In Eight Volumes. Crown 8vo. With Maps, etc.
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The Complete Set £3, Ss. net.
PERIODS OF EUROPEAN HISTORY
General Editor— ARTHUR HASSALL, M.A.
Student of Christ Church, Oxford.
This Series embodies the results of the latest investigations, and
contains references to and notes upon original and other sources of
information, thus forming a comprehensive and trustworthy account
of the general development of European History.
No such attempt to place the History of Europe in a comprehensive,
detailed, and readable form before the English Public has previously
been made, and the Series forms a valuable cpntinuous History of
Mediaeval and Modern Europe, and also deals fully and carefully
with the more prominent events in each century.
Period I.— The Dark Ages. a.d. 476-918.
By Sir C. W. C. Oman, K.B.E., M.A., LL.D., Chichele Professor
of Modern History in the University of Oxford. 8s. 6d. net.
Period II. — The Empire and the Papacy, a.d. 918-1273.
By T. F. Tout, M.A., Professor of Mediaeval and Ecclesiastical History
in the University of Manchester. 8s. 6d. net.
Period III.— The Close of the Middle Ages. a.d. 1273- 1494.
By Sir R. Lodge, M.A., LL.D., Professor of History in the Univer-
sity of Edinburgh. 8s. 6d. net.
Period IV. — Europe in the 16th Century. a.d. 1494- 1598.
By A. H. Johnson, M.A., Historical Lecturer to Merton, Trinity, and
University Colleges, Oxford. 8s. 6d. net.
eriod V. — The Ascendancy of France. a.d. 1598-17 15.
By H. O. Wakeman, M.A., late Fellow of All Souls' College, Oxford.
8s. 6d. net.
Period VI.— The Balance of Power. a.d. 1715-1789.
By A. Hassall, M.A. 8*. 6d. net.
Period VII.— Revolutionary Europe, a.d. 1789-1815.
By H. Morse Stephens, M.A., late Professor of History at the
University of California, Berkeley, California, U.S.A. 8s. 6d. net.
Period VIII. — Modern Europe, a.d. 1815-1899.
By W. Alison Phillips, M.A., Lecky Professor of Modern History
in the University of Dublin. 8s. 6d. net.
-<-
THE DARK AGES, 476-918
By Sir C. W. C. OMAN, K.B.E., M. A., LL.D., M.P., Chichele Professor
of Modern History in the University of Oxford.
Forming Volume I. of Periods of European History.
*A thorough master of his subject, and possessed of a gift for clear exposi-
tions, he has supplied the student with a most valuable and helpful book.' —
Spectator.
1 No better exponent of this era, so full of difficulties and complications,
could have been chosen.' "—Journal of Education.
' Mr. Oman has done his work well. His narrative is clear and interesting,
and takes full account of recent research. ' — English Historical Review.
* This volume will be valued by all historical students as supplying a real
want in our historical literature,, and supplying it well. . . . His touch is
sure and his insight keen. For the accuracy of his facts his historical
reputation is a sufficient guarantee.' — Times.
THE EMPIRE AND THE PAPACY, 918-1273
By T. F. TOUT, M.A., D.Litt., Professor of History and Director
of Advanced Study in History in the University of Manchester.
Forming Volume II. of Periods of European History.
* This admirable and impartial work. ... A more trustworthy historical
treatise on the period and subject has not hitherto appeared.' — '
Morning Post.
' One of the best of the many good historical text-books which have come
out of our universities in recent years.' — Times.
'Altogether Professor Tout has given us a most trustworthy adjunct to
the study of mediaeval times, which all who may be called upon to interpret
those times to others may safely recommend and themselves profit by.' —
English Historical Review.
THE CLOSE OF THE MIDDLE AGES, 1273-1494
By Sir R. LODGE, M.A., LL.D., Professor of History
in the University of Edinburgh.
Forming Volume III. of Periods of European History.
* The book is admirably written, it contains maps and genealogical tables,
an exhaustive index, and a bibliography which students will value as an aid
to the interpretation of the whole period as well as a clue to any part of it.'
— Standard.
4 We are exceedingly thankful for the Series, and as we have already said,
to Prof. Lodge. There is no longer any excuse for English-speaking teachers
to be wholly ignorant of the history of Europe. The obligation lies on them
to purchase these volumes, and then read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest
them, so that they can supplement their teaching with intelligible comment.'
—School World.
'The book must be regarded as quite indispensable to all English students
of the late Middle Ages.' — University Correspondent.
' Professor Lodge's book has the supreme merit of clearness, not less than
that of conciseness.' — Pall Mall Gazette.
'A work of great value on one of the most difficult and at the same time
one of the most important periods of European history. The book is a
monument of skill and labour.' — Aberdeen Journal.
EUROPE IN THE i6th CENTURY, 1494-1598
By A. H. Johnson, M.A., Historical Lecturer at Merton, Trinity,
and University Colleges, Oxford.
Forming Volume IV. of Periods of European History.
' A singularly clear, thorough, and consistent account of the great move-
ments and great events of the time, and the volume may be accepted as one
of the best extant handbooks to a period as complex as it is important.' —
Times.
1 In the present volume Mr. A. H. Johnson has made a useful and unpre-
tentious contribution to a Series of which it can be said more truly than of
most series that it supplies a real want. Mr. Johnson is well known as one
of the most experienced and successful teachers of history at Oxford, and the
book has all the merits which the fact of being written by a good teacher can
give it. It is clear, sensible, and accurate, and commendably free from fads
or bias/ — Manchester Guardian.
'There is certainly no other single book in English which covers the
ground so adequately.' — University Correspondent.
* Mr. Johnson's narrative is clear and accurate, and his grasp of the history
of his period wonderfully strong and comprehensive.'— Journal of Education.
THE ASCENDANCY OF FRANCE, 1598-1715
By H. O. Wakeman, M.A., Late Fellow of All Souls' College, Oxford.
Forming Volume V. of Periods of European History.
'His story is no dry compendium, but a drama, each act and scene of
which has its individual interest.' — Guardian.
'Mr. Wakeman has produced an excellent sketch, both clear and con-
cise. ' — Oxford Magazine.
' Mr. Wakeman's book is a sound, able, and useful one, which will alike
give help to the student, and attract the cultivated general reader.' —
Manchester Guardian.
' A thoroughly scholarly and satisfactory monograph.' — Leeds Mercury.
THE BALANCE OF POWER, 1715-1789
By A. Hassall, M. A., General Editor of the Series.
Forming Volume VI. of Periods of European History.
' Although it contains more than 400 pages, we felt as we read its last page
that it was too short. It is not, however, too short to prevent its author
dealing adequately with his subject according to the scheme of the whole
Series. There is little detail in it, and but little theorising, and what it
contains are clear statements of masterly summaries. . . . We may cordially
recommend this interesting and well- written volume.' —
Birmingham Daily Gazette.
'Treated with much accuracy, patience, and vigour.' — Educational Times.
' The author has struggled manfully with the difficulties of his subject, and
not without a distinct measure of success. He has availed himself of the
latest researches on the period, and his narrative is well ordered and
illustrated by excellent maps and some useful appendices.' —
Manchester Guardian.
REVOLUTIONARY EUROPE, 1789-1815
By H. Morse Stephens, M.A., late Professor of History at the University
of California, U.S.A.
Forming Volume VII. of Periods of European History.
1 As a piece of literary workmanship can hardly be surpassed. . . . The
result is a boon to students, and a serviceable book of reference for the
general reader.' — Daily News.
' Mr. Stephens has written a very valuable and meritorious book, which
ought to be widely used.' — Manchester Guardian.
'An admirable, nay, a masterly work.' — Academy.
1 To say that Mr. Morse Stephens has compiled the best English text-book
on the subject would be faint praise.'— -Journal of Education.
* We are happy to extend a hearty welcome to this much-needed Series,
which, if it throughout keeps on the same high level of this volume, will fill
up a painful gap in our accessible historical literature.' — Educational Times.
1 The volume contains one of the clearest accounts of the French Revolu-
tion and the rise of the First Napoleon ever written. In fact, it is the work
of a real historian. The style of the book is strong and picturesque.' —
Western Morning News.
MODERN EUROPE, 1815-1899
By W. Alison Phillips, M.A., Lecky Professor of Modern History
in the University of Dublin.
Forming Volume VIII. of Periods of European History.
'Remains the most readable general introduction to the history
of the 19th century, and may be recommended for the period
1815-1876.*— Times, August 6, 1914.
An exceedingly difficult task has been accomplished, we may say without
hesitation, to admiration. We have read the book with the keenest and
quite unflagging enjoyment, and we welcome it as one of the very best
histories that have been written within the last few years.' — Guardian.
* It has achieved, with a remarkable success, the difficult task of compress-
ing into a compact space the long history of a time of extraordinary com-
plications and entanglements ; but — much more important — it has never lost
vigour and interest throughout the whole survey. . . . The completeness of
the book is really extraordinary. . . . The book is by far the best and
handiest account of the international politics of the nineteenth century that
we possess. . . . Should give Mr. Alison Phillips distinct rank among his-
torians of the day.' — Literature.
1 Altogether, the book offers a most luminous and quite adequate treatment
of its subject, and makes a worthy conclusion of a Series that well deserves
to be popular.' — Glasgow Herald.
* Mr. Phillips shows decided literary power in the handling of a not too
manageable period, and few readers with any appreciation of the march of
history, having once commenced the book, will be content to lay it aside
antil the last page is reached.'— Manchester Guardian.
5>
EUROPE
IN THE
SIXTEENTH CENTURY
1 494- 1 598
BY
A. H. JOHNSON, M.A.
HISTORICAL LECTURER TO MERTON, TRINITY
AND UNIVERSITY COLLEGES, OXFORD
PERIOD IV
EIGHTH IMPRESSION
SIXTH EDITION
RIVINGTONS
34 KING STREET, CO VENT GARDEN
LONDON
1923
All rights reserved
Printed in Great Britain by T. and A. Constable Ltd.
at the University Press, Edinburgh
PREFACE
The limits as to length imposed upon me by the
Editor of the Series forced me to adopt one of two
alternatives. I had either to content myself with a
very slight sketch of the whole of European History
during the period, or I had to exercise some prin-
ciple of selection.
Unwilling to do over again that which has already
been well done by Mr. Lodge in his History of Modern
Europe^ I have fallen back on the second alternative,
and confined myself to the greater Powers of Western
Europe.
Nor is such a selection without some justification ;
for it is the struggle for supremacy between these
Powers which underlies the other issues, affects every
movement (even the religious ones), and gives unity
to this many-sided and involved period of the world's
history.
My readers will therefore find no reference to the
affairs of England, nor to those of the Kingdoms of
Northern and Eastern Europe, except so far as in
viii
European History *, 1 494- 15 98
their foreign policy they affect the course of that
great struggle.
My best thanks are due to Mr. Armstrong for help,
more particularly in points of Spanish History, and to
Mr. Fletcher, who has revised the proofs, and assisted
with his kindly criticism.
Oxford.
PREFACE TO FOURTH EDITION
I have only to thank my critics, and especially Mr,
Armstrong and Mr. Fotheringham, for many helpful
suggestions.
Oxford,
LIST OF MAPS
PAGO
1. Spain, 1494- 1598, . ,
xvi
2. The Swiss Confederation,
119
3. Netherlands, .
3H
4. Portuguese and Spanish Discoveries, .
473
5. Italy, 1494-1559, .
6. France, 1494- 1598, ....
- at end of book
7. Germany in 1547, .
4
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGK
Bibliography, ...... x
Introduction, •••••• x
I. The Italian Wars, 1494- 1 518, . . . • 4
II. Internal History of France, Spain, and Germany,
1494-15 19, 90
III. From the Election of Charles to the Battle of
Pavia, ...... 129
IV. From the Treaty of Madrid to the Treaty of
Crespi, . . . . . .181
V. From the War of Schmalkalde to the treaty of
Cateau Cambresis, ..... 220
VI. The Counter- Re formation and Calvinism, . • 261
VII. Philip and Spain, ... . 277
VIII. The Revolt of the Netherlands, . . 315
IX. The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France, . 387
Appendix I.— The French Constitution in the Fifteenth
and Sixteenth Centuries, ..... 449
Appendix II.— Constitution of Florence in the Fifteenth
and Sixteenth Centuries, ..... 458
Appendix III.— Venetian Constitution in the Fifteenth and
Sixteenth Centuries, ...... 467-
LIST OF POPES AND GENEALOGIES, . . .472
INDEX, ■ ■•••«., 477
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE1
General —
Cambridge Modern History, vol. i.
Lavisse et Rambaud, Histoire GMrale.
Creighton, History of the Papacy during the Reformation, c. vii. to
the end.
Philippson, La Contre-Rivolution religieuse.
Ranke, Fursten und Vblker von Slid Europa im i6*(WI u. ljten Jahr-
hundert.
Zur Kritik neuerer Gesckichtschreiber.
Maps. — Spruner Menke, No. 8. Putzger, HistoHscher School Atlas.
Clarendon Press Historical Atlas, No. 8.
N.B. — The Clarendon Press Maps, with Notes, can be purchased
separately, the Spruner without Notes.
A chronological summary will be found in llassall, Handbook oj
European History.
France—
Cambridge Modern History, c xii.
Martin, Histoire de France.
Michelet, Histoire de France.
Grant, The French Monarchy.
1 This list may be supplemented by reference to the following
Bibliographies : —
I. The Cambridge Modern History, of which vol. i. has already
appeared.
H. Armstrong, Charles V.
III. Monod, Bibliographie de P Histoire de France.
IV. Dahlmann-Waitz, Quellenkunde der deutschen Geschichte.
v. Forster, Kritischer Wegweiser durch die neuere deutsche historische
Litteratur.
vi. Pirenne, Bibliographie de F histoire de Belgique.
VII. Lavisse et Rambaud, Histoire Gdnirale.
X
Bibliographical Note xi
Gasquet, Pricis des Institutions Politiques et Socialcs de Vancienne
France.
Cheruel, Dictionnaire historique des Institutions, mceurs et costumes
de la France.
Cherrier, Histoire de Charles VIII.
Godefroy, Theod., Histoire de Charles VIII. et Louis XII. (a collec-
tion of Chronicles).
Milntz, La Renaissance en Italie et en France a Pltpoque de
Charles VIII.
Philippe de Commines, Mimoires.
Lettenhove : Commines, Lettres et nigoc. avec un Commentaire.
Memoirs given in Petitot, Michaud et Ponjoulat, especially Fleuranges,
Bayard, Tavannes, Condi, La Noue.
Mignet, Rivaliti de Francois ler et de Charles Quint.
De Thou, Historiarum sui temporis libri cxxxviii. (translated into
French).
Ranke, Franzbsische Geschichte (translated The Civil Wars in France).
Armstrong, Civil Wars in France.
Baird, The Rise of the Huguenots.
Forneron, Les Dues de Guise.
Aumale, due d', Histoire des Princes de Condi.
Delaborde, Coligny.
Whitehead, Coligny.
Solden, Geschichte des Protestantismus in Frankreich.
Willert, Henry IV. (Heroes of Nations Series).
Mornay, Ph. , du Plessis Mimoires.
Maps. — Spruner Menke, No. 54.
Clarendon Press Historical Atlas, Nos. 57, 58.
Germany—
Cambridge Modern History, cc. ix. xvi. xvii. xviii. xix.
Nitzsch, Geschichte des deutschen Volkes.
Krones, Handbuch der Geschichte Osterreichs.
Ranke, Geschichte der romanischen und germanischen Vdlker (trans-
lated.)
Bezold, Geschichte der deutschen Reformation (Onckens Series).
Alman, Kaiser Maximilian I.
Vehse, Memoirs of the House of Austria (translated).
Hutten, Ulrich von, Schriften. Ed. Bocking.
Strauss, Ulrich von Hutten (translated).
Geiger, Renaissance und Humanismus in Italien und Deutschland
(Onckens Series).
Johann Reuchlin.
Erasmus, Opera. Ed. Le Clerc.
xii European History , 1494- 15 98
Froude, Erasmus,
Lamprecht, Deutsche Geschichte (good for the Social and Economic
History).
Allgemeine deutsche Biographic
Zeiler, Histoire oV Allemagne : La Reformation.
Ranke, Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation (part
translated).
Janssen, Geschichte des deutschen Volkes sett dem Ausgange des Mit-
telalters (in course of translation).
Beard, The Hibbert Lectures ; 1803.
Kostlin, Martin Luther.
Maurenbrecher, Studien u. Skizzen zur Reformationszeit.
Geschichte der katholischen Reform.
Karl V. und die deutschen Protestanten.
Armstrong, Charles V. «
Baumgarten, Geschichte Karls V.
Garchard, Life of Charles, in Biographie Nationale, vol. iii.
Mignet, Rivalitd de Francois ler et de Charles Quint.
Sir Stirling Maxwell, Cloister life of Charles V.
Lanz, Correspondenz des Kaisers Karl V.
Staatspapiere zur Geschichte des Kaisers Karl V.
Bradford, Correspondence of Charles V.
Garchard, Correspondance de Charles Quint et d'Adrien VI.
Brandenburg, Moritz von Sachsen.
Ranke, Zur deutschen Geschichte vom Religionsfrieden bis zum dreis-
sigidhrigen Krieg.
Wolf, G., Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Gegenreformation.
Kostlin, Martin Luther.
Kampschutte, Calvin.
Maps. — Spruner Menke, Nos. 43, 73, 74.
Clarendon Press Historical Atlas, Nos. 37, 38, 39, 47.
Bohemia —
Palacky, Geschichte von Bohmen.
Map. — Clarendon Press Historical Atlas, No. 46.
Switzerland —
Dierauer, Geschichte der schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft.
Coolidge, Article in Encyclopedia Brit.
Map. — Clarendon Press Historical Atlas, No. 44.
Italy —
Cf. Cambridge Modern History% cc. iv, v, vi, vii, viii, xvi, xvii, xviii,
xix.
Bibliographical Note xiii
Gregorovius, Geschichte der Stadt Rom, vols. vii. viii. (translated).
Creighton, Popes of the Reformation.
Ranke, Die romischen Pdpste (translated).
Pastor, Geschichte der Pdpste (translated).
Sismondi, Histoire des Republiques italiennes du moyen Age.
Brown, H. F. , Kalendar of Venetian State Papers.
Venice.
Romanin, Storia documentata di Venezia.
Perrens, Histoire de Florence.
Guicciardini, Storia d? Italia.
Considerazione intorno at Discorsi di MachiavelK: opere
inedite, vol. i.
Storia Fiorentina . opere inedite, vol. iii.
Guido Capponi, Storia della republica di Firenza.
Capponi, G. A., Storia del Reame di Napoli.
Jovius, Vitce illustrium virorum ' Elogia virorum illustrium f
Historia sui temporis.
Burcardas Diarium. Ed. Thuasne, 1883- 1885.
Giustiniani Dispacci. Ed. Villari.
Alberi, La relatione degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato durante il
Secolo xvi.
Da Porto, Lettere Storiche.
Sanuto, I Diarii.
Symonds, The Renaissance in Italy.
Zeller, Italie et la Renaissance.
Burckhardt, Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien (translated).
Geiger, Humanismus und Renaissance in Italien und Deutschland
(Onckens Series).
Yriarte, Venise.
Cisar Borgia.
La vie (Tun Patricien de Venise.
Burd, Machiavelli: II Principe (with Biographical and other Notes).
Machiavelli, Storia Fiorentina (French translation, Perier, 1842).
Legazioni e Commissarii, vol. iii. of Opere Discorsi.
Morley, Machiavelli (Romanes Lecture).
Villari, Niccolo Machiavelli (translated).
La Storia di G. Savonarola (translated).
Ranke, Savonarola u. die florentinische Republik.
Sarpi Paolo, Istoria del Concilio Tridentino (translated into French by
Courrayer).
Maps. — Spruner Menke, No. 27.
Clarendon Press Historical Atlas, Nos. 68, 69.
xiv European History \ 1494- 1598
Spain and Netherlands —
Cambridge Modern History, cc. xi. xiii.
Sch'afer und Schirrmaker, Geschichte von Spanien.
Lafuente, Historia general de Espafia.
Prescott, Ferdinand and Isabella.
Philip II.
Forneron, Histoire de Philippe II.
Hume, Spain.
Philip of Spain (Foreign Statesmen Series).
Philippson, West Europa im Zeitalter von Philip II.
Bergenroth, Calendar of Spanish State Papers.
Ranke, Die Osmanen und die spanische Monarchic im i6tm und l'jUm
Jahrhundert (translated).
Lettenhove, Histoire de Flandre.
Harrison, William the Silent (Foreign Statesmen Series).
Miss Putnam, History of the People of the Netherlands (translated from
Dutch of Blok).
William the Silent.
Guillaume Le Taciturne. Correspondance. Ed. Gashard.
Motley, The United Netherlands.
Maps. — Spruner Menke, No. 19.
Clarendon Press Historical Atlas, Nos. 61, 62, 52.
The Ottomans —
Cambridge Modern History, c. iii.
La Jonquiere, Histoire de P Empire ottoman.
Finlay, History of Greece.
Hammer-Purgstall, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches.
Ranke, Die Osmanen und die spanische Monarchic im \6tm und iytm
Jahrhundert (translated).
Maps. — Spruner Menke, No. 89.
Clarendon Press Historical Atlas, No. 82.
Discovery —
Cambridge Modern History, cc. i. ii.
Bancroft, The Pacific States of North America.
Beazley, The Dawn of Modern Geography.
John Sebastian Cabot (Builders of Great Britain Series)
Danvers, The Portuguese in India.
Fiske, The Discovery of America.
Harisse, Christophe Colomb.
John Cabot.
The Discovery of North America.
Bibliographical Note
xv
Markham, Sir C. R., Life of Christopher Columbus.
History of Peru.
Kretchmer, Die Entdeckung Amerikas.
Payne, History of the New World called America.
Peschel, Geschichte des Zeit alters der Entdeckungetu
Prescott, History of Conquest of Mexica.
History of Conquest of Peru.
Winsor, Narrative and Critical History of America,
Maps. — Spruner Menke, No. 20.
Clarendon Press Historical Atlas, No. 85.
•A
INTRODUCTION
The division of history into periods may be very misleading
if its true purport be not understood. One age can no more
be isolated from the universal course of history True mean.
than one generation from another. The ideas, fog of the
i • i i r i • j j division of
the principles, the aims of man change indeed, History into
but change slowly, and in their very change are Periods,
the outcome of the past. The old generation melts into the
new, as the night melts into the day. None the less, just
as the night differs from the day, although it is impossible
to say when the dawn begins, and when the day, so does
the Modern differ from that which has been termed the
Middle age. This once granted, the importance importance
of the later years of the fifteenth century may be °f closing
, . • / i years of the
easily grasped. The mediaeval conception of the fifteenth
great World-Church under Pope and Emperor had century,
by this time lost all practical power. The authority of the
Emperor was confined to Germany, and was even there dis-
puted, and, if the Papacy still retained its pretensions, they
no longer had their old weight. Not only had Break-up of
they been resisted by the various powers of mediaeval
t-i • j *_ i idea of a
Europe in turn, they had even been severely worid-
criticised by two General Councils. Already the church,
man was born who was to take the lead in the final over-
throw of the unity of the Western Church. Meanwhile, the
older society was breaking up : the links which in binding
a man to his lord, his fields, his trade, or his Riseofin-
town, bound him to his fellows, and his livelihood dividuaiism.
to him, were falling to pieces, and the ' individual ' of modern
PERIOD IV. A
2 European History, 1494- 1598
life was emerging. To this change many things contributed.
The movement of the Renaissance emancipated men from
the somewhat narrow limits of medievalism ; it opened to
them the knowledge of the ancients, and gave them a glimpse,
of the worlds of thought beyond, of which the New World]
about to be discovered to the west seemed but a type. The
economic revolution had a like effect. The break-up of the
older organisation of trades under the system of close guilds,
was accompanied by the rise of modern competition. In
life, as in thought, the individual was asserting himself.
Amidst the clashing of rival interests which this revolution
necessitated, a new principle of unity — that of nationality —
Growth of arose. This conception, due to an appreciation
nationalities. Gf the identity of interest based on such things
as common language, common religion, natural bound-
aries, common hopes and fears, was, if a less attractive
one than that of the Holy Roman Empire, at least more
capable of realisation, and alone seemed able to control the
spirit of individualism from running riot. It was in France,
Spain, and England that this new spirit of nationality had
been most successful : but, if Germany was no more than a
loose confederation of princes, the Hapsburgs had already laid
the foundation of a monarchy of their own, while the Pope
was becoming more and more the prince of a temporal king-
dom in Italy. The first result of this triumph of nationality
... was not surprising. When once a people have
ofthe realised the identity of their interests, they are
nations apt t0 ^e aggressive. This now occurred. Eng-
foreign land indeed, isolated from the Continent and
wars. absorbed in domestic questions, did not take
much part as yet ; but the others began to look abroad, and
Italy, where alone no political unity existed, offered fair hopes
of spoil. No sooner had France made the first move in pursuit
of her claims on Naples than their cupidity was aroused, and
Western Europe was involved in a series of wars which con-
tinued, with but little intermission, until the Peace of Vervins,
/Introduction 3
/
1598. ' The circumstances of the age gave to this struggle
it&,£>eculiar character. National consolidation had been
^Kcompanied by the triumph of the monarchical The triumph
^principle, after its long struggle with aristocracy of monarchy.
— a struggle which of late had not been confined to the
temporal sphere, but had been illustrated also within the
Church by the conflict between the Papacy and the General
Councils. It followed that the dynastic interests of the
reigning families predominated. The monarchs, no doubt,
represented the passions and aspirations of their subjects.
Nevertheless, their policy was deeply coloured by their per-
sonal and family rivalries, and hence the wars were more
prolonged than otherwise they might have been. To this
also must in part be attributed the shifting combinations of
alliances and counter-alliances, which change with the variety
and rapidity of a kaleidoscope, and which make R.
the period, so far as its wars are concerned, one theory of the
of the most confused in history. In the struggle balance of
J °°. Power and
which ensued, the Romance and the Teutonic of Dipio-
nations came into close though hostile contact; macy-
the theory of the Balance of Power became a guiding prin-
ciple of politics ; and diplomacy found its birth.
Before many years were passed, the unity of the Church
of the West was broken by the Reformation. It was inevit-
able that the religious and the political questions
should become involved. The struggle for supre- F ohtlcal
00 r issues
macy in Europe, the internal politics of the affected by
several kingdoms, were deeply affected by the t.he Ref°[ma-
. ° J tion. The
religious issues. The web of European compli- beginning of
cations became more confused than ever, and, if M°dern
Europe.
the interest of the period before us is thus en-
hanced, its difficulty is certainly increased. Into it all the
problems of the Middle Age became absorbed, and out of it
Modern Europe was to arise.
CHAPTER I
THE ITALIAN WARS, 1494-1518
Political condition of France — Regency of Anne of Beaujeu — The Italian
Expedition — Political Condition of Italy — Charles attacks Naples-
League of Venice — Battle of Fornovo — Retreat and £)eath of Charles viu,.
— Savonarola— Home Policy of Louis XII. — Louis attacks Milan — Treaty
of Granada and attack on Naples — Quarrel between Louis and Ferdinand
— Battles of Seminara, Cerignola, and Garigliano — French driven from
Naples — Alexander vi. and Caesar Borgia — League of Cambray — Battle
of Agnadello — The Holy League — Battle of Ravenna — French driven
from Italy — Medici restored to Florence, and Maximilian Sforza to Milan
— Conquest of Spanish Navarre — Break-up of Holy League — Louis xn.
succeeded by Francis 1. — Battle of Marignano — Concordat of Bologna —
Treaties of Noyon and London — Causes of decline of Venice*
§ i. The Expedition of Charles VIII.
At the date of the Italian expedition, Charles vni. had been
eleven years on the throne of France. The monarchy to
which he succeeded was, perhaps, less controlled by con-
stitutional checks than any other in Europe. The^_cjown
had earned popularity a>-llje_Jejjdei^Jn^the^truggle against
the English — a struggle which had created the jrenchnation ;
and as the patron of the middleZ3iis£S_aga4ftst--trie feudal
nobles. The Estates-General, the deliberative assembly of
the kingdom, had never succeeded in vindicating its claims.
The class divisions which divided it. as they did Jhe people,
had prevented united action. The third estate did not ade-
quately represent the middle classes ; the knights of the shire,
those valuable representatives of the country districts, who had
formed the backbone of the English House of Commons, did
not exist. With these defects, the Estates-General had failed to
The Italian Wars, 1494-1518 5
secure the command of the purse, or to control the legislation
and administration of the country. AH power accordingly lay
with the Royal Council, a body of royal nominees who issued
ordinances and levied taxes at their will, so long as they did
not entrench on the privileges of the nobility to be free from
all direct taxation beyond their feudal dues.
True, the 'Parlement' of Pans, trie supreme judicial court
of the realm, tried to exercise a power of veto by insisting on
its right of registering, and therefore of refusing to register,
the royal edicts. The King, however, could easily overcome
this opposition by holding a 'Lit de Justice,' — that is, by
summoning the members of the Parlement before the Great
Council, and ordering them to register ; and under a strong
King, at least, the Parlement became the humble instrument
rather than the opponent of the crown.1
As Charles was in his fourteenth year on the death of
his father Louis XL in 1483, a regency was not charles VIII
necessary according to the ordinance of Charles v. under the
(1374). But Louis xi., conscious of the way £^*"hip
in which he had from policy or from cynicism 2 Beaujeu,
neglected his son's education, had intrusted ^83-1493.
. ° Her
him to the guardianship of his daughter Anne, successful
wife of the Sire de Beaujeu, who, on the death ?ohcy-
of his elder brother in 1488, became Duke of Bourbon.
Of Anne Louis xi. had said 'she is the least foolish
woman in France.' But her conduct during the earlier years
of Charles' reign belied his further remark that 'of wise
women he knew none.' She had, in the interests of centralisa-
tion at least, though perhaps to the permanent loss of her
country, successfully evaded the claims made by the States-
General of 1484 to share in the government. She had
defeated the repeated attempts of the nobility headed by
Louis of Orleans, the heir-presumptive, to oust her from
1 Cf. Appendix i.
8 'If he knows these five Latin words, Qui nescit dissimulare nescii
regnare, it will suffice,' Louis XI. had said of his son.
¥ *
6 European History, 1 494-1 598
power, and to restore feudal licence — a movement wmcfc had
been supported by Francis 11. Duke of Brittany, by Maxi-
milian, then King of the Romans, by Richard in., and subse-
quently by Henry vn. of England.
On the death of Francis, Duke of Brittany (1488), she had
interfered in. the affairs of the duchy and won by arms the
hand of Anne, the Bretonne heiress, for the young King. By
the marriage-contract the autonomy of Brittany was indeed
acknowledged, but it was agreed that the duchy should fall
to the survivor, and the Duchess Anne bound herself, in the
event of her husband dying before her without children, to
marry the next possessor of the French throne. Thus the
way was prepared for the final incorporation into the mon-
archy of the last great semi-independent feudatory state, so
long a thorn in the side of France.
This brilliant triumph of diplomacy aroused all the enemies
of France. Maximilian had a double affront to avenge. He
himself had been married by proxy to Anne of Brittany, while
Charles vm. had at the Treaty of Arras, 1482, plighted his
troth to Margaret, Maximilian's daughter. Thus, by Charles'
marriage with the Breton Duchess, both the Emperor and
his daughter were jilted. Stung by this twofold insult, Maxi-
milian forthwith laid claim to Margaret's dower, Artois and
Franche-Comte', and tried to enforce his claims by arms.
Henry vn. attempted to prevent the union of Brittany with
France, and Ferdinand of Aragon seized the opportunity to
reclaim Roussillon, which had been ceded to Louis xi.
The claim of Maximilian to the dower of his daughter was
a just one and could scarce be denied. But the cession of
Roussillon should have been resisted at all hazards, while the
interference of Henry vn. might have been answered by a
resolute attempt to regain Calais and drive the English finally
from the kingdom. Whether France was strong enough for
so bold a stroke may perhaps be doubted, but at least her
policy should hare been devoted to the strengthening of her
frontiers and the consolidation of the kingdom.
The Italian Wars, 1494-1518 7
Unfortunately at this moment Charles had become infatuated
with the idea of the Italian expedition. Being now old
enough to act independently of his sister, he charieshent
hurriedly yielded to the demands of his enemies, on the Italian
Henry vii. was bought off by the Treaty of Staples, JSJj*^
November 1492. Cerdagne and Roussillon were with his
ceded to Ferdinand by the Treaty of Barcelona, enemies-
January 1493, and by the Treaty of Senlis, May 1493, the
princess Margaret was restored to her father with Artois and
Franche-Comte\ Having thus evaded his difficulties near
home, Charles hurried on his preparations for the Italian
campaign.
After the fall of the Roman Empire, Italy had rapidly lost
all national cohesion. In spite of fruitless attempts which
were made now and again to establish a united condition of
kingdom in the Peninsula, the principle of dis- Italy in J494-
integration had finally triumphed. The Emperors of the West
indeed had claimed supremacy, but, since the close of the
thirteenth century, this had ceased to be a reality, and on the
ruins of those claims, amidst numerous smaller states, five
had risen to special prominence.
In the centre of the plain of Lombardy stood Milan, which
at the close of the thirteenth century had fallen to the
Visconti. That cruel but capable family, while
they destroyed the liberties, extended the domin-
ion of the republic, and absorbed most of the smaller states
of the plain which escaped the rule of Venice. The territory,
which on the extinction of the male line of the Visconti was
seized by the Condottiere, Francesco Sforza (1450), stretched
from the river Adda, where it marched with the Venetian lands,
to the Sesia, where it met Piedmont then under the Duke of
Savoy, and the Marquisate of Montferrat. In 1476, the son of
Francesco, Galeazzo Maria, had paid the penalty of his tyranny,
lust, and cruelty at the hands of three Milanese nobles who, if
tyrannicide may ever be defended, are worthy of the name of
patriots. He left a widow Bona of Savoy, who ruled in the
8 European History \ 1494- 1598
name of her infant son Gian Galeazzo, aided by her husband's
wisest counsellor, Francesco Simonetta. Three years later,
1479, Ludovico ' II Moro,' uncle of the young Gian, overthrew
her rule, caused Simonetta to be executed, and assumed the
regency. Ludovico, though ambitious, unscrupulous, and a
lover of intrigue, was not wantonly cruel as many of his pre-
decessors had been, and, if his rule was a despotic one, he was
a liberal patron of the arts and kept his dominions contented
and at peace.
To the east of the Duchy of Milan stood the republic of
Venice. Once a democracy, she had by the close of the
thirteenth century become a commercial oligarchy.
At the close of the fifteenth century, not only did
the Great Council monopolise the electoral functions of the
state, but the Doge himself had become little more than an
ornamental figure-head.1 Venice originally had concerned
herself little with the politics of the mainland. Entrenched
behind her lagoons, she had turned her attention to the
Mediterranean and the East, from whence came her com-
merce, the source of her wealth. At the commencement of
the fifteenth century, however, she had turned her eye west-
ward to form a territory on the mainland.2 In this venture
she had indeed met with great success, and, besides her
possessions on the east of the Adriatic, in the Morea, and
the ^Egean Sea, she now ruled a large territory north of the
Po, which stretched westwards to the Adda and northwards to
the spurs of the Alps. But this policy had drawn her into the
troubled tangle of Italian politics, and aroused the jealousy of
the Italian states. Still Venice was formidable. By the treaty
of 1479, she had surrendered indeed Scutari, Negropont, and
most of her possessions in the Morea, but had retained her
commercial privileges, and secured a temporary peace with
the Turk. In 1488, she annexed, by a fiction of remarkable
ingenuity, the island of Cyprus.
The rule of her aristocracy was far less corrupt and far more
4 Cf. Appendix iii. 2 On this cf. p. 57.
The Italian Wars, 1 494-1 518 g
consistent than that of other Italian states. The stability of
her Government and her immunity from those revolutions to
which the other states of Italy were ever subject excited the
envy of her neighbours. The leniency and wisdom with
which she governed her dependencies secured her the loyalty
of her subjects. Her riches were still great ; her patronage
of art magnificent ; and if the tone of private morality was low,
it was not lower than in the rest of Italy.
To the south and south-west of Venice lay the two
independent territories of Mantua and of Ferrara. Of these
Mantua, situated amid the marshy flats of the Mantua and
Mincio, belonged to the warrior family of the Ferrara-
Gonzagas, while Ferrara, commanding the mouths of the Po,
was ruled by the ancient house of Este.
Nestling under the Apennines, Florence held the watershed
of the Arno with her dependent cities of Volterra, Arezzo,
Cortona, Pistoja, and Pisa. To the north-west
and to the south of her lay the independent states
of Lucca and Siena, long her deadly enemies.
Nominally a republic based on a system of trade-guilds,
Florence was practically in the hands of the Medici, who,
while they left the outward form of the constitution intact,
kept the government in the hands of their partisans. From
time to time a packed ' Parliament' of the citizens elected com-
mittees or Balias, under whose control the Signory and other
officials were selected. Finally, in 1480, a college of seventy,
practically nominated by Lorenzo, took for a time the place
of the Balias. This college not only nominated the Signory,
but elected the Consiglio Maggiore, the legislative body of the
republic, and thus became master of the city. A clever mani-
pulation of the taxes, by which they struck at the rich, gained
the Medici the support of the lower classes, while the con-
fusion of the public treasury with the finances of their banking-
house gave them the final control of the administration.1 The
rule of the Medici was a far more temperate one than that of
1 Cf. Appendix ii.
10 European History, 1 494- 15 98
the Sforza of Milan. Their power was the result of real
political genius. By that alone they had succeeded in con-
trolling the most restless, the most acute, and the most
brilliant people the world had yet seen since the days of the
Athenians. In Florence was concentrated the essence of
Italian art and literature, and with it, alas, much of that
immorality and licence which stains the glory of the Renais-
sance. Unfortunately, at this crisis of her history, Lorenzo the
Magnificent, the type of a Medicean prince, died (April 1492),
and, under the incapable rule of his son Piero, the authority
of the family was being rapidly undermined.
r Encircling the territories of Siena and Florence on the
south and the east, and stretching across the centre of Italy
The Papal from sea to sea, stood the Papal States, formed of
states. the Patrimony of St. Peter, the Campagna, the
Duchy of Spoleto, the March of Ancona and the Romagna.
Of these territories all, except the two first, while acknow-
ledging the suzerainty of the Pope, were practically indepen-
dent, and in the Patrimony and in the Campagna, the
powerful families of the Orsini and the Colonna were ever
setting his authority at defiance. It had been of late the
policy of the Popes to enforce their rule in these districts
and to organise a strong temporal dominion, a policy definitely
begun by Sixtus iv, (147 1-1484). They are probably right who
maintain that by this means alone could the Papacy hope to
survive. The mediaeval conception of the Holy Roman
Empire had gone beyond recall. The idea of a united
Christendom under one faith was no longer a reality. Largely,
though by no means entirely, through its own deficiencies, the
Papacy had lost its moral hold on Europe, and the attempt
of Nicolas v. (1447-1455) and Pius 11. (1458-1464) to regain
the intellectual leadership of Europe had met with scant success.
During the period of the captivity of Avignon (1309-1377),
and the great Schism (1378-1417), the power of the larger
Italian states, and the lust for further extension, had grown.
Under these circumstances, if the Papacy was to save itself
The Italian Wars, I 494- 1 5 1 8 t!
from falling as low as it had fallen in the tenth century,
when it was the puppet of the neighbouring nobles, it must
•( V1 "v sir4- -- "■ r rtror id united dominion.
t The ni ces — cost it dear! Sucked intfr the vortex
of political intrigue, the Papacy r ■ jstituted its spiritual
powers foi ^n hocked the conscience »
Unfortunately the ^opes who ascended the
papal throne at this momerft were men of low principle.
Sixtus iv. (147 1- 1 484) was venal, and sacrificed everything
for the advancement of his nephews. Iano_cent vm.
(1484-1492), hopelessly -corrupt and indolent, was the first
e jsd]Q openly ;:^r,owleidor'afi h^ WlilflrftP 1 while of
is Pope Alexander vi. from 1492
to J >vith moderation. To enurae-
:h have been brought agai st him would
exhaust the crimes of :he decajo^u^s__jEv©»--if--we dismiss
those charges "on which ~tfre~evidence is not conclusive, it
cannot be denied that Alexander was profligate beyond
ordinary profligacy, contemptuous of the ordinary conven-
tionalities of decency, avaricious and cruel, and in states-
manship absolutely without sfcrjjpie.
sire of O-form ... 'poral dominion was
alsojnjurious to Italy.1 jgh to unite the Penin-
a under their own s. /ay, they are determined to prevent
^tsTImon under". aids! tn this attempt to reconcile
head of the Churc' *vith those of a temporal
prince, they were ever ready to b tc awa; eir country's
TKey had more than once before this summoned
igner to their aid, and, if they were not responsible for
the first invasion of the French, th£y went far to make
the foreign dominion permanent.
The extremity of the Peninsula formed the kingdom of
o, new ir the hands of Fe/ranie 1. (145 8- 1494), illegiti-
mate son of Alfonso the Magnanimous, of Aragon ; while
Sicily and Sardinia belonged, with Aragon, to the legitimate
1 Cf. Machiavelli, Discorst, Book i. c. 12.
1 2 European History, 1 494- 1 598
branch represented just now by Ferdinand the Catholic (1479-
15 16). Always the most disturbed of the Italian states,
Naples had in 1485 been the scene of a baronial revolt against
the tyranny of Ferrante. The King, indeed, by cunning and
ability had triumphed, but his faithlessness and inhuman
cruelties had made him most unpopular, and his rule most
insecure. He died in January 1494, to be succeeded by his
son Alfonso 11. (1494-1495), who, according to the French
chronicler Commines, though not so dangerous, was a worse
man than his father, since ' never was any prince more bloody,
wicked, inhuman, lascivious, or gluttonous than he.'
The rivalry of these five states, mutually repellent, yet
unable to establish complete independence, was to cai:
ruin of Italy* Too equally balanced io allov.
of these the supremacy of one, too jealous of each oJier
states- and too divergent in the character of their peoples
and the form of their governments to unite in a federal bond,
theyjost all sense of common national interest* The exist-
ence of numerous petty states between their frontiers, which
could only hope to survive by dexterous intrigue, excited their
cupidity and thickened the thread of treacherous diplomacy
which was now to call the foreigner into Italy.
But if the quarrels of these Italian rulers led to the first
invasion, and subsequently prevented any permanent coalition,
intellectual the condition of the people of Italy destroyed all
activity and hQD£_pi ,. successful resistance. In reading the
moral degra- ' "■■". ;■■ ■ ' ~~ °
dationofthe social history of Italy during the fifteenth century
Italians. tw0 iessons are forced upon us : first, the fatal
effect of the loss of liberty, and of political faction on
the moral fibre of a people ; secondly, the danger of luxury,
and of devotion to art and literature, if not chastened by the
religious spirit
In states like Milan and Naples, where all political liberty
had been destroyed, the only weapons of the oppressed
were those the tyrant had taught them — intrigue and assas-
sination. In cities like Florence, where constitutional forms
The Italian Wars, 1 494- 1 5 1 8 1 3
remained but the spirit had fled, and where the state was
torn by deadly feuds which vented themselves in cruel pro-
scription and exile of the defeated, jhe, people wgre umpired
by mutual suspicion and de/>p politic hatreds. To lose
power was to lose everything. Hence men became desperate,
forgot the necessity for patience, the duty of a minority, and
sought to overthrow their enemies by secret conspiracy or open
revolt. Tn the smaller states things were worse. There was
even less stability, the factions were more bitter, the chance of
successful revolt greater. No doubt Venice and the Papal
Dominions were more stable than the rest of the Peninsula,
but even there intrigue, corruption, and conspiracies were
not uncommon.
Amid such political circumstances as these, not only did
all feeling of Italian nationality perish, but patriotism for city
or kingdom died before the imperative instincts of self-
preservation. The worship of success replaced devotion to
principle and obedience to authority, while cleverness and
selfishness flourished at the expense of morality. More-
over, to protect themselves or to pursue their schemes of
conquest, the tyrants introduced the Condottieri. The
republics, partly from indolence, partly from the difficulty
of resisting the trained soldier with a half-disciplined militia,
followed suit, and Italy became the victim of mercenaries. Of
war these made a game : with no interest in the quarrels be-
yond their wage, or their individual ambitions, they loved the
battlefield by which they lived, yet did not wish the battle to
be decisive. Ever ready to change sides at the dictates of
self-interest, or for higher pay, they set up and overthrew states
and spread confusion around. Meanwhile the citizens forgot
the art of war, and, when the moment of their trial came,
finding themselves no match for the martial nations of the
North, were frightened at the fury of their onslaught.
The rapid increase of luxury and the development of literature
and art tended to the same results. Undue devotion to material
comfort made the Italians cowardly, selfish, and indolent.
14 European History, 1494- 159S
The revival of the critical faculty led to scepticism j the
critic destroyed indeed, but had not the enthusiasm nor the
faith to reconstruct. The return to classical ideals caused a
revival of paganism, while the concentration of man's mind on
the pleasures of art, on the sensuous delight in beauty of form
and colour, led many on to sensuality. The history of the
Renaissance stands as a warning that the aesthetic spirit is not
necessarily religious or even moral. No doubt it is easy to
exaggerate. No doubt there were to be found many who
lived a pure and simple life. Perhaps the denunciations of
an enthusiast like Savonarola1 are too extravagant. But
the contemporary evidence against the Italians is over-
whelming. The literature of the time must have found
readers. The cynical frankness with which Machiavelli
disregards all moral scruples in his treatises on the art of
government are without parallel in the history of political
literature, and the carnival songs of Lorenzo are of them-
selves enough to convince us of the depths of degradation
to which Italian morality had sunk. Thus Italy," without
any sense of nationality or patriotism, and devoid of those
more sterling qualities which might have rendered resistance
possible, was to see her fair plains the scene of other nations'
rivalries, and to fall eventually under the yoke of a foreign
dominion which lasted till our own day.
The French claims on Italy were twofold, and were of
long standing./. The House of Orleans, in virtue of their
French descent from Valentina, heiress of the Visconti
claims on of Milan, looked upon themselves as the legiti-
Italy' mate aspirants to the ducal throne, and con-
sidered the Sforzas usurpers. ^The House of Anjou disputed
the title of the Aragonese kings of Naples and declared that
Joanna 11., who died in 1435, IsjMfteft her territories to
Rend, the head of their house. The claims of the House of
1 Cf. Savonarola ' on the Contempt of the World,' given in Villari, Life
of Savonarola, vol. ii. App. and his Sermons, passim.
The Italian Wars, 1494- 1518 15
Orleans were now represented by Louis of Orleans, cousin of
Charles viii., who already held Asti, while those of the House
of Anjou had in 1481 fallen to the crown, together with Anjou
and Provence, according to the will of Rene 1., the last Duke
of Anjou. Louis xi. had contented himself with Anjou and
Provence, but his foolish and ambitious son, fascinated with
the dream of a southern kingdom which might serve as a
starting-point for a new crusade against the Turk, was eager
to enforce his claims in Italy. Yet even Charles might have
hesitated if a quarrel between Milan and Naples had not
offered a tempting opportunity.
In 1435, Alfonso the Magnanimous, the rival of Rene of
Anjou for the kingdom of Naples, had warned Filippo Maria,
who then ruled Milan, that the French, once
masters of Naples, would seek to extend their ofIet^yace
territories in the north. Francesco STorza, who depended on
secured Milan shortly after Filippo's death Aiiianeeof
(1450), conscious that the legitimate claim to Milan,
Milan had passed with the hand of Valentina to and'iJa'ies
the French House of Orleans, needed no con-
vincing. The result had been a close alliance between these
two powers, which had been strengthened by the marriage of
Ippolita, Sforza's daughter, with Alfonso, Prince of Calabria.
Lorenzo, true to the traditional policy of the Medici, had
joined this league. He hoped, by a triple alliance of Milan,
Naples, and Florence, to maintain the balance of power in
Italy, resist the desire for territorial aggression shared by
Venice and the Papacy, and, by keeping peace within the
Peninsula, deprive the foreigner of all excuse for interference.
Whether Lorenzo would have succeeded may well be doubted,
but certainly his death (April 1492) removed the only man to
whom success was possible.
Even before Lorenzo died, the alliance between Milan and
Naples had threatened to break up. The coup d'etat of 1479,
by which Ludovico ' II Moro ' had seized the reins of power
from Bona of Savoy, had received the approval of Ferrante of
1 6 European History, 1 494- 1 598
Naples. In the following year, however (i48o)/the death of
Ippolita, Ludovico's sister and wife of Alfonso, son*bfFerrante,
broke the bond between the two families. The
thePAiiiance subsequent marriage of the young Gian Galeazzo,
between with Alfonso's daughter, Isabella (1489), made
Napiesforces matters worse. Alfonso became jealous of Ludo-
Ludovico to vico's rule and wished to see his son-in-law, who
foreigner? na<^ m tne year *492 reached the age of twenty,
recognised as duke. This jealousy was shared by
Isabella, who was envious of the higher honours conferred on
her kinswoman, Beatrice of Este, the wife of Ludovico.
Piero de Medici, who had just succeeded Lorenzo at Floi
ence (1492), joined Alfonso in a secret league against Ludovico,
to which Ferrante of Naples was somewhat unwillingly pre-
vailed upon to accede. Thus the triple alliance of Milan,
Naples, Florence, upon which the safety of Italy depended,
was broken, and Ludovico was driven to look elsewhere for
support. To Maximilian, who in 1493 was elected emperor,
he gave the hand of his niece, Bianca, and gained in return
the investiture of his duchy, which had hitherto been denied
to the Sforza family. Despairing of more effective aid from
that .impecunious prince, he next turned to France. San
Severino, Count of Cajazzo, was sent to ' tickle Charles, who
was but twenty-one years of age, with the vanities and glories
of Italy, and to urge the right he had to the fine kingdom of
Naples ' (Commines).
The policy of Ludovico has received undue condemnation.
Every Italian prince had called upon the French when it
suited his purpose. Hitherto Ludovico had been the most
strenuous opponent of this policy, and when in 1485, Inno-
cent viii. had urged Rene 11. of Lorraine to press the Angevin
claims on Naples, it "was he who had prevented it. Though
selfish, and a master of diplomatic treachery, he was by no
means the worst of the Italian princes of his day. It was
the altered policy of Naples which drove him to the fatal step.
Moreover, Gian Galeazzo was an incapable man, aud it seems
The Italian Wars, 1 494- 15 18 1 7
probable that Alfonso, who had an insatiable lust for power,
hoped to make him his puppet. Ludovico neither desired nor
expected the French to conquer Naples. Italians, indeed, had
so often used the threat of foreign intervention that they had
forgotten what it might mean. His appeal to Charles was but
a move in the game of intrigue which all were playing, and all
that can be said is that, while others had tried it without
success, Ludovico succeeded, to his own ruin, and that of
Italy. Nor was he the only one who at this moment called on
Charles. His exhortations were supported by the Prince of
Salerno, a Neapolitan fugitive, eager to avenge the cruelties
which Ferrante, in violation of his promise, had exercised on
the leaders of the revolt of the Barons in 1485. To these were
added the solicitations of the Cardinal Julian della Rovere, the
rival and deadly enemy of Borgia, who had just ascended the
papal throne as Alexander vi. (August 1492).
1 The question of the expedition,' says Philippe de Commines,
1 was warmly debated, since by all persons of experience and
wisdom it was looked upon as a very dangerous Charles de-
undertaking.' Anne of Beaujeu, her husband, cides on the
and many others, did their best to dissuade the "spited?
King, but 'Charles was foolish and obstinate,' better advice
and was supported in his obstinacy by his favourites, Stephen
de Vers, once gentleman of the Chamber, now Seneschal of
Beaucaire, and Briconnet, Bishop of St. Malo ; the one hoping,
for lands in Naples, the other for a cardinal's hat, promised;
by the Milanese ambassadors. The younger nobles, eager for
the spoils of Italy, joined in the cry, and Charles rashly
started on an enterprise 'for which neither his exchequer,
his understanding, nor his preparations sufficed.'
In August, the King, who had wasted the spring and early
summer at Lyons, spending on festivities and on
• 1 1 1 j ,1 1 Charles
amorous intrigues the money he had collected or crosses the
borrowed for his expedition, passed down the a1ps-
Rhone to Vienne, and thence crossed the Alps P ' a' I494'
by the pass of Mont Genevre (September 2). His army was-
PERIOD IV. b
1 8 European History, 1494-1598
not exclusively a French one, for German landsknechts and
Swiss mercenaries also accompanied it. Thus it was a fit
harbinger of those foreign invasions which were for the next
hundred years to desolate the fair plains of Italy.
At Asti, where Ludovico met him, he was delayed first by
his gaieties, then by illness, and it was not until the 6th of
October that he left Asti for Piacenza. Here the question
as to his future course was debated. He was now to leave
the territories of his ally. Venice to the north-east was
neutral. The Pope, had after some hesitation, decided to resist
the French. In Florence, opinion was much divided. The
citizens, tnie rn theJ£_traditionsT were for the French, and wgre
strengthened in their views by the warnings of Savonarola
that a^scourge should chastise Italy.. Piero, on the other
hand, was in league with Maples. Finally, it was decided to
choose the more western route by the Via di Pontremoli
Charles rather than the easier way through Bologna,
crosses the Charles would thus avoid the Neapolitan Prince,
and advances Ferrante, who had been sent by his father, now
•<»> Florence. King Alfonso, to hold the Romagna, and would
maintain his communications with the sea which had been
won by the victory of the Duke of Orleans over Don Federigo,
the brother of the King of Naples, at Rapallo (September 8).
Florence, moreover, it was hoped, would declare for France
on the king's approach.
The pass was a difficult one, and the country through
which it passed was so barren that it did not even supply
forage for the horses. Had the French here been met
with stubborn resistance they might never have pene-
trated into Tuscany, for Ludovico was beginning to re-
pent of having called Charles into Italy. His suspicions
of French designs on Milan were already aroused, and
the death of his unfortunate nephew, Gian Galeazzo
(October 1494), by poison, as was generally believed, re-
moved the need of French assistance against Naples. But
the divided counsels of the Florentines came to Charles'
The Italian Wars, 1494- 15 18 19
aid. The French were left to pass the defiles undisturbed,
and after sacking the town of Fivizzano, sat down p.erQ
before the fortress of Sarzana. Hither Piero, driven from
terrified at the disaffection in Florence, hastened, Flounce.
Nov. g, 1494-
and acceded to Charles' demands. He promised
a sum of money ; he surrendered four of the most important
cities: Sarzana, Pietra-Santa, Pisa, and Leghorn. These
humiliating concessions still further irritated the Florentines.
On Piero's return to Florence (November 8) the citizens
rushed to arms, and he was forced to fly in disguise to Venice.
The defection of Florence threatened the position of Ferrante
in the Romagna and opened the way to Rome. Thither
therefore Ferrante retired.
Meanwhile Charles, after granting to the Pisans freedom
from their hated mistress Florence, a present which was
not his to give, passed on to Florence. Dis- Charles
regarding the warning of Savonarola that he would enters Flor-
,,...-.,. • ,, ence, and
only be victorious if he showed mercy, especially having with
to Florence, and was not an occasion of stum- difficulty
, . . . , , . , made terms,
bhng, he entered the city ' with lance in rest as paSses on to
if he came as conqueror (November 17). This Rome,
threatening attitude was accompanied by extravagant demands.
First, he asked for the recall of Piero. That being refused,
he insisted that a French lieutenant should be left in the
city, whose consent should be necessary for every act.
As the Florentines still demurred, the king in anger
said: 'We shall sound our trumpets.' 'And,' we answered,
^Capponi shall sound our bells.' Seeing that he might
go too far, Charles abated his demands. The Floren-
tines consented to pay 120,000 florins in six months, and
to allow two representatives of the king to remain in
Florence. But the Medici were not to be recalled, and
Charles promised to restore the cities ceded to him by Piero
at the end of the war (November 27). Having thus settled
the difficulty with Florence, Charles passed through Siena
20 European History \ 1494- 1598
which accepted a French garrison (December 2), and advanced
on Rome.
Alexander vi. had done his best for the cause of Naples,
but he now became seriously alarmed* His correspondence
with the Turkish Sultan, Bajazet 11., in which, in return for
help, the murder of the Sultan's brother, Djem, then in
Alexander's keeping, had been mooted, had fallen into
Charles' hands.. His enemies were crying for a General
Council. Ostia had been seized by Fabrizio Colon n a
in the name of his enemy, della Rovere (September 18). He
therefore determined to come to terms, and, securing a free
retreat for Ferrante and his army, admitted the
comes to French within the walls of Rome, while he retired
terms. to the castle of St. Angelo. The Cardinals della
jan. 15, . Rovere an(j gforza urged Charles to offer no further
concessions, and to summon a General Council which should
depose the Pope and proceed to reform the Church. But
Bricpnnet did not wish for a breach which might endanger
his hope of a cardinal's hat ; Charles was scarcely the man
for a reformer; the bribes of Alexander had their effect;
and finally a compromise was effected. The Pope agreed
to surrender Civita Vecchia, Terracina, and Spoleto, for safe
keeping till the conclusion of the war, to pardon the
rebellious cardinals, and to deliver up Prince Djem. He
also conferred on the bishop of St. Malo the coveted
cardinal's hat, and ordered his son, Cardinal Caesar Borgia,
to accompany Charles as a hostage. No sooner had the king
left Rome for the south than Caesar slipped away, and Djem
died. The death of the latter, popularly attributed to poison
administered by Alexander, was probably due to natural
causes ; but Caesar's disappearance warned Charles that no
trust could be placed in the promises of the Pope.
The success of the French had been so extraordinary,
Alfonso that Alfonso might well feel dismay. He knew
resigns his that his subjects hated him with a deadly hatred,
crown and
goes to Sicily, and, with the cowardice so common to cruel
Feb. 3. 1495. men, he now became a victim of superstitious
The Italian Wars, 1 494- 1 5 1 8 21
terror. Declaring that ' the very stones and trees cried France,'
he resigned his crown to his son and fled to Sicily (February
3. 1495)-
His son, Ferrante II., showed more spirit and joined his
army at San Germane Here a mountain pass and the rive"r
Garigliano offered a favourable opportunity for defence ; but
the news of the savage conduct of the French at the storming
of Monte San Giovanni spread terror among his troops, and
they fell back on Capua. A revolt at Naples recalled
Ferrante, to find that his general, Trivulzio, had made terms
with Charles. Naples now rose again, and the luckless
King, declaring that he suffered for the sins of his fathers,
not his own, and promising to come to the aid of his
faithless subjects, should the barbarity of the French cause
them to wish for his return, sailed for Sicily _. ,
' . J Charles enters
(February 21). On the following day Charles Naples,
entered Naples, and within a few weeks all the Feb* aa' I495-
country, with the exception of one or two fortresses, was in
his hands.
'The success of Charles,' says Commines, 'must be con-
sidered the work of Providence.' Almost without breaking a
lance, he had traversed the length of Italy and won „
. ° J Reaction
a kingdom. It seemed as if his boast, that he against the
would lead a crusade against the Turks and French-
conquer Constantinople, would be fulfilled. JBut his triumph
was short-lived, and ' his fortunes changed as suddenly as the
day rises in Norway.' The French, puffed up by their success,
'scarce considered the Italians to be men,' and alienated
them by their cruelties and licence. Charles took no steps
to secure his conquest, but betook himself to his pleasures.
No pains were taken to conciliate the Neapolitan nobles;
all offices were conferred on Frenchmen, and the promised
remission of taxes was never fulfilled.
Meanwhile a storm was gathering in the North. Ludovico
had long repented of his rashness in inviting the French, and
feared that Louis of Orleans might lay claim to Milan \ the
22 European History \ 1494- 15 98
Pope dreaded a General Council, and was only too glad to
raise up enemies against the King ; Venice, which had at first
The Lea ue laughed at the expedition, became seriously
of Venice. alarmed; Ferdinand the Catholic had already re-
March 31, 1495. m0nstrated with Charles, and began to apprehend
an attack on Sicily; the dignity of Maximilian was ruffled
by the preponderance of the House of Valois. Negotiations
between these powers had long been going on at Venice.
The conquest of Naples brought matters to a climax, and
on March 31, they formed the League of Venice, ostensibly to
defend their territories and to prepare for war against the
Turks. Guicciardini asserts that they secretly engaged to
drive the French from Italy. Their object was more probably
to protect themselves against further French aggression.
Florence alone refused to break faith with the French,
hoping to regain Pisa through their help.
With incredible folly, Charles delayed till May, in the vain
hopes of receiving the papal investiture of Naples. Then
Charles hastily receiving the crown at the hands of the
retreats. Archbishop of Naples, he began his retreat with
scarce 10,000 men (May 20). The Count of Montpensier,
' a good soldier,' says Commines, ' but with little wisdom, and
so indolent that he did not rise till mid-day,' was left as viceroy.
Stephen de Vers, now Duke of Nola, was made governor of
Gaeta and controller of the finances, and Stuart d'Aubigny,
the best soldier of them all, governor of Calabria. As Charles
approached Rome, Alexander fled to Orvieto; and thence
to Perugia. Arrived in Tuscany, Charles found all in
confusion. Siena, Lucca, and Pisa had formed a league
against Florence, and pleaded for French assistance. The
Florentines, who had reformed their government after the
advice of Savonarola, demanded the restitution of the cities
temporarily ceded to the King. Charles, incapable of decision,
put them off with negotiations, and leaving French garrisons
in the ceded towns, crossed the Apennines, June 23.
3ut the French were not to escape from Italy without a
The Italian Wars, 1494- 1 518 23
battle. Their fleet on the west coast protected them from
the attack of Venetian or Spanish ships, but on the mainland
the forces of Milan and of Venice under the The Battle
Marquis of Mantua met them at Fornovo on ofFomovo.
the Taro. The army of the League had the J"1*6'1**,
advantage of numbers and position, and had they shown
determination, might have inflicted a decisive defeat. But
the Italians were little eager to bring the French to bay, and
Charles, wisely wishing to pursue his march, pushed on his
vanguard. It was met by the Milanese troops under the
Count Cajazzo, but the attack was feeble and easily
repulsed. This,, according to Guicciardini, was due to
Ludovico. Fearing that too complete a victory might place
him in the power of the Venetian troops, which were far
more numerous than his own, and that too crushing a defeat
might draw on him the vengeance of the French, he had
ordered his captain not to press the French too closely.
Meanwhile the assault on the centre and rearguard was far
more vigorous, and Charles was in momentary danger. He
was, however, saved by the enemies' want of discipline;
many of the Italians turned to plunder his camp, the reserves
did not attack, and the French king, with loss of baggage but
not of prestige, was able to pursue his way,
At Asti, Charles was delayed by the question of Novara.
Louis of Orleans had occupied that town in June, only to be
besieged by Ludovico. In vain, Louis begged for instant aid.
Charles would not stir till reinforcements came, and meanwhile
solaced himself with amorous intrigues. Fortunately Ludovico
was anxious to get the French out of Italy, and in October
came to terms. Louis surrendered the town, but Treat of
Ludovico, breaking with the League, promised vercein.
to give free passage to the French, and even to °ct' I0' I495'
assist them whenever they might march against Naples. This,
however, seemed unlikely for the present.
No sooner had Charles turned his back on Naples than his
conquests began to melt away. The Neapolitans, according
24 European History \ 1494- 1598
to Guicciardini, were the most inconstant people of Italy, and
the follies of the French reminded them of Ferrante's words.
Ferrante accordingly returned at the end of
Charles leaves -1,1 i-r^,- , 1
Italy and his May, aided by troops sent by Ferdinand the
conquests Catholic under Gonzalvo de Cordova, the most
melt away. -
brilliant of the Spanish generals. Defeated by
Stuart d'Aubigny at Seminara, and driven to Messina, he
directed a second attack on Naples. The city rose, the gates
were opened, and Montpensier took refuge in the castle (July 7),
which he was forced to evacuate shortly after. The Venetians,
in return for money, were allowed to occupy Monopoli, Otranto,
Brindisi, and Trani. Montpensier struggled on for some time
longer, hoping for reinforcements from France. But Charles
was immersed in pleasure ; Louis of Orleans, who was heir-
presumptive to the throne, refused to leave France, and finally
Montpensier capitulated at Atella (July 21, 1496). D'Aubigny,
though sick with fever, held out a little longer, but by the close
of the year 1496, all was lost to France. Ferrante did not live
to see the end. He died in September, and his uncle Federigo
quietly succeeded him. Thus five kings had sat on the throne
of Naples within three years.
Of Charles' acquisitions, the only traces which remained
were the cities ceded to him by Florence. These should
' have been restored on his retreat, but in hopes of return,
Charles had evaded his promise, and the officers he had
left in command proceeded to violate it entirely. Leghorn
was indeed surrendered in September, but Sarzana was
sold to the Genoese, Pietra-Santa to Lucca, and the citadel
of Pisa to the Pisans. Of these Pisa was only regained
in 1509, after a prolonged struggle which exhausted the
republic and contributed materially to its fall, Pietra-Santa
not till the Medici had been restored in 15 13, and Sarzana
not at all. Thus the ally of France was the one to suffer
most.
Charles vm. survived the Italian expedition scarce three
years. Always indulging in dreams of a renewed attack on
The Italian Wars, 1494-1 518 25
Naples, he was at first too much engrossed in his pleasures
to carry them into effect. During the last few months of his
life he had, according to Commines, ' resolved Death of
within himself to live a more strict and religious Charles vin.
life.' If so, death anticipated him. While staying April 7' I498,
at the castle of Amboise, which was being embellished by
Neapolitan artists, he struck his head against the lintel of a
door, and died at the age of twenty-seven of a fit of apoplexy
which resulted from it (April 1498).
Contemptible in mind, though with great bodily strength,
inspired with chivalrous ideas which he had not the capacity
to execute, a victim to profligacy, it is strange that he should
have played such a leading part in history, and yet it does
not seem altogether unfit that those Italian wars, which caused
such infinite misery in Italy, and were so disastrous to the
best interests of France, should be associated with his name.
His children had all died in infancy, and the crown accord-
ingly passed to his cousin and brother-in-law, Louis, Duke of
Orleans, then a man of the age of thirty-six.
§ 2. Savonarola and Florence.
A month after the death of Charles vin., the Friar
Savonarola, who had done so much to give an air of mystery
to the Italian expedition, fell a victim to his enemies.
This remarkable man was born at Ferrara in 1452. Having
gradually won a reputation as a preacher of wonderful power
and zeal, he was in the year 1491, elected Prior _
' . . ' -r^ ? Savonarola,
of the Dominican Convent of San Marco in Prior of
Florence. In spite of the independent attitude SanM**»»Mfl«.
which he here assumed, Lorenzo showed him no ill favour,
and even summoned the friar to his deathbed to ask a
blessing.1 In all probability, however, Savonarola would have
remained a great revivalist preacher and nothing more, had it
1 For the question as to the true account of the interview, cf. Creighton,
The Papacy y Appendix vii.
26 European History, 1 494-1 598
not been for the expedition of Charles vm. The constant
theme of his sermons had been that the scourge of God should
visit Italy to punish her for her sins and purify her by fire.
The French invasion, and the rapid success of Charles were
looked upon as the fulfilment of his prophecy, and Savonarola
became one of the leading men in Florence.
In the overthrow of the Medici he did not take an active
part, but on Piero's flight (November 1494) he was sucked
, into the politics of the city. Supported by his
Savonarola r J ... , J
and the powerful advocacy from the pulpit m the Duomo,
revolution an(j gUided by his advice, the popular party, to
which he naturally belonged, was able to intro-
duce and carry a reform of the Constitution. By the decree
of December 23, the government was to be as follows : —
A permanent Great Council {Consiglio Maggiore) was to be
composed of all eligible ' citizens,' that is, of all citizens of the
age of thirty whose father, grandfather, or great-grandfather
had been elected to the greater offices of state. This
Council, numbering some 3000, was to elect out of its own
members a 'senate' {Consiglio degli ottantd), holding office for
six months, and forming with the Consiglio Maggiore the
legislative body of the city. Further, the Great Council was
to nominate the Signory and other magistrates out of a list
presented by a body of nominators, themselves elected in the
Council, and to hear appeals on criminal cases. The Signory
remained as it was before, composed of the Gonfalonier and
the eight priors : it was to be elected every two months, while
the Ten of Liberty and Peace {Died di Liberia e Pace), in
whose hands lay the conduct of foreign affairs, were to hold
office for six months.
The constitution can scarcely be called a democratic one,
for at least 7000 citizens were disenfranchised. In common
with most theorists of his day, Savonarola admired the
stability of Venice, and vainly thought to secure this for his
native city by establishing a closed and permanent electoral
and legislative body, the Consiglio Maggiore, after the
The Italian Wars, 1 494-1 518 27
Venetian type. Nevertheless, the government was preferable
to the old system, by which the city, a republic in name, had
fallen into the control of a single family and their clique.
Savonarola did not content himself with this. From his
pulpit he insisted on moral reformation as the necessary basis
of true liberty, and pressed for a general amnesty which
might allay the dangers of party strife. In thus becoming a
politician, Savonarola protested that he acted unwillingly. In
his sermon of December 21, 1494, he declared that he had
pleaded with God to be excused from meddling with the
government, but had been bidden to go on and establish a holy
city, which favoured virtue and looked to Christ as its master.
That Savonarola was sincere we may well believe. None
the less the interference in politics was a fatal error.
Thereby he became closely associated with a Savonarola
party, responsible for its faults, and dependent on s"°aTedSwith
its success. This weakened his position as a apolitical
reformer, while his adherents had henceforth partLac"i
' ■ — - arouses en-
to count as enemies all those who disliked his mityathome
attempts at a reform of morals. A serious opposi- and abroad-
tion was thus aroused. The Bigi (the Greys) worked for the
restoration of the Medici; the Arrabiati (the enraged),
while casting off the Medici, objected to the changes in
the jConstitution ; the Compagnacci (companions) disliked
the preacher's interference with their pleasures, These three
groups, working at first with very different aims, were even-
tually united together in common opposition to the Piagnoni
(weepers), the followers of the friar. But if Savonarola's
interference in the politics of the city weakened his position
in Florence, the attitude of his party drew down upon him the
enmity of foreign statesmen. The desire to regain Pisa was
an overmastering passion at Florence, and there was nothing
she would not suffer to attain that end. She had refused to
join the League of Venice, in the hopes of regaining Pisa from
the hands of Charles. These hopes had been disappointed.
Still the adherents of the friar headed by Francesco Valori,
28 European History, 1494-1598
clung fondly to the dream that Charles would once more
enter Italy, and at last fulfil his promise. In these expectations
they were supported by the preaching of Savonarola, who
announced that Italy must yet suffer much, but that eventually
Florence should after much tribulation be saved by God.
By thus refusing to join the League, Florence drew down
upon her the enmity of Ludovico, of Maximilian, of Venice,
and of the Pope. The three first in turn supported the
Pisans with arms, and, in October 1496, Maximilian himself
came to Italy. But mutual jealousies prevented united
action, and the expedition of Maximilian ended in a fiasco.
The opposition of the Pope was to prove more serious.
Alexander vi. cared but little for the denunciation of the
Alexander vi ref°rmer against the vices of the times, but his
interferes. interference with politics he would not brook.
Sept. 1495. Accordingly, in September 1495, he had sus-
pended him from prea< hing. Savonarola at fust obeyed, and
was silent during the following Advent. But, in the Lent of
1496, the Signory, then composed of the friar's partisans,
ordered him to resume his preaching. He complied, and in
the Carnival of 1496, the enthusiasm of the Piagnoni broke
forth in religious processions. The children swept the streets
in thick array, bearing olive-branches in their hands and
chanting hymns. This disobedience Savonarola justified, by
declaring that no papal prohibitions should move him from
his duty, and that if they contradicted the Law of Love set
forth in the Gospel, they must be withstood, since 'a Pope
that errs does not represent the Church,' of which he claimed
to be a loyal son. Even this bold conduct did not immediately
rouse Alexander — nay, some would fix this as the date when
he tried to win the friar by the offer of a cardinal's hat. If so,
Savonarola contemptuously rejected the offer, and the Pope
was driven to take further measures.
The Tuscan congregation of the Dominican order had,
at Savonarola's request, been separated from that of Lom-
bardy. This had given him a position of exceptional
independence, which aroused the jealousy of many of his order.
The Italian Wars, 1 494-1 518 29
Alexander now united the convent of San Marco with a new
formed Tusco-Roman congregation (Nov. 7, 1496). This was
clearly within the competence of the Pope, it was popular with
the order generally, and the Pope hoped to strike at the friar
through a superior of his own brotherhood Savonarola,
however, refused to obey, and was supported by some 250 of his
brethren of San Marco. The Carnival of 1497 followed. Here
the enthusiasm of the Piagnoni reached its highest pitch. The
children going from house to house begged for 'vanities.'
Cards, trinkets, immodest books, pictures, works of art, were
handed up, and these, heaped promiscuously in one common
pyre, were solemnly burned in the Piazza. These and other
extra vagnnces, which unfortunately cannot be denied/disgusted
many, and added to the number of the friar's enemies. The
reaction was seen in the election of Bernardo del ReactJon
Nero, a secret adherent of the Medici, to the against
office of Gonfalonier, March 1497 ; in the unsuc- Savonarola-
cessful attempt of Piero to regain Florence in April, and in
a riot in the Duomo, raised by the Compagnacci, while
Savonarola preached, on Ascension Day, May 4.
Influenced, perhaps, by the knowledge that Savonarola was
losing ground, Alexander now decided to strike. After a vain
appeal to the Florentines, in which he even pro- M _,
'.r ... The Pope
mised to regain Pisa for them if they would join excommuni-
the League, a promise which they prudently dis- cates him*
trusted, he declared that they were being misled
by the prophecies of a chattering friar, and proceeded to
excommunicate him, May 1497. The Signory meanwhile had
attempted to stay the excitement in Florence by forbidding
all preaching either from Savonarola or his opponents, and
things remained more quiet for a time.
The elections of July, however, again gave the Piagnoni a
majority in the Signory; and in August, the city was startled by
the news that five of the leading citizens stood The piagnoni
accused of complicity with the Medicean plot of "gain power,
the preceding April. On condemnation, they were refused
1 Savonarola, however, was no enemy to literature and art. Cf. Villari
»• 133-
30 European History, 1494- 1598
their right of appeal to the Great Council, contrary to the
express provision of the new Constitution, and executed.
The condemned belonged to Savonarola's opponents, and
some of them, notably Bernardo del Nero, had lately held
office. Their execution therefore, for a time, materially
strengthened Savonarola's position, and from this date until
the ensuing March the Signory was filled with Piagnoni.
Accordingly, on Christmas Day, Savonarola celebrated the
Mass in San Marco. In the Carnival another pyre of vanities
was burnt; and on invitation by the Signory to resume his
preaching, the friar mounted the pulpit of the Duomo with
Consecrated Host in hand, called on God to strike him dead
if he deserved excommunication, and declared that if the
instrument by which God ruled the world withdrew himself
from God, he was but broken iron, and need not be obeyed.
But Savonarola had at last miscalculated his strength.
Religious enthusiasm is avowedly subject to relapses, and
_.. , u such a relapse now came on Florence. The
Final reaction r
against extravagances of his followers, and his own,
Savonarola. ^ad swelled the number of his enemies. Many
originally well disposed towards him were shocked at his
open defiance of the Pope, and at his daring to administer
the sacrament when excommunicated. The Franciscan order,
always jealous of the Dominicans, now redoubled their attacks,
led by Savonarola's old rival Fra Mariano de Genazzano.
Even the majority of the Dominicans outside San Marco
declared against him. Of this reaction his enemies were
quick enough to take advantage. Accordingly the Signory
of March, 1498, only counted three of his adherents among
its members. Still many of the Dieci, who having been
elected for six months did not leave office, were in his favour.
When therefore Alexander threatened the city with an inter-
dict, unless Savonarola ceased preaching and came to Rome
for absolution, the Government adopted a middle course;
they persuaded the friar to cease preaching, yet would not
force him to leave for Rome.
The Italian Wars, 1494- 1 518 31
It is doubtful whether in any case Alexander would now
have stayed his hand, for Savonarola had begun to speak of a
General Council, and it was known that Charles vm. was
likely to support the cry, while the opponents of Savonarola,
more especially the Franciscans of Santa Croce, were open-
mouthed for his destruction. In any case the fatal suggestion
of the ordeal by fire precipitated the crisis. This, whether
first suggested by the Franciscans or no, was The ordeal
eagerly taken up by them. ' I believe I shall be by fire-
burned,' said the Franciscan, Francesco da Puglia, ' but I am
ready to die to free this people. If Savonarola does not burn,
you may hold him to be a true prophet.'
Savonarola himself declined to thus tempt God, but Fra
Domenico da Pescia, his most faithful follower, declared his
willingness to stand his champion. Savonarola could scarcely
refuse ; the Signory after much debate consented ; and on
April 7, an eager crowd assembled on the Piazza to witness
the ordeal. It may be questioned whether either party
expected that the ordeal would really be essayed; in any
case it was the Franciscans who raised objections. Declaring
that they feared magic on Savonarola's part, they first de-
manded that his champion should lay aside his chasuble and
his vestments ; they then objected to his bearing the crucifix,
and finally insisted that he should not carry the Host into
the fire. Here at last Savonarola refused compliance.
Meanwhile the day wore on. It began to rain, and finally
the Signory postponed the trial. The mob was now mad with
disappointment, and next day the Compagnacci seized the
opportunity to attack San Marco (April 8). Francesco Valori,
the firmest supporter of Savonarola, who had often held office
as Gonfalonier, was slain among others. The brethren, how-
ever, stood firm at San Marco until the Signory intervened
and arrested Savonarola and his two chief supporters, Fra
Domenico and Fra Silvestro.
Alexander now demanded that the friar should be handed
over to him for trial. After much negotiation it was agreed
32 European History \ I494-1598
that the Pope should send two commissaries to judge of the
spiritual offences, while-the Florentine commissioners should
decide on the offences against the city. At the same time, Alex-
ander granted to Florence a tax of three-tenths on ecclesiastical
revenues. c Three times ten makes thirty,' said a Piagnone ;
'they have sold our master, as Christ was sold, for thirty
pieces of silver.' Meanwhile Savonarola had been put to the
torture, and was said to have confessed that he was no true
prophet. But it is acknowledged that confessions extorted
under torture are not worthy of the slightest credit ; there is
good reason, moreover, to believe that his depositions were
falsified. His enemies were determined on -his ruin. All
that was necessary to secure their final triumph was that the
elections of May should return a Signory hostile to the friar.
This was attained by excluding 200 Piagnoni from the Great
Council. A Signory of Arrabiati was thus secured. Savon-
arola and his two followers, found guilty of heresy
the Friar. by the papal commissaries, and of treason to the
May 33, 1498. State Dy hjs fell0w-citizens, went to 'their death
with all the constancy of martyrs, May 23, 1498.
Contemporaries were much divided in their opinions on the
merits of Savonarola, and the contest rages still. ' The thing
I shall be most anxious to know when I get into Heaven,' said
a later Pope, ■ is whether Savonarola was a righteous man or
no.' Those who denounce him as a hypocrite, pretending to
believe in divine guidance, and in the gift of prophecy to
attain his ends, are surely ignorant of the subtle influences
under which religious leaders have ever acted ; men who carry
with them into life a profound conviction of the divine ruling
of the world. Those who lightly dismiss him as a fanatic,
have never felt the burning shame of sin which consumes the
reformer's soul. That he was led to think that God had in-
trusted him with a mission and had used him as the trumpet
of His warnings we may well believe ; that he was betrayed
into some extravagances will only convict him of ordinary
human frailty.
The Italian Wars, 1 494- 1 5 1 8 33
As has been stated above, his real mistake lay in trespassing
on the sphere of politics. Had he confined himself to the
work of a moral reformer, he perhaps would not have risen
so high ; yet he would have escaped from many contradictions,
and never have fallen so low. The office of the preacher and
that of the statesman are not easily reconciled. When once
he had associated himself with the fortunes of a political party,
nothing but complete supremacy could save him from disaster.
For the rest, the work of Savonarola must not be confused
with the later Reformation. He had no idea of breaking
from the Church, or of disputing her doctrines. His mind
was set in a mediaeval mould. He belongs to the long list
of those great reformers who, like St. Francis of Assisi, strove
to bring the life of man into closer harmony with Christian
teaching as then understood, but did not dispute the accepted
interpretation of that teaching. He stands forth as the
opponent of that godless pagan spirit which marred the move-
ment of the Renaissance, to rebuke the moral turpitude of
his country, which was surely working her ruin.
§ 3. Louis XII. The War of Milan and Naples.
The accession of Louis xn. was popular. He had in his
earlier years led the opposition against Anne of Beaujeu, and
for that had suffered imprisonment, but of late he internai
had been the loyal supporter of King Charles, policy of
Careless and fond of pleasure as a young man, he
had, while retaining his generous and chivalrous spirit, now
become more serious. Declaring at his accession that 'the
King did not remember the wrongs done to him as Duke,' he
showed favour to Anne of Beaujeu and her husband, whom
he had once so bitterly resisted. On the marriage of their
only child, Susanna with the young Charles, Count of Mont-
pensier, he annulled the decree of Louis xi. which had declared
that, in the default of male issue, the dominion of Bourbon
should fall to the crown. By this act of generosity, he postponed
the incorporation of the last great noble domain in France.
period iv c
34 European History, 1494- 1598
The reign was inaugurated by several useful measures.
The 'taille' * was reduced; the sale of judicial offices forbidden;
an attempt was made to check the venality of the magistrates.
Provence and Normandy were given local Parle7nents or courts
of justice, which might serve as a counterbalance to the
Parlement of Paris, while the extravagant privileges of the
University of Paris in the matter of jurisdiction were curtailed.
Political interest may by some be held to justify Louis' divorce
from his first wife Jeanne, daughter of Louis xi., and his
marriage with Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles vm. ; for
Jeanne was childless, and Brittany threatened to break away
again from France. But, in the negotiations with the Pope
concerning the divorce, the King acted meanly, and the stipu-
lation insisted on by Anne of Brittany, that her duchy should
not be united to the crown of France, might have led to further
trouble, had not Francis of Angouleme, subsequently King
Francis I., married Claude, the issue of the marriage. In
a word the home policy of the King might justify his title
of ' Father of his People,' had not his ambition led him
Louis t0 fohow in the steps of Charles and seek for
determines to conquests in Italy. If his chivalrous spirit de-
manded war, the renewed attempt of Maximilian
to regain Burgundy and the lands on the west of Flandc rs,
which he still claimed as the heritage of his son, the Arch-
duke Philip, would have fully justified Louis in taking the
offensive, and adding Franche-Comte to his dominions.
But his eyes, like those of Charles, were dazzled with the
fair skies and plains of Italy, and Italy alone would satisfy
French ambitions. Milan, however, and not Naples, was the
first object of Louis' attack.
The invasion of Charles vm. should have taught the
Italians the necessity of union. But this was not to be.
1 The * taille ' was a tax levied on land and income. It was first
imposed by the Estates of Orleans, 1439. The nobles, clergy, the officials
of the sovereign courts, and other royal officials were exempt. It therefore
fell exclusively on the lower classes. Cf. Appendix I. , p. 456.
The Italian Wars> 1494- 1 5 1 8 35
Even in the League of Venice, the aims of Italian statesmen
had been purely selfish, and the common danger once re-
moved, their old rivalries returned and broke up the coalition.
Savonarola had been 'sacrificed by the Pope, because
Florence would not join the League' — yet no sooner was
he gone than Alexander vi. deserted it himself. The chief
aim of Alexander's pontificate was to strengthen the temporal
dominion of the Papacy. Following in the steps of Sixtus iv.,
he hoped to gain his end through his family. His eldest son,
the Duke of Gandia, was first chosen as his in-
strument. He designed to make him Lord of and Venice
the Patrimony of St. Peter and crush the Orsini, desert the
who had given him a pretext by supporting the Ven1ce and
cause of Charles vin. But the Orsini had proved ally them-
too strong. The attempt had failed, and the ^V™1™1
mysterious murder of the duke in June 1497,
seemed for the moment to ruin his hopes. The Pope, however,
was not a man easily dismayed. He shortly resumed his
scheme, and now looked to his third son, the notorious Caesar
Borgia. Caesar, unfortunately, was both deacon and cardinal ;
but in August 1498, his father released him from his ecclesi-
astical vows ' for the good of his soul.' Having thus removed
this primary obstacle, the Pope at first designed to marry him
to Carlotta, the daughter of Federigo of Naples, whereby Caesar
might some day gain a claim to the throne of that kingdom.
Baulked in this hope by the refusal of Federigo, Alexander
turned to France. In return for the papal bull sanctioning
the divorce of his first wife Jeanne, and a cardinal's hat for
George of Amboise, his chief adviser, Louis xn. invested
Caesar with the counties of Valentinois and Diois, and the
title of duke. Subsequently he bestowed upon him the hand
of his niece, the beautiful Charlotte d'Albret (May 1499),
and promised to assist him in his designs on the Romagna.
Thus Alexander was detached from the League.
The relations between Venice and Ludovico had never been
cordial. At the battle of Fornovo, the duke had played it
36 European History \ 1494- 1598
false, and ordered his troops not to press the French too
closely. Shortly after this the Pisan War led to further dis-
agreement. Angry at the refusal of Florence to join the
League of Venice, Ludovico and Venice had both supported
Pisa in her struggle for independence. But the lust of con-
quest soon began to tempt them, and, as both could not hold
Pisa, a quarrel was inevitable. At first Ludovico called upon
the Emperor Maximilian to secure that city, hoping eventually
to wrest it from his hands; but the expedition had failed
(October 1496), and Ludovico, rather than see the city fall
under Venetian control, deserted the Pisan cause, and aided
the Florentines with men and money (May 1498). Venice
accordingly turned a ready ear to Louis' offers, and in the
Treaty of Blois (February 1499), agreed to support his claim
to the Duchy of Milan with arms: Louis, on his side, promising
her Cremona and the Ghiara d'Adda, a small district on the
left bank of that river, as her share of the Milanese spoil.
Thus Louis had succeeded in breaking up the League, and
Ludovico was left without an available ally. Ferdinand
D of Spain was already thinking of seizing Naples
position of for himself, and had no mind to interfere in Lom-
Ludovico. bardy ; Federigo of Naples was trembling for
his throne, and was in no position to lend him aid; while
Maximilian, at this time engaged in a war with the Swiss,
and at variance with his Diet on questions concerning the
Imperial Constitution, could not render any assistance. In
his despair Ludovico stirred up the Turks, and Bajazet 11. sent
an army to ravage the Venetian territories in Friuli, an act
which did not materially assist him, and still further irritated
his enemies.
In August 1499, the French army crossed the Alps com-
manded by three redoubtable leaders : the Lombard Trivulzio,
The French wno kaa" deserted tne cause of Alfonso of Naples *
enter Italy, and adopted France as his country, a man of*
August 1499. whom Ludovico said, ' a halter awaits him as ;
soon as caught ' ; Stuart d'Aubigny, who had already earned a
The Italian Wars, 1494- 1 518 37
reputation in the war of Naples ; and Louis de Luxembourg,
Count of Ligny, the patron of the Chevalier Bayard, whose
chivalrous exploits in the coming campaigns remind us that
the Middle Age had not yet departed. The Duke of Savoy
gave them free passage through Piedmont. At Asti they were
joined by a contingent of 5000 Swiss, sent by the Cantons,
who had made a treaty with Louis. The advance on Milan
met with scant resistance. The village of Annona, fortified
by Ludovico, indeed held out, but was taken by assault on
the second day, and the garrison put to the sword. Terrified
by their fate, and beguiled by the promises and the bribes
of Trivulzio, castles and cities opened their gates. Alessandria,
evacuated by the Milanese army under Galeazzo di San
Severino, who was probably bribed by the French, made submis-
sion, but was cruelly pillaged, and the French crossed the Po.
Meanwhile the Venetian army from the east occupied
Caravaggio, and advanced to Lgdj. Ludovico now saw
that his cause was lost. Warned by a riot in _,. ,.
J The Vene-
Milan that the capital could not be trusted, he tians advance
despatched his two sons and his treasure to on Lodl# •
Germany, threw provisions into the castle of Milan, and fled
to seek assistance of Maximilian at Innsbruck (September 2).
Ludovico gone, the citizens of Milan hastened to Ludovico
offer the keys of the city to the French. On flies to Inns-
September 14, the citadel itself surrendered; French and
Genoa followed suit, and thus within a month, Venetians
the French and Venetians found themselves Milanese,
masters of the Milanese, without having had to Sept. 1499.
fight a single important battle. But they were not to hold
their conquest without another struggle. The rapidity of the
French conquest, like that of Naples by Charles vin., illus-
trates the weakness of Italy. The treachery and cowardice
of the soldiery was the result of the evil traditions of Italian
condottier warfare. The army once gone, the citizens could
scarcely have resisted if they would, and they would not
if they could. Devoid of all sense of patriotism or loyalty,
3 8 European History \ 1494-1598
they feared the vengeance of the French, and listened easily
to their promises of milder government, and lighter taxation.
Reacti n These indeed Louis attempted to fulfil, but ex-
againstthe travagant expectations had been raised, and the
French. choice of Trivulzio as Governor of Milan was
an unfortunate one. A Lombard himself, he became
a party man ; his severity alienated the lower classes,
while the pride and insolence of the French soon lost them
the affection of their new subjects.
A few months sufficed to disillusionise the Italians, and when,
in February 1500, Ludovico returned with an army he had
Ludovico collected in the North, the French were forced to
returns. evacuate Milan and surrender their conquests as
Fe ' I5°°* quickly as they had gained them. All seemed lost,
when in April the French army, reinforced from France, again
The French moved forward to relieve the citadel of Novara,
evacuate which, with the castle of Milan, alone held out.
take Ludo- Tne mo^ey character of the army of Ludovico,
vico prisoner composed as it was of mercenaries from Franche-
Apri°5»aand Comte and Switzerland, Albania and Lombardy,
re-occupy would in any case have rendered victory doubt-
thecity. fu^ kut the chances of battle were never tried
owing to the treachery of the Germans and the Swiss. The
latter pleaded as an excuse that they could not fight against
their countrymen who were serving the French with leave
of the Confederation. The only pretext the Germans could
find was arrears of pay. Allowed by the French to retire,
these honourable companions in arms did not even insist on
the same terms being granted to their Milanese comrades, or to
the Duke. When therefore the Milanese troops attempted to
retreat, they were cut down by the French. The Duke was
discovered among the Swiss in the disguise of a friar, and on
April 17, the French re-entered the capital. The rich Duchy
of Milan was now theirs, with the exception of the strip of
country to the east of the Adda, which fell to the Venetians,
and the district round Bellinzona, which was seized by
The Italian Wars, 1494- 1 518 39
the Swiss in the pay of Louis, and which they retain to
this day.
The Sforza family suffered cruelly for Ludovico's fatal act
in first calling the French into Italy and for his subsequent
breach of faith. The Duke, who had vaunted
Fortunes of
himself on his cleverness, ended his days in the the sforza
dungeons of Loches in Touraine (1508). His family,
brother, the Cardinal Ascanio, and Francesco, son of the un-
fortunate Gian Galeazzo, also fell into French hands. Ascanio
was released in 1503, but died in 1505. Francesco was forced
to become a monk and died in 151 1, and the only important
representatives of the male line of the Sforza who remained
were the two sons of Ludovico, Maximilian and Francesco
Maria, who were hereafter for a period to regain the duchy.1
The collapse of the power of Ludovico is a signal illustra-
tion of the insufficiency and untrustworthiness of mercenary
troops. Caring nothing for the cause they had momentarily
espoused, they were ever open to bribes, or ready to desert
when desertion served their turn.
For the rest, the policy of Venice in thus calling the French
for the second time into Italy, was as short-sighted as it was
blameworthy. The Venetians pleaded as a pretext .
their fears of the ambitious schemer Ludovico, policy of
yet he was never likely to be so formidable as the Venice-
French, and, as Machiavelli well observes, ' in their desire to
win two districts in Lombardy they helped Louis to become
master of two-thirds of Italy.'
Louis once master of Milan hurried on his preparations
against Naples. The only opponent who was likely to be
formidable was Ferdinand the Catholic. He had Treaty of Gran-
helped to restore the Aragonese dynasty after ada between
. Louis and
the retreat of Charles, and might well put in his Ferdinand,
claim, if the illegitimate branch of his house were Nov* "» 15po'
to be excluded. 'But how,' said his envoy, ' if you were
1 Three other sons of Galeazzo Sforza, one legitimate, the other two
illegitimate, were also taken prisoners and died in captivity.
46 European History, 1494-1598
to come to some agreement with us respecting Naples as
you did with Venice about Milan?' The suggestion was
welcomed by Louis, and in November 1500, the secret Treaty
of Granada was signed. An excuse for that shameless compact
was found in the alliance which Federigo in his distress had
made with the Turk. After deploring the discords of Christian
princes, which weakened them before the Turk, the preamble
asserts that ' no other princes, save the Kings of France and
Aragon, have any title to the crown of Naples, and as King
Federigo has excited the Turk to the peril of Christendom,
the two powers, in order to rescue it from this danger and
to maintain the peace, agree to compromise their respective
claims, and divide the kingdom of Naples itself.' The northern
provinces, consisting of the Abruzzi and the land of Lavoro,
with the title of king, were to go to Louis; the Duchy of
Calabria and Apulia in the south as a dukedom to Ferdinand.
That there was danger to be apprehended from the Turks
was true enough ; not only had they ravaged Friuli in the
autumn of 1499, they had also defeated the Venetian fleet
off Sapienza, and taken Modon and Navarino in the Morea.
That the cry of a crusade was not a mere pretext is proved
by the treaties made by Louis in the spring of 1500 with
Ladislas, King of Bohemia and Hungary, and with the King
of Poland ; by the fleet despatched by Ferdinand to aid the
Venetians in the siege of St. George in Cephalonia (September
1500), and by the French attack on Mitylene in 1501. It
is even possible, that the conquest of Italy from the north
alone saved that country from falling before the Turk, but
the advance of the Sultan might have been more successfully
opposed by a joint European coalition, and, as events showed,
lust of conquest was the primary motive of the allies.
The treaty of Granada was 'the first open assertion in
European politics of the principles of dynastic aggrandise-
ment; the first of those partition treaties by which peoples
were handed over from one Government to another as
appendages to family estates.' Not only was the treaty of
The Italian Wars, 1 494- 1 518 41
Granada a crime, it was also a fatal blunder on the part of
Louis. 'The French,' says Machiavelli, 'have little skill in
matters of State, for whereas before, Louis was sole umpire
in Italy, he now entertained a partner, and whereas Louis
might have made the king of Naples his pensioner, he turned
him out and put the Spaniard in his place, who turned out Louis
himself.' The compact was at first kept secret, and Federigo
still hoped for assistance from Ferdinand. In June 1501, how-
ever, when the French army under D'Aubigny entered Rome
on its southward march, Pope Alexander publicly ratified the
treaty, declared Federigo deposed as a traitor to Christendom,
and invested Louis and Ferdinand with his dominions.
Federigo, despairing of his cause, did not dare to
meet the French in the field. Capua, which alone stood out,
was taken by assault on July 23, and handed Federigo
over to a brutal soldiery who massacred the men abdicates
and retires
and outraged the women. To save his country to France,
from further misery, the unfortunate King capitu- Au&ust «a»
lated, and, accepting the terms of Louis, retired to France, to
live till 1504 a pensioner, with the title of Duke of Anjou.
The southern part of the kingdom made a somewhat more
vigorous resistance to the Spaniards. They would have pre-
ferred, they said, the French as masters. But on the fall of
Taranto in March 1502, Ferrante, the young Duke of Calabria,
surrendered, and, in violation of a promise that he might
retire whither he would, was sent to Spain to die in 1550.1
Thus in less than two years the two families, whose quarrels
had first invited the foreigner into Italy, had been driven
from their country.
Naples and Milan conquered, Western Europe found itself
dominated by two great leagues, that of Louis xii., n
J ° o » > Quarrel be-
closely allied with the Pope and some of the tween Loui»
German princes, and that of the Austro-Spanish andFerdinand.
houses. The latter was a family league cemented by the
1 For the fate of the other children of Federigo, cf. Sismondi, Hist, da
Rep. ItalienneSy ix. 295.
42 European History, 1494-1598
marriage of the Archduke Philip, son of the Emperor Maxi-
milian, with Joanna, eldest daughter of Ferdinand and
Isabella,1 and included England and Portugal. At this mo-
ment there seemed a prospect of these two leagues coalescing.
In 1 50 1, it had been agreed that Charles, the* young son of the
Archduke Philip, should marry the Princess Claude, daughter
of Louis xii. The children were yet young, but the joint
conquest of Naples by the Spanish and the French seemed a
guarantee of their future friendship, and that the marriage
would eventually take place. Had this compact stood, Europe
would have been united as it had never been before, and, if
there was some danger that this powerful league would have
destroyed the political balance, and ridden rough-shod over
the smaller princes, at least a crusade to check the advance of
the Turks, or even to drive them from Europe, might have been
possible. The dream, however, was soon to be dispelled by
the quarrel of Louis and Ferdinand over their spoil in Naples.
In the original treaty of partition no definite mention had
been made of the Basilicata,2 the Capitanata, and the two
districts of the Principati. These furnished an easy cause of
dispute, which was further complicated by the claim to the
tolls paid on the sheep-flocks as they passed from their
summer pasture in the Abruzzi to their winter quarters in the
Capitanata. The quarrel might possibly have been com-
promised had it not been fomented by the internal factions of
the country. The old partisans of Anjou were strongest in
Apulia, while the Spaniards found many adherents in districts
held by the French.
1 Ferdinand of Aragon==ISABELLA of Castile
+1516 +1504
John=Margarbt Joanna=Archduke Philip Mary=Emanuel Catherine
+1497 d. of _Maxi- +1555
milian
s. of Maximilian of Portugal (1) betrothed
+ 1506 +1521 to Prince
Arthur.
(a) Married
Henry vm
Charles v.
s For the position of these districts, see Map of Italy.
The Italian Wars, 1494- 1 518 43
These dissensions soon led to an open rupture, and in
July 1502, the war began. The ensuing struggle is famous
in the history of chivalry, which gleamed forth for the last
time in these Italian wars, and is well depicted in the
picturesque pages of the life of Bayard. On TheWarof
the French side, we find Imbercourt, ' to whom, Naples,
wherever there was a battle to fight, the heat of July I5°a*
the Italian noontide seemed like the cool of morning ' ;
the aged La Palice, who in the mS/Se forgot his age; and
Bayard himself, the soul of knightly courtesy and valour.
On the side of Spain, stood Diego de Paredes, whose feats
of extravagant daring furnish the theme for many a Spanish
romance; and Pedro de Paz, a squinting dwarf, who scarce
could be seen above the head of his charger, yet had the
heart of a lion ; while Gonzalvo de Cordova, the ' Great
Captain ' himself, added to his masterly qualities as a general
the chivalrous courtesy and manners of a knight -errant.
These, and many others, fought, not so much for victory, as
for honour. Not content with the opportunities offered by
the regular military operations for the display of their
prowess, they challenged each other to jousts and tourneys,
which, though fought a Poutrance, were conducted with all the
punctiliousness, and all the ceremony of the lists. As we
read the history of their combats, we fancy that we are
present at a tournament of the Middle Ages — the contest, one
for knightly prestige, the prize, some guerdon awarded by
lady's hand.1 But the real issue was not decided by these
feats of personal valour. On the declaration of hostilities, the
French had the advantage in numbers and in the quality of
their troops, as well as the command of the sea.
In December 1502, the victory of D'Aubigny at Terranova,
over a force which had just landed from Spain,~gave him
the whole of Calabria. Gonzalvo de Cordova, the Spanish
1 Cf. especially, Le Combat singulier entre Bayard et Don Alonzo, and
Le Combat des treize contre treize, La tresjoyeuse Histoire dcs gestes du
ben Chevalier% c xxii.-xxiii. Ed. Petitot, vol. 15.
44 European History \ 1494- 1598
commander-in-chief, unable to keep the field, assumed the de-
fensive attitude, and threw his troops into the fortified towns
of Apulia. Of these, Barletta was the most impor-
victory *& * tant. Here the Spanish general entrenched him-
Terranova, gg^ an(j patiently waited for reinforcements from
Sicily and Spain; but Ferdinand was remiss in
sending aid; while a French fleet, holding the sea, prevented
Siege of troops or supplies being shipped from Sicily. The
Barletta. distress was so severe that Gonzalvo de Cordova
had great difficulty in preventing a surrender, and had the
French general, the Due de Nemours, shown more energy,
the Spaniards might have been driven from the country.
In April 1503 there seemed a chance of peace. The
Archduke Philip, as he passed through France, visited
Louis xii. at Lyons, and there made a treaty by which it was
Treat of agreed that Naples should eventually go to the
Lyons. young Charles and the Princess Claude, who, in
April 5, 1503. I50Ij had bggn betrothed. Until the children
should be old enough to marry, the French portion of the
kingdom was to be administered by a nominee of Louis, the
Spanish, by the Archduke Philip, or some deputy appointed
by Ferdinand. Whether Ferdinand had allowed these nego-
tiations to be entered into merely to gain time, as the French
declare, or whether, as seems more probable, Philip, who was
not on good terms with his father-in-law, had exceeded his
instructions, the results to France were fatal.
The treaty signed, Louis countermanded the embarkation
of reinforcements from Genoa, and ordered a suspension of
hostilities in Naples. Meanwhile the position of the Spaniards
Hostilities had materially improved. In February, their
renewed. general, taking advantage of the foolish movement
of the Due de Nemours to recover Castellaneta, which had
just revolted to Spain, made a sortie from Barletta, captured
Ruvo, and took La Palice prisoner. In March, the defeat of
the French fleet gave the command of the sea to Spain.
Now strengthened by reinforcements, Gonzalvo de Cordova
openly repudiated the treaty of Lyons, and at last assumed
The Italian Wars, 1494- 1 5 1 8 45
the offensive. So overwhelming was the superiority of the
Spaniards that two battles fought within eight days of each
other sufficed to make them masters of the country.
The defeat of D'Aubigny at Seminara by the Spanish
General, Fernando de Andrada, on April 20, and his surrender
which shortly followed, gave them Calabria. On the 27th, the
Great Captain at last leaving Barletta, where he had lain
entrenched so long, sought the French at Cerignola (April 28).
Here taking up a strong position, with his front protected by
a ditch, which he filled with pointed stakes and strengthened
with a rampart, he awaited the onslaught of the French
French. The Due de Nemours, true to that defeated at
cautious strategy which had hitherto prevented April ap,%oa ;
him from taking full advantage of his superior and Cerignola,
strength, was for postponing the attack. Stung, pn 2 *
however, by the reproaches flung at him by Ives d'Allegre,
one of his officers, he rashly ordered an advance as evening
was already closing in. ' Now/ said he, ■ perhaps those who
vaunt the loudest will be found to trust more to their spurs
than to their swords.' The event justified the taunt. In
vain, the French flung themselves with desperate valour on
the ditch and ramparts. They were exposed to the concen-
trated fire of the enemy and beaten back. The Due de
Nemours himself, and Chandieu, the leader of the Swiss
contingent, were slain. The explosion of a Spanish powder
magazine caused more confusion to the French than to the
foe, and Gonzalvo de Cordova, seizing the moment, ordered
a general advance. The French, wearied by their long
struggle, broke and fled.
Henceforth, the advance of the Spaniards was unchecked.
The French proved the truth of the Italian saying that,
Vwhile in their attacks they were more than men, The French
they were less than women in their retreats.' driven from
In one day, thirty castles surrendered to the ap es'
'Great Captain.' On the 13th of May, Naples opened its
gates, and Gaeta, Venosa, and Santa Severina remained the
only important places in French hands.
4<$ European History, 1494- 1598
Louis xii. made desperate attempts to retrieve his disaster,
Three large armies were raised : one to penetrate into Spain
by the way of Fontarabia ; the second to invade Roussillon
and seize Salces on the frontier ; the third to re-enter Italy.
Two fleets were also equipped, one in Genoa, the other in
Renewed Marseilles ; the first to support the invasion of
attempts of Naples, the other to co-operate with the attack on
Roussillon by threatening the coast of Catalonia.
But fortune did not smile upon his efforts. The invasion of
Spain was delayed by the supineness or the treachery of the
commander, Alan d'Albret.1 The fleet intended for Catalonia
was driven back by heavy weather. The attack on Roussillon
was equally unfortunate. The fortress of Salces, strengthened
by Pedro Navarra, the best engineer of his day, was too strong
to be taken by assault ; and in October, Ferdinand, marching to
its relief with a superior force, drove the French over the frontier.
Disheartened by these reverses Louis xn. consented to a truce
of five months (15th November), which was subsequently
extended. Curiously enough, the unfortunate Federigo of
Naples was called upon to act as peacemaker between the
two robbers who were still quarrelling over the kingdom they
had dispoiled him of. For Naples was not included in the-
truce, and thither the third French army had marched in July
1503, under the leadership of La. Tremouille.
But the death of Pope Alexander, on August 18, caused
delay. The papal tiara had long been the aim of Cardinal
Death of d'Amboise, an ambition favoured by Louis xn.
Alexander vi., xjncjer the idea that the presence of the army
Aug. 18, 1503, .-,:.>, ill- • jj
and election might influence the election, it was ordered
of Pius in. t0 hait within a few miles of Rome. The
cardinals were indignant at this attempt to overawe them,
and the movement of a Spanish force from the south, as well
1 His son John d'Albret, king ol Navarre in right of his wife, had
allied himself with Ferdinand, fearing the claims on Navarre of the
younger branch, then represented by Gaston de Foix, nephew of
Louis xii.
The Italian Wars, 1 494- 1 5 1 8 47
as the presence of Caesar Borgia with his troops in the Castle
of St. Angelo, made them fear lest the matter might lead to a
conflict. D'Amboise therefore allowed the army to depart.
Shortly after, despairing of success, he supported the election
of Cardinal Piccolomini who, on September 22, became Pope
Pius in. This delay of a month was fatal to the French cause.
The expedition was postponed to the autumn and winter,
which proved to be exceptionally wet and cold. La Tremouille
fell ill and resigned his command to the Marquis of Mantua,
an inferior general, and time was given to Gonzalvo de
Cordova to obtain reinforcements.
Even as it was, however, the French were superior in
numbers, and the ' Great Captain ' found it necessary to
abandon the siege of Gaeta, which still held out Battje of the
for the French, and to drop back on the river Garigiiano,
Garigliano. The French, after a desperate conflict, Dec' 28' I503*
succeeded in throwing a bridge over the river (November 6),
but failed in dislodging the Spaniards from their position
about a mile to the rear, which had, as usual, been strengthened
by Don Gonzalvo. Finally, throwing up an earthwork to
protect the bridge, they dropped back to their old position.
Seven weeks of inaction followed, broken only by partial
skirmishes and personal combats.
Meanwhile the weather, which had been wet, grew worse.
From this, owing to the lowness and swampiness of their posi-
tion, the Spaniards suffered much. Yet Gonzalvo de Cordova
succeeded in imparting to his men his unconquerable deter-
mination to hold the position at any cost. Urged to retreat
he answered, ■ I would not fall back a step to gain a hundred
years of life.' The effect on the French was far more
disastrous. In spite of their being on higher, and therefore
drier ground, the troops and the horses did not endure the
wet and cold so well. The country and even the roads
became so sodden, that the movements of the cavalry, and
still more those of the artillery, the two forces in which the
French excelled, were seriously impeded.
48 European History, 1494- 1598
Under such depressing circumstances, insubordination, the
chief evil of the French armies of those days, began to show
itself, and finally vented itself against the Marquis of Mantua,
their general. Pleading ill-health he resigned, to be succeeded
by the Marquis of Saluzzo. This led to the desertion of some
Italian troops, insulted at the treatment of their countryman.
Thus, time was fighting for the Spaniards ; and when at last,
recruited by the Orsini, whom he had cleverly succeeded in
conciliating, he felt strong enough to assume the offensive,
he met with but faint resistance. On the night of December
28, the troops who guarded the river were overwhelmed and
the passage of the river effected. The French, surprised in
their scattered cantonments by the suddenness of the attack,
were unable to concentrate, and forced to retreat. In spite of
numerous deeds of valour, the retreat soon became a rout, and
the remnants of the army fell back in confusion on Gaeta.
Here after one more struggle they capitulated (January 1,
1504), on the condition that they should retire unmolested,
The French an(* *^at a^ Pr^soners m Spanish hands should be
finally lose released. The few remaining strongholds speedily
I Naples, 1504. surrendered, and the Neapolitan kingdom was
won for Ferdinand.
/ The victory of the Spaniards was due to their possession of /,
Sicily, whence they could draw support, ancPfo the failure of the
French to retain the command of the sea, so that reinforce-
ments could come from Spain ;7to the exceptional inclemency
of the winter, which seems to have been more severely felt
by the French than the Spaniards JMn great measure to the
unpopularity of the French, the result of their licence and u
overbearing conduct ; * largely to the quarrels of the French
generals ; nbut, above all, to their inferiority when matched
against the 'Great Captain.' Cautious, where caution was
necessary, he refused to be drawn from his position till
the right moment came ; but, when he saw his opportunity,
struck with decision and rapidity. Never despairing under
the most gloomy circumstances, he was able to communicate
The Italian Wars, 1494-15 18 49
his fortitude, and impart his cheerfulness to his soldiery.
Gracious and conciliatory, he earned the love of his army,
yet knew how to be severe when discipline was threatened.
A master of diplomacy, as well as of war, he succeeded, as
no other foreign general had, in winning over enemies, and in
settling the factions of that most factious country, Italy.
Courteous in manner, and splendid in his style of life, he
won the hearts of the giddy Neapolitans. Nor was Gonzalvo
de Cordova above learning from his foe. To the short sword
and buckler, the national weapons of the Spaniards, so effec-
tive for attack at close quarters, he added the long German
spear, whereby their power of defence was materially increased.
Indeed, he may be said to have made the Spanish infantry,
which, re-armed by him and reduced to discipline, became
for a time the most formidable force in Europe.
§ 4. Alexander VI. and Ccesar Borgia.
While the struggle between the French and Spaniards was
being decided in Naples, events of importance to Italy and
Europe were happening in the centre of the Aiexandervi.
Peninsula. Need of French help in his designs and the
on the Romagna had been the motive of Alex- Romagna-
ander's alliance with Louis xn. at the date of the Milanese
expedition. To the realisation of these schemes he and his son
now eagerly turned.
The Romagna, once the old Exarchate of Ravenna, a district
of somewhat indeterminate limits, lay on the eastern slopes of
the Apennines, stretching to the Adriatic on the east, while to
the north it was bounded by the territories of Venice, to the
south by the march of Ancona. This country is said to have
been originally granted to the Pope by Constantine. The
gift was confirmed by Charles the Great, and all claims to it
were definitely surrendered by Rudolph of Hapsburg in the
thirteenth century. The Emperor, however, had granted but
an empty title. The country was in the hands of numerous
PERIOD IV, D
50 European History, 1494- 1598
families who acknowledged indeed the nominal supremacy of
Rome, but were practically independent.1
The possession of these petty states had been long coveted
by Milan, Florence, and Venice. Venice indeed had already
encroached on the territory of Ferrara (1484), and under the
new aspect of affairs caused by the French invasion, the
absorption of many of them by one or other of these powers
seemed inevitable. This Alexander hoped to obviate by re-
asserting the papal supremacy, which had never been formally
denied, and by reducing the district to obedience.
The pretext for the overthrow of these principalities was
that they had not paid the yearly dues which they owed the
Pope as his vicars, and no sooner had the French entered Italy
in the autumn of 1499, than Csesar proceeded to execute the
papal decree of confiscation.
Louis xii., in pursuance of his promise, sent 300 lances
under the command of Ives d'Allegre, while 4000 Swiss infantry
_. were hired as mercenaries. With these forces
The con-
quests of Caesar marched against Imola and Forli (Nov. 9).
Romana*6 T^e two c*t*es ^ not ma^e any resistance, but
Nov. 1499. the castles held out longer, especially that of Forli,
Apni 1501. wnich was defended by the brave but masculine
Caterina Sforza, and did not surrender till January, 1500.
1 The most important of these petty states in Alexander's time were the
Duchy of Ferrara in the hands of Ercole, Marquis of Este.
Bologna,
M
Giovanni Bentivoglio.
Imola and Forli,
»»
Caterina Sforza, niece of Ludovico il
Moro, and widow of Girolamo Riario,
nephew of Sixtus IV.
Rimini,
N
Pandolfo Malatesta.
Faenza,
N
Astorre Manfredi.
Pesaro,
W
Giovanni Sforza, distant cousin of Ludo-
vico and first husband of Lucrezia
Borgia.
Camerino,
»»
Giulio Csesare Varano.
Duchy of Urbino,
t»
Guidobaldo di Montefeltro.
Sinigaglia,
»»
Francesco Maria della Rovere, a boy.
A few such as Ancona were still republics, but were weak and obscure.
The Italian Wars, 1494- 1 518 51
The return of Ludovico to Milan in February (cf. p. 38)
necessitated the recall of the French contingent, and Caesar
was forced to postpone further hostilities until the ensuing
September. Then, reinforced once more by French assistance,
and holding the title of Gonfalonier of the Church, just bestowed
upon him by his father, Caesar speedily reduced Pesaro and 3
Rimini. Faenza, happy under the mild rule of the young -■"' ^
Astorre Manfredi, offered stout resistance, and did not fall
till April, 1 50 1. In violation of the terms of capitulation the
unfortunate Astorre was sent to Rome, and in the following
June was found drowned in the Tiber. By whose order
the deed was done, no one knew, but all men not unnaturally
suspected the hand of the Borgias. ^ . —
Fortune now seemed to favour Caesar. Created Duke of
Romagna by Alexander, he had been enrolled a member of the
Venetian nobility by that proud republic, which csesar
hoped thus to gain papal aid against the Turk, created Duke
He had in his pay the best of the Italian condot- April 1501.
tiers, and the remaining cities of the Romagna Emitted a
, ,. -r-x , , , , • • 1 member of
were trembling. Dazzled by his rapid successes, the Venetian
his views expanded. He now aspired, not, only oligarchy,
to complete his conquest of the Romagna, but to interfere v
in the affairs of Florence, if not eventually to make himself
master of all Tuscany. For a time, however, his ambition was
checked. Bologna and Florence were both under French y
protection, and Louis ordered him to stay his hand. Louis XII
The Pope became alarmed, and Caesar was forced forbids
to content himself with a sum of money paid by SjJJJJ *°
Florence, and an agreement to take him into her Bologna and
service for three years. Leaving therefore his Florence-
army to take Piombino, which surrendered in September, he k 7
joined the French expedition against Naples (July). In
September he returned to find his sister Lucrezia betrothed
to Alfonso, the son of Ercole of Este.
This beautiful woman,1 whose character has been the
1 The best account of Lucrezia Borgia is to be found in Gregorovius'
Casar Borgia, a work which has been translated into French.
