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iR.f. F. M\.To,^C<i' 








European War 

September 1915— March 1916 


Anthony Amoux, Ph. D. , LL. B, 


Boston, 1917 


Copyright 1917 

by ' 

Anthony Amoux 


Prof. F. M. Taylor 






From the Sea to Champagnb 

Chapter I 9 

** II 16 

*' III 21 

'* IV 26 

In Champagne 

Chapter VI 33 

** VII ....... 36 


Chapter VIII 41 

In Alsace 

Chapter IX 47 


NoBTH Russia 

Chapter X . 61 

** XII 59 

XIII 64 

** XIV 68 

** XV 74 

Bulgaria's Entry into the War 

Chapter XVI 80 

XVII 83 

XVIII . 88 


Chapter XIX 91 

** XX 98 

XXI 102 

xxni 106 


Chapter XXII 112 





Chapter XXTV . 


• • • 



Chapter XXV . 

• • • 






Chapter XXVII 

• • • 



Chapter XXVIII 




Chapter XXIX . 

• • • 


East Africa 

Chapter XXX . 

• • • 



Chapter XXXI . 

• • • 



Chapter XXXII 

• • • 


The War on the Sea 

Chapter XXXIII 

• • 

• • • 


General and Political History 

op Europe 

Chapter XXXIV 

• • 

• • ■ 



I. Prisoners of War 

• « 

. 177 

II. Miss Cavell 

• • 


III. The Battle of the 



IV. Statistics . 

• « 


V. Bulgaria . 





The comparative calm which obtained along this 
western portion of the end of the western battle front 
from late in August was not interrupted until the third 
week of September, when a joint offensive began on the 
part of both the French and the English. The joint 
offensive was commanded by Sir John French and Gen- 
eral Foch and had as its purpose the forcing of a way 
between the projection of the fine kown as the La Bassee 
salient and the river Scarpe into the plain of the Scheldt, 
while at the same time the French, under Gen. Castelnau, 
opened an offensive to the east of Rheims, between this 
city and the beginning of the Argonne Forest, with the 
object of throwing back the German line in this region 
to the other side of the Aisne River. The entire latter 
part of the summer the British had been engaged in for- 
warding supplies of men and particularly large quantities 
of artillery and ammunition from England, with this 
offensive in view, and indeed it was necessary for the 
British to supply themselves amply with artillery since 
the attack upon the German lines which they intended 
to launch was of necessity a frontal one which could not 
be delivered with any hope of success before the defences 
of the trenches of the existing German position were 
blown away and holes made therein by the artillery so 
that the infantry could advance. We will consider the 
western offensive first and discuss the eastern offensive 

The battle opened with feigned attacks both on the 
Belgian sea coast, and on land at points other than the 
points at which the real effort was intended to be made. 
On the Belgian sea coast, on September 24, the towns of 
Kiiocke, Heyst, Zeebrugge, Blankenberghe, andthef orti- 
fications to the west of Ostend were bombarded by the 
British fleet, and on September 26, 27 and 30 these places 
were again attacked, as well as Middelkirke and West- 



ende. The object of these bombardments was to create 
in the minds of the Germans an impression that a landing 
in force on the Belgian coast, at some convenient point, 
was contemplated, to which these bombardments were 
the preliminary, and thus induce the Germans to send 
troops to the Belgian coast to protect these towns from 
such a landing. 

The feigned attacks on land were upon the German 
positions in the Ypres salient and to the South of La 
Bassee. On September 25 the British artillery subjected 
these positions to a heavy bombardment and this bom- 
bardment was followed up with four infantry attacks. 
The first of these was on the German positions on the 
east bank of the Ypres-Comines Canal; the second to 
the South of Armentieres ; the third to the north of 
Neuve Chapelle, and the fourth near Givenchy. The 
details of these attacks are not of very great moment. 
The first attack only lasted some three or four hours, and 
resulted in the British at first gaining some ground, but 
afterwards retiring to their original positions. 

The second attack, near Armentieres, opened at about 
half past four in the morning and, after lasting until three 
o'clock in the afternoon, also resulted in the British, 
after an initial advance, finding themselves obliged to 
retire to the point from whence they had started. The 
attack near Neuve Chapelle had little better luck; a 
German trench or two were won, but no important prog- 
ress was made. While the attack near Givenchy made 
almost no progress and need not be given further atten- 
tion. Of course it should be said that none of these 
attacks were really expected to gain ground. Their 
object was to confuse the German commanders as to the 
point at which the real attack should be launched, and 
thus prevent them to as large an extent as possible from 
concentrating the strength of their reserve forces at any one 
point. This expectation of the British, however, was 
only met in part, since in spite of the rather naive men- 
tality with which the British commanders credit their 
German opponents, in this war, at least, they have not 
been able at any time to mystify them completely, and 
on this occasion the British commanders did undoubtedly 
have, to some extent, the effect which they desired, and 
induced the German commanders to scatter a portion of 
their reserves; yet enough remained concentrated and 
mobile to be of paramount importance in the subsequent 



The line of German defences extending fromLaBassee 
in the north to Vimy in the south were chosen as the 
objectives against which the real attack was to be hurled. 
The German line here at the opening of the fight was an 
irregular ^one. From the cemetery of Souchez which 
lies but a little to the east of the village, of the same 
name, this German line ran along the eastern slopes of 
the plateau of Notre Dame de Lorette and through the 
Bois k Hasche to the east of Angres and Lievin and 
along in front of a low range of hills extending from the 
west of Loos to the west of Hulluch, and the west of 
Haines, until the line reached the Canal of La Bassee, 
at a point a little to the west of the road leading from 
Lens to La Bassee. The general direction of this line 
was, therefore, north and south, and in fact south of 
Souchez the line ran almost along the eastern side of the 
highway running from Souchez to Arras. 

An almost straight road connects La Bassee, passing 
through Lens, with Vimy, and continues to Arras. This 
road runs along the crest of a line of hills of compara- 
tively insignificant height, but which lift it above the 
plain to the west. Almost half way between La Bassee 
and Vimy, to the northwest of Lens, and at the foot of 
the westward slope of this line of hills spoken of, lies 
Loos. The ultimate object of the offensive which the 
British were about to launch was to capture Loos and 
the line of ridges running northeastwardly from it 
through Hulluch and Haines, as well as all the Vimy 
heights which were formed by the southern and highest 
end of this ridge which culminated at Vimy; the capture 
of either of which would have compelled the Germans to 
evacuate the rather important town of Lens and thus 
have considerably embarrassed them, owing to the 
resultant loss of control of the railways running east- 
ward from Lens, in maintaining their line from La Bassee 
to Vimy. 

But the progress of an attack to the East of Souchez, 
and of Neuville St. Vaast, which, as my readers will 
remember, had been the chief scenes of the intense con- 
flicts in the earlier French offensive in this region, was 
rendered extremely difficult by the fact that to the ea^t 
of these two places rose the long ridge of Hill 140, some 
400 feet above the plain, which interposed itself as a 
formidable natural barrier, (made more formidable by 
intricate works of art and by artillery) to any advance 
of the Allies in this direction; particularly, as further 



north the Germans held a whole system of trenches on 
the eastern slope of Notre Dame de Lorette and in the 
Bois duHasche; to dislodge them from which would have 
been a work of extreme dijficulty since their assailants 
would have come under the German artillery fire from 
Lievin, Angres and Givenchy and could themselves com- 
mand no point of attack on Hill 140. Consequently it 
was resolved to deliver the main assault on the so-called 
Loos-Hulluch-Haines ridges which were not only about 
half the height of the hills northwest of Vimy, but were 
fronted by an easier country on the west and presented 
fewer obstacles generally; this phrase "fewer obstacles" 
is nevertheless to be taken merely as a relative expression. 

The plain in front of these ridges was sprinkled with 
hamlets, mine-heads, and factory buildings of greater 
or less size, interspersed with slag heaps, and these and 
the other existing advantages presented by the terrain 
had been cleverly turned by the Germans into field 
fortifications bristling with machine guns and surrounded 
by the inevitable barbed wire defences which made it 
necessary to take each one of these little forts separately, 
in many cases only by hand to hand fighting. Certain 
more prominent fortifications existed as well; for instance, 
the HohenzoUern redoubt, which has figured so often 
in the bulletins, was located about three-quarters of a 
mile to the west of St. Elie on the La Bassee-Lens road, 
and a little further south, about a mile directly north of 
Loos, was another redoubt on the crest of the hill, which 
afterwards came to enjoy almost as much fame as the 
HohenzoUern redoubt; while, scattered over the western 
slopes of the ridge of hills in this direction, were numerous 
chalk-pits which had been fortified by the Germans. 

Loos itself contained about 12,000 inhabitants prior 
to the war, but at the time of this battle was only ten- 
anted by a handful of its former inhabitants. But in 
Loos, itself, was a bridge known as the "Tower" bridge, 
whose girders rose to the height of about 300 feet, and 
commanded the coimtry for 40 miles around the town, 
which girders were used by the German artillery ob- 
servers and gave them a considerable advantage over 
their rivals on the other side, since it enabled them to 
command the whole coimtry-side without exposing them- 
selves. From Loos to Hulluch on the north the distance 
is about 3000 yards. As has already been said, north* 
west of Hulluch lay the HohenzoUern redoubt, but 
between Hulluch and that fortification were a number of 



stone quaiTies which the Germans had also turned into 

From here the German line of advanced trenches 
turned abruptly northwest and ran to a deep and well 
situated coal pit, whose high and long slag heap extended 
to within a half a mile of the village of Auchy. From 
this slag heap the German line ran almost directly north 
to the La Bassee Canal. 

These German trenches were in three lines; the first 
running to the west of Loos, the second running through 
the town itself, and the third to the east of the town. 
These trenches were elaborately constructed and were 
furnished with electric light from a power station, as 
well as equipped with a telephone system which enabled 
the German commanders to keep in communication with 
all this portion of the lines. The British trenches south 
of the canal, ran parallel to those of the Germans, and at 
distances varying from 100 to 500 yards. 

The British force occupying these trenches was com- 
posed mostly of seasoned troops, though the newly 
created Welsh Guards and the 21st and 24th divisions of 
Kitchener's new army, took part in the battle. Their 
force comprised, in addition to the troops that have 
been mentioned, the 1st and 2nd army corps under Sir 
Douglas Haig, as the assailing troops, and the 11th army 
corps as the reserve, in all, perhaps, from 125,000 to 
130,000 men. 

In addition to this large force of men concentrated on 
a comparatively short front of about 6}4 miles, the 
British had provided themselves, during the months 
that preceded the attack in question, with an enormous 
quantity of large calibre artillery, and they had also 
added to their offensive equipment two weapons which 
were new for them; firstly, retorts for discharging a 
stupefying gas, and secondly, devices for creating large 
volumes of irritating and temporarily blinding smoke. 
In order to use these two weapons to advantage, it was 
necessary for the British to wait for the opening of their 
assault on the German positions, for a day whereupon 
the wind should not only blow from the west but also 
be of sujficient strength to carry the mixture of gas and 
smoke these being generated simultaneously across the 
distance intervening between the place of its liberation 
and the German trenches. 

In theory, this mixture of gas and smoke would have 
produced a temporary asphyxiation and temporary 



blindness, more or less complete, on the defenders of the 
German trenches; and this condition, once having been 
achieved, the rest was expected to be comparatively easy. 
While waiting for these propitious atmospheric condi- 
tions, the British artillery was not idle but pounded 
away continuously on the German trenches. It was not 
until Friday, the 24th of September, that a westerly 
breeze sprang up. This breeze, however, brought with 
it a fine rain with considerable mist, and this, in its turn, 
creating mud, neutralized its promise that the succeeding 
day would be suitable for the assault, since the mud 
would make the ground very difiicult for the infantry 
to advance over; a fact which should have been taken 
into consideration by a competent commander, but 
which, as we shall see later, was not. 



All the rest of this day Friday, September 24tli, the 
British artillery on the north and center of this front, 
and the French artillery to the south of it, kept up an 
unremitting fire upon the German positions, which was 
not even interrupted by the night, and which was prob- 
ably as severe a cannonading as had been seen on the 
western front up to this time. 

The Germans, who, apparently, did not sufifer very 
greatly from the effects of this heavy firing, did not reply 
in anything like the same volume. Towards midnight, 
the cannonading grew slightly less and this slackening 
continued until about half past four in the morning. At 
this hour, the wind had slightly shifted to the southwest 
and was thus no longer as favorable for the success of a 
gas and smoke attack as it had been the afternoon of 

The rain was continuing to fall, and during the night 
the ground had grown much heavier. At half past four 
the British opened a most intense cannonading. The 
cannonading of the evening before had been regarded 
as severe, but its severity was relatively slight as com- 
pared with that of the bombardment which now began. 
Certainly it was the severest artillery assault which the 
British bad ever delivered in the course of their military 
history and it was probably fully the equal of any artil- 
lery assault which had ever been made up to that time 
in the war, on any front. It is stated that shells were 
fired along the five mile battle front at the rate of 600 a 
minute; while the noise was reported to be so terrific in 
its volume that persons thirty or forty miles from the 
battlefield heard it distinctly. This cannonading con- 
tinued unremittingly until about half past five. At this 
time the British began to use their gas and smoke appa- 
ratus, and in the early morning light its clouds could be 
seen issuing from their trenches, but the wind played the 
British a trick on the northern portion of their line and 
carried the gas and smoke above and over Pit No. 8, the 



HohenzoUern redoubt, the stone quarries and HuUuch; 
though towards Loos and Lievin the smoke cloud 
appeared to observers to have been wafted directly. 

At half past six, in obedience to a silent signal, the roar 
of the British artillery ceased; though that of the French 
under General D'Urbal, further south in the direction of 
Souchez, could still be heard thundering; and this contin- 
uance of this French artillery, rather clearly indicated 
that it had not, up to that time, succeeded in plowing a 
way for the French Infantry through the mazes of the 
German defences which confronted it. 

Very curiously, and for themselves very unf ortunately^ 
as the sequel shows, the British high command paid no 
attention to this apparent condition of afifairs on the 
French portion of the front (the southern), but gave the 
signal for the assault by the British Infantry, and thus 
converted what should have been a concerted movement 
along the whole front by both forces, British and French 
acting as a unit, into a sole action by the British troops 
alone. In all probability, this gross blunder had more of 
an efifect on the subsequent unfortunate issue of the 
battle for the Allies than any other contributing cause^ 
though other contributing causes did not lack. 

As said, then, at half past six the signal of the command 
for the British Infantry to advance to the assault was 
given, and the soldiers came pouring out of their trenches, 
their faces concealed in their smoke masks. But hardly 
had the British made their appearance in the open when 
so heavy a German fire began that it was at once per- 
ceived that the artillery had not made an adequate 
preparation for the attack, in spite of 'the number of 
hours it had been at work; so that the troops were ordered 
to return to the protection of their trenches and immedi- 
ately the British artillery reopened on the German 
positions, in an even more severe bombardment than the 
one which had taken place earlier in the morning. This 
bombardment continued for about half an hour, and then, 
suddenly ceasing, the word to advance was once more 

Between the Bethune and La Bassee Canal, on Pit 
No. 8, which, as has been said before, was almost directly 
in front of the HohenzoUern redoubt, the assault from 
the northwest made no progress; in spite of the fact that 
the assailants were veteran troops. The strength of the 
German artillery fire in this sector of the battle, both 
from La Bassee to the northeast and from the general 



line between La Bassee and Haines, was so strong that it 
was impossible for any headway to be made, and the 
British, who fell in thousands, suffered a complete and 
sanguinary check. 

Further south two brigades were thrown directly 
against the HohenzoUem redoubt and its advance 
defense Pit No. 8, in a frontal attack. One brigade, 
attacking the north of the position, devoted itself prin- 
cipally to the HohenzoUern redoubt, while the other, 
proceeding against the southerly end of the general 
portion, succeeded in throwing itself between the redoubt 
and the quarries immediately to the west of the hamlet 
of St. Elie, on the La Bassee-Haines road. The fighting 
which took place around the redoubt was extremely 
violent, as it was also around the slag heap and the 
buildings of Pit No. 8. Pit No. 8 and its western defenses 
were eventually stormed and seized by the British, but, 
in spite of their most desperate efforts, they were unable 
to penetrate into the defences of the HohenzoUem 
redoubt. Had the troops operating between the banks 
of the canal and Pit No. 8 attacking that point from the 
north succeeded in effecting the capture of the east- 
ern defenses of Pit No. 8, this would probably have nec- 
essitated the evacuation of the HohenzoUern redoubt; 
but as these troops did not perform the task assigned 
to them, nothing threatened the HohenzoUern redoubt 
from the north. 

Still further south another assault was made in the 
direction of the quarries opposite St. Elie. Here the 
British troops advanced rapidly and succeeded in cap- 
turing the quarries, and then when these were once in 
their hands an attempt was made to capture the village 
Haines to the northeast of the HohenzoUern redoubt. 
After much hard fighting and heavy losses, some British 
succeeded in establishing themselves in this village at 
about eight o'clock in the morning and in maintaining 
themselves there until five in the afternoon, at which 
time, being almost cut to pieces by the weight of the 
German metal which was poured in upon them from the 
east, and also being almost surrounded by the German 
infantry, they fell back to their main line. 

Another attack struck at St. Elie but was imable to 
enter the scattered hamlet of a few houses itself, though 
they did at one time attain its outskirts; which position 
was reached a few minutes after eight. The German 
counter-attacks on this portion of the Une from St. EUe 



northwest grew stronger and stronger and it became 
apparent that if the British intended to hold the positions 
which they had won it was evident that they must be 
heavily reinforced. 

With that curious misfortune which has attended all 
British movements in battle so far, during this war, 
where the British depend upon their own generals for 
the strategy and tactics of the fights, it was discovered 
too late that the reserves of these forces, the 20th and 
21st divisions of the new army, had been placed so far 
to the rear that they could not be gotten up in time to 
influence the result of the fight. Though ordered to 
advance at 9.30 in the morning, so far back had they 
been carefully stationed, that it was nearly noon when the 
heads of their advancing columns reached a line to the 
west, approximately five miles from the battle line, and 
it was late in the afternoon before they reached a point 
at which they could be of any influence in deciding the 
battle; and then as usual it was "too late." 

Another force, composed entirely of the Guards, was 
also ordered to reinforce the British battle line on its left 
wing, but this force of Guards did not reach the line 
five miles to the rear, already spoken of, on their way to 
the front, until the first darkness of evening had begun 
to fall. Still, another division stationed at Bailleul in 
the south, also ordered up to reinforce the British lines, 
in this sector, never reached those lines at all. 

In the center the British were more fortunate. The 
force here was composed most largely of the Fourth 
Army Corps, under Sir Henry Rawlinson, and, curiously 
enough, were in considerable part composed of members 
of Kitchener's so-called "new army." The advance here 
began at half past six in the morning, and in the early 
portion of the advance the British were considerably 
aided by the gas and smoke which, as has already been 
stated, was launched before the attack began. In the 
center the attack on Hulluch was made by two brigades, 
with one brigade in reserve. The first brigade to the 
north advanced very rapidly, capturing several guns on 
its way and in a short time penetrated into the environs 
of the village of Hulluch. But the brigade advancing 
south was not so fortunate, since it ran into a consider- 
able extent of wire entanglements which the British 
preliminary bombardment had not destroyed. This 
delayed the advance of this brigade until the afternoon. 
Finally, after hard fighting, a portion of the brigade to 



the north succeeded in turning from the north and 
northeast these wire entanglements and in driving their 
defenders out, after which the advance of the second 
brigade was resumed but did not proceed any very great 
distance before it became involved in the very desperate 
fighting which was then going on in the outskirts of 

Still further south the advance was made by a High- 
land division, the 15th, which also began its assault at 
about half past six in the morning. By eight o'clock 
their southern brigade captured the chalk pits, as well as 
Pit No. 14 and Hill No. 70, with the redoubt crowning it; 
thus occupying about half a mile of the central portion 
of the road between Hulluch and^Lens; some advance 
guards of this force even reached the hamlet of St. 
Auguste, a mile to the east on the road from Lens to 

The northern brigade, in the meantime, had taken the 
redoubt on Hill 69, a mile north of Loos, and then, 
turning south, was assaulting Loos itself. A portion of 
this brigade, however, turned at the north and came to 
the aid of the troops in difiiculties in the wire entangle- 
ments south of Hulluch already spoken of. For the next 
hour and a half this division in its entirety was subjected 
to a frightful fire from the German machine guns, 
located not only in Loos itself, but further east and in the 
environs of Lens, which played both on their front and 
rear. Towards half past nine the position of these 
troops became desperate, but the only reinforcements 
which could be sent them were a small force of artillery 
which advanced to their aid from the southwest. 

Another brigade of the new army was also somewhat 
later ordered to the relief of this Highland division, but 
did not come up to them until long after the battle had 

Further south there had started out about the same 
time in the morning from their original trenches in 
Greny two brigades of London Territorials, who were 
considerably aided in their advance by the smoke and gas 
which was discharged before their assault. After a 
hard fight, they dislodged the Germans from their posi- 
tions on the byroad which led northeast from Greny to 
the Bethune-Lens road. Particularly hard fighting took 
place around Pit No. 5, and an old mill, which were 
located near the point where this byroad joins the 
Bethune-Lens road. After taking these, these two 



brigades crossed the Bethune-Lens road and advanced 
towards Loos to the northeast. Between Loos and this 
road, however, was located the cemetery of the town^ 
which the Germans had turned into a veritable fortress 
armed at every point with machine guns. A long, hard 
fight ensued here, but finally towards noon the cemetery 
was carried by storm, and this brought these London 
Territorials to a point from whence, attacking from the 
south and west, with the Highlanders simultaneously 
attacking from the north and east, a general assault 
upon the town of Loos could be delivered. The Ger- 
mans, however, resisted strenuously; — not only was 
there street fighting, but house to house fighting; and 
the cellars, even, of the houses were turned into im- 
promptu fastnesses: so that it was not until late in the 
morning, after a struggle of unrelenting bitterness, 
involving enormous casualties, that the British troops 
were able to clear the town of their enemies, nor was it till 
one o'clock that they were in possession of the ruins of 
the place. 

There had been, perhaps, on the western front, up to 
this time, no single struggle of any size which had been so 
desperately fought inch by inch as was the combat 
which took place in Loos this first day of the battle. 



While these events were taking place on this British 
portion of the front, the morning of this first day of the 
battle, to the south of them, on a line, roughly speaking, 
south of Greny to Souchez and Neuville-St.-Vaast, the 
French were engaged heavily; but here again an unfortu- 
nate incident occurred which seriously compromised the * 
Allied hope of winning the objectives for which they were 

It has been previously remarked that when the British 
started from their trenches earlier in the morning and the 
sound of their artillery had ceased, the noise of that of the 
French to the south could still be heard. Prior to the 
advance of the British, General D'Urbal had notified 
General French that the French artillery had not yet 
succeeded in hacking down the German defences to such 
an extent that neither General Foch nor himself consid- 
ered it wise to give the order for the French infantry to 
advance. In spite of this warning, however, that their 
allies were not ready to advance, and also in spite of 
knowing that for the general movement to be successful 
it must advance as a coherent whole and not in dis- 
jointed parts, the British persisted in starting their 
infantry forward at the hour which had been originally 
fixed. Whose fault this was, cannot be said. But as 
the British high command has since this battle chosen 
to ascribe the comparative failure of the movement to 
the slowness of the French generals in advancing their 
infantry, it seems well to call attention to the fact that 
the British had full knowledge that the French were not 
prepared to advance, when they advanced themselves, 
and that the consequent exposure of the British right 
wing to a flank attack, owing to the fact that the French 
line was not for six or eight hours in that position as 
regards this British right wing, in which it had been 
expected to be, was a risk which the British command had 
taken upon itself. 

The French continued their artillery poimding all the 



morning and did not attempt any infantry advance until 
twelve thirty when the infantry was hurled forward on 
Souchez. On their left, the French charged down the 
eastern slope of Notre Dame de Lorette, the hill which 
had been so fought over a few months before, and cross- 
ing the Hasche wood to the east of the Souchez-Aix 
road, pushed its advance as far as the Souchez brook 
which runs here southwest from Lievin through Souchez 
to Carency. This advance, however, was not achieved 
without considerable losses, because not only were these 
French troops ceaselessly shelled by the German bat- 
teries at Anglers, Lievin and Givenchy to the east of 
them, but also because the Germans had installed many 
machine gun defences on the battle terrain itself, which 
took their tribute of the advancing foes before they 
were stormed and captured. 

South of Souchez, the French line advanced in strength 
on the chateau of Cailul immediately to the south of 
the town, on the cemetery a little further south, and at a 
point known as the Cabaret Rouge near the cemetery; 
while, in unison with this movement, infantry in serried 
masses was thrown forward down the lower slopes of 
Hill 1 19. Extremely hot fighting took place on this front. 

The cemetery was taken, lost, retaken and relost; 
while the infantry on Hill 119 was held up by machine 
gun fire of such intensity that it was impossible to 
advance against it; and the batteries on the line of Vimy 
to the east poured an almost ceaseless stream of pro- 
jectiles on the French who were attempting to move in 
its direction. This desperate fighting went on until 
darkness came and left the French no more advanced 
than the positions they had attained in their first rush, 
while Souchez and the cemetery were still in large part 
in the hands of their enemies. 

We will now return to the English portion of the line. 
In the center, towards one o'clock, the Highlanders and 
the London Territorials, as has been said, were in pos- 
session of Hill 70, with the redoubt on its corner, and the 
outskirts of the village of St. Auguste, whose position 
has been herein above described. 

The Crown Prince of Bavaria chose this time for launch- 
ing a counter-attack upon the British in these positions 
which had been in the hands of the British for so short 
a time that they had not had a chance to fortify them- 
selves therein. The result was that, having no shelter 
from the German artillery, they were obliged to give 



ground slowly, but with the result that by night-fall 
they had been forced out of St. Auguste; andHiUTO, as 
well as its redoubt, had returned to their original 

All this first day the rain had continued, but during the 
night it stopped and the following morning it was clear. 
In the center the Highlanders; who had been driven ofif 
of Hill 70 the night before and who during the night had 
made two other counter-attacks without success to 
recover it,, after artillery preparation again made a 
desperate attack on the German positions on this hill and 
had the support of two divisions of Kitchener's new 
army in this attempt. This attack, however, yielded no 
better results than the two which took place in the night. 
Towards noon the Germans, in their turn, attacked the 
British positions and succeeded in driving them out of 
Pit No. 14 and repossessing themselves thereof. 

At this time the only advantage which the British had 
gained on their portion of the front was the possession 
of the village of Loos, and into this village, during the 
afternoon, they threw a very considerable force of troops. 
During this second afternoon, attacks were made by the 
British on Hulluch and at other points on the line, but 
except northeast of Hulluch where the quarries to the 
West of St. Elie were again recaptured by the British, 
they having been previously driven out, there were no 
changes in position until on the morning of the 26th. 

On the French portion of the line, south of the British 
the French finally succeeded in establishing themselves 
during the day of the 26th in the terrain to the east of 
the Hasche wood. Souchez had been completely evac- 
uated by the German^, presumably owing to the useless 
cost of defending it, and the German troops which left 
it had taken up their positions on the western slopes of 
Hills 119 and 140. 

This was all that occurred on the French section of 
the line that day, involving any change of the respective 
positions. Continuous hand to hand fighting, however, 
took place on the advanced lines. 

Monday, September 27, the day broke cloudy and in 
the afternoon a pom-ing rain set in. The Germans, who 
attached great importance to the continued possession of 
the heights of Vimy which were the real French objective, 
threw reinforcements of the Prussian Guard into this 
terrain. The French remained quiet most of the day 



preparing themselves for the general attack which they 
intended to launch the following day. 

On the British portion of the front the British Guards 
division was brought up to Loos. These Guards, com- 
prising two brigades on the advanced line, and a third 
brigade in reserve, with the London Territorials on their 
right, were intended to be launched in an attack on Hill 
70 and its redoubt. Pit No. 14, and on the woods and 
chalk pits to the south and also towards the town of 
Lens which the British were exceedingly anxious to take. 

The attack was launched at about 4 P. M. by the 
Irish Guards. To the south of them the Scotch Guards 
crossed the road between Hulluch and Loos and attempt- 
ed to advance to Pit No. 14. A tremendous fight took 
place. The Scotch Guards pressed on and reached the 
buildings around Pit No. 14, while the Irish Guards, 
after many vicissitudes, succeeded in capturing a portion 
of the territory they had been ordered to take. To the 
north of the Irish Guards the Coldstream Guards, stand- 
ing up against intense machine gun fire, managed to 
advance in the direction of the chalk pits, but by night- 
fall these troops had been driven by the Germans com- 
pletely out of Pit No. 14 and its abutments, so that the 
Guards had only succeeded in capturing a portion of the 
chalk pits, and, digging themselves in from this position 
back towards Loos. The attack on Hill 70 was under- 
taken by the Third Guards brigade. This advance, as 
soon as it entered the trenches which led upwards 
towards Hill 70, was attacked by gas, but pressed on 
until it reached the summit of the hill. Here they 
were met by a strong German fire against which it was 
impossible for them to maintain themselves and they fell 
back to positions below the crest of the hill where they 
entrenched and remained until evening of the 29th. 

To the north of the scene of the Guards' action, on 
Hill 70, last mentioned, the Germans launched an attack 
on the British position in the buildings of Pit No. 8, 
southeast of the Hohenzollern redoubt. Hard fighting 
ensued, but, in spite of their desperate struggles, the 
British were slowly forced back and finally in the after- 
noon obliged to relinquish their position and fall back to 
the northwest. 

The following day, the 28th, the Guards, not being 
satisfied with the failure of their efifort on the preceding 
day to retake Pit No. 14, in the afternoon made another 
attack thereon from the southwest, and in this attack 



^ere supported by large numbers of British machine 
^ guns whose fire was concentrated on the environs of the 
pit, particularly to the east, as well as by heavy rifle 
firing from the trenches behind them. The Guards 
reached Pit No. 14 after extraordinary exertions, being 
opposed not only by a very strenuous defence by the 
^nemy, but also by the very heavy condition of the 
ground. But on reaching this point, the Guards were un- 
able to maintain the ground they had won, so heavy was 
the artillery fire the Germans threw in upon them, and, 
consequently, they fell back to their original positions. 

With the failure of this attack it may be said that the 
British portion of the battle of Loos ended. The British 
had captured, as the net result, the town of Loos, but had 
failed to capture any of their other objectives, and the 
satisfaction of the taking of this unimportant (consid- 
ered by itself) town had cost them, as was afterwards 
admitted, over 60,000 casualties. To offset this, they 
had taken perhaps, all told, 3000 prisoners and had 
inflicted a loss on their enemy of, as far as we are able 
to judge at the present time, about one-third in casual- 
ties of that which they themselves had suffered. 

The cardinal fact, however, of this battle, so far as the 
British are concerned, is that once more the incompe- 
tency of the British commanders had been made manifest 
to the world. It is doubtful whether in any battle in 
modern history, at least, grosser errors in the most 
elementary dispositions of an order of battle had been 
committed by even semi-trained commanders, and it 
seems in this fight as though every chance wherein a 
blunder was possible was taken the fullest advantage of. 
The rank and file fought well and the troops of Kitchener's 
new army showed a steadiness and courage which, for 
troops of such comparatively little training, was extra- 
ordinary. It seems a great pity that 60,000 of these 
troops should have been forced to play the roll of a mon- 
ument to incompetency. 

The complete demoralization of the English com- 
manders and of the English forces after the end of this 
battle is convincingly evidenced by the fact that the next 
day after an interview between Gen. Foch commanding 
the French troops and Sir John French, all the southern 
portion of the battle line held by the British including 
the town of Loos was taken over completely by the 
French troops which Gen. Foch sent up from his south* 
erly wing for the purpose. 



We will now turn to see what was happening to the 
French while the events that we have narrated were 
taking place on the British portion of the front. The 
whole of September 27th was spent by Gen. d'Urbal in 
assuming the positions which, as we have seen, the 
French had succeeded in capturing in their first onslaught 
on the slopes of Hills 123 and 140 between Neuville 
Saint Vaast and Souchez and between Souchez and 
Angres, to the east of Bois en Hasch. 

On the 28th of September a several days' battle began 
by an attack by the French troops on the Prussian 
Guards on the westerly side of the Vimy Heights; that 
is to say, on Hill 140 itself. This attack gradually spread 
towards the North until it reached the outskirts of 
Angres. The positions were desperately fought over 
and the line swayed to and fro, now ground being gained 
by one side here and there, and almost immediately 
recaptured by a counter-attack of the other side along 
the whole length of the front. It is impossible to give 
more than the outlines of this fighting because the 
advances were counted in feet almost, were lost so rap- 
idly and possibly again regained. Nevertheless in 
Givenchy Wood to the east of Souchez the French 
gained slowly but surely, and when, the offensive fin- 
ished, about the 10th of October, they had possessed 
themselves practically of the whole of this wood and had 
even extended their line a little to the northeast of the 
wood towards Angres and had succeeded in installing 
themselves on the westward slopes of Hill 140, after a 
sustained effort of desperate character lasting over days. 

On October 3rd, the Germans opened a severe bom- 
bardment of the British front from the southerly end of 
their line as far north as the La Bassee Canal. This was 
followed by an infantry attack on the British trenches 
between the HuUuch quarries and the road leading from 
Vermelles to HuUuch. While not successful every- 
where, the Germans did succeed in driving the British 



out of the HohenzoUern redoubt to the northwest of the 
quarries, and thus repossessed themselves of this impor- 
tant field work. 

On October 8th another hard fight with the British 
took place on the line from Hill No. 70 to the north of the 
HohenzoUern redoubt. The Germans gained a little, 
but on the whole the fight can be called indecisive, 
though both sides suffered heavy casualties. 

Thereafter, on this portion of the western end of the 
western battle front, before the November fogs and 
rains settled upon the scene, there was no particular 
activity except on one occasion, towards the middle of 
October, on the 14th, to be precise, when the British on 
the hne from near Ypres, southeastwardly towards Loos, 
made an attack preceded by smoke and gas clouds, 
along nearly the entire front. This attack began early 
in the morning under favorable conditions of the wind 
which carried the gas and smoke clouds straight to the 
German trenches. Under cover of this, the British suc- 
ceeded, to the immediate north of Loos, in capturing 
about 1000 yards of German trenches, including the 
major portion of the HohenzoUern redoubt which figured 
so prominently in the fighting in this neighborhood in 
the battle of Loos itself. Towards midnight, however, 
the Germans rallied and launching a desperate counter 
attack succeeded in driving back the English to the 
position which they had held in the morning when this 
action opened. 

Of course during all these autumn months, from Ypres 
past the great ''L'' bend of the western battle line to the 
Champagne, there was more or less skirmishing, some of 
which occasionally developed into a fight of some local 
consequence, interspersed with artillery duels. But 
there were no movements which are of sufficient impor- 
tance to be gone into in detail. Suffice it to say that 
none of these activities materially changed the position 
of the respective battle lines. 

In the early days of November, the scheme of having 
only one General Staff for the French and British forces 
fighting in France was initiated and Gen. Joffre assumed 
the supreme command of both forces, but this did not 
produce satisfactory results. Finally, on the 15th of 
December, the dissatisfaction caused to Gen. Sir John 
French by this anomalous situation was ended by his 
removal from his command, and Lieut. Gen. Sir Douglas 
Haig was appointed to succeed him. It has been indeed 



said that the British authorities had, as early as the end 
of August, 1915, determined upon retiring Gen. French 
from his command, but, owing to their inability to agree 
upon his successor, this intention was not carried out 
until this time. Gen. French's retirement cannot be 
fairly said to be in the nature of a disgrace. At the time 
the war broke out he was the only British General of 
sujfficient rank, whose record in South Africa in the last 
war in which Great Britain had been engaged, justified 
even the hope that he was of sufficient military ability 
to assume the general command in the present war. 
But General French was essentially a cavalry leader and 
the campaigns of the west in this war have not been of 
a character in harmony with his prior experience, and^ 
furthermore, he was hampered in every conceivable way, 
by those in control of the government at home, partic- 
ularly in having only quarter trained troops, with even 
less trained officers, sent to him with the order to accomp- 
lish the wonderful results the British nation believed 
should be accomplished on its behalf. 

History will possibly not be hard on Gen. French, and 
very probably will rate him as better than the average 
field commander, though almost completely lacking in 
those qualities of the strategist and of the army com- 
mander which the situation in which he was placed 
called for. His worst fault in his tenure of the chief 
command of the British troops in France was that he 
did not seem to have the ability to grow and expand in 
proportion to the importance and difficulty of the mili- 
tary employment entrusted to him. Sir Douglas Haig, 
who took up the command in succession to French had 
shown some ability as a field commander in the opera- 
tions of the war prior to his appointment to the chief 
command, and has also the advantage of being ten years 
younger than Sir John. 

After this change, quietness reigned on the whole of 
this portion of the front for some weeks, which was per- 
haps natural, since the whole of this Flanders-Picardy 
front is low ground and much more subject to rain than 
snow in early winter, so that no great degree of cold 
being obtained, and frequent thaws taking place, the 
ground becomes for most of the time, and remains even 
in the cold season, to a considerable degree, a morass of 
mud in which it is impossible to move troops or artillery. 

Towards the end of December, Great Britain an- 
nounced the withdrawal of most of her native Indian 



troops from the western front. The selndian troops had 
been a disappointment. In Great Britain^s past fighting 
with semi-civilized tribes, wherein the fighting was of 
the so-called open order, and quickly over, the Indian 
troops had always done their share of the work and had; 
on many occasions, manifested great bravery, fortitude 
and endurance; but after the early days of the fighting 
on this western front, and after trench fighting started 
in, it became more and irore apparent that the Indian 
troops did not have the morale necessary to stand the 
continual pounding of the artillery to which they were 
daily subjected, and they also appeared to be adversely 
affected by the climatic conditions. 

As a result, many of them became afflicted with mel- 
ancholy, and suicides among them were not infrequent, 
while others sought to escape from service by blowing 
off some of their toes or fingers. Indeed, so prevalent 
did this mutilation become, that the severest forms of 
punishment were resorted to in order to deter others 
from following the example of those self-mutilators; but, 
in spite of all the preventive measures of one kind and 
another that were attempted, the condition of the 
Indian troops grew steadily worse and their withdrawal 
from this front was in large measure forced. 

^Most of January was also fairly quiet, though there 
was an increase in the number and size of the semi- 
occasional skirmishes. Towards the end of January the 
Germans began an offensive movement northward from 
Arras which centered around the halfway point of the 
road leading from Arras to Lens, and extended as far 
west as a parallel road to the Arras-Lens road running 
from Neuville-St.-Vaast to Givenchy-en-Gohelle, which 
latter village is really the eastern end of the two-mile 
long village of Souchez, which borders a highway running 
at right angles to the last mentioned road. 

All of these places are mining villages, located in a 
generally flat and very uninteresting country and all 
have been almost since the early days of the war the 
scene of almost continuous fighting. Neuville-Saint- 
Vaast, which has probably been mentioned as often in 
the bulletins as any other single town on the western 
front, is about six miles directly north of Arras, and 
directly to the east thereof is the famous "Labyrinth'^ so 
long and so bitterly fought over in the spring and early 
summer of 1915. 

The Germans opened the fighting by a successful 



attack on the French positions east and northeast of 
Neuville, wherein they gained considerable ground and 
took many prisoners on January 25th, and followed this 
up on the 31st by taking and holding the La Folie wood, 
a little further to the northeast of the positions taken on 
the 25th, thus extending their lines to the north. 

The French made valiant counter-attacks during these 
days, but failed to regain the lost territory. The Ger- 
mans continued to ''nibble'' at the French positions all 
this month and made steady progress in improving their 
positions, though on any particular day their gains were 

Most notable of their advances were, perhaps, the 
capture by them on February 10th of about a mile front 
of the French trenches between Neuville-Saint-Vaast 
and Vimy, which advantage was followed up the next 
day by the capture of another mile of French trenches to 
the northwest of Vimy. Subsequently, the interval in 
the hands of the French between these two miles of 
trenches was wrested from them, and these conquests 
united. Other successful nibbles followed. Finally 
on February 1st the Germans delivered an attack in force 
against the French trenches stretching north and south 
nearly parallel to the northern part of the road running 
from Givenchy-en-Gohelle to Neuville-Saint-Vaast to 
the east of Souchez, and succeeded in carrying the first 
line trenches over this whole front and the second line 
over a portion. 

The result of all these advances was that on the first 
of March, when this record closes, the Germans had 
pushed their way well to the west of Hills Nos. 140 and 
119 and were within a mile of the cemetery at Souchez, 
thus having recovered approximately three fifths of the 
territory in this region to the west of Vimy, which the 
French offensive of late September and October had won. 



During January there was also some more or less heavy 
fighting south of the Somme river and in the Ypres 
sector, but as this fighting had but very minor conse- 
quences, it need not be here described. 

Elswhere on this long front, during these months, there 
were numerous small fights. Hardly any of them, how- 
ever, deserve more than casual mention. On November 
7th at Boesinghe there was a struggle of considerable 
size just at the point where the French army to the east 
of the English took contact with the British line. Again 
on February 12th and on February 20th there was 
fierce fighting at this point, and the Germans succeeded 
in gaining some ground to the southeast of Boesinghe. 

On the British front to the east of Boesinghe, as far 
as Loos, during this period, only mining and artillery 
actions took place. In the Ypres salient on December 
19th the Germans made a gas attack on the Allied 
positions on the northeast of the salient, but no ground 
was gained, though there was some severe fighting. 
After this episode, the line here relapsed into its accus- 
tomed quiet, as far as infantry actions were concerned, 
until the 11th of February, when the Germans began to 
bombard the trenches to the east of Boesinghe, which 
bombardment was continued the next day, and followed 
by some slight infantry fighting. 

On the 13th of February the Germans attacked the 
Hooge end, the northeastern, of the salient, and blew 
up a trench which had been much in evidence in the 
bulletins of the fighting at this point, known as the 
International Trench, and took possession of it; and 
fighting went on in this immediate vicinity until the 
second of March, when the English recaptured it. On 
the rest of this front from Ypres to Loos, there was con- 
tinual trench and bomb fighting during the period under 
consideration, but these skirmishes produced no results 
of any moment whatever. The only one which deserves 
mention is the capture of the small village of Friese on 



the left bank of the Somme to the west of Peronne, from 
which, after a stiff fight, on the twenty-eighth of Jan- 
uary, the Germans succeeded in driving the French. 

Of course it is to be understood that when one uses 
the expressions "calm" or "quiet" in respect to these 
fronts that expression is not to be taken in a literal sense. 
The average civilian, had he been on any portion of this 
front during the time under review, would have found 
conditions fully as lively as he would have desired; the 
constant booming of the artillery, the occasional violent 
bomb fighting, the trench raids from time to time, and 
the aerial attacks which both sides made at intervals on 
each other's positions, would have seemed to this civilian 
very real activity. Which view would have been to a 
very considerable extent justified, by the size of the lists 
of casualties which took place on the "quiet" or "calm" 

On the whole, however, the end of the six months 
found the relative positions of the belligerents, on this 
whole front, imchanged from what they were at the 



From Arras to Alsace, nearly the whole of the month 
of September passed comparatively quietly; only un- 
eventful clashes either of infantry or of artillery, of not 
more than local importance, took place. This was, 
however, merely the traditional calm before the storm. 

General de Castelnau, on the 25th of September, began 
a French offensive on the line extending from Suippes to 
the west through Perthes-les-Hures and Beausejour to 
Massiges. This offensive was planned to be executed 
both chronologically and strategically in unison with 
the British and French offensive north of Arras which 
we have already described, and really was intended to 
be in support of that movement. Delivered in force it 
was expected that its violence would be such that it 
would diminish the German power of sending reserves 
to the other front in that it would create a very urgent 
call for these reserves upon this Champagne front, which 
was about 20 miles in length. 

On the 22d of September the French artillery began 
a bombardment of the German first line trenches over 
this 20 mile front, at an early hour in the morning, and 
continued this bombardment for sixty hours. While 
not so severe perhaps as the bombardment on the Loos 
front, it was the severest which had been experienced 
on this portion of the line and it succeeded in destroying 
practically completely the first line of German trenches. 

On the 25th, as soon as day broke, the bombardment 
having continued the entire previous night, the French 
infantry left their trenches and began a simultaneous 
charge over the whole front and after only a few hours 
fighting were in complete possession of the entire German 
first line of trenches, which had been largely destroyed 
by the sixty hours bombardment above mentioned, but 
when this infantry came to attempt an attack on the 



second line of German defenses, in spite of their des- 
perate gallantry and their tenacity in advancing, they 
were unable to progress materially, so that all the gain 
which was made this day was made in the first short 
rush. The fighting lasted all day and when night fell 
the French troops were still in undisputed possession 
of the first line of German trenches which, during the 
night, they turned against their enemies and succeeded 
in consolidating their position preparatory to the assump- 
tion of the offensive the next day. 

But, in place of the French taking the offensive, on 
the 26th of September, it was begun by the Germans 
who launched counter-attacks in great strength on the 
positions which the French had won from them the day 
before. These counter-attacks continued all day and 
were replied to by the French. Some of the fiercest 
fighting which had been seen even in this well fought 
over district resulted, and the line swayed to and fro 
without any permanent gain at any point for either side. 
Summing up the results of this hard fighting, it may be 
said here that they were negative, because, while the 
German counter-attacks checked the French progress 
and halted the French advance, they gained no ground 
themselves permanently, so that when the night fell 
the enemies were in the same relative positions that they 
were twenty-four hours previously. 

The 27th of September was much the same as the 26th; 
continual hard fighting, oftentimes coming to hand to 
hand struggles; but, except for slight French gains near 
Massiges on the extreme right of the French line, there 
was no change at all in the relative positions of the lines. 
Up to the conclusion of this day's fighting, the French 
had captured about 12,000 German prisoners, while the 
Germans in their counter attacks had taken something 
like 3,500 French. Both sides had suffered heavy loss 
in casualties. 

On September 28th and 29th bitter fighting continued 
without intermission and was particularly severe in the 
neighborhood of Beausejour, southeast of Tahure, and 
in the immediate northern outskirts of Massiges, but 
was without result as far as modifying the positions 
theretofore occupied by the opponents was concerned. 

