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THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN ITALY
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D DDD1
THE EVOLUTION OF
MODERN ITALY
ARTHUR JAMES WHYTE
The Norton Library
W,- NORTON & COMPANY * INC
NEW YORK
Copyright 1959 by Basil Blackwell & Mott Ltd,
FIRST PUBLISHED IN THE NORTON LIBRARY 1965
AH Rights Reserved
Published simultaneously in the Dominion of
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PREFACE
C ! "V (MO.)
THE outstanding events and personalities of nineteenth-century
Italy have been the subject of numerous books by English writers.
The classic volumes on Garibaldi by Professor Trevelyan, now Master
of Trinity, Mr. and Mrs. Berkeley's study of Pius IX and the events
of 1848, my own two volumes on Cavour, Mr. Griffith's portrait of
Mazzini and various other books Lave recorded the dominant features
of Italian history between 1815 and 1870. In the last quarter of a
century, however, Italian historians have concentrated mainly on
other aspects of this period: on the origins of the movement: on the
work of Charles Albert: on the light thrown by documents and other
sources on hitherto accepted verdicts and interpretations, as well as
the publication of many memoirs, diaries and letters. As to events
after 1870 they have as yet scarcely begun to consider them critically,
Groce's History of Italy fiom iS/o to 1914 and Rosfs Storia Contem-
poranea dealing very gendy with the political life compared with Miss
Hentze's indictment in her volume on Pre-Fascist Italy or the stric-
tures of Mr. Sprigge in his recent volume on the Development of
Modem Italy.
The present volume, written mainly from Italian sources, has kept
a double purpose in view: to link the more or less familiar story of
the Risorgimento to what preceded and followed it, and to bring
into greater prominence those aspects of the movement upon which
more light has been recently thrown. The rapid survey of Italian
history in the opening chapter seemed necessary to throw into relief
the task of the Risorgimento and to emphasize the importance of the
Napoleonic period, which some Italian writers tend to underrate,
maintaining that the movement was purely Italian and, in essence,
independent of French influence, which merely retarded a process
begun with die reforms of the eighteenth century: a point of
view which the present writer does not accept At what point to
dose die story was also difficult, since Fascism was in action before
the Peace Treaty was signed. But the Treaty of Rapallo seemed die
point where the claims of Italy appeared definitely settled and from
which die two paths of Italian history, linked to the past and to die
unknown future, most clearly diverged.
Italy had but sixty years of parliamentary government, which was,
moreover, an alien importation unsupported by tradition, strongly
iv Preface
opposed by the Church, and planted in a soil corrupted by absolutism.
Based on a wide conception of liberty, uncontrolled by the neces-
sary corrective of political education and self-discipline, it produced
a state of political weakness and a social condition akin to anarchy.
The twenty years of dragooning into greatness which followed was
no more successful, imposed as it was upon a reluctant people, too
intelligent to mistake appearance for reality and too innately sceptical
to accept at its face value either the rhetoric of the balcony or the
panegyrics of a subservient Press* These two successive failures of
liberty and compulsion have been a bitter lesson, and it remains now
for Italy to devise a tertium quid.
*
War-time conditions have necessitated the elimination of footnotes
and references, which is, however, not without its compensations, for,
though of value to the student, this appearance of erudition is apt to
alarm the ordinary reading public to whom it is hoped that this work
will appeal.
ARTHUR J.WHYTE
LATIMER ROAD
OXFORD
CONTENTS
I. THE PREPARATION, 1715-1814 1
n. THE AGE OF CONSPIRACIES, 1815-1831 19
HL CONSPIRACY ON PAPER, 1831-1848 38
IV. THE MILITARY OPERATIONS IN 1848 58
V. THE AFTERMATH: 1849 68
VI. FROM CONSPIRACY TO DIPLOMACY: CAVOUR, 1849-1859 86
VH. THE MHITAJIY OPERATIONS IN 1859 111
VOL THE POLITICAL REACTIONS OF THE WAR, 1859-1861 123
EX. VENICE WITHOUT VICTORY, 1861-1866 140
X.. ROME AT LAST, 1866-1870 161
XI. THE NEW ITALY: TO THE FALL OF CRISM, 1871-1896 182
XH. FiN-DE-SiicLB, 1896-1900 202
Xffl. GIOHTH AND THE NEW NATIONALISM, 1900-1915 212
XIV. THE WAR AND THE PEACE, 1914-192Q 233
NOTES 264
BIBLIOGRAPHY 267
INDEX 272
MAPS
THE MAKING OF ITALY viii
ITALY IN 1920 ix
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1848 60
THE CAMPAIGN OF NOVARA 78
THE BATTLE OF MAGENTA 115
THE BATTLE OF SOLFERINO 118
THE TRENTINO OFFENSIVE, 1916 236
THE ISONZO FRONT 244
THE ITALIAN FRONT, 1915-1918 248
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THE EVOLUTION OF
MODERN ITALY
CHAPTER ONE
THE PREPARATION, 1715-1814
history of Italy in the nineteenth century is the story of a
J[ national resurrection, a Risorgimento, and before considering
it, it will be well to cast a rapid glance across the past and recall the
debt which the world owes to Italy, for her contribution to civilization
has been incalculable. Her language, her law, her culture and her
religion, were the formative elements of human progress for a period
of nearly a thousand years. Emerging under Kings, she won her
Empire as a republic and held it under Emperors. When she could
no longer conquer with the sword she conquered with the Cross, and
built up the marvellous fabric of the CathoEc Church. Terrible in
war, she civilized in peace, and whilst her legions kept watch upon
the boundaries of her empire, her gracious villas spread culture and
refinement from York to the Euxine, When at last the bastions gave
way and the empire was overrun by barbarians, she absorbed,
civilized and christianized her rude masters, and led captivity captive.
Throughout die dark ages she kept alight the flickering lamp
of learning until the leaven of Christianity and Roman Law had done
its work and stability returned to Europe. She gathered up the
religion, the ideals and the learning of the new age in Dante's immortal
Vision, and then, with unexhausted vitality, set herself to recover Ac
treasures of die forgotten past* Her passion for the damcal world and
the learning of the ancients inspired the Humanist movement and fear
wealth and generosity saved the remains of classical culture from the
exterminating Turk. The flowering of her literary and artistic genius
in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries is an epoch to itself and needs
no comment, for wherever European culture has spread tfce work pf
die Italian, painters and poets, sculptors and builders in the Renaissance
is known and treasured.
But Italy drank too deep of die heady wine of pagan thought and
beauty, and cofzoptioa folowed. Tlioug
2 The Evolution of Modem Italy
the Reformation, the stern spirit of the counter movement, while it
purified the Papacy, killed the Renaissance. Her last great poet,
Tasso, was educated by the Jesuits and wrote under the shadow of the
Inquisition. Before the close of the sixteenth century Italy ceased to
laugh, joy died, and her genius fled. She bequeathed to Europe the
wealth of her political experience, the glories of her art and literature,
and the rigid devotion of her historic faith, and sank into impotence.
Her military spirit was decayed: unity she had none: and the little
states into which she was divided, so fertile in genius in the Renais-
sance, were a fatal weakness in the face of the great Powers now taking
shape beyond the Alps. For a century and a half she lay inert while
France and Spain fought for possession of her unprotesting body.
While Italy slept a new world came into being. One might almost
date it from the year 1564 when Michelangelo died and Galileo was
born. -For the new world was one of scientific thought, of relentless
criticism, and experimental methods. Even in this, Italy was among
the pioneers, for the *new men' as Bacon called them included Telesio,
and Giordano Bruno, burnt as a heretic, and Tommaso Campanelk
who rewrote his works from memory in prison after they too had
shared the fate of Bruno. But throughout the seventeenth century
there was no sign of life in Italy and not until the eighteenth century
does she at last show signs of waking.
The long struggle against the ascendancy of France came to an end
at last with the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) and the death of Louis XTV
two years later. It made great changes in Italy. Naples and the
Milanese or Lombardy, as it now came to be called, passed from Spain
to Austria and the deadening weight of Spanish Viceroys was at
length lifted. The Duke of Savoy received the island of Sicily and
took his ride of King from his new acquisition. But this settlement
did not last long. In 1717 Spain attacked Sicily. Charles Emanuel,
unable to defend the island, offered no opposition and three years
later accepted a new arrangement by which Sicily passed to Austria
and in exchange he received the island of Sardinia. Thus the Dukes
of Savoy became Kings of Sardinia, a title they held until in 1860
they became Kings of Italy. The next change took place in 1735.
Elizabeth Famese, heiress to the Duchy of Parma, the masterful wife
of Philip V of Spain, resolved to attempt the recovery of Naples and
the Milanese from Austria. She despatched an army for this purpose
to Italy under her son Don Carlos. Frustrated in the north, he turned
southward, and without difficulty took possession of Naples and
Sicily. As Charles IE of Naples, he and his descendants of the line
The Preparation,
ruled die Kingdom of Naples until in 1860 it was surrendered to
Garibaldi and Victor Emanuel II. Three years later die last of the
Medici, Giovanni Gastone, Grand-duke of Tuscany, died, and the
Duchy then passed to Francis of Habsburg-Lorraine, the husband of
Maria Theresa, who became Archduchess of Austria on the death of
her father Charles VI in 1740. In 1745 Francis was elected Emperor
and Tuscany passed to his son Leopold. The final change was that
of the Treaty of Aquisgrana in 1748, by which Sardinia, on with-
drawal from the War of the Austrian Succession, advanced her
boundary to the river Ticino and received back Nice and Savoy.
Italy was now setded on the general lines which were to last until the
formation of the united kingdom in 1860, for although these rulers
or their successors were destined to be driven out by Napoleon, they
were all restored in 1815. Henceforth, until the French invasion of
Piedmont in 1793, Italy was at peace.
The eighteenth century was a period of great social contrasts.
There was a crust of great wealth at the top and underneath a mass
of poverty. This was, perhaps, more marked in Italy dian in odier
countries owing to the absence of any considerable middle class, and
the rich seemed richer and the poor poorer than elsewhere. Italy at
this time was almost entirely an agricultural country in which the
political and intellectual life was largely confined to a few big towns,
Milan and Naples, Venice, Florence and Rome. The great majority
of the people, living in villages and small towns, took litde interest in
politics. Governments, to the peasantry, were merely organs of
taxation and oppression from whom no benefit was to be expected.
Very few could read, from long experience sceptical of promises,
practical in their attitude to life, they took dieir opinions from their
parish priest to whom they turned for everything. There were great
contrasts also in die temperaments of the natives in different regions
of Italy. The easy-going Tuscan, with a natural leaning to art and
poetry, was a very different individual from the hot-blooded, quick-
tempered Romagnuol; as the pleasure-loving Venetian was of another
type to the superstitious, suspicious Neapolitan, sun-loving and lazy,
but secretive, quick at revenge and dangerous when roused.
Regionalism was very strong and the degree of jealousy between
states or districts was in inverse ratio to the distance between them,
as we can see by the chronic suspicion of Lombards and Genoese
towards their neighbours in Piedmont. All this must be borne in
mind in dealing with the Risorgimento, for it helps to explain why
die peasantry as a whole stood aloof from the movement and why
4 The Evolution of Modern Italy
there was so little genuine co-operation, so that the true motive force
consisted of a minority who bore the whole burden.
A glowing picture has been drawn of Italian city life in this period.
Its most famous panegyrist was Goethe. Rome was the artistic and
religious centre of Europe. The gorgeous pomp of the Papacy, the
sumptuous banquets and receptions of the Cardinals and Roman
nobility, the treasures of the Libraries and Museums and the new
interest in archaeology, attracted to Rome not only the wealthy aris-
tocracy and the cosmopolitan element from all over Europe, but poets
and painters, sculptors and writers. All who could travel came to
Italy and Italy meant Rome. Venice too, where Goldoni's comedies
and the Carnival were a special attraction, welcomed many visitors.
Florence was, then as now, a centre for all who loved Renaissance
architecture and painting, and in spite of bad inns and dangerous roads
many visitors found their way to Naples. But there was another side
to Italian life which the visitors did not see. Crime in Italy was ram-
pant. In Rome during the Pontificate of Clement XIII (1759-1769)
13,000 homicides were registered in the Papal States, of which 4,000
were in Rome itself, with apopulation of 160,000. The wealthy city of
Milan, which could boast of its two thousand smart equipages in the
afternoon parade on the Corso, was even worse. In the twenty years
from 1741 to 1762 the executions or life sentences to the Venetian
galleys amounted to 73,000. So widespread were crimes of violence
that the municipality provided an itinerant Court of Justice, with a
judge, a criminal lawyer, a confessor and an executioner, together
with a posse of police, who patrolled the city on horseback, with
power to arrest, try and execute any malefactor whom they caught.
The conditions of things in Venice and Naples, with their dark, narrow
streets and overcrowded quarters, was quite possibly even worse, but
neither the Council of Ten nor the Neapolitan police kept any record.
Yet it is necessary to remember that the criminal law throughout
Europe in those days was of terrible severity, to which England was
no exception. As late as 1818 in the Assizes held at Lincoln, out of
twenty-four cases in which the most serious charges were burglary
and larceny, no less than fifteen sentences of death were passed, and
a distinguished English judge has written that even in the early forties
'offences which would now be treated as not even deserving of a day's
imprisonment in many cases, were then invariably punished with
death'.
The social condition of Italy in the second half of the century,
brilliant on the surface and tragic beneath, produced a considerable
The Preparation, Iji}-i8i4 5
intellectual movement, especially in Lombardy and Naples. The
writers of this period reflect the general tendencies of the age: the
spirit of criticism, dissatisfaction with existing conditions, and the
demand for reform. The unaccustomed degree of liberty of expres-
sion allowed them, was due to the fact that their views coincided in
general with those of their rulers; for this was the age of the 'Bene-
volent Despots', of Frederic the Great and Catherine of Russia and
the Emperor Joseph II. These monarchs, though no less despotic
than their predecessors, took an interest in the welfare of their subjects,
and according to their lights, endeavoured to promote improvement
in their conditions of life.' Three states in Italy benefited from their
activities: Lombardy, under Maria Theresa and later under Joseph H;
Tuscany under Leopold I, Joseph's brother; and Naples, under
Charles III, a disciple of the same school of thought, whose work,
after his translation to Spain as King in 1759, was continued by his
Minister the Marquis Tannucci
The golden age of Austrian government in Italy was the reign of
Maria Theresa, when except for the Viceroy and a few high officials
the administration was in the hands of the Italians themselves. The
most beneficial reform in Lombardy was the censimento, a fixed
tax on land made after an exhaustive survey in i?57- The assessment
was moderate and led to the development of an intensive form of
cultivation which made Lombardy the most prosperous part of Italy.
The reform of the communal administration which preceded it, sim-
plified the system of rural government, replacing the ancient councils
and congregations by three responsible officials. The abolition of
privileges and exemptions equalized taxation and improved the lot
of the smaller proprietors. With the Church, Joseph was more severe.
He suppressed more than a hundred convents and monasteries, though
even this left some three hundred untouched, and by a Concordat
with the Papacy brought all ecclesiastical possessions acquired since
the sixteenth century under taxation. The proceeds from the sale of
the suppressed religious houses were devoted to hospitals and the
. development of the University of Pavia. The Lombards were
exempted from all military service, and except for a few regiments
kept to maintain the imperial dignity, military rule was absent. In
his later years Joseph developed a mania for centralization, to the
great detriment of Lombardy. The senate was abolished, Austrian
judges and officials replaced Italians, and the province was bound
close to the general Austrian system and treated as an integral part
of the Empire.
6 The Evolution of Modern Italy
The reforms of Leopold in Tuscany were even more thorough-
going. He established free trade, abolishing all restrictions on imports
and exports; swept away the whole mediaeval system of trade guilds
and replaced it with a Chamber of Commerce. In 1770 he imposed
equality of taxation on all citizens including the Royal Family. He
introduced vaccination, reformed the prisons, abolished secret pro-
cedure, torture and the death penalty, exposing implements of torture
found in the prisons in the courtyard of the Bargello. He restricted
appeals to Rome, suppressed useless convents and monasteries, and
used for public purposes the income accruing from vacant benefices.
Leopold had no use for the army or navy. The former he disbanded,
keeping only a garrison for the radical city of Leghorn, and replaced
it with a civic guard, the latter he sold to Russia; there were only two
corvettes. In his last years Leopold tried to reform the Church, under
the inspiration of Scipione Ricci, Bishop of Pistoia. In this he failed
after the Bishop's submission to Rome and subsequent resignation.
The effect of this work was to make Tuscany one of the best governed
states in Europe.
A far more difficult task awaited the reforming zeal of Charles III
in Naples. The soil of the country was owned by the Church, the
Barons and the King. If we divide all the families of the kingdom
into sixty parts', wrote the economist Antonio Genovesi in 1765, 'one
of these owns land, the rest have not enough to be buried in. Half the
soil of Naples is held by the Church and may not be sold, a mortal
wound, I know not if it is remediable/ For a population well under
five millions the Church provided twenty-one Archbishops, one
hundred and sixty-five Bishops and Abbots, fifty thousand Priests
and more than the same number of monks and nuns. She drew an
income from all sources estimated at not less than twelve millions
of ducats. The Church lived in ease and often luxury, amidst poverty
and squalor unequalled in Europe. No less a problem was presented
by the baronage, who owned vast tracts of land, often wild and
uncultivated, but which included great numbers of villages and small
townships. All were held in feu. On the condition of the peasantry
the verdict of contemporaries is unanimous. Abject and utterly ignor-
ant, living in hovels and caves, tied to the soil, without rights or
defenders, they were like beasts of burden that cannot eat the food
they carry on their backs, 'The earth, the water, the minerals, ^the
forests* writes the most recent historian of Naples at this time, *the
very souk and bodies of the inhabitants were regarded as part and
parcel of tie feu. Up to the second French invasion diejusfeminarutn,
The Preparation,
the Jus stercoris (mantire), the /$ aquae pluviae (rain water), were in
force, though the first could be commuted for a money payment*
With a country in such a condition reform was a labour of Hercules,
but something was done. By a Concordat with the Papacy the clergy
were rendered Kable for half the amount of taxation paid by the laity,
though with a long list of exemptions. The ratio of clergy to popu-
lation was fixed at ten per thousand, and after nearly half a century
of effort their numbers were reduced from a hundred thousand
to eighty-one thousand. After the Bang's departure for Spain,
Tannucci the Viceroy continued the same policy. He persistently
asserted the rights of the throne against the Church, abolishing privi-
leges, insisting on the royal consent before the publication of Bulls
and Papal ordinances, and extracting money from the Church when-
ever possible. The Pope retorted by refusing to fill episcopal
vacancies. Then Tannucci expelled the Jesuits, and two years later
refused to pay the Chima, an annual gift to the Pope of a white horse
and seven thousand ducats, which had been paid from Norman times
as a recognition of Papal overlordship, a claim which had long since
become an anachronism.
The attempt to suppress feudalism was even less successful, owing
to the fact that the judges who had to apply the law were appointed
by the barons themselves. Charles endeavoured to attract the nobility
to Court and relieve the tenants of their presence. He issued an edict
permitting the peasantry to sell their produce in the open market and
not to their feudal lords only. He admitted the right of appeal from
the Baronial to the Royal Courts, but distance and expense rendered
it nugatory, apart from the risk of unpleasant reprisals from an in-
dignant feudal lord. Another edict limited the number of armed
retainers, chiefly brigands, protected by the barons and used in-
discriminately against exasperated peasants or the royal power, and
he abolished a number of degrading personal services which tenants
were called upon to render without payment. Tannucd continued
to harass the baronage with new ordinances and restrictions, but, in
practice, they had little effect, for the evil required a far stronger hand
and much more drastic methods, and he never touched the root of the
difficulty. 1
Both in Lombardy and in Naples, the efforts at reform had the
support of the liberal and progressive elements. At Milan, the Mar-
quis Beccaria, whose work on Crimes and Punishments was to be a
landmark in criminal legislation, was a strong advocate of every
forward movement. The brothers Alessandro and Pieteo Vem,
8 The Evolution of Modern Italy
senators like Beccaria and both economists, wrote freely on current
needs and methods of improving them. It was the same in Naples,
where a group of economists and social reformers did their best to
stimulate the government towards reform. Probably the most in-
fluential of these men was Antonio Genovesi, for whom the first
Chair of Political Economy in Europe was founded at the University.
His lectures as weH as his numerous writings helped gready to create
that spirit of liberalism which promoted the reaction of 1799 which
came to a tragic end with the restoration of the King from his exile
in Sicily. Besides Genovesi, the fine work of Filangieri on the History
of Legislation, the Political Essays of Mario Pagano and the writings
of Melchiorre Delfico, Galanti and the Abbe Galiani, all reflect the
new spirit of economic freedom and social amelioration characteristic
of the age.
The rest of Italy was untouched by the spirit of reform. Venice,
still under its Doge and Council of Ten, silent and decadent, with no
policy but neutrality and no life but frivolity, lay torpid amidst her
lagoons. The states of the Church rivalled Naples in misery and
misgovernment under the rule of priests, where every bishop had
his private prison and every literary work was subject to a triple
censure, police, bishops and Inquisition; where the hopeless over-
lapping of authorities brought all improvement to a standstill and
made reform, even had it been suggested, impossible. In the north-
west corner of the peninsula lay the Kingdom of Sardinia, die least
Italian but the most virile of all her states.
This little kingdom, destined to be the motive force in the making
of united Italy, which was to provide the soldiers and statesmen of the
Risorgimento and to seat on the throne of the new nation its own
House of Savoy, was the only state in Italy which had an army with
a ghting tradition. As a buffer state between France and Austria,
geography conditioned her policy, and her readiness to defend her
frontiers alone safeguarded her existence. Surrounded on three sides
by her Alpine barrier and on the other facing Austria across the
Ticino, without access to the sea except for the inadequate port
of Nice, Piedmont was almost cut off from the rest of Italy. Her
King was an absolute monarch. Her nobility was feudal, but of a
patriarchal type very different from the Neapolitan barons, and under
them lived a poor and hard-working peasantry, who rallied to the
standard of their Bong with a readiness and an unswerving loyalty
born of long tradition and an innate sense of self-preservation. The
Piedrnontese were a devout and simple people whose religion was
The Preparation, ijij-iSi4 9
close woven into their lives, and loyalty to throne and altar was an
outstanding quality in all classes. If her mountains provided Pied-
mont with a hardy race of soldiers they cut her off from Europe, and
it is scarcely surprising that the reform movement passed her by;
for her Kings were quite content with the existing system and had
small sympathy with literature and none with political innovation.
The severity of the double censorship of Church and State crushed all
freedom of thought and the activity of the Holy Office ensured a rigid
orthodoxy. Under such conditions writers chose voluntary exile.
Baretri, the friend of Dr. Johnson, went to England, Denina wrote his
Italian Revolutions abroad, and Alfieri the tragic poet, who has left
us in his autobiography a vivid picture of the lamentable state of
Piedmontese education, left the country as soon as was possible, for
royal permission was necessary to do so. But Victor Amadeus III
who came to the throne in 1773 was a keen soldier determined to
defend his country. He strengthened the fortifications on his Alpine
boundary, increased both the active army and the reserves, and drilled
them incessantly. It was well he did so, for it enabled him to defend
his country for three years when war broke out with France in 1793
and he succumbed only to the genius of Napoleon.
Such in outline was the state of Italy in the second half of the eigh-
teenth century. But neither in its political nor its literary aspects can
the period of reforms be regarded as in any sense 'national*. There
was no demand for them, they were not the result of popular agita-
tion, expressed by demonstrations or deputations. They were imposed
on their respective subjects by the three foreign rulers who governed
the greater part of Italy. The 'native' rulers made no reforms. Joseph
had a mania for centralization and desired to make Lombardy an
integral part of his empire. He would, no doubt, have liked the
Lombards, as his nephew Francis II expressed it in 1815, 'to forget they
were Italians'. Leopold was a real reformer who wanted to make
Tuscany a model state. In Naples, to curb the wealth and power of
the Church, to weaken the feudal barons and increase that of the
state, was the objective. Neither rulers nor subjects as yet dreamed
of a united Italy. This is also true of the writers. They were the men
of their time, tolerant and sceptical, humanitarian and cosmopolitan,
keenly interested in reform in the abstract, and in the concrete so far
as it concerned their own state, but no thought of an Italian kingdom
entered their minds. The inspiration of their thought was French.
There were three editions of Diderot's Encyclopaedia printed in Italy.
We may be sure it was studied. It was, in fact, French thought and
io The Evolution of Modern Italy
action combined which gave birth eventually to the idea of unity as
the only way to rid Italy of French and Austrian oppressors.
As French revolutionary thought developed, the more subversive
brand of the 'Liberty, Equality and Fraternity' type reached Italy
through other channels than learned books and academic lectures. It
came through political agents, and the organization through which it
penetrated was the Masonic Lodges. English Freemasonry had been
reorganized in 1717 and with the appointment of the Duke of Mon-
tague as Grand Master four years later, had become definitely
aristocratic. It was the travelling proclivities of the English nobility
which carried it to the Continent. Lord Derwentwater founded the
first French Lodge at Paris in 1725, and others followed. It soon spread
to Italy where the Duke of Middlesex founded a Lodge at Florence in
1733. From here under Grand-ducal patronage it spread to Verona,
Vicenza, Milan and as far as Venice. In the south of Italy it is riot,
however, until 1749 that we get definite information of the craft at
Naples. This was partly due no doubt to its condemnation by Pope
Clement XII in 1733. In 1749 the patronage of the Duca di Sangro
made Freemasonry popular with the aristocracy. He resigned, how-
ever, two years later, and after a second condemnation by Benedict
XIV the King prohibited the society. Nevertheless, ten years later it
revived, this time aided by the Queen, Maria Carolina. A quarrel
ensued between the Queen and Tannucci, who opposed Freemasonry,
and in 1775 it was again suppressed by the King. The society was then
reformed on the lines of the 'strict observance', with the result that the
aristocracy left it and it became middle class, less social and more
political.. It was at this point that Freemasonry became permeated
with French revolutionary thought. It dropped out of sight and
became dangerous. The Lodges were turned into clubs on the French
model and served as propaganda centres for the Revolution. Free-
masonry in Italy was never patriotic. It was non-Catholic, francophil
and non-nationalist. It was this fact which led to the foundation of
Carboneria and its many derivatives. Carbonarsm was professedly
Christian if not Catholic, anti-French and pro-Italian. Its earliest
appearance would be in 1796, if Botta's allusion in his History of Italy
to 'the Bkck League more feared by the French than were the Aus-
trians* refers to Carbonarism as its name suggests. On the eve of the
Revolution, however, only Freemasonry existed in Italy.
The four years that elapsed between the outbreak of the Revolution
in 1789 and the declaration of war on Austria and Sardinia in 1793
were a period of active penetration and propaganda by French agents,
The Preparation, ijij-iSi4 n
official and non-official, throughout Italy, but chiefly in Piedmont
and Naples. The ground was already prepared. Strange figures
flitted about Italy at this time. One such was Antonio Jerocades, poet
and lecturer, who under the soutane of priesthood nurtured the most
subversive and anti-clerical views. Expelled, for corruption and im-
morality, from his post of schoolmaster he found a position in a Jesuit
seminary for priests. Dismissed by the Bishop, he joined Freemasonry
and became a professor at the University of Naples. An enthusiast
for the new ideas of liberty, he seems to have spent his time touring
the Lodges of Calabria, the stronghold of Massoneria, spreading
revolutionary ideas and keeping in touch with French thought by
periodic visits to Marseilles. As the poet of Freemasonry his Lira
Focense and Paolo o Vhumanltd liberata clothed dangerous doctrines in
smooth metastasian verse and spread abroad the fervid Jacobinism of
his thought. Such were the precursors. Genoa was full of French
agents, who thence obtained easy access to Piedmont and Lombardy,
where they collaborated with the restless elements. There were arrests
in Genoa and Pavia, Brescia and Milan. At Turin three Jacobin clubs
were discovered and a plot to seize the citadel and murder the Royal
House. Sections of the intellectuals and upper classes also, following
the example of the French aristocracy, gave evidence of an academic
enthusiasm for liberty and equality, but the real support came from
groups of extremists scattered throughout the country who were
only waiting for a favourable opportunity to take action.
Then in 1793 France declared war on Sardinia and Austria. For
three yean the Allied armies kept the struggle on the Alpine border,
until Bonaparte took over his first command. He led his ragged and
famished army to speedy victory. Striking at the junction of the two
armies, he crushed the Sardinians and forced them to sign the disas-
trous Treaty of Cherasco which put Piedmont into French hands.
Advancing into Lombardy he defeated in succession three Austrian
armies and became master of northern Italy. Then, in October 1797
he signed the Treaty of Campoformio, handing over Venice to Austria
and retaining the rest of northern Italy for France. Before the close
of the year Bonaparte left Italy for Paris, en route for Egypt. In the
wake of the French armies republics sprang up like mushrooms.
Genoa became the Ligurian; Reggio, Bologna, Modena, Ferrara
formed themselves into the Cispadane; Milan, Brescia and other towns
into die Transpadane. At the suggestion of Bonaparte these two latter
combined and Bonaparte raised his first political structure when
he gave than a constitution under the title of the Cisalpine RepubBc.
12 The Evolution of Modern Italy
Italy was unarmed. There were no troops in either Tuscany or the
Papal States and the effectives available in Naples were scarcely twenty
thousand men. In the four years which had passed since the outbreak
of war the Italian governments had done nothing. The attempt of
Victor Amadeus to form a league and present a common front to the
enemy was a complete failure. In 1792 a French fleet had sailed into
the Bay of Naples and under threat of bombardment had demanded
the immediate despatch of a Neapolitan representative to Paris, strict
neutrality, and the acceptance of tie citizen Mackau, as the representa-
tive of the French Republic. While the terrified government nego-
tiated, the French officers landed, fraternized with the citizens,
accepted a banquet offered by the Jacobin elements and in return
gave a reception on tie flagship at which the admiral sketched out a
plan for a club on the usual French lines. From Naples two French
agents, Flotte and Bassville, went on to Rome, where their conduct
so exasperated the populace that the mob sacked their residence and
killed Bassville. All over Italy there were disturbances. In Sicily, at
Naples and Bologna, there were plots followed by executions and
imprisonments. All this played into the hands of the French. Ber-
thier, left in command after Bonaparte's departure, seized the oppor-
tunity, after the killing of General Duphot in Rome, to occupy the
city. The Pope fled to Tuscany and once again Rome became a
Republic, The presence of the Pope in Tuscany soon brought
trouble, General MioUis was ordered to occupy Florence and the
Grand-duchy became the Etruscan Republic.
While these events were taking place Ferdinand of Naples was
collecting an army under the Austrian general Mack, urged on by
his wife and the English, whose fleet was keeping open Sicily as an
asylum in case of disaster. Ferdinand was a feeble creature, without
military training or capacity, devoted only to hunting and women,
and completely dominated by his Austrian wife Maria Carolina,
who, in the intervals of bearing him twelve children, governed the
Kingdom. In December 1798, when the French troops were dispersed
in winter quarters, Ferdinand marched unopposed to Rome. The
expedition has been picturesquely summed up by Alfredo Oriani in
these words, 'Ferdinand entered theEternal City as a conqueror; he re-
called the Pope, and from the summit of the Campidoglio, with the
voice of a rabbit, proclaimed to Europe that "the Kings are awake".'
His triumph was brief. Hastily collecting his troops, Championnet
attacked, and the Neapolitan army beaten and demoralized fled back
in disorder to Naples. No one ran quicker than the King, who arrived
The Preparation, ijij-iSijf. 13
in his capital in time to collect the Queen, his Minister Acton and
all the treasure he could lay his hands on and embark on a waiting
British warship which took him to safety in SicUy. On the approach
of Champiormet the condition within the city was chaotic. The
nobility thought only of compromise, fearing spoliation either from
the French or from the masses, and suggested immediate additional
taxation (since the King had looted the public treasury) to bribe the
French not to enter the city. The Liberals on the other hand were
prepared to welcome them. The decision was, however, made by
the lazzaroni, who, though disgusted with the cowardly flight of the
King and Court, were roused to frenzy against the heretic French.
They defended the city with desperation and though French discipline
triumphed in the end they paid heavily for their victory. When order
was at last restored Naples was transformed into the Parthenopean
Republic. Thus in a litde over eighteen months, what was left of
Italy (for Piedmont was now French with the King in exile in Sar-
dinia, and Venice was Austrian) was a grcfup of Republics held in
being by French bayonets.
The new republican system was hardly established when the power
that sustained it was suddenly withdrawn. The allies had won over
Russia, and in March 1799 an Austro-Russian army under Suvorov
crossed the Adige and swept the French from north Italy. The
southern army, now under Macdonald, was hastily recalled from
Naples and, after narrowly escaping disaster at the Trebbia, joined
Massena at Genoa, the only comer of Italy left in French hands. The
conduct of the French armies had quickly disabused the Italians of
their earlier dream as to the nature of French liberty and equality.
