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WORKS  ON  PSYCHOLOGY. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  ATTENTION.  By  Professor  Th.  Ribot. 
Fourth  edition.     Pages,  121.     Cloth,  75  cents.     {3s.  6d.) 

THE  DISEASES  OF  PERSONALITY.  By  Prof.  Th.  Ribot.  Third 
edition.     Pages,  157.    Cloth,  75  cents.     (3s.  6d.) 

THE  DISEASES  OF  THE  WILL.  By  Prof.  Th.  Ribot.  Second 
edition.     Pages,  vi,  121.     Cloth,  75  cents.     (3s.  6d.) 

THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS.  By  Prof.  Th.  Ribot, 
Pages,  231.     Cloth,  $1.25.     (6s.  6d.) 

THE  PSYCHIC  LIFE  OF  MICRO-ORGANISMS.  By  Dr.  Alfrei 
BiNET.     Pages,  xii,  120.     Cloth,  75  cents.     (3s.  6d.) 

ON  DOUBLE  CONSCIOUSNESS.  By  Dr.  Alfred  Binet.  Third 
Edition.     Pages,  93.     Paper,  15  cents,     (gd.) 

THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF  REASONING.  By  Dr.  Alfred  Binet, 
Pages,  193.     Cloth,  75  cents.     {3s.  6d.) 

THE  SOUL  OF  MAN.  By  Dr.  Paul  Carus.  With  152  cuts  and  dia- 
grams.    Pages,  xvi,  458.     Cloth,  S3.00.     (15s.) 

CONTRIBUTIONS  TO  THE  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  SENS.^TIONS, 
By  Prof.  Ernst  Mach.  Pages,  xi,  20S.  Cuts,  37.  Cloth,  $1.25. 
(6s.  6d.) 

ON  MEMORY,  AND  THE  SPECIFIC  ENERGIES  OF  THE  NERV- 
OUS SYSTEM.  By  Ewald  Hering.  Second  edition.  Pages,  50. 
Paper,  15  cents,     (gd.) 

THREE  INTRODUCTORY  LECTURES  ON  THE  SCIENCE  OF 
THOUGHT.  By  Prof.  F.  Max  Muller.  Pages,  vi,  128.  Cloth, 
75  cents.    (3s.  6d.) 


THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 

324  Dearborn  St.,  Chicago,  III. 

London  :  Kegan  Paul,  Trench,  TrUbner  &  Company 


THE  EVOLUTION 


GENERAL   IDEAS 


TH.  RIBOT 

PROFESSOR  IN  THE  COLLEGE  DE  FRANCE 


AUTHORISED  TRANSLATION  FROM  THE  FRENCH 

BY 

FRANCES  A.  VVELBY 


CHICAGO 
THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 

London-   Kegan  Paul,  Trench,  Trubner  &  Co.,  Ltd. 

i8qq 


COPYRIGHT   BY 

The  Open  Court  Publishing  Co. 

CHICAGO,  u.  s.  A. 

1899 

A/l  rights  reserved. 


PREFACE. 

THE  principal  aim  of  this  work  is  to  study  the 
development  of  the  mind  as  it  abstracts  and  gen- 
eralises, and  to  show  that  these  two  operations  exhibit 
a  perfect  evolution :  that  is  to  say,  they  exist  already 
in  perception,  and  advance  by  successive  and  easily 
determined  stages  to  the  more  elevated  forms  of  pure 
symbolism,  accessible  only  to  the  minority. 

It  is  a  commonplace  to  say  that  abstraction  has  its 
degrees,  as  number  its  powers.  Yet  it  is  not  suffi- 
cient to  enunciate  this  truism ;  the  degrees  must 
be  fixed  by  clear,  objective  signs,  and  these  must 
not  be  arbitrary.  Thus  we  shall  obtain  precise  knowl- 
edge of  the  various  stages  in  this  ascending  evolution, 
and  stand  in  less  danger  of  confounding  abstractions 
highly  distinct  by  nature.  Moreover,  we  avoid  cer- 
tain equivocal  questions  and  discussions  that  are 
based  entirely  upon  the  very  extended  sense  of  the 
terms  to  abstract  and  to  generalise. 

Accordingly  we  have  sought  to  establish  three 
main  periods  in  the  progressive  development  of  these 
operations:  (i)  inferior  abstraction,  prior  to  the  ap- 
pearance of  speech,  independent  of  words  (though 
not  of  all  signs)  ;  (2)  intermediate  abstraction,  accom- 
panied by  words,  which  though  at  first  accessory,  in- 
crease in  importance  little  by  little;  (3)  superior  ab 


VI  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

straction,  where  words  alone  exist  in  consciousness, 
and  correspond  to  a  complete  substitution.^ 

These  three  periods  again  include  subdivisions, 
transitional  forms  which  we  shall  endeavor  to  deter- 
mine. 

This  is  a  study  of  pure  psychology,  from  which  we 
have  rigorously  to  eliminate  all  that  relates  to  logic,  to 
the  theory  of  knowledge,  to  first  principles  of  philos- 
ophy. We  are  concerned  with  genesis,  with  embry- 
ology, with  evolution  only.  We  are  thus  thrown  upon 
observation,  upon  the  facts  wherein  mental  processes 
are  enunciated,  and  discovered.  Our  material,  and 
principal  sources  of  information,  lie  therefore  :  (i)  for 
inferior  abstracts,  in  the  acts  of  animals,  of  children,  of 
uneducated  deaf-mutes;  (2)  for  intermediate  abstracts, 
in  the  development  of  languages,  and  the  ethnograph- 
ical documents  of  primitive  or  half-civilised  peoples  ; 
(3)  for  superior  abstracts,  in  the  progressive  constitu- 
tion of  scientific  ideas  and  theories,  and  of  classifica- 
tions. 

This  volume  is  a  risume  of  lectures  given  at  the 
College  de  France  in  1895.  It  is  the  first  of  a  forth- 
coming series,  designed  to  include  all  departments  of 
psychology  :  the  unconscious,  percepts,  images,  voli- 
tion, movement,  etc. 

Th.  Ribot. 
March,  1897. 

'i-La  parole  is  here,  and  subsequently,  translated  by  speech:  U  mot  by 
words,  ot  language,— verbal  language  being  throughout  understood. — Trans. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THB  LOWER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION. — ABSTRACTION  PRIOR 

TO  SPEECH. 

PAGB 

Two  forms  of  intellectual  activity :  association  and  dissocia- 
tion.— Abstraction  belongs  to  the  second  type.  Its  posi- 
tive and  negative  conditions.  It  is  a  case  of  attention  : 
psychical  reinforcement. — It  is  in  embryo  in  concrete 
operations :  in  perception,  and  the  image.  Its  practical 
character. — Generalisation  belongs  to  the  first  type. 
Problem  of  the  frimum  cognitum  ;  difference  or  resem- 
blance ? — Hierarchy  of  general  ideas  :  need  of  a  notation. 
Three  great  classes. — Lower  forms  of  abstraction  and 
generalisation  or  pre-linguistic  period,  characterised  by 
absence  of  words i 

ANIMALS. 

Different  observations.  Numeration  in  animals  ;  what  does  it 
consist  of  ? — Mode  of  formation  and  characteristics  of  ge- 
neric images.  Reasoning  in  animals. — Reasoning  from 
particular  to  particular :  how  this  differs  from  simple  as- 
sociation.— Reasoning  by  analogy. — The  logic  of  images  : 
its  two  degrees ;  its  characteristics.  Does  not  admit  of 
substitution;  always  has  a  practical  aim. — ;Discussion  of 
certain  cases 1 1 

CHILDREN. 

Does  intelligence  start  from  the  general  or  the  particular  ?  A 
badly-stated  question.  Intelligence  proceeds  from  the  in- 
definite to  the  definite. — Characteristics  of  generic  images 


Vlll  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

PAGE 

in  children ;  examples. — Numeration ;  its  narrow  limits. 
Difference  between  real  numeration  and  perception  of  a 
plurality 31 

DEAF-MUTES. 

These  furnish  the  upper  limit  of  the  logic  of  images. — Their 
natural  language.  Vocabulary.  All  their  signs  are  ab- 
stractions. Syntax  of  position ;  disposition  of  terms  ac- 
cording to  order  of  importance.  —Intellectual  level 39 

ANALYTICAL  GESTURES. 

General  classification  of  signs. — Gesture,  an  intellectual,  not 
an  emotional,  instrument ;  its  wide  distribution.  Syntax 
identical  with  that  of  deaf-mutes. — Comparison  between 
phonetic  language  and  language  of  analytical  gesture. — 
Reason  why  speech  has  prevailed 48 

CHAPTER  II. 

SPEECH. 

Language  in  animals. — The  origin  of  speech ;  principal  con- 
temporaneous hypotheses ;  instinct,  progressive  evolution . 
The  cry,  vocalisation,  articulation.  Transitional  forms : 
co-existence  of  speech  and  of  the  language  of  action  ;  co- 
existence of  speech  and  of  inarticulate  sounds. — The  de- 
velopment of  speech.  Protoplasmic  period  without  gram- 
matical functions. — Roots;  two  theories:  reality,  and  resi- 
due of  analysis. — Did  speech  begin  with  words  or  with 
phrases  ? — Successive  appearance  of  parts  of  speech.  Ad- 
jectives or  denominations  of  qualities.  The  substantive  a 
contraction  of  the  adjective.  Verbs  not  a  primitive  phe- 
nomenon;  the  three  degrees  of  abstraction. — Terms  ex- 
pressive of  relations.  Psychological  nature  of  relation, 
may  be  reduced  to  change  or  movement.  Function  of 
analogy 54 

CHAPTER  III. 

INTERMEDIATE  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION. 

Division  into  two  classes  according  to  the  function  of  the  word. 
— First  class.     Words  not  indispensable,  and  only  in  a 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS.  IX 

PAGE 

limited  degree  the  instrument  of  substitution. — Difference 
between  generic  imnges  and  lower  concepts.  Character- 
istics of  these  two  classes.  Is  there  continuity  between 
the  two  ?  Nature  of  the  lower  forms  of  intermediate  ab- 
straction, according  to  languages,  numeration,  etc.  Con- 
crete-abstract period. — Second  class.  Words  are  indis- 
pensable and  become  an  instrument  of  substitution. — 
Difficulty  in  finding  examples. — History  of  zoological 
classification  :  pre-scientific  period  :  Aristotle,  Linnaeus, 
Cuvier,  etc.,  contemporary  writers.  Progress  towards 
unity 86 

CHAPTER  IV. 

HIGHER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.       THEIR   NATURE. 

Object  of  the  chapter :  What  is  there  in  consciousness,  when 
we  think  by  concepts  ? — The  general  idea  as  a  psychical 
state  may  be  reduced  to  varieties.  Investigation  of  this 
point :  the  method  pursued. — Reduction  to  three  princi- 
pal types.  Concrete  type  the  most  widely  distributed. 
Variation ;  reply  by  association  of  ideas.  Visual  typo- 
graphic type  :  printed  words  seen  and  nothing  further. — 
Auditory  type  ;  less  common. — Interrogations  by  general 
propositions :  same  results.  Investigation  of  cases  in 
which  words  exist  alone  in  consciousness.  Is  it  possible 
to  think  with  words  only  ?  Role  of  unconscious  knowl- 
edge. General  ideas  are  intellectual  habits. — Natural 
antagonism  between  the  image  and  the  concept.  Its 
causes. — Are  there  general  ideas  or  merely  general  terms?  iii 

CHAPTER  V. 

EVOLUTION  OF  THE   PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS. 

Section  i. — The  Concept  of  Number. 
Return  to  lower  phases :  concrete  and  abstract. — Formation 
of  idea  of  unity.  Hypotheses  as  to  its  experimental  ori- 
gin :  touch,  sight,  hearing,  internal  sensations,  attention. 
Unity  the  result  of  decomposition,  an  abstract. — The 
series  of  numbers.  Process  of  construction. — Function 
of  signs :  discussions  of  this  subject 137 


X  THE  EVOLUTION  OE  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

PAGE 

Section  II. — The  Concept  of  Space. 
Extension  as  a  concrete  fact.  Variable  and  relative  charac- 
teristics.— Transition  to  concrete-abstract  period. — Space 
(abstract):  the  current  popular  conception  the  result  of 
imagination.  Idle  problems. — The  true  concept  is  the 
result  of  dissociation. — The  notion  of  "function." — Im- 
agination of  an  infinite  space. — Works  on  ideal  geometry: 
constructive  power  of  the  mind  ;  reinforcement  of  distinc- 
tion between  space  as  perceived  and  conceived 146 

Section  I  J  I. — The  Concept  of  Time. 

Real  (concrete)  duration  :  the  present,  its  reality ;  its  experi- 
mental determination  :  maximum  and  minimum.  Repro- 
duction of  duration  ;  experiments  ;  indifferent  point. — 
Variable  and  relative  characteristics. — Origin  of  concrete 
notion  of  time :  different  hypotheses :  external  and  inter- 
nal sensations  :  presumption  in  favor  of  the  latter. — Ab- 
stract duration  (time).  First  stage,  depends  on  memory 
and  imagination  only :  corresponds  (i)  to  generic  images 
(representation  of  duration  among  the  higher  animals), 
and  (2)  to  the  concrete-abstract  period  (intermediate  forms 
of  abstraction).  Primitive  races.  Why  has  time  (and  not 
space)  been  personified. — Second  stage  depends  upon  ab- 
straction. Function  of  the  astronomers  :  measure  of  time. 
— Infinite  time. — Current  hypotheses  as  to  the  psycho- 
logic process  which  constitutes  the  notion  of  time  :  sensa- 
tions and  consecutive  images  :  sensations  which  are  feel- 
ings of  tension,  of  effort.  "Temporal  signs." — Full  and 
empty  time 159 

Section  IV.  —  The  Concept  of  Cause. 

Psychical  elements  constituting  the  concept. —  Experiential 
origin  of  the  idea  of  cause  :  different  solutions  have  all  a 
common  basis. — Its  primitive  individual  character.  Its 
extension. — Subjective  and  anthropomorphic  period  of 
generic  images. — Period  of  reflexion,  partial  elimination 
of  its  subjective  character,  reduction  to  an  invariable  re- 
lation.— The  notion  of  universal  causality  is  acquired  and 
remains  a  postulate. — Two  ideas  have  hindered  the  devel- 
opment of  this  last  notion :  that  of  miracles  and  that  of 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS.  XI 

PAGE 

chance. — Transformation  of  the  notion  of  cause.  Rule  of 
scientific  research :  its  position  is  exterior.  Identity  of 
cause  and  effect. — Present  form  of  the  principle  of  uni- 
versal causality. — Two  quite  distinct  notions  of  cause 
(force,  invariable  relation),  one  of  which  is  alone  a  con- 
cept     i8o 

Section  V. — The  Concept  of  Law. 
Objective  value  of  general  ideas.  Two  contrary  theories. 
Mere  approximations  to  the  psychologist. — Three  periods 
in  the  development  of  the  notion  of  law. — Period  of  ge- 
neric images.  Primitive  sense  of  the  word  law. — Period 
of  empirical  laws,  corresponding  with  the  intermediate 
forms  of  abstraction.  Characteristics :  identity  of  fact 
and  law  ;  complexity. — Period  of  theoretical  or  ideal  laws, 
corresponding  to  medium  forms  of  abstraction.  Its  fea- 
tures :  simplicity,  quantitative  determination,  ideal  for- 
mula    194 

Section  VI. — The  Concept  of  Species. 
Its  value  :  contemporaneous  discussion  of  this  subject.  Com- 
ponent elements  of  the  concept  of  species  :  resemblance, 
filiation.  Difiiculties  resulting  from  polymorphism,  from 
alternate  generation. — Races,  varieties. — Temporary  and 
provisional  objectivity. — Genera.  Theories  of  Linnaeus 
and  Agassiz. — Shifting  character  of  the  classifications 
above  the  species. — One  common  point  between  trans- 
formists  and  their  opponents  :  practical  value  of  concepts. 
Not  realities,  nor  fictions,  but  approximations. — Laws  and 
species  dependent  on  conditions  of  existence  and  varying 
with  them 203 

CHAPTER  VI. 

CONCLUSION. 

How  was  the  faculty  of  abstracting  and  of  generalising  con- 
stituted ?  Two  principal  causes  :  utility,  appearance  of 
inventors. — How  has  it  developed  ?  Three  principal  di- 
rections :  practical,  speculative,  scientific. — Resume. ■  nec- 
essary co-operation  of  two  factors  :  the  one  conscious,  the 
other  unconscious 216 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  LOWER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION. 

ABSTRACTION  PRIOR  TO  SPEECH. 

SAVE  in  extremely  rare  cases, — supposing  such  to 
occur  at  all,  as  perhaps  in  the  instant  of  surprise, 
and  in  states  approximating  to  pure  sensation, — save 
in  such  extremely  rare  cases,  where  the  mind,  like 
a  mirror,  passively  reflects  external  impressions,  intel- 
lectual activity  may  always  be  reduced  to  one  of  the 
two  following  types  :  associating,  combining,  unifying, 
or  dissociating,  isolating,  and  separating.  These  car- 
dinal operations  underlie  all  forms  of  cognition,  from  ^__ 
the  lowest  to  the  highest,  and  constitute  its  unity  of  t/ 
composition. 

Abstraction  belongs  to  the  second  type.  It  is  a 
normal  and  necessary  process  of  the  mind,  dependent 
on  attention,  i.  e.,  on  the  limitation,  willed  or  spon- 
taneous, of  the  field  of  consciousness.  The  act  of 
abstraction  implies  in  its  genesis  both  negative  and 
positive  conditions,  and  is  the  result  of  these. 

The  negative  conditions  consist  essentially  in  the 
fact  that  we  cannot  apprehend  more  than  one  quality 
or  one  aspect,  varying  according  to  the  circumstances, 
in  any  complex  whole, — because  consciousness,  like 


( 


2  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

the  retina,  is  restricted  to  a  narrow  region  of  clear 
perception. 

The  positive  condition  is  a  state  which  has  been 
appropriately  termed  a  "psychical  reinforcement  "  of 
that  which  is  being  abstracted,  and  it  is  naturally  ac- 
companied by  a  weakening  of  that  which  is  abstracted 
from.  The  true  characteristic  of  abstraction  is  this 
partial  increment  of  intensity.  While  involving  elim- 
ination, it  is  actually  a  positive  mental  process.  The 
elements  or  qualities  of  a  percept,  or  a  representation, 
which  we  omit  do  not  necessarily  involve  such  sup- 
pression. We  leave  them  out  of  account  simply  be- 
cause they  do  not  suit  our  ends  for  the  moment,  and 
are  complementary.^ 

Abstraction  being,  then,  in  spite  of  negative  ap- 
pearances, a  positive  operation,  how  are  we  to  con- 
ceive it?  Attention  is  necessary  to  it,  but  it  is  more 
than  attention.  It  is  an  augmentation  of  intensity, 
but  it  is  more  than  an  augmentation  of  intensity. 
Suppose  a  group  of  representations  a-\-  b  -\-  c=d.  To 
abstract  from  b  and  r  in  favor  of  a,  would  ostensibly 
give  a  =  d — (b -}-  c).  If  this  were  so,  b  and  c  would  be 
retained  unaltered  in  consciousness  ;  there  would  be 
no  abstraction.  On  the  other  hand,  since  it  is  impos- 
sible for  the  whole  representation  d  to  be  suppressed 
outright,  d  and  c  cannot  be  totally  obliterated.  They 
subsist,  accordingly,  in  a  residual  state  which  may  be 
termed  x,  and  the  abstract  representation  is  hence  not 
a  but  a -\-  X  or  A.  Thus  the  elements  of  abstract  rep- 
resentations are  the  same  as  those  of  concrete  repre- 
sentations; only  some  are  strengthened,  others  weak- 


ISchmidkunz,  Ue6er  die  Abstraction.  Halle:  Strieker,  i88g.  This  little 
work  of  forty-three  pages  contains  a  good  historical  and  theoretical  exposi- 
tion of  the  question. 


THE  LOWER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  3 

ened :  whence  arise  new  groupings.  Abstraction, 
accordingly,  consists  in  the  formation  of  new  groups 
of  representations  which,  while  strengthening  certain 
elements  of  the  concrete  representations,  weaken  other 
elements  of  the  same.* 

We  see  from  the  above  that  abstraction  depends 
genetically  upon  the  causes  which  awaken  and  sustain 
attention.  I  have  described  these  causes  elsewhere, '■' 
and  cannot  here  return  to  their  consideration. 

It  is  sufficient  to  remark  that  abstraction,  like  at- 
tention, may  be  instinctive,  spontaneous,  and  natural ; 
or  reflective,  voluntary,  and  artificial.  In  the  first 
category  the  abstraction  of  a  quality  or  mode  of  ex- 
istence originates  in  some  attraction,  or  from  utility ; 
hence  it  is  a  common  manifestation  of  intellectual  life 
and  is  even  met  with,  as  we  shall  see,  among  many  of 
the  lower  animals.  In  its  second  form,  the  rarer  and 
more  exalted,  it  proceeds  less  from  the  qualities  of  the 
object  than  from  the  will  of  the  subject ;  it  presupposes 
a  choice,  an  elimination  of  negligible  elements,  which 
is  often  laborious,  as  well  as  the  difficult  task  of  main- 
taining the  abstract  element  clearly  in  consciousness. 
In  fine,  it  is  always  a  special  application  of  the  atten- 
tion which,  adapted  as  circumstances  require  to  ob- 
servation, synthesis,  action,  etc.,  here  functions  as  an 
instrument  of  analysis. 


iSchmidkunz,  loc.  cit.  This  author,  who  rightly  insists  upon  the  positive 
character  of  abstraction  (which  is  too  frequently  considered  as  a  negation)  ob- 
serves that  no  concept,  not  even  that  of  infinity,  is  in  its  psychological  gene- 
sis the  result  of  negation,  for,  "in  order  to  deduce  from  the  idea  of  a  finite 
thing  the  idea  of  infinity,  it  is  first  necessary  to  abstract  from  that  thing  its 
quality  of  finality,  which  is  certainly  a  positive  act ;  subsequently,  in  order  to 
reach  infinity,  it  is  sufficient  either  constantly  to  increase  the  time,  magni- 
tude, and  intensity  of  the  finite,  which  is  a  positive  process;  or  to  deny  the 
limits  of  the  finite,  which  is  tantamount  to  denying  the  negation." 

i  Psychology  of  Attention.    Chicago  :  The  Open  Court  Publishing  Co. 


\ 


4  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

A  deeply-rooted  prejudice  asserts  that  abstraction 
is  a  mental  act  of  relative  infrequency.  This  fallacy 
obtains  in  current  parlance,  where  "abstract"  is  a 
synonym  of  difficult,  obscure,  inaccessible.  This  is  a 
psychological  error  resulting  from  an  incomplete  view: 
all  abstraction  is  illegitimately  reduced  to  its  higher 
forms. J  The  faculty  of  abstracting,  from  the  lowest  to 
"the  highest  degrees,  is  constantly  the  same :  its  devel- 
lOpment  is  dependent  on  that  of  (general)  intelligence 
and  of  language ;  but  it  exists  in  embryo  even  in  those 
'primitive  operations  which  are  properly  concerned 
with  the  concrete,  i.  e. ,  perception  and  representation. 
Several  recent  authors  have  emphasised  this  point.  ^ 

Perception  is  par  excellence  the  faculty  of  cognising 
the  concrete.     It  strives  to  embrace  all  the  qualities 
^Q  of  its  object  without  completely  succeeding,  because 

it  is  held  in  check  by  an  internal  foe, — the  natural 
tendency  of  the  mind  to  simplify  and  to  eliminate. 
The  same  horse,  at  a  given  moment,  is  not  perceived 
in  the  same  manner  by  a  jockey,  a  veterinary  surgeon, 
a  painter,  and  a  tyro.  To  each  of  these,  certain  qual- 
ities, which  vary  individually,  stand  in  relief,  and 
others  recede  into  the  background.  Except  in  cases 
of  methodical  and  prolonged  investigation  (where  we 
have  observation,  and  not  perception)  there  is  always 
an  unconscious  selection  of  some  principal  character- 
istics which,  grouped  together,  become  a  substitute 
for  totality.  It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  perception 
is  pre-eminently  a  practical  operation,  that  its  main- 
spring is  interest  or  utility,  and  that  in  consequence 
we  neglect — i.  e.,  leave  in  the  field  of  obscure  con- 
sciousness— whatever  at  the  moment  concerns  neither 

1  See    especially  Hoeffding,  Psychologie.    German  translation.    Second 
Edition,  pp.  223  et  seq 


THE  LOWER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  5 

our  desires  nor  our  purpos'es.  It  would  be  superflu- 
ous to  review  all  the  forms  of  perception  (visual,  aud- 
itory, tactile,  etc.),  and  to  show  that  they  are  gov- 
erned by  this  same  law  of  utility ;  but  it  should  be 
remarked  that  the  natural  mechanism  by  which  the 
strengthened  elements  and  the  weakened  elements  are 
separated,  is  a  rude  cast  of  what  subsequently  be- 
comes abstraction,  that  the  same  forces  are  in  play, 
and  are  ultimately  reducible  to  some  definite  direction 
given  to  the  attention. 

With  the  image,  the  intermediate  stage  between 
percept  and  concept,  the  reduction  of  the  object  rep- 
resented to  a  few  fundamental  features  is  still  more 
marked.  Not  merely  is  there  among  the  different 
representations  which  I  may  have  of  some  man,  dog, 
or  tree,  one  that  for  the  time  being  necessarily  ex- 
cludes the  others  (my  oak  tree  perforce  appears  to  me 
in  summer  foliage,  tinted  by  autumn,  or  bereft  of 
leaves, — in  bright  light  or  in  shade),  but  even  this  indi- 
vidual, concrete  representation  which  prevails  over 
the  others  is  no  more  than  a  sketch,  a  reduction  of  re- 
ality with  many  details  omitted.  Apart  from  the  excep- 
tionally gifted  men  in  whom  mental  vision  and  men- 
tal audition  are  perfect,  and  wholly  commensurate  (as 
it  would  seem)  with  perception,  the  representations 
which  we  call  exact  are  never  so,  except  in  their 
most  general  features.  Compare  the  image  we  have 
with  our  eyes  closed  of  a  monument,  with  the  percep- 
tion of  the  monument  itself;  the  remembrance  of  a 
melody  with  its  vocal  or  instrumental  execution.  In 
the  average  man,  the  image,  the  would-be  copy  of  re- 
ality invariably  suffers  a  conspicuous  impoverishment, 
which  is  enormous  in  the  less  lavishly  endowed  ;  it  is 


O  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

here  reduced  to  a  mere  schema,  limited  to  the  infe- 
rior concepts. 

Doubtless  it  may  be  objected  that  the  work  of  dis- 
sociation in  perception  and  representation  is  incom- 
plete and  partial.  It  would  be  strange  and  illogical 
indeed  if  the  abstract  were  to  triumph  in  the  very 
heart  of  the  concrete  ;  we  do  but  submit  that  it  is  here 
in  germ,  in  embryonic  shape.  And  hence,  when  ab- 
straction appears  in  its  true  form,  as  the  conscious- 
ness of  one  unique  quality  isolated  from  the  rest,  it  is 
no  new  manifestation  but  a  fruition,  it  is  a  simplifica- 
tion of  simplifications. 

The  state  of  consciousness  thus  attained,  by  the 
fixation  of  attention  on  one  quality  exclusively,  and 
by  its  ideal  dissociation  from  the  rest,  becomes,  as  we 
know,  a  notion  which  is  neither  individual  nor  gen- 
eral, but  abstract, — and  this  is  the  material  of  gen- 
eralisation. 

The  sense  of  identity,  the  power  of  apprehending 
resemblances,  is,  as  has  justly  been  said,  "the  keel 
and  backbone  of  our  thinking  " ;  without  it  we  should 
be  lost  in  the  incessant  stream  of  things.^  Are  there 
in  nature  any  complete  resemblances,  any  absolutely 
similar  events?  It  is  extremely  doubtful.  It  might 
be  supposed  that  a  person  who  reads  a  sentence  sev- 
eral times  in  succession,  who  listens  several  times  to 
the  same  air,  who  tastes  all  the  four  quarters  of  the 
same  fruit,  would  experience  in  each  case  an  identical 
perception.  But  this  is  not  so.  A  little  reflexion  will 
show  that  besides  differences  in  time,  in  the  varying 
moods  of  the  subject,  and  in  the  cumulative  effect  of 
repeated  perceptions,  there  is  at  least  between  the 
first  perception  and  the  second,  that  radical  difference 

1  W.  James,  Psychology .     Vol.  L,  p.  459. 


THE  LOWER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  7 

which  separates  the  new  from  the  repeated.  In  fact, 
the  material  given  us  by  external  and  internal  experi- 
ence consists  of  resemblances  alloyed  by  differences 
which  vary  widely  in  degree, — in  other  words,  analo- 
gies. The  perfect  resemblance  assumed  between 
things  vanishes  as  we  come  to  know  them  better.  At 
first  sight  a  new  people  exhibits  to  the  traveller  a  well- 
determined  general  type ;  later,  the  more  he  observes, 
the  more  the  apparent  uniformity  is  resolved  into  va- 
rieties. "I  have  taken  the  trouble,"  says  Agassiz,  "to 
compare  thousands  of  individuals  of  the  same  species; 
in  one  case  I  pushed  the  comparison  so  far  as  to  have 
placed  side  by  side  27,000  specimens  of  one  and  the 
same  shell  (genus  Neretina).  I  can  assure  you  that  in 
these  27,000  specimens  I  did  not  find  two  that  were 
perfectly  alike." 

Is  this  faculty  of  grasping  resemblances — the  sub- 
strate of  generalisation — primitive,  in  the  absolute 
signification  of  the  word?  Does  it  mark  the  first  awak- 
ening of  the  mind,  in  point  of  cognition?  For  several 
contemporary  writers  (Spencer,  Bain,  Schneider,  and 
others)  the  consciousness  of  difference  is  the  primor- 
dial factor ;  the  consciousness  of  resemblance  comes 
later.  Others  uphold  the  opposite  contention.^  As 
a  matter  of  fact  this  quest  for  the  primum  cognitum  is 


1  Herbert  Spencer,  Principles  of  Psychology.  Vol.  I.,  Part  2,  Chapter  H.— 
Bain  ( in  the  last  chapter  of  Emotions  and  IVill )  says  that  nothing  more  fun- 
damental can  possibly  be  assigned  as  a  mark  of  intelligence  than  the  feeling 
of  difference  between  consecutive  or  co-existing  impressions.  "There  are 
cases,  however,  where  agreement  imparts  the  shock  requisite  for  rousing  the 
intellectual  wave  ;  but  it  is  agreement  so  qualified  as  to  be  really  a  mode  of 
difference."  For  a  review  and  ample  discussion  of  this  problem  see  Ladd's 
Psychology,  Descriptive  and  Explanatory,  Chapter  XIV.  The  earlier  psychol- 
ogists, in  considering  the  "  faculty  of  comparison"  which  acts  by  resem- 
blance and  difference,  as  primordial,  had  observed  the  same  fact,  although 
they  described  it  in  diiferent  terms. 


8  THE   EVOLUTION  OI'  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

beyond  our  grasp ;  like  all  genetical  questions,  ii 
eludes  our  observation  and  experience. 
-^  No  conclusion  can  be  formed  save  on  purely  log- 
ical arguments,  and  each  side  advances  reasons  that 
carry  a  certain  weight.  There  is,  moreover,  at  the 
bottom  of  the  whole  discussion,  the  grave  error  of 
identifying  the  embryonic  state  of  the  mind  with  its 
adult  forms,  and  of  presupposing  a  sharp  initial  dis- 
tinction between  discrimination  and  assimilation.  The 
question  must  remain  open,  incapable  of  positive  so- 
lution by  our  psychology.  The  incontestable  truth 
with  regard  to  the  mind,  as  we  know  it  in  its  devel- 
oped and  organised  state,  is  that  the  two  processes 
Sidvz.nce  part  passu,  and  are  reciprocally  causative. 

In  sum,  abstraction  and  generalisation  considered 
as  elementary  acts  of  the  mind,  and  reduced  to  their 
simplest  conditions,  involve  two  processes  : 

I.  The  former,  abstraction,  implies  a  iiissociatiye 
process,  operating  on  the  raw  data  of  experience.  It 
has  subjective  causes  which  are  ultimately  reducible 
to  attention.  It  has  objective  causes  which  may  be 
due  to  the  fact  that  a  determinate  quality  is  given  us 
as  an  integral  part  of  widely  different  groups. 

"Any  total  impression  whose  elements  are  never 
experienced  apart  must  be  unanalysable.  If  all  cold 
things  were  wet  and  all  wet  things  cold,  if  all  liquids 
were  transparent  and  no  non-liquid  were  transparent, 
we  should  scarcely  discriminate  between  coldness  and 
wetness  and  scarcely  ever  invent  separate  names  for 

liquidity  and  transparency What  is  associated 

now  with  one  thing  and  now  with  another  tends  to 
become  dissociated  from  either,  and  to  grow  into  an 
object  of  abstract  conterhplation  by  the  mind.     One 


THE  LOWER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  9 

might  call  this  the  law  of  dissociation  by  varying  con- 
comitants."^ 

2.  The  latter,  generalisation,  originates  in  associa- 
t£on  by  resemblance,  but  even  in  its  lowest  degree  it 
rises  beyond  this,  since  it  implies  a  synthetic  act  of 
fusion.  It  does  not,  in  fact,  consist  in  the  successive 
excitation  of  similar  or  analogous  percepts,  as  in  the 
case  where  the  image  of  St.  Peter's  in  Rome  suggests 
to  me  that  of  St.  Paul's  in  London,  of  the  Pantheon 
in  Paris,  and  of  other  churches  with  enormous  dimen- 
sions, of  like  architecture,  and  with  gigantic  domes. 
It  is  a  condensation.  The  mind  resembles  a  crucible 
with  a  precipitate  of  common  resemblances  at  the 
bottom,  while  the  differences  have  been  volatilised. 
In  proportion  as  we  recede  from  this  primitive  and 
elementary  form,  the  constitution  of  the  general  idea 
demands  other  psychological  conditions  which  cannot 
be  hastily  enumerated. 

And  thus  we  reach  the  principal  aim  of  the  present 
work,  which  purports,  not  to  reinforce  the  time-worn 
dispute  as  to  the  nature  of  abstraction  and  generalisa- 
tion, but  to  pursue  these  operations  step  by  step  in 
their  development,  and  multiform  aspects.  Directly 
we  pass  beyond  pure  individual  representation  we 
reach  an  ascending  scale  of  notions  which,  apart  from 
the  general  character  possessed  by  all,  are  extremely 
heterogeneous  in  their  nature,  and  imply  distinct  men- 
tal habits.  The  question  so  often  discussed  as  to 
"What  takes  place  in  the  mind  when  we  are  thinking 
by  general  ideas?"  is  not  to  be  disposed  of  in  one 
definite  answer,  but  finds  variable  response  according 
to  the  circumstances.  In  order  to  give  an  adequate 
reply,  the  principal  degrees  of  this  scale  must  first  be 

1 W.  James,  Psychology.    Vol.  I.,  pp.  502  and  506. 


t^l 


lO  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

determined.  And  for  this  we  require  an  objective  no- 
tation which  shall  give  them  some  external,  though 
not  arbitrary,  mark. 

The  first  distinguishing  mark  is  given  by  the  ab- 
sence or  presence  of  words.  Abstraction  and  general- 
isation, with  no  possible  aid  from  language,  constitute 
the  inferior  group  which  some  recent  writers  have 
designated  by  the  appropriate  name  of  generic  images'^ 
— a  term  which  clearly  shows  their  interme^ate  na- 
ture between  the  pure  image,  and  the  general  notion, 
properly  so-called. 

The  second  class,  which  we  have  termed  intermedi- 
ate abstraction,  implies  the  use  of  words.  At  their 
lowest  stage  these  concepts  hardly  rise  above  the 
level  of  the  generic  image  :  they  can  be  reduced  to  a 
vague  schema,  in  which  the  word  is  almost  a  super- 
fluous accompaniment.  At  a  stage  higher  the  parts 
are  inverted :  the  representative  schema  becomes 
more  and  more  impoverished,  and  is  obliterated  by  the 
word,  which  rises  in  consciousness  to  the  first  rank. 


IThis  term  is  borrowed  from  the  well-known  works  of  Gallon  on  com- 
posite photographs,  which  are  scarcely  more  than  twenty  years  old.  Huxley 
in  his  book  on  Hume  (Chapter  IV.)  appears  to  be  the  first  who  introduced  it 
into  psychology,  as  shown  by  the  following  passage  :  "This  mental  opera- 
tion may  be  rendered  comprehensible  by  consideringwhat  takes  place  in  the 
formation  of  compound  photographs — when  the  images  of  the  faces  of  six 
sitters,  for  example,  are  each  received  on  the  same  photographic  plate,  for  a 
sixth  of  the  time  requisite  to  take  one  portrait.  The  final  result  is  that  all 
those  points  in  which  the  six  faces  agree  are  brought  out  strongly,  while  all 
those  in  which  they  differ  are  left  vague  ;  and  thus  what  may  be  termed  a 
generic  portrait  of  the  six  is  produced.  Thus  our  ideas  of  single  complex  im- 
pressions are  incomplete  in  one  way,  and  those  of  numerous,  more  or  less 
similar,  complex  impressions  are  incomplete  in  another  way;  that  is  to  say, 
they  are  generic.  .  .  .  And  hence  it  follows  that  our  ideas  of  the  impressions 
in  question  are  not,  In  the  strict  sense  of  the  word,  copies  of  those  impres- 
sions; while  at  the  same  time  they  may  exist  in  the  mind  independently  of 
language."  Romanes  employs  the  word  "  recept"  for ''generic  images,"  as 
marking  their  intermediate  place  between  the  "percept"  which  is  below, 
and  the  "  concept  "  which  is  above  them. 


THE  LOWER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  1 1 

Finally,  the  third  class,  that  of  the  higher  concepts, 
has  for  its  distinguishing  mark  that  it  can  no  longer 
be  represented.  If  any  image  arises  in  consciousness 
it  does  not  sensibly  assist  the  movement  of  thought, 
and  may  even  impede  it.  Everything,  apparently  at 
least,  is  subordinated  to  language. 

This  enumeration  of  the  stages  of  abstraction  can 
for  the  present  only  be  given  roughly  and  broadly. 
Every  phase  of  its  evolution  should  be  studied  in 
itself,  and  accurately  determined  by  its  internal  and 
external  characteristics.  As  to  the  legitimacy,  the  ob- 
jective and  practical  value,  of  this  schematic  distribu- 
tion, nothing  less  than  a  detailed  exploration  from  one 
end  to  the  other  of  our  subject,  can  confirm  or  over- 
throw it. 

We  shall  begin,  then,  with  the  lower  forms,  dwell- 
ing upon  these  at  some  length,  because  they  are  usu- 
ally neglected,  or  altogether  omitted.  This  is  the //-<?- 
linguistic  period  of  abstraction  and  generalisation : 
words  are  totally  wanting  ;  they  are  an  unknown  fac- 
tor. How  far  is  it  possible  without  the  aid  of  lan- 
guage to  transcend  the  level  of  perception,  and  of 
consecutive  images,  and  to  attain  a  more  elevated  in- 
tellectual standpoint?  In  replying  empirically,  we 
have  three  fairly  copious  sources  of  information  :  ani- 
mals, children  who  have  not  yet  acquired  speech,  and 
uneducated  deaf-mutes. 

ANIMALS. 

It  is  a  commonplace  to  say  that  animal  psychol- 
ogy is  full  of  obscurities  and  difficulties.  These  arise 
mainly  with  regard  to  the  question  now  occupying 
us ;    for   we    are    concerned   with    ascertaining,    not 


12  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

whether  animals  perceive,  remember,  and  even,  when 
their  organisation  is  sufficiently  advanced,  imagine 
(which  no  one  denies),  but  if  they  are  capable  in  the 
intellectual  order  of  still  better  and  greater  achieve- 
ments. The  common  opinion  is  in  the  negative  ;  yet 
this  may  rest  entirely  upon  ambiguity  of  language. 
Without  prejudging  anything,  we  must  interrogate 
the  facts  to  hand,  and  link  them  as  closely  as  possible 
in  our  interpretation. 

As  to  the  facts  themselves  we  may  be  sparing  of 
detail ;  they  are  to  be  found  in  special  treatises,  and 
it  is  superfluous  to  repeat  them  in  these  pages.  It  is 
moreover  evident  that  a  large  portion  of  the  animal 
kingdom  may  be  neglected.  In  its  lowest  regions  it 
is  so  remote  from  us,  and  has  so  obscure  and  scant  a 
psychology,  that  nothing  can  be  learned  from  it.  In 
the  higher  forms  alone  can  we  have  any  chance  of 
finding  what  we  seek,  i.  e.,  (i)  equivalents  of  con- 
cepts, (2)  processes  comparable  with  reasoning. 

In  the  immense  realm  of  the  invertebrates,  the 
highest  psychical  development  is,  by  general  ac- 
knowledgment, met  with  among  the  social  Hymenop- 
tera  ;  and  the  capital  representatives  of  this  group  are 
the  ants.  To  these  we  may  confine  ourselves.  De- 
spite their  tiny  size,  their  brain,  particularly  among 
the  neuters,  is  remarkable  in  structure — "one  of  the 
most  marvellous  atoms,"  says  Darwin,  "in  all  matter, 
not  excepting  even  the  human  brain."  Injuries  to  this 
organ,  which  are  frequent  in  their  sanguinary  com- 
bats, cause  disorders  quite  analogous  to  those  ob- 
served in  mammals.  It  is  useless  to  recall  what  every 
one  knows  of  their  habits  :  their  organisation  of  labor, 
varied  methods  of  architecture,  their  wars,  plundering 
and  rape,  practice   of  slavery,  methods  of  education, 


THE  LOWER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  1 3 

and  (in  certain  species)  their  agricultural  labors,  har- 
vesting, construction  of  granaries,^  etc.  We,  on  the 
contrary,  must  examine  the  exceptional  cases  in  which 
the  ants  depart  from  their  general  habits ;  for  their 
ability  to  abstract,  to  generalise,  and  to  reason,  can 
only  be  established  by  new  adaptations  to  unaccus- 
tomed circumstances.  The  following  may  serve  as 
examples : 

"A  nest  was  made  near  one  of  our  tramways," 
says  Mr.  Belt,  "and  to  get  to  the  trees,  the  leaves  of 
which  they  were  harvesting,  the  ants  had  to  cross  the 
rails,  over  which  the  cars  were  continually  passing 
and  re-passing.  Every  time  they  came  along  a  num- 
ber of  ants  were  crushed  to  death.  They  persevered 
in  crossing  for  some  time,  but  at  last  set  to  work  and 
tunnelled  underneath  each  rail.  One  day,  when  the 
cars  were  not  running,  I  stopped  up  the  tunnels  with 
stones ;  but  although  great  numbers  carrying  leaves 
were  thus  cut  off  from  the  nest,  they  would  not  cross 
the  rails,  but  set  to  work  making  fresh  tunnels  under- 
neath them." 

Another  observer.  Dr.  Ellendorf,  who  has  carefully 
studied  the  ants  of  Central  America,  recounts  a  simi- 
lar experience.  These  insects  cut  off  the  leaves  of 
trees  and  carry  them  to  their  nests,  where  they  serve 
various  purposes.  One  of  their  columns  was  return- 
ing laden  with  spoils. 

"I  placed  a  dry  branch,  nearly  a  foot  in  diameter, 
obliquely  across  their  path,  which  was  lined  on  either 
side  by  an  impassable  barrier  of  high  grass,  and 
pressed  it  down  so   tightly  on  the  ground  that  they 


IFor  details  see  Romanes,  Animal  Intelligence,  Chapters  III.  and  V.  As 
to  the  probability  of  their  possessing  means  of  communication  for  assistance 
in  their  co-operative  labors  see  below,  Chapter  II. 


14  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  TPEAS. 

could  not  creep  underneath.  The  first  comers  crawled 
beneath  the  branch  as  far  as  they  could,  and  then 
tried  to  climb  over,  but  failed  owing  to  the  weight  on 
their  heads.  .  .  .  They  then  stood  still  as  if  awaiting  a 
word  of  command,  and  I  saw  with  astonishment  that 
the  loads  had  been  laid  aside  by  more  than  a  foot's 
length  of  the  column,  one  imitating  the  other.  And 
now  work  began  on  both  sides  of  the  branch,  and  in 
about  half  an  hour  a  tunnel  was  made  beneath  it. 
Each  ant  then  took  up  its  burden  again,  and  the 
march  was  resumed  in  the  most  perfect  order," 

They  also  show  considerable  inventiveness  in  the 
construction  of  bridges.  It  appears  from  numerous 
observations  that  they  know  how  to  place  straws  on 
the  surface  of  water,  and  to  keep  them  in  equilibrium 
or  unite  their  several  ends  together  with  earth,  mois- 
ten them  with  their  saliva,  restore  them  when  de- 
stroyed, and  to  construct  a  highway  made  of  grains  of 
sand,  etc.  (Reaumur.)  They  even  employ  living 
bridges:  "The  ground  about  a  maple  tree  having 
been  smeared  with  tar  so  as  to  check  their  ravages, 
the  first  ants  who  attempted  to  cross  stuck  fast.  But 
the  others  were  not  to  be  thus  entrapped.  Turning 
back  to  the  tree  they  carried  down  aphides  which  they 
deposited  on  the  tar  one  after  another  until  they  had 
made  a  bridge  over  which  they  could  cross  the  tarred 
spot  without  danger."^ 

I  shall  cite  no  observations  on  the  intelligence 
of  wasps  and  bees,  but  I  wish  to  note  one  rudi- 
mentary case  of  generalisation.  Huber  remarked  that 
bees  bite  holes  through  the  base  of  corollas  when 
these  are  so  long  as  to  prevent  them  from  reaching 
the  honey  in  the  ordinary  way.     They  only  resort  to 

1  Romanes.     Animal  Tntdligcnce,  Chapter  IIL 


THE  LOWER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  1 5 

this  expedient  when  they  find  they  cannot  reach  the 
nectar  from  above ;  "  but  having  once  ascertained 
this,  they  forthwith  proceed  to  pierce  the  bottoms  of 
all  the  flowers  of  the  same  species."  Doubtless  asso- 
ciation and  habit  may  be  invoked  here,  but  before 
these  were  produced,  was  there  not  an  extension  of 
like  to  like  ? 

For  the  higher  animals  I  shall  also  restrict  myself 
to  the  upper  types.  We  shall  of  course  reject  all  ob- 
servations relating  to  "performing"  animals,  all  ac- 
quirements due  to  education  and  training  by  man,  as 
also  the  cases  in  which,  as  in  the  beaver,  there  is  a 
perplexing  admixture  of  instinct  so  called  (a  specific 
property),  and  adaptation,  varying  according  to  time 
and  place. 

The  elephant  has  a  reputation  for  intelligence 
which  may  be  somewhat  exaggerated.  His  psychol- 
ogy is  fairly  well  known.  We  may  cite  a  few  charac- 
teristic traits  that  bear  upon  our  subject.  He  will 
tear  up  bamboo  canes  from  the  ground,  break  them 
with  his  feet,  examine  them,  and  repeat  the  operation 
until  he  has  found  one  that  suits  him  ;  he  then  seizes 
the  branch  with  his  trunk  and  uses  it  as  a  scraper  to 
remove  the  leeches  which  adhere  to  his  skin  at  some 
inaccessible  part  of  his  body.  "This  is  a  frequent 
occurrence,  such  scrapers  being  used  by  each  ele- 
phant daily."  When  he  is  tormented  by  large  flies  he 
selects  a  branch  which  he  strips  of  its  leaves,  except 
at  the  top,  where  he  leaves  a  fine  bunch.  "  He  will 
deliberately  clean  it  down  several  times,  and  then  lay- 
ing hold  of  its  lower  end  he  will  break  it  off,  thus  ob- 
taining a  fan  or  switch  about  five  feet  long,  handle  in- 
cluded. With  this  he  keeps  the  flies  at  bay.  Say 
what  we  may,  these  are  both  really  bona  fide  imple- 


1 6  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

ments,   each   intelligently  made   for   a   definite   pur 
pose." 

"What  I  particularly  wish  to  observe,"  says  an 
experienced  naturalist,  "is  that  there  are  good  rea- 
sons for  supposing  that  elephants  possess  abstract 
ideas  ;  for  instance,  I  think  it  is  impossible  to  doubt 
that  they  acquire  through  their  own  experience  no- 
tions of  hardness  and  weight,  and  the  grounds  on 
which  I  arnTe3  to  think  this  are  as  follows.  A  cap- 
tured elephant,  after  he  has  been  taught  his  ordinary 
duty,  say  about  three  months  after  he  is  taken,  is 
taught  to  pick  up  things  from  the  ground  and  give 
them  to  his  mahout  sitting  on  his  shoulders.  Now 
for  the  first  few  months  it  is  dangerous  to  require  him 
to  pick  up  anything  but  soft  articles,  such  as  clothes, 
because  the  things  are  often  handed  up  with  consid- 
erable force.  After  a  time,  longer  with  some  elephants 
than  others,  they  appear  to  take  in  a  knowledge  of  the 
nature  of  the  things  they  are  required  to  lift,  and  the 
bundle  of  clothes  will  be  thrown  up  sharply  as  before, 
but  heavy  things,  such  as  a  crowbar  or  piece  of  iron 
chain,  will  be  handed  up  in  a  gentle  manner  ;  a  sharp 
knife  will  be  picked  up  by  its  handle  and  placed  on 
the  elephant's  head,  so  that  the  mahout  can  also  take 
it  by  the  handle.  I  have  purposely  given  elephants 
things  to  lift  which  they  could  never  have  seen  before, 
and  they  were  all  handled  in  such  a  manner  as  to  con- 
vince me  that  they  recognised  such  qualities  as  hard- 
ness, sharpness,  and  weight." 

Lloyd  Morgan,  who,  in  his  books  on  comparative 
psychology,  is  evidently  disposed  to  concede  as  small 
a  measure  of  intelligence  to  animals  as  possible,  com- 
ments upon  the  above  observation  as  follows:^ 

IC.  Lloyd  Morgan.     Anitital  Life  and  Inielligencf,  Chapter  IX.,  p.  364. 


THE  LOWER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  I  7 

"Are  we  to  suppose  that  these  animals  possess 
abstract  ideas?  I  reply — That  depends  upon  what  is 
meant  by  abstract  ideas.  If  it  is  implied  that  the  ab- 
stract ideas  are  isolates;  that  is,  qualities  considered 
quite  apart  from  the  objects  of  which  they  are  charac- 
teristic, I  think  not.  But  if  it  be  meant  that  elephants, 
in  a  practical  way,  '  recognise  such  qualities  as  hard- 
ness, sharpness,  and  weight,'  2,%  predominant  elements 
in  the  constructs  they  form,  I  am  quite  ready  to  as- 
sent to  the  proposition." 

I  agree  fully  with  this  conclusion,  adding  the  one 
remark  that  between  the  pure  abstract  notion  and  the 
"predominant "  notion  so  called,  there  is  only  a  dif- 
ference of  degree.  If  the  predominant  element  is  not 
isolated,  detached,  and  fixed  by  a  sign,  it  is  certainly 
near  being  so,  and  deserves  on  this  ground  to  be 
called  an  abstract  of  the  lower  order. 

The  observation  of  Houzeau  has  been  frequently 
quoted  respecting  dogs,  which,  suffering  from  thirst 
in  arid  countries,  rush  forty  or  fifty  times  into  the  hol- 
lows that  occur  along  their  line  of  march  in  the  hope 
of  finding  water  in  the  dry  bed.  They  could  not  be 
attracted  by  the  smell  of  the  water,  nor  by  the  sight 
of  vegetation,  for  these  are  wanting.  They  must  thus 
be  guided  b)'  general  ideas,  which  are  doubtless  of  an 
extremely  simple  character,  and,  in  some  measure, 
supported  by  experience." 

It  is  on  this  account  that  the  term  "generic  im- 
age "  would  in  my  opinion  be  preferable  for  describ- 
ing cases  of  this  character. 

"  I  have  frequently  seen  not  only  dogs,  but  horses, 
mules,  cattle,  and  goats,  go  in  search  of  water  in 
places  which  they  had  never  visited  before.  They  are 
guided  by  general  principles,  because  they  go  to  these 


1 8  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

watering  places  at  times  when  the  latter  are  perfectly 
dry.^  Undoubtedly  it  may  be  objected  that  associa- 
tion of  images  here  plays  a  preponderating  part.  The 
sight  of  the  hollows  recalls  the  water  which,  though 
absent,  forms  part  of  a  group  of  sensations  which  has 
been  perceived  many  times ;  but  since  the  generic 
image  is,  as  we  shall  see  later,  no  more  than  an  al- 
most passive  condensation  of  resemblances,  these  facts 
clearly  indicate  its  nature  and  its  limits. 

I  shall  merely  allude  without  detailed  comment  to 
the  numerous  observations  on  the  aptitude  of  dogs 
and  cats  for  finding  means  to  accomplish  their  aims, 
the  anecdotes  of  their  mechanical  skill,  and  the  ruses 
(so  well  described  by  G.  Leroy)  which  the  fox  and  the 
hare  employ  to  outwit  the  hunter,  "when  they  are 
old  and  schooled  by  experience  ;  since  it  is  to  their 
knowledge  of  facts  that  they  owe  their  exact  and 
prompt  inductions."  The  most  intelligent  of  all  ani- 
mals, the  higher  orders  of  monkeys,  have  not  been 
much  studied  in  their  wild  state,  but  such  observa- 
tions as  have  been  made,  some  of  which  have  been 
contributed  by  celebrated  naturalists,  fix  with  suffi- 
cient distinctness  the  intellectual  level  of  the  better 
endowed.  The  history  of  Cuvier's  orang-outang  has 
been  quoted  to  satiety.  The  more  recent  books  on 
comparative  psychology  contain  ample  testimony  to 
their  ability  to  profit  by  experience-  and  to  construct 
instruments.  A  monkey,  not  having  the  strength  to 
lift  up  the  lid  of  a  chest,  employed  a  stick  as  a  lever. 
"This  use  of  a  lever  as  a  mechanical  instrument  is  an 
action  to  which  no  animal  other  than  a  monkey  has 

IHouzeau,  Etudes  sur  hsfacultes  mentales  des  animaux.  Vol.  II.,  p.  264  et 
Beq.    The  same  author  gives  an  example  of  generalisation  in  bees. 
2  Darwin,  The  Descent  0/ Man,  Vol.  I.,  Chapter  III. 


THE  LOWER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  1 9 

ever  been  known  to  attain."  Another  monkey  ob- 
served by  Romanes,  also  "succeeded  by  methodical 
investigation,  without  assistance,  in  discovering  for 
himself  the  mechanical  principle  of  the  screw ;  and 
the  fact  that  monkeys  well  understand  how  to  use 
stones  as  hammers,  is  a  matter  of  common  observa- 
tion." They  are  also  skilful  in  combining  their  strat- 
agems, as  in  the  case  of  one  who,  being  held  captive 
by  a  chain,  and  thus  unable  to  reach  a  brood  of  duck- 
lings, held  out  a  piece  of  bread  in  one  hand,  and  on 
tempting  a  duckling  within  his  reach,  seized  it  by  the 
other,  and  killed  it  with  a  bite  in  the  breast.  "^ 

One  mental  operation  remains  which  must  be  ex- 
amined separately,  and  in  its  study  we  shall  pursue 
the  same  method,  wherever  it  occurs,  throughout  this 
work.  The  process  in  question  has  the  advantage  of 
being  perfectly  definite,  of  restricted  scope,  com- 
pletely evolved,  and  accessible  to  research  in  all  the 
phases  of  its  development,  from  the  lowest  to  the 
highest.      It  is  that  of  numeration. 

Are  there  animals  capable  of  counting?  G.  Leroy 
is,  I  believe,  the  first  who  answered  this  question  in 
tlie  affirmative,  in  a  passage  which  is  worth  transcrib- 
ing, although  it  has  been  often  quoted.  "Among  the 
various  ideas  which  necessity  adds  to  the  experience 
of  animals,  that  of  number  must  not  be  overlooked. 
Animals  count, — so  much  is  certain  ;  and  although  up 
to  the  present  time  their  arithmetic  appears  weak,  it 
may  perhaps  be  possible  to  strengthen  it.  In  coun- 
tries where  game  is  preserved,  war  is  made  upon 
magpies  because  they  steal  the  eggs  of  other  birds. 
....  And  in  order  to  destroy  this  greedy  family  at  a 
blow,  game-keepers  seek  to  destroy  the  mother  while 

1  Romanes,  loc.  cit..  Chapter  XVII. 


'■J 


20  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

sitting.  To  do  this  it  is  necessary  to  build  a  well- 
screened  watch-house  at  the  foot  of  the  tree  where  the 
nests  are,  and  in  this  a  man  is  stationed  to  await  the 
return  of  the  parent  bird,  but  he  will  wait  in  vain  if 
the  bird  has  been  shot  at  under  the  same  circum- 
stances before To  deceive  this  suspicious  bird, 

the  plan  was  hit  upon  of  sending  two  men  into  the 
watch-house,  one  of  them  passed  on  while  the  other 
remained  ;  but  the  magpie  counted  and  kept  her  dis- 
tance. The  next  day  three  went,  and  again  she  per- 
ceived that  only  two  withdrew.  It  was  eventually 
found  necessary  to  send  five  or  six  men  to  the  watch- 
house  in  order  to  put  her  out  of  her  calculation 

This  phenomenon,  which  is  repeated  as  many  times 
as  the  attempt  is  made,  is  one  of  the  most  extraordi- 
nary instances  of  the  sagacity  of  animals."  Since 
then  the  question  has  been  repeatedly  taken  up.  Lub- 
bock devotes  to  it  the  three  last  pages  of  his  book 
The  Senses  of  Animals.  According  to  his  observations 
on  the  nests  of  birds,  one  egg  may  be  taken  from  a 
nest  in  which  there  are  four,  but  if  we  take  away  two, 
the  bird  generally  deserts  its  nest.  The  solitary  wasp 
provisions  its  cell  with  a  fixed  number  of  victims. 
Sand  wasps  are  content  with  one.  One  species  of 
Eumenes  prepares  five  victims  for  its  young,  another 
species  ten,  another  fifteen,  another  twenty-four ;  but 
the  number  of  the  victims  is  always  the  same  for  the 
same  species.  How  does  the  insect  know  its  charac- 
teristic number?^ 

An  experiment,  methodically  conducted  by  Ro- 
manes, proved  that  a  chimpanzee  can  count  correctly 

1  At  the  end  of  the  passage  in  question  there  is  an  extraordinary  account 
of  the  arithmetical  powers  of  a  dog  which  Lubbock  explains  by  "thought 
reading."  I  omit  this  instance,  since  we  are  deliberately  rejecting  all  rare 
or  doubtful  cases. 


THE  LOWER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  21 

as  far  as  five,  distinguishing  the  words  which  stand 
for  one,  two,  three,  four,  five,  and  at  command  de- 
liver the  number  of  straws  requested  of  her.^ 

Although  the  observations  on  this  point  are  not 
yet  sufficiently  varied  and  extended  to  enable  us  to 
speak  of  them  as  we  should  wish,  it  must  be  remarked 
that  the  cases  cited  are  not  alike,  and  that  it  would  be 
illegitimate  to  reduce  them  all  to  one  and  the  same 
psychological  mechanism. 

1.  The  case  of  insects  is  the  most  embarrassing. 
It  is  but  candid  to  state  a  non  liquet,  since  to  attrib- 
ute their  achievements  to  unconscious  numeration,  or 
to  some  special  equivalent  instinct,  is  tantamount  to 
saying  nothing.  Besides,  we  are  not  concerned  with 
anything  relating  to  instinct. 

2.  The  case  of  the  monkey  and  his  congeners 
stands  high  in  the  scale  :  it  is  a  form  of  concrete  nu- 
meration which  we  shall  meet  again  in  children,  and 
in  the  lowest  representatives  of  humanity. 

3.  All  the  other  cases  resemble  the  alleged  "arith- 
metic" of  G.  Leroy's  magpie  and  similar  observa- 
tions. I  see  here  not  a  numeration,  but  a  perception 
of  plurality,  which  is  something  quite  different.  There 
are  in  the  brain  of  the  animal  a  number  of  co-existing 
perceptions.  It  knows  if  all  are  present,  or  if  some 
are  lacking  ;  but  a  consciousness  of  difference  be- 
tween the  entire  group,  and  the  diminished  defective 
group,  is  not  identical  with  the  operation  of  counting. 
It  is  a  preliminary  state,  an  .introduction,  nothing 
more,  and  the  animal  does  not  pass  beyond  this  stage, 
does  not  count  in  the  exact  sense  of  the  word.  We 
shall  see  further  on  that  observations  with  young  chil- 
dren furnish  proofs  in  favor  of  this  assertion,  or  at 

1  Mental  Evolution  in  Man,  Chapter  III.,  p.  58. 


L 


22  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

least  show  that  it  is  not  an  unfounded  presumption, 
but  the  most  probable  hypothesis. 

We  may  now  without  further  delay  (while  reserv- 
ing the  facts  which  are  to  be  studied  in  the  sequel  to 
this  chapter)  attempt  to  fix  the  nature  of  the  forms  of 
abstraction,  and  of  reasoning,  accessible  to  the  higher 
animal  types. 

I.  The  generic  image  results  from  a  spontaneous  fu- 
sion of  images,  produced  by  the  repetition  of  similar, 
or  very  analogous,  events.  It  consists  in  an  almost 
passive  process  of  assimilation ;  it  is  not  intentional, 
and  has  for  its  subject  only  the  crudest  similarities. 
There  is  an  accumulation,  a  summation  of  these  re- 
semblances ;  they  predominate  by  force  of  numbers, 
for  they  are  in  the  majority.  Thus  there  is  formed  a 
solid  nucleus  which  predominates  in  consciousness,  an 
abstract  appurtenant  to  all  similar  objects  ;  the  differ- 
ences fall  into  oblivion.  Huxley's  comparison  of  the 
composite  photographs  (above  cited)  renders  it  need- 
less to  dwell  on  this  point.  Their  genesis  depends 
on  the  one  hand  on  experience ;  only  events  that  are 
frequently  repeated  can  be  condensed  into  a  generic 
image  :  on  the  other  hand  on  the  affective  dispositions 
of  the  subject  (pleasure,  pain,  etc.),  on  interest,  and 
on  practical  utility,  which  render  certain  perceptions 
predominant.  They  require,  accordingly,  no  great 
intellectual  development  for  their  formation,  and 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  they  exist  quite  low  down 
in  the  animal  scale.  The  infant  of  four  or  five  months 
very  probably  possesses  a  generic  image  of  the  human 
form  and  of  some  similar  objects.  It  may  be  re- 
marked, further,  that  this  lower  form  of  abstraction 
can  occur  also  in  the  adult  and  cultivated  man.  If, 
e.   g.,  we    are  suddenly  transported    into    a   country 


THE  LOWER  FORMS  Of  ABSTRACTION.  2} 

whose  flora  is  totally  unknown  to  us,  the  repetition 
of  experiences  suggests  an  unconscious  condensa- 
tion of  similar  plants ;  we  classify  them  without 
knowing  their  names,  without  needing  to  do  so, 
and  without  clearly  apprehending  their  distinguish- 
ing characteristics,  those  namely  which  constitute  the 
true  abstract  idea  of  the  botanist. 