The 30th of September the battle grew fiercer aroimd 
Massiges. The French captured Hill 191 immediately 
north of that hamlet, and also succeeded in driving their 
line forward on the road from Ville sur Tourbe, a couple 




of miles to the east of Massiges, about three miles towards 
the north, and in capturing the village of Cemay en 
Dormois. The casualties in this fighting were very large 
on both sides in proportion to the nimaber of men en- 
gaged. The same day very hard fighting developed 
around Souain to the west of Perthes and about three 
miles to the south of St.-Marie-a-Py, a little to the west 
of Souain. Up to this time, however, in spite of the 
lavish expenditure of life, there had been neither strategic 
nor tactical gains made by either side, and the opponents 
were still in practically the same relative positions as 
they were when this determined French attack began. 
This portion of the Champagne region is called the 
Champagne Pouilleuse, on account of the character of 
the soil which, when it rains, is converted into extremely 
and persistently sticky mud. On two days of the 
offensive considerable rain had fallen, which made the 
operations of the troops even more difi&cult than they 
would have been ordinarily. 



On the first of October the positions reached in Cham- 
pagne by this fighting were about as follows: The 
immediate objective of Gen. de Castelnau's offensive 
had been the railroad running from Bazancourt through 
Challerange, which railroad connected the army of 
von Einem to the west and the army of the Crown 
Prince to the east, and from [which Irailroad the French 
lines at this time were distant between Dontrien on the 
west and Manre on the east, four miles to the south 
on the average. To this railroad from the French lines 
there was one avenue of approach by the road which 
leads northward through Auberive, another by a road 
running through St.-Hilaire-le-Grand, both of which 
roads join and touch the railroad at St. Souplet. Further 
east from Souain another road runs north to the railroad 
at Somme-Py, and a fourth still further to the east runs 
northward from Perthes through Tahure, and thence 
westwardly to Somme-Py, and finally by another road 
still further to the east, which runs from Ville-sur-Tourbe 
through Cernay to Vosseres. The Germans were in 
Auberive on the first mentioned road and in Cernay on 
the last mentioned road, but on the St. Hilaire road they 
had been forced back to a point near a place called the 
Epine about half way between St. Hilaire and St. Souplet 
and on the road from Perthes to Somme-Py, as far north 
as Tahure. On the Souain-Somme-Py road, the Ger- 
mans had also been driven back to a point near the 
Navarin Farm, about half way between Souain and 

From "the Epine" on the St. Hilaire road to Tahure 
the line of German trenches ran almost due east and 
west with a salient projecting southeast from Tahure, 
as far as a point known locally as Trapeze, about one 
mile to the northeast of Perthes. Behind Tahure was 
the so-called Butte de Tahure, a hill rising between the 
village and the railroad, from which latter it was a little 
over one mile distant. Gen. de Castelnau's primary ob- 



jective therefore, was to drive in this salient projecting 
southward from Tahure and to capture Tahure and its 

On September 30th the French made an attack which 
gained ground on the southerly side of this salient; the 
Germans replying later in the day with two counter- 
attacks which were unsuccessful in recovering the lost 
ground. The next day, October 1st, the Frenc^i made 
an effort along the St. Hilaire road, and to the east of it, 
along a line between Auberive and ''the Epine,'' and 
gained a very little ground. 

That day, and for the next four or five succeeding days, 
hard fighting went on in the Tahure salient, and violent 
attacks were made on the Trapeze, and a position 
known as the "Courtine" to the northeast of it. These 
attacks, which had no marked result, lasted until October 
5th. After this combat the French rested for a couple 
of days, but on October 7th resumed the attack on 
Tahure and its hill. A violent struggle raged all day, 
in the course of which seven German trenches, one line 
behind the other, were taken between the village of 
Tahure and the southerly slopes of the hill, which was 

The French now being in position to do so from 
Tahiu-e itself, the next day attacked southeastwardly 
and captured the Trapeze, taking a couple of hundred 
prisoners here as well as a large number in Tahure. 
While this fight was going on in the Tahure region, 
another rather warm combat took place around the 
Navarin Farm on the Souain-Somme-Py road, where 
the French, after gaining some ground and capturing 
about 500 prisoners, were driven back by machine guns 
to their original trenches. In the night of October 9th 
and 10th, the Germans attacked the French trenches 
east of Navarin Farm, and the next day made a strong 
effort to recapture the hill of Tahure, but were unsuc- 
cessful. The next three days (the 10th, 11th and 12th), 
were days of continual but isolated combats in the 
vicinity of Tahure, in which the French made some 
progress to the north and southeast of this village. 

On October 18th, after a three hours' artillery prepa- 
ration, the Germans onade an attack on the French posi- 
tions between La Pompelle near Rheims and Prosnes 
to the west of Auberive, with the intention of diverting 
the French from fiu-ther attacks on the Tahure front. 
The following day this artillery attack was resumed and 



a gas attack was also made, behind which the German 
infantry advanced, and succeeded in gaining a foothold 
in the French trenches. A desperate combat took place 
which lasted several hours, and towards nightfall the 
French, in a desperate counter-attack, succeeded in 
recovering their lost positions. The next day an attack 
was made on Prosnes in considerable strength by the 
GermajpLS. The fighting lasted all day, and at first the 
attack was successful and the French first line positions 
were taken. But reinforcements came to the French 
who recovered their lost positions by nightfall. Another 
hard battle took place near Prunay the next day but 
was indecisive in its results. In both of these fights 
the casualties were unusually severe. 

On October 22nd another counter-attack was made 
by the Germans on the hill of Tahure and two days 
later the French captured the Courtine, south of Tahure 
and east of the Trapeze, with 200 prisoners, but only 
held this position until the following day when the 
Germans counter-attacked and recovered the center of 
the position and on the 30th of October succeeded in 
recovering it completely. 

On October 30th a general attack was made on a line 
from the Souain road to Ville Tourbe, by the Germans, 
whose effort was made particularly to recapture the hill 
of Tahure and the village of the same name. The artil- 
lery preparation for this attack began at 11 A. M. and 
continued until four in the afternoon, at which time the 
German Infantry came into action and was successful in 
recapturing the hill of Tahure and with it about 1,300 
French. On the next day, October 31st, this attack was 
continued, and a violent battle raged along the whole 
line, but the Germans could make no further headway, 
and lost some 300 in prisoners. 

The following day the attack at this portion of the 
front was abandoned by the Germans who concentrated 
their fronts on the French position near Massiges, near 
"The Hand,'' south of the Fort of Defeat, and for several 
days, November 3rd, 4th and 5th, the fighting con- 
tinued severe aroimd this point, but without particular 
result. On November 10th, however, the Germans 
made another effort to eject the French from Tahure 
village, which was not successful. 

From now on until the end of December there was a 
lull in this section of the front, only broken by a fight 



to the east of Auberive on December 7th, and another 
near Hill No. 193, both of which were indecisive. 

On the 27th of December another effort was made by 
the Germans to capture Tahure, the Maisons de Cham- 
pagne Farm and The Hand north of Massiges, already 
spoken of, which positions extend in a line southeast 
from the hill of Tahure. In this fight which lasted three 
days the Germans did gain considerable ground in the 
vicinity of Maisons de Champagne, and captured quite 
a number of prisoners. Another lull ensued in the 
fighting, which lasted into the second week in January, 
though there was some minor skirmishing around 
Tahure in the meantime. 

About the 7th of January a hot fight began near 
Massiges in this district which developed into a veritable 
battle lasting four days, in which both sides claimed 
the victory. The net result appears to have been that 
the Germans who held the offensive captured a certain 
number of French trenches and took about 2,000 pris- 
oners, as well as some artillery, though as the fighting ^ 
was extremely desperate their casualties were very 

After this battle quietness again reigned until the last 
days of January, when more fighting on a reasonably 
large scale began, but only continued for a couple of 
days. This fighting was general all over this front, and 
appears to have achieved no particularly decisive re- 
sults, though the Germans took quite a number of 

Again a period of inaction followed, broken, however, 
on February 10th by a German attack in some force to 
the northeast of the Butte de Mesnil, and near St. 
Marie-a-Py. In this fight the Germans gained con- 
siderable ground around St. Marie-a-Py and some 
ground near Tahure, but made no progress to speak of 
in the Butte de Mesnil region, though again having the 
advantage in the number of prisoners taken. 

After this fighting quieted down, nothing happened 
of any importance imtil February 25th, when the lYench 
made a surprise attack on the German trenches south of 
St. Marie-a-Py, and won these trenches in part taking 
an appreciable number of prisoners. Not to be out- 
done however on the 28th of February the Germans 
started a drive in this region with the much fought over 
Navarin farm as its objective. This drive succeeded 
and the entire farm with a mile of French trenches on 



either side, fell into the hands of the attackers who also 
took some fifteen hundred prisoners, besides artillery. 
The next day the French counter-attacked viciously but 
unsuccessfully and the Germans remained masters of 
the field. 

In the Argonne forest region to the east of the Cham- 
pagne positions ceaseless trench warfare went on the 
whole six months, varied with occasional bombing 
attacks or the explosion of mines, there being an enor- 
mous amount of subterraneous activity. But these 
forms of fighting though producing a very high casualty 
list, and calling for great fertility of resource, courage 
and endurance on the part of the participants therein, 
do not, as a rule, give rise to incidents of more than very 
local importance, and hence do not afford material for 
the chronicler. 



On February 21, 1916, about 7 o'clock in the morning, 
the Germans began an attack on that fortified area to 
which we give the name of Verdun, and opened what was 
to prove one of the longest and bloodiest episodes of the 

In the early part of the war an effort had been made by 
the Germans to take Verdun just previous to the battle 
of the Marne, but had not been long persisted in and 
also had not been successful. Verdun is one of the two 
main important strategic points in the whole series of 
French defenses against Germany. This has been rec- 
ognized for generations, and the fall of this place into 
the hands of an enemy, or of an invader, has usually been 
followed by the rest of France sharing its fate. The town 
of Verdun gives its name to this defense, which today is 
really a fortified area of about 200 square miles and not 
merely the forts immediately surrounding the town, and 
the citadel. The defenses of this area are thoroughly 
modern; in fact, had been constructed in the 12 months 
preceding this attack upon it. The French generals had 
noticed the results of the heavy artillery attacks against 
the fortresses of Liege, Namur, Antwerp and Maubeuge 
which had occurred earlier in the war and had modified 
and extended the defenses of Verdun to such an extent 
and in such manner that these defenses became far more 
capable of withstanding any character of ojBFensive 
which might be launched at them. One result of this 
remodelling was that the French line had been pushed 
out to a very considerable distance from Verdun, the 
center. When the German offensive of February 21st 
was begun, the exterior line of such defenses began at 
Consenvoye on the Meuse, a good 9}^ miles, as the crow 
flies, to the north of the citadel and town of Verdun, 
and thence ran in an irregular arc eastward through 
Haumont, the wood of Caures, the wood of Wavrille, 



Herbebois, Ornes and Maucourt, where it turned south 
to Mogeville, the pond of Braux, Hte. Charriere wood, 
Fromezey, Les Eparges, and thence curved to the west- 
ward to St. Mihiel on the Meuse, a considerable distance 
to the south of the citadel; and thence, running along 
the arc of a semi-circle, first northwest and then north- 
east until this line reached to its point of departure. 

The course of this western half of the exterior defense 
line is not traced in detail at this time since nothing 
happened thereon during the period of the battle of 
which we shall treat in this volume. When in the next 
volume we come to treat of the fighting on this line, a 
detailed description of such western front will be given, 
and in this next volume there will also be a map of Ver- 
dun showing in detail the topography of the surroimd- 
ing country. 

The town of Verdun lies in a bowl, and is surrounded 
by high hills both to the north and to the east; those to 
the east, however, drop abruptly to the Woevre plain 
a little to the east of the line of the railroad running 
south from Abaucourt to Haudiomont; this line of 
railway being approximately 5>^ to 6 miles to the east 
of Verdun. On the hill surrounding the town there 
were originally 16 detached forts and 20 small works, 
but in the year preceding the attack on it most of these 
detached forts had been decidedly changed in character 
and strength and practically the whole series of forts 
and smaller defenses had been extended and connected 
with each other until three successive rings of fortifi- 
cations encircled the town. Between them were trenches, 
barbed wires, chevaux de friese, mines and every other 
form of impediment to the attack of an advance, which 
is known to miUtary science, so that at the time of the 
attack, Verdun was in all probability the strongest 
fortified area in the world. The Germans concentrated 
probably more artillery on this front than has ever been 
done heretofore, and this battle of Verdun, therefore, 
became a very interesting test between the strength of 
the most modern forms of offensive and defensive. 

On the morning of February 21st, then, the preliminary 
bombardment began, and the front along which it took 
place may be roughly described as along the outer 
margins of the three woods which stretched on the north 
of Verdun to Brabant, Ornes, Haumont, Caures and 
Herbebois. The bulk of this fire came from the forest 
of Spincourt. The bombardment continued all day with 



a ferocity and force which has never been perhaps 
equalled in the history of the war. From 2 to 4 in the 
afternoon this bombardment reached its height and 
about 5 o'clock the German guns lengthened their fire. 

The French artillery during the day replied as best it 
could to the German fire, not only endeavoring to put 
the German artillery out of action but by a barrage 
fire to prevent the advance of the German infantry. 
When the German guns at 5 o'clock, as said, lengthened 
their fire, the German infantry came out of their trenches 
in small detachments composed of 15 men, and rushed 
for the French first line trenches wherein, if fortunate 
enough to reach them, they established themselves. 
Behind them, fairly close, came a larger detachment of 
gr^aadiers and sappers, and behind these again, but at 
a much more considerable distance, came the line of 
infantry. The theory of this attack was that the original 
party of 15 men would reconnoitre and ascertain the 
strength of the defense by the enemy which could be 
expected. The grenadiers anfi sappers were to rebuild 
and turn the trench which was then to be occupied by 
the third element in this attack, the infantry. 

This first evening the Germans, by these tactics, 
secured a footing at many points in the French line, and 
made that footing good, and at some points they pene- 
trated as far as the French second line of trenches. In 
the Haumont wood the defense was particularly strong 
and hard hand to hand fighting occurred at this point 
and continued for a very considerable time. At six 
in the evening, however, the Germans had gained a small 
footing and by eight o'clock they had converted this 
footing into complete possession of the wood but not 
without strenuous and desperate fighting. 

During the night the French tried a counter-attack 
to recover the possession of the wood, but this counter- 
attack was broken up by the use of heavy artillery by 
the Germans. Behind the wood itself, in the village of 
Haumont, the French decided to make a determined 
stand, but the Germans commenced a heavy artillery 
bombardment of the ground behind them, with the 
result that they could not communicate with their rear at 
all, nor were any supplies able to reach them therefrom. 
Soon after the German artillery also cut them ofif from 
the troops on their flanks. Nevertheless, with rare 
courage, the French continued to defend the place as 
long as possible. 



Towards eight o'clock in the morning the bombard- 
ment became even more severe, and at ten o'clock 
heavier artillery was gotten in position and commenced 
to shell the village of Haumont itself. In the afternoon, 
a lucky shot on the part of the Germans destroyed the 
big armored cement redoubt wherein the French ammu- 
nition depot was located. At five o'clock the German 
infantry moved out to the attack of Haumont in three 
columns from the north, northwest and east. The 
French made a gallant effort to hold the place, but the 
enemy established themselves on their right and left 
and then concentrated an assault on the center, which 
gave them no alternative but to retreat, which they did 
to the south of Samogneux. To the right of Haumont 
a very bard fight took place in the wood of Caures 
which was held by two battalions of Chasseurs. 

On February 21st the German artillery bombarded 
this Caures wood with terrible violence, and on the next 
day this bombardment became even worse. Towards 
noon of February 22nd the Germans attacked these two 
battalions of Chasseurs with fresh troops, endeavoring 
to encircle them, and the fighting became very hard; 
grenades and the naked bayonet played an important 
part. Gradually, however, the German grasp on the 
position became stronger and stronger, and at half past 
five in the evening the Germans managed to get a gun 
into a position from which they could enfilade the main 
point of the defense. This made it necessary for the 
French to evacuate their position which they did in 
five columns, which were rather heavily punished, but 
which succeeded in getting to a place of safety. The 
wood of Herbebois is the next wood to the east of the 
wood of Caures. The fighting here was very hard and 
on the first day, in spite of a very heavy bombardment, 
the Germans managed to obtain a footing in the first 
line of French trenches and to capture one of the de- 
fensive works of the supporting trench. Diu-ing the 
night the French launched a counter-attack in the hopes 
of driving the Germans out of this point of vantage, 
which went on until five o'clock in the morning, but 
which did little but hold the Germans in their position. 
Close fighting continued all the next day and the Ger- 
mans made an attack diu-ing the night but without 
particular success. 

The following day, the 23rd of February, the Germans 
launched five attacks on this wood, with little result, 



but the Woevre wood, in the meantime, was captiu^ed, 
and, as a result, the French position in the Herbebois 
wood became untenable, so that at foiu* o'clock the order 
was given for them to withdraw; which they effected 
in good order. 

On the morning of the 23rd, the Germans had succeeded 
in driving the French very nearly completely out of the 
line of woods which formed their first defensive line, 
besides which the French had been forced to evacuate 
Brabant and Haumont and the woods of Caures and 
Herbebois, and had fallen back upon the positions based 
upon Samogneux, Beaumont, the northern fringe of 
Fosses Wood, and a smaller wood, the Chaume. 

On the morning of the 23rd, the French attempted a 
counter-attack to recover these positions, which attack 
was launched from Samogneux, but this counter-attack 
was stopped by the German artillery which inflicted 
sanguinary losses on the attackers. Thereafter a very 
heavy bombardment was opened by the Germans on 
the village of Samogneux, and the French were obliged, 
towards evening, to evacuate Samogneux and fall back 
to the beginning of the northern slope of the very impor- 
tant elevation known as Hill 344. This Hill 344 then 
became the objective of the entire German attack on this 
western end of the northern line and the battle for its 
possession went on all through the night of the 23rd and 
the day of the 24th, both sides fighting with despera- 
tion and determination. 

On the night of the 24th the Germans succeeded in 
getting a footing on the northern slopes of this hill. In 
the center, after bombarding Fosses wood, the Germans 
assembled their infantry for the attack on that wood, 
and the Beaumont Wood to the east of that wood and 
south of Wavrille; but this concentration became known 
to the French artillery, who shelled it heavily, dispersing 
it, and two battalions of French infantry were sent to 
the northwest corner of Woevre wood. 

At this the Germans resumed their bombardment of 
the Beaumont and Fosses woods, and continued it until 
about one o'clock in the afternoon. At that time they 
made an infantry attack which was successful and in a 
half hour they had driven the French out of Woevre 
wood, as far as the village of Beaumont to the west and 
Fosses wood to the east. In another half hour the 
Germans captured the whole of Fosses wood and drove 
into the streets of Beaumont, from which after house 



to house fighting, the French were driven out. Le 
Chaume wood, to the east of Fosses wood, was next 
captured, which resulted in the village of Ornes being 
given up by the French. 

During the night it was quiet. Roughly speaking, 
the French now occupied the line of heights which 
extended from the east of Champneuville on the Meuse 
to the south of Ornes. The German objective had now 
become the capture of Douaumont, both village and fort, 
and of the so-called Pepper Hill, south of Samogneux. 
The Talou Hill, enclosed in the bend of the Meuse, 
south of Champneuville was impossible for either side to 
hold, on account of the fact that it was completely 
exposed to the fire of both artilleries, and it hence became 
a sort of no-man's land played upon by one or the other 
artilleries continuously. 

The situation had become very grave for the French, 
and had the Germans been able to bring up immediately 
their heavy artillery, which the rapidity of their advance 
had left five miles in their rear, and which, in addition 
to the distance to be advanced, had to be brought up 
over a very rough and difficult country, the subsequent 
history of this Verdun battle might have been different. 
But to bring up this heavy artillery took practically a 
day, and this gave the French a respite, which respite 
they turned to their advantage. 

De Castelnau, one of the ablest French Generals^ 
had been hurried to Verdun by Gen. Joffre as soon as it 
became apparent that the German offensive there was 
a serious one. After de Castelnau had inspected the 
situation, he determined to make a stand on the right 
bank of the river, and therefore, to organize most vigor- 
ously the defense of the Douaumont position, and, while 
occupied, in this day of respite, in thus preparing for 
the assaults which were inevitably to follow, he called 
to him, and installed in command of the defense of 
Verdun, an officer who had already distinguished himself 
earlier in the war. Gen. Petain. This general had begun 
the war as a simple colonel, but, as a result of his dis- 
tinguished conduct in the retreat from Charleroix, had 
been promoted to Brigadier-General in the autimin of 
1914, and had mounted rapidly in grade from that time 
as a result of very distinguished services, and these 
finally caused him to be selected as the defender of this 
all-important position for the French. 



In Alsace during the six months under review struggle 
kept up continuously at half a hundred points, but most 
of these affairs were too scattered in scene and insig- 
nificant in consequences, to be here chronicled in detail. 
The first action of any importance occurred on October 
15th, when the Germans, after shelling all the line run- 
ning for about four miles between the Rehfelsen-Hart- 
mannsweillerkopf and Sidelkopf attacked the French 
positions with great violence. A desperate struggle 
ensued and the Germans succeeded in re-occupjdng the 
summit of the Hartmannsweillerkopf. A few days 
later, however, another battle took place in this vicinity, 
principally directed at the Linge and the Barrenkopf, 
which resulted in the Germans being again expelled from 
the summit of the Hartmannsweillerkopf. 

On November 7th and 8th there was lively fighting 
at the Col de Bonhomme, at La Chapelotte, and Le 
Violu. A long lull then followed which lasted until 
December 3rd, when a very lively encounter took place 
near Thann. On the 26th of December the French who 
occupied the top of the Hartmannsweillerkopf pushed 
to the east and northeast from their positions on the 
summit, and gained considerable ground, capturing 1200 
Germans. This operation was in the nature of a surprise. 

The next day the Germans counter-attacked and 
recovered the ground lost and themselves captured 1500 
men. The artillery fighting in this affair was extra- 
ordinarily severe. The French about this time expected 
an attack to be made on Belfort, and shifted troops 
to its surrounding region for its defense. But the real 
attack planned by the Germans was to be made at 
Verdun and probably the demonstration which they 
made at this time in the direction of Belfort was merely 
to draw the French reserves in that direction. 

On the 28th and 29th of December another very violent 



two days battle took place on the slopes of the Hart- 
mannsweillerkopf. In this the French made progress 
but on January 2nd the Germans recovered a portion of 
the ground so lost, and on January 9th captured a hill 
to the north of the summit of the Herzstein and took 
some 1100 French. 

On the 24th of January the demonstration towards 
Belfort became more marked and on the afternoon of 
February 8th a very large German gun, supposed to be at 
least 15 inches calibre, began to bombard that fortress, 
and continued this bombardment for the next three days. 

On February 13th this demonstration toward Belfort 
by the Germans became even more developed. An 
artillery bombardment was opened on February 15th 
on the French positions at Sept, south of Altkirch, and 
on February 15th, after this bombardment had lasted 
rather intensely for three days, the German infantry 
assaulted the place. The struggle lasted for a couple 
of days, but, not being a real attack and merely a dem- 
onstration, the Germans, after they had accomplished 
their object of drawing the French reserves to the east- 
ward from Verdun and its neighborhood, ceased the 
assault. The rest of the month of February was calm 
on this Alsatian front. For the French, most of the 
fighting here was done by the well known regiments of 
Chasseurs Alpins, a picked corps of men who, however, 
were very badly cut to pieces during the fighting, of 
which the struggles on Hartmannsweillerkopf were the 
center, and also had the misfortune to lose their com- 
mander, Gen. Seret, a very distinguished and able officer. 

We may sum up the results of the six months fighting 
on the western front, by saying, that there had been no 
changes in the battle lines during that period, which in 
any way indicated that it was in the power of the Allies 
to force back the German lines from the general positions 
they occupied nor on the other hand were there any 
changes which indicated that it was in the power of the 
Teutons to advance their positions more than locally. 
In short, it looked as though the belligerents on this 
front had reached a deadlock which would very probably 
last, with possibly slight modifications here and there 
on the long front to the end of the war. 






On the 1st of September, 1915, the German troops had 
reached a point on the Gulf of Riga, a little to the west 
of Schlock, from which their line ran south to Mitau and 
thence curved to the east to the bank of the Dwina 
River, whose course it followed, roughly at more or less 
distance to the west thereof, south to a point on the rail- 
road leading from Ponevesh to Dunaberg, about twenty 
miles distant from the latter, from whence it ran souh- 
ward through Vilkomir and along the Svienta River, to 
a point a little to the west of Kovno. On this line are 
two important strategic points, Dunaberg at the south 
and Riga in the north; but of these two, Dunaberg is 
considerably the most important and indeed it may be 
said that it was perhaps as important as any other for- 
tress in this portion of Russia and Poland, except Warsaw. 

The town itself was not heavily fortified, but the rings 
of fortifications running around it at a distance of from 
8 to 20 miles fortified not only the town but all the 
territory within their lines. In addition to the impor- 
tance of Dunaberg as a fortified area, which is a more 
correct description of it than fortress, it was an important 
railroad center. Roads and railroads ran from it to the 
north through Pskoff to St. Petersburg, to the north- 
west to Riga, to the southeast to Smolensk, to the south 
to Vilna; all of these were main lines. Several other 
lines of minor importance radiated from it in various 
directions and hence its capture would have been decisive 
of the entire German offensive, not only to the east of 
Vilna but to the northwest of Riga; and had the Germans 
been able to take this town, Riga itself- would have fallen 
almost mechanically in a very short time, with the result 
that they would have established their front for the 
winter on a strong line easily defended, with even com- 
paratively small forces. 

The approach to Dimaberg from the south is guarded 
not only by works of art, at points advantageously 



placed, but the area in which it stands is also protected 
by a chain of lakes running in a semi-circle from the west 
soutbeastwardly and then northeasterly. The prin- 
cipal of these lakes on the south is Gatin, which was the 
scene of so many arduous struggles in the subsequent 
fighting. For the Russians to prevent a successful attack 
on Dunaberg, therefore, from this front, they were merely 
obliged to retain the necks of land stretching between 
these lakes, which made their task a comparatively 
easy one. On the west the line of defense of but 27 miles 
stretched from Drisviaty, the most northerly of these 
lakes, to lUkust. On the other side a movement to reach 
and cross the Dwina River to the east of Dunaberg, 
which, had it been successfully carried out, would have 
enabled the town to be attacked from the east along the 
line of railroad running to Polotsk, was rendered ex- 
tremely difficult by the line of defense created by the deep 
and fairly rapid flowing Dwina itself, across which at 
this point there were no bridges; and the northern bank 
being the higher of the two, the Russian artillery posted 
on this bank could make short work of any attempt to 
construct any ponton bridges across the stream. This 
movement, nevertheless, was tried several times with 
such result that any idea of pushing it through to com- 
pletion was abandoned, and the Germans turned their 
efforts thereafter to the southern and western fronts 

By the middle of September, on both of these fronts, 
the Teutons had thoroughly intrenched themselves and 
were attempting to advance by sapping in the usual way, 
while, at the same time massing large quantities of heavy 
artillery in their rear with an idea of an eventual attempt 
to storm their opponent's position. 

On the 24th of September an assault opened with a 
heavy artillery bombardment of the Russian positions 
on the whole front from the Dwina River on the north 
to Lake Drisviaty on the south, and after this preparation 
was complete an infantry attack was vigorously pushed. 
The Germans captured many of the Russian advanced 
trenches on this front, but were unable to pimcture 
the Russian main defenses. The result was that their 
advances did not constitute real gains. On the next 
day the Russians counter-attacked and recaptured the 
village of Drisviaty on the lake of the same name, which 
gave them control of the passage between the lakes along 
the Vilna railroad. The loss of this important posi- 



tion by the Germans put an end momentarily to this 
offensive, which then degenerated into more or less violent 
artillery duels, accompanied by occasional skirmishes 
at different points in the line but no concerted movement. 

These operations, lasted ten days, and though during 
their continuation at times each side had the advan- 
tage momentarily, the net result at its conclusion was 
that the gains and losses balanced each other so abso- 
lutely that the general situation was [completely un- 

On the 4th of October a new offensive began in which 
the Germans made an attack on the front between 
lUkust and Lake Sventin, and fierce battles took place 
around the village of Garbunooke directly south of 
lUkust and Shieskovo, almost directly south of it, a 
little to the west of Soirky and Lake Sventin. These 
villages changed hands several times, the Germans 
capturing Garbunooke on the 8th of October, only to 
lose it on the 10th. In the sector around lUkust, how- 
ever, the Germans again made some gains which put them 
in a favorable position for future operations against 
this point. 

For the two weeks following October 10th, the fight- 
ing languished. Gen. Von Morgen, who had commanded 
here, was replaced by Gen. Von Lauenstein, and on the 
23rd a new offensive opened. This began, as usual, by 
a violent artillery bombardment of the Russian trenches 
which lasted several hours, after which the infantry were 
thrown forward on lUkust. At first the Russians man- 
aged to hold their own, but towards evening the Ger- 
mans drove them back and captured the town. This 
capture placed the German forces in a favorable position 
about three miles west of the Dwina River, about two 
miles north of the railroad running westward to Pone- 
vesh and about ten miles, as the crow flies, to the north- 
west of Dunaberg itself, to which an excellent road led. 
On the following day the Germans again attacked to the 
east of Illkust, and furious fighting continued there 
without cessation for the next two or three days. This 
fighting spread to the south, and on October 28th the 
Germans broke through the Russian defenses at the 
village of Garbunooke and to the south of it, and suc- 
ceeded in reaching the forest which lies between the road 
leading from Illkust to Shishkovo and the Dwina River. 

At this point, however, the German advance ceased, 
as the positions to the east of Illkust were found to be 



too strong for the strength of the attacking force and 
because the Russians started an offensive to the south 
between Lake Sventin to Lake lUsen, which forced the 
Germans to withdraw a considerable portion of their 
forces from the lUkust front in order to hold their posi- 
tions there. 

Between Lakes Sventin and Illsen stretches a sort of 
swamp interspersed with sand-hills covered with pines, 
the most important of which were in the hands of the 
Germans, both to the north and south of the little village 
of Platonovk which stands about midway between the 
two lakes. On the western shore of Lake Sventin Ger- 
man batteries were posted on the heights thereon in 
such a manner as to sweep both the shores and waters 
of .this lake. The Russian objective was to first take 
these last mentioned heights and then to take Plato- 
novk. The combat lasted for ten days, and each foot 
of ground was bitterly contested. On the 3rd day the 
Russians succeeded in capturing the heights to the west 
of Lake Sventin, but one of these heights was almost 
immediately recaptured in a counter-attack by the 
Germans. The Russians rallied and counter-attacked, 
and after fierce hand to hand fighting, succeeded for 
the second time in driving the Germans out. 

This was followed a day or two later by a movement 
forward in the center, which the attack on these heights 
had necessarily preceded. This forward movement, 
after about five days of hard fighting, succeeded in ac- 
complishing its object, the capture of Platonovk and the 
hills to the north and south of it, and in driving back 
the German line about three miles to the west over 
the whole front, besides taking possession of the western 
shore of Lake Sventin. But these gains were not made 
without paying a very large price therefor, since the 
Russian casualties in this comparatively minor ten days' 
fighting were admitted to have been in the vicinity of 
15,000 to 17,000, while the German losses were only 
about 10,000. Of these German losses only 700 were 
captured. The result of this fight was to give the 
Russians courage to attempt more and towards the end 
of November, on the 24th, they made an attempt to 
drive back the Germans near lUkust. This fighting 
first resulted in the capture of Yonopol by them to the 
east of lUkust, a point which was of considerable im- 
portance to the Germans as they had made several 
attempts from here to cross the Dwina River. On the 



28th of November the Germans launched a counter- 
offensive on Yonopok which was unsuccessful, and the 
Russians, after repulsing them, followed them back to 
their positions and succeeded in capturing the suburbs 
of lUkust, and afterwards extended their lines both in 
the village and to the south thereof, but this ground was 
not long held by the Russians and a couple of days later 
they were compelled to abandon these positions com- 
pletely, owing to the strength of the German counter- 

With this episode, serious fighting on this front ceased 
for the winter, and from the end of December, 1915, 
until well after the first of March, the period when our 
record closes, both sides remained quiescent. 



On the central portion of this front from Illkust north 
to a point about opposite Uxkell on the Dwina, little 
happened during the period under consideration. The 
Germans made one or two attempts to cross the river, 
in November, near Frederichstat and Jacobstat, but 
were unsuccessful therein. After this the Russian winter 
fell with its full force and the cold and the imusually 
large quantity of snow put a summary stop to operations 

On the Riga front, September passed quietly, with 
the German lines occupying approximately the line 
from Schlock on the Gulf, of Riga to Mitau, thence along 
the river Ekau to the Mitau-Krutzbiu-g Railroad, which 
it followed to a point opposite Frederichstat, whence it 
ran to a point on the Dwina River about half way be- 
tween Riga and Dunaberg, and opposite Jacobstat. 
On October 14th the Germans began to develop a general 
offensive, and on the morning of that day crossed the 
river Ekau near the village of Grunwald, about 15 miles 
to the east of Mitau, near the railroad, and a two days' 
battle followed for the railroad station of Garrosen and 
that of Gross Ekau to the west and east of Grunwald 
respectively. The line of this battle finally extended 
as far as Neugut, considerably to the east of Gross Ekau. 
At Gross Ekau on October 16th the Germans drove the 
Russians back a considerable distance and also gained 
groimd near Neugut. Hard fighting followed for several 
days, and by the 20th of October the Germans managed 
to break through the Russian line extending from the 
Dwina River to Neugut and to advance as far as Borko- 
witz on the river Dwina, a place distant about 14 miles 
southeast from Riga. The Germans followed up this 
advantage by advancing northeasterly from Grunwald, 
and, after forcing their way across the river Missa, which 
rims nearly parallel to the Mitau-Krutzburg railroad 
a few miles to the north of it, forced the passage of this 



river, and captured the two villages of Plakanen and 

While these things were going on, the Germans, who 
had reached Boskowitz, moved forward to the island of 
Dalen, immediately below Riga in the middle of the 
river Dwina. The fighting, for the possession ot this 
island, was very severe and both sides suffered heavily. 
After its capture the Germans attempted to make a 
crossing of the Dwina river from this island, but were 
defeated therein, as the Russians to the north of them, 
on the southern bank of the Dwina and those oppo- 
site them on the northern bank of the river, caught 
them between their two fires and rather severely pun- 
ished them. 

The German center during this time had succeeded in 
reaching Olai, on the railroad between Mitau and Riga, 
and a little nearer to Riga than Mitau. Here they halted 
for the time being. At this time the German line 
stretched from the Gulf of Riga to Schmerder, Kalnsom, 
Olai, Plakanen and ended at the Dwina River at a point 
opposite the Island of Dalen, from which the Germans 
had retreated, owing to its being under the cross fire of 
the Russian artillery to the north and northeast. 

On the last of October the Germans began a move- 
ment on the northern end of their line between the two 
lakes Kanger and Babit, the latter of which parallels 
the sea at a distance of about three miles therefrom. In 
the middle of the neck of land separating this lake from 
the gulf of Riga runs the river Aa, to the north of which 
runs also the railroad from Schlock to Riga. The towns 
of Kemmern and Tchin at the western end of Lake 
Babit were stormed on the 31st of October, and 
speedily taken. Thereafter, the fighting spread as far 
as the town of Ragassen near the northern end of Lake 
Kange, on the Gulf of Riga. This fighting continued 
for several days and the Germans were unable to greatly 
improve their position, although they did advance some- 
what to the east of Kemmern. On November 7th half 
the Russians counter-attacked and succeeded in ad- 
vancing and in reoccupying the district between Schlock 
and Lake Babit and in driving the Germans to the 
westward. On the 10th another battle took place in 
this region, in which the Russian fleet on the Gulf of 
Riga took a hand, the scene of the battle being close 
enough to the shores of that gulf, to permit the guns of 
the warships to be effective. This battle lasted three days 



and at its end the Germans gave ground and falling back, 
permitted the Russians to recapture Kemmern. The 
Russian advance continued to the west of Kemmern, 
the capture of which town gave them complete control 
of Lake Babit, while they also made progress on the 
eastern shore of Lake Kange. Desultory fighting 
continued in this region for the next month, but the 
attempt to advance upon Riga along the shores of the 
Baltic was abandoned by the Germans, and from the 10th 
of November they made no serious effort to again ad- 
vance to the west between Lake Babit and the Gulf of 
Riga. From this time forward, until the end of March, 
the whole Riga front was quiet, the lines remaining with- 
out material change all the rest of the winter in the 
positions hereinbefore described. 

After the fall of Brest-Litovsk, which took place on 
August 25th, the Russian battle line may be divided into 
three distinct sections, the first of which extends from 
Vilna to the Gulf of Riga, the principal events of which 
have been treated of in the preceding chapter; the 
second runs from Vilna south through the Pripet 
Marshes to the railroad ruiming from Kovel to Kief, 
while the third reaches from this railroad to the northern 
frontier of Rumania. 

We will now deal with the central portion which was 
the scene in the period which is under consideration of 
the most important events, both in themselves and in 
their future consequences. 



This central section of the Russian front is also sus- 
ceptible of division, for the sake of both clearness and 
convenience in dealing with it; the first including the front 
from Vilna to Baranovitchy, and the second the front 
from the important railroad junction last named as far 
south as Dubno, Tamopol, and Czernowitz. 

We will now take up the events in the northern sector 
of the first division of this central section. It will be 
remembered that in the second volume the account of 
the campaign in the northern sector finished practically 
with the evacuation of the fortress of Olita by the Rus- 
sians on August 28th, 1915, and their retreat to the north- 
east in the general direction of Vilna. The evacuation 
of this fortress really resulted in the fall of both Vilna 
and Grodno. Situated on the Bug River, equally dis- 
tant from both of these important positions, yet it was 
so located as to be able to effectually bar any attack 
upon Vilna from the southwest or of Grodno from the 
north. After the capture of Olita the next point against 
which the German forces were thrown was Orany which 
is situated on the railroad about midway between Grodno 
and Vilna and almost directly to the east of Olita. As the 
effect of the capture of this point would be to completely 
cut off any communication from the Russian army around 
Grodno and those operating in the north toward Vilna, 
every foot of the way between Orany and Olita was 
strongly defended by the Russians, but their struggles 
were unsuccessful and on the 31st day of August this 
town fell into the hands of the Germans. Another 
reason for the strenuous defence that the Russians made 
of the territory between these two places was that having 
as we are now informed already made up their minds to 
abandon Grodno, in the event that it became necessary, 
which emergency now confronted them, the Russians 
desired to gain as much time as possible in order to re- 
move the garrison and the supplies of all kinds to the 
eastward in that fortress, by the railroad which ran to 



there from Lida; in the accomplishment of which de- 
sire they were partly successful. 

As soon as Orany was captured, the German forces in 
front of Grodno began an offensive move against that 
fortress. On the day after the attack on Orany, the 
outer line of four forts to the north of the Dombrovo- 
Grodno highway was taken by storm, which captures 
were followed up later in the afternoon of the same day 
by the capture of fort No. 4, while fort No. 4-A wa& 
captured towards dusk. Immediately after the fall of 
these forts, all the remaining forts of the outer chain of 
fortifications, to the west of Grodno were abandoned 
by the Russians. The following day, the 2d of September ^ 
the Germans entered Grodno itself and rendered them- 
selves masters of the town after considerable street 
fighting. On the morning of the 3rd of September, the 
Russians made a counter-offensive and succeeded in 
penetrating to the streets of the town itself but were 
speedily driven out, the object of this counter-offensive 
being more to protect the retreat of the troops with- 
drawing to the east, than in the hope of recapturing the 

The Germans had hardly succeeded in this conquest 
of Grodno than they began an offensive therefrom to- 
wards Lida, located on the west side of the line of railroad 
running from Vilna to Baranovichy, at the point where 
the line of railroad running from Grodno to Molodetchna 
traverses at right angles the first mentioned line. The 
purpose of this movement being to drive a wedge between 
the Russian armies operating in the vicinity of Vilna and 
those operating along the upper Niemen river and the 
Pripet Marshes. This attempt, however, was not posi- 
tively successful though some progress was made to the 
east of Grodno, and this progress had considerable in- 
fluence on movements further north in and around Vilna. 

Vilna was the position, of all those positions in the 
northern sector of the central front, most important for 
the Russians to defend; not only on account of its being 
a great railroad center, but on account of the fact that it 
was the key position in thei rentire second line, and the 
loss of which would mean that the Russians would be 
obliged to fall back still further to the east and eventually 
take up a position on their third line of defenses which 
would have the great weakness of being cut into two 
pieces by the Pripet Marshes. These marshes, as my 
readers know, form a sort of peninsula, of very difl[icult 




territory running east and west practically through the 
center of the central section of the Russian front. These 
marshes grew more difficult to manoeuvre through in 
proportion as an army advanced to the east. Therefore, 
if Vilna was captured, and the Russians obliged to fall 
back on their third line of defense, the Rilssian army 
would be, to all practical purposes, divided into two 
sections, one operating to the north of the Pripet Marshes 
and one to the south, with such poor and roimdabout 
means of communication between them as to put out 
of the question any concerted movements. This was, 
of course, appreciated by the German General Staff. 

The first step in the capture of Vilna by the Germans 
was the successful continuation of the movement which 
had begun some days before, northeast of Kovno along 
the ViUya River, and which had reached the Sventa 
River at a point in the direction of Vilkomir. This 
movement was originally to the northeast, but, on Sep- 
tember 11th, a portion of the German forces engaged 
therein turned directly east and began to move towards 
the Vilna-Dunaberg railroad. A day later another force 
of Germans commenced a movement along the railroad 
leaving from Ponevesh to Sventsiany, a place located 
on the Vilna-Dimaberg railroad, a little less than half 
way between these two places and nearest to Vilna. 
Simultaneously a third movement was begun by the 
Germans towards Vilna from the direction of Kovno, 
directly to the west. 

On the 13th the Vilna-Dimaberg railroad was cut at 
Sventsiany by the Germans and the Russian troops here 
were driven southwards to the station of Podbrodzie, but 
the road south from Vilna to Baranovitchy and the road 
to the east through Smorgon to Minsk were still open, 
so that it was still possible for the Russians to with- 
draw their entire force there to the east and south of this 
fortress city in the event they so desired. From Grodno, 
as has been related before, an offensive had been imder- 
taken almost immediately after its capture in the very 
first days of September towards Lida on this Vilna- 
Baranovichy raiboad, which had not met with great 
success. This movement was resumed on a larger scale, 
and gradually advanced, and after heavy fighting, suc- 
ceeded on the 20th of September in capturing Lida itself, 
and by so doing cut communication between Vilna and 

In the meantime, while this movement on Lida was 




taking place, large forces of German cavalry acting as 
raiders made a sudden appearance in the vicinity of 
Smorgon, on the railroad leading from Vilna eastward 
to Minsk, but these were not in sufficient force for the 
purpose for which they were intended not numbering 
more than 20,000 men, and being of course not accom- 
panied to any very great degree by artillery or by in- 
fantry, though some few infantry are said to have been 
brought forward in automobiles to the positions reached 
by the cavalry, were driven back by the Russians, who 
thus recovered the use of the Vilna-Minsk railroad. 
Nevertheless, this movement, in connection with the 
German control of the Vilna-Baranovitchy railroad and 
of the railroad from Vilna to Dunaberg, made it im- 
possible for Vilna to be held longer by the Russians, 
and in fact the Russian army there was in imminent 
danger of having retreat cut off by the German infantry 
in large forces which had in the meantime arrived in 
Baranovitchy from which place they could press on with 
comparative ease to Minsk, not far distant, as distances 
go in Russia. At Minsk the Germans would have oc- 
cupied a commanding position in the rear of the forces 
defending Vilna and on their only line of communication 
by rail with the east. It was, therefore, necessary for 
the Russian commander to escape before Minsk could be 
occupied, and the only possible line of escape was along 
this Vilna-Minsk railroad, which, as has been said, had 
been at one moment lighty held by the German cavalry. 
For a long time, the incompetence of the Russian 
Commander in Chief, Grand Duke Nicholas, had been 
manifest to the most ardent and insidious of his 
flatterers. Placed at the beginning of the war in com- 
mand of the largest army the world has ever seen, whose 
equipment, whose morale, whose discipline and training 
had become the subject of eulogistic effusions in the 
military papers of France and England for some years 
before the war, he had in thirteen months suffered 
greater defeats perhaps than any general in history, if 
defeats are to be measured by the loss of men, the loss of 
artillery, the loss of equipment, the loss of munitions of 
war, and the loss of territory. In view of the fact that 
Russia is so vast as to afford imlimited possibilities of 
retreat for enormous distances, his entire army was 
neither annihilated nor totally captured, but every 
other species of military defeat had been inflicted upon 
it by its foes. Supported, as the Grand Duke was, by 



a powerfully subsidized press, not only in Russia but in 
Great Britain and even to some extent the United States, 
for a time he managed to sustain himself against the ever 
rising tide of events, the results of his gross incompetency 
but ultimately the tide rose too high and he was engulfed. 

On the 6th of September, 1915, the Czar issued an 
order depriving the Grand Duke of his command of the 
Russian armies; which command the Czar took into his 
own hands. Subsequently, the Grand Duke was ap- 
pointed to the Governor-Generalship of the Caucasus, 
and Commander in Chief of the armies in that region. 
Later in this narrative his exploits in his new field of 
action will be considered. 

In removing the Grand Duke from the command of 
his armies, the Czar removed a danger to his throne 
and to his person, as well, if the rumors which came 
to us from Russia at that time, and which continued 
from time to time to come to us, concerning the Grand 
Duke's ambitions, if victorious, were well founded. 



General Evert who was in command of the Russian 
armies at Riga in the predicament above outlined, man- 
ifested more strategic sense than usual in a Russian 
General. He so disposed his forces as to hold for a short 
time the advance of the Germans from the north from 
Sventsiany and from the direction of Kovno in the west 
and threw his main forces upon these German forces 
which had cut the Vilna-Minsk railroad, in the hope of 
recovering the possession of the same. This hope was 
not disappointed; the German cavalry were driven back 
to the south and the line of railroad between the two 
towns was again completely in Russian hands. This 
recapture provided a means of escape for the bulk of the 
Russian army operating around Vilna, and therefore 
was extremely important both to these troops and to the 
Empire in its consequences. As an immediate result, 
the Russian army escaped to the east from Vilna with 
far less losses than might have been expected from the 
very difficult situation in which it was forced by the 
Germans; but the city and fortress of Vilna itself was 
lost, and with Vilna was also lost the control of the 
raiboad running north to Dunaberg to within a few miles 
of that town, and of the railroad running south as far 
as Baranovitchy. 

