power and willingness " to live suitably
to our environment,"" and even to make suffering — far from all
crass want of sensitiveness — into a work of faith and love ; with
the eye fixed on Him who will glorify our " body of humilation "
(Phil. iii. 21). That these propositions are not in themselves a
guarantee against unloving judgment on others, or senseless
severity to ourselves, is in need, as the whole context shows, of no
elucidation.
As to its principle, we have already spoken of the attitude of
the Christian to external nature and to the world (p. 139). The
law of the Christian life which emerges is, however, more easily
explained in detail elsewhere. It may merely be mentioned that
the expression ' love "* of nature, and especially love of animals,
is, as regards Christian ethics, and in connection with love of
God and of our neighbour, unsuitable. It does not fit in with
the true idea of love. Joy in nature is not love. Our right
174 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
relation to the animal world has its origin rather in reverence
for the Creator and a fellow-feeling for our fellow -creatures
(Prov. xii. 10; Jonah iv. 11). The present day often shows,
in the same degree that genuine love of mankind is wanting,
a weak tenderness in regard to animal life ; a descent from
the soundness of the feeling which Christianity sanctions to
Buddhistic flabbiness. For instance, the deep revolt against
animal torture, under the mask of science, from vanity and
coarseness of feeling becomes without reason a deep-seated
aversion to all experiments on living animals, even in the service
of purposes that are higher; and the exquisite titillation of
over-excited nerves in certain forms of sport leads some to the
rejection of all sport whatever. Yet the latter example does at
the same time show that when we enter upon details we soon
enough reach the boundaries, which in the common judgment are
drawn by the rights of the personal conscience.
Everything that is to be said of the supreme Norm of
Christian moral action is embraced illustratively in the
Example of Christ.
The precept of love cannot be completely expressed by any
formula. Without illustration the notion is in great danger of
being an empty expression. The old motto : " Precepts teach,
examples follow," belongs, in fact, also to the doctrine of Motives,
but necessarily at the same time to that of the Rule, the law of
Good. And if this is true in every system of ethics, it is
especially so in Christian ethics, on account of the nature,
content, meaning which the law implicates. In this sense, too, it
is true that Christ is the principle of ethics {cf. p. 125). Jesus
Christ is the type of the ' Good," as it exists in God's eternal
nature, and in the form of a. human personality. He is the
" image of the invisible God" (Col. i. 15), and so the image of
the personal life of man in which He was created (1 Cor. xv.
45), after which he, as sinful, is to be renewed (Col. iii. 10).
Understood in this way, Christ is the moral law incarnate,
although He is no new lawgiver, as the Tridentine Council (6. 21)
asserts with emphasis against the Protestant. For everything
that we have said of the law of the 'Good' is in His person
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 175
a reality, and He illustrates this reality in all its relations, both
as to form and content. It is in Him that we see what is meant
by the law of the ' Good "" not being a sum of single precepts but
the sole will of God. Every moment is occupied by the great
work which the Father gave Him to do, but every moment we
may also say just as in that work He ever alike aims at the one
goal which stands before Him : " I have finished the work which
Thou gavest Me to do " (St John xvii. 4). Hence for Him too
this law is a law of freedom ; what He does and what He leaves
undone both have their springs in His inmost spiritual nature ;
His life is so much a life of obedience to the Father that He can
call it His " meat and drink" (St John iv, 34). But it is a real
command that He follows, which He must fulfil through conflict
(St Matt. xxvi. 42) : " Not My will, but Thy will." And
what this will is, is comprised for Him in the content of the
greatest commandment. He came by the love of God to save
men for God's love. That He can only accomplish by loving to
the end, God, and ' His own ' because He loves the Father.
Everything serves this love which is proper to His image, with
its strongly marked features of self-denying and world-renouncing
zeal. Jesus is consequently no mere ascetic. He protects His
disciples against the exacting demands of ascetical precepts.
He fights against the special, individual ' prescripts ' which were
made in the name of religion, and which find their force merely
in such sayings : ' Touch not, handle not."* He was compelled to
hear the scoff of His foes, that as contrasted with St John the
Baptist He was ' a winebibber."' He is no ascetic, because He
is more than the greatest of them, the ' Son,' who at all times
does the good pleasure of the Father whose almighty love
sanctifies and does not sacrifice and destroy the world. This
is not a mere utterance of faith ; historical investigation is
more and more forced to this conclusion. Yet there are some at
the present time who in the picture of Jesus see, as it appears to
us, only the reverse side; others only His austerity, severity,
renunciation of the world ; of one whose attention was fixed on
the future. But neither can deny the other side, save at the
expense of historical accuracy. And if they do as a matter of
fact recognise these same things, but only as something
176 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
inexplicable and incidental, and in particular the indications
of openness to the world as the revelation of a healthy nature,
as fragments from a rich table, then they make His personality,
without intending it, a psychological riddle. These are not
irresolvable contradictions. Their unity does not lie in the
surface but deep down, in the certainty of this single truth,
that He is the Son of this Father and that it is His will to be
so at every moment.
A closer statement of what this example of Jesus means is of
importance, for the sake of clearness of thought and on account
of its practical consequences. This example cannot consist
in the individual features of His life as individual, nor in
His life as a whole, if it is only considered in its outer aspect.
It consists rather in the essential nature of His whole disposition
of mind as it is illustratively exhibited in the whole picture.
For this picture — provided it is to belong to this actual world —
bears the sharply defined features which mark His special
vocation, such as is found in no other, and which He carried out
under wholly special circumstances. If we were to make Him
an example in this sense, then we should deny the possibility of
His being an example. If He can be this for all changing
periods, and if He is to be this without the denial of His
unique dignity as our Redeemer, it can only be by that in Him
which is most subjective and unique, which expresses itself in
His mien and detachment, such as can never be repeated. It is
a particularly glorious side of faith in Christ that its object has,
by His ascension, disrobed His earthly image of all temporal
limitations, and by this means became transformed into an
example for all men, various as they are, and for all periods,
different as they may be. There is another reason why this
must be so : the other notion of what His example is does not
harmonise with the Evangelical method of understanding
Christian ethics. It would destroy the unity and independ-
ence which is inseparable from the nature of real moral action,
Jesus would be the promulgator of a law which would have
a statutory stamp, and be permanently external to the will.
Hence in the Evangelical Church the phrase ' imitation of
Christ,' in its external connotation, can have no right place.
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 177
All copying of His life is at once excluded. ' Imitation of
Christ "■ can be taught in very various ways. The Catholic
mode is perhaps most plainly seen in the method of St Francis,
concerning whom a Book of Conformity to Christ is designed
to show how everything in the life of Christ had its parallel
in His great disciple, even to the marks of the cross and
ascension ; or in the fanatical idea that it is possible to follow
Jesus in His redemptive work ; or in the rationalistic
attempt to make the virtue of Jesus an example in every respect.
And these three forms pass over into one another in various
ways. But even that form which is connected with those
named by its similarity, which says that the single sayings of
Jesus Christ in their isolation should be regarded as rules to
be followed, is doubtful. Jesus Himself, according to St John
(xviii. 22), did not literally fulfil His own rule of offering the
other cheek to the smiter (St Matt. v. 39), in order that He
might fulfil it in a deeper sense. He has even on this point
shown the way to freedom. After all, the high estimate of
Thomas a Kempis"" Imitation of Christ is beside the mark.
It is only Evangelical when and so far as it can help in the
carrying out in the life of the apostolic reminder to " do all in
the name of Jesus " (Col. iii. 17). To " do all in the name of
Jesus,"" in the sense of the law which has become personal in
Him, is to imitate Christ. To do all ' in Christ,' eating and
drinking, waking and sleeping, praying, troubling, glorying;
in anxiety, in life and in death, — to do this ' in Christ ' was not
for St Paul a suitable formula of speech, but a reality. And
now, since no doubt remains as to the principle, we may add
also that, if in spite of this the expression ' imitation of Christ '
has been degraded and become suspicious, it is only a sign
which betrays the fact that there is a proneness to weaken
down the whole sternness of the Christian command, in (if
needs be) its inmost world-renouncing severity. As opposed to
this inclination, even a drastic reminder of walking ' in His
footsteps,' and the pathetic question, ' What would Jesus do,'
in my place .? may be justifiable. Only in this there exists the
danger of carrying out artificially made plans of life in a
fantastical way, and of despising daily tasks in simple circum-
12
178 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
stances. The phrases ' in the name of Jesus ' and ' in Christ '
have more depth than breadth of applicability.
The Dekpest Spring of Action ; oa Love of God in Christ
AS Incentive and Motive Power ('Faith and Works').
The clearer our conscious grasp of the grandeur of the chief
End and the supreme Rule, as each is understood in Christian
ethics, the more urgent becomes the question as to the Motive
of action which seeks for that End in that way. Ever and anon,
in every single statement in which we tried to make the ' Good '
and the ' Law ' clear to ourselves, we might have interpolated the
demand, ' How do we come by such action ? ' Such a question
would nowhere be a mere factitious interruption ; on the
contrary, is one difficult to keep back. The exponents of other
than the Christian ethical view do not infrequently allude to
this difficulty ; the measure in which they feel and recognise
this is indeed a proof of thoughtfulness and impartiality. Of
course, as long as End and Norm are dominated by the idea of
utility there is no need for a doctrine of Motives. But is the
question then an ethical one ? So soon, however, as the ethical
is recognised in its true character, it is indeed easy to say what
is the high motive for doing the ' Good.' Purely for the sake
of the ' Good ' ; but it is hard to say whence the motive power
is derived for such action. In Christian ethics especially is
this difficulty accentuated. It does not extenuate the contra-
diction in which we are found to the divinely 'Good'; it
knows that there is a kingdom of sin in which we are all
guiltily involved (p. 148). And it has an ideal so unsurpass-
able that we cannot speak of motive at all in relation to it,
save such as is of the purest and deepest. In the kingdom
of love there can be absolutely nothing done in the love of
God and our neighbour save from love. And by this the
question as to the motive power to truly 'good' action is
unavoidable and, as it seems, impossible to ignore. It is just
in the answer to this question that the Christian Church has
from the beginning seen its superiority. Many a time those
noble spirits who sought refuge in the Church from the Graeco-
Roman world thought almost less of finding a new End and a
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 179
new Law of their action, than of the certainty of its truth, and
the motive power for its reahsation. In the experience of the
love of God lies the impulse and motive power to 'good'
action, to love. This is the Christian 'Thou shalf and the
Christian ethical ' Thou canst.' (If we here speak in this way
of ' Thou shalt,' whereas it was, we said, to be treated under
another point of view, that of the supreme command, yet this
stands in no need of justification after what has been previously
said on the ethical principle {cf. pp. 12, 56, 95) ). This
simply sublime thought it is proper to explain more at large.
The expression just used for it harmonises with Evangelical
ethics. But in the formal Confessions of our Church this
question which is to engage our attention is usually treated
under the heading of Faith and Works.
Faith and Works.
This title has reference to Catholic teaching. And the
Catholic Christian traces the motive power to good works back
to the grace of God in Christ. It is a conviction common to
Christians that moral endeavour does not reach its aim unaided ;
and that it is not sufficient to assert that the idea of God is
one inseparably connected with the idea of the Good in order
to necessitate, for the sake of this context of ideas, the existence
of God (Postulate, p. 103). Christian morality for all forms
of faith rests on reality, i.e. on the revelation of the holy and
gracious God. But for the Romish Church (p. 114) this grace
is not properly that personal loving will which, effectual
through Christ, creates anew our wills, but a mysterious force
operative through the sacraments. So far as any personal
transaction is in question at all, free will works together with
sacramental grace, and performs good works which merit
salvation. In this view good works and this eternal life,
the vision of God, stand to one another in an external relation ;
they are the divinely ordered method of acquiring this reward ;
but the End is of another kind than the way which leads to
it ; or their inner unity and conformity are at any rate not
unreservedly carried through. The incentives, therefore, to
good works are hence necessarily eudaemonistic ; something
180 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
else is aimed at than the Good merely ; and in the same way
this motive power to the Good, since it is a compound of the
grace given and free will, is not in itself a unity and a
satisfactory whole ; — a judgment by which, of course, the
pious Catholic is not touched who with a pure heart seeks
God even with incomplete idea and unsufficing powers. Or,
more closely, the Romish doctrine does not i<now the
highest and purest spring of action in our sense even where
it praises in enthusiastic words love to God, and supposes
that it surpasses ours in earnestness and warmth. It is not
less clear that its works are isolated performances, by which way
of speaking once more we do not pass judgment on the personal
morality of members of this Church. In short, the Reforma-
tion objection is intelligible. The Roman Catholics neither show
what good works are, nor how they are done, and no reproach
against Evangelicals is less founded than that which affirms
they depreciate good works. On the contrary, they speak with
open plainness of true Christian perfection, on which there was
in the School theology profound silence, while much that
was useless was discussed. They make it intelligible how grace
is the spring and motive power of doing good with pure
intention. The latter point is the problem with which we
must at once busy ourselves ; the former is also in this place
an important application of what has been said above of the
highest commandment. And in fact it is easy to put the
inexperienced right — both as to the more precise affirmations
of the Reformers and those of Holy Scripture — who have been
captured by opponents, or by the term ' good works,' on which
the latter have put a false stamp. A favourite passage of
Luther''s was that saying of our Lord on the " good tree which
bringeth forth good fruit" (St Mark vii. 17). In the New
Testament the number of our good works is spoken of, but only
where no misconception is possible. Alongside works there
significantly appears the 'walk,' the doing of 'the Good' (St
James i. 4; Phil. i. 22 ; 1 Thess. i. 3; St John xvii. 4;
1 Pet. i. 17 ; Rom. ii. 7). And we may not forget that the
question here treated concerns all those fundamental relations
of the ' Good ' repeatedly discussed, on which we fixed attention
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 181
in speaking of the content of the highest Good and the supreme
commandment. A closer examination of those propositions
is needful in which our confessional writings say how, i.e. for
what reasons, good works are wrought, or how for the sake of
clearness the incentive and the motive power to good action are
distinguished. It is not invariably the case that these two
points, incentive and motive power, or. Why should we ? and
Why can we do the Good? are intentionally separated, since
they are, as a matter of fact, closely connected ; and it is easy
to see that the first of these took the second place because a
strong feeling of the moral motive power which belonged to the
newly discovered faith was a part of their life. But the Re-
former's distinction is helpful to lucidity, and even in the New
Testament the two are distinguished as in the deepest ground
one. We ought to love because " the love of God has appeared ""
and " He who is born of God " loves ; " the love of Christ con-
straineth us " ; " to whom much is forgiven, the same loveth
much " ; and he who will not miss his reward is to forgive " unto
seventy times seven."''' That imperative 'Thou shalt' is ac-
centuated and deepened ; that ' Thou canst ' is now true, and
both have become one by faith in God's forgiving love.
Why ought we to do 'good works,"* to love God and our
neighbour ? Plenty of answers are ready. " On account of
God"'s command "" ^ (Conf. Augsb. vi. 20.) " For the honour of
God and to His praise and glory "'"' (Apol. vi. 77) ; as a confession
of our faith (Apol. iii. 68) ; for the exercise of our faith ; to
prove the reality of our faith and as witness to it (Apol. iii.
63). The Holy Spirit too is spoken of as bestowing the impulse
to good works. And why can we do ' good works ' ? whence
do we gain the power for a new moral life ? Here the answers
are less various. They run : Through the Holy Spirit who is
given to believers ; and from faith ; on account of faith ; they
are the fruits of faith (cf. the places cited above); and especially
from thankful faith. At the bottom the twofold answer is the
same — the Holy Ghost and faith are the incentive and motive
power of the new life. For what was additionally included
in the first question can be traced back to faith. Faith has
^ " Bona opera mandata a Deo facere."
182 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
respect to God's commandment, and is a belief in God's faithful-
ness ; and God's commandment and God's honour are at bottom
one. This depth of meaning has its sources in the Christian
idea of what God is.
But the Holy Ghost and faith are inseparably connected.
What that means when it is said the Holy Ghost is the
incentive and power to the new life, we apprehend, if we
understand what that means, when we say it is the incentive
and motive power of the new life. In brief, and without intrud-
ing too much into doctrine, this is so on the following grounds.
To have the Spirit of a father or of a friend is just the same
as * having the mind ' of the friend or the father. But along
with this very many also say that the father or the friend is
somehow the originator of such disposition of mind. In any
case, to have God's Spirit means to be * spiritually minded ' ; to
aim at God's End ; to be ruled by the law of His will ;
governed by the same motives as God; to love as He loves.
For when we say, 'God is love,' we necessarily mean, in our
human speech, to say that ' God is Spirit ' ; we presuppose the
form of a spiritual personality when we speak of love ; and
by the term ' Holy Spirit ' we mean in the New Covenant
not merely in general that the divine nature is alone, un-
approachable, incomparable, but that He is also this inasmuch
as in His innermost spiritual nature He is love. And we
mean also something else when we speak of God's Spirit ;
we mean that He produces in us a likeness of mind to
Himself; and it is in this that the greatest emphasis lies
when we speak of our fellowship with God. Now, God
gives us His Holy Spirit, and therefore that mind which con-
stitutes His nature. And this not in some way inconceivable.
Truly the dwelling of God in us and His gift of His Spirit
is the eternal secret of God, and for us the eternal reason for our
worship. This indwelling gift is not bestowed accidentally,
vaguely, without rule, as if it had no definite content. En-
thusiasts fancy that God can at any moment do any imaginable
thing in a human soul, and make His Spirit operative in it.
Our Evangelical Church rejoices in His work wrought in us 'in
Christ,' who is Himself full of the Spirit, but acknowledges this
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 183
work is bound up with the word of the Gospel. For us the
Spirit and the Word are mutually conjoined. It is by faith in
the Gospel, by trust, that it becomes to us a personal possession.
Hence it is by the faith, by the trust, which we personally ex-
perience that we understand the working of the Spirit in us ; and
what that miracle of God's Spirit working in the human spirit
means as a matter of our experience. It is on the ground of
such experience that we are able to understand it. We do not
mean that it is all one whether we use the term Spirit or faith.
We must speak of the Holy Spirit if we are to express in
unambiguous language the fact that what we experience is from
God ; that faith is not mere fancy or a dream, but a real work
of God in us. But we may simplify our question as to the
incentive and motive power to the new life by asking : How far
does each rest in faith ?
The Incentive to Good Works.
First of all as to the incentive. Different paths lead to the
same goal. We might start from God's forgiving grace, that
will to love on which faith lavs hold, or from the nature of
faith. God forgives sins. But this does not mean that He
remits all external punishment of sins, and leaves the state of
the man just what it was. It means He removes the sense of guilt,
the feeling of alienation ; that He brings the sinner into fellow-
ship with Himself, makes him blessed in the possession of
justification, and receives him as a child of God into closest
fellowship with Himself. This fellowship is, moreover, fellow-
ship with the perfect Father, the one good God. The nature
of this fellowship and the blessedness of it constrain our love.
It is impossible to obtain its possession and not desire to retain
it, and not desire too to be blessed with that blessedness which
is a part of the nature of God, of which we have become sharers
freely and gratuitously. It is the same thing viewed from
another side, i.e. from the point of view of faith, to say that it
is impossible to believe in God's prevenient love and not at the
same time to have sympathy with God's designs. Where this is
not the case such persons do not know what personal faith is.
I cannot appropriate to myself the love of a friend without
184 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
willing what he wills, and I can only have fellowship with him
in love by having that love which makes up his being.
Speaking strictly, we cannot quite say that the incentive to the
love of God and our neighbour is the result of our faith in God''s
love to us. It is rather the result of the great gift received by
faith. This is the immediate incentive to the new life in which
our love to God and our neighbour becomes manifest. And
why the love of God and of our neighbour are indissolubly
connected needs not to be repeated (p. 168). The new spiritual
life of the Christian does not turn away from God when it turns
to our neighbour, but by this love of our neighbour it turns to
God and rests in God. All that we receive from the divine
fulness in faith is that which immediately impels us to the love
of God as to the love of our neighbour, and this is so because
God is the Love which realises itself in His kingdom.
It is now clear of itself how far the answers of our Confession
of Faith spoken of above, although not so in their verbal ex-
pression, are yet at bottom one. They do, however, only express
one aspect of the truth. For instance, when it is said we do
good works ' on account of the divine commandment,'' even the
most advanced Christian has in this the wholesome reminder
that the new life does not follow the course of nature, but is,
and continues to be, a moral life ; that it is perfected in
submission to the will of God, and in the struggle to do it.
But the other idea of ' grateful love ' is far clearer. It is quite
right in its assertion that moral action has an incentive in
grateful affection. But of course we must not think merely of
' giving thanks,' however important this is ; nor of ' proving our
gratitude,' as if we could give some recompense to God, however
indispensable devotion of the whole life in gratitude to God is ;
nor of ' being thankful ' in the sense of exuberant emotional feel-
ing, however unnecessary it may seem to protest warmly against
the superabounding emotionalism of enthusiastic spiritual hymns.
The incontestable and unimpeachable correctness of the idea of
grateful love is clear from the above ; otherwise those precious
stones (such as Gal. ii. 20; 2 Cor. v. 14) must be removed
from the fabric of the New Testament.
Quite naturally the consideration of this question, Why ought
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 185
good works to be done ? passes over into the next : How can they
be done ? How far do we comprehend faith as the motive
power of the new moral life ? Because, once more, fellowship
with God, and the blessedness found in it, are bestowed in faith
by the forgiveness of our sins. We said above it constrains to
good action, because its nature is such that it cannot be
obtained or retained in any other way than by our will to love
because God is love. Now we say it is the motive power to
good action, and we are able to love because of the fellowship
and blessedness we have as God's gift. It may be that the
explanatory definitions of the reason of this, in our Confessions
of Faith, are not sufficiently perspicuous ; also that faith is
represented in some of the statements as too much a matter of
natural power, from which the fruit of good works necessarily
proceeds. But by experience the plain and inexhaustible truth
of that witness is abundantly evident ; I mean, the truth that
we are not able to do the * Good "■ so long as we do not possess
an experience that it is the highest Good. Man can do much ;
but he has no power to love God and his neighbour as long as
God and his neighbour appear alienated from him, and at
enmity with him, because he thinks that they, by disturbing his
own aims, disturb his happiness. It is impossible to eradicate
the passion, the human hunger for happiness, as long as man is
what he is. So long as he seeks that happiness in himself, and
in the world, he cannot love God, and will ever remain unblest.
Every advantage gained proves illusive, carries him farther from
his goal, because he pursues a wrong way. And the deepest
misery is the feeling of guilt with which his alienation from
God burdens him, because he, by his own act and deed, runs
counter to that which is his true destiny. But now God
forgives the debt, adopts him as His child, bestows upon him
the blessedness of His fellowship. Thus the hindrance is
removed to doing the Good ; the way is open. He is now in
the right way because by that unspeakable gift he is also at the
goal ; at that goal which is ever to be gained afresh in the
eternal gift — a gift which, on account of its nature, becomes a
task to perform eternal as God Himself. But all this is realisable
in faith : Faith itself ; trust in God's revealed grace, the readiness
186 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
to receive it is the great new motive force, and the only one
which enables us to do the Good. Man can only love God and
his neighbour because he is beloved by God ; can only give
because it is superabundantly given to him. There is no longer
hunger for happiness, which was a hindrance to true love
because this love and our own happiness appeared irreconcilable.
There is no longer fear of evil which continually threatened the
desired happiness, and so was a hindrance to all love. Every
event, pleasure, and burden of this life is the leading of the
Father, a demand on the child, who has grown rich in the love
of the Father, to exercise love to others, in that state of life in
which the Father, whose world this is, desires that love to be
exhibited. So could Luther rightly say that " He begets us
anew, and transforms us ; slays the old man ; makes us quite
different men in heart, courage, sense and capacities. Oh, Faith
is a living, energetic, mighty thing ! It does not ask whether
there are good works to be done, but has already done them and
is always doing them." ^
These words of Luther have found a place in the last of our
Lutheran formularies, as no one understood the connection of
faith and works so profoundly as he did. They may here at
the same time stand for an answer to the question, which
likewise need be no longer ambiguously answered, which follows
on what has been said, and that is, whether this cor.iiection of
faith and works is in the strictest sense indissoluble. In the
older formularies that was regarded as self-evident. Hence,
although the usage varies as to individual terms, in the main
such words as regeneration, justification, renewal, restoration,
and similar expressions were regarded as synonyms. In that
latest formulary, however, renewal is definitely spoken of as
following regeneration, although with the proviso that the
question is not one of order of time, but of order of thought.
And by this is not meant that which we call sanctification, the
progress of the new life, but the life itself. The reason for
such modification of doctrine is clear and indisputable, and
that is, the consolation of justification by grace without works
must be safeguarded. But this end may be attained in another
• Preface to Epistle to Romans in Luther's Commentary. — Tr.
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 187
way. The above statements no one will be able to misconceive
as imperilling the principle ' by faith alone.' But that He
who 'freely gives us all things" is, in and with our faith, the
direct incentive and motive power to the new life is both set
forth in the New Testament as something self-evident and is
the experience of all believers. Utterances like those of our
Wurtemburg Book for Confirmees on the first and second use
of faith are therefore to be correctly explained in the sense of
the Reformers. If that had always been done, if the intimate
connection of faith and works, of justification and adoption on
the one hand, of childlike prayer and a holy life on the other,
had been inscribed in the heart, in the way I^uther explained,
then no such confused and bewildering preaching as that, for
example, of Pearsall Smith (1875), with all his personal zeal,
would ever have taken so strong a hold on Germany. What
was good in it was not new but old, frequently adulterated
Lutheran and New Testament truth, and the rest fanaticism.
{Cf. Doctrine of Assurance.)
These statements on faith and works are the common property
of the Protestant Churches. The difference between Luther
and the Swiss Reformer does not concern the principle that
faith is the motive power and incentive to the new life, or the
reason why this is so, but only the closer definition of the sphere
in which this moral action shall operate ; and correspondingly
as to the degree of warmth in which it is to manifest itself
externally — so far, it is true, a somewhat different direction of
thought, and then, of course, of kind of faith as well. Zwinglius
was a statesman and a warrior with the same saving faith as
that which made Luther endure, wait, often restrain and curb
statesmen. Luther saw the danger as quickly as others, and
realised the difficulty not less acutely than they. But the
faith which he expresses in his hymn, " A strong tower is our
God, a trusty shield and weapon," is the great truth for him,
in the sense that his faith here reposes rather than is externally
active. Still, who would say that this resting on God was not
in his case the highest action, activity, work, a reposing on
God's eternal power.'* And who is bold enough to say that
the battles of the Churches founded by Geneva were not battles
188 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
for faith which saved Protestantism ? The Evangelical notion
of faith is so profound that it not merely allows but
demands such apparently widely opposed manifestations of its
activity.
So far this would be an incomplete statement unless attention
were explicitly drawn to the fact that the faith which is the
incentive and motive power to the new moral life cannot be
disconnected from repentance. Some word, then, must be said
on faith and repentance. It is of no importance to the main
question that the use of these terms is confused. Of course,
the idea of recompense by painful penance is excluded. It is
' change of mind ' that is meant, so far as this word implicates
not merely turning to God but aversion to sin, and this
aversion it is which is emphasised. The Augsburg Confession
in Art. 12 calls it ' sorrow for sin ' and a ' troubled conscience,'
and when this is conjoined with faith it names it penitence
and considers it synonymous with ' conversion."" In our context
it is enough to insist that the faith of which such great
things have been said is altogether and in all respects the
faith that is penitential, sorrowful, and grieved at the thought
of sin ; but that sorrow alone, apart from faith, can never be
the motive power of the new life. And this is the answer also to
that moot point much discussed in late years, whether repentance
arises from the law or the Gospel. Our Reformers rxiaintained
both. Now, since Luther had experienced -the terrors of a
troubled conscience wrought in him by the law, and on quite
another side had such experiences as those of his Saxon
pastoral visitation,^ it was impossible to undervalue the law as an
educative power. But that the true sorrow for sin is not to
be severed from belief in the Gospel these theologians firmly
held. This, in fact, was the new element in their knowledge.
In general only this much may be affirmed : first, that a
' One of the early effects of the Reformation in Saxony was that great
confusion arose through the break-down of the old conditions, increased by the
incompetence of many of the clergy to deal with the circumstances that arose.
Luther made a visitation in 1527 in connection with Melancthon. Arrangements
were made to secure proper teaching, church discipline, and an order of worship.
One fruit of this visitation was the compilation of Luther's Large and Shorter
Catechisms. — Tr.
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 189
troubled conscience and the terrors of the law have an
undeniable, though of course in details very varied, value for
those not yet conscious of salvation, while repentance is a grace
of the Gospel, and it is really only converting repentance when
united with faith. Thus, in the life of the true Christian
repentance is fundamentally a Gospel grace. This will be
further elucidated in individual ethics when treating of what
is called the third use of the law.
Taking a thesis from doctrinal teaching, it is here proper
to make reference to the relation between Grace and Freedom,
God's work and man's. From the principles of our religion,
from its teaching concerning God, man, and sin, we arrived in
various passages at the result that God's working is regarded as
creative. Our formularies therefore rightly say that the natural
man cannot dispose himself to divine grace, prepare himself
to seek it, to turn to it or work together with it, as if it were
a co-ordinate factor. The same statement is applicable also to
the new man, the renewed man, in the sense that a co-operation
of God and man as if they were two homogeneous forces of the
created world has no place even after conversion. ^
Even in human relations of mutual trust such ideas are
unsatisfying. In education, in friendship, two natures do not
work homogeneously. It is the higher nature that calls into
activity the trust of the lower. It would be absurd and, more,
destructive of the whole relationship of love if a child should
consider his will as a will co-operating with his father's. The
relationship is one of the subjection of one will to the other.
Nor is this conclusion disturbed if the child has made that will
his own. How much more must the will of the Father of all be
regarded as creative ! Only it is needful once more to insist
that man's trust in God's grace is voluntary, and is his free act
as a responsible being. Man is not a mere passive instrument,
he is not like a stick or a stone — nay, he is worse than this,
since he can resist. These are generally not only unsatisfactory
illustrations — because they are taken from the natural kingdom,
while this is a question which concerns the spirit — but they
explicitly deny, in a way our fathers would not deny, responsi-
bility. For it is not possible, while ascribing resistance to
190 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
divine grace to man, to ascribe grace to God alone. And for
the question under consideration it affords no help to say that
the power to believe is given, not natural to us, however true
that is in the other meaning of the above example. Conse-
quently what has been said earlier as to the indispensableness
and the correctness of the idea of moral freedom as real freedom
to decide for or against the Good, finds here its most important
and indisputable practical application.
Having treated the deepest motive of Christian moral action,
we may now finish a former discussion, and finally dispose of
the charge of hedonism (eudaemonism) brought against Christian
ethics.
The Charge of Hedonism.
This charge, usually brought against every system of ethics
which has a religious foundation, is levelled against the
Christian system with constantly increasing energy, since here
it meets a great antagonist. With remarkable frequency there
is, at the same time, the opposite charge, that Christian ethics
unnaturally suppresses every natural desire for happiness.
Both are with some difficulty combined in the idea that
renunciation of this world is balanced by happiness in the next,
since for the purpose of such a statement the Christian hereafter
has all too little sensuous colouring. To such a peculiar
method of attack no disproof is immediately obvious, and no
doubt there are at least individual passages of the New Testa-
ment, particularly the use of the word rezvard, which do
repeatedly awaken in the cursory reader the feeling that the
charge of hedonism is intrinsically justified. A verdict becomes
easier, in the opinion of many, because both sides provisionally
understand one another ; since even in a system of ethics which
is exclusively and fundamentally hedonistic appeal can be made,
for educative reasons, to invitatory motives, which represent
the Good as the Useful, the True as the Prudent. They attract
attention, they give the enslaved will corn-age for effort.
Truly : only the effort will show soon enough that these motives
are not long-enduring ; that only the good will leads to the End
whose incentive and motive power we have become acquainted
with. To say that those treasures are worth striving for which
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 191
the thief cannot break through and steal is just as illuminative
as it is insufficient to conquer the natural inclination for earthly
good. The idea of a public reward of closet prayer and alms
given in secret has never produced men of much prayer and
self-sacrificing zeal, even when the profounder meaning of such
sayings has been apprehended. It is consequently a constant
dispute about words whether such an educative reference is to
be found in the words of the Lord.
If we look at the assertions which are without doubt
fundamental, the worth of the objections may perhaps be
examined in the following order. There is no question that
the care of the Father in heaven is promised to all the members
of His kingdom. " All other things shall be added to them "" ;
they are of more value than the birds and the lilies. But
riches, honour, pleasure are nowhere promised to them. That
promise confines itself to what is absolutely needful, if a man
aims at the highest End as it is desired he should. The great
care, supreme care, at every stage of the earthly career he only
can exercise from whom anxiety for earthly good, as the
greatest, has been taken away, so long as he in his earthly
conflict stands for the Good. Very well, say our opponents;
but that really means speculating in sensuous enjoyment, and
seeking for it, if future happiness is promised as 'the new
heavens and the new earth,' ' drinking the fruit of the vine
new,' ' sitting down ' with the Patriarchs, ' thrones and crowns.'
Now, the barest justice demands us to note that such sayings
(which are infrequent) must be taken in connection with those
sayings which are more numerous and less metaphorical, and
that it is then easy to comprehend them, but not conversely.
He ' who hungers after righteousness ' is filled — with righteous-
ness. Righteousness dwells in the new heavens and the new
earth. The ' pure in heart ' shall see God — God who is Spirit,
Light, Love. His fellowship, moreover, is an eternal fellowship
with the members of His kingdom. And further, if God is to
be 'all in all,' and the Good realisable under the conditions
of our outward life, how would it be otherwise expressed than
by such a saying as that of the ' new world ' and the ' new
body ' ? From all the ideas which the Christian can conceive
192 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
on the subject, from all presentiments that when that which
is Good is perfected then all that is true and all that is
beautiful will be perfected, we thankfully turn back to those
plain words on righteousness, so inexhaustibly profound.
Again, our opponents object, it is still a suspicious thing that
it is said that this future glory is guaranteed to faith, for in
this way the purity of the motive in seeking for the Good is
clouded. As if the guarantee 'in faith' did not exclude all
intellectual certainty, all compulsory conviction. The exponents
of this objection ought at least so far thoughtfully to consider
the fact of faith as to perceive that there is in it, for the
natural sense, little that is persuasive and enticing. The
gladness of hope (Rom. v, 1) is wholly and entirely grounded
on the 'peace and joy"* of the new life, which our opponents
in this context value lightly, and regard as quite insecure. If
notwithstanding they find in it a stumbling-block, then their
charge that Christian ethics is hedonistic amounts in the end
to the idea that it is ethical, although it is not faith in the
victory of the Good. This idea has already been refuted in
the first part.
Still, it is possible that the word ' reward ' may be felt to be
a difficulty. But this idea of reward is only hedonistic if it is
united with the idea of merit. If it were possible by good
action, and especially by specific works which transcend mere
duty, to merit happiness, and such happiness as, according to
the nature of the subject, must be happiness of a different kind
from life in the ' Good,' in love, then the purity of the moral
incentive would be disturbed. The contrary, as has now been
often observed, is the case, and is most explicitly asserted in
St Luke xvii. 7 ff., St Matt. xx. 1 ff. The self-confession of the
great champion in 1 Cor. ix. 15 fF. shows this at once. His
'reward' he gains by voluntary sacrifice of his whole person,
exhibited in renouncing all claim to the support of the churches,
and he but wishes to become a sharer in the Gospel which he
preaches. Tliis is his 'reward.' And so there lies in the
natural employment of the term 'reward' — a use certainly
borrowed from the ethics in which ' right ' is a leading notion
and transferred to the kingdom of love — for the most part,
THE NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN GOOD 193
merely a plain and important allusion to the meaning which the
moral endeavour for salvation in the Kingdom of God has on
account of its nature, of which we have frequently spoken and
shall speak again. Consequently, the question is, as regards
this endeavour in the Kingdom of God, really one that concerns
personal freedom, and so it is that reward is spoken of; exactly
as also of a righteousness of God which has respect to man's
behaviour to his fellows (Heb. vi. 10). Both these words,
reward and righteousness, emphasise the truth more strongly
than any other that the reaping corresponds to the sowing
(2 Cor. ix. G). If the reconciliation of divine grace and human
freedom is not perceivable by Christian knowledge at its earthly
stage, there is no clear contrariety between grace and reward.
Hence it is not advisable to use the term ' reward of grace '
carelessly in religious address, because it easily produces the
impression that there is no serious regard paid to moral
endeavour; or because, conversely, it serves merely for a
covering of the self-[)leasing idea of merit. The term has
an indisputably correct meaning founded on St Matt. i. 20.
According to this, the final reason for speaking at all of a
reward is only the goodness of the ' goodman of the house.'
Then haughtiness and envy, the hypocritical glance at our
own doing as our own, and harsh judgment on others are
excluded.
Of course he who raises the complaint of hedonism against
any system for which the accomplishment of the Good generally
is not merely self-denial, nor the exaltation and enrichment of
the life in this way, but life which is truly such and in harmony
with our destiny, will not be won over by confuting argument.
But he has not a higher but only an incomplete knowledge of
ethics. In the salvation which consists in divine adoption
eudaeraonism of the unethical type is overcome because this
transcends mere moral rigorism. Stress was laid on this at the
outset (p. 10), and now after this fundamental explanation
of the nature of the Christian Good no more is to be said.
In addition, we have become acquainted (p. 181) with that
great gift of the Love of God as the sole sujfficient motive power
of our love, and how this highest Good is received, kept, and
13
194 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
perfected in moral action will be shown under various headings
in the following exposition.
And thus, finally, this consideration that the love of God
experienced in Christ is the deepest motive to Christian morality,
the incentive and motive power to love, precisely because it is
felt to be the highest Good, brings to its proper conclusion
all that has been said of the relation of religion to ethics, and
afterwards applied and more closely determined. They are
really inseparable. Not only does Christian ethics rest wholly
on Christian faith, but also Christian faith itself is throughout
ethical in its character, which only belongs to the man who
recognises the moral requirement, bows himself before the Good,
yearns after the Good. Of course full knowledge of the Good
springs out of a really deep desire of the Good itself, and
from the drawing near to us of Him who alone is the good
God. But this drawing near is only for him who is resolved to
understand and to recognise that it is the drawing near of the
good God. And what is true of the first movement of faith is
true also of each stage of its development.
Herewith we are led to the threshold of our next section.
We have been involuntarily compelled to touch on terms like
conversion or regeneration, but they belong as fundamental
concepts to the teaching on Christian personality. Still, in
passing on to its consideration it may, for the sake of logical
completeness, be at least mentioned that we might here, at the
conclusion, discuss in unison with our prime principle (p. 118)
how far Christ is to be regarded as the deepest Motive of
Christian moral action, precisely in the same way as we had to
conclude our teaching on the highest Rule with Him (p. 174).
CHAPTER VI.
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN, OK
CHRISTIAN PERSONALITY.
Individual Ethics.
The reason for this division and for the distinction drawn
between individual and social ethics has been given above
(p. 124). It follows from the nature of the Christian Good,
which we have realised to ourselves in the first section of our
dissertation, that we must now represent in two sections,
independent yet frequently crossing over into one another, how
the life of the individual and how the life of the community
shape themselves under Christian influences.
The main thought of this whole section, that we are not born
Christians, but that we become Christians (as St Augustine says),
and that the change involved is a fundamental one, is, after
all that has been said, beyond contention (St Mark i. 15 ;
Rom. xii. 2). If we are all bound up in the kingdom of sin
(p. ] 48 ff. ), then we all need transformation ; and if this affects
our deepest nature, then we all need a thorough-going change.
When this deepest of all springs of action becomes operative,
and the Christian strives for the Christian End in harmony with
the supreme Rule, other and lower motives of action are subdued.
This truth is independent of the varied ways in which the
truth is, as to details, expressed. The most frequent desig-
nations of this phenomenon are ' conversion ' and ' regeneration.'
These terms are of course by some variously understood
and different values assigned to them. For instance, in our
formulary it is necessary to closely consider whether they in
195
196 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
their former context mean a total change in every respect, or
in the narrower sense the planting of faith in us ; also whether
these expressions mark the event more as the work of God,
or more as something that we can really experience of ourselves.
But since we convinced ourselves that, when faith is given, all
is in reality given, the first distinction is not of so much
importance. But as far as regards the second the word
' regeneration "* more plainly emphasises (in harmony with
its derivation) that the new life is God's work ; while
'conversion,' or turning again, is something realised by man's
own personal action. Hence the first expression is doctrinal,
the latter ethical. Both mean essentially the same thing, i.e.
they refer to this great change in all its aspects, but under
different points of view. This must be emphasised, or otherwise
it would be easy, in what follows, to overlook the express
reference to the divine work ; but to maintain this, with the
complete absence of ambiguity with which it needs to be main-
tained, in harmony with the experience of all truly converted
persons, whether eminent or obscure, is not an affair of ethics
but of dogmatics.
But that unimpeachable great truth of conversion contains
a difficult problem, and one clearly enough of fresh importance
for the present time. The statement set forth above is a
judgment on the subjective nature of conversion. The pro-
blem it contains may be put thus : What is the relation
between this subjective nature and its realisation at a given
time.'* Is this experience, which is in its nature new, an ex-
perience of something new at a given time, limited to this
time .'' In short, is there such a thing as the point of transi-
tion from the old to the new life ? Now, as a matter of fact, for
Evangelical Christians, that saying of Luther, which is true to
Scripture and experience, is beyond debate — a Christian man is
ever growing, not a finished product. There is no such thing
as a sudden conversion, as if by magical transformation. It is
precisely the work of Christian ethics to portray this growth ;
it is a carrying out, rightly understood, of the first Reformation
thesis, that a Christian's life is a daily repentance ; for we do
not give the term repentence its Evangelical meaning if we are
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 197
not permitted to call it conversion. Repentance is a change of
mind (a fxeravoia : Mark i. 15). But in that statement of
Luther's it is the conversion of the Christian that is spoken of.
Is there no such thing as conversion to Christianity ? and that
in the midst of Christian influences ? Is it a mere methodistical
exagijeration if we take conversion at a definite time as a
complete turning to the Christian Good, and even assume that
there is a fixed point of transition from the old to the new life ?
In that case are we not supposing that the other term for
conversion, regeneration, is something scarcely intelligible ? Or
should the latter be regarded as merely a metaphor for some-
thing thought of as done completely and at once, which is
only actually done in a gradual development ? and the
metaphor is (say) used merely when the fact is to be looked
at from its divine side, because indeed God's doings can only
be thought of as complete, and independent of time. What this
problem means becomes especially plain by the subordinate
question, whether that sudden change, if we are to assume that
it is such, is, at any rate in its main features, an occurrence
similar in all cases ; and whether any consciousness of it is
present in the subject of it. This latter subordinate question
clearly illustrates what the main question implicates ; the former,
under what conditions it has any intelligible meaning at all.
However it is decided, it is important enough to deserve special
mention. For in this way it is most convincingly clear what, on
general or Evangelical principles, is to be understood by conver-
sion. Hence we purposely speak first of the commencement of the
new life of the Christian personality ; and then of the progress
of the new life, of its growth and increase ; of the development
of the Christian personality. That is, we examine whether this
distinction is justifiable. Here also terms are of little import-
ance— for instance, whether the development is to be called
sanctification, and the commencement renewal, or whether
possibly the term conversion should be reserved for this; although
we may be certain that the propriety of this latter limitation is
of itself a matter of serious doubt, because it almost necessarily
leads into a methodistical rut.
198 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
The Beginning of the New Life.
In the New Testament the first impression that we have
plainly is that, not only is the distinction between the old and
the new life strongly emphasised, but that it recognises a decisive
turning-point, a crisis which (in keeping with the then historical
conditions) coincides in the main with the transition out of
the old religion, whether it was Judaism or heathenism, into
the Christian Church. And fresh intelligence from the mission-
field serves as a constant reminder of such New Testament
accounts of the origins. For instance, there is a story of the
Buddhist youths who, in many respects already become
Christians, would not break with a particular sin, and for that
reason declined baptism, and then on account of this obstacle
at once gave up their disinclination. It is instructive, with
the help of a concordance of the Bible, to learn how numerous
are the fine distinctions of terms in various parts of the New
Testament writings, in the words of the Lord, of St Paul,
in the Acts of the Apostles, in the Apocalypse ; and still that
first impression is the general one. Throughout these passages
the question is of an important recommencement, a sheer
division, a revolution of the innermost nature, a change of
mind. Closer consideration modifies but does not destroy this
first impression. It modifies it, for change of mind, conversion,
is required of those who are already within the Church, and
have been perhaps for long time past, and so far as human
judgment goes are distinguished members of it. We may
think of the Epistles to the Churches of the Apocalypse. This
observation in its double aspect is corroborated by the fact
that other expressions besides change of mind and conversion
(neither of which is relatively employed so much as is some-
times assumed) are used in a quite similar way both of a
decisive turning-point and of a repeated ' turning again "" to
the truly ' Good.' The concordance will supply the proofs, in
the use of such words as * sanctify,' ' renew,' ' enlighten,' * rising
again,' 'putting on Christ.' In short, the great question of
which we are seeking an answer is, by the New Testament
itself, set in a clear light, and, reserving all special exceptions, we
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 199
may at once say, set forth in such a way that to ignore the idea
of a sudden change and fresh start in the strict sense, and such
as actually completes itself at a given time, is maiming New
Testament teaching, just as much as is the assertion that it is
concerned with this simply and entirely.
We must similarly conclude in relation to that special side
of our question which asks whether this new beginning is, in the
main, alike in its character in all instances. Now, on this point
the contrary proposition is maintained, because it is said that
the New Testament emphasises the utmost conceivable variety
of process, especially in its individual biographical notices.
What differences between the 'conversion' of a St Paul, of
St Peter, of St John ! This is also shown by the different
expressions employed — 'enlighten,' 'sanctify,' 'awaken' — which
do not mean stereotyped stages of a ' plan of salvation,' but
describe the same thing in different aspects. Similarly, a stress
is laid, which is exceedingly remarkable, on the different circum-
stances in which the spiritual forces which are operative in
conversion are displayed. For instance, we may recollect that
in the same book, the Acts of the Apostles, the Samaritans
are baptised before they receive the Holy Ghost, while Cornelius
receives the Holy Ghost before he has been baptised. And
yet, in spite of this, there is at the bottom a spiritual similarity
in the main point. " Old things are passed away " ; " If any
man is in Christ Jesus he is a new creature." And all who are
in possession of this new life are represented as having a clear
consciousness of it. ' You know,' ' we know ' are expressions
used again and again. Here too in all degrees and forms of
clearness.
But, now, have these expressions any application to us, in
our circumstances so variously different from those of the com-
mencement of Christianity ? If the new life in the Christian
society is formed in those who have already been baptised as
children, and have from that time been under the incalculable
influences of Christian education, — can this new life be regarded
as new in the same degree and sense as in the case of a
missionary convert.'* Can it be even in its main features
regarded as similar in character.'' And must such change
200 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
always be considered to be a conscious one ? Does not the
sul)ject itself rather suggest that we should avoid all questions
of this kind, and confine ourselves to the simple illustration of
gradual growth ?
We do get some light by the recollection of the old
Protestant theologians'* term, the so-called 'plan of salvation.'
Even in the Shorter Catechism of Luther the words 'call,'
'enlighten,' 'sanctify' are not taken to mean distinct and
definitely bounded stages in the development of the new life.
But this was soon done. The usual order, that presently
obtained, was calling, enlightenment, regeneration, faith,
justification, mystical union, renewal, sanctification, perfection.
Against this various objections are possible : as that they
unite points of view really distinct ; do not sharply define the
separate notions for themselves, nor show clearly their mutual
relation. Here we are simply concerned with the question, so
far as it is relative to our point, whether the commencement
of the new life either can or ought to be separated from its
progress. And then we are compelled to note that the greater
the attention paid to infant baptism, the more importance was
attached to it, and the more it was looked upon as regeneration,
the less inclination was there to answer the question by looking
at actual life ; or if that was done, there easily arose opposition
to this teaching on infant baptism. Accordingly, in that
doctrine of the plan of salvation, in general, too great a
uniformity was insisted on compared with the wealth of life's
experiences, and yet too little similarity in the main thing.
On the one hand there was a danger of setting up a stereotyped
pattern. On the other hand the importance of faith was
lessened. It is not made plain enough that faith is ' the one
and all' when faith and justification are reckoned as separate
facts, or as stations in a journey. And then of necessity
there could be no secure assurance of the presence of the
new life, a difficulty to which pietism is never wearied of
drawing attention, without being able to give a satisfactory
solution of it.
It was therefore an advance when Schleiermacher simplified the
doctrine of salvation, and only distinguished commencement and
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 201
continuation. If he called the latter sanctification, we must of
course recollect that this is a limited use of a word which is
taken in a wider sense in the Holy Scriptures, and in the formu-
laries of faith in a different sense as the equivalent of renewal,
the implantation of the Holy Spirit. But this simplification
opened the way for a question, Can we speak of ' conversion ' in
the case of a Christian born into the Church ? This simplifica-
tion also averted the danger of laying down the same course
which all must follow, however different their personalities.
Led by such historical reminiscences, we can now show the appli-
cability of the above-mentioned Principles of the New Testament.
To this we are moved by observing that the idea of conversion,
although it is certainly one of the most frequent conscious or
unconscious reasons for the aversion to Christian morality, is yet
one that appears to be prevalent in the highest forms of ethics.
That the higher personal life is relatively to the natural life
something really new, and consequently not something that
proceeds in the way of gradual evolution from what is natural,
but by a new commencement, transformation, breaks with the
past, is witnessed in the most varied languages by the religious
mysteries, proverbs of the wise, creations of poets. The newest
literary works speak of a resurrection, awakening from the dead,
in their titles. These are old terms familiar to the Christian.
Nay, when St Paul employed them he could calculate on being
understood in the Greek-Roman world, in which the noblest men
of genius had anticipatively summed up their wisdom in such
terms. Nor since then has the message remained dumb. * Lose
all, find all," ' Die and thou livest,' ' Venture nothing, win nothing. ""
And it is always an evidence of the earnestness of moral require-
ment, and a proof that it summons to new conquest, when the
watch- words ' regeneration,' ' conversion ' ring out clearly. It is
in Christian ethics, however, that this tone is the fullest and
clearest. What would Christianity be without this new begin-
ning ? We have above reflected on the call to change of mind
(or ' repentance,' jULeTavoia) with which Jesus Christ begins His
preaching, and that the letters to the seven churches of the
Apocalypse contain the same truth ; and how St Paul speaks of
the ' new creature,' and St John of the ' birth from above.'
20a THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN IJFE
And these are not bold metaphors, but experiences, when it is
said, * I live, no longer I,' and * Old things are passed away/
But it is just here that in Christian ethics the question
becomes a burning one, whether these are genuine experiences,
and such experiences as are with good reason continually new ;
whether such exalted language has any relation to plain reality ;
whether they are not condemned as falsities by the undeniable
facts that, apart entirely from conversion, good is found, and in
spite of it much evil exists. And all the more when the self-
same men who uttered these enthusiastic confessions also with
no less plainness said with regard to the converted, " If we
say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves" (1 St John i.);
" not as if I had already attained." Conversely we read, apart
from the new life, of the recognition of a seeking for ' glory,
immortality "■ (Rom. ii.), of the noble and the good which comes
from God; and in St John (iii.) of a 'being in the truth' and
a ' coming to the light.' It is easy to compose this irreconcil-
able (as would seem) contradiction by a curtailment of one or
the other truth, and in the history of Christian ethics this has
been attempted in one direction or another. Methodism sees
previously to conversion nothing but darkness, and after con-
version nothing but light, and no real sin afterwards.^ Ordinary
rationalism sees in the word conversion or regeneration only an
unsuitably conceived expression for the really purely gradual
development of the ' Good." The New Testament and the great
witnesses of Christian morality give another solution. Life now
exists under a new rule. The change is not a quantitative one,
it does not concern the whole compass of the moral life in like
proportion and in a like way, but it is qualitative. It is the
spiritual turning of the soul towards a new and unsurpassable
End according to really new rules, from a new and unique reason,
which is at the same time its only sufficient motive power. The
inner inclination of the soul is different ; the heart, the deepest
disposition of the soul, is renewed. The Christian ' Good,"*
however similar it may be to the non-Christian, is in all these
respects of another and a higher quality ; and the same thing is
' This expression is stroi^er than the authoritative doctrine of Methodist bodies
warrants. — Tr.
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 203
true of the evil existent ; that too is now different. There is
now a personality who truly desires the ' Good/ and that the
highest conceivable ' Good,' with which he is fundamentally one,
and by which he is ruled — the * new man."* But also this new
man is not at the first commencement a complete man. He has
the incentive and motive power essential to growth, but he must
grow even from the very first. The new spiritual bias can only
gradually spread its influence over all the departments of its
subjective and objective life, and this bias becomes the more
firmly fixed by this means. Those who are dead to sin are
under obligation to destroy individual sinful impulses ; the new
personal spiritual life governs the body and its members (Rom.
vi. 1, c/! vi. 12 ; Col. iii. 3, cf. with iii. 5). And the more pro-
foundly the changed person recognises his sinfulness, the more
every advance in good is an advance in the knowledge of that
sinfulness, the more matured becomes his conviction that to live
the new life is a matter of daily endeavour, and only proves its
reality in combat with ' the old man '' ; and there is " a daily
solution of the great riddle which every man is to himself ■"
(Otinger). (This thought is all the more acceptable as it is in
the final ground only an application of what has been previously
adduced and said concerning faith as incentive and motive power
to the new life.)
It is in this way, because conversion is of this nature, that a
double error is overcome : the one that the moral life falls into
two disconnected portions ; the new life takes the place of the
old in a magical sort of way ; the other that, generally speaking,
there is in reality nothing new in it. Man in conversion does
not become externally another ; but his thinking, willing, and
feeling gain a new content, and what is more, just that con-
tent after which all those impulses that were good in him
blindly strove. What he loses is not his true self, but the
perversion of that self. This loss is therefore his gain. His
turning away from sin and his turning again are a return to
his home. For the Christian Good is, as we saw, adoption into
the Kingdom of God and man's true destiny. In Christ man
is complete. For the same reason both retrospectively and
prospectively the unity of the life and of its consciousness is
204 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
preserved, and yet there is a new element present. The material
which the renewed will has to fashion in conformity with the
destiny now recognised is precisely the same as that which the
unconverted person had given him, the inner world of his own
* ego,"' and the world external to him. By patient labour it is
his task to smelt this stubborn material in the fire of the new
love, enkindled by God's love, and to refashion it for the service
of the Kingdom of God. How inexhaustible this task is, is
uttered in the humorous saying : " Man must first turn
Christian, and then the Christian turn man.''
The clearer this Evangelical notion of conversion becomes,
the clearer is it that our question as to whether a distinction
is to be made between the commencement and continuation of
the spiritual life is to be answered in the affirmative. That
spiritual inclination to the Christian good is either present or
not present ; the man is either converted or not converted.
That is the more undeniable, the more frankly — as we just
attempted to show — all exaggeration is avoided. It is on
account of exaggeration that there is yet so much mistrust of
that truth. Therefore it is necessary to explain the matter
still more carefully, and that may be done the most simply by
closer examination of the two subordinate questions which have
repeatedly engaged our attention (p. 199). Is it possible,
and are we obliged in spite of all the immense differences of
individuals, to regard conversion as something essentially the
same in all cases ? And is it so, and ought it to be so, that
somehow there is always a consciousness of it present ?
These, once more, are points in the illustration of what
Christian ethics is, on which it must be repeatedly said — How
poor all formulas are in comparison with the riches of life's
experiences ! With this reservation we may note the following
distinctions. The influences brought to bear upon the penitent
soul are indeed infinitely various both in respect of those that
are general in position, circumstances, persons, and those that
are specially connected with the Church. Similarly various
is the treatment of these influences by the individual. He can
allow or disallow, and this again in all forms and degrees of
insistence. Acceptance or rejection may have more the form
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 205
of an almost automatic act, or of conscious will ; may be
indifference to the Good, or kindly acquiescence, enmity to
or enthusiasm for the Good. We may reflect how manifold
the circumstances may be. Hence it is that " one is bent, the
other broken.'*'' " Nail and screw get their due,'*'' but in what a
different way ! And good and evil alike form an articulated
world. How do we stand to God, to our neighbour, to our own
and to external nature .'' As certainly as that Good is finally a
unity, and finds its point of unity in a right relation to God,
so certainly is it true that one needs to be converted more from
an unloving mind ; another from alienation from God ; a third
from dissoluteness ; and a fourth from worldliness. One is
more impressed by need, and another more by the feeling of
sinfulness. So in one case conversion is more the decisive
* Yea ■* to the promise of pardoning grace ; and in another,
more the creative energy of the will of God in the soul. Now,
if examples are searched for from past history, and collected
from the small circle of personally assured observation which
may, at least for some special cases, seem to bring some items
of the fulness of this series of possibilities under a common law,
then from such examples the question is asked whether in any
one of these cases those who are concerned have themselves
denied the necessity and reality of a conversion in the sense
above given, or, if the question could just be put, would deny it.
St Augustine, Luther, Bengel, Schleiermacher are examples.
In our present-day life the ' saved '' of the Salvation Army
in our great capitals ; normal developments in the bosom of
Christian families — all these, in most important respects, may
be great contrasts, but in the point decisive for our present
purpose they agree. All needed the foundation of conversion
(in the previously determined meaning of the word), and this
is, in spite of the enormous differences, similar in the deepest
ground, exactly in the way the New Testament suggests. And
here it is especially important, as far as regards Church
influences, not to attach either too much or too little value
to them. Especially important is it to recognise that the
Methodist undervaluation and the High Church overestimate
of the importance of infant baptism are inaccurate. And in
206 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
reality this overestimate does not merely appear in a dogmatic
form ; it is possible to attach too much value to the incalculable
influences of the Church. If the question of conversion is
regarded as superfluous for one who is within the Church,
the earnestness of the Gospel demand is curtailed. It is
somewhat different if it is insisted on that the conversion is
not an intellectually cognisable process. In regard to individual
susceptibility to all good influences, the truth may be insisted
on that it is only when this personal susceptibility for the
spiritual mystery of the Gospel is real and present that
conversion takes place. This does not detract from a
recognition of the infinite variety of experiences, but it
preserves the definitely Christian sense of the word conversion.
Where there is merely a weak emotion and vague feeling of
wretchedness, there is no conversion of this type. Our God is,
as we ever repeat, the only Good God, the perfect Father.
And this brings us to that further point, whether there is
necessarily a consciousness of conversion present. Public
exhibitions of fanaticism and undignified obtrusiveness make
an impartial attitude to this question difficult. The importance
of the matter itself surely demands this impartiality and makes
it a possibility. Who wishes to contradict John Wesley, when
he says that eight o'clock in the morning of the 24th of May
1738 was very memorable, when he, engaged with Luther\s
preface to the Romans, was assured as never before of the reality
of his new life ? Yet we ourselves cannot regard this experience
as of such radical consequence for him as St Paul's vision of
Christ on the way to Damascus. And now let us once more
recall the plenitude of possibilities, as above mentioned, which
history and life exhibit as realities. But if we should from this
draw the conclusion that for this reason there is generally
speaking no consciousness of the new life, because this conscious-
ness is so different in every individual, and because within the
Christian Church the recollection of a decisive turning-point is
proportionately infrequent, then this would be a fallacy of the
most fatal kind, and recognisable as such, because logically it
would necessitate the denial of the assurance of salvation. We
may be possessed of a well-founded objection to all coercion in
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 207
this mysterious sanctuary of the inner life, to all excitement,
which changes into lassitude, and to the unworthy enslavement
of souls in which it thus celebrates its triumphs. We may feel
compelled to resist them with all spiritual weapons, which, in
this case particularly, means to combat ,them by means of a
theology which enters deeply into the great questions of the
spiritual life, and to expose the soul-endangering uncertainty of
a faith which is only faith in one's personal conversion, instead
of trust in the cross of Christ, and to warn against the too gi*eat
importance connected with this attached to personal experiences
and memories — where ? how ? when were you converted ? And
yet, nay it is precisely at this point we may ask whether there is
not a danger within the Christian Church of excluding the
question as to a real conversion from the sanctuary of one's own
personal life, and from any serious self-examination. But to
enter more deeply into the matter we need more facts to go upon.
All we would do is to put in the right light the high importance
of the idea of the commencement and continuation of the
Christian life. And it is obvious that the ideas thus discussed
are equally applicable to the following section.
It still requires notice, that an attempt has been made to coin
a special word to convey the idea of the preparatory movement
of a radical conversion, of a decisive change in relation to the
Good, and 'awakening' has been proposed. But the objection
to it is not merely that in the New Testament it is rather
impressively used of the turning-point itself, and in addition
that it first of all designates God's work, and on this account is
less suitable as an ethical term ; but also in the latest Church
histories it has been preferred as a term by those who show a
want of reserve in their judgment on the inner life of others,
and lack Gospel sobriety. They call others 'awakened' in
contradistinction to themselves, ' the converted,' and violate
Christian delicacy. For the less we would yield to a false fear
of the idea of a radical conversion, the more must we avoid all
appearance of abuse.
208 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
The Progress of the New Life, the Evolution of
Christian Personality.
Terms here too are of little importance. We may just as
well speak of daily repentance, or of progressive conversion, of
sanctification in distinction from radical renewal or regeneration
or conversion. Only it ought again to be remembered that
the word sanctification, as specially used among us, occurs in the
New Testament in another and partly more general sense (of
commencement and continuance alike) ; partly in a differently
defined sense (of a beginning strictly speaking), which is un-
doubtedly the usual one employed in our context.
The division of the present section is settled for us by the
main aspects under which we explained the nature of the
Christian Good. Man is a new man if he, assured by faith of
the love of God, strives from this deepest motive and deepest
motive power to act conformably to the supreme law, the highest
End, in all his doing. And this ' new man ' grows if he is
ever more and more guided by that supreme Norm in every
event — from this arises the doctrine of duty and calling. And
he grows if he is even more completely determined by that
deepest incentive, that unique motive power — from this arises
the doctrine of virtue and character {cf. p. 9). How and why
both these stand in inseparable and reciprocal connection will be
clear later on. But how Christian character works together
with faithful fulfilment of duty for the realisation of the highest
Good is on the one hand discussed in social ethics ; and on the
other hand that realisation on account of the marvellous nature
of this Good of this Kingdom of God, consists in the fulfilment
of duty and the practice of virtue. And the discussion of duty
and virtue will lead to the section on the fundamental basis of
Christian character (cf. in addition the note on the main
divisions of the subject (p. 124) ). It might still be questioned
whether a general explanation of the factors through which, and
the laws by which, the new life of the Christian personality is
developed could not precede the sections named. But the first
of these {i.e. the factors) would only be a repetition of that
adduced on the 'nature of the Christian Good,' and in part
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 209
that on ' the beginning of the new life,' without being by this
anticipation, and apart altogether from any special application
of it under the headings of ' Duty and Calling,' ' Virtue and
Character,' any more explicit than in the earlier passages. In
the same way the second question of the laws, if touched upon
here, would not get much beyond generalities. For instance,
if we spoke of a law of continuity or of unity or of degenera-
tion in reference to the Christian life, we might say something
just as indubitable as, without closer inspection (which is only
possible by means of those concepts), it is valueless. If, how-
ever, we should illustrate by natural analogues, then, because
we have not as yet defined those indispensable concepts, the
danger of obscurity is great. Hence such ingenious writings
as those of Drummond, Natural Law in the Spiritual Worlds
have not escaped this danger, however imperishably valuable
they may be as means of illustration.
Which is to be put first, ' Duty and Calling ' or ' Virtue and
Character ' ? The latter seems preferable, inasmuch as in this
way the development of Christian personality is at once
delineated ; the former, inasmuch as so the teaching of virtue
and character is without particularisation plainer ; but subject
to the objection that by giving it precedence the idea of law is
made of more importance than that of duty, as has already been
said in speaking of the commencement of the New Life.
Duty and Calling.
The various attempts briefly and compactly to say what duty
is, all amount to saying that duty is the application of the
moral law to the action of each person in his individual case.
• We speak of the duty of a Christian not to deny his Lord in
times of persecution ; of the duty of the Christian head of a
family to care for the proper welfare of its members in his own
special way according to their special need. But we do not
speak of a ' law ■" in reference to the pastoral office or of martyr-
dom. But duties flow from the supreme ' law ' of the Christian
Good, and find the more varied application according to con-
ditions, gifts, education of each person. Such an application
or individualising of the moral law does not in the least rob
210 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
the law of its absolute validity, or give up anything of its
all-comprehending breadth and unique grandeur, or by such
individualisation deprive it of its inspiring power. On the
contrary, it is thus that the imperative ' ought "■ becomes a
reality, in its binding and liberating energy, and in the in-
exhaustibility of its content. It is consequently precisely in
reference to the idea of duty that antinomianism comes in :
" I cannot bear that harsh, hateful word, duty, duty, duty " ; and
conversely so does legalism, in that sense of an inflexible feeling
of duty that is censurable. But all the master-truths of the
meaning of law gain their clearness from the notion of duty.
In the real world the highest End can only be realised by a
single will in a definite place at a definite moment, and only
in one definite respect (p. 147); therefore the action directed
to this end must be regulated in a quite definite way by
the moral law. How are the pretensions of the individual and
of society to be peacefully reconciled in any given action ?
(individual and social duty). Over what department of action
does it extend ? What moral quality is chiefly to be called
into requisition? For instance, courage or prudence,'' How
much moral power has he who is called to perform the action
at his disposal ? Or in other words, if the highest Good has been
rightly defined, then the motto for everyone at every moment
and in all circumstances is. Do what true love demands. But
what does it demand from me in my particular place ? That
is the question of duty.
In the main this is as good as saying that the answer to this
question can only be given by each one for himself. Otherwise
we must keep back all of what we could make our boast as to
the spiritual nature of the law and of the personal independence
of the Christian (p. 160). The judgment of duty is the judg-
ment of my conscience. It is not in vain that the usage of
language conjoins these two — duty and conscience. Again, it
is not as if the sternness of that ' ought,' or its content, was made
a matter of individual preference. The conscience, as we said
earlier, ought to be trained to continually greater sensitiveness
to fulfil the whole compass of the divine will. And it may
really be guilt, if I do not in an individual case recognise what
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 211
my duty properly is. But herewith the precisely decisive point
for the present content is recognised. What was said in the
general teaching on conscience (p. 64) — the variety of con-
science in the individual, as in whole social circles — here gains
greater clearness and an important application. For this reason
all attempts to enumerate duties, and so to lead to the know-
ledge of a particular duty in an individual case, are of no value —
for instance, that the general duty precedes the special, the
absolute the conditioned, the simple the complex. Also, iiTe-
spective of the fact that these notions are not all sufficiently
definite in themselves, in the stress of decision in actual life
they are scarcely of any use at all. Life unfortunately presents
cases that are mostly complex, so that the ' simple ' rule is felt
to be mere sarcasm. A decision available in all cases is
generally impossible, nay, a contradiction in itself, as soon as the
idea of duty is accurately conceived. What my duty is now
depends, on the one hand, on my whole development up to the
present time, on the ground of special endowment and provi-
dential guidance as well as on the way in which I have turned
them to account ; and, on the other hand, in the particular moral
work which is presented to me in the particular moral situation
in which I am placed. If we now call both these by the name
of duty, and not merely, as is often too superficially done, only
the last-named, then the only possible answer to the question
what is my duty runs — Do what thy calling demands of thee.
Or, moral duty is wholly and entirely the duty of my calling.
But that is only another word for the same thing which was
explained before — only each individual can finally settle the
judgment as to what his duty is.
Still, this idea of calling needs a close examination in the
first place, according to the aspect of it mentioned ; secondly,
according to that which calling means in the particular sphere of
the individuaFs work. The more we search into it, the clearer
will it become to us that that other side of the idea must likewise
receive its due attention provided the proposition, ' Our duty is
that which our calling prescribes,' is to be both true and useful.
The quiet influence of Christian ethical principles shows
itself with especial plainness in the widespread use and the great
212 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
honour of the word ' calling.' It means, put quite generally,
the regulated activity of the individual in the associations of
society — a point which will receive our attention in social
ethics. And besides, by vocation in the narrower sense is under-
stood our civic calling, that activity which makes up the
special life-task of each individual, and accordingly necessarily
settles his situation in social life. By ' calling ' in the wider sense
is understood a regulated activity in the different social circles
in which we have to move without detriment to our special
task. The merchant, the scholar is also a member of a family
and of society, a citizen, a member of a church. The special
calling of the wife is more one with her calling as a member of
a family than that of the husband, etc. But whenever the
word calling is used it is not merely an expression for something
actual, but also for something important. Even he who has
no calling, who can really be said to have none, takes pains to
ennoble his nothingness by the name of a calling. ' My calling
does not permit me,' ' demands it of me,' and the like modes of
speech are often excuses for moral sloth. For the word sounds
well, we feel a reverence and joy in its use. Only in our
calling do we do something right and become something right.
Glorious gifts, assiduous diligence, are profitless for ourselves
and for others without the firm grasp on the idea of a calling.
Why is that so.? and why is it that it has such singular
importance in Christian ethics ?