In  sum,  the  generic  image  comes  half  way  between 
individual  representation,  and  abstraction  properly  so 
called.  It  results  almost  exclusively  from  the  faculty 
of  apprehending  resemblances.  The  role  of  dissocia- 
tion is  here  extremely  feeble.  Everything  takes  place, 
as  it  were,  in  an  automatic,  mechanical  fashion,  in 
consequence  of  the  unequal  struggle  set  up  in  con- 
sciousness between  the  resemblances  which  are 
strengthened,  and  the  differences,  each  of  which  re- 
mains isolated. 

2.  It  has  been  said  that  the  principal  utility  of  ab-  | 
straction  is  as  an  instrument  in  ratiocination.  We  may--' 
say  the  same  of  generic  images.  By  their  aid  animals 
reason.  This  subject  has  given  rise  to  extended  dis- 
cussion. Some  writers  resent  the  mere  suggestion 
that  ants,  elephants,  dogs,  and  monkeys,  should  be 
able  to  reason.  Yet  this  resentment  is  based  on  noth- 
ing but  the  extremely  broad  and  elastic  signification 
of  the  word  reasoning — an  operation  which  admits  of 
many  degrees,  from  simple,  empirical  consecutiveness 
to  the  composite,  quantitative  reasoning  of  higher 
mathematics.  It  is  forgotten  that  there  are  here,  as 
for  abstraction  and  for  generalisation,  embryonic  forms 
— those,  i.  e.,  which  we  are  now  studying. 

Taken  in  its  broadest  acceptation,  reasoning  is  an 
operation  of  the  mind  which  consists  in  passing  from 
the  known  to  the  unknown  ;  in  passing  from  what  is 


24  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

immediately  given,  to  that  which  is  simply  suggested 
by  association  and  experience.  The  logician  will 
unquestionably  find  this  formula  too  vague,  but  it 
must  necessarily  be  so,  in  order  to  cover  all  cases. 

Without  pretending  to  any  rigorous  enumeration, 
beyond  all  criticism,  we  can,  in  intellectual  develop- 
ment, distinguish  the  following  phases  in  the  ascend- 
ing order :  perceptions  and  images  (memories)  as 
point  of  departure  ;  association  by  contiguity,  asso- 
ciation by  similarity ;  then  the  advance  from  known 
to  unknown,  by  reasoning  from  particular  to  particu- 
lar, by  analogical  reasoning,  and  finally  by  the  perfect 
forms  of  induction  and  deduction,  with  their  logical 
periods.  Have  all  these  forms  of  reasoning  a  common 
substrate,  a  unity  of  composition?  In  other  words, 
can  they  be  reduced  to  a  single  type — of  induction  ac- 
cording to  some,  of  deduction  according  to  others? 
Although  the  supposition  is  extremely  probable,  it 
would  not  be  profitable  to  discuss  the  question  here. 
We  must  confine  ourselves  to  the  elementary  forms 
which  the  logicians  omit,  or  despise,  for  the  most  part, 
but  which,  to  the  psychologist,  are  intellectual  pro- 
cesses as  interesting  as  any  others. 

Without  examining  whether,  as  maintained  by  J. 
S.  Mill,  all  inference  is  actually  from  particular  to 
particular  (general  propositions  being  under  this  hy- 
pothesis only  simple  reminders,  brief  formulae  serving 
as  a  base  of  operations)  it  is  clear  that  we  have  in  it 
the  simplest  form  of  mental  progress  from  the  known 
to  the  unknown.  At  the  same  time  it  is  more  than 
mere  association,  though  transcending  it  only  in  de- 
gree. Association  by  similarity  is  not,  as  we  have 
seen,  identical  with  formation  of  generic  images  ;  this 
last  implies  fusion,    mental  synthesis.     So,  too,  tea- 


THE  LOWER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  25 

soning  from  particular  to  particular  implies  something 
more  than  simple  association ;  it  is  a  state  of  expecta- 
tion equivalent  to  a  conclusion  in  the  empirical  order ; 
it  is  an  anticipation.  The  animal  which  has  burned 
itself  in  swallowing  some  steaming  food,  is  on  its 
guard  in  future  against  everything  that  gives  off 
steam.  Here  we  have  more  than  simple  association 
between  two  anterior  experiences  (steam,  burning) ; 
and  this  state  ''differs  from  simple  associative  sug- 
gestion, by  the  fact  that  the  mind  is  less  occupied 
with  the  memory  of  past  burns  than  with  the  expecta- 
tion of  a  repetition  of  the  same  fact  in  the  present  in- 
stance ;  that  is  to  say,  that  it  does  not  so  much  recall 
the  fact  of  having  once  been  burnt  as  it  draws  the 
conclusion  that  it  will  be  burnt." ^ 

Otherwise  expressed,  he  is  orientated  less  towards 
the  past  than  towards  the  future.  Granted  that  this 
tendency  to  believe  that  what  has  occurred  once  or 
twice  will  occur  invariably,  is  a  fruitful  source  of 
error,  it  remains  none  the  less  a  logical  operation 
(judgment  or  ratiocination)  containing  an  element 
more  than  association  :  an  inclusion  of  the  future,  an 
implicit  affirmation  expressed  in  an  act.  Doubtless, 
between  these  two  processes, — association,  inference 
from  particular  to  particular — the  difference  is  slight 
enough  ;  yet  in  a  study  of  genesis  and  evolution,  it  is 
just  these  transitional  forms  that  are  the  most  impor- 
tant. 

Reasoning  by  analogy  is  of  a  far  higher  order.  It 
is  the  principal  logical  instrument  of  the  child  and  of 
primitive  man  :  the  substrate  of  all  extension  of  lan- 

1  J.  Sully,  The  Human  Mind,  I.,  460.  The  author  gives  excellent  diagrams 
to  represent  the  difference  in  the  two  cases.  For  reasoning  from  particular 
to  particular,  cf.  also  J.  S.  Mill,  Logic,  II.,  Chapter  III.,  p.  3;  Bradley,  Log.c, 
II.,  Chapter  II.,  p.  2. 


/>^n 


26  THK  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

guage,  of  vulgar  and  empirical  classifications,  of 
myths,  of  the  earliest,  quasi-scientific  knowledge.^  It 
is  the  commencement  of  induction,  differing  from  the 
latter,  not  in  form,  but  in  its  imperfectly  established 
content.  "Two  things  are  alike  in  one  or  several 
characteristics  ;  a  proposition  stated  is  true  of  the 
one,  therefore  it  is  true  of  the  other.  A  is  analogous 
to  B;  m  is  true  of  A,  therefore  m  is  true  of  B  also." 
So  runs  the  formula  of  J.  S.  Mill.  The  animal,  or 
child,  which  when  ill-treated  by  one  person  extends 
its  hatred  to  all  others  that  resemble  the  oppressor, 
reasons  by  analogy.  Obviously  this  procedure  from 
known  to  unknown  will  vary  in  degree, — from  zero  to 
the  point  at  which  it  merges  into  complete  induction. 

With  these  general  remarks,  we  may  return  to  the 
logic  of  animals  or  rather  to  the  sole  kind  of  logic 
possible  without  speech.  This  is,  and  can  only  be, 
a  logic  of  images  (Romanes  employs  a  synonymous  ex- 
pression, logic  of  recepts),  which  is  to  logic,  properly 
so  called,  what  generic  images  are  to  abstraction  and 
to  generalisation  proper.  This  denomination  is  neces- 
sary ;  it  enables  us  to  form  a  separate  category, 
well  defined  by  the  absence  of  language  ;  it  permits 
us,  in  speaking  of  judgment  and  ratiocination  in  ani- 
mals, and  in  persons  deprived  of  speech,  to  know  ex- 
actly what  meaning  is  intended. 

It  follows  that  there  are  two  principal  degrees  in 
the  logic  of  images. 

I.  Inference  from  particular  to  particular.  The 
bird  which  finds  bread  upon  the  window,  one  morn- 
ing, comes  back  next  day  at  the  same  hour,  finds  it 
again,  and  continues  to  come.     It  is  moved  by  an  as- 

l/«  »■«  analogy,  consult  Stern's  monograph,  Die  Analogic  im  volksthutn- 
lichen  Denken,  Berlin,  1894. 


THE  LOWER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  1^ 

sociation  of  images,  plus  the  state  of  awaiting,  of  an- 
ticipation, as  described  above. 

2.  Procedure  by  analogy.  This  (at  least  in  its 
higher  forms  in  animal  int«lligence)  presupposes  men- 
tal construction  :  the  aim  is  definite,  and  means  to  at- 
tain it  are  invented.  To  this  type  I  should  refer  the 
cases  cited  above  of  ants  digging  tunnels,  forming 
bridges,  etc.  The  ants  are  wont  to  practise  these 
operations  in  their  normal  life ;  their  virtue  lies  in  the 
power  of  dissociation  from  their  habitual  conditions, 
from  their  familiar  ant-heap,  and  of  adaptation  to  new 
and  unknown  cases. 

The  logic  of  images  has  characteristics  which  per- 
tain to  it  exclusively,  and  which  may  be  summarised 
as  follows : 

I.  As  material  it  employs  concrete  representations 
or  generic  images  alone,  and  cannot  escape  from  this 
domain.  It  admits  of  fairly  complex  constructions,  but 
not  of  substitution.  The  tyro  finds  no  great  difficulty 
in  solving  problems  of  elementary  arithmetic  (such 
as :  15  workmen  build  a  wall  3  metres  high  in  4  days; 
how  long  will  it  take  4  men  to  build  it?),  because  he 
uses  the  logic  of  signs,  replacing  the  concrete  facts  by 
figures,  and  working  out  the  relations  of  these.  The 
logic  of  images  is  absolutely  refractory  to  attempts  at 
substitution.  And  while  it  thus  acts  by  representation 
only,  its  progress  even  within  this  limit  is  necessarily 
very  slow,  encumbered,  and  embarrassed  by  useless 
details,  for  lack  of  adequate  dissociation.  At  the  same 
time  it  may,  in  the  adult  who  is  practised  in  ratiocina- 
tion, become  an  auxiliary  in  certain  cases ;  I  am  even 
tempted  to  regard  it  as  the  main  auxiliary  of  con- 
structive imagination.  It  would  be  worth  while  to  as- 
certain,   from    authentic  observations,    what   part   it 


Y 


28  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

plays  in  the  inventions  of  novelists,  poets,  and  artists. 
In  a  polemic  against  Max  Muller,  who  persists  in  af- 
firming that  it  is  radically  impossible  to  think  and  rea- 
son without  words,  a  correspondent  remarks : 

"Having  been  all  my  life  since  school-days 
engaged  in  the  practice  of  architecture  and  civil  en- 
gineering, I  can  assure  Prof.  Max  Muller  that  design- 
ing and  invention  are  done  entirely  by  mental  pic- 
tures. I  find  that  words  are  only  an  encumbrance.  In 
fact,  words  are  in  many  cases  so  cumbersome  that 
other  methods  have  been  devised  for  imparting  knowl- 
edge. In  mechanics  the  graphic  method,  for  in- 
stance."* 
...  2.  Its  aim  is  always  practical.  It  should  never 
V'  be  forgotten  that  at  the  outset,  the  faculty  of  cogni- 
tion is  essentially  utilitarian,  and  cannot  be  otherwise, 
because  it  is  employed  solely  for  the  preservation  of 
the  individual  (in  finding  food,  distinguishing  ene- 
mies from  prey,  and  so  on).  Animals  exhibit  only 
applied  reasoning,  tested  by  experience ;  they  feel 
about  and  choose  between  several  means, — their  se- 
lection being  justified  or  disproved  by  the  final  issue. 
Correctly  speaking,  the  logic  of  images  is  neither  true 
nor  false  ;  these  epithets  are  but  half  appropriate.  It 
succeeds  or  fails  ;  its  gauge  is  success  or  defeat ;  and 
as  we  maintained  above  that  it  is  the  secret  spring  of 
aesthetic  invention,  let  it  be  noticed  that  here  again 
there  is  no  question  of  truth  or  error,  but  of  creating  a 
successful  or  abortive  work. 

Accordingly,  it  is  only  by  an  unjustifiable  restric- 
tion that  the  higher  animals  can  be  denied  all  func- 

1  Three  Introductory  Lectures  on  the  Science  of  Thought,  delivered  at  the 
Royal  Institution,  appendix,  p.  6,  letter  4  ;  Chicago,  1888.  It  should,  however, 
be  remembered  that  the  writer  who  thus  uses  the  logic  of  images  has  a  mind 
preformed  by  the  logic  of  signs  :  which  is  not  the  case  with  animals. 


THE  LOWER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  29 

tions  beyond  that  of  association,  all  capacity  for  infer- 
ence by  similarity.  W.  James  (after  stating  that,  as 
a  rule,  the  best  examples  of  animal  sagacity  "may  be 
perfectly  accounted  for  by  mere  contiguous  associa- 
tion, based  on  experience"),  arrives  virtually  at  a 
conclusion  no  other  than  our  own.  After  recalling  the 
well-known  instance  of  arctic  dogs  harnessed  to  a 
sledge  and  scattering  when  the  ice  cracked  to  distrib- 
ute their  weight,  he  thus  explains  it :  "We  need  only 
suppose  that  they  have  individually  experienced  wet 
skins  after  cracking,  that  they  have  often  noticed 
cracking  to  begin  when  they  were  huddled  together 
and  that  they  have  observed  it  to  cease  when  they 
scattered."  Granting  this  assumption,  it  is  none  the 
less  true  that  associations  by  contiguity  are  no  more 
than  the  material  which  serves  as  a  substratum  for  in- 
ference by  similarity,  and  for  the  act  which  follows. 
Again,  a  friend  of  James,  accompanied  by  his  dog, 
went  to  his  boat  and  found  it  filled  with  dirt  and 
water.  He  remembered  that  the  sponge  was  up  at 
the  house,  and  not  caring  to  tramp  a  third  of  a  mile 
to  get  it,  he  enacted  before  his  terrier  (as  a  forlorn 
hope)  the  necessary  pantomime  of  cleaning  the  boat, 
saying:  "Sponge,  sponge,  go  fetch  the  sponge." 
The  dog  trotted  off  and  returned  with  it  in  his  mouth, 
to  the  great  surprise  of  his  master.  Is  this,  properly 
speaking,  an  act  of  reasoning?  It  would  only  be  so, 
says  James,  if  the  terrier,  not  finding  the  sponge,  had 
brought  a  rag,  or  a  cloth.  By  such  substitution  he 
would  have  shown  that,  notwithstanding  their  differ- 
ent appearance,  he  understood  that  for  the  purpose  in 
view,  all  these  objects  were  identical.  "This  substi- 
tution, though  impossible  for  the  dog,  any  man  but 
the  stupidest  could  not  fail  to  do."     I  am  not  sure  of 


30  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

this,  despite  the  categorical  assertion  of  the  author; 
yet,  discussioif  apart,  it  must  be  admitted  that  this 
would  be  asking  the  dog  to  exhibit  a  man's  reason.^ 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  notwithstanding  contrary  appear- 
ances, James  arrives  at  a  conclusion  not  very  different 
from  our  own.  "  The  characters  extracted  by  animals 
are  very  few,  and  always  related  to  their  immediate 
interests  and  emotions."  This  is  what  we  termed 
above,  empirical  reasoning.^ 

G.  Leroy  said :  "Animals  reason,  but  differently 
from  ourselves."  This  is  a  negative  position.  We 
advance  a  step  farther  in  saying  :  their  reasoning  con- 
sists in  a  heritage  of  concrete  or  generic  images, 
adapted  to  a  determined  end, — intermediary  between 
the  percepts  and  the  act.  It  is  impossible  to  reduce 
everything  to  association  by  similarity,  much  less  by 
contiguity,  alone  ;  since  such  procedure  results  neces- 
sarily in  the  formation  of  unchangeable  habits,  in  lim- 
itation to  a  narrow  routine,  whereas  we  have  seen  that 
certain  animals  are  capable  of  breaking  through  such 
restrictions. 


\  Psychology ,  II.,  348  et  seq.  James,  however,  recalls  the  case  of  another 
dog  accustomed  to  find  and  carry  wedges  for  splitting  wood.  One  day  he  did 
not  return.  After  half  an  hour  they  looked  for  him;  he  was  biting  and  tear- 
ing at  the  handle  of  a  hatchet  stuck  in  a  block  (the  wedge  was  not  forthcom- 
ing). Had  this  animal  clear  perception  of  the  common  character  of  the  two 
instruments  used  for  splitting?  "This  interpretation  is  possible,  but  it 
seems  to  me  far  to  transcend  the  limits  of  ordinary  canine  abstraction." 
[Loc.  cit.,  p.  352.)  James  attempts  another  explanation.  It  is  singular  that  he 
does  not  invoke  training,  and  association  with  man:  that  this  is  an  influential 
factor  in  the  intellectual  development  of  animals  cannot  be  doubted.  It  is 
advisable  to  adduce  exclusively  their  spontaneous  inventions,  with  no  possi- 
ble suggestion  :  such  facts  alone  are  clear  and  convincing. 

2  Lloyd  Morgan,  whose  tendencies  have  already  been  indicated,  distin- 
guishes three  sorts  of  inferences:  (i)  unconscious  inference  on  immediate 
construction  (perceptual);  (z)  intelligent  inference  (conceded  to  animals), 
dealing  with  constructs  and  reconstructs  (perceptual);  and  (3)  rational  infer- 
ence, implying  analysis  and  isolation  (conceptual).     (Op.  cit,,  p.  362.) 


THE  LOWER  iOKMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  31 


ON  CHILDREN. 

We  are  here  concerned  with  children  who  have 
not  yet  learned  to  speak,  and  with  such  alone.  In 
contradistinction  to  animals,  and  to  deaf-mutes  when 
left  to  themselves,  infancy  represents  a  transitory 
state  of  which  no  upper  limit  can  be  fixed,  seeing  that 
speech  appears  progressively.  The  child  forms  his 
baby-vocabulary  little  by  little,  and  at  first  imposes  it 
upon  others,  until  such  time  as  he  is  made  to  learn 
the  language  of  his  country.  We  may  provisionally 
neglect  this  period  of  transition,  studying  only  the 
dumb,  or  monosyllabic  and  gesture  phase. 

The  problem  proposed  at  the  end  of  the  seven- 
teenth century  (perhaps  before),  which  divided  phi- 
losophers into  two  camps,  was  whether  the  human 
individual  starts  with  general  terms,  or  with  particu- 
lars. At  a  later  time,  the  question  was  proposed  for 
the  human  race  as  a  whole,  in  reference  to  the  origin 
of  language. 

Locke  maintained  the  thesis  of  the  particular : 
"  The  ideas  that  children  form  of  the  persons  with 
whom  they  converse  resemble  the  persons  themselves, 
and  can  only  be  particular." 

So,  too,  Condillac,  Adam  Smith,  Dugald  Stewart, 
and  the  majority  of  those  who  represent  the  so-called 
sensationalist  school. 

The  thesis  of  the  general  was  upheld  by  authors  of 
no  less  authority,  commencing  with  Leibnitz  : 

"Children,  and  those  who  are  ill-acquainted  with 
the  language  they  desire  to  speak,  or  the  matter 
whereof  they  discourse,  make   use  of  general  terms, 


32  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

such  as  thing,  animal,  plant,  in  lieu  of  the  proper 
terms  which  are  wanting  to  them  ;  and  it  is  certain 
that  all  proper  or  individual  names  were  originally  ap- 
pellative or  general. "  ^ 

The  problem  cannot  be  accepted  under  this  form 
by  contemporary  psychology.  It  is  equivocal.  Its 
capital  error  is  in  applying  to  the  embryonic  state  of 
intelltgence  and  of  language,  formulae  that  are  appro- 
priate to  adult  life  only — to  the  growing  mind,  catego- 
ries valid  for  the  formed  intellect  alone.  A  reference 
to  the  physiology  of  the  human  embryo  will  render 
this  more  intelligible.  Has  this  embryo,  up  to  three 
months,  a  nose  or  mouth?  Is  it  male  or  female?  etc. 
Students  of  the  development  of  intra-uterine  life  in  its 
first  phases  are  very  cautious  in  propounding  these 
and  similar  questions  in  such  a  manner  ;  they  do  not 
admit  of  definite  answers.  That  which  is  in  the  state 
of  envelopment  and  of  incessant  becoming,  can  only 
be  compared  remotely  with  that  which  is  fixed  and  de- 
veloped. 

The  sole  permissible  formula  is  this  :  Intelligence 
progresses  from  the  indefinite  to  the  definite.  If  "in- 
definite "  is  taken  as  synonymous  with  general,  it  may 
be  said  that  the  particular  does  not  appear  at  the  out- 
set ;  but  neither  does  the  general  in  any  exact  sense  : 
the  vague  would  be  more  appropriate.  In  other 
words,  no  sooner  has  the  intellect  progressed  beyond 
the  moment  of  perception  and  of  its  immediate  repro- 
duction in  memory,  than  the  generic  image  makes  its 
appearance,  i.  e.,  a  state  intermediate  between  the 
particular  and  the  general,  participating  in  the  na- 
ture of  the  one  and  of  the  other — a  confused  simpli- 
fication. 

1  Nouveaux  Essazs,  Book  IIL,  Chapter  I. 


THE  LOWER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  33 

Recent  works  on  the  psychology  of  infancy  abound 
in  examples  of  these  abstractions  and  inferior  gener- 
alisations, which  appear  very  early.  ^  A  few  examples 
will  suffice. 

Preyer's  child  (aged  thirty-one  weeks)  interested 
itself  exclusively  in  bottles,  water-jugs,  and  other 
transparent  vases  with  white  contents  ;  it  had  thus 
seized  upon  a  characteristic  mark  of  one  thing  that 
was  important  to  it,  to  wit — milk.  At  a  later  period 
it  designated  these  by  the  syllable  mom.  Taine  re- 
cords an  analogous  case  of  a  child  to  whom  mm  and 
urn,  and  then  nim  at  first  signified  the  pleasure  of  see- 
ing its  pap,  and  subsequently  everything  eatable.  We 
are  assisting  at  the  genesis  of  the  sign ;  the  crude 
sound  attached  to  a  group  of  objects  becomes  at  a 
later  period  the  sign  of  those  objects,  and  later  still 
an  instrument  of  substitution.  Sigismund  showed  his 
son,  aged  less  than  one  year,  and  incapable  of  pro- 
nouncing a  single  word,  a  stuffed  grouse,  saying 
"bird."  The  child  immediately  looked  across  to  the 
other  side  of  the  room  where  there  was  a  stuffed  owl. 
Another  child  having  listened  first  with  its  right  ear, 
then  with  its  left,  to  the  ticking  of  a  watch,  stretched 
out  its  arms  gleefully  towards  the  clock  on  the  chim- 
ney-piece (auditory,  not  vocal,  generic  image). 

Without  multiplying  examples  known  to  every 
one,  which  give  peremptory  proof  of  the  existence  of 
abstraction  (partial  dissociation),  and  of  generalisa- 
tion, prior  to  speech,  let  us  rather  consider  the  hete- 
rogeneous nature  of  these  generic  images,  the  result 
of  their  mode  of  formation.  They  are  in  fact  con- 
structed arbitrarily, — as  it  were  by  accident,  depend - 

ICf.  Taine,  Dlntelli'sence,  Vol.  I.,  Book  I.,  Chapter  II.,  Part  2,  Note  i. 
Preyer,  Dit  Seele  ties  Kindes,  Chapter  XVI. 


34 


THE   EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 


J^^ 


ing  partly  on  the  apprehension  of  gross  resemblances, 
partly,  and  chiefly,  on  subjective  causes,  emotional 
dispositions,  practical  interests.  More  rarely  they  are 
based  upon  essential  qualities. 

John  Stuart  Mill  affirms  that  the  majority  of  ani- 
mals divide  everything  into  two  categories  :  that  which 
is,  and  that  which  is  not  edible.  Whatever  we  may 
think  of  this  assertion,  we  should  probably  feel  much 
astonishment  if  we  could  penetrate  and  comprehend 
certain  animal  generalisations.  In  the  case  of  chil- 
dren we  can  do  more  than  assume.  Preyer's  son  em- 
ployed the  interjection  ass  (which  he  had  forged  or 
imitated)  first  for  his  wooden  horse,  mounted  on 
wheels,  and  covered  with  hair ;  next  for  everything 
that  could  be  displaced  or  that  moved  (carts,  animals, 
his  sister,  etc.),  and  that  had  hair.  Taine's  little  girl 
(twelve  months),  who  had  frequently  been  shown  a 
copy  of  an  infant  Jesus,  from  Luini,  and  had  been 
told  at  the  same  time,  "That  is  the  baby,"  would  in 
another  room,  on  hearing  anyone  ask  her,  "Where 
is  the  baby?"  turn  to  any  of  the  pictures  or  engrav- 
ings, no  matter  what  they  were.  Bady  signified  to  her 
some  general  thing  :  something  which  she  found  in 
common  in  all  these  pictures,  engravings  of  land- 
scapes, and  figures,  i.  e.,  if  I  do  not  mistake,  some 
variegated  object  in  a  shining  frame.  Darwin  com- 
municated the  following  observation  on  one  of  his 
grandsons  to  Romanes  : 

"The  child,  who  was  just  beginning  to  speak, 
called  a  duck  'quack,'  and,  by  special  association,  it 
also  called  water  'quack.'  By  an  appreciation  of  the 
resemblance  of  qualities,  it  next  extended  the  term 
'quack'  to  denote  all  birds  and  insects  on  the  one 
hand,  and  all  fluid  substances  on  the  other.     Lastly, 


THE  LOWER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  35 

by  a  still  more  delicate  appreciation  of  resemblance, 
the  child  eventually  called  all  coins  'quack,'  because 
on  the  back  of  a  French  sou  it  had  once  seen  the  rep- 
resentation of  an  eagle.  "^ 

In  this  case,  to  which  we  shall  return  later,  there 
was  a  singular  mixture  of  intellectual  operations  :  cre- 
ation of  a  word  by  onomatopoeia  (resemblance)  and 
finally  an  unbridled  extension  of  analogy. 

Such  observations  might  be  multiplied.  They 
would  only  confirm  this  remark  :  the  generic  image  va- 
ries in  one  case  and  another,  because  the  condensation 
of  resemblances  of  which  it  is  constituted  depends 
often  upon  a  momentary  impression,  upon  most  unex- 
pected conditions. 

The  development  of  numeration  in  the  child  takes 
us  to  some  extent  out  of  the  pre-linguistic  period ; 
but  it  is  advisable  to  consider  it  at  this  point.  In  the 
first  place  we  have  to  distinguish  between  what  is 
learnt  and  what  is  comprehended.  The  child  may 
recite  a  series  of  numerical  words  that  have  been 
taught  to  him  :  but  so  long  as  he  fails  to  apply  each 
term  of  the  series  correctly  to  a  number  of  corres- 
ponding objects,  he  does  not  understand  it.  For  the 
rest,  this  comprehension  is  only  acquired  slowly  and 
at  a  somewhat  late  period. 

"The  only  distinction  which  the  child  makes  at  i^/^O'^ 
first  is  between  the  simple  object  and  plurality.  At  (f'^ 
eighteen  months,  he  distinguishes  between  one,  two, 
and  several.  At  the  age  of  three,  or  a  little  earlier,  he 
knows  one,  two,  and  four  (2X2).  It  is  not  until  later 
that  he  counts  a  regular  series  ;  one,  two,  three,  four. 
At  this  point  he  is  arrested  for  some  time.  Hence  the 
Brahmans  teach  their  pupils  of  the  first  class  to  count 

1  Romanes,  Mental  Evolution  in  Man,  p,  283. 


36  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

Up  to  four  only  ;  they  leave  it  to  the  second  class  to 
count  up  to  twenty.  In  European  children  of  average 
intelligence,  the  age  of  six  to  seven  years  is  required 
before  they  can  count  to  ten,  and  about  ten  years  to 
count  to  one  hundred.  The  child  can  doubtless  re- 
peat before  this  age  a  numeration  which  it  has  been 
taught,  but  this  is  not  what  constitutes  knowledge  of 
numbers  ;  we  are  speaking  of  determining  number  by 
objects."^  B.  Pdrez  states  that  his  personal  observa- 
tions have  not  furnished  any  indication  contradictory 
to  the  assertions  of  Houzeau.  An  intelligent  child  of 
two  and  a  half  was  able  to  count  up  to  nineteen,  but 
had  no  clear  idea  of  the  duration  of  time  represented 
by  three  days  ;  it  had  to  be  translated  as  follows  : 
"not  to-day  but  to-morrow,  and  another  to-mor- 
row. "2 

This  brings  us  back  to  the  question,  discussed 
above,  of  the  numeration  claimed  for  animals.  Preyer 
tells  us  of  one  of  his  children  that  "it  was  impossible 
to  take  away  one  of  his  ninepins  without  its  being 
discovered  by  the  child,  while  at  eighteen  months  he 
knew  quite  well  whether  one  of  his  ten  animals  was 
missing  or  not."  Yet  this  fact  is  no  proof  that  he  was 
able  to  count  up  to  nine  or  ten.  To  represent  to  one- 
self several  objects,  and  to  be  aware  that  one  of  them 
is  absent,  and  not  perceived — is  a  different  thing  from 
the  capacity  of  counting  them  numerically.  If  the 
shelves  of  a  library  contain  several  works  that  are 
well  known  to  me,  I  can  see  that  one  is  missing  with- 
out knowing  anything  about  the  total  number  of  books 
upon  the  shelves.  I  have  a  juxtaposition  of  images 
(visual  or  tactile),  in  which  a  gap  is  produced. 

For  the  rest,  much  light  is  thrown  on  this  ques- 

IB.  P6rez,  op.  cit.,  211.  S  Houzeau,  op.  cit.,  IL,  202. 


THE  LOWER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  37 

tion  by  Binet's  ingenious  experiments.  Their  princi- 
pal result  may  be  summarised  as  follows.  ^  A  little 
girl  of  four  does  not  know  how  to  read  or  count ;  she 
has  simply  learnt  a  few  figures  and  applies  them  ex- 
actly to  one,  two,  or  three  objects;  above  this  she 
gives  chance  names,  say  six  or  twelve,  indifferently  to 
four  objects.  If  a  group  of  fifteen  counters,  and  an- 
other group  of  eighteen,  of  the  same  size,  are  thrown 
down  on  the  table,  without  arranging  them  in  heaps, 
she  is  quick  to  recognise  the  most  numerous  group. 
The  two  groups  are  then  modified,  adding  now  to  the 
right,  now  to  the  left,  but  so  that  the  ratio  fourteen  to 
eighteen  is  constant.  In  six  attempts  the  reply  is  in- 
variably exact.  With  the  ratio  seventeen-eighteen, 
the  reply  is  correct  eight  times,  wrong  once.  If,  how- 
ever, the  groups  are  found  with  counters  of  unequal 
diameter,  everything  is  altered.  Some  (green)  meas- 
ure two  and  one-half  centimetres,  others  (white)  meas- 
ure four  centimetres.  Eighteen  green  counters  are 
put  on  one  side,  fourteen  white  counters  on  the  other. 
The  child  then  makes  a  constant  error,  and  takes  the 
latter  group  to  be  the  more  numerous,  and  the  group 
of  fourteen  may  even  be  reduced  to  ten  without  alter- 
ing her  judgment.  It  is  not  until  nine  that  the  group 
of  eighteen  counters  appear  the  more  numerous. 

This  fact  can  only  be  explained  by  supposing  that 
the  child  appreciates  by  space,  and  not  by  number,  by 
a  perception  of  continuous  and  not  by  discontinuous 
size — a  supposition  which  agrees  with  other  experi- 
ments by  the  same  author  to  the  effect  that,  in  the 
comparison  of  lines,  children  can  appreciate  differ- 
ences of  length.  At  this  intellectual  stage,  numeration 
is  accordingly  very  weak,   and  restricted  to  the  nar- 

1  Cf .  Revue  Philosophique,  July,  1890. 


38  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

rowest  limits.  As  soon  as  these  are  exceeded,  the  dis- 
tribution between  minus  and  plus  rests,  not  upon  any 
real  numeration,  but  upon  a  difference  of  mass,  felt  in 
consciousness. 

In  children,  reasoning  prior  to  speech  is,  as  with 
animals,  practical,  but  well  adapted  to  its  ends.  No 
child,  if  carefully  watched,  will  fail  to  give  proof  of  it. 
At  seventeen  months,  Preyer's  child,  which  could  not 
speak  a  word,  finding  that  it  was  unable  to  reach  a 
plaything  placed  above  its  reach  in  a  cupboard,  looked 
about  to  the  right  and  left,  found  a  small  travelling 
trunk,  took  it,  climbed  up,  and  possessed  itself  of  the 
desired  object.  If  this  act  be  attributed  to  imitation 
(although  Preyer  does  not  say  this),  it  must  be  granted 
that  it  is  imitation  of  a  particular  kind, — in  no  way 
comparable  with  a  servile  copy,  with  repetition  pure 
and  simple, — and  that  it  contains  an  element  of  inven- 
tion. 

In  analysing  this  fact  and  its  numerous  analogues, 
we  became  aware  of  the  fundamental  identity  of  these 
simple  inferences  with  those  which  constitute  specu- 
lative reasoning :  they  are  of  the  same  character. 
Take,  for  instance,  a  scientific  definition,  such  as  that 
of  Boole,  which  seems  at  first  sight  little  adapted  to 
this  connexion.  "  Reasoning  is  the  elimination  of  the 
middle  term  in  a  system  that  has  two  terms."  Not- 
withstanding its  theoretical  aspect,  this  is  rigorously 
applicable  to  the  cases  with  which  we  are  occupied. 
Thus,  in  the  mind  of  Preyer's  child,  there  is  a  first 
term  (desire  for  the  plaything),  a  last  term  (posses- 
sion); the  remainder  is  the  method,  scaffolding,  a 
mean  term  to  be  eliminated.  The  intellectual  process 
in  both  instances,  practical  and  speculative,  is  identi- 
cal ;  it  is  a  mediate  operation,  which  develops  by  a 


THE  LOWER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  39 

series  of  acts  in  animals  and  children,  by  a  series  of 
concepts  and  words  in  the  adult. 

DEAF-MUTES. 

In  studying  intellectual  development  prior  to 
speech,  the  group  of  deaf-mutes  is  sufficiently  distinct 
from  those  which  we  have  been  considering.  Ani- 
mals do  not  communicate  all  their  secrets,  and  leave 
much  to  be  conjectured.  Children  reveal  only  a  tran- 
sitory state,  a  moment  in  the  total  evolution.  Deaf- 
mutes  (those  at  least  with  whom  we  are  dealing)  are 
adults,  comparable  as  such  to  other  men,  like  them, 
save  in  the  absence  of  speech  and  of  what  results  from 
it.  They  have  reached  a  stable  mental  state.  More- 
over, those  who  are  instructed  at  a  late  period,  who 
learn  a  language  of  analytical  signs,  i.  e.,  who  speak 
with  their  fingers,  or  emit  the  sounds  which  they  read 
upon  the  lips  of  others,  are  able  to  disclose  their  an- 
terior mental  state.  It  is  possible  to  compare  the 
same  man  with  himself,  before  and  after  the  acquisi- 
tion of  an  instrument  of  analysis.  Subjective  and  ob- 
jective psychology  combine  to  enlighten  us. 

The  intellectual  level  of  such  persons  is  very  low 
(we  shall  return  to  this)  :  still  their  inferiority  has 
been  exaggerated,  especially  in  the  last  century,  by 
virtue  of  the  axiom,  it  is  impossible  to  think  without 
words.  Discussion  of  this  antique  aphorism  is  un- 
necessary ;  in  its  rigorous  form  it  finds  hardly  any  ad- 
vocates of  note.*     Since  thought  is  synonymous  with 

1  Max  Miiller,  however,  is  an  exception.  He  has  not  made  the  smallest 
concession  on  this  point  in  any  of  his  works,  including  the  last  {Three  Lec- 
tures, etc.,  cited  above).  He  even  maintains  that  a  society  o£  deaf-mutes 
would  hardly  rise  above  the  intellectual  level  of  a  chimpanzee.  "A  man  born 
dumb,  notwithstanding  his  great  cerebral  mass  and  his  inheritance  of  strong 
intellectual  instincts,  would  be  capable  of  few  higher  intellectual  manifesta- 
tions than  an  orang  or  a  chimpanzee,  if  he  were  confined  to  the  society  of 


40  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

comparing,  abstracting,  generalising,  judging,  reason- 
ing, i.  e.,  with  transcending  in  any  way  the  purely 
sensorial  and  affective  life,  the  true  question  is  not. 
Do  we  think  without  words?  but,  To  what  extent  can 
we  think  without  words?  Otherwise  expressed,  we 
have  to  fix  the  upper  limit  of  the  logic  of  images, 
which  evidently  reaches  its  apogee  in  adult  deaf- 
mutes.  Further,  even  in  this  last  case,  thought  with- 
out language  does  not  attain  its  full  development. 
The  deaf-mute  who  is  left  without  special  education, 
and  who  lives  with  men  who  have  the  use  of  speech, 
is  in  a  less  favorable  situation  than  if  he  forms  a 
society  with  his  equals.  G^rando,  and  others  after 
him,  remarked  that  deaf-mutes  in  their  native  state 
communicate  easily  with  one  another.  He  enumer- 
ates a  long  series  of  ideas,  which  they  express  in  their 
mimicry,  and  gestures,  and  many  of  these  expressions 
are  identical  in  all  countries. 

"Children  of  about  seven  years  old  who  have  not 
yet  been  educated,  make  use  of  an  astonishing  num- 
ber of  gestures  and  very  rapid  signs  in  communicating 

dumb  associates"  (p.  92).  This  thesis  was  attacked  by  thirteen  critics,  in- 
cluding Romanes,  Galton,  the  Duke  of  Argyle,  etc.,  but  Max  Miiller  meets 
them  all  and  replies  to  them  without  flinching.  It  must  be  confessed  that  the 
arguments  invoked  by  his  correspondents  are  very  unequal  in  merit.  Some 
are  convincing,  others  not.  The  Duke  of  Argyle  says  happily  that  "words 
are  necessary  to  the  progress  of  thought,  but  not  at  all  to  the  act  of  think- 
ing." Ebbels  (p.  13,  appendix)  shows  that  Max  Miiller  has  unduly  limited  the 
question  by  excluding  all  processes  anterior  to  the  formation  of  concepts  ; 
we  think  in  images;  the  transition  from  one  form  to  another  is  impercepti- 
ble, and  the  faculty  of  abstraction  does  not  appear  suddenly  along  with  the 
signs.  On  the  other  hand,  we  cannot  admit  as  evidence  the  facts  invoked 
by  other  correspondents,  e.  g.,  chess-players  who  combine  and  calculate 
solely  by  the  aid  of  visual  images;  answers  to  letters,  conceived  in  the  first 
place  as  a  general  plan  before  they  are  developed  in  words,  etc.  It  is  forgot- 
ten that  the  persons  capable  of  these  operations  have  had  long  practice  in 
verbal  analysis,  thereby  attaining  a  high  intellectual  level.  So,  in  the  phy- 
sical order,  the  practical  gymnast,  even  when  not  executing  any  particular 
feat,  possesses  a  suppleness  and  agility  of  body,  due  to  exercise,  which  trans- 
lates itself  into  all  his  movements. 


THE  LOWER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  4I 

with  each  other.  They  understand  each  other  naturally 
with  great  facility.  .  .  .  No  one  teaches  them  the  initial 
signs,  which  are,  in  great  part,  unaltered  imitative 
movements." 

The  study  of  this  spontaneous,  natural  language 
is  the  sole  process  by  which  we  can  penetrate  to  their 
psychology,  and  determine  their  mode  of  thought. 
Like  all  other  languages,  it  comprises  a  vocabulary 
and  a  syntax.  The  vocabulary  consists  in  gestures 
which  designate  objects,  qualities,  acts  ;  these  corres- 
pond to  our  substantives  and  verbs.  The  syntax  con- 
sists in  the  successive  order  of  these  gestures  and 
their  regular  arrangement ;  it  translates  the  move- 
ment of  thought  and  the  effort  towards  analysis. 

I.  Vocabulary — G^rando  collected  about  a  hun- 
dred and  fifty  signs,  created  by  deaf-mutes  living  in 
isolation  or  with  their  fellows.^  A  few  of  these  may 
be  cited  as  examples : 

Child — Infantile  gesture,  of  taking  the  breast,  or 
being  carried,  or  rocking  in  the  cradle. 

Ox — Imitation  of  the  horns,  or  the  heavy  tread,  or 
the  jaws  chewing  the  cud. 

Dog — Movement  of  the  head  in  barking. 

Horse — Movements  of  the  ears,  or  two  figures  rid- 
ing horseback  on  another,  etc. 

Bird — Imitation  of  the  beak  with  two  fingers  of  the 
left  hand,  while  the  other  feeds  it ;  or  simulation  of 
flight. 


^De  I' Education  des sourds-muets,  2  vol.,  1827.  Notwithstanding  its  some- 
what remote  date,  the  book  has  lost  none  of  its  interest  in  this  particular.  It 
must  also  be  remembered  that  institutions  for  deaf-mutes  are  far  more  nu- 
merous now  than  at  the  beginning  of  the  century,  and  that  the  children  are 
placed  in  them  much  earlier.  Formerly  they  were  abandoned  to  themselves 
or  instructed  very  late ;  in  proportion  to  their  age,  they  presented  better  ma- 
terial for  the  study  of  their  development. 


42  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

Bread — Signs  of  being  hungry,  of  cutting,  and  of 
carrying  to  the  mouth. 

Water — Exhibition  of  saliva,  imitation  of  a  rower, 
or  of  a  man  pumping ;  accompanied  always  by  the 
sign  of  drinking. 

Letter  (missive) — Gestures  of  writing  and  of  seal- 
ing, or  of  unsealing  and  reading. 

Monkeys,  cocks,  various  trades  (carpenter,  shoe- 
maker, etc.)  all  designated  by  imitative  gestures.  For 
sleep,  sickness,  health,  etc.,  they  employ  an  appro- 
priate gesture. 

For  interrogation  :  expression  of  two  contradictory 
propositions,  and  undecided  glance  towards  the  per- 
son addressed.  This  is  rather  a  case  of  syntax  than  of 
vocabulary;  but  a  few  signs  may  be  further  indicated 
for  some  notions  more  abstract  than  the  preceding. 

Large — Raise  the  hand  and  look  up. 

Small — Contrary  gestures. 

Bad — Simulate  tasting,  and  make  grimace. 

Number — Indicate  with  the  help  of  the  fingers ; 
high  numbers,  rapid  opening  of  the  hand  several  times 
in  succession. 

Buy — gesture  of  counting  money,  of  giving  with 
one  hand,  and  taking  with  the  other. 

Lose — Pretend  to  drop  an  object,  and  hunt  for  it  in 
vain. 

Forget — Pass  the  hand  quickly  across  the  forehead 
with  a  shrug  of  the  shoulders. 

Love — Hold  the  hand  on  the  heart  (universal  ges- 
ture). 

Hate — Same  gesture  with  sign  of  negation. 

Past — Throw  the  hand  over  the  shoulder  several 
times  in  succession. 

Future — Indicate  a  distant  object  with  the  hand, 


THE  LOWER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  43 

repeated  imitation  of  lying  down  in  bed  and  getting 
up  again. 

It  does  not  need  much  reflexion  to  see  that  all 
these  signs  are  abstractions  as  well  as  imitations. 
Among  the  different  characters  of  an  object,  the  deaf- 
mute  chooses  one  that  he  imitates  by  a  gesture,  and 
which  represents  the  total  object.  Herein  he  pro- 
ceeds exactly  like  the  man  who  speaks.  The  differ- 
ence is  that  he  fixes  the  abstract  by  an  attitude  of  the 
body  instead  of  by  a  word.  The  primitive  Aryan  who 
denominated  the  horse,  the  sun,  the  moon,  etc.,  the 
rapid  one,  the  shining  one,  the  measurer  (of  months), 
did  not  act  otherwise ;  for  him  also,  a  chosen  charac- 
teristic represents  the  total  object.  There  is  a  funda- 
mental identity  in  the  two  cases;  thus  justifying  what 
was  said  above  :  abstraction  is  a  necessary  operation 
of  the  mind,  at  least  in  man  ;  he  must  abstract,  be- 
cause he  must  simplify. 

The  inferiority  of  these  imitative  signs  consists  in 
their  being  often  vague,  with  a  tendency  to  the  oppo- 
site sense ;  moreover,  since  they  are  never  detached 
completely  from  the  object  or  the  act  which  they  fig- 
ure, and  cannot  attain  to  the  independence  of  the 
word,  they  are  but  very  imperfect  instruments  of  sub- 
stitution. 

II.  Syntax — The  mere  fact  of  the  existence  of  a 
syntax  in  the  language  of  the  deaf-mutes  proves  that 
they  possess  a  commencement  of  analysis,  i.  e.,  that 
thought  does  not  remain  in  the  rudimentary  state. 
This  point  has  been  carefully  studied  by  different 
authors:  Scott,  Tylor,  Romanes,^  who  assign  to  it 
the  following  characteristics  : 

1  Tylor,  Early  History  of  Mankind,  p.  80.     Romanes,  Mental  Evolution  in 
Man,  Chapter  VI. 


44  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

1.  It  is  a  syntax  of  position.  There  are  no  "parts 
of  speech,"  i.  e.,  terms  having  a  fixed  linguistic  func- 
tion :  substantive,  adjective,  verb,  etc.  The  terms 
(gestures)  borrow  their  grammatical  value  from  the 
place  which  they  occupy  in  the  series,  and  the  rela- 
tions between  the  terms  are  not  expressed. 

2.  It  is  a  fundamental  principle  that  the  signs  are 
disposed  in  the  order  of  their  relative  importance, 
everything  superfluous  being  omitted. 

3.  The  subject  is  placed  before  the  attribute,  the 
object  (complement)  before  the  action,  and,  most  fre- 
quently, the  modified  part  before  the  modifying. 

Some  examples  will  serve  for  the  better  compre- 
hension of  the  ordinary  procedure  of  this  syntax.  To 
explain  the  proposition :  After  running,  I  went  to 
sleep,  the  order  of  gesture  would  be  :  to  run,  me,  fin- 
ished, to  sleep. — My  father  gave  me  an  apple  :  apple, 
father,  me,  give. — The  active  state  is  distinguished 
from  the  passive  by  its  position  :  I  struck  Thomas 
with  a  stick;  me,  Thomas,  strike,  stick.  The  Abb6 
Sicard,  on  asking  a  deaf-mute.  Who  created  God  ? 
obtained  the  answer :  God  created  nothing.  Though 
he  had  no  doubt  as  to  the  meaning  of  this  inversion, 
he  asked  the  control  question.  Who  makes  shoes? 
Answer,  shoes  makes  cobbler. 

The  dry,  bare  character  of  this  syntax  is  evident : 
the  terms  are  juxtaposed  without  relation ;  it  ex- 
presses the  strictest  necessity  only  ;  it  is  the  replica 
of  a  sterile,  indistinct  mode  of  thought. 

Since  we  are  endeavoring  by  its  aid  to  fix  an  intel- 
lectual level,  it  is  not  without  interest  to  compare  it 
with  a  syntax  that  is  frequent  among  the  weak  in  in- 
tellect. "These  do  not  decline  or  conjugate;  they 
employ  a  vague  substantive,   the  infinitive  alone,  or 


THE  LOWER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION,  45 

the  past  participle.  They  leave  out  articles,  conjunc- 
tions, auxiliary  verbs,  reject  prepositions,  employ 
nouns  instead  of  pronouns.  They  call  themselves 
"father,"  "mother,"  "Charles,"  and  refer  to  other 
people  by  indeterminate  substantives,  such  as  man, 
woman,  sister,  doctor,  etc.  They  invert  the  regular 
order  of  substantives  and  adjectives."^  Although 
this  is  a  case  of  mental  regression,  hence  not  rigor- 
ously comparable  with  a  mind  that  is  sane  but  little 
developed,  the  mental  resemblance  between  the  two 
syntaxes,  and  especially  the  absence  of  all  expression 
of  relations  deserves  to  be  signalised,  because  it  can- 
not be  the  result  of  a  fortuitous  coincidence.  It  is  the 
work  of  intellectual  inferiority  and  of  relative  dis- 
continuity of  thought. 

There  is  little  to  say  about  numeration  in  deaf- 
mutes.  When  untrained,  they  can  count  up  to  ten 
with  the  help  of  their  fingers,  like  many  primitive  peo- 
ple. Moreover  (according  to  Sicard  and  G^rando), 
they  make  use  of  notches  upon  a  piece  of  wood  or 
some  other  visible  mark. 

To  conclude,  their  mental  feebleness,  known  since 
the  days  of  antiquity  by  Aristotle,  by  the  Roman  law 
which  dispossessed  them  of  part  of  their  civil  rights, 
later  on  by  many  philosophers  who  refused  even  to 
concede  them  memory,  arises  from  their  inaptitude  to 
transcend  the  inferior  forms  of  abstraction  and  kin- 
dred operations.  In  regard  to  the  events  of  ordinary 
life,  in  the  domain  of  the  concrete  (admitting,  as  is  not 
always  done,  that  there  are  individual  varieties,  some 
being  intelligent,  and  others  stupid),  deaf-mutes  are 
sufficiently  apt  to  seize  and  to  comprehend  the  prac- 

IKussmaul,  Die  St'drungen  der  Sprache,  Chapter  xxx. 


46  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

tical  connexion  between  complex  things.^  But  the 
world  of  higher  concepts,  moral,  religious,  cosmolog- 
ical,  is  closed  to  them.  Observations  to  this  effect  are 
abundant,  though  here  again — as  must  be  insisted  on 
— they  reveal  great  individual  differences. 

Thus,  a  deaf-mute  whose  friends  had  tried  to  in- 
culcate in  him  a  few  religious  notions,  believed  before 
he  came  under  instruction  that  the  Bible  was  a  book 
that  had  been  printed  in  heaven  by  workmen  of  Her- 
culean strength.  This  was  the  sole  interpretation  he 
gave  to  the  gestures  of  his  parents,  who  endeavored  to 
make  him  understand  that  the  Bible  contains  a  reve- 
lation, coming  from  an  all-powerful  God  who  is  in 
heaven.  2  Another  who  was  taken  regularly  to  church 
on  Sunday,  and  exhibited  exemplary  piety,  only  rec- 
ognised in  this  ceremony  an  act  of  obedience  to  the 
clergy.  There  are  many  similar  cases  on  record.  Oth- 
ers on  the  contrary,  seek  to  inquire  into,  and  to  pene- 
trate, the  nature  of  things.  W.  James ^  has  published 
the  autobiography  of  two  deaf-mutes  who  became  pro- 
fessors, one  at  the  asylum  of  Washington,  the  other 
in  California. 

The  principal  interest  attaching  to  the  first  is  the 
spontaneous  appearance  of  the  moral  sense.  After 
stealing  small  sums  of  money  from  the  till  of  a  mer- 

iCf.  as  proof,  the  story  related  by  Kussmaul  [op.  cit.,V\\.):  A  young 
deaf-mute  was  arrested  by  the  police  of  Prague  as  a  vagabond.  He  was 
placed  in  an  institution  and  questioned  by  snitable  methods,  when  he  made 
known  that  his  father  had  a  mill  with  a  house  and  surroundings  which  he  de- 
scribed exactly ;  that  his  mother  and  sister  were  dead,  and  his  father  had  re- 
married ;  that  his  step-mother  had  ill-treated  him,  and  that  he  had  planned 
an  escape  which  bad  succeeded.  He  indicated  the  direction  of  the  mill  to 
the  east  of  Prague.  Inquiries  were  made,  and  all  these  statements  were  ver- 
ified. 

2  Roibanes,  Mental  Evolution,  etc.,  p.  iSo. 

8W.  James,  Psychology,  I.,  a66,  for  the  second  observation;  Philosophical 
Review,  I.,  No.  6,  p.  613  et  seq.  for  the  first 


THE  LOWER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  47 

chant,  he  accidentally  took  a  gold  coin.  Although 
ignorant  of  its  value,  he  was  seized  with  scruple?, 
feeling  "that  it  was  not  for  a  poor  man  like  him,  and 
that  he  had  stolen  too  much"  He  got  rid  of  it  as  best 
he  could,  and  never  began  again. 

The  other  biography — from  which  we  make  a  few 
brief  extracts — may  be  taken  as  the  type  of  an  intelli- 
gent and  curious  deaf-mute.  He  was  not  placed  in 
an  institution  until  he  was  eleven  years  old.  During 
his  childhood  he  accompanied  his  father  on  long  ex- 
peditions, and  his  curiosity  was  aroused  as  to  the  ori- 
gin of  things  :  of  animals  and  vegetables,  of  the  earth, 
the  sun,  the  moon,  the  stars  (at  eight  or  nine  years). 
He  began  to  understand  (from  five  years)  how  chil- 
dren were  descended  from  parents,  and  how  animals 
were  propagated.  This  may  have  been  the  origin  of 
the  question  he  put  to  himself  :  whence  came  the  first 
man,  first  animal,  first  plant,  etc.  He  supposed  at 
first  that  primaeval  man  was  born  from  the  trunk  of  a 
tree,  then  rejected  this  hypothesis  as  absurd,  then 
sought  in  various  directions  without  finding.  He  re 
spected  the  sun  and  moon,  believed  that  they  went 
under  the  earth  in  the  West,  and  traversed  a  long 
tunnel  to  reappear  in  the  East,  etc.  One  day,  on 
hearing  violent  peals  of  thunder,  he  interrogated  his 
brother,  who  pointed  to  the  sky,  aud  simulated  the 
zigzag  of  the  lightning  with  his  finger;  whence  he 
concluded  for  the  existence  of  a  celestial  giant  whose 
voice  was  thunder.  Puerile  as  they  may  be,  are  these 
cosmogonic,  theological  conceptions  inferior  to  those 
of  the  aborigines  of  Oceanica  and  of  the  savage  re- 
gions of  South  America,  who,  nevertheless,  have  a 
vocal  idiom,  a  rudimentary  language  ? 

To  sum  up.   That  which  dominates  among  the  bet- 


48  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

ter  gifted,  is  the  creative  imagination  :  it  is  the  cul- 
minating point  of  their  intellectual  development. 
Their  primitive  curiosity  does  not  seem  inferior  to 
that  of  average  humanity ;  but  since  they  cannot  get 
beyond  representation  by  images  they  lack  an  instru- 
ment of  intellectual  progress. 

ANALYTICAL  GESTURES. 

The  question  of  signs  is  so  closely  allied  to  our 
subject — the  evolution  of  general  ideas — that  we  must 
insist  upon  the  language  of  gesture  as  an  instrument 
of  analysis,  before  going  on  to  speech — of  which  it  is 
an  imperfect  substitute. 

St.  George  Mivart  {Lessons  from  Nature)  gives  the 
following  as  a  complete  classification  of  every  species 
of  sign,  omitting  those  that  are  written  : 

1.  Sounds  which  are  neither  articulate  nor  ra- 
tional, such  as  cries  of  pain,  or  the  murmur  of  a 
mother  to  her  infant. 

2.  Sounds  which  are  articulate  but  not  rational, 
such  as  the  talk  of  parrots,  or  of  certain  idiots,  who 
will  repeat,  without  comprehending,  every  phrase  they 
hear. 

3.  Sounds  which  are  rational  but  not  articulate, 
such  as  the  inarticulate  ejaculations  by  which  we 
sometimes  express  assent  to  or  dissent  from  given 
propositions. 

4.  Sounds  which  are  both  rational  and  articulate, 
constituting  true  "speech." 

5.  Gestures  which  do  not  answer  to  rational  con- 
ceptions, but  are  merely  the  manifestations  of  emo- 
tions and  feelings. 

6.  Gestures  which  do  answer  to  rational  concep- 


THE  LOWER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  49 

tions,  and  are  therefore  "external"  but  not  "oral" 
manifestations  of  the  verbum  mentale. 

This  last  group,  the  only  one  which  concerns  us 
for  the  moment,  would  to  my  thinking  be  conveni- 
ently designated  by  the  term  analytic  gestures,  as  op- 
posed to  the  synthetic  gestures  which  manifest  the 
different  modes  of  affective  life,  and  constitute  what 
is  called  the  expression  of  the  emotions. 

This  language  of  gesture,  intellectual  and  non- 
emotional,  which  translates  ideas,  not  sentiments,  is 
more  widely  distributed  than  is  generally  known, 
among  primitive  peoples.  It  has  been  observed  in 
very  distinct  regions  of  our  globe ;  among  the  aborig- 
ines of  North  and  South  America,  the  Bushmen,  etc. 
It  is  a  means  of  communication  between  tribes  who 
do  not  speak  the  same  language ;  often,  indeed,  it  is 
an  indispensable  auxiliary  to  these  indigent  idioms. 
The  most  important  work  on  this  subject  is  by  an 
American,  Col.  Mallery,  who  with  indefatigable  pa- 
tience has  collected  and  interpreted  the  gestures  in 
use  among  the  Indians  of  North  America. ^  This  work 
alone  reveals  the  variety  of  sign-language,  which 
hardly  ever  leaves  the  region  of  practical  life  :  de- 
scription of  the  countries  traversed,  hints  for  travel- 
lers, directions  to  be  followed,  distances,  time  re- 
quired for  halts,  manner,  habits,  and  dispositions  of 
tribes.  We  may  cite  a  brief  quotation,  from  another 
author  : 

"  Meeting  an  Indian,  I  wish  to  ask  him  if  he  saw  six  waggons 
drawn  by  horned  cattle,  with  three  Mexican  and  three  American 
teamsters,  and  a  man  mounted  on  horseback.    I  make  these  signs  : 

\Sign-Lani^age  Among  the  North  Afnerican  Indians,  1881.  Published  in 
Report  of  the  Bureau  of  Ethnology  at  Washington.  Cf.  also  :  Tylor,  op.  cit.i 
Romanes,  op.  cit.,  VI.  ;  Lubbock,  Origin  of  Civilisation,  Chapter  VI. ;  Klein- 
paul,  Ztitschriftfur  Volkerpsych.,  VI.,  353. 


50  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

I  point  'you,'  then  to  his  eyes,  meaning  '  see';  then  hold  up  all  my 
fingers  on  the  right  hand  and  the  forefinger  on  the  left,  meaning 
'six';  then  I  make  two  circles  by  bringing  the  ends  of  my  thumbs 
and  forefingers  together,  and.  holding  my  two  hands  out,  move  my 
wrists  in  such  a  way  as  to  indicate  waggon-wheels  revolving,  mean- 
ing 'waggons';  then,  by  making  an  upward  motion  with  each  hand 
from  both  sides  of  my  head,  I  indicate  '  horns,'  signifying  horned 
cattle ;  then  by  first  holding  up  three  fingers,  and  then  by  placing 
ray  extended  right  hand  below  my  lower  lip  and  moving  it  down- 
ward, stopping  it  mid  way  down  the  chest,  I  indicate  '  beard, 
meaning  Mexican  ;  and  with  three  fingers  again,  and  passing  my 
right  hand  from  left  to  right  in  front  of  my  forehead,  I  indicate 
'  white  brow  '  or  '  pale  face.'  I  then  hold  up  my  forefinger,  mean- 
ing one  man,  and  by  placing  the  forefinger  of  my  left  hand  between 
the  fore  and  second  finger  of  my  right  hand,  representing  a  man 
astride  of  a  horse,  and  by  moving  my  hands  up  and  down,  give 
the  motion  of  a  horse  galloping  with  a  man  on  his  back.  I  in  this 
way  ask  the  Indian,  '  You  see  six  waggons,  horned  cattle,  three 

Mexicans,  three  Americans,  one  man  on  horseback  ? ' The 

time  required  to  make  these  signs  would  be  about  the  same  as  if 
you  asked  the  question  verbally."' 

Tyler  says  that  the  language  of  gestures  is  sub- 
stantially the  same  all  the  world  over,  and  this  asser- 
tion is  confirmed  by  all  who  have  practised  and  stud- 
ied it.  Its  syntax  resembles  that  of  deaf-mutes,  and 
it  is  unnecessary  to  repeat  it.  The  parable  of  the 
Prodigal  Son  was  translated  by  Mallery  into  analytic 
gestures  ;  and  from  this  language  translated  afresh 
into  the  spoken  tongue:  "Formerly,  man  one,  sons 
two,"  etc.,  etc.  The  comparison  of  the  two  texts  is 
instructive  :  in  the  one,  the  thought  unfolds  itself  by 
a  movement  of  complete  analysis  with  relations  and 
shades  of  meaning  :  in  the  other,  it  resembles  a  line 
of  badly  quarried  blocks,  put  together  without  ce- 
ment. 

1  Lubbock,  Tkt  Origin  of  Civilisation  and  tht  Primitive  Condition  of  Man, 
p.  417. 


THE  LOWER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  5 1 

After  what  has  already  been  said,  there  is  nothing 
surprising  in  finding  a  fundamental  analogy,  or  even 
identity,  between  the  language  of  deaf-mutes  and  the 
analytic  gestures  of  primitive  peoples.  It  was  indeed 
pointed  out  by  Akerly  in  an  institution  in  New  York 
in  the  beginning  of  the  century.  G^rando  gave  a  good 
many  examples,^  remarking  that  the  "gestures  of  re- 
duction," i.  e.,  abridged  gestures,  are  often  enough 
identical  in  the  two  cases.  Mallery  brought  together 
some  Utah  Indians,  and  a  deaf-mute,  who  gave  them 
a  long  account  of  a  marauding  expedition,  followed 
by  a  dialogue  ;  they  understood  each  other  perfectly. 

The  language  of  analytical  gesture  is  thus  a  sub- 
stitute for  spoken  language,  and  this  leads  us  to  a 
question  which,  though  purely  speculative,  deserves 
our  attention  for  a  moment. 

At  a  time  when  it  was  almost  universally  admitted 
that  man  is  unable  to  think  without  words,  Dugald 
Stewart  ventured  to  write:  "If  men  had  been  de- 
prived of  the  organs  of  voice  or  the  sense  of  hearing, 
there  is  no  doubt  that  they  would  have  invented  an 
alphabet  of  visible  signs  wherewith  to  express  all 
their  ideas  and  sentiments."  ^  This  is  no  rash  asser- 
tion ;  we  have  just  seen  proofs  of  it.  But  is  this  pan- 
tomime-language susceptible  of  progress? 

We  can  hardly  doubt  that  if  humanity,  with  its 
proper  cerebral  constitution,  had  at  the  same  time 
been  unable  to  speak,  the  language  of  analytic  gesture 
would,  by  the  initiative  of  certain  inventors,  under 
press  of  necessity,  and  by  the  influence  of  co-opera- 
tion and  of  life  in  common,  have  advanced  beyond 

IG^rando,  op.  cit.,  II.,  note  K,  p.  203.  Among  the  gestures  that  are  iden- 
tical under  their  double  form  may  be  noted  stone,  water,  large,  tall,  to  see, 
finished,  man,  house,  good,  pretty,  now,  etc. 

i  Philosophy  of  the  Human  Mind,  Ch,  I.,  sect.  3. 


52  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

the  imperfect  phase  at  which  it  has  remained  ;  and 
no  one  can  say  what  it  might  have  become  in  the  ac- 
cumulated effort  of  centuries.  Speech,  too,  had  to 
traverse  an  embryonic  period,  and  oral  language  de- 
veloped slowly  and  painfully.  At  the  same  time  it  is 
an  exaggeration  to  say  that  "phonetic  language  as- 
sumed its  extraordinary  importance  almost  by  chance, 
and  that  we  cannot  doubt  that  the  language  of  mim- 
icry, had  it  been  fashioned  by  social  relations  during 
secular  ages,  would  be  hardly  inferior  to  speech  in 
force,  facility,  and  variety."^  In  fact,  man  had  orig- 
inally two  languages  at  his  disposal;  he  used  the  one 
and  the  other  interchangeably  and  simultaneously. 
They  helped  each  other  in  the  development  of  ideas 
that  were  as  yet  chaotic  and  vacillating.  Under  these 
conditions,  speech  prevailed  ;  the  language  of  gesture 
remained  only  as  a  survival  or  a  substitute.  There 
is  nothing  fortuitous  in  this :  speech  has  won  because 
of  its  greater  value. 