The brutality and irreligion of the soldiery, the systematic looting by
the savants attached to the armies, only equalled in thoroughness by
the rapacity of the 'financial experts' who descended like vultures
upon each prostrate government in turn, had outraged all classes of
the nation. Italy had been treated as a conquered country, looted,
plundered and trampled on, with a greed and cynicism which roused
bitter hatred against their so-called 'liberators'. No sooner were the
armies withdrawn than the infuriated peasantry, under whatever
leaders and with whatever weapons they could find, rose against the
scattered garrisons and outposts still remaining. Thousands flocked
to the standard of the 'Army of the Christian Mass' led by an obscure
individual who called himself Brandaluccio. The Bishops of Asti,
Albi and Acqui, in Piedmont, led their flocks in warfare against the
remains of the invaders. At Arezzo in Tuscany, under the inspiration
14 The Evolution of Modern Italy
of two peasants, believed to be S. Donato and the Madonna of Com-
fort, the peasantry formed themselves into the Aretine army under
the 'pious Buglione* and the 'Maid of the Valdarao*, and looted and
sacked and murdered; from whose fanatic zeal Florence itself escaped
with difficulty. In Lombardy and Emilia the Austrians, not content
with driving out the French, arrested, imprisoned and shot the sup-
porters of the Cisalpine Republic wherever they could be found. But
it was in Naples that the reaction assumed its most tragic and horrify-
ing aspect.
The aims of the Parthenopean Republic were inspired by a group
of cultured Liberals, impractical and idealist, perhaps, but with the
highest aims and the best intentions. Men of the stamp of Mario
Pagano, Domenico Cirillo and Francesco Conforti and women like
Lucia Sanfelice and Eleonora Pimentel. The sudden retreat of the
French army cut the ground from under their feet while they
were yet struggling to bring order out of chaos. The moment was
seized by King Ferdinand to despatch Cardinal Ruffo from Sicily to
the mainlaind, to collect an army and recover Naples. The nucleus
of his force was detachments of English, Austrian and Turkish troops,
to all of whose governments the King had appealed for help. Around
these Ruffo gathered an army of peasants and outlaws and bandits,
including the famous Fra Diavolo and his crew of cut-throats, number-
ing altogether some forty thousand. An imposing Altar, at which Mass
was said daily, accompanied the army, for this was the *Army of the
Holy Faith'. Arrived at Naples the attack began. After two days of
slaughter, looting and incendiarism, Ruffo called a halt to save the
city from further destruction. The republican government and
garrison, who had seized and occupied the strong Castel S. Elmo,
finally surrendered on terms, which included a safe conduct and
transport to Marseilles. The King's representative signed the capitula-
tion, as well as Ruffo and the commanders of the foreign contingents.
At this moment Nelson sailed into the bay. When he learnt what had
been arranged, prompted or perhaps ordered by the King, he re-
pudiated the terms of the capitulation, handed over those who had
surrendered to the royal vengeance and hanged Admiral Caracciolo,
who had deserted the royal cause and taken command of the repub-
Ecan forces, from the yardarm of his own flagship. 2 The vengeance
of Ferdinand and his Queen was savage. More than a hundred of the
leaders, 'the flower of Neapolitan virtue and intellect* as Benedetto
Croce calls them, were hanged or shot: two hundred and twenty
were sent to the galleys for life : three hundred and twelve for definite
The Preparation, i/if-ifij 15
periods and some hundreds exiled. Thus did the King's brutality
crown the victory of the Army of the Holy Faith.
Once more the wheel of fortune turned with surprising rapidity.
In October of this year (1799) Bonaparte escaped from Egypt and
landed in France. By the spring he had an army organized for the
reconquest of Italy. In June, while Massena still struggled with Austria
on the Alpine border, he crossed the S. Bernard Pass and descended
into Lombardy behind the Austrians and crushed them at Marengo.
Eight months later by the Treaty of Luneville (Feb. 1801) France
received the north of Italy to the Adige leaving Western Venetia in
Austrian hands. There were no more great battles in Italy. In the
ensuing years the country was gradually organized into three areas,
the Kingdom of Naples; the Kingdom of Italy; and Piedmont,
Tuscany and the Papal States west of the Apennines, including the city
of Rome, which were incorporated in imperial France. Bonaparte
was now First Consul, and after Marengo he reorganized the Cisalpine
Republic, which emerged from the Council of Lyons, to which four
hundred and fifty Italian delegates were summoned, as 'The Italian
Republic', a title changed to 'The Kingdom of Italy' (Regno d'ltalia)
when Bonaparte became Emperor. At its first formation the Cisal-
pine had adopted the tricolore, the Papal red and white of Bologna
and the green of Liberty, which was to be the future Italian flag,
and thereby became endeared to the Italians who have always regarded
it as Italy's first child of liberty. Napoleon had also a genuine interest
in this his first political creation. In 1806 Venice was added to it, and
two years later the Italian Tyrol, and in 1810 the Marches of Ancona;
it had then seven million inhabitants with an army of a hundred
thousand men. Its Viceroy was Eugene Beauhamais, the Emperor's
brother-in-law. In 1806 Napoleon settled accounts with Naples. On
the approach of the French army Ferdinand fled once more to Sicily
and his place and tide were bestowed on the Emperor's brother
Joseph. After two years employed in reforms, Joseph went to be
King of Spain, and Marshal Murat became King Joachim of Naples,
where he remained until the fall of the Empire. Except in the south
where there was a constant undercurrent of war between the French
and the banditti amongst the mountains, Italy settled down quickly
under French rule and remained quiet until the last disturbed period
which heralded the fall of the Empire. To Napoleon, Italy was a
reservoir of manpower and a useful financial support. It was heavily
taxed and steadily drained of its youth, who fought well and followed
the Napoleonic eagles from Madrid to Moscow. But French rule had
16 The Evolution of Modem Italy
one concealed and relentless enemy, who fought her by a sustained
and ever-spreading system of propaganda, this was the Secret
Societies.
These offshoots from Freemasonry were purely political. The first
article of their creed was the suppression of 'tyrants', which meant
primarily the French, or Napoleon, the 'grosso lupo' as they called
him, but included the Austrians, in fact all foreigners on Italian soil.
The second article was 'a constitution'. They were never a fighting
organization; as a means of expelling the hated foreigners they were
a complete failure. They could neither inspire an heroic insurrection
like the Tyrolese nor instigate a bitter guerilla -warfare like the
Spaniards. They never produced a popular leader or an effective
body of troops, but they penetrated everywhere, they undermined
and destroyed confidence, so that in the last phase of the Empire
neither Murat in the south nor Beauharnais in the north could rely
on the trustworthiness of his subordinates. Besides this the one
valuable work they performed was to hold fast to the idea of inde-
pendence and to spread it unceasingly amongst all classes of the
community. No one who joined a secret society, especially the Car-
boneria, with all its paraphernalia of oaths and daggers, was ever likely
to forget that he had sworn to achieve his country's independence,
however little he was prepared to implement it. This idea of in-
dependence under a constitution was so incessantly reiterated and
with such dramatic emphasis that it worked its way into the very
fabric of the national consciousness and formed the foundation upon
which the subsequent realization was built.
During the Russian campaign of 1812, in which both Murat and
Eugene Beauharnais took part, the secret societies increased with
great rapidity all over Italy, in the south especially. The civil
service was honeycombed with disaffection and many of the Italian
generals wanted a constitution. After his return from Russia, pressure
was brought to bear upon Murat to grant a constitution. This he
refused, and the subsequent opposition of the Carboneria rendered his
final appeal to Italy useless. But Italian opinion had neither leadership
nor organization nor even a candidate of its own for the throne of Italy.
Neither Murat nor Beauharnais was acceptable. The Regno d'ltalia
made a weak effort to remain in being, one party supporting the
Viceroy and another opposing him. His candidature led to riots in
Milan and the brutal murder of the capable but much hated Minister
of Finance, Prina. This gave Austria her opportunity, Marshal
Bellegarde occupied Milan and Italy's chance of expressing her
The Preparation, i/if-iSij 17
wishes vanished. In fact, the fate of Italy was being settled elsewhere.
Metternich and Casdereagh had their own solution ready for the
Congress in which Italian desires were neither consulted nor taken
into consideration.
The work of the Napoleonic period, when considered with refer-
ence to Italy's future development, is both extremely interesting and
of genuine importance. For although Napoleon and the secret
societies were in bitter opposition, they were, as we can now see, in
reality working together and supplementing each other in a joint
work of laying the foundations for a future united and constitutional
Kingdom; Napoleon clearing the site and Carboneria providing the
programme. The work of Napoleon has been accused of being more
destructive than constructive, but it was the destruction of the skilled
housebreaker who pulls down and prepares the ground for others
to build. Over two-thirds of Italy he broke down the old boundaries,
swept away local prejudices and threw the people together, giving
them a wider outlook, an excellent administrative system and the
boon of a uniform system of law in the Code Napoleon. Out of this
came the first glimmer of national consciousness for they began to
think of themselves as Italians rather than Piedmontese or Tuscans.
In the south of Italy the application of the same principles extending
over a number of years, swept away the worst features of feudalism,
made rich and poor equal before the law, and cleared away the mosaic
of the Neapolitan codes dating back to Norman times, upon whose
intricacies and contradictions, it was said, no less than twenty-six
thousand lawyers flourished in Naples alone. His treatment of the
Church, though rude in its methods, freed the Papal States for a time
from corruption and the futility of government by priests, and made
it clear that the possession of temporal power was not necessary for
the adequate performance of the Church's spiritual function. Under
the Emperor's firm rule and pressing financial needs, privileges and
exemptions disappeared whether of nobility or ecclesiastics, and all
had to contribute. He opened a career to talent, many Italians pro-
minent later receiving their training outside Italy in the service of the
Empire. He taught the youth of the country to fight, widened their
views, and gave them a new pride in the profession of arms. Above all,
it was Napoleon who at last shook Italy from the long torpor in which
she had lain, since, exhausted by the overflowering of her genius in the
Renaissance, she had fallen back under the deadening rule of Spanish
and Austrian Viceroys.
To this work of Napoleon, fundamental for the future development
i8 The Evolution of Modern Italy
of Italy, the secret societies added the outline of the future programme,
Independence, Constitutional Government and Unity, though this
last conception was never stressed with the same force as the other
two. When all hopes of any immediate realization of their aims were
dissipated by the settlement of 1815, the secret societies remained the
hidden repository where the hopes of Italy were still kept untar-
nished, until through constant repetition they passed into the com-
mon heritage of the national thought. Italy had a long and difficult
road to travel before these aims were fulfilled, but the thought was
born and the old Italy of placid acceptance of foreign domination
was gone for ever.
CHAPTER TWO
THE AGE OF CONSPIRACIES, 1815-1831
IN relation to the wider framework of European reconstruction, the
settlement of Italy at the Congress of Vienna was a matter of
secondary importance. Italy was destined to be the area of compensa-
tion for Austria. As the wise old Sardinian ambassador Giuseppe de
Maistre put it, Italy was just money with which to pay for other
things'. It was necessary, of course, that Italy should be prevented
from again falling into the hands of France, and to give Austria a
strong bridgehead in North Italy was therefore desirable. Metternich
had made Austria's interpretation of this general principle unmistak-
ably clear in the secret Treaty of Prague, which he signed with
England in 1813, by which Austria was to have the Regno d'ltalia,
that is, Lombardy, Venetia and the Papal States east of the Apennines
down to the Umbrian border, and a control over the rest of the
Peninsula. 8 When the deputations from Lombardy, relying on the
promises of liberty and independence, proclaimed so loudly by
English and Austrian generals, Lord William Bentinck and Marshal
Bellegarde amongst them, came to the Emperor and Casdereagh to
urge their claims, their reception was frigid. The Marquis Alfieri,
Sardinian Minister in Paris, reported the Emperor's reply as follows:
'Gentlemen, Lombardy is to be added to my hereditary dominions
by right of conquest and previous possession. The Lombards would
have done better had they understood that my victorious troops
having conquered Italy there can be no further question of indepen-
dence and constitutional government.* Casdefeagh, in his reply,
blandly assured them: *You have nothing to fear from the paternal
government of Austria. I am intimately convinced that your interests
will be adequately safeguarded'; and the Count San Marzano, Sar-
dinian representative at the Congress, summed up the attitude of die
Emperor thus: 'He is determined to stamp out Italian Jacobinism and
to assure quiet in the Peninsula, and to extinguish all ideas of con-
stitutions and national unification. He will not take the title of King
of Italy. He has already disbanded the Italian troops and suppressed
all those organizations likely to serve as a preparation for 4 great
national Idngdom*; and the Emperor added: *It is necessary foe "the
Lombards to forget they are Italians. Obedience to my will fa the
20 The Evolution of Modem Italy
chain that will unite my Italian provinces to the rest of my states.'
'Chain' was the right word.
Austria, however, did not get all she expected. In spite of what she
termed her 'incontestable rights' over the Papal Legations, the states
of the Church were returned intact to the Papacy. Nor was she more
successful in her attempt to procure the High Novarese from Pied-
mont, across which Napoleon had built a military road from France
to Italy, The protests of Sardinia were strongly supported by Russia,
and Austria withdrew her claim. The rest of die Peninsula was handed
back to its previous rulers, Tuscany to Ferdinand of .Habsburg-
Lorraine, Sardinia and Piedmont to the House of Savoy, enlarged by
union with the republic of Genoa, and Naples, now known as the
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, to Ferdinand. The Duchy of Parma was
to be the domicile of Napoleon's wife Marie Louise. The Archduke
Francis, the most ambitious and astute of the Austrian princelings,
became Duke of Modena. His previous history is a curious sidelight
on the last years of the Napoleonic regime. As governor of Galicia
he had wanted to marry Marie Louise. On her marriage with
Napoleon, Francis resigned his position, took a violent antipathy to
Metternich, and left Austria for Dalmatia. He was accompanied by
two companions who later filled important positions: Count Dela
Tour, for many years Foreign Secretary of Sardinia, and Count
Ficquelmont, the successor of Metternich at the Foreign Office in
1848. At Scutari, he planned an Albanian-Montenegrin rising for the
expuision of the French from Dalmatia, undertaking to pay the in-
surgent army and promising a long list of presents to the organizers,
including such curiosities as airguns for the Basa of Scutari, and
canaries and goldfish for his mother. We hear nothing more of it.
He then travelled to Malta via Salonica, Constantinople and Smyrna,
and set to work to raise an army to expel the French, induce the
English government to transfer the Peninsular army to Italy, and
make himself King of Italy. Lord William Bentinck, in Sicily, was
one of his sponsors with die English government. However, the
small force which he raised was shipped by England to Spain, and see-
bg his kingdom vanish, he went to Sardinia and married his niece
Beatrice, eldest daughter of Victor Emanuel, thus setting up a claim to
the throne of Sardinia, as there were no direct male heirs. His claim
was a thorn in the side of the house of Savoy until the safe accession
of Charles Albert in 1 83 1 .
The welcome accorded to the returning rulers was enthusiastic.
The Pope was received with a delirium of rejoicing. 'Never shall I
The Age of Conspiracies, i8ij~i8)i 21
forget my reception by the good people of Turin,' exclaimed Victor
Emanuel in a letter to his wife. Even the egregious Ferdinand of
Naples was given a gratifying welcome, whilst illuminations and an
outburst of adulatory verse hailed the arrival at Modena of Francis,
who was to prove the most bigoted and tyrannical little despot in the
Peninsula. With one accord the returned rulers began to put back
the clock. The Pope, surrounded by devoted but greedy Cardinals,
clamouring for place and power, hastily restored the rule of priests
and relegated the laity to subordinate positions. Tuscany was little
disturbed, for the Grand-duke was no reactionary and he had a wise
minister in Fossombroni. Victor Emanuel of Sardinia, in his hatred
of Napoleon, threw the whole country into confusion with a single
edict, which refused recognition to any law passed since the Constitu-
tions of 1770. In Naples, Ferdinand had a difficult path to tread.
There were two parties, the Murattisti who were governing the
country and were in command of the army, whom he hated and dis-
trusted, and the 'Federlone*, the faithful, who had followed him to
the safety of Sicily, the Court officials and the army officers who had
commanded the garrisons in the island. There was, however, a large
body of Austrian troops in the kingdom, expensive but effective, and
while he could afford to pay them, lodge them and feed them, as
was always required by Austria, there was small fear of trouble. For
the present he held his hand.
In the meanwhile Metternich had lost no time in carrying out his
policy for Italy. In its wider aspect he appears to have planned the
creation of a Mittel-Europa with Austria as the radiating centre of
power and influence, having the states of Germany in the north and
Italy in the south bound to her by treaty, based on the common bond
of Absolutism, and prepared to support her with arms in times of
crisis. In pursuance of this policy he first approached Naples, with
whom he found no difficulty, for although his throne had already
cost him dear, Ferdinand having lavished money on all receptive
quarters at the Congress, including a dukedom and a handsome
annuity to Metternich himself, he owed his throne to Austria,
and he signed the proposed treaty without demur. By this, after a
mutual guarantee of their respective states, Ferdinand undertook not
to alter the constitution of Naples without first consulting Vienna,
and in case of war to furnish twenty-five thousand men to the com-
mon cause. Equally easy, because unable to resist, was a similar
arrangement with Tuscany, whose military contribution was to be
six thousand. Here, however, his success ended. At Rome, neither
22 The Evolution of Modern Italy
pressure nor blandishments served to move the Pope from his
declaration that the policy of the Vatican could in no way favour the
proposed alliance with a single Power, since through the nature of her
government she must live at peace with all countries alike. An equally
definite refusal came from Turin, for Sardinian policy was based
upon never binding herself to either of her great neighbours, for this
was the only path of safety. Thus the attempt to link each Italian
state individually to Austria fell through.
Metternich was no more successful in his scheme for a Con-
federation of Italian States, in which Austria, as holding Lombardy
and Venetia, would be a member; for Victor Emanuel refused to
surrender his position as an independent sovereign to become a cipher
in a federation controlled by Austria and her subservient Italian Arch-
dukes. Not only so, but Victor Emanuel even attempted to form a
league of small states, to oppose Austrian aggression, of which Bavaria
and Naples, the Papal States and Sardinia, were to be the principals.
Naples, however, too deeply pledged to Austria, refused, and the Pope
returned the same answer as he had given to Metternich, and so the
scheme came to nothing.
In these negotiations the Austrian Chancellor invariably added an
innocent-looking request for a postal convention, by which the states'
foreign correspondence should pass through Austria. Acquiring
information of all kinds and from all sources was an obsession with
Metternich, and this was one of his most effective methods; for he
had set up at Vienna a special bureau for opening, decoding, copying,
and then resealing, all correspondence that came through the post.
Everything deemed of interest was copied and forwarded to the
Chancellery. This was the source by which Metternich so often
astonished foreign ambassadors by displaying the most intimate know-
ledge of all that went on in the inner circle of their governments, and
gave him that belief in his own omniscience, so conspicuous in his
memoirs. It was of course supplemented by reports from his spies,
secret agents and police. However, in this case, the existence of his
special bureau and its purpose being well known, both Rome and
Sardinia refused. Occasionally Metternich was hoisted with his own
petard. Here is the way in which Delia Margherita, Charles Albert's
Foreign Secretary, procured the recall of an uncongenial Austrian
Minister at Turin.
Not wishing to complain of him officially nor to ask the Chancellor to
recall him, but knowing that all diplomatic despatches entrusted to the post
were opened, I decided to make use of this fact. In a private letter to die
The Age of Conspiracies, i$ij-i&)i 23
Sardinian Minister, Count di Sambuy, I gave vent to my anger at the con-
duct of Count Bmnetti, adding that I distrusted the communications he
made to me, but that it was not a matter to be mentioned to the Prince.
The letter was opened, and some time after, Metternich, forgetting the
source of his information, spoke about it to Count di Sambuy, who ex-
pressed his great surprise that the Chancellor knew about a matter of which
he had said nothing and which he had received in a diplomatic despatch
from his Foreign Minister. Metternich, much confused, got out of the
predicament as best he could. Shortly afterwards Count Brunetti asked
for leave of absence and did not return.
In 1819 the Emperor and Empress of Austria, with Metternich in
their train, paid a visit to Italy, journeying through Milan and
Florence to Rome and then to Naples. Mettemich found Italy 'per-
fectly tranquil' and unless, he wrote, some great event took place in
Europe, he anticipated no movement whatever in Italy. It was a
superficial judgement as he was soon to discover. Italy was full of
discontent. In Piedmont, the tactless policy of Victor Ernanuel was
alienating the officers of the army and rendering the middle classes
resentful and uneasy. His refusal to allow French decorations to be
worn, his preference for those who had followed him to Sardinia,
the frequent lowering of the grades of officers to make room for the
favourites, quickly bred symptoms of trouble in the army; while his
revival of reactionary legislation and long-forgotten ordinances made
business uncertain and difficult. In the Papal States the forced resig-
nation of officials to make way for priests, and the return of all the
worst abuses of the former Papal regime exasperated large sections of
the population, stimulated the work of the secret societies, and filled
the Lodges and Vendite with new recruits, for the hatred of priestly
rule was deep seated. It was here that the first outbreak took place,
in 1817; a plot to seize the town of Macerata was to be the signal for
a general rising and a demand for the abolition of priestly government.
It was an utter failure. At the critical moment the leaders failed to
arrive, a few shots were fired and the handful of conspirators dien
dispersed. But the plot had been betrayed, and the government re-
acted with a ferocious repression. Large numbers were arrested and
after eighteen months of imprisonment, ten sentences of death and
twenty sentences to the galleys for periods from five years upwards,
were pronounced. The sentences of death were commuted for life
imprisonment. It was the brutality of such punishmeuts, out of all
proportion to die crime, delivered by a court of priests witfe a
Cardinal as President, which made die whole Papal system hatefiil
to those who lived undo: it
24 The Evolution of Modern Italy
The condition of Naples was far worse. The whole country was
infested with brigands. These wretched creatures, the disjecta membra
of all the armies, camp followers, deserters and stragglers, sometimes
singly or in small groups, occasionally in large and formidable bands,
roved the countryside, living by every kind of pillage and terrorism.
Many of them had been criminals of the lowest class, released, armed,
and landed on the mainland from the prison settlement on the island
of Ponza to make trouble for King Joachim. How real was the danger
from these banditti can be seen in the memoirs of General Pepe. In
1817 he paid a visit to his father at his country house on the Gulf of
SquiUace. 'My visit was a great expense to my father', he writes, *fbr
besides having to keep open house for all who came to see me, he had
also to board a detachment of cavalry and another of infantry. The
latter was for the defence of the house, and the former escorted me
whenever I went abroad. This was not for show but for my personal
safety.' It was the same everywhere, between Capua and Terracina
the highroad was picketed with troops to protect travellers, and an
escort of a thousand men was required to protect the mail that ran
twice weekly from Naples to Calabria.
To deal with this pest, after the withdrawal of the Austrian troops
in iSi8, the government formed a militia, and this proved the cause
of the first serious rising in Italy, the revolution of 1820 in Naples*
General Pepe, in command of the third military Division of Avellino
and Foggia, was responsible for raising ten thousand men in his two
districts. He soon discovered that the only suitable material for the
new force were all Carbonari, feared far more than the brigands by
the King and die government. In spite of this he proceeded to recruit
them, refusing to allow membership of a Carbonarist Lodge to be
any detriment to a suitable candidate for the militia. By his personal
interest and obvious sympathy with Carbonarism, though he was
not himself a member, he won their confidence, and before long had
a fully-equipped contingent of ten thousand men at his command.
Assured of his power, Pepe decided to tise his militia to force the
government to grant a constitution. This new avenue to power and
influence was not lost on the Carbonari, who began to enroll at once
in the militia throughout the kingdom, undermining thereby the
loyalty of the army. In January 1820 the Spanish revolution broke
out, the government was overthrown and die single chamber con-
stitution of 1812 established. News of the events in Spain reached
Naples in March, and threw government and people into a ferment.
To overawe any attempt at insurrection, the Ministry formed an
The Age of Conspiracies, i8ij-ifyi 25
imposing military camp at Sesso and induced die King to take op Ms
residence with his army. The troops were demobilized shortly before
the revolution broke out.
In the meanwhile Pepe, anxious not to miss the favourable moment,
planned to raise the standard of rebellion on June 24th. But, as at
Macerata in 1817, the attempt misfired. The bonfires which were to
be the signal were not lit, and Colonel Russo, his chief confidant,
failed to put in an appearance. Afraid that his plans were known he
hastened to Naples, but found the Ministers quite unsuspicious. He
remained some days in the capital and while still there the rebellion
broke out. Two lieutenants, Morelli and Salvati, raised the flag of
revolt at Nola, in Pepe*s district, independently of Pepe altogether.
His presence at Naples averted all suspicion of Pepe's complicity and
General Nugent, the Minister for War, consulted him as to what
steps to take. Pepe promptly suggested that the militia should be
called under arms. This was approved, Nugent believing that the
purpose of it was to suppress the rebellion, whereas, in reality, Pepe's
motive was exactly the opposite. A few days later he slipped away
from Naples, accompanied by General Napolitano and some squadrons
of disloyal dragoons, put himself at the head of his militia, and after
issuing a proclamation demanding a constitution, marched on the
capital.
There were three generals in command of troops who might have
barred his progress, but none could trust their men, and all alike were
paralysed by die extent of the movement. In Naples the Ministers
were helpless, the King, who lived in terror of the Carbonari, and
was haunted by the fate of Louis XVI, took to his bed, appointed his
heir Francis, Duke of Calabria, Vicar General, and prepared to submit
abjecdy to all demands. On July pdi Pepe and Ms army of disloyal
regulars, militia, and a crowd of armed but unorganized Carbonari,
defiled before the Vicar General and die Royal Family, all of whom
wore Carbonari rosettes. The Constitution, die Spanish of 1812, was
granted almost before it was asked for, a Junta was appointed, and
Parliament was summoned for die first of October. Four days after
Pepe's triumphal entry, Ferdinand took die oath to the Constitution
in his private chapel, in the presence of the Court and the fifteen
members of the Junta. After taking it in a firm and convincing
tone, he turned to Pepe and said: 'Believe me, General, I have sworn
from the very bottom of my heart*. Pepe was so moved that he
wept; he then made a short speech in praise of die King, who,
equally moved, wept ako.
26 The Evolution of Modern Italy
The reaction of Metternich, when the news from Naples reached
him, was one of anger and disgust: 'Two squadrons of cavalry', he
wrote bitterly, 'overturn a throne and expose the whole world to
incalculable dangers. Things will not go at Naples as they have in
Spain. Blood will be shed in torrents. A half barbarous people,
utterly ignorant, superstitious beyond limit, whose final argument is
always the dagger offer a promising material for the application of
Constitutional principles !' But he was wrong as to the bloodshed.
The Carbonari, having got what they wanted, simply gave themselves
up to an orgy of celebration. Except for a single outburst of ferocity,
the murder of the hated Minister of Police, Giampietro, the event
passed off peacefully, though, but for the intervention of Pepe, one
or two unpopular Ministers might have fared badly. The one cause
of anxiety to Metternich was the attitude of the Czar, upon whose
reputed liberalism the Neapolitans were relying to mitigate the
punitive instincts of Austria, for Metternich was bent on force. He
hastened the preparations for the Congress of Troppau, called to con-
sider the situation in Spain, and took the necessary steps to have a
military force available.
The Revolution quickly spread to Sicily. Palermo revolted, drove
the aged General Naselli, sent as Viceroy, back to Naples, decapitated
two reactionary nobles, and pillaged and burnt as usual. They then
formed a Junta to choose a constitution. Pepe's brother, General
Florestano Pepe, was sent to restore order, which he did more by tact
than force, assuring their loyalty, but permitting them to choose
their own form of government. Eventually a separate constitution
was abandoned and Sicily sent twenty-four members to the Parlia-
ment at Naples. During the months which passed before the assembly
of Parliament, Pepe kept order, and as long as he did so, nothing was
too good for him in the eyes of the King. Honours were showered
upon him. It must, however, be said that Pepe, though a poor man,
came through the Revolution with clean hands. He refused the great
position of Grand Master of the Order of S. George, and though he
might have made a fortune with ease, did not do so even returning
the handsome gratuity given him by the Council of Ministers. So
unusual was this in Neapolitan political or any other circles, that it
deserves to be recorded.
The King opened Parliament in person and again took the oath
to uphold the Constitution. The solitary session which it held was a
complete fiasco. Ignorant of parliamentary practice or procedure, the
Cabinet had to be selected from amongst the least objectionable or
The Age of Conspiracies, i8ij-i8ji 27
most subservient of the Royal Ministers. The debates were reduced
to chaos by the behaviour in the public galleries, from which
the speakers were shouted down, threatened or clamorously
applauded, according to the violent partisanship of the audience. But
this form of intimidation was less effective than that of the Carbonari,
who, meeting in their own assembly, dictated the national policy.
The work of the Parliament may be passed over in silence, for
the centre of significance of the Revolution did not lie amongst
the deputies sitting in the church of Santo Spirito, but at Laibach, to
which the Congress of Troppau was about to move. Ferdinand had,
of course, applied to Austria for help. His professed loyalty to the
Constitution was mere double dealing, as was the enthusiasm evinced
by the Vicar General. The reply came in November in the form of
three autograph letters from the Emperors of Austria and Russia and
the King of Prussia, inviting him to attend the Congress at Laibach.
As the consent of Parliament was necessary to leave die Kingdom, he
applied for permission, repeating his determination to support the
new constitution before the Powers. Parliament weakly consented
and Ferdinand, with gratitude on his lips and vengeance in his heart,
departed for Laibach.
It might fairly be argued that the deepest quality in the Italian
character is its love of colour. Obvious in its national dress and its
display of gorgeous pomp and ritual in Catholic worship, as well as
in its art and literature, in the word-pictures of Ariosto and the canvases
of Titian and Giorgione, it is no less conspicuous in the Italian love of
rhetoric. To bring colour into the drab debates of Parliament by the
splendour of words, to conjure up visions of moral perfection and
colourful pictures of imperial greatness both past and future, has been
a feature of Italian parliamentary life throughout its half century of
existence. It was so in Naples. Pepe records how one day, one of the
most eloquent of the deputies said to him with intense conviction:
'The discourse I shall deliver to-morrow wiU produce a revolution in
Europe*. True to this fond illusion, the permanent Commission,
which, by the terms of the Constitution, was appointed to watch the
executive when the Chamber was not sitting, marked its assumption
of office, when die parliamentary session closed on the first ofjanuary,
with a proclamation, which ended with these words:
'Fame will avouch to these monarchs of the north, the firmness of our
calm and noble bearing. They will say: "This is a nation worthy of its
high destiny ". Our good King Ferdinand will listen, his heart tfarffiiag with
joy, to die wett-merited ap plaiise of his people.*
28 The Evolution of Modem Italy
The reality was far different. The Czar-had been won over; neither
France nor England protested; Metternich had had his way and once
again the hated Croats and Hungarians marched south for the extinc-
tion of incipient Italian self-government. The blow fell in February.
A copy of General Frimont's address to his troops was the first
indication, followed by a letter from the King to the Vicar General,
revealing the determination of the Congress to replace him un-
conditionally on his throne and to abolish the Constitution. At the
same time he advised his people to accept the inevitable, and submit
unconditionally. The conduct of the Viceroy was irreproachable.
Aware of his danger from an exasperated populace, he became more
ardendy patriotic than ever, and until the arrival of the Austrians
should enable him to remove his mask, identified himself with the
Constitution, Parliament was hastily summoned and the deputies,
far more fearful of the crowd in the piazza than of the still distant
Austrian army, accepted the ultimatum of the Carbonarists and
declared for war. A Commission of Generals drew up a most
elaborate plan of campaign. Two armies, one to defend die line of
the Garigliano under Carascosa, the other in the Abruzzi under Pepe,
and each as large as the Austrians, were put under arms. The plans
of defence, under the direction of General Colletta, established three
concentric lines. Naples was to be defended, the archives removed,
and a great camp formed on the Faro, from where the remnants
of the heroic armies were to be transported across to Sicily for a last
stand. It was all on paper. Only one clash occurred, at Rieti, on
March yth. The militia fought well for a few hours, Pepe tells us,
but when the action went against them they were seized with panic
and fled. The debacle was absolute. In twenty-four hours the whole
army simply disappeared. Pepe fled to Naples and escaped to France.
As to Carascosa, what he might have done is unknown, for his army
disappeared as rapidly as that of Pepe, and both he and General Col-
letta sought safety in exile. The Austrians occupied Naples UEH
opposed. Behind them, at a safe distance, came King Ferdinand,
bringing with him as Minister of Vengeance the infamous Prince
of Canosa. An orgy of revenge, floggings and executions, imprison-
ments and banishments, followed, which was the King's interpretation
of the intentions of the allied monarchs, which he wrote to his son
in these words:
They sincerely desire that surrounded by the most honourable and wise
of* my subjects, I should consult the real and permanent interests of my
people, without, however, losing sight of wliat is necessary for the mainten-
The Age of Conspiracies, 1815-1831 29
ance of general peace, and that the result of my solicitude and efforts may
be a system of government calculated to guarantee for ever the repose and
prosperity of my kingdom.