Calling in the New Testament is the 'effectual calling' of
us by God into the Kingdom. But now, as this, the highest
End of all Christian moral action, is, as we saw, an articulated
whole of single ends, and each single End in this whole
must realise a part of that whole, so the New Testament itself
paves the way for the easily intelligible usage of speech,
according to which the earthly sphere of our activity — in which
God's calling into His Kingdom meets us — is, because we take
that earthly calling in earnest for the purposes of the spiritual
kingdom, designated our ' calling.' St Paul says (1 Cor. vii. J20),
" Let each remain in the calling wherewith he is called," and
although it is certain that the word here means our heavenly
calling, yet Luther's translation hits off its significance, " in the
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 213
state of life in which he is called." This sublime idea we may
put into the formula, " Without an earthly calling there is no
heavenly calling, and without a heavenly calling there is no
earthly calling." That is, so far, whoever does not love God
and his neighbour in a wholly definite situation in actual life,
in regular labour, does not do this at all ; and so he does
nothing that is really Good and is not a really good man, a
Christian character. He therefore misses also his calling in
relation to the Kingdom of God, his heavenly calling. *' A shoe-
maker, a smith, a labourer — each one has his trade, work, and
office, and yet all are at the same time considered ' kings and
priests,'' and each one ought to be useful and serviceable in his
office and work to others." " A poor servant-maid has joy in
her heart and can sing, ' I cook, I make the beds, I sweep the
house. Who has bidden me? My master and my mistress
have bidden me. But who has given them such authority over
me .? God has done this. Ah, then so it must be true that
I do not only serve them but God in heaven. How then can
I be more blest? It is just the very same as if I were cooking
for God Himself in heaven ' " (Luther). How many an attempt
is made to devote oneself wholly to the heavenly calling in
vain, for ourselves and for others, because we desire to realise
it as our earthly vocation only, and so deceive ourselves. But
also, conversely, without the heavenly calling there is no earthly
vocation in the deepest sense of being a co-worker together
with God and a real member of His Kingdom. Certainly it is
only with respect that we think of all those who without this
sunlight do yet fulfil their perhaps hard, poor, workaday
vocation in never-wearying faithfulness. But the deepest
reason for such faithfulness in our vocation is still trust in the
great One who called us, who also esteems even the least of His
servants. If we were to succeed in extirpating this root from
all hearts, there would no longer be such a thing as a vocation
even in business. We return with all this to what has been
said earlier, that the highest Good both transcends us and is
immanent in us, and that it gives to the individual as to the
community the right of forming part of the ordered whole of
'Ends 'and 'Goods.'
214 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
Still clearer do these two principles become if we consider
whether they are applicable to our earthly vocation. Without
doubt one vocation is, in and for itself, more nearly related
to the whole of all the Ends comprehended under the highest
End which looks to the whole of the moral world than
another; and so, rightly conceived, one earthly calling nearer
than another to the heavenly. And it is possible to think out
a long series of stages between the highest calling, the vocation
of Jesus Christ, in which heaven and earth embrace, down to
the very lowest. If such a system were outlined we should have
— if the full notion of the Kingdom of God is to have its due —
to place on the one hand those types of calling which are
concerned with human intercourse, and their advancement in
the highest End above and over those which aim at the
conquest of nature : for instance, the vocation of deacons and
deaconesses above that of the mere scholar. On the other hand
we should have to recognise fully — since God is love and the
type of all truth and beauty — the value which a vocation with
these aims possesses even though it is not the highest. We
rightly feel gratitude to a Newton or Kepler for discovering the
'laws of motion,'' and a Haydn and a Palestrina for their
melodies ; Livingstone for his discovery of the Dark Continent ;
the merchant for his gain ; the statesman for his victory ; and
all may believe that the work of their earthly calling serves the
Kingdom of God — work which is the fulfilment of 'all good
desires. "■ But two important considerations essentially limit
the practical importance of the statement which we have made,
that one earthly vocation is, in and for itself, more nearly
related to the heavenly than another. One of these is suggested
by poetry, which sings of freedom and of the burden of every
position in life ; and popular language has drawn attention in
laconic terms to the special honour and the danger of various
vocations, such as the phrases ' painstaking erudition,' ' learned
arrogance,' 'learned obstinacy,' 'artistic happiness,' 'artistic
humour,' ' artist's frivolity,' ' peasant faithfulness,' but also
' peasant stupidity.' The principle of our modern commercial
life that ' time is money ' has also its meaning for eternity, and
the main terms in the vocabulary of the merchant, 'profit,'
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 215
'credit,' remind us, in spite of all misuse, of the deepest
foundation of all social life, trust, and enduring gain. But
further, it is plainly undeniable that many a specially high
vocation has more dangers for some persons who occupy
them than for other individuals. St Paul pleads for the * less
honourable ■* members of the body (1 Cor. xii. 12 ff.), and
()tinger meditates on the women who there in the villages
' wash their children, nurse and tend them,' and expresses the
wish that he may gain as high a place as they hereafter. That
serves to remind us in particular of the important truth that
no one may in his civic calling sacrifice, or as scholar or official
neglect, his family. So then — and that is the main point — the
deciding judgment of God only asks finally for the faithfulness
(St Matt. XXV. 32) with which each has fulfilled his calling,
whether insignificant or important. And according to this God
sets him over much or little in the completed Kingdom of God,
and entrusts him with his calling therein. Some presentiment
of this eternally binding standard of judgment finds a place
amid this world of earthly illusions in the quiet reverence which
faithful men and women, fathers, mothers, teachers, friends,
colleagues, gain from others, whether their external stations are
high or low, and gain all the more because they do not seek it.
This Christian idea of vocation can by its own power over-
come the hardest foes which stand in antagonism to the claim
of its universal applicability. We may briefly indicate our
meaning by reference to such phrases as ' the choice of a
vocation,' ' the man without any calling.' Provided it is God
who calls us, then personal choice of a vocation can only consist
in each of us learning to listen for the call of God in our
natural bent and God's leading. This inner conviction is often
rendered harder to follow by the misconceptions or vanity of
parents. It is rendered more difficult still by the fact that only
a minority is favoured by outward circumstances in the actual
choice of a calling as indicated to them by the special gift they
possess. And herewith emerges the host of difficulties which
in present-day commercial life are antagonistic to the carrying
out of the Christian idea of vocation. Are not innumerable
persons in truth without a calling because it does not appear
216 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
that the work, the business which alone presents itself to them,
can be called a vocation in the sense defined ? Is it a vocation
to be constantly mechanically attending to a piece of modem
machinery, and spend a whole life at that ? If we reply, that
is not the only vocation of such an employee, that he goes from
the manufactory into his family, then the accusation is brought
forward that this too is offered up on the altar of the modem
Moloch. And it is not merely in this particular sphere that
we are unable properly to speak of a vocation, for there are
besides wide social circles of those who are bound fast in the
service of sin in manufactures, trades, politics. Such questions
lead us deep into social ethics, and we shall there meet with
them again. Here the answer may be given that, so far as
such accusations are justified, they form an urgent call to those
who are more favourably placed, to those who have a vocation
in the proper sense, to make it a part of their duty to help
the down-trodden and endangered to a truer vocation. The
so-called 'lucky' persons are often without vocation. It is
their duty to make a vocation for themselves by loving service
performed, not as a new form of pastime, but with real energy
and perseverance. If all society acted on such principles, so as
to render it possible for those who wish for it to find a vocation,
then only those disabled by affliction could be considered to
be without a calling. But we know that even from beds of
affliction streams of blessing go forth, such as glorify even
suffering itself.
Now, after having brought home to ourselves the notion of
what vocation means, there is no more proof needed of the
above statement that our duty is that which our calling
prescribes, and that this proposition gives a surer guidance for
daily resolves than those artificial precepts, 'Absolute duty
comes before that which is conditional,' and the like. In fact, if
we realise in each case what our vocation demands, there is
withal a far-reaching assurance afforded us that we shall do the
right thing and be continually preserved from useless trifling.
But of course no absolute security. For this calling, as we saw,
is no simple whole. For instance, what is the boundary-line
between the claims of civic and of family life in an individual
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 217
rase ? Still more striking is the fact that even in like circum-
stances of a vocation he who is called upon to act has his own
special character and personality. The Christian too, as we
may note, if we recall the teaching of conversion as above given.
If, then, the proposition that duty is that which our calling
demands of us is to be correct, then we must use the word
' calling ' in a still wider sense than we have so far understood it,
and in that most comprehensive way on which stress was laid
at the beginning (p. 212). Hence even those who most
reverence vocation — understanding the word in the sense
usually given — are wont to insist on the conclusion that there
are cases in which the duty of love goes beyond the sphere of
our calling, and there it scarcely has a clear boundary-line. I
ought then to ask which of such actions as are possible to me
are of the deepest and widest concern ; which it is that lies next
to me and is most pressing at the moment? But then it is
clear that the proposition that ' duty is that which our calling
demands from us *■ is more a convenient formula, a practical and
not altogether unfruitful abbreviation, and not properly speaking
fresh Icnowledge. It is also clear that we are brought back to
our starting-point, that what duty is can only be settled by the
personal conscience dependent on its idiosyncrasy and the circum-
stances in which each is placed at the moment of resolve. In
both each perceives and honours the call of God to do God''s
will at each moment, and to advance Ihe coming of His King-
dom ; in both, too, he sees his vocation and the judgment what
his duty is rests upon reason. It is because the judgment
is a personal one that the Holy Scriptures demand that it
should be 'proved'' (Rom. xii. 2) what God''s will is in a
particular case. Even all the directions of the most dis-
tinguished Christians how the will of God may best be done
— such as Spener"'s Reflections or the modern Queries on
Conduct (Funke) — can only be aids to learning how to prove it
for oneself. Such independence, felt in conflict to be necessary,
is still recognised in deep experience as the highest honour and
happiness. But herewith we are come to the limits of the
notion of duty, and perceive how closely it is connected with
that of virtue and character.
218 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
If we now ask — still keeping to the question of duty —
what then is the content of duty, there is no further explan-
ation needed. All duty, Christianly defined, is the duty
of love, as certainly as that the highest command is the
love of God and of our neighbour. What that means has
partially been already explained, and partially will be further
explained in individual and social ethics. Only one point
stands in need of special attention, and that is the so-called
legal duty in contradistinction to the duty of love. This legal
duty is so to be understood as to imply a concern for the
rights of others and the guarding of one''s own. Is thei-e
any place in Christian ethics for this notion of legal duty ?
Have we not just declared that all duty, Christianly defined,
is the duty of love.'' The distinction lies in the earlier
definition (p. 21 6) of the relation between love and ' law.'
These distinctions will appear fully justified precisely when
applied to difficult situations in actual individual life. This is
emphatically true of to-day. For we do not need to select
examples from the past of that depreciation and rejection of
legal duty, particularly the duty of preserving our own rights.
In our midst at the present time Tolstoy combats the idea
with an enthusiasm and devotion comparable to those of the
great protagonist of the past, St Francis of Assisi. From
childhood— he relates of himself — he had been instructed to
respect those arrangements which by the use of force protected
him from the bad man, taught him to defend himself against
the wrong-doer, and to revenge injury by force. " Everything
belonging to me — my peace, the safety of my person, my property
— all rested on the law, ' a tooth for a tooth.' But Christ says,
' Resist not evil.' I understand that He means just what He
says. Obedience to this unrespected command of Christ would
regenerate the world. If men would only cease altogether from
insisting on their rights ! " Thus the literal understanding of
the Sermon on the Mount (St Matt. v. 21-28) has the effect on
Tolstoy of a new commandment. He sums it up in five precepts,
but that which is here relevant is the fourth and certainly the
master-law. And we apprehend that he has found innumer-
able admirers. Legal right formulated by modern society
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 219
down to the finest ramifications, but in the absence of love
grown to be thousandfold wrongs, has awakened a yearning for
a love to which ' rights ' appear worthless, and even as the
occasion of our misery. Let us leave out any judgment how
far the enthusiasm for Tolstoy is followed by obedience to his
teaching, or merely a new form of flabby pleasure-seeking, which
seeks a brief gratification of a taste for the sensational. Let us
simply examine what amount of truth there is in that battle
against ' rights.' To begin with, we are unable to acknowledge
its method of Scripture interpretation (p. 119). It is false in
method so long as its exponents have not the courage to apply
it to all similar words of the Sermon on the Mount — as, for
instance, to take St Matt. v. 25 literally, or even St Matt. xix.
12, which Tolstoy himself unhesitatingly twists into another
meaning. It is besides condemned by the actual conduct of
Jesus Christ, who did not, according to the narrative (St John
xviii. 22), offer His other cheek to the smiter, but really did
fulfil it in the probable meaning of His saying, " Resist not evil "
(St Matt. V. 38), because He did what is more difficult, meekly
maintained His rights, and by this means moved the soul of the
offender in love ; whereas the literal compliance would in truth
have been a loveless act. In general, the whole attitude of
Jesus Christ gives the impression of one who valued his rights
in an honourable way unless he renounced them for the sake of
love. In the same way St Paul, although he was ready for any
sacrifice (2 Cor. vi. 3 ff".), still claims his civic right (Acts xvi.
37, xxii. 25). Irrespective of Scripture proof, if it were not
existent, renunciation of rights, understood as a general
command, is condemned by the experiences of history. The very
opposite of the end aimed at has occasionally been reached by
such attempts. But let us rather reflect on the profound
reason why it cannot be otherwise. The question of legal
right is most easily understood from considering the most uni-
versal statements of the relation between love and legal right,
and after such consideration it is impossible that the real value
of such opinions as that of Tolstoy should remain concealed.
If the legal right is indispensable as a presupposition, but
only as a presupposition, of love, we immediately see the reason
220 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
and meaning of the validity of legal right, as well as the
extent of that validity in relation to love. The latter law of
love says that all such duties ought to be fulfilled only for the
sake of love, really and truly for its sake. And in the Christian
meaning it can only be fulfilled when it issues from this fountain,
and where there is true love it will be fulfilled in conformity
with this conception. Or it may be put in this way : the
fulfilment of merely legal requirements, or legality, without
morality is not Christianity, and just as little is morality
without legality. Immature love at one time seeks its freedom
in the depreciation of prescribed right, and at another time its
bounden duty in making too much of its importance. But it
is only when we carefully note the extent of the applicability
that this truth becomes unmistakable. The purport of the
principle here is : — Legal duty is to be absolutely fulfilled
except where the agent, in the judgment of his conscience,
regards it as imperative that he — this particular man, in these
actually existing circumstances, at this present time — can only
fulfil his duty of love (that which the law of love now demands
from him) by setting aside just right, whether it be by re-
nunciation of his own right or the infringement of another's.
In these exceptional cases he must recognise the universal claim
of law as in general representative of the claims of love by taking
on himself the consequences of setting aside law when he
infringes the rights of others or renounces his own, i.e. be
prepared to suffer as a martyr. This principle may be carried
through in all cases, and this alone corresponds to the right use
of the much-misapplied word, martyr, as (Acts iv. 19) is said,
" We must obey God rather than man." Ecclesiastical law does
not perhaps come before the law of the state ; but the supreme
law of the Kingdom of God, the precept of love, stands above
state law or ecclesiastical law, in such way, nevertheless, that
he who contravenes the law does homage to the moral majesty
which belongs to it by taking upon himself (if needs be)
punishment or loss of his rights. If this consideration, on the
one hand, is anticipating what we have to say on the doctrine
of Christian ethics as applied to the state, it is still to be
emphasised in the present context that the principle thus
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 221
adduced is as such valid equally in the respect due to the rights
of others as to the preservation of our own. Of course, the
setting aside of our own rights in order to fulfil the law of love
is much more frequently a duty than the invasion of the rights
of others. Our natural selfishness waxes only too zealous in
reference to our own rights ; while our judgment, corrupted by
selfishness, all too easily palliates our attack on others' rights,
and covers it with the mantle of pretended good intention.
There is scarcely anything that injures the Gospel so deeply as
the want of rectitude in its representatives. Conversely, the
impression produced by patiently suffering wrongfully when it is
the result of pure lovingkindness is overwhelming. And that is
the reason why admonitions like that of Tolstoy can scarcely be
valued too highly. They are a powerful call to repentance to
Christendom, not to bury the absoluteness of our duty of love,
which Jesus Christ inculcates in sayings which make so great an
impression because they invite contradiction, under elaborated
statements on the importance of legal rights. Notwithstanding
this, all that such prophets would put in the place of the Gospel
view of this great problem is false ; and even in the individual
resolves of actual life, the honest use of the principle thus
adduced will carry us further than an uncertain depreciation of
rights for the sake of so uncertain and precarious an exercise of
love. Circumstances noticeable in family life and in Christian
social circles afford easy examples to everyone. When these are
weighed there will be little inclination to maintain the explana-
tion fashionable at this time, that Jesus wished to see His
sayings literally fulfilled in the brotherhood of His true disciples ;
or to agree with the pretensions of a Protestant monasticism
which, by the renunciation of all rights, thinks to make a
profound impression on a selfish world.
/* the Christian subject to the Law ?
It still remains to be mentioned that in this explanation of the
notion of duty, and after having considered the doctrine of con-
version, we have now a thoroughly plain answer to the question,
only earlier referred to cursorily, whether the Christian is subject
to the law, and if so, to what eootent ? In opposition to Roman
222 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
Catholic legalism as well as to fanatical licence, and having in
mind many practical difficulties in the way of making this Protest-
ant reformed view intelligible to the ordinary man, the Formula
of Agreement (Art. 6) decided that the Christian is spiritually
free from curse and compulsion of the law, while it is certain
that he and he only lives in the law of God ; but that he,
inasmuch as he still has to do battle with the 'old man,' is
under the law in respect of its sanctions and judgment. TTiis
last power of the law they called its ' third use ' (in contra-
distinction to the legal meaning of the term), i.e. its usage in
jurisprudence, according to which it means the preservation of
discipline and order against disorderly and unruly people, and
from its use as a ' schoolmaster to lead us to Christ,** in which
it means its purpose is to lead men to the knowledge of their
sinfulness and to seek for grace. The aim of this statement is
no doubt right. It requires to be insisted upon earnestly that
the Christian has to fight with sin in the meaning of the
words (Gal. v. 16), " Walk in the Spirit, and ye shall not fulfil
the lusts of the flesh."" But the method of expressing it is
wrong. Both too much and too little is ascribed to the law in
relation to the Christian. Too much, for the regenerate man is
not even so far as the ' old man ' is concerned ' under the law '
so much as the unregenerate, because the battle of the former
is one of the 'fruits of the spirit." Too little, for even the
regenerate man does not pursue an even path like ' the stars in
their courses ' ; but, if it is true that ' to be a man is to be in
conflict,' so is it doubly true 'to be a Christian is to be in
conflict ' (2 Tim. iv. 4 ff.), after the example of the 'leader and
finisher,' Jesus Christ (Heb. xii. 1). Or, to regard the same
matter under another point of view, by this distinction the
unity of the new life is endangered ; and the reason of this is
that the character of conversion, as strictly a personal rather
than a natural act, does not hereby obtain its due and unequi-
vocal recognition. But we must, above all, bear in mind, in
order to rightly understand the notion of duty, all that has
been already said about the law, and especially its significance in
Protestant Christian ethics (p. 158). Legalists and antinomians
advance their objections to this closely defined notion of duty.
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 223
Coiiflict of Duties.
The Protestant Christian idea of duty is made clearer by the
discussion of three separate questions which, if we look back,
that is, on their long and complicated history, may be designated
master-questions in the doctrine of duty. But in the same way
as what has so far been said illustrates these points, so herein
lies also the answer to these questions. It is remarkable that
neither the one nor the other has invariably received recognition,
and accordingly in dealing with them the three connected and
relevant questions have not been treated connectedly. Their
purport is, Can contrary actions be for the Christian at one
and the same time a duty ? This is the debatable point of
collision or conflict of duties. Further, Can the Christian do
more than his duty ? This is the moot point of works of
supererogation or 'counsels of perfection' in lieu of precise
commandments. Finally, Are there for the Christian man
moral actions which do not properly fall in the category of
duties ? — that is, the moot question of actions that are in-
different, the so-called ' adiaphora,' actions neither bidden
or forbidden, but allowed. All three questions are (with
Schleiermacher) to be answered with an absolute negative
if what has been said of duty is correct. But a proof of this
is essential, because these important points have not always
been considered in their natural context ; besides that, many
of them have been mixed up with other difficult notions, the
discussion of which is still of value in ethics.
When the collision of duties is really a question of a struggle
between duty and inclination, there is no need to discuss the
point at all. The term is in that case merely a fig-leaf to
cover moral indolence. People set before themselves or others
two courses of action between which they must decide, as if
they were duties, in order to disguise the fact that they are
slaves to their inclination at the expense of real duty. For
instance, suppose I in sooth decide between my much too great
inclination to good-fellowship and my duty to my family in
favour of the latter, but my decision for the latter is affected
by my desire to adorn my civic calling. The time-honoured
224 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
examples of the Schools (really worthy of discussion) of so-
called collision of duties are generally such as partly refer to
a supposed conflict between the duty of self-preservation and
our duty to our neighbour (individual and social duty) ; and
in part between two duties of love to our neighbour (say,
for instance, kindly treatment of him, or apparent severity
in order to train him, mostly cases of conflict between love
and truth) ; partly between love of our neighbour and love to
God. If we assume that here there is really a conflict of duties,
we must of course seek for rules which may make the matter
plain by setting up an orderly series of such rules. These rules
are partly formulae. For instance, prefer the negative duty
to the positive, the general before the particular, the categorical
to the hypothetical ; and if there is some act whose moral
justification is dubious, do nothing if you are in a state of
doubt. It is instructive to examine examples of all sorts.
Then we gain the impression that all these rules, except perhaps
the last, are worthless. And indeed because other moralists
take the first in the exactly reversed way, and with better reason.
Of their unsatisfactory character we were compelled to express
our conviction at the beginning of the section concerning
' duty."* They do not set forth any clear idea of duty, such as
that duty is always law individually applied ; and for that
reason these rules on closer consideration must be for the
most part reversed. It is no better with the attempts made
to draw up an appropriate list of duties in order of importance,
such as : Prefer the religious duty before duty to self, duty to
self before duty to our neighbour ! Why not duty to our
neighbour before duty to ourself.? And is there merely an
alternative ? And, above all, what can that mean in a system
of ethics which has, as its axiom, *L.ove thy neighbour as
thyself'.'' and in which the love of our neighbour is so
narrowly joined with the love of God ? If we are wishful to be
thoroughly convinced how insufficient all such rules are, we
may count up all the conceivable cases in reference to the
frequently treated master-example of the two shipwrecked men
who seek to save themselves on the same plank, but recognise
that it is only possible for the plank to bear one. It is as easy as
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 225
it is valueless to say that they are to enter upon a rivalry of
self-sacrifice. Doubtless in Christian judgment such sacrifice
in and for itself is the highest moral action ; and without over-
refinement it may be assumed that in a case of urgency of the
kind here supposed many will put too high a value on such a
critical decision. What the duty of one so situated may be
can only be settled by his conscience. The person of heroic
temperament will act differently from him who is reflective by
nature, the man of ripe experience otherwise than the tyro.
Or, we may say, we recognise in reflecting on these so-called
collisions of duty that there are no such things, when we under-
stand how it is that they appear to exist. The supreme moral
End is realised in a rich united whole of graduated Ends, and
accordingly the highest moral command is articulated in a
united whole of graduated commands. But which of these
Ends, and according to which of these commands, the individual
Christian shall realise at any given time, a precept as such can
never and on no occasion decide. For this it is quite unsuited,
and the decision is made by the moral personality in accordance
with his endowment, course of life, development, and in
accordance with the particular sphere in which he finds
himself placed by the call of God. In short, the different
moral interests (i.e. those individual Ends with their corre-
spondent Rules) are not the same at any definite moment of
actual life in the consciousness of all Christians. The perception
as to what is the duty to be done is the solution of this collision
(not so much of ' duties ' as) of claims amid that variety of
moral interests, at the moment of action, as Rothe says. Thus
our former statement of the completely individual nature of
duty has been confirmed and cleared by this examination of
the so-called conflict of duties, as well as also of the value and
limits of the term 'call of duty.' For even the rules thence
derived (incomparably better than those previously rejected) —
What duty lies nearest to my calling? what does this call
demand of me ? — are only right if the word ' call "" is interpreted
in its widest sense ; in which case it in no way gives help which
enables us to dispense with a personal resolve (p. 218). Still
more obvious now is the need of accentuating the duty of
15
226 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
forming our own judgment and of seeing that our conscience
is trained in the highest school. The more a resolve
spontaneously issues from such a trained conscience, as a
product of acquired sensitiveness, the better. The decision is
never a purely natural one, but has a moral quality. The
two poles of such an education of conscience are, as has been
excellently said, passion, which knows no difficulty of decision,
and sees nor cares to see any collision of Christian moral Ends
(not duties) ; and the other pole is Jesus Christ, who in earnest
conflict ever recognises and desires what the Father desires.
Our uncertainty, our long hesitation, is the result of sin, yet
by no means always so. Of the growth in certainty of moral
judgment Master Eckard's saying is applicable: "I shall be
grieved if to-morrow morning I have not grown brisker.''''
And the exhortation 'to buy up the opportunity "* ('redeem-
ing the time ■*) belongs here. And that all this work can only
thrive in the atmosphere of prayer needs no proof (see below).
Developed teaching on conflict of duties shows quite clearly the
distinction and also the contrast between Protestant and Roman
Catholic ethics. According to the Roman Catholic idea, these
conflicts are so frequent that the insight of the ordinary Christian
is insufficient for true decisions. Help therefore is given in con-
fession by the father confessor. The profound reason of this
want of independence has been shown earlier. The Christian
is not so united to God that he becomes master of everything ;
he is not so far one with God's will, which is his destiny and his
salvation, that he moves invariably in this will as a free child of
God. One fearful result of such want of independence is that
even opposites may be regarded as equally moral if it is possible
to assign reasons for either. This is the so-called probabilism
of Jesuit ethics. It has its name from its asking what degree
of moral sanction, probability, acceptance an opinion must have
in order that it may be followed rather than another, which
really appears to be the more morally right, and worthier of
sanction, in the place of the one which the conscience at first
accepts. Naturally this moral calculus requires that as many
opinions as possible, and as many authorities as possible, should
be counted and compared with one another. The sole moral
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 227
authority, the conscience bound to the will of God, is subjected
to many supposed authorities. In this way caprice has full
play ; any reason, any authority may carry sway in favour of any-
thing worth wishing for. Moral freedom is annihilated. The
favourite j ustifying reason that this probabilism is a protection
against caprice in the Either confessor, as against the immaturity
of the penitent confessing, and by it both are saved from too
anxiously busying themselves with dangerous and frivolous
things, is not merely dragged into a curious light by the
improprieties of which serious Catholics themselves complain ;
but they presuppose that continued moral infancy, which we
have already declared inacceptable, is ethically justifiable (p. 112).
All that is thus generally needed is a system of casuistry, i.e.
a systematic treatise of single moral questions irrespective of
the conscience of the individual, and this casuistry it is that
leads to probabilism. How this Jesuit theory of supposed
conflict of duties is connected and even coincides with an
unmoral idea of expediency, and further still with that of
supererogatory duty, will become clear when these points are
discussed.
Among the cases of so-called collision of duties is the very
old one of the conflict between a duty of love and a duty to
truth, and even the individual examples are fixed by a firm
tradition — such questions as the lie in jest, the polite lie, the
paedagogic lie. For instance, the case of saving an innocent
person by means of an untruth, the equivocation by the doctor
and the family to spare the person dangerously sick, deception
practised on the enemy in war, etc. In such cases must truth
give way to love ? There is an imposing list of famous names
for and against. Unreservedly against any sort of untruth are
St Augustine and Calvin ; on the other side are Chrysostom,
Jerome, Luther. There is the same difference among ethical
philosophers : on the one side Kant and Fichte, and in the latter
case the majority — that is, at the present time. The names are
to the point, for they show how inconsistent it would be to
assume in their relation to our question the presence or absence
of more or less moral earnestness. For of course the question
of the ' needful lie "* of the ordinary stamp, such as only springs
228 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
from the need of the natural, not of the moral man, is no more
in place here than was the previous one of the conflict between
duty and inclination. Nor can we allow it to be supposed that
the question is not rightly put, or rather that it disguises a
problem which goes deeper down than our present limits.
Within these limits it must be put more accurately than is
often the case. It may be taken thus : Can conscious want of
truth in a definite situation ever be a moral duty for the
individual ? And the answer to it must be in the affirmative
if our general result has been right. For we saw that any
judgment in a given alternative, Is this, or that, my duty? is
a matter of personal decision. For example, take the case which
the ancients discussed, whether there are circumstances in which
the wife of a sick man ought to keep back from him her
knowledge of the death of their son ? We must say. Here two
moral interests meet in conflict. Which of these is to be
decisive for the resolution in favour of one or the other depends
on the respective moral positions in which the sick man stands
and in which she stands relatively to him. It depends on this
whether it is a moral duty to announce or to conceal the fact
of the death. If we should deny this, and especially the morality
of concealment, then we should be forced to give up the
Protestant notion of duty, and even the Protestant idea of
moral independence, and no pretended regard for the apparently
greater rigour of the opposite opinion should lead us astray.
If now the opinion thus expressed still is by no means universally
satisfactory, to some appearing too lax and to others too harsh —
because the former assert that the maintenance of truth is under
all circumstances the sole moral duty, while the latter require
the relinquishment of truth in favour of love in general, and
leave out that proviso, * according to the moral standards of the
persons concerned' — then this dissatisfaction can only have a
deeper reason which has nothing at all to do with the doctrine
of conflict of duties, but which concerns rather the question of
the absoluteness of the duty of veracity.
The matter becomes clear if we put the question thus : Can
unveracity become a duty, viewed from the standpoint of an
ideally moral perfection ? Or in other words : Is truth an
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 229
aspect of the ' Good ' ? does it form one of the universe of
interests with regard to which in each case of actual performance
of duty, as we saw, a resolve must be taken ? Or is it possibly
the inalienable presupposition of all moral action which it is not
possible to disregard in any case ? A closer consideration of the
above examples might lead to a solution of this problem, which
is not a factitious one. A jocose lie is a contradiction in terms ;
only a pedant will object to jocose speech. To abolish the
unveracities of polite intercourse is a duty often underestimated ;
a duty which the excuse that they are an expression of love to
oui" neighbour will make all earnest-minded men feel the more in-
sistently. In the sphere of education the advocates of unveracity
are less numerous. It is quite clear what harm to mutual
confidence arises from them ; how unnecessary it is if a wise love
makes proper use of reserve in teaching, and of the promise of
later information. It is also clear that by the denial of the
right of fiction true poetry is no longer possible. The more
serious cases are by no means of equal importance. Certain as
it is that she who conceals the truth from the sick husband acts
rightly in a given situation, it is also certain that those so nearly
connected stand on a morally higher plane, if they have trained
themselves to absolute mutual truthfulness, and if they are one
in their trust in God, who will preserve those who rely on Him
from injury, or will in any case do all things for the best.
There remain now only the examples of necessary self-defence
and of war. In both instances the relation of confidence is no
longer present : absolute mutual truthfulness is therefore no
longer to be expected. But these two cases do not stand on
quite the same footing. If the point in question is the relation
"of one individual to another, reservation plays a larger part than
in war ; and it is also hardly the same thing when in one case
it is property and in another life that is at stake ; and quite
different if it is a question of one''s own and not another's life.
Stories like those of John Kant among the robbers or of Oberlin
( " Look to it, God of truth : I did my duty, Thou do Thine " )
it is easier to turn to ridicule than to refute their profound
meaning. In war it has ever, even among Christians, been
specially honourable, alongside obviously allowable injury to the
THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
enemy by conscious deception, to be truthful in personal inter-
course, so long as the purposes of war are not affected. Still,
this last example is connected with the special question of the
morality of statecraft which will engage our attention later.
Here the point is to deduce some general proposition from these
separate considerations. We are compelled to decide in favour
of the more rigorous idea (if, as pointed out, the question is one
that concerns the individual), and can only recognise one bar
to the sway of the truth, and that is when the relation of
confidence between the parties is clearly destroyed. The reason
why this ought to be so we shall find in the fact that veracity is
the main condition of the moral intercourse of love, just as is
the case with Right ; but still more closely is truth bound up
with love. Hence it happens that acting contrary to the truth
as between individuals and where the community is concerned
is different. The individual can be won by martyrdom for the
truth's sake. This unique majesty of truth is willingly
recognised when, as we attempted to show, the question is
settled as respects individual duty. Such majesty of the truth
Kant has in his mind when he says : " Falsity is sin against my
true self-hood, against the manhood within. If I lie I degrade
myself to a pretender, suicidally sacrifice my true self." And
Fichte, against the defender of the ' necessary lie ' : " Then I ought
both to believe you and not believe you at the same time. I
cannot know whether your assurance that what you say you
consider permissible is not itself a ' necessary lie.' " In definitely
Christian ethics it may once more be called to mind how closely
love is united with truth in the New Testament, whether the
subject treated of is God's work or ours. St Paul thoughtfully
lays the foundation of the ideal when he says : " Wherefore
putting away lying, speak every man truth with his neighbour,
for we are members one of another." There a possible boundary-
line is drawn, not in an external way, but in such a manner that
it cannot be fixed by indolence. More detailed illustration of
our question is obtained by the experiences of life, on which
often enough the duty of veracity is undeniably not taken with
sufficient seriousness, under the influence of inaccurate or mis-
understood answers to this question ; and the ' needful lie ' of
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 231
the German people in Luther''s phrase is becoming more common,
and rapidly, in a time in which Neitzsche proclaims : " Good
men never speak the truth."
Simpler than this question of so-called conflict of duties is
the second master-question of ethics, that of overplus of duty,
works of supererogation. In Evangelical ethics the idea is
absurd that a Christian can do more than his duty ; and this
' more ' is understood in a twofold sense, of range of duty, and
energy in its performance. That is, the Christian man can only
do what he recognises as his duty, and this he ought to do with
all his might. In neither respect has his will any alternative,
except at the cost of being forced to condemn his action as
undutifiil. This principle of Evangelical ethics becomes quite
clear when tested by the case of Jesus Christ, though this may
seem a sm*prising thing to do. Even He did no more than His
duty, i.e. " He finished the work which His Father gave Him
to do."" Offence at such a word arises merely from our quite
rightly regarding His work as the highest act of His freedom ;
but what is here true of Him completely is true of us in our
imitation of Him as our model. And thus we also recognise
the ground of this glorious truth. It is merely an obvious
consequence of the notion of duty, as this is grounded in the
nature of the chief commandment, and still further in that of
the chief Good. In the judgment, ' This is my duty,' we settle
for ourselves what the commandment of love to God and our
neighbour means now, in the fulfilment of which we are now
called to be fellow-labourers in God''s Kingdom. Good and
commandment are of such sort that they can be fulfilled every
moment, and are duly performed at every moment, however
little there may be of outward show ; and that so that they
completely bind the will, and make it completely free, because
in this way the agenfs true destiny is realised. Quite simply :
in every action which the Christian, so far as it is a duty,
performs he loves God and his neighbour, as he now ought,
wholly, or it is no love at all, and he knows that he is in this
wholly bound and yet entirely free, impelled by the marv'ellous
love of God, which is ever alike to him.
On this point the general difference between Evangelical and
232 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
Roman Catholic ethics receives especial illustration. It is
an essential characteristic of the latter to recognise action in
excess of actual duty. It draws a strong distinction between
commandments (the ten commandments, and the five of the
Church, of which the latter refer to the observation of holy
days and the attendance at mass on these days, fasts, and at
least one confession and one communion a year) and Gospel
counsels of perfection. These latter are harder to fulfil than
the former, are not binding on all, but subject to the voluntary
choice of the individual, and merit greater reward. In respect
of their content they include every possible thing, even if it
soars above the absolute command, special proofs of love, special
prayers and special fasts, special trust in God. But in the
narrower sense they understand by this three things : complete
poverty, renunciation of all private possessions ; complete
chastity, abstinence from marriage ; entire obedience to ecclesi-
astical superiors. These are the three chief marks of a perfect
life, which is also called the 'religious' life of the Gospel
(rigorously based on the Sermon on the Mount), or the angelical
life (anticipating the life of the angels in this world). Angels,
to wit, need no earthly goods, know nothing of man and wife,
and always stand ready for the service of God in prayer and
dutiful love. The life of Christians living in the world
approaches to this ideal — which only monks, and in particular
priests, can unreservedly carry out — by means of those counsels
of perfection in the wider meaning, followed as nearly as
circumstances allow ; and those who are desirous of so doing
combine in all kinds of religious communities, among which the
third order of St Francis is an immense force in the Catholic
world of to-day.
The ground of this whole distinction between precept and
counsel is an essentially different conception of ethics in its
most inward nature. All that seems to us to be external, legal,
detached, dependent, and isolated from the world here appears
palpably before us (p. 114). If the 'Good' is not exhausted
in love of God and of our neighbour, but the renunciation of
the natural impulses is somehow something separate, then it is
easily understood that this cannot be expected of all alike, and
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 233
even need not be undertaken at all by the Christian, as his
true independent life must ordinarily be understood. By these
works of supererogation the Roman Catholic ethics for the most
part means those works which in respect of their content are
not required of all. Regarded closely, that other point of view
is, as pointed out, of importance, viz. that the Good may be
fulfilled with more or less of self-surrender. It has, however,
been disputed at length how far the ' good intention ' belongs
to a good work, and the papal decision against the thesis of the
Jansenists that in the absence of love there is no true fulfilment
of the law has never been retracted.
For such reasons it appears to us Evangelical Protestants
that the commendation of 'evangelical counsels of perfection'
is in no way a spur to the highest virtue, to the heroic glorifi-
cation of love ; for we ask, what is love, which does not give all ?
Rather with our Reformers we regard it as a soul-endangering
depreciation of the moral ideal ; a temptation at one time to
levity, at another to presumption, both for the mature and the
immature, and in both ways a source of endless scruples of
conscience. Only we may not forget that the distinction is a
necessary one on the Catholic conception of ethics. Also we
may not in fairness omit to say that this teaching has always
been accompanied by a happy inconsequence. Whereas we
might, for instance, expect that counsels of perfection should
avail as ' means of special salvation,' they are only lauded as
a means of salvation generally. In this way the danger is
obviated of Christians being separated into two wholly distinct
classes, and the ' religious ' kept from boundless self-glorying.
It still needs mention that with this idea of supererogatory
works the Roman idea of meritorious work is most closely con-
nected. Only it is by no means solely confined to this, as we
Protestants are apt to imagine. The bare fulfilment of the
commandments of God can be meritorious, and not merely
following counsels of perfection ; but in general only what is
done by the co-operation of grace with human free-will. Since
we cannot, according to this definition of merit, of ourselves
deserve grace, it is (so far as the words are concerned) right, if
what is in one point of view merit is in another grace ; but, as
234 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
a matter of fact, the contradiction between this and our con-
ception cannot be bridged over. To the Catholic whose ideas
conform to the standard of the Church the forgiveness of God
appears greater if that forgiveness places the suppliant in the
position of raising himself to higher things. We Protestants
cannot conceive how we are to be independent otherwise than
by forgiving grace ; free in God, not free from God. That
again is a dividing line in Christendom. Only some persons
happily do rise above this division in the Churches. There are
Catholic protestants as well as, on the other hand, Catholics who
live by the Gospel, however much embarrassed by their Church.
So far, the question whether there is such a thing as a
surplusage of good action would be sufficiently answered, if it
were not that frequently an impression is made on Protestants
by the Roman Church's use of favourite Scripture sayings
as proof of their position. As concerns the content of these
' counsels of perfection,' appeal is made to the ' counsel ' given
to the rich young ruler (St Matt. xix. 21), as well as to all
found in the words of Jesus Christ and His Apostles which
warn of the danger of riches, or are closely connected with
renunciation of earthly possessions. Proof-texts of the counsel
to chastity are St Matt. xix. 11 fF. and 1 Cor. vii. 6 ff. ; for
absolute obedience and the denial of self, St Matt. xvi. 24, and
as special examples of it, St Matt. v. 18. The notional distinc-
tion between a command and a counsel is found in the parable
of the unprofitable servant (St Luke xvii. 13) compared with
the dutiful and faithful servant (St Matt. xxv. 21) ; and
St Paul (2 Cor. viii. 8, 10), when speaking of the collection
for the poor saints says, " I speak not by way of command-
ment," and "Herein I give my judgment (or counsel)"; and
elsewhere (1 Cor. ix. 15, 17), " If I do this of mine oztm zenll,
I have a reward ; but if not of mine own will, a dispensation of
the Gospel is committed to me," where there is a free-will
service and an enjoined office spoken of. On all such sayings
we shall only speak in a way to avoid misconception, if we
make a sharp distinction. What do the Scriptures really say
about poverty, chastity, obedience? And what do they say
about commandment and counsel ? Much in those passages
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 235
stands in need of the most earnest consideration, in the same
way as the Sermon on the Mount on our ' rights' and the
passage in the Corinthians (i. 7) required attention. The
indefinite feeling that it is all too easy to pervert such utterances
of the New Testament in accordance with our exigencies is
vindicated when we note that much of the Catholic teaching
of ' counsels of perfection ' is taken from passages which have
nothing at all to do with the point. Merely in passing we
may draw attention to the unnaturalness of the application of
the passage on self-denial, when the content of the words is con-
sidered, to ecclesiastical obedience. But here comes in the second
question : what do these passages say of commandment and
counsel ? They do not treat of work to be done at the pleasure
of the person to whom it is assigned, by means of which he
may attain a higher perfection and a proportionately higher
reward. The unprofitable and dutiful servants, if we examine
them a little in their content, are not two classes, those who
keep the commandments and those who follow counsels of
perfection, but the same Christians considered from different
points of view, both of which it is highly necessary for us
alternately to consider; and on the absence of contradiction
between them stress has already been laid (p. 189). So far as
the rich young nobleman is concerned, the issue of the narrative
shows that he ought to have recognised the demands of Jesus
upon him as his duty, and that this was the condition of his
attachment to Him and to His Kingdom. In the same way
the word in St Matt. (xix. 12), " He who will receive it, let him
receive it," turns on the moral power of judgment of the
individual who is to decide what this mysterious saying means
in his case, and whether it is a moral act. If the answer is
'yes,' then it is his duty neither more nor less. Hence, even
the saying which is, in point of content, related to the above of
forsaking wife and parents may be quite general. And St Paul
(1 Cor. vii.) plainly declares that the reader is himself to prove
whether what he says is right, and if it is approved before the
judgment-seat of his individual conscience, then he ought so to
act ; but that the gift of grace is different to each, and duty
accordingly. As to the meaning, this is the same as we settled
236 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
in the matter of our calling. But here are no allusions to
* counsels of perfection.' In that remarkable testimony of St
Paul's (1 Cor. ix. 15) {cf, p. 192) he says plainly that any other
conduct would be for him a sin, because a misuse of his
freedom. This is possibly the sharpest conceivable antithesis
to that of following a 'counsel of perfection' arbitrarily set
before him, which brings a reward. What he calls a free act
is the moral freedom of fulfilling obligatory duty, and its
reward is that he is a partaker of the grace of the Gospel.
If we pass from this problem of the supererogatory to the
third master-question of ethics, to that of the permissible, it will
not easily be doubted that this must be negatived. If the
Christian can do no more than his duty, because in every single
action he fulfils the whole will of God with his whole will, so
far as it can be fulfilled in this single action, it is clear that
there can be no moment in his action that can be thought of
which is not in this manner determined for him by God's will,
and not fulfilled in accordance with duty, and so no action
that is less than duty demands. This first impression is also
certainly the correct one, so that, generally speaking, these three
master-questions of duty must either be collectively affirmed,
or collectively denied ; and that, if the first two cannot be
affirmed as valid for the Protestant view of ethics, the third
must be denied also. But, again, that this impression is the
right one is evident partly because the terms are often employed
in various senses, partly because other difficult questions are
involved which are indeed still more complex than that of the con-
flict of duties and the question of supererogation. Formerly, the
term ' adiaphora ' was most frequently used — the ethically
* indifferent ' actions ; now, since Schleiermacher, the word ' per-
missible' is more often employed. The spheres in which these
notions have come under notice mostly concern the pleasures of
life, and, though apparently outside the limit, religious customs.
Every conceivable meaning has been given to them. Some saw
in the admission of this idea the end of all morality; others,
a special maturity of moral development ; a third party, a
transition point between the two. Such varying opinions are
only possible if different things are intended by the same term ;
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 237
or certainly those who hold them are not fully conscious of all
the conditions of the problem proposed. It helps us to under-
stand if we no longer speak of allowable things or means, but
of actions ; further, not of actions in general allowable, but
those which are permissible to an individual in a definite
situation, and one neither obligatory nor contrary to duty
(as we assumed to be obvious when we, in our context, were
speaking of the doctrine of duty) ; and finally of such actions as
belong in the proper sense to the moral sphere, not those which
are merely juridical or purely natural, and such as are not
yet settled by moral judgment.
The use of the term when questions of right are concerned
may afford us the best aid to define its meaning for ethics.
There its use is completely clear and unambiguous. That is
allowable which law neither commands nor forbids, as, for
example, that it is permissible to invest money so long as it is
not at usurious interest and the like. This ' indifference ' of
actions in this sense plays a great part in the ethical sphere, as,
for instance, in education, so long and so far as morality is
presented to the will as an affair of external law. And in fact a
wise educator makes the circle of what is permissible continually
wider, with the design that he may himself correspondingly
limit it in training the conscience of the pupil. What a
multitude of recollections are brought to the mind of everyone
by this simple proposition ! And what a light it casts on the
confessional practice of the Roman communion, which, dealing
literally with the notion of actions of indifference {cf. above on
conflict of duties), only trains up adult children^ — with all their
boasted education — and not independent personalities. On the
contrary, for mature Christians, for those who are in principle
free from the law, for those who are ' converted ' and regenerate,
for those to whom the will of God has become the law of their
own will, nothing is any longer either commanded or forbidden
in the former sense of what is right or lawful, but in the latter
sense of freedom all is lawful. Hence St Paul has expressly
adopted and recognised that motto of him who is free from
the law, " All things are lawful " (1 Cor. vi. 12), and it receives
the most extensive application in the permissible use of all
238 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
conceivable 'Goods' (1 Cor. iii. 22) when he says, "All
things are yours.*" But he said this, and could say it, because
he wholly and completely set aside the notion of the in-
difference of actions. The Christian is at every moment
completely free from every single external commandment because,
at every moment, he is determined and bound to duty by the
complete will of God, which has become a part of his nature ;
and because, without exception, he does all " in the name of
the Lord Jesus, to the glory of God the Father ''' (1 Col. iii. 17),
in the way that duty has been already explained. St Paul had
occasion — face to face with special dangers existing in the
Churches at Rome and in Corinth — ^to explain in all its aspects
this apparent contradiction, " All things are permitted, because
nothing is merely permissible " ; and that in reference to both
these two things, enjoyment of earthly Goods, and the Christian
attitude towards certain religious ordinances. This freedom,
narrowed by no external law — " Every creature of God is good "
— has its inner limits, and its criterion is full submission to
the highest Norm, which flows from a consideration of the
highest End, and that in all relations of the moral life. Personal
independence was infringed by understanding " All things are
lawful to me " in the lax way that obtained at Corinth ; for
that reason St Paul says, " I will not be brought under the
power of any " (1 Cor. vi. 12). And love was wounded : "All
things are not expedient " (or profitable), " all things edify not."
Both have their foundation in our relation to God. The
Christian, to whom the world belongs, belongs to God (1 Cor. iii.
21 ff.) : " All are yours, and ye are Christ's, and Christ is God's."
In these statements St Paul has merely put into formal pro-
positions what is actually given us in the example of Christ,
both in reference to His attitude to earthly goods and to the
worship of His nation.
Now it is precisely in relation to this full obligation to
individual duty that many moralists wish to use this notion
of permissible things. And by this they wish to express their
conviction that the moral action which is binding on individuals
cannot always be made sufficiently clear to the judgment of
others in the way the agent himself sees it. The term
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 239
' indifference of actions ' or the permissible does therefore in
their opinion guard the right of individual obligation and
sets up a protection against the attacks of others, and is not
merely opening a door to personal caprice. The purpose is
clear and justifiable, the means of realising it not suitable. In
practice the term only too easily gets used in favour of
libertinism. A long history illustrates this, as, for example,
the Jesuit use of the notion. In theory it is also unsuitable
for the purpose of the question at issue, which is, whether
moral actions are not, so far as the consciousness of the agent
is concerned, embraced in the notion of duty, and whether
there can for him be such a thing as doing less than his duty ;
and not whether his individual performance of his duties is
intelligible to a second person. This proposal to retain the
notion of the ' permissible ' is instructive, because it vividly
emphasises the purely individual character of duty, on which
we have in our whole ethical doctrine laid especial stress.
The consideration still remains whether the negative answer
to our question — or, put the other way, whether the assertion
that all moral action is measured by the idea of duty — can be
proved to be correct in all cases in human life. Two groups
have been discriminated — choice of a calling, marriage, and the
like ; and, on the other hand, the province of recreation. In
regard to the first, decision is easy. No one will wish to deny
that resolves so important should be taken with a full conscious-
ness of moral urgency, which, of course, is a matter for the
judgment of the individual. But this grants for our context
that there is at bottom nothing merely 'permissible"* in the
moral life. That, as a matter of fact, men often enough act
quite otherwise, and according to the individual position of
the persons concerned cannot but act otherwise, is indubitable,
but does not affect the principle. At the stage of moral
development which these persons have reached it has not become
clear to them that this or that action should be done on the
principle of duty. They are so far still at the legalist stand-
point of those for whom that is allowed which the law or custom
allows, so far as they have conceived it, and which has not been
actually forbidden. More difficult is the question of recreation.
240 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
The objection appears to be irrefutable — to have a consciousness
of fulfilling a duty with regard to recreation and asking ' What ?''
' How ? ' ' How much ? ' and the like is inconsistent with the
very idea of recreation. The notion of a recreation implicates
the consciousness of permission to take it, the consciousness,
that is, of special freedom. But those who defend the idea of
the ' permissible '' emphasise emphatically that recreation in its
range and content must not merely generally correspond to the
idiosyncrasy of an individual as his own personal aflPair, but
that subsequent reflection, or the judgment of others down to
minute detail, may bring home to him that a particular
recreation is contrary to duty. In such cases at all events
even those who favour the notion of the merely permissible
would find this a contradiction to the notion of recreation ; for
in these cases they even likewise assert that the idea of duty
is determinative. But generally it is not easy to see why the
notions of duty and recreation are contradictory, provided that
duty — as is done by those who favour it — is taken in a strictly
Evangelical sense, so that the idea of making recreation a duty
cannot arise. If it is merely intended to assert that generally
speaking the judgment of duty so far as recreation is concerned
is not entertained with full consciousness, this is right. But
the same thing is true also in regard to other provinces, and
only in an especial measure applies to recreation, since this
province is, as it were, concerned with the outermost circle
of that kind of subject-matter which in its normal develop-
ment only receives an ethical stamp quite gradually, and
generally only under certain circumstances. Undeniably the
moral tactfulness of a virtuous character plays a greater part
than conscious judgment of what belongs to duty in such cases.
In other words, we have here once more reached a point in
which it appears that the doctrine of duty only in connection
with the theory of virtue can exhaustively represent the
development of Christian moral personality. But in order
to avoid the appearance of allowing that this our principle
has need in regard to recreation to fear entering into the
consideration of the customary objections, we may still point
out that even the choice of a walk (supposing that no sort of
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 241
idea of duty comes into consideration, in which case even the
opponent, of course, admits that recreation is limited by the
idea of duty) may be made to depend on aesthetic inclinations,
which, if such inclinations demand a moral judgment, form
the ground of this individual judgment. But in no other case
than as an hypothesis can such an 'if enter into our question.
Then, of course, the whole dispute is almost entirely verbal
only, but the master-thought of duty might become more
plainly prominent in the decision given.
As an illustration, a short resume of some examples of the
doctrine of the morally indifferent, which have historical
importance, may help us.
In the Roman Church the question is one that concerns the
meaning of the proposition that the end sanctifies the means,
makes it morally justifiable ; or, in other words, if the purpose
is allowable, the means to attain it are allowable. The dis-
cussion has often been unnecessarily confused by the Protestant
side not always making it sufficiently clear in what sense the
proposition is at once justifiable. And, in particular, the
notion of the permissible is for the reason given above to be
excluded here, because this idea is employed on the Roman
side to obtain an arena for the play of the moral will as opposed
to the absolutely obligatory will of God. But that the highest
moral purpose, and, properly understood, every higher means
to its realisation, may require that which, irrespective of such
consideration, is immoral, is self-evident. For instance, the
purpose of self-preservation in a nation demands the sacrifice
of human life in war ; and the saying of Jesus Christ (St Luke
xiv. 26) requires, in the case of a conflict of duties, renunciation
of the moral ' Goods "■ of family life for the Kingdom of God''s
sake. On the other hand, the sense of that proposition in
Jesuit morals (freed, as in the ethics of St Alfonsus of Liguori,
from its most damaging points) shows most plainly in the
scholastic example that fornication is permissible, if by this
means the greater sin of adultery is avoided. Now, certainly
marriage is one of the highest moral ' Goods,"" and on that
account its infringement, if we are so to express it, is a ' greater
sin ' than the immoral yielding of an individual to his sensual
16
242 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
impulse. But the question does not concern the application
of this principle to a case of that kind. For he who thus sins
does not, in doing or suffering, sacrifice a lower moral good for
the sake of realising a higher one, like the disciple who, for
Jesus' sake, dissolves the bonds of natural love ; but he cherishes
a desire which, for the sake of personal purity, he ought to
renounce ; just as he ought, for the same reason, as well as on
account of the honour which belongs to it, to refrain from the
infringement of the marriage tie. The Jesuit fallacy is easily
disguised when an inattentive observer has not laid hold of the
principles that will rightly guide him. In a system of moral
' Goods ' marriage takes a supreme place. It is not noted, by
such persons as are misled, that the proposition silently
implicates that a lower moral Good belongs to the same
category as a higher, and such as can never, under any circum-
stances, be designated a moral Good at all ; that is to say, the
immoral satisfaction of the sensual impulse.
The Lutheran Church has twice engaged in conflict on the
so-called ' adiaphora.' The first struggle, in the sixteenth
century, referred to ceremonial customs in worship, and the
constitution of the Church. Luther (here again the rediscoverer
of St Paul) saw in such things wholesome and proper arrange-
ments, provided they serve the purpose of edification. If this
purpose is not directly contravened, then they ought, for the
sake of peace and love, to be suffered, and even misuse borne
with, and turned to the best advantage possible. Such arrange-
ments are, in fact, merely ' swathing-bands ' for the 'infant.'
The same St Paul who, face to face with obstinate legalisers,
where the truth of the Gospel was in peril, yielded, ' no, not for
one moment,' and resisted the circinncision of Titus, allowed it
in the case of Timothy in harmony with his principles (Rom.
xiv., XV.). After the death of Luther, there arose on account
of the Leipzig ' Interim "" ^ the question whether its articles are
^ ' Interim ' is the title given to the three formulas (Regensburg, Augsburg, and
Leipzig) as bases of agreement between the two parties, representing the old
Church and the Reformation, until a council should be called. The Leipzig
'Interim' was the last of these (1548 a.d. ). With Protestant doctrine the
Catholic forms of worship were allowed. For details see Herzog, Encyclopaedie,
sub voce. — Tr.
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 243
congruous with this point of view of the Reformer and the
Apostle. This question of moral ' accommodation "* was — How
far might they go in respect of those uses as to doing them
and allowing them for their own communions, at a time when
the imperial power thundered at the door? The formula
of concord decided that in persecution confession is demanded,
and compliance is sin ; in themselves the uses controverted are
' adiaphora,' indifferent, good, or evil according to circumstances.
If the question in this particular form is a matter of past
history, it yet comes up again afresh in new shapes. How far,
for example, does the use in worship of an ancient creed belong
to uses of this sort ? Who are the weak and who are the
strong ? What respect does one party owe to the other^s
feelings ? Where is the boundary between justifiable concilia-
tion and denial of the truth ? Perhaps Rom. xiv. and xv.
are chapters not yet obsolete, and to the wisdom of these
judgments of faith fresh fields are ever opened in which their
value is tested.
The so-called second conflict on the question of the adiaphora
in the seventeenth century, related directly to the personal life,
that is, the question of pleasures, especially happiness and the
means thereto, sports and art. From the high watch-tower of
faith Luther had said : " They who love God do not fix their
mind at all on creature goods, for God attends to them. It is
not the things that are forbidden, but disorder and their misuse.
Use all things on earth, what, when, and where you like, and
thank God. Keep free and untrammelled!" And with reference,
for instance, to dancing at a wedding according to the country
custom he says : " No importance is attached to such mere
external matters where faith and love abide, so far as it is a
matter of conformity to what is proper to your station." His
praise of music is well known. It was from Calvin that a
sterner judgment on these things pushed its way into the circles
of Lutheran Pietism — for example, in its judgments on such
things as the theatre, dancing, jesting. All enjoyment of
natural things that goes beyond absolute need is not only sin
by misuse, but is, according to this view, in itself sin. For only
that is 'good' which is done directly and consciously to the
244 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
glory of God ; and that means in continual self-denial, and
fulfilling therewith the command of God : and so music must be
religious, and our associations with others edifying. Dancing
as bodily exercise, playing bowls for the sake of health, as at
a health resort, is right. Taking a walk without this object in
view betrays a heart which does not rest in God. Even children,
as the severer school thought, ought no longer to play. If the
orthodox opponents of those old pietists saw in such principles
the denial of Christian freedom, they were right. But their
own position was likewise a legalistic one when they rested
content with showing that there was no express commandment
in the Holy Scriptures against these things. This neither
proved their real moral justification, nor won the insight that
it is only the individual's judgment of duty that can in detail
decide what is of profit to him. Neither was it plain to any
of the opponents at that period that the whole battle refers to
the province of the aesthetic, art itself, and that the questions
in dispute that appear so widely separate, as to ceremonial in
worship and as to social enjoyments, are connected. This
perception — which we owe to Schleiermacher — is indispensable
to a clear decision on Protestant principles. Reserving this for
social ethics, we ought not at this point to refrain from saying
that the pietistic opinion, although it certainly does not stand
in the high level of the Protestant view of faith, still remains
a serious means of self-examination for every seriously disposed
Christian, whether he personally uses these principles conscien-
tiously ; so that he may in each case recognise his duty, and not
be guilty of a misuse, contrary to duty, of the notion of the
permissibility of certain things. For instance, many a thing
that Spener says about dancing which will not here bear
repeating as he says it, requires to be translated into our terms
for their purely Evangelical meaning, and their pressing
necessity cannot be gainsaid without advising weak compliance
with the tone and taste of the average man, with the name of
'Christian freedom.' And all the less is there need for this
gainsaying, as it is just Spener who has, more than the rest of
those who thought with him, refrained from counselling external
coercion in the province of education.
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 245
Our doctrine of duty and calling has repeatedly brought us
to a boundary stone whose superscription is —
Virtue and Character.
That is, as often as we have had to take note of the growth of
the new man as a unique and grand whole we have approached
this point. And actions done in accordance with duty are
fruits of a good tree, and only good inasmuch as they are
grown upon it and are not mere artificial adornments fixed on
an unconcerned bearer of them. Nay, we may ask why it was
only after the statements on the beginning of the new life,
imder the title of growth, that we spoke of single actions, of
duty and calling. This was done because in this way the moral
character of the new life in its development would be shown in
the closest way. That moral imperative ' ought,' in its strict
application to each case of personal resolve, does not permit the
thought to arise that this development is a naturally necessary
one. But of course because it is a personal resolve we should
always bear in mind the unique person for whom alone such
resolves exist, and for whom alone there are such things as duty
and calling. If this personality grows ever so much, precisely
by its acts, and develops in the way of fulfilment of duty, we
must now ponder the development which is really peculiar to
it. The new man is in radical conversion put in the position
that he finds his incentive and motive power to the love of God
and his neighbour in his trust in God's love in Christ. The
' Good,' Christianly considered, has become the innermost quality
of his personal life, and it is so that this 'Good' becomes the
fundamental ruling force in him. We now ask how this force
shall work its way from the centre to the whole circumference,
and penetrate all his faculties most completely. If the teaching
of duty was the teaching of the law in its individual application,
then the teaching concerning virtue is also the same, as the
incentive and motive power to the ' Good ' in detail ever more
fills the whole person, is ever becoming more personal. The
variety of points of view which here present themselves will
justify us in first of all considering the question in general.
246 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
without any reference to sin. Then we may fix our attention
on this battle between the old and the new man.
Virtve.
In the first task thus set the question may arise whether the
title * Virtue and Character' is justifiable at all in Christian ethics.
The German word is derived from the Greek,^ and means the
persevering direction of the will to what is 'good' ; more precisely,
since the word thus derived points to an acquired aptitude for
good action, it imports a power acquired by our own doing,
and that so that this power is thought of as a ' faculty.' It is
distinct from right disposition as that which from within impels
and qualifies for right expression. Activity is different from a
merely internal state ; so that it is self-evident that in Christian
ethics the sole value of such aptness and faculty depends
on the soundness, depth, and strength of the innermost
disposition.
That this word virtue {aperr}) seldom occurs in the New
Testament (used of God, 1 Pet. ii. 9, 2 Pet. ii. 3 ; of men,
Phil. iv. 8, 2 Pet. i. 5) does not of itself prove anything against
its appropriateness in Christians ethics ; and the sufficiently
probable reason is that for immediate practical purposes there
was no need for a comprehensive scientific expression, and so
much the less as it is precisely used mostly in the commonly
accepted sense. Also it is possible that its misuse by rationalists
makes it intelligible how it became suspicious in wide circles of
the Church, and in particular of pietism ; but this scarcely can
destroy its usefulness. We must, however, exercise care, and
avoid a possible danger which lies very near to its non-Christian
origin. The acquired aptitude to good action, that is to say,
put briefly, must not be thought of in a non-Christian sense as
oiu- own, self-originated, natural merely. In the first place, not
' our own,' which would be setting aside the supreme truth of
Christian ethics, that all human goodness has its source in
God ; and that the commencement of the radically new direction
' Vide Kluge's Etymologisches Worterbtuh, sub voce 'taugen.' "The Teutonic
verbal root ' dug ' might point to Aryan ' dhugh ' (Gr. Tvxn, fortune). To this
are allied TsrVA/tj-and Tugend, TiUhtigkeit, aptitude, capacity."— Tr.
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 247
given to the life is neither more nor less than the work of God,
as is each greatest and smallest step in its development. " By
the grace of God I am what I am,"" says St Paul at the zenith
of his life (1 Cor. xv. 10), when the thought that his whole
power was not unreservedly given to the service of God had
long been impossible to him (1 Cor. ix. 16 ff.). In other words,
we may only speak of Christian ' virtue ' if we keep constantly
before us what has been said of the reception of faith as the
fountain of all Christian morality ; were that fountain dried
up, the moral life could not longer be maintained. Christ is
and remains the principle, rather the personal originator, of
holiness, as He is of that conversion which lays the foundation
of the Christian life. And there is no necessity to enumerate
the various words of the New Testament which express the
master-thought of Gal. ii. 20, " I live, no longer I," in ever new
forms. In reality there is, as we have often said before, nothing
more independent than the ' good will,"* the ' new man "" ; the
Good is really his own nature ; he is spiritually one with it.
But this independence is dependence on God, taking from God,
a continual receptiveness at all stages and in all relations.
Thus the word virtue need not mislead us into the mistake of
isolating one individual in contrast to another and regarding
him as a separate personality exclusively as he is in himself^ —
a personality which merely subsists on and represents its own
moral wealth. God''s adoption is only found in the Kingdom of
God ; there is no personal virtue separate from the virtue which
manifests itself in love. Finally, virtue is no natural good
which can grow like a plant, but (on this account the doctrine
of duty precedes) it grows in conflict with our own nature and
the surrounding world. There is no other certain way of
becoming virtuous than by the ' strait way ' of duty. This is
the truth which will still have to engage our attention when we
consider the means of acquiring virtue. But this does not
exclude but includes the thought that the will, when once
guided and really determined in the direction of the Good,
becomes a will which is ever more and more directed to what is
good. When we were speaking of the doctrine of freedom we
recognised that every free resolve of the will binds us either in
248 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
the one direction or the other, that an evil deed has its curse
and a good deed its blessing, in its inner influence on all
subsequent acts.
From all of which it is clear that the word virtue is the least
questionable, simplest, and also, in comparison and contrast
with others, the most suitable expression of the one master-
point of view from which we must consider the develop-
ment of Christian personality. It is scarcely necessary still
to give emphatic expression to the thought that, as the supreme
Christian End and the supreme Christian Rule is a whole, so
at the bottom Christian virtue is one ; that is, the capacity of
the will, acquired by practice, to be continually guided by the
deepest motives, for the highest End and according to the best
Rule. Just as it is obvious that as there is a system of Ends
and Norms, so that one ' virtue ' is divided into many virtues.
The opposite to virtue is strictly speaking the non-virtuous.
We may speak of an unvirtuous act. Vice signifies only
definite perverseness of the will, whether it be momentary,
or a perversion that has laid hold of the inner man ; and in
either case only when a considerable measure of readiness for
evil has been reached. Discourteousness is not a vice, neither
is cowardice, but certainly drunkenness and deceit are vices ; and
all of these are unvirtuous acts.
Character.
The term character has the closest relationship to the word
virtue so defined. This too means a permanent direction of
the will to the ' Good "■ which is self-acquired. The usual
connotation points to this, which is that character^ is some-
thing determined and firm, in contradistinction to the softness
and plasticity of such material as may be fashioned into any
form. A virtuous man and a man of character are at bottom
the same. But a virtuous man is not he who possesses one
or the other virtue, but who exhibits the quality of ' virtue '
considered as a generic unity. We think then, when we use
* Character is from a Greek word meaning to engrave, as on a seal or stamp.
It is thus represented by the German word Geprdge, a stamp, which is here
used. — Tr.
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 249
the word character, on the constancy of the good will, not of
the will as apprehended in isolated acts, nor generally speaking
of this kind of activity at all, but of the inner nature of the
man, and, in contradistinction to original disposition, of an
aptitude which has already been tested ; and on that account
we speak also, instead of using the word 'character,' of a
personality which is an independent whole. But there is
something more that is expressly meant by the term character,
and that is that all the faculties are morally trained and have
received a moral stamp. Explicitly we think of the given
material which is being fashioned. And inasmuch as this
material, in spite of essential similarity, is individually different,
there are just as many different Christian characters. The
natural peculiarity of the individual we call comprehensively
temperament. Special gifts, particularly in the province of
knowledge or of art, we name talents, after St Matt. xxv. 14 ff*.,
where originally that which is spoken of is of sums of money
placed in trust. Special abilities in general are called gifts,
and, when they are used in the conscious service of the highest
End, gifts of grace or charismata ; and by this means emphasis
is laid upon their origin from the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. xii. 4 ff".).
Of special importance in regard to the variety of equipment
which we call temperament is the varying degree of emotional
mobility and the character of the will ; and that both as
regards the susceptibility to impressions and the reflex action
of the mind on the impressions received. These are the
temperamental differences so much spoken of, the importance
of which is not doubtful merely because of the insecurity of
their boundary-lines. In a brief form we may be able the
soonest to say : the choleric and phlegmatic temperaments are
closest related to the will, the sanguine and melancholy to the
emotions. In the first-mentioned temperament excitability
is prevailingly small, and in the last prevailingly great. Then
it is at once clear how every temperament has its own
excellences and dangers, and plainly too in regard to the
development of Christian character ; but it never actually
happens that there is no commixture. To this variety of
natural disposition in individual cases, when we are speaking
250 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
of the given material on which the moral stamp is to be
engraven, we have to add the general distinctions of sex, age,
nationality, social position. If we reflect on all these, we are
easily convinced, also in this place, how little in Christian
ethics any formula can exhaust the fulness of life. But it is
a claim of Christian ethics, and the conviction of its exponents,
that no hindrance which arises from this resisting material can
render the education of Christian character impossible, and
no natural advantage which that material possesses render it
unnecessary. What is true of the commencement in conversion
is true quite in the same way of the progress of the spiritual
life. All ought to become Christian characters ; all can so
become. Every character has its own peculiar impress ; but
in all there is unity in the innermost direction of the soul
to the highest End, in subjection under the self-same royal law
of love from the deepest motive, and that the love of God
experienced in faith. No Christian is like another, as no man
is like another ; but they are one in Christ, who is the New Man
from whose spiritual fulness they draw the power to use His
inexhaustible riches in an especial way for their own good.
It is only in this unity and diversity of character that there is
a Kingdom of God ; and it is explicitly a measure of the ripe-
ness of our own character how far respect for the idiosyncrasy
of other Christian characters has been developed in us. The
predilection for pattern characters, and especially the measuring
of others by the standard of self, proves that he who does these
things is not yet become a Christian personality.
So far we have used the word character throughout in the
good sense. But how much this word has emphatic reference
to constancy of will, and the impress put upon the natural
faculties, we may see by the fact that the usage of speech allows
us to speak of a man of evil character, when the will con-
sistently uses all the individual faculties in the service of evil.
And so great is the likeness, so far as the exercise of will is
concerned, that the evil will is in some degree in respect of
form moral, and so far is will a presupposition of all true
morality that a shimmering of the glory of the * Good ' falls
even on the evil character. And this is not merely for the
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 251
fancy of the poet, who understands how by this means to gain
sympathy for his hero, if it is only a shuddering interest in
him. Even on the part of the Judge of all a milder judgment
(Rev. iii. 15) is pronounced on the 'cold' than on the 'luke-
warm,' inasmuch as the former is more likely to repent than
the man with weak character ; and in the case of its occurrence
there is the promise in him of a subsequent special exhibition of
the energy of Christian love. This is proved by many great
examples in the Kingdom of God (1 Tim. i. 12 fF.). Nor does
this cast any shade on the special glory of an early decision
for the Good and for the harmonious, gradual development of
the spiritual life.