First,  iox  practical  reasons.  And  this  is  the  capi- 
tal factor,  since  the  main  point  is  to  communicate 
with  one's  fellow-men.  The  language  of  gesture — 
besides  monopolising  the  hands,  and  thus  keeping 
them  from  other  work — has  the  great  disadvantage  of 
not  carrying  far,  and  of  being  impossible  in  the  dark. 
To  this  we  may  add  the  reasons  cited  above :  its 
vague  character,  and  (with  regard  to  the  abstract)  its 
imitative  nature,  which  forbids  emancipation,  or  com- 
plete detachment,  from  the  concrete,  or  the  transla- 
tion of  that  which  cannot  be  represented.  It  is  to  be 
remarked,  however,  that  the  invention  of  "reduced" 
signs  seems  to  be  a  transition  from  pure  imitation  to 
symbolism,  a  first  step  in  the  path  of  emancipation. 

IKleinpaul,  loc.  cit. 


THE  LOWER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  53 

Speech,  on  the  contrary,  is  transmitted  to  a  dis- 
tance, and  challenges  darkness.  It  is  dependent  upon 
the  ear,  an  organ  whose  sensations  are  infinite  in 
number  and  kind ;  and  in  the  finest  expression  of 
ideas  and  of  feelings,  language  participates  in  this 
opulence.  It  lends  itself  to  variety,  delicacy,  to  an 
extreme  complexity  of  movement  in  a  small  space, 
with  very  little  effort.  We  are,  for  the  moment,  citing 
physiological  reasons  only.  But  these  will  suffice  to 
show  that  the  triumph  of  speech  has  not  been  fortui- 
tous, but  that  it  is  a  very  special  case  of  natural  su- 
premacy. ^ 

In  conclusion,  there  is  nothing  to  add  as  to  generic 
images,  and  the  logic  of  images.  The  important  part 
which  they  play  amongst  children  and  deaf-mutes  tes- 
tifies to  their  extension  and  importance  as  inferior 
forms  of  abstraction,  without  in  anyway  altering  their 
essential  nature,  as  previously  determined. 

IWriting,  ideography,  originated  in  an  analytical  process  analogous  with 
the  language  of  gestures.  Like  the  latter,  it  (i)  isolates  terms,  (2)  arranges 
them  in  a  certain  order,  (3)  translates  thought  in  a  crude  and  somewhat 
vague  form.  Curious  examples  of  this  may  be  found  in  Max  Miiller's 
Chips  from  a  German  Workshop,  XIV.  The  aborigines  of  the  Caroline 
Islands  sent  a  letter  to  a  Spanish  captain,  as  follows  :  Above,  a  man  with 
extended  arms,  sign  of  greeting.  Below,  to  the  left,  the  objects  he  has  to 
offer  ;  five  big  shells,  seven  little  ones,  three  others  of  different  forms.  To 
the  right  and  centre,  drawing  of  the  objects  wanted  in  exchange  :  three  large 
fish  hooks,  four  small  ones,  two  axes,  and  two  pieces  of  iron. 


CHAPTER  II.' 

SPEECH. 

BEFORE  we  inquire  into  abstraction,  as  fixed  and 
expressed  in  words, — whether  such  words  are  the 
complement  of  an  actual  or  possible  representation,  or 
exist  alone  in  consciousness,  as  complete  substitutes, 
-^it  is  indispensable  that  we  should  study  the  origin, 
and  still  more  the  evolution,  of  this  new  factor.  Al- 
though many  linguists  resolutely  abstain  from  consid- 
ering the  origin  of  speech  (which  is  certainly,  like  all 
other  genetic  problems,  beyond  the  grasp  of  psychol- 
ogy), the  question  is  so  intimately  allied  with  that  of 
the  evolution  of  articulate  language,  allied  again  in 
itself  with  the  progressive  development  of  abstraction 
and  of  generalisation,  that  we  should  not  be  justified 
in  withholding  a  brief  summary  of  the  principal  hy- 
potheses relating  to  this  subject,  while  limiting  our- 
selves to  the  most  recent. 


Launching  forth  then  into  this  region  of  conjec- 
ture— do  we,  in  the  first  place,  find  among  some  ani- 
mals, signs  and  means  of  communication  which  for 
them  are  the  equivalents  of  language  ?  In  consider- 
ing this  point  it  matters  little  whether  or  no  we  accept 


SPEECH.  55 

the  evolutionary  thesis.  It  must  not  be  forgotten,  in 
fact,  that  the  problem  of  the  origin  of  speech  is  only 
a  particular  case  of  the  origin  of  language  in  general : 
speech  being  but  one  species  among  several  others  of 
the  facultas  signatrix,  which  can  only  be  manifested 
in  the  lower  animals  in  its  humblest  form. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  pain,  joy,  love,  impa- 
tience, and  other  emotional  states  are  translated  by 
proper  signs,  easy  to  determine.  Our  problem,  how- 
ever, is  different ;  we  are  concerned  with  signs  of  the 
intellectual,  not  of  the  affective,  life.  In  other  words, 
can  certain  animals  transmit  a  warning,  or  an  order, 
to  their  fellows  ?  Can  they  muster  them  for  a  co-op- 
erative act,  and  make  themselves  intelligible  ?  Al- 
though the  interpretation  is  necessarily  open  to  the 
suspicion  of  anthropomorphism,  it  is  difficult  not  to 
recognise  a  sort  of  language  in  certain  acts  of  animal 
life.  Is  it  a  priori  probable  that  animals,  which  form 
stable  and  well-organised  societies,  should  be  bereft 
of  all  means  of  intercommunication  and  comprehen- 
sion ? 

With  regard  to  ants,  we  learn  from  such  observers 
as  Kirby  and  Spence,  Huber,  Franklin,  that  they  em- 
ploy a  system  of  signs.  To  elucidate  this  point,  Lub- 
bock undertook  a  series  of  patient  experiments,  cer- 
tain of  which  may  be  quoted.^  He  pinned  down  a 
dead  fly  so  that  no  ant  could  carry  it  off.  The  first 
that  came  made  vain  attempts  to  remove  it.  It  then 
went  to  the  ant-hill  and  brought  seven  others  to  the 
rescue,  but  hurried  imprudently  in  front  of  them. 
"Seemingly  only  half  awake,"  they  lost  the  track  and 
wandered  alone  for  twenty  minutes.  The  first  re- 
turned to  the  nest  and  brought  back  eight,  who,  so 

1  Ants,  Bees,  and  Wasps,  VII. — Romanes,  Animal  Intelligence,  IV. 


56  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

soon  as  they  were  left  behind  by  the  guide,  turned 
back  again.  During  this  time  the  band  of  seven  (or 
at  least  some  of  them)  had  discovered  the  fly,  which 
they  tore  in  pieces  and  carried  off  to  the  nest.  The 
experiment  was  several  times  repeated,  with  different 
species,  and  always  with  the  same  result.  Lubbock 
concluded  that  ants  were  able  to  communicate  their 
discoveries,  but  without  indicating  locality.  In  an- 
other experiment  he  placed  three  glasses  at  a  distance 
of  thirty  inches  from  a  nest  of  ants.  One  of  the 
glasses  contained  two  or  three  larvae,  the  second  three 
hundred  to  six  hundred,  the  third  none  at  all.  He 
connected  the  nest  with  the  glasses  by  means  of  three 
parallel  tapes,  and  placed  one  ant  in  the  glass  with 
many  larvae  and  another  ant  in  that  with  two  or  three. 
Each  of  them  took  a  larva  and  carried  it  to  the  nest, 
returning  for  another,  and  so  on.  After  each  journey 
he  put  another  larva  into  the  glass  with  only  two  or 
three  larvae,  to  replace  that  which  had  been  removed, 
and  every  stranger  brought  was  imprisoned  until  the 
end  of  the  experiment.  Were  the  number  of  visits  to 
all  three  glasses  the  same  ?  And  if  not,  which  of  the 
two  glasses  containing  larvae  received  the  greater 
number  of  visitors?  A  difference  in  number  would 
seem  to  be  conclusive  as  proving  power  of  communi- 
cation. The  result  was  that  during  forty-seven  and  a 
half  hours  two  hundred  and  fifty-seven  friends  were 
brought  by  the  ants  having  access  to  the  glass  contain- 
ing numerous  larvae,  while  during  an  interval  of  fifty- 
three  hours  there  were  only  eighty  strange  visitors  to 
the  glass  containing  two  or  three  larvae ;  there  were 
no  visits  to  the  glass  containing  none.  Communication 
for  bees  as  for  ants,  appears  to  be  made  by  rubbing 
the  antennae.     If  the  queen  is  carried  off  in  a  hive. 


SPEECH.  57 

some  of  the  bees  are  sure  to  discover  it  before  long. 
They  become  greatly  agitated,  and  run  about  the  hive 
frantically,  touching  any  companions  they  meet  with 
their  crossed  antennae,  and  thus  spreading  the  news 
through  the  whole  community.  The  bee-hunters  in 
America  discover  them  by  choosing  a  clearing  where 
they  catch  a  few  wandering  bees,  which  are  then 
gorged  with  honey  and  suffered  to  fly  when  replete. 
These  bees  return  with  a  numerous  escort.  The  same 
process  is  repeated  with  the  new  comers,  and  by  ob- 
serving the  direction  which  they  follow  at  their  de- 
parture, the  nest  is  discovered. 

As  regards  the  higher  animals,  the  truth  (notwith- 
standing the  exaggerations  of  G.  Leroy — who  asserts 
that  when  they  hunt  together,  wait  for  one  another, 
find  each  other  again,  and  give  mutual  aid,  "these 
operations  would  be  impossible  without  conventions 
that  could  only  be  communicated  in  detail  by  means 
of  an  articulate  language  [j"zV]")  is  that  we  know  sin- 
gularly little  about  them.  It  is  certain  that,  in  addition 
to  sounds  that  translate  their  emotions,  many  species 
have  other  means  of  communication.  According  to 
Romanes^  the  more  intelligent  dogs  have  the  faculty  of 
communicating  with  one  another,  by  the  tone  of  bark- 
ing, or  by  gesture,  such  simple  ideas  as  "follow  me." 
This  gesture  is  invariably  the  same  ;  being  a  contact 
of  heads  with  a  motion  between  a  rub  and  a  butt,  and 
always  resulting  in  a  definite  but  never  complex  course 
of  action.  In  a  troop  of  reindeer  the  leader  makes 
one  sign  for  the  halt,  another  for  the  march  forward, 
hitting  the  laggards  one  after  another  with  his  horns. 
Monkeys  are  known  to  produce  various  sounds  (the 
gibbon   compasses  a  complete  octave),    and  several 

\  Animal  Intelligence,  XVI.,  p.  445. 


58  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

species  will  meet  and  hold  a  kind  of  conversation. 
Unfortunately,  notwithstanding  recent  researches,  we 
have  only  vague  and  doubtful  data  in  regard  to  mon- 
key language. 

We  know  finally,  that  certain  birds  are  able  to  ar- 
ticulate, and  possess  all  the  material  conditions  of 
speech,  the  faculty  being  indeed  by  no  means  uncom- 
mon. Parrots  do  even  more ;  there  is  no  doubt  that 
they  can  apply  words,  parts  of  sentences,  and  airs,  to 
persons,  things,  or  definite  events,  without  varying 
the  application,  which  is  always  the  same.^  Associa- 
tion by  contiguity  sufficiently  explains  this  fact,  but, 
granting  that  they  do  not  as  a  rule  make  a  right  intel- 
lectual use  of  articulate  sounds,  they  seem  in  certain 
instances  to  attach  to  them  the  value  of  a  sign.  Ro- 
manes actually  observed  a  more  extraordinary  case, 
implying  generalisation,  with  apposition  of  a  sound. 
In  the  first  instance,  one  of  his  parrots  imitated  the 
barking  of  a  terrier  which  lived  in  the  house.  Later 
on,  this  barking  became  a  denotative  sound,  the 
proper  name  of  the  dog ;  for  the  bird  barked  as  soon 
as  it  saw  the  terrier.  Finally,  at  a  still  later  stage, 
it  got  into  the  habit  of  barking  when  any  dog,  known 
or  unknown,  came  into  the  house ;  but  ceased  to  bark 
at  the  terrier.  While  distinguishing  individuals  it 
therefore  perceived  their  resemblance.  "The  parrot's 
name  for  an  individual  dog  became  extended  into  a 
generic  name  for  all  dogs."' 

In  short,  the  language  of  animals — so  far  as  we 
know  it — exhibits  a  very  rudimentary  development, 
by  no  means  proportionate  to  that  of  the  logic  of  im- 

iThe  most  interesting  of  the  many  observations  on  this  subject  are  those 
of  Dr.  Wilks,  F.  R.  S.,  published  in  the  Journal ^ Mental  Science,  July,  1879. 
i  Mental  Evolution  in  Man,  p.  137, 


SPEECH.  59 

ages,  and  highly  inferior  to  that  of  analytical  gesture. 
It  throws  no  light,  notwithstanding  all  that  has  been 
said,  upon  the  problem  of  the  origin  of  speech. 

In  respect  to  this  subject,  which  has  excited  hu- 
man curiosity  for  centuries  without  satiation,  there 
appear  to  me  (when  we  have  eliminated  old  or  aban- 
doned hypotheses)  to  be  only  two  theories  which  have 
any  solidity :  the  one  presupposes  instinct ;  the  other 
a  slow  evolution. 

I.  It  must  be  remarked  that  if  the  partisans  of  the 
first  theory  seem  at  the  outset  to  have  frankly  admit- 
ted innate  disposition  (the  fundamental  characteristic 
of  instinct),  it  is  more  difficult  to  distinguish  between 
some  of  the  later  writers  and  the  evolutionists. 

Thus  it  has  been  said :  speech  is  a  necessary  pro- 
duct in  which  neither  reflexion  nor  will  participate, 
and  which  is  derived  from  a  secret  instinct  in  man 
(Heyse).  Renan  sustained  a  similar  thesis.  For  Max 
Miiller,  "man  is  born  speaking,  as  he  is  born  think- 
ing"; speech  marks  the  transition  from  (concrete)  in- 
tuitions to  ideas ;  it  is  a  fact  in  the  development  of 
the  mind ;  it  is  created  with  no  distinct  consciousness 
of  means  and  end."  For  Steinthal,  on  the  contrary, 
"language  is  neither  an  invention  nor  an  innate  pro- 
duct ;  man  creates  it  himself,  but  it  is  not  begotten  of 
the  reflecting  mind."  Through  all  these  formulae,  and 
others  somewhat  tinged  with  mysticism,  we  can  dis- 
cover but  one  point  of  fact,  analogous  to  that  which 
states  that  it  is  in  the  nature  of  the  bee  to  form  its 
comb,  of  the  spider  to  weave  its  web.  The  last  word 
of  the  enigma  is  unconscious  activity,  and  whether  di- 
rectly, or  by  evasions,  this  school  must  return  to  in- 
nate faculties. 


6o  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

A  somewhat  recent  theory, — that  of  L.  Noird/  — 
is  distinct  from  the  foregoing.  In  these,  speech  is 
the  direct  (although,  it  is  true,  unconscious)  expres- 
sion of  intelligence  ;  for  Noir6,  on  the  other  hand,  it 
is  the  outcome  of  will.  "Language  is  the  result  of 
association,  of  community  of  feeling,  of  a  sympathetic 
activity  which,  at  the  outset,  was  accompanied  by 
sounds  .  .  .  .  ;  it  is  the  child  of  will  and  not  of  sensa- 
tion." Speech  is  derived  from  community  of  action, 
from  the  collaboration  of  primitive  men,  from  the  com- 
mon use  of  their  activities.  When  our  muscles  are  in 
action,  we  feel  it  a  relief  to  utter  sounds.  The  men 
who  work  together,  the  peasants  who  dig  or  thresh  the 
grain,  sailors  rowing,  soldiers  marching,  emit  more  or 
less  vibrant  articulations,  sounds,  exclamations,  hum- 
ming, songs,  etc.  These  sounds  present  the  requisite 
characters  of  the  constitution  of  articulate  language  ; 
they  are  common  to  all ;  they  are  intelligible,  being  as- 
sociated by  all  with  the  same  acts.  Action,  according 
to  Noir^,  is  the  primitive  element  in  all  language. 
Human  labor  is  the  content  of  primitive  roots ;  to 
cut,  knock,  dig,  hollow,  weave,  row,  etc.  Although 
Max  Muller  adhered  almost  unreservedly  to  this  hy- 
pothesis, it  has,  like  all  others,  encountered  much  crit- 
icism which  we  need  not  dwell  on.  Is  it  probable,  it 
has  been  asked,  that  the  first  names  should  have  been 
for  acts  only,  not  for  objects  ?  How  explain  the 
synonyms  and  homonyms  so  frequent  in  primitive  lan- 
guage ?  etc. 

II.  The  hypothesis  of  a  progressive  evolution  of 
speech,  while  dating  from  antiquity,  has  only  taken  a 
consistent  form  in  our  own  days,  under  the  influence 
of  transformist  doctrines.     The  work  of  anthropolo- 

1  Dtr  Ursprung  der  Sprache  (1877).    Fr.  Muller  maintained  a  similar  view. 


SPEECH.  6l 

gists  and  of  linguists,  above  all  of  the  former,  it  finds 
support  in  the  study  of  inferior  idioms  and  of  the 
comparative  method.  Its  fundamental  thesis  is  that 
articulate  language  is  the  result  of  a  long  elaboration, 
lasting  for  centuries,  in  which  we  may  with  some 
probability  reconstitute  the  stages.  While  its  authors 
are  not  in  complete  agreement  it  may  be  said  that, 
generally  speaking,  they  admit  three  periods  :  the  cry, 
vocalisation,  articulation. 

The  cry  is  the  primordial  fact,  the  pure  animal 
language,  a  simple  vocal  aspiration,  without  articula- 
tion. It  is  either  reflex,  expressing  needs  and  emo- 
tions, or,  at  a  stage  higher,  intentional  (to  call,  warn, 
menace,  etc.).  It  has  been  said  that  the  speechless- 
ness of  animals  is  due  to  the  imperfection  of  their  aud- 
itory [?]  organs,  and  want  of  organic  correspondence 
between  their  acoustic  images  and  the  muscular  move- 
ments that  produce  sound  :  but  the  cause  of  this 
aphasia  must  also,  and  above  all,  be  referred  to  their 
weak  cerebral  development ;  this  applies  also  to  prim- 
itive man.  "What  function  could  words  have  ful- 
filled when  the  anthropoid  of  the  Neanderthal  or  the 
Naulette  roamed,  naked  and  solitary,  from  ditch  to 
ditch,  through  the  thick  atmosphere,  over  marshy 
soil,  stone  in  hand,  seeking  edible  plants  or  berries, 
or  the  trail  of  females  as  savage  as  himself?"^  It  is  in- 
telligence that  creates  its  instruments,  as  well  speech 
as  all  the  rest. 

Vocalisation  (emission  of  vowels  only)  does  not  in 
itself  contain  the  essential  elements  of  speech.  Many 
animals  practise  it ;  our  vowels,  long  or  short,  even 
our  diphthongs,  can  readily  be  recognised  in  the  voice 

1  A.  Leffevre,  Let  races  et  les  langues  {Bibliothique  scientifique  internatio- 
niile),  pp.  5-6. 


62  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

of  different  species  (dog,  cat,  horse,  birds  in  large 
numbers,  etc.).  In  the  child,  it  succeeds  the  period 
of  the  simple  cry ;  and  since  it  is  admitted  that  the 
development  of  the  individual  hints  at  that  of  the 
race;  that,  moreover,  many  primitive  languages  or 
rudimentary  idioms  (as  such,  near  the  time  of  their 
origin)  are  very  rich  in  vowels, — it  has  been  concluded 
that  there  existed  a  longer  or  shorter  period  inter- 
mediate between  those  of  the  cry  and  of  articulation 
(this  thesis  has  close  affinities  with  the  theory  of  Dar- 
win, Spencer,  etc.,  which  has  been  rejected  by  other 
evolutionists) ;  that  speech  is  derived  from  song,  in- 
tellectual language  from  emotional  language ;  in 
other  words,  that  man  could  sing  before  he  could 
speak.  Various  facts  are  alleged  in  support  of  this 
theory:  (i)  In  monosyllabic  languages,  which  are 
generally  held  to  be  the  most  ancient,  the  accent 
plays  a  cardinal  role ;  the  same  syllable,  according  to 
the  tone  which  accompanies  it,  takes  on  the  most 
widely  different  meanings.  Such  is  the  case  of  the 
Chinese.  In  Siamese,  /ia  =  to  seek;  A^  =  plague;  hd. 
=  five,  (2)  Other  languages  in  which  intonation  is  of 
less  importance,  are  nevertheless  in  close  relation 
with  song,  and  by  reason  of  their  vocabulary  and  of 
the  grammatical  construction,  modulation  is  necessary 
for  giving  a  complete  sense  to  the  words  and  phrases. 
(3)  Even  in  our  own  languages,  which  are  completely 
dissociated  from  song,  the  voice  is  not  even  in  tone ; 
it  can  be  greatly  modified  according  to  circumstances. 
Helmholtz  showed  that  for  such  banal  phrases  as  "I 
have  been  for  a  walk,"  "  Have  you  been  for  a  walk?" 
the  voice  drops  a  quarter-tone  for  the  affirmation,  and 
rises  a  fifth  for  the  interrogation.  H.  Spencer  called 
attention  to  several  facts  of  the  same  order,  all  com- 


SPEECH.  63 

monplace.  (4)  The  impassioned  language  of  emotion 
resembles  song:  the  voice  returns  to  its  original  form; 
"it  tends,"  according  to  Darwin,  "to  assume  a  musi- 
cal character,  in  virtue  of  the  principle  of  associa- 
tion." 

Whatever  may  be  the  force  of  this  reasoning,  con 
elusive  for  some,  doubtful  for  others,  the  conditions 
necessary  to  the  existence  of  speech  arose  with  artic- 
ulation only,  consonants  being  its  firmest  element. 
The  origin  of  speech  has  been  much  disputed.  Ro- 
manes invokes  natural  selection:  "The  first  articu- 
lation probably  consisted  in  nothing  further  than  a 
semiotic  breaking  of  vocal  tones,  in  a  manner  resem- 
bling that  which  still  occurs  in  the  so-called  'chatter- 
ing' of  monkeys, — the  natural  language  for  the  ex- 
pression of  their  mental  states.  "^  It  should,  however, 
be  noted  that  the  question,  under  this  form,  has 
merely  a  physiological  interest.  The  voice  is  as  nat- 
ural to  man  as  are  the  movements  of  his  limbs ;  be- 
tween simple  voice  and  articulate  voice  there  is  but 
the  same  distance  as  between  the  irregular  movements 
of  the  limbs  of  the  newly  born,  and  such  well-co-ordi- 
nated movements  as  walking.  Articulation  is  merely 
one  of  the  forms  of  expression :  it  is  so  little  human 
that  it  is  met  with,  as  we  have  seen,  among  many  of 
the  lower  animals.  The  true  psychological  problem  lies  ^^ 
elsewhere:  in  the  employment  of  articulate  sounds  as  \ 
objective  signs,  and  the  attaching  of  these  to  objects  / 
with  which  they  are  related  by  no  natural  tie. 

Geiger  in  his  Ur sprung  der  Sprache  (1878)  brought 
forward  a  hypothesis  which  has  been  sustained  by 
other  authors.  It  may  be  summed  up  as  follows : 
words   are   an   imitation   of    the   movements   of    the 

\Loc,  cit.,  372, 


64  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

mouth.  The  predominant  sense  in  man  is  that  of 
sight;  man  is  pre-eminently  visual.  Prior  to  the  ac- 
quisition of  speech,  he  communicated  with  his  fellows 
by  the  aid  of  gestures,  and  movements  of  the  mouth 
and  face ;  he  appealed  to  their  eyes.  Their  facial 
"grimaces,"  fulfilled  and  elucidated  by  gesture,  be- 
came signs  for  others ;  they  fixed  their  attention  on 
them.  When  articulate  sounds  came  into  being,  these 
lent  themselves  to  a  more  or  less  conventional  lan- 
guage by  reason  of  their  acquired  importance.  For 
support  of  this  hypothesis,  we  are  referred  to  the  case 
of  non-educated  deaf-mutes.  These  invent  articulate 
sounds  (which  of  course  they  cannot  hear),  and  use 
them  to  designate  certain  things.  While  many  of 
these  words  appear  to  be  an  arbitrary  creation  (e.  g., 
^a^one,  ricke=^\  will  not,  etc.),  others  result  from 
the  imitation  by  their  mouth  of  the  movements  per- 
ceived on  the  mouth  of  others.  Such  are  mumm  =  to 
eat;  chipp^=-lo  drink;  ^^-jj'r^: barking  of  a  dog,  etc.^ 
Why  should  primitive  man  have  done  less  than  the 
deaf-mute,  when  he  not  only  saw  the  movements  but 
heard  the  sounds  to  boot? 

To  conclude  with  a  subject  in  which  individual 
hypotheses  abound,  and  which  for  us  is  only  of  indi- 
rect interest,  we  may  summarise  the  sketch  given  re- 
cently enough  (1888)  by  one  of  the  principal  partisans 
of  the  evolutionary  theory: 

"Starting  from  the  highly  intelligent  and  social 
species  of  anthropoid  ape  as  pictured  by  Darwin,  we 
can  imagine  that  this  animal  was  accustomed  to  use 
its  voice  freely  for  the  expression  of  its  emotions, 
uttering  of  danger-signals,  and  singing.  Possibly 
enough  also  it  may  have  been  sufficiently  intelligent 

IHeinicke,  Beobachtungen  iibtr  Stumme,  75,  137. 


SPEECH.  65 

to  use  a  few  imitative  sounds;  and  certainly  sooner 
or  later  the  receptual  life  of  this  social  animal  must 
have  advanced  far  enough  to  have  become  compar- 
able with  that  of  an  infant  at  about  two  years  of  age. 
That  is  to  say,  this  animal,  although  not  yet  having 
begun  to  use  articulate  signs,  must  have  advanced  far 
enough  in  the  conventional  use  of  natural  signs  (or 
signs  with  a  natural  origin  in  tone  and  gesture,  whether 
spontaneous  only  or  intentionally  imitative)  to  have 
admitted  of  a  tolerably  free  exchange  of  receptual 
ideas,  such  as  would  be  concerned  in  animal  wants, 
and  even,  perhaps,  in  the  simplest  forms  of  co-opera- 
tive action.  Next,  I  think  it  probable  that  the  ad- 
vance of  receptual  intelligence  which  would  have  been 
occasioned  by  this  advance  in  sign-making,  would  in 
turn  have  led  to  a  further  development  of  the  latter, 
— the  two  thus  acting  and  reacting  on  each  other 
until  the  language  of  tone  and  gesture  became  gradu- 
ally raised  to  the  level  of  imperfect  pantomime,  as  in 
children  before  they  begin  to  use  words.  At  this 
stage,  however,  or  even  before  it,  I  think  very  prob- 
ably vowel-sounds  must  have  been  employed  in  tone- 
language,  if  not  also  a  few  of  the  consonants.  Event- 
ually the  action  and  reaction  of  receptual  intelligence 
and  conventional  sign-making  must  have  ended  in  so 
far  developing  the  former  as  to  have  admitted  of  the 
breaking  up  (or  articulation)  of  vocal  sounds,  as  the 
only  direction  in  which  any  further  improvement  of 
vocal  sign-making  was  possible.  I  think  it  not  im- 
probable that  this  important  stage  in  the  development 
of  speech  was  greatly  assisted  by  the  already  existing 
habit  of  articulating  musical  notes,  supposing  our 
progenitors  to  have  resembled  the  gibbons  or  the 
chimpanzees  in  this  respect.     But  long  after  this  first 


J 


66  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

rude  beginning  of  articulate  speech,  the  language  of 
tone  and  gesture  would  have  continued  as  much  the 
most  important  machinery  of  communication.  Even 
if  we  were  able  to  strike  in  again  upon  the  history 
thousands  of  years  later,  we  should  find  that  panto- 
mime had  been  superseded  by  speech.  I  believe  it 
was  an  inconceivably  long  time  before  this  faculty  of 
articulate  sign-making  had  developed  sufficiently  far 
to  begin  to  starve  out  the  more  primitive  and  natural 
systems ;  and  I  believe  that,  even  after  this  starving- 
out  process  did  begin,  another  inconceivable  lapse  of 
time  must  have  been  required  for  such  progress  to 
have  eventually  transformed  Homo  alalus  into  Homo 
sapiens.  "^ 

Among  all  these  hypotheses  we  may  choose  or  not 
choose  ;  and  while  we  have  dwelt  briefly  on  this  de- 
bated problem,  whose  literature  is  copious,  we  may 
yet  have  said  too  much  on  what  is  mere  conjecture. 

One  certain  fact  remains,  that — notwithstanding 
the  theory  by  which  speech  is  likened  to  an  instinct 
breaking  forth  spontaneously  in  man — it  was  at  its 
origin  so  weak,  so  inadequate  and  poor,  that  it  per- 
force leaned  upon  the  language  of  gesture  to  become 
intelligible.  Specimens  of  this  mixed  language  are 
still  surviving  among  inferior  races  that  have  nothing 
in  common  between  them,  inhabiting  regions  of  the 
earth  with  no  common  resemblances. 

In  some  cases  speech  coexists  with  the  language 
of  action  (Tasmanians,  Greenlanders,  savage  tribes  of 
Brazil,  Grebos  of  Western  Africa,  etc.).  Gesture  is 
here  indispensable  for  giving  precision  to  the  vocal 
sounds  ;  it  may  even  modify  the  sense.  Thus,  in  one 
of  these  idioms,  ni  7te  signifies  "  I  do  it,"  or  "You  do 

1  Romanes,  Mental  Evolution  in  Man,  pp.  377-379. 


SPEECH.  67 

it,"  according  to  the  gesture  of  the  speaker.  The 
Bushman  vocabulary  is  so  incomplete  and  has  to  be 
reinforced  by  so  many  mimic  signs,  that  it  cannot  be 
understood  in  the  dark.  In  order  to  converse  at  night, 
the  tribe  is  obliged  to  gather  round  the  fire. 

In  other  cases,  speech  coexists  with  inarticulate 
sounds  (Fuegians,  Hottentots,  certain  tribes  of  North 
America)  which  travellers  have  compared,  respec- 
tively, to  clinking  and  clapping.  These  sounds  have 
been  classified  according  to  the  physiological  process 
by  which  they  are  produced,  into  four  (or  even  six) 
species  :  dental,  palatal,  cerebral,  lateral ;  it  is  im- 
possible to  translate  them  by  an  articulated  equiv- 
alent. "Their  clappings  survive,"  says  Sayce,  "as 
though  to  show  us  how  man,  when  deprived  of  speech, 
can  fix  and  transmit  his  thought  by  certain  sounds." 
Among  the  Gallas,  the  orator  haranguing  the  assem- 
bly marks  the  punctuation  of  his  discourse  by  cracking 
a  leather  thong.  The  blow,  according  to  its  force, 
indicates  a  comma,  semi-colon,  or  stop ;  a  violent 
blow  makes  an  exclamation.^ 

It  was  advisable  to  recall  these  mixed  states  in 
which  articulate  language  had  not  yet  left  its  primi- 
tive vein.  They  are  transitional  forms  between  pure 
pantomime  and  the  moment  when  speech  conquered 
its  complete  independence. 

II. 

In  passing  from  the  origin  of  speech  to  the  study 
of  its  development,  we  enter  upon  firmer  ground. 
Although  this  development  has  not  occurred  uniformly 
in  every  race,   and  the  linguists — who  are  here  our 

1  For  documents,  consult  especially  Tyler,  Primitive  Culture,  V  ;  Sayc 
Principles  0/  Comparative  Philology}',  I.,  §  17. 


68  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

guides — do  not  always  agree  in  fixing  its  phases,  it  is 
nevertheless  the  surest  indication  of  the  march  of  the 
human  mind  in  its  self-analysis  in  passing  from  ex- 
treme confusion  to  deliberate  differentiation ;  while 
the  materials  are  sufficiently  abundant  to  admit  of  an 
objective  study  of  intellectual  psychogenesis,  based 
upon  language. 

This  attempt  has  nothing  in  common  with  the 
"  general  or  philosophical  grammar  "  of  the  beginning 
of  this  century.  The  Idealogues  who  founded  this 
had  the  pretension,  while  taking  language  as  their 
basis,  to  analyse  the  fundamental  categories  of  intelli- 
gence :  substance,  quality,  action,  relation.  A  laud- 
able enterprise,  but  one  which,  by  reason  of  the 
method  employed,  could  only  be  abortive.  Knowing 
only  the  classical  or  modern  languages,  the  products 
of  a  long  civilisation,  they  had  no  suspicion  of  the 
embryonic  phases  ;  accordingly,  they  made  a  theoret- 
ical construction,  the  work  of  logicians  rather  than  of 
psychologists.  Any  positive  genetic  investigation  was 
inaccessible  to  them  ;  they  were  lacking  in  material, 
and  in  instruments.  If  by  a  comparison  borrowed 
from  geology,  the  adult  languages  are  assimilated  to 
the  quaternary  layer ;  the  tertiary,  secondary,  and 
primary  strata  will  correspond  with  certain  idioms  of 
less  and  less  complexity,  which  themselves  contain 
the  fossils  of  psychology.  These  lower  forms — the 
semi-organised  or  savage  languages  which  are  a  hun- 
dred times  more  numerous  than  the  civilised  lan- 
guages— are  now  familiar  to  us  ;  hence  there  is  an 
immense  field  for  research  and  comparison.  This  re- 
trogression to  the  primitive  leads  to  a  point  that  sev- 
eral linguists  have  designated  by  a  term  borrowed 
from  biology:  it  is  the  protoplasmic  state  "without 


SPEECH.  69 

functions  of  grammatical  categories  "  (Hermann  Paul). 
How  is  it  that  speech  issued  from  this  undifferentiated 
state,  and  constituted  little  by  little  its  organs  and 
functions?  This  question  is  interesting  to  the  linguist 
on  certain  sides,  to  the  psychologist  on  others.  For 
us  it  consists  in  seeking  how  the  human  mind,  through 
long  groping,  conquered  and  perfected  its  instrument 
of  analysis. 

I.  At  the  outset  of  this  evolution,  which  we  are  to 
follow  step  by  step,  we  find  the  hypothesis  of  a  prim- 
itive period,  that  of  the  roots  so  called,  and  it  is  worth 
our  while  to  pause  over  this  a  little.  Roots — whatever 
may  be  our  opinion  as  to  their  origin— are  in  effect 
general  terms.     But  in  what  sense? 

Chinese  consists  of  500  monosyllables  which, 
thanks  to  varieties  of  intonation,  sufficed  for  the  con- 
struction of  the  spoken  language  ;  Hebrew,  according 
to  Renan,  has  about  500  roots  ;  for  Sanskrit  there  is 
no  agreement.  According  to  a  bold  hypothesis  of  Max 
Miiller,  it  is  reducible  to  121,  perhaps  less,  and  "these 
few  seeds  have  produced  the  enormous  intellectual 
vegetation  that  has  covered  the  soil  of  India  from  the 
most  distant  antiquity  to  the  present  day.  "^  What- 
ever their  number  may  be,  the  question  for  us  re- 
duces itself  into  knowing  their  primitive  intellectual 
content,  their  psychological  value.  Here  we  are  con- 
fronted by  two  very  different  theses.  For  one  camp, 
roots  are  a  reality  ;  for  the  other,  they  are  the  simple 
residuum  of  analysis. 

"Roots  are  the  phonetic  types  produced  by  a  force 
inherent  in  the  human  mind ;  they  were  created  by 
nature,"  etc.,  etc.  Thus  speaks  Max  Muller.  Whitney, 
who  is  rarely  of  the  same  mind,  says,  notwithstanding, 

IThis  list  may  be  found  in  The  Science  of  Thought,  p.  406. 


70  THE  EVOLUTION  OK  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

that  all  the  Indo-European  languages  are  descended 
from  one  primitive,  monosyllabic  language,  "that  our 
ancestors  talked  with  one  another  in  simple  syllables 
indicative  of  ideas  of  prime  importance,  but  wanting 
all  designation  of  their  relations." 

In  the  other  camp  it  is  sustained  that  roots  are  the 
result  of  learned  analysis,  but  that  there  is  nothing  to 
prove  that  they  really  existed  (Sayce)  ;  that  they  are 
reconstructed  by  comparison  and  generalisation  ;  that, 
e.  g.,  in  the  Aryan  languages,  roots  bear  much  the 
same  relation  to  Sanskrit,  Greek,  and  Latin  words  as 
Platonic  ideas  to  the  objects  of  the  real  world" 
(Br^al).  It  has  been  calculated  that  the  number  of 
articulate  sounds  which  the  human  voice  is  capable 
of  producing  amounts  to  three  hundred  and  eighty- 
five.  These  sounds,  for  physiological  reasons,  con- 
stitute a  fundamental  theme  in  the  various  words 
created  by  man.  Later  on,  linguists  in  comparing 
the  vocables  used  in  different  languages,  established 
the  frequent  recurrence  of  certain  sounds  common  to 
several  words.  These  have  been  isolated,  but  we 
must  not  see  in  them  aught  besides  extracts.  More- 
over, "the  first  stammerings  of  man  have  nothing  in 
common  with  phonetic  types  so  arrested  in  form  and 
abstract  in  signification,  as  dlid,  to  place,  vid,  to  see, 
man,  to  think,  and  other  analogous  words." 

To  sum  up.  In  the  first  thesis  roots  come  into 
existence,  ab  initio ;  words  are  derived  from  them  by 
reduplication,  flexions,  affixes,  suffixes,  etc. ;  they  are 
the  trunk  upon  which  a  whole  swarm  of  languages  has 
proliferated. 

In  the  second  thesis,  words  come  first ;  then  the 
common  element    disengaged  by  analysis,  but  which 


SPEECH.  71 

never  existed  as  such  in  the  pure  and  primitive  con- 
dition. 

Whether  the  one  opinion  or  the  other  be  adopted, 
I  see  no  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  it  save  that  the 
first  terms  designated  qualities  or  manners  of  being, 
varying  with  the  race.  The  first  thesis  seems  the 
more  apt  in  revealing  to  us  the  primitive  forms  of  ab- 
straction and  generalisation.  If  it  be  selected  despite 
its  fragility,  one  finds  in  the  list  of  roots  (even  when 
most  reduced)  an  extraordinary  mixture  of  terms  ap- 
plied to  the  most  disparate  things  (e.  g.,  tears,  break, 
measure,  milk,  to  choose,  to  clean,  to  vomit,  cold,  to 
fear,  etc.).  To  assert  with  Max  Muller  (from  whom 
I  borrow  the  preceding  terms)  that  "these  are  the 
one  hundred  and  twenty-one  original  concepts,  the 
primitive  intellectual  baggage  of  the  Aryan  family" 
is  to  employ  an  unfortunate  formula,  for  nothing  could 
less  resemble  concepts  than  the  contents  of  this  list. 
If  the  second  thesis  be  adopted,  the  root  then  being 
nothing  but  ''  the  exposed  kernel  of  a  family  of  words," 
"a  phonogram,"  analogous  to  composite  photographs, 
formed  like  these  by  a  condensation  of  the  similari- 
ties between  several  terms,  then  clearly  primitive  ab- 
straction and  generalisation  must  be  sought  in  words, 
and  not  in  roots.  ^ 

1  How  were  primitive  terms  (roots  or  words)  formed?  A  much-debated 
and  still  unsolved  question.  Man  had  at  his  disposal  one  primary  element, 
the  interjection.  By  all  accounts  this  remained  sterile,  unfertile  ;  it  did  not 
give  birth  to  words ;  it  remained  in  articulate  language  as  a  mark  of  its  emo- 
tional origin.  A  second  proceeding  was  that  of  imitation  with  the  aid  of 
sound,  onomatopoeia.  From  antiquity  to  the  present  time,  it  has  been  re- 
garded as  the  parent,  ^ar  excellence.  This  was  accepted  by  Renan,  Whitney, 
Tyler,  H.  Paul,  etc.;  rejected  by  M.  Muller,  Br^al,  P.  Regnaud,  etc.  No  one 
disputes  the  formation  of  many  words  by  onomatopoeia,  but  those  who  ques- 
tion its  value  as  a  universal  process  say  that  "if  in  certain  sounds  of  our 
idioms  we  seem  to  hear  an  imitation  of  the  sounds  of  nature,  we  must  recol- 
lect that  the  same  noises  are  represented  by  quite  diiferent  sounds  in  other 
languages,  which  are  also  held  by  those  who  utter  them  to  be  onomatopoeia. 


72  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

II.  Leaving  this  question  which,  from  its  relation 
to  that  of  the  origin  of  speech,  shares  in  the  same  ob- 
scurity, we  have  further  to  ask  if  the  primitive  terms 
(whatever  nature  be  attributed  to  them)  were,  prop- 
erly speaking,  words  or  phrases?  Did  man  initially 
give  utterance  to  simple  denominations,  or  to  affirma- 
tions and  negations?  On  this  point  all  linguists  seem 
to  be  in  agreement.  "Speech  must  express  a  judg- 
ment." In  other  words  it  is  always  a  phrase.  "Lan- 
guage is  based  on  the  phrase,  not  on  the  single  word  : 
we  do  not  think  by  means  of  words,  but  by  means  of 
phrases."^ 

This  phrase  may  be  a  single  word, — or  composite, 
formed  by  confusion  of  words  as  in  the  so-called  ag- 
glutinative, polysynthetic,  holophrastic  languages, — 
or  two  words,  subject  and  attribute  ;  or  three  distinct 
words,  subject,  attribute,  and  copula ;  but  beneath 
all  these  forms  the  fundamental  function  is  unalter- 
ably to  affirm  or  deny. 

The  same  remark  has  been  made  of  children. 
"We  must,"  says  Preyer,  "reject  the  general  notion 
that  children  first  employ  substantives,  and  afterwards 
verbs.  My  son,  at  the  age  of  twenty-three  months 
first  used  an  adjective  to  express  a  judgment,  the  first 
which  he  enunciated  in  his  maternal  tongue  ;  he  said 

Thus  it  would  be  more  just  to  say  that  we  hear  the  sounds  of  nature  through 
the  words  to  which  our  ear  has  been  accustomed  from  infancy  "  (Breal).  I 
have  observed  that  those  who  study  the  spontaneous  formation  of  language 
in  children,  claim  for  them  but  little  onomatopoeism.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
word  created  by  undoubted  onomatopoeia  is  sometimes  by  means  of  associa- 
tion, or  of  strange  analogies,  transferred  successively  to  so  many  objects 
that  all  trace  of  the  transformations  of  meaning  may  be  lost,  and  the  imita- 
tive origin  actually  denied.  Such  was  Darwin's  case,  cited  above,  where  the 
onomatopoeia  of  the  duck  finally  served  to  designate  all  liquids,  all  that 
flies,  all  pieces  of  money.  If  the  successive  extensions  of  the  term  had  not 
been  observed,  who  could  have  recovered  its  origin  ? 
ISayce,  loc.  cit.,  IV.,  §§  3-5. 


SPEECH.  73 

heiss  (hot)  for  'the  milk  is  too  warm.'  Later  on,  the 
proposition  was  made  in  two  words  :  hei?n-mimi,  *  I 
want  to  go  home  and  drink  some  milk'  (Jieim^^hovae, 
mimi^mUk).  Taine  and  others  have  cited  several  ob- 
servations of  the  same  order.  ^ 

According  to  some  authors,  all  language  that  has 
reached  complete  development  has  perforce  passed 
through  the  three  successive  periods  of  monosyllab- 
ism,  polysynthetism,  and  analysis ;  so  that  the  idioms 
that  remain  monosyllabic  or  agglutinative  would  cor- 
respond to  an  arrest  in  development.  To  others,  this 
is  a  hypothesis,  only,  to  be  rejected.  However  this  may 
be  (and  it  is  not  a  question  that  we  need  to  examine), 
it  seems  rash  to  assert,  with  Sayce,  "that  the  division 
of  the  phrase  into  two  parts,  subject  and  predicate,  is 
a  pure  accident,  and  that  if  Aristotle  had  been  Mexi- 
can (the  Aztec  language  was  polysynthetic),  his  sys- 
tem of  logic  would  have  assumed  a  totally  different 
form."  The  appearance  and  evolution  of  analytical 
language  is  not  pure  accident,  but  the  result  of  men- 
tal development.  It  is  impossible  to  pass  from  syn- 
thesis to  analysis  without  dividing,  separating,  and 
arraying  the  isolated  parts  in  a  certain  order.  The 
logic  of  a  Mexican  Aristotle  might  have  differed  from 
our  own  in  its  form ;  but  it  could  not  have  constituted 
itself  without  fracture  of  its  linguistic  mould,  without 
setting  up  a  division,  at  least  in  theory,  between  the 
elements  of  the  discourse.  The  unconscious  activity 
by  which  certain  idioms  made  towards  analysis,  and 
passed  from  the  period  of  envelopment  to  that  of  de- 

IWe  cannot  doubt,  however,  that  there  is  in  the  child  Cand  so  too  for 
primitive  man)  a  period  of  pure  and  simple  denomination,  when,  in  the  face 
of  perceived  objects,  he  utters  a  word,  as  a  spontaneous  action,  a  reflex,  with 
no  understood  affirmation.  But  this  act  is  rather  the  prelude,  and  attempt  at 
speech,  an  advance  towards  language  proper. 


74  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

velopment,  imposed  upon  them  a  successive  order. 
Polysynthetic  languages  have  been  likened  to  the  per- 
formance of  children  who  want  to  say  everything  at 
once,  their  ideas  all  surge  up  together  and  form  a 
conglomeration.^  Evidently  this  method  must  be  given 
up,  or  we  must  renounce  all  serious  progress  in  anal- 
ysis. 

To  sum  up  the  psychological  value  of  the  phrase, 
independently  of  its  multiple  forms,  we  may  conclude 
by  the  following  remarks  of  Max  Muller : 

"We  imagine  that  language  is  impossible  without 
sentences,  and  that  sentences  are  impossible  without 
the  copula.  This  view  is  both  right  and  wrong.  If 
we  mean  by  sentence  an  utterance  consisting  of  sev- 
eral words,  and  a  subject,  and  a  predicate,  and  a  cop- 
ula, it  is  wrong.  .  .  .  When  the  sentence  consists  only 
of  subject  and  predicate,  we  may  say  that  a  copula  is 
understood,  but  the  truth  is  that  at  first  it  was  not  ex- 
pressed, it  was  not  required  to  be  expressed ;  in  prim- 
itive languages  it  was  simply  impossible  to  express  it. 
To  be  able  to  say  vir  est  bonus,  instead  of  vir  bonus,  is 
one  of  the  latest  achievements  of  human  speech."' 

III. 

The  evolution  of  speech,  starting  from  the  proto- 
plasmic state  without  organs  or  functions,  and  acquir- 
ing them  little  by  little,  proceeding  progressively  from 
indefinite  to  definite,  from  fluid  to  fixed  state,  can 
only  be  sketched  in  free  outline.     In  details  it  falls 

1  There  is  in  Iroquois  a  word  that  signifies,  "  I  demand  money  from  those 
.who  have  come  to  buy  garments  from  me."     Esquimaux  is  equally  rich  in 

terms  of  this  sort.  Yet  we  must  recognise  that  these  immense  composite 
words,  themselves  formed  from  abbreviated  and  fused  words,  virtually  imply 
the  beginning  of  decomposition. 

2  Lectures  on  the  Origin  and  Growth  of  Religion,  ed.  1891,  p.  196. 


SPEECH,  75 

within  neither  our  subject  nor  our  cognisance.  But 
the  successive  points  of  this  differentiation,  which 
creates  grammatical  forms,  and  parts  of  discourse, 
are  under  an  objective  form  the  history  of  the  devel- 
opment of  intelligence,  inasmuch  as  it  abstracts,  gen- 
eralises, analyses,  and  tends  towards  an  ever-growing 
precision.  The  completely  developed  languages — 
and  we  are  speaking  only  of  such — bear  throughout 
the  print  of  the  unconscious  labor  that  has  fashioned 
them  for  centuries:  they  are  a  petrified  psychology. 

We  must  return  to  the  roots  or  primitive  terms, 
whatever  may  be  their  nature.  Two  distinct  catego- 
ries are  generally  admitted :  pronominal  or  demon- 
strative roots,  verbal  or  predicative  roots. 

The  first  form  a  small  group  that  properly  indicate 
rather  the  relative  position  of  the  speaker,  than  any 
concrete  quality.  They  are  equivalent  to  here,  there, 
this,  that,  etc.  They  are  few  in  number,  and  very 
simple  in  their  phonetic  relations :  a  vowel  or  vowel 
followed  by  a  consonant.  Many  linguists  refuse  to 
admit  them  as  roots,  and  think  they  have  dropped 
from  the  second  class  by  attenuation  of  meaning.^ 
Possibly  they  are  a  survival  of  gesture  language. 

The  second  (verbal  or  predicative)  is  the  only 
class  that  interests  us.  These  have  swarmed  in  abun- 
dance. They  indicate  qualities  or  actions ;  that  is  the 
important  point.  The  first  words  denominated  attri- 
butes or  modes  of  being ;  they  were  adjectives,  at 
least  in  the  measure  in  which  a  fixed  and  rigid  termi- 
nology can  be  applied  to  states  in  process  of  forming. 
Primitive  man  was  everywhere  struck  with  the  quali- 
ties of  things,  ergo  words  were  all  originally  appella- 

1  Whitney,  The  Life  and  Growth  of  Language,  Chap.  X.     Sayce,  op.  cii., 
VI.,  28,  rejects  them  absolutely. 


76  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

tive.  They  expressed  one  of  the  numerous  character- 
istics of  each  object ;  they  translated  a  spontaneous 
and  natural  abstraction :  another  proof  of  the  pre- 
cocious and  indispensable  nature  of  this  operation. 
From  its  earliest  developments  intelligence  has  tended 
to  simplify,  to  substitute  the  part  for  the  whole.  The 
unconscious  choice  of  one  attribute  among  many  oth- 
ers depends  on  various  causes ;  doubtless  on  its  pre- 
dominance, but  above  all  on  the  interest  it  has  for 
man.  "A  people,"  remarks  Renan,  "have  usually 
many  words  for  what  most  interests  them."  Thus,  in 
ebrew,  we  find  25  synonyms  for  the  observance  of 
the  law;  14  for  faith  in  God;  11  for  rain,  etc.  In 
Arabic,  the  lion  has  500  names,  the  serpent  200, 
money  more  than  80;  the  camel  has  5,744,  the  sword 
1,000  as  befits  a  warrior  race.  The  Lapp  whose  lan- 
guage is  so  poor,  has  more  than  30  words  to  designate 
the  reindeer,  an  animal  indispensable  to  his  life.^ 
These  so-called  synonyms  each  denominate  a  particu- 
lar aspect  of  things ;  they  witness  to  the  abundance 
of  primitive  abstractions. 

This  apparent  wealth  soon  becomes  an  embarrass- 
ment and  an  encumbrance.  Instead  of  100  distinct 
terms,  one  generic  substantive,  plus  one  or  two  epi- 
thets, would  suffice.  But  the  substantive  was  not  born 
of  the  deliberate  desire  to  obviate  this  inconvenience. 
It  is  a  specialisation,  a  limitation  of  the  primitive 
meaning.  Little  by  little  the  adjective  lost  its  qualifi- 
cative  value,  to  become  the  name  of  one  of  the  objects 
qualified.  Thus  in  Sanskrit  deva  (shining)  finally  sig- 
nified the  god;  sourya  (the  dazzling)  became  the  sun; 
akva  (rapid)  the  name  of  a  horse,  etc.  This  meta- 
morphosis of  adjective  into  substantive  by  a  speciali 

1  Renan,  Histoire  giniraU  des  langues  sfniitiques,  pp.  128  and  363. 


SPEECH.  77 

sation  of  the  general  sense  occurs  even  in  our  actual 
languages;  as,  e.  g. ,  when  we  say  in  French  un  bril- 
liant (diamond);  le  volant  {pi  a  machine);  un  bon  (of 
bread,  coimting-house,  bank,  etc.).  What  is  only  an 
accident  now  was  originally  a  constant  process.^  Thus 
the  substantive  was  derived  from  the  primitive  adjec- 
tive ;  or  rather,  within  the  primitive  organism,  adjec- 
tive-substantive, a  division  has  been  produced,  and 
two  grammatical  functions  constituted. 

Many  other  remarks  could  be  made  on  the  deter- 
mination of  the  substantive  by  inflexions,  declensions, 
the  mark  of  the  gender  (masculine,  feminine,  neuter); 
I  shall  confine  myself  to  what  concerns  number,  since 
we  are  proposing  to  consider  numeration  under  all  its 
aspects.  Nothing  appears  more  natural  and  clear-cut 
than  the  distinction  between  one  and  several ;  as  soon 
as  we  exceed  pure  unity,  the  mother  of  numbers,  plu- 
rality appears  to  us  to  be  homogeneous  in  all  its  de- 
grees. It  has  not  been  so  from  the  beginning.  This 
is  proved  by  the  existence  of  the  dual  in  an  enormous 
number  of  languages:  Aryan,  Semitic,  Turanian,  Hot- 
tentot, Australian,  etc.  One,  two,  were  counted  with 
precision  ;  the  rest  was  vague.  According  to  Sayce, 
the  word  <' three"  in  Aryan  language  at  first  signified 
"what  goes  beyond."  It  has  been  supposed  that  the 
dual  was  at  first  applied  to  the  paired  parts  of  the 
body:  the  eyes,  the  arms,  the  legs.  Intellectual  pro- 
gress caused  it  to  fall  into  disuse. 

At  the  close  of  the  period  of  first  formation  which 

1  We  can  see  how  little  the  real  order  of  evolution  resembles  the  theo- 
retical order  of  the  XVIII.  century,  evolved  from  pure  reasoning:  "The  com- 
plex notions  of  substances  were  xh^  first  known,  since  they  came  from  tlu- 
senses,  and  must  therefore  have  been  the  first  to  have  names"  (Condillac;. 
"With  regard  to  adjectives,  the  notion  must  have  developed  with  exceediu^^ 
difficulty,  since  every  adjective  is  an  abstract  term,  and  abstraction  is  a  pain- 
ful, or  unnatural  operation"  (J.  J.  Rousseau). 


78  THE  EVOLUTION  OK  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

we  have  been  considering,  the  sentence  was  only  a 
defaced  organism  reproduced  by  one  of  the  following 
forms:  (i)  that;  (2)  that  shining ;  (3)  that  sun,  that 
shining.^     The  verb  is  still  absent. 

With  it  we  enter  on  the  period  of  secondary  forma- 
tion. It  was  long  held  to  be  an  indisputable  dogma 
that  the  verb  is  the  word  par  excellence  (verbunt),  the 
necessary  and  exclusive  instrument  of  an  affirmation. 
Yet  there  are  many  inferior  idioms  which  dispense 
with  it,  and  express  affirmation  by  crude,  roundabout 
processes,  with  no  precision, — most  frequently  by  a 
juxtaposition:  snow  white  =  the  snow  is  white  ;  drink 
me  wine  =  I  drink  (or  shall  drink)  wine,  etc.  Plenty 
of  examples  can  be  found  in  special  works. 

In  fact,  the  Indo-European  verb  is,  by  origin,  an 
adjective  (or  substantive)  modified  by  a  pronoun: 
Bhardmi=caLXX\ex-me,  I  carry.  It  is  to  be  regretted 
that  we  cannot  follow  the  details  of  this  marvellous 
construction, — the  result  of  unconscious  and  collec- 
tive labor  that  has  made  of  the  verb  a  supple  instru- 
ment, suited  for  all  expressions,  by  the  invention  of 
moods,  voices,  and  tenses.  We  may  note  that,  as  re- 
gards tenses,  the  distinction  between  the  three  parts 
of  duration  (which  seems  to  us  so  simple)  appears  to 
have  been  established  very  slowly.  Doubtless  it  can 
be  asserted  that  it  existed,  actually,  in  the  mind  of 
primitive  man,  but  that  the  imperfection  of  his  verbal 
instrument  failed  in  translating  it.  However  this  may 
be,  it  is  a  moot  point  whether  the  verb,  at  the  outset, 
expressed  past  or  present.  It  seems  at  first  to  have 
translated  a  vague  conception  of  duration,  of  continu- 
ity in  action;  it  was  at  first  "durative,"  a  past  which 
still  continues,  a  past-present.     The  adjective  notion 

1  p.  Regnaud,  Origine  et  philosophic  dit  langage,  p.  317 


SPEECH.  79 

contained  in  the  verb,  indefinitely  as  to  time,  only 
became  precise  by  little  and  little.  The  distinction 
between  the  moments  of  duration  did  not  occur  by 
the  same  process  in  all  languages,  and  in  some,  highly 
developed,  otherwise  like  the  Semitic  languages,  it 
remained  very  imperfect.^ 

The  main  point  was  to  show  how  the  adjective- 
substantive,  modified  by  the  adjunction  of  pronominal 
elements,  constituted  another  linguistic  organ,  and 
losing  its  original  mark  little  by  little,  became  the 
verb  with  its  multiple  functions.  The  qualificatory 
character  fundamental  to  it  makes  of  it  an  instrument 
proper  to  express  all  degrees  of  abstraction  and  gen- 
eralisation from  the  highest  to  the  lowest,  to  run  up 
the  scale  of  lower,  medium,  and  higher  abstractions. 
Ex.,  to  drink,  eat,  sleep,  strike; — higher,  to  love, 
pray,  instruct,  etc. ;  higher  still,  to  act,  exist,  etc.  The 
supreme  degree  of  abstraction,  i,  e.,  the  moment  at 
which  the  verb  is  most  empty  of  all  concrete  sense,  is 
found  in  the  auxiliaries  of  the  modern  analytical  lan- 
guages. These,  says  Max  Miiller,  occupy  the  same 
place  among  the  verbs,  as  abstract  nouns  among  the 
substantives.  They  date  from  a  later  epoch,  and  all 
had  originally  a  more  material  and  more  expressive 
character.  Our  auxiliary  verbs  had  to  traverse  a  long 
series  of  vicissitudes,  before  they  reached  the  desic- 
cated, lifeless  form  that  makes  them  so  appropriate 
to  the  demands  of  our  abstract  prose.  Habere,  which 
is  now  employed  in  all  Roman  languages  to  express 
simply  a  past  time,  at  first  signified  "to  hold  fast," 
"to  retain." 

The  author  continues,  retracing  the  history  of  sev- 

lOn  this  point,  consult  especially  Sayce,  op,  cit.,  II,,  §  9,  and  P.  Regnaud, 
cp,cit.,T^^.  296-299- 


8o  1  liK  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

eral  other  auxiliary  verbs.  Among  them  all  there  is 
one  that  merits  particular  mention  on  account  of  its 
divagations  :  this  is  the  verb  etre,  verb  par  excellence, 
verb  substantive,  unique;  direct  or  understood  expres- 
sion of  the  existence  that  is  everywhere  present.  The 
monopoly  of  affirmation,  and  even  the  privilege  of  an 
immaterial  origin  have  been  attributed  to  it.^  In  the 
first  place,  it  is  not  met  with  under  any  form  in  cer- 
tain languages  which  supplement  its  absence  by  di- 
vers processes.  In  the  second,  it  is  far  from  being 
primitive;  it  is  derived,  according  to  the  idioms,  from 
multiple  and  sufficiently  discordant  elements :  to 
breathe,  live,  grow  (Max  Miiller) ;  to  breathe,  grow, 
remain,  stand  upright  {stare')  (Whitney). 

Hitherto  we  have  examined  only  the  stable,  solid 
parts  of  speech.  There  remain  such  as  are  purely 
transitive,  translating  a  movement  of  thought,  expres- 
sive of  relation.  Before  we  study  these  under  their 
linguistic  form,  it  is  indispensable  to  take  up  the 
standpoint  of  pure  psychology,  and  to  know  in  the 
first  place  what  is  the  nature  of  a  relation.  This  can 
the  less  be  avoided  inasmuch  as  the  question  has 
scarcely  been  treated  of,  save  by  logicians,  or  after 
their  fashion,  and  many  very  complete  treatises  of 
psychology  do  not  bestow  on  it  a  single  word.'^ 

"A  relation,"  says  Herbert  Spencer,  "is  a  state  of 

IThe  word  ttre  is  irreducible,  indecomposable,  primitive,  and  wholly  in- 
tellectual. I  know  no  language  in  which  the  French  word  ttre  is  expressed 
by  a  corresponding  word  representing  a  sensible  idea.  Hence  it  is  not  tru  ; 
that  all  the  roots  of  the  language  are  in  last  resort  signs  of  sensory  ideas." 
(V.  Coubiii,  Histoire  de  la  phil.  au  XlII siicle,  1841,  II.,  p.  274.) 

2 For  the  psychology  of  relation  consult  Herbert  Spencer,  Psychology,  I., 
p.  65,  II.,  pp.,  360  et  seq.;  James,  Psychology,  I.,  pp.,  203  et  seq.  The  latter 
gives  the  history  of  the  subject,  which  is  very  brief,  and  remarks  that  the 
idealogues  form  an  honorable  exception  to  the  general  abstention.  Thn- 
Destutt  de  Tracy  established  a  distinction  between  feelings  of  sensation  aiid 
feelings  of  relation. 


SPEECH.  8l 

consciousness  which  unites  two  other  states  of  con- 
sciousness." Although  a  relation  is  not  always  a  link 
in  the  rigorous  sense,  this  definition  has  the  great  ad- 
vantage of  presenting  it  as  a  reality,  as  a  state  existing 
by  itself,  not  a  zero,  a  naught  of  consciousness.  It 
possesses  intrinsic  characters :  (i)  It  is  indecompos- 
able. There  are  in  consciousness  greater  and  less 
states;  the  greater  (e.  g.,  a  perception)  are  compos- 
ite, hence  accessible  to  analysis ;  they  occupy  an  ap- 
preciable and  measurable  time.  The  lesser  (relation) 
are  naturally  beyond  analysis;  rapid  as  lightning, 
they  appear  to  be  outside  time.  (2)  It  is  dependent. 
Remove  the  two  terms  with  which  it  is  intercalated, 
and  the  relation  vanishes ;  but  it  must  be  noted  that 
the  terms  themselves  presuppose  relations;  for,  ac- 
cording to  Spencer's  just  remark,  "  There  are  neither 
states  of  consciousness  without  relations,  nor  relations 
without  states  of  consciousness."  In  fact:  to  feel  or- 
think  a  relation,  is  to  feel  or  think  a  change. 

But  this  psychical  state  may  be  studied  otherwise 
than  by  internal  observation,  and  the  subsequent  in- 
terpretation. It  lends  itself  to  an  objective  study,  be- 
cause it  is  incarnated  in  certain  words.  When  I  say, 
red  and  green,  red  or  green,  there  are  in  either  case, 
not  two,  but  three  states  of  consciousness;  the  sole 
difference  is  in  the  intermediate  state  which  corres- 
ponds with  an  inclusion  or  an  exclusion.  So,  too,  all 
our  prepositions  and  conjunctions  {_for,  by,  if,  but, 
because)  envelop  a  mental  state,  however  attenuated. 
The  study  of  languages  teaches  us  that  the  expression 
of  relations  is  produced  in  two  ways,  forming,  as  it 
were,  two  chronological  layers. 