After the fall of Vilna, from the town of Svientsiany 
to the north between that city and Dimaberg the Ger- 
mans attempted a movement in the direction of Polotsk, 
the valley of the Disna river [and along the railroad 
running parallel thereto a short distance south. At 
the same time another German advance began on the 
railroad rimning eastwardly from Vihia to Minsk, and a 
third on the railroad running from Baranovitchy to Minsk, 
still further south, the right wing of the German forces here 
followed the northern end of the Pripet Marshes in a 
movement to Niesuiz and Slutsk against the Minsk- 
Bobruisk line. For more than two weeks a violent 
struggle kept up on the whole of this front and the 



Russian losses in opposing these movements, had Gen, 
Evart not succeeded in the withdrawal of his troops from 
Vilna, would have gone for naught. 

But the necessities of warfare elsewhere induced the 
Germans to weaken their forces operating in this sphere 
of action, and ultimately the Germans were obliged to 
content themselves with occupying a line rimning south 
from Vidzy, northeast of Svientsiany through Smorgon 
on the Vilna-Minsk railroad, whence their Ime extended 
southwardly to a point to the east of Baranovitchy on 
the railroad between that place and Minsk. 

After the first of October, the autumnal rains set in, 
followed as they are in these northern latitudes, by cold 
weather and by snow, which made the roads, particularly 
towards the Pripet Marshes, impassable for fresh move- 
ments and a long period of practical inactivity followed. 
Both Russians and Germans dug themselves in and 
prepared to pass the coming winter in their then posi- 
tions. Indeed this calm lasted all the winter and well 
into the spring, and well past the time when this record 
closes.^ Of course this does not mean that during this 
long period at scattered points along the front, from time 
to time, activities of some sort did not take place; oc- 
casionally each side made a reconnoitre attack on the 
other's position, but these attacks were, strategically or 
tactically speaking, of no importance, and consequently 
need not be herein gone into at length. 

The Pripet Marshes themselves, which thrust forward 
like a huge tongue to the west, narrowing as they go, 
and which separate the northern half of the Russian 
line considering this line in its whole length from the 
southern, deserve a word or two of mention. The 
Pripet River flows through them in the center from west 
to east, eventually falling into the Dnieper some dis- 
tance to the- north of Kiefif, and is about 350 miles in 
length. From its source to the point where it flows into 
the Dnieper the difference in level is a trifle less than 160 
feet. The valley which it flows through is perhaps 150 
miles wide on an average and this valley lies little lower 
than the coimtry to the north of it or south of it. 

The result is that all of the rivers and streams flowing 
from the north and south which flow into the Pripet have 
but little current as the change in level in them is barely 
sufficient to cause their waters to move, and hence, in 
this flat country, the streams spread very easily from 
their normal beds. This is particularly true in the spring 



and the autumn when the whole of this vast distr'ct, 
30,000 square miles in area, becomes practically a lake, 
with here and there islands jutting through it which 
serve for sites f c r the comparatively few and miserable 
towns. At many places these marshes are very deep 
and the black, slimy imderlying mud is known to 
extend down in places to a depth of 150 to 260 
feet. To wander from the beaten path on this soft, 
treacherous surface is almost positive death. It is 
only in the winter that movements through these 
marshes are safe for then the ground is frozen, deep and 
can sustain traffic across its surface. The comparatively 
few roads through these marshes, mostly built on piles 
or like the roads in our backwoods, are formed by tree 
tnmks laid side by side. To add to the other difficulties, 
much of the territory comprised in the marshes is very 
thickly wooded with stimted pine, birch and aspen. 

The farming population constitutes about 70 per cent 
of the inhabitants, while racially the majority of the 
population are white Russians. The people are mostly 
occupied in bee-keeping, himting and fishing — some 
commerce is done in forest products, timber, charcoal, 
wooden dishes, pitch and bark products, and of course 
there is little or no manufacturing. Taken all in all 
this region is perhaps the poorest and most backward in 
Europe. To the east the fortress of Bobruisk on the 
Beresina guards the marshes much in the same manner 
as Brest-Litovsk does on the west. 

After the fall of Brest-Litovsk the Teutonic troops 
who participated in its siege began a march through 
this very difficult region to the eastward. The main 
movement was along the line of the railway running 
from Brest-Litovsk almost directly east to Pinsk, but 
the advance was slow because the usual difficulties had 
been greatly increased in the Autumn of 1916 by an \m- 
usually heavy rainfall which turned the marshes into 
more veritable quagmires then usual. However, by 
dint of perseverance, Pinsk was finally reached by the 
end of September, and the Teutons established them- 
selves a little to the east of this town for the winter, their 
line to the northward following the course of the Jasiolda 
river and the Oginski Canal, to Lipsk on the northern 
edge of the marshes. But the coimtry behind them was 
still full of small isolated detachments of Cossacks and 
other irregular troops of the Russian army who were 
greatly aided in the guerilla warfare they were waging 



by the fact that they had the active aid of the population 
who were famihar with every by-path leading through 
the marshes as well as of every foot of the ground. 

It was not, then, until the cold season began and the 
ground became frozen that the Teutons were able to 
clear the marshes to the west of Pinsk completely of 
these irregular Russian troops. There was little fighting 
on a large scale, but there were multitudinous daily skir- 
mishes, particularly to the east of the line of the Oginski 
Canal and along the Jasiolda River. In this fighting the 
volunteer Polish legions which had been organized to aid 
the Teutons by the Poles themselves, greatly distinguished 
themselves. These conditions always so prevailed to a 
great degree on the line running south from Pinsk to 
Nobill and Borana, the two towns at the southern edge 
of the marshes in the direction of Rovno. 

In its general direction this line from Pinsk south 
followed the course of the Styr River from its connection 
with the Pripet River at Pogost to the railroad running 
from Lublin east. But as the distance from Pinsk to the 
southern boimdary of the Marshes was not so great as 
that from Pinsk to the northern boundary, and conse- 
quently there was not so much difficulty in supressing 
the wandering bands of marauders as there was to the 

Both to the north and south of Pinsk the so-called 
"marsh-wolves'', composed of peasants and other non- 
combatants who had been stirred up by the Russian 
government in a sort of levie en masse, were very active; 
but ultimately the Teutons succeeded in completely 
clearing the marshes of these pests, from their point of 
view, turning now to the campaign in the southern 
sector of the Russian front. 



On August 26, as was narrated in the previous 
volume, the great Russian fortress of Brest-Litovsk, 
.ahnost directly north of Lemberg and Cholm, had 
passed into Teuton possession, and a couple of days 
before it the town of Kovel, about midway on the rail- 
road between this fortress and the Volhynian triangle 
of fortresses, Lutsk, Dobno and Rodno, had also been 
taken by the Austrian cavalry. 

The fall of Vlodava and Dorojush completed the 
piercement of the Russian defenses on the middle line of 
the Bug. At this time the Russian lines continued to 
follow, in a general sense, the course of the Bug River 
south until they reached the point of the joining of the 
watersheds of this river and the Zlota Lipa in Galicia; 
the Zlota Lipa running, roughly speaking, thence in a 
straight line south to the Dniester. 

On August 27th the Austrians attacked the Russian 
positions at Jologury to the southwest of the town of 
Zlochoff in eastern Galicia and broke through their lines 
inflicting a severe material and tactical defeat upon them. 
The result of this operation was that on the next day the 
town of Zlochoflf fell into the hands of the Austrians and 
the upper line of the Bug was forced. The Russians re- 
treated to Bialykiemen on the other side of the Bug 
valley. In the meantime another Austrian force had 
crossed the Zlota Lipa from Brzezanyand was advancing 
towards the Zboroff-Podhaytse line. Still farther to the 
south another Austrian army was marching directly 
north towards Buczacz on the Strypa River. It became 
apparent that the positions of the Russians to the west 
of Tamopol had become very seriously involved and 
the only thing that they could do was to withdraw as 
rapidly as possible. Their position was complicated by 
the fact that further south on the Dniester River the 
Austrians had reached Zaleshchyki and were threatening 
to envelop the end of the Russian line in the south, and 



so the line of the Zlota Lipa was abandoned by the 

A concentric movement by the Austrians on the forti- 
fications of Rovno then developed from Kovel through 
Lutsk and from Galicia through Dubno. On August 
29th a general advance of the Austrians began on the 
whole line stretching from Bialykiemen to Radzivilofif, 
and fighting continued for three days; the Austrians 
slowly and surely making progress. 

On the 31st of August the Russian line broke and the 
Austrians captured Lutsk on the northern end of their 
concentric movement, and crossed the Styr along its 
whole length as far south as Toporoff, following up 
this advantage with an advance the next day September 
1st, to Brody on the frontier between Galicia and Volhy- 
nia, and also along the line of railroad from Lemberg to 
Dubno. These advances of the Austrian forces, and the 
general retreat of the Russians to the Olyka-Radziviloflf 
front, which resulted, in the south in Galicia itself, forced 
the Russians to fall back completely from the north and 
south line formed by the Zlota Lipa, first to that of the 
Strypa, the first parallel river running to the east, and 
eventually to that of the Sereth River which rims north 
and south slightly to the west of Tamopol. 

During these affairs, many thousands of Russian 
prisoners besides much artillery and war supplies were 
captured by the victorious Austrians. 

From Lutsk the Austrians continued their advance 
towards Rovno, almost directly east, and towards 
Dubno to the southeast. At the same time the main 
attack struck north from Brody along the Lemberg- 
Dubno railroad. 

On the 7th of September this Austrian force advanced 
from the southern side of the Ikva River and on the 8th 
of September the Austrians entered Dubno in triumph, 

Li the meantime, in the vicinity of Tamopol, in ex- 
treme eastern Galicia, very heavy fighting was going 
on. The battle here opened about the 6th of September 
and ended on the 9th. The Russian resistance here was 
somewhat stronger than on other points on this line, but 
after three days hard fighting the Russians were forced 
back to the outer lines of Tamopol, though the city 
itself was not carried by the Teutons. 

Still further south, at Trembovla, near the Sereth 
River, situated nearly in the middle of an imdulating 
plain cut up by many small streams, another battle de^ 



veloped on the 7th of November, and lasted through 
the 8th to the 9th. This was one of the most important 
fights in Central Galicia. Here again the Russians were 
heavily pimished but the Teutons were not able to carry 
through their projected movement to completion, so 
that the fight may fairly be called an indecisive one. 

Still further south in the coxmtry district between 
Trembovla and TchortkofiF another fight took place which 
began on the 9th of September and which on the 10th of 
September spread along the whole line from Tamopol 
to Lutsk, a front about 50 miles long. This fight lasted 
with various intermissions, until the 15th of September, 
and at its conclusion, neither side had modified to any 
great extent their original positions. Much further 
intensive fighting took place along the line of the Sereth 
during the next two or three weeks, but on this line the 
Russian defense seemed to stiffen and the Austro-Ger- 
mans were not able in spite of strenuous efforts to force 
the Russians to fall back from this line of the Sereth 

Coming north again to Volhynia in the beginning of 
September the Austro-Germans launched an o'ffensive 
against Rovno which proceeded along the railroad line 
coming from the northwest leading Lutsk, and from 
Dubno from the southwest. 

This advance was, however, strenuously opposed by 
the Russians and did not succed in attaining its object, 
and being rather badly defeated in the coxmtry between 
Lutsk and Rovno, at Klivan and near Olyka it was aban- 
doned. This abandonment gave the opportimity for 
the Russians who had won the victory at Olyka to make 
a dash to the west and recapture the fortress of Lutsk on 
the middle Styr. But their triumph was short-lived and 
four days later they were obliged to evacuate Lutsk as 
well as their other positions northwest of Dubno and fall 
back in an easterly direction. 

The line which the Russians now assumed to defend 
the fortress of Rovno against a new offensive which was 
being launched from the south by the Austro-Germans and 
to which they retreated from Lutsk, extended from 
Rafalovka on the Styr south through Tsartovsky and 
Kolki, also on the Styr, directly south to the river Ikva. 
The plan of campaign adopted by the Teutons for the 
reduction of Rovno included in the north a movement 
against Samy along the railroad which leads from Kovel 
to that place on the eastern side of the Goryn River. 



This advance would have carried them, had it been 
successful, to a considerably shorter line for wintering 
than the one they ultimately adopted, and by the capture 
of Serny, an important railroad jimction, whence one 
railroad line ran, as has been said, west to Kovel, another 
to the east to Keiff, and a third to the north past Stolin 
and through the Pripet Marshes to the line running north 
towards Vilna, while a fourth ran directly south towards 
Rovno, wouldhave enabled them to cut off commimication 
efiFectually between all southern, eastern and northern 
Russia, and would have outflanked the Russians at 
Rovno to the south, which outflanking would have forced 
the abandonment of the fortress by the Russians without 
any assault thereon by the Germans. At the same time, 
another movement against Rovno in the south was de- 
veloped from the base of the Galician town of Novo 
Alexinets. The objective of this movement in the south 
was that in the event it was successful, it would not only 
threaten Rovno, but would also outflank the Russian 
positions along the Zlota Lipa and the Strypa rivers 
further to the south. 

At Sokul, 23 miles north of Lutsk, the river Styr runs 
quite close to the river Stokod, another north and south 
rimning tributary of the Pripet. Between these two 
rivers extends a marshy depression running southeast 
to northwest which follows the right bank of the Stokod 
south almost down to the point at which the railroad 
from Kovel to Sarny crosses this river, the distance be- 
tween the two rivers at this point being about 30 miles. 
Between Kolki and Rafalovka, which last mentioned 
town is a few miles north of the point where the Kovel- 
Sarny railroad crosses the River Styr, the absence of any 
marshes on either side of the Styr renders the conditions 
favorable for laimching an ofifensive^- which is also increas- 
ed by the fact that within this 20 miles stretch are con- 
centrated nearly all the roads and railroads of the region, 
which adds to its advantages as a departure point for an 
offensive. For these reasons, then, this 20 roiles stretch 
became the center of the fighting during the autumn of 
1915 along the Styr River. 

What may be called "the Two Months' Battle of the 
Styr" began on the 27th of September, 1916, when the 
Germans, after a hard fight, forced their way across the 
Styr at Kolki and spread out towards the east, and con- 
tinued advancing for three days in that direction until 
finally on the third day they reached the Russian main 



defence line which extended, roughly, from Novosielki 
to Tchernish. On this line, for weeks, the fighting con- 
tinued, during all this time with comparatively little 
advantage gained by either side in their desperate strug- 
gle. Attacks and coimter-attacks followed on one another 
with almost monotonous regularity, but which at 
the same time cost thousands of human lives. For 
weeks, at this time, the several bulletins contained and 
continually repeated names of the same small towns 
which are almost meaningless unless the movements are 
studied so closely on the map as to lose the interest of 
the general reader. Some few phases of this battle, 
however, should be given. In the early days of October 
the Russians made a drive across the Styr near Polonne, 
where the Kovel-Sarny railroad crosses that river, and 
drove the Germans from the opposite villages, while, on 
the same day, near Chartorysk they also made a crossing 
and established themselves rather firmly on the western 
bank of the river, and during the next three days were 
able to push their lines some six miles west of these points. 
For the next week desperate fighting took place along 
the river aroimd Kolki, which was the border point 
between the two forces, the Germans who had advanced 
east of the river from the Kolki region, and the Russians 
who had advanced west of the river on the line extend- 
ing from Raf alovka to Chartorysk. 

A very peculiar position had now been reached, in 
which each side was in a position to and was threatening 
to outflank the other. This condition of affairs the 
Teutons promptly remedied by capturing the town of 
Chartorysk and thereby forcing the Russians to retreat 
to the Styr and on the northern end of their line to fall 
back from the west as far as Raf alovka, their departure 
point on that end o£ the line. The Russians, however, 
did not acknowledge themselves beaten and tenaciously 
returned to the charge. On October 17th, they re- 
gained practically all ground lost by them north of 
Chartorysk, in the days previous, and on the next day 
followed up their successes by capturing the town itself 
by storm; the Germans falling back beyond Budka and 
Rudka. During the next two or three days the Russians 
pushed up the western bank of the Styr as far as Kamaraff . 

On October 25th the Teutons began a coimter-oflfen- 
sive on the Lisova-Budka line and in the vicinity of 
Kamaraff. This offelisive was successful in the next few 
weeks to the extent that the Russians were driven back 



in semi-disorder and the town of Kamaraff itself was 

On November 10th the Russians were driven out of 
Budka, and by the 15th of November the entire western 
bank of the Styr including the town of Chartorysk had 
returned to the possession of the Teutons, but not for 
long; as, on November 19, after a desperate battle, the 
Russians succeeded in gettmg across the Styr once more 
and in reoccupying Chartorysk, as well as a village 
below it. After this recapture of the left bank of the 
Styr by the Russians, the fighting languished on this 
front, neither side showing any aggressive spirit. The 
heavy autumn rains set in and made the country diffi- 
cult to manoeuvre in; the objectives of the Teuton 
forces here being unachieved, the operations must be 
considered a defeat for them. 



This condition continued until January, 1916, when 
the ground having become frozen, the rivers coated with 
ice, and the marshes solid, for a time hostilities were 
resumed, and the old battlefields on the Styr around 
Chartorysk and Kolki to the northeast once more became 
the scene of animated fighting which at this time ex- 
tended as far south as Olyka on the railroad connecting 
Kovel with Dubno. Once more the Russians made a 
thrust to the westward in the vicinity of Chartorysk, 
and once more the Teutons took the offensive in the 
neighborhood of Kolki. This battle, which has been 
given the name of the "New Year's Battle," raged from 
about the first of the year to the middle of January, and 
at its conclusion, when counter-attack had succeeded 
attack for two weeks, the adversaries stood in practically 
the same positions as they had occupied at the beginning 
of this particular series of hostilties. But this draw 
had not been accomplished without great losses; the 
Teutons losing, perhaps, 60,000 to 70,000 men, while the 
Russian losses were admitted by themselves to have 
exceeded 125,000. Here, as usual, when Teutonic 
troops met Russian, the weight of casualties was on the 
Russian side, a fact which can be most largely attributed 
to the comparative inefficiency of the Russian general- 
ship, and also to the lack of skill which is generally 
shown by the Russians in the use of the artillery; the 
quantity of noise made by this arm seeming in general 
to be the Russian measure of its efficiency. 

From this time until past the first of March activities 
on this front degenerated into strict trench fighting, 
broken from time to time by an occasional skirmish or 
more or less unimportant artillery duel of not even 
local significance. 

In the south the German offensive against Rovno, 
which, as has already been explained, was to co-operate 
with the one which started around Kolki in the north, 
did not have even the same rather poor measure of 



success as the German oflfensive in the north. This 
offensive, as will be remembered, was to be launched 
along a front which extended, roughly, from Radziviloff 
to Novo Alexinets, and was to advance with its left wing 
resting on the railroad from Brody to Dubno, while the 
right wing moved across country pushing the Russians 
from their positions to the west of the Vilia River. The 
country around Novo Alexinets forms the key to the 
position, and here the Ikva, flowing north, the Horyn 
flowing northeast and the Sereth which runs to the south 
have their sources, and their courses are lined with wide 
marshes which at many points deepen into small lakes. 

Around Novo Alexinets itself rises a range of hills 
about 1300 feet high. To the south of this lies the railroad 
leading fromKrasne, through Zlochoff and Zboroff toTar- 
nopol, which is the chief center both of railroads and roads 
in eastern Galicia. From this railroad, as far south as the 
Dniester, runs a high plateau which is cut at- intervals 
into segments by a number of north and south flowing 
rivers, running parallel to each other, of which the Sereth 
and Strypa and the Zlota Lipa are the principal. These 
rivers have cut for themselves small canyons through the 
upper soil down to the limestone beds on which the 
plateau rests, and in some considerable degree therefore 
resemble the rivers of our own West. Their courses thus 
make natural fortifications, at intervals, barring an 
eastern or western advance. At points, these canyons 
attain a depth of 400 feet, from which some idea of their 
formidableness as defenses in the hands of a determined 
enemy can be gained. 

At this time the Russians held the left bank of the 
Strypa and it was the desire of the Teutons to complete 
their conquest of eastern Galicia before the winter set 
in, by driving the Russians to the east bank of the Sereth, 
and thus practicallyredeeming the whole of Galicia from 
Russian possession ; while it was the purpose of the 
Russians to endeavor to push their lines further to the 
west as far at least as the Zlota Lipa, the next parallel 
western river, and thus place themselves in a position 
from which in the spring they would be able to attempt 
to recover LemlDerg and a portion of Galicia to the west 
of them. These two conflicting objectives gave rise to 
almost continuous fighting along this Strypa River. 

In September and up to the middle of October con- 
tinuous skirmishes and small engagements took place 
on this front from the heights below Zboroff to almost 



as far south as the Dniester. Finally on October 12th a 
pitched battle developed around the hamlet bf Haj voron- 
ka, on the Strypa, at a point where the canyon of that river 
is 150 feet deep. The Germans who possessed themselves 
of this village, which lies to the east bank of the Strypa, 
had erected rather extensive field fortifications to pro- 
tect it, since it commands important roads both to the 
east and to the west. After a hard fight, the Germans 
were defeated and driven out of their fortifications, and 
in spite of a desperate counter-attack, were driven across 
the Strypa, and on that same evening were followed 
across that river by the Russians. 

On the following day the Russians improved their 
positions by spreading to the north and to the south from 
the bridge-head on the west bank to which, as has been 
said, they had crossed the previous evening. On the 
13th, however, the Germans, having been reinforced, 
attacked the Russians with bayonets, and after a short 
brisk fight in which the Russians lost heavily, the Mus- 
covites were driven back across the bridge which the 
Germans recaptured, and then themselves crossed, also 
re-taking Hajvoronka itself. 

The next fight of any moment took place slightly to 
the north of Nove Alexinets to the east of Lopushno, 
and here the Austrians were obliged to withdraw on a 
three mile front to a depth of about one mile; but a few 
days later this ground was recovered almost completely. 

Late in October tl\e Austrians assumed an offensive 
north of the Dniester, on the line extending from Zal- 
eshchyki to Buczacz, which resulted in a great battle in 
the neighborhood of Ziemikovitse on the Strypa. At 
first this progressed favorably to the Russians who man- 
aged to capture Bahovice, and a forest of the same name, 
to the south of Ziemikovitse; but on November 2nd the 
Teutons delivered an attack against the village of Ziemi- 
kovitse itself, and, after routing the Russians, entered 
the village. 

During the next few days the fighting was fast and 
furious around this hamlet. The final result was that 
the Russians lost all the ground that they had gained 
on the western bank of the Strypa, besides many thou- 
sand prisoners; in addition to which, their casualties 
were much above the normal. This battle ended the 
serious fighting imtil the latter part of November when 
on the 27th of the month the Austrians attempted to 
cross the Strypa River and gain a footing on its eastern 



bank, but in this they were not successful, as the Russians 
showing a greater firmness and tenacity than they had 
shown heretofore, in this region, succeeded in repelUng 
the Austrian forces. After this the fighting in this 
region again became quiet, and remained so until late 
in December, when the Russians attempted to launch 
an offensive between the Dniester and the Pruth in the 
extreme southern end of the front, as it then stood, 
almost immediately to the north of Czernowitz, the cap- 
ital of Bukowina, which they hoped to recapture by 
means of this movement. 

The space between the Pruth and the Dniester is 
at this point crossed by a range of hills known as the 
Berdo Horodyshtche, which forms a natural barrier diffi- 
cult to cross if well defended. The Russians opened 
their attack by capturing the village named Toporoutz 
which lies on the eastern side of these hills on the western 
side of which is Rarantche; Rarantche being in the hands 
of the Austrians and the ridge of hills between the two 
being the bone of dispute. The battle here raged for a 
couple of weeks, and therein the Russians captured the 
heights on the north bank of the Pruth which to some 
extent dominate Czernowitz, and which later on in the 
year proved of great help to them in the subsequent cap- 
ture of that place, but the possession of which for the 
moment proved useless. 

After this fight was over, quiet fell upon the line for 
a time, until the abortive attempt to capture Czerno- 
witz took place in the latter part of January, 1916, in 
which attempt the Russians wasted 50,000 men and did 
not achieve their objective. 

The only other important fighting which took place 
on any of this Galician front during the rest of the winter 
was around the town of Ustsietcbko, which lies in the 
canyon of the Dniester, at its junction with the Dzuryn, 
which broke out in the early days of February, and lasted 
about a week, and resulted in the Austrians being driven 
from their position in the town and losing this important 
bridgehead. A few days later the Russians advanced as 
far as Butchatch on the southwest bank of the Dniester 
from this bridgehead, but an Austrian counter attack 
here drove them speedily back to the bridgehead where 
they remained without attempting any further move- 
ments until after the time this record closes. 

Such, then, is a cursory review, without dwelling 
unduly upon the daily details, of the Teutonic campaign 



against the Russians in Coin-land, Poland, Volhynia and 
Galicia, during the autumn of 1915 and a portion of the 
spring of 1916. There has, perhaps, never been a 
lengthier battle line fought on for as long a period in the 
world's history than this one which stretches from the 
shores of the Gulf of Riga in the north to the northern 
border of Bukowina in the south; and it is also safe to 
say that never on so lengthy a line of battle for as long 
a time were forces more disproportionate in numbers 
opposed to each other, without the weaker yielding. 

The German-Austrian forces engaged varied in num- 
bers during this period from 1,500,000 at the commence- 
ment to perhaps 800,000 or 900,000 at the end, and the 
advances which they made from the Dunajec River in 
the beginning of May, 1915, until the beginning of March 
of the following year, were continually made in spite of 
the opposition of forces at least one and a half times 
greater in numbers than themselves. Perhaps never 
before in the world's history has one army taken from 
another army, so superior to itself in strength, a total of 
prisoners which equals its own numbers, or inflicted 
casualties on the stronger army of at least two and a 
half times the strength of itself the weaker army, or cap- 
tured 100,000 square miles of territory, including 
therein all of the principal fortresses of the country of 
the enemy. 

The German triumph in what we may call the Russian 
Campaign in 1915 was so overwhelming and so complete 
as to be almost incredible. There has been some talk 
of the fact that the Russian armies escaped destruction, 
and some praise has been given to the Russian generals 
for this feat of withdrawing a greatly superior force 
from an inferior force and escaping aimihilation. The 
facts, however, do not seem to bear out the theory that 
the strategy shown by the Russian generals in this 
campaign merits eulogy of any character. It has been 
advanced, in excuse of the Russians, that they lacked 
artillery and ammunition, but those shortages of supplies 
and arms are not borne out by the facts. For instance 
the Russian General Radko told Mr. Robert Crozier 
Long, the eminent English publicist, on the Dunajec 
itself shortly before the battle of Gorlice-Tarnow, that 
be had plenty of shells, and Mr. Long adds his own 
testimony to the fact that most of the Russian retreast 
in 1915 were not caused by shortness of shell at all. — 
As Mr. Long saw the whole campaign from the Russian 



side, and is stating facts against interest, his testimony 
which appears on page 603 of tte Fortnightly Review, 
an English publication, of April 1, 1916, seems con- 

It is natural and human to seek for excuses which 
palliate defeat, but he will indeed be ingenious, who, 
in view of all the facts surrounding the Russian debacle 
of 1915, finds any excuse therefor!, which excuses. 



After the entry of Turkey into the war, the situation 
in the Balkans became extremely important to the 
Allies, not only in relation to the future of the one 
Balkan State which had joined them — Serbia — whose 
difficulty with Austria constituted the spark which 
ignited the flames of war, but also because the AUi^ 
had then projected an attack on Turkey through the 
Dardanelles, in which attack they desired to have the 
active aid of the other Balkan States, — Greece, Bul- 
garia and Rumania, — for which reason they concen- 
trated imder the leadership of the then Sir Edward 
Grey. Strong diplomatic efforts upon the Balkan 
States, with the object of inducing these nations to join 
their cause. 

For a clear imderstanding of the situation in the 
Balkans, it is necessary to review briefly the history of 
all the States therein for the few years preceding the 
war. Greece, Bulgaria and Rumania, had won their 
independence by the sword from Turkey, of which 
Empire they originally formed part. This was also true 
of Serbia and Montenegro. Each of these States, after 
achieving its independence, developed ambitions totally 
disproportionate to its size, population or power. 

The Rumanians regarded themselves as lineal descen- 
dants of the Romans, an ancestry to which, after all, they 
were perhaps not entitled; nevertheless, this conception 
of their ancestry led them to dreams of empire over the 
whole of the Balkans, Turkey and Asia, and the southern 
portions of the empire of Austria, including the whole of 
Transylvania and Bukowina, as well as parts of Himgary. 

The next State to the south, Bulgaria, also had its 
dreams of a leadership, or rather of an absorption of all 
the other States of the Balkans; while Greece, fired by 
recollections of her glorious history in antiquity, and 



by the fact that undoubtedly at one time, when the 
seat of the Roman Empire was in Constantinople, a 
Greek Emperor had sat on the Imperial throne and given 
the law to the then world, was inspired by these noble 
visions of a glorious past to such an extent that she 
regarded herself as destined again to see one of her sons 
seated in Constantinople, ruling over the entire east of 
Europe and Asia Minor. 

Serbia was troubled by similar visions of widespread 
Empire, inspired by the memory of a more or less 
fabled past. 

These clashing ambitions led several times to wars 
between themselves, though Turkey was regarded by 
all these States as their real enemy, and as the first 
obstacle to be overcome, before their several dreams 
could have taken even the first step towards realization. 

In 1912 this feeling of hostility against Turkey re- 
sulted in the formation of what is now known as the 
Balkan League, wherein Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and 
Montenegro combined to attack the Turkish Empire. 
By means of this fusion of their strengths, these states 
created for themselves a striking force of approximately 
the same strength as that of the Turks, but with the 
added advantage to them of being able to attack Turkey 
from the east and from the north simultaneously. 

In September, 1912, when Turkey was still feeling 
the severe strain of her war with Italy and the Albanians 
were rising against her to win their independence by 
arms and at the same time an internal struggle was 
taking place within the Empire itself for the control of 
its government between the Reactionists and Constitu- 
tionalists, Serbia and Bulgaria simultaneously mobilized, 
and Greece and Montenegro followed suit. The result 
of this action by these states was that in spite of the 
deterrent efforts of the Powers, war against Turkey 
followed. This war, while very short, was one of the 
most sanguinary of modern times, and resulted in the 
total defeat of Turkey. An armistice was signed on 
December 3rd, and thereafter negotiations for peace 
began. But, while these negotiations for peace were 
proceeding, the Great Powers intrigued in support of 
their own particular interests in the Balkans, dividing 
themselves into two groups, one of which comprised 
Austria and her Allies, and the other Russia and her 
Allies. As a result of these intrigues between these 
rival groups and of the difficulty in the division of the 



spoUs between the original participants in the war 
dissension arose in the Balkan League and finally Greece, 
Serbia and Montenegro, making common cause against 
Bulgaria, a second war broke out in the Balkans. 



In February, 1913, while Bulgaria was thus struggling 
with Serbia and Greece, the one attacking her from the 
west and the other from the south, Rumania suddenly 
discovered that she was entitled to compensation (thou^ 
what services this compensation was intended to cover 
is difficult to discover) and demanded it of the nation 
nearest to her which had benefited by the war, Bul- 
garia, and on being refused, attacked her. The result 
was that Bulgaria was compelled to sue for peace on 
any terms, and the Balkan situation was finally settled 
by the Treaty of Bucharest in August, 1913, in which 
Bulgaria was deprived of the bulk of the territory which 
she had expected to gain as a result of, and which had 
been assigned to her at the conclusion of, the first Bal- 
kan war. 

The Treaty of Bucharest, however, did not deprive 
Bulgaria of her strength, as it should have done in order 
to have produced a permanent result, and so that king- 
dom waited, brooding over her wrongs, until a favorable 
opportunity should come to recover those territories 
which had been taken from her by Rumania, Serbia 
and Greece and which she deemed hers rightfully. 
After the Treaty of Bucharest, Serbia and Greece entered 
into a Treaty between themselves whereby they bound 
themselves to go to each other's assistance in the event 
that either one was attacked by Bulgaria alone in respect 
to the territories which either had received under the 
Treaty of Bucharest. 

As this Treaty will play a considerable part hereafter 
in the course of this history when it becomes necessary 
to consider the subsequent relations between Greece 
and Serbia, it is well to point out now that the attack 
contemplated and referred to by this Treaty was an 
attack by Bulgaria only on either Greece or Serbia, and 
not an attack by Bulgaria plus any other Power or 
Powers; had such been the intention, the Treaty would 
not have failed to express such intention in its terms. 



At the time this Treaty was made there was no idea in 
the minds of the statesmen of either Greece or Serbia 
of an imminent alliance of Bulgaria with any other 
Power or Powers, and it was only entered into, therefore, 
for the single purpose which it stated in its own words. 

Bulgaria, it is perhaps needless to say, was even more 
bitter against Rumania for her sudden and, in the eyes 
of Bulgaria, treacherous action in attacking her without 
warning when she was already engaged with two other 
enemies. Hence it is clear that the relations between 
Greece, Bulgaria and Rumania at the beginning of the 
war were the reverse of friendly, and that they regarded 
each other with great suspicion. 

When the Allies started their operations against 
Constantinople they solicited the co-operation of both 
Greece and Bulgaria and held before their eyes glittering 
visions of great spoils to be easily won from their partici- 
pation in the attack on Turkey's territorial integrity 
and on her capital. 

King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, however, who has the 
reputation of being one of the longest and shrewdest 
heads of Europe, and is, to a very considerable degree 
a military leader, doubted the practicability of the Allies' 
plan for the reduction of Constantinople and was un- 
willing, for this reason, to plunge Bulgaria into an adven- 
ture in which the issue was in his eyes and in the eyes of 
his military advisors more than doubtful. Particularly, 
as Bulgaria felt considerable irritation against both 
Russia and Great Britain for the attitude assumed by 
them in the negotiations which terminated both the 
first and second Balkan wars. Consequently, Bulgaria 
assumed at this time, and maintained for several months 
thereafter an attitude of strict neutrality. 

The results of the expedition against Constantinople 
and the crushing defeats which Russia experienced in 
the summer of 1915, confirmed the King of Bulgaria 
and his advisors in this attitude?, and in their opinions 
after the beginning of the war, but prior however to these 
two failures, Bulgaria had endeavored to bring about an 
understanding between Turkey, Rumania and herself, 
whereby Kavalla on the Aegean Sea in Greece should 
pass into her possession without a struggle; and also 
whereby, her claims to Serbian territory in Macedonia, 
which had been taken from her as a result of the second 
Balkan war, should be satisfied. 

Rumania returned evasive answers to these overtures 



and it was impossible to foresee what course she would 
follow during the war. From time to time it was stated 
that she was on the point of mobilizing her army with the 
object of joining the Allies and thereby securing from 
Austria the Province of Transylvania and the Bukowina, 
in which provinces of Austria lived a number of Ruman- 
ians by race, but who had never been politically affiliated 
with Rumania from the time that all of this teritory was 
the Roman Province of Dacia. 

King Charles* the then sovereign of Rumania was a 
prince well versed in statecraft, who had been for more 
than a generation the most considerable factor in all 
Balkan problems, and, as long as he lived, his influence 
was strong enough to prevent Rumania from taking any 
positive action one way or the other. The prospects 
of the eventful triumph of any one side of the combatants 
not being, in his judgment, up to the time of his death, 
sufficiently certain to justify the risk Rumania would 
take in entering the war on either side. 

On Greece (the Allies made much the same demands 
to join them in their Turkish adventure, but here a 
situation developed which requires a chapter by itself 
and which will be treated of some time later. Suffice 
it, for the moment, to say that Greece did not join the 
Allies in their attack on Turkey but remained neutral, 
in spite of tremendous pressure. 

In January, 1915, Bulgaria received an advance from 
German banks of the sum of $15,000,000, a part pay- 
ment on account of a loan of $100,000,000, arrangements 
for which had been concluded iDetween Bulgaria and 
these banks in the summer of 1914. 

About the first of February the campaign against 
Turkey going badly, the British Government gave Bul- 
garia to understand that her national aspiration as re- 
gards the territory taken away from her by the Treaty 
of Bucharest by which the second Balkan war was con- 
cluded was regarded with great sympathy by the British 
and that Great Britain would use its influence to obtain 
the making of the necessary recession of territory by 
Serbia to her, provided that Bulgaria would definitely 
promise armed co-operation in the operations against 
Turkey. To counteract this, Germany and Hungary 
promptly offered, at the expense of Serbia, more terri- 
tory than Great Britain did, and, furthermore, in the 
middle of March made an effort to induce Turkey to 
restore Bulgaria certain territory in Thrace which Bul- 



garia had occupied during the first Balkan war but 
which had been given back to Turkey by the Treaty of 

Thus matters stood in May, when the Bulgarian 
Premier made proposals to the Entente Powers which 
involved secession by Serbia of considerably more terri- 
tory than the Allies had proposed, and the recession by 
Greece of certain territories which had not been com- 
prised in their original proposal. 

Towards the end of May, the Entente Powers 
answered these proposals of Bulgaria to a degree, but 
very evasively, and in the middle of June, Bulgaria 
made new proposals based upon this reply. At this 
time, however, the Allies were not in position to promise 
anything, as they had not completed any arrangements 
with Serbia and Greece which would enable them to 
deliver the territories which they had originally promised 
Bulgaria. To put themselves in a position to do so, they 
began negotiations with both Serbia and Greece to such 
ends, but these negotiations being both delicate and 
difficult, necessarily took considerable time, and they 
were not ready to reply before August to the Bulgarian 
proposals of the middle of June. In the meantime, Bul- 
garia and Turkey had arrived at an agreement, and, as a 
result of this agreement, certain cessions of territory 
were made by Turkey to Bulgaria; but, necessarily, until 
the position of Bulgaria, as regards the Central Empires, 
became clearly defined, Bulgaria was not to enter into 
full possession of the territory effected by this agreement. 

In the early days of August the Entente Powers replied 
to the Bulgarian proposals of Jime 15th, but this reply 
was merely to throw dust in the eyes of their own people 
at home, and to conceal the failure of their diplomacy in 
the Balkans from them because at this time they were 
well aware of the fact of the agreement between Turkey 
and Bulgaria, and were very well aware of what the 
existence of such an agreement meant. 

Through the rest of August, pourparlers and diploma- 
tic notes were exchanged between the Entente Govern- 
ments and Bulgaria to keep up the farce, but these re- 
sulted in nothing, as they were intended to do from the 

On September 10th Bulgaria's Premier, publicly ad- 
mitted that the Turko-Bulgarian agreement already 
mentioned was a fact, and, about the same time, Bulgaria 
called to the colors all of the regular Macedonian and 



Bulgarian troops, and all Bulgarians of Macedonian or 
Thracian origin. This alarmed the Allies, and on Sep- 
tember 14thy they offered Bulgaria more even than she 
had originally demanded, but the die was cast, the policy 
of the government was fixed, which policy was on Sep- 
tember 17th approved by the Bulgarian parliament. 
Next followed a public and official declaration by the 
Bulgarian Premier on September 20th that an agreement 
had been signed with Turkey for the maintenance of 
armed and benevolent neutrality on the part of Bulgaria, 
to carry out which on September 23rd Bulgaria pro- 
claimed a general mobilization. 



This mobilization was followed by ten days of intense 
negotiations on the part of the Allies, but up to this 
time there is no evidence that Bulgaria intended to par- 
ticipate with her army in the war. What she intended 
to do, apparently, up to the 3rd of October, was to hold 
herself ready for eventualities which might arise, either 
by the actions of Rumania to the north, her bitterest 
foe, or to resist such coercion, by force of arms or other- 
wise, as the Entente Powers might choose to bring to 
bear upon her. But this condition was not to continue 
long and a more decided attitude was forced upon Bul- 
garia by the actions of Great Britian and of Russia. 

The British action was, perhaps, more ridiculous than 
serious, and consisted in Sir Edward Grey's issuing to 
Bulgaria what he termed a "solemn warning," to which 
the term "sententious" in place of "solemn" could be 
perhaps more aptly applied, since it was impossible for 
Sir Edward Grey to give any sanction to this warning, a 
fact which was known both to himself and to the Bul- 
garian government. But Sir Edward Grey was and is 
prone to the theory that words from him possess the 
quality of being [omnipotent in themselves. This view, 
however, was not shared by the Bulgarians. 

Russia took more definite action and on the 3rd of 
October addressed to Bulgaria the following note: 

"Events which are taking place in Bulgaria at this 
moment give evidence of the definite decision of King 
Ferdinand's government to place the fate of his country 
in the hands of Germany. The presence of German and 
Austrian officers on the Ministry of War and on the 
staffs of the army, the concentration of troops in the 
zone bordering on Serbia and the extensive financial 
support accepted from our enemies by the Sophia Cab- 
inet, no longer leave any doubt as to the present military 
preparations of Bulgaria. 

"The Powers of the Entente who have at heart the 
realization of the aspirations of the Bulgarian people, 



have, on many occasions, warned Mr. Radoslavoflf that 
any hostile act against Serbia would be considered as 
directed against themselves. The assurances given by 
the head of the Bulgarian Cabinet in reply to these 
warnings are contradicted by facts. 

"The representative of Russia, bound to Bulgaria by 
the imperishable memory of liberation from the Turkish 
yoke, cannot sanction by his presence preparations for 
fraticidal aggression against the Slav and Allied peoples. 
The Russian Minister has therefore received orders to 
leave Bulgaria with all the stafif of the legation and the 
Council if the Bulgarian government does not, in 24 
hours, break with the enemies of the Slav countries and 
of Russia, and does not, at once, proceed to send away 
the officers belonging to the armies and States which are 
at war with the Powers of the Entente." 

With this ultimatum Great Britain and France asso- 
ciated themselves. Great Britain probably deeming 
that something more than the "solemn warning" of Sir 
Edward Grey had now become necessary. 

On the whole, this ultimatum must be regarded as 
humorous, in spite of that tone of a fond parent talking 
to a naughty child which Russia chose to adopt in this 
communication to Bulgaria, wherein, recalling to her 
memory 'events of her liberation from the Turkish yoke, 
(which perhaps are not stated with striking historical 
accuracy as to the role played by Russia therein) she 
informed her that "Russia cannot turn fratricidal against 
the Slavic alUed peoples;" meaning thereby Serbia. 
But only three short years before Russia was not at all 
disturbed in mind by the assault of this same Slavic 
people on the very people whose aggression against them 
she now called "fratricidal." If not "fratricidal" then, 
when directed by Serbia against Bulgaria, how could the 
attack become "fratricidal" now when directed by Bul- 
garia against Serbia? Another highly amusing feature of 
this ultimatum is that it was sent by a power which up 
to the time of its sending had proved itself utterly in- 
capable of defending its own territory successfully, let 
alone attack the territory of others. 

The twenty-four hours came and the twenty-four 
hours went, and Bulgaria, being an independent nation 
and not a vassal state, took, during this time, the reso- 
lution to resist this coercion and pledged herself defi- 
nitely to the Teutonic Powers to military'' action against 
the coercers, and also replied to Russia in a manner 



which that power found "bold to the verge of insolence/' 

On October 16th a demand for their passports was 
made by the Ministers of the Powers who either signed 
or associated themselves with the Russian ultimatum, 
and Bulgaria and the Entente Powers were at war. 

But it is to be noted that no definite pledge of military 
support was ever given by Bulgaria to the Central Powers 
until after the delivery of this Russian ultimatum, which 
is certainly as arrogant an attempt by a large Power to 
coerce a small Power as any whereof modem history 
holds record, including the demands of Germany on 
Belgium in the early part of the war. 

Thus Bulgaria entered the war on the side of the Cen- 
tral Powers, and soon her troops were on Serbian soil. 

This fiasco of the diplomacy of the Allies in the Balkans 
produced the downfall of one foreign minister: Theophile 
Delcasse, who held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in 
the Cabinet of France and had held that portfolio, with 
some intermissions, for many years. Delcasse can be 
regretted; a good hater, a hard hitter, despising hypoc- 
risy and never whining when defeated, in these latter 
traits of character quite a contrast to Sir Edward Grey, 
he passed probably forever off the political stage, leaving 

reputation which will no doubt increase in history. 



At the end of the summer of 1916 the Serbian army, 
in spite of the epidemic of typhus which raged in Serbia, 
had succeeded in thoroughly reorganizing themselves 
after their successful resistance to the Austrian invasion 
in the early part of the war, and constituted a force of 
about 300,000. Physically, and in morale, the Serbian 
infantry is of high quality, while their field artillery was 
considered by competent observers as of equal quality 
with the infantry. This artillery had been considerably 
strengthened by the guns captured from the Austrians 
in their retreat, in their first invasion of Serbia. 

A small international force, under command of Rear 
Admiral Trowbridge, had been sent to Serbia by the 
Allies to assist in the defense of Belgrade and the Dan- 
ube front. This force consisted of a British contingent 
of four 2-gun batteries of naval 4.7 guns, and some experts 
in mine work, a battery of Russian guns, two French guns, 
and a party of aviators. It was supposed that in view 
of the pledges and promises made by the Allies of Serbia, 
particularly Great Britain, that if it became necessary 
this international force would be augmented so as to 
become a really valuable aid in the defense of Serbia, 
but this hope was destined to be disappointed, as will 
be seen in the sequel. 

Russia's aid in this Serbian campaign to the Serbs was 
limited to circulating interesting fiction in relation to an 
army of 600,000 men assembled by her which at various 
times were alleged to have started from Sebastapol or Od- 
essa on transports across the Black Sea. Odessa is distant 
about 250 miles — Sebastopol more — from Varna, their 
nearest Bulgarian port, which is the nearest port on the 
Black Sea to Serbia. 600,000 men, with their artillery, 
ammunition, supplies, etc., would require about 600,000 
tons of shipping to transport them. The entire Russian 



tonnage on the Black Sea and the Azov Sea on the first 
of July 1913 was 282,000. It thus became somewhat 
diflBcult to see how Russia could have transported by any 
possibility, with this comparatively small steamer ton- 
nage, by no means all of which was available, 600,000 
men and their equipment to Varna under three months 
time. And it is to be also observed that this computa- 
tion does not take into consideration the fact that at 
no time did Russia secure any footing on the Bulgarian 
coast, though she attacked it several times with her 
justly famous Black Sea fleet, whereat to land these men 
and their suppUes. The most curious fact in connection 
with this romance was that the American papers devoted, 
during its several epochs of currency, column after colunm 
to the progress of this fictitious army and the apprecia- 
tion of what wonders it would accomplish when it once 
reached the field. Thus, for the thousandth time, in 
this war evincing either their utter and crass geographical 
ignorance or their indomitable prejudice which sought 
to establish as facts in the minds of the people things 
which the editors knew not to be facts. 