Character and culture go together, because the latter means
the stamping and forming of material. Expressions like
' cultivated intelligence,' ' a disciplined will,' ' a cultivated feeling '
show that this shaping of mental material embraces all the
natural faculties. Nevertheless the word ' culture ' does not so
expressly refer to the moral shaping of all the faculties as the
term 'character.' Hence there is the general expression of
'changing ideals of life,' which applies even to the Christian
centuries ; and an appeal is made to seek to deepen the culture
of character and mind, in the place of the more superficial and
broader education of mere intellect, or a one-sided sestheticism.
The acceptance of such opinions in society, and by persons who
are by no means resolved to follow them, proves how deeply
rooted is the feeling that no splendour of external refinement
can delude, in regard to the utter worthlessness of it, where
there is a want of high character. The question, What are you
good for ? — the truth of the statement, ' At bottom we are only
reckoned for what we are,' find a place in the background even
of the superficial consciousness. At least, men widely fear to
openly contradict this truth, because it is felt that by so
doing they may expose themselves to a morally derogatory
judgment. But where it is openly done, then that limit of
moral godlessness is reached which St Paul (Rom. i. 28) calls
' the reprobrate mind.'
The idea of character, and in fact the word, is not found in
the original documents of Christianity ; but by the characters of
252 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
which it gives an account, and above all by the one complete
character of Jesus Christ, authenticated by His life, it shows
that the term character belongs to the sacred things of ethical
terminology, just like that of ' calling,' and is nearer still than
that to the innermost secret of the moral world, the love of
God revealed in Christ.
To give in detail what the essential features of the Christian
character are in respect of content, would necessarily lead to
wearisome repetition (p. 212). Of course they ever concern the
self-same essential relations of all the moral life — the relation to
God and to our neighbour, to our own nature, and to the
external world. Of that we have already spoken in treating of
the highest Good, the supreme Norm, the deepest Motive of all
Christian action, and must again speak in their illustrative
application to social ethics. Besides, the tabular enumeration
of virtues, still needful for the sake of clearness, affords
opportunity for bringing to our recollection any point which
it is absolutely necessary to consider under each such aspect as
is done here under the heading of character ; and also for the
consideration of any other detail, which we can leave out at
present, which it may nevertheless be indispensable to weigh
when we explicitly treat of the formation of character and of our
battle with sin. Still, irrespective of these special points of
view, we may even now consider what that feeling is which
accompanies the growth of Christian personality, of Christian
character ; or what is the fundamental note of Christian
character.
So far as, in this matter, the question relates to the profit-
ableness of good action to the agent, we may also say it
relates to his immediate participation in the highest Good — his
enjoyment of the End which is still present even while he is on
the way to it. Yet phrases of this kind are easily misunder-
stood, and of no great value unless all the earlier closer
definitions are repeated or borne in mind. In simpler form,
we may say the action of the virtuous character, wrought in
conformity with duty, is inseparably associated with a feeling
of dignity and honour as well as of blessedness and freedom.
Both are plainly connected, but yet they are twofold. In
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 253
the idea of honour there is an emphatic reference to the idea
of a moral Judge ; in that of blessedness a similar emphasis
lies on the profitableness of goodness in regard to our im-
mediate emotional life.
Joy and happiness are experienced when our circumstances
in life accord with our nature, or, to use a graphic phrase, when
they are such as that we ' see we live.' Hence it is that one
calls that joy and life, which to another appears as suffering and
even death. The highest conceivable degree of joy, of loving
contentment, is called salvation ; not without the spontaneous
background of thought that with the highest degree of salvation
there is associated that of its greatest duration. Provided that
our true nature, our proper destiny, consists in being good, in
our actual harmony with what we ought to be, then must the
realisation of that our true nature be accompanied by a feeling
of the highest conceivable joy, of, in a word, blessedness or
salvation. That is, it is in the moral life that we find our true
life. It is not merely that blessedness may follow good action
and goodness — that would be a blessedness alien in kind, and
then goodness would be a means to an end foreign in character
to those means, and in comparison with it lower. In fact, the
New Testament, however much it avoids the restriction, on
good grounds, of our blessedness to the world of our earthly
experience, is full of passages which praise the height, depth,
the absolute incomparableness of the blessedness of salvation
now experienced by the Christian. It might be profitable to
exhibit them in detail ; such words as joy, peace, life, blessed-
ness, rejoicing in oneself, and others, in all their shades of
meaning and inexhaustible applications. We can then be
convinced how unfounded is the reproach that Christian ethics
is gloomy and joyless ; as unfounded as the other assertion
that it finally means the search for sensuous enjoyment. It
leaves these contradictions behind, and is effective in composing
the ancient strife which repeats itself in every breast, between
virtue and happiness. It is the ethics of inexpressible joy
(Pet. i. 8), which is a "joy in the Holy Ghost" (Rom. xiv. 17);
in accordance with its origin inseparably one with the joy of
the One who with such mystical openness witnesses of His joy,
254 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
of that joy which is His own, unique, which cannot be taken
away from Him (St John xiv. 16). Its ground is that He knows
that He is beloved of the Father, and that He keeps Himself
in that love by doing His will, and He Himself loves (St John
XV. 11, xvi. 22, XV. 9 ff.) ; and out of His love, which is His life.
His desire is to make this love and the joy of love in life a
living reality for others. This joy is not the inner reward of
virtue as a moral power which is dependent on itself; but the
happiness of a love which, eternally loved, can do no other than
exhibit love to others. Nor is it the outward reward of virtue,
but it finds its completion in the agony of the cross. For the
sake of this inner glory it bursts the bonds of earthly existence
and is a joy "unspeakable and full of glory" (1 Pet. i. 8). It
may easily be seen how here too all the master-relations of the
highest Good come under notice ; at every point Christian
ethics exhibits its uniqueness. Without again recalling detail,
we must here draw attention to the way in which the New
Testament — and that in all its parts — makes clear that this
joy, salvation, this enjoyment of eternal life in the midst of
time, and with the pledge of future completion, uniformly
accompanies all the activities of the Christian character, both
those which are religious and all those which in the more
limited sense are moral duties. Founded in faith, and in that
pure experience of the divine love which it receives, it is active
in the virtues of humility, patience, hope ; in aspiration of the
soul for God, prayer, as in those which belong to the love of
our neighbour in their widest range. With special plainness
and instructive clearness the first Epistle of St John says that
eternal life in faith and love is now experienced (1 John v. 13,
iii. 14). St James says that blessedness is experienced in
'doing' (i. 25 fF.), as in patient endurance (i. 2 ff.). St Paul
knows of a personal glorying which rests in the faith of justifi-
cation (Rom. V. 1 ff.) and in self-denying service for the Gospel
(1 Cor. ix. 15 ff*.). His powerful word, "Rejoice in the Lord
always," he purposely gives twice over in that epistle of joy,
the Philippians. This joy proceeds from the certainty of the
nearness of the Lord ( " The Lord is at hand " ), from the absence
of anxiety, from prayer (iv. 4-7) ; as fi-om diligent meditation
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 255
on all that is "true, just, pure, and of good report" in human
intercourse. Both series issue in the possession of " the peace
of God " ( " The peace of God shall be with you " ), that peace
which is the deepest ground of all Christian joy. But all this
is merely the echo and explanation of the twofold unique
foundation which Jesus lays in the Beatitudes (St Matt. v. 1 fF.).
Why it cannot be otherwise has already been examined : even
here we are led back to the deeper consideration — right to the
sanctuary of the Christian faith — the completely distinct and
unique thought of God as holy love. It is in Him that the
reason is found why this prevailing view of the New
Testament — that the blessedness of the Christian character
is experienced in its activities — contains no contradiction to
the idea of justification by faith alone {cf. pp. 95, 127, 179).
Of coui'se a question will arise out of this when we sub-
sequently have to ponder the fact of enduring sin in the
Christian life.
Next, let us note that in the New Testament the words 'joy,'
' blessedness ' have a reciprocal relation to the word ' freedom "* ;
and that in the sense that freedom is regarded as a Good, as
life and salvation. Impressively does St Paul speak of never
allowing himself to be overcome by natural impulses (1 Cor. vi.
12 ff.) ; of his independence of human judgment, and that he
dare appeal to the highest Tribunal (1 Cor. x. 29); of his
standing above the highest powers of this world (Rom. viii.) ;
of his not being ' initiated *■ into any secret ceremonies, but into
that secret so hard to learn, how " both to be full and to be
hungry, how both to abound and to suffer need,"" and of that
greater difficulty, how to be " all things to all men " (Phil. iv.
12 ff. ; 1 Cor. ix. 19 fF.). And all that because he is free from
the law of sin and death, through the law of the Spirit of life
which is in Christ Jesus (Rom. viii. 1 ff.). And the service of
God Himself in which all this freedom is founded is to him
" perfect freedom.'" It is the freedom of the sons of God, which
is now already a real, and indeed the only true, though hidden
life ; and which yearns for its full revelation, and has, in itself,
the pledge that this desire will be gratified ; and yet this life is
Christ Himself (Rom. viii. 15, 21 f. ; Col. iii. 1 ff.). We
256 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
cannot be surprised at this interchanging relation of the words
blessedness and freedom if we but think of the nature of the
* Good.' Even here the Christian Good proves itself to be the
perfection of all that is truly Good. We cannot define the
nature of the moral life otherwise than that it is a life of inner
unity and freedom ; and we cannot see our true destiny, our
real being, in anything else. But the thought of this freedom
is empty, so far as it gains shape at all ; the power of realising
it is wanting. We seek this freedom in innumerable by-paths ;
and if we divine the right way, this, oui' presage of it, brings
Us only on a portion of our journey, and not yet to the goal.
The will which thirsts for freedom sells itself into servitude.
Our own nature, our fellow-creatures, the whole world becomes
a fetter as long as we fain would regard this world, and gain it
as our freedom. We have recognised the reason why this must
be so. It is not any imperative ' Thou shalt "* ; it is only
a quite definite one that can seriously put forward the claim
to pass as absolute, because it truly leads to the possession of
that freedom. And this ' Thou shalt,' which is the law of our
own will, must be God's will borne by His might above the
whole world ; and also in our weak will led by the proof of His
love on to victory. In short, we must once more say all that was
earlier adduced when speaking of the proof of the truth of the
Christian Good. But that it has (unsought for) again ':nade good
itself in our present context is itself a witness of the correctness
of our fundamental position, and illumines it from every passing
experience (pp. 20, 93, 104, 160).
The distinction and the close connection of blessedness and
honour have already been stated. In the former the good
' character ' experiences that to be good is the true life ; the
latter is the recognition of its moral value in any ethical
judgment of it. Certainly there is no blessedness without the
certainty of such recognition (even if it were in an appeal to
the judgment of God unacknowledged by all the world), and
all honour brings joy. But the notion 'honour' implicates the
moral judgment of a Person, the decisive mark. If it is
correct to say that the German word for honour is related to
the word which means brass, then there was a sense-reference to
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 257
this fact in the word itself.^ Thus, in the idea of ' honour "* there
is the implicate of the splendour of the Good as exhibited to
a judge, whether this judge is the person himself or another;
or, finally, God as the reader of all hearts, and the sole Judge
of all. Thus all those expressions which at first seem to be
contradictory find their explanation ; as, for instance, ' to love
honour,' ' seek for honour,"" ' receive honour,"" ' give honour,"" ' have
honour"" ('have honour in the body""), 'a man of honour.""
Shame is the guardian of honour ; it protects honour from
violation by convincing him whose honour is infringed that he
ought not to have permitted its violation.
Simple as is this general notion of honour at the bottom, the
way in which it is used is very manifold, as we may see by noting
what is supposed to be worthy of honour and what is recognised
as such. As a matter of fact, it has been made to mean almost
anything, even opposite things. To speak more particularly,
the way in which the ' Good ' is defined settles in any system
of ethics the meaning to be attached to the idea of honour.
Because the Greeks had a different moral ideal from that of
Christianity (without prejudice to that common foundation of
all ethics spoken of at the commencement of our work), they had
a different notion of honour. The same thing is true within
the limits of Christianity : the monk, for instance, considers
that his honour consists in blind obedience, which to us Protest-
ants seems unworthy of honour. But still more, it is Protestant
ethics which makes it easier for us to see that every calling has
its code of honour in accord with its special nature. However
true it is that much sin tries to conceal itself under this cloak —
' It is the code of honour in the circle in which I move ' — it
must still be allowed that such code has a certain unimpeachable
justification, since every moral calling has its own special
importance in the whole of the Kingdom of God. ' Give the
king due honour,"" ' Our industry is an honour to us,"" and the
like phrases are but applications of the rule, ' Honour to
^ As the Latin word aes-timo was connected with aes, brass, so Ehre, honour,
with Erz, brass. But Kluge, Etymologisches Worterbuch, gives the more probable
connection of both the Latin and German with Sanscrit root " />," to desire, seek
to obtain. — Tr.
17
258 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
whom honour is due ' (1 Pet. ii. 17 ; Rom. xiii. 7). The
almost inconceivably great variety of temperaments — that is,
of the natural material out of which character is shaped —
illustrates the same thing. The greater the resistance of the
material, the greater the honour of victory over it. When we
look at this we see how, to the widest extent, it is possible for
us to be sincere in our deferential complaisance to another, and
esteem him above ourselves (Phil. ii. 2), ' in honour preferring
one another.' The general distinctions of sex, age, nationality,
give a different impress to the notion of honour. The child's
idea is different from that of the man, as is that of a woman,
whose notion of honour is different from that of a man ; without
any contradiction of Gal. iii. 28, but rather unfolding its
meaning. Christian honour, then, which belongs to all, is, on
account of its intrinsic inexhaustibility, infinitely manifold in
its forms.
Consequently to everyone there belongs just as much honour
as is due to his goodness ; as much recognition as he, measured
by the ideal standard, and according to his disposition and his
special position, is found in moral judgment to be in harmony
with the ideal. To the best belongs the highest honour,
Christ ; to Him who in obedience endured unparalleled humilia-
tion, unparalleled exaltation, the " Name which is above every
name" (Phil. ii.). No honour at all to him who, so far as in
him lies, rejects the binding force of the imperative ' Thou
shalt ' ; declines his duty to others, as the selfish man, who is
in both these points godless and ungrateful for the gift of God
which should bind him to these duties. The only scintilla of
honour that may be given to the idle lounger or the sensual
man is that which arises from this fact of his eternal destiny,
inasmuch as it is not for man to deny his immortal value so
long as God gives him time to repent.
From all this it results that to strive for honour, for
recognition by a moral judgment, is a task for the Christian
which he cannot forego, a task of moral endeavour which cannot
even be thought of as non-existent for him. " Not to be excited
about trifles, and yet to contend for a straw when honour is at
stake," expresses a really Christian thought, how often soever
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 259
it has been misused. Doubtless honour has its place in our
life in the flesh. It is not merely a nation, but every individual,
that is worthless if he is not prepared to sacrifice all for honour.
Not to sacrifice all if need be would be not to recognise the
duty of regarding our life here as the higliest of ' Goods ' ; it
would not be goodness. Hence even in Christian ethics there is
such a thing as justifiable moral self-esteem, legitimate pride.
" I laboured more abundantly than they all " (1 Cor. xv. 9). Self-
respect is a Christian virtue, self-degradation is in Christian
ethics doubly reprehensible — a lie. But a Christian ambition —
{Sio Koi (piXoTi/uLoviuieday " we are ambitious to be well pleasing
to Him," R.V.) — is quite real in its endeavour to obtain re-
cognition for the possession of true goodness, not its mere
appearance. For this is hypocrisy, which is seeming to be
good without really being so, the reverse of a good character,
and the greatest and most subtle danger in the development of
many a Christian. The German word is stronger than the
Greek-derived representative, hypocrisy, which excellently repre-
sents those more subtle forms of it which a coarser word dis-
guises. It includes every sort of pretence. The pursuit of honour
and praise, that is, the desire of recognition of our real worth,
cannot be otherwise regarded than as inseparable from the pursuit
of righteousness. In the education of those not come to maturity
the prospect of such recognition should be a spur to the
endeavour to be worthy of it. To awaken a mere covetousness
of honour is an evil in the training of youth. For those who
have come to years of discretion the pursuit of honour and the
pursuit of goodness go hand in hand.
But, now, the moral judgment from which springs the desired
recognition of our worth is not always and everywhere a right
one, or such as stands on a high level of knowledge and of
purity of will. Our present statements only stand good
without restriction so far as this may be assumed. In the
actual world, on the contrary, we find that all the champions of
the Good are now at war with the evil around them and in
them, with the world and the flesh ; and besides, the Christian
needs continually to ask himself how far his own or another"'s
judgment is to be relied upon in awarding or refusing honour,
260 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
or this moral recognition of worth. On this point we find a
double warning in the New Testament, and easily perceive
their connection with the highest truths. On the one hand, we
are not to despise the worth of even an imperfect judgment,
for there are elements of truth in it which a self-satisfied mind
may easily overlook. Hence Christians are to walk honourably
to those who are without {cf. 1 Cor. x. 32). But, on the other
hand, all human judgment, even the best, even that of the
Christian (and this particularly often) is fallible. To seek
honour of men easily becomes a hindrance to reliance upon the
highest court of appeal, the judgment of God. Even the
tribunal within us cannot have the last word (1 Cor. iv. 4, " He
that judgeth me is the Lord: I judge not mine own self"").
Christ on the cross appeared as the least honourable of all men
in the roll of the world's history, and yet before God that cross
was the highest in honour, and to the opened eye of faith is and
will be a spectacle of eternal glory. To dwell upon the honour
which comes from men is one of the foremost hindrances to
moral progress, and is a fetter as enslaving as Mammon
(St John V. 44, vii. 18; 2 Cor. vi. 8). As a good rule of
personal self-examination, it has ever been recommended to ask
oneself the question : Does the thought of having acted
foolishly in the opinion of our fellows bring deeper pain than
the conviction of having sinned against God ? Luth:*r''s saying
at Worms, " They have deprived me of fame and honour, but
sufficient for me is my Saviour and Redeemer Jesus Christ,"
stands on a high level.
In respect to violations of honour in social intercourse
regulated by legal sanctions, those principles apply which we
adduced above when dealing with right as duty. The so-called
rehabilitation of this honour by the duel is neither harmless nor
reasonable, nor necessary as an additional means for obtaining
what the law already guarantees. It is not harmless, for the
duel is an open breach of the law, a retrogression to the period
of blood-feud, and in particular to that of the superstitions
of the ordeal ; it is also an arbitrary endangering of another''s
life. It is unreasonable, for it is not intelligible how by such
means the wrong done by the offender is atoned for, or the
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 261
honour of the injured person rehabilitated. Neither for the
one end nor the other does the acknowledgment of equal social
rank, which is implied in the challenge to a duel or its accept-
ance, suffice ; and just as little to the purpose is the proved
courage of the combatants, say, for instance, when the cause
of offence is the accusation of dishonourable lying. It is
unnecessary, for only the defender of duelling will assert that
all other legal means are insufficient, which are not really
sought for so long as the prejudice in favour of the necessity
of duelling remains — quite apart from its actual necessity in
some countries. Of course, in this asserted necessity the real
thought which lies concealed is the desire of revenge. After
all, it is the chief duty of the depository of state power, of the
supreme protector of social order, to work for the abolition
of duelling by all means, and that on account of the confusion of
moral issues which obviously exists in those strata of society in
which there are few who are themselves addicted to this breach
of law. Only in reference to duelling we are bound to insist
that we cannot make any exception to the rule given as to the
personal character of every judgment of duty. Whether, for
instance, an individual officer may refuse to comply with this
form of protecting his honour at the price of dismissal from
the service, when also his livelihood and that of his family
depend upon his position, is a matter for his own conscience
{cf. ' Conflict of Duties ■"). In some way quite different from the
serious duel are the academic combats of students. The
Christian moral judgment must notwithstanding be a stern
one, on account of the waste of time inseparable from them :
and still more because far more ideal wreaths of honour allure
the youthful mind ; particularly under the sway of the general
notion of standing up for oneself, to say nothing . of the desire
which asserts itself in every young life to give much high evidence
of a courageous bearing. Exaggeration of supposed personal
honour and the absence of real honour are often quite close
neighbours at the universities where such things obtain.
262 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
Hiimility.
The words blessedness and freedom, dignity and honour,
already discussed, which are the fundamental notes of the
Christian character, get their full and deep quality first of all
by their union with humility. Christian joy, Christian freedom,
and Christian honour are humble — humble joy and humble
glorying. It is clear from such phrases that humility is not
a separate virtue, but properly and rightly is that which in its
main import and intrinsic excellence gives the tone to the
Christian character, and is therefore the common stamp set
upon every Christian virhue. For this reason it is that the
word humility is in a special degree a Christian term. The
New Testament appropriates a Greek word which for Greeks
themselves expressed their contempt for low mean-spiritedness.^
The Old Testament is on this point a prophecy, but not its
fulfilment, for the ' poor,' ' oppressed,"" the ' afflicted," the humble
sufferers of the Psalms and Prophets merely prepare the way
for the meek and humble of heart of the New Testament. And
even in the midst of the Christian world humility is not accorded
the respect due to it, on account of the numerous misconceptions
that have attached themselves to the mere word. It is almost
easier to say what it does not mean than what its true sense is.
It does not mean set reflection on the contrast be^^ween the
finite and the Infinite, creature and Creator, nor the feeling
of insignificance which thence arises. Christ, the example of
true humility, is the Father's Son, and He brings us into the
state of adoption. And His humility, and ours in His likeness,
is the opposite of all self-produced and so easily self-pleasing
work, by means of which man, unable to throw off* the pressure
of life, makes that feeling of insignificance endurable. Just
as little is humility simply self-humiliation arising from a
continual reflection on personal sin or on human sin generally.
Or otherwise where is the humility of Christ ^ And how much
self-satisfaction may be bound up with a strongly marked sense
of being a ' miserable sinner ' ! So much the more readily
because in this way by such self-torment the word sin (a word
* Vide Trench, New Testament Synonyms, pp. 145 ff. — Tr.
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 263
which cannot be misemployed with impunity) is confounded
with the mere sense of human imperfection, and by the
exaggeration of its seriousness its true seriousness is lost, and
the moral mixed up with what is natural. In justifiable
opposition to that kind of misuse of terms, and with a clear
reference to the New Testament, the view has recently been
advanced that true humility means partly a ready acquiescence
in God's providential guidance, and partly a readiness to serve
His will, which is wrought by the joyful consciousness of God's
love, just as the Son of Man, worthy to rule, resolved to be
the servant of all ; and that this willingness to serve is the
measure of true greatness in God's Kingdom. And certainly
humility is not a barren emotion ; it is no wearisome, self-
regarding virtue, which never issues in a resolve of the will ;
certainly, too, humility is the highest courage, and this cannot
manifest its energy otherwise than in subjection to God's
guidance in the service of others ; and hence humility has
express relation to our attitude to our fellow-men, and is not
merely modesty. Still, the word cannot be taken in so narrow
a sense. The observation already made, that all Christian
virtues permit and require the epithet, compels us to give it
a wider meaning. Humility is the reverential inclination of
our souls to the almighty, holy love of God in yearning
confidence, in yearning desire. It is in this respect the belief
that this virtue is the childlike reception of the undeserved and
inexhaustible grace of God. That this willingness to receive
is the incentive and motive power of the willingness to bestow
follows from the nature of God, and the quality of faith which
is determined by that nature, as we have earlier set forth.
In this master-idea, so taken, those other ideas at first rejected
gain their justification, which concern the distance between
God and man, and between the Holy God and sinful man.
Yes, in its place and at its time, each according to his special
character as an individual, each as he is led, both these sides
of the whole truth gain a certain substantiality : " I a shadow,
He, the fount of light," " For me and for my life nothing merely
of earth suffices." The simplest and hardest proof of humility
for all is that inner attitude in relation to those positions in
264 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
life in which good fortune demands greater moral courage than
misfortune. And another proof is found in willing, joyfiil
service for the benefit of our neighbour.
Sin.
This idea of humility, too, like the rest of our exposition,
leads us of itself to the explicit consideration of character in
relation to sin^ and so to apply ourselves to the task named
before (p. 148). The subjects on which it is necessary to speak
as to this matter are numerous and various. Let us start by
saying that the question really is as to the hindrances to be
overcome in the progress of spiritual growth ; of continual
* conversion ' ; of sanctification as the task to be carried to
completeness. Then we find that there are three clear heads to
which it is easy to give intelligible distinctness of meaning.
They are, the enemy, the weapons, the victory. In other words,
we consider the fact of temptation to sin in the way the
Christian encounters it ; then the aids which are available in
this battle ; and finally the success attained. That is, we
ponder questions which concern sin in the regenerate ; the
relation of sin and salvation ; the Gospel idea of perfection.
Temptation.
The word temptation suffers not infrequently from being
used in different senses in well-known passages of Holy Scripture.
God tempts no one, says St James. The petition in the Lord's
Prayer, " Lead us not into temptation,"" assumes that it is God
that leads us into temptation, or why pray that He may not
lead us into temptation ? St Paul, in Corinthians (x. 15),
expressly combines the two, as Luther clearly explains. The
longer catechisms have not always presented the idea in its
depth and freedom. According to them, God will protect us
from being deceived and misled by the devil, the world, and
the flesh, and in our contests with these will give us the victory.
Many a time the old explanations are better than the new ;
when, for instance, a distinction is drawn between the tempta-
tion to evil and to good, explaining the latter idea by showing
how in this ' good ' a temptation may lie, and then afterwards
THE NEW IJFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 265
it is found needful to put the question, Cannot even temptation
be beneficial ? Besides this difficulty in the word temptation,
there comes the other, which lies in a loose use of the words
' world ' and ' flesh,'' and their relation to satanic temptations.
Temptation is everything that can be a motive to sin, and to
our wilful resistance to the will of God. This, of course, is
understanding sin in the ordinary Evangelical sense, so that, as
Luther says, " Nothing damns but unbelief."" Everything in and
for itself can be such incitement to sin, even the greatest
opposites, health and sickness, poverty and riches, society and
solitude. And this occasion for possible sin may be external or
internal — for instance, a talent which we possess, however good
it may be in itself. But this only on the assumption that this
outward or inward incitement meets with something in our
ego that is receptive and responsive to it. Hence real tempta-
tion is continual temptation of a definite person, and varies
with the natural disposition, temperament, calling, and course
of life. In the Confessions of St Augustine, and in the life of
Luther, a special world of temptation is revealed ; for Jesus
Christ temptation had a unique quality, as, say, in contrast with
St Paul (c/. 2 Cor. xi. 21-33; Rom. vii. 7-25). The word
in the Epistle to the Hebrews (iv. 15), " He was in all points
tempted as we are,"" emphasises for our comfort the fact of
His power to realise all our temptations, while it does not
exclude but assumes that for Himself His personal aud unique
temptations were such as sprang from His special calling as
the Redeemer (St Matt, iv., xvi., xxvi.).
Such temptation is necessary for every real moral develop-
ment. It is in accordance with the divine will as the
indispensable basis for personal resolves, as the inevitable
material on which the fulfilment of duty turns. And this
whether we explain away sin, or assume its immense activity
in Paradise and out of it, as read in the early pages of the
Bible. But temptation with the design that it shall result
in sin is absolutely contrary to the idea of God. If it be said
that such temptations proceed from the world and the flesh,
then world and flesh are not here understood to mean that
external incitement necessary to any actual temptation or
266 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
the susceptibility to that incitement which in our ego is
responsive to it, but we mean ' world ■" and * flesh "* in the sense
already assigned to these terms (p. 152) as plainly set forth
in Holy Writ — the world, that is, in opposition to the King-
dom of God, the world as an expression for that interaction
of evil wills everywhere present, although in incalculable variety
of importance ; inclusive also of the social arrangements which
are its product. Flesh as meaning that nature we possess
already at enmity with God : " Every man is tempted when
he is led away by his own lust and enticed" (James i. 14).
If this infinitely complicated whole has been divided into ' lust
of the eye,' ' lust of the flesh,' and ' the pride of life,' that
has been done against the scope of the word, and necessarily
leads to artificiality and superficiality. With regard to the
temptations of the devil, experienced pastors have often in-
sisted on the necessity of using caution in calling those such
which it is very difficult so to regard, since the test, whether
hard or easy, is necessarily subjective feeling. In the same
way we have particularly to guard against thinking those
sudden fancies and impulses which emerge without apparent
reason as temptations of Satan, because they often enough
arise from abnormal physical circumstances which mostly call
for the treatment of the physician. Neither may we deny the
danger of spiritual pride in this province. All those who have
room in their belief for the idea of a background of a mysterious
world of 'offence' are just those who will be most disposed to
insist on this danger. It is, however, rather a subject for
theology than ethics. When we are speaking of temptation,
we are also standing on ground where the Christian neophyte
should put a restraint on himself, and be ready to learn in his
own case from the experience of others, and especially from the
great heroes of faith in the Kingdom of God ; where he may
learn of the strength and weakness of the human heart, and see
the inexhaustible variety of change of feelings ranging from the
joy of assurance of salvation to the severest spiritual contests.
He is finally assured against all, who has penetrated through
the darkness to the eternal light, and for whom the prospect
of a great calm after the storm is one of the surest signs of
THE NEW IJFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 267
one earnestly struggling with temptation. This is the true
preparation for death, and not weak trifling with self-produced
dream-fancies.
This explanation of temptation (which really deserves to be
called a world in itself) becomes deeper and clearer as we gain
an increasing insight into the subtle ramifications of the
interconnected psychical and physical life {cf. p. 172). All
the master-notions of individual ethics, as responsibility,
personal worth, character, freedom, are, in this way, brought
out of shadowy indefiniteness into the full daylight of reality.
We may form some conjecture of the infinite variety in the
comrades we have in this great battle of temptation, which
is fought for the most part in secret. We learn to understand
others, and gain caution in judging them. We give heed for
ourselves even to that which is apparently trifling, which can
have such serious consequences. We find our responsibility no
longer merely in the moments of clear resolve, but in the secret
most insignificant beginnings ; everything is important and
significant. The exhortation to " watch and pray," to manliness
and firmness, becomes a living word for our daily life. Especially
is heedfulness of the temptation which is dangerous to an
individual from his idiosyncrasy increased. The ancient
saying, "Sin which lurks at the door," is true of every-
one, but of everyone in a different way. The lurking beast
at the door is not always the same, and the battle is not always
the same. To ' flee ' is one way, and another is " to starve the
beasts out, give them nothing to graze on in thy thoughts,
and they grow lean and languid." Instead of that we feed
them on the titbits of our fancy or the products of the
lascivious imaginations of others.
That everything may be a source of temptation, fortune or
misfortune, has been above suggested ; yet with good reason a
special word or two must be devoted to suffering, in consonance
with our immediate feeling of its significance in such connection.
Temptation from this source affects all those sides of the moral
life so often named. Suffering makes us unruly, loveless, god-
less, unless there is some counterbalancing influence brought
to bear. Honest self-judgment stands astonished at the way in
268 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
which it can make us stupid and indifferent towards things
above, outside us or within us, and often so quickly. Complain-
ing rebellion against fate, hardness and tyranny towards our
neighbour, anxious and eager care for our personal well-being,
is only apparent strength, and is in truth moral weakness.
Suffering for the purpose of punishment no longer exists for
him who is a child of God. This is most clearly seen in those
sufferings which have their real origin in the sins and eiTors of
earlier life, and even of our after life. They can become tempta-
tions, such as we call severe temptation to unbelief, or a trial
arising from doubt why it is that God does not remove the
suffering if peace with God is a reality (Rom. v. 1). But then the
victory consists in the firmly fixed faith that " there is no con-
demnation to them who are in Christ Jesus,"" that that kind of
suffering, however bitter it may be to our feelings, is yet no
longer punishment, but the discipline of fatherly love, which —
the very opposite of all human arbitrariness — in a wonderful
way helps us forward to the goal of perfection (Heb. xii. 5).
Such suffering has always been regarded as a sanctuary in the
stillness of which it is only the sufferer himself who can find the
proper answer to the questions : Why is this particular suffering
sent to me .'' How far am I to meet it by work and prayer ?
(2 Cor. xii.). In what way can it be made to serve my best
interests ? How much Christian reflection has busied itself
with this life-question of suffering is witnessed by the number
of words which have on them the impress of the various sides of
this educative power of suffering. In respect of the result for
the sufferer are such words as refer to ' proving,"* ' purifying,""
'perfecting"' power; and designations famous in Christian
ethics are such as ' martyr,"" ' witness "" in sufferings for others
and to the glory of God, inexhaustibly illustrated in the picture-
gallery of histories of saints, of the Scriptures, and the Church.
All suffering attains its highest consecration when it is dignified
by the name of the Cross, and a truly reverent piety will
watch jealously lest, in common speech, this word should be
misused by application to any pain which the natural heart
shuns. It is only bearing the ' Cross '' after Christ in the
strictest sense when suffering is borne in the power of the
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 269
atoning Cross of Christ, in the spirit of His obedient faith and
His patient love. All sufferings, of course, in respect of range
can be subsumed under this head, however distinct the out-
ward form of the suffering may be. In the chief place stands
conscious sorrow over others' sin, enduring sympathy with
others' deepest need.
Suicide.
Here, where the question spoken of is of suffering as tempta-
tion, is probably the right place to consider the morality of
suicide. For in Christian ethics it is only in such a connection
from the point of view of trial, that it can explicitly come
within purview. It is not an indifferent fact, in regard to a
verdict on it, that the spread of suicide keeps pace, generally
speaking, with the progress of civilisation, of our mechanical
and intellectual mastery over nature's forces. It has increased
in the last half-century with the immense impetus given to
industries, commerce, and national education. During this
period it has increased among the nations mainly affected by
this impulse, and, among these, more among the German than
the Romance nations, and among the latter more than among
the Sclavs. Within these nations it has increased at the
centres of civilisation, in the great capitals, and within these
latter among those who are chiefly engaged in callings where
culture is highest. But we are warned to be cautious of hasty
conclusions, since, in Norway, with advancing civilisation the
number of suicides in the last century has greatly diminished.
The warfare waged against alcohol may perhaps have some
connection with this. The causes in individual cases are often
obscure, but, so far as they are ascertainable, it would appear
that temporary excitement of passion is provable in a decreas-
ingly small number of cases ; while in many cases disease is
accountable ; in the vast majority, probably more than two-
thirds, the cause is weariness of life slowly coming to a head.
But this itself has its reason in the ruin of the life by economical
or business or spiritual or moral causes, and that in such incon-
ceivably great variety and combinations of circumstances as to
leave no possibility of being able to assess the measure of
270 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
personal guilt, and especially in those cases where the im-
mediate causes are not such as drunkenness and dissipation,
which are relatively plain and clear. Particularly shocking
cases, as, for instance, youthful suicides, often cast light on the
difficulty and necessity of plain speaking on the purely individual
needs that arise in the spiritual, moral, and bodily development
of the young life. In this task of the most personal care for
souls love must always and ever be more ingenious in its faith-
fulness.
There is scarcely any point of ethics on which moral judgment
has passed through so many and extraordinary alternations.
The natural horror of death which characterises an unembarrassed
mind, which does not willingly take this step into the dark
unknown — man alone among the creatures of this world essays
a voluntary death — was weakened at the commencement of
complicated social arrangements by the tendency to excuse
suicide, or even to glorify it, existing alongside this natural
disapproval. The death of Saul seems much like the end of
a course of disobedience, while it throws a sort of expiatory
shimmer of light on a life which began with so much promise.
The Stoic philosophy set the rule for that which appeared so
grand in the end of Themistocles and Cato — if the circumstances
seem unworthy, there is a way open ; the life that can no longer
be lived with dignity may be left like a room filled with smoke.
The faith of Christians gave them reason and strength for
stern disapproval. So completely did this view pass into the
general consciousness that it seemed no longer needful to appeal
to faith. The heroes of German philosophy almost overpassed
the Christian judgment in strictness. In the opinion of Fichte,
"to take one''s own life is just the same as determining no
longer to do one's duty ; our duty to God, to our neighbour,
to ourselves.^ There were many causes which combined to bring
about the breaking of the bow too stiffly bent. Medical science,
which recognised the intimate dependence of the psychical on
the physical life ; still more the popularisation of its actual and
supposed scientific results ; the progress of social insight into
the might of economic circumstances ; moral considerations
which would not submit to those master-sayings — considerations
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 271
which appeared to have sound human intelligence on their side.
Why — it was asked always more insistently, — why not dare to
take a life received unasked for ? or that which is grown to be
merely a burden and a torment to others as to oneself? Nay, is
not the ruined man still a man by at least courageously putting
an end to a life already lost ? Is not such an end the opposite
of the cowardice which these exalted axioms of philosophy would
brand it as being ? And from this prevalent feeling the sincere
upholders of the stern view, and especially the Church, found
the growing need of facing the question : Whether, where the
last honours of burial are concerned, in such cases the poor and
rich, the respectable and the pauper, are alike impartially
dealt with ?
In spite of all the confusion of the moment, the principles
of Christianity on this matter cannot be doubtful. That word
"Judge not," set forth as an obvious rule for all, ought to
make it clear to every Christian that there is no such thing
as a ' lost ' life so long as that " To-day if ye will hear His
voice" (Heb. iii. 7) has meaning. The Christian knows that
nothing can separate him from the love of God, and that in the
light of this love everything without exception is for the best,
even the suffering that is unendurable without this faith, and
that for the sufferer himself, as for his own immediate circle
(Rom. viii.) ; that he is the Lord's, whether in life or death, and
especially that he can die ' to the Lord,' in subjection to the
will of the Lord, as to time and circumstances (Rom. xiv.).
But we may go down a step further still into the labyrinth
of the mind oppressed by sadness and weariness of life, and
say, even where that living faith is not present at all, or is
temporarily obscured, the common fear of God, the dread,
however undefined, of that step into the unknown, that de-
termination to pause before the final secret of our existence,
may and ought to be a powerful obstacle to the carrying out
of dark thoughts into darker deed. That is the meaning of
the poet :
Oh that the Everlasting had not fixed
His canon against self-slaughter. . . .
272 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
To die, to sleep,
To sleep, perchance to dream ; — ay, there's the rub ;
For in that sleep of death what dreams may come
When we have shuffled off this mortal coil
Must give us pause.
But that the dread of something after death,
. The undiscovered country from whose bourn
No traveller returns, puzzles the will.
Many doctors affirm that one reason of suicide is the cessation
of belief in a hereafter. In Christian judgment, accordingly,
suicide is a guilty act when and so far as that definite faith
or religious fear could be present, and on that only God can
decide. But Christian history is full of examples of how this
temptation to suicide more frequently tortures men than a
merely superficial view recognises ; and it is only known in
confidential conversation how it is overcome by faith, and
partly in ways that only those who are led in them can rightly
declare to be marvellous.
Asceticism.
In the battle with temptation the Christian proves his
weapons. He inquires for the means which will lead him on
his course to the goal. Or then, if this goal is under our
present point of view the ripening of Christian character, and
the state of virtue, then he seeks for the means of realising it ;
for the virtues which are the means for the cultivation of his
character. But if that is correct which has already been said
of the development of the new life, then the doctrine of moral
gymnastic (asceticism) may be shortly dealt with. It is
at bottom merely a question of setting aside a doubtful
notion, and one that is in ethics dangerous. We have long
noted that, as said, we become good when we do good ; the
will grows firmer by practice on the material which divine
Providence offers, by the fulfilling of God's will in a definite
way. That is the secret not only of an active but also of a
holy and, in both, peaceful life for Christ as for Christians
{cf. Adolphe Monod, Farewell Addresses). "To walk in good
works which God has prepared beforehand,"" that is the way
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 273
in which we ourselves become a personal whole, and do our-
selves become a work of God (Eph. ii. 10) : " We are His
workmanship.""
.... I
Am no tongue hero, no fine virtue-prattler.
I cannot warm by thinking
Cease I to work, I am annihilated. (^Wallenstein.y
But that is our question, Is it not possible to ' warm the will '
without being a ' virtue-prattler '' ? Is there no work that ma^^
be done merely for strengthening the will ? Did not Jesus go
alone on to the mountains and into the wilderness for prayer,
for self-recollection ? Such questions show in the briefest way
possible that wholly distinct questions are mixed up and
confused. Prayer, meditation, discipline of the emotional
nature, all that we have long become acquainted with as
important features of that image after which we have been
formed and after which we are still to be fashioned, are our
obvious task. But now the question is, are virtues attained
in any other way than by being faithful to the task to be
done, and by fulfilling every present duty, and so by prayer,
meditation on God''s word, " keeping under my body " (1 Cor.
ix. 27), at the time, in the degree, and as our course in life
and special position or individual calling (in the widest sense of
this word, as previously defined) demands for this purpose ? Or
are there at least intervals in the Christian life which may be
filled up by action, such as make no contribution to that great
object ; which do not help in any respect to realise the ideal
even in the smallest point, even by adding some minor branches
to the tree ? Otherwise put, is there not action which has
merely the purpose of fitting the will for future action, of
increasing the quantity of the energy with which we may enter
as trained combatants into the battle ; action which, as it is
phrased, aims at the attainment of virtue as such ? It is a mere
unimportant distinction, when those who answer these questions
in the aflSrmative, with the usual expression, assert the right of
asceticism, i.e. of the practice of virtue for practice' sake, or for
^ Coleridge's translation. — Tr.
274 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
the attainment of virtue, and employ this term asceticism some-
times of all possible means of virtue, positive and negative, or in
other words such things as gymnastics and cathartic discipline,
or bodily exercises and the practice of strict purity, or only use
it of the latter of these. Those who take this latter accordingly
do not generally quote all the passages of Scripture which speak
of diligence, bodily exercise, avoidance of slackness, and the like,
but only those which refer to self-restraint, self-renunciation,
self-denial, the " plucking out of the right eye," the " taking up
of the cross."" Those who would include all possible means draw
up in some detail — as far as the content is concerned — exceedingly
attractive lists, in which they combine the points of view named
{i.e. the ascetic, which is both practical and purifying, exercise
and discipline) with a number of other items (such as our relation
to God and one''s own self, and the latter again contemplated
from the side of the intelligence and the will) such as correspond
well to the opulence of life's experience. In which, therefore, not
merely such things as fasting and prayer and vows, but also
travel, diaries, and the like, have their place as means of virtue.
But all earnest Protestant moralists, however much they may
differ in such artifices, are one in regarding such means of virtue
merely as means, and not as laying full claim to the title of
meritorious action (cf. p. ^34).
But has an idea of this kind in general its proper place in
Protestant ethics ? We might hope that, when it is taken
only and merely as just defined, this will be generally
denied. Any example you like may serve to explain. In our
time much is rightly said of temperance in the use of spirituous
liquors. But the opinion that here we have a specially clear
case, morally justifiable, for actual obligatory asceticism for
us Protestants arises from want of clear knowledge. How far
is this obligation to extend ? By this self-control it is said
our moral power for action in other provinces is exercised.
Doubtless this is often the case. But as soon as we think of
a definite person in a definite situation, then we see that this
is undoubtedly only the case when such temperance is under-
stood to be merely one item in the whole of our moral task.
To this belongs, as we have repeatedly insisted, the profitable
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 275
subjection of all our natural impulses under the highest End ;
and here we need that sound common sense which, to use the
words of St Paul, not merely struggles against the carnal
desires of the flesh, but also avoids undue regardlessness of
bodily needs. Now, the duty of self-control certainly, for the
vast majority of persons, presents a wider range when they are
ready to recognise this duty. But this is only so far as the
question is one of individual duty. That is to say, according
to all said earlier, so far as it is a duty necessary to the
realisation of one side of the moral ideal that self-control has
for the person practising it the result affirmed of steeling his
energy for other different duties. It has not this result at all
when it is a mere exercise of determination. How conceited
and how small many of the heroes of temperance and abstinence
show themselves by ignoring this simple truth ! Nay, more
than that, how unfit for practical action on the wide province
of their whole life's task ; in the most favourable case capable
in this and that point, but not men of God "thoroughly
furnished to every good work." The delusion thus opposed,
that such practice of virtue for practice' sake is a high stage
of moral attainment, arises from the fact that it is not always
borne in mind how inseparable are the whole of the funda-
mental relations in the moral ideal, and particularly that
relation of our own individuality to society. And if we,
neglecting inward growth for this external morality, suddenly
become aware, both for ourselves and for others, how hollow
such morality is, because its roots are rotten, so conversely we
overvalue the long-neglected work for a time, and give it
an undue importance in an equally untrue way. Certainly
so far as such work is done with earnestness, and further,
in so far as it happens that personal morality first comes into
existence in such effort, it would be wrong to undervalue such
facts. Very often that motto is true of it : " Destroy it not,
for there is a blessing in it." The true-hearted man is led on
to something higher. This opinion as to the single case
alters the principle in no wise. If we recognise the inseparable
unity of moral gifts, then we see that no action is merely
empty, but on the contrary mere self-discipline is so. Every
276 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
genuine effort of self-discipline is undertaken in the realisation
of the whole of our moral task, in a determinate respect, and
every such action is a practising oneself in virtue. At the
bottom, opponents admit this when they, at the conclusion
of their eulogy of ascetic exercises, do all they can to warn
against self-righteousness, and exhort to trustful reliance on
divine discipline, which, apparently so incidental, is in reality
that which is alone consistently carried through. For, in fact,
attempts to equip oneself for calls to act, with which we may
most probably be met, are aimless when we remember the
limit of our insight and the changeableness of our feelings.
Salvation from this self-torment is to be found in the faith
that it is God who prepares for us the works in which we are
to employ ourselves, who determines, limits, furthers, and
hinders our action, as well in reference to the formation of
our own character as in reference to His great Kingdom,
provided we will that His will may be done. On that account
the dispute over ascetic practice is no mere learned debate,
but it is important in this subject of the Christian life that
this obscure and unsatisfactory notion should be dismissed.
If the above-chosen example appears like trifling, it may still
easily be shown that others bring us to the same results.
What is the practice of prayer just for the sake of practice
but a strange, even unchristian idea ? The practice of prayer
is a great factor in the Christian life, the right and duty of
all the children of God, both (once more) different for every
individual and for him in his individual experiences. Examples
are, Luther during the Augsburg diet and in the sickness of
Melancthon. The delusion that the practice of prayer for the
sake of devotional exercise is good and praiseworthy again
arises out of the fact that in the dissipating distractions of the
world many do not seek or find the collectedness which is
generally, and for them especially, necessary, without which
they cannot be Christians at all, or fulfil their Christian calling ;
and many must have merely self-chosen ' Christian influences '
brought to bear on them. So then it appears to them to be
' pious "" if they arrange special devotional exercises. In truth,
they must either so do the will of God in this or that measure,
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 277
in this or that way, or they think they sin. But we should
say that surely in certain stages of development — for instance,
in the special temptations of youth — single moral actions
{e.g. temperance) might merely serve the purpose of testing
the powers ; then it can easily be shown that even these could
not demonstrate their Protestant ethical character, even while
they are capable of being regarded as individual calls of duty.
In short, there are no such things as especial means of virtue
rightly understood, ascetic exercises in the accurately defined
sense (p. 273). There is only the training of self by readiness
to submit to the training of the great Teacher, and that by
being ready to fulfil the one great life-task, in the way in which
it is to be realised by a definite individual in a definite
situation. To put it otherwise, there must be readiness to
fulfil the ' calling of life "* in the sense earlier defined. But
this proposition will be still plainer if we consider some of the
notions which are usually set forth as specially important
examples of ascetical practice, such as vows, fasting, pious
meditation, and prayer. But in what follows we use these
subjects not merely as helps in our judgment on this subject
of ascetical practice, but in order to avoid repetition we conjoin
all that ought to be said generally of these important ideas in
Protestant ethics.
Vows.
Vows occupy a special position. For vows can refer to all
sorts of things — among other things, to fasting or prayer ; and,
again, not merely to such (nominal) ascetical practices, but, for
instance, to one single heroic act. The speciality of a vow is
the form of the action — that is, the person who takes a vow
binds himself in a solemn way by a voluntary promise for the
most part by calling God to witness. In this connection we
do not deal with the question whether such confirmation by
oath in the name of God beseems the Christian, but whether
that solemn promising has any value in relation to the moral
growth of the Christian, and for his progress in holiness. Even
in the Old Testament the vow takes a far more modest position
than in other religions. It finds place there, but is not really
recommended. The emphasis lies on the point that a vow
278 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
once taken must be kept. And it is right not merely to call
upon God in the time of need, but to thank Him afterwards for
help afforded {cf. Ps. 1. 14, 15, 23). Jesus neither mentions
nor uses the vow. In the case of Acts xviii. 18 and xxi. 24 it is
disputed whether in the former passage it was St Paul or
Aquila who shaved his head, and in the latter it was those
who accompanied him who had taken a vow on themselves.
If it was St Paul himself, then the general proposition which
we have in any case to derive from the main principles of
Evangelical morality apply to him. They may be arranged as
follows : — Firstly, a vow is in general immoral which has for
its end an immoral purpose, such as the person who takes the
vow would at his stage of knowledge recognise as such. The
robber who sees the blameworthiness of his doings, but in spite
of that proposes to ensure the divine blessing on his transaction
by a vow, is not condemned by Christian morality only.
Secondly, that vow also is unchristian which is undertaken for
the purpose of obtaining from God some kind of help in a
plan not in itself evil, which he supposes he would not gain
without such offering. For in this there is an idea of God
supposed which is different from the Christian conception,
although this sort of heathenish notion of God has survived in
Christianity in manifold ways. Thirdly, a promise to God in
which we pledge ourselves to conduct not required of us and
connect it with an offering, from the conviction that we are
doing something specially acceptable to God, or are thereby
attesting our gratitude and reverence, is not in harmony with
Protestant ethics. Such ideas of a vow presuppose the Catholic
idea of transcending duty, that is to say, of meritorious action,
and therefore stand or fall with this Catholic conception of
Christian ethics. It is obvious, in reference to these three types
of vow, that they, if undertaken, are no longer binding the
moment their unchristian or unevangelical character is recog-
nised. Thus the Reformation conviction threw off monastic
vows ; nay, it is a duty to throw them off (Confession of
Augsburg, Art. 27).^ They are contrary to divine precept
{cf. above). And now, fourthly, those vows are unevangelical
' Sylloge Confessionum, p. 219. — Tr.
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 279
which are yet only justifiable for reasons of personal self-
discipline. Those vows are not in any way in themselves a sign
of special moral earnestness, which some persons take on
themselves (who are far from all those unchristian or unprotestant
ideas), in order by their means to provide support for their weak-
ness— to use, in fact, a crutch. For instance, he whose heart has
often enough learnt its own ingratitude may find it a duty in
some special situation (external or internal) to force himself to
the expression of gratitude by a vow. Or when there is often
proved weakness in reference to the use of intoxicants, taking
the pledge becomes a matter of duty. Yet it lies in the nature
of the thing that all vows of this kind must be temporary in
their character, otherwise they encroach upon the providential
guidance. Official vows or oaths of office are nearly related to
these ; related because they serve as a support to a weak will ;
distinct because they are expressive of readiness to undertake
the task which belongs to a calling and not to an isolated piece
of work, and because they are imposed from without by the
state, or by some community, or the church. On this account
their importance is in one aspect greater, and in another less.
In any case much more should be done to secure their
simplification and limitation. Doubly so in the case of the
confirmation vow. In this case the ideal and the actual often
stand in fearful contrast. Generally all vows, so far as
Evangelical, as Luther grandly expresses it {e.g. in the Larger
Catechism), are inclusively contained in the baptismal vow, which
in reality is no ' vow.' The whole Christian life is its fulfilment,
the daily " creeping to the font " (Luther) ; the faith which is ever
new, never complete, that God desires to be to me a gracious God
and Father, is the only enduring incentive, the one single motive
power to love and to serve Him ; and every individual vow is
only justifiable when it is proved to be temporarily necessary
for anyone from some special external or internal circumstance.
Asceticism in the strict sense it is not ; it is not ' practice for
practice" sake,' but that realisation of a part of his duty which
is necessary for the individual, and only for him.
This latter remark is still clearer in reference to the above-
mentioned other portions of ascetical practice, and above all
280 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
to fasting, i.e. the voluntary abstinence from food and drink,
and from physical enjoyment in general. Simple as this defini-
tion of fasting as to its content is, it is difficult to speak of
its value without misconception. It is rendered easier by
excluding at once in this case too the idea of supererogatory
and meritorious action. The preaching of fasting in the Old
Testament by the prophets is directed against such idea, and
not merely the testimony of Jesus Christ. After this preliminary
statement a double sense of the term fasting may be distinguished.
It is, for one thing, merely the expression of an inward state of
mind. It is precisely this meaning which stands for the most
part in the forefront in the Holy Scriptures. A heart bowed
down like that of Hannah, a nation visited with defeat and
famine, fasts ; doubly so if pain and anxiety, connecting these
visitations with sin, are felt, and if guilt burdens the conscience.
The depression and humilation will voluntarily express them-
selves by abstinence from physical enjoyments. But even in
this respect the less demonstrative western peoples understand
these outward tokens of grief. We may merely recall the
painful impression which, for all refined sentiment, the shock
of death or moral need calls forth, when in such circumstances
importance is attached to eating and drinking. Fasting in
this sense finds its plainest and purest expression in the word
of the Lord, that the " friends of the bridegroom cannot fast so
long as the bridegroom is with them,*" at the time when He is
speaking of Himself and His disciples in contradistinction to the
disciples of St John the Baptist (St Mark ii. 18 ff.); and in
the saying inseparable from it, that His disciples when they fast
" wash their faces and anoint their heads." This noble sense
of fasting sets aside outward forms which are valuable only in
a lower state of knowledge. The heart is directed to God
alone. This as the really principal meaning of fasting has
clearly nothing to do with any ascetical practice. It is
impossible to practise this for practice' sake. It is the outward
clothing of the inward experience. If the inward feeling is in a
certain state, it is done spontaneously ; and in any other case it is
hypocrisy, an appearance answering to no reality. But fasting
has not merely the sense thus spoken of even in the history of
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 281
Jesus Christ ; another appears, namely, it is to answer the
purpose of making the physical impulses servants to the moral
life. Both purposes are often united, and the latter is wholly un-
impeachable : as well when the training of the moral capacity
is in question as when, in consequence of past neglect of
discipline, a determinate special counteractive is desirable. The
Augsburg Confession i has the first in contemplation (xxvi. 33)
when it says that it is the duty of all by bodily exercise so to
discipline themselves that excess should not give occasion to
sin ; and each should discipline his body so as to make it fit
for, and not a hindrance to, each doing what his calling demands
from him. Not in precepts of fasting but in such way does
it recognise the place of fasting (1 Cor. ix. 27). The second
is not less important. The temperance movement has its
high value as such a counteractive. And it has this the more
unquestionably the more it keeps at a distance from every idea
of ascetical practice as 'practice for the sake of practice."" It
is dutiful self-training for the realisation of an important part
of the moral ideal, and that as completely individual. To put
before the drunkard the notion of teetotalism as the whole of
morality, or to wish to impose it on those who are in no danger,
is and remains unevangelical. Also in this connection we
expressly insist as above on the general proposition : so far as
a temperance pledge is a question of the first earnest return to
that which is good, perhaps at length definitely undertaken — a
not infrequent occurrence where this matter of temperance is
concerned — this overestimate of its importance in temperance
missions is often more morally justifiable than the indifference of
opponents. It is quite impossible to deny that the conscience
of the community in its widest areas requires education in this
question. How carefully suppressed the insight as to the
services rendered by this movement to college life, to the
nation, to the future! what rich sources of joy which have
sprung up from the courageous fight against this consuming
evil could be disclosed ! It is merely a special application of
the purpose of fasting just discussed when it is insisted on as
^ " Quilibet Christianus etiam corporali disciplina, laboribus, .... coercere
carnem debet." Wide Sylloge Con/essionum, t^. hi. — Tr.
282 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
a preparation for prayer or some special religious work. It is
by complete mastery over the sensual impulse that a state of
preparation is attained. As instances may be mentioned the
temptation of Jesus, the preparation for the first Mission (Acts
xiii. 1 ff.), and the like. The conviction we have of the danger
of self-deception, and how easy it is, and particularly what injury
to the work to be attempted, instead of assistance in it, results
from unwise fasting (for instance, the excitement of, rather than
the victory over, sensual passions), has partially blunted for us in
our day the more refined feeling of the actual gain of reasonable
self-discipline, and of the discipline of others in this very respect.
Prayer and Devotions.
Prayer and devotional exercises are frequently treated of
under this head of ascetical practice. The error of such a method
is in this case plainer than in that of the subject of fasting.
For whereas fasting is a discipline of our own nature, here a
human being becomes absorbed in God's word and communes
with God. If this subject is treated under this head, then the
deepest and holiest which the ' new man ' knows is brought down
to the level of a mere means, and that only for the purpose of
his own strengthening. Certainly prayer is in particular the
richest and purest source of moral power. But as the most
immediate expression of communion with God it is also the
most direct participation in the highest Good, as so many de-
votional hymns attest. For it is in its innermost nature nothing
else but living faith, the outward expression of trust and the
desire to grow in faith. And that is generally true of all genuine
devotion or of mental collectedness before God and in God, and
is not merely true of prayer proper. Besides this we may call the
hearing of God's word by the name meditation, and the response
of the soul to that word we may call prayer. Only we must not
forget that there is no prayer without giving heed to God's
word, to His love in which He manifests Himself; and that inner
listening is itself speaking with God. But on this assumption
the distinction made is an aid to clearness. Prayer is the imme-
diate intercourse of the whole personality with God ; it is in the
region of Christian knowledge that meditation perfects itself.
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 283
The value of meditation as a protection against the danger of
distraction can scarcely be overestimated. This danger pro-
bably never pressed on any generation so much as on ours.
For example, the press overwhelms us daily with a flood of the
most contradictory and for the most part unimportant ideas, from
which it is ever growing more difficult for the young to find the
quiet needful for acquiring any fixed convictions. Christian con-
templation is protected against the reproach of spiritual narrow-
ness just because it has both the right and the power to draw
everything that is of worth into its service. But it is not
confined merely to Holy Scripture, but extended to all in which
the Christian sees the working of God, in the history of the
Church and of the world, as of the individual life, in art and
nature, ever according to the gifts bestowed and the way in which
each is led. In this matter there are sorts of religious medi-
tation which use all legitimate material without constraint or
artificiality, without becoming distracted by its variety ; faith-
ful in this to the great type of that incomparable book of
devotion, the Bible. For in fact the Scripture remains for all
such devotional occupation of the mind as well its supreme
standard as its greatest subject, and without this book devotion
is indefinite and confused, emotional and unsound. It is
wanting in backbone. The desire to train Christian character
cannot be satisfied if the value of Bible Christianity does not
gain more recognition — such character, that is, as grows out
of devotional occupation of the mind with the Holy Scriptures.
We are in the midst of the great battle about the Bible, which
does not merely occupy the theologian, but has laid hold of the
very roots of the Churches' life. But even in the midst of the
battle we may say, the attack of human learning on the Bible,
of which it itself knows nothing, and on the other hand the
insight which is awakened that it must prove by its contents
that it is for the believer the word of God, may contribute
much to the furtherance of that devotional occupancy with it,
and bring to those who love the truth the desire and the love of
busying themselves with it untroubled about the opinions of
friends or foes. Luther's saying is on this point true for every-
one : " I ought to so regard the word of God that if God says
284 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
something I should ask whether that does not mean me.
Hence, brother, if you wish to compel me by God's word, then
give me a text which touches me ; otherwise I give no heed
to it." And in such meditation on the divine word, by a
necessary reflex influence, that attitude to the Holy Scripture
which is alone justifiable in the Evangelical Church is ever
becoming more clearly known, and ever better grounded, of
which we spoke earlier (pp. 1 16 fF.). Here we are only concerned
with the fruit of Bible reading by learned and unlearned for
the furtherance of Christian character. Under completely
changed conditions, with an embarrassing plenitude of spiritual
nourishment, in the midst of the haste of modern life the
Holy Scriptures, divested of the halo of sanctity, will anew and
in a fresh way become the home of the personal spiritual life ;
unity in variety ; a resting-point amid useless motion ; a
motive force for tasks which cannot otherwise be accomplished.
The power of the word of God to shape character we often
perceive with astonishment in the markedly high character of
many so-called uneducated persons. In the confidential letters
of our great statesmen it has unexpectedly been made even
plainer. It will prove itself the only cure for that so-called
culture which imagines that there is a culture which does not
produce an independent personality. It is in this that there
lies at the same time the sufficient pledge that such meditation
is not mere contemplation which unfits for active life. The
mere contemplative existence is condemned, root and branch,
by this guide, the Holy Scripture, on which we rely for the
purifying and nourishing of the spiritual life within.
God's word, in which we become devotionally absorbed
wherever and however it greets us, demands our response.
This response is prayer, the intercourse of the heart with God.
Disclosing Himself to us, He desires that we should open our
hearts to Him. His return to us induces our return to Him ;
a real intercourse is set up. Not as if every single prayer must
grow up out of a fully conscious absorption of ourselves in the
divine revelation ; even the cry of the long-estranged heart may
be prayer. But this were not possible if we could not somehow
lay hold on God's efficacious though often unacknowledged
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 285
power and goodness. As all Christian life, rightly understood,
is faith, so also must truly Christian prayer be ; and prayer is
the most direct and the most spiritually essential utterance
of faith. For this reason it has been often compared to
breathing : " We breathe because we cannot help doing so, and
this is the very reason why we wish to breathe and must
breathe." That is true in fact of the freely necessary breathing
of the soul in the air of eternity, of prayer. It is true of
prayer because it is true of faith, because faith is the incompar-
able giving of ourselves to God, and the willingness to receive
God's gifts ; the marvellous experience of possessing and seeking
to possess at the same time ; of attaining the goal, and yet
never by complete realisation. But now, inasmuch as Christian
faith reposes wholly on the nearness of God in Christ, and has
this as its special stamp, so also is it with prayer. It is prayer
in the name of Jesus (St Matt, xxviii. 29 ; St John xvi. 23).
Whatever may be the meaning of these words as to their
original signification, all the interpretations are right in sub-
stance because they are mutually complementary — the utterance
of the name of Jesus ; by the command of Jesus ; in the stead
of Jesus ; in faith in Him ; according to His mind — both as
regards the content of the prayer and the inner state of the
suppliant. One of these is impossible without the other. The
name of Jesus is the ground and the power of Christian prayer,
and determines its form and content. Here especially form
and content are of importance. In regard to form, it is prayer
in the faith which lives in the prayers of Jesus Himself, in
confidence and humbleness, its look directed to the Father who
* freely gives "" ; the Father in heaven who gives from pure
grace, who will be ' entreated of but not compelled. By this
too its content is shaped — the final, great object of such
believing prayer ' in accordance with the mind of Jesus ' cannot
be other than God Himself. All the questions about prayer
put by the Christian man are in principle answered by that
word, ' in accordance with the mind of Jesus,' such as how
thanksgiving and intercession are related in prayer ; how prayer
ought to pass into intercession ; how all single petitions find
their right place in the model prayer. It is only another mode
286 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
of expressing the same fact when we say the Lord's Prayer is
a model for all Christian prayer. For He who gave it is the
foundation of our confidence when we appropriate this prayer
to ourselves, and it has this stamp upon it ; no one can pray
more heartily and reverently than, in its use. The Prayer
embraces adoration and thanksgiving, or, if we leave out the
doxology at the end, adoration is at any rate the dominant
note, as found in the opening words. Prayer for ourselves is
united with prayer for others at the beginning, ' Our Father. ""
* Our daily bread ' is in the middle separate from those great
prayers which make God's business ours, and our highest
interest. The care of God who ' forgives ' keeps us and delivers
us from evil. Thus we understand, since prayer is faith, and
the 'Our Father' teaches us to pray in the name of Jesus,
what Luther means when he says, " Faith is a perpetual
' Our Father.'"
There are two points to which we may explicitly refer. One
concerns the fourth petition. It is our warrant for bringing
our earthly cares to God. The Father of our Lord Jesus
Christ would not be the omnipotent God of heaven and the
earth ; the world in which He has put us, not God's world, if
our petitions may refer to the eternal and not also to the
temporal. For both are inextricably bound together so long
as a Christian is here in the stage of growth ; and consequently
it is not in keeping with the living trust of a child in his
Father if that trust may not express itself in prayer for
deliverance in the time of need, and for the bestow ment of
earthly gifts ; so long as this earthly sorrow and earthly joy
are, in His view, inseparable from that final end of all prayer,
that God may be our God. It is this end that determines the
value of those means, and it is here that the prayer for ' bread '
* daily,' ' to-day ' comes in. This position of the fourth petition
points to this idea of ' value.' The name of God, the Kingdom
and the Will of God, are for the Christian in the midst of
the earthly battle not what they ought to be and will be if he
is not allowed to pray for his daily bread. But when he has
made this prayer, then the three last petitions, which are, in
fact, the most important, are the most important for hiin,
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 287
Unless anxiety about earthly good is removed, no man can,
without self-deception, seek ' first of all the Kingdom of God
and His righteousness' (p. 191), The fourth petition is only
an application of the great principle that it is only he who has
been ' made rich ' who is loved with ' an everlasting love,' who
can do God's will with entire earnestness. In each single case
of earthly necessity he ought, by believing prayer, to manifest
the assurance of his faith. But it must be the prayer of faith.
If the transitory usurps the place of the permanent and takes
the first place in our endeavour, then our prayer for earthly
goods becomes mere conjuring with words, leads us away from
God, instead of closer to God, even though it assumes the
appearance of the most heroic devoutness. The word ' in the
Name of Jesus' is of especial importance in reference to the
fourth petition. In no other prayer is the Father so confidently
besought for all that is needful ; in no other is there such
humble deference to the Father to vouchsafe to hear so that
His will may be done. It is for this reason that it is precisely
in this case that no external limits can be named up to which
prayers for earthly good are justifiable as far as their content
is concerned. Each one has, in the exercise of faith in each
case, to make clear to himself what those limits are. They may
be drawn widely or narrowly in faith or unfaith. Doubtless
our outlook in prayer ought to be widened, and then our own
personal needs will not loom so large ; but they do not, on that
account, cease to be subjects for prayer. The same thing is
true of the manner in which we pray for earthly good. Very
closely connected with this manner of prayer is the imminent
danger of ' stormy ' prayer, and yet the intermission of repeated
and importunate prayer may arise from a reprehensible want
of confidence in God. It is true that often enough the earthly-
minded heart may be led by prayer to cease petitioning for
some one thing, and that by prayer confidence in prayer may
be increased. There especially law and compulsion find no
ruling place, but trust, and trust of the kind that is not mere
imagination, but such as will confess its want of steadfastness
to Him who is " greater than our heart and knows all things,"
who will strengthen our trust. The riches and the freedom of
288 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
our faith grow in clearness in this its sanctuary, and that
phrase is a correct one which speaks of a ' world of prayer.'
Intercession.
A further question often occupies Christian reflection, when
speaking of petition, and that is how far intercession ought to
go. The answer to this question is also in the * Our Father.'
The interests of the children of the heavenly Father are more
personal than anything else, while at the same time they have
interests in common with others wider than anything else.
* Our ' and ' us ' instead of the natural ' my ' and ' me ' is for the
Christian a really natural utterance. This faith in the Father
cannot exist without love to the brethren, both to those who
really are so and to those who may presently become so. And
his love, because it lives in faith, necessarily expresses itself
in believing prayer also for others, and that, as 1 Tim. ii. 1
explicitly affirms, prayer of every sort, as supplication, thanks-
giving, petition. Thus St Paul has the churches ' in his
heart ' (Phil. i. 7) ; every heart-beat, every breath is for them.
Love would not be Christian love if it were not true of it, ' I am
responsible in God's sight for my love.' When intercessory
prayer is taken in this obvious way, the objection need not
arise — however much to each person the battle of faith is
ordained to be and ought to be his own personal concern — that
intercession is an interference with our neighbours' freedom and
with God's arrangements. The Christian idea of the Kingdom
of God, which it is the purpose of its Creator and Builder to
build by earthly means, transcends these objections. The task
of each co-worker with God (1 Cor. iii. 2) is to be faithful in
the exercise of his influence on others outside, and in his
intercession as the motive power of his work for them. And
both are done in humility {cf. p. 262). Livingstone, ready for
any sacrifice, prayed : " Wilt thou vouchsafe to me to make
intercession for Africa ? " (cf. Gen. xviii.). That doubt
besides may rise quite apart from the question of intercession —
Who can at all measure the influence "of one person on another ?
And who can deny the diversity of the divine gifts in the
temporal development of His Kingdom ? Is it consequently
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 289
necessary to deny the freedom of man or the righteousness of
God?
It may be merely mentioned in passing how in the Lord's
prayer other subordinate as well as these primary questions in
regard to the life of prayer find their answer. He who in his
praying will be taught by the ' Our Father ' the manner and
content of his prayer will gain the Christian sensibility required
for ' praying without ceasing ' (St Luke xviii. 1 ; 1 Thess. v.
17) ; and uniting this with the claims of special prayer just in the
way both are needful for him, and both in the right proportion,
such as is only possible for one trained by the Lord's Prayer, and
whose Christian character has grown in this training. ' Praying
always with all prayer' assumes that all prayer is in its final
reason directed to one great object in the way that is fitting, that
is, that it is wholly and fully the act of the living faith, which has
its being in the revelation of the divine will. Such a faith as
this impels to conscious intercourse with God in proportion as
this revelation has a vivid hold of the outward and inward life.
It is this that makes the soul fit for the reception of those
blessings which come from special times of prayer, without
which these may easily degenerate into formality. In the same
way the thankful employment of special forms of prayer becomes
merely the way to freedom in spontaneous prayer which comes
from the heart; and in this way the use of human words is
no hindrance to the ' unutterable groaning,' the assistance of
the divine Spirit in our weakness.
