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iR.f. F. M\.To,^C<i'

.All

European War

September 1915— March 1916

Anthony Amoux, Ph. D. , LL. B,

VOLUME III

PRIVATELY PRINTED
Boston, 1917

by '

Anthony Amoux

Gift

Prof. F. M. Taylor

TABLE OF CONTENTS

\ PAGE

i> THE CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST

From the Sea to Champagnb

Chapter I 9

** II 16

*' III 21

'* IV 26

In Champagne

Chapter VI 33

** VII ....... 36

Vbedun

Chapter VIII 41

In Alsace

Chapter IX 47

THE EASTERN CAMPAIGN

NoBTH Russia

Chapter X . 61

** XII 59

XIII 64

** XIV 68

** XV 74

Bulgaria's Entry into the War

Chapter XVI 80

XVII 83

XVIII . 88

Serbia

Chapter XIX 91

** XX 98

XXI 102

xxni 106

Dardanelles

Chapter XXII 112

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Italy

Chapter XXTV .

•

• • •

118

Caucasus

Chapter XXV .

• • •

125

XXVI .

•

129

Mesopotamia

Chapter XXVII

• • •

133

Africa

Chapter XXVIII

141

Cameroons

Chapter XXIX .

• • •

142

East Africa

Chapter XXX .

• • •

145

Zeppelins

Chapter XXXI .

• • •

148

Air

Chapter XXXII

• • •

152

The War on the Sea

Chapter XXXIII

•
• •

• • •

157

General and Political History

op Europe

Chapter XXXIV

• •

• • ■

165

APPENDICES

I. Prisoners of War

• «

. 177

II. Miss Cavell

• •

190

III. The Battle of the

Maene

199

IV. Statistics .

• «

209

V. Bulgaria .

217

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST

CHAPTER I
FROM THE SEA TO CHAMPAGNE

The comparative calm which obtained along this
western portion of the end of the western battle front
from late in August was not interrupted until the third
week of September, when a joint offensive began on the
part of both the French and the English. The joint
offensive was commanded by Sir John French and Gen-
eral Foch and had as its purpose the forcing of a way
between the projection of the fine kown as the La Bassee
salient and the river Scarpe into the plain of the Scheldt,
while at the same time the French, under Gen. Castelnau,
opened an offensive to the east of Rheims, between this
city and the beginning of the Argonne Forest, with the
object of throwing back the German line in this region
to the other side of the Aisne River. The entire latter
part of the summer the British had been engaged in for-
warding supplies of men and particularly large quantities
of artillery and ammunition from England, with this
offensive in view, and indeed it was necessary for the
British to supply themselves amply with artillery since
the attack upon the German lines which they intended
to launch was of necessity a frontal one which could not
be delivered with any hope of success before the defences
of the trenches of the existing German position were
blown away and holes made therein by the artillery so
that the infantry could advance. We will consider the
western offensive first and discuss the eastern offensive
subsequently.

The battle opened with feigned attacks both on the
Belgian sea coast, and on land at points other than the
points at which the real effort was intended to be made.
On the Belgian sea coast, on September 24, the towns of
Kiiocke, Heyst, Zeebrugge, Blankenberghe, andthef orti-
fications to the west of Ostend were bombarded by the
British fleet, and on September 26, 27 and 30 these places
were again attacked, as well as Middelkirke and West-

FROM THE SEA TO CHAMPAGNE

ende. The object of these bombardments was to create
in the minds of the Germans an impression that a landing
in force on the Belgian coast, at some convenient point,
was contemplated, to which these bombardments were
the preliminary, and thus induce the Germans to send
troops to the Belgian coast to protect these towns from
such a landing.

The feigned attacks on land were upon the German
positions in the Ypres salient and to the South of La
Bassee. On September 25 the British artillery subjected
these positions to a heavy bombardment and this bom-
bardment was followed up with four infantry attacks.
The first of these was on the German positions on the
east bank of the Ypres-Comines Canal; the second to
the South of Armentieres ; the third to the north of
Neuve Chapelle, and the fourth near Givenchy. The
details of these attacks are not of very great moment.
The first attack only lasted some three or four hours, and
resulted in the British at first gaining some ground, but
afterwards retiring to their original positions.

The second attack, near Armentieres, opened at about
half past four in the morning and, after lasting until three
o'clock in the afternoon, also resulted in the British,
after an initial advance, finding themselves obliged to
retire to the point from whence they had started. The
attack near Neuve Chapelle had little better luck; a
German trench or two were won, but no important prog-
ress was made. While the attack near Givenchy made
almost no progress and need not be given further atten-
tion. Of course it should be said that none of these
attacks were really expected to gain ground. Their
object was to confuse the German commanders as to the
point at which the real attack should be launched, and
thus prevent them to as large an extent as possible from
concentrating the strength of their reserve forces at any one
point. This expectation of the British, however, was
only met in part, since in spite of the rather naive men-
tality with which the British commanders credit their
German opponents, in this war, at least, they have not
been able at any time to mystify them completely, and
on this occasion the British commanders did undoubtedly
have, to some extent, the effect which they desired, and
induced the German commanders to scatter a portion of
their reserves; yet enough remained concentrated and
mobile to be of paramount importance in the subsequent
battle.

FROM THE SEA TO CHAMPAGNE

The line of German defences extending fromLaBassee
in the north to Vimy in the south were chosen as the
objectives against which the real attack was to be hurled.
The German line here at the opening of the fight was an
irregular ^one. From the cemetery of Souchez which
lies but a little to the east of the village, of the same
name, this German line ran along the eastern slopes of
the plateau of Notre Dame de Lorette and through the
Bois k Hasche to the east of Angres and Lievin and
along in front of a low range of hills extending from the
west of Loos to the west of Hulluch, and the west of
Haines, until the line reached the Canal of La Bassee,
at a point a little to the west of the road leading from
Lens to La Bassee. The general direction of this line
was, therefore, north and south, and in fact south of
Souchez the line ran almost along the eastern side of the
highway running from Souchez to Arras.

An almost straight road connects La Bassee, passing
through Lens, with Vimy, and continues to Arras. This
road runs along the crest of a line of hills of compara-
tively insignificant height, but which lift it above the
plain to the west. Almost half way between La Bassee
and Vimy, to the northwest of Lens, and at the foot of
the westward slope of this line of hills spoken of, lies
Loos. The ultimate object of the offensive which the
British were about to launch was to capture Loos and
the line of ridges running northeastwardly from it
through Hulluch and Haines, as well as all the Vimy
heights which were formed by the southern and highest
end of this ridge which culminated at Vimy; the capture
of either of which would have compelled the Germans to
evacuate the rather important town of Lens and thus
have considerably embarrassed them, owing to the
resultant loss of control of the railways running east-
ward from Lens, in maintaining their line from La Bassee
to Vimy.

But the progress of an attack to the East of Souchez,
and of Neuville St. Vaast, which, as my readers will
remember, had been the chief scenes of the intense con-
flicts in the earlier French offensive in this region, was
rendered extremely difficult by the fact that to the ea^t
of these two places rose the long ridge of Hill 140, some
400 feet above the plain, which interposed itself as a
formidable natural barrier, (made more formidable by
intricate works of art and by artillery) to any advance
of the Allies in this direction; particularly, as further

FROM THE SEA TO CHAMPAGNE

north the Germans held a whole system of trenches on
the eastern slope of Notre Dame de Lorette and in the
Bois duHasche; to dislodge them from which would have
been a work of extreme dijficulty since their assailants
would have come under the German artillery fire from
Lievin, Angres and Givenchy and could themselves com-
mand no point of attack on Hill 140. Consequently it
was resolved to deliver the main assault on the so-called
Loos-Hulluch-Haines ridges which were not only about
half the height of the hills northwest of Vimy, but were
fronted by an easier country on the west and presented
fewer obstacles generally; this phrase "fewer obstacles"
is nevertheless to be taken merely as a relative expression.

The plain in front of these ridges was sprinkled with
hamlets, mine-heads, and factory buildings of greater
or less size, interspersed with slag heaps, and these and
the other existing advantages presented by the terrain
had been cleverly turned by the Germans into field
fortifications bristling with machine guns and surrounded
by the inevitable barbed wire defences which made it
necessary to take each one of these little forts separately,
in many cases only by hand to hand fighting. Certain
more prominent fortifications existed as well; for instance,
the HohenzoUern redoubt, which has figured so often
in the bulletins, was located about three-quarters of a
mile to the west of St. Elie on the La Bassee-Lens road,
and a little further south, about a mile directly north of
Loos, was another redoubt on the crest of the hill, which
afterwards came to enjoy almost as much fame as the
HohenzoUern redoubt; while, scattered over the western
slopes of the ridge of hills in this direction, were numerous
chalk-pits which had been fortified by the Germans.

Loos itself contained about 12,000 inhabitants prior
to the war, but at the time of this battle was only ten-
anted by a handful of its former inhabitants. But in
Loos, itself, was a bridge known as the "Tower" bridge,
whose girders rose to the height of about 300 feet, and
commanded the coimtry for 40 miles around the town,
which girders were used by the German artillery ob-
servers and gave them a considerable advantage over
their rivals on the other side, since it enabled them to
command the whole coimtry-side without exposing them-
selves. From Loos to Hulluch on the north the distance
is about 3000 yards. As has already been said, north*
west of Hulluch lay the HohenzoUern redoubt, but
between Hulluch and that fortification were a number of

FROM THE SEA TO CHAMPAGNE

stone quaiTies which the Germans had also turned into
strongholds.

From here the German line of advanced trenches
turned abruptly northwest and ran to a deep and well
situated coal pit, whose high and long slag heap extended
to within a half a mile of the village of Auchy. From
this slag heap the German line ran almost directly north
to the La Bassee Canal.

These German trenches were in three lines; the first
running to the west of Loos, the second running through
the town itself, and the third to the east of the town.
These trenches were elaborately constructed and were
furnished with electric light from a power station, as
well as equipped with a telephone system which enabled
the German commanders to keep in communication with
all this portion of the lines. The British trenches south
of the canal, ran parallel to those of the Germans, and at
distances varying from 100 to 500 yards.

The British force occupying these trenches was com-
posed mostly of seasoned troops, though the newly
created Welsh Guards and the 21st and 24th divisions of
Kitchener's new army, took part in the battle. Their
force comprised, in addition to the troops that have
been mentioned, the 1st and 2nd army corps under Sir
Douglas Haig, as the assailing troops, and the 11th army
corps as the reserve, in all, perhaps, from 125,000 to
130,000 men.

In addition to this large force of men concentrated on
a comparatively short front of about 6}4 miles, the
British had provided themselves, during the months
that preceded the attack in question, with an enormous
quantity of large calibre artillery, and they had also
added to their offensive equipment two weapons which
were new for them; firstly, retorts for discharging a
stupefying gas, and secondly, devices for creating large
volumes of irritating and temporarily blinding smoke.
In order to use these two weapons to advantage, it was
necessary for the British to wait for the opening of their
assault on the German positions, for a day whereupon
the wind should not only blow from the west but also
be of sujficient strength to carry the mixture of gas and
smoke these being generated simultaneously across the
distance intervening between the place of its liberation
and the German trenches.

In theory, this mixture of gas and smoke would have
produced a temporary asphyxiation and temporary

FROM THE SEA TO CHAMPAGNE

blindness, more or less complete, on the defenders of the
German trenches; and this condition, once having been
achieved, the rest was expected to be comparatively easy.
While waiting for these propitious atmospheric condi-
tions, the British artillery was not idle but pounded
away continuously on the German trenches. It was not
until Friday, the 24th of September, that a westerly
breeze sprang up. This breeze, however, brought with
it a fine rain with considerable mist, and this, in its turn,
creating mud, neutralized its promise that the succeeding
day would be suitable for the assault, since the mud
would make the ground very difiicult for the infantry
to advance over; a fact which should have been taken
into consideration by a competent commander, but
which, as we shall see later, was not.

CHAPTER II

All the rest of this day Friday, September 24tli, the
British artillery on the north and center of this front,
and the French artillery to the south of it, kept up an
unremitting fire upon the German positions, which was
not even interrupted by the night, and which was prob-
ably as severe a cannonading as had been seen on the
western front up to this time.

The Germans, who, apparently, did not sufifer very
greatly from the effects of this heavy firing, did not reply
in anything like the same volume. Towards midnight,
the cannonading grew slightly less and this slackening
continued until about half past four in the morning. At
this hour, the wind had slightly shifted to the southwest
and was thus no longer as favorable for the success of a
gas and smoke attack as it had been the afternoon of
Friday.

The rain was continuing to fall, and during the night
the ground had grown much heavier. At half past four
the British opened a most intense cannonading. The
cannonading of the evening before had been regarded
as severe, but its severity was relatively slight as com-
pared with that of the bombardment which now began.
Certainly it was the severest artillery assault which the
British bad ever delivered in the course of their military
history and it was probably fully the equal of any artil-
lery assault which had ever been made up to that time
in the war, on any front. It is stated that shells were
fired along the five mile battle front at the rate of 600 a
minute; while the noise was reported to be so terrific in
its volume that persons thirty or forty miles from the
battlefield heard it distinctly. This cannonading con-
tinued unremittingly until about half past five. At this
time the British began to use their gas and smoke appa-
ratus, and in the early morning light its clouds could be
seen issuing from their trenches, but the wind played the
British a trick on the northern portion of their line and
carried the gas and smoke above and over Pit No. 8, the

FROM THE SEA TO CHAMPAGNE

HohenzoUern redoubt, the stone quarries and HuUuch;
though towards Loos and Lievin the smoke cloud
appeared to observers to have been wafted directly.

At half past six, in obedience to a silent signal, the roar
of the British artillery ceased; though that of the French
under General D'Urbal, further south in the direction of
Souchez, could still be heard thundering; and this contin-
uance of this French artillery, rather clearly indicated
that it had not, up to that time, succeeded in plowing a
way for the French Infantry through the mazes of the
German defences which confronted it.

Very curiously, and for themselves very unf ortunately^
as the sequel shows, the British high command paid no
attention to this apparent condition of afifairs on the
French portion of the front (the southern), but gave the
signal for the assault by the British Infantry, and thus
converted what should have been a concerted movement
along the whole front by both forces, British and French
acting as a unit, into a sole action by the British troops
alone. In all probability, this gross blunder had more of
an efifect on the subsequent unfortunate issue of the
battle for the Allies than any other contributing cause^
though other contributing causes did not lack.

As said, then, at half past six the signal of the command
for the British Infantry to advance to the assault was
given, and the soldiers came pouring out of their trenches,
their faces concealed in their smoke masks. But hardly
had the British made their appearance in the open when
so heavy a German fire began that it was at once per-
ceived that the artillery had not made an adequate
preparation for the attack, in spite of 'the number of
hours it had been at work; so that the troops were ordered
to return to the protection of their trenches and immedi-
ately the British artillery reopened on the German
positions, in an even more severe bombardment than the
one which had taken place earlier in the morning. This
bombardment continued for about half an hour, and then,
suddenly ceasing, the word to advance was once more
given.

Between the Bethune and La Bassee Canal, on Pit
No. 8, which, as has been said before, was almost directly
in front of the HohenzoUern redoubt, the assault from
the northwest made no progress; in spite of the fact that
the assailants were veteran troops. The strength of the
German artillery fire in this sector of the battle, both
from La Bassee to the northeast and from the general

FROM THE SEA TO CHAMPAGNE

line between La Bassee and Haines, was so strong that it
was impossible for any headway to be made, and the
British, who fell in thousands, suffered a complete and
sanguinary check.

Further south two brigades were thrown directly
against the HohenzoUem redoubt and its advance
defense Pit No. 8, in a frontal attack. One brigade,
attacking the north of the position, devoted itself prin-
cipally to the HohenzoUern redoubt, while the other,
proceeding against the southerly end of the general
portion, succeeded in throwing itself between the redoubt
and the quarries immediately to the west of the hamlet
of St. Elie, on the La Bassee-Haines road. The fighting
which took place around the redoubt was extremely
violent, as it was also around the slag heap and the
buildings of Pit No. 8. Pit No. 8 and its western defenses
were eventually stormed and seized by the British, but,
in spite of their most desperate efforts, they were unable
to penetrate into the defences of the HohenzoUem
redoubt. Had the troops operating between the banks
of the canal and Pit No. 8 attacking that point from the
north succeeded in effecting the capture of the east-
ern defenses of Pit No. 8, this would probably have nec-
essitated the evacuation of the HohenzoUern redoubt;
but as these troops did not perform the task assigned
to them, nothing threatened the HohenzoUern redoubt
from the north.

Still further south another assault was made in the
direction of the quarries opposite St. Elie. Here the
British troops advanced rapidly and succeeded in cap-
turing the quarries, and then when these were once in
their hands an attempt was made to capture the village
Haines to the northeast of the HohenzoUern redoubt.
After much hard fighting and heavy losses, some British
succeeded in establishing themselves in this village at
about eight o'clock in the morning and in maintaining
themselves there until five in the afternoon, at which
time, being almost cut to pieces by the weight of the
German metal which was poured in upon them from the
east, and also being almost surrounded by the German
infantry, they fell back to their main line.

Another attack struck at St. Elie but was imable to
enter the scattered hamlet of a few houses itself, though
they did at one time attain its outskirts; which position
was reached a few minutes after eight. The German
counter-attacks on this portion of the Une from St. EUe

FROM THE SEA TO CHAMPAGNE

northwest grew stronger and stronger and it became
apparent that if the British intended to hold the positions
which they had won it was evident that they must be
heavily reinforced.

With that curious misfortune which has attended all
British movements in battle so far, during this war,
where the British depend upon their own generals for
the strategy and tactics of the fights, it was discovered
too late that the reserves of these forces, the 20th and
21st divisions of the new army, had been placed so far
to the rear that they could not be gotten up in time to
influence the result of the fight. Though ordered to
advance at 9.30 in the morning, so far back had they
been carefully stationed, that it was nearly noon when the
heads of their advancing columns reached a line to the
west, approximately five miles from the battle line, and
it was late in the afternoon before they reached a point
at which they could be of any influence in deciding the
battle; and then as usual it was "too late."

Another force, composed entirely of the Guards, was
also ordered to reinforce the British battle line on its left
wing, but this force of Guards did not reach the line
five miles to the rear, already spoken of, on their way to
the front, until the first darkness of evening had begun
to fall. Still, another division stationed at Bailleul in
the south, also ordered up to reinforce the British lines,
in this sector, never reached those lines at all.

In the center the British were more fortunate. The
force here was composed most largely of the Fourth
Army Corps, under Sir Henry Rawlinson, and, curiously
enough, were in considerable part composed of members
of Kitchener's so-called "new army." The advance here
began at half past six in the morning, and in the early
portion of the advance the British were considerably
aided by the gas and smoke which, as has already been
stated, was launched before the attack began. In the
center the attack on Hulluch was made by two brigades,
with one brigade in reserve. The first brigade to the
north advanced very rapidly, capturing several guns on
its way and in a short time penetrated into the environs
of the village of Hulluch. But the brigade advancing
south was not so fortunate, since it ran into a consider-
able extent of wire entanglements which the British
preliminary bombardment had not destroyed. This
delayed the advance of this brigade until the afternoon.
Finally, after hard fighting, a portion of the brigade to

FROM THE SEA TO CHAMPAGNE

the north succeeded in turning from the north and
northeast these wire entanglements and in driving their
defenders out, after which the advance of the second
brigade was resumed but did not proceed any very great
distance before it became involved in the very desperate
fighting which was then going on in the outskirts of
Hulluch.

Still further south the advance was made by a High-
land division, the 15th, which also began its assault at
about half past six in the morning. By eight o'clock
their southern brigade captured the chalk pits, as well as
Pit No. 14 and Hill No. 70, with the redoubt crowning it;
thus occupying about half a mile of the central portion
of the road between Hulluch and^Lens; some advance
guards of this force even reached the hamlet of St.
Auguste, a mile to the east on the road from Lens to
Annay.

The northern brigade, in the meantime, had taken the
redoubt on Hill 69, a mile north of Loos, and then,
turning south, was assaulting Loos itself. A portion of
this brigade, however, turned at the north and came to
the aid of the troops in difiiculties in the wire entangle-
ments south of Hulluch already spoken of. For the next
hour and a half this division in its entirety was subjected
to a frightful fire from the German machine guns,
located not only in Loos itself, but further east and in the
environs of Lens, which played both on their front and
rear. Towards half past nine the position of these
troops became desperate, but the only reinforcements
which could be sent them were a small force of artillery
which advanced to their aid from the southwest.

Another brigade of the new army was also somewhat
later ordered to the relief of this Highland division, but
did not come up to them until long after the battle had
concluded.

Further south there had started out about the same
time in the morning from their original trenches in
Greny two brigades of London Territorials, who were
considerably aided in their advance by the smoke and gas
which was discharged before their assault. After a
hard fight, they dislodged the Germans from their posi-
tions on the byroad which led northeast from Greny to
the Bethune-Lens road. Particularly hard fighting took
place around Pit No. 5, and an old mill, which were
located near the point where this byroad joins the
Bethune-Lens road. After taking these, these two

FROM THE SEA TO CHAMPAGNE

brigades crossed the Bethune-Lens road and advanced
towards Loos to the northeast. Between Loos and this
road, however, was located the cemetery of the town^
which the Germans had turned into a veritable fortress
armed at every point with machine guns. A long, hard
fight ensued here, but finally towards noon the cemetery
was carried by storm, and this brought these London
Territorials to a point from whence, attacking from the
south and west, with the Highlanders simultaneously
attacking from the north and east, a general assault
upon the town of Loos could be delivered. The Ger-
mans, however, resisted strenuously; — not only was
there street fighting, but house to house fighting; and
the cellars, even, of the houses were turned into im-
promptu fastnesses: so that it was not until late in the
morning, after a struggle of unrelenting bitterness,
involving enormous casualties, that the British troops
were able to clear the town of their enemies, nor was it till
one o'clock that they were in possession of the ruins of
the place.

There had been, perhaps, on the western front, up to
this time, no single struggle of any size which had been so
desperately fought inch by inch as was the combat
which took place in Loos this first day of the battle.

CHAPTER III

While these events were taking place on this British
portion of the front, the morning of this first day of the
battle, to the south of them, on a line, roughly speaking,
south of Greny to Souchez and Neuville-St.-Vaast, the
French were engaged heavily; but here again an unfortu-
nate incident occurred which seriously compromised the *
Allied hope of winning the objectives for which they were
contending.

It has been previously remarked that when the British
started from their trenches earlier in the morning and the
sound of their artillery had ceased, the noise of that of the
French to the south could still be heard. Prior to the
advance of the British, General D'Urbal had notified
General French that the French artillery had not yet
succeeded in hacking down the German defences to such
an extent that neither General Foch nor himself consid-
ered it wise to give the order for the French infantry to
advance. In spite of this warning, however, that their
allies were not ready to advance, and also in spite of
knowing that for the general movement to be successful
it must advance as a coherent whole and not in dis-
jointed parts, the British persisted in starting their
infantry forward at the hour which had been originally
fixed. Whose fault this was, cannot be said. But as
the British high command has since this battle chosen
to ascribe the comparative failure of the movement to
the slowness of the French generals in advancing their
infantry, it seems well to call attention to the fact that
the British had full knowledge that the French were not
prepared to advance, when they advanced themselves,
and that the consequent exposure of the British right
wing to a flank attack, owing to the fact that the French
line was not for six or eight hours in that position as
regards this British right wing, in which it had been
expected to be, was a risk which the British command had
taken upon itself.

The French continued their artillery poimding all the

FROM THE SEA TO CHAMPAGNE

morning and did not attempt any infantry advance until
twelve thirty when the infantry was hurled forward on
Souchez. On their left, the French charged down the
eastern slope of Notre Dame de Lorette, the hill which
had been so fought over a few months before, and cross-
ing the Hasche wood to the east of the Souchez-Aix
road, pushed its advance as far as the Souchez brook
which runs here southwest from Lievin through Souchez
to Carency. This advance, however, was not achieved
without considerable losses, because not only were these
French troops ceaselessly shelled by the German bat-
teries at Anglers, Lievin and Givenchy to the east of
them, but also because the Germans had installed many
machine gun defences on the battle terrain itself, which
took their tribute of the advancing foes before they
were stormed and captured.

South of Souchez, the French line advanced in strength
on the chateau of Cailul immediately to the south of
the town, on the cemetery a little further south, and at a
point known as the Cabaret Rouge near the cemetery;
while, in unison with this movement, infantry in serried
masses was thrown forward down the lower slopes of
Hill 1 19. Extremely hot fighting took place on this front.

The cemetery was taken, lost, retaken and relost;
while the infantry on Hill 119 was held up by machine
gun fire of such intensity that it was impossible to
advance against it; and the batteries on the line of Vimy
to the east poured an almost ceaseless stream of pro-
jectiles on the French who were attempting to move in
its direction. This desperate fighting went on until
darkness came and left the French no more advanced
than the positions they had attained in their first rush,
while Souchez and the cemetery were still in large part
in the hands of their enemies.

We will now return to the English portion of the line.
In the center, towards one o'clock, the Highlanders and
the London Territorials, as has been said, were in pos-
session of Hill 70, with the redoubt on its corner, and the
outskirts of the village of St. Auguste, whose position
has been herein above described.

The Crown Prince of Bavaria chose this time for launch-
ing a counter-attack upon the British in these positions
which had been in the hands of the British for so short
a time that they had not had a chance to fortify them-
selves therein. The result was that, having no shelter
from the German artillery, they were obliged to give

FROM THE SEA TO CHAMPAGNE

ground slowly, but with the result that by night-fall
they had been forced out of St. Auguste; andHiUTO, as
well as its redoubt, had returned to their original
possessors.

All this first day the rain had continued, but during the
night it stopped and the following morning it was clear.
In the center the Highlanders; who had been driven ofif
of Hill 70 the night before and who during the night had
made two other counter-attacks without success to
recover it,, after artillery preparation again made a
desperate attack on the German positions on this hill and
had the support of two divisions of Kitchener's new
army in this attempt. This attack, however, yielded no
better results than the two which took place in the night.
Towards noon the Germans, in their turn, attacked the
British positions and succeeded in driving them out of
Pit No. 14 and repossessing themselves thereof.

At this time the only advantage which the British had
gained on their portion of the front was the possession
of the village of Loos, and into this village, during the
afternoon, they threw a very considerable force of troops.
During this second afternoon, attacks were made by the
British on Hulluch and at other points on the line, but
except northeast of Hulluch where the quarries to the
West of St. Elie were again recaptured by the British,
they having been previously driven out, there were no
changes in position until on the morning of the 26th.

On the French portion of the line, south of the British
the French finally succeeded in establishing themselves
during the day of the 26th in the terrain to the east of
the Hasche wood. Souchez had been completely evac-
uated by the German^, presumably owing to the useless
cost of defending it, and the German troops which left
it had taken up their positions on the western slopes of
Hills 119 and 140.

This was all that occurred on the French section of
the line that day, involving any change of the respective
positions. Continuous hand to hand fighting, however,
took place on the advanced lines.

Monday, September 27, the day broke cloudy and in
the afternoon a pom-ing rain set in. The Germans, who
attached great importance to the continued possession of
the heights of Vimy which were the real French objective,
threw reinforcements of the Prussian Guard into this
terrain. The French remained quiet most of the day

FROM THE SEA TO CHAMPAGNE

preparing themselves for the general attack which they
intended to launch the following day.

On the British portion of the front the British Guards
division was brought up to Loos. These Guards, com-
prising two brigades on the advanced line, and a third
brigade in reserve, with the London Territorials on their
right, were intended to be launched in an attack on Hill
70 and its redoubt. Pit No. 14, and on the woods and
chalk pits to the south and also towards the town of
Lens which the British were exceedingly anxious to take.

The attack was launched at about 4 P. M. by the
Irish Guards. To the south of them the Scotch Guards
crossed the road between Hulluch and Loos and attempt-
ed to advance to Pit No. 14. A tremendous fight took
place. The Scotch Guards pressed on and reached the
buildings around Pit No. 14, while the Irish Guards,
after many vicissitudes, succeeded in capturing a portion
of the territory they had been ordered to take. To the
north of the Irish Guards the Coldstream Guards, stand-
ing up against intense machine gun fire, managed to
advance in the direction of the chalk pits, but by night-
fall these troops had been driven by the Germans com-
pletely out of Pit No. 14 and its abutments, so that the
Guards had only succeeded in capturing a portion of the
chalk pits, and, digging themselves in from this position
back towards Loos. The attack on Hill 70 was under-
taken by the Third Guards brigade. This advance, as
soon as it entered the trenches which led upwards
towards Hill 70, was attacked by gas, but pressed on
until it reached the summit of the hill. Here they
were met by a strong German fire against which it was
impossible for them to maintain themselves and they fell
back to positions below the crest of the hill where they
entrenched and remained until evening of the 29th.

To the north of the scene of the Guards' action, on
Hill 70, last mentioned, the Germans launched an attack
on the British position in the buildings of Pit No. 8,
southeast of the Hohenzollern redoubt. Hard fighting
ensued, but, in spite of their desperate struggles, the
British were slowly forced back and finally in the after-
noon obliged to relinquish their position and fall back to
the northwest.

The following day, the 28th, the Guards, not being
satisfied with the failure of their efifort on the preceding
day to retake Pit No. 14, in the afternoon made another
attack thereon from the southwest, and in this attack

FROM THE SEA TO CHAMPAGNE

^ere supported by large numbers of British machine
^ guns whose fire was concentrated on the environs of the
pit, particularly to the east, as well as by heavy rifle
firing from the trenches behind them. The Guards
reached Pit No. 14 after extraordinary exertions, being
opposed not only by a very strenuous defence by the
^nemy, but also by the very heavy condition of the
ground. But on reaching this point, the Guards were un-
able to maintain the ground they had won, so heavy was
the artillery fire the Germans threw in upon them, and,
consequently, they fell back to their original positions.

With the failure of this attack it may be said that the
British portion of the battle of Loos ended. The British
had captured, as the net result, the town of Loos, but had
failed to capture any of their other objectives, and the
satisfaction of the taking of this unimportant (consid-
ered by itself) town had cost them, as was afterwards
admitted, over 60,000 casualties. To offset this, they
had taken perhaps, all told, 3000 prisoners and had
inflicted a loss on their enemy of, as far as we are able
to judge at the present time, about one-third in casual-
ties of that which they themselves had suffered.

The cardinal fact, however, of this battle, so far as the
British are concerned, is that once more the incompe-
tency of the British commanders had been made manifest
to the world. It is doubtful whether in any battle in
modern history, at least, grosser errors in the most
elementary dispositions of an order of battle had been
committed by even semi-trained commanders, and it
seems in this fight as though every chance wherein a
blunder was possible was taken the fullest advantage of.
The rank and file fought well and the troops of Kitchener's
new army showed a steadiness and courage which, for
troops of such comparatively little training, was extra-
ordinary. It seems a great pity that 60,000 of these
troops should have been forced to play the roll of a mon-
ument to incompetency.

The complete demoralization of the English com-
manders and of the English forces after the end of this
battle is convincingly evidenced by the fact that the next
day after an interview between Gen. Foch commanding
the French troops and Sir John French, all the southern
portion of the battle line held by the British including
the town of Loos was taken over completely by the
French troops which Gen. Foch sent up from his south*
erly wing for the purpose.

CHAPTER IV

We will now turn to see what was happening to the
French while the events that we have narrated were
taking place on the British portion of the front. The
whole of September 27th was spent by Gen. d'Urbal in
assuming the positions which, as we have seen, the
French had succeeded in capturing in their first onslaught
on the slopes of Hills 123 and 140 between Neuville
Saint Vaast and Souchez and between Souchez and
Angres, to the east of Bois en Hasch.

On the 28th of September a several days' battle began
by an attack by the French troops on the Prussian
Guards on the westerly side of the Vimy Heights; that
is to say, on Hill 140 itself. This attack gradually spread
towards the North until it reached the outskirts of
Angres. The positions were desperately fought over
and the line swayed to and fro, now ground being gained
by one side here and there, and almost immediately
recaptured by a counter-attack of the other side along
the whole length of the front. It is impossible to give
more than the outlines of this fighting because the
advances were counted in feet almost, were lost so rap-
idly and possibly again regained. Nevertheless in
Givenchy Wood to the east of Souchez the French
gained slowly but surely, and when, the offensive fin-
ished, about the 10th of October, they had possessed
themselves practically of the whole of this wood and had
even extended their line a little to the northeast of the
wood towards Angres and had succeeded in installing
themselves on the westward slopes of Hill 140, after a
sustained effort of desperate character lasting over days.

On October 3rd, the Germans opened a severe bom-
bardment of the British front from the southerly end of
their line as far north as the La Bassee Canal. This was
followed by an infantry attack on the British trenches
between the HuUuch quarries and the road leading from
Vermelles to HuUuch. While not successful every-
where, the Germans did succeed in driving the British

FROM THE SEA TO CHAMPAGNE

out of the HohenzoUern redoubt to the northwest of the
quarries, and thus repossessed themselves of this impor-
tant field work.

On October 8th another hard fight with the British
took place on the line from Hill No. 70 to the north of the
HohenzoUern redoubt. The Germans gained a little,
but on the whole the fight can be called indecisive,
though both sides suffered heavy casualties.

Thereafter, on this portion of the western end of the
western battle front, before the November fogs and
rains settled upon the scene, there was no particular
activity except on one occasion, towards the middle of
October, on the 14th, to be precise, when the British on
the hne from near Ypres, southeastwardly towards Loos,
made an attack preceded by smoke and gas clouds,
along nearly the entire front. This attack began early
in the morning under favorable conditions of the wind
which carried the gas and smoke clouds straight to the
German trenches. Under cover of this, the British suc-
ceeded, to the immediate north of Loos, in capturing
about 1000 yards of German trenches, including the
major portion of the HohenzoUern redoubt which figured
so prominently in the fighting in this neighborhood in
the battle of Loos itself. Towards midnight, however,
the Germans rallied and launching a desperate counter
attack succeeded in driving back the English to the
position which they had held in the morning when this
action opened.

Of course during all these autumn months, from Ypres
past the great ''L'' bend of the western battle line to the
Champagne, there was more or less skirmishing, some of
which occasionally developed into a fight of some local
consequence, interspersed with artillery duels. But
there were no movements which are of sufficient impor-
tance to be gone into in detail. Suffice it to say that
none of these activities materially changed the position
of the respective battle lines.

In the early days of November, the scheme of having
only one General Staff for the French and British forces
fighting in France was initiated and Gen. Joffre assumed
the supreme command of both forces, but this did not
produce satisfactory results. Finally, on the 15th of
December, the dissatisfaction caused to Gen. Sir John
French by this anomalous situation was ended by his
removal from his command, and Lieut. Gen. Sir Douglas
Haig was appointed to succeed him. It has been indeed

FROM THE SEA TO CHAMPAGNE

said that the British authorities had, as early as the end
of August, 1915, determined upon retiring Gen. French
from his command, but, owing to their inability to agree
upon his successor, this intention was not carried out
until this time. Gen. French's retirement cannot be
fairly said to be in the nature of a disgrace. At the time
the war broke out he was the only British General of
sujfficient rank, whose record in South Africa in the last
war in which Great Britain had been engaged, justified
even the hope that he was of sufficient military ability
to assume the general command in the present war.
But General French was essentially a cavalry leader and
the campaigns of the west in this war have not been of
a character in harmony with his prior experience, and^
furthermore, he was hampered in every conceivable way,
by those in control of the government at home, partic-
ularly in having only quarter trained troops, with even
less trained officers, sent to him with the order to accomp-
lish the wonderful results the British nation believed
should be accomplished on its behalf.

History will possibly not be hard on Gen. French, and
very probably will rate him as better than the average
field commander, though almost completely lacking in
those qualities of the strategist and of the army com-
mander which the situation in which he was placed
called for. His worst fault in his tenure of the chief
command of the British troops in France was that he
did not seem to have the ability to grow and expand in
proportion to the importance and difficulty of the mili-
tary employment entrusted to him. Sir Douglas Haig,
who took up the command in succession to French had
shown some ability as a field commander in the opera-
tions of the war prior to his appointment to the chief
command, and has also the advantage of being ten years
younger than Sir John.

After this change, quietness reigned on the whole of
this portion of the front for some weeks, which was per-
haps natural, since the whole of this Flanders-Picardy
front is low ground and much more subject to rain than
snow in early winter, so that no great degree of cold
being obtained, and frequent thaws taking place, the
ground becomes for most of the time, and remains even
in the cold season, to a considerable degree, a morass of
mud in which it is impossible to move troops or artillery.

Towards the end of December, Great Britain an-
nounced the withdrawal of most of her native Indian

FROM THE SEA TO CHAMPAGNE

troops from the western front. The selndian troops had
been a disappointment. In Great Britain^s past fighting
with semi-civilized tribes, wherein the fighting was of
the so-called open order, and quickly over, the Indian
troops had always done their share of the work and had;
on many occasions, manifested great bravery, fortitude
and endurance; but after the early days of the fighting
on this western front, and after trench fighting started
in, it became more and irore apparent that the Indian
troops did not have the morale necessary to stand the
continual pounding of the artillery to which they were
daily subjected, and they also appeared to be adversely
affected by the climatic conditions.

As a result, many of them became afflicted with mel-
ancholy, and suicides among them were not infrequent,
while others sought to escape from service by blowing
off some of their toes or fingers. Indeed, so prevalent
did this mutilation become, that the severest forms of
punishment were resorted to in order to deter others
from following the example of those self-mutilators; but,
in spite of all the preventive measures of one kind and
another that were attempted, the condition of the
Indian troops grew steadily worse and their withdrawal
from this front was in large measure forced.

^Most of January was also fairly quiet, though there
was an increase in the number and size of the semi-
occasional skirmishes. Towards the end of January the
Germans began an offensive movement northward from
Arras which centered around the halfway point of the
road leading from Arras to Lens, and extended as far
west as a parallel road to the Arras-Lens road running
from Neuville-St.-Vaast to Givenchy-en-Gohelle, which
latter village is really the eastern end of the two-mile
long village of Souchez, which borders a highway running
at right angles to the last mentioned road.

All of these places are mining villages, located in a
generally flat and very uninteresting country and all
have been almost since the early days of the war the
scene of almost continuous fighting. Neuville-Saint-
Vaast, which has probably been mentioned as often in
the bulletins as any other single town on the western
front, is about six miles directly north of Arras, and
directly to the east thereof is the famous "Labyrinth'^ so
long and so bitterly fought over in the spring and early
summer of 1915.

The Germans opened the fighting by a successful

FROM THE SEA TO CHAMPAGNE

attack on the French positions east and northeast of
Neuville, wherein they gained considerable ground and
took many prisoners on January 25th, and followed this
up on the 31st by taking and holding the La Folie wood,
a little further to the northeast of the positions taken on
the 25th, thus extending their lines to the north.

The French made valiant counter-attacks during these
days, but failed to regain the lost territory. The Ger-
mans continued to ''nibble'' at the French positions all
this month and made steady progress in improving their
positions, though on any particular day their gains were
slight.

Most notable of their advances were, perhaps, the
capture by them on February 10th of about a mile front
of the French trenches between Neuville-Saint-Vaast
and Vimy, which advantage was followed up the next
day by the capture of another mile of French trenches to
the northwest of Vimy. Subsequently, the interval in
the hands of the French between these two miles of
trenches was wrested from them, and these conquests
united. Other successful nibbles followed. Finally
on February 1st the Germans delivered an attack in force
against the French trenches stretching north and south
nearly parallel to the northern part of the road running
from Givenchy-en-Gohelle to Neuville-Saint-Vaast to
the east of Souchez, and succeeded in carrying the first
line trenches over this whole front and the second line
over a portion.

The result of all these advances was that on the first
of March, when this record closes, the Germans had
pushed their way well to the west of Hills Nos. 140 and
119 and were within a mile of the cemetery at Souchez,
thus having recovered approximately three fifths of the
territory in this region to the west of Vimy, which the
French offensive of late September and October had won.

CHAPTER V

During January there was also some more or less heavy
fighting south of the Somme river and in the Ypres
sector, but as this fighting had but very minor conse-
quences, it need not be here described.

Elswhere on this long front, during these months, there
were numerous small fights. Hardly any of them, how-
ever, deserve more than casual mention. On November
7th at Boesinghe there was a struggle of considerable
size just at the point where the French army to the east
of the English took contact with the British line. Again
on February 12th and on February 20th there was
fierce fighting at this point, and the Germans succeeded
in gaining some ground to the southeast of Boesinghe.

On the British front to the east of Boesinghe, as far
as Loos, during this period, only mining and artillery
actions took place. In the Ypres salient on December
19th the Germans made a gas attack on the Allied
positions on the northeast of the salient, but no ground
was gained, though there was some severe fighting.
After this episode, the line here relapsed into its accus-
tomed quiet, as far as infantry actions were concerned,
until the 11th of February, when the Germans began to
bombard the trenches to the east of Boesinghe, which
bombardment was continued the next day, and followed
by some slight infantry fighting.

On the 13th of February the Germans attacked the
Hooge end, the northeastern, of the salient, and blew
up a trench which had been much in evidence in the
bulletins of the fighting at this point, known as the
International Trench, and took possession of it; and
fighting went on in this immediate vicinity until the
second of March, when the English recaptured it. On
the rest of this front from Ypres to Loos, there was con-
tinual trench and bomb fighting during the period under
consideration, but these skirmishes produced no results
of any moment whatever. The only one which deserves
mention is the capture of the small village of Friese on

FROM THE SEA TO CHAMPAGNE

the left bank of the Somme to the west of Peronne, from
which, after a stiff fight, on the twenty-eighth of Jan-
uary, the Germans succeeded in driving the French.

Of course it is to be understood that when one uses
the expressions "calm" or "quiet" in respect to these
fronts that expression is not to be taken in a literal sense.
The average civilian, had he been on any portion of this
front during the time under review, would have found
conditions fully as lively as he would have desired; the
constant booming of the artillery, the occasional violent
bomb fighting, the trench raids from time to time, and
the aerial attacks which both sides made at intervals on
each other's positions, would have seemed to this civilian
very real activity. Which view would have been to a
very considerable extent justified, by the size of the lists
of casualties which took place on the "quiet" or "calm"
front.

On the whole, however, the end of the six months
found the relative positions of the belligerents, on this
whole front, imchanged from what they were at the
beginning.

CHAPTER VI
IN CHAMPAGNE

From Arras to Alsace, nearly the whole of the month
of September passed comparatively quietly; only un-
eventful clashes either of infantry or of artillery, of not
more than local importance, took place. This was,
however, merely the traditional calm before the storm.

General de Castelnau, on the 25th of September, began
a French offensive on the line extending from Suippes to
the west through Perthes-les-Hures and Beausejour to
Massiges. This offensive was planned to be executed
both chronologically and strategically in unison with
the British and French offensive north of Arras which
we have already described, and really was intended to
be in support of that movement. Delivered in force it
was expected that its violence would be such that it
would diminish the German power of sending reserves
to the other front in that it would create a very urgent
call for these reserves upon this Champagne front, which
was about 20 miles in length.

On the 22d of September the French artillery began
a bombardment of the German first line trenches over
this 20 mile front, at an early hour in the morning, and
continued this bombardment for sixty hours. While
not so severe perhaps as the bombardment on the Loos
front, it was the severest which had been experienced
on this portion of the line and it succeeded in destroying
practically completely the first line of German trenches.

On the 25th, as soon as day broke, the bombardment
having continued the entire previous night, the French
infantry left their trenches and began a simultaneous
charge over the whole front and after only a few hours
fighting were in complete possession of the entire German
first line of trenches, which had been largely destroyed
by the sixty hours bombardment above mentioned, but
when this infantry came to attempt an attack on the

IN CHAMPAGNE

second line of German defenses, in spite of their des-
perate gallantry and their tenacity in advancing, they
were unable to progress materially, so that all the gain
which was made this day was made in the first short
rush. The fighting lasted all day and when night fell
the French troops were still in undisputed possession
of the first line of German trenches which, during the
night, they turned against their enemies and succeeded
in consolidating their position preparatory to the assump-
tion of the offensive the next day.

But, in place of the French taking the offensive, on
the 26th of September, it was begun by the Germans
who launched counter-attacks in great strength on the
positions which the French had won from them the day
before. These counter-attacks continued all day and
were replied to by the French. Some of the fiercest
fighting which had been seen even in this well fought
over district resulted, and the line swayed to and fro
without any permanent gain at any point for either side.
Summing up the results of this hard fighting, it may be
said here that they were negative, because, while the
German counter-attacks checked the French progress
and halted the French advance, they gained no ground
themselves permanently, so that when the night fell
the enemies were in the same relative positions that they
were twenty-four hours previously.

The 27th of September was much the same as the 26th;
continual hard fighting, oftentimes coming to hand to
hand struggles; but, except for slight French gains near
Massiges on the extreme right of the French line, there
was no change at all in the relative positions of the lines.
Up to the conclusion of this day's fighting, the French
had captured about 12,000 German prisoners, while the
Germans in their counter attacks had taken something
like 3,500 French. Both sides had suffered heavy loss
in casualties.