The lofty sentiments and nauseating complacency of this letter,
which breathes the very verbiage of Mettemich, for the ignorant
Ferdinand could never have composed it, though he held the pen, are
scarcely less contemptible than the cowardice, duplicity and cruelty
of Ferdinand himself. Thus ended the first attempt in Italy to undo
the settlement of 1815, an effort which was to continue for fifty years
until in 1870 it was finally attained. 4
The Austrians had scarcely occupied Naples when a similar rebellion
broke out in Piedmont. It was the work of a group of highly placed
army officers under the leadership of Count Santorre di Santarosa,
who occupied an important post at the Ministry for War. The
Marquis di Caraglio, son of the Foreign Minister, die Marquis di
Collegno, Equerry to Prince Charles Albert, the CavaHere Perrone
di San Martino, and the Marquis di Priero, formed the inner circle of
the conspiracy. Their programme was war with Austria under the
flag of constitutional government. There was no animus against the
King, who, it was believed, would look with favour upon war with
Austria and would not, under pressure, be averse to granting a
constitution. For some time Ministers had been uneasy and aware
that something was on foot. A mysterious order for the provisioning
of the citadel at Alessandria, a war measure, the origin of which could
not be traced; a plan signed by the King for the organization of a
militia, which was unknown to the new Secretary for "War, Count
Saluzzo; inflammatory posters and anonymous letters: all were in-
dications of coming trouble. The first tangible evidence, however,
came, following a hint from the French police, when the examination
of the travelling carriage of the Prince della Cistema revealed letters
and documents having affiliations with both. Lombardy and France,
including the late French Minister at Genoa, the Duke Dalberg, who
had been recalled at the request of the King for his liberal intrigues.
Letters to Luigi Angeloni, a celebrated leader of Carbonarism and
founder of the sect of the Filadelfi, widened the possible scope of the
organization. All this should have prompted action from the authori-
ties, for the suspected leaders were weE known, but the evidence was
vague, the Ministry weak, and nothing was done.
In the meantime, subversive propaganda among the troops had
undermined the loyalty of considerable sections of the army,
especially at Alessandria, where there was also an active civilian
jo The Evolution of Modern Italy
Carbonarist movement headed by a lawyer, Urbano Rattazzi, the
uncle of Cavour's colleague and would-be rival of the same name.
The departure from Lornbardy of the large body of troops sent to
Naples precipitated matters, and on March 21, 1821, the garrisons at
Vercelii, Alessandria and other places mutinied, demanding a con-
stitution and war with Austria. When this news came through to
Turin the Ministers were petrified, no one knew what to do. The
King, hastily recalled from his country seat at Moncalieri, summoned
a council, which debated the question of a constitution, but came to no
decision and took no steps to suppress the rebellion. Half the army
was in revolt, half of it remained still loyal. While they debated, the
garrison of the citadel at Turin mutinied, shot their commandant, and
threatened to bombard the city unless a constitution was proclaimed.
Then to add to the confusion, the Sardinian delegate at the Congress
of Laibach, the Count of San Marzano, father of one of the leading
conspirators, arrived at Turin with the ultimatum of the Powers,
forbidding under threat of armed invasion the promulgation of any
constitution. Faced with the alternatives of civil war or foreign inter-
vention, Victor Emanuel, first declared his intention to leave Turin,
rally the loyal troops, and suppress the rebellion by force. Changing
his mind he abdicated in favour of his brother Charles Felix, then at
Modena; appointed the Prince Charles Albert as Regent, and left the
capital for Nice.
The sudden and unforeseen abdication of the King completely
dislocated the plans of the conspirators, for they well knew that they
would get no mercy from the narrow absolutist temperament of
Charles Felix, After the departure of the King all the Ministers
resigned, and no one would take their place. With one accord all
began to make excuse, one unconscious humorist even pleading the
death of his grandmother. At last after great difficulty, the Prince
filled the. vacant posts and the new Ministers met to discuss the
situation. By now the Carbonari, who had hitherto held aloof, began
to agitate. Crowds surrounded the palace shouting for the Spanish
Constitution of 1812. To a deputation making die same demand
Charles Albert replied that he could not alter the Constitution with-
out the consent of the new King, A similar demand in writing,
signed by the Municipal Council, the Decurioni, met with a like
answer, and it was not until it was unanimously supported by a
hastily convened council of Notables, Generals, ex-Ministers and
leading citizens, that the Regent gave way and proclaimed the
Spanish Constitution from the palace balcony. At Modena, Charles
The Age of Conspiracies, i8lj~ifyi 3*
Felix, who had little desire to ascend the throne, exasperated by Ms
brother's abdication, and more so by the conduct of Charles Albert
(who was now his heir, and who he was convinced was a Carbonaro),
urged by his host the Duke Francis, appealed to the Austrian* to crash
the rebellion, an appeal at once granted. At the same time he ordered
Charles Albert, If he had a drop of royal blood in his veins', to collect
what loyal troops he could, leave Turin, and put himself under the
orders of General de la Tour at Novara, The Prince obeyed, and from
Novara, with an escort of Austrian dragoons, was despatched into
exile with his father-in-law the Grand-duke, at Florence. After this
the end soon came. Austrian troops under General Bubna scattered
the insurgents without much difficulty and occupied Alessandria,
sending the keys of the city, with the usual tactless arrogance so
often displayed by the Austrians towards Italy, not to the King, but
to the Emperor, which Charles Felix noted with annoyance when
writing to his brother. Not until September did the new King appear
at Turin. In the meanwhile a special commission drew up a terrifying
list of death sentences and banishments, but by the time it was
published tie victims had all safely escaped abroad. Only two suffered
capital punishment. 5 The almost simultaneous success of Austria in the
suppression of the two revolts gave great satisfaction to Mettenuch.
At the close of the Congress he summoned the Italian delegates and
addressed them. After commenting on the successful issue of these
unhappy events, he pointed out that 'protective intervention* was
clearly not sufficient to prevent their possible repetition, and closed
by saying that "never, perhaps, had the spirit of the allied sovereigns
been manifested under an aspect more consoling for the human race
and more reassuring for the Italian courts', adding that all they asked
in return was for 'a pledge of common felicity*.
These fine sentiments were Mowed by the practical measures
deemed necessary to supplement the 'protective intervention'. Forty
thousand troops were quartered on Naples, twelve Aousand over-
awed Piedmont by the occupation of Alessandria, and in spite of their
protests, the Pope had to admit and pay for an Austrian garrison at
Ancona, and the Grand-duke of Tuscany for one at Florence, while
Duke Francis at Modena combed his litde duchy for sectaries tod
succeeded in hanging the unfortunate priest Andreoli and im-
prisoning others. Even so, Metternich was not satisfied. In 1820
there had been arrests of suspects in Lombardy and afco: the
events in Piedmont in 1821, the police wore urged to greater efforts.
The arrest of Count Con&lonieri and Hs trial resulte
32 The Evolution of Modern Italy
had two primary objectives: to discover evidence of the complicity
of Prince Charles Albert, and to unearth that central directing body
of Carbonarism, which he always believed to exist. Although the
trial was prolonged for nearly two years, no evidence of either was
forthcoming, and in the end the unfortunate victims were sent to the
Spielberg without his principal object being attained. 6
The exile of some hundreds of the most active, or as Austria con-
sidered, the most dangerous, political agitators from Italy, with
the armed occupation of the peninsula, produced a two-fold result.
For ten years, until the outbreak of 1831, Italy was quiet and the
centre of political agitation was transferred to France. Henceforth
it was Paris that became the home of Europe's exiled liberals where
in an international committee they plotted die overthrow of tyranny
and all its works, and it was this body which sponsored Italy's next
effort, the rising of 1831. The after-effects of 1821 upon the rulers in
Italy consisted mainly in increased vigilance. The Italians had now
to live under a regime of secret police and spies. Not only was the
police system of the legitimate ruler a constant source of danger to all
free speech, but the Austrian Minister at every court had his spies and
informers from whose unwelcome attention no class of the com-
munity was free. The wretched class of paid police-informers haunted
every cafe arid street corner and the endless denunciations intensified
the hatred of Austria and the system which she represented. Metter-
nich himself was indefatigable. He revived and pressed his postal
conventions. 'The intrigues of the Court of Vienna*, wrote the
Sardinian representative at Laibach, 'make it clear that she is trying
to bring there the whole foreign post of the Italian states, so as to be
able to use her influence in Italy as she wishes'. Not yet content with
the ubiquity of the police and spy system, he now proposed to co-
ordinate it with a kind of supef-police, with representatives from all
the states, who would collate reports and direct the entire complex
of activities. Once again it was Tuscany and the Papal States who
refused their co-operation, and Metternich had to be content with
police interaction between such states as were amenable.
The Congress of Laibach was followed by that of Verona. Although
there was no Italian question on the agenda, a matter of considerable
importance was setded unofficially before it closed. Charles Felix,
brooding over the iniquities of Prince Charles Albert, suddenly
decided to disinherit him in favour of his infant son. 'Count della
Valle*, wrote Mr. Hill, the English Minister at Turin on February 23,
1822, *only two days since, informed me in the strictest confidence
The Age of Conspiracies, iSij-iSji 33
that H.M. has at last, rather suddenly, resolved to make an appeal to
his august allies against the succession of the Prince Carignano to the
throne/ To convert Metternich to his views, Count Pralormo, the
Sardinian Minister at Paris, was sent to Vienna. The Austrian Chan-
cellor's reply, when he opened his case, must have been disconcerting,
for he told Count Pralormo bluntly that the first step was to
produce evidence, which must be based 'neither on prejudices nor
suspicion, nor even isolated facts, but on a mass of proofs capable of
carrying conviction not only to the Sovereigns but to the whole of
Europe*. The plain truth was that such evidence did not exist. The
diplomatic exchanges continued and were finally closed by a long
memorial from Metternich. In this, after a severe indictment of
Charles Albert, he overruled the King's wish to disinherit him on the
sacred ground of legitimacy. The Chancellor's fear was that, if
thwarted, the King would abdicate, which would leave a most awk-
ward situation, with the heir under suspicion and in exile. To avoid
this, while he rejected the King's appeal for disinheritance, his judge-
ment on the Prince was so severe that it must have left Charles Felix
with the conviction that, after all, he was morally right. This satisfied
him, and he undertook not to disinherit the Prince, and sent him to
fight the liberals in Spain with the Broach army under the Duke of
Angouleme. It was a clever piece of diplomacy.
In 1825 Ferdinand of Naples died, leaving the throne to his son
Francis. He had been King for sixty-six years and he left behind him
a record of cowardice, treachery and self-indulgence seldom equalled.
His brutal repression of the liberal movement of 1799 left an indelible
stain upon his character, and his abject behaviour in the revolution of
1820 and his subsequent cruel revenge were in keeping with a
Character which had neither courage nor kingliness. In the States of
the Church, the pontificate of Leo Xn (1823-1829) saw little improve-
ment in conditions. A chronic state of sectarian warfare existed and
the ferocities of Cardinal Rivarok, sent in 1825 to restore order, only
made matters worse. For many years yet the unfortunate people
governed by the Pope were doomed to live under a government
whose readiness to suppress disorder was only equalled by its capacity
to provoke it. By way of contrast the mild rale in Tuscany was
earning for the Grand-duchy the tide of the Earthly Paradise.
There is a striking contrast between the spirit of Italy after 1815 and
that of die eighteenth century. It is no longer a question of humani-
tarian reforms advocated in books and lectures, Italy is seething witii
suppressed conspiracy, and the Austrian policy, backed by the Cttocli,
34 The Evolution of Modern Italy
is merely intensifying it and driving it deeper underground. Its aims
are confused and it is not yet national, but it is becoming so, and the
next effort, that of 1831, was the first to embrace the conception of
the union of separate states under a single ruler. It was the culminating
effort of the secret societies formed on the Carbon arist model, and
was largely the work of a single conspirator, Enrico Misley, a well-to-
do young lawyer of Modena. Early in 1826 Misley left Modena 'to
travel' with a passport to Milan, the Modenese police refusing to
extend it further. At Milan the liberals procured him a passport to
France and England. At Geneva he got in touch with die Russian
agent Capodistria to whom he opened his plan.
A constitutional kingdom of Central Italy was to be established
by a concerted rising in the duchies and legations, which was to be
extended as opportunity offered to the whole peninsula. It was the
old Maltese plan of 1811-1812 revived, this time from within. To
prevent its immediate suppression by Austria, Misley looked to
Russia, now preparing for war with Turkey and anxious to embarrass
Austria and prevent her support of Turkey. To this end sympathetic
risings in Hungary, Bohemia, and if possible Lombardy, were sug-
gested. The ruler of this new kingdom was, as before, to be Duke
Francis IV of Modena. He was rich, determined and thirsting for a
real throne, and in Misley's opinion the only prince in Italy strong
enough to hold so precarious a position. From Geneva Misley went
to Paris, where, having got in touch with the leaders of the Inter-
national Committee, die Comitato Cosmopolita, he unfolded his
scheme once more. He found intense repugnance to accept Francis
as sovereign, for both in Paris and Italy the hatred and distrust which
he inspired was profound. After three months' effort he returned to
Modena with sufficient encouragement to warrant revealing the
scheme to the Duke in person. Here he remained for a year, winning
the confidence of the Duke, maturing his plans with Paris, and
making the necessary contacts throughout the duchies and legations.
The attitude of the Duke was far from satisfactory. He was enig-
matic and non-committal. He was, in fact, prepared to double-cross
Metternich and accept a constitutional throne if it materialized. He
was equally prepared to double-cross Misley, suppress the rising and
hang die leaders, if his personal safety made it advisable. For three
years Misley worked incessandy, touring Europe from France to the
Balkans via Germany and Austria, knitting together the threads of
conspiracy, and keeping in touch at once with London, Paris and
Modena, The supreme obstacle was die repugnance to accept the
The Age of Conspiracies, i8iji8)i 35
Duke. At last, in January 1829, Misley triumphed. The London
Committee had demanded a pledge of the Duke's sincerity. On this
Committee was a certain Modenese, Camillo Manzini, condemned to
death, in contumadam, by Francis for his implication in the events of
1821. Misley offered to procure a foil pardon and a safe conduct,
together with a personal interview, for Manzini from the Duke, to
prove his sincerity. He did so, and when it arrived, the Committee
finally accepted him as Sovereign of the new State. How deep, never-
theless, was the distrust, is revealed in the minutes of the Committee
under the date February 18, 1829, when after staling that the 'great
Italian Society intends to make Italy one single, free and independent
State', it adds, that to announce the name of the 'Personage' selected
as the future King would at the present stage be inadvisable 'consider-
ing the general repugnance existing towards him'. After the receipt
of the safe conduct, however, they change, and record that 'after long
consideration they have decided that the personage proposed
Francesco IV is the only person capable of undertaking the work
of Italian liberty and independence*.
All now seemed ready for the outbreak. In Italy, while Misley was
in Paris, the arrangements were being perfected by Cko Menotri, his
friend and confidant at Modena. But in September, Russia made
peace with Turkey and resumed friendly relations with Austria. At
once, the Duke, terrified lest his political activities should be revealed
to Metternich by Russia, drew back hastily and severed all relations
with the liberals, and the original plan of the conspiracy came to an
abrupt end. Bitterly disappointed, Misley returned to Paris to recon-
struct the ruined fabric of his designs while Francis hastened to Vienna
to assure himself that the voice of truth (he published a paper with
that tide in his duchy) had not reached Metternich.
The new plan was to be a simultaneous rising in France, Italy and
Spain. A constituent assembly would choose the new Italian ruler,
who, Misley assured the Duke, "would be himsel Here the Italians
coalesced with the French party, working for Louis Philippe and die
overthrow of Charles X, who were, of course, fully conversant with
their plans. Misley departed for England where he interviewed the
Spanish generals, Mina and Quiroga, returning four days before the
July revolution. The advent of Louis Philippe upon the French throne
and the appointment of a cabinet which included the most prominent
members of tie Comitato Cosmopolite raised high the hopes of the
conspirators, and Misley, full of enthusiasm* left Paris for Modena in
a final effort to induce frauds to takethelead. AH hopes faded,
36 The Evolution of Modern Italy
ever, when the Duke told him that Metternich was already suspicion.!
of him, for Louis Philippe had betrayed the Italians' plans to Austria.
He could not believe it, and the announcement of the doctrine of non-
intervention by the Foreign Secretary, Sebastiani, in September, again
raised Italian hopes, for it was a direct challenge to Austria, proclaim-
ing that if she sent troops to suppress an internal movement in states
which did not belong to her, France would oppose her by force.
Everything now depended on France's loyalty to her own declared
principles. Marshal Souk in the Chamber of Peers, and the Premier
Lafitte in that of the Deputies, officially declared their determination
to support it. Sebastiani, Lafayette, Dupin and others, adhered to it;
and satisfied of their sincerity, the Italian Committee, in the words of
Misley, 'having taken all possible precautions, and having obtained
both personal and public assurances from the Ministry of Louis
Philippe, as well as that of the principal members of the Chamber of
Deputies, proclaimed the insurrection of Central Italy'.
The conspirators, however, had not allowed sufficiently for the
craftiness of Louis Philippe, the determination of Metternich or the
capacity for treachery in the Duke. The latter, fully informed of
everything, gave Menotti a free hand until the last minute. On
February 2nd when all the leading conspirators were assembled
to make the final arrangements, he surrounded the house with troops,
and after a brief resistance captured them all. When, in spite of this,
the rising broke out at Bologna, he retired at once, surrounded
by his soldiers and dragging Menotti with him, to the safety of the
Austrian garrison at Mantua. The rising spread with great rapidity.
As the liberal troops under Sercognani marched south, all the towns
from Rimini and Bologna to Perugia, threw off the Papal yoke with
unanimity. Their delegates met at Bologna and declared themselves
the United Italian Provinces. Metternich, haunted by the fear of a
sympathetic movement in Lombardy-Venetia, openly defied France
and marched in troops. Faced with implementing the declaration of
non-intervention, which meant war, Louis Philippe took French
policy into his own hands, reassured Metternich privately that France
would not interfere, dismissed Lafitte, and reorganized the Cabinet
under Casimir-Perier. Austria occupied Bologna, hunted Zucchfs
levies as far as Ancona, where they dispersed, and stamped out the
whole movement. So ended the last attempt of the secret societies to
bring about a revolution in Italy by a popular movement. When all
was quiet again, Francis of Modena returned, hanged Giro Menotti,
and resumed his role of a loyal Archduke of Austria, 7
The Age of Conspiracies, i$iji8ji 37
The suppression of the rising of 1831 brought the first stage of the
Risorgimento to a close, and opened another whose characteristics
and personalities were different. It ended the work of the old type
of secret society. Their work was not without value. They had kept
alive the ideal of independence under a constitution, despite the avowed
intention of Austria to permit neither the one nor the other. But if
these old organizations with their oaths and symbols, their fantastic
ritual and incomprehensible passwords, disappeared, the spirit of
conspiracy remained, nourished by bad governments, poverty and
repression. Young Italy, Mazzini's offspring, was a secret society
but of another kind, combining political conspiracy with a high moral
code, and for the first time using the Press as a political weapon. At
the same time there were changes on the thrones of Italy. Francis I,
King of Naples, less brutal but quite as despicable as his father, died in
1830, giving place to Ferdinand II, who, if he earned the tide of
'Bomba' from bombarding his own country, and permitted a type of
rule that Gladstone called the negation of God, had a certain vulgar
bonhomie that endeared him to the lazzaronL In the next year Pope
Gregory XVI succeeded Leo XII. An obscurantist in his views, a
vulgarian in his habits, his long pontificate of sixteen years was marked
chiefly by his refusal to introduce the least modem improvement in
his States. Of far more importance was the accession of Prince Charles
Albert to the throne of Sardinia on the death of Charles Felix in April
1831. Silent and enigmatic, distrustful and distrusted, he was destined
to lead Italy in the first War of Independence, to be defeated, to
abdicate and die in exile, and to receive the posthumous honour of the
tide fl Re Magnanimo. But the most significant fact of all was the
July Revolution and the appearance of Louis Philippe. For fifteen
years Austria had had no opposition in dealing with Italy; from now
onwards the old competitor was back again and the possibility of
French support of Italy had always to be reckoned with. It was not
long before this new factor made itself felt. Thus with new men at
the helm, and new ideas in men's minds, Italy opened the second phase
of her struggle for liberty and independence.
CHAPTER THREE
CONSPIRACY ON PAPER, 1831-1848
LOUIS Philippe had saved France from war at the price of repu-
diating the declared policy of his own government, betraying the
Italian liberals, and yielding before the open defiance of Austria.
France was humiliated, and Casimir Perier felt called upon to warn
Metternich that a repetition of Austria's occupation of Papal territory
would force France to act. He then circularized the Powers, suggest-
ing that, as the revolt was clearly the result of Papal misgovernment,
the ambassadors in Rome should be authorized to meet and draw up
a statement of necessary reforms to be recommended for adoption by
the Pope. This was done, and thereby the whole question slipped
out of the narrow confines of the States of the Church and became a
matter of European interest. The meeting of the ambassadors re-
vealed at once the different interests of the Powers. England and
Prussia, non-catholic states, worked conscientiously at reform. Austria,
opposed on principle to any fundamental changes, because of their
reaction in Lombardy-Venetia, concentrated on assuring the 'in-
dependence* of the Papacy which meant freedom to repudiate the
suggestions embodied in the Memorandum. The main object of
France was to get the Austrian troops out of Italy. The Memorandum
was drawn up, presented, and then quietly shelved, the Pope announc-
ing the imminent promulgation of reforms of his own. The
troops of Austria were then withdrawn. But when the promised
reforms appeared, they were so inadequate that they were at
once rejected, Bologna rebelled, and once again Austria occupied
the city. The reply of France was to despatch an expeditionary force
and occupy Ancona.
Both from the diplomatic and the military point of view France
mismanaged the Ancona expedition. She announced Cardinal Ber-
netti's consent, when, in fact, he opposed it. V r hile the general in
command broke his journey to take instructions from the ambassador
at Rome, the second-in-command exceeded his orders, seized Ancona
by force, and printed an inflammatory proclamation all about liberty.
It was suppressed, but not before the Papal authorities had obtained a
copy and circularized it to the Powers. Austria was furious and
ordered Radetzky to block all the roads to Rome if the French troops
38
Conspiracy on Paper, 1831 I $48 39
moved from the city. War looked very near, but before going further
Mettemich consulted the Powers. Russia supported him, Prussia
declared for neutrality, but England stood behind France. This saved
the situation. So the Austrians at Bologna and the French at Ancona
sat facing each other for six years until by mutual consent both forces
were withdrawn. For the next ten years we hear little of the affairs
of the Papal States; not that they were any happier or more peaceful.
Blood feuds between Liberals and Papalini were endemic and the
formation of the Centurioni, a body intended as a semi-military
police, only made matters worse. Whether or not the first recruits
were of the good material they were supposed to be, it is certain they
rapidly degenerated into half-organized bands of Papal brigands
whose ferocity knew no bounds. When, after the revolt at Rimini
in 1845, the veil was lifted upon the true state of things by the
brochure of Massimo d'Azeglio, Gli ultimi casi di Romagna, Europe
was shocked at the results of Papal misgovemment.
"The last echoes of 1831 had hardly died away when fresh trouble
broke out, this time in Piedmont. This was the first and most elabor-
ate attempt of Mazzini at insurrection. After organizing his new
society of Young Italy in 1831 and the secret printing and distribution
of his paper of the same name, Mazzini had opened his direct political
campaign with an appeal to Charles Albert, on his accession to the
throne of Sardinia, to put himself at the head of a nation wide revolu-
tionary movement against Austria, in the name of Italian indepen-
dence. When the only answer was an order to the police to arrest the
author if he entered Piedmont (he was bom at Genoa) Mazzini con-
centrated all his forces on seducing the loyalty of the army, over-
turning the throne, and rousing Italy against her oppressor Austria.
It was an ambitious enough programme for a group of young men,
without money or influence, whose only asset was their patriotic
enthusiasm and the literary and organizing genius of their chief. In
a surprisingly short time Mazzini had a 1 network of .propaganda
spread between Genoa, Turin and Alessandria, with numerous
groups of adherents both in civil life and in the army. But the police
were very much awake. Copies of Young Italy and other docaments
found in a trunk opened by the customs enlightened them as to what
was on foot. A year later a tavern brawl amongst some soldiers
revealed the infection in the army, and a little later still the arrest of a
young lieutenant, who broke down under examination and turned
King's evidence, revealed the whole plot in detail. The King,
thoroughly frightened, appointed a. special commission to try die
40 The Evolution of Modern Italy
culprits. Altogether fourteen soldiers and civilians were executed,
and the activities of Young Italy stamped out beyond recovery. For
the rest of the King's reign there were no subversive efforts of the kind
in Piedmont. In the meantime Mazzini had been collecting troops
and money for the invasion of Savoy, convinced, as he always was,
that the least spark would set all Italy aflame. Charles Albert knew
all about it, writing an accurate forecast regarding it to the Duke of
Modena some months before it materialized. The attempt was a
miserable failure, largely due to the unfortunate choice of the Polish
general Ramorino as the commander, and was not even a threat to
die safety of the King or any part of Ms country. It was a bitter
disappointment to Mazzini for it sadly discredited Young Italy, which
for a time ceased to be regarded as an active force and dropped into
the background.
The remorseless persistency with which the sects were hunted down
by all the rulers of Italy, except in Tuscany, is evidence of the terrible
fear they inspired. As every form of religious and social louleverse-
ment was beHeved to be their aim, so every form of bestial cruelty
and outrage was accepted as their normal procedure. In a state such
as Naples, where moral restraint on either side was almost unknown,
it was a^warfare without pity or quarter. 1 found in the archives
of the 3rd Division', Pepe wrote in his memoirs, *a document proving
that upwards of two thousand ducats had been expended on poison
and on the remuneration of those who poisoned bandits/ Immunity
was granted to those who undertook to murder their companions;
in some cases, as in that of the famous VardarelH band, the govern-
ment took them into its pay and having established confidence, had
them killed by treachery. The ferocious struggle in the Papal states
between the Liberals and the Centurioni was on die same level. During
the investigation of Mazzini's plot in Piedmont Metternich forwarded
to Charles Albert a horrible document issued in the name of Young
Italy advocating every barbarous form of warfare. It would be an
outrage on Mazzini to suppose he ever even heard of it, but it was
issued in his name. It made an indelible impression on the King, who
printed extracts from it in the official gazette. % was the belief that
Mazzini sanctioned such methods that determined Charles Albert
to stamp out Young Italy as one would some noxious reptile. 8
The almost unintelligent obstinacy with which Metternich clung
to this conception of the liberal movement, persistently identifying
the ideals of die later leaders of its thought with the crude barbarism
of Neapolitan or Romagnuol ferocity, is to be observed in his
Conspiracy on Paper, j<P^j-/^<f 41
correspondence. As late as 1847 in a letter to the Grand-duke of Tus-
cany lie writes, 'Between a Balbo, a Gioberti, a D'Azeglio, a Petitti,
these champions of Italian liberalism, and a Mazzini and his acolytes,
there is no other difference than that between poisoners and assassins,
and if their wills are different, the difference disappears when it comes
to methods of action*. The explanation of this attitude lay in Austria
itself. The Empire was a congeries of states, differing in race,
language and culture, whose delicate adjustment, a blend of expe-
diency and experience, was held together by a common loyalty to
the Crown. To touch it was to risk collapse, to reform it was more
than Mettemich could undertake; but lie saw clearly enough, that
any liberal or constitutional reform in Italy would at once be de-
manded in Lombardy-Venetia and if there, why not elsewhere in the
Empire ? So Mettemich set his face as a flint against reform, however
reasonable, lest the whole imperial structure should disintegrate.
The first phase of the Risorgimento was now over. There would
be sporadic revolts, inspired by Mazzini, which served to keep Europe
alive to the fact that Italy had not submitted to Austria nor been
lulled into inaction, but as a whole, for the next ten years, Italy was
quiet. It was a period of thought and education, in which in her own
way she reflected for the first rime the three great movements, nation-
alism, romanticism and industrialism, which were transforming
European life and thought, Italy now entered upon a period of liter-
ary activity which had one peculiar feature, that everything was
coloured by the one absorbing problem, her political future.
Her fiction, her poetry, her drama, even her dull trade journals, all
alike revealed the underlying obsession. It was conspiracy on paper.
The pioneer of the movement was the poet Alessandro Manzoni who
in June 1827 produced his romance I promessi sposi (The Betrothed)
which remained in solitary glory as Italy's great prose masterpiece. Here
at once we see the subtle political influence, for though the story is set
back in the days of Spanish oppression it might equally well be that
of Austria, as his readers quickly understood; by so doing Manzoni
set a fashion in the writing of historical fiction, which was later
foEowed by many less gifted authors whose works are little read
to-day. The romantic movement has been called 'the discovery of the
middle ages* and there grew up in Italy a school of writers who turned
to the past to arouse die present. Choosing episodes or periods of
Italian greatness they sought to stimulate the patriotic pride of their
readers by the heroic deeds of Italy in the past. Massimo d'Azeglio's
Ettore Fieramosca and Niccolo de* Lapi, Grossi's Marco Vuconti and
42 The Evolution of Modern Italy
the romances of Cantu and Guerrazzi, were ail of this type, and there
were many others. They were read by the cultured upper and middle
classes, untouched by the propaganda of Mazzini, and were not
without their effect in arousing patriotic ardour; but their intrinsic
merit was not great, and few, if any, survived the passing of the active
phase of the Risorgimento.
Another aspect of the literary movement, which stands by itself,
was the work of Joseph Mazzini. His influence was European. From
his asylum in Switzerland he founded Lejeun? Suisse and Young Europe,
and indefatigible in his labour, spread his social and political ideas
wherever possible. He was the apostle of Italian nationalism. He was
the first to give the Risorgimento an ethical content. The first to
realize the need for social and political education; the need to make
Italians in order to make Italy. Italy, one and indivisible, under a
Republican form of government, was his political creed, with Liberty,
Independence and Unity as its triune banner. He gave the national
movement a purpose and an ideal, and the youth of Italy a vision of
greatness; teaching duty, self-sacrifice and patriotic self-dedication as
the necessary preliminary to the grim business of action. His teaching
reached the middle classes, he never touched the peasantry who took
their politics from tne parish priest, nor did he influence the upper
classes. The poverty of his resources and the secrecy imposed on his
methods by the unceasing activity of the police, limited his success,
but all over Italy were groups of men who adopted his creed and
followed him as the apostle of Hberty^J,
The appeal to the past to stimulate the present, was by no means
restricted to the historical novel, but is evident in all literary forms
at this period. The wide interest in the drama, for instance, obviously
offered a fruitful field for patriotic declamation. The classical dramas
of Alfieri with their lurid denunciations of tyranny were already
familiar, but something more in touch with reality than Orestes and
Agamemnon seemed called for. The Francesca da Rimini of Silvio
PeHico, though hardly a great work, contained patriotic passages
which roused frantic applause, and his Eufemia da Messina was pro-
hibited by the police for its outspoken sentiments. It was Niccolini who
voiced public feeling most clearly. His Arnaldo da Brescia and Giovanni
da Procida received rapturous applause, especially the latter with its
setting in the Sicilian Vespers, the rising in the thirteenth century
which expelled the Angevins from the island. A story is told that when
performed at Milan the French Minister expressed himself most
strongly to his Austrian colleague beside him, at the anti-French
Conspiracy on Paper, 18)1-1848 43
sentiments, only to receive the reply, 'Don't be upset: the envelope
is addressed to you but the contents are for me*. It was of course
inevitable that poetry should catch the patriotic note. Here again
Manzoni was among the first in his poem on the Piedmontese rebel-
lion of 1821, Marzo 1821, in which the single line, *O day of our
redemption !' expressed at once the longing in the hearts of the Italian
people. The lyrics of Berchet, written however in exile, the patriotic
odes of Mameli and many others struck the same note. Some, in a
single poem like Mercantinf s Ode to Garibaldi which became the
Marseiflaise of the Risorgimento, or Mamelf s Fratelli d* Italia, achieved
instant success. There was truth, however, in Cavour's remark that
there were too many songs about freeing Italy, though this did not
prevent him from adding his own untuneful voice to that of the other
journalists, when in 1847 they marched past Charles Albert in the
great procession in honour of the reforms, and adding sotto voce to
his neighbour, *We sing like dogs !' His one public appearance as a
singer.