During September the Serbian commanders began to 
notice that there was increased activity on the opposite 
shores of the Danube and Save, which served, as refer- 
ence to a map will show, as the northern defense lines of 
Serbia, and rumors of large troop movements to the 
north of the Danube, and particularly of a very consid- 
erable concentration alleged to be going on at Tamsavar 
began to be circulated in Serbia. The Serbians, however, 
were extremely confident that they would be able to 
repeat their performance of the previous campaign, and 
that, in the event that this attack was made from the 
north, it would not be made frontally on Belgrade itself 
but would be attempted either to the west across the 
Save River or else Irom the northeast via Semendria. 

As was said in a preceding chapter, Bulgaria mobilized 
on September 28th; on October 3rd, Russia addressed 
her ultimatum to her, ordering her to suspend all miKtary 
preparations to attack Serbia, and on the 5th the Min- 
isters of the Entente Powers at Sophia were handed 
their passports, which capital they left on the 8th. 

On the 11th, at a point near Kniashevatz, to the 
northeast of Nish, Bulgarian troops crossed the Serbian 
frontier in the morning, and later on that same day 
another force of Bulgarian troops also crossed the frontier 
near Leskovafcz to the southeast of Nish. 



As has been said, the Serbians did not contemplate 
any frontal attack on Belgrade itself, and this for a 
double reason. The Serbian capital occupies a sort of 
triangle jutting to the north from the general line of the 
northern territory of Serbia, which is protected by 
rivers on the two sides projecting northward, but is 
also of course faced on both these sides, on the opposite 
sides of these rivers, by territory of the enemy. 

Both the Danube and Save here, which join in front 
of Belgrade, are wide, fairly rapidly flowing streams, 
and once the bridges were removed the Serbians sup- 
posed it to be hardly possible that the Austrians had 
military skill enough to force their way across these 
streams. Another advantage was that the southern 
banks of these rivers on which Belgrade is situated are 
much higher ground than the northern banks, and thus 
artillery in position upon the southern bank commands 
completely the territory forming the northern banks. 

The Serbians, therefore, as said before, were over- 
confident of Belgrade's strength; furthermore, the 
menacing attitude of Bulgaria at this time induced the 
Serbians to weaken the force of troops which they had 
available for the defense of Belgrade, in which city itself 
only two infantry regiments were left, though 20,000 
men were held in reserve a short distance to the 
south. In addition to the withdrawal of infantry, con- 
siderable artillery was also sent to the Bulgarian frontier. 

On their side, the Austro-Germans had, during Sep- 
tember, assembled about 150,000 men, partly Germans 
and partly Austrians, the general command of which 
army was placed in the hands of Marshal von Mackenscn 
who had distinguished himself in the advance into 
Poland the siunmer before. 

This army was divided into two forces, one of which 
was destined for the capture of Belgrade and one of 
which was to penetrate into Serbia via Semendria, 25 
miles to the east. The army which was to take Belgrade 
was under the command of Austrian General Kovess, 
and that which was to attack Semendria being under 
that of the German General von Gallwitz. To this force 
of infantry was joined a large quantity of German artil- 
lery. The smallness of this army may give rise to 
comment, but it must be remembered, from the preceding 
chapter, that a definite agreement had been arrived at 
between the Austrian-Germans and the Bulgarians which 
contemplated the entrance of Bulgaria into the war 



and the attack on Serbia from the east as soon as invasion 
began from the north. This would add another 350,000 
men to the attacking force, and this Bulgarian attack 
would be made on Serbia's most vulnerable line. 

We will first trace the outline of the operations in the 
north. On October 3rd a desultory bombardment of 
Belgrade began and continued for three days, gradually 
growing more violent. On October 5 the direct attack 
opened with great violence and was a complete surprise 
to the Serbians. Their artillery, such as they had, 
could only make a feeble reply to the terrific onslaught 
which was being delivered by the Austro-Germans, and 
the Serbian artillery was speedily put out of action either 
by the projectiles of their opponents or because their own 
supply of ammunition ran out. This bombardment 
continued severely for one day and wrought great 
destruction, so that the dty was on fire at many points, 
the front on the river suflFering particularly. The elec- 
tric lights, the telephone and telegraph communications 
being destroyed as well. 

The night of the 6th, the Austro-Germans commenced 
to cross both the Save and the Danube Rivers, using for 
this purpose flat bottom boats which had previously 
been gathered. The principal landing was on the Dan- 
ube quays on the river front of the city itself, though 
minor landings were also made to the east and west. 

By daybreak of October 7th about 5,000 troops had 
been successfully transported across the rivers and had, 
after driving away the Serbian Infantry opposing their 
landing, established themselves securely upon the Ser- 
bian side of the river, where they entrenched themselves 
during that day. All this day of October 7th the Austro- 
German bombardment continued with increased fury 
and destroyed the British guns which had been brought 
back during the night from positions distant from the 
town on the Save and Danube from which they had 
been driven, the French guns also were destroyed. 
During the night of the 7th and 8th additional forces 
were transported by the Austro-Germans across the 
river, and these, by dawn on the morning of the 8th, 
were practically in possession of the entire river front 
of A the town. Considerable fighting took place in the 
streets, but in the afternoon, a general retreat of the 
Serbians and the international force was ordered. 
[ These fell back towards Torlak and on their way 
encountered the division of Serbian troops which had 



been placed in reserve south of the city but which had 
advanced northward and on reaching a position on the 
outskirts of the town, found the city completely in the 
enemies' hands, and so fell back again. 

By the evening of the 8th all resistance to the Austro- 
Germans had ceased and all that night these continued 
hurrying troops across the rivers so that by the morning 
of the 9th the city of Belgrade was for the second time 
completely in the hands of invaders of Serbia. 

While these events were taking place at the Capital, 
on the 7th of October an attack against Semendria to 
the east began. Gen. von Gallwitz had a large quantity 
of artillery at his disposition, and this artillery was used 
without intermission from the morning of October 7th 
to the morning of October 9th. Under cover of a tre- 
mendous fire which was directed from the northern 
bank of the Danube on Semendria and its environs, a 
force of Austro-Germans managed to occupy Semendria 
Island in the Danube directly in front of the town and to 
install a considerable number of guns there, which also 
opened upon the town. The Serbian artillery in the 
town was speedily put out of action and on the morning 
of October 9th the Austro-Germans succeeded in throw- 
ing strong contingents across the Danube and in taking 
possession of the town after a six hour battle in its 
streets with the Serbian infantry which fought with great 
courage and determination, but which was eventually 
overcome and forced to retreat, after suffering very 
heavy losses. 

Thus in three days two of the northern gates of Serbia 
had been forced. 

At the same time that the attack on these two towns 
was delivered, simultaneous attacks were begun on the 
part of the Austro-Germans on Orsova near the extreme 
east of Serbia, near where the boundarj^ lines of Him- 
gary, Rumania and Serbia meet, and also near the cele- 
brated Iron Gate of the Danube, and to the west of 
Belgrade on the Save River at Shabatz; while on the 
western boundary another attack had begun on Vishe- 
grad from Serajevo to the west, the scene of the crime 
which ^began the war. 

|n The* objective in the attack from Orsova was to unite 
with the Bulgarian troops which had crossed the border 
near Negotin, while that from Shabatz was to capture 
Valievo, the head of the railroad running to the east from 
Sopot on the main line of railroad running through 



central Serbia from Belgrade to Nish; and that from 
Vishegrad to capture Uzitsha, at the head of another 
branch of this same line of railroad, which branch ran 
parallel to and to the southward of the Valievo branch. 

The army of von Kovess began advancing, on October 
11th towards the south, 1but the Serbians contested every 
foot of the way with great gallantry, and it was not until 
the 20th of October, ten days later, that this army had 
progressed as far as Leskovatz and Stepoyevatz; the 
first, 30 miles directly south of Belgrade and the second 
the same distance southwest, and was menacing Sopot 
on the Nish railroad where the branch for Valievo runs 
to the west. The force which crossed the Danube at 
Shabatz had also moved south and was moving directly 
on Valievo. 

In the center the Teutons, starting from Semendria, 
moved southward in two columns, one marching directly 
south, which captured Selevatz, in the valley of the 
Morava River, while the other had struck southeast 
and had taken Ranovatz, in the valley of the Mlava 

The force from Vishegrad did, in its first two weeks' 
operations, reach Uzitsha, as before stated, the terminus 
of the southern branch of the Nish Railroad. The force 
proceeding from Orsova on the northeastern frontier 
had moved south along the line of the Danube and had 
succeeded in opening the navigation of this river, whereby 
it became possible to send ammunition down the river 
to the Bulgarian fortress of Vidin. 

On the Bulgarian frontier, the east front, the Bul- 
garians had occupied Negotin and Zaitchar to the south, 
on the River Tunok. Further south near Pirot, north- 
west of Sofia, on the railroad between Sofia and Nish, 
about ten miles from the frontier, the Bulgarians had 
made but slow progress owing to the desperate resis- 
tance of the Serbians, and further north, at Kniashevatz, 
another force was moving to the westward, thus threaten- 
ing Nish from the northeast, while the force at Pirot 
threatened it from the southeast. 

On the southern end of this eastern front of Serbia 
the Bulgarians had advanced to the line of railroad 
running from Nish to Salonika and had cut it at Vrania; 
by which move they had intercepted communications 
between the main body of the Serbian Army to the north 
and the Allied Forces which were now beginning to dis- 
embark at Salonika. South of Vrania another thrust 



was being made by the Bulgariaiis which started from 
Kustendil and which after winning a bloody battle at 
Egri Palanka had pushed forward close to Eumanovo. 

In the far south another Bulgarian force started from 
Strmnitza, moved northwestwardly and after hard 
fighting lasting till the 20th of October, captured the 
town of Veles on the Nish-Salonika Railroad, a day or 
two later. 

About the 16th of October the Allied Forces at Salo- 
nika made a move forward in two columns; the French 
moved along the raikoad northward in the direction of 
Krivolak and Veles, where they hoped to arrive before 
the occupation of the town by the Bulgarians; while the 
British contented themselves at this time by occupying 
the railroad from Salonika to the frontier, as far as 
Ghevgeli, and establishing a line to the eastward from 
this town to Lake Doiran. The French were about 
24,000 strong, and the British about 16,000. 

The Allied Fleets, about this time, began to bombard 
the southern Bulgarian coast towns on the Aegean, and 
particularly bombarded Dedeagatch heavily but in- 



The next week witnessed fierce combats between the 
Bulgarians and the Serbians on the eastern front, but it 
eariy became apparent that the Serbian Army was not 
going to be able to defend Nish successfully. At this 
time Nish was the seat of the government which had 
been removed thither at the time of the fall of Belgrade, 
but on October 21st the Serbian government, foreseeing 
that the situation of Nish was extremely precarious, 
moved the capital north to Krushevatz, but only re- 
mained here two days, removing to Kralievo on October 
23rd. The fighting on this eastern front continued 
violent for the next ten days. 

Returning now to the Austro-German Armies advanc- 
ing southward. The two Serbian Armies, being forced 
south, continued their brave resistance, but were forced 
back on the 22nd of October to Mladnovatz, and three 
days later were again compelled to give ground, this time 
falling back as far as Topola, which is north of Krague- 
vatz; a position they onlj'- held two days, retiring to the 
south of Kraguevatz on October 27. Here, after a 
rather warm fight, in which the Serbians were defeated, 
the remaining portion of their army fell back as far as 
Krushevatz on October 27th. 

By the capture by the Teutons of Kraguevatz which 
followed on October 31, the Serbian main arsenal, which, 
in addition to being an arsenal, was also the site of the 
only powder factory of importance in Serbia, a hard blow 
was dealt to the Serbian power of defense. It was from 
this arsenal, according to the proofs produced at the 
trial of the assassins of the Austrian Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand, that the bombs which were used by Cabri- 
novic, one of the conspirators who had been taken by 
Major Tankosic of the Serbian General Staff and given 
to the bomb thrower; and this testimony of the witnesses 
was corroborated by that of experts on explosives who 
proved that bombs of the particular character of those 
used in the assassination of the Archduke were not man- 



ufactured anywhere outside of the Royal Arsenal of 

With the arsenal were taken a vast quantity of mili- 
tary supplies and munition of war, besides some 60 guns. 

The weather during these days was very bad, and the 
Serbian retreat, as well as the Austro-German advance, 
was conducted under very great difficulties; and in addi- 
tion to the difficulties caused by the weather, the Austro- 
German forces pressed so closely on the Serbian rear as 
to give the latter no respite. 

The Serbian Army in the northwest comer of Serbia, 
during this time, was also in great difficulties, although 
it occupied the strongest positions on this northern front. 
Valievo was evacuated on October 22nd, and the evac- 
uation being orderly, the bridges over the Kolubara 
River were destroyed and all the supplies of the army 
taken away. For some reason, the Austro-Germans 
were not ready to seize their advantage, and did not 
enter the town until October 30th; but then immediately 
set itself in pursuit of the Serbian Army; which being 
outflanked on the left, fell back continuously through 
Mionitsa, Goukosh, Gomi Milanovatz, Rudnik, Blaz- 
nava. Bar, Knitch, and Vitanovitse, to Kralievo, the 
temporary capital where it eventually joined the army, 
which had fallen back from Belgrade itself. 

In this retreat there were continual clashes between 
the Serbian rear guards and the advance guards of the 
Austro-Germans; but except at the Ub-Kotselievo lines 
and one or two places south of this, there was no hard 
fighting. After the capture of Uzitsha, the Austro- 
Germans advanced from the westward at Vishegrad 
and began a forward movement towards Kralievo. 
In order to protect Kralievo until it could be reached by 
the Serbian armies retreating from thenorth,the Serbian 
army retreating from the east made a stand at Tchar- 
tchak, a town on the railroad from Uzitsha to Krushe- 
vatz, about haK way between the first named place and 
Kralievo, and here a most desperate struggle took place 
which lasted for six days; the town itself being captured 
and re-captured several times. This was probably the 
hardest fighting which took place in northern Serbia, 
in proportion to the number of men engaged, the casual- 
ties were very great. 

However, eventually, the Austro-Germans, advancing 
from the West with some aid from their forces moving 
from the north, possessed themselves of the town and 



the Serbians who had opposed them began a retreat 
southward from both Tchartchak and Kralievo in the di- 
rection of Mitrovitza, the head of a raikoad line running 
Bouth to Uskuby where it joined the main line to Salonika. 
It was the hope of these Serbian armies to be able to 
retreat in reasonable order to Mitrovitza and thence 
take the railroad south to Uskub, and thence to Ghevgeli, 
where they would join the French and British troops. 

Turning to the eastern frontier. On the 26th of 
October, the Bulgarians drove the Serbians out of Pirot 
and captured the town, and on the same day, further 
south, they entered Veles after a hard fight, driving the 
Serbians in the town to the westward. The effect of 
this capture of Veles was to cut off any probable chance 
of escape for these Serbian armies coming south on the 
line from Mitrovitza, which has already been spoken of, 
and this hope was totally extinguished by the capture 
of Uskub by the Bulgarians, which is the termination 
of the Mitrovitza branch, the day after the capture of 
Veles. A part of the forces which captured these two 
towns turned south and, moving rapidly, reached a point 
near Prilep, three days afterwards; thus interposing 
themselves between the Serbians retreating from Veles 
and Uskub and the British and French forces, and thus 
finally preventing the junction of which the Serbians 
and British had hoped it would have been possible to 

Further north, Leskovatz, on the Nish-Salonika Rail- 
road, was captured by coincident movements north 
from Vrania and west from Pirot. The effect of this 
capture was to almost completely surround the Serbian 
army in this region and to add to the difficulties in which 
it had fallen. 

TheAustro-German forces which had captured Krague- 
vatz, on the 31st of October, were moving south rapidly. 
Gen. Stephanovitch, commanding the Serbian for cesin 
Leskovatz, appreciated his position and fearing lest a 
longer stay in that place would result in his being com- 
pletely surrounded, on October 4th evacuated the town 
and began a retreat to the west, crossing the Morava 
River and directing his march in the direction of Pristina. 
This retreating army was pursued by the Bulgarians, 
but its retreat, by forced marches averaging 35 miles a 
day, was so swift that it outstripped its pursuers and 
arrived at Pristina safely but in an exhausted condition. 

In the meantime, in the north, the Austro-Germans 



who, as said, captured Kraguevatz on October 31st, 
immediately resumed their march south and rapidly 
approached to Kralievo and Krushevatz. On Novem- 
ber 2nd Krushevatz fell into the possession of the Austro- 
Germans but a few hours after the Serbians who had 
evacuated it had fallen back in the direction of Kralievo. 
Kralievo, however, did not prove a safe place of refuge, 
and on the next day the Serbian Army which had re- 
treated thither, as well as the Serbian government, 
went south to Rashka. 

Rashka, which is only some 30 miles south of Kralievo, 
was not deemed a safe place for a long stay, and a day 
or two after its arrival there, the Serbian government 
moved to Mitrovitza, across the country. By this time 
the retreat had become that of not only the government 
and the army, but of the entire Serbian population, and 
the roads, such as they were, were thickly encumbered 
for many days with the primitive carts of the civilian 

For this reason, traveling was slow, and it took the 
government ten days to cover the comparatively short 
distance between Rashka and Mitrovitza. At Mit- 
rovitza, however, the government stay was almost 
equally short, because a force of the enemy advancing 
from the west occupied Pristina two days after its 
arrival there, rendering its further stay in this town 

Consequently, on the same day the Serbian govern- 
ment left for Prisrend, where it arrived the day following, 
the 16th of November, and where it remained for a little 
over a week. WTien Prisrend became unsafe, the gov- 
ernment again left and following the River Drin across 
Albania to the Albanian seaport of Scutari, which city 
it finally reached on the 30th of November. 

Prisrend is remarkable as being the last place where 
the Serbian government exercised any authority in 
Serbia; and, a little later on, Prisrend became the center 
from which the terrible winter retreat of the Serbian 
population westward, through the Albanian Alps to the 
shores of the Adriatic, started. 



In the meantime, and while the government was at 
Prisrend, another Serbian army which had been defeated 
at Pristina to the northeast thereof, succeeded in moving 
west from Pristina after their defeat and retreated 
directly west to Ipek, in Montenegro. Pristina itself 
was abandoned by the Serbian army thereon the morning 
of November 26th, and in the afternoon of that day the 
enemy entered it. 

The army moving from Pristina towards Ipek reached 
Ipek on December 1st, but being hotly pursued by their 
enemy, in two columns, one which moving from the 
northeast had previously captured Novi Bazar and the 
other from Pristina, were only able to remain there 
over the night and on the next day started for Scutari 
where the Serbian government had preceded it. 

The country through which this retreat had to be 
conducted would have been a difficult country even in 
summer, but now it was the height of the winter and the 
lofty mountains were deeply covered with snow. 
Through their valleys and across their ridges the re- 
treating Serbians made their way for eleven days; 
finally arri\ing at Podgoritsa and four days after at 

Another portion of the Serbian army which was at 
the time of the beginning of the general Serbian retreat^ 
to the east of Pristina, found itself in a very difficult 
position; behind it were the Bulgarians pushing up the 
railroad from Uskub towards Pristina, and threatening 
to cut the road to Prisrend, which meant that the Ser- 
bians' road to comparative safety, through Albania, 
would be cut off. Before them were 150,000 to 200,000 
civilian fugitives seeking a way through the Albanian 
moimtains, and moving with a slowness which, under 
the circiunstances, endangered both themselves and the 
army behind them. The Bulgarians came up rapidly^ 
and to save their people, this Serbian army, having no 
other choice, threw itself in the way of the Bulgarians 



on the line from Lipliane to Ferozevitch, where, being 
without artillery, it endeavored to stay the advancing 
foe by rifle fire. This army fought very gallantly, and 
not only held the Bulgarians but drove them back for 
some iniles in spite of its insufficient equipment for 
battle, and continued to withstand them for six days, 
the gaining of which time gave the opportunity for the 
refugees, among whom was the King of Serbia, to move a 
considerable distance to the westward and to attain a 
position of relative safety. At the end of the 6th day, 
however, the ammunition of the Serbians gave out and 
their losses from the enemy's rifle and artillery fire 
having been very heavy, they began to fall back to the 

It is impossible to describe this general flight of the 
Serbians both the armies and the civiUan population 
from their country; it lasted from six to eight weeks in 
the depth of winter, its line of movement lying through 
a very difficult country which could supply the flying 
refugees with neither food nor shelter; and to add to the 
difficulties, many of the tribes of Albanians through whose 
territories the line of retreat lay, were hostile to the 
Serbians and opposed them by force of arms. Among 
the most unfortimate of all those who were carried 
away by the stream of this retreat were some 20,000 
Austrian prisoners taken in the first invasion, who were 
driven by the Serbian troops before them to the west. 
These unfortunates were in even worse pUght than theur 
captors, the Serbian refugees themselves, and of the 
20,000 barely 6,000, one quarter, survived to reach the 
shores of the Adriatic. 

When the Serbian army reached the sea coast, it may 
be doubted whether its strength exceeded 60,000. Of 
the Serbian civilian refugees many thousands had also 
perished. There is perhaps no episode like this flight 
of an entire people in modern history. To find anytlmig 
similar to it we would be obliged to go back to the middle 

Towards the end of December, the confused mass of 
army, prisoners and refugees were practically all in 
northern Albania, concentrated in the vicinity of Scutari. 
The troops were gotten together into some sort of organ- 
ization, and pushed on to San Giovanni di Medua, on 
the port on the coast to the south where they could 
obtain some supplies from the outside, and here we will 
leave them for a time. 



While these things were going on in western Serbia, 
other events of considerable interest were taking place 
in southeastern Serbia where as has been said the French 
and EngUsh troops had advanced as far as Ghevgeli. 
These forces were joined here by a comparatively few 
Serbian troops which had succeeded in evading the 
Bulgarians by fljdng southward, and it was resolved by 
the AlUed commanders to endeavor to make an advance 
to the north in order to attempt to create a diversion 
which would give the Serbian army retreating to the 
west towards Albania a chance to withdraw more suc- 
cessfully. Accordingly an advance was made on a 
line rimning north from Strumitza, to the east of Ghev- 
geU. This advance was temporarily successful, and 
defeating the Bulgarians more than once succeeded in 
getting up as far north as Krivolak, but the struggle at 
Krivolak did not last long, as reinforcements soon came 
to the Bulgarians there, whereupon these took the 
oflfensive and the combined forces of French, British 
and Serbians were driven back again to their point of 
departure, and even further south along the Vardar, 
until, at the end of January, the Bulgarian Une had 
arrived at a point well to the south of Lake Doiran and 

During this time in southwest Serbia the Bulgarians 
moving from Veles to Uskub, had successfully occupied 
Kritchevo and Prilep, and finally attained the height 
of their desires by the occupation of the much-coveted 
eity of Monastir; a few days after which they captured 
Ochrida. Later on, to the west, on the Albanian border, 
the Bulgarian lines were advanced south of Monastir 
and took up a position as far south as an east and west 
line running through Fiorina in Greek territory. 

It is needless to say that the Serbians felt deeply 
their practical desertion by the Allies. Not only had 
they asked for aid as far back as the 7th of July, but 
latterly had repeated that request, which was particiilarly 
addressed to the British. On September 24th Sir 
Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister, had sol- 
enmly pledged Serbia that England would assist her 
without qualification and without reserve. To most 
people, as to the Serbs, such a broad pledge of support 
would have meant that, in the event of necessity, military 
assistance would be offered unstintedly; but it appears 
that, in putting this interpretation upon Sir Edward 
Grey's pledgCi the Serbians were mistaken, becausei 



when the necessity for the redemption of this pledge 
arose, Sir Edward Grey explained that his words meant 
that "diplomatic support" would be given and had 
not meant military support at all. 

One result of the conquest of Serbia was peculiar. 
All the officers of the Serbian array who were proved to 
have been mixed up in the conspiracy which resulted 
in the tragedy at Serajevo in Jime, 1914, and also all 
survi\dng officers, without exception who took part in 
the assassination of Alexander and Draga years before, 
wherebj'- Peter, ex-King of Serbia, came to the throne, 
were killed during the fighting resulting from the in- 
vasion. In this case one may quote with some appropri- 
ateness the line: 

"The mill of the gods grinds slowly, 
But it grinds exceedingly fine." 

Subsequent to the punishment of Serbia, the Allies 
withdrew a considerable distance to the south and con- 
centrated in the city of Salonika, in Greek territory on 
which they installed themselves, and which they fortified 
and constituted their base for the problematic future 
operations for the redemption of Serbia. This occupa- 
tion of Salonika led them into a series of complications 
with Greece, since such occupation of this city on Greek 
territory was without the consent of the Greek govern- 
ment, and, in fact over the protest of that government, 
to which protest the Allies paid no attention. 



As an aid to the operations taking place in Serbia, in 
the early days of October, the Austrians opened an 
offensive from southern Bosnia on Montenegro. This 
little country, which is a tangled mass of high mountains 
covered with almost impenetrable forests, which contains 
no roads in our sense of the word, presents great difficulty 
to an invader, and defended as it was by a brave though 
not particularly numerous mountain people, every foot 
of the way had to be won against guerilla fighting. 
Under these circumstances, the Austrians progressed 
so extremely slow in the first two months, that little 
of practical importance resulted, though, nevertheless, 
a steady advance took place; but still this was so slow 
that Austrian troops had not got into a position in Monte- 
negro where they could successfulh'* oppose the retreat 
of the Serbians westward from Ipek and through Pris- 
rend to Scutari at the time that these retreats took place. 
In fact, the serious advances in this campaign did not 
commence really until after the 11th of January, when 
the Austrians captured Mount Loven, the famous 
"Black Mountain" whose possession they had coveted 
for years; and the taking of Cettinje, the capital, six 
miles distant therefrom followed four days later, Jan- 
uary 15th. 

On the 18th of January the Austrians captured Anti- 
vari, which capture gave them command of Scutari; 
whose occupation soon followed, and on the 19th Dul- 
cigno fell into their power. At this time the announce- 
ment was made that the Montenegrin King had sued 
for a separate peace. 

But it turned out that these negotiations of Monte- 
negro's King looking to surrender were merely a ruse 
de guerre to gain time to enable him to concentrate his 
scattered army and to make provision for its retreat in 
case of need. Under the rules of war in the case of the 
armistice which was arrived at for a few days as a result 
of these negotiations, such a course is allowable unless 



the armistice is sued to surprise the enemy before he 
can put himself on guard, which was not the case in 
these negotiations. Generally speaking, unless the 
armistice itself contains stipulations to the contrary, 
each side is authorized, during its continuance, to make 
movements of troops within its own lines, to receive and 
instruct recruits, to construct retrenchments, to repair 
bridges and establish new batteries, and in general, to 
take advantage of the time and means at his disposal 
to prepare for resuming hostilities. 

This was apparently what the King did in this case, 
and having accomplished his object, on the 19th of 
January King Nicholas left the country and joined his 
Queen and the royal family at San Giovanni de Medusa, 
whence he embarked for Italy. His stay in Italy was, 
however, but brief, in spite of the fact that the King of 
Italy was his son-in-law, and King Nicholas ultimately 
took up a residence near Lyons, France, where he re- 
mained for some time, being supported by an allowance 
from the French Government. 

Many of the Montenegrins, however, particularly 
those to the northeast and north of Cettinje, were de- 
ceived by these negotiations and the towns of Podgoritza, 
Danilovegrad and Niksic surrendered without resistance 
to the Austrians; these towns being the only important 
towns of Montenegro which the Austrians had not 
occupied before; and all except the very southern end of 
Montenegro was completely in Austrian possession by 
January 25th, 1916. To the south, however, a small 
army under General Milanovitch obeyed the orders of 
the King and attempted to continue their resistance, 
even going so far as to take the offensive and attacking 
the Austrians. The main result of these negotiations 
was, however, to free the Austrians from any further 
need of very large forces in Montenegro itself and con- 
sequently to enable them to detach enough troops from 
their army there to form a sufficient force for the invasion of 
Albania in pursuit of the remainder of the Montenegrin 
army, and the Serbians, and for the attack of the Itahan 
forces also there. 

This the Austrians did and Milanovitch being easily 
brushed aside the Austrians soon appeared in force to 
the immediate north of the port of San Giovanni de 
Medua. By which appearance the Serbian army which, 
as has been seen before, had concentrated in the neigh- 
borhood of this town after its escape from the mountains 



of Montenegro and Albania, was compelled to retreat 
further south. Their retreat began on January 21st, 
and San Giovanni di Medua and its neighborhood was 
evacuated by all the forces of the Serbians and their 
Allies. This retreat was directly south towards Durazzo 
where these mixed forces arrived safely after a march of 
several days though losing some men in rear guard 
actions on the road with the Austrians and in combats 
with the Albanians who threw themselves across their 
path to bar their way southward. 

From Durazzo a portion of the Serbian army was 
taken south by water to the Greek island of Corfu which 
had been occupied "temporarily" by the Allies without 
the consent of Greece. Another portion, however, 
was forced to evacuate Durazzo owing to the approach 
of the Austrian forces advancing from the north and of 
Bulgarian forces moving from the eastward, and re- 
treated 'southward to Avlona, another Albanian sea- 
port which at this time was in the hands of the Italians. 
These forces were somewhat roughly handled on the 
road, but eventually the bulk thereof arrived at Avlona 
and were there embarked for Corfu. 

The Austrians themselves soon after the taking of San 
Giovaimi di Medua moved southward through Kroia 
which they occupied on February 5th in the direction 
of Durazzo and on February 8th made a juncture with the 
Bulgarians at a point a dozen miles to the northwest of 
the city, which the united forces proceeded leisurely 
to surround. Another force of Bulgarians moving from 
the eastward was met at Elbassan to the southeast of 
the town on the 12th of February, by which meeting the 
town was completely surrounded on its land side. There 
was, however, a large force of Italians in the town, as 
well as some Serbians, and a force of Albanian tribesmen 
led by Essad Pasha, who had thrown in their lot with the 
Entente Powers and the attempt of the Austro-Bulgarian 
force to draw in the arc of their semi-circle to its center 
was vigorously opposed, and progress was slow particu- 
larly as the Austro-Bulgar commanders having no reason 
to hurry, refrained as much as possible from exposing 
their men. A few days before the fall of the city Essad 
Pasha made his escape. Finally on February 27th the 
city was taken and with it some Serbian and quite a 
number of Italian prisoners. 

The Austro-Bulgar forces which captured Durazzo, 
immediately set out for Avalona and being reinforced 



by other Bulgarian forces who jomed them a short dis- 
tance to the northeast thereof; an attack against that 
city was planned, but, owing to the difficulties of the 
terrain surrounding the place and the consequent cost 
in life its storming would have entailed was never de- 
livered, though the Italian troops were driven into, and 
kept in the city itself and its immediate outskirts foir the 
rest of the period under consideration. 

In this maimer were Serbia and Montenegro com- 
pletely overrun, their governments forced into exile and 
their peoples subjected to the rule of the Teutons. 
Considered from any standpoint the subjugation of these 
two countries, and the Teuton occupation of this Balkan 
area had a great influence upon the whole war, both in 
a military and in an economic sense. Prior to the attack 
upon Serbia, though Bulgaria and Turkey were allied 
with the Central Empires, there was no communication 
possible between them. By the capture of the railroad 
running from Belgrade to Nish and from Nish to Sophia, 
a speedy and economical means of communication was 
opened between these allies, with the result that not only 
were the Central Empires able to send forward munitions 
of war, supplies of ammimition and the artillery imper- 
atively needed by her ally, Turkey, to withstand the foe 
at her door, but they were able to draw from Turkey 
and from Bulgaria the superfluous quantities of food, 
supplies which these countries possessed, and of which 
they themselves stood in need. 

Furthermore, and as we shall see in the sequel, not 
only were they able to relieve Turkey's immediate mili- 
tary necessities, but, by being in direct communication 
with Turkey and having the opportunity of henceforth 
sending military stores, supplies and equipment unhin- 
dered, they were able to take advantage of the very 
considerable force of man power which Turkey had at 
her disposal but of which she had not been able up to 
this time to make any effectual use, for the reason that 
Turkey herself did not possess the necessary arms, 
artillery and ammunition and equipment to put these 
men upon a war footing. 

Another very important result achieved by this open- 
ing up of communication between them and Turkey was 
that it gave the Central Empires access to the rich agri- 
cultural regions of Asia Minor, which are not only valu- 
able from the agricultural standpoint, but also from the 
mineral standpoint. The fertility of the soil of Asia 



Minor is proverbial, and this fertility for many cen- 
turies has made its possession of extreme importance 
and value to its owners. At one time it was the impor- 
tant source of food supply of the ancient world, and 
could be made so of proportionate importance to-day 
if proper agricTiltural methods were followed and irriga- 
tion introduced. Even under the slipshod methods of 
cultivation now in use there are produced in Asia Minor 
from 250,000 to 300,000 bales of cotton a year. At the 
time the Teutons opened the road through to Turkey the 
bulk of the cotton crop of 191 i was still at the points of 
production; no market having existed for it owing to 
the closing of the ordinary means of transportation. 
This cotton crop of 1914, plus the crop of 1915, passed 
into the hands of Germany and had a marked influence 
not only upon her power to produce explosives (in the 
manufacture of which some cotton is used) but also in 
her production in other lines of industry wherein cotton 
is used. 

In addition to cotton, tobacco, coffee, maima, and 
cereals in very considerable quantities became available, 
and, more important even in one sense than their 
present availability, was the fact that there was now 
practically united to the Central Empires an agricultural 
region which under proper conditions could produce 
nearly all of the requirements in most raw materials of 
the Central Empires for manufacturing and other pur- 
poses in the future, and which was so situated geograph- 
ically as to be beyond the reach or control of the sea 

In addition to this agricultural production, Asia 
Minor contains mineral regions of very considerable 
extent: producing in larger or smaller quantities chrome, 
zinc, antimony, borax, emery, asphalt, gold, silver, litho- 
graphic stones, iron, and above all, copper. Near Diar- 
bekir is located what is said to be one of the largest and 
most productive mines of this mineral in the world. 

This condition of affairs has not only affected and 
ameliorated conditions in Germany at present, but it 
also places her in a position where, in the future, she will 
be to a far greater degree than ever before really inde- 
pendent of importation of many of these agricultural 
products and minerals from lands beyond the sea, and 
the consequences arising thereupon to Germany's many- 
sided industrial development will probably be very 
great in the years following the war, and not without 



consequences of considerable importance to the western 
and southern states of the United States. 

It can be said, without exaggeration, that in this 
respect alone the Central Empires added in the period of 
the next eight or nine months not less than one million 
to a million and a quarter men to their available man 
power. As will be seen later on in the war, this addition 
to the strength of the Turkish forces was destined to 
play an important role not only on the battlefields in 
Turkey itself, but also along the far-flung battle lines of 
the Central Empires. 

A more immediate result, however, of this power to 
bring aid to Turkey in the respects above stated, was the 
abandonment of the British and French operations on 
the Peninsula of Gallipoli, which had as their objective 
the capture of Constantinople, and as it subsequently 
appeared, the transfer of the possession of that famous 
city to Russia under an agreement which had been 
entered into between the Entente Powers at the time 
the operations on Gallipoli Peninsula began. In fact, 
it can be said that no prior campaign in the war had had 
as beneficial and strengthening an effect upon the mili- 
tary and economic situation of the Central Empires as 
did the conquest of Serbia and Montenegro. It is per- 
haps not too much to state that when the entire war 
comes to be looked at from a reasonable perspective, 
from this campaign it will be possible to see the 
war's ultimate result flow. After this completion of the 
conquest of Serbia and Montenegro, a temporary ad- 
ministration of the first kingdom was instituted under 
Bulgarian and Austrian auspices, and of the second 
under Austrian. The aged King Peter of Serbia, after 
various adventures finally arrived at Salonica, Greece. 



As was said, in closing the account of the operations 
on the Peninsula of GalBpoli up to the first of Septem- 
ber, 1915, in the last volume of this work, at that time 
the British and French positions on this Peninsula were, 
to all intents and purposes, the same as they had been 
at nightfall on the 27th of April. 

No events of importance took place in September 
on this front. The trench fighting continued as intensely 
as before, but neither side made any attempt to take 
a serious offensive at any point. Sniping and bombard- 
ing really constituted the entire activity. 

On October 8th, Gen. Hamilton reported that there 
had been an average gain during the month of Septem- 
ber of 300 yards along the whole four miles of the Suyla 
fronts. But public opinion in England was becoming 
alarmed. The reports of heavy casualties and of a 
great prevalence of sickness among the troops engaged 
in these operations had gradually leaked out to the 
British public, in spite of the attempts to mislead them 
as to the actual progress of the troops in this campaign 
^by the familiar expedient of chronicling their advances 
but omitting mention of their retrogressions, and England 
was genuinely anxious. About the middle of October 
criticisms of the expedition began to be openly voiced 
in Parliament, and these grew more insistent and more 
direct as the replies of the government grew more evasive. 
At one time an organized effort was begim to take the 
necessary parliamentary steps to force the government 
to appoint a select committee to inquire into the general 
condition of this campaign. But, about the time that 
that movement in Parliament commenced to be em- 
barrassing, it was announced the government itself had 
taken steps to ascertain the exact situation. 

On October 11th, a telegram was sent by Lord Eitch- 



ener to Sir Ian Hamilton, asking him what, in his opin- 
ion, would be the loss which would be necessarily involved 
in the evacuation of the Peninsula. To this. Gen. 
Hamilton answered that such a step was "unthinkable," «r 
with the result that four days later he was recalled and 
on his arrival in London in October was informed that 
he had been superseded in his command. His successor 
was Gen. Sir Charles Monroe. 

The new commander left London for the Dardanelles 
on October 22nd, and pending his arrival. Gen. Bird- 
wood took command. On his arrival at GalUpoli, Gen. 
Monroe, after a thorough examination of the situation, 
reported in favor of the immediate evacuation, but with ^ 
its usual uncertainty of purpose, the Government did 
not accept his report but vacillated, fearing the poHtical 
consequences to it of an evacuation, as well as the loss 
of prestige both to Great Britain and her AlUes. 

But the storm of criticism continued, and on Novem- 
ber 2nd Mr. Asquith was forced to defend the govern- 
ment in a general statement made in the House of 
Commons in a partial justification of the Dardanelles 
expedition. This defense was severely attacked, but 
almost immediately it was made known that Lord 
Kitchener had been sent to the Dardanelles by the 
government to examine the situation for himself, which, 
quieted criticism. On his arrival there in the early 
days of November, and after going over the whole sit- 
uation with Gen. Monroe and examining the British 
positions, Lord Kitchener endorsed Gen. Monroe's 
recommendation in favor of evacuation. 

During October the daily monotony of trench warfare 
continued on the Peninsula. On the 4th of Novem- 
ber the first real fighting, in some time, took place. 
The Turks attacked the Australians and New Zealanders 
on the Anzak front about six o'clock in the evening and 
a brisk fight ensued which kept up for two hours, foially 
resulting in a repulse for the Turks. On November 20th 
the sub-marine "E-20," whose exploits in the Sea of 
Marmora have been heretofore referred to, was simk 
in that Sea and its crew and commander captured by 
the Turks. 

On November 15th the British tried an oflfensive 
against the Turks entrenched in the Krithia Ravine 
and were successful in carrying a few yards of Turkish 
trenches. The Turks, however, coimter-attacked on 
November 17th and regained the trenches they had lost 



on the 15th; and on November 21st made another at- 
tack, wherein they gamed some gromid. On November 
27th a three days' storm of ram and snow, accompanied 
by very high winds and extreme cold, fell upon the Pen- 
insida. This was the opening of the winter which, this 
particular year, came a few weeks earUer than usual. 
This storm inflicted great suffering upon the Europeans 
as well as upon the Turks, and was perhaps one of the 
main causes which opened the eyes of the British mili- 
tary commanders to the fact that it would jbe difficult, 
if not impossible, to keep their men on this Peninsula 
during the winter, hving, as they did, exposed to the full 
force of the elements, and practically without shelter. 

On November 30th Lord Kitchener returned to Lon- 
don. From that time until December 21st nothing was 
heard from GaUipoli. Apparently the campaign had 
vanished from the face of the earth. 

On the 21st of December, Mr. Asquith electrified the 
world by aimouncing in Parliament that all the troops 
at Suvla Bay and Anzac, had evacuated those fronts 
and had succeeded in removing with them not only 
most of their stores but 193 gims of various sizes, leav- 
ing only seven to fall into the hands of the Turks, and that % 
this result had been accomplished at the cost of a hali- \) 
a dozen wounded men. It appears that this evacuation 
had really begun about the ^tji^of December, when the 
winter stores and miscellaneous articles were first re- 
moved. Thereafter all other stores, except a small 
quantity of ammunition, were removed, and the first 
"^ embarkation of troops took place. Finally came the 

embarkation of the gims and the remaining troops. 
On the afternoon of the last day, December 20th, to . 
deceive the enemy, on the Krithi^a front, a faint attack 
was made on some Turkish trenches which were taken 
and held against Turkish counter-attacks. Very early 
in the morning of the 21st of December the Australians 
exploded a large mine on the Anzac front which was 
fired from the beach where the last troops were em- 

According to the British story, this also aided in de- 
ceiving the Turks, so, that it was nearly a day before 
they ascertained that the enemy whom they had fought 
for so many months had disappeared. It is true that 
the Turkish version of this episode does not quite coin- 
cide with the English account, but as it is impossible 
to obtain any convincing evidence either way, it is per- 



haps as well for the time to set forth this English version 
in order to have it upon record. 

After Suvla and Anzac were evacuated, the English 
government and the English press announced that the 
Rrithia front at the extremity of the Peninsula wgujd, 
be jield indefinit ely; in fact there were many mililary 
e5$erls in Eugliiud who considered that its holding was 
of immense importance to Great Britain in that it forced 
the mobilization in the extremity of this Peninsula of 
a large force of Turkish troops who could have been 
used to great advantage otherwise. But this was prob- 
ably a mere pretense intended to deceive the Turks, and 
incidentally, the British pubUc, because it is now known 
that the French troops began to prepare to depart as 
soon as the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac was com- 
pleted. And in fact on the 29th of December the orders 
for a general evacuation of Krithia were issued, and 
embarkation began almost immediately. 

On January 4th there were only a few thousand French 
remaining, and a division of the British had already 
gone. It appeared, however, that the Turks were be- 
ginning to suspect that some movement was in progress, 
and irregular skirmishing began along the line; conse- 
quently, on the night of January 5th and 6th, the evac- 
uation was continued more hurriedly. On the after- 
noon of January 7th the Turks apparently meditated 
a general advance; the British perceiving that they were 
making preparations to leave their trenches. Actually, 
however, there was only one advance made on the ex- 
treme left of the British line where there was a two hour 
fight of a rather bitter hand to hand character, which 
ended indecisively, and in which the Staffordshires par- 
ticipated, thus having the honor of taking part in the 
last actual fighting of the expedition. 

That night the evacuation proceeded very hurriedly, 
on account of the evident disposition of the Turks to 
attack and most of the artillery was gotten away. The 
next day was still more disturbed, but finally about three 
o'clock in the morning of January 9th the embarkation 
was completed. Seventeen gims were left behind and a 
large quantity of stores and ammunition, most of this 
ammimition, however, was exploded from the embarka- 
tion points at the last moment. 

This version, again, is that of the British. No report 
has been made by the French, and the Turkish version is 
that the British suilered very heavy losses on the 7th, 



8th and 9th of January, and that in place of their suc- 
ceeding in burning their stores, these stores fell into the 
Turks' hands. 

In this unfortunate Gallipolian adventure the British 
lost, in officers: killed 1745, wounded 3143, missing 353; 
or a total of 5,241. Of the rank and file there were 
killed 26,455, wounded 74,952, missing 10,901; total 
112,308; a grand total of 117,549. To these battle 
casualties must be added 102,683 sick who passed through 
the miliary hospitals between April 25th and December 
11th, of whom it is said, imofficially, that about 12,000 
to 14,000 died. The French losses cannot be accurately 
stated. In the first place, we do not know with any 
degree of absolute accuracy how many men the French 
sent to Gallipoli, though such evidence as we have points 
to the fact that at various times the French used approx- 
imately 200,000 men in this campaign. We know that 
in the early portion of the campaign, when they dis- 
embarked on the eastern side of the Strait and were sub- 
sequently forced to re-embark, their losses in the fighting 
which went on for a couple of weeks on this eastern side 
of the Strait were very severe; and we also know that 
their sick list was a large one. If the French losses were, 
in proportion to the number of men engaged in the cam- 
paign, the same as those of the British, they would 
easily attain a grand total of from 110,000 to 120,000. 
But as the French are much more scientific fighters 
than the British, and as their officers know better how 
to handle and care for troops in the field, it is extremely 
probable that their losses were not in the same propor- 
tion as those of the British. So that if we take, arbi- 
trarily, the figure of 85,000 as the extent of the French 
losses, we will have a total Allied casualty loss of 303,000; 
of whom perhaps, all told, from 60,000 to 65,000 were 
killed in action or died of disease. 

On the Turkish side there is much uncertainty as to 
the losses. The Turks themselves admit a total casu- 
alty list of from 65,000 to 70,000, but according to the 
British and French accounts their casualty list must 
have been considerably greater than this. If we allow 
that to an extent this British and French claim is well 
founded, and add 50 per cent, to the casualties stated 
by the Turks themselves to have occurred on this front, 
we will then have in the neighborhood of 105,000 cas- 
ualties which may be regarded as a fairly accurate 
.figure. Of this 105,000, perhaps 25,000 to 30,000 con- 



stituted the total permanent losses. The sickness 
among the Turkish troops was not very great. 

The disproportion between the estimates of the losses 
of the two sides may give rise to some criticism, but it 
must be remembered that the Turks were far more ac- 
customed to the climate of the Peninsula than were the 
invaders, and consequently, suffered less therefrom. 
The Turks were, on the whole, in this campaign, the 
attacked and not the attackers, and it is well known 
that in frontal attacks, as all those on the Peninsula of 
Gallipoli by the necessities of the terrain were, the at- 
tacking party always suffers much heavier casualties 
than the defending party. 

The Prime Minister of Great Britain, in his final 
summary of the Gallipolian Expedition, in speaking of 
the retirement from the Peninsula, said that it was 
"one of the finest operations in naval and military his- 
tory and would take an imperishable place in British 
national history/' It is hard to see how even a retire- 
ment as successful as is claimed by the British from the 
Peninsula of Gallipoli could be considered in any degree 
to redeem the colossal blunders of the most ill-planned 
and ill-conducted campaign in miUtary history, or 
would relieve those responsible for the childishness 
shown in the preparation, strategy and organization of 
the expedition from their responsibility. Three hundred 
thousand human beings killed, maimed or injured to no 
purpose because the British Government preferred talk- 
ing to acting. Such is the best final summary of the 
GalUpolian campaign. 