To speak of answers to prayer is clearly a subject for doctrinal
treatment, and especially apologetics — that is to say, so far
as it concerns justification of the idea against doubts — and
relates to the question of Christian faith in God. But, on the
other hand, it is the Christian life that makes it clear what the
hearing of prayer means. Our communion with God is so vivid
a reality, in faith, and in the prayer of faith, that the supposition
that it is a mere means of self-contentment and self-encourage-
ment, self-exaltation, and self-absorption, is at once shut out.
And this is so with the above-given closer definitions, in the
sphere of the outward as of the inner life. Those objections too
are excluded which arise from the idea held by some who are un-
19
290 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
convinced of the power of prayer, of a logical necessity joining
all things, which is not more important in regard to the outward
than to the inward life, for all phenomena in both spheres are
just as much or as little related to the idea of absolute necessity.
That does take place which would not happen in the absence
of prayer. But in Christian ethics, in the connected considera-
tion of the Christian life, it is also quite clear that the divine
answers to prayer are never evoked by human prayer save as
those answers spring from the present willingness of God.
His eternal love, which is under no natural necessity, discloses
itself to that trustful faith which seeks to become a partaker
in that love. God's will is pure goodness quite apart from our
prayer. It is our prayer that makes us capable not merely of
understanding the whole * riches of His goodness,' but also of
desiring, in the strict sense, that God would give, and believing
that He is able to give, because He desires to give, since He is
love. In this connection two questions emerge for the believer
in particular, which are not often discussed in the measure that
the experiences of life seem to require ; and these concern
prayer when faith is wavering, and the right and duty to hold
firmly the possibility of answer to our own prayers.
The first question is indeed a burning one in respect to the
origin and development of a life of prayerfulness. It has
received much attention ; as, for instance, A. H. Francke has
forcibly discussed it. But it is of special importance at
present in the battle with ' the modern consciousness.' Perhaps
our answer — so far as it is possible to give a general one, and is
not a question for which each one must now and again seek his
own solution — lies in the connection of prayer with faith. We
have seen that it springs out of faith and leads on to fuller
faith. Now, the first part of this truth seems to exclude the
prayer of the doubter. Often enough do we hear, ' I cannot
pray, for I cannot believe.' But prayer without faith is degrad-
ing it to a mere throw of the dice which forbids the possibility
of reverence, perhaps of the last remains of such reverence ;
and it leads into the danger of self-deception, and to a kind of
self-hypnotisation which shuts out self-respect. But the con-
clusion that, where there is a deficiency of faith, prayer is
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 291
altogether impious and unworthy is still too hasty ; because
the correct assumption that prayer grows out of faith is easily
left too much undefined. Surely it never grows out of an
absolutely perfect confidence ; otherwise it could never have the
purpose of strengthening it. Nevertheless, there is an undeni-
ably strong difference between a faith that is still incomplete,
and doubt. But, on the other hand, is the doubt on the part of
him who would willingly pray so decided, so certain of itself,
that he for his part must give up prayer altogether? In that
case it would no longer be the doubt of the seeker, but a
decision against God. More particularly, in accordance with
Christian conviction, there is no life in which there are no traces
of the divine inworking, and hence none without traces of faith.
It is this imperfect faith that the seeker may and ought to use.
But still more important, and probably more convincing to an
anxious mind, is that other portion of our statement about
prayer, namely, it is the desire to come closer to God ; it is the
wish to grow in faith. Of prayer it is true that it is not only
' from "* but also ' to ' faith. Now, this desire for God even in
strong doubt, in the midst of the great uncertainty of our own
consciousness, can be very vivid and sincere. Then in God's
judgment it is very possibly a sufficient substitute for the
faith in which he who prays finds himself deficient. This is
especially so if he has true readiness to do the will of God in
real earnest (St John vii. 17). Nor must the idiosyncrasy of
each person be forgotten, just as in the complexity of conditions
it is not seldom the case that want of physical health is the
origin of that self-torment over deficient faith which then
demands other than ethical treatment. Finally, it is worth
remarking that in a period which is not religious in its tendency,
subjected to the overmastering influence of sense-experiences,
many strange thoughts find expression on the character of
religious certainty, as on the way in which we gain our know-
ledge of God — as if it must be such a certainty as excludes any
doubt on the part of any sane man. A deeper penetration
recognises that those ideas are of that kind which contradict the
nature of religious faith, and such as would make it impossible.
Among the ethical means for the cure of that doubt
292 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
gratitude for answered prayer occupies a high place ; for
gratitude is the great secret of progress in the whole province
of the Christian life. In this way we are led to the other
question above mentioned : Is it the right and duty of faith
thankfully and firmly to hold fast to the idea of answered
prayer? In any case thankfulness ought to go far beyond
all prayer, and experiences of special answers to prayer. There
is scarcely any apostolic exhortation so insistent as that of
being in all things thankful. But in that it is not excluded
but included that we ought to be thankfiil for the answer to
any prayer. Every prayer, as Luther says, concludes with " the
amen of thankfulness." It is, however, never vain, however
God may hear our prayer, whether granting or denying, because
God gives us better than that. But even in the case of a
special answer childlike confidence is the soul of gratitude.
Neither a poor faith that in the absence of prayer this or that
would not have been done, nor a restraint of special thanks-
giving when a special providence forces itself on the attention,
is Christian. To restrain gratitude is at one time as impious
and disastrous to the increase of faith as it is to force it at
another time. " God is greater than our heart " also in this
that He seeks nothing but sincere faith, and not laboured
prayer or gratitude.
By this review of this grand peculiarity of the Christian
character, its life in the world of prayer, we understand how
profound is that often-used answer to the question : How ought
we to pray .? " Reverently, as in God's presence, penitently,
humbly, in true faith, in the Name of Jesus." At bottom
these ideas are pure implicates and not at all mere assertion
of the manner of prayer, but of the type of Christian character ;
and indeed, as the word ' penitently ' explicitly reminds us,
of the Christian in his battle with sin.
Sin in the Christian.
But we have still to speak of the issue of this battle, or, in
other words, of sin in the regenerate and of the assurance of
salvation, in spite of sin, and it is at this point that the idea
of Christian perfection becomes clear.
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 293
The New Testament is full of testimonies to the fact in the
Christian life that the battle with sin is by no means always
a victorious one. It exhorts with much earnestness, to become
"dead to sin," not to "let sin reign in your mortal bodies,"
to be "planted into the new life," to "seek what is above,"
so that we vividly realise that such exhortations do not refer to
a remote possibility of sinning on the part of the Christian,
but a dangerous reality. We do, however, no longer refer
that expression of the Apostle of his being " sold under sin "
(Rom. vii. 7 ff'.) to St Paul the Christian. St Paul the
Christian knows that he is "no longer the servant of sin,"
but freed from it. But the reason which made the Reformers
and numerous others inclined to this interpretation we fully
recognise as the truth which St Paul himself impressively
bears witness to in other places (Gal. v. 16 ff.), that even in
the Christian, nay, particularly in the Christian, there exists
a severe struggle between flesh and spirit. With a wholly
special design are the ideas of ' sinning no longer ' and ' sinning '
placed in juxtaposition in the first Epistle of St John. He who
affirms that he has fellowship with God and sins is a liar ;
he too is a liar who says "he has no sin" (1 John i. 8 ff.,
iii. 1 ff".). The apparent contradiction is merely the whole
truth. A ' new man ' really exists, a good tree has been planted.
But because it is a question of a ' new man,' and the metaphor
of a tree, however excellent, is a mere metaphor ; because the
new man does not like a plant grow according to natural laws,
but as a personality, by a personal trust reposed in the personal
God, in ever fresh states of the will, it follows that the old life
of sin has its influences still, and must be overcome in daily
conflict and by a complete overthrow. Nay, it is precisely the
really renewed man who completely recognises how much there
is of the ' old man,' of the ungodly, still left in him which
must be given over to death ; and especially the best are often
the deepest tainted with evil. So we comprehend the word
in the Catechism that " we daily offend often." By this Luther
hits the meaning of the Gospel, although it is certain that in
the New Testament, especially in St Paul's writings, the
emphasis naturally lies on the consideration of the 'new man,'
294 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
the creation of divine grace, in accordance with his experience
in missionary work.
It is but consistent when the Romish Church judges differently
of sin. Because it does not recognise any truly personal relation
to God at all, in the sense earlier given, it consequently knows
no ' new man '' in the sense of a radically new personality, no
Christian moral character, so much does it at once overestimate
and underestimate — now one and now the other — the sin of
the Christian. It has on the one side spotless sainthood, yea,
sainthood with superabundant merits ; and regards evil desire
in itself as no sin, artfully disguising the contradiction of St
Paul (fifth session of Tridentine Council), On the other hand,
it teaches that the grace of justification is lost by mortal sin,
and must be reinstated by means of the sacrament of penance ;
and though it includes every possible ' mortal sin,' and demands
from all, even its 'saints,' approach to the sacrament of
penance, this holiness appears to us to be a very doubtful
quantity. The reason of both propositions — which appear to
us to be mutually contradictory — shows that they are not
concerned with personal renewal, as we Protestants understand
the word personal. Conversely, for the same reason our teaching
on sin in Christian men must produce the impression on
Romanists that we sometimes take sin too lightly, and at
another time too seriously. The contrast of the two views
becomes explicitly clear in the dispute on the question whether
faith can exist where there is mortal sin. We negative the
question. For us in the strict sense there is only one mortal
sin which shuts out from salvation, and that is unbelief, because
for us faith means a personal trust in God's personal grace.
So long as this faith lives in the heart, it has a part in the life
which consists in fellowship with God, whatever the danger to
which it is subject, and however urgently necessary earnest
repentance (in the Gospel sense of the word) may be. We
really do take sin not less earnestly than our opponents, but
more seriously. (On the question whether this loss of faith
is possible, and whether there are circumstances in which it is
recoverable, see below.) The Romanists answer in the affirma-
tive, because for them faith is a belief of the creeds ; con-
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 295
sequently, clearly sin may coexist with it, such as is
regarded as heinous enough to require penance in which
the forfeited grace of God is restored, and of course lasts
until it is lost by the next mortal sin. The idea of unified
will, of moral character which has its basis in the gracious
will of God, is not duly recognised. Consequently by ' state
of grace "* they understand something different from our-
selves.
There is one more opponent of our Protestant teaching of
sin deserving of attention, and that is the fanatical theologian.
The enthusiasts of the Reformation period maintained even
then the sinlessness of true Christians. And in the present
day we have it here loudly proclaimed, and at least as a passing
phase, the eager cry — The Protestant Evangelical Church has
no appreciation of the fact of a present and full salvation
through Christ. Sanctification, say they, is a gift as well as
justification which it is possible to receive instantaneously by
faith. Occasionally such opinions are variously expressed. The
Christian is sinful, but he commits no sins. There is such a
thing as sinless perfection here on earth, and so forth. We seek
in vain for clear definition of the idea. A complete gift of
holiness — if by this is meant something new and special such
as is not contained in the great master-truth of the Gospel that
faith in God's forgiving grace in Christ is the motive force and
incentive to the new moral life, to good action — is something
unintelligible. It ignores the nature of the will. The divinely
ordered distinction between way and end, faith and sight, is
wiped out. The negative word sinlessness easily leads to a
negative and ascetical idea of the Good ; and when to avoid
open contradiction to explicit statements of the New Testament
it is said that sin is a single, fully conscious, and designed
breach of a divine commandment, then the kind of freedom
from sin thus indicated is a very trifling claim which may do
nothing else but weaken the earnestness of the Christian conflict
with sin. We are involuntarily reminded of the Roman
view. Of course it also is indubitable : — those warnings are in-
telligible and justifiable according to circumstances, as against
inconsiderate misuse of the doctrine of grace. However, it does
296 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
not mean a deeper acquaintance with the Gospel, but a falling
off from the ideal of our Church (p. 187).
But can the sin of the regenerate man issue in the irrecover-
able loss of a state of grace ? or, more closely, can a mortal sin,
in the Gospel sense, result in a fall from grace generally ? Is it
irrevocable, and such as actually ends in eternal death ? Strictly
speaking, both these two questions arise ; but they are clearly
connected with one another, so that they can only be affirmed
or denied together. Whoever denies the first does implicitly
deny the second ; whoever affirms it will find himself inclined to
the affirmation of the second. The Protestant Churches have
judged variously on these questions, the Reformed denying,
the Lutheran affirming. Not merely single passages (like Heb.
vi. 4 ff., X. 26 ffi) which Luther himself stumbled at as "hard
knots," or 1 John v. 17, are in favour of the Lutheran view,
but also the whole New Testament conception of the Christian
life. However strong those metaphors taken from nature are
which are employed for illustration, still the New Testament
never regards the new life as a higher natural life, but as to be
understood ethically. It is possible to be ever so enthusiastic
and profound in speaking of moral necessity ; provided this
necessity miist be ' moral/ then it is not a natural necessity, and
to assert the impossibility of a fall from grace is wrong. With-
out the contrary possibility that summons, " Work out your
salvation with fear and trembling"" (Phil. ii. 12), has no clear
meaning. The Apostle uses in relation to himself the expres-
sion "if I may apprehend," "if I might attain" (Phil. iii. 12).
The objection that such a fall is inconceivable, because it is the
denial of the clearly recognised possession of salvation, fails to
appreciate the mysterious depths of the inner life in which
knowledge and will generally appear in contrast. But of
course the final answer rests with the judgment of God and
not that of our fellow-men where responsibility is concerned ;
and "God is greater than our heart" (1 John iii. 20). This is
doubly true when that idea of a possible fall is clothed in the
words which have often proved the source of gloomy self- torment
— the sin against the Holy Ghost. The application of the
saying (St Matt. xii. 31) which in the first instance refers to
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 297
those still unregenerate, to those in a state of grace is accord-
ing to the other above-cited passages and on general grounds
unobjectionable. Only in that case the utterance must be
understood in the sense above defined. Then, without in any
way depreciating the seriousness of the Gospel, the danger of
misuse is obviated. This misuse is connected with the fact
that it is precisely in such a point that it is difficult to recognise
the limits of mental soundness, as, for instance, in the historically
famous examples of a Francesco Spiera^ and others.
Assurance of Salvation.
But how may assurance of salvation be said to be consistent
with sin in Christians .'' Assuming that the assurance of
salvation is not a mere empty expression, it is a present
experience of blessedness and a certain hope of blessedness, and
is present blessedness in fellowship with God the only good,
whose blessedness flows from His own eternal life, in which no
one can share unless he shares in His goodness, in His love
(cf. p. 182). But how weak is the faith in which we experience
God's love, how poor our love to God and to our neighbour
which grows from this faith ! But, nevertheless, are we to say
that there is assurance of salvation ? It is here, in this very
context, in which we can appraise the difficulty of this thought,
that it is proper to bring the matter to a definite conclusion,
having used it as a leading idea without always mentioning the
phrase itself.
The Evangelical Protestant Church makes its highest boast
that in it the doctrine of assurance is preached and experienced.
With full justification ; only we must be on our guard against
the loss of this our superiority, and of regarding what the
Romish Church offers to its members as valueless. For, if
assurance becomes for us a mere expression, then that Church
would have more than we, namely, the continual readiness to
provide the means to impel to good works by its arrangements,
^ A case similar to that of Archbishop Cranmer in English history. After
becoming a Protestant in 1542, Spiera recanted under pressure in 1547. He died
in despair, believing that he had thereby committed the unpardonable sin. He was
a barrister near Padua. — Tr.
298 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
particularly its sacraments. For the Catholic that is his trust,
and the spur to his souPs yearning for heaven. It is repose
and earnestness so closely united that we understand how a
pious Catholic, in the presence of a Protestant who is certain
of his salvation, may feel distressed because to him this
assurance of salvation seems merely an empty phantasy. But
yet only in the presence of a Protestant who had the word
only without the thing. This is really our jewel. It is only
through it that we become persons, independent men in free
obedience. It is only from the assurance of salvation that we
can do good works such as deserve the name. On this we have
said enough. But on this account the question above mentioned
is a burning one — How is it possible to reconcile the sin of
the regenerate with his assurance of salvation ? The answer
is found in all that has been already said in the foundation
of the new life. It does not depend on what we do, or
partly on God, partly on ourselves, but purely on God's free
love, on the fact that He bestows on us His personal favour.
Therefore also our assurance of salvation is not based on our
doing, but on trust in God's love. But God's love really
creates in us a new life. To trust in that love is the new
life, and this life is blessedness. Or, to say the same thing
in other words — we know nothing of ' empty ' faith. Faith
is to us the most effectual and effectuating reality. But its
basis is God's love and God's love in Christ alone. Hence the
sole ground of the assurance of salvation is this love of God,
Christ Himself. I^his basis is not destroyed by sin, but
through it only made clearer to the mind. Again, the same
thought may find expression in this way : since we are aware
of our personal fellowship with the personal God, this, so long
as it is present, soars high over our single and continually
repented sins, which would disturb that assurance of salvation.
In the state of grace forgiveness is ever present even along with
our offences (Schleiermacher ; cf. Luther's Short Catechism),
By reason of this assurance of salvation the right answer to
the question is at once given as to how this assurance of salva-
tion is experienced. If it is a genuine experience and not a
mere idea, if it is to be regarded as a true idea, stamped with
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 299
its value, and firmly maintained, then plainly the answer can
only be — it is experienced in all the manifestations of the new
life, realisable by us in sincere reverence, and humble confidence
in God, especially in that proof of it, childlike prayer, and in
love of our neighbour maintaining itself in the faithful
performance of the duties of our calling. And that not by
the exclusion but with the inclusion of all the fluctuations
arising from the conflict with sin. Even in the life of St Paul
the triumphant, " For I am persuaded "" (Rom. viii. 38) changes
to the less jubilant "We rejoice also" in the confession of
tribulations, of inner need and struggling weakness. But
this struggling is itself a witness of the new life, and brings
the ever new victory of an assured faith, which in very deed
would not be faith if it possessed the certitude of an external
fact. If bodily health is not merely the experience of every
particular pleasurable feeling, but consists in the activity of
the powers, so in the kingdom of the Holy Spirit and of
freedom, with all the differences involved, is the new life of
the Christian. There is here no danger that in this way the
Christian"'s gaze is directed self-wards and his new life made the
foundation of his confidence, that is, a foundation which is a
continually shifting one. For, as we again observe, he knows
what the firm foundation of this new life really is. But if
this life does not show itself active, it is not really present.
No wish that this obvious truth were otherwise will clear it
away. For it is impossible to imagine a greater contradiction
than to suppose that the living God interests Himself in a
man, and yet it continues to be the same with him as before ;
or, regarded from the other side, that a man can believe in
God's grace and not the least alteration of his emotional
life take place. Even among weak men that kind of fellow-
ship would scarcely be regarded as worthy of the name.
But is not this answer too simple and in the end unsatisfying
so far as anxiety about assurance of salvation comes to us in all
forms ? There is an abundance of instructions and of specifics
for this anxiety. If we consider them, the solution above
given will become clearer. Some of these are recommended by
the Evangelical Churches themselves ; others more by different
300 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN IJFE
pious societies in the Church. To the former belongs the
emphatic reference to baptism or confession or communion ;
and beside this the advice to lay fast hold of the promise of
salvation, to impress it on the mind, to grasp it with the will,
to rest on it in feeling, or by vividly pressing the conclusion :
Christ died for all who believe ; I believe, therefore. He died for
me also. In the second class of methods of becoming assured
of salvation, which, used by individuals, secured recognition
amongst followers in these communions, and from thence spread
more widely in the Protestant Churches generally, there belongs
the high estimate which some attach to deep exhibitions of
penitence, ending in an overflowing emotion of pardoning grace.
Another is the instruction to vividly realise in the mind the
image of the Crucified. Another is the counsel to become
assured of salvation from every sign of an earnest Christian walk,
especially self-denial of worldly enjoyment. The three last-
mentioned ways to this desired end cannot, of course, rightly
be connected without further explanation with the names of
A. H. Francke, Zinzendorf, Spener, but represent rather the
views of their followers.
Perhaps we might arrive more easily at unanimity, so far as
the subject-matter allows, if it were openly acknowledged by
the opposers of these particular methods that they all are right,
so far as they stand opposed to the widespread indifference on
the question of assurance of salvation, which nevertheless,
properly understood, ought to be the Christian's chiefest care.
If this were acknowledged on one side, then it would be easier for
others to examine whether these methods always pursue the right
path, and whether they attain the end. The first must be doubtful
to everyone who has a clear idea of the nature of grace and of
faith, as we Protestants understand these things. Then we see
that assurance of salvation cannot always be present in equal
strength of feeling. We have already reminded ourselves
that invariability of pleasurable feeling is not a proof of
bodily health; specially long and lasting feelings of pleasure
are on the contrary frequently signs of an approaching sick-
ness. And those higher relations of mutual confidence
among men, between mother and son, friend and friend, do
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 301
not show such invariability. Of course there are festivals of
love, in which we have a clear consciousness and enthusiastic
appreciation of the sunlight which both illumines and warms
us ; but the value of such occasions is tested in our every-
day sober tasks. People do not say much about their
love. Its certitude is only in the quiet, strong keynote of the
life stirred, tempted, tried. It is none otherwise in the
Christian life with the assurance of salvation. What the New
Testament says of flesh and spirit and the ' piercing ' power of
the Word (Heb. iv. 2) has its special meaning in this connection.
But the methods recommended do not securely lead to the goal,
always supposing that we have rightly defined it. For a heart
which is agitated by such doubts is ingenious in knowing how
to produce a new doubt about the means thus lauded — for
instance, a doubt of the conclusion from the general promises
of grace. The person concerned may raise continually fresh
doubts whether he has the faith required. Then for him the
conclusion is invalid. Or, he may fancy that he has this faith
without possessing it. Then he deludes himself. Further, the
recollection of his specially deep penitential emotion may
become dim, or a doubt may rise as to its earnestness and depth.
Zinzendorf himself, on his own testimony, was not always
alike fit for his meditation on the wounds of Christ. To
resolve to found an assurance of salvation on certain pious
exercises, or self-denials, has already led many to spiritual pride,
and in the end destroyed all assurance. But the whole of these
methods separate the subjective from its objective ground, i.e.
the grace of God in Christ, and so ascribe to faith what it, by
itself alone, cannot accomplish.
Thus we are driven back on the statement previously ad-
vanced, that the assurance of salvation is experienced in the
various manifestations of the new life. But when this state-
ment is admitted we may without any ambiguity allow, may
even rejoice, that each of those single answers to the question,
*How can I be sure of my salvation?' contains a part of the
truth to which value may be attributed by each according to
his own especial need. Just as, in the case of some disturbance
of the bodily health, the anxiety which this occasions is relieved
302 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
by occupancy with some energetic work, so may the direction
of the attention of the anxious Christian to some special con-
firmation of his true Christian character serve to show him to
whom he really belongs, spite of doubt. Still more important
are those methods which vividly realise the final ground and
anchoring place of all saving faith, God's grace in Christ. It
would be both petty and untrue to deny that they have all
proved valuable. But it would be just as petty and untrue if
we were to wish to give more prominence to one above the
other, and if we were not willing to range them all equally
under the great main principle. The riches of the divine
wisdom are as inexhaustible here as in conversion. Of clear
and especial value is that question of Luther's, " Have you not
then been baptised ? " — exactly in Luther's sense, for whom
assurance was nothing but the express reference to the sole
ground of all certainty of salvation ; for whom consequently
it could not be separated from vital, real, but never wholly
perfect faith, so that there is no longer need to speak of a
special means of assurance. It would be a profitable task to
point out how the whole exposition of the question, so far as
it has wandered into aimless ways, is simply founded on the
want of comprehension of the true Evangelical idea of faith.
The mistake arises from speaking of a general faith such as
obviously carries with it no assurance of salvation, because it
is not ' faith ' in the full sense ; and on that account is sup-
posed to be in need of all sorts of completions, confirmations,
assurances, etc.
From this point it is finally clear, too, what importance the
growth of the new life — the manifestation of Christian character
in useful work — has for its future perfection ; or, in the old
formula, how * good works and eternal salvation ' are connected.
The formulas by which the last of the Lutheran confessional
writings sought to smooth the strife on this question are clearer
in their design than satisfactory in their content. The state-
ment (which some considered could alone guarantee the truth
of justification by faith alone) that good works are a hindrance
to salvation was rejected, as was the opposite proposition,
which others considered the only safeguard of the true Gospel
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN
against abuse, namely, that good works are essential to
salvation. But their negations were more definite than their
affirmations as to what the right doctrine is. The statements
deemed sufficient were that not merely on the point of
justification but also on that of salvation good works are
excluded, but they follow necessarily from faith, and they are
proofs of faith. It is undeniable that the emphasis rests on
the first proposition. It was feared lest the jewel of peace of
conscience might be lost. That is clear too from the dispro-
portionateness of the Scripture proofs : while Rom. iii. and iv.
and Eph. ii. are expressly cited, 2 Cor. v. 10 is absent ; the
passage which gives the unambiguous words of the Lord on
judgment according to works (St. Matt. xxv. and parallels) is
silently passed over, or set aside with the observation that by
these works, works of faith are intended ; not recognising that
the statement is clear as to judgment according to works.
For ourselves, we need only to refer to what has been earlier
said of the relation of faith and works. But in this connec-
tion it is particularly clear that the emphasis may and ought
to lie now on the one side and now on the other of those
two inseparable parts of the same truth, according to circum-
stances and occasion. This truth has room for the story of the
malefactor on the cross, as for the insistence of St James on
good works. No artificial reconciliation of individual passages of
Scripture has succeeded or will succeed. The more the Christian
experiences the inner unity of faith and works, the more surely
will he grow in this conviction. Hence, after what has been
now stated as to the ground of the assurance of salvation, every
suspicion is completely excluded that this would be injured by
recognising the connection, in unison with the clearest Scripture
statements, between the moral action of the Christian and his
eternal salvation.
Christian Perfection.
And now we have become acquainted with all the premisses
on the ground of which a conclusion may be arrived at as to
the meaning of Christian perfection. For they show us in
what sense it is possible to speak of perfection, and in what
304 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
sense we cannot speak of it. It cannot mean perfection in the
sense that in it everything is included, and that he who possesses
it is incapable of higher perfection. If this were so, then all
must be false that has been said of the work of each person
for the whole life-task, viz. that he is to perform his duties
with the capacity with which he is specially gifted, in a
certain social area, in his own calling, and that his power in
this work is strengthened as well by conflict as by defeat.
On the other hand, if there is no such thing as perfection,
all that must be false which has been said of faith as the
power of a new life, of faithful fulfilment of duty, and of
the Christian character; inasmuch as all these things are
only other words for that which is in itself the truly ' Good '
and therefore perfect in kind and in innermost content. And
what is ' Good ' is certainly the criterion of Christian ethics,
and in the last resort of every right system of ethics. Still,
it may perhaps be possible to dispute whether this word
' perfection "* ought to be used, or not rather avoided as open
to misconception.
We find it not infrequently in the New Testament, in many
contexts. St James says : " Let patience have its perfect
work, that ye may be perfect "" (i. 4), and he says that he is
the ' perfect man "" who ' offends not in word."* He therefore
recognises both a ' perfect ' person and a ' perfect ' work. The
plain antithesis, though not always expressed, is clearly with
that of a Christian who is not full-grown in work and
character; but it is assumed in regard to all that they can
and ought to be 'perfect.' In a similar way St Paul dis-
tinguishes " babes in Christ," the immature in knowledge as
in goodness generally (1 Cor. ii.); but he not only assumes
that there are those who are 'perfect' in Philippi (iii. 15),
but he also pleads in prayer that he may " present every man
perfect in Christ Jesus " (Col. i. 28), and that they may now
"stand perfect and complete in the will of God" (Col. iv. 12).
This perfection is therefore not the privilege of a few. And
how much it is perfection in kind and not in extent he im-
pressively affirms when he says, "Not as if I were already
perfect." Thus there is the reservation that there are stages
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 305
of perfection. St Paul is aware that he "laboured more
abundantly" than all the Apostles (1 Cor. xv. 10); but he
certainly did not regard those other Apostles as immature
Christians, but as 'perfect' in the meaning of Phil. iii. 15:
" Let us therefore, as many as be perfect, be thus minded.''
In St John we read of 'perfect love' (1 John iv. 18) —
' perfect,' that is, in kind, but not so that more love is not
demanded. And as all are to possess it, it is certain that
differences of degrees are not excluded. The same thing is
true of the perfection of which our Lord speaks (St Matt.
V. 48) (on St Matt. xix. 21, cf. p. 234).
The Roman Church does not stand on this high level. It
is true that its public teaching affirms perfection in the
Christian who loves God above all, and loves all in loving
God. Even in secular life this perfection may be attained,
and not merely in monastic life ; and its counsels of perfection,
strictly taken, do not set forth a higher perfection, but
an ' easier and surer ' way to perfection (p. 232). But
the Augsburg Confession is right when, in regard to the
actual valuation of the monastic life, it insists that perfection
in the mind of the Romish Church consists of perfection in
single things — laying down assignable qualities in which
perfection consists [cf. 'Counsels of Perfection'), and con-
sequently measurable by external tests. Even in the Protestant
Churches ideas of a similar kind are current, where sin in
the regenerate is denied or veiled. The confession of faith
mentioned, on the other hand, delineates the plain and inex-
haustible image of true Christian perfection thus : " It is
fearing God with the whole soul, with earnestness, accompanied
by a heartfelt assurance and trust that God is for Christ's sake
a merciful God, and that we ought to pray and desire from God
what is needful for us, and seek help from Him in all trouble
such as each may surely expect in his calling and position ;
and that it is our duty to diligently practise good works
towards those that are without, and perform the duties of our
calling." These are the 'good works' which form the proof
of our Christian character in regard to God, in relation to
our neighbour, to ourselves, and to the world, as we have
20
306 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
already learnt. But the term 'Christian perfection' fell into
disuse, and was all but crushed out of the terminology of
Evangelical Christianity. The reasons were many and manifold.
Romish and fanatical caricatures made the name suspicious.
The comfort of justification by faith was thought to be
endangered. In fact, the fundamental note of the judgment
of the Evangelical Church on the Christian life had grown to
be something different from that which rules in the Pauline
epistles. Neither the exalted feeling to which St Paul gives
utterance in all humility, nor the high praise which, along with
unvarnished reprehension of the deep shadows which marked
the position of the primitive Christian Churches, seemed
appropriate for the conditions that obtained now. Since the
world became Christian, Christianity had become of the world.
And it was precisely those who were in earnest who necessarily
based their judgment on all the finer ramifications of the inner
life. Attention was fixed more on the imperfection of the
Christian profession than on its perfection.
The idea of perfection, rightly understood, conflicts in itself
just as little with the recognition of ourselves as 'miserable
sinners ' as judgment according to our works with salvation from
judgment, by our faith — or, shortly put, as faith conflicts with
works. It is precisely for this reason that giving up the use
of the word ' perfection ' cannot be recommended, having, as is
the case, such a firm basis in New Testament usage. The term,
so to speak, recognises the duty of gratitude for God's work —
how great it is, and how it ever demands more and gives more ;
and the duty of self-encouragement in the maintenance of the
position we have attained in order to fresh advancement. In
this way both indolence and self-satisfaction are more securely
overcome, than by merely being content with our personal
imperfections. This is not adding anything new to what has
already been said in treating of Christian character. The
' new man ' is not perfect in its first stage, but comes into
existence with the power of growth. The new man is to grow
to adult manhood. This is just what is meant by the expres-
sions— the Christian is an 'independent' entity, a whole
Christian, a Christian 'character,' and his work is in itself a
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 307
whole and independent. But even in this there is found the
contrary of all idea of something ' finished,"" and room for the
desire of perfection in another world. In order that all these
thoughts may have due consideration, we regard the word
' perfection ' as a term of value. And when it is taken in its
true sense, then the danger is most safely obviated lest the
various stages of progress made should become fixed in proud
self- mirroring, or in harsh judgments on our fellow-Christians
{cf. Phil. iii. 152 and iii. 15). And here it is, as elsewhere, easily
comprehensible that the divinely ordered distinctions between
members of the great kingdom have their abiding right — the
theologian, the statesman, the artisan, the artist ; the differ-
ences amongst these in natural equipment and mode of life.
The same thing is true of the manifoldness of separate areas of
society, the ' worldly ' and the ' religious ' ; for instance, the
old pietists and the ' Hahnists "* of Wiirtemburg.^
What the practical value of all the thoughts just broached,
referring to the development of the Christian character, is, may
in conclusion receive further light from noting that only such
a character, who is a whole but not a ' finished ' Christian, can
conquer a foe, otherwise invincible, of the inner life — that is,
splenetic humour. " For is not spleen,'' as Goethe says, " an
inner discontent with our personal unworthiness, displeasure
with ourselves ever associated with envy and spurred on by
foolish vanity ? We see happier {i.e. better) men who make
us unhappy, and that is intolerable." But now it will have
become clear that the Christian is thoroughly freed from all
such spleen, and the reason clear too.
Certain Duties and Virtues.
A ' perfect man "" in the sense just explained is like to no
other. His character has on it a special impress according to
his special natural capacity and his special relations ; and so
each person has to settle for himself what his duty is in his own
fixed circumstances, both external and internal. The unity of
1 I. Michael Hahn (1758-1819) was the originator of a speculative theosophist
system in antagonism to pietism and orthodoxy. His numerous followers did not
form a separate body. They are also called ' Michelians.' — Tr.
308 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
the ' Good ' is not destroyed by this, but on the contrary it is
realised in all the fixed circumstances of definite men. But
since these relations and these men have, in spite of all variety,
something in common, we are able to speak and must speak
of virtue and the axioms of duty. For instance, the virtue of
benevolence is an indispensable one for all virtuous persons, and
the duty of acting generously belongs to everyone, although the
relation of this duty and virtue to the virtue and duty of thrift,
equally incumbent on all, is diverse.
A separate presentment of the principles of virtues and
duties would lead to wearisome reiteration, for the content is
necessarily the same. Only at one time the content is looked
at from the point of view — this and that virtue is the acquired
moral capacity to act in this way or that ; at another time from
the point of view — this or that principle of duty says, Regard
thyself as bound to act in this way or that. But such a
separate treatment would not be merely wearisome, but also
not suitable to the subject. For it conceals the truth of the
intimate connection between virtue and duty previously dis-
cussed, namely, that by the practice of duty we become virtuous,
and virtue shows itself in dutiful conduct.
A complete list of the virtues and axioms of duty to be thus
presented in unison must enumerate both the contraries and the
exaggerations, e.g. wisdom, folly, cunning ; courage, cowardice,
foolhardiness ; confidence, pusillanimity, audacity. Further, it
would be necessary to note the difference in relation to time,
e.g. beginning and continuance. One thinks of the steadfast-
ness of love — and also in regard to time and duration generally,
e.g. firmness and obstinacy. Not less it would be required to
observe the contrast of activity and passivity, so important in
respect of person and person ; and the contrast of pliability and
resistance on the part of the object. In fact, to carry this out
in detail would be quite endless. Still, it is necessary to remind
those who fancy that they can compile a complete list of virtues
and duties of this fact.
But even when we have declined to do this, it is in no wise
simple to find even one general method of division, arising from
the nature of the subject and so serving to illustrate it. Not
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 309
infrequently virtues of character and virtues of duty are dis-
tinguished from social virtues and social duties, while occasion-
ally religious duties are added. But then is it not simpler on
the whole to openly use the four main relations often mentioned
already — of God, our neighbour, our own nature, and the world ;
and then to distinguish between the virtues and duties which
are always presupposed by those relations, and so can be re-
garded as formal ? For, e.g.^ without wisdom there is no such
thing as a right attitude to God or to our neighbour ; either to
the physical impulses of our own nature or to the world outside
us. It is interesting to note that these latter virtues have their
prelude in the province which cannot strictly be called moral.
For instance, a strenuous will is by no means, as such, a moral
will in its full sense ; and we have had occasion to remark that
there are evil characters who, on account of this firmness of will
on the formal side, are nearer to goodness than those of weak
character, although the former, on the other hand, as far as the
content of the will is concerned, are antagonistic to goodness.
In this the one main principle of all morality, the independence
of the person in relation to external nature, asserts itself
directly. The true dignity of personality is independent of
that subjection to law which belongs to nature. And of course
this is assumed when speaking of Christian virtues and duties.
Those virtues and axioms of duty which are invariably
paralleled with one another are so paralleled by reason of their
connection with the three psychological divisions of the mental
nature — intellect, will, and feeling. The German language has
only recognised terms for the cardinal virtues related to know-
ledge and will. In reference to the first of these psychological
divisions, intellect, we name it wisdom when the intelligence is
at bottom, however imperfectly, so trained in clarity and depth
that it judges everything from the point of view of the highest
end. The grand virtue belonging to the will we call courage or
bravery when it is fully trained to such activity and persever-
ance that it determines and governs all its doings in conformity
with the highest end. The contraries of wisdom are folly
and cunning; those of courage, cowardice and foolhardiness.
According as we regard these two, wisdom and courage, as
310 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
effective wholes, or as referring to each separate case of their
use, we divide them into insight and prudence (discretion) sis
relating to the intellect ; and as related to the will, into
perseverance and determination. We have no special word in
German for the third division related to feeling. Perhaps we
might recommend * ideal feeling"' to denote the vivacity and
constancy, the clarity and depth, which are in our mind''s eye
when we think of 'feeling' as subjected to moral training, of
the state of mind in which everything is felt according to its
relation to the highest end, and rated at its true value. It is
well known that wisdom and courage had their place among the
four ' cardinal virtues ' of the ancients. But close adherence
to ancient ethics has in this connection produced almost
nothing but confusion. For plainly ' temperance ' refers to
our own nature, and 'justice' is the comprehensive social
virtue of the ancients.
In these three formal fundamental concepts of wisdom,
courage, ' ideal feeling,' those various subordinate notions may
be arranged which are found in the language of Christian
peoples, whether derived from the Holy Scriptures or not, such
as watchfulness, sobriety, right judgment in all things, etc.
There are also concepts which these three supreme ones include,
as truthfulness in the widest sense, conscientiousness, simplicity.
One may perhaps say they mark the unity of wisdom, courage,
and ' ideal feeling,' and in such a way that in the same cate-
gory each one of these in turn may form the leading one. But
this usage of speech in respect of these terms is not clearly
defined, and it is only in illustrative application that they find
their value in the practical life of the Christian. How great
this value is, the hymn " Holy Simplicity, marvel of grace " may
witness.^ This simplicity in sincerity is also the secret of the
deepest influence over others ; it works without violence, like
Christ Himself.
If we now note, as briefly as may be, how these formal virtues
and axioms of duty find their definite content in the great
* A hymn by Aug. Gottlieb Spangenberg on Christian simplicity, the Gospel
' singleness of eye,' the simple life, 1704-1792 A.D. A friend of Zinzendorf and
a Moravian bishop.
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 311
sphere of the moral life, we see that love to God, of which
we have spoken at length (p. 165), is essentially a humble
love (p. 264). Also it may be here insisted that it is both
directly built on God''s love to us, and in all its relations with
the world as God's world it evinces its power, and that both
when its attention is immediately occupied with it or raised
above it. This love of God, regarded under the above
formal aspects, is religious wisdom and the courage of faith.
The first is the Christian virtue so forcibly emphasised and
fervently prayed for by St Paul ; the latter as saving faith is
distinct from the faith spoken of by him (1 Cor. xiii. 2, " all
faith ") in spite of the sameness of the word. Religious virtue,
regarded under the aspect of ' ideal feeling,' is divine blessed-
ness. Christian wisdom finds the right light in which to regard
all changes in historical conditions, whether in politics or in
the prevailing cosmic philosophy, and refrains from all hasty
opinion injurious to faith. It shows itself, in a refined form,
in tact, which finds special mention alongside knowledge in
Phil. i. 9, " that your love may abound in all knowledge and
in all Judgment.'''' To the courage of faith belongs patience.
The New Testament does not delineate this as a weak
compliance, but mainly as firmness ; and indeed as a fully
conscious stability, not merely generally in severely trying
events, but in such as are felt to be trials of confidence in
God's goodness and power. That is a saying of patient endur-
ance, " I will trust and not be afraid," when the sun of divine
love seems to be extinguished, and only appears like a far-distant
star, to which the struggler with storm and darkness looks,
hoping against hope. Patience and hope are therefore closely
conjoined. All faith has, as often has been insisted on, a side of it
turned towards the eternal future, while genuine patience is
ever a conflict for this hope of faith. In conclusion, it is still to
be emphasised that, inasmuch as the attitude of the Christian
towards God is in all its relations maintained and fortified by
prayer, it is proper to speak of prayer as a duty. We might even
speak of prayer as a virtue, as in the language of devotion
we speak of a man of prayer and a hero of prayer ; of course
accompanied by the warning not to forget the importance of
312 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
humility in prayer, and in every exhibition of the wisdom of
faith and the courage of faith.
The presentment of the virtues and duties belonging to the
love of our neighbour naturally presupposes what was previously
said at large on the nature of Christian love of our neighbour.
Outside definite Christian ethics, the supreme virtue and duty
we owe to other men is not infrequently called Justice. The
higher the plane of such a system of ethics, the deeper is the
conception of what this justice is. Especially grand is that
delineation of the just man in Plato, who was compelled to die on
account of his firmness in cleaving to justice, as if he were an un-
righteous man, the martyr for righteousness' sake. Still plainer
and having affinity in some features with Christian love, in many
modern systems of ethics, is that in which justice is regarded as
devotion to the great aims of humanity. When the virtue of
justice is understood in this comprehensive and profound sense, it
goes far beyond the virtue of justice in the narrow meaning, or
the rectitude, which in Christian ethics — in harmony with what
has been said on the relation between love and law — we must call
its permanently indispensable presupposition. For the idea of
a disposition to love in the absence of a sense of right is for the
Christian a contradiction, however often in real life, in the case
of those who have just become Christians, this contradiction is
found. In the Christian love of our neighbour, again, that
permanent presupposition can be distinguished from its innermost
nature. This presupposition really consists in respect for others.
And indeed, provided it is Christian ethics of which we are
speaking, this respect for others is regard for the divinely ordered
destiny of our neighbour, his divine sonship in the Kingdom of
God. So it is, for this reason, respect for all that our neighbour
possesses of natural gifts, and for the moral position to which
he has already attained in his life, whether as the result of
Christian influences or otherwise. For it is God who has given
each natural capacity as means for the highest ends, and this
moral position is the fruit of providential guidance and of the
human obedience of each to it. This respect for others is
accentuated with special earnestness in the New Testament, as,
e.g.^ "Honour all men"" (J Pet. ii. 17), and "in honour pre-
THE NEW LIFE OF THE CHRISTIAN 313
ferring one another " (Rom. xii. 10) ; and as a virtue it is illus-
trated in the life of the Lord, as of His disciples. So to speak,
this virtue and duty of respect, merely regarded from the other
side, is modesty, ' thinking soberly ^ of oneself (Rom. xii. 3).
Looking at another's character helps us to rightly estimate our
own, and conversely. Aggrandisement of our own selves or de-
preciation of others is an inexhaustible fount of misunderstand-
ings in social intercourse which only modesty dries up. What
in particular we call reasonableness and toleration are clearly
only parts of this modest respect and respectful modesty. The
form of respect which should prevail in social intercourse is
courtesy. But why we have already assigned so special a place
to truthfulness, and must allow that the strict view of this duty
is demanded, is clear from what has just been said of respect for
others. For without this respect the highest relation of confi-
dence. Christian love of our neighbour, is destroyed in the bud,
and indeed cannot be entered upon at all, since sincerity is the
very foundation of its expression. And the inner limit of this
duty spoken of is now far more intelligible. The various chief
relations in which this love of our neighbour manifests itself
may perhaps be most simply set forth if we divide them into a
class in which there is the relation of giver and receiver, and a
class in which no such relation exists. The latter includes such
things as peacefulness, longanimity, and a conciliatory disposi-
tion. In the former case we distinguish between the love
of the receiver, or gratitude, and the love of the giver, of
course bearing in mind that there can only be real love in
mutual offices of kindness in giving and receiving, although in
every kind of reciprocal relation. The love which bestows is
attractive in friendliness of disposition, important not merely as
a key to men's hearts, but also for the retention of the aroma of
long-enduring fellowship of love. It is active in serviceableness
to others and benevolence. In its quality of durableness it is
faithfulness, that 'peerless treasure."" It is obvious now how
much those ' formal ' virtues of wisdom, courage, ' ideal feeling '
are indispensable in the love of our neighbour.
In regard to our own nature generally the union of wisdom
and courage is often called the virtue and duty of self-restraint
314 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
or temperance. In respect of our physical nature in the nar-
rower sense, in regard to eating and drinking it is moderation ;
in regard to the sexual impulse, chastity. Of this we need not
speak until we come to the section on marriage and the family.
In respect of external nature it is sufficient here to note that
we comprise all single virtues and duties in intelligent industry
and practicality. The latter is a particularly happy expression ;
it marks out the right of the practical, and warns at the same
time against the danger of personality being overwhelmed by it.
But, again, that comes into consideration when speaking of the
great social areas of human activity which make external nature
minister to mind. That is to say, the inventory of virtues and
duties which concludes individual ethics points us in every way
to social ethics.
CHAPTER VII.
SOCIAL ETHICS.
The Christian Life in Human Society.
In asserting the correctness and the importance of having a
special main division in the treatment of social ethics, it is
assumed, from the Christian standpoint, that the importance of
individual ethics has been fully recognised. When at the turn
of a century the question is asked what has been the chief
feature in the picture of the departing era, one of the many
answers given is : The uprise of the social question. This self-
characterisation awakens all kinds of reflections. To many it
is certainly convenient to cry out for a reform of society and to
forget that, in the last resort, society can only be improved by
the individual, and not the individual by society, however
highly we may rate the influence of society on the individual.
The passage in the Lamentations (iii. 39), " Wherefore doth a
living man complain, a man for the punishment of his sins,?'"' is
far more applicable to that ineffective censure of circumstances and
conditions, and the uncertain pressure to secure their alteration,
than any other in the Old Testament, for the Christianity which
recognises, in the sense of St Matt. vii. 17, the importance of the
person for this work of reform, and so for the ordering of all
society. One-sided regard for general improvement tends to
cripple the force of personal conviction and the sense of respon-
sibility. If the conscience of the individual is stirred, this has
its real value for the whole. " The world," says George, " needs
to-day high endeavour : will and freedom are not words of
empty rodomontade but sacred protestations."
316 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN IJFE
Nevertheless, it is inaccurate in Christian ethics to speak
only of giving proof of the value of Christian virtues by the
application of Christian principles of duty to the common
customs of society. For in the idea of the highest Good as
recognised by Christians the individual and society (indivi-
dualism and socialism) are knit together in a higher synthesis
nowhere else reached. Therefore, in any treatment apart
from social ethics less value is assigned to the community than
follows from the idea of the Kingdom of God. It is an inevi-
table task, necessarily involved in the fundamental principle,
that attention should be given to the way in which the highest
Good, the Kingdom of God, begins to find its earthly realisation
in human society. If each person may well perceive the limits
of his power to consider the immeasurable breadth, and depth
too, of human life, in the light of this Kingdom of God, at least
the problem must plainly be set. For this highest and deepest
fellowship in the Kingdom of God, springing from and founded
on the love of God, only then becomes actual under earthly
conditions when it is realised in those conditions which now
exist ; that is, in the social spheres arranged by a God of
omnipotent love for Christian men. Otherwise it remains
empty, unreal, a pious wish, the exact antithesis of a kingdom
of God, which is far from being an unsubstantial vision,
but the highest reality, of the highest value. That saying,
" Let us not love in word or tongue, but in deed and truth,"'
means : " Let us love in the interchange of all the capacities
and possessions which make up the fellowship of real men in
this real world, as members of a family, of a nation, in the work
of our hands or our heads."" But while the highest, the Kingdom
of God, is realised in all these fellowships, they gain a Christian
impress and thus must be considered in their Christian forms.
Certainly much in earthly history has only a transitory value —
nay, rightly understood, is all scaftblding destined to removal.
But nothing is in vain which helps to perfection, until that
which is perfect comes and that which is in part is done away.
It is to think meanly of the rule of God if, in spite of all
imperfection and sin, we think meanly of the framework of the
growing Kingdom of God formed, guided, supported by Him.
SOCIAL ETHICS 317
As a matter of fact, we are at present led by this history to a
stage of contemplation which is distinct not only from the
Roman Catholic mistrust of all that is of this world (p. 112),
but also from that Reformation idea that we ought in those
forms of nature certainly to honour God''s will, but still without
recognising in them the special value assigned to them by God's
will for moral ends. In this particular, Protestant ethics may
not go behind Schleiermacher, certain as it is that he only con-
quered a new field for the activity of the Protestant fundamental
principle, and but expanded Christian theistic ideas ; of course
with the accompanying danger of confusing morality with
civilisation. {Cf. below on the notion of civilisation ; also of
the transcendence and immanence of the highest Good (p. 140) ).
In connection with this, our conviction has grown more vivid
and of more weight, that all those social activities have a high
relative value irrespective of their Christian completion. Of
this we shall have to remind ourselves when dealing with marriage
and the family relationship.
A double injury arises from the neglect to appreciate social
ethics at its true value. The Christian himself has a doubtful
conscience when he asks. Is not every step forward into full life
a step away from God .? But anxious retirement from the
world revenges itself only too easily by an over- valuation of the
world, fear of its power or desire of its good things. And at
the same time the influence of Christian ideas on society suffers
loss. The regulation of society is left to the foes of Christian
ethics, who willingly cast themselves into the broad stream of
the world's activities, and do not stand doubtfully or critically
on the bank. The problems here opened up receive illustration
from Bismarck's correspondence, which has possibly contributed
more to their elucidation — for those who are sympathetic —
than great ethical systems. And if the right and importance
of social ethics is unreservedly recognised, stress may be freely
laid on its limitations. In solving the problems which life offers,
it is ever creating new ones. It is not capable of solving all the
riddles which arise from the complicacy of society and nature,
the growth of civilisation from the state of nature ; and still
less is it able to apprehend their inner unity, amid restless
318 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
change. And so it is perpetually compelled to put to each
person afresh the question of his duty. Both these limitations
have their basis in the nature of Christian ethics, in its religious
foundation, and its entire earnestness with regard to responsi-
bility— which very things do, however, make up its pre-eminence
over other ethical ideals. Still, we may say that in connection
with this point in Christian ethics a principle of the Christian
faith becomes more directly convincing than when standing
alone ; namely, that if we had in every respect an adequate
knowledge of God, then faith in God as the only God of love
could no longer have any ethical quality. In the absence of
this mystery of revelation the moral history of mankind, of each
person, would be a merely natural development.
Division of Social Ethics.
As to the division of social ethics agreement prevails in the
main, that is, on what are the most important groups of human
associations which ought to come under consideration. These
are the family, social intercourse generally, companionship and
friendship, in particular the industrial life (the social question
in the narrowor sense), science and art, the legally ordered
community or state, religious association or the Church. The
industrial group has not very long established a claim
commensurate with its clearly recognised importance to be
treated as a separate item. But there is no single social group
can be found wider or standing out more distinctly from othei-s
than this. For the concept ' society ' (in its widest connotation),
which might be thought of as wider, does not in itself connote
any special group, but is clearly a comprehensive term which
may be used in manifold application for all the classes above
named. It connotes the collective life of men regarded as an
articulated whole, however various the type and character of
their domestic, social, business, scientific, artistic, civic, religious
life. * Society "■ is different according to the period intended or
the particular class alluded to — for instance, ' society ' in the
time of Louis XIV. and ' society ' in agreement with Earl
Marx. From this it follows that it cannot be compared with
the enumerated types.
SOCIAL ETHICS 319
While, then, there is scarcely any dispute as to the subject-
matter of social ethics, it is possible, in forming a theory to
account for this, to be easily led into subtleties. Thus there is
the once-famous theory of Schleiermacher that it is the mind's
activity in reference to nature, in its power intellectually to ap-
propriate and symbolise emotionally, to shape spontaneously and
organise externally, from which the forms of society issued, when
it was once recognised that this activity is in part identically
and universally the same in all, and in part is individual and
peculiar to each. Still, as an example, the nature of art or of
friendship is only obscurely described in this way. Moreover,
the theory generally presupposes a notion of ethics which we
rejected at the outset as too indefinite. In this case also it is
simpler to recall those fundamental concepts of the moral life,
God, our neighbour, our own nature, and that which is external
to it. Each one of these, or several combined, yields the special
content of the social groups enumerated. Thus, under the idea of
the religious nature comes the Church ; from that point of view
of free intercourse arises our relation to our fellow-men, which
becomes fellowship in intellectual communion one with another ;
under the notion of law and right is that of the ordered state ; in
respect of external nature there is association in industrial life,
science and art ; of course so that in every way all the various
ruling relations receive attention in various proportions and in
various ways. For instance, the industrial life is a specially
important and difficult province of our relation to our
neighbours, as one of love, just because it is concerned with the
shares we are each to have in ' natural goods.' The family is,
however, the grand basis and centre of all others, having its
roots in the natural relation of the sexes.
Among these groups, as above pointed out, those three are
very intimately connected which relate to our mastery over
nature, the industrial and technological on the one hand, the
ideal group — intellectual in the narrow sense, for of course the
technological department is in reality the dominion of the mind
over nature — namely, art and science. This mental dominion
over nature is called civilisation, and the society which correspond-
ingly rests on it civilised society. But the word 'civilisation' is not
320 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
always strictly used. It is employed sometimes so as to include
family, social intercourse, and state, and even religion itself — in
short, every advance over a mere state of nature. One thinks of
many treatises of the history of civilisation in this sense of the
word. The disposition to widen the connotation of the term is
very intelligible. For one thing, the advancement of all depart-
ments of life is greatly influenced by the progress of civilisation
in the narrower sense. For instance, a higher development of
the state without a higher development of scientific knowledge
is in some measure inconceivable. Many a sanctuary of a once
living religion has disappeared for this very reason, that its gods
could not stand against advancing knowledge ; and conversely,
the Christian is convinced that his religion can and ought to
gain by every step forward in civilisation. But still more.
Even the simplest activities of the moral life, for instance in the
family, are inconceivable in the entire absence of civilisation, in
the absence of dominion over nature, inasmuch as they are
indissolubly connected with the regulation of our own nature.
Nevertheless, it is advisable to give up this comprehensive use of
the word because the danger is involved, or even there is a
conscious design, in such use, to confound the moral with the
natural, and sacrifice the distinction between the two asserted at
the outset (p. 23). Even in the name of Christianity many
are to-day enthusiastic for a so-called ' monism of ci vilisation,'
and by this means do violence to the clearness of ethical con-
cepts, and to its unique character. For in regard to the family,
the ordered community, and entirely so in religion, the questions
that arise are, irrespective of Christian ethics, altogether diverse
from those in art, science, technology. Hence we avoid the
ambiguity which lies in the expression, * the dominion of the
mind over nature,' and rather say — the whole of social ethics is
not included in the ethics of civilisation, but that the former in-
cludes social forms which are fundamentally ethical in character,
while there are others which have to do with civilisation
(in the plain narrow sense). Of both. Christian ethics has to
show how the specially Christian ideal ought to be realised in
them. Only it is of course indispensable that great stress should
be laid on the immense importance of civilisation for the
SOCIAL ETHICS 821
development of ethics generally, and of Christian ethics in
particular, as will be done in what follows ; for example, the
refinement of human society in the family, trade, the state, in
companionship, in religious life, through technology, science
and art. But this refinement, this advancement in civilisation
in all the spheres spoken of, is not necessarily moral advance-
ment. Often enough there arises by the advance a real danger
of moral retrogression, and the idea of civilisation in general
contains the hardest problems, as we may proceed to show, in
reference to each single social group. Consequently it is more
correct probably to decline the expression 'civilised com-
munities' even as a comprehensive term for all social groups
except family and Church, on account of the misunderstandings
which it easily causes.
The term ' customs ' deserves a word in this place on account
of analogous difficulties. We call that sum of rules by the
name customs, the authority for which is neither founded in the
coercive power of law, so that one refrains from an act for fear
of punishment, nor grounded on the personally free recognition
of an absolute law, the breach of which brings with it a feeling of
guilt ; but whose basis is the judgment of the public of a greater
or lesser group. He who holds this cheap is held cheap, loses
his honour in this public opinion and his social status. Custom
in this sense regulates the whole of human life in all the men-
tioned communities. We speak of family custom, artisan habits,
honour among thieves. Church usages {cf. ' Vocation "■ and
' Honour ' ), and consequently the term is of some importance
for all parts of social ethics. Customs are founded partly on
that refinement of the natural human collective life of which we
first spoke in dealing with the notion of civilisation ; partly on
the opinion set up by the particular social group concerned
according to the stage of civilisation reached. For the latter
reason custom is both a prelude to morality and a field for its
exercise. But the school of custom does not always bring forth
good fruits. We are bound to rate it highly so far as custom is
the moral passed over into flesh and blood. But the limits of
its value are just as clear ; namely, it depends on how far it asks
itself what standard of moral conviction lies at its base. And
21
322 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
still more, it is merely in this closely defined sense that we can
speak of a custom which is become ethical. For what is
ethical is in its ultimate basis something personal and, just on
that very account, something that transcends mere custom
(p. 18). It is also of great value as educative for the individual,
and is, in fact, ultimately only the means to this end ; for those
who are trained to personal morality do no longer follow custom
merely as custom. In this respect too what has been said of
the attitude of the Christian towards honour is applicable
here. Moreover, custom which is merely in keeping with a
particular standard of civilisation (in the narrow sense of the
term) may, although of considerable educational value, become,
as is well known, a seductive temptation to immorality.
Marriage and the Family.
Following on the above general remarks on the nature of
social ethics, important reasons for the discussion of marriage
and the family in Christian ethics result from the fact that
these are not the creation of Christianity. Firstly, it must be
noted that the Christian doctrine of marriage and the family is
to be derived from the principles of the Gospel, and not from a
careless collocation of passages from the Old and New Testaments.
Otherwise, what account could one give without untruthfulness
of the narratives of the patriarchal times ? Nor do even isolated
New Testament sayings form a sufficient foundation. For even
that profound saying of our Lord, "They twain shall be one
flesh" (St Mark x. 6-8), speaks of the indissolubility of the
marriage between a man and his wife ; but that it is a relation
Christian in its end, character, and motive is not contained in
the words themselves. And even an express appeal to the
varied sayings of the Apostle would not be sufficient for this
purpose; for while Eph. v. 32 appeals to the 'mystery' of
Christian marriage, so far as the apparent meaning is concerned,
1 Cor. vii. 2 does not assign it a very high value. We must con-
sequently be mindful, in this matter of Christian marriage, of
the rules given earlier for the interpretation of Scripture. So
then it follows from the fact above mentioned that, while it is
indubitable that marriage, Christianly understood, has an incom-
SOCIAL ETHICS 323
parable moral value, and certain as it is that Christian morality
according to the faith of Christ is the perfection of all morality,
yet the institution of marriage has great moral value even
where the highest ideal is not reached. This truth is in the
midst of Christianity itself important ; its recognition will point
the right way to a judgment of the value of various legal ordin-
ances as to marriage, possibly some in our civil law-books.
Finally, the value of the Christian conception of marriage and
the family for Christian ethics is independent of historical in-
vestigations on early and pre-Christian forms of the marriage
relation. \^For generally the validity of a moral truth is inde-
pendent of the means by which~"it has asserted itself in the
course of history. What our present duty is, is determined by 7
our present moral insight, in whatever way it may have pleased )
God to lead us slowly to it. Mankind, as a whole, can judge in
no other way. The mystery of marriage as a type of the union
betwixt Christ and His Church could neither be understood
nor appreciated until the Lord and His Church were formed on
the earth ; but now the Church is there it can be understood
and experienced by its members. If this principle is recognised we
may add that what is asserted as to the relation of the sexes in
the grey dawn of history has in no way such secure basis as the
originators of such theories seem to suppose. For example, the
theory that in the so-called patriarchal period not only was the
man the ruler in the family, but there was a ' matriarchate ' also,
in which the mother was the chief factor in the family life, and that
a period preceded this, before the family relation existed, when
in the tribe promiscuous intercourse of the sexes was the usage.
(Cf. Bachofen, Morgan, Population and Degeneration ^m the litera-
ture of the Social Democratic propaganda.) Against this view
objections have been raised not merely in the name of history,
but also from the side of scientific research. Still, however
that may be, historical researches have never got to the very
beginnings ; and they concern the Christian faith merely in the
judgment on sin. More important for us is the reference to
the undoubted fact — because ever presenting itself in experience
— that in the life of the family the natural and the moral are
more closely conjoined than anywhere else. The one impinges
324 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
on the other, and one arises out of the other. In this, for
the Christian, there lies an inexhaustible incentive to prove here
too the truth of the Pauline saying of the depth of the divine
wisdom ; as for the non-Christian there is the insistent temp-
tation to doubt not only God but also the independent basis
of the moral element. And we shall see that this doubt may
unite itself with apparently strong faith, and particularly when
the demand is made to deny this natural element in the name
of faith. It does indeed remain a mystery that God has so
inseparably conjoined the ethically highest with the naturally
lowest. It is a mystery which we reverence while experiencing
its blessings, and of which no human intelligence can affirm
that it has apprehended it in all its depth. For this very reason
shame is given as its guardian.
By these remarks the way is paved for what follows. The
definite Christian idea of marriage must be first of all treated
without discussing theoretical or practical doubts, for it is only
thus that it can justify itself against these doubts, and give the
right clue to their solution.
The Christian Idea of Marriage.
Marriage is the mutual moral life-association of a man and a
woman. The essence of marriage lies in the unity of the natur-
ally sexually different and of the moral relation between them. It
is erroneous to think only on the imion of two persons of different
sex ; just as erroneous to think merely of the moral union of
two persons without consideration of the sex element. In the
first case the ethical element is left out of sight, and in the
second it is not marriage but friendship that is thought of.
All that is ethical in Christian marriage is conditioned by the
natural ; all that is natural ought to be wholly and fully stamped
with the ethical. And indeed in this natural element there is
not merely the physical but the mental differences of the sexes
concerned ; and in both respects there is the general as well as
special (or individual) elective affinity arising from this differ-
ence. This mental difference of the sexes has been variously
defined. It is, for instance, said, as by Lotze, that " the mind
of the female particularises as that of man generalises " ; or as
SOCIAL ETHICS 826
Paulsen says, " Man seeks respect, woman love.'' No such
formulas exhaust the reality which offers itself to experience,
and which poets present in different aspects, giving expression
to the deep feeling that the sexes in their union represent man.
This inexhaustibly rich abundance of material (the physical
and mental nature) gets in marriage an ethical impress, and that
in all the fundamental relations of ethics : self-discipline, love of
our neighbour, overcoming the world, trust in God ; above all,
in the mutual relations of the married pair. It is only where^
there is real self-control that love between the sexes is possible
without injury to personal self-respect. Otherwise, when there
is a want of mutual respect the nearest neighbour becomes
estranged from the nearest neighbour. By self-control, on the
other hand, this grave danger of degradation becomes a means
of self-conquest. The love of our neighbour is illustrated in a
special form in the married relationship, and it has unique power,
depth, glory. The sexual difference is in its way the greatest
possible difference that can exist, and the union consequently
forms a unique relationship. No man, however perfect, feels,
knows, or wills precisely in the same way as a typical woman.
When these thus diverse become one in love, then there is a
unity in diversity. We might even explicitly say that a new ,
operative power becomes the possession of the married persons,
for there is in reality a new experience not actually found in
the consciousness of any human being without this union of the
greatest contrasts. It really involves seeing with other eyes —
which are still their own — hearing, feeling, judging, willing,
acting, helping ; and this not by the sacrifice of the personal
nature of each, but by its enrichment. Isolated examples dis-
parage rather than interpret the great fact. Still, we may
remember how the man's view of things, learning to see them
with his wife's eyes, gains in appreciation of the trifles of life,
which still are important, and apprehends the power of patience
as a special gift ; how the woman, by sympathy with the life-
work of her husband, is preserved from frivolousness. The
married life of Luther, and, in the broad current of modern life,
the sermons of Schleiermacher and the letters of Bismarck to his
wife, are grand illustrations for us German people of the truth
326 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
1 here set forth. They all at the same time show what in reality
! is the indestructible foundation of an ideal marriage, and that
[is faith in God. Otherwise, in the larger as in the smaller
world, the world of the man and that of the woman are no longer
the same. When the natural ardour is extinguished, differences
of temperament, education, and culture, built on the strong
foundation of sexual difference, grow into mental separation.
Of course an upright will, even when it is not Christian at all,
may fight against this tendency to a mere 'living with one
another.' But the trials to which such a will is subjected may
easily be too much for its power when the battle lasts long ;
and lifelong habit, with the obtrusive examples of many sordid
marriages, blunt its energy. It is otherwise when a common
aim which is more than earthly unites them ; when access to
the eternal home stands open, and there is common prayer for
forgiveness and grace ; faith in the one eternally true God of
love, such as makes all human love, of bridegroom, of husband,
father, mother, brother, and friend, a symbol of its power. And
also in this fellowship with God, which is the firm foundation of
every true Christian marriage, one spouse ministers to the other
in a way not otherwise possible.
So far we have considered the nature of marriage in its signi-
ficance for the married pair as persons who in marriage, and
only by the completion thus given, experience personal advance-
ment in the good, and consecrate themselves to God in this high
school of faith and love. But this does not completely describe
the nature of marriage. Even on its natural side it points
beyond the persons as a pair to society as a whole. This smallest
of communities among men is the grand basis of all others.
And even in this respect that which is naturally sexual has in
marriage a wholly and fully ethical quality. The new genera-
tions essential to the earthly development of the Kingdom of
God, the product of marriage, are trained by the married pair
in the Christian family, in each home, in the particular circum-
stances which are specially prepared by natural love, for which
no substitute is possible.
Both purposes which make up the nature of marriage, the
^personal benefit of the married pair and the procreation and
SOCIAL ETHICS 327
training of children, are most completely realised together.
The personal love of the espoused has no field for its exercise
that touches it closer than the bringing up of children ; in no
other point can a unity of interests which otherwise are often
widely separate be found ; and no other makes such demands on
the most personal devotion. On the other hand, this task
cannot be successful unless they have gained already their true
personality, and have found that higher unity of their in-
dividualities in real affection. Hence it is just as erroneous
to say that the purpose of marriage is personal completion and
not mutual agreement in bringing up children, as to affirm the
contrary. But it is intelligible that, in accordance with the
tendency of the times, now the individual and now the social
aspect may stand in the forefront. At the end of the eighteenth
century it was the first, at the end of the nineteenth the second
— of course with opposite dangers. For the truth is, it is a
question of a single purpose with a double side. All that has
been advanced on the relation between the individual and the
community (pp. 143 ff.) is equally applicable to marriage, and has
here a particularly profound significance. Here too man must
not put asunder what God has joined together; namely, the
principle of matrimonial fellowship on the basis of the natural
sexual relation. But if it happens, as a matter of fact, that
God denies the blessing of offspring, then this raises a question
for the Christian couple in what other way they can attain a
unity of purpose, and find thereby a means of showing their
mutual personal completeness. The answer will be different in
each case, but at any rate this love will always aim at avoiding
secluding itself in weak and selfish isolation, but open itself to
others in need. Not necessarily by adopting children ; for the
failure to have offspring of their own necessitates double pre-
caution in considering their capability of bringing up those of
others. But . it is undoubted that numerous childless marriages
give illuminative evidence that even this deprivation may be
turned to a glorious account. And here not only the Christian
principle finds illustration, that all things may be turned to the
best account, but also the proposition often insisted on of the
relation of the individual to the community ; in this case the
328 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
relation of fellowship between the married couple themselves
and to the human society propagated by means of marriage. So
much does everything find its end in marriage in the completion
of united personalities, of course in love, that even this essential
deficiency in the natural foundation of the marriage tie, its non-
fulfilment of its social purpose, may be overcome and find its
compensations.
In the ideas of marriage are included its indissolubility,
monogamy, the fundamental equality of rights of the married
couple. And these concomitants are indispensable both on
account of the mutual fellowship of the married pair and on
account of their relation to their children. It is only possible
for that many-sided life of fellowship to perfect itself by such
persons as are inseparably joined together. If, as in the case
of polygamy, it is the dishonour of woman that is most evident,
this is not absent in the man's case either. The same thing is
true of the position of the rising generation. Not less is the
indissolubility of the marriage tie implicate in the thought of
this many-sided life-fellowship. And the serious endeavour to
maintain it is impossible if the possibility of separation is even
thought of. Further, the rightly regulated training of offspring
is impossible. Finally, there is only a truly ethical life-fellow-
ship when essential equality of rights is admitted. For if both
the parties aimed at the like highest Good, but not wHh equal
personal independence, then it could not be the like at which they
aimed ; and the same thing would be repeated in reference to all
the subordinate ends included in the highest Good. In equal
measure the effect on the family is profoundly bad if the com-
mand, " Honour thy father and thy mother^'' does not apply in
the fullest sense. But this fundamental claim of equality of
rights in all respects does not exclude but includes, by reason of
the difference in the sexes, the right of the man to be the ' head
of the woman"" and of the home. But this control is the
opposite of coercion ; it is rather love itself under the ethically
determined conditions of a true marriage and as settled by
nature.
On these three notes — the ' indissoluble,' ' equal ' maniage
of 'one man to one woman' — it is quite clear that it is not
SOCIAL ETHICS 329
permissible to mix up the pre-Christian or even the Jewish
ethical views with those that are Christian. The most recent
history of missions bears witness to the difficult questions of
conscience we are compelled to face at home and abroad, in
order at the right time, and in the right place, to insist upon
the Christian estimate of marriage. On the other hand, we are
not to co-ordinate the question of a second marriage with the
three requisites given. For this is in no wise contradictory to
the Christian ideal, however often, as a matter of fact, this is
asserted from want of ethical i<nowledge, and is even declared to
be contrary to duty. But to see in a second marriage real
unfaithfulness to the first, because personal completeness is in
general supposed to be accomplished in this alone, is a want of
accurate understanding and right estimate of the natural side of
marriage.