On September 28th and 29th bitter fighting continued
without intermission and was particularly severe in the
neighborhood of Beausejour, southeast of Tahure, and
in the immediate northern outskirts of Massiges, but
was without result as far as modifying the positions
theretofore occupied by the opponents was concerned.

The 30th of September the battle grew fiercer aroimd
Massiges. The French captured Hill 191 immediately
north of that hamlet, and also succeeded in driving their
line forward on the road from Ville sur Tourbe, a couple

IN CHAMPAGNE

of miles to the east of Massiges, about three miles towards
the north, and in capturing the village of Cemay en
Dormois. The casualties in this fighting were very large
on both sides in proportion to the nimaber of men en-
gaged. The same day very hard fighting developed
around Souain to the west of Perthes and about three
miles to the south of St.-Marie-a-Py, a little to the west
of Souain. Up to this time, however, in spite of the
lavish expenditure of life, there had been neither strategic
nor tactical gains made by either side, and the opponents
were still in practically the same relative positions as
they were when this determined French attack began.
This portion of the Champagne region is called the
Champagne Pouilleuse, on account of the character of
the soil which, when it rains, is converted into extremely
and persistently sticky mud. On two days of the
offensive considerable rain had fallen, which made the
operations of the troops even more difi&cult than they
would have been ordinarily.

CHAPTER VII

On the first of October the positions reached in Cham-
pagne by this fighting were about as follows: The
immediate objective of Gen. de Castelnau's offensive
had been the railroad running from Bazancourt through
Challerange, which railroad connected the army of
von Einem to the west and the army of the Crown
Prince to the east, and from [which Irailroad the French
lines at this time were distant between Dontrien on the
west and Manre on the east, four miles to the south
on the average. To this railroad from the French lines
there was one avenue of approach by the road which
leads northward through Auberive, another by a road
running through St.-Hilaire-le-Grand, both of which
roads join and touch the railroad at St. Souplet. Further
east from Souain another road runs north to the railroad
at Somme-Py, and a fourth still further to the east runs
northward from Perthes through Tahure, and thence
westwardly to Somme-Py, and finally by another road
still further to the east, which runs from Ville-sur-Tourbe
through Cernay to Vosseres. The Germans were in
Auberive on the first mentioned road and in Cernay on
the last mentioned road, but on the St. Hilaire road they
had been forced back to a point near a place called the
Epine about half way between St. Hilaire and St. Souplet
and on the road from Perthes to Somme-Py, as far north
as Tahure. On the Souain-Somme-Py road, the Ger-
mans had also been driven back to a point near the
Navarin Farm, about half way between Souain and
Somme-Py.

From "the Epine" on the St. Hilaire road to Tahure
the line of German trenches ran almost due east and
west with a salient projecting southeast from Tahure,
as far as a point known locally as Trapeze, about one
mile to the northeast of Perthes. Behind Tahure was
the so-called Butte de Tahure, a hill rising between the
village and the railroad, from which latter it was a little
over one mile distant. Gen. de Castelnau's primary ob-

IN CHAMPAGNE

jective therefore, was to drive in this salient projecting
southward from Tahure and to capture Tahure and its
hill.

On September 30th the French made an attack which
gained ground on the southerly side of this salient; the
Germans replying later in the day with two counter-
attacks which were unsuccessful in recovering the lost
ground. The next day, October 1st, the Frenc^i made
an effort along the St. Hilaire road, and to the east of it,
along a line between Auberive and ''the Epine,'' and
gained a very little ground.

That day, and for the next four or five succeeding days,
hard fighting went on in the Tahure salient, and violent
attacks were made on the Trapeze, and a position
known as the "Courtine" to the northeast of it. These
attacks, which had no marked result, lasted until October
5th. After this combat the French rested for a couple
of days, but on October 7th resumed the attack on
Tahure and its hill. A violent struggle raged all day,
in the course of which seven German trenches, one line
behind the other, were taken between the village of
Tahure and the southerly slopes of the hill, which was
captured.

The French now being in position to do so from
Tahiu-e itself, the next day attacked southeastwardly
and captured the Trapeze, taking a couple of hundred
prisoners here as well as a large number in Tahure.
While this fight was going on in the Tahure region,
another rather warm combat took place around the
Navarin Farm on the Souain-Somme-Py road, where
the French, after gaining some ground and capturing
about 500 prisoners, were driven back by machine guns
to their original trenches. In the night of October 9th
and 10th, the Germans attacked the French trenches
east of Navarin Farm, and the next day made a strong
effort to recapture the hill of Tahure, but were unsuc-
cessful. The next three days (the 10th, 11th and 12th),
were days of continual but isolated combats in the
vicinity of Tahure, in which the French made some
progress to the north and southeast of this village.

On October 18th, after a three hours' artillery prepa-
ration, the Germans onade an attack on the French posi-
tions between La Pompelle near Rheims and Prosnes
to the west of Auberive, with the intention of diverting
the French from fiu-ther attacks on the Tahure front.
The following day this artillery attack was resumed and

IN CHAMPAGNE

a gas attack was also made, behind which the German
infantry advanced, and succeeded in gaining a foothold
in the French trenches. A desperate combat took place
which lasted several hours, and towards nightfall the
French, in a desperate counter-attack, succeeded in
recovering their lost positions. The next day an attack
was made on Prosnes in considerable strength by the
GermajpLS. The fighting lasted all day, and at first the
attack was successful and the French first line positions
were taken. But reinforcements came to the French
who recovered their lost positions by nightfall. Another
hard battle took place near Prunay the next day but
was indecisive in its results. In both of these fights
the casualties were unusually severe.

On October 22nd another counter-attack was made
by the Germans on the hill of Tahure and two days
later the French captured the Courtine, south of Tahure
and east of the Trapeze, with 200 prisoners, but only
held this position until the following day when the
Germans counter-attacked and recovered the center of
the position and on the 30th of October succeeded in
recovering it completely.

On October 30th a general attack was made on a line
from the Souain road to Ville Tourbe, by the Germans,
whose effort was made particularly to recapture the hill
of Tahure and the village of the same name. The artil-
lery preparation for this attack began at 11 A. M. and
continued until four in the afternoon, at which time the
German Infantry came into action and was successful in
recapturing the hill of Tahure and with it about 1,300
French. On the next day, October 31st, this attack was
continued, and a violent battle raged along the whole
line, but the Germans could make no further headway,
and lost some 300 in prisoners.

The following day the attack at this portion of the
front was abandoned by the Germans who concentrated
their fronts on the French position near Massiges, near
"The Hand,'' south of the Fort of Defeat, and for several
days, November 3rd, 4th and 5th, the fighting con-
tinued severe aroimd this point, but without particular
result. On November 10th, however, the Germans
made another effort to eject the French from Tahure
village, which was not successful.

From now on until the end of December there was a
lull in this section of the front, only broken by a fight

IN CHAMPAGNE

to the east of Auberive on December 7th, and another
near Hill No. 193, both of which were indecisive.

On the 27th of December another effort was made by
the Germans to capture Tahure, the Maisons de Cham-
pagne Farm and The Hand north of Massiges, already
spoken of, which positions extend in a line southeast
from the hill of Tahure. In this fight which lasted three
days the Germans did gain considerable ground in the
vicinity of Maisons de Champagne, and captured quite
a number of prisoners. Another lull ensued in the
fighting, which lasted into the second week in January,
though there was some minor skirmishing around
Tahure in the meantime.

About the 7th of January a hot fight began near
Massiges in this district which developed into a veritable
battle lasting four days, in which both sides claimed
the victory. The net result appears to have been that
the Germans who held the offensive captured a certain
number of French trenches and took about 2,000 pris-
oners, as well as some artillery, though as the fighting ^
was extremely desperate their casualties were very
considerable.

After this battle quietness again reigned until the last
days of January, when more fighting on a reasonably
large scale began, but only continued for a couple of
days. This fighting was general all over this front, and
appears to have achieved no particularly decisive re-
sults, though the Germans took quite a number of
prisoners.

Again a period of inaction followed, broken, however,
on February 10th by a German attack in some force to
the northeast of the Butte de Mesnil, and near St.
Marie-a-Py. In this fight the Germans gained con-
siderable ground around St. Marie-a-Py and some
ground near Tahure, but made no progress to speak of
in the Butte de Mesnil region, though again having the
advantage in the number of prisoners taken.

After this fighting quieted down, nothing happened
of any importance imtil February 25th, when the lYench
made a surprise attack on the German trenches south of
St. Marie-a-Py, and won these trenches in part taking
an appreciable number of prisoners. Not to be out-
done however on the 28th of February the Germans
started a drive in this region with the much fought over
Navarin farm as its objective. This drive succeeded
and the entire farm with a mile of French trenches on

IN CHAMPAGNE

either side, fell into the hands of the attackers who also
took some fifteen hundred prisoners, besides artillery.
The next day the French counter-attacked viciously but
unsuccessfully and the Germans remained masters of
the field.

In the Argonne forest region to the east of the Cham-
pagne positions ceaseless trench warfare went on the
whole six months, varied with occasional bombing
attacks or the explosion of mines, there being an enor-
mous amount of subterraneous activity. But these
forms of fighting though producing a very high casualty
list, and calling for great fertility of resource, courage
and endurance on the part of the participants therein,
do not, as a rule, give rise to incidents of more than very
local importance, and hence do not afford material for
the chronicler.

CHAPTER VIII
VERDUN

On February 21, 1916, about 7 o'clock in the morning,
the Germans began an attack on that fortified area to
which we give the name of Verdun, and opened what was
to prove one of the longest and bloodiest episodes of the
war.

In the early part of the war an effort had been made by
the Germans to take Verdun just previous to the battle
of the Marne, but had not been long persisted in and
also had not been successful. Verdun is one of the two
main important strategic points in the whole series of
French defenses against Germany. This has been rec-
ognized for generations, and the fall of this place into
the hands of an enemy, or of an invader, has usually been
followed by the rest of France sharing its fate. The town
of Verdun gives its name to this defense, which today is
really a fortified area of about 200 square miles and not
merely the forts immediately surrounding the town, and
the citadel. The defenses of this area are thoroughly
modern; in fact, had been constructed in the 12 months
preceding this attack upon it. The French generals had
noticed the results of the heavy artillery attacks against
the fortresses of Liege, Namur, Antwerp and Maubeuge
which had occurred earlier in the war and had modified
and extended the defenses of Verdun to such an extent
and in such manner that these defenses became far more
capable of withstanding any character of ojBFensive
which might be launched at them. One result of this
remodelling was that the French line had been pushed
out to a very considerable distance from Verdun, the
center. When the German offensive of February 21st
was begun, the exterior line of such defenses began at
Consenvoye on the Meuse, a good 9}^ miles, as the crow
flies, to the north of the citadel and town of Verdun,
and thence ran in an irregular arc eastward through
Haumont, the wood of Caures, the wood of Wavrille,

VERDUN

Herbebois, Ornes and Maucourt, where it turned south
to Mogeville, the pond of Braux, Hte. Charriere wood,
Fromezey, Les Eparges, and thence curved to the west-
ward to St. Mihiel on the Meuse, a considerable distance
to the south of the citadel; and thence, running along
the arc of a semi-circle, first northwest and then north-
east until this line reached to its point of departure.

The course of this western half of the exterior defense
line is not traced in detail at this time since nothing
happened thereon during the period of the battle of
which we shall treat in this volume. When in the next
volume we come to treat of the fighting on this line, a
detailed description of such western front will be given,
and in this next volume there will also be a map of Ver-
dun showing in detail the topography of the surroimd-
ing country.

The town of Verdun lies in a bowl, and is surrounded
by high hills both to the north and to the east; those to
the east, however, drop abruptly to the Woevre plain
a little to the east of the line of the railroad running
south from Abaucourt to Haudiomont; this line of
railway being approximately 5>^ to 6 miles to the east
of Verdun. On the hill surrounding the town there
were originally 16 detached forts and 20 small works,
but in the year preceding the attack on it most of these
detached forts had been decidedly changed in character
and strength and practically the whole series of forts
and smaller defenses had been extended and connected
with each other until three successive rings of fortifi-
cations encircled the town. Between them were trenches,
barbed wires, chevaux de friese, mines and every other
form of impediment to the attack of an advance, which
is known to miUtary science, so that at the time of the
attack, Verdun was in all probability the strongest
fortified area in the world. The Germans concentrated
probably more artillery on this front than has ever been
done heretofore, and this battle of Verdun, therefore,
became a very interesting test between the strength of
the most modern forms of offensive and defensive.

On the morning of February 21st, then, the preliminary
bombardment began, and the front along which it took
place may be roughly described as along the outer
margins of the three woods which stretched on the north
of Verdun to Brabant, Ornes, Haumont, Caures and
Herbebois. The bulk of this fire came from the forest
of Spincourt. The bombardment continued all day with

VERDUN

a ferocity and force which has never been perhaps
equalled in the history of the war. From 2 to 4 in the
afternoon this bombardment reached its height and
about 5 o'clock the German guns lengthened their fire.

The French artillery during the day replied as best it
could to the German fire, not only endeavoring to put
the German artillery out of action but by a barrage
fire to prevent the advance of the German infantry.
When the German guns at 5 o'clock, as said, lengthened
their fire, the German infantry came out of their trenches
in small detachments composed of 15 men, and rushed
for the French first line trenches wherein, if fortunate
enough to reach them, they established themselves.
Behind them, fairly close, came a larger detachment of
gr^aadiers and sappers, and behind these again, but at
a much more considerable distance, came the line of
infantry. The theory of this attack was that the original
party of 15 men would reconnoitre and ascertain the
strength of the defense by the enemy which could be
expected. The grenadiers anfi sappers were to rebuild
and turn the trench which was then to be occupied by
the third element in this attack, the infantry.

This first evening the Germans, by these tactics,
secured a footing at many points in the French line, and
made that footing good, and at some points they pene-
trated as far as the French second line of trenches. In
the Haumont wood the defense was particularly strong
and hard hand to hand fighting occurred at this point
and continued for a very considerable time. At six
in the evening, however, the Germans had gained a small
footing and by eight o'clock they had converted this
footing into complete possession of the wood but not
without strenuous and desperate fighting.

During the night the French tried a counter-attack
to recover the possession of the wood, but this counter-
attack was broken up by the use of heavy artillery by
the Germans. Behind the wood itself, in the village of
Haumont, the French decided to make a determined
stand, but the Germans commenced a heavy artillery
bombardment of the ground behind them, with the
result that they could not communicate with their rear at
all, nor were any supplies able to reach them therefrom.
Soon after the German artillery also cut them ofif from
the troops on their flanks. Nevertheless, with rare
courage, the French continued to defend the place as
long as possible.

VERDUN

Towards eight o'clock in the morning the bombard-
ment became even more severe, and at ten o'clock
heavier artillery was gotten in position and commenced
to shell the village of Haumont itself. In the afternoon,
a lucky shot on the part of the Germans destroyed the
big armored cement redoubt wherein the French ammu-
nition depot was located. At five o'clock the German
infantry moved out to the attack of Haumont in three
columns from the north, northwest and east. The
French made a gallant effort to hold the place, but the
enemy established themselves on their right and left
and then concentrated an assault on the center, which
gave them no alternative but to retreat, which they did
to the south of Samogneux. To the right of Haumont
a very bard fight took place in the wood of Caures
which was held by two battalions of Chasseurs.

On February 21st the German artillery bombarded
this Caures wood with terrible violence, and on the next
day this bombardment became even worse. Towards
noon of February 22nd the Germans attacked these two
battalions of Chasseurs with fresh troops, endeavoring
to encircle them, and the fighting became very hard;
grenades and the naked bayonet played an important
part. Gradually, however, the German grasp on the
position became stronger and stronger, and at half past
five in the evening the Germans managed to get a gun
into a position from which they could enfilade the main
point of the defense. This made it necessary for the
French to evacuate their position which they did in
five columns, which were rather heavily punished, but
which succeeded in getting to a place of safety. The
wood of Herbebois is the next wood to the east of the
wood of Caures. The fighting here was very hard and
on the first day, in spite of a very heavy bombardment,
the Germans managed to obtain a footing in the first
line of French trenches and to capture one of the de-
fensive works of the supporting trench. Diu-ing the
night the French launched a counter-attack in the hopes
of driving the Germans out of this point of vantage,
which went on until five o'clock in the morning, but
which did little but hold the Germans in their position.
Close fighting continued all the next day and the Ger-
mans made an attack diu-ing the night but without
particular success.

The following day, the 23rd of February, the Germans
launched five attacks on this wood, with little result,

VERDUN

but the Woevre wood, in the meantime, was captiu^ed,
and, as a result, the French position in the Herbebois
wood became untenable, so that at foiu* o'clock the order
was given for them to withdraw; which they effected
in good order.

On the morning of the 23rd, the Germans had succeeded
in driving the French very nearly completely out of the
line of woods which formed their first defensive line,
besides which the French had been forced to evacuate
Brabant and Haumont and the woods of Caures and
Herbebois, and had fallen back upon the positions based
upon Samogneux, Beaumont, the northern fringe of
Fosses Wood, and a smaller wood, the Chaume.

On the morning of the 23rd, the French attempted a
counter-attack to recover these positions, which attack
was launched from Samogneux, but this counter-attack
was stopped by the German artillery which inflicted
sanguinary losses on the attackers. Thereafter a very
heavy bombardment was opened by the Germans on
the village of Samogneux, and the French were obliged,
towards evening, to evacuate Samogneux and fall back
to the beginning of the northern slope of the very impor-
tant elevation known as Hill 344. This Hill 344 then
became the objective of the entire German attack on this
western end of the northern line and the battle for its
possession went on all through the night of the 23rd and
the day of the 24th, both sides fighting with despera-
tion and determination.

On the night of the 24th the Germans succeeded in
getting a footing on the northern slopes of this hill. In
the center, after bombarding Fosses wood, the Germans
assembled their infantry for the attack on that wood,
and the Beaumont Wood to the east of that wood and
south of Wavrille; but this concentration became known
to the French artillery, who shelled it heavily, dispersing
it, and two battalions of French infantry were sent to
the northwest corner of Woevre wood.

At this the Germans resumed their bombardment of
the Beaumont and Fosses woods, and continued it until
about one o'clock in the afternoon. At that time they
made an infantry attack which was successful and in a
half hour they had driven the French out of Woevre
wood, as far as the village of Beaumont to the west and
Fosses wood to the east. In another half hour the
Germans captured the whole of Fosses wood and drove
into the streets of Beaumont, from which after house

VERDUN

to house fighting, the French were driven out. Le
Chaume wood, to the east of Fosses wood, was next
captured, which resulted in the village of Ornes being
given up by the French.

During the night it was quiet. Roughly speaking,
the French now occupied the line of heights which
extended from the east of Champneuville on the Meuse
to the south of Ornes. The German objective had now
become the capture of Douaumont, both village and fort,
and of the so-called Pepper Hill, south of Samogneux.
The Talou Hill, enclosed in the bend of the Meuse,
south of Champneuville was impossible for either side to
hold, on account of the fact that it was completely
exposed to the fire of both artilleries, and it hence became
a sort of no-man's land played upon by one or the other
artilleries continuously.

The situation had become very grave for the French,
and had the Germans been able to bring up immediately
their heavy artillery, which the rapidity of their advance
had left five miles in their rear, and which, in addition
to the distance to be advanced, had to be brought up
over a very rough and difficult country, the subsequent
history of this Verdun battle might have been different.
But to bring up this heavy artillery took practically a
day, and this gave the French a respite, which respite
they turned to their advantage.

De Castelnau, one of the ablest French Generals^
had been hurried to Verdun by Gen. Joffre as soon as it
became apparent that the German offensive there was
a serious one. After de Castelnau had inspected the
situation, he determined to make a stand on the right
bank of the river, and therefore, to organize most vigor-
ously the defense of the Douaumont position, and, while
occupied, in this day of respite, in thus preparing for
the assaults which were inevitably to follow, he called
to him, and installed in command of the defense of
Verdun, an officer who had already distinguished himself
earlier in the war. Gen. Petain. This general had begun
the war as a simple colonel, but, as a result of his dis-
tinguished conduct in the retreat from Charleroix, had
been promoted to Brigadier-General in the autimin of
1914, and had mounted rapidly in grade from that time
as a result of very distinguished services, and these
finally caused him to be selected as the defender of this
all-important position for the French.

CHAPTER IX
IN ALSACE

In Alsace during the six months under review struggle
kept up continuously at half a hundred points, but most
of these affairs were too scattered in scene and insig-
nificant in consequences, to be here chronicled in detail.
The first action of any importance occurred on October
15th, when the Germans, after shelling all the line run-
ning for about four miles between the Rehfelsen-Hart-
mannsweillerkopf and Sidelkopf attacked the French
positions with great violence. A desperate struggle
ensued and the Germans succeeded in re-occupjdng the
summit of the Hartmannsweillerkopf. A few days
later, however, another battle took place in this vicinity,
principally directed at the Linge and the Barrenkopf,
which resulted in the Germans being again expelled from
the summit of the Hartmannsweillerkopf.

On November 7th and 8th there was lively fighting
at the Col de Bonhomme, at La Chapelotte, and Le
Violu. A long lull then followed which lasted until
December 3rd, when a very lively encounter took place
near Thann. On the 26th of December the French who
occupied the top of the Hartmannsweillerkopf pushed
to the east and northeast from their positions on the
summit, and gained considerable ground, capturing 1200
Germans. This operation was in the nature of a surprise.

The next day the Germans counter-attacked and
recovered the ground lost and themselves captured 1500
men. The artillery fighting in this affair was extra-
ordinarily severe. The French about this time expected
an attack to be made on Belfort, and shifted troops
to its surrounding region for its defense. But the real
attack planned by the Germans was to be made at
Verdun and probably the demonstration which they
made at this time in the direction of Belfort was merely
to draw the French reserves in that direction.

On the 28th and 29th of December another very violent

IN ALSACE

two days battle took place on the slopes of the Hart-
mannsweillerkopf. In this the French made progress
but on January 2nd the Germans recovered a portion of
the ground so lost, and on January 9th captured a hill
to the north of the summit of the Herzstein and took
some 1100 French.

On the 24th of January the demonstration towards
Belfort became more marked and on the afternoon of
February 8th a very large German gun, supposed to be at
least 15 inches calibre, began to bombard that fortress,
and continued this bombardment for the next three days.

On February 13th this demonstration toward Belfort
by the Germans became even more developed. An
artillery bombardment was opened on February 15th
on the French positions at Sept, south of Altkirch, and
on February 15th, after this bombardment had lasted
rather intensely for three days, the German infantry
assaulted the place. The struggle lasted for a couple
of days, but, not being a real attack and merely a dem-
onstration, the Germans, after they had accomplished
their object of drawing the French reserves to the east-
ward from Verdun and its neighborhood, ceased the
assault. The rest of the month of February was calm
on this Alsatian front. For the French, most of the
fighting here was done by the well known regiments of
Chasseurs Alpins, a picked corps of men who, however,
were very badly cut to pieces during the fighting, of
which the struggles on Hartmannsweillerkopf were the
center, and also had the misfortune to lose their com-
mander, Gen. Seret, a very distinguished and able officer.

We may sum up the results of the six months fighting
on the western front, by saying, that there had been no
changes in the battle lines during that period, which in
any way indicated that it was in the power of the Allies
to force back the German lines from the general positions
they occupied nor on the other hand were there any
changes which indicated that it was in the power of the
Teutons to advance their positions more than locally.
In short, it looked as though the belligerents on this
front had reached a deadlock which would very probably
last, with possibly slight modifications here and there
on the long front to the end of the war.

THE EASTERN CAMPAIGN

CHAPTER X
NORTH RUSSIA

On the 1st of September, 1915, the German troops had
reached a point on the Gulf of Riga, a little to the west
of Schlock, from which their line ran south to Mitau and
thence curved to the east to the bank of the Dwina
River, whose course it followed, roughly at more or less
distance to the west thereof, south to a point on the rail-
road leading from Ponevesh to Dunaberg, about twenty
miles distant from the latter, from whence it ran souh-
ward through Vilkomir and along the Svienta River, to
a point a little to the west of Kovno. On this line are
two important strategic points, Dunaberg at the south
and Riga in the north; but of these two, Dunaberg is
considerably the most important and indeed it may be
said that it was perhaps as important as any other for-
tress in this portion of Russia and Poland, except Warsaw.

The town itself was not heavily fortified, but the rings
of fortifications running around it at a distance of from
8 to 20 miles fortified not only the town but all the
territory within their lines. In addition to the impor-
tance of Dunaberg as a fortified area, which is a more
correct description of it than fortress, it was an important
railroad center. Roads and railroads ran from it to the
north through Pskoff to St. Petersburg, to the north-
west to Riga, to the southeast to Smolensk, to the south
to Vilna; all of these were main lines. Several other
lines of minor importance radiated from it in various
directions and hence its capture would have been decisive
of the entire German offensive, not only to the east of
Vilna but to the northwest of Riga; and had the Germans
been able to take this town, Riga itself- would have fallen
almost mechanically in a very short time, with the result
that they would have established their front for the
winter on a strong line easily defended, with even com-
paratively small forces.

The approach to Dimaberg from the south is guarded
not only by works of art, at points advantageously

NORTH RUSSIA

placed, but the area in which it stands is also protected
by a chain of lakes running in a semi-circle from the west
soutbeastwardly and then northeasterly. The prin-
cipal of these lakes on the south is Gatin, which was the
scene of so many arduous struggles in the subsequent
fighting. For the Russians to prevent a successful attack
on Dunaberg, therefore, from this front, they were merely
obliged to retain the necks of land stretching between
these lakes, which made their task a comparatively
easy one. On the west the line of defense of but 27 miles
stretched from Drisviaty, the most northerly of these
lakes, to lUkust. On the other side a movement to reach
and cross the Dwina River to the east of Dunaberg,
which, had it been successfully carried out, would have
enabled the town to be attacked from the east along the
line of railroad running to Polotsk, was rendered ex-
tremely difficult by the line of defense created by the deep
and fairly rapid flowing Dwina itself, across which at
this point there were no bridges; and the northern bank
being the higher of the two, the Russian artillery posted
on this bank could make short work of any attempt to
construct any ponton bridges across the stream. This
movement, nevertheless, was tried several times with
such result that any idea of pushing it through to com-
pletion was abandoned, and the Germans turned their
efforts thereafter to the southern and western fronts
exclusively.

By the middle of September, on both of these fronts,
the Teutons had thoroughly intrenched themselves and
were attempting to advance by sapping in the usual way,
while, at the same time massing large quantities of heavy
artillery in their rear with an idea of an eventual attempt
to storm their opponent's position.

On the 24th of September an assault opened with a
heavy artillery bombardment of the Russian positions
on the whole front from the Dwina River on the north
to Lake Drisviaty on the south, and after this preparation
was complete an infantry attack was vigorously pushed.
The Germans captured many of the Russian advanced
trenches on this front, but were unable to pimcture
the Russian main defenses. The result was that their
advances did not constitute real gains. On the next
day the Russians counter-attacked and recaptured the
village of Drisviaty on the lake of the same name, which
gave them control of the passage between the lakes along
the Vilna railroad. The loss of this important posi-

NORTH RUSSIA

tion by the Germans put an end momentarily to this
offensive, which then degenerated into more or less violent
artillery duels, accompanied by occasional skirmishes
at different points in the line but no concerted movement.

These operations, lasted ten days, and though during
their continuation at times each side had the advan-
tage momentarily, the net result at its conclusion was
that the gains and losses balanced each other so abso-
lutely that the general situation was [completely un-
changed.

On the 4th of October a new offensive began in which
the Germans made an attack on the front between
lUkust and Lake Sventin, and fierce battles took place
around the village of Garbunooke directly south of
lUkust and Shieskovo, almost directly south of it, a
little to the west of Soirky and Lake Sventin. These
villages changed hands several times, the Germans
capturing Garbunooke on the 8th of October, only to
lose it on the 10th. In the sector around lUkust, how-
ever, the Germans again made some gains which put them
in a favorable position for future operations against
this point.

For the two weeks following October 10th, the fight-
ing languished. Gen. Von Morgen, who had commanded
here, was replaced by Gen. Von Lauenstein, and on the
23rd a new offensive opened. This began, as usual, by
a violent artillery bombardment of the Russian trenches
which lasted several hours, after which the infantry were
thrown forward on lUkust. At first the Russians man-
aged to hold their own, but towards evening the Ger-
mans drove them back and captured the town. This
capture placed the German forces in a favorable position
about three miles west of the Dwina River, about two
miles north of the railroad running westward to Pone-
vesh and about ten miles, as the crow flies, to the north-
west of Dunaberg itself, to which an excellent road led.
On the following day the Germans again attacked to the
east of Illkust, and furious fighting continued there
without cessation for the next two or three days. This
fighting spread to the south, and on October 28th the
Germans broke through the Russian defenses at the
village of Garbunooke and to the south of it, and suc-
ceeded in reaching the forest which lies between the road
leading from Illkust to Shishkovo and the Dwina River.

At this point, however, the German advance ceased,
as the positions to the east of Illkust were found to be

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too strong for the strength of the attacking force and
because the Russians started an offensive to the south
between Lake Sventin to Lake lUsen, which forced the
Germans to withdraw a considerable portion of their
forces from the lUkust front in order to hold their posi-
tions there.

Between Lakes Sventin and Illsen stretches a sort of
swamp interspersed with sand-hills covered with pines,
the most important of which were in the hands of the
Germans, both to the north and south of the little village
of Platonovk which stands about midway between the
two lakes. On the western shore of Lake Sventin Ger-
man batteries were posted on the heights thereon in
such a manner as to sweep both the shores and waters
of .this lake. The Russian objective was to first take
these last mentioned heights and then to take Plato-
novk. The combat lasted for ten days, and each foot
of ground was bitterly contested. On the 3rd day the
Russians succeeded in capturing the heights to the west
of Lake Sventin, but one of these heights was almost
immediately recaptured in a counter-attack by the
Germans. The Russians rallied and counter-attacked,
and after fierce hand to hand fighting, succeeded for
the second time in driving the Germans out.

This was followed a day or two later by a movement
forward in the center, which the attack on these heights
had necessarily preceded. This forward movement,
after about five days of hard fighting, succeeded in ac-
complishing its object, the capture of Platonovk and the
hills to the north and south of it, and in driving back
the German line about three miles to the west over
the whole front, besides taking possession of the western
shore of Lake Sventin. But these gains were not made
without paying a very large price therefor, since the
Russian casualties in this comparatively minor ten days'
fighting were admitted to have been in the vicinity of
15,000 to 17,000, while the German losses were only
about 10,000. Of these German losses only 700 were
captured. The result of this fight was to give the
Russians courage to attempt more and towards the end
of November, on the 24th, they made an attempt to
drive back the Germans near lUkust. This fighting
first resulted in the capture of Yonopol by them to the
east of lUkust, a point which was of considerable im-
portance to the Germans as they had made several
attempts from here to cross the Dwina River. On the

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28th of November the Germans launched a counter-
offensive on Yonopok which was unsuccessful, and the
Russians, after repulsing them, followed them back to
their positions and succeeded in capturing the suburbs
of lUkust, and afterwards extended their lines both in
the village and to the south thereof, but this ground was
not long held by the Russians and a couple of days later
they were compelled to abandon these positions com-
pletely, owing to the strength of the German counter-
attacks.

With this episode, serious fighting on this front ceased
for the winter, and from the end of December, 1915,
until well after the first of March, the period when our
record closes, both sides remained quiescent.

CHAPTER XI

On the central portion of this front from Illkust north
to a point about opposite Uxkell on the Dwina, little
happened during the period under consideration. The
Germans made one or two attempts to cross the river,
in November, near Frederichstat and Jacobstat, but
were unsuccessful therein. After this the Russian winter
fell with its full force and the cold and the imusually
large quantity of snow put a summary stop to operations
here.

On the Riga front, September passed quietly, with
the German lines occupying approximately the line
from Schlock on the Gulf, of Riga to Mitau, thence along
the river Ekau to the Mitau-Krutzbiu-g Railroad, which
it followed to a point opposite Frederichstat, whence it
ran to a point on the Dwina River about half way be-
tween Riga and Dunaberg, and opposite Jacobstat.
On October 14th the Germans began to develop a general
offensive, and on the morning of that day crossed the
river Ekau near the village of Grunwald, about 15 miles
to the east of Mitau, near the railroad, and a two days'
battle followed for the railroad station of Garrosen and
that of Gross Ekau to the west and east of Grunwald
respectively. The line of this battle finally extended
as far as Neugut, considerably to the east of Gross Ekau.
At Gross Ekau on October 16th the Germans drove the
Russians back a considerable distance and also gained
groimd near Neugut. Hard fighting followed for several
days, and by the 20th of October the Germans managed
to break through the Russian line extending from the
Dwina River to Neugut and to advance as far as Borko-
witz on the river Dwina, a place distant about 14 miles
southeast from Riga. The Germans followed up this
advantage by advancing northeasterly from Grunwald,
and, after forcing their way across the river Missa, which
rims nearly parallel to the Mitau-Krutzburg railroad
a few miles to the north of it, forced the passage of this

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river, and captured the two villages of Plakanen and
Repe.

While these things were going on, the Germans, who
had reached Boskowitz, moved forward to the island of
Dalen, immediately below Riga in the middle of the
river Dwina. The fighting, for the possession ot this
island, was very severe and both sides suffered heavily.
After its capture the Germans attempted to make a
crossing of the Dwina river from this island, but were
defeated therein, as the Russians to the north of them,
on the southern bank of the Dwina and those oppo-
site them on the northern bank of the river, caught
them between their two fires and rather severely pun-
ished them.

The German center during this time had succeeded in
reaching Olai, on the railroad between Mitau and Riga,
and a little nearer to Riga than Mitau. Here they halted
for the time being. At this time the German line
stretched from the Gulf of Riga to Schmerder, Kalnsom,
Olai, Plakanen and ended at the Dwina River at a point
opposite the Island of Dalen, from which the Germans
had retreated, owing to its being under the cross fire of
the Russian artillery to the north and northeast.

On the last of October the Germans began a move-
ment on the northern end of their line between the two
lakes Kanger and Babit, the latter of which parallels
the sea at a distance of about three miles therefrom. In
the middle of the neck of land separating this lake from
the gulf of Riga runs the river Aa, to the north of which
runs also the railroad from Schlock to Riga. The towns
of Kemmern and Tchin at the western end of Lake
Babit were stormed on the 31st of October, and
speedily taken. Thereafter, the fighting spread as far
as the town of Ragassen near the northern end of Lake
Kange, on the Gulf of Riga. This fighting continued
for several days and the Germans were unable to greatly
improve their position, although they did advance some-
what to the east of Kemmern. On November 7th half
the Russians counter-attacked and succeeded in ad-
vancing and in reoccupying the district between Schlock
and Lake Babit and in driving the Germans to the
westward. On the 10th another battle took place in
this region, in which the Russian fleet on the Gulf of
Riga took a hand, the scene of the battle being close
enough to the shores of that gulf, to permit the guns of
the warships to be effective. This battle lasted three days

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and at its end the Germans gave ground and falling back,
permitted the Russians to recapture Kemmern. The
Russian advance continued to the west of Kemmern,
the capture of which town gave them complete control
of Lake Babit, while they also made progress on the
eastern shore of Lake Kange. Desultory fighting
continued in this region for the next month, but the
attempt to advance upon Riga along the shores of the
Baltic was abandoned by the Germans, and from the 10th
of November they made no serious effort to again ad-
vance to the west between Lake Babit and the Gulf of
Riga. From this time forward, until the end of March,
the whole Riga front was quiet, the lines remaining with-
out material change all the rest of the winter in the
positions hereinbefore described.

After the fall of Brest-Litovsk, which took place on
August 25th, the Russian battle line may be divided into
three distinct sections, the first of which extends from
Vilna to the Gulf of Riga, the principal events of which
have been treated of in the preceding chapter; the
second runs from Vilna south through the Pripet
Marshes to the railroad ruiming from Kovel to Kief,
while the third reaches from this railroad to the northern
frontier of Rumania.

We will now deal with the central portion which was
the scene in the period which is under consideration of
the most important events, both in themselves and in
their future consequences.

CHAPTER XII

This central section of the Russian front is also sus-
ceptible of division, for the sake of both clearness and
convenience in dealing with it; the first including the front
from Vilna to Baranovitchy, and the second the front
from the important railroad junction last named as far
south as Dubno, Tamopol, and Czernowitz.

We will now take up the events in the northern sector
of the first division of this central section. It will be
remembered that in the second volume the account of
the campaign in the northern sector finished practically
with the evacuation of the fortress of Olita by the Rus-
sians on August 28th, 1915, and their retreat to the north-
east in the general direction of Vilna. The evacuation
of this fortress really resulted in the fall of both Vilna
and Grodno. Situated on the Bug River, equally dis-
tant from both of these important positions, yet it was
so located as to be able to effectually bar any attack
upon Vilna from the southwest or of Grodno from the
north. After the capture of Olita the next point against
which the German forces were thrown was Orany which
is situated on the railroad about midway between Grodno
and Vilna and almost directly to the east of Olita. As the
effect of the capture of this point would be to completely
cut off any communication from the Russian army around
Grodno and those operating in the north toward Vilna,
every foot of the way between Orany and Olita was
strongly defended by the Russians, but their struggles
were unsuccessful and on the 31st day of August this
town fell into the hands of the Germans. Another
reason for the strenuous defence that the Russians made
of the territory between these two places was that having
as we are now informed already made up their minds to
abandon Grodno, in the event that it became necessary,
which emergency now confronted them, the Russians
desired to gain as much time as possible in order to re-
move the garrison and the supplies of all kinds to the
eastward in that fortress, by the railroad which ran to

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there from Lida; in the accomplishment of which de-
sire they were partly successful.

As soon as Orany was captured, the German forces in
front of Grodno began an offensive move against that
fortress. On the day after the attack on Orany, the
outer line of four forts to the north of the Dombrovo-
Grodno highway was taken by storm, which captures
were followed up later in the afternoon of the same day
by the capture of fort No. 4, while fort No. 4-A wa&
captured towards dusk. Immediately after the fall of
these forts, all the remaining forts of the outer chain of
fortifications, to the west of Grodno were abandoned
by the Russians. The following day, the 2d of September ^
the Germans entered Grodno itself and rendered them-
selves masters of the town after considerable street
fighting. On the morning of the 3rd of September, the
Russians made a counter-offensive and succeeded in
penetrating to the streets of the town itself but were
speedily driven out, the object of this counter-offensive
being more to protect the retreat of the troops with-
drawing to the east, than in the hope of recapturing the
place.

The Germans had hardly succeeded in this conquest
of Grodno than they began an offensive therefrom to-
wards Lida, located on the west side of the line of railroad
running from Vilna to Baranovichy, at the point where
the line of railroad running from Grodno to Molodetchna
traverses at right angles the first mentioned line. The
purpose of this movement being to drive a wedge between
the Russian armies operating in the vicinity of Vilna and
those operating along the upper Niemen river and the
Pripet Marshes. This attempt, however, was not posi-
tively successful though some progress was made to the
east of Grodno, and this progress had considerable in-
fluence on movements further north in and around Vilna.

Vilna was the position, of all those positions in the
northern sector of the central front, most important for
the Russians to defend; not only on account of its being
a great railroad center, but on account of the fact that it
was the key position in thei rentire second line, and the
loss of which would mean that the Russians would be
obliged to fall back still further to the east and eventually
take up a position on their third line of defenses which
would have the great weakness of being cut into two
pieces by the Pripet Marshes. These marshes, as my
readers know, form a sort of peninsula, of very difl[icult

NORTH RUSSIA

•

territory running east and west practically through the
center of the central section of the Russian front. These
marshes grew more difficult to manoeuvre through in
proportion as an army advanced to the east. Therefore,
if Vilna was captured, and the Russians obliged to fall
back on their third line of defense, the Rilssian army
would be, to all practical purposes, divided into two
sections, one operating to the north of the Pripet Marshes
and one to the south, with such poor and roimdabout
means of communication between them as to put out
of the question any concerted movements. This was,
of course, appreciated by the German General Staff.

The first step in the capture of Vilna by the Germans
was the successful continuation of the movement which
had begun some days before, northeast of Kovno along
the ViUya River, and which had reached the Sventa
River at a point in the direction of Vilkomir. This
movement was originally to the northeast, but, on Sep-
tember 11th, a portion of the German forces engaged
therein turned directly east and began to move towards
the Vilna-Dunaberg railroad. A day later another force
of Germans commenced a movement along the railroad
leaving from Ponevesh to Sventsiany, a place located
on the Vilna-Dimaberg railroad, a little less than half
way between these two places and nearest to Vilna.
Simultaneously a third movement was begun by the
Germans towards Vilna from the direction of Kovno,
directly to the west.

On the 13th the Vilna-Dimaberg railroad was cut at
Sventsiany by the Germans and the Russian troops here
were driven southwards to the station of Podbrodzie, but
the road south from Vilna to Baranovitchy and the road
to the east through Smorgon to Minsk were still open,
so that it was still possible for the Russians to with-
draw their entire force there to the east and south of this
fortress city in the event they so desired. From Grodno,
as has been related before, an offensive had been imder-
taken almost immediately after its capture in the very
first days of September towards Lida on this Vilna-
Baranovichy raiboad, which had not met with great
success. This movement was resumed on a larger scale,
and gradually advanced, and after heavy fighting, suc-
ceeded on the 20th of September in capturing Lida itself,
and by so doing cut communication between Vilna and
Baranovitchy.

In the meantime, while this movement on Lida was

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•

taking place, large forces of German cavalry acting as
raiders made a sudden appearance in the vicinity of
Smorgon, on the railroad leading from Vilna eastward
to Minsk, but these were not in sufficient force for the
purpose for which they were intended not numbering
more than 20,000 men, and being of course not accom-
panied to any very great degree by artillery or by in-
fantry, though some few infantry are said to have been
brought forward in automobiles to the positions reached
by the cavalry, were driven back by the Russians, who
thus recovered the use of the Vilna-Minsk railroad.
Nevertheless, this movement, in connection with the
German control of the Vilna-Baranovitchy railroad and
of the railroad from Vilna to Dunaberg, made it im-
possible for Vilna to be held longer by the Russians,
and in fact the Russian army there was in imminent
danger of having retreat cut off by the German infantry
in large forces which had in the meantime arrived in
Baranovitchy from which place they could press on with
comparative ease to Minsk, not far distant, as distances
go in Russia. At Minsk the Germans would have oc-
cupied a commanding position in the rear of the forces
defending Vilna and on their only line of communication
by rail with the east. It was, therefore, necessary for
the Russian commander to escape before Minsk could be
occupied, and the only possible line of escape was along
this Vilna-Minsk railroad, which, as has been said, had
been at one moment lighty held by the German cavalry.
For a long time, the incompetence of the Russian
Commander in Chief, Grand Duke Nicholas, had been
manifest to the most ardent and insidious of his
flatterers. Placed at the beginning of the war in com-
mand of the largest army the world has ever seen, whose
equipment, whose morale, whose discipline and training
had become the subject of eulogistic effusions in the
military papers of France and England for some years
before the war, he had in thirteen months suffered
greater defeats perhaps than any general in history, if
defeats are to be measured by the loss of men, the loss of
artillery, the loss of equipment, the loss of munitions of
war, and the loss of territory. In view of the fact that
Russia is so vast as to afford imlimited possibilities of
retreat for enormous distances, his entire army was
neither annihilated nor totally captured, but every
other species of military defeat had been inflicted upon
it by its foes. Supported, as the Grand Duke was, by

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a powerfully subsidized press, not only in Russia but in
Great Britain and even to some extent the United States,
for a time he managed to sustain himself against the ever
rising tide of events, the results of his gross incompetency
but ultimately the tide rose too high and he was engulfed.

On the 6th of September, 1915, the Czar issued an
order depriving the Grand Duke of his command of the
Russian armies; which command the Czar took into his
own hands. Subsequently, the Grand Duke was ap-
pointed to the Governor-Generalship of the Caucasus,
and Commander in Chief of the armies in that region.
Later in this narrative his exploits in his new field of
action will be considered.

In removing the Grand Duke from the command of
his armies, the Czar removed a danger to his throne
and to his person, as well, if the rumors which came
to us from Russia at that time, and which continued
from time to time to come to us, concerning the Grand
Duke's ambitions, if victorious, were well founded.

CHAPTER XIII

General Evert who was in command of the Russian
armies at Riga in the predicament above outlined, man-
ifested more strategic sense than usual in a Russian
General. He so disposed his forces as to hold for a short
time the advance of the Germans from the north from
Sventsiany and from the direction of Kovno in the west
and threw his main forces upon these German forces
which had cut the Vilna-Minsk railroad, in the hope of
recovering the possession of the same. This hope was
not disappointed; the German cavalry were driven back
to the south and the line of railroad between the two
towns was again completely in Russian hands. This
recapture provided a means of escape for the bulk of the
Russian army operating around Vilna, and therefore
was extremely important both to these troops and to the
Empire in its consequences. As an immediate result,
the Russian army escaped to the east from Vilna with
far less losses than might have been expected from the
very difficult situation in which it was forced by the
Germans; but the city and fortress of Vilna itself was
lost, and with Vilna was also lost the control of the
raiboad running north to Dunaberg to within a few miles
of that town, and of the railroad running south as far
as Baranovitchy.