\
$2 European History \ 1494- 1598
subject of almost as much controversy as that of Mary Queen
of Scots, and who has been accused, probably unjustly, of
Lucrezia the most unmentionable crimes, seems rather to
Borgia. have been a person of colourless disposition who
was made the puppet of the schemes of her father and
brother. She had already been married twice. From her first
husband, Giovanni Sforza, Lord of Pesaro, she had been
divorced to wed the Duke of Biseglia, an illegitimate son of
Alfonso 11. of Naples (August 1498). At that date the Pope
desired an alliance with Naples, but two years afterwards
the papal policy had changed. The second invasion of
Naples by Louis xn. was about to take place, and the friend-
ship of Naples was no longer needed. Personal antipathies
widened the breach, and in August 1500, the Duke was
murdered by Caesar's orders. Now, barely a year since the
foul deed, a new husband was found for this girl of twenty-one.
Alexander's motives, as before, were political. The alliance
of Ferrara was valuable. It protected the Romagna from the
North, and threatened Bologna. The results were not so great
as had been hoped, but the marriage was a happier one than
might have been expected ; and Lucrezia in her Ferrarese
home found peace and a refuge from the slander which had
hitherto assailed her.
Meanwhile the quarrel between France and Spain offered
new opportunities to Caesar, since Louis needed papal
Further support and was in no position to thwart him
successes overmuch. He had indeed to surrender Arezzo,
8esar" which had in June rebelled against Florence and
called in Vitellozzo Vitelli, one of Caesar's captains. But
in January 1502, Fermo; in June, Urbino; in July, Camerino
had been occupied, while Pisa, which still held out against
Florence, offered to recognise him as its lord. Finally in
August, he obtained the leave of Louis to attack Bologna.
At this moment a revolt of his captains threatened to over-
whelm him. The rapid success of Caesar had awakened
the apprehensions of these men. Once master of the
The Italian Wars, 1494-1518 53
Romagna, he would no longer need their help, and might turn
against them ; indeed, his negotiations with Florence at this
time lead one to suspect that he had already made The Con.
up his mind to destroy them. The chief con- spiracyof
spirators were Vitellozzo Vitelli of Citta di Castello, inigag la-
Oliverotto da Fermo, the Duke of Gravina and Paolo, both
Orsini, and Gian Paolo Baglioni of Perugia. These gained the
adhesion of Cardinal Orsini, Giovanni Bentivoglio of Bologna,
and others. They met at Magione (October 9, 1502), near
Lake Thrasimene, where they swore to be true to one another,
and applied to Florence for aid. A rebellion was stirred up in
Urbino, from whence Caesar's troops were driven, and another
contingent of his was defeated at Fossornbrone (October 17).
A terrible retribution was, however, soon to fall upon the
rebels. Louis sent Caesar aid. The opportune death of the
wealthy Cardinal of Modena, whether poisoned or no, enabled
Alexander to appropriate his possessions to Caesar's military
needs. Florence feared the hostility of Caesar and would not
help, and Venice, in spite of the exhortations of Ferdinand to
seize the opportunity of freeing Italy from the tyrant, was too
cautious to move.
The confederates began to hesitate. They were unable to
raise any more troops, and were divided amongst themselves.
Listening therefore to the fair promises of Caesar The Massacre
and the Pope, they made their peace on Octo- of sinigagiia.
ber 28, abandoned the cause of Bologna, and, as Dec* 3I' I503,
an earnest of their goodwill, marched against Sinigagiia. The
town surrendered, but the castle refused to yield to any one
but the Duke. Caesar accordingly came to Sinigagiia (Decem-
ber 31), and, beguiling his captains with gracious words,
suddenly pounced upon them. Oliverotto and Vitellozzo
were strangled that night, the first accusing Vitellozzo of
tempting him to rebel ; Vitellozzo imploring Caesar to obtain
a plenary indulgence for him from the Pope. Paolo Orsini
and the Duke of Gravina were executed shortly after. Cardinal
Orsini was seized at Rome to die in prison, probably of poison.
54 European History, 1494 1598
The conspiracy put down, nothing seemed to stand in
the way of the papal ambition. Urbino was again reduced ;
Further sue- Citta di Castello and Perugia submitted ; most of
cesses of j-jjg Qrsini strongholds fell ; and Alexander was
deniy stopped playing off Spain against France, in the hopes of
by his illness, gaining the assistance of one or another in sup-
and the death ° ° r
of Alexander, port of the still more magnificent scheme of
Aug. 8, 1503. making Caesar King of Tuscany, when father and
son were suddenly struck down by an illness, to which
Alexander succumbed on August 8. It was popularly
believed that they had fallen victims to a poisoned cup, which
they had intended for one of the cardinals. The story needs
confirmation, but this- and others of the kind are at least an
indication of the popular opinion, which thought no crime too
horrible, or too improbable, to be imputed to the Borgias.
The fate of Csesar now depended on the choice of the
cardinals. If he could secure the election of one who would
support him, he might yet hold his own. Of late Louis xn.
had shown an inclination to desert the Borgia alliance.
Csesar therefore from his sick-bed intrigued to get one of the
Spanish cardinals chosen, but in this he failed. Louis
had hoped to obtain the papal tiara for the Cardinal
D'Amboise; Giuliano della Rovere was determined to pre-
vent the election of a Spaniard, and hoped to succeed him-
self. Foiled in the first instance, Giuliano concurred in the
choice of an Italian cardinal, Piccolomini, who, in memory of
his famous uncle Pius 11., took the name of Pius 111. But, in
The election October, Pius died, and della Rovere, coming
of juiius 11. t0 terms with Caesar, secured the votes of the
fatal to his .
cause. conclave by promises and bribes. Machiavelli,
Nov. 1, 1503. wno however exaggerates Caesar's influence in the
College of Cardinals, blames his shortsightedness, because,
' if he could not procure the election of his own nominee,
he might have prevented that of della Rovere.' The new
Pope, Julius 11., had long been the enemy of the Borgias.
He had instigated Charles viu. to invade Italy, and urged
The Italian Wars, 1494- 1 518 55
him to summon a council to depose Alexander, and although
of late he had acquiesced in the inevitable, and affected
reconciliation, he was not the man to forget past injuries.
Fear of the designs of Venice on the Romagna caused him
to support Caesar for a moment. But Julius was determined
to win the Romagna for the Papacy, not for the Borgia family,
and no sooner did Caesar attempt to act independently than
he ordered him to return to Rome (November 29). Caesar's
captains, however, refused to surrender the places which they
held without his consent, and Caesar would not consent
except at the price of freedom. After long negotiation the
agreement was concluded, and Caesar, free once more, set out
for Naples to seek the aid of Spain (April 1504).
Ferdinand was at first inclined to listen, till, convinced
by the Pope that Caesar would only disturb the peace of
Italy, he ordered his arrest on May 26, 1504, as The
the Duke was on the point of sailing for the ofcaesar's
Romagna. In violation of a safe-conduct given career-
him by Gonzalvo, he was shortly sent to Spain, where he
remained a prisoner till November, 1506. Escaping at last,
he found refuge with his brother-in-law, now King of Navarre,
to die in the succeeding March (1507), in a skirmish with a
rebel vassal of the King.
Thus, at the age of thirty-one, ended the career of the man
whom Machiavelli in his Prince holds up as a pattern, in all but
his ill-fortune, to him who would attempt to form a united
kingdom of Italy. No doubt Caesar had many of the qualities
requisite for success. Clever and versatile in conception,
rapid and resolute in action, and a master of diplomacy, he had
in a high degree the quality of ' virtu,' that compound of force
and intellect, which we find praised not only by Machiavelli,
but by Commines and other writers of the day, as the essential
characteristic of the ruler.
We must, alas ! allow that private morality is not always
the accompaniment of good statesmanship. Although Caesar
was absolutely without scruple in his treatment of the petty
56 European History », 1494- 1598
princes of the Romagna, it may be questioned whether the
independence of these petty principalities was worth preserving.
Ruled by despots, no question of political freedom was involved.
With a few exceptions, such as that of Urbino, they illustrated
the evils without the advantages of the larger tyrannies, and
their history is one tangled tale of faction, murdei, and
intrigue. The country too, it must be confessed, was well
governed under him, and his rule was not unpopular.
But, when all is said, we cannot believe that a kingdom
founded by such cruelty, and maintained by such villany and
treachery, can really be a solid one. That Machiavelli,
dazzled by the temporary good fortune of Csesar, should boldly
hold him up as a model to be copied, only makes one realise
the cynical despair of the Italians as to the possibility of success
in their country by any other means, and the depth of degrada-
tion to which the people had fallen.1 Nor, finally, do we
believe that the idea of thus founding a temporal dominion
of the Papacy was likely to succeed. Had Alexander lived
longer, it might, perhaps, have ended in the establishment of
another petty kingdom in Italy. But the state would have
been founded in the interest of the Borgia, not of the Papacy,
and would have only added one more enemy to the advance of
the temporal dominion. If the papal authority in the Romagna
was to become a reality, it must be based on a firmer founda-
tion than that of papal nepotism. This Julius 11. saw. Most
of the cities held or threatened by Caesar fell at once into his
hands, with the exception of Rimini, Faenza, and Cesena,
which were seized by Venice, to be secured, however, by
Julius in the war of the League of Cambray. Meanwhile
Perugia and Bologna were gained by Julius in 1506, while
the Duchy of Urbino fell to his nephew, Francesco della
Rovere, who was adopted by Guidobaldo, its late Duke. These
territories were incorporated into the papal dominions; the
1 For a review of Caesar's character, and of Machiavelli's treatment of
him, cf. Creighton, vol. iv. 64 ; Burd, Machiavelli, introduction, pp. 22,
28; Villari, Machiavelli, ii. 154; Symonds' Age of the Despot s^ p. 27^.
The Italian Wars, 1 494-1 518 57
history of their semi-independent princes came to an end,
and Julius 11., rather than Alexander, established the papal
dominion in the Romagna.
§ 5. The League of Cambray,
The pretext for the invasion of Italy by France and Spain
had been the necessity of securing a base of operations for a
crusade against the Turk. This had been prevented by the
quarrel of the robbers over their spoil. They were now to
prove by their attack on Venice — the only power which had
seriously attempted to check the fyToslem advance^— that the
idea, even if ever seriously entertained, had been definitely
abandoned.
The hostility with which that republic was viewed by
the rest of Italy dates from the beginning of the fifteenth
century, when she definitely began to aim at al ug
establishing a dominion on the Italian mainland, against
A quarrel between Milan and the Carrara of JJjjSjofhiit
Padua enabled her to overthrow that family, advance on
to seize Padua, then, step by step, Vicenza themainland-
and Verona, and to advance to the Adige (1405). In
1427 and 1428, she wrested Brescia and Bergamo from
the hands of Filippo Maria Visconti, Duke of Milan, and
after his death secured Crema (1454). Meanwhile she had
acquired the district of Friuli from the Patriarch of Aquileia
(1420), and in 144. had added Ravenna, hitherto an in-
dependent state under the Polentani, to her conquests. In
1484, the peace of Bagnolo, which closed the Ferrarese war,
gave her Rovigo and the Polesine. In 1499, she gained
Cremona and the Ghiara d'Adda from Louis xn., as the price
of her assistance against Ludovico. On the death of Caesar
Borgia, she had occupied Faenza, Rimini, and Cesena ; while
in Apulia, she held the four towns, Trani, Otranto, Gallipoli,
Brindisi, which she had acquired at the date of Charles vni.'s
expedition. Thus, within the space of some hundred years,
58 European History \ 1494- 1598
Venice had completely altered her character. The island city
had gained a large territory on the mainland, which stretched
to the neighbourhood of Milan, Florence, and the Papal States.
The change of policy has usually been attributed to the
advance of the Turk, which threatened her possessions in the
^Egean Sea, and on the coast of Greece. This no doubt was
one of her motives at a later date. But as her first advance on
the mainland occurred in 1405, some years before the Turk
seriously menaced her, we must look elsewhere for the
primary cause. This is to be found in the danger to be
apprehended from the growing power of Milan. As long as
the plain of Lombardy and the approaches to the Alpine
passes were in the hands of petty princes, she could hope to
purchase, or to extort, an outlet for her commerce to the
north ; but, if these were to fall into the hands of the powerful
and aggressive Dukes of Milan, they might be closed against
her. An alternative route no doubt remained. She might
have threaded the Straits of Gibraltar and reached the north
of Europe by the Atlantic and the English Channel. But,
though of late a Flanders fleet had yearly sailed from Venice,
this route was not developed. It could, and probably would,
have been closed by Spain. Nor would such a policy have
saved her from Milan, which, if she became too powerful,
might cut off her food supplies, surround her, and drive her
into the sea. 1
The attempt, then, to form a state in Lombardy appears
to have been inevitable ; nor was it so selfish as her enemies
declared it to be. Her treatment of the cities under her rule
was not only infinitely superior to that of Milan, but com-
pared most favourably with that of Florence. She left them
as much local autonomy as was compatible with the main
tenance of her supremacy ; she did not tax them heavily.
It was the aim of Venice to secure the affection of her
subjects, and their loyalty in the days of her troubles, proved
that she had succeeded. With equal injustice the policy
of Venice towards the Turk has been denounced as faithless
The Italian Wars, 1494- 1 518 59
\.
to the cause of Christianity. No doubt, despairing of the
aid of Europe, she was anxious to keep on friendly terms
with the Turk, and would, if possible, have avoided war ; but
this policy was forced upon her by the refusal of European
states to sink their common jealousies and join heartily in a
crusade. Venice, after all, was the only power which seriously
attempted to check the advance of the Moslem, and the coalition
against her is the best proof of the hollowness of the cry of a
crusade on the part of her spoilers. But though the advance
on the mainland seems to have been inevitable, and is capable
of justification, it was none the less a fatal step. Had it been
possible for Venice to conquer Milan, and to have secured the
whole of Lombardy before the date of the French invasion, she
might some day have become the capital of a united Italy, and
the history of the Peninsula might have been a happier one.
But for this her resources were not sufficient, nor is it likely
that the European powers would have acquiesced. Failing
this, her vain attempts to find a strategic frontier only added
to her enemies, and earned her the name of the most selfish
and grasping of the Italian states ; while in her endeavour
to protect her commerce by friendly treaties with the Turk,
she added to her crimes the charge of treachery towards the
cause of Christendom.
The real fault of Venice has not been so often noted by
historians. Her interests imperatively demanded that the
foreigner should be excluded from Italy. As The real faultg
long as the Peninsula was left to itself, she was of Venetian
strong enough to hold her own ; but she was no pohcy*
match for the more powerful kingdoms of the north. Her
vacillation at the date of the expedition of Charles vm. she
had in part redressed by forming the League of Venice and
driving him from Italy, although her occupation at that date
of the Apulian towns eventually earned her the hostility 01
Ferdinand. The good work was, however, again undone by
her foolish alliance with Louis xn. in his war against Milan.
By this short-sighted policy she earned with some justice the
60 European History, 1494- 1598
accusation of territorial greed ; irritated Maximilian, who did
3i not relish being excluded from Lombardy ; and established
jN on her western frontier the ever-grasping power of France.
Thus, by the close of the fifteenth century, Venice had
incurred the enmity not only of the petty Italian states, but
of the chief powers of Western Europe.
Maximilian desired to recover Friuli ; Louis xn. wished /•
to extend the frontiers of the Milanese : Florence feared
European that Venice might cross the Apennines ; Ferdi-
combinations nanj was determined to recover the cities in
leading to . . ,
the League Apulia. Above all, Pope Julius was bent on
of cambray. humbling the proud republic. Her acquisitions
in the Romagna interfered with his darling scheme of
establishing the papal rule in that district. Between France
in Milan, and Spain in Naples, Julius might hope to hold the
balance, and to establish the temporal dominion of the
Papacy, but Venice, or indeed any strong Italian power, would
strenuously oppose it. In this Julius only followed the
traditional policy of his predecessors in the papal chair,
that of inveterate hostility to the growth of a strong native
state in Italyv Moreover, the independent attitude of the
republic in matters of church government, illustrated at
this moment by her refusal to allow him to nominate to
the vacant bishopric of Vicenza, angered the haughty prelate.
They wish to treat me as their chaplain,' he said, 'let them be-
ware lest I make them humble fishermen as they once were.'
Under these circumstances the sole hope for Venice lay in
the mutual jealousies of her enemies. From these she had
profited hitherto, but when they ceased her day of reckoning
would come. Hence it is necessary to treat in 'some detail
the relations of the European powers at the opening of the
sixteenth century.
At the close of the Neapolitan war, the alliance between the
houses of Hapsburg and Spain, based on the marriage of the
Archduke Philip, son of Maximilian, with Joanna, the daughter
of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile, threatened to
break up. By the deaths in 1497, and I5°o, of John, the
eldest son, and of Michael of Portugal, the grandson of the
-
The Italian Wars, 1 494- 1 5 1 8 6 1
Spanish monarchs, Joanna became the heiress of Castile and
Aragon,1 and, in the event of Isabella's death, would become
Queen of Castile to the exclusion of her father. This at
once aroused the jealousy of Ferdinand against her husband
the archduke. The temporary division of Castile and
Aragon would arrest the unification of the Peninsula ; while
the prospect of Spain eventually falling to the Hapsburg was
equally distasteful to him.
Ferdinand had accordingly rejected the treaty of Lyons
(April 1503), concluded between Philip and Louis xn. for
the settlement of the Neapolitan quarrel. By that Treaty of
treaty, it had been agreed that the kingdom of Ly°ns; ap»^
Naples should one day fall to Claude, the infant Biois, Sep. 22,
daughter of Louis xn., who had already, in 1501, ls°4-
been betrothed to Charles, the young son of the archduke.
Philip, abandoned by his father-in-law, clung all the closer
to the French alliance, and was supported by his father,
Maximilian, who hoped by this marriage treaty to realise
his most magnificent dreams. In September 1504, at Blois,
Louis xn., influenced by his wife, Anne of Brittany, promised
Milan, Genoa, Asti, Brittany, and Blois, as Claude's dower, to
which Burgundy was to be added in the event of his own
death without male heirs. In the following year, Maximilian
actually proposed, with the approval of the French Queen,
that the Salic Law should be repealed, in order that Claude
might succeed her father on the -French throua
Thus there seemed a prospect that the young Charles
would some day unite the kingdoms of Castile, Aragon,
France, the Milanese, and the kingdom of Naples, with the
hereditary dominions of the House of Hapsburg. Had
this ever come about, the rest of Germany must have sub-
mitted, and the descendants of the poverty-stricken Frederick
in. would have found themselves masters of an empire over
1 Ferdinand of Aragon = Isabella of Castile
John Emanuel of Portugal = Isabella Joanna= Archduke Philif
+ 1497 I + T498
Michael 4- isqp
62 European History, 1494- 1598
most of the Teutonic and Latin races of the continent.
But the day dream was not to last. In November 1504,
Isabella died, and Ferdinand, determined to retain his hold
as regent of Castile, made haste to conciliate Louis xn.
At Blois, in October 1505, he agreed to marry Germaine
Second Treaty ^e Foix, the niece of the French king. To her
of Biois. the French claims on Naples were to be resigned,
Oct. 12, 1505. which, however, were to revert to Louis xn. in
default of her having issue by Ferdinand. Ferdinand further
promised to Louis a sum of money, and an amnesty to
the French party in Naples. In the June of the following
year, 1506, Ferdinand was indeed obliged to surrender the
regency of Castile to Philip and Joanna; but in September
the Archduke Philip died at Burgos ; the unfortunate
Joanna was declared to show signs of madness,1 and
Ferdinand, by the help of Cardinal Ximenes, secured,
though with difficulty, the government of Castile. Thus the
quarrel between Louis xn. and Ferdinand was temporarily
accommodated, and Ferdinand was secure in Spain and in
Naples.
Meanwhile, in France the national hostility to a foreigner
had been aroused. The Estates-General at Tours (May 1506)
prayed the King to abandon the intended match between
Claude and Charles, and to marry her to Francis of Angou-
leme, the heir-presumptive to the crown, who was ' entirely a
Frenchman.' Maximilian, irritated at the failure of his
schemes, now broke with Louis. In 1507, he summoned the
Diet to Constance, and passionately demanded help of the
empire. \ The King of France,' he said, • wishes to rob the
Germans of the Imperial crown, the highest dignity of the
world and the glory of our nation.' In return for a promise
to reorganise the Imperial Chamber, he received a contingent
from the Diet; he also took a body of Swiss mercenaries
into his pay. Crossing the Brenner, he reached Trent in
1 On the question of Joanna's madness, cf. authorities at page 104,
note.
The Italian Wars, 1 494- 1 5 1 8 63
February, 1508, and there, with the consent of the papal
legate, declared himself Emperor-elect.
But as usual the pretensions of Maximilian outran his
abilities to a ludicrous extent. The Venetians, fearing
his designs on Friuli, refused him free passage, and en-
forced their refusal by arms. His attempt on Vicenza failed.
The Duke of Gueldres, stirred up by Louis xn., threatened
the Netherlands, and the would-be ruler of Western Europe
was forced to accept the terms of the insolent republic and
retire. Burning to revenge himself, he pocketed his pride,
and at Cambray, December 1508, came to terms with
Louis xii. Peace was made with the Duke of _,, T
, The League
Gueldres, and Maximilian promised, in return for ofCambray.
h money, the investiture of Milan to Louis xn. and Dec* I0' X508,
his descendants. Their quarrels thus accommodated, the
King and Emperor agreed to partition the Venetian territory.
All princes who had any claims on Venetian lands were
asked to aid in checking her intolerable selfishness and greed
by recovering their lost possessions. Ferdinand and the Pope
shortly joined, the latter with some misgivings, and only after
Venice had refused to restore to him Rimini and Faenza ; a
number of petty Italian princes followed suit, and Venice
found herself face to face with one of the most shameful of
coalitions in history. Ferdinand, however, was engaged in
wars against the Moors of Africa. The penniless Maximilian
was not ready for a fresh campaign; and the French, and
papal troops, assisted by the Duke of Ferrara and other Italians,
alone took the field.
The wisest policy for Venice would probably have been, as
Pitigliano urged, to avoid pitched battles, and to play a wait-
ing game. If the war were prolonged, the robbers would be
sure to quarrel. But rasher counsels prevailed.
Neglecting the movement of the papal troops in AgmideUo
the Romagna, the Venetians turned against the orvaiia.
French and attempted to stop their attack at the May I4' I509'
frontier. As the two armies were manoeuvring in the valley
64 European History, 1494- 1598
of the Adda, it came about that the rear-guard of the Venetian
army, under Bartolomeo d' Alviano, came within striking dis-
tance of the French advanced guard. Alviano, a condottier
with more valour than discretion, thought it more honourable
to be beaten than to retreat, and at once ordered the attack.
The Venetian army was a curious medley of Italian condottiers
and peasants, Greek light horse from the Peloponnese and the
^Egean isles, and half-savage archers from Crete. Nevertheless
it fought well, more especially the Italian infantry, composed
of peasants from the Lombard plain and the slopes of the
Alps and Apennines. But it was exposed to the attack of
the whole French army, aided by a large body of Swiss. The
van, under the Count of Pitigliano, whether from jealousy, or
because it was too far distant, did not co-operate ; and, after
a desperate struggle, the Venetian army turned and fled,
leaving Alviano a prisoner, and most of their infantry dead
on the field. As is often the case with mercenaries, the
defeated army soon became a mob. The cities refused refuge
to the fugitives, and opened their gates to the victors. The
French met with no opposition till they reached Peschiera,
which they took by assault.
At Venice meanwhile, the Senate were debating their future
policy amidst the wildest consternation. Deciding to bow to
the storm and to abandon their subject cities, they authorised
them to surrender. Verona, Vicenza, and Padua forthwith
sent their keys to Louis, and on his chivalrous refusal to
accept their submission, since they did not fall to his share,
they turned to Maximilian. In the Romagna, the Pope
occupied Ravenna, Rimini, and Faenza. The Duke of
Ferrara entered the Polesine ; the Marquis of Mantua seized
the territories of which Venice had deprived him ; and the
Apulian towns surrendered to Ferdinand.
Venice had now lost all her acquisitions made during the
fifteenth century, and seemed doomed to be confined again
to her lagoons ; nay, Maximilian even spoke of taking the
city itself and dividing it into four districts among the
The Italian Wars, 1 494- 1 5 1 8 65
confederates. But the Emperor as usual counted without
his host. Neither Ferdinand nor Julius were willing to press
matters so far; they stayed their hand, while Venice saved
Louis, having attained his object, withdrew to by the loyalty
Milan, and then to France. In the conquered ^s an^the
territories, more especially in those claimed by dissensions
Maximilian, a reaction now took place in favour
of the republic of St. Mark. The nobles had easily deserted
Venice, but now the lower classes in town and country rose
in her defence. The Senate regained courage. By a majority
of one vote it was decided to resume the offensive, and, on
July 17, Padua was re-taken. The law which forbade the
Venetian nobility to serve on the mainland was revoked, and
one hundred and seventy-six young nobles, headed by the
sons of the Doge, Loredano, marched to the defence of the
recovered city. Maximilian at last determined to come in
person, and laid siege to Padua with a large army composed
not only of Germans, but of Spanish auxiliaries, and reinforced
by a French contingent. But the French and Germans
were not on the best of terms. The French knights, when
ordered to storm the breach on foot, demanded that they
should be joined by the German men-at-arms, and not be
left to fight side by side with low-born lansquenets, and the
German knigjits refused to serve on foot at all. At last
Maximilian, passing as was his wont from overweening con-
fidence to blank despair, raised the siege, October 3, 1509,
and recrossed the Alps, to hear that Vicenza had also revolted,
and recalled the Venetian troops.
Unable to defeat the Venetians in open battle, or to take
their cities, Maximilian ordered their territories to be ravaged,
and a cruel war of pillage and of massacre went on in Friuli
throughout the winter of 1509-10. On one occasion, six
thousand men, women, and children were suffocated in a cave
near Vicenza. Such cruelties could only serve to convince
the people of the superiority of the Venetian rule.
PERIOD IV. E
66 European History ', 1494- 1598
Venice was now to be saved by the dissensions of hei
enemies Julius 11. had hitherto been the most bitter of her
foes, and had supported the League not only by arms, but
by excommunication. Yet he had always declared that
Venice had driven him to this step by her refusal to recognise
the just claims of the Papacy, spiritual and temporal. ' But
for this/ he had said, ' we might have been united and found
some way to free Italy from the tyranny of the foreigner.'
Why should this not now be done? The lands he claimed
were in his possession, and Venice was prepared to acknow-
ledge his spiritual pretensions. Moreover, the overwhelming
predominance, which France had gained, might be more
dangerous to papal interests than the Venetian republic.
Thus by joining Venice there was an opportunity, not only of
lurthering the papal cause, but also of realising that dream
of every patriotic Italian, the expulsion of the foreigner.
Julius, however, did not show his hand at once. It would
be rash to do so until he could be sure that Venice was strong
enough to resist her foes ; hence his long refusal to listen to
her prayers. When, at last, in February 15 10, he admitted
the city to his peace, it was only on the severest terms. Venice
acknowledged the justice of the excommunication; renounced
her claims to tax her clergy, and to nominate to her bishoprics ;
promised that clerics should be tried by ecclesjastical courts,
and declared the navigation of the Adriatic free to citizens of
the Papal States. The Council of Ten indeed entered a secret
protest against these concessions as having been extorted by
force, and subsequently repudiated them, but for the moment
the Papacy had triumphed.
It was now the aim of Julius to drive the French and
■ Germans from Italy by the assistance of Venice, and of the
Swiss, who had broken with Louis. The Swiss alliance for the
time failed him. Nevertheless he met at first with transient
success. The neutrality of Ferdinand was secured by the
investiture of Naples and Sicily, hitherto refused by the
Papacy (July 15 10). Modena, belonging to the Duke
The Italian Wars, 1494- 1 518 67
of Ferrara, and Mirandola, were conquered; the first
by the nephew of the Pope, the Duke of Urbino ; the
second by the warlike Julius himself, who, rising from a
bed of sickness, crossed the trenches on the ice, and took
the city by storm (January 1511). But here his success
ended.
On May 13, 15 11, the French captured Bologna, aided
by treachery within the city, and in September, Louis sum-
moned a general council at Pisa, which had been at last
reconquered by Florence two years before. The council was a
failure, for Europe was not prepared for another schism. But
it was evident that the French were not to be easily driven
from Milan. Julius, therefore, determined to be avenged on
France, now turned to Ferdinand. The wily Spaniard had
long lost interest in the League. Having regained the
Apulian towns, he did not care to see Venice further humbled,
and dreaded the increase of French power in Lombardy.
Moreover, a quarrel in Italy would give him a pretext for
seizing Navarre, which he had long coveted. Ferdinand
accordingly gladly welcomed the offers of the Pope; and
on October 5, 151 1, the Holy League was formed The Hol
between the Pope, Ferdinand, and Venice. The League,
ostensible object of the League was the protection °ct* 5' I5"#
of the Church, the recovery of Bologna, and the restoration to
Venice of her territories. The real aim of the confederates was
to drive the French from Italy, while a further stipulation in
the treaty, that the Pope should confirm the Spaniards in any
conquest made outside Italy, pointed clearly to Navarre. The
allies also gained the support of the young Henry vm. of
England, who was anxious to revive his claims to Guienne, and
to strengthen his alliance with his father-in-law. Against this
formidable coalition, Louis was at first successful. The French
army was commanded by Gaston de Foix, the king's nephew
and brother of Ferdinand's wife. The young man — he
was twenty-three, * a great general without having served as
a soldier ' — who by the rapidity of his movements earned in
68 European History \ 1494- 1598
this campaign the title of the Thunderbolt of Italy, first threw
himself into Bologna (February 4), and forced the army of
the League, under Raymond de Cardona, viceroy of Naples,
to retire. Hearing of the revolt of Brescia, he hurried thither,
took the town by assault, mounting the ramparts with bare
feet to improve his hold on the steep slopes (February 18),
and killed so many of the defenders ' that the horses could
not put foot to the ground for the corpses that covered it.'
Then, speeding back to Bologna, he forced his enemies to
retire, and, pressing on to Ravenna, attempted to take the
town by assault (April 19).
Cardona was anxious to avoid a pitched battle. Time, he
knew, was on his side, for Maximilian was on the point of
joining the League ; the Swiss were preparing to
Ravenna. pour down into the Milanese ; and the projected
Easter Day, invasion of France by Henry vm. would prevent
Louis from sending efficient reinforcements. He
had accordingly retired to Faenza, but, fearing that Ravenna
would fall if not relieved, was forced to return. Even then his
tactics were defensive. His camp was protected on the left
flank by the river ; in front, by some of the numerous ditches
which intersect the marshy country. Strengthening this
further by his artillery, and by waggons with scythe-like im-
plements mounted on them, he awaited the French attack.
The position of Cardona was indeed a strong one, but in
numbers his force was slightly inferior, and, if France was to win,
the victory must be won at once. Gaston, therefore, decided
rightly to tempt fortune once more, and on Easter Day at
8 a.m. he ordered the attack. He had hoped to dislodge the
enemy from their strong position by means of his artillery,
which had been brought to a condition of high efficiency
under the Duke of Ferrara. In this he was disappointed.
The fire of the Spaniards was nearly as effective as his own,
and, although the cavalry of the League suffered as severely as
that of the French, the Spanish infantry protected themselves
by lying on the ground, a movement which French ideas of
The Italian Wars, 1494- 1 518 69
military honour forbade. After three hours' furious cannonade,
the impatience of the cavalry of the League, and of the
French and German infantry, could no longer be restrained,
and while the former charged the French cavalry, which stood
opposite to it, the latter attacked the Spanish foot. Thus
cavalry was opposed to cavalry, and infantry to infantry.
In the shock which followed, the French horse under
Ives d'Allegre, after half-an-hour's struggle, carried all before
them ; but their foot, with the German lansquenets, in spite
of heroic efforts, found the position too strong, and were already
being driven back, when a detachment of their horse, returning
from the charge, took the infantry of the League in flank.
The French and German infantry now rallied, and forcing
their opponents back, finally drove them from their camp.
The battle was already won, when Gaston, attempting to
check the retreat of some two thousand Spanish footmen,
rashly threw himself across their path, followed by a handful
of men-at-arms. Though unhorsed he still fought on, * rival-
ling the feats of Roland at Roncesvalles,' till at last he fell
pierced by wounds. Thus ended the most bloody battle of
the war, which had lasted from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m.
The graphic account, given by the biographer of Bayard,
helps us best to realise its peculiar character. The shock
of the men-at-arms, the thrust of pike and short sword,
the arquebuses and ■ hacquebutes,' or mounted arquebuses,
belong to the Middle Age, but the efficiency of the guns
reminds us that we are on the threshold of the sixteenth
century.
The victory lay with the French. Pedro Navarra, one of the
best of the Spanish generals, the young Marquis of Pescara,
and the Cardinal de Medici, legate of the Pope, soon to
become Pope Leo x. himself, were prisoners. * The Spanish
loss was such that an hundred years could not repair it,'
and Ravenna at once surrendered. Yet, never was victory
more dearly bought, or more useless. Though the Spanish
troops had suffered most, the losses amongst the officers were
70 European History \ 1494-159$
more severe on the side of the French and Germans, and many
a knight who had distinguished himself in Italy had bit the
dust. More serious still was Gaston's death. Had he lived, he
might have pressed on to Rome, and brought the Pope at once
to terms. His death, however, caused delay, and delay was
ruinous. The cruelty of the French had made them hated by
the Italians; the richness of the booty, at Brescia and Ravenna,
demoralised the troops, and many returned to France.
Maximilian had come to terms with the League just before
the battle, but too late to prevent his lansquenets from taking
part and rendering most efficient help to the
and the Swiss French. Now, in hopes of securing the Milanese
join the Holy for himself, or for his grandson Charles, he re-
called his troops and openly broke with France.
Deprived of their support, the French could hardly keep
the field. It was, however, at the hands of the Swiss that
they were to be driven across the Alps. In the previous
wars, these mercenary mountaineers had been of the greatest
service to Louis ; but the cantons had been alienated by
his refusal to increase the subsidy, and still more by his
stopping their trade with the Milanese, whence they drew
their corn and wine and oil. A strong anti-French party
accordingly arose in Switzerland, headed by^Mathias Schinner,
Bishop of the Valais, the implacable enemy 'of France, and. in
May 15 1 2, a Swiss army poured down on Milan. La Palice,
who, on the death of Gaston, had succeeded to the com-
mand, felt too weak to resist them with an army deprived of
the German contingent, and demoralised by its excesses
The French ^e accordingly withdrew to Pavia. Trivulzio^.
recross the the governor of Milan, followed him, and shortly
Alps* afterwards the French recrossed the Mont Cenis.
With the exception of the castle of Milan, and a few others,
their conquests rapidly melted away. Genoa drove out the
French and elected Giano Fregoso as its doge. All the
Romagna returned to the obedience of the Pope. The Duke
of Ferrara indeed held out, but lost Reggio. Bologna was
The Italian Wars, 1 494- 1 5 1 8 ? I
regained, and even Parma and Piacenza seized, while Julius
claimed all the territory south of the Po.
In August 15 1 2, representatives of the League met in con-
gress at Mantua. Florence first demanded their attention.
Since the death of Savonarola, the position of
that republic had been most weak. The con- restored to
stitution established in 1494 had not worked Florence,
well. It was too oligarchical to be popular, while
the partisans of the exiled Medici did all they could to
discredit it. ^In 1502, to strengthen the executive, the office
of Gonfalonier had been made a life appointment, and Piero
Soderini had been elected; in 1506, at the suggestion of
Machiavelli, a militia had been formed. But these measures
did not mend matters much. The long struggle to regain
Pisa, which was only ended in 1509, exhausted the revenues
of the state, and the intrigues of the Medici grew more
active. Clinging to the French alliance, the city had
refused the offers of the League ; yet, in the pursuit of a policy
of feeble neutrality, had given no help to Louis xn., wjien
help might have saved him. Her turn was now to come.
The confederates demanded that Soderini should retire from
office, and that the Medici should be allowed to return as
private citizens. The Florentines agreed to admit the
Medici, but, over-confident in their new-formed militia,
declined to depose Soderini. Accordingly, on August 12,1512,
Raymond de Cardona attacked the town of Prato, which lay
a few mile's to the north of Florence. The militia, although
far more numerous than their enemies, did not justify the
confidence which had been placed in them, and fled as soon
as a breach was made ; possibly there was treachery within
the walls. In any case, the Spaniards Entered the town
without further opposition, and put it to the sack with such
brutality that the memories of it are said to have disturbed
the last moments of Giovanni, the future Pope, Leo x. This
cruelty at least did its work. Soderini, an amiable though weak
man, whose ' silly soul ' the indignant epitaph of Machiavelli
72 European History \ 1494- 1598
sentences to the limbo of infants, at once resigned rather than
expose Florence to further woes; and, on September 1, the
Cardinal Giovanni entered Florence. The Medici 1 returned
nominally as private citizens, but the constitution of 1494
was swept away, and the government, restored as it had been
under Lorenzo, was completely under their control. Although
the revolution was effected with moderation, the partisans of
the old government naturally lost office. Machiavelli, who
had been secretary to the Council of Ten (Dieci di Liberta
e Pace), and who had taken an active part in the diplomacy
of the republic, was driven from public life, and devoted himself
to writing The Prince, and The Discourses? the former of
which treatises has given him such an unenviable notoriety.
The city under its new rulers abandoned the French alliance
and joined the League.
The confederates then turned to the question of Milan.
Maximilian was eager to secure this for his grandson
Charles. But he was not acceptable to the
Milan granted — : — J .x
to Maximilian Pope, the Venetians, or the Swiss, or even to
sforza. Ferdinand. All dreaded the/ addition of the
Dec. 29, 1512. , L .
Milanese to the vast possessions present and
reversionary of the young prince, J?ina|ly, it was agreed
to recall Maximilian, the son of Ludovico il Moro, who
had since his father's fall been brought up in the imperial
court. On the 29th of December, Maximilian received
the keys from the Swiss and entered the city. In return,
* their puppet duke ' ceded to the confederates the Val
Maggia, Locarno, and Lugano; and to their allies, the
Rhsetian League (later the canton of the Grisons), Chiavenna,
1 The leaders of the Medici at this time were as follows : —
1. Giuliano, Duke of Nemours, and Cardinal Giovanni, subse-
quently Leo x. , both sons of Lorenzo.
2. Giulio, nephew of Lorenzo, subsequently Cardinal and then
Pope Clement vn.
3. Lorenzo, Duke of Urbino, son of Piero, grandson of Lorenzo.
2 On the purpose of the Prince, cf. Burd, // Principe, Introduction.
Cambridge Modern History, c. 6.
The Italian Warsy 1494- 1 518 73
Bormio, and the Valtelline. This, added to the Val Leven-
tina, acquired 1440, and to Bellinzona, granted by Louis xn.
in 1503, gave the Swiss, and their allies, complete command
over four of the most important passes of the Alps, the St.
Gothard, the Splugen, the Maloia, and the Bernina, and
extended their territory to the Italian lakes of Como, Lugano,
and Maggiore.1 Thus at the close of the year 15 12, the
Medici and the Sforza found themselves again in power as
they had been at the invasion of Charles vm.
Meanwhile France had been threatened by a joint attack
on Guienne — on the part of Ferdinand and Henry vm. The
English indeed landed at Bayonne, but fortunately for Louis,
the attention of Ferdinand was called off to Navarre. That
kingdom, which sat astride of the Pyrenees, was at this
moment under the rule of Catherine de Foix and her hus-
band, the Frenchman, John d'Albret. But her title had
always been disputed by the younger line, represented by
Gaston de Foix, the nephew of Louis xn. On his death at
the battle of Ravenna, his claims passed to his Ferdinand
sister Germaine, wife of Ferdinand, and these con<iuer8
Spanish
Ferdinand now proceeded to press. -Catherine, Navarre,
the reigning queen, no longer afraid of France, J^y^s.
sought the alliance of Louis xn. This gave Ferdinand
the pretext he sought. He demanded a passage through
Navarre for his attack on France, and on being refused, in-
vaded the little kingdom. He was supported by a powerful
faction, headed by the Beaumonts. The timid John fled.
'Wert thou queen and I king, the realm would not be thus
lost/ said Catherine, but was forced to follow her cowardly
husband, and, by the end of July, Ferdinand occupied all the
territory on the Spanish side of the mountains. That portion
of the country which lay on the French slope of the Pyrenees,
continued an independent kingdom, to be absorbed into France
in the sixteenth century, by the accession of Henry of Navarre
1 Chiavenna, Bormio, and the Valtelline, were held till 1797. The
others since 1803 have formed the Swiss canton of Ticino.
74 European History \ 1494- 1 598
to the French crown. The English, irritated at Ferdinand's
failure to co-operate with them, and attacked by disease, due
to the hot climate, the incessant rain, and the heavy wine of
the South in which they indulged too freely, withdrew from
Bayonne, and France was relieved from immediate danger on
that side.
At the beginning of the year 15 13, it was pretty evident that
the Holy League would not last. The Venetians, finding
that the Emperor was coveting the share of their
the Holy territory originally meted out to him by the
League. League of Cambray, were looking again to France.
At this moment, Julius 11., one of the chief movers in that
League, passed away. The objects of this 'fiery personality'
/♦ Death of **ad been : first to conquer the Romagna, and
Julius 11. establish the papal dominion there on a sound
Feb. 2o, 1513. f00ting . secondly, if possible, to free Italy from
the foreigner. Of these, the first had been the dominant aim,
and he had attained it. 'For good or for ill, Julius is the
founder of the Papal States.' We may deplore the secular-
ising influence of the temporal dominion on the spiritual
character of the Papacy, but at least the scheme of Julius
h infinitely preferable to that of Alexander vi. Alexander
had tried to establish his family; Julius won territories for
the Papal See. But in gaining this, his primary aim, he
sacrificed his second. By the League of Cambray, he finally
destroyed the political life of Italy, and called the foreigner
to his aid; and, when, in the Holy League, he attempted
to undo the work, and to drive the French, the chief instru-
ments of his previous policy, across the Alps, he found that
he could only do so at the price of changing masters. , In
his last days, indeed, he hoped to reconcile Maximilian by
some small concessions, and then, with the help of the
Venetians and the Swiss, to drive the Spaniards from the
peninsula. But the dream was an idle one.. Julius had
riveted the chains of Italian slavery, and done much to
advance the power of that formidable Austro-Spanish House
The Italian Wars, 1494- 1 5 iS 7$
tfhich was shortly to become so dangerous a menace to
Europe, and to control the destinies of Italy till our own
day. None the less, the name of Pope Julius will always live
as the founder of the Papal States, as the last representative
of that great semi-political, semi-religious Church, whose
claims to universal supremacy over western Christendom were
on the point of being overthrown ; as the patron of Bramante,
Michael Angelo, and Raphael, the authors of those supreme
efforts of Renaissance art, the Cathedral of St. Peter,1 and
the frescoes of the Sistine Chapel, and of the Vatican.
Of all the schemes of Julius 11., few had more influence
on the immediate history of Italy and of the Papacy than
the restoration of the Medici to Florence. He E1 ction of
had been led to it by the obstinate adherence of LeoX.
the republic to Louis xn. But the policy was a March "' I513"
mistaken one. The republic was weak and could not have
had much influence, whereas, under the Medici, allied as
they were with Spain, Florence was likely to become formid-
able again. Julius, however, could hardly have foreseen that
a family, which had only just been restored from exile, would
furnish his successor on the papal throne ; for the election of
the young Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici — he was only thirty-
eight — surprised every one.
Giovanni, the second son of Lorenzo the Magnificent,
appointed a cardinal before he was a man, had indeed shown
himself a capable politician by the leading part he had taken
in the restoration of his family to Florence. He was not,
however, otherwise noteworthy, and his election was due
mainly to the desire of the young cardinals for some rest
after the political activity of the pontificates of Alexander vi.
and Julius 11. This they hoped to gain by the election of the
pleasure-loving Medici, who represented the Renaissance in
its shallower aspects, loved magnificence, and dallied with
literature and art ; but had no serious purpose in life beyond
1 Bramante began St. Peter's under Julius 11., Michael Angelo added the
dome under Leo. x.
76 European History \ 1494- 1598
a desire to establish his family at Florence, and, for the rest,
to be ever on the winning side.
But though, by the death of Julius 11., the Holy League was
robbed of its most earnest member, the change of Popes did
not for the moment improve the prospects of peace. On
the one hand France and Venice, united by common interest,
Treat of formed an alliance; on the other, the young
Mechlin. Henry vin. of England and his ambitious minister
Apni 5, 1513. "Wolsey, anxious to win a place in European
counsels, pined for a new league of partition against France.
This was signed at Mechlin, in April, between Maximilian,
Henry vin., Leo. x., and Ferdinand ; although the last named
was at the same moment making a secret treaty with the
French King.
Threatened thus on all sides, France seemed likely to be over-
whelmed. In Italy, her attempt to reconquer the Milanese,
„ . , . by the aid of the Venetians, was foiled by the
Battle of * I *
Novara. disastrous battle of Novara. Here the Swiss, who
June 6, 1513. i00ked upon Maximilian Sforza as their protege,
without cavalry or artillery, decisively defeated a French
army three times as numerous as themselves, and well pro-
vided with both guns and horse.
Meanwhile Henry vin., with the needy Maximilian in his
pay, invaded France ; laid siege to Terouenne ; put a
f French relieving force to flight at Guinnegate
Guinnegate. with such ease, as to earn for the combat the
Aug. 16. name of <the Battie 0f the Spurs'; and took
Terouenne and Tournay. In September, the Swiss actually
invaded France and extorted a treaty from Louis xn. In the
Fiodden. same month, James iv. of Scotland, as he sought
Sept. 9. to make a diversion in favour of his French ally,
lost the flower of the Scottish nobility, and his own life, on the
field of Fiodden.
It looked as if France, the country which at first had gained
most from the partition of Venice, was likely to be partitioned
herself. But, as ever, the mutual jealousies of the European
The Italian Wars, 1494- 1 518 77
powers prevented any lasting combination. Neither Ferdinand
nor Leo x. wished to see France too weak. Leo thought
that his own interests and those of his family
would be best secured by balancing the powers more saved
of Spain and France in Italy, and hoped to secure hy dissen-
French assistance for his scheme of establishing foes#
Giuliano his brother in Naples. He accordingly Ferdinand,
became reconciled to the French King, and par- Heniyviii.
doned the French cardinals, who had taken part are reconciled
in the schismatic council of Pisa (November,
1 5 13). Ferdinand was above all things anxious to prevent the
undue aggrandisement of the House of Hapsburg. He had
already made a secret treaty with Louis, and he now intrigued
to detach the Emperor from the English alliance. Henry was
determined not to be thus left in the lurch. He was irritated
at the treachery of Ferdinand, and the incurable shiftiness of
Maximilian, 'the man of few pence,' who would do anything
to gain a little money, and accordingly made his own peace
with Louis (August, 15 14). It was agreed that his sister
Mary, who had just been betrothed to Charles, the grandson
of Maximilian, should marry the French King. The disparity
in their ages was serious. The bridegroom was a widower
of fifty-two, and Mary was but sixteen. But the scruples
of the maiden were overcome by the promise that, if she
would this time sacrifice herself to her brother's interests,
she should next time follow her own inclinations ; and peace
was concluded between France and England. Thus France
escaped from her danger, and England, under the guidance
of Wolsey, had secured for herself an influential position in
Europe.
Of the folly of Louis' Italian policy, there cannot be a
doubt. His three capital errors are thus described by
Mnrhjgvplli : (j^He increased the power of the Church Qhe
caiiea the Spaniards into Italy, a foreigner as puissant as
himselQ^e ruined the power of the Venetians, his best allies.'
The mutual jealousies of the other powers, indeed, saved
78 European History, 1494- 1598
France itself from dismemberment. But her resources were
terribly strained : Spain had seized foajf of Na^axre^ Tournay
had been lost to England ; and the attempt to hold Italy had
only proved the truth of the adage that ■ Italy is the grave of
the French.'
Had Louis lived, Europe might possibly have had peace.
But the unfortunate man succumbed in three months in
_ . „,. his attempt to play the bridegroom, * dining at
Louis XII. . 1 , ,. • , ,
succeeded by eight when he was accustomed to dine at midday,
Francis i. ancj retiring to bed at midnight when he was wont
to sleep at six,' and was succeeded by his ambitious
cousin, Francis of Angouleme, who had, in 15 14, married the
king's daughter, Claude, heiress through her mother to the
Duchy of Brittany.
The young king, now in his twenty-first year, is thus de-
scribed by Sir Robert Wingfield, the ambassador of Henry till.
at the court of Maximilian : ' He is mighty insatiable, always
reading or talking of such enterprises as whet and inflame
himself and his hearers. His common saying is, that his
trust is, that by his valour and industry the things which have
been lost and lettyn by his ignoble predecessors shall be
recovered, and that the monarchy of Christendom shall rest
under the banner of France as it was wont to do.' Encouraged
by his mother, Louise of Savoy, who was bent on the exalta-
tion of her * Caesar,' he was no sooner on the throne than
he resolved to plunge into Italy and wipe out the
tannines to disgrace of No^ani. In the spring and summer,
invade Italy, he renewed the treaties with Henry vm. and
withVenice, Venice» and concluded an alliance with the young
England, and Charles, who, although only fifteen, had just been
called to assume the government of the Nether-
lands, and who, under the guidance of Croy, the Lord of
Chievres, had adopted a conciliatory attitude towards France.
Francis also hoped to gain the support of Leo x. In February,
he sanctioned the marriage of Giuliano de' Medici, the brother
of the Pope, with Philiberta of Savoy, sister of his mother
The Italian Wars, 1 494-1 518 79
Louise, and held out hopes of some day establishing him in
Naples.
The fickle Pontiff, however, was as usual playing double,
and in the same month joined the counter-league against
France, which was composed of the Emperor,
Ferdinand, Florence, the Duke of Milan, and the League
Swiss. Had the allies been united it might have against
4Mb 'J= — —— -; ,-P France.
gone ill for Francis, but they were bent on their
own interests, and divided their forces. Francis, finding that
the outlet of the passes of the Mont Cenis and Mont
Genevre were guarded by the Swiss, pushed his way across the
Alps by the Col de l'Argentiere, a new and difficult route, and *
reached Saluzzo unmolested. He then surprised Prospero
Colonna, who commanded the Milanese forces at Villafranca,
and completely turned the position of the Swiss
Franric
at Susa. The Swiss dropped back on Milan, and crosses the
the French advanced to Marignano, a place a1ps»
between Piacenza and Milan. Here, late on a victoryof
September afternoon, they were attacked by the Marignano,
Swiss. The intrepid mountaineers had been ep ' I3'
stirred by the eloquence of Mathias Schinner, the Cardinal of •
Sion, the life-long enemy of the French. With only a few
Milanese cavalry to support them, and scarcely any guns, they
trusted to the weight of their famous phalanx, and push of
pike. The French they despised as ■ hares in armour.' Dis-
encumbered of their caps, and with bare feet to give them-
selves firmer footing, they dashed upon the enemy, hoping to
repeat the exploit of Novara. But they underrated their
opponents, who were led by the flower of French chivalry, the
Constable of Bourbon, La Palice, the Chevalier Bayard, Robert
de la Marck, the son of the ' devil of the Ardennes,' himself
dubbed ' L'Aventureur,' and the Milanese, Trivulzio, who
had fought in seventeen pitched battles. Pedro Navarra, the
Spanish general of artillery, was also there. He had been
made prisoner at the battle of Ravenna, and since the
niggardly Ferdinand had refused to pay his ransom, he had
taken service with the French.
80 European History, 1494- 1598
The struggle which ensued was declared by Trivulzio to be
a battle of giants, compared with which, all that he had ever
been engaged in were but child's-play. When darkness came
upon the combatants, they lay down to sleep ' within cast of a
tennis ball of each other.' With the dawn the combat was
renewed, and continued till midday. The Swiss had divided
their forces in an attempt on the rear-guard, when d'Alviano
attacked them in the rear with the Venetian contingents.
This decided the matter, and Francis, knighted on the battle-
field by the Chevalier Bayard, remained the master of the
field. Yet though defeated, the Swiss retreated in good
order, bearing their wounded with them.
The battle of Marignano gave Milan to the French.
Maximilian Sforza abdicated his dukedom, which he had
Results of ne^ f°r three years, and died some years after,
the victory. a pensioner in France. By his victory, Francis
shattered the military prestige of the Swiss, who had of late
deemed themselves invincible, commanded the destinies of
Lombardy, and [ tamed and corrected princes/ Never again
did these mercenaries exercise an independent influence in
Italy. Thus Francis had attained at one stroke the pinnacle
of military glory, and, had he pressed his advantage, might
have reduced the Pope and regained the kingdom of Naples.
But for this he was not prepared, and, contrary to expecta-
tion, the battle for a moment promoted the cause of peace.
Leo, eager to join the winning cause, hastened to come to
terms. He ceded Parma and Piacenza, while Francis pro-
mised to support Lorenzo in Florence, and to sanction the
papal attack on the Duchy of Urbino, whence Francesco della
Rovere, the Duke, was driven. A short time afterwards, Francis
gave Lorenzo a wife connected with the royal family, Made-
leine de la Tour d'Auvergne.
Having thus settled their political affairs, Pope and King
proceeded, by the concordat of Bologna, to share between
them the liberties of the Gallican Church. The traditional
privileges of the Church of France had been" confirmed and
The Italian Wars, 1 494-1 518 $1
extended by Charles vn. in the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges
(1439). By it, the free election to bishoprics and abbacies
had been secured to the chapters; the papal TheConcordat
claims to first-fruits had been rejected, as well as of Bologna,
the right to nominate to benefices by way of Aug* I5l6# *-
1 reservations ' and ' expectancies ' ; appeals to Rome had
been restricted, and the superiority of General Councils over
the Pope had been declared. The independence thus gained
by the Church of France had been distasteful, not only to
the Pope, but to Louis XI. himself, who had attempted,
though unsuccessfully, to repeal the Pragmatic Sanction.
Now Francis had his opportunity, and was met half-way by
Leo x. The Concordat of Bologna restrained indeed the /
appeals to Rome, and declared papal ' reservations ' and ' ex-
pectative graces ' abolished. But it restored the first-fruits to
the Pope, omitted the assertion of the superiority of General
Councils over the Pope, and gave to the King the rigljt of
nomination to bishoprics and archbishoprics, subject only to
t4.e papal confirmation and institution. A few years later, the
King gained the same privilege with regard to the abbots of
French monasteries. This serious attack on the constitu-
tional liberties of the Church of France met with resolute
opposition from the ' Parlement ' and the University of Paris.
But the ' Parlement,' after an ineffectual resistance, was forced
to register it de expressimo mandato regis, the University was
overawed by royal threats, and the Concordat became the
law of France. Henceforth the French Church became the
servant of King and Pope. The power, which the crown
obtained by control of these nominations, may be estimated
by remembering that in France at that time there existed
ten archbishoprics, eighty-three bishoprics, and five hundred
and twenty-seven abbacies. This right of nomination was
almost exclusively exercised in favour of men of noble birth.
Hence the mischievous distinction between the higher clergy
who were nobles, and, for the most part, courtiers, and
the cures, who were not. Under these circumstances, the
PERIOD IV. F
82 European History, 1494- 1598
position of the Church formed a counterpart to the social
condition of the country, with its sharp and disastrous
division between the noble and the roturier. On the
other hand, the right of veto enjoyed by the Pope on the
royal nominations caused the higher clergy and the aspirants
for office to look to him. Thus the Church of France, once
the most independent of the European churches, became one
of the most servile and ultramontane, whilst its rulers lost
all touch with the middle classes.
Meanwhile, the triumph of Francis materially influenced
the policy of Ferdinand. Since the death of the Archduke
Philip, the King of Spain had been jealous of his grandson
Charles. He feared lest he might reclaim the regency of
Castile, and disliked the prospect of his eventually joining
Austria, the Netherlands, and Spain under one
Ferdinand rule. His hostility even led him to entertain
the Cathohc, serious thoughts of dividing his inheritance on
Jan. 23, 1516. ° °
Charles King his death between Charles and his brother
of Spam. Ferdinand. Now, fearing that France might
become too powerful, he changed his will and bequeathed
all to Charles. In January, 15 16, the wily old diplomatist,
who had so adroitly schemed to establish his undivided
authority in Spain, and to balance the powers of Europe,
died, and Charles found himself, at the age of sixteen, the
ruler of Spain, the Netherlands, the kingdoms of Naples and
Sicily, and the New World.
It was now the aim of Wolsey, who had gained his cardinal's
hat in the previous year, to oppose the predominant power of
France by an alliance between Charles, Maximilian, the Pope,
and the Swiss. But Leo for the present preferred the French
alliance, and Charles was not yet prepared for a struggle with
Francis. His position was by fio means secure ; his suc-
cession in Spain was disliked by many of the Spaniards ;
the Netherlands lay exposed to the attacks of the Duke
of Gueldres, and of Robert de la Marck, the Lord of
Bouillon, both ever glad of a pretext for war. Finally, with
The Italian Wars, 1494- 1 518 83
all his titles, he was sadly in need of money. He was therefore
in no position to contest the possession of Milan, and, follow-
ing the advice of Chievres, he concluded the Charles makes
Peace of Noyon with the victor of Marignano Peace of
(August 13, 15 16). Charles was betrothed to Francis™
Louise, the infant daughter of Francis; the Aug. 13, 1516,
French retained Milan, but surrendered all miiian
claims to Naples; Charles promised to restore accepts.
Spanish Navarre to the line of Albret ; Venice agreed to offer
200,000 ducats to Maximilian for Brescia and Verona, but in
the event of his refusing, the two Kings might adopt what
policy they liked with regard to Venetian affairs.
The Peace of Noyon was a blow to Wolsey. In vain
did he try to form an alliance with Maximilian, the
Venetians, and the Swiss. The Emperor was ever ready
with fantastic projects calculated to deceive the simple Sir
Robert Wingfield, Henry's representative at his court, who
was an ambassador of the old generation, and did not fathom
the wiles of the new diplomacy. But Richard Pace, Wolsey's
special agent, warned his master against the credulity of the
good knight, whom he humorously describes as * Summer will
be green,' and against the shiftiness and money greed of
Maximilian. Eventually, in December, Maximilian accepted
the terms of the treaty of Noyon, and surrendered Brescia and
Verona to Venice. Nor was Wolsey more successful with the
Swiss. In November, in return for gold, they made a
'perpetual peace' with the French at Friburg. England
seemed to be isolated once more. But the desire of Francis
to recover Tournay, which had been seized by Henry vin.
in 1513, gave Wolsey an advantage, and by the
Treaty of London (October, 15 18), Henry sur- makel Treaty
rendered that town. The alliance between the of London,
two countries was confirmed by the usual marriage Europe for
arrangements. The English princess Mary, a the moment
child of two, was betrothed to the dauphin, who a eace*
was not yet one year old. Thus England had at least saved
herself from isolation, and Europe was at peace.
84 European History, 1494- 1598
The Pope, when he dissolved the Lateran Council in the
March of the preceding year, had declared that schism had
been ended, that the necessary reforms in the Church had been
accomplished, and that he had good hopes that Europe, now at
peace, might unite against the Turk. The powers of Europe
openly professed their intention so to do ; indulgences were
promised, and papal collectors attempted to raise money.
Yet Europe was on the threshold of a renewed struggle
between the Houses of Hapsburg and of Valois, which was
to last with some slight pauses for another eighty_jeaxs ; and
already Luther had affixed his famous ' Theses ' to the church
door at Wittenberg, which were to lead to a schism such as
Rome had never dreamt of.
The series of treaties just mentioned may be said to have
closed the desultory war which had commenced with the
Eff ctofthe League of Cambray, It is often said that the
wars of the League ruined Venice, yet we find that she still
League of retained almost all her dominions on the mainland,
Cambray on '
the decline of with the exception of the Apulian towns and a
Venice. few districts surrendered to the Pope, and that '
the Adda still remained her boundary on the west. The long
war had no doubt severely strained her resources and her
exhausted finances, but these might have been restored.
We must therefore look elsewhere for the causes of the decline
of Venice. In the first place, the condition of politics
had changed. The great monarchical states of Europe,
more especially France and Spain, had become consolidated.
Venice could no longer hope to compete with
K6ul CmUScS
of the decline them; her resources on the mainland were not
of Venice. sufficient to cope with the armies which these
powerful nations could put into the field ; and in any case
she must have contented herself with a subordinate position.
We must also remember the strain of the Turkish wars.
Europe, ever ready to accuse Venice of treachery to the cause
of Christendom, turned deaf ears to her earnest entreaties for
assistance. Thus Venice was left almost alone to face the
The Italian Wars, 1494- 1 518 85
Turk. During the struggle, which continued with some few
intermissions throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies, Venice slowly lost ground. She had to surrender
Cyprus in 157 1, and Candia in 1669, after a desperate defence
of four-and-twenty years. The expenses of these wars, added
to those she had just incurred, would have been difficult to
meet, even if her trade had been left to her. But even this
was slipping away. Her wealth had depended chiefly on her
commerce with the East and on her carrying-trade between
East and West. The old routes of Eastern commerce had
been mainly three. First, from Central Asia to the Black
Sea, and thence to the Mediterranean; secondly, by the
Persian Gulf and the Euphrates Valley, to the Levant ; and
lastly, to Cairo and Alexandria from the Red The old routes
Sea. Thence goods were shipped in Venetian of commerce
galleys to Venice, and were sent over the Alps, SceveSof
generally by the Brenner Pass, to the Inn, the route round
Danube, the Maine, and the Rhine, and thence the Cape"
to Bruges, or were conveyed round by sea in the 'Flanders
galleys.' But at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the
Eastern routes to Venice became closed. The Turks, after
their conquest of Constantinople, in 1453, cut off her trade
with the Levant, while the advance of the Portuguese on
India destroyed the trade through Egypt.
The Genoese had been the pioneers of exploration on the
western coast of Africa. They had rediscovered the Canaries
and the island of Madeira, which had been known to the
Carthaginians. But their attention had been directed to the
Mediterranean, their strength exhausted in struggles with their
Venetian rivals, and in the fourteenth century the Portuguese
had reoccupied these islands. The great period of Portuguese
discovery dates from the time of Prince Henry the Navigator
( 1 394-1460). This son of John 1. of Portugal _.
v kjs-t -r / j to Discoveries
built an observatory at Sagres, on Cape St. of the
Vincent, the extreme south-west promontory of Portu£uese-
Europe, and devoted himself to "the scientific study of
/
86 European History \ 1494- 1598
geography, and to the encouragement of discovery. Other
motives were not wanting; the desire to avenge himself on
the Moors, the hereditary foes of his country, and greed
for gold dust, and the profits of the slave-trade, in which
the Prince was the first to engage. In one expedition no
less than two hundred and sixteen negro slaves were brought
to Portugal, of whom one-fifth were assigned to Henry as his
share ; ' of which,' says the chronicler, ' he had great joy
because of their salvation, who otherwise would have been
destined to perdition.' Under his influence, the Portuguese
planted colonies at Porto Santo and Madeira, discovered the
Azores, and the Cape de Verde Islands, and began to creep
down the western coast of Africa. In 1442, Prince Henry
obtained from Pope Martin v. a grant of all kingdoms and
lordships from Cape Bojador to India. The hopes of reaching
India spurred him on. In 1479, Ferdinand of Spain, still
occupied at home with the Moors of Granada, agreed not to
interfere with the exclusive right of the Portuguese to traffic
and discovery on the western coast of Africa, while claiming
the Canary Islands. The agreement was confirmed by the
bull of Alexander vi., which gave to Portugal all newly
found lands east of a line one hundred — subsequently, in
1494, extended by treaty to three hundred and seventy
— leagues west of the Cape de Verde Islands.
I <f % ifi Eight years before this bull, Bartholomew Diaz rounded the
Cape, to which he gave the name of Stormy, but which his
more sanguine sovereign, John 11. of Portugal, called the Cape
of Good Hope. In 1498, Vasco da Gama, again sailing round
the Cape, crossed the Eastern Ocean, and set foot on the
Malabar coast at Calicut. Shortly after, Emmanuel, King of
Portugal (1495-15 21), assumed the title of 'Lord of the
navigation, conquest, and commerce of ^Ethiopia, Persia,
Arabia, and India/ and sent Almeyda to India with the title
of viceroy, although he did not yet possess a foot of territory
there. The Portuguese now pushed steadily up the western
coast of India, defeated the princes who opposed them, and
The Italian Wars, 1494-1518 87
began to monopolise the trade. ;In 1505, the first Portuguese
ships appeared at Antwerp, offering eastern wares at a cheaper
rate than they could be got at Bruges, the market for the goods
which came overland from Venice. This advance seriously
threatened the Venetian trade through Egypt, then chiefly in
the hands of Arabian and Moorish merchants. Accordingly,
in 1509, the Sultan of Cairo, in answer to an appeal from
some of the petty princes of the Malabar coast, despatched
an expedition from Suez against the Portuguese, which the
Venetians, conscious that their interests were involved, assisted.
But in February 1509, three months before the battle of
Agnadello, the expedition was defeated by Almeyda in the
harbour of Diu. His successor Albuquerque fixed the centre of
the Portuguese rule at Goa, and occupied Ormuz, Defeat of
an important port on the Persian Gulf. Hence- Egyptian
Jorth the advance of the Portuguese was un- Portuguese
checked. By the close of the sixteenth century at Diu.
not only did they control the commerce of the Feb* I509'
coasts of Africa, Arabia, and the western coast of India, but
they had planted themselves at Ceylon and in Bengal, had
opened up a trade with China and Japan, and, above all, had
occupied the true ' Spice Islands ' which cluster round Borneo
and Celebes (1546).
Thus the same spring witnessed the fall of the Venetian
military power in the battle of Agnadello, and the destruction
of their trade with the East.4 The caravans no longer came to
Cairo. The eastern goods were shipped round the Cape. The
mediaeval trade-routes were revolutionised, and the carrying
trade passed from the Venetians to the Portuguese, shortly
to be followed by the Dutch and English, while Antwerp
took the place of Bruges as the 'entrepot' in the North.
Finally, the conquest of Egypt by Selim 1. (15 16) destroyed
what remained of the Egyptian trade. This loss of commerce
prevented Venice from recovering from her financial straits,
and was the chief cause of her decline.
The effect on the internal politics of the city was also fatal
88 European History, 1494- 15 98
The nobility, who had hitherto enriched themselves by trade,
either took to banking, which could not last without the aliment
of commerce, or invested their savings in land, and became an
idle class. Poverty increased, and the aristocracy of Venice
was weakened by internal feuds. The rich monopolised the
administration, while the less fortunate, with a majority in the
Great Council, were ever attempting to overthrow their power
by agitation, or by intrigues and plots, often with foreigners.
Thus Venice, which had long been the admiration of Europe
for the stability of her government, and the honour and
patriotism of her nobility, became the victim of selfishness,
corruption, and conspiracy. It is this which explains the
growing power of ' The Ten.' This executive committee, an
excrescence on the original constitution, first organised for
temporary objects in 13 10, assumed more and more the
character of a committee of public safety, and with the three
inquisitors, created in 1539 to deal more efficiently with
treason, gave to the government a character of mystery,
suspicion, and cruelty, hitherto unknown. A loss of moral
tone accompanied this decline. As the wealth of the state
decreased, the extravagance, both public and private, grew.
At no date were the public pageants so magnificent, or the
private luxury so unbridled. In more vital questions of
morality, though Venice had never maintained a high
standard, even for Italy, she now fell lower, and private
crime went almost unpunished. It would be absurd to
attribute this degradation entirely to the loss of her prestige
and power, but that it was increased thereby no one can
doubt. Yet Venice still survived. Protected by her impreg-
nable position, and served by her clever diplomatists, who
resided ' at every court and carefully steered the country
through the mazes of European intrigue, she continued the
Queen of the Lagoons, if no longer of the Mediterranean,
* The admiredst citie of the world ' for her buildings, her blue
lagoons, and azure skies.
In the domain of art she had something still to give the
The Italian Wars, 1 494-1 518 89
world. The sixteenth century is the age of Titian (147 7-
1576), Tintoret (1512-1594), and Paolo Veronese (1532-
1588), in whose works painting reached its climax of
technique, of elaborate and harmonious grouping, and of
gorgeous, if somewhat sensuous, colour ; while to the Aldine
Press we owe some of the earliest triumphs of the art of
printing.
In her struggle with the Papacy, in the later decades of the
sixteenth and the first of the seventeenth centuries, Venice
showed the world once more, as she had in days gone by,
that though she accepted her religion from Rome, she was
determined and powerful enough to maintain her independ-
ence in matters of church government.
Finally, in her long contests with the Turk, notably in the
wars of Cyprus (1570-157 1), and of Gandia (1645-1669), she
displayed a heroism which recalled the greatness of her past,
and which, but for the abominable selfishness of Europe,
might have checked the advance of that Power which could
conquer, but knew not how to rule, or to develop the
resources of subject lands.
CHAPTER II
INTERNAL HISTORY OF FRANCE, SPAIN, AND GERMANY,
1494-1519
Administration of Cardinal d'Amboise — Union of Crowns of Castile and
Aragon — Policy of Ferdinand and Isabella — Ximenes — Spanish Conquests
in AfricawDiscovery of America — Character of Isabella and Ferdinand —
Results of their Policy— -Maximilian and the Empire — Diet of Worms— j(
Attempted reforms — Opposition of Maximilian — Diet of Augsburg— |
Compact of Gelnhausen — The Landshut Succession — Results of attempts
at reform — The Swiss Confederation — War with Maximilian — Peace of
Basel — Policy and character of Maximilian.
§ I. France.
The most important events in the internal history of France
during the reigns of Charles viii. and Louis xn. have
internal already been mentioned. The nation, engaged
condition in war abroad, enjoyed peace at home. The
of France. nobieSj reduced in number, found, in the Italian
wars, satisfaction for their ambition, and did not disturb the
country with their feuds. Under the administration of the
Cardinal, Georges d'Amboise, the minister of Louis xii.
(1498-15 10), the country prospered. Population increased
rapidly and towns grew. One-thircl of the land, we are told,
was again restored to cultivation. In a word, France, having
at last escaped from the disastrous English wars, showed her
marvellous power of recuperation. Nor was she behind-
hand in art. In the reign of Louis xn., the domestic archi-
tecture of the early Renaissance style reached, perhaps, its
highest point of excellence before it became over-refined and
overloaded with ornament : witness the eastern fagade of the
chateau of Blois, and part of the chateau of Amboise ; while
so renowned were the glass painters of France that Julius 11.
sent for the artists, Claude and William de Marseille, to help
decorate the windows of the Vatican.
90
Internal History of Spain 9 1
Louis earned the title of Father of his People, and the
popularity of the cardinal is illustrated by the proverb, ' Leave
things to Georges.' Nothing, indeed, was done to strengthen
the constitutional liberties of the country. The Estates-
General won no extension of their privileges. Although
Louis forbade the sale of judicial offices, he really extended
the evil system by openly applying it to the financial offices.
Yet, if the government was despotic, it was at least kindly ;
and if the taxes were heavy, the poor were not oppressed.
Indeed, if we confine our view to the domestic policy,
we should not perhaps be wrong in holding that the popu-
larity was well earned. If Louis had only refrained from
the Italian wars, his reign might have been a turning-point
in the history of his country, and in a few years she might
have become the richest and most powerful country in
Europe.
But if the internal history of France during the period
we have covered is uneventful, far different is the case of
Spam and Germany, h '
■
§ 2. Spain.
By the accession of Isabella to the throne of Castile in
1474, and of her husband, Ferdinand the Catholic, to that of
Aragon in 1479, not only did these two countries „ .
r \ i * * ■ Union of the
escape from a long period of internal anarchy, crowns of
but the rivalry hitherto existing between Castile Castile and
_ Aragon.
and Aragon was put an end to, and, while the
autonomy of the two governments was preserved, the policy
which guided them was one. In their determination to
increase the power of the crown at home and the prestige of
their nation abroad, Isabella and Ferdinand were in singular
agreement. The most startling events of their reigns either
occurred before the beginning of our period, or have been
already mentioned. In 1492, Granada had been conquered
from the Moors ; and the expulsion of the Jews, the estab-
lishment of the Inquisition, even the discovery of His-
92 European History, 1494- 1598
paniola by Columbus, had also occurred before the Italian
wars.
At this time, the policy of Ferdinand and Isabella was
mainly devoted to the formation of a great European alliance
based upon the tie of. marriage, whereby they
of Ferdinand might at once strengthen themselves against the
andiisabeiia. formidable power of France, and contribute to
Alliances. ^e mrtner consolidation of the Spanish Peninsula.
With this end in view, their eldest daughter,
Isabella, was given in marriage to Alonso, the Prince of
Portugal, and on his death to his kinsman, Emanuel, who
ascended the Portuguese throne in 1495. To this period
also belongs the betrothal of Catherine, their youngest
daughter, with Arthur, Prince of Wales (1496), an alliance
which brought England into intimate relations with Spain
for the first time since the days of John of Gaunt. More
important was the double marriage treaty with the House of
Hapsburg. It was agreed that John, the heir to the Spanish
kingdom, should marry Margaret, the daughter of the
Emperor Maximilian, and that the Archduke Philip, the son
and heir of Maximilian, should marry Joanna, second daughter
of the Spanish monarchs. The hopes founded on these
marriages by Ferdinand and Isabella were not, however,
realised. By the death of their only son John in 1497, and
by that of Don Miguel, only son of Isabella of Portugal, in
1500, all hopes of uniting Portugal to Spain were destroyed;
and Joanna, the wife of the Hapsburg prince, and mother
of Charles v., became heiress of Castile and Aragon. Thus
an alliance which had been originally made to protect the
balance of power against France, was eventually to destroy
that balance in the interest of the House of Hapsburg.
In their internal policy, Ferdinand and Isabella consistently
pursued the principles adopted from the commencement of
Their internal ^e*T reigns. In no countries in Europe perhaps
policy. were privileges so strong, the crown so poor, or
the royal prerogative so limited, as they were in Castile in
Internal History of Spain 93
the fifteenth century.1 A direct attack on these ancient privi-
leges would have been dangerous among so proud a people.
The sovereigns left, therefore, the outward forms of the con-
stitution intact, and indirectly pursued their aim by concen-
trating the machinery of government in the royal hands, and
by strengthening the personal authority of the crown. They
took advantage of the disinclination of the nobles to attend
the Cortes ; they omitted to summon them to it, or even to
call them to their councils, and deprived the hereditary
officers of state of many of their powers.
One of the most efficient instruments for keeping the
nobility in check was the ' Hermandad.' This associa-
tion, which had been originally organised by the principal
cities of Castile to protect themselves at once against the
crown and the aristocracy, had, in 1476, been reorganised
under royal control. In every city of importance a court
was established for the trial of highway robbery and other
acts of violence. From these city courts, appeal lay to a
supreme court of the whole kingdom. The courts had in
their service a force of mounted police, which was maintained
by a contribution levied on householders. The regulation of
affairs was placed in the hands of provincial assemblies acting
under a supreme 'junta,' which passed laws relating to justice,
and often trenched upon the privileges of the Cortes itself.
So effectual was *he work of this reorganised { Hermandad
that in 1495 *ts powers were considerably curtailed. A few
subordinate functionaries alone were retained for the execu-
tion of justice, and these were placed under the appellate
jurisdiction of the ordinary law-courts.
During this period also, the resumption of grants of royal f\
lands to the nobility was persistently pursued, while the)
policy of annexing the mastership of the powerful military]
orders to the crown, first begun in 1487 with that of Calatrava/
was completed. In 1494, the mastership of Alcantara, and in
1499, tnat °f St. Iago of Compostella, were assumed by
Ferdinand. It was not until the reign of Charles v. that
1 For a description of the constitution of Castile and Aragon, cf. Cam-
bridge Mod. Hist., vol. i. 348 ff.
94 European History, 1494- 15 98
a Bull of Adrian vi. finally accorded the papal sanction to
this measure, but Ferdinand and Isabella reaped the practical
fruits of the policy. Not only was the royal prestige thereby)
materially increased, but the crown gained complete control!
of wealthy and powerful organisations, which had long been
a menace to its authority, as the Hospitallers and Knight
Templars had been in other European kingdoms during the
Middle Ages.
In the kingdom of Aragon the opportunities of the crown
were not so great. The Cortes had more extensive powers,
the nobles were more regular in their attendance, and there
were no military orders whose masterships might be annexed.
Above all, the peculiar privilege of the * Justiza' formed a
serious obstacle to royal encroachment. This notable officer,
elected by the Cortes, claimed the right of hearing all appeals,
of inquiring into the legality of any arrest, of advising the
King on constitutional questions, and of sharing the execu-
tive with him. Even here, however, Ferdinand excluded his
nobles as far as possible from political power, ruled with the
aid of commoners whose fidelity could be more safely relied
upon, and introduced the Castilian Hermandad.
The Catholic sovereigns also turned their earnest attention I]
to church reform. The relations between Church and State
had always been close in Spain. The long Crusades against
the Moors had given the crown a peculiar position of which
it had taken advantage. It was the aim of Ferdinand and
Isabella to subordinate still further the Church to the royal
will, and use it as an engine at once for extirpating heresy,
and increasing the royal authority. Having, in 1482, gained
from. Pope Sixtus iv. the right of exclusive nomination to the
higher dignities of the Church, the sovereigns proceeded to
make excellent use of their prerogative. The sees of Spain
were filled with men of energy and devotion, and the work
of reform begun. Cardinal Mendoza, Talavera (the first con-
fessor of the queen), and, above all, the famous Franciscan
friar, Francisco Ximenes de Cisneros, were the chief agents
of the royal policy.
Internal History of Spain 95
Ximenes was first appointed confessor to the Queen in
1492 at the instigation of Cardinal Mendoza, Archbishop of
Toledo, and on the death of his patron (1492), Administra.
was nominated as his successor to this, the richest tion of
see of Europe, as well as to the post of High Ximenes-
Chancellor. The very elevation of this remarkable man was
a blow to the privileged classes, since the see of Toledo had
hitherto been exclusively reserved to men of noble birth.
The appointment was even contrary to the wish of Ferdinand,
who had hoped to secure the coveted position for his natural
son, the Archbishop of Saragossa. The confidence of the
Queen was not misplaced. The proud Castilian nobles learnt
to quail before the inflexible integrity of this Franciscan friar,
whom no terrors, no blandishments nor bribes could turn
from his purpose. Nor were the energies of Ximenes confined
to secular matters. Appointed Provincial of the Franciscans
in 1494, he had zealously pressed for reform of his Order,
which of late had departed from its primitive severity, owned
large estates, and lived in luxury and indolence. He now
extended his view, and aimed at a general reform, not only \\
of the Franciscans, but of the monastic orders and the secular v
clergy in his province. In the face of much opposition,
not only on the part of the General of the Franciscans,
who in vain visited Castile, but of the Pope himself, the
eflbrts of Ximenes succeeded. A Castilian writer of the
following century asserts that the clergy, the monks, and
the friars of Castile, once the most lax in Europe, could
then compare most favourably with those of other countries.
The energies of the Archbishop were also devoted to the
promotion of theology and scholarship. He insisted on
compliance with a papal Bull of 1474, by which stalls were
to be reserved in each chapter for men of letters, canonists,
and theologians. He reformed the old universities, founded
and richly endowed the University of Alcala, started other
schools, and caused the famous polyglot Bible to be pub-
lished. This was an edition of the Scriptures in the ancient
96 European History, 1494- 1598
languages : the Old Testament in the Hebrew original, the
Septuagint version, and the Chaldaic paraphrase with Latin
translations thereof; the New Testament in the original
Greek, and the Vulgate of Jerome. Under his influence there
arose in Spain a school of Catholic Humanists free from the
taint of heresy, and it is mainly due to the efforts of the
Cardinal and his royal patrons, that Protestantism gained no
hold in the country, and that Spain became the centre of the
future Catholic reaction.
Unfortunately, the zeal of Ximenes was not confined to
these excellent objects. He burned also to be the extirpator
of heresy. By the terms of the capitulation of Granada in
1492, considerable privileges had been promised to the Moors.
Freedom of worship and of education, as well as personal free-
dom, had been secured to them. They were to live under the
Mahometan laws, administered by their own judges, and to be
tried by mixed tribunals. Content with their position, the
Moors had settled down in tranquillity, and many had been
converted by the energetic but conciliatory policy of Talavera,
Archbishop of Granada. But his measures were not stringent
enough for the fiery Ximenes. The promises were violated.
The Arabic copies of the Koran and other theological treatises
were collected and consigned to the flames, and terror was called
in to further the work of proselytism. A series of revolts ensued
during the years 1 500-1 501, revolts which seriously taxed the
military energies of Castile and embittered the relations of
the two nationalities. Finally in 1502, on the suppression of
the rebellion, a decree was issued offering the alternative of
baptism or exile to the unfortunate Moors. Meanwhile, the
Inquisition assailed the Jews and any Spaniard suspected of
heretical views.
Mahometanism thus nominally driven from the Peninsula,
it was natural that the Spaniards should cast their eyes across
Conquests the narrow channel which divided them from
in Africa. Africa. The ravages of Moorish pirates on the
Spanish coasts, the desire of national aggrandisement, jealousy
Internal History of Spain gy
at the notable advances of the Portuguese on the eastern
shores of Africa, the crusading spirit engendered of their past
history, all these motives urged the Spaniards to extend their M
dominion in the north of the great dark continent. And we
cannot be surprised to find that Ximenes, true Castilian as
he was, eagerly advocated such a policy. At his instigation
Mazarquiver, a nest of pirates on the Barbary coast, was taken
in September, 1505. In 1509, the far more important reduc-
tion of Oran followed, while, in the following year, Algiers
and Tripoli submitted to the Spanish arms.
But although these African exploits fill the pages of the
Spanish chroniclers, the expeditions of Columbus and his
followers, which received much less support from the royal
exchequer, and which attracted far less attention, were destined
to play a far greater part in the future of Spain and of Europe.
That the discovery of America was so long delayed will not
surprise us if we remember the following facts. The Cartha-
ginians, who had done something to explore the
islands off the coast of Africa, had been over- 0f America.
thrown in their struggle with Rome. The Why so lons
Romans were not a seafaring people; Europe
was large enough to monopolise their energies, and for the
rest their gaze turned naturally enough to Africa, or to the
East, which was inseparably bound up with their traditions.
After the fall of the Roman Empire it was long before her
Teutonic conquerors were strong enough, or consolidated
enough, to think of foreign enterprise. When that time
arrived, it was only natural that they too should look eastward.
The East was the birthplace of their religion, and Palestine
was in the hands of the Saracens and subsequently of the
Turks; the East was the fabled treasure-house of riches
and of luxury. Eastward therefore the adventurer, the
trader, and the pilgrim turned, and found in the Mediter-
ranean their natural pathway.
Besides all this, as a glance at a physical atlas will show,
♦he winds and the currents of that part of the Atlantic which
period iv. G
98 European History \ 1494- 1598
lies in the latitude of central Europe, are not favourable to
western enterprise. There westerly winds prevail throughout
the year, and with greater force than those winds which occa-
sionally blow from the north and east. Moreover, the great
ocean current known as the Gulf Stream sets continuously
eastwards. To the north and south of these latitudes the
conditions are different. In the north, the great arctic
current runs southward from Davis' Straits to Greenland,
and thence to the North American shore. In the south,
the equatorial current sweeps from the shores of Africa to
Brazil; while immediately north of the Equator, the trade
winds blow to the south-west, and south of the Equator to
the north-west, continuously. It might therefore have been
predicted that America would not be discovered until the
northern or southern latitudes had been occupied by some
seafaring nation with sufficient resources, and sufficient know-
ledge of navigation, to brave the unknown perils of the
ocean.
In the tenth century, indeed, the Norsemen had discovered
Labrador, Newfoundland, and even the mainland of North
America, which they called 'Wineland.' But their numbers
were insufficient, Europe offered plenty of scope for their
inroads and for settlement, and the memories of Wineland
remained in their sagas alone. In the southern latitudes
there was little opportunity for such enterprise until the close
of the fourteenth century. Then, however, as shown at
p. 85, the Genoese, and subsequently the Portuguese, had
begun to creep down the African coast. The primary aim of
the Portuguese in their expeditions had been to seek an
oceanic route to India and the east, which since the appear-
ance of the remarkable work of Marco Polo at the end of the
thirteenth century, had assumed a new importance as an
earthly paradise of gold and spices.
The African mainland, it was then believed, did not reach
south of the Equator. But, as the continent continued to
expand before the explorers in its endless length, these ideas
Internal History of Spam 99
faded away, and hopes were entertained of seeking Asia
across the Atlantic. For, that the Atlantic washed the
eastern shores of Asia, was a belief which gained strength in
mediaeval Europe. This idea, guessed at by The idea of
some of the ancients, was first definitely revived "aching India
J by the Atlan-
by Roger Bacon, the Franciscan schoolman of tic, abandoned
Oxford, in the thirteenth century. From him bythePortu-
; 1 r Suese» 1S taken
it was adopted by Peter d'Ailly, the chancellor of Up by coium-
the University of Paris, in his treatise de Imagine bus*
Mundi, written early in the fifteenth century. It seemed to
receive confirmation from the tradition of islands lying out far
in the Atlantic, and from drift-wood carried to European shores
on the Gulf Stream, and was definitely asserted by Paolo
Toscanelli, a Florentine astronomer, in a letter to a monk
of Lisbon, dated June 25, 1474, By that time, however,
the Portuguese had made a notable advance down the western
shores of Africa, and finally the discovery of the Cape of
Good Hope by Bartholomew Diaz in i486, caused them to
concentrate their efforts on the eastern route.
The idea thus abandoned by the Portuguese was now to
be taken up by Christopher Columbus. To appreciate the
exact position of this remarkable citizen of Genoa in the
history of discovery, we must remember that he had no idea
of discovering a new continent. To find a shorter way to the
Indies was his sole aim. His views in this respect were not
beyond his age. His knowledge was based on the authorities
above mentioned; and he is marked out from his con-
temporaries only by his determination to sail due west until
he should reach the continent of Asia. With this intention,
and furnished with the treatise of D'Ailly, _ ,
J ' Columbus
a copy of Toscanelli s letter, and a chart approaches
given him by the author, he first applied to vanous courts,
1 r -r • , , 1 , T , , and ""ally
the court of Lisbon, where he had already gains the
settled with his brother Bartholomew. But support of
t 1 r t^ 1 1 • Spain.
John 11. of Portugal, intent on the circum-
navigation of Africa, declined his offer, and, if we may believe
roo European History \ 1494- 1598
some accounts,1 his attempts to obtain assistance from Venice
and Genoa were equally unsuccessful. He now, in 1484,
turned to England, and to Spain.
His brother Bartholomew sailed for England, but un-
fortunately fell among pirates in the English Channel.
Returning to Portugal, he accompanied Diaz on his expedi-
tion which reached the Cape, and though he subsequently
sought the court of Henry vil, where he was well received, it
was then too late : Christopher had already entered into
negotiations with Ferdinand and Isabella. The affair was
indeed long delayed. The Spanish Monarchs listened to his
tempting scheme ; but the financial strain of the war of
Granada, then in progress, was severe, and the terms of
Columbus were. high. He demanded the hereditary office
of royal admiral and viceroy in all the lands and islands
he might discover, and the privileges enjoyed by the high
admiral of Castile. One-tenth of all treasures — gold, or other-
wise— was also to fall to his share. On the conquest of
Granada, however, the contract was at last signed (April
1492), and, in the following August, Columbus left the road-
stead of Palos on his memorable voyage, with three carracks,
one hundred and twenty souls, and provisions for twelve
months. He carried with him a letter from the Catholic
sovereigns to the Khan of Cathay, and announced his inten-
tion, not only of opening the riches of the Indies to Spain,
but of leading a new crusade against the infidel. The
details of his voyage we must leave to others, and content
ourselves with the briefest summary.
In his first expedition, after a sail of five weeks due west
from the Canaries, he touched land at one of the islands of
His first ex- the Bahama group, and shortly after reached
pedition, 1492. Crooked Island and Long Island. Understand-
ing from the signs of the natives that gold was to be found
to the south-west; he reached the shores of Cuba, and from
thence the island of Hispaniola or Hayti. Here, on the night
1 These supposed visits to Genoa and Venice are very doubtful.
Internal History of Spain tot
of Christmas Eve, his ship struck on the sands and became a
wreck. Pinzon, one of his subordinates, had deserted him,
hoping to be beforehand in announcing the news in Spain ;
and Columbus, leaving the crew of the wrecked Santa Maria in
Hayti, returned to Spain in the Nina, his sole remaining ship.
In his second voyage, 1493, ne discovered Jamaica, and
some of the Antilles group. In his third voyage, he at last
touched the continent, and explored the coast of His later
Venezuela. This was in 1498, the same year in voyages, 1493.
which Vasco da Gama, . rounding the Cape, had reached
India by the eastern route. In 1502, Columbus landed on
the coast of Honduras. But although Columbus had thus
discovered the continent of America, he had been really
forestalled in this by his compatriot John Cabot, who started
from Bristol in the pay of Henry vn., reached the coast
of North America, near the mouth of the St. Lawrence,
in 1497, and traced the coast possibly as far south as Cape
Cod. Columbus therefore was not the first to touch the
continent, and, moreover, to the day of his death believed that
Cuba was part of the mainland of Asia, and that Hispaniola
and the other islands he had found lay in the Asian Archipelago.
Meantime, his governorship of his colony in Hispaniola
was so unsuccessful that he had been removed by the com-
mand of his royal masters in 1498. Although His failure as
Ferdinand and Isabella may be open to the a Governor,
charge of some ingratitude in their treatment of one who had
done so much for the cause of Spain, Columbus had certainly
shown himself incapable as a ruler, and it was out of the
question that they should fulfil all the promises originally
made to him. He had, indeed, been the unconscious
instrument in the discovery of South America, but the
determination he displayed in his first voyage forms his best
title to fame, and the true importance of his discovery was
left to be appreciated by his successors.
In 1500, Vincent Pinzon, one of the original companions
of Columbus, sailing farther southwards reached Cape St
tOi European History \ 1494- 1598
Agostino, at the northern extremity of the future Brazil, and
explored the coast to the north-west between that point and
Further Venezuela. In the same year the Portuguese
discoveries. Cabral, on his way to the Cape, was driven
to the westward and again reached Brazil, which was then
claimed by Portugal, as falling within the limits of the line
drawn by the Treaty of Tordesillas (p. 86). In the succeed-
ing year, 1501, the country was more completely explored by
Amerigo Vespucci. This Florentine, who was once in the
employ of Spain, but had deserted to the service of Portugal,
now traced the coast line down as far as Rio de Janeiro — a
point far to the southward of any yet reached — and by a
curious literary freak was destined to give his name to this
New World. The ' New World/ however, was still supposed
to be either a huge promontory of Asia, or a large island
lying in the Atlantic. Five years later, Columbus died in
Spain, in obscurity, and almost forgotten. After his death the
discoveries continued apace.
In 151 2, Ponce de Leon, a colonist of Hispaniola, dis-
covered or explored Florida. Shortly after, the Gulf of Mexico
was again entered, and the continuity between North and South
America demonstrated. In 15 13, Vasco Nunez de Balbao
crossed the Isthmus of Darien, and from the summit of the
Cordilleras gazed on the waters of the Pacific. So strong, how-
ever, was the belief in the Columbian hypothesis, that this great
ocean was still believed by many to be but an inland sea.1
The final explosion of this idea was probably due to the
Portuguese advance in the East. During the early years of
the sixteenth century they had gradually crept
discovered round the shores of Asia. Fernan de Andrade
Continent expl°red Part of the Asian Archipelago, and, in
by Magellan, 1517, reached Canton. In some of these Portu-
xslQ- guese expeditions Magellan had taken a part.
It was the knowledge thus acquired of a great sea to the
1 On this point cf. Ruge, Geschichtc des Zeitalters der Entdeckungent
p. 45S ff.
Internal History of Spain 103
east of Asia which led him to conceive his great exploit of
seeking a western approach through the newly discovered
world of America to Asia. Piqued by the refusal of
Emmanuel of Portugal to increase his pay, he entered the
service of the young Charles v., and in September 1519,
started on his notable voyage. After thirteen months' sail, he
discovered the Straits which are known by his name. It
took him three months more to reach the Philippines. On
the 27th of April, 1521, the intrepid seaman was unfortunately
slain on one of the Ladrone islands in an attempt to aid
a native Christian convert against his enemies, and eventu-
ally only one of his fleet of five ships returned to Spain
(September, 1522). At last the globe had been circumnavi-
gated; and though it took two centuries to work out the
precise size of America and its relation to Asia, it had at least
baen proved to be a ' New World \ in a sense hitherto never
dreamt of. Meanwhile Mexico had been conquered by Cortes
(15 19-21), and in 1524 Pizarro began the conquest of Peru.
Some twenty days after the return of Columbus from his
last voyage, the great Queen of Castile had passed away
(November 26, 1504), in the fifty-fourth year of
her age, and the thirtieth of her reign. No Isabella,
queen of Spain, and few queens in Europe have Nov- a6» ls°4-
Her character
ever enjoyed such a reputation. She represents
in a striking way the virtues and weaknesses of her times Of
genuine and unaffected piety; affable, yet dignified; stern
in the execution of her duty; gifted with rare fortitude,
magnanimity, and disinterestedness, and with a true insight
into the needs of her kingdom, she was admirable as a
woman, and every inch a queen. The only blemish in her
otherwise fine character is to be found in her persecuting
spirit. The establishment of the Inquisition, the expulsion
of the Jews, and subsequently the violation of the terms
promised the Moors at the capitulation of Granada, these
all met with her full approval. But in justice to Isabella it
must be remembered that she shared this spirit of intolerance
104 European History, 1494- 1 59
with the best men of the age, and that the time had not yet
come when toleration was thought of, or perhaps was possible.
Her husband Ferdinand, who survived her twelve years,
was not nearly so fine or attractive a character. Crafty, in an
character of aSe remarkable for its diplomatic faithlessness, he
Ferdinand, prided himself on often having deceived others
without himself ever having been duped. Suspicious, and
often ungrateful to those who had served him best, with
a cold and calculating heart which was rarely stirred by any
generous emotion, he seemed unworthy of his wife. Yet
it must be remembered that state-craft was then looked
upon as virtue in a prince; that his contemporaries, if less
successful in their falseness, were not more honest ; and that
his statesmanship was guided on the whole by a true insight
into the needs of his country. He supported, and for the
most part originated, the schemes for the consolidation of
the royal authority, and, as long as Isabella lived, worked
heartily for the union of the two kingdoms.
After her death, he seemed at times to waver in his policy.
In the autumn of 1 505, he married Germaine de Foix, in the
hopes of having a son by her who might succeed
after the death to Aragon, hopes which, if realised, would have
of Isabella. destroyed that union of the two kingdoms for
which he had hitherto worked. Jealousy of the House of
Hapsburg was, however, the explanation of this move. By
the death of Isabella the crown of Castile had fallen to
Joanna. As she had already begun to show signs of madness,1
Ferdinand claimed the regency. This was, however, disputed
by her husband, the Archduke, and eventually, in June 1506,
Ferdinand had to yield. The death of Philip on the following
September 25, removed, indeed, Ferdinand's more immediate
apprehensions, yet transferred the claims of the Archduke to
1 The madness of Joanna has been denied by Bergenroth, State Papers^
London 1868, supplement to vol. i. II. But cf. Gachard, Sur Jeanne La
Folle, Brussels,' 1869; Rosier, Johanna die Wahnsinnige, Vienna, 1870;
Ranke, Latin and Teutonic Nations, Bk. II. ch. ii., note.
Internal History of Spain 105
his young son Charles. Disappointed in his hopes of a male
heir by his second wife, the King in his later years is said to
have thought of leaving his dominions to Ferdinand, his younger
grandson. The old diplomatist foresaw the danger both to
Spain and Europe involved in the consolidation of so wide a
dominion in Charles' hands. Had he had his will, he would
have secured Italy and Spain for Ferdinand, Charles' younger
brother, and thus balanced the power of Austria by that of
Spain and France. But the victory of Francis at Marignano
(September, 15 15) aroused once more his apprehensions of
French supremacy. The counsels of Ximenes prevailed, and
on his death (January 23, 15 16), the whole of the magnificent
inheritance passed on unimpaired to Charles of Austria.1
The reigns of Ferdinand and Isabella form the turning-
point in the history of Spain. Succeeding to their respective
possessions after long periods of anarchy and civil
discord, they had re-established order, and bridled £J3£T *
the turbulence of the nobility. Their kingdoms, of Ferdinand
which had been divided by long-standing national and Isabella-
rivalries, were united, never to be again dismembered. The
confines of their territory had been extended by the conquests
of Granada and Spanish Navarre, and now comprised the
whole of the Peninsula with the exception of Portugal. To
this had been added the conquests in Italy and on the north
coast of Africa, while the discoveries in the New World were
soon to give Spain a dominion upon which the sun never set.
The infantry and artillery, reorganised by Gonzalvo de
Cordova, and Pedro Navarra, had already become the terror
of Europe, and Spain had definitely, and for the first time,
established her position as one of the leading powers of Europe.
Yet amidst all these appearances of outward greatness,
signs of coming trouble might have been detected. The
union of the kingdoms was not more than a personal one.
No constitutional unify had been effected, and the national j
rivalries were deep-seated. The nobility had been kept in
1 Isabella had left Castile to Joanna, and after her to Charles, and Ferdinand
did the same with Aragon. But Ximenes proclaimed Charles king conjointly
with his mother ; and her madness made Charles practically sole king.
lo6 European History , 1 494- 1 598
control, but their power was not gone, and the absence of
all real constitutional liberty was to lead to the revolt of the
1 Communeros ' under Charles v. Above all, the bigotry
which had led to the establishment of the Inquisition, the
expulsion of the Jews, and the proscription of the Moors,
was soon to destroy all liberty of opinion. The greed for
the precious metals which accompanied the discovery of the
New World, had already led to an inordinate belief in their
value, and to a neglect and even a proscription of trade which
was shortly to ruin the commercial prosperity of the country.
§ 3. Germany.
The history of Germany during the period we have covered
(1494-15 19), comprises almost exactly the reign of the
Emperor Maximilian 1. Elected King of the
history of Romans during the lifetime of his father, Frederick
Germany m he jia(j 0f iate practically controlled affairs,
during the . ,.,,,, • , • i
reign of and, on Frederick s death in 1493, he quietly suc-
Maximiiian, ceeded him. Our attention throughout the reign
must be mainly directed to a consideration of
those attempted reforms of the imperial constitution which,
in their origin, and in their comparative failure, illustrate
forcibly the weakness of Germany, and the fatal conflict of
interests which prevailed.
While the other kingdoms of northern Europe were becom-
ing consolidated under the strong rule of a monarch, it was
otherwise with Germany. The Holy Roman Emperor, in
theory at least the temporal head of Europe, and still enjoying
The imperial considerable prestige on that account, was, so far
Constitution. as his actual authority in Germany went, the
weakest monarch in Europe. The office was considered too
dignified a one to become hereditary, and, like that of the
Pope, the spiritual head of Europe, was elective.1 The
•
1 On election he assumed the title * The King of the Romans.' But
coronation by the Pope was then held necessary for the assumption of the
title 'Holy Roman Emperor.' Frederick III. was, however, the last
Emperor crowned at Rome; Maximilian in 150S, assumed the title of
Internal History of Germany 16J
electoral privilege was vested in seven Electors ; the three
Archbishops of Mainz (Mayence), Trier (Treves), and Koln
(Cologne), the Duke of Saxony, the Margrave of Branden-
burg, the Count Palatine of the Rhine, and the King of
Bohemia. Of these seven Electors all, with the exception of
the King of Bohemia, who took no part in the legislative
affairs of the Empire, formed the first college of the Diet.
Below it stood two other colleges ; that of the ^Princes,
spiritual and lay ; and that of the^mperial Cities^, which had
only lately obtained a place. The Diet deliberated on im-
perial questions, passed laws with the assent of the Emperor,
and issued the ban of the Empire against the recalcitrant.
/But the rivalries between the three colleges, and between the
Diet and the Emperor, prevented effective legislation, and it
was still more difficult to get laws obeyed, or ban enforced.
The Diet was in no real sense a representative assembly.
With the exception of the deputies of the Imperial Cities, who
were few in number and played an unimportant part, the
members sat in their own right,1 while the lesser nobility, the
Imperial Knights, were entirely excluded. This numerous
and influential class claimed to hold immediately of the
Emperor, and refused to pay the taxes levied by the Diet.
Owners, perhaps of one, perhaps of several villages, they
entrenched themselves in their strong castles, levied tolls and
exercised other rights of petty sovereignty, and, profiting by
the old German privilege of private war, disturbed the country
with their quarrels and their raids. Nor was the system of
imperial justice in any better plight. This lay with the court
of the Emperor, called, since i486, the Imperial Chamber
(Reichskammergericht). But its jurisdiction was disliked as
' Roman Emperor- elect ' with the assent of the Pope ; and after Charles V. ,
who was crowned at Bologna (1529), no Emperor sought for coronation
from the Pope.
1 Besides the Princes who enjoyed an individual vote ( Virilstimme), there
were three collective votes {Curiatstimmen) — that of the Prelates who were
not princes, and those of the Suabian and Wetterabian Graves and Barons.
108 European History, 1 494- 1598
being too much under the control of the Emperor. The
Electors claimed to be free from its jurisdiction, except on
appeal for refusal of justice, and in the other states it was
impossible to get its verdicts enforced.
The weakness of the imperial system was also displayed
in its military organisation. The imperial army was levied
by a requisition of men from each Elector, Prince, or City.
But the summons was often neglected, and if obeyed, resulted
in the collection of a mob of ill-armed and ill-drilled soldiery,
with no united organisation or even common commis-
sariat. In a word, if we except the few occasions when the
national spirit was really stirred as against the Turk, the
imperial army was the laughing-stock of Germany and of
Europe.
While the imperial authority, once — in theory at least — the
centre of unity and control, had become a cipher, no efficient
:^* substitute had taken its place. So complete was the failure
of the imperial constitution to maintain order, that Germany
had of late protected itself by forming leagues. These were
usually confined to one class or estate. In 1488, however, a
union of the various existing leagues was established in Suabia.
Joined by Cities, Knights, and Princes, it organised a common
army, held a common purse, and regulated its affairs by a
federal assembly consisting of two colleges. This famous
Suabian League was favoured by Frederick m. ; it maintained
some order in the district, hitherto one of the most disturbed
of Germany, and its authority was far more real than that of
the Diet itself.
The reign of Frederick in., however, had witnessed a
remarkable attempt on the part of the Electors to meet the
Attem ted most serious evils of their country. That attempt
Reform of had failed ; it was now to be revived. The aims
the Empire. of thig party of reform> now \^ ty Berthold
Archbishop of Mayence, John of Baden the Archbishop
of Treves, Frederick the Wise of Saxony, and John Cicero
of Brandenburg, were briefly these :
Internal History of Germany 109
/
I. To establish and enforce ■ The Public Peace and put
an end to the system of private feuds.
3. To establish a federative Court of Justice, freed from
the absolute control of the Emperor, for the settle-
ment of disputes, and the maintenance of peace.
3. To organise a more equal system of Imperial taxa-
tion under the control of the Diet.
4. To extend and complete the system of ' The Circles '
for administrative purposes.
5. Finally, to establish a more effective Central Council
of the Empire which might control the administra-
tion, and act as a check on the Emperor himself.
In a word, the Electors aimed at substituting a more effective
system of justice, and a government freed from the irrespon-
sible rule of the Emperor, and representing a new unity, based
on a federative organisation of Germany.
Such were the reforms which the Electors demanded of
Maximilian when, at the Diet of Worms, 1495, ne sought
the aid of the Empire for his expedition to The Diet of
Italy. Whether it would have been well for Worms, 1495.
Germany if these reforms had been effected, is a matter
much disputed.1 Certainly they are wrong, who attribute
the cry for reform solely to a selfish desire on the part of a
few Electors for personal aggrandisement and independence.
Yet who can doubt that the movement, if successful, would
have resulted in the establishment of an aristocratic federation,
primarily in the interest of the Electors and greater Princes —
a federation which would have been unpopular with the
smaller Princes, the Knights, and the other classes below
them? Whether such a federation would have stopped
the tendencies towards separation, and given Germany a
new centre of unity, must ever remain doubtful. Yet the
history of Germany from henceforth inclines one to believe
that the cure of German evils was not to be found in this
direction.
1 Cf. Cambridge Mod. Hist. , vol. i. 299 ff.
HO European History y 1 494- 1 598
In any case, the opposition of Maximilian was natural
enough. He had indeed shown some sympathy with the
Opposition of movement during his father's lifetime, and was not
Maximilian. averse to reforms, so long as they did not weaken
his own authority. Now, however, he saw more clearly their
true import. Not only would they circumscribe his imperial
prerogative, they would also seriously hamper his designs
for the aggrandisement of his House. For although the
highly romantic mind of the Emperor was not unaffected
by the splendour of the imperial title, his policy was really
dynastic, rather than imperial. The Empire he hoped to
make practically, if not theoretically, hereditary in his family.
The dignity of the office was to be enforced by the resources
of the house of Hapsburg, and to be used meanwhile to further
Hapsburg interests. To secure the Netherlands, to regain
Hungary, and if possible, Bohemia, to reassert his claims on
Italy, to overthrow the threatening power of France, these
were his present aims ; while from time to time, day-dreams of
an universal Empire in the future, based on a succession of
brilliant marriages, and on an enlarged hereditary dominion,
floated before his eyes. Thus might the anagram of his
father AEIOU, 'Austria? est imperare orbi universo,' be
realised in part.1
With aims thus fundamentally different, real harmony
between Maximilian and the Electors was impossible. Of
all the projected reforms, those with regard to taxation alone
met with his hearty approval, as likely to replenish his ever
empty exchequer, and enable him to form a more efficient
army for the prosecution of his own designs. Yet this was
the one reform which the Electors cared for least. Whether
therefore they would carry their projects depended on the
fortunes of Maximilian. As long as he needed their assistance
in men and money, something might be extorted from his
weakness, but when success smiled upon him, he grew cold
and opposed or postponed their schemes.
1 This is the usual interpretation. But Ottokar Lorenz, Deutschland
Geschichtsquellen im Mittdalter, ii. 280, reminds us that this solution is
not found in the Emperor's ' Diary. ' Cf. Kollarii Anahcta Monumentorum
Vindobonensia. ii. p. 675-
Internal History of Germany III
When in March 1495, ne met tne D*et °* Worms, he was
in need of help that he might join the League of Venice, just
formed to prevent the undue extension of French influence in
Italy. In return for the establishment of the Common Penny
(der gemeine Pfennig) — that is, a tax upon all property through-
out the Empire, and a poll-tax on those of small means, — he
allowed the Diet to proclaim the public peace, and make it
perpetual. Those who broke it were to be under the ban of
the Empire.
To remove all pretext for private war, the Imperial
Chamber was to be reorganised. The Emperor was to
retain the right of nominating the President, the sixteen
Assessors were to be elected by the Diet. The court was
not to follow the Emperor, but was to have a fixed place of
session, and was to be supported by imperial taxation. It
was to have supreme jurisdiction in all cases arising between
states of the Empire, and to hear appeals on all causes arising
in their courts, except where the Prince enjoyed the privi-
legium de non appellando; and it could pronounce the ban of
the Empire without the Emperor's consent. Maximilian also
consented to an annual meeting of the Diet, and conceded to it
the right of appropriating the proceeds of the Common Penny.
The demand for a Council of Regency (Reichsregiment) to
control the central administration he rejected, as trenching
too seriously on his prerogative. Yet five years Diet of
afterwards, at the Diet of Augsburg, 1500, his Augsburg,
difficulties were so great, and his need of help so Apnl I50°*
imperious, that he yielded even on this point. His Italian
expeditions of 1495 an(* M9& had failed. On the day on
which the Diet met, Ludovico Sforza had been taken prisoner,
April 10, 1500 (cf. p. 38), and Milan was once more in
French hands.
The system of the Common Penny had failed, owing to the
difficulty of collection. The Diet therefore ordered a levy of
men for six months. Every four hundred inhabitants were
to furnish one soldier, the Princes to provide the cavalry ; a
tax was also laid on those who did not serve. In return, the
112 European History, 1494- 1598
Emperor consented to the establishment of the Council of
Regency (Reichsregimeni). This standing Council of the Empire
was to be formed of a President, one Elector, one Bishop,
one Prince, one Count, and sixteen representatives of the States.
It was to summon the Diet, of which it served as a standing
committee, to nominate the members of the Imperial Chamber,
to collect taxes, to maintain order at home, and decide on
questions of peace and war. Although under the presidency
of the Emperor or his Stadtholder, nothing of importance could
be done without its leave, and thus it shared the executive
power with him.
Maximilian, however, had no intention of seeing his authority
thus controlled, and this abortive Council only lasted a
n . few months. Henceforth, disappointed at the
1502. Opposi- ' .
tionofMaxi- niggard support which his concessions had pro-
mihan. duced — for the levy voted at Augsburg was never
fully furnished — he determined to lean upon his own resources.
' As King of the Romans,' he said, ' he had only experienced
mortification. He would for the future act as an Austrian
Prince.' Accordingly, in 1502, he fell back on his imperial
right of holding Courts of Justice (Hofgerichte), and erected
a standing Court or Aulic Council (Hofrath), entirely under his
own control, to which he referred matters pertaining to his
own territories, and cases which he was called upon to adjudi-
cate in his capacity of overlord.1 He even thought of institu-
ting a Council of his own to take the place of the Council of
Regency. The Electors on their side entered into a solemn
compact at Gelnhausen (Tune 1502) to unite
Compact at r VJ J '
Gelnhausen. themselves as one man against the dangerous
June 1502. innovations of the Emperor ; carried on negotia-
tions with Louis xii. on their own account; and, in 1503,
even spoke of deposing Maximilian and electing his rival,
the French king, in his stead.
At this moment the position of Maximilian began to improve.
He found himself supported by many of the literary men who
cherished the memories of the Empire, by many of the
1 The Aulic Council was also to act as a supreme administrative body.
Internal History of Germany 113
Princes, the Imperial Knights, and others who dreaded the
power of the Electors, and, in 1504, the question of the
Landshut succession gave him an opportunity I504# success
of humiliating his chief enemy, the Elector Pala- of Maximilian
_..,,„, . . _TT. . , in the Lands-
tine, Frederick the Victorious, or the Wicked, as hutsucces-
his opponents called him. On the death of Duke sion question.
George, the Rich, of Landshut (December 1503), without
direct heirs, three claimants appeared : Rupert, the second
son of the Elector Palatine, and son-in-law and nephew of
George, who claimed under the will of his father-in-law ; and
the two Dukes of Bavaria, Wolfgang and Albert, who urged
their claim as his nearest agnates. Maximilian supported
the cause of Bavaria ; called on the princes who were jealous
of the Elector Palatine ; with their help, defeated his forces
in a battle where Rupert, his son, was killed, and forced the
Diet of Cologne, in 1505, to divide the territories of Landshut
between the Dukes of Bavaria and himself; while the son of
Rupert was fain to content himself with the small district of
the upper Palatinate on the north of the Danube.
By this defeat of a prominent Elector, the prestige of Maxi-
milian was much enhanced. Moreover, the death of John of
Baden the Elector of Treves, and of Berthold of I504. Death
Mayence during the year, 1 504, seriously weakened of Berthold of
the party of reform. The Emperors position 0f the Elector
abroad also seemed magnificent. The Treaty of of Treves.
Blois (September 1 5 04) promised a brilliant match for his grand-
son Charles (cf. p. 61), a match which was not only to bring
Brittany, Burgundy, and the French possessions Improved
in North Italy to the Hapsburgs, but might even, position of
so Maximilian hoped, end in uniting the crowns of aximi ian*
the Empire and of France. In the ensuing November, the death
of Isabella made Joanna, his daughter-in-law, Queen of Castile;
and the old age of Ladislas, of Bohemia and Hungary, gave pro-
spects of the speedy fulfilment of the agreement, made by that
King fifteen years before, by which Hungary was to fall to the
Hapsburg house in the event of his dying without male issue.
PERIOD IV. H
114 European History \ 1494- 1598
While Maximilian indulged in wild projects of universal
empire, he was not in a mood to listen to further demands,
„ , , , nor were the Electors in a position to enforce
End of the r
attempted them. Here therefore the attempts at reform may
Reforms. ^e sa^ t0 have practically ceased. The hopes of
Maximilian were not indeed fulfilled. Accordingly, in 1507,
at Constance we find him once more demanding men and
money against the perjured Louis XII*, in return for a promise
to revive the Imperial Chamber, which had held no sittings for
three years. Supplies were granted, no longer by the Common
Penny, or by assessment by parishes, but by a matricula or
roll on which the separate states were rated, according to
their resources, a system which emphasised the independence
of the separate states. Thus furnished, Maximilian once
more invaded Italy, only to fail even more ludicrously than
before (cf. p. 65); and the Diets of the years, 1509 to
15 1 2, are taken up with mutual recriminations — the Emperor
bitterly remonstrating with the Diet for refusing adequate
support, and for attempting to weaken his prerogative ; while
the Diet retorted that his alliances and his wars had been
entered into without its consent, and that he had prevented
the execution of the reforms which had been enacted.
At the Diets of Treves andCologne(i5i2), something indeed
was done. The organisation of the Empire into six circles,1
1 The idea of dividing Germany into circles dates from the reign of
Albert II. The four then instituted were now increased to ten —
1. Franconia.
2. Suabia, including the Duchy of Wurtemberg, the Margraviate of
Baden, and 32 imperial cities.
3. Bavaria, with the Archbishopric of Salzburg.
4. The Upper Rhine, including Lorraine.
5. Lower Rhine, composed of the three Ecclesiastical Electorates.
6. Westphalia, Julich, Cleves, Berg, the County of Oldenburg, and
numerous Bishoprics.
7. Upper Saxony, formed of the Duchies of Saxony, and Pomerania,
the Margraviate of Brandenburg.
8. Lower Saxony, composed of the Duchies of Brunswick, Luneburg,
and Holstein (held by the King of Denmark), Meckle burg, the Arch*
Internal History of Germany 1 1 5
hitherto only used for elections to the Council of Regency,
and of the Assessors to the Imperial Chamber, was extended,
and the administrative and military work of the „ . .
J 1512. Estab-
districts placed in their hands. Even then the Hshmentof
Diets refused to allow Maximilian the privilege of the c,rcles-
nominating the Captains of the circles, or of appointing a Cap-
tain-general who should be supreme, or nominating a council
of eight, who were to act as a Privy Council under his control.
In short, the eternal conflict continued ; Maximilian, though
not averse to reforms which might make the executive and
judicial work of the Empire more efficient, refused to allow
his prerogative to be touched, and the Diet would only sanc-
tion those which secured them some control. The measure
therefore was still-born, the Captains were never elected, and
the establishment of the circles was not finally effected till
152 1, three years after Maximilian's death.