From the nature of marriage the principles that should guide
us in entering upon it are easily deducible. Marriage is not
ethically justifiable either when there is an absence of a real
sentiment of love, or when this is not under moral control.
The marriage for money comes under the first heading, as
also the so-called marriage of convenience ; the latter is true
of mere amorousness and the frenzy of passion. Only we may
not forget that this irrefragable proposition finds the most
various application in the fulness of life's interests, and
that the wisdom and power of divine providence are able to
overcome much human ignorance and confusing self-deception,
though often by the discipline of trouble. But this does not
affect the question of what ought to be and might be if men''s
wills were clearer and stronger. The same thing is true when
we come to define more closely the meaning of the above pro-
position, and find that it is of individual application. For,
speaking generally, we may just say — that in order to the real
completeness of the marriage union, and that the personal per-
fection of each in their calling and relation to society may be
possible, the differences between the married couple must not be
too great ; and yet there ought to be some difference. Otherwise
the one has nothing to give and the other nothing to receive ;
and they are not independent in their unity, or their independ-
330 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
ence excludes fellowship. This statement is true, of course, in
varied meaning and measure, of such differences as those of
social position, age, education, religion. The two first are at
times plainly a less hindrance than the two last, and they are
all, with the above reservation, a limitation to marriage. But
a glance at life shows how little an intelligence otherwise clear
and practical avails in this particular sphere as a guarantee of a
wise choice ; how pressing the danger is of being blinded by
the glamour of passion, and overestimating one's power — as if
it were an easy thing to do, for instance, to bridge over the gulf
of a different educational standard. It is because the nature of
marriage has its foundation in the most imperious of natural
propensions that this is so. So much the more needful to
remember, " If any man lack wisdom, let him ask of God" (St
James i. 5) ; " that is the true way to gain wisdom." There is
no other way, probably, of winning that true naturalness in the
intercourse of the sexes, without which a choice, clear in its
reasons and yet leaving room for spontaneousness, is not con-
ceivable. At a point where man's spirit and nature so
strangely meet, fellowship with God — who created man's
spirit and is the Author of nature — is the sole guarantee
of their higher synthesis in man. It is only such personal
sincerity that is in the position to find right answers to the
innumerable questionings which start up in this region : for
instance, whether youthful love and early engagement is a surer
safeguard than a self-imposed restraint on the free unfolding of
the natural affections.
On the principles thus laid down marriage is for the Christian
a divine ordinance (St Mark x. 6-8), and indeed as such the
basis of Christian society. A complete ethical manhood formed
by the union of the sexes grows into an ethical humanity, and
so individual and social ethics here find their point of unity,
and all other forms of society rest on marriage. This is conse-
quently, for the earthly development of the Kingdom of God, the
most important of human fellowships. Of course only for its
earthly realisation, since its sexual base appertains to this
present form of our existence merely. Those who are accounted
worthy to receive that world " neither marry nor are given in
SOCIAL ETHICS 331
marriage '" (St Mark xii. 25). Certainly " when that which is
perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away " —
elementary knowledge, art, the control over the world ; and even
the Church will be different when all is ' made new.' But
marriage on its natural side belongs to the transitory in a
wholly different and profounder way than even these intellectual
activities. Still, so long as it endures it is second to no other
association, but rather is the divinely ordered and most spiritual
sphere of all ; not merely one of the means, but one of the chiefest
means, for the realisation of the Kingdom of God rightly under-
stood. Consequently it is under Christian conditions a duty to
seek marriage, where there is no special reason which makes
celibacy a duty for the individual. Apart from such cases, it
ought to be acknowledged by everyone that there is no way to
personal sanctification and usefulness to the corporate whole
that is more pleasing to God. The popular jocose sayings on
bachelorhood and spinsterhood rest in good part on the
Christian belief which penetrates the general consciousness that
marriage is the securest, because the most natural, field for the
exercise of personal ability, and of all work for others ; that
much-vaunted holiness and self-devotion are severely tested by
the daily trials of the Christian household ; that it is a fact that
the man who is famous in his vocation only becomes a whole
man by the unprejudiced criticism of the genuine wife. And
that other point is just as clear, that, although marriage is a
means to advance the Kingdom of God, if the Lord of the
Kingdom demands by His gifts and His leading of any indi-
vidual abstinence from marriage, whether because the natural
presuppositions, sexual sensibility, or business circumstances
are wanting, or because such person feels that he caimot
adequately fulfil the task appointed him, in the way duty
demands in any other vocations, without abstaining from
marriage, his place in the Kingdom of God is unaffected by
this. The wide scope for possible self-deception again becomes
obvious, and against this also there is the only remedy re-
peatedly mentioned. But that the question is not one of
manufactured difficulties may be realised by thinking of the
missionary or the travelling explorer. And here too we must
332 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
maintain that what duty is for such an one only the person
himself can decide. It is precisely in this province that the
counsels of the most famous counsellors with especial frequency
lead away from that evangelical freedom which is one with
God's will in respect of its full obligatoriness.
This development of the idea of marriage is combated from
several opposite quarters. To one it appears too lax, to another
too stern, and to leave too much or too little room for the play
of the natural propensions. Too little room by the stern require-
ments of monogamy, indissolubility, and some sort of supremacy
on the part of the man, even with fundamental equality of
rights. If the last-mentioned objection is essentially a new
one, the two former are clearly the revival of pre-Christian
views, but elaborated altogether differently in detail and made
more acceptable. At one time there is biting sarcasm over
the innumerable unhappy marriages, whether among the lower
orders through the pressure of hard work, or among the more
fortunate classes who have no life-purpose (BebePs book on
Woman, Ibsen's Puppenheim); at another time there is the preach-
ing of free love in the attractive guise of the novel, represent-
ing the bonds of matrimony as disturbing the proper development
of the ' ego,' or in sheer coarseness claiming that nature should
not be in bondage. Such opinions are felt by the Christian to
be an insistent summons to seek to obviate the miseries of the
' conventional marriage,' and to remove the social obstacles to
family life, yet only so as to carry out the Christian ideal.
The ' freedom of the flesh ' is to him slavery from which Christ
has set us free. But so much the more seriously will he be
compelled to note the objections which see in this elaborated
idea of marriage a wrong compliance with sensual desire, and
to protest against them generally or explicitly in the name of
Christianity (cf. Grabowsky's impressive words).
This latter protest is all the more worthy of note as history
shows that those who raised it have contributed much to the
elevation of family life. Sexual licence, easiness of divorce, the
degradation of woman called forth a counter-movement even in
the Greek world itself But the Stoic and Neo-Pythagorean
philosophies were as little capable of a thorough-going reforma-
SOCIAL ETHICS 383
tion affecting the whole national life as legislative measures.
It is the incontestable merit of the Christian Church that it
translated sublime words and wishes into plain fact. But even
the Church which sanctified marriage looked upon the unmarried
state as the higher and more perfect ; understood the word
chastity of the non-satisfaction of the sexual impulse ; was
inclined to look upon sanctity as summed up in chastity, and,
conversely, to regard the sexual propension as the root of sin.
On the one side the Tridentine Council condemned those who
did not recognise marriage as a sacrament which was the means
of supernatural grace, and on the other side those who would
not concede that virginity is a state of higher perfection. Even
many Protestants occupy an inconsistent position in regard to
marriage. Thus, if they consider natural desire as essentially
sinful, they plainly forsake the Evangelical line of teaching,
and are in contradiction both with the plain ruling of Jesus
on marriage (St Mark x. 6-8), and with such passages of
Scripture {e.g. 1 Tim. iv. 3) as are explicitly adverse to such
reasoning. It sounds like Christian piety, and is in truth
heathenish, when at the present time the question is put, with
or without connection with the introduction of Buddhist ideas
— How can Christians wish to bring children into the world,
when they surely know that they will be born into a world of
sin and misery ? Christianity, it is said, has not renovated
personality in history. As if Christianity were cognisant of
such a redemption as this, by the annihilation of the desire of
life by natural process !
Still there are many to whom such assumptions and argu-
ments are unwelcome, who yet share in a feeling of the higher
value of the unmarried state at least secretly. For proof of
this they readily appeal to some expression of the Apostle
Paul. But that he did not give his ' counsel ■" (in the sense of the
Roman Catholic Church) in contradistinction to commands we
have seen earlier (p. 233). Here the point is as to the mean-
ing of such expressions in reference to maiTiage, and the value
set upon it generally by the Apostle. Now, in his elaborate
explanation (1 Cor. vi.) it is certain that he insists upon the
nearness of the Advent as the reason why he desires the celibate
334 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
state also for others (v. 26), and prefers it on account of the
'trouble in the flesh' marriage will bring (v. 28). In this
same connection the self-same Paul distinguishes more strongly
than elsewhere his ' opinion ' from the Lord's ' command,'
although with the clear consciousness that he has "the Spirit
of the Lord"; and in other utterances he places marriage so
high that it is the type of the fellowship between Christ and
His Church (Eph. v. 32 ; c/! 1 Cor. ii. 3). But undeniably he
regards marriage essentially as a concession to weakness (v. 2) ;
says, quite generally, that it is morally good " not to touch a
woman" (v. 1); designates continence as a gift of grace (v. 7);
and grounds this judgment on the fact that not only are the
unmarried freer from worldly anxiety, but also freer to care
for " the things of the Lord " (vv. 32-34). If we reflect on all
this, and also note how strongly St Paul lays emphasis on the
dignity of the man in comparison with the woman, then we
may be inclined, in Evangelical ethics, in harmony with the
principles founded on the usage of Scripture, to judge much
as follows. In the saying of the Lord (St Mark x.) the position
in regard to marriage corresponding with the genius of the
Gospel finds clearer expression than in isolated utterances of
the Apostle, which may have been influenced by his personal
idiosyncrasy, his period, and his view of the frightful licentious-
ness of the surrounding world. The Lord Himself, in Lhat plain
saying treating of the indissolubility of the marriage union,
and of the equality of rights of man and wife as something
quite obvious, because it is God's ordination, and not adding
any single prescript whatever, here as everywhere left it to the
spirit of freedom to make its deductions from the principles
laid down. In this sense Luther's battle about marriage was
a harking back to the Gospel and a battle on its behalf. And
so were all the new convictions which the German mind, under
the influence of the Gospel, acquired as to the interpenetration
of the natural and the moral in marriage, and of its completely
unique character for each individuality ; and that, in this way,
the sanctification of every person, as of the corporate whole, is
inseparable from marriage and the family (Schleiermacher).
Whoever considers this judgment as to the attitude of the
SOCIAL ETHICS 386
Apostle in regard to marriage, as justifiable from the Protestant
principle of an appeal to Scripture, will be the very one who will
also venture to go back on the question whether these passages
exhaust the whole depth of the Pauline sayings. It has already
been insisted on (p. 330) that the sexual relation is one that in
an especial degree belongs to the transitory conditions of our
earthly development (p. 331). Now, has not he who, in his
individual opinion as to his duty, rejects this earthly means for
the attainment of the highest purpose, the moral right to say
(like St Paul in his glance at the nature of this means) that
not to require them is ethically right, and even to wish that were
the case with others ; especially if also, like St Paul, he
insists on the danger of self-deception on this subject ? Is not
that a fresh application of the saying of Jesus Christ (St Matt.
xxii. 30) under definite conditions ? Is it not a logical conse-
quence from the nature of the Christian good as transcendent ?
From the Roman Catholic depreciation of the natural (and its
obverse side, the overvaluation of it), this would be something
fundamentally and entirely different from the idea of the super-
erogatory and meritorious. It would be merely a due recog-
nition of the right of private judgment and duty — for apart
from this those who are unmarried sin— and that according to
its special content, by remembering that our highest good is
realised in a whole of ordered ends ; and becomes actually
complete under other conditions of existence. St Paul there-
fore designates his own dutiful realisation of a great good, in
the scale of ' Goods ' (in which he without fanaticism assumes
the standpoint of perfection), as a gift of grace, and desires it
for others. Only if we are to complete this train of thought
we should admit that the various single sayings used by St
Paul, which can plainly be understood in that wider sense, are
conditioned by his personal and general situation.
Consequences^ and Various Questions.
Here in connection with marriage is also the place to speak
of chastity — ' morality ' in the clearly narrowest sense of the
word. That ' chastity ' in marriage is not only the opposite
of adultery, but modesty (not, however, prudishness) in the
336 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
deepest sense, follows from the above idea. Among the pro-
perties of true love a prominent place (1 Cor. xiii. 5) is given
to its not " behaving itself unseemly."" The physically sensual
act, as we saw, becomes ethically personal, in which lies its
freedom and its obligation. If those who love one another
" stand with their love before God," it is in this that, with their
joy in God"'s gift, they also find the power of self-control ; and
also the power of dutiful abstention arises out of such love. If
in this sense a true marriage is the high school of chastity, so is
chastity before marriage the most personal of marriage portions ;
the greatest pledge of happiness. The different judgment
found in very wide areas of society on this demand of chastity
in the young man and the maiden cannot in any way be
Christianly justified. How much in this respect public opinion
is poisoned, how largely dishonour is done to the idea of
marriage, and how shameless the idea of shame, was shown by
Bjornson's ' Handschuh,' published in an otherwise respectable
journal. Conscientious doctors testify that purity is health,
even when preserved after hard struggle {cf. Ribbing, Sexual
Hygiene). On the other hand, the beast in man becomes the
more craving by weak indulgence, and the passions more un-
natural than in beasts themselves {cf. cases in magisterial courts).
That unchastity means to the Christian a dishonour to his
person, and lovelessness under the guise of love, follows from
what has been said before. The prostitution brought to the
light of day in the society of the present only superficially dis-
guises the widely existing slavery of women. Contempt for
women prevails everywhere where the love of one man for one
woman is undermined and this ideal no longer illumines and
warms the youthful mind. It ought to be especially insisted,
in opposition to the poetic glorification of impurity, that the
true poetry of life perishes in it ; the emotions fullest of promise
languish ; and the fatality is not confined to the individual, the
corporate life is endangered at its very roots. The trade of the
prostitute has been and is the beginning of the end of nations.
Therefore society ought not to countenance prostitution in any
form, as having the right of existence, but rather counteract its
influence in every way for the protection of future generations.
SOCIAL ETHICS 337
For this end there is need of renewal right down to the inmost
sensibility. Everyone must use the means for bringing it
about — self-control, work, prayer. The question is one of a
crusade for the salvation of the future ; the more successful, the
more it is prepared for in the quiet of the pure heart and steadfast
will. There is scarcely any point in which the task of Christian
ethics is as difficult as it is pressing. But it is exactly when
due account is unreservedly taken of the ' sexual need in man
and wife' that the truth of the above propositions becomes
all the clearer, while the inclination to enter on half-considered
measures of reform grows less (for instance, what disparate
ideas are combined in that grand word, ' the right of mother-
hood'!); and at the same time the courage grows greater
to work for a brighter future in which also in this region
the imperial freedom — ' all things are yours ' — may wrest
new victories.
Family.
Also in \he family relation, as in marriage, there is a special
need that, as ethical love is on all sides conditioned by blood-
relationship, it should be in every way ethically defined. For
this too consists in the fellowship of moral personalities with
those who are to grow to personalities, the children ; and as
growing up with one another, the brotherhood and sisterhood
of the family life. To this is to be added, among the
better classes, close domestic relationship with those who are
not equal in social position, the servants and dependants. The
wealth of moral suggestions which are included in this is so
great that among the strongest features of present-day dreams
of the future there is scarcely one more God- forsaken thing than
the wish to destroy family life. Among the tasks of the
fubure there is scarcely one that is plainer than that the
preservation and re-establishment of family life, in corre-
spondence with the new conditions, should keep pace with the
advance of all other forms of society. And as a fact the moral
value of their reciprocal influence is for all the members of the
family immeasurable. It has been rightly said that children in
the family give more help than culture in the battle against
338 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
selfishness. That is true of the selfishness of age as of children.
In the constant presence of the workaday life, passed in
common by those who are united by natural ties, there lie
hidden moral problems, tests, powers, conflicts, advancement
such as no human wisdom can exhaust by reflection.
Education of Children.
The education of children by their parents is a duty from
which the claims of other duties in other social spheres cannot
absolve, and a right which, as against the tendency to the
dominance of the school, must be jealously preserved. This
right and this duty belong to the father and the mother in
the unity conditioned by their individuality. Even famous
men have been known to be wanting in the appreciation of the
dignity of woman and the blessing of family life who never
knew a mother's care. The voluntary renunciation of this duty
by numberless fathers is the surest evidence of their enslave-
ment by social claims ; and they finally become as inefficient
and dangerous to society as to their own household and them-
selves. The passage 1 Tim. v. 8 refers to neglect of those
nearest to us as a step back into heathen morality. The aim
of education is the moral maturity of children on the basis of
their assimilation of the moral quality of their parents — of
course inclusive of useful branches of knowledge (but not so
that these form the main end), and certainly not a mere heap
of disconnected pieces of knowledge. Inasmuch as the jewel of
the moral quality of the parents is sonship in the Kingdom of
God, the Christianly moral education of children must be
essentially religious. But the kernel needs a shell. To find
the proper measure and form of religious influence is the crown
of parental wisdom. In general it may be affirmed that, if
sound, it is essentially an education in reverential and trustful
love, and that so that, as Luther says, the parents are God's
representatives. The assimilation of moral qualities must be not
by compulsion but by free suggestion, in the way God Himself,
the great Educator, acts. Natural interest will in itself per-
ceive the opportunity of setting definite tasks, and of ad-
ministering indispensable chastisement as purposeful means of
SOCIAL ETHICS 339
training. "High thoughts and a pure heart are what we
ought to supplicate God for " ; and then the educational power
of the parents, ruled by this principle, cannot be other than a
means of self-education under the same guiding star. After all,
it is clear that it is rightly said that love in relation to education
shapes itself in the form of authority and respect, and the sole,
all-comprehending virtue of a child is obedience based on
gratitude, and trustful reverence. The more real the authority
of the parent and the respect of the child, the more securely do
they change their forms with change of age. It is especially
difficult to exercise influence on young people who are growing
up when the mother easily seems to be petty, and the father
austere, because there is a want in them of something of the
swing of perennial youth and the power to sympathise.
Paedagogics is an art much described. But in that deepest of
its branches, personal education, it may in general be said not
to admit of a complete description. Various examples and
rules from real life, such as one found in ' Old Flattich,' ^ are
commonly more effective than discursive directions.
Would that something of the same sort could be said of that
present urgent question of domestic servants ! It is un-
doubtedly the case that with the disappearance of the old
relation an important means for a real understanding between
classes and masses has been lost. What each person may do in
his limited sphere to restore its old value a Christian conscience
will not un plainly dictate. And such an one knows that it
is not merely the wish to be accommodating that makes it
hard to confute the talk on the overpowering might of circum-
stances. On this subject Christian principles found in the
New Testament are the more illuminative as their first appli-
cation was to a world of slavery. Christianity did not at
once abolish this social arrangement, certain as it is that it
was incompatible with the spirit of the Gospel and must gradu-
ally yield to it. How much more in a Christian world ought
mutual sympathy in joy and sorrow to be developed in such
1 See Herzog, Encyclopddie (sub voce). Flattich lived A.D. I7I3-I797. and
was famous as a ' Pietist ' for his originality and devotion as an educator
of youth. — Tr,
340 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
ways as social differences allow, in faith and by fellowship
in the highest things ! This too not by the restoration
of vanished patriarchal forms, but in new shapes working
from within.
Legal Recognition of Marriage.
Legal recognition of this 'fast tie' is needful for marriage
not merely on account of the actual wickedness of human
society ; no reasonable man will deny it for its own sake. It
might, so far as itself is concerned, appear that marriage, as
the most thoroughly personal of all forms of social intercourse,
had nothing to do with law. On closer consideration it will
appear all the more needful, not merely on account of its varied
relation to civic life, legitimacy of children, inheritance of
property ; but generally — provided we have determined aright
the value of legal arrangements — this union especially stands
in need of the recognition of law as a many-sided life- associa-
tion for the mutual interchange of the highest personal
property, in order to prevent any doubt in the public judgment,
and avoid all other difficulties and uncertainties with respect to
it. Obviously this public recognition is an affair of the State
in its legal aspect. For the Church cannot of itself busy itself
with the law. The Augsburg Confession does with great
clearness explicitly reckon the marriage contract among the
matters which belong to the civil government ; on the contrary,
the Tridentine Council claims it for the Church. Although
the Evangelical Church in Germany for a long time performed
the legal part of the marriage contract, it did this (in harmony
with Protestant principles) by the concession of the State, which
so far gave over its control as to unite with the legal contract
the blessing of the Church in one ceremonial act. It was a
question in 1873 whether this condition of things should be
abolished for the German Empire ; and for clear-thinking men
it became a very serious point of advisability, but not one
of faith. It is always an injury to the Church when these two
distinct things are mixed up. By the civil procedure the duties
of members of the Church are of course not affected.
SOCIAL ETHICS 341
Divorce.
Divorce is also a civil question. Marriage is according to
its nature (see above) an indissoluble union, and if the un-
conditional saying of St Mark x. 11 appears, according to
St Matt. V. 22, to admit of an exception — assuming that the
words " save for the cause of fornication " are genuine — then that
exception is only the recognition of an actually existent fact ;
for by adultery marriage is ipso facto dissolved. On the other
hand, Jesus Christ does not by His saying interdict the injured
party from resuming cohabitation in certain circumstances, by
the exercise of pardon, however little it may be possible to demand
this in all cases ; since it must be left entirely to the judgment of
the person concerned, and emphatically so, since it is a matter of
purely personal feeling as to what duty demands. The passage
in St Mark (x. 11) is not weakened by that of 1 Cor. vii. 10-15,
for St Paul merely says that if the unbelieving husband or wife
actually dissolves the marriage the other party is to remain
content. On the contrary, careful consideration of this saying
of St Paul may lead to a proper understanding of the saying
of the Lord. St Paul does not recognise divorce in the case
of Christians, and Jesus Christ has declared the divine idea of
marriage, while knowing well, and not calling in question, the
fact that " Moses for the hardness of your hearts " suffered
divorce. Now, since Christian nations undoubtedly do not con-
sist of those only who are really true disciples of Jesus, it is
only in appearance that the Catholic Church, with its opposi-
tion as a matter of principle to any divorce, is the truer pro-
tectress of Christ's word, even when we leave out of account
the unworthy shifts with which it finds a loophole for the
great ones of the earth, as in the case of Napoleon ; a mere
failure in form was held sufficient to justify a declaration of
nullity. The State, in the case of a Christian nation, has
merely the moral duty, in harmony with its real well-being, to
render all easy divorce impossible, since the moral educative
power of marriage for the married persons, as for their family,
can scarcely be overestimated. But where the chief conditions
of the marriage tie have been set at nought, its right and duty
342 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
is to give legal validity to this fact. What ought to be the
reasons for separation in various cases must be subject to the
determination of the civil law and legal process, unless the moral
purpose of divorce is to be nullified. The Christian Church
has the duty of using all the moral means that are at her com-
mand to secure the voluntary fulfilment of the command of
Christ for Christians and by Christians, as well as to influence the
spirit of legislative procedure through the moral earnestness of the
members of the Church. But if this moral means remain fruit-
less, then as a national Church it ought to rest content with the
decisions of the State, and possibly set up a severer standard
where questions of the re-marriage of divorced persons arise,
which it may the more easily do as now the legal portion
of the marriage contract is no longer its affair.
The Status of Woman.
When Protestant ethics speaks of marriage and the family
it must also think of the question of the position of woman.
For in clearly setting forth the importance of marriage, it may
not overlook the fact that millions of women cannot find in
marriage their highest vocation, the vocation of woman. And so
much the less as Protestant ethics cannot point to the nunnery
as in its way a grand solution of the difficulty. Of course this
question of woman's position is very closely connected with
other present problems of social ethics, and particularly with
the economic question. The manifold answers suffer from not
paying a really sufficient regard to the importance of marriage
and the family. But even irrespective of possible solutions, the
question itself is frequently obscurely put when no clear dis-
tinction is drawn between the proposals for improvement called
forth by undeniable abuses, and the attempts made to secure
the all-round equality of rights for women. It will easily be
seen that, the more the former are put to practical test, the more
light falls on the latter.
The exigency of the position does not depend merely on that
fact from which we started, but almost as much on another,
that by no means all who have found the highest calling of
woman are equal to it. And in reality that is not true merely
SOCIAL ETHICS 343
of the mill-hand, who cannot attend to her home, but also of
the lady who does not want to stay at home, or is even a
stranger in her own house, because she does not find her sphere
of work there ; and, as things are, for the most part cannot find
it, since she was not trained to this, but to mere amusement, and
only knows how to amuse herself — with her husband, her children,
her household, her life. And, besides, the mill-hand has neither
the time nor the education for fulfilling this vocation of woman.
But now between these two facts — that not all women can find
their highest calling in marriage and the family, and that not
all who find it are fit for fulfilling it — not merely the undeniable
connection subsists that the deficient capacity for this vocation
of woman lessens the inclination of man to render it possible
for them, and of woman to undertake it ; but there exists,
and indeed in a much wider degree, a connection between the
diiferent remedies. The only suitable remedy for curing the
one evil does of itself lessen the other. That is to say, let the
education of girls be different, an education in ' self-reliance
and common sense,' so that they may be able to train others.
In this way those who are shut out from marriage by their
providential path would find a suitable sphere. There is
everywhere a want of trained female forces for domestic em-
ployment of every kind, nursing, teaching, education. It has
been purposefully asked whether there should not be a training
time for woman for her social work corresponding to the period
of compulsory military service. Even now there is no want of
the true nobility which prefers an active sympathy in the
immeasurable province of womanly service to the empty life of
pleasure, which at the same time so often exercises a disturbing
influence on society by its wearisome gossip. It may be quietly
left to the teaching of experience where the limits of this
province lie, if the main truth is recognised that, as every
sphere of usefulness is in its depths a service of love, it is
woman that has quite peculiar gifts for this service, to
which the highest dignity and honour belong, and that her
service is all the more womanly service the more clearly it has
reference to family life. To make girls fit for such service must
be the aim of all reforms. In this is included that they are
344 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
truly made free for such service, and this freedom is not only
the means of learning to serve, but is part of the genuine
service itself.
The more remote the service of women gets from family life,
the more shifting do the boundaries of the question of woman''s
position become in the other point above mentioned, as to the
all-round equality of rights with man. The term employed,
' emancipation of woman,'' her deliverance from slavery, reminds
us of the enormous guilt of the world of men, but contains,
when this guilt is not minimised, a reference in itself to all the
exaggerations which have allied themselves with and done
injury to the whole movement. In any case the chief reason
for complete equality, the equality of mental endowment, is
dubious, because this expression is ambiguous — it may be
equality in the sense of ' equal in value ' or ' equal in kind.'
Now, he who recognises equality of value is not compelled to
admit equality of kind. A judgment which is not entirely
external cannot but consider the mutual attraction which exists
between the sexes as founded purely on great physical differences,
however difficult it may be to find a formula for them. Suppos-
ing it be granted that the various mental faculties are present
in like strength, that in particular a woman's understanding is
not less acute than that of the man, the memory not less
capacious or true — still these factors stand, so to speak, under
another denominator ; the inner soul of sympathy, of emotion is
different. The proofs asserted — the talent for rule of Elizabeth
of England, of a Maria Theresa, a Victoria — only show that it is
possible in special circumstances for a woman to reach the height
of man in political life. Equality of value in every respect
cannot be maintained by a reference to these illustrious names,
and appeal made to them as the exceptions that prove the non-
existence of a rule. To this psychological peculiarity there
corresponds the difference in physical energy. Only man's
fancy can assign to a woman less fortitude than a man when we
only think that there is a fortitude of patience and suffering
(which is perhaps the greater). But it is just as senseless to
ascribe to a woman the same capability of bearing arms in the
same way as man. By this fact complete political equality of
SOCIAL ETHICS 345
rights is excluded so long as this difference remains. To grant
greater scope in public life than has been so far customary is
in no way excluded, provided a form can be found which will
suppress undesirable by-products. A very promising beginning,
for instance, has been made in the civil law by allowing to the
woman more independent control of her own means, especially
when earned by herself. If we are yet unable to estimate what
in this sphere the future may have in store, still less can we
judge in advance as to the share to be given to woman in voca-
tions hitherto closed to her. But, for instance, the limits of
woman's capacity in reference to the doctor's calling are now no
longer obscure, nor her special suitability for the profession
within certain limits. Great difficulties arise on the question
of the methods of her training for this end. But a ' will ' will
find a way, provided that this will is a good will, and that is in
this case a will which recognises a special natural vocation.
The cry for all-round reciprocal equality is in the mouth of a
woman a self-degradation, because a self-forgetfulness of her
own true value. For what she effects in the history of mankind
is at least as great as all the glory of man's deeds. Genius
itself has its bounds, which do not necessarily exclude the most
homely of women or mothers ; and the greatest of men have often
declared that they owe most to their mothers. That under-
valuation of self which is led astray by striving to be something
more than womanly is only comprehensible on account of the
overvaluation of themselves by men, who must more and more
become convinced that their attitude is no very manly one.
In the transition from the family to the other forms of social
life we meet with the remarkable historical fact that the family
was once the centre of all other social activities, and that when
these latter asserted their independent existence the stability of
family life from which they originated was shaken ; but at the
same time they see the roots of their own life threatened by the
dissolution of the family. The terms 'domestic economy,'
'law of the household,' 'housekeeping books,' 'family por-
traits,' ' the altar of the household ' excite deep reflections.
If labour and learning, art and companionship, law and religion
are disjoined from the home, they are homeless, and make human
346 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
beings themselves homeless in all their knowing and doing, in their
work as in their recreation, in their temporal as in their eternal
interests. He who has not acquired in the nursery reverence
for reality and a feeling for the beautiful ; he who has not
in the little state of family life learnt to value law and love ; he
who has not played and prayed with the father and mother at
home — such an one is exposed to the temptation (each accord-
ing to his power and position) to criticise all this particular
sphere of joint human life, or some item of it, unsparingly; and
to seek to alter it, now making too much of one point, and anon
expressing contempt on another point ; here unsympathetic and
there unduly enthusiastic. The old limit of domestic life cannot
be restored ; but if anywhere, then it is here that the saying is
applicable — Build anew and better.
It is indifferent in what order the various social fellowships
should be taken after that of the family, inasmuch as they all
stand together in a reciprocal relation of influence. Only those
portions of our civilised life, above mentioned, comprised under
sociology, science, and art must be taken by themselves. The
State, the legally ordered community, has its right place either
before or after these three. Most naturally before any of them
stands friendship.
Friendship.
Friendship is the enduring fellowship of persons such as enters
into the very core of personal life. In this respect it is allied
to the fellowship which belongs to marriage and the family
life, but diff*erent from it because it is not conditioned by sex-
difference and blood-relationship. This does not exclude the
idea that it has its roots in elective affinity, and presupposes
mental similarity and difference. Rather this is essential, for in
their absence there cannot be friendship, but general Christian
love or Christian brotherhood. It is a frequent and fatal
illusion when it is supposed that all true Christians ought to be
friends in the precise sense. In friendship too there rules the
power of attraction of two natures mutually complementary.
Hence the order arises : Brothers and sisters and relatives are
given to us ; we contract marriage on the ground of natural
SOCIAL ETHICS 347
sexual love ; but we gain friends by free choice. No one can say
to another — This person or that shall be thy friend ; we ought to
love our neighbour. And from this it is at the same time clear
how dangerous friendship is between relatives of the opposite
sex, just because the frontiers of sexual love can only be guarded
by a purity and moral energy which most persons more easily
imagine they possess than actually are able to exercise. On the
contrary, the married pair ought and can be always more and
more the best friends.
All conceivable common ends bind friends together. The
End of ends can and ought to be sought for in all of them,
and that is to experience somewhat of the meaning of that
confession : —
So I vow'd.
Since I might never cope with thee in power.
That I would love thee with excess of love. — Don Carlos.^
Youth is naturally the springtide of friendship, for then the
awareness of personality, and the desire for its completion, puts
forth its tendrils, and is not yet narrowed down by the various
aims of practical life. But just on that account it is true of
great men at the summit of their ambition that " a little true
friendship is worth more than all the mere respect of all men.""
And not only have those true friendships of youth which have
been lastingly preserved their special grace, but even those
formed later, when the normal time of friendship is past, just
because they required more moral energy to form them. In the
larger circles of acquaintanceship, especially of the young, the
true friendship of one individual for another is not only as
regards themselves, but also as regards the corporate whole, the
sole preservative against insipidity ; for otherwise those super-
ficial persons to whom form, appearance, noise are everything
get the upper hand.
The estimation and character of friendship vary with periods
and nations. It has often been observed how in the estimate of
the Greeks friendship surpasses marriage in tenderness and depth.
For example, Socrates dying in the circle of his friends discovers
^ Trans. Boy Ian, p. 3, Bohn's Standard Library : Schiller's Historical
Dramas, — Tr.
348 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN IJFE
his tenderest tones ; and Aristotle celebrates friendship as the
highest form of personal intercourse. In the Old Testament the
picture of David and Jonathan stands out prominently for the
fineness of its psychological delineation, but its religious character
gives it its most peculiar impress. Both ideals, the Greek and the
Jewish, in the main reappear in the Christian Church ; fellow-
ship in all-sufficing faith, brother-love goes beyond friendship.
Both the ideals mentioned are exalted into a higher synthesis in
the special natural aptitude of the Teutonic character.
Civilised Intercourse.
The judgment of Christian ethics on the three groups which
have been already noted above as intimately connected (c/! p.
319), because they all refer to the mastery of mind over matter,
whether in the department of pure intellect (science and art) or in
that of the practical, in which sphere mind makes matter into its
servant (industrial life, technology), was discussed as to its supreme
principle when we had to define the relation of the Kingdom of
God to earthly and physical things (p. 147 if.). The complete
ranging of the physical under the highest moral End nowhere
else attempted, and the complete freedom of the physical nowhere
else reached, are points now to be illustrated by the rich experi-
ence of life, and their applicability tested in these spheres. In
them quite especially because these departments to be discussed
are more exclusively concerned with physical nature than is the
case with the family and the State. The supreme principle in
question as to the value or valuelessness of all civilisation flows
out of obedience to the mind of Christ. When we speak of obedi-
ence we mean it in the sense of a full following of Christ as
He Himself would have it, and not merely external imitation.
Whoever makes Christ into the foe of civilisation does Him as
little justice as he who glories in all advance in civilisation as if
this was the true task of His Church. ' For ' and ' against "■
civilisation, 'for' and 'against' the world — these are watch-
words which only have a clear meaning for those to whom the
world and its civilisation are still their highest Good, and for
whom the question as to the real highest Good has not received
its Christian solution. Jesus exalts Himself and His own
SOCIAL ETHICS 349
people above the world, above all civilisation ; and so in the
ordinary sense He is neither for it nor against it. For Him the
highest Good is the Kingdom of God, and every soul to be saved
in this kingdom is to Him more than the whole world. When-
ever, wherever, however, and for whomsoever civilisation,
knowledge, glory and might and riches and honour are anta-
gonistic to the Kingdom of God — he only knows one attitude
to civilisation, that of renunciation ; * no ' without limit or
hesitation. But where the motto, ' One thing is needful,** is
recognised, then obviously to such an one all things are the good
gift of God ; and then such an one does not know of any gift
whatever which does not bring its duty with it, and its work,
which is to him something obvious. If these gifts were valueless,
if they had not their importance for what is highest (although
subordinate to the highest), they would not exist. For the
world is God's — His Father's world. This faith is for Him an
unreserved and trustful conviction, not an insecure opinion or
a pious wish. Nor did His disciples understand Him to mean
that He would form them out of the world into a separate order ;
nor did His foes, or the indifferent, receive that impression
from Him. Otherwise He would not have had the reproach
cast on Him that He had less of holy earnestness than St John
the Baptist. Certainly the world and its civilisation are not for
Him the consummation of God's plans, but rather " God's
kingdom and His righteousness" is such consummation. But
both these kingdoms are one in the One God, and therefore both
exist for the good of the children of the Father. To their
faith nothing in this world is worthless. The new world for
which they wait is not the annihilation of the present, but its
perfection, its glorious transformation. Therefore, so long as it
is the Father's will that this world should remain, the citizens of
His kingdom have in the world to aim at the righteousness of
God, and so to prove their faithfulness that they may be
counted worthy to be entrusted with the true kingdom. It is
here amid preparatory conditions that they are to train them-
selves for the true kingdom. By what worldly arrangements,
in what forms of labour, and to what extent — all this the Son
of God leaves to the personal judgment of the "sons of God"
850 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
who are by their own free choice to follow the mind of Christ.
He is anxious only that they should have no other desire than
to have the " same mind that was in Him."" And inasmuch as
the danger is ever growing greater of thinking too highly of the.
value of this world's ' goods ' and the work of civilisation, or of
thinking too little of them, He has expressly warned His
disciples that, of these two things, they are to guard against the
spiritually dangerous overestimate of their value. Christianity,
as is easily intelligible, assumed another external position in its
estimate of civilisation when, contrary to expectation, one
generation followed another, and each one was to be that in
which at last the world would become Christian. It did not
promptly discover that spiritual attitude towards it which is in
keeping with the idea of Christ. The whole history of the
Christian world is a history of the struggle of the best men to
find this secret. It is certain that the mediaeval Church did not
reach that sunlit height on which Jesus stood, to whom in
comparison with God's kingdom all civilisation was nothing,
and yet to whom even the most unimportant things seemed
important for the greatest of ends. Its faltering and uncertain
attitude was not in keeping with His imperial freedom and His
spiritual independence. According to the mediaeval view,
industry, science, art were allowable when they were so indispens-
able to human existence that without them it had no longer
a foundation. They were counted as raw material for the
Kingdom of God, i.e. for the Church as it then was. But civil-
isation was to it only really 'good' if it, as far as possible,
served the Church's needs, or secured in some way the Church's
stamp of approval. Our formularies are full of evidences of the
still fresh wounds to conscience which such a faith inflicted on
the ordinary man in the midst of real life. In such evidences
we still participate in the first happiness of the new freedom.
But we cannot say that no difficulties are now present with us ;
nay, we know that we must meet with them. And here that
supreme principle is ever becoming clearer of the thoroughly sub-
ordinate but still irreplaceable value of civilisation for the
Kingdom of God. The latest histories of missions afford inex-
haustible illustrations. And as well for the whole of mankind
SOCIAL ETHICS 861
as for the individual person mastery over nature is indispensable.
There is no vocation independent of civilisation, and in the
absence of vocation, as we have convinced ourselves, there is no
Christian falfilment of duty, no ordered service of love. But
even when we possess this insight the difficulty of its application
in real life is always a growing one. Right down in the midst
of every Christian heart to which the 'supreme care*" is no
mere phrase there is the conflict between civilisation and
Christianity ; the tension between the claims of the highest Good
and of the social spheres in which it is realised ; the question
of conscience how we can approve ourselves as Christians in
these spheres of duty. The question assumes a diiferent colour
in each period, and extends over a wide and constantly changing
area. But in every period the same demand is made for the
earnestness of personal resolve, which, inspired by the love of
God, desires to love God with the whole heart. The great
problem of all Christian ethics, its characteristic riddle, presents
itself to everyone in a particularly urgent form in the question
of the relation of Christianity to civilisation. This is doubly
active in a time like our own, which to the superficial view of its
enthusiasts presents a perfection of civilisation such as renders
the Kingdom of God superfluous, and consequently turns those
believers who have not penetrated into the deepest depths of the
Kingdom of God into the enemies of culture. The solution of the
enigma can only be found by everyone for himself by recognising
that the answer is found in the attitude of Jesus Himself, which
exists as an inspiration for His followers {cf. on Vocation).
This whole question of civilisation is plainly very closely
related to that of asceticism. But the word civilisation turns
our thoughts to the breadth of external life, asceticism to the
depth of the inner personal life. Besides, asceticism applies to
objects different from those which we call the blessings of
civilisation. Apart from this, the one notion does in fact help
to illustrate the other ; and when one is understood in the
Evangelical sense, the other follows in its train. As we recognise
no mere self- abnegating asceticism, so we do not approve of
hostility to civilisation on the part of Christians. And we can
set up no general rules how far the Christian shall participate in
352 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN IJFE
the labour of advancing civilisation or refrain from it, but must
also leave it to his individual judgment, what his duty may
be in individual cases, just as we denied in the teaching on
asceticism that there is any such thing allowable as practice for
practice"* sake.
Work.
More necessary than this allusion to asceticism is a general
remark on the subject of work. For work has its original
source in the human activity which seeks the control of nature,
although we certainly use the word in a wider sense. Further,
work is activity which looks beyond the present exigency. It
is orderly and consecutive activity, and so work is the special
glory of man, and can only be correctly applied to animals so
far as their activity exhibits those qualities. What now is the
ethical value of work ? Plainly twofold. On the one hand, it is
only by work that man becomes a full personality, for this is
impossible without control of nature, above all of our own nature,
and somehow nature external to us (both in inseparable recipro-
city) ; and how can such control be gained without work ? Of
course there are diligent men (in a definite sphere) who still are
not by this means Christian moral characters ; but a lazy
Christian is a contradiction in terms. And as without work
that one leading principle of all moral life cannot be realised,
so neither can the others. The fellowship of love, the services of
love are impossible without work ; evidently because he who
has not become a ' person ' in the proper sense can neither love
nor be loved, and that for the reason previously stated. To this
may be added that work associates men together in various ways,
and sets them tasks of love so simple and at the same time so
inexhaustible that the boldest imagination cannot think them
out, in the home and school, in the village and in the manu-
factory. Work, too, paves the path of love ; without the facilita-
tion of human life which it affords, an infinite amount of energy
now set free for the higher purposes of love would remain
hampered by the daily battle for the necessaries of mere
existence. And most of all, without work we should have
nothing that we could in love bestow on or receive from one
SOCIAL ETHICS 353
another. This at once makes it plain how work and property
are inseparably connected. The proceeds of work, that which
the personal 'T appropriates to himself, this enlargement of
the personal existence, gives to the individual life a larger
content, and a wider opportunity for the services of love.
Every developed faculty, like every external possession, can be
and ought to be a means for these services and for personal
growth. In the absence of all ' property ' in this widest of
senses man is a mere void in himself and useless to others.
Because work has so great an ethical significance, it possesses
some of that blessedness which is the inner reward of all moral
action. The most humble labourer honours himself by industry.
The dignity which belongs to work pales the greatest outward
splendour of the indolent man, and, if he is not already morally
callous, makes him feel the unworthiness and ennui of his exist-
ence, at any rate for the moment. For the Christian his work
is the service of God, and the joyless care inseparable from all
earthly labour, yet a part of its educational value, is glorified
by the lofty thought of vocation (p. 112). At the same time
that this Christian estimate of the value of work remains a true
one, it keeps aloof from that exaggeration of its value which
does not verify itself by the test of experience ; which is an error
often committed by the indolent, or used for the purposes of
grandiloquent boasting. The type of the divine activity, one
with repose, illumines the restless, eager desire for work of
Christian humanity. It has no time for weariness, but has not
merely in itself, but by reason of its unity with the work and
the peace of God, the vision of an eternity which is therefore
called " the sabbath rest of the people of God"" (Heb. iv. 9 f.).
On account of special dangers in the Church of Thessalonica,
St Paul found it needful to deduce from the great thoughts of
the Gospel the above-cited principles in regard to the attitude
of the Christian man to work and property (1 Thess. iv,
11 fF. ; 2 Thess. iii. 10 fF.). Let it be noted how in the first
Epistle the whole exposition is governed by the idea of brotherly
love {v. 9 ; cf. vv. 10 and 11), and how the injunction "to give to
him that needeth " is also subordinated to that end. In a quite
similar way in the second Epistle the strongly emphasised
354 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
expression " his own bread " is correlated to the " working of
that which is (morally) good."" So that it is in no way true to
say that it is first of all in Eph. iv. 28 that a moral motive for
work is found. These principles are doubly impressive because
they are written as a corrective of the existent pietistic contempt
for work. St Paul insists that there can be no independence
without work, since without it we are of no value to others ; but
there is not here any apotheosis of labour. In these words
St Paul did but make an application in this department of what
lay contained and ready for this use in the word of Jesus Christ
that " he who is unfaithful in that which is least " cannot be
entrusted with the true riches (St Luke xvi. 1). Jesus Christ,
assured of His own incomparable vocation, is therefore a worker
without a peer, ready to " work while it is day." Out of this
has necessarily grown that new glory of work — even the work
that is full of care, outwardly insignificant and apparently without
result. The ' highest Good "■ does not present itself to careless
luxury, but to the most diligent exertion. And because the
highest Good takes all other ends into its service, these also are
involved in any special exertion. To this Evangelical way of
understanding Christianity the Roman Catholic view on this
point stands in contrast. To it, earthly labour is the result of
sin, or anyhow appears as something of inferior value {cf.
Gen. iii. 19 with ii. 15 of laborious work). And so far as it
recognises its value it is always in danger of finding its real
end simply in the capability it affords of alms-giving, and even
obscuring this idea by that of meritorious action. Still, much
of this can only be made clear by turning our attention to the
various social circles of civilised intercourse.
The Industrial Life.
This special form of activity is at present often called the
social question, whereas we have felt it necessary to use the
words social and socialism in a much wider sense, that is, as the
antithesis of the individual and individualism {cf. pp. 145, 315 fF.);
and, fitting in with that, have headed the whole second main
division of Christian ethics with the title * Social Ethics.' The
SOCIAL ETHICS 355
limitation of the word to the industrial part of the community
is of itself an involuntary sign of the extent to which it has forced
itself to the front. The same may be said of the term ' society,'
when by this is understood, as is frequent, the articulation of
human society according to economic differences, i.e. according
to the differences in point of wealth. Taken by itself, the word
' society ' has a much wider connotation : age, knowledge, art,
law, religion, quite necessarily condition that articulation of the
corporate whole into various groups, classes, status. But this
new use of words betrays the fact that the industrial distinction
has acquired a decisive influence. This revolutionary change is
especially clear when we note that each group for a time pre-
dominant called itself ' society ,"" and ponder the fact that
previously to the French Revolution only the nobility and the
clergy, and not the citizen class at all, made up 'society.'
Meanwhile, amongst us now all other distinctions are insig-
nificant face to face with the contrast of wealth and poverty.
If now the unregardful concession of this latest employment
of the terms 'social' and 'society' is indicative of a false
complaisance ; and it is needful to remind ourselves even in this
sense that " man lives not by bread alone " ; there still lies in
this fact a call to Christian ethics to seek to cast some clearer
light on this form of society. The difficulty, of course, is as
great as the necessity. And the difficulty lies as much in the
nature of the particular social area as in the public feeling in
regard to it — the former of these two inasmuch as a vast
amount of technological knowledge is indispensable to a pertinent
judgment; the latter inasmuch as the personal interest which
enters into any explanation of such a question of the time has
a disturbing influence on clearness of judgment. Even the
difference of age and youth cannot be allowed to escape notice
in such a matter, for not long ago socialist and anti-socialist
was almost the same as saying young and old. Latterly the
subject has become clearer, and people understand one another
more easily. In any case, as on this subject of socialism the
interest of Christian ethics now centres on ascertaining whether
any inferences, from Christian principles, can be drawn on the
questions of labour and property, in relation to the great social
356 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
question, and what those inferences are, we at once address our-
selves to the point. In order to comprehend it we must, however
(with all the reserve that our partial knowledge of the subject
demands), draw attention to some assumptions of present-day
economics.
Theories of Political Economy.
The professors of economics, of social or political or national
economy — the qualifying words emphasise different sides of the
one subject — tell us that the ' Good '' in the economic sense is
every natural product that serves for the satisfaction of any
human need; in the narrower sense, anything gained as the result
of labour, in contradistinction to the so-called gifts of nature,
as light and air. If these are to be called free in the sense of
accessible to all, all kinds of questions arise in connection with
the great problem of the age, and of the future. Among the
' goods ' gained by labour, a distinction again is drawn between
those which are useful for the satisfaction of primary needs,
and such as serve for the creation of fresh supplies for those
needs, as machinery. These economic 'goods' must of course
be produced, distributed, and used, i.e. production, distribution,
consumption make up the industrial life. Clear as this series of
concepts is in reality, the interworking of the various activities
so designated is very complex, as may be shown by any of the
simplest examples, e.g. the woollen cloth industry. The sphere
of the industrial movement is, however, most clearly described
when we note that this industry, in relation to the three points
mentioned above, has, so to speak, its centre in the question of
distribution, the share of each in what is produced. Demand
in the last resort governs all — production, distribution, spending
— and the whole social question is again before us.
First of all let us call to mind some fundamentals of these
most general notions of the economic question. Human labour
producing economic goods is concerned either with the (more or
less) free gifts of nature, which in any case are offered by nature,
as in hunting, fishing, mining ; or it uses the processes of nature
for its own ends, as in breeding cattle and in agriculture ; or it
shapes the materials of nature by independent manual labour
and profitable manufacture. These distinctions depend on the
SOCIAL ETHICS 367
object of the labour, and in general correspond with the following
stages — enclosure, court, village, city. In reference to the
workers themselves, their labour is either such as involves
initiative or mere execution, creative or mechanical, in all con-
ceivable variety. It is important here to remember that the
last-named distinction by no means always coincides with the
difference between intellectual and bodily labour, because even
the first may be a very wearisome business. Whereas what has
been so far said refers to the form of production of economic
goods, the supreme law of its development is termed specialisa-
tion and co-operation, or the subdivision and combination of
labour. The more specific and universal needs ever result in
more specialised work. Whereas once an artisan produced twenty
sewing needles in a day, a machine, with fewer hands, whose
work is purely mechanical, will turn out millions. But even so,
all depend more and more on all, and mankind becomes a great
industrial community.
All thus hastily said of production is true also in a similar
way of the exchange of commodities. What a story, that of
commerce, from the rudest barter to that of the Stock Exchange
with no actual values exchanged ! With regard to consumption
or demand it may suffice here to mention that in sound condi-
tions it necessarily governs production. But once more we see
ourselves face to face with the exigencies of the present, in which
we find huge quantities of goods offered for sale, for the use of
which there is no failure as to need so much as in the capacity
to acquire them. Is it the method of supply which must bear
the blame ? alone ? or in connection with other causes ? And
what is our judgment to be on the reckless expenditure of
private means in relation to that of a common right of
possession ? In any case, it is so far quite plain that all these
forms and laws of the industrial life are not patient of simply
being called good or evil. They may be as a whole good or
evil ; nay, more, they have become both good and evil mostly in
such inextricable confusion as defies human insight. Let us for
once not forget the sayings — " The way in which a man hammers
in a nail, well or badly, has an ethical quality" (Schmoller); and,
"Perfect thyself as an instrument, and wait for what place
358 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
mankind will assign thee "" (Goethe). On the other hand, many
now begin by desiring and expecting that society will find
them a pleasant place, and think it ought to be content with a
badly made tool. That is, we call to mind the principle which
accompanied us out of personal into social ethics, that the good
will is a power even when we discern clearly the limits of that
power. But we do not mention this for the purpose of minify-
ing the importance of the social question.
In the first place, two further concepts which follow from
the above-mentioned fundamental notions require explanation.
One of these belongs primarily to the question of production
and the other to distribution of commodities. Both are watch-
words of the social question of the day. The first is the notion
of capital, the second that of the currency.
The critical word is capital. It has become a watchword,
and its proper meaning is not always clear to all those who
speak of tax on capital, profits of capital, productive and
accumulated capital, capitalisation, and the war against capital.
We must commence with the undeniable fact that the produc-
tion of economical goods does by no means always depend on
labour alone, but on the possession of free or worked-up pro-
ducts of nature ; on the possession of machinery, ana the space
suitable for the work to be carried out. All these together, i.e.
in the widest sense all economical goods which extend beyond
immediate necessities for the production of new economical
goods, are called means of production, and this is the full and
plain notion of what capital is in itself. The possession of
such means of work is obviously never equally distributed, and
the access to them never alike easy to all. But apart from
manual and agricultural labourers, who, in the main, only need
a small amount of the means of labour correspondent to their
capabilities, the relation in the actual world between capability
of work and means of work has for the most part been that the
possessor of the most — sometimes immense — means has stood
on the one side opposite to the possessor of the capability of
work on the other ; and, in fact, in such a proportion that the
worker has become completely dependent on the capital-owner,
and has sunk down to the position of a mere productive machine, j
SOCIAL ETHICS 359
The person of the slave is the property of his master, is merely
a means of production, a portion of his capital, and merely a
' living machine."* The case of the serf is similar in this, that his
capability of work does not belong to himself, but, at least in
a certain measure, to his feudal lord, and in this, that he cannot
free himself from this condition, but is adscriptus glehas, bound
to the soil ; but different from the slave in that he cannot be
sold like a chattel, but possesses certain personal rights,
although greatly limited. If, therefore, we understand by
capitalism merely the control of the means of work, and so of
the capabilities of the worker, or, in other words, the control
of the capitalist over the working classes, then slavery and
serfdom ought to be called by this name. Slavery and serfdom
were, we may say, forms of industrial life, but they were not
industrial in the same way present-day capitalism is ; if only
because they rested on the basis of the subjection of aliens
often as the result of conquest. Quite different from this is
the case of the worker whose position before the law is that of
equality with the owner of capital — the one just as civilly and
politically free as the other. Everyone, for instance, is entitled
to a vote for the representative legislature of the nation. But
at the period when this freedom and equality in European
nations was reached, the power of capital grew to a height
hitherto undreamed of. From the fifteenth century to the
discovery of the New World enormous quantities of natural
products had been accessible ; the spirit of enterprise of great
merchants gained the control of these products by the use of
capital of a moderate amount already acquired. "Fugger in
Augsburg," as is said, " speculated with 10,000 ducats and
gained 175,000 ducats." Then by the invention of machinery
worked by steam these products were prepared in quite astonish-
ing quantity, and opened up at the same time short and cheap
methods of manufacture. " Everywhere machinery : it rattles
on Pilatus, it penetrates the St Gothard, ... it roars every-
where, it hums and creates. . . . The total amount of force
present in the machinery of the present has been estimated at
five milliards of horse-power" (Naumann). In this way the
power of production and of capital grew perforce so great that
S60 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
it gained the mastery of all human agents in production. Of
course capital always needs these agents, if it is to produce new
commodities ; but the value of these human means of production
does not increase in equal proportion to the possibility of produc-
tion. And that just because machinery renders it possible to
dispense very largely with human labour. Still more because
mere labour, without the possession of capital, can do less for
itself. Consequently it is largely growing more dependent,
although the workers are politically independent persons.
And so the most important index of this modern free unfreedom
and unfree freedom, capitalism, consists in the complete recog-
nition of the immense might of capital, the employment of
this power to control the means of production. This results in
the exploitation of the worker at the smallest possible wage,
and the greatest possible exclusion of the worker from the
profits of enterprise. The nature of this situation comes the
most definitely to light in the fact that the owners of capital, by
merely putting it into any enterprise, without any physical or
mental exertion of their own, have their share in the profits
merely because they possess it, draw interest — interest on under-
takings in any industrial business ; interest on investments in
the narrower sense of money lent, ground-rents for allowing the
use of land. In other words, the capitalist can employ his money
for the purposes of work without working. And inasmuch as in
the present economical condition of society means of labour are
acquired by money, it is of course the case that its possession is
an essential element in the idea of capital. And it has already
been shown that capitalism, in the deep meaning, is closely con-
nected with the general changes taking place in the whole mental
life of the community. By this we mean that, when the Calvin-
istic assurance of salvation was a force in the industrial life in
which men realised their calling to work and consciously valued
capital, the spirit of Protestantism worked in remarkable unison
with the ideas of general natural equality and freedom.
Money or Bullion.
This reference to the notion of capital naturally leads on to
that of money. Along with the idea of economic ' good,' i.e.
SOCIAL ETHICS 361
such as satisfies some need, that of value is given. The value of
a commodity is on one side dependent, and on the other side to
the last degree independent, of the individual judgment. The
latter is true, inasmuch as many needs of human nature are
common to all, and consequently the demand for them remains
for the most part the same, as also does the quantity of natural
materials and the labour expended on them ; consequently also
the price of them. This is of course true only within certain
limits. At once the gravest difficulties emerge. In what
relation are these factors to be placed in measuring their value ?
as, for example, how is the time expended in their production to
be appraised, and can this be done ? However this may be, in
any case the value of these economical commodities, so far as
they are not produced by everybody, is settled by exchange.
The value is the exchange value, and commodities are called
economical ' goods ^ in so far as they have any exchange value.
The fixed value in exchange is ' price,' or the amount of com-
modities for which any other commodity can be bartered. To
facilitate and shorten this exchange, and to render it fairer,
some recognised medium of exchange is needful. This is
money. Naturally, for this purpose only such substances will
gain recognition as are always in demand, always of value, and
valuable because found in small quantity, i.e. are rare ; and such,
further, as are easily transferable and therefore suitable for ex-
change. The precious metals have this property. No doubt the
pleasure conferred by lustre and brilliance has contributed to
this end, and so they have won the victory over shells and
cattle as the recognised medium of exchange. By means of
this convenient, easily and safely managed means of exchange,
wealth, accumulated capital, has gained its full reality.
This evolution of the industrial life of which these briefly
mentioned master-notions remind us is the originating soil of
the social question.
The Social Question.
It is rightly called an international question, inasmuch as its
development is essentially similar in the civilised nations of
Europe. Yet we may not forget the great difference in detail
THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
both in regard to its pressure and its remedy. England, the
home of modern industry and modern commerce, the mistress of
the world by its machinery, its colonies, and its fleet, presented
the most frightful caricature of civilisation in the thirties of the
nineteenth century. It fell asunder " into two peoples, between
which there was neither intercourse nor sympathy, who under-
stood one another in their thought, feeling, and will as little
as the inhabitants of different zones and planets, were educated
in a different way and fed on different food, whose habits were
different, and who were not even subject to the same laws"
(Disraeli). As the statesman, so the poet judges. " The misery
or happiness, weal or woe, beginning and end, existence, hope,
religion of the poor ! — rents, rents, rents (for the rich) " (Byron).
Similarly the fine scorn of the ' Isaiah ' of the century, Carlyle.
Such a state of misery as Charles Kingsley describes in Alton
Locke, and Dickens in Hard Times, existed in other countries
only occasionally — starvation wages, houses unfit for human
habitation, moral stupidity. But England has set an example
also in many questions as to the remedy. It shows the
superiority of gradual reform suited to varied needs, that is,
by the activity of self-help on the part of the worker within the
limits of the law, in contrast with the violent and radical revolu-
tion in France ; while Germany is in advance of both in effective-
ness of State interference. And yet it is just in this country
that the Social Democratic party is not only stronger and better
organised than in the countries named, but its ideal is inter-
national in the sense of national equality in a way that neither
the English nor the French understand. And the number of
its votes (1903, three millions) is undoubtedly composed not
merely of the artisan class in the great manufactories, but of the
lower orders of manual labour injured by those manufactories,
and also probably of many of the discontented in other classes.
Social democracy cries out against the miseries of the present
economic arrangements. The force of its complaint consists in the
fact that those who utter it have the conviction that this com-
plaint will grow into an indictment of the present order of things,
and will issue in the promise of a nobler future. We note these
three points — the complaint, the indictment, and the promise.
SOCIAL ETHICS
The Socialisfs Complaint.
The complaint has reference to the economic position and to
the social situation created by it. As to the economic situation
it says : Wages are too low ; work too long, and unsatisfactory
in its nature. The lowness of wages is elucidated by the fact
that only three-tenths of the inhabitants of Prussia in the year
1899 paid taxes on more than 900 marks income (=;P45 sterling).
From this circumstance conclusions may be formed as to the
character of the dwellings — that is, in great cities — and the
general style of living. Still, many refer to the rise in wages
as above what the depreciation of the value of money would
account for, and point to the millions spent in alcoholic drinks.
Many more point to the uncertainty of all such calculations.
The complaint as to too long hours of labour might — apart from
admitted exceptions, which scarcely at all apply to the larger
industries, but to charwomen's work and the like — possibly have
greater and more justification along with the complaint of the
deadly monotony of the work, and moral stunting, when the
compensations of family, educational pursuits, and recreations
fail ; that is to say, along with the complaint that man is
degraded to a machine. This position, unsatisfying in itself, it
is further said, is still more unendurable by the uncertainty of
employment, and the absence of prospect of improvement in
one's situation. The former is the result of crises in trade, and
the latter arises from the fact that a worker who belongs to a
particular class can seldom raise himself out of it. The com-
plaint extends beyond the range of the industrial community.
Different classes no longer understand each other; the chasm
grows continually wider. And in fact there are (it is said) at
bottom only two classes, called the well-to-do educated persons
and the uneducated — in truth, the rich and the pooi". Gold,
they say, not only purchases pleasure and honour, it glorifies
stupidity ; while there is always more wit in the poor man's
pouch. The greatest contrasts of past history are trifling com-
pared with this 'either,' 'or.' To this is added the growing
awareness of this chasm following on the abolition of the re-
straints on personal freedom ; on the broader education given
364 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN IJFE
in elementary schools. The people are educated as if with the
design of rendering them more sensible of these difficulties.
So long as they are regarded as unavoidable they are easier
to bear. The complaint to which we lend an ear will, it is
thought, become an indictment — an indictment of the pre-
vailing economic order; an indictment against all the social
groups which are connected with those arrangements, as the
rulers and the propertied classes. Not that these persons are
to be charged with the guilt of these anomalies ; for those who
represent them are, it is said, themselves under the law of
industrial evolution. But when once the causes are known, it
becomes their duty to find a remedy. Capital in the sense
above mentioned is declared to be the great evil from which all
this misery arises, the dominance of the means of production
over the producing power of the people ; more especially the
accumulation of this capital in the hands of the few instead
of belonging to the corporate whole. In this latter case a
fair access to the means of production might be afforded to
all who are willing to work. That is, capital as a private
possession is regarded as an evil. This is the simplest and also
the clearest way of putting it. Other statements of the same
subject, after having been of service in the agitation, and valued
as weapons in the warfare, have with more gain in knowledge
been lately given up, although unwillingly. As a particular
instance, ' the iron law of competition in wages."" It has been
declared to be a necessity that the wages paid by capitalists
are always close to the minimum required for existence, and,
in spite of all trifling variations, only amount to so much as
just suffices for the needs of the worker. If any speculator
enters on an enterprise when labour is cheap, and afterwards
can only obtain it at a higher rate of wages, then those who
are thus fortunate enter into mamage, and the greater supply
of labour thus created is the cause that the price at which
' hands "■ can be secured goes down because the supply is greater
than the demand. The untenableness of this theory has made
it necessary to set it aside, as well as the supposed equally well-
established theory of Malthus, closely connected with the
former, on the increase of population in geometrical proportion.
SOCIAL ETHICS 366
while the means of life only increase in arithmetical proportion.
But the weight of that great grievance against private capital
is not lessened because greater care has become necessary
in regard to watchwords of that sort. And this grievance
turns with special energy against the various social groups of
the present time built up on such a foundation. It is said that
family life is undergoing dissolution — the creche at the bottom,
and at the top the nurse. And in fact the family life of the
upper ten thousand is, it is asserted, a seat of moral corruption
and the home of all evil social prejudices. The State, under
the influence of the propertied classes, say they, makes laws
entirely in their favour and is the " muzzle of the have-nots.""
And the Church "preaches cream and gives skim-milk,""
" offers a dose of opium to the burdened," and so the pro-
letariat has turned its back on it, and left it to the rich, who
are favoured by it as they are by the State. For whatever
may be thought of the well-known axiom that " Religion is a
private affair" — neither meant in a diplomatic nor a scornful
sense in and for itself — the awful fact is quite certain that the
socialistic masses are estranged from the Church.
What picture of the future can we draw on the dark back-
ground of this complaint and impeachment of the present time ?
Righteousness not only demands generally that any statement
of it should be kept free from all bias, but that a careful distinc-
tion should be drawn between the economic ideal of socialism and
its theory of the universe. It is conceivable that the latter is not
bound up with the former, yet keen-sighted observers have
debated whether the social question is really one of a theory of
the universe or a question of the means of existence. But clearness
of statement and of judgment is rendered extraordinarily difficult
in regard to the economic ideal by the various and partially
contradictory theories of recognised leaders both in respect of
what they demand and in the way they consider it may be
realised. Whereas at first revolution was considered to be the
only certain way of bringing in the new era, and was unreservedly
advocated (' Tremble, Canaille ! ') before the laws on socialism
were passed, now the number is increasing of those who are
advocates of the idea of gradual improvement of the conditions
366 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
of life, and, accordingly, of participation meanwhile in the
tasks of the present. Both these views change about in the lips
of orators according to the need of the moment. But if we ask,
What is to be the content of this great future 't then not merely
do many reject the Utopias of individual enthusiasts — and when
opportunity serves make. use of them — but frequently, and with
an air of superiority, brand them as signs of the ignorance of
their advocates if opponents ever urge questions as to the
character of the end to be aimed at. For the development, it
is said, is to be continuous advance in all directions, according
to a programme set forth. Clearly this latter assertion is itself
unscientific. Insight into the carrying through of an idea in all
its details, and insight into the possibility of its realisation, are
ideas easily mistaken for one another. Bismarck''s proposition
that the politician must not play Providence, and can only form
his conclusions from a view of all the elements that exist at a
given moment, was valuable just because the aim of his political
action stood luminously before him, and he had closely examined
all the forces available for its realisation. But this deficiency
in definite aims for the future does not in any way detract from
the seriousness of the democratic movement. For many this
want of clearness makes it all the more dangerous, and to count
on its ruin because of the variousness of individual opinions
found in one camp would be foolish self-deception on the part
of its opponents.
First of all, then, what is the economic demand of the
socialists.'' It is threefold, and purports, according to the official
programme of the party: the conversion of the means of produc-
tion (capital) into the common property of society ; the regula-
tion of all work by a co-operative community ; the application
to the common use and the just distribution of all the products
of labour. We see that this demand closely fits in with the
above-mentioned master-conditions of industrial life, if these
are considered under the point of view of the control of
capital over labour. The master-notions there mentioned of
the production of commodities, the circulation of them, their
consumption, are all included in the watchword, ' Regulation
of labour.' But the decisive idea is just this, that the means
SOCIAL ETHICS 367
of work (capital) and the products of labour, and so, on that
account, the regulation of labour, belong to the corporate
whole, and ought to be regulated by it. Thus the question of
the distribution of ' goods,' under that all-dominating point of
view which we made clear when dealing with the ' complaint '
and ' indictment ' spoken of, is answered thus : — The means of
production (capital) is not to dominate the power of production
(labour), but the latter is to prevail, for " labour is the source
of all wealth and civilisation.'"
Misconceptions and misunderstandings, even among those who
are well-meaning, have attached themselves to all the three sides
of the one demand, which must be disposed of before an opinion
can be formed of it. In the first place, it is wrong to say that
the Social Democratic movement is the foe of all capital, instead
of saying of private capital ; or, in agreement with that idea,
wishes to set aside all property ; or that property is robbery,
instead of — private property in all the means of production ;
or, that it desires an equal division of the private property now
so unequally distributed between individuals, instead of — it
desires that all private capital should be put together or placed
in the possession of society. It is true that these rejected
interpretations of the proposals do prevail in many minds
confused by the agitation, and often enough to the vexation
of the agitators ; and particularly was this so at the commence-
ment of the movement. Consequently it is difficult to gain clear-
ness of view as to where the allowance of private property is to
begin, and private capital to be disallowed. But it is the duty
of prudence, as well as of justice, to take all such misconceptions
for what they are worth. For instance, the amusing idea often
put forth with oratorical adornments, that if a partition were
made to-day, then to-morrow the diligent man would be ahead
of others. In spite of its essential justice, and in spite of its
value, too, for many social questions of detail, such an idea does
not belong to our present context. It is a misconception or mis-
interpretation of the second portion of the demand to say : Social
democracy wishes to leave the regulation of production to various
small groups, perhaps to the commonalty. It knows well enough
that this would mean the annihilation of present-day civilisation.
368 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
It thinks, on the contrary, of its regulation within a nation, nay,
even of a combination of nations. Certainly commerce, in the
present sense, so far as it is connected with production by private
capital, and, with it, money in its intrinsic value, would of itself
cease, at least over a wide area. FinaUy, it is a misinterpretation
of the third point if it is said : In the division of commodities
produced all will have equal share, and all will get just as much
as they really desire. The programme, on the contrary, insists,
in manifold and varying expressions, over and over again on
"the universal duty of work, by equal right, and to each
according to his reasonable requirements."
If now these very last words are plainly open to question
as to whether they express any clear meaning, certainly the
two first points demand a critical estimate. But it is a help
to clearness if this question, whether they are capable of
realisation, is distinguished from the other, and examined first
— Supposing this question is answered in the affirmative, is it
probable that then there would be such a quantity of com-
modities available as would ensure to each person an essentially
greater share than under present conditions? With every
consciousness of the limits which beset the mere layman with
regard to such difficult problems of political economy, he may
not be debarred from noting the fact that the exponents
of the new economical order rate many items in their account
surprisingly high — for instance, the gain to the community
by the abolition of military burdens, of the national debt,
etc. ; others are put astonishingly low — for instance, the con-
sequences of the essential curtailment of the hours of labour.
In the agitation speakers talk of from two to three hours' work
a day. Are the savings made in the one direction and the
deficits caused by the other to be seriously estimated so high ?
to say nothing of the cessation of the spur to individual effijrt
which lies in the prospect of immediate needs. And is not the
wealth of natui'e in general overestimated ?
Still, these interrogatories do of themselves partly lead to
the examination of the three principal socialistic demands.