After the fall of Vilna, from the town of Svientsiany
to the north between that city and Dimaberg the Ger-
mans attempted a movement in the direction of Polotsk,
the valley of the Disna river [and along the railroad
running parallel thereto a short distance south. At
the same time another German advance began on the
railroad rimning eastwardly from Vihia to Minsk, and a
third on the railroad running from Baranovitchy to Minsk,
still further south, the right wing of the German forces here
followed the northern end of the Pripet Marshes in a
movement to Niesuiz and Slutsk against the Minsk-
Bobruisk line. For more than two weeks a violent
struggle kept up on the whole of this front and the

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Russian losses in opposing these movements, had Gen,
Evart not succeeded in the withdrawal of his troops from
Vilna, would have gone for naught.

But the necessities of warfare elsewhere induced the
Germans to weaken their forces operating in this sphere
of action, and ultimately the Germans were obliged to
content themselves with occupying a line rimning south
from Vidzy, northeast of Svientsiany through Smorgon
on the Vilna-Minsk railroad, whence their Ime extended
southwardly to a point to the east of Baranovitchy on
the railroad between that place and Minsk.

After the first of October, the autumnal rains set in,
followed as they are in these northern latitudes, by cold
weather and by snow, which made the roads, particularly
towards the Pripet Marshes, impassable for fresh move-
ments and a long period of practical inactivity followed.
Both Russians and Germans dug themselves in and
prepared to pass the coming winter in their then posi-
tions. Indeed this calm lasted all the winter and well
into the spring, and well past the time when this record
closes.^ Of course this does not mean that during this
long period at scattered points along the front, from time
to time, activities of some sort did not take place; oc-
casionally each side made a reconnoitre attack on the
other's position, but these attacks were, strategically or
tactically speaking, of no importance, and consequently
need not be herein gone into at length.

The Pripet Marshes themselves, which thrust forward
like a huge tongue to the west, narrowing as they go,
and which separate the northern half of the Russian
line considering this line in its whole length from the
southern, deserve a word or two of mention. The
Pripet River flows through them in the center from west
to east, eventually falling into the Dnieper some dis-
tance to the- north of Kiefif, and is about 350 miles in
length. From its source to the point where it flows into
the Dnieper the difference in level is a trifle less than 160
feet. The valley which it flows through is perhaps 150
miles wide on an average and this valley lies little lower
than the coimtry to the north of it or south of it.

The result is that all of the rivers and streams flowing
from the north and south which flow into the Pripet have
but little current as the change in level in them is barely
sufficient to cause their waters to move, and hence, in
this flat country, the streams spread very easily from
their normal beds. This is particularly true in the spring

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and the autumn when the whole of this vast distr'ct,
30,000 square miles in area, becomes practically a lake,
with here and there islands jutting through it which
serve for sites f c r the comparatively few and miserable
towns. At many places these marshes are very deep
and the black, slimy imderlying mud is known to
extend down in places to a depth of 150 to 260
feet. To wander from the beaten path on this soft,
treacherous surface is almost positive death. It is
only in the winter that movements through these
marshes are safe for then the ground is frozen, deep and
can sustain traffic across its surface. The comparatively
few roads through these marshes, mostly built on piles
or like the roads in our backwoods, are formed by tree
tnmks laid side by side. To add to the other difficulties,
much of the territory comprised in the marshes is very
thickly wooded with stimted pine, birch and aspen.

The farming population constitutes about 70 per cent
of the inhabitants, while racially the majority of the
population are white Russians. The people are mostly
occupied in bee-keeping, himting and fishing — some
commerce is done in forest products, timber, charcoal,
wooden dishes, pitch and bark products, and of course
there is little or no manufacturing. Taken all in all
this region is perhaps the poorest and most backward in
Europe. To the east the fortress of Bobruisk on the
Beresina guards the marshes much in the same manner
as Brest-Litovsk does on the west.

After the fall of Brest-Litovsk the Teutonic troops
who participated in its siege began a march through
this very difficult region to the eastward. The main
movement was along the line of the railway running
from Brest-Litovsk almost directly east to Pinsk, but
the advance was slow because the usual difficulties had
been greatly increased in the Autumn of 1916 by an \m-
usually heavy rainfall which turned the marshes into
more veritable quagmires then usual. However, by
dint of perseverance, Pinsk was finally reached by the
end of September, and the Teutons established them-
selves a little to the east of this town for the winter, their
line to the northward following the course of the Jasiolda
river and the Oginski Canal, to Lipsk on the northern
edge of the marshes. But the coimtry behind them was
still full of small isolated detachments of Cossacks and
other irregular troops of the Russian army who were
greatly aided in the guerilla warfare they were waging

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by the fact that they had the active aid of the population
who were famihar with every by-path leading through
the marshes as well as of every foot of the ground.

It was not, then, until the cold season began and the
ground became frozen that the Teutons were able to
clear the marshes to the west of Pinsk completely of
these irregular Russian troops. There was little fighting
on a large scale, but there were multitudinous daily skir-
mishes, particularly to the east of the line of the Oginski
Canal and along the Jasiolda River. In this fighting the
volunteer Polish legions which had been organized to aid
the Teutons by the Poles themselves, greatly distinguished
themselves. These conditions always so prevailed to a
great degree on the line running south from Pinsk to
Nobill and Borana, the two towns at the southern edge
of the marshes in the direction of Rovno.

In its general direction this line from Pinsk south
followed the course of the Styr River from its connection
with the Pripet River at Pogost to the railroad running
from Lublin east. But as the distance from Pinsk to the
southern boimdary of the Marshes was not so great as
that from Pinsk to the northern boundary, and conse-
quently there was not so much difficulty in supressing
the wandering bands of marauders as there was to the
north.

Both to the north and south of Pinsk the so-called
"marsh-wolves'', composed of peasants and other non-
combatants who had been stirred up by the Russian
government in a sort of levie en masse, were very active;
but ultimately the Teutons succeeded in completely
clearing the marshes of these pests, from their point of
view, turning now to the campaign in the southern
sector of the Russian front.

CHAPTER XIV

On August 26, as was narrated in the previous
volume, the great Russian fortress of Brest-Litovsk,
.ahnost directly north of Lemberg and Cholm, had
passed into Teuton possession, and a couple of days
before it the town of Kovel, about midway on the rail-
road between this fortress and the Volhynian triangle
of fortresses, Lutsk, Dobno and Rodno, had also been
taken by the Austrian cavalry.

The fall of Vlodava and Dorojush completed the
piercement of the Russian defenses on the middle line of
the Bug. At this time the Russian lines continued to
follow, in a general sense, the course of the Bug River
south until they reached the point of the joining of the
watersheds of this river and the Zlota Lipa in Galicia;
the Zlota Lipa running, roughly speaking, thence in a
straight line south to the Dniester.

On August 27th the Austrians attacked the Russian
positions at Jologury to the southwest of the town of
Zlochoff in eastern Galicia and broke through their lines
inflicting a severe material and tactical defeat upon them.
The result of this operation was that on the next day the
town of Zlochoflf fell into the hands of the Austrians and
the upper line of the Bug was forced. The Russians re-
treated to Bialykiemen on the other side of the Bug
valley. In the meantime another Austrian force had
crossed the Zlota Lipa from Brzezanyand was advancing
towards the Zboroff-Podhaytse line. Still farther to the
south another Austrian army was marching directly
north towards Buczacz on the Strypa River. It became
apparent that the positions of the Russians to the west
of Tamopol had become very seriously involved and
the only thing that they could do was to withdraw as
rapidly as possible. Their position was complicated by
the fact that further south on the Dniester River the
Austrians had reached Zaleshchyki and were threatening
to envelop the end of the Russian line in the south, and

NORTH RUSSIA

so the line of the Zlota Lipa was abandoned by the
Russians.

A concentric movement by the Austrians on the forti-
fications of Rovno then developed from Kovel through
Lutsk and from Galicia through Dubno. On August
29th a general advance of the Austrians began on the
whole line stretching from Bialykiemen to Radzivilofif,
and fighting continued for three days; the Austrians
slowly and surely making progress.

On the 31st of August the Russian line broke and the
Austrians captured Lutsk on the northern end of their
concentric movement, and crossed the Styr along its
whole length as far south as Toporoff, following up
this advantage with an advance the next day September
1st, to Brody on the frontier between Galicia and Volhy-
nia, and also along the line of railroad from Lemberg to
Dubno. These advances of the Austrian forces, and the
general retreat of the Russians to the Olyka-Radziviloflf
front, which resulted, in the south in Galicia itself, forced
the Russians to fall back completely from the north and
south line formed by the Zlota Lipa, first to that of the
Strypa, the first parallel river running to the east, and
eventually to that of the Sereth River which rims north
and south slightly to the west of Tamopol.

During these affairs, many thousands of Russian
prisoners besides much artillery and war supplies were
captured by the victorious Austrians.

From Lutsk the Austrians continued their advance
towards Rovno, almost directly east, and towards
Dubno to the southeast. At the same time the main
attack struck north from Brody along the Lemberg-
Dubno railroad.

On the 7th of September this Austrian force advanced
from the southern side of the Ikva River and on the 8th
of September the Austrians entered Dubno in triumph,

Li the meantime, in the vicinity of Tamopol, in ex-
treme eastern Galicia, very heavy fighting was going
on. The battle here opened about the 6th of September
and ended on the 9th. The Russian resistance here was
somewhat stronger than on other points on this line, but
after three days hard fighting the Russians were forced
back to the outer lines of Tamopol, though the city
itself was not carried by the Teutons.

Still further south, at Trembovla, near the Sereth
River, situated nearly in the middle of an imdulating
plain cut up by many small streams, another battle de^

NORTH RUSSIA

veloped on the 7th of November, and lasted through
the 8th to the 9th. This was one of the most important
fights in Central Galicia. Here again the Russians were
heavily pimished but the Teutons were not able to carry
through their projected movement to completion, so
that the fight may fairly be called an indecisive one.

Still further south in the coxmtry district between
Trembovla and TchortkofiF another fight took place which
began on the 9th of September and which on the 10th of
September spread along the whole line from Tamopol
to Lutsk, a front about 50 miles long. This fight lasted
with various intermissions, until the 15th of September,
and at its conclusion, neither side had modified to any
great extent their original positions. Much further
intensive fighting took place along the line of the Sereth
during the next two or three weeks, but on this line the
Russian defense seemed to stiffen and the Austro-Ger-
mans were not able in spite of strenuous efforts to force
the Russians to fall back from this line of the Sereth
river

Coming north again to Volhynia in the beginning of
September the Austro-Germans launched an o'ffensive
against Rovno which proceeded along the railroad line
coming from the northwest leading Lutsk, and from
Dubno from the southwest.

This advance was, however, strenuously opposed by
the Russians and did not succed in attaining its object,
and being rather badly defeated in the coxmtry between
Lutsk and Rovno, at Klivan and near Olyka it was aban-
doned. This abandonment gave the opportimity for
the Russians who had won the victory at Olyka to make
a dash to the west and recapture the fortress of Lutsk on
the middle Styr. But their triumph was short-lived and
four days later they were obliged to evacuate Lutsk as
well as their other positions northwest of Dubno and fall
back in an easterly direction.

The line which the Russians now assumed to defend
the fortress of Rovno against a new offensive which was
being launched from the south by the Austro-Germans and
to which they retreated from Lutsk, extended from
Rafalovka on the Styr south through Tsartovsky and
Kolki, also on the Styr, directly south to the river Ikva.
The plan of campaign adopted by the Teutons for the
reduction of Rovno included in the north a movement
against Samy along the railroad which leads from Kovel
to that place on the eastern side of the Goryn River.

NORTH RUSSIA

This advance would have carried them, had it been
successful, to a considerably shorter line for wintering
than the one they ultimately adopted, and by the capture
of Serny, an important railroad jimction, whence one
railroad line ran, as has been said, west to Kovel, another
to the east to Keiff, and a third to the north past Stolin
and through the Pripet Marshes to the line running north
towards Vilna, while a fourth ran directly south towards
Rovno, wouldhave enabled them to cut off commimication
efiFectually between all southern, eastern and northern
Russia, and would have outflanked the Russians at
Rovno to the south, which outflanking would have forced
the abandonment of the fortress by the Russians without
any assault thereon by the Germans. At the same time,
another movement against Rovno in the south was de-
veloped from the base of the Galician town of Novo
Alexinets. The objective of this movement in the south
was that in the event it was successful, it would not only
threaten Rovno, but would also outflank the Russian
positions along the Zlota Lipa and the Strypa rivers
further to the south.

At Sokul, 23 miles north of Lutsk, the river Styr runs
quite close to the river Stokod, another north and south
rimning tributary of the Pripet. Between these two
rivers extends a marshy depression running southeast
to northwest which follows the right bank of the Stokod
south almost down to the point at which the railroad
from Kovel to Sarny crosses this river, the distance be-
tween the two rivers at this point being about 30 miles.
Between Kolki and Rafalovka, which last mentioned
town is a few miles north of the point where the Kovel-
Sarny railroad crosses the River Styr, the absence of any
marshes on either side of the Styr renders the conditions
favorable for laimching an ofifensive^- which is also increas-
ed by the fact that within this 20 miles stretch are con-
centrated nearly all the roads and railroads of the region,
which adds to its advantages as a departure point for an
offensive. For these reasons, then, this 20 roiles stretch
became the center of the fighting during the autumn of
1915 along the Styr River.

What may be called "the Two Months' Battle of the
Styr" began on the 27th of September, 1916, when the
Germans, after a hard fight, forced their way across the
Styr at Kolki and spread out towards the east, and con-
tinued advancing for three days in that direction until
finally on the third day they reached the Russian main

NORTH RUSSIA

defence line which extended, roughly, from Novosielki
to Tchernish. On this line, for weeks, the fighting con-
tinued, during all this time with comparatively little
advantage gained by either side in their desperate strug-
gle. Attacks and coimter-attacks followed on one another
with almost monotonous regularity, but which at
the same time cost thousands of human lives. For
weeks, at this time, the several bulletins contained and
continually repeated names of the same small towns
which are almost meaningless unless the movements are
studied so closely on the map as to lose the interest of
the general reader. Some few phases of this battle,
however, should be given. In the early days of October
the Russians made a drive across the Styr near Polonne,
where the Kovel-Sarny railroad crosses that river, and
drove the Germans from the opposite villages, while, on
the same day, near Chartorysk they also made a crossing
and established themselves rather firmly on the western
bank of the river, and during the next three days were
able to push their lines some six miles west of these points.
For the next week desperate fighting took place along
the river aroimd Kolki, which was the border point
between the two forces, the Germans who had advanced
east of the river from the Kolki region, and the Russians
who had advanced west of the river on the line extend-
ing from Raf alovka to Chartorysk.

A very peculiar position had now been reached, in
which each side was in a position to and was threatening
to outflank the other. This condition of affairs the
Teutons promptly remedied by capturing the town of
Chartorysk and thereby forcing the Russians to retreat
to the Styr and on the northern end of their line to fall
back from the west as far as Raf alovka, their departure
point on that end o£ the line. The Russians, however,
did not acknowledge themselves beaten and tenaciously
returned to the charge. On October 17th, they re-
gained practically all ground lost by them north of
Chartorysk, in the days previous, and on the next day
followed up their successes by capturing the town itself
by storm; the Germans falling back beyond Budka and
Rudka. During the next two or three days the Russians
pushed up the western bank of the Styr as far as Kamaraff .

On October 25th the Teutons began a coimter-oflfen-
sive on the Lisova-Budka line and in the vicinity of
Kamaraff. This offelisive was successful in the next few
weeks to the extent that the Russians were driven back

NORTH RUSSIA

in semi-disorder and the town of Kamaraff itself was
captured.

On November 10th the Russians were driven out of
Budka, and by the 15th of November the entire western
bank of the Styr including the town of Chartorysk had
returned to the possession of the Teutons, but not for
long; as, on November 19, after a desperate battle, the
Russians succeeded in gettmg across the Styr once more
and in reoccupying Chartorysk, as well as a village
below it. After this recapture of the left bank of the
Styr by the Russians, the fighting languished on this
front, neither side showing any aggressive spirit. The
heavy autumn rains set in and made the country diffi-
cult to manoeuvre in; the objectives of the Teuton
forces here being unachieved, the operations must be
considered a defeat for them.

CHAPTER XV

This condition continued until January, 1916, when
the ground having become frozen, the rivers coated with
ice, and the marshes solid, for a time hostilities were
resumed, and the old battlefields on the Styr around
Chartorysk and Kolki to the northeast once more became
the scene of animated fighting which at this time ex-
tended as far south as Olyka on the railroad connecting
Kovel with Dubno. Once more the Russians made a
thrust to the westward in the vicinity of Chartorysk,
and once more the Teutons took the offensive in the
neighborhood of Kolki. This battle, which has been
given the name of the "New Year's Battle," raged from
about the first of the year to the middle of January, and
at its conclusion, when counter-attack had succeeded
attack for two weeks, the adversaries stood in practically
the same positions as they had occupied at the beginning
of this particular series of hostilties. But this draw
had not been accomplished without great losses; the
Teutons losing, perhaps, 60,000 to 70,000 men, while the
Russian losses were admitted by themselves to have
exceeded 125,000. Here, as usual, when Teutonic
troops met Russian, the weight of casualties was on the
Russian side, a fact which can be most largely attributed
to the comparative inefficiency of the Russian general-
ship, and also to the lack of skill which is generally
shown by the Russians in the use of the artillery; the
quantity of noise made by this arm seeming in general
to be the Russian measure of its efficiency.

From this time until past the first of March activities
on this front degenerated into strict trench fighting,
broken from time to time by an occasional skirmish or
more or less unimportant artillery duel of not even
local significance.

In the south the German offensive against Rovno,
which, as has already been explained, was to co-operate
with the one which started around Kolki in the north,
did not have even the same rather poor measure of

NORTH RUSSIA

success as the German oflfensive in the north. This
offensive, as will be remembered, was to be launched
along a front which extended, roughly, from Radziviloff
to Novo Alexinets, and was to advance with its left wing
resting on the railroad from Brody to Dubno, while the
right wing moved across country pushing the Russians
from their positions to the west of the Vilia River. The
country around Novo Alexinets forms the key to the
position, and here the Ikva, flowing north, the Horyn
flowing northeast and the Sereth which runs to the south
have their sources, and their courses are lined with wide
marshes which at many points deepen into small lakes.

Around Novo Alexinets itself rises a range of hills
about 1300 feet high. To the south of this lies the railroad
leading fromKrasne, through Zlochoff and Zboroff toTar-
nopol, which is the chief center both of railroads and roads
in eastern Galicia. From this railroad, as far south as the
Dniester, runs a high plateau which is cut at- intervals
into segments by a number of north and south flowing
rivers, running parallel to each other, of which the Sereth
and Strypa and the Zlota Lipa are the principal. These
rivers have cut for themselves small canyons through the
upper soil down to the limestone beds on which the
plateau rests, and in some considerable degree therefore
resemble the rivers of our own West. Their courses thus
make natural fortifications, at intervals, barring an
eastern or western advance. At points, these canyons
attain a depth of 400 feet, from which some idea of their
formidableness as defenses in the hands of a determined
enemy can be gained.

At this time the Russians held the left bank of the
Strypa and it was the desire of the Teutons to complete
their conquest of eastern Galicia before the winter set
in, by driving the Russians to the east bank of the Sereth,
and thus practicallyredeeming the whole of Galicia from
Russian possession ; while it was the purpose of the
Russians to endeavor to push their lines further to the
west as far at least as the Zlota Lipa, the next parallel
western river, and thus place themselves in a position
from which in the spring they would be able to attempt
to recover LemlDerg and a portion of Galicia to the west
of them. These two conflicting objectives gave rise to
almost continuous fighting along this Strypa River.

In September and up to the middle of October con-
tinuous skirmishes and small engagements took place
on this front from the heights below Zboroff to almost

NORTH RUSSIA

as far south as the Dniester. Finally on October 12th a
pitched battle developed around the hamlet bf Haj voron-
ka, on the Strypa, at a point where the canyon of that river
is 150 feet deep. The Germans who possessed themselves
of this village, which lies to the east bank of the Strypa,
had erected rather extensive field fortifications to pro-
tect it, since it commands important roads both to the
east and to the west. After a hard fight, the Germans
were defeated and driven out of their fortifications, and
in spite of a desperate counter-attack, were driven across
the Strypa, and on that same evening were followed
across that river by the Russians.

On the following day the Russians improved their
positions by spreading to the north and to the south from
the bridge-head on the west bank to which, as has been
said, they had crossed the previous evening. On the
13th, however, the Germans, having been reinforced,
attacked the Russians with bayonets, and after a short
brisk fight in which the Russians lost heavily, the Mus-
covites were driven back across the bridge which the
Germans recaptured, and then themselves crossed, also
re-taking Hajvoronka itself.

The next fight of any moment took place slightly to
the north of Nove Alexinets to the east of Lopushno,
and here the Austrians were obliged to withdraw on a
three mile front to a depth of about one mile; but a few
days later this ground was recovered almost completely.

Late in October tl\e Austrians assumed an offensive
north of the Dniester, on the line extending from Zal-
eshchyki to Buczacz, which resulted in a great battle in
the neighborhood of Ziemikovitse on the Strypa. At
first this progressed favorably to the Russians who man-
aged to capture Bahovice, and a forest of the same name,
to the south of Ziemikovitse; but on November 2nd the
Teutons delivered an attack against the village of Ziemi-
kovitse itself, and, after routing the Russians, entered
the village.

During the next few days the fighting was fast and
furious around this hamlet. The final result was that
the Russians lost all the ground that they had gained
on the western bank of the Strypa, besides many thou-
sand prisoners; in addition to which, their casualties
were much above the normal. This battle ended the
serious fighting imtil the latter part of November when
on the 27th of the month the Austrians attempted to
cross the Strypa River and gain a footing on its eastern

NORTH RUSSIA

bank, but in this they were not successful, as the Russians
showing a greater firmness and tenacity than they had
shown heretofore, in this region, succeeded in repelUng
the Austrian forces. After this the fighting in this
region again became quiet, and remained so until late
in December, when the Russians attempted to launch
an offensive between the Dniester and the Pruth in the
extreme southern end of the front, as it then stood,
almost immediately to the north of Czernowitz, the cap-
ital of Bukowina, which they hoped to recapture by
means of this movement.

The space between the Pruth and the Dniester is
at this point crossed by a range of hills known as the
Berdo Horodyshtche, which forms a natural barrier diffi-
cult to cross if well defended. The Russians opened
their attack by capturing the village named Toporoutz
which lies on the eastern side of these hills on the western
side of which is Rarantche; Rarantche being in the hands
of the Austrians and the ridge of hills between the two
being the bone of dispute. The battle here raged for a
couple of weeks, and therein the Russians captured the
heights on the north bank of the Pruth which to some
extent dominate Czernowitz, and which later on in the
year proved of great help to them in the subsequent cap-
ture of that place, but the possession of which for the
moment proved useless.

After this fight was over, quiet fell upon the line for
a time, until the abortive attempt to capture Czerno-
witz took place in the latter part of January, 1916, in
which attempt the Russians wasted 50,000 men and did
not achieve their objective.

The only other important fighting which took place
on any of this Galician front during the rest of the winter
was around the town of Ustsietcbko, which lies in the
canyon of the Dniester, at its junction with the Dzuryn,
which broke out in the early days of February, and lasted
about a week, and resulted in the Austrians being driven
from their position in the town and losing this important
bridgehead. A few days later the Russians advanced as
far as Butchatch on the southwest bank of the Dniester
from this bridgehead, but an Austrian counter attack
here drove them speedily back to the bridgehead where
they remained without attempting any further move-
ments until after the time this record closes.

Such, then, is a cursory review, without dwelling
unduly upon the daily details, of the Teutonic campaign

NORTH RUSSIA

against the Russians in Coin-land, Poland, Volhynia and
Galicia, during the autumn of 1915 and a portion of the
spring of 1916. There has, perhaps, never been a
lengthier battle line fought on for as long a period in the
world's history than this one which stretches from the
shores of the Gulf of Riga in the north to the northern
border of Bukowina in the south; and it is also safe to
say that never on so lengthy a line of battle for as long
a time were forces more disproportionate in numbers
opposed to each other, without the weaker yielding.

The German-Austrian forces engaged varied in num-
bers during this period from 1,500,000 at the commence-
ment to perhaps 800,000 or 900,000 at the end, and the
advances which they made from the Dunajec River in
the beginning of May, 1915, until the beginning of March
of the following year, were continually made in spite of
the opposition of forces at least one and a half times
greater in numbers than themselves. Perhaps never
before in the world's history has one army taken from
another army, so superior to itself in strength, a total of
prisoners which equals its own numbers, or inflicted
casualties on the stronger army of at least two and a
half times the strength of itself the weaker army, or cap-
tured 100,000 square miles of territory, including
therein all of the principal fortresses of the country of
the enemy.

The German triumph in what we may call the Russian
Campaign in 1915 was so overwhelming and so complete
as to be almost incredible. There has been some talk
of the fact that the Russian armies escaped destruction,
and some praise has been given to the Russian generals
for this feat of withdrawing a greatly superior force
from an inferior force and escaping aimihilation. The
facts, however, do not seem to bear out the theory that
the strategy shown by the Russian generals in this
campaign merits eulogy of any character. It has been
advanced, in excuse of the Russians, that they lacked
artillery and ammunition, but those shortages of supplies
and arms are not borne out by the facts. For instance
the Russian General Radko told Mr. Robert Crozier
Long, the eminent English publicist, on the Dunajec
itself shortly before the battle of Gorlice-Tarnow, that
be had plenty of shells, and Mr. Long adds his own
testimony to the fact that most of the Russian retreast
in 1915 were not caused by shortness of shell at all. —
As Mr. Long saw the whole campaign from the Russian

NORTH RUSSIA

side, and is stating facts against interest, his testimony
which appears on page 603 of tte Fortnightly Review,
an English publication, of April 1, 1916, seems con-
vincing.

It is natural and human to seek for excuses which
palliate defeat, but he will indeed be ingenious, who,
in view of all the facts surrounding the Russian debacle
of 1915, finds any excuse therefor!, which excuses.

CHAPTER XVI
BULGARIA'S ENTRY INTO THE WAR

After the entry of Turkey into the war, the situation
in the Balkans became extremely important to the
Allies, not only in relation to the future of the one
Balkan State which had joined them — Serbia — whose
difficulty with Austria constituted the spark which
ignited the flames of war, but also because the AUi^
had then projected an attack on Turkey through the
Dardanelles, in which attack they desired to have the
active aid of the other Balkan States, — Greece, Bul-
garia and Rumania, — for which reason they concen-
trated imder the leadership of the then Sir Edward
Grey. Strong diplomatic efforts upon the Balkan
States, with the object of inducing these nations to join
their cause.

For a clear imderstanding of the situation in the
Balkans, it is necessary to review briefly the history of
all the States therein for the few years preceding the
war. Greece, Bulgaria and Rumania, had won their
independence by the sword from Turkey, of which
Empire they originally formed part. This was also true
of Serbia and Montenegro. Each of these States, after
achieving its independence, developed ambitions totally
disproportionate to its size, population or power.

The Rumanians regarded themselves as lineal descen-
dants of the Romans, an ancestry to which, after all, they
were perhaps not entitled; nevertheless, this conception
of their ancestry led them to dreams of empire over the
whole of the Balkans, Turkey and Asia, and the southern
portions of the empire of Austria, including the whole of
Transylvania and Bukowina, as well as parts of Himgary.

The next State to the south, Bulgaria, also had its
dreams of a leadership, or rather of an absorption of all
the other States of the Balkans; while Greece, fired by
recollections of her glorious history in antiquity, and

BULGARIA'S ENTRY INTO THE WAR

by the fact that undoubtedly at one time, when the
seat of the Roman Empire was in Constantinople, a
Greek Emperor had sat on the Imperial throne and given
the law to the then world, was inspired by these noble
visions of a glorious past to such an extent that she
regarded herself as destined again to see one of her sons
seated in Constantinople, ruling over the entire east of
Europe and Asia Minor.

Serbia was troubled by similar visions of widespread
Empire, inspired by the memory of a more or less
fabled past.

These clashing ambitions led several times to wars
between themselves, though Turkey was regarded by
all these States as their real enemy, and as the first
obstacle to be overcome, before their several dreams
could have taken even the first step towards realization.

In 1912 this feeling of hostility against Turkey re-
sulted in the formation of what is now known as the
Balkan League, wherein Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and
Montenegro combined to attack the Turkish Empire.
By means of this fusion of their strengths, these states
created for themselves a striking force of approximately
the same strength as that of the Turks, but with the
added advantage to them of being able to attack Turkey
from the east and from the north simultaneously.

In September, 1912, when Turkey was still feeling
the severe strain of her war with Italy and the Albanians
were rising against her to win their independence by
arms and at the same time an internal struggle was
taking place within the Empire itself for the control of
its government between the Reactionists and Constitu-
tionalists, Serbia and Bulgaria simultaneously mobilized,
and Greece and Montenegro followed suit. The result
of this action by these states was that in spite of the
deterrent efforts of the Powers, war against Turkey
followed. This war, while very short, was one of the
most sanguinary of modern times, and resulted in the
total defeat of Turkey. An armistice was signed on
December 3rd, and thereafter negotiations for peace
began. But, while these negotiations for peace were
proceeding, the Great Powers intrigued in support of
their own particular interests in the Balkans, dividing
themselves into two groups, one of which comprised
Austria and her Allies, and the other Russia and her
Allies. As a result of these intrigues between these
rival groups and of the difficulty in the division of the

BULGARIA'S ENTRY INTO THE WAR

spoUs between the original participants in the war
dissension arose in the Balkan League and finally Greece,
Serbia and Montenegro, making common cause against
Bulgaria, a second war broke out in the Balkans.

CHAPTER XVII

In February, 1913, while Bulgaria was thus struggling
with Serbia and Greece, the one attacking her from the
west and the other from the south, Rumania suddenly
discovered that she was entitled to compensation (thou^
what services this compensation was intended to cover
is difficult to discover) and demanded it of the nation
nearest to her which had benefited by the war, Bul-
garia, and on being refused, attacked her. The result
was that Bulgaria was compelled to sue for peace on
any terms, and the Balkan situation was finally settled
by the Treaty of Bucharest in August, 1913, in which
Bulgaria was deprived of the bulk of the territory which
she had expected to gain as a result of, and which had
been assigned to her at the conclusion of, the first Bal-
kan war.

The Treaty of Bucharest, however, did not deprive
Bulgaria of her strength, as it should have done in order
to have produced a permanent result, and so that king-
dom waited, brooding over her wrongs, until a favorable
opportunity should come to recover those territories
which had been taken from her by Rumania, Serbia
and Greece and which she deemed hers rightfully.
After the Treaty of Bucharest, Serbia and Greece entered
into a Treaty between themselves whereby they bound
themselves to go to each other's assistance in the event
that either one was attacked by Bulgaria alone in respect
to the territories which either had received under the
Treaty of Bucharest.

As this Treaty will play a considerable part hereafter
in the course of this history when it becomes necessary
to consider the subsequent relations between Greece
and Serbia, it is well to point out now that the attack
contemplated and referred to by this Treaty was an
attack by Bulgaria only on either Greece or Serbia, and
not an attack by Bulgaria plus any other Power or
Powers; had such been the intention, the Treaty would
not have failed to express such intention in its terms.

BULGARIA'S ENTRY INTO THE WAR

At the time this Treaty was made there was no idea in
the minds of the statesmen of either Greece or Serbia
of an imminent alliance of Bulgaria with any other
Power or Powers, and it was only entered into, therefore,
for the single purpose which it stated in its own words.

Bulgaria, it is perhaps needless to say, was even more
bitter against Rumania for her sudden and, in the eyes
of Bulgaria, treacherous action in attacking her without
warning when she was already engaged with two other
enemies. Hence it is clear that the relations between
Greece, Bulgaria and Rumania at the beginning of the
war were the reverse of friendly, and that they regarded
each other with great suspicion.

When the Allies started their operations against
Constantinople they solicited the co-operation of both
Greece and Bulgaria and held before their eyes glittering
visions of great spoils to be easily won from their partici-
pation in the attack on Turkey's territorial integrity
and on her capital.

King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, however, who has the
reputation of being one of the longest and shrewdest
heads of Europe, and is, to a very considerable degree
a military leader, doubted the practicability of the Allies'
plan for the reduction of Constantinople and was un-
willing, for this reason, to plunge Bulgaria into an adven-
ture in which the issue was in his eyes and in the eyes of
his military advisors more than doubtful. Particularly,
as Bulgaria felt considerable irritation against both
Russia and Great Britain for the attitude assumed by
them in the negotiations which terminated both the
first and second Balkan wars. Consequently, Bulgaria
assumed at this time, and maintained for several months
thereafter an attitude of strict neutrality.

The results of the expedition against Constantinople
and the crushing defeats which Russia experienced in
the summer of 1915, confirmed the King of Bulgaria
and his advisors in this attitude?, and in their opinions
after the beginning of the war, but prior however to these
two failures, Bulgaria had endeavored to bring about an
understanding between Turkey, Rumania and herself,
whereby Kavalla on the Aegean Sea in Greece should
pass into her possession without a struggle; and also
whereby, her claims to Serbian territory in Macedonia,
which had been taken from her as a result of the second
Balkan war, should be satisfied.

Rumania returned evasive answers to these overtures

BULGARIA'S ENTRY INTO THE WAR

and it was impossible to foresee what course she would
follow during the war. From time to time it was stated
that she was on the point of mobilizing her army with the
object of joining the Allies and thereby securing from
Austria the Province of Transylvania and the Bukowina,
in which provinces of Austria lived a number of Ruman-
ians by race, but who had never been politically affiliated
with Rumania from the time that all of this teritory was
the Roman Province of Dacia.

King Charles* the then sovereign of Rumania was a
prince well versed in statecraft, who had been for more
than a generation the most considerable factor in all
Balkan problems, and, as long as he lived, his influence
was strong enough to prevent Rumania from taking any
positive action one way or the other. The prospects
of the eventful triumph of any one side of the combatants
not being, in his judgment, up to the time of his death,
sufficiently certain to justify the risk Rumania would
take in entering the war on either side.

On Greece (the Allies made much the same demands
to join them in their Turkish adventure, but here a
situation developed which requires a chapter by itself
and which will be treated of some time later. Suffice
it, for the moment, to say that Greece did not join the
Allies in their attack on Turkey but remained neutral,
in spite of tremendous pressure.

In January, 1915, Bulgaria received an advance from
German banks of the sum of $15,000,000, a part pay-
ment on account of a loan of $100,000,000, arrangements
for which had been concluded iDetween Bulgaria and
these banks in the summer of 1914.

About the first of February the campaign against
Turkey going badly, the British Government gave Bul-
garia to understand that her national aspiration as re-
gards the territory taken away from her by the Treaty
of Bucharest by which the second Balkan war was con-
cluded was regarded with great sympathy by the British
and that Great Britain would use its influence to obtain
the making of the necessary recession of territory by
Serbia to her, provided that Bulgaria would definitely
promise armed co-operation in the operations against
Turkey. To counteract this, Germany and Hungary
promptly offered, at the expense of Serbia, more terri-
tory than Great Britain did, and, furthermore, in the
middle of March made an effort to induce Turkey to
restore Bulgaria certain territory in Thrace which Bul-

BULGARIA'S ENTRY INTO THE WAR

garia had occupied during the first Balkan war but
which had been given back to Turkey by the Treaty of
London.

Thus matters stood in May, when the Bulgarian
Premier made proposals to the Entente Powers which
involved secession by Serbia of considerably more terri-
tory than the Allies had proposed, and the recession by
Greece of certain territories which had not been com-
prised in their original proposal.

Towards the end of May, the Entente Powers
answered these proposals of Bulgaria to a degree, but
very evasively, and in the middle of June, Bulgaria
made new proposals based upon this reply. At this
time, however, the Allies were not in position to promise
anything, as they had not completed any arrangements
with Serbia and Greece which would enable them to
deliver the territories which they had originally promised
Bulgaria. To put themselves in a position to do so, they
began negotiations with both Serbia and Greece to such
ends, but these negotiations being both delicate and
difficult, necessarily took considerable time, and they
were not ready to reply before August to the Bulgarian
proposals of the middle of June. In the meantime, Bul-
garia and Turkey had arrived at an agreement, and, as a
result of this agreement, certain cessions of territory
were made by Turkey to Bulgaria; but, necessarily, until
the position of Bulgaria, as regards the Central Empires,
became clearly defined, Bulgaria was not to enter into
full possession of the territory effected by this agreement.

In the early days of August the Entente Powers replied
to the Bulgarian proposals of Jime 15th, but this reply
was merely to throw dust in the eyes of their own people
at home, and to conceal the failure of their diplomacy in
the Balkans from them because at this time they were
well aware of the fact of the agreement between Turkey
and Bulgaria, and were very well aware of what the
existence of such an agreement meant.

Through the rest of August, pourparlers and diploma-
tic notes were exchanged between the Entente Govern-
ments and Bulgaria to keep up the farce, but these re-
sulted in nothing, as they were intended to do from the
beginning.

On September 10th Bulgaria's Premier, publicly ad-
mitted that the Turko-Bulgarian agreement already
mentioned was a fact, and, about the same time, Bulgaria
called to the colors all of the regular Macedonian and

BULGARIA'S ENTRY INTO THE WAR

Bulgarian troops, and all Bulgarians of Macedonian or
Thracian origin. This alarmed the Allies, and on Sep-
tember 14thy they offered Bulgaria more even than she
had originally demanded, but the die was cast, the policy
of the government was fixed, which policy was on Sep-
tember 17th approved by the Bulgarian parliament.
Next followed a public and official declaration by the
Bulgarian Premier on September 20th that an agreement
had been signed with Turkey for the maintenance of
armed and benevolent neutrality on the part of Bulgaria,
to carry out which on September 23rd Bulgaria pro-
claimed a general mobilization.

CHAPTER XVIII

This mobilization was followed by ten days of intense
negotiations on the part of the Allies, but up to this
time there is no evidence that Bulgaria intended to par-
ticipate with her army in the war. What she intended
to do, apparently, up to the 3rd of October, was to hold
herself ready for eventualities which might arise, either
by the actions of Rumania to the north, her bitterest
foe, or to resist such coercion, by force of arms or other-
wise, as the Entente Powers might choose to bring to
bear upon her. But this condition was not to continue
long and a more decided attitude was forced upon Bul-
garia by the actions of Great Britian and of Russia.

The British action was, perhaps, more ridiculous than
serious, and consisted in Sir Edward Grey's issuing to
Bulgaria what he termed a "solemn warning," to which
the term "sententious" in place of "solemn" could be
perhaps more aptly applied, since it was impossible for
Sir Edward Grey to give any sanction to this warning, a
fact which was known both to himself and to the Bul-
garian government. But Sir Edward Grey was and is
prone to the theory that words from him possess the
quality of being [omnipotent in themselves. This view,
however, was not shared by the Bulgarians.

Russia took more definite action and on the 3rd of
October addressed to Bulgaria the following note:

"Events which are taking place in Bulgaria at this
moment give evidence of the definite decision of King
Ferdinand's government to place the fate of his country
in the hands of Germany. The presence of German and
Austrian officers on the Ministry of War and on the
staffs of the army, the concentration of troops in the
zone bordering on Serbia and the extensive financial
support accepted from our enemies by the Sophia Cab-
inet, no longer leave any doubt as to the present military
preparations of Bulgaria.

"The Powers of the Entente who have at heart the
realization of the aspirations of the Bulgarian people,

BULGARIA'S ENTRY INTO THE WAR

have, on many occasions, warned Mr. Radoslavoflf that
any hostile act against Serbia would be considered as
directed against themselves. The assurances given by
the head of the Bulgarian Cabinet in reply to these
warnings are contradicted by facts.

"The representative of Russia, bound to Bulgaria by
the imperishable memory of liberation from the Turkish
yoke, cannot sanction by his presence preparations for
fraticidal aggression against the Slav and Allied peoples.
The Russian Minister has therefore received orders to
leave Bulgaria with all the stafif of the legation and the
Council if the Bulgarian government does not, in 24
hours, break with the enemies of the Slav countries and
of Russia, and does not, at once, proceed to send away
the officers belonging to the armies and States which are
at war with the Powers of the Entente."

With this ultimatum Great Britain and France asso-
ciated themselves. Great Britain probably deeming
that something more than the "solemn warning" of Sir
Edward Grey had now become necessary.

On the whole, this ultimatum must be regarded as
humorous, in spite of that tone of a fond parent talking
to a naughty child which Russia chose to adopt in this
communication to Bulgaria, wherein, recalling to her
memory 'events of her liberation from the Turkish yoke,
(which perhaps are not stated with striking historical
accuracy as to the role played by Russia therein) she
informed her that "Russia cannot turn fratricidal against
the Slavic alUed peoples;" meaning thereby Serbia.
But only three short years before Russia was not at all
disturbed in mind by the assault of this same Slavic
people on the very people whose aggression against them
she now called "fratricidal." If not "fratricidal" then,
when directed by Serbia against Bulgaria, how could the
attack become "fratricidal" now when directed by Bul-
garia against Serbia? Another highly amusing feature of
this ultimatum is that it was sent by a power which up
to the time of its sending had proved itself utterly in-
capable of defending its own territory successfully, let
alone attack the territory of others.

The twenty-four hours came and the twenty-four
hours went, and Bulgaria, being an independent nation
and not a vassal state, took, during this time, the reso-
lution to resist this coercion and pledged herself defi-
nitely to the Teutonic Powers to military'' action against
the coercers, and also replied to Russia in a manner

BULGARIANS ENTRY INTO THE WAR

which that power found "bold to the verge of insolence/'

On October 16th a demand for their passports was
made by the Ministers of the Powers who either signed
or associated themselves with the Russian ultimatum,
and Bulgaria and the Entente Powers were at war.

But it is to be noted that no definite pledge of military
support was ever given by Bulgaria to the Central Powers
until after the delivery of this Russian ultimatum, which
is certainly as arrogant an attempt by a large Power to
coerce a small Power as any whereof modem history
holds record, including the demands of Germany on
Belgium in the early part of the war.

Thus Bulgaria entered the war on the side of the Cen-
tral Powers, and soon her troops were on Serbian soil.

This fiasco of the diplomacy of the Allies in the Balkans
produced the downfall of one foreign minister: Theophile
Delcasse, who held the portfolio of Foreign Affairs in
the Cabinet of France and had held that portfolio, with
some intermissions, for many years. Delcasse can be
regretted; a good hater, a hard hitter, despising hypoc-
risy and never whining when defeated, in these latter
traits of character quite a contrast to Sir Edward Grey,
he passed probably forever off the political stage, leaving

reputation which will no doubt increase in history.

CHAPTER XIX
SERBIA

At the end of the summer of 1916 the Serbian army,
in spite of the epidemic of typhus which raged in Serbia,
had succeeded in thoroughly reorganizing themselves
after their successful resistance to the Austrian invasion
in the early part of the war, and constituted a force of
about 300,000. Physically, and in morale, the Serbian
infantry is of high quality, while their field artillery was
considered by competent observers as of equal quality
with the infantry. This artillery had been considerably
strengthened by the guns captured from the Austrians
in their retreat, in their first invasion of Serbia.

A small international force, under command of Rear
Admiral Trowbridge, had been sent to Serbia by the
Allies to assist in the defense of Belgrade and the Dan-
ube front. This force consisted of a British contingent
of four 2-gun batteries of naval 4.7 guns, and some experts
in mine work, a battery of Russian guns, two French guns,
and a party of aviators. It was supposed that in view
of the pledges and promises made by the Allies of Serbia,
particularly Great Britain, that if it became necessary
this international force would be augmented so as to
become a really valuable aid in the defense of Serbia,
but this hope was destined to be disappointed, as will
be seen in the sequel.

Russia's aid in this Serbian campaign to the Serbs was
limited to circulating interesting fiction in relation to an
army of 600,000 men assembled by her which at various
times were alleged to have started from Sebastapol or Od-
essa on transports across the Black Sea. Odessa is distant
about 250 miles — Sebastopol more — from Varna, their
nearest Bulgarian port, which is the nearest port on the
Black Sea to Serbia. 600,000 men, with their artillery,
ammunition, supplies, etc., would require about 600,000
tons of shipping to transport them. The entire Russian

SERBIA

tonnage on the Black Sea and the Azov Sea on the first
of July 1913 was 282,000. It thus became somewhat
diflBcult to see how Russia could have transported by any
possibility, with this comparatively small steamer ton-
nage, by no means all of which was available, 600,000
men and their equipment to Varna under three months
time. And it is to be also observed that this computa-
tion does not take into consideration the fact that at
no time did Russia secure any footing on the Bulgarian
coast, though she attacked it several times with her
justly famous Black Sea fleet, whereat to land these men
and their suppUes. The most curious fact in connection
with this romance was that the American papers devoted,
during its several epochs of currency, column after colunm
to the progress of this fictitious army and the apprecia-
tion of what wonders it would accomplish when it once
reached the field. Thus, for the thousandth time, in
this war evincing either their utter and crass geographical
ignorance or their indomitable prejudice which sought
to establish as facts in the minds of the people things
which the editors knew not to be facts.