The Austro-Italian front during the six months under 
consideration presents comparatively little of interest. 
As has been before said, the mountainous character of 
most of this front prevents any great movements thereon 
and necessitates the carrying of the hills, mountains 
and valleys foot by foot in almost hand to hand com- 
bats between small bodies of men. The character of 
the fighting, therefore, while not spectacular, and devoid 
of any of the magnetic features of the massed attacks 
on the other fronts is, nevertheless, bitter and sanguin- 
ary, but is also extremely diflBcult to narrate so as to 
give any consecutive idea of its incidents. 

The principal fighting took place on the eastern front 
in the direction of Trieste, the capture of which city 
is perhaps the wish dearest to the Italian heart. From 
the end of August to the middle of October the Italians 
made quiet but strenuous preparations for a general 
offensive all along the line from Tolmino where the 
river Idria joins the Isonzo south, and brought up artil- 
lery, ammunition and the other necessaries of war, 
behind their lines in large quantities. This offensive 
had three important strategic objectives from the 
Italian standpoint which were: first, to enlarge the 
Italian holdings at the position known as the Plava 
Bridge Head, of which a part was already in Italian 
hands to the south of Canale, and to the north of Gorizia 
on the river Isonzo, so that the Italians would be enabled 
to turn the Monte Santo, a height which protected 
Gorizia from the north and which could be passed, if 
turned, along the line of Gargaro, Salcano and Gorizia, 
then be captiu*ed by a simultaneous attack from Salcano 
to the north and Podgora to the west. 

Second, to capture, by a frontal attack, the Austrian 
lines on the right bank of this river Isonzo from Monte 



Sabato in the north to below Podgora on the south. 
It was evident that as long as the Austrians held their 
position on the right bank of the river Isonzo it was 
impossible for the Italians to make any forward move- 
ment of any importance, or even to place their artillery 
in favorable positions to destroy the Austrian trenches. 
The third object was to gain possession of the northern 
edge of the Carso Plateau which stretches, roughly 
speaking, from Merna, almost directly south of Gorizia, 
to Bagni on the shores of the Adriatic, and which is 
bounded on the east by that depression to which the 
name of Vallone is given. The Carso Plateau . itself 
stretches south as far as the road leading from San 
Daniel to Opcina which is only a few miles to the north- 
east of the city of Trieste itself. The possession of these 
three objectives by forces attacking Trieste would be a 
long step in advance towards the taking of that city. 

On October 18th, then, a general bombardment began 
along the whole of the line above described, and this was 
followed the morning of October 21st by the opening of 
the infantry attack. 

Considerable criticism has been directed against the 
Italian high command for not having made this offensive 
in June or even in the early days of July, since then the 
Austrians had not had time to strengthen their lines to 
the extent that they had been strengthened at the time 
this offensive was delivered. Why it was not done, it 
is impossible to state, but it was not, and it was not until 
the end of September, when the commanding General on 
this front was relieved of his command that really any 
energetic preparations for the offensive under consid- 
eration were made. 

Towards realizing their first objective, that is the 
enlargement of the Italian position at Pragna Bridge 
Head but little progress was made, though the Italians 
continued a steady effort for several weeks. They did, 
however, successfully elongate their lines both to the 
north and south of the bridge head, but when it came to 
making progress east thereof they were never able, 
during the whole period which this offensive lasted, to 
take the absolutely essential position of Kuk, the pos- 
session of which was the first absolutely necessary step 
towards any serious movement against Monte Santo 
itself. The fighting all along this line was intense for 
several weeks, but in spite of its intensity, and in spite 
of the desperate struggle of the Italians, the Austrian 



lines held firm and no tactical progress at all was made. 

To the south an attempt to achieve the second Italian 
objective, that is, the occupation of the Austrian lines 
on the right bank of the river from Monte Sabotino to 
below Podgora was conducted obstinately on both sides. 
For six weeks this fight went on unbrokenly day and 
night. Attack and counter-attack succeeded each other 
without cessation and the loss of life was very heavy. 
On the easterly end of the line, in about the seventh 
week of the offensive, the Italians, as a result of valiant 
efforts, did gain some ground and succeeded in working 
themselves in behind Podgora and also established 
themselves in the broken and rugged country which 
lies around Oslavia, and occupied a little village to the 
east of Podgora which lies opposite Graffenberg, a 
suburb of Gorizia itself. 

Towards the commencement of December the offen- 
sive slackened for a few days but a^ain began and con- 
tinued for another period of several weeks, but in this 
later struggle the Italians failed to improve their posi- 
tions, which remained to all intents and purposes un- 
changed at its end. 

North, in the Monte Sabato region, the attacks on 
that mountain continued almost without cessation from 
the 21st of October until the middle of January. This 
mountain, which was the key to Gorizia, and the bridge 
crossing the Isonzo into Gorizia itself on the north, were 
heavily fortified by the Austrians, not only on the slopes 
of the mountain itself, but subterraneously, and con- 
stituted positions of very great strength which were 
tenaciously defended by the Austrians. 

On the 3rd of November the Italians had succeeded 
in working to the westward and northward slopes of 
the mountain and by a valiant effort, continued diu-ing 
the next three days, they succeeded in capturing the 
summit of Mt. Sabato, but then a frightful blunder on 
the part of the Italian Staff occurred, which rendered 
all the work of the previous weeks by the Italian troops, 
and all the loss of life which had taken place therein, 
worthless. When the Italian attacking troops estab- 
lished themselves on the summit, no reserves followed 
and there were no reserves anywhere near the battlefield 
which could be brought up in time to be of use in main- 
taining the position. By an almost criminal oversight 
on the part of the Italian commanding General, the 
assault had been dealt by his full force, and in spite 



of the fact that the conflict had lasted for three whole 
days, no reserves had ever been brought up to a point 
where they could be available to complete the work 
which the assaulting troops had accomplished. 

The result was that the 4,000 men who had forced 
their way to the top, after suffering frightful losses, were 
comparatively soon swept back by the Austrians' 
counter-attack and the hill completely cleared of the 
Italian forces, so that the positions reverted to where 
they had been when the offensive was begun several 
weeks before. This counter-attack which was par- 
ticipated in by Hungarians and Tyroleans, merits some 
notice, on account of the dogged courage and the elan 
shown by both of these categories of troops. 

After this repulse, trench fighting continued for the 
next few weeks; the Italians gaining a little in this form 
of combat. Finally they arrived at a point quite close 
to the bridge crossing the Isonzo to Gorizia, and after 
holding this for some time, they were able to bring up 
heavy artillery with which they began to bombard the 
town itself. From this time on, until the end of the 
period under consideration, at this point, nothing more 
but artillery duels between the Italian artillery on the 
western side of the Isonzo, in front of and to the north- 
west of Gorizia, and that of the Austrians, on the oppo- 
site side of the river, varied by occasional infantry 
attacks of little importance, took place. These artil- 
lery duels were, however, a stand-off, so that the Italians 
were unable to seize the bridge and force their way into 

It will perhaps be remembered that at this time, every 
now and then, at periods when the artillery attack with 
the Italians grew more vehement, we were informed by 
the cables that Gorizia was at the point of falling, but 
it will also be remembered that the sequel proved all of 
these several warnings in which our press revelled, of 
the imminence of the capture of this city, to be false 

While these events were taking place on this portion 
of the front a vehement struggle was continuing, on the 
western edge of the Carso Plateau. The villages of 
Gradisca, Sagrado, Farra and S. Pietro had been cap- 
tured by the Italians some time before, and it was from 
these points as a base that their attack was launched 
against this western edge of the Plateau. This attack 
was at first directed against Monte San Michele which 



lies in the center of the bend of the Isonzo between 
Gorizia and the sea, Monte San Martino, which lies to 
the south of Monte San Michele, and Doberdo which is 
still further south, almost directly north of Monfalcone, 
with which it is connected by a road. These three 
heights dominated this edge of the Carso Plateau, hence 
their military importance. The struggle here lasted 
for months, and was trench fighting of the most intensive 
character. One day the Italians capturd a trench, to 
lose it the next, and 'thus the line swayed to and fro 
from the days of early fall until the end of winter. 
Ultimately some slight progress was made by the Italians 
towards the Lake of Doberdo which lies between the 
village of the same name and the Isonzo River; a portion 
of the summit of Monte San Michele was taken, as well 
as the western slopes of Monte San Martino, up to the 
church of the same name. 

On the northern boundary of this Carso Plateau is 
the Visp River and here at this river's western extrem- 
ity there was another combat which raged all winter, 
the object of the Italians being to establish themselves 
on the crest of the northern slope of the Carso Plateau 
whence they could move eastward on San Michele, thus 
attacking it in flank. But in spite of arduous and in- 
tense combats here very little results were achieved, 
and with the coming of spring the Austrian first line 
was only broken at points and the second line was 

During all these operations the Italians showed that 
their knowledge of trench warfare was not as yet suflBi- 
ciently advanced for them to fight with success against 
troops even in largely inferior numbers who were accus- 
tomed to this form of warfare, while the Italian Staff 
broke down almost completely in their handling of their 
men in a manner which would have been highly danger- 
ous had they been faced by equal forces. It is certain 
that General Cadoma, up to the month of March, 
could not congratulate himself upon any signal ability 
that he showed in the handling of his men; nor had this 
General, up to that time, shown strategic abilities in 
proportion to the importance of the military rank which 
he holds. 

In some respects, there is a striking similarity between 
the British and the Italian army. In both cases the 
rank and file show great courage, willingness; and also, 
in both cases, these qualities in the rank and file are 



rendered of small avail by the rather glaring lack of 
training of their younger officers and the incompetency 
of their staffs and their generals. 

In the Italian army the troops from the south were 
not expected to rank, at the beginning of the war, in 
their military qualities, with those from the north, but 
curiously enough, actual practice of war proved this 
supposition false and it can be said truthfully that the 
southern Italian troops have shown themselves to be 
very nearly on the same level as those of the north. 
On the other hand, the Bersaglieri and the Alpini have 
fully lived up to the rather high expectations entertained 
of them, and it is doubtful whether there are any troops 
in any army of greater efficiency, in all senses of the word, 
than these two rather small and peculiar divisions of 
the Italian army. 

The battle line on the rest of this Austro-Italian front 
runs, as my readers may remember from the previous 
volume, either actually among the snow peaks of the 
higher Alps, or along the mountains forming the southern 
buttresses of the main chain. While the activity on 
both sides along this part of the battle line was great, 
yet it consisted of an infinity of very small engagements 
impossible to describe, euffice it therefore to say that in 
spite of this incessant activity continued under the most 
adverse conditions practically all the period now under 
consideration, the lines in the spring were practically in 
the same positions they had occupied at the beginning of 
autumn. Of course here or there one side or the other 
had captured this obscure valley or that unknown peak, 
but these gains were equal on the balance, in spite of the 
bravery shown by the troops on both sides, in the hand 
to hand and murderous fighting necessary to achieve 
such gains. 

Some reference must be made to the condition of 
affairs, during the period under consideration, in Italy's 
recently conquered colony of Tripoli on the northern 
coast of Africa. It will perhaps be recollected that at 
the outbreak of the war Italy had but partially completed 
the conquest of this colony from its original Arab 
possessors. As a result of the war, Italy was obliged to 
withdraw a number of the troops of which she had a 
large force then, owing to the necessities of the combat 

The Arabs, struggling for their independence, took 
advantage of this, with the result that by spring of 1916 



they had driven the Italians out bf the interior of the 
country which they had previously, at points, pene- 
trated to as great a distance as 100 miles, and back to a 
narrow zone on the sea-shore, wherein the Italians main- 
tained themselves with some diflSculty; daily battles 
being the rule and not the exception. How many men 
Italy lost in these combats, spread over this period of 
six months, we do not know, since Italy follows the 
policy of giving no statistics whatever in regard to her 
casualties in any of her reports of military operations, 
but it is rumored that these casualties were severe, and 
this is perhaps not impossible to believe since Italy 
lost so very heavily when the Arabs put up such a stiff 
fight against the original Italian advance to the interior 
from the sea-shore, a few years before. 




As has been already said, in the narration of the events 
which took place on the Russian front during the period 
under consideration, the Grand Duke Nicholas, prev- 
iously Commander in Chief of the Russian armies, was, 
on Septemebr 5th, relieved by the Czar from that com- 
mand and appointed Governor General of the Caucasus 
and Commander in Chief of the Russian Army operating 
on that front. 

To a man of the intense ambition and great personal 
vanity of the Grand Duke, it was indeed a fall from being 
Commander in Chief of all the armies of Russia, and 
potentially master of the Russian Empire, to be trans- 
lated to this comparatively minor position. Up to this 
time, the course of events along the Caucasian front 
had not been very favorable to the Russian armies, and 
the Russian and Turkish armies were still fighting along 
what is practically the line of the frontier between their 
respective countries. The country through which the 
frontier runs is an exceedingly difficult one to fight in, 
traversed as it is by precipitous mountains rising oc- 
casionally to the height of 12,000 to 14,000 feet, which 
are divided from each other by steep and narrow valleys. 
As a general thing, these mountain ranges run east and 
west, but there are enough bisecting chains to make the 
whole country a topographical jumble. It was in such 
regions that the rival forces contended. 

During the first three months after the Grand Duke 
assumed command in the Caucasus, the time was ap- 
parently spent by him in preparing for a general offensive 
which it was, as heretofore explained, intended that the 
Russian forces should take here in support of the move- 
ment of the English up the Tigris towards Bagdad 
in Mesopotamia. The delay of three months, which 
had elapsed, however, was fatal to these two movements 
being simultaneous and the Russian troops did not com- 



mence their forward march until after General Town- 
shend's forces had been defeated at Ctesiphon and had 
retreated to Kut-el-Amara and there been surrounded 
by the Turks, so that as far as rendering any aid to the 
first effort of the British to take Bagdad was concerned, 
the Russian offensive in the Caucasus was unavailing. 

It may, however, have been presumed by both the 
British and Russians that the force which was advancing 
to the relief of General Townshend from the Persian 
Gulf would ultimately succeed in accomplishing that 
object, and the united British forces would then begin a 
new attack upon Bagdad. But this was still on the lap 
of the gods, at the time when, on January 10th, the 
Russians opened their offensive by an attack on the 
Turkish positions on Lake Tortum at the village of Tew 
on the northern shores of this lake, and of Ardesh on 
the southeastern shore. 

This Russian attack was successful and the Turks 
were driven out of these villages. The Russians' right 
flank continued its advance, and a few days afterwards 
captured the town of Archava on the coast of the Black 
Sea. In the center a general attack was launched by 
the Russians on the 16th of January, on the entire 
Turkish line from Lake Tortum to a point a little to 
the north of Melaskerd on the Upper Euphrates, directly 
north of Lake Van. For three days a battle raged 
along this line, which resulted on the 19th in the almost 
total defeat of the Turks who were thrown back along 
the whole line in the general direction of Erzerum. 

The town of Kapri Keuyh was captured on the first 
day of the battle, together with a number of Turkish 
prisoners and a large quantity of war m,aterial. On the 
20th, General Yudenitch captured the fortified town of 
Hassankala where about 1,200 prisoners were taken, 
besides a considerable amount of artillery. Hassankala 
is only about twenty miles from Erzerum and a little 
less than 15 from the famous Deve Boyen Pass, which has 
been the scene of many battles in the past for the pos- 
session of Erzerum. 

Between Erzerum and Hassankala a ridge rises to 
about 2,500 feet above the small plain, in the center of 
which Erzerum is situated. On this ridge, guarding 
the passes through it, were situated some eleven forts 
located at convenient points on the heights. The 
Russians first tried to capture these by storm in their 
anxiety for a speedy victory, but the Turks succeeded 



in repelling their attack and in inflicting rather heavy 
losses upon them. Seeing that even attempted as- 
saults would not succeed in taking the ridge and its 
forts, the Russians brought up artillery from their rear, 
which took a couple of weeks and it was not until the 
12th of February that the Russian artillery opened upon 
the forts. None of these forts were modern, and they 
were, therefore, unable to resist for any considerable 
period the weight of metal which the Russian heavy 
artillery poured in upon them. 

On the 13th one fort was taken and on the following 
day another; and on the 15th the remaining forts, which 
by this time had been pretty well battered to pieces by 
the Russian artillery, were in such condition that the 
Russians were able to launch a successful storming at- 
tack against them. On the evening of the 15th, then, 
the ridge with all its forts was in Russian hands. This 
insured the speedy capture of Erzerum which could be 
easily commanded by artillery located on these heights. 
The Turks did not attempt, under these circumstances, 
the defense of the fortress, in fact had already on the 
13th (the date of the capture of the first fort) begun pre- 
parations to evacuate the town by moving their supplies 
and artillery further to the rear, so that when the fortress 
of Erzerum surrendered to General Yudenitch, on the 
16th of January, comparatively little except the fortress 
itself fell into Russian hands. 

At the time it occurred, the fall of Erzerum was 
looked upon by the Allies as an event of first rate mil- 
itary importance and they expected that its capture 
would be the means of speedily putting them into pos- 
session of all Asiatic Turkey as far to the westward as 
Sivas and Aleppo, as well as insure the ultimate success 
of the British movement up the Tigris. But fate, which 
has in this war played the Allies many tricks, once more 
disappointed them. 

^ These expectations of the Allies were somewhat jus- 
tified by the strategic importance of Erzerum which 
dominates the main highway from the Black Sea into 
eastern Asia Minor, and is also on the center of the trade 
route from the Black Sea port of Trebizond into Persia. 
For many years the Russians have greatly desired to 
be the possessors of this fortress as it would be an im- 
portant step forward in their real design which was the 
possession of Armenia as a whole. It may be observed 
here that all of the fighting, wherein the Russian right 



wing and center had participated in this invasion of 
Asia Minor, has taken place in Armenia, and that to 
a very large extent the Russians have been able to profit 
by the active aid of the inhabitants of this district, who, 
as is well known, are in a state of chronic rebellion against 
the control of the Turkish government. 

Russia has been in possession of the fortress twice in 
its history, once in 1829 when, after its captm*e by Gen- 
eral Paskovitch, the Treaty of Adrianople restored its 
possession to the Turks; again in 1877 when the Russians, 
under the leadership of the Grand Duke Michael, had 
siu*rounded Erzerum but bad not captiu*ed it, when the 
armistice in 1878 put an end to its siege, though the town 
was siu*rendered on the condition that hostilities should 
cease. Subsequently another treaty, that of Berlin, 
retiu*ned Erzerum to the Turks. 



Simultaneously with this Russian attack on the 
Turkish center which culminated in the capture of 
Erzerum, the Grand Duke directed attacks on both the 
Turkish left and right wings, with the effect that the 
Turks holding the passes southwest and southeast of 
Lake Tortum were driven completely out of their posi- 
tions and driven down towards the Doumen Dagh pla- 
teau, 16 miles from Erzerum. The Turkish retreat was 
rather disorderly, owing to the energetic pursuit by 
Russian cavalry, but the bulk of the forces managed to 
get through to Erzerum, before its fall, and joined the 
main body of their army. On the Turkish right an 
attack was launched from Melashkerd, which moved 
to the west on the town of Kryskali. Here a hard 
battle took place, lasting four or five days, which ended 
in the capture of the town by the Russians; the Turks 
retreating in an easterly direction towards Mush, a 
rather important place situated near the eastern Eu- 
phrates, northwest of Bitlis. 

After the capture of Erzerum itself a movement was 
launched to the northwest against Trebizond, in two 
columns, one which followed the direct road between the 
two places and the other which was to advance on 
Trebizond by way of Rizeh, and capture a Turkish 
army which had retreated from Erzerum in the direc- 
tion of Trebizond, by way of the Chorokh River. These 
two columns had to pass through very diflBcult country, 
a tangled maze of mountains, and their progress was in 
consequence very slow, as they were greatly impeded 
by heavy snow in their march through this tangled 

The column which went by the direct road at the 
end of February had only reached Ashkala, not half way 
between the two places, while the column proceeding by 
Rizeh, after great difficulties arrived at the banks of 
the Chorokh River at Isbir on the 26th of February, but 
here it found its further progress towards Rizeh held up 



by the Turks who had fortified the lower reaches of the 
Tchanassdeg Pass which crosses these mountains here 
at a height of 10,485 feet above the sea level, and which, 
in addition to the opposition of the Turks, was covered 
with snow to so great a depth that the Russians were 
unable to manoeuvre their artillery. The resulting 
deadlock was continued for a long time. 

At the same time that these columns were launched 
towards Trebizond, a third column was launched to- 
wards Erzindjan, to the southeast of Erzerum. This 
column also had to advance through a country whose 
very topography rendered it extremely difficult for troops 
to march through, particularly at this season of the year, 
and to these natural difficulties was added more or less 
opposition by the Turks who had by this time somewhat 
rallied, and showed every disposition to dispute the 
path of the Russian invaders. 

On the first of March this column had reached a point 
between Erzerum and Mannahatoun, the half-way town 
as regards Erzindjan, only about forty miles from their 
departure point. 

Turning now to the Russian armies which had been 
attacking the Turkish right, and which, as has been said, 
had captured Kryskali, this army advanced therefrom 
and captured Mush on February 18th, after a not very 
determined battle. The Russian forces then turned to 
the southeast, and twelve days later, on the night of the 
second of March, stormed and captured Bitlis. This 
town *is an important strategic point on account of its 
position on the main highroad from Erzerum to Bagdad, 
besides which it commands the approaches to the Tach- 
tale Pass from the south; this Pass being on the extreme 
eastern spurs of the Taurus range of mountains which 
end abruptly on the shores of Lake Van. From Bitlis to 
the nearest point on the Tigris River is approximately 
fifty miles; and Niesivin, the present western terminal 
of the Bagdad railway, is 120 miles away. Mosul, 
the most important city of central Asia Minor, except 
Bagdad, on the Tigris is, as the crow flies, 150 miles 
from this place. 

To the lasting disgrace of the Russian armies, that 
portion of the garrison of Bitlis which was captured 
with the town was put to the sword. 

The expectation of the Russians was that they would 
be able from Bitlis to strike southeast and south against 
Mosul and Niesevin respectively, and thus not only 



capture the terminal of the Bagdad railway and cut the 
main line of Turkish communication between Bagdad 
and Constantinople, but also to get behind the Turkish 
army operating on the Tigris River in the defense of 
Bagdad, and presumably to advance south from Mosul 
along the Tigris and join the English force at Bagdad. 
But as we shall see in our subsequent account of this 
phase of the Caucasian campaign, in our next volume, 
the old proverb that "there is many a slip Hwixt the 
cup and the lip" very often proves true. 

While these events were taking place in this portion 
of the Caucasian front, many events of interest were 
happening in eastern Persia. Prince Henry of Reuss, 
in the early part of the war had endeavored to bring 
about a coup d'etat in Teheran, the capital of Persia, 
whereby Persia would, as a nation, join the Turks and 
their Allies, the Central Powers; but in November 1915, 
this cowp d'etat failed and Russian troops advanced from 
Tabriz southwardly, whereupon Prince Henry divided 
his forces into two portions and sent one to Kum and the 
other to Hammadan. The Russian troops entered 
Teheran after making a virtual prisoner of the Shah of 
Persia, forcing him to compel Persia to become an ally 
of Russia. The Russians treated Teheran in much the 
same fashion as they did Tabriz some years before, and 
many of the most important men in Persia were hanged 
or otherwise done to death in the usual humane manner 
of the Russian Cossack. 

After Teheran was purged of its agitators, the Russian 
troops moved south and occupied Hammadan on Decem- 
ber 15, and Kum on the 21st, and made these two places 
the bases from which they directed their efforts to sup- 
press what the Russians called a rebellion against the 
legitimate authority of the Shah. Prince Henry and 
his forces retreated to Kermanshah whence a Turkish 
force which had been concentrated at Khanikin ad- 
vanced to his assistance and entered Kermanshah on the 
14th of January. The Russian commander at Hamma- 
dan, while these things were going on, had sent a strong 
force of Russian troops to seize Kaghdan which this force 
occupied on the 15th of January, but on the 16th of 
January the Turkish regular forces attacked the town, 
and, after soundly drubbing the Russians, expelled them 
and drove them a considerable distance to the north, 
and following up this success, advanced towards Ham- 
madan and succeeded in driving back the Russians to a 



considerable distance to the north of Mokshovend, in- 
flicting very considerable losses upon them during this 

The fighting continued in this region, that is to say, 
between Kaghdan and Burujird until after the first of 
Marjch, the Turks having the better of it. 

Kermanshah, which is a town of 30,000 inhabitants, 
is located 150 miles to the north of Bagdad, and became 
the base of the Turkish defense against a Russian at- 
tempt on Bagdad from this direction; but in the middle 
of February General Baratofif advanced with a large 
army on the road to this place and succeeded in defeating 
the Turks in the Bidesurkh and Sakhne Passes, through 
which the road to the town lies, in a two days' battle. 
After this defeat, the Turks fell back on Kermanshah 
itself, but the place was taken by storm on the 26th of 
February and here again we have to chronicle the same 
disgraceful act on the part of the Russian General that 
we had in the case of Bitlis and the Turkish garrison and 
their Persian allies were put to the sword. This was the 
limit of the Russian advance in central Persia up to the 
first of March. 

We have heard much of the cruelty of the various 
belligerent troops in various other spheres of war, but 
it is extremely doubtful whether those cruelties and those 
atrocities ever attained one-tenth part of those which 
characterized the advance of the Russians in eastern 
Armenia and eastern and central Persia. Certainly in 
no other field of action have surrendered garrisons been 
taken out and slaughtered in cold blood as was the fact 
in this campaign in the case of the two garrisons above 
spoken of. It is to be hoped that when a general settle- 
ment is had at the conclusion of the war that the fate of 
these Turkish troops will not be forgotten and that in 
reparation for this deliberate and malicious violation of 
the rules of war will have a fitting reparation exacted for it. 
The fame of the Cossack has been the same for many 
generations. It used to be in France, for years, after 
the second capture of Paris that naughty children were 
frightened into obedience by the threat of an approach- 
ing Cossack, who represented to the French of that time 
not a human being but a cold-blooded executioner. 
The hundred years which have elapsed do not seem to 
have changed the character of those savages, as has been 
shown in this war, not only in Turkey and Persia but in 
Galicia and eastern Prussia. 




In order to completely cripple Turkey, the Allies 
planned in 1915 a joint campaign against her which 
would culminate, they hoped, eventually in the capture 
of Mosul and Bagdad and the control of the Tigris and 
Euphrates Rivers, which flow southeast of that famous 
city into the Persian Gulf; thus cutting ofif her communi- 
cation with the east, as well as rendering themselves 
masters of the whole of Mesopotamia, Mosul, Diarbekr 
and Armenia. To the west of Bagdad the control of 
the so-called Bagdad railroad would have also been seized. 
The effect of such a campaign the Allies expected to be a 
practical paralysis of Turkey, both in recruiting her 
armies and in her supply of food and metals used in war, 
in that it would completely interrupt communication 
between the east and west of the Empire. 

In order to accomplish these two results, the Allies 
planned a simultaneous invasion of Turkey from the 
Russian Caucasus between the Black Sea and the Caspian 
through Armenia as far as Sivas, which would necessarily 
include the control of the Black Sea coast as well. This 
invasion was to be undertaken by the Russians. Sim- 
ultaneously with this Russian invasion another in- 
vasion by the British was to be undertaken starting from 
Basra, the seat of that local Sultan whom England, in 
order to cripple the projected railroad from Bagdad 
through to the Persian Gulf, in whose dominion the 
terminal of such railroad to the Persian Gulf would have 
been situated, had effected an alliance with the Sultan 
some years before and had, by granting him a yearly 
allowance, rendered him fully subservient to their wishes. 
This invasion was to move northwestwardly, having as 
its primary objective Bagdad, and as a secondary ob- 
jective the obtaining of control of such completed sec- 
tions of the Bagdad railroad as was possible. 

Had these joint invasions moved with proper cor- 



relation, and had they attained anything like the measure 
of success which the Allies expected, Turkey would 
have been hit a body blow and would no longer have 
been able to play a very great role in the war. This 
strategic conception was good, but as usual, in the exe- 
cution of their plan the Allies made blunder after blunder. 

The British movement to the northwest from the 
Persian gulf started too soon, and the Russian move- 
ment from the Caucasus started too late, with the result 
that the Tiu-ks by defeating the British, as will hereafter 
be seen, before the Russians were in a position to aid 
them, frustrated the whole plan. 

Having explained the strategic plan of the Allies, 
we will now proceed to cast a glance on the manner of its 
execution; taking up first the advance of the English 
northwest of the Persian Gulf. 

The General Staff of India had charge of this invasion 
and troops were sent to the base previously selected 
which base was established on Bubian Island, a little 
to the west of the point where the mingling streams of 
the Euphrates and Tigris flow into the Persian Gulf. In 
number this force sometimes is computed at from 100,000 
to 125,000 Indian troops, who were joined at the base by 
a comparatively small force of British not exceeding 
perhaps 10,000 to 12,000 in number. General Sir John 
Nixon was the Commander-in-chief of the expedition. 

Steamers suitable for the navigation of the Tigris River 
were provided, and finally, when all was in order, an ad- 
vance was made up the stream of the Tigris. At the 
start, and until Basra was reached, there was but little 
opposition to this movement. From Basra northward, 
however, the Turks made such opposition as they could, 
but as they were not provided with river gunboats, or 
other means of defense against the improvised war- 
ships which the British had put upon the Tigris, 
they could do but very little, and the British forces 
advanced steadily forward though not particularly 
rapidly. Kale Sale, Amara, Kumail and Elata were the 
scenes of some fighting which terminated regularly in 
favor of the British, but there was no really serious at- 
tempt to oppose their advance until September 27th, 
when the advance division of the British forces, num- 
bering about 30,000 under General Townshend arrived at 
a point seven miles below the town of Kut el Amara, 
where the Turks were found to be occupying a strongly 
intrenched position on both sides of the river Tigris. 



This Turkish force was commanded by Nair-el-Din 
Pasha and consisted of from 7,000 to 8,000 regular 
troops, and in a large number of irregulars. General 
Townshend attacked both from the river and from the 
banks on each side, on September 28th; the fight con- 
tinued all day, but that night the Tiu-ks gave way 
leaving about 1,600 prisoners and much material in 
General Townshend's hands and the British resumed 
their advance. 

This Tm-kish position was a very strong one as is 
shown by the following description: 

*'The Turks constructed twelve miles of defences 
across the river at right angles to its general direction 
at this point, six miles on the right bank and six miles 
on the left. The works on the right bank were streng- 
thened by the existence of an old water-cut. The banks 
of this, ten to twenty feet high, towered above the rest 
of the flat country and afforded excellent facilities for 
viewing the deployment of troops advancing to the at- 
tack. A strong redoubt on the extreme right opposed 
a flank attack from that direction. On the left bank the- 
line of defences was cut in two by an impassable marsh 
two miles broad, so that from the left bank of the river 
there were first two miles of trenches, then two miles of 
marsh, and then again two more miles of defences.. 
Much labor had been expended on these defences, each 
section consisting of many successive lines of trenches,.. 
connected by an intricate net-work of deep communi- 
cation trenches, along which a complete system of water- 
supply pipes had been laid. Everything pointed to the.- 
Turkish intention to hold the position permanently." 

After being expelled from this position the Turkish 
regular troops continued to oppose the advancing British 
and were aided by irregular troops raised among the 
Arabs and tribesmen of the vicinity, who contested 
every foot of the way bitterly, and who, while suffering 
heavily themselves, inflicted extremely heavy casualties 
upon the British. Nevertheless, the British continued 
to advance and though it took them the whole of the 
month of October, and more than half of the month of 
November, they finally, on November 20th, reached 
Ctesiphon, 18 miles from Bagdad. 

At this place a great battle took place between the 
Turkish army and General Townshend's forces. The 
original British account represented the result of this 
battle as a complete British victory, but the later 



accounts do not bear this statement out in the least, 
nor do general Townshend's subsequent movements. 

On the 21st of November General Townshend at- 
tacked and captiu-ed the Turkish advanced position, 
using in this fight his entire force of 25,000 men, and took 
all told some 1,600 Turkish prisoners. The night of the 
21st the British bivouacked on that day's battlefield. 
The following day the main body of the Turkish forces 
came up and attacked General Townshend forthwith. 
The battle continued all that day and the next, and 
General Townshend managed to hold his ground till the 
morning of the 24th, when having lost fully half his force, 
he began to retreat in the direction of Kut el Amara, 80 
miles in his rear, abandoning much of his baggage. 

The Turks followed up the retreating British and 
forced them to fight almost continuous rear guard ac- 
tions, in some of which, particularly in one fought in the 
night of November 30th, the British suffered rather 
heavily. Finally on December 3rd General Townshend 
reached Kut el Amara, the scene of his victory in Sep- 
tember. The British, not unnatiu-ally, felt extremely 
disappointed over this misfortune, as this movement 
against Bagdad was the only purely British operation 
during the war which had been, even for a time, uni- 
formly successful, and which made fair to crown its 
achievements by the capture of Bagdad, its objective. 

Had Bagdad been captured, it would have had an 
enormous eJBfect upon the opinion of the Mohammedan 
world, not only of Turkey-in-Asia, the sphere of action, 
but also of that of Afghanistan, Persia, Egypt and India. 
Besides which this capture would have been of the great- 
est importance from a purely military standpoint. The 
retreat, however, changed these prospects, into consid- 
erable loss of prestige as regards the Faithful of Islam, 
and therefore has had a considerable influence on the 
course of events thereafter to the eastward in Asia Minor. 
Bagdad is also important as being on the highroad to 
Persia and India. At the same time, the defeat cannot 
be considered a disgrace to the forces that suffered it; 
since the difficulties which confronted the British forces 
in this advance from the Persian Gulf along the Tigris 
were stupendous and it is really marvelous that they 
managed to penetrate so far into the very difficult and 
inhospitable country through which their route of ad- 
vance necessarily lay. The casualties suffered by the 
British in this campaign at Ctesiphon (the supposed site 



of the ancient Babylon) and the subsequent retreat were 
very heavy in proportion to their total strength, certainly 
attaining the large figure of fifty per cent, and perhaps 
an even greater percentage. 

On December 3rd when his entire force reached Kut- 
el-Amara, General Townshend's total strength was in 
the neighborhood of 12,000 men. Hardly had General 
Townshend and his tired troops reached Kut el Amara, 
when the pursuing Turks surrounded that town. Kut- 
el-Amara is a rather miserable town of fair size, well sit- 
uated, in a loop of the Tigris, surrounded on three sides by 
that river, to withstand a siege. The fourth side is 
defended by a series of forts, which had been to some 
extent modernized by the Turks to withstand the British 
original advance. These forts General Townshend im- 
mediately strengthened to such degree as possible for 
him to do and it was well he did so, for on the 8th of 
December the Turks having in the meantime brought 
down artillery from Bagdad, began to bombard the 
town. This bombardment continued for four days, 
December 8, 9, 10 and 11, and in the afternoon of Decem- 
ber 11th began an infantry assault of the place. But 
this, after a day's hard fighting, the British succeeded 
in beating off. 

A lull in the fighting for some days, and for about a 
couple of weeks there were no incidents. Then the Turks 
perceiving that it would be impossible for them to reduce 
the place with the artillery they had at their disposal, 
resolved to storm it, and on the 24th of December began 
an attack which lasted for three days. 

In the course of this attack the Turks succeeded in 
capturing some of the outer forts of the place but were 
not able to hold them against the British counter-attacks. 
The fighting, for these three days, was extremely fierce, 
according to such accounts as have reached us, and the 
casualties on each side are placed at very considerable 
figures, but as there is no certainty in relation to these 
figures they will not be given here. Suffice it to say, that 
in spite of their most valiant efforts, the Turks were 
unable to force an entry into the town and consequently 
resumed their former plan of endeavoring to reduce the 
city by siege, in other words, by famine. 

A siege in form of Kut-el-Amara then began and con- 
tinued with the usual incidents of such an operation for 
the next few months. 

As soon as the news of General Townshend's defeat 



and his subsequent predicament reached the British 
military authorities, immediate preparations began to 
despatch the main body of the British forces, to the 
south of Kut-el-Amara, on the Tigris, to his relief. 
General Aylmer was placed in command of this army, 
which started from Aligherbi on January 6th, and on the 
night of the 7th came in touch with the Turks, who 
were in position on both sides of the Tigris two or three 
miles below Sheikh Saad. The Turkish force was com- 
posed of three Divisions, and was under the command of 
Nair-el-Din. A battle took place on the 8th, resulting 
in the retreat of the Turks to Orah, 25 miles down river 
from Kut, heavy rain preventing pursuit by the victori- 
ous troops. 

General Aylmer halted on the 10th at Sheikh Saad, 
partly on account of the weather, partly also to get his 
wounded away. The Turks had meanwhile fallen back 
to the Essin position, from which General Townshend 
had driven them last September. Finding that General 
Aylmer was not coming after him, Nair-el-Din went for- 
ward again to Orah, where he took up what is described 
as the ''Wadi position." There he was attacked by 
General Aylmer on the 13th and driven back to his en- 
trenchments at Essin, six miles down the river from Kut, 
but owing to the continuance of bad weather, which lasted 
till the 18th, there was again no pursuit. 

The Turkish army then took up a very strong defen- 
sive position on the north bank of the Tigris, with its 
left wijig resting on an impenetrable swamp called 
Durvekie, and his right wing on the river bank. This 
position was 23 miles from Kut. General Aylmer for 
some days was unable to attack, owing to a heavy rain 
which soaked the ground to a great depth and made 
military movements difficult if not impossible. During 
this time General Sir John Nixon resigned his command 
on January 16th and General Sir Percy Lake who suc- 
ceeded him did not reach General Aylmer until _ Jan- 
uary 26 th. 

On January 21st the rain having partly held up Gen- 
eral Aylmer assaulted the Turkish position above 
described at Unnu-el-Henna, under conditions which 
were favorable to the Turks, since their flanks were se- 
cured from being turned, which necessitated a frontal 
attack by their enemies who were forced to advance to 
that attack over a flat plain, totally destitute of cover 
of any description. Ordinarily such an attack would 



have had no chance of being successful unless preceded 
by a strong artillery bombardment of the position to be 
attacked, and this rule held good in the present case. 
General Aylmer has since asserted that the reason which 
impelled him to attack without first bombarding the 
Turkish trenches was the urgency in delivering General 
Townshend from his critical position at Kut-el-Amara. 

This excuse hardly seems a good one, since as subse- 
quent events proved General Townshend was able to 
maintain himself at Kut for a much longer time than 
would have been necessary for General Aylmer to have 
had a sufficient force of artillery brought up the river to 
him. On the whole it looks as though General Aylmer 
adopted the old English idea of "mulling through some- 
how.'* But this idea has rarely succeeded in the present 
war, and this battle was not one of such occasions. 
General Aylmer's forces gallantly charged the Turkish 
positions and were very badly cut to pieces as a result. 
The British losses were extremely heavy, 4,000 killed, 
and perhaps twelve to fifteen thousand wounded, and 
the Turks remained completely masters of the field. 
So completely masters indeed that the next day General 
Aylmer was obliged to ask for an armistice to bury his 
dead, which was granted. After this battle the British 
sent for reinforcements, and sat down to wait for their 
arrival, before making any further serious attempts 
to advance to General Townshend's relief. On Feb- 
ruary 4th there was a skirmish of some magnitude, and 
on February 11th an attempt to push forward to better 
positions by the British on the right bank of the Tigris, 
this attempt was however beaten back by the Turks. 

General Townshend in the meantime made no at- 
tempt, though only 23 miles distant, to abandon his 
position in Kut, and cut his way through to General 
Aylmer. The reason for this was that it was not the 
intention of the British to abandon the Kut position 
which is a very strong one strategically, situated as it is 
at the point where the Shatt-el-Hai, connects the Tigris 
with the Euphrates at Nasiriyeh. According to the 
British generals the possession ot this town by the Turks 
would enable them to use the Shatt-el-Hai as a route 
for reaching the Euphrates and turning the flank of the 
British main position at Kuma. 

The British held Nasiriyeh and early in February 
Sir Percy Lake sent General Brookings up the Shatt-el- 
Hai to see if that river was clear. General Brookings 



advanced a considerable distance up the stream and 
found no signs of Turkish troops. On his return, how- 
ever, he was suddenly attacked on February 7th by the 
Arabs and lost 400 men, besides being compelled to 
retreat hastily. Later on a punitive expedition was 
sent against these Arabs. This was the last fighting in 
this campaign in the period we are dealing with. 

In the meantime the Turks continued to hold General 
Townshend closely surrounded, and bombarded the town 
from time to time, but the provisions and supplies, as well 
as the ammunition of the British forces in Kut held out 
and they were able to repel successfully the assaults 
upon the town. On the 15th of February the British 
war office took full charge of this campaign from the 
India office; when the first of March arrived the sit- 
uation remained unchanged; Townshend. was sur- 
rounded in Kut, 23 miles below was Aylmer waiting for 
re-inforcements, and between him and Townshend was 
a strong well placed Turkish army. 




The situation in Africa at the beginning of the period 
under consideration was as follows. The Allies had 
completely conquered German southwest Africa, where 
resistance to their forces had ceased. In British South 
Africa the rebellion had been absolutely suppressed. 
In the Cameroons, however, fighting was still going on 
as it was in German East Africa. 



The campaign against this German colony can now 
be sketched with some degree of accuracy from the 
beginning, a thing impossible to do heretofore on account 
of the conflicting reports received therefrom. Lieu- 
tenant Colonel P. Maclean in command of a British 
column, began an invasion from the north, starting from 
Yola in Nigeria a few days after the declaration of war 
with the object of capturing Garcia, the northern capital 
of the Cameroons by surprise. The column reached 
Garna on August 29th, 1914, but the element of surprise 
lacked, as it found the Germans prepared for it. One 
of the forts defending the town was captured but Col. 
Maclean was unable to hold this fort, and the German 
attacks on his forces becoming too strong, was obliged 
to retreat completely, and to recross the frontier losing 
heavily on the way, among the killed being Colonel 
Maclean himself. Another column started at about 
the same time from Ikon on the river Cross, about one 
hundred miles northeast from the coast with the object 
of capturing Usanakang some few miles south of the 
northern frontier of the Cameroons. At first this force 
was successful and Usanakang was occupied on August 
29th, but only held, for a week for on September 6th it 
was surprised by the Germans, the town recaptured and 
the British driven back across the frontier. Still another 
British force crossed the frontier from Calabar, also on 
the river Cross but nearer the coast, and advanced 
against the coast town of Rio-del-Rey, where its further 
progress south was stopped. These reverses stimulated 
the British to greater preparations, and under Major 
General Dobell, a force of about 10,000 men was made 
ready at Lagos, and embarked- on transports. In 
September these transports escorted by the warships 
Cumberland and Dwarf, appeared ofif the principal port 
of the colony Duala, near the mouth of the Sanaga river. 



Summoned to surrender, the town refused to, and was 
bombarded, but after standing this bombardment for 
four days, did surrender on September 26th, when the 
expeditionary force was disembarked. ' From Duala one 
railway runs northeast to Bare, and another almost 
directly east to Sende, passing through Edea. The 
expeditionary force was composed of French and British 
troops, the French predominating, and after landing the 
British contingent followed the line of the iBrst mentioned 
railway, the French the second. 

Jabissa was captured by the British on October 14th, 
Bura on November 15 and Bare on December 15th, the 
German forces falling back towards Joko, to the east, 
almost in the center of the colony. The French moving 
eastward along the line of the railroad to Edea, captured 
that place on October 6th, After these captures, opera- 
tions on this west front moved very slowly and it was 
not till nearly a year later that the British under Gen- 
eral Dobell turned south from Bare and reached the 
Puge river to the east of Edea, while further south the 
French occupied Makondo. During this time another 
French column, in which were Belgian troops from the 
Congo, advanced from Wesso, at the southeastern 
corner of the colony of the Cameroons, and marching 
500 miles northwest reached Sende, the eastern terminal 
of the Duala-Edea-Sende railroad. The effect of the 
taking of Sende was to place the possession of all the 
railways of the colony in the hands of the Anglo-French 

All these advances were bitterly contested by the 
German forces, constant and severe fighting taking place, 
with the Allied troops suffering severe losses, which, 
however, as they were in a position to receive reinforce- 
ments from time to time, did not halt their forward 

After the capture of Edea, the Germans had removed 
the capital of the colony to Jarmde, to the south of the 
Sanaga river, in a comparatively elevated area, and to 
Jarmde the Germans retreated after the capture of Sende 
on October 24th, 1915, from which place it is forty-five 
miles distant. To traverse these forty-five miles, how- 
ever, took the Anglo-French forces over two months, so 
strenuous was the German defense, although the Ger- 
man forces had been cut off for over a year from any 
possibility of receiving supplies and munitions of war 
from the outside world. 



Finally, however, on January 1st, 1916, the Anglo- 
British forces entered Jarmde, and the Germans re- 
treated to the south in the direction of Spanish Guinea, 
but still unbroken. The Allies then moved to the south- 
ward and ultimately the German forces crossed the 
frontiers into Spanish Guinea, where they were interned. 
While these events were taking place on the western 
front, the British were avenging their early defeat on 
the northeastern front. 

Another force under General Cunliffe was organized 
at Yola, composed of British and French troops. This 
force at the end of November, 1914, started eastwardly 
from Yola towards Garna with the intention of cap- 
turing that place. The German defense in this field was 
so strong that it was not till in the late spring that 
General Cunliffe was able to reach and surround Garna, 
which then stood a two months' siege, not surrendering 
till June 11th, 1915. This capture was followed up by 
General Cunlifife by the taking of Ngaundere further 
south on June 29th. 

From Garna, the two main roads through the colony 
westward to the seaboard start; one, the northerly, 
running through Banjo to Bari, and thence by railroad 
to Duala, while the other, the southerly, runs through 
Ngaundere, Tibati, to Edea, and thence by rail to Duala. 

The British began a movement westwardly along the 
northerly road soon after the captiu-e of Gama, but it 
was not until October 24, 1915, that they were able to 
enter Banjo, about half way to the sea. The French, 
after the capture of Ngaundere, moved westerly along 
the southerly road and on November 11th, after nearly 
a half year's fighting entered Tibati. 

The Germans retreating before the advance of these two 
columns fell back on Joko, a place in the moimtainous 
region of the colony directly south of Banjo and south- 
west of Tibati, where in spite of all efforts of the British 
and French to dislodge them, t^ ey maintained the very 
unequal struggle for some time longer. 



As a result of his comparative failure to conquer 
German East Africa, the British government decided 
on a change of commanders, and General Smith-Dorrien 
was recalled, after some months of hesitation, owing 
to the difficulty of iBnding someone with whom to replace 

Officially, General Smith-Dorrien was said to have been 
invalided home, but actually he was removed. General 
Smuts, one of the most distinguished Boer generals in 
the South African war, was appointed to succeed him, 
but did not begin offensive operations until the middle 
of February 1916. 