It would be natural to expect that the most obvious evidence of
this patriotic feeling would be found in the Press. But in the first half
of the nineteenth century the Press in Italy was almost non-existent,
and the profession of journalist might well have been scheduled as a
dangerous occupation. In the whole seven states of Italy there may
have been some ninety publications altogether, including papers,
magazines, trade journals and similar matter. It was not until 1847
that a genuine literary magazine, Predari's Antologia 3 was permitted in
Piedmont, and the fate of the Lombard Condliatore and the Florentine
Antologia, both suppressed by the Austrian police, was plain evidence
of the severity of the censorship. A single official gazette, containing
government announcements and such other matter as it thought fit
to publish, a few 'family' papers, and some trade journals, made up
the bulk of periodical literature in each state. In spite of this a de-
termined and not unsuccessful effort was made to produce a patriotic
journal. In 1 827 the editorship of an existing journal with the safe but
forbidding title ofAnnali universali fi statistics, economia pubblica, storia
e commercio, passed into the hands of G. D. Romagnosi, one of the finest
intellects in Italy. His policy was aimed at drawing Italy from her
condition of backwardness and isolation into the main stream of
European progress, not by means of rebellion like Mazzini, nor by
historical comparisons like the romantics, but by political economy,
trade statistics, and industrial information and encouragement. He
gathered round him a group of able assistants, Carlo Cattaneo, Cesare
44 The Evolution of Modern Italy
Correnti and others, and set to work to create a well Informed and
interested public opinion bent on the economic and industrial revival
of Italy. The Annali was definitely patriotic; but Romagnosi had
Ms eyes not on the present like Mazzini nor on the past like the
romantics, but on the future. He did not abuse Austria but simply
ignored her, turning all his attention to the industrial progress of
France and England. By a stream of information about new^inven-
tions and developments, by statistics of production and distribution
drawn from all over Europe, he pointed the moral of Italian back-
wardness. Italian industries fcuch as wines and silk received special
attention. Advice and information regarding markets and prices,
reforms and new methods, were given, and wherever possible, the
contrast between Austrian methods and those of the progressive
states were stressed. His outlook was always national. A railway
scheme for the whole peninsula, a universal standard of weights and
measures, a plea for a common programme of technical and university
education, reveal the width of his views. After ten years as editor
Romagnosi died, but the movement went on and widened, and later
reviews such as the Rivista Europea and the Politecnico developed and
improved the original idea. Thus did the influence of Industrialism,
Romanticism and Nationalism make their separate contributions
towards the redemption of Italy, and as we approach the critical
years of the early forties, their combined force, aided by external
events, gave Italy, at last, a consciousness of her destiny as a
nation.
The event in Europe which most directly affected Italy, was the
death in 183 5 of the Emperor Francis II. It removed a narrow bigoted
bureaucrat, who, impervious to new ideas, preferred obedience to
education and a police barracks to a university, yet lit by rare and
unsuspected flashes of an underlying humanity which won for him.
the sobriquet of Vater Franz'. The personality of an Austrian Emperor
was of greater importance than that of any other ruler in Europe, and
the fact that the son and heir of Francis H, Ferdinand, was mentally
deficient and a mere figurehead, was a tragedy for the Empire. A
brave face, however, was put upon a bad situation and for thirteen
years the Empire was governed by a triumvirate, Metternich, Count
Kolowrat and the Archduke Louis. Metternich dealt with all foreign
relations and policy and Kolowrat with internal affairs; the Archduke
was a nonentity. The effect of this new state of things was to impose
on Metternich a policy of peace. The difficulties between himself
and Kolowrat, the agitations of Kossuth in Hungary, the uselessness
Conspiracy on Paper, 2831184 ^
of the Emperor and the ominous creaking of the entire imperial
fabric, made the thought of war a nightmare.
While Italy lay quiet, scarcely recovered from the terrible epidemic
of cholera which swept both north and south in 1835 and the follow-
ing years, most severely in Sicily, where suffering and superstition
led to a fanatical outbreak of rebellion in 1837, crushed with unsparing
severity by Naples, the Eastern Question darkened the European
horizon and threatened a general war. France, under the bellicose
Thiers, stood facing England and Austria, and in 1840 war seemed
inevitable. Once again Louis Philippe prevented it, dismissing Thiers
and replacing him with the pacific Guizot. Though Italy as a whole
was unaffected, the crisis inevitably involved Sardinia which from
now onwards becomes the centre of significance in Italian politics.
It was essential if the states of Italy were ever to act in unison, that
there should be one, free and independent of Austrian influence, to take
the lead and form a rallying point around which the forces of the
peninsula could gather. The choice lay between Naples and Sardinia,
for they alone had armies. The young King Ferdinand H of
Naples, nephew of the French Queen and married to the pious
Christina of Savoy, was one of whom the Sardinian Minister wrote,
not inaptly, 'he is dominated by a laziness and heedless indifference
which nothing can rouse; it is the fatalism of the lazzarone. Neverthe-
less he began his reign with some symptoms of energy and liberalism.
He issued a political amnesty: resisted Austrian pressure to sign an
offensive and defensive treaty, as his grandfather had done:^took an
active if superficial interest in the army, and flirted with the idea of a
French alliance. All this brought him into bad odour at Vienna. He
was said to have his eyes on the crown of Italy for which purpose he
was enlarging the army and seeking French support. In January 1836,
however, Ms wife, whom he treated abominably, died, after giving
birth to the last of the line to ascend the throne, the feeble Francis II.
In May, Ferdinand, with indecent haste, paid a round of royal visits,
to Florence, Modena, Vienna and Paris, in search of a new^ Queen.
Finding wives for royalties was a speciality with Austria *tu felix
Austria nube' was still true, and she did not miss her opportunity, for
the numerous brood of Archdukes (Francis II had seven brothers) had
always
'. . . daughters sly and tall
And comely and compliant. . . .*
and Ferdinand was duly provided for. Even before the Queen's death,
in his passion for inside information, Mettemich had however assured
46 The Evolution of Modern Italy
a knowledge of all that went on in the Royal circle at Naples by
providing the widowed Queen Mother with an Austrian paramour,
the Baron Smiicker. After his second marriage Ferdinand returned
to the fold and all thought of leading Italy died away.
There remained Charles Albert of Sardinia. He was an unknown
quantity when he ascended the throne, for he had lived in semi-
retirement since his return from the Spanish war. His reputation,
however, both with the liberals and the royalists, was still deeply
tainted with the memories of 1821, both regarding him as a traitor
to their cause. He found the Kingdom in a lamentable condition.
Charles Felix in his later years thought of little except amusing him-
self. The Ministers went their own way: the army was neglected:
the finances were in disorder: the real directors of the national policy
were the Austrian and Russian Ministers at Turin and the Papal
Nuncio, who treated the country as an Austrian satellite state. There
were spies and informers everywhere and everything was passed on
to Vienna. All this was deeply resented by Charles Albert, but he
lacked the moral courage to make a general clearance of all the lay
and clerical *austriacanti' who surrounded the throne and occupied all
the important posts in the government. An absolutist, a religious
ascetic, above all a legitimist, the King was severely handicapped in
taking a firm line by the fact that while he hated Austria, he hated
Louis Philippe still more. Warmly attached to the elder branch of the
Bourbons, who had been his strong supporters in 1821 and after, he
regarded Louis Philippe as an irreligious bourgeois usurper. In 1832
he had done his best to drive Austria into war with France, signing a
military convention with Vienna, and writing in his diary, 'I have
written a letter to Metternich in which I have put forward every
possible reason to increase his indignation (against France), telling him
that if Austria wished to make war on France, I was quite ready to
begin it*. But Metternich was not to be stampeded.
Charles Albert's first task was to become master in his own house.
Fortunately he found in his Foreign Secretary, Count Solaro della
Margherita, the very man that was required. A pure-blooded Pied-
montese of the provincial nobility, a diplomat by profession, Minister
at Naples and then Madrid, Delia Margherita was as jealous of his
country's independence as the King, and determined to assert it. In
a few years he procured the recall of four Foreign Ministers, including
two Austrian*, for undue interference, and retired two old and tried
servants of the crown, the Ministers in London and Paris, for too much
servility to the Courts to which they were accredited. This broke the
Conspiracy on Paper, 18)1-1848 47
back of the old system and Charles Albert was at last his own master.
Metternich was naturally disgusted at the treatment of his representa-
tives and informed the Sardinian Minister that the third should have
orders to 'keep quiet and never to push himself forward but always
to wait until they came to fetch him*. A new role for Austrian Minis-
ters at Turin.
Having reorganized the army and the finances Charles Albert
was now free to carry out his own policy. Abroad, he warmly
supported the Duchess de Berry, providing her with nearly a million
francs from his private purse with which she bought the 'Carlo
Alberto 9 , the ship in which she made her descent on France. He
espoused the cause of Don Carlos in Spain and of Dom Miguel in
Portugal. In so doing he irritated France and England and lost the
foreign trade of both Spain and Portugal. In fact for some years lie
had not a friend in Europe. His attitude towards Austria was enig-
matic. His behaviour was correct but cold. He was neither friendly
nor unfriendly, and Metternich, whilst affecting to approve highly of
his attitude, grew increasingly puzzled and suspicious. When the
crisis of 1840 came, the results of this policy of complete independence
became painfully clear. Sardinia proclaimed a strict neutrality, but
no one would agree to respect it. England told the King that his only
policy was to fight with Austria; France said bluntly that whether
neutral or not a French army would occupy Piedmont, and Prince
Schwarzenberg, the Austrian Minister at Turin, toured the defences
in the Alps and spoke of immediate steps, such as the Austrian occupa-
tion of Alessandria. It was well for Italy that war never came, for,
had it done so, Sardinia could never have played the part she did a
few years later.
Of greater ultimate importance to Italy was the King's internal
policy. Charles Albert ruled as an absolutist. Every Minister reported
to him weekly and nothing was done without him. The police, the
double censorship, were as severe as in any other state. Education
was in the hands of the Jesuits. The Press was negligible. Every day
he received the Vicario, the head of the urban police, and listened to
his report of all the rumours, gossip and crime in the capital. Spies
and informers were ubiquitous. His personal life was admirable. He
had neither vices nor passions. He worked long hours, lived in the
simplest way, and tried to do what he believed to be his duty. He
was devout even to asceticism. His poEcy was summed up in the
phrase, 'tout amfliorer et tout conserved, which in practice meant
political stagnation and economic betterment. He was interested in
48 The Evolution of Modern Italy
economics, and writes about 'his little library on social and economic
questions', and he felt it safe to allow freedom of discussion and the
publication of books and pamphlets on current problems. More than
a hundred were issued on the silk industry alone. He turned the
Council of State into an economic Council to whom the recommen-
dations of the Chambers of Commerce were sent and from which he
himself was the final court of appeal. The previous government had
had only one idea of raising money, to increase tariffs, and stop all
exportation of raw materials in profitable industries, such as cocoons
in the silk industry. The consequence was that smuggling had reached
gigantic proportions. Charles Albert's new policy was not impressive,
Tariffs were slowly reduced by about fifty per cent, but many indus-
tries only existed by state subsidies and remained small. As Cavour
said later, *they never grew up'. There was a gradual improvement,
the revenue increased and the government was frugal, and in 1848
there was a good balance in hand. But the real value was not in the
increase of wealth, but in economic knowledge. The country became
educated on economic matters, the problems were understood
even if the solutions were not known, and ten years later, whea
Cavour brought in his wide economic reforms, the country grasped
their significance with a quick intelligence which was due in no small
degree to the preparatory work of Charles Albert.
The great mistake which Charles Albert made was in thinking
that he could keep apart his two opposite programmes, political silence
and economic loquacity. Piedmont was as politically minded in
these years as any other part of Italy, and when in 1842 the King was
induced to permit the foundation of the Societa Agraria or Agricul-
tural Society, with a central committee at Turin, and provincial and
local committees all over the country, the inevitable happened. For
centuries public meetings had been forbidden, now they were per-
mitted to talk agriculture. No doubt they did, but it was a time to
talk of many things, and if they began with talking of cabbages it
was not long before they were talking of Kings. The whole organiza-
tion became political and it was largely responsible for the creation
of that public pressure which ended in the reforms and finally in
the Constitution.
All this literary activity throughout Italy, as was to be expected,
produced before long a series of political programmes* The first, by
far the most logical and consistent as it was the most radical, was that
of Mazzini, which postulated the expulsion of Austria, the abolition
of the Temporal Power, and the union of all Italy under a republican
Conspiracy on Paper, 18)11848 49
form of government. This was to be brought about by a national
rising en masse, provoked and heralded by sudden explosions wher-
ever possible. Mazzini's programme was strenuously opposed by
the Moderates or Reformers, a party of intellectuals whose base was
in Lombardy. They regarded the Mazzinian policy of sporadic
rebellion as futile and unnecessary, leading only to exasperation on
both sides and the loss of valuable lives. Nor were they as a whole
enamoured of a republic, though it had its partisans in their ranks.
Their central idea was reform by co-operation between Princes and
people within each state, leading up to the federal union of all
Italy. Education, railways, banks, the modernizing of industry, must
come first and then federation by consent. This programme received
strong support with the publication in 1843 of the Abbe Gioberti's
H Primato, 'The civil and moral primacy of die Italians', in which the
political solution advocated was federation under the "Papacy with a
College of Princes as an executive. The work, in spite of its seven
hundred pages, was widely read and received with great applause, for
Gioberti was determined that it should be read and not put on the
Index, and he toned down his asperities and flattered every one,
finding even a word of praise for the Jesuits and the egregious
Ferdinand of Naples. Il Primato was perhaps the most elaborate piece
of propaganda ever written. Its effect was to accentuate still further
an existing rift in thought amongst the Reformers, between, that is to
say, the Neo-Guelfs, who like Gioberti looked to the Papacy to lead,
and the Albertisti, who were already speculating on the possibility
of a lead from the House of Savoy. But the real weakness of the work
was that it shirked the two vital questions which formed the crux of
the whole problem, the Temporal Power and the Austrian possession
of Lombardy-Venetia. The idea of leaving the States of the Church
to be permanently misgoverned by Cardinals and Bishops revolted
every one, and how to persuade Austria to quit Italian soil, was a
problem Gioberti thought it well to leave unanswered.
The Primato was followed by Balbo's Hopes of Italy which aban-
doned the idea of Italy under the Pope and veered towards the
leadership of the House of Savoy; but his solution of the Austrian
problem, that with the break up of Turkey Austria would turn east
and abandon Lombardy-Venetia, was fantastic. Other books of less
importance making further suggestions appeared about this time,
but the only one to reach public opinion outside Italy was D* Azeglio's
brochure On the recent events in the Romagna. Prompted by the mani-
festo To the Princes and Peoples of lEwropeissued after therevolt at Rimini,
5O The Evolution of Modern Italy
It was a scathing indictment of Papal rale and shattered all thoughts
of a regenerated Papacy so long as the present rule by priests was
allowed to exist. D'Azeglio, already well known through his
historical romances, was one of the few realists amongst the many
idealists in Italy at this time, who looked the ugly fact in the face that,
if his country demanded independence and freedom from Austria,
she must be prepared to fight for it. Looked at from this angle the
one hope for Italy lay in Charles Albert. Would he fight Austria?
That was the single vital question. Determined to put this to the test
D'Azeglio in 1845 ma ^e a pilgrimage from Rome through central
and northern Italy to gauge public opinion and estimate what
prospect there was of practical support for Piedmont if she threw
down the glove to Austria. He reached two conclusions, first that
the desire to fight Austria was a reality, and secondly, that there was
little trust put in the Sardinian King. His journey over, D'Azeglio
went to Turin and asked for a private audience of the King to whom
he was well known. It was granted, and one autumn morning at
6 a.m. whilst the city still slept and the palace alone was ablaze with
lights, for the King rose before dawn, D'Azeglio was ushered into
the King's presence.
Charles Albert gave D'Azeglio an opening by inquiring where he
had been lately. Then D'Azeglio spoke of his journey : of the generally
expressed condemnation of the Mazzinian policy; the useless sacrifices
and die futile risings. All sensible people, he told the King, deprecated
conspiracy, but they knew force was necessary, they realized that
Italy would have to fight, and all eyes were turned upon Piedmont
and her King. Here he stopped and awaited the King's reply. He
expected, he tells us, the usual colourless words of sympathy, instead,
looking D'Azeglio in the eyes he said, 'Tell those gentlemen to keep
quiet and not move, for at present there is nothing to be done; but
they may be certain that, if the opportunity comes, my life, the life
of my sons, my resources, my wealth, my army, all shall be given for
the cause of Italy'. Such was Charles Albert's deliberate pledge to
Italy and nobly did he redeem it.
The motto of Mazzini, 'Thought and action', both inflammable,
was finding wide expression throughout Italy in the years after 1840.
The chronic unrest in Sicily, the abortive rising of the Muratori at
Bologna, the troubles at Rimini, followed by the quixotic attempt
of the Bandiera brothers in 1844, with its tragic close before a firing
squad at Cosenza, were all clear evidence of the quickened tempo
of the national aspirations. There were new opportunities for inter-
Conspiracy on Paper, zfjz-ifyS 51
change of Ideas in the Scientific Congresses (whose members were
drawn from all the states of the peninsula) which met annually in
some city of northern Italy. Literature was becoming increasingly
outspoken and there was a hitherto unknown freedom in the expression
of public opinion, while Giusti's bitter epigrams gave a jagged edge
to Italy's resentment at the conduct of Austria and her petty tyrants.
The old and the new were at grips, and demands for social reform
were meeting obstruction from reactionary ministers. When Cavour
in 1846 proposed a bank for Turin it was at once turned down by
the minister concerned as too great a novelty. Plans for railways
were meeting with curious objections. The first line built, that from
Naples to Portici, had to be constructed without tunnels on the ground
of their moral danger. The Pope employed the same arguments,
adding the reason, potent in the States of the Church, that they would
bring malcontents into Rome. But the mere proposals revealed a
new spirit.
Politically there appeared to be no change, but in Lombardy and in
Piedmont there was a slowly increasing tension. The Lombards were
bitter over the continual increase of Austrian officials, the slowness in
an administration where everything had to be referred to Vienna,
and the steady tendency to 'germanize* the country. In Piedmont,
Charles Albert was pursuing a policy of contenting the liberals with
small concessions without exciting die suspicions of Austria, but he
was beginning to show clear symptoms of italianitA. In a variety of
small contentious matters with Austria, a contraband convention,
the building of a bridge, the salt question, he consistently refused
to meet Austria half way and showed himself difficult and
unaccommodating. In his letters to Delia Margherita we find him
speaking of the 'necessity of showing ourselves completely indepen-
dent of Austria* and again of 'bending all our thoughts to Italian
independence', phrases which reveal an attitude of mind very different
from the pro-Austrian leanings usually attributed to him. But noth-
ing of this appeared in public and his enigmatic silence still caused
distrust in his sincerity; as D'Azeglio wrote after Ms interview 'that
is what he said, but God alone knows his heart*.
Thought in Italy, as elsewhere in Europe, was reaching a climax.
It was no longer a vague hope but a deepening conviction that great
changes were imminent. Things could not go on as they were.
There was no certainty of leadership, there was no plans. There was
not even a fighting spirit. It is upon moral grounds that Italy rests
her cause. Monarchists, federalists and republicans each have their
52 The Evolution of Modem Italy
panacea, but all agree that change there must be. Clear-sighted as ever,
Mettemich saw the storm rising round him, but a sense of helplessness
possesses him apres moi k deluge is his mental outlook, and the storm
when it broke left him more helpless than ever, with the one thing
he thought impossible, a liberal Pope.
On June i, 1846, Gregory XVI died and after a short conclave
Cardinal Mastai-Ferretri was elected as his successor, taking the tide
of Pius EX. A kindly, gentle priest, with a handsome presence and a
fine voice, the new Pope had never made himself prominent and was
generally unknown, and his selection was regarded as without much
political significance. It was known, however, that he had shown
humanity to the liberals in his diocese of Imola, that he was a friend
of the liberal-minded Count Giuseppe Pasolini, at whose suggestion
he had read both Gioberti and D'Azeglio. It was customary for a new
Pope to issue an amnesty, but political criminals were habitually
barred from this. A month after his elevation to the Papacy Pius
issued a wide political amnesty which, though restricted by an oath
of future loyalty and good conduct, was an unheard of concession,
giving evidence of a liberal spirit hitherto unknown at the Vatican.
The efiect was electric. To the accompaniment of a chorus of praise
from Europe (even the Sultan of Turkey sent a congratulatory
embassy to Rome), the Pope entered boldly upon the path of reform.
A series of commissions were appointed and plans made for railways
and gas lighting, prison reform and education, communal and
provincial administration. The States of the Church were to
be modernized.
Amongst all these excellent administrative proposals, however*
there were three political measures of fundamental importance. In
March 1847, a law on the Press, permitted the publication of news-
papers and journals under the supervision of a body of lay censors;
in June a Consulta was granted, an advisory body of laymen under
the presidency of a Cardinal; and finally, after a long struggle, came
permission to form a Civic Guard. The method by which these
results were obtained is of great interest and peculiar to the Papacy,
though they were soon imitated at Florence and Turin. It might be
called the process of 'pressure by acclamation*. The spontaneous
display of devotion to Pio Nono in the kneeling crowds and the
vivas, was before long cleverly organized into a form of political
pressure. A body of progressives, amongst whom the most promin-
ent were the Marquis Massimo D'Azeglio (returned to Rome from.
Turin), the doctor Sterbini and the popular wine carrier Angelo
Conspiracy on Paper, 1831-1848 53
Bninetti, known to all as Ciceruacchio, were behind the movement.
The bouquets and the banquets, at which the national passion for
rhetoric received carte, blanche to expand itself, were soon supple-
mented by organized demonstrations of applause or silent disapproval,
according as a wanted measure was passed or rejected by the Pope.
Pio Nono was sensitive and vain: the incense of popularity was dear
to him and its opposite abhorrent; and this subtle war on the Papal
nerves, alternating between rapturous applause when he acquiesced,
and a grim silence broken only by groans or threats (revealing the
ugly temper of the Romans that lay beneath the surface) when popular
measures were rejected, pushed the good Pope much further than
he meant to go, without resort to the usual methods of force.
The repercussions of Papal liberalism were felt at once aE over Italy.
In May, by not dissimilar methods, Tuscany obtained a Press, and the
Alba in Florence and at PisaL'Ite/w at once began demands for further
concessions. At Lucca a Civic Guard was granted in September, but
the death of Marie Louise, which removed the princeling at Lucca to
Parma, and caused the transference of Lucca to Tuscany, brought the
full benefits won at Florence to the small state as well. Modena, where
the new Duke, Francis V (his father died in 1846) was entirely under
Austria, promptly asked for a garrison of his protector's troops. At
Milan the appointment of a new Archbishop, this time an Italian,
led to demonstrations whose nationalist character was unmistakable,
as was the impressive funeral of Count Confalonieri, the martyr of the
Spielberg, in the following January. Naples did not move, but there
were disturbances at Reggio and Messina followed by executions and
imprisonments as usual.
At Vienna the reaction to these events was a feeling of dismay. The
prompt use offeree, to which Metternich was averse, would only
make matters worse and raise a storm of protest. But Metternich took
precautions. The garrisons in Lombardy were strengthened and the
timely appeal for troops from Modena gave him a valuable opening
to exert influence in Tuscany if necessary. The tone of his letters to
Liitzow, his ambassador at the Vatican, is almost one of distress. He
encloses notes, 'apergis' to be read to the Pope: hints on forms of
government: on the true significance of an amnesty and the real
meaning of concessions. Realizing that Austrian action means
trouble, he turns to France, trying to induce Guizot to take a firm
line at the Vatican; but Guizot will not interfere with internal reforms
and does nothing. But the patience of Metternich had limits. Com-
missions on prison reform and railways he does not mind, but when
54 The Evolution of Modern Italy
It comes to putting arms in the hands of the people by the formation
of a Civic Guard, it is necessary to take steps. So, on the anniversary
of the amnesty, when all Italy was en fete, cavalry, infantry and
artillery, with fuses lighted all ready for action, occupied the Papal
city of Ferrara, where Austria already had garrison rights. At once
the storm broke; the Cardinal Legate protested, the Pope circularized
the Powers, there was a shriek from the new Press, and Charles Albert
offered to put all his forces at the disposal of the Holy Father for the
defence of his states. The occupation of Ferrara was a bad mistake
and involved Metternich in six months of worry and diplomatic
warfare, until in December he felt beaten and withdrew the
troops.
Metternich was no more successful elsewhere. The condition of
Lombardy was causing grave misgivings. The administration seemed
paralysed and the old Viceroy, the Archduke Rainer, was useless.
Metternich sent Count Ficquelmont to try and vitalize the govern-
ment. But nothing could be done, Milan laid the blame on Vienna
and Vienna on Milan, and finding it hopeless, Ficquelmont resigned
his commission and withdrew. The one live force in Lombardy was
the army. Radetzky kept his sword sharp and ready for action and
was eager to settle the Italian problem by force but Metternich would
not permit it. The crux of the whole Italian situation lay with Charles
Albert, for though the extremists everywhere were trying to drive
the governments into war with Austria, the contributions they could
make towards victory, apart from the Sardinian army, were neg-
ligible, and the state of things at Turin was as obscure as ever. The
King's first care was to maintain law and order and prevent the
country from falling into the condition of Rome and Florence. He
had always hated crowds and demonstrations. The mob round the
palace in 1821 had left upon him an unforgettable memory. All these
vivas and rosettes and hymns to Pio Nono, from which Turin was
by no means exempt, were thoroughly distasteful and everything was
done to discourage them. As to war with Austria the position was
complicated in the extreme. Charles Albert had not the least inten-
tion of provoking it. He knew very well the danger of flinging his
small army against Radetzky and he had no illusions as to the fighting
value of untrained revolutionary levies. Yet deep down in his nature
there was a mystical crusader's vision of leading a victorious army
under the banner of the Cross against the hated Austria, and of dying,
like "Wolfe, in the moment of victory. From time to time we see a
flash of it in his correspondence, as in the message he sent to be read
Conspiracy on Paper* ifjiifyf 55
to the Scientific Congress at Casale. If ever', he wrote, 4 God grants us
the favour of being able to undertake a war of independence, it is I
alone who will command the army, and then, I am resolved to do for
the Guelf cause what Schamil has done against the great Russian
empire. Oh the brave day that we shall be able to raise the cry of
national independence !' 'He had one sole passion', wrote Delia Mar-
gherita who watched him closely for thirteen years, Italian indepen-
dence as his personal work.' But this quixotic dream was neutralized
by a native caution. At his elbow was Delia Margherita bent on
preventing Italian adventures. The liberals worked hard to bring
about his dismissal but could not. Nothing would induce him to
resign and at every turn he opposed and obstructed the King's liberal
tendencies. Nor did the King get any encouragement- against Austria
from abroad. No one wanted war. England urged reform but not
war, neither France nor Austria wanted it, only the extremists in Italy
favoured it.
The temper of resistance was rising in Piedmont. They hated
Austria. They were sick of the King's policy of secrecy and silence
and the plague of spies and informers. They wanted a free Press and
a constitution, and freedom and liberty of expression. Its centre was
Genoa rather than Turin, where under the inspiration of Goffredo
Mameli, poet and soldier, destined to die in defence of Rome, and
of Nino Bixio, Garibaldi's volcanic lieutenant and a future general of
united Italy, processions and demonstrations culminated in an in-
fluential deputation to the King. But the first change came from
events in the capital, where an assembly of citizens preparing to give a
birthday ovation to the King, was rudely dispersed by the police and
carabinieri with unnecessary violence. Strong protests followed
which resulted in the dismissal of the Marquis Villamarina, the Minister
for War, and, at last, of Delia Margherita from the Foreign Office. A
week later Charles Albert published his long expected reforms
(October 1847). These included a free Press under a lay censorship,
a court of Cassation, the transfer of the police from the Minister of
War to that of the Interior, and a communal law by which members
of the provincial and communal councils were eligible for election
to the Council of State, together with the abolition of the exceptional
Courts of Justice. For a brief space the King was raised to the pinnacle
of popularity but the country was not satisfied. The new Press began
to concentrate on the need for a constitution, Genoa was demanding
a Civic Guard and the expulsion of the Jesuits, and the year closed in
a struggle of will power between King and people as to whether
56 The Evolution oj Modern Italy
parliamentary government or the old absolutism were to direct the
future destinies of the country.
The same problem was troubling the Ministers at Florence, Rome
and Naples, and the solution came from the south. The new year
opened with the Tobacco Riots at Milan which revealed the rapidly
increasing tension in Lombardy, involving clashes with the police
and some fatalities, which roused ostentatious echoes of sympathy in
Piedmont and Rome and impressive funeral services for the victims.
It was a first indication of the national quality of the movement.
Then on January I2th Palermo rose in revolt, expelled the garrison
and put Ruggero Settimo at the head of the municipality. The bom-
bardment of the city which followed was stopped by the protests of
the foreign consuls. The example of Palermo spread quickly across
the island. The constitution of 1812 was re-established and Sicily
declared its independence. Afraid of losing his throne, Ferdinand
hastily began reforms which culminated on January 2pth in the
proclamation of a constitution. Quickly drawn up on the French
model of 1830, it comprised two chambers, one elective, the other
nominated by the Bang, with a free Press and individual liberty.
Ignoring Article 87 specially inserted to bring Sicily within its scope,
the Parliament on the island declared boldly on April I3th, 'The
throne of Sicily is vacant. Sicily will be ruled by its own constitution
and will elect an Italian prince to the throne when it has revised its
statutes. Ferdinand of Bourbon and his dynasty are for ever excluded/
The example of Naples decided the other states. In Piedmont the
pressure was irresistible and on February 8th Charles Albert promised
a constitution and appointed a commission to draw it up. Three days
later a constitution was likewise proclaimed in Tuscany. Like the rest
of Italy, the Earthly Paradise had had its political troubles. These
reached their climax in the revolt of the seaport ofLeghorn, which, like
Genoa in Piedmont, was the most radical city in the duchy. This
decided the Grand-duke to submit and follow the craze for parlia-
mentary government. Finally came Rome. On March loth a
ministry of laymen was nominated and five days later, the day on
which Prince Metternich fled from Vienna to England, a constitution
was proclaimed in Rome. 10 Of all these constitutional efforts one only
was to last, that of Piedmont, which after twelve years of successful
Efe in Turin was in 1860 extended to all Italy then united, and finally,
ten years later, to Italy with Rome as its capital.
Whilst these events were transforming the peninsula, Europe was
in revolution. On February 22nd France overthrew the Orleans
Conspiracy on Paper, liji-iSfi 57
throne and Louis Philippe fled to England. On March 3rd Baden
obtained a constitution. From Germany revolution spread to
Austria and on March ijth Mettemich left Vienna. When this
news reached Milan the city rose and in the famous *Five Days'
of street fighting reduced the Austrian garrison of thirteen
thousand men to such a plight that on the 23rd Radetzky withdrew
his troops from the city. The next day Charles Albert declared war
on Austria, on the 26th his troops crossed the frontier and the first
war of Italian independence began. The news of the 'Five Days* of
Milan spread like wildfire over Italy. At Venice, Daniele Manin,
rescued from prison by the people, at once took command of the
situation and by a combination of audacity and determination seized
the arsenal and compelled the Austrians to evacuate the city, and the
Lion of S. Mark floated once again over the Republic of Venice.
The princelings at Parma and Modena fled for safety, and Pied-
montese troops arrived at Modena. It was the same at Florence
though the Grand-duke remained. Like Manin at Venice, Leonetto
Cipriani forced the weak hands of the government, volunteers were
enrolled, the University of Pisa, both students and staff, volunteering
almost to a man. Everywhere the Austrian arms were torn down.
In Rome and Naples tie organization of volunteers began and it
seemed as if all Italy was rising at the call of national independence
to a new greatness. In these first days it almost resembled a holy war,
with the Pope's *God bless Italy* ringing in every one's ears and the
belief that his liberalism extended to the declaration of war on Austria.
But volunteers are not like trained troops and enthusiasm is a poor
substitute in war for organization and discipline; Italy had many
bitter lessons yet to learn before she won her independence.
CHAPT ER FOUR
THE MILITARY OPERATIONS IN 1848
T "T THEN Charles Albert crossed the frontier at Pavia, he had with
VV him by his own account just over twenty-three thousand men.
This small number was due to the despatch of part of the regular army
to watch French movements on the western border and to the fact
that mobilization was not complete. At Lodi he learnt that Radetzky
had taken up a strong position at Montichiari behind the river Chiese.
This position he decided to outflank by advancing to Cremona and
ascending the Oglio, but Radetzky divined his intention and retired
behind the Mincio within the famous Quadrilateral The Sardinians
met no opposition until they reached this new position. A brilliant
little action gave them a bridgehead at Goito and a second at Mon-
zambano and Charles Albert took up his position on both banks of the
Mincio with the Austrians on the high ground beyond.