The  most  ancient  is  that  of  the  cases  or  declen- 
sions: a  highly  complex  mechanism,  varying  in  marked 


82  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

degree  with  the  idioms,  and  consisting  in  appositions, 
suffixes,  or  modifications  of  the  principal  theme. 

But  these  relations  have  only  acquired  their  proper 
linguistic  organ,  specialised  for  this  function,  by  means 
of  prepositions  and  conjunctions.  They  are  wanting 
in  many  languages;  gesture  being  then  substituted 
for  them.  The  principal  parts  of  the  discourse  are 
solitary,  juxtaposed  without  links  after  the  manner  of 
the  phrases  used  by  children.  Others,  somewhat  less 
poor,  have  only  two  conjunctions:  and,  but.  In  short, 
the  terms  on  which  devolved  the  expression  of  rela- 
tions are  of  late  formation,  as  it  were,  organs  de  luxe. 
In  the  analytical  languages,  prepositions  and  con- 
junctions are  nouns  or  pronouns  diverted  from  their 
primitive  acceptation,  which  have  acquired  a  value 
expressive  of  transition,  condition,  subordination,  co- 
ordination, and  the  rest.  The  psychological  notion 
common  to  the  greater  number,  if  not  to  all,  is  that 
of  a  movement.  "All  relations  expressed  by  preposi- 
tions can  be  referred  to  repose,  and  to  movement  in 
space  and  time,  i.  e.,  to  those  with  which  the  locative, 
accusative  (movement  of  approximation)  and  ablative 
(movement  of  departure)  correspond  in  declension."^ 
It  may  be  admitted  that  this  consciousness  of  move- 
ment, of  change,  which  is  no  more,  fundamentally,  than 
the  sense  of  different  directions  of  thought,  belongs 
less  to  the  category  of  clear  notions  than  to  that  of 
subconscious  states,  of  tendencies,  of  actions,  which 
explains  why  the  terms  of  relation  are  wholly  wanting, 
or  rare,  and  only  conquered  their  autonomy  at  a  late 
period. 

With  these,  the  progressive  work  of  differentiation 
is  accomplished.    Discourse  has  now  its  materials  and 

1  Regnaud,  op.  cit.,  pp.  304  et  seq. 


SPEECH.  83 

its  cement ;  it  is  capable  of  complex  phrases  wherein 
all  is  referred  and  subordinated  to  a  principal  state, 
contrary  to  those  ruder  essays  which  could  only  attain 
to  simple  phrases,  denuded  of  connective  apparatus. 

We  have  rapidly  sketched  this  labor  of  organo- 
genesis, by  which  language  has  passed  from  the  amor- 
phous state  to  the  progressive  constitution  of  special- 
ised terms  and  grammatical  functions :  an  evolution 
wholly  comparable  with  that  which,  in  living  bodies, 
starts  from  the  fecundated  ovule,  to  attain  by  division 
of  labor  among  the  higher  species  to  a  fixed  adjust- 
ment of  organs  and  functions.  "Languages  are  nat- 
ural organisms,  which,  without  being  independent  of 
human  volition,  are  born,  grow,  age,  and  die,  accord- 
ing to  determined  laws."  (Schleicher.)  They  are  in 
a  state  of  continuous  renovation,  of  acquisition,  and 
of  loss.  In  civilised  languages,  this  incessant  meta- 
morphosis is  partially  checked  by  enforced  instruc- 
tion, by  tradition,  and  respect  for  the  great  literary 
works.  In  savage  idioms  where  these  coercive  meas- 
ures are  lacking,  the  transformation  at  times  occurs 
with  such  rapidity  that  they  become  unrecognisable 
at  the  end  of  a  few  generations. 

Spoken  language,  as  a  psycho-physiological  mech- 
anism, is  regulated  in  its  evolution  by  physiological 
and  psychological  laws. 

Among  the  former  (with  which  we  are  not  con- 
cerned), the  principal  is  the  law  of  phonetic  altera- 
tion, consisting  in  the  displacement  of  an  articulation 
in  a  determined  direction.  It  is  dependent  on  the 
vocal  organ ;  thus,  after  the  Germanic  invasion,  the 
Latin  which  this  people  spoke  fell  again  under  the 
power  of  physiological  influences  which  modified  it 
profoundly. 


1 


^W^ 


84  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

Among  the  latter,  the  principal  is  the  law  of  analr 
-^6u*^^>^ogy,  the  great  artisan  in  the  extension  of  languages. 
I  It  is  a  law  of  economy,  the  basis  of  which  is  general- 

isation, the  faculty  of  seizing  on  real  or  supposed  re- 
semblances. The  word  remains  invariable,  but  the 
mind  gives  it  different  applications  :  it  is  a  mask  cov- 
ering in  turn  several  faces.  It  suffices  to  open  a  dic- 
tionary to  see  how  ingenious  and  perilous  is  this  un- 
conscious labor.  Such  a  word  has  only  a  few  lines  ; 
it  has  no  brilliant  record.  Such  another  fills  pages  ; 
first  we  see  it  in  its  primitive  sense  ;  then — from  anal- 
ogy to  analogy — from  accident  to  accident — it  departs 
from  it  more  and  more,  and  ends  by  having  quite  a 
contrary  meaning.^  Hence  it  has  been  said  that  "the 
object  of  a  true  etymology  is  to  discover  the  laws  that 
have  regulated  the  evolution  of  thought."  Among 
primitive  people,  the  process  that  entails  such  devia- 
tions from  the  primitive  sense,  is  sometimes  of  strik- 
ing absurdity ;  or  at  least  appears  to  us  as  such  by 
reason  of  the  strange  analogies  that  serve  the  exten- 
sion of  the  word.  Thus :  certain  Australian  tribes 
gave  the  names  of  mussels  {inuyi4vi),  to  books  because 
they  open  and  close  like  shell-fish ;  and  many  other 
no  less  singular  facts  could  be  cited.  Much  more 
might  be  said  as  to  the  role  of  analogy,  but  we  must 
adhere  to  our  subject. 

In  conclusion  :  it  is  to  be  regretted  that  linguistic 
psychology  attracts  so  few  people,  and  that  many  re- 
cent treatises  on  psychology,  excellent  on  all  other 
points,  do  not  devote  a  single  line  to  language.  Yet 
this  study,  especially  if  comparative,  from  the  lowest 
to   the  most  subtle   forms,   would  throw  at  least  as 

lit  is  superfluous  to  give  examples  of  such  a  well-known  fact.    See  Dar- 
mesteter,  The  Life  of  Words. 


SPEECH.  85 

much  light  on  the  mechanism  of  the  intelligence  as 
other  highly  accredited  processes.  Physiological  psy- 
chology is  much  in  vogue,  since  it  is  rightly  concluded 
that  if  the  facts  of  biology,  normal  and  morbid,  are 
being  studied  by  naturalists  and  physicians,  they  are 
available  to  psychologists  also,  under  another  aspect. 
So  too  for  languages:  comparative  philology  has  its 
own  aim,  psychology  another,  proper  to  it.  It  is  in- 
credible that  any  one  who,  with  sufficient  linguistic 
equipment,  should  devote  himself  to  the  task,  would 
fail  to  find  adequate  return  for  his  labors. 


CHAPTER  III. 

INTERMEDIATE  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION, 

HAVING  thus  acquainted  ourselves  with  this  new 
factor — speech — which  as  an  instrument  of  ab- 
straction becomes  steadily  more  and  more  important, 
we  can  take  up  our  subject  from  the  point  at  which 
we  left  it.  In  passing  from  the  absence  to  the  presence 
of  the  word,  from  the  lower  to  the  intermediate  forms 
of  abstraction,  we  must  again  insist  on  our  principal 
aim  :  viz.,  to  prove  that  abstraction  and  generalisa- 
tion are  functions  of  the  completely  evolved  mind. 
They  exist  in  embryo  in  perception,  and  in  the  image, 
and  at  their  extreme  limit  involve  suppression  of  all 
concrete  representation.  This  conclusion  will  hardly 
be  contradicted.  The  difficulty  is  to  follow  the  evo- 
lution step  by  step,  stage  after  stage,  and  to  note  the 
difference  by  objective  marks. 

For  intermediate  abstraction,  this  operation  is  very 
simple.  It  implies  the  use  of  words  ;  it  has  passed 
the  level  of  prelinguistic  abstraction  and  generalisa- 
tion. We  may  go  farther,  and — always  ivith  the  aid 
of  words — establish  two  classes  within  the  total  cate- 
gory of  mean  abstraction  : 

I.  The  lower  forms,  bordering  on  generic  images, 
whose  objective  mark  is  the  feeble  participation  of  the 


INTERMEDIATE  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  87 

word  :  it  can  indeed  be  altogether  foregone,  and  is 
only  in  the  least  degree  an  instrument  of  substitution. 

2.  The  higher  forms,  approximating  to  the  class 
of  pure  concepts,  and  having  as  their  objective  mark 
the  fact  that  words  are  indispensable,  since  these  have 
now  become  an  instrument  of  substitution,  though 
still  accompanied  by  some  sensory  representation. 

The  legitimacy  of  this  division  can  be  justified 
only  by  a  detailed  comparison  of  the  two  classes. 


Before  giving  examples  that  determine  the  nature 
and  intellectual  trend  of  the  lower  forms,  a  theoretical 
question  presents  itself  which  cannot  be  eluded,  albeit 
any  profound  discussion  of  it  belongs  to  the  theory  of 
cognition  rather  than  to  psychology.  It  is  as  follows : 
Is  the  difference  between  generic  images  and  the 
lowest  concepts,  one  of  nature  or  of  degree?  This 
question  has  sometimes  been  propounded  in  a  less 
general  and  more  concrete  form ;  Is  there  any  radical 
difference,  any  impassable  gulf  between  animal  intelli- 
gence^ in  its  higher,  and  human  intelligence  in  its 
lower  aspects?  Some  authors  give  an  absolute  nega- 
tion, others  admit  community  of  nature,  and  of  transi- 
tional forms. 

I  shall  first  reject  as  inadmissible  the  argument 
that  identifies  abstraction  with  the  use  of  words. 
Taine  seems  at  times  to  admit  this  :  "We  think,"  he 
says,  "the  abstract  characters  of  things  by  means  of 
the  abstract  names  that  are  our  abstract  ideas,  and 
the  formation  of  our  ideas  is  no  more  than  the  forma- 

1  Intelligence  is  taken  here  in  its  restricted  sense,  as  the  synonym  of  ab- 
stracting, generalising,  judging,  reasoning. 


^ 


88  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

tion  of  names  which  are  substitutes."^  Clearly  if  ab- 
straction is  impossible  without  words,  this  operation 
could  only  begin  with  speech.  All  that  was  said  above 
(Chap.  I)  proves  the  inanity  of  such  an  assertion. 

Let  us,  in  order  to  discuss  the  question  profitably, 
sum  up  the  principal  characteristics  of  generic  images 
on  the  one  hand,  of  inferior  concepts  on  the  other. 

Generic  images  are  :  (i)  simple  and  of  the  practical 
order;  (2)  the  result  of  often-repeated  experiences; 
(3)  extracts  from  very  salient  resemblances ;  (4)  a 
condensation  into  a  visual,  auditory,  tactile,  or  olfac- 
tory representation.  They  are  the  fruit  of  passive  as 
similation. 

The  inferior  concepts  most  akin  to  them,  which 
we  are  studying  in  the  present  instance,  are  in  char- 
acter :  (i)  less  simple  ;  (2)  less  frequently  repeated  in 
experience ;  (3)  they  assume  as  material,  similarities 
mingled  with  sufificiently  numerous  differences ;  (4) 
they  are  fixed  by  a  word.  They  are  the  fruit  of  active 
assimilation. 

It  may  be  said  that  the  two  classes,  when  thus  op- 
posed to  each  other,  present  but  minimal  differences, 
save  for  the  addition  of  words.-  For  the  moment,  in- 
deed, the  word  is  only  an  instrument  handled  by  a 
bad  workman,  who  ignores  its  efficacy  and  highest 
significance,  as  will  be  proved  below.  But  were  it 
otherwise,  and  were  the  delimitation  between  the  two 
classes  in  no  way  fluctuating,  the  thesis  of  a  progres- 
sive evolution  must  needs  be  given  up,  unless  it  be 
admitted  to  begin  only  with  the  appearance  of  speech. ^ 


\DtV intelligence,  VoL  I.,  Bk.  IV.,  Chap.  I.,  p.  254,  first  edition. 
i  De  I ''intelligence,  I.,  Bk.  iv.,  chap,  i,  p.  254,  first  ed. 


INTERMEDIATE  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  8g 

Romanes  describes  the  passage  from  the  generic 
image  to  the  concept  as  follows  : 

"Water-fowl  adopt  a  somewhat  different  mode  of 
alighting  upon  land,  or  even  upon  ice,  from  that  which 
they  adopt  when  alighting  upon  water;  and  those 
kinds  which  dive  from  a  height  (such  as  terns  and 
gannets)  never  do  so  upon  land  or  ice.  These  facts 
prove  that  these  animals  have  one  recept  answering 
to  a  solid  substance,  and  another  answering  to  a  fluid. 
Similarly  a  man  will  not  dive  from  a  height  over  hard 
ground,  or  over  ice,  nor  will  he  jump  into  water  in 
the  same  way  as  he  jumps  upon  land.  In  other  words, 
like  the  water-fowl,  he  has  two  distinct  recepts,  one 
of  which  answers  to  solid  ground,  and  the  other  to  an 
unresisting  fluid.  But  unlike  the  water-fowl,  he  is 
able  to  bestow  upon  each  of  these  recepts  a  name, 
and  thus  to  raise  them  both  to  the  level  of  concepts. 
So  far  as  the  practical  purposes  of  locomotion  are 
concerned,  it  is,  of  course,  immaterial  whether  or  not 
he  thus  raises  his  recepts  into  concepts ;  but,  as  we 
have  seen,  for  many  other  purposes  it  is  of  the  high- 
est importance  that  he  is  able  to  do  this.  Now,  in 
order  to  do  it,  he  must  be  able  to  set  his  recept  before 
his  own  mind  as  an  object  of  his  own  thought :  before 
he  can  bestow  upon  these  generic  ideas  the  names  of 
"solid"  and  "fluid,"  he  must  have  cognised  them  as 
ideas.  Prior  to  this  act  of  cognition,  these  ideas  dif- 
fered in  no  respect  from  the  recepts  of  a  water-fowl ; 
neither  for  the  requirements  of  his  locomotion  is  it 
needful  that  they  should :  therefore,  in  so  far  as  these 
requirements  are  concerned,  the  man  makes  no  call 
upon  his  higher  faculties  of  ideation.  But,  in  virtue 
of  this  act  of  cognition  whereby  he  assigns  a  name  to 
an  idea  known  as  such,  he  has  created  for  himself — 


go  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

and  for  purposes  other  than  locomotion — a  priceless 
possession  ;  he  has  formed  a  concept."^ 

In  point  of  fact,  the  transition  is  not  so  simple. 
Romanes  omits  the  intermediate  stages  :  for  with  fluid 
and  liquid  we  penetrate  into  a  more  elevated  order  of 
concepts  than  those  immediately  bordering  on  the 
generic  image.  What  he  well  brings  out  is  that  the 
bare  introduction  of  words  does  not  explain  every- 
thing. It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  if  the  higher  de- 
velopment of  the  intelligence  depends  upon  the  higher 
development  of  abstraction,  which  itself  depends  upon 
the  development  of  speech,  this  last  is  conditioned, 
not  simply  by  the  faculty  of  articulation,  which  exists 
among  many  animals,  but  by  anterior  cerebral  condi- 
tions that  have  to  be  sought  out. 

For  these,  we  must  return  to  the  distinction 
loosely  established  above,  between  passive  and  active 
assimilation.  We  know  that  the  fundamental  mech- 
anism of  cognition  may  be  reduced  to  two  antagonistic 
processes,  association  and  dissociation,  assimilation 
and  dissimilation  ;  to  combine,  to  separate ;  in  brief, 
analysis  and  synthesis. ^  In  the  formation  of  the  gen- 
eric image,  as  we  have  seen,  assimilation  plays  the 
principal  part ;  the  mind  works  only  upon  similarities. 
In  proportion  as  we  recede  from  this  point,  we  have 
the  contrary ;  the  mind  works  more  and  more  upon 
differences ;  the  primitive  and  essential  operation  is  a 
dissociation ;  the  fusion  of  similarities  only  appears 
later.  The  further  back  we  go,  the  more  analysis 
preponderates,  because  we  are  pursuing  resemblances 

1  Mental  Evolution  in  Man,  pp.  74  and  75. 

2  As  Paulhan  remarks,  "  Labstraction  et  les  id6es  abstraites"  (Revue 
Philosophitjue,  Jan.,  1889,  p.  26  et  scq.),  these  two  processes  are  initially  linked 
one  with  the  other,  so  that  we  find  analytical  syntheses,  and  synthetical  anal- 
yses. 


INTERMEDIATE  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  91 

more  and  more  hidden  by  differences.  Coarser  minds 
do  not  rise  above  palpable  similarities.  The  peasant 
who  hears  a  dialect  or  patois  closely  akin  to  his  own 
understands  nothing  of  it ;  it  is  another  language  to 
him ;  whereas  even  a  mediocre  linguist  immediately 
perceives  the  identity  of  words  that  differ  only  in  ac- 
cent. 

We  may  represent  the  differences  between  generic 
images,  and  these  general  notions  that  most  nearly 
approximate  to  them,  by  the  following  symbol : 

I.  ABCde  II.  Abcde 

ABCef  xyzAf 

ABCgh,  etc.  gAhktn,  etc. 

where  each  line  corresponds  to  an  object,  and  each 
letter  to  one  of  the  principal  characters  of  the  object. 
Table  I  is  that  of  the  generic  image.  A  part,  ABC, 
is  constantly  repeated  in  each  experience  ;  moreover, 
it  is  in  relief,  as  indicated  by  the  capitals;  the  elimi- 
nation of  differences  is  almost  passive, — self-caused  ; 
they  are  forgotten. 

Table  II  is  that  of  a  fairly  simple  general  notion. 
Here  A  has  to  be  disengaged  from  all  the  objects  in 
which  it  is  included.  It  still  has  a  salient  character, 
indicated  by  capitals,  and  recurring  in  each  object; 
but  as  it  is  merged  in  the  differences,  as  it  represents 
but  a  poor  fraction  of  the  total  event,  it  is  not  disen- 
gaged spontaneously;  it  exacts  a  preliminary  labor  of 
dissociation  and  elimination. 

Thus  understood,  the  difference  between  the  two 
processes  consists  only  in  the  faculty  of  greater  or 
less  dissociation,  and  we  are  in  no  way  authorised  in 
assuming  a  difference  of  nature. 

But  the  question  may  be  propounded  in  a  different 


92  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

manner, — more  precise  and  more  embarrassing.  I 
formulate  it  thus:  the  generic  image  is  never,  the 
concept  is  always  a  judgment.  We  know  that  for 
logicians  (formerly  at  any  rate)  the  concept  is  the 
simple  and  primitive  element ;  next  comes  the  judg- 
ment, uniting  two  or  several  concepts;  then  ratiocina 
tion,  combining  two  or  several  judgments.  For  the 
psychologist,  on  the  contrary,  affirmation  is  the  fun- 
damental act ;  the  concept  is  the  result  of  judgments 
(explicit  or  implicit),  of  similarities  with  exclusion  of 
differences.  If  in  addition  to  this  we  recall  what  was 
said  above:  that  speech  commences  with  phrases 
only,  that  in  its  simplest  form  it  is  the  word-phrase ; 
then  the  debated  question  may  be  thus  transformed  : 
Is  there,  between  the  generic  image  and  judgment  in 
its  lower  forms,  a  break  in  continuity,  or  a  passage  by 
slow  transformation? 

For  the  partisans  of  the  first  theory,  the  appear- 
ance of  judgment  is  a  "passage  of  the  Rubicon" 
(Max  Miiller).  It  is  as  impossible  to  deny  this  as  to 
affirm  it  positively  and  indisputably.  Romanes,  who 
makes  a  stand  against  the  "passage  of  the  Rubicon," 
admits  the  following  stages  in  the  development  of 
signs,  taken  as  indicative  of  the  development  of  intel- 
ligence itself. 

1.  The  indicative  sign;  gesture  or  pronominal 
root ;  a  dog  barking  for  a  door  to  be  opened,  etc. 

2.  The  denotative  sign  which  is  affixed  to  particu- 
lar objects,  qualities,  or  actions;  for  example,  the 
parrot  which  on  seeing  a  person  utters  the  name  of 
the  person,  or  some  word  which  it  has  associated  with 
him,  and  which  for  the  animal  has  become  the  dis- 
tinctive mark  of  the  person. 

3.  The    connotative   or   attributive   sign,   which, 


INTERMEDIATE  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  93 

rightly  or  wrongly,  is  attributed  to  an  entire  class  of 
objects  having  a  common  quality;  for  instance,  the 
child  which  applies  the  word  star  to  everything  that 
shines. 

4.  The  denominative  sign  ;  or  the  intentional  em- 
ployment of  the  sign  as  such,  with  a  full  appreciation 
of  its  value ;  for  example,  the  word  star  in  its  meaning 
to  the  astronomer, 

5.  The  predicative  sign,  or  a  proposition  formed 
by  the  apposition  of  two  denominative  signs. ^ 

This  hierarchical  order,  while  in  some  measure 
open  to  criticism,  indicates  at  least  schematically  the 
progressive  passage  from  the  concrete  to  the  higher 
abstractions,  and  may  therefore  be  accepted. 

It  is  clear  that  the  two  first  stages  scarcely  pass 
beyond  the  concrete. 

To  the  third,  Romanes  attaches  capital  importance: 
judgment  begins  with  it.  It  may,  however,  be  asked 
if  afifirmation  really  exists  at  this  stage.  For  my  own 
part  I  am  inclined  to  admit  it  as  included  in  the  gen- 
eric image  in  its  highest  degree  (for  here  too  there 
are  degrees),  under  the  form  not  of  a  proposition,  but 
of  an  action.  The  hunting  dog  assuredly  possesses 
generic  images  of  man  and  of  different  kinds  of  game, 
under  the  visual  and  more  especially  the  olfactory 
form.  When  it  starts  off  on  the  scent  of  its  master, 
of  a  hare,  or  of  a  partridge,  this  is  surely  a  judgment 
of  a  certain  kind,  an  affirmation,  the  least  doubtful  of 
all,  seeing  that  it  is  an  act.  The  absence  of  verbal 
expression  and  of  logical  information  in  no  way  alters 
the  fundamental  nature  of  the  mental  state.  We  have 
already  (Chap.  I.)  spoken  of  /ra;(r//Vdf/ judgments  and 
ratiocinations ;  it  is  needless  to  reiterate. 

10/.  «•/.,  VIII.,  158-165.  ^ 


94  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

The  transition  from  the  third  to  the  fourth  stage 
is  even  more  important.  It  is  here  that  the  true  con- 
cept appears;  this  point  attained,  an  almost  unlimited 
progress  is  possible.  Now  the  true  cause  of  the  true 
-concept  is  reflexion.  This  formula  appears  to  us  the 
simplest,  the  briefest,  the  most  clear,  and  the  most 
exact.  There  is  the  possibility  of  concepts  where  there 
is  the  possibility  in  the  mind  of  detaching  a  single 
character  (or  several),  extracted  from  among  many 
others,  of  setting  it  up  as  an  independent  entity,  of 
raising  it  into  a  known  object,  i.  e.,  determined  in  its 
relations  with  ourselves,  and  with  other  things.  Ex- 
ample :  to  form  the  general  idea  of  a  vertebrate.  But 
this  fundamental  act — reflexion — is  not  without  an- 
tecedents, it  does  not  spring  forth  as  a  new  apparition. 
It  is  the  highest  degree  of  attention,  i.  e.,  of  a  mental 
attitude  that  we  encounter  very  low  down  in  the  ani- 
mal scale. 

Discontinuity  of  evolution,  in  the  passage  from 
lower  to  higher,  is  thus  far  from  being  established. 
Doubtless  this,  like  all  other  questions  of  genesis, 
leaves  much  to  hypothesis,  and  can  only  be  decided 
on  probabilities :  yet  these  do  not  appear  to  favor  a 
rupture  in  continuity,  and  opposition  of  nature. 

In  sum — to  confine  ourselves  to  what  is  least  con- 
testable :  given  the  cerebral  and  psychological  condi- 
tions for  speech  (not  for  articulate  language  alone), 
and  application  of  words  to  qualities  and  attributes 
raised  little  by  little  into  independent  entities, — and 
the  decisive  step  has  been  taken.  Such  is  intellectual 
progress,  and  we  may  remark  in  passing  that  the  pro- 
cess which  creates  the  true  concept,  leads  fatally  by 
the  same  issue  to  faith  in  idols,  in  the  entities  real- 
ised. 


INTERMEDIATE  FOKMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  95 

Without  for  the  moment  pausing  at  this  last  point, 
let  us  under  a  more  positive  form,  and  strictly  on  the 
lines  of  experimental  psychology,  examine  the  nature 
of  the  lower  forms  of  intermediate  abstraction,  deter- 
mining it  by  examples.  At  the  same  time  we  shall  fix 
the  intellectual  level  that  corresponds  to  the  moment 
of  transition  between  generic  images  (animal  form), 
and  the  higher  abstracts  which  have  still  to  be  studied 
in  detail.  The  best  method  is  to  take  as  a  type  such 
human  races  as  have  remained  in  the  savage  or  half- 
civilised  state  :  these  are  more  instructive  than  child- 
hood, because  they  represent  fixed  and  permanent 
conditions.  We  can  draw  on  two  principal  sources  : 
their  languages,  and  their  systems  of  numeration. 
Their  religious  beliefs  might  also  be  studied,  with  the 
same  results,  but  this  would  take  too  long,  and  would 
moreover  be  less  definite.^ 

I.  The  languages,  considered  under  their  most  gen- 
eral characteristics,  reveal  a  notable  impotence  for 
transcending  the  simplest  resemblances,  an  incurable 
incapacity  for  extended  generalisations ;  they  hardly 
rise  above  the  concrete.  Words  play  a  very  indistinct 
part ;  they  are  the  most  incomplete  substitute — hardly 
more  than  a  mark,  a  sign,  like  gestures — differing 
from  the  latter  only  in  the  future  they  carry  within 
them.  The  study  of  the  ascending  progress  of  gener- 
alisation is  in  effect  the  study  of  the  successive  phases 
of  the  emancipation  of  speech  up  to  the  time  when  it 

1  We  have  touched  on  this  subject  incidentally  in  La  psychologie  des  senti- 
menis  {Part  II,  IX,  §  2,  pp.  305  et  seq.).  Many  tribes  do  not  get  beyond  poly- 
demonism,  peopling  the  universe  with  innumerable  genii ;  this  is  the  reign 
of  the  concrete.  A  certain  progress  is  marked  by  subordinating  the  genius 
of  each  tree  to  the  god  of  the  forest,  the  different  genii  of  a  river  to  the  god 
of  the  river,  etc.  At  a  degree  higher,  the  intellect  constitutes  a  single  god 
for  water,  one  for  fire,  one  for  the  earth,  etc.  Thus  there  come  to  be  genii  of 
individual,  specific,  and  generic  origin. 


\ 


g6  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

becomes  preponderant  and  dominating.  At  the  actual 
stage,  which  might  be  termed  concrete-abstract,  it  is 
not  yet  emancipated;   it  is  a  minor,  under  tutelage. 

Let  us  take  in  turn  substantives,  adjectives,  and 
verbs. 

The  indigenes  of  Hawaii,  says  Max  Miiller  (^Lectures 
on  the  Science  of  Language,  Second  Series,  II.,  p.  19), 
have  but  one  word,  "aloba,"  to  express  love,  friend- 
ship, esteem,  gratitude,  benevolence,  etc.;  on  the 
other  hand,  words  to  express  variations  in  the  direc- 
tion of  the  force  of  the  wind  are  very  numerous,  prov- 
ing once  more  how  at  its  origin  abstraction  or  dis- 
sociation is  governed  by  practical  causes.  In  savage 
languages  there  are  terms  to  express  not  merely  each 
species  of  dog,  but  their  age,  the  color  of  their  hair, 
good  or  bad  qualities,  etc.  So,  too,  for  the  horse ; 
there  are  special  words  to  designate  its  varieties,  and 
all  its  movements ;  to  indicate  if  it  is  mounted,  not 
mounted,  frightened,  running  away,  and  the  like.  The 
North  American  Indians  have  special  words  for  the 
black  oak,  the  white  oak,  and  the  red  oak,  but  none 
for  the  oak  in  general,' — still  less  for  tree  in  general. 
The  indigenes  of  Brazil  can  point  out  the  different 
parts  of  the  body,  but  not  the  body  as  a  whole  (Lub- 
bock). Among  several  tribes  of  Oceania,  a  special 
word  is  employed  for  the  tail  of  a  dog,  another  for 
the  sheep's  tail,  and  so  on,  but  they  have  no  designa- 
tion for  tail  in  general.  Again,  there  is  no  common 
term  for  the  cow,  but  there  are  distinct  words  for  red, 
white,  or  brown  cows  (Sayce). 

There  are,  however,  cases  of  very  clear  progress 
in  generalisation ;  the  significance  of  a  word  extends 
itself;  from  specific  it  becomes  generic.  This  meta- 
morphosis exists  in  vivo  among  the  Finns  and  Lap- 


INTERMEDIATE  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  97 

landers.  The  former  have  a  name  for  the  smallest 
stream,  and  none  for  river;  originally  again  there  was 
a  term  for  each  finger,  none  for  finger  in  general ;  but 
latterly  the  term  used  for  thumb  alone  has  come  to 
designate  the  fingers  collectively.  Among  the  second 
race,  certain  tribes  who  had  a  special  denomination 
for  each  kind  of  bay,  have  now  adopted  one  that 
serves  for  all  kinds  (Max  Miiller). 

The  same  holds  good  of  the  poverty  of  the  ad- 
jective, the  abstract  term  proper.  The  case  of  the 
Tasmanians  has  often  been  quoted,  how  they  could 
only  express  qualities  by  concrete  representations : 
hard  =  like  a  stone;  long  =  legs;  round  =  like  a  ball, 
like  the  moon,  etc.  (Lubbock).  A  less  familiar  case, 
termed  by  linguists  "concretism,"  is  met  with  even 
in  certain  more  developed  idioms,  like  a  survival  of 
the  time  when  the  mind  was  unable  to  detach  itself 
from  the  concrete,  or  to  forego  a  complete  and  de- 
tailed qualification.  Instead  of  saying  ten  merchants, 
five  hens,  the  idiom  is  merchants  ten  men,  hens  five 
birds,  and  so  on  for  similar  cases. 

The  verb  is  able  to  express  all  degrees  of  abstrac- 
tion and  of  generalisation  as  well  as  the  adjective  and 
substantive.  At  this  period,  it  exactly  repeats  the 
type  (as  described  above)  of  the  substantive  with  its 
burdensome  multiplicity, — for  want  of  a  generalisa- 
tion simple  enough,  according  to  our  judgment.  The 
North  American  Indians  have  special  words  for  say- 
ing :  to  wash  one's  face,  another  person's  face,  the 
linen,  utensils,  etc. :  in  all,  thirty  words,  but  none  for 
washing  in  general.  So,  too,  for  eating  bread,  fruits, 
meat,  etc.,  striking  with  the  hand,  foot,  axe,  etc.,  for 
cutting  wood,  meat,  or  any  other  objects:  for  all  these 
there  are  special  terms,  but  none  for  saying  simply, 


gS  THE  EVOLUTION  OK  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

to  eat,  to  knock,  to  cut  (Sayce,  Hovelacque.)  On  the 
Other  hand,  we  note  a  case  of  transition,  analogous  to 
that  of  the  Lapps  and  Finlanders.  Certain  tribes  in 
Brazil  have  a  few  verbs  of  general,  simple  significance: 
eat,  drink,  dance,  see,  etc.,  even  love,  thank,  etc. 
(Lubbock). 

We  need  not  multiply  examples  ;  these  will  suffice 
to  throw  into  relief  the  extreme  impotence  in  general- 
ising, so  soon  as  the  mind  loses  its  hold  on  the  con- 
crete. We  might  also  recall  the  difficulty  so  often 
experienced  by  missionaries.  They  find  it  almost  im- 
possible, even  by  creating  new  words,  or  by  changing 
the  meaning  of  others,  to  translate  the  sacred  books 
into  these  idioms,  from  their  paucity  of  concrete 
terms. 

2.  The  numeration,  taking  its  development  as  a 
whole,  appears  to  sub-divide  into  three  principal  pe- 
riods :  concrete  numeration,  as  studied  above,  in  ani- 
mals and  children  ;  concrete-abstract  numeration,  with 
which  we  are  now  occupied ;  purely  abstract  numera- 
tion, which  we  shall  examine  later,  as  translated  into 
organised  arithmetic. 

We  have  seen  that  speech  at  its  origin  was  so 
humble  as  to  need  gesture  to  complete  and  to  eluci- 
date it.  During  its  concrete-abstract  period,  nume- 
ration is  in  an  analogous  position.  At  first  its  exten- 
sion is  very  limited  :  it  progresses  slowly  and  painfully 
from  unity.  Further,  it  can  operate  only  when  sus- 
tained by  the  concrete ;  it  must  have  a  material  ac- 
companiment. Counting  is  accomplished  by  the  enun- 
ciation of  words,  with  the  aid  of  enumerated  objects, 
as  perceived  at  the  same  time,  or  with  that  of  the  fin- 
gers :  which,  let  it  be  remarked,  is  the  first  essay  in 


INTERMEDIATE  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  99 

substitution.  There  is  simultaneously  concrete  or 
digital,  and  verbal  numeration.^ 

We  know  that  many  Australian  and  South  Ameri- 
can tribes  can  count  verbally  to  two  only ;  some  say 
two  one  =  three  ;  two- two  =  four;  others  by  the  same 
process  arrive  at  six  (two-three  :==  five,  three-three  = 
six):  everything  else  is  "much."  For  the  most  part 
they  count  without  words,  with  the  aid  of  fingers  or 
of  articulation  ;  even  when  they  employ  words,  the 
two  numerations — digital  and  verbal — are  performed 
simultaneously.* 

This  manner  of  counting  is  in  first  degree  concrete; 
the  concrete-abstract  form  is  only  there  in  embryo.  A 
great  advance,  made  early  enough  in  many  tribes, 
consisted  in  counting  by  five,  taking  the  hand  (^five 
fingers)  as  a  new  unit,  superior  to  the  simple  unit. 

I TyloT,  Primitive  Culture,  I.,  gives  abundant  data  on  this  question.  Chap. 
VII.  is  entirely  devoted  to  it. 

2  In  the  account  of  his  travels  among  the  Damaras  (in  his  Tropical  South 
Africa,  p.  133)  Galton  says  :  "In  practice,  whatever  they  may  possess  in  their 
language,  they  certainly  use  no  numeral  greater  than  three.  When  they  wish 
to  express  four,  they  take  to  their  fingers,  which  are  to  them  as  formidable 
instruments  of  calculation  as  a  sliding-rule  is  to  our  English  schoolboy.  They 
puzzle  very  much  after  five,  because  no  spare  hand  remains  to  grasp  and 
secure  the  fingers  that  are  required  for  '  units,' — yet  they  seldom  lose  oxen: 
the  way  in  which  they  discover  the  loss  of  one,  is  not  by  the  number  of  the 
herd  being  diminished,  but  by  the  absence  of  a  face  they  know."  [This  tal- 
lies with  what  we  said  above,  Chap.  I.,  as  to  so-called  numeration  in  animals 
and  children.]  "When  bartering  is  going  on,  each  sheep  must  be  paid  for 
separately.  Thus  suppose  two  sticks  of  tobacco  to  be  the  rate  of  exchange 
for  one  sheep,  it  would  sorely  puzzle  a  Damara  to  take  two  sheep  and  give 
him  four  sticks.  I  have  done  so  and  seen  a  man  first  put  two  of  the  sticks 
apart  and  take  a  sight  over  them  at  one  of  the  sheep  he  was  about  to  sell. 
Having  satisfied  himself  that  one  was  honestly  paid  for,  and  finding  to  his 
surprise  that  exactly  two  sticks  remained  in  hand  to  settle  the  account  for 
the  other  sheep,  he  would  be  afflicted  with  doubts;  the  transaction  seemed 
to  come  out  too  pat  to  be  correct,  and  he  would  refer  back  to  the  first  couple 
of  sticks,  and  then  his  mind  got  hazy  and  confused,  and  wandered  from  one 
sheep  to  the  other,  and  he  broke  off  the  transaction  until  two  sticks  were  put 
into  his  hand  and  one  sheep  driven  away,  and  then  the  other  two  sticks  given 
him  and  the  second  sheep  driven  away."  Galton  relates  many  other  similar 
tacts  which  he  had  himself  witnessed. 


lOO  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

Then:  one  hand  =  5;  two  hands  or  half  a  man  =  10; 
two  hands,  one  foot  =  15;  two  hands,  two  feet,  or  a 
man  =  20.  Such  is  the  evident  origin  of  the  quinary, 
decimal,  and  vigesimal  numerations.  Sometimes  fin- 
gers, as  instruments  of  numeration,  have  been  replaced 
by  objects  of  a  typical  number.  Ex.:  i=moon  or 
sun ;  2  =  the  eyes  or  legs,  etc. 

However  varied  these  processes  (of  which  only  a 
few  have  been  mentioned)  in  different  races  and  peri- 
ods, they  are  fundamentally  identical  to  the  psychol- 
ogist. They  may  be  reduced  to  this;  numeration  is 
performed  more  particularly  with  the  aids  of  sensible 
perceptions;  words  are  but  an  insignificant  accompa- 
niment, a  superfluity — existing  only  as  a  proliferation 
— of  so  little  utility  that  they  are  for  the  most  part 
neglected. 

Though  it  is  less  often  spoken  of,  we  may  remark 
that  the  measure  of  continuous  quantity  passed 
through  the  same  concrete-abstract  phase ;  and  here 
it  appeared  at  a  somewhat  early  stage,  owing  to  prac- 
tical and  social  wants.  Hence  we  find  at  the  outset, 
the  foot,  the  finger,  the  thumb  (inch  =  Fr.  pouce),  the 
palestra  (four  fingers'  length),  span,  cubit  (arm's  reach 
=  coudee),  fathom,  etc.,  the  stadium  (distance  a  good 
runner  could  cover  without  stopping).^  The  concrete 
character  of  all  these  measures  is  obvious.  Again, 
there  are  survivals  in  certain  current  locutions,  such 
as  a  day's  journey.  More  than  this ;  they  have  a  hu- 
man character,  their  standard  and  starting-point  be- 
ing, at  least  at  the  outset,  certain  parts  of  the  body, 
or  a  determined  sum  of  muscular  movements.  Little 
by  little  they  lost  their  original  significance,  progres- 
sing through  centuries  towards  our  metrical  system 

1  And  the  barley-corn  of  English  measure. — 7>. 


INTERMEDIATE  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  lOI 

the  type  of  a  scientific,  deliberate,  rationally  abstract 
system,  as  far  as  possible  liberated  from  anthropomor- 
phism. 

The  reader  will  probably  obtain  a  more  definite 
idea  of  the  nature  of  these  lower  forms  by  recapitulat- 
ing the  examples  cited,  than  from  any  long  disserta- 
tion. Is  their  intellectual  level  very  superior  to  that 
of  the  generic  image?  This  question  is  doubtful.  At 
times  the  only  distinction  between  them  is  the  pres- 
ence of  the  word :  at  the  present  stage  it  makes  but  a 
poor  figure, — yet  with  all  its  modesty,  it  augurs  a  new 
world  wherein  it  is  to  be  of  prime  importance. 


n. 

We  now  pass  to  a  study  of  transition.  In  ascend- 
ing from  the  lower  to  the  higher  forms  of  abstraction, 
we  traverse  the  intermediate  region  between  the  states 
directly  superposed  upon  generic  images,  and  the 
higher  concepts.  In  fact,  we  shall  to  some  extent 
have  to  penetrate  into  this  extreme  region,  before  the 
close  of  the  chapter. 

At  the  risk  of  repetition,  we  must  first  indicate  the 
characteristics  by  which  the  general  notions  we  are 
at  present  concerned  with  are  distinguished  from  the 
abstractions  above  and  below  them.  To  recapitulate 
briefly  :  In  the  concrete-abstract  phase  (which  we  are 
leaving)  the  general  notion — so-called — is  constituted 
by  concrete  elements,  plus  words,  whose  substitutory 
office  is  weak  or  null. 

In  the  abstract  phase  (upon  which  we  are  entering) 
the  concept  is  constituted  by  an  evoked  or  evocable 
image,  which   may  exhibit  every  degree  from   clear 


-/ 


I02  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

representation  to  the  pure  schema,  plus  the  word  that 
now  becomes  the  principal  element. 

In  the  phase  of  higher  abstractions  (to  be  studied 
later),  no  sensory  representation  arises,  or  should  any 
such  appear,  reflexion  would  find  in  it  only  a  dubious 
support,  often  an  obstacle :  the  word  meantime  has 
acquired  absolute  supremacy  in  consciousness. 

Taken  as  a  whole,  psychological  development  ex- 
hibits a  complex  phenomenon,  a  binary  compound,  in 
y  \  which  one  element  is  always  increasing,  the  other  as 
steadily  decreasing.  Words  pass  from  nonentity  to 
autocracy;  the  concrete  from  supremacy  to  nonentity. 

We  must  now  return  to  the  higher  forms  of  inter- 
mediate abstraction,  since  we  may  not  content  our- 
selves with  any  purely  theoretical  determination. 
Characteristic  examples  must  be  selected;  and  here 
we  find  a  certain  embarrassment.  Does  our  choice 
fall  on  numeration?  Yet  on  leaving  the  concrete- 
abstract  period,  this  at  once  finds  its  formative  law, 
and  introduces  us  to  pure  abstraction.  Are  we  to  se- 
lect language?  This  procedure  might  seem  to  be  ap- 
propriate, seeing  that  the  general  ideas  v/ith  which 
we  are  occupied  constitute  the  substrata  of  our  highly 
civilised  modern  languages,  when,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  more  developed  concepts  (of  mathematics,  meta- 
physics, etc.)  are  only  found  rarely  and  incidentally. 
One  might  even  plunder  the  dictionary,  extracting  all 
general  terms,  with  elimination  of  those  that  are 
purely  scientific,  and  classification  of  the  former  ac- 
cording to  their  increasing  degree  of  generality.  But 
this  method,  besides  being  very  laborious  and  incapa- 
ble of  reduction  to  a  clear  statement  for  the  reader, 
would  suffer  the  cardinal  defect  of  being  arbitrary. 
How,  indeed,  could  any  common  measure  be  estab 


INTERMEDIATE  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  I03 

lished  for  all  these  general  terms,  issuing  from  the 
most  diverse  sources  of  human  activity?^ 

But  the  best  method  would  seem  to  be  that  of  tak- 
ing as  our  basis  the  classifications  of  the  naturalists, 
following  their  development  historically.  Here  we 
have  the  advantage  of  positive  documents,  since  these 
refer  to  concrete  beings,  and  are  formed  according  to 
characters  observed  empirically.  They  create,  namely, 
an  ascending  progress  from  the  individual  to  the  more 
general  notions,  by  a  methodical  process  of  filiation ; 
they  operate  upon  living  beings,  or  objects  of  the 
same  nature,  having  consequently  a  common  standard. 
The  history,  even  in  brief,  of  these  classifications  is 
instructive :  it  shows  the  progressive  passage  of  con- 
crete-abstract ideas  to  more  and  more  abstract  con- 
cepts, from  a  statement  of  gross  resemblances  to  the 
quest  after  subtle  similarities,  from  the  period  of  as- 
similation to  that  in  which  dissociation  predominates. 

Among  these  different  classifications,  we  may  se- 
lect those  of  the  zoologists,  since  they  appear  to  be 
the  most  numerous,  most  complete,   and  best  elab- 


IWundt  [ILogik,  I.,  pp.  113  et  seq.)  gives  what  he  regards  as  a  complete 
classification  of  concepts,  but  it  does  not  correspond  with  our  design.  It 
maybe  summarised  as  follows.  Four  classes:  I.  Identical  or  equivalent  con- 
cepts; Aristotle  =  Alexander's  tutor.  II.  Subordinate  or  superordinate  con- 
cepts; mammals  and  vertebrates,  etc.  III.  Co-ordinated  concepts,  compris- 
ing five  species:  i.  Disjunctive  concepts;  sound  and  noise,  French  and  Ger- 
man, etc.  They  are  subordinate  to  a  larger  concept,  ii.  Correlative  con- 
cepts, with  reciprocal  relations;  men  and  women,  mountain  and  valley,  iii. 
Contrary  concepts ;  high  and  low,  good  and  bad.  iv.  Contingent  concepts; 
such,  i.  e.,  as  touch,  with  very  minute,  perceptible  differences;  this  highly 
important  category  comprises  numbers,  v.  Interferent  concepts,  which  co- 
incide or  partially  cross  ;  negro  and  slave,  rectangle  and  parallelogram.  IV. 
Concepts  which  are  interdependent;  etc.,  space  and  movement,  crime  and 
punishment,  demand  and  supply,  labor  and  wages.  This  table  may  suit  the 
logician  but  not  the  psychologist,  because  it  presents  the  concepts  under 
what  may  be  termed  the  static  order,  i.  e.,  ready  formed:  we,  on  the  other 
hand,  are  considering  them  as  dynamic,  i.  e.,  in  their  becoming  and  order  of 
genesis. 


I04  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

orated.  For  the  rest,  the  succeeding  observations 
apply  equal!}',  mutatis  mutandis,  to  the  classifications 
of  the  botanists.  We  need  scarcely  add  that  our  study 
is  strictly  psychological,  that  its  object  is  not  the  ab- 
solute value  of  classifications,  but  the  determination 
of  the  processes  followed  by  the  human  mind,  in  pro- 
portion as  the  zoological  taxonomy  has  constituted  it- 
self. 

At  the  outset  we  find  a  pre-scientific  period  as  to 
which  we  know  little  ;  for  these  essays  in  classifica- 
tion differ,  according  to  times  and  races.  The  Bible, 
Hindu  literature,  the  primitive  poets  and  historians  of 
Greece,  do  however  provide  sufficient  indications  of 
the  manner  in  which  man  originally  classified  other 
living  beings.  The  repartition  was  usually  made  in 
three  great  categories,  according  as  the  animals  lived 
in  the  water,  or  upon  the  earth,  or  flew  in  the  air. 
The  subdivisions  are  remarkable.  Thus,  among  ter- 
restrial animals,  there  are  some  that  walk,  and  some 
that  climb  :  in  this  last  group  there  is  a  mixture  of  ar- 
ticulate creatures,  of  molluscs,  reptiles  and  amphib- 
ians. Among  aerial  animals,  we  find  birds,  and  many 
flying  insects.  These  primitive  classifications  are 
based  upon  perception  far  more  than  on  abstraction, 
or  at  any  rate  rest  upon  superficial  resemblances. 
The  habitual  environment,  air,  water,  earth,  deter- 
mines the  cardinal  classes.  Some  easily  apprehended 
characteristic  makes  the  subdivisions:  e.  g.,  flight 
(birds,  insects),  locomotion  (walking,  climbing).  The 
method  employed  is  hardly  superior  to  that  by  which 
generic  images  are  formed  ;  and  in  the  order  of  classi- 
fication, this  point  corresponds  with  the  concrete- 
abstract  period  of  primitive  languages,  numerations, 


INTERMKDIATE  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  I05 

and  religions,  i.  e.,  to  a  gross  generalisation  fixed  by 
a  word. 

The  scientific  period  begins  with  Aristotle.  It  has 
been  affirmed  that  he  owes  numerous  points  to  prede- 
cessors whom  he  fails  to  mention  :  this  is  a  historical 
matter  of  no  interest  in  the  present  connexion.  With 
him,  or  under  his  name,  we  have  the  commencement 
of  comparative  anatomy  which  involves  a  preliminary 
labor  of  analysis,  unknown  in  the  pre  scientific  period, 
and  marking  the  transition  from  apparent  and  super- 
ficial to  profound  and  essential  resemblances.  His 
classification  is  of  course  imperfect,  often  inconsis- 
tent ;  it  bears  the  impress  of  an  epoch  of  transition. 

His  terminology  is  poor,  unstable,  floating.  He 
distinguishes  two  sorts  of  groups  only :  the  genus 
lyei'os)  and  the  species  (e?8os).  "But  the  term  yevo^ 
has  the  least  constant  significance  :  it  serves  as  the 
indistinct  designation  of  any  group  of  species,  how- 
ever great  its  extension,  as  well  what  we  now  term 
classes,  as  other  lower  groups."^  Sometimes  however 
Aristotle  speaks  of  large  genera  (yivr]  fiiyaXa)  and  of 
very  large  genera  (yevrj  /ncyto-ra),  without  any  precise 
denotation.  It  has  been  said  that  penury  of  words 
was  an  obstacle  to  him  :  yet  this  is  hardly  a  plausible 
reason,  seeing  that  he  found  means  to  create  the  word 
evTOfm  to  designate  insects.  The  true  obstacle  was  the 
insufficient  determination  of  character. 

Again,  independently  of  nomenclature,  ** while 
Aristotle  knew  a  fairly  large  number  of  animals,  the 
notion  of  grouping  them  in  definite  order,  which 
should  express  their  greater  or  less  degree  of  similar- 
ity, does  not  appear  to  have  presented  itself  to  his 

1  For  details,  with  quotations  in  point,  consult  Agassiz :  Be  I'cspice,  Chap. 
III.,  and  E.  Penier,  La  Philosophie  xoolo^que  avant  Darivin,  Chap.  II. 


Io6  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

mind.  Hence  he  did  not  attempt  what  we  call  classi- 
fication. He  compares  different  animals  together,  by 
every  possible  means,  and  endeavors  to  reduce  the 
result  of  his  comparisons  to  general  propositions." 
In  this  way  he  arrives  at  relations  which  are  some- 
times important,  sometimes  without  importance.  For 
example  :  among  animals,  some  have  blood,  some 
lymph,  which  takes  its  place  :  this  division,  notwith- 
standing the  error  on  which  it  is  based,  corresponds 
broadly  speaking  with  the  distinction  between  ver- 
tebrates and  invertebrates.  Animals  "which  have 
blood  "  are  subdivided  into  viviparous  and  oviparous. 
Further,  animals  that  fly  are  ranged  in  three  cate- 
gories, according  as  their  wings  are  feathered  (birds), 
or  formed  by  a  fold  of  skin  (bats),  or  dry,  thin,  and 
membranous  (insects).  Then  there  is  a  division  of 
animals  into  aquatic  and  terrestrial,  social  and  soli- 
tary, migratory  and  sedentary,  diurnal  and  nocturnal, 
domestic  and  wild,  etc. 

In  sum,  there  is  co-existence  of  two  processes  : 
one  scientific,  implying  a  preliminary  analysis  ;  the 
other  of  common  observation,  which  does  not  sensibly 
differ  from  concrete-abstract  classifications  ;  and  the 
idea  of  a  hierarchy  formed  by  abstraction  of  abstracts, 
by  a  systematic  arrangement  of  the  animal  kingdom, 
has  not  yet  made  its  appearance.  Yet  Aristotle's  work, 
just  by  reason  of  its  composite  nature,  is  interesting 
to  the  psychologist  who  studies  the  evolution  of  the 
faculty  of  abstracting  and  generalising. 

We  may  pass  over  two  thousand  years,  during 
which  no  progress  was  made,  till  we  come  to  Linnaeus. 
"He  was  the  first  man  who  distinctly  conceived  the 
idea  of  expressing,  under  a  definite  formula,  what  he 
believed  to  be  the  system  of  nature."     His  nomencla- 


INTERMEDIATE  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  I07 

ture  is  fixed.  Under  the  names  of  classes  {genus  sum- 
fnum),  orders  {genus  iniermcdiuni),  genera  {genus  prox- 
ifHuni),  species,  varieties,  he  proposes  subdivisions  of 
decreasing  value,  embracing  a  greater  or  less  number 
of  animals  which  all  present  in  common  more  or  less 
general  attributes.  He  pursues  the  research  after  fun- 
damental characteristics,  and  essential  similarities,  in- 
cessantly correcting  his  first  results.  Thus  it  is  only 
at  the  eleventh  edition  of  his  Sysiema  natures,  that  the 
class  of  "Quadrupeds"  is  converted  into  Mammals  : 
the  Cetacea  are  included  in  this  class,  and  no  longer 
placed  among  the  fish,  as  also  bats,  which  were  for- 
merly classified  with  birds,  etc.^  Whatever  their  ob- 
jective value,  we  have  here  a  true  system  of  rational 
concepts. 

We  may  instance  Cuvier  for  the  clearness  with 
which  he  separates  the  predominant  and  subordinate 
characteristics  :  "  If,"  he  says,  *' we  consider  the  ani- 
mal kingdom  on  the  principles  just  laid  down,  re- 
garding only  the  organisation  and  nature  of  the  ani- 
mals, instead  of  their  size  and  utility,  according  to 
our  knowledge  of  them,  or  the  sum  of  accessory  cir- 
cumstances, we  find  that  there  are  four  principal 
forms,  four  general  plans,  if  we  may  so  express  our- 
selves, on  which  all  animals  seem  to  have  been  mod- 
elled," etc.  These  four  branches  (a  new  word  created 
by  him),  which  he  held  to  be  irreducible,  were  the 
Vertebrata,  Articulata,  MoUusca,  and  Radiata. 

Finally,  since  the  progress  of  consecutive  abstrac- 
tion and  generalisation  consists  in  incessantly  seeking 

lAgassiz,  op.  cii.,  gives  a  summary  of  the  successive  improvements.  They 
are  of  interest  not  merely  to  the  zoologist,  but  also  from  our  own  point  of 
view,  as  showing  the  increasing  preponderance  of  analysis,  and  search  for 
fundamental  characteristics,  to  the  exclusion  of  the  external  resemblances 
which  served  as  basis  for  the  more  primitive  classifications. 


Io8  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

out  extracts  of  extracts,  and  simplifications  of  simpli- 
fications, the  natural  movement  of  the  mind  tends 
fatally  towards  pure  unity  as  its  supreme  end.  This 
last  phase  belongs  to  the  nineteenth  century,  and  still 
more  to  the  contemporary  epoch.  It  comes  from  vari- 
ous sources,  and  has  assumed  different  forms  : 

1.  Speculative  in  the  school  of  Schelling.  To 
Oken,  the  highest  representative  of  this  view,  man  is 
the  prototype  and  measure  of  animal  organisation  ; 
all  other  animals  are  constructed  after  his  pattern. 
"Their  body  is  in  some  sort  the  analysed  body  of  a 
man ;  the  human  organs  live,  whether  in  isolation,  or 
in  different  combinations,  in  the  state  of  independent 
animals.   Each  such  combination  constitutes  a  class." 

2.  Embryological,  according  to  the  labors  of  Von 
Baer.  While  Cuvier,  in  classification,  brought  anat- 
omy and  morphology  to  the  front,  a  new  system  now 
appears,  founded  upon  development  only  ;  the  science 
of  embr3'ology.  To  be  accurate,  Baer's  conception 
was  not  unitary,  since  it  admitted  four  tj'pes  :  periph- 
eral (radiate),  massive  (molluscan),  longitudinal  (ar- 
ticulated), bi-symmetrical  (vertebrate).  But  little  by 
little,  the  oft-substantiated  principle  asserted  itself 
and  found  firm  footing  among  his  successors  :  the  ani- 
mal with  the  highest  organisation  passes,  during  its 
individual  development,  through  phases  which,  in  less 
highly  evolved  beings,  are  permanent  states  ;  or,  more 
briefly,  among  the  higher  animals,  ontogenesis  is  a 
repetition  of  phylogenesis. 

3.  Transformist.  The  boldest  partisans  of  this 
view,  e.  g.,  Haeckel,  adopt  a  rigorously  unitary  con- 
ception :  all  the  innumerable  examples  of  the  animal 
kingdom  have  issued  from  one  common  stock. 

In  all  there  is  a  fundamental  trend  of  the  mind  to 


INTERMEDIATE  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  IO9 

wards  the  idea  of  original  unity.  It  is  unimportant 
for  the  moment  to  examine  whether  this  concept  of 
ideal  unity  (we  might  also  recall  the  vegetable  ideal 
of  Goethe,  and  the  vertebrate  ideal  of  Richard  Owen) 
is  a  delusion,  or  a  true  apprehension  :  we  shall  return 
to  this  later,  in  discussing  the  objective  value  of  the 
notions  of  genus  and  species  (Chap.  V.  §  vi).  At  this 
point,  the  subjective  psychological  process  alone  is 
relevant  to  our  purpose. 

This  review  has  no  pretensions  at  being  even  an 
abridged  history  of  zoological  classifications.  It  merely 
aims  at  showing  by  facts,  (i)  how  a  hierarchy  of  con- 
cepts is  constituted,  and  in  the  travail  of  centuries 
passes  from  the  period  of  generic  images  to  the  ideal 
of  embryological  unity,  common  to  all  beings  ;  (2)  how 
the  work  of  dissociation  and  analysis  has  alwaj's  gone 
on,  and  multiplied,  in  quest  of  similarities  more  and 
more  difficult  to  discover — often  indeed  fragile  or  du- 
bious— to  stop  at  unity  only,  the  supreme  abstraction. 

We  are  now  at  the  threshold  of  the  last  period  of 
abstraction,  that  of  complete  symbolism,  and  it  is  not 
without  interest  to  note  that  what  passes  in  the  theo- 
retical order  has  its  equivalent  in  another  form  of  hu- 
man activity — the  practical  order — where  the  mechan- 
ism of  exchange  is  again  developed  by  the  aid  of  an 
ever-increasing  substitution.  Thus,  at  the  lowest 
stage,  all  commercial  transactions  are  reduced  to 
truck,  to  exchange  by  barter.  The  concrete  for  the 
concrete  is  the  method  of  primitive  peoples.  An  im- 
mense step  is  taken  when  this  rudimentary  process  is 
succeeded  by  the  employment  of  precious  metals.  A 
substitutory  value  is  taken  as  the  common  measure  of 
other  values.  At  the  outset,  silver  and  gold,  in  the 
form  of  powder  or  of  small  bullion,  were  weighed  out 


^ 


no  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

by  the  contractors  for  each  particular  transaction. 
Next,  this  inconvenient  procedure  was  replaced  by 
coined  money,  issued  under  the  control  of  an  officer, 
or  of  the  social  aggregate,  thus  conferring  a  general 
value  on  the  instrument  of  exchange.  Lastly,  at  a 
much  later  period,  bills  of  exchange,  bank-notes,  and 
numerous  forms  of  letters  of  credit,  were  substituted 
for  gold  and  silver ;  so  that  a  sheet  of  paper  worth 
less  than  a  centime  may  become  the  symbol  of  mil- 
lions and  tens  of  millions. 

This  resemblance  of  the  two  cases  is  by  no  means 
fortuitous.  It  is  based  upon  identity  of  psychological 
process,  namely  a  substitution  of  ascending  degrees, 
an  ever  increasing  simplification,  whether  in  the  order 
of  speculative  research,  or  in  the  department  of  com- 
mercial transaction  :  and  just  as  paper  tokens,  unless 
financially  convertible  into  objects  of  consumption, 
for  use  or  luxury,  are  nonentities  that  can  accumulate 
in  the  bank  without  the  gain  of  anything  more  than  a 
simulacrum — so,  if  the  highest  symbols  of  abstraction 
cannot  be  reduced  to  the  data  of  experience,  we  may, 
as  too  often  occurs,  accumulate,  manipulate,  build  up 
concepts,  and  still  be  in  a  state  of  permanent  intellec- 
tual bankruptcy. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  HIGHER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.     THEIR 
NATURE. 

BEFORE  we  embark  on  the  study  of  the  principal 
concepts,  it  is  incumbent  upon  us  (in  order  to 
determine  for  each  of  these,  separately,  the  conditions 
of  their  genesis  and  development — as  was  shown  for 
abstraction  in  general)  to  throw  as  much  light  as  pos- 
sible upon  the  very  vexed  question  of  the  psj^cholo- 
gical  nature  of  the  concepts  of  pure  symbolism,  where 
the  word  appears  as  the  sole  element  that  exists  in 
consciousness.  Is  it  true  that  we  can  think  effectually 
and  usefully  with  words  and  nothing  but  words,  as 
has  been  sustained  to  satiety?  Is  not  this  assertion 
founded  upon  the  misapprehension  of  a  factor  which, 
although  it  does  not  enter  into  consciousness,  is  none 
the  less  in  active  existence?  The  investigation  of  this 
point  is  the  prime  object  of  the  following  chapter. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  enter  in  detail  into  the  re- 
searches of  the  last  thirty  years,  as  to  the  seat  and 
the  nature  of  images.  Yet  since  these  have  been  the 
point  of  departure  of  the  following  inquiry,  the  results 
may  be  briefly  summarised. 

It  is  generally  admitted  that  the  image  occupies 
the  same  seat  as  the  percept  of  which  it  is  a  weak  and 


112  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

incomplete  residuum,  i.  e.,  in  order  to  produce  itself 
in  consciousness  it  demands  the  putting  into  activity 
of  certain  definite  portions  of  the  cerebral  centres. 
The  energy  of  the  representative  faculty  does  not 
merely  vary  from  individual  to  individual  in  a  general 
manner :  there  are  particular  forms  of  imagination, 
constituted  by  the  very  marked  predominance  of  a 
certain  group  of  representations,  visual,  auditory, 
muscular,  olfactory,  gustatory. 

Normal  observation,  and  still  more  pathological 
documents,  have  thus  determined  certain  types.  We 
may  also  (though  this  is  mere  hypothesis  and  difficult 
to  verify)  admit  a  "mixed"  or  "indifferent"  type,  in 
which  the  different  species  of  sensations  are  repre- 
sented by  corresponding  images  of  equal  clearness 
and  vigor,  without  marked  predominance  of  any  one 
group,  whilst  still  maintaining  their  relative  impor- 
tance;  e.  g.,  it  is  clear  that  in  man  the  visual  and 
olfactory  images  cannot  be  equivalent  in  absolute 
importance.  Excluding  this  indifferent  type,  we  have 
three  principal  "pure"  types:  visual,  auditory,  mus- 
cular or  motor,  signifying  a  tendency  to  represent 
things  in  terms  borrowed  from  vision,  from  sound,  or 
from  movement.  If  we  push  the  investigation  further, 
we  find  that  these  types  again  imply  variations  or  sub- 
types. Thus  there  may  be  a  lively  faculty  for  repre- 
sentation of  complex  visual  forms  (faces,  landscapes, 
monuments)  along  with  a  weak  sense  for  graphic  signs 
(printed  or  written  words)  and  so  on. 

The  numerous  works  devoted  to  this  subject,  and 
too  well  known  to  be  insisted  on  here,  lead  us  to  this 
conclusion  :  that  there  is  no  general  faculty  of  imagi- 
nation. This  is  a  vague  term  which  designates  very 
different  individual  variations ;  these  last  alone  have 


HIGHER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  II3 

any  psychological  reality,  and  are  alone  important  in 
cognising  the  mechanism  of  the  intellect. 

Ma}^  it  not  be  the  same  for  the  faculty  of  concep- 
tion? May  not  the  word  "general  idea"  or  "con- 
cept" be  in  its  kind  the  equivalent  of  the  word  image, 
namely  a  vague  formula, — its  psychological  reality  ly- 
ing in  types  or  variations  as  yet  undetermined?  I  am 
exposing  for  ideas,  the  problem  that  has  already  been 
set  forth  for  images,  while  recognising  its  much  greater 
obscurity.  The  psycho-physiological  conditions  of  the 
existence  of  concepts  are  practically  unknown :  this 
is  a  terra  incognita  wherein  the  new  psychology  has 
hardly  adventured  itself,  and  where  it  would  indeed 
have  been  chimerical  to  tread  before  the  preliminary 
study  of  the  image. 