In the fifteen months which had elapsed since the 
British defeat at Tanga in the autumn of 1914, the 
British forces in German East Africa had merely stood 
on the defensive, and had not attempted any forward 
movements. During all this time German East Africa 
may be said to have been quiet, though from time to 
time the Germans attempted to raid the Nganda rail- 
road, but unsuccessfully, as the British forces under 
General Tighe, who had come from India to take the 
interim command, were strong enough to repel these 

After inspecting the scene of his future labors, General- 
Smuts adopted a plan of campaign and determined on 
launching an offensive from Mombasa along the line 
of Voi-Taveta railway, and to this end a concentration 
of British troops in Mombasa began about the first 
of December 1915. But owing to the vast distances 
from which the troops composing this force were drawn, 
some from England itself, some from India, and some, 
the larger portion, from South Africa, it was not imfcil 
the middle of February 1916 that the force was ready 
to move. 

The German commanders had, however, perceived 



General Smuts' plan of campaign and had made such 
disposition of their forces as they deemed would be 
best suited to oppose the British advance. Altogether 
the German force comprised about 20,000 men, of which 
the great bulk were natives. These took up a strong 
position in the Kitovo hills in the Kilimanjaro district 
and prepared to dispute the march of Smuts' forces. 
The position selected was naturally a rather strong 
one, on the top of a ridge of hills with abrupt slopes, 
up which slopes General Smuts' troops had to make their 
way through the very dense pathless woods with which 
these slopes were clothed. 

General Smuts' total strength was about 70,000, of 
which 20,000 were white troops, and his army was 
better supplied with artillery, particularly light artillery 
and machine guns, than were the Germans. 

On March 7th, General Smuts seized the fords on the 
Lumi river as the opening move in his oflFensive, and 
these once securely in hand, threw forward General 
Van de Venter to capture Taveta, which was done on 
March 9th, General Smuts then rapidly advanced his 
entire army and with the bulk of it made a frontal 
attack on the Germans in the Kitovo position. At 
the same time, General Smuts sent a large force of 
cavalry from Longido around the north side of Mount 
Kilimanjaro to outflank the German position and to 
cut off their retreat. 

The frontal battle was bitterly contested and lasted 
until late in the night, when the Germans learning of the 
movement of General Stewart's force on their flank, 
and fearing to be surrounded, fell back on Kahe, whence 
they retreated still further to positions on the Rufu 
river in good order. The effect of this retreat was, 
however, to throw open the whole of the Arusha district 
to the invaders. General Smuts detached General 
Van de Venter to occupy this district which he did, 
capturing Moshi on March 13th, and Arusha itself on 
March 20th, and Lolkissale a few days later, at which 
latest place he captured the entire German force in this 
region, numbering some 500 rifles. 

Meanwhile, General Smuts with the main army, 
followed up the Germans who were retreating south- 
ward, and on March 21st attacked them on the Rufu 
river and after a stubborn fight, drove them out of 
their positions and forced them to begin another retreat. 

In both these fights at Kitovo and on the Rufu river 



the native German troops showed great steadiness, 
almost equal to white troops, and had they been on 
anything like even terms with the British, the latter 
would not have won such easy victories. The quality 
of the German command was also good, and great in- 
genuity was repeatedly shown in the extrication of the 
German forces from the danger of being surrounded. 
The British were particularly anxious to conquer 
German East Africa quickly and easily because German 
East Africa in German hands makes their dream of a 
Cape to Cairo railroad running wholly through British 
territory an impossibility. 




The activity in the air during the period of time we 
have under consideration increased rather than dimin- 
ished, but before we take up the accounts of the activ- 
ities on the Continent of Europe, we will first cast a 
glance at the zeppelin raids on Great Britain during the 
period in question. These raids were carried on on a 
considerable scale during this period, though with what 
real results we do not know with any certainty since the 
accounts furnished from the opposing sides differ very 
materially. The reasons why these discrepancies exist 
are several: in the first place we may mention the natural 
tendency of one side to hide all the results accomplished 
by the enemy. Furthermore, as the zeppelins attacked 
under cover of night, and, by preference, on moonlight 
nights, land-marks are elusive and navigation difficult. 
Hence errors are inevitable, and a commander of a 
zeppelin may quite consistently assert that he dropped 
bombs on a town near which he never was, and do so 
in good faith. 

The first of these raids in the period under considera- 
tion took place on September 7th, when the eastern 
counties were visited by two aeroplanes; bombs were 
dropped and some damage was done. London itself 
was raided the same evening between ten and eleven 
o'clock; the outlying districts being the point of attack. 

The next evening a serious and concerted raid was 
made on the very heart of London; in spite of the British 
denial, there is reason to believe that the damage ac- 
complished was very serious, as well as in some degree 
important. The casualties on this occasion were the 
largest up to date, and some of them were very curious. 
As for instance, one bomb exploded near a passing 
motor bus in which were twenty people; nine of these were 
killed and eleven injured. The zeppeUn making the 
attack was the object of unusually hot fire by the air 
guns and their defenses against these raiders. This 



Zeppelin was also attacked by four aeroplanes, but 
escaped unscathed. 

\ One result of this raid was to raise a storm of protest 
against what was felt to be the very inadequate defenses 
against this form of attack which the government had 
seen fit to provide for London. Anti air-craft guns were 
utterly unable to attain the height at which the zeppelin 
flew, which gave rise to much comment. The govern- 
ment shortly afterwards appointed Admiral Sir John 
Percy Scott to take charge of the gunnery for the aerial 
defense of London. 

On the 11th of September a zeppelin flew over the 
east coast, and on the 12th there was another raid on 
the east coast, as well as on the 13th. None of these, 
apparently, accomplished very great results, though 
there were several casualties in each. 

On October 13th, at about half past nine in the evening, 
another attack was made on the center of London, and 
the same evening parts of the eastern counties were 
attacked as well. In London a great deal of damage 
was done; and even some military, as the British reports 
admit by inference when they state that **no serious 
damage was caused to military material.'' Admiral 
Scott's air-craft defenses were tried out but did not 
prove equal to the task of bringing down the assailants. 
An attempted attack by aeroplanes on these assailants 
failed because the aeroplanes were unable to locate the 
sair-hips. Perhaps, however, it would have failed in 
any event. In London the casualties amounted to 32 
killed and 95 injured; while in the eastern coimties 24 
were killed and 18 wounded. The bombs used in this 
action were the most powerful which the zeppelins had 
yet employed. 

Agitation again began for better defenses against these 
aerial visitors, and the government was accused of poorly 
organizing the defense. 

After this, for some three months, there was no further 
activity on the part of the zeppelins, it is supposed that 
this quietness was c: used by the fact that the weather 
wr s so strong as to be unsuitable for them to cross the 
North Sea. 

On January 23rd, 1916, the raids began again. Dover 
was visited that night, as it was also later on the day 
following. It is noticeable, however, that these raids 
were made by aeroplanes and not by zeppelins. 

On Monday, January 31st, a large raid was carried 



out on the east coast and the Midlands. The raiders 
on this occasion stayed longer over England than they 
had at any previous raid, some of them being over the 
island for twelve hours. The zeppelins entered through 
Norfolk and across from Lincolnshire to Derbvshire 
and Staffordshire. Their evident objective was Liver- 
pool; and it is presumed that they thought they had 
reached that place, instead of which they had reached a 
town in Staffordshire whose name is still unknown. 
This town was twice raided" during the night, once 
between eight and nine o'clock, and the second time 
about one o'clock in the morning. Many houses were 
destroyed and about 30 people killed, with at least fifty 
people injured. No precautions had been taken to 
protect this part of England, and the zeppelins met with 
no opposition. From Staffordshire the zeppelins then 
circled through Leicestershire and in a town in this 
county, whose name is also unknown to us, ten people 
were killed, besides many being injured. All told, in 
this raid it appears that 59 persons perished, while 101 
were injured. What material damage was done, it 
was impossible to say. The Germans reported that they 
had attacked Liverpool and Birkenhead, Nottingham 
and Sheffield, and tbe great industrial works on the 
Humber, but the fact that they reached any of these 
places was flatly denied by the British. 

The greatest apparent result of this attack was to 
rouse the British people to the urgent need of adequate 
air defense. Up to this time there had been a tendency 
to regard the matter as affecting only limited areas on 
the sea coast and around London, but the Zeppelins in 
this raid showed their power to travel far inland and far 
north, and over a country totally defenseless against 
their attack. Such measures as were thought necessary 
were then taken to cope with this peril. Another result 
was to lead to a renewal of the controversy about the 
advisability of a policy of reprisals. 

Sir Evelyn Wood, however, in a letter full of common 
sense, stated that the principles of morality forbade a 
policy of reprisals which had as a deliberat-e object the 
killing and wounding of non-combatants, maintaining 
that the killing and maiming of non-combatants was an 
incidental side of the Zeppelin raids, whose real objective 
was to inflict damage on the military defenses or the 
munition factories, etc., of the country; perfectly legiti- 
mate objects of attack. The Germans, he wrojte, would 



not willingly waste one air bomb, after having carried 
it hundreds of miles, in killing and maiming non-com- 
batants. This is, of course, the ^^ew that will be taken 
by most military men, or in fact by most statesmen, 
since where injury is inflicted upon non-combatants as 
collateral to an attack upon a legitimate object of attack, 
it is the rule that there can be no reprisals undertaken. 

The next attack of the Germans was on February 9th 
when two of their sea-planes crossed the Isle of Thanet, 
in the mouth of the Thames below London. It is to be 
noticed that this was the first raid made by sea-planes. 
This raid, however, did not apparently accomplish 
very much. 

On February 10th, 1916, one of the airships which 
took part in this raid, on its way back to Germany, 
suffered some accident and fell into the North Sea with 
its crew of twenty-two. While in this predicament a 
Grimsby steam trawler, the King Stephen, discovered 
it, came up to it and circled around it but refused to 
take ofiF the crew from the air ship, nor did the Captain 
of the trawler report the situation of these unfortunate 
men until reaching port three days afterwards, when 
a British naval vessel was sent to search for them, but 
they were never found. The skipper's excuse was 
that there were twenty-two Germans on the airship 
and he carried a crew of only nine, and that he was 
afraid to rely on the pledges offered him by the Germans. 
This is, taken all in all, one of the most discreditable 
episodes of the war to the British, since it would have 
been easily possible for the skipper of the King Stephen 
to have secured himself in a dozen different ways against 
any uprising on the part of these men had he taken them 
on his boat. It is extremely probable, however, that 
had he done so, in view of his having saved their lives, 
there would have been no trouble caused by the crew 
of this airship. 

Instead, however, of taking the chance thereof, if 
chance there was, for the sake of humanity, whereof the 
British have talked so much during the course of this 
war, this skipper deliberately steamed away. 

On Sunday, February 20th, another sea-plane raid was 
made on Loestoft and Walmer. Here only material 
damage, apparently, was done. On the same day still 
another sea-plane raid took place on the Kentish coast, 
near Walmer, and also accomplished apparently little 
real damage, nor did it inflict many casualties. 



It would perhaps be uninteresting to fill several 
pages with a catalogue of all the various air raids which 
took place during these six months, but nevertheless 
there were some, which, on account of their size or the 
importance of the towns attacked, present some features 
of interest. 

Late in September, the 22d, the Allies made a large 
raid on the city of Stuttgart, the capital of Wurttemberg. 
Some twenty machines participated in this attack and 
over a hundred bombs were dropped on the town, 
particular attention being paid to the Royal palace and 
the railway station, both of which appear to have been 
damaged to some extent. Other buildings in the city 
were also damaged, and the American consulate was 
struck. But of this, curiously enough, our American 
papers did not declaim to any extent, thus reversing 
their procedure on prior occasions of a like character. 
Several persons were killed as well. 

The next really important raid was made by the Aus- 
trians on Venice, on October 25th. This raid was on a 
smaller scale than the one on Stuttgart and was parti- 
cipated in by only about half as many machines. A 
large number of bombs were dropped, one of which fell 
on the church of Degli Scalzi; while others fell near, 
but not on, St. Mark's, doing no damage to the church. 
On the whole, this raid accomplished very little, though 
on account of the fact that Venice is such a well known 
and so unique a city and contains so many art treasures 
whose destruction or damage would be irreparable, it 
attracted both attention and criticism. 

A couple of weeks later, on November 14th, Austrian 
machines raided Verona, the Italian military head- 
quarters for northern Italy. While no military damage 
was done, and comparatively little material damage 
either, some 30 persons were killed and a considerable 



number injured. Five days later Verona was again 
raided with little result, and on the same day Vienza 
and Udine were attacked from the air by the Austrians. 
In the latter place 12 persons were killed and 27 injured, 
and considerable material and military damage done. 

By way of reprisal for recent Zeppelin raids on London, 
a large aerial fleet of the Allies made a raid on Treves, 
on the Moselle, a town containing many very interesting 
Roman remains, more than any other city north of the 
Alps. A large number of bombs were dropped but there 
was little damage done and very few casualties were 

On the 23d of January the French city of Nancy was 
severely shelled from the air by German aviators, over 
150 bombs being dropped with comparatively slight 
results. On the 24th of January the French aviators 
dropped a couple of hundred bombs on the town of 
Monastir in southern Serbia, then in possession of the 
Bulgarians, with what results, however, is uncertain. 
On this same day Lieutenant Boehme, a noted German 
aviator, who had brought down many enemy machines 
and who had distinguished himself in the defense of 
Freiburg, Baden, against all allied raids in the early part 
of the war, was killed in an air combat behind the 
German lines in the vicinity of Argonne. 

Freiburg, in Baden, was for the third time since the 
beginning of the war bombarded by an allied air fleet on 
January 28th, considerable damage being done and the 
casualty list was a large one. Two days later, in re- 
prisal for this raid, Paris was raided by the Germans 
with a large fleet of aeroplanes. Twenty-four persons 
were killed, tv^ enty-svcn were wounded and material 
damage was done to buildings, etc., in addition to the 

Many minor raids took place during the period under 
consideration, but the reports of these are so conflicting 
and the results so comparatively unimportant that any 
account of them would be wholly unsatisfactory. 

During all this time, of course, there was intense 
and untiring activity among the rival air fleets on the 
battle line itself, and each day numberless deeds of 
bravery were done, each suflSciently gallant to deserve 
a chapter or recital, but unfortunately, except in a very 
few cases, the bravery and gallantry is buried so deeply 
in a few dry official words in the daily bulletins that any 
description is impossible. 



One thing, however, may be said and said emphati- 
cally: — The aerial services of the several combatants 
displayed more of the chivalry of war in their dealings 
with each other than any of the other arms, numerous 
instances of this chivalry and what may even be called 
courtesy are well attested. The reason for this is 
perhaps that the conditions under which aerial fighting 
takes place are more like the individual combats of the 
earlier days. 

The following interesting statement on this subject 
by a British aviator is worth reading: — 'Though it 
has been repeatedly stated that chivalry does not exist 
in this war, this does not apply to the British and German 
aviation branches. Whether it is the individualism 
of our work and its novelty, or whatever it is that is 
responsible, something of the old spirit of knighthood 
maintains among the riders of the air. When a British 
aviator has to descend in the German lines whether 
from engine trouble or because his engine or his planes 
have been damaged by anti-aircraft gims' fire the next 
day the Germans report to us his name and whether he 
survived and if so whether he is wounded. We always 
do the same. It has come to be a custom." 

The reports are made in a manner worthy of airmen 
and they are the only communications that ever pass 
between the two foes which watch for heads to snipe 
at from their trenches. What is called a ''message 
bag" is dropped over the British lines by a German or 
over the German lines by a British aviator — sometimes 
when he is in the midst of bursting shells from the 
anti-aircraft gims. Long streamers are attached to 
the little cloth bag. These, as they piroutte down to 
the earth from a height of seven or eight thousand 
feet/attract the attention of soldiers in the neighborhood 
and they run out to get the prize when it lands. 

It is taken to battalion headquarters which wires 
the fact on to the aviation headquarters where the fate 
of a comrade may be known a few hours after he has 
left the home aerodrome; and, in another few hours, 
someone in England may know the fate of a relative. 

That is one of the advantages of belonging to the 
flying corps. It may be weeks before his relatives 
and comrades know whether a man who is missing after 
a trench attack or counter-attack is a prisoner or dead. 
Such little kindnesses as this don't interfere with your 
fighting your best for your cause; at the same time 



they take a little of the savagery out of war. Of course, 
the rule could not apply to prisoners taken in trench 
fighting — only to airmen. There are relatively few 
airmen on either side and only an occasional one ever 
comes down in the enemy's lines." 

The neutral countries surrounding the belligerent 
coimtries, particularly Switzerland and Holland, had 
their attention most positively drawn to the absolute 
lack of international legislation regarding the ship- 
wrecked aviators who came tumbling out of the sky in 
large numbers into their territory. 

International law and the law of various nations have 
regulated the rights of foreign men of war who are forced 
to seek a temporary refuge into a neutral port. The 
foreign warship may repair the damages it has suffered 
and it may take on board sufficient coal to sail to the 
next home port. If a German cruiser should suddenly 
arrive in a Dutch harbor she would be given coal enough 
to reach Emden, the nearest German port. A British 
ship would be sent to Harwich. All this is generally 
understood as an established rule of war. But when 
a foreign aviator, through lack of gasoline is obliged 
to land upon neutral territory he is interned for the rest ^ 
of the war. 

Apparently he does not come under the class of the 
warships, for in that case he would obtain a few cans of 
oil and would be given a chance to fly home. In the 
same way, if the flying machine were given equal rights 
with the warships, a broken machine might stay upon 
neutral ground in order to get repaired before it once 
more took to the open sky. In times to come all this 
may be regulated, but at the present time a number of 
aviators walk around in Dutch and Danish and Swiss t 
fortresses and express their opinion of a rule which 
to them seems entirely unfair. 

When an aviator lands in the sea and is picked up by 
a neutral fishing or merchant vessel he may go home 
freely. If, however, he is picked up by a torpedo boat 
of a neutral nation, that neutral nation is obliged to 
intern their involuntary guest. This rule, however, 
only holds for aviators, shipwrecked mariners seem to 
go free no matter who saved them. But the aviator 
who is fished out of his wrecked machine by an official 
vessel belonging to a neutral navy loses his liberty for 
the rest of the war, while he would be allowed to go 



home if he had waited a few minutes longer for a fishing 

A rather complicated question arises, when an aviator 
just before he is approached by a naval launch dives 
from his machine and claims his right to liberty as a 
"distressed mariner." Unfortunately a ride of several 
hours upon the choppy waves of the North Sea sitting 
on the wings of a disabled flying machine seems to 
produce a state of abject seasickness. And the aviators 
who might have availed themselves of the technical 
rights of their" case as " distressed mariners "were usually 
in such an advanced state of seasick indifference that 
they cared not what happened as long as they were 
hoisted on board something stable. 





During the period under consideration there were no 
naval battles of any size or importance. The British 
kept up their patrol of the North Sea unremittingly, 
but, as we shall see in the course of our narrative, their 
patrol was sometimes evaded. Except on the Belgian 
coast, this patrol did not include any offensive oper- 
ations during the period under consideration and was 
of a very laborious and monotonous character. The 
British fleet was considerably expanded during these 
months in order to meet the heavy calls upon it which 
this patrol necessitated. Drifters and trawlers for mine 
sweeping, armed yachts and other similar vessels for 
patrol duty, motor boats for dispatch carrying, as well 
as many vessels of new types were added. Most of 
these, it is true, were added for the purpose of com- 
batting the German submarine blockade of England 
which was growing to be more of a menace. 

On September 6th the steamer Hesperian was tor- 
pedoed off the Irish coast, and while not immediately 
sunk, went to the bottom later, which incident led to 
diplomatic action by the United States. 

On September 24th the Anglo-Canadian, a British 
horse transport was sunk off Fastnet, near the Irish 
coast, with some 900 horses on board, but whether by 
a mine or by a submarine is uncertain. 

On October 28th the British lost the cruiser Argyle, 
under the command of Captain Tancred, grounded off 
the eastern coast of Scotland and became a total wreck, 
though there was no loss of life. On November 17th 
the hospital ship Anglia struck a mine in the channel 
on her way from France to Dover, and sank with a loss 
of 80 lives. 

On the 30th of December the British lost another 
cruiser, the Natal, which blew up as a result of an 
internal explosion in some English harbor, the name of 




which we do not know. Her captain and twenty-four 
other officers, together with 380 men, were killed or 
drowned. The fate of the Natal reminds one of that 
of the Bulwark which about the same time, the year 
before, blew up imder somewhat similar circumstances. 

In the early part of the six months imder consider- 
ation there was considerable activity by the British 
submarines in the Baltic where an attack on the German 
merchant ships in that sea was begun. During October 
the British submarines averaged one victim a day 
among this class of vessels, but this soon ceased as the 
Germans declined to send forth their ships from the 
harbors and expose them to this danger. The principal 
object of this raid on German shipping was to stop 
the supply of ores and other minerals of like character 
from Scandinavia into Germany. Later on, the Ger- 
mans, through mines and other defenses, succeeded in 
keeping the British submarines out of the Baltic very 
largely. During the time of their activity, however, 
these submarines managed to sink three German warships 
the Prince Adelbert, which was sunk oflf Libau on 
October 23rd, nearly all crews going down with the ships; 
the light cruiser Undine, which was sunk oflf the south 
coast of Sweden on November 7th, with a loss of 26 
lives; and on December 17th, the light cruiser Bremen 
and a torpedo boat. 

Towards the end of 1915, the German submarines 
operating in the Mediterranean were largely reinforced 
and their activity was directed mostly to the merchant 
ships and transports of the Allies which passed up and 
down that almost inland sea. In the last three months 
of the year this traffic was greatly increased owing to the 
new expedition to Salonica. Several British transports, 
the Ranazan on September 19th, with 225 Indian troops 
being lost; the Marquette on October 26th, with 90 
lost; the Woodfield on November 2d, and the Merian 
on November 8th, with 40 lost and 50 injured, were 
sunk or damaged by these submarines, besides a very 
considerable number of commercial vessels. 

Early in November, further reinforcements to the 
submarines of the Central Powers in the Mediter- 
ranean arrived and signalized their advent by sinking 
a number of merchantmen oflf the North African coast. 
On the 7th of November, the Italian passenger liner, 
•Ancona, on a voyage from Italy to New York, was 
torpedoed and sunk, with a loss of about 300 lives. 



The sinking of the vessel gave rise to considerable 
diplomatic correspondence with the United States, owing 
to the presence of Americans on board. On the 14th, 
another Italian passenger steamer, the Bosnia, was 
also sunk. 

On December 30th the Peninsular and Oriental 
boat, the Persia, was torpedoed and sunk off Crete, 
with a loss of 250 lives, which sinking also involved the 
United States in diplomatic correspondence. 

About the same time submarines appeared on the 
western coast of Egypt and sank the armored auxiliary 
cruiser Tara, and two Egyptian gun-boats, the Prince 
Aban and Abdul MoeninintheBay of Solium on that coast. 

On December 7th the Standard Oil tank steamer 
was attacked by a submarine off the coast of Tripoli, 
near where a somewhat similar attack had been made 
on the Petrolite, another Standard Oil vessel, a few days 
before. These attacks also provoked diplomatic cor- 
respondence on the part of the United States. 

Towards the end of the land campaign at the Dar- 
danelles the British and French submarines penetrated 
into the Sea of Marmora once more and for two or three 
months were very successful in their operations, damag- 
ing a Turkish battleship, a couple of gunboats, a torpedo 
boat, three or four transports, and quite a number of 
supply ships of various kinds. Several of these sub- 
marines, at various times, entered the harbor of Con- 
stantinople itself and attacked shipping tied up to the 
quays of the city and also the Turkish powder mills at 
Zeitunlik came in for a measure of their attention. 
But this work was extremely risky and cost the French 
four submarines, the Sapphire, the Marriotte, the 
Joule, and the Turquoise, and also cost the British the 
same number, they losing the E-15, E-2, E-7, and 
E-20 during the year. 

Towards the end of 1915, the free navigation of the 
Adriatic by the Allies became of great importance, 
since the Italians were sending an army across that sea 
to Albania and the Allies at the same time were moving 
the Serbian troops and refugees southward to Corfu 
and Greece. These movements necessitated continual 
voyages between Italy to the West, and Corfu to the 
South, and the Albanian coast. The Austrians took 
advantage of this state of affairs and attacked with 
their submarine flotilla and succeeded in destroying 
a number of vessels belonging to their opponents. 



In the Black Sea, during this time, both the German 
and Russian submarines were to some extent active. 
The German submarines were particularly useful at the 
time of the bombardment of the Bulgarian fortress 
of Varna when they prevented the Russian fleet from 
closing in on the fortress defending the place. 

As has already been mentioned in the account of the 
fighting on the western line, there was considerable 
activity by the British Navy oflf the Belgian coast, 
where the German submarine bases at various points 
on that coast were attacked. In fact, the English 
detailed a fleet of eighty minor vessels under Vice- 
Admiral Bacon for these operations, and curiously 
enough, here Ericson's invention of the monitor, which 
had been discarded by the fleets of the world for several 
years, again came into use, as Admiral Bacon's fleet 
included 12 of these vessels, six bearing the names of 
distinguished soldiers, and the other six nimibers only. 
How much damage these attacks on the Belgian coast 
did to the German ports is unknown; six major attacks 
being made and eight minor. Naturally, the British 
say that important results were accomplished, while 
on the other hand, the Germans report that these bom- 
bardments inflicted no serious damageupon these ports. 

During these operations the British lost three small 
vessels, an armed yacht, a drifter and a mine sweeper, 
and suffered causalties of 34 killed and 24 wounded. 

On January 9th, 1916, the British lost the battleship 
Edward VII in the Channel, through a mine which after- 
wards became known was one of those planted by the 
German raider, the Moewe. No lives were lost in this 

Another British war vessel was lost in the same waters 
a little more than a month later, when the Arethusa 
also struck a mine and sank, with a loss of ten lives, 
on February 13th. It will be remembered that this 
cruiser, when just out of her builders' hands, participated 
in the fight in the North Sea in which the Blucher was 
sunk, and indeed was said to have fired the torpedo 
which sank that vessel. On February 28th, the Maloja, 
a Peninsular and Oriental passenger steamer, homeward 
bound, struck a mine in the channel near Dover and 
was sunk, some forty lives being lost. The mines which 
sank the Arethusa and the Maloja were also supposed 
to have been among those planted by the Moewe whose 
history follows shortly. 



During these six months other navies, than the British 
and German suffered casualties on the sea. On Sep- 
tember 28th, the Italian battleship Benedetto Bim 
was destroyed through an explosion and with the ship 
some three hundred lives were lost. 

On February 13th, the French cruiser, the Admiral 
Channier, 4800 tons, an old and not particularly for- 
midable vessel, was torpedoed and sunk off the Syrian 
coast, about 300 men going down with her. 

The only spectacular event on the ocean in the period 
under consideration was the career of the Moewe, the 
German raider hereinbefore referred to. 

On the first of February, 1916, Norfolk, Virginia, 
had one of the sensations of its history. The Elder 
Dempster Line steamer ''Appam" which trades between 
Great Britain and West Africa was much overdue, 
and should have arrived at Plymouth, England, on 
January 20, 1916, eleven days before. A broken boat 
bearing the name "Appam," however, had been picked 
up between Madeira and Gibraltar on January 16th. 
This circumstance, in connection with her being so long 
overdue, led to the Appam's loss being considered certain. 
To the surprise of the world, and more particularly to 
the surprise of Norfolk, the Appam made a sudden 
appearance in that harbor on the date above mentioned 
in charge of a German prize crew which had been put 
on board of her by the captain of a German raider, the 
Moewe, after the capture of the Appam by this raider 
on January 16th, near the West African coast. 

The German prize crew had navigated the Appam 
from this point all the way across the middle Atlantic 
Ocean in safety, repeatedly passing British merchant 
vessels and cruisers which by one strategy or another 
they had outwitted, and brought her in safety into the 
American port of Norfolk. On board the Appam, 
in addition to her prize crew, were the passengers who 
were on her at the time of capture and portions of her 
own crew and those of other vessels previously destroyed 
by the Moewe. 

The reason why an American port had been selected 
was that under certain clauses of an existing treaty 
between Prussia and the United States there was a 
provision under which the Germans deemed themselves 
entitled to bring prizes of war into American harbors, 
and had acted in accordance with their views of their 
rights thereunder. 



The history of the Moewe was most romantic. She 
left a German naval port towards the end of December 
1915, and first crossed over to the Swedish coast, thence 
following that coast and the Norwegian coast closely 
until fairly far to the north, whence she had described 
a great semi-circle around the British Isles, successfully 
eluding the British cruisers in this portion of the ocean, 
and had reached the neighborhood of the Canary Islands 
in the early days of January. 

Briefly simimarized, during the next two months 
she succeeded in capturing fourteen vessels belonging 
to the Allies, of which 12 were English, one French and 
one Belgian. Eleven of the British vessels captured 
were steamers: the Author, the Traider, the Curbridge, 
Ariadne, Dromomly , Farrington, ClanMcTavish, Appam, 
Westburne, Flamenco and Saxon, while the twelfth, 
the Edinburgh, was a sailing ship. The French vessel, 
the Maroni, was a steamer, as was the Belgian, the 
Luxemburg. The total tonnage was 67,855. 

All of these vessels were sunk, except the Appam 
which was sent into Norfolk, and the Westburne which 
was sent into Teneriflfe, in charge of a prize crew and 
also carrying prisoners taken from the various ships 
captured by the Moewe. These prisoners were landed, 
after which the Westburne was taken outside the harbor 
of Teneriflfe and sunk. 

The raid of the Moewe was even more successful than 
the raid of the Emden, in point of damage inflicted upon 
the enemy; as the aggregate values of the cargoes and 
vessels sunk and captured by her were considerably 
more than those captured by the Emden. With the 
Appam, she captured a considerable amount of gold 
which this vessel was bringing home to England. 

One of the most interesting features of her raid was 
the fight between herself and the British steamer Clan 
McTavish, one of the Clan Line. The Moewe, which 
was disguised as a merchantman, by means of canvas 
screens and other devices, summoned the Clan McTavish 
to stop; this vessel refused, not knowing, imdoubtedly, 
the character of her accoster, and thereupon the Moewe 
let fall her screens, exposed her battery of guns, and 
opened fire on the McTavish. This latter vessel still 
held on her course, and increasing her speed attempted 
to escape, replying to the fire of the Moewe guns with 
the gun she had mounted on her stern as a precaution 
against submarines. But this attempt to escape was 



unavailing, and the Clan McTavish finally stopped and 
surrendered, being subsequently sunk, and her crew 
being taken prisoners. 

The Moewe finally reached Wilhelmshaven, the 
German naval port, on March 4th, in safety, bringing 
some British naval prisoners as well as some of the 
crews of the other vessels she had destroyed about the 
time she sank the Appam. 

On her return, the Moewe, curiously enough, passed 
directly through the English Channel and successfully 
eluded the patrol of British naval vessels therein. 

This exploit aroused so much enthusiasm in Germany 
that attempts to duplicate it were thereafter made. 

On February 29, 1916, the British auxiliary cruiser 
"Alcantra" was doing patrol duty in the North Sea when 
she sighted a large steamer flying the Norwegian flag with 
the Norwegian colors painted on her side. The Alcantra 
halted the "Grief," the name of this apparently Nor- 
wegian vessel, which was, in fact, a German cruiser, and 
asked her name and destination; the answer was ap- 
parently unsatisfactory for tte British cruiser lowered 
a boat to board the "Grief" in order to verify the infor- 
mation supplied. But the German vessel, which was 
disguised as was the Moewe, by false bulwarks, dropped 
these, thus giving her guns full play and attacked the 
Alcantra and the boat she was sending to search her. 
The Alcantra was a ship of over 15,000 tons, while the 
"Grief" was considerably smaller. But nevertheless, 
after a fight lasting several hours, the Grief got the 
better of the combat, one of her shells having struck 
the rudder of the Alcantra and rendering her unmanage- 
able. The Grief then fired a torpedo at the Alcantra, 
which sank very shortly thereafter. 

In the meantime, another British auxiliary cruiser, 
the Andes, which had heard the call of the Alcantra 
wireless, came up and reached the scene of the battle 
about the time the Alcantra sank. The Grief which 
had been several times struck by the Alcantra and was 
on fire, seeing this new antagonist, put off at full speed, 
the Andes following her as rapidly as possible. The 
chase was a long one and the Grief attempted to torpedo 
the Andes more than once, but did not succeed. The 
Andes, however, wrecked the upper decks of the Grief, 
driving her crew from her guns, but even then the 
Grief would have probably escaped had it not been for 
the fact that a, British light cruiser suddenly appeared 



to the northward of the Grief in the direction of her 
flight. At a considerable distance the gunners picked 
up her range. The Grief of course, did not carry guns 
of sufficient calibre to combat this new antagonist, and, 
shortly after the cruiser entered into the fray, blew up 
with a terrific explosion. 

It is supposed that the Grief was laden with mines 
that were intended to be laid by her on various points of 
her voyage, and that one of the British shots had reached 
these mines, thus causing the explosion which brought 
about her end. 

As a result of a meeting of the Privy Council of Great 
Britain on February 14th, 1916, the British government 
issued an order on February 29th, whereby the appli- 
cation of a certain British mimicipal act entitled "The 
Trading with the Enemy" (Extension of Powers) Act 
1915, under what the British called the "Trading with 
the Enemy'' (Neutral Countries) proclamation 1916, 
was applied to the world in general. 

This proclamation first applied to certain subjects 
of Greece, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Portugal, Spain and Portuguese East Africa, and all 
consignments to persons and firms on the statutory 
black lists which were issued on the same day were for- 
bidden. This was the first public assumption, abso- 
lutely without warrant of international law, of that right 
to control the trade of the world which Britain has 
always privately practised, and it created a storm of 
protest from the neutrals whose subjects found them- 
selves on this black list. This subject will, however, 
be dealt with more fully in the next volume when it will 
be discussed as regards its subsequent application to 
the citizens of the United States. 

Late in February an official annoimcement was made 
that the British and French fleets operating in the 
North Sea and the Channel would thereafter act as one 
and be placed under one supreme command. 





In the early autumn of 1915, it became apparent to 
Great Britain that it was impossible for her to continue 
the poUcy which she had adopted at the beginning of 
the war of voluntary military service. Her advertising 
campaign did not produce, after first enthusiasm had 
faded, that nmnber of recruits for the army which 
could make her a factor in the land fighting on the 
Continent, and though every method had been adopted 
to draw the men of military age to the colors still these 
were not coming forward in sufiicient numbers and the 
complaints of Great Britain's Allies at her lack of co- 
operation with them in the land warfare on the Continent 
were commencing to be extremely pointed. 

In proportion to their population at that time the 
British colonies, Canada and Australia, had furnished 
a greater proportion of their men of military age than 
had the United Eangdom; in September and the early 
part of October, the slowness with which voluntary 
recruits joined the army grew even greater, so that it 
was necessary to adopt some radical plan dealing with 
the situation under which the field armies could not 
only be sustained but increased, and the legitimate 
demands of Britain's Allies satisfied. The natural and 
normal system which would have been adopted in any 
other country in the world than Great Britain would 
have been to have adopted compulsory military service, 
but many obstacles stood in the way of such adoption. 

In the first place, there was the rooted objection of 
Englishmen of all classes and characters to be compelled 
to do anything of any kind or nature. In the second 
place, there was the serious opposition of the workmep 
class of the population which found political expression 
through the labor imions and the Labor party. And 



finally there was the fear of all the politicians (there 
being no statesmen at the head of England's government) 
of the loss of votes to their particular party through 
taking any definite and decisive action of any kind to 
meet this emergency. Consequently a quack remedy 
was applied; which quack remedy consisted of what is 
known as the Lord Derby Recruiting Scheme. Under 
this scheme, in every area a local civilian committee 
was appointed and these committees imdertook to 
procure for the army a minimum supply of 30,000 
recruits per week; the number which it was said was 
necessary to maintain the efiiciency of the British army 
then in the field. As a matter of fact, however, it was 
subsequently discovered that this figure only represented 
infantry needs. The theory of obtaining recruits through 
civilians was to relieve the War Ofiice from any fiu-ther 
work of recruiting, leaving it free to concentrate upon 
the training of these recruits after they had been ob- 
tained by the civilian committee. 

On the 6th of October, Lord Derby was appointed 
to direct the operations of this scheme and a general 
canvassing scheme was adopted. All the men in Eng- 
land, married and unmarried, between the ages of 18 
and 41, were divided according to their ages into 46 
groups. Certain of these groups were to be what is 
known as "starred groups''; that is to say, persons 
reserved by reason of their occupations, or for other 
causes, from active military service. The unstarred 
men left were then supposed to be available for military 
service, after a physical examination. But these \m- 
starred men had two coiu-ses open to them, they could 
either enlist immediately or else could attest to join 
the army at some future time. During the course of 
the canvass, the promise was made by the government 
that the unstarred married men should not be called 
until all the unstarred unmarried men had been called. 
This caused considerable trouble thereafter, and nearly 
caused the fall of the government. 

The canvass lasted for nearly two months and it was 
found that of the unmarried men only about one-half 
presented themselves, while of the married men approxi- 
mately three-fifths. The reason why the greater pro- 
portion of married men presented themselves was that 
their service, imder the pledge of the government, 
was postponed until all unmarried men had been called 
and were in actual service. 



Without going further into the details of this remark- 
able plan which was intended to gild the pill, so to speak, 
of compulsory service, and create compulsory service 
under another name, it will suffice to say that the entire 
plan was a complete and absolute failure, and that the 
number of men absolutely necessary to maintain the 
armies of Great Britain at their then strength, was not 
obtained, and the government was compelled to face 
the alternative of compulsory military service. 

After much hesitation the government did meet the 
situation by a military service bill which was introduced 
into Parliament on the 5th of January, 1916. This 
first military bill was nothing but a measure to compel 
the unmarried men to do what they had failed to do 
imder the Derby recruiting scheme. Without going 
into the provisions of this bill at length it may be that this 
bill was merely a makeshift and that it did not under 
its terms provide for anything like general military 
service even from the unmarried men. Furthermore, 
it provided for local tribunals to which claims for exemp- 
tion from military service were to made. These tribunals 
in the future played a very considerable part in weaken- 
ing an already weak measure. This bill passed the 
Commons after much negotiation with the labor in- 
terests of the country, receiving its first reading on 
January 6th, and its third on January 26th, becoming 
law a day or two afterwards, and going into operation 
on February 10, 1916. 

Early in the year there were strong efforts made in 
and out of Parliament to have the provisions of the 
military service bill apply to Ireland as well as to the 
other component parts of the United Kingdom. Ireland 
having been by the terms of the bill exempted from its 
provisions, but these efforts were opposed by the govern- 
ment and did not succeed in rallying enough strength 
to their cause to impart their desires on that government. 
A considerable sensation was caused in Great Britain 
in November by charges made in the House of Lords by 
Lord St. Davids, that favoritism was rampant in the 
army, that the British generals were incompetent, and 
that women were not only exercising far too much influ- 
ence in the army but were at the front in large nimibers, 
particularly at or near headquarters, on what might be 
termed pleasure trips. These charges were vigorously 
denied, but ultimately, at a considerable time, events 
proved their correctness to a large degree. 



Parliament was finally prorogued on February 27th, 
doubtless much to the relief of the ministry. 

A very interesting and rather bitter controversy 
arose between Sweden and Great Britain in the latter 
months of 1915. It will be remembered how Great 
Britain, by a monstrous enlargement of the "continuous 
voyage" theory as applicable to contraband, had by 
an unscrupulous use of her naval strength compelled all 
the smaller powers of Europe, Holland, Norway, Den- 
mark and Switzerland, to submit to her dictation as 
to the characters and quantities of the foodstuffs and 
raw materials they should import for their trade and 
commerce from abroad by sea. 

Great Britain had further, in recent months, begun 
to seize the mails on the high seas, not only those des- 
tined for her enemies, but those destined to the above 
named neutral countries as well. This regime 
Great Britian now attempted to apply to Sweden, 
thinking presumably that Sweden being a small nation 
would not have the temerity to resist the orders of the 
mistress of the seas. 

But though small, Sweden is a robustly independent 
nation and to her credit, now and hereafter, she not only 
dared to oppose Great Britain by formal protest but 
by effective act. Her first step in her resistance was 
to solicit the co-operation of the United States in taking 
some action looking to an assertion and an enforcement 
of the right of neutrals to have their ships traverse 
the ocean, between neutral ports at least, without 
interference and in her commimication to the United 
States, Sweden used the following strong, but justified, 
expressions: — 

"The violation of existing rules of international law 
has, regardless of protests, increased until at present 
only a few rules, serving as protection to neutral com- 
mercial intercourse, are observed by Great Britain, 
and it is feared that also these remaining few will be 

"Of late the British authorities have violated the mail 
traflSic, etc., etc.'' 

However, England's present practise of censoring 
also first class mail, sent by neutral vessels from one 
neutral country to another, is an even greater violation 
of the rights accorded neutral powers by the rules of 
international law. It is not necessary to particularly 
point out how contrary this practise is to the stipulations 



of The Hague Convention, which stipulations or rules 
must be considered to have been in existence even 
before the promulgation of this convention. 

The Hague Convention referred to by the govern- 
ment of Sweden, No. XI., in its article 1 of chapter 1, 
lays down the rule in relation to mail as follows: 

"The postal correspondence of neutrals or belligerents, 
whatever its oflSicial or private character may be, found 
on the high seas on board a neutral or enemy ship is 
inviolable, If the ship is detained the correspondence 
is forwarded by the captor with the least possible delay." 

This convention was ratified by Great Britain. 

We have heard so much during this war of the duty of 
observing The Hague Conventions, in some cases when 
imratified and consequently not in force, and so much 
vituperative inspired denunciation in our neutral press 
of one set of belligerents for not obesrving even such 
unratified conventions, that the absolute silence of this 
same press in relation to the violation of the convention 
under consideration seems strange, unless something 
which the writer has been imable to discover in these 
Hague Conventions, makes them in the eyes of that 
press only binding on the particular belligerent they 
do not favor. 

The government of the United States, at this time, 
being more interested in sentimentality than with 
principle, as a reason for decisive action declined to 
co-operate with Sweden. 

Sweden, however, was not discouraged and acting on 
her own initiative, took advantage of her geograpUcal 
position, and in retaliation for Great Britain's illegal 
actions, held up all mail communication of any kind 
between that country and her ally, Russia; and also pro- 
hibited the passage of goods of any kind going between 
Great Britain and Russia, or the reverse, from crossing 
Swedish territory. As at this time the only other means 
of reaching Russia, except by shipping across Amer- 
ica to Vladivostock in extreme eastern Siberia, through 
Archangel, was closed by the ice and would not be open 
for many weeks, this action was embarrassing for both 
Great Britain and Russia, and they attempted to solve 
the problem thus presented, first by negotiations, and 
second by threats. But Sweden stood firm and finding 
that the action already taken was not drastic enough, 
further crippled Great Britain by placing an embargo 
on all exports of wood pulp to that country. 



This action, of course, hit the British newspapers 
and hit them hard, since about seventy per cent of all 
the paper on which British newspapers are printed is 
made from Swedish pulp. 

At the date our record ends the situation between 
Sweden and Great Britain had experienced no modifi- 
cation. Great Britain was talking, the Bear was growling 
and Sweden was acting. It may be here said, in passing, 
that the only two neutral coimtries which have shown 
in this war that they have normal self respect for them- 
selves are Sweden and Switzerland. 

In January, the presidert of the Bremen Chamber of 
Commerce officially announced that not a pound of 
cotton had been used for the last eight months in making 
ammunition in Germany, and that the substitute was 
both cheaper and better suited to the making of am- 
munition than cotton, and that hence, even after the 
war, the German ammunition factories will not have 
td use cotton. 

This official made the further statement that camphor, 
which the Germans have been making for some years 
from American turpentine, could be made more advan- 
tageously from another substitute, which would also 
do away, now and henceforth, with the use of American 

If the Germans have actually discovered a cheaper 
substitute for cotton, it is certain to come into general 
use after the war and will constitute a very severe blow 
to our cotton growers, which loss, if it occurs, can be 
directly chargeable to our policy of letting Great Britain 
do in this war what Great Britain would not let Russia 
do in the Russo-Japanese war — put cotton on the list 
of contraband. This result would also give Mr. Lansing 
the enviable pre-eminence of being that one, of all our 
Secretaries of State, who inflicted the most injury on 
his own country whose interests it was his duty to guard. 

In the autumn of 1915, the British government 
began mobilizing the American and other foreign 
securities in the hands of private investors throughout 
the United Kindgom for the purpose of either using them 
as collateral security for loans negotiated in the United 
States, or the outright sale thereof on the American 
market. This scheme was partly undertaken to steady 
exchange between the United States and Great Britain, 
and partly to raise money for the government. 

In the early days of September the pound sterling 



had fallen very largely in the New York market; at 
one time reaching the record low price of $4.55, and 
though this situation had been immediately eased by 
large shipments of gold by the British government 
the exchange market remained nervous and imsteady. 

The original owner of the securities either received a 
promise of the return of his securities at a future day 
with certain financial advantages in the meantime, or 
handed them over in return for a fixed price payable 
at a future day. 

Prices of foodstuffs of all kinds advanced very largely 
in all the belUgerent cotntries during the year. In 
the case of the Central Empires this advance was a 
result of bad crops at home in a large measure, and also 
because the Central Empires were not able to follow 
the ordinary course in peace times of importing food- 
stuffs from beyond the seas owing to the British blockade. 
However, the Central Empires were by no means at 
or even near the point of starvation or even real scarcity 
of food in spite of the information to that effect spread 
broadcast by Great Britain. 

In fact, even if the seas were entirely and absolutely 
closed to the Central Empires it would be impossible 
to starve them. 

This submarine campaign and the use of ships by the 
government for purposes of the war drove ocean freight 
rates, during this period, to a very high figiu'e. For 
instance, in normal times the rate per ton of coal from 
Cardiff, Wales, to Genoa, Italy, even as late as July, 
1914, was seven shillings; in January, 1916, this rate 
was 75 shillings. The normal rate on grain from the 
Argentine was 12 shillings and the abnormal rate of 
January, 1916, was 150 shillings. 

These increases in carrying charges had a practical 
effect, both^n belligerent and non-belligerent countries. 
In Great Britain, for instance, the price of bread per 
quartern loaf of four pounds rose from 11 cents in August, 
1914, to 19 cents in January, 1916. In France, the 
general rise in prices was greater than in England, and 
in Italy, very much greater. The neutral countries 
also saw prices mount rapidly. 