Of the reforms thus afremprpH during t-Tift reign of Maxi-
jmnan, The- Compion Penny, and the Imperial Council of
Regency were revived again under Charles v., soon *
to be abandoned for ever ; and though the Imperial results of the
Chamber (Reichskammer), the Aulic Council attempt at
(Reichshofratti), the circles, the system of taxa-
tion, and the levy by matricula were destined, with certain
modifications, to last as long as the Empire itself, they did not
succeed in saving the Empire from the continuation of weak-
ness and intestine disorder. Not only were they disliked by
the Emperor in the shape in which they were passed, but they
received lukewarm support from most of the Princes, and were
opposed by the Imperial Knights; while the Cities, which
bishoprics of Magdeburg and Bremen, and the towns of Hamburg,
Lubeck, and Goslar.
9. Austria.
10. Burgundy, including the Netherlands and Franche-Comt6.
N.B. — Bohemia did not form part of any circle.
The duty of police and administration were to be in the hands of a
captain (Hauptmann), with two assessors elected by the circles.
Il6 European History, 1 494- 1598
feared increased taxation as likely to fall chiefly upon theii
citizens, complained that they had no representatives among
• the assessors of the Imperial Chamber. The failure of these
reforms confirms the opinion that the idea of reconciling
imperial unity with the establishment of an aristocratic federa-
tion was a hopeless one, and that two alternatives alone
were practicable : either the consolidation of Germany into
a strong concentrated kingdom under an hereditary Monarch ;
or the overthrow of national unity, and the dismemberment of
the Empire into a number of petty states, practically sovereign
and independent.
The condition of the separate states formed a counterpart
to that of the Empire. The more powerful Electors and
nditi n of Prmces> wn0 wished to establish a strong govern-
statesofthe ment, met with the same opposition from their
Empire. vassals, their cities, and even their ..peasants,
which they themselves offered to the Emperor; their pro-
vincial Diets were torn with the same dissensions as those
which disturbed the Imperial Diet. Yet here, more surely
than in the Empire, the authority of the ruler was asserting
itself, based upon that principle of independent territorialism
which was eventually to triumph.
The Imperial Knights, enemies of the Princes whose power
they dreaded, were the chief opponents of such consolidation,
and the Emperor was not ashamed at times to lean upon
these questionable allies, who ruined commerce by their
raids, and welcomed the wolves as their comrades. ' Good
luck, my dear comrades,' cried an Imperial Knight to a pack
of wolves which he saw fall on a flock of sheep ; ' good luck to
us all, and everywhere.' The condition of the peasants under
such a state of things was probably a more miserable one
than in any other country, and led to frequent revolts and
conspiracies, such as that of 'The Bundschuh' (peasant's
shoe) — risings which, however, were put down with cruelty.
Germany, in a word, was suffering the throes of dissolution.
The old institutions were falling into decay, the new ones
Internal History of Germany 117
had not yet been established, and soon the religious troubles
were to add one more element of discord and weakness.
But if Germany at the close of the fifteenth century was in
a condition of anarchy political and social, it is a mistake to
suppose that she was in a condition of barbarism.
. -r-i -»r Social and
Many a prince — nay, the Emperor Maximilian economical
himself — was a patron of art and literature : while condition
... f • t of Germany.
the cities at least formed an exception to the
prevailing anarchy. They protected themselves with some
success from the raids of the knights by their strong walls,
their sturdy burghers, and their leagues ; and, although not
free themselves from violent ferments between the governing
bodies of the towns and the unprivileged classes, who sought
for entrance into the town councils, this civic turbulence, as
is often the case, did not ruin the trade by which many
towns and burghers enriched themselves.
The cities also were the home of education, of literature,
and of art. At the close of the fifteenth century sixteen
universities existed, of which nine had been recently founded.
Hence came the humanist scholars, Agricola, Erasmus,
Reuchlin, Melanchthon, and a host of others, who revived
the knowledge of the ancient languages, and enriched their
own mother-tongue with their pens. In the cities too,
the arts of printing, etching, metal-working, and painting
flourished — witness more especially the names of Holbein,
Albert Diirer, and Peter Vischer, the metal-worker of Nurem-
berg. In a word, Germany was in a condition of transition,
of unrest, of political dislocation, and yet of much intellectual
ferment, which was preparing her to take the lead in the
Reformation.
The reign of Maximilian witnessed also an actual loss of terri-
tory to the Empire, for it was then that Switzerland practically
established its independence. The Swiss Con- The Swiss
federation was originally one of those numerous Confederation,
leagues formed in Germany for self-protection as the Empire
1 1 8 European History \ 1 494- 1 5 g&
fell into decay. In the year 1291, the three Forest Cantons of
The ^r*> Schwytz, and Unterwalden, lying at the head
Everlasting of the lake of Lucerne, formed ' The Everlasting
ComPactof Compact,' to protect themselves more especially
Forest against the powerful Counts of Hapsburg, who,
Cantons. wjtj1 their castle of Hapsburg on the lower Aar,
held large possessions, and enjoyed considerable political
authority within, and around these districts.
witVthe86 C Henceforth, for some two hundred years, opposi-
House of tion to this aggressive house forms the clue to the
aps urg. history of Switzerland. By the victories of Mor-
garten, 131 5, and of Sempach, 1386, they freed themselves
from all claims to political control or jurisdiction
Morgarten, on trie Part °f tne Hapsburgs and of any other
1315, and sem- power except the Emperor. In 1468, Sigismund
pac , 13 . ^ Tyrol ceded to them all the lands he held in
Switzerland, with the exception of the Frickthal in the
_. . Aargau. By their famous war with Charles the
Their wars ° '
with Charles Bold, Duke of Burgundy, 1471-1477, they not
the Bold. onjy established the reputation of their formid-
able infantry, but gained a footing in the French-speaking
territories belonging to the House of Savoy.
The primitive Confederation of the three Forest Cantons
had, by the date of Maximilian's accession, increased its num-
condition of bers to ten, and ruled over a stretch of country
the confedera- r0Ughly bounded by the Jura and the lake of
tion at the ° ■■/ ,
accession of Neuchatel on the west, the Bernese Alps on the
Maximilian. south, and the Rhaetian Alps, the lake of Con-
stance, and the Rhine on the south-east, east, and north.1
The city of Constance was a free imperial city, and was not
a member of the Confederation.
1 List of Cantons in 1499, with date of their admission to the league :
f Three (Uri, 1335. Zurich. 1353. Bern.
1291.-! Forest -| Schwytz, TGlarus. /Fribourg.
I Cantons I Unterwalden. IZug. * '\Solothurn.
1332. Lucerne.
xH
120 European History \ 1494- 1598
The constitution of the Confederation was based on 'The
Everlasting Compact' of 1291, which had been confirmed
The Govern. an(^ expanded by subsequent compacts, notably
ment of the the Parson's ordinance (Pfaffenbrief) of 1370, the
confederation. Sempach ordinance of 1393, and the Compact
of Stanz, 1 48 1. These agreements referred almost exclusively
to questions of jurisdiction and police, and of mutual assist-
ance and common action with regard to foreign powers, and
assumed, rather than defined, the character of the central
institutions which should give sanction to these compacts.
The Diet, composed of two delegates from each member of
the Confederation, and one from each 'Socius,' was little
more than a meeting of envoys, strictly limited by their
instructions. Nor were the minority bound by the decisions
of the majority, except in matters concerning the 'Common
Bailiwicks.' Although all the Confederates were allied with
the three Forest Cantons, they were not necessarily leagued
with one another — thus Bern had made no direct league with
Zurich, nor Lucerne with Glarus. The internal constitution
of the separate states also varied infinitely. Some, like the
Forest Cantons and Zurich, were practically democracies,
while Bern was ruled by an exclusive burgher aristocracy.
Thus the constitution was that of a ' Confederation ' of the
loosest kind, a union between communities practically sovereign,
neither all bound to each other, nor alike in their internal
organisation. The complications, which were certain to result
from these peculiarities, were further increased by the existence
of other territories more or less intimately connected. Of
these there were three kinds :
1. The 'Subject Lands.' Some of these belonged to the
separate states ; others, ' the Freie Orte,' such as the Thurgau
The Subject and Aargau, were held as Common Bailiwicks
Lands. Dv severai or au 0f the members of the Confedera-
tion. These districts enjoyed no political rights, and, as is
so often the case with the dependencies of democracies, were
governed most harshly.
In ternal History of Germ a ny 1 2 1
2. Secondly came the * Associated Districts' (Zugewandte
Orte). Of these, three indeed, the abbot, and town of St. Gall
and the town of Bienne (Biel), on the lake of that The Associ-
name, were admitted as 'sodi' with one vote ated Districts,
each in the Diet.
But the far more numerous class, the * Confcederati,' were
not admitted to the privileges of full membership, and yet
were bound to obey the orders of the Confederation in matters
of peace and war. x •
3. Lastly came the 'Protected Districts,' where the tie
was Still more loose. The Protected
The extraordinary complications and conflict of D,stncts-
interests thus caused had from time to time led to serious
disputes, both internal and external. They were now to
involve the Swiss in a war with the Empire.
As long as the imperial title was in other hands than those
of the hated Hapsburg, the Swiss had remained faithful to
the Empire, although practically free. But in 1440, the
election of Frederick in. reawakened their ap- causes of the
prehensions. They feared lest he should use war with the
his imperial authority to regain his power over Empire-
them. On the cession of most of the family possessions
by Sigismund of Tyrol (cf. p. 118), a brief period of
friendship ensued, which was strengthened when, by 'The
Everlasting Compact' of 1475, ne confirmed his renuncia-
tion, and promised help against Charles of Burgundy. But
the startling successes of the Swiss had caused the Emperor
and Sigismund to desert their cause, and the old jealousies
revived. The Confederation looked with dislike on the
formation of the Suabian League (1488), to the north of
them, a dislike which was embittered by the open contempt
shown by the German nobility for these upstart Swiss.
The claim made by the imperial city of Constance to
1 List of * Confoederati ' before 1497 —
The league of Wallis, Schaffhausen Rothweil
or Valais Mttlhausen Appenzell.
1497, The Grisons. 1498, The League of God's House,
122 European History \ 1494- 1598
jurisdiction over the district of the Thurgau, which had been
mortgaged to it by Sigismund, caused further friction. After
the death of Frederick m. matters grew worse. The reform-
ing party among the Electors were eager to bring Switzerland
under the jurisdiction of the Imperial Chamber, and to force
the Confederation to bear its share of the taxation imposed
on the Empire by the Diet of Worms (1495). Maximilian
here attempted to play double. He hoped that by allowing
the Diet to make these claims he might frighten the Swiss,
while by refraining from enforcing them he might gain
the aid of the Confederation against the French. In this
he made a double blunder. The Electors, anxious to
make the imperial organisation a reality, insisted on the
execution of the decrees of the Diet, and the Swiss looked
upon his policy as a dishonest attempt to revive the claims of
his house. They had long been practically, although not
legally, free from all imperial jurisdiction and taxation. They
had no representative in the Diet, and their consent had not
been asked. The tax of the Common Penny they declared to
be a scheme on the part of the princes to tax the peasants.
In short, their view of the matter was singularly like that of
the American Colonies when, in the eighteenth century,
England attempted to tax them. The Swiss, however, not only
refused to comply themselves, they even claimed independence
for their ally St. Gall. This at least could not be sanctioned,
and, in 1497, St. Gall was placed under the ban of the Empire.
Maximilian still continued his double dealing. He delayed
the execution of the ban in the vain hope of influencing
the Swiss to make a personal arrangement with him, and
serve him in his wars. Meanwhile, other differences pre-
cipitated the crisis. Of several leagues which had grown up
around that of the Swiss Confederation, some of the most
important were the three Rhastian Leagues : the League of
God's House, ' Gotteshausbund,' round about Chur, from the
cathedral of which it took its name ; the ' Grauer Bund,' or
Orisons, on the Upper Rhine ; and the League of the Teq
Internal History of Germany 1 23
Jurisdictions in the Prattigau and the valley of Davos. The
succession of Maximilian to the possessions of the cadet
branch of his family in Tyrol on the death of Sigismund
(1496), not unnaturally aroused the fear of these Leagues, the
more so because Maximilian also about this time gained part
of the Prattigau. Accordingly in 1497, the Grauer Bund,
and in 1498, the League of God's House, entered into an
alliance with the Swiss and became associates (Confcederati).
The Swiss Confederation was thus drawn into the inter-
minable disputes as to possessions and jurisdictions, which
existed between these two Leagues and Tyrol. Finally, the
occupation of the Miinsterthal — one of the valleys which
joins that of the upper Adige — by the authorities at Innsbruck,
led to hostilities (1499).
The war was at first carried on by Maximilian as
Archduke of Austria, assisted by the Suabian League, and
was not taken up by the Empire until the follow- outbreak ot
ing year. The best policy on the Emperor's part War> J499.
would probably have been to concentrate his attack, and try
to outmanoeuvre the Swiss and crush them in one decisive
battle ; for the Swiss army, organised according to the states in
which it had been levied, was better fitted for detached enter-
prises, and its leaders were always somewhat deficient in
strategy. Instead of this, Maximilian divided his forces and
thus played into the hands of his enemies. The Swiss,
advancing in a dense column, or in phalanxes in echelon of
three divisions, with four rows of pikemen in front armed with
pikes eighteen feet long, supported in the rear by
halberdiers with halberds (a combination of the Suabian
battle-axe and spear), proved more than a match ***&** and °*
r i /-1 \ t « 1 mi -r-. , , • Maximilian.
for the German landsknechts. The French king
sent money and artillery ; even the Venetians contributed
money, unwilling to see Hapsburg influence increase in these
parts. Ludovico Sforza, Duke of Milan, Maximilian's only
ally, was at this moment driven from Milan (September 2).
The Suabian League was defeated at Bruderholz and at
124 European History \ 1494- 1598
Dornach, near Basel. Maximilian himself was worsted at
Frastenz in the Tyrol, and again at the gorge of the Calven
in the Miinsterthal, and on September 22, 1499, was forced
to come to terms.
By the peace of Basel all matters in dispute between
Maximilian and the Rhaetian Leagues were referred to
The Peace of arbitration. All decisions of the Imperial Cham-
Basei, 1499. ber against the Confederation were annulled, and
though nothing definite was said as to its future relations
with the Empire, no attempt was ever again made to subject
the Swiss to imperial taxation, jurisdiction, or military levy.
Though still nominally a member of the Empire the Con-
federation enjoyed practical independence, which was finally
recognised at the peace of Westphalia, 1648.
In 1 501, for the purpose of strengthening their northern
frontier, the Swiss admitted Basel and Schaffhausen to the
Confederation; and the addition of Appenzell, in 1513,
brought up the number of the Confederate States to thirteen,
a number which was not increased till the present century.
The Swiss continued to be the mercenaries of Europe, and in
1502, and 15 1 2, gained, as we have seen, further possessions
to the south of the Alps (cf. p. 72). One thing at least Maxi-
milian learnt from his defeats. He copied the arms, and to
some extent the organisation, of the Swiss, and thus did much
to form that formidable infantry which did Charles v. good
service in Italy. Yet even this had its disadvantages ; for the
German landsknechts, finding themselves in request, some-
times adopted the mercenary habits of the Swiss, and took
service with the enemies of their country.
In spite of Maximilian's attachment to the imperial name
The Policy of ** mav De sa^ °^ mm> as ^ was °^ an earuer
Maximilian Emperor, Charles iv., that he was * stepfather'
Empke^nd of the Empire. FnrtherT it was his aim to
his Hapsburg_ humiliate the- -Electors. He had robbed the
territories. Palatinate of the succession to Landshut (cf.
p. 113). He defrauded the Elector of Saxony of his claim
Internal History of Germany 1 25
to Berg and Julich by securing the succession, through
marriage, to the Duke of Cleves, and of the tutelage of
Philip of Hesse, by declaring the young Landgrave of age
when only fourteen ; and though he supported the house
of Brandenburg (Hohenzollern) by approving of the election
of Albert, a cadet of the house, to the Grand Mastership of
the Teutonic Order in Prussia (15 12), he irritated him by
confirming the peace of Thorn of 1466, by which the knights
had been forced to cede Western Prussia to Casimir of
Poland, and to hold East Prussia as a fief of that king. To
this he was induced by family reasons : Lewis,1 the nephew
of Sigismund, the reigning King of Poland, had recently
married Maximilian's granddaughter Mary, while Anne, the
sister of Lewis, married his grandson Ferdinand, with the
promise of succession to Hungary and Bohemia, should Lewis
die without heirs. In short, the policy of Maximilian was
mainly dynastic. To increase the power and the future
prospects of his house was his main aim. — by the aid of the
imperial position, if possible ; if not, by conquest, w.
n 1 s success
by policy, and by successful marriages. His as a Haps-
success in this design will be best realised by burg Pnnce-
contrasting the position held by his house in 1485 with
that which it enjoyed at his death in 15 19.
In 1485, one year before Maximilian was elected King of
the Romans, Mathias Corvinus not only held Hungary and
Bohemia, which had belonged to the Hapsburgs from 1437 to
1457, but had driven Frederick in. from Vienna. The Tyrol
and Alsace were in the hands of Maximilian's cousin Sigis-
mund. Styria and Carinthia were being ravaged by the Turk,
and Maximilian himseK, now that his wife Mary of Burgundy
was dead (1482), was deprived of the government of the
1 Casimir iv. of Poland, 1445-1492
I I I
John Albert Alexander Sigismund i. Ladislas, King of Hungary and
1492-1501 1501-1506 1506-1548 Bohemia, 1471-1516
Lewis = Mary, g.d. of Max. Anne, jr.d. of Max. = Ferdinand i.
1516-1526
126 European History, 1494- 1 598
Netherlands, and even of the education of his son Philip.
Far different was the state of things in 1519. Not only had
all Austria proper been regained, but on the death of Sigis-
mund, 1496, the Emperor reunited in his own hands all the
Hapsburg possessions, and the ravages of the Turks had for
the time ceased. If he had lost Switzerland, and if his
attempt to restore his authority in Italy had ludicrously failed,
these were losses to the Empire rather than to his house.
It is, however, in his marriage alliances that Maximilian
met with most success. The marriage treaties with Ladislas
His Marriage and his son Lewis, mentioned just above (p. 125),
Alliances. were shortly (1526) to restore Hungary and
Bohemia to the Hapsburgs. His wife Mary, daughter of
Charles the Bold, had brought him most of the posses-
sions of the powerful House of Burgundy, and Philip, the
issue of this match, had wedded Joanna of Spain. Already
in 1 5 16, Charles, their son, ruled in the Netherlands and in
Spain and in Naples.1
In spite of his long struggle with the electors, ^and the
failure of his Italian wars, Maximilian was not unpopular
His with the Germans. Indeed, he must have been
Character. an attractive character, if rather an irritating
person to deal with. Although not handsome — for his com-
plexion was pale, and he had a snub nose rising above a grey
beard — his countenance was manly, and his activity and
strength extraordinary, as his feats in pursuit of the chamois
prove. His intellectual activity was not less remarkable ; well
educated, speaking seven languages or dialects; with wide
' interests, quick sympathies, a chivalrous and highly imagin-
ative mind, and inexhaustible energy, his many-sidedness
won him admirers among all classes. No doubt, some of
these qualities stood .in^Jthe way of his success. Fond of
indulging in magnificent schemes, many of them incapable of
realisation, his very versatility and resource opened him to
1 The success of these and other marriages of the Hapsburgs is com-
memorated in the lines : — , ' Bella gerant alii, tu felix Austria nube,
Nam quae Mars aliis, dat tibi regna Venus.'
Internal History of Germany 1 27
the reproach of being indecisive and changeable. 'What
he says at night he holds of no account on the morrow/
said Louis xi. of him. His self-confidence taught him to
be impatient of strong men; 'to refuse the advice of
any, and yet to be deceived of all,' says Machiavelli. His
overweening ambition led him into financial straits, and these
to humiliating shifts, more especially in his dealings with foreign
powers who called him ' the man of few pence,' and treated
him as an importunate beggar, to be pensioned or bought off
at will. But at least, Maximilian was not self-deceived. In
his epic of ' Teuerdank,' the adventurous knight of ' glorious
thoughts,' who sets out to seek his bride and finally wars
against the Turk, he depicts himself, and introduces us to
self-conceit and the desire of adventure as the two great
dangers which, with envious intrigue, beset him. This attrac-
tive, lovable, impracticable, exasperating man of dreams, of
nervous, though ill-directed energy, is a fit representative of
that period of transition which may be said to .be covered by
his reign.
With the accession of Francis in 15 15, and with the death
of Maximilian in 15 19, we are definitely introduced to a new
period. It is an interesting fact that Italy, the home «.
of that papacy which had guided the Teutonic SSmSuSfik "
barbarians out of barbarism, had nursed their 'Wi mfrkf
... . the beginning
earlier days and introduced them to the priceless'"~of]uiay
legacy of Roman law, government, and civilisation, J2££i2i —
should have been the stage upon which the scenes were shifted.
It was in the Italian wars that the kingdoms of Europe first
showed full consciousness of their national identity. In them,
notwithstanding their deadly rivalries, they learnt that their
fortunes were necessarily bound together as members of the
European commonwealth of nations. Thence the system
of the balance of power, the birth of modern diplomacy, the
foundation of a system of international law. j[n short, during
this period, - that political system of Europe was established
whichstilLsuHive* — Further, in the Italian wars the nations
128 European History \ 1 494- 1598
found it necessary to keep large armies on foot, and the
art of war was revolutionised by the more extensive use of
gunpowder.
Italy indeed suffered terribly. At no date was the selfish-
ness of nations more flagrantly exhibited than in these Italian
wars. The peninsula became the spoil of the foreigner, never
to regain her independence till our own day. Yet in the
midst of her supreme agony, she had bestowed a priceless
gift on Europe. The revived knowledge of Greek art
and literature, the highest perfection of painting, the new
style of architecture, the knowledge of man, and the spirit of
criticism — these were to be her final legacies to Europe in
the movement of the Renaissance, which was so peculiarly
Italian.
Henceforth the main interest of European history will
no longer lie in Italy. The struggle for her fair plains is
not indeed over. The papacy will still demand our atten
tion, in its relations to the Reformation and to the Empire.
But Italy falls back into a subordinate position. The
Mediterranean ceases to be the highway of commerce between
east and west. Our gaze is directed north of the Alps to
follow the great struggle between the Hapsburg and Valois
houses, and the momentous issues which were involved in the
Reformation.
CHAPTER III
FROM THE ELECTION OF CHARLES TO THE BATTLE OF PA VI A
The Imperial Election — Preparations of Charles and Francis for war, which is,
however, delayed— The Revolt of the Comuneros — The Diet of Worms
— The Council of Regency — The Renaissance and the Reformation —
Erasmus and Luther — The Imperial Ban — War between Charles and
Francis — Their Alliances — Successes of Imperial Troops — Adrian vi.
succeeds Leo x. — His quarrel with Charles-^ Battle of Bicocca — Treaty
of Windsor — Luther and the Council of Regency — Diet of Nuremberg —
The Knights' War — Congress of Ratisbon — Battle of Pavia — The Peasants
WarT~ ^"
§ i. The Imperial Election.
On the death of Maximilian in January 15 19, the destinies of
Europe fell into the hands of three young Monarchs, all of them
of marked individuality and of great ambition. „, .
^r , T-r • 1 • . , , The three
Of these Henry viii., now in his twenty-eighth candidates foi
year, was the eldest. The profound impression the ImPerial
made on foreigners by his personal appearance is
probably in part to be attributed to the fairness of his com-
plexion, always much admired on the Continent ; but although
in after-life he became very corpulent, his high colouring, his
massive head and wide-set eyes, his tall, powerful, yet active
frame must have been striking enough. When to this is
added his prowess in games and in the joust, his proficiency
in music and languages, and, above all, his masterful character,
we shall probably not think the estimate exaggerated.
Francis 1. was only three years younger. Nearly as tall as
Henry, his dark complexion, his corpulence and thin legs
especially struck contemporaries. A patron of art, a lover of
pleasure, he was a true son of the Renaissance in its shallower
aspects. With little foresight, prudence, or statesmanship — a
bad King and a bad man — he was bold to rashness, fully as
ambitious as his rivals and yet was gifted with a certain
period iv 1
130 European History, 1494- 15 98
chivalrous spirit which was wanting in Charles, and which
formed the redeeming feature of his otherwise worthless
character.
Of Charles little was at that time known, and little expected.
He was only nineteen, and was completely under the control
of his Flemish counsellor, William de Croy, *le Sieur de
Chievres.' Of middle height and slouching gait, his fine fore-
head and powerful aquiline nose were spoilt by the under-
hanging jaw of the Hapsburg, and small bad teeth. The
troubles of his early life, the quarrels between his father and
his grandfather Ferdinand, the jealousy which Ferdinand had
subsequently shown him, the madness of his mother, had made
him reserved and grave, and perhaps destroyed the enthusiasm
of youth. These qualities gave the impression of stupidity ;
yet he was soon to show the world that, beneath that impassive
exterior, lay a clear-headedness, a business capacity, and a
determination which, coupled with indifference to sentiment,
was to prove him the ablest statesman of the three.
These young Kings were the most important candidates for
the imperial throne vacant by Maximilian's death, the election
to which now monopolised the attention of Europe. Maxi-
milian had squandered money and promises to win the
Electors, and fondly believed that he had secured the votes of
five of them for his grandson j but no sooner was he dead, than
they repudiated their engagements, and began to chaffer again
for bribes. Henry was scarcely a serious candidate ; of the
other two, the chances of Francis seemed at first the best.
The victory of Marignano, and his ambition for military
renown, pointed him out as the most likely leader of that
Crusade of which Europe was ever talking, though never
undertaking ; and Francis vowed that, if elected, he would be
in - Constantinople within three years. Leo x., although
(unwilling to declare himself, hoped to see Francis elected-
The possession of Milan by the French made their friendship
necessary if the Medici were to be secure in Florence, and it
was the traditional policy of the Popes to prevent Naples and
From the Election of Charles to the Battle of Pavia 131
the Empire from falling into the same hands.) ■ Do you know,'
said Leo, 'that it is only forty miles from Rome to the
Neapolitan frontier?' The Electors, more especially Frederick
the Wise of Saxony, and Joachim 1. of Brandenburg, had
many of them been irritated by Maximilian's opposition to
reform, and by his general policy towards them (cf. p. no ff).
The Rhenish Electors — that is, the three Archbishops of
Mayence, Treves, and Cologne, and the Elector Palatine —
feared the vengeance of Francis if they refused their votes
and Richard Greifenklau, the Elector of Treves, was an ally of
the Duke of Gueldres, the inveterate enemy of the Hapsburgs.
Francis, moreover, was determined to obtain the coveted
title. 'And he spent three millions of gold,' he said, 'he would
be Emperor ' ; and the bribes he offered to the Electors were
higher than Charles had to give. So poor indeed did the
prospects of Charles appear that he was urged by some to
retire in favour of his brother Ferdinand, an alternative which
Charles rejected with warmth, as fatal to the interests of his
house, though promising that, if elected, he would prevail upon
Germany to accept his brother as his successor. (^ He then
instructed his agents, for he himself was in Spain, to spare no
pains and to refuse nothing whereby his election might be
secured. Thus the dishonourable traffic continued with the
Electors, who were at the election itself to swear that they gave
their votes free from all promise, engagement, or earnest-money O
How the matter might have ended, if it had been left to
the Electors, it is impossible to say. But, as the day of
election drew near, the sentiment of Germany began to show
itself unmistakably. Not only did the literary
men declare for Charles, but the Suabian League i^§meiit
also began to move. This powerful League had, aeclares T6i
in the previous May, driven Ulrich, Duke of
Wiirtemberg, from his duchy on account of his cruelty and
misgovernment, and was in a position to enforce its views.
The League was commanded by Duke William of Bavaria,
132 European History, 1494- 1598
whose sister had been brutally treated by her husband, the
Duke Ulrich, and by Franz von Sickingen, the famous im-
perial knight, who was already in the pay of Charles. The
army of the League now proclaimed that it would not
submit to the election of Francis, and was joined by the
Swiss. The Confederates were generally the opponents of the
Hapsburgs, and in 1499, by tne peace of Basel, which closed
their last war with Maximilian, had gained their freedom from
imperial laws, justice, and taxation (cf. p. 124). Yet, influ-
enced by Mathias Schinner, the Cardinal of Sion, they now
supported the cause of Charles.
In the north, too, the Duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbiittel
threatened to take up arms for the German candidate. . This
strong expression of German sentiment naturally influenced
the Electors. ^.They therefore lowered their demands, and
accepted smaller sums and promises from Charles than
Francis offered; while the Fuggers, the Rothschilds of that
day, refused to honour the bills of the French King./ Leo,
too, seeing ' that it was useless to run his head against a brick
wall,' abandoned his opposition to Charles. \
The most important suffrage to be gained was that of the
Archbishop of Mayence, the brother of Joachim of Branden-
burg. His vote would certainly carry with it that of the
vacillating Hermann von der Wied, Archbishop of Cologne,,
and he might have some influence on his brother, although
that ' father of all avarice ' was deeply pledged to support the
French King. The Archbishop had been offered 120,000
florins and the perpetual legateship of Germany by Francis.
Nevertheless, after much haggling, he accepted Charles'
smaller promise of 72,000 florins and the legateship, ' and
championed his cause in the electoral college which met on
June 18. Here the Elector of Treves, who had dipped
Th ei ctors deeply mto French money-bags, urged the claims
^finally eiectT of Francis, and suggested, that if he were not ac-
-y!H!£s' ceptable, they should elect some other German
prince likely to be less dangerous than Charles — the Duke of
From the Election of Charles to the Battle of Pavia 133
Bavaria, the Margrave of Brandenburg, or the Elector of
Saxony. This had been the final move of Francis. The
Elector of Saxony was the only one who had honourably
refused all bribes, and so great was the reputation of his
virtuous and godly life, as also of his singular wisdom, that,
had he been willing, he might have been chosen. (Too shrewd,
however, to accept so dangerous a position, and patriotic
enough to wish it conferred on a German, he declined the offer,
and declared for Charles. His conduct decided the matter?}
Lewis, the young King of Bohemia, had married Mary, sister
of Charles, and voted for his brother-in-law. Hermann von
der Wied, Archbishop of Cologne, followed the lead of
Mayence; the three remaining Electors, the Archbishop of
Treves, the Elector Palatine, and the Margrave of Branden-
burg, followed suit, and Charles was unanimously elected
Emperor. The papal confirmation was no longer thought
necessary for the assumption of the title of Emperor, and,
though Charles was subsequently crowned by the Pope at
Bologna (1530), he at once assumed the title, not of King
of the Romans, but of Emperor Elect. Thus ended the
most memorable of the elections to that imperial dignity,
which was fast becoming a mere shadow — an election which
surpassed all others in the shameless corruption and intrigue
which accompanied it, and which Henry's agent Pace de-
clared to be ' the dearest merchandise which ever was bought.'
The desire of Francis to attain the title is a proof of his V^
want of statesmanship. His success would have been dis-
astrous to his country; the hostility of Germany, and pro-
bably of the whole of Europe, would have been aroused, and
the resources of France would have been exhausted in a
struggle in which she was not really interested.
By the election of Charles, the magnificent dreams of
Frederick 111. and of Maximilian were in part realised. ( The
house of Hapsburg now ruled over Germany, the Nether-
lands, Spain, Naples, and a large part of the New World,
and held once more the title of the Holy Roman Emperor.")
134 European History, 1494- 1 5 98
And yet it may be questioned whether the imperial dignity
was really a source of strength. As a price of his election
Charles had to sign the 'Capitulations,' which henceforth
were demanded of every Emperor Elect. These 'Capitula-
tions' well illustrate the views of the German Princes. The
The fear of the Spanish and Flemish parentage of
Capitulations, the new Emperor is seen in their demands that
German or Latin should be the official language, that imperial
offices should be reserved for Germans, that the States should
not be subject to any foreign jurisdiction, and that no foreign
troops should serve in imperial wars without the consent of
the Diet. The opposition to papal claims prompted the
Princes to insist on the abolition of every innovation intro-
duced by the court of Rome, in contravention of the con-
cordat made with Germany after the Council of Constance
(14 1 8). • Finally, determined to maintain their privileges, they
demanded that Charles should confirm their sovereign rights
and appoint a standing Council which should take a share in
government. These last demands were of serious import,
and led to serious controversies. For the rest, as the sequel
will show, Charles' numerous and ill-assorted possessions and
claims led to difficulties, before which at last he succumbed.
That the election of Charles v. would lead to war was
almost inevitable. The fears of the French were not un-
war naturally aroused by the union of the Hapsburg and
. inevitable. Spanish claims in his person, while the personal
vanity of Francis had received a deadly affront by the election
of his rival to the Empire.
Under these circumstances, it was not difficult to find
occasions of quarrel. The terms of the treaty of Noyon (15 16)
(cf. p. 83), had not been carried out on either side. Francis
could complain that Spanish Navarre had never been restored
to Henry d'Albret, while Charles asserted that Milan belonged
to him, as an imperial fief, and demanded the restoration of
the Duchy of Burgundy as part of his Burgundian inheritance.
Nevertheless, it was clearly to the advantage of Charles that
/
From ike Election of Charles to tfu Battle of Pavia 135
the war should be postponed. Now, as throughout his reign,
the very extent of his dominions and the number of his
titles were a source of weakness. Spain, indig-
nant at the rule of the Flemings, was on the ^JjJJeVto
point of rebellion; Germany, which Charles had put off the
not yet visited since his election, for he was still in war*
(Spain, was annoyed at his continued absence ; the Diet had
to be reckoned with ; and the question of ' the little monk
Luther' demanded immediate attention.
(^ Francis on the contrary, with less extravagant pretensions,
was master of a consolidated kingdom. He enjoyed a pre-
rogative far less controlled, more especially with regard to the
finances and the army, than his rival. He held the central
position, and, as long as he retained Milan, cut off the
Emperor from all communication by land between his German
and Italian territories.) Under these circumstances Chievres
was probably right, apart from the particular interests of the
Netherlands, in wishing, at least, to postpone the commence-
ment of hostilities. France, on the other hand, should have
begun the war at once. But the treasury had been exhausted
by the extravagance of the King, by the expenses incurred in
the last war, and in the canvass for the Empire, and the addition
of fresh imposts would cause discontent. Above all it was
thought desirable, if possible, first to secure the alliance, or
at least the neutrality, of England. Charles, too, realised the
importance of English aid ; and the two rivals were so evenly
matched that an opportunity, such as had never occurred before,
was opened to England to hold the tongue of the balance.
The opportunity was eagerly seized by Wolsey. To con-^
tinue friends with both sides without offending either ; to
keep both asunder by fostering mutual suspicion;
to prevent either from declaring war lest the wolaeyto
aggressor might find England arrayed against keep the
him, and thereby to prevent if possible, if not to peace*
delay, the outbreak of hostilities; meanwhile, to gain for
England the proud position of arbiter of Europe — this was
136 European History \ 1 494- 1598
the aim of Wolsey) a policy which for nigh two years met with
such success that the two most powerful monarchs of Europe
became the humble suitors of the Cardinal and his master.
In May, 1520, Charles hurried from Spain to meet
Henry vm. at Sandwich, an act of condescension on the
Emperor's part which excited the astonishment of Europe.
Immediately afterwards (June 7), followed the interview
between Henry and Francis at the 'Field of the Cloth of
Gold,' near Guisnes in the Pale of Calais — again, be it noted,
on English ground. The importance attached to this famous
interview is not only attested by the magnificence of the
display, by the feats of arms in which even the kings them-
selves took part to the discomfiture of Francis, but by the
attention it received from the artists and the writers of the day.
Thence Henry vm. passed to a second interview with Charles
at Gravelines (July 10). The actual results of these meetings
are doubtful ; 1 but it is probable that Wolsey declined any
definite agreements, since his policy was to avoid declaring
himself on either side.
Thus the negotiations dragged on, much to the indignation
of the Pope, Leo x., who had made treaties with both, yet was
anxious that war should begin without delay in order that he
might see who was likely to prove the winner before he com-
promised himself too far.)
At the close of the year 1520, however, the diplomacy of
Wolsey began to break down. Francis determined to take
the offensive, and accused Wolsey of betraying his
acy of wolsey secret to the Pope ; while Charles, who had long
fails to avert been hesitating whether to carry out the proposed
match with Mary of England, or to marry the
Infanta of Portugal, attempted to implicate Henry in a war
with France and demanded that he should fulfil his promises.
Wolsey, however, was not thus to be entrapped, and recalled
Tunstal, his agent at the Emperor's court. Yet Charles was in
no position to declare war, and the actual outbreak of hostilities
was accordingly postponed till 1521.
1 Cf. Cambridge Modern History, ii. 416.
From the Election of Charles to the Battle of Pavia 1 3?
(^Meanwhile the troubles in Spain, the difficulties with the /
Diet, and the question of the condemnation of Luther,
demanded the attention of the EmperorCN
§ 2. The Revolt of the Comuneros
The troubles in Spain had commenced immediately on the
death of Ferdinand. In spite of the temporary success
which had accompanied the policy of that King Discontent
and his consort, the work of consolidation was in sPain«
by no means complete. Not only were the kingdoms of
Castile and Aragon independent of each other, but even
Valencia and Catalonia, although dependencies of Aragon,
had their separate Cortes and characteristic institutions.
This outward variety of constitutional machinery was but the
symbol of deep and essential differences — differences which
were the outcome of the physical peculiarities of the various
countries, their racial differences, and their past history.
The rivalries between Castile and Aragon were of old
standing, and no sharper contrast is to be found in Europe
than that which existed between the primitive and poverty-
stricken population of the Asturias, the proud Castilian noble,
and the busy trader of Barcelona, the democratic capital of
Catalonia. Nor was there more unity within the separate
kingdoms themselves. The social divisions were deepest in
Castile. There the nobles enjoyed numerous exclusive
privileges, notably that of freedom from taxation. The
revenues derived from their wide domains were so great as to
exceed in several instances those of the crown itself. Living
in proud isolation, they despised* the burghers of the towns and
their struggles for the constitutional rights of the Cortes, the
meetings of which they themselves had long ceased to attend.
In Aragon the nobles were less isolated. They were still
represented in the Cortes, and joined with the deputies of
the clergy and the towns in common defence of their political
rights. Even here, however, the social cleavages were deep,
138 European History \ 1 494- 1598
while in Valencia things were nearly as bad as in Castile.
But if Spain was the victim of national and class jealousies
and divisions, she was not on that account less tenacious of
_. . her privileges, and the change of rulers gave
Thediscon- . . r . ,,„
tent reaches her an opportunity of reasserting them. When
its climax on therefore Charles came to Spain a year after his
the accession .
of Charles, grandfathers death (15 17), he had met with con-
especiaiiy in siderable opposition. The Cortes of Aragon only
consented to acknowledge him as King in conjunc-
tion with his mother after he had sworn to confirm their liberties,
and in Catalonia and Valencia he met with similar difficulties.
Meanwhile, in Castile matters were even worse. The Cas-
tilians had been irritated by the rule of the Fleming, Chievres
— the ' goat ' as they called him in allusion to his name — who
had administered affairs till Charles came to Spain. When
their new King did arrive he hurt their pride by his ignorance
of their language, excited the indignation of many by his heart-
less treatment of Ximenes, who was rewarded for his faithful
services by being dismissed to his diocese to die (November
17), and alienated all by conferring the dignities which had
been held by the Cardinal upon his hated Flemings. The see
of Toledo was given to the Bishop of Tournay, the nephew of
Chievres ; and Sauvage, another Fleming, succeeded him in
his office of Chancellor of Castile. Accordingly the Cortes
of Valladolid, in 15 18, while acknowledging Charles and his
mother as co-rulers, and voting him a ' servicio ' or money
grant, for two years, demanded that no foreigners should be
given office ; that no gold, silver, or horses should be exported
from Spain ; that Charles should speedily marry ; and that his
brother Ferdinand should act as his representative until he
should have children. These demands, if ever granted, were
not complied with. Meanwhile, the imperial election increased
their apprehensions. The Emperor, they said, would rarely be
in Spain, and they would have to pay the expenses of the
honour as they had of the election. Charles, anxious to leave
From the Election of Charles to the Battle of Pavia t^Q
Spain to meet Henry vin. at Sandwich, and to be crowned
at Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen), consented to call another
meeting of the Cortes before leaving the country. He,
however, avoided the larger towns on account of their
disaffection, and summoned it to Santiago (March 31), in
Galicia, and subsequently (April 25) transferred it to
Corunna that he might be near his ships. Here he extorted
a sum of money by promises to return again m three years,
on the faith of a King, to appoint no foreigners to office,
and to spend the c servicio ' only in the interests of Castile.
The Cortes, however, was by no means a full one; the
deputies of Salamanca had been excluded, and some, such
as Toledo, had refused to send any. Even so, the vote was
only carried by a narrow majority.
The city of Toledo had special cause for indignation. The
appointment of Chievres' nephew as Archbishop had been
looked upon as a special insult, and the envoys Toledo rises,
sent to remonstrate with Charles, had been Apnl "• I520,
refused an audience. The citizens therefore rose, headed by
two nobles, Don Pedro Laso de la Vega, and Don Juan de
Padilla, son of the Commendador or Governor of Leon, whose
intrepid wife had forced him into a career for which he was
ill fitted. They seized the government in the name of the
king and queen, drove the royal Corregidor from the town,
and formed a ' Communidad ' of deputies from the parishes of
the city (April 21).
Charles was now to experience for the first time, but not
the last, the conflict of those jarring interests which resulted
from his anomalous position. As King of Spain, his presence
there was imperatively needed, yet his European interests
necessitated his departure. Henry vin. had promised to meet
Francis in May or early in June, and, if the conference at
Sandwich was not to be abandoned (cf. p. 136), no time was
to be lost. Accordingly, on the 19th of May, he left Spain
almost as a fugitive, having appointed Adrian, his old tutor,
t40 European History t 1494- 1598
regent in Castile, Don Juan de Lanuza, viceroy in Aragon
and Don Diego de Mendoza, in Valencia.
The departure of the King only served to increase the dis-
content. The Spaniards felt that henceforth their country
^u 1 . a would no longer be the centre of his interests,
Charles' de- °
parture from but only a province of his wider Empire. ^The
fefoii'wY X9' revo^ therefore spread rapidly. At Segovia the
by the revolt deputy who had voted for the ' servicio ' was
of Castile. murdered. Salamanca, Zamora, Madrid, Burgos,
and many other towns rose ; and finally Valladolid, then the
seat of government, took up arms. Meanwhile, in Valencia, a
social war was raging between the nobles and the commons,
although the disturbances there had no connection with those
in Castile. At the end of July, the movements in Castile,
hitherto isolated, coalesced under the leadership of the citizens
of Toledo, and a 'Junta' of deputies from the insurgent towns
_. T was formed at Avila. In August, Padilla, march-
The Junta o » >
set up Joanna, ing on Tordesillas, not far from Valladolid, seized
August, 1520. Charles' mother, Joanna, who was now completely
imbecile, and established the revolutionary government in her
name. With this formidable revolt, Adrian was quite unable
to cope; he had been left without adequate resources in
troops or money, and had not even been intrusted with full
powers. After a fruitless attempt to quell the rebellion, he
fled to Medina de Rio Seco, and hastily wrote to Charles
demanding his own recall, and urging him to come quickly
or Spain would be lost. Charles, however, was in no position
to comply with his request, or to send reinforcements. He
therefore bade Adrian temporise. He was to summon a Cortes,
to offer to abandon the [ servicio ' and promise to govern
Spain according to the ancient laws ; yet in no way to touch
the prerogatives of the crown. At the same time, Charles
appointed Don Fadrique Henriques, the High Admiral, and
Don Inigo de Velasco, the High Constable of Castile, as co-
regents, hoping by this act to gain the support of the nobles.
Meanwhile the 'Junta,' after vainly attempting to prove
From the Election of Charles to the Battle of Pavia 141
Joanna sane, and to put her on the throne, proceeded to
draw up a charter of their liberties. They called upon Charles
to return to Spain, to marry the Infanta of Portugal, The Junta
to reduce his expenses, and to live like his fore- present their
fathers, and passed the following decrees. No Char^r*
) ■ foreigner was again to hold office ; the taxes were to be
reduced, and the exemptions of the nobility abolished ; the
crown lands, which had been alienated, were to be resumed,
and future alienations were declared illegal ; finally a Cortes,
fully representative of the three orders of nobles, clergy, and
burghers, was to meet once in every three years. These
decrees were declared to be fundamental laws, which could
never be revoked by King or Cortes, and Charles' acceptance
of them was made the condition of his return.
Hitherto the nobles had displayed extraordinary apathy.
They had been irritated at the policy of Ferdinand and
Isabella, and if, with few exceptions, they had not taken any
active part in the rebellion, they had given Adrian no
assistance. But now their fears began to be aroused ; some
of these decrees touched their privileges, an^the movement
in Castile threatened to follow that of Valencia, ...
' The nobles
and to assume the character of a social revolt, declare against
Moreover, the appointment of two of their t^1*13618-
number as co-regents indicated a change in the policy of the
government, and had done something to conciliate them.
The hostility of the nobles once awakened, the position of
the ■ comuneros ' became critical, and their chances of success
were further jeopardised by the internal dissensions which
now broke out.
The citizens of Burgos, the capital of Old Castile, became
jealous at the leading part assumed by Toledo, the capital of
New Castile, while Pedro Laso, the President of , ,
' ' Jealousies
the Junta, who represented the more moderate weaken the
party, was opposed to the more extreme views rebels' cause-
of Padilla. The Regents, seizing the opportunity, managed
to detach Burgos from the Junta (October 1520), and in
142 European History, 1494- 1598
December, the Count de Haro, son of the Constable, retook
Tordesillas and gained possession of Joanna. Yet in spite
of these successes the danger was by no means over.
The nobles showed their want of union, and even the
Constable and the Admiral quarrelled. The rebels, on
the other hand, received the valuable support, not only of
the Count de Salvatierra, a powerful noble of the north, but
also of Acufia, the Bishop of Zamora. This clever and
ambitious ecclesiastic attempted to give to the movement
a wider significance, and to establish a democracy, while
ne hoped to gain for himself the Archbishopric of Toledo,
just vacant by the death of the nephew of Chievres. In
these designs he obtained the support of Francis, and even
the neutrality of the Pope. Inspired by these notable
additions to their party, the ' communeros ' dis-
vigourof the played renewed vigour. Padilla, marching on the
comnneros. town of Torrelobaton near Valladolid, took it and
put it to the sack (March 3, 152 1); and the city
of Burgos, enraged at the refusal of the royalists to confirm
their promises, again took up arms. Once more the King's
cause seemed to be lost. The rebels had a short time before
refused the concessions offered them by his Regents, and
determined to win all or lose all. Charles therefore fell back
upon his previous policy of letting things take their course,
while he refused to surrender a jot of his prerogative.
This policy of obstinate inactivity met with a success it
did not deserve. It is the common fate of all rebellions,
Failure of the when not guided by leaders of strong individuality,
rebellion. ^0 fau t0 pieces of themselves. This now happened
in Spain. The leaders of the revolt were men of no real
strength. Padilla was an unpractical enthusiast, and the
Bishop of Zamora a dishonest, self-seeking man. There was
a complete absence of statesmanship or self-sacrifice. The
Junta lost all control. Pedro Laso, the President, digusted
at the turn things were taking, began to waver, and was
followed by many who feared that anarchy would ensue
From the Election of Charles to the Battle of Pavia 143
The nobles, at last thoroughly alarmed, laid aside their
quarrels, and showed a unanimity which, if displayed at first,
would have nipped the revolt in the bud. Finally, the Count
de Haro, reinforced by troops sent by the Count de Najera
from Navarre, advanced against the army of the ' communeros,'
which since the fall of Torrelobaton had remained idle.
Meeting them on the plain of Villalar, as they attempted
to retreat to Toro, he won a decisive victory. The rebels
outnumbered, especially in cavalry, fled, leaving
their commander Padilla in the enemy's hands, defeated at
On the following day he was executed. The villalar.
defeat of Villalar, and the loss of their leader, pn 23,IS21'
sufficed to end the matter. The Bishop of Zamora was seized
as he attempted to fly to France, and having murdered the
governor of the prison was hun^" -Town after town capitu-
lated, and on April 27, i52i,the viceregents entered Valladolid.
In Toledo, the first city to rise, Donna Maria Pacheco, the
intrepid widow of Padilla, still held out. But in October,
finding it impossible to keep the citizens in control, she fled to
Portugal, and the city and citadel opened their gates. Shortly
afterwards the revolt in Valencia was put down, chiefly by the
nobles themselves.
The cause of the failure of this serious revolt may be
summed up in one word— disunion. The rebellion had been
confined to the kingdom of Castile. Neither Causesof
Aragon nor Catalonia had moved, and the rebels failure of the
of Valencia fought for their own cause and gave Revolt*
no support. Nor were the * comuneros ' of Castile of one
mind. They were divided in their aims, and showed no
power of concentrated action, while their cause was further
weakened by the incapacity and the jealousies of their
leaders. The prestige of the monarchy, enhanced as it had
been by the policy of Ferdinand and Isabella, was too
great to be thus overthrown. Indeed, but for the European
difficulties of Charles, and the lukewarmness of the nobles
— an attitude which is largely to be attributed to their
144 European History \ 1494- 159S
discontent — the revolt would either never have occurred, or
would have been crushed out at once.
Charles did not come to Spain till the year 1522. A few
of the rebels were executed, the estates of others were con-
Subsequent fiscated. He then summoned a Cortes in which
measures of he ordered that the ' servicio ' should be granted
before grievances were heard, and forbade all dis-
cussion in the absence of the President, who was to be his
nominee. In future, deputies were nominated by the govern-
ment and frequently bribed ; and so valuable did a seat in
the Cortes become, that in 1534 we find a deputy giving
14,000 ducats for his seat. The nobles, still insisting on
their privilege of exemption from taxation, continued to be
excluded from the Cortes, and rapidly lost all political
influence. After the decline of the military power in Spain,
the higher nobility, the 'ricos hombres,' relapsed into luxuri-
ous idleness; the. lower nobility, 'the hidalgos,' and the
knights or 'caballeros,' pressed into the service of the Crown,
and became its creatures, while the commoners sought for
titles of nobility that they might share the emoluments of
office, and enjoy the other privileges of nobility. Nor was
the Church more independent. The Crown made use of
its power of nominating to benefices, filled them with its
adherents, and kept it in a condition of servility. The
Inquisition, however, was the most efficient weapon in the
hands of the Crown. It was entirely under the King's
control ; the property of the condemned fell to the Crown,
and no subject, cleric or lay, was free from its jurisdiction.
Charles did not indeed directly tamper with the constitution
of Castile, and was even more cautious in his treatment of
Aragon. The meetings of the Cortes still continued, nor did
Charles refuse to listen to their petitions. Nevertheless, the
power of the bureaucracy of the Crown increased, and Spain,
exhausted by the wars of Charles, was being prepared for the
despotism of Philip*1
1 On this point cf. Armstrong, Charles V., II. c. iii.
From the Election of Charles to the Battle of Pavia 145
§ 3. The Diet of Worms > 152 1.
Charles had been forced to let the revolt of the c comuneros '
in Spain 'run its course because of the serious problems in
which he was involved by his position as an Aus- The Diet f
trian Prince and as Emperor. After his interview Worms. ~
with Henry vm. at Gravelines in the beginning l*?E±M*i-
of July, he had passed on to Germany to be crowned. Partly
owing to need of money, partly because of an outbreak of
the plague at Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen), this was delayed
till October, and it was not till the following January, 15 21,
that he met his first Diet at Worms. Meanwhile he had
settled the fate of the Austrian dominions. He had at first
thought of keeping at least a portion of these lands in his
own hands. Finally, however, while retaining the Nether-
lands and Franche-Comte', he granted to his brother Fer-
dinand the whole of the hereditary Austrian lands ; to which
were added the claims on Hungary and Bohemia, based on
Ferdinand's marriage with the Princess Anne. Thus Spain
and Austria, which had been in Charles' hands for two years,
were once more divided, never to be again united. The
questions which came before this important Diet were
mainly three :
— (1) The settlement of the Imperial Constitution.
— (2) The war with France.
(3) The attitude to be adopted towards Luther.
1. The question of the reform of the Imperial Constitution
revived those controversies, of which we have treated in speak-
ing of Maximilian, and with very similar results. Charles had
promised in his 'Capitulations' (p. 133) that the Council of
period IV. k
146 European History \ 1494- 15 98
Regency (Reichsregiment) which had existed for two brief
years, 1 500-1 502, should be restored. But here, once more,
the old controversies reappeared. The Eleqtors wished that
the Council should constitute the supreme administrative
body in home and foreign affairs, even when Charles was
present in Germany, and that its members should be elected
by the States with the sole exception of the President, who
was to be nominated by the Emperor. Charles, however,
was fully determined to protect his imperial prerogatives.
His views as to the imperial office were, if possible, more
exalted than those of his grandfather. In his opening speech
on the 28th of January, the day consecrated to the memory
of Charles the Great, he declared that 'no monarchy was
comparable to the Roman Empire. This the whole world had
once obeyed, and Christ Himself had paid it honour and
allegiance. Unfortunately it was now only a shadow of what
it had been, but he hoped with the help of those powerful
countries and alliances which God had granted him, to raise
it to its ancient glory.' ' My will,' he said subsequently, 'is
not that there should be many, but one master, as befits the
traditions of the Roman Empire.' Yet the needs of Charles
were great, and had the Diet been of one mind it might have
forced its views upon him. The old jealousies, however,
_ still existed, and Charles, by playing upon these, was able to
make it abate something of its demands. It was accordingly
agreed that the Emperor should nominate, not only the
President, but two assessors. Of the other twenty members,
the seven Electors were each to send one delegate ; the six
Circles, with Austria and the Netherlands, one apiece. From
the imperial towns two more were to come, while one Elector
in rotation, one temporal and one spiritual Prince, were always
to have a seat. The Council, thus constituted, was to have
the initiative in the negotiation of foreign alliances, and in
settling feudal questions, subject, however, to the confirmation
of the Emperor. Its powers, for the present at least, were
only to continue during Charles' absence. At the same time,
From the Election of Charles to the Battle of Pavia 147
the Imperial Chamber {Reichskammergericht) was slightly
altered. The Emperor was to nominate the President and
two assessors. The others were to be elected by the
Electors and the Circles, while two were to represent the
hereditary dominions of the House of Hapsburg. The most
difficult question yet remained. How were the members
of these bodies to be paid ? If no permanent revenue were
established, continuity would be impossible, and if the
Emperor were to pay them, the real control would lie with
him. Accordingly, the old controversies began again. The
plan of the Common Penny having failed (p. in), the novel
idea of establishing a system of custom-duties on all imports
coming into the Empire was suggested. Had this been
carried, a kind of customs-union {Zollverein) would have been
set on foot which might in time have led the way to a closer
political union. It was, however, violently opposed by the
towns and merchants, who declared that the burden would
fall on them and ruin trade; and, accordingly, the Diet fell
back on the system of the 'matricula' of 1507 (cf. p. 114).
2 Difficulties also arose on the question of the army.
The war with France had already been commenced by the
invasion of Spanish Navarre by the French, and by the
attack of Robert de la Marck, the Lord of Bouillon, on
Luxembourg. Charles also was eager to enter Italy that he
might put it to the arbitrament of war, 'whether he should
become a very poor Emperor, or Francis a sorry King.' Yet
all the Diet would provide was a levy of some 4000 cavalry
and 20,000 infantry, levied on the separate states according
to the system of the 'matricula.' It was further decreed
that each contingent should be under its own officers, and
that the commander-in-chief, though appointed by the
Emperor, must be a German. This ' matricula ' or imperial
roll was the last ever drawn up, and thus became the model
for future imperial levies. From 1535 onwards, the system
was gradually adopted of substituting for the men themselves
the money necessary to pay the contingent — the money being
0
Mr ■
148 European History, 1494- 1598
assessed on the separate States, according to their liability on
the roll of 15 21. The grants were termed 'Roman Months,
because they originated with the vote for the Roman expedi-
tion of 152 1.
In these constitutional struggles, Charles had obtained some-
thing. He had at least succeeded in retaining more control
over the Council of Regency and the Imperial Chamber
than his grandfather had enjoyed. Yet the Diet had
gained much. It had now a real share in the executive and
-judicial administration of the Empire, and Charles would be
more often absent than present. For the rest, as before, the
reforms were mainly in the interest of the Electors and more
powerful Princes. The towns, though represented in the
Council, could easily be outvoted, and had failed, in spite
of urgent protests, to secure any delegates in the Imperial
Chamber. Devoid of popular support, the Imperial Ckamber
failed to enforce its judicial authority, while the next few
years were to prove conclusively that the Council was power-
^ss to maintain order.
3. The last question — that of the attitude of the Diet
towards Luther — was to prove a fay more serious question
than any one at that time dreamt of — a question which was
to affect deeply the future history not only of the Empire, but
of Europe.
** The Reformation was the outcome of two forces, indepen-
dent in origin, and never wholly in agreement : the Renais-
mitL „ . sance, and the desire for reform in dogma and
The Eegais- ' °
sance and the practice. Of these, the Ast owes its birth to Italy.
Keformagon. rj*^Q Italians, despairing^of political unity or stabi-
lity, yet excelling %ther people in material prosperity and
comfort, betook themselves to the study of the past for which
their unbroken connection with the language and memories of
Rome will fitted them. The movement, beginning in the
earlier decades of the fifteenth century, had made rapid
strides before it closed, and was many-sided. In art, it was
marked by a return to the study of the antique ; in literature*
From the Election of Charles to the Battle of Pavki 149
by a fresh taste for prose and poetry, founded on classic
models ; in scholarship, it was accompanied by the discovery
of ancfent manuscripts, and the revival of criticism; in*
philosophy, it led to a revival of the knowledge of Plato ; in
natural science, to a more critical inquiry into the nature of
the earth and its relation to the system of the universe.
But the principles which underlay and actuated these
different energies were the same. Mediaeval thought had
striven to sacrifice the individual. It had taught men to
crucify the body with its fleshly lusts, to check the rebellious
passion for independence and individuality. .It had bidden
men accept without question the authority of the Church, and
of the temporal power. The new spirit revolted from all these .
doctrines. It preached the dignity of man, and of this life.
It questioned the virtue of asceticism, and lusted after the .
world In thought and deed. It proclaimed the right of the
individual to think, and feel, and shape his creed according to
the dictates of reason. It inculcated the lessons of inquiry,,
of criticism, of naturalism. Thus a new paradise was opened
to the imagination, and men rushed headlong into it with a
pleasing sense of freedom. There was much that was valuable,
and indeed necessary to progress, in this movement of
emancipation. It led to more accurate observation, to more
careful criticism, to greater regard for literature, and to the
triumph of individualism. Nevertheless, it had its darker
side. It was accompanied by much riot and licence. The
sensuous delight in form and colour betrayed some into '
sensuality ; the undue devotion to things of this world led to
a mundane pagan spirit ; criticism, to scepticism and infidelity.
The atmosphere of the Renaissance was indeed inimical to •
that of the Christian life, yet, with a few exceptions, the
Italians made no direct attack upon the Church. The literary
men were well content to leave an institution alone, which
was so closely wrapped up with their past traditions and with
the general culture of the day, and which so conveniently
patronised them, and even tolerated their satires, so long as .
1 50 European History \ 1 494- 1 5 98
they left her government and her dogmas alone. With the
philosophers it was different. Yet even they assailed Chris-
tianity rather than the Church ; and if Ficino tried to recon-
cile Christianity and Platonism, or Pomponazzi questioned the
immortality of the soul, these scholars affected to distinguish
between science and religion, and while they speculated as
philosophers, professed to believe as Christians. Thus there is
hardly any humanist of Italy, if we except Laurentius Valla,
who attacked the claims of the Pope to interfere in temporal
affairs, or the tradition that the Apostles' Creed was the work
of the apostles ; and even he, for the sake of papal protection,
easily retracted his errors.
For the rest, the Italian humanists were scarcely serious
enough to undertake a reformation of the Church. Their
temper, if not anti-religious, was irreligious, and their lives,
with few exceptions, as loose as those of the churchmen whom
they lampooned. Reformers there were indeed in Italy, but
these had no connection with the humanists. They were men
of the type of Savonarola, whose sole idea of reform was one
of morals and of life, and who had no quarrel with the dogmas,
or the organisation of the Church.
No sooner did the Renaissance cross the Alps than, in the
hands of the more earnest-minded Germans, it became more
serious and more theological, less philosophical and more
dogmatic. , Criticism they now applied to the Church, and
in another sense to the Bible, with the intention not of
destroying .Christianity but of restoring it to its primitive
purity.
Among numerous scholars who rose in Germany at the
close of the fifteenth century, the two most characteristic
Reuchiinand representatives of the age were John Reuchlin
Erasmus. (1455-1522) and Desiderius Erasmus (1467-1536).
Reuchlin is chiefly noticeable for his revival of the study of
Hebrew, a study which he applied to the criticism of the
Vulgate, and for his attempt to save the Jewish writings from
indiscriminate destruction at the hands of the bigoted
Dominican Hochstraten. Although a philologist, rather than
From the Election of Charles to the Battle of Pavia 151
a theologian, he may yet be called the father of Old Testa-
ment criticism, and during the struggle over the Jewish
literature, the conflict between the old and new ideas is
strongly emphasised.
But the most famous child of the German revival is
Erasmus. Educated at the school .of Deventer, a school
which owed its origin to the Brethren of the Common Life,
he was, at the date of the Diet of Worms, looked upon as the
greatest scholar of his age, and enjoyed a reputation such as
probably has never been equalled since. If Reuchlin may be
called the father of Old Testament criticism, Erasmus may be
termed the father of New Testament criticism, and of scientific
theology. In 1505, he republished Valla's notes on the New
Testament, the solitary piece of biblical criticism which had
come from Italy. This was followed, in 15 16, by his Greek
editioD of the New Testament, with a Latin translation and
notes. The aim of these works was to revive the knowledge
of the original, and by the collation of such mss. as were
procurable, to furnish as correct a version as possible of the
text. In the notes, Erasmus applied the canons of ordinary
criticism to the New Testament, and thereby laid the founda-
tions of modern biblical scholarship. The aim of his third
work, the Enchiridion Militis Christie may be gathered from
a letter to his friend Colet, Dean of St. Paul's : ' I write,'
he says, ' to remedy the error which makes religion depend
on ceremonies and on observance of bodily acts, while
neglecting true piety.' With these views Erasmus was
naturally a severe critic of the existing state of things. He
lamented the ignorance of many churchmen who dreaded
the new learning without understanding it; who went so
far as to denounce Hebrew and Greek as heretical because
they were not the language of the Vulgate, and whose
bigotry had just been so conspicuously displayed in the
Reuchlin controversy. He despised the idleness of the
monks, and the intolerable narrowness of the scholastic
pedants, with their barren disputations and endless hair
152 European History, 1494- 1598
splittings. He denounced the folly of that Church which
insisted on every tittle of outward ceremony and dogma,
and yet neglected practical piety. These were the objects of
his satirical pen in his Praise of Folly \ which was written in
England in 1509. In this wonderful satire, Folly, declaring
herself the real source of happiness, represents herself as the
authoress of all the superstition, the pedantry, the idleness,
the hypocrisy, which were so prosperous in the world.
Nor was the satire of Erasmus the only one which appeared
at this time. The Ship of Fools by Sebastian Brandt in
1494, and the more famous Epistoloz Obscurorum Virorum,
which arose out of the Reuchlin controversy, deal with much
the same evils, though without the literary refinement of the
northern scholar ; while the Ship of Fools is specially noticeable
as having been originally written in German, and therefore
written for the people, not to the scholars. But although these
and other writings indicate how deeply Germany was stirred
by the corruptions of the Church, and although they had
done much to prepare the way, there was as yet no idea of
breaking away from her. Men still looked to internal reform
by Council, or if not, by some other method*
It has been usual to accuse Erasmus of half-heartedness in
the cause of religion, of carelessness in his private life, and of
time-serving in his public conduct. There is certainly some
truth in this attack, and assuredly he was not the man to raise
the standard of avowed rebellion. As he himself confessed,
he was not of the stuff of which martyrs were made. He was
a scholar who loved peace, and had nothing of the religious
enthusiast about him. But quite apart from his character, his
whole intellectual position was incompatible with that of the
Reformation, as the Protestants understand the meaning of the
word. Erasmus belongs to that school of broad churchmen,
who did not believe that the cure for the evils afoot was to be
found in the assertion of new dogmas. In their view, too much
dogma was insisted upon already. Much was at least not
comprehensible to the multitude, and, if to be altered, should
From the Election of Charles to the Battle of Pavia 153
be altered by the slow dissolvent of learned criticism. Reform
with them meant a gradual autumnal change, which might
take place without violently breaking with the past, while the
moral principles acknowledged by all should be enforced, and
made more real. In short, Erasmus is the father of modern
latitudinarianism, as well as of ^JbMcaJ criticism. His whole
nature shrank from more violent methods, and he feared their
results. He foresaw the extravagances, the controversies, and
the schisms which would inevitably follow, and delay the
triumph of rational theology. The Reformation of the sixteenth
century could not be guided by him ; but, as it has been well
said, perhaps the Reformation that is to come will trace
itself back to Erasmus.
The final breach with Rome was not to come from scholars
of world-wide reputation, but from the son of a Thuringian
peasant who, although of robust mind, was an
indifferent Greek scholar, and knew no Hebrew. _Luther,
In dealing with Martin Luther it is of importance x433-i54fi.
to remember the various steps in his career.
Driven by the consciousness of sin and the desire of spiritual
peace he had, at the age of twenty-two, entered the Order of
the Augustinian Friars at Erfurt, much against the wish of his
father (1505). Here he subjected himself to the severest
discipline, but without avail. 'If ever a monk had got to
heaven by monkery, I should have been he,' he said subse-
quently ; ■ for all that a monk could do, I did.' Repeated
acts of penance did not save him from new temptations, and
God remained in his eyes an inexorable judge, demanding
obedience to an impossible law. From this condition of
despair, Luther was delivered by Staupitz, the Vicar-General
of his Order, who counselled a closer study of the Bible,
especially of the writings of St. Paul, and of the Latin
father, St. Augustine. Here, in the Augustinian doctrine of
justification by faith, he at last found peace; in the text,
1 The just shall live by faith,' appeared the solution of his
difficulties. The sinner was not to be saved by his own
154 European History, 1494- 1598
efforts or work, but by throwing himself unreservedly on the
mercies of a loving God ; thus received into a state of grace,
the faithful believer found penitence no longer painful, but a
spontaneous act of love, while work and life for God alone
became easy. In this view he was strengthened at a later
date by discovering that the Greek word for penitentia was
fiiTavota — in other words, that the efficacy of penance did not
consist in the external ecclesiastical penalty, but in the inward
change of heart. In thus asserting the Augustinian doctrine
of justification by faith, Luther was only reviving what
had been held by many Fathers of the early Church — a
doctrine which had indeed of late been overclouded by
the contrary one of the justification by works, but which
had never been wholly discarded. It is no doubt true
that these opposing and contradictory dogmas are incapable
of entire reconciliation, nor must either of them be forced
to their logical conclusion, for if we are justified by God's
grace alone, where is the necessity for works ; and if by works
alone we are saved, where is the need for a Redeemer ? No
doubt, once more, the doctrine of the justification by faith is,
if it be carried to an extreme, apt to lead, and has in fact led,
to fanatical fatalism and antinomianism. To Luther, however,
it seemed that the evils which followed on the adoption of the
contrary doctrine were worse ; as if frail men could by their
unaided efforts extort salvation from the Almighty. To hold
this view was to nurse that very spiritual pride which was the
cause of the existing corruption. The only hope for moral
reformation lay in bringing man to believe in his utter un-
worthiness in the sight of God; thus alone could he attain
that spirit of humility which was the essential preliminary to
a godly life.
In 1508, Luther was summoned by Staupitz to teach at the
university of Wittenberg, just founded by Frederick the Wise
of Saxony. In 15 10, he visited Rome, a visit which only~~
served to strengthen him in his conviction that spiritual pride,
the characteristic fault of the Renaissance, was the enemy to
From the Election of Charles to the Battle of Pavia 155
be withstood, and to deepen his dislike of those ceremonial
observances of the Church which consecrated the belief in the
efficacy of works. Luther had returned to Wittenberg to
carry on his teaching, when the visit of Tetzel, a Dominican,
to Germany, offering papal indulgences to those who would
contribute money to the building of St. Peter's at Rome,
aroused him to immediate action. The doctrine of indul-
gences originated in the not unnatural view* that while
penitence reconciled the sinner to God, the wrong done to
man had yet to be punished, and that the punishment, like
that for worldly offences, could be commuted by a finet
But the system had been shamefully abused. The Church
declared that she held, in the works of supererogation of the
faithful, a treasure from which she could draw for the remission
of penalties, and, in her eager desire to gain money, granted
indulgences carelessly and without insisting on the previous
penitence of the offender. She even claimed the power of
remitting the punishment of those in purgatory. Whatever
may be said in defence of the primitive system of indulgences,
it cannot be denied that in their exaggerated form they led
to grievous abuse, and involved a flat denial of the necessity of
grace. Accordingly Luther, in pursuance of academic custom,
nailed on the door of the church at Wittenberg his famous
ninety-five theses, in which he controverted the theory of
indulgences, and challenged all comers to disprove the correct-
ness of his statements (October 17, 151 7).
The views of Luther were not original. Several theologians
before him, even Cardinal Ximenes himself, had protested
against the scandalous abuse of indulgences. Nor did Luther
dream of rebelling against Mother Church. He did not deny
the value of indulgences altogether, but declared that, in his
opinion, the Pope could not thereby remit the guilt of sin nor
abate the penalties of those who had already passed to their
account. Further, he declared that the extravagant views he
was combating were the invention of the schoolmen, not of
the Church, which had never formally accepted them. IJe
156 European History ', 1494- 1598
therefore demanded an expression of the mind of the Pope
and Church thereon. Luther asked for discussion and for
argument; he was met with assertion and denunciation.
Tetzel in his answer disdained to discuss the question of
indulgences at all, and he asserted the claim of the Pope to
determine matters of opinion and to interpret Scripture. The
Dominican Prierias declared that neither a Council presided
over by the .Pope, nor the Pope himself, could err when he
gave an official decision, and branded all those as heretics
who did not accept the doctrines of the Church and Popes,
as the rule of faith. Cardinal Cajetan, who was sent as papal
legate to the Diet of Augsburg in 1518, although he secretly
agreed with Luther as to the abuse of indulgences, refused
all disputation, and demanded a recantation and silence for
the future. Luther's subsequent promise to keep silence on his
part, if it were adhered to on the other, could not possibly
be kept, and the discussion soon broke out afresh.
Meanwhile, the ground of controversy had shifted. It was
no longer a question of indulgences, but of papal power and
the authority of tradition. The extravagant assertions of the
papal advocates were met by more outspoken, more violent,
and sometimes by unseemly language on the part of Luther.
Wider reading now convinced him that his views were not
novel, but had been anticipated by others, such as John
Huss, John Wessel, and even by the humanist Laurentius
Valla ; while he was strengthened by the increasing support
he met with in Germany. Ulrich von Hutten, a man whose
love of satire outran his better taste, embittered the con-
troversy by the biting epigrams of his Vadiscus (15 19):
* Three things maintain the dignity of Rome — the authority
of the Pope, the relics of the saints, the sale of indulgences.
Three things are feared at Rome — a General Council, a
reform of the Church, the opening of the eyes of the
Germans. Three things are excommunicated at Rome —
indigence, the primitive Church, the preaching of truth/
Finally, Luther, in his Address to the Christian Nobility of
From the Election ofChartes to the Battle of Pavia 1 57
the German Nation (July, 1520), still more in his tractate
on the Babylonish Captivity (October, 1520), was led on not
only to deny the authority of the Pope, but to question the
divine institution of the priesthood, and the authority of '
tradition, and to attack the mediaeval doctrine of Transub-
stantiation. That Luther had now definitely put himself '
outside the Church, cannot be gainsaid. Yet at least it
should be remembered that he was driven to his final posi-
tion by the knowledge that he was already condemned, and \
that the Bull of excommunication had been issued as early
as June 1520, although not published in Germany till later.
Luther, therefore, throwing all hopes of conciliation to the
winds, declared the Bull a forgery and the author of it
Antichrist, and on December 10, 1520, burnt it publicly at
Wittenberg.
Whether, considering the character of Luther, his earnest-
ness, his bluntness, his fearlessness, his want of scholarly
refinement, and his violence, he might have been checked
by a more conciliatory attitude on the part of his opponents ;
or whether, again, had he been conciliated, another leader in
the existing ferment of German feeling would not have arisen,
may well be questioned. But at least the conduct of the
papal court could not have been more indiscreet or less
statesmanlike. Leo x. himself, with his cynical indifference
to such matters, might very possibly have acted otherwise ;
but the attack on indulgences threatened the whole machinery \
of papal finance and administration, and the officials of the
Curia drove him on. We cannot but deplore that a Church,
which could treat with leniency unorthodoxy on such funda-
mental questions as the immortality of the soul, should have
refused to listen to the criticism of her system of indulgences,
especially as we know that the system, in its abuse at any rate,
pricked the consciences of so many of her most loyal sons.
That the conduct of Luther is open to blame must be
allowed. That he too lightly cast away the traditions of the
Church, and too confidently believed in the possibility of
158 European History, 1 494- 1 598
finding all that was necessary to salvation, and for the organi-
sation of the Church in the Bible alone ; that many of his
doctrines have been exaggerated and have led to much evil ;
that the immediate results of the Reformation were neither
> to promote learning, nor to advance the spirit of toleration —
all this cannot be denied. That the revolt which was thus
inaugurated was to break the unity of the Church, to lead to
endless schism, and verily to bring a sword on earth, we must
all regret. But Rome, at least, determined that it should
be so ; and we may fairly doubt whether the reform of that
corruption, which had eaten so deeply into her system, could
have been effected at a less costly price.
Such was the position of affairs when the Diet of Worms
met. The question was whether the Diet would enforce the
kathg^and Bull and place Luther under the ban of the
theJUetT" Empire — a question fraught with momentous
issues. Leo x., without allowing Luther to be heard in
^ self-defence, urged Charles to execute the Bull. But though
the Emperor himself was in favour of such a course^
and was supported by his confessor Glapion, many of his
advisers, notably Chievres, and Gattinara, his chancellor, were
of a contrary opinion. They knew the support which Luther
had already received in Germany from the poorer nobles,
the poets, the lawyers, and the men of letters, and what that
support was we may learn from the papal agent, Aleander :
'Nine-tenths of Germany shouts for Luther; and the other
one-tenth, if it does not care for Luther, at least cries, Down
with the Roman court, and demands a Council to be held
in Germany.' It was not to be expected that the Diet would
dare to disregard this popular feeling. Moreover, although
the majority were wholly opposed to the doctrinal views held by
Luther, many of its members sympathised with his desire for
reform in matters of Church government and discipline. The
Diet, therefore, demanded that Luther should be heard, declar-
ing at the same time that, if he persisted in his heretical views,
contrary to the doctrine and faith * which they, their fathers,
From the Election of Charles to the Battle of Pavia 1 59
and fathers' fathers had held/ they were ready to condemn
him. Besides all this, the advisers of Charles were not blind
to the political advantages which might be gained from the
_ situation. Maximilian had once said : * Let the Wittenberg
^Bonk be taken good care of; we may want him some day,'
»-and the day had come. Leo was still hesitating between
•he alliance of Charles and Francis, and the threat of referring
■he whole question to a General Council might be used to
■force his hand.
* Luther was accordingly summoned to Worms under promise
of a safe-conduct. If now he had consented to retract his
doctrines on matters of faith, and had confined himself to the ^
question of internal reform, he would probably have received
the hearty support of the Diet. But this was far from his
intention, and his uncompromising conduct played for the
moment into the hands of Rome. He had expected that he
would be asked for a defence of his opinions ; he was ordered
to retract his heresies on points of doctrine. This he declined
to do. To the demand that he would acknowledge the
Emperor and the Diet as judges of his doctrines, he answered
that he would not allow men to judge of God's word. He
even refused to submit to the decisions of a General Council
'unless his views were refuted by Scripture ox by cogent
reason.' Thus he became in the eyes of Charles not only a
heretic, but, what was worse, a rebel ; and the alliance of the
Pope having now been secretly secured, Luther was no longer
wanted for political purposes. Charles, therefore, was eager
for the publication of the ban and for an order that the books
of the heretic should be burnt. So great, however, was the
repugnance of the Diet to face the unpopularity of this act
that Charles only succeeded in gaining its assent at its last
session (May 25), after Frederick of Saxony and the Elector
Palatine had left. Luther meanwhile had fled to the Castle
of the Wartburg in Saxony, where he lay hid under the pro-
tection of Frederick the Wise. He had now been excom-
municated, and the excommunication had been ratified by the
160 European History, 1494- 15 98
Diet. The future was to see whether the Emperor could
enforce the decision of the Diet in Germany.
§4. The War, 1522-1523.
At this moment the attention of Charles was directed to
the war against Francis. The humiliation of his rival, and the
conquest of Italy, were the first essentials; till these were
attained, the affair of Luther might wait. The French had
been the first to assume the offensive. Already, in May, they
had invaded Navarre, while in the previous March, Robert de
la Marck, the Lord of Bouillon, had attacked Luxembourg.
These expeditions, however, had both failed, and Charles
now secured the alliance, not only of the vacillating Pope, but
Leo x. and ^so of Henry vin. Leo x. had been gratified at
HenryvTTi. the publication of the ban against Luther. He
ally them- . .
-ieTveswith convinced himself that the victory of the French
Charles y, jn Italy would be more disastrous than that of
Charles, and on May 25 definitely joined the Emperor.
Ferrara and Parma were to be restored to the Pope. Milan
was to be held as a fief of the Empire by Francesco Sforza,
son of Ludovico il Moro ; the French were to be driven
from Genoa, and Antonio Adorno set up as Doge ; the
Emperor promised to protect the Medici in Florence, and to
join the Pope in extirpating the heresy of Luther.
In November, Wolsey, after in vain attempting to continue
his policy of mediation at the Conference of Calais, was forced
at last to declare himself. He joined the league of Emperor
and Pope, and promised to aid Charles in a joint invasion of
France : the Emperor, on his part, engaged to marry the
Princess Mary.
The English did not move ; but in Italy the imperial and
papal troops were successful. Lautrec, the
imperial and French commander, deserted by the Swiss,
papal troops who had been forbidden by the authorities at
in Italy.
home to fight against their countrymen, was
forced to evacuate Milan, with the exception of the citadel
(November 19), and Parma and Piacenza soon surrendered.
From the Election of Charles to the Battle of Pavia 161
At this moment, when fortune seemed to smile on Leo x.,
he was struck down by fever (December i). The character
of his pontificate is such as we should expect Deathof
from the son of Lorenzo the Magnificent. His LeoX.
name will always be associated with the artistic Dec# *» I521,
triumphs of Raphael, and remembered for his patronage of
literature ; but this is his only claim to honour. His char-
acter is well illustrated by his saying at his election, ' Let us
enjoy the Papacy now we have got it.' Though not profligate
himself, he condoned profligacy in others, and at no time was
luxury more profuse, or life in Rome more careless. He lived
for pleasure ; in the spiritual duties of his office he took but
little interest. The serious problems of the time he showed
himself incapable of realising.- If his careless generosity
brought him popularity, it seriously encumbered the papal
finances ; and if, when he died, the sky seemed fair, this was
but the clearness which oft precedes the storm — a storm
which was largely due to his want of seriousness, of insight,
and of statesmanship.
To the surprise of all, the man chosen to succeed him was
Adrian of Utrecht, once the tutor of Charles, and subsequently
his Viceroy in Spain. His election was due to the „, .
., ...-_,. Election of
impossibility of finding any one else who could Adrian vi.
obtain sufficient suffrages in the electoral college. ^an* I522#
Wolsey, who was a serious candidate, only secured severe
Giulio de' Medici and Alexander Farnese^ both eventually
destined to wear the tiara, as Clement vn. and Paul in., were
equally unsuccessful. A long vacancy was considered danger-
ous; and Cardinal de' Medici, who, in spite of the warm
support of the Emperor, despaired of his own success, trans-
ferred his votes to Adrian. Thus two Flemings, hitherto
closely associated, now held the two highest dignities in
Christendom, and much might have been expected from such
a remarkable event. These expectations, however, were not
to be realised. The new Pope, indeed, presented a striking
contrast to his predecessor ; but this very contrast served but
PERIOD IV. L
1 62 European History, 1 494-1598
to increase his difficulties. The Romans were annoyed at the
election of *a barbarian.' Their fears that Adrian might
transfer the seat of the Papacy to Spain, expressed itself in
the satirical advertisement, ' Roma est locanda,' posted on
the walls of the Vatican. The Cardinals, who at first went
in fear of their lives from the Roman populace, soon regretted
their decision, and hated this austere reforming Pope, who
tried to cut down their salaries and pensions, while he showed
favour to his Flemish followers. The literary men were
disgusted at his lack of sympathy with the new learning.
Even his uprightness and holiness of life failed to make him
friends among those who desired reform. His economies were
attributed to parsimony ; his retiring habits and his want of
real initiative and of character lost him that support which
otherwise might have been accorded to him. Nor was his
attitude towards Luther, or to the political issues of the day,
more fortunate. Fully convinced of the necessity of internal
reform of abuses, he was none the less devoid of sympathy
with the new theology. As inquisitor in Spain, he had
adopted Spanish views, and thought that repression must
precede reform ; when the heretic had been disposed of, the
Pope could begin to set his house in order.
On this point the Emperor agreed with him, but here agree-
ment ceased. Adrian had served him well as tutor, and then
Causes of as ^s vicerov ni Spain \ and now that his servant
disagreement sat on the papal throne, he looked for a continu-
with Charles. ance of- that servjce# jje forgot that there was
all the difference between Adrian, the viceroy of the King of
Spain, and Adrian the Pope. Nor were their views the same.
Charles was determined to be master in Italy ; for that, not
only the Lutheran question, but even the war against the
Turk must wait, threatening though the attitude of Solyman
was at this moment. Adrian, on the contrary, was not anxious
to see the Emperor too powerful in Italy, and yearned to free
the Papacy from the political trammels in which late Popes
had involved it To bring about a reconciliation between the
From the Election of Charles to the Battle of Pavia 163
two rivals, and then rally all Christendom in a crusade against
the Turk, this was Adrian's dream. For this purpose he
assumed a position of neutrality and attempted the work of
mediation. The results of this policy were most unfortunate.
The French party in Italy raised their heads; the Duke
of Ferrara began to move (February, 1522); the opponents
of the Medici in Florence and Siena renewed their intrigues
with Francis; the Swiss again took service under France,
and sent a contingent into Italy, which was supplemented by
Venice. So serious did things look, that Don Manuel, writing
from Rome, advised a truce with Francis.
At this moment, however, the victory of Bicocca retrieved
the fortunes of Charles. In March, Lautrec had advanced
against Milan, then held by Colonna for the Battle of
Emperor. Sforza at once marched from Pavia Bicocca.
to relieve Colonna, and, after some manoeuvring, pn 27, I5M"
entrenched himself in the Villa Bicocca, some few miles from
the city. The position was a strong one. But the Swiss
showed insubordination, and insisted on an attack, which
Lautrec dared not refuse. The Swiss had miscalculated their
powers, and were repulsed. Lautrec, who had made a detour
with his French soldiers, with the object of taking the position
in the rear, from whence alone an entrance seemed practicable,
was delayed, and had to face the united force of the enemy,
flushed as they were with victory over the Swiss. He was beaten
back with serious loss, and the imperial forces remained masters
of the first important battle of the war. The defeat ruined
the French cause. They still held the citadel of Milan, and
the town of Novara, but had to evacuate the rest of the
Milanese, and shortly after (May 30), they were French
driven from Genoa. The Doge, Ottavio Fregoso, evacuate the
the leader of the French party , was taken prisoner, as
well as Pedro Navarra, the great Spanish general, who had been
driven into the service of France by the niggardliness x>t
Ferdinand. Antonio Adorno was set up as Doge, as a vassal
of Charles — and France thus lost the important harbour which
164 European History \ 1494- 1598
hitherto had given her an easy entrance into Italy. The
victory of Charles only served to increase Adrian's desire
for peace, but neither of the rivals would listen. In
Treaty of June> I522> Charles, then on his way to Spain,
Windsor. signed the treaty of Windsor. Henry and the
june, 152a. Emperor agreed that the humiliation of Francis
was the necessary preliminary to a war against the Turk.
They accordingly promised to engage in a joint attack on
France, and to solicit the alliance of the Pope and Venice.
Even the fall of Rhodes, the important outpost against the
Moslem, held by the knights of St. John in the Mediterranean
(December 20), although it caused great dismay in Europe
and bitter grief to Adrian, did not cause the two great powers
to forego their quarrels ; and finally in August, Adrian, warned
by the intrigues of the French partisans in Italy that any idea
The League of mediation was vain, and that if the French
of August were victorious the Papal States would be in
of Adrian, danger, joined in a defensive league with the
Sept 14, 1523. Emperor, a league which included England, Milan,
Genoa, Florence, and Venice. Six weeks afterwards, Adrian
died (September 14, 1523).
In spite of his narrowness and want of statesmanship,
Adrian was a good man, and earnestly desired reform.
Yet the desire only earned him the inveterate hatred of the
Cardinals, and of the mob of Rome, who decorated the
door of his physician with a wreath, dedicated ' to the liberator
of his country.' The pathetic failure of Pope Adrian is
perhaps the best vindication of Luther's revolt.
§ 5. Luther and the Council of Regency.
The absence of Charles in Spain, where he remained for
seven momentous years (July 1522 to August 1529), indicates
most forcibly where his real interests lay. Cruelly as he treated
all those who had taken part in the revolt of the Communeros,
he had, since the death of Chievres in 1521, become a thorough
Spaniard in sympathy. In that year, he finally ceded to
From the Election of Charles to the Battle of Pavia 165
Ferdinand the Austrian lands of his House, and henceforth
looked on Spain as the real centre of his Empire. The pride
of the Spaniards, their determination to crush out
heresy, — above all, their passion to dominate the Spain for
world, he fully shared; and it was on Spanish seven years,
troops and Spanish money that he mainly de-
pended in his wars. He passed the largest part of his life
in Spain. He retired thither, and there he died.
In this fact then, and in his imperial position, lies the best
answer to Napoleon's taunt that Charles was a fool not to
have adopted Protestantism and founded a strong Answer to
monarchy on that basis. Whether such a policy the taunt of
on Charles' part would have succeeded, may NaP°leon-
well be doubted. He would have found arrayed against
him the majority of the Electors and Princes, who, whatever
their religious views, dreaded above all things a strong
monarchical rule ; and our doubt will be intensified if we
remember the future policy of the Catholic League during the
Thirty Years' War. But, however that may be, Napoleon
did not appreciate Charles' character. As well might a
leopard be bidden change its spots, as Charles be asked to
lead a national German movement against all that Emperors,
and Kings of Spain held dear.
To grasp the possible alternatives we have only to recall
the political condition of Germany, already de- The possibie
scribed at pages 106 ff. We there noticed four alternatives
forces struggling for the mastery : — for Germany-
1. The dynastic aims of the Hapsburgs, bent on establish-
ing a centralised monarchy. (i #f
2. The constitutional ideas of the Electors, aiming at an C°uA ,
aristocratic confederation* . jtff'f
3. The anarchical elements, represented by the constant fk***
private warfare, and the social disturbances of the
1 Bundschuhe,' or peasants' associations,
4. "The desire for territorial independence, shared by
most of the Princes.
1 66 European History \ 1494- 1598
On the question which of these should finally gain the
mastery, to a great extent depended the fate of the Reforma-
tion in Germany. The triumph of the first would, there can
be little doubt, have led to the extirpation of heresy, and the
establishment of autocratical rule, both ecclesiastical and
civilr Could the second succeed, there was some hope of a
Protestant reformed Church, based upon a reformed Empire,
and a revived spirit of German nationality against Pope as
well as Emperor. The third, if not suppressed, or guided,
would surely lead to an outburst of religious fanaticism, and
to religious as well as political chaos. The last, which as we
shall see was eventually to prevail, established Protestantism
on the principle of ' cujus regio ejus religio,' — that is, of
territorial independence in Church as well as State.1
1 To understand the future course of the Reformation in Germany, it is
necessary to study the map, and note —
a. The extraordinary number of principalities into which Germany was
divided.
b. The division of the dominions of the greater princes among branches
of the same family, many of whom took opposite sides. This will be best
seen from the following table : —
PROTESTANT. CATHOLIC.
House of Wettin, in Saxony.
Albertine, at Meissen.
Ernestine, Electoral Branch
at Wittenberg.
Ernest, 1464-1468.
Frederick the Wise, 1486-1525.
John, his brother, 1525-1532.
Albert, 1485-1500.
Duke George, 1500-1535.
Henry, his brother, 1535-1541, be-
comes Protestant.
John Frederick, 1532-1554. Maurice, 1541-1553, secures the
Electorate.
HOHENZOLLERN.
Younger Branches.
(1) Albert of Prussia, Grand Master
of Teutonic _ Order, 1512-1568.
Secularises his Duchy, 1525.
(a) Albert Alcibiades, Margrave of
Culmbach, 1 536-1557.
(3) John of Kustrin, Margrave of Neo-
mark, brother of Joachim 11. ,
1571.
Electoral Branch.
Albert Achilles, 1470- 1486.
John Cicero, 1485-1499.
Joachim 1., 1499-1535.
Joachim 11., 1535-1571. Becomes
Protestant in 1539, though he
never breaks with the Emperor.
From the Etection of Charles to the Battle of Pavia 1 6?
The departure of Charles for Spain gave some hope that
a reform of the Church might go hand in hand with a reform
of the Empire. In his absence, power fell into _The council
the hands of the Council of Regency under the °f Regency
during
presidency of Ferdinand, whom Charles had -miarieV
nominated his Stadtholder. The Council in- »Uc"v?-
eluded among its numbers some, who desired to extend the
political reforms already begun, and who were also not unfavour-
able to Luther ; while the orthodox party, although Di t f
still in the majority, were too much alarmed at the Nuremberg,
growing popularity of Lutheran opinion to assume Nov- *5aaT~
a decided attitude. In spite, therefore, of the exhortation of
Adrian that they would enforce the Edict of Worms, the
Council decided, after a stormy debate, to refer the matter
PROTESTANT. CATHOLIC.
WlTTELSBACH.
(1) Bavaria. Munich.
Albert II., 1460-1508.
William 1., 1508-1550.
(2) Palatinate.
Frederick the Victorious,i45i-i476.
Welf.
Duke Ernest I., of 1 Duke Henry iv. , of Wolfenbuttel, 1514-1568.
Philip, his nephew, 1476-1508.
Lewis v., 1508-1544.
Frederick 11., his brother,
1544-1556, becomes Pro-
testant.
Luneburg, 1532-
IS4I.
WURTEMBURG.
Ulrich 1., 1503-1550, became Protestant 1534.
c. The number of ecclesiastical states. The three great electoral
archbishoprics of Treves, Mayence, Cologne — with the bishoprics of
Metz on the Moselle, and Strasburg and Worms — so dominated the
upper Rhine and its tributaries as to give it the name of Priest Street.
The dioceses of Utrecht, Bremen, Minister, and Paderborn stretched in
an almost continuous line along the north-west. To these we must
add Hildesheim, Halberstadt, Magdeburg, Wiirzburg, Bamberg in
central Germany ; and in the south, the archbishopric of Salzburg, and
the bishopric of Trent. The existence of these numerous ecclesiastical
principalities had a twofold effect. It caused a strong feeling in
Germany against papal exactions, of which the bishoprics were the victims,
or the agents ; while the desire on the part of the Princes to extend their
dominions by secularising these ecclesiastical states, had a potent in-
fluence on many an Elector and Prince, both Catholic and Protestant.
In many cases, too, the bishops were the relations of the Princes, and
their policy was guided by family interests or rivalries.
1 6$ European History, 1494-1598
to the Diet, which met for its second session at Nurem-
berg on November 17. In the Diet, the struggle began
again with like results. The orthodox party still found
themselves in the majority, but, with the exception of
Joachim, Elector of Brandenburg, the Archbishop of Treves,
and George, Duke of Saxony, .were unwilling to proceed to
active measures. The delegates from the imperial cities
all supported Luther. Nuremberg, where the Diet sat, was
hotly in his favour, and many of the lay Princes feared to
oppose the sentiments of their subjects. Accordingly, after
much debate and reference to committees, the Diet answered
the Pope as follows : They regretted the confusion caused by
the Lutheran movement, but had refrained from enforcing the
edict for fear of civil war. The Pope himself had admitted
the existence of evils in the Church, and these must be
amended. They therefore asked that a free Christian Council
— in which laymen as well as ecclesiastics should be repre-
sented— should be summoned in Germany to discuss griev-
ances. Meanwhile, no further Lutheran books should be
printed, or sermons allowed, which might stir the people to
revolt.
At the same time the lay estates presented their hundred
1 Gravamina,' enumerating the chief papal abuses from which
The hundred Germany had suffered. It is not correct to say,
Gravamina. as has been said, that the Diet had declared for
Luther, for he had been condemned to silence, and the Diet
had no intention of breaking from Rome ; but the enforcement
of the Edict was delayed, and delay was all that his cause
needed. His adherents were increasing apace: as Ferdinand
said, * There is not one man in a thousand who is not more
or less infected by Lutheran heresy,' and this explains the
unwillingness of the Diet to proceed against him. Indeed,
had the Diet, and more especially the Council of Regency,
truly represented public opinion, the Reformation might have
been established on national lines. This was prevented by
the constitution of the Diet. Moreover, the respect 0/
Prom the Election of Charles to the Battle of Pavia 169
Germany for the Council had been lost by its failure to put
down the ' Knights' War.'
Franz von Sickingen, the famous Imperial Knight who had
taken so prominent a part in the election of Charles, had
adopted the opinions of Luther under the guid- The council
ance of Ulrich von Hutten, that strange literary of Regency"
free-lance on the Reformer's side. True to f-J^ngH-ts*
the traditions of his order, Sickingen hated the vr**.1
Electors, the Princes, and the cities. He accord- ept' I53a*
ingly had organised a League of the Knights of the Upper
Rhine and neighbouring districts. The League demanded
the restoration of the old liberties of the Empire, the aboli-
tion of trade monopolies, the abrogation of foreign^law, the
diminution of the number of clergy and of monks, the
cessation of the drain of money through indulgences and
other papal exactions. Seeing his opportunity in the weak-
ness of the Council, Sickingen determined to attack the
dominions of the Elector of Treves, relying for support upon
a Lutheran party which had been formed there. If he could
win the country, he would at once establish the Reformed
opinions, and gain for himself a splendid territory. In
September, 1522, he accordingly laid siege to the city of
Treves. In vain the Council ordered him to desist. The city,
however, held out. Meanwhile the Princes became alarmed ,
they feared that their turn might come next, and took
the matter into their own hands. Despite the commands of
the Council to keep the peace, they rose, and, led by Philip,
Landgrave of Hesse, defeated Sickingen, who shortly after
died in the defence of his Castle of Ebernburg, April 1523.
Hutten fled to Switzerland, to perish miserably shortly after.
The Council also attempted, though in vain, to prevent the
Suabian League from taking upon itself the duty of suppress-
ing those Knights within its jurisdiction who had joined
Sickingen.
Failing thus to secure obedience or maintain order, the
Council forfeited all support. Some opposed it for what it
I I
tJ6 European History, 1494-1598
failed to do, others for fear of what it might become. It
had never represented popular opinion, and now became
Failure of disliked by the Diet itself. The cities had
the council always objected to it on account of the taxa-
^^s^y- tion it necessitated. Most of the Princes were
behindhand with their dues, and feared that the Council
might proceed against them. Even the Electors despaired
of their projected reforms. It was accordingly soon deserted
by its most prominent members. The Elector Palatine, who
had been appointed vice-president, left it; and the Elector
of Treves, George of Saxony, and Philip of Hesse, declared
against it Finally, the Diet of Nuremberg, at its third session
(March- April, 1524), decided that its members should be re-
elected, and that none of the present members should be
re-eligible. The new Council was no more successful, and
though it lasted till 1531, it enjoyed little authority. The
spirit of independence and territorialism was too strong, and
all hope that the Reformation might go hand-in-hand with a
national movement based on a constitutional reform of the
Empire was at an end.
But this was not the only question that came before this Diet.
Adrian vi. had died on September 14, 1523. The new Pope,
the Cardinal Guilio de' Medici, who took the name of Clement
clement vii. vii. (elected November 1523), had sent Cam-
of Nurember PeSSio> n*s legate> to demand prompt execution
March-April of the Edict of Worms. The adherents of
1524- Rome, although still in a majority, did not feel
strong enough to comply fully with the Pope's command.
They promised indeed that the Edict should be enforced as
far as possible, and that heretical books should be suppressed;
but, ' lest the good should be rooted up with the bad,' they
again insisted on the summoning of a General Council in
Germany, and meanwhile suggested that another Diet should
be summoned at Spires to settle religious matters. Clement
was not unnaturally displeased, and was in the main sup-
ported by Charles, who, in July, issued a decree enjoining strict
Prom the Election of Charles to the Battle of Pavia tft
obedience to the Edict of Worms. The Emperor denounced
Luther in the strongest terms, forbade the meeting of the Diet
at Spires, and declared that, although he was not entirely
opposed to the summoning of a General Council, this was
a matter for him and the Pope to decide, since it would be
presumptuous for Germany to undertake the alteration of
Christian ordinances by herself. At the same time he wrote
to Clement, saying that only two alternatives were before them :
either that he (Charles) should go to Germany and suppress the
heretics by force, a course which would be not only dangerous
but impossible ; or that a General Council should be called.
The Council he suggested might be summoned to Trent, and
then removed to Rome. This course, however, Clement was
unwilling to adopt, and Campeggio, by his orders, had already
begun to treat with the Princes least favourable to Luther,
who met in Congress at Ratisbon in June, 1524.
. J The Catholic
After deciding to inaugurate a reform of some of "Congressof
the worst abuses of Christian discipline, and of Ratisbon-
1 r • i 1 1 1 m • -i , June, 1524.
the system of indulgences, they prohibited the
reading of Luther's books, and forbade students to attend
the heretical university of Wittenberg.
This Congress at Ratisbon marks a further stage in the
controversy. Hitherto the question of Luther had been
treated as one of national interest. Here we meet with the
first attempt to organise a party of opposition ; the Lutherans
were forced to follow suit ; and Germany began to fall into two
hostile camps, so that all hope of settling the religious question,
without destroying the unity of the Empire, was wrecked.
It was however something that the reform of abuses had been
definitely mooted, and had Pope and Emperor been at one,
something might have come of it ; but this was prevented by
the political issues which once more drove them apart, and so
monopolised Charles' attention that, as he said, 'This was
no time to speak of Luther/
t}2 European History \ 1494-159$
§ 6, The Victory of Pavia.
Charles had hoped much from the election of Clement vil
But he forgot that he had to deal with a Medici. The aim
Charles dis- of Clement was to further the interests of the
appointed in papai States, and of his House in Florence, whither
his hopes of
support from he had sent as governor Alessandro, the young
Clement vi 1. son 0f his cousin Lorenzo, Duke of Urbino, under
the tutelage of the Cardinal of Cortona. To attain these
ends he, like Leo. x., hoped to balance the powers of Francis
and Charles. Although he pretended that he was anxious
for peace, he really feared the outcome of a common under-
Yet is at first standing between the rivals. Meanwhile he played
successful in a waiting game ; and anxious to find himself on
Italy, 1524. tjie wjnnjng gjd^ pUrsueci a timid faithless policy
of intrigue which deceived no one, and was to bring the
Papacy to the depths of humiliation.
Fortune at first favoured Charles. In 1523, the Duke of
Bourbon, the most powerful vassal of the French Crown,1
High Chamberlain and Constable of France, had quarrelled
with his King and joined the cause of the Emperor. He was
now made generalissimo of the Italian army. In May, the
French, beaten in several battles, in one of which the Chevalier
Bayard found the death which alone he thought worthy of a
knight, had been forced to evacuate Lombardy.
The success of Charles led Henry to renew his alliance,
1 He was Lord of 2 principalities, 2 duchies, 4 counties, 2 viscounties,
and 7 lordships. See Map of France.
Cause of the quarrel between Francis and Bourbon. — Charles, Count of
Montpensier had been allowed by Louis xn. to marry Susanna, the
heiress of Duke Peter of Bourbon. After the death of his wife without
children, the Queen-mother, Louise of Savoy, claimed some of his
possessions as niece of Duke Peter. Francis, with better right, demanded
the restoration of others in fulfilment of Duke Peter's original promise,
that in default of male issue he would leave all the alienable possessions of *
his House to the Crown.
From the Election of Charles to the Battle of Pavia 173
much to the dismay of Wolsey, who wished to keep the hand
of England free, and to prevent either rival from Hen vm
gaining too great preponderance. The King of renews Ms
England promised once more to invade France, a»iaijcewith
and to supply Charles with the money he so
sorely needed; while Bourbon was to do homage to the
English King, as King of France.
In July, Bourbon crossed the Alps, invaded Provence and
attacked Marseilles — an important harbour, the basis of the
operations of the French fleet in the Mediterranean Bourbori's
—whence he threatened the communications of unsuccessful
, attack on
the Emperor between Spain and Italy. Con- Marseilles,
trary to expectation, Marseilles held out. The J^W-
Marquis of Pescara, who was next in command, advised
Bourbon not to attempt to storm it ; while his soldiers, short
of pay and food, refused.
Meanwhile, Wolsey was averse to an English attack on
Picardy ; Charles was unable to co-operate from Spain ; and on
the approach of Francis with his army, Bourbon was forced
to beat a hasty retreat across the Alps with the ^ss of most of
his artillery. Francis pressed close at his. heels, Francis
and, crossing the Alps by the valley of the Durance, crosses the
' _. , _k 1 %.r-\ Alps and
reached Pignerol on October 17, 1524. Milan at enters Milan,
the moment was ravaged by the plague, and could °ct 29» x524-
scarcely be held. The Imperialists, therefore, after despatch-
ing a force of some 6000 men, under Antonio de Leyva,
to hold Pavia, threw some troops into its citadel, and
retreated under Lannoy and Pescara to Lodi, while Bourbon
hastened to Germany to collect fresh forces.
On the 29th of October, the French entered Milan by one
gate, as the last of the Imperialists left it by the other.
Had Francis pursued his advantage, he might have annihilated
his enemy; but in a fatal moment, Admiral Bonnivet, the
French commander, persuaded him to attack Pavia, and
Pescara had time to recruit his exhausted troops. ' We are
beaten,' said Pescara, ' but we shall soon be victors.' Yet. as in
174 European History \ 1494- 1598
1521, so now, Charles seemed likely again to lose the Milanese.
Clement, fearing the vengeance of the French, first tried
ntVII mediation. He suggested that Charles should
breaks with cede Milan to Francis, and content himself with
Charles. Naples. When Lannoy, Charles' viceroy in Naples,
refused to entertain so humiliating a proposal, the Pope
offered his alliance to the French, and attempted to win over
Venice. This conduct he attempted to justify on the plea of
necessity. He declared to the Emperor that he earnestly
desired peace, and called God to witness to the honesty of
his motives. Charles, however, was not deceived, and vowed
1 he would revenge himself on this poltroon of a Pope, and
that perhaps some day Martin Luther might become a man of
worth.'
The position of the Emperor indeed seemed desperate.
The alliance with England he could not depend upon. In
The fortunes Germany the peasants' revolt had already begun,
of Charles He himself was sick with fever in Spain : above
theTictory7 a^> ne knew not where to turn for money with
of Pa via. which to pay the troops he had on foot. Even
Feb. 34, 1525. Lann0v warned him that he was likely to lose a
crown in the attempt to save a dukedom. Two months later,
the victory of Pavia reversed all this, and placed Charles in
a position of which he could scarcely have dreamed. In
January, 1525, Bourbon returned from Germany with so
many troops, that the army of the Imperialists nearly equalled
that of the French, except in artillery and men-at-arms. But
he had no money to pay his men. Here Pescara came to his
aid. He succeeded in persuading the soldiers to await their
pay till February 10, by which day Pavia was to be relieved;
and the advance was at once commanded. The city was
still held by Antonio de Leyva ; but the position of the
French army, which beleaguered it, was so strong that Lannoy
hesitated to attack. All attempts, however, to force Francis
to raise the siege by a diversion failed, and the garrison were
in such distress that they must soon have capitulated.
From the Election of Charles to the Battle of Pavia 175
Accordingly, after three weeks' delay, it was determined to
hazard the chance of an engagement. On the night of
February 23, a breach was made in the walls of the park of
Mirabello, which stretched to the north of the French entrench-
ments, and on the following morning the attack was ordered.
Francis, misled by Bonnivet, now rashly left his strong en-
trenchments, and determined to accept the offer of battle.
The open ground at first favoured his artillery, and the
movements of the men-at-arms. The Imperialists wavered
in the first assault, and the King, assured of victory, cried,
* To-day I will call myself Duke of Milan.' But Pescara re-
formed his Spanish infantry ; the German landsknechts under
Frundsberg supported them, and the French men-at-arms
were driven back. In the shock of infantry which followed,
the Swiss in the pay of France were the first to give way,
and the Italian troops gave but poor support. The lands-
knechts in the French army for a while stood firm, till a
sortie of Leyva frorrK the "beleaguered city took them in the
rear, and the French army broke. Francis, as he attempted
to restore the battle, had his horse shot under him, and was
taken prisoner. He would have fallen in the general
slaughter, had he not been recognised by one of Bourbon's
men. The losses of the French were heavy, for no quarter
had been given. Bonnivet, the French commander, La
Palice and La Tremouille, who had both grown old in the
Italian wars, Francis of Lorraine, and many others of note
were slain ; and Henri d'Albret of Navarre was among the
prisoners.
The battle, fought on Charles' five-and-twentieth birth-
day, seemed to realise the wildest dreams of Maximilian.
Never since the days of Charles the Great had the idea of
an Empire of the West been so nearly realised. Not only
Italy, but France seemed to be at Charles' mercy, and, if
France had fallen under his rule, Europe could scarce have
escaped bondage. But the victory was too complete. Europe,
alarmed for its safety, drew together in self-defence, and the
1 76 European History \ 1 494- 1598
hopelessness of Maximilian's dream was soon to be demon-
strated.
§ 7. The Peasants' War.
While these momentous issues were being decided in Italy,
Germany had been the scene of a serious outbreak which
Causesot threatened the whole structure of society. The
the Peasants' causes of the Peasants' Revolt were primarily
social. Even before the appearance of Luther,
we hear of the ' Bundschuhe ' and other organisations of the
peasants, and of revolts against their lords. Their grievances
were those common to the villein class in all feudal societies ;
heavy services and dues, oppressive sporting rights, and
enclosure of common lands by their lords. From the first,
indeed, the higher clergy were specially marked out for
attack. The bishop and the abbot united in their own
persons the position of spiritual superior and feudal lord.
As feudal lords, thev levied dues, exacted services, and tried
offenders in their courts. As ecclesiastical superiors, they
claimed the tithes, punished ecclesiastical offences in their
ecclesiastical courts, and threatened excommunication on the
impenitent or recalcitrant. Moreover, the heavy contribu-
tions demanded of them by Rome, forced them to exact their
dues to the full. Yet, at first, there was no connection
between these social grievances and the religious discontent.
It was, however, inevitable that in time they should become
identified. The more fanatical teachers of the new doctrines,
such as Carlstadt, were attracted to the movement. They
appealed to Scripture as justifying the revolt, and taught the
peasants to interpret the spiritual injunctions of the Gospel
literally, and to fight for religious and political freedom and
for social equality under the same banner. Thus in Germany,
as elsewhere, the religious motive came to the front, gave
expression to misery as yet inarticulate, and furnished the
malcontents with a gospel.
From the Election of Charles to the Battle of Pavia i?f
The eastern districts of the Black Forest, between the
watersheds of the Rhine and Danube, were the first to rise
in May 1^24. Their views were comparatively
, , , ■ r 1 j • TheRevoltin
moderate, and were subsequently formulated in the Black
'The Twelve Articles.' In this document, after Forest,
an appeal to Scripture in justification of their
demands, they claimed the right of electing their own ministers,
and asked for the abolition of the lesser tithe, for liberty of
chase, fishing, and hewing wood, the commutation of personal
serfdom, the reduction of villein services and dues, the restora-
tion of communal rights. The revolt was even here accom-
panied by some violence, but if it had been met by a spirit of
conciliation on the part of the lords, and of firmness on the
part of the government, it probably could have been arrested.
The nobles, however, clung to their privileges ; the Council
was incapable, and Ferdinand was concentrating his energies
on supplying troops and money for the Italian campaign.
The disturbances accordingly increased rapidly during the
autumn of 1524; and by February, 1525, they had spread to
the whole of Germany, from the left bank of the spread of
Rhine to the Tyrol, and from the lake of Con- the Revolt,
stance to Thuringia and Saxony. The claims of the peasants
became more extreme, the more moderate lost control, and
the fanatics or the designing assumed the lead.
IrHEranconia, amidst violent excesses, we find the demands
for social reform connected with a scheme of political recon-
stitution of the Empire on a democratic basis — _. . . .
r The rebels of
a scheme which betrays the hand of a more Franconia and
educated mind. But it was in Thuringia and the Thunnsia-
district round the Harz mountains that the extravagance
reached its climax. The leader, Thomas Miinzer, taught
doctrines which were subversive of all authority in Church
and State, and of the existing conditions of society. Received
at Miilhausen in Thuringia as a prophet, he proposed to make
that town the seat of his authority, whence he should rule
his kingdom according to revelation.
period iv. M
178 European History, 1494- 1 598
For a moment the social fabric of Germany was imperilled.
On all sides the peasants triumphed. The nobles were either
Social driven from their strongholds or forced to join
Anarchy the leagues as 'brothers.' The smaller towns,
threatened. many 0f which suffered from the same oppres-
sions as the peasants — even some of the lesser imperial cities
— joined the movement. Ulrich of Wiirtemberg seized the
opportunity to attempt a recovery of the dominions which
he had forfeited by misrule (cf. p. 131), and called the rebels
to his aid.
Germany was indeed threatened with anarchy; yet it is
doubtful whether the peasants had any chance of permanent
success. LThe leaders were for the most part
Causes of w r
failure of visionary and ignorant fanatics. -vMunzer was
the Revolt. neither a prophet, nor a general, and the rebels
had no effective organisation. - Moreover, the middle classes,
led- by Luther, declared against them. Luther at first had
preached moderation and reconciliation. While condemning
the revolts against authority as contrary to divine law, he
had rebuked the Princes and the lords for their oppression,
and urged them to redress the grievances of their villeins.
JThe extravagance of the peasants, however, shortly disgusted
and frightened him. He disliked their views, and feared
lest his own position and work might be compromised.
He pointed out that the spiritual principles of Christianity
might not without peril be transferred .to the sphere of
society and politics; and that, if the gospel demands the
freedom of the soul, it does not thereby emancipate the body
from the control of law. He denounced the rebels with his
usual violence of language, and bade the authorities cast away
all scruple, and ' stab and kill and strangle ' without mercy.
At this moment the news of the victory of Pavia strengthened
the cause of order. The Suabian League took up arms
against Duke Ulrich. The Swiss, -who had at first shown
some sympathy with the peasants, and had supported the
Duke, now withdrew their contingent, partly on account of
From the Election of Charles to the Battle of Pavia 179
disturbances at home, partly from fear of Charles' vengeance,
and Ulrich was forced to beat a hasty retreat. On April 4,
the army of the League inflicted a decisive defeat The defeat of
on the peasants at Leipheim, near Ulm. On the Leipheim.
15th of May, the Princes, once more led by APnl4-
Philip of Hesse, crushed the army of Miinzer near Franken-
hausen. Miinzer was taken prisoner and was executed at
Miilhausen. The Duke of Lorraine took Zabern in Alsace,
and restored order in the Vosges. The reduction of the city
of Wurzburg by the united forces of the Suabian League, of
the Elector of Treves, and of the Elector Palatine on June 7,
decided the fortunes of Frariconia; and shortly after, the
peasants of the Upper Rhine and the Black Forest either
came to terms, or were crushed. The Princes and the
nobles, once more masters, rivalled the cruelties of the rebels.
Numbers of unfortunate peasants were cut down without
mercy, and the grievances of the survivors remained, with a
few exceptions, unredressed.
But although the peasants failed in their attempt, the effect
of the revolt upon the course of the Reformation was profound.
The utter incapacity of the Council had been
,. , , ... , , - ,. , .Effect of the
once more displayed, while the .defeat of the "peasants'
peasants had saved Germany from religious and Revolt on the
social anarchy. Of the four possible results of
the Lutheran movement which we have indicated above
(p. 165), two alone now remained. The question was whether
Charles would succeed in completely re-establishing his
authority, or whether the spirit of territorialism would be
too strong for him. The cause of the Princes had indeed
been strengthened. Once more, as in the case of the
Knights' War, they had asserted their power, and, with the
Suabian League, had shown themselves the real masters of
the country. Luther had lost to some extent the support of
the lower classes, and was forced to lean still more upon the
Princes. Yet the position of the Emperor was most threaten-
ing. The opponents of Luther, with scant justice, laid the
180 European History, 1 494- 1598
responsibility of the disturbances to his charge, and many of
the more timid and refined were alienated from his cause.
Charles himself became still more convinced that heresy and
rebellion were synonymous. He was determined therefore
to crush out heresy, and the victory of Pavia seemed to offer
him a brilliant opportunity. All depended upon what the
issue of that victory should be.
CHAPTER IV
FROM THE TREATY OF MADRID TO THE TREATY OF CRESPI
Treaty of Madrid — League of Cognac — Sack of Rome — Medici driven from
Florence — Battle of Aversa — Treaty of Barcelona — Peace of Gambray —
Charles crowned Emperor — Diets of Spires and Augsburg — League of
Schmalkalde — Zwingle in Switzerland— Peace of Nuremberg — Barbarossa
of Algiers — Renewed war between Charles and Francis — Truce of Nice —
Revolt at Ghent suppressed — The Anabaptists at' Minister — Diet of Ratis-
bon — Campaign of 1542 — Treaties of Crespi and Ardres.
§ i. Treaty of Madrid and League of Cognac.
Charles maintained the same imperturbable composure at
the news of his good fortune as he had displayed in the days
when defeat seemed to stare him in the face. He Behaviour and
forbade all public rejoicing. He attributed all to '"difficulties
God, and protested that his only desire was for \x^^P
a lasting peace, so that he might turn the arms victory_°L,
of Christendom against the Turk. But he had -^^*-
before asserted that the only hope of peace lay in the submis-
sion of France, and he had not changed his mind. Yet how
was that submission to be effected ? War was at the moment
out of the question. Charles had no money, and even the
payment of the troops was in arrear. The Peasants' War
still continued in Germany, and Ferdinand could not help.