Plainly, the first is easier of serious examination than are the
second and third. For the unlimited accumulation of capital
SOCIAL ETHICS 369
in the hands of individual persons has long been felt, even in
circles that are not Social Democratic, to be a danger to the
corporate whole. Many accumulate merely for the sake of
the power their property confers, and not in order, at least at
the same time, to produce useful commodities for others. This
danger it is sought to meet by such devices as a progressive
income tax, death duties, delimitation of the right of owner-
ship of the soil. And the objection that special laws of this
sort are an attack on the rights of property is considerably
weakened by the quiet reflection whether it is not perhaps
merely an overweening idea of private rights that is assailed ?
and in what way the right of the corporate whole may be recon-
ciled with that of the individual ? But then production not by
private capital but by that of the community is not merely a
possibility of the future, but an actuality. I'his is the case
with (continental) railways, municipal supply of water, light.
But of course the unlimited extension of such modes of trading
in the production of commodities could plainly only be con-
ceivable and desirable if all commodities were produced best
in a wholesale way ; and this has by no means as yet been
proved in reference to agricultural products and much manual
work.
In still less degree has it been successfully shown, even
approximately, how — in relation to the second point, that the
community as such is to take the lead in production — the
demand for commodities is to be calculated and their manu-
facture is to be carried out, and on what principle work on
the materials supplied is to be assigned to each. In fact, the
latter point might be regarded as an insuperable difficulty,
unless we are to suppose a complete change in human nature.
But this is to admit the fanciful character of the whole demand.
It is true that freedom in the choice of a calling is a very
limited one under present conditions, but even when these
conditions are presupposed, much may be done to enlarge it
and to improve the conditions. But when it is said that the
official representatives of the body corporate will assign to
each his place in the great framework of the future state, we
see that this is inconceivable, without the divine omniscience
24.
370 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
of this central controlling power, and must involve the
enslavement of those who are under this tutelage. It is also
inconceivable how, without the most extreme coercion, the
necessary industry required from each is to be secured. It
has been correctly said that this army of labourers of the
future cannot be governed without a dictator, unless, in ways
not now known, the community may in the use of its collective
forces be brought to aim at that which is needful alike to the
body corporate as to the single person ; as is now done in a
certain measure, taught by necessity (the hard taskmaster of
human progress), and by the much-ridiculed old morality.
As far as the third point is concerned — the division of com-
modities— such watchwords as ' use of them for the common
public benefit '' or ' according to the natural needs "" have been,
in part even by their originators, recognised to be what they
are, phrases. We should really like to know how the use of
commodities for the public benefit can be reconciled with the
claims of individuals, and what the natural needs are of those
persons. Reward in proportion to achievement is certainly the
ideal, but the question is how to realise it. To measure work
done by the time occupied would plainly be unjust. The ob-
jections to all the formulas hitherto attempted, even to that
which purports to make the average value of a piece of work to
the community the standard, may all be comprehended in one
statement : — As soon as the standard suitable to a particular
single case is thought to be applicable, then such serious con-
cessions must be made to scouted individualism, by paying
regard to the special case of the man concerned, and the
particular situation, that in fact the principle of socialism
started with is given up. It is consequently only too intelligible
how these difficulties lead many exponents of socialism to the
anarchist communism which they at first strenuously repudiated.
Such difficulties do not afflict these advocates. But even at the
price of giving up the ordered collective life of man, the ideal
is in any case only asserted and in no way proved to be possible.
Some communistic ditties demonstrate the lowness of the ideal,
as, ' An equal share of all will please us.' But on the other
hand there are others who keep themselves consciously aloof
SOCIAL ETHICS 371
from this strong programme ; quietly or openly utter one
catch-phrase after another, such as the ' iron law of demand
and supply as ruling wages,' or the 'solidarity of the pro-
letariat' and the ' break-down of society founded on capitalism,"*
and even invoke the great goddess herself as 'the science of
economical evolution as the single factor of the whole of
human history ' (' Revisionism "*). This brings us to the funda-
mental theories of social democracy.
For the sake of clearness and justice we separated the
economical ideal of socialism from its philosophy of the cosmos.
At various points the one position touches on the other
naturally, as, for instance, where reference was made to the
forces which are supposed as the basis of the society of the
future ; also when speaking of the power of evolution which is
to lead on to that future, and on the impeachment of the present
social order, the guilt of which is not guilt in any proper sense,
but simply the necessary consequence of the evolution of the
present order. Now, it is needful to realise to ourselves what
lies at the back of this economical ideal. It is insisted em-
phatically that the whole question is one of a new cosmic
theory. The demand made by social democracy is confessedly
put forward in the name of the Science^ the absolute science of
which it is the sole possessor. How deep is the feeling behind
may be shown by the fact that in popular songs homage is paid
to this science, and the cry raised against " the tyrant " — " the
youthful giant of the fourth estate, with knitted brow." " In
blind amaze he stands when science opes her store." All the
old statues of the gods, say they, lie on the ground, while
science holds the throne. What sort of science is that ? In
ordinary life nothing but a hotch-potch mixture of contra-
dictory portions of the old civilisation and the new ideas, " the
most unblest half-education the world has ever seen," " a
vulgarised science." The intelligent leaders are not like this.
Its view of the universe, unique in itself, has been called the
materialisation of history ; that is, the idea of a spiritual
development as Hegel once expounded it has been transformed
by the leaders of the movement, under the influence of the
Darwinian hypothesis and that of science generally, into this
372 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
materialism. The innermost core of all development, as it says, is
the economic evolution of society and the evolution of morality ;
science, art, religion merely its consequences. Even the repre-
sentatives of hated capitalism may take shelter under this idea
of necessitated evolution. They too are its victims. But if by
the inner necessity of this industrial evolution capitalism has
now dug its own grave, by the same law of necessity a new
science of morality will arise. It will at the same time be a
richer substitute for the self-delusion of religion. The reasons
of its origin are now seen through ; but these reasons have now
for ever disappeared. We have no need here to examine the
core of this cosmic philosophy, either as to the concept of evolu-
tion itself, or that of the economic hypothesis which asserts
that this is the single determining factor {cf. p. 39 fF.).
It is, however, important to note, at this juncture, that this
cosmic hypothesis is in no way new, as is sometimes conceitedly
thought. The turn given to the hypothesis in the assertion
that social evolution is the governing principle is certainly new
so far as it has never before been so recklessly and one-sidedly
asserted. But because the evolution hypothesis is in the main
only a general formula, capable of the most various statement,
we can comprehend, by examining these statements, the most
surprising fact, that the social democratic theory of the world is,
not merely not new, and at the bottom not even social, but
curiously enough so much like that of its bitterest opponents
that they may be easily mistaken for one another. According
to it men are naturally equal {i.e. individual men) ; equal in
their natural propensions directed to the same end of seeking
their own welfare. From their natural propensions of self-love,
benevolence under the guidance of reflection, calculation, and a
will that is free and naturally good there proceeds a prosperous
condition of society, and a general happiness based on civil-
isation. We recognise these tones. This is the hedonistic
ethics of the so-called ' natural right ' to happiness, which has
received this name because a supposed equality of natural
endowment forms the starting-point of subsequent difference,
apart from history {cf. p. 34).
But these are the principles from which the opponents of
SOCIAL ETHICS 373
socialistic economics start. This is the foundation of their idea
of ' leaving the world to take its course ' and ' giving free play
to natural forces' and the like. The difference between the
rival views is that present-day socialism, after the essential
error of such theories has received fearful proof, now wishes to
help the personal life by putting all capital in the control of
the corporate whole. But other assumptions intrinsically
different are not put forward. This supposed corporate whole
is only the sum of the persons composing it, and these are
individually the same with those above described, with no deeper
powers, or higher aims ; satisfied to claim ' rigKts "* and in-
different to ' duties."* There is no thought of society properly
articulated, or of a humanity with a great history and a sublime
future. When the problem of economics is solved, this solves
all others, and that because for it no other problem exists. In
short, the poverty of the idea is merely concealed by the dazzling
word ' evolution.*'
How much of this science of socialism is conscious know-
ledge possessed by the exponents of its watchword, or really
effective, it is difficult to decide. Its effectiveness often enough
consists in its critical element and battle-cries, and in many
cases its materialism, so easy of comprehension. It is under-
neath that these same men often enough exhibit power of self-
abnegation and of self-sacrifice on behalf of their ideal, con-
fused as it seems, which might well shame us. The question
whether this is not the power of the Gospel unconsciously
working in them leads us to the examination of what is the
proper position of Christian ethics to the whole movement.
On this point it is only possible to speak plainly after having
— apart from any reference to the present social question —
previously made clear what the Gospel view is on the question of
industrial labour. Only in this way is it possible for us, in the
current of the movement, to judge whether we are in position,
without self-delusion, to bring the light of its simple truths to
bear on it. So much that is false or only half-true has beea
said in the name of the Gospel, that such a doubt ought clearly
to be put to the test of examination, and if at all possible set
at rest.
374 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN IJFE
The Judgment of Christian Ethics on Economic Questions.
Provided Christian life is a coherent whole illuminated by a
great light, the general truths which bear on these points can
only consist in the application of those with which we made
acquaintance in the sections on worlc and property (p. 348). The
sphere of industrial labour and the property produced by it in
the form of external goods is complicated enough to require
such explicit application.
Here too Jesus stands above the two extreme views, in the
support of which appeal is made to Him — that of the enemies of
industrial labour, or such as only work because driven by necessity ;
and that of the orators who make it into a god. In the Romish
Church (p. 353) the state of nature and state of grace are
just on this point made to appear as two entities intrinsically
alien to one another. Accordingly, private possession of earthly
goods is regarded as something not proper for those who are
perfect, and, for the ordinary Christian, needing to be sanctified
by alms-giving. The ideal condition of property is a community
of goods ; its historical example is that of the first Christian
community in Jerusalem. This picture of the early days of
Christianity floats before the eyes of many Protestants, in
obscure outline, as the goal of their desire. They do not
clearly see that what was possible then under special and limited
conditions for a short time, was in no form introduced by St
Paul into his Grecian missionary churches. They often over-
look, as well, how strongly the voluntariness of that communism
is emphasised ; and even by a false concession to communistic
opinions forget Luther"'s saying : " Those said, ' What is mine is
thine"'; these now say, 'What is thine is mine."'"" Still the under-
valuation of labour is not compelled to express itself in far-away
visions of a community of goods. It takes a remarkable form
at the present time in Tolstoy, in his glorification of manual
labour and his contempt for the more highly developed civilisa-
tion. For this it cannot make appeal to Jesus. He makes no
such trifling distinctions about work. He calls His disciples
away from the net as from the ' receipt of custom.' He takes
His parables of the Kingdom from all sorts of vocations, does
SOCIAL ETHICS S'75
not regard one as holier than another, and promises the reward
of work in the highest calling of all. Free Himself, he only
suffers freedom to be bound by the Father's will, in all other
points as in this ; certain that all are able to do that will.
But of course just as little — when we have regard to individual
sayings, nay, still less — does He pronounce those to be in the
right — why is at once plain — who think all is going excellently
well if only work and trade are peacefully progressing, and the
' ordered social conditions ■" are not disturbed. He applies even
to these worshippers of custom and devotees of assured property
a higher requirement, that of ' the treasure in heaven,"* for which
no sacrifice is too great. And He knows how it really is that
wealth is the hardest of fetters, as well as the last needing to be
broken off; how hard it is for the rich to enter into the kingdom
of heaven ; ' impossible to man,"" to him who is rich or is deter-
mined to be so. He sees how easy it is for the rich man to be
without love to his neighbour, and to be in unbelief without
love to God, of whom he apparently has no need. This is why
such a one has treated his property, which is for the highest
Good, as Mammon, a false God. Accordingly He sees that
many poor are more receptive for His riches (St Matt. v. 2, vi.
24 ; 1 Tim. vi. 17 ff.). But all who are poor are not in His
kingdom because they are poor; and He received the rich,
without taking their property from them save when its sacrifice
is required as a proof of earnestness, as in the case of the rich
young noble (cf. p. 225). St Peter has his own house in
Capernaum (St Mark i. 29), and the whole Epistle of Philemon
is a protest against the opinion that there is such a thing as a
Christian law in regard to property which necessarily arranges
its measure and asserts its rights. " To have as though one
had not "" (1 Cor. vii. 29), is the Christian demand. The Apostle
claims independence in want and superfluity, and to be a Stoic of
a higher order and so not a Stoic — " initiated into the mystery "
{jne/uivrjiuiai) of rising above earthly property at once by enjoying
and forgoing it. In this too he was the servant of the Lord
who " had not where to lay His head," but was not either an
anchorite or a beggar ; who uses the goods of this world as they
come to Him ; has a common chest for the immediate circle of
376 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
His disciples ; defends the ' waste ■" of Mary ; and thus is the rich
Son of the rich Father. Nowhere is there narrowness or trivial-
ity, but everywhere freedom in the service of the Father. Even
that beautiful and wise saying of the Old Testament (in Prov.
XXX. 8), of the "food convenient for me," contrasted with
" poverty nor riches,"" does not rise to the height of His attitude.
Nor does He lay down a law in favour of the golden mean in
property. Therefore so many questions which an earthly sense
would put to Him glance off from Him and pass on. He is
no judge of an ' inheritance,' but he does not abrogate work,
property, inheritance. The notion of property for its own sake
certainly has not for Him the dignity which it had for the
people of ' the law."* God is the great proprietor, and we are
His stewards ; but it is right to be faithful in the least, so that
we may be entrusted with the true riches. In short, it is as
always when the ' one thing needful ' and the ' many things ■"
of this world stand before His gaze. His attitude to
industrial labour is the same as to all that is peculiar to
civilisation {cf. p. 349). He is neither ' for "" it nor ' against ' it.
He is above it, and hence in it as no other is ; unreservedly
' against ' it if it seeks to usurp the place of the highest Good ;
' for "■ it, so far as it originates with the Father in heaven and
is used in His service. Hence the opponents of civilisation
and fanatics wrongly claim Him as on their side in this
special point too ; now praise and now condemn Him without
reason. And it is only he who allows Jesus to raise him to the
same level as that on which He stands who comprehends His
meaning, and that such factitious antitheses are no part of His
thoughts. For His kingdom is not the kingdom of this world,
and His Father is not the God of this world ; and just as little
is He opposed to this world, according to the common idea of
this world, whether it is that of the godly or the ungodly. He
knows the Father, and He is the Almighty Lord of heaven and
earth.
Such principles are binding on every Christian, provided the
word of God is to stand good. He who has not the spirit of
Christ is none of His. And with the conviction of the obliga-
tion of these principles there is assumed the possibility of
SOCIAL ETHICS 377
carrying them out under all conditions, however various, by the
poor as by the rich ; by both, whether in the first or twentieth
century. Only the way of carrying out these principles, as of
everything that is truly the will of God, is committed to the
dutiful choice of each. Is that now intended to mean that the
Christian ought to have no decisive attitude towards the great
social question of our day ? Is it right in the flood-tide of
' Christian socialism ' for a little band of independent men to
proclaim that the Christian in the name of Christianity has
nothing he can demand from public order beyond the liberty to
live in his own faith.? No doubt justifiable in relation to
innumerable obscurities of the momentary fashion, yet there is
a very simple objection which besets this proposition. The
Christian ought, as has been impressively rejoined by its
exponents, to live out his faith in love, and so become ' salt ""
in the life of others. Certainly. But this activity of love at
once meets in actual life with the most difficult economical
problems. If we reflect on Luther's attitude towards the
forbidding of usury in the ancient Church, can we say that the
scrupulous care with which the Christian world of to-day disposes
of this is founded on clear Evangelical conviction ? The view,
of course, may not be so very difficult (although often taken
too lightly) that "lending and taking nothing in return," in
the true meaning (cf. St Matt. v. 42), is neither fulfilled by the
Churches' forbidding of usury, nor by destroying the possibility
of taking it in the state of the future {cf. p. 119). But it is
impossible not to recognise that the necessary development of
industrial life brings with it a mass of difficulties in the manage-
ment of money, in relation to which the difficulty of a decided
opinion on the part of the Christian man is a fearfully hard one.
This is the case not merely with the merchant and the contractor,
but for everyone who is involved in ever so quiet a way in this
vast world of business. As to the duties of the wealthy,
Carnegie the millionaire has lately written and urged his fellow-
millionaires to expend their wealth in benefiting mankind, not
perhaps in the form of some charitable institution after death —
weakening their sense that they cannot take their treasures
with them — but by prompt expenditure of their superfluity,
378 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
themselves as fellow-workers and not mere enjoyers of their
substance. And over wide areas the judgment gains increasing
currency that the private gentleman, living on the interest of
his capital, whether he has little or much, is no less a parasite
than the tramp. But the Christian is not able to judge thus
without taking close account of the mass of anomalies in the
social order of the present day ; and for him this means, without
feeling that he is under obligation to endeavour to reduce their
number — just for his own sake, and even still more for the
sake of others. For if he groans under those anomalies in
spite of the strong counterpoise of his faith and his love, how
much more others who do not know either faith or love ?
On his part he is to help in securing for others the blessing of
work for themselves, that they in their turn may do the like
for their fellows. But for this he is incapacitated in the absence
of some j udgment on this great question of the day.
We are not to consider it merely as an economic question.
That the materialisation of history of which we have spoken is
unchristian, is at once just as clearly seen in Christian ethics
as the mistake of supposing that it is the promise of a golden
time without heart-renewal. The proper answer, however,
cannot be brought out of isolated passages of the Holy
Scriptures, but must be deduced from the briefly presented
Christian view of the broad principles of labour and property.
This at once puts one consequence beyond doubt. Neither
pure socialism nor pure individualism in economic life is
Christian. For in the thought of the Kingdom of God in-
dividuals with the community, and the community with its
individuals, are bound together into a unity and into a freedom
which far transcend the mere predominance of the individual
or of the community at the cost of one or the other. But
pure socialism or pure individualism does sacrifice either the one
or the other (p. 143 f.). Both endanger personal independence
and the true union of love. The first especially endangers
independence, and the second chiefly love. But in fact both
independence and love are endangered, for we saw that we
can be of no service to others unless we are a whole in our-
selves, and the freest personality in the absence of love is poor
SOCIAL ETHICS 379
and empty. At this point the question, not always clearly put,
may be answered — May a Christian be a social democrat ? The
question has in the main a sense open to a general explanation
only when all that is purely personal is excluded, for here as
everywhere the statement is applicable — Each must for himself
give an account to God. Consequently the meaning of this
question cannot be, whether and how far a Christian ought to
support the claims of social democracy which he, if only
generally, recognises as a justifiable means for a justifiable
end, but rather whether he ought, for the sake of such
demands, to belong to the Social Democratic party. On this
his conscience must decide {cf. p. 381). But if the question
concerns the main principle of economic socialism, and if this
main principle is clearly grasped, and thought out in all its
consquences, then there can be no doubt that it is to be answered
negatively, and on the ground stated — the independence of the
individual, without which he is of little value either to himself
or to the community, is essentially sacrificed, although under the
present perplexing conditions there is many a one who really by
this devotion to this communal ideal — fundamentally injurious
to individuality — does become a personality for himself. For
instance, a workman who, by his savings for the party funds, for
the first time learns to make a personal self-sacrifice for an ideal.
Only this fundamental decision is undeniably in agreement with
the other assertion — that pure individualism is unchristian.
Is it possible to put these negative statements more definitely ?
Very probably in this way — an individualistic economic order
with a strong socialistic stamp on it corresponds to the
Evangelical master-idea of the relation of the individual to the
corporate whole more purely than the converse possibility.
That follows from what has been said before of the importance
of the individual in the Kingdom of God, and this application
of the idea pressed itself on our attention when we dwelt on the
practicability of the ' state of the future.' The Christian must
value the improvement of social conditions as an urgent task,
but he cannot, even in the economic sphere, give up the supreme
and frequently emphasised principle that the improvement of
individuals more certainly leads to soundness of social conditions
380 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
than that this soundness of conditions tends of itself to make
men good. Hence a certain reserve is imposed on Christians —
not a reserve in benevolence, but caution in the matter of
flattering partisanship for the cause of the poor. Jesus was
not the prince of the proletariat, and tax-gatherers were certainly
not the ' poor ' of His day. Only of course there is always the
reverse danger near.
But in the application of these principles to the wealth of life
we find ourselves warned of the need of the greatest prudence, not
only by the undeniable want of success which has attended even
the well-meaning work of amateurs, but by the knowledge which
all may be supposed to possess that in a sphere so especially
perplexing there is little promise of success in the absence of the
closest knowledge of history and of present-day life, and even
less promise than in other departments. By this judgment the
general claim is not affected that there ought to be the
opportunity of work for those who are willing to work, and that
sufficient wages ought to be assured to the worker — sufficient
wages not merely for in some degree guaranteeing his physical
existence in health and in sickness, but also for the furtherance
of his intellectual and moral development (family life,
education) ; in fact, a wage the scale of which shall stand in as
close a relation as possible to the utility of his work. To
this end the community ought not to allow the unavoidable
conflicting interests of individual persons or of social circles
to become a selfish battle of one against another, or of single
classes against other classes ; but ought to shape them to such
ends as concern the good alike of the individual and the
community.
But what ways lead to these ends Christian ethics cannot of
itself form a judgment. It can only give utterance to its well-
founded conviction that many things which are to-day con-
sidered impossible will be found practicable. It does this,
taught by history that many an apparently unimpeachable
' right "" has disappeared when it plainly grew into a wrong.
And it can feel encouraged to honour in such changes the
triumph of the ' Good,"* i.e. of the love to which right and law
are indispensable and sacred servants, but still servants. So
SOCIAL ETHICS 381
much the more will such alterations be rich in blessing, the
oftener they are called forth by the moral conviction of the
propertied classes, and are not mere anxious concessions to the
exigeant masses.
But perhaps it is still a task of ethics to try to realise by
whom such reforms are to be set in operation. In this as
always the appeal must be to the individual. It would often
be cheering (if it were not often saddening) to see social
reformers in personal intercourse with others among all parties.
People dispute and debate over the future of society, and let
the moment slip in which, by saying a prudent word or doing
a kindly deed, the present condition of society might be im-
proved in their own circle. Nay, it is a new task of the first
order, set for us by the new conditions, how in the huge manu-
factories of modern life, personality, the personal whole, inde-
pendent, matured, can assert and perfect itself; and it is not
only a weak but a false complaint that this personality has no
longer place in our time. But it is to misconstrue facts when
everything is made to depend on the individual, and a mistake
to seek to depreciate the value of the duty and power of social
groups to make attempts at improvement and advancement.
Face to face with such enormous tasks, the individual is not in
the position to help on radical improvement unless a divinely
commissioned leader sets the example of action, and constrains
others into his service for the good of all. Among social groups
naturally that of labour takes the precedence. It is in the first
line called to remove industrial hindrances. On this a dis-
tinction emerges. The worker oppressed by the hardships of
present-day labour plainly stands in a different position from
the proprietor. The former is at once summoned to a battle
for the improvement of his status. But in what form, in what
measure, that again is a matter belonging to his personal con-
science. Severe inner struggles may be his lot just because
the external battle for the improvement of his status is associated
with so much that is dreamy and unjust. But positively, along
with his vocation as a worker he has another calling, that of
freeing his position from the limitations which are in danger of
rendering it no longer a vocation in the proper sense. If we
382 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
reflect on this, then we shall no longer consider that judgment
against strikes (as a weapon in the struggle for more wages) which
for a long time passed current in the name of Christian ethics,
a reasonable one ; without in the least going beyond this to
glorify strikes in the way usual with many. The other party in
this great economic struggle represents moral worth. Real pro-
gress is most surely guaranteed by the spirit of honesty, justice,
social utility, by which both parties may and ought to be
inspired. It appertains to those who are economically the
stronger party to be ready to render possible for the weakest
what is purely impossible for them by their own strength. For
instance, as a set-off to mechanical labour, improvement in the
conditions of family life, higher education, and as the basis of
this better dwellings and surroundings. It is one of the
brightest rays of hope that the last-named task is ever more
and more regarded as most urgent. Many incidental and
aimless streams of beneficence might find an ordered course in
this great work ; and this will happen when society gains the
clear conviction that there here stands before it a simple, long-
delayed duty ; and has made the discovery that the common
notion of charity is itself a mere pillow of content, and is at
once the product and the source of self-deception. For it is
only when one has begun to fulfil the duties of righteousness
that genuine Christian pity unreservedly attends to its proper
and never-ending service in a province peculiarly its o/zn.
The Christian family will ever continue to be the most
successful school of duty for both. On the field most easily
surveyed, with circumscribed tasks, in the years when sensibility
is the keenest, the truly social disposition must be cultivated
which alone will alone guard in later life against all charity
becoming a mere soulless piece of business. In the degree that
this quiet home of all efforts to be put forth on a larger scale
is cherished, science and art may succeed in doing their part in
bridging over the social gulf. A novelist like Dickens poured
* oil and wine "" into the wounds of the oppressed, and smote the
oppressors at the same time with fiery strokes. And he also
shows that neither the pathetic skill of literary art nor
illuminative science can soothe the hunger for life and love in
SOCIAL ETHICS 383
the unhappy masses ; but only the message of life which springs
out of the fount of love, in fine, from the eternal love. That is
to say, a credible and worthy common faith must bind high and
low together, if all the bridges that ingenuity can build are not
to be finally destroyed.
The way to a common understanding as to the tasks to be
accomplished by the State at least begins to be made plain.
These are, protection of the weak and care for the feeble, by
such methods as those of which a foundation for future effort
has been laid in the German systems of insurance laws for
workers — the first finest fruit of the newly united empire,
although widely condemned by those for whom they were
designed ; juster laws of taxation ; colonisation abroad, and
home colonies and the like. Alongside this, and coincident in
origin — although yet more a matter of future prospect than a
present reality — is the recognition of the full right of organisa-
tion of labour in forms profitable for the whole community.
Such recognition is the surest way to destroy the delusion that
it is the duty of the State and in its power to do everything,
and a summons to all the slumbering forces of the world of
labour.
It is notoriously a question much debated whether the Church
should be called upon to render direct help in the social
exigencies of the present, and especially whether this is its
proper province ; or whether, as a matter of principle, it is only
called upon to indirect effort, particularly by the performance
of its proper religious tasks, and in this way render all the more
powerful and practical assistance by influencing the dispositions
of all those who ought to be socially active in the circles in
question. It is not difficult to understand that the Roman
Church takes the first-mentioned view. Its conviction is that
as a church all questions generally, and therefore also this
question, can be settled by its treasury of supernatural truths
and gifts of grace, and by the discipline as well which it cari'ies
out in the secular sphere through the State at the Church's
instance (making a virtue of necessity); and in its religious
orders it has a well-schooled and thoroughly well-disciplined
army for the social crusade (c/! the papal encyclical, 1891).
384 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
Naturally, in the Evangelical Church of Germany those incline
to this ideal of ecclesiastical social activity in proportion to the
emphasis which they lay generally on the fact of its establish-
ment by the State, and their judgment on the matter — therefore,
for example, their judgment on the Church Social Conference on
the one hand, and on the Evangelical Church Congress on the
other hand, which represent both these views — will depend in
the end not on their different attitude to the social question
but on their Church views. It scarcely needs to be said that the
real difference of conviction goes down much deeper than such
examples from a rapidly changing period would of themselves
serve to indicate. Perhaps it is well that both tendencies
should be separately suffered to show what they are able to
accomplish. It would not be difficult to determine historically
which line of thought comes closer to the original idea of the
German Reformation. In no case need we ascribe to that view
less social energy than to the other, when it regards the task
entrusted to the Church, in proper Lutheran fashion, from
the point of view of the ' Word only "* ; the ' Word,' of course,
applied in its encouraging and illuminative power to all difficult
problems of the day, and of proved efficacy for things high as for
things low. But it is as little inclined to the idea which tends
in the other direction of helping by " fighting shoulder to
shoulder with the oppressed " through an organisation after the
manner of a religious order, and denying to start > -ith citizen
rights in the Evangelical Church. {^Cf. the attempts of the
High Church party in the English Church.) Both lines of
thought may in their final statement be one, that the Gospel is
the only force which can make us ' social,"" that is capable of
sacrifice ; while the mere insight into the relation between the
good of the individual and that of the corporate whole only
produces a ' socialism of prudence.' Whatever one may
consider to be the duty of the Church, such is that of the
individual clergyman, save that here the scruple against direct
participation steps at once into a clearer light. For everyone
will allow that in the main the clergyman should not be a party
man. Plainly the individual conscience must draw the line for
each person. But any passing pronouncements of ecclesiastical
SOCIAL ETHICS 886
authorities ought always to be framed from the Church's point
of view, simply because these authorities will otherwise be drawn
into the uncertain course of the ship of State, to the injury of
both Church and State.
In any case, whatever opinion may be formed on these matters
just discussed, the social question is of such complexity that it
can only be brought nearer to solution by the co-ordinated
efforts of individual persons and of the social circles concerned,
that is, by self-help, by neighbourly help and by that of the
community at large, the State and the Church. Science and art
must be summoned to aid. But the help of God, which is
effectual in all such troubles, does not, provided we admit the
witness of the Gospel, guarantee a heaven on earth. Every
solution creates a new question in this earthly development;
behind every height scaled there looms a new horizon. Nor is
this merely a result of human sin, but belongs to the very
nature of this material development. Conflict of interests,
progress and regress, are essential factors. In the midst of this
conflict God's peace is the guardian of faith and love, but this
peace points beyond the battle-fields.
Science and Art.
Civilised society comprises both the industrial life already
discussed on the one hand, and science and art on the other.
It is plain without saying more that the industrial department
has to do with the mastery of nature, practically and techno-
logically, by the human intellect, and art and science with the
ideal appropriation of nature by the human consciousness ; the
former grasps the objective world, the latter enriches the sub-
jective world of mind. It is less clear and not unattended with
danger to suppose that both these departments of art and
science are apprehended in their unity and distinction when we
have designated them ' knowledge "" ; science as the knowledge
that is general and universal, art that which is special and indi-
vidual. For the very expression ' feeling for the beautiful ' is
in itself a protest against subsuming art under the category of
knowledge, or 'knowing.' In both regions, art and science, there
25
386 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
distinctly emerges the difference between the minds that lead
and create and those that are receptive and impressible, although
the boundary-line between the two is most certainly fluctuating,
because every personal acquisition results from imitation.
Science.
In its nature science is the conscious and coherent search for
the knowledge of truth ; that is, for judgments universally true,
compelling, and illuminating. In regard to subject-matter,
it is divided into physical and mental sciences, into pure and
applied (practical or ' positive ") according as they are pursued
for the sake of knowledge alone, or at the same time for the
solution of a practical problem. But these distinctions do not
affect the great end, the knowledge of truth. The labour
directed to this end is by associated effort, for no one person is
in himself equal to the task. The great medium of exchange
is language. This fellowship in knowledge is on one side of
it informal general intellectual intercourse. That is, without
express design knowledge in various subjects spreads with
immeasurable rapidity from one to another ; from one circle of
cultivated society to another ; from nation to nation. Men
live in a common intellectual atmosphere. The great currents
in this mental atmosphere are set up by the literary works,
which are the products of the inquiring intellect. The daily
press is active in propagation, popularising in a way often
shallow, reaching the most remote villages. The power of the
press is great precisely because it is in a position to use its
influence in the form of unfettered intercourse in a way that
is not possible for any organised formal school of instruction.
Inasmuch as the outward form of entire freedom is preserved,
the 'gentle reader' yields himself as a slave to tyrants who
force on his attention the wants and views of others, which
often enough have grown up out of the soil of wasted lives.
But still an incalculable amount of what is useful, true, and
good is in this way diffused. In the main both these state-
ments are true of the so-called secular as well as of the
Christian press. 'Schools' of instruction imply a formal
fellowship of knowledge, whether as between teacher and
SOCIAL ETHICS 387
scholar from the elementary school to the public school, or as
between literati in their mutual intercourse in philosophical
or scientific societies. German universities cover both ; that,
in addition to their functions as collegiate institutions, they
invite to learned independent research, constitutes their power
and their weakness.
The judgment of Christian ethics on science does not
admit of being initially stated in a short formula. In the
Holy Scriptures are found words in praise of human know-
ledge alongside earnest warnings ; and these latter predominate.
" Not many wise are called," " Has not God made foolish the
wisdom of this world ? " One of the chief charges made by
modern ethics against the Christian system is, in fact, its sup-
posed depreciation of human knowledge ; and we saw that in
wide social areas ' Science *" is the one (often unknown) god, to
which men offer sacrifice after crumbling all other altars into
ruins. But the Holy Scriptures assert with particular emphasis
that the Gospel is the ' Truth ' ; the Christian is exhorted to
" seek after the wisdom which is perfect " ; and they candidly
recognise all that interests the human mind — and that not
merely in the Proverbs of the Old Testament; for the New
Testament also is far from that intentional contempt for know-
ledge which has been a matter of glorying in the name of piety
in some periods of the history of the Church. If we look more
closely, this aversion to science rests on a twofold ground. For
one thing, "knowledge puff'eth up," the cultivation of the
intellect is thought too much of. Thus ' knowledge "* appears
in opposition to ' faith."" They mutually influence one another.
Knowledge is overvalued in its significance for the individual
because too much or everything is attributed to it ; and the
reverse. Knowledge has in fact done so much that it is supposed
nothing is impossible to it ; and how much more compre-
hensively is that true of this than of any former genera-
tion ! It is only when there is clear insight into the nature
of knowledge that it is possible to pronounce a clear judg-
ment on its value. In other words, the proposition above
previously given, that the mark of true science consists in
the enunciation of ' universal judgments,"" needs closer inspection.
388 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
How far do such generally valid judgments, such as each person
of sound intellect must acknowledge, reach ? Do these only
exist in that sphere of perception determined by the ' laws of
thought,' or do they extend to such questions as are related
to a theory of the universe ? Do not the latter rather rest on
the concurrency of reasons of a quite different sort from those
which are sufficient for the intellectual part of our nature ?
Have not will and feeling a justifiable share in all our final
convictions as to the reason and purpose of the world ? — justifiable
precisely because otherwise a real conviction could only be
attained by the gifted and educated. So that in ethics a state-
ment at once appears to be obvious, which in investigations
busied merely with the nature of knowledge easily produces the
impression of a mere attempt to escape a difficulty. In short, it
is the highest task of science to know itself, recognise its own
legitimacy, to examine the limits which naturally belong to it,
and to turn its criticism on itself. Until this work is accom-
plished the Christian judgment on science must ever remain
uncertain. It will at the same time both be in conflict with it
and highly value it, fear it and yet have confidence in it ; and as
long as this obscure relation subsists, there will always be
religious men inclined to keen enmity to science. The history
of the mediaeval Church as well as of modern Protestantism
offere numerous illustrations. Too much is conceded to induct-
ive science, unproved in matters of faith ; and then arbitrarily
enough a special ' higher ' province is assigned to ' exact ' know-
ledge, and then faith, conscious of its original might, revenges
itself with illogical invectives against 'godless reason.' Now,
to our thinking Kant so took in hand that greatest of scientific
problems, the investigation of the nature of cognition, ' the
Critique of Reason,' that only the superficial student can ignore
its results. But it is precisely on this point that it again
appears clear how the grand final questions are settled in the
holy of holies of the human heart, and therefore not in one way
for the educated and in another way for the uneducated. How-
ever clearly the limits of ' exact ' knowledge are defined, it is
still a matter of personal resolve whether a man will take this
insight into these final questions seriously ; whether he will cast
I
SOCIAL ETHICS 389
away all fancy, and see that his true honour consists in doing
his duty. Is scientific knowledge my highest Good or the
Good-will ? This is in this place the chief question ; and that
saying, " Whoever will do His will," finds here a new, unique
application. The whole real importance of the present point
comes into a clear light when we note that the warning against
the " knowledge that puffeth up " was said in the first instance
to Christians of their supposed knoivledge, and has since received
ample justification in all forms in the world of pietism. But it is
indispensably needful to battle against vanity and paltriness in the
learned world, and often most indispensable at its highest levels.
Supposing this main question is properly settled, and thus the
nature of science really known, and the limits which this nature
imposes ; and if this knowledge is taken with true religious
earnestness of mind, then Christian ethics can scarcely go too
far in the recognition of the moral value of all genuine know-
ledge. Knowledge makes the personal spirit the lord over
nature, and only by such mastery is a man fitted for the fellow-
ship of love, for loving and being loved. And the importance,
in particular, that belongs to the knowledge of God and of His
ways in history, and in the most insignificant life, has been
repeatedly insisted on. Here we need only allude to missions
— the best men in every department of theology, the best
expositors, historians, systematic theologians, and practical
divines, would be barely good enough for this mighty task of
announcing the Gospel to fresh nations in fresh languages ; but
it is precisely here that we see true theology is inseparably
connected with all science. True and real theology. If that
main question is properly answered, then all knowledge wins the
freedom befitting its nature. The sublime word of Job (xiii.
7), " Will ye speak wrongfully for God ? will ye talk deceitfully
for Him ? " is understood in all its depth. The freedom of the
children of God is freedom, too, from any inclination to find
fault with the truth ; to prescribe to God the way in which He
ought to proceed in the kingdom of nature or of grace ; to settle
the way (for example) in which He ought to have fashioned
Holy Writ. Faith assured of God's existence reverences God's
almighty wisdom in all that is real and offers to us real know-
390 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
ledge. Faith is the mainspring and motive power of this.
And where absolute loyalty to truth seems to demand what to
our human weakness is a sacrifice involving our most cherished
ideas, it is faith that gives us humility, patience, and hope.
Every act of renunciation becomes to us the gain of closer inter-
course and fellowship with God. In the unlimited obedience
which can do nothing against the truth, faith perceives that it is
linked in hope with those who have been martyrs for truth
other than that which is distinctively Christian. All alike live to
the God of truth.
This spiritual attitude of the Christian to all forms of
knowledge renders him capable of a tolerance which far surpasses
all that usually bears that name. Faith which does not really
understand itself has often done dishonour to the true estimate
of what the faith really is by blind fanaticism ; tolerance as
the general attitude of public opinion and the usage of the
State, has often been inspired by mere antagonism to the
representatives of religion. But it is only true faith that has
the power to avoid the danger of all such tolerance, the
danger, that is, of acquiescing in each believing what he chooses
because in the last resort every form of truth is equally good
— that is equally hard to prove. This is the paralysing effect
of that great truth that a philosophy of the world is not
deducible from exact science. But in Christianity this con-
sequence is intrinsically impossible, because it founds, faith on
the revelation of the good God {cf. above, p. 60 ff.). And it
respects this faith as a personal secret which excludes all judg-
ment on others, and as that which constrains its possessors
to win men by unwearying love. {Cf. all that has been said
on the basal idea of Christian ethics.)
Art.
Christian ethics has only very slowly arrived at a judgment
on art in keeping with the special character of the subject.
This hangs together with the difficiilty of an accurate defini-
tion of art. For there are many explanations that are as unin-
telligible as they are worthless. " Art is concerned with a form
of mental pleasure through the channel of the senses ; " " Art
SOCIAL ETHICS 891
is a complex of sensuous impressions through which a feehng
of harmony arises,"" and that because it goes beyond immediate
reahty. Certainly, but how far, and why ? Perhaps we may
the sooner obtain what may be needful as a foundation for a
judgment, if, instead of entering into the conflict of views, we
let those speak to us who were themselves great artists, and
tell us what their idea of art was. Schiller says : " Everyone
who has the power to put his own emotional condition into
such objective form that this object compels me by an inner
necessity to pass over into the same emotional condition and
so powerfully affects me is an artist — a maker. . . . But it
is not everyone who is in the same degree eminent. That
depends on the wealth, the contents of his mind which thus
find external display, and on the degree of the ' necessity '
with which his work produces that impression on the mind."
And Goethe says : " The greater the talent, the more decisively
does the image that is to be produced at once take shape at
the beginning (of each particular artistic effort).'' Therefore the
question is one of an emotional condition rvhich is so presented to
the senses that this sensuous presentation again calls forth that
same emotional condition. Any such imaging work we call
beautiful. The means of perceptual presentation may be very
various — form, colour, sound, word ; and the various arts are
distinguished accordingly. But the common and decisive
feature is the sensuous presentation of an inner experience.
How decisive, we may know from the fact that the measure
of artistic power is the measure of the power of calling forth
(by the 'necessity' in the above sense) the same emotional
state, of compelling a sympathetic response. Inner experience
alone does not make an artist, nor of course the power of re-
presentation in the absence of an inner experience to represent.
Both inseparably belong to one another. To be sure, it has
been recently maintained, in the justifiable demand for realism
in art, that it is simply the representation of nature itself (and
so the illusion called forth by this means) that essentially
makes up the nature of art. But when the exponents of this
opinion praise the saying, " Art is a bit of nature, seen in a
particular mental mood," they silently admit what they attack
392 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
when they use that phrase, * mental mood."' In this phrase there
lies what we have above asserted. No one has yet seriously
declared that a mere accurate representation of a bit of nature
is for itself beautiful ; it must be a piece of nature specially
conceived, * ensouled ' nature. But because there are many who
have much artistic feeling without being able to represent it,
it is right, when considering the nature of art, to bring this
ability, this power of sensuous representation, into the forefront ;
and that in respect of its subjective reason, the imagination, the
power of mental intuition. A psychical event assumes a physical
form ; the subjective feeling gets free play and becomes objective ;
a mental movement reaches rest. This whole explanation would
be incomplete without explicitly emphasising the point from
which we started, that such a representation of emotional con-
dition offers itself to the contemplative feelings, awakening the
emotion of pleasure and gratification. Art is pleasurable even
in the form of the most moving of tragedies. It involves no
immediate impulse to action. Hence the question, the decisive
point whether the represented object is real or not, is a matter
of complete indifference for emotional pleasure as for the
knowledge of truth. Pleasure in its sympathetic contemplation
is its only purpose.
It is easy to add the supplementary consideration that those
simple ideas are just as true of the beautiful in nature as in
art. It is in nature that we find the emotional content of
human life, and it is in art that we embody its forms ; but in
every case the characteristics above mentioned come into question.
It is more necessary to note that while every perfect sensuous
presentation of an emotional content is beautiful, yet where
there is an equal completeness in the representation of the
higher emotional content this marks a higher a-sthetic level.
There is a realm of the beautiful, a unity amid infinite variety.
The complete expression of the highest content of human life
in an artistic synthesis would yield complete enjoyment of art.
Each period stamps out its own content peculiar to it. And if
there is a considerable amount in each age which all men of
every age can contemplate with like sympathy, especially much
that is common to human nature everywhere and at all times,
SOCIAL ETHICS 393
yet this common element does not represent the whole content
of life. For instance, the classic art of Italy is not the whole
of art. And even art in this age of machinery is still art, real,
and having its own character, influenced and enriched by this
world of machine production which at first sight appeal's to be
the very antithesis of art.
In the community of those men who direct their attention to
{esthetics, a difference is manifest which was stated previously
when we were dealing with the nature of the beautiful. It is
one thing to have a sensibility for aesthetic beauty ; it is another
thing to produce the beautiful. In both respects there is an
infinite gradation of talent down to the most deficient ability.
The difference marks out either the professional calling or the
mere taste of the amateur, whose real calling is to do work in
other spheres. It is often a difficult task which the teacher has
to perform, to lay stress on this distinction, for a person of
moderate ability soon believes himself capable of being an
artist ; and he who has the true calling easily deludes himself
with the idea that there is no need for hard work. Great
artists, however, have pointed out {cf. Wilhelm Meister ; Richter's
Life) that such persons are the very ones who stand in need of
the discipline of redoubled diligence, and give utterance to it
in a witty word with a serious meaning, that Talent is diligence.
A special and often undervalued form of the aesthetic life,
both of that which is receptive and that which is productive —
but neither of them in the form determined by vocation — is that
of companionship in pastimes which is called ' play "" — in the
narrower sense meaning the diversions of childhood. Social
forms and even the fixed (yet within certain limits ever-changing)
fashions of dress and society manners set forth the fact that
companionship is a kind of ' play,"" as the mould of social inter-
course. Social intercourse runs its course in the form of ' play '
in the wider sense of diversion. Conversation is an intellectual
pastime, in which the mental store of each is used for reciprocal
enjoyment, incorporating itself in lively word and suitable
gesture. Many a one, to whom the terms art and aesthetics
have all his life been unknown, may even on the lower levels of
culture be an artist by using his conversational powers for his
394 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
own and others'' pleasure with his own natural originality.
Besides the pastime of conversation there are other social
diversions. Whoever would object to them must prepare to
deny that there is any ethical justification of those recreations
which form the immediate end of companionship. But it is for
this very reason that we must say that they have moral value
as far as they are real diversions. And it is not merely those
forms of diversion that have an intrinsic value that are
justifiable, however true it is that a man of worth will prefer
them. Games of chance for the purpose of gain are inconsistent
with the idea of recreation, and are to be reprobated on account
of their inner unreality. Gain and work are connected. Hence
many hurtful results arise from the gambling spirit. Perhaps it
will seem inconceivable in a not very remote future that any
State should so lower itself as to constitute itself the banker of
a lottery. Those lotteries which have the serious purpose of
aiding some venture of art, or have a definite purpose for the
common good, must be differently judged. Still more surprising
will it seem that gambling hells, run by individual speculators,
were not long ago swept away by a storm of public indignation.
If there has long been some uncertainty of opinion prevailing
amongst Christians in reference to diversions, there is still more
in regard to the exercise of art as a calling, and the pleasure
connected with it. The aversion of the ancient Church was not
confined to the many openly immoral productions of the art of
the period. Among the arts, poetry and painting were the
earliest recognised by the Church. Then there was a long
period when all art dealt with religious subjects only and bore
an ecclesiastical impress. In the Evangelical Protestant Church
the older pietism regarded the whole region of artistic beauty as
a dangerous one for him at any rate who would take his religion
in real earnest, and as better avoided. For such a one joy in
the Holy Ghost is only conceivable as joy in religious subjects ;
and even the representation of these in art easily disturbs their
purity ; but still the exceptions of the simplest poetry and music
were allowed. The exclusion of these two arts from the
service of religion was precluded by Col. iii. 16. Of course
this passage and that of Philippians iv. 8 both give the impres-
SOCIAL ETHICS 396
sion that they require a far more unfettered interpretation, and
at the same time a far wider application. Reference has often
been made to the profound sensibility for the enjoyment of
nature which shines in many sayings of Jesus Christ. Still, such
several utterances do not suffice to prove that aesthetics was in
principle recognised. For it is undeniable that this whole field
of human mental activity is not prominent in the Holy
Scriptures. This statement is not altered by the appeal to the
Old Testament, its Temple and Psalter, or the vision of the
New Jerusalem and its glory. Ought we on this account to
say those are right who regard professed Christianity and
professed enmity to art as identical ? It would be better for
us to try to conceive what the reasons were for that undeniable
reserve ; for then we shall not only understand why, as a matter
of fact, that enmity arose, but also be able to judge whether
such a view has a real foundation in the nature of our religion.
Reflection on the nature of art passes with spontaneous ease
on to the question whi/ it is that the sensuous presentation of
an inner emotional experience gives such special exaltation,
such pure pleasure. The Neo-Platonists spoke of an eternal
element in art ; Schiller, of an ethical element in * form.'
Doubtless art stands above the tormenting questionings
and contradictions of our life. The objective and the sub-
jective, nature and spirit, are not in accord ; knowledge is
limited, the will crippled. But art assures us of a life in the
eternal ; here otherwise insoluble problems are resolved ; ' it
knows no breaks ' ; the soul finds repose, is at home. Hence
pleasure in the beautiful has been often called ' finding salvation/
But even when this noblest term is used of the yearning for
artistic enjoyment it gives rise to a great questioning. Is it the
highest salvation which is attainable by man ? In short, art
steps into rivalry with religion. Can it possibly be a substitute
for religion, for a humanity which has outgrown religion ?
It is indubitable that in this relationship of art and religion
there lies the intrinsic reason why the Gospel at first appeared
to be so indifferent to, and inclined to be inimical to, the
world of art. Art does not ask after reality ; the splendour
of illusion is its province. In religion reality is everything;
396 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
the more unambiguous everything belonging to it appears, the
higher it stands ; it is wholly and entirely ethical. It refuses
to throw a shimmering light of glory on evil, least of all on
guilt. To it sin is real, and forgiveness just as real. To
bind such religion with art without limitation, even were the
union only temporary, would be its death ; it would itself
become a splendid illusion. And art would carry off the victory
just because the splendour of illusion is its own specialty ; its
reality of illusion is more powerful than the reality of religion
when this latter is not taken with unreserved earnestness. The
solution of contradictions in art, her reconciliation of opposites,
has in it something fascinating; it offers itself to immediate
experience of enjoyment in its embodiment of the spiritual.
God seems distant, doubtful ; the beautiful present, realisable,
the only divine thing that can be experienced — of course only
within our own selves. When we reflect on the power of such
ideas at the present time, in spite of so long and deep a Christian
history, then we understand what the danger was that threatened
Christianity on a soil from which art and religion had simul-
taneously sprung in indissoluble union. In addition, since art
is in its nature the sensuous presentation of the non-sensuous,
the temptation lies very near to make the sensuous its sole con-
tent. Art that is not true to nature is artificiality, not art.
'Naturalism ■" in art is a deliberate preference for that view which
is even regarded as the only valid one, that " the natural propen-
sions are the ground of all human action, and even of the highest
ideals." And since this lower nature naturally lends itself most
easily, convincingly, and seductively to graphic representation,
art often becomes in periods of moral decline the chief handmaid
of lust. Lust subdues art to her service, and thus helps forward
her domination over continually wider spheres. Her language
is only too easily intelligible. Immoral culture becomes by her
means accessible to the uneducated.
Let us, however, not forget what a powerful impetus to higher
things art can give, for the same reasons and in the same way ;
often where no other means of culture will reach so quickly and
surely. In this way we arrive at a Christian ethical judgment
on art, befitting the subject. We have no new idea to bring
SOCIAL ETHICS 397
forward for this purpose ; but this is merely a proof that there
is no exclusiveness in Christian ethics. We have only un-
reservedly to carry out on this ground, apparently so unsafe,
the great thought so often emphasised. The will ought in
freedom to be subject to the will of God. But God is love.
To be loved and to love is the highest destiny of man. He is
to have no other gods but this God. But also there is nothing
in heaven and earth which does not minister to the purposes of
God's love, and among the ministering spirits before this throne
art is one of the noblest. Why ? The answer is clear from
what has been said on the nature of art. The ' Good "" must
shape itself in outward form, and, provided it is really divinely
good, in perfect form. But what is truly good is truly beautiful.
But " it doth not yet appear what we shall be." Until then the
beautiful is a deceitful illusion if it poses as that which is final
and supreme ; but it is a prophecy which hastens on to fulfil-
ment for all who " hunger after righteousness." Art does not
delude the Christian into the belief that there is no real unity
and synthesis of contraries. He is not the victim of any such
delusion, because he knows of a real synthesis of which he now
has experience. And art is to him a presentiment that this
real reconciliation which he already experiences in faith, and
which is worthy, on the ground of faith in its operative power,
of being mentioned at the same time, will one day be experienced
not by faith merely but by sight. In short, that famous saying
is true, " The good includes the beautiful," and must some way
reveal itself as the beautiful. Hence the Christian religion has
never separated itself from all art. Jesus graphically presented
the invisible mysteries of the Kingdom of God in parables, the
kingdom of the future and the kingdom that now is. The power
of the sacred picture and of the religious hymn cannot be
measured by human calculation.
Yet it is not a mere question of religious art. " It is not
what is painted, but how it is painted, that is of importance."
Not that the subjects are indifferent (see above), but here too
there is a rich gradation from the inconsiderable to the very
highest. But the secret of art depends on the artistic power
and style in which an idea is embodied. The most common-
398 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
place picture of daily life may deeply move us, when a sublime
theme may leave us cold. In the perfected Kingdom of God
even the smallest thing will be irradiated by the light of
eternity, and of this art gives us a glimpse. And again, just as
the beautiful artistic forms which are the product of human
genius affect us, so is it with nature itself in its divinely fashioned
beauty. This is in very fact the teacher of art. In the demand
for truth to nature the spirit of truth is manifest in spite of
all aberrations. There is no need of multiplying words to under-
stand from this that the main requirement in all art is that it
ought to be chaste, the pure representation of the idea to be
embodied, without any ulterior motive. By this, in the most
disputed part of artistic representation, all that is lascivious, as
all that is prudish, is excluded. Every creature of God is good,
and to the pure all things are pure. Even the human form has
its divinely designed beauty, but the Christian too is not blind
to the lurking danger. In days of excited public debate on
the morality of art both parties alike fall into misunderstandings.
The Christian desires not to lose the liberty with which Christ
has made him free ; and he is careful about allying himself with
those who make everything into a serious Church question, and
is alive to the danger of mental slavery. He is just as little
able to chime in with the jubilant songs on 'free' art in which
he discerns no really pure tones. He is mindful of the need of
protecting unstable youth. He asks himself whether all the
contributions of all the arts are national in regard to our
German feeling, in harmony with our nature and our history.
We cannot give so prompt an answer as is sometimes desired to
all the old famous ' school "" examples. The theatre as the home
' of the festal enjoyment of art ' for the people he cannot
condemn unless he wishes to condemn art itself. He is not,
however, able to conceal from himself that, as a matter of fact,
the theatre has often become the home of mere superficial and
vapid amusement, just precisely because true works of art are not
the staple of the performances of plays, but too often the light
wares of the mere speculative playwrights — whose methods of
advertisement often remind us of business firms — trading on the
low public taste. To this it may be added that a host of moral
SOCIAL ETHICS 399
dangers of all kinds are inseparably connected with the present
methods of management. Hence those who are in no wise
narrow-minded judges do not recommend the choice of the
actor's vocation under existing conditions, unless in the case
where someone possesses a quite special histrionic talent con-
joined with moral stamina, and feels that all these difficulties
may be overcome. Some will go a step further and will have us
think it proper to call it unworthy of an earnest Christian to
visit the innumerable small playhouses which are the opposite
of institutes of art. The strict conscience shows itself in this
to be rightly sensitive ; while the mind not infrequently finds a
pure joy in some really artistic production. The verdict on
dancing must be of a similar kind. It is unimpeachable as a
natural expression of social pleasure, and especially in the
society of one's own home. But again the actual way in which
the amusement is often arranged, the importance assigned to it,
and the continual dissipation of thought in it ever le-awaken the
old doubt, even when all dourness and hypercritical fault-finding
are excluded, and clear Evangelical principle is not infringed.
From this subject it is quite especially impossible to pass
without calling to mind in the most emphatic way that each
" must be fully persuaded in his own mind " ; and " to his own
Master he standeth or falleth." General rules are here particu-
larly valueless, because at bottom impossible and even unethical.
A reflection generally applicable is that art, simply because it
is in itself something divine, can with double ease become
godless ; that each must decide for himself whether and just
how far this daughter of the skies can be to him a guide and
prophetess. It is without doubt that many ought to remind
themselves that aesthetic, in the wrong place, at the wrong time,
in undue degree, may be the most serious foe of morality ; and
if they have any questioning ' either .... or ' they ought to
act up to the principle of St Matt. v. 29, certain that at the
right time the life attained by the sacrifice of life will be the
more glorious. For that which is ' Good ' and that which is
' beautiful ' are not for ever separated for anyone. Some are
armed against one thing and others against another ; some are led
in one way and s6me in another. But to ' live only for art ' is
400 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
impossible for anyone without injury, except for the artist, whose
vocation it is, to whom, like every other earthly calling, it may
and ought to be his preparation for the heavenly. To the
danger of thinking too highly of art, a certain witness, to whom
no suspicion can attach, points when he says : " Young man,
note betimes when thy soul and mind are in a state of exalta-
tion, that the Muse knows how to follow but not how to lead "
(Goethe). Thus as a form of special social intercourse various
pleasures have been mentioned, and there here naturally follows
a short treatment of the question of companionship.
Companionship.
The word companionship may need some explanation.
Essentially it can only imply all moral intercourse in human
society as a community of persons who live in the reciprocal
interchange of the thought, feeling, and experience, whatever
these may be, peculiar to each. Regarded from the point of
view of its fundamental principle this relation includes the
whole ethical sphere. Of course we speak of human companion-
ship in distinction from the herding of wild animals. Also it
would be possible, when using the word companionship, to
confine it merely to the outward form of such intercourse in
the way it is regulated by social usage. But the use which is
common and meant here is different from the one or the other
of these, and inasmuch as the latter is, so far as is needful,
clear, we only need to mark it off from the former. Put briefly,
it is much narrower both in purpose and content, in form
and range. The immediate end of companionship is not the
service of love so much as enjoyment, pleasure, and refreshment,
though of course such pleasure, provided it has its justifiable
place in Christian ethics, must be subordinated to the highest
moral end. Accordingly the content of companionship may
include all and everything which is not really immoral ; but it
is not, in the first line, consciously religious and moral as such.
And its form is not serious work such as our calling in life
demands, but action which represents itself artistically, and
that not as part of our serious vocations but as a diversion
SOCIAL ETHICS 401
{cf. * Art '). In its range, companionship — although it has its
centre in the family relationship — stretches purposely beyond
the family, and so far as it is at the same time subject to
limits, those limits are different from those which mark off
intercourse that is, properly speaking, ethical. The intercourse
of companionship extends to other persons besides those with
whom our moral vocation associates us. In short, companion-
ship is in all the mentioned aspects freer, and not intercourse
limited by our calling. But in all these aspects plain dangers
threaten companionship when it stretches its proper claim to
freedom too far. The highest end may never be denied, and
the highest content never excluded ; form and content must
not be in antagonism to the highest end and content ; nor
may its range be unlimited. For example, companionship
that will be nothing unless religious is unnatural, and may
easily degenerate into vulgarity ; beginning in the spirit, it
may end in the flesh. The conversation of those to whom art
and nature appear to be trivial subjects, when all religious
material is exhausted may take the form of a more eager
interest on the subjects of money and property. Yet friend-
ship in which the deepest earnestness is despised becomes vapid.
The surest indication of soundness lies in the simplicity with
which conversation may, without any artificiality, pass from
the commonplace to the highest subjects, and from the highest
back to the commonplace. Hence the rule for what is right,
the unerring test, is whether it hinders our prayers. Of course
this too, as everything else in Evangelical ethics, can only be
apprehended by each person in his special position.
This principle is again so far true of the amount of recreation
permissible. With this principle many content themselves,
because they like to escape the need of forming a personal
resolve in harmony with duty. In general, that which is obvious
enough may be said, that the concept of recreation excludes
the idea of strain, and cannot be regarded in the light of duty
at all. The usual ' obligations of companionship ' are of course
largely neither obligation nor companionship, but so called when
there is a need to extenuate some unfortunate doings. But
the individual himself ought to measure out the boundary-
26
402 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
lines of his recreations. There are sober natures to whom
that is real enjoyment which is, and rightly is, to others a
torment as dereliction of duty. Neither let us forget that
companionship is not our sole recreation, that nature and art
raise their quiet claims which may not be disregarded, although
it is certain that he who pays attention to these alone curtails
the moral demand, to which demand all recreation must be
finally subservient, since even that enjoyment of nature and
art which is the most intellectual cannot be a substitute for
the reciprocal influence of one will on another.
The chief danger to companionship arises from vanity. For
where it is really a matter of representing our characters to
others, that is, of appearances, the step to the over-valuation of
appearances, that is, to self-glorification, is not great. Self-
glorification is the worship of delusion, and entangles the mind
more and more in vain delusion. On the other hand, candour
and susceptibility are the good genii of social intercourse.
Candour is opposed to reserve and to mere gossipiness ; sus-
ceptibility is opposed to self-conceit and pretence. But it is
plain how true it is that these excellences can only be the fruits
of a tree whose roots are sound. When the roots are sound, a
princely mind will show itself in true courtesy, although it may
fail in many respects of exhibiting the polish of good society.
In our social circumstances, hospitality is frequently a form
of companionship, although it has widely departed from its
original character of ministering love, and appears in other
forms of helpful assistance and benevolence.
Thb State.
Companionship, art, and science are often called * free ' fellow-
ships, although they certainly do create and need manifold
fixed forms. As an antithesis to these ' free "" forms the social
community which is realised under the coercion of law is
sometimes thought of. But the above examples of ' free ' forms
of social fellowship are not unrelated to law — least of all the
family relationship, which in its nature is at the same time
especially independent of it. But law is more closely connected
SOCIAL ETHICS 403
with commercial life. It is now proper to look at that sphere
more closely which may be described as society affected by law.
As such it comprehends all that has hitherto been discussed.
It is the sheltering roof covering the many-roomed house of
human society. In order to put in a clear light the verdict of
Christian ethics in the state, we must here set forth, as a pre-
liminary, all that is most essential to its nature.
The Nature of the State.
Nation, Power, Law are the three master-concepts on the
synthesis of which the idea of the state reposes. In order to
reach a right understanding, it will be instructive to examine
these carefully, as a reciprocal series. Nation is a larger
community of men, who are connected by blood-relationship,
language, fixed abodes, customs, interests, and history. These
grounds of connection may operate in very various proportion.
Sometimes the natural and sometimes the historical elements
may be the larger factors. The first of these, the natural
elements, do not suffice for a permanent union ; the latter may
really form a substitute for the former, reconcile great differ-
ence in racial character — at least in a smaller area, and where
there are strong common interests, as, e.g., Switzerland ; whereas
where these are absent and complicated conditions arise in a
larger area like that of Austria-Hungary, when even the most
elaborate attempts at ' equalisation ""^ yield no guarantee of per-
manence. The strongest bond of union is that which specially
arises from intellectual interests in common, national culture.
But we only call that the * state "" which is formed by a national
community under the protection of law. The Grecian people
could not for long periods of their history be called a Grecian
state. We have previously discussed the nature of law as the
generally binding public regulation of all intercourse (p. 136 ff.) ;
that is, it defines the scope to be given to individual activity,
and settles what each must grant to others. If any dispute
1 The well-known word in the politics of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the
' Ausgleich,' which refers to the desire to secure equal treatment in all respects as
between the two parts of the Empire where naturally racial distinction and
jealousies are found. — Tr.
404 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
arise over the question whether the idea of force is implicate in
the concept of law, it is indubitable that in this actual world law
cannot be earned out without force. If law is the lord, it yet
needs for its mastery this servant — force. And in any case the
legalised community which forms a nationality is a state by the
fact that it has the power, the force needed to carry through
the law, and to maintain law and order, with all the interests
involved, intact even against external foes. Sovereignty,
internal and external, belongs therefore to the idea of the
state, so that a confederacy is not in the strict sense of the
word a state. Consequently we may say that a state is a com-
munity of people under the protection of law, armed with the
power of enforcing it, a legally constituted, independent nation.
In this general notion there is room for all sorts of dis-
tinctions, both as to what concerns the range of state-activity
and what has regard to the rights of the individual in relation
to the state ; since in fact the state means the binding together
of many into a unity. The latter is merely an application of
the general question, whether the individual exists for the sake
of the corporate whole or the whole for the individual {if.
Socialism and Individualism, p. 143 ff.). The former view is
known as the absolutist theory of the nature of the state, and
the latter as the liberalist — namely, that the ordering of law is
only a means of securing the greatest possible scope for
individual freedom, while in the former case it is the sole
means for carrying out the state idea, that is to say, the
common ends which are included in that idea. In actual
history, of course, these two theories pass over into one another.
Even where they are found in some degree pure, the ways in
which they are carried out in practice are very various.
Robespierre, in his type, set up the idea of liberty, equality,
fraternity ; Frederick the Second, that of an absolute monarchy.
The other point as to the range of state interference depends on
this. He who regards the state as essentially the servant of the
individual will be jealous for the so-called ' political state,' i.e.
he would confine the state to the functions of determining the
limits of and protecting freedom, which is indispensable so that
as many persons as possible may be able to use their liberty
SOCIAL ETHICS 405
untrammelled. On the opposite side there stands the * social
state,' so called ; i.e. it is the duty of the state of its own
accord, and its positive duty, to advance all the purposes of the
national life as a corporate whole ; consequently to influence,
as a kind of earthly providence, all other spheres of social
activity, adjust all differences, and unite all for a great
collective success. It is not difficult to understand how easily
that ' political state ' may be used by the strong against the
weak, who stand in especial need of legal protection ; how easily
thus the greatest right may become the greatest wrong ; and, on
the other hand, how easy is the temptation for the ' social state'
to encroach on the independence of the various bodies who set
up in opposition to the ideal of civilisation it seeks to further.
This whole notion of the state thus sketched in outline is
itself the product of history. Stages in this prolonged develop-
ment are indicated by such terms as the tribal and race com-
munities, the city as an independent state. Oriental empires,
personal rule, territorial states, pure despotisms, the bureaucratic
state, the modern * political ' and ' social ' states. If after this
glance at the development of the state we touch upon origins,
we find that two methodised concepts important in ethics have
a specially clear application here. Firstly, it is in no way invari-
ably the case that the end to be gained is the motive, or that
the idea of a moral Good is invariably the reason why any
particular form of government arises. A confusion on this
point is the ground on which rests the theory of a ' social con-
tract' so long maintained, even by those who looked at the
subject from opposite standpoints. The theory is that the
recognition of the utility of the regulations of law gave rise to
this agreement, of voluntarily yielding the right of unlimited
individual freedom on the part of these individuals. The truth
is that actual needs of the simplest kind, the right to which was
invaded by the violence of the powerful, really form the ground-
work of the need of an ordered state, and the ' contract ' assumed
really presupposes the existence of these. Secondly, whatever
may be the origin of the state, the dignity which belongs to the
law of the state cannot be lessened by such origin, whatever its
form may have been. In fact, the point as to the validity of
406 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
any truth is quite a different question from the inquiry as to
how it came to possess it, whether gained by process of thought
or as the result of action.
The Meaning of the State.
The significance of the state for the Kingdom of God becomes
clearer when we recollect that the verdict of Christianity in
history has (as to the principle) wavered between the most
extreme opposites. For Hegel the state is the highest ethical
form of society, explicitly the realisation of the ethical ideal.
This view was a revival of the ancient conception of the state
as the ' highest Good,' and indeed went beyond it. For after
the tasks of nations grow wider and deeper, and the idea of
a ' humanity ' gains acceptance, such an estimate of the state
has more to be said for it. In such an estimate expression is
given to the yearning for a full realisation of the Good, particu-
larly in the form which Rothe gave to it — that the perfect
state will be the Kingdom of God on earth. But it is precisely
in this form that the impossibility of the idea is clear. Such an
overestimate of the state necessarily involves underestimation
of the other subordinate social spheres, abridges and narrows their
special value. Art and science as an affair of state lose their
freedom, and hence their ethical value ; and even commercial
intercourse loses its inexhaustible vivacity and its educative
power, which we are bound to recognise in spite of our view
of the attendant dangers and injurious effects. But at the
same time the importance of the state itself, raised to so exalted
a place, is in truth necessarily curtailed. For what is it if it is
not a community under the sanction of law ? But as such it is
impossible for it to accomplish these tasks. For such an end
powers and capacities must be assigned to it which it cannot
employ without itself becoming the fellowship of love as distinct
from law ; in short, a confused, contradictory, and therefore
ineffective form. St Augustine stands almost at the opposite
pole in his judgment. According to him the state arose as the
result of our sinful condition, and is in its nature sinful. The
force and coercion which characterise it are the pure antithesis to
the kingdom of love, the Kingdom of God. It is the kingdom
SOCIAL ETHICS 407
of this world under the prince of darkness, beginning with the
fratricide Cain. The recognised Catholic doctrine is milder
in form. The state has not arisen from sin in its origin ; it
arose as a defence against sin ; it is the human as well as the
divinely designed ' social contract "■ for protection against wrong.
But the state merely ministers to material interests. It is the
Church that represents the highest, the supernatural end. And
we recall what that means in the Roman Catholic view (p. Ill ff.).
Therefore worldly government must act on the prompting of
the Church. To her belong the two swords : only, one is to be
borne by the Church alone, the other by the state on the
Church's behalf. By this theory the state is first of all under-
valued because law is depreciated ; and not only so, but the other
communities too do not get their due, since they are externally
made subject to the Church ; and finally, this over- valuation of
the Church gives up its own idea of its equivalence with the
Kingdom of God, to its own injury. It assigns to itself a part
which it cannot perform without casting its crown away ; its
transcendent ' Good "* becomes in this world scarcely real, and
the Church itself grows worldly.
The sixteenth article of the Confession of Augsburg is directed
chiefly against this under-valuation which the fanatics of the
Reformation period shared in agreement with the Roman Catholic
view. It says " that all magisterial authority in the world is the
good ordinance of God, by God created and established." " The
Gospel does not stumble over worldly government." " Christ's
kingdom is spiritual, and conscience gains obvious solace " from
this doctrine. Now, we must guard, of course, against importing
modern ideas on the nature of the state into such words ; and
especially on the relation of the state to the Church, such as
making them equivalent to the idea of the separation of the
spiritual and the worldly, of Church and state in our sense.
Church and state were then still an unseparated whole; the Chris-
tian society in the holy Roman Empire of the German nation.