On October 28th, the Viviani ministry, which had 
been in power in France since the beginning of the war, 
though partly reconstructed at the time the French 
government fled to Bordeaux in September, 1914, fell 
from power and was succeeded by a new cabinet organ- 



ized by Aristide Briand in which cabinet Mr. Viviani, 
the former premier, consented to occupy a minor position. 
Mr. Briand, who is one of the ablest of French contem- 
porary politicians, first came into real prominence in 
connection with the separation of church and state in 
1904-05, in the enactment of the legislation concerning 
which he played a very prominent role, being, in fact, 
what would be here called the chairman of the committee 
which introduced such legislation. Cold, intellectual 
and practical in his planning, Mr. Briand, once his plan is 
formed, becomes impetuous and tenacious in its execution. 
On the whole, it seeiiis only justice to say that in placing 
Mr. Briand at the head of affairs in the difficult situation 
in which the coimtry found itself, France chose the best 
man she had available. And France was obliged to 
choose a strong, able man for this position the more 
as her president, Mr. Poincare, is notoriously without 
stability or balance. 

Like France, Italy, to some degree, suffered from a 
shortage of food this winter of 1915-16. Early in 
January, however, the government took a census of all 
the grain in the kingdom and devised a scheme for 
controlling its price and the method of its distribution. 
Like measures adopted as regards other foodstuffs 
largely ameliorated the situation, and prevented too 
much suffering. 

Italy continued at peace oflSicially with Germany 
during all this period and did not commit any act of war 
against her imtil just at the end of the six months under 
consideration, when on Febraury 28, 1916, she siezed 
34 out of the 57 German ships in Italian ports. At this 
time, however, Italy denied that these seizures were acts 
of war and claimed that they were merely an exercise 
of the right of angary. 

This right of angary is in international law the right 
of a belligerent to use neutral merchant vessels and their 
crews for the purpose of transporting troops, ammunition 
and provisions, pa3dng freight, and is undoubtedly 
imiversally recognized. Those interested in this subject 
will find a full discussion of the subject in Stockton's 
"Laws and Usages of War at Sea", article 6. 

A couple of weeks before this, Portugal had taken 
forcible possession of 36 German and Austrian ships 
in the river Tagus, and had hoisted the Portuguese 
flag over them. In this case, however, such seizures 



differed entirely from the Italian seizures, since Portugal 
at the time was not a belligerent and consequently had 
no right of angary. Her act in seizing these ships was 
therefore an absolute act of war, and thus this wretchedly 
corrupt and debased land entered the struggle. Such 
entry need not, however, be viewed as one of the main 
events of the period we are considering. 

There were few or no political events of any importance 
in Germany or Austria during the winter. 

In Russia there were internal troubles of some char- 
acter, but few of the details have come to us. Sozonoflf, 
Russian minister of Foreign AjBfairs, next to Sir Edward 
Grey the person most responsible for the outbreak of 
the war in 1914, fell from power on November 2d. 

As early as the commencement of the ill fated Dardan- 
elles campaign, the Allies had turned their eyes on Greece 
whose geographical situation and whose possession of 
a veteran army had suggested to them that it would be 
a very considerable advantage to them if they could 
be able to secure her co-operation in their projects. 
With the end in view, various vague and shadowy 
promises of territory and advantages in other ways were 
made by the Allies to Greece in an effort to secure her 
active aid. 

But the King of Greece and the generals of the Greek 
staff were well aware of the difficulties which the capture 
of Constantinople presented, and after a very careful 
^study of the plan of campaign adopted by the Allies, these 
qualified men gave it as their judgment that such plan 
could not be carried through, a decision which the subse- 
quent history of the Dardanelles operations fully sus- 

It has always seemed incomprehensible why when 
Warned by a body of men who not only know the lay 
of the land but also the Turk from actual experience 
in fighting, and who were qualified by professional 
attainments of merit. King Constantine alone as a 
general being entitled to higher rank, than any general 
Great Britain had shown up to this time, or since for 
that matter, of the defects of tbeir plan the Allies did 
not change it. Particularly as the Greek general staff 
pointed out the true road through southeastern Bulgaria 
which any well planned campaign should follow. But 
they not only did not but they insisted on Greece's 
participating in their plan without modification. 

But this the government of Greece was imwilling to 



do, in fact, finally refused point blank to do, arguing 
that it was the duty of that government not to waste 
the lives of its subjects on an expedition in which there 
was only one possibility, failure. In which decision 
it would seem that the Greek government showed a 
reasonable and wise discretion, as it was undoubtedly 
its duty to consider the interests and lives of its subjects 
first and not to adopt the course of sacrificing these 
lives in order that Great Britain could save the lives 
of some British soldiers. ' 

At the end of the second Balkan war a treaty had been 

.made between Greece and Serbia whereby the parties 

thereto pledged themselves to come to each other's 

aid in the event that either thereafter was attacked by 


Prior to the attack of the Teutonic powers upon 

Serbia and before Bulgaria had taken sides in the war, 

the Allies who suspeqted her inclinations had sought 

by territorial bribes to obtain her military co-operation 

with them or her neutrality. As they themselves had 

no territory to give her they sought to pay these bribes 

with territory of Serbia and Greece, Serbia being Russian 

^in fact, though Serbia in name was easily enough per- 

1 suaded to make the necessary territorial sacrifices, but 

\ with Greece it was different. 

Venizelos deserves a paragraph by himself. By 
birth a Cretan, and probably with Italian blood in his 
veins, he is not in any sense of the word racially a Greek, 
though since his rise to prominence a mythical descent 
from an old Athenian family has been arranged for him. 
By profession he is a lawyer, but by metier a revolutionist 
and in his younger days In Crete he was the leader oi 
practically all the uprisings which took place in that 
Island between 1890 and 1910. 

In 1910 having exhaupted the possibilities of Crete and 
also having been elected to the Greek national assembly, 
the Boule, from Athens he trans: erred himself to the 
mainland, arriving In the capital at a singularly oppor- 
tune moment for the display of his undoubted talents 
for intrigue. The employment of these talents almost 
immediately earned for him the Premiership. At this 
time, Greece was in the throes of a wave of reform 
against the corruption in politics then so prevalent in 
the country. Cleverly taking advantage of the oppor- 
tunity thus afforded Venizelos not only proclaimed 
himself in thorough sympathy with this movement, 



but put himself at the head of it and rode into power with 
absolute freedom of action guaranteed to him, and since 
then has showed himseh a stern foe to political corruption 
of all kinds when exercised by his opponents. 

A little later on.the Balkan league against Turkey was 
formed which carried its plans through successfully, 
the credit tor the formation of which league and ior its 
victoiy, is modestly assumed by Venizelos. AHei- the 
war, Venizelos was the most active fermenter oi the 
trouble between Bulgaria and the rest of the league which 
followed, though it is fair to say that he had had able 
assistants therein, in the persons oi the most venal of 
Balkan politicians, Take Jonescu, the Rumanian, and 
Prince Alexandei of Serbia. 

At the outbreak of the present wai, entirely on his 
own motive and without consulting either the exec utive 
or the legislative. Venizelos offered tJie AUies the armed 
co-operation of Greece, and from that moment, he became 
to all intents and purposes a political agent for the 

The first real break between the King and Venizelos 
arose over the question of the interpretation of the 
treaty between Greece and Serbia. As has been said, 
that treaty bound Greece to come to the aid of Serbia 
if that country were attacked by Bulgaria. Further 
than this the treaty did not go. 

In the autumn of 1915, Serbia was menaced by Bul- 
garia, Germany, Austria and Turkey. The question 
arose was Greece bound to aid Serbia hfflflnaft "Rnigarift 
was amon g fh^s^ mpngping Viftf^ or did the treaty only 
contemplate an attack on Serbia by Bulgaria alone? 

Venizelos laid down the principle that as long as 
Bulgaria was among the menacers of Serbia, Greece 
wa-? bound to aid her. The King said that the Greco- 
Serbian Treaty dealt with a Balkan war and a Balkan 
war alone. It was only to come into force in case either 
Greece or Serbia was attacked by Bulgaria alone. Clearly 
it did not refer to and was never intended to refer to the 
case of Serbia being attacked by two of the great mili- 
tary powers of Europe as well as by Bulgaria. 

Had the contention of Venizelos prevailed and the 
treaty been interpreted in its most literal sense, it would 
have been equivalent to suicide by Greece, since inevi- 
tably Greece, would have suffered much the same fate 
of Serbia. 

A general election was held and the policy of the 



King was approved by the Greek people, surely the 
most interested persons. The Venizelos faction, however, 
refused to part icipate in^ these., elections, alleging as 
tneir reason for such non-participation that the King 
had no right to dissolve the Parliament and to proclaim 
new elections at a time when 300,000 of the voters were 
under arms on account of the general mobilization of 
the Greek army. The question as to the right of the 
King to act as he did of course depends on the terms 
of the Greek constitution as it actually existed at the 
time the King so acted, and these are not ambiguous 
and fully sustain him, as Venizelos then knew and 
now knows. 

But as by this time Venizelos had been taken under 
the financial protection of the Allies, and was abimdantly 
supplied with money for political purposes, this issue 
was as good as another, since it permitted him to play 
the role of the "man of the people" oppressed by a 
"tyrant king." 




So much derogatory propaganda in relation to the 
condition and management of the German prison camps 
and of the treatment of British prisoners has been made 
officially and unoflScially by the British Government 
in relation to the condition of these camps and the treat- 
ment of the prisoners therein that it seems desirable to 
, deal with this subject to some extent. 

In the first place, it may be stated that the govern- 
ment of the United States has from the beginning of the 
war, from time to time, inspected these prison camps, 
through its sworn officials, and that these officials have 
rendered reports in writing, which reports have been 
printed; all of which reports from the beginning of the 
war to the close of this period are before me as these 
words are written. 

I have performed the labor, not an inconsiderable one, 
of reading these reports through, because these reports 
contain the only credible evidence as to the condition 
of these camps. The statements which have appeared 
in the press from time to time are not worthy of belief, 
inspired by the British propaganda as they have been. 

As to the reports themselves, these being too long to 
quote in extensOj I can only state the conclusions which 
I draw therefrom: 

(a) Complaints about food. There are many of these 
almost entirely from the English prisoners. Practically 
in each camp Mr. H. H. Morgan, Mr. Rivington Pyne, 
Dr. Ohnesorg (Dr. Ohnesorg and Mr. Jackson having 
both been formerly officers in the United States Navy), 
Mr. John J. C. Watson, and Mr. E. L. Dresel (a well 
known Boston lawyer), made investigations regarding 
complaints on the part of the British prisoners in regard 
to the food. It seems worth while, therefore, to set 



forth a few of the experiences of these inspectors in 
relation to that food. 

Under date of September 11, 1915, Mr. Jackson 
reports his visit to the detention camp at Senne: 

"There were some complaints as usual in regard to 
the food. I had arrived in camp just after the mid-day 
meal was served; while some of the men said that the 
meat had been bad and they wished I had had an oppor- 
timity to taste it, others said that the meat had been 
particularly good because the officers had heard I was 
coming. None of them knew that I had actually eaten 
a plate of their soup and had found it excellent, both 
palatable and nutritious, and that my visit to this 
particular camp had not been announced in advance. 
The menu for the day had been made out at the beginning 
of the week and could iiot have been changed after my 
presence in the camp was known, and I had a bowl of 
the soup which was left over after the prisoners had 
been served." 

Mr. Lithgow Osborne, under date of October 19, 

"Camp of Zwickau: 

After mentioning the British prisoners by name, he 
continues: "The complaints that the men had to make 
were in regard to the inefficiency of the meat rations and 
the quality of the bread. I tasted the soup being pre- 
pared at the time of my visit and found it excellent in 
quality and evidently containing considerable quantity 
of meat." 

Same inspector at Lauban: 

"The British made complaints relattive to the quality 

of the food which they said was dirty and badly cooked 

by the Russians, though the quantity was sufficient. 

During inspection of the kitchen I tasted the food which 

seems not to justify the complaints as to its quality, 

though it was evident it might become tiresome as a 

continued diet." 

* * * 


"The complaint of the seven non-commissioned 
officers with whom I spoke was concerning the quality 
of the food. The complaint not sustained by the thor- 
ough test I gave the meal then being served." 



"Friederichsfdlte : 
"When I visited the barracks in which the English 
were all quartered, they were seated at the table eating 
their mid-day meal. It consisted of thick vegetable 
soup with portions of meat served separately. I tasted 
the soup and found it very good, and the meat looked 
clean and well cooked." 

^p ^n ^n 

"Lazarets at Wesel: 

"Complaints as regards insufficiency of the food by 

one man out of thirty. Others whom I questioned 

specially on this subject did not bear out this complaint, 

although of similar state of health." 

* * * 

Dr. Ohnesorg: 


"They (the British) expressed themselves as dissat- 
isfied with the food. I had tasted the mid-day soup in 
the kitchen of one battalion, before it was served out 
and tasted what was left in one of the kettles after 
serving in the other. The soup was the same, good in 
both cases." 

The real truth of the matter of food in the German 
prison camps seems to be this: The German cookery and 
the method of preparation of food generally is very 
different from that which obtains in England, and there- 
fore to the English the food is unappetizing and distaste- 
ful; hence the complaints. It is impractical that the 
British should expect treatment in this particular which, 
necessarily, cannot be accorded to them. There are 
many other complaints which could be gone into in 
detail, but which can be covered generally by the state- 
ments of Dr. Bert W. Caldwell of the American Red 
Cross publication in the Military Surgeon for March, 
1916, which deals with the whole subject at considerable 
length, sufficient quotations from which follow. In 
presenting this statement of Dr. Caldwell, it may be 
noted that both Dr. Caldwell's profession, his official 
connection with an organization such as the Red Cross, 
and his quality of neutral, entitle his positive statements 
to a greater degree of credence than should be accorded 
either to the hearsay statements of the American press, 
founded upon alleged facts transmitted to them by one 
of the belligerents, or to the necessarily partisan state- 
ments of that belligerent itself. 

"Prisoners are of two classes — the civilian class, 



which is composed of civilians who were in the enemy 
countries at the beginning of hostilities, and the second 
class consisting of soldiers taken prisoners in the dififerent 
campaigns. The civilian class, comprising men, women 
and children, were immediately detained at the beginning 
of the war, and were placed in camps arranged especially 
for them; although in almost every camp in Germany 
which has prisoners of war there is a scattering of civilian 
prisoners to care for as well. 

**The great majority, practically all of the civil pris- 
oners in Germany, are detained at the Ruh'^eben camp 
near Berlin. This prison camp was constructed es- 
pecially for them and paid for out of the private fortunes 
of the Imperial Family. It is especially well located and 
is constructed with every convenience and safeguard of 
sanitation. The prisoners of each nationality have 
buildings assigned to them separately. Playgroimds 
have been established, theaters and schools instituted, 
and every provision made for the feeding and for the 
cleanliness of the camp. The prisoners here detained 
are arranged into groups of each nationality, and some 
member of each group is placed as administrative head 
fo that particular group. The only complaint encoun- 
tered at the Ruheleben camp was made by some English 
lads who had over them an Australian sea captain, and 
they complained and demanded a change of authority 
because the captain flogged them when they took too 
many liberties. The administration of this camp is 
humane and just, and the health and comfort of the 
prisoners here detained is the first care of the prison 
authorities. The Kaiser is personally interested in 
RuheL ben, and members of the Imperial Family visit 
it frequently. 

'The second class, and by far the larger class, is com- 
posed of soldier prisoners. Prison camps are located 
and constructed with these considerations in view in 
their order: Sanitation (including water supply), guard- 
ing, feeding, housing, transportation, and proximity to 
possible employment of prisoners outside of the prison 
camp. Another consideration to which great importance 
is attached, and which is never neglected by the German 
authorities, is the institution of playgrounds, the estab- 
lishment of schools, and places and forms of amusement 
inside of the prison camps. The most discouraging 
feature which the prison authorities have to contend 
with is the inactivity and consequent ennui which is 



incident to prison life following the excitement and 
activi y of campaigning. This condition among the 
•prisneors causes the authorities much anxiety, and no 
measure is neglected that will assist in relieving it. The 
prisoners are permitted to work in the fields near the 
camp, or in mines or factories, or on the roads, for which 
labor they receive a small remuneration, and nine out 
of ten prisoners welcome with an unconcealed joy any 
opportunity to do such work as a relief from the con- 
finement and inactivity of the prison camp. 

*'In establishing a prison camp, a site is selected con- 
venient to transportation routes, easily susceptible to 
the institution of adequate sanitation, near an abundant 
and potable water supply, and free of trees. Different 
areas of ground are utilized, varjdng, of course, with the 
number of prisoners which it is intended that the camp 
shall accommodate. Usually 20 acres of ground is 
allotted for each five thousand prisoners for prison camp 
purposes, although in many instances this proportion of 
ground is smaller. After selecting the ground two 
barbed wire fences are constructed entirely around the 
site, about 12 feet in height, with the strands of barbed 
wire about 9 inches apart. These two fences are located 
one within the other and are separated from each other 
by about 12 feet. Between these two fences a smaller 
barbed wire fence is constructed about 4>^ feet in height, 
with the barbed wire strands running close enough so 
as to prevent the prisoners from climbing through them, 
and this smaller fence is constantly charged with a 
current of high voltage electricity — this to discourage 
possible attempts upon the part of the prisoners to leave 
the grounds. At each corner outside the inclosure a 
mound is built sufficiently high to command the camp, 
and on top of this mound a rapid-firing gun is placed; 
while at convenient intervals around and through the 
camp inclosure guard-posts have been established to 
assist in guarding the prison camp. 

"At the same time that this wire fencing is imder 
construction sanitary installation of water pipes and 
sewer system is at once instituted, and the latrine system 
is installed. The water supply is generally taken from 
the same supply which feeds the nearby city or town, 
and where such supply is not available it is obtained 
through a system of driven wells. The water supply is 
frequently examined in the government laboratories and 
is quickly condemned upon the appearance of anything 



that would threaten the health of the prisoners in camp. 
The latrine system is the open cement basin system, 
located usually at the rear or near one corner of the camp, 
compound. This is covered by seats which are made 
fly-proof, and the contents generously and frequently 
treated with deodorants and disinfectants. The basins 
are emptied frequently and the contents used to fertilize 
the adjacent fields. 

"After the installation of the sewer system and water 
supply, a kitchen, laundry and bath-house are con- 
structed, and around these establishments the prison 
camp itself is built. The kitchen is connected with the 
commissary and is usually imder the same roof. The 
laundry and bath-house are under the same roof, and 
are equipped with a large disinfecting plant, either a 
steaming room or autoclave. Both laundry and bath- 
house are supplied with an abundance of hot and cold 

"The camps are built following one of two plans. The 
older plan, which has since been abandoned, consisted 
of building the prison barracks around a square, in the 
center of which were located a kitchen, laundry and 
bath-house, and at one corner the latrine. The area 
comprised in each square was approximately three acres, 
and the barracks were built to accommodate between 
2,500 and 3,000 prisoners to each compound. The 
buildings were of wooden construction, built with a 
slanting roof about 14 feet in height on the inside of the 
square, and sloping to about 9 feet in height on the 
outside. The barracks were about 50 feet wide, of an 
average height of 10^ feet, and divided into rooms of 
different sizes, usually 60 feet in length and 120 feet in 
length. These barracks were illy suited to the pur- 
poses for which they were built, because there were no 
openings for light or ventilation on the outside of the 
rooms, and the only ventilation or light that was possible 
came from the inside of the square and occasionally from 
dormer windows constructed in the roof. The result 
was that all the barracks constructed after this plan 
were poorly ventilated, poorly lighted and over-crowded. 
The smaller rooms accommodated about 80 to 100 
prisoners and the larger rooms from 160 to 200 prisoners, 
giving a cubical content and space allotment for each 
prisoner entirely insufficient for the purposes of health 
or comfort. This small space was further diminished 
by the bedding and the dunnage which each prisoner 



was permitted to bring into camp with him. The newer 
and the better plan which is now followed in the German 
prison camps consists of building the barracks on either 
side of streets running through the camp. These build- 
ings are of a type that is uniform in dimensions and 
construction. They are about 14 meters wide by 60 
meters long, their roofs sloping either way from a center 
ridge, and about 4>^ meters in height. These barracks 
are inclosed in a high barbed wire fence in a separate 
compound, with separate water supply and separate 
latrine in the rear of the compound and a garbage pit 
in each compound for the use of the barracks. Each 
barrack is separated from its neighbor by an intervening 
space of 80 feet. Each barrack is raised on pillars above 
the ground, about 2 feet. These barracks are generally 
ceiled. They accommodate, when full, 180 to 200 
prisoners, including quarters for petty officers, which 
are partitioned off in the center of the barracks, and these 
partitioned rooms accommodate from four to six petty 
officers. Each barrack is occupied by prisoners of the 
same nationality. This is made necessary because of 
the fact that the English insist upon an abundant and 
free circulation of air, the French do not care for so much 
and the Russian prisoners do not want any at all. Then 
the personal habits of each nationality of prisoners are 
not acceptable to those of other nationalities, and to 
avoid constant conflict among the prisoners the prison 
authorities house the prisoners of each nationality in 
separate barracks. This new type of prison barrack 
permits of sufficient lighting and ventilation by the 
construction of doors and windows in the ends and sides 
of the building as well as apertures through the roof. 

"When the prisoners are taken on any front, they are 
moved back a short distance from the front. If possible, 
the sick and wounded are segregated and sent to the 
hospital, and the well detained until they are free from 
vermin and then are moved on to the prison camps. 
Upon their arrival at the prison camp they are detained 
in isolation barracks, which are especially reserved for 
the reception of incoming prisoners, for a period of four- 
teen days. In this camp their hair is cut and they are 
sent to the bath-house and laundry and disinfecting 
plaDt every fourth day. They receive a warm water, 
soap and kerosene bath, their clothes are placed in the 
steaming-room and subjected to steam at a temperature 
of 135 degrees Celsius for a period of 30 minutes. Their 



surplus clothing and bedding is boiled and washed in 
the laundry. At the end of fourteen days the prisoners 
are mustered, carefully examined for vermin and if 
they are free from insects are sent to the permanent 
barracks inside the camps. On his admission into the 
camp the prisoner receives two blankets and a pallet 
filled with excelsior, which the Germans have found 
better suited for bedding purposes than straw. He is 
equipped with two suits of under-clothes, two shirts, 
two pairs of socks, an overcoat, an outer suit, and cap 
and a pair of boots. If the clothing which he wears 
when he comes to the camp is sufficiently good he retains 
it. In the event that it is not sufficiently good' he 
receives new clothing from the prison authorities. 

"The kitchens attached to each camp arQ well con- 
structed, well equipped, and in excellent condition of 
cleanliness. The food furnished the prisoners is not of 
great variety, and seems to me to be insufficient in 
quantity. It is largely vegetable in character, consisting 
of potatoes, carrots, cabbage, turnips, of beans, peas, 
lentils, and other dehydrated vegetables, of meals made 
from corn, soy beans and peas, of dried fruits, salt fish, 
and small rations of meat. Coffee is also included. An 
allowance for each prisoner of 300 grams of bread per 
day in addition to the regular ration is issued. The 
unprepared food is of very good quality; nothing is found 
upon examination that is deleterious in any way. 

"It became necessary to prepare the ration in such a 
manner as would obviate the necessity of the prisoners 
using knives and forks and other eating utensils. The 
Germans solved this problem by cooking all of the 
different articles of the ration together in large cookeries, 
and issuing to each prisoner this prepared food in bowls, 
to be eaten with spoons. The Kitchens are all equipped 
with large cylindrical cookers which are heated with 
coal, and the food is cooked until it is soft and in a con- 
dition to be eaten with a spoon. It is seasoned well 
and is fairly palatable, but does not afford the variety in 
preparation or ingredients, nor is the quantity sufficient 
to afford a well-balanced diet. The prisoners are per- 
mitted to receive from home articles of food, which are 
sent from friends and organizations of their respective 
countries. The food thus received supplements the diet 
furnished by the prison authorities. In fact, the English 
prisoners insist that were it not for the food that they 
receive from home, they would not be able to live upon 



the prison food. On the other hand, the Russians 
receive very little food from home and yet as a rule the 
Russian prisoners present a very good appearance of 

"The feeding problem presents many difficulties, one 
of which I came in contact with in the camp at Altdam. 
Among the Russian prisoners taken in this camp are 
two orthodox Jews. Their religion forbade them par- 
taking of the diet furnished by the Russians or by the 
prison authorities, and they consistently followed the 
dictates of their religion with the result that they became 
emaciated and seriously anemic. The prison authorities 
were some days in discovering what the trouble was, 
but finally succeeded, and they at once provided these 
two prisoners with spirit lamps to prepare their own food 
with and a diet which is in accordance with their religion. 
The result was that both these prisoners were improving 
in health and a pearance daily, and were in a condition 
to be discharged from the hospital when they were seen. 

*'In almost all the camps the prisoners were over- 
crowded. Measures looking to the remedying of this 
condition were being instituted, and as tast as possible 
new barracks were being built and new camps located 
to accommodate the prisoners. The sewage is disposed 
of by the septic tank system, which seems to meet all 
the purposes which the situation demands. The gar- 
bage is collected in large receptacles located at con- 
venient points in the camp compounds, and such of it 
as cannot be utilized for the feeding of hogs and other 
animals is disposed of by burning. The receptacles in 
every case are fly-proof, and great care is taken to pre- 
vent the breeding of flies, either in these receptacles or 
in any other part within or adjacent to the camp. 

"Connected with the prison camp is a well-equipped 
and well-regulated hospital, under the supervision of a 
medical officer of the German Army Medical Corps, 
and assisted by a staff collected from the medical officers 
of the different nationalities of prisoners. The hos- 
pital is sufficiently large to care for the sick of the prison 
camp. The surgical work of the camp is generally 
done in these hospitals. Attached to the hospital is 
an isolation ward for the quarantining of contagious 
diseases. The hospital corps men among the prisoners 
are utilized in the personnel of the camp hospital. The 
medical officers who are detailed from among the pris- 
oners for work in hospitals are treated with consideration 



and respect, are housed and fed as become their rank 
and have all the privileges which officer prisoners of 
war would have. 

"The disease which is most frequently encountered, 
and one which presents the greatest difficulties of control 
among the prisoners, is pulmonary tuberculosis. This 
is undoubtedly contributed to by the close and indiffer- 
ent housing of the prisoners. In some camps the mor- 
bidity from this disease reaches two and a half to three 
per cent. In fact more deaths among prisoners are due 
to tuberculosis than from all other causes combined. 
Next in order of their occurrence are the diarrheal and 
intestinal diseases, usually not serious in character. 
Typhus exanthematicus made its appearance in two or 
three of the camps, causing frightful morbidity and 
mortality in one. This regrettable occurrence was due 
to the inhumanity of the prison commandant, who, 
when typhus broke out in the barracks among the 
Russian prisoners, insisted upon the English, French 
and other prisoners occupying the same barracks with 
the infected Russians, until some eight hundred of the 
prisoners became infected with the disease and about 
three hundred of them died. This epidemic, when the 
commandant was shorn of a part of his authority, and 
effective measures were established within the camp, 
was soon controlled, and for the past four months no 
cases of epidemic diseases were encountered in the prison 
camps in Germany. Cholera is occasionally imported 
into the camps from the Russian frontier. These cases 
are quickly diagnosed, segregated, and the disease pre- 
vented from becoming epidemic. Contrary to the 
general idea, there are few cases of insanity or mental 
disturbance encountered among the prisoners of war. 
In one of the larger camps, containing 48,000 prisoners 
on its rolls, and established for the past ten months, 
only three cases of insanity have developed. 

''Great care of person and clothing is insisted upon 
by the prison authorities. The authorities in Germany 
place greater importance upon their laundry and bath- 
room facilities than they do upon any other institution 
of their camp regime except their kitchens. To the 
laundry and bath-house each prisoner must go, with his 
surplus clothing and loose bedding, at least once a week. 
There he takes his bath, washes his clothes, and has his 
clothing and bedding disinfected in the steam-chamber 
or in the autoclave. The prisoners are frequently 



mustered for inspection by the authorities of the camp. 
Their barracks are inspected regularly, and immediately 
that one is foimd to be infested with vermin of any kind, 
it is abandoned, the bedding burned, the barracks 
scrubbed and fumigated, the bed-clothing washed and 
disinfected, and the prisoners isolated in clean barracks 
until they are free from vermin and are ready to go into 
clean permanent barracks. Among the thousands of 
prisoners examined in different camps, and as many beds 
and beddings inspected, not a single louse or bed-bug 
was discovered. 

"The administration of the prison camps was found, 
with but the one single exception noted above, himiane, 
just and of high order. For the commandant of these 
camps some retired officer high in rank, usually a Major- 
General, is detailed. He has a full staff with him — , 
his Quartermaster and his Commissary. His medical 
stafif is large or small in proportion to the number of 
prisoners confined. He has supreme command of the 
prisoners and prison camp, as well as the command 
which is detailed to the camp to guard the prisoners. 
In every instance but one, in the experience of our 
Commission, the commandant of the prison camp was 
a man well along in years, kindly, generous spirited, 
and experienced in the conduct of the work with he was 
intrusted. As an example, the commandant of the 
prison camp at Munster, Germany, presents himself. 
Major-General von Eyd-Steinecker was the comman- 
dant. He had the interest of the 50,000 prisoners 
under his care at heart. He established within his camp 
a theater which accommodated 650 people, in which 
comedies and dramas were staged, the parts being taken 
by the prisoners themselves. He organized schools for 
the instruction of such prisoners as might desire to take 
advantage of them, the teachers being selected from 
among the prisoners of the camp. He maintained a 
large studio in which were working painters and sculp- 
tors of the different nationalities in camp. A large 
playground was connected with the camp, where foot- 
ball, baseball, running, jumping, boxing and other 
sports could be indulged in. Without the camp, he had 
established a large farm where vegetables, potatoes, 
beans, and other articles of food were raised for the 
consumption of the camp. In this prison camp was a 
bank which hfid deposits aggregating 150,000 marks 
and which employed 125 clerks, where the funds sent to 



the prisoners from home, or earned by them at labor 
in the fields or mines or factories, could be deposited 
and later utilized as they saw fit. Each compound in 
the camp had its own band, and there were three orches- 
tras in the camp at large. The hospital connected with 
this prison camp was especially well cared for and well 
equipped. He had instructed his medical strff to 
examine frequently and regularly the prisoners for signs 
of tuberculosis, and upon such a diagnosis being made 
the prisoner was sent to a segregation camp provided 
for the reception of this class of sick. He had equipped 
in his camp a large tailoring establishment for the repair 
and manufacture of clothing, and a large boot and shoe 
shop, which employed 150 workmen, for the repair of 
footwear. In another place he had established a factory 
for wooden shoes, where great quantities of this class 
of foot-wear were turned out. He enjoyed the respect 
of all the prisoners in this camp, and without exception 
the prisoners praised the General and his administration 
and the care and consideration which he gave them. 

"Each camp has its own canteen, where articles of 
food and clothing and toilet necessities can be pur- 
chased by the prisoners at a very low price, the latter 
being regulated by the German War Office. Each 
camp has its own post-office, where the mail, letters 
and packages addressed to the prisoners are delivered, 
censored, and then turned over to the prisoners. Each 
package received is opened in the presence of the prisoner 
himself, and if nothing objectionable is found is at once 
delivered to him. The staff of this post-office, with the 
exception of the censors, is made up from among the 
prisoners themselves. 

*'The officer prisoners of war are in every case treated 
with the consideration due their rank. Especial camps 
have been set aside for them; one of which, at Gutersloh, 
has every comfort which they could reasonably expect. 
It was built and designed for a sanatorium and was just 
completed at the outbreak of hostilities. It consists 
of twelve large modern stone buildings, three stories 
in height, and accommodates with ease and comfort 
the twelve hundred officers who are detained there. 
Each officer has quarters in keeping with his rank, and 
each officer of sufficient rank has detached for his service 
an orderly of his own countrymen. The bedding is 
good, the kitchen is excellent, and the food is both 
sufficient in quantity and variety to insure a well- 



ba If need diet. Although on two days in the week in 
Germany the use of meat is forbidden, yet on these days 
in the prison camp for officers it Gutersloh, meat was 
served at their me^ls. The officers, too, are permitted 
to receive delicacies and food from home. Attached 
to the camp are large fields for footbr 11, tennis f nd other 
sports. Libraries have been instituted for er ch nation- 
ality. In fact, the whole has more the appe.'^rance of 
a large, over-crowded, rather badly managed club than 
it does a prison camp. The commrnd^^nt is very kind 
in his treatment of these pri oners, is very considerate 
of their condition, and is extremely popular with all 
classes of officers under his rule." 

It would appear, as far as I am able to judge from the 
reports of inspection officers of the United States Gov- 
ernirent, in France and Inglrnd, of the camps pro- 
vided for prisoners of war in tho^e countries, that on the 
whole conditions are as good f s i\ ey reason: bly can be 
expected to be. Naturally, there are conphints, but 
in mxost cases in both these countries, as in Germany, the 
complf ints appear to be ill-founded and to come from 
that class of prisoners which has been accustomed in 
their life at home to the least. It is to be regretted, 
however, that a like statement a.s to the character of 
the prison camps and of the treatment of the prisoners 
cannot be made concerning Rus&ia. One singular thing 
about these reports from officers of our own government, 
on the German camps, is that though supplied to prac- 
tically every newspaper office in the United States, no 
publicity practically has been given to them. The 
American press true to its allegi. nee, preferring to print 
and moralize upon the necessarily partisrn statements 
of the British governn^ent or of British writers of fiction, 
rather than those of officers of the United States. 




One event which attracted a great deal of attention 
at the time of its occurrence in the autumn of 1915, 
was the execution by the German military authorities 
of an English nurse, Miss Cavell^ at Brussels. So much 
has been said and written at random about this execution, 
that it is well to have an accoimt thereof based on the 
official reports thereon, which official reports emanate 
from Mr. Whitlock, the United States Minister at 
Brussels, in whose hands at the time of the outbreak 
of the war, the British interests in Brussels had been 
confided and who consequently acted for Miss Cavell. 
The M. de Leval, mentioned in the report which here 
follows, is the legal adviser to the American Legation 
in Brussels. In this report are set forth the proven 
facts and the law governing the case. 

M. de Leval to Mr. Whitlock, 

United States Minister in BrusseU 

Eepobt fob the Ministeb 

October 12, 1916. 

' "As soon as the Legation received an intimation 
that Miss Cavell was arrested, your letter of the 31st 
August was sent to Baron von der Lancken. The 
German authorities were by that letter requested, 
inter alia, to allow me to see Miss Cavell, so as to have 
all necessary steps taken for her defence. No reply 
being received, the Legation, on the 10th September, 
reminded the German authorities of your letter. 

"The German reply, sent on the 12th September, 
was that I would not be allowed to see Miss Cavell, 
but that Mr. Braun, lawyer at the Brussels Court, 
was defending her and was already seeing the German 
authorities about the case. 



"I immediately asked Mr. Braun to come to see me 
at the Legation, which he did a few days later. He 
informed me that personal friends of Miss Cavell had 
asked him to defend her before the German Court, that 
he agreed to do so, but that owing to some unforeseen 
circumstances he was prevented from pleading before 
that Court, adding that he had asked Mr. Kirschen, 
a member of the Brussels Bar and his friend, to take 
up the case and plead for Miss Cavell, and that Mr. 
Kirschen had agreed to do so. 

*^I, therefore, at once put myself in communication 
with Mr. Kirschen, who told me that Miss Cavell was 
prosecuted for having helped soldiers to cross the frontier. 
I asked him whether he had seen Miss Cavell and whether 
she had made any statement to him, and to my surprise 
found that the lawyers defending prisoners before the 
German Military Court were not allowed to see their 
clients before the trial, and were not shown any docu- 
ment of the prosecution. (Similar rules obtain in 
France.) This, Mr. Kirschen said, was in accordance 
with the German military rules. He added that the 
hearing of the trial of such cases was carried out very 
carefully, and that in his opinion, although it was not 
possible to see the client before the trial, in fact the 
trial itself developed so carefully and so slowly, that it 
was generally possible to have a fair knowledge of all 
the facts and to present a good defence for the prisoner. 
This would specially be the case for Miss Cavell, because 
the trial would be rather long as she was prosecuted with 
thirty-four other prisoners. 

"I informed Mr. Kirschen of my intention to be present 
at the trial so as to watch the case. He immediately 
dissuaded me from taking such attitude, which he said 
would cause a great prejudice to the prisoner, because 
the German judges would resent it and feel it almost 
as an affront if I was appearing to exercise a kind of 
supervision on the trial. He thought that if the Ger- 
mans would admit my presence, which was very doubt- 
ful, it would in any case cause prejudice to Miss Cavell 

"Mr. Kirschen assured me over and over again that the 
Military Court of Brussels was always perfectly fair and 
that there was not the slightest danger of any miscar- 
riage of justice. He promised that he would keep me 
posted on all the developments which the case would 
take and would report to me the exact charges that were 
brought against Miss Cavell and the facts concerning 



her that would be disclosed at the trial, so as to allow 
me to judge by myself about the merits of the case. 
He insisted that, of course, he would do all that was 
humanly possible to defend Miss Cavell to the best of 
his ability. 

"Three days before the trial took place, Mr. Kirschen 
wrote me a few lines saying that the trial would be on 
the next Thursday, the 7th October. The Legation 
at once sent him, on the 5th October, a letter confirming 
in writing in the name of the Legation the arrangement 
that had been made between him and me. This letter 
was delivered to Mr. Kirschen by a messenger of the 

"The trial took two days, ending Friday the 8th. 

"On Saturday I was informed by an outsider that 
the trial had taken place, but that no judgment would 
be reached till a few days later. 

"Receiving no report from Mr. Kirschen, I tried to 
find him, but failed. I then sent him a note on Sunday, 
asking him to send his report to the Legation or call 
there on Monday morning at 8.30. At the same time 
I obtained from some other person present at the trial 
some information about what had occurred, and the 
following facts were disclosed to me: 

" 'Miss Cavell was prosecuted for having helped English 
and French soldiers, as well as Belgian young men, to 
cross the frontier and to go over to England. She had 
admitted by signing a statement before the day of the trialy 
and by public acknowledgment in Court, in the presence 
of all the other prisoners and the lawyers, that she wa^ guilty 
of the charges brought against her, and she had acknowl- 
edged not only that she had helped these soldiers to cross 
the frontier, but also that some of them had thanked her 
in writing when arriving in England. This last admission 
made her case so much the more serious, because if it 
only had been proven against her that she had helped 
the soldiers to traverse the Dutch frontier, and no proof 
was produced that these soldiers had reached a coimtry 
at war with Germany, she could only have been sen- 
tenced for an attempt to commit the crime and not for 
the crime being duly accomplished. As the case stood, 
the sentence fixed by the German military law was a 
sentence of death. 

'Paragraph of the German Military Code says: 
'Will be sentenced to death for treason any person 




who, with the intention of helping the hostile Powers, 
or of causing harm to the German or allied troops, is 
guilty of one of. the crimes of paragraph 90 of the German 
Penal Code/ 

"The case referred to in above said paragraph 90 
consists in: 

" ' . . . conducting soldiers to the enemy (viz : 

'dem Feinde Mannschaften zufiihrtO. 

"The penalties above set forth apply, according to 
paragraph 160 of the German Code, in case of war, to 
foreigners as well as to Germans. 

"In her oral statement before the Court Miss Cavell 
disclosed almost all the acts of the whole prosecution. 
She was questioned in German, an interpreter trans- 
lating all the questions in French, with which language 
Miss Cavell was well acquainted. She spoke without 
trembling and showed a clear mind. Often she added 
some greater precision to her previous depositions. 

"When she was asked why she helped these soldiers 
to go to England, she replied that she thought that if 
she had not done so they would have been shot by the 
Germans, and that therefore she thought she only 
did her duty to her country in saving their lives. 

"The Military Public Prosecutor said that argument 
might be good for English soldiers, but did not apply 
to Belgian young men whom she induced to cross the 
frontier and who would have been perfectly free to 
remain in the country without danger to their lives. 

"Mr. Kirschen made a very good plea for Miss Cavell, 
using all argimients that could be brought in her favor 
before the Court. 

"The Military Public Prosecutor, however, asked the 
Court to pass a death sentence on Miss Cavell and 
eight other prisoners amongst the thirty-five. The 
Court did not seem to agree, and the judgment was 
postponed. The person informing me said he thought 
that the Court would no go to the extreme limit. 

"Anyhow, after I had found out these facts (viz., 
Sunday evening), I called at the Political Division of 
the German Government in Belgium, and asked whether, 
now that the trial had taken place, permission would 
be granted to me to see Miss Cavell in jail, as surely 
there was no longer any object in refusing that permission 
The German official, Mr. Conrad, said he would make 
the necessary inquiry at the Court and let me know 
later on. 



"I also asked him that permission be granted to 
Mr. Gahan. the English clergyman, to see Miss Cavell. 

"At the same time we prepared at the Legation, to be 
ready for every eventuality, a petition for pardon, 
addressed to the Governor-General in Belgium and a 
transmitting note addressed to Baron von der Lancken. 

"Monday morning at 11 I called up Mr. Conrad on 
the telephone from the Legation (as I already had done 
previously on several occasions when making inquiries 
about the case), asking what the Military Court had 
decided about Mr. Gahan and myself seeing Miss Cavell. 
He replied that Mr. Gahan could not see her, but that 
she could see any of the three Protestant clergymen 
attached to the prison; and that I could not see her 
till the judgment was pronounced and signed, but that 
this would probably only take place in a day or two. 
I asked the German official to inform the Legation 
iromediately after the passing of said judgment, so 
that I might see Miss Cavell at once, thinking of course, 
that the Legation might, according to your intentions, 
take immediate steps for Miss Cavell's pardon, if the 
judgment really was a sentence of death. 

"Very surprised to still receive no news from Mr. 
Kirschen, I then called at his house at 12.30 and was 
informed that he would not be there till about the end 
of the afternoon. I then called at 12.40, at the house 
of another lawyer interested in the case of a fellow- 
prisoner, and found that he also was out. In the after- 
noon, however, the latter lawyer called at my house, 
saying that in the morning he had heard from the 
German Kommandantur that judgment would be passed 
only the next morning, viz., Tuesday morning. He 
said that he feared that the Court would be very severe 
for all the prisoners. 

"Shortly after this lawyer left me, and while I was 
preparing a note about the case, at 8 p.m. I was pri- 
vately and reliably informed that the judgment had 
been delivered at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, that Miss 
Cavell had been sentenced to death, and that she would 
be shot at 2 o'clock the next morning. I told my 
informer that I was extremely surprised at this, because 
the Legation had received no information yet, neither 
from the German authorities nor from Mr. Kirschen, 
but that the matter was too serious to run the smallest 
chance, and that therefore I would proceed immediately 



to the Legation to confer with your Excellency and take 
all possible steps to save Miss CavelFs life. 

"According to your Excellency's decision, Mr. Gibson 
and myself went, with the Spanish Minister, to see 
Baron von der Lancken, and the report of our interview 
and of our efforts to save Miss Cavell is given to you by 
Mr. Gibson. 

"This morning, Mr. Gahan, the English clergyman, 
called to see me and told me that he had seen Miss Cavell 
in her cell yesterday night at 10 o'clock, that he had 
given her the Holy Communion and had found her 
admirably strong and calm. I asked Mr. Gahan whether 
she had made any remarks about anything concerning 
the legal side of her case, and whether the confession 
which she made before the trial and in Court was, in 
his opinion, perfectly free and sincere. Mr. Gahan 
says that she told him she perfectly well knew what she had 
done, that laccording to the law, of course, she was guilty 
and had admitted her guilt, but that she was happy to die 
for her country, 

"G. DE Leval." 

Much of the confusion which arose in this case was 
occasioned by the fact that Mr. Page, the United States 
Ambassador at the Court of St. James, transmitted all 
the papers in this case to the British Government before 
he transmitted them to his own government, as he should 
have done. As regards the law in the case, it may be 
said that the German War Code corresponds almost 
exactly with that of the United States applying to similar 
facts. The 102nd article of General Order No. 100, 
1863, which is the War Code of the United States to-day, 
is as follows: 

"The law of war, like the criminal law governing other 
offences, makes no differences on account of the difference 
of sexes concerning spy or traitor or war rebel." 

The 98th article is as follows: "All unauthorized 
or secret communication with the enemy is considered 
treasonable by the law of war. Foreign residents in an 
invaded or occupied territory, or foreign visitors in the 
same, can claim no immunity from this law. They 
may communicate with foreign parts or with the in- 
habitants of the hostile country so far as military author- 
ity permits, but no further." 



Article 90 of the General Order 100 is as follows: 
"A traitor under the law, or a war traitor, is a person 
in the place or district under martial law (military 
government) who, unauthorized by the military com- 
mander, gives information of any kind to the enemy 
or holds intercourse with him/' 

Article 92 reads as follows: "If a citizen, subject 
of the country or place invaded, or conquered, gives 
information to his own government from which he is 
separated by the hostile army, or to the army of his 
government, he is a war traitor.'' 

Article 91 of the same General Order is as follows: 
''A war traitor is always severely punished. When his 
offence consists of betraying to the enemy anything 
concerning the condition, safety, operations or plans 
of the troops holding or occupying the place or district, 
his punishment is death." 

It is thus apparent from these Articles of the War 
Code of the United States that any person or persons 
who, under similar circumstances to those in the case 
in point, had taken similar action or had done similar 
things, would have been liable to the punishment of 
death without regard to sex. It must be furthermore 
remembered, in considering this case, that all countries 
of the world, except the United States and except, in 
a minor degree. Great Britain, hold a woman for any 
violation of the criminal law to the same degree of 
responsibility as a man, which is also true in cases of 
violation of military law. This is clearly shown by the 
fact that France has executed three women during this 
war certainly, and probably seven. Of the execution 
and history of two of these women the London Times 
on November 3rd 1915 published the following account: 

"On February twenty-seventh last, secret service 
agents arrested at Bourges a woman calling herself 
Jeanne Bouvier. She was provided with papers, bearing 
this name, but after being interrogated, she confessed 
that the papers were fraudulent and that her name 
really was Ottillie Voss. She was born in the Rhine 
provinces of German parentage. She was unmarried 
and aged 33. For seven years before the war she had 
lived in the Agen region of Bordeaux, where she had 
been giving lessons in German. 

At the outbreak of hostilities she returned to Germany. 
Being out of work she accepted employment as a spy, 
whereupon she was sent to France with orders to visit 



Nice, Montpelier, Marseilles and Lyons and to report 
on important new troop foundations, the frequency 
of railway military transports, and the direction of the 
same, the sanitary condition of the army, and the num- 
ber of woimded; also the debarkation of troops at various 
ports, especially of black soldiers. 