Henry vin. might perhaps have been prevailed upon to invade
France, if the Emperor would have recognised his claim to
the French throne ; but Charles did not wish to see England
thus aggrandised, and refused all definite promises. Wolsey
therefore had his way, and, in August, concluded a treaty of
alliance with the Regent of France, in which Henry, in return
for an annual pension, promised to demand the liberty of
the King on honourable terms. Italy was forming a league
181
1 82 European History \ 1494- 1598
of self-defence, and Clement, though still full of promises,
was known to be playing double. France, although she
had lost an army and her King, was still France, and was
determined to resist invasion to the last penny in her purse,
and the last drop of her blood. War then was not to be thought
of ; nor did Charles' prospects of gaining his end by treaty
seem much better. His demands that Burgundy and Artois
should be ceded to him, and that Bourbon should hold
Provence independently of France, were indignantly rejected.
To the mutilation of their territory, the French would not
submit, and the French King declared that he would sooner
die in captivity than buy his freedom by such dishonour.
Francis, however, had not the strength of character of his
rival, and presently began to pine for freedom. Hearing
that it was proposed to send him a prisoner to Naples, he
prevailed upon Lannoy to send him to Spain instead (June),
for he hoped much from a personal interview with Charles.
He did not understand the man with whom he had to deal.
Nothing is more remarkable than the tenacity, often amount-
ing to obstinacy, with which Charles clung to a decision once
made. He looked upon his claims to Artois and Burgundy
as just ; Burgundy especially was the cradle of his race, and
had been wrongly taken from his grandmother, Mary of
Burgundy ; it should be restored to him. In vain Francis
and the French envoys pleaded for some abatement of his
demands. Charles remained unmoved : he even refused to see
the King of France until a serious attack of fever threatened
the prisoner's life. The news that Clement and the Italians
were making a league with France, that Francesco Maria
Sforza of Milan, his own creature, was turning against him ;
the attempt of Morone, the Milanese chancellor, to corrupt
the honour of his best general Pescara — an attempt which
Pescara,1 urged by feelings of loyalty or self-interest, betrayed
to his master — all this had no effect on Charles. Morone
1 On the question of Pescara's motives, cf. Baumgarten, Geschichtt
Karl V., ii. 453.
From the Treaty of Madrid to the Treaty of Crespi 183
was seized, Sforza was declared to have forfeited his dukedom,
and was besieged, in his citadel, by the imperial troops.
Francis, having recovered from his serious illness, tried to
escape ; but the plan was betrayed. There was nothing for it
but to abandon Burgundy ; and to this course the queen-
mother, Louise of Savoy, now urged him. Francis accord-
ingly yielded ; but, asserting that he alone could obtain the
consent of his people to the cession, offered to leave his two
eldest sons as hostages, and promised to return to captivity if
that consent could not be obtained. Charles was most
unwilling to grant even this, and was supported by his
chancellor Gattinara, who predicted the result. The condition
of Italy was, however, desperate. Pescara died on December 3,
urging his master almost with his last breath to make peace
with France, if he would save Italy ; all his other counsellors
were of the same opinion. Charles accordingly gave way,
and consented to the Treaty of Madrid.
By this treaty Francis was to cede Tournay, to * restore '
Burgundy in full sovereignty, to surrender all claims on Italy,
as well as the suzerainty over Flanders and Artois. The Treaty
He was to withdraw his protection from his allies, of Madrid,
pay the debt incurred by Charles to England in I4, I52 '
the late war, and aid him against the Turk. The Duke of
Bourbon was to regain his forfeited possessions, and to receive
besides the Duchy of Milan. In ratification of the treaty,
Francis promised to marry Eleonora, the widowed Queen of
Portugal, sister of the Emperor, and left his sons as hostages
for the fulfilment of the treaty. The treaty was not, how-
ever, worth the paper it was written on. Although Charles
had made Francis swear on the honour of a knight, and
on the gospel, to fulfil the compact or return to captivity, no
sooner was the latter free again than he repudiated it. The
day before he signed it, he had protested to his own ambas-
sadors that he would not consider promises thus extorted from
him as binding, and gave them notice that he did not mean
to keep it. We are astonished to find that this conduct
184 European History \ 1494- 15 98
excited no surprise in Europe. Wolsey actually urged Francis
to take this course, and Clement absolved him from his oath.
The release of the French King, therefore, served but to
encourage the enemies of Charles, and, on May 22, the Pope,
The League Francis, Sforza, Venice, and Florence concluded
of Cognac. the Holy League of Cognac, under the ' protec-
ay 22, 152 . t-Qn o^ Henry of England.' Sforza was to be
confirmed in his possession of Milan ; all Italian states were
to be restored to the position they held before the war;
Charles was to release the young French princes for a sum
of money, and pay his debt to England within three months.
The Leaguers proclaimed their desire to secure a lasting peace.
Charles and all other princes were therefore offered the
opportunity of joining the League. But if the Emperor
refused, he was to be driven not only from the Milanese, but
from Naples, which was then, to be held by the Pope on
payment of a yearly revenue to France.
Charles was now threatened by a coalition more formidable
than any previous one. Nor was this all. His army was in
a mutinous condition from want of pay and food, and in
danger from the determined hostility of the Italians. Colonna,
and Pescara, two of his best generals, were dead, while
Bourbon had quarrelled with Lannoy, the viceroy of Naples.
In Hungary, Solyman was on the point of winning the
battle of Mohacs (August 28, 1526) — a victory which was
to give him the larger part of that country; Francis was
negotiating with this enemy of Christendom, and even Venice
declared she preferred to be the vassal of the Turk rather
than of the Emperor.
Fortunately for Charles, the members of the League were
not hearty in the common cause. Francis seemed deter-
mined to make up for the dreary days of imprisonment, and
spent his time in hunting and other pleasures. He expressed
the most admirable sentiments as to the necessity of immediate
action, and made use of the League to try and extort easier
terms from Charles, yet did nothing. Wolsey had no
From the Treaty of Madrid to the Treaty of Crespi 185
intention of openly breaking with Charles, and prevailed on
Henry vm. to decline the office of Protector of the League.
The Divorce Question had already arisen, and if this in-
fluenced Wolsey to prevent a reconciliation between Pope and
Emperor, it also gave him strong reasons fof not needlessly
irritating Charles. Finally, the Duke of Urbino, the com-
mander of the Venetian army, either from incompetence, or
from a disinclination unduly to extend the power of the Pope,
failed to prosecute the war with vigour. The Imperialists,
therefore, were able to concentrate their efforts on the citadel
of Milan, and on July 24, Sforza was forced to MM
7 J J ^" Milan capitu-
capitulate. The Colonnesi, headed by the Car- latestothe
dinal Pompeio, now rose, and were supported by imperialists.
Don Hugo de Moncada, the successor of Pescara.
On August 22, they pretended to come to terms; but no
sooner had Clement dismissed his troops, than Moncada
and the Cardinal, rivalling the perfidy of Francis, appeared
before the walls of Rome with the army of the Colonnesi.
The citizens, assured that the Colonnesi only came to deliver
them from the tyranny of the Pope, and threatened with
destruction if they stirred, offered no resistance ; the papal
palace, the houses of the cardinals and ambassadors, were
sacked ; the Church of St. Peter was rifled, and the Host pro-
faned ; and Clement, utterly defenceless, was obliged to submit
to the terms dictated by the victors (September 21). He
promised to recall his troops from Lombardy, to make a four
months' truce with the Emperor, and to pardon the Colonnesi.
The news, however, of the taking of Cremona by the army
of the League inspired him in an evil moment to break his
promises. He sent his troops to ravage the territories of the
Colonnesi, and deprived Cardinal Pompeio of his dignities.
Moncada had told the Emperor to disavow his attack on
Rome. This Charles did, but at the same time warned the
College of Cardinals that if anything befell Christendom, it
would be the fault of the Pope who, in thus joining the League,
4 had sought the satisfaction of his own desires rather than
1 86 European History > 1494- 1598
the honour of Christ and his people's good.' The Emperor
also despatched six thousand Spanish troops to Italy,
and bade Ferdinand send eight thousand Germans under
Th Frundsberg. In November, this enemy of the
of Rome. Papacy crossed the Alps with an army, levied
May 6, 1527. mostly from the robber fastnesses of Germany,
in which there were many Lutherans. By the end of Decem-
ber, he had reached Piacenza, in spite of the feeble attempts
of the forces of the League to check him. At the same time
Lannoy landed at St. Stefano, in Tuscany, with the levies
from Spain. Clement was now ' in such a condition that he
did not know where he was/ says an eye-witness. At one
moment he haggled over terms of peace with Lannoy, at
another he threatened him and his troops with excommunica-
tion. Finally, however, on the 15th of March, he made an
eight months' truce. This did not, however, save him.
Frundsberg had in February been joined by Bourbon with
the troops from Milan. Their first idea had been to attack
Florence. Hearing, however, that the city was prepared to
resist, and was protected by the army of the League under
the Duke of Urbino, Bourbon turned on Rome, declaring that
his troops were mutinous and were dragging him there. As
he advanced, his army was swelled by Italians bent on plunder.
On the 6th of May, after being twice repulsed, the fortifica-
tions of the Eternal City were carried, though Bourbon fell,
and Rome was for eight days in the hands of the spoiler. She
had suffered much from the barbarians of old, but probably
never did she suffer such brutality as now at the hands of
Christians. The death of Bourbon, and the absence of
Frundsberg, who had been left mortally sick at Bologna,
removed the only men who might have restrained the fury of the
soldiery. The Spaniards excelled in cruelty, the Lutherans in
blasphemy and sacrilege. They sacked and plundered without
discrimination of friend or foe. 'There is not,' says a con-
temporary, 'a house in Rome, not a church or monastery,
either of Romans or of foreigners, great or small, which has
From the Treaty of Madrid to the Treaty of Crespi 187
not been sacked/ * Cardinals/ says another, * bishops, friars,
priests, old nuns, infants, dames, pages, servants, the very
poorest, were tormented with unheard-of cruelties, often
three times over : first by the Italians, then by the Spaniards,
afterwards by the lance-knights. Lastly, the villainous Colon-
nesi came, dying of hunger, and ravaged what the other
soldiers had not deigned to take.' The sack of Rome may
we'll be said to close the period of the greatness of Italy. No
longer was she to be the leader of the new learning and of art.
Meanwhile, the unfortunate Pope lay besieged in the Castle
of St. Angelo. He might have escaped while the city was being
sacked ; yet he delayed, trusting that the army of the League
would hurry to his support. It came, indeed, at last; but
the Duke of Urbino, declaring that he was not strong enough
to attack, retreated, and, on June 7, Clement was forced to
capitulate. He promised to pay the sums of money demanded,
surrendered six towns as securities, and consented to remain
a prisoner, with his thirteen Cardinals, until the first instalment
should be paid. Some now advised the Emperor to take the
lands of the Papacy and reduce the Pope to his spiritual
functions; or, at least, 'to keep the see apostolic so low
that he might always dispose of it and command it.' But
though Charles declared the sack of Rome to be the judg-
ment of God, he was probably sincere in regretting it,1 and
even had he wished to proceed to extremities, he was in no
^-position to do so. Indeed, the capture of the Pope promised
to bring him as little advantage as that of the King of France
had done. The news of the sack of Rome had at last aroused
the pleasure-seeking Francis, and caused England to change her
policy of masterly inactivity. To this, Wolsey was driven by his
imperious master. Henry vm. was now bent on Henry vni.
divorcing; Queen Catherine, the aunt of Charles : allies himseIf
0 ' with Francis.
it was therefore of importance, not only to gain April-May,
the support of Francis, but, if possible, to earn I527*
the gratitude of the Pope. Accordingly, by the treaties of
April 30, and May 29, Henry abandoned his claim to the
1 On Charles' responsibility for the sack of Rome, cf. Armstrong'*
Charles V., i. 17?.
1 88 European History > 1494- 1598
French throne in return for a perpetual pension ; the infant
Princess Mary was betrothed to the second son of the
French King; and England promised to furnish Francis
with money for his Italian campaign. In the following
August, Wolsey held a conference at Amiens with the French
King. It was agreed that, during the captivity of
at Amiens, the Pope, no Bull derogatory to the interests of
August, 15*7. either King should be admitted into their terri-
tories, that the Churches of France and England should be
administered by their bishops, and that the judgments pro-
nounced by Wolsey in his legatine and archiepiscopal courts
should be enforced, notwithstanding any papal prohibition.
The contracting parties also decided that the Pope, being
in captivity, should be asked to intrust his power to another,
who should take steps to meet present necessities. Wolsey
even suggested that he himself should be appointed papal
Vicar. The pretext for these strange proposals was the fear that
Charles might use the spiritual powers of his prisoner to their
disadvantage, but there is little doubt that Wolsey also hoped
in this way to obtain authority for an immediate settlement of
the divorce question.
Meanwhile, a new French army under Lautrec had invaded
Italy, and shortly secured the whole of Lombardy except Milan
itself, which was stoutly defended by Antonio de
again enter Leyva. Had Lautrec concentrated all his efforts
Italy. on the city, as he was urged to do by Sforza and
Ju y 3°' the Duke of Urbino, it must have fallen ; for Leyva
had but a handful of men, and was short of money and sup-
plies. Leyva, however, it was known, would fight to the last ;
and Lautrec, unwilling to weaken his force by so desperate an
encounter, turned southward to the relief of Clement (October
1527). The position of the Pope was indeed a pitiable one.
Money he had none, and, without the payment of his ransom,
he could not regain his freedom. Rome, meanwhile, continued
to be the victim of the merciless soldiers. The Duke of
Ferrara had seized Reggio and Modena; and even the
From the Treaty of Madrid to the Treaty of Crespi 189
Venetians, although the allies of the Pope, had occupied
Ravenna and Cervia, under the pretext that they did it to
save those cities from falling into Ferrarese hands.
Worse than this, the Florentines had in May risen once
more against the Medici, driven the Pope's two cousins,
Alessandro and Ippollito, from the city, and re-
,. 1 , „ - , «,. . Medici again
established a Republic under the veteran Nicolo driven from
Capponi. Clement had sacrificed the interests of Florence.
,._,,... . . May 17, 1537.
the Church in his attempt to strengthen the
temporal power and to aggrandise his family, and this was the
result. Before Lautrec reached Rome, however, the Pope
had at least regained his freedom. Charles realised that he was
gaining nothing by keeping Clement in captivity; he earnestly
wished to make peace with him, and to proceed to the extirpa-
tion of heresy. He had therefore ordered Moncada to try to
come to terms, warning him at the same time to beware that
he was not tricked, as he himself had been, by Francis.
Accordingly, on November 26, the following agreement
was made. The Pope was to pay a certain sum of money
at once, and to promise more. He under- clement
took not to oppose the Emperor's designs on comes to
Italy; he granted him a 'cruzada' from the Charles,
ecclesiastical revenues of Spain, and half of the Nov- ?6-
ecclesiastical tithes of Naples ; Ostia, Civita- orvieto
Vecchia, and Civita Castellana were to be left in Dec 6.
Charles' hands as guarantees, as well as five of the cardinals ;
the Pope was to be freed on the 7th of the following month.
On the preceding night, afraid lest he might even yet be kept a
prisoner, he fled in disguise to the papal stronghold of Orvieto.
Even so, the affairs of Charles were going ill. Florence,
although she had expelled the Medici, did not abandon the
League. Leyva still held Milan, but warned
Charles that 'God did not work miracles every dition of the"
day,' and that, if not speedily relieved, his troops, imperialists
though they would not surrender, would be m ay*
starved. Genoa had been once more won for the French
190 European History \ 1494- 1 598
by Andrea Doria. I. annoy, the viceroy of Naples, had just
died of the plague, and the imperial army, which had marched,
under the Prince of Orange, to the relief of Naples, was
surrounded by the French army under Lautrec. Naples
seemed doomed, and Francis was jubilant.
Yet, as had been the case at every important crisis of this
long struggle, the French, when most confident, were nearest
defeat. Although the troops of the Emperor were ill paid
and ill fed, and, on that account, insubordinate and ready
for plunder, they were decidedly superior to those of Francis,
both in powers of endurance and on the battlefield. They
had hitherto been outnumbered, but their endurance had
been wearing out their enemies, and they were soon to be
in a position to meet them in the field. The fate of Naples
depended on the command of the sea, and this was now
in the hands of Andrea Doria and his nephew Filippino.
Andrea Doria had taken the lead in the revolu-
Francis
quarrels with tion which had recently restored Genoa to the
Dona. French. He soon repented of his deed. Not
only did Francis personally affront him by refusing to
pay him properly for the use of his galleys, and by denying
him the ransom of the prisoners he had taken, but he
also touched his patriotism by neglecting Genoa, and attempt-
ing to set up Savona, which the French had lately gained, as
her commercial rival. On Doria's remonstrance, Francis sent
a Breton to take command of the French fleet in the Medi-
terranean, and even thought of having the Doge arrested.
Doria accordingly listened to the tempting offers of the Prince
of Orange, and, on the 4th of July, ordered his nephew to sail
from Naples. His departure at once enabled the city to pro-
vision itself from Sicily, and the danger of famine was
removed. At this critical moment, the French army,
which had also suffered from want of supplies, was
attacked by a severe outbreak of the plague. To this
Lautrec, with several of his officers, fell a victim, and the
army was so decimated that the Marquis of Saluzzo, who
From the Treaty of Madrid to the Treaty of Crespi 191
succeeded him in command, determined to retreat to Aversa
(August 28).
As the French attempted to execute this movement, the
rear-guard, under Pedro Navarra, was overtaken by the
enemy, and forced to surrender. The Prince of Battl of
Orange, following up his success, pursued the Aversa,
retreating foe, and forced them to capitulate at xh? French
discretion. The Marquis of Saluzzo remained a evacuate
prisoner in his hands with Pedro Navarra, both NaPles-
to die shortly afterwards. The rest of the army were allowed
to return to their homes under promise not to serve for the
present against the Emperor. Doria now sailed to Genoa,
and raised the city against the French. On the 28th of
October, the governor Trivulzio was forced to capitulate,
and Doria was successful in establishing a govern-
, . , ., , .. , . , . The French
ment which, if somewhat oligarchical, at least finally driven
protected the city from those violent party factions from Genoa.
which had torn it for years, and secured its
independence until the year 1796. Doria then reduced
Savona, and the French were driven from the Ligurian coast.
In Lombardy the struggle continued for a while. Here Leyva,
who still held Milan, was opposed by the troops of the League,
commanded by Sforza, the Duke of Urbino with the Venetian
troops, and the Count de St. Pol with the new levies from
France. The armies of the League, after retaking Pavia, had
^surrounded Milan, but hesitated to attack the formidable
Leyva. In the following June, the Count de St. „ , ,
-n 1 \ Battle of
Pol, as he rashly attempted to make a diversion Landriano.
on Genoa, was surprised by Leyva, who had June2°-
received information of his movements, and was completely
routed at Landriano (June 20). The besieging armies
retreated, and Milan was saved.
Charles was not yet complete master in Italy. Asti and
Alessandria were still in the hands of the French. Lodi,
Cremona, and Pavia were held by Sforza; the Republic
at Florence still kept out the Medici, and Venice yet clung to
192 European History, 1494-1598
the eastern coast of Apulia. Further resistance on the part
of the League was, however, hopeless, unless supported by its
more important members, and these were soon to abandon it.
England had never intended to act as a principal in the war,
and was certainly unable to do so at present : she was weakened
by a serious outbreak of the sweating sickness, and the atten-
tion of her King was absorbed in the matter of the divorce.
Still more fatal to the cause of the League was the final
reconciliation of Clement with the Emperor. The real desire
of Clement, since his escape from Rome, had been to
maintain his neutrality until peace was declared. This, how-
ever, was difficult, besieged as he was by the importunate
agents of the League, and of Charles. Moreover, Clement
cared chiefly for the temporal interests of the Papacy and the
aggrandisement of his family. To regain the possessions of
which he had been robbed, to re-establish the Medici in
Clement and Florence — these, rather than the freedom of Italy,
the Emperor Qr the overthrow of heresy, were his aims, as
atCtheCTreaty these were not to be gained from the League,
of Barcelona, the Pope decided after much hesitation to come
to terms with the Emperor, the more so, because the ultimate
success of Charles seemed certain. Nor can it be denied
that, for once, Clement's private interests coincided with
those of the Church, for reconciliation with Charles offered
the only hope of making head against the formidable Luther.
His only apprehension was that Charles would put into effect
his threat of summoning a General Council, a threat which
he had enforced by his promises to the Diet of Spires in June
1526. On this point, the Emperor's agents succeeded in
allaying the fears of the Pope, and no mention of a Council was
made in the treaty which was concluded at Barcelona on the
29th June, 1529. By that treaty the Pope promised to invest
Charles with the kingdom of Naples, and to crown him
Emperor. Charles undertook that the places seized from the
Papal States by the Duke of Ferrara, and by Venice, should
be restored ; he also promised to re-establish the Medici in
From the Treaty of Madrid to the Treaty of Crespi 193
Florence. Finally, they both agreed to turn their united forces
against the infidel and the heretic. Yet the treaty was to
lead to another schism. On the 16th of July, Clement, yielding
to the wishes of Charles, revoked the powers he had given to
Wolsey and Campeggio to try the question of Henry's divorce
in England, and cited the cause to Rome. Wolsey's dream
of gaining papal sanction was broken, and soon Henry was
to take the matter into his own hands and cast off the papal
supremacy.
Meanwhile, negotiations for peace between the Emperor
and Francis had been going on. The rivals had, however,
challenged each other to single combat the year Peace of
before, and their honour did not suffer them cambray.
personally to correspond. The negotiations, ugus 3' I529#
therefore, had been conducted by two women — Margaret,
Governess of the Netherlands, the aunt of Charles, and
Louise of Savoy, the mother of the French King, both of
whom were anxious for peace. Francis had been most un-
willing to grant the terms demanded, yet he was in no con-
dition to continue the war, and the reconciliation of Pope
and Emperor forced him to abandon his scruples, and sign
the Peace of Cambray, or Women's Peace, August 3, 1529.
The French King was indeed freed from the necessity of
ceding Burgundy, and regained his sons, who had been left
^hostages in the hands of Charles, in return for a sum of money.
The other terms were, however, sufficiently humiliating. Not
only did Francis surrender all claims to Italy, and to the over-
lordship of Artois and Flanders ; but he had also to abandon
his allies ; he even undertook, if necessary, to force the
Venetians to disgorge the conquests they had lately made on
the Neapolitan coast, and this in the face of his solemn engage-
ment on the honour of a King to include them in any treaty
which he might make. Francis, it must be confessed, rated a
King's word rather low. The marriage, first arranged at the
Treaty of Madrid, was ratified ; it was hoped that if Eleonora,
the widowed sister of Charles, were wedded to Francis, the
PERIOD IV. n
194 European History \ 1494- 1598
family tie might serve to heal the personal enmity of these
two sovereigns, whose rivalry had plunged Europe into an
eight years' war.
Before the negotiations had been brought to a successful
issue, Charles had left Spain. It was his earnest desire to
Charles leaves finish the war himself, and to receive the imperial
Spain for Italy, crown from the hands of the Pope. It was at
August, 1529. Piacenza therefore that he finally ratified the
treaty. Italy was now at the mercy of Charles. He was,
however, wise enough to adopt a conciliatory policy towards
all her States, except the Republic of Florence. Venice was
indeed forced to surrender to Charles her conquests on the
east coast of Naples, and to restore Ravenna and Cervia
Settlement of to tne Pope, but was not further punished. To
Italian affairs. Francesco Maria Sforza was left the duchy of
Milan, with the exception of Monza, which was granted to
Antonio de Leyva, Charles' brave general, and of the citadels
of Milan and Como, which Charles kept in his own hands.1
This policy had its reward. By a treaty of December 23,
1529, Venice and Sforza joined the Pope in contracting a
defensive alliance with Charles ; while Savoy was strengthened
as an outpost against France by the acquisition of the county
of Asti. The affairs of Florence had yet to be settled.
Charles would gladly have found some middle course. But
the Florentines refused to readmit the Medici even as private
citizens, and Clement insisted that they should be restored to
power. The city, strengthened by the fortifications designed
by Michael Angelo, and defended by the militia formed after
the advice of Machiavelli, stood an eight months' siege, during
which the Prince of Orange, Charles' general, was killed. No
one, however, came to the aid of the unfortunate Republic,
which was forced to accept as Duke, Alessandro, the cousin
of the Pope, who had married Margaret, the illegitimate
daughter of the Emperor.2
1 On Francesco's death in 1535, the duchy was annexed by the Emperor.
1 On the assassination of Alessandro, 1537, Cosimo of the younger
branch of the Medici became Duke.
From the Treaty of Madrid to the Treaty of Crespi 195
Meanwhile, on February 23, Charles had been crowned
Emperor at Bologna by the Pope, and on the following day,
the anniversary of his birth, and of the victory
of Pavia, had received the iron crown of Italy. crowned
During this long war, which had lasted eight Emperor at
years, we find the same story repeated again and Feb.aa, x«o.
again. Thrice the French seemed on the point
of success, only to experience a crushing reverse which
snatched from them all they had gained. The imperialist
armies, whether composed of Germans or of Spaniards, ill
paid and ill fed, often broke out in mutiny, and disgraced
their feats of arms by plunder and atrocities of all kinds ; yet
no sooner were they called upon to meet the enemy than they
proved themselves superior whether in defensive or offensive
operations ; while they were also, as a rule, better led.
Francis, after his capture at Pavia, never appeared in the
field again, and although infinitely better supplied with money
from his subservient people than was Charles, he was too
careless and too fond of pleasure to make full use of his
advantage. As for Charles, he had taken no active part in
the campaigns at all. Absent in Spain, surrounded by diffi-
culties which the vastness of his Empire entailed upon him,
and ever in grievous need of money, it seemed sometimes as
if he were forgetful of the war, and neglectful of his soldiers.
Yet under this callous exterior there was a determination and
fixedness of purpose which nothing could shake, and which,
if it sometimes appeared to be sheer stupidity, yet succeeded
in the end.
While the armies of Charles had thus been engaged in
winning Italy from his Christian rival, Vienna seemed likely
to fall into the hands of the infidel. In May,
1529, Solyman the Magnificent had allied him- invades" s
self with the Hospodar of Moldavia, and with Hungary.
John Zapolya, Waivode of Transylvania, the in-
veterate enemy of the Hapsburgs, and had invaded Hungary.
His pretensions knew no bounds. 'As there is but one
196 European History ', 1494- 1598
God in Heaven, so must there be but one lord on earth, and
Solyman is that lord,' he proudly asserted, a boast which he
hoped to carry into effect by reducing the dominions of the
Emperor in Germany. The Austrians, afraid to trust the
fidelity of the Hungarian forces, had been unable to meet
the Turk, and retreated from the country. Solyman, in
possession of the sacred crown of Hungary, which was handed
to him by an Hungarian bishop, passed on into Austria, and
on the 20th of September laid siege to Vienna. But divided
though Germany was, it was not so lost to shame as to allow
the Crescent to be established on the walls of the Austrian
city. The Reformers, although irritated by their treatment at
the hands of the second Diet of Spires (cf. p. 198), answered
to the appeal of Ferdinand and to the injunctions of Luther.
Vienna was bravely held ; and Solyman, threatened
Vienna by the levies which were coming to its aid, was
raised. forced to retreat after a fruitless siege of twenty-
c . 14, 1529. ^Qur ^^ ^Qcj-obgj. 1^y Vienna indeed was saved,
but Hungary was held by Zapolya, and Croatia and Bohemia
threatened.
§ 2. Progress of the Reformation in Germany.
jn the midst of the troubles of the Italian campaign, and
in the face of the hostility of the Pope, any decisive action
against the Reformers had been out of the question. It was
at least necessary to procrastinate. Accordingly, at the Diet
of Spires (Aug. 1526), the Emperor had promised,
"spires, Aug. through his representatives, that a General
is^andTHe Council should be summoned, but that, mean-
■— — — — ; while, the penal clauses of the Edict of Worms
should be enforced. At the same time, he had warned
Clement vn. that if the Christian republic should suffer in
consequence of a Council not being summoned, the blame
must fall on him. At the Diet itself, the Catholics found
From the Treaty of Madrid to the Treaty of Crespi 197
themselves in a majority in all the chambers, except that of
the imperial cities, yet they were not prepared to advocate
extreme measures. The Recess l declared that, until a Council
should meet^each state should, in matters appertaining to
the Edict of Worms, .jso live, rule? and conduct itself as it
shall be ready to answer to God and his Imperial Majesty/ It
is a mistake to hold that the Reformers were thereby authorised
to set on foot their new ecclesiastical organisations. The
concession was purely provisional, and they were to answer
to the Emperor for what they did. None the less, the Elector
of Saxony and Philip of Hesse proceeded to establish their
Lutheran churches, and to appropriate monastic property for
the purpose — a policy which was soon followed by others,
especially by Albert of Prussia, who, in 1525, had already
secularised the estates of the Teutonic knights, and converted
his mastership into a dukedom.
Thus the Diet of Spires makes an important advance in the
history of the Reformation. If, on the one hand, it was now
clear that Germany was not to belong exclusively to the
Lutherans, on the other, a great impulse was given to the
principle of territorialism {cujus regio ejus religio)^ upon which
eventually the ecclesiastical settlement of Germany was to be
based. Three years later, the position of affairs had materially
altered. The marked advance of the Reformed opinions had
excited the apprehensions of the Catholics, while the suc-
cesses of the Emperor in Italy, and his reconciliation with the
Pope, had strengthened their cause. The rapid growth of the
Zwinglian opinions in the south of Germany, opinions which
were wholly distasteful to Luther, had weakened the Evan-
gelical party, and the rash appeal to arms on the part of
Philip of Hesse, to resist a supposed conspiracy against those
who thought with him, had irritated the Princes.
This reaction of opinion expressed itself in the second
Diet of Spires. The Recess of 1526 was revoked, all further
1 The Recess (Reichsabscheid) was the collection of the Decrees of
the Diet which had received the assent of the Emperor {Reichsschliisse).
193 European History, 1494- 1598
innovations were forbidden, and the ■ sect ' of the Zwin-
glians was refused all toleration. The minority, indeed,
. ~. • here earned their name of ' Protestants ' by the
Second Diet t \ J
of Spires. protest they issued against these decrees — a pro-
Feb. 1529. test wnicn was signed by John, Elector of Saxony,
Philip of Hesse, George, Margrave of Brandenburg, Ernest
of Luneburg, Wolfgang of Anhalt, and fourteen imperial
cities. But the protest was rejected by both Diet
•^cTTrninkaTde". and Emperor ; and so evident was it that Charles
Dec. 1529. onjy waited for an opportunity to take decisive
action, that a meeting was held at Schmalkalde, at which the
lawfulness of resistance was discussed, to be abandoned,
however, for the present in deference to the scruples of
Luther.
When on June 30, 1530, Charles, after eight years' absence,
met the Diet of Augsburg in person, the moment seemed to
have arrived for a final settlement of his diffi-
the Diet of~~ culties. Italy was at his feet; Francis had at
Augsburg^ last accepted his terms ; the Pope had promised
— ! — to join with him in suppressing heresy, and had
crowned him Emperor; and, if Hungary was in the hands
of Solyman, Germany at least was free from his attack. The
Protestants, conscious of their weakness, desired reconcilia-
tion. This was strongly advocated by Melanchthon, and
breathed in every line of the ' Confession of Augsburg ' which
was presented to the Diet, at the request of Charles that the
Protestants would express their thoughts in writing. In this
famous Confession, the doctrine of Justification was stated
in qualified terms ; the paying of honour to the Saints was
not entirely forbidden ; although reasons were given why
the Lutherans had permitted the Cup to the laity, the marriage
of the clergy, and the secularisation of Church lands, and had
rejected vows and private masses, no definite assertion was
made as to the number of the Sacraments, or on the question
of the papal power; while the decision of other contested
questions was to be left to the verdict of a General Council.
From the Treaty of Madrid to the Treaty of Crespi 199
The tone of the document was avowedly defensive, and its
I aim was rather to show that the Lutheran doctrines were not
heretical than to attack those of the Church.
The original intention of Charles had been to act as a
mediator, and to settle the religious dissensions by fair and
gentle means. He had asked the Evangelical party for
an expression of their views. He now wished that their
opponents should bring forward a distinct charge against the
Reformers which would allow him to assume the part of
an umpire. But the Catholics in the Diet refused; they
declared that they had nothing new to propose, and
accordingly prepared a confutation in which, indeed, they
made some approach towards the Lutheran view of the
doctrine of Justification, but in other respects insisted on
the old doctrines, and demanded that the Protestants should
return to the unity of the faith. The Emperor now abandoned
the rdle of a mediator, and attempted to overawe the recal-
citrants with threats. Alarmed, however, by the determined
though respectful attitude of the Protestant princes, the Diet
made one more attempt at reconciliation, and a small com-
mittee was appointed. On the question of dogma there
seemed some chance of agreement, and a General Council
might possibly have broken down the opposition of the Pro-
testants. But, though this was earnestly desired by the
Emperor, the Pope had no idea of complying with his wish ;
while on questions relating to the constitution and the prac-
tice of the Church, reconciliation was probably hopeless.
These the Catholics regarded as of Divine institution; the
Protestants, on the other hand, looked upon them as the
work of men, and therefore capable of modification. Erasmus 1
in his letters bitterly complains .of the want of moderation on|
both sides ; yet this is not the only occasion where attempts at
compromise on serious religious issues have failed. Eventually,
Charles adopted the views of the majority, and The Recess of
the Recess of Augsburg proclaimed his intention Augsburg.
of enforcing the Edict of Worms. The Protestants were given
206 European History ', 1494-1598
till the ensuing April to consider whether they would volurt-
tarily return to the Catholic Church. After that date, measures
were to be taken for the extirpation of their sect. But although
the majority of the Diet had thus shown themselves hostile
to the Reformers, they hesitated to put arms into the hands
Reorganisa- of the Emperor with which he might enforce the
tion of the Edict ; rather they proposed to make use of the
T m r\& ri n 1
Chamber. Imperial Chamber for the purpose. This court
Nov. 19, 1530. was accordingly reorganised and increased in
number; assessors suspected of Lutheran tendencies were
admonished, and the Chamber was ordered to enforce the
Recess.
In answer to this, the Protestant princes and city deputies
met at Schmalkalde on December 22, 1530. They appointed
procurators to watch their interests before the
the League of Imperial Chamber ; they agreed to protect each
Schmalkalde. other from any attempt on its part to enforce the
Recess of Augsburg, and after much debate
decided that resistance was lawful even to the Emperor
himself, should he appeal to arms. Hitherto Luther and the
theologians had preached the doctrine of passive obedience.
But the civilians brought forward arguments to prove that
the power of the Emperor was limited by law. His title
was not hereditary, but elective; he had granted capitu-
lations at his election; if, therefore, he acted illegally, he
might be resisted. Convinced by these arguments, Luther
gave way, and was followed by most of those present, with
the exception of the Margrave of Brandenburg and the city
of Nuremberg. Thus originated the League of Schmalkalde,
which was definitely formed in March 1531 and finally
organised in the ensuing December. Its members were to be
represented in a Diet. They promised to furnish contribu-
tions to a common fund, and intrusted the supreme command
of their forces to John, Elector of Saxony, and the Landgrave
Philip of Hesse. The formation of the League of Schmal-j
kalde marks a new period in the struggle. In spite of the\
From the Treaty of Madrid to the Treaty of Crespi 20 1
scruples of Luther, the movement had become a political one,
Henceforth Germany was to hp. divided inrn two hostile camps,
each with its centre of unity, and the Protestants had taken
measures for their common defence, by arms if necessary.
The next crucial question was, whether this League should
include all those both in Switzerland and in Upper Germany,
who had embraced the views of Zwingle. Although it may
be doubted whether this Reformer would ever have been
heard of had it not been for the impulse given to the cry
for Reform by the appearance of Luther, yet the .
two movements were to a great extent inde- —
pendent of each other, and, from the first, presented essential
points of difference. The son of the <Amtmahn, of the
village of Weldenhaus, near St. Gall, Zwingle was born in
1484, a few weeks after Luther. He had in early life been
influenced by the literary movement of the Humanists, and
was well versed in the classics. Chosen as curate of the
congregation of Glarus in 1506, he had accompanied his
countrymen on some of the Italian expeditions, notably on
that which ended so disastrously at Marignano, and henceforth
never ceased to warn his fellow-citizens against the demoral-
ising influences of this mercenary system of warfare.
It is, however, with his call to be curate at Zurich (15 19-
1525) that his career as a Reformer began. Starting, like
Luther, with a crusade against the abuse of indul-
gences, he soon began to take up different ground, curateat
While Luther did not deny the Real Presence, Znri^h
Zwingle looked upon the Sacrament merely as I5I9"I?25*
a festival of commemoration, and pressed the Lutheran
view of Justification to its logical conclusion — the doctrine
of election and the denial of man's free will. Luther was
willing to accept anything which could not be proved contrary
to his interpretation of Scripture; Zwingle would accept
nothing but what he found there. Luther had a deep rever-
ence for the Universal Church, and only left it after a struggle ;
Zwingle based the right of each congregation to independent
202 European History, 1 494- 1598
action in matters religious on the republican organisation of
the village. Luther had attempted to keep religious questions
apart from politics, and, when finally driven from this position,
threw himself on the side of authority as represented by the
Princes. The religious ideas of Zwingle were intimately
connected with a scheme of establishing a more thorough and
representative democracy in Switzerland, in which the Forest
Cantons should lose their privilege of holding as many
votes in the Federal Diet as the other and larger Cantons.
By the close of the year 1530, the opinions of Zwingle had
not only been accepted by the Cantons of Zurich, Basel, Bern,
and Schaffhausen, and by many of the country-folk of Appen-
zell, Glarus, and the Grisons, but had spread among many of
the towns of southern Germany, notably those of Constance,
Ulm, Augsburg, and Strasburg.
Common danger had for a moment drawn the adherents
of these two Reformers together, to protect themselves
Temporajy against the Recess of the second Diet of Spires.
jmioEL&e7 But permanent union between such widely diver-
tween the . . ... _. ... .
followers of gent views was scarcely possible. Philip of
LutKeran^d Hesse, who was himself inclined towards the
ZwTngTesqpn . . _ _ . -. ' . , . „
comeTtcfaji opinions of Zwingle, had attempted to effect a
e"^- reconciliation at his castle of Marburg in 1529.
The attempt failed — Luther showing the most uncompromising
hostility to the Zwinglian doctrine concerning the Sacraments
— and shortly after, Zwingle had to face a reaction in his own
country. Like so many reformers, he was wrecked on the
shoal of politics. The Forest Cantons had from the first been
the resolute opponents of the new teaching,
against not only because they were strongly Catholic, but
Zwmgie in because Zwinde's political reforms, if carried out,
Switzerland. ° r
would destroy the position they had hitherto en-
joyed in the Federal Diet. His political views also lost him
adherents in those Cantons that were in favour of his doctrinal
position. The Hapsburgs cleverly fostered these divisions; war
ensued, and finally at the battle of CappeJ, the army of Zurich,
From the Treaty of Madrid to the Treaty of Crespi 203
which alone stood by him to the last, was defeated, and
Zwingle himself was slain (October, 1531). By the second
Treaty of Cappel it was agreed that each Canton The battle
was free to retain its own creed. In the andthe
. . , second Treaty
'Common Bailiwicks,' the religion was to be ofCappei.
decided by the majority. But no force was °ct- x53^
to be used, and the city Cantons were to abandon their
foreign alliances.
Switzerland was now definitely divided into Catholic and
Protestant Cantons. The Catholics regained lost ground,
and secured seventeen out of twenty-nine votes in the Diet.
The Evangelical party held Zurich, Bern, Basel, and Schaff-
hausen ; while Thurgau, Glarus, and Appenzell were divided.
All hope that Switzerland would support the Protestants of
Germany was now over; nevertheless the cities of southern
Germany, deprived of their Swiss allies, Were forced to
join the Lutherans and to swell the numbers of the League of
Schmalkalde. Thus, by the commencement of the year 1532,
the position of the Protestants in Germany had improved.
Had Charles' hands been now free, doubtless he would
have appealed to the arbitrament of the sword. But
here again his political necessities stood in his Charles pre-
way. The peace with France was by no means "vented by
secure ; nay, Francis was even intriguing with the ai^eSSe*
League of Schmalkalde. Solyman was again frefl^taknig
threatening to invade his dominions. Spain, as ^e^roSt^
usual, complained of his absence. In Africa "bhs
the piracies of Barbarossa demanded his attention. Nor
could Charles depend on the unqualified support of the Catholic
princes. In June, 1531, he had with difficulty secured the
election of his brother Ferdinand as King of the Romans by
five of the Electors. But the election had been protested
against by John of Saxony, and he was joined by the two Dukes
of Bavaria and others, who, despite their Catholic sympathies,
dreaded to see the power of the Hapsburgs increased. Dis-
appointed in his hopes of settling the religious difficulty
2d4 European History \ 1494-1598
the Emperor was forced to procrastinate. At the Peace of
Nuremberg (July 1, 1532), he promised to suspend the proceed-
p . f ings of the Imperial Chamber until the convocation
Nuremberg, of a General Council ; while at the Diet of Ratis-
l^y^s*- bon, which followed, he undertook, in the event
of such a Council not being convoked by the Pope within
six months, to summon a general assembly of the Empire for
the settlement of the religious difficulties.
Charles was at least rewarded by the loyal support of
the Protestants against the Turk. His army, recruited by
Spaniards, Italians, and Netherlanders, was the largest force
he had ever led, and Solyman, repulsed by the brave de-
fenders of Guns, retreated without having dared to fight a
pitched battle. Yet the Emperor was in no position to make
use of his victory. The affairs of Italy and of Spain impera-
tively demanded his presence. Accordingly, in the autumn of
1532, he crossed the Alps, to be involved again in European
complications, and for seven other years Protestantism was
left unmolested.
Shortly after the Peace of Nuremberg, John the Steadfast
of Saxony died. He had gone much further in the direction
^ *u n u 0I" Protestantism than his brother, Frederick
Death of John, '
Elector of the Wise, whom he had succeeded in 1525.
Saxony, 1532. Frederick had never wholly broken from Rome ;
John had been one of the leaders in the League of Schmal-
kalde, and had organised an Evangelical Church within his
territories. Yet, to the last, he tried to maintain a moderate
line of policy, and hoped to find a place for the protestant
Churches without breaking up the Empire, or departing from
the obedience of the Emperor. With no remarkable intel-
lectual gifts — corpulent and somewhat slow-witted, — the
simplicity and honesty of his character, and the courage
-with which he clung to his convictions, make him something
of a hero ; and there is, perhaps, no one to whom Luther and
the Protestants of Germany owe more than to this plain and
single-hearted man.
From the Treaty of Madrid to the Treaty of Crespi 205
§ 3. European complications and the fortunes of the Protestants •,
from 1 532 to the Treaty of Crespi,
At no time during the career of Charles v. are the contra-
dictions and difficulties which surrounded him better illus-
trated than during the period from 1532 to the The European
Treaty of Crespi. Had his claims been less complications
extensive he might have been more successful; ofcharles-
but the very magnificence of his pretensions prevented the
complete realisation of any one of them. As head of the
Holy Roman Empire, it was his duty Jo defend the unity
of the Church, to put down heresy, and to support the papal
authority. Yet his position as King of Germany forced him
to postpone the suppression of heresy to the imperative
necessity of gaining the support of the Protestants against the
Turk; while his claims on Italy brought him into constant
conflict with the Pope. As King of Germany, it was his
aim to increase the royal authority and suppress the tendencies
towards disruption, and, as ruler of the Austrian territories, to
further the family interests of the Hapsburgs ; but both these
aims incurred the hostility of many even of the Catholic princes.
As King of Spain and master of Italy, it was incumbent on
him to secure his dominions and the Mediterranean from the
piratical incursions of the Moors. Yet here and everywhere,
he was constantly being thwarted by his persistent rival,
Francis I., who not only intrigued with the Pope against him,
but, while persecuting the Reformers at home, entered into
alliances with the Protestants of Germany, the schismatic
King of England, and even the Infidel himself.
With the actual events of this period we must deal very
briefly. They are not in themselves of great importance.
Scarcely any new question is involved, with the exception, of
that of Africa, and the position of European affairs is not
very materially altered. Charles had for the moment checked
the attack of the Moslems from the East. He was now
forced to turn his attention to their movement in the south-
206 European History \ 1494- 1 5 98
west. By the conquests of Ferdinand the Catholic, the
Spaniards had acquired possessions on the north African
The struggle coast from Melilla to Tripoli, and reduced the
with Bar- rulers of Algiers and Tunis to the position of
barossa. , .
June- August, vassals. Since 15 10, however, the Spaniards had
1535. met with many reverses, especially since the rise
of the two Barbarossas. These two men, sons of a Greek or
Albanian renegade, had made themselves masters of Algiers.
Huroc, the elder, was slain in 15 18, but Hayraddin, his younger
brother, interfered in the dynastic disputes of Tunis, and, in
1534, added t that country to his kingdom. To gain the
support of Solyman, he had consented to hold his conquests
of him, and, in 1533, received the command of the Turkish
fleet. Meanwhile his own ships had been threatening the
Mediterranean, harrying the coasts of Spain and Italy, and
carrying off Christians to the slave-markets of Africa and the
East. This rise of a new Mahometan power in Africa, a power
with which Francis was not ashamed to coquet, demanded
instant attention. Charles, therefore, having renewed his
alliance with the new Pope, Paul ill. (Farnese), and settled as
far as was possible the affairs of Italy, passed on to Spain.
Thence, with a fleet under the command of Andrea Doria, and
an army which was not only recruited from various parts of
his dominions, but was joined by the Knights of Malta, he
sailed for Africa (June, 1535), nominally in support of Muley-
Hassan, one of the claimants to the kingdom of Tunis. The
expedition proved a brilliant success. Solyman could send
no help, and Francis was either afraid or ashamed to aid.
The harbour of Goletta was taken by storm, and the army of
Barbarossa defeated on the field. The Christian prisoners in
Tunis rose against their captors, and Barbarossa was forced
to evacuate the country, which was granted to Muley-Hassan
under the suzerainty of Spain (August, 1535). But though
the expedition caused a great stir and increased the reputa-
tion of the Emperor, it did not materially improve his
prospects in Europe.
From the Treaty of Madrid to the Treaty of Crespi 207
Francis had never intended to keep the Treaty of Cambray,
and was determined to attempt the recovery of the duchy of
Milan at least. He had accordingly been long The intriguC8
intriguing, both in Germany and Italy. To gain of Francis,
the support of Clement vn. he had consented to marry his
second son, Henry of Orleans, to Catherine de' Medici, on
condition of a principality being granted to the Duke in
Italy, a principality which might possibly include Milan ; but
the death of the Pope (25th September 1534) had disappointed
him of his hopes in this direction. Francis had also opened
negotiations with the members of the League of Schmalkalde —
who, however, refused to support one who persecuted the
Protestants in his own kingdom — and had made a commercial
treaty with Solyman, in which the plan of a joint attack on
the Milanese was mooted. Francis had then begun an unsuc-
cessful intrigue with Francesco Sforza, and, on the execution of
his secret agent Maraviglia, had declared war against that
Prince. To reach the Milanese it was necessary to pass
through the dominions of the Duke of Savoy. Since the
days of Charles vm. of France, Savoy had been friendly to
France, and had given free passage to her troops. But the
present Duke, Charles in., had married Beatrix of Portugal,
sister of the Emperor's wife, and now refused such passage.
Francis therefore determined to occupy Savoy and Piedmont.
At the same time he supported the Calvinists of Geneva, who
were in rebellion against the Duke of Savoy and their bishop,
and stirred up the Swiss of Bern to invade the district of
Vaud.
At this moment, the death of Sforza of Milan (24th October
T-5Z5)) altered the position of affairs. He was the last direct
descendant of the House, and Milan accordingly ^ . „
' & 3 Death of
fell to Charles as suzerain. The Emperor, who sforza.
had only just concluded the expedition against °ct-24,i535.
Barbarossa, was anxious to gain time, and amused the King
with negotiations. Francis demanded Milan for Henry, Duke
of Orleans, his second son. Charles offered to grant it to the
2o8 European History, 1494- 1 598
Duke of Angouleme, the third son of the French King, on
condition of his marrying an Austrian princess.
Meanwhile the French had crossed the Alps by the Pass of
Susa, and occupied Turin (April, 1536). Charles now threw
The French °ff tne mask. He denounced the King as a faith-
cross the Jess man, the ally of heretic and infidel, and
oc?upyDTurin. challenged him to personal combat, suggesting
April, 1536. that Burgundy and Milan should be the prize of
victory. On this being refused, Antonio de Leyva crossed
the Sesia at the head of the imperial troops (May, 1536).
The Marquis of Saluzzo, who commanded the French army
in Piedmont, deserted to the Emperor, and Charles, neglecting
to secure Turin, pressed on into Provence in the
makes an hopes of bringing Francis to a decisive engage-
unsuccessful ment. The French, contrary to their usual prac-
Provence. tice, adopted a Fabian policy. They devastated
juiy-Sep. 1536. foe country as they retired, and threw themselves
into strong positions at Avignon and Valence. Unable to
storm these places, the imperial army began to suffer from
want and disease, to which de Leyva himself succumbed
(September 10, 1536). Charles, despairing of success, was
forced to evacuate the country (September 23), and retired to
Spain * to bury there his honour which he had lost in Provence.'
The attack of the Imperialists on Picardy and Languedoc
Campaigns nad been equally unsuccessful, although, during
in Picardy, the campaign in Picardy, Francis lost Robert de
Artofs^and' la Marck, ' Le Jeune Aventureux,' the military
Piedmont. companion of his youth, and the author of the
Memoirs which bear his name. In 1537, the French invaded
Artois. The war in Piedmont still continued, and Solyman,
Soiyman m pursuance of his recent treaty, sent Barbarossa
defeats t0 attack the coasts of Naples, while, shortly after,
atEmek. ne invaded Hungary in person, and defeated
Oct. 1537. Ferdinand at Essek (October 8). This alliance of
the French with Solyman excited the indignation of Europe,
1 Ferdinand had been recognised as King of Hungary after the death
of Lewis at Mohacs (cf. p. 184). But his claim was opposed by Zapolya,
Woivode of Transylvania, who was supported by Solyman.
From the Treaty of Madrid to the Treaty of Crespi 209
Paul in., who had hitherto adopted a neutral attitude, now
intervened as mediator. Francis was not unwilling to treat,
and Charles had nothing to hope from a continu- Revoit of
ance of the war. The Lutherans were daily gain- Ghent, 1537.
ing strength ; the attack of the Moslem was threatening the
imperial hold on Naples; while in the north, the people of
Ghent had risen against the taxes imposed by the Regent of
the Netherlands (1537).
Accordingly, a truce for ten years was made at Nice (June
18, 1538). By that truce the Peace of Cambray was confirmed.
The rivals abandoned their allies, and each was _. _
' The Truce
to retain the conquests they had made. Thus the of Nice.
Duke of Savoy was made the scapegoat. Savoy June l8, I538,
and two-thirds of Piedmont were retained by Francis, the
Swiss henceforth occupied the district of Vaud, and the
Emperor held the rest, with the exception of Nice, which alone
was left to the unfortunate Duke. A conference at Aigues
Mortes followed (July. 1538), at which Francis, hoping to gain
by conciliation what he had failed to attain by arms, adopted
a most friendly attitude towards Charles. The Marshal de
Montmorency, who had gained a great reputation in the
campaign of Provence, urged the King to ally himself with
Charles, and even suggested a joint invasion of England,
where the anti-papal measures of Henry vni. and the execution
of Bishop Fisher and Sir Thomas More had excited much
discontent. Although Francis stopped short of this, he turned
a deaf ear to the petition for aid which the citizens of Ghent
sent him, and shortly after gave the Emperor a free passage
thither through France.
On the approach of Charles, the city, disappointed in its
expectation of French assistance, submitted (February 6, 1540),
to pay dearly for its rashness. Fourteen of the Charles sup-
leading citizens were executed, the civic privileges Presses the
were forfeited, a heavy fine was levied, and a Ghent,
garrison admitted within the walls. This com- Feb- 6» de-
pleted the ruin of the ancient city, whose commercial
period iv. o
2 i 0 Bu ropean History, 1 494- 1598
supremacy, with that of Bruges, had already passed to Antwerp
in consequence of the revolution in the routes of commerce
caused by the discovery of the way round the Cape.
Now for a moment it appeared as if King and Emperor
would lay aside their long rivalry and unite to resist both
heretic and Turk. That Charles entertained such an idea
is not to be wondered at. Solyman, encouraged by the French
alliance, was menacing Hungary once more, and Barbarossa was
still threatening the Mediterranean from Algiers.
"Protestant- Nor was the danger less at home. Protestantism
lsnlin_. had made notable advances since the Peace of
. ^ Nuremberg, 1532. In 1534, Duke Ulrich of
Wurtemberg was restored to his duchy, from which he had
been driven by the Suabian League in 1 5 1 9, and which had
been granted to Ferdinand, Charles' brother. The restoratiop
was effected by Philip of Hesse, who defeated the troops of
Ferdinand at the battle of Laufen (May 1534), but it was also
approved of by John Elector of Treves, who, although Catholic,
was glad to see the House of Hapsburg humbled. Duke
Ulrich forthwith established Protestantism in his duchy ; the
University of Tiibingen became the stronghold of the Re-
formers, and a wedge was driven into the phalanx of Catholic
states in South Germany.
In the north, indeed, the outbreak of the Anabaptist revolu-
tion at Miinster, under John of Leyden, in the spring of 1534,
The Ana- ^ad tnreatened to compromise the Lutheran party,
baptists at This fanatic, who united unbridled licentiousness
Munster, 1534. wjtn strange religious views, attempted to establish
a kind of socialistic state of which he proclaimed himself
prophet and king. But only the most heated partisanship
could find any connection between the views of Luther and
of this wild fanatic. As had been the case with the Peasants'
Revolt, Philip of Hesse, one of the most prominent of the
leaguers of Schmalkalde, rallied to the cause of order. John
of Leyden was executed, his followers dispersed, and Munster
restored to its bishop, 1535. Purged from any complicity with
From the Treaty of Madrid to the Treaty of Crespi 211
the Anabaptists by the suppression of the revolt, the Lutherans
continued to make fresh converts in the north of Germany.
In the year 1535 Joachim 1., Elector of Brandenburg, and in
1539 George, Duke of Saxony, of the Albertine branch of the
house, both staunch Catholics, died. Of their
successors, Henry of Saxony actually embraced of Saxony" *
the Lutheran creed, and Joachim 11. adopted a and Joachim i.t
conciliatory policy; while his younger brother Brandenburg,
John, Margrave of the Neumark, became a de- die and are
voted adherent of the new opinions. Many other Henry and 7
smaller princes followed, and, by the close of the Joachim H
year 1539, the only important Catholic states were I535"1539'
those of Austria, Bavaria, the Palatinate, the Duchy of Bruns-
wick-Wolfenbiittel, and the three ecclesiastical Electorates;
moreover, the Elector of Cologne, Herman von der Wied,
was known to be wavering Shortly after, both he and the
Elector-Palatine embraced the Protestant cause.
, The crisis demanded instant action. But this was impos-
-Tsible unless the neutrality of France could be secured.
Charles accordingly offered the hand of his eldest _. ,
0 * Charles anxi-
daughter to the third son of Francis, who, by the ous for a free
death of the dauphin during the campaign in hand> makes
r ° r o unsuccessful
Provence, had now become the Duke of Orleans, advances to
He promised to cede to the Duke Franche-Comte' Francis-
and the Netherlands, if Francis, on his part, would grant to
him the duchy of Burgundy, abandon all claim to Milan
and to the suzerainty of Flanders, and restore the conquests
in Savoy and Piedmont to the Duke of Savoy. This would
have meant the revival of the old dukedom of Burgundy,
but as a fief of the Empire, and it is doubtful whether in any
case Francis would have acquiesced in the final loss, not only
of his conquests in Piedmont, but also of Milan. In short,
the claims on Italy prevented any agreement. After tedious
haggling as to whether the Duke of Orleans should have
instant possession, and whether the territories should revert
to Charles in the event of the Duke's death without issue,
Charles invested Philip, his son, with the duchy of Milan
212 European History \ 1494- 1 598
(October 1540), and Francis determined to appeal to arms
once more.
^With the prospect of war before him, the Emperor recog-
nised the impossibility of using force against the Protestants.-
Attem ted Reconciliation, if possible on the basis of com-
"reconciiiation prehension, was the only alternative; and for
StT^—" that purpose he summoned the Diet of Ratisbon,
ofRatiibon, in the spring of 1 541. For a moment the
I541, chances of reconciliation seemed bright. There
had risen of late in Italy a party of reform, led by Reginald
Pole, then a fugitive from England, the Venetian Contarini,
at this moment the papal legate in Germany, and Morone,
Bishop of Modena. This group of literary men, who repre-
sented the reaction against the sceptical spirit which had
dominated Italy during the days of Leo x., approached very
closely to Luther's views on the doctrine of Justification, and
were as eager as he to reform the abuses which disfigured the
Church of Rome. Even Paul in. declared himself desirous
of doing something. At Ratisbon, a conference of theologians
was held, under the presidency of Granvelle, at which
Melanchthon, Bucer, and Dr. Eck,1 Luther's old opponent,
appeared, and an agreement was come to on three of the
articles of controversy — Original Sin, Redemption, and Justi-
fication. In the Diet itself, the majority of the Electors and
of the deputies of the cities declared themselves in favour of
this agreement, and Pole rejoiced at the approach of peace
and concord. But these hopes were not to be realised. In the
Chamber of Princes the opposition was very formidable. The
Pope insisted that his supremacy and the Romish view of the
Sacraments should be accepted, and Luther could not bring
himself to believe in the sincerity of the Catholics. Even if the
question had been untrammelled by political considerations,
it is very doubtful whether any satisfactory conclusion could
have been arrived at, and politics could not be excluded.
Reconciliation with the Protestants would make Charles too
1 Eck, however, had opposed it throughout. Granvelle the chancellor,
Gropppr and Pflug, two Catholic divines, were in favour of it.
From the Treaty of Madrid to the Treaty of Crespi 213
powerful, as master of a reunited Germany, not to meet
with strenuous opposition, both within and without the
Empire. Francis and the Pope brought their intrigues to
bear on the Princes, many of whom were jealous of Haps-
burg influence and dreaded the loss of their political privileges. /
In vain did the Emperor suggest that the articles on which
the theologians had agreed should be accepted for the present,
and that, with regard to others, differences of opinion should
be tolerated on either side. The agreement was rejected
by the Chamber of Princes, much to Charles' indignation.
Thus failed the last chance of a reconciliation between the|
two religious parties — wrecked on political rivalries — a re-
conciliation which might have altered the history of Ger-
many and even of Europe. Yet, even so, the Protestants
gained much. Charlest anxious for their support during
the coming struggle, issued a declaration by which the
enforcement of the Recess of Augsburg was still further
delayed. Those who had secularised ecclesiastical property
were permitted to retain it until the final settlement ; Luther-
ans were to be admitted as assessors to the Imperial Chamber ;
and, until the meeting of a General Council, no one was to be
prevented from adopting Lutheranism. So confident were
the Protestants in the strength of their cause, that when the
Duke of Brunswick attempted, contrary to this Recess, to
force the decisions of the Imperial Chamber on Goslar, he
was driven from his duchy by the League of Schmalkalde
(summer of 1542), and the Catholics thus lost the only
important lay principality which they held in Northern
Germany.
While Francis had been doing his utmost to perpetuate the
religious divisions in Germany, he had been diligently pre-
paring for war. The Marshal Montmorency, Francis again
who had advocated friendship with Charles, was declares war.
disgraced ; alliances were eagerly sought for ; and y X541'
finally, the assassination of the French agent as he was passing
through the Milanese on his way to Constantinople (July 3,
1541), gave the French King a decent pretext for breaking the
214 European History, 1494- 1598
truce of Nice. War, however, was not actually declared till
1542. During the interval Charles suffered two disasters at the
hands of the Mahometans. In Hungary, Solyman, marching
to the support of the son of Zapolya (who had died in 1 540),
inflicted a crushing defeat on Ferdinand at Buda (July 30,
1 541), and in October, an expedition which the Emperor led
in person against Barbarossa in Algiers failed, chiefly owing
to wild weather on the African coasts.
The attempts of Francis to procure allies were not very
successful. Henry viii., at this moment engaged in the war
Attempts of w^tn James v. which ended in the defeat of the
Francis to Scots at Solway Moss (December), was in no
obtam a les. jlumour t0 supp0rt the French, their allies.1 More-
over, the old cause of quarrel between the English King and the
Emperor, arising out of the divorce of Catherine of Aragon,
had been in part removed by her death, and all idea of an
English alliance with the Protestants had been abandoned
with the divorce of Anne of Cleves and the fall of Cromwell
in 1540. Henry therefore declined the offers of Francis, and
renewed his alliance with Charles. The Protestants of Ger-
many, satisfied with the concessions of the Emperor, remained
quiet. The Pope, Paul 111., adhered to his policy of neutrality.
Solyman, the Kings of Denmark and of Sweden, and the
Duke of Cleves, were therefore the only allies of France.
Of these, Christian in. of Denmark was irritated by the sup-
port Which Charles had given to the claims of the Palatinate
branch of the Wittelsbach family on his throne ; Guscavus
Vasa, of Sweden, by the favour Charles had shown to a
revolt of his peasants ; while the Duke of Cleves disputed the
claim of the Emperor to the reversion of Gueldres, in virtue
of the will of Charles of Gueldres, who died without children
in 1538.
Francis, contrary to his usual strategy, refrained from
1 James had married (1) Magdalen, daughter of Francis 1. ; (2) Mary
of Guise,
From the Treaty of Madrid to the Treaty of Crespi 215
directly attacking the Milanese, and, while he acted on the
defensive in Piedmont, devoted his chief attention to the
Netherlands and Rousillon. The results of the first campaign,
1542, were not important. Luxembourg was campaign
gained, only to be lost, and the invasion of 011542.
Rousillon was foiled by the resistance of Perpignan. Never
theless, at the beginning of the year 1543, the position of
Charles was serious enough. Solyman was master of most
of Hungary and was preparing for a decisive stroke; Barba-
rossa was on the point of joining the French in an attack on
Piedmont ; the Pope, angry at the refusal of Charles to invest
his grandson, Ottavio Farnese, with Milan, at his concessions
to the Protestants, and at the demand for a General Council,
was leaning towards France ; Denmark had closed the Sound
to German ships ; moreover, it was very doubtful whether
Philip of Hesse, and John Frederick of Saxony would allow
the Duke of Cleves to be overthrown, more especially as the
Duke was the brother-in-law of John Frederick, and was
known to have strong Protestant sympathies.
The Emperor, however, succeeded in his negotiations with
England. On the death of James v. of Scotland, in 1542,
the regent, Mary of Guise, had rejected all the
, ^ in i-i tt. 1 • j i Henry allies
advances of the English King, and continued the himself with
French alliance. Henry accordingly turned again ph*rles*
to Charles. By the treaty of February 11, 1543,
Emperor and King agreed to demand that Francis should give
up his alliance with the Turk, indemnify the Empire for the
sums it had incurred in the Turkish war, and, as security for
the debts he owed the King of England, hand over Boulogne
and other towns. If Francis refused these terms, the allies
engaged themselves to pursue the war till Burgundy should be
restored to Charles, and England had made good her ancient
claim to Normandy and Guienne, and to the crown of France.
In May, Charles hastily left Spain, and arrived in Germany.
He secured the neutrality of John Frederick of Saxony,
entered the territories of tjie Puke of Cleves, and forced
216 European History, 1494- 1 598
him to resign his pretensions to Gueldres (August). In Sep-
The military tember the joint attack of Barbarossa and the
events of 1543. Count of Enghien, at the head of the French
troops, on Nice, was foiled by the approach of Doria with
the Spanish fleet and the army of Milan. Francis had not
even the consolation of success to requite him for the odium
he incurred by his alliance with the infidel. In Hungary,
indeed, the advance of Solyman was unchecked, and by
the end of August nearly the whole of that country had
been conquered. But even this success cost
Diet of Spires. _, ., , , ._.. r r* • i * •»
Feb. 1544. Francis dear. At the Diet of Spires, held
Charles gains jn February 1 544, Charles denounced the
assistance of . *rm
the Empire King of France as an enemy to Christendom,
against He informed the Protestants of the offers
France.
which Francis had made in 1539 to assist
him against them if he would cede Milan, and there-
with made further concessions with regard to the religious
question. He promised that a general free and Christian
Council should be summoned, and that, if the Pope delayed,
he would next year call a Diet for the final settlement
of the religious question. The Protestants expressed their
horror at the unholy alliance with the Turk, and once more
the Emperor secured the aid of the Empire in his struggle
with the French. At the same time, Denmark abandoned the
French alliance. Francis was now threatened by a serious com-
bination. In Piedmont, indeed, the Count of Enghien won a
decisive victory over the Marquis de Guasto and the army of
Milan at Cerisoles (April n). But in June, the Imperialists, after
Success of the reducing Luxembourg, invaded Champagne and
imperialists, advanced as far as the Marne, while the English
landed on the coast. Had Henry kept his engagement and
co-operated with Charles in a combined attack on Paris, the
capital might have fallen. Intent, however, on his own
schemes, he delayed to lay siege to Boulogne, which did not
surrender till September. Indignant at this breach of faith,
anxious to break the dangerous alliance between Francis and
From the Tredty of Madrid to the Treaty of Crespi 217
the Turk, and to have a free hand to deal with the Protestants
in Germany, Charles, who was, moreover, in serious want of
money, now offered peace.
Francis, largely owing to his intemperate mode of life, was
seriously ill. His mistress, Madame d'Estampes, feared that
on his death all influence would pass to her hated rival,
Diana of Poictiers, once the mistress of the King, now all
powerful with the Dauphin. She was therefore anxious to
secure for Orleans, the second son, an independent sovereignty.
He was at enmity with his brother, and might be of service to
her in the future. She therefore urged the King to accept the
Emperor's terms. Francis listened; and on September 18,
1544, the Treaty of Crespi ended the last war between the
two rivals. All conquests made since the truce of Nice
were to be abandoned. The Emperor renounced his claims
ion Burgundy, and Francis gave up his own upon Treat
[Naples, as well as the suzerainty of Flanders and CreaoL
Wirtois. The Emperor further promised to the Sept l8' I544'
Duke of Orleans, either the hand of his daughter, with the
Netherlands and Franche-Comte, or that of his niece, the
daughter of Ferdinand, with the duchy of Milan. Charles
retained the right of deciding which of these two marriages
should be carried out ; and, on the completion of the com-
pact, Savoy and Piedmont were to be restored to the Duke
Charles in. Finally, the rivals engaged themselves to unite in
>(iefending Christendom against the Turk, and in restoring
peace and unity to the Church.
Henry, complaining bitterly of the Emperor's desertion,
continued his war with Francis till the summer of ,„
Treaty of
1546. He then promised to restore Boulogne to Ardres,
Francis within eight years on the payment of a June 7' I546,
sum of money, and of the perpetual pension already pro-
mised in 1525 and 1527.
The marriage of Orleans, from which the French King
hoped so much, was prevented by the death of the Duke
(September 1545). Francis was, indeed, no longer bound
to surrender his conquests in Piedmont and Savoy, but
2 1 8 European History \ 1 494- 1598
these were poor compensation for four exhausting wars,
which cost France, it is said, 200,000 men.
Francis survived the Peace of Crespi two years and a half,
but these years are only noticeable for the persecution of the
~ iU r Huguenots in France, which will be treated of
Death of ° '
Francis i. hereafter. On March 31, 1547, he succumbed
March 31, 1547. tQ a disease wnich was the result of his careless
life, just when he was preparing to intervene once more in
the affairs of Germany. Few kings of France were so popular
during their lives, or have retained such a place in history ;
yet it may be doubted whether Francis deserved his reputation.
His character, though not wanting in some superficial attrac-
tiveness, was shallow and utterly wanting in high principle. His
generosity led him into gross extravagance. His gallantry was
spoilt by an entire absence of refinement and morality. His
chivalry and his love of manly sports and of the chase, even
his literary and artistic tastes, though praiseworthy in them-
selves, he shares with many a worthless character. Nor is it
easy to see how he benefited his country, except by his
(patronage of art and literature, and by founding the College of
\France for the study of languages and science. No doubt his
reign is marked by a great outburst of Renaissance archi-
tecture, of which the Louvre and some of the ' chateaux ' on the
Loire are the best examples. In literature, Rabelais ; in paint-
ing, the two Clouets ; in sculpture, Jean Goujon, have earned a
European reputation ; while of foreigners, the painters, Leon-
ardo da Vinci and Andrea del Sarto, and Benvenuto Cellini,
the metal-worker and sculptor, were welcomed at the court.
It may,, however, be questioned whether this artistic revival was
due to royal patronage, and at least in the more serious business
of government and administration, the name of Francis is
[associated with no important measure of reform. During his
jeign, the sale of offices became the custom, the corrup-
/\on of royal officers increased, and the taxes grew. The
independence of the Gallican Church was destroyed by the
From the Treaty of Madrid to the Treaty of Crespi 219
Concordat. The Estates-general were only twice summoned,
and gained no further privileges. The nobles, it is true, were/
kept in check and amused in the foreign wars, or at the)
court ; they lost much of their power, which was transferred
to the bureaucracy ; but in losing this they lost also their
usefulness; they retained their privileges, they swelled the.
factions of the court, and formed a turbulent class which was
to. disturb France for many a year. The lower classes rose,
indeed, to some prominence in the service of the State; butj
they were only powerful as servants of the King, and as
members of a bureaucracy which strangled all local life and
constitutional liberty. In short, during the reign of Francis j
the absolutism of the crown increased, without that beneficial f
administration which alone can justify it. Nor is his foreign
policy any more worthy of praise. It may be true that he
foiled the attempt of Charles to establish the universal su-
premacy of the Spanish Hapsburg monarchy in Europe, yer
we can scarce forgive him for his alliance with the Porte.
When we recall his cruel persecutions of the Huguenots at
home, it is difficult to justify his support of the Lutherans in
Germany. Jealous of the ascendency of Charles, he plunged
his country into war as carelessly as a knight of old entered
the lists, and, in spite of the lessons of the past, he grasped
after the bauble of a kingdom beyond the Alps, and neglected
to strengthen or extend the true frontiers of his country. A
good captain of a division, rather than a general : a pleasant,
clever, but wicked man, and a bad King, 'Le roi galant4
homme1 left behind him an absolute monarchy, uncheckec
and unsupported by any constitutional system, an encumberec
revenue, a heavy debt, a corrupt government, an immoral courtJ
a factious nobility, and a nation flushed with the lust of warj
and disturbed by religious discord. The troubles which came
on France after the King's death are in part at least attribut-
able to his policy, and yet it is these very troubles which, by
contrast, have led historians to judge more favourably of his
reign than it deserves.
CHAPTER V
FROM THE WAR OF SCHMALKALDE
TO THE TREATY OF CATEAU CAMBRESIS
Charles and the Protestants — Council of Trent, second session — Maurice won
over — Death of Luther — Outbreak of war of Schmalkalde — Charles
successful in Southern Germany — Council removed to Bologna — Battle of
Miihlberg — Diet of Augsburg — Charles and Paul ill. — The Interim —
Charles and Julius in. — End of second session of Council of Trent —
Maurice joins the Protestants — Treaty of Friedwald — Policy of Ferdinand
— Charles flies from Innsbruck — Treaty of Passau — Death of Maurice —
Diet and Peace of Augsburg — Truce of Vaucelles — Abdication and death
of Charles — Last war between France and Spain — Battles of Gravelines
and St. Quentin — Treaty of Cateau Cambresis.
§ I. The Schmalkaldic War and the battle of Muhlberg.
On the signature of the Peace of Qjjsspi, the hands of the
Emperor were at last free to deal with the Protestants in
Germany. To understand the conduct of Charles
last free to at this juncture, it is necessary to remind ourselves
deal with the 0f tne majn ajm Qf j^ jjfe jje na(i inherited from
Protestants. . . . .
Maximilian the idea of establishing an universal
supremacy in Western Europe ; from his grandmother Isabella,
that severe spirit of orthodoxy so characteristic of the Spanish
nation. To a man with such views as these, the Lutheran
movement was equally distasteful, both from a political and
a religious point of view ; and, had he been able to follow his
own convictions, he would have taken immediate steps to
crush out the new opinions in the year 1521. But Charles
was no fanatic, and the political exigencies of the moment
had caused him to listen to the advice of his ministers, more
especially of Gattinara, who bade him temporise, and try to win
back the Lutherans by measures of conciliation. From that
day to this, it had been necessary to pursue the same path,
while of late he had entertained the idea of comprehension
and possibly of settling the religious difficulty by a National
Diet [pp. 204, 212, 216].
220
The Schmalkaldic War 221
But although this policy had served the political ends of
the Emperor, and prevented the Lutherans from joining his
enemies in the field, it had not succeeded in bringing them
back to the fold. In his determination to put an end to
schism, by force if necessary, the Emperor had never swerved.
Of late, more especially since the death of Gattinara (1530),
he had learnt to depend more upon himself, and now at last
the moment had arrived for action. Meanwhile, the Spanish
leanings of Charles had been intensified. Since the resigna-
tion of the Austrian lands to Ferdinand in 1521, he had
looked on Spain as the centre of his rule, and had identified
himself with Spanish interests in Church and State. It
was Spain that had chiefly supported him in his European
struggles, and he now came, rather as King of Spain and
Emperor of the West, than as a German prince, to re-establish
the unity of the Empire and of the ancient Church. Charles,
however, was too good a statesman to ruin his cause by over
haste. He appreciated the strength of the Protestant
position, and saw that he must proceed with caution. The
Germans had often petitioned for a General Council, and
if a Council could now be summoned, it might institute
certain reforms, which might conciliate the A
' ° p Agreement
more moderate, and strengthen his hand. For with the
this, the consent of the Pope was necessary. Pope*
Accordingly, Charles promised Parma and Piacenza to
Ottavio Farnese, the grandson of Paul, and the Pope con-
sented to re-summon the Council to Trent,1 in March, 1545.
Meanwhile, the Emperor met his Diet at Worms. The
hopes of the Emperor with regard to the Council were
not fulfilled. It did not open its session till December. It
was not well attended; only some forty bishops second
came, and among them the Spaniards and Sessi°n of
_ „ . ° . . , ..,-», -r. the Council
Italians were in a decided majority. The Protes- of Trent,
tants therefore refused to acknowledge it as a Dec- J545.
free and general Council, more especially as it was decided
1 It had already been summoned in 1 542, but had been postponed.
222 . European History, 1494- 1598
that its members should vote as individuals and not by
nations, a course of procedure which would ensure the
victory of the papal party. Moreover, the wish of Charles
that the Council should postpone the consideration of dogma,
and first proceed to the reform of abuses, was rejected. It
was agreed that both subjects should be taken together; and
on the question as to the authority of tradition, and the
doctrine of Justification, the views of Rome prevailed.
Charles, meanwhile, had met with more success in Germany
in his attempts to gain the German Princes to his side.
Charles William, Duke of Bavaria, who, by the death of
succeeds in his brother (1 545), had become sole ruler in the
ianjtf ihT duch?' had hithert0- although a Roman Catholic,
princes of coqueted with the League of Schmalkalde. He
Germany, wag nQW brougrht over by the promise of the hand
especially ° J r
Maurice of of Ferdinand's daughter for his son, with the
saxony. reversion of Bohemia should Ferdinand die with-
out male heirs, and by the hopes held out to him, that, if the
Elector-Palatine remained obdurately Protestant, the electoral
dignity should be transferred from the Palatine to the Bavarian
branch of the Wittelsbach family. John* of Brandenburg-
Kustrin, Margrave of the Neumark, and Albert Alcibiades of
Brandenburg-Culmbach, two of the younger members of the
House of Hohenzollern, annoyed at the reinstatement of the
Duke of Wurtemberg (cf. p. 210), also joined the Emperor.
Charles was further successful in securing the neutrality of
Joachim, Elector of Brandenburg, Frederick, the Elector-
Palatine, and of some of the cities who had been members of
the League.
Of his allies, however, by far the most important was
Maurice of Saxony. The history of the House of Wettin in
Saxony illustrates most forcibly the evil results of that custom,
so prevalent among the German princes, of dividing thek
territories among their sons. In 1464, Frederick 11. of Saxony
had died, leaving his territories to his two sons, Ernest and
Albert, and from that day the jealousy between these two
lines had been extreme. In the early days of the Lutheran
The Schmalkaldic War 223
movement, while the Electors, Frederick the Wise, John, and
Jjohn Frederick, the representatives of the elder or Ernestine
branch, had, in their capital of Wittenberg, been the earnest
supporters of reform, George, the representative of the Alber-tine
line at Meissen, had been one of the most devoted advocates
of the ancient faith. This cause of difference was but in part
removed when Henry, the brother of Duke George, who
succeeded him in 1539, accepted Lutheranism. Maurice,
who succeeded his father Henry in 1541, had also declared
himself a Protestant, and had married the daughter of the
Landgrave, Philip of Hesse. Nevertheless, he had recalled
some of the ministers of his Catholic uncle, George, and among
them Carlowitz. He had also refused to join the League
of Schrrjalkalde, weak and divided by jealousies as it was,
and had always taken an independent position, which was
disliked by his cousins at Wittenberg. The estrangement
thus caused between him and John Frederick, the Elector, was
aggravated by more personal grounds of quarrel. None of the
princes of Germany had made greater use of the cry for secular-
isation of ecclesiastical property than these Saxon princes, and
this had led to fresh disagreements between the two cousins.
The bishopric of Naumburg had been secularised by John
Frederick; Maurice was anxious to do the same with the
bishopric of Merseburg. They also quarrelled over their
claims within the limits of the see of Meissen, which was
under the common jurisdiction of both branches ; while both
were anxious to obtain possession of the two bishoprics of
Magdeburg and Halberstadt, which had accepted Protestant-
ism, and lay close at hand.
The Emperor, by cleverly playing upon these jealousies
and by magnificent promises, succeeded in buying the alliance
of Maurice. He consented to appoint him guardian of the
bishoprics of Halberstadt and Magdeburg, entertained the
proposal of assigning the bishoprics of Merseburg and Meissen .
to him as hereditary duchies, and finally promised to transfer
to him the electoral dignity now held by John Frederick.
On the question of religion it was not difficult to calm the
224 European History -, 1494- 1 5 98
apprehensions of the Saxon duke. He had been subjected tc
various influences during his youth ; his mother, Catherine
of Mecklenburg, was an earnest Protestant ; his uncle, the
Catholic George, had made a favourite of him and tried to
influence his religious views. It is not, therefore, astonishing
that Maurice, although by no means an irreligious man, had
no strong convictions on points of dogma, nor that he viewed
matters from the standpoint of the statesman rather than of the
theologian. He had accepted Lutheranism because his people
wished for it, and the promises of the Emperor seemed to
give all that was needed. In religious matters, Maurice was
to allow no further innovations until the final settlement,
which was to be referred to a Council, ' and, if some points
remained unsettled for the present, Maurice was to be under
no apprehension.' The terms indeed were vague; but when
people wish to be satisfied, they are not very exacting. On
these conditions, therefore, Maurice engaged to join the
Emperor in his attack on the Elector, John Frederick. He
did not, however, thereby break his alliance with the Land-
grave, nor declare war on the League of Schmalkalde.
While these negotiations had been going on, Charles had
been holding diets and entertaining schemes of compromise.
Charles takes ^s attempts, however, to gain comprehension
action against either through a Council or a Diet had failed,
antsPr°teSt" an(^ at ^ast tne moment f°r action had arrived.
June 1546. A truce had been effected with Solyman ; France
and the Pope were friendly, and Charles' concessions had
brought over several of his opponents. Against the wish of
Granvelle he therefore threw off the mask, and at Ratisbon
published the imperial ban against those who refused
to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the Imperial Chamber.
Even now he did not speak of the war as a religious one ;
he proceeded, he declared, not against those who were
dutiful subjects, but against those who would not submit
to imperial laws; he was about to check insubordination,
not to punish heresy. It is not necessary to accuse
Charles of deliberate falsehood ; indeed, as long as Maurice
The Schmalkaldic War 225
was on his side, it could scarcely be called a war against the
Protestants. Nor, on the other hand, is it just to accuse the
Protestants of having taken up the question of reform solely
from political motives, in pursuance of their old struggle against
the Emperor. Nevertheless, the cause of religious indepen-
dence was now so closely identified with that of territorial
independence, and the unity of the Church so intimately
connected in Charles' mind with that of the Empire, that the
religious and political issues could no longer be distinguished.
The question at stake was this : should Germany be forced to
accept the mediaeval system of one Empire and one Church,
or should the princes vindicate their rights to political and
religious autonomy?
By a strange coincidence, Luther, who had been the prime
author of the discord, and yet had striven so long to keep the
religious question apart from politics, and had so Death of
reluctantly sanctioned the appeal to arms, passed Luther.
away before the actual outbreak of hostilities. On e ' x ' I54 '
February 18, 1546, he died in his native town of Eisleben, in
his sixty-fourth year. Whatever may be our view as to the
doctrinal position of the Reformer, it is as idle to deny his
greatness, as to belittle the importance of the movement he
originated. Of his faults, and he had many, some were
those of his class and of his age, some were all his own.
Luther was the son of a Saxon peasant, and never freed him-
self from the homely coarseness of his early surroundings.
Scurrility in controversy was the custom of the day, and
Luther did not rise above the common standard ; while nature
had given him an uncompromising and dictatorial, and a some-
what violent character. Yet he was not deficient in more
amiable qualities. His hospitality, his generosity, his geniality
and affection, made him beloved at home and among his
friends ; while his sterner virtues — his honesty, his piety, his
earnest conviction, his unflagging industry, and, above all,
his unflinching courage — even his adversaries have not been
able to gainsay. It would also be a mistake to imagine
period iv. p
226 European History \ 1494- 1598
that he had no refinement. Of this his hymns, many of which
are familiar to us, and, above all, his German translation of the
Bible, are sufficient proof. This magnificent work, which did
much to elevate and fix the literary style of Germany, is enough,
of itself, to give to Luther a high place among men of letters.
The position of the League of Schmalkalde on the pro-
clamation of the imperial ban was a serious one. They had
trusted too easily to the Emperor's promises,
Critical con- * r *"
dition of the and now found themselves unprepared for war.
League of The concessions of Charles had reduced their
Schmalkalde. . _■ , , ' , ,
ranks, and the only members of the League who
actually took up arms were John Frederick, the Elector of
Saxony, Philip, Landgrave of Hesse, Duke Ulrich of Wiirtem-
berg, and the towns of Augsburg, Strasburg, Ulm, and Con-
stance. None the less, had the Protestants boldly taken the
offensive, they might have secured the Upper Inn and the
outlet of the Brenner Pass, and thus prevented the march of
troops from Italy, without which the Emperor could do little;
or, again, they might have surrounded him in Ratisbon, where
he had but few troops. But the organisation of the League was
very faulty, there were many jealousies and quarrels, and
John Frederick was no statesman, and no general. The army
of the League, therefore, adopted a weak defensive attitude,
and entrenched itself between the Danube and the Rhine.
Charles, taking advantage of the dilatoriness of his enemies,
had time to concentrate his troops from Spain, Italy, and
the Netherlands, and then by superior strategy, in which he
was assisted by Alva, was able to avoid a decisive battle until
events in the north forced his enemies to retire.
It was not until J^^r^e had received a definite promise
of the Electorate that, on October 27, he declared himself.
Armed with Charles' orders to occupy the forfeited estates oi
John Frederick, he then approached his own subjects. He
warned them of the danger of refusal, and by undertaking
that their religion should not be interfered with, at last
gained their consent to act. Finally, when John Frederick
The Schmalkaldic War 227
contemptuously rejected his proposal to occupy the Electorate
quietly, he. ""i*^ his forces with those of Ferdinand and
rapidly overran the whole territory, with the ex-
, Maurice
ception of Wittenberg, Eisenach, and Gotha declares him-
(November 1 546). The receipt of this news filled self» °ct- a7»
\ , ,- , t • , 1 j 1 • x546. And
the members of the League with alarm, and their overruns the
overtures of peace having been spurned by Charles, Electorate,
the Landgrave Philip and John Frederick hurried
north, while the rest of the confederates dispersed to protect,
if possible, their own territories. This enabled the Emperor
to deal with his opponents in detail, and to make himself
master in the south. The cities of the League were _
0 Success of
quickly occupied. The Duke of Wurtemberg, and Charles in
the Elector-Palatine, who, though taking no active the South*
part himself, had assisted the League with troops, submitted.
They undertook to obey the Diet, and the decisions of the
Imperial Chamber, and to pay a fine ; and Charles, on his side,
promised, as he had promised to Maurice, that with regard to
religious matters they should be left in peace until the final
settlement. At the same time, Herman von der Wied, the
Archbishop of Cologne, resigned his see (January 1547), and
a Catholic succeeded him.
Elsewhere, however, matters were not going so well for
Charles. John Frederick, on his return, not only easily
recovered his dominions, but invaded the terri- m
. x Successes
tories of Maurice, where he was well received; of John
Ferdinand, recalled by a Protestant insurrection Frederick
_, . , , . , in Saxony.
in Bohemia, could give no assistance; and
Maurice in a few weeks lost all his lands except Leipsic and
Dresden, which were too strong to be suddenly reduced.
Nor could Charles respond at once to Maurice's ouarrel of
call for help. His alliance with the Pope seemed Charles with
likely to break up. The interests of Paul in. as an patents his
Italian potentate demanded that neither France assisting
nor Spain should become too powerful; as a Maunce'
Farnese, it was his aim to increase the power of his family '
228 European History \ 1494- 1598
The refusal, therefore, of Charles to appoint Ottavio Farnese
as Stadtholder of Milan on the death of the Marquis
de Guasto in March 1546, and the appointment of Gonzaga,
an old enemy of the Farnese and a strong supporter of the
imperial claims in Italy, had irritated the Pope, while the
imperial successes now alarmed him. Emperor and Pope
differed, too, with regard to the Council of Trent. Charles
wa& most anxious that the Council should proceed no further
in the definition of dogma, lest thereby the apprehensions
of the moderate Protestants should be too soon aroused;
Paul, less careful of the position of Charles in Germany, wished
to maintain the infallibility of the Pope and of the Church,
and hesitated to touch the thorny question of internal reform ;
he also feared lest the Emperor, victorious in the north,
might come to Trent and claim to preside. True, therefore,
to the traditions of papal policy, Paul began to waver. The
time having expired for which he had lent his troops
(December 1546), he recalled them, and refused to send
any more. He declined to sanction the grant of ecclesiastical
revenues from Spain which Charles had demanded
Council of . . _,
Trent removed for the war ; and since Trent was surrounded by
to Bologna. Austrian lands, in March he removed the Council
March 1549.
to Bologna. Nor did the Pope stop here. He
even entered into intrigues with Francis, who, disappointed
in his hopes with regard to Milan by the death of the Duke
of Orleans (September 1545), was negotiating again with the
League of Schmalkalde, and stirring up revolts in Genoa,
Siena, and Naples.
Fortunately for Charles, the dilatoriness and want of
generalship of John Frederick saved Maurice from ruin, until
the death of Francis 1. (March 1547), relieved the
marches Emperor from the fear of a French attack ; and
North. he was able, although tortured with gout and pale
pn 1547. ag a ghost) ^0 march north, in April 1547. Even
then the imperial army only numbered some 16,000 men,
• mostly Italians, Spaniards, and Hungarians ; while the Elector
TJie Schmalkaldic War 22§
had a much larger force at his disposal. This deficiency in
numbers was, however, fully compensated for by the superi-
ority of Charles' veterans, and by the utter want of generalship
displayed by his opponent. Not only had the Elector de-
spatched a considerable detachment to aid the Bohemians
against Ferdinand, but he further weakened his forces by
attempting to hold open towns. When the success of Charles,
who entered Saxony from the south and rapidly reduced
these positions, forced him at last to concentrate on Muhlberg,
a Town to the east of the Elbe not far from Dresden, he
did not even then use all his troops to dispute the passage
of the river, where Charles might, perhaps, have been success-
fully resisted. When the Emperor had crossed the river, the
Elector in vain attempted to retreat. He was forced to
accept a battle, in which his personal courage and Battle of
that of his troops was of no avail against the well- Muhlberg.
disciplined veterans of his foe. After a short pn 24, I547*
struggle, the Saxons gave way ; the Elector, surrounded and
wounded, had no alternative but to surrender; and Charles
and his foreign army had won a decisive victory with the loss
of some fifty men. It was earnestly debated whether John
Frederick should not answer with his head for his rebellion.
Such condign punishment, urged Pedro de Soto, Charles'
confessor, would have an excellent effect. But Wittenberg
was strong, and too severe a treatment might raise further
opposition; accordingly, by the advice of Granvelle and of
Alva, his life was spared. Even so, the terms were hard
enough. The city of Wittenberg was to surrender at once ;
John Frederick was to resign the electoral dignity and most
of his territories, of which those in Bohemia were to go to
Ferdinand; he was to submit to the decision of ihe Imperial
Chamber, and remain a prisoner for the rest of his life. On
these conditions the city of Gotha and the district around it,
with a pension to be paid out of the other territories, were
secured to his heirs, and a provision was to be made for his
own support.
230 European History -, 1494- 1598
The capture of John Frederick was shortly followed by the
submission of the Landgrave. Hitherto he had rejected the
offers made by Charles. Now that opposition seemed hope-
less, he was persuaded by Ferdinand and Maurice to accept
the Emperor's terms, severe though they were. Most of the
Hessian strongholds were to be delivered, and their fortifica-
tions demolished; the Landgrave was to acknowledge the
imperial authority, and submit to the decrees of the Imperial
Chamber ; he was to set the Duke of Brunswick free, to pay
a fine, and to place himself in the Emperor's hands. Charles,
it is said, once master of the person of the Landgrave, took
advantage of some looseness in the agreement, and, contrary to
the distinct undertaking of Ferdinand and Maurice, refused to
grant him his liberty, declaring that he had only promised
not to keep him in prison for ever.1 It does not appear that
Charles actually broke his word, and the chief blame of the
mistake must apparently fall on Ferdinand and Maurice, who
gave promises to Philip without full authority. None the less,
Maurice had understood Charles otherwise. He considered
that he had been duped, and Germany believed it. Maurice
never forgave the Emperor, and Germany did not forget.
§ 2. From the Diet of Augsburg to the Peace of Augsburg,
When on September 1, 1547, Charles met his Diet at
Augsburg, he seemed at last about to realise his dream of
re-establishing the unity of the] Church. All
Dietof Augs- & .,,,., , ,
burg. nis opponents were either defeated or had come
Sept. 1547 to to terms, and all had agreed to accept the de-
June 1548. . . ° r
cisions of a General Council. The Diet unani-
mously declared itself to the same effect, and demanded that
the Council should be recalled to Trent. The Chamber of
the Princes further insisted that the decisions already
published by the Council should be reconsidered. The lay
Electors held that Scripture should be the only authority on
1 The question whether Charles had used the words, 'nicht einiges' (any),
or 'nicht ewiges (perpetual) Gefangniss,' appears to be an afterthought.
Cf. Armstrong, ii. 156.
The Schmalkaldic Wat 23 1
matters of dogma, and wished for reform of the Church in
* Head, and members ' ; the deputies from the imperial cities
requested that the Council should be composed of learned
men of all orders. Some desired that the Council should
be under the presidency of the Emperor, and although this
was not demanded by the whole Diet, nothing was said of the
necessity of papal approval.
The Emperor, armed with this support, requested Paul to
recall the Council from Bologna to Trent. He expressly
stated that he did not approve of all that had
been said against the papal authority, but urged quarreibe-
the Pope to take advantage of this unlooked-for tween Pope
... , " _ x and Emperor.
submission on the part of Germany. It cannot
be denied that a serious question of principle was involved in
this request. Although the Emperor did not definitely claim
the right of presidency; yet the demand that the Council
should return to Trent, where still some of the Spanish and
Neapolitan bishops remained, practically assumed that the
Council at Bologna was no true Council. Compliance with
the demand of Charles would have emphasised the control of
the temporal over the spiritual power, and dealt a blow at
the independence of the Church, which claimed to be guided
by the Holy Spirit. And yet if the Pope had really been in
complete harmony with the Emperor on other matters, one
of the many compromises which were suggested could pro-
bably have been carried out by the clever diplomacy of
Mendoza, the imperial ambassador at Rome. Unfortunately,
the affairs of Italy once more stood in the way of that recon-
ciliation between Pope and Emperor which was so desirable
for the welfare of the Church. On September 10 Pierluigi
Farnese, to whom his father Paul had granted Parma and
Piacenza, fell a "victim to a conspiracy. He had been the
centre of anti-imperialist intrigues during the winter and
spring of 1546-1547; and Gonzaga, the imperial governor
at Milan, who, with the consent of the Emperor, had sup-
ported the conspiracy though not the assassination, forth-
with occupied Piacenza, ostensibly to preserve the peace,
232 European History, 1494-159S
but really in pursuit of ambitious views of extending the
imperial authority in north Italy. The angry Pope at once
entered into negotiations with Henry 11. of France. He was
even heard to say that he would call hell itself to avenge him
of his enemy. At the same time the prelates at Bologna,
influenced, it must be allowed, by more worthy motives,
replied to the Emperor's demand by summoning those ecclesi-
astics who had remained at Trent to join them at Bologna,
whereby they might show that Germany meant to obey the
Council. Charles might now have attempted to form a Council
of his own at Trent; but he was too good a Catholic to think
of starting a schism. Declaring therefore that he must take
measures for the protection of that Church which the Pope
neglected, he determined to settle matters in his own way.
His confessor, Pedro de Soto, suggested that he should
forbid all Lutheran preaching, insist on the restoration of
secularised property, and of the Catholic ritual, and then
leave every one to think as he pleased. But this, said
Ferdinand, would require another war. The Emperor there-
fore fell back on the suggestion of his brother, that he should
try to find some ground of union in Germany independently
of the Pope. The Interim followed, a document drawn up
The interim, by theologians from both sides, and accepted
May 19, 1548. without debate by the Diet, May 19. It affirmed
that ' There is but one Church, of which the Pope is chief
Bishop ; but the power lies in the Church under the guar-
dianship of the Holy Spirit, rather than in the Pope.' While
insisting on the seven Sacraments in the Catholic sense,
it agreed to the doctrine of Justification by Faith in some-
what vague terms, and declared that the questions of the
celibacy of the clergy and of the Communion in both kinds
should be left undecided until the calling of the future free
Christian Council. It must not be supposed that Charles
intended this settlement to be permanent ; he only looked
on it as a temporary measure which might entice the Pro-
testants back to obedience to the Church and to the Empire.
The Sckmalkaldic War 233
Nevertheless, had the whole Empire, Catholic and Protes-
tant, accepted the Interim, a decided step would have been
taken towards the establishment of a national Church under
the control of the Emperor rather than of the Pope. Any
such result as this was, however, prevented by the refusal of
the Catholics to acknowledge the Interim as binding on them
in their dealings with their subjects, and the only question
was, how far Charles would be successful with the Protestants.
The attempts of Charles to re-establish his authority were
not confined to the ecclesiastical sphere. He had also
approached the Diet with schemes for strengthening the
imperial power. He did not succeed in obtaining all he
wished. His desire to revive, and, if possible, extend the
organisation of the Suabian League (which had died out of
late), though approved of by the smaller Princes, was reso-
lutely opposed by many of the larger, even Maurice himself,
and had to be abandoned. Nevertheless Charles gained much.
He was allowed to nominate, for this term, the assessors to
the Imperial Chamber, so long as they were Catholics, and
was granted ' a Roman month,' as a fund for future contin-
gencies. He also obtained his aim with respect to the
Netherlands, which were now definitely organised as one of
the Circles of the Empire, were put under imperial protection,
and were to contribute to imperial taxation. But while in this
way Charles hoped to gain for these hereditary possessions the
support of the Empire, yet they were to retain their own
privileges ; and though their ruler was to have a seat in the
Diet, they were to be free from its control, and from the
jurisdiction of the Imperial Chamber. In June, 1548, the
Diet was dismissed, and Charles proceeded to enforce the
Interim on the Protestants. In the south, where the events
of the previous year had made him master, he was able,
partly by expelling the Lutheran preachers, partly by revolu-
tionising the town councils, partly by means of his Spanish
soldiery, to secure obedience. In the north, he had more
difficulty. But even there, except in the case of Magdeburg
234 European History, 1494- 1598
and a few imperial towns, he eventually obtained a general
assent to a modified form of the Interim, drawn up by
Melanchthon, and termed the ' Leipsic Interim.'
In November 1549, the position of the Emperor was much
strengthened by the death of Paul in. That Pope, in the
The death of vain hope of prevailing on the Emperor to free
Paul in Nov. parraa and Piacenza from their dependence on
election of Milan, had assumed for a moment a conciliatory
Julius in., attitude, and spoke of confirming the Interim, and
the position recalling the Council to Trent. Many at Rome
of Charles. thought these concessions dangerous and opposed
such a policy, and on Charles' refusal to comply with his
demands with respect to Parma and Piacenza, the Pope
had declared them annexed to the papal see and turned to
France for aid. His death, therefore, was welcome news
to Charles, more especially as Cardinal Monte, who suc-
ceeded as Julius in. in February 1550, contrary to all expecta-
tions, declared for the imperialists. He promised to recall
Second the Council to Trent, to consider the question
Session 0f internai reform, and to come to terms with
of Diet of _'. *».-.« ,.
Augsburg. regard to the Interim. Fortified by this un-
juiyxsso. wonted alliance Charles found little difficulty in
influencing the Diet (which was re-summoned to Augsburg
in July), to submit to the Council of Trent ; the Protestants
even undertaking to appear there and plead their cause.
The success of his ecclesiastical policy now enabled Charles
to return to his dadinj; idea of establishing the hereditary
Charles' ru^e °*" tne ^aPsburgs over the Empire of the
dynastic West. But of this Empire the centre was to
ideas. ^ nQt Qernianyj kut Spain and Italy, and its
representative after his death, not his brother Ferdinand, but
his son Philip. The plan, long cherished, had been steadily
pursued. In 1540, Philip had been recognised as Duke of
Milan. When Charles left Spain in 1543, he had intrusted the
government to his son, although then only sixteen years old.
In 1548, he had sent for Philip that he might become known
The Schmalkaldic War $%%
in Germany, and had, though with difficulty, obtained for him
an oath of allegiance from the Netherlands. Meanwhile, an
intimate correspondence between the two had completely
imbued Philip with his father's ideas. The Emperor now hoped
to complete his scheme by securing for his son the succession
to the Empire. He had originally intended to bring the
subject before the Diet ; but it was necessary first to over-
come the not unnatural opposition of Ferdinand. After
much difficulty, a compromise was arrived at between the
two brothers (March 9). It was agreed that on the death of
Charles, Ferdinand was to be Emperor; he was, however,
to make Philip imperial vicar, and support his election as
King of the Romans. Philip, on his part, promised to do
the same for Maximilian, the son of Ferdinand, when he
himself should ascend the imperial throne. Charles, though
he had not obtained all that he wanted — for the Empire
was to be shared in turn between the two branches of the
family — had to all appearance won over Ferdinand to his
scheme of a future union of the Empire with the Spanish
monarchy of Philip. But, as a fact, he had excited the
jealousy of Ferdinand, who intrigued with the Electors to defeat
the plan which he had promised to further, and henceforth
ceased to support his brother as he had hitherto done. The
family quarrel thus aroused was shortly to cost Charles dear.
When, in November 1551, Charles went to Innsbruck
that he might watch over the Council which had re-
assembled at Trent in September, he might well think
that he had won ; the unity of the Church seemed about
to be re-established, and the imperial power to Renewed
be revived, based on the support of the Spanish quarrels with
, „,. _ , . the Pope
monarchy. I he next few months were, how- concerning
ever, to see this hope dispelled. The failure of the Council
the Council was to prove the impracticability sept. 1551 to
of his ecclesiastical policy ; the European opposi- APril x55a.
tion, to ruin his scheme of political supremacy. From the
friendship of the Pope and the recalling of the Council to
236 European History, 1494- 1 598
Trent, Charles had anticipated great things. A states-
man rather than a theologian, he did not appreciate the
difficulties which surrounded the question of dogma, nor
those which concerned the independence of the Church as an
organisation of divine institution. Although severely orthodox
himself, he did not see the necessity for further definition of
doctrine, and, above all, wished nothing to be done that might
irritate the Protestants, until the Council had approached the
question of reform. The abuses of the Church he knew
had been the primary cause of the Lutheran revolt, and a
genuine reform of these would, he believed, enable him
successfully to overcome all further opposition in Germany.
He accordingly supported the demand of the Protestants
that they should be heard, and that the decisions of the last
session should be reconsidered, while he urged Julius to deal
forthwith with the question of reform. It was not to be
expected that this policy would find favour among the more
orthodox, still less with the Pope. When at last, in January
1552, the Protestants, having extorted a promise of safe
conduct, appeared at the Council, it at once became clear
that an accommodation was impossible, either on the question
of dogma, or of the constitution of the Council, or even of the
form of procedure. The demands of the Reformers that Scrip-
ture should be the only standard of truth, that laymen should
have a vote, and that the Pope should claim no right of
presidency nor of veto, 'since a Council was superior to a
Pope,' seemed to the orthodox both godless and insolent;
and Julius was determined to resist this serious attack on the
papal position. Nor were the demands of Charles and his
Spanish bishops any more palatable. The Emperor's idea
of reform was based on the ecclesiastical organisation of Spain.
There the crown was served by a church, the discipline of
which had been reformed by Ximenes, and which could be
used as a weapon for extending royal authority, and even for
checking papal pretensions. The request more especially that
bishops should be resident and that the Pope should resign the
right of collation to all benefices was stoutly resisted by Julius;
The Schmalkaldic War 237
'rather than suffer that, we will suffer all misfortune,' he said.
The Papal court subsisted on foreign benefices since the
Italian bishoprics were poor, and the independence of national
churches would destroy the Papal power. The Pope, more-
over, was disturbed at the refusal of Henry II. to acknow-
ledge the Council or to allow French bishops to attend it,
and by that King's preparations for renewing the war in Italy.
Evidently nothing was to be expected of the Council. It had
only served to illustrate the conflicting interests of the Pope
and Emperor, and the hopelessness of all reconciliation with
the Protestants. Under these circumstances it was soon
abandoned by the German bishops, and dragged on until the
course of events in Germany caused its second suspension
(April 28, 1552).
While Charles' ecclesiastical policy was thus breaking
down, the whole fabric of his political scheme, of which his
ecclesiastical views were but a part, was tumbling
into ruins. Although Henry 11. of France had Charles'
viewed with apprehension the growing pretensions political
of Charles, he had not yet felt strong enough c emes*
for active opposition. In the summer of 155 1, however,
hostilities broke out in Italy over the interminable question
of Parma and Piacenza, in which Henry 11. supported the
cause of Ottavio Farnese. But Charles had no money to
send to Gonzaga ; Julius in. was most anxious to keep matters
quiet ; and Henry, on the point of invading Germany, con-
sented to a truce (April 1552), by which Ottavio was to be
left in possession of Parma for two years.
Henry n. rightly judged that the issue must be fought out
in the north. Here the indignation against the Spanish
rule and policy of Charles had been growing fast.
The Interim had never been popular even with of Henry 11.
the Catholic princes ; it had been passed without ann^y
the consent of the Church, and the concessions to Germany.
the Lutherans were considered a dangerous com- x55i-i55»«
promise with heresy. The Protestants looked upon many of
its clauses as popish, and resented the tyrannical means by
238 European History, 1494- 1598
which they had been enforced. Above all, Charles' behaviour
to the Landgrave irritated all ; not only did Charles keep him
a prisoner, he forced him to follow him in his progresses,
and treated him with open contempt. Indeed,
against Charles' conduct had changed. The certainty of
Charles success made him abandon all idea of concilia-
tion,-and, tortured by gout and other ailments,
he became more irritable, more dictatorial, and more over-
bearing than he had ever been before.
Already in February 1550, John of Custrin and Albert
Alcibiades of Culmbach had formed a defensive league to
protect their common interests, and had decided
intrigues to approach the French King. Meanwhile, the
with the relations between the Emperor and Maurice were
daily becoming more strained. The victory of
Miihlberg won, Charles was most unwilling to make Maurice
too strong, and accordingly had hesitated to fulfil his promises.
The right of protection over Magdeburg and Halberstadt was
not granted ; the representatives of John Frederick were not
forced to acknowledge their new master; and the Emperor had
been heard to say that in John Frederick ' he had a bear which
he could let loose against Maurice.' On the other hand, the
young Elector found that his position among the Protestants
and in his own dominions was daily becoming more difficult.
The unpopularity of the Emperor was transferred to him ; the
treatment of the Landgrave was laid at his door; he was
looked upon as the arch-traitor who had ruined the Protestant
cause ; and schemes were on foot of driving him from his
ill-gotten possessions by the aid of France. Maurice began to
fear that his new-won Electorate might be torn from him either
by the Emperor, or by the Protestant Princes. Apart from
these personal motives, which were strong, it cannot be denied
that Maurice also thought of the cause of Protestantism,
which would be seriously endangered if Charles should become
completely master. The interests therefore of Maurice's co-
religionists, as well as his own, urged him to offer his alliance
to the Princes on condition that they would guarantee him
The Schmalkaldic War 239
the peaceful possession of his newly-won territories. Accord-
ingly, since the spring of 1550, he had been making advances.
None the less, the Protestant Princes not unnaturally suspected
him, more especially as Charles had intrusted him with the
enforcement of the Interim on the city of Magdeburg. It was
not therefore till February 20, 1551, that Maurice was able to
allay the apprehensions of the Protestants. He then con-
vinced them that the expedition against the city was only
intended to lull the suspicions of Charles ; he promised them
that the religion of the inhabitants should be in no way
interfered with, and that he would be true to the Protestant
cause. By two treaties (February and May, 1551), the Princes
agreed to unite in common defence of the Protestant religion
and the liberties of Germany, and Maurice was secured in his
Electorate against all claims of the Ernestine branch.
The siege of Magdeburg was now continued. In November,
1 55 1, the city surrendered. The citizens promised to implore
the pardon of the Emperor, to pay a fine, and to
conform to the Interim. At the same time they surrender?
received secret assurances from Maurice that they to Maurice,
should not be deprived of their privileges, nor
disturbed in the exercise of their religion. Further, they
elected Maurice as their Burgrave, a title generally held by
the electoral house of Saxony, which gave him considerable
jurisdiction over the city and its dependencies.
Meanwhile, the question had been debated whether the
League should remain a defensive one, and be confined to
Germany, or whether it should look for help from outside.
Maurice held that if the Protestants were to win they must
gain the aid of France. In spite of the opposition of John of
Custrin, who refused to go so far, the advice of _
. . . Treaty of
Maurice was followed, and negotiations were com- Friedwaid.
menced in October, 155 1, which led, in January, Jan- I552'
1552, to the Treaty of Friedwaid. Henry 11. had the effrontery
to request that the religious affairs of Germany should be placed
under his protection ; but this the Protestants refused to grant
240 European History \ 1494- 1598
to the persecutor of their co-religionists at home, and no
mention of the religious questions was made in the treaty.
Henry it. promised to assist in obtaining the release of the
Landgrave from prison, and in defending the liberties of
Germany. The price of the French King was high. He was
empowered to occupy, as Vicar of the Empire, Cambray,
Metz, Toul, and Verdun— with reservation, however, of the
imperial sovereignty — and the Princes promised at the next
vacancy of the Empire to support his candidature, or that
of some one agreeable to him. The cession of the three
bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, which dominated
Lorraine, has been often and severely blamed. But we should
at least remember that French was the common language of
these districts, that the sentiment of German nationality, never
very strong, had been weakened by the struggles of the Refor-
mation, and that the French alliance was necessary, if Charles
was to be successfully resisted in his attempt to subjugate
Germany to a foreign Spanish rule. Maurice, however, did
not rest satisfied with the French alliance. Ferdinand had
gained from him a pledge that he would resist the plan of
Charles with regard to the succession to the Empire. The
friendly terms which were thus established Maurice turned to
good account, and, by assuring Ferdinand that no attack
should be made on him, secured himself against active hostility
on the part of the Austrian prince.
While Maurice had been raising this formidable coalition
against the Emperor, the relations between the two had been
strictly amicable. Yet it is a mistake to suppose that Charles
remained in ignorance of what was going forward. At this
moment, however, Charles was ill, and in one of his fits of
irresolution and lassitude. Dazzled, moreover, by the
success of his policy since the battle of Miihlberg, he
thought too lightly of the conspiracy, and hoped to deal with
his opponents as he had done in 1546. He believed that
he could either win over Maurice by further concessions, or
ruin him by freeing John Frederick, and restoring to him his
electoral dominions. The Emperor did not understand how
The Schmalkaldic Wat" 241
circumstances had changed since 1546; he did not realise
how unpopular his Spanish rule, his highhandedness, and his
succession scheme had become in Germany, even with his
brother Ferdinand ; he omitted the French alliance in his
calculations ; finally, he mistook the man with whom he had
to deal. With all his ambition Maurice really cared for the
cause of Protestantism, and was determined to protect his
subjects' in their religion. It was improbable that he would
ever have sacrificed that to any personal gains. Charles also
forgot that he had taught a lesson in diplomatic tactics, which
his pupil had learnt too well ; a master of diplomacy himself,
he was fairly beaten by this young man of thirty. Maurice
to the last kept up appearances ; he even pretended compliance
with the Emperor's request that he would come Maurice
to Innsbruck to discuss the situation. Then declares
suddenly gathering his army, which he had held Jj"^""1
together since the siege of Magdeburg, he marched south,
southward (March 18), and was joined by the Hen^ii'
young William of Hesse at Bischofsheim. At the invades
same moment Henry 11. invaded Lorraine. The Lorraine-
French King declared he came to protect German liberty, and
the Princes issued a manifesto in which they denounced ' the
infamy and unreasonableness of the imprisonment of the
Landgrave,' and 'the foreign beastly {viehische) hereditary
servitude,' religious and political, which Charles ^ad at-
tempted to force on Germany. At Rothenburg, Maurice
was joined by Albert Alcibiades of Culmbach, and advanced
to Augsburg, 'the watch-tower of the imperial power,' which
was hastily evacuated by the imperial garrison.
It was now that Ferdinand assumed that attitude which
was the outcome of his jealousy of Charles, and of his earlier
negotiations with Maurice, an attitude which he p0iicvof
was to maintain until the final abdication of his Ferdinand,
brother. Anxious to protect his own interests and those of
his House, Ferdinand proposed to intervene as mediator ; to
come to terms with the Protestants, and, with a united
PERIOD IV. Q
242 European History, 1494- 1598
Germany at his back, defeat the succession scheme of Charles,
and turn upon the Turk. Accordingly he induced Maurice
Conference to n°l°- a conference at Linz, April 18, at which
at Linz. they agreed upon the general terms of the future
pn l ' peace, and Maurice consented to a suspension of
arms on May 26, when negotiations should be resumed at
Passau. Charles had authorised his brother to negotiate,
hoping thereby to gain time, but the results of the conference
were not entirely to his mind, and Maurice had once more
gained a diplomatic victory. The neutrality of Ferdinand was
practically secured ; while Maurice had time to act before the
26th. Marching on the Ehrenberg, he secured the castle
which commanded the pass to Innsbruck, where the Em
Flight of peror was ; and Charles, too ill with gout to ride,
Charles to after a vain attempt to escape northwards to the
Netherlands, fled with difficulty in a litter across
the Brenner to Villach. Maurice was urged to end the matter
by seizing the Emperor himself. 'I have no cage big enough
to hold such a bird,' he answered, and preferred to treat.
On the 1st of June, negotiations were again resumed at
Passau between Ferdinand and Maurice, where the Electors,
The Tre t manv °f tne cu7 representatives, and most of the
of Passau. princes were present. It is sometimes said that
Aug. a, 1552. Charles, in despair, left the negotiations to Ferdi-
nand, and let things go as they would. Nothing is further
from the truth. At no time of his life are the tenacity and
obstinacy of his character better illustrated than at this
moment, especially • when we remember how ill he was.
Unwilling to abandon his darling scheme of restoring unity
to the Church, and supremacy to the imperial authority, he
fought each concession clause by clause; ever dreaming of
revenge, he laboured to gain time while he intrigued andj
tried to organise an opposition on every side. But all in vain. I
Germany had suffered too much from his rule to care to fight
for it again. The political tendencies of the time leant too
strongly to autonomy in Church and State ; and the Treaty of
Passau is mainly due to the growth of a middle party, both
The Schmalkaldic War 243
Catholic and Protestant, who were weary of war, disliked the
political schemes of Charles, and saw the necessity of com-
promise— a party which expressed the sentiments of Germany
at large. On one point, however, the Emperor stood firm.
He refused to acknowledge the authority of the conference
at Passau as final ; to the decisions of a Diet alone would he
bow, and the terms granted at Passau must be provisional
only. Maurice who, in despair at the obstinacy of Charles,
had again taken up arms and besieged the city of Frankfort-
on-the-Main (July 17), did not feel his position secure
enough to refuse compliance, and, on August 2, agreed to the
terms offered by the Emperor. The confederates were to
lay down their arms before the 12th of August, when the
Landgrave was to be set at liberty; a Diet was to be held
in six months, when the matters in dispute should be finally
decided, and, if no decision were come to, the present arrange-
ment should continue. Meanwhile, all those who adhered
to the Confession of Augsburg were to be unmolested, and
Protestants were to be admitted as assessors to the Imperial
Chamber. Even at the last Charles thought of refusing his
consent, and of appealing to arms. Overborne, however,
by the solicitations of Ferdinand, who warned him that he
would have to fight the great majority of the Princes, Catholic
as well as Protestant, he at last ratified the treaty (August 15),
and set the Elector, John Frederick, as well as the Landgrave,
free.
The Treaty of Passau represented, there cannot be a doubt,
the general wish of Germany, both Catholic and Protestant.
It received the hearty assent of all except a few devoted
Catholics, and those who, like John Frederick, hoped to regain
what they had lost, or, like Albert Alcibiades of Culmbach,
looked to benefit by a continuation of the war. Much as
Charles disliked the peace, any attempt to join the disaffected
would have been madness. Yet with that doggedness which
seemed to grow upon him with years, he did not abandon
hope. The French had not been included in the treaty. A
244 European History, 1494-1598
successful war waged against them might yet regain him popu-
larity, and place him in a position to make one more struggle
for all that he held dear.
Fortunately for the cause of Protestantism and the interests
of Germany, Charles' military enterprises failed. He secured,
111 success indeed, the assistance of Albert of Culmbach,
of Charles and jn October, 1 55 2, laid siege to Metz. But
breaking the tne s^iH and energy of the Duke of Guise, who
Treaty. here won his military name, baulked the efforts of
Charles. The winter came on, and sorely tried the Spanish
and Italian troops; and, in December, 1552, Charles abandoned
the attempt, bitterly declaring that * Fortune, like women,
favoured a young King rather than an old Emperor.' Nor
were his arms more successful in Italy. The republic of
Siena, torn by internal dissensions, had put itself under the
Emperor's protection, and admitted a body of soldiers
under Mendoza, the imperial ambassador at Rome. But the
severity of Mendoza's rule soon caused the Sienese to repent ;
they applied to France for aid, drove out the Spanish troops,
and transferred their allegiance to France; while Solyman,
again in alliance with the French, sent a fleet which threatened,
though unsuccessfully, the city of Naples. In 1553, the
Emperor, who had retired to the Netherlands, was somewhat
more fortunate, and took the town of Terouenne. But in
Italy, all the attempts of the Viceroy of Naples, and of
Cosimo, Duke of Florence, to oust the French from Siena were
vain ; Naples was again threatened by a Turkish fleet, and
the French conquered a part of Corsica. In Hungary, Isabella
the widow of Zapolya, and her son, leaning on Turkish
support, finally secured Transylvania ; and Vienna itself might
have been attacked once more if Solyman had not been
called off by a Persian war, and distracted by the domestic
troubles which led to the execution of his own favourite son
Mustapha.