The ensuing campaign was fought out in an area represented by a
right-angled triangle. The point of the angle was the Austrian for-
tress of Peschiera at the extreme southern point of Lake Garda. From
here the river Mincio flows south past the villages of Salionze, Valeggio
and Goito to Mantua, a distance of about thirty miles. This was the
Austrian front. Eastwards from Peschiera ran the main road to Verona
twenty miles away, which was Radetzky 's headquarters. The hypo-
senuse of the triangle was the road running south-west from Verona
to Mantua. The Austrian position was exceedingly strong. Holding
the high ground rising from the river they overlooked the Sardinian
lines and at the same time could reinforce any point of their front
unseen by the enemy, while the two fortresses of Peschiera and
Mantua protected them from any turning movement. Radetzky *s
strategy was quite -simple : to remain strictly on the defensive until
such time as he had received enough reinforcements to take the
offensive. The position of Charles Albert was correspondingly
difficult. To make a successful frontal attack he needed enough men
to mask both Peschiera and Mantua to prevent an attack on his flanks.
For he could not advance and leave the strong garrisons of the two
fortresses to close in behind him. The same weakness made a wide
turning movement round Mantua impossible. He could not stand
58
The Military Operations in 1848 59
still, nor could he mass his men at one point without the risk of
uncovering Milan and Lombardy.
His first move was a reconnaissance in force towards Mantua which
only revealed that it was strongly held, that the Austrians had flooded
the marshes, and that the place was practically impregnable, except
by a long siege. A week later on April ipth a similar move was made
against Peschiera with the same discouraging result. It was then
decided to reduce Peschiera by siege. The siege train at Alessandria
was therefore sent for and in the meantime it became necessary to
drive off the Austrians covering Peschiera. This led to the first battle.
Charles Albert had by now received considerable reinforcements.
The regiments had been brought up to full strength by the arrival of
the reservists, and a force of some five thousand Tuscans and Moden-
ese had also reached him. Another body of about the same strength,
Lombard volunteers, was operating in the Tyrol and Roman levies
were on their way, but under orders to remain south of the Po. The
Tuscans were sent to the southern end of the front where they
entrenched themselves at Montanara and Curtatone opposite Mantua.
The Roman contingent, after long delay, passed through Venetia
and joined the local levies blocking the road for Austrian rein-
forcements by the valley of the Brenta.
On April soth Charles Albert attacked General D'Aspre at Pastren-
go. This position not only covered Peschiera but kept open the valley
of the Adige through which reinforcements could reach Radetzky
from Trent and Rovereto. The battle started late, as it was a Sunday
and the troops had to hear Mass. By four o'clock in the afternoon
D'Aspre was dislodged from the heights and his troops were retiring
in some disorder upon Verona. A vigorous pursuit might have dis-
located the whole Austrian front but the King showed his lack of
generalship by recalling his victorious army. In so doing he missed
the one real opportunity offered him. It was a victory but fruitless,
and brought the solution of driving out the Austrians no nearer. The
moral effect of the victory was, moreover, completely neutralized
by the Papal Allocution of April 29th in which the Pope declared the
impossibility of his making war on any Christian nation. It was a
great blow, for Italy had hoped to reincarnate in Pio Mono the
warrior spirit of old Julius II, and it was true, that however little lie
meant to do it, his words and actions had gready encouraged the
people to beat their ploughshares into swords. The Pope's attitude
was right and proper, for though he knew that he could not stop his
people from joining in the struggle, his position made it impossible
6o
The Evolution of Modern Italy
The Military Operations in 1848 61
for him to sanction it. The next day Charles Albert again attacked
the Austrians at Santa Lucia, but this rime things went wrong. The
staff work was defective. Orders did not arrive and the terrain
proved unexpectedly difficult, and although by the end of the day
the main objective was attained, the position could not be held and
the Sardinian troops withdrew.
The battle of Santa Lucia was forced on the King by political
pressure. The Ministers at Turin, now on the eve of the first general
election, wrote insistently on the need of a victory, and the letters
from the provisional government at Milan were in the same strain.
The truth was that the situation was completely misconceived in both
capitals. They were convinced that the Austrian army was utterly
disorganized and that all Charles Albert had to do was to round up
Radetzky's scattered forces and drive the remnants back into Austria.
The exaggerated accounts of the setback at Santa Lucia produced a
feeling of dismay, and a virulent campaign broke out in the demo-
cratic press against the army commanders and staff, which had the
worst effect upon the morale of the army. During the month of May
there was a lull in the fighting which was concentrated on the siege
of Peschiera. During this interval the strength of the Sardinians was
further weakened by the defection of the Neapolitan contingent.
Ferdinand had promised forty thousand men, reduced finally to
twelve thousand, but on May I5th there were fresh troubles at
Naples, the army sided with the King, the Constitution was swept
aside, and the troops sent to Lombardy were recalled. The general in
command, Pepe, resigned, half of the regiments either disbanded or
returned, but the rest, at the urgent prayer of the Milanese, rallied
round Pepe who eventually led diem to Venice where they were of
great value later during the siege.
Towards the end of May the fall of Peschiera, which was not pro-
visioned for a siege, was imminent, and Radetzky made an effort to
save it. With some thirteen thousand men he slipped out of Verona,
marched right across the Sardinian front undetected, and readied
Mantua. The next day he threw his whok force against the Tuscans
at Montanara and Curtatone. His aim was to roll up the Sardinian
right, draw the King's main forces south, then to provision Peschiera
and catch the King's army between two fires. The splendid defence
of the Tuscans saved the situation. They fought like veterans, the
students' battalion from the University of Pisa in particular showing
splendid skill and courage. Though their losses were severe, and
eventually they were compelled to retire upon Marcaria, they had
62 The Evolution of Modern Italy
given Charles Albert time to collect a force at Goito and forestall an
attack. The next day Radetzky marched on Goito. The battle lasted
all day until finally the Austrian* were compelled to fall back on
Mantua without achieving their purpose, for Pescliiera surrendered
the same day. The fall of Pescliiera and the battle of Goito proved the
high- water mark of Sardinian success. After two months of fighting
no decision had been reached by either side. Charles Albert had failed
to dislodge Radetzky, he had lost the Neapolitans and^ the Tuscans
who had to be withdrawn, his only gain was Peschiera, and the
Austrians had failed to crush Charles Albert at Goito. The war
seemed to be approaching a stalemate.
Ever since the opening of the struggle the conduct of the war had
been complicated by the political situation. The King left behind him a
completely inexperienced cabinet, in which only two ministers, those of
Finance and Public Works, had any political experience. The Premier,
Count Cesare Balbo, was best known as an historical writer; the
Foreign Secretary, the Marquis Pareto, was a democratic exalt* from
Genoa, and Count Ricci, Minister for Internal Affairs, ^ was of the
same colour. The electoral law was in course of preparation, and the
tone of the Chamber of Deputies, when elected, was, of course, an
unknown quantity. In the country generally, the complete defeat of
Austria was regarded as certain, and the absorbing topic was the new
'Kingdom of Upper Italy' to be founded when the last Austrian was
safely across the border. Moreover, France was now a republic
and so was Venice, and there was a noisy republican party in
Milan which from jealousy of Piedmont clamoured for Milanese self-
government as an autonomous state. Mazzini was there in April
urging republicanism, Gioberti followed him urging federalism,
while the Albertisti pressed for union with Piedmont During May
and June the question of fusion with Piedmont was put to the vote.
The duchies voted solidly in the affirmative, and to die general sur-
prise, Lombardy did the same. Finally, in the first week in July Venice
surrendered her republic and voted for union. Thus when the Pied-:
montese Chamber of Deputies met, all upper Italy was solid for union
under the House of Savoy. The one reservation, proposed by Milan
and accepted at Turin, was a Constituent Assembly to be sum-
moned after the victory to consider the revision of the Piedmontese
statute. This included the vexed question whether Turin or Milan
was to be the capital of the new state. All appeared happily settled,
when the one contingency overlooked, defeat in the field, material-
The Military Operations in 1848 63
ized* and the new kingdom suddenly vanished in the smoke and
flame of Custoza.
In spite of all their troubles at Vienna, the Austrian Government
had found reinforcements for Radetzky. Twenty thousand men
under Count Thurn were advancing through the valley of the Adige,
and another fifteen thousand under General Welden by the Brenta.
This information reached both sides, and Charles Albert planned to
seize Rivoli and block Count Thurn's advance, while Radetzky
decided to clear the road for Welden by attacking the Papal and
Lombard troops under General Durando at Vicenza. The Sardinians
seized Rivoli without much difficulty, and almost at the same rime,
Radetzky, with a greatly superior force, fell upon Durando. His
success was complete. After a three days* battle Durando surrendered
and Radetzky without wasting a moment hurried back to Verona,
leaving the road clear for Welden. He was just in time, for Charles
Albert had got word of his departure for Vicenza, and too late,
advanced upon Verona. These two actions seriously altered the
balance of forces. Charles Albert was weakened by the loss of ten
thousand men and Radetzky strengthened by the addition of fifteen
thousand, with another twenty thousand approaching from Rovereto;
a force strong enough to drive back the Sardinian left and render
it liable to a flank attack from Verona. The position of the King was
getting critical.
Charles Albert made war much as he governed. He used his
generals as his subordinates to carry out his plans, though no doubt
he consulted them when he thought it desirable. The danger inherent
in this mode of conducting war, was that if political matters distracted
the King, military operations came more or less to a standstill. This
happened now, just when Radetzky wanted a quiet time to plan Ms
offensive, now that his reinforcements had readied him and he had
superiority in numbers. For a month quiet reigned on the front,
while the King, absorbed with political business, waited for reinforce-
ments which never came, and die Austrians completed their prepara-
tions for a real offensive. The basic trouble was that both in Piedmont
and Lombardy every one was so utterly convinced of the approaching
defeat of the Austrians that instead of concentrating upon strengthen-
ing the army in the field, they gave themselves up to an orgy of
political planning in the construction and constitution of the new
Kingdom of Upper Italy, This was accentuated by what was happen-
ing in the higher ranks of the Powers, where England was working
with France for peace, chiefly on the basis of the surrender of Lorn-
64 The Evolution of Modern Italy
bardy, whereas at Turin they refused to consider it without the
acquisition" of Venetia as well.
*At Headquarters', wrote Delia Rocca, 'ambassadors, diplomats and
intermediaries, bringing advice or proposals for peace or mediation, were
perpetually coming and going. A deputation arrived from Sicily to offer
the crown to the Duke of Genoa, which was, however, rejected. Ministers
came from Turin to take orders and entreat that the war should be pushed
on rapidly. Parma, Piacenza and Modena sent deputations asking for help,
while the Lombard representatives insisted on immediate action/
After compelling Radetzky's withdrawal from Milan in the 'Five
Days', the Lombards did nothing. In the middle of June the King
wrote that there was not a Lombard soldier on the Mincio. The two
divisions they undertook to send to the front never materialized, all
they did was to urge the King to go on and win the final victory.
Political pressure of the same kind came incessantly from Turin. At
length, after planning a great advance into Venetia, promptly discarded
for lack of troops to hold the Mincio in his rear, Charles Albert fell
back on the hopeless task of besieging Mantua. By the middle of July
he had thirty thousand men round the city. This was almost half his
army. He had fifteen thousand at the northern end, stretching south
from Rivoli to Sommacampagna, and ten thousand in the centre
between Peschiera and Goito. Opposed to these twenty-five thousand,
Radetzky, with Welden's fifteen thousand, had at least double the
number of troops within a few miles of the front, without counting
the twenty thousand under Count Thurn coming south down the
Adige. Such was the disposition of the Bong's army when Radetzky
struck on July 22nd.
The five days of fighting which constituted the battle of Custoza
opened with an attack by Count Thurn on the Sardinian position at
Rivoli. This was successful. De Sonnaz was forced back across the
main road from Peschiera to Verona and took up his position at night-
fall on the high ground of Sommacampagna between the Mincio on
his left and the road from Verona to Mantua on his right. His new
position brought him within reach of a flank attack from Verona, and
the next day, heavily engaged both in front by Thurn and in flank by
Radetzky, Ke was driven first westwards from the high ground to the
shelter of Peschiera, and then southward beyond Valeggio, on the
Mincio north of Goito. The noise of battle as it came south reached
the King's headquarters at Marmirola, and realizing the seriousness of
die position, he broke up the siege of Mantua and leaving a containing
force, to prevent a sortie from the garrison in his rear, prepared to
The Military Operations in 1848 65
march north. His most obvious course was to follow the river road
to Golto, but unexpectedly he gave orders to take the north-east road
and to concentrate at Villafranca, halfway to Verona. The weather
was unbearably hot (98 degrees in the shade) and hundreds of men
fell out on the long road north but by evening the army was concen-
trated at Villafranca. The soundness of Charles Albert's strategy is
open to question. To have joined De Sonnaz at Goito would have
concentrated the full strength of the army and kept it in touch with
any available reserves and with supplies. It was what was expected*
by Radetzky, for his troops were now formed up across the river
facing south. On the othfer hand an attack from the east took the
Austrians in the flank and had the element of surprise. The army
rested the next day (24th) until 4 p.m. and then advanced to the
attack. The battle of Staffalo, as it has been called from a village on the
line of advance, was a complete success. The high ground was
captured and the Austrians driven back to the Mincio, two thousand
prisoners including fifty officers were taken and the army bivouacked
for the night in high spirits. Radetzky was now compelled to change
his front from south to east. It was a brilliant piece of staff work to
do this in a single night with an army of sixty thousand men. But
he had his share of luck. The Sardinian attack was timed for 4 a.m.
but the failure of the commissariat saved the Austrians from being
caught in the midst of a complicated manoeuvre and by the time the
Sardinians were ready to advance Radetzky's new front was securely
established.
The advance, however, never came; for the high hopes of victory
held the night before were sadly dashed when they realized the
strength of the enemy. In the absence of De Sonnaz and die covering
force left at Mantua, Charles Albert had probably no more than
twenty-five thousand men. Radetzky, with the addition of Thum,
must have had more than double that number. It was now the
Austrians who attacked and the Sardinians who defended. The grim
battle of Custoza, taking its name from another village in the vicinity,
raged all day under the July sun. The diversion for which the King
hoped, an attack by De Sonnaz on Valeggio, never came; his troops
were too exhausted. Despite their great numerical superiority, which
enabled Radetzky to withdraw his troops and rest them during the
fighting, the Austrians failed to dislodge the Sardinians from their
position. But as night fell their ammunition gave out and retreat
was inevitable, and they slowly withdrew. to Villafranca. The praise
66 The Evolution of Modem Italy
that Radetzky lavished on his troops is sufficient evidence of the
splendid courage of the defence.
Custoza was a defeat, but it was not yet a disaster. The next day,
taking his prisoners with him, the King took the cross road from
Villafranca and joined De Sonnaz at Goito. The addition ^of two
thousand prisoners, however, had exhausted the commissariat, and
the army arrived weary and famished. Here, for the first time,
discipline broke down. Ill news spreads apace and the rumours of
defeat arrived before the King, and at once the Milanese contractors
who supplied the army fled for safety, taking their stores with them,
and the hungry troops pillaged Goito for food, unearthing, happily,
large stores of pilfered supplies. To remain in Goito was impossible,
for the military situation of the army grew more dangerous hour by
hour. The neglect of De Sonnaz to garrison Volta and the failure of
the desperate effort to retake it, compelled the King to ask for an
armistice. But the terms included the handing over of the duchies,
and Charles Albert would not surrender those who had chosen him
as their King. The retreat continued. Two days later he was at
Cremona; an attempt to defend the line of the Adda was foiled by the
demoralization of some units who left their positions and retired on
Piacenza. This, in truth, was the only defensible position, and the one
which the staff expected to occupy, but the King thought otherwise.
A quixotic sense of loyalty to those who had chosen him, and the
hope of checking the full tide of Austrian vengeance, decided him
to attempt the defence of Milan.
Early on the morning of August 3rd the remains of his army,
twenty-five thousand out of what at one time was sixty thousand,
reached Milan and were disposed in a wide arc round the city. The
King himself would not enter Milan but took up his quarters at a
poor osteria, the San Giorgio, outside the walls. The next day the
Austrians attacked, concentrating on the Porta Romana near the
King's quarters. That evening the King moved to the Greppi palace
within the city. The grim events of these days came as a rade shock
to the complacency of the Milanese. In great haste a Committee of
Safety was appointed and vigorous steps taken, which should have
been taken months before. But the spirit of the 'Five Days' was no
longer in evidence. All who could had left the city and die call for
defence was utterly inadequate. Charles Albert and his staff toured
tie city and were convinced of the hopelessness of defending it. That
night at a Council of War it was decided to ask for terms and two
generals were despatched to die Austrian headquarters. In the morn-
The Military Operations in 1848 67
Ing they returned. Twenty-four hours were to be allowed for the
withdrawal of the army, forty-eight for all those who wished to leave
the city, the Porta Romana to be handed over on August 6th. These
terms were accepted. When news of the armistice reached the city,
where at last the citizens had begun to construct defences, there was
an angry cry of betrayal. A furious crowd rushed to the Palazzo
Greppi shouting death to Charles Albert, but were kept outside by
the national guard on duty. All day the King and his staff were
besieged. Deputations interviewed the King and bitter charges were
made on both sides, but at last reason prevailed and the Archbishop
and the Podesta were sent to Radetzky *s headquarters to try and get
better terms, but returned without success. The city had to accept its
fate. Late that night word reached the army of the King's plight and
the crowd disappeared like magic when the quick step of a company
of Bersaglieri was heard approaching. Two hours later the army left
Milan and within two days was on Piedmontese soil. The first war
of Italian Independence was over,
Charles Albert's conduct of the campaign has been very adversely
criticized. That he was not the equal of Radetzky as a general is
evident : except in courage, he led, however, an army inferior in nearly
every necessary quality. In staff work, in discipline and training, in
cohesion and power of manoeuvre, the Austrians were far superior.
Nor should we forget that while Radetzky had a free hand, and at
the critical period received large trained reinforcements, Charles
Albert was sorely hampered by political problems, additional troops
never materialized, and he was forced into premature action by the
pressure of political uncertainties. Ten years later Napoleon III, with
an army four times the size, after two resounding victories, when faced
with the same problem, made peace at ViHafranca rather than attempt
to force the Quadrilateral.
Thd rising of Italy in 1848 was no effort for unity, an aim which as
yet had but few supporters beyond the more far-seeing Mazzlnians.
It was a purely anti-Austrian movement, Charles Albert could never
have made Italy, for he would never have invaded the States of the
Church. There is a passage in his diary where he writes, *if once we
could obtain the duchy of Parma it would be less difficult to get
Modena. This is the constant aim of my policy for which I shall work
with perseverance and warmth*. The events of 1848 made Lombardy
a further possibility, and this, with the more remote prospect of
Venetia, comprised his entire ambition. To form this Kingdom of
Upper Italy, not to make Italy, was his one and only objective.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE AFTERMATH: 1849
THE blaze of enthusiasm which marked the opening of the first
war of independence had its source not only in hatred of Austria
but in the liberalism of Pio Mono. That a Pope should bless Italy and
wish her independent, should grant an amnesty and initiate reforms,
was so unexpected and untraditional that it lent an atmosphere almost
of benediction to the whole national effort. But with the Papal
Allocution of April 2pth and the subsequent defeat of Charles Albert
the spirit of the movement changed colour. We can now detect a
steady growth of the more extreme opinions, as happened in the early
phases of the French Revolution. Mazzini is behind it and summed
it up in the words, 'the war of the Kings is over, the war of the people
begins*. It is evident in Piedmont, Tuscany and the Papal States. Its
central idea is a Constituent Assembly and a Jilepublic, and it is
accompanied by a rising tendency to violence, animosity against the
rulers, and in some quarters a demand for the renewal of war with
Austria.
The Allocution had revealed the hopeless contradiction involved
in the dual personality of the Pope. As a temporal prince he could
arm the people through the medium of a Civic Guard, he could enroll
troops to keep order, who at need might shoot down his own subjects,
but as .the spiritual head of Catholicism he could not declare war
against any Christian nation. Equally anomalous was the relation
between the Pope and his government. All the government proposals
had to pass through the sieve of the College of Cardinals before the
final sanction of the Pope permitted their translation into laws. There
were two foreign secretaries, one dealing with the spiritual and the
other with the temporal aspects of the problems arising with other
countries, and the Pope's insistence that he must have 'absolute free-
dom of action that there may be no obstacle to carrying out what he
believed to be in the interest of religion and the state* hampered the
ministry at every turn. 11 Under such peculiar conditions govern-
ments were unlikely to have a long existence. The first ministry under
Count Mamiani, an exile of 183 1, resigned in the middle of July, after
ten weeks of perpetual friction with the Papal authorities. On August
3rd Count Odoardo Fabbri succeeded him the day the Austrians
68
The Aftermath: i$<f$ 69
occupied Ferrata. The people clamoured for war but the Pope merely
protested, without result. A week later, General Welden tried to do the
same at Bologna, again the Pope protested, but this time the people
of Bologna took up arms, and after a sharp action drove the Austrians
from the city. On August 26th Parliament was prorogued until
November isth and shortly afterwards Count Fabbri resigned to
make way for Pellegrino Rossi.
Few men could have been chosen better equipped to bring order
and decent government into the States of the Church than Count
Rossi. An Italian by birth, a convinced liberal, a man of wide political
knowledge and experience, an economist and financier, who had held
chairs at Geneva and the Sorboime, and a peer of France, he had been
sent to Rome two years before as French ambassador and political
and financial adviser to the Pope. He threw himself into his new task
with all his power, preparing a whole series of measures on railways
and telegraphs, army and police reform, to be submitted to Parliament
when it reassembled. He was working too on a scheme of federation
between Rome, Turin and Florence, a counter project to that of
Gioberti at Turin, whose representative, the philosopher Rosmini,
was already in Rome with proposals of a like kind. But Rossi was
not popular. He was, perhaps, too much of a doctrinaire; too
superior, too efficient, and too cold, to appeal to the Romans, and
one suspects he lacked a sense of humour. That he somehow
offended all classes and failed to win the support of any, is unfor-
tunately true. Especially was this the case with the extreme democrats,
the members of the Circolo Romano, to whom Rossi's attitude to-
wards war with Austria, which he discouraged, regarding it as hope-
less, was a bitter cause of offence. What Rossi might have done for
Italy is, however, an idle conjecture, for on November isth as he
ascended the steps to open the first sitting of the new Chamber he was
stabbed to death by an unknown hand. The indifference shown by
the members of the Chamber of Deputies at this foul and foolish
deed, and the open satisfaction, even rejoicing, displayed by the
populace, is evidence enough of the moral condition and the political
sagacity of the Roman people.
With the death of Rossi the extreme parties redoubled their efforts
to get control of the government. On the i6th a crowd headed by
the members of the Circolo Popolare assembled at the Quirmale
demanding the promulgation of Italian nationality, convocation of a
Constituent Assembly, war with Austria and a government including
Galletti, Sterbini and Saliceti, all extremists and anathema to the Pope.
yo The Evolution of Modern Italy
The day following a more threatening crowd assembled; attempts
were made, the French Minister d'Harcourt wrote to Paris, to set fire
to the palace, but it was frustrated by the Swiss Guard who arrested
the ringleaders. Finally the Pope yielded, and a new Ministry of which
GaUetti and Sterbini were the dominant members came into power.
A week later on November 24th Pius, in disguise as a simple priest,
left Rome in the carriage of Count Spaur and sought peace and safety
at Gaeta in the Kingdom of Naples. Thus the year 1848 in the States
of the Church closed with the abandonment of Rome by the Pope,
the collapse of the moderate or reformist party and the assumption
of power by the extremists, in whose programme a Constituent
Assembly, a Republican form of government, and war with Austria
were the avowed objectives.
During this period a parallel movement was developing both in
Tuscany and in Piedmont. At Florence the news of Custoza led to
the fall of the weak Ridolfi Ministry, which was followed by that of
Gino Capponi, who promised more energetic measures of defence
and the upholding of national independence. But in Tuscany as in
the Roman States it was the extremists who were the active force,
and it was not Florence but the radical city of Leghorn which was
shaping the policy of the state. Dominated by the turbulent poet-
politician Domenico Guerrazzi, the city broke into revolt and the
attempt of Cipriani to master it with a force of two thousand men
only made matters worse. The arrival, however, of a popular hero
in Montanelli, a second poet-politician, who had been wounded at
Curtatone and taken prisoner by the Austrians, restored order. His
advocacy of the need for a Constituent Assembly added a new
demand from the Circolo politico del Popolo and threw fresh diffi-
culties in the path of the Ministry, and in October Capponi resigned.
There was at once a popular demand for a democratic government
and after a fortnight of indecision the Grand-duke, like the Pope,
yielded. At the end of October Montanelli was called to the Presi-
dency of the Council with Guerrazzi beside him as Minister for
Internal Affairs, and a programme embracing a Constituent Assembly
and political union with the ideals of Rome. A general election
followed Capponf s fall and the new Parliament was called for January
10, 1849.
The course of events in Piedmont followed the same general lines
but the problems were more complicated. When the news of Custoza
arrived, the new Ministry, which had been designed as representative
of the 'Kingdom of Upper Italy' with Count Casati, President of the
The Aftermath: 1849 7*
Provisional Government at Milan as Premier, at once resigned. Before
doing so, however, they appealed urgently to the Ministers of France
and England at Turin for immediate mediation, and at the same rime
sent Count Ricci to Paris to approach the government for the loan of
a general and twenty-five thousand troops, to take command of the
Sardinian army and repair its losses. On the return of the army to
Piedmont Count Casati and the Abb^ Gioberti hastened to the King's
headquarters at Vigevano and having informed him of the steps
already taken, begged him not to prolong the armistice but to prepare
for a renewal of the straggle, assuring him of the speedy arrival of a
French army. To this the King, painfully aware of the real condition
of his troops, returned a definite refusal, and sent his Chief of Staff,
General Salasco, to make terms with Radetzky. These included the
recall of the fleet from Venice and the withdrawal of all troops from
the duchies. The prompt mediation of England and France, however,
saved Piedmont from invasion and her soil remained free from
Austrian occupation. These terms were certainly not unduly severe,
but when they were known there was a furious outbreak in the press,
which stigmatized them as unacceptable and dishonourable, for it was
held that the vote of the duchies and of Lombardy-Venetia for union
with Piedmont constituted a dejure right to the establishment of the
Kingdom of Upper Italy, regardless of the fact that Austria was in
possession. Their army had been beaten, not the spirit of the people,
and they clung to their moral right to Italian independence with a
tenacity which, in spite of defeat, in the end convinced Europe and
led to victory. As to the French army which never arrived, it was
England's determination to prevent French interference in Italy,
backed by the general state of France herself, that accounted for its
failure to appear.
Charles Albert had now to appoint a new Premier. Public opinion
pointed strongly to Gioberti, but the King, who had no fancy for an
ex-priest as his Prime Minister, turned to a tried servant of the State
and invited Count Revel to form a government. He accepted on
two conditions, that there must be a strict inquiry into the conduct
of the campaign and that the King must submit to the appointment
of another commander-in-chief. Charles Albert acquiesced, mdwhat
is known as the Revel-Pinelli Ministry took office. The new Minister
for War, General Dabormida, however, refused to gratify die demo-
cratic thirst for a holocaust of generals. Changes were made,
some were retired, but the morale of the army was maintained
as far as possible, and there was no public inquiry. The attitude
72 The Evolution of Modern Italy
of the King, revealed in a letter to the Minister for War, was worthy
of his position. After remarking that in his opinion such an inquiry
would have been both impolitic and revolutionary, and productive
only of discontent and indiscipline, he added
besides this measure would have had no serious consequences for the
officers attacked, for I beg you to believe, that I have enough courage to
have assumed the entire responsibility and faced the inevitable unpopu-
larity: for I should indubitably have covered them with my name and my
orders: then, after such an insult, I should have abdicated the crown, which
I only still wear from a sense of devotion to my country at this critical
time.
As to the French general, those approached revealed a strange reluct-
ance to assume the task of reorganizing the Piedmontese army and
attacking the victorious Radetzky and the idea was given up.
In the first shock of defeat parties had disappeared and all classes had
united to save the country. When that stage was passed and the
expected invasion did not take place, the old divisions reappeared.
Gioberti had not hitherto identified himself with any party, but now,
wounded in his self-esteem by the King's selection of Revel instead
of himself, he joined the extreme democratic section and in the
Circolo Politico Nazionale at Turin, for Piedmont had its democratic
'circles' as well as Rome and Florence, he thundered against the new
Ministry, demanding a general election at which he hoped to be borne
to victory and the premiership. The country was rapidly splitting
up into two parties, for and against a renewal of the war, but everything
depended on the outcome of the Anglo-French mediation. England
urged the complete withdrawal of Austria, but the creation of a
strong northern Italian Kingdom was by no means desired by France,
and the hope of any satisfactory solution gradually faded. The revolt
of Hungary the first week of October followed by a fresh outbreak
at Vienna and the flight of the Court to Olmutz, gave a fresh impetus
to the war party in Piedmont, and when the Chambers met in the
second week in October the Left demanded a full-dress debate on the
policy of the government. Their motion for immediate war was,
however, lost, and had not the Ministry foolishly demanded the
appointment of a committee to report on its policy it might have
weathered the storm. But the report when it came was virtually a
vote of censure and its position was so shaken that before long
resignation became inevitable.
In the meantime Austria recovered. Before the close of October
Prince Windischgratz crushed the revolt in Vienna and in Prince
The Aftermath: 184$ 73
Felix Schwarzenberg Austria found the strong man she needed. His
announcement that not a foot of imperial soil would be surrendered
nullified the Anglo-French mediation, and faced with the alternative
of signing a humiliating peace or breaking the armistice, and possibly
a second Custoza, the Ministry resigned. The King had no alter-
native but to summon Gioberti, and with him came the
Circolo Nazionale, pledged to a renewal of the struggle; and thus*
as in Rome and Florence, the close of 1848 saw power in the
hands of the men of the Left, the democrats, whose creed was war
with. Austria with a Constituent Assembly and republicanism in the
background.
Although there were now democratic governments alike in Rome,
Turin and Florence, in none of them was there unanimity of opinion,
nor was there any common policy between them. Rome was divided
into constitutionalists such as Mamiani, who desired the return of the
Pope and the maintenance of the existing constitution, and democrats
such as Galletti and S terbini, who looked first for a Constituent Assembly
and then a republic. The scope of 'the Constituent' was in itself divided,
for some wanted a 'Roman* , limiting its action to the Papal States,
and some wanted an 'Italian', which meant legislating for Italy. More-
over, the Italian* was differently interpreted, some meaning a federal
pact which would leave the individual states free to adopt their own
form of government, others that it meant imposing a republic on all
members of the constituent body. On these points the circles met
all over the Papal States, some supporting a Roman, others an Italian
'Constituent'. Finally on December 29th a decree was issued by the
government for the convocation on February 5th of the assembly of
Roman States with full powers, and the ambiguity as to its scope was
cleared up a fortnight later when it was announced that it would be
Italian, not merely Roman. To this the Pope replied on January ist
with an edict which stigmatized the 'so-called general national
assembly of the Roman State* as a 'monstrous act of masked treason
. . . abominable alike for the absurdity of its origin no less than the
illegality of its form and the impiety of its aims* and forbade his sub-
jects to vote at the elections. We gather some idea of the bitterness
of the feeling at Rome when we read that on January yth a demonstra-
tion organized by Ciceruacchio, carrying torches and chanting tfae
De profundis and the Miserere, solemnly consigned the Papal protest
to the public latrines.
A parallel movement was taking place in Florence. On January
loth the new democratic parliament led by Montanelli and Guer-
74 The Evolution of Modern Italy
razzi was opened. The former presented to the Grand-duke the
decree for a Constituent Assembly and the Inauguration of a federal
pact, which while 'respecting the existence of the separate states and
leaving their forms upaltered' would "strengthen and assure the
liberty, union and absolute independence of Italy'. The Prince
consulted Guerrazzi who advised him to accept it as 'a guarantee
to Piedmont in case of victory and as a useful instrument in
case of defeat', adding, that it would be a safeguard against republican
impetuosity. With some misgiving the Grand-duke signed it on
January 2ist. The next day it was presented to Parliament and was
accepted and passed by both Chambers. Thirty-seven deputies were
to be sent to represent Tuscany in the Roman Constituent Assembly,
elected by universal suffrage. But on the 3Oth the Grand-duke com-
mitted the same mistake as the Pope and left Florence for Siena,
from where, before leaving to join Pius at Gaeta, he wrote to the
President of the Council that 'as it is now proposed to expose me
and my state to the greatest dangers, that is, to force both myself and
many good Tuscans to suffer the censures and denunciations of the
Church, I must refuse to adhere to the law, which I do with a tranquil
conscience'.
The withdrawal from their states of the Pope and Grand-duke was
an error, for not only did it show a lack of courage but it put an
effective weapon in the hands of the extremists. At Rome, the
Constituent Assembly met on February 5th in the Palace of the
Cancelleria, after hearing Mass at the Church of Aracoeli as was
customary. On the pth, after two days of debate, by a majority of 13 1
to 5, the motion of the deputy Filopanti was passed, which read:
The temporal Power of the Pope has fallen in fact and in law: all neces-
sary guarantees for independence in the exercise of his spiritual power
will be provided : the form of government is a pure democracy with the
glorious tide of the Roman Republic.