During September the Serbian commanders began to
notice that there was increased activity on the opposite
shores of the Danube and Save, which served, as refer-
ence to a map will show, as the northern defense lines of
Serbia, and rumors of large troop movements to the
north of the Danube, and particularly of a very consid-
erable concentration alleged to be going on at Tamsavar
began to be circulated in Serbia. The Serbians, however,
were extremely confident that they would be able to
repeat their performance of the previous campaign, and
that, in the event that this attack was made from the
north, it would not be made frontally on Belgrade itself
but would be attempted either to the west across the
Save River or else Irom the northeast via Semendria.

As was said in a preceding chapter, Bulgaria mobilized
on September 28th; on October 3rd, Russia addressed
her ultimatum to her, ordering her to suspend all miKtary
preparations to attack Serbia, and on the 5th the Min-
isters of the Entente Powers at Sophia were handed
their passports, which capital they left on the 8th.

On the 11th, at a point near Kniashevatz, to the
northeast of Nish, Bulgarian troops crossed the Serbian
frontier in the morning, and later on that same day
another force of Bulgarian troops also crossed the frontier
near Leskovafcz to the southeast of Nish.

SERBIA

As has been said, the Serbians did not contemplate
any frontal attack on Belgrade itself, and this for a
double reason. The Serbian capital occupies a sort of
triangle jutting to the north from the general line of the
northern territory of Serbia, which is protected by
rivers on the two sides projecting northward, but is
also of course faced on both these sides, on the opposite
sides of these rivers, by territory of the enemy.

Both the Danube and Save here, which join in front
of Belgrade, are wide, fairly rapidly flowing streams,
and once the bridges were removed the Serbians sup-
posed it to be hardly possible that the Austrians had
military skill enough to force their way across these
streams. Another advantage was that the southern
banks of these rivers on which Belgrade is situated are
much higher ground than the northern banks, and thus
artillery in position upon the southern bank commands
completely the territory forming the northern banks.

The Serbians, therefore, as said before, were over-
confident of Belgrade's strength; furthermore, the
menacing attitude of Bulgaria at this time induced the
Serbians to weaken the force of troops which they had
available for the defense of Belgrade, in which city itself
only two infantry regiments were left, though 20,000
men were held in reserve a short distance to the
south. In addition to the withdrawal of infantry, con-
siderable artillery was also sent to the Bulgarian frontier.

On their side, the Austro-Germans had, during Sep-
tember, assembled about 150,000 men, partly Germans
and partly Austrians, the general command of which
army was placed in the hands of Marshal von Mackenscn
who had distinguished himself in the advance into
Poland the siunmer before.

This army was divided into two forces, one of which
was destined for the capture of Belgrade and one of
which was to penetrate into Serbia via Semendria, 25
miles to the east. The army which was to take Belgrade
was under the command of Austrian General Kovess,
and that which was to attack Semendria being under
that of the German General von Gallwitz. To this force
of infantry was joined a large quantity of German artil-
lery. The smallness of this army may give rise to
comment, but it must be remembered, from the preceding
chapter, that a definite agreement had been arrived at
between the Austrian-Germans and the Bulgarians which
contemplated the entrance of Bulgaria into the war

SERBIA

and the attack on Serbia from the east as soon as invasion
began from the north. This would add another 350,000
men to the attacking force, and this Bulgarian attack
would be made on Serbia's most vulnerable line.

We will first trace the outline of the operations in the
north. On October 3rd a desultory bombardment of
Belgrade began and continued for three days, gradually
growing more violent. On October 5 the direct attack
opened with great violence and was a complete surprise
to the Serbians. Their artillery, such as they had,
could only make a feeble reply to the terrific onslaught
which was being delivered by the Austro-Germans, and
the Serbian artillery was speedily put out of action either
by the projectiles of their opponents or because their own
supply of ammunition ran out. This bombardment
continued severely for one day and wrought great
destruction, so that the dty was on fire at many points,
the front on the river suflFering particularly. The elec-
tric lights, the telephone and telegraph communications
being destroyed as well.

The night of the 6th, the Austro-Germans commenced
to cross both the Save and the Danube Rivers, using for
this purpose flat bottom boats which had previously
been gathered. The principal landing was on the Dan-
ube quays on the river front of the city itself, though
minor landings were also made to the east and west.

By daybreak of October 7th about 5,000 troops had
been successfully transported across the rivers and had,
after driving away the Serbian Infantry opposing their
landing, established themselves securely upon the Ser-
bian side of the river, where they entrenched themselves
during that day. All this day of October 7th the Austro-
German bombardment continued with increased fury
and destroyed the British guns which had been brought
back during the night from positions distant from the
town on the Save and Danube from which they had
been driven, the French guns also were destroyed.
During the night of the 7th and 8th additional forces
were transported by the Austro-Germans across the
river, and these, by dawn on the morning of the 8th,
were practically in possession of the entire river front
of A the town. Considerable fighting took place in the
streets, but in the afternoon, a general retreat of the
Serbians and the international force was ordered.
[ These fell back towards Torlak and on their way
encountered the division of Serbian troops which had

SERBIA

been placed in reserve south of the city but which had
advanced northward and on reaching a position on the
outskirts of the town, found the city completely in the
enemies' hands, and so fell back again.

By the evening of the 8th all resistance to the Austro-
Germans had ceased and all that night these continued
hurrying troops across the rivers so that by the morning
of the 9th the city of Belgrade was for the second time
completely in the hands of invaders of Serbia.

While these events were taking place at the Capital,
on the 7th of October an attack against Semendria to
the east began. Gen. von Gallwitz had a large quantity
of artillery at his disposition, and this artillery was used
without intermission from the morning of October 7th
to the morning of October 9th. Under cover of a tre-
mendous fire which was directed from the northern
bank of the Danube on Semendria and its environs, a
force of Austro-Germans managed to occupy Semendria
Island in the Danube directly in front of the town and to
install a considerable number of guns there, which also
opened upon the town. The Serbian artillery in the
town was speedily put out of action and on the morning
of October 9th the Austro-Germans succeeded in throw-
ing strong contingents across the Danube and in taking
possession of the town after a six hour battle in its
streets with the Serbian infantry which fought with great
courage and determination, but which was eventually
overcome and forced to retreat, after suffering very
heavy losses.

Thus in three days two of the northern gates of Serbia
had been forced.

At the same time that the attack on these two towns
was delivered, simultaneous attacks were begun on the
part of the Austro-Germans on Orsova near the extreme
east of Serbia, near where the boundarj^ lines of Him-
gary, Rumania and Serbia meet, and also near the cele-
brated Iron Gate of the Danube, and to the west of
Belgrade on the Save River at Shabatz; while on the
western boundary another attack had begun on Vishe-
grad from Serajevo to the west, the scene of the crime
which ^began the war.

|n The* objective in the attack from Orsova was to unite
with the Bulgarian troops which had crossed the border
near Negotin, while that from Shabatz was to capture
Valievo, the head of the railroad running to the east from
Sopot on the main line of railroad running through

SERBIA

central Serbia from Belgrade to Nish; and that from
Vishegrad to capture Uzitsha, at the head of another
branch of this same line of railroad, which branch ran
parallel to and to the southward of the Valievo branch.

The army of von Kovess began advancing, on October
11th towards the south, 1but the Serbians contested every
foot of the way with great gallantry, and it was not until
the 20th of October, ten days later, that this army had
progressed as far as Leskovatz and Stepoyevatz; the
first, 30 miles directly south of Belgrade and the second
the same distance southwest, and was menacing Sopot
on the Nish railroad where the branch for Valievo runs
to the west. The force which crossed the Danube at
Shabatz had also moved south and was moving directly
on Valievo.

In the center the Teutons, starting from Semendria,
moved southward in two columns, one marching directly
south, which captured Selevatz, in the valley of the
Morava River, while the other had struck southeast
and had taken Ranovatz, in the valley of the Mlava
River.

The force from Vishegrad did, in its first two weeks'
operations, reach Uzitsha, as before stated, the terminus
of the southern branch of the Nish Railroad. The force
proceeding from Orsova on the northeastern frontier
had moved south along the line of the Danube and had
succeeded in opening the navigation of this river, whereby
it became possible to send ammunition down the river
to the Bulgarian fortress of Vidin.

On the Bulgarian frontier, the east front, the Bul-
garians had occupied Negotin and Zaitchar to the south,
on the River Tunok. Further south near Pirot, north-
west of Sofia, on the railroad between Sofia and Nish,
about ten miles from the frontier, the Bulgarians had
made but slow progress owing to the desperate resis-
tance of the Serbians, and further north, at Kniashevatz,
another force was moving to the westward, thus threaten-
ing Nish from the northeast, while the force at Pirot
threatened it from the southeast.

On the southern end of this eastern front of Serbia
the Bulgarians had advanced to the line of railroad
running from Nish to Salonika and had cut it at Vrania;
by which move they had intercepted communications
between the main body of the Serbian Army to the north
and the Allied Forces which were now beginning to dis-
embark at Salonika. South of Vrania another thrust

SERBIA

was being made by the Bulgariaiis which started from
Kustendil and which after winning a bloody battle at
Egri Palanka had pushed forward close to Eumanovo.

In the far south another Bulgarian force started from
Strmnitza, moved northwestwardly and after hard
fighting lasting till the 20th of October, captured the
town of Veles on the Nish-Salonika Railroad, a day or
two later.

About the 16th of October the Allied Forces at Salo-
nika made a move forward in two columns; the French
moved along the raikoad northward in the direction of
Krivolak and Veles, where they hoped to arrive before
the occupation of the town by the Bulgarians; while the
British contented themselves at this time by occupying
the railroad from Salonika to the frontier, as far as
Ghevgeli, and establishing a line to the eastward from
this town to Lake Doiran. The French were about
24,000 strong, and the British about 16,000.

The Allied Fleets, about this time, began to bombard
the southern Bulgarian coast towns on the Aegean, and
particularly bombarded Dedeagatch heavily but in-
effectually.

CHAPTER XX

The next week witnessed fierce combats between the
Bulgarians and the Serbians on the eastern front, but it
eariy became apparent that the Serbian Army was not
going to be able to defend Nish successfully. At this
time Nish was the seat of the government which had
been removed thither at the time of the fall of Belgrade,
but on October 21st the Serbian government, foreseeing
that the situation of Nish was extremely precarious,
moved the capital north to Krushevatz, but only re-
mained here two days, removing to Kralievo on October
23rd. The fighting on this eastern front continued
violent for the next ten days.

Returning now to the Austro-German Armies advanc-
ing southward. The two Serbian Armies, being forced
south, continued their brave resistance, but were forced
back on the 22nd of October to Mladnovatz, and three
days later were again compelled to give ground, this time
falling back as far as Topola, which is north of Krague-
vatz; a position they onlj'- held two days, retiring to the
south of Kraguevatz on October 27. Here, after a
rather warm fight, in which the Serbians were defeated,
the remaining portion of their army fell back as far as
Krushevatz on October 27th.

By the capture by the Teutons of Kraguevatz which
followed on October 31, the Serbian main arsenal, which,
in addition to being an arsenal, was also the site of the
only powder factory of importance in Serbia, a hard blow
was dealt to the Serbian power of defense. It was from
this arsenal, according to the proofs produced at the
trial of the assassins of the Austrian Archduke Franz
Ferdinand, that the bombs which were used by Cabri-
novic, one of the conspirators who had been taken by
Major Tankosic of the Serbian General Staff and given
to the bomb thrower; and this testimony of the witnesses
was corroborated by that of experts on explosives who
proved that bombs of the particular character of those
used in the assassination of the Archduke were not man-

SERBIA

ufactured anywhere outside of the Royal Arsenal of
Serbia.

With the arsenal were taken a vast quantity of mili-
tary supplies and munition of war, besides some 60 guns.

The weather during these days was very bad, and the
Serbian retreat, as well as the Austro-German advance,
was conducted under very great difficulties; and in addi-
tion to the difficulties caused by the weather, the Austro-
German forces pressed so closely on the Serbian rear as
to give the latter no respite.

The Serbian Army in the northwest comer of Serbia,
during this time, was also in great difficulties, although
it occupied the strongest positions on this northern front.
Valievo was evacuated on October 22nd, and the evac-
uation being orderly, the bridges over the Kolubara
River were destroyed and all the supplies of the army
taken away. For some reason, the Austro-Germans
were not ready to seize their advantage, and did not
enter the town until October 30th; but then immediately
set itself in pursuit of the Serbian Army; which being
outflanked on the left, fell back continuously through
Mionitsa, Goukosh, Gomi Milanovatz, Rudnik, Blaz-
nava. Bar, Knitch, and Vitanovitse, to Kralievo, the
temporary capital where it eventually joined the army,
which had fallen back from Belgrade itself.

In this retreat there were continual clashes between
the Serbian rear guards and the advance guards of the
Austro-Germans; but except at the Ub-Kotselievo lines
and one or two places south of this, there was no hard
fighting. After the capture of Uzitsha, the Austro-
Germans advanced from the westward at Vishegrad
and began a forward movement towards Kralievo.
In order to protect Kralievo until it could be reached by
the Serbian armies retreating from thenorth,the Serbian
army retreating from the east made a stand at Tchar-
tchak, a town on the railroad from Uzitsha to Krushe-
vatz, about haK way between the first named place and
Kralievo, and here a most desperate struggle took place
which lasted for six days; the town itself being captured
and re-captured several times. This was probably the
hardest fighting which took place in northern Serbia,
in proportion to the number of men engaged, the casual-
ties were very great.

However, eventually, the Austro-Germans, advancing
from the West with some aid from their forces moving
from the north, possessed themselves of the town and

SERBIA

the Serbians who had opposed them began a retreat
southward from both Tchartchak and Kralievo in the di-
rection of Mitrovitza, the head of a raikoad line running
Bouth to Uskuby where it joined the main line to Salonika.
It was the hope of these Serbian armies to be able to
retreat in reasonable order to Mitrovitza and thence
take the railroad south to Uskub, and thence to Ghevgeli,
where they would join the French and British troops.

Turning to the eastern frontier. On the 26th of
October, the Bulgarians drove the Serbians out of Pirot
and captured the town, and on the same day, further
south, they entered Veles after a hard fight, driving the
Serbians in the town to the westward. The effect of
this capture of Veles was to cut off any probable chance
of escape for these Serbian armies coming south on the
line from Mitrovitza, which has already been spoken of,
and this hope was totally extinguished by the capture
of Uskub by the Bulgarians, which is the termination
of the Mitrovitza branch, the day after the capture of
Veles. A part of the forces which captured these two
towns turned south and, moving rapidly, reached a point
near Prilep, three days afterwards; thus interposing
themselves between the Serbians retreating from Veles
and Uskub and the British and French forces, and thus
finally preventing the junction of which the Serbians
and British had hoped it would have been possible to
make.

Further north, Leskovatz, on the Nish-Salonika Rail-
road, was captured by coincident movements north
from Vrania and west from Pirot. The effect of this
capture was to almost completely surround the Serbian
army in this region and to add to the difficulties in which
it had fallen.

TheAustro-German forces which had captured Krague-
vatz, on the 31st of October, were moving south rapidly.
Gen. Stephanovitch, commanding the Serbian for cesin
Leskovatz, appreciated his position and fearing lest a
longer stay in that place would result in his being com-
pletely surrounded, on October 4th evacuated the town
and began a retreat to the west, crossing the Morava
River and directing his march in the direction of Pristina.
This retreating army was pursued by the Bulgarians,
but its retreat, by forced marches averaging 35 miles a
day, was so swift that it outstripped its pursuers and
arrived at Pristina safely but in an exhausted condition.

In the meantime, in the north, the Austro-Germans

100

SERBIA

who, as said, captured Kraguevatz on October 31st,
immediately resumed their march south and rapidly
approached to Kralievo and Krushevatz. On Novem-
ber 2nd Krushevatz fell into the possession of the Austro-
Germans but a few hours after the Serbians who had
evacuated it had fallen back in the direction of Kralievo.
Kralievo, however, did not prove a safe place of refuge,
and on the next day the Serbian Army which had re-
treated thither, as well as the Serbian government,
went south to Rashka.

Rashka, which is only some 30 miles south of Kralievo,
was not deemed a safe place for a long stay, and a day
or two after its arrival there, the Serbian government
moved to Mitrovitza, across the country. By this time
the retreat had become that of not only the government
and the army, but of the entire Serbian population, and
the roads, such as they were, were thickly encumbered
for many days with the primitive carts of the civilian
population.

For this reason, traveling was slow, and it took the
government ten days to cover the comparatively short
distance between Rashka and Mitrovitza. At Mit-
rovitza, however, the government stay was almost
equally short, because a force of the enemy advancing
from the west occupied Pristina two days after its
arrival there, rendering its further stay in this town
imsafe.

Consequently, on the same day the Serbian govern-
ment left for Prisrend, where it arrived the day following,
the 16th of November, and where it remained for a little
over a week. WTien Prisrend became unsafe, the gov-
ernment again left and following the River Drin across
Albania to the Albanian seaport of Scutari, which city
it finally reached on the 30th of November.

Prisrend is remarkable as being the last place where
the Serbian government exercised any authority in
Serbia; and, a little later on, Prisrend became the center
from which the terrible winter retreat of the Serbian
population westward, through the Albanian Alps to the
shores of the Adriatic, started.

101

CHAPTER XXI

In the meantime, and while the government was at
Prisrend, another Serbian army which had been defeated
at Pristina to the northeast thereof, succeeded in moving
west from Pristina after their defeat and retreated
directly west to Ipek, in Montenegro. Pristina itself
was abandoned by the Serbian army thereon the morning
of November 26th, and in the afternoon of that day the
enemy entered it.

The army moving from Pristina towards Ipek reached
Ipek on December 1st, but being hotly pursued by their
enemy, in two columns, one which moving from the
northeast had previously captured Novi Bazar and the
other from Pristina, were only able to remain there
over the night and on the next day started for Scutari
where the Serbian government had preceded it.

The country through which this retreat had to be
conducted would have been a difficult country even in
summer, but now it was the height of the winter and the
lofty mountains were deeply covered with snow.
Through their valleys and across their ridges the re-
treating Serbians made their way for eleven days;
finally arri\ing at Podgoritsa and four days after at
Scutari.

Another portion of the Serbian army which was at
the time of the beginning of the general Serbian retreat^
to the east of Pristina, found itself in a very difficult
position; behind it were the Bulgarians pushing up the
railroad from Uskub towards Pristina, and threatening
to cut the road to Prisrend, which meant that the Ser-
bians' road to comparative safety, through Albania,
would be cut off. Before them were 150,000 to 200,000
civilian fugitives seeking a way through the Albanian
moimtains, and moving with a slowness which, under
the circiunstances, endangered both themselves and the
army behind them. The Bulgarians came up rapidly^
and to save their people, this Serbian army, having no
other choice, threw itself in the way of the Bulgarians

102

SERBIA

on the line from Lipliane to Ferozevitch, where, being
without artillery, it endeavored to stay the advancing
foe by rifle fire. This army fought very gallantly, and
not only held the Bulgarians but drove them back for
some iniles in spite of its insufficient equipment for
battle, and continued to withstand them for six days,
the gaining of which time gave the opportunity for the
refugees, among whom was the King of Serbia, to move a
considerable distance to the westward and to attain a
position of relative safety. At the end of the 6th day,
however, the ammunition of the Serbians gave out and
their losses from the enemy's rifle and artillery fire
having been very heavy, they began to fall back to the
west.

It is impossible to describe this general flight of the
Serbians both the armies and the civiUan population
from their country; it lasted from six to eight weeks in
the depth of winter, its line of movement lying through
a very difficult country which could supply the flying
refugees with neither food nor shelter; and to add to the
difficulties, many of the tribes of Albanians through whose
territories the line of retreat lay, were hostile to the
Serbians and opposed them by force of arms. Among
the most unfortimate of all those who were carried
away by the stream of this retreat were some 20,000
Austrian prisoners taken in the first invasion, who were
driven by the Serbian troops before them to the west.
These unfortunates were in even worse pUght than theur
captors, the Serbian refugees themselves, and of the
20,000 barely 6,000, one quarter, survived to reach the
shores of the Adriatic.

When the Serbian army reached the sea coast, it may
be doubted whether its strength exceeded 60,000. Of
the Serbian civilian refugees many thousands had also
perished. There is perhaps no episode like this flight
of an entire people in modern history. To find anytlmig
similar to it we would be obliged to go back to the middle
ages.

Towards the end of December, the confused mass of
army, prisoners and refugees were practically all in
northern Albania, concentrated in the vicinity of Scutari.
The troops were gotten together into some sort of organ-
ization, and pushed on to San Giovanni di Medua, on
the port on the coast to the south where they could
obtain some supplies from the outside, and here we will
leave them for a time.

103

SERBIA

While these things were going on in western Serbia,
other events of considerable interest were taking place
in southeastern Serbia where as has been said the French
and EngUsh troops had advanced as far as Ghevgeli.
These forces were joined here by a comparatively few
Serbian troops which had succeeded in evading the
Bulgarians by fljdng southward, and it was resolved by
the AlUed commanders to endeavor to make an advance
to the north in order to attempt to create a diversion
which would give the Serbian army retreating to the
west towards Albania a chance to withdraw more suc-
cessfully. Accordingly an advance was made on a
line rimning north from Strumitza, to the east of Ghev-
geU. This advance was temporarily successful, and
defeating the Bulgarians more than once succeeded in
getting up as far north as Krivolak, but the struggle at
Krivolak did not last long, as reinforcements soon came
to the Bulgarians there, whereupon these took the
oflfensive and the combined forces of French, British
and Serbians were driven back again to their point of
departure, and even further south along the Vardar,
until, at the end of January, the Bulgarian Une had
arrived at a point well to the south of Lake Doiran and
Ghevgeli.

During this time in southwest Serbia the Bulgarians
moving from Veles to Uskub, had successfully occupied
Kritchevo and Prilep, and finally attained the height
of their desires by the occupation of the much-coveted
eity of Monastir; a few days after which they captured
Ochrida. Later on, to the west, on the Albanian border,
the Bulgarian lines were advanced south of Monastir
and took up a position as far south as an east and west
line running through Fiorina in Greek territory.

It is needless to say that the Serbians felt deeply
their practical desertion by the Allies. Not only had
they asked for aid as far back as the 7th of July, but
latterly had repeated that request, which was particiilarly
addressed to the British. On September 24th Sir
Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister, had sol-
enmly pledged Serbia that England would assist her
without qualification and without reserve. To most
people, as to the Serbs, such a broad pledge of support
would have meant that, in the event of necessity, military
assistance would be offered unstintedly; but it appears
that, in putting this interpretation upon Sir Edward
Grey's pledgCi the Serbians were mistaken, becausei

104

SERBIA

when the necessity for the redemption of this pledge
arose, Sir Edward Grey explained that his words meant
that "diplomatic support" would be given and had
not meant military support at all.

One result of the conquest of Serbia was peculiar.
All the officers of the Serbian array who were proved to
have been mixed up in the conspiracy which resulted
in the tragedy at Serajevo in Jime, 1914, and also all
survi\dng officers, without exception who took part in
the assassination of Alexander and Draga years before,
wherebj'- Peter, ex-King of Serbia, came to the throne,
were killed during the fighting resulting from the in-
vasion. In this case one may quote with some appropri-
ateness the line:

"The mill of the gods grinds slowly,
But it grinds exceedingly fine."

Subsequent to the punishment of Serbia, the Allies
withdrew a considerable distance to the south and con-
centrated in the city of Salonika, in Greek territory on
which they installed themselves, and which they fortified
and constituted their base for the problematic future
operations for the redemption of Serbia. This occupa-
tion of Salonika led them into a series of complications
with Greece, since such occupation of this city on Greek
territory was without the consent of the Greek govern-
ment, and, in fact over the protest of that government,
to which protest the Allies paid no attention.

106

CHAPTER XXII

As an aid to the operations taking place in Serbia, in
the early days of October, the Austrians opened an
offensive from southern Bosnia on Montenegro. This
little country, which is a tangled mass of high mountains
covered with almost impenetrable forests, which contains
no roads in our sense of the word, presents great difficulty
to an invader, and defended as it was by a brave though
not particularly numerous mountain people, every foot
of the way had to be won against guerilla fighting.
Under these circumstances, the Austrians progressed
so extremely slow in the first two months, that little
of practical importance resulted, though, nevertheless,
a steady advance took place; but still this was so slow
that Austrian troops had not got into a position in Monte-
negro where they could successfulh'* oppose the retreat
of the Serbians westward from Ipek and through Pris-
rend to Scutari at the time that these retreats took place.
In fact, the serious advances in this campaign did not
commence really until after the 11th of January, when
the Austrians captured Mount Loven, the famous
"Black Mountain" whose possession they had coveted
for years; and the taking of Cettinje, the capital, six
miles distant therefrom followed four days later, Jan-
uary 15th.

On the 18th of January the Austrians captured Anti-
vari, which capture gave them command of Scutari;
whose occupation soon followed, and on the 19th Dul-
cigno fell into their power. At this time the announce-
ment was made that the Montenegrin King had sued
for a separate peace.

But it turned out that these negotiations of Monte-
negro's King looking to surrender were merely a ruse
de guerre to gain time to enable him to concentrate his
scattered army and to make provision for its retreat in
case of need. Under the rules of war in the case of the
armistice which was arrived at for a few days as a result
of these negotiations, such a course is allowable unless

106

SERBIA

the armistice is sued to surprise the enemy before he
can put himself on guard, which was not the case in
these negotiations. Generally speaking, unless the
armistice itself contains stipulations to the contrary,
each side is authorized, during its continuance, to make
movements of troops within its own lines, to receive and
instruct recruits, to construct retrenchments, to repair
bridges and establish new batteries, and in general, to
take advantage of the time and means at his disposal
to prepare for resuming hostilities.

This was apparently what the King did in this case,
and having accomplished his object, on the 19th of
January King Nicholas left the country and joined his
Queen and the royal family at San Giovanni de Medusa,
whence he embarked for Italy. His stay in Italy was,
however, but brief, in spite of the fact that the King of
Italy was his son-in-law, and King Nicholas ultimately
took up a residence near Lyons, France, where he re-
mained for some time, being supported by an allowance
from the French Government.

Many of the Montenegrins, however, particularly
those to the northeast and north of Cettinje, were de-
ceived by these negotiations and the towns of Podgoritza,
Danilovegrad and Niksic surrendered without resistance
to the Austrians; these towns being the only important
towns of Montenegro which the Austrians had not
occupied before; and all except the very southern end of
Montenegro was completely in Austrian possession by
January 25th, 1916. To the south, however, a small
army under General Milanovitch obeyed the orders of
the King and attempted to continue their resistance,
even going so far as to take the offensive and attacking
the Austrians. The main result of these negotiations
was, however, to free the Austrians from any further
need of very large forces in Montenegro itself and con-
sequently to enable them to detach enough troops from
their army there to form a sufficient force for the invasion of
Albania in pursuit of the remainder of the Montenegrin
army, and the Serbians, and for the attack of the Itahan
forces also there.

This the Austrians did and Milanovitch being easily
brushed aside the Austrians soon appeared in force to
the immediate north of the port of San Giovanni de
Medua. By which appearance the Serbian army which,
as has been seen before, had concentrated in the neigh-
borhood of this town after its escape from the mountains

107

SERBIA

of Montenegro and Albania, was compelled to retreat
further south. Their retreat began on January 21st,
and San Giovanni di Medua and its neighborhood was
evacuated by all the forces of the Serbians and their
Allies. This retreat was directly south towards Durazzo
where these mixed forces arrived safely after a march of
several days though losing some men in rear guard
actions on the road with the Austrians and in combats
with the Albanians who threw themselves across their
path to bar their way southward.

From Durazzo a portion of the Serbian army was
taken south by water to the Greek island of Corfu which
had been occupied "temporarily" by the Allies without
the consent of Greece. Another portion, however,
was forced to evacuate Durazzo owing to the approach
of the Austrian forces advancing from the north and of
Bulgarian forces moving from the eastward, and re-
treated 'southward to Avlona, another Albanian sea-
port which at this time was in the hands of the Italians.
These forces were somewhat roughly handled on the
road, but eventually the bulk thereof arrived at Avlona
and were there embarked for Corfu.

The Austrians themselves soon after the taking of San
Giovaimi di Medua moved southward through Kroia
which they occupied on February 5th in the direction
of Durazzo and on February 8th made a juncture with the
Bulgarians at a point a dozen miles to the northwest of
the city, which the united forces proceeded leisurely
to surround. Another force of Bulgarians moving from
the eastward was met at Elbassan to the southeast of
the town on the 12th of February, by which meeting the
town was completely surrounded on its land side. There
was, however, a large force of Italians in the town, as
well as some Serbians, and a force of Albanian tribesmen
led by Essad Pasha, who had thrown in their lot with the
Entente Powers and the attempt of the Austro-Bulgarian
force to draw in the arc of their semi-circle to its center
was vigorously opposed, and progress was slow particu-
larly as the Austro-Bulgar commanders having no reason
to hurry, refrained as much as possible from exposing
their men. A few days before the fall of the city Essad
Pasha made his escape. Finally on February 27th the
city was taken and with it some Serbian and quite a
number of Italian prisoners.

The Austro-Bulgar forces which captured Durazzo,
immediately set out for Avalona and being reinforced

108

SERBIA

by other Bulgarian forces who jomed them a short dis-
tance to the northeast thereof; an attack against that
city was planned, but, owing to the difficulties of the
terrain surrounding the place and the consequent cost
in life its storming would have entailed was never de-
livered, though the Italian troops were driven into, and
kept in the city itself and its immediate outskirts foir the
rest of the period under consideration.

In this maimer were Serbia and Montenegro com-
pletely overrun, their governments forced into exile and
their peoples subjected to the rule of the Teutons.
Considered from any standpoint the subjugation of these
two countries, and the Teuton occupation of this Balkan
area had a great influence upon the whole war, both in
a military and in an economic sense. Prior to the attack
upon Serbia, though Bulgaria and Turkey were allied
with the Central Empires, there was no communication
possible between them. By the capture of the railroad
running from Belgrade to Nish and from Nish to Sophia,
a speedy and economical means of communication was
opened between these allies, with the result that not only
were the Central Empires able to send forward munitions
of war, supplies of ammimition and the artillery imper-
atively needed by her ally, Turkey, to withstand the foe
at her door, but they were able to draw from Turkey
and from Bulgaria the superfluous quantities of food,
supplies which these countries possessed, and of which
they themselves stood in need.

Furthermore, and as we shall see in the sequel, not
only were they able to relieve Turkey's immediate mili-
tary necessities, but, by being in direct communication
with Turkey and having the opportunity of henceforth
sending military stores, supplies and equipment unhin-
dered, they were able to take advantage of the very
considerable force of man power which Turkey had at
her disposal but of which she had not been able up to
this time to make any effectual use, for the reason that
Turkey herself did not possess the necessary arms,
artillery and ammunition and equipment to put these
men upon a war footing.

Another very important result achieved by this open-
ing up of communication between them and Turkey was
that it gave the Central Empires access to the rich agri-
cultural regions of Asia Minor, which are not only valu-
able from the agricultural standpoint, but also from the
mineral standpoint. The fertility of the soil of Asia

109

SERBIA

Minor is proverbial, and this fertility for many cen-
turies has made its possession of extreme importance
and value to its owners. At one time it was the impor-
tant source of food supply of the ancient world, and
could be made so of proportionate importance to-day
if proper agricTiltural methods were followed and irriga-
tion introduced. Even under the slipshod methods of
cultivation now in use there are produced in Asia Minor
from 250,000 to 300,000 bales of cotton a year. At the
time the Teutons opened the road through to Turkey the
bulk of the cotton crop of 191 i was still at the points of
production; no market having existed for it owing to
the closing of the ordinary means of transportation.
This cotton crop of 1914, plus the crop of 1915, passed
into the hands of Germany and had a marked influence
not only upon her power to produce explosives (in the
manufacture of which some cotton is used) but also in
her production in other lines of industry wherein cotton
is used.

In addition to cotton, tobacco, coffee, maima, and
cereals in very considerable quantities became available,
and, more important even in one sense than their
present availability, was the fact that there was now
practically united to the Central Empires an agricultural
region which under proper conditions could produce
nearly all of the requirements in most raw materials of
the Central Empires for manufacturing and other pur-
poses in the future, and which was so situated geograph-
ically as to be beyond the reach or control of the sea
power.

In addition to this agricultural production, Asia
Minor contains mineral regions of very considerable
extent: producing in larger or smaller quantities chrome,
zinc, antimony, borax, emery, asphalt, gold, silver, litho-
graphic stones, iron, and above all, copper. Near Diar-
bekir is located what is said to be one of the largest and
most productive mines of this mineral in the world.

This condition of affairs has not only affected and
ameliorated conditions in Germany at present, but it
also places her in a position where, in the future, she will
be to a far greater degree than ever before really inde-
pendent of importation of many of these agricultural
products and minerals from lands beyond the sea, and
the consequences arising thereupon to Germany's many-
sided industrial development will probably be very
great in the years following the war, and not without

110

SERBIA

consequences of considerable importance to the western
and southern states of the United States.

It can be said, without exaggeration, that in this
respect alone the Central Empires added in the period of
the next eight or nine months not less than one million
to a million and a quarter men to their available man
power. As will be seen later on in the war, this addition
to the strength of the Turkish forces was destined to
play an important role not only on the battlefields in
Turkey itself, but also along the far-flung battle lines of
the Central Empires.

A more immediate result, however, of this power to
bring aid to Turkey in the respects above stated, was the
abandonment of the British and French operations on
the Peninsula of Gallipoli, which had as their objective
the capture of Constantinople, and as it subsequently
appeared, the transfer of the possession of that famous
city to Russia under an agreement which had been
entered into between the Entente Powers at the time
the operations on Gallipoli Peninsula began. In fact,
it can be said that no prior campaign in the war had had
as beneficial and strengthening an effect upon the mili-
tary and economic situation of the Central Empires as
did the conquest of Serbia and Montenegro. It is per-
haps not too much to state that when the entire war
comes to be looked at from a reasonable perspective,
from this campaign it will be possible to see the
war's ultimate result flow. After this completion of the
conquest of Serbia and Montenegro, a temporary ad-
ministration of the first kingdom was instituted under
Bulgarian and Austrian auspices, and of the second
under Austrian. The aged King Peter of Serbia, after
various adventures finally arrived at Salonica, Greece.

Ill

CHAPTER XXIII
DARDANELLES

As was said, in closing the account of the operations
on the Peninsula of GalBpoli up to the first of Septem-
ber, 1915, in the last volume of this work, at that time
the British and French positions on this Peninsula were,
to all intents and purposes, the same as they had been
at nightfall on the 27th of April.

No events of importance took place in September
on this front. The trench fighting continued as intensely
as before, but neither side made any attempt to take
a serious offensive at any point. Sniping and bombard-
ing really constituted the entire activity.

On October 8th, Gen. Hamilton reported that there
had been an average gain during the month of Septem-
ber of 300 yards along the whole four miles of the Suyla
fronts. But public opinion in England was becoming
alarmed. The reports of heavy casualties and of a
great prevalence of sickness among the troops engaged
in these operations had gradually leaked out to the
British public, in spite of the attempts to mislead them
as to the actual progress of the troops in this campaign
^by the familiar expedient of chronicling their advances
but omitting mention of their retrogressions, and England
was genuinely anxious. About the middle of October
criticisms of the expedition began to be openly voiced
in Parliament, and these grew more insistent and more
direct as the replies of the government grew more evasive.
At one time an organized effort was begim to take the
necessary parliamentary steps to force the government
to appoint a select committee to inquire into the general
condition of this campaign. But, about the time that
that movement in Parliament commenced to be em-
barrassing, it was announced the government itself had
taken steps to ascertain the exact situation.

On October 11th, a telegram was sent by Lord Eitch-

112

DARDANELLES

ener to Sir Ian Hamilton, asking him what, in his opin-
ion, would be the loss which would be necessarily involved
in the evacuation of the Peninsula. To this. Gen.
Hamilton answered that such a step was "unthinkable," «r
with the result that four days later he was recalled and
on his arrival in London in October was informed that
he had been superseded in his command. His successor
was Gen. Sir Charles Monroe.

The new commander left London for the Dardanelles
on October 22nd, and pending his arrival. Gen. Bird-
wood took command. On his arrival at GalUpoli, Gen.
Monroe, after a thorough examination of the situation,
reported in favor of the immediate evacuation, but with ^
its usual uncertainty of purpose, the Government did
not accept his report but vacillated, fearing the poHtical
consequences to it of an evacuation, as well as the loss
of prestige both to Great Britain and her AlUes.

But the storm of criticism continued, and on Novem-
ber 2nd Mr. Asquith was forced to defend the govern-
ment in a general statement made in the House of
Commons in a partial justification of the Dardanelles
expedition. This defense was severely attacked, but
almost immediately it was made known that Lord
Kitchener had been sent to the Dardanelles by the
government to examine the situation for himself, which,
quieted criticism. On his arrival there in the early
days of November, and after going over the whole sit-
uation with Gen. Monroe and examining the British
positions, Lord Kitchener endorsed Gen. Monroe's
recommendation in favor of evacuation.

During October the daily monotony of trench warfare
continued on the Peninsula. On the 4th of Novem-
ber the first real fighting, in some time, took place.
The Turks attacked the Australians and New Zealanders
on the Anzak front about six o'clock in the evening and
a brisk fight ensued which kept up for two hours, foially
resulting in a repulse for the Turks. On November 20th
the sub-marine "E-20," whose exploits in the Sea of
Marmora have been heretofore referred to, was simk
in that Sea and its crew and commander captured by
the Turks.

On November 15th the British tried an oflfensive
against the Turks entrenched in the Krithia Ravine
and were successful in carrying a few yards of Turkish
trenches. The Turks, however, coimter-attacked on
November 17th and regained the trenches they had lost

113

DARDANELLES

on the 15th; and on November 21st made another at-
tack, wherein they gamed some gromid. On November
27th a three days' storm of ram and snow, accompanied
by very high winds and extreme cold, fell upon the Pen-
insida. This was the opening of the winter which, this
particular year, came a few weeks earUer than usual.
This storm inflicted great suffering upon the Europeans
as well as upon the Turks, and was perhaps one of the
main causes which opened the eyes of the British mili-
tary commanders to the fact that it would jbe difficult,
if not impossible, to keep their men on this Peninsula
during the winter, hving, as they did, exposed to the full
force of the elements, and practically without shelter.

On November 30th Lord Kitchener returned to Lon-
don. From that time until December 21st nothing was
heard from GaUipoli. Apparently the campaign had
vanished from the face of the earth.

On the 21st of December, Mr. Asquith electrified the
world by aimouncing in Parliament that all the troops
at Suvla Bay and Anzac, had evacuated those fronts
and had succeeded in removing with them not only
most of their stores but 193 gims of various sizes, leav-
ing only seven to fall into the hands of the Turks, and that %
this result had been accomplished at the cost of a hali- \)
a dozen wounded men. It appears that this evacuation
had really begun about the ^tji^of December, when the
winter stores and miscellaneous articles were first re-
moved. Thereafter all other stores, except a small
quantity of ammunition, were removed, and the first
"^ embarkation of troops took place. Finally came the

embarkation of the gims and the remaining troops.
On the afternoon of the last day, December 20th, to .
deceive the enemy, on the Krithi^a front, a faint attack
was made on some Turkish trenches which were taken
and held against Turkish counter-attacks. Very early
in the morning of the 21st of December the Australians
exploded a large mine on the Anzac front which was
fired from the beach where the last troops were em-
barking.

According to the British story, this also aided in de-
ceiving the Turks, so, that it was nearly a day before
they ascertained that the enemy whom they had fought
for so many months had disappeared. It is true that
the Turkish version of this episode does not quite coin-
cide with the English account, but as it is impossible
to obtain any convincing evidence either way, it is per-

114

DARDANELLES

haps as well for the time to set forth this English version
in order to have it upon record.

After Suvla and Anzac were evacuated, the English
government and the English press announced that the
Rrithia front at the extremity of the Peninsula wgujd,
be jield indefinit ely; in fact there were many mililary
e5$erls in Eugliiud who considered that its holding was
of immense importance to Great Britain in that it forced
the mobilization in the extremity of this Peninsula of
a large force of Turkish troops who could have been
used to great advantage otherwise. But this was prob-
ably a mere pretense intended to deceive the Turks, and
incidentally, the British pubUc, because it is now known
that the French troops began to prepare to depart as
soon as the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac was com-
pleted. And in fact on the 29th of December the orders
for a general evacuation of Krithia were issued, and
embarkation began almost immediately.

On January 4th there were only a few thousand French
remaining, and a division of the British had already
gone. It appeared, however, that the Turks were be-
ginning to suspect that some movement was in progress,
and irregular skirmishing began along the line; conse-
quently, on the night of January 5th and 6th, the evac-
uation was continued more hurriedly. On the after-
noon of January 7th the Turks apparently meditated
a general advance; the British perceiving that they were
making preparations to leave their trenches. Actually,
however, there was only one advance made on the ex-
treme left of the British line where there was a two hour
fight of a rather bitter hand to hand character, which
ended indecisively, and in which the Staffordshires par-
ticipated, thus having the honor of taking part in the
last actual fighting of the expedition.

That night the evacuation proceeded very hurriedly,
on account of the evident disposition of the Turks to
attack and most of the artillery was gotten away. The
next day was still more disturbed, but finally about three
o'clock in the morning of January 9th the embarkation
was completed. Seventeen gims were left behind and a
large quantity of stores and ammunition, most of this
ammimition, however, was exploded from the embarka-
tion points at the last moment.

This version, again, is that of the British. No report
has been made by the French, and the Turkish version is
that the British suilered very heavy losses on the 7th,

115

DARDANELLES

8th and 9th of January, and that in place of their suc-
ceeding in burning their stores, these stores fell into the
Turks' hands.

In this unfortunate Gallipolian adventure the British
lost, in officers: killed 1745, wounded 3143, missing 353;
or a total of 5,241. Of the rank and file there were
killed 26,455, wounded 74,952, missing 10,901; total
112,308; a grand total of 117,549. To these battle
casualties must be added 102,683 sick who passed through
the miliary hospitals between April 25th and December
11th, of whom it is said, imofficially, that about 12,000
to 14,000 died. The French losses cannot be accurately
stated. In the first place, we do not know with any
degree of absolute accuracy how many men the French
sent to Gallipoli, though such evidence as we have points
to the fact that at various times the French used approx-
imately 200,000 men in this campaign. We know that
in the early portion of the campaign, when they dis-
embarked on the eastern side of the Strait and were sub-
sequently forced to re-embark, their losses in the fighting
which went on for a couple of weeks on this eastern side
of the Strait were very severe; and we also know that
their sick list was a large one. If the French losses were,
in proportion to the number of men engaged in the cam-
paign, the same as those of the British, they would
easily attain a grand total of from 110,000 to 120,000.
But as the French are much more scientific fighters
than the British, and as their officers know better how
to handle and care for troops in the field, it is extremely
probable that their losses were not in the same propor-
tion as those of the British. So that if we take, arbi-
trarily, the figure of 85,000 as the extent of the French
losses, we will have a total Allied casualty loss of 303,000;
of whom perhaps, all told, from 60,000 to 65,000 were
killed in action or died of disease.

On the Turkish side there is much uncertainty as to
the losses. The Turks themselves admit a total casu-
alty list of from 65,000 to 70,000, but according to the
British and French accounts their casualty list must
have been considerably greater than this. If we allow
that to an extent this British and French claim is well
founded, and add 50 per cent, to the casualties stated
by the Turks themselves to have occurred on this front,
we will then have in the neighborhood of 105,000 cas-
ualties which may be regarded as a fairly accurate
.figure. Of this 105,000, perhaps 25,000 to 30,000 con-

116

DARDANELLES

stituted the total permanent losses. The sickness
among the Turkish troops was not very great.

The disproportion between the estimates of the losses
of the two sides may give rise to some criticism, but it
must be remembered that the Turks were far more ac-
customed to the climate of the Peninsula than were the
invaders, and consequently, suffered less therefrom.
The Turks were, on the whole, in this campaign, the
attacked and not the attackers, and it is well known
that in frontal attacks, as all those on the Peninsula of
Gallipoli by the necessities of the terrain were, the at-
tacking party always suffers much heavier casualties
than the defending party.

The Prime Minister of Great Britain, in his final
summary of the Gallipolian Expedition, in speaking of
the retirement from the Peninsula, said that it was
"one of the finest operations in naval and military his-
tory and would take an imperishable place in British
national history/' It is hard to see how even a retire-
ment as successful as is claimed by the British from the
Peninsula of Gallipoli could be considered in any degree
to redeem the colossal blunders of the most ill-planned
and ill-conducted campaign in miUtary history, or
would relieve those responsible for the childishness
shown in the preparation, strategy and organization of
the expedition from their responsibility. Three hundred
thousand human beings killed, maimed or injured to no
purpose because the British Government preferred talk-
ing to acting. Such is the best final summary of the
GalUpolian campaign.