At this moment occurred the death of Maurice, an event
which, under more prosperous circumstances, might have
The Schmalkaldic War 245
offered Charles an opportunity of final victory. In the midst
of the foreign war, Charles had not ceased to intrigue with
the disaffected, more especially with Albert of Culmbach.
In return for the assistance that prince had given him before
Metz, he had confirmed those grants of money and of
land which Albert had extorted from the Bishops of
Bamberg and Wurzburg. These claims Albert now pro-
ceeded to enforce with arms, in spite of the order of the
Imperial Chamber; whereupon, in February 1553, Ferdi-
nand and Maurice, who, with other Princes of the south of
Germany, formed the League of Heidelberg to enforce the
Treaty of Passau, marched against him and defeated him
at Sievershausen, in the Duchy of Luneburg (July 9).
The victory, however, was dearly bought, for Maurice died
two days afterwards of his wounds. Thus, at the age of
thirty-two, a Prince passed away who had played
the leading part in the history of Germany since Maurice at
1 546. To this day his aims and his character are sievershausen.
July 9» J553-
matters of hot dispute. By some he is looked
upon as the apt pupil of Machiavelli, a man devoid of religious
conviction, or of any principle beyond that of calculating
self-interest. Others represent him as the greatest statesman
of the day; as the man who first guessed the designs of
Charles, and whose treachery in 1546 was really only the
first and necessary move towards the final vindication of the
cause of Protestantism, forced upon him by the necessity of
gaining a strong position before he could hope to resist the
Emperor. As is so often the case with violent partisanship,
the truth lies midway between these two extreme views.
Although Maurice had no very strong convictions on the
points at issue between the adherents of the two hostile
creeds, and was, no doubt, influenced by ambition, yet it
is unjust to accuse him of sacrificing the religion of his
subjects to personal ends. In any case, whatever we may
think of his motives, the ability of his statesmanship is
beyond dispute. Once deceived by Charles, he quickly
246 European History », 1494-1598
learnt of him, and finally succeeded in outmanoeuvring
that master of diplomacy. To Maurice, at least, Protestantism
owed its final recognition, and Germany her escape from
the Spanish tyranny of Charles. Nor did the electorate of
Saxony suffer under his hands. The country was well
ruled, and education advanced. Nay, had Maurice lived
longer or been succeeded by men of like calibre with
himself, Saxony would probably not have seen herself
eclipsed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by
her neighbours, the Hohenzollern Electors of Brandenburg.
Whether it be true that, at the moment of his death, he
dreamt of even greater things, and that he, in conjunction
with Ferdinand, was intriguing with France to secure the
imperial dignity for himself, we cannot say. Maurice was
too good a diplomatist to show his hand before the decisive
moment. But at least we may believe that Germany would
not have fared ill under him as Emperor.
Neither Albert nor Charles benefited from the death of
Maurice. The former was shortly driven from Germany to
end his days as a pensioner of the French King, while his
dominions in Franconia fell to his cousin, George Frederick
of Anspach ; and Charles, despairing of resisting the united
will of Germany, at last bowed to the inevitable. He aban-
doned his scheme of succession, and ceased to oppose a
permanent settlement of the religious difficulties. To this
course he was the more inclined, because he now thought of
marrying Philip to Mary, the Catholic Queen of England,
and thus uniting England with the Spanish monarchy. With
this change of policy, the rivalry between him and his
brother was at an end, and Ferdinand was given a free hand
in Germany.
The affairs of Saxony first demanded attention. John
Frederick, in spite of his remonstrances, was forced to rest
content with some territorial concessions ; while the rest of
the dominions, with the electoral titles, went to Augustus,
the brother of Maurice.
The Schmalkaldic War 247
Having settled this question satisfactorily, Ferdinand pre-
vailed on his brother to summon the Diet to Augsburg in
February, 1555. Charles, however, refused to DietofAugs.
take any part in the negotiations, and left Fer- burg. Feb.-
dinand to preside and to settle matters as he Sept* I555*
would, with the warning that he should do nothing against
his conscience.
With a few exceptions all in Germany, both Catholic and
Protestant, earnestly desired a settlement of the religious
question, and the establishment of a peace which might
protect them from such turbulent spirits as Albert of Branden-
burg. And yet the attempt to reconcile the conflicting
interests of the two religions — always a difficult matter — was
rendered doubly so by the complicated character of the
imperial constitution. No sooner, therefore, did discussion
begin than dissensions appeared, and these were fostered by
the papal party. Fortunately, the death of Death of
Julius in., in March, forced his legate, Cardinal -I"liu!? III-»
J , 1 March 1555,
Morone, to retire from Augsburg. The next facilitates
Pope, Marcellus n., only lived twenty days ; and matters-
although his successor, Paul iv. (Caraffa), attempted to put
every obstacle in the way, he was only able to limit the con-
cessions granted to the Protestants.
On two points, agreement was comparatively easy. _ It was
declared that hereafter all religious disputes should be settled
by peaceful means, and to this end, in all causes between a
Catholic and a Lutheran, the Imperial Chamber was to be
rpmpnspH nf ^n equal number of assessors from either party^
The remaining questions presented greater difficulties. The
Lutherans had originally wished that every individual should
be allowed to conform to the Confession of Augsburg, whether
the subject of a Protestant state or no. But this was dreaded by
those Catholic Princes in whose dominions Lutheranism had
made great strides, and the Reformers were forced to rest con-
tent with the stipulation, that every secular Prince or imperial
city should be allowed to decide which of the two religions
248 European History \ 1494-1598
should be adopted within their jurisdiction, and that those who
could not conform should be allowed to depart with their
goods. A compromise was also arrived at with regard to the
secularisation of ecclesiastical property within the jurisdiction
of secular Princes. All such property as had been secularised
before the Treaty of Passau, 1552, was to remain so, but no
furtherexercise of the right was to be allowed. The Pro-
testants, while conceding this point, demanded that ecclesias-
tical Princes should, like the secular Princes, be allowed to
establish what religion they liked within their jurisdictions,
and that any ecclesiastical Prince or Bishop who adoptecTtrTe
Lutheran Confession should retain his dignities and his
revenues. This would, however, have dealt a fatal blow at
the whole fabric of the Empire, and was stoutly resisted by the
Catholics, and by Ferdinand himself. As the Lutherans stood
out, Ferdinand thought seriously of postponing the considera-
tion of this question, lest the rest of the treaty might be lost
Finally, however, an unsatisfactory compromise was arrived at.
It was enacted, that if any ecclesiastic should hereafter abandon
the Catholic religion, he should relinquish his office, with the
revenues and patronage appertaining thereto. This clause
theXulherans allowed to be inserted in the treaty, but only
under protest that they did not consider the reservation bind-
ing on them ; and further obtained the concession that those
subjects of ecclesiastical Princes, who had already embraced
Lutheranism, should be unmolested, and that those who might
subsequently become Lutherans should be allowed to emigrate.
By"the"Peace of Augsburg, the attempt of Charles to re-estab-
lish the unity of the Church on the basis of a revived Empire
of the West, received its final death-blow ; and the principle of
autonomy in ecclesiastical matters was definitely recognised.
Had Charles been victorious over his foreign enemies, in all
probability he would, for a time at least, have gained his
end. Had he been less ambitious, and confined his attention
to Germany, he might possibly have succeeded in crushing
(iilt Lutherprrism. But the very magnificence of his aims
The Schmalkaldic War 249
prevented their realisation. Again and again, when he was about
to strike, some exigency of politics intervened to thwart him ;
and eventually the principle of territorialism, when supported
by the foreigner, proved too strong. Yet it would not be fair
to charge the Protestants with having used a religious cry to
further their political ends. In Germany, as elsewhere in
Europe, the religious element perforce connected itself with
politics. ' The Reformation furnished a creed and a new en-
thusiasm to the political aspirations already existing, and event-
ually gave the victory to those political tendencies which were
the strongest. Had Charles been a different man, he might have
adopted Protestantism and thereon founded a united kingdom
in Germany. But this his character and his Spanish sympathies
prevented, and, short of complete victory on his part, there V
was no alternative but that of decentralisation. Henceforth,
Germany abandoned all hope of reconciling the two religions
by means of a general or even a national Council in Germany.
The Lutheran Church obtained a legal recognition, and
the Protestant states claimed to pursue their course without
the intervention of any external ecclesiastical authority. In
this way the mediaeval conception of Church and State was
completely revolutionised, and the temporal authority gained
an independence it had not enjoyed before. Nevertheless, the
settlement was by no means final, and bore in it the seeds of
future discord. The principle of individual toleration was not
conceded. If the Princes usually adopted the religion of the
majority of their subjects, the rights of the minority were not
respected. The \ ecclesiastical reservation ' was certain here-
after to lead to serious disputes. Above all, the Calvinists,
who were shortly to become the most active of the Reformers,
were not included in the peace. The religious quarrels which
ensued between them and the Lutherans embittered the
political jealousies already existing. The Catholics took
advantage of this, and Germany had yet to undergo the
horrors of the Thirty Years' War, before the religious question
should receive its final settlement.
250 European History \ 1494-1598
While Germany had been absorbed in these momentous
issues, the war with France had been continued on the
_ borders of the Netherlands, and in Italy, with
Vauceiies. varying results. In April 1555, Siena was regained
Feb. 1556. for the imperialists by Cosimo, Duke of Florence.
Elsewhere the events were unimportant, and, in 1556, a truce
concluded at Vauceiies, led to a brief cessation of arms. By
that date, however, Charles had ceased to be King of Spain.
Disappointed at the frustration of all his schemes, a victim
to gout, asthma, and other ailments, he determined to abandon
the heretical Germany to Ferdinand, and to resign
Preoaration , , . , . . . .
of Charles for the government of his other territories to his son.
hisabdica- Charles fondly hoped that Philip, united to the
Queen of England, and in the full vigour of youth,
might yet establish a great Catholic monarchy with its centre
in Spain, and resist the dangerous advance of heresy; nay,
might some day bring the King of France to his knees, and
establish Spanish supremacy in Europe. Milan and Italy had
been already ceded to Philip on his marriage with Mary of
England, but the division of authority had led to difficulties,
and to some quarrels between father and son. In October
1555, therefore, one month after the peace of Augsburg, Queen
Mary of Hungary resigned her post as Regent of the Nether-
lands, and the government of those territories, which had just
been once more separated from the Empire, was handed over
to Philip.
Even then, Charles had apparently intended to retain the
government of Spain somewhat longer in his hands, but Italy
Jan. 1556. and the Netherlands could scarcely be defended
philiP without Spanish arms and money ; accordingly,
scknovvlcdETcd
King of Spain, in the following January (1556), Philip was
Sept.: Charles acknowledged King of Spain. Finally, in the
imperial September of that year, Charles resigned the im-
throne. perial crown, although, owing to certain techni-
calities, Ferdinand was not elected for two years. By this act,
the ambitious idea, first entertained by Maximilian, of uniting
The Schmalkaldic War 251
under one rule Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands with the
German dominions of the Hapsburgs, was abandoned, and
a return was made to the more reasonable policy of Ferdinand
the Catholic. Henceforth until the disappearance of the
Spanish line in 1700, the House of Hapsburg was divided into
two branches£)of which the Austrian ruled over the family
territoriesin South Germany, and secured the elective throne
of the Empire ;:; while the Spanish ruled over Italy, Franche-
Comt£, the Netherlands, and the conquests in the New
World. It would probably have been well for Spain if she
had never had a German Emperor as her King ; while the
Netherlands, all that now remained to her of the patrimony
of the Archduke Philip, was yet to prove a source of weak-
ness and humiliation.
Charles, having resigned the burden of government to younger
shoulders, retired to the Jeronymite monastery of Yuste in the
province of Estremadura, in September, 1556. The
Charles
traditional story of his life there requires some at Yuste.
correction. He did not dwell in the monastery, SePt- J556 to
but in a house prepared for him close by. Al-
though he lived a religious life, attended regularly the services
of the Church, and even submitted himself to the penance of
flagellation, his daily lot was not otherwise one of extreme hard-
ship. In the matter of diet, especially, he not only excused
himself from fasting, ostensibly on the score of health, but
indulged, to his cost, his love for rich and unwholesome
dishes. He by no means shut himself off from all worldly
concerns, but kept up an active correspondence with his son,
and with his daughter Joanna, who acted as Regent of Castile
during Philip's absence. He was most energetic in collecting
the necessary taxes for the campaigns of 1557 and 1558, and
one of his last acts was to urge the Regent to- . m
° ° Death of
crush out the Lutheran heresy, which had appeared Charles v.
in Spain. Retaining in his retreat the same aist Sept- 1558'
dogged adherence to the principles which had guided his
life, Charles at last, in his fifty-eighth year, succumbed to
252 European History, 1494- 1 598
the ailments which had been growing upon him of late
(21st September 1558).
The Emperor has been so often before us, that it is need-
less to say much more of him here. His character was late
in developing, and it was not until the Diet of Worms, 1521,
that he began to show his powers. From that moment, how-
ever, he bent himself to the bewildering difficulties of his
position with a consistency of purpose which is all the more
remarkable when we remember his constitutional indolence
and irresolution. It is the conflict between these three
qualities — his obstinacy, his lethargy, and his irresolution —
which explains the contradictions of his conduct. Self-pos-
sessed and self-contained, yet with a fiery nature which at
times betrayed itself, few save his two chancellors, Gattinara
and Granvelle, and his confessor Pedro de Soto, were
admitted to his counsels. If we except his wife Isabella of
Portugal, who died in 1539, his son and his sisters, he made
but few close attachments, and his heart was rarely stirred
by any sentiment. He never forgave an injury ; he rarely
did a generous deed. He was a man to command fear and
even admiration, but not to inspire affection. A Netherlander
at first, but never a German, he soon became a thorough
Spaniard, and looked upon Spain as the model he would fain
impose on Europe.
§ 3. Last War between France and Spain.
The wish of Charles to secure a few years' peace for his
successor was not fulfilled. It was thwarted by the Duke of
Paul iv. allies Guise, the representative of the war party in
himself with France, and by his brother the Cardinal of Lor-
pSSp? agains raine, but more especially by Paul iv. That fiery
July 1556. prelate, who was now in his eightieth year, although
a leader in the Catholic reaction, had throughout his life been
a strenuous opponent of the Spaniard in Italy. A member of
, Last War between France and Spain 253
a Neapolitan family (the Caraffa) which had always supported
the Angevin party in that kingdom, he had early incurred the
displeasure of Charles, who had caused his name to be struck
off the Council of Government, and resisted his nomination
to the archiepiscopal see of Naples. Under these circum-
stances it is not surprising that, as Pope, he should adopt
that anti-Spanish policy which had now become almost tradi-
tional with the Papacy. He remembered the days of Italian
freedom, and considered the Spaniard the most dangerous of
its enemies. 'The French,' he said, ' may easily be dislodged
hereafter ; but the Spaniards are like dog-grass, sure to strike
root wherever it is cast.' Prompted by these motives, he
had, in December 1555, made a secret treaty with France,
with the object of driving the Spaniards from Italy, and now
he urged Henry 11. to break his truce with Spain. The
Guises threw their influence on the side of war ; and in July,
1556, in pursuance of a fanciful scheme of reviving the French
claim to Naples, a treaty was made by which that kingdom
was to be torn from Philip and conferred on one of Henry's
sons, with the exception of some portion of the northern
frontier, which was to fall to the Pope as his share of
the spoil.
Paul had not waited for this alliance to commence hostilities,
or to punish the Colonnesi, who supported the imperial cause.
In answer to this, the Duke of Alva, who had just been
appointed Governor of Naples, entered the Papal States
(September), and, in the absence of the French,
occupied the chief places in the Campagna. invadesthe
Indeed, had it not been for the scruples of the PaPal s*ates-
Duke, or rather of his royal master, Rome itself ep * I55 '
might have been taken ; but Philip's orders were that he should
bring the Pope to terms rather than ruin him. Alva accordingly
listened to the insincere offers of the Pope, and delayed further
operations until the advance of the French army under the
Duke of Guise, at the beginning of the new year, forced him
to retreat southwards. Alva now played a waiting game, and,
1 54 European History, 1 494- 1 5 98
refusing to meet the French in a pitched battle, gradually wore
them out, as Gonzalvo had done in 1503. The Duke of Guise,
French in- frustrated in his attempt to take the town of
vade Naples, civitella (May 15), and wearied by these tactics,
called by was forced to evacuate the kingdom of Naples,
defeat of an(j shortly afterwards was recalled to France
jan.-Aug.1 (August 1 5), by the news of the defeat of St.
J557- Quentin, 'having done little for his King, still less
for the Church, and nothing for his honour.' Paul, deserted by
his allies, was forced to accept the terms offered him, which,
_ , however, were so advantageous that, as Alva
Paul comes ' .
to terms with bitterly remarked, 'they seem to have been dic-
Alva# tated by the vanquished instead of the victor.'
The territories of the Church were to be restored intact ; the
remaining French troops were to be allowed a free passage to
France ; the affair of the Colonnesi was to be submitted to the
arbitration of Philip and the Pope. The Duke of Alva was
actually to ask pardon, and receive absolution from the Pope,
for having dared to take up arms against him. -»
This, the last war for the possession of Italy for many a
long day, is noticeable for the strange contradictions it presents.
Not only does the most bigoted of the Popes oppose the most
bigoted of Kings ; he even calls to his assistance the Infidel
and the Protestant mercenaries of Germany; while his
opponent, at the command of his master Philip, wages war on
the Pope with every expression of reverence, and, when
dictating peace, does so, as a suppliant, on his
Milan, final"' knees. Yet, in spite of his haughty demeanour,
secured by paul had failed. The French henceforth ceased
Spam* to struggle for Italy ; Sicily, Naples, and Milan
remained in the hands of the Spanish Hapsburgs until the
extinction of their line in the year 1700.
In the war which had meanwhile broken out on the eastern
frontier of France, the exhaustion of that country was plainly
visible. The feudal levies responded but feebly; the pro-
vincial legions of infantry, which had been organised by
Last War between France and Spain 2$$
Francis I. in 1534, had never been successful; and of the
French peasantry, the Gascons alone appeared in any numbers.
France was thus forced to fall back on six thousand campaign on
German mercenaries. Emanuel Philibert, the *heefste^n
' frontier of
dispossessed Duke of Savoy, a man of twenty-nine France,
years, who commanded the army of Philip, had a s.pamsh
much larger force drawn from the various coun- Quentin,
tries under Spanish rule, and was aided by a con- Aug* I0*
tingent of English, who with difficulty had been prevailed
upon to aid the husband of their queen. The financial straits
of the two combatants were much the same, but the energy
of Charles in his retreat at St. Yuste succeeded in wringing
from the Spaniards a considerable amount of money. On
the approach of the Duke of Savoy, Coligny threw him-
self into the city of St. Quentin (August 2), a town of
importance, as being the entrepot for trade between France
and the Low Countries. But the rash attempt of the
Marshal de Montmorenci, who was in supreme command,
to relieve it with a far inferior force, led to his total defeat
(August 10). The Marshal himself, many nobles, and
thousands of the common soldiers, were taken prisoners;
as many more were slain. France, in a word, had not
suffered such a defeat since Pavia. ' Is not my son in
Paris ? ' asked Charles, on receiving intelligence of the victory ;
and had Charles himself been in command, Paris might have
fallen. But Philip, ever more fond of negotiation than of
war, delayed till he should be master of St. Quentin. The
city, defended by the energy and ability of Coligny, was
not stormed till the 27th of August — and the delay saved
Paris. Quarrels subsequently broke out in the Spanish camp,
which led to the retreat of the English. The Germans
complained of want of pay ; many transferred their services
to the French ; and, after taking a few more places, the army
of Philip went into winter quarters. In January, the surprise
of Calais by the Duke of Guise reversed, at least in the
opinion of the French, the disaster of St. Quentin. The
256 European History, 1494- 1598
English, in overweening confidence, had of late neglected
the defences of that town, and in the winter were accustomed
to withdraw a portion of the troops, because the
by the Duke marshes were then believed to be impassable.
ofGuise. xhe Duke, informed of this, suddenly appeared
before the walls, and took by assault the two forts
of Newman Bridge, and Risbank, which defended Calais
from the sea and from the shore respectively. Lord Went-
worth, despairing of holding the city now that his position
was commanded, capitulated on January 8. The recovery
of this city, which had been in the hands of the English since
the days of Edward III., very naturally caused boundless
exultation in France. The taking of Thionville by the
Duke of Guise followed in June ; and in July, the Marshal
de Termes, in command of the Calais garrison, secured
Dunkirk and Mardyke. But the Marshal had imprudently
ventured too far into the enemies' country, and had left
Gravelines unmasked behind him. As he at-
The French 111
defeated at tempted to retreat, he was caught between the
Gravelines. garrison of Gravelines and a Flemish force raised
55 ' by the Count of Egmont, and was completely
routed, falling himself into the enemies' hands (July 13).
This was the last action in the war. The renewal of
hostilities had not been of Philip's seeking, and he was now
doubly anxious for peace. The difficulty of supplying money,
always a serious matter, was now so great that Philip con-
fessed to his ministers thit he was on the brink of ruin.
The death of his father, Claries, on the 21st of September,
demanded his presence in Spain; and England was not to be
trusted to continue the war, especially as Mary was very ill.
Nor had France much to hope for from a continuation of the
struggle, now that the Pope had made his peace with Philip.
Her finances were exhausted, her people weary of a struggle
which brought them no benefit. Besides all this, heresy had
appeared both in France and in Spain. Henry 11. therefore
listened to the advice of Montmorenci and of the Cardinal of
Last War between France and Spain 257
Lorraine. The first, as a captive and a rival of the victorious
Duke of Guise, had personal reasons for desiring peace ; the
latter urged Henry to devote his attention to the extirpation
of heresy.
Negotiations were commenced in October, but were delayed
by the death of Mary of England in November, and the re-
fusal of Queen Elizabeth to acknowledge the sur-
, ^ . _.: ' , . . ° , Treaty of
render of Calais. Philip, hoping perhaps thereby cateau
to gain her hand, offered to stand by the English Cambr&sis.
Queen and break off the negotiations, but only on
condition that she would support him with all her power as
long as the war should last. This did not suit the cautious
and parsimonious Queen, and she finally consented to leave
Calais for eight years in the hands of France. France was
also allowed, by the Emperor Ferdinand, to retain the
three Lotharingian Bishoprics, Metz, Toul, and Verdun, but
had to surrender all her other conquests to Philip and his
allies, except Turin, Saluzzo, Pignerol, and a few other
places of importance in Piedmont. These she was to hold
until Henry's claim to that principality through his grand-
mother, Louise of Savoy, should be decided — a claim which
he could hardly believe to be serious. Thus Philip re-
gained the towns which France had taken in Luxembourg;
Montferrat was restored to the Duke of Mantua ; Genoa re-
gained Corsica. On his side, Philip surrendered the few places
he held in Picardy. The two Kings further bound themselves
to do their best to procure the meeting of a General Council,
which was necessary both for reformation of abuses, and for
the restoration of union and concord to the Church. The
treaty was to be ratified by a double marriage ; Philip was
to marry Elizabeth, the eldest daughter of Henry 11., then a
girl of thirteen, who had at first been suggested as the bride
of his son Don Carlos ; Margaret, the sister of the French
king, was to espouse Emanuel Philibert, Duke of Savoy.
In the tournament which was held to celebrate the marriage
of Philip with the French princess, Henry II. received a
PERIOD IV. R
258 European History, 1494- 1 593
wound from which he died, and was succeeded by his son
Francis n.} a youth of sixteen, who in 1558 had married
Mary Queen of Scots.
The peace of Cateau Cambre*sis, by which France ' lost as
many provinces as she regained cities,' was far more dis-
advantageous than the military position, in spite of the defeats
of St. Quentin and Gravelines, justified. It is therefore not
unnaturally looked upon as a dishonourable one by most
French writers. It reminds us once more of the taunt of
Machiavelli that the French are not masters of diplomacy, and
is perhaps not an unfitting close to that long struggle between
the Houses of Valois and of Hapsburg, which commenced with
the foolish expedition of Charles viii., and in which France
had continually been the aggressor. Her only permanent
gains were those of Calais, and the three Lotharingian
bishoprics; and these, balanced as they were by the loss of
Spanish Navarre, were won at the price of an exhausted
treasury and an impoverished people. She had no doubt
taken a leading part in resisting the dangerous supremacy of
the Austro-Spanish House, and in foiling the attempt of
Charles to establish a universal monarchy in Europe. Yet
it may be questioned whether she could not have done this
more effectively if she had kept her hands off Italy, and had
strengthened and extended her frontiers by winning Rousillon
and Franche-Comt£, and by pressing towards the Rhine.
While playing the rival to the House of Hapsburg, she had not
only contributed to the success of the Reformers in Germany,
and to the advance of the Turk in Hungary, but had allowed
Protestantism to gain a firm hold at home, and had fostered a
military spirit among the smaller nobility, which was to give to
the religious struggle in France some of its worst characteristics.
Throughout the long struggle nothing had been done to
strengthen the government of France, or to develop constitu-
tional life. The monarchy came out of the war bankrupt, and
the government the prey of rival factions — factions which, if
they did not cause the religious wars, most certainly prolonged
Last War between France and Spain 259
them and France, torn by civil and religious strife, had to wait
till the reign of Henry iv. before she could take that part in
European affairs to which her central position, the ability of
her people, and her magnificent natural resources entitled her.
Nor was Spain in much better plight. To outward appear-
ances, indeed, the power of Philip seemed overwhelming.
He was King of the whole Spanish Peninsula with the excep-
tion of Portugal;1 King of Naples and of Sicily, and Duke of
Milan, a position which enabled him to control the politics
of the Peninsula;2 Master of Franche-Comte and of the
Netherlands. In Africa, he held Tunis and Oran, with places
on the Barbary coast, and the islands of Cape de Verd, and the
Canaries ; while in the Pacific Ocean, the Philippines were
undeY his sway. In America, Spain held a large part of the
eastern coast, except Brazil, which belonged to Portugal, all
the islands in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, and
the kingdoms of Mexico and Peru, which had been con-
quered during the reign of Charley. The Spanish infantry
was considered the most formidable in Europe, and the
treasures of the Indies were believed to be inexhaustible.
1 For the character of the Spanish rule in Italy, cf. Armstrong,
Charles V., II. p. 291 ff.
2 As we shall have to speak but little hereafter of Italy, it may be well
to give concisely the names of the chief dependent or independent states :
1. Piedmont, in the hands of Emanuel Philibert of Savoy.
2. Genoa and Venice, independent republics.
3. Parma and Piacenza, under the rule of Ottavio Farnese ; of these
Parma had been restored to him by Paul III., and Piacenza by
Philip 11. in 1556.
4. Mantua, in the hands of Frederick, first Duke of Mantua, who also
gained Montferrat from Charles v. in 1536, having married the
heiress of William VII. (Paleologus), Marquis of Montferrat.
5. Florence, under Duke Cosimo dei Medici, who had just secured
Siena, and assumed the title of Grand Duke of Tuscany in 1569.
6. The Duchy of Urbino, a papal fief, in the hands of Guidobaldo
della Rovere.
7. The duchies of Ferrara, Modena, and Reggio, in the hands of
Ercole n. of Este. On the extinction of the direct line in 1597,
Ferrara was seized by the Pope, Clement VIII. Modena and
Reggio went to Charles of Este, a collateral.
260 European History, 1494 -1598
Yet Spain had suffered seriously from the long-protracted
struggle. Her resources were nearly as much crippled as
those of France; her government, if better organised, was
fully as despotic, and all religious liberty had been crushed
out ; and she was shortly to give evidence of her weakness in
the failure to put down the revolt of the United Provinces,
and in the defeat of the Armada by the puny ships of
England.
The peace of Cateau Cambrdsis, therefore, closes one epoch
and begins another. New actors came upon the scene.1
The struggle for supremacy is stayed a while. Germany
and Spain are for ever divided ; the Turkish Empire soon
ceases to be aggressive, and begins to suffer from internal
decay. The remaining thirty-nine years we have to cover
is chiefly taken up with the Counter-Reformation and the
struggles to which that movement gave birth, with the
religious wars in France, and with the revolt of the Nether-
lands against the religious and political tyranny of Spain.
1 Charles, and Mary Queen of England died in 1558, Paul iv. and
Henry n. in 1559.
CHAPTER VI
THE COUNTER-REFORMATION AND CALVINISM
The Counter- Reformation in Spain and Italy — The Theatihes — The Jesuits —
Last Session of Council of Trent — The Inquisition — John Calvin and
Geneva — Characteristics of Calvinism. t
§ i. The Counter- Reformation.
With the abdication and the death of Charles v., the history
of Europe loses that unity which it received from the com-
prehensiveness of his policy, and from his striking personality.
None the less, a central point of interest is afforded us by
the movement of the Counter-Reformation, which affects all
Europe and focuses the political movements for
i . mi a> Spain the
the next thirty years, or more. The Counter- home of the
Reformation found its impulse in that profound Counter-
. ,. ._. .11 i-. ri Reformation.
sense of dissatisfaction with the condition of the
Church to which Protestantism itself owed its origin^ Like
the two orders of the Dominicans and Franciscans of the
thirteenth century, this movement took its rise in Spain
and in Italy. In the days of Alexander vi., when the
Papacy was immersed in secular interests, and was rapidly
forfeiting the respect of Europe, a thorough reform of the
Church in Spain had been inaugurated by Ferdinand and
Isabella and carried through by the energy and devotion of
Cardinal Ximenes. Under these influences a school of
theologians had been formed, who revived the doctrine of the
great Dominican of the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas,
and united learning with a life of purity and zeal. The
movement had at first met with little support from the
Papacy. The kings of Spain were determined to maintain
their independence in matters ecclesiastical, and had acted
261
262 European History \ 1494- 1598
independently and often even against the papal will. Yet the
spirit of reform soon spread to Italy. Adrian vi. had, while
Regent in Spain, been influenced by the movement, and, as
Pope (1522-1523), had vainly attempted to extend the reform
to the Church at large. Under the leadership of Caraffa
(1555-15 59), who had before he became Pope spent some
years in Spain, and still more of Loyola, Lainez, and Xavier,
the Spanish founders of the Jesuits, the Counter-Reformation
was to become the great support of papal authority.
Italy had never been much attracted by the speculative
difficulties of Luther. No doubt The Oratory of Divine Love,
it spreads a small band of literary men, with Contarini at
to Italy, their head, had embraced the Doctrine of the
Justification by Faith, but their party had been a small one,
and did not represent any important section of opinion in
Italy. Those of her children who approached the question
of theology at all went further and deeper ; they questioned
the truth of Christianity, or discussed the immortality of the
soul. Meanwhile, the majority of the more earnest-minded,
satisfied with the tenets of the Church and influenced by the
spirit of reform which had spread from Spain, aimed, like
Savonarola, at bringing doctrine to bear on life and conduct.
With this object many societies were formed in Italy at the
beginning of the sixteenth century, of which the Theatines are
The the most interesting. The members of this frater-
Theatines. nityj of which Caraffa, the future Pope Paul iv.,
was one of the founders (1524), were not monks but secular
clergy. They devoted themselves to preaching, to the adminis-
tration of the sacraments, and to the care of the sick ; and took
no other vow but that of poverty. Even from the Franciscans,
the most corrupt of the older orders, the reformed order of
the Capuchins arose.
The society, however, which was to play by far the greatest
part in the coming movement, and in future history, was to be
founded by a Spaniard. Ignatius Loyola (Don Inigo Lopes
Ricalde y Loyola), cadet of a house of high nobility, who
The Counter- Reformation 26$
was born in 1491, had in early days devoted himself to
the profession of arms, with all the fervour of a chivalrous
spirit. A serious wound received at the siege _. .
r The Jesuits.
of Pampeluna (152 1) crippled him for life, and
Loyola, denied all hopes of a military career, turned, with
the enthusiasm of his romantic and high-strung nature, to the
service of the Virgin and the infant Christ, after experiencing
much the same moral crisis as Luther had undergone.
Returning to Spain after a pilgrimage to Jerusalem (1523), his
first attempt at preaching brought him under suspicion of
heresy, and he was ordered to undertake a course of theology
before he resumed his teaching. In 1528, he came to Paris to
pursue his studies. Here he made the acquaintance of three
men whom he profoundly influenced — Peter Faber, son of a
Savoyard shepherd, Francesco Xavier, and Iago Lainez, both
countrymen of his own. In August, 1534, the four friends, of
whom Faber at first was the only one in orders, formed a
society. They took the vow of chastity, and bound them-
selves, after the conclusion of their studies, to pass their lives
in poverty at Jerusalem, devoted to the care of the Chris-
tians or to the conversion of the infidel ; or, if that were
impossible, to offer their labour in any place whither the Pope
might send them. Three years after (1537), the society,
now increased to ten, set out on their pilgrimage to the
Holy Land, and were ordained to that end. The war
between Venice and the Turk, however, prevented their depar-
ture ; and Loyola and his brethren becoming acquainted with
Caraffa and the Theatines, changed their purpose, and deter-
mined to devote their energies to Christendom. Even then
their difficulties were not over. They were charged with
heresy, and, though acquitted, it was not till 1540 that they
obtained with difficulty a confirmation of their 'company
of Jesus ' from Pope Paul m., and that Ignatius was elected
as the first General. The society was organised in six classes :
the novices, the scholastics, the lay coadjutors who adminis-
tered the revenues of the colleges so that the rest of the
i»V<^
264 European History \ 1494-1598
society should be free from such cares, the spiritual coad-
jutors, and the professed of the three, and of the four vows. Of
these, the spiritual coadjutors were the ordinary active mem-
bers of the society, and from their number the rectors of
the colleges were chosen. The professed of three vows were
formed of men who, for exceptional reasons, were admitted
into the order without having passed through the inferior
grades, and held a position similar to that of the spiritual
coadjutors. The professed of four vows alone enjoyed all
the privileges of the order. They alone elected the General ;
from their number the provincials over each province into
which Christendom was divided were chosen by the General ;
and they alone, beyond the three vows of poverty, chastity,
and obedience, took a fourth of especial obedience to the Pope,
although his authority was limited by the power, exclusively
reserved to the General, of sending out, or recalling, mission-
aries. To reach this highest grade a man must, unless he had
been admitted to the number of the professed of three vows,
pass through all the others except that of the lay coadjutors —
a probation of thirty-one years — and was not ordained till he
became a spiritual coadjutor. The supreme official of the
order was the General, elected from the professed of four
vows by the provincial and two members from each province.
The rules of this remarkable society were so framed as to
reconcile the principle of absolute obedience with the utmost
freedom of action. In imitation of the Theatines, whose views,
however, the Jesuits carried much further, they rejected the
monastic habit, and were relieved from the more onerous and
ascetic practices of religion ; they were forbidden to weaken
their bodies with fasts and vigils, and were exempted from
the routine of devotional exercise and daily service. Nor
did the professed confine themselves to any special duties.
But if in this way they enjoyed a freedom denied to the
members of other religious orders, that freedom was con-
trolled by the absolute authority of the society itself. They
were not permitted to hold any ecclesiastical dignity without
The Counter-Reformation ±6$
Special leave of the General ; they were to hold no property
of their own ; they had to cut themselves off from kith and
kin, and to obey implicitly the orders of the superiors, the pro-
vincials, and the General, even against their reason and their
conscience. ■ It is your duty to obey the call of your superior
at once, even if in so doing you have to leave a letter of the
alphabet unfinished.' 'If/ said Ignatius, 'my conscience
forbids me obey, I should at least submit my judgment to
one or more superiors. Otherwise I am far from perfection/
Even their most secret thoughts were not their own. None * .y^
jcould write or read a letter except under the eye of a superior/ *
and it w^s the duty oftheir confessor and of each membe£ic^_ ^yJ^
'reveal to the General anything he might wish to know of their
acts or thoughts. The General himself, although absolute
within the rules of the society, and with right of nominating
and recalling the provincials and the superiors, could not
alter the constitution of the society without consulting a
General Council. He was under the constant supervision of
assistants elected for that purpose, and of a monitor, and
could be deposed by a general congregation of the professed.
Thus all individuality was merged in the company, and
obedience usurped the place of reason, affection, and impulse.
Bound by this iron chain of obedience, which was riveted by
a system of espionage, this marvellous society went forth to
guide and rule mankind. The young they influenced by
education, the old by preaching and by the confessional.
Believing that he who gains the young possesses the future,
they founded schools and colleges where the education,
like their other work, was gratuitous; they crept into the
universities and sat in the professors' chairs. To make
the confessional an efficient instrument for guiding the con-
sciences of men, they soon developed a system of casuistry,
in which the sins of men were nicely weighed and the
principles of moral conduct sapped by the suggestion, at least,
that the end justified the means. The Jesuits, however, did
not confine themselves to educational or spiritual functions.
266 European History ', 1494- 1598
Not only did they become the confessors of Kings, they mixed
themselves up in society and politics ; they were found in every
court of Europe supporting the orthodox, and conspiring to
overthrow those who pleased them not. The growth of the
company was as marvellous as its principles. When Loyola
died in 1556, sixteen years after its foundation, the society
numbered two thousand ordinary and forty-five professed
members; there were twelve provinces, and more than one
hundred colleges and houses. Under Lainez, who succeeded
Loyola as General, the organisation was completed, and its
growth was still more rapid, especially in Italy and Spain.
Soon not only Europe, but India and America, received their
missionaries. The society, as one might expect, was met by
much hostility at first, on the part more especially of the
older monastic orders and the friars; in later times, owing
to the independent attitude it assumed, it was often at serious
variance with the Papacy. Yet for the time at least the
Papacy had gained an army of devoted soldiers. It now
remained for the Church to define its articles of war, and to
provide more efficient weapons. The Council of Trent was to
do the first ; the Inquisition to furnish the last.
The second session of the Council of Trent had been dis-
persed in 1552, in the confusion caused by the advance of
Maurice of Saxony on Innsbruck (p. 242). In
of council*5 o? January> IS62, Pius iv. opened its third and last
Trent. session. There was no longer any question of
"Dec 1563 t0 ^e Amission of representatives of the Protestants;
yet its work, if limited to Catholic nations, was
neither unimportant nor easy. It had to determine the re-
lation between the Pope and the Church ; to settle the articles
of faith which still remained in dispute, and to undertake
those internal reforms the necessity of which all admitted.
As might have been anticipated, these questions led to grave
dispute. The Emperor Ferdinand, and the French king
Charles ix. desired such a reform of the Church as might
possibly lead to a reconciliation, or at least to a compromise
The Counter- Reformation 267
with the Protestants. They demanded, therefore, that the
marriage of the clergy si-ould be allowed; that communion
in both kinds should be granted to the laity; that the
services of their Churches should be in the vernacular.
The French, led by the Cardinal of Lorraine, went further,
and raised the claim advanced at the Councils of Constance
(1414-1418), and of Basle (1431-1443), of the superiority of
a General Council over a Pope. The Spaniards, while they
opposed many of the demands of the Germans and of the
French, and were anxious to prevent any change in doctrine,
objected to the extreme pretensions of the Papacy, and wished
that the bishops should be recognised as holding their
spiritual authority by divine institution and not as the mere
delegates of the Pope. The papal party, on the contrary, were
eager to affirm the supremacy of the Pope, and then dismiss
the Council as soon as might be. Had their opponents been
united, and had the German and French representatives been
more numerous, something might have been done, for all
were determined to assert the independence of the Council
from papal control; they also wished to limit the authority
of the Pope and to reform many of the abuses, more especially
the financial extortions, of the Roman Curia. Unfortunately,
their divisions gave the Pope an opportunity which he eagerly
seized, and which was turned to good account by Cardinal
Morone, who was appointed president in 1563. Quarrels for
precedence between the representatives of France and Spain
were studiously fostered. Separate negotiations were opened
with Ferdinand and Charles; they were warned of the danger
which might arise from too powerful an episcopate, and
reminded that these continued quarrels among the Catholics
would only favour heresy ; they were urged to look to the Pope
rather than to the Council for the reforms they needed. Since
the Council had declared that the question of granting the Cup
to the laity was to be left to the decision of the Pope, Ferdi-
nand was promised that it should be conceded as soon as the
Council closed; the election of Maximilian, his son, as
268 European History \ 1 494- 1598
King of the Romans, should also be confirmed. The Cardinal
of Lorraine, the chief representative of the French Church at
the Council, was promised the legation in France, and even
the reversion of the pontifical throne ; and in accordance with
the policy of his family, the Guises, he joined the papal party,
and influenced the attitude of the French court. To con-
ciliate further the sovereigns of Europe, some articles which
had been passed, and which touched unduly on the temporal
power, were rescinded. The opposition of France and of the
Emperor having been thus in part removed, the triumph of the
papal policy was secured. The Italians, who outnumbered
the rest, were almost unanimously on the papal side, which was
also supported by the powerful advocacy of the Jesuit Lainez,
and of Carlo Borromeo, the saintly Archbishop of Milan.
Aided by the Spanish representatives, who were in agreement
with them so far, the Italians succeeded in defining some
of the more important doctrines in accordance with their
own views, and in resisting all except some minor internal
reforms.
Having now gained all that could be hoped for, the Pope
was eager to close the Council. To this the Spaniards alone
The council 0DJected. Philip was anxious that it should
closed, its continue its sessions until every disputed doctrine
results. fad been settled, and a thorough reform of the
Church and the papal Curia had been effected. Here again
the papal party triumphed. A report of the serious illness
of the Pope finally overcame the opposition of Philip ; for a
vacancy while the Council was still sitting would lead to
serious difficulties. Accordingly, on December 3, 1563, the
Council was finally closed, ^ltf^'ytffo sorr^ppjnrs_ja£-4agfrjne
W^rft left nndpridpdj iftnsft writh respprr tn irjrlnl p;pnpps,
urgatory, the — sacmmjgnts, jind the invocation__of saints,
w^r^miffirmjjKil jEij^-gew-^aEecision, Controverted questions
were replaced by dogmas, doubtful traditions by definite
doctrines, and an uniformity established in matters of faith
hitherto unknown. If, in the matter of reform, a stricter
The Counter- Reformation 269
discipline was enforced upon the inferior clergy, and the
abuse of pluralities was checked, nothing was done to touch
the prerogatives of the Pope, or of the cardinals. The Council
of Trent may be said therefore to have defined the articles of
the Counter-Reformation. The Catholic Church of the West
was henceforth to be divided, and the Church of Rome may
be said to have begun.
The decisions of the Council of Trent were accepted with-
out reserve by the chief states of Italy, by Portugal, and by
Poland. In Germany they were ratified by the Catholic
princes at the Diet of Augsburg, 1566. Philip also confirmed
them, 'saving the prerogatives of the crown.' In France a
distinction was made ; the decrees which referred to dogma
were acknowledged, and, indeed, subsequently declared to
need no confirmation by the temporal power; those, how-
ever, which referred to discipline, and which interfered with
the Gallican Church, were opposed by the 'Parlements/and by
some of the lower clergy. Although gradually accepted in
practice, and even acknowledged by the clergy at the States-
General of 1 61 5, they were never formally ratified by the
crown.
To enforce the principles of this newly organised Church
an instrument already existed. On July 21, 1542, Pope
Paul in. had, on the advice of Cardinal Caraffa, The
authorised by Bull the erection of a 'Supreme inquisition.
Tribunal of the Inquisition.' Its organisation was based
on the court instituted in Spain by Ferdinand and Isabella
in 1483. Six cardinals were appointed universal Inquisitors
on either side the Alps, with powers of delegating their
authority to other ecclesiastics. All from highest to lowest ;
were declared subject to their jurisdiction ; no book could ?~
be printed without their leave; they could punish with
imprisonment, confiscation of goods, and death; and from ;;
their judgment there was no appeal save to the Pope. How
far these tremendous powers could be exercised in the various
countries of Europe depended, no doubt, on the attitude
270 European History, 1494- 1598
of the temporal sovereigns, but in Italy there was little
difficulty. The Spanish Inquisition willingly co-operated, and
the tenets of the Council were enforced with merciless rigour. !
The influence of the Counter-Reformation is seen in the i
revival of apostolic piety and missionary zeal by such men as/
The Popes of Carlo Borromeo, nephew of Pius iv., Archbishop
the Counter- of Milan (1538-1584), and also in the altered
Reformation, character of the Popes. Of these Paul iv. (1555-
i559)iVpius v. (1566-1572), Sixtus v. (1585-1590), are true
representatives of the time; while the others, Pius iv. (1559-
1565) and Gregory xm. (1 572-1 585), although not men of
remarkable zeal, could not resist the tendency of the age.
The policy of all these Popes was much the same. They
abandoned the pernicious system of nepotism — Pius v.
finally forbidding all alienation of Church property; they
reformed the Court of Rome ; they enforced better discipline
in the Church, and improved its services; they kept the
cardinals in order, insisted on bishops residing in their
dioceses, and, for the rest, gave to the Papal States an organised
system of government and finance in which they had been
hitherto wanting. Abandoning the idea of aggrandising
themselves in Italy, they no longer struggled against the
Spanish rule. Although they had their difficulties with the
temporal sovereigns of Europe, they none the less supported
the cause of authority and orthodoxy. They allied themselves
with the orthodox Kings and Princes, whose younger sons
they invested with episcopal sees, and granted them taxes
from ecclesiastical revenues. Thus the Church of Rome had
defined its faith^ reformed some of its most flagrant abuses,
Jj_ organised within itself a force of devoted servants, and armed
^itself with the terrors of the Inquisition. Strengthened in
this way, and by the revived associations and enthusiasms of
the past, the Church, allied with the monarchs of Europe,
went forth to stay the advance of heresy, and to win back, if
possible, the ground she had lost by her laches.
Of the Counter- Reformation, the two great exponents in the
Calvin and Geneva 271
field of temporal politics are Philip of Spain, and the family
of the Guises in France. It was ever the aim of Philip to
carry out his father's schemes with such modifications as the
altered circumstances demanded. The loss of the Empire
and of Germany forced him to lean more exclusively on
Spain: the triumph of the Protestants in Germany and
England destroyed all hopes of bringing them again within
the fold, except by force, and this was not at first possible.
But Philip never relinquished the hope of re-establishing the
authority of the Catholic Church, backed up by a strong and
wide-embracing monarchy under his own control. The political
ambition of the Guises, and their attempt to place Mary
Queen of Scots upon the throne of England excited the
apprehensions of Philip, who hoped to secure that country for
himself, and at first prevented his cordial co-operation with
their attempt to master France. But in time these appre-
hensions were removed, and finally these two representatives
of the Catholic reaction formed the ' League,' and united to
enforce their rule on Europe. It is this which forms the
connecting link between the revolt of the Netherlands and
the civil wars in France, and gives a unity to the history until
the end of our period.
§ 2. Calvin and Geneva.
While the Church of Rome was thus marshalling her
forces, that form of Protestantism which was henceforth to be
her most deadly foe was receiving its organisation at the
hands of John Calvin.
It is a remarkable fact that Lutheranism has never made
any permanent conquests outside Germany and the Scandi-
navian kingdoms, and that even in Germany the
numbers of its adherents decreased after the failure of
middle of the sixteenth century. For this, three Lutheranism
reasons may be suggested : —
(1) Many of the doctrines of Luther, notably those on
272 European History, 1494-1 598
Justification, and on the Eucharist, were compromises of too
subtle a nature to appeal to ordinary minds, even among
the Germans themselves, and led to arid controversies and
ignoble divisions.
%A£L Moreover, by force of circumstances arising out of the
political conditions of Germany, the movement had allied
itself with the interests of the Princes, and with authority
too closely to appeal to democratic impulses. The failure of
Lutheranism to command the adhesion of the lower classes
was illustrated even in Germany itself by the revolt of the
peasants, the rise of the Anabaptists, and by the temporary
success of the reform of Zwingle. From their extravagances
Luther had drawn back with horror, and, becoming daily
more conservative, had to a great extent lost the support of
the more enthusiastic and thorough-going.
(3) Lastly, Luther had serious scruples on the question of
effiptoying force, and although he had finally sanctioned the
appeal to arms, the war was to be a defensive one, waged by
those in authority, and not in alliance with rebels. Luther
had no idea of leading a religious and political crusade, or of
promoting missionary enterprise outside Germany. For this
the world had to look elsewhere.
The French have always been the most successful inter-
preters of new ideas to Europe. Their logical acuteness, their
mastery of method, their gifts of organisation, as well as their
language, with its matchless clearness and elasticity, have
well fitted them for this office ; and these gifts were now to be
illustrated in a pre-eminent degree by their great countryman
John Calvin.
This son of the notary in the episcopal court of Noyon in
Picardy, was born in the year 1509. At the age of twelve he
had been appointed to a chaplaincy in the cathe-
John Calvin. ,, , . , , -™ i l l
dral, and received the tonsure. But, though he
subsequently became a cure, he never proceeded any further
in clerical orders ; for his father, thinking that the legal profes-
sion offered more promise, sent him to Orleans, and then to
/
Calvin and Geneva 273
Bourges to study law, 15 29-1 5 31. It was during these years
that Calvin fell under the influence of Lutheran teachers,
notably of Jacques Lefevre, a man of Picardy like himself,
and one of the fathers of French Protestantism In the year
1534, Calvin was driven from his country by the persecutions +"
instituted by Francis 1., and retired to Basle. Here at the
age of twenty-five he published the first edition of his great-j-
work, The Institutes, a manual of Christian religion, which,
although subsequently enlarged, contains a complete outline
of his theological system, and which probably has exercised a
more profound influence than any other book written by so
young a man. In the year 1536, as he passed through Geneva,
he was induced by the solemn adjurations of William Farel of
Dauphine, a French exile himself, to abandon the condition of
studies he so dearly loved, and devote himself to Geneva,
missionary effort. The imperial city of Geneva was of im-
portance because it commanded the valley of the Rhone,
and the commercial routes which united there; it enjoyed
municipal self-government, but was under the ecclesiastical
jurisdiction of its bishop and was threatened by the Duke of
Savoy, who held the surrounding country and possessed certain
judicial powers within the town itself. To emancipate them-
selves more completely from this double yoke of ecclesiastical
and temporal authority was the constant aim of the patriots
of Geneva, and with that view they had made an alliance with
the canton of Freibourg in 15 19, and that of Bern in 1526.
An intermittent struggle had ensued, which was embittered
by the adoption of the Lutheran Doctrine by the city in 1535,
at the instigation of Farel. In 1536, war had broken out
between the Duke and the canton of Bern, when the Swiss suc-
ceeded in conquering the whole of the country of Vaud, and
thus relieved Geneva of all immediate danger from the Duke.
Calvin, induced to stay in Geneva at this moment, com-
menced forthwith to found a Christian church after the model • V*
of the Institutes-, but. the severity of his system led to a
reaction, and caused his exile, and that of Farel, in 1538'-^
period iv. s »
2^4 European History \ 1 494- 1 5 98
Three years afterwards (September 1541), the city, torn by
internal discord, and afraid of being conquered either by the
Duke, who was supported by the Catholics within
Geneva, the walls, or by Bern, which courted the Pro-
1536-1538, testants, recalled the Reformer, and accepted his
1541-1564. c
system of church-government. Leaving the muni-
cipal government of the city intact, he set up by its side an
ecclesiastical consistory, consisting of the pastors, and twelve
elders elected from the two councils of the town on the nomina-
tion of the clergy. The jurisdiction of this consistory was
nominally confined to morals, and the regulation of Church
matters. It could only punish by penance, and by exclusion
from the Sacrament, but as it was the duty of the secular
authority to enforce its decisions, every sin became a crime,
punished with the utmost severity. All were forced by law to
attend public worship, and partake of the Lord's Supper. To
wear clothes of a forbidden stuff, to dance at a wedding, to
laugh at Calvin's sermons, became an offence punishable at law.
Banishment, imprisonment, sometimes death, were the penalties
inflicted on unchastity, and a child was beheaded for having
struck his parents. When offences such as these were so
severely visited, we cannot wonder that heresy did not escape.
In 1547, Gruet was executed, and in 1553, Servetus was burnt.
This remorseless tyranny, which reminds one forcibly of the
rule of Savonarola, was not established without opposition.
A party termed the Libertines was formed, who endeavoured
to relax the severity of the discipline, and to vindicate the
independence of the secular authority. Nevertheless Calvin,
aided by the French exiles who crowded into Geneva and
obtained the freedom of the city and a share in the govern-
ment, successfully maintained his supremacy until his death in
1564, when he was succeeded by his pupil, Theodore Beza.
Geneva had been relieved from fear of attack from thfi.
Duke of Savoy by the French conquest of his country in 1543,
and although, in the October of the year in which Calvin
died, the Duke obtained from Bern a restoration of all the
J^u^" 7Calvin and Geneva 275
country south of the Lake of Geneva which it had seized in
1536, he did not make any attempt on the city itself, fteneya.,
continued to be an independent republic, forming from time
to time alliances with some of the Swiss cantons, till 18 15,
when she finally became a member of the Swiss Confederation.
The predominant characteristic of the teaching of Calvin
lies in its eclecticism. In his doctrinal views : in his tenets
as to Predestination, the Eucharist, and the un- character-
questioned authority of Scripture to the exclusion istics of
of tradition. _he approached the views of Zwingle a vimsm-
rather than those of Luther. But if in so doing he repre-
sents the most uncompromising and pronounced antagonism
to the teaching of Rome, yet in his conviction that ^oul;
side the Church there is no salvation, and in the over-
whelming authority he ascribes to her, he reasserts the most
extravagant tenets of Catholicism, and revives the spirit
of Hebraism. That the religion he established, if not
exactly ascetic, was gloomy bevond measure^ that it has
inspired no art except. perhapsT certain forms of literature;
that his principles of church-governmejik though founded
on a democratic basis, in practice destroyed all individual
liberty ; that, so far from advancing the spirit of tolera-
tion, they necessarily involved persecution — all this must be
admitted. His strong predestinarian views, > if logically acted
up to, ought to have led to a fatalistic spirit most dangerous
to morals, and paralysed action, as perhaps they have in a few
cases. But few sane men have ever believed themselves to
be eternally reprobate, or acted as if they disbelieved in free-
will. The practical results of Calvinism have therefore been
to produce a type of men like the founder himself, John
Knox, and Theodore Beza, men of remarkable strength of
will, extraordinary devotion, and indomitable energy, and to
furnish a creed for the most uncompromising opponents of
Rome.
Henceforth Geneva was to become the citadel of the
Reformers; the refuge of those who had to fly from other
<*
uv<\
276 European History \ 1494- 1598
lands; the home of the printing-press whence innumerable
pamphlets were despatched; the school whence missionaries
went forth to preach ; the representative of the most militant
form of Protestantism on a republican basis; the natural
and inevitable enemy of the Counter-Reformation which was
the ally of the Jesuits, and of the monarchical forces of
Catholic Europe, headed by Spain.
CHAPTER VII
PHILIP AND SPAIN
Persecution of the Protestants — The mystery of Don Carlos — Wars against
the Moors and Turks— Relief of Malta — Persecution and Rebellion of
the Moriscoes — Battle of Lepanto — Conquest of Portugal — Internal
Government of Spain and its dependencies under Philip II.
§ i. Persecution of the Protestants — The Inquisition.
At the date of the Treaty of Cateau Cambresis (April 5,
1559), Philip was in his thirty-second year. He had already
wedded and lost two wives. His first, Maria of Portugal,
had died, in giving birth to Don Carlos, on July 8, 1545 ; his
second, Mary of England, on 1 7th November 1558. After hav-
ing settled the government of the Netherlands (cf. p. 319 ff.),
Philip proceeded to Spain. A furious tempest phiiip lands
greeted his arrival ; nine vessels of his fleet were to Spain,
lost ; and the King himself landed on the shores ug' 29, I559'
of his kingdom — which he was never to leave again — in a
small boat.
Philip had not hitherto displayed those bigoted views of
which he henceforth became the exponent. During his brief
residence in England he had, in the vain attempt to conciliate
the English, opposed or pretended to oppose the policy of
persecution adopted by his unhappy wife. He had intervened
to protect the Princess Elizabeth, and after her accession
had first proposed to marry her, and, when that was refused,
had continued on friendly terms. He even gave the Calvinists
of Scotland his tacit support against Mary of devotes
Guise and her daughter. No sooner, however, himself to the
did he finally settle in Spain than all was changed, extirpation of
., , • /• 1-1 1 Protestantism.
Spain was the representative of all that was most
fanatical in Europe, and Philip eagerly adopted the views
278 European History \ 1494- 1598
of that country. Henceforth the increase of his own
authority, and the advance of Catholicism, became identified ;
the reformed opinions were in his eyes a gospel of rebellion
and of opposition to authority, and to crush out this per-
nicious heresy under his absolute rule became the principle
of his life.
During the early years of Charles v., a few Spaniards abroad
had adopted reformed opinions, such as Francis de Enzinas,
the translator of the New Testament into Spanish, and sub-
sequently Professor of Greek at Oxford (152 0-1522); while in
1553 Servetus the anti-Trinitarian suffered at Geneva. But
it was not until the year 1^8 that Protestantism seems to
have made much head in Spain itself. By that time, however,
not only had Spanish translations of the New Testament and
various Protestant books been disseminated in Spain, but a
considerable congregation of Reformers had been secretly
formed, more especially in the towns of Seville, Valladolid,
and Zamora, and in the kingdom of Aragon. On receiving
intelligence of this new nest of heretics, Pope Paul iv. issued a
brief, February 1558, in which he urged the Inquisitor-General
to spare no efforts in exterminating this evil ; and the dying
Emperor, forgetting his dislike of papal interference, besought
the Regent Joanna, and Philip himself, to listen to the Pope's
exhortations. Philip required no urging. He published an
edict, borrowed from the Netherlands, which condemned all
to the stake who bought, sold, or read prohibited books, and
revived a law by which the accuser was to receive one-fourth
of the property of the condemned. Paul enforced the law by
his Bull of 1559, commanding all confessors to urge on
their penitents the duty of informing against suspected per-
sons. He also authorised the Inquisition to deliver to the
secular arm even those who abjured their errors, 'not from
conviction, but from fear of punishment,' and made a grant
from the ecclesiastical revenues of Spain to defray the expenses
of the Inquisition.
This terrible tribunal, which had been established in its
Philip and Spain 279
final form by Ferdinand and Isabella in 1478, and freed from
appeal to Rome in 1497, consisted of a Supreme Council
formed of lawyers and theologians, mostly Dominicans, an
order to which Philip showed especial favour. The
At the head of this Council stood the Grand inquisition.
Inquisitor, appointed by the king himself, with numerous
subordinate tribunals, protected by armed 'familiars.'
Their trials were conducted in secret. Persons were
tempted or forced by threats to denounce their enemies,
their friends, and even their relatives ; a system of espion-
age was resorted to ; torture was freely used to extort con-
fessions from the accused ; and the most harmless words were
often twisted into heterodoxy by the subtle refinements of the
Dominican theologians. They punished by forfeiture of goods,
by penance, by imprisonment, and in the last resort handed
over the condemned to the secular arm, to be burnt at an Auto
da ft. Supported by this unwonted harmony between Pope
and King, the Grand Inquisitor, Don Fernando Valdes, Arch-
bishop of Seville, set vigorously to work. In Seville alone,
800 were arrested on the first day, and on May 21, 1559, the
first of the Autos da fl took place in the streets of Valla-
dolid; another was solemnised on the arrival of Philip in Spain,
and a third amid the fties attending his marriage with his
third wife, Elizabeth of France, in 1560. Indeed, no great
ceremonial was for some years considered complete unless
sanctified by an Auto daft, and the Spaniards preferred one
to a bull-fight. It may be true that the cruelties of the
Inquisition have been exaggerated; yet, at least, opinions,
which in other countries would have been tolerated, were
ruthlessly suppressed. Not only was all scientific speculation
tabooed, and Spanish scholars forbidden to visit other countries,
but the slightest deviation from the strictest orthodoxy was
severely visited. The Inquisition was even used against the
Church. Although the number of the clergy and the monks
was very large, and their wealth, especially in Castile, enor-
mous, no Church in Europe was more completely under
royal control. The nomination to ecclesiastical offices wa?
2 So European History, 1494-159S
exclusively in the hands of the king ; papal interference, unless
by his leave, was stoutly resisted ; and, if the Church was
rich, at least one-third of its revenues fell into the
tion and the royal coffers. The power of the crown was also 1
Spanish enhanced by the devotion of the Jesuits to the |
royal cause. It was, however, on the Dominicans
that Philip mostly relied. The ignorance and bigotry of the
members of this order of friars in Spain is only equalled by
their subservience to the rbyal will. They dominated the
Holy Office of the Inquisition, and subjected to its discipline
not only Theresa, one of the most devoted of Spanish
saints, but the members of the powerful Society of Jesus,
and even the episcopal bench itself. No less than nine
bishops were condemned to various acts of penance ; even
Carranza, Archbishop of Toledo, was attacked. This learned
and zealous prelate, who had taken an important part in some
of the sessions of the Council of Trent, and in whose arms
Charles v. had died, was charged in August, 1559, with
heterodox opinions. After his trial had dragged on for more
than seven years, Pius v. insisted on the cause being trans-
ferred to Rome. But the death of the Pope again delayed
the matter, and it was not until April 1576 that the papal
decision was finally given. The Archbishop was convicted
of holding doctrines akin to those of Luther, and was to
abjure sixteen propositions found in his writings ; he was to
do certain acts of penance; to be suspended from his
episcopal functions for five years more, and meanwhile to
be confined in a convent of the Dominicans, his own order,
at Orvieto.
* The efforts of the Inquisition succeeded in crushing out
' Protestantism in Spain ; and its success unforjujialeiy-jefutes^
thecomfortingjdoctrine tEaTpersecutionJs powerless, against
strong convictions. But the success involved the destruction
r of all intellectual independence ; Spain soon became one of the
most backward countries in Europe, and, if we except Cervantes
the author of Don Quixote, and Calderon the poet, she gave
Philip and Spain 23 1
1 birth to no writer of eminence. Nor did the Holy Office confine
'itself to the extirpation of heresy, or to the vigorous control
of the clergy. Formed exclusively of nominees of
the crown,1 it became an instrument in the royal ti0n used to
jhands for financial extortion and for the pursuit punish poiiti-
of political offenders. Thus, custom-house officers
1 were dragged before the Inquisition for having allowed
horses to cross the frontier, on the pretext that they were for
the service of the Huguenots ; Antonio Perez, the notorious
secretary of Philip, was arraigned before the Inquisition of
Aragon ; and foreign ambassadors were enjoined to obey its
orders. At times the Pope remonstrated against these abuses
of the Holy Office, which trenched upon the papal claims.
But Philip answered 'that with his scruples his Holiness
would destroy religion'; and long after the reign of Philip the
I Inquisition, as well as the Church, continued the humble
servant of royal prerogative.
§ 2. The Mystery of Don Carlos?
According to some authorities the zeal of Philip did not
spare his own son and heir, Don Carlos. The history of this
unfortunate Prince was so distorted by the enemies Don Carlos
of his father, Philip during his own lifetime, and 1545- 1568.
since then has become such a favourite subject of romance,
that on some points it is difficult to arrive at the truth. Some
declare that the estrangement between father and son was
caused by the suspicion of a guilty passion between the Prince
1 The Grand Inquisitors during the reign of Philip were —
1. Don Fernando Valdes, Archbishop of Seville, 1547- 1566.
2. Espinosa, the King's Secretary, Bishop of Siguenca, and Cardinal,
I566-I573-
3. Quiroga, Archbishop of Toledo, 1573- 1594.
8 For the mystery of Don Carlos cf. Prescott, Philip II. , c. vi. ;
Forneron, Philippe II. , c. xi. ; Gachard, Don Carlos ct Philippe //.
282 European History \ 1494- 1 59S
and his stepmother, Elizabeth of France, and this is the view
which has been adopted by those, like Schiller, who have
made Don Carlos the hero of a romantic tragedy.
We find that in the negotiations for the Treaty of Cateau
Cambresis it had been suggested that Don Carlos should wed
the French Princess. The idea was dropped, and
his imprison- the hand of Elizabeth was subsequently bestowed
ment. on Philip, the father of the Prince. Nevertheless,
it is asserted that Elizabeth had learnt to love the
son ; that Don Carlos never forgave his father for having
robbed him of his bride ; and that the jealous husband threw
his son into prison out of revenge, and finally procured the
death by poison not only of his son, but of his unfaithful
wife. This tragic tale must, however, be rejected. Don
Carlos was only twelve years old at the date of the Treaty of
Cateau Cambresis, and the story is not supported by any
contemporary authority. Even William of Orange, who in
his ■ Apology ' accuses Philip of poisoning both, is silent as
to the motive.
Less improbable is the story that Don Carlos had secret
sympathy with the Flemish malcontents, or at least some
leaning towards the Protestant heresy. This, it is said,
explains the wish of Don Carlos to be intrusted with the
administration of the Netherlands, the unwillingness of Philip
to publish the reason of his treatment of his son, and his
letter to his aunt the Queen of Portugal, in which he spoke
of 'sacrificing to God his own flesh and blood, preferring
God's service and the welfare of his people to all human con-
siderations.' These expressions are, however, quite com-
patible with the third, and far more probable, hypothesis that
Don Carlos was mad. Two of his brothers had died of
epilepsy. Don Carlos, who was born in July, 1545, was a sickly
child, subject to serious feverish and bilious attacks ; that as
he grew in years he became, in spite of a certain reckless
generosity and an extravagant attachment to a few, arrogant,
violent, and unmanageable. A fall down a staircase on his
Philip and Spain 283
head, in April, 1562, which necessitated an operation of trepan-
ning, increased his violence, and from this moment his actions
were those of a crazy man. He insulted women of position
with opprobrious epithets. Twice he swallowed costly jewels.
He forced a shoemaker to eat stewed strips of a pair of
boots because they did not fit. He violently assaulted
the Duke of Alva, because the Duke was sent to the
Netherlands instead of himself, and even Don John, to
whom he was much attached. He declared that he
meditated killing a man whom he hated, and sought for
absolution beforehand. He attempted to fly from Spain, and
probably to rebel against his father. Of his insanity the
Venetian ambassador was convinced, and that this is the
explanation of the mystery gains confirmation from a secret
letter of Philip to the Pope, of which, although the original
has disappeared, a translation has been preserved, and in
which insanity is pleaded as the justification for the treat-
ment of the Prince; while surely we cannot wonder that
Philip should be anxious to keep secret the fact that the
insanity of Joanna was reappearing in her great-grandson?
Nor, as far as we can see, does the actual treatment of Don
Carlos, while in prison, appear to have been exactly cruel. No
doubt, he was most carefully watched. He was not to be
allowed to talk on politics, or to have any news of the outer
world ; he was only allowed books of a devotional character ;
but his guardians were men of good birth, they were enjoined
to lighten his captivity by conversation, and he was not
tortured or starved.
We have yet to deal with the accusation that the un-
fortunate Prince was poisoned by the order of his father.
This was plainly asserted by William of Orange, Was he
and by Antonio Perez, who was at the time of poisoned?
the death of Don Carlos in the service of King Philip, and the
story was believed by many contemporaries. Yet both William
the Silent and Perez were, when they wrote, the mortal enemies
of the King, and although Philip was unfortunately not above
284 European History \ 1494- 1598
resorting to murder to attain his ends, we may at least allow
that the charge in this case is not proven.
Don Carlos died on the 24th of July, 1568, and in less
than three months he was followed to the grave by
Death of Elizabeth, his stepmother, who died in child-
Don Carlos, bed, October 3, 1568. Two years later Philip
a^d of ly I568 ; married his fourth wife, Anne of Austria, his
Isabella, niece, and daughter of the Emperor Maximilian.
Oct. 3, 1568. ghe died on the 26th of 0ctober l58o> of
her children, all died young except Philip, who succeeded
his father.
§ 3. Wars against the Moors and Turks.
The Rebellion of the Moriscoes.
By the ordinance of 1502, published by Ferdinand after the
suppression of the Moorish rebellion in Granada (cf. p. 96),
„ .... the alternative of baptism or exile had been
Condition r
of the offered to the Moors, and this had been ex-
Moriscoes. tended to Aragon, and its subordinate kingdoms
Valencia and Catalonia, in the early part of the reign of the
Emperor Charles. To further the work of conversion churches
had been built in the districts most occupied by the Moors,
and missionaries despatched thither. The attempt, however,
met with scant success. The bitter memories of the past,
the deep racial hatreds, the imperfect acquaintance of the
preachers with the language of the Moors, the differences of
usage and of customs, presented insurmountable difficulties.
Accordingly, in 1526, coercion was attempted. An edict was
issuedordering the Moors to renounce their national usages,"*
dress, and language, and the Inquisition was intrusted with the
enforcement of the edict. Wiser counsels, however, for the
time prevailed. The edict was not enforced ; and the govern-
ment was fain to rest content with an outward conformity,
which was all that could, under the circumstances, be looked
Philip and Spain 285
for. The * New Christians/ or Moriscoes, as the Moors
were called, at least did not disturb the peace. Taking
advantage of a strange clause in the Treaty of Granada,
which exempted them from certain duties paid by the
Christians in their trade with the Barbary coast, they
devoted themselves to commerce with that country. But
it was as artisans and in agriculture that they especially
excelled. As artisans their skill was displayed in many a
handicraft ; while by their irrigation and by their husbandry
they turned the slopes and uplands of the Sierras in
Granada into one of the most fertile parts of Spain. The
fig, the pomegranate, the orange, and the grape grew side by
side with corn and hemp ; their flocks of merino sheep were
famous ; the mulberry tree formed the basis of an extensive
manufacture of silk. We may well deplore the fact that
this policy was abandoned; and yet amid the fanaticism
aroused by the crusade against the Protestants, the wonder
perhaps is that it continued so long. Moreover, at this
moment, a renewal of the struggle with the Moors of Africa
and with the Turk in the Mediterranean naturally revived the
national antipathy to the Moriscoes.
The unceasing raids of the corsairs of the Barbary coast
had not only rendered the sea unsafe, but devastated the
shores of Italy and Spain. Accordingly, two Expeditions
expeditions were despatched against them from against the
Naples, which did not meet with much success., corsairs.
The first, under the Duke of Medina Sidonia, ^so-^.
Viceroy of Naples, was directed against Tripoli, then held by
a Greek named Dragut, who had been taken prisoner by the
corsairs in early life, and had turned Mahometan. The Duke
was forced to put back by stress of weather ; his ships were
subsequently put to flight by a Turkish fleet under Piali,
another renegade, who sailed to the assistance of Dragut,
and the island of Jerbah (Gelves), which had been occupied,
was retaken by the Turks (June 29, 1560). The second
expedition, which started in 1562, was almost annihilated
286 European History \ 1494- 1598
by a storm. In the following year (April 1563), the Dey of
Algiers, encouraged by these disasters of the Spaniards,
attempted to drive them from Oran and the neighbouring
fortress of Mazarquivir (Mers-el-Kebir), two of the conquests
of Cardinal Ximenes, which, with Goletta near Tunis_and
Melilla in Morocco, were the only remaining Spanisnposses-
sions on the African coast. Mazarquivir was nearly lost,
when, at the last moment, it was relieved by a Spanish fleet on
June 8, and in the two succeeding years (1564 and 1565), the
efforts of the Spaniards were somewhat more successful. In
September 1564, the island fortress of Pefion de Vejez,
which lay to the west of the Spanish possessions, was taken
by Don Garcia de Toledo, who had succeeded Medina
Sidonia as Viceroy of Naples ; and in the following year the
estuary of the Tetuan, another stronghold of the corsairs,
was blocked up and rendered useless. Further enterprise on
the coast of Africa was now stopped by the news that Malta
was hard beset by the Turks. On the loss of Rhodes, in
1522, the Knights of St. John had received the grant of the
The relief island of Malta from Charles v. (1530); from
of Malta. that time forward they had formed a bulwark
Sept. 1565. against the Turk from the east, and had joined
in most of the late expeditions against the Barbary coast.
Solyman 1., often urged to reduce this important place, at
last despatched a powerful fleet against it in May, 1565.
Piali, the renegade, who had already distinguished himself in
1560, shared the command with Mustapha, a tried veteran
of seventy, while Dragut of Tripoli also added his contingent.
In vain did the Grand Master, Jean de la Valette, appeal
for aid to repel the attack. Catherine de Medici was
at this moment intriguing with the Turks, and Venice was
afraid to arouse the anger of the Sultan. Even Philip did
not seem inclined to listen; the affairs in the Netherlands
and in France demanded his attention; perhaps he did
not care to help an Order which, as it happened at that
time, was largely composed of Frenchmen. Finally, however,
Philip and Spain 287
he listened to the warning of Don Garcia de Toledo that
Malta, if once in Turkish hands, could never be recovered,
and would give the Sultan the command of that part of
the Mediterranean ; and on September 8, 1565, Malta was
relieved by Don Garcia when reduced to the last gasp.
That these events should have awakened the dislike of the
Spaniards for the Moriscoes at home, and that suspicions
were aroused of some correspondence between them and the
Moors of Africa, is not surprising. Nor under these circum-
stances can any serious objection be brought The Edicts of U/ «
against the first two ordinances; that of 1560, *&0-v&7^/i y 1
forbade the Moriscoes to acquire negro slaves, on the reason- ,
.able ground that thereby the number of the infidels was
constantly increased; that of 1563, prohibited the Moriscoes
from possessing arms without the licence of the captain-general.
These measures, however, did not satisfy Don Pedro Guerrero,
the Archbishop of Granada, nor the clergy of his diocese, and
in pursuance of a memorial which they presented, the govern-
ment issued the following astounding edict. The provisions of
the ill-advised edict of 1526 were revived; thej^tiona]_spjigs
and dances of the Moriscoes were proscribed ; their weddings
werejto_be conducted in public according to the Christian^
ritual, and their houses were to be kept open during the day
of the ceremony, so__that all rould enter a^id see that no
unhallowed rites were solemnised ; their women were to appear
in public with their faces uncovered ; and lastly, the baths in
which the Moriscoes delighted were ordered to be destroyed-
on the ground that they were turned to licentious purposes^ ^
Still further, as if to outrage the feelings of the Moriscoes, the
edictwas published on January 1, the anniversary of the
capture of the capital of Granada. It appears that many of""
~tHe local nobility protested against the execution of this
atrocious edict, and that the Marquis de Mondejar, the
captain-general of Granada, and even Alva himself, were
opposed to it. To expect that the Moriscoes would submit
to such interference with their most cherished customs — an
288 European History, 1494- 1598
interference which did not even respect the domestic privacy
of their homes —was absurd, and if it was intended to seize
upon disobedience as a pretext for expelling them, the army
should at least have been increased. The Grand Inquisitor
Espinosa was, however, above such considerations, and the
execution of the order was intrusted to Diego Deza, auditor of
the Holy Office, who was appointed President of the Chancery
of Granada. Finding all remonstrance vain, the Moriscoes
Revolt of the ma(^e preparations to revolt in June, 1569. Un-
Moriscoes. fortunately some of the more hot-headed, led by a
Dec. 1568. £yer Qf tke name 0f Aben-Farax, could not brook
delay, and in December, 1568, attempted a premature rising
in the Moorish quarter (the Albaicin) of Granada. 'You are
too few, and you come too soon,' said the Moriscoes of
Granada, and refused to move. Disappointed in seizing the
city, the rebels retreated to the country, where they met with
more response, and signalised their success by horrible
ferocity. Neither sex nor age were spared; and Christians,
we are told, were sold as slaves to the Algerian corsairs for a
carbine a piece.
The Moriscoes now elected as their King Aben-Humeya,
a young man of twenty-two, a descendant of the ancient
house that once had ruled in Spain. The
Aben- r
Humeya young King indeed dismissed Aben-Farax, and
elected King. ^ something to check the cruelties of his
followers. The revolt was confined to a somewhat limited
area. Its chief stronghold was in the Alpujarras, a low
Limits of range of hills which lies between the higher
the rebellion. peaks 0f the Sierra Nevada and the sea ; thence
it spread to the neighbourhood of Almeria on the east,
and that of Velez-Malaga on the west. The Moriscoes
held no large towns, and only ventured on occasional raids
upon the rich plain of La Vega, in which the town of Granada .
lay, and upon the towns on the sea-coast. Had the Sultan,
Selim 11., listened to the appeals of Aben-Humeya, and
thrown himself with energy into the struggle, the rule of the
Philip and Spain 289
Mahometans might have been re-established in Granada. The
Turks, however, were at this time too much engaged in the
war of Cyprus, and the Moriscoes only obtained some Turkish
mercenaries and some insufficient help from the Barbary
corsairs; they were but poorly armed, and their cause was
ever weakened by internal feuds and personal rivalries.
Under these circumstances, if the advice of the Marquis de
Mondejar had been followed, the rebellion might in all pro-
bability have soon been quelled. Unwilling
, . . _ _ . , . t The counsels
to drive the Moors to despair, he advocated a 0f the Marquis
policy of conciliation, and attempted, though de Mondejar
not always with success, to restrain the fanaticism
and cruelty of his soldiers. Unfortunately, he was violently
opposed by Diego Deza, who urged a war of extermination.
The wish of Diego prevailed, and the Marquis of Los
Veles, a nobleman of the district who held the office of
Adelantado of the neighbouring province of Murcia, was
appointed to the command of an army which was to operate
from the east. The stern old veteran proceeded to conduct
the war with such ferocity that he earned the name of the
' Iron-headed Devil.' The Spanish soldiery, formed chiefly of
local levies, retainers of the nobles, and volunteers, were
allowed to satisfy their unquenchable hatred of the Moriscoes,
and proceeded to rival, if not surpass, the atrocities of the
rebels. Even peaceful villages were sacked: the men were
cut down without remorse ; the women, when they escaped a
worse fate, were sold into slavery. Meanwhile, in the town
of Granada itself, some hundred and fifty Moors, who had
been arrested on suspicion, were massacred in „
x Massacre of
cold blood by the order of Deza (March 1569). the prisoners
Death in open war was better than such a fate. at Granada-
The Moors, driven to despair, had no alternative but to fight
to the last. The war was not marked by any great battles ;
the rebels, holding but few towns, and unable to meet the
enemy in the open field, betook themselves to the hilly
districts, where a confused though hard-fought struggle of
PERIOD IV4 T
290 European History, 1494-1598
races and creeds was carried on. The government, however,
was scarcely likely to succeed as long as the bickerings
between Mondejar and his rivals continued. In the spring
of 1569, Philip, anxious to check these cabals, appointed
JDon John, his half-brother, the illegitimate son
appoHriiS'to °^ Charles v., to the supreme command. At
supreme com- tne same time he was forbidden to take the field,
spring 1569. an(* as ne was onty twenty-two years old he was
to be guided by a council of war, of which Deza
and Mondejar both were members. The only result, there-
fore, of the change was that the quarrel was transferred from
the camp to the council, where finally the views of Deza
triumphed. In June, 1569, the whole of the
The Moorish Moorjsn inhabitants of the town of Granada,
population of
Granada re- amounting to some three thousand five hundred
the^interior. soiu<sj were ordered to leave the city for the
interior, where they were to find new homes.
Mondejar, remonstrating at this act, was removed from his
post; and on the 19th of October, Philip, who had come to
Cordova to be nearer the scene of operations, issued an edict
in which he proclaimed that the war henceforth would be
carried on with ' fire and blood.'
Philip had now definitely committed himself to the views
of Deza ; yet, owing to the incapacity of Los Veles, the royal
army met with scant success. At the close of the
tionof Abeiv Year' Aben-Humeya fell a victim to the vengeance
Humeya, of one of the women of his seraglio. His death
racced*?9 was no loss t0 the cause of tne Moriscoes> for al"
though a man of much energy, and of some ability,
he had become intoxicated by success, and by his jealousy,
his selfishness, his licence, and his cruelty, had forfeited the
popularity he once enjoyed. Aben-Aboo, who succeeded him
as King, was a man of higher integrity and patriotism, and of
greater constancy and courage. He succeeded in obtaining
the sanction of his election from the Pasha of Algiers, in the
name of the Sultan, and under his rule the revolt spread
Philip and Spain 291
eastwards to the very borders of Murcia, and assumed a more
formidable aspect than ever.
At last Philip, convinced of the inefficiency of Los Veles,
removed him from his command, and allowed Don John to
take the field, assisted by the Duke of Sesa, the
grandson of Gonsalvo de Cordova. At the same takes the*
time, fresh levies were raised from the towns field-
of Andalusia, and many nobles, with their re- ' * 7 *
tainers, flocked to the standard of the young and popular Don
John, who at once marched to the district on the east
of the Alpujarras, and, in spite of several reverses, gradually
wore down the 'rebels. On January 28, the strong town
of Galera was invested, to fall on February 7, after a
desperate struggle; the reduction of Seron followed, and
soon the whole country to the east of the Alpujarras was
re-won. Meanwhile, the Duke of Sesa had been equally
successful in the north. Gradually working his way across
the Alpujarras, he secured his conquests by a line of forts,
and, in May, united his forces with those of Don John at
Padules. At the same time an amnesty was offered to those
who would lay down their arms. The cause of the Moris-
coes was now hopeless. On May 19, El Habaquin, a leading
Moorish chieftain, agreed, in the name of Aben-Aboo, to the
severe terms imposed by the conqueror. The e . . .
r J * Submission
1 Little King,' as the Moorish prince was called, of Moriscoes.
was to make public submission to Don John ; May I57°*
the lives of the Moriscoes should be spared, but, like their
fellow-countrymen of Granada, they were to be removed from
their native district and distributed elsewhere in Spain. At
the last moment Aben-Aboo refused these humiliating terms,
and attempted to raise once more the standard of revolt, only
to fall by the hand of one of his subjects who had been
bribed by the government.
The rebellion was now at an end. By the edict of Octo-
ber 28, every Morisco from within the disturbed districts,1
1 There were Moriscoes in other parts of Spain, especially in Murcia,
Valencia and even in the Vega of Granada, who were not disturbed.
292 European History, 1494- 1 598
including those who had remained loyal, was to be removed
into the interior. Their houses and lands were declared
forfeited to the Crown; but their flocks, their
settie1n"ther8 nerds an^ their grain were, if they so wished, to
parts of Spain, be taken at a valuation. It was, however,
Edict of Oct. ordered that families should not be divided, and
28, 1570,
the removal appears to have been effected in as
humane a way as possible. The districts appointed for their
settlements were in the territory of La Mancha, in the northern
borders of Andalusia, in the Castiles, Estremadura, and Galicia.
Flogging and forced labour on the galleys was threatened
against any Moor who should leave his abode without leave,
and death to any one who dared approach within ten leagues
of Granada. The edict of 1566 continued in force; and by
a subsequent one, to keep an Arabic book was declared an
offence punishable with stripes and four years in the galleys.
Andalusia now became a desert. Meanwhile, in spite of these
cruel laws, the exiles enriched their new homes by their
husbandry and industry until the year 1609, when the fanaticism
and national hatred of the Spaniards led to the final expul-
sion of this unfortunate people from Spain itself. The treat-
ment of the Moriscoes by the Spaniards forms one of the
saddest episodes in history ; yet, in justice, an Englishman
should remember that the treatment of the Irish by Cromwell,
if it was preceded by greater provocation, was fully as cruel.
§ 4. Renewed struggle against the Turks.
The victory of Lepanto, 1571-1574.
If the intolerance of Philip is responsible for the cruel pro-
scription of the Protestants and the Moriscoes, his political
interests at least did not lead him into such inconsistencies as
.those of other European sovereigns. Indeed, when we consider
the attitude of the great Powers in Europe towards the Turks
• at this moment, we shall be led to the conclusion that their
Philip and Spain 293
policy with regard to heretics, as well as to infidels, was guided
rather by political, than by religious considerations. The
French, while they persecuted the Huguenots in thejr_own
country, were ever allying themselves with the Turks to oppose
the Spaniard*-— Elizabeth of England, no doubt, gave grudging
aid to the Calvinists abroad, and established a form of Pro-
testantism in England; yet she proscribed the extreme
Calvinists at home, and at times sought the alliance of the
Turk ; whereas if Philip was the persecutor of Protestants and
infidels alike, the necessity of protecting Italy and Spain at
least made him the resolute opponent of the infidel in the
Mediterranean.
The rebellion of the Moriscoes had not yet been crushed
out, when on May 1, 1570, the messenger of Pius v. reached
Spain, praying for the help of the most Christian ,-
King against the Turk. JSoly'man the Magnificent Spain— Pope
had ended his long and triumphant career in and Ven»ce
0 l against the
1566. Although his successor, Selim 11. , possessed Tuck.
none of his father's qualities, the vigour of the May 25' I571,
late administration was still represented by the Grand Vizier
Mahomet; and at the close of the year 1569, Piali, one of the
commanders of the attack on Malta, and now brother-in-law
of the Sultan, had started on an expedition against Cyprus.
Philip gave a ready ear to the papal appeal, but meanwhile
Nicosia, one of the most important Cypriot fortresses, fell
(September 1570). Venice in despair attempted, though
unsuccessfully, to make a separate treaty with the Sultan ; and
it was not until the 25th of May, 157 1, that the difficulties and
jealousies were surmounted, and that the League was finally
concluded. Venice had wished that the League should
confine itself to the protection of Cyprus; but Philip, not
unnaturally, was anxious to extend its scope ; and accordingly
Spain, the Pope, and Venice agreed to forma perpetual
^alliance against the Moors of Tunis, Tripoli/ and "AlgiersT
as well as against the Turk. They agreed to defend each
other's territories, and to make no separate peace ; each Powei
294 European History, 1494- 1598
was to appoint a captain-general, and they should together
decide on the plan of operations, while the supreme command
was to be given to Don John of Austria. Finally, to defray
the expenses of Philip, Pius granted a eruzada, and an
excusado.1 The treaty came too late to save the island of
Cyprus; for on July 30, Famagusta had fallen, when Bragadino,
the chief in command, was flayed alive, his skin stuffed and sent
as a trophy to Constantinople. It was not till the 16th of the
following September, that the fleet of the League finally left
Messina. On reaching Corfu, intelligence was received that
the Turkish fleet was in the Gulf of Lepanto. Against the
advice of John Andrew Doria, who commanded the Genoese
contingent. Don John was eager to close with his antagonist.
He was supported in his opinion by the Marquis of Santa
Cruz, the Grand Commander Requesens, and the young
Alexander of Parma, as well as by the other captains-general,
and on the 7th of October, the two fleets came in sight
of each other. That of the Christians was composed of
264 vessels of all sizes, with 26,000 soldiers and 50,000 rowers
and sailors aboard. That of the Turks, of some 300 vesselsj
and not less than 120,000 men.
In the action which ensued it was the object of the Turkish
admiral Piali to turn the wings of his adversary. This move-
The battle ment was> however, foiled by Barbarigo, who com-
of Lepanto. jnanded the Venetian galleys on the left, and by
^Oct. 7,^57i^Qhn Andrew Doria on the right. They hugged
the shore, and a terrible struggle ensued, in which the allies
suffered severely. At last, the Venetians drove back their
enemies, and though Barbarigo was mortally wounded, his
loss was compensated by the death of Mahomet Sirocco, the
Turkish admiral opposed to him. Meanwhile the centre,
1 A cruzada was a licence granted by papal dispensation, allowing the
eating of eggs and milk on certain days. This licence was sold by the
King, and to induce people to purchase it, every one was forced to buy
these articles whether they ate them or no. An excusado was the tithe
upon one holding in each parish in Spain, granted to the King.
Philip and Spain 295
lefl by Don John, after a desperate conflict at close quarters,
which resembled a fight on land rather than on the sea,
was equally successful. Piali fell, and most of the Moslem's
ships surrendered or were destroyed. Finally Uluch
Ali, the Dey of Algiers, who had been severely handling
the Genoese opposed to him, seeing that all was over, took
refuge in flight, and the Christians remained the victors of
one of the greatest naval combats of the century. The
importance of the battle of Lepanto, which lasted for more
than four hours, will be best appreciated when it is remem-
bered that the Turks had never hitherto been beaten at sea.
Although an accurate computation of the losses is not possible,
it may with certainty be affirmed that those of the Turks were
more than twice as heavy as those of their antagonists, and
that not more than fifty of their vessels escaped. Among the
captives were found, we are told, 12,000 Christians who had
been condemned to the galleys.
Some now thought that this crushing defeat should be
followed by an immediate attack on Constantinople. The
season, however, was far advanced, and it was ~ .
' ' / Delays and
decided to postpone further operations until the jealousies of
spring. The delay was fatal. An attempt was made ihe alhes-
to buy over Uluch Ali, a Calabrian renegade, who had not
forgotten his Christian parents from whom he had been
separated in youth. The offer was declined, and Uluch
shortly took the command of the new fleet which the Turks
had put on the sea with remarkable rapidity. Far different
was the conduct of the allies. In Spain there was the
usual procrastination. Nor were the interests of Spain and
Venice the same ; Philip desired to turn against the Moors
of Africa, and extend his conquests there ; Venice only cared
to strengthen her position in the Levant. In vain did the
aged Pontiff attempt to reconcile these conflicting views. He
died in the following May, and although Philip's fears,
that a Pope in the French interest would succeed him,
were removed by the election of Cardinal Buoncampagno
2g6 European History \ 14.94-1598
(Gregory xiii.), the papal ■ Briefs of Fire ' were not of much
avail. The allies, indeed, at last sent out another expedition
under Don John, which found the Turkish fleet off Modon on
October 7, 1572, the anniversary of the victory of Lepanto.
But Uluch Ali declined the contest ; he remained under the
guns of the fortress, and at the end of the month the allies again
dispersed. In the following March all hope of
Venice makes concerted action was destroyed by the news that
a separate J t J
treaty with Venice had come to terms with the Sultan ; she
2j*T!rk* surrendered Cyprus, and agreed to pay a three
years' tribute to the Porte. The Turks could
scarcely have hoped for better terms if they had won the
battle of Lepanto.
Deserted by his allies, Don John, in the following
October, sailed to the African coast and easily reduced the
town of Tunis. He now dreamt of obtaining the
duces Tunis, investiture of the African kingdom from his half-
pct. 1573; but brother. The jealousy of Philip was instantly •
are retaken aroused ; he urged that the fortresses of Tunis •
by uiuch ah, anc[ Goletta should be dismantled, and, although )
this was not done, they were left with such an
insufficient force that Uluch Ali had little difficulty not only
in retaking Tunis, but in reducing the fortress of Goletta
(Sept. 1574). Such were the miserable results of the victory
of Lepanto. It did not save the island of Cyprus,
aU-epanto which henceforth belonged to the Porte; it was
,a barren followed by the loss of Goletta, one of the few
victory. . . _, , .
— — — .. remaining conquests of Charles v. on the coast
of Africa ; it only served to display once more the jealousies
of the European nations ; and if for seventy years the Turks
made no further advance, and never again seriously threatened
the south-western shores of Europe, this was due far more to
the internal decay of the Ottoman Empire, than to the victory
of Lepanto itself.
Philip and Spain 297
§ 5. The Conquest of Portugal.
On August 4, 1578, Sebastian, the young King of Portugal,
was killed at the battle of Alcazar-K^bir as he was conduct-
ing a crazy campaign against Abd-el-Melek, the
Sultan of Morocco. The death of the young jebasttsg;
King, who appears to have been half-mad, at once King of
aroused the determination of J^hlUp, tn secure the Au^^i^n,
crown of Portugal, and thus finally unite the__
Therfan Peninsula under one hand. The successor of
Sebastian was his great-uncle, Henry. He was a Cardinal,
and over sixty-six years of age. Nevertheless, it was hoped
that he might yet have children, and the Pope
was asked to authorise his marriage. Philip J£««-
declared his indignation at this interference of ceeds; but
the Papacy with what were 'so clearly temporal j^s' ^
affairs,' but was relieved from further apprehension
by the death of the Cardinal-King on January 31, 1580. The
only claimant whom Philip had now to dread was Antonio,
prior of Crato.1 He was the illegitimate son, by a converted
Jewess, of Lewis, Duke of Beja, the great-uncle of Sebastian, but
he had been secretly legitimised by his father, had entered
the order of St. John of Malta, and was prior of the rich
commandery of Crato. If his legitimacy could be established,
no doubt he was the next male heir. Philip, however, refused
to allow his claim, and asserted his own right to the Phili ciaims
throne through his mother, the daughter of King the crown,
Emanuel. To enforce this claim an army had armymfder"
been collected on the frontier under the Duke of the Duke of
Alva, which marched as soon as the intelligence of A va*
the Cardinal's death arrived. Those who did not submit were
treated as rebels, and when the town of Setubal offered some
1 There were other possible claimants — Emanuel Philibert, Duke of
Savoy, and the sons of Alexander Farnese, who could claim through the
female line, but did not do so. Even Catherine de' Medici affected to base
2gB
European History 1494- 1 598
slight resistance it was given over to pillage, ' because to deny
the soldiers would have been a great injustice' (July 16, 1580).
Meanwhile, Antonio had been proclaimed King by a *notley
assembly of peasants at Santarem, and proceeded to Lisbon.
Antonio *n va*n P°Pe Gregory xm. attempted to mediate,
proclaimed To propitiate Philip, who had a passion for
King* relics, he sent a most precious gift, part of the body
of one of the Holy Innocents ; Philip accepted the gift, but de-
clined his mediation, and for once did not procrastinate. The
Marquis of Santa Cruz was despatched with the fleet to Setuval.
There he took the Duke of Alva and his troops on board, and
Lisbon sailed for Lisbon. Antonio in vain attempted to
capitulates resist. The citizens of Lisbon would not fight; they
asked for terms, but had to capitulate at discre-
tion; and Antonio, escaping with difficulty, reached Calais
after many wanderings. The city of Lisbon was partly saved
from pillage by Alva, but the neighbouring villages were
sacked with such relentless cruelty that it even surpassed all
that Alva could have imagined ; and such was the insubordina-
tion of the soldiery that the Duke declared rope would fail
her title on descent from a distant King of Portugal, but did not at this
time urge it. The question of the succession, and the close relationship
between the royal families of Spain and Portugal will be best understood
from the following table : —
{Isabella, daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella.
Mary, daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella.
Eleanor, sister of Charles v.
John III.=Catherine,
1521-1557. sister of
Charles v.
Lewis, Henry,
Duke of Cardinal,
Beja. 1578-1580.
Isabella=Charles t
Philip ii.»Mart,
of Spain
Emanuel= Joanna,
John,
+1554.
sister of
Philip It
Antonio,
Prior of
Crato, the
Pretender.
Philip II. Joanna -
Em an u EI
John.
Sebastian,
1557-1578.
Philip and Spain 2$9
him wherewith to hang his mutinous soldiers. At Oporto,
the same scenes were repeated by the troops under Sancho
d'Avila, an officer who had already earned an evil reputation
for mutiny in the Netherlands. On the 29th of June, 1581,
Philip made his entry into Lisbon. Those few nobles who
had dared to oppose him were treated with relentless cruelty ;
the majority attempted no resistance, and the Phiiipenterg
people sullenly submitted. Antonio, with a price Lisbon,
set on his head, wandered from court to court June 29' I581'
begging for assistance to regain his crown. In June, 1582, he
succeeded in obtaining the help of a French fleet, which sailed
to the Azores. The fleet, however, was dispersed by the
Marquis of Santa Cruz ; and for the rest of his life the unfor-
tunate pretender found an asylum for the most part in
England. .Philip had gained his end, and Portugal was for
a time united with Spain. The Spaniards, however, had never
been liked in Portugal ; the atrocities which accompanied
the accession of Philip turned the dislike to hatred ; and
it was not many years before Portugal again threw off the
hated yoke, and once for all declared her independence.
§ 6. Internal Government of Philip II.
Although fhf* government of Philip 11. ^ag p,rP ^ti^qlly a,
^desrjoiisnvJl would be a mistake to suppose that no con-
stitutional checks existed, or that they were The Govern-
entirely futile. The Cortes of Castile and mentdes-
Aragon still survived, and even in the subject constitu**
provinces the old assemblies were not done away tionai forms
with. In Castile, the Cortes nominally enjoyed Ip^j^J
deliberative powers; no edict could constitu- itsdepen-
tionally be issued except on their petition, and dencies-
no tax levied except by their consent. Yet if Philip often
summoned them, if he did not interfere with their debates,
if he listened to their petitions, these were constantly dis-
regarded on the plea that it was not expedient that they
300 European History \ 1 494- 1 598
should be granted ; and, when occasion demanded it, royal
ordinances were issued, and fresh taxes imposed, without
waiting for their assent.
The constitutional rights of Aragon and its dependencies,
Valencia and Catalonia, were even more extensive. Any
member of the Cortes could present a memorial of grievances ;
until these grievances were redressed the session could not
be closed ; and no law could be passed or tax imposed
except by the unanimous vote of the assembly. The royal
tribunals were subject to that of the Justiza, and any one
who set foot in Aragon could escape from the jurisdiction
of the royal courts by 'manifesting' — that is, by appealing
to his aid. No foreigners could hold office in Aragon ; the
Inquisition, though established, met with constant opposition.
With these privileges Philip came into open conflict when, in
April, 1590, Antonio Perez, his secretary, fled to Aragon and
claimed the protection of the Justiza (cf. pp. 307-9). On the
pretext that Perez had, in the justification which he had just
published, been guilty of blasphemy, he was, at the demand
of the Inquisitors of Aragon, transferred to their own prison.
The citizens of Saragossa at once rose against this violation
The revolt °f tneu" ' fueros.' The Justiza was mobbed for
of Saragossa, having surrendered the prisoner ; the royal repre-
XS91, sentative, the Marquis of Almanara, was killed;
and the Inquisitors, in fear of their lives, restored Perez to
the ' Aljaferia,' or Justiza's prison. Four months later, another
attempt on the part of the Inquisitors (September 1591) led
to a renewed revolt, which was supported by the new Justiza,
who had been just appointed. Philip forthwith ordered an
army to march (October 24). The rebels had no army or
organisation, and found little support, except from some of
the more violent of the peasants, who betook themselves to
brigandage. Accordingly, the royal army met with no resist-
ance; and when it reached Saragossa on November 12, 1591,
the city submitted without striking a blow. Although Philip
published an amnesty, all the leading men who had taken
Philip and Spain 301
any part were excepted ; and the Justiza himself was executed,
in violation of the law that he could not even be arrested
unless by the order of the Cortes. A meeting .
. ° Interference
of that body followed. In spite of the rule that with the
it should be presided over by the King him- privileges of
self, or a prince of the blood, the chair was
taken by Chinchon, the Archbishop of Saragossa, and
the Cortes consented to the following invasion of their
privileges. The King was to be allowed to nominate aliens
as his viceroys ; a definite time was to be fixed for presenting
grievances ; except for the voting of taxes, the right of any
member to veto any measure was done away with, and
matters were to be decided by the vote of the majority of
each estate. This last concession practically made the King
master of their decisions, since he had the power of adding
to the number of deputies of each estate by summoning his
nominees. Finally, for the appointment of the deputies of
the Justiza, a complicated system was established which prac-
tically put the nomination in the King's hands, and made
them the creatures of the royal will. Here, therefore, ended
the real independence of the Cortes of Aragon, and of its
Justiza. True, the country was not so severely taxed as
Castile ; yet, as in Castile itself, the shadow of constitutional
liberty alone remained, while the reality had departed.
An identical policy, although in a more exaggerated form,
was pursued by Philip in Sicily, in Naples, and in Milan.
Satisfied with getting the control of the central
...,_. . Government
courts of justice, and of the supreme executive, of Naples,
into the hands of his nominees, Philip allowed Sicily, and
the old assemblies, the feudal and municipal
privileges, to continue. For the rest the royal authority
was maintained by the Viceroy. He made use of class and
local jealousies; he played off noble against burgher and
peasant, laity against clergy; he resorted to wholesale
corruption, and kept an army, mainly composed of Spaniards,
to fall back upon in the last resort ; and, if at any time
302 European History, 1494- 1598
the Viceroy became too unpopular, he could always be made
the scapegoat and removed. It was in Naples that the
authority of the Viceroy was the least uncontrolled, that
corruption was deepest, and the taxation heaviest; while
Milan was protected by the privileges of the town and the
pretensions of the archbishop, more especially under the well-
known prelate, Carlo Borromeo ; and in Sicily the feudal rights,
and the municipal privileges of such towns as Messina
and Palermo, were too powerful to be entirely overthrown.
Under such a system of government as this, it was inevitable
that the real power should lie with the King and with those
The Central central councils which controlled the adminis-
Counciis. trative and judicial system in the various parts of
the empire. Of these there were as many as eleven,1 of which
the three following were the most important : the Council of
State, the Council of Castile, and that of the Inquisition.
The Council of the Inquisition has already been described
(p. 279). The Council of State confined itself for the most
part to foreign affairs. But since Philip looked upon Castile
as the centre of his empire, it was but natural that the
Council of Castile should become the most important.
1 The others were : —
1. The Hazienda, for the administration of the revenue, and for
the trial of cases concerning it.
2. The Council of The Orders, for the administration of the three
Military Orders of St. Iago, Calatrava, Alcantara.
3. The Camera, originally a section of the Council of Castile,
subsequently became practically a separate council.
4. The Council of War.
5. 6, 7, 8. The Councils of Aragon, Italy, Flanders, and Portugal.
That of Portugal was created after the conquest of that country.
That of Flanders soon ceased to be of much importance.
9. The Council of Indies, for the general administration of the
Indies, and for the trial of cases, civil and ecclesiastical, arising
thence.
Philip and Spam 303
Its functions were mainly judicial; it heard appeals from
inferior courts, and under Philip 11. was mainly composed of
lawyers. It enjoyed, however, other powers; it kept the
Church in control, it drafted laws, and was generally con-
sulted on all matters of state interest. In fact, it became
practically the Council of State for the interior. The nomi-
nation of the members of these Councils was exclusively in
the hands of the King. With the exception of the Council
of State they were composed of ecclesiastics as well as lay-
men, but the nobles rarely found a place there.
Excluded altogether from the Cortes of Castile, and with a
very limited representation in that of Aragon,1 the Spanish
nobility took but little part in political affairs at
— - ■ -w ■■ . = * r " Exclusion of
nome. They had enormous revenues ; they were, nobles from
exempted from taxation; they filled most ofjhe political
offices in the royal household; they often com-
manded the royal armies and fleets abroad ; they acted as
ambassadors, and as Viceroys in the dependent states and in
the colonies; but at home they had little influence. They
were no longer allowed to bear arms or levy their retainers,
except in the royal service; and, except on special occasions,
such as the rebellion of the Moriscoes, rarely appeared in
the field unless on foreign service. The time which was not
spent at court, was passed on their wide domains, where they
copied on a small scale the magnificence and the etiquette
of the court. Living thus in proud isolation, with much
wealth but little power, they refused to mix, or to intermarry
with the lower classes, and rapidly became a degenerate and __
jiseless_class like the nobles of France in rh<=> <*ightpfntji,
^centuryj___
The Councils, then, depending as they did on the royal will,
were filled for the most part with the obsequious servants of
a suspicious master who could ruin them at his pleasure,
1 Only eight titled houses of the Grandees could claim a seat. Of the
hidalgos, or lesser nobility, only those came whom the king chose to
summon.
304 European History, 1494- 1598
unless, indeed, as was sometimes the case, they were able to
spread a net of intrigue round the King which he was, for a
time at least, unable to break. If Philip usually asked the
advice of his Councillors, he kept to his father's injunction,
'to depend on no one but himself.' He did not often
appear at their sessions; sometimes he altered despatches
before submitting them to his Councils ; he generally received
their opinions through a committee, or more often demanded
a written report, which he took to his private cabinet and
annotated with marginal comments. True to his boast,
that ' with a bit of paper he ruled over both hemispheres,'
he sat at his desk for hours together, sometimes assisted
by a secretary, sometimes by his favourite daughter Isabella,
often quite alone, and covered the state papers with notes
in his crabbed hand with the assiduity of a clerk, and not
uncommonly with trivialities, of which a schoolboy might be
ashamed. Under these circumstances the actual authority
exercised by any individual depended on his personal influ-
ence, and that of his clique, with the King. Although Philip
would allow his ministers considerable latitude as long as he
trusted them, his suspicions were easily aroused. He made
use of one minister against another; he learnt from each
severally the views and opinions of the others ; he adopted
the same system of espionage with regard to them as he did,
through his secret emissaries, abroad, and his suspicion once
aroused, the fall of the minister or viceroy was not far off.
Of the ministers who chiefly enjoyed his confidence the
following may be mentioned. At the beginning of his reign
The chief three men were, most influential : the Duke of
ministers. Alva, Ruy Gomez de Silva, Prince of Eboli, and
Espinosa. The Duke of Alva had been a trusted adviser of
Charles, and had served him in his wars. Accordingly he
The Duke recommended him to his son as the ablest states-
of Alva. man, and the best soldier in his dominions. Alva's
love of carefully weighing all sides before arriving at a deci-
sion, coupled with his determination in carrying out the royal
Philip and Spain 305
will, made him a congenial spirit. He was Grand Steward of
the household, and a member of the Council of State, and for
the first few years had much influence. From the very first
however, he found a rival in Gomez. This noble- _, _
' Ruy Gomez,
man, descended from the younger branch of a Prince of
Portuguese family which had settled in Castile, Eboh-
had, as an imperial page, become the favourite of Philip when
prince. The ascendency thus obtained he subsequently
maintained by his knowledge of the humours of his master, his
pliability, his obsequiousness, and his dexterity ; while by his
affability to others he succeeded in retaining popularity.
After his marriage with Anna Mendoza, Princess of Eboli, a
woman remarkable for her wit and for her beauty in spite of the
loss of an eye, he was created Prince of Eboli, and made a
member of the Council of State, and First Gentleman of the
Bedchamber. Generally in favour of pacific measures, he
was opposed to the policy of repression in the Netherlands,
of which Alva approved. On this question Alva's advice
prevailed ; but with his departure to carry out the policy he
advocated, the influence of the Duke declined. The King
perhaps had learnt to resent his haughty demeanour; at all
events Alva ceased to play an important part in affairs of
state.1 The influence of the Prince of Eboli was now supreme ;
and by his adroitness, and, if we may believe some, by the
complaisance of his wife to the attentions of the King, ht
continued to retain his power till his death, in July, 1573
The third man of note during Philip's earlier years was
Diego de Espinosa, who attracted the attention of the
King by his extraordinary capacity for work, cardinal
and by his ability. He became President of the Espinosa.
Council of Castile and of the Indies ; he was also Inquisitor-
1 After the return ot Alva from the Netherlands, a quarrel broke out
between him and the King about the marriage affairs of his son, and he was
ordered to live in retirement at Uzada, 1579. There he remained till his
services were required for the conquest of Portugal, 1580. He died in
December 1582.
PERIOD IV. U
306 European History y 1494- 1 598
General, a member of the Council of State, and Bishop of
Siguenca, and, finally, was created Cardinal. This rapid rise,
however, made him so arrogant that he shortly incurred the
dislike of his master, and on being given the lie by the King
in open council, Espinosa took to his bed and died of chagrin,
in September, 1572.
After the death of Ruy Gomez in July, 1573, his policy was
continued by the Marquis de Los Velez, the Queen's major-
Antonio domo, and by Antonio Perez. The history of the
Perez. latter is so characteristic of the dealings of Philip
with his ministers, that it requires more elaborate notice.
Antonio Perez, the illegitimate son of Gonzalo Perez, Arch-
deacon of Sepulveda — one of the secretaries of state of
Charles v., and afterwards of his son — had learnt his business
in the service of the Prince of Eboli. On his father's death,
in 1566, Perez had succeeded to some of his duties, and on the
death of his patron, the Prince of Eboli, he stepped into his
place and continued his policy, supported by the powerful
advocacy of his widow. Blindly devoted to the service of the
King, and an adept at that system of espionage which Philip
loved, he sought for confidences that he might betray them to
his master, and flinched at no baseness to do him service. Of
these despicable acts, the dealings of Perez with Don John will
furnish the most flagrant example. We shall find (p. 353)
that it was Perez who fed the jealousy of Philip for his half-
brother ; that he made use of Escovedo, Don John's secretary,
to tempt Don John into rash statements, only that they might
be communicated to the King, and finally that it was he who
saw Philip's order to murder the unfortunate secretary carried
out. From that moment, however, Perez knew no peace. His
enemies in the council fostered the report that he was the
murderer of Escovedo, and implored the justice of the King.
Philip at first promised to support his instrument, or, rather,
his accomplice, but suddenly changed his mind, and had him
and the Princess of Eboli arrested (July 28, 1579). The
explanation of this strange conduct is still one of the mysteries
Philip and Spain 307
of that reign of mystery. The popular opinion, that it was due
to the wounded pique of the monarch, who was affronted
because the widowed Princess of Eboli preferred the embraces
of the secretary to those of his master, is not very probable.
The report was based on vague surmises, and is not supported
by any definite proof; the Princess was now in years, and
the mother of ten children ; the wife of Perez remained the
constant defender of her husband ; nor is it easy to believe
that Philip's confessor, Fray Diego de Chaves, would have
shown such activity in the matter had the reason for the
persecution of Escovedo been of this shameful character. It
would appear more likely that Philip became convinced that
Perez and the Princess had deceived him in the matter of
Escovedo, and that, possibly to free themselves from a rival,
they had by their slanders compassed the death of the
unfortunate man. The conduct of the King seems to support
this view. Afraid apparently of compromising revelations with
regard to his treatment of Don John, and the murder of
Escovedo, he at first seemed inclined to pardon Perez, and
even to recall him to his work ; and it was not until November,
1 58 1, that, urged on by his confessor, he determined on a
more rigorous course. From that moment, the affair became
almost a personal struggle between the King and Perez. For
five years the ignoble matter dragged on, while Philip was
collecting evidence against his secretary. Perez was then
(January 23, 1585) condemned to a fine and to two years'
imprisonment, followed by eight years' exile. Even then an
attempt was made to get hold of all compromising papers
and letters. These had been hidden by the wife of Perez at
the commencement of the affair, but, though imprisoned, she
refused to surrender them, even after receiving her husband's
leave. Meanwhile, Perez himself succeeded in escaping from
his house, where he had been confined, and took sanctuary.
This was, however, violated, and Perez was seized and put to
torture. Nevertheless, on April 20, 1590, he managed to
escape from his tormentors, dressed in his wife's clothes, and
308 European History \ 1494- 1598
fled to Aragon, where we have already met him (p. 300)
On the suppression of the revolt in that kingdom he once
more succeeded in escaping, this time to France. Philip still
pursued him with fury ; he suborned agents to murder him ;
he tried to entrap him by means of a woman of Pau, but all in
vain. Perez subsequently went to England, where he stirred
up Elizabeth to send the expedition to Cadiz (cf. p. 374).
He finally survived his persecutor, and tried to make his
peace with Philip ill. by offering to betray the state secrets
of the countries which had given him refuge. Philip, mean-
while, baulked of his prey, took vengeance on the Princess of
Eboli, and the heroic wife of the secretary. The first was
treated with increased harshness, and died eighteen months
afterwards (February 1592); the second was imprisoned with
her children, during the rest of Philip's life.
With the fall of Perez in 1579, the party originally led by
Ruy Gomez lost influence in the royal councils. Their places
were taken by Granvella, Don Juan de Idiaquez,
change of and Cnristoval de Moura. Of these, Cardinal
Ministers and »
of Policy, after Granvelle, son of the Chancellor of Charles v.,
fail of Perez, an(j ft native 0f Franche-Comt6, had already
Cardinal served Philip as a member of the Consulta in
%£gt* Flanders, 1559-1563 (<* P- 321). Since then
he had filled the post of Viceroy of Naples, where
he had distinguished himself by forming the league which led
to the battle of Lepanto (cf. p. 293). He was now appointed
President of the Council of Castile. Idiaquez, son of a secretary
idiaquez and °f state under Charles v., succeeded to Perez'
christovai de place as secretary, while Moura, a Portuguese, was
appointed member of the Council of Finance, and
took an active part in the conquest of his native country
(cf. p. 297 ). This change of ministry was marked by a complete
revolution in the policy of the King. Philip had hitherto pur-
sued a pacific policy in Europe ; but from this moment he
began to embark on those attempts to make himself master of
France and England which finally ended in complete collapse.
Philip and Spain 309
Granvelle soon found himself supplanted by his colleagues ;
and on his death (September 22, 1586), Idiaquez and Moura
with the addition of the Count de Chinchon, an The Night
Aragonese, formed a triumvirate known as the Junta.
Night Junta, to which all important affairs from every de-
partment were referred. Under the rule of this Junta, which
lasted to the end of the reign, the administration became
more corrupt, and the quarrels among the subordinates
more frequent, while the irresolution and procrastination of
the King increased as his health began to fail.
We should, however, fail to appreciate the influences which
surrounded Philip if we omitted his confessors. These were
two Dominican friars — Fray Bernardo de Fresneda The King'S
up till 1577 ; from that date till 1595, Fray Diego confessors.
de Chaves. Both these men added to their position as
confessors a post in the civil administration. The former —
'the fat Bishop of Cuenca,' — whom Cecil's agent declared
to be one of the ' chiefest ' of the ministers, was appointed a
member of the Council of War, and commissary-general of
the revenue derived from the Cruzada. The second had even
greater influence. Nominated a Councillor of State in 1584,
we find De Chaves taking a principal part in the affair of Perez,
in the suppression of the rebellion in Aragon, and in the con
quest of Portugal. He did not scruple to betray to his master
the secrets he learnt in the confessional, but in return for this
devotion he at times demanded obedience. Thus, in 1591,
we find him actually refusing the sacrament to Philip until
the King should follow his wishes with regard to the appoint-
ment of the President of the Council of Castile.
To this despotic rule, one thing alone was wanting — a stand-
ing army — and even there a beginning had been made.
Although a large force had been kept on foot by
Philip's father, it was only used on foreign service, nings of a"
and was stationed abroad. For service at home, standing
Charles had depended on the militia levies from army#
the towns, and the feudal service of the nobles and their
310 European History \ 1494- 1598
retainers. To these Philip added the ' Guards of Castile,
a considerable force of men-at-arms with their followers,
together with some squadrons of light cavalry, who were put
upon a permanent footing, and retained at home. Hence-
forth the government had an army at hand wherewith to
quell any domestic troubles. But if Philip's rule may be
justly called a despotism, here too, as ever, that despotism
. - involved the restraints and the intrigues of a
the absolute bureaucracy — a bureaucracy which, though ap-
ruie of Philip, pointed by the King, sometimes became his
master. Nowhere perhaps can a more startling illustration be
found of the evil results of absolute rule, especially when
placed in the hands of a man of small intelligence, of narrow
and bigoted views, and of suspicious temperament, yet with
a tenacious love of power, and with indefatigable though mis-
directed industry. Charles had, indeed, ruled despotically,
and with some success. But the son resembled his father in
one point only, his self-control. Neither good nor bad news
made him display any emotion; at most, when some un-
toward event was announced, he was seen to clutch his
beard. For the rest, Philip had not his father's gifts, and,
with such a man, the consequences of the system were dis-
astrous. His determination to hold the reins of govern-
ment, at least in appearance, necessarily caused delay ; and,
coupled with his unfortunate delusion that * time and he were
a match for any other two,' led to that fatal habit of procras-
tination and irresolution which often ruined his most cherished
schemes. Dearly as he loved power, he was not strong
enough always to take the lead himself; and hence his eager
desire for the opinions of his councillors. No doubt he
fancied that the ultimate decision lay with him ; yet often, in
reality, he was guided by the individual who for the
moment had his ear. Under these circumstances it was
inevitable that intrigue and corruption should gather round
him, until they were often too strong to be withstood.