The secular authority is a portion of this Christendom, established
by God for the punishment of evil-doers and for the protection
of the good. On the other hand, the clergy too formed a
portion of this kingdom. Both are connected with each other
408 THE ETHICS OP THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
as the hand and the eye, and unitedly represented Christian
authority. Only (as was considered), the action of the ecclesi-
astical and civil authority ought to be separated ; but even the
civil authority has its Christian vocation. Certainly these are
not quite our present ideas of the state. This position may
often seem to us as if it had not quite attained the whole high
level of the saying of St Paul (Rom. xiii. 1), to which the
Reformers always appealed. To the Church of Rome —
which easily enough appeared to early Christendom to be ' great
Babylon ' — St Paul does not write a word of the prudence of un-
questioning obedience, but the word of faith, when he says. All
authority is from God, in its ultimate origin and in its ultimate
purpose, 'for good"" ("He is the minister to thee for good,'^
Rom. xiii. 4). He uses that simple, inexhaustible word ' for
good' which he employs in the same Epistle of the highest
conceivable ' Good,' which is the portion of the children of God
(Rom. viii. 28). Authority ministers to them, is a means for the
highest end, and therefore obedience to it ' for conscience' sake '
is needful, and flows from faith. In faith St Paul looks high
over all that in this world-kingdom must to him, as a Christian,
seem to be evil without parallel ; he sees only God's will, His
creative power and His holy design. All of ungodly civilisation
that is incorporated in this state seems to his eye to disappear
in the reflection that it is the agent of ordered law " for the
punishment of the evil-doer and for the praise of them that do
well." Only let us not forget that this word also of the Apostle
is a clear light on a vast history ; and that each period of this
history must use this light for itself. The like is true of the
words of the Lord Himself. In this case too we r?ust say of
them as of the words of St Paul, that they for the most part
say next to nothing directly of that which we call the state ;
and so far as they do, in the first line it is anything but to its
glorification. St. Matt. xx. 25 emphasises the Kingdom of God
as the antithesis of the ' exercise of lordship,' the force and
violence of earthly rule. Ministering love is so much more than
all law that, above all, the antithesis of law and love must be
insisted on. Hence too that demand, which has so often excited
objection, for the renunciation of one's ' rights.' And even in
SOCIAL ETHICS 409
the saying about the tribute penny (St Matt. xxii. 15), the first
design of it is to warn against confusing divine and earthly
law, and to exalt in its majesty the rightful claim which God
has on His people. But since to " render to God that which
is God's " is something so utterly different, so infinitely higher
than to " render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's " — money
with the " image and superscription " — in this way that which at
first is a refusal turns out to be a recognition of a legal right of
the emperor, and a quiet challenge to the recognition of the
higher law. It is as ever : when that which stands highest gains
its true place, then all other things fall into their right order.
Then we may also point out how Jesus loved His people,
ministered first to them, and was in this matter the teacher of
His greatest Apostle (Rom. ix. 1). And if from this standpoint
we look again at these statements of the Reformers, then the
reference to Rom. xiii. and St Matt. xxii. is an interpretation
and explanation of the original Gospel in and for a new era ;
and if we do not interpret it in the sense of our own present
ideas, it still really is the living and producing cause of our
modern convictions that " Christ's kingdom is a spiritual king-
dom." This saying produced a new idea of the Church as against
the Roman Catholic idea, and from it too there grew up a new
idea of the state. How often has the proposition that we ought
to obey God rather than man (Acts v. 29) been applied to the
Church, which, as a religious community with its system of
jurisprudence, identified itself with God's Kingdom. It was
thought that God was obeyed by refusing obedience to this
Church, the caricature of a true divine state, and by recognising
the secular authority as "the good ordinance of God." The
state as legally ordered in this divinely determined shape was
now entitled to be put on a level with the other ordinances of
God, the family, the Church, and no longer subordinated to the
Church, but to the Kingdom of God only, along with the rest of
the special social spheres. This idea was at first existent merely
as a germ waiting development. Nor is it to be wondered at
if withal — for instance, in the case of Luther himself — other
statements are found which represent secular government as
all "of the earth, earthy," and valueless {cf. his expression.
410 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
"the world as the devil's inn''). But the new idea was a
productive germ.
This Evangelical estimate of the state, therefore, simply
follows from what has been said on the subject of Law. Because
law in its general sense puts into shape that which love itself
requires and is its indispensable prerequisite, the state as a
society existing for the maintenance of rights has a wholly
special dignity in and for itself, such as does not so directly
appertain to the other communities as family. Church, and so
forth. And it has with good reason been pointed out what
importance the state has in this respect in the education of
the moral personality, and how for the sake of this important
end Christian ethics favours the democratic principle, if by this
phrase is meant the independence of public opinion and action,
and not the arid reduction of society to a dead unintellectual
equality. But so far as the state (see above) means a legally
constituted nation having its own special history, that is, with
the civilisation wholly peculiar to itself which it has acquired,
the importance of the state is increased in depth and breadth
by this acquirement. It is not simply a ' political state ' but
also a ' progressive social state.' The sense in which it is such
may be more clearly explained after having settled that its
main duty is concerned with law as a ' political state.' That is,
it is desirable that the state should foster all the ends of
civilisation, since these concern the welfare of the community
at large, and consequently are such as it alone can carry
through. Of this nature plainly are the economic tasks, which
have a far greater range than those of science and art. But
also in this department we must not forget the proper freedom
of the individual ; and, on the other hand, science (for instance
in the school question) has a very general importance for the
corporate whole. Consequently the most serious problems of
every period require a solution in keeping with the needs and
knowledge of the time. Hence it is undoubtedly the case
that just as the principle of democracy is, as above shown, a
truly Christian one, because it is the insistence on the inde-
pendence of the personality, our present reflection shows us
the equally unimpeachable importance of conservatism in state
SOCIAL ETHICS 411
affairs. And in this the question is not as to the incomplete
realisation of this principle, but merely the principle itself.
But how these two principles, the democratic and conservative,
help one another in state affairs — as in truth they have a
common origin — simply appears from the foundation principles
of the nature of morals as they are continually more closely
determined and have become plainer from their manifold
applications — that is, from the principles involved in the
relationship between personality and love.
Yet so much the more plainly does the question force itself
on our attention whether we can speak of a Christian state,
and ought so to speak, and in what sense. Not in the sense
that the interests of the state and that of the Kingdom of God
are identical, or that the state's prime duty is to plant and foster
the growth of Christian faith and Christian love. It neither
can do this nor ought to do these things. In this way its
power for its own task is curtailed. He who will foster
righteousness can only be unrighteous in using force where
no force avails. And the proper work demanded of the
Kingdom of God is injured because the means used for its
accomplishment is contradictory to its true nature. It is
instructive to mark the varied forms in which this feature has
put its stamp on the Christian state. In Constantinople, the
new Rome, an imperial patriarchate ; in the holy Roman
Empire of Germany ; in the state-churchism of Protestant
churches, operative too in Catholic provinces by means of the
territorial law of the Reformation time ; finally, the Romanticist
inclination of the nineteenth century (for instance) to form
Prussia into a Christian state, partly favoured by the irrespons-
ible counsellors in the time of Frederick William the Fourth,
who many a time claimed their own right in the name of
pietism to carry out plans of this description. The imperish-
able service that pietism rendered, as a matter of history, con-
sists in the fact that it earnestly opposed the old state-churchism
because (as it maintained) the Kingdom of God " cometh not
with the outward observation" of secular power. Such a
Christian state as that proposed is in truth unchristian, because
it springs from that self-exaltation of the state above spoken
412 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
of. The state is made ' the highest good ' and identified with
the Kingdom of God, and the obverse side of this is that it
lowers its own position by subjecting itself to the Church, which
thus oversteps its province, and in reality lowers itself as a
Church. And hence the Christian state can assume either the
form of a state-church or a church-state, of a secular ecclesi-
astical domination ; although the latter form has only been
realised in the small papal state, the 'States of the Church,*'
which for impartial historians acquired the fame of the worst-
managed state ever known. The fall of this government has
in the judgment of many Catholics given a fresh impetus to
the Roman Church. As opposed to all these, it is the high
ideal of Protestant ethics, and one to be more and more realised,
that the state is to be Christian in a quite different sense by
its being led on the path of freedom through the power of the
Gospel; and that in legislation, in its judicial functions, in
administration, and in all these spheres both when the questions
at issue concern the most general principles of law and those
which refer to the multiplicity of the problems of civilisation.
And as to all these problems it ever asks what is the cosmic
view which stands at the back of them. An example of the
first of these points is the defence of ' morality,"" which is a task
differing in range and character according as the high plane
of Christian ethics is taken as the starting-point or not. An
example of the second is the way in which our great statesman
laid down as the foundation of the ' social laws ' that legislation
must be in great measure in agreement with Christian ideas.
But as this case shows, the proper way to permeate the state
with Christian principles is through the Christian disposition of
its citizens, as was pointed out at the time of this legistation :
the "state consists, in great majority, of Christians." The
question is, in fact, how far men of light and leading, supported
by the consent of the majority, and even legislating in opposition
to public opinion, may be able to foster Christian principles in
the consciousness of the nation. The goal to be aimed at is
for the state to do perfectly all that it legitimately can do for
the Kingdom of God. By so doing, it at the same time serves
its own end, inasmuch as order based on law gets its roots
SOCIAL ETHICS 418
deeply fixed in the minds of the people — roots which then grow
in the soil of the Christian religion. And if this religion is
represented in the diverse forms exhibited by the Roman and
the Protestant Churches, then we must logically go further and
say : In the sense laid down, the State must not merely be
Christian, but Protestant. Again, this is not as if we meant
it to be inferred that the state ought itself to realise a
Christianity of the Evangelical type, but that it should stand
in a closer relation to it than to any other. For the Evangelical
Church yields in principle (not always actually) to the state
what is the state's without any idea in the background of
dominating over it. The Roman Church finds it a real
necessity to be at war with the state, of course actually — " with
due regard to the times," and with an eye to what is practicable
— in a state of truce. It is therefore absurd for the state, on
the ground of equality and fairness, to treat both alike. Such
equality of treatment is, in fact, inequality, since the relation of
the two Churches to the state is not alike.
While this question of the attitude of the state to the Church
can only be made clear by dwelling upon the latter, when we
come to use the term ' Christian state ' light is cast on two
special points which have long been in debate, the public
observance of Sunday and the question of oaths. The Sunday
question is a complicated one, as it is possible to be among the
most zealous supporters of a Sunday rest day, and yet reject
a common reason for striving for its maintenance — namely,
when the claim is put forward that it is God's command,
whether resting on one of the ten commandments, or to be
traced further back, and founded on its antiquity and majesty
as a primeval ordinance. It has been pointed out, on the
authority of Luther's teaching, that the fourth commandment,
as every single commandment of the Old Testament, has been
abolished for the Christian ; and that the contrary assertion,
although it has a pious ring about it, is in clear contradiction
to the words of the Apostle St Paul, and those of the Lord
Himself. But even if this commandment applied to the Chris-
tian, still the Christian, it is thought, could not as such carry
it out. Nevertheless, there are the most urgent reasons for
414 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
preserving the Sunday rest day. For one thing, the need of
human nature for regular cessation from toil, rendered all the
more necessary by the feverish unrest of modern life ; and for
another thing, the need of opportunity for the cultivation of the
higher mental and spiritual life, and the highest of all, the
religious needs ; a necessity deepened by so much excessive toil
in the service of material interests, in short, the pursuit of gain.
The Christian knows that these needs, created by God and
satisfied by Him, are the ground of the Sabbatic law (St Mark
ii. 22 ff.) ; and although free from the law, he voluntarily sub-
jects himself to it as a blessing. The Christian state too will
provide for these needs, and must, as the source of law, use her
power to this end, since even in a Christian nation only the
protection of the law can secure for the humble and poor, con-
fronted with human selfishness, the blessing of a free Sunday.
We may therefore venture to say that the blessings of the
Sunday rest day have proved their value in regard to the health,
trade, family, life, education, and morality of the nation ; that
the resistance of selfish interests (for instance, in regard to the
servants and employees of railways) grows weaker, if only
slowly ; and even the bogus cry of the ' wearisome English and
American Sunday "" exerts continually less influence. But here
it is especially clear how the best laws of a Christian state
remain inoperative without the active help of all. In some
parts of Germany many curious customs of long-established
use survive which certainly appear to have prejudiced the
Sunday law.
Oaths.
The consideration of the oath, as such, does not merely
include that taken before magisterial authority, though, not
without good reason, the interest of the subject has turned on
this. An oath is the protestation of the truth of a statement
by an appeal to God as witness and judge. This latter is at
least implied in most formulas as, ' So help me God.' A dis-
tinction is made between the oath of asseveration and the pro-
missory oath in the assumption of an office. Now, the command
of our Lord (St Matt. v. 34) seems an absolute one. The
SOCIAL ETHICS 416
words 'not at all' do not allow of a forced interpretation.
Not only is wanton swearing excluded ; not only the pharisaic
and Jesuitical trifling which supposes that the variety of the
words, * neither by the Temple "" nor ' by Jerusalem,' or the
greater or lesser earnestness of the oath uttered, or mental
reservation, could abate one jot of its inviolability ; it is also an
evasion of the clear meaning of the saying to assert that Jesus
cannot intend to forbid all swearing, when in fact the Old
Testament speaks of God's oath, and His oath to the faithful
is gloried in as a sign of the favour of God. But certainly the
fact that Jesus Himself adopted the oath put to Him by the
high priest, "I adjure thee by the living God," demands an
explanation (St Matt. xxvi. 63). This fact has been made a chief
reason for the statement that it is permissible for the Chris-
tian to swear before the magistrate. And certainly the Augsburg
Confession (in Art. 16^), in the same article in which it estab-
lishes the divine right of the magistracy, also affirms that an
oath may be taken by the Christian without sin. (This was
first of all declared in opposition to the fanatics with whom
their mild successors, the Mennonites ^ of to-day, agree.) But
this is no sufficient foundation. The circumstance that in the
Epistles of St Paul there are asseverations, and even attestations
by oath which go far beyond the ' Yea, yea,' ' Nay, nay ' of the
Sermon on the Mount, may help us to find one. Many have
been too easily satisfied with the explanation that these ex-
pressions are a reflection of the Apostle's past life in Judaism ;
while many others have taken reasonable offence at this explana-
tion. St Paul plainly uses such words when he is dealing
with opponents who doubt his veracity, because an oath will
set before them impressively the question of conscience whether
they ought to believe him or not. Thus we may — reverting
to what has been earlier remarked — say, in the form of such
exacting words of the Lord, that Jesus desires to accentuate
the duty of absolute truth on the part of His disciples ; their
^ Sylloge Confessionum, p. 128. Oxford ed.
^ The Mennonites are a sect of Anabaptists, Menno, their originator, was bom
in 1496 in Friesland, The 39th Article of the Church of England is directed
against the same error of Anabaptists, — Tr.
416 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
bare ' yea ' or ' nay ' is to be to them as the most solemn oath.
And we have already seen why the duty of truthfulness has
such dignity (p. 227). But the words 'not at all' have their
obvious limits in the sense that, where the hypothesis fails —
viz. that simple assertion alone is sufficient to induce belief —
an oath may be used. In the kingdom of sin, in a world of
lying, it may consequently become a duty for the Christian
to confirm the truth of an assertion by an oath. But it is
magisterial authority, which is ordained by God for good, that
has, in such a case and for the cause of truth, the especial right
and duty to use this means for this end. In such cases an oath
is, in fact, a work pleasing to God ; it is the imprecatory
corroboration of the truth, a duty to God, a confession, and at
the same time a protest against the falsities of the world. In
this too all ministers to the good of the Christian, and that
which is a necessary evil as the result of sin becomes a means
of honouring God, a benefit to our neighbour, and a deepening
of our own life of faith. From all such sacred use of the oath
not only must all that be kept at a distance which is an injury
to reverence and humility before God {e.g. every word which is
a challenge to God or a cursing of self), but it cannot be denied
that the Christian state demands too many oaths, often almost
as mere conventional usage. The oaths of office, that is, such
as are promissory in their character, aie not for the most part
justifiable. In any case they could and ought to be confined to
quite special cases within a narrowly circumscribed range. For
they must all be explained with the proviso that he who is
guilty of untruth in a detail is not on that account a perjurer.
What value have they then which cannot be attained in some
other way, and indeed with more propriety .? There is a
reflection that goes deeper, which in our present conditions
to-day may be raised against the universal demand for the
oath, even the oath of a witness. A belief in God no longer
exists in wide circles. Where this is the case the oath has
become a meaningless form, the obligation of the oath a con-
tradictory pretence, and for Christian sentiment a dishonour
to the name of God. And it is not simply for declared atheists
that the state ought to consider some substitute. Nor is it to
SOCIAL ETHICS 417
be overlooked how the public well-being might be injured if the
penalties that have hitherto been inflicted for perjury were im-
posed for the breach of the affirmation substituted in the place
of an oath. Of course in such changes the greatest care is
demanded, because they might easily have the accompanying
consequence of awakening suspicion in those in whom inde-
pendent thought is wanting, that generally, even amongst
educated persons, the belief in God was a thing of the past.
The average politician is not always able rightly to estimate
the mental condition of the masses, and hence in such matters
any change had need be carefully made, and in such a way as
to maintain an old custom so long as it has any real justifica-
tion ; that is, in other words, conservative statecraft is much
to be desired in such matters. The limits of such procedure
are also clear, and what is generally and plainly recognisable as
unveracious ought not to be preserved. And to the Christian
sensibility of the present generation acquainted with history,
it is intolerable for the state in any way to present the appear-
ance of acting as if it could of its own self produce an effect on
morality or religion. It rather renders to Christianity a great
service by making it quite clear that there is such a thing as
a region of inner freedom and personal responsibility in which
the majesty of the state has no right of interference. For
law only takes cognisance of that which is obvious to all the
world ; but the state, even as a civilised state of advancing
culture, and when influenced by the Christian spirit, is in its
innermost nature a nation organised under law.
The School
The carrying out of this principle in the schools as a field for
its operation is needful as well as difficult. Every organised
nation with any self-respect will take into its own hands the
education of youth, that is, will care for its own future. The
supreme guidance of education in schools is a matter for the
state, not for the family or the Church ; but for the above-
mentioned reasons not to the state in opposition to, but in
union with, these other portions of society, a union which is
easier to demand than to establish in actual life, and which can
n
418 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
only be approximately realised, as the nature of the case shows,
by continual reform and perpetual conflict. It is confessedly a
perplexing problem to assign the limits of the school in relation
to the family, and one scarcely less so that of its relation to the
Church. {Cf. the section on the Church.)
Patriotism.
It is only in relation to the state that patriotism is a duty
and a virtue when we have learnt to appreciate its true character
and ethical value for the Kingdom of God. It is something
different from, and greater than, love of home which depends
merely on nature, and belongs to the narrowest sphere. It
involves something different from, and greater than that sense
of the value of law which fails in possessing the living power of
self-sacrifice on behalf of some particular nation with its special
character and past history. The cosmopolitan may have this
juridical sense, but he has no sympathy with the proper genius
and peculiar task of his nation ; he does not understand that
the corporate whole of humanity is intended to consist of single
special members of the body, or the certain fact that according
to the Christian faith each separate part of this whole is designed
by the will of God as a means for giving its special impress to
morality. But it is at the same time unchristian to strain love
of country so far as to limit the idea of the Kingdom of God
into which all nations are called. And the history also of our
own day shows that there is only one certain remedy against a
barren cosmopolitanism, as against a hollow national self-conceit,
and that is the faith that in Christ there is neither Jew nor
Greek nor barbarian (Gal. iii. 28) ; that the Christian's highest
citizenship is 'in heaven' (Heb. xi. 16); that in any and every
case of conflict he must for its sake renounce the merely earthly ;
but that nevertheless all these racial distinctions — as the early
Church shows in its history — have in their specialities a value
for the Kingdom of God {cf. Ep. to Romans). In the absence
of this faith, the words patriotism and humanity become even
among Christians mere phrases frequently used in curious inter-
change ; certain as it is that in the main the movement in the
direction of the national state idea has given its impress and
SOCIAL ETHICS 419
importance to the nineteenth century. But how we are to
prove our Christian patriotism is made clearer without entering
into minutiae by devoting some attention to some aspects of our
life in the state, which will at the same time serve to bring its
character and value into light.
Some Aspects of State Life.
Private Rights.
These aspects are marked out by calling to mind the usual
method of division of law. Law as it relates to private persons
regulates the relation of individuals to others, in the various
conditions of human intercourse and trade {e.g. the laws of
property, marriage-laws, and the law of inheritance), and secures
to each his share of freedom, and determines the amount of
respect each must give to that of others. In a Christian nation
it is influenced by Christian morality not only as regards the
most general principles, but often down to minute details. It
has been boasted of our new civil law procedure that it pays
some serious attention to the idea of creating healthy conditions
for the labouring classes with entire conscientiousness ; of making
laws not for the capable but for the poor and weak, of whom
it is easy to take a wrong advantage ; of securing confidence in
the administration of justice and insisting on its conscientious
administration. But even single legislative acts like those which
guarantee greater personal independence — for instance, that
relating to the female worker who is married to a spendthrift
husband — are due to the quiet operation of Christian ideas on
this respect that ought to be shown to woman.
T^e Rights of the State.
Public laws which secure the common ends of a nation are
distinguished from the laws relating to private persons. If
public laws fall into the divisions : state law, ecclesiastical law,
penal law, it is clear that this brings together things plainly
different. Reflection on these again deepens our conviction of
the greatness of the state's task. Penal law determines how
the state is to preserve the regulations of law in the case of
420 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
infringements of rights. Constitutional law, or state law as
regulative of the form of government, is the foundation of all law.
It was from this point we started — that the state is the nation
armed with power, a legally ordered community. Consequently
it must be definitely settled who is to use this power, and in
what degree the authorities of the state are to take their share
in its use. In the absence of a settled arrangement, the state
is like the house divided against itself which cannot stand. And
from these directly follow the two supreme principles — firstly,
that the government should be independent, and as much as
possible free from party pressure, because otherwise it is not
state government ; secondly, that those who belong to the state
should have their share in it as far as possible according to
their importance, since otherwise, without the support which
rests on the will of all, there is no security for permanence. It
is obvious that these two propositions can easily fall into con-
tradictories ; so much the more is their union an ideal the
realisation of which must be sought in ever new and fuller form.
But what form of state this union will most completely guarantee
no single proposition is capable of expressing; certainly none
that may be claimed as constituting the only Christian form.
The special genius and history of a nation will settle this. This
much may be said — that the well-known three forms which
Aristotle distinguishes — the monarchical, the aristocratic, the
democratic — nowhere occur in pure form in actual history ; and
further, that such occurrence in pure form could only be
regarded as a misfortune, as in fact Aristotle himself points out
in the three caricatures of these respective forms. Some sort of
commixture of these three chief forms is, in the varied compli-
cated conditions which obtain, an intrinsic necessity. This
follows from the two fundamental needs of the social state as
laid down — the independence of the government and the
participation of all. In particular a monarchy ' by the grace of
God ■" that has no strong roots in the intelligent participation in
the government by a free people, or a republic without a strong
executive, is intolerable to highly developed nations and un-
enduring. Germans rejoice that the idea of the monarchy which
doctrinaire philosophers would only permit as intrinsically
SOCIAL ETHICS 421 -
justifiable for the beginnings of civilisation has gained a deep
hold on their affections, and gained new energy in the soil of
the new Empire : especially at a time which cannot dispense
with leaders who stand above all the interested groups in the
struggle for the reconciliation of economic and industrial
interests.
Obedience.
Over against authority, whatever form it may take, stands
obedience as the duty of the Christian. The security of law
and order is so great a good that even great anomalies in
details are of much less consequence than the destruction of
that security ; and the Christian who has the conviction of the
divine origin and purpose of law has an unequalled incentive
and motive force to such obedience, and in that obedience
he finds his freedom. Only it is obvious enough that,
directly the state has a fixed constitution, all parties are alike
pledged to obedience to it, each according to the degree pre-
scribed to him by the state, but to all alike absolute in its
claim ; for example, king, the representatives of the people,
civil officers, citizens, and so forth : " Faithfulness in return
for faithfulness."
But in this a serious problem is involved, which must be
closely attended to, because otherwise its solution — when some
such single point such as the right or wrong of revolution
arises — can only be incomplete. I^aw, in spite of its majesty,
often insisted on, is certainly only a means to the highest end —
even constitutional law. Consequently its reform in accordance
with the needs of a nation undergoing development is a moral
duty, otherwise " statute and law are handed down like some
hereditary disease." The obedience of the Christian, there-
fore, precisely because in its deepest grounds it is obedience to
God, cannot be a blind obedience. The Christian desires to
serve God^s will, as the " good, acceptable and perfect will of
God." Hence he is not only pledged in the case of clear con-
flict to obey God rather than man (if, that is to say, the
question at issue is really one of obeying God, and not possibly
His supposed representatives), but also, so far as it is his
422 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
personal duty, to strive that law may be always in accord with
the highest end. Now, this his labour must of course concern
itself, as its very first duty, with the content of civic law, as well
as of penal law, and seek its continuous reform according to the
needs of the day. But the reforming spirit will quietly extend
its operations according to circumstances to constitutional law as
well. Are not the most essential reforms wrecked at one time
by the opposition of the Crown, and at another by the parlia-
mentary representatives of the people ? Ought not both parties
to feel it their duty to be careful in such cases ? If anyone
were to affirm that the Christian need not trouble himself about
these questions because in the decisive passage, Rom. xiii. 1,
there is no reference to them, he would forget that for the
Christians in the Roman Empire no such influence as is here
supposed could possibly be exerted. For the authorities of a
Christian state it follows at once of necessity from the meaning
of that apostolical injunction of " obedience for conscience'
sake," that it is the individual duty to further the general
good in special conditions. And at least, too, the supreme
principle of Christian conduct in any given condition is not
difficult to deduce from that injunction. It is this — the right
and the duty of reform are implied in the existing constitu-
tion of a state. The English Parliament of 1640 had other
rights and duties than the representative assembly of the
French nation in 1789 ; Zwinglius other duties than Luther
in Wittenberg.
Every honest battle for the right on ground of law can
therefore be better defended from the Christian standpoint
than from any other. The necessity of steady progress in a
living, legally ordered society is intelligible to the Christian
from the very nature of what right and law mean. Of course
which side he shall take, his gifts, education, and the occasion
point out to him what his ' calling "" is in each case ; on such
a matter in the complexity of affairs only his own conscience
can decide on the whole as in each single instance. Further,
charity in judgment of others, confronted with such hard
questions for decision, is a supreme Christian duty. Luther, on
the groimd of conscientious scruple, declined to favour the far-
SOCIAL ETHICS 423
reaching plans of a Protestant alliance. Much that is to the
point might be said how such limitation of efforts to the
power of the word of God alone preserved the purity of the
German Reformation movement. Still, the fearful horrors of
the counter-Reformation may, according to human judgment, be
regarded as no less one of the cohsequences of this limitation.
Were the people of Zurich and Geneva to blame if they, of
different temperament, education, and differently situated, de-
cided differently from Luther ? Do not the Lutheran churches
profit in part from these different resolves of these men ? But
also, has not Germany, in spite of all this "political mistake of
Luther's,"" remained in an especial way a " house of defence "" for
the Gospel .?
Revolution.
Revolution is not a battle for constitutional reform but for
the destruction of the state constitution. On this subject a
glance at history shows us how uncertain may be the boundary-
line between legitimate conflict and revolution ; because the
boundary-lines of right are frequently indeterminate, e.g. as
between the Emperor and the German states at the time of the
Reformation. Think of the plans of Philip of Hesse ! Con-
sequently, in order to see what is undoubted revolution, in the
strict sense of the word, we must distinguish more clearly than
is often done two points of view — firstly, the Christian ethical
judgment on the importance which a revolution may have for
the history of a nation and for humanity at large ; and
secondly, the Christian moral judgment on the author of such
revolution. As far as the first is concerned, the evils and
horrors of many revolutions are patent to all, as well as their
momentous after-effects at large and in detail. It is clear too
that the nations who have reformed themselves have great
advantage over those who have gained their ends by revolution.
But no one denies, on the other hand, the dreadful conditions
of social misery which forced on the revolution of 1789, or the
beneficial results of that revolution, without which even its
strongest opponents are unable to imagine what the life of the
present day would be. These are facts, and the Christian will
consider them in the light of Rom. xi. 33, i.e. they will be a
424 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
means for the strengthening of his faith that God rules all
things according to the counsel of His will, and that even
revolution may be " an envoy of order,*" " a bit of the great
battle between truth and sham," " a true though terrible apoca-
lypse for a vicious age." ^
As far as regards a Christian ethical judgment on the author
of a revolution, it has already been suggested to us by our
reflections on our duty in relation to the law, which here finds a
weighty application. Revolution is, by reason of the fully
acknowledged value of legal administration as a foundation of
moral order, absolutely reprehensible, save when the breach with
law and order is made in full consciousness of responsibility,
and with the clear conviction that the administration of law
has become a hindrance to moral order instead of a help, and
so on this account must be broken down. This must be done
in full readiness for personal sacrifice (p. 226). In this case
Carlyle's word becomes true, that "Revolution is better than
resignation."' But the Christian, who has such a choice set
before him, will with especial sincerity seek to know the will of
God, and conjoin with this a particularly strong feeling of the
limitations of human insight, before he will feel in a position to
decide whether any break with constituted law is ethically
justifiable; and he will recognise how doubtful the collabora-
tors are on whom he can calculate to carry out such a
resolution. The Christian knows that he is free from any
temptation to 'play Providence.' Our great statesman, who
candidly carried out such a revolution as morally necessary,
uttered an impressive warning on this point. In short, the
Christian has no need to fear superficial and scornffl criticism
of * patient obedience ' ; nor will he permit himself to be driven
by this scorn from his own high standard. How little Christian
ethics j udges according to partisan feeling is clear from all that
has been said. In the strictly logical sense of the word,
Revolution is not, as a matter of fact, confined to any individual
tendency or party, nor to those who are called ' subjects.'
There may be a revolution from above as well as from below, to
which the same ethical judgment is applicable.
^ Carlyle.
SOCIAL ETHICS 425
The Right of Punishment.
Whereas in regard to constitutional law we have been
occupied with the special points whether there is any particular
form of constitution that may be considered the best, and
whether there are any circumstances in which revolution in lieu
of progressive reform may be justified, in regard to the right
of punishment the question which stands in the forefront is as
to the ethical nature of punishment. Put more specifically, the
point at issue is as to the meaning and purpose of punish-
ment, for it is already clear that it is felt to be in itself an
evil, as an impairment of right. On this matter we recall, in
passing, the fact that here too origin and validity are not in the
same category. Suppose, if you like, that punishment is a slow
development from blood-feud, requiring discharge, etc., this does
not bring suspicion on its ethical importance. Therefore, what
is its end ? It is certain that in a morally trained community
punishment will have an educative effect ; but to designate
reformation as the proper purpose of punishment inflicted by
the state is a contradiction in itself ; for the state is essentially
a juridical community. And punishment is certainly not
revenge taken by society as a whole. It is also something
different from self-defence, for this term only has meaning apart
from law. Nor can punishment be considered to be reparation
or indemnification for injury inflicted ; evidently not, as this is
true only in the very smallest number of instances. Finally,
there is no doubt that it serves as a deterrent ; but this is a
poor way of putting it, if this is conceived to be the purpose
of punishment. The real core of the matter plainly is that
punishment is for preventing infraction of the law. But
then this may be more definitely put by saying that punish-
ment is penal deprivation of some right, ordained by the
representatives of law, with the design of upholding the ad-
ministration of the law and preserving the state. But this
notion, this view of punishment as means of the self-preserva-
tion of the state, as the protection of society, appears far too
objective. This view, it is said, gives a utilitarian and merely
empirical reason which does not adequately express the ' majesty
426 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
of punishment."' It is said that it is firmly fixed as with
grappling irons to the eternal idea of retribution. It is not
merely means for an earthly end, as the preservation of the
state, but its purpose resides in itself Punishment is to be
administered not in order that there may be no infraction of
the law, but because it has been broken. Punishment, they
fiu-ther say, is atonement, and its measure is not objective
justice, but the subjective equivalence of punishment to the
misdemeanour.
In reality Christian ethics knows no ' either ' — ' or ' between
this so-called sociological, modern juridical view of punishment
as a state preservative and the other so-called ' exemplary theory,"*
or as between the (inaccurately named) ' educative theory "* and
the ' compensation theory."" If the relation between law and
morality has been rightly defined, then the retributive theory,
which is, at any rate, the only one clear and convincing, acquires
a deeper significance by means of the others, and it certainly
avoids their artificiality. If legal right is a necessary unfolding
of ethical right, and even if nothing more, certain though it
may be that it may have a plenary j ustification in the need of
maintaining the administration of law, it has its final reason in
the inviolability of the moral law, though only in the last
resort. So far, then, it may be really maintained that the right
of punishment gains its supreme sanction through Christian
moral conviction ; and it is clear that the progress of Chris-
tian morality in a nation will have an essential influence on
its penal laws, both as regards the various deeds which are
liable to punishment and as to the mode of punishment — this
latter up to the point of its actual infliction — which must
be punishment, not torture. Both in regard to the first and
the second of these points the influence of Christian morality
will be felt, so that the crime itself will not be looked at
as an isolated fact, but the criminal valued as a complete
personality. And then penal laws will become a great
educative means, the content of which really forms a part of
' objective morality.' Rightly, therefore, has it been pointed
out that the value of this aspect of the modern theory of
punishment was recognised long before the victorious attack
SOCIAL ETHICS 427
on the world of criminal jurisprudence b_y Wichern,^ the
father of 'the Inner Mission.""
Capital Punishment,
With these thoughts in our minds we may be able to discuss
without passion the much-disputed question of capital punish-
ment. The fact that there are friends and foes of capital
punishment among both philosophical and theological moralists,
who are curiously divided on the question, prevents it from
becoming a matter of faith, whatever our judgment may be.
Some have demanded and striven for the maintenance of
capital punishment in the name of the welfare of the state.
But from the standpoint of the justification of punishment
above touched on as arising from the idea of recompense, while
Kant favours it, Fichte is against it. Theologians, too, have
decidedly opposed capital punishment in the name of Christianity;
particularly by an appeal to the Holy Scriptures. That it is
assumed in them (Rom. xiii. 1 ff.) is just as undoubted as that
the proof can scarcely be held to be sufficient that it is a principle
of Christianity. Of the passage, " Whoso sheddeth man's blood,
etc."" (Gen. ix. 6), the same thing is true as was quoted above
from Luther in regard to another isolated Old Testament com-
mandment. Some think that it appears from the nature of the
Gospel to be dispensable ; nay, that it is even unworthy ; for in
capital punishment the Christian society assumes to itself the
right of placing the murderer beyond the pale of its own influence,
and invades the prerogative of the Divine Majesty. But it is
not characteristic of a living faith in God to think so highly of
the earthly Christian society as to suppose that, apart from it,
the victim is altogether lost ; quite irrespective of the fact that
the murderer has often been more seriously influenced by the
thought of .the proximity of death than the prisoner subject to
life imprisonment, the fear of which is easily dulled. On the
other hand, the advocates of capital punishment are unable
to derive a plea for it from the nature of the Christian religion.
1 Wichern, J. H., born 1808. The name ' Inner Mission' originated with him.
His great work was in ' reformatory institutions ' and other activities of this
description, — Tr.
428 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
In any case the question is chiefly a practical one, as to
whether the state may safely dispense with it. This question
leads on one side into technical considerations which lie out-
side the limits of our subject; and besides, for the present
time the subject is simplified by the anarchist propaganda.
As far as the principle is concerned it must be answered in
the negative, as long as it cannot be made clear how the criminal
condemned to lifelong hard labour on account of murder is to
be restrained from a fresh murder. We may also go a step
further. If punishment generally has its final basis in the
inviolability of the moral law, then it appears to be right that
the man who, so far as in him lies, has destroyed the foundation
of all legally ordered common life should be made to forfeit the
possibility of a further part in it. That is only the consequence
of his own act. For this view the personal feeling of the
criminal himself may, as is well known, be cited ; death appears
to him the only proper atonement he can make. And it is
possible that the above-cited passages of Scripture may be
understood in this way. Under all the circumstances (as the
earnest opponents of capital punishment themselves admit), it
is needful to do battle against all the mere " sentimentality of
an affected humanitarianism."
Personal Responsibility.
In treating of the subject of capital punishment Christian
ethics cannot pass over without notice the lively discussions of
the present day which arose at the same time as the debate on
the ' End "" of punishment. This is the question of how far men
are accountable for their actions in the way accoun Lability has
been generally defined, and in the statute-book itself. This defini-
tion assumes the idea of the freedom of the will, so that personal
responsibility is presupposed, except where some mental malady
has so disturbed the normal consciousness that the resolves of
the will are no longer free, and this can be proved to be the
case. But instead of this, others now say there should be know-
ledge of the consequences of the action, or better — since such
knowledge assigns too much to intellectual apprehension and
denies the unity of the psychical life — there should be present
SOCIAL ETHICS 429
the normal power of the will as ordinarily moved by mental
presentation ; in other words, the criminal must have the mental
presentation of the punishment and the conception of it before
him, if he is to be regarded as in possession of full responsibility,
and is to be subject to punishment. Christian ethics can only
take up the position, in regard to these important discussions,
that has already been laid down and justified in the doctrine of
the freedom of the will (p. 76). Christian ethics has no
reason for asserting that such a theory must, so far as it is
concerned, injure the state or generally alter in any essential
respect the external form of human life ; but it will not allow
that the reason and meaning of all human conduct would remain
the same in the absence of the feeling of the personal responsi-
bility which is an inseparable adjunct of freedom.
Thus here the same must be said as above on the End of
punishment. Only, no hasty : ' This is Christian — that is
heathenish."* The first impression made by the assertion that
the retributive theory of punishment represented the idea of
the moral order of the world with essentially more clearness,
pureness, and depth, should not prevent us from recognising the
truth that is contained in the idea of educative punishment. It
is precisely the recognition of this truth that would lead us more
assuredly to emphasise this thought. Meanwhile, the idea of
retributive punishment is by many of its supporters grounded
partly on a reason much too objective, and in the final resort
contradictory, namely, as is asserted, on experience itself (since
Kanfs hypothesis can no longer be regarded as admitted by
all) ; partly on a reason which is not accordant with the Chris-
tian concept of God, as if retribution were its innermost
nature. Similarly is it here with the question of freedom.
The new sociological theory has often, especially at first, been
identified in quite a superficial way with the denial of personal
responsibility and associated with unproved and unprovable
naturalism {cf. I^ombroso's Bom Criminal^ and on the con-
trary Aschaffenberg). More and more often has the question
of the freedom of the will as a matter of personal conviction
been separated from discussions on the penal laws, so that there
are both friends and foes of personal freedom among the
480 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
supporters of that modern notion of criminal responsibility
above mentioned. But still more with the energetic demand
not to punish the crime but the criminal, so far as it is possible
to human insight, and in punishing to reform (see above). The
new school has brought into prominence claims of Christian
ethics too long forgotten. And when it looks upon criminals
as * wounds in the social organism,' it provides new material for
Christian reflection on the ' kingdom of sin,"* even if that is done
unconsciously and even often unwillingly.
IlO^RNATIONAL LaW.
War,
As a counterpart to the right of punishment within the state
there is that of the relation of states to each other, the question
of war. But inasmuch as war certainly is the last resource of a
state in maintaining its rights in relation to other states, and
that by an interruption of legally ordered intercourse, war
throws light on the difference between international law and
that law which internally regulates a state. In the single state,
law prevails because it is one with the power which is a connota-
tive mark of a state. But with regard to other states there
is no such power for carrying out the rights of nations, or main-
taining its own order by the impairment of the rights of other
nations, as in the case of the infliction of personal punishment.
Moreover, the association of nations in legally regulated inter-
course was a task which, under the promptings of utility and
strengthened by the power of sympathy, was undertaken quite
independently of Christianity. But the whole r.?nge of this
task was first of all recognised in the idea of the Kingdom of
God (Gal. iii. 28), and felt to be one that must be undertaken.
Of course, even in the Christian world international law has only
gradually been evolved ; limited in its range, and uncertain in
its operation. But a glance at history convinces us that it
would be unjust and ungrateful to depreciate the value of what
has been gained. The inclination to do this is intelligible from
the fact that all the progress made in international law has not
been able to eliminate war, its contradictory. And who is there
SOCIAL ETHICS 431
who would not share the yearning of the friends of peace that
international courts could decide not merely the insignificant
but also the serious matters of differences between nations ?
But the complete powerlessness to which, in the sight of all the
world, an arbitration court set up with a solemnity never before
heard of, at the close of the nineteenth century, was doomed, by
the outbreak immediately afterwards of the South African war,
and afterwai'ds of the war between Japan and Russia, clearly
enough illustrates the error in the calculations of the value of
such settlements. That war is antagonistic to the Kingdom of
God, " which is righteousness, peace, and joy,'' is shown even in
the Old Testament prophecy of the transformation of "the
sword into a ploughshare and the spear into a pruning-hook " ;
that war arises from sinfulness — Evangelical ethics has no
need to dwell upon such truths. The question needs to be
brought to this test : — Is it proper under the earthly conditions
of this world of sin for Christians to serve in war and for
Christian rulers to engage in war ? The affirmative of the
Augsburg Confession (Art. 16),^ unaccompanied by any limiting
clause, suffices to justify it, in which the clearness of the distinc-
tion between real war and litigation is remarkable, while both
regarded as justifiable. Not merely ought the conscience of the
individual Christian to be assured, and not his conscience, so to
say, included — in an unevangelical way — in that of the ruling
authorities (however certain it is that each ought to feel that
the duty of military service is embraced in the idea of his
obedience to those authorities), but also the decisive question
whether war is justifiable under certain circumstances ought to
be set clearly before us. This question is to be answered in the
affirmative, because the state itself is part of God's good
order — that is, specifically, inasmuch as the true ' Good,' com-
pletely ethical love, cannot be realised in the Kingdom
of God in its earthly progress save on the assumption
that there is such a thing as ' right ' and law, and that this
is part of the unimpeachable ordering of the state. If the
Christian may consciously will the existence of a state for
^ P. 175, Sylloge Confessionutn — " jure bellare, militare. " Cf. the Articles of
the Church of England (No. xxxvii.), — Tr,
432 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN IJFE
the sake of the Kingdom of God, then he must along with
this, as means for the Kingdom of God, will the means for the
preservation of the state. There is no such thing as the power
of penal law over other states ; the only means a state has for
maintaining its own rights is by war, the last resource for its
own protection, since the right of legal punishment is confined
within the limits of each state. The friends of peace at any
price say that such a proposition sanctions the Jesuitical
principle that ' the end sanctifies the means,' or more accurately,
if the end is allowable, the means are allowable. We showed
earlier that this principle is not unchristian (if we leave the
loose word 'allowable' aside {cf. p. 241)); but its Jesuitical
application is inadmissible. A nation to which the preservation
of the individual life is of higher importance than the future
of the whole is no fit agent of the Kingdom of God, which puts
to each individual questions as to the value of his own personal
life. And even the undeniable moral mischiefs of war are less
than that involved in endangering the foundation of the highest
Good, which consists in the training power of a legally ordered
state. If, in this question, anyone should appeal to the words
of the Sermon on the Mount, then what has been previously
said is applicable here. Its explanations of the absolute com-
mand of love are only apprehended and carried out in their
entirety by him who asks how he ought to apply them in any
single case (p. 209). At the same time, all is contained in
them that is always properly insisted on by those who accept
the proposition of the Augsburg Confession for conscience' sake,
and not merely that they may find excuse for the sad fact of
war ; namely, that war can only be justifiable as the very last
means for the settlement of a national disagreement. The final
decision is in every separate case a difficult duty for the rulers
of a nation ; on which point what has been said on the question
of conflict of duties (p. 223) may be referred to. In general, it
can simply be said that the only thing that justifies war is when
the honour and liberty of a nation are at stake ; not vain
desire of conquest, and certainly not the extension of the
Christian religion. But it is morally indifferent who overtly
begins the war ; to anticipate the inevitable is the duty of a
SOCIAL ETHICS 433
statesman ; the law of the country, right or wrong, really
settles this point. Then, while war itself is between foes, yet,
so far as the purpose of war is not imperilled, the command of
love to our neighbour is to be obeyed, and history has some
pathetic examples of its applicability. The moral effects are
various, according to the character of the nation and its previous
condition, and according to the duration and course of the
war ; various, too, as regards individuals. And first and last —
the purpose of war is peace. Let us conclude with I^uther's
saying : " A good physician, when the malady is so serious and
bad that he must destroy hand or ear or foot in order to save
the body, appears to be a cruel man," and, " To kill a little while
is better than without end."
Politics.
Similar difficulties arise at times in the department of politics.
For forming a judgment on politics the same principle points
the way, i.e. the right estimate of the state in its relation to
the Kingdom of God. Even in a state of peace international
relations, even of nations most closely connected, are nearly
always a battle of opposing interests. Doubly so when new
and energetic nations assert themselves in the arena of history,
or old nations develop new powers. Then, provided those
nations desire to show themselves Christians, along with their
privileges grow their duties. The German nation stands in
the midst of the tasks presented to the ' greater Germany.' Is
it right for Europeans to push out into various parts of the
world, and drive out their savage or civilised inhabitants ?
And if self-preservation demands it, and the higher civilisation
fostered justifies it, under what conditions ? Surely only if the
African is taught to work ; higher ideals brought to the Chinese,
with the destruction of their self-complacent dreaminess ; and
the best is brought to both, the Gospel ; and if, above all, the
country does not itself sink down to the lower level of civilisa-
tion of past times. And at home we must not grudge our best
powers even when, as has long been the case in missionary
operations, it is only by serious sacrifice that a foundation for
the future can be laid ; and we must foster our connection with
28
434 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
the pioneers of this future, in all departments, even as a Church.
A manifold and hard task, but an undeniable duty. No mere
talk about historical development can dispense from it, nor any
criticism of the faults of other nations.
On the field of internal politics the question of revolution
has been discussed above in connection with state law. But
national politics are generally not less disturbed by ethical
difficulties than international. Is it right to say that it is
mostly merely a battle for power ; a struggle of various classes
and conditions of men in the nation for the extension of their
own rights ? and far from being a battle of ethical ideals ? It
is true that in academical discussion the truth is underestimated
that politics is never anything else but a struggle of forces.
But that 'but' does not correspond to the whole reality. Even
the strongest upholders of that statement must allow that each
single person can wage the warfare ethically or unethically, and
ought to carry it on without barbarism or malice. This would
have no meaning unless the battle were somehow a struggle for
righteousness. Of course ethical ideas will be victorious in the
battle with natural forces only by making these forces sub-
servient to its ends ; but even all the most powerful instincts
can produce no permanent results, if they will not submit
to a leading of these ideas. This may be said to be the teaching
of history, unless we are to regard ethical ideas themselves as
merely the reactions of the wills of the oppressed, as weapons
in the battle with force — that is, unless the moral is to be
altogether denied, and we are to turn to the ' devaluation of
all values' {cf. p. 25). Where this does not happen, it
will be considered a matter for special congratulation that the
greatest of practical statesmen, in contrast to the Macchia-
vellian ideal (the union of the lion and the fox), has with
special impressiveness given his testimony to the importance of
moral imponderables generally, and the ideas of Christian ethics
in particular. In short, the idea widely diffused of late that
the Christian theory is not adequate to settle every question in
human life is conceivable enough under the pressure of modem
problems (over-population, colonisation, conflict of industrial
interests, fleets), but only ethically justifiable as an incentive to
SOCIAL ETHICS 486
overcome the difficulties, and as the most urgent cry — Upwards !
and so forwards !
The Church.
It is only in Christian ethics that the religious community
has such independence alongside the domestic life, society,
industrial life, art and science, law, that it may find its place
at the conclusion of social ethics. Everywhere else this position
is assigned to the state or, perhaps, to socialism, in its theory
of the industrial problem. In Christian ethics the Church is
given the position of a form of society intended to minister
directly to the highest end, the Kingdom of God. But if
conscious Christian conviction itself has denied that the Church
in its transcendent value is properly employable as a means
for the whole social development, then this is a call to us to
define the nature of the Church in the simplest possible way,
so that judgment on this point may not be prejudiced.
The Nature of the Church.
The religious life, like all psychical life, seeks for utterance.
It cannot exist alone, but will share itself with others. The in-
stinct to express our own inner life to others may be selfish ; we
heighten our own self-respect. All such self-disclosure is moral
when others may be enriched by it. This in its higher stages
is the pressure of the Christian life to find expression. It is blest
in having its own sanctuary ; in being alone with God, who —
Himself a Spirit, eternal personal love — raises the created spirit
into loving fellowship with Himself; but as a child of God in
the Kingdom of God. To be alone with God in a way which
excludes others from God would not be fellowship with God
who is love. Gratitude for God\s love, joy in God, expresses
itself for God's honour and our neighbours' benefit ; otherwise
it would not be to the praise and glory of God, who is love.
Therefore the spiritual life of the Christian is constrained to
fellowship. "Each tells another that he lives." And this
fellowship in mutual religious influence and reciprocated
benefits is the Church. More precisely, this is the ethical
meaning of the word Church. The dogmatic meaning of the
436 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
Church is that it is the fellowship of the faithful called into
existence by the Spirit of God through His Gospel. We
believe that " God*'s Word cannot be without God's people,"
that the Word always produces faith, and that " God''s people
cannot be without God''s Word"" (Luther); but there is con-
tinually in this Word the power of faith and so of life. In
short, in dogmatics the Church is the communion of the faith-
ful, and so that their faith is the work of God and the instru-
ment of God ; in ethics it is the communion of faithful men in
such a way that their faith is regarded as of their own act.
This is no contradiction, provided that what has been said of
the working of the divine on the human will is right. It is
precisely thus, and by this means, that the fellowship of the
faithful is God's work and instrument, because it suffers itself
to be made God's work and instrument. But the two significa-
tions of the term Church must be distinguished, if in all that
follows we are to avoid obscurity in every direction by con-
founding them. The German is apt too easily to think of the
word Church and of the Church in its ethical sense, and indeed
for the most part of an idea of the Church still more secondary
— if he does not in the end think merely of the parson and the
church buildings — and consequently fails to comprehend how
in the Creed it can be called ' the Holy Catholic Church.'
Some destroy the consolation of this article, and only too
easily put their confidence, in a false way, in the Church as it
presents itself in human self-activity, or even merely in the
forms of law. Therefore even Luther stumbled at the word
' Church,' and preferred to speak of a ' holy Christian people ' ;
' of Christendom ' ; of ' the flock ' of those who hearken to the
voice of the Good Shepherd. But as anyhow that meaning of
the word is firmly embedded in the Creed, we must be content
with drawing attention to the ever-recurring danger of con-
founding the two meanings.
The Church as a Special Organisation.
Nevertheless, have we not been too hasty in asserting that the
undeniable promptings of the religious life to give itself ex-
pression is the sufficient reason for a special religious community.
SOCIAL ETHICS 487
the Church in the ethical sense of the term ? May not that
prompting be just as well, or better, satisfied if it find expres-
sion in other social spheres ? And the present question is not
that the Church has in course of time given up to others a
number of the useful activities with which it at one time
occupied itself — sometimes because it must, at other times of its
own initiative ; as, for instance, questions of jurisprudence to the
state, as well as the care of the school and of the poor ; but the
question really is whether, since the influence of Christianity
on the spirit of the nation is increasing, religion cannot
sufficiently display itself in its conduct in worldly spheres,
and perhaps with more depth and purity ? An unbiassed con-
sideration of a danger which is not merely incidentally but
necessarily implicated in any specialised advocacy of religious
interests — that is to say, the danger of materialisation and
secularisation — may easily incline us to answer the question
affirmatively. This is easier for the consciousness of the
present generation than many friends of the Church will credit,
when without more ado they consider aloofness from the Church
equivalent to estrangement from Christianity itself. Those who
would shirk the seriousness of this question must have forgotten
the attitude our Lord took to His Church, in that His severest
woes were not on the world but on those who were by their
vocation the defenders of the religion of the day. For instance,
an attractive picture may be drawn of the power of the Gospel in
the confidential circle of the family and in friendship, and an
inspiring description painted how in the social circles of a
common calling there may be the common care for religious
interests ; how religion may be constituted into a bond of
fellowship governing all, and having the real and simple tone of
true piety. And yet the question is to be answered in the
negative. The greatest advocates of the proposition of Rothe
that the Church, although indispensable at the commencement,
and even during long eras of development, ought to recognise
that its greatest work is to make itself unnecessary, to work
downwards into other social forms, and train them in its spirit,
have never been able to dispose of the objection that, so long
as resistance to the Kingdom of God exists, only a special
438 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
organisation is in a position to give proper expression to the
Gospel of this Kingdom for each generation ; to bring itself to
bear on all the spheres of human life ; to offer itself for full
acceptance by all, for all their duties ; to secure unimpaired
transmission from one generation to another. In regard to its
character and origin the Kingdom of God in its strictest meaning
is not of this world, certain though it be that its taslc is the
subj ugation of the world. If the Church is not to be secularised,
then its witness must assert itself consciously and designedly as
the witness of God's eternal counsel of love, and of the revela-
tion of Himself in time. The Church, therefore, is the
organisation which exclusively exists for the Kingdom of God ;
the most necessary and most direct means for its highest End.
In this lies its dignity, and in this too its danger. It stands
nearest to the throne, and therefore it is pledged to remain the
farthest from all merely earthly dealings. And its greatest
danger is to imagine that it is itself the Kingdom of God ;
whereas it only ministers along with the other social spheres to
the Kingdom of God, although occupying the highest place.
So long as that imagination ensnares it, it becomes more even
than the rest a contradiction of the Kingdom of God. Even
a small ideal state is still a state ; a profoundly secularised
Church is only a simulacrum of the Church. But so long
and so far as it honestly recognises its special danger and
bravely fights against it, it ought to be considered as the
divinely appointed and chief handmaid of this Kingdom, and
it will draw ever new power for the fulfilment of its taslcs
even out of temporary decline, and out of all its deficiencies
and weaknesses.
If we are to rightly answer the question whether Jesus
founded the Church, we must keep this spiritual necessity in
view. The word ' founded ' is in any case an inaccurate term,
and fixes our attention on external ordering. But we may say
' willed,"' or, at any rate that it follows necessarily from His will.
To speak parabolically : — The Kingdom of God is not merely
compared to leaven, but also to the good seed which is always
alike possessed of vital power, and is to be sown in the hearts of
successive generations. And if the Lord purposely spoke of
SOCIAL ETHICS 430
His death at the institution of the Lord's Supper, then He
desires the preservation of this witness of Him, which is the
highest end for which the Christian ' congregation of faithful
men ' exists, and which it can only realise as a Church. Can it
then be a matter of surprise that express, although only few,
words have been handed down to us about this congregation,
the Church ? (St Matt. xvi. 18, xviii. 17); and that, ere long,
the world saw a Church in its midst, small in its numbers,
but powerful in operation, in all parts of the Empire; one
without externally organised unity ; independent in a way no
religious society ever was previously ; confronting all other
social circles, and in particular the state ; the power of the
future ?
The ChurcWs Task.
It is important to define the task of the Church more closely.
This is necessary since the whole Christian life flows from faith ;
because in Christianity it is not as in imperfect religions, where
only a particular part of conduct is definitely religious. Hence
it is, conversely, not so simple to delimit the action proper to
the religious community, the Church, as such — that is to say,
according to the Evangelical conception. The Catholic identifies
the Church with the Kingdom of God; for it in principle all
Christian action is churchly, and all other social spheres are
properly only closer or remoter constituents of the religious
sphere, the Church. The great principle which we as Evan-
gelical Christians must carry out on all sides cannot be other than
the above-mentioned one ; and also in the carrying out of this
a larger amount of agreement prevails than is sometimes sup-
posed, when thinking only of the variety of artificial phrases
used. Some call the Church 'a fellowship in the worship of
God"; others name it after its most important element as 'a
fellowship of prayer ' ; others, ' a fellowship in a conunon
creed," or even of a common creed and common prayer ; others
again emphasise in these activities in a special way the battle
for the truth and for love in a world of deceit and sin. All
agree that it is concerned with the expression of the religious
inner life, and therefore with a common religious participation
440 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
and mutual interest in this highest end. All other things,
which possibly the Church includes in its own sphere of work,
are not its true tasks ; it is precisely as a Church that it is
called to its true work in contradistinction to other forms of
society. But this may properly be expressed, and in the
simplest way, by the word * confession of faith ' ; always
supposing that by this term every idea of the special meaning
which it has acquired in the course of history is excluded, and
above all the ' confession "" which is theologically formulated,
however important it may be in its right place. In the New
Testament the word 'confess' is used variously. It is the
honouring of God in prayer. It means, to profess before men
that we belong to the Lord ; it is to, acknowledge His unique
dignity as the Lord, the Son of God, and so forth. The
common element of all these things is that it is concerned with
the expression of the inner life, which is wrought in us by God,
by His revelation; with the human response, in some way,
made to God's word, whether in the form chiefly of uttering
the thought which is stirred in us by devotional absorption in
this word, or in the direct witness for God of the spiritual life
created by His Word. It is not solitary, but consists in mutual
interchange of giving to others, and receiving in turn from
them ; nor is the utterance of the lips excluded, fitting in with
the principle of the saying, " Out of the abundance of the heart
the mouth speaketh " ; and thus the confession of the whole life
is indispensable. But this in itself does not exactly describe
the immediate task of the Church.
Worship.
This confession of faith, as descriptive of the nature of the
Church's activity, puts its impress on all other of its activities
in accordance with the various needs of men ; and, in this way,
the purpose for which the Chiu-ch exists is clearly illustrated.
In the forefront stands divine worship. There " our dear Lord
speaks with us and we with Him" (Luther). The two main
parts of it are the ministry of the Word of God, and prayer.
In both the Church confesses her faith which God begets by
His Word, His revelation. Both the Word and prayer are
SOCIAL ETHICS 441
ministered by her as a Christian assembly, all with each other
and for each other's sake. The purpose of this solemnisation
of divine worship is edification. It is not a contradiction to
assert that worship has an end, and that this end is edification.
For we do not mean an end external to the worship, as, for
instance, when in heathen religions the gracious response of the
deity is sought by sacrifice ; certainly not worldly ends. And
that edification is the purpose of divine worship follows from
the nature of the Christian worship of God. Every external
expression of the internal life stimulates it ; the Christian
expression of its life helps forward that Christian life which
consists in communion with the God of holy love ; and therein,
in the love of our neighbour. For this the word edification is
particularly appropriate. From all the formality of former
worship of God the Christian holds aloof; is mindful of the
true temple of God, the Kingdom of God, in which each indi-
vidual is himself a temple of God. It has nothing weak about
it, as if it only meant an awakening of sweet, fleeting emotions.
It builds with earnest seriousness and not on sand. Its solem-
nity is not a mere presentation of what already exists, a sweet
repose without enrichment of spiritual energy. So the discus-
sion as to single items of the worship of God, such as the value
of preaching, is mere wordy strife ; to ask, for instance, whether
it is only a presentation in discourse of the living faith already
existing in the Chiu-ch, or its main purpose is to awaken that
faith. It is always both these things, when we consider what
faith is ; and it is always both for the benefit of all. Of course
time, place, preacher, hearers may give a different tone to one
element or the other. The same thing may be said of the so-
called apologetic preaching. The proposition widely current,
yet often unproven, that Christian ceremonial is not intended
to influence God, here finds its limits. It is obvious that it
receives all its force from the gracious nearness of God ; while
heaven-storming and God-compelling prayer has as little proper
place in the congregation as in the life of the godly man. But
God's grace opens up a living intercourse ; and it is only
unbelief that would desire to draw external boundary-lines to
the believing prayer of the Church (St Luke xviii. 8).
442 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
Form of Divine Worship.
Finally, the question as to the form of divine worship receives
its answer when we have thus settled its content and purpose.
Every expression of the interior life somehow goes back on art
(p. 391). It is always a mistake when art is suspected as a
means of religious utterance. But the mistake is intelligible,
because this means is thought too highly of when full justice
is not done to the genius of our religion as the expression of
life. It is accordant with its spiritual and ethical character
that oratory and music chiefly claim notice as artistic means of
expression ; while the arts of painting and sculpture take a less
prominent place. The case naturally stands otherwise where
truth and where will are of less importance than they are in the
Evangelical Church.
To this context of divine worship belongs, in accord with its
idea — quite irrespective of all legal regulations — the observa-
tion of Sunday, so far as it is merely a rest day (p. 413) and
serves the need of regularly recurring and assured times for
worship convenient for the majority. Rest finds its highest
expression in common prayer, and the rest day is sanctified in
a special sense by the Word of God and prayer ; as Luther has
explained in the Large Catechism, most purely according to the
sense of our Church. But the Church is not merely the fellow-
ship of divine worship. Pastoral care satisfies the special needs
of individuals, whether they are able to participate in worship
or not. For the rising generation the Church uses Christian
catechetical instruction. To non-Christian nations it brings
the Gospel as a missionary Church, and it seeks to win afresh
the estranged masses by the so-called home missions. It needs
no further detail to show how the Church in these special
forms of activity gives special expression to the above-mentioned
main ideas.
When we are clear why it is that religious action is a matter
specially belonging to a society, and in what accordingly its
nature and end consist, then in principle it is granted that this
society, the Church, will in its earthly development be subject
to legal regulations. This admission has often been challenged
SOCIAL ETHICS 448
even by Christians of to-day ; not merely in the Middle Ages,
when canon law bound the Gospel in fetters ; not merely
in the bloom of Protestant state-churchism, when pietism pro-
tested against it; but at the present time prominence on the
juristic side has been given to the statement 'that law and
religion are antithetic' It was, it is said, through a pre-
tended divine ecclesiastical law that primitive Christianity was
catholicised ; it was through human law that the Church of the
Reformation was secularised ; it was through rationalism, which
undermined faith in the Holy Scriptures, that the Church grew
into a religious union without divine foundation and without
eternal power. In the beginning, say they, it was different ;
the apostolical period knew no canon law in the Church.
Accordingly, the Evangelical Church ought to be reformed after
this original model, as the men who introduced these ecclesiastical
laws under the compulsion of need themselves demanded for the
deepest reasons, that is, the Reformers. Nay, say they, did not
Luther complain that the people were not in its favour, and that
the danger was imminent that the jurists would bring back
popery into the Church?
No Evangelical Christian will fail to acknowledge the serious-
ness of such considerations. How is that which is the freest, that
which springs up from the soul itself; how is the revelation of
the personal religious life as a confession of faith (see above) to
be bound to the forms of law ? Does not the " Spirit blow where
it listeth ■" ? Is it not sinful to " quench the Spirit " ? It is
certain that such opinions in the Evangelical Church cannot but
have the result of completely sweeping away the Roman leaven
of thinking too highly of law in a religious society. When we
were attempting to establish the majesty of law in general we
insisted at the same time on the fact that it was a derived
majesty, a majesty borrowed from the ethical sphere. Here it
is only needful to draw the inference in relation to the special
nature of the Church. The nearer the rest of the social circles
stand to the highest End, the less important is the claim of law on
them ; least of all then on the Church, the immediate handmaid
of the Kingdom of God. In her case the law, which is always
the servant of the higher, is completely the servant of that hand-
444 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
maid of the Highest. If now the special purpose of the Church
is the service of the Gospel, then all Church law must minister
to the general, sure, pure, powerful, free annunciation of the
Gospel. It can never claim to be divine law, but merely a
means ; and is therefore changeable according to the needs of each
time in order to subserve the one eternal End. But it is a
means indispensable for the Church precisely for the same reasons
that it is indispensable for all other moral forms of the common
social life in order that freedom may be able to prevail as
freedom, neither arbitrarily limited nor arbitrary in itself ; and
at the same time subserve the purpose of a means of training for
the recognition of common ends (cf. p. 136). Whatever form
of Church activity may be thought of, so soon as we subject it
to careful examination we have no alternative but to admit that
it cannot secure permanence in the absence of regulations. The
place, the times of divine service, of prayer and of preaching
require some kind of recognised regulations unless continual
confusion is to arise. It is quite the same with all other expres-
sions of Church life, for the simple reason that in the absence of
any established regulations men cannot profitably work together.
It is further necessary, and in this case most undoubtedly so,
because in this sphere far more than in others there is need to
show that laws and regulations are but means for the expression
of that love which is ever ready to serve.
The ' Churches.''
When once the importance of law for the Church has been
realised, it is then possible to understand some other most
important questions of detail. There are chiefly four which
are closely connected with questions of law. These are the
multiplicity of churches, the clerical office, the constitution of
the Church, Church and State. The number of the churches is
chiefly conditioned by the variety of the organisations. Now,
when law in the Church takes the position above assigned to
it, then the variety in legal forms is a ground of external but
not for internal division, and certainly not for strife. It is
only when law is thought too highly of that the latter is con-
ceivable, and even on that very account reprehensible. Our
SOCIAL ETHICS 445
judgment must be the same over geographical, national, and
political distinctions, inasmuch as, as is perfectly natural, the
variety of laws have their foundation in such differences. The
matter is not so simple of treatment when the question is one
that concerns a different conception of the Gospel. So far,
indeed, as this different conception has its roots in the special
gifts and the special history of a nation, this is only a proof
of the universality and inexhaustibility of the Gospel ; and
it is, again, not to be lost sight of how in that a reason for
separation may be supposed to lie. On the other hand, the
progress so far of Christian knowledge awakens the hope that
once more newly won nations will gain a new glimpse into special
aspects of the " inexhaustible riches of Christ " (Eph. iii. 8),
and will offer their fresh knowledge for the enrichment of the
older Christianity ; since it would be strange if missions should
hand over the dogmatic result of the religion of their own
home, with its different character and history, as if it were an
inviolable Good. But of course if the knowledge of the Gospel,
in its original purity, is corrupted, then separation is a duty,
and faithful adherence to known truth required ; and even more,
honest and sincere battle for it is demanded, which is at the
same time the only sure means for overcoming error and sin ;
whereas to disguise the disagreements injures both parties, and
the cause of truth itself. This is our Evangelical judgment on
the Church disruption of the sixteenth century. But how this
judgment is to extend to detail needs the most careful examina-
tion, and undeniably the separation of churches has in the
course of history very often been the consequence of sin, of
guilty exaggeration of differences into antagonisms, of holy
zeal into the strife of envy. The last words of our Lord, "■ that
they may be one,"" do not of course, in the first instance, refer
to regularly constituted churches, but to the fellowship of
believers ; yet the application of their meaning does refer to
them also and to them in particular. The separation of nations
is morally justifiable in a much wider degree than of churches.
There was even a period when the saying, " One Lord, one
faith, one baptism," was largely truth (Eph. iv. 4), in spite of
the potent diff*erences existing in Jewish Christendom. So our
4*6 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
aim should not be the constant, inopportune, and even dishonest
smoothing over of differences, but to understand the character
of others, and to seek unity in common work, where this is
possible without compromising truth. As an obvious indica-
tion of union, united communions of all Evangelical churches in
the Lord"'s Supper ought no longer to be neglected, unless that
saying, " Even to Christian churches the exhortation is needful :
Love one another," is to be felt to be a bitterly shameful truth.
This first aim, as well as many others, will be reached so much
the more easily the less suspicion is awakened by attempts at
unions on the basis of Church polity, that seem more concerned
with the advantages of a single church organisation than the
welfare of the Church of Christ. Perhaps the common foe will
bring about what the yearning of piety has so long only
imperfectly effected.
When we speak of many ' churches,' then it is time to ask.
What do you mean by a * sect ' ? The use of the term is various.
For instance, ought our Evangelical state churches ^ to call the
great Baptist community to which a Spurgeon belonged a ' sect,'
or the Methodists in America ? And supposing we do not so
call them, but churches, do we do so merely on account of their
numbers ? Is that a sufficient reason ? And are not also our
Evangelical churches in Germany called sects by the Roman
Church? When carefully noted, these facts at once give the
answer. From the Roman standpoint the term has a clear
sense without further explanation. For it, the Church in its
true character is not a community of faith in the Gospel, but
consists in unity of organisation, of creed, and of sacraments.
On this assumption every Christian community is c. sect which
is separate from its hierarchy, with the Pope at its head. For
us Protestants the word sect means first of all such a religious
community as is separate from the churches recognised by the
state for any reason whatever. The ground of separation may
be organisation, or mode of worship, or doctrine, and yet its
' On the special state arrangements of the ' Landeskirche,' in which corporate
rights and state recognition on the basis of an Evangelical confession of faith belong
to distinct communions, see article su6 voce, Theologisches Universal Lexicon. It
is to such special conditions that much of the foregoing and the following explana-
tions have reference. — Tr.
SOCIAL ETHICS 447
character such that the Evangelical Church idea remains un-
affected ; therefore only inisconception can deny the name
' Church.' The case is altered if a Christian community sets up
the claim that it is in its external limits a ' church of the saints,''
which includes in its membership only the ' perfect,' the ' truly
converted/ This claim resolves itself into self-delusion. In
this sense the early Christian churches were not ' holy ' churches,
as any glance into the Pauline epistles shows ; certain though it
may be that, compared with later times, they shone in the
splendour of their first faith, and certain too as it is that no
church ought to be without discipline. The matter is one of
principle, and it is plain that men cannot make a pure church ;
only God is the searcher of hearts. Supposing that a single
church was at a definite period composed of pure Christians, the
uprise of a fresh generation would necessarily compromise this
position. What the Lord says, first of all, of the Kingdom of
God in its earthly form, " Let both grow together until the
harvest" (St Matt. xiii. 29), applies necessarily also to the
Church and the churches (Conf. Augsburg, Art. 7 and 8).^ Such
a claim of purity of membership rests, therefore, on a different
conception of the Gospel ; not on any subordinate point or mere
theological formulas, but on a difference of view of the Gospel
of the Kingdom of God in relation to the notion of the Church.
And that it depends on this, those who believe that they rightly
apprehend what the Church is under oiu" conditions, in the
meaning of the Lord of the Church, may make clear by employing
the terms ' sect ' in contradistinction to ' Church.' This may be
done without censorious self-satisfaction and with mindfulness
of the many transitions which real life shows. The communities
above alluded to are ' churches ' in England and America, not
by reason of their numbers, but because they in the succession
of generations necessarily have to recognise the task of religious
training, and because they, in the same proportion, have been
compelled to put the idea of ' churches of saints ' behind that
^ Sylloge Confessionum, Confessio Augustana, p. 125, ' De Ecclesia' and ' Quid
sit Ecclesia.' Cf. Articles of Church of England, Art. xxvi. On the relation between
these articles and those of Cranmer, etc., cf. Campion and Beaumont, Prayer
Book Interleaved. — Tr.