117

CHAPTER XXIV
ITALY

The Austro-Italian front during the six months under
consideration presents comparatively little of interest.
As has been before said, the mountainous character of
most of this front prevents any great movements thereon
and necessitates the carrying of the hills, mountains
and valleys foot by foot in almost hand to hand com-
bats between small bodies of men. The character of
the fighting, therefore, while not spectacular, and devoid
of any of the magnetic features of the massed attacks
on the other fronts is, nevertheless, bitter and sanguin-
ary, but is also extremely diflBcult to narrate so as to
give any consecutive idea of its incidents.

The principal fighting took place on the eastern front
in the direction of Trieste, the capture of which city
is perhaps the wish dearest to the Italian heart. From
the end of August to the middle of October the Italians
made quiet but strenuous preparations for a general
offensive all along the line from Tolmino where the
river Idria joins the Isonzo south, and brought up artil-
lery, ammunition and the other necessaries of war,
behind their lines in large quantities. This offensive
had three important strategic objectives from the
Italian standpoint which were: first, to enlarge the
Italian holdings at the position known as the Plava
Bridge Head, of which a part was already in Italian
hands to the south of Canale, and to the north of Gorizia
on the river Isonzo, so that the Italians would be enabled
to turn the Monte Santo, a height which protected
Gorizia from the north and which could be passed, if
turned, along the line of Gargaro, Salcano and Gorizia,
then be captiu*ed by a simultaneous attack from Salcano
to the north and Podgora to the west.

Second, to capture, by a frontal attack, the Austrian
lines on the right bank of this river Isonzo from Monte

118

ITALY

Sabato in the north to below Podgora on the south.
It was evident that as long as the Austrians held their
position on the right bank of the river Isonzo it was
impossible for the Italians to make any forward move-
ment of any importance, or even to place their artillery
in favorable positions to destroy the Austrian trenches.
The third object was to gain possession of the northern
edge of the Carso Plateau which stretches, roughly
speaking, from Merna, almost directly south of Gorizia,
to Bagni on the shores of the Adriatic, and which is
bounded on the east by that depression to which the
name of Vallone is given. The Carso Plateau . itself
stretches south as far as the road leading from San
Daniel to Opcina which is only a few miles to the north-
east of the city of Trieste itself. The possession of these
three objectives by forces attacking Trieste would be a
long step in advance towards the taking of that city.

On October 18th, then, a general bombardment began
along the whole of the line above described, and this was
followed the morning of October 21st by the opening of
the infantry attack.

Considerable criticism has been directed against the
Italian high command for not having made this offensive
in June or even in the early days of July, since then the
Austrians had not had time to strengthen their lines to
the extent that they had been strengthened at the time
this offensive was delivered. Why it was not done, it
is impossible to state, but it was not, and it was not until
the end of September, when the commanding General on
this front was relieved of his command that really any
energetic preparations for the offensive under consid-
eration were made.

Towards realizing their first objective, that is the
enlargement of the Italian position at Pragna Bridge
Head but little progress was made, though the Italians
continued a steady effort for several weeks. They did,
however, successfully elongate their lines both to the
north and south of the bridge head, but when it came to
making progress east thereof they were never able,
during the whole period which this offensive lasted, to
take the absolutely essential position of Kuk, the pos-
session of which was the first absolutely necessary step
towards any serious movement against Monte Santo
itself. The fighting all along this line was intense for
several weeks, but in spite of its intensity, and in spite
of the desperate struggle of the Italians, the Austrian

119

ITALY

lines held firm and no tactical progress at all was made.

To the south an attempt to achieve the second Italian
objective, that is, the occupation of the Austrian lines
on the right bank of the river from Monte Sabotino to
below Podgora was conducted obstinately on both sides.
For six weeks this fight went on unbrokenly day and
night. Attack and counter-attack succeeded each other
without cessation and the loss of life was very heavy.
On the easterly end of the line, in about the seventh
week of the offensive, the Italians, as a result of valiant
efforts, did gain some ground and succeeded in working
themselves in behind Podgora and also established
themselves in the broken and rugged country which
lies around Oslavia, and occupied a little village to the
east of Podgora which lies opposite Graffenberg, a
suburb of Gorizia itself.

Towards the commencement of December the offen-
sive slackened for a few days but a^ain began and con-
tinued for another period of several weeks, but in this
later struggle the Italians failed to improve their posi-
tions, which remained to all intents and purposes un-
changed at its end.

North, in the Monte Sabato region, the attacks on
that mountain continued almost without cessation from
the 21st of October until the middle of January. This
mountain, which was the key to Gorizia, and the bridge
crossing the Isonzo into Gorizia itself on the north, were
heavily fortified by the Austrians, not only on the slopes
of the mountain itself, but subterraneously, and con-
stituted positions of very great strength which were
tenaciously defended by the Austrians.

On the 3rd of November the Italians had succeeded
in working to the westward and northward slopes of
the mountain and by a valiant effort, continued diu-ing
the next three days, they succeeded in capturing the
summit of Mt. Sabato, but then a frightful blunder on
the part of the Italian Staff occurred, which rendered
all the work of the previous weeks by the Italian troops,
and all the loss of life which had taken place therein,
worthless. When the Italian attacking troops estab-
lished themselves on the summit, no reserves followed
and there were no reserves anywhere near the battlefield
which could be brought up in time to be of use in main-
taining the position. By an almost criminal oversight
on the part of the Italian commanding General, the
assault had been dealt by his full force, and in spite

120

ITALY

of the fact that the conflict had lasted for three whole
days, no reserves had ever been brought up to a point
where they could be available to complete the work
which the assaulting troops had accomplished.

The result was that the 4,000 men who had forced
their way to the top, after suffering frightful losses, were
comparatively soon swept back by the Austrians'
counter-attack and the hill completely cleared of the
Italian forces, so that the positions reverted to where
they had been when the offensive was begun several
weeks before. This counter-attack which was par-
ticipated in by Hungarians and Tyroleans, merits some
notice, on account of the dogged courage and the elan
shown by both of these categories of troops.

After this repulse, trench fighting continued for the
next few weeks; the Italians gaining a little in this form
of combat. Finally they arrived at a point quite close
to the bridge crossing the Isonzo to Gorizia, and after
holding this for some time, they were able to bring up
heavy artillery with which they began to bombard the
town itself. From this time on, until the end of the
period under consideration, at this point, nothing more
but artillery duels between the Italian artillery on the
western side of the Isonzo, in front of and to the north-
west of Gorizia, and that of the Austrians, on the oppo-
site side of the river, varied by occasional infantry
attacks of little importance, took place. These artil-
lery duels were, however, a stand-off, so that the Italians
were unable to seize the bridge and force their way into
Gorizia.

It will perhaps be remembered that at this time, every
now and then, at periods when the artillery attack with
the Italians grew more vehement, we were informed by
the cables that Gorizia was at the point of falling, but
it will also be remembered that the sequel proved all of
these several warnings in which our press revelled, of
the imminence of the capture of this city, to be false
alarms.

While these events were taking place on this portion
of the front a vehement struggle was continuing, on the
western edge of the Carso Plateau. The villages of
Gradisca, Sagrado, Farra and S. Pietro had been cap-
tured by the Italians some time before, and it was from
these points as a base that their attack was launched
against this western edge of the Plateau. This attack
was at first directed against Monte San Michele which

121

ITALY

lies in the center of the bend of the Isonzo between
Gorizia and the sea, Monte San Martino, which lies to
the south of Monte San Michele, and Doberdo which is
still further south, almost directly north of Monfalcone,
with which it is connected by a road. These three
heights dominated this edge of the Carso Plateau, hence
their military importance. The struggle here lasted
for months, and was trench fighting of the most intensive
character. One day the Italians capturd a trench, to
lose it the next, and 'thus the line swayed to and fro
from the days of early fall until the end of winter.
Ultimately some slight progress was made by the Italians
towards the Lake of Doberdo which lies between the
village of the same name and the Isonzo River; a portion
of the summit of Monte San Michele was taken, as well
as the western slopes of Monte San Martino, up to the
church of the same name.

On the northern boundary of this Carso Plateau is
the Visp River and here at this river's western extrem-
ity there was another combat which raged all winter,
the object of the Italians being to establish themselves
on the crest of the northern slope of the Carso Plateau
whence they could move eastward on San Michele, thus
attacking it in flank. But in spite of arduous and in-
tense combats here very little results were achieved,
and with the coming of spring the Austrian first line
was only broken at points and the second line was
intact.

During all these operations the Italians showed that
their knowledge of trench warfare was not as yet suflBi-
ciently advanced for them to fight with success against
troops even in largely inferior numbers who were accus-
tomed to this form of warfare, while the Italian Staff
broke down almost completely in their handling of their
men in a manner which would have been highly danger-
ous had they been faced by equal forces. It is certain
that General Cadoma, up to the month of March,
could not congratulate himself upon any signal ability
that he showed in the handling of his men; nor had this
General, up to that time, shown strategic abilities in
proportion to the importance of the military rank which
he holds.

In some respects, there is a striking similarity between
the British and the Italian army. In both cases the
rank and file show great courage, willingness; and also,
in both cases, these qualities in the rank and file are

122

ITALY

rendered of small avail by the rather glaring lack of
training of their younger officers and the incompetency
of their staffs and their generals.

In the Italian army the troops from the south were
not expected to rank, at the beginning of the war, in
their military qualities, with those from the north, but
curiously enough, actual practice of war proved this
supposition false and it can be said truthfully that the
southern Italian troops have shown themselves to be
very nearly on the same level as those of the north.
On the other hand, the Bersaglieri and the Alpini have
fully lived up to the rather high expectations entertained
of them, and it is doubtful whether there are any troops
in any army of greater efficiency, in all senses of the word,
than these two rather small and peculiar divisions of
the Italian army.

The battle line on the rest of this Austro-Italian front
runs, as my readers may remember from the previous
volume, either actually among the snow peaks of the
higher Alps, or along the mountains forming the southern
buttresses of the main chain. While the activity on
both sides along this part of the battle line was great,
yet it consisted of an infinity of very small engagements
impossible to describe, euffice it therefore to say that in
spite of this incessant activity continued under the most
adverse conditions practically all the period now under
consideration, the lines in the spring were practically in
the same positions they had occupied at the beginning of
autumn. Of course here or there one side or the other
had captured this obscure valley or that unknown peak,
but these gains were equal on the balance, in spite of the
bravery shown by the troops on both sides, in the hand
to hand and murderous fighting necessary to achieve
such gains.

Some reference must be made to the condition of
affairs, during the period under consideration, in Italy's
recently conquered colony of Tripoli on the northern
coast of Africa. It will perhaps be recollected that at
the outbreak of the war Italy had but partially completed
the conquest of this colony from its original Arab
possessors. As a result of the war, Italy was obliged to
withdraw a number of the troops of which she had a
large force then, owing to the necessities of the combat
elsewhere.

The Arabs, struggling for their independence, took
advantage of this, with the result that by spring of 1916

123

ITALY

they had driven the Italians out bf the interior of the
country which they had previously, at points, pene-
trated to as great a distance as 100 miles, and back to a
narrow zone on the sea-shore, wherein the Italians main-
tained themselves with some diflSculty; daily battles
being the rule and not the exception. How many men
Italy lost in these combats, spread over this period of
six months, we do not know, since Italy follows the
policy of giving no statistics whatever in regard to her
casualties in any of her reports of military operations,
but it is rumored that these casualties were severe, and
this is perhaps not impossible to believe since Italy
lost so very heavily when the Arabs put up such a stiff
fight against the original Italian advance to the interior
from the sea-shore, a few years before.

124

CHAPTER XXV
CAUCASUS

As has been already said, in the narration of the events
which took place on the Russian front during the period
under consideration, the Grand Duke Nicholas, prev-
iously Commander in Chief of the Russian armies, was,
on Septemebr 5th, relieved by the Czar from that com-
mand and appointed Governor General of the Caucasus
and Commander in Chief of the Russian Army operating
on that front.

To a man of the intense ambition and great personal
vanity of the Grand Duke, it was indeed a fall from being
Commander in Chief of all the armies of Russia, and
potentially master of the Russian Empire, to be trans-
lated to this comparatively minor position. Up to this
time, the course of events along the Caucasian front
had not been very favorable to the Russian armies, and
the Russian and Turkish armies were still fighting along
what is practically the line of the frontier between their
respective countries. The country through which the
frontier runs is an exceedingly difficult one to fight in,
traversed as it is by precipitous mountains rising oc-
casionally to the height of 12,000 to 14,000 feet, which
are divided from each other by steep and narrow valleys.
As a general thing, these mountain ranges run east and
west, but there are enough bisecting chains to make the
whole country a topographical jumble. It was in such
regions that the rival forces contended.

During the first three months after the Grand Duke
assumed command in the Caucasus, the time was ap-
parently spent by him in preparing for a general offensive
which it was, as heretofore explained, intended that the
Russian forces should take here in support of the move-
ment of the English up the Tigris towards Bagdad
in Mesopotamia. The delay of three months, which
had elapsed, however, was fatal to these two movements
being simultaneous and the Russian troops did not com-

125

CAUCASUS

mence their forward march until after General Town-
shend's forces had been defeated at Ctesiphon and had
retreated to Kut-el-Amara and there been surrounded
by the Turks, so that as far as rendering any aid to the
first effort of the British to take Bagdad was concerned,
the Russian offensive in the Caucasus was unavailing.

It may, however, have been presumed by both the
British and Russians that the force which was advancing
to the relief of General Townshend from the Persian
Gulf would ultimately succeed in accomplishing that
object, and the united British forces would then begin a
new attack upon Bagdad. But this was still on the lap
of the gods, at the time when, on January 10th, the
Russians opened their offensive by an attack on the
Turkish positions on Lake Tortum at the village of Tew
on the northern shores of this lake, and of Ardesh on
the southeastern shore.

This Russian attack was successful and the Turks
were driven out of these villages. The Russians' right
flank continued its advance, and a few days afterwards
captured the town of Archava on the coast of the Black
Sea. In the center a general attack was launched by
the Russians on the 16th of January, on the entire
Turkish line from Lake Tortum to a point a little to
the north of Melaskerd on the Upper Euphrates, directly
north of Lake Van. For three days a battle raged
along this line, which resulted on the 19th in the almost
total defeat of the Turks who were thrown back along
the whole line in the general direction of Erzerum.

The town of Kapri Keuyh was captured on the first
day of the battle, together with a number of Turkish
prisoners and a large quantity of war m,aterial. On the
20th, General Yudenitch captured the fortified town of
Hassankala where about 1,200 prisoners were taken,
besides a considerable amount of artillery. Hassankala
is only about twenty miles from Erzerum and a little
less than 15 from the famous Deve Boyen Pass, which has
been the scene of many battles in the past for the pos-
session of Erzerum.

Between Erzerum and Hassankala a ridge rises to
about 2,500 feet above the small plain, in the center of
which Erzerum is situated. On this ridge, guarding
the passes through it, were situated some eleven forts
located at convenient points on the heights. The
Russians first tried to capture these by storm in their
anxiety for a speedy victory, but the Turks succeeded

126

CAUCASUS

in repelling their attack and in inflicting rather heavy
losses upon them. Seeing that even attempted as-
saults would not succeed in taking the ridge and its
forts, the Russians brought up artillery from their rear,
which took a couple of weeks and it was not until the
12th of February that the Russian artillery opened upon
the forts. None of these forts were modern, and they
were, therefore, unable to resist for any considerable
period the weight of metal which the Russian heavy
artillery poured in upon them.

On the 13th one fort was taken and on the following
day another; and on the 15th the remaining forts, which
by this time had been pretty well battered to pieces by
the Russian artillery, were in such condition that the
Russians were able to launch a successful storming at-
tack against them. On the evening of the 15th, then,
the ridge with all its forts was in Russian hands. This
insured the speedy capture of Erzerum which could be
easily commanded by artillery located on these heights.
The Turks did not attempt, under these circumstances,
the defense of the fortress, in fact had already on the
13th (the date of the capture of the first fort) begun pre-
parations to evacuate the town by moving their supplies
and artillery further to the rear, so that when the fortress
of Erzerum surrendered to General Yudenitch, on the
16th of January, comparatively little except the fortress
itself fell into Russian hands.

At the time it occurred, the fall of Erzerum was
looked upon by the Allies as an event of first rate mil-
itary importance and they expected that its capture
would be the means of speedily putting them into pos-
session of all Asiatic Turkey as far to the westward as
Sivas and Aleppo, as well as insure the ultimate success
of the British movement up the Tigris. But fate, which
has in this war played the Allies many tricks, once more
disappointed them.

^ These expectations of the Allies were somewhat jus-
tified by the strategic importance of Erzerum which
dominates the main highway from the Black Sea into
eastern Asia Minor, and is also on the center of the trade
route from the Black Sea port of Trebizond into Persia.
For many years the Russians have greatly desired to
be the possessors of this fortress as it would be an im-
portant step forward in their real design which was the
possession of Armenia as a whole. It may be observed
here that all of the fighting, wherein the Russian right

127

CAUCASUS

wing and center had participated in this invasion of
Asia Minor, has taken place in Armenia, and that to
a very large extent the Russians have been able to profit
by the active aid of the inhabitants of this district, who,
as is well known, are in a state of chronic rebellion against
the control of the Turkish government.

Russia has been in possession of the fortress twice in
its history, once in 1829 when, after its captm*e by Gen-
eral Paskovitch, the Treaty of Adrianople restored its
possession to the Turks; again in 1877 when the Russians,
under the leadership of the Grand Duke Michael, had
siu*rounded Erzerum but bad not captiu*ed it, when the
armistice in 1878 put an end to its siege, though the town
was siu*rendered on the condition that hostilities should
cease. Subsequently another treaty, that of Berlin,
retiu*ned Erzerum to the Turks.

128

CHAPTER XXVI

Simultaneously with this Russian attack on the
Turkish center which culminated in the capture of
Erzerum, the Grand Duke directed attacks on both the
Turkish left and right wings, with the effect that the
Turks holding the passes southwest and southeast of
Lake Tortum were driven completely out of their posi-
tions and driven down towards the Doumen Dagh pla-
teau, 16 miles from Erzerum. The Turkish retreat was
rather disorderly, owing to the energetic pursuit by
Russian cavalry, but the bulk of the forces managed to
get through to Erzerum, before its fall, and joined the
main body of their army. On the Turkish right an
attack was launched from Melashkerd, which moved
to the west on the town of Kryskali. Here a hard
battle took place, lasting four or five days, which ended
in the capture of the town by the Russians; the Turks
retreating in an easterly direction towards Mush, a
rather important place situated near the eastern Eu-
phrates, northwest of Bitlis.

After the capture of Erzerum itself a movement was
launched to the northwest against Trebizond, in two
columns, one which followed the direct road between the
two places and the other which was to advance on
Trebizond by way of Rizeh, and capture a Turkish
army which had retreated from Erzerum in the direc-
tion of Trebizond, by way of the Chorokh River. These
two columns had to pass through very diflBcult country,
a tangled maze of mountains, and their progress was in
consequence very slow, as they were greatly impeded
by heavy snow in their march through this tangled
country.

The column which went by the direct road at the
end of February had only reached Ashkala, not half way
between the two places, while the column proceeding by
Rizeh, after great difficulties arrived at the banks of
the Chorokh River at Isbir on the 26th of February, but
here it found its further progress towards Rizeh held up

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CAUCASUS

by the Turks who had fortified the lower reaches of the
Tchanassdeg Pass which crosses these mountains here
at a height of 10,485 feet above the sea level, and which,
in addition to the opposition of the Turks, was covered
with snow to so great a depth that the Russians were
unable to manoeuvre their artillery. The resulting
deadlock was continued for a long time.

At the same time that these columns were launched
towards Trebizond, a third column was launched to-
wards Erzindjan, to the southeast of Erzerum. This
column also had to advance through a country whose
very topography rendered it extremely difficult for troops
to march through, particularly at this season of the year,
and to these natural difficulties was added more or less
opposition by the Turks who had by this time somewhat
rallied, and showed every disposition to dispute the
path of the Russian invaders.

On the first of March this column had reached a point
between Erzerum and Mannahatoun, the half-way town
as regards Erzindjan, only about forty miles from their
departure point.

Turning now to the Russian armies which had been
attacking the Turkish right, and which, as has been said,
had captured Kryskali, this army advanced therefrom
and captured Mush on February 18th, after a not very
determined battle. The Russian forces then turned to
the southeast, and twelve days later, on the night of the
second of March, stormed and captured Bitlis. This
town *is an important strategic point on account of its
position on the main highroad from Erzerum to Bagdad,
besides which it commands the approaches to the Tach-
tale Pass from the south; this Pass being on the extreme
eastern spurs of the Taurus range of mountains which
end abruptly on the shores of Lake Van. From Bitlis to
the nearest point on the Tigris River is approximately
fifty miles; and Niesivin, the present western terminal
of the Bagdad railway, is 120 miles away. Mosul,
the most important city of central Asia Minor, except
Bagdad, on the Tigris is, as the crow flies, 150 miles
from this place.

To the lasting disgrace of the Russian armies, that
portion of the garrison of Bitlis which was captured
with the town was put to the sword.

The expectation of the Russians was that they would
be able from Bitlis to strike southeast and south against
Mosul and Niesevin respectively, and thus not only

130

CAUCASUS

capture the terminal of the Bagdad railway and cut the
main line of Turkish communication between Bagdad
and Constantinople, but also to get behind the Turkish
army operating on the Tigris River in the defense of
Bagdad, and presumably to advance south from Mosul
along the Tigris and join the English force at Bagdad.
But as we shall see in our subsequent account of this
phase of the Caucasian campaign, in our next volume,
the old proverb that "there is many a slip Hwixt the
cup and the lip" very often proves true.

While these events were taking place in this portion
of the Caucasian front, many events of interest were
happening in eastern Persia. Prince Henry of Reuss,
in the early part of the war had endeavored to bring
about a coup d'etat in Teheran, the capital of Persia,
whereby Persia would, as a nation, join the Turks and
their Allies, the Central Powers; but in November 1915,
this cowp d'etat failed and Russian troops advanced from
Tabriz southwardly, whereupon Prince Henry divided
his forces into two portions and sent one to Kum and the
other to Hammadan. The Russian troops entered
Teheran after making a virtual prisoner of the Shah of
Persia, forcing him to compel Persia to become an ally
of Russia. The Russians treated Teheran in much the
same fashion as they did Tabriz some years before, and
many of the most important men in Persia were hanged
or otherwise done to death in the usual humane manner
of the Russian Cossack.

After Teheran was purged of its agitators, the Russian
troops moved south and occupied Hammadan on Decem-
ber 15, and Kum on the 21st, and made these two places
the bases from which they directed their efforts to sup-
press what the Russians called a rebellion against the
legitimate authority of the Shah. Prince Henry and
his forces retreated to Kermanshah whence a Turkish
force which had been concentrated at Khanikin ad-
vanced to his assistance and entered Kermanshah on the
14th of January. The Russian commander at Hamma-
dan, while these things were going on, had sent a strong
force of Russian troops to seize Kaghdan which this force
occupied on the 15th of January, but on the 16th of
January the Turkish regular forces attacked the town,
and, after soundly drubbing the Russians, expelled them
and drove them a considerable distance to the north,
and following up this success, advanced towards Ham-
madan and succeeded in driving back the Russians to a

131

CAUCASUS

considerable distance to the north of Mokshovend, in-
flicting very considerable losses upon them during this
process.

The fighting continued in this region, that is to say,
between Kaghdan and Burujird until after the first of
Marjch, the Turks having the better of it.

Kermanshah, which is a town of 30,000 inhabitants,
is located 150 miles to the north of Bagdad, and became
the base of the Turkish defense against a Russian at-
tempt on Bagdad from this direction; but in the middle
of February General Baratofif advanced with a large
army on the road to this place and succeeded in defeating
the Turks in the Bidesurkh and Sakhne Passes, through
which the road to the town lies, in a two days' battle.
After this defeat, the Turks fell back on Kermanshah
itself, but the place was taken by storm on the 26th of
February and here again we have to chronicle the same
disgraceful act on the part of the Russian General that
we had in the case of Bitlis and the Turkish garrison and
their Persian allies were put to the sword. This was the
limit of the Russian advance in central Persia up to the
first of March.

We have heard much of the cruelty of the various
belligerent troops in various other spheres of war, but
it is extremely doubtful whether those cruelties and those
atrocities ever attained one-tenth part of those which
characterized the advance of the Russians in eastern
Armenia and eastern and central Persia. Certainly in
no other field of action have surrendered garrisons been
taken out and slaughtered in cold blood as was the fact
in this campaign in the case of the two garrisons above
spoken of. It is to be hoped that when a general settle-
ment is had at the conclusion of the war that the fate of
these Turkish troops will not be forgotten and that in
reparation for this deliberate and malicious violation of
the rules of war will have a fitting reparation exacted for it.
The fame of the Cossack has been the same for many
generations. It used to be in France, for years, after
the second capture of Paris that naughty children were
frightened into obedience by the threat of an approach-
ing Cossack, who represented to the French of that time
not a human being but a cold-blooded executioner.
The hundred years which have elapsed do not seem to
have changed the character of those savages, as has been
shown in this war, not only in Turkey and Persia but in
Galicia and eastern Prussia.

132

CHAPTER XXVII

MESOPOTAMIA

In order to completely cripple Turkey, the Allies
planned in 1915 a joint campaign against her which
would culminate, they hoped, eventually in the capture
of Mosul and Bagdad and the control of the Tigris and
Euphrates Rivers, which flow southeast of that famous
city into the Persian Gulf; thus cutting ofif her communi-
cation with the east, as well as rendering themselves
masters of the whole of Mesopotamia, Mosul, Diarbekr
and Armenia. To the west of Bagdad the control of
the so-called Bagdad railroad would have also been seized.
The effect of such a campaign the Allies expected to be a
practical paralysis of Turkey, both in recruiting her
armies and in her supply of food and metals used in war,
in that it would completely interrupt communication
between the east and west of the Empire.

In order to accomplish these two results, the Allies
planned a simultaneous invasion of Turkey from the
Russian Caucasus between the Black Sea and the Caspian
through Armenia as far as Sivas, which would necessarily
include the control of the Black Sea coast as well. This
invasion was to be undertaken by the Russians. Sim-
ultaneously with this Russian invasion another in-
vasion by the British was to be undertaken starting from
Basra, the seat of that local Sultan whom England, in
order to cripple the projected railroad from Bagdad
through to the Persian Gulf, in whose dominion the
terminal of such railroad to the Persian Gulf would have
been situated, had effected an alliance with the Sultan
some years before and had, by granting him a yearly
allowance, rendered him fully subservient to their wishes.
This invasion was to move northwestwardly, having as
its primary objective Bagdad, and as a secondary ob-
jective the obtaining of control of such completed sec-
tions of the Bagdad railroad as was possible.

Had these joint invasions moved with proper cor-

133

MESOPOTAMIA

relation, and had they attained anything like the measure
of success which the Allies expected, Turkey would
have been hit a body blow and would no longer have
been able to play a very great role in the war. This
strategic conception was good, but as usual, in the exe-
cution of their plan the Allies made blunder after blunder.

The British movement to the northwest from the
Persian gulf started too soon, and the Russian move-
ment from the Caucasus started too late, with the result
that the Tiu-ks by defeating the British, as will hereafter
be seen, before the Russians were in a position to aid
them, frustrated the whole plan.

Having explained the strategic plan of the Allies,
we will now proceed to cast a glance on the manner of its
execution; taking up first the advance of the English
northwest of the Persian Gulf.

The General Staff of India had charge of this invasion
and troops were sent to the base previously selected
which base was established on Bubian Island, a little
to the west of the point where the mingling streams of
the Euphrates and Tigris flow into the Persian Gulf. In
number this force sometimes is computed at from 100,000
to 125,000 Indian troops, who were joined at the base by
a comparatively small force of British not exceeding
perhaps 10,000 to 12,000 in number. General Sir John
Nixon was the Commander-in-chief of the expedition.

Steamers suitable for the navigation of the Tigris River
were provided, and finally, when all was in order, an ad-
vance was made up the stream of the Tigris. At the
start, and until Basra was reached, there was but little
opposition to this movement. From Basra northward,
however, the Turks made such opposition as they could,
but as they were not provided with river gunboats, or
other means of defense against the improvised war-
ships which the British had put upon the Tigris,
they could do but very little, and the British forces
advanced steadily forward though not particularly
rapidly. Kale Sale, Amara, Kumail and Elata were the
scenes of some fighting which terminated regularly in
favor of the British, but there was no really serious at-
tempt to oppose their advance until September 27th,
when the advance division of the British forces, num-
bering about 30,000 under General Townshend arrived at
a point seven miles below the town of Kut el Amara,
where the Turks were found to be occupying a strongly
intrenched position on both sides of the river Tigris.

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MESOPOTAMIA

This Turkish force was commanded by Nair-el-Din
Pasha and consisted of from 7,000 to 8,000 regular
troops, and in a large number of irregulars. General
Townshend attacked both from the river and from the
banks on each side, on September 28th; the fight con-
tinued all day, but that night the Tiu-ks gave way
leaving about 1,600 prisoners and much material in
General Townshend's hands and the British resumed
their advance.

This Tm-kish position was a very strong one as is
shown by the following description:

*'The Turks constructed twelve miles of defences
across the river at right angles to its general direction
at this point, six miles on the right bank and six miles
on the left. The works on the right bank were streng-
thened by the existence of an old water-cut. The banks
of this, ten to twenty feet high, towered above the rest
of the flat country and afforded excellent facilities for
viewing the deployment of troops advancing to the at-
tack. A strong redoubt on the extreme right opposed
a flank attack from that direction. On the left bank the-
line of defences was cut in two by an impassable marsh
two miles broad, so that from the left bank of the river
there were first two miles of trenches, then two miles of
marsh, and then again two more miles of defences..
Much labor had been expended on these defences, each
section consisting of many successive lines of trenches,..
connected by an intricate net-work of deep communi-
cation trenches, along which a complete system of water-
supply pipes had been laid. Everything pointed to the.-
Turkish intention to hold the position permanently."

After being expelled from this position the Turkish
regular troops continued to oppose the advancing British
and were aided by irregular troops raised among the
Arabs and tribesmen of the vicinity, who contested
every foot of the way bitterly, and who, while suffering
heavily themselves, inflicted extremely heavy casualties
upon the British. Nevertheless, the British continued
to advance and though it took them the whole of the
month of October, and more than half of the month of
November, they finally, on November 20th, reached
Ctesiphon, 18 miles from Bagdad.

At this place a great battle took place between the
Turkish army and General Townshend's forces. The
original British account represented the result of this
battle as a complete British victory, but the later

135

MESOPOTAMIA

accounts do not bear this statement out in the least,
nor do general Townshend's subsequent movements.

On the 21st of November General Townshend at-
tacked and captiu-ed the Turkish advanced position,
using in this fight his entire force of 25,000 men, and took
all told some 1,600 Turkish prisoners. The night of the
21st the British bivouacked on that day's battlefield.
The following day the main body of the Turkish forces
came up and attacked General Townshend forthwith.
The battle continued all that day and the next, and
General Townshend managed to hold his ground till the
morning of the 24th, when having lost fully half his force,
he began to retreat in the direction of Kut el Amara, 80
miles in his rear, abandoning much of his baggage.

The Turks followed up the retreating British and
forced them to fight almost continuous rear guard ac-
tions, in some of which, particularly in one fought in the
night of November 30th, the British suffered rather
heavily. Finally on December 3rd General Townshend
reached Kut el Amara, the scene of his victory in Sep-
tember. The British, not unnatiu-ally, felt extremely
disappointed over this misfortune, as this movement
against Bagdad was the only purely British operation
during the war which had been, even for a time, uni-
formly successful, and which made fair to crown its
achievements by the capture of Bagdad, its objective.

Had Bagdad been captured, it would have had an
enormous eJBfect upon the opinion of the Mohammedan
world, not only of Turkey-in-Asia, the sphere of action,
but also of that of Afghanistan, Persia, Egypt and India.
Besides which this capture would have been of the great-
est importance from a purely military standpoint. The
retreat, however, changed these prospects, into consid-
erable loss of prestige as regards the Faithful of Islam,
and therefore has had a considerable influence on the
course of events thereafter to the eastward in Asia Minor.
Bagdad is also important as being on the highroad to
Persia and India. At the same time, the defeat cannot
be considered a disgrace to the forces that suffered it;
since the difficulties which confronted the British forces
in this advance from the Persian Gulf along the Tigris
were stupendous and it is really marvelous that they
managed to penetrate so far into the very difficult and
inhospitable country through which their route of ad-
vance necessarily lay. The casualties suffered by the
British in this campaign at Ctesiphon (the supposed site

136

MESOPOTAMIA

of the ancient Babylon) and the subsequent retreat were
very heavy in proportion to their total strength, certainly
attaining the large figure of fifty per cent, and perhaps
an even greater percentage.

On December 3rd when his entire force reached Kut-
el-Amara, General Townshend's total strength was in
the neighborhood of 12,000 men. Hardly had General
Townshend and his tired troops reached Kut el Amara,
when the pursuing Turks surrounded that town. Kut-
el-Amara is a rather miserable town of fair size, well sit-
uated, in a loop of the Tigris, surrounded on three sides by
that river, to withstand a siege. The fourth side is
defended by a series of forts, which had been to some
extent modernized by the Turks to withstand the British
original advance. These forts General Townshend im-
mediately strengthened to such degree as possible for
him to do and it was well he did so, for on the 8th of
December the Turks having in the meantime brought
down artillery from Bagdad, began to bombard the
town. This bombardment continued for four days,
December 8, 9, 10 and 11, and in the afternoon of Decem-
ber 11th began an infantry assault of the place. But
this, after a day's hard fighting, the British succeeded
in beating off.

A lull in the fighting for some days, and for about a
couple of weeks there were no incidents. Then the Turks
perceiving that it would be impossible for them to reduce
the place with the artillery they had at their disposal,
resolved to storm it, and on the 24th of December began
an attack which lasted for three days.

In the course of this attack the Turks succeeded in
capturing some of the outer forts of the place but were
not able to hold them against the British counter-attacks.
The fighting, for these three days, was extremely fierce,
according to such accounts as have reached us, and the
casualties on each side are placed at very considerable
figures, but as there is no certainty in relation to these
figures they will not be given here. Suffice it to say, that
in spite of their most valiant efforts, the Turks were
unable to force an entry into the town and consequently
resumed their former plan of endeavoring to reduce the
city by siege, in other words, by famine.

A siege in form of Kut-el-Amara then began and con-
tinued with the usual incidents of such an operation for
the next few months.

As soon as the news of General Townshend's defeat

137

MESOPOTAMIA

and his subsequent predicament reached the British
military authorities, immediate preparations began to
despatch the main body of the British forces, to the
south of Kut-el-Amara, on the Tigris, to his relief.
General Aylmer was placed in command of this army,
which started from Aligherbi on January 6th, and on the
night of the 7th came in touch with the Turks, who
were in position on both sides of the Tigris two or three
miles below Sheikh Saad. The Turkish force was com-
posed of three Divisions, and was under the command of
Nair-el-Din. A battle took place on the 8th, resulting
in the retreat of the Turks to Orah, 25 miles down river
from Kut, heavy rain preventing pursuit by the victori-
ous troops.

General Aylmer halted on the 10th at Sheikh Saad,
partly on account of the weather, partly also to get his
wounded away. The Turks had meanwhile fallen back
to the Essin position, from which General Townshend
had driven them last September. Finding that General
Aylmer was not coming after him, Nair-el-Din went for-
ward again to Orah, where he took up what is described
as the ''Wadi position." There he was attacked by
General Aylmer on the 13th and driven back to his en-
trenchments at Essin, six miles down the river from Kut,
but owing to the continuance of bad weather, which lasted
till the 18th, there was again no pursuit.

The Turkish army then took up a very strong defen-
sive position on the north bank of the Tigris, with its
left wijig resting on an impenetrable swamp called
Durvekie, and his right wing on the river bank. This
position was 23 miles from Kut. General Aylmer for
some days was unable to attack, owing to a heavy rain
which soaked the ground to a great depth and made
military movements difficult if not impossible. During
this time General Sir John Nixon resigned his command
on January 16th and General Sir Percy Lake who suc-
ceeded him did not reach General Aylmer until _ Jan-
uary 26 th.

On January 21st the rain having partly held up Gen-
eral Aylmer assaulted the Turkish position above
described at Unnu-el-Henna, under conditions which
were favorable to the Turks, since their flanks were se-
cured from being turned, which necessitated a frontal
attack by their enemies who were forced to advance to
that attack over a flat plain, totally destitute of cover
of any description. Ordinarily such an attack would

138

MESOPOTAMIA

have had no chance of being successful unless preceded
by a strong artillery bombardment of the position to be
attacked, and this rule held good in the present case.
General Aylmer has since asserted that the reason which
impelled him to attack without first bombarding the
Turkish trenches was the urgency in delivering General
Townshend from his critical position at Kut-el-Amara.

This excuse hardly seems a good one, since as subse-
quent events proved General Townshend was able to
maintain himself at Kut for a much longer time than
would have been necessary for General Aylmer to have
had a sufficient force of artillery brought up the river to
him. On the whole it looks as though General Aylmer
adopted the old English idea of "mulling through some-
how.'* But this idea has rarely succeeded in the present
war, and this battle was not one of such occasions.
General Aylmer's forces gallantly charged the Turkish
positions and were very badly cut to pieces as a result.
The British losses were extremely heavy, 4,000 killed,
and perhaps twelve to fifteen thousand wounded, and
the Turks remained completely masters of the field.
So completely masters indeed that the next day General
Aylmer was obliged to ask for an armistice to bury his
dead, which was granted. After this battle the British
sent for reinforcements, and sat down to wait for their
arrival, before making any further serious attempts
to advance to General Townshend's relief. On Feb-
ruary 4th there was a skirmish of some magnitude, and
on February 11th an attempt to push forward to better
positions by the British on the right bank of the Tigris,
this attempt was however beaten back by the Turks.

General Townshend in the meantime made no at-
tempt, though only 23 miles distant, to abandon his
position in Kut, and cut his way through to General
Aylmer. The reason for this was that it was not the
intention of the British to abandon the Kut position
which is a very strong one strategically, situated as it is
at the point where the Shatt-el-Hai, connects the Tigris
with the Euphrates at Nasiriyeh. According to the
British generals the possession ot this town by the Turks
would enable them to use the Shatt-el-Hai as a route
for reaching the Euphrates and turning the flank of the
British main position at Kuma.

The British held Nasiriyeh and early in February
Sir Percy Lake sent General Brookings up the Shatt-el-
Hai to see if that river was clear. General Brookings

139

MESOPOTAMIA

advanced a considerable distance up the stream and
found no signs of Turkish troops. On his return, how-
ever, he was suddenly attacked on February 7th by the
Arabs and lost 400 men, besides being compelled to
retreat hastily. Later on a punitive expedition was
sent against these Arabs. This was the last fighting in
this campaign in the period we are dealing with.

In the meantime the Turks continued to hold General
Townshend closely surrounded, and bombarded the town
from time to time, but the provisions and supplies, as well
as the ammunition of the British forces in Kut held out
and they were able to repel successfully the assaults
upon the town. On the 15th of February the British
war office took full charge of this campaign from the
India office; when the first of March arrived the sit-
uation remained unchanged; Townshend. was sur-
rounded in Kut, 23 miles below was Aylmer waiting for
re-inforcements, and between him and Townshend was
a strong well placed Turkish army.

140

CHAPTER XXVIII

AFRICA

The situation in Africa at the beginning of the period
under consideration was as follows. The Allies had
completely conquered German southwest Africa, where
resistance to their forces had ceased. In British South
Africa the rebellion had been absolutely suppressed.
In the Cameroons, however, fighting was still going on
as it was in German East Africa.

141

CHAPTER XXIX
CAMEROONS

The campaign against this German colony can now
be sketched with some degree of accuracy from the
beginning, a thing impossible to do heretofore on account
of the conflicting reports received therefrom. Lieu-
tenant Colonel P. Maclean in command of a British
column, began an invasion from the north, starting from
Yola in Nigeria a few days after the declaration of war
with the object of capturing Garcia, the northern capital
of the Cameroons by surprise. The column reached
Garna on August 29th, 1914, but the element of surprise
lacked, as it found the Germans prepared for it. One
of the forts defending the town was captured but Col.
Maclean was unable to hold this fort, and the German
attacks on his forces becoming too strong, was obliged
to retreat completely, and to recross the frontier losing
heavily on the way, among the killed being Colonel
Maclean himself. Another column started at about
the same time from Ikon on the river Cross, about one
hundred miles northeast from the coast with the object
of capturing Usanakang some few miles south of the
northern frontier of the Cameroons. At first this force
was successful and Usanakang was occupied on August
29th, but only held, for a week for on September 6th it
was surprised by the Germans, the town recaptured and
the British driven back across the frontier. Still another
British force crossed the frontier from Calabar, also on
the river Cross but nearer the coast, and advanced
against the coast town of Rio-del-Rey, where its further
progress south was stopped. These reverses stimulated
the British to greater preparations, and under Major
General Dobell, a force of about 10,000 men was made
ready at Lagos, and embarked- on transports. In
September these transports escorted by the warships
Cumberland and Dwarf, appeared ofif the principal port
of the colony Duala, near the mouth of the Sanaga river.

142

CAMEROONS

Summoned to surrender, the town refused to, and was
bombarded, but after standing this bombardment for
four days, did surrender on September 26th, when the
expeditionary force was disembarked. ' From Duala one
railway runs northeast to Bare, and another almost
directly east to Sende, passing through Edea. The
expeditionary force was composed of French and British
troops, the French predominating, and after landing the
British contingent followed the line of the iBrst mentioned
railway, the French the second.

Jabissa was captured by the British on October 14th,
Bura on November 15 and Bare on December 15th, the
German forces falling back towards Joko, to the east,
almost in the center of the colony. The French moving
eastward along the line of the railroad to Edea, captured
that place on October 6th, After these captures, opera-
tions on this west front moved very slowly and it was
not till nearly a year later that the British under Gen-
eral Dobell turned south from Bare and reached the
Puge river to the east of Edea, while further south the
French occupied Makondo. During this time another
French column, in which were Belgian troops from the
Congo, advanced from Wesso, at the southeastern
corner of the colony of the Cameroons, and marching
500 miles northwest reached Sende, the eastern terminal
of the Duala-Edea-Sende railroad. The effect of the
taking of Sende was to place the possession of all the
railways of the colony in the hands of the Anglo-French
forces.

All these advances were bitterly contested by the
German forces, constant and severe fighting taking place,
with the Allied troops suffering severe losses, which,
however, as they were in a position to receive reinforce-
ments from time to time, did not halt their forward
progress.

After the capture of Edea, the Germans had removed
the capital of the colony to Jarmde, to the south of the
Sanaga river, in a comparatively elevated area, and to
Jarmde the Germans retreated after the capture of Sende
on October 24th, 1915, from which place it is forty-five
miles distant. To traverse these forty-five miles, how-
ever, took the Anglo-French forces over two months, so
strenuous was the German defense, although the Ger-
man forces had been cut off for over a year from any
possibility of receiving supplies and munitions of war
from the outside world.

143

CAMEROONS

Finally, however, on January 1st, 1916, the Anglo-
British forces entered Jarmde, and the Germans re-
treated to the south in the direction of Spanish Guinea,
but still unbroken. The Allies then moved to the south-
ward and ultimately the German forces crossed the
frontiers into Spanish Guinea, where they were interned.
While these events were taking place on the western
front, the British were avenging their early defeat on
the northeastern front.

Another force under General Cunliffe was organized
at Yola, composed of British and French troops. This
force at the end of November, 1914, started eastwardly
from Yola towards Garna with the intention of cap-
turing that place. The German defense in this field was
so strong that it was not till in the late spring that
General Cunliffe was able to reach and surround Garna,
which then stood a two months' siege, not surrendering
till June 11th, 1915. This capture was followed up by
General Cunlifife by the taking of Ngaundere further
south on June 29th.

From Garna, the two main roads through the colony
westward to the seaboard start; one, the northerly,
running through Banjo to Bari, and thence by railroad
to Duala, while the other, the southerly, runs through
Ngaundere, Tibati, to Edea, and thence by rail to Duala.

The British began a movement westwardly along the
northerly road soon after the captiu-e of Gama, but it
was not until October 24, 1915, that they were able to
enter Banjo, about half way to the sea. The French,
after the capture of Ngaundere, moved westerly along
the southerly road and on November 11th, after nearly
a half year's fighting entered Tibati.

The Germans retreating before the advance of these two
columns fell back on Joko, a place in the moimtainous
region of the colony directly south of Banjo and south-
west of Tibati, where in spite of all efforts of the British
and French to dislodge them, t^ ey maintained the very
unequal struggle for some time longer.

144

CHAPTER XXX
EAST AFRICA

As a result of his comparative failure to conquer
German East Africa, the British government decided
on a change of commanders, and General Smith-Dorrien
was recalled, after some months of hesitation, owing
to the difficulty of iBnding someone with whom to replace
him.