Meanwhile, in the lower orders of the bureaucracy these
Philip and Spain 311
evils grew apace, and were even acknowledged by Granvella
himself.
Nevertheless, since it is not to be denied that Philip decided
what influences should be near him, and thus gave the general
tone to the character of the administration, he must be held
primarily responsible for its harmful action. We have already
shown how the isolation of the nobility was fostered \ how by
the absolute authority which Philip exercised over the Church,
combined with the powers of the Inquisition, all independence
of thought was crushed; how by a narrow bureaucratic
system, the people were deprived of the substance of political
power.
A few words remain to be said on the commercial and
«finandalpolicy of the reign. The view prevalent at that
time in Europe~lhat gold and silver were the
most desirable of all forms of wealth, and that a 5"llp'* , .
' r inancial ana
country benefited when the imports of those Commercial
metals exceeded their exports, had a certain Pohcy-
practical truth in it. It should be remembered that, in the
absence of paper money, the amount of metallic currency
required within a country would, relatively to the volume of
trade, be greater then than now. Moreover, since national
loans were only in their infancy, and a National Debt
unknown, a well-filled treasury was necessary to meet great
emergencies, such as a war. Above all, in those countries
which did not themselves possess any mines, the only way
of obtaining the precious metals was in exchange for home-
made goods, or by trade. In such countries, therefore, the
doctrine tended to stimulate, not to cramp industrial enter-
prise. The case of Spain, however, was different. The mines
of the New World gave her the precious metals, and therefore
she was tempted to discourage the imports of foreign countries,
and even to forbid the exportation of gold and silver. Nor
was this all. Trusting to the produce of th* mines, tf)f
Spaniards -both at home and in the colonies were encouraged
in their national dislike for the more laboriousT though more
312 European History \ 1494- 1 598
y productive industries, and national indolence increased. The
\ mines, moreover, were not nearly so productive as was hoped,
and Philip soon learnt that the wealth turned out by the
\ Flemish looms was infinitely greater than that produced by
\ the far-famed mines of Mexico and Peru.
The absurd regulations with regard to trade, which were not
however new, led also to disastrous results. In the vain hope
.of keeping prices down, the export of corn and cattle, and
even dealing in corn within the country, was prohibited;
importation of any kind from the Barbary coast was alsojor-
bidden. The effect of these and other absurd restrictions was
that the cultivation of the restricted articles was checked, and
that trade gradually fell into the hands of foreigners. Many
of these, in return for loans, obtained licences from the King
to export, while the demand for foreign goods gave the foreigner
the command of the import trade. All articles of luxury came
from abroad, and we know that the rebels of the Netherlands
carried on a thriving trade in those very munitions of
war which Spain used in her attempt to crush them. It
has been computed that five-sixths of the home, and nine-
tenths of the Indian trade were monopolised by foreigners.
Thus Spain, by no means wealthy by nature, failed to
enrich herself by trade and manufactures, and remained
poverty-stricken. The evil was increased by the exorbitant
taxation necessitated by Philip's wars, and by the expenses
of the court. These taxes fell more especially on Castile
and Naples, and were collected by such evil and corrupt
methods that, while the people suffered much, the govern-
ment often received but little.
The general effect of Philip's policy at home was to
foster and exaggerate all the worst traits of the Spanish char^_
G acter — its intolerance, its ignorance, its indolence,
results of and its pride; and if at the beginning of his reign
Philip's Home Spain seemed to have touched her pinnacle of
greatness, by the end of it she had made a long
step towards her future decline. We must now pass on to
Philip and Spain 313
deal with Philip's policy in the Netherlands and abroad, to
trace the failure of his attempt to reduce these provinces to
the condition of his other dependencies, and the collapse of
his wild idea of subjugating England and France to his
despotic rule.
THE
NETHERLANDS
UTBE seven UnimED Provinces
.The provinces still
1 retained by Srain.
T.I/poJ£t<Jiiny Coat*
CHAPTER VIII
THE REVOLT OF THE NETHERLANDS
Policy of Charles v.— Regency of Margaret of Parma — The States- General of
1559 and their grievances — Granvella retires — Edict of Segovia — The
Confederates at St. Trond — Alva — Execution of Egmont, Hoorne and
Montigny — Jemmingen — The ' Beggars ' seize Brille — Alliance with France
— St. Bartholomew — Fall of Mons — Siege of Haarlem— Don Requesens —
Military events — Conference at Breda — Exploits of Mondragon — Sack of
Antwerp — Pacification of Ghent — Don John — The Perpetual Edict — The
Archduke Mathias — Gemblours — Alexander of Parma — Union of Arras
and Utrecht — Sovereignty offered to Duke of Anjou — The French Fury —
Assassination of Orange — Successes of Parma — Henry HI. and Elizabeth
decline the Sovereignty— Leicester in the Netherlands — The Armada —
Successes of Maurice — Death of Parma — The Archdukes Ernest and
Albert — Truce of 1609 — Condition of Netherlands.
The revolt of the Netherlands has been generally looked upon
as a notable instance of the resistance of a democracy to
religious persecution. The statement, however, requires some
modification. The religious element, no doubt, furnished a
principle of enthusiasm to many, more especially in the
northern provinces. Yet persecution was not the primary, nor
indeed the chief cause of discontent, and many Catholics, at
first, in any case, joined the party of resistance;1 while the
oligarchical character of the government of many of the towns,
and the influential position held by the nobles, more especially
in the southern and western provinces, remind us that the
1 Lord Buckhurst, the English envoy, declared that as late as 1587, the
numbers of the Catholics in the disobedient provinces exceeded those of the
Protestants, ,, „
Stt
316 European History, 1494- 1598
movement was far more oligarchical in character than has
often been allowed.
Of the seventeen provinces which formed the Nether-
lands at the accession of Philip 11., the greater number had
been gradually collected together by the powerful
history of the Dukes of Burgundy during the fifteenth century,
Netherlands, ^y successfui marriages, by cession, and by
conquest. On the marriage of the Burgundian heiress Mary
to Maximilian they had passed to the house of Hapsburg,
and thence, by the marriage of the Archduke Philip and
Joanna, to their son Charles v. The tie which bound these
provinces together was purely a personal one. They were held
by various titles.1 They were inhabited by peoples of different
race and language; the Dutchman in the north-east, the
Flamand in Brabant, the Walloon and the German in the
western and southern provinces. The social conditions also
varied. In Flanders and Brabant the country districts were)
in the hands of a powerful nobility, the cities inhabited by anN
industrial and turbulent people, controlled by opulent burghers.
In the north, the democratic element predominated, more \
especially in the Frisian provinces, and the inhabitants spent
their life either in fishing and commerce on the sea, or in
saving their country from its inroads. These differences, social )
and political, were reflected in the variety of their institutions. J
Each province had its own peculiar government. Many had
especial privileges guaranteed them by charter, and no native
of one province could constitutionally hold office in another.
The attempt of the Dukes of Burgundy to establish a more \
centralised system of government, and to fuse these hetero-J
geneous elements into greater unity, had been strenuously
1 Four were Duchies : Brabant, Guelderland, Limburg, Luxemburg.
Five were Lordships : West Friesland, Mechlin, Utrecht, Overyssel, Gronin-
gen. Six were Counties : Flanders, Artois, Hainault, Holland, Zealand,
Zutphen. Antwerp and Namur were Margravates. Of these Friesland,
Groningen, Utrecht, Guelderlapd. Zutphen were added by Charles v.
The Revolt of the Netherlands 317
resisted, more especially by the burghers of Brabant and of
Flanders, and the relations between the provinces and their
\rulers had often been severely strained. During the rule of
the Archduke Philip (1494-1506) the struggle had abated,
but with the accession of Charles v., the policy of consolida-
tion and centralisation was again resumed. The / Poncy 0f
boundaries were extended by the acquisition of chariesv.
West Friesland in 1524, of the lordship of Groningen in 1536,
and of the duchy of Gueldres and of the county of Zutphen in
1543. By the treaty of Madrid (1526), Artois, Flanders, and
Tournay were freed from their dependence on France, and in
1528, Charles acquired the temporalities of the bishopric of
Utrecht, and the lordship of Overyssel. In 1548, the whole
of the Netherlands were formed into the Burgundian Circle,
while retaining their independence of the Diet and the
Imperial Chamber, and Charles thought of erecting them
into a middle kingdom under a separate government — a
policy which was, unfortunately, reversed when, in 1555,
Charles decided to leave these provinces to his son. Owing
to his necessary absence from the country, the Emperor
left the control of the government in the hands of Gover-
nesses— his aunt, Margaret of Savoy, ruling from 1506 to
1530; his sister, Mary of Hungary, the widow of Lewis,
from 1530 to 1555 — yet the policy of centralisation was
steadily pursued. A States - General composed of clergy,
nobles, and city representatives from each of the provinces,
was summoned, although its meeting was not a success.
A Central Court of Justice was again established at Mechlin,
to which all provincial courts were declared subje'ct. The
control of the administration was placed in the hands of three
Councils: a Privy Council, to act as a ministry of police and
justice; a Court of Finance over the financial chambers of the
provinces ; and a Council of State, composed chiefly of the
greater nobles, which, under the presidency of the Regent, was
to administer foreign affairs and exercise a general super
intendence over the other Councils. The provinces were
Ji8 European History] 1494- 1598
placed in the hands of Stattholders, nominated from the
ranks of the nobility by the Emperor himself. The other
officials, both municipal and judicial, were usually ap-
pointed by him. The privileges of the towns were gradually
circumscribed, and the attempt of Ghent to refuse a tax
voted . by the States-General, and generally to resist the
centralising policy of the Emperor, was crushed out with
merciless severity in 1540; the immunities and privileges
of the city were declared forfeit, and the exclusive nomina-
tion of ten magistrates vested in the Emperor's hands
(cf. p. 209).
It was on the question of heresy, however, that Charles j
proved himself most inexorable. Not only had the doctrines |
of Luther early spread among the Netherlander, but the more
extreme views of Calvin, which were even better suited to the
genius and character of the people j while the extravagant and
anarchical views of the Anabaptists of Munster had appeared
at Amsterdam, and elsewhere. Untrammelled by the poli-
tical difficulties which surrounded him in Germany, Charles
was eager to crush out these opinions. A series of edicts,
termed^JLEkcards,' culminating in that of 1550, threatened
death by pit, fire, or sword to all convicted of heresy, or of
harbouring heretics, of dealing in heretical books, of attending
conventicles, of disputing on the Scriptures, or of imagg
breaking. An attempt, indeed, to appoint one Inquisitor
General, with uncontrolled powers of enforcing these edicTC
led to such discontent that the Inquisitor had to fly, ?y\4
Charles was fain to content himself with dividing the off **>
among four, who were not to proceed to sentence wit1
the consent of the provincial council. If the numbf
victims under these 'Placards' has been grossly -cmh
gerated, yet at least Charles had not refrained fron fer-
secution. Nevertheless, he was not unpopular fft *t\e
Netherlands ; the religious and political grievances r ^d \<fX
as yet become identified. Charles was a Fleming r 6rw . |»v
his earlier years he was entirely in the hands of his F(£fV*>Vv
councillors, and if latterly the exigencies of his Eva yeans
The Revolt of the Netherlands 319
position enforced his residence elsewhere, he often visited
the home of his birth ; and not only abstained from appoint-
ing foreigners to office in the Netherlands, but irritated his
Spanish subjects by raising Flemings to the highest posts
in Spain. His constant wars offered a profession to those
who cared for the pursuit of arms, and the wide extent of
his empire gave commercial opportunities of which the in-
dustrious Flemings were eager to take advantage. At no time
was the prosperity of the Netherlands greater ; the looms in
the western towns were never busier; the lands of Flanders
and of Artois were rich in corn; the north-east provinces
furnished ample supplies of butter and of cheese, while the
fishermen enriched themselves by the herring fishery. Ant-
werp, which of late had taken the place of Bruges as the
entrepot of commerce, became one of the most populous
and prosperous towns in Europe ; its quays were crowded
with the shipping, its banking houses with the business men,
of every nation. The riches__oLjhe .Netherlands may be
estimated by remembering that in a few years they contributed
no less than twenty-four millions of ducats to the finances
of the Emperor. These contributions had, however, only
been extorted with difficulty; the Netherlands complained
that their revenues were expended on wars in which they
were not concerned ; the religious difficulties were increasing ;
and when Charles, in 1555, handed over the government to
his son, it was pretty clear that this prosperous yet turbulent
and independent people could only be kept loyal by clever
and conciliatory statesmanship.
The succession of Philip 11. at this critical moment was
most unfortunate. His cold and arrogant behaviour was
contrasted with the more genial manners of the Philip at
great Emperor ; he made no secret of his devotion ate^the6""
to Spain and his> contempt for his Fleming sub- sympathies
jects, while his bigoted adherence to the Catholic Nether-
faith was proved by his renewal of the edicts of landers.
1550, in all their severity. Even the war with France was
320 European History, 1494-1598
not popular in the Netherlands ; they complained that their
interests were sacrificed to those of Spain, and resisted the
demands made upon their purses. The Peace of Cateau
•Cambresis (1559) still further increased this discontent. By
that treaty, the Duke of Savoy, who had been Regent in
Brussels since 1555, was restored to his dominions in
Italy. It therefore became necessary to choose another
Regent. Here was an opportunity of conciliating the Nether-
landers by appointing some Flemish noble, of whom there
were at least two well qualified for the post. William of
Nassau had, by the death of his cousin R£ne* in 1544,
succeeded, not only to large possessions in Holland and in
Brabant, but to the rich lands of Chalons in France, and the
principality of Orange on the Rhone. Appointed Stattholder
of Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, and West Friesland by Charles v.,
he had been intrusted by him with military command, and
with the conduct of diplomatic missions, an employment for
which he displayed a special gift. By character and position
he would have been excellently well fitted for the position of
Regent. Failing him, there was Lamoral, Count of Egmont,
and Stattholder of Flanders and Artois, who although inferior
to the Prince of Orange in ability and strength of character,
had gained a great reputation in the battles of St. Quentin
and Gravelines, and was, owing to his genial and impulsive
nature, a general favourite.
Philip, however, had no intention of appointing any one
who was likely to be too powerful or independent, and
finally selected his half-sister Margaret, Duchess
Paarmarap-°f of Parma, the illegitimate daughter of Charles v.,
pointed and wife of Ottavio Farnese, grandson of Pope
Regent^ pauj m Margaret, who was at this time thirty-
eight years of age, was the daughter of a Flemish
lady. She had been brought up by two Regents of the Nether-
lands, Margaret of Savoy, and Mary of Hungary, and her
appointment was not disliked. But although of masculine
appearance and voice, she was a woman of no great political
The Revolt of the Netherlands 321
ability, and was apt to adopt the policy of any one who for the
moment was most influential, and unfortunately those in power
were most unpopular. Philip had given instructions that she
was to rule by the aid of the three Councils, that of Finance, the
Privy Council, and the Council of State. The Council of State
comprised amongst its members several of the higher nobility,
the most notable of whom were the Prince of Orange and
Egmont. It was nominally the supreme authority in the
Netherlands ; but Philip gave orders that all the The
more delicate questions of State should be in the Cons«lta-
hands of an interior Council, termed the Consulta, which was
composed of Count Berlaymont, Viglius, and Granvelle. Of
this triumvirate, Count Berlaymont, the president of the
Council of Finance, was a Fleming of good family, an honest
man, but with narrow and despotic views. Viglius, the
president of the Privy Council, was a jurist and a humanist of
some reputation, and a friend of Erasmus ; yet he was so avari-
cious that he took orders in order to enjoy the revenues of
several benefices ; he was wanting in initiative, and was the
humble follower of Granvelle. This man, son of Charles'
chancellor, was born in 15 17, at Besancon, in Franche-Comte'.
Raised to the see of Arras at the age of twenty-five, he had,
during the declining years of his father, and after his death
in 1550, enjoyed the confidence of the Emperor, and was
by him specially recommended to Philip, who appointed
him president of the Council of State. Although a hard-
working and able statesman of polished and insinuating
manners, and with a real interest in the welfare of the
Netherlands, he was ambitious, fond of power, corrupt, and
greedy. He was disliked as a Burgundian by the Nether-
landers, and detested as the representative of the views of
Philip. Nor was the policy of the King calculated Un ular
to smooth the susceptibilities of the Flemings, measures of
The Spanish troops, whose presence had been phlhp-
necessitated by the war, were not removed on the conclusion
of peace, and made up for the arrears in their pay by extortion
PERIOD IV. x
322 European History, 1494- 1598
and plunder ; while the well-known intention of Philip to crush
out heresy caused widespread apprehension.. These, and
other grievances found expression at the meeting of the
Grievances States-General, which had been summoned to
presented by Ghent in August, 1559. Philip indeed pro-
General of mised to withdraw the troops— a promise which,
1559- owing to his procrastination, was not fulfilled till
October 1560 — but the other grievances he did not deign to
notice. Sooner than reign over heretics, he declared to his
ministers he would rather not reign at all ; while the opposi-
tion shown to the foreigner caused him to remark : ' I, too, am
a foreigner; will they refuse to obey me as their Sovereign?'
Having thus disregarded the complaints of his people, Philip
left the Netherlands never to return again, after accusing
William of Orange, if we may credit a contemporary writer, of
being the real mover in the opposition which had shown itself
in the States-General.
The departure of the King was followed by another measure
which seriously aggravated the discontent. The ecclesiastical
Philip's organisation of the Netherlands was very imperfect,
scheme of There were only three sees — Arras, Tournay, and
asticai Utrecht, and their dioceses were far too large to
reform. be efficiently administered. That of Utrecht
alone included three hundred walled towns and eleven hundred
churches. The other parts of the Netherlands were either
under the jurisdiction of the Bishop of Cambray, a free
imperial city, or under that of foreign Bishops such as Liege,
while the duchy of Luxemburg formed part of four foreign
dioceses. The confusion and conflicts with regard to appeals
were further increased by the fact that these bishoprics
were under the jurisdiction of foreign metropolitans : the
two first being subject to the archbishopric of Rheims,
Utrecht to that of Cologne. Charles v. himself had
planned a reform ; time, however, and opportunity failed
him, and it was left to Philip to carry it out on a more
extended basis. The number of the bishoprics was to
be increased to fifteen; they were to be freed from all
The Revolt of the Netherlands 323
foreign control, and to be organised under three
archbishoprics — Mechlin, Cambray, and Utrecht, of which
Mechlin, with Granvelle as its archbishop, was to enjoy the
primacy; the requisite revenues were to be supplied from
the abbey lands within each diocese, and the abbeys to be
placed under priors dependent on the bishops : each bishop
was to appoint nine additional prebendaries, two of whom
were to be Inquisitors and to assist him in the work of rooting
out heresy. The announcement of this scheme was met with*
a storm of opposition from Catholic and Protestant alike.'
The bishops, it was declared, would be the creatures of the
crown ; while the abbots, whose place they were to take,
had been elected by the monks, and had represented the
local interests in the provincial assemblies and in the
States-General. The appropriation of the revenues of the
abbeys was denounced as an act of spoliation, by the nobles ij
especially, whose sons had often rilled the place of abbot. W
The more careless and ignorant of the clergy feared the
stricter supervision and discipline which would ensue. Above
all, the measure was condemned as an attempt to introduce
the Spanish Inquisition. It is true, no doubt, that some reform
was needed, and that much of the opposition was due to
interested motives ; nevertheless it was unwise, if not
unconstitutional, to introduce such a radical alteration in the
ecclesiastical organisation of the country without the approval l
of the States-General, or even of the Council of State. The/
change would certainly have enhanced the despotic authority
of the crown; while the inquisitorial powers given to the
bishops at the very moment when Philip was crushing out
Protestantism in Spain, were of dangerous import. In ai
word, the measure was inopportune unless it was avowedly
intended to serve the interests of authority and of persecu-
tion, and if it was so intended, it demanded the most
strenuous opposition. Accordingly, the scheme met with such V
resistance that it could not be fully carried out; Antwerp,
which was specially protected against an increase of ecclesi-
astical power by * La Joyeuse Entree ' (the charter of Brabant),
324 European History, 1494- 1 598
Gueldres, Utrecht, and five other places escaped. But even
mutilated as it was, the measure served to unite the religious
and political malcontents, and seriously increased the un-
popularity of the government.
In April, 1562, the first attempt to rescue victims of the
Inquisition was made at Valenciennes ; at the same time the
opposition of the nobles to Granvelle became more deter-
mined. As Archbishop of Mechlin, he was looked upon,
though wrongly, as the prime mover in the matter; as
president of the Council of State he was held responsible
for all the hated measures of the King ; while his acceptance
of a cardinal's hat, in 1561, still further awakened the jealousy
of his enemies. The malcontents found a leader in the
Prince of Orange. In 1561, he had taken as his second
wife Anne, the daughter of Maurice of Saxony,
of OrT^e the old opponent of Charles v. The marriage had
heads the been opposed by Granvelle as likely to strengthen
the Protestant sympathies of the Prince, and from
that time forward there was open war between them. Finally,
in March 1563, Orange, Egmont, and Hoorne addressed a
letter to Philip, in which they demanded the dismissal of
the Cardinal, and declined to appear at the Council of State
until their demand was granted. Even the Regent Margaret,
who had hitherto been a strenuous supporter of Granvelle,
g n eiie deserted him, and supported the request of the
retires. nobles. In March 1564, after long delay, Philip
March 1564. at jast consented to dismiss his minister. This
however, had but little effect; for Berlaymont and Viglius
still remained, while Granvelle, from his place of retreat,
continued to advise the King; the system of government
was unaltered, the corruption continued, and the persecu-
tion did not cease. In the following August, Philip
added to the discontent by ordering on his sole authority
the publication of the Decrees of the Council of Trent.
This act met with general disapproval, not only from
the Protestants, but also from the Catholics, who looked
The Revolt of the Netherlands $2$
upon it as an infringement of their liberties. William of
Orange expressed the general opinion, when he declared in
the Council of State that, in the existing condition of public
opinion, the Tridentine Decrees and the edicts against heresy
could not be enforced, and that it was time that the corrupt
system of government, the perversion of justice, and the
wranglings between the Councils should cease. To remedy
this state of things the nobles, led by the Prince of Orange
and Counts Egmont and Hoorne, urged on the Regent the
necessity of summoning the States-General and of increasing
its powers, of reforming the Council of State by the admission
of more of the native nobility, and of more completely
subordinating the other Councils to it. Margaret, who had
now completely identified herself with the oli-
garchical party, adopted their views, and Egmont sen™™ ^ —
was sent to Spain to urge their acceptance on Spain,
Philip (January 1565). Had Philip consented, ihmp565
the Netherlands might have remained loyal ; but refuses to
the reforms would have involved an overthrow of lsten'
the bureaucratical system which had hitherto existed; the
native nobility would have regained power in the States-
General, and in the reformed Council of State, and a miti-
gation of the laws against heresy must have followed.
Philip therefore was unwilling to comply. In June, 1565, he
had sent Alva to the Conference of Bayonne, and had
urged Catherine de Medici to proceed to stringent measures
against the Huguenots, and he was not likely to stultify him-
self by tolerating heresy in his own dominions. He seemed
indeed, at first, anxious to procrastinate. Granvelle's brother
wrote in despair : ■ Everything goes on from to-morrow to to-
morrow : the only resolution is to remain irresolute.' Possibly
Philip delayed in the hopes of winning over Egmont. At all
events, in October the King threw off the mask, and The Edict
in his famous despatches from the wood of Segovia of Se&ovia-
forbade any change in the system of administration, and ordered
the edict against heresy to be enforced with all severity.
326 European History , 1494-159$
* Now we shall see the beginning of a fine trageay/ said
William of Orange. The Regent, and even Berlaymont and
Viglius, were dismayed, and urged that Philip should be warned
of the probable consequences. But William declared that,
1 Since the word of his majesty was so unequivocally expressed,
all that remained for them was to execute it.' It is generally
believed that the Prince of Orange wished to precipitate
matters ; in any case his prophecy was speedily to be fulfilled.
In the agitation which ensued we find a new element appear-
Generai m%' Hitherto the opposition for the most part\l
opposition, had been confined to the higher nobility, men]]
who held some office, and who had something to lose; now'l
the lesser nobility began to move. These, like the smaller ||
nobility in France, had previously found occupation in the
wars, where they furnished a famous force of cavalry. The
peace had destroyed this occupation, and many had returned
to their homes with a turbulent spirit, a love of extrava-
gance and of licence engendered of the war, and ready for
any opportunity of repairing their shattered fortunes. Others,
however, were of a more serious turn of mind, who had,
during their stay abroad, learnt and zealously adopted Pro-
testant opinions, while all were inspired by a sturdy love of
freedom. Of the less reputable, Henry, Viscount of Brederode,
is a fair type. Philip van Marnix, Lord of Sainte Aldegonde,
represented the fanatical party ; while Louis of Nassau, the
impetuous brother of William of Orange, was the only states-
TheCom- man among them. Their views were expressed
promise. in * The Compromise,' a document which was
very numerously signed by Catholics as well as Protestants,
and which declared that Philip had been induced by evil
councillors to establish the Inquisition, in violation of his oath,
and that they would resist it.
It does not appear that any of the greater nobles signed the
Compromise. William of Orange himself openly condemned
the violence of its tone ; yet his influence is probably to be
traced in the more moderate petition which the Confederates,
The Revolt of the Netherlands 327
led by Brederode, presented to the Regent on April 5, 1566.
In this petition, while protesting their loyalty, they expressed
their fears of a general revolt, and demanded Petition of the
that envoys should be sent to Philip to urge Confederates,
upon him the necessity of abolishing the In- ^tto'spSn
quisition, and of summoning the States-General by Bergen and
for the purpose of moderating the edicts. ontlsny-
The Regent consented to despatch the Marquis de Bergen,
and the Baron de Montigny to Spain, and promised mean-
while some mitigation of the edicts. Montigny reached Spain
on June 17. But Philip, with his usual procrastination,
vouchsafed no answer until July 31. He then promised
that the Inquisition should be abolished, and that he would
content himself with the inquisitorial powers vested in the
bishops. Some hopes were held out that the severity of the
edicts would' be moderated, and pardon was promised to any
whom Margaret might think deserving of it, on condition that
they would abandon the League of the Confederates and
engage to support the government. To the summoning of
the States-General he would in no case consent.
There is little reason to suppose that these terms would
have satisfied the Netherlanders even if the King had been
sincere. But we now know that he protested in the presence
of the Duke of Alva, a notary, and two jurists that, as these
concessions had not been granted of his own free will, he did
not feel himself bound to them. He wrote to the Pope
to the same effect, and forthwith began secret prepara-
tions for the despatch of Alva to punish those to whom a
pardon had just been offered. Meanwhile, events happened in
the Netherlands which, unfortunately, went some way to justify
Philip's conduct. The Confederates, in one of those drinking-
bouts with which they were too apt to inflame their patriotism,
had assumed the name of Les Gueux, possibly in allusion to a
remark of Berlaymont that they were nothing but a crowd of
beggars. In July, they held another meeting at St. Trond,
near Liege, where, in spite of the opposition of many Catholics,
32S European History, 1494- 15 98
notably Count Mansfeld, they determined to insist on complete
toleration, and on some guarantee against the vengeance of
Philip. On the 28th, headed by Louis of Nassau,
Confederates tney presented their petition to the Regent, but
at st. Trond. were ill received ; and so convinced were they
that Philip would not long delay his vengeance,
that Louis proceeded to subsidise a force of mercenaries in
Germany.
At this moment an outburst of violent fanaticism ruined
their cause. The activity and violence of the preachers,
iconociasm which had of late been increasing, led, in the
causes a early days of August, to a serious outbreak of
iconociasm. Commencing at St. Omer, the con-
tagion rapidly spread, and in a fortnight four hundred churches
were sacked in Flanders alone, while in Antwerp the cathedral
was stripped of all its treasures. Images, relics, shrines,
paintings, manuscripts and books shared a common fate.
Only a few of the southern provinces were spared. The
fanatics were joined by the criminal classes, and for a
time anarchy reigned supreme. Margaret, bowing before
the storm, followed the advice of William. She promised
that the Reformers should be allowed to hold their meetings
in the places where they had hitherto held them, until the
King and the States-General should otherwise command. The
Confederate nobles, on a promise of pardon, undertook to
assist the government, and the Stattholders, despatched to
their respective provinces, succeeded — some by concessions,
some by more stringent measures — in partly restoring order.
The violence had, however, done its work. The Catholics,
shocked at the extravagance and profanity of the rioters,
abandoned the movement in disgust. The Lutherans,
anxious to throw blame on the Calvinists, with whom they
had little sympathy, followed suit. Egmont and Hoorne
made haste to rally round the government; even William
was forced to execute some of the ringleaders in Antwerp
before he could restore order. Margaret, taking advantage
The Revolt of the Netherlands 3^9
of this reaction, assumed a bolder line, and commanded that
the towns which were least to be trusted should be occupied
by royal garrisons, levied among the Walloon and Catholic
provinces.
The Confederate nobles, who had not been directly
concerned in these riotous proceedings, knowing that they
would none the less be held responsible, now _, _
^ ^ i , The C°n-
rose. Compromised, however, as they were federates rise,
by the extravagant conduct of the fanatics, and *u* are ,
. , , . , defeated.
not quite prepared to make common cause with
them, they failed to obtain adequate support. William for-
bade the citizens of Antwerp to march to the defence of
the patriots, who had seized the village of Austruweel near
by (March 13, 1567). They were defeated by the royal troops,
and their leader, the brother of St. Aldegonde, was slain.
On April 2, Valenciennes, which had refused to admit the
royal troops, was taken ; and shortly the Regent was practically
mistress of the country, with the exception of the province of
Holland, and the city of Antwerp. Fortresses were built in
the principal towns ; the meetings of the Calvinists were dis-
persed ; and many suffered death on the scaffold, or at the
hands of a ruthless soldiery.
Yet Philip was not satisfied. He had for some time
determined to replace Margaret by a stronger hand, and, in
spite of the opposition of his chief minister, the
t» • r t-<i t 1 Philip deter
rrince of bboli, to take summary vengeance, not mines on
only on the authors of the late excesses, but upon stringent
the greater nobles, whom he held responsible for
the troubles. Of this intention William of Orange was fully
informed through his secret and paid agents at Madrid,
and, despairing of successful resistance for the wiiiiam
pre"<mt, he decided to retire. His conduct has °f°ran&e
been severely criticised. Had he stayed, it has Nassau,
been said, and raised the standard of civil war, the April 3°' I567-
cruel rule of Alva might have been prevented, or the struggle
would have been ended sooner and with more brilliant success.
330 European History \ 1 494- 1 598
It must be admitted that there is something to be said for this
view. Subsequent events proved that the political and re-
ligious issues must eventually become identified; and if so,
the sooner that occurred the better. The government was as
yet ill-provided with troops upon whom it could depend, and
a victory at this moment would have rallied to the Prince's
standard many who had not declared themselves, and yet have
made him strong enough to suppress the most extravagant of
his partisans. William might possibly have made the venture
if Egmont could have been prevailed upon to move. But
e mont Egmont was a Catholic, and the movement had
declines become decidedly anti-Catholic ; he still remem-
bered the conciliatory treatment he had received
in Spain : he still trusted to Philip's clemency and shrank from
open rebellion. Without Egmont, William was unwilling to
take action. He was an aristocrat at heart : he looked for
reform to a properly representative Estates-General, and was
disgusted at the mob-rule which had of late prevailed.
Although he had probably by this time embraced Lutheranism,
he had no sympathy with the Calvinistic tenets, and scarcely
realised their strength as the militant creed of those who fought
for political liberty. Moreover, he had alienated the Calvinists
by his conduct during the late troubles, and it was question-
able whether they would heartily rally round him. Finally,
the Lutheran princes of Germany could not be depended
upon, and, of success without foreign aid, he despaired. With
these views, he had no alternative but to fly ; and, after vainly
warning Egmont that he feared Philip was merely ' making a
bridge of him whereby he might enter the Netherlands,' he
took refuge, together with his brother and some of the other
Confederates, in his county of Nassau (April 30, 1567).
William gone, all opposition was at an end. Antwerp
opened its gates on the day he left for Germany. Bredenxie,
who had held out at Viana in Holland, fled to Germany, to
die in the summer of 1568, a victim to his intemperate mode
of life j and shortly after all Holland submitted. The churches
The Revolt of the Netherlands 33 *
wtre now taken from the Calvinists; the Regent issued a
new edict which threatened death to all Calvinistic preachers,
and all who had been a party to the late sacrilegious
attack on the churches. The Prince of Orange had left none
too soon. Three days before he crossed the frontier, Alva
had started from Spain (April 27). The ques- Aivades-
tion as to the despatch of Alva had been patched to
debated in the royal council. Ruy Gomez, iandS.
Prince of Eboli, the chief minister of Philip, April 1567.
and others, urged that the Flemings were a people more
likely to be overcome by clemency than by arms. This
was also the opinion of Margaret, who informed Philip that
order was now re-established, and that all that was needed
was 'not an army but a vigilant police.' Philip, however,
was of another mind. He had from the first chafed under
the restraints imposed on his despotic authority by the
privileges and independent spirit of the Netherlanders, especi-
ally in the matter of taxation. He was determined to root
out heresy there, as he had done in Spain. Above all he was
eager to inflict summary vengeance on the nobles, whom he
considered the real authors of the troubles, and the chief
obstacles to the triumph of arbitrary rule. For this task no
more fit agent could have been found than the Duke of Alva.
With a father's blood to revenge, he had been nurtured in
the wars against the Moors. At the age of thirty-nine he led
the army of Charles v. against the Lutherans at Miihlberg,
and since then had governed Italy with a rod of iron. His
severity only increased with his age ; and now at the age of
sixty, a good general, a severe disciplinarian, an enemy of all
political freedom, and a narrow bigot, he was a man after
Philip's own heart, and one to succeed if severity without
statesmanship could win success. Appointed in the first instance
Captain-General, with supreme control over military affairs, he
was by a later commission, of March 1, 1567, invested with
supreme control in civil matters as well, and all authorities,
including the Regent herself, were ordered to obey his
332 European History, 1494-159S
commands. He was to inquire into the causes of the recent
troubles, to bring the suspected to trial, with full authority
of punishment or pardon, and to reduce the country to
submission.
With these extensive powers, and with an army of about
10,000 men, chiefly composed of Spanish veterans, Alva
reached Genoa on the 17th of May. Thence he marched
to the Mont Cenis, and, passing the Alps, pressed northwards.
His advance caused considerable apprehension at once to
the city of Geneva and the French court. Conde*, indeed,
offered to raise a force and overwhelm him as he deployed
from the mountain passes. But Catherine declined, and
contented herself with levying a body of Swiss Catholics to
watch his progress. Alva, however, was careful to give no
Alva reaches Pretext f°r attack; enforcing the strictest dis-
Brusseis, cipline, he proceeded by way of Franche-Comte*
Max are?67 an(* Lorraine to Luxemburg. This he reached
resigns, on August 8, and entered Brussels on the 22nd.
December. Margaret, hurt at the way in which she had been
treated, demanded her recall. Her request was not granted
till December 1567, but her authority was at an end, and even
her protests against the tyranny and cruelty of Alva's rule were
disregarded. The horrors which followed have, perhaps,
served to place her eight years' administration in too favour-
able a light. And yet, if she had at first acquiesced in the
unpopular measures of Granvella, she had subsequently joined
the greater nobles and backed their demands for some mitiga-
tion of the Inquisition, and for the summoning of the Estates-
General. She had, indeed, put down the Iconoclasts with a
severe hand, but in this she had been supported by the higher
nobility, and probably would not have dissociated herself
from their cause. With no great administrative ability, and
with some want of initiative, she had a real interest in
her charge, and a belief in the loyalty of the greater nobles
and in their fitness to rule the country. She would probably
not have altogether opposed their request for an extension
The Revolt of the Netherlands 333
of the authority of the Estates-General, for a reform of the
Council of State, and for some toleration; and, had these
been granted, the troubles might have ceased. There was,
however, no prospect that Philip would grant such conces-
sions, and under these circumstances a continuation of her
rule was impossible.
No sooner had Alva reached Brussels than the scheme of
Philip rapidly unrolled itself. In spite of the protests of
Margaret, the Walloon soldiers in the chief towns were
replaced by Spanish soldiery, who forthwith made up for
the restraint imposed on them during their march, by a
reckless cruelty and a licence which even Alva deplored.
Egmont and Hoorne, enticed by fair promises, were arrested
on the 9th of September, together with Egmont's secretary,
Backerzell, and Van Stralen, the Burgomaster of
__ , „ , . ,. Egmont and
Antwerp. To try such offenders the ordinary Hoorne
courts could not be trusted. Accordingly Alva arrested.
created the ' Council of his Excellency ' or of council of
1 Tumults,' which became popularly known as the Blood
erected*
Council of Blood. This terrible tribunal was
nominally composed of twelve judges. Two of these,
Berlaymont and Noircarmes, were nobles, and six were
lawyers of the country; but these eight only acted as
assessors, or sub-commissioners, and the right of voting on
the cases was reserved to three Spaniards, Juan de Vargas,
Del Rio, and La Torre, the final ratification of their
decisions being reserved to Alva, who was president. Of
this trio, Juan de Vargas, who presided in the absence of
Alva, was a miscreant who, after violating his ward, an
orphan in Spain, had fled from justice, and earned immunity
by subservience to the will of the King. He was in the habit
of relieving the monotony of his work of blood by cruel jokes
at the expense of the accused ; while another judge, Hessels,
who subsequently had much influence, is reported, when
aroused from naps in court, to have cried out automatically :
* To the gallows, to the gallows.' To furnish victims for this
334 European History, 1494-159S
court, commissioners, despatched to the provinces, arrested
on the charge of treason all preachers, or harbourers of them,
all members of Calvinistic consistories, all who had joined
in destroying Catholic, or in building Protestant churches, and
all who had signed the Compromise. Except in more im-
portant cases, the commissioners or local authorities pro-
ceeded to judgment, the revision of their sentences being
alone reserved for the Council itself; and rarely, if ever, was
the revision exercised on the side of mercy. The punish-
ment was death and confiscation of goods, and Alva hoped
from this source to replenish the exhausted treasury. As to
the precise number of the victims it is impossible to speak
with certainty. Alva is said to have boasted that he had
executed 18,600 during the period of his rule. This is pro-
bably an exaggerated statement, but that the victims are to be
counted in thousands is not to be doubted, nor that the
trials and executions were accompanied with all the refine-
ments that cruelty could suggest. It is indeed difficult to
find a parallel in history for this irresponsible and tyrannical
court, which was created by the mere word of Alva, without
even the authority of his written instrument, much less of
the royal warrant, and which violated every constitutional
privilege of the Netherlanders. Alva had indeed succeeded
in his designs 'of making every man feel that any day his
house might fall about his ears/ Under the pressure of these
cruel proscriptions, the tide of emigration, which had already
begun under the rule of Margaret, assumed such proportions,
even as early as October, 1567, that a decree was then issued
threatening confiscation and death to all who left the country
or abetted others in so doing. This, however, only increased
the panic ; and by the end of Alva's administration, Granvella
declared that there were 60,000 fugitives in England, and
more in Germany.
The vengeance of Alva and his master could not, however j
be sated until the heads of the most distinguished had
fallen. Since the arrest of Counts Egmont and Hoorne, the
The. Revolt of the Netherlands 335
proceedings against them had been dragging slowly on, but
in the early summer of 1568, events occurred to hasten the
hand of Alva. William of Orange and his brother Louis
had, by the end of April, succeeded in collecting a motley
force of Germans, of Huguenots, and of exiles from the
Netherlands, and now attempted a triple attack, in the hopes
of exciting a rising against the Spanish rule. Two of the
attempts (that of Hoogstraten on Brabant, and Louis of
that of Coqueville, with his Huguenots, on Artois) Nassau wins
failed, the latter being dispersed by a French Heiiigeriee.
corps which was despatched by Charles ix. But May 23, 1568.
on May 23, Louis of Nassau succeeded in defeating a force of
Spanish soldiers at Heiiigeriee under the Count of Aremberg,
the governor of Groningen, who himself fell in battle.
The defeat of Heiiigeriee hurried on the doom of the two
Counts. Alva, anxious to retrieve the disaster in person, was
determined not to leave them alive behind him. Egmont and
The counsel for the prisoners had hitherto delayed Hoorne con-
to produce their evidence, probably in the hope executed,
that the exertions made in favour of their clients Junes, 1568.
by the Duke of Lorraine, by many of the German princes,1 and
even by the Emperor himself, might at least secure them a trial
before the order of the Golden Fleece, of which they were
members. This privilege was, however, refused them, on the
ground that it did not extend to charges of treason. On
the 1st of June, a decree was published, declaring that the
time allowed for the production of witnesses had expired.
On the following day, Vargas and del Rio pronounced the
prisoners guilty of treason, and the sentence was confirmed
by Alva. They were convicted of having given their support
to the Confederate nobles, who signed the Compromise;
of having shown favour to the sectaries in their respective
governments of Flanders and Artois, of Gueldres and
Zutphen ; and of being parties to the conspiracy of the
Prince of Orange. On June 5, they were led to execution
1 The Duke of Bavaria was the brother-in-law of Egmont.
336 European History, 1494-1,598
in the market-place of Brussels. A few days before, the
secretary of Egmont, Backerzell, and the Burgomaster of
Antwerp, had shared the same fate, after having been cruelly
tortured in the vain hope of extorting evidence from them
against Egmont and Hoorne. That the trial and condemna-
tion of these two nobles was flagrantly illegal is not to be
questioned. It violated the ancient privilege that no Fleming
should be tried by a foreign judge, and the right, definitely
acknowledged by a law of 1531, of the Knights of the Golden
Fleece to be tried by their own order, a law which Philip him-
self had confirmed in 1550. Moreover, the court had been
erected without a royal warrant ; and the cause was decided
before the defendants had produced their evidence. Nor does it
appear that, apart from the technical aspects of the question,
Egmont and Hoorne had been guilty of treason. As Catholics
they certainly had no sympathy with the Sectaries ; and this
their conduct at the time of the Iconoclastic riots shows ; and
if they indirectly supported the movement of the Confederates
who signed the 'Compromise,' there is no proof that they
intended to appeal to arms, or to throw off the Spanish yoke —
or that they did anything more than insist, perhaps with
somewhat too great vehemence, on the constitutional privi-
leges of their country.
There yet remained one more noble for whose blood Philip
thirsted. Of the two envoys sent to Spain in 1566 (cf. p. 327)
. n the Marquis of Bergen had died in May 1567. In
condemned the following September, as soon as the arrest of
and secretly Egrmont an(j Hoorne was known in Spain, Bergen's
executed in ° . . P
Spain. companion, the Baron de Montigny, brother of
March 1570. count Hoorne, had been seized. But it was not till
February, 1569, that proceedings against him were commenced.
The results of the examination to which he was then subjected
were sent to the Council of Blood, which after a year's delay
condemned him to death (March 4, 1570), without giving
him the opportunity of defending himself. The verdict was
kept close, and finally Philip ordered that he should be
The Revolt of the Netlierlands 337
secretly executed in Spain. This was represented to the
unfortunate man as an act of mercy, whereby he would
be saved from the humiliation of a public execution — while it
was publicly announced that he had died a natural death.
His property, as well as that of the Marquis of Bergen, was,
however, confiscated. So successfully was the secret kept,
that this act of perfidy and tyranny was never known till
1844, when access to the records at Simancas was granted
by the Spanish government. Philip might now indulge the
hope that he had rid himself of all his enemies ; but Granvelle
with truer insight remarked that 'as they had not caughi
William, they had caught nothing.'
From the tragedy in the market-place of Brussels, Alva
marched against Louis of Nassau, and on July 21, defeated
him at the battle of Jemmingen. In vain did Louis ot
William of Orange strive to retrieve this disaster. Nassau
In spite of the express command of the Emperor jemmingen.
Maximilian, who was attempting to mediate, he July 2I» x568-
crossed the Meuse on October 5, 1568, and entered
Brabant with a levy of German mercenaries, to which
were subsequently added a body of Huguenots under the
Comte de Genlis. In mere numbers Orange had Fruitless
the advantage over his adversary, but in nothing expedition of
else. Alva avoided a pitched battle, and with his Cf Orange,
veterans completely outmanoeuvred the ill-discip- °ct- x568-
lined troops of William, who soon became insubordinate and
began to desert. No city opened its gates ; and the Prince,
disheartened at the want of support which he received, was
forced to retreat to Strasburg, whence, after disbanding most
of his worthless troops, he and his brother joined Coligny,
and took part in the campaign of 1569 in France.
The expeditions of William and of Louis had been pre-
mature. The Netherlands, cowed by the late reign of terror,
and always slow to move, had not answered their appeal, and
Alva felt so secure that he determined to furnish Philip with
tangible evidence of his success. He had long talked of
PERIOD iv. y
33$ European History \ 1494- 1598
1 the stream fathoms deep ' of wealth which he would cause to
flow from the Netherlands. The confiscations of the disloyal
Financial falling short of his expectations, he now proposed
tyranny of to tax the wealth of all. In March, 1569, summon-
Alva- ing in haste the Estates of each province, he
demanded a tax of one per cent, on all property, moveable
and immoveable, a tax of five per cent, on every sale of landed
property, and one of ten per cent, on every sale of moveables.
The two first were heavy enough, but the third amounted to
nothing less than a proscription of all trade. Before a com-
modity reached the hands of the consumer it would have to
pay the tax at least four times — first, as raw material ; then,
when it passed from the manufacturer to the wholesale dealer ;
again, when it was sold to the retail dealer ; and, finally, when
it was bought by the consumer. The absurdity of this tax
was patent to all but Alva. Viglius, and even Berlaymont
and Noircarmes tried to dissuade him from his purpose ; and,
although most of the provincial assemblies, inspired by fear, at
first consented, the opposition of Utrecht, which was soon
imitated, forced Alva to postpone its enforcement for two
years, in return for a stated sum. In July, 1570, an amnesty
was proclaimed, although with so many exceptions as to
render it nugatory; and no sooner did Alva, on the
expiration of the two years' respite, attempt to enforce
the hated tax (July 31, 157 1) than a storm of opposition
arose. In vain did Alva offer to remit the tax on raw
materials, and on corn, meat, wine, and beer. In spite of
the threat of a fine on those who refused to sell, merchants
declined to deal, shops were shut, trade was at a standstill,
debtors were not able to meet their creditors, and many
banks broke. The distress caused by the lack of employ-
ment was also aggravated in the northern provinces by a
fearful inundation, caused by a north-westerly gale which
had destroyed the dykes in the winter of 1570. The
numbers of the ' wild beggars ' — already considerable —
seriously increased, while the Spanish troops, furious for their
The Revolt of the Netherlands 339
pay, which Alva was unable to provide, became daily more
insubordinate. The words of Margaret were now fulfilled.
' This man,' she said, ' is so detested by the people that he
will make the very name of Spaniard hateful.' Even Alva
himself acknowledged that all had turned against him, and
demanded his recall. Philip, informed of the universal dis-
affection, had, in September, 157 1, appointed the Duke of
Medina Celi as Alva's successor, but his love of procrastination
caused delay, and the Duke had not left Spain when the
news arrived that Brille had been seized by the ' Beggars of
the Sea/
Of those who fled from the tyranny of Alva, some had
betaken themselves to the sea, and carried on an organised
system of piracy against Spanish commerce.
Although common fear of the Guises had led to by the
friendly relations between ' Philip and Elizabeth 'Besgars-'
J t r April 1, 157a
in the early part of her reign, and still prevented
open hostility between them, Elizabeth had, more especially
since the overthrow of Mary Stuart at Carberry Hill (June,
1567), given a tacit approval to the attacks of the English
seamen on the Spanish settlements and trade, had harboured
the Dutch privateers, and even allowed them to sell their
plunder in English markets. In 1568, she had actually
seized a Genoese loan, which was on its way to the Nether-
lands. Philip had in retaliation supported the Ridolfi
plot of 1571, in favour of Mary Queen of Scots and the
Duke of Norfolk. The plot failed indeed, yet at this moment
Elizabeth was not anxious openly to defy the Spaniard. She
therefore ordered the Dutch privateers, then under the
command of William de La Marck, a noted and unprincipled
freebooter, to leave the shores of England. The fleet of twenty-
four vessels accordingly put out to sea, and La Marck, after
attacking a Spanish merchant fleet which he met in the
channel, suddenly seized the town of Brille, at the mouth of
the Meuse (April 1, 1572). The seizure of Brille had not been
authorised by William of Orange, who was not yet prepared for
340 European History \ 1494- 15 98
active operations, nor was it intended at first to be more than
a temporary raid. Nevertheless, it was the first act in the
Revolt of the Netherlands. The news of the ' Beggars' ' exploit
spread like fire. Flushing, which commands the opening
of the Scheldt, was the first to rise ; Enkhuizen, the Spanish
arsenal on the Zuyder Zee, soon followed, and
revolt of the shortly after, the chief towns of Holland and
Northern Zealand — with the exception of Amsterdam and
Provinces. i
Middleburg — as well as those in Guelderland,
Overyssel, Utrecht, and Friesland, declared for the Prince of
Orange.
From this time forward the revolt of the Netherlands
becomes closely involved in the wider range of European
politics, and with the diplomatic relations of the great powers
of France, Spain, and England, As is more fully explained in
the chapter on the religious wars in France (pp. 411, 429), the
h Poncv °f tne French court was at this moment in
support the favour of supporting the Netherlands. Since the
Rebels. treaty of St. Germains (August, 1570) Coligny had
been in power, and had prevailed on Catherine, and on her
feeble son, Charles ix., to divert the attention of the French
from their civil and religious troubles at home, by reviving
the slumbering hostility against Spain. Even Elizabeth of
England, angry at the support Philip had given the Ridolfi
plot, and anxious to prevent either the dreaded union of
France and Spain, or the incorporation of any part of the
.Netherlands into France, listened to these schemes, and enter-
tained the idea of marrying Anjou or his brother Alencon, to
whom the sovereignty of the Netherlands was to be offered.
William of Orange had eagerly embraced the French Alliance ;
and the outcome of the negotiations was the taking of Mons,
. . the capital of Hainault, on May 24, by Louis of
Louis of 1
Nassau takes Nassau, assisted by a Huguenot force under the
Mons. Comte de Genlis. On the 15th of July, the
nobles and deputies from six cities of the northern
provinces met at Dort. While still acknowledging the
The Revolt of the Netherlands 341
sovereignty of Philip, they recognised William as their Stadt-
holder, voted him a sum of money, and gave him authority to
take measures for liberating the country from Spanish tyranny
William, assured of support from the northern provinces, and
trusting in the co-operation of the French, had already
crossed the Rhine on the 7th July, with the intention
of raising the southern provinces. A bitter disappoint-
ment was, however, in store for him. On "July
_ 17 ' , . J J Genlisde-
19, denlis was defeated and taken prisoner feated before
in his attempt to relieve Mons, which had been Mons-
invested by the son of Alva ; and although the
advance of William in the following August was well received
by most of the southern towns, his hopes were suddenly
dashed to the ground by the news of the massacre of St.
Bartholomew (August 24, 1572). —
The reasons for this astounding revolution in the policy of
the French court are dealt with elsewhere (cf. p. 413 ff.). We
are here concerned with its effects on the struggle change in
in the Netherlands. The news of the massacre of the P°licy of
St. Bartholomew fell 'like the blow of a sledge- court,
hammer' on William of Orange. He continued, Effects of the
IVT tisso.crc of
indeed, his march to relieve Mons, but Alva, st. Bar-
who had assumed the command on the 27th of tnoiomew.
August, avoided, according to his wont, a pitched engage-
ment; the troops of William, discouraged by the defection
of the French, became insubordinate ; the Prince himself was
only saved from surprise in a night attack by the watchfulness
of his spaniel, and was forced to fall back on the northern pro-
vinces. Louis of Nassau, thus deserted by his brother, and no
longer in hope of French assistance, capitulated on September
19. His troops were allowed to retire, in FaiiofMons.
spite of the treacherous request of Charles ix. Sept. 19.
that they should be cut to pieces, but the city was cruelly
treated in violation of the terms of capitulation. The fall of
Mons decided the fate of the southern provinces. City after
city returned to its allegiance and was admitted to pardon,
342 European History \ 1494-1598
with the exception of the city of Mechlin. This prosperous
city, that it might serve as an example, was given over to
Reduction of pillage for three days by the commands of Alva ;
Southern churches and monasteries were ruthlessly sacked,
and Catholics as well as Protestants suffered
at the hands of the brutal soldiery.
The struggle round Mons had at least given the northern
provinces time to strengthen themselves, and to Holland the
Prince of Orange retired, to organise resistance. It was now
the plan of Alva to try and isolate the revolt by reducing the
chief towns in the north, and so to place the disaffected pro-
campaign of vinces between two fires. The work was intrusted
Don Frederick to his son, Don Frederick. Zutphen was taken
m the North. 1 an£ .^ garrjson pUt t0 the sword. The provinces
of Guelderland, Overyssel, and Groningen submitted, and
Don Frederick passed on westwards to Holland, where
Amsterdam was the only city held by the Spaniards. After
razing the small town of Naarden to the ground, in violation
of the terms on which it had capitulated, Don Frederick laid
siege to the important town of Haarlem. The city lies on
the narrowest part of the neck of land which
Haarlem. separates the Zuyder Zee from the German
Dec. 9- Ocean, and which at that point is barely five miles
4* broad. Its occupation by the Spaniards would
completely isolate the northern portion of Holland. Alva,
fully realising the strategical importance of the city, ordered
his son, who had a force of 30,000 men, to take it at all
hazards. The task, however, proved most serious. The city
was protected on the east by the large though shallow lake of
Haarlem, and by land was only approachable from the west.
The inhabitants, warned by the experience of Zutphen and of
Naarden that they could expect no mercy, resolved to resist to
the last ; and although the garrison was but some 4000, it took
the Spaniards more than seven months before they could
reduce the city (December 9 — July 14). The siege was marked
Dy great cruelty on both sides j and, after the surrender, the
The Revolt of the Netherlands 343
city became a shambles, over 2000 being murdered in cold
blood. The news of the fall of Haarlem is said to have raised
Philip from a bed of sickness ; but the city had been dearly
won. Don Frederick had lost 12,000 men, and the cruelties
of the victors only nerved the Netherlanders to greater efforts.
'Our cities,' said William, 'are pledged to each other to
stand every siege, to dare the utmost, to endure every possible
misery, yea rather, to set fire to all our homes and be con-
sumed with them, than ever to submit to the decrees of this
cruel tyrant.' The independence of Holland, indeed, may be
said to have been won by the defence of Haarlem. Fifteen
days after the fall of the town, the Spanish soldiers, furious at
the arrears of their pay, mutinied. They were
conciliated by the promise of the pillage of the Spanish
town of Alkmaar if they could take it, but this Fleet °ff
they failed to do; and on the nth of October,
Alva suffered a still more serious check in the destruction of
his fleet off Enkhuizen.
Philip, disheartened at the failure to crush out the revolt,
and assailed on all sides with complaints of the fiendish
cruelty and the incapacity of Alva, decided, after long
hesitation, to supersede him. The Duke de Medina Celi had
been in the Netherlands since June, 1572 ; but, as it was not
thought wise to change masters at such a crisis, he had
refrained from taking over the reins of power, and remained
a very unfriendly critic of Alva's administration till August,
1573, when he returned to Spain to swell the number of those
who condemned the policy of indiscriminate vengeance.
Finally, on the 17th of November, the new Lieu- Alva super-
tenant-Governor, Don Louis de Requesens, Grand seded by
Commander of Santiago, arrived at Brussels, nov"^?"3'
Alva left the country, as he bitterly complained, J573-
without having gained the approbation of the King, while he
had incurred universal detestation 'of Catholics as well as
Protestants, of the clergy as well as the laity.' The tyranny
and ferocity of his rule almost surpass belief. Every form of
344 European History \ 1494- 1598
torture which ingenuity could devise had been exercised on
his unfortunate victims, and he will ever remain in history
as the incarnation of fiendish cruelty. And yet, it must
at least be confessed that the policy he adopted was one
after Philip's own heart in all but its failure, and that he
had at least succeeded in restoring the King's authority in
the southern provinces.
It was the avowed intention of the new Governor-General to
abandon the system of wholesale proscription pursued by
Military Alva, and to try and win back the Netherlands by
events ot conciliatory measures. Nevertheless, his attention
the year 1574. _. . . .
Taking of was at first necessarily directed to military affairs.
Middieburg, jn the n0rth the cause of the patriots prospered.
Defeat of On the 21st of February, 1574, Mondragon, who
Mooker nacl held the important town of Middieburg, was
April 14. forced to capitulate, and thus the whole of the
siege of island of Walcheren, which commands the two
Nov. 1573. mouths of the Scheldt, was finally lost to Spain ;
Oct. 3, 1574. while the town of Leyden, which had been
invested since November, 1573, still held out for the Prince
of Orangev These successes in the north were, however,
neutralised by the terrible disaster of Mooker Heyde on the
Meuse (April 14, 1574). Here Louis of Nassau, as he
attempted to force his way to join his brother at the head
of a motley body of French and German mercenaries,
was completely routed by the Spanish general Sancho de
Avila. Louis himself, with his brother, Count Henry, and
Duke Christopher, son of the Elector-Palatine, were among
the slain. The death of Louis, * the Bayard of the Nether-
lands/ was a serious blow to William, who had now lost
three brothers in the field ; 1 and Requesens, having with
difficulty quieted a serious mutiny of the victorious troops,
ordered the reinvestment of Leyden (May 26, 1574), which
had been suspended owing to the advance of Louis. In
the opinion of Requesens, religion had but little to do with
the rebellion. He accordingly offered a general amnesty to
* Adolf fell at Heiligerlu 1568.
The Revolt of the Netherlands 345
all, with a few exceptions, who would return to Mother
Church. But although this view of the Grand Commander
was correct enough with respect to the original causes of the
revolt, matters had changed, at all events in the northern
provinces. There religious and political discontent were fast
becoming identified, and already in the summer of 1572,
William had complained of the cruelties exercised by the
patriots on priests and monks. The offers, therefore, of the
Governor-General were rejected, and with the cry, 'Rather
Turks than Papists, better be drowned than taken,' the
citizens of Leyden prepared to hold out to the last gasp. All
hopes of succour by land had been destroyed by the defeat of
Mooker Heyde. Nevertheless, the sea remained. This was
indeed fifteen miles away ; but the dykes were cut ; and, after a
long and anxious delay, the wind shifted to the north-west ;
two furious gales on the 18th September and the 1st and 2nd
of October helped to heap the waters of the ocean on the
land, and enabled the fleet of Admiral Boisot to approach.
The Spaniards, with Vald£s their commander, fled at the
advance of this new enemy, and the city was saved (October 3).
The relief of Leyden, the most brilliant success of the war —
a success commemorated by the foundation of the University —
proved conclusively that although the Spaniards might con-
quer by land, they were no match for the 'Sea Beggars'
wherever a ship could float. While this memorable siege had
been proceeding, Requesens had been attempting
to conciliate the southern provinces. On the 7th Estatesof
of June, an assembly of the Estates of Brabant Brabant,
had been held at Brussels. The King's pardon,
above mentioned, was published, and the abolition of the
Council of Blood and the tax of the tenth penny promised.
The Estates, not satisfied with this, demanded the departure
of the Spanish troops, the exclusion of foreigners from office,
and the restoration of municipal privileges to the cities, while
they were niggardly in their offers of money. Requesens
had no authority to grant these demands, and the attempt
346 European History \ 1494- 1598
at complete restoration of the King's authority in the south
had to be postponed. The alternative was to make peace
with William and the northern provinces. To this end,
negotiations had begun as early as the previous autumn,
„ and finally in March, 1575, a conference was
Conference * , , . . . ,
at Breda. held at Breda. The commissioners who had
March-July been appointed by the Estates of Holland and
Zealand demanded the dismissal of the foreigner,
the summoning of the Estates-General from all the provinces,
and the toleration of Calvinistic opinion. The royal com-
missioners offered to dismiss the foreign soldiers, if the Prince
would disband the German and other foreign mercenaries in
his service, and they consented to the summoning of an Estates-
General. They, however, asked that in return for the
guarantee of the King's sign-manual and the pledge of the
Emperor that the royal promises should be kept, the Prince
should give hostages and surrender some of the most important
towns he held. William was not likely thus to deprive him-
self of effective means of resistance, and an agreement was
highly improbable on such terms, even if the religious difficulty
had not presented an insurmountable obstacle. The utmost
that the royal commissioners would offer was that those, who
would not return to the Catholic Church, should be allowed
to sell their property and leave the country. Requesens,
despairing himself of peace on such conditions, had made
the curious suggestion to Philip that he should surrender the
Netherlands to some other ruler, who would not have the
same scruples with regard to toleration. 'They might be
exchanged for Piedmont with the Duke of Savoy or be granted
to Philip's second son.' 'To my son — never,' wrote Philip on
the margin of the despatch. ' I would rather he were a pauper
than a heretic.' And in his answer to Requesens he suggested
the advisability of adopting Alva's last advice to burn all the
cities which, could not be held ; then after secretly tempting
the adherents of the Prince to win pardon by assassinating
their master, he relapsed into one of his long periods of
The Revolt of the Netherlands 347
silence. Under these circumstances peace was clearly im-
possible. The negotiations were broken off in July, 1575,
and Requesens with a heavy heart, a mutinous soldiery, an
empty exchequer, and a ruined credit, prepared for further
operations.
Meantime, steps had been taken by Holland and Zealand
to form a union and to reorganise the government. There
had been a tendency of late on the part of the increased
burgher aristocrats to place restraints on the authority
authority of the Prince. But he refused to accept Prince of
the responsibilities of rule under such conditions ; Orange,
and accordingly, in June, 1575, he was intrusted with absolute
power in all matters concerning the defence of the country,
subject only to the power of the purse, which was reserved
to the Estates. The magistrates and other officials were to
be nominated by him out of a list supplied by the Estates.
The Estates also demanded that he should suppress the open
exercise of the ' Roman religion.' William, however, insisted
on substituting for these words ' any religion at variance with
the Gospel.' The clause, even as amended, showed very
clearly that the religious question was coming more and more
to the front, and the difficulty of any compromise on this
question, not only with the King, but with those southern
provinces where Catholicism was strong. In October of the
same year, the Estates of Holland and of Zealand took a still
more decisive step. Hitherto they had declared themselves
the loyal subjects of King Philip; they now resolved to
forsake the King and seek the sovereignty of some other
prince. But their efforts were not successful. Elizabeth,
to whom they first offered the sovereignty, played her usual
game. She listened graciously to their offers; she allowed
them to purchase arms and levy soldiers at their own expense
in England ; but on the question of the sovereignty she re-
served her decision ■ until she had done all in her power to
bring about an arrangement between them and their King*
(April, 1576). An offer made at the French court to the Due
348 European History \ 1494- 1598
d'Alencon was no more successful ; and while these fruitless
negotiations were being pursued the patriots suffered a serious
reverse in the north of Zealand. Of the three islands, Tholen,
Duiveland, and Schouwen, which lie between the northern
outlet of the Scheldt and the Meuse, the last had remained
Mondragon in the hands of the Spaniards. In September,
secures the \c*i* an attack, led by Mondrasron and supported
islands of 010^ •> « *-*.!«
Duiveland by the fleet, was made thence on Duiveland,
andSchou- wnicn was taken in October. A landing was
wen.
Oct. 1575- then effected on Schouwen, and the town of
June, 1576. Zierickzee was besieged, to fall in the follow-
ing June, 1576. By this brave exploit of Mondragon the
island province of Zealand was cut in two, and the northern
outlet of the Scheldt commanded.
In the midst of this transient success, Requesens died
suddenly of a fever aggravated by the anxieties of his post
(March 5). Philip allowed several months to slip
Requesens, away before he finally decided on his successor.
March 5, 1576, Meanwhile, the Council of State carried on the
an interred government. Of the old members there remained
n um of eight onjy the Duke of Aerschot, Count Berlaymont,
and Viglius. To these, several Netherlanders and
one Spaniard, Jerome de Roda, were added ; while Count
Mansfeld, a German, was intrusted with supreme military com-
mand. Although the Council of State was thus formed almost
exclusively of natives, its administration was still very unpopu-
lar. Aerschot was secretly a partisan of William. The other
two original members had been associated with Cardinal Gran-
vella, and Berlaymont had besides been one of the judges of
the Council of Blood. In spite of the desire of the majority
for a thorough change in policy, the Council was divided,
wanting in capacity, and absolutely devoid of funds. Above
all, it failed in maintaining the discipline of the Spanish troops.
No sooner had the town of Zierickzee fallen (June 21), than
the soldiers, furious on account of the arrears of their pay,
mutinied once more, deserted Mondragon, and left Zealand
The Revolt of the Netherlands 349
for Brabant (July 15). The mutiny spread rapidly, and Alost
in Flanders was seized. The indignation and fear thus aroused
led the Estates of Brabant, then sitting at Brussels,
,r • Vx T 1 J ReVOlt Of
to take measures of self-protection. On July 26, Spanish
they forced the trembling Council of State to soldiery,
issue an edict against the mutineers. They then
threatened the Spaniards in the city, levied troops, and
finally, on September 4, arrested the members of the Council
themselves. This only served to further irritate the soldiery.
The officers, already jealous at the appointment of Mansfeld,
now with few exceptions made common cause with their
mutinous troops, more especially Sancho. de Avila, who was
in command of the citadel of Antwerp. Many of the German
and Walloon mercenaries joined, while De Roda, flying from
Brussels to Antwerp, declared himself the only representative
of the King and openly supported d' Avila. The mutineers
now held the citadels of almost every important town in the
south, with the exception of Brussels, and in many cases
obtained possession of the towns themselves, which they
treated with great cruelty. Meanwhile, Orange had seized
the opportunity to try and win over the southern provinces.
Although the religious divisions between the north and south
had of late become accentuated, all were at least united
in their desire to drive out the foreigner, more especially the
foreign soldiery, and to reassert their political privileges.
William, appealing to this common motive, urged them to sink
all differences, and with one heart and will to work for the
liberation of their country. Inspired by his stirring words,
delegates from the Estates of the southern provinces appeared
at Ghent, in the middle of October, to confer with the repre-
sentatives sent by the Estates of the north. Hardly had their
conference commenced when the violence of the mutineers
reached its climax. On the 4th November, the troops at Alost
marched upon Antwerp, joined hands with the garrison
under d' Avila, overcame the German and Walloon regiments
which had been sent by the Estates of Brabant to hold the
350 European History, 1494- 1598
town, and with the cries, ' St. Iago, Spain, fire, murder, and
pillage,' wreaked their vengeance on the city. Catholics and
The Protestants, native and foreign merchants, women
mutineers an(j children, the poor as well as the rich, were
sack Ant- <■
werp. attacked without discrimination. Eight thousand
Nov. 4, 1576. persons were massacred ; the finest buildings were
burnt ; property to the value of twelve millions was destroyed
or seized ; and Antwerp, the richest city of the Netherlands,
and * one of the ornaments of Europe,' became ' the most
forlorn and desolate city of Christendom.'
The sack of Antwerp served, at least, the cause of William.
On the 8th of November, the Parifirarinn pf Ghent was signed
Pacification J3? ^e delegates Qf trie northern and southern
of Ghent. provinces assembled at that city.. By this famous
Nov. 8, 1576. treatVj lt was agreed that the Spaniards should be
at all hazards expelled from the Netherlands, and that an
Estates-General from all the provinces should be summoned
to take measures for the common safety and future govern-
ment. The Prince of Orange was to continue lieutenant,
admiral, and general for his Majesty in Holland and Zea-
land. There should be freedom of trade and communication
between the provinces. All prisoners should be released, and
all confiscated property restored. The placards and ordin-
ances against heresy should be suspended until the Estates-
General had decided on the matter. No attack, however,
should be made on the Catholic religion outside the provinces
of Holland and Zealand, and if the property of prelates and
other ecclesiastics in the north were alienated, it should not
be done without compensation. Lastly, no province was to
have the benefit of this treaty until it had given its adhesion.
The Pacification of Ghent was received with enthusiasm by
the whole of the Netherlands; and, although the religious
difficulty was postponed rather than solved, there seemed a
reasonable prospect that both Catholics and Protestants would
at last unite, on the basis of mutual toleration, to throw off
the Spanish yoke. The Pacification was at first followed by
The Revolt of the Netherlands 351
encouraging results. On November 1 1, the Spanish garrison
surrendered the citadel of Ghent. That of Valenciennes
was bought from the German soldiery, and at successes
the same time the islands of Schouwen and of the
Duiveland were abandoned by Mondragon. All
Zealand, with the exception of Tholen, was again free from
Spanish rule. Shortly after, Friesland and Groningen were
regained by the national party ; and in January, 1577, the Paci-
fication of Ghent was confirmed by the Union of Brussels, an
union which was numerously signed in every province except
that of Luxemburg.
Meanwhile, the new governor had arrived. One day before
the Antwerp massacre, and four days before the publication
of the Treaty of Ghent, Don John of Austria, Don »ohn
the illegitimate son of Charles v., rode into of Austria
Luxemburg, having crossed France in the disguise LuJS.
of a Moorish slave. Philip had at last made up burg,
his mind to bow before the storm. He hoped v' 3' I576,
that by a show of conciliation, and by restoring the govern-
ment to the condition in which it had been at the death of
Charles v., he might secure the authority of the crown and
the exclusive exercise of the Catholic religion, and yet recover
the obedience of the Netherlands. Don John appeared well
fitted to carry out this policy. The great, though somewhat
undeserved, reputation he had gained by the suppression of
the Moorish rebellion in Granada and by the victory of
Lepanto, his imperial descent, his fascinating manners, had
made him universally popular, and he started on his errand
with all the enthusiasm of a darling of fortune and of a young
man of twenty-nine.1 His ambition was not bounded by
the Netherlands. He dreamt, after a rapid settlement
of the difficulties there, of either marrying Elizabeth of
England, or of overthrowing that heretic Queen and ascending
the throne as the husband of her rival Mary Queen of Scots.
1 Some, however, fix the date of Don John's birth two years earlier,
1545-
.'
352 European History , 1494- 1 598
He was soon, however, to be rudely awakened. He did not
even dare to leave Luxemburg, and was forced to content
himself with negotiating from thence with the States-General.
This assembly, warned by the Prince of Orange not to trust to
promises, demanded the following concessions as the price of
their obedience (December 6, 1576) : the Spanish troops must
be removed at once ; all prisoners must be released ; and the
Treaty of Ghent must be confirmed. One at least of these
demands, the dismissal of the Spanish soldiery, Don John was
willing enough to grant. Yet in pursuance of his scheme of
invading England, he wished that they should go by sea,
and that ships should be provided for the purpose. The
Estates, ignorant of this design, suspected some future
attempt on the Netherlands, and insisted on their departure
by land. Philip peremptorily ordered an accommodation,
The Per- anc* Don John, forced to abandon the projected
petuai Edict, invasion of England, signed the Perpetual Edict
e .17,1577- on February Iyj 1577. The Spanish soldiers
were to depart by land; all prisoners were to be released
on both sides ; all privileges and charters were to be con-
firmed, and the Estates-General were to be convened as
they had been in the time of Charles v. On these terms the
insurgent provinces promised to recognise Don John as
Governor-General, to surrender the citadels which they held,
to disband their own troops, and to take an oath to maintain
the Catholic religion.
The Spanish soldiery departed at the end of April, and
Don John, entering Brussels on May 1, met at first with such
success in his policy of conciliation, that he
enters seemed likely to add the pacification of the Nether-
Brusseis. lands to his other laurels. But, apart from the
May I, I577. ..-. ,.rr- 1 r i i
intrinsic difficulty of the attempt, there were
two fatal obstacles in his way — the wariness of his enemy,
William the Silent, and the suspicions of his master. William
had been disconcerted at the signature of the Perpetual
Edict, which had been done without his approval, or that of
The Revolt of the Netherlands 353
his deputies. He had not expected that Don John would
be so compliant, or he would have raised his terms. From
letters which he had intercepted, he had good
_ ,. . , . . . , 0 ., William
cause for distrusting the sincerity of the Spaniard, rejects the
and he knew that peace on such terms would Perpetual
mean his own ruin. He had accordingly re-
fused to recognise the Edict, or to publish it in the
provinces of Holland or Zealand, and he now proceeded
to take measures against it. He turned to the lower classes
and excited their opposition ; he entered into negotiations
with England and France, and even plotted to secure the
person of Don John. On the other hand, Don John listened
to schemes for the assassination of the Prince, while he wrote
to Philip abusing the Netherlanders as ' drunkards and wine
skins,' and urging him to prepare for war. Finally, on July 10,
the Governor-General despatched his secretary Escovedo to
Madrid to represent his views to the Spanish King. Un-
fortunately, Philip had meanwhile conceived a profound
jealousy of his half-brother. He suspected him of some design
on the government or crown of Spain, a suspicion phn. ,
.which was studiously fostered by Antonio Perez, suspicions of
his minister and confidential adviser. The repre- DonJ°hn-
sentations of Escovedo were therefore disregarded, the urgent
solicitations of Don John for counsel or assistance were left
unanswered for more than three months, and in the following
March, Escovedo himself was assassinated by the orders of
Perez, and with the connivance of the King.
The brilliant dreams of Don John had indeed been rudely
dissipated ; and when, on September 23, William of Orange,
after an absence of eighteen years, entered causes of
Brussels, the capital of Brabant, it seemed as if disunion in the
the whole of the Netherlands would soon be lost
to Spain. But the near prospect of success served only to
revive those feelings of disunion and personal jealousy, which
had been temporarily laid aside under the pressure of Spanish
tyranny. The northern provinces, it must be remembered,
PERIOD iv. z
354 European History \ 1494-1598
had only lately been united to those of the south. Of the
southern provinces, those which lay closest to Holland
and Zealand were inhabited by a people of kindred race
indeed, but who spoke a different dialect, the Flamand;
while in the more southern and eastern provinces, the infusion
of Romance blood was strong, and the common language
French. These differences of race and past history were
illustrated in the religious leanings of the people. In the
north, the Protestant, in the south, the Catholic religion
predominated, and now that the fear of Spain was declining,
a narrow spirit of intolerance began to be displayed on
either side. To these causes of disunion we must add the
oligarchical jealousy of the southern nobles, mostly of the
Catholic persuasion, at the growing importance and the
democratic leanings of the Prince of Orange — a jealousy which
led to the strange idea of offering the office of Governor-
General to the Archduke Mathias, the brother of the Emperor
Archduke Rudolf, subject to the fuller approval of King
Mathias Philip. The adroitness of William, however,
elected
Governor. enabled him to turn this move of his opponents to
Jan. 18, 1578. his own advantage. He openly supported the
candidature of the Archduke, who was elected Governor-
General on the 1 8th of January. Meanwhile, the revolt
of Ghent against the newly appointed governor, the Duke of
Aerschot, one of those who had called in the Archduke
Mathias — a revolt secretly approved of by William — showed
that the latter had the support of the lower classes. And
Mathias, afraid of opposing so popular a man, not only
confirmed his election as *■ Ruwart ' of Brabant, an office
generally held by the heir of the ruling prince, and as Stadt-
holder of Flanders, but acknowledged him as his lieutenant-
general, and promised to rule with the consent of the States-
General and of a Council of State. At the same time, by the
New or Nearer Union of Brabant, the Catholics and Protes-
tants engaged to respect and to protect each other against all
enemies whatsoever.
The Revolt of the Netherlands 355
Yet while William had been thus dealing with those factions
which threatened to ruin his cause, the Spaniards had been
again preparing for war. Philip, at last aroused from his
strange apathy, had ordered the Spanish veterans to return
from Italy. Reinforced by these troops, which were led by
Alexander of Parma, and by others from France under
Mansfeld, Don John marched against the ill-disciplined
army of the States, and, aided by the skilful generalship of
Alexander, inflicted a disastrous defeat on them The defeat
at Gemblojiis, near Namur. The victory ofGembiours.
secured the valley of the Sambre, forced Jan-3I» I5?8-
William and the Archduke to abandon Brussels, and went
far to ruin the cause of liberty in the southern provinces.
In the north, however, the reverse of Gemblours served
rather to advance the interests of William. In March, his
brother, Count John, was elected governor of the important
province of Guelderland; and in May, the adherents of the
Prince succeeded in overthrowing the Catholic magistrates of
Amsterdam, and thus securing the capital of Holland, as well
as Haarlem, for the Protestant cause.
Meanwhile the Catholic nobles, disappointed in their expec-
tations of Mathias, turned to Francis, Duke of Anjou, the
brother of Henry m. of France. Never since _ , , .
* . DukeofAnjou
the days of Coligny's brief supremacy, had appointed
Catherine altogether abandoned the idea of ^JJjJ"^
taking advantage of the disturbed condition of of the
the Netherlands to extend French influence in Netherlands.
July 1578.
the Walloon provinces of Hainault, Artois, and
French Flanders. At this moment, she would probably have
preferred to gain her end by friendly negotiations with Philip,
and possibly by a marriage of one of her sons with a Spanish
princess. But Anjou was little pleased with his position in
France ; he was attracted by the hope of carving out a new
principality for himself; and, accepting the offer, arrived at
Mons, in Hainault, in July 1578. William, although unwijling
to see French influence predominant in these parts, did not
356 European History, 1494- 159S
deem it politic to oppose Anjou, and hoped that the enterprise
might excite the jealousy of Elizabeth, who, while she
coqueted with the Duke as a suitor for her hand, was deter-
mined not to see the Low Countries under French control,
and had already promised some help to William. The
Duke of Anjou was accordingly recognised as ' the defender
of the liberty of the Netherlands against the tyranny of
the Spaniards.' He was assured of the offer of the
sovereignty should the Netherlands find it necessary to
throw off the supremacy of Spain. Meanwhile, he promised
to make no alteration in the government of the country,
and to hold all conquests he might make for the States
(August 20). Before these confused negotiations had led
to any definite result, Don John, worn out by disease, and
Death of s^ at neart at tne failure of his magnificent
Don John. schemes, at the neglect shown to him by King
Succeeded Philip, and at the murder of Escovedo, had
by Alexander passed away. He died in his camp at Bouges,
of Paro a. near ^amur, on ^e ist 0f October, 1578, at the
age of thirty-one, having appointed his nephew, Alexander of
Parma, as his successor. Although there is no probability
in the rumour that he was poisoned by the orders of Philip,
the suspicion and neglect with which he had been treated at
least contributed to his death.
Alexander of Parma, who succeeded Don John as governor,
was the son of Ottavio Farnese and Margaret of Parma, the first
Regent during the reign of Philip II. He had been brought up in
Spain with his cousin Don Carlos, and his uncle Don John of
Austria. His love of adventure and of military exercises had in
earlier days shown itself in an inordinate passion for duelling;
but the war against the Turks gave him a more honourable
field, and at the battle of Lepanto he had distinguished himself
by the most remarkable personal bravery. Now at the age of
thirty-three, he was imre than the equal of his uncle, Don John,
as a soldier, and infinitely his superior as a diplomatist and a
statesman. Great, however, as were the abilities of the new
The Revolt of the Netherlands 35?
governor, it must be remembered that the position of affairs
at this moment gave him opportunities which had been
denied to his predecessors. The racial and religious differ-
ences between the northern and southern provinces were
becoming daily more accentuated. In the southern and
western provinces disunion was rapidly spreading. The de-
cisions of the States-General, especially with regard to taxation,
were little observed. The soldiery were ill-paid, ill-disciplined,
and mutinous ; the intolerance of the Catholics and Calvinists
was becoming more pronounced; the social and political
rivalries were daily forcing themselves more prominently to
the front and threatening civil war or anarchy. William had
of late been forced to lean on the lower classes, and he was
not able to keep them in control. In Ghent, especially, the
turbulence reached its climax under the demagogue Imbize,
supported by John Casimir of the Palatinate, an ambitious and
weak prince, who had just arrived with a motley force of
German mercenaries and English soldiers, sent by Queen
Elizabeth. The rise of this fanatical party not only excited
the indignation of the Catholics, or ' Paternoster Jacks,' who
still represented the majority in the southern provinces, but
also alienated many of the * Malcontent ' nobles, who had
hitherto supported the national cause. Of these divisions,
Alexander was quick to take advantage. Partly by concilia-
tion, more successfully by bribery in money, or in promises of
advancement, he succeeded in reconciling many of the nobles.
Among these, we may especially note Egmont, the degenerate
son of his father, and Champagny, the brother of Granvella,
while Parma even approached William himself with brilliant
offers if he would but desert the cause.
The most signal result of Alexander's diplomacy was seen
in the Union of Arras (January 6, 1579), between the Walloon
provinces of Artois and Hainault, and the towns of Lille,
Douay, and Orchies in French Flanders — a League which,
in the following May, came to terms with Alexander, on
condition that the foreign troops should be dismissed, and
35$ J European History \ 1494- 1 598
the provincial privileges respected. In answer to this, the
northern provinces of Guelderland, Holland, Zealand, Utrecht,
and Friesland formed the Union of Utrecht
Arras! ° (January 29). The object of the union was
Jan. 6, declared to be the strengthening of the Pacifica-
theUn^n V ^on °f Ghent. The allegiance to Spain was not
of Utrecht, thrown off, but the provinces bound themselves
jan. 39, 1579. tQ protect each other against all force brought
against them, either in the name of the King or of foreign
Potentates. Each province was, while renouncing its right
of making separate treaties, to retain its especial liberties and
privileges, and to decide on the religion it should adopt,
although individual freedom of conscience was to be allowed ;
the Roman Catholic provinces were asked to join on the
same terms. The Confederacy was to be ruled by a General
Assembly formed of deputies from each provincial assembly.
It was to have a common currency, a common system of
taxation, and an executive Council, responsible to the
General Assembly. This famous document was originally
only signed by five of the northern provinces, but the
other two — Groningen and Overyssel — subsequently joined,
as well as the towns of Ghent, Bruges, Ypres, and Antwerp.
Although the Union was originally intended to be temporary,
it became the basis for the future federal constitution of the
Seven United Provinces, as the Union of Arras formed the
germ of the future reconstituted Spanish Netherlands.
While the inevitable cleavage between the north-eastern
and south-western districts was thus appearing, Parma made
Success of notable advances in the central provinces. In
Parma in the summer of 1579, Maestricht, on the Meuse,
pro^ncTs816'" fel1 after a four months' siege, and Mechlin was
and in the treacherously surrendered by De Bours. In
north. May of tne f0nowing year, the famous Huguenot,
De la Noue, was taken prisoner near Ingelmunster. Even
in the north, Count Renneburg had betrayed the town of
Groningen, and John of Nassau, the brother of William,
The Revolt of the Netherlands 359
disgusted at the people's lack of patriotism, and at their want
of discipline, abandoned his Stadtholderate of Guelderland
and retired into Germany.
Encouraged by his success, in June, 1580, Philip took the
decisive step of publishing a ban against the Prince of Orange.
He was declared a traitor and a miscreant. All Philip pub.
loyal subjects were forbidden to communicate Hshes the
with him, or to give him food or shelter, and a wmSmof *
purse of twenty-five thousand crowns of gold and orange,
a patent of nobility were offered to any one who June I58o#
would deliver him into Philip's hands, dead or alive. Philip
in this had acted by the advice of Granvella, who declared
that William was a coward, and that the fear of assassination
would either cause him to submit, or * die of his own accord.'
Nevertheless, though the ban may well be called
the death-warrant of the Prince, he was not in w*llia™Pub-
' hshes his
the least dismayed. In the Apologia which shortly Apologia, and
appeared, William boldly defied his enemy. He J^Jl
asserted that Philip had murdered his son Don with the
Carlos, his wife Elizabeth, and the Emperor °ukeof
' ' *• > Anjou.
Maximilian. He declared that as Philip's claim
to rule the Netherlands was forfeited by his tyranny, he
was no longer their legitimate king, nor he himself a rebel.
Finally, professing that he would gladly endure perpetual
banishment or death if he could thereby deliver his people
from their calamities, he placed himself in the hands of God,
1 who would dispose of him and of his goods as seemed best
for His own glory, and his salvation.' Nor did William con-
tent himself with words. He had long been convinced that,
unless foreign help could be obtained, the southern provinces,
at least, were lost. Duke Casimir had, by his incapacity,
done the cause more harm than good, and had left the country
without even paying chis 30,000 devils' of German mercenaries.
The Archduke Mathias was evidently not the man to streng-
then any cause, and further help Germany would not give.
France alone remained. Accordingly negotiations were again
$6o European History *, 1494- 1598
reopened with the Duke of Anjoti, who, in 1579, had left th6
Netherlands for England, enticed by the hope that Elizabeth,
if she could only see him, might accept his hand. Certainly
the personal appearance of the Duke was not likely to further
his suit, for although he had the gracious manners of all the
Valois princes, and was 'a good fellow and a lusty prince,'
he was of puny stature, his face was pitted by smallpox, and
he had an enormous nose. The virgin Queen was, moreover,
playing with him. To marry Anjou and assist him in the
Netherlands without a definite promise of French assistance,
would be to incur too rashly the enmity of Philip 11., and
Henry 111. would not promise ; to allow him to conquer the
Netherlands for France was not to be endured. She had
raised her lover's hopes, only to draw him out of Flanders,
and there was no alternative but to keep him dangling on
as her suitor, and nothing more. Anjou was accordingly
dismissed with fair promises, and, in the hope of securing
his bride, eagerly accepted the offers of the States.
By the Treaty of Plessis-les-Tours (September, 1580), which
was ratified in the following January, the Duke was granted
the hereditary sovereignty over the Netherlands.
over the He was always to reside in the country, to appoint
Netherlands n0 foreigner to office, not to attempt any altera-
conferred on , . . , ,
the Duke of tl0n m the government, nor interfere with the
Anjou by privileges of the provinces ; he was to procure
p^essis-ies- tne assistance of the King of France, but to per-
Tours. mit no incorporation of territory with that country.
Any violation of these conditions was to cause an
immediate forfeiture of his sovereignty. On the 26th of the
July following (1581), the Estates finally renounced their
allegiance to Philip, and the Archduke Mathias left the
Netherlands in October, though Anjou was not finally
accepted till February, 1582. The northern provinces were
most unwilling to receive this foreign ruler. In July, 1581,
William had already, after many refusals, accepted the title
of Count of Holland and Zealand, with the sovereignty during
The Revolt of the Netherlands 36 1
the war. These provinces, therefore, only consented to
acknowledge the Duke of Anjou on the express terms that
no alteration should be made in the practical supremacy of
the Prince of Orange. Thus to all intents the Tf. ledivi.
Netherlands were now divided into three divi- sionofthe
sions : the western provinces, which had again Netherlands-
submitted to Spanish rule ; the north-eastern under William ;
and the central, which acknowledged the sovereignty of the
French Prince. The policy of William in the matter has
been severely criticised, and certainly the previous conduct
of Anjou in France (cf. pp. 418 and 423) was not of very
hopeful augury. Yet, although a desperate remedy, the French
alliance was not altogether a bad idea. There was some
hope that a Catholic sovereign who would consent to
tolerate the Protestants, might unite once more all the
elements of opposition to Spain. Catherine and King
Henry in. were at this time half inclined definitely to adopt
an anti-Spanish policy (cf. p. 426); while, if the English
marriage had also come about, Coligny's idea of a great coali-
tion against Spain might have been realised at last. Unfor-
tunately, all turned out for the worst. Elizabeth, after sending
for Anjou once more, and even exchanging betrothal rings
with her lover, declined to take the decisive step, and Anjou
finally left England for the Netherlands. There the Flemings
and the French quarrelled ; religious intolerance added to the
discord ; the successes of Parma continued ; and Anjou, irri-
tated by the restraints imposed upon him, rashly and foolishly
attempted a coup d'etat. He succeeded in some ,The French
of the smaller towns, but failed at Bruges ; while Fury.'
at Antwerp, the citizens rose and cut down nearly ^an' l6' I583<
2000 of his soldiers (January 16, 1583). Anjou, with shameless
effrontery, attempted to throw the blame upon his subjects,
while he intrigued with Parma, and offered to join him in
return for the cession of certain towns on the French frontier.
Even then, William did not think it wise to irritate the
French. Negotiations were continued after the departure
362 European History, 1494- 1598
of the Duke for France (June 28), and were only ended by
his death in the June of the ensuing year. Before that
event, Parma, taking advantage of the confusion
the Nether- and distrust caused by ■ the French Fury,' partly
lands. by arms, partly by bribery, recovered nearly all
june a ,15 3. ^e central provinces except Flanders, and even
there Bruges was surrendered through the treachery of Chimay,
the son of the Duke of Aerschot.
One month after the death of Anjou, William of Orange
was assassinated. The ban had been his death-warrant. No
less than five attempts had been made, of which
of wniiam one had been nearly fatal to the Prince, and by
of Orange. fae anxiety it caused, contributed at least to the
July 10, 1584. *
death of his wife, Charlotte of Bourbon. Finally,
on the 10th of July, 1584, when fifty-one years of age, he was
shot at Delft by Balthazar Gerard, a fanatic of Franche-Comte,
who had long looked upon himself as predestinated to do the
deed.
The great man, who thus passed away, is a good example of
the chastening influence of a life of responsibility and danger.
The troubles of his country, and the anxieties they brought
upon him, had weaned him from the extravagance and dissipa-
tion of his youth and had deepened his character. A Catholic
by birth rather than conviction, his adoption of Lutheranism,
and subsequently of Calvinism, were probably in part due
to political interest; and although there is no reason to
doubt the sincerity of his ultimate beliefs, his past experi-
ence led him to realise, as few of his contemporaries did,
the value of toleration — a belief which cost him the support
of some of his more fanatical followers. Few would deny
that he was ambitious, but his repeated refusal to accept
the sovere.gnty offered to him — a refusal which some
think mistaken — proves at least that he knew how to
keep his personal interest in control. That he was no
great general, and that he was deficient in military courage,
may be true ; yet, if it be remembered that he commanded
The Revolt of the Netherlands 363
Mercenaries who were not to be trusted, or civil levies which
could indeed defend a town, but were scarcely fitted to meet
the veterans of Spain in the open field, we shall probably
applaud his wisdom in avoiding pitched battles. It is, however,
as a statesman and a diplomatist that he excelled. Absolute
straightforwardness is difficult in diplomacy, but William was
infinitely more straightforward than the shifty Elizabeth, the
Machiavellian Catherine, or the treacherous Philip ; while his
constancy under reverse, in spite of a constitutional tendency to
depression, justly entitles him to his motto, ' Je maintiendrai.'
The extravagant denunciations of the Prince by his enemies
may be taken as a measure of his ability ; the number of his
devoted followers, of his personal fascination; the future
glories of the ' United Netherlands,' as an incontestable proof
of the greatness of the man who is justly called their
* Father.' Nevertheless it is improbable that William, had he
lived, would have won back the south western provinces.
The cleavage, as we have seen, had already begun — a cleavage
which future history has proved to be deep and permanent —
and the success of Parma in the south-west seemed already
pretty well assured. No doubt William hoped for an alliance
with the Huguenots and with Henry of Navarre, who, by the
death of Anjou, had become the heir to the French crown, an
idea which explains his marriage with Coligny's daughter.1 He
seems even to have looked for a coalition of all Protestant
powers. But Henry had enough to do at home, and Elizabeth
1 William married four times : —
1. Anne of Egmont.
2. Anne, daughter of Maurice of Saxony.
3. Charlotte of Bourbon, daughter of Louis, Duke of Montpensier.
4. Louisa, daughter of Admiral Coligny.
Of his eleven children, the following are the most important : —
1. Philip William, son of Anne of Egmont, a captive in Spain
since 1567 ;. ob. s.p. 16 18.
2. Maurice, son of Anne of Saxony, Stattholder from 1587 to 1625.
3. Frederick Henry, son of Louisa de Coligny, Stattholder from
1625 to 1647.
364 European History, 1494- 1598
was a broken reed ; while the quarrels between the Lutherans
and Calvinists, and the advance of the Catholic Reaction,
would probably have prevented effective help from Germany.
William had laid the foundation of the independence of the
Seven United Provinces, and had he lived he would not in
all probability have done more than antedate by a few years
the recognition of that independence.
'Had William been murdered two years earlier,' said
Philip, % much trouble might have been spared me ; but it is
Maurice better late than never.' His second son, Maurice,
elected who was elected Captain-General of Holland and
Genera! "of Zealand, and head of the Council of State, which
Holland and was appointed provisionally, was only seventeen ;
Hohenlo, the son-in-law of William, who was ap-
pointed commander-in-chief, was a drunkard ; while Treslong,
the admiral, quarrelled with the Estates, and was superseded by
Justin, an illegitimate son of William, a man of no experience.
Of the confusion which naturally ensued, Parma made good
use. The most important towns in the South, which remained
unsubdued, were Dendermonde, Ghent, Brussels, Mechlin,
Success of an<* Antwerp, all of them lying on the Scheldt or
Parma. its tributary the Senne. Alexander offered good
terms; he promised to respect their privileges, to make no
inquiry into conscience, and to free them from foreign gar-
risons. Many of the old adherents of Orange deserted the cause
in despair, and by the end of July, 1585, all these towns had
surrendered or had been taken, with the exception of Antwerp.
Against that important place, Parma now concentrated all his
The siege of efforts. The enterprise was a difficult one ; Parma
Antwerp. had no fleet; Philip, at this moment occupied with
ug. 17, 155. foe affairs of the League in France (cf. p. 428),
gave him scant assistance ; and, had the citizens of Antwerp
followed the example of those of Leyden in the year 1574,
and completely flooded the country, he could scarce have
approached the city. For this sacrifice, however, they were
not prepared, and the half-measures which they adopted did
The Revolt of the Netherlands 365
more harm than good. Parma accordingly was able to reach
the Scheldt to the seaward of the town, and began a bridge
which should cut off all communication with the sea. The
besieged, when too late, made energetic attempts to defeat
his purpose, and once, by means of the dread fire-ships, nearly
succeeded in breaking through the barrier. But Parma was
not to be baulked. In spite of all their efforts, the bridge was
completed, and, after a six months' siege, St. Aldegonde the
Burgomaster, surrendered (August 17). The victory was not
tarnished by any outrages. An amnesty was proclaimed, though
the city had to pay a fine ; all religions except the Catholic
were proscribed, but those who would not conform were
allowed two years' grace. But if the capitulation of Antwerp
raised the military fame of Parma to the highest pitch, and
practically secured Brabant to the Spaniards, the actual gain
was not very great. Ostend and Sluys still held out, and
although they were subsequently won (Sluys in August 1587),
the Dutch succeeded in permanently holding Flushing and
the entrance to the Scheldt. By so doing, they not only
destroyed the commercial importance of Antwerp, which de-
pended on her communication with the sea, but contributed
to the decline of the industries of the other great Flemish
cities. Amsterdam now took the place of Antwerp ; the
Scheldt was closed to Flemish commerce, and never till our
day, when that river was finally declared open, did Antwerp
become again that entrepot for trade, for which her geo-
graphical position so well fits her.
While this memorable siege had been progressing, the
sovereignty over the Netherlands was going a-begging. Two
parties had now arisen there : those who based 0
*■ Sovereignty
their hopes on French assistance, and those who refused by
looked to England. The French party were at oct"^11"
first successful. Undismayed by the treachery is offered to
of Anjou, and in spite of the opposition of the Elizabeth-
Province of Holland, they offered the sovereignty to Henry
in., 'upon conditions which should hereafter be settled,'
366 European History \ 1494- 1598
October, 1584. So brilliant an offer was indeed tempting,
and, had the hands of Henry been free, he probably would
have accepted it. But the last of the Valois was in the
toils of the Catholic League. After much hesitation he had,
in July, 1585, submitted to its dictation (cf. p. 429), and
accordingly he declined the profer.ed dignity.
Disappointed in their hopes of French assistance, the
Netherlanders turned to England. Elizabeth had leceived
with satisfaction the news of the refusal of the sovereignty
by the French King. Well aware of the designs of Philip on
England, she was anxious to save the United Provinces
from reconquest by Parma, and was willing to aid them with
men and money. Nevertheless, with her usual parsimony,
she was determined to obtain good security for repayment,
which should take the form of cautionary towns, while she
feared to accept the sovereignty lest such a step might pledge
her too deeply to a definite anti-Spanish policy. This was,
however, just what the Netherlanders most desired. The nego-
tiations therefore, which had begun before the fall of Antwerp,
were long protracted, and it was not until November, 1585,
that the Netherlanders finally consented to her terms. The
Queen engaged herself to maintain a permanent force of
5000 foot and 1000 horse in the provinces at her own
charges ; for the repayment of the expense
declines the t^lus mcurred, Brille and Flushing were to be
sovereignty, placed in her hands, to be garrisoned by an
patches" the additional contingent; she was also to have
Earl of the right of nominating two members of the
Leicester. Council of State of eighteen, to which the ad-
Dec g, 1585. m # o »
ministration of affairs had been intrusted after
the death of William the Silent. The Earl of Leicester, the
favourite of the Queen, was appointed commander of the
forces; the governorship of Flushing was intrusted to his
nephew, Sir Philip Sidney, and that of Brille to Sir Thomas
Cecil, son of Lord Burleigh.
On the 9th of December, the expedition sailed. The
The Revolt of the Netherlands 367
Netherlander were not, however, yet satisfied. Anxious
apparently to compromise the Queen still further in their
cause, they offered the post of Governor-General Leicester
of the United Provinces to Leicester, with accepts the
office of
supreme military command by land and sea, and Governor-
supreme authority in matters civil and political. General-
He was to swear to maintain the ancient laws and privileges of
the country, and to govern with the assistance of the Council
of State ; he might, however, summon the States-General at his
will, and was to enjoy the right of appointing to all offices,
civil and legal, out of a list presented to him by the states of
the province where the vacancy should occur. The Earl not
only accepted the brilliant offer, but, elated by the magnificent
reception he received, was even heard to say that his family
had been wrongly deprived of the crown of England.1 By
this conduct the susceptibilities of Elizabeth were aroused. As
a Queen, she was angered at ' the great and strange indignation
contempt' of her subject who had dared accept of Elizabeth,
the f absolute ' government without her leave ; as a woman,
she was jealous of her favourite who looked for honours from
other hands than hers ; as a diplomatist, she feared that this
rash act of Leicester would destroy her game, and that Philip
would strike at England. She therefore peremptorily com-
manded him to make 'public and open resignation' of his
office. For two months the Queen was implacable. At last,
however, a most secret letter from her ' sweet Robin ' salved
her woman's pride. Burleigh and Walsingham warned her of
the fatal results of her capricious conduct ; and she consented
that the Earl should, provisionally at least, retain the authority
of 'absolute governor' (April 10). We even find her subse-
quently declaring ' that she misliked not so much the title, as
the lack of performance ' of their promises by the Dutch.
The quarrel between the Queen and her favourite was at
an end ; not so its consequences. The authority of the Earl
1 The Earl of Leicester was the brother of Guildford Dudley, the
husband of Lady Jan« Grey, executed 1554.
368 European History, 1494- 1 598
had been discredited by the humiliating position in which
he had been placed by his own vanity and rashness, and by
Leicester the pique of his mistress. The suspicion and
loses the disgust thus engendered among the Netherlanders
Support Of . ill r 1
the • states ' were increased by the reports of negotiations be-
Party. tween Elizabeth and Parma — reports which were
but too well founded ; for as the projected invasion of England
became more certain, the efforts of the Queen to avert the
blow by peaceful negotiations increased. Nothing could have
been more unfortunate than the policy thus adopted.
Philip's object was simply to gain time until he should be
ready for his great stroke; and, although Elizabeth hoped to
include the Netherlands in any peace she might make, her
previous conduct certainly gave no security that she would
refuse to sacrifice their interests if necessary. These appre-
hensions were naturally most acutely felt by the ' States
Party/ — that is, by the governing classes, who were re-
presented in the Provincial Estates, and in the States-
General — men like Paul Buys, the ex-advocate, and John
Van Olden Barneveld, the advocate of Holland. This party
had hitherto taken the lead in the struggle against Spain,
and, although still in favour of the English alliance, were
unwilling to see their country made the victim of a woman's
pique, or of a faithless Queen's diplomacy.
Leicester £. . , . . • •., ** \
leans on the Leicester, stung by their reproaches, with that
democratic vanity and love of flattery which were his chief
pa y* faults, accordingly turned to the people and
adopted a democratic policy which was still more distasteful
to the official classes, and to the patrician burgher families.
In violation of the law that no person should hold office
in any province of which he was not a native, he raised
three creatures of his own to power : Deventer, a native
of Brabant, was appointed burgomaster of Utrecht; Daniel
de Burgrave, a Fleming, was made his private secretary ; and
Regnault, another Fleming, a renegade who had once taken
service under Granvella and Alva, was placed at the head of
The Revolt of the Netherlands 369
the new Finance Chamber — a chamber which Leicester erected J
with the hope of putting a stop to frauds on the revenue,
and of finding 'mountains of gold.' The merchants were
further irritated by the refusal of Elizabeth to remove the
staple for English cloth from Embden, in East Friesland, to
Amsterdam or Delft, and by the prohibition of all exports to
Spanish territories — a measure which did far more harm to
Dutch trade than it did to that of Spain, and which was so
unpopular that it had shortly to be rescinded. A Calvinist
himself, the Earl gladly adopted the views of the democratic
party in religious matters. Declaring that the Papists were
favourers of Spain, he banished seventy from the town of
Utrecht and maltreated them elsewhere ; while with the object
of declaring Calvinism the state religion, he summoned a
religious synod at the Hague. By this conduct he abandoned
the principle of toleration which William the Silent had ever
advocated ; he threatened the compromise laid down at the
Union of Utrecht (cf. p. 358) whereby each province had been (
allowed to settle the religious question for itself, and he
alienated the best statesmen of the day, men who objected '
to Church influence in secular affairs, who feared the in-
temperate zeal of the Calvinist ministers, and wished to avoid
the establishment of a theocracy after the fashion of Geneva.
The adherents of the Earl did not stop there; they denied
the authority of the States-General and of the Provincial
Estates, and declared that sovereignty resided in the people.
In pursuance of these theories the government of Utrecht,
where Leicester generally resided, was revolutionised, and
Paul Buys, one of the most prominent of the burgher party
— seized with the tacit acquiescence, at least, of Leicester —
was kept six months in prison without trial. Thus the
Earl, instead of uniting all parties in common opposition to '
the Spaniard, had become a partisan, had made enemies of
those who had been the most strenuous advocates of the
English alliance, and deepened those provincial, class, and
religious differences which henceforth were to be the chief
period iv. 2 A
a**
3?0 European History, 1494-159$
bane of Holland. Nor was Leicester more fortunate in his
relations with his own subordinates ; he quarrelled with
Sir John Norris, who had been in command of
Leicester ,
quarrels the English contingent before his arrival, with
with his sub- the knight's brother Edward, and his uncle the
ordinates. ° ... ,,TM1 - , _- ...
treasurer, and with Wilkes, one of the English
members of the Council of State. Although Leicester was
not altogether responsible for these dissensions, they did not
improve the Dutch opinion of him, and, added to the niggard-
liness of Elizabeth's supplies, seriously crippled his efforts in
the field. It was fortunate, under these circumstances, that
Philip was too intent on securing the victory of the League in
France, and on his preparations for the Armada, to send
efficient help to Parma. As it was, the year 1586 was one ot
Disasters of disaster for the patriots. On June 7, Grave was
the year 1586. treacherously surrendered to Alexander by its
governor. On the 28th, Venloo capitulated, and Parma
became master of the Meuse almost to its mouth. Finally,
the attempt of Leicester to take the town of Zutphen on the
Yssel, which was still held by Parma, led to the death of Sir
Philip Sidney^the brilliant nephew of the Earl, who was
mortally wounded as he took part in an heroic, though un-
successful effort to intercept a convoy of provisions thrown
into the town by Parma (October 2). The only successes on
the English side were the surprise of Axel on July 17, the
reduction of Doesburg, September 12, and the taking of
some of the outlying forts of the town of Zutphen.
The only remedy for the ill that had been done was that
Elizabeth should accept the sovereignty, and send a good
army into the field. This Leicester earnestly pressed on the
Queen, and the proposal met with the support of Burleigh.
Elizabeth, however, objected to the one, 'because it bred
a doubt of perpetual war ' ; to the other, ' because it required
an increase of charges'; and the departure of Leicester on
a visit to England at the end of November only added to
the confusion and disagreements in the Netherlands. The
The Revolt of the Netherlands 37 1
government during his absence was nominally left to the
Council of State. To Sir John Norris was given command
of the English forces, to Hohenlo that over the Leicester
Dutch and German troops. Leicester, however, temporarily
, . . • • • 1 /-i •! leave* the
knowing that the majority in the Council were Netherlands,
against him, and that these two officers were his Nov- ■* *586.
deadly enemies, had left a secret paper by which content
he forbade the Council to set aside any appoint- increases,
ments to the command of forts and towns without his
consent. Unfortunately, two of his last nominees turned
traitors. Sir William Stanley surrendered the town of
Deventer, near Zutphen, and Rowland York betrayed Fort
Zutphen to Tassis, the Spanish commander of the fcwn
(January 29). These acts of treachery on the part of Leicester's
own nominees, added to the negotiations of Elizabeth with
Parma, which were now well known, roused the indignation
of the States Party in Holland to boiling pitch. Barneveld
declared ' that the country had never been so cheated by the *
French as it was now by the English, and that the govern-
ment had become insupportable.' Envoys bearing a bitter
remonstrance were despatched to Elizabeth, and Maurice
was again provisionally appointed Governor-general, with
Hohenlo for his lieutenant-general. The visit of the envoys
was most inopportune. At the moment of their arrival the
question of the fate of Mary, Queen of Scots, who had been
convicted of complicity in the Babington Plot, was agitating
the English Queen. Four days after their arrival, Elizabeth
at last consented to sign the death-warrant (February 1), and
on the 8th, Mary's head fell on the scaffold. It was now
thought imperatively necessary to conciliate Philip, or to
husband all the resources of England for defence against
the invasion which was otherwise inevitable. Under these
circumstances, Elizabeth was in no mood to listen either
to the remonstrances of the Dutch against the conduct of
her favourite, or to their demands for increased help and
money. ' No reason that breedeth charges,' said Walsingham,
37 - European History > 1 494- 1 598
'can in any sort be digested.' In March, indeed, Lord
Buckhurst was despatched to Holland, and by his wise and
conciliatory policy did much to heal the breach. But with
Leicester tne return of Leicester in July, the quarrels again
returns. broke out. His attempt to relieve the town of
The dis-7 Sluys, which he found invested by the Duke of
content Parma 1 on his return, failed, and on August 4,
that important basis for an attack on England
was in Parma's hands. The fall of Sluys led to recrimina-
tions between Leicester, Maurice, and Hohenlo. Mean-
while, the altercations with the States Party continued, while
the continued negotiations between Elizabeth and Parma
deepened the suspicions against the English. The Dutch
even declared that Elizabeth's aim was to secure possession
of more towns, that she might thereby make a better bargain
for herself, while she sacrificed her allies. That the Queen
herself entertained so base an idea is not proved; yet we
have Leicester's own words to show that he at least did not
shrink from such a course ' if the worst came to the worst.
When, therefore, in the autumn of 1587, Leicester made a
vain attempt to revolutionise the governments of Amsterdam
and Leyden (October, 1587), as he had previously done in
the case of Utrecht, a cry was raised that he was playing
again the game of the false Anjou (cf. p. 361), and there was
no alternative for him but to retire. He was accordingly
recalled by his mistress in December to bask in
finally re- ner royal smile, although he did not actually
called. resign his authority till the following March 31.
Dec. 1587. _,.. °, . .. J , ,& . -r
Elizabeth would not hear a word against her
favourite. In her letter of recall she threw the blame
entirely on her allies; she upbraided them for their in-
gratitude, their breach of faith, their false and malicious
slanders against the Earl, and concluded this marvellous
epistle with a gracious promise that ' out of compassion for
1 Alexander had become Duke of Parma on the death of his father
Ottavio, September 1586,
The Revolt of the Netherlands 373
their pitiful condition, she would continue her subsidies for
the present, and that if she concluded a peace with Spain,
she would take the same care for their country as for her
own.'
It would be unfair to hold Leicester altogether responsible
for the failure of this ill-starred expedition. Some of the
leading men, like Hohenlo, were violent men, R . f
especially when in their cups ; the parties and his adminis-
factions which divided the Netherlanders were not tratlon-
of Leicester's making; the complicated and loose character
of the government, and the religious difficulties, were sure
to lead to trouble ; except in the provinces of Holland and
Zealand, little zeal was at this time shown in the cause, and -
Stanley and York were not the only traitors. But if the task im-
posed on Leicester had been a delicate one, certainly no person
was less fitted than he to carry it through. His arrogance,
his imperiousness, and his implacable temper made him many
personal enemies, and led him to chafe against any control or
contradiction ; his vanity caused him to listen to the flattery
of his creatures, and to break with the leading statesmen of
the time, because they dared criticise his conduct ; his strong
Calvinistic prejudices ill fitted him to hold the balance amid
the religious parties of the Netherlands ; and ' if he was
courageous and open-handed, he was certainly neither a
capable statesman nor a good general. Yet, after all, the chief
fault lay in the policy of the Queen herself. Her refusal to *
accept the sovereignty and throw herself heartily into the
cause of the Netherlands, the niggardliness of her supplies, and
the harshness of her terms — above all, her suspicious negotia-
tions with Parma — these were the chief causes of complaint.
Nor was this conduct the result of mere caprice. Well aware
of the preparations of Philip against England, she still vainly
hoped that, if she refrained from the irretrievable step of
assuming the sovereignty, she might make use of her position
in the Netherlands to secure a lasting and honourable peace
for herself and them. She accordingly allowed herself to be
374 European History \ 1494- 1598
deluded by the comedy of negotiation, which Alexander was
playing, at his master's orders, with the sole intention of
deceiving her till the time for action was ripe. With the same
idle hope, she had disavowed the action of Sir Francis Drake,
who, in the preceding April, had ■ singed Philip's beard ' by
entering the ports of Cadiz and of Lisbon, and destroying
some two hundred and fifty vessels. Her conduct was in
keeping with her policy to the Protestants in Scotland and in
France — a policy which has been generally praised, if not for
its Honesty, at least for its cleverness. It has been asserted
that by this trimming attitude she prevented a coalition of
the united forces of Catholicism, before which England must
have succumbed ; however true that may have been in the
' earlier years of her reign, it was certainly so no longer, for
Philip was now determined on his invasion of England. Once,
indeed, he had feared the designs of the Guises ;
mines to * Dut tne Duke of Guise was now in his pay. In
invade January, 1584, Mendoza, Philip's ambassador, who
had been summarily dismissed from England on
account of his known connection with Throgmorton's plot,
informed Elizabeth * that as he had failed to please the Queen
as a minister of peace, she would in future force him to try
and satisfy her in war,' and he had been true to his word.
Removing to France, he became thenceforth Philip's most
active agent in making preparations. In May, 1586, the
Queen of Scots had ceded to Philip all her claims on the
crown of England, unless James accepted Catholicism before
her death, and her execution finally removed all his scruples.
Under these circumstances, Philip was determined to endure
the ill-disguised acts of enmity on the part of the English
Queen no longer. She had aided the rebels in the Nether-
lands ; she had supported the Pretender to the crown of
Portugal ; above all, the piratical attacks of the English sea-
dogs were bleeding Spain to death. England must be con-
quered. If that could be effected, the Netherlands would
be soon subdued ; and, since the victory of the League
The Revolt of the Netherlands 375
seemed assured in France, Philip might well hope soon to be
master in London, Amsterdam, and Paris. Had Elizabeth
at the time of Leicester's expedition cast all fears to the
winds and thrown her energies once for all on the side of
Henry of Navarre, and on that of the Netherlands, Philip
would have had his hands too full to strike. Even as it was,
Alexander was prevented from co-operating in the attack
on England by those very Netherlanders whose sympathy
Elizabeth had done her best to alienate.
Five months after the departure of the Earl, the Armada,
under the Duke of Medina Sidonia, sailed. The scheme for
invading England had been elaborately planned The Armada
between Philip and Parma. The Armada was to sails,
proceed from Lisbon to the throat of the English ay 3°' 15
Channel, off Calais. There it was to wait for Alexander, who
was to come forth with his army, numbering some 17,000
men, shipped on the flat-bottomed boats he had prepared,
and assume the command of the whole expedition. The
Channel was then to be crossed. The Duke of Parma was to
land and march on London, while Medina Sidonia was to
guard the harbours from the Dutch and English fleets. The
first experiences of the Spanish fleet were not encouraging.
Many of the ships proved unseaworthy, Medina was forced
to put into Corunna to refit, and it was not until the 28th of
July, that the Armada sighted the Lizard. The
, / , , , r . ° .. . . , , , , The Armada
delay had been of value. Elizabeth, although she sights the
had continued her negotiations with Parma to the Lizard-
July 28.
very last, had made some preparations. On land,
indeed, little had been done ; but when the Spaniards appeared
off Plymouth a motley fleet of some one hundred and ninety-
seven ships had been collected. Of these only thirty-four
belonged to the government ; the rest had been provided
by the merchants of London and other towns, or by private
individuals.
It appears, however, that the strength of the Armada has
been exaggerated. Although it is impossible to speak with
376 European History, 1494- 1598
absolute accuracy, it would appear that the number of the
Spanish vessels actually engaged was some one hundred and
twenty, while that of the English was about one hundred and
seventy. The tonnage of the individual Spanish ships was
greater, but in everything else the advantage was on the
English side. They had more guns — a weapon which the
Spaniards, depending as they did on boarding their adversary,
despised. The number of effective fighting men was probably
greater than that of the Spaniards, if we omit the galley
slaves ; certainly the proportion of sailors to the soldiers was
greater in the English fleet; the sailors were far better
seamen than those on the Spanish ships, and they had
amongst their captains such men as Drake, Hawkins, and
Frobisher, who had spent their lives at sea. The Spanish
ships, if higher and of greater size, and therefore dangerous
at close quarters, were unwieldy and undermanned. In a
word, as Drake well said, if the English could ' fight loose and
at large,' their victory was assured ; and this they succeeded
Running in doing. In a running engagement up the
ungthTment Channel> which lasted eight days> the English
Channel. hung round the Spanish fleet, generally to
July 30-Aug. 6. vv ind ward of them, poured their shot into the
hulls of the Spanish ships, and were away again before they
had suffered much punishment. The English fired low j the
Spaniards, anxious to disable their enemies preparatory to
boarding, fired at the masts and rigging, and often missed
their aim. When, therefore, the Armada at last reached
Armada in tne Calais roads, the absurdity of the idea that
Calais roads, they could drive the English fleet from the sea
The fire- was already palpable ; and unless that could be
ships. done, it would have been madness for the Duke
of Parma to venture out to sea in his flat-bottomed boats,
encumbered as they would be by troops. This he himself
had foreseen ; but in any case, the swarm of Dutch craft which
lined the coast prevented him from the attempt. Nothing
clearly could be done unless the Armada could command the
The Revolt of the Netherlands 377
sea, and this it completely failed to do. On the night of
August 7, the English sent six fire-ships against their enemies
as they lay at anchor. The fire-ships might easily have been
towed aside by boats, for they had no explosives on board.