448 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
of fellowship in the Word of God and in faith. Among us,
however, they are, in the mass, sects when they attack the
churches historically grown into what they are on account of
their ' mixed character ' ; a thing they cannot themselves escape
when they have a longer history behind them, unless at the
cost of separating themselves from the living current of history
and sinking into the sands of despicable self-seclusion. This is
exactly what we often mean by the word 'sectarian."* It
scarcely needs proof that such sects may bring blessing to the
Church, particularly by their example of care in personal fellow-
ship on the one hand, and on the other hand by showing that
the ' churches ' may with good reason lay stress on the conviction
that they do express the ideas of the Church in the truly Evan-
gelical sense ; for the urgency for visible holiness has finally, on
the part of the Evangelical, some sort of relation to the Roman
idea of the Church. In any case, for all these reasons the
accurate use of the term ' sect ^ is a proof of an accurate under-
standing of the Evangelical idea of the Church.
The Clerical Office.
One of the most important ethical problems of Church law,
properly speaking, is that of the clerical office. The objections
spoken of above against 'law** in the Church return in an
accentuated form when we turn our attention to this subject.
One objection is easy of refutation which asserts that, because the
witness and confession of faith is a universal Christian duty,
therefore in the divine worship of the Church the office ought to
be exercised at any time by all without distinction. This asser-
tion forgets the distinction between those who lead and those
who are led ; or, quite generally, between the active and recep-
tive mind, which is one founded in the nature of the religious
as of the mental life ; and it is a clear misconception to appeal
to the saying that we are " all taught of God "" applied in this
way. St Paul insists that there are " diversities of gifts,"" and
even the mental dispositions of the self-same gifted persons vary.
" Is any among you afflicted .? let him pray. Is any merry ?
let him sing psalms"" (St James v. 13). But the thought is not
easily disposed of : — If all that be admitted, ought not freedom
SOCIAL ETHICS 449
to remain unfettered by the restriction of law at least in this
innermost, central point of Church action ? May it not be
thought that the time and place of the worship of the congrega-
tion is really all that refers, in connection with it, to that which
belongs to the earthly and to be subject to regulation ; but prayer
and the ministry of the Word really belong to the moving of the
Spirit ? He who has never suffered under the arrangements of
divine worship from the official leader of devotion, and the
preacher, the formularies of prayer, the long set discourse, and
the passivity of the congregation, is hardly capable of a judg-
ment. But he whom such a doubt has pained — and is it
possible that in our time a thoughtful member of the Church
could remain free from such a doubt ? — ought in justice not to
weaken the consideration whether these evils are not actually
necessary for our earthly development, because they are less than
those evils which would arise if the opponent of law and order
were allowed to pave the way for freedom as he understands it.
An honest personal examination of the historical evidences of the
early Church will dispose to caution. We see in the New Testa-
ment accounts only what is different from our customs, and see
the bright side. As if, for instance, in the warnings of the great
advocate of freedom (1 Cor. xiv.), plain traces of order did not
manifest themselves, which a little later become the beginnings
of regulated order following on necessarily changing conditions.
This must happen provided the principle of edification is to be
carried through, which was maintained as applicable even in those
still untrammelled conditions of the early Church. From the
free operation of the gifts of grace there soon arose permanent
service ; and when the charismata were no longer found active in
their original universality and variety, then the perceptible need
ever present pointed the way to a settled order of divine service.
But what happened to the Church as a whole may often be
proved most instructively in smaller religious areas. And then
the friend of freedom will recognise, not from the force of
custom but from conviction, the necessity of regulated forms in
this region. On one side the question is as to the application
of the fundamental idea which determines why all the moral
action of the community must be subject to the rule of law.
S9
450 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
But in this present issue there are other special reasons that
come under notice. One is that, in such delicate matters as
prayer and preaching of the Gospel, the sins of conceit and
desire of power in the most spiritual form are especially sinful
and especially dangerous. At least a part of the danger is
avoided by a recognised order. The person is so far disburdened
of responsibility that a sincere man, even with only an average
measure of gifts and experience, can bear it. In addition, the
nature of the Christian Church, directly it has a history behind
it, renders a special training essential for giving religious expres-
sion to its truth. The Sacred Scriptures are written in strange
languages, and in order to understand them aright the harvest of
the centuries must be garnered. The changing spirit of the
times does indeednever require another Gospel, but the old eternal
Gospel must be adapted to it. It is not as if the promise of
the Holy Spirit were given to theologians more than to others.
But because the Holy Spirit is not an indefinite religious in-
fluence, although a deeply moving energy, but the Spirit of Jesus
Christ, and because the Spirit and the Word are closely con-
nected. He works by means of knowledge and is the Spirit of
* sevenfold wisdom.' And if this wisdom is not to degener-
ate into fanaticism it must, although not that alone, include
a knowledge of the historical conditions under which it has
pleased God to reveal His eternal love, and also of the condi-
tions under which this revelation is to show itself ever new and
ever adaptable — in other words, a theology is indispensable.
For all these reasons we stand by the conviction of our
Reformers that a regular call is needed for the ministry of the
Word ; and of course the appropriate preparation for it. And
when it is once acknowledged that the service of the Church is
a special vocation, it is impossible to see why this service should
not guarantee to the agent the means of subsistence (1 Cor.
ix. 7). Those who take objection to this for the most part find
no difficulty if their favourite leaders have an assured means of
livelihood by their ' free gifts.' The warning to the Evangelical
Churches that a luxurious ministry is for them as unworthy as it
is dangerous is entirely justifiable. But apart from exceptions
the time is not yet come in which the servants of the Church are
SOCIAL ETHICS 451
placed in such a position of independence that the danger of
being overwhelmed by earthly anxiety is not nearer than that
by luxury.
All that has been here said in favour of the Tightness of a
special ministerial office in the Evangelical Church would be false
if at the same time (as amongst ourselves should be obvious) it
were not unreservedly recognised that office is service, service in the
Gospel, and service in the Gospel on behalf of the Church. If all
legal regulations are finally merely means, so are especially all
Church regulations, and among these particularly that of the
ministerial office. It must stand by Luther's word — this office has
not " the status of a priest in itself, but it is a common public
office for those who are all priests, i.e. Christians." They fulfil
their service not as over the Church, but in its name and in its
stead. It is therefore of ' divine right ' only so far as it is essen-
tial to the edification of the Church. Therein lies its authority,
only there. All claims, however cautiously put forward, that
higher qualities are imparted to the bearers of this office than are
given to the community of believers themselves are Romish,
not Evangelical. The value of ordination is measured by this
principle. It has its justification in a regularly ordered Church ;
but the remembrance that, e.g., in Wiirtemberg in the time of
the Suabian Fathers there was no ordination, may save us from
making too much of i^.
Church Organisation.
On the border-line of ethics stands a judgment on various
forms of Church organisation. On account of the smaller
importance which law has for the Church as a community than
for other forms of society, the Church can perform her special
tasks with different forms of constitution equally as well as the
State her tasks, whether by a constitutional monarchy or an
unlimited democracy. The personal factors are of the most
importance. Of course it is not a mere matter of indifference
what the constitution of a church is. But there is greater
danger in making too much of constitutional questions than
in the fact that the organisation may not yet be wholly con-
formable to the needs of the Church. The witness for the
462 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
faith for the sake of which it exists can be in every way borne
by her whether the constitution is episcopal, or presbyterian, or
consistorial, or a mixture of these principal possibilities. For the
Evangelical, provided the notion of the clerical office above given
is a correct one, these are one and all merely human arrange-
ments, matters of convenience. For Rome, on the other hand,
the constitution of the Church is a matter of faith, because the
priesthood is a divine order in the Church and over it. The
Consistorial (originally Lutheran) and the Presbyteral synods
(originally the reformed government of the Church) probably
suit on the whole our historically evolved needs. But these
forms of constitution do not guarantee the guidance of the
Church on Evangelical lines, because the synods are specially
prone to the inclination to make the Church a part of the
constitutional state order, with the accompanying danger of
its radically foreign domination in the Church. And the self-
importance of many orators tends easily to making too much of
the synods, to the injur}^ of their true value. The governance
of the Church rests far more than that of the state on confidence
in the rulers : in this case essentially on the confidence of the
synods in the consistories that their naturally conservative bias
is only for the good of the Church, i.e. has exclusively the
advancement of the Gospel in view ; and on the confidence of the
consistories in the synods that their naturally forward policy
has the same end. The roles may be reversed. But it is only
when — in whatever direction movement is taken — both these
springs of action of the spiritual life secure representation that
the whole synodal institution has meaning and so real authority.
It is the task of both parties to take pains by careful electoral
arrangements to put the synods in the position of exercising
this legitimate authority. The suppression of minorities is
plainly fatal.
Relation of Church to the State.
The constitution of the Church is with us well known to be
most intimately connected with and related to the state. It is
here sufficient to recall the statements made on ' the Christian
State,' and now note them from the point of view of the
SOCIAL ETHICS 453
Church as we there did from that of the state. The dominance
of the Church over the state was there ruled out chiefly for the
sake of the state. Now, after having become better acquainted
with the nature of the Church, it is just as clear that the latter,
when it makes disturbing encroachments on the proper province
of the state, and the national civilisation fostered and repre-
sented by it, then the Church no less does injury to itself,
dissipates its energies, departs from its true vocation, as the
Roman Church proves. As above, the domination of the
state over the Church was to be avoided for the Churches own
sake, because it fails to possess the powers necessary to a direct
solution of ecclesiastical problems, and damages its true power
by a wrong use of them. So in the present instance it is per-
fectly plain that the Church injures its own work by such en-
croachments. How can there be a state-ordered witness of faith .''
Has not the saying that religious men are hypocrites or fools
a strong support in the actual or supposed ease with which the
Church trims her sails to the breezes blowing from a lofty
quarter ? Hence it is intelligible why the panacea of a ' free
church in a free state ' is greeted as the end of all difficulties.
If only its operation were as clear as the formula ! If it were
not that on all sides there were points of contact and friction-
surfaces which present, and cannot but present, themselves.
Ought not the state to desire guarantees against any church
receiving its citizens under rules recognisable as against the
state order ? against the subordination of obedience to its
authority to obedience to ecclesiastical superiors ? — as, for
instance, when an episcopal oath is demanded in relation to
the Pope which contradicts that to the ruler of the country ?
And ought the state to be indifferent to the power influencing
the mind of its citizens either as regards that which is a danger
to the Church or that which is for its great good ? Similarly, can
the Church conceal the fact that its influence on the whole life
of a nation is not merely greater but more answerable to the
whole conditions of its work if the state helps its activity by
affording special protection to its arrangements, and even more
by handing over a portion of its activity, especially on the wide
and far-reaching field of its civilising work, particularly the
454 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
schools ? Whether, of course, the gain or the loss would be the
greater it is impossible to state definitely — whether, for instance,
the much-explained section 166 of our statute law ought to be
repealed. This is a point which only historical development
can decide in the long run ; but at every juncture the particular
attitude of the representatives of the Church and of the state,
that is, in the last resort, the disposition of those men''s minds
who rule Church and state alike, will settle the points. Every
fancy that it is possible to ' bring religion to the people from
above' is met by profound mistrust and passive resistance to
such attempts. Still, nothing is in vain which plainly flows from
a sincere heart, whether from above or from below. On one
matter there should be no doubt, so far as Evangelical Christians
are concerned, and that is, if, as a matter of principle, the
friendly relation of Church and state is rejected, and so, as a
matter of principle, the separation of Church and state is pre-
ferred, then the state is, in a way unevangelical, thought too
little of, and quite as unevangelically is the Church made too
much of, and confounded with the Kingdom of God itself. The
state is not a something ' non-ethical "" in itself, and ' the honour
of the Lord' is not ' placed in jeopardy ' if the guidance of the
Church is closely conj oined with that of the state. This general
ethical judgment may even go a step farther, and say that the
freedom of the individual is in no way, as might seem to be the
case, necessarily greater in a Church separated from the state,
and as a matter of fact is in many cases less. For dogmatism
and paltry prejudices in matters of faith natui-allv manifest
themselves on the whole more strongly in a self-dependent
Church, and all the more the less of reality there is in the
religious life of the period.
The National Church.
For this reason, too, a Church standing in a closer felt relation
to the state can with far more facility embrace a whole nation,
be a national Church. Still more, for the great reason before
given for the close union of Church and state, namely, that the
educative influence of the religious community on the whole
national life is better guaranteed if the Church is legally
I
SOCIAL ETHICS 455
associated with the legal order of the state. And that the
national Church is a great benefit for us as Evangelicals is as clear
both from the character of our Church, as it has been corro-
borated by a long history ; the missionary Churches find them-
selves pointed to this goal with more clearness ; and it is also
forced on the attention of those who at home appear only to see
the injury which, as they publicly proclaim, it does to the Church.
It would be quite unevangelical to promise on this account
permanence to this form of the national Church. The existence
of the Church is in no way dependent on its relation to the
state, neither on its firm union with it nor its dissolution, in
the way both friends and foes often wrongly assert. And so we
are under the necessity of mentioning a series of questions which
at the present time stir the minds of men, and throw in general
a clearer light on the nature of the Church in its earthly
conditions. The questions that are raised are : — May the
importance attaching to ' law ' in the Church of which we have
above treated be in details apprehended in other ways than that
stated ; and may the regulations made be altered and differently
shaped in the State Church just as well as in the Free Church,
of course with continually fresh application in detail ? The
matters really concern certain questions essential to the internal
well-being of the Church.
It is with some reason that our Church hopes to deepen the
sympathy of its members with the common tasks by the delimita-
tion of congregations into smaller areas more easily attended to
for the purposes of the ministry of the Word and pastoral care.
The great cathedrals, to wit, are more suitable for the ceremony
of the Mass than for Evangelical preaching. The Roman
communion touches the individual at the confessional box.
Still, we must not overlook the fact that there are shades as well
as bright points in the plan also recommended by the panegyrists
of this smaller congregational system of linking on to it all
possible practical tasks ; the care of the poor and sick, and of
the young ; congregations of those of the same age and social
position. In this way, will not many a duty be taken away from
other societies which they are better fitted to fulfil, and the
highest task of the Church, its teaching function, crippled ? If
456 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
it is replied that these dangers are at least not necessarily
involved, while pressing tasks can only be thus accomplished in
reasonable time, or not at all; and moreover without such
' Martha ' labour no access to the hearts of the estranged masses
for the ' Mary ' labour of the Church can be gained ; then in any
case this assertion points to a need for the satisfaction of which
even the best organisation of smaller local congregations can
only be one among other plans.
What the Home Mission work can accomplish we see. Its
name, * Inner Mission,' was itself a feat, unveiling as it did the
unchristian state of great masses in Christian nations. And it
was a feat of saving grace in which the father of the Inner
Mission proved its efficacy by his own personal and self-denying
labour, and then published abroad his success without starting
with high-sounding speeches as so many others. The question
is worth serious consideration whether this work of home
missions, in the shape which it has taken, and that one not
quite in all respects in the spirit of its founder, ought not to be
extended so that other social areas may be touched by it and
won. If a work among ' the whole ' in contradistinction to that
among ' the sick ' is spoken of as needed, this is not refuted by
the saying of Jesus Christ, " They that are strong have no need
of the physician, but they that are sick," for St Paul justifies
this use of the words 'ye that are strong' and 'ye that are
weak.' Both classes need the best care, and both of them, when
estranged from the Gospel, must be won in different ways. The
more personal the help is, the more permanent it will be, and a
wide field for energy is hereby opened up.
Evangelisation.
A further means of healing the deepest wounds of this
estrangement is found in 'evangelisation' or special mission
work, not only by its bringing the Word and ordered services to
those not ordinarily reached, but also by its effect on those who
are not awakened by those ordinary means. The danger of this
extraordinary means of preaching for the purpose of arousing
and advancing the spiritual life of the Evangelical Church is
just as evident as pertinent to draw attention to it. Exaggera-
SOCIAL ETHICS 467
tion on the one side, curiosity, excitement, self-delusion on
the other hand, undoubtedly very frequently cleave to the
management of these missions up to the present, and in fact
there is a special danger attending the work itself. But the
question is whether these difficulties cannot be overcome.
The charge of failure cannot be proved, irrespective of the
fact that the expression is very inaccurate, unless meant to
apply only to the sort of effects here mentioned as questionable.
The 'proving of the spirit' is of course indispensable. A
man is not suitable for an evangelist or missioner because he
has been proved to be unfit somehow for the ordinary work
of the Church, for in this way these ' remarkable ' geniuses who
believe that they have ' missed their calling ' may easily become
a public danger. It should be absolutely demanded that these
missioners should work honourably in connection with the
regularly constituted authorities of the Church, and it is in
the highest degree desirable that undertakings of this kind should
be carried on by those smaller societies in individual churches
who have a strong sympathy with such movements.
The Evangelical Church will have to give unreserved recogni-
tion to these societies. Not by showing indulgence to them,
and at the same time enslaving them because they appear to be
useful instruments in Church politics, nor by calling them into
existence by artificial action from above, having no root in the
life of the people ; but by protecting them in their freedom.
The dangers that beset this work are more remote when such
societies keep faithfully to the Church, and intend so to remain.
In Wiirtemberg, e.g., they form an important living portion of
its history not yet adequately described and such as never can
be fully described. And if some who hold aloof think more of
the results on practical life, it may be pointed out that even
quiet progress in knowledge, and so the growth of mutual
understanding, owes much to these quietists. Personal research
into Holy Scripture produces even at any stage of culture some-
thing of the nobility of the Beroeans (Acts xvii. 11). Many a
young clergyman has for the first time realised the meaning of
intercession when he has seen his own faltering steps borne up
by it. All the greater is the responsibility when such societies
458 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
are disturbed from the outside, as by theological questions — for
example, in the debate over the Bible which some years ago
distracted the members of the Basle Mission.
The Supply of Clergy.
Here another question is touched which must ever affect the
Evangelical Church, and at every fresh period. It remains a
final question of importance to its welfare, so far as it is an
external community of religious men, a Church in the sense in
which ethics takes note of it, that it shall have good
clergy. Compared with this, all pains about constitution,
liturgy, social arrangements are things of secondary importance.
It cannot be otherwise, if it is the Church of the ' Word,' and
as the witness of that Word, to be a servant of the Word is the
special vocation entrusted to it. Of whichever side of this
witness we think, it is certainly of immense importance.
Preaching ought to be suited to the most varied needs, and the
one unchangeable Word rightly ' divided.' To men of our day,
in the whirlpool of work and of pleasure, in the confusions of
various cosmic philosophies, the eternal truth needs to be brought
home. Pastoral care needs an adaptability, a deep personal
sympathy with others, and to this end a depth of culture such as
no other vocation demands. It is indeed an immense responsi-
bility by reason of its contents to bear witness of the Word of
God. And yet it is not beyond our power on account of its
contents, seeing that the Word itself is the power of powers ; and
of the bearer of its message no more is demanded than of other
believers ; no surpassing religious endowment or religious ex-
perience ; but rather all comes to him as to all others when he
only acts as a faithful householder; faithful to his particular
earthly vocation, in the use of all the special means of his
training. Therefore this vocation is not with all its difficulty
merely a work that may ' still "* be called ' a good work '
(1 Tim. iii. 1) — that 'still' is a word of unfaith ; as if there
could ever be a time, however late, when it is no longer
requisite — but must ever be so regarded. And further, each
Church ought to feel that it is a duty to bring forward the
right instruments for this ecclesiastical vocation, not by external
SOCIAL ETHICS 459
inducements but by a living sympathy ; taken from all classes
because it is a ministry to all classes ; with all gifts, because for
this task none is too great or too small. And if there is a
failure in the needed supply for this service, the Church must
ask itself the question, whether its attitude is the right one
and whether it presents sufficient attractive power. In such
examination what is external is not to be regarded as un-
important. There may be too much ' serving of tables "*
required from the minister of the Word. Although the addition
of earthly affairs is a wholesome one and indispensable clearly
enough as a share in the service of love, yet time and energy
for self- recollection must not be wanting. But even evils like
this, or even the modest situation in life, so far as property and
honour are concerned, do not sufficiently explain the fact that
the service of the Church is not one eagerly desired. It
would be wrong to ignore the deepest reason, not to speak
openly of the widespread although not always outspoken
indifference to the Church, and to the Gospel of which the
Church is, in weakness, the minister. A reason and a pretext
for this indifference is a doubt of the truth of the Gospel,
often increased by the bad impression that the Church imposes
on her servants all the more stringent orthodoxy the less she
can reckon on free agreement. Consequently it is one of the
most important tasks of the Church to remove this mistrust and
to strengthen confidence in the truth of her message, i.e. the
truth of the Gospel to which she is a witness ; and to do this
in the whole circle of its influence, especially in the case of the
young who devote themselves to the special service of the
Church. The way to strengthen this confidence can be no other
than by the way of freedom. Certainly the Church ought to
devise and use all means for making all its theological candidates
fit for the various practical parts of the clerical office. But
that innermost, deepest personal conviction of the truth of the
Gospel only the Gospel itself is able to produce when amid the
freest battle of minds it proves its own power as the tiTith.
Therefore all attempts to limit the freedom of science, or, since
this is impossible, to inhibit the freedom of science to the future
servants of the Church, have the contrary effect to that which
460 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
well-meaning anxiety desires. They repel the honest. It cannot
be otherwise. Only a society which calls men to freedom can
win them for its service. This is true in a unique degree of the
region of the highest truth and the highest freedom. Therefore
those churches are not the least blessed which do not regulate the
admission into their service according to the letter of a single
statutory paragraph, but can take them in the faith that this
entrance to the office is a matter of a direct agreement between
the servant and the Lord of all. Those taken in trust, yea, in
' hope against hope,' have not infrequently become the most
faithful servants. On this point especially each legally organised
Evangelical Church ought to be mindful that its whole legal
existence is only a means for the advancement of the Church in
which we believe, and through it for the furtherance of the
Kingdom of God (p. 408). Consequently the variety of theo-
logical tendencies in its midst ought not to be destroyed, and we
should not even desire their removal. Not only does history
demand them ; this conviction follows from the nature of our
faith. The justification and benefit of the conservative tendency
(the expression ' positive ' we ought to gradually drop, because it
is misleading) is clear enough. But who can deny to the ' broad '
tendency the merit of keeping alive problems of importance, and
in this way not only preserving those who stand aloof from
altogether breaking off from the Church, and newly attaching
them, but also it is essential to the welfare of the Church, which,
as the handmaid of the Gospel, cannot be without these problems,
because the Gospel as a spiritual and ethical religion cannot be
without them. This judgment is of course a judgment of
faith, but what is the Church without faith ? And it will
in the consideration of these problems reach by its struggles
the right level of faith all the sooner, the more personal faith its
members have.
Missions.
A token, consequence, and ground of such personal faith is
the grateful recognition of missionary work. Among the special
notes of the modern Church, this too is one of its special consola-
tions. A missionary Church is a living Church. But this subject
of present-day importance may not be treated here. Rather we
SOCIAL ETHICS 461
will only just call to mind that among the activities of the Church
the spread of the Gospel cannot fail, in whatever form it may
be carried on, whether by individuals or societies, or by the
organised Church itself. So this reminder in its particular
content as to the needs of the Church of to-day may bring us to
a conclusion of this work on Christian ethics which links it to
the commencement. From the farthest distance it returns
again to that which is nearest and innermost.
Doubt infecting everything makes itself felt even against
missionary work. Christianity, it is said, after having done
^educational service to the higher civilisation of Europe, has
now been superseded as a religion. This obsolete Christianity has
been carried by noble but fanatical religious natures to distant
lands. According to the opinion of the missionaries themselves,
it is in order to find a new home in other lands, as the old home
has ungratefully rejected it ; but in truth, as the opponents assert,
it is in order to minister to the progress of civilisation, and
finally by this means to render itself no longer indispensable.
Therefore that which to Christian faith appears to be the dawn
of a new era seems to the cool observer merely the last gleam of
a belated inspiration. The facts of missionary history, and
certainly those which have been part of our experience, do
not show agreement with this explanation. Missionary work
addresses itself to the deepest moral needs with success, i.e. to
the same moral values the miscalculation of which plainly
enough inspired the enmity which, in a way few expected, broke
out against missions when they were antagonistic to utilitarian
interests (China in 1900 and German S.W. Africa in 1905).
It is the character of genuine Christian missions not to cry
' Halt ! ' in the presence of selfishness. What constrains the
messengers of the Gospel ? They have found in Christ re-
demption for moral need, as in the case of that greatest of
missionaries the two things coincided, becoming a Christian and
becoming an apostle (Gal. i. 14 fF.). Freed from the discord
(spoken of in Rom. vii. 7 ff'.), the Apostle recognised that
he was a " debtor " to all who stand in need of this help (Rom.
i. 14). But this is only one special case of an experience that
is general.
462 THE ETHICS OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE
The Gospel of Christ is for all who "hunger after right-
eousness"" (St Matt. V. 1). It is the final and deepest differ-
ence among men, whether they discern or not the majesty
of the Good. Whether they, however warm their admiration
of the beautiful may be, still more warmly struggle after
truth, and in this struggle grow certain that one truth is for
them decisive, the truth that is above them. Whether they
recognise that they ought to be good, and whether they now
desire to be good. But what is good .'' How can an evil will
become good ? Jesus Christ it is who meets him who desires
" that which alone is good in heaven and on earth, the good
will," for He alone is the type and pledge of the one good will in
heaven by the fact that He is 'the good will' incarnated on
earth. And He produces the confidence that this good will is a
gracious one for all who are not good but desire to be so. This
faith is the incentive and motive power of the new life for indi-
viduals, for the transformation of all forms of society. It begins
in time, but everywhere points to its perfection in eternity, for it
is fellowship with eternal divine love. And so the Christian life,
as it is produced by Christian belief, is the one great apology
for the Christian faith (St John vii. 17). And precisely for
this reason the concluding thought of ethics is essentially the
same as the concluding idea of dogmatics.
INDEXES.
INDEX TO SCRIPTURE PASSAGES QUOTED.
Genesis.
St Matthew,
St Matthew— ^<?;7/rt?.
CHAP. VER. PAGE
CHAP.
VER
PAGE
CHAP.
VER.
PAGE
ii. 15 354
i.
20
193
XX.
25
408
iii. 19 354
iv.
265
xxii.
409
ix. 6 427
V.
I
462
15
409
xviii. 288
I
fif.
255
xxii.
30
335
2
375
xxv.
303
6
127
I ff.
160
Job.
18
234
14 ff.
249
xiii. 7 389
21-
-48
218
21
234
22
341
32
215
25
219
xxvi.
265
PSALMS.
29
"^n, 399
31
152
i. 278
xiv. 278
XV. 278
xxiii. 278
34
414
42
175 .
38
219
63
415
42
377
xxviii.
29
285
48
f 131,169,
1305
St Mark.
vi.
24
375
Proverbs.
vii.
xi.
17
6
315
296
i.
15
29
195, 197
375
xii. 10 174
xii.
31
ii.
18 ff
280
XXX. 8 376
xiii.
XV.
29
12
447
152
vii.
22 ff.
17
414
180
Isaiah.
liii. 60
xvi.
18
24
25
265
439
234
133
x.
6-8
II
334
1322,330,
I 333
341
Lamentations.
iii- 39 315
xviii.
xix.
6,
7
17
II
7
ff.
84
150
439
234
xii.
25
29
29 ff.
331
160, 169
/ 161,163,
\ 165, 168
12
219, 235
St Luke.
Jonah.
17
131
21
234, 305
X.
29
170
iv. II 174
XX.
I
ff.
463
192
36
170
464 INDEX TO SCRIPTURE PASSAGES QUOTED
St Luke-
-contd.
Romans-
—contd.
I (
30R.—
contd.
chap. VER.
PAGE
chap,
VER.
PAGE
CHAP.
VER.
PAGE
xiv. 26
241
viii.
255, 271
vii.
10-15
341
XV. 6
146
Iff
255
20
212
xvi. I
354
2
162
29
375
xvii. 7 ff.
192
IS
255
ix.
7
450
13
234
21
255
15
234, 236
xviii. I
289
28
165, 408
15 ff.
192, 254
8
441
38
299
16 ff.
247
ix.
I
409
17
234
xi.
6
159
19 ff.
255
St John.
33
423
27
273, 281
iii.
202
xii.
36
2
140
195,217
X.
15
29
264
255
iv. 34
V. 44
^1S
260
3
10
312
312
xi.
32
4
260
118
vii. 17
18
xiii. 34 ff.
291, 462
260
160
xiii.
I
I ff
409
408, 422
427
xii.
21
4ff
12 ff
161
249
215
xiv. 16
254
4
408
xiii.
2
311
XV. 9 ff.
254
7
258
5
336
II
254
Sff
160
xiv.
449
xvi. 22
254
285
175, 180
177,219
167
14
172
XV.
9
259
23
xvii. 4
xviii. 22
xxi. 15
xiv.
7
23
1151,242,
1243,271
253
122
10
45 ff
247, 304
172
XV.
242, 243
2 Cor.
Acts
iv. 19
220
I Cor.
. i.
V.
7
I
235
172
V. 29
xiii. I ff.
409
282
i.
ii.
23
152
304
334
334
334
334
334
4
10
170
303
xvi. 37
219
I
14
184
xvii. II
xviii. 18
xxi. 24
457
278
278
2
3
7
32-34
vi.
8
135
219
260
xxii. 25
219
viii.
8
234
iii.
2
288
10
234
Romans.
16
21
162
140
ix.
xi.
6
21-23
193
265
i. 14
461
21 ff.
238
xii.
268
28
251
22
238
ii.
202
iv.
3
84
7
180
4
260
Gal.
14-16
13
vi.
333
iii.
303
3ff-
172
i.
14 ff
461
iv.
303
12
237, 238
ii.
20
184, 247
V. I
I ff.
192, 268
254
12 ff.
26
255
334
iii.
28
f 148,258,
1418,430
vi. I
203
28
334
28 ff
170
12
203
vii.
235
V.
I
162
vii. 7 ff.
293, 461
2
322
16
222
7-25
265
6
234
l6ff
293
INDEX TO SCRIPTURE PASSAGES QUOTED 465
Eph
I Thess.
CHAP.
VER.
I'AGE
CHAP.
VER.
PAGE
i.-iv.
148
i.
9
180
ii.
303
iv.
II ff.
353
lO
273
V.
17
289
iii.
8
445
iv.
4
445
2 Thess.
28
354
V.
32
322,
334
iii.
9-1 1
353
I Tim.
Phii
•
12 ff
251
i.
7
288
ii.
I
288
9
311
iii.
I
458
22
180
iv.
3
333
ii.
258
8
172
2
258
V.
8
338
■ 5
122
23
172
12
296
vi.
17 ff
375
iii.
7
140
12
296,
307
2 Tim.
15
304, 307
21
173
iv.
4ff
222
iv.
4-7
254
8
246,
394
Philemon.
12 ff.
255
119,375
Col
Hebrews.
i.
15
174
iii.
7
271
28
304
iv.
2
301
ii.
23
172
9f.
353
iii.
I ff.
255
15
265
3
203
vi.
4ff
296
5
203
10
193
10
174
X.
26 ff.
296
16
394
xi.
16
418
17
177-
-238
xii.
I
222
iv.
12
304
5
268
James.
CHAP.
VER.
PAGE
i.
2ff
254
4
180, 304
5
330
14
266
25
160
25 ff
254
ii.
8,12
162
V.
13
448
I Peter.
i.
8
253, 254
17
180
ii.
9
246
17
258,312
2 Peter.
i.
5
246
ii.
3
246
I John.
i.
202
8ff
293
iii.
I ff.
293
14
254
20
296
iv.
8
131
10
133
12
139
18
305
V.
13
254
17
296
Rev
iii.
15
251
GENERAL INDEX.
Absolute law, 12, 63, 64, 81.
Absolutist theory of the state, the,
404.
Abstinence {cf. Temperance).
Action and motives, 81, 82, 85.
meritorious, 192, 278, 354.
Actions, ' indifferent,' 236 et seq.
' permissible,' 236 et seq.
'Adiaphora,' 223, 236, 242, 243.
{Cf. Works of supereroga-
tion.)
Adoption, Divine, 128, 193, 203.
Adultery and divorce, 341.
Esthetic naturalism, 58.
^stheticism, individualistic, 42,
144.
Grecian, 172.
Esthetics and art, 393.
and ethics, 8, 11.
Affirmation, 417. {Cf. Oaths.)
Alfonso of Liguori, St, ethics of, 241.
Almsgiving, 354.
Altruism, 14.
Altruistic realism, 49.
regards, 37.
Anabaptists {cf Mennonites).
Anarchist communism and the
Socialists, 370.
'Angelical' life, the, 233.
Animal torture, revolt against, 174.
Annihilation, loi.
Antinomianism and Christian ethics,
157-
and Gnosticism, 157.
and legalism, 210.
and the Evangelical churches, 1 59.
and the idea of duty, 210.
definition of, 158.
Apologetic preaching, 441, 450, 458.
Apologetics, 3, 95, 103.
Arbitration, inefificacy of, 43 1 .
466
Aristocratic state, the, 420.
Aristotle, 420.
Art, 390 et seq.
and religion, 395 et seq.
and the Evangelical Church, 394.
Goethe on, 391.
morality of, 398.
naturalism in, 396.
Schiller on, 391, 395.
the nature of, 395.
the Neo-Platonist conception of,
395-
Ascetical practices :
fasting, 280.
prayer and devotions, 282.
vows, 277 et seq.
Asceticism, 112, 272.
and civilisation, 351.
Buddhistic, 172.
monastic, 172.
Atheistic morality, 98.
Atheists and the oath, 416.
Atonement, the doctrine of, 66.
Audacity, 308.
Augsburg Confession of Faith, the,
157, 181, 184, 188, 278,
281, 305, 340, 407, 415,
431, 432, 447-
Diet, Luther's prayers during the,
276.
Augustine, St, and his knowledge
of the Gospel, 123.
and the state, 406.
cited, 166, 195.
temptations of, 265.
Autonomy of the reason, 96.
Baptism and salvation, 302.
infant, 199, 200, 205.
of Cornelius, 199.
of Samaritans, 199.
GENERAL INDEX
467
Baptismal vo\vs, 279.
Baptists, 446.
Basle Mission, the, 458.
Bebel's Wotnan, 332.
Benevolence, 37, 46.
the virtue of, 307.
Benthamism, 35.
Bible, the, 117.
and meditation, 283.
its response, 284.
controversy regarding, 458.
Bismarck, 317, 325.
on politics, 366.
Bjornson's " Handschuh," 336.
Blasphemy against the Holy Ghost,
296.
Blessedness, 253, 255.
Bodily exercise, 172.
Book of Conformity to Christy The,
177.
Bravery, 309.
Brotherhood, the science of, 46.
Brotherly love {cf Neighbour
love).
Buddhistic asceticism, 172.
Bullion, 360, 361.
Burial of suicides, the, 271.
Business morality, 10, 17.
Byron cited, 362.
Calling, 212 ^/ seq. {Cf. Duty.)
Calvinistic doctrine of the fall of
man, 79.
Calvin's judgment of dancing, jest-
ing, and theatres, 243,
Candour, 402.
Capital, 358, 364, 368, 369.
Capital punishment, 427-428.
Capitalism, 359.
and interest, 360.
Cardinal virtues, the, 58,
Carlyle, Thomas, 362.
cited, 146, 424.
Carnegie, Andrew, 377
Catechetical instruction, 442.
Catechism, Luther's, i88 (footnote),
200, 442.
Cato, the death of, 270.
Causality and freedom, 89.
Celibacy, 331.
Character, 248 et seq.
and culture, 251.
in relation to sin, 264.
{Cf Christian character.)
Charismata, 249, 449.
Chastity, 313, 333, 335.
complete, 232.
Children, chastisement of, 338.
education of, 338.
Christ, the imitation of, 176.
the 'principle' of Christian
ethics, 126-127, 174.
Christian, the, sin in, 292 et seq.
Christian character and ' Bible
Christianity,' 283.
character, the fundamental note
of, 252 et seq.
concept of love, the, 135, 156
et seq.
doctrine of marriage, the, 322.
duty, 218.
ethics and antinomianism, 157.
and doctrine, 120 et seq.
and economic questions, 374
et seq.
and freedom, 79.
and legalism, 157.
and the Old and New Testa-
ments, 117 et seq.
apologetics, 95.
as a coherent whole, 109 et
seq.
formal divisions of, 123, 124.
ideal, 106, 107.
love in, 131.
opponents of, 24, 32.
devaluation of all values,
25.
evolutionary ethics, 39.
hedonistic ethics, 34.
mixed systems, 52;
monism, 46.
pessimism, 49. .
positivism, 48.
Roman Catholic view of, 58.
the charge of hedonism (eudae-
monism) against, 190.
the principle of, 55.
the transcendence of, 60.
the truth of :
aversion to, 57.
causality and freedom, 89.
Christian morality and the
Christian religion, 100.
conscience and freedom, 64.
freedom, 76.
morality and religion, 95.
morality without religion, 97.
the unsurpassability of, 104 et
seq.
468
GENERAL INDEX
Christian ethics — continued.
Tolstoy and, 53.
{Cf. also Ethics.)
Christian faith, the truth of the,
103.
good, the nature of the, 125.
chief commandment, the, 1 56.
Christ, the type of the, 174.
the 'principle' of Christian
ethics, 126.
faith and works, 1 78.
good works, the incentive to,
183.
hedonism, 190.
Kingdom of God, the, 127,
138.
law, the content of, 163.
form of, 160.
meaning of, 158.
'right' and 'law,' 136.
sin, 148.
honour, 257, 258.
idea of duty, 222.
of marriage, the, 324.
life in human society, 315 et seq.
love, 156 et seq.
moral attitude towards the law,
157.
morality and supernaturalism, 58.
and the Christian religion, 100.
perfection, 303 et seq.
personality {cf. New life of the
Christian),
prayer, the ground and power of,
285.
socialism, yj"].
Christianity and civilisation, conflict
between, 351.
and evolution, literature on, 47.
and the Social Democrats, 379.
Evangelical, \\\ et seq.
' unconscious,' 98.
Church and state, 452 et seq.
Luther on, 436.
organisation, 451.
schools and the state, 454.
the, attitude towards socialism,
3837385.
and civilisation, 350.
and its Founder, 438.
and laity, 149.
and suicides, 271.
dogmatic teaching of, 435, 436.
ethical meaning of, 435.
German idea of, 436.
Church, the — continued.
nature of, 435 et seq.
tasks of, 439 et seq.
Churches, separation of, 445.
Civilisation, 319.
and asceticism, 351.
and Christianity, conflict between,
351-
and the Church, 350.
monism of, 320.
Civilised communities, 321.
society, 319.
Clergy, supply of the, 458.
Clerical office, the, 448.
the Evangelical idea of, 448 etseq.
the Roman Catholic idea of, 452.
Collective will, the, 44, 71.
Commandment, the chief : ' Love,
to God and our neighbour '
156 et seq.
Commodities, distribution of, 358,
369-
division of, 368, 370.
exchange of, 357, 361, 369.
' Common welfare ' theory, the
German, 34.
' Communions ' of Evangelical
Churches, united, 446.
Communism, 370.
Companionship, 400.
and vanity, 402.
Comte, Auguste, 49.
Concord, the formula of, 243.
Confession and the Roman Church,
122.
auricular, 226, 227, 232, 237.
of faith, 440, 443.
Confessional writings, and good
works, 181.
Confessions of faith, ihe Augsburg,
157, 181, 184, 188, 278,
281,305,340,407,415,431,
432, 449-
Confirmation vows, 279.
Conscience, 19, 63, 64.
an infallible guide, 65.
an internal judge, 65.
and Church theology, 65, 66.
doctrine of, 65 etseq.
evolution of, 68.
formation of, 69.
judgments of, 74, 220.
nature of, 64.
origin of, 65.
phenomena of, 67, 68.
GENERAL INDEX
469
Conscience — continued.
subjection of, 227.
the intuitional theory of, 66.
Constitutional law, 420.
Conventional marriages, 329, 332.
Conversation, 393, 394.
Conversion, 188, 196, 197, 198, 199,
201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206.
consciousness of, 206.
Evangelical notion of, 204.
Methodism and, 202, 205.
Council of Trent, the, 157, 174, 294,
333, 340.
Counsels of perfection, 223, 232,
233> 305-
Evangelical, 233.
Courage, 58, 308, 309.
Courtesy, 313.
Cowardice, 308.
Creeds, the, supreme rule of
Catholics, 117.
Critique of Reason, Kant's, 388.
Culture and character, 251.
Cunning, 308.
Currency, 358.
'Cursing' psalms, the, 117.
Custom, 17.
Customs, 321.
Dancing, 243, 244, 399.
Spener on, 244.
Darwin and Spencer, 46.
Darwinian hypothesis, the, 371.
Death, Stoic philosophy of, 270.
Demand and supply, law of, 357.
Democratic state, the, 420.
Determinism, "j^, 92.
Development, laws of, 40.
theory, defects of, 41.
Devil, temptations of the, 266.
Devotional meditation, the Bible
and, 283-284.
Devotions and prayers, 282.
Dickens, Charles, 362, 382.
Discourteousness, 248.
Disraeli cited, 362.
Divine adoption, 128, 193, 203.
love, 133.
the many-sidedness of, 135.
revelation the ground of Evan-
gelical truth, 116.
worship, form of, 442.
the purpose of, 441.
Divorce, 341.
facility for, 332.
D i vorce — continued.
marriage and, 322, 327, 328.
Moses and, 341.
Divorcees, re-marriage of, 342.
Doctrine, 3, 4.
Christian ethics and, 1 20 et seq.
Dogmatics, 103, 148, 436.
Domestic servants, 339.
Duelling and 'honour,' 260-261.
Duty, 9, 209 et seq.
and calling, the doctrine of, 208,
209 et seq.
conflict of, 223 et seq., 261.
individual, 238 et seq. {Cf. Indi-
vidual and social duty.)
of justice, the, 218, 219, 220.
of love, the, 218.
overplus of {^cf. Works of super-
erogation).
the judgment of, 210.
the Protestant Christian idea of,
223.
to our neighbour, 224.
Dwellings, improved, 382.
Eckard cited, 226.
Economic questions and Christian
ethics, 374 et seq.
Edification, 441, 449.
Education, higher, 382.
of children, 338.
of girls, 343.
Egoism, 46.
Egoistic systems of Christian ethics,
144.
Eliot, George, 49.
Emotional nature and conscience,
Empirical character of freedom, 86,
87.
ethics, 21.
theory of conscience, 66, 70 et
seq.
Engel, 45.
Equalisation, 403 (and footnote).
Equality of rights for women, 342,
344-
Equivocation {cf. Lies and untruth).
Eschatology, 142.
Ethical concepts, fundamental :
action, 7.
moral action, 10.
content of, 13.
Society, the, 38.
value of work, 352.
470
GENERAL INDEX
Ethics, 436.
and aesthetics, 8, 11.
and supernaturalism, 58.
and the Old Testament, 1 17-1 18.
autonomous, 21.
Christian, i.
definition of, i.
eudasmonic, 33.
evolutionary, 33, 38, 39.
fundamental concepts of, 9.
Greek, 58.
hedonistic, 29, 34.
heteronomous, 21.
idealistic, 21.
immanent, 33.
intuitive, 21.
of development, 33.
of the Reformation, 1 1 5.
positive, 48.
the principle of, 22.
the validity of, 57.
transcendent, 33.
varying ideas of, 2.
{Cf. also Christian ethics.)
Eudaemonic and moral action, 12.
Eudaemonism, 96, 190 et seq. {Cf.
Hedonism.)
defects of, 36.
social, 34.
utilitarian, 37.
Evangelical Christianity, ill et seq.
Church and art, 394.
and divine revelation, 1 16.
and the state, 413.
in Germany and the legal part
of the marriage contract,
340.
churches and antinomianism, 1 59.
conception of the law, 160 et seq.
ethics and Roman Catholic, 112,
113-
true conformity of, to Scripture,
122, 123.
notion of conversion, 203, 204.
view of the law, 1 59.
of works of supererogation, 23 1 .
Evangelicals and good works, 180.
Evangelisation, 456.
Evolution, 373.
literature on, 47.
theory of, 39, 62.
universal, 43.
Evolutionary ethics, 33, 38, 39, 45.
Exchange value of commodities,
361.
Faith, 15, 100.
and mortal sin, 294.
and prayer, 291.
and repentance, 188.
and the Holy Ghost, 182.
and works, 1 79 et seq.
' empty,' 298.
justification by, ill, 123, 128.
Luther on, 186, 286.
misuse of the term, 166.
personal, 183.
Family life, 337,
Farewell Addresses, Monod's, 272.
Fasting, 280 et seq.
Feeling, ideal, 309, 310, 311.
Fellowship with God the foundation
of true Christian marriage,
326.
Fichte on lying, 230.
on suicide, 270.
Flattich as an educator of youth,
339 (footnote).
Flesh, the, history of the word, 149,
150, 265, 266.
Folly, 308.
Foolhardiness, 308.
Fornication, 241.
and divorce, 341
Francis of Assisi, St, 177, 218.
order of, 232.
Francke, A. H., and prayer, 290.
Free fellowships, 402.
Free love, 332.
Free will, 76, 77 et seq., loi, 428, 429.
and sacramental grace, 1 79, 1 80.
Freedom, 63, 64, 76, 93, io6, 255,
256.
and monism, 90.
causality and, 89.
grace and, relation between, 189.
illusion of, 86.
psychical, 80, 81,
responsibility and, 76 et seq.
Schopenhauer on, 89.
French home of positivism, 49.
Friendship, 346.
among the Greeks, 347.
Aristotle and, 348.
David and Jonathan, 348.
Socrates and, 347.
Games of chance, 394.
George, Henry, cited, 315.
German Evangelical Church and
marriage, 340.
GENERAL INDEX
471
German Reformation movement,
the, 423.
systems of insurance laws for
workers, 383.
Gifts, 249.
of grace, 249, 449.
Girls, education of, 343.
Gnosticism and antinomianism, 157.
God, love to and of, 164 et seq.
Luther's conception of, 134.
the Kingdom of, 127 et seq., 138
et seq., 316.
Lavater on, 143.
Luther on, 129.
our highest good, 138.
Goethe cited, 42, 43, 45, 92, 102, 118,
307,357,358,391-
Good works, incentives to, are
eudsemonistic, 179.
the incentive to, 183.
the Roman Catholic idea of, 179,
180.
which merit salvation, 179.
Grabowsky, 332.
Grace and freedom, relation be-
tween, 189.
fall from, 296.
gifts of, 249, 449.
the doctrine of, 61, 103, 159.
Grateful love, 184.
Gratitude for answered prayer, 292.
Grecian sestheticism, 172.
Greek civilisation and antinomian-
ism, 158.
Greeks, the, and their high concep-
tion of friendship, 347.
Guilt, 103, 1 54. {Cf. Sin.)
Haeckel, 46.
Hahnists, the, 307.
Hartmann, E. von, 51.
Hedonism, 96, 190 et seq. {Cf.
Eudaemonism.)
Hedonistic ethics, Zarathustras and,
29.
want of logic in, 35.
Hegel's view of the state, 143, 371.
Heredity, 38, 88.
Hero-worship, 93.
Hesse, the Landgraf of, 117.
Heteronomy, 96.
Historical Dramas (Schiller's), 347.
Histrionics and art, 398, 399.
Holiness, complete, unintelligible,
295.
Holy Ghost, the, and faith, 182.
Holy Scriptures, the, and Evangeli-
calism, 116, 117.
the devotional meditation of the,
283.
Home missions, 427 (and footnote),
442, 456.
Honour, 253, 256 et seq. {Cf.
Duelling.)
Hope, 311.
Hospitality, 402.
Human sin {cf. Sin).
Humility, 262 et seq.
misconceptions of the word, 262
et seq.
Humour, splenetic, 307.
Husband and wife, separation of,
.342.
Hypnotism, 88, 89.
Hypocrisy, 259.
Ibsen, 31.
cited, 48, 62.
Ibsen's Puppenheim, 332.
Ideal feeling, 309, 310, 311.
Idealistic ethics, 21, 66, 70.
Imitation of Christ, The, 177.
Imitation of Christ, 348.
Immanence, ethics of, 45, 100, 146,
147, 148, 152,317.
Immoral vows, 278.
Impurity, 336.
Inclination, 16.
Independents, the, 144.
' Indifferent ' actions, 236 et seq.
Individual and social duty, 210, 224,
238, 239.
IndividuaHsm, 143, 316.
Individualistic sestheticism, 42, 144.
churches, 144.
conception of marriage, the, 144.
of the state, 144.
confederacy, 144.
Industrial life, 348, 354 et seq.
Infallibility, the decree of, 143.
Infant baptism, 199, 200, 205.
' Inner Mission,' the, 427 (and
footnote), 456.
Insurance laws for workers, 383.
Intellect, pure, 348.
Intellectual freedom, 80.
Intercession in relation to prayer,
285, 288.
Interest and capitalism, 360.
Internal politics, 434.
472
GENERAL INDEX
International law :
politics, 433.
war, 430.
Intuitional theory of conscience,
66 et seq.
Intuitive ethics, 21.
Jansenists' thesis, papal decision
against, 233.
Jesuit ethics, probabilism of, 226,
227.
Journalism, present-day, 52.
Joy and happiness, 253 et seq.
Judgment, a standard of, 84, 105.
Justice, Plato and, 312.
the supreme duty and virtue, 311.
Justification and mortal sin, 294.
by faith, 128.
Luther on, 11 1, 123.
the doctrine of, in, 123.
Kant cited, 11, 58, 63, 94, 96, 99,
229, 230, 388.
Kempis, Thomas \ 177.
Kierkegaard cited, 144.
Kingdom of God, the, 127 ei seq.,
138 el seq., 316.
of sin, the {cf. World, the).
Kingsley, Charles, 362.
Knowledge, 309.
and science, 387 et seq.
Labour and machinery, 357, 358,
359-
hours of, 363
question, the, 381.
regulation of, 366.
right of organisation, 383.
the source of wealth and civilisa-
tion, 367
Large and Shorter Catechism,
Luther's, 188 (footnote),
200, 442.
Lavater cited, 143.
Law, 403.
and religion, 443.
and responsibility, 91.
constitutional, 420,
international, 430.
Luther and the, 161.
penal, 419.
public, 419.
state, 420.
the fore-court of love, 136.
' the third use ' of the, 222.
Law — continued.
the Roman Catholic doctrine a
perversion of the Gospel,
159-
two Evangelical propositions on,
160 et seq.
Lectures on Heroes, Carlyle's, 149
(footnote).
Legalism and Christian ethics, 157.
and the Roman Catholics, 157.
the Council of Trent and, 157.
Roman Catholics and, 112, 117.
Legality without morality unchris-
tian, 220.
Leipzig Interim, the, 242 (and foot-
note).
Liberalist theory of the state, the,
404.
Liberty and hero-worship, 93.
Lichtenberg cited, 85.
Lies and untruth, 227 ei seq.
Fichte on, 230.
Kant on, 230.
Luther on, 230, 231.
Nietzsche on, 231.
St Paul's dictum, 230.
Literature, present-day, and ethics,
48, 52.
social democratic, 323.
Littre, 49.
Livingstone's prayer, 288.
Lord's Prayer, the, 286.
Supper, united communion of
Evangelicals in the, 446.
Loti, Pierre, 49.
Lotze cited, 324.
Love, an essential attribute of God,
133-
and Christian ethics, 131.
definition of, 131.
misuse of the word, 166, 173.
of God and our neighbour
prompted by God's love,
178.
in Christ an incentive and
motive power, 178, 194.
of mankind {cf. Neighbour love),
of our enemies, 171.
of our neighbour {cf. Neighbour
love),
the fellowship of {cf. God, the
Kingdom of),
to Christ, 167.
to God, 164 et seq.
unselfish, 36.
GENERAL INDEX
478
Luther cited, 79, in, 123, 129, 134,
146, 152, 156, 161, 162, 180,
181, 186, 187, 196,212,213,
230, 231, 243, 260, 264, 265,
276, 279, 283, 284, 286, 292,
293, 296, 298, 302, 334, 338,
374, 377> 409, 410, 413, 422,
433,436,440,442,443,451-
Lutheran Church and the adiaphora,
242, 243.
and antinomianism, 159.
Luther's married hfe, 325.
Catechism, 188, 200, 442.
pastoral visitation of Saxon
churches, 188 (and foot-
note).
Machinery and labour, 357, 358,
359-
Naumann on, 359.
Malthusian theory, the, 364.
Marriage, 242.
a Christian duty, 331.
a divine ordinance, 330.
a type of the union between
Christ and His Church,
323, 334-
and the family, 322 et seq.
childless, 327.
individualistic conception of, 144.
legal recognition of, 340.
Luther and, 334.
nature of, 326.
regulation of, and the super-man,
30-
separation, 328.
the Christian conception of, 322.
doctrine of, 322.
idea of, 324.
the high school of chastity, 336.
the indissolubility of, 322, 327,
328, 334, 341.
the individualistic conception of,
144.
the mystery of, 322, 323.
when not ethically justifiable, 329.
Marriages of convenience, 329, 332.
second, 329.
Married Woman's Property Act,
the, 345.
Martyr, correct use of the term, 220.
Marx, 45.
Materialism, modem, 172, 372.
Meditation, 282 et seq.
Melancthon, Luther and, 276.
Mennonites, the, 415 (and footnote).
Merit and reward, 192.
works of, 233.
Meritorious action, 192, 278, 354.
Methodism and conversion, 202.
Methodists, 446.
Mill, J. S., on happiness, 35.
Ministry, a 'call' necessary for the,
450.
Missionaries, 13.
Missionary operations, self-sacri-
fice and, 433.
Missions, 350, 442, 460 et seq.
and missioners, 456, 457.
enmity towards, 461.
Moderation, 313.
" Modern consciousness," 60, 61,
63, 90, 95-
and prayer, 290.
and the evolution theory, 62.
objections to, 63.
Modesty, 335.
Monarchical state, the, 420.
Monastic asceticism, 172.
vows, 278.
Monasticism, 96, 221, 232.
Money, 360, 361, 377.
marriages for, 329.
Monism, 46.
and freedom, 90.
and will-power, 78.
of civilisation, 320.
Monogamy, 328.
Moral action, content of, 13.
eudaemonic conception of, 12.
nature of, 8.
value of, 10.
freedom, 71, 81, 190.
good, 9.
gymnastic, 272.
judgment, 84, 226.
law, 18, 63, 76, 93, 95.
Morahty and religion, 95, 412.
chastity as, 335.
commercial, 10, 17.
objective, 426.
of art, the, 398.
of statecraft, 230.
' Sodomite,' 31.
statistics of, 88.
without legality unchristian, 220.
without religion, 97 et seq.
Morals, 3.
Mortal sin, 294.
and the fall from grace, 296.
474
GENERAL INDEX
Mosaic law of divorce, the, 341.
Motives and action, 81, 82, 85, 86,
87.
Music, Luther's praise of, 243.
Mysticism, 142.
Nation, definition of, 403.
National Church, the, 454.
fasts, 280.
Natural science, 45.
Naturalism in art, 396.
Naumann cited, 359.
Necessity, the law of, "JT.
Neighbour love, 15, 49, 139, 163,
325-
the second commandment, 168.
the universal love of mankind,
170.
New life of the Christian, the :
asceticism, 272.
beginning of, 198.
character, 248.
duties and virtues, 307.
duties, conflict of, 223.
duty and calling, 209.
humility, 262.
individual ethics, 195.
intercession, 288.
law and the Christian, 221.
perfection, Christian, 303.
prayer and devotions, 282.
progress of the new life, 208.
salvation, assurance of, 297.
sin, 264, 292.
suicide, 269.
temptation, 264.
virtue and character, 245.
vows, 277.
{Cf. Conversion, Regeneration,
Salvation.)
New Testament, the, compared
with the Old Testament,
Christian ethics and, \\% et seq.
Newspapers and ethics, 52.
Nietzsche, Friedrich, cited, 26, 27,
29.
Oaths, Christians and, 416.
of office, 279, 416.
the question of, 413, 414.
St Paul and, 415,
the Mennonites and, 415.
Obedience, 348, 421.
and reform, 422.
the apostolical injunction con-
cerning, 422.
the duty of all Christians, 421.
to ecclesiastical superiors, 232.
Objective morality, 426.
Offence, 84, 149, 150 et seq. (Cf.
Sin.)
Luther on, 152.
Official vows, 279, 416.
Old and New Testaments, 117.
Old Testament, ethics and, 117,
118.
Goethe on the influence of, 1 1 8.
Ordination, 450, 451.
Organisation of labour, the right of,
383.
' Other-worldliness,' 60, 96.
Otinger cited, 203.
Painting, 394.
Paley's Moral Philosophy, 68 (foot-
note).
Papal state churches, 412.
Pastoral care, 442, 458.
Patience, 311.
Patriotism, 418.
Paul, St, and marriage, 333-335-
Paulsen cited, 59, 325.
Peace of God, the, 255.
Penal law, 419.
Penance, the sacrament of, 294,
295.
Penitence, 188.
Perfection, Christian, 303 et seq.
counsels of, 223, 232, 233, 305.
Roman Catholic teaching of, 305.
the idea of, 306.
' Permissible ' actions, 236 et seq.
Personal renewal, the Protestant
idea of, 294.
responsibility, 428.
self-examination, a good rule for,
260.
will, subordination of, 14.
Personality, 249.
Pessimism, 49.
ethics of, 50.
Physical science, 48.
Plato, the death of, 312.
Plato's view of the state, 143.
Play and pastimes, 393.
Pledge against intoxicants, a, 279.
Poetry, 394.
GENERAL INDEX
475
Political economy, 45.
theories of, 356 et seq.
fundamental notions of, 356.
state, the, 404.
Politics, 433.
internal, 434.
Polygamy, 328.
Positivism, 48.
the ethics of, 98.
Poverty, the rule of, 232.
Powell on religion and science, 47.
Power, 403.
Prayer, 276, 282, 284 et seq., 450.
a life of, 290.
and faith, 291.
and intercession, 285, 288.
answer to, 289.
as a duty, 311.
danger of ' stormy,' 287.
Livingstone's, 288.
temporal petitions of, 286.
the ground and power of, 285.
the Lord's Prayer, 286, 289.
Preaching, 441, 450, 458.
Priests, Luther on, 451.
Private rights, 419.
Probabilism of Jesuit ethics, 226, 227.
Production, the question of, 358.
Property, private, 367.
Prostitution and the slavery of
woman, 336.
Prudence, 17.
Psalms, the, 117.
Psychical freedom, 80, 85.
Public laws, 419.
Punishment, definition of, 425.
retributive, 429.
the right of, 425.
Pusillanimity, 308.
Queries on Conduct (Funke's), 217.
Rationalism and conversion, 202.
and regeneration, 202.
Recreation, 393, 394, 401.
the province of, 239, 240.
Redemption, the doctrine of, 66.
Ree cited, 77-78.
Regeneration, 196, 197, 200, 202.
baptismal {cf. Infant baptism).
Religion and art, 395 et seq.
and law, 443.
and science, 47.
morality and, 95.
without morality, 96.
Religious communities, 232.
meditation, 283.
'Religious' life of the Gospel, the,
232.
Re-marriage of divorcees, 342.
Repentance, 188, 196, 197, 201.
Respect for others, 312.
Responsibility and freedom, 76 et
seq.
and law, 91.
Resurrection, 201.
Retributive punishment, 429.
Revenge, 261.
Revisionism, 371.
Revolution, 423.
and internal politics, 434.
Carlyle on, 424.
' Reward " and the charge of
hedonism, 190 et seq.
Ribbing's Sexual Hygiene, 336.
Richter cited, 147.
Riddle of the Universe (Haeckel's),
46.
Right, consequences of the absence
of, 137-
of justice, the, 219, 220.
of punishment, the, 425.
of the state, 419.
private, 419.
renunciation of, and monasticism,
221, 408.
the indispensable presupposition
of the fellowship of love,
136.
the notion of, 136.
Roman Catholic conception of the
Church socialistic, 143.
view of Christian ethics, 58.
view of the state, 407.
view of works of supererogation,
233-
Roman Catholics and Evangelical
ethics, 112.
and legalism, 112, 157.
and moral action, 112.
and socialism, 383.
and the state, 407.
confession, 122.
morality of, 113.
subjection to the Church, 115.
Romanticists, the, 115.
Romish conception of sin, 294.
doctrine of faith and works, the,
179, 180.
Rothe cited, 173, 225, 406, 437.
476
GENERAL INDEX
Sabbath observance, 1 61-162, 413,
414, 442.
Luther on, 162.
Sacrament of penance, 294.
Sacramental grace, free will and,
179, 180.
Sacraments, the Catholic concep-
tion of the, 297.
Sacrifice, 59.
Salvation Army, the, 205.
Salvation, assurance of, 297.
and the Evangelical Church,
297.
the Protestant idea of, 298,
300-303.
by faith, 160.
doctrine of, 160.
' plan of,' 200.
Schleiermacher's doctrine of, 200.
Sanctification, 201, 208.
the doctrine of, 162, 295.
Saul, the death of, 270.
Schiller cited, 273, 347, 391.
Schleiermacher cited, 23, 148, 200,
223, 236, 244, 298, 317,
319. 325. 334-
SchmoUer cited, 357.
School, the, 417.
Schopenhauer cited, 22, 51, 79,
85, 87, 89.
Science, 386 et seq.
and art, 348, 385.
and religion, 47.
and theology, 389.
aversion to, 387.
knowledge and, 387 et seq.
Sectarian, meaning of, 448.
Sects, 446.
the Protestant idea of, 446.
the Roman Catholic conception
of, 446.
Self, love of, 1 63.
Self-aggrandisement, 312.
consciousness, 80.
control, 325, 336.
an individual duty, 275.
denial, 163.
determination, 9, 16.
discipline, 275, 276, 325.
examination, a good rule for, 260.
judgment, 84.
love, ideal, 164.
mastery, 15.
restraint, 58.
sacrifice, 14.
Separation of husband and wife,
342. (yCf. Divorce.)
Sermons, 441, 450, 458.
Servants, domestic, 339.
Servetus, execution of, 1 1 7.
Sex differences, 324 et seq.
Sexual licence, 332. .
Sigwart quoted, 83.
Sigwart's Logic, 40, 90.
Sin, 59, 65, 84, 148 et seq.
against the Holy Ghost, the, 296.
character in relation to, 264.
dogmatics and, 148.
ethics and, 148.
the Biblical expression of, 153.
the kingdom of, 153, 195.
the resistance of the human will
to the Divine, 154.
the unforgivable, 296.
Sinlessness of true Christians, the,
295.
Slavery, 1 1 9.
and serfdom forms of industrial
life, 359.
of women, prostitution and, 336.
Smith, Adam, and modern social-
ism, 144.
Pearsall, 187.
Social Democracy and Christianity,
379-
and the science of brotherhood,
46.
fundamental theories of, 371 et
seq.
literature, 323.
Social Democratic party and hedon-
ism, 38.
organisation of, 362.
Social ethics :
art, 390.
capital punishment, 427.
children, education of, 338.
Christian life in human society,
the, 315.
Church, the, 435.
and state, 452.
organisation, 451.
national, the, 435.
task of the, 439, 440.
' Churches,' the, 444.
civilisation, 319.
civilised intercourse, 348.
clergy, supply of, 458.
clerical office, the, 448.
companionship, 400.
GENERAL INDEX
477
Social t^\cs— continued.
divine worship, form of, 442.
divorce, 341.
economic questions, Christian
ethical judgment of, 374.
eudaemonism, 34.
evangelisation, 456.
family, the, 337.
friendship, 346.
industrial life, the, 318, 354.
intercourse, 393.
international law, 430.
laws, the foundation of, 412.
marriage, 322.
Christian idea of, 324.
consequences, 335.
legal recognition of, 343.
missions, 460.
money, 360.
National Church, the, 454.
oaths, 414.
obedience, 421.
patriotism, 418.
personal responsibility, 428.
political economy, theories of, 356.
politics, 433.
punishment, 425.
revolution, 423.
rights, private, 419.
state, 419.
school, the, 417.
science, 385, 386.
social ethics, 318.
question, the, 354, 361.
socialists' complaint, 363.
State, the, 402, 405.
life, aspects of, 419.
meaning of, 406.
nature of, 403.
rights of, 419.
woman, status of, 342.
work, 352.
Socialism, 143, 316.
and the Roman Catholics, 383.
in social life, 143.
modern, Adam Smith the pro-
tagonist of, 144.
Socialistic conception of the Church
by the Roman Catholics,
143-
Socialists' complaint, the, 363.
indictment, the, 364.
promise, the, 368.
Socialists, the threefold economic
demand of the, 366 et seq.
Society, 318, 355.
Sociology, 49.
Socrates and the Sophists, 25.
death of, 347, 348.
SodonCs End, 31.
Spangenberg's famous hymn, 310,
Spencer, 46.
Spener's Theological Reflections,
157,217.
Spleen, Goethe on, 307.
State, a political, 404.
a progressive social, 410.
law, 420.
life, some aspects of :
capital punishment, 427, 428.
obedience, 421.
personal responsibility, 428.
private rights, 419.
revolution, 423. j
right of punishment, 425 et seq.
rights of the State, 419 et
seq.
the, 402.
the, a new idea of the Church
against the Roman Cath-
olic conception of, 409.
the Christian, varied forms of,
411, 412.
the Evangelical Church and the,
413-
the, Hegel's view of, 143.
the, meaning of, 406.
the, nature of, 403 et seq.
the, Plato's view of, 143.
the relation of the Church to, 452
et seq.
the Roman Catholic doctrine of
the, 407.
the, two views of, 404.
Statecraft, morality of, 230.
" States of the Church," the, 412.
Stoic philosophy, 14, 270.
Stoics, the, 42, 145.
Submerged Bell, The, 31.
Subordination of personal will, 14.
Sudermann, 31, 48.
Suffering, 59,
in the light of temptation, 268.
Suicide, 269.
alarming increase of, 269.
causes of, 269.
Fichte on, 270,
reason for, 272.
temptation to, 272.
Suicides, burial of, 271.
478
GENERAL INDEX
Sunday, the observance of, i6i, 162,
413,414,442.
Supererogation, works of, 223, 231
et seq.
Super-man, the, Goethe and, 30.
Nietzsche on, 26.
Supernaturalism and Christian
morality, 58.
and modern consciousness, 63.
Supply, demand and, law of, 357.
Synods, 452.
Talents, 249.
Technology, 348.
Teetotalism, 281.
Temperamental differences, 249.
Temperance, 58, 274, 281, 313.
Temporal petitions in prayer, 286,
287.
Temptation, 264, 267, 272.
definition of, 265.
of Luther, 265.
of the devil, 266.
sources of, 267.
sufferings as, 268.
Thanksgiving in relation to prayer,
285.
Theatre, the, 398.
Calvin's judgment on, 243.
Themistocles, the death of, 270.
Theological candidates, preparation
of, 459.
Theology and science, 389.
Thought, the law o{{cf. Causality).
Tolstoy, 53, 218, 219, 221, 374.
Transcendent duty. Catholic idea
of, 192, 278, 317.
ethics, 146, 147, 148, 152.
Trent, the Council of, 157, 174, 294,
"333. 340.
Tridentine Council {cf. Trent,
Council of).
Truth essential to love, 230.
Truthfulness, 227 et seq., 313, 416.
Unbelief, the Protestant 'mortal
sin,' 294.
Unchastity, 336.
Unchristian aspect of vows, 278.
* Unconscious ' Christianity, 98.
Unevangelical aspect of vows, 278,
279.
Unforgivable sin, the, 296.
Unselfish love the highest pleasure,
36.
Untruthfulness, 228 et seq., 277 et
seq. {Cf. Lies and un-
truth.)
Usury, Luther and, 377.
Utilitarian ethics, 38.
hedonism, 37, 39.
Utilitarianism, 102.
Utility, 17.
Vanity, 402.
Veracity the main condition of
moral intercourse of love,
230. {Cf. Truthfulness.)
Vices, 248.
Vinet cited, 144.
Virginity, the Tridentine Council
and, 333.
Virtue, 9, 246 et seq.
and character, 245.
Virtues and duties, 307 et seq.
contraries of, 308, 309.
Vivisection, revolt against, 174.
Vocation, the Christian idea of,
214-216. {Cf CaUing,
Duty.)
Vows, 277 et seq.
baptismal, 279.
confirmation, 279.
monastic, contrary to divine pre-
cept, 278.
not in harmony with Protestant
ethics, 278.
official, 279, 416.
taking the pledge, 279.
unchristian, 278.
unevangelical, 278.
Wages, the question of, 363, 364,
380.
War, 430.
a justification for, 432.
Warfare and the question of truth-
fulness, 229, 230.
Wesley, John, 206.
Wichern, J. H., 427.
Will, the. 73, 76,80,86,309. {Cf
also Free will.)
Wisdom, 58, 308, 309.
Wit, Sudermann on, 31.
Woman, degradation of, 332.
emancipation of, 344.
spheres open to, 343.
the status of, 342 et seq.
1
GENERAL INDEX
479
Women doctors, 345.
equality of rights for, 342, 344.
Work, 352 et seq.
Works of supererogation, 223, 231
et seq., 242, 243.
World, the, 148 et seq., 265, 266.
"the kingdom of sin," 153, 195,
416.
Worship, 440.
Wundt, ethics of, 44, 78.
"Wiirtemburg Book for Con-
firmeesl'' the, 187.
Zarathustras (cf. Nietzsche).
Zinzendorf, 301.
Zwinglius, 187.
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