Officially, General Smith-Dorrien was said to have been
invalided home, but actually he was removed. General
Smuts, one of the most distinguished Boer generals in
the South African war, was appointed to succeed him,
but did not begin offensive operations until the middle
of February 1916.

In the fifteen months which had elapsed since the
British defeat at Tanga in the autumn of 1914, the
British forces in German East Africa had merely stood
on the defensive, and had not attempted any forward
movements. During all this time German East Africa
may be said to have been quiet, though from time to
time the Germans attempted to raid the Nganda rail-
road, but unsuccessfully, as the British forces under
General Tighe, who had come from India to take the
interim command, were strong enough to repel these
attacks.

After inspecting the scene of his future labors, General-
Smuts adopted a plan of campaign and determined on
launching an offensive from Mombasa along the line
of Voi-Taveta railway, and to this end a concentration
of British troops in Mombasa began about the first
of December 1915. But owing to the vast distances
from which the troops composing this force were drawn,
some from England itself, some from India, and some,
the larger portion, from South Africa, it was not imfcil
the middle of February 1916 that the force was ready
to move.

The German commanders had, however, perceived

146

EAST AFRICA

General Smuts' plan of campaign and had made such
disposition of their forces as they deemed would be
best suited to oppose the British advance. Altogether
the German force comprised about 20,000 men, of which
the great bulk were natives. These took up a strong
position in the Kitovo hills in the Kilimanjaro district
and prepared to dispute the march of Smuts' forces.
The position selected was naturally a rather strong
one, on the top of a ridge of hills with abrupt slopes,
up which slopes General Smuts' troops had to make their
way through the very dense pathless woods with which
these slopes were clothed.

General Smuts' total strength was about 70,000, of
which 20,000 were white troops, and his army was
better supplied with artillery, particularly light artillery
and machine guns, than were the Germans.

On March 7th, General Smuts seized the fords on the
Lumi river as the opening move in his oflFensive, and
these once securely in hand, threw forward General
Van de Venter to capture Taveta, which was done on
March 9th, General Smuts then rapidly advanced his
entire army and with the bulk of it made a frontal
attack on the Germans in the Kitovo position. At
the same time, General Smuts sent a large force of
cavalry from Longido around the north side of Mount
Kilimanjaro to outflank the German position and to
cut off their retreat.

The frontal battle was bitterly contested and lasted
until late in the night, when the Germans learning of the
movement of General Stewart's force on their flank,
and fearing to be surrounded, fell back on Kahe, whence
they retreated still further to positions on the Rufu
river in good order. The effect of this retreat was,
however, to throw open the whole of the Arusha district
to the invaders. General Smuts detached General
Van de Venter to occupy this district which he did,
capturing Moshi on March 13th, and Arusha itself on
March 20th, and Lolkissale a few days later, at which
latest place he captured the entire German force in this
region, numbering some 500 rifles.

Meanwhile, General Smuts with the main army,
followed up the Germans who were retreating south-
ward, and on March 21st attacked them on the Rufu
river and after a stubborn fight, drove them out of
their positions and forced them to begin another retreat.

In both these fights at Kitovo and on the Rufu river

146

EAST AFRICA

the native German troops showed great steadiness,
almost equal to white troops, and had they been on
anything like even terms with the British, the latter
would not have won such easy victories. The quality
of the German command was also good, and great in-
genuity was repeatedly shown in the extrication of the
German forces from the danger of being surrounded.
The British were particularly anxious to conquer
German East Africa quickly and easily because German
East Africa in German hands makes their dream of a
Cape to Cairo railroad running wholly through British
territory an impossibility.

147

CHAPTER XXXI

ZEPPELINS

The activity in the air during the period of time we
have under consideration increased rather than dimin-
ished, but before we take up the accounts of the activ-
ities on the Continent of Europe, we will first cast a
glance at the zeppelin raids on Great Britain during the
period in question. These raids were carried on on a
considerable scale during this period, though with what
real results we do not know with any certainty since the
accounts furnished from the opposing sides differ very
materially. The reasons why these discrepancies exist
are several: in the first place we may mention the natural
tendency of one side to hide all the results accomplished
by the enemy. Furthermore, as the zeppelins attacked
under cover of night, and, by preference, on moonlight
nights, land-marks are elusive and navigation difficult.
Hence errors are inevitable, and a commander of a
zeppelin may quite consistently assert that he dropped
bombs on a town near which he never was, and do so
in good faith.

The first of these raids in the period under considera-
tion took place on September 7th, when the eastern
counties were visited by two aeroplanes; bombs were
dropped and some damage was done. London itself
was raided the same evening between ten and eleven
o'clock; the outlying districts being the point of attack.

The next evening a serious and concerted raid was
made on the very heart of London; in spite of the British
denial, there is reason to believe that the damage ac-
complished was very serious, as well as in some degree
important. The casualties on this occasion were the
largest up to date, and some of them were very curious.
As for instance, one bomb exploded near a passing
motor bus in which were twenty people; nine of these were
killed and eleven injured. The zeppeUn making the
attack was the object of unusually hot fire by the air
guns and their defenses against these raiders. This

148

ZEPPELINS

Zeppelin was also attacked by four aeroplanes, but
escaped unscathed.

\ One result of this raid was to raise a storm of protest
against what was felt to be the very inadequate defenses
against this form of attack which the government had
seen fit to provide for London. Anti air-craft guns were
utterly unable to attain the height at which the zeppelin
flew, which gave rise to much comment. The govern-
ment shortly afterwards appointed Admiral Sir John
Percy Scott to take charge of the gunnery for the aerial
defense of London.

On the 11th of September a zeppelin flew over the
east coast, and on the 12th there was another raid on
the east coast, as well as on the 13th. None of these,
apparently, accomplished very great results, though
there were several casualties in each.

On October 13th, at about half past nine in the evening,
another attack was made on the center of London, and
the same evening parts of the eastern counties were
attacked as well. In London a great deal of damage
was done; and even some military, as the British reports
admit by inference when they state that **no serious
damage was caused to military material.'' Admiral
Scott's air-craft defenses were tried out but did not
prove equal to the task of bringing down the assailants.
An attempted attack by aeroplanes on these assailants
failed because the aeroplanes were unable to locate the
sair-hips. Perhaps, however, it would have failed in
any event. In London the casualties amounted to 32
killed and 95 injured; while in the eastern coimties 24
were killed and 18 wounded. The bombs used in this
action were the most powerful which the zeppelins had
yet employed.

Agitation again began for better defenses against these
aerial visitors, and the government was accused of poorly
organizing the defense.

After this, for some three months, there was no further
activity on the part of the zeppelins, it is supposed that
this quietness was c: used by the fact that the weather
wr s so strong as to be unsuitable for them to cross the
North Sea.

On January 23rd, 1916, the raids began again. Dover
was visited that night, as it was also later on the day
following. It is noticeable, however, that these raids
were made by aeroplanes and not by zeppelins.

On Monday, January 31st, a large raid was carried

149

ZEPPELINS

out on the east coast and the Midlands. The raiders
on this occasion stayed longer over England than they
had at any previous raid, some of them being over the
island for twelve hours. The zeppelins entered through
Norfolk and across from Lincolnshire to Derbvshire
and Staffordshire. Their evident objective was Liver-
pool; and it is presumed that they thought they had
reached that place, instead of which they had reached a
town in Staffordshire whose name is still unknown.
This town was twice raided" during the night, once
between eight and nine o'clock, and the second time
about one o'clock in the morning. Many houses were
destroyed and about 30 people killed, with at least fifty
people injured. No precautions had been taken to
protect this part of England, and the zeppelins met with
no opposition. From Staffordshire the zeppelins then
circled through Leicestershire and in a town in this
county, whose name is also unknown to us, ten people
were killed, besides many being injured. All told, in
this raid it appears that 59 persons perished, while 101
were injured. What material damage was done, it
was impossible to say. The Germans reported that they
had attacked Liverpool and Birkenhead, Nottingham
and Sheffield, and tbe great industrial works on the
Humber, but the fact that they reached any of these
places was flatly denied by the British.

The greatest apparent result of this attack was to
rouse the British people to the urgent need of adequate
air defense. Up to this time there had been a tendency
to regard the matter as affecting only limited areas on
the sea coast and around London, but the Zeppelins in
this raid showed their power to travel far inland and far
north, and over a country totally defenseless against
their attack. Such measures as were thought necessary
were then taken to cope with this peril. Another result
was to lead to a renewal of the controversy about the
advisability of a policy of reprisals.

Sir Evelyn Wood, however, in a letter full of common
sense, stated that the principles of morality forbade a
policy of reprisals which had as a deliberat-e object the
killing and wounding of non-combatants, maintaining
that the killing and maiming of non-combatants was an
incidental side of the Zeppelin raids, whose real objective
was to inflict damage on the military defenses or the
munition factories, etc., of the country; perfectly legiti-
mate objects of attack. The Germans, he wrojte, would

150

ZEPPELINS

not willingly waste one air bomb, after having carried
it hundreds of miles, in killing and maiming non-com-
batants. This is, of course, the ^^ew that will be taken
by most military men, or in fact by most statesmen,
since where injury is inflicted upon non-combatants as
collateral to an attack upon a legitimate object of attack,
it is the rule that there can be no reprisals undertaken.

The next attack of the Germans was on February 9th
when two of their sea-planes crossed the Isle of Thanet,
in the mouth of the Thames below London. It is to be
noticed that this was the first raid made by sea-planes.
This raid, however, did not apparently accomplish
very much.

On February 10th, 1916, one of the airships which
took part in this raid, on its way back to Germany,
suffered some accident and fell into the North Sea with
its crew of twenty-two. While in this predicament a
Grimsby steam trawler, the King Stephen, discovered
it, came up to it and circled around it but refused to
take ofiF the crew from the air ship, nor did the Captain
of the trawler report the situation of these unfortunate
men until reaching port three days afterwards, when
a British naval vessel was sent to search for them, but
they were never found. The skipper's excuse was
that there were twenty-two Germans on the airship
and he carried a crew of only nine, and that he was
afraid to rely on the pledges offered him by the Germans.
This is, taken all in all, one of the most discreditable
episodes of the war to the British, since it would have
been easily possible for the skipper of the King Stephen
to have secured himself in a dozen different ways against
any uprising on the part of these men had he taken them
on his boat. It is extremely probable, however, that
had he done so, in view of his having saved their lives,
there would have been no trouble caused by the crew
of this airship.

Instead, however, of taking the chance thereof, if
chance there was, for the sake of humanity, whereof the
British have talked so much during the course of this
war, this skipper deliberately steamed away.

On Sunday, February 20th, another sea-plane raid was
made on Loestoft and Walmer. Here only material
damage, apparently, was done. On the same day still
another sea-plane raid took place on the Kentish coast,
near Walmer, and also accomplished apparently little
real damage, nor did it inflict many casualties.

151

CHAPTER XXXII
AIR

It would perhaps be uninteresting to fill several
pages with a catalogue of all the various air raids which
took place during these six months, but nevertheless
there were some, which, on account of their size or the
importance of the towns attacked, present some features
of interest.

Late in September, the 22d, the Allies made a large
raid on the city of Stuttgart, the capital of Wurttemberg.
Some twenty machines participated in this attack and
over a hundred bombs were dropped on the town,
particular attention being paid to the Royal palace and
the railway station, both of which appear to have been
damaged to some extent. Other buildings in the city
were also damaged, and the American consulate was
struck. But of this, curiously enough, our American
papers did not declaim to any extent, thus reversing
their procedure on prior occasions of a like character.
Several persons were killed as well.

The next really important raid was made by the Aus-
trians on Venice, on October 25th. This raid was on a
smaller scale than the one on Stuttgart and was parti-
cipated in by only about half as many machines. A
large number of bombs were dropped, one of which fell
on the church of Degli Scalzi; while others fell near,
but not on, St. Mark's, doing no damage to the church.
On the whole, this raid accomplished very little, though
on account of the fact that Venice is such a well known
and so unique a city and contains so many art treasures
whose destruction or damage would be irreparable, it
attracted both attention and criticism.

A couple of weeks later, on November 14th, Austrian
machines raided Verona, the Italian military head-
quarters for northern Italy. While no military damage
was done, and comparatively little material damage
either, some 30 persons were killed and a considerable

152

AIR

number injured. Five days later Verona was again
raided with little result, and on the same day Vienza
and Udine were attacked from the air by the Austrians.
In the latter place 12 persons were killed and 27 injured,
and considerable material and military damage done.

By way of reprisal for recent Zeppelin raids on London,
a large aerial fleet of the Allies made a raid on Treves,
on the Moselle, a town containing many very interesting
Roman remains, more than any other city north of the
Alps. A large number of bombs were dropped but there
was little damage done and very few casualties were
reported.

On the 23d of January the French city of Nancy was
severely shelled from the air by German aviators, over
150 bombs being dropped with comparatively slight
results. On the 24th of January the French aviators
dropped a couple of hundred bombs on the town of
Monastir in southern Serbia, then in possession of the
Bulgarians, with what results, however, is uncertain.
On this same day Lieutenant Boehme, a noted German
aviator, who had brought down many enemy machines
and who had distinguished himself in the defense of
Freiburg, Baden, against all allied raids in the early part
of the war, was killed in an air combat behind the
German lines in the vicinity of Argonne.

Freiburg, in Baden, was for the third time since the
beginning of the war bombarded by an allied air fleet on
January 28th, considerable damage being done and the
casualty list was a large one. Two days later, in re-
prisal for this raid, Paris was raided by the Germans
with a large fleet of aeroplanes. Twenty-four persons
were killed, tv^ enty-svcn were wounded and material
damage was done to buildings, etc., in addition to the
casualties.

Many minor raids took place during the period under
consideration, but the reports of these are so conflicting
and the results so comparatively unimportant that any
account of them would be wholly unsatisfactory.

During all this time, of course, there was intense
and untiring activity among the rival air fleets on the
battle line itself, and each day numberless deeds of
bravery were done, each suflSciently gallant to deserve
a chapter or recital, but unfortunately, except in a very
few cases, the bravery and gallantry is buried so deeply
in a few dry official words in the daily bulletins that any
description is impossible.

153

AIR

One thing, however, may be said and said emphati-
cally: — The aerial services of the several combatants
displayed more of the chivalry of war in their dealings
with each other than any of the other arms, numerous
instances of this chivalry and what may even be called
courtesy are well attested. The reason for this is
perhaps that the conditions under which aerial fighting
takes place are more like the individual combats of the
earlier days.

The following interesting statement on this subject
by a British aviator is worth reading: — 'Though it
has been repeatedly stated that chivalry does not exist
in this war, this does not apply to the British and German
aviation branches. Whether it is the individualism
of our work and its novelty, or whatever it is that is
responsible, something of the old spirit of knighthood
maintains among the riders of the air. When a British
aviator has to descend in the German lines whether
from engine trouble or because his engine or his planes
have been damaged by anti-aircraft gims' fire the next
day the Germans report to us his name and whether he
survived and if so whether he is wounded. We always
do the same. It has come to be a custom."

The reports are made in a manner worthy of airmen
and they are the only communications that ever pass
between the two foes which watch for heads to snipe
at from their trenches. What is called a ''message
bag" is dropped over the British lines by a German or
over the German lines by a British aviator — sometimes
when he is in the midst of bursting shells from the
anti-aircraft gims. Long streamers are attached to
the little cloth bag. These, as they piroutte down to
the earth from a height of seven or eight thousand
feet/attract the attention of soldiers in the neighborhood
and they run out to get the prize when it lands.

It is taken to battalion headquarters which wires
the fact on to the aviation headquarters where the fate
of a comrade may be known a few hours after he has
left the home aerodrome; and, in another few hours,
someone in England may know the fate of a relative.

That is one of the advantages of belonging to the
flying corps. It may be weeks before his relatives
and comrades know whether a man who is missing after
a trench attack or counter-attack is a prisoner or dead.
Such little kindnesses as this don't interfere with your
fighting your best for your cause; at the same time

154

AIR

they take a little of the savagery out of war. Of course,
the rule could not apply to prisoners taken in trench
fighting — only to airmen. There are relatively few
airmen on either side and only an occasional one ever
comes down in the enemy's lines."

The neutral countries surrounding the belligerent
coimtries, particularly Switzerland and Holland, had
their attention most positively drawn to the absolute
lack of international legislation regarding the ship-
wrecked aviators who came tumbling out of the sky in
large numbers into their territory.

International law and the law of various nations have
regulated the rights of foreign men of war who are forced
to seek a temporary refuge into a neutral port. The
foreign warship may repair the damages it has suffered
and it may take on board sufficient coal to sail to the
next home port. If a German cruiser should suddenly
arrive in a Dutch harbor she would be given coal enough
to reach Emden, the nearest German port. A British
ship would be sent to Harwich. All this is generally
understood as an established rule of war. But when
a foreign aviator, through lack of gasoline is obliged
to land upon neutral territory he is interned for the rest ^
of the war.

Apparently he does not come under the class of the
warships, for in that case he would obtain a few cans of
oil and would be given a chance to fly home. In the
same way, if the flying machine were given equal rights
with the warships, a broken machine might stay upon
neutral ground in order to get repaired before it once
more took to the open sky. In times to come all this
may be regulated, but at the present time a number of
aviators walk around in Dutch and Danish and Swiss t
fortresses and express their opinion of a rule which
to them seems entirely unfair.

When an aviator lands in the sea and is picked up by
a neutral fishing or merchant vessel he may go home
freely. If, however, he is picked up by a torpedo boat
of a neutral nation, that neutral nation is obliged to
intern their involuntary guest. This rule, however,
only holds for aviators, shipwrecked mariners seem to
go free no matter who saved them. But the aviator
who is fished out of his wrecked machine by an official
vessel belonging to a neutral navy loses his liberty for
the rest of the war, while he would be allowed to go

155

AIR

home if he had waited a few minutes longer for a fishing
sloop.

A rather complicated question arises, when an aviator
just before he is approached by a naval launch dives
from his machine and claims his right to liberty as a
"distressed mariner." Unfortunately a ride of several
hours upon the choppy waves of the North Sea sitting
on the wings of a disabled flying machine seems to
produce a state of abject seasickness. And the aviators
who might have availed themselves of the technical
rights of their" case as " distressed mariners "were usually
in such an advanced state of seasick indifference that
they cared not what happened as long as they were
hoisted on board something stable.

156

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE WAR ON THE SEA

During the period under consideration there were no
naval battles of any size or importance. The British
kept up their patrol of the North Sea unremittingly,
but, as we shall see in the course of our narrative, their
patrol was sometimes evaded. Except on the Belgian
coast, this patrol did not include any offensive oper-
ations during the period under consideration and was
of a very laborious and monotonous character. The
British fleet was considerably expanded during these
months in order to meet the heavy calls upon it which
this patrol necessitated. Drifters and trawlers for mine
sweeping, armed yachts and other similar vessels for
patrol duty, motor boats for dispatch carrying, as well
as many vessels of new types were added. Most of
these, it is true, were added for the purpose of com-
batting the German submarine blockade of England
which was growing to be more of a menace.

On September 6th the steamer Hesperian was tor-
pedoed off the Irish coast, and while not immediately
sunk, went to the bottom later, which incident led to
diplomatic action by the United States.

On September 24th the Anglo-Canadian, a British
horse transport was sunk off Fastnet, near the Irish
coast, with some 900 horses on board, but whether by
a mine or by a submarine is uncertain.

On October 28th the British lost the cruiser Argyle,
under the command of Captain Tancred, grounded off
the eastern coast of Scotland and became a total wreck,
though there was no loss of life. On November 17th
the hospital ship Anglia struck a mine in the channel
on her way from France to Dover, and sank with a loss
of 80 lives.

On the 30th of December the British lost another
cruiser, the Natal, which blew up as a result of an
internal explosion in some English harbor, the name of

157

THE WAR ON THE SEA

•

which we do not know. Her captain and twenty-four
other officers, together with 380 men, were killed or
drowned. The fate of the Natal reminds one of that
of the Bulwark which about the same time, the year
before, blew up imder somewhat similar circumstances.

In the early part of the six months imder consider-
ation there was considerable activity by the British
submarines in the Baltic where an attack on the German
merchant ships in that sea was begun. During October
the British submarines averaged one victim a day
among this class of vessels, but this soon ceased as the
Germans declined to send forth their ships from the
harbors and expose them to this danger. The principal
object of this raid on German shipping was to stop
the supply of ores and other minerals of like character
from Scandinavia into Germany. Later on, the Ger-
mans, through mines and other defenses, succeeded in
keeping the British submarines out of the Baltic very
largely. During the time of their activity, however,
these submarines managed to sink three German warships
the Prince Adelbert, which was sunk oflf Libau on
October 23rd, nearly all crews going down with the ships;
the light cruiser Undine, which was sunk oflf the south
coast of Sweden on November 7th, with a loss of 26
lives; and on December 17th, the light cruiser Bremen
and a torpedo boat.

Towards the end of 1915, the German submarines
operating in the Mediterranean were largely reinforced
and their activity was directed mostly to the merchant
ships and transports of the Allies which passed up and
down that almost inland sea. In the last three months
of the year this traffic was greatly increased owing to the
new expedition to Salonica. Several British transports,
the Ranazan on September 19th, with 225 Indian troops
being lost; the Marquette on October 26th, with 90
lost; the Woodfield on November 2d, and the Merian
on November 8th, with 40 lost and 50 injured, were
sunk or damaged by these submarines, besides a very
considerable number of commercial vessels.

Early in November, further reinforcements to the
submarines of the Central Powers in the Mediter-
ranean arrived and signalized their advent by sinking
a number of merchantmen oflf the North African coast.
On the 7th of November, the Italian passenger liner,
•Ancona, on a voyage from Italy to New York, was
torpedoed and sunk, with a loss of about 300 lives.

168

THE WAR ON THE SEA

The sinking of the vessel gave rise to considerable
diplomatic correspondence with the United States, owing
to the presence of Americans on board. On the 14th,
another Italian passenger steamer, the Bosnia, was
also sunk.

On December 30th the Peninsular and Oriental
boat, the Persia, was torpedoed and sunk off Crete,
with a loss of 250 lives, which sinking also involved the
United States in diplomatic correspondence.

About the same time submarines appeared on the
western coast of Egypt and sank the armored auxiliary
cruiser Tara, and two Egyptian gun-boats, the Prince
Aban and Abdul MoeninintheBay of Solium on that coast.

On December 7th the Standard Oil tank steamer
was attacked by a submarine off the coast of Tripoli,
near where a somewhat similar attack had been made
on the Petrolite, another Standard Oil vessel, a few days
before. These attacks also provoked diplomatic cor-
respondence on the part of the United States.

Towards the end of the land campaign at the Dar-
danelles the British and French submarines penetrated
into the Sea of Marmora once more and for two or three
months were very successful in their operations, damag-
ing a Turkish battleship, a couple of gunboats, a torpedo
boat, three or four transports, and quite a number of
supply ships of various kinds. Several of these sub-
marines, at various times, entered the harbor of Con-
stantinople itself and attacked shipping tied up to the
quays of the city and also the Turkish powder mills at
Zeitunlik came in for a measure of their attention.
But this work was extremely risky and cost the French
four submarines, the Sapphire, the Marriotte, the
Joule, and the Turquoise, and also cost the British the
same number, they losing the E-15, E-2, E-7, and
E-20 during the year.

Towards the end of 1915, the free navigation of the
Adriatic by the Allies became of great importance,
since the Italians were sending an army across that sea
to Albania and the Allies at the same time were moving
the Serbian troops and refugees southward to Corfu
and Greece. These movements necessitated continual
voyages between Italy to the West, and Corfu to the
South, and the Albanian coast. The Austrians took
advantage of this state of affairs and attacked with
their submarine flotilla and succeeded in destroying
a number of vessels belonging to their opponents.

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THE WAR ON THE SEA

In the Black Sea, during this time, both the German
and Russian submarines were to some extent active.
The German submarines were particularly useful at the
time of the bombardment of the Bulgarian fortress
of Varna when they prevented the Russian fleet from
closing in on the fortress defending the place.

As has already been mentioned in the account of the
fighting on the western line, there was considerable
activity by the British Navy oflf the Belgian coast,
where the German submarine bases at various points
on that coast were attacked. In fact, the English
detailed a fleet of eighty minor vessels under Vice-
Admiral Bacon for these operations, and curiously
enough, here Ericson's invention of the monitor, which
had been discarded by the fleets of the world for several
years, again came into use, as Admiral Bacon's fleet
included 12 of these vessels, six bearing the names of
distinguished soldiers, and the other six nimibers only.
How much damage these attacks on the Belgian coast
did to the German ports is unknown; six major attacks
being made and eight minor. Naturally, the British
say that important results were accomplished, while
on the other hand, the Germans report that these bom-
bardments inflicted no serious damageupon these ports.

During these operations the British lost three small
vessels, an armed yacht, a drifter and a mine sweeper,
and suffered causalties of 34 killed and 24 wounded.

On January 9th, 1916, the British lost the battleship
Edward VII in the Channel, through a mine which after-
wards became known was one of those planted by the
German raider, the Moewe. No lives were lost in this
disaster.

Another British war vessel was lost in the same waters
a little more than a month later, when the Arethusa
also struck a mine and sank, with a loss of ten lives,
on February 13th. It will be remembered that this
cruiser, when just out of her builders' hands, participated
in the fight in the North Sea in which the Blucher was
sunk, and indeed was said to have fired the torpedo
which sank that vessel. On February 28th, the Maloja,
a Peninsular and Oriental passenger steamer, homeward
bound, struck a mine in the channel near Dover and
was sunk, some forty lives being lost. The mines which
sank the Arethusa and the Maloja were also supposed
to have been among those planted by the Moewe whose
history follows shortly.

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THE WAR ON THE SEA

During these six months other navies, than the British
and German suffered casualties on the sea. On Sep-
tember 28th, the Italian battleship Benedetto Bim
was destroyed through an explosion and with the ship
some three hundred lives were lost.

On February 13th, the French cruiser, the Admiral
Channier, 4800 tons, an old and not particularly for-
midable vessel, was torpedoed and sunk off the Syrian
coast, about 300 men going down with her.

The only spectacular event on the ocean in the period
under consideration was the career of the Moewe, the
German raider hereinbefore referred to.

On the first of February, 1916, Norfolk, Virginia,
had one of the sensations of its history. The Elder
Dempster Line steamer ''Appam" which trades between
Great Britain and West Africa was much overdue,
and should have arrived at Plymouth, England, on
January 20, 1916, eleven days before. A broken boat
bearing the name "Appam," however, had been picked
up between Madeira and Gibraltar on January 16th.
This circumstance, in connection with her being so long
overdue, led to the Appam's loss being considered certain.
To the surprise of the world, and more particularly to
the surprise of Norfolk, the Appam made a sudden
appearance in that harbor on the date above mentioned
in charge of a German prize crew which had been put
on board of her by the captain of a German raider, the
Moewe, after the capture of the Appam by this raider
on January 16th, near the West African coast.

The German prize crew had navigated the Appam
from this point all the way across the middle Atlantic
Ocean in safety, repeatedly passing British merchant
vessels and cruisers which by one strategy or another
they had outwitted, and brought her in safety into the
American port of Norfolk. On board the Appam,
in addition to her prize crew, were the passengers who
were on her at the time of capture and portions of her
own crew and those of other vessels previously destroyed
by the Moewe.

The reason why an American port had been selected
was that under certain clauses of an existing treaty
between Prussia and the United States there was a
provision under which the Germans deemed themselves
entitled to bring prizes of war into American harbors,
and had acted in accordance with their views of their
rights thereunder.

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THE WAR ON THE SEA

The history of the Moewe was most romantic. She
left a German naval port towards the end of December
1915, and first crossed over to the Swedish coast, thence
following that coast and the Norwegian coast closely
until fairly far to the north, whence she had described
a great semi-circle around the British Isles, successfully
eluding the British cruisers in this portion of the ocean,
and had reached the neighborhood of the Canary Islands
in the early days of January.

Briefly simimarized, during the next two months
she succeeded in capturing fourteen vessels belonging
to the Allies, of which 12 were English, one French and
one Belgian. Eleven of the British vessels captured
were steamers: the Author, the Traider, the Curbridge,
Ariadne, Dromomly , Farrington, ClanMcTavish, Appam,
Westburne, Flamenco and Saxon, while the twelfth,
the Edinburgh, was a sailing ship. The French vessel,
the Maroni, was a steamer, as was the Belgian, the
Luxemburg. The total tonnage was 67,855.

All of these vessels were sunk, except the Appam
which was sent into Norfolk, and the Westburne which
was sent into Teneriflfe, in charge of a prize crew and
also carrying prisoners taken from the various ships
captured by the Moewe. These prisoners were landed,
after which the Westburne was taken outside the harbor
of Teneriflfe and sunk.

The raid of the Moewe was even more successful than
the raid of the Emden, in point of damage inflicted upon
the enemy; as the aggregate values of the cargoes and
vessels sunk and captured by her were considerably
more than those captured by the Emden. With the
Appam, she captured a considerable amount of gold
which this vessel was bringing home to England.

One of the most interesting features of her raid was
the fight between herself and the British steamer Clan
McTavish, one of the Clan Line. The Moewe, which
was disguised as a merchantman, by means of canvas
screens and other devices, summoned the Clan McTavish
to stop; this vessel refused, not knowing, imdoubtedly,
the character of her accoster, and thereupon the Moewe
let fall her screens, exposed her battery of guns, and
opened fire on the McTavish. This latter vessel still
held on her course, and increasing her speed attempted
to escape, replying to the fire of the Moewe guns with
the gun she had mounted on her stern as a precaution
against submarines. But this attempt to escape was

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THE WAR ON THE SEA

unavailing, and the Clan McTavish finally stopped and
surrendered, being subsequently sunk, and her crew
being taken prisoners.

The Moewe finally reached Wilhelmshaven, the
German naval port, on March 4th, in safety, bringing
some British naval prisoners as well as some of the
crews of the other vessels she had destroyed about the
time she sank the Appam.

On her return, the Moewe, curiously enough, passed
directly through the English Channel and successfully
eluded the patrol of British naval vessels therein.

This exploit aroused so much enthusiasm in Germany
that attempts to duplicate it were thereafter made.

On February 29, 1916, the British auxiliary cruiser
"Alcantra" was doing patrol duty in the North Sea when
she sighted a large steamer flying the Norwegian flag with
the Norwegian colors painted on her side. The Alcantra
halted the "Grief," the name of this apparently Nor-
wegian vessel, which was, in fact, a German cruiser, and
asked her name and destination; the answer was ap-
parently unsatisfactory for tte British cruiser lowered
a boat to board the "Grief" in order to verify the infor-
mation supplied. But the German vessel, which was
disguised as was the Moewe, by false bulwarks, dropped
these, thus giving her guns full play and attacked the
Alcantra and the boat she was sending to search her.
The Alcantra was a ship of over 15,000 tons, while the
"Grief" was considerably smaller. But nevertheless,
after a fight lasting several hours, the Grief got the
better of the combat, one of her shells having struck
the rudder of the Alcantra and rendering her unmanage-
able. The Grief then fired a torpedo at the Alcantra,
which sank very shortly thereafter.

In the meantime, another British auxiliary cruiser,
the Andes, which had heard the call of the Alcantra
wireless, came up and reached the scene of the battle
about the time the Alcantra sank. The Grief which
had been several times struck by the Alcantra and was
on fire, seeing this new antagonist, put off at full speed,
the Andes following her as rapidly as possible. The
chase was a long one and the Grief attempted to torpedo
the Andes more than once, but did not succeed. The
Andes, however, wrecked the upper decks of the Grief,
driving her crew from her guns, but even then the
Grief would have probably escaped had it not been for
the fact that a, British light cruiser suddenly appeared

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THE WAR ON THE SEA

to the northward of the Grief in the direction of her
flight. At a considerable distance the gunners picked
up her range. The Grief of course, did not carry guns
of sufficient calibre to combat this new antagonist, and,
shortly after the cruiser entered into the fray, blew up
with a terrific explosion.

It is supposed that the Grief was laden with mines
that were intended to be laid by her on various points of
her voyage, and that one of the British shots had reached
these mines, thus causing the explosion which brought
about her end.

As a result of a meeting of the Privy Council of Great
Britain on February 14th, 1916, the British government
issued an order on February 29th, whereby the appli-
cation of a certain British mimicipal act entitled "The
Trading with the Enemy" (Extension of Powers) Act
1915, under what the British called the "Trading with
the Enemy'' (Neutral Countries) proclamation 1916,
was applied to the world in general.

This proclamation first applied to certain subjects
of Greece, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
Portugal, Spain and Portuguese East Africa, and all
consignments to persons and firms on the statutory
black lists which were issued on the same day were for-
bidden. This was the first public assumption, abso-
lutely without warrant of international law, of that right
to control the trade of the world which Britain has
always privately practised, and it created a storm of
protest from the neutrals whose subjects found them-
selves on this black list. This subject will, however,
be dealt with more fully in the next volume when it will
be discussed as regards its subsequent application to
the citizens of the United States.

Late in February an official annoimcement was made
that the British and French fleets operating in the
North Sea and the Channel would thereafter act as one
and be placed under one supreme command.

164

CHAPTER XXXIV

GENERAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY

OF EUROPE

In the early autumn of 1915, it became apparent to
Great Britain that it was impossible for her to continue
the poUcy which she had adopted at the beginning of
the war of voluntary military service. Her advertising
campaign did not produce, after first enthusiasm had
faded, that nmnber of recruits for the army which
could make her a factor in the land fighting on the
Continent, and though every method had been adopted
to draw the men of military age to the colors still these
were not coming forward in sufiicient numbers and the
complaints of Great Britain's Allies at her lack of co-
operation with them in the land warfare on the Continent
were commencing to be extremely pointed.

In proportion to their population at that time the
British colonies, Canada and Australia, had furnished
a greater proportion of their men of military age than
had the United Eangdom; in September and the early
part of October, the slowness with which voluntary
recruits joined the army grew even greater, so that it
was necessary to adopt some radical plan dealing with
the situation under which the field armies could not
only be sustained but increased, and the legitimate
demands of Britain's Allies satisfied. The natural and
normal system which would have been adopted in any
other country in the world than Great Britain would
have been to have adopted compulsory military service,
but many obstacles stood in the way of such adoption.

In the first place, there was the rooted objection of
Englishmen of all classes and characters to be compelled
to do anything of any kind or nature. In the second
place, there was the serious opposition of the workmep
class of the population which found political expression
through the labor imions and the Labor party. And

165

POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE

finally there was the fear of all the politicians (there
being no statesmen at the head of England's government)
of the loss of votes to their particular party through
taking any definite and decisive action of any kind to
meet this emergency. Consequently a quack remedy
was applied; which quack remedy consisted of what is
known as the Lord Derby Recruiting Scheme. Under
this scheme, in every area a local civilian committee
was appointed and these committees imdertook to
procure for the army a minimum supply of 30,000
recruits per week; the number which it was said was
necessary to maintain the efiiciency of the British army
then in the field. As a matter of fact, however, it was
subsequently discovered that this figure only represented
infantry needs. The theory of obtaining recruits through
civilians was to relieve the War Ofiice from any fiu-ther
work of recruiting, leaving it free to concentrate upon
the training of these recruits after they had been ob-
tained by the civilian committee.

On the 6th of October, Lord Derby was appointed
to direct the operations of this scheme and a general
canvassing scheme was adopted. All the men in Eng-
land, married and unmarried, between the ages of 18
and 41, were divided according to their ages into 46
groups. Certain of these groups were to be what is
known as "starred groups''; that is to say, persons
reserved by reason of their occupations, or for other
causes, from active military service. The unstarred
men left were then supposed to be available for military
service, after a physical examination. But these \m-
starred men had two coiu-ses open to them, they could
either enlist immediately or else could attest to join
the army at some future time. During the course of
the canvass, the promise was made by the government
that the unstarred married men should not be called
until all the unstarred unmarried men had been called.
This caused considerable trouble thereafter, and nearly
caused the fall of the government.

The canvass lasted for nearly two months and it was
found that of the unmarried men only about one-half
presented themselves, while of the married men approxi-
mately three-fifths. The reason why the greater pro-
portion of married men presented themselves was that
their service, imder the pledge of the government,
was postponed until all unmarried men had been called
and were in actual service.

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POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE

Without going further into the details of this remark-
able plan which was intended to gild the pill, so to speak,
of compulsory service, and create compulsory service
under another name, it will suffice to say that the entire
plan was a complete and absolute failure, and that the
number of men absolutely necessary to maintain the
armies of Great Britain at their then strength, was not
obtained, and the government was compelled to face
the alternative of compulsory military service.

After much hesitation the government did meet the
situation by a military service bill which was introduced
into Parliament on the 5th of January, 1916. This
first military bill was nothing but a measure to compel
the unmarried men to do what they had failed to do
imder the Derby recruiting scheme. Without going
into the provisions of this bill at length it may be that this
bill was merely a makeshift and that it did not under
its terms provide for anything like general military
service even from the unmarried men. Furthermore,
it provided for local tribunals to which claims for exemp-
tion from military service were to made. These tribunals
in the future played a very considerable part in weaken-
ing an already weak measure. This bill passed the
Commons after much negotiation with the labor in-
terests of the country, receiving its first reading on
January 6th, and its third on January 26th, becoming
law a day or two afterwards, and going into operation
on February 10, 1916.

Early in the year there were strong efforts made in
and out of Parliament to have the provisions of the
military service bill apply to Ireland as well as to the
other component parts of the United Kingdom. Ireland
having been by the terms of the bill exempted from its
provisions, but these efforts were opposed by the govern-
ment and did not succeed in rallying enough strength
to their cause to impart their desires on that government.
A considerable sensation was caused in Great Britain
in November by charges made in the House of Lords by
Lord St. Davids, that favoritism was rampant in the
army, that the British generals were incompetent, and
that women were not only exercising far too much influ-
ence in the army but were at the front in large nimibers,
particularly at or near headquarters, on what might be
termed pleasure trips. These charges were vigorously
denied, but ultimately, at a considerable time, events
proved their correctness to a large degree.

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POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE

Parliament was finally prorogued on February 27th,
doubtless much to the relief of the ministry.

A very interesting and rather bitter controversy
arose between Sweden and Great Britain in the latter
months of 1915. It will be remembered how Great
Britain, by a monstrous enlargement of the "continuous
voyage" theory as applicable to contraband, had by
an unscrupulous use of her naval strength compelled all
the smaller powers of Europe, Holland, Norway, Den-
mark and Switzerland, to submit to her dictation as
to the characters and quantities of the foodstuffs and
raw materials they should import for their trade and
commerce from abroad by sea.

Great Britain had further, in recent months, begun
to seize the mails on the high seas, not only those des-
tined for her enemies, but those destined to the above
named neutral countries as well. This regime
Great Britian now attempted to apply to Sweden,
thinking presumably that Sweden being a small nation
would not have the temerity to resist the orders of the
mistress of the seas.

But though small, Sweden is a robustly independent
nation and to her credit, now and hereafter, she not only
dared to oppose Great Britain by formal protest but
by effective act. Her first step in her resistance was
to solicit the co-operation of the United States in taking
some action looking to an assertion and an enforcement
of the right of neutrals to have their ships traverse
the ocean, between neutral ports at least, without
interference and in her commimication to the United
States, Sweden used the following strong, but justified,
expressions: —

"The violation of existing rules of international law
has, regardless of protests, increased until at present
only a few rules, serving as protection to neutral com-
mercial intercourse, are observed by Great Britain,
and it is feared that also these remaining few will be
violated.

"Of late the British authorities have violated the mail
traflSic, etc., etc.''

However, England's present practise of censoring
also first class mail, sent by neutral vessels from one
neutral country to another, is an even greater violation
of the rights accorded neutral powers by the rules of
international law. It is not necessary to particularly
point out how contrary this practise is to the stipulations

168

POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE

of The Hague Convention, which stipulations or rules
must be considered to have been in existence even
before the promulgation of this convention.

The Hague Convention referred to by the govern-
ment of Sweden, No. XI., in its article 1 of chapter 1,
lays down the rule in relation to mail as follows:

"The postal correspondence of neutrals or belligerents,
whatever its oflSicial or private character may be, found
on the high seas on board a neutral or enemy ship is
inviolable, If the ship is detained the correspondence
is forwarded by the captor with the least possible delay."

This convention was ratified by Great Britain.

We have heard so much during this war of the duty of
observing The Hague Conventions, in some cases when
imratified and consequently not in force, and so much
vituperative inspired denunciation in our neutral press
of one set of belligerents for not obesrving even such
unratified conventions, that the absolute silence of this
same press in relation to the violation of the convention
under consideration seems strange, unless something
which the writer has been imable to discover in these
Hague Conventions, makes them in the eyes of that
press only binding on the particular belligerent they
do not favor.

The government of the United States, at this time,
being more interested in sentimentality than with
principle, as a reason for decisive action declined to
co-operate with Sweden.

Sweden, however, was not discouraged and acting on
her own initiative, took advantage of her geograpUcal
position, and in retaliation for Great Britain's illegal
actions, held up all mail communication of any kind
between that country and her ally, Russia; and also pro-
hibited the passage of goods of any kind going between
Great Britain and Russia, or the reverse, from crossing
Swedish territory. As at this time the only other means
of reaching Russia, except by shipping across Amer-
ica to Vladivostock in extreme eastern Siberia, through
Archangel, was closed by the ice and would not be open
for many weeks, this action was embarrassing for both
Great Britain and Russia, and they attempted to solve
the problem thus presented, first by negotiations, and
second by threats. But Sweden stood firm and finding
that the action already taken was not drastic enough,
further crippled Great Britain by placing an embargo
on all exports of wood pulp to that country.

169

POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE

This action, of course, hit the British newspapers
and hit them hard, since about seventy per cent of all
the paper on which British newspapers are printed is
made from Swedish pulp.

At the date our record ends the situation between
Sweden and Great Britain had experienced no modifi-
cation. Great Britain was talking, the Bear was growling
and Sweden was acting. It may be here said, in passing,
that the only two neutral coimtries which have shown
in this war that they have normal self respect for them-
selves are Sweden and Switzerland.

In January, the presidert of the Bremen Chamber of
Commerce officially announced that not a pound of
cotton had been used for the last eight months in making
ammunition in Germany, and that the substitute was
both cheaper and better suited to the making of am-
munition than cotton, and that hence, even after the
war, the German ammunition factories will not have
td use cotton.

This official made the further statement that camphor,
which the Germans have been making for some years
from American turpentine, could be made more advan-
tageously from another substitute, which would also
do away, now and henceforth, with the use of American
turpentine.

If the Germans have actually discovered a cheaper
substitute for cotton, it is certain to come into general
use after the war and will constitute a very severe blow
to our cotton growers, which loss, if it occurs, can be
directly chargeable to our policy of letting Great Britain
do in this war what Great Britain would not let Russia
do in the Russo-Japanese war — put cotton on the list
of contraband. This result would also give Mr. Lansing
the enviable pre-eminence of being that one, of all our
Secretaries of State, who inflicted the most injury on
his own country whose interests it was his duty to guard.

In the autumn of 1915, the British government
began mobilizing the American and other foreign
securities in the hands of private investors throughout
the United Kindgom for the purpose of either using them
as collateral security for loans negotiated in the United
States, or the outright sale thereof on the American
market. This scheme was partly undertaken to steady
exchange between the United States and Great Britain,
and partly to raise money for the government.

In the early days of September the pound sterling

170

POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE

had fallen very largely in the New York market; at
one time reaching the record low price of $4.55, and
though this situation had been immediately eased by
large shipments of gold by the British government
the exchange market remained nervous and imsteady.

The original owner of the securities either received a
promise of the return of his securities at a future day
with certain financial advantages in the meantime, or
handed them over in return for a fixed price payable
at a future day.

Prices of foodstuffs of all kinds advanced very largely
in all the belUgerent cotntries during the year. In
the case of the Central Empires this advance was a
result of bad crops at home in a large measure, and also
because the Central Empires were not able to follow
the ordinary course in peace times of importing food-
stuffs from beyond the seas owing to the British blockade.
However, the Central Empires were by no means at
or even near the point of starvation or even real scarcity
of food in spite of the information to that effect spread
broadcast by Great Britain.

In fact, even if the seas were entirely and absolutely
closed to the Central Empires it would be impossible
to starve them.

This submarine campaign and the use of ships by the
government for purposes of the war drove ocean freight
rates, during this period, to a very high figiu'e. For
instance, in normal times the rate per ton of coal from
Cardiff, Wales, to Genoa, Italy, even as late as July,
1914, was seven shillings; in January, 1916, this rate
was 75 shillings. The normal rate on grain from the
Argentine was 12 shillings and the abnormal rate of
January, 1916, was 150 shillings.

These increases in carrying charges had a practical
effect, both^n belligerent and non-belligerent countries.
In Great Britain, for instance, the price of bread per
quartern loaf of four pounds rose from 11 cents in August,
1914, to 19 cents in January, 1916. In France, the
general rise in prices was greater than in England, and
in Italy, very much greater. The neutral countries
also saw prices mount rapidly.