But the Spaniards remembered the fire-ships of Antwerp ; a
shameful panic seized the men ; the great hulks slipped their
anchors ; two were set on fire, others became entangled with
each other, and the rest of the fleet were driven seaward
by awkward squalls which sprang up from west-south-west.
On the following morning, the English pursued ; and in the
engagement which ensued, while the English lost Final
not a single vessel and scarce a hundred men, the engagement
Spaniards had sixteen of their ships disabled and Ausust •
lost four to five thousand men. Unfortunately the English
were now short of powder and of shot and of provisions.1
The Lord- Admiral, Lord Howard of Effingham, however, * put
on a brag countenance and gave them chase, as though they
wanted nothing,' and the Spaniards, afraid to face the English
ships again, were fain to drop before the wind which soon
began to freshen into half a gale from the west, and threatened
to drive the fleet upon the Zealand sands. A sudden shifting
of the wind to the south-west saved them from this disaster ;
but the change was only the prelude to a violent gale, which,
finally bursting upon the half-disabled ships on August 14,
scattered them far and wide. Of the one. hundred and thirty-
four sail which left Corunna in July, some fifty-three alone,
painfully and one by one, found their way back to Spain, and
even these were so damaged as to be useless.
The great enterprise of Philip had been ruined by the com-
bined action of the English and the Dutch. Yet, unfortunately,
the disagreements caused by the expedition of Leicester were
long in disappearing. On the retirement of the Earl, Maurice
of Nassau, who was already Stattholder of Holland and
1 This is generally attributed to the parsimony of the Queen. But on
\his and other popular errors cf. State Papers relating to Defeat of the
Spanish Armada, Navy Records Society, Introduction.
378 European History y 1494- 1598
Zealand, had been appointed Captain-general of those pro-
vinces ; 1 but his authority was disputed by Leicester's party,
more especially in the provinces of Utrecht,
Holland after Friesland, and in North Holland. They declared
departure of that the Earl had only temporarily retired, and
refused obedience to Maurice and the States-
General. The difficulties were further increased by quarrels
with Lord Willoughby, who had been left in command of the
English forces, and was himself an adherent of the Earl.
Under these circumstances, Alexander had easily reduced most
of the contumacious cities; and, on April 10, a quarrel between
Maurice and the English officer, Sir Robert Wingfield, enabled
him to secure the important city of Gertruydenberg. In the
Dutch and same month, however, a joint Dutch and English
English ex- expedition was made against Portugal, which,
Portugal*0 althougn ifc failed in its immediate object— the
Apni-juiy, restoration of the pretender Don Antonio to the
*&* crown — did some damage to Spanish shipping,
and gave earnest of a better feeling between those two
countries, whose interests were so closely knit together. In
Br d se ^e following February, a clever stratagem, heroi-
cured by a cally carried out, won Breda for the patriots, and
FcV^SFT' during the following summer, Maurice began to
display his military powers by the reduction of
several places of importance. Nevertheless, the dissensions
still continued. The two English councillors, and the com-
mander of the English auxiliary forces, who, according to the
original treaty, still retained a seat in the Council of State,
were ever quarrelling with the Hollanders. The province of
Holland, which contributed at least a half to the expenses of
the war, did not consider its representation on the State
Council an adequate one ; the States-General, in which the
influence of the delegates of Holland was predominant, began
1 In 1590, Maurice was also appointed Stattholder and Captain -general
of Guelderland, Utrecht, Overyssel ; but he never was appointed Captain,-
general of the whole Union,
The Revolt of the Netherlands 379
to disregard the authority of the Council, while its authoritv
in turn was often disputed by the other Provincial Councils.
It was fortunate, under these circumstances, that the atten- v
tion of Philip was at this time directed elsewhere. In France
alone his fortunes seemed prospering. If the victory of the
League in that country could be secured, England and the
Netherlands might yet be conquered. Besides, Philip was
becoming jealous of the Duke of Parma. No one could serve
Philip long without arousing his suspicions ; and Alexander
had no lack of enemies who spread rumours of his in-
tention to make himself independent in the Netherlands.1
He was therefore neglected, and with troops mutinous for
want of pay, operations on a large scale were impossible.
Finally, in spite of his remonstrances, Farnese
was ordered to ■ talk no more of difficulties ' but marches into
to march into France to the assistance of the France.
Duke of Mayenne, August 3, 1590 (cf. p. 434),
and although on December 3, Parma returned from his
French expedition, rt was with enfeebled health, exhausted
funds, and an army seriously reduced in numbers.
Maurice at last had his opportunity. This second 2 son of .
William the Silent, and, through his mother, the grandson of
Maurice of Saxony, whom he resembled in feature Early life of
and in character, had not as yet attracted much Maurice,
attention. Some indeed thought him nothing more than a
petulant and unmannerly schoolboy ; shrewder observers,
however, admitted that he was a man of ' deep if sullen ' wit,
and that as he grew up to manhood he did not indulge in
the vice of deep drinking so prevalent among Dutchmen of
that day. With politics he had hitherto concerned himself
but little, and had been content to follow the lead of
1 That Alexander had been approached on this subject is true ; but that
he ever entertained such a proposal there is not the slightest proof.
2 The eldest son, Philip, had been kidnapped from school and sent to
Spain in 1567. When he returned in 1596, he had become a Catholic and
a supporter of Spanish rule.
380 European History \ 1 494- 1 598
Barneveld. Meanwhile he had devoted himself to mathe-
matics, the science of fortification, and to tactics, and sub-
sequently, assisted by his cousin, Lewis William, Stattholder
of Friesland — an odd little man with bullet head, bright eyes,
His military and shaggy brown beard — had turned to military
reforms. reform. A more elaborate system of drill was
introduced, which might give greater elasticity to the army in
the field ; appreciating the value of fire-arms, he increased
the proportion of musketeers to pikemen in the infantry,
and armed the cavalry with carbines. To this he added the
use of the spade, which had hitherto been despised as beneath
the dignity of the soldier, and formed a school of engineers.
In his anxiety to put an end to the system of pillage which
disgraced the armies of the day, and which had made the
Spaniards a terror, he severely punished such offences ; while,
to remove all pretext for such conduct, he was careful to
prevent the peculation which had been rife among the officers,
and insisted on the soldiers being punctually paid. By these
means he had succeeded, in spite of much hostile criticism
and ridicule, in making the small army of the Hollanders a
thoroughly effective one ; while he himself at the age of
twenty-three had become a master of scientific fortification
and siege operations. The moment had now come to use his
remodelled forces. On May 24, 159 1, he laid siege to
Zutphen on the Yssel, and in six days reduced
Maurice. tnat town, which had hitherto proved impregnable.
May-juiy, The reduction of Deventer, on the same river,
followed on June 10. Sixteen days later, he
appeared before the walls of Groningen, and reduced several
places in the neighbourhood. Farnese, aroused by the news
Continued of his exploits, attempted in July, to make a
success of diversion by attacking the fort of Knodsenburg
Sept.-Oct., on the Waal, but was outmanoeuvred by his
x59x- young antagonist, and was forced to retreat, and
in August was compelled by illness to retire to Spa.
Maurice now took the town of Hulst on September 24,
The Revolt of the Netherlands 381
and on October si, Nymwegen, at the frontier of the
Netherlands, on the Waal.
In January, 1592, the Duke of Parma was peremptorily
ordered by Philip to advance once more into France.
Maurice, thus free from all apprehension, again
took the field. After a siege of forty-four days, seCond
the town of Steenwyck fell (July 3), on the 26th, expedition
the fortress of Coeworden capitulated, and thus Further .
con-
the keys to the districts of Friesland, Groningen, quests of
and Drenthe were in his hands. Thus in two .
summers, Maurice had not only secured once more the control
of the Waal, but had driven the Spaniards from most of the
strongholds they had hitherto held in the northern provinces
of Guelderland, Overyssel, and Drenthe; Groningen alone
/emained, and this was to be reduced in the following year.
In the winter of 1592, Alexander, Duke of Parma, the only
man whose military genius Maurice had need to fear, passed
away. He had returned from his second French _
... . . _ _- . . Death of
expedition at the end of May, a dying man, Alexander
but even if he had been himself, the suspicions of Parma.
• Dec *\ 1^02
of Philip would have effectually paralysed his
efforts ; for that jealous King, persuaded by enemies of the
Duke that he had designs on the sovereignty of the Southern
Netherlands, had already appointed his successor, and had
intended to remove him by force if necessary. Never were
suspicions more unjust ; and Farnese, in obedience to his
master's orders, was preparing a third expedition into France,
when he was suddenly struck down at Arras (December 3).
Thus, at the age of forty-seven, passed away the first soldier
of his age, and one of the most devoted servants Philip ever
had. The only blot on his political career is to be found in
the unscrupulous character of his diplomacy. But even here,
he was at least faithful in his baseness ; if he deceived others,
it was in obedience to his master's orders, and the suspicion
with which Philip treated him in his later moments was as
cruel as it was unjust. The fourteen years of Parma's
382 European History \ 1494- 1598
governorship may be looked upon as the critical period in
Philip's reign ; they witnessed the final move in the political
game which the King of Spain was playing for the mastery of
Western Europe, and when Parma died the game was nearly
lost. Yet such success as Philip had, was largely due to
Alexander. Although the Duke had failed in the impossible
task of subduing the northern provinces, he had at least
secured the southern and western ones for Spain, and post-
poned the triumph of Henry of Navarre. Had Philip had
more such servants, he might have succeeded better.
On the death of Parma, the government had been pro-
visionally placed in the hands of Count Peter Ernest Mans-
Archduke feld, a veteran now in his dotage. The real
Ernest successor was to be the Archduke Ernest, brother
Governor. of the Emperor Rudolf. The Archduke was
Jan. 1594. Philip's nephew. He proposed to marry him
to the Infanta and to gain for him the crown of France
(cf. p. 435). Thus, Philip hoped that the Spanish Netherlands
might be united to France, and ruled by a submissive relation.
At least, Philip seemed determined that the new Governor-
general should not be a man to excite his fears. The Arch-
duke was thoroughly incapable, very indolent, very fat, fond
of drinking and of gambling; withal a melancholy man, a
victim to gout, and one who wept when complaints were
made to him. It was not until January, 1594, that the
Archduke arrived in Brussels. By that time his chances
of the French throne seemed remote, and his arrival
with no troops and no money, but 'with 670
Maurice gentlemen, pages, and cooks, and 534 horses to
Gertmyden- draw his coaches,' did not augur very well. A
*>erg' jealous scramble for places ensued; the proud
June 24, 1593 ; J *• r
and Spanish and Flemish nobles were insulted by his
Groningen, want of courtesy, and the soldiery mutinied for
July 23, 1594. c TT , ., A/T •
want of pay. Under these circumstances Maurice
was able to reduce the only two important places which
were held by the Spaniards in the northern provinces. On
The Revolt of the Netherlands 3S3
June 24, 1593, the successful siege of Gertruydenberg gave
him the command of the Meuse. On the 22 nd July of the
following year (1594), the taking of the town of Grdningen,
after sixty-five days' siege, practically secured that province.
After the death of the Archduke Ernest, which occurred
on February 20, 1595, the attention of Philip was once more
concentrated on France. In January, Henry iv.
had at last declared open war against Spain, and Archduke
the army of the Netherlands was required for ^r"est»
•.i_- t- l * v u u Feb. 20, 1595-
service against him Fuentes, therefore, who held succeeded
the post of Governor provisionally, and the Cardinal *[y J?*J
Archduke Albert, brother of Ernest, who was cardinal
appointed in January 1596, both took part in the Albert»
campaigns in the east of France (cf. p. 440), and
had but little time to give to the Netherlands. The Dutch,
free from immediate apprehension, were therefore enabled to
share in the brilliant English expedition to Cadiz, Dutch and
which ended in the destruction of a Spanish fleet English
and in the sack of the city (July 2, 1596). In "0 Cadiz?"
August, indeed, the Archduke Albert succeeded July» x596.
in wresting the town of Hulst from Maurice ; but in October,
Holland joined the League which Henry ivj and Elizabeth
had made against Spain in the previous August, Triple league
and on the 24th of the following January (1597), a&ainst
Maurice decisively defeated the Archduke at Aug.-oct.,
Turnhout near Gertruydenberg. This important x596.
victory was followed by a three months' campaign, from
August to October 1597, on the frontiers of the duchy of
Cleves — which was being used by the Spaniards successful
as a basis of operations against the disobedient campaign
,.11,, 1 . of Maurice.
provinces — a campaign in which, by the reduction jan..oct.,
of nine cities and five castles, Maurice materially *597-
strengthened his eastern frontier on the Rhine.
The Dutch had entered the League with France and
England in the hope that they might by such help finally
secure the recognition of their independence. But Henry
\
384 European History \ 1494- 1 598
was now weary of war, and had already opened those
negotiations which, in spite of the remonstrances of the
Dutch not Dutch, ended in the Peace of Vervins (May 2,
included in I59g} c£ p> 444). ^s the recognition of their
of vervins. independence was denied them, the Dutch declined
May a, 1598. j0 take part in the treaty. Nevertheless, the Peace
was accompanied by some change in the position of the
obedient provinces ; for as Henry would no longer brook the
Settlement presence of the Spanish King on his eastern
of govern- frontier, Philip consented to renounce his claim
obedient to them, as well as to Franche-Comte', on condi-
provinces. tion that the sovereignty should be conferred
on the Archduke Albert, who was to marry the Infanta Clara
Eugenia Isabella (May, 1598). It was, however, stipulated
that these provinces should fall again to Spain in the event of
there being no issue of the marriage; Philip had reason to
believe that the Archduke could have no children, and by
a secret treaty, his nephew acknowledged the suzerainty of
Spain, and promised to allow Spanish garrisons to hold the
cities of Antwerp, Ghent, and Cambray. A desultory war,
which did not materially affect the issue, continued between
the Spanish and disobedient provinces till 1609. A truce of
1609. Twelve twelve years then virtually recognised the inde-
years' truce, pendence of the United Netherlands — an inde-
pendence which was not, however, formally acknowledged till
the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.
The seven United Provinces which thus broke away from
Spain were Guelderland, Utrecht, Friesland, Overyssel, Gro-
ningen, Zealand, and Holland. These occupied
of the seven a stretch of country on the shores of the German
United Ocean, running from the duchy of East Fries-
land to the estuary of the Scheldt, both sides
of which they held. They thus completely commanded
the various mouths of the Rhine, as well as those of the
Meuse and the Scheldt. On the east and the south their
boundaries were East Friesland, the territories of the bishopric
The Revolt of the Netherlands 385
of Miinster, the duchy of Cleves, the bishopric of Liege, and
South Brabant. Of the United Provinces, the sea was at
once the enemy and the friend ; a large proportion of their
territory had been reclaimed from its embrace, and it was
only kept back by expensive dykes. Some of the water of
the Rhine had even to be conveyed to the sea in canals
above the level of the fields (poulders), yet so much below
the level of high tide that this had to be kept back by gates,
which opened and shut as it ebbed and flowed. Yet it was
this very sea which they had so often called to their assistance
against their human foes, and which gave them the trade
upon which their prosperity depended. The condition of
these provinces, compared with that of the obedient pro-
vinces, had undergone a marvellous change since
_° , ... . , Contrast in
the accession of Philip. At the commence- condition of
ment of his reign, Flanders and Brabant were the United
, , , ,. . . Netherlands
by far the most wealthy districts; Antwerp was andthe
one of the great entrepots for the trade of Spanish
, , . , , Netherlands.
Europe, and their other great towns were the
centres of busy industries ; while their contributions to the
royal exchequer equalled those of all the other provinces
together. At the close of the struggle these provinces were a
desert ; the wolves, we are told, roamed over the vacant fields ;
the looms were silent, and whole streets in the towns were
empty ; trade had shifted to the north, and Amsterdam had
usurped the place of Antwerp. Already the Dutch were
becoming the carriers of Europe, and taking the lead in
colonisation to the east. Yet the young State was threatened
by many dangers. The jealousy of England for
her trade was likely to prove formidable, and the tionai and
internal dangers were many. The government other
> . . , . - difficulties.
was a loose federation of provinces of very un-
equal size and wealth, and each province a federation of
municipal councils, which, with the exception of those in
Overyssel and Groningen, were filled up by co-optation, or by
election on a very narrow franchise. The authority of the
PERIOD IV. 2 B
386 European History, 1494- 1598
States-General, therefore, which was the legislative assembly
of the federation, and that of the States Council which formed
the Executive, was continually being disputed by the Provincial
Councils ; while the burgher aristocracy which ruled the towns
was disliked by the nobles in the country, and looked upon
with jealousy by the unenfranchised. The predominant
power of the province of Holland, which contributed more
than half of the annual budget, and the existence of the
Stattholder and Captain -general,1 who held the supreme
military and executive power, no doubt gave a practical unity
to the government. But there was ever a tendency on the
part of the Stadtholder to break away from the burgher
aristocracy, and to base a more extended sovereignty and a
more united kingdom on the support of the unprivileged
classes. Religious differences embittered these dissensions ;
the burghers generally supported the new Arminian views, the
Stadtholder those of the more extreme Calvinists ; and thus
there arose two parties whose quarrels were often in the
future to shake the federation to its base.
1 Maurice after 1590 was Stattholder and Captain-general of Holland,
Zealand, Guelderland, Utrecht, and Overyssel, but never Captain-generaJ
or Stattholder of the Union.
>
CHAPTER IX
THE REFORMATION AND THE CIVIL WARS IN FRANCE
§ i. The Rise of the Huguenots during
the Reign of Francis I.
Francis and the Reformers — Massacre of the Vaudois — Henry H. and the Re-
formers— Parties at Accession of Francis II. — Tumult of Amboise —
Accession of Charles IX. — States-General and Colloquy of Poissy —
Massacre of Vassy— First Civil War — Dreux — Assassination of Francis of
Guise — Pacification of Amboise — Second Civil War — St. Denis — Edict of
Longjumeau — Third Civil War — Jarnac and Moncontour — Peace of.S_t.
Germain — Massacre of St Bartholomew;— Fourth Civil War — Treaty of
La RocheUs — Change in Views of Huguenots — Fifth Civil War — Accession
of Henry in. — Peace of Monsieur — Guise and the Catholic Leagues —
Sixth and Seventh Civil Wars — Treaties of Bergerac and Fleix — France
and the Netherlands — The Catholic League — Treaty of Joinville — Eighth
Civil War — Courtras — The Barricades — Assassination of Henry of Guise
and Henry in. — Henry IV. and the League — Ninth Civil War— Arques
and Ivry — Henry 'receives instruction' and enters Paris — War with
Spain — Edict of Nantes — Peace of Vervins — Conclusion.
While France, in pursuit of her policy of opposition to the
House of Hapsburg, had been allying herself with the Pro-
testants of Germany, heresy had been growing Thefirst
apace within her own borders. Jacques Lefevre French
of Etaples may fairly claim the title of father of Reformer»-
French Protestantism. A lecturer on theology at Paris, he
had in a commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul (15 12) taught
the Doctrine of Justification by Faith five years before Luther
had denounced indulgences. In 1521, he had, under the
patronage of Briconnet, the Bishop, collected a small band
of men at Meaux in Champagne, of whom Farel of Dauphine"
* 887
388 European History, 1494- 1598
was the most important, and had also influenced Louis de
Berquin, the friend of Erasmus, who was a nobleman and a
courtier.
The rise of these new opinions had at once excited the
fears of the Sorbonne or theological faculty in the University
of Paris, and of the ' Parlement ! of Paris. But
Francis at p '
first inclined Francis had no love for either of these institu-
te toleration. tions> The « parlement' had opposed him in
the matter of the Concordat (cf. p. 81), the Sorbonne had
viewed with jealousy his new foundation, the * College de
France' (cf. p. 218). Moreover, he disliked the monks and
friars, while his sympathy with literature and culture, the
redeeming traits of his otherwise worthless character, as well
as the influence of his sister, Margaret of Navarre, led him
to tolerate the new opinions; indeed, he is said to have
entertained the idea of founding a literary and philosophic
institution in France with Erasmus at its head. Accordingly
in 1523, he saved de Berquin from the ' Parlement,' and had he
been victorious at Pavia he might have continued this policy
of toleration. His defeat and imprisonment, however, .altered
Persecution tne condition of the Protestants for the worse, for
begins in his mother, Louise of Savoy, took advantage of his
Francis.° absence to crush out heresy* Leclerc, a wool-
1525- carder of Meaux, was burnt, July, 1525 ; Bric,onnet
was ordered to disperse the brotherhood of Meaux (October
1525); and de Berquin was again arrested (January, 1526).
He was, indeed, once more saved from his enemies by Francis,
who, on his return to France, even appointed Lefevre tutor to
his children. But a change soon came over the policy of the
fickle King. His political necessities demanded an alliance
Francis w*tn tne P°Pe> wno was forming the Holy League
adopts a against the Emperor (cf. p. 184), and with the
persecution, clergy at home, who could supply him with money
1529. wherewith to continue the war. He had never
sympathised with the religious views of the reformers, but only
with the literary side of the movement \ while the iconoclastic
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 389
and other extravagances of some of the more hot-headed
reformers gave colour to the suggestion that the movement
had a political significance. De Berquin, although in no
vay responsible for these extravagances, refused to listen to
the timid caution of Erasmus 'not to disturb the hornets,'
and in consequence was seized again and executed (April,
15-9).
In 1534, an intemperate placard on the abuses of the Mass
not unnaturally increased the indignation of the King; in
1535, the outbreak of the Anabaptists in Miinster still further
frightened him ; and in January 1 545, convinced by the mis-
representations of the ' Parlement ' of Aix that the Vaudois of
Provence were attempting to set up a republic, he gave the
fatal order which, whether he intended it or no, __ r
JYicLSSaCrG 01
led to a massacre. More than twenty towns theVaudois.
and villages were destroyed, and some three I545#
thousand .Protestants in the valley of the Durance perished.
The reign of Francis closed in the following year with the
execution of the ' fourteen ' poor artisans at Meaux, the cradle
of French Protestantism.
§ 2. The Reign of Henry II, 1 547-1 559.
Meanwhile, the French Protestants had come under the
influence of Calvin. In 1535, he had dedicated his In-
stitutes to Francis 1., in the hope, it is said, of French Pro-
convincing the King that his doctrines were not testantism
dangerous, and from that moment the French Cai°inTstic
rapidly assimilated the teaching of their great and
countryman. French Protestantism now became aggressive*
dissociated from the literary movement with which it had
hitherto been connected, its churches were organised on
the democratic system of Geneva, and the movement soon
became for the first time political and aggressive. Under
these circumstances it is no wonder that persecution increased
after the death of Francis I., especially when we remember
tOO European tfistory, 1494-159$
that the young King (he was twenty-nine) had not the literary
sympathies of his father, and that the Constable de Mort-
morenci and the Guises, who had been out of favour durii g
the later years of Francis, were again recalled. Accordingly,
at the beginning of the reign of Henry 11., a specu.1
persecution chamber of the 'Parlement' was erected to try
under cases of heresy, which gained the name of 'La
Chambre Ardente,' from the number of victims
it sent to the flames. In 1551, the Edict of Chateaubnant
gave to the ecclesiastical courts jurisdiction in matters of heresy
without appeal to the 'Parlement,' and in 1557, an attempt
was made to introduce the Inquisition into France ; Paul iv.
published a Bull appointing a commission consisting of the
three cardinals of Lorraine, Bourbon, and Chatillon, vith the
power of delegating their authority.
In spite of these severe measures the number of converts
grew apace, and this was the chief motive which induced
Henry II. to conclude the treaty of Cateau Cambr£sis in April,
1559. Although there appears to be no foundation for the
assertion that the Kings of France and Spain bound them-
selves by a secret clause of that treaty to unite against the
heretics, yet negotiations to that effect certainly followed.
In June, Philip proposed to aid the French King in exter-
minating the Protestants ; and Henry, while declining the offer,
suggested a joint expedition against Geneva. The political
rivalry, however, of the two countries was too deep to per-
mit of joint action at present, and Henry pursued his course
alone. Here he met with unlooked-for opposi-
Opposition . , , . , _ . — ' , __." ^*^~ ;
of the tion on the part of the Parlement. Heresy in
•Parlement' France had hitherto been within the cognisance
of the civil courts, and the 'Parlement' had
therefore protested as well against the Edict of Chateaubriant
as against the Bull of Paul iv. On the latter point the King
had given way, but the other cause of dispute remained, and
was aggravated by the appearance of a moderate party in the
'Chambre de la Tournelle,' or criminal session of the
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 391
1 Parlement,' who declared that persecution was ineffective,
and that they would not punish heresy with death. The
King was most indignant, and was on the point of proceed-
ing against the leaders, Du Faur and Anne de Bourg, when,
at the tournament held to commemorate the Peace, the lance
of Montgomery laid him in the dust and transferred the crown
to his son, Francis 11., a youth of sixteen (July, 1559).
§3. The Reign of Francis II, July, 1559 — December, 1560
The Protestants, or Huguenots,1 as they began to be called,
were now too powerful to be put down by such persecution as
was possible. They numbered some 400,000, of condition of
whom the largest proportion were either burghers Huguenots
and tradesmen of some substance, or belonged sionof8"
to the smaller nobility, a military class who were Francis 11.
only too ready to appeal to arms. Nor were they destitute
of leaders from the higher nobility and from those of influ-
ence at court, notably Conde* and Coligny. And yet, had a
strong and popular King succeeded, or had there existed in
France a well-knit and healthy constitution, some compromise
might have been effected, or, failing that, the new opinions
might have been at once suppressed by a vigorous use of
force. But France was suffering: from the evil ->.
0 Disorganised
results of the prolonged foreign war, and from condition
the misguided policy of her Kings since Louis ofFrance«
xi. The financial distress, the heavy and unequal taxation,
which fell almost exclusively on the lower classes, caused
widespread discontent against the government. The bureau-
cracy and the judicature, largely owing to the system of
purchase, were hopelessly corrupt, and had lost respect.
The Church, though exceedingly wealthy (its revenues
amounted to two-fifths of the total revenue of the country),
was suffering from the effects of the Concordat ; its benefices
1 Probably a corruption of the German word ' Eidgenossen ' (con-
federates), first applied to the Protestant party in Geneva.
302 European History, 1494-1598
were monopolised by the nobility and the courtiers, and
absorbed in a few hands ; thus John, the Cardinal of
Lorraine, held three archbishoprics, seven bishoprics, and
four abbeys. Its leaders were for the most part men of
secular interests, swayed *by the factions of the court, and
caring little for the spiritual needs of their dioceses. The
States-General had been rarely called of late, and had lost all
constitutional life. The towns, with no real share in the
government of the country, were inclined to stand apart,
and depend upon themselves. The greater nobility aimed
either at controlling the crown, or, failing that, at establish-
ing themselves as hereditary governors of their provinces.
The smaller nobility, excluded from trade and from all pro-
fessions except those of the army and the Church, now that
the war was over, either crowded into the Church, to secularise
it more completely, or formed a turbulent military class
who welcomed the chance of renewed war. France, in short,
nominally under the control of a closely centralised mon-
archy, was suffering from that worst form of anarchy which
comes of a bureaucracy when it has become disorganised. To
complete the misfortunes of France, the House of Valois was
represented by four boys of no character, intellect, or physique,
who were the victims of court intrigue and factions, which
were to make the crown still more unpopular, and soon to
hurry the country into civil war.
The three most influential parties among the nobles were
led by the Bourbons, the Constable Anne de Montmorenci,
The and the Guises. Of these the Bourbons stood
Bourbons. nearest the throne. The eldest, Antony of
Bourbon, was King of Navarre, in right of his wife Jeanne of
Navarre, the daughter of Margaret, the tolerant sister of
Francis 1. But, although he adopted the Calvinistic views
of his wife, and was popular and a good soldier, his weak-
nesses and irresolution unfitted him for the leadership, which
fell to his youngest brother Louis de Cond£, who also leaned
to the new opinions, and was a man of far more character.
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in Prance 393
The second brother Charles, Cardinal of Bourbon, remained a
Catholic, dissociated himself from the policy of his family, and
subsequently strove for a brief season to be called Charles x. of
France. Closely connected with the Bourbons stood the two
nephews of the Constable — Gaspard de Coligny, Admiral
of France, and D'Andelot, Colonel-General of the infantry,
both strenuous Huguenots. The eldest Odet, Cardinal of
Chatillon, although sympathising with the reformers, was
never of much weight.
The Constable Anne de Montmorenci, who headed the
second party, was a devoted Catholic, and a stern soldier,
whose severity and devotions in time of war had _. „
The Con-
led men to say, c Beware of the Constable s Pater stable Anne
Nosters.' His policy had ever been that of de Mon*-
. . morenci.
alliance with Spain and suppression of heresy —
a policy which had lately triumphed in the Peace of Cateau
Cambr£sis. Yet his jealousy of the Guises and of the queen-
mother caused him for the present to join the party of the
Bourbons.
Lastly came the Guises. This family, the cadet branch
of the House of Lorraine, was founded by Claude, second
son of R£ne. of Lorraine, the grandson of Rene' The
le Bon, of Anjou, through nis daughter Iolante. Guises.
Claude had earned a reputation by his defence of the
eastern frontier after the defeat of Pavia, 1525, and had
married his daughter Mary to James v. of Scotland. In
reward for his services, Francis 1. had erected Guise, Aumale,
and Mayenne into duchies which Claude left on his death
(1550) to two of his sons, Francis, Duke of Guise, and Claude,
Duke of Aumale ; while two others, Charles and Louis, entered
the Church to become the Cardinals of Lorraine and Guise.
Duke Francis had surpassed his father's fame by his defence
of Metz (155 2- 1553), and by the taking of Calais (1558).
Ostentatious and open-handed, he courted popularity, and
what he lacked in statesmanship was supplied by his younger
brother Charles, the "ardinal, who, in spite of his avarice
394 European History, 1494-1598
and his arrogance, was scrupulous in the outward observ-
ance of his clerical duties, a master of diplomacy, and an
accomplished scholar of persuasive speech. Although we
must wait till the next generation for the full development
of the schemes of this ambitious family — schemes which no
doubt expanded as the opportunities presented themselves —
yet the foundations were already laid by these two remarkable
men. The key to the policy of the Guises is to be found in
the fact that they were only half Frenchmen, and that they
were only remotely connected with the royal family. Looked
upon as upstarts by the older nobility, and afraid of being
excluded from power by the Bourbons, they asserted their
descent from the House of Anjou, and even from the
Karolings. The family of Anjou, if still existing in the
male line, would have been nearer to the throne than the
Bourbons themselves. But the male line had died out
with Charles of Maine (1481), and accordingly the Guises
pressed the claims of the female line, through which they
could trace their descent from Rene* of Anjou. Their half-
foreign exti action presented greater difficulties. These they
had no doubt in part removed by their military exploits in
defending France. Now that the war was over, they naturall)
adopted the cause of Catholicism, which gave them a certain
popularity among the lower classes, more especially of Paris,
which city remained intensely Catholic throughout. Their
foreign policy, although Catholic, was not Spanish at this
date, for they dreamt of supporting the claim of Mary, Queen
of Scots, wife of Francis 11., to the throne of England, and of
uniting the three countries into a strong monarchy which
might balance the Austro-Spanish power.
Amid these conflicting factions, belonging to none of them,
yet anxious to control them all, stood Catherine de Medici,
Catherine tne Queen-mother. ' What,' said Henry iv. of
de Medici. her subsequently, c could a poor woman have
done, with her husband dead, five small children upon her
hands, and two families who were scheming to seize the throne
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 395
— our own and the Guises ? I am astonished that she did not
do even worse.' The clew to the policy of this much-abused
woman lies in her foreign extraction and her previous life. A
Florentine and a Medici, she was unpopular in France, while
she failed to secure the love of her husband, Henry II., and
saw her influence eclipsed by Diana of Poictiers, his mistress.
This exclusion from all influence working on a jealous nature,
had bred an intense passion to rule. Had direct rule now
been possible for her, Catherine might have done well enough ;
for though devoid of moral elevation, she was not vicious.
She was very industrious and painstaking, and anxious to
please. She wished to maintain the independence of the
country against the designs of Spain, as well as the authority
of the crown which was threatened by the internal factions ;
if Or Catholic, she was certainly no bigot, and would probably
have granted at least a contemptuous toleration to the
Huguenots. But when power was denied her, and her
position was threatened, like a true Medici she betook herself
to intrigue — so often the resource of the weak — and pursued
a policy of balance which was all the more fatal because it
did not succeed.
As Francis was over thirteen, it was not necessary to have
a regency. None the less, it would have been natural that
Antony of Navarre, as the nearest male relation of The Guises
full age, should be called to power. Thit was, in power,
however, prevented by the Guises. Uncles of the Queen,
they succeeded in obtaining complete control of the young
King ; and Catherine, seeing that they were too strong to be
opposed, jealous of Navarre, and disliking Montmorenci on
account of his insolent behaviour to her during her husband's
life, threw herself on thej^support. Montmorenci was dismissed,
and retired to his estates at Chantilly ; Coligny was deprived
of his governorship of Picardy, nearly all the governors on
whom the Guises could not depend were removed, and while
the Duke controlled the army, the Cardinal of Lorraine
became the head of the civil administration. Having thus
$$6 European History -, 1494- 1 5 98
monopolised the government of the kingdom, the Guises
resumed the procedure against the refractory members of the
c Parlement/ which had been stayed by the death of Henry 11.
Anne de Bourg, condemned by a special commission, was
executed in spite of his appeal against the legality of the
court, and the others were suspended or imprisoned.
But the triumph of the Guises was not to go unchallenged,
I and a formidable opposition was aroused in which their
» political and religious opponents joined hands. The nobility
were indignant at being deprived of their governorships, and
asserted the right of the princes of the blood against these
upstart foreigners. The heavy taxation and the poor success
of the war in Scotland, where Mary of Guise, assisted by her
brothers, was carrying on an unequal struggle against the
' Lords of the Congregation,' added to the grievances. Those
who wished to revive the authority of the States-General seized
the opportunity to attack the despotic government of the
Guises, and the religious discontent served as a rallying-point.
In the spring of 1560, De la Renaudie, a noble of Perigord,
formed a plot to remove the King, who was at Amboise, from
_. _ .„ the hands of the Guises, and to place the Prince
The Tumult ' r
of Amboise. of Conde* at the head of the government. The
March 17, 1560. plot) however) was betrayed. De la Renaudie
was killed in a skirmish, and the other conspirators cruelly
punished, some being hung from the balcony of the castle.
Although the * Tumult of Amboise' was by no means
exclusively confined to the Protestants, it marks the moment
when they finally became a political and aggressive party, and
when they were joined by the smaller nobility of the provinces ;
while it furnished the government with a pretext for declaring
that the interests of the monarchy and of the Catholic Church
were identical. For the moment the Guises pretended some-
what to change their policy. On first hearing of the plot,
they had issued an Edict in the King's name promising forgive-
ness for all past deeds ; and, although the Edict of Roromantin,
which followed in May, 1560, gave exclusive jurisdiction
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 397
over matters of conscience to the ecclesiastical courts, it urged
the desirability of proceeding gently in the matter. The
Guises even listened to demands of Coligny, which were
supported by Catherine and Michel L'Hopital, who had just y
been made chancellor, to summon a States-General, and a
Council of the French prelates for the discussion of grievances,
political and religious. To these proposals, however, they had
consented in the belief that they could postpone the ecclesi-
astical Council under pretext that the Council of Trent was
shortly to be reopened, and that they could secure a sub-
servient majority in the Estates-General by influencing the
elections, and by excluding and imprisoning those who would
not subscribe to the articles of the Catholic faith.
The death of Mary, the Regent of Scotland (June 10, 1560),
and the Treaty of Leith (July 6), by which the French were to
evacuate Scotland, and King Francis and his wife, Mary Stuart,
were to abandon their claims to the throne of England, had
removed the apprehensions of Philip. He therefore offered to
help the Guises in securing their power. The Pope and the
Duke of Savoy were to send troops to exterminate the Vaudois
and to attack Geneva, while Philip was to invade Navarre.
Conde" and the King of Navarre having rashly answered a
summons to Orleans, where the court had assembled for the
meeting of the States-General, were seized; an Thetrium h
unsuccessful attempt was made to assassinate of the Guises
Navarre ; and Conde, tried before a special com- JJ^deathof
mission for complicity in the late conspiracy, was Francis 11..
condemned to die. The triumph of the Guises Dec- 5' X56a
seemed secured, when it was snatched from them bv the
sudden death of the young King from a disease in the ear
(December 5, 1560).
§ 4. Charles IX. , December 1560 — May 1574.
The Guises, baulked of their prey, went at first in such fear
of their lives that they shut themselves up in their palace,
398 European History, 1494- 1598
and Catherine at last seemed to have her opportunity. As
Charles ix. was only ten, a regency was necessary, and, beyond
all dispute, the office should have been held by
rules in the Antony of Navarre. But he agreed to surrender
name of his right to the Queen-mother, reserving for
himself only the office of Lieutenant-general.
Catherine was delighted. * He is so obedient,' she wrote to
her daughter the Queen of Spain, ' that I dispose of him as I
please.' She now hoped to act the part of mediator between
the two religious parties, and, by playing off the Guises
against the Bourbons, to rule. Her first difficulty was with
regard to the States-General. Summoned on December 15,
1560, to Orleans, they were prorogued till the following
August, when they met again at Pontoise.
This, the first meeting of the States-General for seventy-seven
years, is noticeable as illustrating the political ideas of the
The states- Huguenots, who found themselves in a majority,
General. and for the remarkable reforms proposed, which,
August 1561. .^ carrjecj outj might have saved France from
civil war, and altered her future history. The nobles, while
insisting on their privileges, urged the reformation of the
judicial system, and the substitution of an elective magistracy
for one which, through the system of purchase, was rapidly
becoming hereditary; they denounced the chicanery of the
ecclesiastical courts and the abuses of pluralities and non-
residence; they petitioned that nobles who preferred the
Calvinistic worship should be allowed to use the churches for
their services.
The demands of the Tiers £tat went further. They asked
that the Prerogative should be limited by triennial meetings of
the Estates, and by the appointment of a Council from which
the clergy should be excluded. They petitioned for the sale
of church lands. From the interest of the capital thus
obtained, the clergy were to be paid fixed stipends, and the
balance was to be spent on paying the debts of the crown,
and in loans to the principal cities for the furtherance of their
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 399
commerce. They demanded that persecution should cease,
since ■ it is unreasonable to compel men to do what in their
hearts they consider wrong, and that a national Council, in
/which the laity as well as the clergy should have votes, and
in which the Word of God should be the sole guide, should be
summoned for the final settlement of religious questions.
j This would have meant the establishment of the Reformed
opinions in France, and for this Catherine was certainly not
prepared, for the Huguenots after all only represented some
one-thirtieth of the nation.
Nor did the results of the ■ Colloquy of Poissy,' which was
held near by at the same time, offer better hopes that compre-
hension would be possible. At this conference The colloquy
eleven ministers — among whom were Theodore of Poissy.
Beza, the disciple of Calvin, and Peter Martyr the Italian
— and twenty-two laymen appeared. But as might be ex-
pected, the attempt served rather to accentuate the differences
between the two creeds. The only practical result of the
Colloquy was that the bishops, to meet the demands of the
third estate with regard to Church property, pledged them-
selves to pay by instalments the sum needed for the re-
demption of those crown lands which had been alienated
to satisfy the public creditors.
Comprehension was plainly impossible. It remained to be
seen whether toleration was practicable. This was attempted
by the TEdirfr nf JqriflaFYi J562, which, while it in- The Edict
sisted on the Huguenots surrendering the churches of Jan- I56a-
which they had occupied, allowed them, until the decision of
a General Council, to assemble for worship in any place-
outside walled towns. Thus the policy of L'Hopital seemed
to have triumphed. The Huguenots were given a legal
recognition, and ceased to be outlaws,. But the appearances
were delusive, and the Edict of January really only precipi-
tated civil war. L'Hopital himself had confessed, at the
opening of the States-General, that 'It was folly to hope
for peace between persons of different religions. A French-
400 European History, 1494- 1598
man and an Englishman,' he said, 'who are of the same
religion have more affection for one another than citizens of
the same city, or vassals of -the same lord, who hold to
different creeds.' Nor was this all. Religious differences
were in many cases embittered by personal rivalry, by selfish
interests, and by political prejudices, and all these had been
intensified by the demands of the third estate. If grarted,
the demands would have revolutionised the constitution of the
country, and they could only have been successful if backed up
by the nation. But the third estate, nominated for the most
part by the municipal oligarchies, represented neither the views
of the peasants in the country districts nor those of the lower
classes in the towns, who were mostly Catholics. Those whose
interests and prejudices they assailed formed the great majority
of the nation, and these henceforth learnt to look upon the
Huguenots as their deadly enemies. The higher nobility
were frightened at the demand for resumption of the crown
lands, many of which were in their hands ; the Church
resented the cry for disendowment ; the lawyers were in-
dignant at the attack on their privileges, and were as jealous
as ever of the claims of the States-General to rule the
country. It is, in fact, from this time that we must-date-
the uncompromising hostility to the Reformers of these three _
powerful bodies — the nobility, the clergy, and the lawyers— r
many of whom hitherto had not been unwilling to show some
favour to the Huguenots. The only chance of the Huguenots
now depended on the maintenance of peace. Although
they had not gained all that they desired, and although the
Edict was only to be provisional, their adherents were increas-
ing so fast that in a short time they might hope to be able to
I command respect. One archbishop — that of Aix — and six
I bishops, besides the Cardinal of Chatillon, were said to favour
the new opinions. Throgmorton informed the Queen of
I England that even Charles ix. himself was wavering. Catherine
did not object to her ladies reading the New Testament and
singing the psalms of the Huguenot Marot, and certainly she
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 40 1
would not have hesitated to continue her policy of toleration
if she could thereby have secured her authority. Un-
fortunately the administration was not powerful enough to
enforce the law, and the religious and political animosities
were too deep. The leaders of the Huguenots could not
entirely control the more hot-headed spirits, and iconoclastic
outrages occurred, more especially in the south ; while the
Catholics were determined to overthrow the Edict as soon as
possible.
Already in April, 156 1, Montmorenci had been reconciled to
the Guises. They now succeeded in gaining over the unstable
King of Navarre by offering him the island of Sardinia and a
kingdom in Africa, or possibly a divorce from his Protestant
wife, Jeanne d'Albret, and the hand of Mary, Queen of Scots,
with the crown of Scotland, and some day that of England.
In the south, massacres and outrages occurred ; and finally, on
Sunday, March i, the Duke of Guise coming The massacre
across some Huguenots who were worshipping ofVassy. >
in a barn at Vassy, in Champagne, ordered his_ arc l* I5 2'
followers to disperse the meeting as being contrary to the lavj.
The Huguenots, though unarmed, probably made some resist;
ance, and the affair ended in the massacre of some fifty or,
sixty men and women, while two hundred more were seriously
^wojinded. As the town of Vassy was apparently not a
'walled' one, the Huguenots were probably within then
rights. In any case, the Duke had no authority to take the
execution of the law into his own hands. It may be true
that he had not intended his followers to proceed to such
extremities, but at least he never denounced or punished
the perpetrators. For the rest, the massacre of Vassy was
not the only one that had occurred since the Edict, and it
is important only because it was committed with the acquies-
cence of one of the great party leaders, and because in
thus transferring the quarrel from the country to the court,
it rendered war inevitable. The question was, Who should
secure the person of the King? The Duke advancing
period iv. 2 c
462 European History, 1494- 1 598
rapidly, entered Paris (March 16) in spite of the order of
Catherine to the contrary. On her retiring with the young
Duke of King to Fontainebleau he followed her ; and the
Guise enters Queen-mother, seeing no other alternative, con-
March 16; sented to return to Paris (April 6), Charles ix.
and secures crying ' as if they were taking him to prison.'
of the king. Catherine, after attempting to support the weaker
Apni 6. party, had ended, as was her wont, in siding with
the stronger.
Meanwhile, Conde* had retreated from Paris (March 23)
to Orleans. Being joined there by Coligny and d'Andelot
Conde's ne published a manifesto in which he justified his
Manifesto. appeal to arms, and declared that he did so to
free the King from unlawful detention by the
'Triumvirate' — Guise, Montmorenci, and the Marshal St.
Andre\ Thus, if the Catholics were the first to break the
peace at Vassy, the Huguenots were the first to appeal to
arms. Many have blamed them for want of patience, and
held that, if they had refrained from raising the standard of
rebellion, they would in time have gained toleration. Calvin
had always been opposed to war, and Coligny only consented
after much hesitation, overborne, it is said, by the entreaties
of his wife. But it is extremely doubtful whether they could
thus have disarmed persecution; the Catholic party were
determined to crush out heresy ; and, as it was, the victims of
1562 exceeded those of the massacre of St. Bartholomew.
A more serious charge is that the Huguenots, under the
garb of religion, were pursuing political objects; but this
assertion may be brought with equal truth against all parties
in the religious struggles of the century. In France, as else-
where, the religious disaffection furnished a rallying-point for,
and a creed to, all the smouldering discontent in the country.
With some the religious, with others the political, and even the
personal element was strongest. 'The grandees,' says a Venetian
observer, ' adopted reform for ambition, the middle classes for
Church property, the lower classes for Paradise.' Moreover,
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 403
the accusation would be equally true of the Catholics. If
Conde* was fighting for the control of the government, he
had a juster claim thereto than the half-foreign Guises. The
political aims of the Huguenots, as represented at Orleans,
were more worthy of support than the absolutist opinions of
the Guises. If the Huguenots may be charged with reviving
feudalism at one moment, and of being republicans at another,
the Guises at first fought for political as well as religious
tyranny, and latterly masqueraded as the champions of pure
democracy. Finally, the cause of the Huguenots, although
that of a minority — and, it must be confessed, an unpopular
minority — was yet the cause of national independence, which
was threatened by the ever-tightening alliance of the Guises
with Philip of Spain. Nor must it be supposed that there
was nothing deeper on either side; indeed, it was the
presence of religious convictions which gave to the struggle
at once its earnestness and its ferocity.
The geographical distribution of the two parties does not
bear out the idea that there is a natural affinity between
Protestantism and the Teutonic races, and between The geo,
the Celtic and Romance nations and Catholicism, graphical
It is true that the lower classes in Celtic Brittany attribution
were strongly Catholic, but so was the north-east of the two
of France, in which the Teutonic element was par ies*
strong, while the Huguenots found their chief support in the
south-west, which was Romance. The main stronghold of the
Huguenots may be described as a square enclosed between
the Loire, the Saone, and the Rhone on the north and east ; the
Mediterranean, the Pyrenees, and the Bay of Biscay on the
south and west ; while Dauphine and Normandy were their out-
posts. Yet even here it was only in Eastern Languedoc and in
Dauphine*, and later, at La Rochelle, that they solidly held their
own, or that they were supported by the majority of the
population, both noble and non-noble. Elsewhere, in those
provinces where the nobles inclined to Protestantism, the
peasants generally remained Catholic. While the Huguenots
404 European History \ 1494- 1598
had, with the exception of Conde* and his relations, few ad
herents among the grandees, they found their main support in
the smaller nobility and in the trading classes bf the towns.
Of these, the nobility formed, at their own charges, a most
admirable light cavalry, and, in spite of the inferiority of
their arms, proved in many a battle that they were more than
a match for mail-clad men-at-arms. Unfortunately their
poverty, their dislike of discipline, and their local interests
rendered them unfit for a long campaign, and this accounts
for the fact that their victories often led to such poor results.
On the side of the Catholics were ranged the mass of
the greater nobles, the Church, and the official classes of
the magistracy and bureaucracy, the peasants of the rural
districts, except in the Cevennes and Dauphine, and the lower
classes in the towns, more especially of Paris, and later, of
Orleans and Rouen. The intense Catholicism of these and
other towns is to be explained by the influence of the religious
houses, and in Paris of the University which, with its sixty-five
colleges, formed almost a town of itself, and, together with the
monasteries, owned a large part of the city and its suburbs.
The moral strength of Catholicism depended on the conserva-
tive instincts of the people and on their religious traditions,
which were so closely intertwined with the business and
pleasures of life, and which were shocked by the iconoclasm
of the Huguenots ; while the feudal, separatist, and republican
tendencies of the Huguenots at once prevented harmony
among themselves, and opened them to the charge of being
enemies to unity and centralisation — always dear to the French
mind. The Catholics had also tEe possession of the King's
person and of the financial resources of the government_and
the Church, and were assisted by the subsidies of Philip n.
Finally, the Catholics were able to recruit their troops by
mercenaries not only from the Catholic states of Germany^
but also from the Lutherans, who gave but scant support to
their Calvinistic brethren. That under these circumstances,
coupled with the fact that they never numbered more than
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 405
one-tenth of the population, the Huguenots maintained the
struggle so long as they did must be, in the main, attributed
to the zeal and devotion of many — notably of the ministers —
to the stubbornness of the bourgeoisie, the superiority of their
cavalry, and the ability of their leaders, especially of Condd
and of Coligny.
The war began in August by the taking of Poictiers by
St. Andre', and the surrender of Bourges, which gave the centre
of France, up to the gates of Orleans, to the
Catholics. In September, the Huguenots secured war.
the alliance of Elizabeth of England, who feared Aue« 1562-
t i • * 'm \* r% • • '1 1 March 1563.
lest the triumph of the Guises might mean that
the whole of the resources of France would be used to place
Mary Queen of Scots on the English throne. Yet with her
usual caution, Elizabeth demanded the cession of Dieppe and
Havre as the price of her assistance. The indignation, how-
ever, caused by the cession of these towns was scarcely
balanced by the niggardly help which the Queen vouchsafed
to the Protestants ; and on the 28th of October,
the Catholics gained a brilliant success by the by the
capture of Rouen, the capital of Normandy, which catholics,
henceforth became * one of the eyes of the
Catholics.' The loss of the town was, however, sufficiently
compensated for by the death of the fickle Antony of Navarre
of a wound received at the siege, for thereby the headship of
his house devolved on Cond£, and on his own son the future
Henry iv., a boy of ten years old. In December, the attempt
of Cond£ to neutralise the effect of the loss of Rouen by an
attack on Normandy led to the battle of Dreux, Battle of
on the Eure, which was really a victory for the Dreux.
Catholics. The losses on their side were indeed Dec* X9, 156a*
the heavier; the Marshal St. Andr£ was slain, and the Constable
Montmorenci taken prisoner. Nevertheless, Cond£ himself fell
into the* enemy's hands, and Coligny was forced to retire on
Orleans. In February of the following year, Coligny again
returned and took several towns of importance in Normandy.
406 European History \ 1494-1598
But the Duke of Guise had taken advantage of his absence
to besiege Orleans (February 5), and the city seemed doomed,
Assassination when the Duke was assassinated by a fanatic
of Francis, named Poltrot, who believed that it was the
Duke of
Guise. will of God that he should rid the world of
Feb. 18, 1563. < the butcher of Vassy.'
The death of the leader of the Catholics revived the hopes
of Catherine that she might succeed in keeping the balance
._ . between the two parties. Accordingly, on March
ofAmboise. 12, the Pacification of Amboise was signed. By
March ia, 1563. ^^ ireSLtyt Conde and Montmorenci were ex-
changed ; nobles were permitted to hold Protestant services in
their houses ; in each sen'echauss'ce? one city was to be granted,
in the suburbs of which the Huguenots might worship ; and
in every town where the Protestant service had been held in
the preceding March one or two places were to be designated
by the King, where it might be continued inside the walls.
From these provisions, however, Paris was to be excepted.
The treaty was followed by a united attack on Havre, from
which the English were driven on the 25th of July,
and Elizabeth was forced to surrender her claim to the
restitution of Calais. Coligny was opposed to the treaty. It
did not, in his opinion, give sufficient security to the Pro-
testants ; but Condd, who was as rash in making peace as he
had been in declaring war, had fallen under the fatal influence
of Mdlle. de Limeuil, one of the ladies of Catherine's suite, and
was deluded with the promise that he would be appointed
Lieutenant-general, and could then watch over the interests
of his party. In this he was disappointed ; for Catherine, to
escape from her promise, had Charles, who was now thirteen
declared of age ; and although she herself was anxious to
prevent any further hostilities, such was not the wish of the
Pope, of the Guises, or of Philip.
At a conference held at Bayonne in June, 1565* Alva, in
his master's name, urged the Queen-mother to dismiss the
1 Cf. Appendix I. for meaning of this.
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 407
chancellor L'Hopital, to 'show herself a good Catholic,' and
to proceed to stringent measures against the Huguenots.
Very possibly she might have complied if Philip had consented
to further her dynastic aims by giving the hand of Don Carlos
to her second daughter, and that of his sister, the widowed
Queen of Portugal, to her favourite son, Henry of Anjou;
Philip, however, rejected the proposal, and Catherine refused
to follow his advice. Nevertheless, the alarm of the Protestants
was natural ; it was rumoured that a League had been made
and a massacre of the Protestants decided upon, and finally,
the levying of some Swiss Catholic troops, osten-
sibly to watch the march of Alva from Piedmont spiracy of
to the Netherlands (cf. p. 332), led to the con- Meaux- and
spiracy of Meaux in September, 1567. The civiiwar.
Protestant leaders proposed to seize the person. SePt I567-
-,-... . . , ' P ~ March 1568.
of the King? to insist on the removal of the_
Cardinal of Lorraine, and to demand that unrestricted liberty
of conscience should be conceded. The court, warned at the
last moment of its danger, escaped with difficulty to Paris,
escorted by the Swiss troops ; and the Cardinal, after a hair-
breadth escape, fled to Rheims. Conde* then advanced on
St. Denis, where he was attacked by the Constable The battle f
with an overwhelming force (November 10, 1567). st. Denis.
But the Huguenots fought so stubbornly, and the Nov> I0' I5&7-
Parisian levies so badly, that the battle was indecisive. On
the Huguenot side, more men of note fell, yet on the Catholic
side, the Constable Montmorenci was mortally wounded. The
death of Montmorenci for the moment strengthened the
hands of Catherine and the influence of L'Hopital. Accord-
ingly, in March, 1568, the Edict of Longjumeau Thc Edict f
confirmed the Treaty of Amhoise, which was to Longjumeau.
last 'till by God's grace all the king's subjects M*Tchl&-
should be reunited in the profession of one religion.'
Catherine hoped that the Catholic party would be weakened
by the death of Montmorenci. She kept the office of
Constable want, and conferred on the Duke of Anjou, the
408 European History \ 1494- 1598
brother of the King, the less ambitious title of Lieutenant-
general. But her hopes of thus maintaining peace were not
to be realised. The 'Parlements' throughout France had
opposed the Edict of Longjumeau, and that of Toulouse went
so far as to execute the King's messenger on the charge of
heresy. The Huguenots, not unnaturally, refused to sur-
render all the cities, as they had promised in the treaty. The
Cardinal of Lorraine returned, and, in August, 1568, a plot
was formed to seize Cond6 and the Chatillons, who only
succeeded in effecting their escape to La Rochelle owing to
a sudden flood in the Loire. L'Hopital, in despair, retired ;
and Catherine was once more forced to adopt the policy of
the Guises. The Edicts of Toleration were
civil war. revoked, and the 'Patched-up Peace/ as it was
Sept. 1568- called, was at an end. In this, the third Civil
All or X*C*70.
War, Orleans, which had been surrendered at the
last truce, became one of the Catholic outposts; while La
Rochelle, which only declared for the Huguenots in February
1568, was the chief Protestant stronghold. No serious battle,
however, occurred till the spring of the year 1569. Then
the Duke of Anjou, a young man of eighteen
jamac years, won the battle of Jarnac on the Charente
March 13, (March 13th), in which Conde* was slain after he
1 had surrendered. The death of Conde* was looked
upon as a serious blow to the Huguenot cause. But it is
doubtful whether they lost much, for, although Conde' was
popular, and did not, like his brother, sacrifice his religious
convictions to his personal interest, he was an ambitious man,
and his aims had been chiefly political. His moral character
was, moreover, weak ; and, though a brave soldier, he was not
a general of the first order, while as a statesman his conduct
often verged on foolhardiness.
The expectation of the Catholics that the victory of Jarnac
would put an end to the war was not fulfilled. The battle
was not much more than a cavalry skirmish. The death
of Conde left Coligny in supreme command, and served,
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 409
as a contemporary says, ' to reveal in all its splendour the
merits of the admiral,' who was in every way, except as a
diplomatist, the superior of his predecessor. Even the loss of
d'Andelot, who at this juncture died of fever, did not prevent
the Huguenots from meeting at first with considerable success.
In May, 1569, Wolfgang, Duke of Zweibriicken(Deux Ponts),
entered France at the head of 'reiters' from lower, and of
'landsknechts' from upper Germany, and a force
of French and Flemish troops under William of the Duke
of Orange and Louis of Nassau. Forcing their of Zwei-
way to the Loire they seized La Charity, a place wuiiam of
of considerable importance as commanding the orange,
passage of the river from Burgundy and Cham- ay
pagne, and, although Wolfgang himself died of fever during
the campaign, his troops effected a union with Coligny near
Limoges (June 12). Unfortunately, instead of attacking
Saumur, which commanded the road to Anjou and Brittany,
they turned south against Poictiers. The city was bravely held
by Henry, Duke of Guise, the young son of Francis, who here
first displayed his military genius ; and, after seven weeks,
Coligny was forced to abandon the siege by the advance of
the Duke of Anjou. Coligny was anxious to avoid a battle,
for William of Orange had departed to raise fresh troops in
Germany ; his losses before Poictiers had been considerable ;
and, as usual, he had found it difficult to keep his forces long
in the field. But the Germans demanded pay, which he could
not give, or to be led against the enemy ; and Coligny, forced
to accept the challenge of Anjou with far inferior f
forces, suffered a serious defeat at Moncontour Moncontour.
(October 3), where he was severely wounded. °ct-3»I569-
Had Anjou at once pursued, the Huguenots might have been
completely crushed ; fortunately, whether owing to the jealousy
of the Guises at this success of Anjou or no, it was decided
first to reduce Saint Jean d'Angely. The city fell, indeed,
after seven weeks' siege, but 'as the siege of Poictiers was the
beginning o** the mishaps of the Huguenots, so that of Saint
4io European History, 1494- 1598
Jean d'Angely was the means of wasting the good fortune
of the Catholics.' La Rochelle still held out ; the winter
came on ; the Duke of Anjou resigned his command, while
his successor, the Duke of Montpensier, retired to Angers.
Meanwhile in October, Coligny, now recovered of his
wounds, had started on a brilliant expedition. He crossed
the south of France, his army growing like a
of Coligny! snowball, and reached the Rhone ; thence, hugging
Oct. 1569- the right bank of the Saone, he marched north-
wards to Arnay Le Due, where an indecisive
engagement with Marshal de Cosse' (June 25), caused him
to retreat to La Charitd, and thence to his own castle at
Chitillon-sur-Loire. Coligny had not, indeed, succeeded
in carrying out his plan of uniting with William of Orange,
who was collecting a force on the German frontier, and of
forcing his way to Paris, but the campaign showed conclu-
sively that the Huguenots were not yet crushed.
Philip 11. would send to the Catholics nothing but promises ;
Queen Elizabeth, unwilling to see the Huguenots completely
routed, was considering the question of aiding them ; Charles
was jealous of the military success of his brother Anjou ;
and Catherine was not sorry to listen to the advice of Francis
of Montmorenci, eldest son of the old Constable, to come
to terms once more.
By the Peace of St. Germain (August 8. 157°), whirh biased
the third Civil War, the Huguenots r»ot only regained all that
they had obtained by the Edict of LongjumeaUj
st. Germain, but were allowed to celebrate their services in
Aug. 8, 1570. two cities of each of the twelve provinces _gf
France, and received as securities four cities which they were
_to hold for two years — La Rochelle, Montauban, Cognac,
and La Charite\ They were also to be j-estored to all their
property, honours, and ^offices, and were given the right of
^challenging a certain number of the judges in the 'Parle-
ments,' and a right of appeal from that of Toulouse, which
bad been the most violent. Thus the Huguenots had atJasL
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 411
obtained liberty of conscience, and terms with regard to the
holding of services, which, if not completely satisfactory, were
perhaps as much as they could expect. Moreover, they might
well hope that this time the terms would be kept, for the
Treaty of St Germain was followed by a complete change in
the foreign policy of the court.
Catherine had hitherto followed two lines of conduct. At
/ one time she had tried to act as a/, mediator between the two
religious parties: at another to support the weaker,
and thus maintain a balance. But both had failed, the policy of
The crown was not powerful enough for the first, ^e French
and, instead of succeeding in the second, she had
been obliged to join the stronger party. 3-A third alternative
remained. Might it not be possible to revive the nationar
hostility to Spain ; sink religious differences in a foreign war;
form a great Protestant league against the Pope and Spain ;
divide the~Netherl?,p^s with Rnglandand William of Orange;
and at home secure" the authority of the crown ? Such were
the views of Coligny, which were now to be adopted by the
King and Catherine. Charles ix., feeble though he was,
was not without some traces of better things ; he had always
been averse to civil war, and saw that Spain had been the
chief gainer from the discords of France, since, as Marshal
Vielleville had said long ago, 'as many gallant gentlemen
had fallen in one battle as would have sufficed to drive the
Spaniards out of Flanders.' The Spanish victory of Lepanto
over the Turks in October, 1571, only served to intensify
Charles' dread of Philip. Moreover, as we have seen, he was
jealous of the fame his brother, the Duke of Anjou (the
favourite of his mother), had gained in the late campaign, and
hoped that he might eclipse it by leading a national war
against the Spaniard. But the support of the King would
have been of little value had not Catherine also favoured
the designs of Coligny. Philip had refused to further her
dynastic interests at the Conference of Bayonne, in June 1565
(cf. p. 407). His third wife, Elizabeth of France, had died in
412 European History, 1494- 1598
1568. He now declined either to marry Margaret of Valois,
Catherine's second daughter, or to urge the claims of that
lady upon the young King of Portugal. Accordingly Catherine
wished to marry her to the young King of Navarre, the first
prince of the blood, whose possessions1 stretched from the
Pyrenees to the other side of the Garonne, and whose friendship,
whether he was converted or not, might be of great assistance
to her. His mother, however, Jeanne d'Albret, dreaded the
influence of the depraved court of France on her son, and
rightly suspected the character of the young princess ; and
Catherine, eager to gain the assistance of the Admiral, who
alone was likely to overcome the scruples of the Queen of
Navarre, listened to his suggestions, and negotiations were
opened with William of Orange and with England. The
Prince eagerly welcomed these overtures. He had long
realised that the revolt of the Netherlands against Spain would
not be successful if fought solely on religious lines. The
Protestants were too scattered, and too much divided among
themselves, for that; and the only chance lay in waging a
political war against Spanish tyranny, in alliance with foreign
powers. Accordingly Louis of Nassau was sent to negotiate,
and there was talk of an alliance of France, England, and the
Empire, and of a division of the Netherlands between them.
In pursuance of this scheme, Elizabeth of England was
approached ; but though at this time quarrelling with Philip
over the exploits of the ■ Sea-dogs ' on the Spanish Main, and
angry at the support he had given to the Ridolfi plot in 1571,
she had insuperable objections to see Antwerp and the
Scheldt in French hands. It was therefore proposed that
she should marry the Duke of Anjou, and that he should be
declared sovereign of the Netherlands (cf. p. 338). To this
proposal Elizabeth appeared more favourably inclined, and
1 Henry held Lower Navarre and the Principality of Beam in his own
right, and, as fiefs, the Duchies of Vendome, Beaumont, and Albret ; the
Counties of Bigorre, Armagnac, Rouergue, Perigord, and Marie; the Vis«
counties of Limoges, and other lordships. See Map of France.
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 413
Walsingham, her agent in France, was closely questioned as to
the personal appearance of the Duke. The negotiations broke
down, indeed, in January, 1572, owing to the preference of
Anjou, who had been influenced by the Guises, for the hand
of the Queen of Scots, ' the rightful Queen of England,' but
even then Alencon, Anjou's younger brother, was suggested;
antf a correspondence on the subject, which, on the part of
Elizabeth at least, was only entered into to gain time, con-
tinued until arrested by the massacre of St. Bartholomew. *
- While Elizabeth trimmed, events moved rapidly. On the
1st of April, 1572, the Comte de la Marck, a Flemish refugee,
being expelled from Dover with his ships by the La Marck
order of the English Queen, who was not yet seizes Briiie.
prepared for an open breach with Philip, seized pn x' I572'
Brille and Flushing, and Holland and Zealand rose. In May,
Louis of Nassau, having by the connivance of Charles raised
a force, chiefly of Huguenots, in France, took Mons, the
capital of Hainault, while Elizabeth, not to be outdone,
allowed English volunteers to cross to Flushing. The
dream of Coligny seemed likely to be fulfilled, and Charles
appeared to be on the point of declaring war on Spain. ™
Unfortunately, the apprehensions of Catherine had been in
the meantime aroused. She had consented to the Treaty of
St. Germain because"she feared the Guises ; she
was now threatened by the more distasteful comeVaiarmed
ascendency of Coligny, who, if we may believe at the growing
Tavannes, advised Charles that he would never ShST*
be truly King until he had emancipated himself
from his mother's control. She therefore returned to the idea,
often entertained, and often pressed upon her, of getting rid
of the leaders of the Huguenots, more especially of Coligny.
At what date she finally decided on this course it is impossible
to say with certainty, but there is evidence to show that the
scheme had assumed practical shape as early as February, 1572.
Even then had the movement in the Netherlands met with com-
plete success, King Charles might have made up his mind to
414 European History, 1494-1598
declare war against Spain ; Elizabeth might have cast away
her doubts, and some of the Protestant princes of Germany
would have joined the alliance. The position of Coligny
would then have been too strong for Catherine, who, as she had
often done before, might have submitted to the inevitable, and
the hopes of Burleigh and Walsingham of beating back Catho-
licism behind the Alps and the Pyrenees might have been
realised. Unfortunately, de la Noue was driven from Valen-
ciennes, a French detachment under the Count of
featecf and Genlis was cut to pieces by the son of Alva in an
taken prisoner, attempt to relieve Mons (July 19), and Genlis
Juyia, 1572- himself was taken prisoner. The hands of
Catherine were now free, and she planned the assassination
of Coligny with the Duke of Anjou and Henry of Guise.
The attempt was made in the midst of the
assassination festivities which followed the marriage of Henry
of Coligny. 0f Navarre and Margaret. Whether, if it had
succeeded, Catherine would have been satisfied,
or whether she hoped that the murder would cause the Pro-
testants to rise, and thus give the Catholics an excuse for
proceeding further, it is impossible to say. In any case, the
assassin missed his aim ; Coligny escaped with a serious wound,
and it was necessary to proceed to further extremities. Accom-
panied by the Duke of Anjou, by Birago a Milanese, the
successor of L'Hopital in the chancellorship, and by others, the
Queen-mother visited the King, and, with threats and imputa-
tions that he was too timid to act, at last persuaded him.
'By God's death,' said he, 'since you insist that the admiral
must be killed, I consent ; but with him every Huguenot in
France must perish, that not one may remain to reproach
me with his death, and what you do, see that
o?stMBar.aCre {t be done quickly-' The King's consent ob-
thoiomew. tained, the plan was rapidly concerted between
Aug. 24, 1572. Catherine, Anjou, Henry of Guise, and Charron,
the 'Prevot des Marchands' of Paris. Whether, even
then, it was intended to dispose of more than some of the
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 4I5
leaders is doubtful, but, when once the order had gone out,
the fanatical mob of Paris could not be restrained. On
Sunday morning, August 24, the massacre began, and was
subsequently taken up in the provinces.
Such appears to be the truth with regard to the causes of this
pitiful tragedy, which some think had been premeditated as
early as the Treaty of St. Germain itself. All direct evidence,
however, has been destroyed, and the facts have been so dis-
torted by partisanship, that certainty is no longer possible. The
number of victims has been variously stated ; but at the lowest
computation they were not less than 1000 in Paris, and 10,000
elsewhere. Among the victims, besides Coligny, were Teligny,
his son-in-law, and La Rochefoucauld, an important noble of
Poitou. Navarre and the young Conde" were spared, but were
forced to abjure Protestantism, and were practically prisoners
in the hands of Catherine and the Guises. As to any future
policy, the Court had not made up its mind. Catherine, it is
said, had hoped that, if the responsibility could be thrown
upon the Guises, the Huguenots would rush to arms and
attack them, and that an obstinate struggle would then ensue,
which would weaken the two factions, and justify the King in
interfering to restore order; thus both parties might be de-
stroyed, and she and her favourite son Anjou might be left
without dangerous rivals. Accordingly the King at first
announced that the affair had been the result of the long-
standing quarrel between the Guises and the Chatillons,
which the Government had done its best to suppress. But
as the Guises would not accept the responsibility, the King
changed his tone, justified the crime by declaring that the
Huguenots had been plotting against the crown, and, with
singular baseness, urged Alva to put to death all the Hugue-
not prisoners he had taken before Mons. At ., .
* m .No change in
the same time, Catherine was eager not to foreign policy
alienate the Protestants abroad. She looked contemPlated-
upon the massacre as a domestic incident, and was not un-
willing to continue the policy of Coligny now that he was gone
416 European History », 1494-1598
This she was the more anxious to do, because she now enter-
tained the idea of securing the crown of Poland, just vacant
by the death of the last of its hereditary Kings, the Jagellons,
for her favourite son Anjou. It was therefore announced that
the Edict of Amboise would be kept, and negotiations were
continued with the Protestant powers. This policy met with
some success.
The rulers of Europe expressed delight or disapprobation
according to their sentiments, but guided their policy as
. d f tneu* interest demanded. Philip was at first beside
European himself with joy ; it meant, he thought, the end of
Powers. tjie French alliance with the Netherlands; Alva,
however, warned him that the overthrow of the Huguenots
would strengthen France too much. Elizabeth declared her
disgust, but could not afford to quarrel with France; while
William the Silent, especially after the fall of Mons on Sep-
tember 19, was not in a position to abandon all
Anjou elected , _ _ , . _,. _.
King of hopes of French assistance. The Protestant
Poland. Princes of Germany at first showed great indig-
nation, but did nothing to interfere with the candi1
dature of the Duke of Anjou, who was elected King of Poland
(May 9, 1573).
At home, Catherine was not so successful, and ' France.7 says
Effect of Sully, Atoned fpr the massacre hy twenty-six years
Massacre on of disaster. carnage! and horror. L On the news of
France. ^q massacre, the survivors took up arms, but they
were not strong enough to meet their enemies in the field, and
,-J. .. „7 the resistance was confined to a few cities, of which
4th Civil War. . '
August, 1572- Nimes and Montauban in the south, Sancerre
June, 1573. an(j jja Rocnelle in the west, were the most im-
portant. The Government in vain attempted their reduction.
The siege of La Rochelle cost the lives of some 20,000 men,
and of more than 300 officers of some distinction. Sancerre
was reduced to such straits that cats, rats, mice, and even dogs,
were eaten ; the last, says Jean de Lery, whose narrative has
not been inaptly called a cookery book for the besieged, were
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 417
found to be rather sweet and insipid. At last, on June 24,
1573, the Government despairing of success, and unwilling
that the Polish ambassadors should find their new King, the
Duke of Anjou, who was in command of the army, besieging a
Protestant town, concluded the Treaty of La Roch- Treat of
elle. By this treaty the Huguenots were promised , La Rocheiie.
liberty of conscience throughout Yrw™, g™^ *hfi_-*une 24, I573'
right of holding services in.- La Rocheiie, Nimes, and Montau-
'Ban^-Ihese towns were also to be free from royal garrisons. In
August, by the mediation of the Polish ambassador, Sancerre
was admitted to the same terms. But the treaty could not
last. It was doubtful whether the Government were sincere, and
it was not likely that the Huguenots would consent to forego
their rights of worship. Besides all this, their cause was being
strengthened by the rise of the ' Poiitiques.' or Riseofthe
'Peaceable Catholics,1 as they called themselves. Poiitiques.
This party, born of the horror and weariness which the Civil
War had caused, was anxious to establish peace on the basis
of mutual toleration. Its leaders were the two sons of the
old Constable, Francis, Marshal of France and Governor of
Paris, and Henry Damville, Governor of Languedoc. Their
jealousy of the Guises they had inherited from their father,
yet their ideas as to toleration would have been most dis-
tasteful to him, and, still more so, the opinions of his two
youngest sons, William (Thor£), and Charles (MeYu), who
adopted the Huguenot faith. The Poiitiques were strongest.
in the south, where the adherents of the two creeds had
been more equally balanced, and where the struggle had
been most severe. As a whole_Jjiey wgpg r>nt arj^ptpH Ky
high principle. If they adopted the views of L'Hopital it
was from cynical indifference to religion, rather than from
conviction as to the merits of toleration, and the leaders at
least were largely influenced bv ambition r>r pprf^"a1 aaatUMSi
Indeed, the massacre nf Sf Barfhnlnmpw wuc fr.11r»wprl Ky a
general lowering of tone and of morality throughout France.
Closely connected with the Poiitiques stood Navarre and
period iv. 2 D
418 European History », 1494-1598
Henry of Conde, who had been forced to abjure their faith
and were practically prisoners in royal hands, and the King's
brother, the Due d'Alencon, who selfishly sided with
Huguenots in the hope of securing the crown on the death of
Charles ix. At this time, too, the results of the massacre
were seen in a complete transformation of the views of the
Change in the Huguenots. Hitherto, the party had been domi-
character and nated by the- nobility, great and small, who,_in *"
Huguenot spite of the feudal colour which they gave to__
Party, the movement, had asserted that they were not
fighting against the crown, but for the removal of foreign
and unpopular ministers, while the third estate had limited
its demands to an extension of the powers of the States-
General. But now many of the greater nobility had fallen,
and many had abjured their faith. The importance of the
bourgeoisie and of the ministers had consequently increaseoV
and under their influence republican ideas had become more
prominent ; while the feudal element, which was still repre-
sented by the smaller local nobility, went to strengthen
separatist tendencies. The change was accompanied by the
appearance of numerous political pamphlets, of which the
most striking were the Franco- Gallia of Hotman, and the
Vindicice contra Tyrannos from the pen of Languet, or possibly
of Duplessis-Mornay, the faithful adviser of Henry of Navarre.
The Franco- Gallia* adopting the historical method, asserts
that the Teutonic nations saved France from the tyranny of
The Franco- Rome, revived the free institutions of the Gauls,
Gallia, and an(i established an elective monarchy, which
contra Tyr- governed through the people and for the people,
annos. in whom eventually the sovereignty resides.- The
decadence of this free constitution began with the Capetian
Kings, who in time overthrew the privileges of the Estates,
and introduced the despotic rule of King and ' Parlement'
The writer goes on to illustrate from the history of France
the evil results of the rule of women, and holds that this is
the reason for their exclusion from the throne, rather than
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 419
any fundamental law, like the Salic Law, which conflicts with
the primeval right of free election.
The author of the second treatise, the Vindidce, adopts the
opposite method, and seeks to prove his point by a deductive
argument. Both King and people have made a contract
with God : the King to rule his country well, the people to
depose him when he fails to do so. Hence resistance to a
tyrant is a duty. Nevertheless, the right of resistance does
not belong to individuals, except, indeed, against an invader,
an usurper, or a woman, if such, in defiance of law, seek to
rule a country ; for they are outside the law. In other cases,
not the individuals, but their representative, the magistracy,
should be the judge of breach of contract. Thus, although the
doctrine of resistance is clearly enunciated, the resistance must
come from the properly constituted authorities, and the writer
objects to anything which savours of anabaptism or other
extreme views.
The Huguenots did not limit themselves to theory. On
the 24th of August, 1573, the anniversary of St. Bartholomew,
the Protestants of Languedoc and Upper Guienne
formed two federative republics, each divided organisation
into dioceses with small deliberative assemblies, ofthe
... , , , - Huguenots.
which were to send deputies to the central assem-
blies at Nimes and Montauban. These, with an elective
governor, were to have the power of levying troops and of
imposing taxes on Protestant and Catholic alike. This re-
publican form of government, in which we see the Presbyterian
ideas of church-government applied to secular politics, was
to be extended to all parts of France which the Protestants
might subsequently win. After thus settling the government
of the south, the Huguenots sent a petition to the King
demanding complete liberty of conscience and of worship
throughout the kingdom, and the cession of two fortresses in
each province as a security. The Politiques at the same time
published a manifesto demanding toleration. * If Conde had
been alive and in possession of Paris he would not have asked
420 European History \ 1494- 1598
so much,' said Catherine. And on February, 1574, the fifth
war broke out. An unsuccessful attempt on the part of
., _ .. Navarre and Alencon to fly from St. Germain,
Fifth Civil , , , . . * * , '
war. led to the imprisonment of the Marshal Mont-
Feb. 1574. morenci, and Marshal de Cosse', another Politique.
May 1576. _ *
Henry of Conde" effected his escape, and negoti-
ated with the German princes for help. Before, however,
Death f any event °f importance occurred, the unfortunate
Charles ix. King, Charles ix., passed away (March 30, 1574),
March 30, 1574. tortured to the last by remorse, and terrified by
visions of the massacre to which, in an evil hour, he had
consented.
§ 5. The reign of Henry III., March itf^—July 1589.
The death of Charles ix. gave Henry a pretext for hastily
leaving Poland, where he had already become unpopular. He
Henry in. did not, however, appear to be in any hurry to
leaves Poland reach his new kingdom. Warned by his mother
ond rcflchcs
France. io avoid North Germany, since 'the German princes
Sept. 1574. had too many causes of quarrel with France/ he
passed through Austria and Italy. At Venice, he wasted two
months in luxury and debauch, and is said to have been
corrupted by the licence of that town. On his arrival in France
(September, 1574), he seemed for a moment inclined to adopt
a conciliatory policy. But his mother, now that her favourite
son was King, hoped that if he were victorious over the
Huguenots her influence would be paramount, and expected
everything from the hero of Jarnac and Moncontour. The
King therefore announced that he would recognise liberty of
conscience, but would not tolerate religious practices which
deviated from Catholicism, and that he would speak of peace
when his castles and his cities had been restored.
Thus the war dragged on, though without any decisive
events, and soon Henry in. began to crave for peace that he
might indulge in his pleasures. The definite alliance of the
Politiques with the Hu^uenots.ofJJie_gQiitluwhich took place
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 42 1
in December, enabled the rebels to hold their own. In
September, 1575, Alencon, and in the following February,
Navarre, effected their escape. Meanwhile Duke Casimir,
son of the Elector Palatine, who dreamt of heading an aggres-
sive Calvinistic party in Europe, had invaded France, ravaged
Burgundy and the Bourbonnois, and, in March, joined Alencon
at Soze\ Finally, by the exertions of Francis of Montmorenci,
the Marshal, who had been released by the King, Peace of
the Peace of ' Monsieur (May, 1576) gave to the Monsieur.
Huguenots better terms than they had hitherto May' X576'
obtained. They were allowed to worship wnw> thgy likedr—
.except within two leagues of Pari^ and within thp domains oL
any lord who might withhold his j?anctioiL_ Cases in which,
Prnrpgtants were concerned were to be tried by 'Chambres_
mi-parties ? in each ' Parlement,' — that is, by courts composed
of an equal number of judges of the two religions. The
Estates were to be convened at Blois ; and eight cities were to_
be held by the Huguenots in pledge of the fulfilment of .the
treaty. The Duke of Alencon, or Anjou, as he had now
become in consequence of the accession of Henry of Anjou
to the throne, was to receive the duchies of Berry, Touraine,
and Anjou, with reservation of the rights of suzerainty to the
crown. To Henry of Navarre was given the governorship of
Guienne, and to Henry of Condd that of Picardy, with Peronne
as his residence. The last concession was an important one,
for Picardy hitherto had been very Catholic in its sympathies,
and had divided the Huguenots from their Protestant allies
in the Netherlands. JThe__P£ace. of Monsieur was received
with violent indignation by the Catholics of France, and lecf
to an agitation which was directed almost as much against
the crown as against the Huguenots.
The idea of forming associations of 'Better Catholics'
was no new one. Shortly after the Edict of Amboise, in
1563, we find mention of several, such as the Fraternity of
the Holy Ghost in Burgundy, and the Christian and Royal
League of Champagne. With the massacre of St. Bartholomew
\
422 European History, 1494- 1598
these associations had fallen into neglect; they were now to
be revived on a much more important scale. The first of
The Catholic these new leagues was that of Peronne, organised
Leagues. j>y Humieres, the old governor who refused to
surrender the fortress to Conde (1576). The example was
speedily followed elsewhere, and formed the counterpart to
Huguenot federation in the south (cf. p. 419). The organisa-
tion of these leagues was a military on p. Their objects jwere
declared to be :/ the defence of the Roman Catholic and Apo-
stolic Church p Jhe preservation of Henry hi. in the obedience
of his subjects, and after him ' of all the posterity of the House
of Valois ' ;3the execution of the re^P1n^nr|C; whirh should be
presented by the Estates which were about to meet ; and the
restoration of the ancient liberties as they existed in the
time of Clovis, the hrst Christian KingT In this declaration
The Guises we are remmded of a new departure in the policy
adopt demo- of the QfliaSL ITirhprrn they had attempted to
cratxc views. secure their power as the first ministers of the
crown, and supported the principles of despotic rule. But
Henry in. threatened to shake himself free from their in-
fluence, and was already leaning upon his favourites ' the
Mignons.' Accordingly, Henry of Guise, who, by the death
of his uncle, the cardinal, in 1574, was the undoubted leader
of his house, assumed a position of antagonism to the crown,
and even began to dream of some day winning the throne
itself. The unpopularity which Henry in. incurred by the
Peace of Monsieur and by his foppish follies, caused the Duke
to lean on popular support, while many of the Catholic nobles
had joined the Politiques. Thus the party of the Guises,
without completely breaking with the upper classes, began to
seek its fulcrum in a lower stratum.
The change is represented not only in the articles of these
Catholic Leagues but also in the Catholic pamphlets of the
day, which began to borrow the popular doctrines of the
Franco-Gallia and other Huguenot writings. Denying the
application of the Salic Law to France, they asserted that
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 423
the title of the House of Lorraine was superior to that of
the Bourbon, and even to that of the House of Valois itself,
since it could trace its descent through the female line from
Charles the Great himself. In the face of these new develop-
ments, Henry m. followed for some time an Henry in.
oscillating policy. At first he forbade all Associa- tries to make
tions. Subsequently he abandoned that idea, and states-
tried to utilise them for the purpose of influencing General,
the elections to the States-General which were to meet at
Blois according to the Treaty, in the hope, by the aid of
the Catholic majority thus obtained, of putting down both the
Guises and the Huguenots. In this he was only partially
successful. The Huguenots, indeed, despairing of success
owing to the terrorism and intrigues of the League, declined
even to send deputies from those districts and towns which
were in their power, and the Catholics finding themselves in a
majority, demanded that there should be only one religion in
France. Yet so great was the dislike to a continuance of the
war that they refused the necessary supplies, and brought
forward constitutional demands which made Henry ill. only
too glad to be quit of them (March 1577).
In the war which had broken out in the meantime, the
King was somewhat more successful. The Duke of Anjou
(Alencon), who had now deserted the Huguenots, Sixth Civil
took command of the royal army; the aristocratic War» x577«
prejudices and the religious indifference of the Politiques
could ill agree with the earnestness of the republican and
Calvinistic burghers ; and Damville, who by the death of his
brother had now become Duke of Montmorenci and Marshal
of France, soon abandoned the alliance and made his peace
with the court (May, 1577). Under these circumstances the
Huguenots lost grounrL In May fell La Charitd on the
Loire ; in August, Brouage, a place next in importance to La
Rochelle; and it was only the want of union among the
Catholics themselves, and the utter weariness of the country,
which enabled the Huguenots to gain such favourable termg
4^4 European History, 1494- 1 598
as they did by the Treaty of Bergerac (September 17, 1577)
Their right of worship was indeed restricted to the domains
Treaty of °^ noD^es> to a^ cities where worship was held at
Bergerac. the date of the peace, and elsewhere to one city
Sept. 17, 1577. Qr jts suburbs in each s£ne*chausse*e — Paris itself
being specially excluded. The 'Chambres mi-parties' were
also confined to the four southern ' Parlements ' where the
Huguenots were strongest. But they still had eight cities
intrusted to them in pledge for six years, and Conde* received
St. Jean d'Ange'ly instead of PeVonne. The King was pro-
bably sincere in desiring to maintain the Peace of Bergerac, for
he was anxious if possible to escape from the thraldom of the
Guises, and the violations of the rrenty which occurred were
due to the insubordination of the governors of provinces, to the
popular fanaticism, and to the stubborn ill-will of the Law Courts.
In 1580, indeed, 'The Lovers' War' broke out. This was
caused, however, rather by quarrels between the King and
Henry of Navarre concerning the dower of
civil war, Margaret, and it is noticeable that the great
PeacVof0' t0 Protestant leader, de la Noue, disapproved of it,
Fieix, Nov. and that neither La Rochelle nor the southern
x58°- towns took part in it. It was ended by the Peace
of Fleix, in Perigord (26th November, 1580), which confirmed
the Treaty of Bergerac, and closed the Seventh Civil War.
The Peace of Fleix was followed by five years of feverish
peace, which served only to illustrate the utter disorganisation of
Disorganisa- the country and the demoralisation of all classes,
tion of France. Although there were not wanting earnest, if
fanatical, adherents of the two creeds, these formed an ever
lessening minority; and for the most part, as a competent
observer tells us, ' Men were combating not for the faith, nor
for Christ, but for command.' Of the greater nobles, the
Guises were attempting to overawe the crown, if not to seize
it for themselves; the rest, like Henry de Montmorenci the
Marshal, and the Duke of M^rcoeur, strove to make themselves
independent in the provinces of which they were governors
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in Prance 425
The smaller nobility played the same game on a less magnifi-
cent scale, and in some cases had degenerated into brigands ;
while many, both great and small, spent their leisure in duels
and assassinations, often caused by some shameful intrigue.
Even the women resorted to the dagger to free themselves from
an inconvenient lover, or to avenge some act of infidelity.
While the upper classes were thus disturbing the country with
their ambitions and their vices, the lower classes were be-
moaning their social grievances, and threatening social war.
At the head of this seething mass of iniquityT and of political,
social, and moral anarchy, stpoo* «■ gacillating, effeminate ^"fr
and an intriguing Queen-mother.
Henry in. had in earlier life shown some character. He
was far more able than his brothers, the unfortunate Charles ix.,
or the Duke of Anjou (Alengon) ; and had distinguished him-
self in the battles of Jarnac and Moncontour. His natural
gifts, however, had been choked in a life of licence and of
luxury, and ever since his accession he had gone from bad to
worse. He dressed himself more like a woman than a man ;
he surrounded himself with favourites, and with lap-dogs ; he
relieved the monotony of his debaucheries by ridiculous acts of
penance and superstition which deceived no one. No doubt,
the idea of raising new men to power to balance the ambitions
of the older nobility was not altogether a foolish one, and some
of the favourites, like Epernon, Joyeuse, and the Marshal de
Biron, were men of capacity. But others, like Villequier and
D'O, would have disgraced any court ; while all were influenced
by sordid and unworthy motives. By the King's side stood
the Queen-mother, still intriguing for power though life was
fast ebbing, and descending to the arts of a procuress to win
her opponents. Clearly there was no hope for France until
the last of this fJPgPnffratift SaC< of thfi Yal^lS haH disappeared
The only chance for a continuance of internal peace? such as
it was, lay in a vigorous foreign policy, which might have
monopolised the attention of the turbulent spirits, and put the
King at the head of a united people.
426 European History, 1494- 1598
For this, the offer of the sovereignty of the Netherlands
to the Duke of Anjou, in September, 1580, furnished an
Sovereignty opportunity which Catherine, angry at the recent
of Nether- occupation of Portugal by Philip (cf. p. 298),
bTAnfoTPted eagerly embraced. Even the King himself ap-
Sept. 1580- proved ; while Elizabeth received with favour
Feb. 1582. ^g a(jvances of Anjou for her hand in marriage.
The sovereignty was finally conferred on the Duke in February,
1582. In the June of that year, Catherine sent an expedition
Expedition to t^ie ^ZOTes m support of Antonio, the Pre-
to the Azores, tender of Portugal. William of Orange might
June 1582. wejj k0pe tYia.t France was about to return to
the policy of Coligny, and, in alliance with the Protestant
Queen of England, and the Netherlands, finally to join
issue with the representative of the Catholic reaction. His
hope was not, however, to be realised. Henry 111. was not
prepared for so bold a course, and was half-jealous of his
brother. Elizabeth had been only scheming to prevent the
Netherlands from being incorporated into France, and, if
possible, to embroil France with Philip, and, for all her love-
making, had no intention of really marrying Anjou. The
expedition to the Azores, as well as another which
The French , . , . _ . . .
Fury. was despatched in June, 1583, was destroyed by a
Jan. 16, 1583. Spanish fleet under the Marquis de Santa Cruz.
Netherlands, Anjou, ill satisfied with the restricted authority
June 1583, granted to him, rashly attempted to establish him-
and dies. , . .....
Assassina- self in a more independent position by seizing
w-ir* f Bruges and Antwerp (January 16). The attempt
Orange. failed, and in June, 1583, Anjou retired from the
July io, 1584. Netherlands to die in the following June. One
month after (July, 1584), William the Silent fell a victim to the
pistol of Balthazar GeVard.
The deaths of Anjou and of William the Silent both led
to most momentous consequences. The first made the ifrb-
testant, Henry ofNavarre, the heir-presumptivet and rendered
a renewal of civil war almost inevitable ; the second was
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 427
followed by the offer of the sovereignty of the Netherlands
to Henry hi. It seemed by no means impossible that Henry in.
would reconcile himself with his heretic heir, and sovereignty
accept the offer made him. At once the appre- ofNetner-
hensions of the French Catholics, of the Guises, to Henryin
and of Philip were aroused, and the outcome was °ct- 1**
the Catholic League. Following the model of the Catholic
Associations of 1576, the League was formed in The catholic
Paris. The city was divided into five districts : League,
the president of each of these, assisted by an elective Council of
Eleven, formed the famous Sixteen. This Council deliberated
on the measures to be adopted, and its decisions were communi-
cated to the faithful through the agency of professional and
trade associations. The example of Paris was rapidly followed
in the provincial towns ; and France was threatened with the
tyranny of a central club with its affiliated societies, whose
authority was maintained partly by terrorism, partly by the
fanaticism excited through the preaching of friars and Jesuits.
Although Henry of Guise did not altogether approve of the
democratic principles adopted by the Catholic League, his in-
terests demanded that he should put himself at the head of it.
But this was not the only important change in the policy of
the Guises. The reputation of the family had been originally
made in defending France against Spain, and Francis, Duke
of Guise, had always been anti-Spanish in his views ; while
Philip, on his side, was most unwilling to see Mary, Queen of
Scots, their kinswoman, triumphant in England, and had even
sent secret help to the Scottish rebels. Of late, however, the
more imperative necessity of preventing the French from
assisting the Dutch, or from incorporating any part of the
Netherlands into France, had caused Philip to alter his views.
Negotiations had accordingly been entered into with Henry of
Guise as early as the end of the year 1581, and Philip pretended
to favour the family designs in favour of Mary Stuart, now a
captive in the hands of Elizabeth. The death of Anjou, and
the danger of reconciliation between Henry in. and the heretic
42S European History \ 1494-159S
Henry of Navarre, still further aroused the apprehensions of
Philip. He therefore approved of the organisation of the
Tr . League, and in January, 1 585, concluded the Jjeaty
joinviiie. of Joinville with Guise. The allies bound them"~
Jan. 1585. selves to eradicate heresy, and to proclaim the_
Cardinal of BonrhonT the Catholic uncle of Henry of Navarre,
King in the event of the decease of Henry 111. ; the viscounty of
Beam and French Navarre was to be ceded to Philip, as a price
of his assistance. In March, 1585, the Leaguers issued a mani-
festo, in which they declared their intention to restore the
dignity and unity of the crown, to secure the nobility in their
ancient privileges, to drive unworthy favourites from the court,
to relieve the country from new taxes, and to prevent future
troubles by settling the succession on a Catholic king, and by
providing for regular sessions of the States-General.
Meanwhile, to enforce their views they had seized the
three bishoprics, Metz, Toul, and Verdun, most ot the towns
of Picardy, all Champagne, and the larger part of Burgundy,
Normandy, and Brittany ; while in June they presented an ulti-
matum to the King insisting on the withdrawal of the late Edict
of Toleration. The formidable movement which was thus in-
augurated was the outcome of the union of three forces : —
1. The determination of the Catholic party to oppose the
claims of a heretic heir.
2. The jealousy of the Guises for the King's { Mignons.'
3. The European policy of Philip n.n who not only dreaded
the French alliance with the Netherlands, but also feared that
it might lead to a definite alliance with the Protestant Queen
of England, and thus shatter his hopes of re-establishing his
authority and that of the Catholic Church.
It remained to be seen what line of conduct Henry in. would
adopt in the face of this formidable conspiracy. Sixtus v.,
who had just succeeded Pope Gregory xm. (August 26, 1585),
did not altogether approve of the League. ' I fear me,' he
said, 'that matters will be pressed so far that the King,
Catholic though he be, will be constrained to appeal to the
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 429
heretics for aid to rid himself of the tyranny of the Catholics,'
and this for a moment did not appear impossible. Henry in.
went so far as to acknowledge Henry of Navarre as his lawful
successor, and laughed at the claims of the Cardinal as those
! of an old fool.' He forbade all Leagues and Associations, and
even made an unsuccessful attempt to seize the Duke of
Guise at Metz. But a continuation of such a bold policy
was scarcely to be looked for from such a King. Elizabeth,
although she could scold Henry for submitting to rebels within
his kingdom, would not depart from her position of dubious
neutrality ; Henry of Navarre, although professing his willing-
ness 'to be instructed,' refused to declare himself a Catholic;
while Catherine, who was hoping to secure the succession for
her daughter Claude and her husband the Duke of Lorraine,
warned the King of the danger of opposing so powerful a
coalition. Henry, to his ruin, listened to his HenryIIL
mother's advice, and allowed her to yield, in his submits to
name, to the demands of the Leaguers at the juiLeaIg£e'
Conference of Nemours (July 5, 1585). The Sixtus excom-
Edicts of Toleration were revoked, and they of h™^68
the Huguenot faith who would not conform were Navarre,
to leave the country. Sixtus, now partly relieved Sept' 9' I58s*
from his apprehensions, issued a Bull of Excommunication
against Henry of Navarre.
The capitulation of Henry 111. to the League brought
"Ej>nry nf TMavorrP prnmin^nHy to the front. He had already
shown his military abilities during the Lovers' War, and,
in 1 58 1, he had been appointed 'Protector of the Churches.'
He now became the representative of all fonsf* whr>s<*
bigotry Or whose inrprpsr HiH nnf Hpsrrny tripir parrinHsr^
It is interesting to note how completely the posi- Altered
tion of the two parties was reversed. The charges P°sition <*
r 1 1 • • /- t 1 ••• tne Hugue-
of opposing the legitimate successor, of holding nots and
republican doctrines, and of alliance with the Catholics,
foreigner, once brought against the Huguenots, could now be
laid at the door of the Catholics ; while the Huguenots could
430 European History \ 1494- 1598
claim to be fighting for the principle of legitimacy and of
national independence. Navarre was, accordingly, supported
bvthe Politiques and by the Constable Henry of Montmorenci,
who was, however, chiefly influenced by personal jealousy of
the Guises. Even the 'Parlement' of Paris remonstrated
against the intolerance of the Edict, and against the Papal Bull.
Although opposed as before to the concession of the right of
worship to the Protestants, its members were in favour of liberty
of conscience, and resented, as they had always done, the papal
claim to interfere in the internal affairs of France. Thus the
party of the Huguenots was by no means a contemptible one.
The centre of their position lay in the territories belonging to
Henry of Navarre, or under his control. These, spreading from
the Spanish frontier to the Dordogne, and from the Bay of
Biscay to Languedoc, comprised Lower Navarre and B£arn,
which Henry held in his own right, and seven fiefs which he
held of the King of France. He was also Governor of Guienne,
and he was not without adherents in Normandy and Brittany,
while Languedoc was held by the Constable. And yet the
position of the Huguenots was discouraging enough. If their
party was not confined to those of their religious profession,
this only added to the divisions which had always weakened
them. The Catholics held by far the greater part of France ;
in the Netherlands, Alexander of Parma had secured Antwerp
(August, 1585), and threatened to carry all before him, and
were his task in the Netherlands finished, how should they
resist the united forces of the League and of Philip 11.?
What wonder if many apostatised or fled, and that the beard
of Henry of Navarre turned white with anxiety. Already
Philip dreamed of overthrowing Elizabeth of England, of
placing Mary Queen of Scots on the English throne, and
of subjugating France under his lieutenant, the Duke of
Guise. Fortunately, however, the King of Spain as usual
procrastinated, and preferred to work his end by diplomacy
and by bribes, rather than by arms. The Guises were not in
complete accord with him, and Henry in. himself daily grew
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 43 1
more impatient of the yoke. To these causes, and to the
personal ability of the King of Navarre, the salvation of France
must be attributed.
Henry in. hoped, in the war which now broke out, to humble
the Huguenots, and yet curb the ambition of the Guises. He
accordingly gave to the Duke of Joyeuse, his E. hthc- u
favourite, the command of the army which was to War. War
advance against the Huguenots, while he himself ^the-three
opposed the German 'reiters' whom Casimir, — 1585-
brother of the Elector Palatine, had sent to the April 3°» I589-
assistance of the Protestants. Unfortunately for the King,
Joyeuse was defeated and slain by Henry of Navarre at Courtras
on the Isle (October 20, 1587), and although the
1 reiters ' were forced to retire, the Guises succeeded courtras.
in gaining the credit of their retreat. c Saul/ cried °ct* 20' I587*
the fanatics of Paris, ' has slain his thousands, but David his
ten thousands.' Philip was anxious at this moment to pre- #
vent any interference with his schemes for the Armada.
His envoy, Mendoza, therefore urged the Duke of Guise
to make further demands on the King; and on his hesi-
tating to comply with these, the Duke entered Paris in
defiance of the royal command (May 12). The attempt of
the King to reassert his authority by ordering the Municipal
Guard and the Swiss to secure the important points of the
city was answered by the ' barricades ' ; and Th ;
Henry in., finding himself no longer master of his cades,
capital, retired to Chartres, never again to enter Aug* "' I58a
Paris. Forced for the moment to submit to the League, the
feeble monarch next tried to outbid the Guises with the
deputies of the States-General, which assembled at Blois on
September 16, 1588. But so extreme were the
A. s s sl s s i n &•
views adopted by the League at this moment that tion of Henry
this proved impossible. Accordingly, the King of Guise,
turned to the last expedient of the coward, and
ordered the assassination of Henry of Guise in his royal palace
of Blois (December 23, 1588). The Cardinal of Guise the
432 European History, 1494- 1598
brother of the Duke, was executed the next day, and the Cardinal
of Bourbon was held a prisoner. c Now at last I am King,'
said Henry. The illusion was soon to be dispelled, for the
assassination of the Duke led to the open revolt of the
League. Supported by the decision of the Sorbonne, it
declared that the crown was elective ; and when the * Parle-
ment ' resisted, its more obstinate members were imprisoned.
The Duke of Mayenne, the eldest surviving brother of the
murdered Duke, was made Lieutenant-General of the realm,
and ruled Paris with a Council of forty, formed of deputies
from the affiliated societies of the League. The example of
Paris was followed elsewhere, and the League secured most
of the important towns of the centre and south of France.
Meantime, the failure of the royal army in Guienne destroyed
the last chance of maintaining an independent attitude, and
the King at last did what he should have done four years
before, and threw himself into the arms of Henry of
1 Ten years ■ J
Truce. Navarre. A truce for a year was made between the
April 30, 1589. two Henries (April 30, 1589). The King promised
to leave the Huguenots undisturbed, and Navarre engaged
to oppose the Duke of Mayenne. The armies of the two
Kings shortly after advanced on Paris, which seemed doomed,
when the dagger of the Dominican, Jacques Cle-
Death of r .u t \m 1
Catherine, ment, an emissary of the League, avenged the
Jan. 5; assassination of the Duke of Guise (July 31).
tionof The death of the last Valois King had been
Henry in. preceded only a few months by that of Catherine
x' ' de' Medici, his mother. She died (January 5,
1589), with the reproaches of the Cardinal of Bourbon ringing
in her ears : 'If you had not deceived us and brought us here
(to Blois) with fine words, the two brothers (the Guises) would
not be dead, and I should be a free man.'
§ 6. Henry IV. and the League, July 1589— May 1598.
By the assassination of Henry hi., Henry of Navarrejbecame
the legitimate Kinp of Franre The question was, whether he
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 433
would make good his claim. Had he now been willing to
declare himself a Roman Catholic, he would have at once won
over the more conservative of the people, for the League was
daily becoming more anarchical ; the Cardinal of Bourbon, who
was by it acknowledged as King Charles x., was but a puppet
of Spain; and the Spanish alliance was ever growing more
unpopular. But conversion would have probably lost him the
support of the Huguenots, while it would not have gained
the more fanatical members of the League. Accordingly,
Henry refused. He offered to recognise Catholicism ; to
grant to the Huguenots no privileges beyond those they had
hitherto gained ; and to submit ' to the instruction ' of a
National or General Council. In thus acting he was guided by
policy, not by conviction ; and the interpretation he would put
on his favourite phrase ' receiving instruction ' would depend
on his success in the field.
Not feeling strong enough to attack Paris itself, Henry de-
termined to hold Picardy, Champagne, and Normandy, whence
the capital drew her supplies. The Duke of gth and Jast
Longueville was therefore sent to Picardy, the Civil War-
Marshal d'Aumont to Champagne, while Henry I5^"1595*
himself dropped back on Normandy, and occupied Dieppe, the
most important of the Norman ports, and valuable on account
of its proximity to England. The attempt of the Duke of
Mayenne to dislodge him was foiled at the battle of Arques
(September 21). In the following March, 1590, the still
more brilliant victory of Ivry, near Dreux, con- Battle of
clusively proved the superiority of Henry over Arques, 5 Sept.
his antagonist. Henry perhaps ' committed the Jtry, March
bravest folly' that ever was in staking the fate T59o.
of a kingdom on a single battle, in which he had far inferior
forces ; but at least his intrepidity won for him the admiration
of his countrymen. Possibly if he had pressed on at once,
Paris might have been taken ; but Henry had not the faculty
of making the best of a victory, and preferred to continue his
more cautious policy of starving the city into submission. He
period iv. 2 E
434 European history y 1494-1598
occupied Corbeil, Lagny, and Creil, which commanded the
upper Seine, the Marne, and the Oise, and by the end of
August, Paris was reduced to fearful straits. 'Nothing was
siege 01 cheap except sermons.' As at Sancerre, dogs, cats,
Paris. rats, and mice were eagerly devoured ; some, it is said,
even ate the flesh of children ; and the people were loudly
clamouring for peace or bread, when the approach of Alexander
of Parma, from the Netherlands, baulked Henry of his prey,
and forced him to retire (September 10). In the year 1592,
Parma again entered France, and saved Rouen from Henry's
clutches. In December, however, the death
Alexander of of the great commander freed the King from
Parma. immediate apprehension, and left the League with-
out any leader who could match him in the field.
Nevertheless, the war seemed likely to be indefinitely pro-
tracted. The party of the League indeed threatened to break
up. Mayenne was impatient of Spanish influence, and was
becoming daily more disgusted with the extravagance of the
League in Paris. In the preceding November, the Sixteen
had even dared to execute Brisson, the president of the
'Parlement,' and two other judges who opposed thiem, and
had established a reign of terror. Accordingly, Mayenne
had marched into the city, seized and condemned four of
the Sixteen to death, and reasserted his authority. Hated,
however, as he was by the fanatics, he was in no position
to carry on the war with vigour unless with Spanish help,
which he wished to do without.
Henry, too, was gaining popularity. Although his sensu-
ality, his lack of real conviction, his cynical indifference, pre-
p sitionof vent our ma^mg altogether a hero of the King
Henry of of Navarre, his superabundant energy, his splendid
Navarre. courage, his frankness, affability, and genuine
humanity, coupled with his caustic wit, had already endeared
him to his countrymen. And yet he was not powerful enough
to win his country by the sword; the Catholics would not
Consent to see a heretic on the throne of France; his
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 435
attempt to settle the religious difficulty by the Declaration
of Mantes (July, 1591), which acknowledged the Catholic
religion as that of the State, while he himself ^ .
• j ' Declaration
remained a Protestant, pleased neither party, of Mantes.
Too many, like the Marshal Biron and D'O, who July« I591'
had control of the finances, were interested in perpetuating
the war, lest a return of peace might deprive them of employ-
ment, or of the hope of carving out a fortune for themselves.
Meanwhile, France was going to ruin. Trade was at a
standstill. Even the more patriotic of the nobles — whether
Catholic or Protestant — despairing of peace, were aiming at
their own independence, and the enemies of France were
taking advantage of her weakness ; Philip 11. hoped to
place his nominee on the throne, and to secure Brittany;
the Duke of Savoy was attempting to encroach on her
south-east frontier; and even Elizabeth of England was de-
manding Calais, or some other return for help, niggardly
and intermittent though it was. The earnest desire, there-
fore, of all the moderate Catholics in France who were
not sold to Philip, that Henry would 'go to Mass,' can-
not excite surprise. In the spring of 1593, the
meeting of the States-General, summoned to General,
settle the question of the succession, brought Jan' 26, I593>
matters to a crisis. The Cardinal of Bourbon had died
in 1590; and, according to the Catholic view, the throne had
been vacant for three years. Philip 11., therefore, instructed his
representative the Duke of Feria, to propose that the crown
should be conferred on the Infanta (who through her mother
represented the House of Valois in the female line). If, how
ever, the Salic Law could not be violated, he was to suggest
that the Archduke Ernest, the Governor of the Netherlands,
and brother of the Emperor Rudolf, should be chosen King, or,
failing him, the young Duke of Guise, who should take the
Infanta as his Queen. In all probability, had the Duke of
Feria at once proposed the Duke of Guise as King, he would
have been accepted; but fortunately for Henry iv. he first
436 European History, 1494- 1598
suggested the Infanta, and thereby aroused the indignation of
the ' Parlement ' and of all those who cared for the funda-
mental laws of the country, and were not wholly sold to Spain.
Convinced that delay was perilous, Henry now accepted the
offers of a deputation of the Estates-General
•receives * sent to hold conference with him at Suresnes,
instruction/ an(j promised to 'receive instruction' within two
July 23 i"5Q3.
months, while at the same time he strengthened
his position by occupying Dreux. On July 23, Henry iv. re-
cognised the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman Church as the
true one, and promised obedience. On the following February
27, he was anointed in the Cathedral of Chartres, since Rheims,
where this ceremony should have been performed, was still
in the hands of the League.
In dealing with the justification of Henry's ' conversion \ it
must always be remembered that, although by no means a
disbeliever, he had no strong convictions as to the relative
merits of Catholicism and Calvinism, and was a man on whom
religious scruples sat somewhat lightly. To him, therefore, the
question would necessarily be one to be decided on the grounds
of political expediency. But some may be disposed to think
that, even if Henry had been convinced of the superiority
of the Huguenot faith, it would still have been his duty to
guide his policy by the same considerations. Any one in his
position, it has been said, would have been justified in accepting
Catholicism as the State religion if he had good grounds for
believing : first, that there was no other way of giving peace to
his country ; and secondly, that he could, while officially recog-
nising Catholicism, secure complete and lasting toleration for
the Huguenots. Of the first, it was not difficult to convince
himself. He had attempted to win France by arms and had
failed. We must remember also that the Huguenots, after
all, represented but a small minority of the nation, and that a
large number of the Catholics preferred the Duke of Guise
with his Spanish wife to a heretic King. Nor is it easy
to believe that, if Henry had been willing to efface himself,
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 437
any settlement which the Huguenots would have accepted
could have been arrived at. On the second point, opinions
will probably always differ. The danger was that in accepting
Catholicism, he would revive the idea as to the intimate connec
tion between Church and State in France which led men to look
on heresy as treason. We know that the Edict of Nantes did
not last; but whether the Revocation was inevitable, and, if so,
whether Henry ought to have foreseen it, may well be questioned.
The King of Navarre was thus at last acknowledged King of
France. By his ■ conversion \ he won to his side all Catholics
except the most fanatical of_the Leaguers, and those who, like
the Dukes of Mayenne and of Mercceur, were intent on their
personal interests. While, therefore, Henry restrained as far as
possible all hostile operations, he steadily pursued a policyjKhich
he had long adopted of buying over trios** whng^ opposition was
still to be dreaded-^ The governors of provinces were con-
firmed in their governorships, or offered pensions ; the smaller
nobility were tempted by subordinate offices and money ; the
cities were promised exemption from extraordinary taxation
and freedom from Huguenot worship within their walls. The
wisdom, and indeed the necessity, of this course have been
disputed, and certainly the evil results of it — the independence
of the nobility, the venality of the government, the serious
straining of the finances — long outlived the King himself.
Yet at least it must be confessed that the policy succeeded.
On March 17, Rouen surrendered, and Henry secured all
Normandy. Four days later Brissac, just appointed Governor
of Paris by the Duke of Mayenne, accepted the offers of
Henry, brought over the Parisian magistrates, Henry secures
and opened the gates. The Duke himself had Rouen, March
already left, the Spanish troops were forced to Pari*? March
evacuate the city with some sixty of the more ai> x594-
prominent Leaguers, and Henry was at last master of his
capital. 'That which is Caesar's has been given unto Caesar,'
said one to the King. ' Given ? ' said he, looking at Brissac \
* No, sold, and for a goodly price.'
43$ European History, 1494- 1598
Henry, anxious to secure his eastern frontier which was
always threatened from the Netherlands, next laid siege to
Laon, which surrendered on the 2nd of August, 1594. A
fortnight later Amiens, and other towns of Picardy, followed
its example. The spring of the year 1595 was marked by a
far more important event. Henry succeeded in conciliating
the Duke of Lorraine and the young Duke of
Dukes of jo
Lorraine and Guise. The former restored the cities of Toul
Guise come and Verdun ; the latter surrendered his governor-
to terms. . . _ ^,, .
ship of Champagne in exchange for that of
Provence, where he shortly proved his loyalty by driving out
Epernon, one of Henry iii.'s 'Mignons,' who, after joining
Henry iv., had played him false. The only important nobles
who still held out were the Dukes of Mayenne and of Mercoeur,
both members of the House of Guise, and the Duke of Nemours.
The two first were loth to abandon the ambitions of their family,
and hoped, by the aid of Spain, to turn their governorships
of Burgundy and of Brittany into hereditary principalities.
The Duke of Nemours, with the support of Savoy,
threatened the country round Lyons. Henry, therefore, after
some futile negotiations with Spain, in which the idea of
Henry's marrying the Infanta was entertained, determined to
declare open war against Spain. An open war, he held, was
suits ^ar Preferable to a continuation of unavowed ]
expelled. hostilities ; the national enthusiasm against the^
w° q594i d f°reigner might be aroused ; all those who con- 1
against Spain, tinued to resist would incur the charge of
Jan. 17, 1595. treachery to their country ; while the English
and the Dutch promised their assistance. The war was pre-
ceded by the expulsion of the Tesuits. ^Introduced into France
by Henry 11. they had made many enemies ; the ' Parlement '
objected to their extravagant assertions of papal supremacy,
and to their attacks on the prerogatives of the crown; the
Bishops resented their claim to be free from episcopal
authority ; the older orders grudged them their popularity, the \
University their educational success. Although it does not s
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 439
appear that the Jesuits had taken any prominent part in the
organisation of the League, and though they were, as a matter
of fact, at this time out of favour in Spain, where they opposed
the tyranny of the Inquisition, they were nevertheless denounced
as the tools of Philip. An attempted assassination of Henry IV.
by one of their pupils, though not apparently instigated by them,
brought matters to a crisis. They were convicted by the 'Parle-
ment of attempting to subvert the laws of Church and State,
of instigating to rebellion and assassination, and were expelled
the kingdom (December 29, 1594).
War was declared against Spain on January 17, 1595. The
young Marshal Biron, who had been intrusted with the
governorship of Burgundy, succeeded in driving
-» r /• i • rr>^ -wr • The Duke Of
Mayenne from that province. The King, on Mayenne
marching to support him against the attack of a driven from
Spanish force under Don Fernan de Velasco, the
Constable of Castile, was nearly surprised at Fontaine-
FranQaise. He, however, saved himself by his intrepidity ;
and the Spanish general retreated, much to the disgust of
Mayenne. Henry now entered Franche-Comte ; but the Swiss
who were guarantors of the neutrality of the country, remon-
strated, and the King, unwilling to incur their hostility,
retreated. His presence was indeed needed elsewhere.
The Duke of Longueville, after a successful campaign in
Artois, had died in April ; and Turenne, the Duke of Bouillon,
had suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Spaniards
under Fuentes, in an attempt to raise the siege Fuentes takes
of Doullens (July 24, 1595). Doullens fell, and DouUeiw, jitfy
Fuentes laid siege to Cambray, which had been besieges
in French hands since the expedition of the Cambray.
Duke of Anjou in 1581 (cf. p. 361). The King, too late to
save Cambray, which capitulated in October, besieged La
Fere, a fortress on the Oise, which the League had surrendered
to the Spaniards, and the siege dragged on through the winter.
^The success of Henry in the field had not been brilliant. He
/n^as more successful in diplomacy. In September, 159^
440 European History \ 1494- 1598
Clement vin. at last consented to grant him absolution, and in
the following January, the Duke of Mayenne finally made his
peace. The terms he received were too high. His
The Duke of * . ... . , ,
Mayenne debts, which were enormous, were paid ; he was
submits. made Governor of the Isle de France, and received
three fortresses as places of security. £pernon,
who soon followed the example of Mayenne, was equally well
rewarded. Truly Henry was teaching his people that rebellion,
if prolonged, was the way to royal favour.
There now remained no other important noble in arms
except the Duke of Mercceur ; and the winning of Marseilles
by the young Duke of Guise, which also took place in January,
caused Henry to declare ' that God had indeed pity for France.'
Yet the outlook was not very promising. The financial straits
were severe : Elizabeth would not, and the Dutch could not',
render any efficient help ; while the Huguenots were becoming
very troublesome. They were scandalised at the desire of
Henry iv. to get a divorce from his faithless and hated wife,
Margaret of Valois, that he might marry his mistress, Gabrielle
d'Estre'es; they were outraged by the delay of the King in
dealing with their grievances, while the rebellious Leaguers
were receiving all that they could desire, and they even talked
of enforcing their claims by arms.