The  question  I  have  set  myself  to  elucidate  is  very 
modest,  very  limited  and  circumscribed,  representing 
only  part  of  the  problem  indicated  above.  It  may, 
however,  teach  us  something  of  the  ultimate  nature  of 
concepts.      It  is  as  follows  : 

When  we  think,  hear,  or  read  a  general  term,  what 
arises  as  sign  in  consciousness,  directly  and  without 
reflexion  ? 

I  have  purposely  italicised  these  words  in  order 
to  emphasise  my  principal  aim,  which  was  to  discover 
the  instantaneous  operations  (conscious  or  unconscious") 
that  occur  in  such  a  case,  in  persons  whose  habits  of 
mind  are  widely  different.  I  endeavored  as  much  as 
possible  to  eliminate  reflexion  and  to  seize  the  mental 
state.  With  time  and  effort,  minds  that  are  least  apt 
in  abstraction  will  arrive  at  a  more  or  less  successful 
translation  of  general  terms,  or  at  the  substitution  for 


114  '^^E  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

them  of  some  mangled  and  halting  definition.  I  set 
myself  as  far  as  possible  to  suppress  this  secondary 
phase  of  the  mental  process,  and  to  arrest  it  at  the 
first,  in  order  to  determine  what  the  word  evokes  im- 
mediately^ and  in  what  degree  this  differs  with  the 
individual. 

In  order  to  make  the  answers  more  exactly  com- 
parable, I  interrogated  only  the  adults  of  both  sexes, 
excluding  all  children.  It  was  indispensable  to  my 
investigation  that  it  should  comprise  people  of  very 
different  degrees  of  culture,  habits  of  mind,  and  pro- 
fession. The  principal  classes  were  mathematicians, 
physicists,  doctors,  scientists,  philosophers,  painters, 
musicians,  architects,  men  of  the  world,  women,  nov- 
elists, poets,  artisans.  The  last  class  made  such  con- 
fused replies  that  I  must  regard  their  documents  as 
worthless.  Too  much  is  left  for  individual  interpre- 
tation. The  total  number  of  persons  interrogated 
amounted  to  one  hundred  and  three. 

The  method  was  invariably  the  same.  We  said  to 
the  subject :  "I  am  going  to  pronounce  certain  words; 
will  you  tell  me  directly,  without  reflexion,  whether 
this  word  calls  up  anything  or  nothing  in  your  mind? 
If  anything,  what  is  suggested  to  you?"  The  reply 
was  noted  down  at  once ;  if  delayed  beyond  five  to 
seven  seconds,  it  was  held  to  be  null,  or  doubtful.  In 
the  case  of  naive  subjects,  I  employed  certain  prelimi- 
naries :  before  pronouncing  abstract  words,  concrete 

1  Under  the  heading  "Observations  on  General  Terms"  the  American 
Jojcrnal  of  Psychology,  III.  i,  p.  144  (Jan.,  1890)  gives  the  results  of  an  investi- 
gation conducted  upon  113  school  children  aged  13  to  18.  The  words  being, 
the  infinite,  literature,  abstraction,  number,  flay,  coldness,  horror,  etc.,  yvexe 
written  down,  and  a  few  moments  were  given  the  pupils  to  transcribe  their 
impressions  in  each  case. 

The  summarised  answers  are  not  devoid  of  interest,  but  the  object  of  the 
inquiry  is  evidently  very  diiterent  from  our  own. 


HIGHER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  II 5 

terms  (designating  a  monument,  or  person)  such  as 
would  evoke  a  simple  image,  were  heard;  then  the 
impulse  being  given,  I  proceeded  to  the  enumeration 
of  general  terms. 

The  words  which  served  as  material  for  the  inquiry- 
were  fourteen  in  number,  proceeding  from  the  con- 
crete to  the  highest  abstractions.  They  were  enun- 
ciated in  an  indifferent  order  and  were  as  follows : 
dog,  animal,  color,  form,  justice,  goodness,  virtue,  law,^ 
number,  force,  time,  relation,  cause,  infinity. 

The  inquiry  was  invariably  oral,  never  in  writing, 
the  greatest  care  being  taken  to  prevent  the  person 
from  knowing  the  end  in  view,  unless  afterwards : 
which  led  in  certain  cases  to  interesting  explanations. 
The  very  nature  of  my  method  prevented  me  from 
extending  it  as  widely  as  I  could  have  wished.  I 
could  not,  as  was  done  in  England,  distribute  printed 
questions  among  the  public,  because  it  was  necessary 
to  note  the  spontaneous  answer  immediately  before  it 
was  corrected  by  later  reflection.  Moreover,  I  needed 
unsophisticated  subjects,  ignorant  of  my  purpose,  and 
therefore  eliminated  all  whom  I  suspected  of  being 
even  indirectly  acquainted  with  it. 

The  majority  were  interrogated  on  the  fourteen 
terms  cited  above,  others  on  a  few  only ;  so  that  the 
total  number  of  responses  was  over  nine  hundred.  It 
would  be  beside  the  mark  to  publish  them  here. 
They  are  nothing  more  than  data  which  have  to  be 
interpreted.  Three  principal  or  pure  types  appear  to 
stand  out  from  them,  besides  the  failures  or  mixed 
cases.     These  may  be  termed  the  concrete  type,  the 

iThe  word  "law"  was  purposely  chosen  for  its  ambiguity;  physical 
laws,  moral  or  social  laws.  The  immense  majority  of  answers  were  in  the 
juristic  sense.  Ex.,  Code,  Law  of  the  Twelve  Tables,  a  judge,  woman  with 
scales,  etc. 


Il6  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

visual  typographic  type,  and  the  auditory  type.  Each 
of  these  corresponds  with  a  particular  mode  of  repre- 
senting the  general  idea.  We  will  examine  them  sep- 
arately. 

I.  Concrete  Type.  Here  the  abstract  word  nearly 
always  evokes  an  image,  vague  or  precise ;  usually 
visual,  sometimes  muscular.  It  is  not  a  simple  sign, 
it  does  not  represent  the  total  substitution,  it  is  not 
dry,  and  finally  reduced.  It  is  immediately  and  spon- 
taneously transformed  into  a  concrete.  In  fact,  the 
persons  of  this  type  think  only  in  images.  Words  are 
for  them  no  more  than  a  kind  of  vehicle,  a  social  in- 
strument of  mutual  comprehension.  When  a  sequence 
of  general  or  abstract  terms  passes  through  their 
minds,  what  really  passes  is  a  succession  of  concretes, 
save  for  the  very  abstract  words  which  "evoke  noth- 
ing." This  is  an  answer  I  have  often  received,  and 
which,  in  virtue  of  its  importance,  will  be  considered 
apart,  at  the  end  of  this  chapter. 

The  concrete  type  appears  to  be  the  most  widely 
distributed ;  it  obtains  almost  to  exclusion  among 
women,  artists,  and  all  who  have  not  the  habit  of  sci- 
entific abstraction.  I  have  selected  a  few  examples 
from  among  the  many  observations  belonging  to  this 
type. 

A  painter.  —  Cause:  nothing.  Relation:  relations  of 
terms ;  recital,  written  report.  Law:  judges  in  red 
robes.  Number:  vague.  Color:  contrast  between  green 
of  plant,  and  red  of  drapery.  Forffi:  a  round  block, 
a  woman's  shoulder.  Sound:  a  murmur.  Dog:  ears 
of  a  dog  running.  Animal:  vague  collection,  as  in 
certain  Dutch  pictures.  Force:  hits  out  with  his  fists. 
Goodness:  his  young  mother,  seen  vaguely.  Titne: 
Saturn  with  his  scythe.     Infinity:  a  black  hole. 


HIGHER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  ll^ 

A  woman. — Cause:  I  had  been  the  cause  of  her 
son's  success.  Law:  the  government  is  bad.  Color: 
sees  an  impressionist  picture  by  her  son.  Form:  names 
a  beautiful  person.  Goodness  and  Virtue:  names  two 
people  who  each  have  this  quality.  Force:  sees  men 
fighting.  Relation:  social  relations  between  husband 
and  wife.  Justice:  sees  an  audience-hall  and  judges. 
Dog:  sees  a  dog  that  bit  one  of  her  parents.  Infinity: 
nothing.      Time:  a  metronome. 

These  two  interrogatories  are  complete.  I  might 
proceed  by  another  method :  that  of  taking  each  gen- 
eral term  (law,  cause,  number,  etc.)  and  quoting  all 
the  answers  received,  among  which  many  would  be 
identical.  Such  an  enumeration  would  be  long  and 
superfluous :  we  cannot,  however,  neglect  a  few  of 
the  particulars.  For  the  word  cause,  several  persons 
(women,  artists,  people  in  society)  replied  ^ 'cause  ci- 
lebre,*^  "proces  c^lebre,"  for  the  most  part  mentioning 
one  only,  and  that  some  recent  trial.  At  first  this 
reply  annoyed  me,  and  appeared  to  be  useless  for  my 
inquiry.  Later,  on  the  other  hand,  I  felt  it  to  be  in- 
structive, because  it  characterises  better  than  any  de- 
scription the  type  which  I  have  denoted  as  concrete, 
and  the  particular  turn  of  this  kind  of  mind,  in  which 
the  abstract  sense  does  not  present  itself,  at  any  rate 
at  the  beginning. 

I  may  also  note  two  answers  given  me  immediately 
by  a  celebrated  painter : — Number:  I  see  many  bril- 
liant points.  Law:  I  see  parallel  lines.  (Is  this  the 
unconscious  idea  of  levelling  by  the  law?) 

The  terms  goodness  and  virtue  suggested  answers 
which  are  easily  summarised :  they  fall  into  two  cate- 
gories, (i)  Nothing;  this  answer  does  not  belong  to 
the  concrete  type ;  (2)  a  definite  person,  who  was  al- 


Il8  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

ways  named  and  who  thus  becomes  the  incarnation, 
the  concrete  representation. 

Nearly  all  the  images  evoked  belong  to  the  visual 
sense;  the  word  force,  however,  most  frequently  called 
up  pure  muscular  images,  or  the  same  accompanied 
by  a  vague  visual  representation.  Example — Seeing 
somebody  lifting  a  weight ;  I  vaguely  see  something 
pulling ;  a  weight  suspended  by  a  ring ;  a  string  draw- 
ing on  a  nail;  pressure  of  my  fist  in  a  fluid ;  the  Mar- 
shal of  Saxony  breaking  an  ^cu  of  six  pounds,  etc. 

I  have  been  describing  the  ordinary  and  principal 
form  of  the  concrete  type.  It  consists  in  the  immedi- 
ate and  spontaneous  substitution  of  a  particular  case 
(fact  or  individual)  for  the  general  term.  In  certain 
observations  a  slightly  different  variation  may  be  de- 
tected ;  I  have  encountered  it  among  several  histori- 
ans and  learned  men.  In  the  ordinary  type,  the  whole 
(general)  is  thought  by  means  of  the  part  (concrete); 
in  the  variation,  the  thinking  is  by  analogy,  and  the 
mechanism  seems  to  be  reduced  to  pure  association. 
A  few  examples  will  explain  the  distinction.  The  re- 
plies in  duplicate  were  given  by  different  persons. 
Number:  the  "Language  of  Calculation,"  Pythagoras. 
Cause:  Hume's  theory  of  causality;  Kant's  theory. 
Law:  the  "Tables  of  Malaga,"  Montesquieu's  defini- 
tion. Color:  the  chemistry  of  the  spectrum.  Justice: 
Littr^'s  definition.  Animal:  the  Tre/jt  ^vyri<i  of  Aristotle. 
Time:  a  vague  metaphysical  theory.  Relation:  dis- 
cussion of  Ampere  and  Tracy  on  this  subject.  Infinity: 
books  on  mathematics.  Color:  treatises  of  photogra- 
phy, etc. 

It  might  be  objected  that  there  is  a  certain  associ- 
ation in  ordinary  cases  as  in  these;  but  the  distinction 
will  readily  be  perceived.     The  former  proceed  from 


HIGHER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  IIQ 

that  which  contains,  to  the  content — from  the  class  to 
the  fact :  they  think  the  whole  by  means  of  the  part ; 
there  is  an  internal  association.  The  latter  form  as- 
sociations beside  and  from  without.  Apparently  these 
do  not  reach  to  the  concrete,  they  stop  half  way ;  for 
a  complete  generality  they  substitute  a  semi-general- 
ity. Further  than  this,  my  data  are  neither  sufficiently 
numerous,  nor  clear  enough,  for  the  point  to  be  in- 
sisted on. 

2.  Visual  Typographic  Type.  Nothing  is  easier 
to  define.  In  its  pure  form  it  consists  in  seeing  printed 
words  and  nothing  more  ;  in  three  cases  words  were 
seen  written.  Among  some  the  vision  of  the  printed 
words  was  accompanied  by  a  concrete  image  as  in  the 
first  type,  but  only  for  semi-concrete  concepts  (dog, 
animal,  color)  ;  for  the  higher  abstracts  (time,  cause, 
infinity,  etc.)  the  typographical  vision  alone  exists.^ 
This  mode  of  representation  is  widely  distributed 
among  those  who  have  read  much  ;  but  there,  are 
many  exceptions. 

No  doubt  many  of  my  readers  will  discover  from 
self-observation  that  they  belong  to  this  type.  I  have 
further  noticed  that  all  who  have  this  mode  of  repre- 
sentation regard  it  as  normal,  and  necessary,  in  any- 
one who  knows  how  to  read.  This  is  a  fallacy.  I  do 
not  possess  it  myself  in  the  faintest  degree,  and  have 
met  many  others  who  resemble  me. 

Thus  I  was  little  prepared  to  discover  this  type ; 
and  had  even  reached  my  thirtieth  observation  with- 
out suspecting  it,  when  I  encountered  such  a  clear 
case  as  to  put  me  on  the  track.  I  was  interrogating 
a  well-known  physiologist.     To  every  word  except 

IFor  the  word  infinity,  those  who  fall  under  this  type  see  the  printed 
word,  or  the  mathematical  sign  oo. 


I20  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

Law  and  Form,  he  replied  '  *  I  see  them  in  printed 
characters  "  and  was  able  to  describe  these  accurately. 

Even  the  words  do^,  aniynal,  color,  were  unaccom- 
panied by  any  image.  He  volunteered  further  infor- 
mation which  maybe  reduced  to  the  statement,  "I 
see  everything  typographically."  The  same  holds 
good  for  concrete  objects.  If  he  hears  the  names  of 
his  intimate  friends  whom  he  meets  every  day,  he  sees 
the  names  printed ;  it  is  only  by  an  effort  of  thought 
that  he  sees  the  image.  The  word  "water"  appears 
to  him  as  if  printed,  and  he  has  no  vision  of  a  liquid. 
If  he  thinks  of  carbonic  acid,  or  nitrogen,  he  sees  in- 
differently either  the  words  printed  or  the  symbols 
CO2,  N.  He  does  not  see  the  complex  formulae  of 
organic  chemistry,  but  the  words  only. 

Surprised  (from  the  reasons  above  indicated)  at 
this  observation — of  the  sincerity  and  precision  of 
which  there  could  be  no  doubt — I  continued  my  in- 
vestigation, and  discovered  this  mode  of  thinking  in 
general  terms  to  be  sufficiently  common.  Several 
cases  indeed  were  as  pure  and  as  detailed  as  the  one 
just  cited.  Thenceforward  I  adopted  the  habit  of  in- 
variably asking  at  the  close  of  my  interrogatory  "Did 
you  see  the  words  printed?  " 

Several  people  remarked  that  they  had  read  a  great 
deal,  and  corrected  many  proofs,  and  that  this  would 
account  for  their  belonging  to  the  typographical  visual 
type.  The  influence  of  habit  is  certainly  enormous, 
but  is  no  adequate  explanation  here,  since  there  are 
many  exceptions.  I  have  myself  read  and  corrected 
many  proofs,  but  no  word  ever  appeared  in  my  con- 
sciousness as  printed,  unless  after  considerable  effort, 

lit  should  be  noted  that  he  lived  among  these  animals  and  experimented 
with  them  almost  dailv. 


HIGHER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  121 

and  then  vaguely.  Hence  this  mode  must  be  due  in 
great  part  to  natural  disposition. 

Among  the  compositors  questioned  I  found  :  (i) 
That  they  saw  my  fourteen  words  printed  in  some 
special  type,  which  they  occasionally  specified  ;  (2) 
they  had  a  concomitant  image  for  semi-concrete  terms; 
(3)  for  abstract  terms  no  image  accompanied  the  typo- 
graphical vision.  Here  we  have  the  superposition  of 
two  types  :  the  one  natural,  and  of  primitive  forma- 
tion (concrete  type) ,  the  other  acquired,  and  of  sec- 
ondary formation  (typographical  visual  type). 

In  short, — in  many  minds  the  existence  of  the  con- 
cept is  associated  with  a  clear  vision  of  the  printed 
word  and  nothing  beyond  it. 

3.  Auditory  Type. — In  its  pure  form  this  seems  to 
be  rare.  It  consists  in  having  in  mind  nothing  but 
signs  (auditory  images)  unaccompanied  either  by  the 
vision  of  printed  words  or  by  concrete  images.  Pos- 
sibly it  may  preponderate  among  orators  and  preach- 
ers ;  of  this  I  have  no  documentary  evidence.  Musi- 
cians do  not  appear  to  belong  to  this  type. 

One  very  clear  and  complete  case  of  the  kind  I 
have,  however,  encountered.  This  was  a  polyglot 
physician  known  as  the  author  of  several  works,  who 
for  many  years  had  lived  among  books  and  manu- 
scripts. He  has  no  trace  of  typographical  vision,  but 
all  words  "sound  in  his  ear."  He  can  neither  read 
nor  compose  without  articulating ;  as  the  interest  of 
his  book  or  work  grows  upon  him  he  speaks  aloud — 
"He  must  hear  himself."  In  his  dreams  there  are 
few  or  no  visual  images ;  he  hears  his  voice  and  that 
of  his  interlocutors:  "His  dreams  are  auditory." 
None  of  my  words,  even  when  semi-concrete,  evoked 
visual  images. 


122  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

In  most  cases  the  auditory  type  is  not  clear.  For 
very  general  terms  the  heard  word  alone  exists,  but  in 
proportion  as  the  concrete  is  approached,  the  sound 
is  accompanied  by  an  image  ;  thus  returning  upon  our 
former  type. 

It  is  worth  while  to  note  that  the  term  flatus  vocis 
^'nomina,"  first  employed  in  the  Middle  Ages  and 
which  has  since  become  the  formula  of  Nominalism, 
seems  by  its  nature  to  indicate  that  it  was  originally 
invented  by  persons  who  belonged  to  the  auditory 
type,  and  I  may  even  hazard  an  hypothesis.  The  typo- 
graphical visual  type  did  not  exist  (printing  not  being 
invented)  ;  it  is  true  that  a  substitute  might  have  ex- 
isted in  the  graphic  visual  type  (reading  of  manu- 
scripts). But  considering  that  in  the  Middle  Ages  in- 
struction was  essentially  oral,  that  learning  came 
rather  through  listening  than  by  reading,  that  the  ora- 
torical jousts  and  arguments  were  daily  and  intermin- 
able, it  is  undeniable  that  the  conditions  for  develop- 
ing the  auditory  type  were  highly  favorable  here. 

I  need  hardly  say  that  the  three  types  described 
above  are  rarely  met  with  in  the  pure  and  complete 
form.  As  a  rule  a  mixed  type  prevails  :  a  concrete 
image  for  certain  words,  and  typographical  vision,  or 
auditory  images,  for  others.  To  sum  up  :  all  cases  seem 
to  be  capable  of  reduction  to  the  following  :  (i)  The 
word  heard  ;  beyond  this,  nil  (we  shall  subsequently 
have  to  examine  this  "nothing");  (2)  typographical 
vision  alone  ;  (3)  the  same,  accompanied  by  a  con- 
crete image ;  (4)  the  word  heard,  accompanied  invari- 
ably by  a  concrete  image. 

4.  Prior  to  the  commencement  of  this  inquiry  I 
felt  much  hesitation  on  one  point :  should  one  in  ques- 
tioning use  general  7vords  or  general  propositions  ?     I 


HIGHER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  1 23 

decided  in  favor  of  words  because  these  are  brief, 
simple,  isolated,  and  undisguised,  and  have  the  ad- 
vantage of  being  understood  directly,  while  they  in  no 
way  suggest  to  the  subject  what  line  he  is  to  follow. 

I  still  however  felt  scruples  in  the  matter.  Was 
not  the  investigation  as  conducted  on  these  lines  a 
little  artificial?  In  point  of  fact,  general  terms  most 
frequently  occur  as  members  of  a  phrase,  co-operating 
with  others,  and  connected  with  them  by  certain  rela- 
tions. I  therefore  recommenced  my  inquiry,  using 
the  same  method,  but  replacing  words  by  phrases. 
The  general  propositions  employed  are  purposely 
trite,  to  avoid  contradiction,  and  to  ascertain  the  im- 
mediate mental  state.     They  were  as  follows  : 

Cause  invariably  precedes  effect. — Infinity  has  sev- 
eral meanings. — Is  Space  infinite? — Has  Time  any 
limits? — Law  is  a  necessary  relation. — I  need  not  en- 
large upon  the  results  :  they  are  pi-ecisely  the  same  as 
for  words.  In  every  case,  and  for  each  person,  there 
is  one  predominating  word  which  absorbs  all  the  con- 
tent of  the  phrase,  and  is  a  substitute  for  it.  On  this 
the  instantaneous  mental  operation  is  concentrated. 

If  of  the  concrete  type,  the  subject  sees  images. 
In  the  second  phrase,  e.  g.,  everything  converges  on 
the  word  infinity.  Replies  :  Sensation  of  obscurity 
and  depth,  vague  luminous  circles,  a  sort  of  cupola,  a 
never-receding  horizon,  etc.  If  a  typographic  visual- 
ist,  the  printed  sentence  is  seen  less  clearly  than  the 
simple  words  :  "in  minute  characters  ;  no  capitals"  ; 
some  persons  glimpse  it  rapidly:  others  see  only  "the 
principal  word  printed." 

For  the  pure  auditory  type,  the  answer  is  always 
very  simple.  "I  hear  the  sentence,  I  see  absolutely 
nothing." 


124  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

The  new  method  therefore  simply  confirms  the 
previous  observations,  with  no  variations.  This  iden- 
tity of  result  seems  to  me  to  militate  against  a  dis- 
tinction admitted  by  many  authors.  In  the  classical 
treatises  a  distinction  is  made  between  "necessary 
ideas"  and  "necessary  truths"  (I  use  their  terms  un- 
critically), i.  e.,  general  concepts  and  general  propo- 
sitions. Example  :  cause,  principle  of  causality.  In 
my  opinion  there  is  merely  a  difference  of  form  be- 
tween the  two  positions,  the  one  psychological,  the 
other  logical.  A  concept  is  a  judgment  in  a  state  of 
envelopment,  or  of  result.  The  proposition  is  a  word 
in  the  state  of  development.  The  difference  is  not 
material,  but  formal ;  it  is  the  passage  from  synthesis 
to  analysis. 

I  thought  that  after  an  interval  of  two  years  it 
might  be  interesting  to  repeat  the  same  inquiry  on  the 
same  people  ;  but  the  results  were  not  encouraging  in 
this  direction.  Some,  remembering  the  previous  in- 
vestigation, declared  that  "they  felt  themselves  in- 
fluenced beforehand."  Others,  who  had  a  more  vague 
recollection  (perhaps  because  they  did  not  understand 
the  object  of  the  inquiry)  gave  answers  analogous  to 
their  former  replies.  In  short,  notwithstanding  the 
lapse  of  time,  and  change  of  circumstances,  each 
seemed  to  be  consistent  with  his  former  self. 

I  must  admit  that  in  the  preceding  research  the 
psychological  nature  of  the  concepts  was  studied  un- 
der a  particular  aspect.  This  objection  was  made  at 
the  London  Psychological   Congress^  by  the   Presi- 


IThe  results  of  the  investigation  were  published,  partly  in  the  Revue 
Philosophique,  October,  1891,  partly  at  the  International  Congress  of  Psychol- 
ogy, second  session,  London,  1892  {International  Congress  of  Experimental 
Psychology.     London  :  Williams  &  Norgate,  pp.  20,  et  seq.). 


HIGHER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  1  25 

dent,  Professor  Sidgwick,  whose  remarks  may  be  sum- 
marised as  follows  : 

First,  Professor  Sidgwick  believes  that  the  act  of 
suddenly  calling  attention  to  a  word,  in  a  person  not 
accustomed  to  introspective  observation,  evokes  a  re- 
sponse which  does  not  exactly  correspond  to  the  state 
ordinarily  aroused  by  such  words.  In  his  own  par- 
ticular case  he  has  found  that  the  images  evoked  (us- 
ually visual)  were  extremely  feeble,  but  that  when  he 
dwelt  upon  them  they  were  enlivened.  Secondly,  the 
images  vary  a  great  deal  according  to  the  terms  em- 
ployed ;  for  example,  when  he  is  occupied  with  math- 
ematical and  logical  trains  of  thought,  he  sees  only 
the  printed  words.  If  he  is  engaged  upon  the  subject 
of  political  economy,  the  general  terms  sometimes 
have  for  their  concomitants  extremely  fantastic  im- 
ages :  like  value,  for  instance,  which  is  accompanied 
by  the  indistinct  and  fragmentary  image  of  a  man 
placing  something  upon  the  pan  of  a  balance.  Thirdly, 
when  for  such  words  as  infinity,  relation,  etc.,  the  sub- 
ject answers  nothing,  the  only  conclusion  justified  is 
that  the  subject  is  incapable  of  describing  the  con- 
fused elements  which  exist  in  his  consciousness. 
Fourthly,  Professor  Sidgwick's  own  experience  points 
to  the  conclusion  that  my  types  may  succeed  each 
other  in  the  same  person. 

On  this  last  point — the  co-existence  of  several 
modes  of  conception  in  the  same  person — I  am  quite 
in  agreement  with  Professor  Sidgwick,  and  my  own 
data,  drawn  up  from  personal  observations,  would 
provide  me  with  sufficient  evidence.  At  the  same 
time  the  object  of  my  investigation  was  not  to  deter- 
mine the  manner  in  which  each  individual  conceives, 
but  the  forms  under  which  men  as  a  whole  think  of 


126  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

concepts.  Nor  did  I  profess  to  follow  the  work  of  the 
mind  when  it  resolves  its  general  ideas  into  concretes, 
when  it  makes  coin  out  of  its  bank-notes,  but  only  to 
seize  the  subjacent  labor  that  accompanies  the  current 
and  facile  use  of  general  terms,  in  speaking,  listening, 
reading  or  writing.  No  doubt  it  would  be  advisable 
to  treat  the  subject  in  another  manner  by  studying — 
no  longer  the  momentary  state  that  corresponds  with 
the  presence  of  the  concept  in  consciousness — but  the 
stable  organised  turn  of  mind  due  to  a  long  habit  of 
dealing  with  concepts.  To  this  end  it  would  be  de- 
sirable more  especially  to  question  mathematicians 
and  metaphysicians.  My  data  are  neither  numerous 
nor  clear  enough  to  permit  of  my  hazarding  any  dic- 
tum on  this  subject.  Some  mathematicians  have  told 
me  that  they  invariably  require  a  figured  representa- 
tion, a  construction,  and  that  even  when  these  are 
considered  as  purely  fictitious  their  support  is  indis- 
pensable to  the  train  of  reasoning.  Contra  those  who 
think  geometrically,  there  are  others  who  think  alge- 
braically, eliminating  all  configuration,  or  construc- 
tion, and  proceeding  by  simple  analysis  with  the  aid 
of  signs  :  which  (with  the  necessary  corrections  and 
descriptions)  would  bring  the  first  under  the  concrete, 
and  the  second  under  the  audito-motor  type.  Among 
metaphysicians  the  typographical  visual  type  seems 
largely  to  predominate.  One  (who  is  well  known)  be- 
longs to  the  pure  auditory  type.  All  this,  however, 
is  inadequate  ;  the  investigation  would  have  to  be  fol- 
lowed out,  by  and  upon  others. 

A  young  Russian  doctor,  M.  Adam  Wizel,  who 
was  interested  in  the  subject,  put  the  same  questions 
(following  the  method  indicated  above)  to  persons  in 
the  hypnotic  state.   Admitting  the  unconscious  mental 


HIGHER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  127 

activities  to  preponderate  in  this  state  he  asked 
whether  by  this  procedure  it  would  not  be  possible  to 
penetrate  farther  into  the  unknown  substrate  of  con- 
sciousness. His  experiments  were  undertaken  at  the 
Salpetriere,  in  Charcot's,  clinique,  upon  six  women — 
hysterics  of  the  first  order.  The  subjects  were  first 
put  into  a  state  of  somnambulism,  then  after  a  pre- 
liminary explanation  were  questioned,  as  above.  After 
getting  the  answers  Wizel  ordered  the  subjects  to  for- 
get all  that  had  happened,  and  then  woke  them.  He 
now  began  again  in  the  waking  state,  asking  the  same 
questions,  so  that  he  was  able  to  compare  the  answers 
given  successively  in  the  two  cases.  They  are  nearly 
always  clearer  and  more  explicit  during  somnambu- 
lism than  during  the  waking  state,  as  may  be  judged 
by  the  following  example  (taken  from  the  third  ob- 
servation): 


QUESTIONS 

SOMNAMBULISM 

WAKING  STATE 

Dog: 

A  big  grey  animal 

Nothing 

Form  : 

A  red  cardboard  head 

Nothing 

Law: 

A  tribunal 

Nothing 

Justice: 

A  magistrate 

State  of  justice 

Number : 

Figure  12  in  white 

The  number  of  a  note  (?) 

Color : 

Green 

Blue 

Where  the  replies  are  concrete  in  the  two  cases  I 
note  a  tolerable  analogy  between  them.  M.  Wizel 
(who  eliminated  all  doubtful  cases,  and  any  accompa- 
nied by  crises)  never  encountered  the  typographical 
visual  type,  nor  the  pure  auditory  type,  in  his  experi- 
ments. His  six  hysterics  belong  to  the  concrete  type, 
with  the  predominance  of  visual  images — much  more 
rarely  of  motor  images,  provoked  by  the  word  "force." 
The  answer  "nothing "  is  very  frequent ;  less  so,  how- 
ever, during  somnambulism  than  during  the  waking 
state. 


128  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 


II. 

We  now  reach  the  most  obscure  and  difficult  part 
of  our  subject.  Among  the  nine  hundred  and  odd  re- 
plies collected,  the  one  most  frequently  met  with  is 
"nothing."  There  is  no  observation  in  which  it  does 
not  occur  at  least  once  :  in  the  majority  of  cases  it  is 
found  one,  two,  three,  four,  or  more  times.  If  I  take 
the  word  cause,  the  formula  "I  have  no  representa- 
tion," forms  fifty- three  per  cent,  of  the  total  of  answers 
collected ;  the  rest  saw  the  printed  word  or  some  con- 
crete image;  e.  g.,  a  stone  falling,  horses  drawing,  or 
other  simulacra,  of  which  several  have  already  been 
enumerated.  It  is  the  same  with  all  the  other  highly 
abstract  terms  (time,  infinity,  etc.).  So  that  to  return 
to  the  question  which  was  to  be  the  exclusive  object 
of  our  investigation, — "Is  the  general  idea  when 
thought,  read,  or  heard,  accompanied  by  anything  in 
consciousness?" — we  may  reply,  an  image,  a  typo- 
graphical vision,  or  nothing.  We  must  now  inquire, 
what  this  nothing  is,  for  it  must  be  something. 

We  are  face  to  face  with  the  problem  which  the 
pure  Nominalists  attacked,  when  they  took  this  nil  in 
its  proper  sense.  Were  there  indeed  any  who  really 
pretended  that  we  could  have  in  mind  words,  and 
words  only — nothing  besides?  This  is  a  historical 
problem  into  which  it  is  useless  for  us  to  enter.  It  is 
possible  that  some  may  have  pushed  their  reaction 
against  the  extravagances  of  realism  even  to  this 
point,  but  the  thesis  is  totally  insupportable ;  for  at 
that  rate  there  would  be  no  difference  between  a  gen- 
eral term,  and  a  word  of  any  unknown  language :  the 
latter  is   the  pure  flatus  vocis,  a  sound  that  evokes 


HIGHER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  I29 

nothing.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  by  word  we  mean 
sign,  everything  changes,  since  the  sign  implies  and 
envelops  something.  Such  appears  to  me  to  be  the 
true  interpretation. 1 

So  that  for  the  cases  which  alone  concern  us  for 
the  moment,  i.  e.,  those  in  which  the  reply  was 
"Nothing,"  there  are  two  elements,  the  one  existing 
in  consciousness  (word  heard  or  auditory  image),  the 
other  subconscious,  but  not  therefore  invalid  and  in- 
accurate. Hence  we  must  penetrate  into  the  obscure 
region  of  the  unconscious,  in  order  to  apprehend  the 
something  which  gives  to  the  word  its  signification, 
its  life,  its  power  of  substitution. 

Leibnitz  wrote:  "Most  frequently,  e.  g.,  in  any 
prolonged  analysis,  we  have  no  simultaneous  intuition 
of  all  the  characteristics  or  attributes  of  a  thing :  in 
their  place  we  use  signs.  In  actually  thinking,  we 
are  accustomed  to  omit  the  explanation  of  these  signs 
by  reference  to  what  they  signify — knowing  or  believ- 
ing that  we  have  this  explanation  in  our  power :  but 
we  do  not  judge  the  application,  or  explanation,  of  the 
words  to  be  positively  necessary.  ...  I  have  termed 
this  method  of  thinking,  blind  or  symbolic.  We  em- 
ploy it  in  algebra,  in  arithmetic,  and  in  fact  univers- 
ally:" which  is  equivalent  to  saying  that  potential 
knowledge  is  stored  up  beneath  the  general  or  ab- 
stract terms ;  nor  should  we  be  surprised  at  finding 
this  doctrine  in  the  man  who  first  introduced  the  idea 
of  the  unconscious  into  philosophy. 


IThusTaine,  who  is  usually  regarded  as  a  Nominalist,  tells  us  that,  "A 
general  idea  is  a  name,  nothing  more  than  a  name,  a  name  which  signifies 
and  comprehends  a  sequence  of  similar  facts,  or  class  of  similar  individuals, 
accompanied  usually  by  the  sensory  but  vague  representation  of  some  of 
these  facts  or  individuals."  (The  words  italicised  for  emphasis  are  not  so 
distinguished  in  the  text.) 


130  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

To  determine  the  role  of  this  inevitably  active, 
albeit  silent,  factor  is  a  difficult  enterprise,  and  one 
that  is  necessarily  inaccurate, — since  it  amounts  to 
the  translation  of  obscure  and  enveloped  states  into 
the  clear  and  analytical  language  of  consciousness. 
The  simplest  procedure  is  to  examine  how  we  arrive 
at  the  comprehension  of  general  terms. ^  Set  a  page 
of  a  philosophical  work  before  the  eyes  of  a  novice 
or  of  a  man  wholly  ignorant  of  the  subject.  He  under- 
stands nothing.  The  only  method  that  will  render  it 
intelligible  is  to  take  the  general  or  abstract  terms 
one  after  the  other,  and  translate  them  into  concrete 
events,  into  facts  of  current  experience.  This  labor 
demands  an  hour  or  two.  In  proportion  to  the  pro- 
gress of  the  novice,  the  translation  is  effected  more 
quickly ;  it  becomes  superfluous  for  certain  terms ; 
and  finally  but  a  few  minutes  are  required  for  the 
comprehension  of  a  page.  Untrained  minds  are  often 
surprised,  on  reading  a  sentence  consisting  of  abstract 
terms,  at  understanding  each  word,  and  yet  not  know- 
ing what  the  whole  means.  This  signifies  that  they 
have  not  beneath  each  word  potential  knowledge  suf- 
ficient to  establish  a  connexion  or  relation  between  all 
the  terms,  and  giving  meaning  to  them.  Apart  from 
those  who  are  familiar  with  abstraction  by  natural  gift 
or  by  habit,  it  is  incontestable  that  to  the  vast  major- 
ity the  reading  of  an  abstract  page  is  a  slow  and  pain- 
ful and  very  fatiguing  process.  This  is  because  each 
word  exacts  an  act  of  attention,  an  effort,  which  cor- 
responds to  labor  in  the  unconscious  or  sub-conscious 
regions.     When  this  labor  becomes  useless,  and  Vve 


iWe  are  dealing  only  with  comprehension,  and  not  with  invention  (dis- 
covery of  a  law,  or  of  general  features  in  nature).  Invention  requires  quite 
different  mental  processes. 


HIGHER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  I3I 

think,  or  appear  to  think,  by  signs  alone  all  goes  rap- 
idly and  easily. 

In  short,  we  learn  to  understand  a  concept  as  we 
learn  to  walk,  dance,  fence,  or  play  a  musical  instru- 
ment: it  is  a  habit,  i.  e.,  an  organised  memory.  Gen- 
eral terms  cover  an  organised,  latent  knowledge  which 
is  the  hidden  capital  without  which  we  should  be  in 
a  state  of  bankruptcy,  manipulating  false  money  or 
paper  of  no  value.  General  ideas  are  habits  in  the 
intellectual  order.  Suppression  of  effort  corresponds 
with  perfected  habit ;  as  again  with  perfect  compre- 
hension. 

What  occurs  each  time  we  have  in  consciousness 
merely  the  general  term,  is  only  a  particular  case  of  a 
very  common  psychological  fact :  as  follows : — The 
useful  work  is  carried  on  below  consciousness,  and 
above  its  surface  only  results,  indications,  or  signs 
appear.  The  facts  enumerated  above  are  all  taken 
from  motor  activity.  Their  equivalents  abound  in  the 
domain  of  feeling.  The  "causeless"  states  of  joy  or 
sorrow,  which  are  frequent  in  the  sound  man,  and  still 
more  in  the  invalid,  are  onl)'  the  translation  into  con- 
sciousness of  ignored  organic  dispositions  operating 
in  obscurity.  What  gives  intensity  and  duration  to 
our  passions  is  not  the  consciousness  we  have  of  them, 
but  the  depth  of  the  roots  by  which  they  plunge  into 
our  being,  and  are  organised  in  our  viscera,  and  sub- 
sequently in  our  brain.  They  are  no  more  than  the 
expression  of  our  constitution,  permanent,  or  mo- 
mentary. We  might  run  over  the  whole  province  of 
psychology,  with  variations  on  the  same  theme.  I  do 
not  propose  to  do  so  here,  but  would  simply  recall 
that  every  state  of  consciousness  whatsoever  (percept, 
image,  idea,   feeling,   passion,  volition)   has   its   sub- 


132  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

strate ;  that  the  concept  reduced  to  the  bare  word  is 
but  another  case  of  the  same  kind,  and  in  no  wise  pe- 
culiar :  that  to  believe  that  there  is  nothing  more  than 
the  word,  because  it  alone  exists  in  consciousness,  is 
to  seize  only  the  superficial  and  visible  part  of  the 
event, — perhaps,  all  things  considered,  the  least  part. 
This  unconscious  substratum,  this  organised  and  po- 
tential knowledge,  gives  not  merely  value,  but  an  ac- 
tual denotation  to  the  word, — like  harmonics  super- 
added to  the  fundamental  note. 

To  conclude:  we  think  not  with  words  in  the  strict 
sense  (^flatus  vocis)  but  with  signs.  Symbolic  thought, 
which  is  a  purely  verbal  operation,  is  sustained,  co- 
ordinated, vivified,  by  potential  knowledge  and  uncon- 
scious travail.  To  this  it  must  be  added  that  potential 
knowledge  is  a  genus,  of  which  the  concept  is  only  a 
species.  All  memory  can  be  reduced  to  latent  knowl- 
edge, organised,  susceptible  of  revival,  but  all  mem- 
ory is  not  material  for  concepts.  The  man  who  knows 
many  languages  even  when  not  speaking  them,  the 
naturalist  capable  of  identifying  millions  of  specimens 
while  not  classifying  them,  have  a  very  extended  po- 
tential knowledge,  but  it  is  all  concrete.  The  poten- 
tial knowledge  which  underlies  concepts  consists  in  a 
sum  of  characters,  qualities,  extracts,  which  are  the 
less  numerous  in  proportion  as  the  concept  approxi- 
mates to  pure  symbolism  :  in  other  terms  what  under- 
lies the  concept  is  an  abstract  memory,  a  memory  for 
abstracts. 

In  my  opinion,  a  large  measure  of  the  obscurities 
and  dissensions  which  prevail  as  to  the  nature  of 
concepts,  arises  from  the  fact  that  the  role  of  uncon- 
scious activity  has  for  centuries  been  misunderstood 
cr  forgotten, — psychology  having  confined  itself  ex- 


HIGHER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  1 33 

clusively  to  consciousness :  and  while  its  action  is 
universally  admitted  to-day  for  all  other  manifesta- 
tions of  mental  life — instincts,  percepts,  feelings,  vo- 
lition, etc. — it  is  still  excluded  from  the  domain  of 
concepts.  The  whole  of  the  foregoing  discussion  is 
an  essay  towards  its  reintegration. 

Need  we  add  that  the  opinion  adopted  as  to  the 
nature  of  the  unconscious  matters  little  in  the  present 
connexion?  On  this  point  there  are,  we  know,  two 
principal  hypotheses.  According  to  the  one  it  is  a 
purely  physiological  event,  and  can  be  reduced  to  un- 
conscious cerebration.  According  to  the  other,  the 
unconscious  is  still  a  psychical  fact;  whether  it  be  an 
affective  rather  than  a  representative  state,  or  a  com- 
plex of  little,  scattered  consciousnesses,  isolated,  evan- 
escent, with  no  linkage  to  the  self,  or,  again,  an  or- 
ganisation or  sequence  of  states,  which  forms  another 
current  coexistent  with  that  of  clear  consciousness. 
These  theories,  and  others  which  I  omit,  have  nothing 
to  do  with  our  purpose.  It  is  sufficient  to  recognise 
unconscious  activity  as  a  fact,  without  any  explana- 
tion, and  this  position  would  seem  to  be  incontest- 
able. 

We  have  seen  that  abstraction,  in  proportion  as  it 
ascends  and  strengthens,  separates  itself  more  and 
more  from  the  image,  until  finally,  at  the  moment  of 
pure  symbolism,  the  separation  becomes  antagonism. 
This  is  because  there  is  fundamentally,  and  from  the 
outset,  an  opposition  of  nature  and  procedure  between 
the  two.  The  ideal  of  the  image  is  an  ever-growing 
complexity,  the  ideal  of  abstraction  an  ever-growing 
simplification,  since  the  one  is  formed  by  addition, 
the  other  by  subtraction. 

To   the   man  who  is  gifted  with  a  rich  internal 


134  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

vision,  the  shape  of  people,  of  monuments,  of  land- 
scapes, surges  up  clearly  and  well  defined  :  under  the 
influence  of  attention,  and  with  time,  details  are  ad- 
ded,— the  representation  completes  itself,  and  ap- 
proaches more  and  more  completely  to  the  reality.  So 
too  with  internal  audition  :  witness  the  musician  who 
hears  ideally  every  detail  of  a  symphony. 

The  contrary  holds  for  abstraction.  "There  is," 
says  Cournot,  "an  analysis  which  separates  objects, 
and  an  analysis  which  distinguishes  without  isolat- 
ing them.  The  use  of  the  refracting  prism  is  an  in- 
stance of  the  analysis  which  separates  or  isolates.  If, 
instead  of  isolating  the  rays  so  as  to  cause  them  to 
describe  different  trajectories,  they  are  made  to  trav- 
erse certain  media  which  have  the  property  of  extin- 
guishing a  definite  color,  we  are  able  to  distinguish 
without  isolating."^ 

Abstraction  belongs  to  this  last  type,  with  inter- 
vention of  the  process  described  by  Cournot.  Atten- 
tion brings  a  feature  into  relief ;  inattention,  and  vol- 
untary inhibition,  act  as  extinguishers  to  the  other 
characteristics. 

Let  us  pass  from  theory  to  practice.  This  antag- 
onism is  of  current  observation,  almost  a  banality, 
whenever  men  of  imagination  are  confronted  with  ab- 
stract thinkers.  We  must  of  course  exclude  those 
who  by  a  rare  gift  of  nature  (Goethe),  or  by  the  arti- 
fice of  education,  are  capable  of  handling  the  image 
and  concept  alternately. 

Let  us  take  the  artists  as  type  of  the  imaginative 
thinker :  the  novelist,  poet,  sculptor,  painter,  musi- 
cian, etc.  Each  dreams  of  an  organic,  living  work,  a 
complex.     Some  with  words,  others  with  forms,  others 

1  Cournot,  Essai  stir  lesfondements  de  nos  connaissances.    L,  S  109,  p.  231. 


HIGHER  FORMS  OF  ABSTRACTION.  I  35 

with  sounds;  realists  with  the  aid  of  minute  detail, 
classics  by  means  of  general  sketches ;  all  make  for 
the  same  end.  Music  again,  which  from  its  nature 
seems  a  thing  apart,  is  an  architecture  of  sounds  of 
amazing  complexity,  often  exciting  contradictory  states 
of  mind. 

Among  abstract  thinkers  (theorists,  scientists)  the 
tendency  is  always  towards  unity,  law,  generalities — 
towards  simplification :  by  what  is  fundamental  and 
essential,  if  the  man  be  genuine  ;  by  shifting  and  ac- 
cidental features,  if  he  is  a  charlatan.  The  mathe- 
matician and  the  pure  metaphysician  have  usually  a 
distaste  for  facts,  for  multiplicity  of  detail.  A  writer 
whose  name  has  escaped  me  says:  "  Every  scientist 
smells  of  the  cadaver."  This  is  our  thesis,  under  the 
form  of  an  image.  Abstract  thought  is  a  cadaver.  It 
would  be  more  just,  though  less  picturesque,  to  say  a 
skeleton  ;  for  scientific  abstraction  is  the  bony  frame- 
work of  phenomena. 

The  antagonism  between  the  image  and  the  idea 
is  thus  fundamentally  that  of  the  whole  and  the  part. 
It  is  impossible  to  be  at  the  same  time  an  abstract 
thinker  and  an  imaginative  thinker,  because  one  can- 
not simultaneously  think  the  whole  and  the  part,  the 
group  and  the  fraction  ;  and  these  two  habits  of  mind 
while  not  absolutely  exclusive  are  antagonistic. 

* 
*  * 

In  conclusion,  have  we  general  ideas,  or  merely 
general  terms?  It  must  first  be  remarked  that  the  ex- 
pressions, "general  ideas  or  notions,"  "concepts,"  are 
equivocal  or  rather  multivocal.  We  have  seen  that 
concepts  differ  widely  in  their  psychological  nature 
according  to  their  degree,  having  but  one  character- 
istic in  common — that  of  being  extracts.     It  is  there- 


136  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

fore  chimerical  to  attempt  to  include  them  all  under  a 
single  definition.  To  take  the  highest  only,  as  most 
frequently  debated,  some  say,  "There  are  no  general 
ideas  but  only  general  terms."  To  others  the  general 
idea  is  only  an  indefinite  series  of  particular  ideas,  or 
"a  particular  idea  that  the  mind  proposes  as  the  first 
stake  in  a  forward  march.  "^  To  others  it  is  a  system 
of  tendencies  accompanied  or  not  by  the  possibility  of 
images. 2  For  my  own  part  I  prefer  the  formula  of 
Hoffding^:  "General  ideas  exist  therefore  in  the  sense 
that  we  are  able  to  concentrate  the  attention  on  cer- 
tain elements  of  the  individual  idea,  so  that  a  weaker 
light  falls  on  the  other  elements." 

This  is  the  sole  mode  of  existence  that  can  be 
legitimately  conceded  to  them. 

In  regard  to  the  higher  concepts  we  have  endeav- 
ored to  show  that  they  have  their  distinctive  psycho- 
logical nature:  on  the  one  hand  a  clear  and  conscious 
element  which  is  always  the  word,  and  sometimes  in 
addition  the  fragmentary  image  ;  on  the  other  an  ob- 
scure and  unconscious  factor, — without  which,  never- 
theless, symbolic  thought  is  only  a  mechanism  turn- 
ing in  the  air,  and  producing  naught  but  phantoms. 

1  Dugas.    Du  Psittacis7ne  et  de  la pensle  symboligue,  pp.  i2i  et  seq. 
SPaulhan.    Revue philosophigut.     July,  1889,  pp.  77  et  seq. 
3H5Sding.    Ptychologie,    £og.  tr.,  p.  168. 


CHAPTER  V. 

EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS. 

AFTER  this  general  study  of  the  nature  of  the  most 
-  elevated  forms  of  abstraction,  we  must  take  the 
principal  concepts  one  by  one,  and  retrace  their  evo- 
lution in  outline.  Let  us  once  more  note  that  we  are 
concerned  with  pure  psychology,  and  are  to  eliminate 
all  that  depends  on  the  theory  of  knowledge  and  other 
transcendental  speculations.  As  regards  the  ^rs^  ori- 
gin of  our  notions  of  time,  space,  cause,  etc.,  each 
may  adopt  the  opinion  that  pleases  him.  Whether 
we  admit  the  hypothesis  of  d  priori  forms  of  the  mind 
(Kant),  or  that  of  an  innate  sense  acquired  by  repeti- 
tion of  experience  in  the  species,  and  fixed  by  hered- 
ity in  the  course  of  centuries  (Herbert  Spencer),  or 
any  other  whatsoever — it  is  clear  that  the  appearance 
of  these  concepts,  and  the  data  of  their  evolution,  de- 
pend on  experimental  conditions,  and  consequently 
fall  within  our  province.  Accordingly  it  is  with  their 
empirical  genesis,  and  development  through  experi- 
ence, that  we  are  concerned — and  with  that  alone. 

SECTION  I.     CONCEPT  OF  NUMBER. 

The  lower  phases  of  this  concept  are  already  known 
to  us.    We  have  traversed  them  in  considering  nume- 


138  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

ration,  in  brutes,  children,  and  aborigines.  And  here 
we  return  to  it  finally  under  its  higher  aspects. 

At  the  outset,  counting  was,  as  we  found,  merely 
the  perception  of  a  plurality ;  abstraction  being  prac- 
tically at  zero.  Later  on  a  rudiment  of  numeration 
appeared,  under  a  practical  concrete  form  :  we  have 
perception  plus  the  word — a  poor  auxiliary,  whose 
part  is  so  insignificant  as  to  be  mostly  negligible.  We 
noted  the  different  stages  of  this  concrete  abstract 
period,  marked  by  the  increasing  importance  of  the 
word.  Finally  we  arrived  at  the  point  at  which  it  is 
the  prime  and  almost  the  only  factor.  Number  under 
its  abstract  form,  as  it  results,  from  a  long  elabora- 
tion, consists  in  a  collection  of  unities  that  are,  or  are 
reputed,  similar.  We  have  therefore  first  to  examine 
how  the  idea  of  unity  is  formed.  Next  by  what  men- 
tal operation  the  sequence  of  numbers  is  constituted, 
lastly  what  is  the  part  played  by  the  sign. 

I.  To  common  sense  nothing  appears  more  easy 
than  to  explain  how  the  idea  of  unity  is  formed.  I 
see  a  man,  a  tree,  a  house ;  I  hear  a  sound  ;  I  touch 
an  object ;  I  smell  an  odor,  and  so  on  :  and  I  distin- 
guish this  single  state  from  a  plurality  of  sensations. 
John  Stuart  Mill  seems  to  admit  that  number  (at  least 
in  its  simplest  forms)  is  a  quality  of  things  that  we  per- 
ceive, as  white,  black,  roundness,  hardness  :  there  is 
a  distinct  and  special  state  of  consciousness  corre- 
sponding to  one,  two,  three,  etc. 

Even  if  we  admit  this  very  doubtful  thesis,  we 
should  arrive  at  last  only  at  perceived  numbers,  with 
which  consistent  and  extended  numeration  is  impos- 
sible. It  can  only  be  carried  on  with  homogeneous 
terms,  i.  e.,  such  as  are  given  by  abstraction. 

The  notion  of  unity  must  however  find  its  point  of 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  1 39 

departure  in  experience,  at  first  under  a  concrete  form. 
Although  it  may  enter  consciousness  by  several  doors, 
some  psychologists,  with  no  legitimate  reason,  have 
attributed  its  origin  to  one  definite  mode  of  external, 
or  even  internal,  perception  which  they  have  chosen 
to  the  exclusion  of  all  others. 

For  some,  it  is  the  primordial  sense,  the  sense  par 
excellence ;  touch.  The  child  regards  as  a  unity  the 
object  which  it  can  hold  in  its  hand  (a  ball,  a  glass), 
or  follow  uninterruptedly  in  all  its  boundaries.  Wher- 
ever his  operations  are  interrupted,  where  there  are 
breaks  of  surface  continuity,  he  perceives  plurality. 
In  other  terms  unity  is  the  continuous,  plurality  is 
the  discontinuous.  Numerous  observations  prove  that 
children  actually  have  a  far  more  exact  and  precocious 
notion  of  continuous  quantity  (extension),  than  of  dis- 
continuous, discrete  quantity  (number). ^ 

For  others,  it  is  sight,  for  which  all  that  was  said 
above  may  obviously  be  repeated.  The  retina  replaces 
the  cutaneous  surface :  an  image  clearly  perceived 
without  discontinuity  is  the  unity ;  the  perception  of 
simultaneous  images  leaving  intermediate  lacunae  in 
the  field  of  vision,  gives  plurality. 

The  same  may  be  said  of  the  acoustic  sensations. 
Preyer,  in  a  work  on  "Arithmogenesis,"  claims  that 
"hearing  takes  first  rank  in  the  acquisition  of  the 
concept  of  number."     Number  must  be  felt  before  it 


1  Maclellan  &  Dewey  {Psychology  of  Number  and  Its  Application  to  Methods 
of  Teaching  Arithmetic,  New  York,  1895)  made  pedagogical  deductions  from 
this  fact.  They  ask,  for  beginners,  that  the  examples  should  be  borrowed 
from  continuous  quantity,  and  that  number  be  considered  as  a  particular 
species  of  measure. — In  his  book  Our  Notions  of  Nutnber  and  Space  (Boston, 
1894)  Nichols,  taking  a  theory  of  James  about  judgments  of  number  as  the 
basis  of  his  experiments,  tries  to  show  that  the  simultaneous  sensation  of 
two  points  applied  to  the  skin  originates  in  the  successive  sensation  of  a  dis- 
tinct contact  upon  two  separate  tactile  circles. 


140  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

is  thought.  Ideas  of  number  and  of  addition  have  to 
be  acquired,  and  this,  according  to  him,  takes  place 
in  the  child  when  it  hears  and  compares  sounds.  Sub- 
sequently, touch  and  sight  complete  this  first  outline. 
It  is  known  that  Leibnitz  assimilated  music  to  an  un- 
conscious arithmetic.  Preyer  reverses  the  proposition 
and  says :  Arithmetica  est  exercitium  musicum  occultum 
nescientis  se  sonos  comparare  aninii?- 

As  against  those  who  seek  the  origin  of  the  idea 
of  unity  in  external  events,  others  attribute  it  to  in- 
ternal experience. 

Thus  it  has  been  maintained  that  consciousness  of 
the  ego  as  a  monad  which  knows  itself,  is  the  proto- 
type of  arithmetical  unity.  Obviously  this  assertion 
is  open  to  numerous  objections.  To  wit,  the  late  for- 
mation of  the  notion  of  the  ego,  the  fruit  of  reflexion ; 
its  instability, — still  more,  this  unity,  like  all  the  pre- 
ceding, is  concrete,  complex  ;  it  is  a  composite  unity. 

The  thesis  of  W.  James  is  very  superior:  "Num- 
ber seems  to  signify  primarily  the  strokes  of  our  at- 
tention in  discriminating  things.  These  strokes  re- 
main in  the  memory  in  groups,  large  or  small,  and 
the  groups  can  be  compared.  The  discrimination  is, 
as  we  know,  psychologically  facilitated  by  the  mobil- 
ity of  the  thing  as  a  total.  ...  A  globe  is  one  if  undi- 
vided ;  two,  if  composed  of  hemispheres.  A  sand 
heap  is  one  thing,  or  twenty  thousand  things,  as  we 
may  choose  to  count  it.  "^  This  reduction  to  acts  of 
attention  brings  us  back  definitely  to  the  essential  and 
fundamental  conditions  of  abstraction. 

Save  this  last,  the  hypotheses  enumerated  (and  in- 

1 1  do  not  insist  on  any  such  rash  thesis.    A  discussion  of  it  will  be  found 
in  the  Report  of  the  Int.  Congress  of  Exp.  Psychol,  in  London  [cii.,  pp.  35-41). 
i Psychology.  \\.,  p.  653. 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  I4I 

ternal  sensation  might  also  have  been  invoked;  e.  g., 
a  localised  pain  as  compared  with  several  scattered 
pains)  give  only  percepts  or  images,  i.  e.,  the  raw 
material  of  abstract  unity.  This  is  itself  a  subjective 
notion.  We  said  above  (Chapter  II)  that  the  question 
whether  consciousness  starts  from  the  general  or  the 
particular  is  a  misstatement,  because  it  applies  to  the 
mind  which  is  in  process  of  formation,  categories 
valid  only  for  the  adult  intelligence.  So  here.  At  the 
outset  there  is  no  clear  perception  of  primary  unity 
and  subsequent  plurality,  or  vice  versa :  neither  ob- 
servation nor  reasoning  justifies  an  affirmation.  There 
is  a  confused,  indefinite  state,  whence  issues  the  an- 
tithesis of  continuous  and  discontinuous,  the  primitive 
equivalents  of  unity  and  plurality.  It  took  centuries 
to  arrive  at  the  precise  notion  of  abstract  unity  as  it 
exists  in  the  minds  of  the  first  mathematicians,  and 
this  notion  is  the  result  of  a  decomposition,  not  of  any 
direct  and  immediate  act  of  postulation.  It  was  neces- 
sary to  decompose  an  object  or  group  into  its  con- 
stituent parts,  which  are  or  appear  to  be  irreducible. 
Then  a  new  synthesis  of  these  parts  was  required  to 
re-constitute  the  whole,  in  order  that  the  notion  of  re- 
lation between  unity  and  plurality  should  be  perceived 
clearly.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  for  the  lesser  num- 
bers two,  three,  four,  the  successive  perception  of 
each  separate  object,  and  then  of  the  objects  appre- 
hended together  at  a  single  glance,  has  aided  the 
work  of  the  mind  in  the  conception  of  this  relation. 
We  have  seen  that  many  human  races  never  passed 
beyond  this  phase.  The  abstract  notion  of  unity  is 
that  of  the  indivisible  (provisory).  It  is  this  abstract 
quality  of  the  indivisible,  fixed  by  a  word,  that  gives 
us  the  scientific  idea  of  unity  as  opposed  to  the  vulgar 


142  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

notion.  Perceived  unity  is  a  concrete,  conceived  unity 
is  a  quality,  an  abstract;  and  in  one  sense  it  may  be 
said  that  unity,  and  consequently  all  abstract  number, 
is  a  creation  of  the  mind.  It  results  like  all  abstrac- 
tion from  analysis — dissociation.  Like  all  abstraction, 
it  has  an  ideal  existence ;  yet  this  in  no  way  prevents 
it  from  being  an  instrument  of  marvellous  utility. 

II.  It  is  owing  to  this  that  the  sequence  of  num- 
bers, homogeneous  in  material,  can  be  constituted  ; 
for  the  identity  of  unities  is  the  sole  condition  in  vir- 
tue of  which  they  can  be  counted,  and  the  scant  nu- 
merations of  the  concrete-abstract  period  transcended. 
The  sequence  is  constituted  by  an  invariable  process 
of  construction,  which  may  be  reduced  to  addition  or 
subtraction.  "Thus  the  number  2,  simplest  of  all 
numbers,  is  a  construction  in  virtue  of  which  unity  is 
added  to  itself ;  the  number  3  is  a  construction  in  vir- 
tue of  which  unity  is  added  to  the  number  2,  and  so 
on  in  order.  If  numbers  are  composed  by  successively 
adding  unity  to  itself,  or  to  other  numbers  already 
formed  by  the  same  process,  they  are  decomposed  by 
withdrawing  unity  from  the  previously  constructed 
sums;  and  thus,  to  decompose  is  again  to  compose 
other  numbers.  For  example,  if  3  is  2  +  i,  it  is  also 
4  —  I.  Addition  and  subtraction  are  two  inverse  oper- 
ations whose  results  are  mutually  exclusive :  they  are 
the  sole  primitive  numerical  functions."^ 

The  simplicity  and  solidity  of  this  process  result 
from  its  being  always  identical  with  itself,   and  al- 

1  Liard,  La  science  positive  et  la  mltaphysique,  p.  226.  It  should  be  remarked 
that  the  process  by  subtraction  is  met  with  even  among  uncivilised  people, 
though  very  rarely.  The  plan  of  making  numerals  by  subtraction,  says  Tyler 
[op.  cit  ,  I.,  p.  264),  is  known  in  North  America,  and  is  well  shown  in  the  Aino 
language  of  Yesso,  v/here  the  words  for  8  and  9  obviously  mean  "two  from 
ten,"  "  one  from  ten." 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  I43 

though  the  series  of  numbers  is  unlimited,  some  one 
term  of  the  sequence  is  rigorously  determined,  be- 
cause it  can  always  be  brought  back  to  its  point  of 
departure,  unity.  In  this  labor  of  construction  by 
continuous  repetition,  two  psychological  facts  are  to 
be  noted : 

1.  No  sooner  is  unity  passed,  in  the  elaboration  of 
numbers,  than  intuition  fails  altogether.  Directly  we 
reach  5,  6,  7,  etc.  (the  limit  varies  with  the  individ- 
ual), objects  can  no  longer  be  perceived  or  represented 
together  :  there  is  now  no  more  in  consciousness  than 
the  sign,  the  substitute  for  the  absent  intuition  :  each 
number  becomes  a  sum  of  unities  fixed  by  a  name. 

2.  For  our  unity-type  we  substitute  higher  unities, 
which  admit  of  simplification.  Thus  in  the  predom- 
inating decimal  system,  ten  and  a  hundred  are  unities 
ten  and  a  hundred  times  larger  than  unity,  properly 
so  called.  They  may  be  of  any  given  magnitude  :  the 
Hindus,  whose  exuberant  imagination  is  well  known, 
invented  the  koti,  equivalent  to  four  billions  three  hun- 
dred and  twenty-eight  millions  of  years,  for  calculat- 
ing the  life  of  their  gods  ;  each  koti  represents  a  single 
day  of  the  divine  life.^ 

Inversely,  we  may  consider  the  unity-type  as  a  sum 
of  identical  parts,  and  represent  1=y^  or  ^^g,  etc. 
A  tenth,  a  hundredth,  are  unities  ten  times,  a  hundred 
times,  smaller  than  unity  properly  so  called,  but  they 
obey  the  same  laws  in  the  formation  of  fractional 
numbers. 

l"The  childish  and  savage  practice  of  counting  on  the  fingers  and  toes 
lies  at  the  foundation  of  our  arithmetical  science.  Ten  seems  the  most  con- 
venient arithmetical  basis  offered  by  systems  founded  on  hand-counting,  but 
twelve  would  have  been  better,  and  duodecimal  arithmetic  is  in  fact  a  pro- 
test against  the  less  convenient  decimal  arithmetic  in  ordinary  use.  The 
case  is  the  not  uncommon  one  of  high  civilisation  bearing  evident  traces  of 
the  rudeness  of  its  origin  in  ancient  barbaric  life."    (Tylor,  loc.  cit.,  I.  p.  272  ) 


144  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

It  is  well  for  the  psychologist  to  note  the  privileged 
position  of  what  we  term  the  unity-type,  or  simply  i. 
It  originates  in  experience,  because  unity,  even  when 
concrete,  and  apprehended  by  gross  perception,  ap- 
pears as  a  primitive  element,  special  and  irreducible. 
So  long  as  the  mind  confines  itself  to  perceiving  or 
imagining,  there  is  in  the  passage  from  one  object  to 
two,  three,  or  four  objects,  or  inversely  in  the  passage 
from  four  objects  to  three,  two,  or  only  one,  an  aug- 
mentation or  diminution.  But  below  unity  in  the  first 
case,  and  above  unity  in  the  second,  there  is  no  longer 
any  mental  representation  ;  unity  seems  to  border  on 
nonentity  and  to  be  an  absolute  beginning. 