On October 28th, the Viviani ministry, which had
been in power in France since the beginning of the war,
though partly reconstructed at the time the French
government fled to Bordeaux in September, 1914, fell
from power and was succeeded by a new cabinet organ-

171

POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE

ized by Aristide Briand in which cabinet Mr. Viviani,
the former premier, consented to occupy a minor position.
Mr. Briand, who is one of the ablest of French contem-
porary politicians, first came into real prominence in
connection with the separation of church and state in
1904-05, in the enactment of the legislation concerning
which he played a very prominent role, being, in fact,
what would be here called the chairman of the committee
which introduced such legislation. Cold, intellectual
and practical in his planning, Mr. Briand, once his plan is
formed, becomes impetuous and tenacious in its execution.
On the whole, it seeiiis only justice to say that in placing
Mr. Briand at the head of affairs in the difficult situation
in which the coimtry found itself, France chose the best
man she had available. And France was obliged to
choose a strong, able man for this position the more
as her president, Mr. Poincare, is notoriously without
stability or balance.

Like France, Italy, to some degree, suffered from a
shortage of food this winter of 1915-16. Early in
January, however, the government took a census of all
the grain in the kingdom and devised a scheme for
controlling its price and the method of its distribution.
Like measures adopted as regards other foodstuffs
largely ameliorated the situation, and prevented too
much suffering.

Italy continued at peace oflSicially with Germany
during all this period and did not commit any act of war
against her imtil just at the end of the six months under
consideration, when on Febraury 28, 1916, she siezed
34 out of the 57 German ships in Italian ports. At this
time, however, Italy denied that these seizures were acts
of war and claimed that they were merely an exercise
of the right of angary.

This right of angary is in international law the right
of a belligerent to use neutral merchant vessels and their
crews for the purpose of transporting troops, ammunition
and provisions, pa3dng freight, and is undoubtedly
imiversally recognized. Those interested in this subject
will find a full discussion of the subject in Stockton's
"Laws and Usages of War at Sea", article 6.

A couple of weeks before this, Portugal had taken
forcible possession of 36 German and Austrian ships
in the river Tagus, and had hoisted the Portuguese
flag over them. In this case, however, such seizures

172

POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE

differed entirely from the Italian seizures, since Portugal
at the time was not a belligerent and consequently had
no right of angary. Her act in seizing these ships was
therefore an absolute act of war, and thus this wretchedly
corrupt and debased land entered the struggle. Such
entry need not, however, be viewed as one of the main
events of the period we are considering.

There were few or no political events of any importance
in Germany or Austria during the winter.

In Russia there were internal troubles of some char-
acter, but few of the details have come to us. Sozonoflf,
Russian minister of Foreign AjBfairs, next to Sir Edward
Grey the person most responsible for the outbreak of
the war in 1914, fell from power on November 2d.

As early as the commencement of the ill fated Dardan-
elles campaign, the Allies had turned their eyes on Greece
whose geographical situation and whose possession of
a veteran army had suggested to them that it would be
a very considerable advantage to them if they could
be able to secure her co-operation in their projects.
With the end in view, various vague and shadowy
promises of territory and advantages in other ways were
made by the Allies to Greece in an effort to secure her
active aid.

But the King of Greece and the generals of the Greek
staff were well aware of the difficulties which the capture
of Constantinople presented, and after a very careful
^study of the plan of campaign adopted by the Allies, these
qualified men gave it as their judgment that such plan
could not be carried through, a decision which the subse-
quent history of the Dardanelles operations fully sus-
tained.

It has always seemed incomprehensible why when
Warned by a body of men who not only know the lay
of the land but also the Turk from actual experience
in fighting, and who were qualified by professional
attainments of merit. King Constantine alone as a
general being entitled to higher rank, than any general
Great Britain had shown up to this time, or since for
that matter, of the defects of tbeir plan the Allies did
not change it. Particularly as the Greek general staff
pointed out the true road through southeastern Bulgaria
which any well planned campaign should follow. But
they not only did not but they insisted on Greece's
participating in their plan without modification.

But this the government of Greece was imwilling to

173

POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE

do, in fact, finally refused point blank to do, arguing
that it was the duty of that government not to waste
the lives of its subjects on an expedition in which there
was only one possibility, failure. In which decision
it would seem that the Greek government showed a
reasonable and wise discretion, as it was undoubtedly
its duty to consider the interests and lives of its subjects
first and not to adopt the course of sacrificing these
lives in order that Great Britain could save the lives
of some British soldiers. '

At the end of the second Balkan war a treaty had been

.made between Greece and Serbia whereby the parties

thereto pledged themselves to come to each other's

aid in the event that either thereafter was attacked by

Bulgaria.

Prior to the attack of the Teutonic powers upon

Serbia and before Bulgaria had taken sides in the war,

the Allies who suspeqted her inclinations had sought

by territorial bribes to obtain her military co-operation

with them or her neutrality. As they themselves had

no territory to give her they sought to pay these bribes

with territory of Serbia and Greece, Serbia being Russian

^in fact, though Serbia in name was easily enough per-

1 suaded to make the necessary territorial sacrifices, but

\ with Greece it was different.

Venizelos deserves a paragraph by himself. By
birth a Cretan, and probably with Italian blood in his
veins, he is not in any sense of the word racially a Greek,
though since his rise to prominence a mythical descent
from an old Athenian family has been arranged for him.
By profession he is a lawyer, but by metier a revolutionist
and in his younger days In Crete he was the leader oi
practically all the uprisings which took place in that
Island between 1890 and 1910.

In 1910 having exhaupted the possibilities of Crete and
also having been elected to the Greek national assembly,
the Boule, from Athens he trans: erred himself to the
mainland, arriving In the capital at a singularly oppor-
tune moment for the display of his undoubted talents
for intrigue. The employment of these talents almost
immediately earned for him the Premiership. At this
time, Greece was in the throes of a wave of reform
against the corruption in politics then so prevalent in
the country. Cleverly taking advantage of the oppor-
tunity thus afforded Venizelos not only proclaimed
himself in thorough sympathy with this movement,

174

POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE

but put himself at the head of it and rode into power with
absolute freedom of action guaranteed to him, and since
then has showed himseh a stern foe to political corruption
of all kinds when exercised by his opponents.

A little later on.the Balkan league against Turkey was
formed which carried its plans through successfully,
the credit tor the formation of which league and ior its
victoiy, is modestly assumed by Venizelos. AHei- the
war, Venizelos was the most active fermenter oi the
trouble between Bulgaria and the rest of the league which
followed, though it is fair to say that he had had able
assistants therein, in the persons oi the most venal of
Balkan politicians, Take Jonescu, the Rumanian, and
Prince Alexandei of Serbia.

At the outbreak of the present wai, entirely on his
own motive and without consulting either the exec utive
or the legislative. Venizelos offered tJie AUies the armed
co-operation of Greece, and from that moment, he became
to all intents and purposes a political agent for the
Allies.

The first real break between the King and Venizelos
arose over the question of the interpretation of the
treaty between Greece and Serbia. As has been said,
that treaty bound Greece to come to the aid of Serbia
if that country were attacked by Bulgaria. Further
than this the treaty did not go.

In the autumn of 1915, Serbia was menaced by Bul-
garia, Germany, Austria and Turkey. The question
arose was Greece bound to aid Serbia hfflflnaft "Rnigarift
was amon g fh^s^ mpngping Viftf^ or did the treaty only
contemplate an attack on Serbia by Bulgaria alone?

Venizelos laid down the principle that as long as
Bulgaria was among the menacers of Serbia, Greece
wa-? bound to aid her. The King said that the Greco-
Serbian Treaty dealt with a Balkan war and a Balkan
war alone. It was only to come into force in case either
Greece or Serbia was attacked by Bulgaria alone. Clearly
it did not refer to and was never intended to refer to the
case of Serbia being attacked by two of the great mili-
tary powers of Europe as well as by Bulgaria.

Had the contention of Venizelos prevailed and the
treaty been interpreted in its most literal sense, it would
have been equivalent to suicide by Greece, since inevi-
tably Greece, would have suffered much the same fate
of Serbia.

A general election was held and the policy of the

175

POLITICAL HISTORY OF EUROPE

King was approved by the Greek people, surely the
most interested persons. The Venizelos faction, however,
refused to part icipate in^ these., elections, alleging as
tneir reason for such non-participation that the King
had no right to dissolve the Parliament and to proclaim
new elections at a time when 300,000 of the voters were
under arms on account of the general mobilization of
the Greek army. The question as to the right of the
King to act as he did of course depends on the terms
of the Greek constitution as it actually existed at the
time the King so acted, and these are not ambiguous
and fully sustain him, as Venizelos then knew and
now knows.

But as by this time Venizelos had been taken under
the financial protection of the Allies, and was abimdantly
supplied with money for political purposes, this issue
was as good as another, since it permitted him to play
the role of the "man of the people" oppressed by a
"tyrant king."

176

APPENDIX I

PRISONERS OF WAR

So much derogatory propaganda in relation to the
condition and management of the German prison camps
and of the treatment of British prisoners has been made
officially and unoflScially by the British Government
in relation to the condition of these camps and the treat-
ment of the prisoners therein that it seems desirable to
, deal with this subject to some extent.

In the first place, it may be stated that the govern-
ment of the United States has from the beginning of the
war, from time to time, inspected these prison camps,
through its sworn officials, and that these officials have
rendered reports in writing, which reports have been
printed; all of which reports from the beginning of the
war to the close of this period are before me as these
words are written.

I have performed the labor, not an inconsiderable one,
of reading these reports through, because these reports
contain the only credible evidence as to the condition
of these camps. The statements which have appeared
in the press from time to time are not worthy of belief,
inspired by the British propaganda as they have been.

As to the reports themselves, these being too long to
quote in extensOj I can only state the conclusions which
I draw therefrom:

(a) Complaints about food. There are many of these
almost entirely from the English prisoners. Practically
in each camp Mr. H. H. Morgan, Mr. Rivington Pyne,
Dr. Ohnesorg (Dr. Ohnesorg and Mr. Jackson having
both been formerly officers in the United States Navy),
Mr. John J. C. Watson, and Mr. E. L. Dresel (a well
known Boston lawyer), made investigations regarding
complaints on the part of the British prisoners in regard
to the food. It seems worth while, therefore, to set

177

PRISONERS OF WAR

forth a few of the experiences of these inspectors in
relation to that food.

Under date of September 11, 1915, Mr. Jackson
reports his visit to the detention camp at Senne:

"There were some complaints as usual in regard to
the food. I had arrived in camp just after the mid-day
meal was served; while some of the men said that the
meat had been bad and they wished I had had an oppor-
timity to taste it, others said that the meat had been
particularly good because the officers had heard I was
coming. None of them knew that I had actually eaten
a plate of their soup and had found it excellent, both
palatable and nutritious, and that my visit to this
particular camp had not been announced in advance.
The menu for the day had been made out at the beginning
of the week and could iiot have been changed after my
presence in the camp was known, and I had a bowl of
the soup which was left over after the prisoners had
been served."

Mr. Lithgow Osborne, under date of October 19,
reports:

"Camp of Zwickau:

After mentioning the British prisoners by name, he
continues: "The complaints that the men had to make
were in regard to the inefficiency of the meat rations and
the quality of the bread. I tasted the soup being pre-
pared at the time of my visit and found it excellent in
quality and evidently containing considerable quantity
of meat."

Same inspector at Lauban:

"The British made complaints relattive to the quality

of the food which they said was dirty and badly cooked

by the Russians, though the quantity was sufficient.

During inspection of the kitchen I tasted the food which

seems not to justify the complaints as to its quality,

though it was evident it might become tiresome as a

continued diet."

* * *

"GORLITZ:

"The complaint of the seven non-commissioned
officers with whom I spoke was concerning the quality
of the food. The complaint not sustained by the thor-
ough test I gave the meal then being served."

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PRISONERS OF WAR

"Friederichsfdlte :
"When I visited the barracks in which the English
were all quartered, they were seated at the table eating
their mid-day meal. It consisted of thick vegetable
soup with portions of meat served separately. I tasted
the soup and found it very good, and the meat looked
clean and well cooked."

^p ^n ^n

"Lazarets at Wesel:

"Complaints as regards insufficiency of the food by

one man out of thirty. Others whom I questioned

specially on this subject did not bear out this complaint,

although of similar state of health."

* * *

Dr. Ohnesorg:

"Gardeleben:

"They (the British) expressed themselves as dissat-
isfied with the food. I had tasted the mid-day soup in
the kitchen of one battalion, before it was served out
and tasted what was left in one of the kettles after
serving in the other. The soup was the same, good in
both cases."

The real truth of the matter of food in the German
prison camps seems to be this: The German cookery and
the method of preparation of food generally is very
different from that which obtains in England, and there-
fore to the English the food is unappetizing and distaste-
ful; hence the complaints. It is impractical that the
British should expect treatment in this particular which,
necessarily, cannot be accorded to them. There are
many other complaints which could be gone into in
detail, but which can be covered generally by the state-
ments of Dr. Bert W. Caldwell of the American Red
Cross publication in the Military Surgeon for March,
1916, which deals with the whole subject at considerable
length, sufficient quotations from which follow. In
presenting this statement of Dr. Caldwell, it may be
noted that both Dr. Caldwell's profession, his official
connection with an organization such as the Red Cross,
and his quality of neutral, entitle his positive statements
to a greater degree of credence than should be accorded
either to the hearsay statements of the American press,
founded upon alleged facts transmitted to them by one
of the belligerents, or to the necessarily partisan state-
ments of that belligerent itself.

"Prisoners are of two classes — the civilian class,

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PRISONERS OF WAR

which is composed of civilians who were in the enemy
countries at the beginning of hostilities, and the second
class consisting of soldiers taken prisoners in the dififerent
campaigns. The civilian class, comprising men, women
and children, were immediately detained at the beginning
of the war, and were placed in camps arranged especially
for them; although in almost every camp in Germany
which has prisoners of war there is a scattering of civilian
prisoners to care for as well.

**The great majority, practically all of the civil pris-
oners in Germany, are detained at the Ruh'^eben camp
near Berlin. This prison camp was constructed es-
pecially for them and paid for out of the private fortunes
of the Imperial Family. It is especially well located and
is constructed with every convenience and safeguard of
sanitation. The prisoners of each nationality have
buildings assigned to them separately. Playgroimds
have been established, theaters and schools instituted,
and every provision made for the feeding and for the
cleanliness of the camp. The prisoners here detained
are arranged into groups of each nationality, and some
member of each group is placed as administrative head
fo that particular group. The only complaint encoun-
tered at the Ruheleben camp was made by some English
lads who had over them an Australian sea captain, and
they complained and demanded a change of authority
because the captain flogged them when they took too
many liberties. The administration of this camp is
humane and just, and the health and comfort of the
prisoners here detained is the first care of the prison
authorities. The Kaiser is personally interested in
RuheL ben, and members of the Imperial Family visit
it frequently.

'The second class, and by far the larger class, is com-
posed of soldier prisoners. Prison camps are located
and constructed with these considerations in view in
their order: Sanitation (including water supply), guard-
ing, feeding, housing, transportation, and proximity to
possible employment of prisoners outside of the prison
camp. Another consideration to which great importance
is attached, and which is never neglected by the German
authorities, is the institution of playgrounds, the estab-
lishment of schools, and places and forms of amusement
inside of the prison camps. The most discouraging
feature which the prison authorities have to contend
with is the inactivity and consequent ennui which is

180

PRISONERS OF WAR

incident to prison life following the excitement and
activi y of campaigning. This condition among the
•prisneors causes the authorities much anxiety, and no
measure is neglected that will assist in relieving it. The
prisoners are permitted to work in the fields near the
camp, or in mines or factories, or on the roads, for which
labor they receive a small remuneration, and nine out
of ten prisoners welcome with an unconcealed joy any
opportunity to do such work as a relief from the con-
finement and inactivity of the prison camp.

*'In establishing a prison camp, a site is selected con-
venient to transportation routes, easily susceptible to
the institution of adequate sanitation, near an abundant
and potable water supply, and free of trees. Different
areas of ground are utilized, varjdng, of course, with the
number of prisoners which it is intended that the camp
shall accommodate. Usually 20 acres of ground is
allotted for each five thousand prisoners for prison camp
purposes, although in many instances this proportion of
ground is smaller. After selecting the ground two
barbed wire fences are constructed entirely around the
site, about 12 feet in height, with the strands of barbed
wire about 9 inches apart. These two fences are located
one within the other and are separated from each other
by about 12 feet. Between these two fences a smaller
barbed wire fence is constructed about 4>^ feet in height,
with the barbed wire strands running close enough so
as to prevent the prisoners from climbing through them,
and this smaller fence is constantly charged with a
current of high voltage electricity — this to discourage
possible attempts upon the part of the prisoners to leave
the grounds. At each corner outside the inclosure a
mound is built sufficiently high to command the camp,
and on top of this mound a rapid-firing gun is placed;
while at convenient intervals around and through the
camp inclosure guard-posts have been established to
assist in guarding the prison camp.

"At the same time that this wire fencing is imder
construction sanitary installation of water pipes and
sewer system is at once instituted, and the latrine system
is installed. The water supply is generally taken from
the same supply which feeds the nearby city or town,
and where such supply is not available it is obtained
through a system of driven wells. The water supply is
frequently examined in the government laboratories and
is quickly condemned upon the appearance of anything

181

PRISONERS OF WAR

that would threaten the health of the prisoners in camp.
The latrine system is the open cement basin system,
located usually at the rear or near one corner of the camp,
compound. This is covered by seats which are made
fly-proof, and the contents generously and frequently
treated with deodorants and disinfectants. The basins
are emptied frequently and the contents used to fertilize
the adjacent fields.

"After the installation of the sewer system and water
supply, a kitchen, laundry and bath-house are con-
structed, and around these establishments the prison
camp itself is built. The kitchen is connected with the
commissary and is usually imder the same roof. The
laundry and bath-house are under the same roof, and
are equipped with a large disinfecting plant, either a
steaming room or autoclave. Both laundry and bath-
house are supplied with an abundance of hot and cold
water.

"The camps are built following one of two plans. The
older plan, which has since been abandoned, consisted
of building the prison barracks around a square, in the
center of which were located a kitchen, laundry and
bath-house, and at one corner the latrine. The area
comprised in each square was approximately three acres,
and the barracks were built to accommodate between
2,500 and 3,000 prisoners to each compound. The
buildings were of wooden construction, built with a
slanting roof about 14 feet in height on the inside of the
square, and sloping to about 9 feet in height on the
outside. The barracks were about 50 feet wide, of an
average height of 10^ feet, and divided into rooms of
different sizes, usually 60 feet in length and 120 feet in
length. These barracks were illy suited to the pur-
poses for which they were built, because there were no
openings for light or ventilation on the outside of the
rooms, and the only ventilation or light that was possible
came from the inside of the square and occasionally from
dormer windows constructed in the roof. The result
was that all the barracks constructed after this plan
were poorly ventilated, poorly lighted and over-crowded.
The smaller rooms accommodated about 80 to 100
prisoners and the larger rooms from 160 to 200 prisoners,
giving a cubical content and space allotment for each
prisoner entirely insufficient for the purposes of health
or comfort. This small space was further diminished
by the bedding and the dunnage which each prisoner

182

PRISONERS OF WAR

was permitted to bring into camp with him. The newer
and the better plan which is now followed in the German
prison camps consists of building the barracks on either
side of streets running through the camp. These build-
ings are of a type that is uniform in dimensions and
construction. They are about 14 meters wide by 60
meters long, their roofs sloping either way from a center
ridge, and about 4>^ meters in height. These barracks
are inclosed in a high barbed wire fence in a separate
compound, with separate water supply and separate
latrine in the rear of the compound and a garbage pit
in each compound for the use of the barracks. Each
barrack is separated from its neighbor by an intervening
space of 80 feet. Each barrack is raised on pillars above
the ground, about 2 feet. These barracks are generally
ceiled. They accommodate, when full, 180 to 200
prisoners, including quarters for petty officers, which
are partitioned off in the center of the barracks, and these
partitioned rooms accommodate from four to six petty
officers. Each barrack is occupied by prisoners of the
same nationality. This is made necessary because of
the fact that the English insist upon an abundant and
free circulation of air, the French do not care for so much
and the Russian prisoners do not want any at all. Then
the personal habits of each nationality of prisoners are
not acceptable to those of other nationalities, and to
avoid constant conflict among the prisoners the prison
authorities house the prisoners of each nationality in
separate barracks. This new type of prison barrack
permits of sufficient lighting and ventilation by the
construction of doors and windows in the ends and sides
of the building as well as apertures through the roof.

"When the prisoners are taken on any front, they are
moved back a short distance from the front. If possible,
the sick and wounded are segregated and sent to the
hospital, and the well detained until they are free from
vermin and then are moved on to the prison camps.
Upon their arrival at the prison camp they are detained
in isolation barracks, which are especially reserved for
the reception of incoming prisoners, for a period of four-
teen days. In this camp their hair is cut and they are
sent to the bath-house and laundry and disinfecting
plaDt every fourth day. They receive a warm water,
soap and kerosene bath, their clothes are placed in the
steaming-room and subjected to steam at a temperature
of 135 degrees Celsius for a period of 30 minutes. Their

183

PRISONERS OF WAR

surplus clothing and bedding is boiled and washed in
the laundry. At the end of fourteen days the prisoners
are mustered, carefully examined for vermin and if
they are free from insects are sent to the permanent
barracks inside the camps. On his admission into the
camp the prisoner receives two blankets and a pallet
filled with excelsior, which the Germans have found
better suited for bedding purposes than straw. He is
equipped with two suits of under-clothes, two shirts,
two pairs of socks, an overcoat, an outer suit, and cap
and a pair of boots. If the clothing which he wears
when he comes to the camp is sufficiently good he retains
it. In the event that it is not sufficiently good' he
receives new clothing from the prison authorities.

"The kitchens attached to each camp arQ well con-
structed, well equipped, and in excellent condition of
cleanliness. The food furnished the prisoners is not of
great variety, and seems to me to be insufficient in
quantity. It is largely vegetable in character, consisting
of potatoes, carrots, cabbage, turnips, of beans, peas,
lentils, and other dehydrated vegetables, of meals made
from corn, soy beans and peas, of dried fruits, salt fish,
and small rations of meat. Coffee is also included. An
allowance for each prisoner of 300 grams of bread per
day in addition to the regular ration is issued. The
unprepared food is of very good quality; nothing is found
upon examination that is deleterious in any way.

"It became necessary to prepare the ration in such a
manner as would obviate the necessity of the prisoners
using knives and forks and other eating utensils. The
Germans solved this problem by cooking all of the
different articles of the ration together in large cookeries,
and issuing to each prisoner this prepared food in bowls,
to be eaten with spoons. The Kitchens are all equipped
with large cylindrical cookers which are heated with
coal, and the food is cooked until it is soft and in a con-
dition to be eaten with a spoon. It is seasoned well
and is fairly palatable, but does not afford the variety in
preparation or ingredients, nor is the quantity sufficient
to afford a well-balanced diet. The prisoners are per-
mitted to receive from home articles of food, which are
sent from friends and organizations of their respective
countries. The food thus received supplements the diet
furnished by the prison authorities. In fact, the English
prisoners insist that were it not for the food that they
receive from home, they would not be able to live upon

184

PRISONERS OF WAR

the prison food. On the other hand, the Russians
receive very little food from home and yet as a rule the
Russian prisoners present a very good appearance of
health.

"The feeding problem presents many difficulties, one
of which I came in contact with in the camp at Altdam.
Among the Russian prisoners taken in this camp are
two orthodox Jews. Their religion forbade them par-
taking of the diet furnished by the Russians or by the
prison authorities, and they consistently followed the
dictates of their religion with the result that they became
emaciated and seriously anemic. The prison authorities
were some days in discovering what the trouble was,
but finally succeeded, and they at once provided these
two prisoners with spirit lamps to prepare their own food
with and a diet which is in accordance with their religion.
The result was that both these prisoners were improving
in health and a pearance daily, and were in a condition
to be discharged from the hospital when they were seen.

*'In almost all the camps the prisoners were over-
crowded. Measures looking to the remedying of this
condition were being instituted, and as tast as possible
new barracks were being built and new camps located
to accommodate the prisoners. The sewage is disposed
of by the septic tank system, which seems to meet all
the purposes which the situation demands. The gar-
bage is collected in large receptacles located at con-
venient points in the camp compounds, and such of it
as cannot be utilized for the feeding of hogs and other
animals is disposed of by burning. The receptacles in
every case are fly-proof, and great care is taken to pre-
vent the breeding of flies, either in these receptacles or
in any other part within or adjacent to the camp.

"Connected with the prison camp is a well-equipped
and well-regulated hospital, under the supervision of a
medical officer of the German Army Medical Corps,
and assisted by a staff collected from the medical officers
of the different nationalities of prisoners. The hos-
pital is sufficiently large to care for the sick of the prison
camp. The surgical work of the camp is generally
done in these hospitals. Attached to the hospital is
an isolation ward for the quarantining of contagious
diseases. The hospital corps men among the prisoners
are utilized in the personnel of the camp hospital. The
medical officers who are detailed from among the pris-
oners for work in hospitals are treated with consideration

185

PRISONERS OF WAR

and respect, are housed and fed as become their rank
and have all the privileges which officer prisoners of
war would have.

"The disease which is most frequently encountered,
and one which presents the greatest difficulties of control
among the prisoners, is pulmonary tuberculosis. This
is undoubtedly contributed to by the close and indiffer-
ent housing of the prisoners. In some camps the mor-
bidity from this disease reaches two and a half to three
per cent. In fact more deaths among prisoners are due
to tuberculosis than from all other causes combined.
Next in order of their occurrence are the diarrheal and
intestinal diseases, usually not serious in character.
Typhus exanthematicus made its appearance in two or
three of the camps, causing frightful morbidity and
mortality in one. This regrettable occurrence was due
to the inhumanity of the prison commandant, who,
when typhus broke out in the barracks among the
Russian prisoners, insisted upon the English, French
and other prisoners occupying the same barracks with
the infected Russians, until some eight hundred of the
prisoners became infected with the disease and about
three hundred of them died. This epidemic, when the
commandant was shorn of a part of his authority, and
effective measures were established within the camp,
was soon controlled, and for the past four months no
cases of epidemic diseases were encountered in the prison
camps in Germany. Cholera is occasionally imported
into the camps from the Russian frontier. These cases
are quickly diagnosed, segregated, and the disease pre-
vented from becoming epidemic. Contrary to the
general idea, there are few cases of insanity or mental
disturbance encountered among the prisoners of war.
In one of the larger camps, containing 48,000 prisoners
on its rolls, and established for the past ten months,
only three cases of insanity have developed.

''Great care of person and clothing is insisted upon
by the prison authorities. The authorities in Germany
place greater importance upon their laundry and bath-
room facilities than they do upon any other institution
of their camp regime except their kitchens. To the
laundry and bath-house each prisoner must go, with his
surplus clothing and loose bedding, at least once a week.
There he takes his bath, washes his clothes, and has his
clothing and bedding disinfected in the steam-chamber
or in the autoclave. The prisoners are frequently

186

PRISONERS OF WAR

mustered for inspection by the authorities of the camp.
Their barracks are inspected regularly, and immediately
that one is foimd to be infested with vermin of any kind,
it is abandoned, the bedding burned, the barracks
scrubbed and fumigated, the bed-clothing washed and
disinfected, and the prisoners isolated in clean barracks
until they are free from vermin and are ready to go into
clean permanent barracks. Among the thousands of
prisoners examined in different camps, and as many beds
and beddings inspected, not a single louse or bed-bug
was discovered.

"The administration of the prison camps was found,
with but the one single exception noted above, himiane,
just and of high order. For the commandant of these
camps some retired officer high in rank, usually a Major-
General, is detailed. He has a full staff with him — ,
his Quartermaster and his Commissary. His medical
stafif is large or small in proportion to the number of
prisoners confined. He has supreme command of the
prisoners and prison camp, as well as the command
which is detailed to the camp to guard the prisoners.
In every instance but one, in the experience of our
Commission, the commandant of the prison camp was
a man well along in years, kindly, generous spirited,
and experienced in the conduct of the work with he was
intrusted. As an example, the commandant of the
prison camp at Munster, Germany, presents himself.
Major-General von Eyd-Steinecker was the comman-
dant. He had the interest of the 50,000 prisoners
under his care at heart. He established within his camp
a theater which accommodated 650 people, in which
comedies and dramas were staged, the parts being taken
by the prisoners themselves. He organized schools for
the instruction of such prisoners as might desire to take
advantage of them, the teachers being selected from
among the prisoners of the camp. He maintained a
large studio in which were working painters and sculp-
tors of the different nationalities in camp. A large
playground was connected with the camp, where foot-
ball, baseball, running, jumping, boxing and other
sports could be indulged in. Without the camp, he had
established a large farm where vegetables, potatoes,
beans, and other articles of food were raised for the
consumption of the camp. In this prison camp was a
bank which hfid deposits aggregating 150,000 marks
and which employed 125 clerks, where the funds sent to

187

PRISONERS OF WAR

the prisoners from home, or earned by them at labor
in the fields or mines or factories, could be deposited
and later utilized as they saw fit. Each compound in
the camp had its own band, and there were three orches-
tras in the camp at large. The hospital connected with
this prison camp was especially well cared for and well
equipped. He had instructed his medical strff to
examine frequently and regularly the prisoners for signs
of tuberculosis, and upon such a diagnosis being made
the prisoner was sent to a segregation camp provided
for the reception of this class of sick. He had equipped
in his camp a large tailoring establishment for the repair
and manufacture of clothing, and a large boot and shoe
shop, which employed 150 workmen, for the repair of
footwear. In another place he had established a factory
for wooden shoes, where great quantities of this class
of foot-wear were turned out. He enjoyed the respect
of all the prisoners in this camp, and without exception
the prisoners praised the General and his administration
and the care and consideration which he gave them.

"Each camp has its own canteen, where articles of
food and clothing and toilet necessities can be pur-
chased by the prisoners at a very low price, the latter
being regulated by the German War Office. Each
camp has its own post-office, where the mail, letters
and packages addressed to the prisoners are delivered,
censored, and then turned over to the prisoners. Each
package received is opened in the presence of the prisoner
himself, and if nothing objectionable is found is at once
delivered to him. The staff of this post-office, with the
exception of the censors, is made up from among the
prisoners themselves.

*'The officer prisoners of war are in every case treated
with the consideration due their rank. Especial camps
have been set aside for them; one of which, at Gutersloh,
has every comfort which they could reasonably expect.
It was built and designed for a sanatorium and was just
completed at the outbreak of hostilities. It consists
of twelve large modern stone buildings, three stories
in height, and accommodates with ease and comfort
the twelve hundred officers who are detained there.
Each officer has quarters in keeping with his rank, and
each officer of sufficient rank has detached for his service
an orderly of his own countrymen. The bedding is
good, the kitchen is excellent, and the food is both
sufficient in quantity and variety to insure a well-

188

PRISONERS OF WAR

ba If need diet. Although on two days in the week in
Germany the use of meat is forbidden, yet on these days
in the prison camp for officers it Gutersloh, meat was
served at their me^ls. The officers, too, are permitted
to receive delicacies and food from home. Attached
to the camp are large fields for footbr 11, tennis f nd other
sports. Libraries have been instituted for er ch nation-
ality. In fact, the whole has more the appe.'^rance of
a large, over-crowded, rather badly managed club than
it does a prison camp. The commrnd^^nt is very kind
in his treatment of these pri oners, is very considerate
of their condition, and is extremely popular with all
classes of officers under his rule."

It would appear, as far as I am able to judge from the
reports of inspection officers of the United States Gov-
ernirent, in France and Inglrnd, of the camps pro-
vided for prisoners of war in tho^e countries, that on the
whole conditions are as good f s i\ ey reason: bly can be
expected to be. Naturally, there are conphints, but
in mxost cases in both these countries, as in Germany, the
complf ints appear to be ill-founded and to come from
that class of prisoners which has been accustomed in
their life at home to the least. It is to be regretted,
however, that a like statement a.s to the character of
the prison camps and of the treatment of the prisoners
cannot be made concerning Rus&ia. One singular thing
about these reports from officers of our own government,
on the German camps, is that though supplied to prac-
tically every newspaper office in the United States, no
publicity practically has been given to them. The
American press true to its allegi. nee, preferring to print
and moralize upon the necessarily partisrn statements
of the British governn^ent or of British writers of fiction,
rather than those of officers of the United States.

189

APPENDIX II

MISSCAVELL

One event which attracted a great deal of attention
at the time of its occurrence in the autumn of 1915,
was the execution by the German military authorities
of an English nurse, Miss Cavell^ at Brussels. So much
has been said and written at random about this execution,
that it is well to have an accoimt thereof based on the
official reports thereon, which official reports emanate
from Mr. Whitlock, the United States Minister at
Brussels, in whose hands at the time of the outbreak
of the war, the British interests in Brussels had been
confided and who consequently acted for Miss Cavell.
The M. de Leval, mentioned in the report which here
follows, is the legal adviser to the American Legation
in Brussels. In this report are set forth the proven
facts and the law governing the case.

M. de Leval to Mr. Whitlock,

United States Minister in BrusseU

Eepobt fob the Ministeb

October 12, 1916.
"Sir:

' "As soon as the Legation received an intimation
that Miss Cavell was arrested, your letter of the 31st
August was sent to Baron von der Lancken. The
German authorities were by that letter requested,
inter alia, to allow me to see Miss Cavell, so as to have
all necessary steps taken for her defence. No reply
being received, the Legation, on the 10th September,
reminded the German authorities of your letter.

"The German reply, sent on the 12th September,
was that I would not be allowed to see Miss Cavell,
but that Mr. Braun, lawyer at the Brussels Court,
was defending her and was already seeing the German
authorities about the case.

190

MISS CAVELL

"I immediately asked Mr. Braun to come to see me
at the Legation, which he did a few days later. He
informed me that personal friends of Miss Cavell had
asked him to defend her before the German Court, that
he agreed to do so, but that owing to some unforeseen
circumstances he was prevented from pleading before
that Court, adding that he had asked Mr. Kirschen,
a member of the Brussels Bar and his friend, to take
up the case and plead for Miss Cavell, and that Mr.
Kirschen had agreed to do so.

*^I, therefore, at once put myself in communication
with Mr. Kirschen, who told me that Miss Cavell was
prosecuted for having helped soldiers to cross the frontier.
I asked him whether he had seen Miss Cavell and whether
she had made any statement to him, and to my surprise
found that the lawyers defending prisoners before the
German Military Court were not allowed to see their
clients before the trial, and were not shown any docu-
ment of the prosecution. (Similar rules obtain in
France.) This, Mr. Kirschen said, was in accordance
with the German military rules. He added that the
hearing of the trial of such cases was carried out very
carefully, and that in his opinion, although it was not
possible to see the client before the trial, in fact the
trial itself developed so carefully and so slowly, that it
was generally possible to have a fair knowledge of all
the facts and to present a good defence for the prisoner.
This would specially be the case for Miss Cavell, because
the trial would be rather long as she was prosecuted with
thirty-four other prisoners.

"I informed Mr. Kirschen of my intention to be present
at the trial so as to watch the case. He immediately
dissuaded me from taking such attitude, which he said
would cause a great prejudice to the prisoner, because
the German judges would resent it and feel it almost
as an affront if I was appearing to exercise a kind of
supervision on the trial. He thought that if the Ger-
mans would admit my presence, which was very doubt-
ful, it would in any case cause prejudice to Miss Cavell

"Mr. Kirschen assured me over and over again that the
Military Court of Brussels was always perfectly fair and
that there was not the slightest danger of any miscar-
riage of justice. He promised that he would keep me
posted on all the developments which the case would
take and would report to me the exact charges that were
brought against Miss Cavell and the facts concerning

191

MISS CAVELL

her that would be disclosed at the trial, so as to allow
me to judge by myself about the merits of the case.
He insisted that, of course, he would do all that was
humanly possible to defend Miss Cavell to the best of
his ability.

"Three days before the trial took place, Mr. Kirschen
wrote me a few lines saying that the trial would be on
the next Thursday, the 7th October. The Legation
at once sent him, on the 5th October, a letter confirming
in writing in the name of the Legation the arrangement
that had been made between him and me. This letter
was delivered to Mr. Kirschen by a messenger of the
Legation.

"The trial took two days, ending Friday the 8th.

"On Saturday I was informed by an outsider that
the trial had taken place, but that no judgment would
be reached till a few days later.

"Receiving no report from Mr. Kirschen, I tried to
find him, but failed. I then sent him a note on Sunday,
asking him to send his report to the Legation or call
there on Monday morning at 8.30. At the same time
I obtained from some other person present at the trial
some information about what had occurred, and the
following facts were disclosed to me:

" 'Miss Cavell was prosecuted for having helped English
and French soldiers, as well as Belgian young men, to
cross the frontier and to go over to England. She had
admitted by signing a statement before the day of the trialy
and by public acknowledgment in Court, in the presence
of all the other prisoners and the lawyers, that she wa^ guilty
of the charges brought against her, and she had acknowl-
edged not only that she had helped these soldiers to cross
the frontier, but also that some of them had thanked her
in writing when arriving in England. This last admission
made her case so much the more serious, because if it
only had been proven against her that she had helped
the soldiers to traverse the Dutch frontier, and no proof
was produced that these soldiers had reached a coimtry
at war with Germany, she could only have been sen-
tenced for an attempt to commit the crime and not for
the crime being duly accomplished. As the case stood,
the sentence fixed by the German military law was a
sentence of death.

'Paragraph of the German Military Code says:
'Will be sentenced to death for treason any person

192

MISS CAVELL

who, with the intention of helping the hostile Powers,
or of causing harm to the German or allied troops, is
guilty of one of. the crimes of paragraph 90 of the German
Penal Code/

"The case referred to in above said paragraph 90
consists in:

" ' . . . conducting soldiers to the enemy (viz :

'dem Feinde Mannschaften zufiihrtO.

"The penalties above set forth apply, according to
paragraph 160 of the German Code, in case of war, to
foreigners as well as to Germans.

"In her oral statement before the Court Miss Cavell
disclosed almost all the acts of the whole prosecution.
She was questioned in German, an interpreter trans-
lating all the questions in French, with which language
Miss Cavell was well acquainted. She spoke without
trembling and showed a clear mind. Often she added
some greater precision to her previous depositions.

"When she was asked why she helped these soldiers
to go to England, she replied that she thought that if
she had not done so they would have been shot by the
Germans, and that therefore she thought she only
did her duty to her country in saving their lives.

"The Military Public Prosecutor said that argument
might be good for English soldiers, but did not apply
to Belgian young men whom she induced to cross the
frontier and who would have been perfectly free to
remain in the country without danger to their lives.

"Mr. Kirschen made a very good plea for Miss Cavell,
using all argimients that could be brought in her favor
before the Court.

"The Military Public Prosecutor, however, asked the
Court to pass a death sentence on Miss Cavell and
eight other prisoners amongst the thirty-five. The
Court did not seem to agree, and the judgment was
postponed. The person informing me said he thought
that the Court would no go to the extreme limit.

"Anyhow, after I had found out these facts (viz.,
Sunday evening), I called at the Political Division of
the German Government in Belgium, and asked whether,
now that the trial had taken place, permission would
be granted to me to see Miss Cavell in jail, as surely
there was no longer any object in refusing that permission
The German official, Mr. Conrad, said he would make
the necessary inquiry at the Court and let me know
later on.

193

MISS CAVELL

"I also asked him that permission be granted to
Mr. Gahan. the English clergyman, to see Miss Cavell.

"At the same time we prepared at the Legation, to be
ready for every eventuality, a petition for pardon,
addressed to the Governor-General in Belgium and a
transmitting note addressed to Baron von der Lancken.

"Monday morning at 11 I called up Mr. Conrad on
the telephone from the Legation (as I already had done
previously on several occasions when making inquiries
about the case), asking what the Military Court had
decided about Mr. Gahan and myself seeing Miss Cavell.
He replied that Mr. Gahan could not see her, but that
she could see any of the three Protestant clergymen
attached to the prison; and that I could not see her
till the judgment was pronounced and signed, but that
this would probably only take place in a day or two.
I asked the German official to inform the Legation
iromediately after the passing of said judgment, so
that I might see Miss Cavell at once, thinking of course,
that the Legation might, according to your intentions,
take immediate steps for Miss Cavell's pardon, if the
judgment really was a sentence of death.

"Very surprised to still receive no news from Mr.
Kirschen, I then called at his house at 12.30 and was
informed that he would not be there till about the end
of the afternoon. I then called at 12.40, at the house
of another lawyer interested in the case of a fellow-
prisoner, and found that he also was out. In the after-
noon, however, the latter lawyer called at my house,
saying that in the morning he had heard from the
German Kommandantur that judgment would be passed
only the next morning, viz., Tuesday morning. He
said that he feared that the Court would be very severe
for all the prisoners.

"Shortly after this lawyer left me, and while I was
preparing a note about the case, at 8 p.m. I was pri-
vately and reliably informed that the judgment had
been delivered at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, that Miss
Cavell had been sentenced to death, and that she would
be shot at 2 o'clock the next morning. I told my
informer that I was extremely surprised at this, because
the Legation had received no information yet, neither
from the German authorities nor from Mr. Kirschen,
but that the matter was too serious to run the smallest
chance, and that therefore I would proceed immediately

194

MISS CAVELL

to the Legation to confer with your Excellency and take
all possible steps to save Miss CavelFs life.

"According to your Excellency's decision, Mr. Gibson
and myself went, with the Spanish Minister, to see
Baron von der Lancken, and the report of our interview
and of our efforts to save Miss Cavell is given to you by
Mr. Gibson.

"This morning, Mr. Gahan, the English clergyman,
called to see me and told me that he had seen Miss Cavell
in her cell yesterday night at 10 o'clock, that he had
given her the Holy Communion and had found her
admirably strong and calm. I asked Mr. Gahan whether
she had made any remarks about anything concerning
the legal side of her case, and whether the confession
which she made before the trial and in Court was, in
his opinion, perfectly free and sincere. Mr. Gahan
says that she told him she perfectly well knew what she had
done, that laccording to the law, of course, she was guilty
and had admitted her guilt, but that she was happy to die
for her country,

"G. DE Leval."

Much of the confusion which arose in this case was
occasioned by the fact that Mr. Page, the United States
Ambassador at the Court of St. James, transmitted all
the papers in this case to the British Government before
he transmitted them to his own government, as he should
have done. As regards the law in the case, it may be
said that the German War Code corresponds almost
exactly with that of the United States applying to similar
facts. The 102nd article of General Order No. 100,
1863, which is the War Code of the United States to-day,
is as follows:

"The law of war, like the criminal law governing other
offences, makes no differences on account of the difference
of sexes concerning spy or traitor or war rebel."

The 98th article is as follows: "All unauthorized
or secret communication with the enemy is considered
treasonable by the law of war. Foreign residents in an
invaded or occupied territory, or foreign visitors in the
same, can claim no immunity from this law. They
may communicate with foreign parts or with the in-
habitants of the hostile country so far as military author-
ity permits, but no further."

195

MISS CAVELL

Article 90 of the General Order 100 is as follows:
"A traitor under the law, or a war traitor, is a person
in the place or district under martial law (military
government) who, unauthorized by the military com-
mander, gives information of any kind to the enemy
or holds intercourse with him/'

Article 92 reads as follows: "If a citizen, subject
of the country or place invaded, or conquered, gives
information to his own government from which he is
separated by the hostile army, or to the army of his
government, he is a war traitor.''

Article 91 of the same General Order is as follows:
''A war traitor is always severely punished. When his
offence consists of betraying to the enemy anything
concerning the condition, safety, operations or plans
of the troops holding or occupying the place or district,
his punishment is death."

It is thus apparent from these Articles of the War
Code of the United States that any person or persons
who, under similar circumstances to those in the case
in point, had taken similar action or had done similar
things, would have been liable to the punishment of
death without regard to sex. It must be furthermore
remembered, in considering this case, that all countries
of the world, except the United States and except, in
a minor degree. Great Britain, hold a woman for any
violation of the criminal law to the same degree of
responsibility as a man, which is also true in cases of
violation of military law. This is clearly shown by the
fact that France has executed three women during this
war certainly, and probably seven. Of the execution
and history of two of these women the London Times
on November 3rd 1915 published the following account:

"On February twenty-seventh last, secret service
agents arrested at Bourges a woman calling herself
Jeanne Bouvier. She was provided with papers, bearing
this name, but after being interrogated, she confessed
that the papers were fraudulent and that her name
really was Ottillie Voss. She was born in the Rhine
provinces of German parentage. She was unmarried
and aged 33. For seven years before the war she had
lived in the Agen region of Bordeaux, where she had
been giving lessons in German.

At the outbreak of hostilities she returned to Germany.
Being out of work she accepted employment as a spy,
whereupon she was sent to France with orders to visit

196

MISS CAVELL

Nice, Montpelier, Marseilles and Lyons and to report
on important new troop foundations, the frequency
of railway military transports, and the direction of the
same, the sanitary condition of the army, and the num-
ber of woimded; also the debarkation of troops at various
ports, especially of black soldiers.