That evening the Republic was proclaimed in the city, followed the
next day by a Te Deum. When the events in Rome were known, the
Pope at once appealed to the Catholic Powers for armed intervention
to restore him to Rome and free the States of the Church from 'the
faction ofmiserabili that exercise there the most atrocious despotism
and every sort of crime*. The union of Tuscany with Rome,
however, did not materialize. The withdrawal of the grand-ducal
assent complicated matters, and Guerrazzi was anxious to postpone
it. Mazzini came and harangued the crowd, urging the formal
The Aftermath: 1849 75
declaration of the republic and immediate union with Rome, but it
still hung fire. The government was meeting much opposition. Many
supporters of Leopold had followed him into exile. The country
districts dreaded war and favoured their Prince. The troops were
unreliable. The whole country was in a state of utter confusion and
rapidly getting out of hand, and when in March came the news of
Charles Albert's defeat at Novara, all idea of union with Rome
vanished.
In Piedmont die democratic movement was neither so violent nor
so subversive as in Rome and Tuscany, for the country was content
with its constitution and loyal to the House of Savoy. Gioberti, how-
ever, made a mistake in identifying himself with the Circolo Nazionale.
Had he stood aloof, he might have formed a coalition govern-
ment from all parties; as it was, he had to form his Cabinet from
among the extremists. He made another mistake in immediately
dissolving the chamber which had brought him to power, for
the new one, when it met on February ist, proved more radical
than its predecessor. Gioberti took the portfolio of Foreign Affairs.
He had a definite policy of his own. Though he expected war with
Austria he hoped that before it broke out he would have concluded a
real alliance with Rome and Tuscany. That was his first aim; his
second was to prevent the restoration of the Pope to Rome by a
foreign power: he wanted to make it an Italian not a Catholic ques-
tion, and he hoped that the kudos for bringing back the Pope would
fall to Piedmont. A vain and self-centred person, with an immense
confidence in Ms own ability, Gioberti consulted no one. Neither
the King nor the Cabinet was aware of his diplomacy and this proved
the cause of his fall.
In pursuance of this policy, realizing that the Powers would never
allow a republic either at Florence or Rome, Gioberti first approached
the Pope, offering him an asylum in Piedmont or sufficient troops to
restore him to Rome. But Pius refused. He had lost all confidence in
Italian governments and was resolved to appeal to the Catholic
Powers, which he did. Then Gioberti approached the Romans,
trying to find a common ground for reconciliation with the Pope,
but they were bent on a republic. He then considered force, and
thought of landing troops at Ancona, but the King forbade it. Finally,
he asked Papal permission to send troops to Rome but Pius replied that
if he gave his consent to such action to Piedmont he must also give it
to Austria. Failing at Rome, Gioberti tried the same methods at
Florence, but Ferdinand likewise refused, for Piedmontese policy
76 The Evolution of Modern Italy
was viewed with deep suspicion. She was generally regarded as a
greedy, ambitious little country eager to dominate Italy, and not to
be trusted. But when Leopold abandoned Tuscany and the situation
grew more and more disturbed, Gioberti decided on armed interven-
tion. He collected a force of some nine thousand men under General
La Marmora at Sarzana on the Tuscan border, destined, when the
moment came, to restore order, organize the Tuscan forces, and
in case of war with Austria to be prepared to attack Lombardy
from the south. Such was the state of things when the Chambers met
on the first of February.
The previous day, news had reached Turin that ^ the Constituent
Assembly at Rome was to be Italian' and not 'Roman', and the Circolo
Nazionale had at once sent a deputation to Gioberti to nominate
delegates to represent Piedmont. To their utter surprise Gioberti
absolutely refused, on the ground that a federative system should
leave each of its components full liberty as to their own form of
government, whereas Rome intended to impose republicanism on all
the Italian States. The next day in the Chamber, the Left taxed the
Premier with splitting Italian unity, but the Right supported him,
and he retained the confidence of the Chamber. When his
attitude was known at Rome he was at once deprived of his
Presidency of the Circolo Popolare, the erasure of his name by the
committee being accompanied by the typical rhetorical imprecation,
'May the curse of infamy rest upon this wicked man who armed his
country for fratricidal war', a sentiment uttered 'with groaning heart'.
But it was the resignation of General La Marmora from his post as
Minister for War, to take command of the troops at Sarzana, which
proved Gioberti's undoing. Questions were asked in the Chamber
and the whole design to occupy Tuscany by force was revealed.
Neither the King nor the Cabinet were in the secret and Gioberti
found his most intimate colleagues in furious opposition to his policy.
Charged with sending Italians to fight Italians, his position became
untenable and he offered his resignation, thorjh firmly convinced
that the King would not accept it, so indispensable did he believe
himself to be. Charles Albert, however, was of another opinion, and
his resignation was, to his surprise and annoyance, accepted. The new
Premier, General Chiodo, was a mere figurehead, the real power being
in the hands of Urbano Rattazzi and his colleagues of the Circolo
Nazionale, whose policy was the repudiation of the armistice and war.
Whilst Gioberti in the secrecy of the Foreign Office had been
carrying out his personal policy, the rest of the Cabinet had been
The Aftermath: 1X4$ 77
steadily engaged on 'democratizing' the fabric of government and
the army. Each Minister arrived with a queue of 'aspiranti* behind
him, for whom places had to be found, and the civil service was
thrown into disorder. Their most thorough work, however, was
the new army. As a new commander-in-chief had to be found also,
the King, on the recommendation of a Polish officer attached to the
army, invited General Chrzanowsky, known as a military writer
rather than a commander in the field, to take over the post of chief
of staff, General Bava in the meanwhile being appointed commander-
in-chief. This arrangement did not last long for General Bava was
foolish enough to publish an account of lie recent campaign in
which his criticisms of the other commanding officers was so severe
and in such bad taste that he was removed and replaced by Chrza-
nowsky. According to the Minister Tecchio, speaking in the Chamber
for the Minister for War, the army was doubled in numbers and
flourishing, burning with thirst for revenge and destined 'not to stand
still but to go forward; not to sicken in the marshes of Mantua but to
pluck the laurels warmed by the Italian sun*. A very different picture
of the reality, from the military point of view, caine from the Duke
of Savoy, in command of his division at Casale, in which the lack
of discipline, the want of training of the new officers, and the
general tone of the troops was bitterly criticized. Confidence between
the men ancl their officers had been weakened, politics had been
introduced among the rank and file, and too often indiscipline was
condoned. The democratic principles did not work well for the
cohesion and fighting value of the new army. 12
The situation of the country was in truth becoming desperate. The
failure of mediation brought the government face to face with a peace
dictated by Austria. The cost of the army was exhausting the
resources of the Treasury. Piedmont too was full of refugees from
Milan and elsewhere, and the stories reaching them of the treatment
of the Lombards by the Austrians was rousing a feeling of such
exasperation that the desperate chances of war seemed the less
of two evils. At the end of February the Ministry decided to
denounce the armistice, which ended on March I2tk The King
presided at the final Cabinet meeting and the next day left Turin
for army headquarters, while Rattazsd informed ParKament of the
government's decision. A state of war was to begin on March 2ist.
Charles Albert nominally took the supreme command, while
Chrzanowsky, for whom the rank of 'General-Major' was devised,
was the commander in the field.
The Evolution of Modern Italy
THE CAMPAIGN OF NOVARA
The Aftermath: 1849 79
The campaign of Novara was one of the shortest and most decisive
in history, for it occupied only six days. War was declared on March
zoth and on the 26th Charles Albert was beaten and surrendered. The
Austrian army was in high fettle. Cheers and massed bands greeted
the announcement of war. Everything was ready. During the last
days of peace Radetzky concentrated his whole force at Pavia on the
southern extremity of Piedmontese territory where the Ticino joined
the river Po. From here it was possible to invade Piedmont by two
roads; the main road, which ran north-west from Pavia to Mortara,
or by crossing below the junction, on Lombard territory, to take
that which ran west on the southern bank by Tortona to Alessandria.
The Austrian dispositions were completely unknown to Chrzanowsky.
Opposite Radetzky he placed the weakest division of the army under
the worst of his commanders, his compatriot Ramorino, the hero of
Mazzini's attempt on Savoy in 1834, lauded by the democrats as a
great general. His orders were to hold the strong position of La Cava
in the angle of the two rivers, and if attacked, to send word at once to
headquarters for support. His force numbered only six thousand men.
But on the night of the ipth Ramorino withdrew his main force to
the southern bank of the Po by the bridge at Mezzanacorte, leaving
only a feeble detachment under Colonel Manara at La Cava, ls The
intention of Chrzanowsky was apparently to march directly on Milan
by the main road from Novara, which crossed the Ticino by the only
permanent bridge north of Pavia, at Boffalora, expecting no doubt
to find his path barred by the main Austrian army. When the armis-
tice ended, Radetzky crossed the Ticino at Pavia, brushed aside the
small force at La Cava, isolated Ramorino by destroying the bridge
crossing the Po at Mezzanacorte, and marched on Mortara, held by
the reserve division under the Duke of Savoy. Chrzanowsky crossed
at Boffalora, marched east as far as Magenta, unopposed, and then
marched back again to await news of the Austrians. Uncertain as to
the Piedmontese positions, Radetzky detached a force under Stxa&-
soldo to explore the area on Ms right flank. Strassoldo made contact
with the Piedmontese at Sforzesca and held them all day whilst
Radetzky marched on Mortara behind him. In the evening the
Austrian main force fell on the Duke and drove him back in the
gathering darkness into Mortara, where a desperate action was fought
through the night, until at dawn the Duke disentangled his division
and regrouped it behind the town. When information arrived of
the disaster at Mortara a council of war was held. The King and
Chrzanowsky advocated a dawn attack on Mortara by all available
8o The Evolution of Modern Italy
forces, but it was overruled by the generals who were insistent that
the morale of the troops was unequal to such a desperate attempt,
and it was decided to fall back on Novara for a final struggle.
Thb next day the army retired on Novara and took up position. The
following morning the Austrians attacked. The battle raged all day,
but Radetzky had the last reserves; the Piedmontese left gave way,
dragging the centre with it, and the battle was lost. There was now
no alternative to surrender and General Cossato and the Minister
Cadorna, attached to the army, were sent to ask terms from Radetzky.
These included the occupation of Alessandria and Novara and the
surrender of the person of the Duke of Savoy as a hostage for the
fulfilment of the Austrian terms. To such humiliation Charles Albert
would not yield. The council of war was adjourned: two hours later
it again assembled and the King for the last time addressed his generals.
*To the cause of Italy,' he said, *my life has been dedicated. For that I
have risked my throne, my life and that of my sons. I have not succeeded.
I recognize that my person is the one obstacle to peace. Since to-day I have
failed to find death on the battlefield, I make my last sacrifice for my
country, I lay down my crown and abdicate in favour of my son, the Duke
of Savoy.'
That same night Charles Albert, accompanied by only two attendants,
left Novara. He was stopped by an Austrian picket on the Vercelli
road and conducted to Count Thurn's headquarters, the one Austrian
commander who had never seen him. He was not recognized and as
the Count de Barge he was permitted to pass through the Austrian
lines. Without returning to Turin he traversed Piedmont and south-
ern France, crossed into Spain and travelled on to Oporto. Here he
lived four months in complete seclusion and died on July 28th. 14
The victory of Novara removed the only real obstacle to an Austrian
re-conquest of Italy. Venice was under blockade and the recall of the
Piedmontese fleet rendered it at last effective: There remained
Tuscany and Rome. The condition of Tuscany was one of utter
political and social confusion. There were three parties, and GuerrazzL
The Republicans, who even after Novara clung to union with Rome
and a republic; they were, however, the least important party. The
Legitimists, who wanted the return of the Grand-duke, preferably
without, but even with, the Austrians; finally the Constitutionalists,
who wanted the Grand-duke to return but dreaded an Austrian occupa-
tion above anything, and who hoped that Leopold would trust his
subjects and return without them. As to Guerrazzi, he would have
liked an autonomous state without the Grand-duke, who, better
The Aftermath: 184$ 81
informed than others, he knew to have been intriguing with Vienna.
But Guerrazzi would not commit himself. He detested the Austrians
and knew what his fate would be at their hands, but he could not rouse
the people to self defence nor stop their demands for the return of
Leopold, and his attitude was without decision. The conduct of the
Grand-duke was typical as an Archduke of Austria, but despicable as
an Italian sovereign. Dreading the loss of his little throne, he wrote
humbly to the Emperor, the young Franz Joseph, begging for Austrian
troops to replace him safely in the Palazzo Pitti. The Emperor's reply
was cold, and certain reputed remarks of Prince Schwarzenberg
about the necessity of removing him, added to his fears. He was,
however, forgiven and put in touch with Marshal Radetzky,
with whom he arranged for the occupation of his states by Austrian
troops. All this he concealed from his subjects.
On April nth matters came to a head. The presence in Florence
of a body of undisciplined troops from Leghorn resulted in a riot.
The next day the Municipality at last took action. Co-opting five
leaders of the Constitutional party including Gino Capponi, Bettino
Ricasoli and Luigi Serristori, they suppressed the assembly, nullified
its acts, dismissed the extraordinary tribunals and declared the Grand-
duke re-established in power. Guerrazzi was arrested and imprisoned,
and a deputation sent to Gaeta to ask Leopold to return. After keeping
the deputation waiting for a week, Leopold accepted, and on May ist
nominated Count Luigi Serristori as his commissary with absolute
powers, to restore order and to prepare for the restoration of the
constitutional regime as previously established. On the 5th of
May the Austrians occupied Lucca, after garrisoning Parma, Modena
and Pontremoli. On the loth they reached Leghorn. In a blaze
of fory the populace, without leaders or organization, fought to stop
their entry, and it was not until the next day that they forced their
way into the city. It was the last protest of Tuscany. On the 25th
they occupied Florence without resistance. Leopold returned on
July 28th, His return under Austrian protection was never forgotten.
He regained his throne but he lost the respect of his people; and ten
years later it was one of those same constitutionalists, Bettino Ricasoli,
whose support in 1849 restored him who declared his deposition.
The restoration of the Pope was a question of European interest
but primarily to the Catholic Powers. The first to move in the
matter was Spain, who as early as December 1848 in a circular
note to the Powers from the Foreign Secretary, the Marquis Pidal,
had proposed a congress. The proposal met with general accept-
82 The Evolution of Modern Italy
ance except at Turin, where Gioberti at once replied that it was
an Italian not a Catholic question and should be dealt with by the
Italian people. Gioberti's views found support both in London and
Paris where both governments were anxious for a peaceful solu-
tion and held that if force was necessary it should be provided
by Italy. France then proposed a conference of the Catholic Powers
at Gaeta, whose representatives should determine not only the
means by which the Pope should be restored to his capital, but
also the basis of a stable form of government which would prevent
the renewal of the old abuses. Austria, though with obvious re-
luctance, accepted the French proposal, and on March soth the
conference met under the Presidency of Cardinal Antonelli, France,
Austria, Spain and Naples each sending a delegate. It at once became
clear that no support was forthcoming for the French point of view.
Neither the Pope nor any other Catholic Power would hear of any-
thing else except unconditional restoration. All alike regarded a
peaceful solution as impossible and narrowed down the question
to what number of troops would be required and who should supply
them. Austria alone was prepared to provide the thirty thousand
which Antonelli suggested would be necessary. The restoration of the,
Pope without conditions, by Austrian arms, France would not permit,
and while the delegates continued their discussions at Gaeta, the
government at Paris decided on action. The position was very deli-
cate, for while French Catholic sentiment demanded the Papal
restoration, republican sentiment was opposed to the suppression by
French arms of the sister-republic at Rome. The solution devised in
this difficult state of feeling was the immediate despatch of ten
thousand men under General Oudinot to occupy Civitavecchia.
From there he was to occupy Rome, if possible without conflict, and
to restore the Papal authority without suppressing the republican
government. In the presence of a 'friendly' French army it was hoped
that a via media between Papal reaction and republican government
would be found without recourse to violence. It was believed that
the French would be received with open arms, that the republican
forces would at once disintegrate, and that the Pope, grateful for
restoration, would return to die ingenuous liberalism of 1846; all of
which were illusions. On April 25th General Oudinot disembarked
at Civitavecchia, advancing on Rome during the following days.
Serious opposition was not expected and Rome, it was anticipated,
would be in French hands by May 4th.
The lights of liberty in Italy were going out one by one. Piedmont
The Aftermath: 1849 83
was crashed, Venice blockaded. Ferdinand II had wreaked Ms ven-
geance on Sicily and she too lay under the triumphant bayonets of
reaction. Austria ruled in Parma, Modena and Tuscany. Only Rome
was left. But the fate of the Eternal City was no longer in the hands
of men of the calibre of Carlo Bonaparte and Sterbini, but of two
men whose love of liberty and Italy was dearer than life, Mazzini
and Garibaldi, and under their inspiration Rome rose to greatness.
The military position was wellnigh hopeless. Four armies were
converging on the city, for Spain had landed five thousand men
under Fernandez de Cordova at Gaeta who, blessed by the Pope, were
marching on Albano. Naples, with sixteen thousand under the King,
crossed the border towards Velletri; Austria after a hard fight
had subdued Bologna and was moving on Ancona, and Oudinot
approached from Civitavecchia. Yet Rome decided to resist. The
last of the Roman Republics would go down, but at least it would
go down fighting.
On the last day of April Oudinot attempted to force his way into
Rome, only to be soundly beaten by Garibaldi and forced to retire to
Civitavecchia, from where he urgently demanded from the govern-
ment large reinforcements. This required time, and while the
French representative at Gaeta, the Duke d'Harcourt, pressed Cardinal
Antonelli for a Papal proclamation of the terms of his future govern-
ment, which might bridge over the chasm that divided republicans
from papalists, a new agent, De Lesseps, was sent to Rome, professedly
to try once more to make a friendly settlement for the entry of the
French army into the city. But De Lesseps was being used as a
catspaw, for the real object was to gain time. The military honour of
France had been compromised, and defeat must be wiped out in
victory. De Lesseps was well received in Rome and after two
proposals had been rejected he was at last successful, but the terms
agreed upon exceeded his instructions and would never have been rati-
fied in Paris, and he was at once recalled, and the army now being heavily
reinforced, Oudinot Ignored De Lesseps and again marched on Rome.
With his army raised to thirty thousand men and a full com-
plement of sappers, scaling ladders and siege guns, Oudinot opened
his attack on Rome on June 3rd. From the first the city was doomed,
but the Romans put a desperate defence, foil of heroic exploits which
have passed into history, and a month was required before the
position of the defenders became hopeless. Early on July ist, while
Mazzini in the Assembly still urged with all his eloquence resistance
at any cost, Garibaldi, haggard and battle-stained from the desperate
84 The Evolution of Modem Italy
straggle of the previous night, arrived and bluntly told the deputies
that defence was no longer possible. The next day Garibaldi left
Rome with some five thousand of the remaining troops on his great
retreat across Italy to Ravenna. Pursued by four armies, his little
force, defying capture, melted away amongst the Apennines and
he himself, after hairbreadth escapes, at last found safety in Tuscany,
guided in the final stage of his journey by a patriotic priest, Don
Giovanni Vend. The next day Oudinot marched through the silent
streets of Rome, dissolved the Assembly, and sent the keys of the
city to be laid at the feet of the Pope, A Junta of Cardinals arrived
in due course to rule the city under the bayonets of France until such
time as His Holiness thought fit to return. Alone amid her lagoons
Venice still held out some weeks longer, but in August she too was
forced to surrender, and all Italy lay prostrate under Austria and
triumphant reaction.
Despite the wave of unjustified optimism, not only in Italy but in
England, and the corresponding pessimism in Austria, which alike
had anticipated an Italian victory and the expulsion of the Austrians
from Lombardy-Venetia, the defeat of Italy in 1848 was to be
expected. When we discount the extravagant hopes, the flood of
patriotic rhetoric, the ignorance of war and the complete failure to
grasp the military realities of the position, and look at the actual
situation, no other outcome was likely; unless Radetzky committed
a bad blunder or Charles Albert revealed military genius, neither of
which took place. For what the Sardinian army was so hopefully
expected to do, was to force one of the strongest defensive positions
in Europe, in the face of an army as numerous and far better trained
than their own, perfectly familiar with the terrain, and commanded
by an experienced general, who, as a divisional commander at Wagram
and chief of staff at Leipsic, had probably forgotten more about war
than Charles Albert ever knew. Outnumbered and outgeneraled,
Charles Albert was defeated, and after Custoza the war was won. But
the Sardinian troops fought splendidly and upheld their reputation,
as did the Tuscan levies at Curtatone, and Garibaldi's little army in the
defence of Rome, and the Venetians in the defence of their city.
Those who did fight, fought well, but they were not enough.
The significance of Italy's effort in 1848-1849 is not, however, to be
judged only by the adverse military decision, for it revealed both the
strength and the weakness of the whole national movement. Its
strength lay in the nation-wide expression of its hatred of Austrian
domination. From now onwards it was clear that Italy was simply
The Aftermath: 1849 85
held down by force, and at the first opportunity would repeat her
frantic straggle for freedom. Moreover, the national aim was clari-
fied. Republicanism as a solution died with the Roman republic
and Gioberti's federalism disappeared with Pio Nono's reversion to
absolutism, but the idea of monarchy was strengthened. Charles
Albert's last desperate attempt at Novara had won the heart of Italy,
and the young Victor EmanueTs loyalty to the Constitution, in spite
of all the cajoling of Radetzky, had between them lifted the House of
Savoy to the first claim on Italy's hope and gratitude. It was not yet
Italy and Victor EmanueT but it soon would be. Its weakness lay
primarily in the impossibility of creating a national army when all
the material was in the hands of the rulers, adverse to the national
movement and ready to call in Austria. But besides this, there were two
deep-seated weaknesses which were certain to complicate any forward
movement. The first was political inexperience; the second, the
now ingrained habit of conspiracy. These two failings were the
legacy left by Mettemich. In his determination to suppress every
manifestation of self-government, throughout a period of over thirty
years, he had not only robbed Italy of all political experience but
had forced her into a mentality of chronic conspiracy. The quick
Italian mind was full of political ideas but with no practical experi-
ence of the difficulties of realizing them. Carried away by their
inveterate love of rhetoric, conceiving the ends without considering
the means, they made the 'business of government 5 a vocal panorama
of unattainable ideals. The effect of the spirit of conspiracy, on the
other hand, was to create the belief that in order to get things done,
it was necessary to work against the government rather than with it.
This feeling, that the hand of the government must be forced, that
it would always accept tine fait accompli, was to retard the national
political development and to create endless embarrassments for
successive governments for many years to come.
The rising of 1848 was a spontaneous expression of national feeling
but completely unco-ordinated and therefore defeated in detail. After
it, once more patrolled by Austria, Italy sank back into inaction.
But the movement had now a rallying point in Piedmont and a states-
man in Cavour: conspiracy became national and radiated discreetly
from a centre at Turin: the policy of isolated effort was abandoned,
and the traditional policy of the House of Savoy of playing France
against Austria, rejected alike by Charles Albert and Mazzini, was
once more brought into action in the extremely capable hands of
Cavour. The age of conspiracy has passed into that of diplomacy.
CHAPTER SIX
FROM CONSPIRACY TO DIPLOMACY
CAVOUR, i 849-I&59
THE history of Italy during the ten years that followed the
collapse of the national effort in 1848-1849 and which ended
with the war of 1859, is centred in the political life of Piedmont and
in the work of one man, Count Cavour. Elsewhere in Italy the
old system is at work again as if the agitation of the previous
two years was a bad dream. Those most deeply compromised have
fled abroad. Garibaldi is in America, Mazzini in London and Manin
in Paris, and around each of them are grouped bands of refugees.
Austrian garrisons now keep order at Florence, Modena and Parma,
and control the Legations with troops at Bologna, whilst the Pope is
kept secure on his throne by the presence of French bayonets. This
is not to say that the spirit of revolt is dead, but that, as in 1831, its
centre was now outside Italy. Mazzini was as busy as ever weaving
new plots and combinations which before long produced disastrous
results in Lombardy and Piedmont. In Naples, the policy of Fer-
dinand was to imprison every one kgainst whom the "least sus-
picion of possible subversive activities was directed, and to keep
them there indefinitely. There is a story related of a prominent
English resident, one of whose Italian friends was thrown into prison
in this way. Knowing the Chief of Police he at once endeavoured to
procure his release. The official expressed his regrets, adding that he
was most anxious to oblige him, and that if at any time he wanted
anybody put into prison it should be done at once, but that the one
thing he could not do was to get any one out again. It was this ini-
quitous system which Gladstone, after watching the whole procedure
of Neapolitan justice, condemned with such vigour in his letters to
Lord Aberdeen.
Lombardy was held down by force, with Radetzky in command
as civil and military governor, but even this did not stop the Lom-
bards from conspiring. In London, Mazzini had formed a National
Italian Committee, one of whose activities was the issue of a loan to
be subscribed both in Italy and in England. Another was an anti-
Austrian printing press, established at Capolago on the Swiss border
of Lombardy, which introduced leaflets and pamphlets into Austrian
86
From Conspiracy to Diplomacy: Cavour, 1849-1$ J9 By
territory. The activities of the police in arresting agents of this latter
led to several executions, and the discovery of a share certificate in
the loan had even more disastrous results. The trial which followed
the investigations of the police, was known as the Process of Mantua
or s The Martyrs of Belfiore'. Priests, professional men and land-
owners, were found to be Implicated, nine persons were executed
in 1852 and thirty-two others condemned to years of imprisonment
in irons. This severity led to an outbreak at Milan the year following,
which though hopelessly ineffective, produced the first breach be-
tween Austria and Piedmont over the sequestrations of the property
of Lombard Emigres now in possession of Piedmontese nationality,
Ri the States of the Church the old order was restored by Papal
decrees, enforced in the Legations by Austrian bayonets: the Romans,
however, were more gratified by the return of the Pope than grieved
over the loss of die Republic, and soon settled down under the accus-
tomed system without complaint. There was no further internal
trouble in Rome, even when Cadoma occupied the city in 1870.
It would be a mistake, however, to regard this general inaction as
an acceptance of the status quo. The masses in Italy, it is true, never
took a real part in the movement. Outside Piedmont, the peasantry
never moved. Naples was sunk in apathy and corruption, and even
in 1860 Cavour's attempt to promote a rising against the Bourbons
was a complete failure. The whole strength of the Risorgimento was
in the liberal element in the cities and after 1848 there was a marked
change in their attitude. There is no longer any agitation for reform:
in fact, a reform movement is what they arc afraid of, because it might
lead to apathy. The whole political system is now under, condemna-
tion. Austria, the princelings, the temporal power of the Pope, all
must go and unity and independence must be established. Some years
later Daniele Manin in reply to a speech on Austxo-Italian reconcilia-
tion by Lord John Russell, voiced the conviction of Italy when he
said, *W don't want Austria to reform, we want her to go*. How this
was to be brought about no one could tell, but before many years
were passed a new hope was bom which this time was to achieve
unity.
From the wreck of the Italian political institutions in 1849 there
was only one survival, the constitution granted by Charles Albert in
Piedmont. It provided for a Premier or President of the Council,
who, like the Senate, was nominated by the King, and a Chamber
of Deputies numboring two hundred and four, elected on a narrow
franchise. The Chamber met in the Palazzo Carignano, the Senate
88 The Evolution of Modern
In the Palazzo Madama. The Deputies quickly grouped themselves
into the Conservative Right, the Democratic Left, and a wavering
section of Moderates in between. The Chamber had a President or
Speaker, to which position Gioberti on his first return to Italy had
been unanimously elected. At first members spoke from a rostrum,
a great stimulus to democratic oratory, until Cavour abolished it and
made members speak from their places. The hall in which they met
was arranged in tiers facing the President and the bench of Ministers.
After Novara, the young King Victor Emanuel induced his friend
the Marquis Massimo D'Azeglio to accept the Premiership, though he
had scarcely recovered from a wound in the thigh received at Vicenza
which sometimes necessitated Cabinet meetings at his bedside. A
painter by profession, a soldier and a writer, JD'Azeglio's qualifica-
tion as first Minister lay in his sterling character, rather than in
political gifts, of which he had few, for he had neither administrative
nor political experience. Almost his first task was the suppression
of a revolt at Genoa, where the extremists had seized two of the forts
and raised the old republican cry of independence. It was easily
suppressed by General La Marmora, happily without bloodshed.
Then came the peace treaty, the terms of which the Left opposed
with such determination that D'Azeglio at length dissolved the
Chamber and strained the constitution by inducing the King to issue
a personal appeal, known as the Proclamation of Moncalieri, for
loyalty and support. The new Chamber accepted the peace treaty.
After this the members settled down to work. Amongst those who
had lost their seats in the wave of democratic victories which had led
to Novara, and now regained them, was Count Camillo Cavour,
editor of II Risorgimento, elected as one of the members for Turin,
which seat he held for the rest of his life. A convinced liberal, whose
opinions had caused his resignation from the army, Cavour had taken
up farming and made a fortune by the application of machinery and
modern methods to the family estates. Interested from his youth in
politics, he had travelled much in Switzerland, France and England,
studying agriculture, parliamentary government and modern in-
dustry. He knew most of the leading political figures in France and
some in England. He was recognized as a financial expert, interested
in all kinds of business ventures, banks and mills and railways, and all
the progressive forms of modem industry. A man of great ability and
wide knowledge, gifted with courage and determination, he stood
politically between the two extreme parties, opposed equally to the
reactionary tendencies of the Right and the democratic excesses of
From Conspiracy to Diplomacy: Cavour, 18491 8 jp 89
the Left, and, in consequence, was condemned by both. Amongst his
many gifts there were two of peculiar value for the future of his
country: he was a born parliamentarian, with a genuine knowledge
and practical understanding of constitutional government, a tree
appreciation of liberty, and what we should call a House of Commons
temperament and he was a modernist. He took small interest in
Italy's historic past, her art and literature were beyond his ken 9 *his
whole outlook was to the future and his interest was centred on
modem progress, scientific advance, industry and finance. He was
the one great statesman Italy produced in the nineteenth century and
the architect of Italian unity,
The presence of D'Azeglio as first Minister, was a guarantee to the
Powers that Piedmont would follow a policy of reason and modera-
tion. His policy was aimed at keeping the ship of state on an even
keel and avoiding those contentious political measures which were
calculated to arouse violent opposition and party bitterness. Although
D'Azeglio prided himself that he understood Italy and the Italians 5
Cavour, nevertheless, had a truer appreciation of what Piedmont
expected than the Premier. He realized that the new Constitution,
if it was to satisfy expectations and justify its existence, must deal
promptly with those very reforms which D'Azeglio was anxious to
postpone, amongst which stood out prominently the relations with
the Church. Even from 1848 the government had been working at
Rome to induce the Pope to agree to anew Concordat; to regulate the
relation's of Church and State under the new form of government; in
particular, to permit the abolition of the Foro Ecclesiastico or Ecclesi-
astical Courts, which duplicated the whole legal system of the country
and doubled the expense of litigation in all cases which came within
the orbit of the Canon Law. The most recenfrepresentations had been
made at Gaeta by Count Cesare Balbo, and after his failure* by Count
Siccardi. To all alike the Pope returned an uncompromising refusal
and at last the government decided on legislation. The Siccardi Laws,
abolishing the Foro Ecclesiastico, were passed in March 1850 and die
speech made by Cay our on that occasion laid the foundation of his
parliamentary reputation. After this Cavour's advance was rapid.
In October he accepted the post of Minister of Agriculture, Com-
merce and Marine. His great ability and masterful energy converted
what was regarded as the least important position in the government
into the most vital. In a series of commercial treaties with Belgium,
France and England, Cavour practically committed the country to a
policy of free trade, cutting down the tariffs on imports to a minimum
90 The Evolution of Modem Italy
but at the same time opening fresh markets to Piedmontese exports.
This involved a considerable immediate loss to the Treasury, and
Cavour took over the Ministry of Finance, floated an internal loan
for immediate requirements, while he negotiated another of three
and a half millions in England. With this he paid off the balance
of the Austrian war indemnity, freed the finances from the hold of
the Rothschilds, and used what was left for the railways under
construction.
It was a maxim of Cavour that in politics there is nothing so absurd
as rancour, and he gave an example in dealing with the English loan,
for he at once asked Count Revel, a political opponent and one of his
severest critics, to go to England to negotiate it, which he did.
This spirit of putting the country first was one of the secrets of Pied-
montese strength. It was now becoming obvious to every one that
D'Azeglio's retirement and the accession to power of Cavour was
merely a matter of time. To Cavour the problem was how to secure
a stable majority which would enable him to carry out his pro-
gramme. There were two centre parties in the Chamber, of which he
himself led the one and Rattazzi the other. Neither was strong
enough by itself to assure power, but together they would dominate
the Chamber. To this union offerees Cavour had for some time
been urged by his friend Castelli, but he had hitherto ignored it;
however, a circumstance now arose which rendered it imperative. 15
This was the coup d'etat of Louis Napoleon, with the return to
absolutism and empire which it foreshadowed. Pressure was almost
at once brought to bear at Turin to control her press, by both France
and Austria, supported by the more extreme Right in the Chamber.