She was likewise particularly instructed to report on the 
state of mind of the population in regard to the war. 
She confessed further that she had been given 400 francs 
($80) expense money. From February 8th to February 
11th she traveled as directed, then returned to Germany, 
where she was given 160 marks ($40) as an expression 
of satisfaction with her work. 

On February 20th, she returned to France on a similar 
mission, having been provided with 500 francs ($100) 
expense (money. ^Two days after her arrest at Bourges 
she made a full confession, and she was unanimously 
condemned to death by a council of war on the charge 
of espionage under Articles 197, 206 and 269 of the Code 
of MiUtary Justice. On April 20th, her application 
for a retrial was rejected, and on May 14th, her appeal 
to the Chief of State for clemency was refused. She 
was therefore executed on May 16th. 

Marguerite Schmitt, aged 25, was arrested at the 
railway station at Nancy as a suspect on February 17th, 
.1915. She had traveled via Switzerland from Anoux, 
near Briey, then occupied by the Germans. After a 
lengthy examination she cociessed that the Germans 
had sent her to obtain information concerning the 
presence of British troops, reported as being in the region 
of Nancy, also concerning divers regiments encamped 
between Bar-le-Duc and St. Menehould. A friend had 
put her in relation with the Germans, They had oflfered 
her money which she had at first refused, but afterwards 
had accepted 40 francs ($8.) The Germans took her 
by automobile to the Swiss frontier. She asserted, that 
although sent by the Germans, she had not intended 
to spy upon the French. It was her purpose to tell 
the Germans upon her return that she had been held by 
the French as a suspect. Her presence at Nancy 
refuted this claim. In addition, there was found in 
her possession, a book of questions to ask, prepared by 
a German oflScer. When tried before a council of war, 
to all questions she replied simply "I am sorry.'' 

She was condemned to death on March 20th, for 
espionage under Articles 206 and 64 of the Code of 



Military Justice and on March 22nd she was executed. 

Both before and since these executions there have 
been other executions of women by the French for 
offences against military law, and like executions have 
occurred during the war in Belgiimi by the Belgians, 
in Russia, particularly in Poland and Galicia, in fact in 
nearly all the belligerent countries, though details 
thereof are not complete. 

A fair judgment in all these cases is that all these 
women who suffered death in rendering a service to 
their country are in exactly the same position as was, 
for instance, Nathan Hale who suffered death at the 
hands of the British during our Revolution, as a spy; 
that is, heroines to their own coimtry and spies or war 
traitors to the other side. 

Concerning their bravery and concerning the purity 
of their motives, there can be no dispute, but it is equally 
true that there can be no dispute as to the fact that they 
had taken the chances of the occupation in which they 
engaged; and there should be no legitimate complaint 
in regard to their having suffered the consequences of 
these acts. In fact. Miss Cavell's own words, as re- 
ported by Mr. Gahan, the English clergyman who 
attended her immediately before her execution, wherein 
she told him that she knew perfectly well what she had 
done, that according to the law of course she was guilty, 
and had admitted her guilt, but that she "was happy to 
die for her coimtry*' — ^form the best epitaph, not only 
for herself, but for all women in like case. 




The history of the battle of the Mame, probably the 
greatest battle in most respects which the world has ever 
known, is still in many important details shrouded in 

mystery. iP'll B 

Therefore, to the accomit given in the first volume of 
this work it has seemed wise to add the following account 
written by a competent hand one year after the battle 
took place and after many incidents previously imknown 
or disputed had been settled. This accoimt is arranged 
chronologically by days, and ought to help in giving 
its readers a clearer idea of the sequence of events, 
though not perhaps of their proportionate importance. 

The battle of the Mame began on September 6th, 1914, 
yet some of its details will be cleared up only when all 
official reports and documents are available. 

The respective strength of the armies during the battle 
of Charleroi and the retreat, the number and position of 
General Maunoury's forces during the retreat, and the 
preliminary manoeuvres and the number and origin of 
the reinforcements sent to him during the battle, are 
disputed questions. The reasons for the sudden obliquing 
of von Kluck's forces on approaching Paris are ako in 
doubt. Little by little, however, the principal develop- 
ments of the battle have been estabUshed approximately. 

Though the execution of their plans had been retarded 
a fortnight by the resistance encoimtered in Belgium, 
the Germans, in their vast circular movement, pivoting 
on Metz, reached the line of the Sambre and Meuse 
August 21. The Allies, counting upon several days re- 
sistance by the fortress of Namur, took the offensive 
August 22, with the object of piercing the German lines 
at the junction of the Sambre and the Meuse and cutting 
the armies of von Kluck and von Buelow off from the 
rest of the German forces. 



Namur fell in a few hours; the army of General Foch 
(120,000 men) concentrating behind the center, was not 
yet ready to go into action, and the plan of the Allies 
was compromised. After partial successes around Char- 
leroi and on the Meuse, the first division of reserves at 
Dinant was thrown back and the 3rd corps at Mar- 
chiennes sustained a grave reverse, weakening the center, 
held by the army of General Lanrezac. General Langle 
de Gary on his right had been checked in the Ardennes, 
and Ruflfey on the extreme right was in difficulties with 
the army of the Crown Prince of Prussia at the frontier 
of Luxembourg. On the extreme left the British troops 
around Mons were violently engaged with superior num- 
bers, constantly increasing and gravely threatening their 

General French was informed by General Jofifre, 
August 23, that the enemy was sending three more corps 
upon his left. General Smith Dorrien's 2nd corps was 
already giving ground. Such was the beginning of the 
fourteen days' retreat, during which the Allies, covering 
140 miles distance, on the left wing fought continual rear 
guard actions and some important engagements that 
checked the advance of the Germans and prepared the 
battle of the Marne according to the plans said to have 
been definitely fixed August 27th, by orders in Joffre's 
own hand. 

General Langle de Gary obliged the Duke of Wuert- 
temberg to recross the Meuse and held him there twenty- 
four hours, retiring only under orders from Jofifre that 
he must be at Laimois on the 29th. At Laimois and 
Rethel he held the same forces from August 28 to 31, 
before continuing his retreat. From his position facing 
the Ardennes to the front of the Marne, he had fought 
ten whole days and covered 60 miles with his forces 

General Lanrezac attained a success at Guise, but was 
ordered not to follow it up; the situation was not yet 
favorable for resuming a general ofifensive. 

The retreat of General French was attended with the 
greatest difficulties. The Germans, sending over in- 
creasing numbers of soldiers by forced marches against 
his left, necessitated violent and desperate counter 
attacks. At Cambrai he sustained the fire of the artil- 
ery of four corps; he lost 6,000 men from the 23rd to 
the 26th before being disengaged by a heroic charge of 
General Allenby's cavalry. 



The army of General Maunoury, afterward called the 
Army of Paris, partly constituted the 26th near Amiens 
and popularly supposed not to have been in action until 
September 6th, appears to have gone to the support of 
the British contingent the 29th, in the region of the 
Somme, where it administered a severe check to von 
Kluck's right. The superiority of numbers was too 
great, however; after every effort the Allies found increas- 
ing forces on their left, and the lines extended continu- 
ally further west. The Germans accupied Amiens and 
continued on as far as Beauvais. This strengthening 
of the line and the obliquing of the army of General 
Franchet d'Esperey (formerly the army of Lanrezac) 
to the left, created a gap between that army and the army 
of General Langle de Gary, which was filled by the new 
army under General Foch,in process of formation during 
the battle of Charleroi. 

Von Kluck's army, whose objective was supposed to 
be Paris, was officially reported September 4th as obli- 
quing to the south-east, with the apparent intention oi 
neglecting Paris and pursuing his efforts to turn the 
Allies' left. At the same time the army of the Crown 
Prince on the left descended along the western edge of 
the Argonne. There were two theories of the sudden 
change in the direction of von Kluck's march. One that 
he was pursuing the enveloping movement; the other, 
that he had discovered the Army of Paris on his right 
flank and by a clever dodge to the southeast avoided the 
menace of being enveloped himself. In the light of later 
disclosures the first theory seems to be the good one. 
The oblique movement continued after the partial check 
at Compi^gne and Chantilly by way of Beauvais, 
Dammartin, Meaux. Senlis and Compidgne were evacu- 
ated by them the 3rd — the advance guard reached the 
region of Provins, 30 miles Ifeoutheast of Paris and 20 
miles south of Meaux. 

The "trough'' or semi-circle prepared by Joffre's 
orders was in position, and the German armies had so far 
marched into it the 5th, that General-in-chief Joffre was 
able to issue orders for a general attack the next morning, 
in order of battle as follows: 

Maunoury northeast of Meaux, ready to cross the 
Ourcq between Lizy-sur-Ourcq and Nay-en-Multien in 
the direction of Chateau-Thierry. 

British army on front Changis-Coulommiers, facing 
the east, ready to attack in the direction of Montmirail. 



Fifth Army of Franchet d'Esperey between Courtagon- 
Esternay and Sezanne, ready for attack in the direction 
of the north. 

Seventh Anny of General Foch covering the right of 
5th army and holding southern issues of the Saint-Gond 

Oflfensive by these armies to be taken September 6 in 
the morning. 

The following day Joflfre completed his disposition of 
the allied forces by orders to the 4th and 3rd armies as 

Fourth Army of General Langle de Gary — stop move- 
ment southward, turn about and face enemy, combining 
its movements with 3rd army, which was to (Jebouch to 
the north of Revigny and take the oflfensive towards the 

Third Army will attack the left fliank of the enemy 
which is marching to the west of the Argonne. 

The formation of the position into which the German 
armies marched was that of a wide trough; Maimoury 
and French formed the side toward Paris, Franchet 
d'Esperey, Foch and Langle de Gary the bottom, while 
SarraiFs army formed the side towards Verdun in the 

September Sixth 

Maimoury's Zouaves and Moors began the battle of 
the Mame in the early hours of the 6th of September by 
recapturing the ridges of Marcilly, Barcy, Ghambry, 
and Penchard — while the 7th corps also advanced to 
the north. 

From dawn the British army and the army of General 
Franchet d'Esperey were heavily engaged with von 
Kluck and von Buelow's Vight. The British, facing a 
general northeasterly direction, attacked the German 
line in the angle of the trough. After ten hours' continual 
fighting the pressure on the British front and that of the 
5th army on its right diminished. Hard pressed on his 
flank by Maunoury, and with his communications 
threatened, von Kluck was obliged to weaken his center 
by sending two corps (80,000 men) to the support of the 
overwhelmed 4th corps on the Ourcq. The withdrawal 
of these troops was concealed by a particularly violent 
attack in which were sacrificed a great number of men. 

During the afternoon von Kluck was obliged to repass 



the Grand Morin and abandon Coulommiers,but s uceeeded 
in maintaining himself on the right bank. The army 
of Franchet d'Esperey also gained ground. The Sene- 
galese riflemen drove th^ Germans from the village and 
the environs of Jouy-sur-Morin at the point of the bay- 
onet. Several villages were taken and retaken and the 
fighting continued by moonlight, the French troops 
taking three more villages. 

The strongest shock of this first day's fighting was 
supported by the 7th army of General Foch. After 
resisting the pressure of the first assault, a vigorous 
counter-attack realized a gain on his left before Monde- 
ment. The 4th army of Langle de Gary, though just 
arrived, also attacked vigorously along the entire front. 

The army of the Crown Prince of Prussia had just taken 
up its position before the Argonne and begim an attack, 
which Sarrail repulsed. 

Dubail, in the Vosges, pushed back the forces of von 
Heeringen, and de Castelnau held the Grand Couronne 
de Nancy against the attacks of the Crown Prince of 

September Seventh 

On the morning of the 7th Maunoury found in front 
of him not only the single corps of the preceding day 
but 120,000 men; von Kluck had skilfully accomplished 
the conversion of his forces and for the moment disen- 
gaged his flank and saved the entire German army from 

Several villages were retaken by the Germans and the 
pressure everywhere was severely felt. The day was 
saved for the Army of Paris by the 2nd Zouaves around 
Etrepilly, where the most violent attacks were repulsed, 
at such cost to the Germans that they found it necessary 
to burn their dead. . The British troops accentuated 
their advance, punishing severely the cavalry divisions 
of the Prussian Guard by remarkable charges of the 9th 
Lancers and the 18th Hussars. 

Franchet d'Esperey took at the point of the bayonet 
Vieux Maisons and Pierrby on von Kluck's left, and after 
several violent combats crossed the Grand Morin, 
occupied Jouy-sur-Morin definitely and took up position 
on the Petit Morin. 

Foch, overrun by numbers on his right, held good until 
the 11th corps weakened; then established his line a 



little in the rear of the front Salon-Gougangon-Coiinatre- 

The 12th corps of General Langle de Gary's anny, 
heavily punished, was sent to the rear to be reorganized. 
Six battalions of this corps — the least tried — sustained 
alone the attack of 25,000 Germans all the evening. 

The German attacks were arrested aroimd Sompiers 
by the 13th division of the 21st corps, which lost its 
chief, General Barbade, as well as Colonel Hamont and 
a great many other officers. 

The army of General Sarrail and that of the Crown 
Prince of Prussia continued their duel, without result. 

General de Castelnau, before Nancy, having lost the 
Plateau of Amance, retook it and held it while Dubail in 
the Vosges maintained his advances. 

September Eighth 

The morning of the 8th found the position of the wings 
littk changed from the beginning and the AlUes' success 
limited to the gains of the British forces and the Army 
of Langle de Cary. The fighting had continued all 
night. The army of Paris, at the extreme left, weakened, 
but the center held firm by grace of the furious charges 
by the Algerian and Moroccan troops that created gaps 
in the enemy's ranks, in each case immediately filled. 
The day passed in attacks and counter-attacks. Villages 
were taken and retaken. At the cemetery of Chambry, a 
great many officers and soldiers of the 3rd Zouaves were 
killed, and finally the line began to bend back in the 
direction of Neufmoutiers. 

The 4th corps, commanded by General Boelle, brought 
from Alsace and retarded en route by the exodus of civil- 
ians from Paris arrived, one division went to the support 
of the British troops, the other reinforced Maunoury. 
The situation of the army of Paris became critical as the 
result of the retreat of the 14th division of the 7th corps. 

The British forces, reinforced by one division of the 
4th corps, made further gains, taking many prisoners 
and several cannon. The Army of General Franchet 
d'Esperey, after eight hours' hand-to-hand fighting, 
entered Montmirail and the army of von Buelow, leaving 
7,000 dead and a large number of prisoners, was in re- 
treat all along the line. 

General Foch, at dawn, declared to his troops: 



"The situation is excellent. I order again a vigorous 

The retreat of part of von Buelow's forces before 
Franchet d'Esperey broke the German line and facili- 
tated the efforts of Foch's army on his right. The key 
to the heights of Sezanne, the Chateau of Mondement 
where the Prince Eitel Friederich of von Kluck's staff 
had conferred and dined with von Buelow, was the 
center of attack. The artillery drove out the staff, 
after which the Moroccan riflemen penetrated the park 
of the Chateau — were driven out, attacked again and 
were repulsed. A third assault succeeded and in the 
park lay 3,000 dead Germans, including two generals. 
Whole battalions of French troops were annihilated 

Ffere Champenoise and Sommesous, after Sezanne, 
fell into the hands of Foch's army. Sommesous, counter- 
attacked by the Prussian Guard, remained in their hands 
only the time necessary for the French forces to reform. 
Two regiments of the 11th corps charged and drove out 
the 4th regiment of Grenadiers of the Queen Augusta and 
the 4th regiment of Grenadiers of the Emperor Francis. 

A vital development of the day's fighting was the dis- 
covery, by aviators, of a gap between the armies of von 
Buelow and von Hansen, the effect of von Buelow's 
retreat, leaving von Hansen's right flank exposed. By 
an audacious and opportune manoeuvre, General Foch 
massed his right in this gap under cover of the night, 
before von Hansen's flank, and threw his adversary 
back upon the Marshes of Saint-Gond in disorder. 
The German losses there were heavy. 

The army of Langle de Gary was very heavily 
engaged around Vitry-le-Frangois, where the forces 
of the Duke of Wuerttemberg counter-attacked fiercely. 
The artillery fire crossed here over the town of Vitry- 
le-Frangois, which was partly in flames. At Pargny 
and at Maurupt-le-Montay both sides lost heavily in 
hand-to-hand fighting. By a night attack the French 
infantry took the village of Etrepy, almost entirely 
burned, and the surrounding region. A little progress 
was made also to the left of Vitry-le-Frangois. 

Sarrail, menaced with envelopment by a combined 
attack from forces coming from Metz and the Crown 
Prince's army in front, sent his cavalry against the 
forces from Metz and continued his infantry attacks 
in front. Fresh troops from Strassburg resumed the 



violent but vain attacks upon the Heights of Amance. 
The German losses here were extremely heavy, but less 
than on the Heights of Sainte-Genevieve, where de 
Castelr au's troops inflicted such losses on the Bavarian 
reinforcements from Metz that they were obliged to 
retire upon the village of Atton. 

Dubail, obliged to abandon Luneville to the enemy, 
held them in check elsewhere and retook the summit of 
Mandroy and Fourmeaux. 

September Ninth 

The position of the army of Paris, which had become 
critical the evening of the 8th, had not improved the 
morning of the 9th. Heavily outnumbered, it appeared 
little likely that the position could be held without 
reinforcements. General Joffre ordered Maunoury to 
resist just the same to the last man. The formation 
of the line had been so modified that the army of Paris 
described an angle, one side of which faced the east and 
the other north. Three thousand men of the 7th corps, 
pitted against one entire division, began an attack at 
Marville, and the action became general. During nine 
hours the battle waged incessantly. Encouraged by 
news of successes of the other armies, Maunoury's men 
redoubled their assaults. General Mangin, with the 
6th division, by a desperate charge near Acy-en-Multien, 
hurled back the forces in front of him, nearly destroying 
the regiment of Madgeburg. Bayonet charges by the 
African troops relieved the pressure near May-en- 
Multien, and toward the end of the day the Germans, 
having lost nearly half of their force, were repulsed all 
along the line of the army of Paris. The 4th corps of 
Landwehr was signalled coming to the relief of von 
Kluck's flank from Rethel. Maunoury 's army was 
exposed to a decisive attack by fresh troops. Mau- 
noury appealed to General Gallieni. The Governor of 
Paris requisitioned 5,000 taxi-automobiles, drays, etc. 
and sent 20,000 men to his support across Paris. 

Nanteuil-le-Haudoin and its vast petroleum stocks 
were in flames. The troops, most of them, had been 
without food for three days — only the Moors, habituated 
to fasting, seemed capable of further effort. The Ger- 
mans seemed equally exhausted, for their attacks 
weakened with the darkness. 

The British forces, continuing their progress, threw 
von Kluck's center back upon the Mame from Vareddes 



to Chateau-Thierry; they had gained twenty miles in 
two days, taking prisoners and booty every hour. After 
seventeen failures, the British engineers succeeded in 
throwing a bridge across the Marne at Vareddes, threat- 
ening von Kluck's rear. They crossed at La-Ferte- 
sous-Jouare, at noon in close pursuit. A detachment 
of cavalry, meeting two squadrons of German cavalry 
toward Chateau-Thierry, charged through and charged 
back again. After traversing both squadrons, then 
<;harged them again in front. Von Kluck's entire 
army was now in full retreat, abandoning wounded 
and material and losing prisoners. The British forces 
discovered that von Kluck's troops lacked ammunition 
for their Mausers. Many cannon and prisoners fell 
into the hands of the British army during the day. 

The army of Franchet d'Esperey advanced in imison 
with the British troops close upon the heels of the enemy, 
and only the German batteries, posted on the slopes, 
north of Chateau-Thierry, saved the retreat from de- 
veloping into a rout. The German losses on this front 
exceeded even those of the left. At Estemay they 
left 8,000 unburied dead after four days' fighting. Near 
Chateau-Thierry they had emptied the reservoir that 
supplied Paris with water from the Nestles, filled it 
with dead and covered the bodies with earth. 

Foch pushed ahead also with the 7th army after the 
capture of Mondement, throwing the Prussian Guard 
into the Marshes of Saint-Gond. A stubborn resistance 
was offered there in the parts where defense works 
could be organized. Foch succeeded in taking these 
works in the rear, driving thousands of the Guard so 
precipitately from the safe routes that they sank into 
the slime of the marshes. Several batteries of artillery 
were lost there and the 7th army took many prisoners. 

The army of Langle de Cary, pressed by fresh troops 
brought from Belgium, maintained its positions, while 
Sarrail repulsed a violent attack by von Heeringen 
with the 16th corps. 

As the result of the bloody battles of Dieulouard and 
Saint-Genevifeve, Nancy was entirely disengaged and 
the Bavarians retired from Pont-a-Mousson into the 
Bois le petre, and Dubai in the Vosges progressed in the 
regions of Luneville and Baccarat. 

September Tenth 
The morning of the 10th, General Maunoury was 



informed of the general retreat of the armies of von 
Kluck, von Buelow and von Hansen. Vareddes and 
Lizy-sur-Ourcq, evacuated in haste, were found crowded 
with German wounded. At Etrepilly piles of car- 
bonized bodies were seen and dead and wounded were 
found in all the ravines and thickets, behind hedges 
and generally at every spot where the soldier seeks 

The British troops, continuing their pursuit, took 
thirteen more cannon and a few hundred prisoners and 
great convoys of supplies and ammunition: The army 
of Franchet d'Esperey, in spite of the fatigue of five 
days' fighting after 14 days' retreat forced its advance 
and reached the line of Chateau-Thierry-Dormans, 
taking four cannon, 1,500 prisoners and a convoy of 50 
baggage wagons. The losses of von Buelow's army 
on this front were nearly equal to von Kluck's. 

Foch's 7th army, marching on Epernay and Chalons- 
sur-Marne, took prisoners and booty and supported the 
army of General Langle de Gary by attackmg in flank 
the forces of the Duke of Wuerttemberg, Langle de Gary 
entered Vitry-le-Frangois, which was full of wounded, 
and progressed toward Sermaize. The struggle between 
the Crown Prince and Sarrail was still undecided. At 
Triaucourt Sarrail captured ammunition and on the 
other side of the Meuse the Germans completed the 
destruction of the forts of Troyon and attacked Sar- 
rail's rear, but were repulsed. They tried to cross 
the Meuse lower down toward Saint-Mihiel, but the 
French 3-inch grrns destroyed each bridge as soon as 
thrown across. 

The 11th, the army of the Duke of Wuerttemberg, 
vigorously attacked in the center, gave way and re- 
treated in disorder, while the armies of von Kluck, 
von Buelow and von Hansen took up positions on the 
line of the Aisne. 

This was practically the termination of the battle, 
though the army of the Grown Prince held its ground 
until the 12th, when it began to retire slowly. 

The best estimates of the forces engaged placed the 
Germans at 1,075,000 and the Allies at 1,125,000. 
The French are known to have lost 60,131 killed. The 
Germans left 50,000 dead, while 250,000 wounded of 
both armies were picked up during and after the battle 
by the Allies' stretcher bearers. The number of prison- 
ers taken is still unknown, but was not large. 




It may be of iaterest for us now to cast a glance on 
what this war has actually cost in borrowed money, 
since that is the only cost of which we can be certain, 
though there are other costs, such as the amount raised 
by taxation, and expended on the war, destruction of 
property, the loss of the productive capacity of the men 
who are either killed or so maimed or injured as to be 
no longer self-supporting, besides the loss of production 
in occupied territories, the decrease in stocks of foody 
metal and other materials, and the derangement of the 
machinery of distribution. Then there is the outright 
loss of property which the millions of soldiets and many 
millions of other people would have created if they had 
not been fighting in the ranks or otherwise contributing 
their skill and energy to the ends of the war. The cost 
of provisions, the loss and investment of the national 
savings in things which have only a tcmporarv use such 
as guns, shells and other munitions of war and war's 
equipment, which would otherwise have been invested 
in permanent things. But for these latter losses, there 
is no means of measurement. At the present time the 
daily expenditures bj'- the various countries on^both 
sides are about as follows: 

Great Britain 


Russia . 



Belgium and Servia 

Entente Allies . 

$27 ,000 ,000 

18 ,000 ,000 

16 ,000 ,000 

7 ,000 ,000 

2 ,000 ,000 

2 ,000 ,000 

«72 ,000 ,000 




Austria-Himgary . 
Turkey and Bulgaria 

Central Allies 

All belligerents 

$21 ,000 ,000 


3 ,000 ,000 

$35 ,000 ,000 

$106 ,000 ,000 

Up to August 1, 1917, which would be the end of a 
complete three years since the war began, we may com- 
pute the war cost as follows: 

Direct war cost to 
Great Britaia 
Russia . 

Belgium and Servia 

$16 ,500 ,000 ,000 

14 ,000 ,000 ,000 

11 ,750 ,000 ,000 

3 ,900 ,000 ,000 

450 ,000 ,000 

1 ,600 ,000 .000 

Entente Allies . . $48,200,000,000 

Germany . . . $16,500,000,000 
Austria-Hungary . 9 ,250 ,000 ,070 
Turkey and Bulgaria 2 ,000 ,000 ,000 

Central Alliance . $27,750,000,000 

All belligerents . $75 

Gr6at Britain 


Russia .... 

Italy .... 


Belgiuin and Servia 

,950 ,000 ,000 

Per capita 

$351 .00 



108 .00 


133 .40 

Entente Allies . . 

Germany . . . 
Austria-Hungary . 
Turkey and Bulgaria 

$151 .50 




Central Alliance 


All belligerents 

$163 .30 



A complete table of the loans to date follows: 

War Loan, 3>^%, November, 

1914 $1,750,000,000 

War Loan, 4^%, July, 1915 2 ,970 ,000 ,000 
Treasury bills, approximate 5 ,100 ,000 ,000 

Exchequer 5s, approximate 1 ,750 ,000 ,000 

Exchequer 6s, approximate 250 ,000 ,000 

Exchequer 3s, approximate 105 ,000 ,000 

War expenditure certificates 1 00 ,000 ,000 

War savings certificates . . 100,000,000 

Treasury indebtedness on note 

issues 500,000,000 

Anglo-French Loan, 5% Oc- 
tober, 1915 .... 250 ,000 ,000 
Collateral Loan in U. S., 5% 

August, 1916 ... 250 ,000 ,000 

Banking credit in United States 50 ,000 ,000 

Banking credit in Canada . 100 ,000 ,000 

Total, Great Britain . $13 ,275 ,000 ,000 


National loan, 5%, Novem- 
ber, 1915 .... $3 ,100 ,000 ,000 

National loan 5%, October, 

1916 (estimated) . . 3 ,000 ,000 ,000 

National defense bonds (es- 
timated) . . . . 2,800,000,000 

National defense obligations 

(estimated) . . . 400,000,000 

Advances from Bank of 

France 2,000,000,000 

Advances B. of F. to foreign 

governments . . . 250,000,000 

Bonds and notes in London . 500 ,000 ,000 

Anglo-French loan, Oct. 1915 260 ,000 ,000 

Collateral loan in United States 100 ,000 ,000 

One-year 5% notes in United 

States 30,000,000 

Banking credits in N. Y. (es- 
timated) .... 60,000,000 

Advances from Bank of Al- 
geria 20,000,000 

Total, France ... $12 ,600 ,000 ,000 




War loan, 6% October, 1914 $257 ,500 ,000 

War loan, 5%, February, 1915 257 ,500 ,000 

Exchequer bonds, 4%, March, 

1915 310,000,000 

Currency loan, April, 1915 . 105 ,000 ,000 

War loan, 5>^%, May, 1915 515 ,000 ,000 

War loan, 5}4%, November, 

1915 515,000,000 

War loan, 5>^%, April, 1916 1 ,040 ,000 ,000 

War loan, 5>^%, November, 

1916, (estimated) . . 1 ,000 ,000 ,000 

Treasury bills, 5%, (es- 
timated) .... 2,000,000,000 

Issues discoimted in England 700 ,000 ,000 

Issues in France .... 150 ,000 ,000 

Loan in Japan .... 25 ,000 ,000 

Three-year 6>^% credit in 

United States . . . 50,000,000 

Total, Russia ... $6 ,925 ,000 ,000 


Imperial loan, 5%, September, 

1914 $1,120,000,000 

Imperial loan, 5%, March, 

1915 2,265,000,000 

Imperial loan, 5%, Septem- 
ber, 1915 .... 3 ,040 ,000 ,000 

Imperial loan, 5%, March, 

1916 2,678,000,000 

Imperial loan, 5%, Septem- 
ber, 1916 .... 2 ,750 ,000 ,000 

Securities in United States . 25 ,000 ,000 

Bank loan in Sweden ... 10 ,000 ,000 

Total, Germany . . $11 ,988 ,000 ,000 


Austrian loan, 5>^%, Novem- 
ber, 1914 .... $445 ,000 ,000 

Austrian loan, 5>^%, June, 

1915 560,000,000 



Austrian loan, 5>^%, Novem- 
ber, 1915 .... 815 ,000 ,000 

Austrian loan, 5>^%, May, 

1916 • 565,000,000 

Hungarian loan, 6%, Novem- 
ber, 1914 .... 244 ,000 ,000 

Hungarian loan, 6%, June, 

1915 223,000,000 

Hungarian loan, 6%, Novem- 
ber, 1915 .... 240 ,000 ,000 

Hungarian loan, 6%, May, 

1916 . . . . . 300,000,000 
Loan from German bankers 1 13 ,000 ,000 
Second loan in Germany . 125 ,000 ,000 
Credit In Germany ... 60 ,000 ,000 

Total, Austria-Hungary $3 ,690 ,000 ,000 


National loan, 4>^%, Decem- 
ber, 1914 .... $200 ,000 ,000 
War loan, 4>^%, July, 1915 200 ,000 ,000 
Twenty-five year 5s (approx.) 800 ,000 ,000 
Treasury coupon bonds, 5% 250 ,000 ,000 
English credit for war supplies 250 ,000 ,000 
One-year 6% notes in United 

States 25,000,000 

Total, Italy .... $1 ,725 ,000 ,000 



Belgium's war cost has been defrayed in the most part 
by Great Britain and France. No formal loans have 
been issued, and taxes have been of no service to the 
Belgian arms, for the reason that Belgium, save for a 
small strip of territory, is in the hands of German forces* 

Servia has been financed by the Entente Allies. No 
loans have been issued, and the tax collections yielded 
an insignificant proportion of the cost of that country's 

Turkey has issued three loans, amounting to $350,000,- 
000, which were taken at home and in Germany, and to 



a small extent in neutral countries of Europe, like 
Switzerland. Its war expenditure has been jSnanced in 
large measure from Germany; a syndicate of German 
and Austro-Himgarian banks has also helped in the 

Bulgaria has been financed chiefly from Germany, by 
means of special advances. Tax collections and small 
loans at home have also contributed to the payment 
for war. 

Roumanians late entrance into the war was undoubt- 
edly accompanied by financial accommodation on the 
part of the embattled group with which that nation 
took sides. The banks of Roumania have also been 
called upon for their facilities. 

The approximate cost of other wars is given in the 
following table for the purpose of comparisons with the 
cost of this: 

Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815 $6 ,250 ,000 ,000 
American Civil War, 1861- 

1864 8,000,000,000 

Franco-Prussian W^r, 1870- 

1871 3,000,000,000 

South African War, 1900-1902 1 ,250 ,000 ,000 
Russo-Japanese War, 1904- 

1905 2,500,000,000 

As a result of these enormous loans made by all the 
belligerents, their national debts have now gone to figures 
which formerly would have been deemed impossible 
and phantastic, but which in August, 1917, will be 
positive facts about as follows: 

Great Britain . . $19,850,000,000 

France , . . 19,000,000,000 

Russia .... 13,450,000,000 

Italy . . . . 5 ,050 ,000 ,000 

Entente nations . $57,350,000,000 

Germany . . . $18,900,000,000 
Austria-Himgary . 9 ,300 ,000 ,000 
Turkey .... 950,000,000 

Central nations . $29,150,000,000 

Grand Total . . $86,700,000,000 



The figures as regards Germany may differ from this in 
estimates from some made by others, because most of 
the American financial authorities, for reasons best 
known to themselves and perhaps not imconnected with 
their efforts to sell securities of Great Britain, France 
and Russia, include in the German national debt the 
debt of the separate states of the Empire. Now the 
Empire of Germany is a federation of separate states, 
in many ways bearing a great resemblance to the United 
States, and as it is not customary, in stating the debt of 
the United States, to add the debts of the separate states 
contracted on their own liability, there seems no good 
reason why this should be done in the case of Germany, 
and hence the amount of the debt of the separate states 
has not been included in the debt of the Empire. This 
debt forms a very considerable percentage of the total 
national wealth of the various belligerent countries, 
and in order that this appropriation can be clearly 
grasped the following table of the national wealth of the 
coimtries at war is given: 

United Kngdom $90,000,000,000 

France 65,000,000,000 

Russia 60,000,000,000 

Italy 35 ,000 ,000 ,000 

Belgium . 13,750,000,000 

Portugal and Roumania . . 7,500,000,000 

Entente total $271 ,250 ,000 ,000 

Germany $80,000,000,000 

Austria-Hungary 45,000,000,000 

Turkey and Bulgaria . . . 8,750,000,000 

Alliance total $133 ,750 ,000 ,000 

All belligerents $405,000,000,000 

as well as a total of the eanxing power previous to the 
war of the same coimtries: 

Annual Income : Annual savings : 

United Kjngdom $1 1 ,250 ,000 ,000 $1 ,875 ,000 ,000 

Prance . . . 7,500,000,000 1,250,000,000 

Russia . . . 7,500,000,000 1,250,000,000 

Italy .... 4,250,000,000 625,000,000 

Belgium and Servia 1 ,750 ,000 ,000 300 ,000 ,000 

Roimiania . . 600,000,000 100,000,000 

Entente nations $32 ,850 ,000 ,000 $5 ,400 ,000 ,000 



Germany . . $10,500,000,000 $1,750,000,000 
Austria-Hungary 6 ,000 ,000 ,000 1 ,000 ,000 ,000 
Turkey and Bul- 
garia . . 1,000,000,000 150,000,000 

Central nations . $17,500,000,000 $2,900,000,000 

Total, aU . . $50,350,000,000 $8,300,000,000 




Reigning King 

" Ferdinand, youngest son of the late Prince Augustus 
of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, and the late Princess Clemen- 
tine of Bourbon-Orleans (daughter of King Louis 
Philippe), born February 26, 1861, was elected Prince 
of Bulgaria by unanimous vote of the National Assembly, 
July 7, 1887; assumed the government August 14, 1887, 
in succession to Prince Alexander, who had abdicated 
September 7, 1886. His election was confirmed by 
the Porte and the Great Powers in March, 1896. Married 

(1) April 20, 1893, to Marie Louise (died January 31, 
1899), eldest daughter of Duke Robert of Parma; 

(2) February 28, 1908, to Princess Eleonore of Reuss 

Children of the King (all of first marriage) : — (1) Prince 
Boris, born January 30, 1894 (heir apparent); (2) 
Prince Cyril, born November 17, 1895; (3) Princess 
Eudoxia, born January 17, 1898; and (4) Princess 
Nadejda, born January 30, 1899. 

The Prince must reside permanently in the Principal- 
ity. The princely title is hereditary. In May 1893, the 
Grand Sobranje confirmed the title of "Royal Highness" 
to the Prince and his heir, and this style was recognized 
by the Porte and by Russia in April 1896. On July 
10, 1911, the Grand Sobranje confirmed the title of 
"King" (Czar). According to the Constitution, the 
Sovereign must profess the Orthodox religion, excepting 
the case of the present King. 

The civil list is fixed at 1,250,000 leva (francs), be- 
sides 830,000 leva for the maintenance of palaces, etc. 

Constitution and Government 

The Principality of Bulgaria was created by the 
Treaty of Berlin, signed July 13, 1878. It was ordered 
by the Treaty that Bulgaria should be constituted an 



autonomous and tributary Principality, under the 
suzerainty of His Imperial Majesty, the Sultan, with a 
Christian Government and a national militia. The 
Prince of Bulgaria should be freely elected by the 
pupulation and confirmed by the Sublime Porte, with 
the consent of the Powers. On October 5, 1908, Bulgaria 
declared her independence. The difficulty as to com- 
pensation to the Turkish Government in respect of 
railway claims was arranged by an understanding 
between the Turkish Government and the Oriental 
Railways Company, and the Powers have recognized 
Bulgarian independence, and the title of "King of the 
Bulgarians'' assumed by Prince Ferdinand. 

"By the Constitution of 1879, amended May, 1893, 
and June, 1911, the legislative authority was vested in 
a single Chamber, called the Sobranje or National 
Assembly. The members of it are elected by imiversal 
manhood suffrage at the rate of one member to every 
20,000 of the population. Those residing in the city 
where the National Assembly sits receive 15 leva (12s) 
a day (including Sundays and holidays) during session; 
others, 20 leva (16s) a day with traveling expenses. All 
over 30 years of age who can read and write (except the 
clergy, soldiers on active service, persons deprived of 
civil rights, etc.) are eligible as representatives. The 
duration of the Assembly is four years, but it may be 
dissolved at any time by the King, when new elections 
must take place within two months. Laws passed by 
the Sobranje require the assent of the King. Questions 
concerning the acquisition or cession of territory, changes 
in the constitution, a vacancy on the throne, or the 
appointment of a regent have to be decided by a Grand 
Sobranje, elected for the special purpose in a manner 
similar to that in which the ordinary Sobranje is elected, 
but with double the number of members. 

"Sobranje (elected March 10, 1914) : 126 Ministerial- 
ists, 51 Agrarians, 21 Socialists, 31 Democrats, 9 National- 
ists, 5 Radicals, 2 Zankovists; total, 245 (207 in Old 
Bulgaria and 41 in the new territories). 

"The executive power is vested in a Council of eight 
ministers nominated by the King. 

Area and Population 

"The estimated area of Bulgaria (1914) is 43,305 
English square miles, and the estimated population, 
4,752,997. Of the new population 227,598 were Bul- 



garians, 75,337 Pomatz, 275,498 Turks, and 58,709 

''By a census taken in December 31, 1910, the popu- 
lation of the whole kingdom was ascertained to be 
4,337,516 (2,206,691 males and 2,130,825 females), as 
against 4,035,575 (2,057,092 males and 1,978,483 fe- 
males) in 1900. Bulgaria before 1913 was divided into 
12 districts (including the 3 districts of Eastern Rumelia), 

"The population, divided according to nationality, 
was as follows: in 1910, 3,203,810 Bulgarians; 488,010 
Turks; 75,775 Rumanians, 63,487 Greeks; 98,004 
Gipsies, 37,663 Jews, 3,863 Germans, 3,275 Russians, 
and 61,690 of other nationalities. The present capital 
is the city of Sofia, with a population (census, 1910) 
of 102,812. The other principal towns, with popu- 
lation in 1910, are Philippopolis, 47,981; Rustchuk, 
36,255; Varna, 41,419; Shumla, 22,225; Slivno (Sliven), 
50,598; Plevna (Pleven), 23,049. 

''The census returns of 1910 showed the following 
distribution of public [buildings in the country: 1,347 
belonged to the State, 34 to the provincial authorities, 
1,436 to the municipalities, 185 to the villages, 196 
were schools, 426 churches, 534 mosques, 9 synagogues, 
264 monasteries, 77 to various societies, 48 to the 
National Bank, and 65 to the Agricultural Bank. 

Religion and Instruction 

"The national faith is that of the Orthodox Greek 
Church, though, in 1870, in consequence of its demand 
for and acceptance of religious autonomy, the Bul- 
garian Church was declared by the Patriarch of Con- 
stantinople to be outside the Orthodox communion. 
The church is governed by the Synod of Bishops. There 
are 11 Eparchies or Bishoprics. The clergy, both 
Orthodox and of other religious bodies, are paid by the 
State and also receive fees for services at burials, mar- 
riages, etc. Of the population in 1910, 3,643,951 
belonged to the Orthodox Church 602,101 were Mohame- 
dans, 40,070 were Jews, 32,130 were Catholics, 12,270 
Gregorian Armenians, 6,252 Protestants. The Mohame- 
dans are mostly in the northern and eastern provinces. 

"There is a university at Sofia, with three faculties — 
History and Philology, Physics and Mathematics, and 
Law. In 1911-12 it was attended by 2,260 students, 
of whom 217 were women, and there were 70 professors 
and lecturers. 



"In 1911-1912 the Bulgarian and other secondary 
schools were as shown in the following table : The non- 
Bulgarian schools were Turkish, Greek, Jewish, Armenian, 
American, French and German: — 

Teachers Pupils 

Description of Schools Schools Male Female Male Female 

Gymnasia 47 ' 667 300 10,625 6,862 

Lower Middle Class 316 2,111 38,973 16,639 

Special Technical and Other 

Schools 166 4,749 4,744 

"In 1913-14 there were 4,589 elementary schools with 
5,769 male and 5,031 female teachers and 290,800 boys 
and 213,963 girls. 


"The estimated revenue and expenditure of Bulgaria 
for five years were as follows (25 leva=£ (1): 

1911 1912 1913 1914 1916 

Revenue 7,137,812 7,610,920 5,765,344 10,279,800 11,027,196L 
Expenditure 7, 136,818 7,667,200 4,732,832 10,270,604 11,014,648L 

"For 1915 the chief sources qf revenue were: direct 
taxes, 2,197,774L, indirect taxes, 4,275,020L. The 
chief branches of expenditure were: Public Debt, 
3,077,856L; War, 2,372,638L; Interior, 544,891L; 
Instruction, 1,167,263L; Finance, 440,659L. 


"Service is universal and compulsory. Mohamedans 
are exempted, but like all other exempted, pay a tax. 
Service in the ranks commences at the age of 20, and is 
now for two years in the infantry, and for three in the 
other arms. Reserve service is for 18 years in the infan- 
try, and 16 years in the other arms The reservists are 
liable to be called out for three weeks training annually. 

"After completion of his reserve service, the Bulgarian 
soldier passes to the Opolchenie (Territorial Army), 
serving in the first ban for four years (infantry), or five 
years (all other arms). Finally, the men of all arms pass 
for two years to the second ban, thus completing a total 
service of 26 years. 

"At the present the Bulgarian infantry is organized in 
36 regiments of two battalions, each of four companies; 
and the artillery in nine regiments of two divisions, each 
of three batteries of four guns, 12 mountain batteries, 
and three battalions of fortress artillery. On mobiliza- 

(1) Excluding the expenditure for the war 



tion each infantry regiment expands to four battalions, 
and each artillery regiment forms a third division of 
three batteries. Further, from the large number of re- 
servists of each regiment is formed a reserve regiment of 
four battalions, and a depot battalion. 

"There is one guard cavalry regiment of three squad- 
rons, four line regiments of four squadrons, and six of 
three squadrons. On mobilization, all regiments are 
raised to four squadrons and a depot squadron. There 
are further three battalions of pioneers, one railway 
battalion, one pontoon battalion, one telegraph battalion, 

"The Opolchenie forms on mobilization 36 battalions 
of the first ban, and 36 half-battalions of the second ban. 

"The reservists not required to complete the field 
units join the depots and are available to make good 
the waste of war. 

"Bulgaria is divided into nine military districts, each 
of which supplies a complete division to the field army, 
besides a portion of the independent cavalry, fortress 
artillery and engineers, mountain artillery, etc., and of 
reserve troops. The strength of the divisions in peace 
(eight battalions, six batteries, etc.) is email; but in war, 
besides the exparsion above mentioned a third (reserve) 
brigade is added, enabling additional divisions to be 
created — there were fourteen mobilized in the summer 
of 1913. The peace strength of the Bulgarian army is 
about 3,900 officers and 56,000 all other ranks, but the 
field army amounts to about 280,000 men besides line 
of communications, troops, etc. 

"The Bulgarian infantry is armed with the Mannlicher 
magazine rifle, calibre .315. Cavalry have the Mannlicher 
carbine. The field gim is the Schneider Q. F. gun of 7.5 
cm. caUbre. The mountain batteries are armed with 
the light Krupp 7.5 cm. Q. F. guns. 

"The miUtary budget for 1915 was 2,372,638L. 

Production and Industry 

"Agriculture is the chief occupation of the people. 
Land is held in absolutefreehold by the owners and there 
is a land tax. The communes hold pasture-land and 
wood-land in perpetuity and pay no rent, and over such 
lands the members of the communes have grazing and 
wood-cutting rights. 

"About five-sevenths of the population are engaged in 
agriculture, most of them being small proprietors holding 



from one to six acres. The total area of (old) Bulgaria 
comprised 23,797,000 acres, of which, in 1913, 8,212,649 
acres were cultivated. Of the new area 986 square 
miles are cultivated land. 

"The acreage and field of the principal crops for two 
years are shown as follows: 

Area in Acres Produce in Cwts. 

1913 1914 1913 1914 

Wheat 2,539,150 2,669,137 24,392,102 14,141,166 

Barley 508,075 539,782 4,949,152 4,013,710 

Oats 390,150 383,165 2,721,498 2,345,586 

Rye 494,180 533,485 4,474,870 3,685,598 

Maize 1,465,850 1,584,740 15,472,246 15,786,978 

"The harvest of 1915-16 produced of wheat 1,257,698 
metric tons; rye, 193,604 metric tons; barley, 384,714 
metric tons; oats, 138,544 metric tons. 

"In 1910 there were in Bulgaria 8,669,260 sheep, 
1,464,719 goats, 1,606,363 head of cattle, 527,311 pigs, 
478,222 horses, 118,488 asses, and 12,238 mules. 

' Commerce 

"The foreign trade follows three main routes: The 
Black Sea, the Danube and the mainland railway. 

"The chief imports in 1913 were: cattle, 211,683L; 
cereals, 133,952L; metals, 540,060L; machinery, imple- 
ments, etc., 974,860L; textiles, 1,380,076L; hides, skins, 
leather, etc., 343,364L. The chief articles of export 
were: wheat, 816,468L; maize, 172,620L; live stock, 
38,412L; silk cocoons, 68,084L; hides, skins etc., 149,720L 
attar of roses, 306,244L. Other exports are fruit, timber, 
and tobacco. 

Shipping and Communications 

"The number of vessels entered at the ports of Bul- 
garia in 1913 was 11,755 of 3,132,481 tons, and 11,710 
of 3,108,505 cleared. The chief ports are Varna and 
Bourgas on the Black Sea, and Rustchuk, Sistor, Vidin 
on the Danube. 

"In 1914, Bulgaria (including Eastern Rumelia) had 
1,486 miles of railway open. Railways connect Sofia 
with the general European system. New railways are 
being planned to link the Danube and the Aegean. 
One is to be 220 miles long and Portalogos will be the 
terminus at the sea. The other will be a shorter line