She was likewise particularly instructed to report on the
state of mind of the population in regard to the war.
She confessed further that she had been given 400 francs
($80) expense money. From February 8th to February
11th she traveled as directed, then returned to Germany,
where she was given 160 marks ($40) as an expression
of satisfaction with her work.

On February 20th, she returned to France on a similar
mission, having been provided with 500 francs ($100)
expense (money. ^Two days after her arrest at Bourges
she made a full confession, and she was unanimously
condemned to death by a council of war on the charge
of espionage under Articles 197, 206 and 269 of the Code
of MiUtary Justice. On April 20th, her application
for a retrial was rejected, and on May 14th, her appeal
to the Chief of State for clemency was refused. She
was therefore executed on May 16th.

Marguerite Schmitt, aged 25, was arrested at the
railway station at Nancy as a suspect on February 17th,
.1915. She had traveled via Switzerland from Anoux,
near Briey, then occupied by the Germans. After a
lengthy examination she cociessed that the Germans
had sent her to obtain information concerning the
presence of British troops, reported as being in the region
of Nancy, also concerning divers regiments encamped
between Bar-le-Duc and St. Menehould. A friend had
put her in relation with the Germans, They had oflfered
her money which she had at first refused, but afterwards
had accepted 40 francs ($8.) The Germans took her
by automobile to the Swiss frontier. She asserted, that
although sent by the Germans, she had not intended
to spy upon the French. It was her purpose to tell
the Germans upon her return that she had been held by
the French as a suspect. Her presence at Nancy
refuted this claim. In addition, there was found in
her possession, a book of questions to ask, prepared by
a German oflScer. When tried before a council of war,
to all questions she replied simply "I am sorry.''

She was condemned to death on March 20th, for
espionage under Articles 206 and 64 of the Code of

197

MISS CAVELL

Military Justice and on March 22nd she was executed.

Both before and since these executions there have
been other executions of women by the French for
offences against military law, and like executions have
occurred during the war in Belgiimi by the Belgians,
in Russia, particularly in Poland and Galicia, in fact in
nearly all the belligerent countries, though details
thereof are not complete.

A fair judgment in all these cases is that all these
women who suffered death in rendering a service to
their country are in exactly the same position as was,
for instance, Nathan Hale who suffered death at the
hands of the British during our Revolution, as a spy;
that is, heroines to their own coimtry and spies or war
traitors to the other side.

Concerning their bravery and concerning the purity
of their motives, there can be no dispute, but it is equally
true that there can be no dispute as to the fact that they
had taken the chances of the occupation in which they
engaged; and there should be no legitimate complaint
in regard to their having suffered the consequences of
these acts. In fact. Miss Cavell's own words, as re-
ported by Mr. Gahan, the English clergyman who
attended her immediately before her execution, wherein
she told him that she knew perfectly well what she had
done, that according to the law of course she was guilty,
and had admitted her guilt, but that she "was happy to
die for her coimtry*' — ^form the best epitaph, not only
for herself, but for all women in like case.

198

APPENDIX III

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

The history of the battle of the Mame, probably the
greatest battle in most respects which the world has ever
known, is still in many important details shrouded in

mystery. iP'll B

Therefore, to the accomit given in the first volume of
this work it has seemed wise to add the following account
written by a competent hand one year after the battle
took place and after many incidents previously imknown
or disputed had been settled. This accoimt is arranged
chronologically by days, and ought to help in giving
its readers a clearer idea of the sequence of events,
though not perhaps of their proportionate importance.

The battle of the Mame began on September 6th, 1914,
yet some of its details will be cleared up only when all
official reports and documents are available.

The respective strength of the armies during the battle
of Charleroi and the retreat, the number and position of
General Maunoury's forces during the retreat, and the
preliminary manoeuvres and the number and origin of
the reinforcements sent to him during the battle, are
disputed questions. The reasons for the sudden obliquing
of von Kluck's forces on approaching Paris are ako in
doubt. Little by little, however, the principal develop-
ments of the battle have been estabUshed approximately.

Though the execution of their plans had been retarded
a fortnight by the resistance encoimtered in Belgium,
the Germans, in their vast circular movement, pivoting
on Metz, reached the line of the Sambre and Meuse
August 21. The Allies, counting upon several days re-
sistance by the fortress of Namur, took the offensive
August 22, with the object of piercing the German lines
at the junction of the Sambre and the Meuse and cutting
the armies of von Kluck and von Buelow off from the
rest of the German forces.

199

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

Namur fell in a few hours; the army of General Foch
(120,000 men) concentrating behind the center, was not
yet ready to go into action, and the plan of the Allies
was compromised. After partial successes around Char-
leroi and on the Meuse, the first division of reserves at
Dinant was thrown back and the 3rd corps at Mar-
chiennes sustained a grave reverse, weakening the center,
held by the army of General Lanrezac. General Langle
de Gary on his right had been checked in the Ardennes,
and Ruflfey on the extreme right was in difficulties with
the army of the Crown Prince of Prussia at the frontier
of Luxembourg. On the extreme left the British troops
around Mons were violently engaged with superior num-
bers, constantly increasing and gravely threatening their
envelopment.

General French was informed by General Jofifre,
August 23, that the enemy was sending three more corps
upon his left. General Smith Dorrien's 2nd corps was
already giving ground. Such was the beginning of the
fourteen days' retreat, during which the Allies, covering
140 miles distance, on the left wing fought continual rear
guard actions and some important engagements that
checked the advance of the Germans and prepared the
battle of the Marne according to the plans said to have
been definitely fixed August 27th, by orders in Joffre's
own hand.

General Langle de Gary obliged the Duke of Wuert-
temberg to recross the Meuse and held him there twenty-
four hours, retiring only under orders from Jofifre that
he must be at Laimois on the 29th. At Laimois and
Rethel he held the same forces from August 28 to 31,
before continuing his retreat. From his position facing
the Ardennes to the front of the Marne, he had fought
ten whole days and covered 60 miles with his forces
intact.

General Lanrezac attained a success at Guise, but was
ordered not to follow it up; the situation was not yet
favorable for resuming a general ofifensive.

The retreat of General French was attended with the
greatest difficulties. The Germans, sending over in-
creasing numbers of soldiers by forced marches against
his left, necessitated violent and desperate counter
attacks. At Cambrai he sustained the fire of the artil-
ery of four corps; he lost 6,000 men from the 23rd to
the 26th before being disengaged by a heroic charge of
General Allenby's cavalry.

200

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

The army of General Maunoury, afterward called the
Army of Paris, partly constituted the 26th near Amiens
and popularly supposed not to have been in action until
September 6th, appears to have gone to the support of
the British contingent the 29th, in the region of the
Somme, where it administered a severe check to von
Kluck's right. The superiority of numbers was too
great, however; after every effort the Allies found increas-
ing forces on their left, and the lines extended continu-
ally further west. The Germans accupied Amiens and
continued on as far as Beauvais. This strengthening
of the line and the obliquing of the army of General
Franchet d'Esperey (formerly the army of Lanrezac)
to the left, created a gap between that army and the army
of General Langle de Gary, which was filled by the new
army under General Foch,in process of formation during
the battle of Charleroi.

Von Kluck's army, whose objective was supposed to
be Paris, was officially reported September 4th as obli-
quing to the south-east, with the apparent intention oi
neglecting Paris and pursuing his efforts to turn the
Allies' left. At the same time the army of the Crown
Prince on the left descended along the western edge of
the Argonne. There were two theories of the sudden
change in the direction of von Kluck's march. One that
he was pursuing the enveloping movement; the other,
that he had discovered the Army of Paris on his right
flank and by a clever dodge to the southeast avoided the
menace of being enveloped himself. In the light of later
disclosures the first theory seems to be the good one.
The oblique movement continued after the partial check
at Compi^gne and Chantilly by way of Beauvais,
Dammartin, Meaux. Senlis and Compidgne were evacu-
ated by them the 3rd — the advance guard reached the
region of Provins, 30 miles Ifeoutheast of Paris and 20
miles south of Meaux.

The "trough'' or semi-circle prepared by Joffre's
orders was in position, and the German armies had so far
marched into it the 5th, that General-in-chief Joffre was
able to issue orders for a general attack the next morning,
in order of battle as follows:

Maunoury northeast of Meaux, ready to cross the
Ourcq between Lizy-sur-Ourcq and Nay-en-Multien in
the direction of Chateau-Thierry.

British army on front Changis-Coulommiers, facing
the east, ready to attack in the direction of Montmirail.

201

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

Fifth Army of Franchet d'Esperey between Courtagon-
Esternay and Sezanne, ready for attack in the direction
of the north.

Seventh Anny of General Foch covering the right of
5th army and holding southern issues of the Saint-Gond
Marshes.

Oflfensive by these armies to be taken September 6 in
the morning.

The following day Joflfre completed his disposition of
the allied forces by orders to the 4th and 3rd armies as
follows:

Fourth Army of General Langle de Gary — stop move-
ment southward, turn about and face enemy, combining
its movements with 3rd army, which was to (Jebouch to
the north of Revigny and take the oflfensive towards the
west.

Third Army will attack the left fliank of the enemy
which is marching to the west of the Argonne.

The formation of the position into which the German
armies marched was that of a wide trough; Maimoury
and French formed the side toward Paris, Franchet
d'Esperey, Foch and Langle de Gary the bottom, while
SarraiFs army formed the side towards Verdun in the
Argonne.

September Sixth

Maimoury's Zouaves and Moors began the battle of
the Mame in the early hours of the 6th of September by
recapturing the ridges of Marcilly, Barcy, Ghambry,
and Penchard — while the 7th corps also advanced to
the north.

From dawn the British army and the army of General
Franchet d'Esperey were heavily engaged with von
Kluck and von Buelow's Vight. The British, facing a
general northeasterly direction, attacked the German
line in the angle of the trough. After ten hours' continual
fighting the pressure on the British front and that of the
5th army on its right diminished. Hard pressed on his
flank by Maunoury, and with his communications
threatened, von Kluck was obliged to weaken his center
by sending two corps (80,000 men) to the support of the
overwhelmed 4th corps on the Ourcq. The withdrawal
of these troops was concealed by a particularly violent
attack in which were sacrificed a great number of men.

During the afternoon von Kluck was obliged to repass

202

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

the Grand Morin and abandon Coulommiers,but s uceeeded
in maintaining himself on the right bank. The army
of Franchet d'Esperey also gained ground. The Sene-
galese riflemen drove th^ Germans from the village and
the environs of Jouy-sur-Morin at the point of the bay-
onet. Several villages were taken and retaken and the
fighting continued by moonlight, the French troops
taking three more villages.

The strongest shock of this first day's fighting was
supported by the 7th army of General Foch. After
resisting the pressure of the first assault, a vigorous
counter-attack realized a gain on his left before Monde-
ment. The 4th army of Langle de Gary, though just
arrived, also attacked vigorously along the entire front.

The army of the Crown Prince of Prussia had just taken
up its position before the Argonne and begim an attack,
which Sarrail repulsed.

Dubail, in the Vosges, pushed back the forces of von
Heeringen, and de Castelnau held the Grand Couronne
de Nancy against the attacks of the Crown Prince of
Bavaria.

September Seventh

On the morning of the 7th Maunoury found in front
of him not only the single corps of the preceding day
but 120,000 men; von Kluck had skilfully accomplished
the conversion of his forces and for the moment disen-
gaged his flank and saved the entire German army from
disaster.

Several villages were retaken by the Germans and the
pressure everywhere was severely felt. The day was
saved for the Army of Paris by the 2nd Zouaves around
Etrepilly, where the most violent attacks were repulsed,
at such cost to the Germans that they found it necessary
to burn their dead. . The British troops accentuated
their advance, punishing severely the cavalry divisions
of the Prussian Guard by remarkable charges of the 9th
Lancers and the 18th Hussars.

Franchet d'Esperey took at the point of the bayonet
Vieux Maisons and Pierrby on von Kluck's left, and after
several violent combats crossed the Grand Morin,
occupied Jouy-sur-Morin definitely and took up position
on the Petit Morin.

Foch, overrun by numbers on his right, held good until
the 11th corps weakened; then established his line a

203

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

little in the rear of the front Salon-Gougangon-Coiinatre-
AUemand.

The 12th corps of General Langle de Gary's anny,
heavily punished, was sent to the rear to be reorganized.
Six battalions of this corps — the least tried — sustained
alone the attack of 25,000 Germans all the evening.

The German attacks were arrested aroimd Sompiers
by the 13th division of the 21st corps, which lost its
chief, General Barbade, as well as Colonel Hamont and
a great many other officers.

The army of General Sarrail and that of the Crown
Prince of Prussia continued their duel, without result.

General de Castelnau, before Nancy, having lost the
Plateau of Amance, retook it and held it while Dubail in
the Vosges maintained his advances.

September Eighth

The morning of the 8th found the position of the wings
littk changed from the beginning and the AlUes' success
limited to the gains of the British forces and the Army
of Langle de Cary. The fighting had continued all
night. The army of Paris, at the extreme left, weakened,
but the center held firm by grace of the furious charges
by the Algerian and Moroccan troops that created gaps
in the enemy's ranks, in each case immediately filled.
The day passed in attacks and counter-attacks. Villages
were taken and retaken. At the cemetery of Chambry, a
great many officers and soldiers of the 3rd Zouaves were
killed, and finally the line began to bend back in the
direction of Neufmoutiers.

The 4th corps, commanded by General Boelle, brought
from Alsace and retarded en route by the exodus of civil-
ians from Paris arrived, one division went to the support
of the British troops, the other reinforced Maunoury.
The situation of the army of Paris became critical as the
result of the retreat of the 14th division of the 7th corps.

The British forces, reinforced by one division of the
4th corps, made further gains, taking many prisoners
and several cannon. The Army of General Franchet
d'Esperey, after eight hours' hand-to-hand fighting,
entered Montmirail and the army of von Buelow, leaving
7,000 dead and a large number of prisoners, was in re-
treat all along the line.

General Foch, at dawn, declared to his troops:

204

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

"The situation is excellent. I order again a vigorous
offensive."

The retreat of part of von Buelow's forces before
Franchet d'Esperey broke the German line and facili-
tated the efforts of Foch's army on his right. The key
to the heights of Sezanne, the Chateau of Mondement
where the Prince Eitel Friederich of von Kluck's staff
had conferred and dined with von Buelow, was the
center of attack. The artillery drove out the staff,
after which the Moroccan riflemen penetrated the park
of the Chateau — were driven out, attacked again and
were repulsed. A third assault succeeded and in the
park lay 3,000 dead Germans, including two generals.
Whole battalions of French troops were annihilated
there.

Ffere Champenoise and Sommesous, after Sezanne,
fell into the hands of Foch's army. Sommesous, counter-
attacked by the Prussian Guard, remained in their hands
only the time necessary for the French forces to reform.
Two regiments of the 11th corps charged and drove out
the 4th regiment of Grenadiers of the Queen Augusta and
the 4th regiment of Grenadiers of the Emperor Francis.

A vital development of the day's fighting was the dis-
covery, by aviators, of a gap between the armies of von
Buelow and von Hansen, the effect of von Buelow's
retreat, leaving von Hansen's right flank exposed. By
an audacious and opportune manoeuvre, General Foch
massed his right in this gap under cover of the night,
before von Hansen's flank, and threw his adversary
back upon the Marshes of Saint-Gond in disorder.
The German losses there were heavy.

The army of Langle de Gary was very heavily
engaged around Vitry-le-Frangois, where the forces
of the Duke of Wuerttemberg counter-attacked fiercely.
The artillery fire crossed here over the town of Vitry-
le-Frangois, which was partly in flames. At Pargny
and at Maurupt-le-Montay both sides lost heavily in
hand-to-hand fighting. By a night attack the French
infantry took the village of Etrepy, almost entirely
burned, and the surrounding region. A little progress
was made also to the left of Vitry-le-Frangois.

Sarrail, menaced with envelopment by a combined
attack from forces coming from Metz and the Crown
Prince's army in front, sent his cavalry against the
forces from Metz and continued his infantry attacks
in front. Fresh troops from Strassburg resumed the

205

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

violent but vain attacks upon the Heights of Amance.
The German losses here were extremely heavy, but less
than on the Heights of Sainte-Genevieve, where de
Castelr au's troops inflicted such losses on the Bavarian
reinforcements from Metz that they were obliged to
retire upon the village of Atton.

Dubail, obliged to abandon Luneville to the enemy,
held them in check elsewhere and retook the summit of
Mandroy and Fourmeaux.

September Ninth

The position of the army of Paris, which had become
critical the evening of the 8th, had not improved the
morning of the 9th. Heavily outnumbered, it appeared
little likely that the position could be held without
reinforcements. General Joffre ordered Maunoury to
resist just the same to the last man. The formation
of the line had been so modified that the army of Paris
described an angle, one side of which faced the east and
the other north. Three thousand men of the 7th corps,
pitted against one entire division, began an attack at
Marville, and the action became general. During nine
hours the battle waged incessantly. Encouraged by
news of successes of the other armies, Maunoury's men
redoubled their assaults. General Mangin, with the
6th division, by a desperate charge near Acy-en-Multien,
hurled back the forces in front of him, nearly destroying
the regiment of Madgeburg. Bayonet charges by the
African troops relieved the pressure near May-en-
Multien, and toward the end of the day the Germans,
having lost nearly half of their force, were repulsed all
along the line of the army of Paris. The 4th corps of
Landwehr was signalled coming to the relief of von
Kluck's flank from Rethel. Maunoury 's army was
exposed to a decisive attack by fresh troops. Mau-
noury appealed to General Gallieni. The Governor of
Paris requisitioned 5,000 taxi-automobiles, drays, etc.
and sent 20,000 men to his support across Paris.

Nanteuil-le-Haudoin and its vast petroleum stocks
were in flames. The troops, most of them, had been
without food for three days — only the Moors, habituated
to fasting, seemed capable of further effort. The Ger-
mans seemed equally exhausted, for their attacks
weakened with the darkness.

The British forces, continuing their progress, threw
von Kluck's center back upon the Mame from Vareddes

206

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

to Chateau-Thierry; they had gained twenty miles in
two days, taking prisoners and booty every hour. After
seventeen failures, the British engineers succeeded in
throwing a bridge across the Marne at Vareddes, threat-
ening von Kluck's rear. They crossed at La-Ferte-
sous-Jouare, at noon in close pursuit. A detachment
of cavalry, meeting two squadrons of German cavalry
toward Chateau-Thierry, charged through and charged
back again. After traversing both squadrons, then
<;harged them again in front. Von Kluck's entire
army was now in full retreat, abandoning wounded
and material and losing prisoners. The British forces
discovered that von Kluck's troops lacked ammunition
for their Mausers. Many cannon and prisoners fell
into the hands of the British army during the day.

The army of Franchet d'Esperey advanced in imison
with the British troops close upon the heels of the enemy,
and only the German batteries, posted on the slopes,
north of Chateau-Thierry, saved the retreat from de-
veloping into a rout. The German losses on this front
exceeded even those of the left. At Estemay they
left 8,000 unburied dead after four days' fighting. Near
Chateau-Thierry they had emptied the reservoir that
supplied Paris with water from the Nestles, filled it
with dead and covered the bodies with earth.

Foch pushed ahead also with the 7th army after the
capture of Mondement, throwing the Prussian Guard
into the Marshes of Saint-Gond. A stubborn resistance
was offered there in the parts where defense works
could be organized. Foch succeeded in taking these
works in the rear, driving thousands of the Guard so
precipitately from the safe routes that they sank into
the slime of the marshes. Several batteries of artillery
were lost there and the 7th army took many prisoners.

The army of Langle de Cary, pressed by fresh troops
brought from Belgium, maintained its positions, while
Sarrail repulsed a violent attack by von Heeringen
with the 16th corps.

As the result of the bloody battles of Dieulouard and
Saint-Genevifeve, Nancy was entirely disengaged and
the Bavarians retired from Pont-a-Mousson into the
Bois le petre, and Dubai in the Vosges progressed in the
regions of Luneville and Baccarat.

September Tenth
The morning of the 10th, General Maunoury was

207

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

informed of the general retreat of the armies of von
Kluck, von Buelow and von Hansen. Vareddes and
Lizy-sur-Ourcq, evacuated in haste, were found crowded
with German wounded. At Etrepilly piles of car-
bonized bodies were seen and dead and wounded were
found in all the ravines and thickets, behind hedges
and generally at every spot where the soldier seeks
protection.

The British troops, continuing their pursuit, took
thirteen more cannon and a few hundred prisoners and
great convoys of supplies and ammunition: The army
of Franchet d'Esperey, in spite of the fatigue of five
days' fighting after 14 days' retreat forced its advance
and reached the line of Chateau-Thierry-Dormans,
taking four cannon, 1,500 prisoners and a convoy of 50
baggage wagons. The losses of von Buelow's army
on this front were nearly equal to von Kluck's.

Foch's 7th army, marching on Epernay and Chalons-
sur-Marne, took prisoners and booty and supported the
army of General Langle de Gary by attackmg in flank
the forces of the Duke of Wuerttemberg, Langle de Gary
entered Vitry-le-Frangois, which was full of wounded,
and progressed toward Sermaize. The struggle between
the Crown Prince and Sarrail was still undecided. At
Triaucourt Sarrail captured ammunition and on the
other side of the Meuse the Germans completed the
destruction of the forts of Troyon and attacked Sar-
rail's rear, but were repulsed. They tried to cross
the Meuse lower down toward Saint-Mihiel, but the
French 3-inch grrns destroyed each bridge as soon as
thrown across.

The 11th, the army of the Duke of Wuerttemberg,
vigorously attacked in the center, gave way and re-
treated in disorder, while the armies of von Kluck,
von Buelow and von Hansen took up positions on the
line of the Aisne.

This was practically the termination of the battle,
though the army of the Grown Prince held its ground
until the 12th, when it began to retire slowly.

The best estimates of the forces engaged placed the
Germans at 1,075,000 and the Allies at 1,125,000.
The French are known to have lost 60,131 killed. The
Germans left 50,000 dead, while 250,000 wounded of
both armies were picked up during and after the battle
by the Allies' stretcher bearers. The number of prison-
ers taken is still unknown, but was not large.

208

APPENDIX IV

STATISTICS

It may be of iaterest for us now to cast a glance on
what this war has actually cost in borrowed money,
since that is the only cost of which we can be certain,
though there are other costs, such as the amount raised
by taxation, and expended on the war, destruction of
property, the loss of the productive capacity of the men
who are either killed or so maimed or injured as to be
no longer self-supporting, besides the loss of production
in occupied territories, the decrease in stocks of foody
metal and other materials, and the derangement of the
machinery of distribution. Then there is the outright
loss of property which the millions of soldiets and many
millions of other people would have created if they had
not been fighting in the ranks or otherwise contributing
their skill and energy to the ends of the war. The cost
of provisions, the loss and investment of the national
savings in things which have only a tcmporarv use such
as guns, shells and other munitions of war and war's
equipment, which would otherwise have been invested
in permanent things. But for these latter losses, there
is no means of measurement. At the present time the
daily expenditures bj'- the various countries on^both
sides are about as follows:

Great Britain

France

Russia .

Italy

Roumania

Belgium and Servia

Entente Allies .

$27 ,000 ,000

18 ,000 ,000

16 ,000 ,000

7 ,000 ,000

2 ,000 ,000

«72 ,000 ,000

209

STATISTICS

Germany

Austria-Himgary .
Turkey and Bulgaria

Central Allies

All belligerents

$21 ,000 ,000

11,000,000

3 ,000 ,000

$35 ,000 ,000

$106 ,000 ,000

Up to August 1, 1917, which would be the end of a
complete three years since the war began, we may com-
pute the war cost as follows:

Direct war cost to
Great Britaia
France
Russia .
Italy

Roumania
Belgium and Servia

$16 ,500 ,000 ,000

14 ,000 ,000 ,000

11 ,750 ,000 ,000

3 ,900 ,000 ,000

450 ,000 ,000

1 ,600 ,000 .000

Entente Allies . . $48,200,000,000

Germany . . . $16,500,000,000
Austria-Hungary . 9 ,250 ,000 ,070
Turkey and Bulgaria 2 ,000 ,000 ,000

Central Alliance . $27,750,000,000

All belligerents . $75

Gr6at Britain

France

Russia ....

Italy ....

Roumania

Belgiuin and Servia

,950 ,000 ,000

Per capita

$351 .00

350.00

67.10

108 .00

59.30

133 .40

Entente Allies . .

Germany . . .
Austria-Hungary .
Turkey and Bulgaria

$151 .50

$242.60

174.60

75.50

Central Alliance

$188.10

All belligerents

$163 .30

210

STATISTICS

A complete table of the loans to date follows:

GREAT BRITAIN
War Loan, 3>^%, November,

1914 $1,750,000,000

War Loan, 4^%, July, 1915 2 ,970 ,000 ,000
Treasury bills, approximate 5 ,100 ,000 ,000

Exchequer 5s, approximate 1 ,750 ,000 ,000

Exchequer 6s, approximate 250 ,000 ,000

Exchequer 3s, approximate 105 ,000 ,000

War expenditure certificates 1 00 ,000 ,000

War savings certificates . . 100,000,000

Treasury indebtedness on note

issues 500,000,000

Anglo-French Loan, 5% Oc-
tober, 1915 .... 250 ,000 ,000
Collateral Loan in U. S., 5%

August, 1916 ... 250 ,000 ,000

Banking credit in United States 50 ,000 ,000

Banking credit in Canada . 100 ,000 ,000

Total, Great Britain . $13 ,275 ,000 ,000

FRANCE

National loan, 5%, Novem-
ber, 1915 .... $3 ,100 ,000 ,000

National loan 5%, October,

1916 (estimated) . . 3 ,000 ,000 ,000

National defense bonds (es-
timated) . . . . 2,800,000,000

National defense obligations

(estimated) . . . 400,000,000

Advances from Bank of

France 2,000,000,000

Advances B. of F. to foreign

governments . . . 250,000,000

Bonds and notes in London . 500 ,000 ,000

Anglo-French loan, Oct. 1915 260 ,000 ,000

Collateral loan in United States 100 ,000 ,000

One-year 5% notes in United

States 30,000,000

Banking credits in N. Y. (es-
timated) .... 60,000,000

Advances from Bank of Al-
geria 20,000,000

Total, France ... $12 ,600 ,000 ,000

211

STATISTICS

RUSSIA

War loan, 6% October, 1914 $257 ,500 ,000

War loan, 5%, February, 1915 257 ,500 ,000

Exchequer bonds, 4%, March,

1915 310,000,000

Currency loan, April, 1915 . 105 ,000 ,000

War loan, 5>^%, May, 1915 515 ,000 ,000

War loan, 5}4%, November,

1915 515,000,000

War loan, 5>^%, April, 1916 1 ,040 ,000 ,000

War loan, 5>^%, November,

1916, (estimated) . . 1 ,000 ,000 ,000

Treasury bills, 5%, (es-
timated) .... 2,000,000,000

Issues discoimted in England 700 ,000 ,000

Issues in France .... 150 ,000 ,000

Loan in Japan .... 25 ,000 ,000

Three-year 6>^% credit in

United States . . . 50,000,000

Total, Russia ... $6 ,925 ,000 ,000

GERMANY

Imperial loan, 5%, September,

1914 $1,120,000,000

Imperial loan, 5%, March,

1915 2,265,000,000

Imperial loan, 5%, Septem-
ber, 1915 .... 3 ,040 ,000 ,000

Imperial loan, 5%, March,

1916 2,678,000,000

Imperial loan, 5%, Septem-
ber, 1916 .... 2 ,750 ,000 ,000

Securities in United States . 25 ,000 ,000

Bank loan in Sweden ... 10 ,000 ,000

Total, Germany . . $11 ,988 ,000 ,000

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Austrian loan, 5>^%, Novem-
ber, 1914 .... $445 ,000 ,000

Austrian loan, 5>^%, June,

1915 560,000,000

212

STATISTICS

Austrian loan, 5>^%, Novem-
ber, 1915 .... 815 ,000 ,000

Austrian loan, 5>^%, May,

1916 • 565,000,000

Hungarian loan, 6%, Novem-
ber, 1914 .... 244 ,000 ,000

Hungarian loan, 6%, June,

1915 223,000,000

Hungarian loan, 6%, Novem-
ber, 1915 .... 240 ,000 ,000

Hungarian loan, 6%, May,

1916 . . . . . 300,000,000
Loan from German bankers 1 13 ,000 ,000
Second loan in Germany . 125 ,000 ,000
Credit In Germany ... 60 ,000 ,000

Total, Austria-Hungary $3 ,690 ,000 ,000

ITALY

National loan, 4>^%, Decem-
ber, 1914 .... $200 ,000 ,000
War loan, 4>^%, July, 1915 200 ,000 ,000
Twenty-five year 5s (approx.) 800 ,000 ,000
Treasury coupon bonds, 5% 250 ,000 ,000
English credit for war supplies 250 ,000 ,000
One-year 6% notes in United

States 25,000,000

Total, Italy .... $1 ,725 ,000 ,000

BELGIUM, SERVIA, TURKEY, BULGARIA,

ROUMANIA

Belgium's war cost has been defrayed in the most part
by Great Britain and France. No formal loans have
been issued, and taxes have been of no service to the
Belgian arms, for the reason that Belgium, save for a
small strip of territory, is in the hands of German forces*

Servia has been financed by the Entente Allies. No
loans have been issued, and the tax collections yielded
an insignificant proportion of the cost of that country's
warfare.

Turkey has issued three loans, amounting to $350,000,-
000, which were taken at home and in Germany, and to

213

STATISTICS

a small extent in neutral countries of Europe, like
Switzerland. Its war expenditure has been jSnanced in
large measure from Germany; a syndicate of German
and Austro-Himgarian banks has also helped in the
financing.

Bulgaria has been financed chiefly from Germany, by
means of special advances. Tax collections and small
loans at home have also contributed to the payment
for war.

Roumanians late entrance into the war was undoubt-
edly accompanied by financial accommodation on the
part of the embattled group with which that nation
took sides. The banks of Roumania have also been
called upon for their facilities.

The approximate cost of other wars is given in the
following table for the purpose of comparisons with the
cost of this:

Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815 $6 ,250 ,000 ,000
American Civil War, 1861-

1864 8,000,000,000

Franco-Prussian W^r, 1870-

1871 3,000,000,000

South African War, 1900-1902 1 ,250 ,000 ,000
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-

1905 2,500,000,000

As a result of these enormous loans made by all the
belligerents, their national debts have now gone to figures
which formerly would have been deemed impossible
and phantastic, but which in August, 1917, will be
positive facts about as follows:

Great Britain . . $19,850,000,000

France , . . 19,000,000,000

Russia .... 13,450,000,000

Italy . . . . 5 ,050 ,000 ,000

Entente nations . $57,350,000,000

Germany . . . $18,900,000,000
Austria-Himgary . 9 ,300 ,000 ,000
Turkey .... 950,000,000

Central nations . $29,150,000,000

Grand Total . . $86,700,000,000

214

STATISTICS

The figures as regards Germany may differ from this in
estimates from some made by others, because most of
the American financial authorities, for reasons best
known to themselves and perhaps not imconnected with
their efforts to sell securities of Great Britain, France
and Russia, include in the German national debt the
debt of the separate states of the Empire. Now the
Empire of Germany is a federation of separate states,
in many ways bearing a great resemblance to the United
States, and as it is not customary, in stating the debt of
the United States, to add the debts of the separate states
contracted on their own liability, there seems no good
reason why this should be done in the case of Germany,
and hence the amount of the debt of the separate states
has not been included in the debt of the Empire. This
debt forms a very considerable percentage of the total
national wealth of the various belligerent countries,
and in order that this appropriation can be clearly
grasped the following table of the national wealth of the
coimtries at war is given:

United Kngdom $90,000,000,000

France 65,000,000,000

Russia 60,000,000,000

Italy 35 ,000 ,000 ,000

Belgium . 13,750,000,000

Portugal and Roumania . . 7,500,000,000

Entente total $271 ,250 ,000 ,000

Germany $80,000,000,000

Austria-Hungary 45,000,000,000

Turkey and Bulgaria . . . 8,750,000,000

Alliance total $133 ,750 ,000 ,000

All belligerents $405,000,000,000

as well as a total of the eanxing power previous to the
war of the same coimtries:

Annual Income : Annual savings :

United Kjngdom $1 1 ,250 ,000 ,000 $1 ,875 ,000 ,000

Prance . . . 7,500,000,000 1,250,000,000

Russia . . . 7,500,000,000 1,250,000,000

Italy .... 4,250,000,000 625,000,000

Belgium and Servia 1 ,750 ,000 ,000 300 ,000 ,000

Roimiania . . 600,000,000 100,000,000

Entente nations $32 ,850 ,000 ,000 $5 ,400 ,000 ,000

215

STATISTICS

Germany . . $10,500,000,000 $1,750,000,000
Austria-Hungary 6 ,000 ,000 ,000 1 ,000 ,000 ,000
Turkey and Bul-
garia . . 1,000,000,000 150,000,000

Central nations . $17,500,000,000 $2,900,000,000

Total, aU . . $50,350,000,000 $8,300,000,000

216

APPENDIX V

BULGARIA

Reigning King

" Ferdinand, youngest son of the late Prince Augustus
of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, and the late Princess Clemen-
tine of Bourbon-Orleans (daughter of King Louis
Philippe), born February 26, 1861, was elected Prince
of Bulgaria by unanimous vote of the National Assembly,
July 7, 1887; assumed the government August 14, 1887,
in succession to Prince Alexander, who had abdicated
September 7, 1886. His election was confirmed by
the Porte and the Great Powers in March, 1896. Married

(1) April 20, 1893, to Marie Louise (died January 31,
1899), eldest daughter of Duke Robert of Parma;

(2) February 28, 1908, to Princess Eleonore of Reuss
Kostritz.

Children of the King (all of first marriage) : — (1) Prince
Boris, born January 30, 1894 (heir apparent); (2)
Prince Cyril, born November 17, 1895; (3) Princess
Eudoxia, born January 17, 1898; and (4) Princess
Nadejda, born January 30, 1899.

The Prince must reside permanently in the Principal-
ity. The princely title is hereditary. In May 1893, the
Grand Sobranje confirmed the title of "Royal Highness"
to the Prince and his heir, and this style was recognized
by the Porte and by Russia in April 1896. On July
10, 1911, the Grand Sobranje confirmed the title of
"King" (Czar). According to the Constitution, the
Sovereign must profess the Orthodox religion, excepting
the case of the present King.

The civil list is fixed at 1,250,000 leva (francs), be-
sides 830,000 leva for the maintenance of palaces, etc.

Constitution and Government

The Principality of Bulgaria was created by the
Treaty of Berlin, signed July 13, 1878. It was ordered
by the Treaty that Bulgaria should be constituted an

217

BULGARIA

autonomous and tributary Principality, under the
suzerainty of His Imperial Majesty, the Sultan, with a
Christian Government and a national militia. The
Prince of Bulgaria should be freely elected by the
pupulation and confirmed by the Sublime Porte, with
the consent of the Powers. On October 5, 1908, Bulgaria
declared her independence. The difficulty as to com-
pensation to the Turkish Government in respect of
railway claims was arranged by an understanding
between the Turkish Government and the Oriental
Railways Company, and the Powers have recognized
Bulgarian independence, and the title of "King of the
Bulgarians'' assumed by Prince Ferdinand.

"By the Constitution of 1879, amended May, 1893,
and June, 1911, the legislative authority was vested in
a single Chamber, called the Sobranje or National
Assembly. The members of it are elected by imiversal
manhood suffrage at the rate of one member to every
20,000 of the population. Those residing in the city
where the National Assembly sits receive 15 leva (12s)
a day (including Sundays and holidays) during session;
others, 20 leva (16s) a day with traveling expenses. All
over 30 years of age who can read and write (except the
clergy, soldiers on active service, persons deprived of
civil rights, etc.) are eligible as representatives. The
duration of the Assembly is four years, but it may be
dissolved at any time by the King, when new elections
must take place within two months. Laws passed by
the Sobranje require the assent of the King. Questions
concerning the acquisition or cession of territory, changes
in the constitution, a vacancy on the throne, or the
appointment of a regent have to be decided by a Grand
Sobranje, elected for the special purpose in a manner
similar to that in which the ordinary Sobranje is elected,
but with double the number of members.

"Sobranje (elected March 10, 1914) : 126 Ministerial-
ists, 51 Agrarians, 21 Socialists, 31 Democrats, 9 National-
ists, 5 Radicals, 2 Zankovists; total, 245 (207 in Old
Bulgaria and 41 in the new territories).

"The executive power is vested in a Council of eight
ministers nominated by the King.

Area and Population

"The estimated area of Bulgaria (1914) is 43,305
English square miles, and the estimated population,
4,752,997. Of the new population 227,598 were Bul-

218

BULGARIA

garians, 75,337 Pomatz, 275,498 Turks, and 58,709
Greeks.

''By a census taken in December 31, 1910, the popu-
lation of the whole kingdom was ascertained to be
4,337,516 (2,206,691 males and 2,130,825 females), as
against 4,035,575 (2,057,092 males and 1,978,483 fe-
males) in 1900. Bulgaria before 1913 was divided into
12 districts (including the 3 districts of Eastern Rumelia),

"The population, divided according to nationality,
was as follows: in 1910, 3,203,810 Bulgarians; 488,010
Turks; 75,775 Rumanians, 63,487 Greeks; 98,004
Gipsies, 37,663 Jews, 3,863 Germans, 3,275 Russians,
and 61,690 of other nationalities. The present capital
is the city of Sofia, with a population (census, 1910)
of 102,812. The other principal towns, with popu-
lation in 1910, are Philippopolis, 47,981; Rustchuk,
36,255; Varna, 41,419; Shumla, 22,225; Slivno (Sliven),
50,598; Plevna (Pleven), 23,049.

''The census returns of 1910 showed the following
distribution of public [buildings in the country: 1,347
belonged to the State, 34 to the provincial authorities,
1,436 to the municipalities, 185 to the villages, 196
were schools, 426 churches, 534 mosques, 9 synagogues,
264 monasteries, 77 to various societies, 48 to the
National Bank, and 65 to the Agricultural Bank.

Religion and Instruction

"The national faith is that of the Orthodox Greek
Church, though, in 1870, in consequence of its demand
for and acceptance of religious autonomy, the Bul-
garian Church was declared by the Patriarch of Con-
stantinople to be outside the Orthodox communion.
The church is governed by the Synod of Bishops. There
are 11 Eparchies or Bishoprics. The clergy, both
Orthodox and of other religious bodies, are paid by the
State and also receive fees for services at burials, mar-
riages, etc. Of the population in 1910, 3,643,951
belonged to the Orthodox Church 602,101 were Mohame-
dans, 40,070 were Jews, 32,130 were Catholics, 12,270
Gregorian Armenians, 6,252 Protestants. The Mohame-
dans are mostly in the northern and eastern provinces.

"There is a university at Sofia, with three faculties —
History and Philology, Physics and Mathematics, and
Law. In 1911-12 it was attended by 2,260 students,
of whom 217 were women, and there were 70 professors
and lecturers.

219

BULGARIA

"In 1911-1912 the Bulgarian and other secondary
schools were as shown in the following table : The non-
Bulgarian schools were Turkish, Greek, Jewish, Armenian,
American, French and German: —

Teachers Pupils

Description of Schools Schools Male Female Male Female

Gymnasia 47 ' 667 300 10,625 6,862

Lower Middle Class 316 2,111 38,973 16,639

Special Technical and Other

Schools 166 4,749 4,744

"In 1913-14 there were 4,589 elementary schools with
5,769 male and 5,031 female teachers and 290,800 boys
and 213,963 girls.

Finance

"The estimated revenue and expenditure of Bulgaria
for five years were as follows (25 leva=£ (1):

1911 1912 1913 1914 1916

Revenue 7,137,812 7,610,920 5,765,344 10,279,800 11,027,196L
Expenditure 7, 136,818 7,667,200 4,732,832 10,270,604 11,014,648L

"For 1915 the chief sources qf revenue were: direct
taxes, 2,197,774L, indirect taxes, 4,275,020L. The
chief branches of expenditure were: Public Debt,
3,077,856L; War, 2,372,638L; Interior, 544,891L;
Instruction, 1,167,263L; Finance, 440,659L.

Defence

"Service is universal and compulsory. Mohamedans
are exempted, but like all other exempted, pay a tax.
Service in the ranks commences at the age of 20, and is
now for two years in the infantry, and for three in the
other arms. Reserve service is for 18 years in the infan-
try, and 16 years in the other arms The reservists are
liable to be called out for three weeks training annually.

"After completion of his reserve service, the Bulgarian
soldier passes to the Opolchenie (Territorial Army),
serving in the first ban for four years (infantry), or five
years (all other arms). Finally, the men of all arms pass
for two years to the second ban, thus completing a total
service of 26 years.

"At the present the Bulgarian infantry is organized in
36 regiments of two battalions, each of four companies;
and the artillery in nine regiments of two divisions, each
of three batteries of four guns, 12 mountain batteries,
and three battalions of fortress artillery. On mobiliza-

(1) Excluding the expenditure for the war

220

BULGARIA

tion each infantry regiment expands to four battalions,
and each artillery regiment forms a third division of
three batteries. Further, from the large number of re-
servists of each regiment is formed a reserve regiment of
four battalions, and a depot battalion.

"There is one guard cavalry regiment of three squad-
rons, four line regiments of four squadrons, and six of
three squadrons. On mobilization, all regiments are
raised to four squadrons and a depot squadron. There
are further three battalions of pioneers, one railway
battalion, one pontoon battalion, one telegraph battalion,
etc.

"The Opolchenie forms on mobilization 36 battalions
of the first ban, and 36 half-battalions of the second ban.

"The reservists not required to complete the field
units join the depots and are available to make good
the waste of war.

"Bulgaria is divided into nine military districts, each
of which supplies a complete division to the field army,
besides a portion of the independent cavalry, fortress
artillery and engineers, mountain artillery, etc., and of
reserve troops. The strength of the divisions in peace
(eight battalions, six batteries, etc.) is email; but in war,
besides the exparsion above mentioned a third (reserve)
brigade is added, enabling additional divisions to be
created — there were fourteen mobilized in the summer
of 1913. The peace strength of the Bulgarian army is
about 3,900 officers and 56,000 all other ranks, but the
field army amounts to about 280,000 men besides line
of communications, troops, etc.

"The Bulgarian infantry is armed with the Mannlicher
magazine rifle, calibre .315. Cavalry have the Mannlicher
carbine. The field gim is the Schneider Q. F. gun of 7.5
cm. caUbre. The mountain batteries are armed with
the light Krupp 7.5 cm. Q. F. guns.

"The miUtary budget for 1915 was 2,372,638L.

Production and Industry

"Agriculture is the chief occupation of the people.
Land is held in absolutefreehold by the owners and there
is a land tax. The communes hold pasture-land and
wood-land in perpetuity and pay no rent, and over such
lands the members of the communes have grazing and
wood-cutting rights.

"About five-sevenths of the population are engaged in
agriculture, most of them being small proprietors holding

221

BULGARIA

from one to six acres. The total area of (old) Bulgaria
comprised 23,797,000 acres, of which, in 1913, 8,212,649
acres were cultivated. Of the new area 986 square
miles are cultivated land.

"The acreage and field of the principal crops for two
years are shown as follows:

Area in Acres Produce in Cwts.

1913 1914 1913 1914

Wheat 2,539,150 2,669,137 24,392,102 14,141,166

Barley 508,075 539,782 4,949,152 4,013,710

Oats 390,150 383,165 2,721,498 2,345,586

Rye 494,180 533,485 4,474,870 3,685,598

Maize 1,465,850 1,584,740 15,472,246 15,786,978

"The harvest of 1915-16 produced of wheat 1,257,698
metric tons; rye, 193,604 metric tons; barley, 384,714
metric tons; oats, 138,544 metric tons.

"In 1910 there were in Bulgaria 8,669,260 sheep,
1,464,719 goats, 1,606,363 head of cattle, 527,311 pigs,
478,222 horses, 118,488 asses, and 12,238 mules.

' Commerce

"The foreign trade follows three main routes: The
Black Sea, the Danube and the mainland railway.

"The chief imports in 1913 were: cattle, 211,683L;
cereals, 133,952L; metals, 540,060L; machinery, imple-
ments, etc., 974,860L; textiles, 1,380,076L; hides, skins,
leather, etc., 343,364L. The chief articles of export
were: wheat, 816,468L; maize, 172,620L; live stock,
38,412L; silk cocoons, 68,084L; hides, skins etc., 149,720L
attar of roses, 306,244L. Other exports are fruit, timber,
and tobacco.

Shipping and Communications

"The number of vessels entered at the ports of Bul-
garia in 1913 was 11,755 of 3,132,481 tons, and 11,710
of 3,108,505 cleared. The chief ports are Varna and
Bourgas on the Black Sea, and Rustchuk, Sistor, Vidin
on the Danube.

"In 1914, Bulgaria (including Eastern Rumelia) had
1,486 miles of railway open. Railways connect Sofia
with the general European system. New railways are
being planned to link the Danube and the Aegean.
One is to be 220 miles long and Portalogos will be the
terminus at the sea. The other will be a shorter line

222

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