The result of this was the Deforesta Press Law, which transferred
actions against the Press from juries to special magistrates, in cases
where foreign countries or rulers were concerned. Cavour viewed
this support of the reactionary parties with great misgiving, and to
strengthen the liberal element in the Chamber, joined Rattazzi and
formed the centre party which was to give him a steady majority
for the eight years of his Premiership. His action brought about
D'Azeglio's resignation, but the King refused to accept it and ordered
him to reconstruct the Ministry, leaving out Cavour. Had Cavour
been vindictive he could have made the position of the new Cabinet
impossible, but instead, he made it as easy as he could by resigning
his portfolios and going abroad. The inevitable change could not,
however, be long delayed and in November 1852 D'Azeglio again
From Conspiracy to Diplomacy; Cavour, 1849-1 8 j^ 91
resigned, advising the King to call Cavour. This he did, and the
Great Ministry came into being.
The man to whom the destinies of his country were now entrusted
came to his task not only with a clear idea of what was to be done, but
with a definite plan as to the steps to be taken to achieve it. Cavour's
ultimate aim was the deliverance of Italy from Austria and the for-
mation of an Italian Kingdom. But the events of 1848 had con-
vinced him that Charles Albert's motto, 'I/Italia fari da se* (that Italy
would win her own salvation), was not practical, and that she must
revert to her traditional policy of a French alliance. To lessen the
danger of French dictation, he hoped to enlist the sympathy and
support of England, whose liberal policy might be used as a counter-
poise to Napoleonic absolutism. Thus Cavour's primary object was
to win the joint support of the two Western Powers, and he rightly
foresaw that nothing would be more effective to this end, than law,
order and prosperity, in Piedmont herself. Sound constitutional
government, firm, moderate and progressive, resulting in material
prosperity, would not only raise Piedmontese prestige abroad, but
would focus the eyes of Italy .on Piedmont and enhance the contrast
between the Austrian methods of force and political stagnation and
the freedom and progress of the little Subalpine Kingdoml Cavour
had already given a considerable fillip to trade, and many schemes
were afoot for further advance. Nor had his holiday abroad been
wasted. He had been to Paris and London, interviewed Palnjerston
and dined and had an audience with Louis Napoleon, he had calmed
French fears of a reversion to radicalismj had introduced Rattazzi, who
made a gqod impression, and returned with a knowledge of the
leading political figures in the West and their views, which was of
great .value.
In November 1852 the new government took office. Cavour
immediately avoided a clash with Rome by withdrawing the Civil
Marriage Bill which in his absence D'AzegMo had mismanaged and
which had been, moreover, the direct cause of his fill. After that came
the budget, with the usual deficit and plans for additional taxation,
economies, and further loans. For the next two years Cavour was
plunged in reform, roads and docks and railways, and all the expen-
sive but essential foundations for commercial advance. The country
was already showing signs of increased prosperity. Parliamentary life
had taken firm hold, and business was now conducted in the Chamber
of Deputies in a manner which won warm praise from for all observ-
ers, especially the English Minister, Sir James Hudson, whose reports
92 The Evolution of Modern Italy
to Lord Palmerston paid tribute to the steady progress of the country
and its sound political life. Cavour broke his first lance with Austria
over the sequestration of the property of the Lombard emigres in
Piedmont, which followed the Mazzinian rising at Milan in 1853.
It was handled with ability and firmness, and when it became obvious
that no satisfaction was to be obtained from Vienna, despite the
illegality of Austrian action, a full statement of Piedmont's case was
drawn up and circulated amongst the Powers, and the Piedmontese
Minister was then recalled in protest. The moderation and dignity of
Piedmont's attitude was in striking contrast with the angry bullying
tone of the Austrian Foreign Secretary, and Cavour came through
his first diplomatic battle with increased prestige. It was an essential
part of Cavour* s diplomacy to reverse the opinion generally held in
Europe regarding Italy : to show that she was not a hot-bed of con-
spiracy against law and order, but a people driven to exasperation by
oppression of a foreign Power, and thus to shift the moral support of
Europe from Austria to herself. The sequestration question gave him
his first opportunity, for Austria was in the wrong, and he made full
use of it. There were other forces working in the same direction.
The sustained indictment of Austria in the writings of Mazzini, the
translation into English by Gladstone of Farini's Lo State Romano,
the publication of such works as the Rinnovamento of Gioberti, with
its revised programme in favour of unity under Victor Emanuel and
the abolition of the temporal Power, and the histories of Ranalli and
Gualterio, were all alike helping to change European opinion as to
the treatment of Italy by Austria.
Not the least interesting aspect of Cavour's political life was his
handling of the Chamber of Deputies. Although, in fact, he exercised
a parliamentary dictatorship, it was accompanied by such tact, ability
and humour, that it never occasioned irritation or revolt. Cavour
was perfectly at home in the Chamber. Debate stimulated and clarified
his thought, and he was never at his ease when the Chamber was not
sitting. He loved the stress and storm of debate and was always ready
to cross swords with a vigorous opponent. Normally he interfered
very little. He would sit throughout a long session, playing with a
paper-knife and apparently inattentive, but he missed nothing. He
had a mathematical brain, which in his early years as a young engineer
in the army, he had trained by forming the habit of working out his
calculations mentally, without having recourse to paper and pencil.
This faculty he used in his speeches and in debate, and he could carry
a long series of facts, deductions and inferences in his mind, and
From Conspiracy to Diplomacy: Cavour y 1849-1 8 j$ 93
reproduce them in logical order, without making a note. At the close
of the sitting he would rise and sum up with admirable lucidity the
arguments of both sides, explaining or refuting as he thought neces-
sary, and marshalling his own case with such skill that there was
seldom any other conclusion to be drawn but his own. If the sitting
was stormy and he was heckled, he had at his command a pungent
irony, the gift of the quick retort and a keen sense of humour, all of
which weapons he was an adept at using. The democratic orator,
Angelo Brofferio, who in the early days of a rostrum and galleries
crowded with the rhetoric-loving populace, aroused tumultuous
applause with his resounding periods, quickly learnt to be very
cautious in provoking the caustic wit of the President of the Council,
who so persistently deflated him, that a duel between them became
one of the relaxations of the Chamber. 1 will try and arrange a little
boutade with Brofierio for your amusement', Cavour once wrote to a
friend coming on a visit to Turin. He prepared his speeches without
committing a word to paper, except figures, testing the effect of
special passages on his private secretary from whom he would invite
criticism. He was never a real orator. His delivery was somewhat
hesitating and his command of Italian limited, but Ms speeches, closely
reasoned and filled with facts, covering every aspect of the
question, produced a sense of inevitability which as a rule carried
through his measures without difficulty.
With the dawn of the year 1854 the political horizon was darkened
by the shadow of the Crimean War. It was the 'European complica-
tion' which Cavour had anticipated, and upon the probability of
which his desire for friendship with the Western Powers was based.
*It is above all upon France that our destiny depends, 9 he wrote in
1852, Tor good or ill we must be her partner in the great game that
sooner or later must be played out in Europe/ Cavour had now to
turn his attention from domestic problems to the wider sphere of
European politics, and exploit if he could, to the advantage of his
country, the new international situation created by the Crimean War.
He had done a great work in his three years of office. In 1850 the
deficit was no less than seventy-seven millions with a revenue of
ninety millions. In 1853 the revenue was increased by thirty-two
millions and the expenses reduced by twenty millions, leaving a deficit
of twenty-five millions, and he spoke of establishing an equilibrium
in the next budget. But a sound budget was for Italian Finance
Ministers a will-o'-the-wisp for many years to come. They are still
pursuing it.
94 The Evolution of Modern Italy
It seldom happens that a small power is in a position to put a great
power under an obligation, but this was precisely the opportunity
offered to Sardinia by the war with Russia. England with her small
army was in need of troops, and a contingent from Sardinia would be
very welcome. Cavour saw his opportunity and decided to offer
fifteen thousand men. In January 1854, previous to bringing the
matter before the Cabinet, he sounded the King, who at once agreed.
He then approached the British Minister, to whom he made a definite
offer, which Sir James Hudson embodied in a despatch; but before
sending it he read it to the Foreign Secretary, General Dabormida,
who to his surprise told him that the matter had never been discussed
by the Cabinet, that personally he did not agree with the proposal
which must be regarded as the President's private opinion. So Sir
James tore it up and wrote a private letter to Lord Palmerston
describing the position. Cavour J s treatment of his Cabinet was cer-
tainly not complimentary, but he well knew that nearly all would
oppose him and to strengthen his position he wanted to have a
definite request to put before them. When the question was discussed
by the Cabinet, only one member supported him, and so, for the time
being, Cavour appeared to drop it. His proposal was soon common
property and met with general condemnation. No request for troops
came from the Western Powers and Cavour could only wait. In the
meantime opinion in Parliament and Press began to appreciate better
the advantages of the alliance. Time was on the side of Cavour, and
the King spoke out in favour of the treaty. The cause of the delay,
which lasted throughout 1854, was Austria. Both sides were press-
ing Austria for an alliance. Her position was very difficult, for she
would not fight against Russia, whose help in 1848 had saved the
monarchy, nor would she fight against the Allies, for fear of an
attack by France and Sardinia when she was committed in the East.
Her assistance, however, was so much more valuable than that of
Sardinia, that as long as there was the least hope of her joining the
Western Powers, the offer of Turin was kept in abeyance. At last in
December Austria signed a non-committal treaty with the Allies.
She did not promise troops, but merely stipulated that if peace was
not in sight by the end of die year, the three Powers should deliberate
upon further steps. At the same time Sardinia's offer was accepted
and in January, eighteen thousand Sardinian troops were embarked
in English transports for the Crimea. It had been a hard struggle for
Cavour, He had had to convince the Cabinet, the Chamber and the
From Conspiracy to Diplomacy: Cavour, rfyy-iSj? 95
nation, and had had to dismiss Ms Foreign Secretary and take over his
portfolio, before the treaty was signed,
Cavour defended the alliance before the Chamber a month later.
The debate showed very clearly the difference between the European
outlook of Cavour and the municipalismo of the majority, summed op
in the phrase of Brofferio that the treaty was neither just, rational,
useful nor necessary*. In his reply to criticisms of the smallness of the
English army and its lack of any striking success, Cavour revealed his
understanding of English character and his trust in her policy in a
passage deserving quotation :
*As to the disasters of the English army, which it would be useless to
deny', he said, *I do not consider that this should be* any reason for us to
doubt the final result of the campaign, nor to induce us to believe that
England is not in a position^ and has not the determination, to make equal,
if not greater, efforts than her allies. The history of all wars in which
England has taken part shows us that at first she always suffers reverses,
starting with forces out of proportion to her powers; but that the disasters
and failures which she suffers, instead of discouraging her, have the effect
of stimulating her to greater efforts and sacrifices, and that while her
adversaries, after some successes, begin to lose courage and exhaust their
resources, she, as the war progresses, gains in strength and attacking power.
'This, gentlemen, happened in the great wars of the French Revolution.
In 1792 and 1793 the EngHsh experienced nothing but reverses, their means,
in comparison with their allies, being very small: the others grew weary:
but the longer the English fought the greater grew their army to such a
point that in 1814 I believe they had four hundred thousand men in their
pay. What has happened in Europe has happened several times to them in
India. Nearly al their early efforts turned out badly, and it was not until
after a real disaster that the English used means adequate to their task. All
remember the expedition to Cabul in 1839, which resulted in the complete
destruction of the English army. Well, after this immense disaster, which
has scarcely a parallel, many people prophesied the ruin of the English power
in the East. But this prophecy, very far from being realized, was shown to
be completely false, when the next year the English returned to Cabul with
an army more than twice the size. What took place in the French revolu-
tionary wars, and has now happened in Cabul, I believe will repeat itself
in the Crimea. I am, then, convinced that we can put full trust in our allies,
assured that we shall find them as the war progresses not weaker but
stronger than ever before.*
Though Cavour did not put it in epigrammatic form, this passage
may well be the origin of the phrase that England loses all the battles
but the last*.
During the most critical period of the negotiations for the Crimean
96 The Evolution of Modem Italy
alliance and throughout the months that followed up to May 1855,
the Chamber was engaged in one of the most violent political
struggles it had experienced in its short life. The cause of this was a
government Bill known as the Law on the Convents. It was die
necessary corollary to the Siccardi Laws. The Bill was sponsored by
Urbano Rattazzi, and Cavour, engaged in the alliance negotiations,
did not speak until late in the debates. The Law had been preceded
by an investigation into the wealth of the Church, which afforded
ample justification for the terms of the measure. It provided for the
suppression of 334 convents with an average of 16 inmates apiece,
leaving 274 containing 4,050 inmates. Religious Orders engaged in
teaching, preaching, or care of the sick, were excluded. It also pro-
vided for the removal from the annual budget of the sum of nearly
one million lire a year in support of the poor clergy: for a drastic
reduction in the salaries of the Episcopate: and the establishment of
an Ecclesiastical Bank for the repartition and distribution of clerical
incomes. The Bill was bitterly opposed by the clericals and unhappily
was accompanied by three deaths in the royal family, the Queen, the
Queen Mother and the Duke of Genoa, the King's younger brother.
The straggle roused such intense feeling outside Parliament, in the
press and the public, that Cavour feared for the morale of the country.
The real crisis arose when the Bill, having passed the Chamber of
Deputies, came before the Senate, which was the clerical stronghold.
Cavour had made a tactical error in persisting in regarding it as a
financial measure rather than, what it really was, a matter of principle.
At the critical momerft the Bishops offered to provide the million of
lire and thus render the Bill unnecessary. The King accepted the offer
gladly and insisted on its being brought forward. It was now a
question of submission to Rome. The government resigned. The
King, distracted with grief, determined to end the struggle and sought
a new Prime Minister. No one would accept, and at last Cavour had
to be recalled. The crisis was over. The Senate passed the measure
after some slight amendments and the King signed it with a good
grace. The Bill on the Convents was the coping-stone to the new
political system. The old mediaeval system was broken, and Sardinia
was now a modern state folly equipped to go forward unhampered
by the restrictions of the past.
In the Crimea on the i6th of August the alliance was sealed at
the Chernaia, when as comrades-in-arms with the French, the Italian
troops repulsed the Russian attack, winning warm praise from General
P<3issier, the French commander-in-chief. The victory was fully
From Conspiracy to Diplomacy: Cavour, i$0-i$f$ 97
exploited by Cavour and a wave of pride swept over Italy, and the
bold policy of the King and Cavour was recognized as fully justified,
for the stain of Novara was wiped out. The war continued through-
out the year but In January 1856 the Czar accepted the mediation of
Austria and peace became" assured. The preliminaries of the Peace
Conference was a time of great anxiety at Turin, the point at issue
being whether or not the Sardinian representative would be admitted
on an equal footing with the Great Powers. Austria naturally opposed
it, pointing out with some justification that It might Impose responsi-
bilities which a small country might find beyond Its powers. ^ The
question was not finally settled until Cavour, nominated as Sardinia's
representative, actually arrived In Paris, where he was at once
accepted as an equal. Sardinia had joined the alliance without any
conditions, and so far all she had gained was prestige, at the cost of
two thousand men (mostly from cholera) and a heavy financial
turden. Cavour aimed at 'some Increase of territory, at Austria's
expense; he would have liked the duchy of Parma. His other objective
was to put the condition of Italy on the agenda, provoke a discussion
and, if possible, obtain a condemnation of Austria's policy and position
in Italy. As this had nothing to do with the purpose of the Congress,
it would require great skill and pertinacity to carry It through.
Cavour worked very hard, but all hope of territorial compensation
had soon to be abandoned. 'Austria*, Napoleon told Mm, 'would go
to war sooner than let you have Parma/ So Cavour concentrated on
bringing up the Italian question. He induced Lord Clarendon, the
English representative, to promise to speak first and he primed him
weE with information. He kept the Emperor fully informed of every-
thing. It was impossible to drag in Italy until the Peace with Russia
was signed, but at the close of the Congress, on April 8th, Count
Walewsky, the President, was instructed by the Emperor to introduce,
as a supplementary subject upon which the Emperor thought It
desirable to have die opinion of the Conference, the questions of the
occupation of Greece, the excesses of the Belgian press, and the
condition of Italy. Walewsky, who throughout was pro-Austrian
rather than Italian, did his best to minimize the importance of these
questions, and the Conference got a shock when Lord Clarendon rose,
and passing over Greece and Belgium In a few sentences, proceeded to
denounce the occupation of the Romagna by Austria, the misgovem-
ment of the Papal States and the appalling condition of the Kingdom
of Naples, with a warmth and vigour of language^ which Cavour
himself would not have dared to use. *He charged*, as one of the
98 The Evolution of Modern Italy
secretaries present wrote, 'like Lucan at Balaclava*. To the onslaught
of Lord Clarendon the rest of the delegates replied with pained
surprise, and with the Austrian delegate, Count Buol, at their
head, pleaded that they had no instructions to deal with a question
so far outside the purpose of the Congress. The speech of Cavour
was very moderate, but he drove home Lord Clarendon's points and
made it clear that the existing state of things in Italy put Sardinia in a
most difficult and dangerous position. Lord Clarendon had more than
fulfilled Cavour's most sanguine expectations. He had made Italy a
European question, and awakened the conscience of her statesmen to
a state of things which, unless remedied, meant another Euro-
pean war. After this the Congress broke up. Cavour went to London
and saw Palmerston, who toned down considerably the hopes of
English support aroused by the enthusiasm of Lord Clarendon, and
after a final audience with the Emperor in Paris he returned to Turin.
He had won a European reputation at the Congress: Italy had found
her spokesman and produced the ablest statesman in Europe.
The Congress of Paris forms a definite turning point in the history
of the Risorgirnento. From Italy's point of view its importance does
not lie in the terms of the treaty, which had nothing to do with her,
nor in the few anaemic sentences with which the sitting of April 8th
was recorded by Benedetti in the Protocol. It lies in the fact that for
the first time the Italian Question had been placed before Europe by
her resppnsible statesmen, and could no longer be ignored. It brought
to an end the first phase of Cavour's policy, based on the hope rather
than the belief, that the problem of Italy could be solved by diplomacy
alone, for the attitude of Austria had made it abundantly clear that
nothing but force would induce her to surrender her Italian provinces.
Cavour saw no other issue now except war, and he bent all his ener-
gies on winning the help of his two allies. Napoleon had already
given him a lead. * Austria will give way on nothing', he said to
Cavour; "at the moment I cannot present her with a casus belli: but
make your mind easy, I have a presentimeiit that the actual peace will
not last long'. In his final interview with Clarendon, and in the Note
directed to his allies on April i6th, he stressed the critical situation
of Piedmont with uncompromising directness. Inaction, he declared,
would redouble revolutionary activity in Italy and throw her into the
arms of Mazzini: only with the active help of her allies could the
conditions in the peninsula be rectified. Some incautious words of
Clarendon had led Cavour to anticipate armed intervention from
England if Sardinia was driven to war, but his interview with Pal-
From Conspiracy to Diplomacy: Cavour, 1849 18$) 99
rnerston had quickly shown him his mistake and his hopes were now
centred on the Emperor.
The policy pursued by Cavour between the Congress of Paris and
the outbreak of war three years later, was based upon a twofold con-
viction. The first was reliance on the help of Napoleon. Though
he had nothing to rely on but the verbal assurances of the Emperor
and his own intuitive appreciation of Napoleon*s policy and character,
it is clear that Cavour felt assured that France would make "war on
Austria, and before very long. His second conviction was that Sar-
dinia was safe from attack by Austria unless she was prepared to face
both her allies as well, for that they would both come to her help s
in the event of an unprovoked attack by Austria, he felt certain. It
was this sense of relative safety which made Cavour so audacious both
in words and actions at this time. He adopted a policy of complete
disregard for Austrian susceptibilities, which, if the tempo was
quickened, would speedily become a policy of exasperation, as in the
later stages it did, and finally drove Austria into delivering her famous
ultimatum, and thereby provided Napoleon with an admirable reason
to come to the help of Sardinia. The first indication of this attitude
was the Appropriation Bill for the rebuilding of the fortifications of
Alessandria, which Austria, with cynical disregard for other people's
property, had dismantled before evacuating the city after its occupa-
tion in 1815. The Bill was opposed in the Chamber on the grounds
that it was a deliberate provocation of Austria, to which Cavour
replied that if Austria was allowed to fortify Piacenza, which did not
belong to her, and in which she had only garrison rights, Sardinia
was more than justified in fortifying an important military centre on
her own soil. Austria was annoyed, and more so when the Lombards,
not only subscribed to a fund opened by Mania to present a
hundred cannon to the refortified city, but sent a further sum to pay for
a memorial to the Piedmontese army to be erected in Turin. Cavour's
next step was to print and circularize abroad Ms Memorandum, of
April i6th, to find out the opinion of the Powers on his new policy,
and he also made use of a visit abroad of General Dabormida, to
gather unofficially the impression made on foreign Cabinets. The
result was not unsatisfactory, *be cautious' was the general verdict.
Though personally friendly to General Dabormida when he visited
Vienna, Count Buol, so the British Ambassador wrote to Lord
Palmerston, was very irritated at the general behaviour of Sardinia,
though he did not show it officially as yet.
In words as well as actions Cavour went to the verge of provoca-
ioo The Evolution of Modem Italy
tion. Addressing the Chamber on his return from Paris regarding
the results of the Congress, he spoke as follows:
It is certain that the negotiations in Paris have not bettered our relations
with Austria. We are bound to confess that the plenipotentiaries of Sar-
dinia and Austria, after having sat beside each other for two months, and
after having co-operated in the greatest political work of the last forty
years, have separated without personal animosity, indeed I ought to bear
witness to the courteous behaviour of the chief of the Austrian Government,
but they have separated with the intimate conviction that the policies of
their two countries were further than ever from reaching agreement, that
the principles to which they adhered were irreconcilable. [Bene! Applau$i.~j
This fact is grave, we cannot deny it: it may cause difficulties, it may
provoke dangers, but it is the inevitable, fatal, consequence of that loyal
and liberal system which Xing Victor Emanuel inaugurated on his accession
to the throne, of which his government has always sought to make itself
the interpreter and to which you have always leant firm and valid support.
[Bravo / Bravo !} I do not believe, gentlemen, that the thought of these
difficulties will make you counsel the King's Government to change its
policy.
These were bold words. Candour could scarcely go further and the
applause which greeted them revealed the spirit of the country.
Twice Piedmont had faced Austria and been defeated, and she was
ready to do it again. 'Those Piedmontese devils', old Radetzky once
said, 'are always the same.* Cavour then brought his speech to a close
with a passage still more irritating to Austria, emphasizing as it did
the general condemnation in Europe of her Italian policy:
Our policy during these last years- has taken a great step forward: for the
first time in our history the Italian question has been discussed in a Euro-
pean Congress, not as at Laibach and Verona, with a view to intensify
the sufferings of Italy and to reforge her chains, but with the openly mani-
fested intention of bringing some remedy to the evils which oppress her,
with the open expression of the sympathy which the great nations feel
towards her. The struggle may be long, the fluctuations of fortune many,
but trusting in the justice of our cause we await the final issue with con-
fidence.
In preparation for the struggle which he saw ahead, Cavour next
drew around him all the live forces in Italy. He had already seen and
won over Danide Manin, the old Venetian republican leader, while
at the Congress; he now got in touch with Garibaldi, who had
returned from America and bought his rocky home at Caprera. He
told him his hopes, and encouraged him to prepare the ground for the
foture. More important was his new friendship with La Farina, the
From Conspiracy to Diplomacy: Cavour 3 ifyfiSjg 101
indefatigable secretary of the National Society. They met almost
daily at dawn and to the slogan of 'Italy and Victor Emanuel 9 the
National Society began to rouse the people for unity and indepen-
dence. Alone amongst the active elements in the country, the
republicans, with Mazzini at their head, were impervious to the value
of any other method of national redemption than futile risings and
the old ideal of conspiracy. The previous autumn there had been one
more such effort in Sicily under Count Bentivegna, which, according
to Brofferio, should have been supported by the government. It
met with no encouragement from the Ministry. Such movements,
Cavour had replied, would receive neither sanction nor assistance, for
they were convinced that they did far more harm than good to the
national cause, and only created fresh difficulties for the Ministry in
their relations with foreign courts.
When Cavour returned to Turin from Paris he wrote to his friend
CastelH that he left Count Buol 'frightened at the general marks of
sympathy which the Italian cause aroused throughout Europe 5 . It led
to a change of policy at Vienna. The Emperor of Austria, advised of
the general feeling, decided on a policy of leniency. It will be remem-
bered that the two Ministers at Turin and Vienna, had been recalled
to their respective capitals following the decree of sequestration im-
posed by Austria on the Lombard emigre's after the Milan rising of
1853. The sequestration order was now removed, and it only required
the nomination of the Ministers to resume normal relations. Before
this took place the Emperor paid a visit to Milan, and Victor Emanuel,
as an act of courtesy, proposed to send a delegate to meet him. But at
the critical moment the Austrian police committed a blunder, arresting
and expelling as an undesirable a Sardinian Senator, M. Plezza* visiting
friends. Victor Emanuel was furious, refused to nominate a delegate,
and ignored the visit of the Emperor. This so irritated Count Buol
that he sent an angry note to Turin demanding explanations and
denouncing as provocations the fortifying of Alessandria, the hundred
cannon, and the conduct of Sardinia in general. Cavour sent a cold
and dignified reply, and shortly afterwards Austria withdrew Count
Paar from Turin and Sardinia then recalled her charge d'affaires, and
all diplomatic relations between the two countries were thus severed.
The policy of leniency towards Lombardy was not, however,,
changed. Following the Emperor's visit, which was accompanied
by various acts of grace, the release of prisoners, an amnesty
for some classes of exiles, and the cancelling of various communal
debts to the state, the Archduke Maximilian was appointed Viceroy.
IO2 The Evolution of Modern Italy
He was young and attractive, cultured, and filled with zeal to do Ms
best to win over the Lombards. But it was too late. The upper
classes stood aloof. His actions were adversely criticized, his invita-
tions refused, his motives misinterpreted, and in spite of his best efforts
the policy of conciliation proved a failure. This new attitude of
Austria caused Cavour considerable uneasiness, nevertheless. It was
warmly supported both at Vienna and Turin by England, who
persisted in believing that a little goodwill on both sides would
even now reconcile Italy to the status quo as if the desire for unity
and the existence of Lombardy-Venetia in the hands of Austria, were
just small matters that could be easily forgotten and forgiven. The
blindness of English politicians to the real desires of Italy and the
depth of her craving for freedom and independence, when they
conflicted with her own love of peace and quiet, reduced Cavour
at times almost to despair.
Cavour's programme of frigid correctness towards Austria and
quiet preparation for the future in Italy, was rudely broken in June
of this year (1857) by a new Mazzinian effort. It came at a moment
when Cavour had great schemes on hand. He was not only busy
pushing forward the strategic railway extensions and occupied with
the negotiations connected with the piercing of the Mont Cenis
tunnel, but he had appropriated large sums for the transfer of the
naval base at Genoa to Spezia, and the conversion of Genoa into a
first-class commercial port by the extension of docks and loading
facilities, to enable her to deal with the largest mercantile vessels and
become the rival of Marseilles as the first commercial port in the
Mediterranean. At the end of June Mazzini's new plan matured.
There was to be a descent on the coast of Naples and a simultaneous
rising at Genoa, aimed at seizing the forts and procuring weapons to
be despatched to arm the Neapolitans. Both attempts were a dismal
failure. Pisacane and his three hundred patriots landing at Sapri, were
either killed or captured, and the attempt at Genja fizzled out iii a
few scuffles. It brought, however, the usual crop of recriminations
from Paris and London. Cavour was equal to the occasion. Writing
to his ambassador in London, he deliberately magnified Mazzini's
effort, but pointed out that 'the great European revolutionary party'
had its headquarters in London, which harboured all the most danger-
ous conspirators who hatched their plots under cover of English
liberty, adding that he regretted that one Englishwoman (Jessie White
Mario) was amongst those arrested. He took the opposite line in
dealing with French reproaches, minimizing the outbreak, and stress-
From Conspiracy to Diplomacy: Cavour, 1849-1 8 jy 103
ing die fact that if this was all the revolutionary party could do, they
might be disregarded. The storm soop. blew over and before long
Napoleon was once more quite friendly.
In November this year there was a general election in Piedmont.
It was fought with unusual vigour. There was a strong feeling against
Rattazzi s to whose want of energy and sympathy with the Mazzin-
ians the events .of June were attributed. Cavour supported his
colleague and this led to co-operation between the Right and the
Clericals, in a determined attempt to upset the government. The
result was an opposition so strong that Cavour was doubtful as to his
ability to carry through his programme. However, the by-elections
went in Ms favour and the Chamber carried a Bill excluding clerics*
and this restored his majority. A scapegoat was, nevertheless, re-
quired, and Rattazzi left the Ministry.
The role which Sardinia had played in European affairs since the
Congress of Paris imposed a difficult and delicate task upon Cavour,
which a statesman of smaller calibre could never have sustained, for her
prestige far exceeded her power. The status of equality which Sardinia
had then obtained put her on level terms with her allies in those prob-
lems which remained unsettled when the Congress closed, Cavour had
since acted as arbitrator in the intricate boundary question of Bolgrad
and had settled it to the satisfaction of both sides, but his real difficulty
lay in trying to keep in with two allies whose policies and interests,
once the binding force of the military alliance was removed, tended
steadily to diverge. On the question, for instance, of the union of the
Principalities (Moldavia and Wallachia, afterwards Roumania)
Cavour sided with France, both believing that a single strong state
was far better than two weak ones, while England wished to keep
them separate, holding that united they would 611 at once under the
sway of Russia. Cavour's support of union irritated Lord Clarendon
and was at once interpreted as subservience to France. The rigid
attitude of Sardinia towards Austria, was likewise a source of com-
plaint, because English friendship with Austria was a matter of
principle, as a check, when needed, on either France or Russia, and
the irritation of Vienna at Sardinia's attitude and her friendship with
France, disturbed English relations with Austria. To Cavour, good
relations with England were essential but friendship with France was
vital, and throughout 1857 he had a hard task to keep in with both.
But he knew that Cabinets change and he relied for support on
English public opinion, which at bottom, was with Sardinia, and he
was right to do so, and though at the close of the year his relations
IO4 The Evolution of Modern Italy
with France were closer than with England, the latter's fundamental
sympathy was not lost. The new year, however, was to imperil Ms
friendship with both.
The Parliament which met at Turin in the closing days of December
1857 was destined to be the last, the next would be that of the King-
dom of Italy. The new year was only a fortnight old when the news
came of Orsini's attempt on the life of the Emperor and Empress as
they went to the opera. In due course came violent recriminations
from Paris accompanied by demands and threats. Almost equally
strong were the protests made in London, which culminated in the
defeat of Palrnerston's Conspiracy Bill and the resignation of the
government. Mazzini, though this rime innocent of connivance in
the outrage, had to bear the responsibility, and at Turin the hand of
the government fell heavily on his partisans. Many were exiled, and
his paper, L* Italia del Popolo, was hounded to death by confisca-
tion and prosecution. Another Press Law was passed to limit
still further criticism of foreign governments and articles directed
against their rulers. When the French Minister, La Tour d'Auvergne,
read M. "Walewsky's despatch to him, Cavour strongly resented the
tone of it. He was prepared, he said, to apply the full rigour
of the existing law, but nothing would induce the government to
alter the constitution at the dictation of a foreign power. Strongly as
Cavour spoke, it was, however, the proud bluntness of the King which
had the most unexpected results. Victor Emanuel had sent General
Delia Rocca to congratulate the Emperor on his escape and his report
as to what Napoleon had said to him was so menacing that the King's
pride and anger were roused. If what you write are the actual words of
the Emperor', he wrote to the General in reply, 'tell him in your own
words that one does not treat a faithful ally in such a way: that I have
never tolerated compulsion from any one: that my path is that of
untarnished honour and that to this I hold myself responsible to none
but God and my people: for eight hundred and fifty years my race
has held its head high and no one shall make me lower it: yet, for all
that, I have no other wish than to be his friend/ Forwarding the
King's letter to Delia Rocca, Cavour added that it would do no harm
if he committed the indiscretion of reading it to Napoleon, but not
to let it out of his hands, as it contained a phrase about 'perfidious
Albion' which he regretted. The enigmatic parvenu on the throne
of France had never before been addressed in such a tone and his
reaction to it was not what was anticipated. *Now that is what I call
courage', he exclaimed, 'youi King is a brave man. I love his answer.
From Conspiracy to Diplomacy: Cavour, 1849-1 8 j) 105
Write to Mm at once and put his mind at ease and express my regret
at having caused him pain'. In short, far from producing a breach
with France as Cavour feared, the King's letter clinched the wavering
determination of Napoleon to go to the aid of Italy and face war with
Austria. Orsinf s bomb had had strange repercussions.