From  this  privileged  point  the  mind  can  follow 
two  opposite  directions,  by  an  identical  movement  : 
the  one  towards  the  infinitely  great,  with  constant 
augmentation  ;  the  other  towards  the  infinitely  small, 
with  constant  diminution — but  in  one  sense  or  the 
other,  infinity  is  a  never  exhausted  possibility.  Here 
we  reach  the  much  disputed  question  of  infinite  num- 
ber :  psychology  is  not  concerned  with  this.  For  some, 
infinite  number  has  an  actual  existence.  For  others, 
it  only  exists  potentially,  i.  e.,  as  an  intellectual  opera- 
tion which  may,  as  was  said  above,  add  or  subtract, 
without  end  or  intermission.^ 

III.  The  importance  of  signs,  as  the  instruments  of 
abstraction  and  generalisation,  is  nowhere  so  well 
shown  as  in  their  multiple  applications  to  discrete  or 
continuous  quantity.  The  history  of  the  mathemat- 
ical sciences  is  in  part  that  of  the  invention,  and  use 
of  symbols  of  increasing  complexity,  whose  efficacy 
is  clearly  manifested  in  their  theoretical  or  practical 

1  For  the  most  recent  view  of  this  discussion,  with  the  arguments  on  either 
side,  see  Couturat :  De  VTnfini  >iiathei)iatique  (i%<)f>).     and  part.     Bk.  III. 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  I45 

results.  In  the  first  place,  words  were  substituted  for 
the  things  that  were  held  to  be  numerable  ;  next,  par- 
ticular signs,  or  figures ;  later  still,  with  the  invention 
of  algebra,  letters  took  the  place  of  figures,  or  at  any 
rate  assumed  their  function  and  part  in  the  problem 
to  be  solved ;  later  still,  the  consideration  of  geomet- 
rical figures  was  replaced  by  that  of  their  equations  ; 
finally,  the  use  of  new  symbols  corresponded  with  cal- 
culations for  infinitesimal  quantities,  negative  quanti- 
ties, and  imaginary  numbers. 

These  symbols  are  such  a  powerful  auxiliary  to  the 
labor  of  the  mathematicians  that  those  among  them 
who  affect  philosophy  have  gladly  discoursed  upon 
their  nature  and  intrinsic  value.  They  seem  to  be 
divided  into  two  camps. 

One  faction  attribute  reality  to  the  symbols,  or  at 
least  incline  that  way.  It  is  the  introduction  of  the 
noniina  numina  into  mathematics.  They  maintain  that 
these  pretended  conventions  are  only  the  expression 
of  necessary  relations  which  the  mind  is  obliged,  on 
account  of  their  ideal  nature,  to  represent  by  arbitrary 
signs,  but  which  are  not  invented  by  caprice,  or  by 
the  necessity  of  the  individual  mind — since  this  con- 
tents itself  with  laying  hold  of  that  which  is  offered  by 
the  nature  of  the  things.  Do  we  not  see  moreover 
that  the  labor  accomplished  by  their  aid  is,  with  neces- 
sary modifications,  applicable  to  reality? 

To  the  other,  symbols  are  but  means,  instruments, 
stratagems.  They  mock  at  those  who  "look  upon 
relations  once  symbolised  as  things  which  have  in 
themselves  an  a  priori  scientific  content,  as  idols, 
which  we  supplicate  to  reveal  themselves  "  (Renou- 
vier).  Signs,  whatever  they  may  be,  are  nothing  more 
than   conventions ;    negative    quantities    represent    a 


[46  THE   EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

change  in  the  direction  of  thought.  Imaginary  num- 
bers "represent  important  relations  under  a  simple 
and  abridged  form."  S3^mbols  are  an  aid  in  surmount- 
ing difificulties,  as,  empirically,  the  lever  and  its  de- 
velopments serve  for  the  lifting  of  weights.  "It  is 
not  calculation,"  said  Poinsot,  "that  is  the  secret  of 
this  art  which  teaches  us  to  discover  ;  but  the  atten- 
tive consideration  of  things,  wherein  the  intellect  seeks 
above  all  to  form  an  idea  of  them,  endeavoring  by 
analysis  properly  so  called  to  decompose  them  into 
other  more  simple  ideas,  and  to  review  them  again 
subsequently  as  if  they  had  been  formed  by  the 
union  of  those  simpler  things  of  which  it  had  full 
knowledge."^ 

In  sum  :  numbers  consist  in  a  series  of  acts  of  in- 
tellectual apprehension,  susceptible  of  different  direc- 
tions, and  of  almost  unlimited  applications.  They 
serve  for  comparison,  for  measurement,  for  putting 
order  into  a  variety  of  things.  If  we  compare  now 
the  two  extremes, — viz.,  the  first  attempt  at  infantine 
numeration  and  the  highest  numerical  inventions  of 
the  mathematician, — we  must  recognise  the  notion  of 
number  to  be  a  fine  example  of  the  complete  evolu- 
tion of  the  faculty  of  abstraction,  as  applied  to  a  par- 
ticular case,  the  principal  stages  of  which  we  have 
been  able  to  note  in  bringing  out  the  ever-increasing 
importance  of  signs. 

SECTION  II.     THE  CONCEPT  OF  SPACE. 

The  idea  of  space  has  given  rise  to  so  many  the- 
ories that  it  is  difficult  to  restrain  ourselves  within  the 
strict  limits  of  psychology,  and  of  our  particular  sub- 

ICournot,  op.cit.,  I.,  p.  331  et  seq.     Renouvier,  Logique,  I.,  pp.  377-394. 
Poinsot,  Thiorie  nouvelle  de  la  rotation  des  corps,  p.  78. 


EVOLUTION  OF  THK  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  I47 

ject.  Whether  or  no  this  concept  be  innate,  given 
d~  priori  or  derived  from  our  cerebral  constitution,  we 
have  here — setting  aside  all  question  of  origin — only 
to  inquire  by  what  ways  and  means  we  attain  full  con- 
sciousness of  it  and  determine  it  to  be  a  fundamental 
concept. 

In  order  to  follow  its  development  we  must  neces- 
sarily set  out  from  experience  ;  since  space,  like  num- 
ber or  time,  is  perceived  before  it  is  conceived.  For 
the  sake  of  clearness  and  precision,  let  us  designate 
the  primitive  concrete  data,  the  result  of  perception, 
as  extension,  and  the  concept,  the  result  of  abstraction, 
as  space — properly  so  called. 

I.  At  the  outset  what  is  given  us  by  intuition  is 
extension  under  a  concrete  form.  What  first  becomes 
known  to  us  is  not  space  but  a  limited  and  determined 
extension — what  the  child  can  hold  in  its  hand,  reach 
by  a  movement  of  its  arms,  later  on  the  room  which 
it  crosses  with  uncertain  steps  ;  it  is  a  street,  a  square 
traversed,  a  journey  made  by  carriage  or  by  train,  the 
horizon  which  the  eye  embraces,  the  nebulae  vaguely 
seen  in  the  nocturnal  sky,  etc.  All  this  is  concrete 
and  measurable,  and  can  be  reduced  to  a  measure, 
i.  e.,  to  a  concrete  extension  such  as  the  metre  and 
its  fractions. 

These  different  extensions,  although  given  by  the 
senses,  and  therefore  concrete,  are  already  abstract ; 
since  they  co-exist  with  other  qualities  (resistance, 
color,  cold,  heat,  etc.)  from  which  a  spontaneous  anal- 
ysis separates  them,  in  order  to  consider  them  indi- 
vidually. This  analysis  is  translated  by  the  common 
terms,  long,  short,  high,  deep,  near,  far,  to  the  right, 
to  the  left,  in  front,  behind,  etc. 

By  a  simplification  which  occurred  much  later  (for 


m 


148  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

it  implies  the  foundation  of  geometry)  tliis  somewhat 
confused  and  incoherent  list  is  replaced  by  a  more 
rational  analysis :  height,  breadth,  depth,  distance, 
position.  It  marks  the  transition  from  the  concrete- 
abstract  to  the  abstract  period.  It  is  in  fact  certain 
that  before  constituting  itself  as  a  science  founded 
upon  reasoning,  geometry  traversed  a  semi-empirical 
stage,  it  was  born  of  practical  needs — the  necessity  of 
measuring  fields,  building  houses,  and  the  rest.  More- 
over certain  great  mathematicians  have  by  no  means 
disdained  to  admit  its  relations  with  experience  :  Gauss 
called  it  the  "science  of  the  e5'e,"  and  Sylvester  de- 
clared "that  most  if  not  all  the  chief  ideas  of  modern 
mathematics  originated  in  observation." 

Let  us,  without  insisting  further,  recollect  that  ex- 
tension is  given  us  by  touch  and  sight.  Touch  is  par 
excellence  the  sense  of  extension  :  thus  geometry  re- 
duces the  problems  of  equality  or  inequality  to  super- 
positions, and  all  measure  of  extension  is  finally  re- 
ducible to  tactile  and  muscular  sensations.  The  terms 
touch  and  vision  ought  in  fact  to  be  completely  co- 
extensive, representing  not  merely  a  passive  impres- 
sion upon  the  cutaneous  surface,  or  the  retina,  but  an 
active  reaction  of  the  motor  elements  proper  to  the 
sensorial  organs. 

The  term  acoustic  space  has  recently  come  into  use. 
Much  work  has  been  done  on  the  semi-circular  canals, 
leaving  no  doubt  as  to  the  part  they  play  in  the  sense 
of  bodily  equilibrium  ;^  some  authors  have  even  local- 
ised a  "  space-sense  "  in  them.  Miinsterberg  relates 
from  his  personal  experience  that  while  the  vestibule 

IFor  a  summary  of  these  investigations,  see  the  chapter  "Sensations  of 
Orientation  "  in  Prof.  E.  Mach's  Popular  Scientific  Lectures,  3rd  ed.,  Chicago, 
1898;  and  for  original  discussions  of  the  whole  subject  of  space-sensations, 
see  the  same  author's  Analysis  of  the  Semations,  Chicago,  1897. —  Trans. 


KVOI.UTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  I49 

and  the  cochlea  receive  excitations  whence  result  the 
purely  qualitative  sensations  of  sound  (height,  in- 
tensity, etc.),  the  semi-circular  canals  receive  others 
which  depend  upon  the  position  of  the  source  of  the 
sound  :  these  excitations  would  produce  reflexes,  prob- 
ably in  the  cerebellum,  the  purpose  of  which  would 
be  to  bring  the  head  into  the  position  best  adapted 
for  clear  audition.  The  synthesis  of  sounds,  of  the 
modifications  perceived  in  the  canals,  and  of  the  afore- 
said movements  (or  images  of  movement)  would  con- 
stitute the  elements  of  an  acoustic  space.  Wundt, 
who  opposes  this  theory,  sees  nothing  more  in  the 
semi-circular  canals  than  internal  tactile  organs,  auxil- 
iary to  external  touch.  ^ 

Leaving  this  hypothesis  of  acoustic  space  (which 
is  by  no  means  well-established),  we  know  from  nu- 
merous observations  that  the  different  modalities  of 
tactile  and  visual  extension,  notably  that  of  distance, 
are  only  known  with  precision  after  much  groping  and 
long  apprenticeship. 2 

Extension  under  all  its  aspects,  whether  perceived 
or  imagined,  presents  according  to  constitution,  age, 
or  circumstances,  a  character  of  variability  which  is  in 
complete  contrast  with  the  stability  and  fixity  of  the 

IMiinsterberg,  Beitr'dge  zur  experinten.  Psychologic,  pp.  182  et  seq.  Wundt, 
Physiol.  Psychologic,  4th  ed.,  II.  pp.  95-96. 

J  This  is  not  the  place  to  enter  into  the  well-known  discussion  between 
the  "nativists"  and  the  "  empiricists."  To  the  former  all  sensation,  visual 
or  tactile,  contains  from  its  outset  a  quantum  of  extension  which  is  the  prim- 
itive element,  and  the  foundation  for  our  spatial  constructions.  For  the 
others  there  are  only  local  signs,  tactile  or  visual,  and  movements  whose 
synthesis  suffices  to  constitute  all  the  modalities  of  existence.  Whichever 
hypothesis  be  adopted,  the  extension  in  point  is  always  that  given  by  concrete 
data  (not  that  of  space  conceived  in  the  abstract) — directly  cognised  accord- 
ing to  some,  a  genetic  construction  according  to  others.  This  discussion  has 
no  direct  relation  with  our  subject:  for  the  full  debate  see  Ribot's  Psychologic 
allemandc  contemporaine,  Ch.  V.  James  [Psychology,  II.  Ch.  XX.)  has  recently 
taken  up  the  nativistic  theory,  giving  new  arguments  in  its  favor. 


150  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

concept  of  space.  The  conditions  of  this  relativity 
have  been  exposed  at  length  by  Herbert  Spencer.  "A 
creature  without  eyes  cannot  have  the  same  concep- 
tion of  space  as  one  that  has  eyes  ;  and  it  is  the  same 
with  the  congenitally  blind  as  compared  with  those 
who  are  in  full  possession  of  their  eyesight  ;  and  for 
the  creature  whose  locomotion  is  rapid  and  powerful 
as  compared  with  the  creature  which  moves  slowly 
and  painfully.  Our  bodily  bulk  and  organic  dimen- 
sions also  affect  conceptions  of  space  ;  distances  which 
seemed  great  to  the  boy  seem  moderate  to  the  man, 
and  buildings  once  thought  imposing  in  height  and 
mass  dwindle  into  insignificance.  Without  speaking 
of  nervous  subjects,  who  illusively  imagine  their  bod- 
ies enormously  large  or  infinitely  small,  there  are 
also  transient  and  momentary  states  of  the  organ- 
ism which  considerably  modify  the  consciousness  of 
space  ;  thus,  De  Quincy,  describing  some  of  his  opium 
dreams,  says  that  "buildings  and  landscapes  were  ex- 
hibited in  proportions  so  vast  as  the  bodily  eye  is  not 
fitted  to  receive.  Space  swelled,  and  was  amplified  to 
an  extent  of  unutterable  infinity."^  "Deliberate  anal- 
ysis of  their  movements,"  says  Lotze,  "is  so  little 
practised  by  women  that  it  can  be  asserted  without 
fear  of  error  that  such  expressions  as  'to  the  right,' 
*to  the  left,'  =  forwards,'  'backwards,'  etc.,  express  in 
their  language  no  mathematical  relations  whatever, 
but  merely  certain  particular  feelings  which  they  ex- 
perience when  during  work  they  perform  movements 
in  these  directions."^  In  fine,  the  consciousness  of 
concrete  extension  varies  in  quantity  and  quality  with 


1  Extracted  from  Spencer's  Psychology,  Vol.  I.  §  90. 

2  Lotze,  Mikrokosmus,  II.  p.  47. 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  I51 

the  structure,  position,  age,  and  momentary  condi- 
tion of  the  feeling  subject. 

II.  Starting  from  these  concrete  data — extension 
as  included  in  our  perceptions — how  does  the  intel- 
lect arrive  at  the  abstract  notion  of  space? 

The  immense  majority  of  men  left  to  their  own  re- 
sources do  not  rise  above  a  confused  notion,  half- 
concrete,  half-abstract,  of  the  properties  of  extension, 
and  what  Lotze  says  {supra)  applies  even  better  to 
their  total  idea  of  space-relations.  The  fundamental 
conception  in  such  minds  is  simply  the  possibility  of 
going  very  far  in  all  directions,  or  of  placing  a  suc- 
cession of  bodies  one  behind  the  other.  As  to  limit, 
this  operation  remains  vaguely  undetermined.  It  is 
however  translated  into  current  parlance,  e.  g.,  "bod- 
ies are  in  space,"  and  other  analogues.  Space  is  con- 
ceived, or  rather  imagined,  as  an  immense  sphere 
which  encloses  everything,  as  the  receptacle  of  all 
extension.  It  contains  bodies,  as  a  barrel  holds  wine. 
The  primitive  cosmologies  which  yet  demand  a  cer- 
tain development  of  reflexion  and  of  abstraction  re- 
veal the  nature  of  this  conception  to  us  when  they 
speak  of  the  circle  of  the  horizon,  the  vault  of  heaven, 
the  firmament  (a  kind  of  firm  enclosure),  and  other 
expressions  which  denote  belief  in  an  insurmountable 
limit.  This  conception,  which  is  wholly  imaginative 
at  bottom,  is  a  fine  example  of  abstraction  elevated 
into  an  entity,  and  the  phantom  thus  created  becomes 
in  its  turn  the  source  of  idle  or  badly-stated  problems 
such  as  the  following. 

'We  have  never,' contends  J.  S.  Mill,  'perceived 
an  object,  or  a  portion  of  space,  without  there  being 
space  beyond  it,  and  from  the  moment  of  our  birth 
we  have  always  perceived  objects  or  parts  of  space. 


152  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

It  follows  from  this  that  the  idea  of  an  object  or  part 
of  space  must  be  inseparably  associated  with  the  no- 
tion of  a  further  space  beyond  it.  Each  moment  of 
our  life  tends  to  rivet  this  association,  no  experience 
has  ever  interrupted  it.  Under  the  actual  conditions 
of  existence,  this  association  is  indissoluble.  .  ,  .  Yet 
we  can  conceive  that,  given  other  conditions  of  exist- 
ence, it  might  be  possible  to  transport  ourselves  to 
the  limits  of  space,  and  that  after  there  receiving  im- 
pressions of  a  kind  totally  unknown  to  our  present 
state,  we  might  instantly  become  capable  of  conceiv- 
ing the  fact  and  of  stating  the  truth  of  it.  After  some 
experience  of  the  new  conception,  the  fact  would  seem 
as  natural  to  us  as  the  revelations  of  sight  to  the  blind 
man  whose  cure  is  of  long  standing.' 

This  argument  is  founded  upon  an  equivocation. 
Mill  appears  to  admit  as  the  basis  of  his  discussion 
the  semi-concrete,  semi-abstract  notion  of  space,  de- 
scribed above;  namely,  that  of  common  sense.  Con- 
sequently he  confounds  and  mixes  up  two  perfectly 
distinct  questions ;  that  of  Extension,  the  concrete 
fact  perceived  or  imagined,  and  Space,  abstract  and 
conceived.  In  the  case  of  the  former,  the  problem  is 
cosmological  and  objective,  and  we  are  not  concerned 
with  it ;  it  is,  under  another  form,  the  repetition  of 
the  discussion  on  infinite  number, — are  we,  or  are  we 
not,  to  admit  a  continous,  real  magnitude?  In  the 
latter,  the  problem  is  psychological,  subjective,  rela- 
tive to  abstraction  alone,  and  will  be  answered  later 
on. 

Up  to  this  point,  in  fact,  the  concept  of  Space 
corresponds  to  the  state  of  evolution  that  we  have  so 
frequently  denoted  as  concrete-abstract.  The  true 
concept  of  space — of  purely  abstract  space — was  only 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  1 53 

constituted  when  the  geometricians  (Greek  and  other- 
wise) disengaged  from  different  extensions  those  es- 
sential features  which  they  termed  dimensions,  show- 
ing by  their  science  that  elements  thus  abstracted  and 
considered  separately  can  be  substituted  for  all  the 
rest.  Stallo  justly  observes  that  the  geometrical  ele- 
ments are  neither  real,  nor  ideal,  nor  hypothetical; 
they  are  conceptual,  the  result  of  abstraction.  "In 
the  processes  of  discursive  thought  the  intellect  never 
has  before  it  either  sensible  objects  or  the  whole  com- 
plement of  relations  which  make  up  their  mental  im- 
ages or  representations,  but  only  some  single  relation 
or  class  of  relations.  It  operates  along  lines  of  ab- 
straction, the  final  synthesis  of  whose  result  never 
yields  anything  more  than  outlines  of  the  objects 
represented.  During  all  its  operations  the  intellect 
is  fully  aware  that  neither  any  one  link  in  the  chain 
of  abstraction  nor  the  group  of  abstract  results  which 
we  call  a  concept  (in  the  narrower  sense  of  a  collec- 
tion of  attributes  representing  an  object  of  intuition 
or  sensation)  is  a  copy  or  an  exact  counterpart  of  the 
object  represented.  It  is  always  conscious  that  to 
bring  about  true  conformity  between  concepts  or  any 
of  their  constituent  attributes  with  forms  of  objec- 
tive reality,  the  group  of  relations  embodied  in  these 
concepts  would  have  to  be  supplemented  with  an  in- 
determinate number  of  other  relations  which  have  not 
been  apprehended  and  possibly  are  insusceptible  of 
apprehension.  .  .  ."^ 

No  one  imagines  that  there  are  in  Nature  points, 
surfaces,  lines,  volumes,  such  as  geometry  proposes 

IStallo,  Concepts  of  Modern  Physics,  Chap.  XIIL,  p.  225,  Int.  Sc.  Ser.,  third 
ed.  He  also  gives  a  veiy  concise  ooriticism  of  Mill's  theory  of  induction  in 
geology. 


154  "T^^  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

them,  nor  that  its  concepts  are  copies  of  these,  but  it 
is  not  therefore  necessary  to  take  refuge  in  the  i  priori: 
abstraction  suffices,  the  act,  i.  e,,  by  which  fundamen- 
tal qualities  are  abstracted,  to  be  subsequently  fixed 
by  definition.  It  is  strange  that  Stuart  Mill  in  his 
long  and  untoward  discussion  of  this  subject  should 
content  himself  with  saying  that  "we  have  a  power, 
when  a  perception  is  present  to  our  senses,  or  a  con- 
ception to  our  intellect,  of  attending  to  a  part  only  of 
that  perception  or  conception."^  In  this  remark  upon 
attention  he  is  very  near  recognising  the  role  of  ab- 
straction (which  for  the  rest  he  fails  to  name),  but  in- 
stead of  insisting  upon  it  he  returns  to  his  thesis,  that 
"the  foundation  of  all  sciences,  even  deductive  and 
demonstrative  sciences,  is  induction  .  .  .  ." 

The  concept  of  space  such  as  the  geometers  have 
made  it,  namely  at  its  highest  degree  of  abstraction, 
is  thus  the  result  of  association.  It  is  extension  emp- 
tied of  all  its  constitutive  qualities,  save  the  necessary 
conventions  which  determine  it.  This  schema  (apart 
from  all  transcendental  considerations)  appears  to  us 
as  the  total  of  the  conditions  of  bodily  existence  in  so 
far  as  they  are  endowed  with  extension.  Thus  consti- 
tuted, with  the  marks  which  are  proper  to  it,  and  dis- 
tinguish it  from  all  others,  this  concept,  like  that  of 
number,  is  susceptible  of  multiple  application,  while 
moreover  it  has  no  assignable  limits  in  any  direction 
(i.  e.,  according  to  the  time-honored  expression,  it  is 
infinite). 

Just  as  concrete  number  represents  real  unities  or 
collections,  while  abstract  number  detached  from  dis- 
continuous realities  admits  of  infinite  numeration;  so 
concrete  space  (extension)  corresponds  to  the  intui- 

l  System  of  Logic,  I.  Bk.  II.,  Chap.  15,  §  I. 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  1 55 

tion  of  certain  bodies,  while  abstract  space,  by  an  un- 
representable concept,  if  not  by  words,  implies  an  un- 
limited extension. 

If,  hypothetically,  it  were  possible  to  count  all  the 
leaves  of  all  the  trees  in  the  world,  this  prodigious 
number  corresponding  to  concrete  unities  would  be  as 
nothing  to  the  mind  that  can  count  for  ever  beyond 
that.  So  for  the  extension  determined  by  the  move- 
ment of  our  arms  or  legs,  by  days  of  railway  travelling 
or  sailing,  by  balloon  ascensions,  and  finally  by  the 
most  powerful  telescopes  that  can  scrutinise  the  infin- 
ity of  the  heavens, — in  all  these  concrete,  fixed,  meas- 
ured extensions  we  can  always  imagine  a  beyond,  be- 
cause the  end  of  one  extension  is  the  beginning  of  the 
next.  All  that,  however,  is  but  the  work  of  the  imagi- 
nation manipulating  abstraction.  The  law  of  con- 
struction for  infinite  space  is  the  same  as  for  infinite 
number :  this  infinity  is  only  in  the  operation  of  our 
mind,  it  is  a  pure  psychological  process ;  we  believe 
we  are  dealing  with  real  magnitudes,  and  we  are  only 
acting  upon  our  own  judgment :  we  are  but  adding 
states  of  consciousness  one  upon  another.  Space  is 
only  potentially  infinite,  and  this  potentiality  is  in  us, 
and  in  nothing  but  ourselves ;  it  is  a  virtuality  which 
can  neither  be  exhausted  nor  achieved.  To  erect  it 
into  an  entity  is  to  reify  an  abstraction,  to  attribute 
an  undue  objective  value  to  an  entirely  subjective  con- 
cept. The  journey  to  the  end  of  space  as  suggested 
by  Stuart  Mill  in  the  passage  above  cited  (if  by  space 
he  means  the  simple  possibility  of  containing  extended 
bodies)  would  really  be  a  journey  to  the  end  of  our 
minds :  if  he  means  a  journey  to  the  end  of  the  real 
world,  i.  e.,  determinable  and  measurable  extension — 
which  has  no  limits  beyond  the  imperfection  of  our 


156  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

instruments — then  he  admits  implicitly  that  the  uni- 
verse has  bounds,  he  takes  sides  in  a  debate  in  which 
experimental  psychology  (we  repeat)  sees  nothing, 
and  which  it  is  even  totally  incompetent  to  decide. 


During  this  century  certain  illustrious  mathemati- 
cians,— Gauss,  1792,  in  an  unpublished  work,  Loba- 
ch^vski  in  1829,  Riemann,  Beltrami,  Helmholtz  and 
many  others  after  them,  constructed  a  new  geometry 
known  under  various  names  :  astral,  imaginary,  pan- 
geometric,  metageometric,  and  lastly  non-Euclidean 
geometry.  Its  fundamental  principle  is  that  our  Eu- 
clidean space  is  only  one  particular  case  among  several 
possible  cases,  and  our  Euclidean  geometry  one  spe- 
cies of  which  pangeometry  is  the  genus — that  the  sole 
determining  reason  in  its  favor  is  that  Euclidean  geom- 
etry alone  is  practically  applicable  to,  and  verified  by, 
experience.  These  essays,  beyond  their  direct  interest 
to  mathematicians,  have  already  given  rise  to  a 
considerable  number  of  philosophical  considerations. 
While  they  have  only  very  distant  relations  with  psy- 
chology, they  deserve  notice,  because  they  enable  us 
the  better  to  understand  the  genesis  of  the  concepts 
of  space,  and  are  moreover  a  striking  proof  of  the 
constructive  power  of  the  mind,  emancipated  from 
experimental  data,  and  subject  only  to  the  rules  of 
logic. 

Our  space  being  of  three  dimensions,  the  neo- 
geometers  speculated  in  the  first  place  as  to  the  hy- 
pothesis of  a  space  of  4,  5,  or  ^-dimensions ;  later  on 
they  chose  as  their  base  of  operations  a  space  of  three 
dimensions,  considered  no  longer  as  plane  (Euclidean 
space)  but  as  spherical  or  pseudo-spherical,  having, 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  1 57 

i.  e.,  instead  of  a  zero  curvature,  either  a  positive 
(spherical  space)  or  a  negative  curvature  (pseudo- 
spherical  space).  Their  point  of  departure  is  the  re- 
jection of  Euclid's  postulate — they  do  not  admit  that 
it  is  impossible  to  draw  through  a  point  more  than 
one  parallel  to  a  given  straight  line.  In  spherical 
space  there  is  nothing  analogous  to  the  Euclidean 
axiom  of  parallels ;  in  pseudo-spherical  space  two 
parallels  to  a  line  can  be  drawn  through  any  point. 
In  the  first  hypothesis,  the  sum  of  the  three  angles  of 
a  triangle  is  greater  than  two  right  angles;  in  the 
second  it  is  smaller.  Thus  by  deduction  after  deduc- 
tion, the  neo-geometers  constructed  an  edifice  very 
different  from  ordinary  geometry,  subject  to  no  other 
conditions  than  that  of  being  free  from  internal  con- 
tradiction. 

In  our  connexion,  the  sole  utility  of  the  invention 
of  imaginary  geometries  is  to  have  reinforced,  as  if  by 
a  magnifying  process,  the  distinction  between  space 
perceived  and  conceived-^  this  assumes  various  forms 
according  to  the  process  of  abstraction  employed  and 
fixed  in  definitions.  "Euclidean  "  space  has  only  one 
advantage,  that  it  is  the  simplest,  the  most  practical, 
the  best  adapted  to  facts :  in  short,  that  which  in- 
volves the  least  disparity  between  the  ideal  and  our 
experience,  and  consequently  the  most  useful.  Cer- 
tain neo-geometers  have  in  fact  maintained  that  it  is 
uncertain  whether  space  can,  or  cannot,  have  the 
same  properties  throughout  the  whole  universe  .  .  . 
and  that  it  is  possible  that  in  the  rapid  march  of  the 
solar  system  across  space  we  might  gradually  pass 
into  regions  in  which  space  has  not  the  same  proper- 
ties as  those  we  know";  yet  this  thesis,  which,  fun- 
damentally, reifies  an  entity,  does  not  seem  to  have 


158  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

gained  many  partisans.     Stallo  criticises  it  at  length 
{pp.  cit.,  Chap.  XIII). 

There  is  no  agreement  as  to  the  measure  in  which 
the  new  concepts  agree  or  disagree  with  the  theory  of 
space,  "the  a  priori  form  of  sensibility."  Some  hold 
them  to  be  indifferent,  others  to  be  unfavorable  to 
Kantism  :  this  discussion  which,  for  the  rest,  does  not 
concern  us  is  still  in  progress. 

* 
*  * 

In  conclusion,  extension  is  a  primary  datum  of 
perception  and  cannot  be  further  reduced  :  it  is  mul- 
tiple, full,  heterogeneous,  continuous  (at  least  in  ap- 
pearance), variable,  perhaps  finite  ;  while  space  (con- 
cept) is  void,  unified,  homogeneous,  continuous,  and 
without  limits. 

Many  men  and  races  never  get  beyond  this  stage 
of  concrete  representation,  which  corresponds  with 
the  first  moment  of  evolution  in  the  individual  and  in 
the  species.  The  first  step  towards  the  concept  of 
space  (concrete-abstract  period)  consists  in  represent- 
ing it  to  oneself  as  the  place,  the  receptacle  of  all 
bodies.  This  is  the  direct  result  of  primitive  reflex- 
ion :  image  rather  than  concept,  to  which  the  mind 
attributes  an  illusive  reality. 

The  true  concept,  resultant  of  abstraction,  has  been 
the  elaboration  of  geometricians.  It  is  actually  con- 
stituted by  a  synthesis  of  abstracts  or  extracts  which 
are,  according  to  Riemann,  size,  continuity,  dimen- 
sion, simplicity,  distance,  measure.  This  synthesis 
or  association  of  abstracts  has  nothing  necessary  about 
it ;  its  elements  may  be  combined  in  several  ways  ; 
hence  the  possibility  of  different  concepts  of  space 
(Euclidean,  non- Euclidean).  Space  conceived  as  in- 
finity reduces  itself  to  the  power  that  the  human  mind 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  1 59 

has  of  forming  sequences,  and  it  forms  them  thanks 
to  abstraction,  which  admits  of  its  seizing  the  law  of 
their  formation. 

Intuition  is  the  common  basis  of  all  concepts  of 
space.  Euclidean  space  rests  directly  upon  this,  and 
upon  definitions.  Non-Euclidean  space  rests  directly 
upon  it,  but  more  particularly  upon  definitions. 

Although  inapplicable  to  the  real  world,  these  last 
— which  are  constructions  in  which  the  mind  is  sub- 
mitted to  no  other  laws  than  agreement  with  itself — 
are  brilliant  examples  of  the  power  of  abstraction, 
when  it  attains  its  highest  degree  of  development. 

SECTION  III.     THE  CONCEPT  OF  TIME. 

In  evolving  the  idea  of  time,  as  in  that  of  space, 
we  must  first  examine  the  concrete  fact  which  is  its 
starting-point,  i.  e.,  real  duration  \  next  the  concept 
which  is  extracted  from  it,  time  in  abstracto — and  this 
must  be  followed  in  the  successive  stages  of  its  de- 
velopment. 

I. 

Real,  concrete  duration  is  a  quality  known  by  it- 
self, included  among  internal  and  external  sensations, 
as  later  on  in  the  representations  which  psychology, 
in  what  concerns  it,  must  accept  as  an  ultimate  datum. 

What  is  this  concrete  duration,  furnished  by  ex- 
perience? It  might  strictly  be  said  to  be  the  pres- 
ent ;  yet  this  answer  is  somewhat  theoretical,  for  it 
must  be  admitted  that  what  we  term  '' the  present " 
has  vague  and  fluctuating  limits.  Moreover,  its  clear 
and  precise  distinction  from  what  has  preceded  and 
what  is  to  follow  it — the  past  and  the  future — is  a 
somewhat  late  production.    Of  this  we  have  objective 


l6o  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

witness  (see  Ch.  II.)  in  primitive  languages,  during  the 
period  in  which  the  value  of  the  verbs  was  undeter- 
mined. Take  again  the  fact,  as  frequently  observed, 
that  children  even  at  the  age  of  three,  or  older,  hav- 
ing vague  notions  of  past  and  future,  make  a  general 
confusion,  and  do  not  distinguish  between  "yester- 
day" and  last  week,  between  "to-morrow"  and  next 
week  (Sully). 

Still,  we  must  admit  that  the  present  has  the  priv- 
ilege of  appearing  in  consciousness  as  the  typical  dura- 
tion, the  standard,  the  measure  to  which  everything 
must  be  referred.  Nor  can  this  be  otherwise,  seeing 
that  (as  is  too  often  forgotten)  we  live  only  in  the 
present ;  that  the  past  and  the  future  have  no  exist- 
ence for  us,  are  only  known  to  us  under  the  condition 
of  becoming  present,  of  occupying  actual  conscious- 
ness. The  present  is  the  only  psychical  element, 
which,  consciously  or  unconsciously,  gives  a  content 
and  reality  to  duration. 

It  is  essential  to  rid  ourselves  of  the  opinion  ac- 
credited by  many  authors,  that  the  present  is  only  an 
elusive  moment,  a  transition,  a  passage,  a  flash,  a 
mathematical  point,  a  zero,  a  nullity;  on  the  contrary 
— it  alone  has  duration,  is  now  long,  now  short.  It  is 
even  possible,  to  some  extent,  to  determine  its  limits, 
and  to  transcend  this  vague  description.  Here  we  are 
aided  by  the  labors  of  the  psycho-physicists.  We  may 
say  that  this  study,  long  restricted  to  metaphysical 
dissertations,  entered  upon  a  positive  phase  with 
Czermak,  who  (in  1857)  opened  out  a  new  line,  in 
which  he  has  been  followed  by  many  others.  The 
numerous  researches  and  experiments  made  upon  the 
"sense  of  time"  may  be  omitted  without  prejudice  to 
our  subject,  while  the  discussion  of  them  would  deter 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  l6l 

US  from  our  principal  aims.  We  must,  however,  give 
a  rapid  summary  of  those  which  relate  either  to  the 
actual  perception  of  duration,  or  to  the  reproduction 
in  memory  of  past  duration.^ 

I.  This  present,  declared  to  be  inapprehensible, 
has  however  been  determined  as  regards  its  minimum 
duration.  For  the  discrimination  period  between  two 
different  sensations  (taken  as  the  type  of  the  briefest 
and  simplest  psychical  act),  Kries  and  Auerbach  found 
durations  varying  between  o-oi  and  007  second  with 
an  average  of  0-03  second.  At  a  later  period,  Exner, 
experimenting  with  Savart's  wheel,  stated  that  the  in- 
terval at  which  two  successive  taps  can  be  perceived 
separately  may  be  reduced  to  0-05  second:  as  also 
for  the  sound  produced  by  two  electric  sparks.  For 
the  eye,  the  minimum  perceptible  interval  between 
two  impressions  falling  on  the  yellow  spot,  is  0-044 
second.  Below  this,  one  of  the  conditions  necessary 
to  consciousness — an  adequate  duration — is  wanting. 

Certain  experiments  contributed  by  Wundt  and 
his  pupils  throw  light  also  upon  the  maximum  dura- 
tion that  can  be  apprehended  by  consciousness.  They 
made  use,  almost  exclusively,  of  auditory  sensations, 
which  are  more  closely  allied  than  any  others  to  the 
sense  of  time.  Wundt  finds  that  twelve  impressions 
equivalent  to  a  duration  varying  from  3-6  to  6  seconds 
can  be  clearly  perceived  to  form  a  group.  Dietze  ad- 
mits the  continuous  perception  of  40  beats  of  the 
metronome,  provided  the  mind  arranges  them  spon- 
taneously in  5  sub  groups  of  8,  or  8  sub-groups  of  5. 
Total  duration  :    12  seconds.     Others  vary  in  their 


1  The  complete  history  of  this  question,  from  its  first  beginnings  to  con- 
temporaneous work,  may  be  studied  in  Nichols's  "  Psychology  of  Time,"  Am. 
J.  0/ Psychol.,  III.  pp.  453-530- 


l62  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

conclusions  from  6  to  i2  seconds  and  even  more.^ 
James  is  inclined  to  think  that  the  actual  present  may 
extend  to  a  minute. 

Of  course  these  figures,  of  which  we  can  only  give 
a  few,  vary  with  the  subjects,  quality  of  the  impres- 
sions received,  conditions  of  experience,  exercise,  etc. 
Nor  must  we  forget  that  these  laboratory  researches 
are  somewhat  artificial,  and  concerned  with  the  per- 
ception of  "the  present"  under  studied  conditions  of 
simplicity  which  are  not  precisely  those  of  spontane- 
ous consciousness.  Still  it  is  plain  that  "  the  present" 
is  by  no  means  an  abstraction,  a  nothing,  and  we  may 
conclude,  in  the  words  of  James,  "by  saying  that  we 
are  constantly  conscious  of  a  certain  duration — the 
specious  present — varying  in  length  from  a  few  sec- 
onds to  probably  not  more  than  a  minute,  and  that 
this  duration  (with  its  content  perceived  as  having 
one  part  earlier  and  the  other  part  later)  is  the  orig- 
inal intuition  of  time.  Longer  times  are  conceived  by 
adding,  shorter  ones  by  dividing,  portions  of  this 
vaguely  broached  unit,  and  are  habitually  thought  by 
us  symbolically."* 

2.  Experiments  relating,  not  to  consciousness  of 
actual  duration,  but  to  the  reproduction  of  durations, 
and  determination  of  the  errors  involved,  are  numer- 
ous, and  contradictory.  I  refer  to  them  in  passing 
only  because  they  are  eminently  suited  to  show  the 
very  relative  and  precarious  character  of  our  concrete 
notions  of  duration. 

Through  all  divergencies,  the  formula  enunciated 
by  Vierordt,  the  principal  initiator  of  these  researches, 

iFor  these  and  the  following  experiments,  cf.  Wundt,  Physiolo^ische  Psy- 
chologic, 4th  ed.,  I.  pp.  408  et  seq. 
1  Psychol.,  I.  642. 


EVOI.UllON  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  163 

remains  stable  ;  our  consciousness  of  time  comes,  not 
from  a  sensation,  but  from  a  judgment,  and  in  our 
retrospective  appreciation  of  duration,  we  diminish 
intervals  that  are  long,  and  increase  those  that  are 
short.  The  debates  and  disagreements  of  the  ex- 
perimenters relate  above  all  to  the  determination  of 
the  "indifferent  point."  Vierordt  denoted  by  this 
term  the  interval  of  time  which  we  appreciate  the 
most  exactly,  which  we  have  no  tendency  to  lengthen 
or  abridge,  so  that  if  we  are  required  to  repeat  it  ex- 
perimentally, the  error  is  nil,  or  very  rare.  This  dura- 
tion, reproduced  according  to  reality,  is  0-35  sec.  (ac- 
cording to  Vierordt  and  Mach)  ;  0-4  sec.  (Buccola)  ; 
0-72  sec.  (Wundt) ;  0-75  sec.  (KoUert)  ;  0-71  sec; 
etc.  According  to  another  author,  Glass,  there  is  a 
series  of  points  at  which  we  find  maximum  relative  ac- 
curacy; 1*5  sec,  2- 5  sec,  3 '75  sec,  5  sec,  6  25  sec, 
etc.  Munsterberg  again  criticises  the  entire  series  of 
figures  and  experiments,  for  reasons  that  will  be  given 
below. 

Independent  of  these  experiments,  which  are  re- 
stricted to  very  simple  events,  the  facts  of  our  daily  life 
show  to  superabundance  that  our  memory  of  duration 
is  almost  always  inexact.  Thus  it  has  often  been  re- 
marked that  the  years  seem  to  be  shorter  with  ad- 
vancing age  :  which  is  again  an  instance  of  abbrevia- 
tion of  the  longer  intervals.^  It  is  hardly  necessary  to 
say  that  our  appreciation  of  duration  (concrete),  like 
that  of  extension  (concrete),  depends  upon  multi- 
ple conditions,  and  varies  with  these.  Such  are  pre- 
eminently constitution  and  temperament :  compare  a 

1  M.  Janet  has  studied  this  subject,  under  the  title  "  Una  illusion  d'op- 
tique  interne"  (Rev.  Phil.,  1877,  III.  pp.  497  et  seq.)  and  explains  the  illusion 
by  supposing  that  the  apparent  duration  of  a  certain  portion  of  time,  in  the 
life  of  each  individual,  is  proportional  to  the  total  duration  of  his  life. 


164  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

phlegmatic  with  a  nervous  individual ;  an  Oriental  for 
whom  time  is  not,  with  an  Occidental,  agitated  by  a 
feverish  existence.  Add  to  these,  age,  number,  and 
vivacity  of  impressions  received,  certain  pathological 
states,  etc.,  and  we  find  here,  as  for  space,  that  the 
variability  of  concrete  knowledge  is  opposed  to  the 
fixity  of  the  concept. 

This  consciousness  of  duration,  fluctuating,  vari- 
able, and  unstable  as  it  may  be,  is  nevertheless  the 
source  whence  our  abstract  notion  of  time  is  derived : 
but  whence  comes  it,  itself?  Where  does  it  originate? 
"Time  has  been  called  an  act  of  mind,  of  reason,  of 
perception,  of  intuition,  of  sense,  of  memory,  of  will, 
of  all  possible  compounds  and  compositions  to  be 
made  up  from  all  of  them.  It  has  been  deemed  a 
General  Sense  accompanying  all  mental  content  in  a 
manner  similar  to  that  conceived  of  pain  and  pleas- 


ure 


"1 


Here  are  many  answers.  We  may  add  that  among 
these  supposed  origins  some  authors  admit  only  one, 
to  the  exclusion  of  the  rest,  though  nothing  justifies 
them  in  such  arbitrary  selection. 

Some  prefer  external  sensations,  inasmuch  as  they 
give  us  the  consciousness  of  a  sequence.  Hearing  has 
been  termed  the  sense  of  time  par  excellence.  This 
thesis  has  notably  been  sustained  by  Mach  •?  since  in 
a  melody  we  can  separate  the  rhythm  from  the  sounds 
which  compose  it,  he  concludes  that  rhythm  forms 
a  distinct  sequence,  and  that  there  must  be  in  the  ear, 
as  in  the  eye,  a  mechanism  of  accommodation  which 
is  perhaps  the  organ  of  the  "time-sense."  Others  de- 
cide in  favor  of  the  general  sense,  touch,  capable  in 

1  Nichols,  op.  cit.,  p.  502. 

^Analysis  of  the  Sensations,  Chicago,  1897,  PP-  1'°  6'  seq. 


EVOI-UTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  165 

all  animals  of  receiving  a  succession  of  impressions  at 
once  distinct  and  forming  a  series.  Sight,  with  its 
fine  and  rapid  perception  of  movements  and  changes, 
is  an  organ  admirably  adapted  to  the  formation  of  re- 
lations of  sequence,  the  constitutive  elements  of  time. 
Were  not,  moreover,  the  first  essays  at  determining 
time  (succession  of  days  and  nights,  seasons,  etc.) 
founded  upon  visual  perceptions? 

The  majority  of  contemporary  psychologists  are, 
however,  inclined  with  reason  to  seek  the  principal 
origin  of  the  notion  of  duration  in  internal  sensations ; 
and  these  derive  their  .prerogative  from  the  primordial 
and  rhythmical  nature  which  pertains  to  the  principal 
functions  of  life. 

"A  stationary  creature,"  says  Herbert  Spencer, 
"without  eyes,  receiving  distinct  sensations  from  ex- 
ternal objects  only  by  contacts  which  happen  at  long 
and  irregular  intervals,  cannot  have  in  its  conscious- 
ness any  compound  relations  of  sequence  save  those 
arising  from  the  slow  rhythm  of  its  functions.  Even 
in  ourselves,  the  respiratory  intervals,  joined  some- 
times with  the  intervals  between  the  heart's  pulses, 
furnish  part  of  the  materials  from  which  our  con- 
sciousness of  duration  is  derived ;  and  had  we  no 
continuous  perceptions  of  external  changes,  and  con- 
sequently no  ideas  of  them,  these  rhythmical  organic 
actions  would  obviously  yield  important  data  for  our 
consciousness  of  Time:  indeed,  in  the  absence  of  loco- 
motive rhythms,  our  sole  data." 

"Rhythm,"  to  quote  Horwicz,  "is  the  measure, 
and  the  sole  measure,  of  time;  a  being  incapable  of 
regular  periodic  intervals  could  not  attain  to  any  con- 
ception of  time.     All  the  rhythmic  functions  of  the 

IH.  Spencer,  Psychology,  I.,  g  91,  p.  215. 


l66  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

body  subserve  this  end  :  respiration,  pulse,  locomotor 
movements,  hunger,  sleep,  work,  habits  and  needs 
of  whatever  kind." — Guyau  maintains  essentially  the 
same  thesis,  under  a  more  metaphysical  aspect : 
"Time  is  embryonically  in  primitive  consciousness; 
under  the  form  of  force  and  effort ;  succession  is  an 
abstraction  of  motor  effort,  exerted  in  space.  The 
past  is  the  active  become  passive."^ 

More  recently,  Miinsterberg^  has  attributed  a  pre- 
ponderant and  almost  exclusive  part  to  respiration. 
Although  he  affirms  that  the  origin  of  our  notions  of 
duration  must  be  sought  in  our  consciousness  of 
muscular  effort  in  general,  and  that  its  primitive 
measure  lies  in  the  rhythm  of  the  bodily  processes ; 
yet  the  gradual  rise  and  fall  of  the  sense  of  effort 
which  accompanies  the  two  phases  of  the  respiratory 
function  (inspiration,  expiration)  seem  to  him  the 
principal  source  of  our  appreciation  of  duration.  After 
a  rather  sharp  criticism  of  the  attempts  of  his  prede- 
cessors (which  we  have  already  reviewed)  to  determine 
the  "indifferent  point,"  he  maintains  that  their  dis- 
agreements were  caused  by  incomplete  comprehension 
of  the  ps3^chical  events  produced  in  the  course  of  ex- 
perience. In  the  perception  of  the  successive  beats 
of  a  metronome,  or  taps  of  Wundt's  electric  hammer, 
only  the  auditory  impressions  are  attended  to  ;  this  is 
a  mistake.  It  is  supposed  that  the  sensation-limits 
form  the  entire  content  of  consciousness,  and  that  the 
intervals  between  them  are  empty.  On  the  contrary, 
they  are  filled  by  an  act  of  attention.  We  are  con- 
scious of  a  process  of  variable  tension  which,  from 

1  Horwicz,  Psychologische  Analysen,  III.,  145.  Guyau,  Genise  de  Vidfe  du 
temps,  pp.  35  et  seq. 

^Beitriige  zur  experimentellen  Psychologie,  11.,  1889. 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  1 67 

the  initial  moment,  goes  decreasingly  towards  zero, 
and  then  rises  again,  to  adapt  itself  to  the  sonorous 
impression  that  should  follow  it.  In  other  words, 
there  are,  in  the  perception  of  three  successive  taps, 
not  three,  but  five  states  of  consciousness :  three  ex- 
ternal and  two  internal  sensations.  We  must  reckon 
thus  if  we  are  rigorously  to  determine  ^o.  psychological 
conditions  of  experience.  As  evidence,  Miinsterberg 
brings  forward  the  following  results,  which  are  from 
his  own  experiments. 

The  "normal  time"  is  first  determined,  i.  e.,  the 
standard  of  duration  that  should  be  reproduced  by 
the  experimenter  as  exactly  as  possible  (*'time  of 
comparison"). 

In  one  case,  different  durations  were  given,  such 
as  15,  7,  22,  18  sees.,  etc.,  without  attending  to  the 
respiration  (expiration  or  inspiration)  of  the  subject, 
who  reacted  independently  of  it.  In  the  reproduction 
of  normal  time,  the  mean  error  was  10.7  per  cent. 

In  the  second  case,  the  same  numbers  were  given 
again,  but  care  was  taken  that  the  subject  began  his 
estimation  at  precisely  that  respiratory  period  which 
coincided  with  the  beginning  of  the  normal  time.  The 
mean  error  did  not  now  exceed  2.9  per  cent. 

In  the  two  cases  cited,  there  was  no  interruption 
between  the  determination  of  the  normal  time  and 
its  reproduction  ;  the  two  operations  succeeded  each 
other  immediately.  If,  on  the  contrary,  a  short  pause, 
or  arrest,  was  introduced  between  the  two,  varying 
from  I  to  60  seconds,  the  results  are — proceeding  at 
random  as  in  the  first  case — a  mean  error  of  24  per 
cent.;    as  in  the  second,  a  mean  error  of  5-3  per  cent. 

Miinsterberg  has  been  not  unreasonably  reproached 
for  attributing  to  respiration,  among  all  the  other  in- 


l68  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

ternal  sensations,  the  exclusive  privilege  of  measuring 
time.  A  less  justifiable  criticism  asserts  that  his  thesis 
is  devoid  of  value  because  we  can  appreciate  the  vari- 
ations in  duration  in  the  beats  of  a  clock  more  read- 
ily than  the  changes  in  the  rhythm  of  respiration. 
This  is  confounding  two  distinct  factors  in  the  genesis 
of  the  idea  of  duration  :  its  period  of  formation  and 
its  period  of  constitution  ;  that  which  occurs  at  the 
commencement,  and  that  which  takes  place  in  the 
adult.  Our  measure  is  at  first  subjective,  variable  ; 
progress  consists  in  the  substitution  of  a  fixed,  objec- 
tive measure.  Doubtless,  the  latter  is  superior  in 
clearness  and  in  precision ;  yet  this  is  no  proof,  not 
even  presumption,  that  it  is  first  in  order  :  we  shall 
return  to  this  point  later  on. 

In  short,  our  consciousness  of  duration  is  a  com- 
plex state,  more  exactly,  a  process — since  it  is  less  a 
state  than  a  becoming.  The  rhythmical  visceral  sen- 
sations are  its  core  ;  it  is  an  internal  chronometer, 
fixed  in  the  depths  of  our  organisation.  Around  this 
subjective  element,  other  objective  elements  are  added 
and  co-ordinated — the  regular  sequences  which  are 
caused  by  external  sensations.  They  form  the  sheath 
of  the  core,  and  constitute  the  sensible  portion  of  our 
consciousness  of  duration,  not,  however,  its  totality. 

II. 

Until  now  we  have  considered  time  under  its  con- 
crete form  alone,  whether  given  as  an  actual  event  in 
consciousness,  or  revived  as  a  past  event  in  memory. 
We  have  now  to  follow  the  complete  development  of 
this  idea  to  its  extreme  limit.  In  this  study  we  may 
conveniently  distinguish  two  stages  : 

The  first,  which  depends  on  memory  and  imagina- 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  1 69 

tion,  consists  in  thinking  a  certain  extension  of  dura- 
tion, that  may  be  more  or  less  vaguely  represented  : 
a  day,  a  week,  a  year,  etc. 

The  second,  which  depends  on  abstraction  alone, 
gives  time  in  general,  the  pure  concept,  which  cannot 
be  represented,  and  is  determined  by  signs  alone. 

First  Stage. — Certain  minds  never  get  beyond 
this  first  stage.  In  respect  of  time,  this  corresponds 
to  the  lower  forms  of  abstraction  which  we  have  so 
often  designated  by  the  terms,  generic  image  and,  at  a 
higher  degree,  concrete-abstract  notions  (intermediate 
abstracts) . 

The  lowest  form,  which  is  just  higher  than  the 
recognition  of  concrete  duration,  results  like  the  gen- 
eric image  from  the  repetition  of  a  sequence  of  events 
that  recur  constantly,  and  are  approximately  uniform. 
They  are  series  of  which  the  terms  are  variable,  but 
which  begin  and  end  always  in  the  same  manner. 
Such  are  the  appearance  and  disappearance  of  the 
sun,  lying  down  to  sleep  and  waking  up  again,  and 
similar  facts  of  common  life.  The  points  of  departure, 
the  start  and  finish,  are  always  the  same,  whatever 
the  variations  in  the  intermediate  states.  These  gen- 
eric images  are  met  with  among  the  higher  brutes, 
children,  and  primitive  races. 

To  what  extent  are  the  higher  animals  capable  of 
having  a  certain  representation  of  time,  constructed 
from  their  experience  of  real  duration?  This  is  an 
obscure  problem  which  has  been  little  studied.  We 
are  not  of  course  referring  to  time  in  abstracto,  to  the 
concept,  but  to  the  recognition  of  certain  often  re- 
peated cycles.  Many  animals  are  known  to  have  an 
approximate  appreciation  of  sufficiently  protracted 
periods,   supplied   by  the  periodicity  of  their  needs 


170  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

(hours  at  which  they  get  food,  are  taken  out,  etc., 
etc.).  Prejudice  apart,  we  know  of  others  which,  in 
addition  to  this  subjective  physiological  knowledge, 
possess  a  fairly  exact  notion  of  certain  regular  and  ob- 
jectively caused  periods,  determined  by  the  progress 
of  natural  phenomena,  especially  by  the  path  of  the 
sun.* 

In  all  these  instances  we  may  assign  as  cause,  the 
incontestable  preponderance  (in  animal  life)  of  au- 
tomatism and  of  routine  :  which  is  equivalent  to  say- 
ing that  the  notion  of  these  durations  is  formed  by  a 
passive  assimilation,  and  this — as  we  have  seen — is 
the  creative  process  of  generic  images. 

According  to  some  authors,  there  are  instances  of 
exact  appreciation  of  much  less  simple  periods.  Brehm 
says  that  during  a  long  passage  an  ourang-outang  vis- 
ited the  sailors  every  Wednesday  and  Friday  at  8 
o'clock,  because  on  those  days  sago,  sugar,  and  cin- 
namon were  served  out,  of  which  he  got  his  share. 
An  anecdote  has  often  been  cited  after  Romanes,  of 
"the  geese  who  came  regularly  every  fortnight,  from 
afar,  the  morning  after  the  market,  in  a  small  English 
town,  to  pick  up  the  corn  scattered  on  the  market- 
place. One  year  the  market  was  postponed  for  a  day 
of  national  humiliation,  but  the  geese  came  as  usual.  "* 

These  and  other  analogous  facts  seem  scarcely  suf- 
ficient in  number,  nor  strictly  enough  observed,  to 
warrant  any  scientific  conclusion. 


IVanEnde  cites  a  large  number  of  facts  in  point,  but  they  are  not  all 
equally  convincing.    Histoire  naiurelle  de  la  croyance,  pp.  208-212. 

S  Romanes,  Animal  Intelligence,  p.  314.  It  should  be  remarked  that  the 
author  only  reports  the  fact  from  another  witness — that  the  narrator  said  it 
had  occurred  "  thirty  years  before,"  and  "  that  he  did  not  pretend  to  remem- 
ber under  what  precise  circumstances  the  habit  of  coming  into  the  street  was 
acquired." 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  171 

We  have  previously  remarked  that,  up  to  the  age 
of  three  years  or  more,  children  who  already  have  an 
approximate  knowledge  of  space  relations,  (distance, 
proximity,  within,  without,  upper,  lower,  etc.)  have  a 
very  confused  notion  of  periods  as  short  as  three  to 
four  days,  a  week,  etc.  It  has  been  hypothetically 
suggested  that  the  extension  of  the  notion  of  dura- 
tion must  for  them  arise  in  expectation  rather  than  in 
memory,  in  an  orientation  towards  the  future  rather 
than  the  past. 

The  concrete-abstract  period  with  its  different  de- 
grees, limited  on  the  one  extreme  by  generic  images, 
on  the  other  by  the  pure  concept,  is  met  with  among 
savage  races,  and  in  rising  civilisations.  It  is  a  stage 
that  has  to  be  traversed  by  every  human  race  ;  many 
now  existing  have  not  got  beyond  it.  Days  (solar 
revolution),  months  (lunar  revolution),  and  seasons, 
the  round  of  the  changing  aspects  of  nature,  give  the 
primitive  and  simplest  notions  of  time  in  extension. 
No  tribe  is  so  low  in  the  scale  as  not  to  have  reached 
this  level.  The  determination  of  the  (solar)  year,  even 
when  only  approximate,  marks  a  decisive  progress. 

The  peculiar  feature  of  this  period,  in  its  lowest 
degrees,  is  that  the  notion  of  time  cannot  as  yet  be 
separated,  or  extracted,  from  the  sequence  of  events. 
We  have  already  given  many  examples  of  this  state  of 
intelligence.  It  is  not  poetical  feeling  that  makes  the 
savage  reckon  the  age  of  his  children  by  the  flower- 
ing of  certain  plants  (and  other  analogous  locutions 
abound  among  primitive  races,) — nor  any  innate  taste 
for  metaphor  :  it  is  merely  that  he  requires  concrete 
marks  to  determine  duration.  He  cannot  think  the 
longer  periods  in  abstracto  ;  they  must  be  imagined, 
represented  in  virtue  of  a  more  or  less  arbitrary  choice, 


172  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

imprisoned  in  a  concrete  mould.  Moreover,  in  the 
absence  of  any  extended,  coherent,  systematic  numer- 
ation, the  mind  loses  itself  after  the  first  step.  It 
lacks  the  necessary  vehicle  for  movement  in  front  and 
behind,  knowing  whither  it  is  tending.  The  natural 
phenomena  vi^hich  it  takes  as  its  starting-point  are 
poor  substitutes  for  the  absent  sign,  and  moreover 
rivet  it  invincibly  to  the  concrete. 

In  my  opinion,  the  culminating  point  of  this  period 
is  arrived  at  in  the  popular  conception  of  time — con- 
sidered as  a  vague  entity  which  unrolls  itself,  as  it 
gives  birth  to  events.  This  is  the  notion  that  is  gen- 
eral among  most  men  of  medium  culture,  who  are  ig- 
norant of  philosophical  speculation  on  the  subject. 
It  is  the  final  term  of  common,  spontaneous  reflexion, 
left  to  its  own  resources.  Thus  it  is  said  of  time  that 
it  brings  the  unexpected,  consoles  sorrow,  extinguishes 
passion,  changes  tastes,  solves  difficulties,  and  the  like; 
it  seems  to  be  an  active  power,  a  thing  in  itself.  In 
fact,  no  other  abstraction  has  perhaps  been  so  often  re- 
ified. We  may  further  remark  that  time  has  often  been 
personified  and  even  deified  in  several  religions.  Such 
an  honor  has  never  been  conceded  to  space.  The 
cause  of  this  difference  is  that  time  has  an  internal, 
human  character :  above  all,  that  it  is  opposed  to 
space  as  dynamic  to  static.  It  is  an  entity  manifested 
in  movement  and  change,  and  thereby  essentially  act- 
ing and  living.  While,  in  the  popular  conception, 
space  is  the  passive  receptacle  of  bodies,  time  is  the 
active  spring  by  which  the  whole  is  set  in  motion. 

Second  Stage. — The  generic  images  of  duration, 
and  later,  the  semi-concrete,  semi-schematic  represen- 
tation of  more  prolonged  lapses  of  time,  provide  the 
material  whence  we  obtain  the  purely  abstract  con- 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  173 

cept  of  time.  It  was  stated  above  (p.  153)  that  the 
true  concept  of  space  was  constituted  on  the  day 
when  the  ancient  geometers  disengaged  from  the  dif- 
ferent extensions,  the  essential  features  which  they 
termed  dimensions.  So  must  the  first  astronomers, 
without  knowing  or  seeking  for  what  they  did,  have 
laboriously  disengaged  the  essential  characteristics  of 
time  conceived  in  abstracto.  First,  they  purified  the 
notion  of  duration  from  all  anthropomorphic  features, 
studying  it  objectively,  in  the  course  of  the  regular 
phenomena  of  nature.  Moreover,  they  introduced 
measure.  The  Chaldaeans  of  Alexander's  time,  who 
possessed  a  series  of  astronomical  observations  em- 
bracing a  period  of  i,goo  years,  who  made  an  error  of 
only  two  minutes  in  their  computation  of  the  sidereal 
year,  who  determined  a  cycle  of  6,585  days  by  which 
they  were  able  to  calculate  eclipses  ;^  who  were  later 
on  the  inventors  of  the  clepsydra,  hour-glass,  and 
other  more  or  less  imperfect  instruments  for  measur- 
ing the  subdivisions  of  the  day ;  all  these  counted  for 
more  than  metaphysical  speculation  in  ridding  our 
subject  of  popular  conceptions — or  at  least  to  a  large 
extent  prepared  the  way.  Accustomed  as  we  are  in 
civilised  life  to  a  convenient  and  exact  knowledge  of 
the  flow  of  time,  measuring  it  off  at  any  moment  by 
clocks  and  watches,  we  forget  how  widely  different 
must  be  the  state  of  mind  in  the  man  whose  only 
guides  are  approximations  :  such,  e.  g.,  as  the  vary- 
ing height  of  the  sun  in  different  seasons,  with  other 
natural  changes  apt  to  be  misinforming.  The  one  life 
is  precise,   the  other  vague,   or  at  least  mysterious. 

1  According  to  Delambre,  the  Chaldaeans  could  only  discover  the  cycle 
which  the  Greek  mathematicians  called  saros  by  studying  their  commemora- 
tive notes  ;  i.  e.,  from  a  considerable  mass  of  observations,  they  extracted  or 
abstracted  a,  const.int  recurrence. 