In April, 1596, the new Governor of the Netherlands, the
Cardinal Archduke Albert, invaded France and inflicted a
a hd k serious blow on the prestige of Henry's army by
Albert takes taking Calais. The town might have been saved
Calais. if Elizabeth had not demanded its possession as
April, 1596. . . r
a pnee of her assistance, and higgled till it was too
kte. In the ensuing month, Henry, in a measure, balanced
this serious loss by taking La Fere, and by driving the Arch-
duke across the frontier ; but he was quite unable to dislodge
the Spanish garrisons from Calais or from Doullens. If the
war was to be continued with vigour, money at least must be
found ; and to this object the Baron de Rosny (Sully), who
had lately been appointed * surintendant ' of the finances,
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 441
now turned his attention. New offices were created, which
were sold to the highest bidder. Loans were extorted from
the rich. Those who had filled their pockets by Sull ,
frauds on the exchequer were forced to disgorge financial
part of their ill-gotten gains, and some attempt was reforms*
made to put a stop to such corruption in the future. The
tax on salt was raised, and in the autumn an Assembly of
Notables granted the King the ' Pancarte,' or duty of 5 per
cent, on all goods offered for sale.1
Yet what Henry gained with one hand he was, with his usual
recklessness, ready to spend with the other. Much of the
money thus obtained was being thrown away on p0rto
expensive festivities in Paris, when the news sud- Carrero
seizes
denly arrived that Porto Carrero, the Governor of Amiens.
Doullens, had seized the important town of Amiens Mar- "• 1597*
by a clever coup de main (March 11, 1597). 'Enough,' said
Henry, ' of playing the King of France j 'tis time to be the
King of Navarre again.' Biron was despatched to besiege
Amiens forthwith. In June, the King followed himself with an
army, in which the presence of Montmorenci, Mayenne, and
Epernon showed that the old factions had been well-nigh
extinguished. The English and the Dutch also sent rein-
forcements, in pursuance of a treaty of alliance which they
had made in the previous year (August-October, 1596). On
September 3, Porto Carrero died. The Archduke Albert,
unable to raise supplies even on credit, owing to Philip's late
act of repudiation, could not advance to the relief of the
1 While Sully had been doing something to replenish the exchequer of
King Henry, his antagonist, Philip, attempted a more summary method.
On November 20, 1596, he publicly revoked all assignments, or mortgages
by which the taxes on the royal domain had been pledged for money
advanced to him. The pretext for this wholesale repudiation was that his
exertions for Christianity had reduced him to beggary, while the money-
lenders had been growing rich at his expense. The deed, however,
produced a panic. The chief merchants and bankers suspended payment,
and the credit of Spain received a shock from which it did not easily
recover.
442 European History, 1494- 1598
garrison till September 1 2 ; then, finding himself in the
presence of a superior force, he retreated ' like a priest,' and
Amiens on September 19, 1597, Amiens was at last re-
recovered, covered. Henry now determined to take advantage
ep • 19. 1597- 0f j^g success to negotiate with Spain. Philip did
not refuse his offer. Tortured by disease, knowing that his end
was approaching, that Spain could no longer bear the strain
of war, and that his feeble son was not likely to succeed where
he had failed, he was anxious to leave his country at peace.
Philip agrees He accordingly agreed to a truce, and to hold a
to a truce. conference at Vervins in the following January
for finally settling the terms of peace. The affairs of
Brittany Henry was determined to settle without any foreign
interference ; and this he succeeded in doing without drawing
the sword. The Bretons, despairing of successful resistance
~,_ ~ j now that the aid of Spain was withdrawn, deserted
The Due de r '
Mercoeur the Duke of Mercceur, who was forced to come to
submits. terms at Angers (March 20). He surrendered
Mar. ao, 1598. *. TTL . • 1 1 1 j /•
the governorship of Brittany, with the hand of
his daughter, to Caesar, the illegitimate son of the King by
Gabrielle d'Estrees, and received a pension in return. Thus
at last all resistance had ended, and France was once more
united.
The King was now in a position to attend to the grievances
of the Huguenots. On entering Paris he had republished the
The Edict Edict of 1576, with the amendments added thereto
of Nantes. by the treaties of Bergerac and Fleix. Since he
April 15, 1598. couj(j no ionger De their Protector, nor allow any
other to hold that position, he had also authorised the Huguenots
to organise themselves into a federative system for defence, and
ten provinces had been formed, each with its elected assembly
and a General Council of ten nominated by the assemblies.
But the Huguenots were not satisfied ; they complained that
these concessions were not sufficient, and that they were often
violated. All members of the League, whether noble or town,
who came to terms were allowed to forbid the exercise of the
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 443
Protestant religion within their jurisdiction, and what security
had the Huguenots that one who could so lightly change his
own religion would care or dare to protect that of others?
They therefore had demanded more formal ratification of the
privileges already granted them, an extension of the system of
' Chambres mi-parties ' to all the l Parlements ' of France, and
admission to all offices. The King, in spite of the grave
discontent which at times threatened to break out in open
war, had hitherto refused to satisfy their demands ; until the
Catholics were completely reconciled such a policy might be
dangerous, and certainly would be futile, since Henry was not
strong enough to enforce his promises. Now, however, that
he was really master of France, he had neither the excuse nor
the wish to delay any longer. Negotiations had, indeed, been
going on for some time, and finally led to the Edict of Nantes,
which was published on April 15, i5q8._ The clauses of this
famous Edict followed closely on the lines of the Treaty of
Bergerac of 1577. The Huguenots were permitted to hold
divine service in all towns specified by that treaty, or in which
it had been held in 1596 and 1597 ; and besides this, in one
town in each bailiwick and in the fiefs of Protestant nobles.
In these privileged towns they were also allowed to found
colleges and schools, and to print books. Paris, however,
as before, with a circuit of five leagues, was especially exempted
till 1606, when the King allowed a temple to be built at
Charenton, five miles distant. Huguenot ministers were to
be exempt from military service, and the King promised to
contribute an annual sum for their support; while the
Protestants, on their part, were to pay tithes. In the ' Parle-
ments ' of Paris, Rouen, and Rennes, special ' Chambres de
l'Edit' — one of the judges of which was to be a Protestant — were
to be established to try cases in which Huguenots were con-
cerned; while three 'Chambres mi-parties' at Castres, Bordeaux,
and Gap were to exercise a similar jurisdiction in the south.
Finally, the Huguenots were to be allowed to hold synods, to
have admission to all colleges and schools ; all offices were
444 European History \ 1494- 1598
to be open to them, and they were to suffer in no way for
their religion. They were to hold the eight cities they
possessed for eight years, but to allow the Catholic worship
to continue there. Considering that the Huguenots did
not number more than one-twelfth of the population of
France, the terms they thus obtained were as favourable as
they could expect, and all that was perhaps possible in the
existing condition of France.
But the principle on which the Edict was based was radically
faulty. It can scarcely be called an Edict of general toleration,
for no other religion but that of Calvinism was allowed.
Moreover, the concession of the privilege of worship to indi-
vidual nobles, and to congregations in special towns, tended to
accentuate the independence and isolation of the Huguenots,
and to perpetuate the centrifugal tendencies, both of feudalism
and of federative republicanism, which the wars of religion had
intensified, and which were yet to give trouble to France. As
long as there was a King on the throne willing and able to
enforce the Edict, the compromise continued fairly satisfactory.
But after he was gone, the chances that the Edict would be
permanent day by day became less. The Huguenots, partly
in self-defence, partly in pursuance of political aims which the
Edict had fostered, attempted to form those towns which
had been granted them into a semi-independent federation ;
and when, to check this, Richelieu deprived them of these
pledges for the fulfilment of the Edict, he left them to fall
defenceless before the tyranny and bigotry of Louis xiv.
While Henry was thus removing the last traces of opposition
in France, the negotiations with Spain had been going on;
Peace of anc*> on ^^ 2> ^e Peace °f Vervins was signed.
Vervins. Spain evacuated all the conquests she had made(
Maya, 1598. m ;prance during the last war with the exception of
Cambray; Henry, on his part, restoring the county of Charolais.
The Duke of Savoy came to terms at the same time; he
surrendered Berre, the only place he held in Provence ; while
the question as to the Marquisate of Saluces, which he had
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 445
seized in 1588, was referred to the arbitration of the Pope.1
Neither the Dutch nor the English were included in the Peace.
The Dutch refused to enter into any treaty which did not
recognise their independence, while Elizabeth was not unwilling
to see the war continue between France and Spain. She had
even attempted to make capital out of the negotiations, going
so far as to suggest to Philip that he should cede Calais in
exchange for Brille and Flushing, which she still held. Henry
accordingly contented himself vjith securing the right of his
allies to become parties to the treaty within six months.
Conclusion.
The Treaty of Vervins scarcely made any alteration in the
political geography of Europe. Its importance lies rather in
the changed conditions which accompanied it, and „ ' . _
° . . ' , Condition of
followed it. A few months after the signing of that Europe at the
treaty, Philip 11. died (September 12, 1598) in his **eac? of
seventy-second year, at the Escurial — that magnifi-
cent though somewhat strange mixture of ' a palace, a monas-
tery, and a tomb,' which is the chief architectural monument
of his reign. Had Philip been a wiser man, he might have
retained the obedience of the Netherlands, and profited by
their industry and their colonies. He might have developed
the resources and the constitutional liberties of his country,
and enriched her by commerce with America. He might
have turned her arms against the Turk, made himself
master of the Mediterranean, and left Spain con- Decline of
solidated and prosperous. Intent, however, on Spain,
more magnificent schemes, he had failed disastrously. His
attempt to lead the Catholic reaction, and to re-establish the
unity of the Church on the basis of Spanish supremacy, had
tended in disaster. The defeat of the Armada had saved
1 The Marquisate of Saluzzo in Piedmont had been ceded to France by
the Treaty of Cateau Cambresis, cf. p. 257. Henry iv. in 1601 exchanged it
with the Duke of Savoy for Bresse, Ru^ey, and Gex.
446 European History, 1494- 1598
England from both Spain and Rome. The United Provinces
had virtually won their religious and political freedom, and
Henry iv. had bowed the Spaniard from his doors. Mean-
while Spain, exhausted by the constant drain which the vast
attempts involved, and ruined by the disastrous policy pursued
at home (cf. ch. vii.), was fast declining. After Philip's death
her royal race degenerated rapidly; and with a shrinking
population, paralysed industries, and attenuated resources, she
was forced to step aside and -leave the struggle for supremacy
to others.
And yet the Catholic reaction, of which Philip had been
the leading spirit, had not been without its successes. If
f England, the United Netherlands, and the Scandi-
the catholic navian kingdoms had decisively broken away from
Reaction. RomyEfccttflBaaiiaa ViqH h<apn mmpiptpiy ccafed
out in Spain and in ItalyT and in 1 58 7 1 Catholicism was
Unally restored in Poland by .fo'ff^'in^^JrTTrance, it the
•Huguenots had secured toleration, that tolefaTion was not to
Mast; and Catholicism had not only captured the King, but
X bad again been recognised as the religion of the State. In
Germany, too, the advance of Protestantism had, since the
middle of the century, been arrested. The Jesuits had by
this time made their influence felt, not only by their missionary
and educational work among the people, but also on the policy
of the Princes. In Bavaria, Albert lit. (15 50-1 579) drove
out the Protestants, and made his Duchy a stronghold of
Catholicism. In 1576, Rudolf 11. succeeded his father,
Maximilian 11., in the most important of the Austria^
dominions,1 and was elected Emperor. Maximilian had
been half-inclined towards Lutheranism. Rudolf, educate^
under the influence of his mother, the daughter of Charles v.,
and subsequently at the Spanish Court, was strongly Catholic. .
He dismissed the Protestant preachers from Vienna, an«n
1 His brothers, Ferdinand and Charles, received Tyrol and Styria.
These were reunited to Austria proper under Ferdinand II., and th«
Austrian dominions were declared indivisible, 162 1.
The Reformation and the Civil Wars in France 447
supported a Catholic policy in the Empire. The advance
of Catholicism was also favoured by the dissensions between
the Lutherans and the Calvinists. who were respectively headed
by the Electors of Saxony and of the Palatinate. Under these
circumstances, quarrels over the controverted clauses of the
Peace of Augsburg were inevitable (cf. pp. 248-9). The Catholics
questioned the right of the Bishop of Magdeburg to a seat in
the Diet, and, in 1581, had driven Gebhard Truchsess from
his Electoral See of Cologne, because these two prelates had
embraced Protestantism.
Day by day the relations between the adherents of the two
creeds became more strained. Already the Thirty Years' War
was looming in the distance — a war in which Pro- T.. . .
0 , Disorganised
testantism was indeed to hold her own, but at the condition of
/price of the destruction of German nationality Germany-
■ and unity, almost of German independence, and of the
• crippling of national prosperity and intellectual growth for
I more than a century.
France, it is true, had suffered severely from her civil
war ~~oF~1:hirty-six years. Trade and industry had been
/^ruined, and her finances heavily strained. The condition of
venality of her administrative system had been in- France.
Xreased. The Estates-General and the ■ Parlements,' the re-
f/presentatives of constitutional life, had been discredited ; the
former by the extreme views it had at times adopted, both
by their subservience to the League. The power and self-
-importance of the nobles had been increased during the civil
^yars, and by the system adopted by Henry iv. of buying off
their opposition. The desire for federative republicanism had
J^grown with the growth of Calvinism. All these things had been
the results of the religious wars. Yet after all, it was the royal
y«power and_prestige which in the end had benefited .
APOSt from the interna! ftisrnrris Jt was Henry the Royal
"who had given his country peace at last, and authority-
thereby earned the gratitude of his people; he it was who
chiefly gained by the discredit into which the organs of
4 48 European History \ 1 494- 1598
constitutional life had fallen, and by the divisions and dissen-
sions of his subjects. The nobles, indeed, were dangerous, but
I/Henry iv. was successful in defeating their intrigues. His
able, though self-sufficient and egotistical minister, Sully,
.reorganised the finances, and did something to check the
venality and corruption which existed. ^ The marvellous re-
cuperative powers of the country came to his assistance ; and
France under the clever, though somewhat cynical, rule of
her great King became once more a first-rate Power. Had
Henry lived longer, or had he been succeeded by a capable
son, the Thirty Years' War would probably not have occurred,
or would have been ended sooner. The House of Hapsburg
might have been humbled to the dust, and France might have
established a dangerous supremacy in Europe. The assassina-
tion of Henry iv. in 16 10 prevented this; France, on his
death, became the victim of a weak minority, and a troubled
regency; and Europe was not threatened with a French
supremacy until the reign of Louis xiv.
V
APPENDIX I
THE FRENCH CONSTITUTION IN THE FIFTEENTH
AND SIXTEENTH CENTURIES.
Cf. Gasquet, Institutions Politiques et Sociales de la France.
Ch6ruel, Dictionnaire Historique des Institutions de la France.
I. Central Administration. — Cornell du Rol (King's Council),
or Conseil d^tat (Council of State). The supreme Executive
Council of the realm. It also exercised Legislative powers
through its Ordinances, and high Judicial power until
organisation of the Grand Conseil.
1. Sometimes heard ultimate appeals from the Sovereign
Law Courts.
2. Evoked cases from other Courts in which public
interests were involved.
3. Heard complaints against the royal officials.
These Judicial Powers were subsequently-transferred
to—
a. The Grand Conseil.— Finally organised in
1497, to decide questions of disputed jurisdic-
tion between the other sovereign Courts, but
never very important. Composed of the Con-
stable (the chief Military Officer), the Chan-
cellor (the Supreme Civil Officer), the Princes
of the Blood, Officers of State.
£. The Conseil Prive or des parties.
A Judicial Committee of the Council erected in
the seventeenth century.
A number of clerks (Maitres de Requetes) under the Conseil
du Roi, worked various Departmental Councils, such as
those of War and Finance.
II. Central Courts of Justice.
A. The Parlement of Paris.— The Central Judicial
Court of the Realm, sharing with the Grand Conseil
the right of hearing appeals from all subordinate
Courts.
It also (1) issued Arrets, or Injunctions.
(2) Registered all royal ordinances, treaties of
peace, and other public documents ; and,
pi:riod iv 2 f
450 European History \ 1494- 1598
from the reign of Louis XL, claimed the
right of refusing to register — a right
which gradually ripened into a right of
veto. The King, however, could always
override its veto by holding a 'Lit de
Justice' — i.e. by summoning the Parle-
ment, in solemn assembly, before the
Peers of France and the officers of State,
and ordering it to register.
Its members held office for life, and were, since the
reign of Louis XL, irremovable, unless convicted of
some penal offence. As membership was generally
purchased from the King, they became saleable,
and, after the reign of Henry iv., practically
hereditary.
The Parlement was divided into five Courts : —
1. The Grand Chambre. — This heard all appeals of great
importance, and cases of first instance which con-
cerned the Peers ; cases of treason ; and criminal
charges against royal officials and members of the
Parlement.
2. Chambre des Requetes. — Decided smaller cases of first
instance.
3. Chambre des Enquetes. — Heard smaller cases of appeal,
and prepared the more important appeals for the
Grand Chambre.
4. Chambre de la Tournelle. — Tried less important
criminal cases.
5. Chambre de /'isV///.— Established after the Edict of
Nantes, 1598, to try cases between Catholics and
Huguenots. One or two of the judges were to be
Protestants.
B. Chambre des Comptes. — Exercised jurisdiction in all
financial matters dealing with the royal domain, and
audited accounts of the Baillis and Seneschals ;
registered edicts concerning the royal domain, and
recorded the fealty and homage of tenants-in-chief.
Jurisdiction civil— not criminal.
Appendix /. 451
C. COUR des Aides. — Exercised civil and criminal juris-
diction over cases dealing with Taxation, and audited
accounts of the £lus who collected the direct taxes.
Ill Local Justice and Administration.
1. Provincial Parlements, exercising the same authority as
the Parlement of Paris within their districts, existed
in the fifteenth century at —
Toulouse for Province of Languedoc, instituted 1443.
Grenoble „ Dauphin^, „ 1453.
Bordeaux „ Guienne, „ 1462.
Dijon „ Burgundy, „ 1477.
And the following were added during the sixteenth
century at —
Aix for Provence, 1501.
Rouen for Normandy, 1515
Rennes for Brittany, 1553.
Five more were subsequently added —
Pau for Be*arn, 1620.
Metz „ 3 Bishoprics, 1633.
Douai „ Flanders, 1686.
Besangon „ Franche- Comtek 1676.
Nancy „ Lorraine, 1769.
Most of these Provinces had their separate Chambre des
\ Comptes, and Cour des Aides.
2. The Baillis or Sdnischals (with PreV6ts under them).
(a) Collected the dues from the royal domains (while
the £lus collected the regular direct taxes).
(b) Tried petty cases.
(c) Administered affairs, civil and military, of their
Bailliage or Se'ne'chausse'e.
Their jurisdiction was subordinated to that of the Parle-
ments, and their financial accounts were under the
Cours des Comptes, while that of the £lus were
audited by the Cours des Aides.
Francis I., however, appointed new officers — the
Lieutenants, Civil and Criminel — to whom, by the
ordinance of 1 560, the judicial functions of the Baillis
452 European History ', 1494-1598
and Se*ne"schals were transferred. After that date the
importance of the Baillis and Seneschals rapidly
declined, especially after the final institution of the
Intendants by Richelieu.
Francis 1. also appointed twelve Lieutenants- Gdndral o\tx
the frontier Provinces. During the Civil War these
were extended to most of the Provinces ; and the
Governors, as they now were called, made themselves
so powerful as to be ' very kings.' Henry IV. did his
best to buy off these Governors ; but their power was
not finally overthrown till the time of Richelieu.
3. In 155 1 Henry II. instituted Tribunaux Presidiaux as
intermediate Courts between the Parlements and those
of the Baillis or Seneschals.
4. The nobles still retained their Seignorial Courts ; but
these, jealously watched by the Baillis and Seneschals,
were confined to questions between the Seigneur and
his dependants.
5. The towns enjoyed municipal government, which varied
very much, but was usually composed of a General
Assembly which elected a Corps de Ville, which in its
turn elected a municipality composed of the Mayor and
e"chevins (sheriffs). In Paris the Prevot des Marchands
took the place of the Mayor. The rights of election,
however, became day by day more and more visionary.
The officials were usually nominated by the Crown,
often in return for money. The towns also had their
Courts, but the judicial powers, always limited, were
finally withdrawn.
In Paris, however, there was a peculiar Court, that of
the Chdtelet, under the Prevot of Paris (to be distin-
guished from the Prevot des Marchands). The Prevot
of Paris had no Baillis or Seneschal over him. He
administered the police of the city, and heard cases on
appeal from the Seignorial Courts of the town and
district, as well as certain cases especially reserved to
the Chdtelety such as dowries, rights of succession to
property, etc.
Appendix L 453
The Estates-General (£tats Ge"ne*raux).
Composed of three Chambers, consisting of deputies from
the three Orders of Nobles, Clergy, Tiers £tat (Third Estate).
Mode of Election. — On fixed day, nobles, clergy, and towns-
men met in chief town of Bailliage or Se"ne*chausse"e.
Nobles and Clergy by direct Election. — The nobles and
clergy drew up their cahiers (petitions), and elected their
deputies separately.
Tiers ittat by double Election. — The townsmen chose a
body of electors, who drew up the cahier, and elected the
deputy.
After 1484 the peasants of the villages took part in the
election of the Electoral Body.
In some of the Provinces a different system prevailed.
Thus in Languedoc and Champagne, the three orders elected
their deputies in common ; in Brittany, the deputies of one
order were chosen by the other two orders.
Procedure. — On the meeting of Estates- General the three
orders were summoned to a Royal Stance (Session), in which
the reasons for the summons were given.
The orders then separated, and each order proceeded to
draw up their general cahier apart. The three cahiers having
then been presented to the King, the States-General was
dismissed.
Powers. — The States-General were originally summoned
not to discuss, but to hear the will of the King, and to present
grievances.
These Petitions were of considerable value, for, although
the States-General was dismissed without having received
the answer of the King, the cahiers often furnished the basis
for royal ordinances. At various dates the Estates-General
attempted to gain the same powers as those finally secured
by the English Parliament :
1. Frequent and regular Sessions.
2. That their petitions should be answered.
3. Control of taxation and of policy.
4. Appointment, or at least responsibility, of ministers.
454 European History \ 1494- 1598
But in spite of notable attempts, especially those of 1355-
1358, 1484, 1561 (p. 398), 1576-7 (p. 423), 1588 (p. 431), the
States- General failed in obtaining its object, and after 1614,
ceased to be summoned until 1789.
Reasons for failure of the States-General. — It is sometimes
said that the States-General did not represent France ; it is
more correct to say that it represented France too well — in
its want of cohesion, its class divisions, its absence of local
government. Nor were the circumstances of the fifteenth and .
sixteenth centuries propitious. During that period, the hundred
years' war, and the religious wars, led the people of France to"
lean on the King ; the privileges of the feudal nobles pre-
vented any unanimity between the upper and lower classes,
and allowed the bureaucracy to gain such strength that it
was impossible subsequently to overthrow it.
Thus the causes of failure may be tabulated as follows : —
1. The existence of three Houses prevented unanimity, more
especially because they represented class divisions
which were deep. The nobility being a caste depend-
ent on blood ; while the upper offices of the Church
were also filled by nobles.
2. There was no class of country gentry as in England,
from whom the knights of the shire were elected, and
who united with the burgesses in the House of
Commons.
*
3. The number of royal officials elected as deputies of Tiers
d'Etat was generally very large.
4. The Estates-General of Orleans (1439), in establishing a
permanent army by the Ordonnance sur la Gendar-
merie, was held to have granted to the King a
permanent tax, the Taille ; and this, in spite of several
protests, was subsequently increased at the royal will.
5. Since the nobles and clergy were exempt from the Taille —
the first because they served in the feudal array ; the
latter because of their clerical privileges — the deputies
of these two orders did not support the Tiers £tat in
their attempt to control the purse. Thus the States-
General lost the control of the purse.
Appendix!. 455
6. There was no efficient local government like that of the
English shire. The real power being in the hands of
the royal officials, the Baillis and the Se*ne*schals, and
later, of the Intendants.
Provincial Estates. — It is true that all the Provinces of
France originally had their Provincial Estates composed
of three orders.
(i) But in many Provinces they were artificial creations.
(2) They were weakened by the same class divisions as
the States-General.
Accordingly after the fifteenth century many Provinces
lost their Estates, and finally only some four survived
the reign of Louis xiv., and even those had but little
power beyond that of assessing the Taille.
The Church. — The Church had its
(1) Ecclesiastical Courts, which as elsewhere in Europe had
attempted to extend their jurisdiction very widely,
not only over clergy but over laity. By the end of
the fifteenth century, however, their jurisdiction was
confined to offences of clerics or laics against morals,
the law or doctrine of the Church, and to cases con-
cerning the marriage and death-bed — e.g. divorce,
wills, etc. ; any attempt on the part of the Ecclesi-
astical Courts to encroach on the domain of secular
jurisdiction being met by the Appels comme d'abus
(abuse), which were presented to the Parlement of
Paris.
(2) Its Assemblies, in which, in and after the sixteenth
century, the clergy voted ' dons gratuits ' (voluntary
offerings) to the Crown.
The relations of the Church to the Crown and to the Pope
were further defined by the Pragmatic Sanction of
Bourges, and the Concordat of Bologna (cf. p. 81).
456 European History, 1494- 1598
TAXATION.
The revenue during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was
drawn from the following sources : —
I. The Royal Domain.
(a) Feudal incidents.
(&) Profits of Justice.
(c) Rights appertaining to the King as Sovereign — e.g. of
succeeding to property of aliens dying without
heirs, and of all bastards ; fines on land granted
in mortmain. f
II. Direct Taxes.
(1) The Taille, which was of two kinds —
(a) In the Pays d'litats it was generally a tax on the
value of land, assessed by regular assess-
ments, under orders of the Provincial
Assembly.
(b) In the other parts of France (the Pays d* Elec-
tion), it was a tax levied on presumed income
derived from whatever source, and assessed
in a very arbitrary fashion by Elus, who were
responsible to the Cour des Aides.
Exe?npt from the Taille were Nobles following arms,
Clergy, Students at the Universities, Royal Officials,
Municipal Authorities. Thus the tax fell practically
on the lower classes.
(2) Dons Gratuits. — Taxes on clergy voted by ecclesiastical
assemblies.
III. Indirect Taxes.
(1) Aides. — Dues levied on the sale of food-stuffs, wine,
and other articles.
(2) Gabelles. — Salt was a royal monopoly; and every
household had to buy so much salt for every member
above the age of eight. The price was very high,
but varied, as well as the amount to be bought, in
different Provinces^
Appendix /. 457
13) Customs at the frontiers of every Province. These in
later days were so heavy that a cask of w]ne would
pay its value before it reached Paris.
(4) Sale of Offices. — By the end of the sixteenth century
there was scarcely any royal office which was not
sold.
The Aides, Gabelles, and Customs were in the hands
of farmers of the taxes, who exercised great
extortion.
APPENDIX II
CONSTITUTION OF FLORENCE IN THE FIFTEENTH
AND SIXTEENTH CENTURIES.
I. Based on System of Guilds (since 1282), cf. Von Reumont,
Lorenzo de Medici, vol. i. pp. 15 and 67. Villari, Florence^
p. 312 ff.
Seven Greater Arti=Popolo Grasso.
Fourteen Lesser Arti = Popolo Minuto.
Each with its Council, Consuls, and Proconsuls. Number
of eligible citizens (Statuali), some 5000 out of 100,000.
I I . EXECUTIVE.— The College^ composed of fognory and Collegi—
/ tre Maggiori (offices).
(1) Signoria appointed for two months. Its members (unpaid
with exception of its Secretary, and Chancellor), lived in
Palazzo Publico at public cost.
Powers. — (a) Initiation of Legislation.
(5) Supreme Executive power.
(c) Right of summoning a Parlamento.
Members. — A. Gonfalonier of Justice (first instituted 1293),
must be forty-five years of age and a member of one
of Arti Maggiori. Presided over all Councils— and
could call out the Militia. Originally elected by the
Councils, but subsequently appointed by lot. Cf
below.
B. Eight Priori. — Two from each quarter of
the city (originally elected by the Arts), must be thirty
years old and members of a guild (six from Arti
Maggiori, two from Minori since 1345). Each Prior
presided with Gonfalonier for three days, and could put
any measure to the vote if Gonfalonier refused. (* II
proposto.')
453
Appendix II. 459
(2) The Colleagues (Collegi).
(a) Twelve Buonuomini (nine from greater, three from
lesser Arts). These acted as a Privy Council and
check on the Signory.
(&) Sixteen Gonfaloniers of the sixteen militia companies
(four from each quarter of the city), under the Capi-
tano del Popolo.
(c) Nine assessors of the Priors.
A permanent paid Secretary called ' Second Chancellor.1
Exceptional. Capitani di Parte Guelfa. — These instituted in
1297, for protection of city against Ghibellines, were con-
tinued long after danger had passed away. They were
from three to nine in number, elected for two months,
and empowered to administer proceeds of confiscated
property of Ghibellines exiled or condemned, and as
these sums were large the Capitani undertook the main-
tenance of fortresses and defences and public buildings.
By Law of 1358 all who held or had held office might be ac-
cused openly or secretly before the Capitani as being no
genuine Guelph. No witnesses for defence allowed — and
if the accusation was supported by six witnesses worthy
of belief the accused could be condemned to fine or
death, without appeal.
By the end of the fourteenth century, however, this tyrannical
organisation had somewhat lost its power.
III. Foreign Affairs were in hands of—
(1) Dieci di Guerra — called later Dieci di libertk e Pace —
first appointed 1423.
(2) Two Councils, which considered the bills concerning
foreign affairs before they went to the ordinary Councils.
(a) Consiglio del Dugento. — Two hundred of those who had
held the highest offices of State.
(6) Consiglio Centotrentuno, 131 (the Signory, Captains of
Guelph Party, Ten of War, Councils of craftsmen,
Consuls of Guilds, and forty eight citizens).
460 European History \ 1494- 1598
IV. Legislation after 1328.
A Law approved by the College went to —
1. The Two Councils of the Capitano del Popolo.
(a) Consiglio di Credenza or del Cento, 100 officials of
guilds, sometimes called Senate, often disregarded.
Cf. Nardi, 1, 4 (b). Symonds, Age of Despots, p. 530.
{p) Consiglio del Popolo, 300 originally chosen from the
greater Arts — later from others as well, renewed every
four months.
2. The Two Councils of the Podesta.
(a) A special Council of 90.
(b) The larger Consiglio del Podesta or del Commune, some
390. This contained judges and law officers (and there-
fore nobles, since nobles could hold these offices), as
well as popolani, and were renewed every four months.
Finally, a law having passed these Councils had to be submitted
to a General Council of them all.
The Signory and the colleagues ex officio were members of
these Councils.
System of voting. By ballot. Black and white beans. Black
= yes, white = no. § of black beans necessary to carry a question.
Tenere le fave or il partito = To vote no.
Rendere le fave or il partito = To vote yes.
L'autorita dei sei fave m Majority of § in Signory.
(6 out of 9.)
II piu della fave « § of votes.
V. Justice.
1. Court of Capitano del Popolo — a paid officer — must be a
foreign noble and lawyer. Exercised summary criminal
jurisdiction, especially over Plebs.
2. Court ofPodestd, — a paid officer — must be a foreign (Italian)
noble and lawyer. Exercised higher civil and criminal
jurisdiction.
% Executor of Justice — a paid officer — must be a popolano
and a Guelph and a foreigner. Exercised summary
jurisdiction, especially over nobles.
All these held office for six months.
Appendix II. 461
4. Casa delta Mercaianzia. A tribunal for decision of Com-
mercial Cases, which also acted as a Board of Trade.
5. Otto di Balia e Guardia, nominated by Signory, held
office for four months.
A court of appeal from Court of Podesta and with powers of
police.
The Signoria and the Otto had power to execute, banish, or
imprison any citizen.
VI. Mode of Appointment to Chief Magistracies.
Originally elected by the Councils, but subsequently this
replaced by system of ' lot.'
For each office a purse (borsa), was formed every three or five
years of all citizens eligible to said office, and names were drawn
out of this purse.
In case of Priors, fifty wax balls, each containing eight names
(six from Arti Maggiori, two from Minori), were put in the purse,
and then a ball was drawn out.
Eligibility (Benefiziati, the Eligible). — This was decided by a
Squittino (Scrutiny) conducted by a board — and persons could
be considered ineligible ' messo a sedere,' for the following reasons
(the disenfranchised 9000 out of 100,000) : —
I. (a) Grandi. — By Ordini della Guistizia, 1293, nobles could
not be members of the Signoria or of the Collegi or
of Consiglio del Popolo until 1434, when Cosimo
allowed them to enter Guilds.
(b) The Plebe or Ciompi, all not members of Guilds.
(c) Inhabitants of Contado, country districts.
2 Ammonito. — ' Warned' for any political offence, e.g. being
a Ghibelline, and denounced by the Capitano del Parti
Guelfa ; disqualification for life or shorter time. This
system carried to great extravagance. ' Hast thou no
enemy? Consent to admonish mine and I will do the
same by thine.' Cf. Napier, ii. 235.
3. Moroso di Specchio (mirror). — One who had not paid his
taxes. (Netto di Specchio^ freed from this ineligibility.)
By law of 142 1, taxes must have been paid for thirty
years by self, father and grandfather.
4, Divieto (prohibited). — Even after names were drawn a
462 European History \ 1494- 1598
man might be disqualified because he or a relation had
recently held office — * veduto ma non seduto.'
The members of the board bound to secrecy, but
(1) As the period for which the purses had been made up
drew to its close, it became possible to guess who would
be the coming magistrates, and there were charlatans
who pretended to foretell this.
(2) The members of the boards of scrutiny were bribed to
divulge the names who would be drawn.
Legalised Revolution. — At times of crisis the Signoria would
summon a Parlamento nominally of the whole citizens,
but generally only of party adherents, who granted
exceptional powers (Balia) to a certain number of citizens.
The Balia (1) could alter the constitution.
(2) Appointed Accopiatori (couplers or joiners)
who selected those eligible to office, and some-
times nominated the officials, i.e. appointed
*a mano' instead of 'a sorte.'
In 1459 (under Cosimo) a council of 100 was instituted to
elect the Accopiatori.
Florence enjoyed political, but no civil liberty.
(1) Powers of magistrates unchecked.
(2) No appeal from Law Courts. Arbitrary Jurisdiction.
(3) No liberty of Press.
CHANGES IN THE CONSTITUTION.
N.B. Signory lasted till 1530.
I. Under Lorenzo.
1472. Burd, Machiavelli, 81, 85, 89; Pen-ens' Histoire de
Florence, Depuis la domination des Mddicisy 1, 362,
445) 523 > Armstrong, Lorenzo de* Medici.
Arti reduced to 12 by suppression of 9 Arti minori.
1480. After Pazzi Conspiracy.
Consiglio de Settanta (College of 70), appointed by
Signoria with power to fill up its own vacancies from
those who had held office of Gonfalonier.
Its work (a) To permanently nominate to offices (a mano).
(b) Appoint the Otto di Pratica which superseded
the old Dieci di Liberta e Pace.
This College, originally appointed for five years, was con-
tinually reappointed.
Appendix II. 463
In 1490. This College intrusted some of its powers to a smaller
Committee of 17, of whom Lorenzo was one ; and
this Committee
(a) Appointed Accopiatori to nominate to offices.
(b) Supervised every branch of administration.
II. 1494. Savonarola's Reforms. Cf. Burd, p. 94. Guicciar-
dini, Storia Fiorentia, iii. 1 20. Villari, Savonarola, p. 2 57.
Perrens, ii. c. 3. Cambridge Mod. Hist., vol. i. p. 158.
(1) Temporary. — A Parlamento summoned, who appointed 20
Accopiatori (Governo de* Venti). These rilled up
magistracies for the year and prepared a Squittino for
the future.
(2) Permanent. — Constitution formed in imitation of Venice.
Consiglio del Popolo and del Commune and Parlamento
abolished.
A. Consiglio Generate, or Maggiore, formed of all
eligible ' benefiziati ' citizens (all those of age of
29 whose father, grandfather:, or great-grandfather
had been veduto^r seduto for one of three greater
offices, about 3000). But if the number of the
'benefiziati' exceeded 1500, they were to be
' sterzati,' i.e. divided into 3, and J of the whole
number were to form the Consiglio for 6 months.
A small number of citizens, above age of 24 and
otherwise qualified, were admitted, and each year
60 eligible but neither vedutcr nor seduto might
be elected if they received two-thirds of votes.
B. Consiglio degli Ottanta, a Senate elected out of and
by Consiglio Generale for six months, must be
40 years of age.
The Senate was to advise The Signory (which
remained as before), and elect ambassadors
and commissioners to army.
The Consiglio Generale was
(i) To elect to magistracies by a complicated system of
voting and selection by lot. Cf. Guicciardini,
Storia Fiorentina, iii. 125.
(Subsequently the system of direct appointment
by lot was again introduced. Cf. Guicciardini,
iii. 155, 203, 235.)
(2) To hear criminal appeals from the Signory and Otto
di Balia.
464 European History \ 1494- 1598
(3) To pass laws. The President // Proposto} one of the
Signory, changed every third day, laid the law
before the Signory and the Collegi. If they
approved it might be submitted to a Practica of
selected members of the Consiglio d'Ottanta.
Thence it went before the Ottanta, and then to
the Consiglio Generale. Here laws could not be
discussed, though Signory might call on some one
to speak in support, but were voted on.
C. Dieci di Liberta e Pace (called also Dieci di Balia), again
restored in place of the Otto di Pratica. The Signory,
the Courts of the Capitano and of the Podesta, the
Mercatanzia, and the Otto di Balia remained as before.
The Dieci di Pace e Liberta restored.
In 1498. The Courts of the Podesta and the Capitano del
Popolo were restored.
This Government lasted till 1512, with these exceptions : —
(i) In 1502.
{a) The Gonfalonier to be elected for life, by a double
system of nomination and election. Piero Soderini
elected. (Guicciardini, iii. 281 ; Villari, Life oj
Machiavelli, ii. 102 ; Perrens, Hist. Flor. ii. 408.)
(b) Courts of Podesta, of the Capitano del Popolo, and of
Mercatanzia abolished. Instead, the Ruota delta
Justizia composed of five Doctors of Law with civil
and criminal jurisdiction. These to be foreigners
elected by Signory and the College forthree years, and
paid, one of whom was to be Podesta. The Merca-
tanzia, however, continued as a Board of Trade,
(ii) 1 506. A militia instituted at suggestion of Machiavelli.
All males from 1 5 — 50 years of age to serve, but only
from the city and country district (contado) of Florence.
Not from her subject cities. (Burd, 126.)
The militia placed under a new board of nine, Nove
delta Milizia, which however was under the Dieci di
Liberta e Pace in time of war.
Til. 1 512. Return of Medici.
The constitution restored as it was before the revolution of
1494, although nomination to offices lay practically in hands of
the Medici, Giuliano, and Lorenzo. (Burd, 145, 148.)
Appendix II 465
IV. 1527. Re-establishment of the constitution 01 Savonarola,
1494, except that Gonfalonier was to be elected for 13 months.
V. 1530. Final overthrow of the Republic. Perrens, Hist.
Flor., iii. 368.
Alessandro de Medici appointed Grand Duke.
12 Reformatori elected in a Parlamento to 'reform ' the State.
1. Signory abolished.
2. A Council of 200 elected for life.
3. A Senate of 48 elected for life from the 200, with powers
of legislation and taxation, and appointment to offices.
4. A Privy Council of four Councillors elected for three
months by 12 Accopiatori chosen out of the Senate.
These with the hereditary Grand Duke fulfilled
duties of the Signory.
The Otto di Pratica ^
The Otto di Guardia 1- to be nominated by the Senate.
The Buonuomini J
All distinction between higher and lower 'arti' abolished.
The offices paid.
TAXATION.
See Napier, iii. 117. Von Reumont, i. 30. Ewart, Cosimo d£
Medici. Armstrong, Lorenzo di Medici.
I. Indirect Taxes. Import and Export Duties. Monopoly on Salt.
II. On Real and Personal Property.
III. Prestanze. — Forced loans on the estimated property. In
theory these were to be repaid and interest paid mean-
while, but this was rarely done ('tenere i luoghi' (shares)
= to withhold the payment of interest), so much so that
most took advantage of the law, that where the amount
did not exceed two golden florins they might pay one-third
down and forfeit all claim to interest or repayment.
The system led to great abuse. The influential got
repaid, not so the poor. Hence speculators connected
with Government bought up claims on the State for small
sums, and then got the loan refunded.
The Assessment (estimo) of citizen's property for II. and III.
was originally managed thus —
1. A Balia appointed who assigned to each ward their quota.
2. In each ward. Seven Boards of seven each (Sette Settine)
made seven schedules of assessment on the citizens
according to their jdea of the property of each individual.
PERIOD IV. 2 0
466 European History, 1494- 1598
3. These seven schedules were sent to some of the best
reputed monasteries, which rejected the four schedules
which differed most widely, and then, adding up the
amounts assessed to each taxpayer by the three remain-
ing schedules, divided the total by 3.
But under this system numerous exceptions had crept in ;
indeed, the rich were largely exempted on the plea that
they served the State by taking office.
Hence the reform of the Catasto, 1427 (Accatastare, to heap
up). A valuation made every five years of all property
subject to taxation. (Lands, movables within or without
city, rents, profits of business.)
From this sum capitalised at the rate of 7 per cent., i.e. 7 florins
income = 100 florins capital, deductions for necessary
expenses were made. The remainder, which was looked
upon as a surplus, was liable to be taxed either for direct
tax or for loans at the rate of \ per cent, on the capital.
From the time of Cosimo the Assessment was made by officials
instead of representative Committees, and the principle of
graduation was introduced. This became perpetual in
1480, when the tax was thrown on land only at ^jth of
annual value (the Decima Scalatd). In 1482 the tax on
movables and professions (Arbilrio) was reintroduced.
Under Savonarola, 1494, the system of graduation was abolished
and the Decima was levied on land only, but shortly after
the old system was re-established.
In 1503. The Arbitrio, a tax on Professions established.
IV. Poll Tax from i\ to 4^ florins per head between ages 17-70.
In cases of large young families only one member taxed.
Subject Towns and Districts of two kinds.
1. Somissio by conquest or compact. The relation of Florence
to these differed ; but, generally speaking, the Podesta was
appointed by Florence, and an appeal lay to Florentine
Courts, while the dependent city kept its own government
and laws, and more or less freedom of taxation.
The trade relations were peculiar. Both mother city
and dependent cities maintained protective duties against
each other.
2. Accomandigia. — Under a Protectorate, the town then called
Raccomandato. This did not amount to much more than
acknowledging the Florentine supremacy, and following
her lead in war.1
* Guicciardini in his Ricordi says : ' The subjects of a Republic are in worse
Appendix III. 467
Causes of instability of Florentine Government —
1. Conflict between idea of equality and desire of families to rule.
2. Jealousy of the Executive.
3. No adaptability in the Constitution.
4. Weakness and partiality of Justice.
5. Taxation the sport of parties, except when regulated by the
Catasto, and that only for a short time.
6. Turbulent character of its citizens.
7. Oppressive government of its subject cities.
APPENDIX III
VENETIAN CONSTITUTION IN THE FIFTEENTH
AND SIXTEENTH CENTURIES
Authorities. — Daru, Histoire de la Ripublique de Venise, B. xxxix.
Brown, Venice, pp. 163, 177, 398 ; Venetian Studies, p. 178.
I. The Great Council (Maggior Consiglio).
Confined by law of 1296 to the families of those who were
then members {Serrata del Maggior Consiglio). Thejeligible
had to be elected, but were, as a matter of fact, always
elected. No one. could take his seat until the age of twenty-
five, with the exception of thirty who were elected every
December, and a few specially allowed to do so, in return
for loans lent to the State.
Its functions were chicflyJEfccfiEM All officials, and magis-
trates elected by it, except a few of the highest officers, e.g.
the Savii Grandi, the Savii di Terra Firma, and the Admiral.
System of Election. — Nominators, chosen by lot in the.
Council, elected candidates — sometimes two, sometimes four —
for~~the vacant office. The names of these candidates were
then submitted to the Council, and the one who received
most votes was declared elected.
The Great Council also originally enjoyed (a) some legis-
lative powers, but these were gradually absorbed by the
Senate ; (6) judicial powers. On presentation by the College
they tried commanders accused of negligence or incompetency.1
case than those of a Prince. A Republic grants no share of its grandeur to
any but citizens of its chief city while oppressing others. A Prince considers
all equally his subjects.'
1 The College decided whether the offender should be tried by the Council
or the Senate. If he was accused of treason, the case went to the Council of Ten.
468 European History, 1494- 1 598
II. The Senate (Pregadi, i.e. the Invited), 246 in number: —
(a) Sixty elected in the Great Council for one year.
(6) Sixty (the Zonta, i.e. addition) elected by the outgoing
Senate and confirmed by the Great Council.
(c) Ex officio. — The Doge, his six Councillors, members of
Supreme Court of Criminal Appeal, and members of
financial and judicial departments.
(d) Fifty minor officials, who had a right to debate, but not
to vote.
Its Functions.
(a) Chiefly Legislative. — It passed laws on the proposal of
the College.
(6) Elected a few of the higher officials.
The Savii Grandi.
The Savii di Terra Firma.
The Admiral.
(c) Sometimes tried commanders accused of negligence or
incompetence.
III. The Council of Ten (Consiglio de' Dieci). — After 13 10
this Council absorbed some of the functions of the Senate.
Brown, Venice, p. 177.
How elected.
Eox-ane__ye_ar, by the Maggior Consiglio, out of a list ot
twenty, of which ten were elected by the Consiglio,
ten by the Doge, his Councillors, and the Chiefs of
the Supreme Court of Justice. No member to be
re-eligible for a year after holding office. The Doge
and his six Councillors were ex-officio members. Sub-
sequently, twenty additional members were elected in
the Maggior Consiglio for each important case.
Functions. — (a) It looked after urgent questions of finance,
pujilic-iiolicy, and railftagfcjotganisatioii
(&) Tried cases of treason, and other cases removed from
the ordinary courts by the College.
Appendix TIL 469
IV. The Collegio proposed measures to the Senate, and was
the Supreme Executive Authority.
Members.— (a) The Doge, six Councillors, three Presidents
of the Criminal Court of Appeal.
(&) Six Savii Grandi, elected by the Senate for a period of
six months. Must be 38 years old.
These superintended the action of the hoards
below them, and fulfilled the work of the responsible
ministers of State.
(c) Five Savii di Terra Firma, elected for six months. Must
be 30 years old.
1. Savio alia Scrittura. Minister of War.
2. Savio Cassier. Chancellor of Exchequer.
3. Savio alle Ordinanze. Minister for Native
Militia.
4. Savio ai da mo. Minister for execution of urgent
matters.
5. Savio ai ceremoniali. Minister for ceremonies
of State.
(d) Five Savii da Mar, or agli ordini.
The Board of Admiralty, elected for six months,
worked under direct superintendence of the Savii
Grandi. Had a vote, but no voice in the College.
Filled for most part with young men, who here
received their political education.
V. The Doge. — Elected for life, by forty-one electors, themselves
chosen by ballot, and vote in the Great Council (cf. Brown,
Venice, p. 150). His position ornamental. He, with his six.
Councillors, ™"Q wprp eWted for eight months in the Qreat
Council, presided over the Council, the Senate, the College,
and all State affairs were conducted in his name. But he
had nojx>wer without his six Councillors, and little even
with them.
VI. Justice. — This was administered by four Supreme Courts
formed of judges elected out of its own members by the
Great Council, who held office nominally for one year, but
were usually re-elected.
470 European History \ 1494- 1598
(a) Criminal. — The members of this Court sat in the
Senate, and its three presidents in the College.
(b) Three Courts of Civil Jurisdiction: of which one heard
appeals from the inferior Courts in Venice, the other
two from the Courts in the dependencies.
No decision of the appellant Court was valid unless it con-
firmed the decision of the inferior Court ; and in the event
of their decisions differing, the matter was constantly
referred backward and forward until the Court of first
instance and the Supreme Court could agree.
VII. Taxation. — Venice always objected to permanent direct
taxation, and it was not till 1530 that she resorted to an
income tax.
The chief taxes were :
1. Forced loans, redeemable or not, on which the State
paid regular interest. This system, adopted in 1171,
is perhaps the earliest instance of a national debt
2. Each member of a guild paid —
(a) The Taglione= capitation fee for belonging to a
guild.
(b) The Tansa insensibile** tax on profits of his work.
3. Duties on imports and exports.
4. Trade in salt, which was a State monopoly. The profits
of this trade at home and abroad amounted at times to
one-tenth of the gross revenue.
5. Profits of the fttate Bank, which did business often with
foreign princes.
6. In days of her decline Venice also resorted to the system
of selling public offices.
VIII. Government of Dependencies. — Aim to leave as much^
independence as was compatible with maintenance of
Venetian supremacy, and to assimilate the government
of the dependent town as closely as was possible with
that of Venice.
The representatives of the Venetian Supremacy were the
Rettori.
Appendix III. 47 1
That is—
1. The Podesta — the supreme civil officer, with control over
the police, the fiscal, and other administrative work.
2. The Capitano — who looked after the local levies and
other forces.
Both these officials were in immediate communication with
the Venetian Senate and the Ten, but were bound by
oath to respect the local privileges.
Under the Rector stood the Free Municipal Government,
which varied in every town, but was always presided
over by a Podesta — an elected officer, who was sometimes
a native, sometimes a Venetian, sometimes the Rector
himself.
Reasons for stability of Venetian Government —
1. Coincidence of theoretical and practical Sovereignty in the
same hands.
2. Adaptability of the Constitution, e.g. gradual assumption of
power by Senate, and then by the Ten.
3. Strength of the Executive which excited no jealousy.
4. Impartiality of Justice.
5. Provision made for nobles in Government of Dependencies,
for the middle class in civil service and commerce, for the
lower classes in the fleet
6 Large alien Population who did not want political power,
but to be judged fairly, taxed lightly, and find employ-
ment.
For the imperial Institution, see pp. 106, 145.
For the Spanish Constitution, see pp. 92, 299.
THE POPES, 1494 to 1598,
1 Alexander vi. (Rodrigo Borgia), August 1492 to 1503.
V Pius in., (Francis Piccolomini), September to October 1503.
•J Julius 11. (Julian della Rovere), November 1503 to February
1513.
Leo x. (Giovanni dei Medici), March 1513 to December 1521.
^Adrian vi. (Tutor of Charles v.), January 1522 to September 1523.
^Clement vii. (Giulio dei Medici), November 1523 to September
1534.
^aul in. (Alexander Farnese), October 1534 to November 1549.
Julius ill. (Giovanni Maria del Monte), February 15 50 to March
1555-
Marcellus It (Marcello Cervini), April 1555.
Paul IV. (John Peter Caraffa), May 1555 to April 1559.
Pius IV. (Giovanni Angelo dei Medici), December 1559 to
December 1565.
Pius V. (Michael Ghislieri), January 1566 to May 1572.
Gregory xin. (Hugh Buoncompagno), May 1572 to April 1585.
Sixtus v. (Felix Peretti), April 1585 to August 1590.
Urban VII. (Giovanni Baptist Castogna), September 1590.
Gregory XIV. (Nicholas Sfondrati), December 1590 to October
1 591.
Innocent ix. (Giovanni Antony Facchinetti), October to Decem-
ber 1591.
Clement vin. (Ippolito Aldobrandini), January 1592 to March
1605.
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INDEX
AARGAU, I20.
Aben-Aboo, King of Moriscoes, 290.
Aben-Farax, a leader of the Moris-
coes, 288.
Aben-Humeya, King of Moriscoes,
288, 290.
Abruzzi, the, 40.
Adrian vi., tutor to Charles v., ap-
pointed Regent of Castile, 139;
Pope, 161 ; policy of, 162 ; death
and character of, 164.
Aerschot, Duke of, 348, 354.
Africa, Portuguese conquests in, 85 ;
Spanish possessions in, 97, 206, 208.
Agnadello, battle of, 63.
Albert, and Albert Alcibiades. See
Brandenburg.
Albert, Cardinal-Archduke of Austria,
Governor of Netherlands, 383 ; in-
vades France, 440 ; retreats, 442.
Albret, Alan d', in command against
Spain, 46.
■ Charlotte d', 35.
John d\ King of Navarre, 46.
Albuquerque, Portuguese Commander
in India, 87.
Alencon, Hercules Francis, Due d',
offered sovereignty of Netherlands,
347; marriage negotiations with
Elizabeth, 413 ; sides with Hugue-
nots, 418 ; deserts them, 423. See
Anjou.
Alessandria pillaged, 37.
Alessandro. See Medici.
Alexander of Parma. See Parma.
Alexander vi. , Pope, 17 ; makes terms
with Charles, 20 ; flies to Perugia,
22 ; suspends and excommunicates
Savonarola, 27, 28 ; family policy,
35 ; ratines treaty of Granada, 41 ;
death, 46 ; policy of, 49-53.
— Alfonso the Magnanimous, 15.
— — II., 15; succeeds Ferrante, 12;
marriage with Ippolita of Milan,
15 ; abandons alliance with Milan,
16; abdicates, 20; escapes from
San Germano, 21.
Alfonso of Este, 51.
Algiers, taking of, 97.
Allegre, Ives d', 50.
Almeyda, Portuguese Commander in
India, 86.
Alost, revolt at, 349.
Alva, Duke of, success in Italy,
253 ff. ; takes Lisbon, 298 ; min-
ister, 304 ff. ; sent to Netherlands,
327 ; success in Netherlands, 331 ff. ;
system of taxation, 337 ff. ; asks for
recall, 339 ; attempts to subdue re-
volt, 341 ff. ; leaves Netherlands,
343 ; at Conference of Bayonne,
406.
Frederick, son of Duke, defeats
Genlis before Mons, 341 ; takes
Haarlem, 342.
Alviano, Bartolomeo d', 64.
Amboise, George, Cardinal of, 35,
46.
Castle of, 25 ; ' Tumult ' of, 396 ;
' Pacification ' of, 406.
Amiens, Conference of, 181 ; seizure
of, 441.
Amsterdam, rise of, 365.
Ancona, 49.
Angoulfime, Francis of. See Francis I.
Anjou, Hercules Francis, Duke 01
(cf. Alencon), in Netherlands, 355
ff. , 360 ; death of, 426.
Henry, Duke of (cf. Henry
in. ), made Lieutenant-Governor of
France, 407 ; defeats Coligny, 409 ;
marriage negotiations, 412 and foil.;
plots massacre of St. Bartholomew,
414-416. See Henry in.
Anne. See Austria, Brittany, Saxony,
and Beaujeu.
Annona, assault of, 57.
Andrada, Fernando de, 45.
477
47$
European History, 1 494- 1 5 98
Anspach, George Frederick of, suc-
ceeds Albert Alcibiades of Bran-
denburg, 246.
Antonio, Don, claims crown of Portu-
gal, 297, 378.
Antony. See Navarre.
Antwerp, rise of, 87, 319; sack of,
350; capitulation, commercial de-
cline, 365.
Apulia, 42, 44.
Aragon, Ferdinand of, reclaims Rous-
sillon, 6; Treaty of Barcelona, 7;
Lord of Sicily and Sardinia, 11 ;
aids Ferrante, 24 ; Treaty of Gra-
nada, 40 ; war with Louis xn. , 42,
48 ; character of, second marriage,
and death, 104 ff.
— Catherine of, marriage, 92.
Isabella of, marriage, 92.
Joanna of, marriage, 92.
John of, death, 92.
Constitutional rights of, 92 ; po-
licy of Ferdinand, 94; Cortes of,
extracts confirmation of liberties
from Charles v., 138; not fulfilled,
144 ; under Philip, 300.
Armada, 375 ff.
Arques, battle of, 433.
Arezzo, department of Florence, 52.
Arras, Union of, 357.
Asti, 37 ; acquired by Savoy, 194.
Atella. fall of, 24.
Aubigny, Stuart d', Governor of Cal-
abria, 22 ; invades Italy, 37 ; enters
Rome, 41 ; gains Calabria, 43.
Augsburg, Diets of (1530), in, 198,
230, 234, 247 ; ' Confession ' of, 198 ;
(1555) Compromise on religious
question, 247 ff.
Augustus. See Saxony.
Aumont, Marshal d', 433.
Austria, Anne of, marriage, 285.
Don John of. See John of
Austria.
Aversa, battle of, 191.
Avila, Sancho de, 334 ; aids mutiny
of Spanish soldiery, 349.
Axel, surprise of, 370.
Backerzell, 336.
Bailiwicks, the Swiss, 120.
Bajazet 11. intrigues with Alexander
VI., 17, 36.
Baglione, Gian Paolo, of Perugia,
53.
Barbarossa, Hayraddin, and Huroc,
206, 208.
Barberigo, Venetian admiral at Le
panto, 294.
Barcelona, Treaty of, 7, 192.
Barletta, 44.
Basel, Peace of, 124.
Basilicata, the, 42.
Barneveld, John Van Olden, 368,
37I-.
Bavaria, Duke William of, supports
election of Charles, at head of
Suabian League, drives out Duke
Ulrich, 131 ; approves of his re-
storation, 210 ; won over by Charles,
222.
Albert in., Duke of, 446.
Bayard, 43, 172.
Bayonne, Conference of, 406.
Beaujeu, Anne of, 5. — -
Susanna of, 33.
Bentivoglio, Giovanni, of Bologna,
50, 52, 53-
Bergen, Marquis of, 327, 336.
Bergerac, Treaty of, 424.
Berlaymont, Count, 321, 333.
Berquin, Louis de, 388.
B^za, Theodore, successor of Calvin,
274.
Bicocca, battle of, 163.
Bienne, 121.
Birago, successor of L'Hdpital as
Chancellor, 414.
Biron, Marshal de, 425, 435, 439.
Biseglia, Duke of, second husband of
Lucrezia Borgia, 52. [of, 61.
Blois, Treaty of, 36 ; second Treaty
Boisot, Admiral, relieves Leyden, 345.
Bologna in hands of Giovanni Benti-
voglio, 50; under French protec-
tion, 51 ; threatened by Borgia, 52;
gained by Pope Julius 11. , 56 ; Con-
cordat of, 81.
Bonnivet, Admiral, 173.
Borgia, Cassar, 47, 49-56; released
from ordination vows, 35 ; conquests
in Romagna, 50 ; subdues revolt of
his captains, 53 ; death, 55.
Lucrezia, marriages, 52.
Rodrigo. See Alexander VI.
Borromeo, Carlo, Archbishop of
Milan, 268, 302.
Bouillon, Robert de la Marck, Lord
of, 147.
Bourbon, family of, 392.
Charles, Cardinal of, 392 ; can-
didate of League for Crown, 428,
433 ; reproaches to Catherine, 432 ;
death, 435.
Index
4?9
Bourbon, Due de, quarrels with
Francis, commands Italian army
with success, 172 ; wins battle of
Pavia, 175 ; takes Rome, death, 186.
Bourg, Anne de, 391 ; death, 396.
Bourges, Pragmatic Sanction of, 81 ;
Bragadino, 294. [surrender of, 405.
Brandenburg, Albert of, 125 ; secu-
larises Prussia, 197.
Albert Alcibiades (of Branden-
burg-Culmbach) joins Charles, 222;
joins Maurice against Charles,
241; rejoins Charles, defeated by
Maurice, 245; driven from Germany,
— Joachim 1. of, 131. [246.
John Cicero of, 108.
John of Brandenburg- Kustrin,
Breda, Conference of, 346. [222.
Brederode, Henry, Viscount of, 326,
Brescia, assault of, 67. L330
Bresse ceded to France, 445.
Briconnet, Bishop of Meaux, 307.
Brille seized by ' Beggars of the Sea,'
339« 4*3 I handed over to Elizabeth,
366.
Brindisi occupied by Venice, 24.
Brissac yields Paris to Henry IV. , 437.
Brisson, death, 434.
Brittany, Anne of, betrothed to
Maximilian, marries (1) Charles
viii., 6; (2) Louis xii., 34. .
Brouage, fall of, 423.
Brunswick, House of, in Luneburg
and Wolfenbuttel, 167.
Brussels, Union of, 351.
Buchhurst, Lord, 372.
Buda, battle of, 214.
Bugey ceded to France, 445.
Bundschuh, the, 116, 176.
Buoncompagno, Cardinal. See
Gregory xm.
Burgrave, Daniel de, secretary to
Leicester, 368.
Burgundy, Mary, heiress of, 126.
Burleigh, Lord, 414.
Buys, Paul, 368.
Cadiz, Sack of, 383.
Cajetan, Cardinal, Papal Legate,
156.
Calabria, 40.
Calais taken by Duke of Guise, 255 ;
taken by Archduke Albert, 440.
Calvin, John, early life, 272 ; at
1 Geneva, 273 ff.
Cambray, Capitulation of, 439;
League of, 63 ; Peace of, 193.
Camerino in hands of Giulio Caesare
Varano, 50 ; occupied by Caesar
Borgia, 52.
Campeggio, Legate of Clement vii.,
170.
Cappel, battle of, 203 ; second Treaty
of, 203.
Capitanata, the, 42.
Capitulations signed by Charles v.,
i34.
Capponi, Nicolo, re-establishes
Florentine republic, 189.
Capua, fall of, 41.
Caraffa and the Counter- Reformation,
262. See Paul IV.
Caravaggio, 37.
Carberry Hill, battle of, 339.
Cardona, Raymond de, commands
army of Holy League, 67; loses
battle of Ravenna, 68.
Carlos, Don, mystery of, 281 ff. ; pro-
posal for marriage of, 407.
Carlotta of Naples, 35.
Carranza, Archbishop of Toledo, 280.
Castellaneta, 44.
Castile, constitutional privileges of,
92, 299; centralising policy of
Ferdinand and Isabella, 93 ; social
cleavages in, 137 ; protests of Cortes
to Charles v., 138; unsuccessful
revolt, 140 ff. ; loss of liberties, 144.
Isabella of. See Isabella.
Catalonia, 46.
Cateau Cambr6sis, Treaty of, 257.
Caterina Sforza. See Sforza.
Catherine. See Medici and Navarre.
Cecil, Sir Thomas, Governor of Brille,
366.
Lord Burleigh, 414.
Cerdagne, cession of, 7.
Cerignola, battle of, 45.
Cerisoles, battle of, 216.
Cesena, surprise of, 56.
1 Chambres mi-parties,' 421, 424, 443.
•Champagny, brother of Granvella,
357-
Chandieu, a Swiss leader, 45.
Charles in., Duke of Savoy. See
Savoy.
v. , betrothal, 42, 61 ; Governor
of Netherlands, alliance with
Francis L, 78 ; King of Spain, 82 ;
Peace of Noyon, 82 ; character of,
130; early difficulties in Spain,
137 ff. ; disputes with Diet of
Worms, 145 ff. ; attitude to Luther,
159 ; leagued with Henry vm. and
4&0
European History \ 1494- 1598
Leo X., 160; with Adrian vi.,
Milan, Genoa, Florence, and Ven-
ice, 164 ; Spanish sympathies, 165 ;
attitude towards Luther, 171 ff. ;
success in Italy; alliance with
Henry vm. , 172 ff. ; makes Treaty
of Madrid, 183 ; opposed by League
of Cognac, 184; his success over
Clement, 186 ; makes Treaty of
Barcelona, 192 ; makes Treaty of
Cambray, 193; conciliatory policy
in Italy, 194 ; crowned by Pope at
Bologna, 195 ; forced to procras-
tinate in Germany, makes peace of
Nuremberg ; repulses Solyman ;
leaves Germany, 204; his diffi-
culties, 205 ; negotiations and
quarrel with Francis, 207 ; tries to
win over the Protestants, 213 ;
alliance with Henry vm. , 215 ;
holds Diet of Spires, 216 ; Treaty
of Crespi, 217; secures various
princes, 222 ; issues ban against
recalcitrants, 224 ; arrangement
with Ferdinand as to succession,
235 ; failure of ecclesiastical policy,
and of political schemes, 236 ff. ;
agrees to Treaty of Passau, 243;
ill-success against France, 244 ;
Diet of Augsburg, 247; policy in
Netherlands, 317 ff. ; abdication,
250 ; death, character of, 251 ff.
Charles vm., Accession of, 5; be-
trothed to Margaret of Hapsburg,
but marries Anne of Brittany, 6;
makes treaties of Naples, Senlis, and
Barcelona, 7 ; claims on Naples,
15 ; invades Italy, 17, 22 ; retreats,
22, 24 ; death, 25.
ix., Accession, 398 ; declared of
age, 406; jealous of Anjou, 410;
supports Coligny, 411 ff. ; massacre
of St. Bartholomew, 414 ff. ; death,
420.
of Guise. See Guise.
Charron joins in massacre of St.
Bartholomew, 414.
Chatillon, Odet, Cardinal of, 393.
Chaves, Fray Diego de, 307, 309.
Chievres, 138 ; attitude towards
Luther, 158 ; death of, 164.
Chimay, son of Duke of Aerschot,
surrenders Bruges, 362.
Chinchon, Archbishop of Saragossa,
Count de, 309. [301
Circles of German Empire, 114.
Citta di Castello, 53.
Claude, daughter of Louis XII., 34,
42, 61, 78.
of Guise. See Guise.
Clement vn. -tries to enforce Edict of
Worms, 175& ff. ; vacillation of, 172,
174; concludes Holy League of
Cognac with Francis, Sforza, Ven-
ice, and Florence, 184 ; obliged to
submit to Moncada, but breaks
terms, 185; sack of Rome by
Germans, 186; captivity, 187;
selfish policy, final reconciliation
with Charles, 192; cites Henry's
cause to Rome, 193; defensive
alliance against Charles, 194;
crowns Charles at Bologna, 195 ;
refuses a General Council, 199;
death, 207.
vm., 440.
Cleves, Duke of, claims Gueldres, 214;
forced to resign pretensions, 216.
Coeworden, capitulation of, 381.
Cognac ceded to Huguenots, 410 ;
Holy League of, 184.
Coligny, Gaspard de, Admiral, de-
fence of St. Quentin, 255 ; in power,
340; connected with Bourbons,
393; deprived of governorship of
Picardy, 395 ; joins Conde\ 402 ;
retires on Orleans, 405 ; opposes
pacification of Amboise, 406 ; in
supreme command, 408; defeated
at Moncontour, 409 ; expedition,
Peace of St. Germain, 410; his
foreign policy adopted by court,
411 ; attempted assassination, 414;
death of, 415.
Cologne, Hermann von der Wied,
Archbishop of, 132 ; becomes pro-
testant, 211 ; resigns, 227.
Diet of, 114. [mander, 79.
Colonna, Prospero, Milanese com-
Columbus, Bartholomew, 100.
Christopher, difficulties in obtain-
ing assistance, 99 ; his discoveries
and rule in Hispaniola, 100 ff.
Comuneros, revolt of, 137-144.
Conde\ Louis of (a Bourbon), 392 ;
tried for conspiracy, 397 ; appeals
to arms, 402 ; taken prisoner, 405 ;
pacification of Amboise, 406 ; defeat
at Jarnac, death, 408.
Henry of, in hands of Catherine,
415 ; connected with ' Politiques,'
418 ; escape of, 420 ; comes to
terms with Catherine, 421.
Condotheri, their influence, 7-13.
Constance, Diet of, 62, 114.
Index
4$ I
Contarinl, 212.
Coqueville, 335.
Corbeil, occupation of, 434.
Cordova, Gonzalvo de, Spanish
general in Italian war, 24, 43-48 ;
character of, 48.
Cortona, department of Florence, 9.
Cardinal of, 172.
Cosimo. See Medici.
Cosse\ Marshal de, 420.
Courtras, battle of, 431.
Creil, occupation of, 434.
Cremona, 36.
Crespy, Treaty of, 217.
Cruzada, a, 294. [Brandenburg.
Culmbach, Albert Alcibiades of. See
Custrin, John of, Margrave of the
Neumark, joins Charles, 222.
Damville. See Montmorenci.
D'Andelot connected with Bourbons,
393 ; joins Cond6, 402 ; death, 409.
Del Nero, Bernardo, enemy of Savon-
arola, 29 ; executed, 30.
Del Rio, 333.
Deventer made burgomaster of
Utrecht by Leicester, 368.
surrender of, 371; reduction of,
Deza, Diego, 288. [380.
Died, the, 26, 459.
Diet of Empire, construction of, 107 ;
chief Diets in period — Worms
(1495), 109 ; Augsburg (1500), m ;
Constance (1507), 114 ; Treves and
Cologne ( 1 512), 114-, Worms (1521),
145; Nuremberg (1523), 167;
Spires (1526), 196; second (1529),
197 ; Augsburg (1530), 198 ; Ratis-
bon(i532), 204; second (1541), 212;
Worms (1545), 221 ; Augsburg
(1547), 230 ; second session (1530),
234 ; Augsburg (1555), 247.
Diois given to Caesar Borgia, 35.
Diu, battle of, 87.
Djem, brother of Bajazet 11., 20.
D'O, 425, 435.
Doesburg, reduction of, 370.
Doria, Andrea, carries over Genoa
to Francis ; affronted with Francis,
makes terms with Prince of Orange,
190; establishes independent re-
public in Genoa, commands fleet
against Barbarossa, 206.
John Andrew, at Lepanto, 294.
Doullens, battle of, fall of, 439.
Dragut, 285.
Drake, Sir Francis, 374.
PERIOD IV.
Dreux, battle of, 405.
Duplessis-Mornay, 418.
Eboli, Ruy Gomez de Silva,
Prince of, 304 ff. ; advises clemency
towards Flemings, 331.
Princess of, 306, 308.
Egmont, Lamoral, Count of, wins
battle of Gravelines, 256 ; his repu-
tation, 320 ; joins in opposition to
Philip, 324 ; rallies to government,
328 ; declines to support William of
Orange in arms, 330 ; arrested, 333 ;
executed, 335.
Egmont, Count, son of former,
357.
Eleanoraof Portugal, sister of Charles
v., second marriage arranged with
Francis, 183, 193.
Elizabeth of England, Treaty of
Cateau Cambresis, 257; foreign
policy of, 339 ff. ; offer of sovereignty
of Netherlands, 347; marriage
negotiations with Anjou, 360 ; sends
Leicester to Netherlands, 366 ff. ;
orders execution of Mary Queen
of Scots ; altercations with Dutch,
371 ff. ; policy of, 373 ff. ; Armada,
373 ff. ; leagued with Henry iv.
against Spain, 383 ; alliance with
Huguenots, 405 ; gives up claim to
Calais, 406; negotiations with
France and Netherlands, 412 ff. ;
marriage negotiations, 426; at-
tempts to obtain Calais from Philip
in exchange for Brille and Flushing,
445-
of France, marriage of, 279;
death of, 412.
Enghien, Count of, 216.
Epernon, a favourite of Henry III.,
425, 438, 440.
Erasmus, Desiderius, 151 ff.
Ernest, Archduke, in Netherlands,
382; proposed as King of France,
435 ; death, 383.
Duke of Luneburg, 167.
Escovedo, Secretary to Don John,
murdered, 306, 353.
Espinosa, Bishop of Siguenca,
Cardinal and Secretary, Grand
Inquisitor, 281, 288 ; influence with
Philip, 305 ff.
Essek, battle of, 208.
Estampes, Madame d', 217.
Estates-General of France at Tours
(1506), 62 ; at Orleans and Pointoise
2H
482
European History \ 1494- 1598
(1560-1), 397, 398 ; at Blois (1577).
423 ; at Blois (1588), 431 ; of 1593,
435. See Appendix I., 453.
Este, House of, 9. [50.
Ercole I., Marquis of Ferrara,
Alfonso, marries Lucrecia Borgia,
Ercole n. , 259. [51.
Estr^es, Gabrielle d', 440
Etaples, Treaty of, 7.
Excusado, an, 294.
Faber, Peter, 263
Faenza, 50, 56, 64.
Famagusta, fall of, 294.
Farel, William, of Dauphind, 273.
Farnese, Alexander. See Parma.
Paul See Paul in.
Ottavio, his grandson, 215 ;
Charles promises him Parma and
Piacenza, 221 ; refuses to appoint
him Stadtholder of Milan, 227 ; in
possession of Parma, 237, 259.
Pierluigi, granted Parma and
Piacenza by Paul, anti-imperialist,
death, 231.
Federigo. See Naples.
Ferdinand of Aragon makes second
Treaty of Blois, 61 ; on Joanna's
madness secures Castile, 62 ; Holy
League, 67 ; Treaty of Mechlin, 75 ;
peace with France, 76 ; a member
of counter-league, 78 ; death, 82 ;
policy, 92 ; Church reform, 94.
of Austria obtains Austria,
marriage of, 145 ; assists in Italian
campaign, 177; sends Frundsberg
to help Charles, 186 ; elected King
of the Romans, 203 ; defeated at
Essek, 208; at Laufen, 210; at
Buda, 214 ; arrangement with
Charles as to succession; dissatis-
faction of, 235; neutral position
of, 242 ff. ; manages affairs at
Augsburg, 247 ; becomes Emperor,
250.
Federigo of Naples, 24 ; capitulates,
41.
Feria, Duke of, 435.
Fermo, Oliveretto da, 53.
occupation of, 52.
Ferrante 1. of Naples, his cruelty and
abdication, 12.
— — 11. of Naples, driven from Naples,
returns, but dies, 21, 24.
— Duke of Calabria, 41.
Ferrara, House of Este in, 9; birth-
place of Savonarola, 25.
— ceded to the Pope, 259.
Fivlzzano, sack of, 19.
Fleix, Peace of, 424.
Florence, constitution of, 9 (and see Ap-
pendix II. ) ; leagued against France,
15,78; submits to Charles vin.,
expels Piero, 19 ; refuses to join
League of Venice, 22 ; reforms con-
stitution, 26 ; Medici restored to,
p. ; Medici driven out and a re-
public re-established, 189 ; siege of,
Alessandro reinstated, 194 ; under
Cosimo, 259.
Flushing held by Dutch, commercial
results of, 365 ; handed over to
Elizabeth, 366.
Foix, Germaine de, betrothal of, 62 ;
heiress to Gaston, 73.
Gaston de, 46; commands in
Italian wars, 67 ; death in battle of
Ravenna, 68, 69.
Catherine de, Queen of Navarre,
73-
Fontaine-Francaise, 439.
Fontarabia, 46.
Forest Cantons, the, 118. See Swiss
Confederation.
Fornovo, battle of, 23.
Fossombrone, engagement of, 53.
France, under Louis xn., 90; under
Francis I., 219; after civil wars,
447; constitution of, 5. And see
Appendix I.
Francesco and Francesco Maria Sforza.
See Sforza.
Francis 1. of Angoulfime, King of
France, 71 ; Treaties with Venice,
England, and Charles, 78; Italian
expedition of, 78; makes Peace
of Noyon, 82, and Treaty of
London, 83 ; character of, 129 ;
taken prisoner at Pavia, 175 ; signs
Treaty of Madrid, 183 ; joins Holy
League of Cognac, 184 ; allies him-
self with Henry VIII. , 187 ; sends
army to Italy, 188 ; makes Treaty
of Cambrai, 193 ; commercial
Treaty with Solyman, 207 ; invades
Italy, 208 ; truce of Nice, 209 ; war
with Charles, Treaty of Crespi, 216;
death, character, 218 ff.
II., marriage, position of affairs
at accession of, 258, 391 ; death,
397-
See Guise and Montmorenci.
Franco-Galliat the, 418.
Frederick I., Elector-Palatine, 1x3.
II., 167, 227.
Index <■
483
Frederick the Wise. See Saxony.
Fresneda, Fray Bernardo de, 309.
Friedwald, Treaty of, 330.
Friuli, 36, 65. [186.
Frundsberg, an imperialist leader,
Fuentes, Governor in Netherlands,
383 ; defeats Turenne, 439.
Gaeta, siege of, 47.
Galeazzo Maria Sforza. See Sforza.
Gandia, Duke of, a Borgia, 35.
Garigliano, battle of, 47.
Gaston. See Foix.
Gattinara, 220, 221.
Gelnhausen, compact of, 11a,
Gemblours, battle of, 355.
Genazzano, Fra Mariano da, 30.
Geneva, position of, 273 ; Calvin at,
274 ff.
Genlis, Count of, defeated before
Mons, 341, 414.
George of Saxony. See Saxony.
Gerard, Balthazar, 362.
Germaine. See Foix.
Gertruydenberg, siege of, 383.
Gex, ceded to France, 445.
Ghent, revolt and submission of, 209.
Gian Galeazzo Sforza. See Sforza.
Giovanni. See Medici and Sforza.
Giulio. See Medici.
Goletta, storming of, 206.
Gonzaga, House of, 9.
Imperial Stadtholder at Milan,
231.
Granada, Treaty of, 40.
Granvelle, Cardinal, influence with
Philip, 308 ff. ; in Netherlands,
321, 323.
Gravamina, the hundred, 168.
Grave, surrender of, 370.
Gravelines, battle of, 256.
Gravina, Duke of (Orsini), 53.
Gregory xin. , 270 ; attempts to medi-
ate between Philip 11. and Antonio,
298.
Groningen, betrayal of, 358; fall of,
383.
Gruet, executed at Geneva, 274.
Guasto, Marquis de, 216, 237.
Guerrero, Pedro, Archbishop oi
Granada, 288.
Guidobaldo, Duke of Urbino, 56.
Guinnegate, battle of, 76.
Guise, family of, 393.
Claude, Duke of, 393.
John, Cardinal, brother of Claude,
267, 392.
Guise, Mary, sister of Claude, Regent
of Scotland, 215.
Francis, Duke of, success at
Metz, 244 ; advises war, 252 ;
defeated in Italy, 254 ; takes Calais,
256 ; falls from power, 397 ; enters
Paris and secures person of king,
401 ; death, 406.
Charles, Cardinal of Lorraine,
brother of Francis, 393, 407,
422.
Louis, Cardinal of Lorraine,
brother of Francis, 393.
Henry, Duke of, holds Poictiers,
409; joins in plot for murder of
Coligny, and in massacre of St.
Bartholomew, 414; position of, 422 ;
heads Catholic League, 427 ; enters
Paris, death, 431.
Charles, Duke of, 435 ; recon-
ciled to Henry IV., 438; takes
Marseilles, 440.
Louis, Cardinal of, brother of
Duke Henry, executed, 431.
Guisnes, scene of ' Field of Cloth of
Gold,' 136.
Guns, repulse of Solyman at, 204.
Haarlem, sack of, 342.
Hapsburg, House of, Sigismund of
Tyrol, 123.
Maximilian, betrothed to Anne
of Brittany, 6; war with Charles
viii., makes treaty of Senlis, 7;
Italian expedition, 28 ; wishes to
maintain Treaty of Lyons, 61 ; a
member of League of Cambray, 63 ;
signs Treaty of Mechlin, 76;
leagued against France, 79; ac-
cepts Peace of Noyon, 83 ; election
of, 106; attitude to reforms of
Empire, no; position abroad, 113;
defeated by Swiss, 123 ; dynastic
policy of, 124; character of, 126;
death of, 127.
Philip, Archduke, son of Maxi-
milian, marriage of, 42.
Charles, son of Archduke. See
Charles v.
Ferdinand, brother of Charles V. ,
145. See Ferdinand of Austria.
Joanna, daughter of Charles v. ,
regent of Castile, 251.
Margaret, daughter of Maxi-
milian, governess of Netherlands,
92. See Margaret.
484
European History, 1494- 1598
Hapsburg, Albret, Cardinal Arch-
duke. See Albert.
Ernest, Archduke, brother of
Emperor Rudolf. See Ernest.
Maximilian n. , son of Ferdinand,
446.
Rudolf 11., son of Maximilian n.,~
446.
Havre ceded to Elizabeth, 405 ; fall
of, 406.
Hayraddin, Huroc. See Barbarossa.
Heiligerlee, battle of, 335.
Henry 11. of France, war in Italy,
237 ; alliance with Maurice and Pro-
testants, 239; campaign in France,
254 ; Peace of Cateau Cambr&is,
257 ; persecution of Huguenots,
389 ; death, 257, 391.
Henry III. {see Anjou) succeeds his
brother, 420 ; refuses sovereignty of
Netherlands, 366, 427 ; yields to
League, 429 ; has Duke of Guise
murdered ; on revolt of League
turns to Navarre ; death, 431.
Henry IV. succeeds Antony of
Navarre, 405 ; his possessions,
412 ; in hands of Catherine, 415 ;
connected with ' Politiques,' 417 ;
escapes, 420 ; heir-presumptive,
426; supported by 'Politiques,'
429 ; his success, 429 ff, ; reconcilia-
tion with Henry in., 432 ; struggle
for the crown, 433; 'conversion,'
436 ; war with Spain, 438 ff. ;
leagued with Elizabeth and Nether-
lands, 383 ; negotiations with Philip,
384, 442 ; treatment of Huguenots,
442 ff. ; Peace of Vervins, 444 ; rule
and death of, 447 ff.
IV. ot Brunswick- Wolfenbiittel,
167.
of Guise. See Guise.
of Montmorenci. See Mont-
morenci.
of Saxony. See Saxony.
vii. makes Treaty of Etaples, 7.
viii. supports Holy League, 67 ;
Treaty of Mechlin, 75 ; victory
of Guinnegate, 76 ; peace, jj ;
Treaty of London, 83; leagued
with Charles v. and Leo x., 160;
with Charles and Adrian VI., 164;
alliance with Charles v. , 173 ; allies
himself with France after Pa via, 181 ;
anxious for divorce, 187 ; Clement
cites the cause to Rome, 193 ;
change of policy pnd alliance with
Charles, 214 ff. ; war with France,
Treaty of Ardres, 216 ff.
Henry (the Navigator), 85.
of Portugal, 297.
Hermandad, the, 93.
Hesse, Philip, Landgrave of, puts
down the Knights' War, 169 ; defeats
Munzer, 176 ; establishes Lutheran-
ism, 197 ; signs protest, 198 ; com-
mands forces of League of
Schmalkalde, 200 ; battle of Laufen ;
restores Duke Ulrich ; opposes John
of Leyden, 210 ; leader in Schmal-
kaldic War, 226 ff. ; submission
and imprisonment, 229 ; freed by
Treaty of Passau, 243.
Hessels, 333.
Hohenlo, 364, 371.
Hohenzollern, House of, 166. See
Brandenburg.
Holy League, the, 67, 70; forces
Venice to restore Medici, 71 ; breaks
up. 73-
Hoogstraten, 335.
Hoorne, Count, an opponent of
' Philip's policy in Netherlands, 324 ;
rallies to government, 328; arrested,
333; executed, 335.
Hotman, author of Franco- Gallia,
418.
Howard, Lord, of Effingham, in
command against Armada, 377.
Huguenots, early history of, 389 ff. ;
origin of name, 391; condition of, in
1 56 1, 398 ; Edict of January, 399 ;
massacre of Vassy, 401 ; geographi-
cal distribution of, 403; peace of
St. Germain, 410 ; massacre of, on
St. Bartholomew, 414; change in
party; writings, 418; federative
republics, 419 ; peace of Monsieur,
421 ; altered position of, 429 ; obtain
Edict of Nantes, 442.
Hulst, reduction of, 380.
Humieres organises League
Peronne, 422.
Hutten, Ulrich von, 169.
Idiaquez, Juan de, 308.
Imbercourt, Chevalier d', 43.
Imbize, a demagogue, 357.
Imola, in hands of Caterina Sforza,
Inquisition in Italy, 269 ff. ; in Spain
"278 AT; in Netherlands, 323 ff.
Interim, 232.
Ippolita Sforza. See Sforza.
Index
48$
Isabella of Castile, 9! ; policy of, 92 ;
Church reform, 94 ; death, character
of, 103 ; importance of reign, 105.
of Portugal, 277.
Italy, the chief states of, in 1494, 7 ff ;
in 1559, 259.
Ivry, battle of, 433.
Jeanne, daughter of Louis XL, wife
of Louis xii. , 34.
Jarnac, battle of, 408.
}emmingen, battle of, 337.
oanna 11. of Naples, 14.
of Castile, 42, 60 ; succeeds her
mother as Queen, 113 ; madness of,
62, 104.
Regent of Castile, 251.
Joachim 1. and II. of Brandenburg.
See Brandenburg.
John Casimir of the Palatinate, 357,
359. 43i.
— — Cicero of Brandenburg. See
Brandenburg.
Don, of Austria, 290 ff. ; wins
Lepanto, 294 ; commands a second
expedition against the Turks, 296 ;
Governor of Netherlands, 351 ff. ;
excites jealousy of Philip, 353 ;
victory of Gemblours, 355 ; death,
356.
of Saxony. See Saxony.
Frederick of Saxony. See Saxony.
Joinville, Treaty of, 428.
Joyeuse, Duke of, 425, 431.
Julius II., policy of, 54, 56; makes
terms with Venice, 66 ; forms Holy
League, 67 ; death of, 74.
in., imperialist policy of, 234,
236, 247.
Justin, son of William of Orange, 364.
'Justiza,' the, of Aragon, 94, 300.
Knights' War, the, 169.
La Charite\ 410 ; fall of, 423.
Ladislas, King of Bohemia and
Hungary, 40.
— — of Poland, 125.
La Fere, reduction of, 439, 440.
Lagny, occupation of, 434.
La Marck, William, Comte de, seizes
Brille and Flushing, 339, 413. See
Bouillon.
Landshut, George the Rich, Duke of,
113.
Landriano, battle of, 191.
Languet, 418.
PERIOD IV.
Lainez, Iago, 26.?.
Lannoy in command under Bourbon,
173 ; death of, 190.
La Noue, 414, 424.
Laon, reduction of, 438.
La Palice, 43, 44, 70.
La Renaudie, 396.
La Rochefoucauld, 415.
La Rochelle, 408, 410, 416 ; Treaty
of, 417.
Laso Pedro, leader of the Junta, 139,
La Tremouille, 46. [141 , 142.
La Torre, 333.
Lautrec, French commander in Italy,
160, 163, 188, 190.
Laufen, battle of, 210.
Lavoro, district of, 40.
Lefevre, Jacques, influence on Calvin,
273 ; position and doctrine of,
387.
Leghorn, dependency of Florence, 9 ;
French garrison in, 22 ; given back
to Florence, 24.
Leicester, Earl of, commander of
forces in Netherlands, 366 ft
Leipheim, battle of, 179.
Leith, Treaty of, 397.
Leo X., election of, makes Treaty of
Mechlin, 75 ; peace with France,
76 ; joins Counter-League, 78 ;
makes peace with France and signs
the Concordat of Bologna, 80;
policy towards Luther, 157; leagued
with Charles V. and Henry VIII.,
160 ; character of, i6i .
Lepanto, battle of, 294 ff., 411.
Lewis v., Elector- Palatine, 167, 179,
211.
of Poland, 125.
Duke of Beja, 297.
Leyden, investment of, 344.
John of, 210.
Leyva, Antonio de, 173 ; holds Milan
for Emperor, 188; wins battle of
Landriano, 191 ; granted Monza by
Charles, 194 ; death, 208.
L'Hdpital, Michel, Chancellor, 397,
407, 408.
Ligny, Count of, 37.
Limeuil, Mdlle. de, 406.
Linz, Conference of, 242.
Lisbon, capitulation of, 298.
Lodi, 37.
London, Treaty of, 83.
Longjumeau, Edict of, 407.
Longueville, Duke of, 433, 439.
Lorenzo. See Medici.
2 H 2
486
European History \ 1 494- 1 5 98
Lorraine, Charles II., Duke of, recon-
ciled to Henry IV. , 438.
Cardinal of. See Guises.
Louis. See Nassau.
Louis of Orleans (the xnth), leader of
opposition to Anne of Beaujeu, 5 ;
claims on Milan, 15 ; at Rapallo,
18 ; surrenders Novara, 23 ; suc-
ceeds Charles vin., 25; policy,
33-34 ; makes Treaty of Granada,
40 ; war with Ferdinand, 42-8 ;
death of, 78.
Louise of Savoy, mother of Francis I.,
negotiates peace of Cambray, 193,
388.
Loyola, Ignatius, early life, founda-
tion of Order of Jesus, 262 ff.
Los Veles, Marquis of, cruelty to
Moors, 289 ; inefficiency as general,
291 ; in power, 306.
Lucca, enemy of Florence, 9 ; joins
league against France, 22.
Ludovico il Moro. See Sforza.
Luneburg, Ernest I. of, 167.
Luther, Martin, early difficulties and
visit to Rome, 153 ; the Theses,
155 ; break with the Church, 157 ;
at Diet of Worms, 168 ; attitude to
peasants' revolt, 178 ; supports
League of Schmalkalde, 200; death,
character, 225.
Lyons, Treaties of, 45, 61.
Machiavelli, views on Caesar
Borgia, 55 ; devotes himself to
letters, 72; his militia, 194.
Madrid, Treaty of, 183.
Maestricht, fall of, 358. V
Magdeburg, surrender of, 239.
Magellan, discoveries of, 102.
Magione, 53. [294.
Mahomet Sirocco, Turkish Admiral,
Mansfeld, Count Peter Ernest, 348,
Mantes, Declaration of, 435. [382.
Malatesta, Pandolfo, 50.
Manfredi, Astorre, 50, 51.
Mantua, the Gonzagas of, 9.
Marquis of, 23, 28.
Marcellus 11., Pope, 247.
Margaret, Duchess of Parma, Gover-
ness of Netherlands, appointed to
Netherlands, 320 ; policy, 324, 325,
328, 329, 331, 332.
of Savoy, aunt of Charles v., 92;
Governess of the Netherlands, 3x7 ;
negotiates Peace of Cambray, 193.
sister of Henry 11., marriage of,
«S7.
Margaret of Valois, marriage of, 412,
Mary of Burgundy, 126. [440.
Mary Queen of Scots, marriage, 258 ;
plots with Guises, 271 ; defeated at
Carberry Hill, 339 ; plots against
Elizabeth, 339 ; death of, 371.
sister of Henry vm., marries
Louis xii., 77.
of Hungary, Governess of Nether-
lands, 320.
Marignano, battle of, 79.
Mathias, Archduke, brother to Em-
peror Rudolf, elected Governor-
General of Netherlands, 354; de-
feated at Gemblours, 355 ; his
inefficiency, 359.
Matricula, the, 114.
Maurice. See Orange.
of Orange. See Orange.
of Saxony. See Saxony.
Maximilian I. and II. See Hapsburg.
Sforza. See Sforza.
Mayence, Berthold, Archbishop of,
108, 113.
Archbishop of, a Hohenzollern,
131, 132, 133.
Mayenne, Duke of, made Lieutenant-
General, rules Paris, 432 ; defeated
at Arques, 433 ; selfish aims, 437 ;
comes to terms with Henry IV. , 440.
Mazarquiver, fall of, 97 ; relief of, 286.
Meaux, Briconnet, Bishop of, 387 ;
Protestants at, 387, 389 ; conspiracy
of, 407.
Mechlin, Treaty of, 75 ; sack of, 342 ;
surrender of, 358.
Montigny, Baron of, execution, 336.
Medici in Florence, 9 ; Lorenzo,. 9,
15 ; Piero, joins Alfons"o-of Naples
against Ludovico of Milan, 16 ;
submits to Charles vm. ; flies from
Florence, 19.
Giovanni, Carpinal, restored to
Florence, 71. See Leo x.
Giulio de. See Clement vii.
— — Alessandro, Governor of Flor-
ence, 172 ; driven from Florence,
189 ; reinstated, 194,
Cosimo, Duke of Florence, 250 ;
Grand Duke of Tuscany, 259.
Catherine de, 394 ff. ; regent,
398 ; adopts policy of Guises, 402,
406-408 ; joins Coligny, 411 ; be-
comes alarmed, 413 ; her share
in massacre of St. Bartholomew,
414 ; subsequent policy, 4x5 & ;
death of, 432.
Index ,
487
Medina Celi, Duke of, sent to Nether-
lands, 336 ; returns to Spain, 343.
— Sidonia, Duke of, 285 ; in com-
mand of Armada, 375.
Mendoza, imperial Ambassador to
Rome, severe rule at Siena, 244 ;
Ambassador to Elizabeth, 374 ; en-
voy to France, 431.
Mercoeur, Duke of, 438 ; selfish aims,
424, 437 ; submission to Henry IV. ,
442.
Messina, 24.
Miguel, Don, 92.
Milan, claims of House of Orleans to,
14 ; leagued with Naples and Flor-
ence against France, 15 ; Maxi-
milian grants investiture to Sforza,
16 ; joins League of Venice, 21, 22 ;
Treaty of Vercelli (1495), 23 ; sur-
renders to French, 37 ; lost by
French, 70; leagued against France,
79 ; in French hands, 80 ; French
driven out, given to Francesco
Sforza, 160 ; taken by imperialists
from Francesco Maria Sforza, 185 ;
held by Leyva, 188 ; granted by
Charles to Sforza, 194 ; on his death
annexed by Charles, 207 ; given by
Charles to his son Philip, 212 ;
Philip's government of, 301. See
Sforza.
Mirandola, conquest of, 66.
Mitylene, French attack on, 40.
Modena taken by Julius 11., 66.
Cardinal of, 53.
Modon taken by Turks, 40.
Mohacs, battle of, 184.
Moncada, Hugo de, succeeds Pes-
cara ; takes Milan ; treacherous
seizure of Rome, 185.
Moncontour, battle of, 409.
Mondragon, success of, 348.
Mondejar, Marquis de, 289.
Monopoli, occupation of, 24.
Mons, fall of, 340, 413 ; defeat of
Genlis before, capitulation of, 341.
Monsieur, Peace of, 421.
Montauban, 410, 416.
Monte, Cardinal. See Julius m.
Mbntefeltro, Guidobaldo di, Duke of
Urbino, 50.
Montigny, Baron of, brother of Count
Hoorne, 327. 336.
Montmorenci, Anne de, Marshal and
Constable, his policy, 209; dis-
graced, 213 ; defeated at St. Quentin,
advises peace, 255 ; policy, 392 ;
reconciled with Guises, 401 ; taken
prisoner, 405 ; death of, 407.
Montmorenci, Francis of, Marshal
of France and Governor of Paris,
leader of the * Politiques,' 410, 417,
420, 423.
Henry, (Damville), Governor of
Languedoc, a leader of the ' Poli-
tiques,' 417 ; becomes Duke and
Marshal, and makes peace with
court, 423, 441. [417.
William (Thor6), Charles (Meru),
Montpensier, Count of, Viceroy in
Italy, 22 ; capitulates, 24,
Duke of, 410.
Mooker Heyde, battle of, 344.
Morone, Bishop of Modena, 212.
Cardinal and Papal Legate, 247
Moura, Christoval de, 308.
Muhlberg, battle of, 229.
Muley-Hassan, 206.
Munster, Anabaptist revolution at, 210.
Miinzer, Thomas, 177. * [286.
Mustapha in command against Malta,
Naarden, razing of, 342.
^Nantes, Edict of, 442.
Naples, condition of, 11 ; French
claims on, 14, 15 ; government of,
by Philip, 301.
Naussa, John of, brother of William,
355, 358.
Louis of, 326, 335 ; defeated at
Jemmingen, 337 ; invades France,
337, 409 ; negotiations with France,
takes Mons, 337, 409 ; capitulates,
341 ; defeated at Mooker Heyde,
death, 344.
Maurice of. See Orange.
William of. See Orange.
Navarra, Pedro, 46, 69, 191.
Navarre, Spanish, conquered by
Ferdinand, 73.
Antony of {see Albret), position
of,392; submissiveness to Catherine,
398 ; death, 405.
Henry of. See Henry IV.
Navarino, battle of, 40.
Nemours, Conference of, 429.
Duke of, 5, 44, 45, 438.
Netherlands, condition of, at accession
of Philip 11. , 316 ; at his death, 385 ;
Philip's ecclesiastical policy, 322 ;
plan of- reform of nobles, 325 ; Alva
in, 331 ; revolt of, 335 ff. ; indepen-
dence of, 384.
Nicosia, fall of, 293.
488
European History, 1494- 1598
Nice, truce of, 209.
Ntmes, 416.
Noircarmes, 333.
Norris, Sir John, 37a
Edward, 370, 371.
Novara, battle of, 76.
Noyon, Peace of, 82.
Nuremberg, Diet of, the religious
struggle at; the hundred Gravamina,
167 ff. ; peace of, 204.
Nymwegen, reduction of, 381.
Oliverotto, 53.
Oran, fall of, 97.
Orange, Philibert, Prince of, com-
mands imperial army in Italy, 190 ;
killed in siege of Florence, 194.
William (of Nassau), Prince of,
320 ; leader of malcontents, 324 ff. ;
leaves Netherlands, 328 ; ill-success,
337 ; French campaign, 337, 409 ;
negotiations with England and
France, 340, 412 ; forced to retire,
341 ; increased authority, 347 ; paci-
fication of Ghent, 350; opposition
to Don John, 353 ff. ; ban and Apo-
logia, 359 ; death, character, 362 ;
marriages and children, 363.
Maurice, Prince of, second son
of William, Captain-General, 364 ;
reappointed Governor-General, 371 ;
again appointed, 377 ff. ; early
life, 379 ; military reforms, 380 ;
success, 380 ff.
Orleans, siege of, 406.
Louis, Duke of. See Louis xii.
Orsini, the, 35, 48.
Cardinal, 53.
Paolo, 53.
Otranto, occupation of, 24.
Pacheco, Donna Maria, widow of
Padilla, 143.
Padilla, Don Juan de, heads revolt
at Toledo ; defeated at Villalar and
executed, 139 ff.
Padua, 64.
Palatinate, Family of Wittelsbach in,
167.
John Casimir of, 357, 359, 431.
Palatine, Frederick 1., Elector, defeat
of, 113.
Rupert, second son of Frederick,
death of, 113.
Lewis v. , Elector, 167; puts down
peasants, turns Protestant, 179, 211.
Palatine, Frederick 11. .Elector, brother
of Lewis, submits to Charles, 227.
' Pancarte,' 441.
Paolo, Gian, 52.
Papal States, the, origin of, 10; ex-
tension of, 49-56.
Parlement of Paris, 5 ; (Appendix,
449-450) ; weakness of, 5 ; policy
towards Huguenots, 390, 396, 400,
404, 408, 421, 430, 443.
Provincial (Appendix I., 451) ;
policy of, 408, 421, 424, 443.
Parma, Alexander Farnese of, at
Lepanto, 294; son of Margaret,
successor of Don John, 356 ; suc-
cesses, 358, 361, 364, 370; takes
Sluys, 372 ; negotiates with Eliza-
beth, 374 ; success of, 378 ; jealousy
of Philip, 379; ill-success and
death, character, 380, 434.
Margaret, Duchess of, birth,
education, and marriage, 320. See
Margaret of Parma.
Paredes, Diego de, 43.
Passau, Treaty of, 242.
Paul in., allies himself with Charles
V. , 206 ; mediates to bring about
Truce of Nice, neutral policy, 209,
214 ; re-summons Council to Trent,
221 ; refuses to support Charles ;
intrigues with Francis, 228 ; refuses
to recall Council from Bologna to
Trent, negotiates with Henry II.,
231 ff. ; death, 234.
iv., Pope, 247; anti-Spanish
policy, 252 ; terms with Alva, 254.
Paz, Pedro de, 43.
Peasants' war, 176-180.
Perez, Antonio, accused by Inquisi-
tion, 281 ; accuses Philip of murder
of Don Carlos, 283 ; quarrel with
Philip, 300; rise, quarrel with
Philip, exile, 306 ff.
Perpetual Edict, 352.
Perpignan, 215.
Perugia, 53, 56.
Pesaro, 50.
Pescara, Marquis of, 173; advises
Treaty of Madrid, death, 183.
Peschiera, 64.
Pescia, Domenico da, 31, 32.
Philibert of Orange, 190, 194.
Emanuel, Duke of Savoy. See
Savoy.
Philip, Archduke of Austria, 4a;
marriage, 316.
Index
489
Philip 11. , granted Milan by his father,
212 ; governor in Spain, etc. , 234 ff. ;
King of Spain, 250; Treaty of
Cateau Cambresis, marriage with
Elizabeth of France, 257 ; position
of affairs, 259 ; ecclesiastical policy,
268, 271, 278 ; marriages, 277, 282,
284; treatment of the Moriscoes,
287 ff. ; internal policy and govern-
ment, 299 ff. ; character of, 310 ;
commercial policy, 311 ff. ; policy
in Netherlands, 319 ff. ; ecclesi-
astical scheme, 322 ff. ; opposi-
tion to plan of reform, 325 ;
policy to Elizabeth of England, 374 ;
to Catherine of France, 407, 410;
to Guises, 427, 431 ; designs on
France, 435 ; method of filling
exchequer, 441 ; negotiations with
Henry iv. , 442 ; peace of Vervins,
444 ; death and policy, 445 ff.
of Hesse. See Hesse.
Piali, 285, 286, 293; death at Lepanto,
295-
Piero. See Medici.
Piccolomini, Cardinal, Pope Pius HI.,
47-
Pietra-Santa, dependency of Florence,
9 ; French garrison, 22 ; sold to
Lucca, regained by Florence, 24.
Piombino, surrender of, 51.
Pisa, dependency of Florence, 9 ;
joins Charles vni., 19, 22 ; regained
by Florence, 24 ; Council of, 66.
Pistoja, dependency of Florence, 9.
Pitigliano, Count of, 64.
Pius in., 47, 54.
iv. , 266, 270.
v. , 270, 295.
Poictiers, taking of, 405 ; siege of, 409.
Diana of, 217.
Pointoise, States-general at, 398.
Poissy, colloquy of, 399.
Pol, Count de St., defeated at Lan-
driano, 191.
Poland, Ladislas of, 125.
Lewis of, 125.
Sigismund of, restores Catholi-
cism, 446.
Pole, Reginald, 212.
Polesine, the, 64.
Poltrot assassinates Duke of Guise,
406.
Pompeio, Cardinal, leader of the
Colonnesi, takes Rome, 185.
Porto Carrero, Governor of Doullens,
441.
Portugal, Isabella of, 277.
Kings of — Antonio, Prior of
Crato ; Henry ; Lewis, Due de Beja ;
Sebastian, 297 ff., 378.
Portuguese, discoveries and conquests
Prato, sack of, 71. [of, 85.
Principati, the district of the, 42.
Puglia, Francesco da, 31.
QuiROGA, Archbishop of Toledo,
Grand Inquisitor, 281.
Rapallo, battle of, 18.
Ratisbon, Congress at, 171 ; Diets of
(1532), 204; (1541), 212.
Ravenna, occupied by Julius II., 64;
battle of, 68.
Regency, Council of, ill-success of,
169, 179.
Regnault, head of Finance Chamber
in Netherlands, 368.
Requesens, Don Louis de, grand com-
mander of Santiago, at Lepanto,
294; succeeds Alva, 343; change
of policy, 344 ; attempt at recon-
ciliation, 345 ff. ; death, 348.
Reuchlin, John, 150.
Rhsetian Leagues, 122.
Rhodes, fall of, 164.
Rimini, 49, 56, 64.
Roda, Jerome de, 348, 349.
Romagna, papal claims over, 49;
Caesar Borgia's conquests in, 50 ff.
Roromantin, Edict of, 396.
Rosny, Baron de. See Sully.
Rouen taken by Catholics, 405;
secured by Henry iv. , 437.
Rousillon, 6, 46, 215.
Rovere, Francesco Maria della, lord
of Sinigaglia, 50.
Giuliano della. See Julius II.
Francesco, Duke of Urbino, 56.
Rudolf 11., Emperor, 446.
Rupert, son of Frederick I., Elector-
Palatine, 113.
Ruvo, 44.
St. Andr£, Marshal, 405.
St. Denis, battle of, 407.
St. GaU, 121.
St. Germains, Treaty of, 340, 41a
St. Quentin, battle of, 254.
Saint Jean d' Ang61y, fall of, 409.
Sainte Aldegonde, Philip van Marnix
Lord of, 326.
Santa Cruz, Marquis de, 426.
Severina, 45.
490
European History, 1494- 1598
Sapienza, battle of, 4a
Saluzzo, Marquis of, 48 ; succeeds
Lautrec in command, defeated at
Aversa, death, 191.
Marquisate of, ceded to France,
257 ; exchanged for Bresse, Bugey,
Gex, 445.
Sancerre, siege of, 416.
San Severino, Galeazzo di, 37. [299.
Santa Cruz, Marquis of, 294, 298,
Sarzana, dependency of Florence, 9 ;
French garrison in, 22 ; sold to
*--SasaBliarola, 25-33. [Genoa, 24.
Savoy, Charles in., Duke of, quarrel
with Francis, 207 ; Treaty of Crespi,
217 ; Emanuel Philibert, son of
Charles 111., commands Philip's
forces against France with success,
255 ; restored by Treaty of Cateau
Cambresis, 257.
Philibert Emanuel, 257, 320.
Louise of, 193 ; persecutes the
Huguenots, 388.
Saxony, Frederick the Wise, Elector
of, his family, 166 ; one of party of
reform, 108 ; refuses to be a candi-
date for the Empire, 133 ; founds
University of Wittenberg, 154; pro-
tects Luther, 159.
George, Duke of, 166-168, 170.
Henry, 166.
John the Steadfast, Elector of
character of, 204 ; establishes
Lutheranism after Diet of Spires,
*97 I signs protest against Second
Diet, 198 ; commands forces of
League of Schmalkalde, 200 ; pro-
tests against election of Ferdinand
as King of the Romans, 203 ; death,
policy of, 204.
— — John Frederick, 222 ff. ; Schmal-
kaldic War, 224 ff. ; capture, 229 ;
freed by Treaty of Passau, 243.
Maurice, secured by Charles'
pronises, 223 ; overruns Saxony,
repulsed, reinstated, 226 ff. ; con-
spires and takes arms, 238 ff. ;
death, character, 244 ff.
Augustus, succeeds Maurice as
Elector, 246.
Anne of, daughter of Maurice,
marriage of, 324.
Schinner, Mathias, Bishop of the
Valais, Cardinal of Sion, 70, 132.
Schmalkalde, meeting of, 198; League
formed, 200; joined by Southern
Germany, 203.
Sebastian of Portugal, 207.
Selim 11., Sultan, 288, 293.
Seminara, battle of, 24, 45.
Senlis, Treaty of, 7.
Servetus burnt at Geneva, 274.
Sesa, Duke of, 291.
jSforza, Francesco, seizes Milan, 7,
allies himself with Naples and
Florence, 15.
Ippolita, daughter of Francesco,
wife of Alfonso of Calabria, 15.
Galeazzo Maria, son of Fran-
cesco, 7.
— - Gian Galeazzo, son of Galeazzo,
7 ; marries Isabella of Naples, 16 ;
death of, 18.
Ludovico il Moro, uncle of Gian
Galeazzo, seizes power, 8 ; calls on
Charles viii., 16; joins League of
Venice, 22 ; makes Treaty of Ver-
celli, 23 ; flies to Maximilian, 37 ;
returns but is taken prisoner, 38 ;
death, 39 ; family of, 39.
Caterina, niece of Ludovico, at
Imola and Forli, 50.
Giovanni, Lord of Pesaro, cousin
of, 50.
Maximilian, son of Ludovico, 39 ;
restored to Milan, 72 ; surrenders
to Francis, 80.
Francesco Maria, granted Milan,
160; joins League of Cognac, 184;
capitulates to imperialists, 185 ;
commands troops of Holy League,
191 ; restored by Charles v., 194 ;
death, 207.
Sicily, government of, by Philip,
301.
Sickingen, Franz von, 132 ; organises
League of Knights, defeat and
death, 169.
Sidney, Sir Philip, Governor of Flush-
ing, 366 ; death, 370.
Siena, enemy of Florence, 9 ; accepts
a French garrison, 20 ; joins league
against Florence, 22 ; turns to Em-
peror, then to France, 244 ; regained
for Imperialists by Cosimo, Duke
of Florence, 250.
Sievershausen, battle of, 245.
Sigismund of Tyrol, cousin of Maxi-
milian, 123.
of Poland, 446.
Signory, Florentine executive, 26,
458.
Silvestro, Fra, executed with Savona-
rola, 32.
Index
491
Simonetta, counsellor of Bona of
Savoy, murdered by Ludovico 'II
Moro,' 8.
Sinigaglia, massacre of, 53.
Sixtus v. , 270 ; disapproval of League,
428 ; excommunicates Henry of
Navarre, 429.
Sluys, fall of, 365, 372.
Soderini, Piero, Gonfalonier of Flor-
ence, 71.
Solyman wins battle of Mohacs, 184 ;
forced to retreat from Vienna, 196 ;
treaty with Francis, defeats Ferdi-
nand at Essek, 208 ; and at Buda,
214 ; nearly completes conquest of
Hungary, 216 ; supports the French,
244 ; sends fleet against Malta,
286 ; death, 293.
Spires, Diets of, 196, 197, 216.
Stanley, Sir William, 371.
Steenwyck, fall of, 381.
Stralen, Burgomaster of Antwerp,
333. 336.
Suabian League, formation of, 108 ;
defeat at Bruderholz and Dornach,
123 ; favours election of Charles,
131 ; wins battle of Leipheim ; with
Elector of Treves and Elector- Pala-
tine suppresses revolt of peasants,
179.
Sully, 440, 448.
Swiss Confederation, origin of, 117
ff. ; constitution of, 120 ff. ; war with
Maximilian, 123 ; makes Peace of
Basel, 124.
Taillie, the, 34, 456.
Tassis, 371.
Teligny, 415,
Terouenne, 76, 244.
* Termes, Marshal de, deieated at
Gravelines, 256.
Terranova, battle of, 43.
Theatins, the, 262.
Thurgau, the, 120.
Toledo, revolt of, 139.
Garcia de, 286, 287.
Torrelobaton, sack of, 142.
Tours, Estates-General of, 62.
Trade routes, 84, 87.
Trani occupied by Venice, 24.
Trent, 62 ; Council of, first and second
session, 221 ; at Bologna, 230 ; re-
assembles^at Trent ; failure, 235 ;
third session, 266ft •*
Treves, John of Baden, Archbishop
of, 108; death, 1x3.
Treves, Richard Greifenklau, Arch-
bishop of, his policy at the imperial
election, 131-133; joins in suppres-
sing peasants' revolt, 179 ; attacked
by Sickingen, 169 ; opposes Council
of Regency, 170. [u4-
Diet of, organisation of Empire,
Tripoli, 97.
Trivulzio, General in French service,
36; Governor of Milan, 38; in
Italian Wars, 70 ; surrenders Genoa,
Tubingen, University of, 210. [191.
Turnhout, battle of, 383.
Turenne, Duke of Bouillon, 439.
Ulrich. See Wurtemberg.
Uluch Ali, Dey of Algiers, 295 ; re-
takes Tunis and reduces Goletta,
296. [gia, 52, 53, 56.
Urbino, 50 ; occupied by Caesar Bor-
Duke of, leads army of Holy
League, 186 ff. [vi.
Utrecht, Adrian of. See Pope Adrian
Union of, 358.
Valdes, Don Fernando, Archbishop
of Seville, Grand Inquisitor, 281.
a Spanish Commander, 345.
Vaila, battle of, 63.
Valencia, social war in, 140.
Valenciennes, fall of, 414.
Valette, Jean de la, Grand Master of
Knights of Malta, 286.
Valentina, Visconti, 14. [35.
Valentinois given to Caesar Borgia,
Valla, Laurentius, 150.
Valois, Margaret of, 412, 440.
Valori supports Savonarola, 27 ; slain,
31. [erino, 50.
Varano, Giulio Caesare, Lord of Cam-
Vargas, Juan de, 333.
•Vassy, Massacre of, 401.
Vega, Don Pedro Laso de la, 139.
Velasco, Don Fernan de, 439.
Venice, constitution of, Appendix III. ;
position of, 8 ; joins League against
Charles VIIL, 22; growth of, 57;
losses of, 64; recovery of, 65 ; agrees
to peace of Noyon, 83 ; causes of
decline, 84 ; though an ally, seizes
Ravenna and Cervia from Clement,
189 ; forms defensive alliance with
Charles, 194.
Venloo, capitulation of, 370.
Venosa, 45.
Vercelli, Treaty of, 23.
Verona, 64.
^ ^
492
European History \ 1494- 1598
Vers, Stephen de, Duke of Nola, 22,
Vervins, Peace of, 384, 442.
Vespucci, Amerigo, 102.
Vicenza, 64, 65.
Vielleville, Marshal, 4x1.
Viglius, 321.
Villalar, battle of, 143.
Villequier, 425.
Vitellozzo, Vitelli, a captain of Caesar
Borgia's, 52, 53.
Vindicite contra Tyrannos, 418 ffc
Volterra, a dependency of Florence,
9-
Walsingham, 413, 414.
Welf, House of, 167.
Wettin, House of, 166. See Saxony.
Wilkes, 370.
William I. of Bavaria, 167.
of Orange. See Orange.
Willoughby, Lord, in command in
Holland, 378.
Wingfield, Sir Robert, Ambassador
of Henry vm. , 78.
Wittelsbach (see Palatinate and Ba-
varia) ; House of, 167.
Wolfenbuttel, Henry iv. of, 167.
Wolfgang of Zweibriicken, 409.
Wolsey, Cardinal, 75, 77 ; opposition
to France, 82 ; policy of, 135 ff. ;
joins Charles v. and Leo x., 10;
induces Henry to ally himself with
France after Pavia, 181 ; persuades
Henry not to promise ' protection '
to Holy League of Cognac ; divorce
question on foot, 184 ff. ; therefore
alliance with France necessary, con-
ference at Amiens with Francis,
188; Clement revokes powers of
Wolsey and Campeggio to try
Henry's cause,*iQ3.
Worms, Diet of (1495), reforms de-
manded, 109 ; second Diet of, chief
questions for settlement, 145 ff. ;
practical failure of, 148, 221.
Wurtemberg, Ulrich, Duke of, driven
out by Suabian League, 131 ; re-
covers Duchy, 178; ousted again
by Suabian League, 179; restored
by Philip of Hesse, establishes
Protestantism, 210; Schmalkaldic
war, 226.
Xavier, Francesco, 263.
Ximenes, Francisco, de Cisneros,
Cardinal, 62; Archbishop of To-
ledo, 95; rise, reforms, 95; per-
secution, 96 ; death of, 138.
York, Rowland, 371.
Zamora, Acufia, Bishop of, 142.
Zapolya, John, Waivode of Transyl-
vania, allied with Solyman, holds
Hungary, 195 ff.
Isabella, secures Transylvania,
244.
Zierickzee, fall of, 348.
Zutphen, engagement of, 370 ; reduc-
tion of, 380.
Zweibriicken, Wolfgang, Duke of, 409.
Zwingle, position as a reformer, re-
action against him in Switzerland,
death in battle of Cappel, 201 ff.
BINDING LIST JUN151931
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228
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1923
Johnson, Arthur Henry
Europe in the sixteenth
1494-1598. 6th ed.
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