174  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

That  our  measure  of  time  (as  of  aught  else)  is  rela- 
tive, matters  little,  and  the  vexed  problems  of  this 
subject  do  not  concern  us.  By  measure,  the  notion 
of  time  acquires  a  quantitative  mark  ;  it  no  longer  ap- 
pears as  an  entity,  but  as  a  possibility  of  successive 
events,  as  a  divisible  and  subdivisible  process ;  as  an 
extract  or  abstract,  set  apart  from  the  events,  disso- 
ciated from  them  by  an  intellectual  operation :  in 
short — time  is  a  thing  no  longer  real  or  imaginary, 
but  conceptual. 

It  is  wasted  labor  to  repeat  for  time  what  has  al- 
ready been  said  for  space,  and  is  applicable  to  both 
concepts.  Time,  like  space  and  number,  can  be  con- 
ceived as  illimitable  ;  but  here  again  the  infinity  is 
only  in  our  mental  operation.  We  can  add  century 
to  century,  million  upon  million  of  years.  This  in- 
finite time  is  potential  only — constituted  by  a  two-fold 
process  :  either  as  a  sequence  of  numbers,  which  is 
the  ordinary,  simplest,  and  most  abstract  proceed- 
ing ;  or  by  filling  it  with  fictitious  events,  with  arbi- 
trary constructions,  for  the  future  ;  by  evoking  the 
image  of  vanished  states,  when  we  go  back  to  the  first 
geological  ages  of  our  globe,  to  the  nebulous  period, 
and  so  on.  This  conception  of  infinite  time  is  how- 
ever quite  subjective,  and  in  itself  reveals  nothing  as 
to  the  nature  of  things  :  we  do  but  add  one  state  of 
consciousness  to  another  ;  it  is  an  inexhaustible  pos- 
sibility of  progression  and  retrogression ;  and  it  is 
nothing  more. 

It  is  a  common  illusion  to  transform  this  conceived 
infinity  into  a  real  infinity;  we  forget  that  the  mind  is 
only  working  upon  the  abstract,  i.  e.,  upon  a  fiction, 
useful  no  doubt,  but  created  by  ourselves  alone,  ac- 
cording to  our  intellectual  nature. 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  1 75 

Let  US  suppose  that,  in  consequence  of  gradual 
cooling,  the  disappearance  of  the  sea,  or  any  other 
cause,  man  and  all  animals  capable  of  appreciating 
duration  were  to  disappear  from  the  surface  of  the 
earth  ;  time  would  disappear  with  them.  Doubtless 
the  earth  would  continue  to  turn  round  its  axis,  the 
moon' round  our  planet,  the  sun  to  take  its  course  ; 
yet  nothing  would  exist  beyond  the  movements.  Just 
as — if  every  eye  were  to  disappear — there  would  be 
neither  light  nor  color ;  if  every  ear  failed,  there  would 
be  neither  sounds  nor  noises,  but  only  the  bare  poten- 
tiality of  luminous  and  auditory  sensations  if  the  ap- 
propriate organs  were  to  appear  again :  so,  on  our 
hypothesis,  there  could  only  be  a  potentiality  of  time. 

Consciousness  is  the  necessary  condition  of  any 
notion  whatever  of  the  time  which  appears  and  dis- 
appears with  it. 

* 
*  * 

It  is  no  part  of  our  subject  to  discuss  the  various 
theories  that  have  been  advanced  as  to  the  nature  of 
the  psychological  process  by  which  the  primitive  no- 
tion of  time  is  constituted  in  consciousness.  This 
question  is,  on  the  one  hand,  distinct  from  the  history 
of  its  development  as  an  abstract  idea,  which  we  have 
been  endeavoring  to  follow,  and,  on  the  other,  from 
all  hypotheses  as  to  its  ultimate  origin  (Kant's  d.  priori 
form,  Renouvier's  law  of  the  mind,  Spencer's  cerebral 
innateness)  which  explains  neither  its  appearance  as 
a  fact,  nor  its  genesis  in  experience.  We  may,  how- 
ever, complete  our  account  by  summarising  the  latest 
psychological  opinions.^ 

iFor  details  see,  in  addition  to  Nichols's  article  as  previously  cited, 
Sully,-  The  Human  Mind,  IL,  Appendix  E,  and  James,  Psychology,  I.,  pp.  632 
et  seq. 


176  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

It  is  clear  that  a  simple  sequence  of  impressions 
will  not  suffice  to  constitute  the  idea  of  time  ;  the  se- 
ries must  be  cognised  as  such,  felt  or  thought  as  a 
sequence.  How  is  it  to  be  cognised?  Contemporary 
opinion  upon  this  point  appears  to  be  capable  of  re- 
duction into  two  principal  types. 

I.  Some  admit,  as  adequate  conditions,  sensations 
and  their  consecutive  images,  strong  states  and  weak 
states ;  provided,  however,  that  the  latter  arise  be- 
fore the  former  have  disappeard  from  consciousness. 

Wundt  supposes  that  similar  beats  of  a  clock  suc- 
ceed each  other  at  regular  intervals  in  a  vacant  con- 
sciousness. When  the  first  has  disappeared  its  image 
remains  until  the  second  succeeds  it.  This  reproduces 
the  first,  in  virtue  of  the  law  of  association  by  simi- 
larity, but  at  the  same  time  encounters  the  still  per- 
sisting image.  Hence  the  simple  repetition  of  the 
sound  contains  all  the  elements  of  time-perception. 
The  first  sound  (recalled  by  association),  gives  the 
commencement,  the  second  the  end,  and  the  persist- 
ent image  represents  the  length  of  the  interval.  At 
the  moment  of  the  second  impression,  the  entire  per- 
ception of  time  exists  simultaneously,  since  all  the 
elements  are  presented  together:  the  second  sound 
and  the  image  directly,  and  the  first  impression  by 
reproduction. 

"The  phenomena  of  'summation  of  stimuli'  in  the 
nervous  system  prove,"  says  James,  "that  each  stim- 
ulus leaves  some  latent  activity  behind  it  which  only 
gradually  passes  away.  Psychological  proof  of  the 
same  fact  is  afforded  by  those  'after-images'  which 
we  perceive  when  the  sensorial  stimulus  is  gone.  .  .  . 
With  the  feeling  of  the  present  thing  there  must  at  all 
times  mingle  the  fading  echo  of  all  those  other  things 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  1 77 

v\  liich  the  previous  few  seconds  have  supplied.  Or, 
!o  state  it  in  neural  terms,  there  is  at  every  moment 
a  cumulation  of  brain-processes  overlapping  each  other,  of 
which  the  fainter  ones  are  the  dying  phases  of  processes 
which  but  shortly  previous  were  active  in  a  maximal  de- 
gree. The  amount  of  the  overlapping  determines  the  feel- 
ing of  the  duration  occupied.  .  .  .  Why  such  an  intuition 
should  result  from  such  a  combination  of  brain-pro- 
cesses, I  do  not  pretend  to  say.  All  I  aim  at  is  to 
state  the  most  elemental  form  of  the  psycho  physical 
conjunction."  James  is  careful  to  repeat  in  several 
places  that  he  makes  no  attempt  at  explanation. 

2.  Others  admit  sensations  and  intervals ;  sensa- 
tions that  are  no  longer  images,  but  internal  sensations 
of  tension,  of  effort ;  more  properly  a  sub-conscious 
element,  which  consciousness  is  able  to  apprehend  by 
observation  or  induction.  This  theory  has  a  more 
active  character  than  that  first  discussed. 

The  cleanest  and  most  complete  form  of  this  inter- 
pretation is  that  of  Miinsterberg, — as  set  forth  above. 

Fouill6e  supports  the  same  thesis  as  a  particular 
case  of  his  general  theory  of  idees-forces.  The  appar- 
ent present  is  a  synthesis  of  real  presents.  Our  prim- 
itive perception  is  of  change,  not  of  stability;  we  are 
conscious  of  transition.  The  static  point  of  view  must 
be  completed  by  the  dynamic. 

The  complete  separation  of  present  and  past  is  a 
mathematical  fiction.  The  sum  of  transition  which  is 
a  factor  in  appetite  aids  in  forming  the  series.  Time 
is  a  form  of  appetite;  beneath  the  floating  image 
there  is  a  tendency  to  movement.  A  non-volitional 
being  would  have  no  representation  of  time :  time  is 
a  form  of  appetition.^ 

IFouill^e,  Psychologic  des  Idies-forccs,  II.,  81-204. 


178  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

"It  is  probable,"  says  Mach,  "that  time  sensa- 
tion is  connected  with  the  organic  consumption  neces- 
sarily associated  with  consciousness, — that  we  feel 
the  work  of  attention  as  time.  .  .  .  The  fatiguing  of 
the  organ  of  consciousness  goes  on  continually  in 
waking  hours,  and  the  labor  of  attention  increases 
just  as  continually.  These  sensations  connected  with 
greater  expenditure  of  attention  appear  to  us  to  hap- 
pen later. "  ^ 

Others  again  (Waitz,  Guyau,  and  more  particularly 
Ward)  admit  temporal  signs  in  imitation  of  Lotze's 
"local  signs."  Our  successive  acts  of  attention  leave 
a  series  of  residua,  variable  in  intensity  and  precision; 
these  "temporal  signs"  permit  the  conception  of  rep- 
resentations as  successive,  and  no  longer  as  simulta- 
neous. "What  is  this  distance  that  separates  A  from 
B,  B  from  C,  and  so  on?  ...  It  is  probably  that  the 
residuum  of  which  I  have  called  a  temporal  sign ;  or, 
in  other  words,  it  is  the  movement  of  attention  from 
A  to  ^."2 

These  extracts  will  suffice  to  show  the  character 
of  the  second  theory,  which  seems  to  me  the  more 
acceptable.  It  is  the  more  complete,  inasmuch  as  it 
takes  into  consideration,  not  only  the  clear  states,  ex- 
isting in  consciousness,  but  the  sub-conscious  states 
also ;  it  is  not  confined  to  intellectual  elements  alone 
(sensations  and  images),  but  recognises  the  necessary 
role  of  the  active,  motor  elements. 

Moreover,  it  seems  more  apt  than  the  other  to  ex- 

1  Mach,  Analysis  of  the  Sensations,  English  translation  (Chicago,  1897),  pp. 
111-112. 

2 Ward,  article  "Psychology,"  in  the  Encydopcedia  Britannica,  Vol.  XX., 
pp.,  65  et  seq. — On  the  metaphysics  of  time  considered  as  pure  heterogene- 
ity, see  the  recent  work  of  Bergson,  Essai  sur  les  donnies  immidiates  de  la 
conscience ,  pp.  76  et  seq. 


EVOLUIION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  1/9 

plain  certain  facts  of  current  experience.  It  is  a  mat- 
ter of  common  observation  that  time  seems  long  to 
us,  under  two  contrary  conditions:  (i)  when  it  is  very 
long ;  (2)  when  it  is  very  empty.  Here  we  have  an 
apparent  psychological  contradiction.  The  two  cases, 
however,  are  equally  explained  by  the  quantity  of  the 
states  of  consciousness :  the  first  is  filled  with  events, 
the  second,  with  efforts.  After  three  or  four  days  of 
a  journey  fertile  in  incident,  one  seems  to  have  left 
home  a  long  time,  because  (in  comparison  with  three 
or  four  days  of  ordinary  life)  the  quantity  of  adven- 
tures held  in  mind,  each  implying  a  quantum  of  dura- 
tion, appears  to  us  in  sum  as  an  enormous  duration. 
On  the  other  hand,  to  the  prisoner  incarcerated  in  a 
cell,  to  the  traveller  at  a  deserted  station  waiting  for 
a  train  ;  briefly,  to  all  who  are  in  the  state  known  by 
the  name  of  expectant  attention,  time  seems  to  be  of 
immeasurable  extension.  This  is  because  there  is  a 
constant  expenditure  of  effort,  a  tension  incessantly 
renewed,  incessantly  frustrated  ;  consciousness  is 
nearly  void  of  representations,  while  it  is  filled  with 
acts  of  attention  constantly  repeated.  This  instance 
of  time  prolonged,  while  apparently  empty,  is  difficult 
to  explain,  if  only  the  intellectual  elements  are  taken 
into  consideration,  omitting  the  consciousness  of  mo- 
tor states.  It  should  be  noticed  that  "full"  time 
seems  longer  in  the  past ;  "empty  "  time,  in  the  pres- 
ent and  immediate  past ;  perhaps  because  the  former 
rests  principally  upon  intellectual  memory,  which  is 
stable ;  the  latter,  upon  motor  memory,  which  is 
vague  and  fragile. 


l8o  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 


SECTION  IV.     CONCEPT  OF  CAUSE. 

The  idea  of  cause  has  for  centuries  been  the  sub- 
ject of  so  many  speculations,  that  our  first  care  must 
be  to  confine  ourselves  scrupulously  to  our  subject, 
i.  e. ,  to  retrace  its  evolution  simply,  marking  the  prin- 
cipal phases  of  its  development  in  the  individual  and 
the  species,  while  as  far  as  possible  eliminating  what- 
ever lies  outside  this  one  question. 

It  has  been  remarked  that  the  word  cause  signi- 
fies sometimes  an  antecedent,  sometimes  a  process, 
sometimes  antecedent,  process,  and  effect  produced, 
taken  all  three  together. ^  This  last  sense  alone  is 
complete.  For,  if  the  primitive,  popular  conception 
tends  to  restrict  the  cause  to  the  antecedent,  to  that 
which  acts,  a  little  reflexion  will  show  us  that  the 
cause  is  only  determined  as  such  by  its  effect,  that  the 
two  terms  are  correlative,  the  one  not  existing  with- 
out the  other.  Finally,  with  more  profound  reflexion, 
the  process  itself,  the  transition,  the  passage,  the 
nexus  between  antecedent  and  consequent,  appears  as 
the  vital  point,  the  proprium  quid  of  causality.  As 
psychical  fact,  as  state  of  consciousness,  therefore, 
this  notion  is  complex,  and  among  the  elements  which 
compose  it,  now  one  and  now  the  other,  according  to 
the  epoch,  has  been  considered  the  most  important. 

In  what  follows,  we  shall  have  to  consider  :  I.  the 
origin  of  the  idea  of  cause  in  experience  j  II.  its  gen- 
eralisation, and  passage  from  the  individual  subjec- 
tive, to  the  objective  form;  III.  its  transformation  as 
resulting  from  the  work  performed  in  the  various  sci- 
ences, its  scission  into  two  fundamental  ideas  :  on  the 

1  Lewes,  Problems  of  Life  and  Mind,  II.  p.  375. 


ETOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  l8l 

one  hand,  that  of  force,  en«rgy,  active  and  effective 
power,  cause  in  the  true  sense  {vera  causa),  which 
tends  more  and  more  to  become  a  postulate,  an  x,  a 
metaphysical  residuum  ;  on  the  other,  that  of  a  con- 
stant and  invariable  succession,  a  fixed  relation,  which 
becomes  the  scientific  form  of  the  concept  of  cause, 
equivalent  in  all  respects  to  the  concept  of  law. 

I.  Every  one  seems  agreed,  fundamentally  at  least, 
upon  the  empirical  origin  of  the  idea  of  cause.  It  is 
of  internal,  subjective  origin  ;  suggested  to  us  by  our 
motor  activity.  A  being  who  was  hypothetically  per- 
fectly passive,  while  seeing  or  feeling  constant  external 
sequences,  would  have  no  idea  of  causality.  It  would 
be  superfluous  to  show,  by  multiplying  our  quota- 
tions, that  spiritualists  like  Maine  de  Biran,  empiri- 
cists like  Mill,  critics  like  Renouvier,  all  the  schools  in 
short,  with  varying  formulae,  agree  upon  this  point. 
At  the  same  time  it  must  not  be  overlooked  that  some 
writers  attribute  an  exclusive  privilege  to  the  "will," 
maintaining  it  to  be  the  type  of  causality;  whereas  the 
assertion  that  "our  own  voluntary  action  is  the  ex- 
clusive source  whence  this  idea  is  derived  "  is  unjustifi- 
able. If,  with  some  authors,  the  word  "will  "  is  used 
in  a  large  and  vague  sense,  as  designating  all  mental 
activity  that  is  translated  by  movements,  no  objection 
can  be  raised.  But  if  it  be  used  in  the  proper,  re- 
stricted sense,  as  meaning  a  fully  conscious,  deliber- 
ate act,  resulting  from  motive,  the  statement  cannot 
be  accepted.^  Volition  is  a  state  that  makes  its  ap- 
pearance somewhat  tardily.  It  is  preceded  by  a  period 
of  appetites,  of  needs,  instincts,  desires,  passions ; 
and  all  these  facts  of  internal  activity,  translated  into 
movements,  are  as  apt  as  the  "will"  to  engender  the 

1  For  the  discussion  of  this  point,  see  Renouvier,  Logique,  II.  384. 


1 02  THE  EVOLUTION'  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

empirical  notion  of  cause,  i.  e.,  transitive  action,  i.  e. , 
change  produced  :  they  have  moreover  the  advantage 
of  being  anterior  in  chronological  order. 

Contemporary  psychology  has  studied  the  role  of 
movements,  far  more  than  any  of  its  predecessors.  It 
attributes  to  them  a  capital  importance  ;  it  shows  that 
motor  elements  are  included  in  every  intellectual  state 
without  exception,  in  percepts,  in  images,  and  even  in 
concepts.  Hence  it  feels  no  repugnance  in  accepting 
the  common  thesis.  We  must  however  remember  that 
the  psychology  of  motion  is  centred  in  the  conscious- 
ness of  muscular  effort,  which  moreover  represents 
the  type  of  primitive  causality.  The  nature  of  this 
sense  of  effort  has  given  rise  to  long  and  animated  de- 
bate. For  some,  it  is  of  central  origin  :  It  is  anterior 
to,  or  at  least  concomitant  with,  the  movement  pro- 
duced ;  it  goes  from  within  outwards — it  is  efferent. 
For  others,  it  is  of  peripheral  origin,  posterior  to  the 
movement  produced  ;  it  goes  from  without,  inwards 
— is  afferent.  It  is  an  aggregate  of  the  sensations 
coming  from  the  articulations,  tendons,  muscles,  from 
the  rhythm  of  respiration,  etc. :  so  that  the  sense  of 
effort  is  no  more  than  the  consciousness  of  energy  that 
has  been  expended,  of  movements  that  have  been  effec- 
tuated :  it  is  a  resultant.  This  second  theory,  without 
so  far  being  decisively  and  incontestably  established, 
is  daily  gaining  more  adherents,  and  remains  the  most 
probable.  So  that,  since  consciousness  of  effort  is 
essentially  that  of  effect  produced,  it  follows  that  in 
considering  the  act  as  the  source  of  the  idea  of  cause, 
we  know  much  less  of  antecedent  than  of  consequent. 
Yet  this  consciousness  of  effort  produced  is  not  the 
whole,  whatever  people  may  say,  of  what  is  in  the 
primitive  conception  of  a  proper,  personal  causalit)'. 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  1 83 

Something  more  remains :  this  is  the  confused  idea, 
illusory  or  not,  of  a  creation  that  proceeds  from  us. 
We  shall  return  to  this  point. 

To  conclude  :  at  the  outset,  the  two  terms  ante- 
cedent  and  consequent,  form  almost  the  exclusive  ele- 
ments in  the  notion  of  cause.  At  any  rate,  they  pre- 
ponderate in  consciousness,  to  the  exclusion  of  the 
third,  relation.  The  idea  of  a  constant  invariable  se- 
quence, wRich  was,  later  on,  to  be  the  intrinsic  mark 
of  the  causal  process,  cannot  yet  be  distinguished. 

II.  The  idea  of  cause — at  first  strictly  individual — 
soon  commences  its  movement  of  extension. 

I.  During  the  first  period,  this  extension  is  the 
work  of  the  imagination,  rather  than  of  generalisation 
properly  so  called.  By  an  instinctive  tendency,  well- 
known,  though  not  explained,  man  concludes  for  in- 
tentions, a  will,  and  a  causality  analogous  to  his  own,  in 
the  medium  that  acts  and  reacts  around  him  :  his  fel- 
lows, all  living  things,  and  whatever  else  by  their 
movements  simulate  life  (clouds,  rivers,  etc.).  This 
is  the  period  of  primitive  fetishism  that  is  fixed  in 
mythologies  and  languages.  It  may  actually  be  ob- 
served in  children,  in  savage  races,  in  brutes  (as  in 
the  dog  that  bites  the  stone  by  which  it  is  hit),  even 
in  rational  man,  when — becoming  again  for  the  mo- 
ment a  creature  of  instinct — he  falls  into  a  passion  at 
the  table  that  has  hurt  him. 

This  period  corresponds  fairly  well  with  that  of 
generic  images,  because  the  idea  of  cause  thus  gener- 
alised results  from  gross,  external,  partial,  accidental 
resemblances,  which  the  mind  perceives  almost  pas- 
sively. It  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  higher  brutes 
have  a  generic  image  of  causality;  i.  e.,  they  are  ca- 
pable— given  an  antecedent — of  invariably  represent- 


184  THE  EVOLUTION  OF   GENERAL  IDEAS. 

ing  to  themselves  the  consequence.  This  mental  state, 
which  has  been  termed  "empirical  consecution,"  and 
which  is  not  infrequent  even  among  men  who  may 
never  rise  beyond  it,  resolves  itself  into  a  permanent 
association  of  ideas,  the  result  of  repetition  and  of 
habit.i 

All  this,  however,  is  merely  an  external  conception 
of  causality,  of  its  form,  and  not  its  nature ;  it  is  an 
outside  view,  an  approximation.  The  proffer  charac- 
teristic of  this  period  is  that  it  remains  subjectiv-e,  an- 
thropomorphic, representing  cause  as  an  intentional 
activity,  which  produces  movements  only  in  view  of 
an  end. 

2.  The  second  period  begins  with  philosophic  re- 
flection, and  proceeds  by  the  slow  constitution  of  the 
sciences.  Its  development  may  thus  be  summarised: 
little  by  little  it  deprives  the  notion  of  cause  of  its 
subjective,  human  character,  without  however  com- 
pletely attaining  this  ideal  end  ;  it  reduces  the  essen- 
tials of  the  concept  to  a  fixed,  constant,  and  invariable 
relation  between  a  determined  antecedent  and  conse- 
quent ;  hence  it  sees  in  cause  and  effect  only  the  two 
moments,  or  aspects  of  one  and  the  same  process, 
which  is  fundamentally  the  affirmation  of  an  identity. 

Here  imagination  recedes,  to  make  way  for  ab- 
straction and  generalisation, — for  abstraction  since  it 
is  less  a  question  of  terms  than  of  a  certain  relation 


1  Romanes  gives  some  examples  of  what  he  terms  appreciation  of  causal- 
ity in  animals,  including  that  of  a  setter  that  was  frightened  at  thunder.  "On 
one  occasion  a  number  of  apples  were  being  shot  out  of  bags  upon  the 
wooden  floor  of  an  apple  room,  the  sound  in  the  house  as  each  bag  was  shot 
closely  resembled  that  of  distant  thunder.  The  setter  therefore  became  ter- 
ribly alarmed  ;  but  when  I  took  him  to  the  apple-room  and  showed  him  the 
real  cause  of  the  noise,  his  dread  entirely  forsook  him,  and  on  again  return- 
ing to  the  house  he  listened  to  the  rumbling  with  all  cheerfulness."  Other 
analogous  cases  are  to  be  found  in  his  Mental  Evolution,  in  Animals,  Chap.  X. 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  1 85 

between  the  terms,  for  generalisation  because  the  nat- 
ural tendency  of  the  mind  is  to  extend  causality  to  the 
whole  of  experience. 

It  must,  however,  be  remarked  that  the  transition 
from  particular  cases  to  generalisation,  and  ^finally  to 
the  universalisation  of  the  concept  of  cause,  in  a  strict 
sense,  has  only  been  effected  little  by  little.  An  opin- 
ion that  has  gained  much  credit,  on  the  authority  of 
the  apriorists,  is  that  every  man  has  an  intuitive,  in- 
nate idea  of  the  law  of  causality,  as  universal.  This 
thesis  is  equivocal.  If  it  means  that  all  change  sug- 
gests to  every  normal  man  who  witnesses  it  an  invin- 
cible belief  in  a  known  or  unknown  agent  of  its  pro- 
duction, then  the  assertion  is  incontestable  :  but  this, 
as  we  have  seen,  is  only  the  popular,  practical,  and 
external  notion  of  causality.  If  the  true  concept  (that 
of  the  solidly  constituted  sciences),  which  is  reducible 
to  an  inflexible,  invariable  determination,  is  implied, 
then  it  is  a  fallacy  to  pretend  that  the  human  mind 
acquired  it  at  the  outset.  The  belief  in  a  universal 
law  of  causality  is  no  gratuitous  gift  of  nature :  it  is  a 
conquest.  The  fallacy  persists,  because  for  at  least 
three  centuries  this  idea  has  been  propagated  by  the 
writings  of  philosophers  and  scientists  who  have  made 
it  familiar  enough.  None  the  less,  it  is  a  late  concep- 
tion, unknown  to  the  great  mass  of  the  human  species. 
Scientific  research  began  by  establishing  laws,  (i.  e., 
invariable  relations  of  cause  and  effect)  between  cer- 
tain groups  of  phenomena,  began  by  establishing  a 
law  of  causality  that  was  valid  for  these  and  these 
only;  and  the  transfer  of  this  law  to  all  that  is  known 
and  unknown  has  only  been  effected  little  by  little, 
and  is  even  yet  incomplete.     In  a  word,  the  law  of 


l86  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

universal  causality  is  the  generalisation  of  particular 
laws,  and  remains  a  postulate. 

In  support  of  the  above  (without  entering  into 
historical  detail)  we  may  note  the  existence  in  human 
consciousness  of  two  ideas,  which  from  time  to  time, 
each  after  its  own  fashion,  give  check  to  the  univer- 
sality of  the  principle.  Although,  from  the  develop- 
ment of  scientific  thought,  their  influence  has  been  a 
decreasing  factor,  they  are  still  very  active.  These 
two  ideas  are  those  of  miracle  and  chance. 

Miracle,  taking  this  word  not  in  the  restricted,  re- 
ligious sense,  but  in  its  etymological  acceptance  (jni- 
rari'),  is  a  rare  and  unexpected  event,  produced  ex- 
trinsically  to,  or  against,  the  ordinary  course  of  events. 
The  miracle  gives  no  denial  to  cause,  in  the  popular 
sense,  because  it  assumes  an  antecedent :  God,  an 
unknown  power.  It  does  deny  it,  in  the  scientific 
sense,  since  it  is  an  abrogation  of  determinism  among 
phenomena.  Miracle  is  cause  without  law.  Now,  for 
a  long  period,  no  belief  could  have  appeared  more 
natural.  In  the  physical  world,  the  appearance  of  a 
comet,  eclipses,  and  many  other  things  were  regarded 
as  prodigies  and  warnings.  Many  races  are  still  im 
bued  with  weird  fancies  on  this  subject  (monsters  that 
would  swallow  up  the  sun  or  moon,  etc.),  and  even 
among  civilised  men  these  phenomena  produce  in 
many  minds  a  certain  uneasiness.  In  the  biological 
world,  this  belief  has  been  much  more  tenacious :  en- 
lightened spirits  in  the  seventeenth  century  still  ad- 
mitted the  errores  or  lusus  naiurce,  held  the  birth  of 
monstrosities  to  be  a  bad  augury,  and  so  on.  In  the 
psychological  world  it  has  been  even  worse.  Not  to 
speak  of  the  widely-spread  (and  not  yet  extinct)  preju- 
dices of  antiquity  as  to  prophetic  dreams,  auguries  of 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  187 

the  future  ;  of  the  mystery  which  so  long  surrounded 
natural  or  induced  somnambulism,  and  analogous  con- 
temporary speculations  on  the  occult  sciences ;  of 
those  who  regard  liberty  as  an  absolute  beginning, 
etc.:  there  is,  even  in  the  limited  circle  of  scientific 
psychology,  so  little  well-determined  relation  between 
cause  and  effect,  that  the  partisans  of  contingency 
may  comfortably  imagine  anything.  Useless  to  insist 
upon  sociology.  We  need  only  recall  the  fact  that 
Utopians  abound  who,  while  rejecting  miracle  in  the 
religious  order,  admit  it  freely  in  the  social ;  believing 
all  to  be  possible,  and  reconstructing  human  society 
from  top  to  bottom  according  to  their  dreams.  If, 
finally,  we  consider  that  this  very  dry  and  incomplete 
enumeration  covers  millions  of  cases,  past  and  pres- 
ent, we  must  recognise  that  the  human  mind  in  its 
spontaneous  and  self- governed  progress,  experiences 
no  reluctance  to  admit  causes  without  law. 

The  idea  of  chance  is  more  obscure.  We  might 
almost  say  that,  for  the  majority  of  people  who  make 
no  attempt  to  clear  it  up,  it  is  an  event  that  supposes 
neither  cause  nor  law  ;  it  is  sheer  indetermination,  a 
cast  of  the  die  arriving  no  one  knows  how,  by  means 
of  no  one  knows  what.  It  is  very  evident  that  chance 
excludes  neither  cause  nor  law,  but  evident  to  those 
alone  who  have  reflected  upon  its  nature,  and  have 
analysed  the  notion.  To  others,  it  is  a  mysterious, 
impenetrable  entity,  a  Tyche  whose  acts  cannot  be 
foreseen.  Hume  says  that  "chance  is  only  our  ig- 
norance of  true  causes."  Cournot  rightly  observes 
that  this  is  incorrect,  that  chance  involves  something 
real  and  positive  :  the  conjunction,  the  crossing  of 
several  sequences  of  cause  and  effect,  which  are  inde- 
pendent of  one  another  by  origin,  and  not  naturally 


100  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

intended  to  exert  any  reciprocal  influence.  Thus  one 
series  of  causes  and  effects  lead  a. traveller  to  take  a 
particular  train  :  on  the  other  hand  a  totally  distinct 
set  produces  at  a  given  place  or  time  an  accident 
which  kills  the  man.^  There  is,  in  short,  in  chance, 
no  contravention  of  the  laws  of  universal  mechanism. 
Why  then  does  it  seem  to  the  vulgar  mind  to  be  an 
exception,  indeterminate  by  nature?  First,  because 
the  problem  set  by  the  unexpected  is  insuflficiently 
analysed  ;  but  also  in  my  opinion,  because  the  primi- 
tive idea  of  cause  is  nearly  always  that  of  a  single  an- 
tecedent, whereas  here  the  unique  antecedent  is  not 
present,  and  cannot  be  discovered.  The  conception 
of  a  complex  causation,  constituted  by  a  sum  of  con- 
current conditions,  of  equal  necessity,  is  the  fruit  of 
advanced  reflexion. 

Accordingly,  while  the  man  who  is  formed  by  sci- 
entific discipline  refuses  when  confronted  with  these 
so-called  prodigious  or  fortuitous  facts,  to  concede 
that  they  are  exceptions  to  the  law  of  universal  causal- 
ity, others  are  quite  ready  to  admit  that  the  wall  that 
surrounds  phenomena  may  give  way  at  certain  points, 
with  resulting  breaches. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  pure  psychology,  it  is 
impossible  not  to  affirm  that  the  idea  of  universal  caus- 
ality, of  uniformity  in  the  course  of  nature,  of  rigor- 
ous determinism  (and  other  analogous  formulae),  is 
acquired — superposed.  Whether  this  notion  be  ap- 
plicable to  the  whole  of  experience,  although  experi- 
ence is  not  yet  exhausted,  or  whether  it  is  simply  a 
guide  to  research,  a  stratagem  for  introducing  order 

1  For  the  study  of  Chance,  see  Cournot,  op.  cit.,  I.,  Chap.  iii.  [Also  J.Venn 
"The  Logic  of  Chance,"  etc. — TV.] 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  1 89 

into  things,  is  a  question  which  psychology  has  no 
capacity  for  discussing,  still  less  power  to  resolve. 

III.  We  return  to  the  work  of  transformation, 
which,  starting  with  the  notion  of  cause  as  it  is  given 
in  experience — i.  e.,  a  force,  a  power,  that  acts  and 
produces — culminates  finally  in  its  last  term,  the  law 
of  causality. 

Just  as  the  plurality  of  objects  perceived  in  nature, 
forms  the  material  of  the  concept  of  number ;  as  the 
diverse  durations  present  in  our  consciousness  are  the 
material  of  the  concept  of  time  ;  so  our  conscious- 
ness of  acting,  of  modifying  our  self  and  our  environ- 
ment (a  power  which  we  attribute  freely  to  everything 
that  surrounds  us)  is  the  prime  material  of  the  con- 
cept of  cause.  But  in  order  that  this  concept  may  be 
constituted  as  such — fixed  and  determined — a  work  of 
abstraction  is  needed  to  isolate  and  bring  into  relief 
its  distinctive,  essential  characteristic  from  among  all 
the  different  elements  that  compose  the  primitive  and 
complex  notion  of  empirical  cause  (antecedent,  conse- 
quent, action  or  reaction,  change,  transformation, 
etc.).  This  distinctive  characteristic  is  an  invariable 
relation  of  sequence  (the  conditions  being  supposed 
the  same);  and  the  establishment  of  it  has  been,  al- 
most exclusively,  the  result  of  scientific  research. 

A  history  of  the  secular  fluctuations  in  the  idea  of 
cause,  as  affected  by  the  various  philosophical  theo- 
ries and  changes  of  method  in  the  sciences,  would  be 
the  best  review  of  the  phases  of  its  evolution.  Impos- 
sible here  to  attempt  such  a  task.  We  may  only  note 
the  two  extreme  points  :  the  speculations  of  antiquity, 
and  the  contemporaneous  aspect  of  the  question.^ 

1  Under  the  title  Zur  Entiuickelung  von  KanV s  Theorie  der  Naturcausali- 
t'at,  {Philosopkische  Studzen,  IX,  3  and  4),  Wundt  gives  us  a  rapid  historical 


I  go  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

The  ancient  philosophers  who  (at  least  during  the 
great  eras)  were  at  once  metaphysicians  and  scien- 
tists, constructed  systems  of  cosmogony  and  assumed 
"first  causes,"  which  were  conceived  either  as  forces, 
principles  of  action,  motive  elements  of  nature  (water, 
air,  fire,  atoms),  or  as  rational  types  (numbers,  ideas). 
On  the  other  hand  they  invented  mathematics,  and 
laid  the  foundations  of  astronomy  and  physics.  Now, 
as  regards  causality,  these  essays  at  the  scientific  in- 
vestigation of  nature  involved  consequences  which 
were  not  plainly  disclosed  until  a  much  later  period. 
They  exacted  another  position, — a  passage  from  sub- 
jective to  objective :  whether  in  relation  to  the  fall  of 
bodies,  or  to  a  law  of  hydrostatics  (such  as  that  to 
which  Archimedes  gave  his  name),  anyone  who  studies 
the  physical  world  necessarily  sees  its  changes  from 
without.    He  considers  cause  no  longer  as  an  internal 

sketch.  He  holds  that  speculation,  in  antiquity,  is  characterised  by  the 
method  of  contraries:  the  opposition  of  being  and  becoming,  etc.  It  is  wholly 
qualitative.  The  ancients  progressed  by  definition.  Elaboration  of  the  con- 
cept of  mechanical  causation  was  impossible,  by  reason  of  the  absence  of 
any  quantitative  determination.  This  began  with  Galileo.  The  progress  of 
mathematics,  and  the  introduction  of  fractional  and  irrational  numbers  made 
it  possible  to  search  out,  not  merely  measure,  but  also  the  relation  between 
magnitudes — i.  e.,  function.  This  became  the  type,  and  at  the  same  time  the 
goal  of  all  intellectual  elaboration,  as  applied  to  natural  phenomena.  This 
method  culminated  in  the  seventeenth  century,  with  the  predominance  of  the 
logical  type.  In  consequence  of  the  old  concept  of  substance,  forces  were 
taken  as  cause,  phenomena  as  eflfect.  The  latter  is  more  frequently  derived 
from  cause  by  deduction,  not  by  intuition.  The  cause  of  a  determined  event 
might  either  be  the  total  of  its  conditions,  or  one  antecedent  event.  This  last 
conception  prevailed,  as  being  the  more  favorable  to  the  application  of  math- 
ematics. The  eighteenth  century  marks  the  genesis  of  the  biological  sciences. 
The  growing  importance  of  observation  and  experimental  research  made 
against  the  preponderance  of  mathematics.  The  facts  of  experience  were 
held  more  solid  than  the  conclusions  of  reason.  The  type  of  causality  is 
placed  no  longer  in  deduction,  but  in  sensory  intuition;  it  is  the  residuum  of 
experience.  This  tendency  found  its  exponent  in  Hume.  Kant  endeavored 
to  reconcile  the  two  theses;  that  which  models  object  upon  subject  (seven- 
teenth century)  and  that  which  models  subject  upon  object  [eighteenth  cen- 
tury). 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  IQI 

factor  revealed  by  consciousness,  but  as  a  sequence 
given  by  the  senses.  Antecedents,  consequents,  in- 
variable succession,  are  for  him  the  only  useful  data. 
Conditions  equal  cause;  and  the  important  determi- 
nation is  that  not  of  an  operating  entity,  but  of  a  con- 
stant relation.  This — the  only  scientific  conception 
of  cause — it  is  which  is  covered  by  Stuart  Mill's  defi- 
nition :  "Cause  is  the  sum  of  the  positive  and  nega- 
tive conditions,  which,  when  given,  are  followed  by 
an  invariable  consequent." 

This  external  aspect,  old  as  science  itself,  was  big 
with  consequences  that  have  only  been  clearly  re- 
vealed in  our  own  day,  and  which  may  be  summed  up 
in  a  word  as  identity  of  cause  and  effect.  There  is  no 
separation  between  the  two ;  the  antecedent  is  not 
one  thing  and  the  consequent  another ;  they  are  two 
manifestations,  different  in  time,  of  a  fundamental 
unity.  It  has  rightly  been  observed  that  the  mechan- 
ical theory  of  the  universe  (correlation  of  forces,  con- 
servation and  transformation  of  energy,  etc.)  is  the 
contemporaneous  form  of  the  concept  of  natural  cau- 
sality. Expressed  from  earliest  antiquity  in  the  form 
of  a  metaphysical  anticipation  {ex  nihilo  nihil),  it  en- 
ters in  the  seventeenth  century  upon  its  scientific 
phase,  and  is  completed  in  our  own  day.  The  physi- 
cists who  have  established  it  upon  experience  and  by 
calculation,  saw  plainly  the  consequences  it  involved. 
To  cite  only  one  instance,  R.  Mayer  in  his  Mechanik 
der  Wdrme  says,  "If  the  cause  c  produces  the  effect  e, 
then  c=^e;  if  e  is  the  cause  of  another  effect  /,  then 
e=f,  and  so  on.  Since  c  becomes  e,  e=^f,  etc.,  we 
must  consider  these  magnitudes  as  the  different  phe- 
nomenal forms  of  one  and  the  same  object.  Just  as 
the  first  property  of  cause  is  its  indestructibility,  so 


192  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

the  second  property  is  convertibility,  i.  e.,  capacity 
for  assuming  different  forms.  And  this  capacity  must 
not  be  regarded  as  a  metamorphosis ;  each  cause  is 
invariable,  but  the  combination  of  its  relations  is  vari- 
able. There  is  quantitative  indestructibility  and  quali- 
tative convertibility." 

It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  general  principles 
of  thermodynamics — the  latest  form  of  the  concept  of 
natural  causality — are  not  absolute,  but  are  proposed 
as  ideal.  We  know,  e.  g.,  that  heat  can  never  give 
rise  again  to  all  the  work  from  which  it  was  produced, 
that  no  physical  event  is  exactly  reversible,  /.  e.  it  can- 
not be  reproduced  identically  at  the  opposite  end  of 
the  process,  because  in  its  first  appearance  it  had  to 
overcome  resistance,  and  thus  lost  part  of  its  energy. 
All  this,  however,  is  outside  our  scope.  As  much  as 
the  doctrine  of  the  conservation  of  energy  is  valid,  so 
much  is  the  actual  concept  of  natural  causality  worth. 
We  merely  undertook  to  follow  the  evolution  of  this 
concept  down  to  the  present  day,  to  point  out  its 
transformations,  without  in  any  way  prejudging  the 
future,  or  still  less  attributing  to  it  any  absolute 
value.  ^ 

What  now  becomes  of  the  idea  of  causality  taken 
in  the  other  sense,  no  longer  as  an  invariable  relation 
of  antecedent  to  consequent,  but  as  a  thing  that  acts, 
creates,  modifies,  or  persists  under  all  transformations 


IThe  question  is  sometimes  raised  as  to  whether  psychical  (and  con- 
sequently moral,  social)  facts  ought  to  be  included  under  the  formula  of  con- 
servation of  energy  and  correlation  of  forces.  Since  the  only  evidence  pro- 
duced has  been  of  the  nature  of  theoretical  affirmations,  or  vague  and  partial 
experiences,  without  quantitative  determination,  the  question  so  far  remains 
open.  The  concept  of  natural  causality  was  in  the  same  way  considered 
above  in  its  positive  sense,  i.  e.,  as  a  relation  of  invariable  sequence,  without 
inquiring  whether  it  extends  to  all  forms  of  experience, — or  whether  it  is 
limited. 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  1 93 

and  clothes  all  masks?  The  scientific  method,  as  soon 
as  it  penetrates  into  any  order  of  phenomena,  tends 
to  exclude  cause,  to  reduce  it  to  the  strictest  limits, 
to  make  the  least  possible  use  of  it.  Cause  then  be- 
comes the  synonym  of  force.  But  physical  science 
defines  force  only  by  its  effects  : — movement,  or  work 
done.  So,  too,  the  biologist  rejects  the  notion  of 
"vital  force";  non-metaphysical  psychology  will  have 
none  of  the  "faculties,"  intervention  of  "the  soul," 
and  the  like.  Is  the  notion  thus  discarded,  totally 
suppressed?  Nay, — for  even  in  mechanics  and  phys- 
ics it  cannot  be  entirely  eliminated.  It  is  there  as  a 
postulate,  a  residuum,  an  unknown  factor  covering 
lacunae.  Yet,  do  what  we  will,  force  or  energy,  in 
order  to  be  more  than  an  empty  word  and  to  become 
intelligible,  can  only  be  represented  and  imagined 
under  the  form  of  the  muscular  effort  whence  it  origi- 
nates, and  which  is  its  type ;  and  despite  all  the  elab- 
orations to  which  it  is  submitted  in  order  to  rid  it  of 
its  anthropomorphical  character,  and  dehumanise  it, 
it  remains  rather  a  fact  of  internal  experience  than  a 
concept.  Is  it  destined  to  undergo  other  transforma- 
tions, by  reason  of  more  profound  apprehension,  or 
some  new  aspect  of  the  problem?  Is  there — along 
with  mechanical  causality  and  rigorous  determinism — 
room  for  any  other  mode  of  causality,  proper  to  psy- 
chology, to  linguistics,  to  history,  in  short  to  the  posi- 
tive sciences  of  the  mind,  as  is  maintained  by  Wundt 
and  others?     The  secret  remains  for  the  future. 

The  natural  tendency  of  the  mind  (which  is  but 
one  aspect  of  the  instinct  of  conservation)  to  seek  and 
investigate  in  face  of  the  unknown  and  unexpected, 
its  clear  or  confused  need  of  explanation  for  better  or 
worse,  at  the  outset  concluded  for  an  acting  entity. 


194-  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

The  idea  still  survives  under  a  naive  or  transcenden- 
tal form ;  it  reappears  in  every  unexplained  contin- 
gency, whether  in  regard  to  the  first  origin  of  things, 
or  (for  the  partisans  of  liberty)  to  freedom  of  action. 
In  this  sense,  "causality  is  an  altar  to  the  Unknown 
God,  an  empty  pedestal  that  awaits  its  statue.  "^ 

In  its  other  sense,  which  is  widely  different  and 
even  contrary,  which  has  been  slowly  fixed,  and  more 
slowly  extended  to  the  whole  of  experience,  cause  is 
a  true  concept :  the  resultant  namely  of  abstraction, 
summarised  in  the  characters  exclusively  proper  to  it. 
Under  this  form  it  is  equivalent  to  the  concept  of 
law. 

SECTION  V.     CONCEPT  OF  LAW. 

Our  general  ideas,  from  those  immediately  border- 
ing on  the  concrete  to  those  which  attain  pure  sym- 
bolism, constitute  a  hierarchy  of  ever-increasing  sim- 
plicity. What  value  must  be  assigned  to  this  thinking 
by  concepts,  in  proportion  as  it  ascends  higher  in  the 
scale?  We  are  all  familiar  with  the  debates  upon  this 
question,  bearing,  as  it  does,  fundamentally  upon  the 
objective  value  of  abstraction  and  generalisation.  Psy- 
chology, as  the  science  of  facts,  is  able  to  ignore  this 
point,  since  it  is  concerned  only  with  the  nature  of 
the  two  intellectual  processes,  their  variations,  and 
adaptations  to  multiple  cases.  Still,  it  is  reasonable 
enough  that  it  should  assume  a  position,  at  any  rate 
provisionally,  and  for  convenience  of  discussion. 

To  recall  only  the  two  extreme  opinions :  On  the 
one  side  we  have  those  who  maintain  that  the  partic- 
ular alone  exists — for  event  or  individual — that  our 
general  ideas  are  but  a  means  of  maintaining  order, 

1 W.  James,  Psychology,  II.,  p.  671. 


F.VOLUllON  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  1 95 

while  they  teach  us  nothing  as  to  the  nature  of  things. 
They  are  comparable  to  a  catalogue,  or  to  the  card- 
index  of  a  library  which  are  an  easy  indicator  to  the 
millions  of  books,  leaving  us  totally  ignorant  as  to 
their  contents  and  value.  Hence,  the  higher  we  as- 
cend, the  farther  we  penetrate  into  the  region  of  the 
fictitious  and  the  vacant. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  are  those  who  assert  that 
nature  has  general  and  fixed  characteristics  ;  in  dis- 
covering them,  we  penetrate  into  the  essence  of 
things.  Events  and  individuals  have  but  a  borrowed 
existence;  under  their  fleeting  appearances,  we  must 
seek  the  enduring ;  and  thus,  the  greater  the  general- 
isation, the  higher  we  rise  in  reality  and  in  dignity. 

The  psychologist  can  only  take  up  the  position  of 
relativity.  To  him,  general  ideas  are  approximations  : 
they  have  an  objective  value,  but  it  is  provisional  and 
momentary,  dependent  on  the  variability  of  phenom- 
ena and  on  the  state  of  our  knowledge. 

On  the  one  hand,  the  similarities  that  are  the  sub- 
strata of  generalisation  are  not  fictitious.  Since,  more- 
over, knowledge  of  the  laws  of  nature  has  a  practical 
value,  by  enabling  us  to  act  upon  things,  and  since  we 
fail,  in  ignorance  of  them, — we  are  fain,  objections 
notwithstanding,  to  attribute  to  them  at  least  a  cer- 
tain measure  of  objective  value. 

On  the  other,  if  there  is  evolution  in  nature,  there 
must  also  be  evolution  in  our  ideas,  and  the  preten- 
sion to  laws  or  types  that  are  fixed  unalterably,  be- 
comes chimerical.  There  is  no  longer  the  sharp  dis- 
tinction, as  formerly  admitted,  between  "essential" 
and  "accidental,"  i.  e.,  permanent  and  variable  char- 
acters. The  Primary  epoch  of  our  globe  may  have 
obeyed  laws  which  no  longer  hold  for  our  Quaternary 


196  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

age  :  all  changes  in  the  course  of  development.  We 
shall  return  to  this  point  in  the  concluding  section. 

Without  insisting  further  upon  a  debate  that  is  of 
secondary  interest  for  the  psychologist,  we  may  re- 
mark that  three  principal  periods  can  be  distinguished 
in  the  development  of  the  Concept  of  Law:  viz.,  the 
periods  of  generic  images,  of  concrete  or  empirical 
laws,  and  of  theoretical  or  ideal  laws. 

It  is  useless  to  study  the  first  phase  in  detail,  since 
it  interests  us  only  as  an  embryonic  form,  a  germ,  or 
essay.  It  consists  in  the  mechanical  conception  of 
regularity  for  a  very  restricted  number  of  events.  Re- 
sulting from  the  constant  or  frequent  repetition  of  cer- 
tain cycles  (the  course  of  the  sun,  moon,  seasons, 
etc.)  it  is  organised  in  the  mind  by  a  process  of  semi- 
passive  assimilation,  that  of  generic  images.  Many 
men  have  had,  and  still  have,  only  this  shadow,  this 
simulacrum  of  law,  resting  upon  pure  association, 
upon  practical  habit,  upon  the  unreflecting  expecta- 
tion of  an  often- perceived  recurrence.  Humble  as  it 
is,  this  notion  was  nevertheless  useful  in  the  educa- 
tion of  humanity,  for  it  checked  the  exuberant  ten- 
dency of  the  imagination  to  people  the  world  with 
capricious  causes,  obedient  to  no  law.  It  prevented 
the  establishment  of  a  rule  of  universal  contingency  ; 
it  was  the  first  affirmation  of  a  faith  in  regular  order. 
The  progress  of  reflexion,  and  methodical  research, 
have  done  the  rest. 

We  owe  to  Wundt  {Philosophische  Studien,  i8S6, 
III.,  p.  195  et  seq.)  an  observation  of  great  interest  to 
any  one  concerned  in  the  development  of  the  idea  of 
law.  To-day  this  word  is  current  in  all  the  sciences; 
indeed  its  most  rigorous  acceptance  is  in  mathematics 
and  chemical  physics.     This  was  not  always  the  case. 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  ICjJ 

In  antiquity,  the  word  was  employed  almost  exchi 
sively  in  a  social,  juristic,  moral  sense.  The  concept 
of  natural  law,  regarded  as  a  sort  of  order,  a  police- 
force,  was  only  very  slowly  formed  and  established. 
Copernicus  and  Kepler  employed  the  word  "hypothe- 
sis." Galileo  calls  the  fundamental  laws  of  nature 
"axioms,"  and  those  derived  from  them  "theorems," 
following  the  terminology  of  the  mathematicians. 
Descartes  begins  his  Philosophy  of  Nature  by  laying 
down  certain  RegulcB  sive  leges  naturales.  Newton 
says  :  Axiomata  sive  leges  motus.  The  extension  of  the 
word  law  is  due  apparently  to  the  need  of  establishing 
a  clear  distinction  between  the  purely  abstract  axioms 
of  mathematics,  and  the  principles  to  which  we  at- 
tribute an  objective  value,  an  existence  in  nature. 
Montesquieu's  celebrated  definition,  "  Laws  are  the 
necessary  relations  derived  from  the  nature  of  things," 
exhibits  this  concept  in  its  highest  degree  ol  generali- 
sation. We  may  note,  in  passing,  that  in  the  enquiry 
referred  to  above  (ch.  IV.),  nearly  all  the  answers  in- 
dicate that  images  of  the  social  juristic  order  were 
evoked,  although  the  scientific  acceptance  of  the  word 
was  perfectly  familiar  to  a  large  number  of  the  sub- 
jects :  showing  that  the  primitive  signification  prepon- 
derates in  the  vulgar  conscience. 

In  another  article,  entitled  Wer  ist  der  Gesetzgeber 
der  Naturgesetze?  {loc.  cit.,  pp.  493  et  seq.),  the  same 
author  maintains  an  opinion,  which,  notwithstanding 
its  paradoxical  appearance,  seems  to  me  perfectly 
valid.  Descartes  called  the  laws  of  nature  "rules," 
inasmuch  as  they  explain  phenomena  to  us;  "laws," 
inasmuch  as  God  constituted  them  ab  initio  as  proper- 
ties of  matter.  At  a  later  period,  nature  takes  the 
place  of  God,  which  is  still  the  survival  of  a  panthe- 


igS  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

istic  conception  of  the  world.  Still  later,  the  prepon- 
derating tendency  is  to  call  laws  by  the  names  of  their 
inventors  :  Mariotte,  Gay-Lussac,  Dulong  and  Petit, 
Avogadro,  Ohm,  Weber,  etc.  "In  the  seventeenth 
century  it  was  God  who  established  the  laws  of  na- 
ture ;  in  the  eighteenth  it  was  Nature  herself  ;  in  the 
nineteenth  it  is  the  affair  of  the  scientists."  This  the- 
sis agrees  with  what  was  said  above  of  the  approxi- 
mate character  of  laws,  of  the  mixture  of  objective 
and  subjective  elements  that  obtain  in  their  formulae, 
and  it  is  no  paradox  to  assert  that  the  state  of  mind 
of  a  Mariotte,  a  Gay-Lussac,  a  Weber,  etc.,  when 
they  discover  their  law,  represents  this  approximation 
at  a  given  moment. 

I.  Empirical  laws  correspond,  broadly  speaking, 
with  the  intermediate  forms  of  abstraction  and  of  gen- 
eralisation. They  consist  in  the  reduction  of  a  large 
number  of  facts  to  a  single  formula,  but  without  any 
rational  explanation.  In  the  course  of  events  we  dis- 
cover a  constant  relation  of  co-existence  or  of  succes- 
sion between  two  or  several  facts ;  we  mentally  de- 
tach this  regular  relation  from  the  total  which  includes 
it,  and  extend  it  to  other  cases.  Constancy  is  not 
even  necessary  for  empirical  laws,  frequency  suffices  : 
at  least  one  often  has  to  be  content  with  it.  These 
laws  abound  in  the  half-sciences,  and  in  embryo  sci- 
ence :  they  are  useful,  they  give  order  and  simplifica- 
tion. 

Their  first  characteristic  is  that  they  are  identical 
with  fact.  Laws  and  facts  are  only  two  aspects  of  the 
same  thing.  To  pass  from  facts  to  their  empirical 
law,  is  merely  replacing  simple  and  homogeneous  cog- 
nition by  abstraction,  multiple  and  heterogeneous  cog- 
nition   by  perception.      Hence    the    empirical   law  is 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  1 99 

rightly  compared  to  a  general  fact,  and  it  is  legitimate 
in  psychology  to  say  the  law  of  association  or  the  gen- 
eral fact  of  association.  On  the  other  hand  (in  vir- 
tue of  the  natural  tendency  to  anthropomorphism) 
vulgarisms  such  as  "laws  govern  facts,"  and  the  like, 
encourage  in  many  minds  the  illusion  of  an  ideal 
world  of  law  superposed  upon  the  world  of  facts,  ex- 
ternal to  experience,  and  acting  upon  it  like  a  govern- 
ment. 

A  second  characteristic,  which  though  frequent  is 
not  universal,  is  complexity.  Necessarily  objective, 
since  it  is  a  simple  notation  of  observed  facts,  the  em- 
pirical law  does  not  always  succeed  in  embracing  the 
results  of  abstraction  in  one  short  and  simple  formula. 
Sometimes  it  does  so ;  sometimes  it  is  confronted 
with  a  multiplicity  that  cannot  be  reduced  to  a  single 
proportion  ;  in  many  cases  it  has  to  distribute  itself, 
and  resignedly  to  employ  a  long  formula.  Ex.  :  in 
physiology,  Pfliiger's  law  (or  the  laws  of  reflexes),  in 
linguistics,  the  laws  of  Grimm,  etc.  Here  there  is  a 
summary  description,  reduced  to  the  principal  facts. 
It  often  has  to  cover  a  great  number  of  details,  as  in 
Listing's  law  (of  the  rotation  of  the  ocular  globe). 
Plenty  of  examples  are  to  be  found  in  the  sciences 
that  are  in  process  of  formation,  and  ill-constituted  : 
psychology,^  ethics,    sociology,    etc.     Empirical   law 

1  Sigwart  in  his  Logik,  Book  II.  (English  translation  by  Helen  Dendy) 
has  made  a  profound  study  of  the  classification  of  the  psychological  laws  in 
psychology,  and  their  relative  value.  He  divides  them  into  three  categories, 
according  to  the  nature  of  the  relations  which  they  express  :  1.  Psychophys- 
ical laws  which  formulate  constant  relations  between  states  of  consciousness 
and  the  cerebral  states.  Ex.  the  relation  between  the  sensation  directly  re- 
ceived, and  the  image  that  is  reproduced  in  consciousness.  2.  Psychological 
laws  properly  so-called  ;  these  express  the  internal  relations  of  the  states  of 
consciousness.  Ex.  Law  of  conservation  of  impressions,  law  of  association, 
law  of  systematisation  by  volition.  3.  Laws  expressive  of  the  reciprocal  ac- 
tion that  human  thoughts  and  volitions  exert  one  upon  the  other  :  they  pre- 


200  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

could  only  be  further  simplified  by  changing  Its  na- 
ture, namely  by  transforming  it  into  theoretical  law. 

Empirical  law  is  thus  the  type  of  law  that  is  im- 
manent, contained  in  the  facts,  invoking  their  repre- 
sentation directly  and  indirectly  by  means  of  inter- 
mediate abstraction,  involving  ascending  degrees  of 
abstraction,  that,  at  their  highest  level,  bring  it  insen- 
sibly very  near  to  ideal  law. 

II.  Theoretical,  or  ideal,  law  corresponds  with  the 
higher  forms  of  abstraction.  It  exhibits  increasingly 
approximative  constructions  of  the  mind,  in  propor- 
tion as  these  ascend,  and  are  farther  removed  from  ex- 
perience. Empirical  laws  are  the  material  whence  they 
are  derived,  and  the  transformation  is  accomplished 
at  the  moment,  and  in  the  degree,  in  which  descrip- 
tion gives  place  to  explanation.  To  minds  accus- 
tomed to  the  discipline  of  the  strict  sciences,  this 
conception  of  law  alone  is  valid,  and  they  are  prone 
to  treat  with  disdain  or  defiance  the  formulae  that  are 
a  simple  summing-up  of  the  results  of  experience, 
judging  them  unworthy  of  the  name  of  laws.  To  the 
psychologist,  the  position  is  quite  other  :  empirical 
concept  and  theoretical  concept  are  two  forms,  two 
aspects  of  the  same  intellectual  process  :  there  is  no 
constitutional  difference  between  them.  Nevertheless, 
in  its  higher  form,  the  concept  of  law  has  its  proper 
and  special  characteristics  which  must  be  noted. 

I.  Simplicity,  as  contrasted  with  the  complexity 
of  empirical  laws  ;  this  is  the  necessary  corollary  of 
the  operation  that  gives  rise  to  it,  since  it  is  an  ab- 
straction of  abstractions,  the  final  result  of  a  long,  se- 

snppose  the  intenrention  of  social  causes,  and  are  to  this  day  vague  and 
ill-determined ;  hence  there  are  no  fixed  rules  for  the  government  of  human- 
ity, or  the  bringing  up  of  children. 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  20I 

ries  of  eliminations.  Compare  with  the  long,  vague, 
entangled  formulae,  charged  with  details,  of  which 
examples  were  given  above,  the  enunciation  of  the 
higher  laws,  which  are  usually  short  and  invariably 
precise.  And,  it  may  be  added,  invariably  lucid,  at 
least  to  the  scientist  who  is  in  the  habit  of  dealing 
with  them,  because  he  knows  exactly  what  they  cover. 
In  this  connexion  a  saying  of  D'Alembert  deserves 
to  be  recalled  and  considered,  because  it  discloses, 
better  than  any  commentary,  the  psychology  of  ab- 
stract minds:  "The  most  abstract  notions,  such  as 
the  majority  of  mankind  regard  as  the  most  inaccessi- 
ble, are  often  those  which  carry  with  them  the  great- 
est elucidating  power :  our  ideas  seem  to  be  blotted 
out  by  obscurity  in  proportion  as,  in  any  object,  we 
examine  into  its  sensible  properties." 

2.  Quantitative  determination.  The  higher  laws 
alone  can  assume  a  numerical  form,  and  it  is  a  truism 
to  say  that  the  perfection  of  any  science  is  measured 
by  the  quantity  of  mathematics  which  it  involves. 
Not  that  mathematical  formulae  imply  or  confer  any 
magical  virtue,  but  they  are  the  sign  of  reduction  to 
clear  and  simple  relations,  and  are  frequently  an  in- 
strument of  further  progress.  It  is  true  that  in  the 
domain  of  empirical  law,  there  are  many  processes 
which  attempt  to  imitate  quantitative  determination  : 
graphic  records,  curves,  statistics,  percentages,  etc. 
Yet  these  are  often  a  very  poor  substitute  for  the 
equation,  or  worse — for  they  offer  an  illusory  precise- 
ness,  and  are  fallacious. 

3.  It  is  well  to  insist  upon  the  ideal  character  of 
these  laws,  because  one  is  apt  to  forget  that,  in  virtue 
of  their  very  abstraction,  they  can  be  approximate 
only ;  and  can  but  be  applied,  and  reduced  from  theory 


202  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

to  practice,  by  means  of  rectifications  and  additions. 
It  has  been  said  that  "physical  laws  are  general  truths 
that  are  invariably  more  or  less  falsified  for  each  par- 
ticular case."  All  scientific  men,  and  there  are  many, 
who  have  reflected  on  the  subject,  bring  out  this  char- 
acter of  approximation.^ 

Thus — it  is  not  absolutely  true  that  a  movement 
is  uniform  and  rectilinear.  The  theoretic  law  of  the 
oscillation  of  a  pendulum  is  unrealisable,  because 
there  is  no  non-resisting  medium,  no  totally  rigid  and 
inextensible  bar,  no  suspending  apparatus  capable  of 
turning  without  friction.  A  planet  could  only  describe 
an  exact  ellipse  if  it  alone  were  turning  round  the 
sun :  but  as,  in  point  of  fact,  there  are  several  which 
act  and  react  upon  one  another,  Kepler's  law  remains 
ideal.  It  is  known  by  very  accurate  researches  that 
Mariotte's  law  of  the  relations  between  the  density  of 
a  gas,  and  the  pressure  which  it  bears,  is  not  strictly 
accurate  for  either ;  but  the  differences  between  theory 
and  reality  are  so  slight  that,  in  ordinary  cases,  they 
are  negligible.  The  laws  of  thermodynamics  (con- 
servation of  energy,  correlation  of  forces)  which  are 
so  much  used  in  the  present  day  because  of  their 
character  of  generality,  and  are  held  by  some  to  be 
the  ultimate  principle  of  phenomena,  have  no  abso- 
lute value.  It  is  not,  e.  g.,  correct  to  say  that  all 
change   generates  a  change  which  can  be  re-trans- 

1 "  Fundamental  laws  are,  or  should  be,  only  the  simplest,  most  abridged, 
and  most  economical  mode  of  expressing  facts,  within  the  limits  of  precision 
possible  to  our  observations  and  experiences.  The  laws  of  nature  are  simple, 
essentially  because — among  all  the  possible  modes  of  expression — we  choose 
the  simplest"  (see  Mach,  Mechanics.  Chicago,  1893,  and  Popular  Scientific 
Lectures,  23d  ed.,  Chicago,  1898,  under  the  headings  "Economy  of  Thought," 
"Law,"  etc.).  "In  formulating  a  general,  simple,  precise  law,  based  upon 
relatively  few  experiences,  which,  moreover,  present  certain  divergencies, 
we  only  obey  a  necessity  from  which  the  human  mind  cannot  free  •itself." 
(Poincard.; 


I 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  203 

formed  without  loss  or  addition.  The  first  moment 
of  enthusiasm  passed,  there  was  no  lack  of  criticism 
and  of  reservation  on  this  point.  And  so  in  other  in- 
stances, ad  infinitum. 

In  brief,  the  concept  of  law,  whenever  it  is  more 
than  a  vague  term  in  the  mind,  corresponds  either  to 
a  direct  condensation  of  facts  (empirical  laws),  or 
to  an  ideal  simplification  (theoretical  laws)  ;  but,  im- 
perfect or  perfect,  the  mental  process  is  the  same 
in  the  two  cases.  They  differ  only  in  the  degree  of 
simplification  attainable  by  analysis  for  any  given  ma- 
terial or  datum.  If  empirical  law,  which  is  in  strict 
relation  with  experience,  has  not  been  idolised,  this 
distinction  and  misfortune  has  frequently  befallen  the 
other  categories.  It  has  been  forgotten  that,  in  the 
sciences  as  in  the  arts,  the  ideal  is  only  an  ideal, 
although  it  is  here  attained  by  different  means,  viz., 
elimination,  voluntary  omission  for  the  sake  of  pre- 
ciseness,  a  more  or  less  artificial  reduction  to  unity. 
Consequently  many  have  fallen  into  the  strange  illu- 
sion of  believing  that,  in  manipulating  experience  by 
the  labor  of  an  ever-growing  abstraction,  the  absolute 
can  be  brought  out.^ 

SECTION  VI.     CONCEPT  OF  SPECIES. 

In  departing  from  phenomena  by  successive  ab- 
stractions and  generalisations,  we  rise  to  laws  that  are 
more  and  more  extensive  :  so  in  setting  out  from  the 
individual,  species,  genera,  orders,  branches,  and  the 

1  Since  our  subject  is  the  tracing  out  of  the  concept  of  law  in  its  different 
degrees,  starting  from  the  generic  image,  w«  have  no  need  to  study  the  na- 
ture of  the  laws  proper  to  each  science  (logic,  mathematics,  mechanics, 
physico-chemistry,  biology,  etc.),  nor  to  discuss  their  value.  For  this  point, 
see  Boutroux,  L'IdSe  de  lot  naturelU  dans  la  science  et  la  philosophie  contempo- 
r.tine.     Paris,  1895. 


204  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

like,  are  formed  by  a  succession  of  abstractions  and 
generalisations.  We  have  already  followed  this  labor 
of  the  intellect  in  its  primitive  attempts  to  introduce 
order  into  the  multiplicity  and  variety  of  living  be 
ings  (Ch.  III.).  We  saw  its  start  in  the  period  of 
generic  images,  its  passage  through  the  various  de- 
grees of  the  concrete-abstract  period,  and  its  final 
outcome  by  diverse  paths  into  a  unitary  conception. 
We  must  now  take  up  the  subject  from  the  point  at 
which  we  left  it,  and  consider  the  nature  of  the  classi- 
ficatory  concepts  at  the  final  term  of  their  develop- 
ment, the  moment  of  their  highest  scientific  determi- 
nation. If  the  geometers  ware  the  first  who  abstracted 
from  extension  the  essential  data  of  Space ;  if  the  as- 
tronomers accomplished  an  analogous  operation  for 
Time ;  the  naturalists  for  their  part  had  by  abstrac- 
tion to  disengage  from  among  the  numerous  charac- 
teristics of  living  beings,  those  which,  as  fundamental, 
enable  them  to  reduce  individuals  to  species,  species 
to  genera,  and  so  on.  They  are  the  inventors  of  the 
concepts  which  govern  this  province  of  experience. 

The  notion  of  the  individual,  which  is  the  basis, 
and  preliminary  material,  of  biological  classification, 
is  sufficiently  clear  so  long  as  we  confine  ourselves  to 
the  higher  creatures  ;  it  becomes  obscure  and  equivo- 
cal in  descending  to  the  lower  grades,  where  life  mul- 
tiplies by  budding,  or  by  division.  Hence  it  has  been 
a  great  stumbling-block  to  the  naturalists.  For  our 
purpose,  the  point  is  negligible.  We  can  without 
inconvenience  omit  the  debates  on  this  subject,  and 
presume  that  individuality  always  has  its  fixed  char- 
acteristics. The  work  of  abstraction  and  of  generali- 
sation alone  concern  us. 

Among  all  others,  the  Concept  of  Species  is  cer- 


EVOLUTION  OK  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEFIS.  205 

tainly  the  one  which — more  especially  in  our  own  day 
— has  been  the  most  studied  and  disputed.  Many 
efforts  have  been  made  to  determine  its  essential  char- 
acters, to  which  some  attribute,  and  others  refuse,  an 
objective  value.  In  effect,  and  broadly  speaking — 
two  contrary  theories  obtain  in  this  connexion : 

1.  That  of  fixity  of  species,  the  oldest,  and  long 
paramount :  still  perhaps  finding  its  partisans.  If  we 
accept  this,  we  admit  at  the  same  time  that  the  natura- 
list in  determining  species,  reveals  a  mystery  of  na- 
ture, and  partially  discovers  the  plan  of  creation. 

2.  The  complete  antithesis  of  the  foregoing,  which 
maintains  that  only  individuals  exist.  In  its  absolute 
and  radical  form,  this  assertion  seems  rarely  to  have 
been  brought  forward.  It  has,  however,  been  said 
that  "the  idea  of  species  is  not  given  to  us  by  nature 
itself."^  In  point  of  fact,  the  contention  of  the  trans- 
formists  is  different.  They  do  not  refuse  to  recognise 
the  grouping  of  living  beings,  according  to  their  de- 
grees of  similarity,  into  varieties  and  species ;  but 
they  grant  to  species  only  a  momentary  fixedness  in 
time  and  space.  It  does  not  exist,  it  is  not  a  natural 
type,  it  is  transitionally  a  stable  variation ;  the  indi- 
vidual is  the  reality.  From  our  point  of  view,  this 
signifies  that  the  specific  characters  isolated  by  ab- 
straction are  of  value  only  as  practical  means  of  sim- 
plification in  no  way  helping  us  to  penetrate  into  the 
nature  of  things. 

However  this  may  be, — and  without  for  the  mo- 


1  Brown,  quoted  by  Quatrefages  [Pricurseurs  de  Dar^uin,  p.  218),  who  adds, 
"  If  this  were  the  case,  one  would  not  find  many  species  denoted  by  particu- 
lar names  among  savages,  and  our  own  illiterate  population.  The  general 
notion  of  species  is  on  the  contrary  one  of  those  that  are  forced  upon  us,  di- 
rectly we  look  round.  The  difficulty  is  to  formulate  it  clearly,  to  give  it  sci- 
entific precision,  and  this  is  a  very  real  probl  111." 


2o6  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

ment  inquiring  whether  the  work  of  abstraction  in  this 
province  gives  objective  or  subjective  results,  whether 
it  limits  itself  to  simplification  in  relation  to  man,  or 
discovers  in  relation  to  nature, — let  us  follow  it  in  its 
ascending  progress.  Once  again,  we  can  distinguish 
two  principal  stages  :  that  of  species  corresponding  to 
empirical  and  concrete  law ;  that  of  genera,  and  the 
still  higher  forms,  corresponding  to  theoretical  and 
ideal  laws. 

I. 

The  nature  of  a  concept  is  fixed  by  the  determina- 
tion of  its  constituent  elements;  these  are  determined 
by  abstraction.  Abstraction  that  is  not  vulgar  and 
arbitrary,  but  scientific,  should  disclose  characteris- 
tics that  are  the  substitutes  for  a  group  (here  living 
beings  in  general),  taking  its  place,  and  enabling  us 
to  think  it.  These  constituent  elements  of  the  con- 
cept of  species  are  met  with  in  nearly  all  the  natural- 
ists' definitions.^  They  are  two  in  number;  species  is 
determined  by  two  essential  characteristics  :  similarity 
(morphological  criterion),  filiation  (physiological  cri- 
terion). 

I.  Similarity  seems  at  first  sight  easy  to  determine 
— as  though  we  had  only  to  open  our  eyes  ;  yet  by  this 
elementary  procedure  we  hardly  pass  beyond  the  level 
of  generic  images,  and  there  is  risk  of  falling  into 
many  errors.     It  is  necessary  to  penetrate  into  resem- 

IQuatrefages  {op.  cit.,  pp.  219-222)  gives  a  great  number  of  definitions  of 
species.  A  few  may  be  quoted  :  "  Species  should  be  defined  as  a  succession 
of  wholly  similar  individuals,  perpetuated  by  means  of  generation  "  (De  Jus- 
sieu). — "Species  is  a  constant  succession  of  like  individuals,  which  repro- 
duce themselves"  (Buffon). — "  By  species  we  mean  any  collection  of  similar 
individuals,  that  have  been  produced  by  individuals  like  unto  themselves  " 
(Lamarck). — "  Species  is  the  individual  repeated  and  continued  in  time  and 
space"  (Blaiuville). — "  Species  is  the  totality  of  all  individuals  that  have  the 
same  origin,  and  of  those  that  are  as  like  them,  as  they  are  among  them- 
selves "  (Brown),  etc.,  etc. 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PKINCll'AL  CONCEPTS.  Q.O'] 

blances  deeper  than  the  superficial ;  and  here  is  the 
first  degree  of  complexity.  Buffon  observed  that  "the 
horse  and  the  donkey,  which  are  distinct  species,  re- 
semble each  other  more  than  the  water  spaniel  and 
the  harrier,  which  are  of  the  same  species."  The  facts 
which  our  contemporaries  denote  by  the  name  oi  poly- 
morphism, entirely  baffle  the  criterion  of  similarity. 
Not  to  speak  of  the  obvious  difference  between  the 
larva  and  the  perfect  insect,  the  caterpillar  and  the 
butterfly,  or  between  the  males,  females,  and  neuters 
of  bees,  ants,  and  termites  ;  there  are  cases  in  which 
the  disparity  between  the  two  sexes  is  so  great  that 
the  male  and  the  female,  taken  respectively  as  two 
different  creatures,  have  been  classified  in  distinct 
geno-a,  and  even  orders :  e.  g.,  the  lampyris  or  glow- 
worm, Lernea,  and  many  others.  The  character  of  the 
resemblance  is  thus  too  often  vague,  sometimes  de- 
ceptive, nearly  always  inadequate  :  it  follows  that  we 
must  resort  to  the  other,  to  filiation. 

2.  This,  the  physiological  criterion,  again  appears 
to  leave  no  opening  for  equivocation,  since  it  can  be 
materially  stated.  Generally  speaking,  one  is  imbued 
with  the  notion  that  children  resemble  their  parents, 
that  the  immediate  product  is  the  reproduction  of  the 
type  of  the  progenitors.  But  the  alternating  genera- 
tions (metagenesis,  geneagenesis)  discovered  in  the 
course  of  the  present  century,  show  that  this  concep- 
tion is  too  simple,  and  often  fallacious.  This  mode  of 
reproduction  is  by  no  means  rare  ;  we  meet  with  it 
among  a  great  number  of  the  lower  plants,  infusoria, 
worms,  and  even  insects.  "The  dominating  fact  in 
the  reproduction  of  all  these  creatures,  is  that  a  sexual 
being,  of  definite  form,  gives  birth  to  asexual  beings 
which  do  not  resemble  it,  but  which  in  their  turn  pro- 


2o8  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

duce  by  a  sort  of  budding,  or  by  fission  of  their  bodies, 
the  sexual  creatures  similar  to  those  from  which  they 
issued."  Vogt,  accordingly,  in  his  definition  of  spe- 
cies, is  forced  to  include  the  case  of  alternate  genera- 
tion by  saying :  "Species  is  the  reunion  of  all  the 
individuals  that  originate  from  the  same  parents,  and 
are  in  themselves,  or  in  their  descendants,  similar  to 
their  primordial  ancestors." 

In  brief,  the  general  notion  of  species  depends 
upon  two  ideas,  complex  notwithstanding  their  appar- 
ent simplicity,  fluctuating  in  spite  of  their  apparent 
precision. 

Till  now,  we  have  spoken  of  species  as  if  it  were 
directly  superposed  upon  individuals,  as  if  it  resulted 
from  immediate  generalisation.  This  is  not  the  nat- 
uralists' position.  Their  classification  descends  from 
the  species  to  the  individual  by  decreasing  generalisa- 
tions of  the  race  and  the  variation.  Thus  the  human 
species  comprises  several  races  (white,  yellow,  etc.), 
the  white  race  comprises  several  variations  (English, 
Arab  type,  etc.).  To  the  partisan  of  fixedness  of  spe- 
cies, these  three  general  notions  have  not  the  same 
value :  species  alone  has  peculiar  and  irreducible  char- 
acters, which  are  deduced  from  the  function  of  repro- 
duction and  the  facts  of  cross-breeding. 

Couple  two  individuals  of  distinct  species:  the 
union  is  generally  sterile.  If  otherwise,  the  hybrids 
which  result  from  it  are  unfruitful.  If,  as  rarely  hap- 
pens, they  propagate  themselves,  the  offspring  rapidly 
return  to  the  type  of  one  of  the  ancestral  species. 

Couple  two  individuals  of  distinct  races  or  varia- 
tions, the  union  will  be  fruitful ;  the  resulting  cross- 
breeds are  again  fertile  ;  the  progenitors  are  able  to 
create  and  fix  varieties,  and  even  races. 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  SOQ 

Hence,  it  is  concluded,  species  must  be  a  thing 
that  exists,  that  protects  itself,  does  not  let  itself  be 
encroached  upon. 

Evidently  the  debated  question  is  one  of  facts  : 
and  both  the  parties  in  dispute  adduce  experimental 
evidence.  Few  in  number  as  they  may  be,  there  are 
fertile  hybrids,  which  perpetuate  themselves.  They 
are  found  among  birds  and  mammals,  e.  g.,  the  alpaca 
and  the  vicuna,  the  bull  and  the  zebu,  the  goat  and 
the  sheep — which  have  for  issue  the  ovicaprinse, — the 
hare  and  the  rabbit — whose  offspring  is  the  leporide, 
(their  perpetuity  has  been  contested).  On  the  other 
hand,  if  certain  species  have  thus  been  formed  by  a 
durable  blend,  there  exist  races  that  have  been  refrac- 
tory to  all  attempts  at  cross-breeding:  i.  e. ,  the  do- 
mestic and  Brazilian  guinea-pig,  different  races  of 
rats,  of  rabbits,  etc. 

We  need  not  enter  into  the  discussion,  nor  enu- 
merate the  observations  and  experiments  invoked  on 
either  side  :  they  are  to  be  found  in  special  works. 
Our  aim  was  to  discover  the  constituent  elements  of 
the  notion  of  species  in  its  scientific  aspect.  Now, 
neither  the  morphological  element  nor  the  physio- 
logical element  has  any  distinguishing  mark  of  per- 
manence and  universality.  The  concept  of  species  is 
possessed  of  no  absolute  value ;  neither  is  it  a  simple 
replica  in  the  mind  of  the  "plan  of  nature."  The 
result  of  abstraction  and  of  generalisation,  it  cor- 
responds to  something  which  is  fixed  for  a  certain 
time  in  certain  conditions ;  it  has  temporary  and  pro- 
visional objectivity.^ 

IFor  the  transformists,  as  is  well  known,  variety,  race,  and  species  are 
not  fixed  concepts.  "  From  variety  to  race,  from  race  to  species,  there  is  a 
continuous  insensible  passage.  Individual  modifications,  at  first  slight,  give 
rise  to  a  variety  or  to  a  race.  Continuing  to  augment,  and  extending  to  a  con- 


2IO  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

II. 

Contemporary  discussion  is  almost  entirely  cen- 
tred upon  species.  Little  is  said  about  genera,  and 
still  less  of  the  higher  divisions.  We  do  not,  in  any 
case,  find  what  we  require  :  the  determination  of  con- 
stitutive elements,  of  general  acceptance,  which  shall 
be  for  the  genus,  family,  order,  or  class,  the  equiva- 
lent of  the  two  denotative  marks — morphological  and 
physiological — that  are  attributed  to  species. 

This  has  not  always  been  the  case.  At  the  time 
when  there  was  general  belief  in  a  scheme  of  creation, 
the  naturalists  were  careful,  by  bringing  together 
species,  genera,  families,  etc.,  to  disengage  more  and 
more  general  characters,  which  they  regarded  as  es- 
sential, and  determined  by  the  nature  of  the  thing. 
We  have  already  said  that  Linnaeus  was  the  first  to 
formulate  a  precise  notion  of  genus,  to  which  he  ex- 
pressly attributed  a  reality :  "You  must  know,"  he 
says,  in  his  Philosophia  botanica,  "that  it  is  not  char- 
acter that  constitutes  the  genus,  but  genus  the  char- 
acter ;  that  character  devolves  from  genus,  not  genus 
from  character ;  that  character  exists  not  in  order 
that  genus  should  come  about  {fiaf),  but  so  that  the 
genus  should  be  known."  In  the  binary  nomenclature 
which  he  adopted,  the  first  term  designates  the  genus, 
the  second  one  of  the  species  included.  Thus  the  dog 
and  the  wolf  have  characters  by  which  they  resemble 
each  other,  and  are  distinguished  from  other  animals 
(five  fingers  on  the  anterior  limbs,  four  only  on  the 
posterior,  twenty-two  teeth  in  the  upper  and  lower 
jaw,  etc.)  Linnaeus  classifies  them  as  the  genus  Ca?iis, 

stantly  increasing  number  at  individuals,  they  may  come  to  constitute  spe- 
cific characters.  Pursuing  its  evolution,  the  species  then  finally  reaches  the 
rank  of  the  genus,  family,  etc." 


I 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  211 

of  which  Canis  familiaris,  Canis  lupus,  Canis  vulpes, 
etc.,  are  the  species.  Again,  the  genus  Felis,  deter- 
mined by  the  characters  common  to  certain  animals 
exclusively,  comprises  in  its  species  :  the  cat  {Felis 
caius),  the  lion  {Felis  leo),  the  tiger  {Felis  tigris^,  etc. 

Agassiz,  the  last  representative  of  the  line  of  nat- 
uralists who  aspired  at  reproducing  the  order  of  na- 
ture in  the  hierarchy  of  their  classificatory  concepts, 
characterises  the  genera  and  divisions  superior  to 
them  by  vague  formulae.  Of  these  we  can  judge  from 
the  following  passage  : 

"Individuals  are  the  support,  at  the  actual  mo- 
ment, of  the  characters  not  merely  of  species,  but  of 
all  other  divisions.  As  representative  of  genus,  they 
have  certain  details  of  a  definite  and  specific  structure, 
identical  with  those  possessed  by  the  representatives 
of  other  species.  As  representative  of  family,  they 
have  a  definite  constitution,  expressive  of  a  distinct 
and  specific  model,  in  forms  resembling  those  of  the 
representatives  of  other  genera.  As  representative  of 
order,  they  take  definite  rank,  as  compared  with  the 
representatives  of  other  families.  As  representative 
of  class,  they  manifest  the  structural  plan  of  their  ram- 
ifications by  the  aid  of  special  means,  and  according 
to  specific  directions.  As  representative  of  branches 
the  individuals  are  all  organised  on  a  distinct  plan 
which  differs  from  the  plan  of  other  branch-lines."^ 

It  was  shown  above  (Oh.  III.)  that  the  contempo- 
rary classifications,  which  are  radically  embryological, 
transformist,  and  generic,  proceed  otherwise,  and  have 
a  different  aim.  Their  ideal  is  to  draw  up  the  genea- 
logical tree  of  living  beings,  with  its  multiple  ramifica- 
tions, marking  the  principal  moments  of  evolution. 

1  De  I'Espice,  Ch.  II.,  §§  6  and  7. 


212  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

But  if,  leaving  aside  the  material  of  these  (animal 
or  vegetable)  classifications,  we  consider  only  the  psy- 
chological labor  by  which  they  are  constituted,  we 
find  that  the  transformists  and  their  adversaries  have 
at  least  one  common- point  which  is  of  cardinal  impor- 
tance. The  notion  of  fundamental  types — conceived 
as  fixed  or  provisory — is  for  the  one  as  for  the  other  a 
compass,  a  guide  in  research,  a  normal,  by  means  of 
which  deviations  are  appreciated.  Hence,  these  con- 
cepts have  a  practical  value,  and  it  is  true  that  we  find 
abstraction  and  generalisation  in  their  principal  role, 
which  is,  not  to  discover,  but  to  simplify,  above  all  to 
be  useful. 

In  effect,  the  one  side,  yielding  to  the  natural  ten- 
dency of  the  mind  to  reify  abstractions,  admit  the 
permanence  and  objectivity  of  types :  they  believe 
firmly  that  they  have  in  certain  concepts  the  possibil- 
ity of  an  ideal  reconstruction  of  the  entire  world  of 
living  beings.  This  faith  sustains  them  and  urges 
them  on  to  more  and  more  exact  determinations. 

Their  opponents,  the  transformists  of  every  de- 
gree, are  guided  by  a  different  ideal ;  they  search  after 
continuity,  transition,  forms  of  passage.  Species,  gen- 
era, families,  etc.,  are  but  provisory  starting-points, 
with  intermediate  lacunae  which  they  endeavor  to 
bridge  over.  Although  the  animal  order,  the  chain  of 
life,  is  itself  only  a  theoretical  construction,  a  natural 
abstraction,  many  fine  works  could  be  quoted  which 
are  inspired  by  this  faith  in  continuity.  Such,  e.  g., 
are  Huxley,  Cope,  and  others  upon  the  genus  Equiis, 
establishing  the  filiation  of  the  four-fingered  Eohippus 
of  the  old  Tertiary  epoch,  with  the  Hipparion  of  the 
new  Tertiary  epoch,  and  with  the  Horse  of  the  Quat- 
ernary period. 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  21 3 

The  hierarchy  of  concepts  formed  by  superposition 
of  abstractions  and  generalisations  only  facilitates  the 
task.  The  sole  incontestable  value  that  can  be  as- 
signed to  any  notion  of  species,  and  still  more  to 
genus,  and  other  still  more  general  concepts,  is  that 
of  utility.  They  are  successful  implements  in  the  in- 
vestigation of  nature.  All  other  pretensions  are  open 
to  discussion.  One  position  more  especially  is  unten- 
able :  that  which  claims  for  concepts,  the  pure  results 
of  abstraction,  an  absolute  value.  It  is  obvious  that 
they  can  have  none.  They  are  neither  reality  nor  fic- 
tion, but  approximations. 

*  * 

Laws    and    species — two    general   notions   which 

must  be  connected — were  bound  to  vary  in  the  course 
of  evolution,  because  they  are  entirely  subordinated 
to  the  conditions  which  govern  the  existence  of  phe- 
nomena and  of  living  beings.  Let  us — merely  as  an 
illustration  to  fix  our  ideas — admit  the  hypothesis  of 
a  primitive  nebula.  Imagine  (which  is  impossible) 
an  intelligent  being,  able,  at  that  point  in  the  world's 
history,  to  draw  up  a  scheme  of  the  existing  laws.  He 
could  discover  none  but  those  which  govern  matter  in 
the  gaseous  state, — some  of  which  are  still  extant,  oth- 
ers unknown  to  us,  and  unknowable — since,  their  con- 
ditions of  existence  having  ceased,  they  are  annihi- 
lated. When  at  a  later  time  this  matter,  uniformly 
diffused  and  dispersed  through  space,  became  divided 
from  one  or  other  cause  into  vast  nebulous  spheres 
commencing  their  slow  revolution,  our  hypothetical 
being  might  have  surprised  the  birth  of  the  astronom- 
ical laws.  Subsequently,  the  constitution  of  the  liquid 
state  of  matter,  and  then  of  the  solid  state  in  its  dif- 
ferent degrees,  would  give  birth  to  new  physico-chem- 


214  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

ical  laws,  others  meantime  disappearing.  When, 
finally,  life — whatever  may  have  been  its  origin — ap- 
peared, other  laws  again  loomed  forth,  and  the  possi- 
bility of  classification.  Yet  to  the  hypothetical  spec- 
tator, these  must  needs  be  highly  singular,  highly 
dissimilar  from  our  own — unless  we  admit  the  hypoth- 
esis of  a  world  created  at  one  throw. 

It  is  needless  to  enter  into  the  details  of  this  long 
evolution,  as  it  is  generally  admitted  to  have  been. 
Enough  to  remember  that  the  matter  whence  abstrac- 
tion deduces  laws  and  species  has  varied,  and  may 
vary  again  in  the  course  of  ages.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  we  consider  the  slow  progress  of  human  knowl- 
edge, and  the  incessant  corrections  imposed  by  expe- 
rience and  reasoning  from  century  to  century,  we  find 
ourselves  confronted  with  two  variable  factors,  one 
objective,  the  other  subjective.  No  permanence  can 
result  from  their  union.  Long  as  may  be  the  stability 
of  laws  and  species,  nothing  guarantees  their  perpet- 
ual duration.  So  that  after  two  centuries  which  make 
a  brave  show  in  the  history  of  the  sciences,  we  may 
still  advance  the  formula  of  Leibnitz:  ** Our  deter- 
minations of  physical  species  are  provisional  and  pro- 
portional to  our  knowledge.  "1 

Many  other  concepts  might  be  added  to  the  pre- 
ceding, among  them,  those  of  the  moral  sciences.  I 
forbear,  because  the  history  of  their  fluctuations  would 
in  itself  exact  a  volume.  Till  now,  these  have  been 
ill-determined,  badly  defined.  May  we  even  speak  of 
any  regular  evolution  ?  Have  they  not  rather  suffered 
corsi  e  ricorsi,  which  bring  them  back  perennially  to 
their  point  of  departure  ?  Whenever — during  a  devel- 
opment of  centuries — the  work  of  abstraction  has  suc- 

1  Nouveaux  Essais,  IIL,  §  6,  23. 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CONCEPTS.  2l5 

ceeded,  we  have  seen  it  pass  through  successive 
phases  : — generic  ideas,  intermediate  forms,  higher 
forms — but  not  by  any  constant  process.  Sometimes 
it  has  rapidly  attained  the  period  of  complete  simpli- 
fication, as  in  mathematics;  sometimes  it  is  long  ar- 
rested in  its  progress,  as  in  the  natural  sciences : 
sometimes,  again,  as  in  the  less  established  sciences, 
it  is  incapable  even  to  the  present  day  of  transcending 
the  lowest  stages. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

CONCLUSION. 

WE  have  endeavored  to  show  how  the  faculty  of  ab- 
stracting and  of  generalising  has  been  developed 
empirically,  and  to  follow  it  in  its  spontaneous  and 
natural  evolution  as  shown  in  history, — not  in  the 
philosophical  speculations  which  are  only  its  efflor- 
escence, and  which,  for  the  most  part,  ignore  or  de- 
spise its  origins.  It  remains  to  us,  in  conclusion,  to 
seek  out  how,  and  by  what  causes,  this  intellectual 
process  has  constituted  and  developed  itself  :  further 
— what  are  the  different  directions  it  has  followed  in 
the  course  of  its  development. 

I.  To  contemporary  psychology,  the  mind  is  a 
sum  of  processes  of  dissimilar  nature,  whose  mode  of 
appearance  and  of  evolution  depends  upon  predeter- 
mined conditions.  In  the  total  of  intellectual  opera- 
tions, abstraction  is  a  process  of  secondary  formation  : 
it  does  not  belong  to  the  primary  stratum  of  sensa- 
tions and  percepts,  of  appetites  and  tendencies,  of 
primitive  emotions.  We  found  however  that  it  was 
there  in  embryo.  How  then,  instead  of  remaining  in 
this  rudimentary  state,  has  it  been  so  differentiated  as 
to  become  a  function  proper  to  the  intellect,  and  with 
a  long  development  that  is  still  in  progress? 


I 


CONCLUSION.  217 

The  primary  condition  is  the  existence  of  attention, 
which  brings  a  few  points  into  relief,  amid  the  general 
confusion.  We  have  shown  elsewhere  that  attention 
itself  depends  originally  upon  the  instinct  of  individ- 
ual preservation.^  Attention,  however,  can  only  pre- 
cede and  prepare  for  abstraction,  because  it  is  a  mo- 
mentary state  of  application  to  the  variable  aspects 
of  events,  and  does  not  isolate  anything. 

We  know  how  the  first  labor  of  separation,  of  dis- 
sociation, takes  effect  in  the  formation  of  generic  im- 
ages, and  how  the  extracted  quality  fixed  itself,  for 
better  or  worse,  by  the  aid  of  a  visual,  auditory,  tac- 
tile scheme,  by  a  movement,  a  gesture,  which  confers 
on  it  a  sort  of  independence. 

Finally,  with  the  word — the  substitute  for  the  ab- 
stract intuition — the  mental  dissociation  approximates 
to  a  real  dissociation  :  the  abstract  character,  incar- 
nated in  the  word,  seems,  as  happens  only  too  often, 
to  exist  by  itself.  The  process  of  abstraction,  with 
its  fitting  instrument,  is  completely  constituted. 

During  these  successive  phases,  and  afterwards, 
throughout  the  course  of  the  historical  development 
of  human  intelligence,  the  progress  of  abstraction  and 
of  generalisation,  depends  upon  two  principal  causes  : 
one  general,  i.  e.,  utility;  the  other  accidental  and 
sporadic,  the  advent  of  inventors. 

I.  In  his  book  on  Darwinism  (Ch.  XV.)  Wallace, 
in  contesting  the  theory  that  applies  the  law  of  con- 
servation of  variations,  useful  in  the  struggle  for  ex- 
istence, to  the  mental  faculties,  insists  at  length  upon 
the  mathematical  faculty ;  he  maintains  that  it  is  an 
inexplicable  exception,  a  case  that  cannot  be  reduced 
to  law.     The  inaptitude  of  inferior  races  for  even  the 

\  Psychology  of  Attention,  Ch.  I.    (Chicago  :  Open  Court  Publishing  Co.) 


2l8  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

simplest  calculations  is  well  known  ;  how — from  such 
a  rudimentary  origin — could  it  develop  into  the  genius 
of  a  Newton,  a  Laplace,  or  a  Gauss  ?  What  motive 
power  accounts  for  this  development?  The  author 
establishes  by  a  host  of  sufficiently  useless  historical 
details,  that  mathematical  superiority  played  no  part 
in  the  struggle  of  tribe  with  tribe,  and  later  on  of  peo- 
pie  with  people  (Greeks  against  Persians),  and  that 
the  victory  resulted  from  other  causes,  moral  and  so- 
cial. For  this  there  is  abundant  evidence.  But  since 
mathematical  aptitude  is  only  a  particular  instance  of 
abstraction,  albeit  one  of  the  most  perfect,  the  ques- 
tion ought  to  be  proposed  under  a  more  general  form. 
Had  the  aptitude  for  abstraction,  ab  initio,  any  prac- 
tical value  ?  Yes,  ''the  motive  power  that  caused  its 
development,  that  Wallace  claims  without  specifying 
it,  is  utility." 

To  avoid  possibility  of  equivocation,  let  us  remark 
that  the  development  of  the  attitude  for  abstracting 
and  generalising  may  be  explained  in  a  two-fold  man- 
ner :  by  acknowledging  the  influence  of  heredity,  and 
by  omitting  it. 

In  the  former  case,  it  is  supposed  that  this  apti- 
tude appears  as  a  "spontaneous  variation"  in  the  in- 
dividual or  race,  that  it  fixes  itself,  is  reciprocal, 
grows  by  slow  accumulation  in  the  course  of  genera- 
tions. This  theory  postulates  the  heredity  of  acquired 
characters,  which  is  accepted  by  some,  rejected  by 
others,  more  especially  since  the  advent  of  Weis- 
mann.  I  refrain  from  invoking  it,  by  reason  of  its 
hypothetical  and  disputed  nature.  The  probability  of 
any  transmission  would  moreover  be  far  harder  to  es- 
tablish here  than  in  other  psychical  directions,  such 
as  imagination,  or  feeling. 


CONCLUSION.  219 

In  the  second  case,  with  elimination  of  the  hered- 
itary factor,  progress  must  be  attributed  to  social 
causes,  utility  and  imitation.  From  all  time  there 
have  been  minds  which  when  face  to  face  with  prac- 
tical problems  knew  better  than  others  how  to  extract 
the  essential,  and  neglect  the  accessory,  in  the  com- 
plex of  facts.  The  utilitj'  of  abstraction  is  identical 
with  that  of  attention,  which  does  not  require  demon- 
stration ;  it  may  be  summed  up  in  a  single  word :  to 
simplify.  As  the  process  succeeds,  it  finds  imitators. 
There  is  no  need  to  admit  at  the  outset  any  reflected 
and  fully  conscious  abstraction  :  a  happy  instinct, 
guided  by  the  needs  of  life,  is  sufficient  at  the  com- 
mencement. Races  that  are  poorly  gifted  in  this  re- 
spect, or  little  apt  at  imitating  their  betters,  have 
never  got  beyond  a  low  level.  In  effect,  abstraction 
and  generalisation  are  the  nerve  of  all  knowledge  that 
transcends  sensation.  Is  this  mode  of  cognition  use- 
ful ?  There  can  be  no  possible  doubt  as  to  the  an- 
swer. 

2.  The  role  of  inventors  corresponds  to  the  fact 
which,  in  transformist  terminology,  is  known  as  spon- 
taneous variation.  By  inventors,  we  mean  those  who 
are  born  with  the  talent  or  the  genius  for  abstrac- 
tion. It  is  superfluous  to  prove  that  such  have  been 
found,  in  considerable  numbers.  They  are  abstract 
thinkers  by  instinct,  as  others  are  musicians,  me- 
chanicians, designers.  The  biography  of  the  great 
mathematicians  abounds  in  examples  :  Pascal  invent- 
ing geometry  out  of  a  few  vague  indications  from  his 
father ;  Newton  divining  Euclid's  demonstrations  from 
the  simple  enunciation  of  the  theorems ;  Ampere,  be- 
fore he  could  read  or  understand  the  use  of  figures, 
making  long  calculations  by  means  of  a  few  pebbles  \ 


220  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

Gauss,  at  five  years  old,  rectifying  the  arithmetic  of  a 
workman,  etc.  If  fewer  analogous  facts  can  be  quoted 
from  the  other  sciences,  it  is  because  mathematical 
precocity  is  frequent,  and  is  more  surprising.  All  that 
is  the  effect  of  innate  disposition :  this  word  serving 
only  to  recapitulate  our  ignorance  of  the  causes  which 
produce  such  minds.  In  the  development  of  knowl- 
edge by  abstraction  and  generalisation,  the  first  cause 
— utility — may  be  likened  to  the  part  played  by  slow 
actions  in  geology;  whether  in  the  case  of  practical 
inventions,  or  of  the  constitution  of  an  idiom,  it  is 
continuous,  collective,  and  anonymous.  The  role  of 
the  great  abstract  thinkers,  on  the  contrary,  resembles 
the  rapid  and  epoch-making  actions. 

II.  If  we  now  consider  the  progress  of  abstraction 
from  a  more  general  point  of  view  (instead  of  follow- 
ing it  step  by  step,  from  its  lowest  to  its  highest  de- 
gree, as  in  the  preceding  chapters),  i.  e.,  according  to 
its  orientation  towards  a  given  end,  we  find  that  it 
has  followed  three  principal  directions  during  its  his- 
tory: practical,  speculative,  scientific.  These  are, 
indeed,  inseparable,  inasmuch  as  practical  abstraction 
leads  to  science,  scientific  abstraction  is  profitable  to 
practice,  and  speculation  cannot  entirely  forego  the 
other  two.* 

Abstraction  and  practical  generalisation  are  neces- 
sarily the  first  in  order,  as  we  found  in  studying  their 
first  appearance  in  the  lower  animals,  in  children,  and 
in  savages.  They  serve  to  distinguish  the  qualities  of 
things  by  some  word,  or  sign ;  they  subserve  the  sim- 
ple adaptations  of  daily  life.  Later  on,  at  a  higher 
stage,  they  note  the  appearance  of  mixed  processes, 

IFora  study  of  the  function  and  practical  value  of  symbolism  consult 
Ferrero,  Les  lots psychologiques  du  symbolisme :  Paris,  F.  Alcan. 


I 


CONCLUSION.  221 

which,  while  more  especially  directed  to  utility,  are 
already  the  prelude  to  scientific  knowledge.  Disinter- 
ested curiosity  has  awakened,  and  timidly  makes  for 
daylight.  A  minimum  acquaintance  with  the  history 
of  the  sciences  teaches  us  that  all  were  at  their  origin 
processes  of  applied  research,  and  that  often,  in  their 
uncertain  efforts,  our  forbears  found  what  they  were 
not  looking  for.  The  numerative  systems  issued  from 
the  need  of  counting  objects,  and  later  on,  from  rude 
commercial  exchanges.  Elementary  geometry  was  re- 
quired, in  order  to  measure  the  fields,  to  determine  a 
right  angle,  to  fix  relative  positions,  and  to  furnish 
the  indispensable  parts  of  primitive  architecture.  The 
invention  of  the  lever,  of  the  balance,  of  rudimentary 
engines  for  the  lifting  of  heavy  masses,  gave  the  first 
foundations  of  mechanics.  Astronomy  arose  in  the 
desire  to  regulate  civil  life  and  the  religious  festivals, 
and  the  wish  (e.  g.,  among  the  Peruvians  and  Mexi- 
cans) not  to  irritate  the  gods  by  delaying  the  sacri- 
fices due  to  them.  Metallurgy,  and  later  on  the  search 
for  the  philosopher's  stone,  and  the  elixir  of  life,  were 
the  prelude  to  scientific  chemistry.  The  historical 
outset  of  each  science  would  furnish  a  profusion  of 
similar  facts. 

The  two  other  operations  issued  by  an  internal  di- 
vision of  labor  from  this — at  first  the  only — tendency 
of  the  mind. 

First  come  purely  speculative,  i.  e.,  philosophical 
or  metaphysical  abstraction  and  generalisation.  This 
new  trend  has  clean  and  well  defined  characteristics  ; 
and  it  was,  in  antiquity,  the  privilege  of  two  peoples 
alone,  the  Greeks  and  the  Hindus.  Abstraction  leads 
immediately  to  the  highest  generalisations ;  from  the 
crude  and  direct  simplification   of  a  few   facts,   the 


222  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

mind  leaps  at  a  bound  to  the  final  causes  of  things ; 
it  skips  the  intermediate  stages :  it  ignores  the  se- 
quence of  slow  and  progressive  evolution.  This  pro- 
cedure where,  in  point  of  fact,  abstraction  and  gener- 
alisation are  only  the  servants  of  a  particular  form  of 
imagination,  found  its  first  complete  expression  in 
Plato,  and  the  Theory  of  Ideas.  With  Plato,  the  hu- 
man intellect  tasted  for  the  first  time  the  supreme 
pleasures  of  playing  with  the  highest  abstractions, 
and  believing  firmly  that  the  universe  can  be  summed 
up,  constructed  and  explained  by  the  help  of  some 
few  entities.  In  this  direction,  notwithstanding  its 
manifold  changes  of  aspect,  the  generalising  process 
has  remained  fundamentally  the  same,  and  has  done 
no  more  than  repeat  itself.  We  are  here  concerned 
with  statement,  not  with  criticism.  Psychologists 
must  needs  admit  that  this  tendency  to  construct  the 
world  (whether  or  no  it  be  illusory)  is  a  fact  inherent 
in  the  nature  of  the  human  intellect.  Stallo,  in  the 
book  already  quoted,^  gives  an  incisive  critique  of  the 
fundamental  concepts  of  the  physical  sciences,  and 
their  unconscious  trend  towards  metaphysics.  His 
appreciation  of  the  characteristics  proper  to  the  purely 
speculative  process  of  abstraction  and  generalisation, 
is  so  apt,  that  we  cannot  do  better  than  transcribe  it : 

' '  Whatever  diversity  may  exist  between  metaphysical  sys- 
tems, they  are  all  founded  upon  the  express  or  implied  supposition 
that  there  is  a  fixed  correspondence  between  concepts  and  their  fil- 
iations on  the  one  hand  and  things  and  their  mode  of  interdepend- 
ence on  the  other.  This  fundamental  error  is  in  great  part  due  to 
a  delusory  view  of  the  function  of  language  as  an  aid  to  the  forma- 
tion and  fixation  of  concepts.  Roughly  stated,  concepts  are  the 
meanings  of  words ;  and  the  circumstances  that  words  primarily 
designate  things,  or  at  least  objects  of  sensation  and  their  sensible 

1  The  Concept!:  and  Theories  of  Modern  Physics,  Ch.  IX.,  p.  137,  3rd  ed. 


CONCLUSION.  223 

interactions,  has  given  rise  to  certain  fallacious  assumptions  which, 
unlike  the  ordinary  infractions  of  the  laws  of  logic,  are  in  a  sense 
natural  outgrowths  of  the  evolution  of  thought  (not  without  anal- 
ogy to  the  organic  diseases  incident  to  bodily  life)  and  may  be 
termed  structural  fallacies  of  the  intellect.  These  assumptions 
are : 

"  I.  That  every  concept  is  the  counterpart  of  a  distinct  objec- 
tive reality,  and  that  hence  there  are  as  many  things,  or  natural 
classes  of  things,  as  there  are  concepts  or  notions. 

"2.  That  the  more  general  or  extensive  concepts  and  the  re- 
alities corresponding  to  them  pre  exist  to  the  less  general,  more 
comprehensive,  concepts  and  their  corresponding  realities  ;  and 
that  the  latter  concepts  and  realities  are  derived  from  the  former, 
either  by  a  successive  addition  of  attributes  or  properties,  or  by  a 
process  of  evolution,  the  attributes  or  properties  of  the  former 
being  taken  as  implications  of  those  of  the  latter. 

"  3.  That  the  order  of  the  genesis  of  concepts  is  identical  with 
the  order  of  the  genesis  of  things. 

"4.  That  things  exist  independently  of  and  antecedently  to 
their  relations ;  that  all  relations  are  between  absolute  terms  ;  and 
that  therefore  whatever  reality  belongs  to  the  properties  of  things 
is  distinct  from  that  of  the  things  themselves." 

The  differences  between  this  procedure  and  that 
proper  to  the  third  (or  scientific)  direction  need 
hardly  be  enumerated. 

Here  the  advance  is  step  by  step,  without  for  an  in- 
stant losing  hold  of  the  thread  that  leads  back  to  the 
starting-point  of  experience.  Even  where  the  mind 
takes  giant  strides,  or  leaps  across  the  intermediate 
generalisations,  it  pauses  to  verify  its  results  and  to 
take  up  the  thread  it  had  loosed  for  the  moment.  This 
is  the  typical  process.  Since  it  formed  the  basis  of 
our  discussion  of  the  intermediate  and  higher  forms  of 
abstraction,  we  need  not  here  return  to  it.  Yet  in 
conclusion,  it  is  well  to  recall  once  more  what  makes 
it  of  sterling  value. 

To  reduce  the  essentials  of  abstraction  and  gener- 


224  "THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

alisation  to  the  exclusive  use  of  the  word  (or  sign)  as 
is  customary,  is  an  error  that  can  only  be  explained  by 
the  time-honored  neglect  of  the  function  of  the  uncon- 
scious in  psychology.  The  sign  is  no  more  than  an  in- 
strument of  simplification,  an  abbreviated  formula. 
When  the  mind  works  with  the  aid  of  concepts,  the 
co-operation  of  two  factors,  the  one  conscious,  the 
other  unconscious  or  sub-conscious,  is  required,  in 
order  that  its  labor  may  be  legitimate  and  fruitful :  on 
the  one  hand,  we  have  words  or  signs,  accompanied 
sometimes  by  a  vague  representation  ;  on  the  other 
hand,  a  latent,  potential,  organised  knowledge.  We 
endeavored  above  (Ch.  IV.)  to  show  how  this  couple 
forms  and  fixes  itself.  The  mechanism  is  invariably 
the  same,  without  exception.  Whether  we  keep  up  a 
trivial  conversation  by  means  of  the  abstract  terms 
which  compose  our  languages,  or  whether  we  ascend 
to  the  highest  generalisations,  there  is  in  the  mental 
state  no  more  than  a  difference  in  degree ;  there  is  no 
difference  in  nature.  Beneath  the  words  that  are  the 
clear  factors,  exists  the  dumb  travail,  the  vague  invo- 
cation, of  the  organised  experience  that  gives  life  to 
them.  Without  this  unconscious  factor  which  may, 
often  does,  become  conscious,  there  is  nought  but  illu- 
sion. When  we  induct,  deduct,  traverse  a  long  series 
of  abstractions  to  demonstrate  or  to  discover,  the  use- 
ful work  consists  in  new  relations  which  establish 
themselves  in  our  organised  potential  knowledge ; 
words  are  no  more  than  the  instruments  that  com- 
mence the  task,  facilitate  and  mark  its  phases.  When 
the  mind  is  grappling  with  the  highest  abstractions, 
and  climbs  from  height  to  height,  what  preserves  it 
from  catastrophe,  and  guarantees  against  error,  is  the 
quantity  and  quality  of  the  unconscious  material  stored 


CONCLUSION.  225 

up  beneath  the  words.  The  entomologist  who  at  first 
sight,  and  immediately,  classifies  one  insect  among 
millions  of  species,  acts  in  virtue  of  his  long  experi- 
ence, impressed  firmly  in  his  memory  with  salient 
characteristics  :  he  proceeds  from  the  sensory  data  to 
the  name.  In  the  inverse  operation,  when  he  merely 
enunciates  the  name,  all  this  acquired  knowledge  is 
the  substrate.  The  existence  of  these  conscious-un- 
conscious couples  is,  so  to  speak,  a  rule  in  pyscbol- 
ogy  :  general  ideas  are  but  a  particular  case,  perhaps 
the  least  well-known  :  hence  we  previously  likened 
them  (Ch.  IV.)  to  rnental  habits. 

It  follows  that  in  proportion  as  we  ascend  in  gen- 
eralisation we  rise,  not  into  vacuity,  as  has  been  said, 
but  into  the  simple — as  also,  it  must  be  confessed, 
into  the  approximate.  The  relatively  empty  concepts 
(there  are  none  that  are  absolutely  void  of  content) 
are  the  product  of  a  discontinuous  generalisation 
which  prevents  descent  without  interruption  or  omis- 
sion into  the  concrete.  Of  course  these  are  chiefly 
encountered  in  the  world  of  pure  speculation.  They 
are  names  representing  a  knowledge  that  is  incom- 
plete, partial,  inadequate,  or  ill-organised  ;  they  cor- 
respond not  to  elimination  of  what  is  useless,  but  to 
deficit  of  what  is  necessary.  Having  no  possible  con- 
tact with  reality,  they  float  in  an  unreal  atmosphere, 
and  are  material  for  a  fragile  and  quickly  crumbling 
architecture.  The  aim  of  thinking  by  concepts  is  to 
substitute  for  complex  states,  simpler  conditions  that 
may  be  turned  and  re-turned  in  every  possible  sense, 
in  order  the  better  to  discover  their  relations:  whereas 
here,  by  the  nature  of  things,  the  unconscious  activ- 
ity, the  labor  that  operates  silently  in  the  lower  strata, 


2  26  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 

is  applied  to  a  soil  that  is  full  of  faults  and  fissures, 
and  can  but  project  a  false  light  into  consciousness. 

It  has  frequently  been  stated  that  symbolic  thought 
is  thinking  by  substitution.  This  formula  is  admissi- 
ble only  when  we  recognise  that  the  substitute  sup- 
poses, nay  expects,  the  actual  existence  of  that  for 
which  it  is  substituted.  Substitution  is  valid  in  con- 
sciousness, but  not  for  the  total  operation.  To  sum 
up  in  a  word :  the  psychology  of  abstraction  and  gen- 
eralisation, is  in  a  great  measure  the  psychology  of  the 
unconscious. 

We  have  merely  studied  general  ideas  in  so  far  as 
they  have  an  assignable  origin  in  experience,  and  do 
not  transcend  its  limits.  Are  there,  as  some  main- 
tain, notions  anterior  to  any  sensory  intuition — that 
can  by  no  means  nor  effort  be  derived  from  empir- 
ical data  ?  It  is  not  our  part  to  discuss  this  question. 
The  thesis — whether  or  no  it  be  legitimate — is  a  con- 
tention in  favor  of  innate  ideas,  and  in  whatever 
fashion  it  is  conceived  {Jt  priori  forms,  hereditary  dis- 
position, cerebral  conformation),  it  is  the  problem  of 
the  ultimate  constitution  of  human  intelligence,  which 
we  have  rigorously  eliminated  from  our  present  sub- 
ject. 


INDEX. 


Abstraction,  a  positive  operation,  2 ; 
a  process  of  secondary  formation, 
216  et  seq.;  has  followed  three  prin- 
cipal directions;  practical,  specu- 
lative, scientific,  220  et  seq.;  higher 
forms  of,  III  et  seq.;  implies  a  dis- 
sociative process,  8;  intermediate 
forms  of,  86  et  seq. ;  prior  to  speech, 
I  et  seq.;  stages  of,  10  et  seq. 

Abstract  thought,  a  skeleton,  135. 

Acoustic  space,  148. 

Adjective,  the,  76. 

Agassiz,  7,  105,  107,  211. 

Ampfere,  219. 

Analogy,  27,  84. 

Animals,  causality  in,  184;  counting 
of,  19;  language  of,  58;  psychology 
of,  II  et  seq.;  reasoning  of,  30;  time- 
sense  of,  i6g. 

Antecedent  and  consequent,  180,  183 
et  seq. 

Ants,  intelligence  of,  12  et  seq.,  27,  55. 

Arabic,  76. 

Archimedes,  190. 

Architecture,  28. 

Aristotle,  45,  105  et  seq. 

Arithmogenesis,  139. 

Articulation,  63. 

Artists,  134. 

Association  of  images,  18;  by  simi- 
larity, 24. 

Astronomers,  the  first,  173. 

Attention,  134,  217. 

Auditory  types,  112,  121  et  seq. 

Aztec  language,  73. 

Baer,  Von,  108. 
Bain,  7. 


Barter,  109. 

Bees,  intelligence  of,  14,  56. 
Belief  in  a  universal  law  of  causal- 
ity, 185  et  seq. 
Belt,  Mr.,  13. 
Bergson,  178. 
Binet,  37. 
Blainville,  2o6. 
Boole,  38. 
Boutroux,  203, 
Bradley,  25. 
Breal,  70,  71. 
Brehm,  170. 
Brown,  205,  206. 
Buffon,  206,  207. 

Cases,  grammatical,  81. 

Causality,  belief  in  a  universal  law 
of,  185  et  seq. 

Cause,  empirical  origin  of,  181 ;  his- 
tory of  concept  of,  180  et  seq.;  uni- 
versalisation  of  the  concept  of,  185 
et  seq. 

Chaldasans,  173. 

Chance,  idea  of,  187  et  seq. 

Charcot,  127. 

Chess-players,  40. 

Child,  numeration  in  the,  35  ;  gen- 
eral ideas  of,  31  et  seq.;  time-sense 
of,  171. 

Chinese,  62,  69. 

Class,  211. 

Classification,  biological,  history  of, 
103  et  seq.,  204. 

Cognition,  cardinal  operations  of,  i. 

Communication,  55  et  seq. 

Compositors,  121. 

Concepts,   11,  92,   135;  hierarchy  of, 


228 


THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 


109,213;  relatively  empty,  225  ;  the 
inferior,  88;  ultimate  nature  of,  113. 

Concrete  type,  115. 

Condillac,  31,  77. 

Consciousness,  the  condition  of  any 
notion  of  time,  175  at  seq. 

Convertibility,  192. 

Cope,  212. 

Copernicus,  197. 

Counting,  35,  99,  143. 

Cournot,  134,  146,  187,  188. 

Couturat,  144. 

Cross-breeding,  208. 

Cuvier,  107,  108. 

Czermak,  160. 

D'Alembert,  201. 

Dammaras,  99. 

Darmesteter,  84. 

Darwin,  12,  18,  34,  63. 

Deaf-mutes,  psychology  of,  39 ;  lan- 
guage of,  41;  syntax  of,  43;  numera- 
tion in,  45  ;  religious  notions  of,  46. 

Decimal  system,  143. 

Declensions,  81. 

Delambre,  173 

De  Jussieu,  206. 

DeQuincy,  150. 

Descartes,  197. 

Determinism,  188,  193. 

Dewey,  139. 

Dietze,  161. 

Diff.  rences,  90. 

Dissociation,  27. 

Dogs,  intelligence  of,  17,  90,  29. 

Dual,    he,  77. 

Duck,  34. 

Dugas,  136. 

Duke  of  Argyle,  40. 

Duration,  concrete,  159  et  seq.;  per- 
ception of,  161  et  seq.;  reproduc- 
tion of,  162. 

Ebbels,  40. 

Economy  of  thought,  202. 

Effort,  sense  of,  182  et  seq. 

Elephant,  intelligence  of,  15. 

Ellendorf,  Dr.,  13. 

Empirical  laws,  198. 

Empiricists,  149. 

Energy,  conservation  of,  192. 


Esquimaux,  74. 

Euclidean  geometry,  156  et  seq. 

Evolution  in  our  ideas,  195. 

Exchange,  no. 

Expectation,  in  reasoning,  state  of, 

25. 
Extension,  concrete,  feeling  of,  147 

et  seq.;  characterised,  158. 
Extracts,  70. 

FacuHas  signatrix,  55. 
Family,  211. 
Ferrero,  220. 
First  causes,  190. 
Fouill6e,  177. 
Fox,  ruses  of,  18. 
Franklin,  55. 

Function,  notion  of  mathematical, 
190. 

Galileo,  190. 

Galton,  10,  40,  99. 

Gauss,  148,  156,  218,  220. 

Geese,  time-sense  of,  170. 

Geiger,  63. 

Genera,  210  et  seq. 

General  ideas,  thinking  by,  9;  their 
grades  distinguished,  loi;  likened 
to  mental  habits,  131,  225;  meaning 
of,  135;  observations  on,  114  et  seq. 

Generalisation,  9,  185. 

Generic  image,  10,  87  et  seq.,  93,  169, 
183,  196;  an  almost  passive  conden- 
sation of  resemblances,  18;  a  spon- 
taneous fusion  of  images,  22;  comes 
half  way  between  individual  repre- 
sentation and  abstraction  properly 
so  called,  23. 

Genii,  95. 

Geometry,  born  of  practical  needs, 
148  et  seq.;  non-Euclidean,  156  et 
seq. 

G^rando,  40,  41,  51. 

Gesture,  language  of,  48  et  seq.,  66. 

Glass,  163. 

Goethe,  109,  134. 

Guyau,  166,  178. 

Habere,  79. 
Haeckel,  108. 
Hare,  ruses  of,  18. 


INDEX. 


229 


Hebrew,  69. 

Heinicke,  64. 

Helmholtz,  62. 

Heredity  of  acquired  characters,  218. 

HoeSding,  4,  136. 

Horwicz,  165,  166. 

Houzeau,  17,  18,  36. 

Huber,  55. 

Hume,  187,  190. 

Huxley,  10,  22,  212. 

Hybrids,  208. 

Hysterics,  127. 

Idealogues,  68. 

liifes-forces,  177. 

Identity,  sense  of,  6. 

Ideography,  53. 

Images,  logic  of,  26etseq.,  40;  also 

5  et  seq.,  iii. 
Imagination,  forms  of,  112. 
Indiflferent  point,  163. 
Individual,  notion  of  the,  204. 
Inference,  24,  26,  30. 
Infinity,  144. 
Intelligence,  87. 
Inventors,  r61e  of,  219. 
Iroquois,  74. 
Isolates,  17. 

James,  W.,  6,  9,  29,  30,  46,  80,  140,  149, 

162,  175,  176,  194. 
Janet,  163. 

Kant,  137,  158,  175,  190. 
Kepler,  197,  202. 
Kirby,  55. 
Kleinpaul,  52. 
Kussmaul,  45,  46. 

Ladd,  7. 

Lamarck,  206. 

Language,  origin  of,  31  et  seq.,  54  et 

seq. 
Languages,   natural    organisms,   83; 

savage,  95  et  seq. 
Laplace,  218. 
Lapp,  76. 
Law,  origin  of  concept  of,  194  et  seq.; 

theoretical  or  ideal,  200. 
Laws,   defined,    197;    called    by   the 

names  of  their  inventors,  198  ;  vary 

in  the  course  of  evolution,  213. 


Leffevre,  A.,  61. 
Leibnitz,  31,  129,  140,  214. 
Leroy,  G.,  18,  19,  30,  57. 
Lewes,  i8o. 
Liard,  142. 
Linnaeus,  106,  210. 
Lobachevski,  156. 
Locke,  31. 
Lotze,  150,  151,  178. 
Lubbock,  20,  50,  55,  96. 

Mach,  E.,  148,  163,  164,  178,  202. 

Maclellan,  139. 

Magpie,  20,  21. 

Maine  de  Biran,  181. 

Mallery,  Colonel,  49,  50,  51. 

Mariotte,  202. 

Mathematical  faculty,  the,  217. 

Mathematicians,  126. 

Mathematics,  originated  in  observa- 
tion, 148. 

Mayer,  R.,  191. 

Measure  of  quantity,  100. 

Memory,  132. 

Mill,  John  Stuart,  24,  25,  26,  34,  138, 
i5i>  i54i  155,  181,  191. 

Mimicry,  language  of,  52. 

Mind,  the,  9,  216. 

Miracles,  186. 

Mivart,  St.  George,  48. 

Monkeys,  intelligence  of,  19. 

Montesquieu,  197. 

Morgan,  C.  Lloyd,  16,  30. 

Motion,  psychology  of,  182. 

Motor  types,  112. 

Miiller,  Fr.,  60. 

Miiller,  Max,  28,  39,  40,  59,  60,  6g,  71, 
74>  79.  80,  92. 

Miinsterberg,  148,  163,  166,  167,  177. 

Muscular  types,  112. 

Mussels,  84. 

Names,    individual,    appellative    or 

general  ?  32. 
Nativists,  149. 

Neanderthal  anthropoid,  61. 
Neo-geometers,  157. 
Neretina,  7. 
Newton,  218,  219. 
Nichols,  139,  161,  164,  175. 
Noire,  L.,  60. 


230 


THE  EVOLUTION  OF  GENERAL  IDEAS. 


Nomenclature,  105  at  seq. 

Nominalists,  122,  128. 

Normal  time,  167. 

Nothing,  the  answer,  127  at  seq. 

Number,  concept  of,  history  and  the- 
ories of  its  origin,  137  et  seq. 

Numbers,  sequence  of,  142  et  seq.; 
nature  of,  146. 

Numeration,  in  animals,  19;  in  the 
child,  35  ;  its  development,  98. 

Observations  on  general  terms,  114 

et  seq. 
Oken,  108. 

OnomatopcBia,  71,  73. 
Order,  211. 
Owen,  Richard,  109. 

Painter,  117. 

Parallels,  axiom  of,  157. 

Pascal,  219. 

Paul,  Hermann,  69,  71. 

Paulhan,  90,  136. 

Perception,  utility  its  mainspring,  4. 

Percepts,  in. 

Perez,  B.,  36. 

Performing  animals,  15. 

Perrier,  E.,  105. 

Physiologist,  119. 

Phonogram,  71. 

Photographs,  composite,  xo,  22. 

Plato,  222. 

Plurality,  139. 

Poincare,  202. 

Poinsot,  146. 

Polymorphism,  207. 

Practical  judgments,  93. 

Present,  the,  its  nature,  160  et  seq. 

Preyer,  33,  38,  72,  139. 

Progress,  219. 

Quack,  34. 

Quantity,  measure  of,  100. 

Quatrefages,  205,  206. 

Ratiocination,  25. 

Realism,  12S. 

Reasoning,  signification  of,  23  ;  prior 

to  speech,  38. 
Reaumur,  14. 
Recepts,  10,  26,  8g. 


Reflexion,  94. 

Regnaud,  P.,  71,  78,  79. 

Regularity,  conception  of,  196. 

Relations,  80,  81. 

Renan,  59,  69,  71,  76. 

Renouvier,  145,  146,  175,  i8x. 

Representation,  5. 

Representative  faculty,  112. 

Reproduction,  207. 

Resemblances,  6,  90. 

Respiration,  166. 

Rhythm,  164,  165. 

Ribot,  his  observations  on  general 

ideas,  135. 
Riemann,  156,  158. 
Romanes,  10,  13,  14,  19,  34,  35,  40,  43, 

46,  55.  57.  63,  66,  89,  93,  170,  184. 
Roots,  69  et  seq.,  75. 
Rousseau,  J.  J.,  77. 
Rubicon,  passage  of  the,  ga. 

Sanscrit,  69. 

Savage  languages,  95  et  seq. 

Savage  races,  time-sense  of,  171. 

Sayce,  67,  70,  73,  75,  77,  96. 

Schelling,  108. 

Schleicher,  83. 

Schmidkunz,  2,  3. 

Schneider,  7. 

Sciences,  origin  of  the,  221. 

Scientists,  135. 

Scott,  43. 

Semi-circular  canals,  149. 

Sensation-limits,  166. 

Sequence  of  numbers.  142  et  seq. 

Siamese,  62. 

Sicard,  Abb6,  44. 

Sidgwick,  Prof.,  125. 

Sigismund,  33. 

Signs,  logic  of,  27;  imitative,  43;  lan- 
guage of,  49 ;  development  of,  92 ; 
the  importance  of,  144  et  seq. 

Sigwart,  199. 

Similarities,  90,  195. 

Simplification,  135. 

Skeleton,  abstract  thought  a,  135. 

Smith,  Adam,  31. 

Song,  speech  is  derived  from,  62. 

Space,  origin  of  the  concept  of,  146 
et  seq.;  acoustic,  148;  sense  of,  148; 
abstract  notion  of,  151  et  seq.;  «-d.- 


INDEX. 


231 


mensional,  156;  Euclidean,  157; 
characterised,  158. 

Species,  origin  and  growth  of  tlie 
concept  of,  203  et  scq.;  fixity  of, 
205;  constituent  elements  of  the 
concept  of,  206;  defined,  206;  vary 
in  the  course  of  evolution,  213. 

Specific  characters,  205  et  seq. 

Speech,  origin  of,  54  et  seq.,  59  et 
seq.;  development  of,  67. 

Spence,  55. 

Spencer,  Herbert,  7,  62,  80,  137,  150, 
165.  175- 

Stallo,  153,  158,  222. 

Steintbal,  59. 

Stern,  26. 

Stewart,  Dugald,  31,  51. 

Substantive,  the,  76. 

Substitution,  27,  no,  226. 

Sully.  J.,  25,  160,  175. 

Sylvester,  148. 

S)mbolic  thought,  132,  226. 

Symbolism,  complete,  log. 

Symbols,  145. 

Taine,  33,  34,  73,  87,  129. 

Temporal  signs,  178. 

Ten,  the  most  convenient  arithmeti- 
cal basis,  143. 

Thermodynamics,  192. 

Time,  origin  of  the  concept  of,  159; 
consciousness  of,  164  et  seq  ;  sense 
of,  164;  conception  of  infinite,  174; 
measure  of,  174  et  seq  ;  psycho- 
logical process  by  which  its  primi- 
tive notion  is  constituted  in  con- 
sciousness, 175  et  seq. 


Time-perception,  simple  repetition 
the  elements  of,  176;  the  work  of 
attention,  178. 

Tracy,  Destutt  de,  80. 

Tylor,  43,  50,  67,  71,  99,  142,  143. 

Unconscious  activity,  132. 
Unconscious,  the,  224  ;  psychology  of 

the,  226. 
Unity,  idea  of,  138;  abstract,  141. 
Unity-type,  143. 
Utility,  218,  219;  law  of,  5. 

Van  Ende,  170. 

Venn,  J.,  188. 

Vera  causa,  181. 

Verb,  the,  78,  97. 

Vierordt,  163. 

Visual  types,  112,  119  et  seq. 

Vital  force,  193. 

Vocalisation,  61. 

Vogt,  2o8. 

Waitz,  178. 

Wallace,  217. 

Ward,  178. 

Wasps,  intelligence  of,  14. 

Weismann,  218. 

Whitney,  6g,  71,  75,  80. 

Wilks,  Dr.,  58. 

Will,  the  type  of  causality,  181  et  seq. 

Wizel,  Adam,  126. 

Words,  do  we  think  without  them  ? 

40;  they  pass  to  autocracy,  102. 
Writing,  53. 
Wuudt,  103,  149,  161,  162,  163,  176, 189. 

196. 


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