From now onwards Napoleon worked steadily in his own peculiar
way towards war with Austria. His methods were devious and his
Eurpose sometimes obscure. He poblished s for instance, Orsini's
ist letter with its fervid appeal to the Emperor to free Italy. Cavour
was dumbfounded. *How can we fight successfully the doctrine of
regicide*, he wrote, when France transforms the assassin into a
martyr >' But the object of the Emperor was to popularize the future
Italian adventure in France and win pubic opinion to support it.
In the same way he instigated the publication of Orsini's final repudia-
tion of regicide, in the official Piedmontese Gazette, a document which
Cavour described as a direct provocation of Austria. It was not long
before further steps were taken. The first week in May came a com-
munication from Paris proposing the marriage of Prince Napoleon*
the Emperor's cousin, to die King's daughter the Princess Clothilda,
coupled with the offer of an alliance for war with Austria and the
formation of a Kingdom of Upper Italy. Thus began, hidden in die
deepest secrecy, the conspiracy between Cavour and Napoleon against
Austria, which a year later led to the war of 1859. In June, the
Emperor's intermediary, Dr. Conneau, came to Turin, and in July,
when the parliamentary Cession ended, Cavour went to Switzerland
for a holiday and on the 24th at the Emperor's invitation* he joined
him at Plombieres where the two arch-conspirators planned die future
of Italy. At this famous meeting the purpose of Cavour was to probe
the Emperor's mind, to let him talk and reveal his ideas, while he him-
self reserved his own opinions. There was to be a Kingdom of Upper
Italy, stretching from die Alps to the Adriatic, co include the Roma-
gna : a Kingdom of Central Italy to be offered to the Duchess of Parma :
the remaining Papal States under the Pope, and Naples. Italy was to
be a confederation of these four states under the presidency of the
Pope. To achieve this there must be an army of three hundred
thousand men, of which France would supply two-thirds. The price
to be paid to France was Savoy and possibly Nice, to be sealed by
the marriage of Prince Napoleon to the King's daughter.
In reply to this elaborate setdemcnt of Italy, devised without any
regard for ItaHan wishes, still less on the principle of a plebiscite, to
which Napoleon owed his own throne, Cavour said very little,
106 The Evolution of Modern Italy
though his mental reservations must have been considerable. There
was little likelihood of Italy acquiescing in the exploded ideals of
Gioberti or being content with a reshuffling of her territorial divisions,
but it would have been impolitic to suggest it. The vital matter was
the French army in Italy and the expulsion of Austria, the settlement
would come later. The next day Cavour, having written a full
account to Victor Emanuel, crossed the border into Germany
where at Baden he sounded German and Russian opinion before
returning to Turin. His first task was to reconcile the King and his
fifteen-year-old daughter to the marriage with the Prince, then aged
thirty-seven, for on this hinged the success of the whole plan. That
accomplished, he took into his confidence the leaders of the army and
the National Society La Marmora, La Farina and Garibaldi to
prepare the country for war. To Paris he sent his confidential secretary
Count Nigra,, whose tact and judgement throughout the long and
difficult preparations proved of inestimable value. The war was to
begin in the late spring of 1859 and to Cavour it was left to find the
casus belli, which must be non-revolutionary and one in which Austria
was clearly the aggressor. In consultation with the Emperor at
Plombieres, Massa and Carrara had been pitched upon as a likely
source from which to make trouble, but it faded out quickly and
Cavour relied on the policy of exasperation to goad Austria into a
declaration of war. So far nothing had been put'upon paper and the
entire plans were dependent on the good faith of the Emperor. To
translate these verbal arrangements into a formal treaty of alliance
now became Cavour's primary object. Fortunately, Napoleon's
keen anxiety to see the Prince's marriage successfully concluded put
a trump card in Cavour's hand, for he made the treaty the pre-
condition of the marriage. There were plenty of difficulties over
the treaty, for France wanted all the glory and none of the expense,
proposing that the Sardinian army should be relegated to the south
bank of the Po and employed in 'mopping up' operations following
the French victories, and that Sardinia should feed and pay both
armies as well as handing over Nice and Savoy. All this had to be
modified. However, by die end of the year a satisfactory compromise
was effected and the treaty was ready for signature.
No less difficult was the time factor, for both armies must be ready
together, lest Austria should, by a 'preventive* attack, overwhelm the
Sardinians before France could come to her assistance. To synchro-
nize their preparation was difficult, for Napoleon wanted money and
to float a loan took time, whereas Cavour could not face a postpone-
From Conspiracy to Diplomacy: Cavour, iS^-iSff 107
merit. Italian enthusiasm might evaporate and the expense of keeping
the army on a war footing once it was mobilized might mean bank-
ruptcy. Yet another difficulty arose from diplomatic suspicion.
Complete secrecy soon became impossible. Though the Emperor
kept his Foreign Secretary in the dark, the mission of Prince Napoleon
to the Czar at Warsaw leaked out, and before the end of the year the
Chancelleries of Europe were alive to the approaching struggle. The
position was not too reassuring. If Russia could be relied on for a
friendly neutrality, the attitude of Prussia was disturbing, and though
England was unlikely to interfere actively, all her diplomatic weight
would be against war. These were days when the lightest words of
Kings and Emperor vibrated through the diplomatic web to the
boundaries of Europe, and on the opening day of the new year (1859)
the words addressed to Baron Hiibner, at Napoleon's reception of the
Diplomatic Corps, reverberated throughout the Chancelleries. *I
regret*, he remarked to the Austrian Ambassador, 'that cay relations
with Austria are not as good as I could wish, but I beg that you will
write to Vienna that my personal sentiments towards the Emperor
remain the same.' These words were generally interpreted as meaning
war. *The Emperor*, wrote Cavour, 'has opened the year with an
outburst (algarade) that recalls the style of his uncle on the eve of
declaring war/
The Sardinian Parliament met ten days later and the address from
the throne was a matter of anxious deliberation. Victor Emanuel,
however, was determined not to be outdone by Napoleon and he
spoke boldly of completing *the great mission entrusted to us by
Divine Providence*. The address was then sent to Paris for the
Emperor's approval, and it was Napoleon who, changing the final
paragraph, added the famous sentence, 6 though we respect treaties,
we cannot remain insensible to the cry of grief {grido M dolorej that
reaches us from so many parts of Italy*. The speech created a tre-
mendous sensation and opened the floodgates of European diplomacy
in protest against the approaching war. A week later Prince Napoleon
arrived in Turin with the signed treaty of alliance and on January 3Oth
his marriage to the Princess Clothilde took place in the Royal Chapel.
In the diplomatic struggle which now commenced, in an endeavour
to prevent the war, the lead was taken by Lord Malmesbury, who
had followed Palmerston at the Foreign Office. Perhaps the most
general feeling perceptible in Europe during these months was the
underlying distrust of Napoleon. Europe had not forgotten his uncle,
and if the French army routed Austria and dictated peace at Vienna,
108 The Evolution of Modern Italy
as Napoleon said might be necessary, the old danger of French
domination would become a live issue and the former coalition would
have to be revived. This is seen in the cautious attitude of Prussia,
determined not to be taken unawares, and in the silent and watchful
attitude of Russia. Malmesbury took his stand on the sanctity of
the treaties of 1815, that there must be no territorial changes in Italy:
in so doing he had the hearty support of Austria whose possessions
and policy in Italy was based on that settlement. As it was the fixed
purpose of Napoleon and Cavour to change the map of Italy, the one
to re-divide it, the other to unite it, there was small chance of a
common denominator being found with English policy. Besides,
England would not fight in support of her policy, for the sympathy
of the nation was with Italy not Austria. The complicating factor
was the difficult situation of Napoleon. Unlike Cavour, who had
the nation with him, the Emperor was almost alone in his determina-
tion to make war. His Ministers, especially his Foreign Secretary,
Walewsky, were against him, and his only support came from a small
inner circle of intimates headed by Prince Napoleon. The bankers
could find no money; stock fell on the Bourse: trade and business
were all for peace. In this awkward situation Napoleon adopted a
tortuous policy, what might be termed an elastic defence, alternately
retreating and advancing, confusing the issues, putting forward
suggestions which he knew were futile, and all the time hastening
preparations for war.
Cavour, on the other hand, had a relatively straightforward if
difficult policy, namely, to goad Austria into sending Sardinia an
ultimatum. This would put her wrong in the eyes of Europe, fulfil
the conditions demanded by Napoleon and bring France, in pursuance
of the terms of the alliance, to his help immediately. His chief cause
of anxiety was the possible success of English pressure on Napoleon,
leading to a joint note from the Powers, and the search for a solution
not by war but by diplomacy through such medium as a congress,
which would never sanction the unity of Italy nor even the formation
of a strong state in the north with Piedmont as its centre.
Austria's reply to Napoleon's speech to Hiibner had been the
despatch of the 3rd Army Corps into Lombardy, for she put more
trust in soldiers than in diplomacy and this clearly aggressive action
strengthened Cavour J s diplomatic hand. He replied with an Appro-
priation Bill for fifty million lire. This was opposed by the
extreme Right in both Chambers on the ground of provocation; but
Cavour was able to make out a good case for his action, as purely
From Conspiracy to Diplomacy: Cavour, 1849-1 8 J9 109
defensive, and pointed to the increased Austrian army. Both sides
were insistent on the defensive nature of their military moves. *We
shall not declare war', Buol announced and Cavour was equally
emphatic. The first article of the Alliance stated, *In the event of war
breaking out between H.M. the King of Sardinia and H.M. the
Emperor of Austria, as the result of an aggressive action on the part
of Austria, an offensive and defensive alliance will be signed between
the Emperor of France and the King of Sardinia*. This imposed on
Cavour the necessity of provoking Austria and to do so he adopted
the policy of 'defensive provocation'- The loan s which was raised
entirely in Italy, much to Cavour's satisfaction, was followed by a Bill
for the reorganization of the National Guard* This was the method
chosen to defeat the clause in the treaty which stated that *no free
corps were to be raised*. Hundreds of volunteers were flocking into
Piedmont to join the army, from Lombardy and the Duchies. They
were incorporated nominally in the National Guard, but in reality
were trained as a special force of volunteers destined to be commanded
by Garibaldi. At the outbreak of hostilities they totalled twelve
thousand. This was the contribution of Italy to the war, outside
Piedmont. They were a further source of irritation to Austria for
most of them were her subjects.
In France the troubles of the Emperor increased. England was
exerting every kind of pressure, from the Queen's personal letters to
the activities of her ambassador. Lord Cowley. Further, there was
disconcerting news of Prussian preparations. Napoleon took a step
back. In a long article in the Moniteur he avowed his guarantee of
help to Italy but only in case of aggressive action by Austria. Having
obtained some satisfaction from Paris, England sent Lord Cowley
to preach peace at Vienna: he got many assurances but the steady
increase of troops sent into Lombardy belied the words of the Minis-
ters. Cavour then, with the consent of Napoleon, Vailed up the
contingents', bringing up all the regiments to war strength^ It was
practically mobilization. The next step was taken ostensibly by
Russia but inspired by Napoleon. Through Kisseleff, the Russian
ambassador to France, a congress was proposed. Cavour fought it
with ail his strength, for no help for Italy had ever come by this
means. The first suggestion was to limit it to the five great Powers,
Sardinia to be excluded. Then Austria proposed to include all the
Italian States, except Piedmont. While this was being debated England
summoned Sardinia to disarm but Cavour agreed only if Austria
disarmed first. Austria of course refused. No amount of pressure
no The Evolution of Modern Italy
would make Cavour give way so long as France maintained her
refusal to coerce Sardinia. Then came Lord Malmesbury's final
proposal, simultaneous disarmament by all three states, France, Austria
and Sardinia. Napoleon gave way and, provided that Sardinia was
admitted to the congress, agreed. The joint note, from France and
England, drove Cavour to the verge of suicide, but the timely advent
of his friend Castelli saved him. lf He was forced to yield, and tele-
graphed his willingness to disarm on equal terms with France and
Austria. No answer had yet come from Vienna upon whom the
entire responsibility for peace or war now rested. If she agreed to
disarm^ attend the congress and sit beside Sardinia, it would be peace.
Unknown to Europe Austria had, however, decided to take the law
into her own hands. She refused to disarm, sabotaged the congress,
and sent an ultimatum to Turin giving her three days' grace. It was
war. Cavour's policy of defensive provocation had triumphed.
Austria was the aggressor and the terms of the treaty came into
force.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE MILITARY OPERATIONS IN 1859
THE Austrian ultimatum was presented at Turin on April 23rd
and was formally rejected by the government on the 26th. The
general military situation on that date was as follows: Austria had
by then some 230,000 troops in Lombardy-Venetia, of which 70,000
were required to keep order and perform garrison duty, leaving
160,000 available for immediate action. This force was distributed
along the eastward curve of the river Ticino to its junction with the
river Po at Pavia. The chief centres of concentration being Afebiate-
grasso, lying almost due west of Milan, Bereguardo* further south,
and Pavia, with Milan, Lodi and Piacenza, as bases behind them.
Opposed to them was the Sardinian army of 60,000, upon whom fell
the double task of covering the capital and safeguarding the vital
railway from Genoa to Alessandria and Turin, by which the French
troops coming by sea from Algeria and Marseilles would arrive. To
cover the capital La Marmora had constructed defence works on the
river Dora Baltea twenty miles east of Turin, but after consultation
with the French experts sent beforehand, they were only lighdy held
and the army was concentrated between Casale and Alessandria, with
the King's headquarters midway at San Salvatore, and strong forces
guarding the passage of the river Po at Valenza and Bassignana. In
this position they not only protected the railway but threatened the
left flank of an Austrian force advancing on Turin.
When Napoleon made his famous remark to Hfibner at the opening
of the new year the French army was ill prepared for war. Tremen-
dous efforts had, however, been made since and by April the Army of
Italy, numbering 200,000 men divided into four army corps, was
equipped and ready. A fifth corps under Prince Napoleon was
formed a little later, and with the Imperial Guard, 360 guns, and three
cavalry divisions completed the entire force. The ist and 2nd corps
were to come by sea, and the 3rd and 4th by the Alpine Passes. No
time was wasted. By April 29th French troops were reaching Susa
and disembarking at Genoa, at the rate of no less than 10,000 a day.
One hundred thousand men were, in fact, transported into Italy in
twenty-five days.
Marshal Gyulai, the Austrian Commander-in-chief, began his
ill
112 The Evolution of Modern Italy
advance on April 29th. The country between the TIcino and Turin
is intersected by a series of rivers, roughly parallel, and all flowing
south. By May 2nd the tony had crossed the Terdoppio, the Agogna
and the Sesia, and had occupied Mortara, Novara and Vercelli, whilst
a brigade of Urban's reserve division had been sent north to seize
Como. At the southern end of the line a bridge was thrown across
the Po below Pavia and three brigades advanced on Castelnuovo,
Voghera' and Tortona (May 3rd). Unfortunately for the Austrian
plans the weather broke, heavy rain swelled the rivers, carried away
the pontoons and held up the advance. At the same time news came
through of the rapid concentration of the French in the central sector
around Alessandria, so on May 9th Gyulai ordered all troops to
retire behind the Sesia. By that date the 3rd and 4th French corps
were at Alessandria and the ist and 2nd, arriving by sea from Algeria
and Marseilles, were in force south of the Po between Novi and
Tortona. In a despatch to Vienna, Gyulai explained that the enemy
strength compelled him to abandon the idea of advancing on Turin
or of forcing the Po at Valenza and Bassignana, and necessitated his
covering Lombardy, which he proposed to do on a line between
Mortara and Vercelli. Gyulai's analysis of the situation in the middle
of May was that it was the Allies' intention to march on Piacenza,
crossing the Po at Valenza and advancing on both sides of the river.
To meet this threat he concentrated the bulk of his forces in the
centre, and to clear up the situation south of the Po, and find out, if
possible, the allied strength around Tortona and Voghera, he directed
Stadion to make a reconnaissance in force from Pavia on the southern
bank of the Po. This led to the first clash at Montebello.
Stadion now took over the command from Urban, whose reserve
division had been the single unit across the Po, and with a mixed
force of twenty thousand men advanced along the Stradella-Tortona
road towards Casteggio and Montebello. Having occupied these two
places without opposition, he sent forward a detachment to seize
Genestrello, a position of tactical importance a mile or two further on.
Voghera was held by a French division under General Forey, who on
getting word of Stadion's movements, collected what troops were
ready and at once advanced. The two forces met at Genestrello.
Forey, though outnumbered at first, attacked. The battle lasted two
hours. The elan of the French troops carried the day, and Stadion
promptly retired on Pavia. Forey lost in all some seven hundred men,
while Stadion not only lost double that number but failed in the
objective of the reconnaissance. This action convinced Gyulai of
The Military Operations in i$j$ 113
the accuracy of his forecast that Piacenza was the aim of the allied
army and he still further strengthened his left and centre at the
expense of his right.
The action at Montebello was hardly over when fighting flared up
in the north. Garibaldi, who was now an Italian major-general in
command of the volunteers, was at Biella on May lyth with three
thousand men; from there he crossed the Sesia and a week later was
at Varese. Urban with a brigade was sent north to stop him. On
the 26th he attacked Garibaldi at Varese but was beaten and retired
to Rebbio where a second brigade joined him; but Garibaldi, who had
followed him closely, again attacked him and drove him as far as
Monza. On the 2pth, strengthened by yet another brigade, he
advanced and reoccupied Varese, while Garibaldi tried unsuccessfully
to capture the fort of Laveno on Lake Maggiore; before, however,
he could exploit his advantage, for Garibaldi's position was now
difficult with the Austrians at Varese and Lake Maggiore behind Mm,
much greater events further south brought Urban a hasty recall and
removed all danger for the volunteers.
Napoleon arrived at Genoa on May 12th, exactly two months
before the signing of the Peace of Villafiranca, and was met by Victor
Emanuel and Cavour. The Emperor then joined his army at Alessan-
dria and preparations for the advance began. The problem was where
to attack, in the south, the centre or the north. An advance in the
south, by the right bank of the Po, which Gyulai thought most
probable, meant moving a large army by a single road, that from
Tortona to Piacenza, between the mountains on their right and the
river on their left, with the Austrians in possession of the crossing
below Pavia and the difficult and strongly held fortress of Piacenza
blocking further advance. To attack in the centre meant a frontal
effort on entrenched positions over a terrain intersected with dykes
and streams and often under water. There remained the northern
sector* This was the most lightly held; it opened the road to Milan
and turned the Austrian right flank, necessitating, in the event of an
allied victory, a general withdrawal from Lombardy. On the other
hand, it en|ailed the abandonment of Genoa as a base of supply, and
in case of defeat would find the army in a most precarious position
with a neutral country, Switzerland, in their rear; above all it entailed
a hazardous flank march across the enemy's front from south to north.
This was, however, the plan which was adopted.
Vercelli had been evacuated by the Austrians on the iyth and was
now occupied by the Italians, but east of the Sesia the Austrians held
H4 The Evolution of Modem Italy
the whole area from Novara southward to Mortara with detach-
ments occupying the villages right up to the river. It was now decided
that the flank advance northwards of the French army should be
covered by an Italian attack from Vercelli across the Sesia on the
villages of Palestro, Vinzaglio and Confienza, to divert the attention
of the enemy from the movement of the French divisions and drive
the Austrians back upon Robbio. Three bridges were thrown across
the Sesia opposite Vercelli, and on May 29th four Italian divisions
crossed. On the soth, the anniversary of Charles Albert's victory at
Goito, they attacked. Severe fighting took place at Palestro, which
occupied a commanding position on the plateau overlooking the
river. The Italians, supported here by the French Zouaves, stormed
the village and held it, while two other divisions seized Vinzaglio
and Confienza, the Austrians withdrawing to Robbio. Gyulai, it
was evident, had not yet grasped the esjtent of the French move
northwards, for the next day he sent forward two divisions to recover
the lost ground, now held by more than double the number of allied
troops. Besides, Canrobert's corps had now concentrated at Prarolo,
some two miles west of the river opposite Palestro, and had crossed it
with three further divisions. In the fighting on the 3ist the Austrians
lost over two thousand men against six hundred allied losses, and that
evening Gyulai telegraphed to Vienna that he had cancelled the attack
for the next day owing to the great superiority of the allied forces.
After the defeat at Palestro the indecision of Gyulai became most
marked, for he could not make up his mind which side of the Ticino
to fight. He is said to have proposed to withdraw behind the Mincio,
as Radetzky did in 1848, but that this was strongly opposed by Kuhn,
his chiefof-staff, and that finally a compromise was reached by decid-
ing to withdraw behind the Ticino. This was effected during the first
three days of June, the main forces being concentrated at Magenta,
Abbiategrasso and Binasco. The only permanent crossing of the
Ticino was by the stone bridge at Boffalora, strongly held and
defended by earthworks, but six miles higher up the river could be
crossed by a ferry at Turbigo. This was at once seized by the Allies,
a bridge was thrown across and on the 3rd MacMahon's ist division
crossed, and driving the Austrians from the village of Robecchetto,
assured the passage of the river for the army.
The battle of Magenta which was fought the next day (June 4th)
a s the first of the two battles which decided the campaign. The main
ench forces were around Novara, while MacMahon's 2nd corps
as now across the river at Turbigo and Robecchetto. On the
The Military Operations in
115
u6 The Evolution of Modern Italy
morning of the 4th, the French advanced on Magenta from the north
and the west. From Novara, the main road and railway went direct
to Milan, crossing the river at Boffalora, and a mile further, crossing
the Grand Canal, which rambelow the rising ground beyond which
lay the village of Magenta. It was along this road the main forces
moved to seize the bridge, cross the river, and then the canal, whilst
MacMahon's troops worked southward. The struggle began about
midday and lasted until eight that evening. As the two French forces
converged on Magenta, they formed a semicircle, steadily pressing
in upon the village. The severest fighting was for the bridges, of
which there were five across the canal, and for groups of houses and
some farm buildings which lay beyond. These changed hands several
times as fresh troops were drawn in to drive out the exhausted
defenders. ,At the close of the fighting a desperate struggle took place
in Magenta itself until the Austrians were finally expelled, their
remaining troops withdrawing east to Corbetta. The losses -of the
French were 4,500, the Austrians, including prisoners, 10,000.
The battle of Magenta was on both sides a premature action.
Neither army was fully concentrated and ready to fight. Only a
portion of the Austrians had been engaged, for Gyulai was still
uneasy as to an attack towards Piacenza and had considerable forces
at the southern end of the front. Better generalship and superior
fighting powers had given the Allies victory, but the night of June 4th
must have been an anxious one for Napoleon. In fact, Gyulai gave
orders that night for a renewal of the struggle the next day, to be
concentrated on the recapture of Magenta. But the deplorable con-
dition of the troops who had fought and the disorganization and
confusion that reigned in the commands made an immediate renewal
of the battle impossible. Melczer, in command at Milan, had at once
ordered the immediate evacuation of the city, troops to be sent to
Lodi and munitions to Verona, and this, with the report of the
divisional commanders, decided Gyulai on a general withdrawal.
The plain of Lombardy is traversed by two main roads, a northern
and a southern. The first crossing the frontier at Boffalora goes direct
to Milan, Brescia, Verona and Venice. The other follows the river Po
through Pavia, Piacenza, Cremona and Mantua. The whole plain
is likewise transected by the series of rivers feeding the Po, the Adda,
the Oglio, the Chiese and the Mincio, this last forming the eastern
boundary of Lombardy. The victory of Magenta had opened the
road to Milan, and while the Allies marched on the capital the Aus-
trians withdrew to the Mincio by the southern road, thereby surren-
The Military Operations in i8j) 117
dering Lombardy to the victors. Napoleon and Victor Emanuel
made their triumphant entry into Milan on June 8th, acclaimed with
delirious joy by the populace, for the Italians have a genius for wel-
coming those who fight their battles for them; but the feelings of
Victor Emanuel as he rode beside the Emperor must have been tinged
with bitterness when he thought of the last time he saw the city, ten
years before, after Custoza; with his father Charles Albert besieged
in the Palazzo Greppi and the crowd hurling cries of treason and
death, and the final exit from the city accompanied by unanswered
gun shots from the roofs and windows. It was small wonder that the
House of Savoy preferred the silent loyalty of their Turinese to the
mercurial enthusiasm of the citizens of Milan. The next day the
Emperor and the King left Milan for the front. More than one plan
was made by Gyulai for a determined stand before reaching the safety
of the Quadrilateral, but the steady pressure of the advancing French
army quickly caused their collapse. On the night of the 6th he
received stringent orders from the Emperor Franz Joseph to stand
firm on the Adda, or if it was now too late, to take up a position
between Piacenza and Lodi. Instructions were therefore issued to this
effect, and to gain information of the movements of the French,
Gyulai sent Roden to hold Melegnano, with orders to patrol every-
where and report on enemy activities. This was on the 6th. On the
8th a force six times as large attacked him; Roden put up a splendid
resistance but the odds were too great and he was driven out with a
loss of fifteen hundred men. This action determined a further retreat.
Pavia was evacuated, the fortresses of Piacenza, Pizzighettone and
Cremona were dismantled as far as possible, their heavy guns being
sent to Mantua or destroyed, and the garrisons absorbed into the army
and all the columns of the retiring troops were directed to the Mincio.
A new Austrian army was now appearing on the scene. As early
as May 30th the 1st army was ordered to mobilize under the com-
mand of Count Wimpffen, with the Emperor in supreme command
of both armies. On the 3Oth Franz Joseph proceeded to Verona, After
the failure of the defence of the Adda, Gyulai had decided on defend-
ing the Mincio from behind the river CMese, between Lonato, Mon~
richiari and Castiglione, a line south and west of Lake Garda with
the fortress of Peschiera upon which to retire. This was now given up
and both armies were concentrated behind the Mincio, the second
army between Peschiera and Goito, the first from Goito to Mantua.
Nine bridges were thrown across the Mincio and by June 2ist both
armies were in their assigned positions. On the i8th Gyulai re-
The Evolution of Modern Italy
The Military Operations in iSjp up
signed and was replaced by Count ScHlck. The Emperor was now
in command of an army numbering 190,000 men with 22,600 horses
and 752 guns. While this concentration of the Austrian army was
being carried through the Allies were steadily converging on the
Mincio. Napoleon commanded a slightly smaller force, numbering
174,000 men with 14,500 horses and 522 guns. The only portion
of the troops which had left France that was absent, was one half of
the 5th corps under Prince Napoleon, of which one division had been
detached and added to the ist corps while the other had been sent to
Tuscany, where, with the levies under General Ulloa and the volun-
teers of General Mezzacapo, it formed a body of nearly ten thousand.
After the battle of Magenta, the flight of the Duchess of Parma and
the Duke of Modena, together with the recall of the Austrian gar-
risons, left the Duchies unguarded, and on June i2th Prince Napoleon
crossed the Apennines and before the end of the month occupied
Parma.
The terrain over which the great final battle of the campaign,
Soiferino, was fought, was as unusual as it was difficult. The ground
on the western bank of the river Mincio, as it flows south to Mantua,
rises between Peschiera and Pozzolo to form a mountainous block
extending six or seven miles from east to west and about the same
distance from north to south. Roughly shaped like a triangle, it has
its base on the Mincio and its apex the town of Castiglione, which
lies in the plain beyond the last hills to the west. This block of hilly
country is surrounded by the plain: within it lies the village of
Soiferino, midway along its southern side a mile or two from the
edge. A circle of villages surrounds the block of Mils. On die east
side lies Pozzolengo towards the northern angle, in the centre Hes
Castellaro with Cavriano in the southern angle. From Castiglione a
chain of villages, well out in the plain, runs eastward along the
southern border of hills, Medole, Guidizzolo, Cereta and finally
Pozzolo on the Mincio, Two miles north of CastigEone lies Esenta
and due north again the larger village of Lonato.
Franz Joseph and his staff had no intention of remaining on the
Minao and awaiting the French attack. They calculated, from their
information as to the position of the enemy, that by a sudden and
unexpected advance they would intercept the French troops in the
act of crossing- the river Chiese. With this objective, orders were
issued on the 22nd for the general advance of the army. On the
23rd they were to cross the Mincio and occupy the line Pozzolengo-
Solferino-Guidizzolo and on the 24th to advance to that of Lonato-
120 The Evolution of Modern Italy
Castiglione-Carpenedolo. On the same date the French staff issued
orders for the advance on the 24th from the line Lonato-CastigHone-
Carpenedolo to that of Pozzolengo-Solferino-Guidizzolo. Thus on
the same day and on the same roads, each army would be advancing
on the bases which the other was vacating. The only possible result
must be a general action, in which the element of surprise would lie
with the army which started first. This advantage lay with the
French, whose movement was to start 'not later than 3 a.m.' whereas
the Austrians were to move at stated times between 8 a.m. and 10 a.m.
This advantage, however, might be held to be balanced by 'the fact
that the French troops had had several hours of marching before the
action began while the Austrians would be fresh. The Italian army
was on the left of the allied line and their objective was thus Pozzo-
lengo. The advance on Solferino in the centre was entrusted to the
1st and 2-nd corps (mainly Algerian troops) and the Imperial Guard,
while MacMahon with the 3rd and 4th corps on the right had the
village of Guidizzolo as his objective.
The battle consisted of three separate actions, for the steep scarp
of the mountains that fringed the southern edge of the block made it
impossible for MacMahon to send help to the centre if needed, and
the same was true of the Italians in the north, divided from the
centre by almost the entire width of the hills; only the divisions held
in reserve outside could be directed by the Emperor to one or other
of the centres of conflict. The first contact was made on the southern
sector with MacMahon' s advance on Medole. The terrain here was
partly cultivated, with farms and houses spread about round the
villages but with stretches of open heathy land. It was some time
before the Austrians realized the strength of the opposing forces but
when they did a dour struggle began for every defensible point. The
numbers engaged were about equal, and the battle lasted until the
afternoon, when the general retirement of the Austrians to the Mincio
became necessary, and their forces withdrew fighting obstinately to
the last. Medole, Guidizzolo and finally Cavriana were stormed by
the French but only after long hours of effort and repeated setbacks.
In the northern sector, Benedek, in command at Pozzolengo, observed
the advance of the Italians as early as 6 a.m. He at once sent forward
two brigades to hold the high ground about San Martino, covering
Pozzolengo, which he reinforced later. Here the battle raged all day
until the general Austrian withdrawal across the river in the afternoon.
No impression could be made by Victor Emanuel on the defence of
San Martino, but, at least his pressure was so severe that Benedek
The Military Operations in i$j$ 121
had to refuse the request for help for the centre and concentrate all
his strength on the safe withdrawal to the Mincio. But the crux of the
whole battle lay in the epic struggle for the village of Solferino and Its
environs. The village itself lay high up, in a depression surrounded
by higher ground. North-west of it rose a conical hill called the Bocca
di Solferino, from which were flung out two spurs, the one on the left
called the Monte di Cipressi from a ridge of cypresses on its summit,
the other being occupied by the Church of St. Nicholas. This was
surrounded by a high wall enclosing the school, a belfry and the
priest's house as well as the church itself. Close by was another
wallcd-in enclosure, the cemetery. Two narrow roads wound up
between the hills to the church and village. From this group of
buildings the ground sloped down towards the plain in a series of
sharp ridges called the Scale (ladders) di Solferino , each one com-
inanded by the ridge above it, forming a natural outwork of great
strength. Such was the terrain, strongly occupied by the Austrians,
which the troops of Marshal Baraguey cTHilliers assaulted. The
struggle was long and made at tremendous cost, but the French
would not be denied. Ridge after ridge was carried at the point of
the bayonet, but, as the French approached the summit, it was neces-
sary to bring up the guns to breach the walls of the enclosures. After
tremendous labour this was at length accomplished and in one great
final assault, into which Napoleon threw all his last reserves, the whole
position was carried. The capture of Solferino broke the back of the
defence, for from this central position the remaining points of
Austrian resistance could be taken in rear and Franz Joseph now issued
orders for a general withdrawal to their original positions across the
Mincio. This was carried out skilfully and in order, for the French
were themselves too much exhausted for further efforts and no fresh
troops were available. About 5 o'clock a violent thunderstorm,
accompanied by torrents of rain and an intense darkness, broke over
the battlefield, putting an end to the fighting and enabling the
Austrians to disengage their forces. The losses of the Austrians at
Solferino were nearly 22,000 officers and men and the total losses of
the French were over 17,000.
No movement took place in either army until the 28th. On that
day Franz Joseph, after consulting his generals, decided to retire to
the line of the Adige. That night, leaving their watch fires burning,
the army dropped quiedy back and a week later were in their new
positions. There was no suspicion in the French army or in Italy
that the campaign was about to close. In fact all indications pointed
122 The Evolution of Modern Italy
to an advance. The troops of Garibaldi and the Italian division under
Cialdini, had already secured the army's left flank by the occupation
of Lavenone s Gavardo and Salo on Lake Garda. An allied fleet had
now reached the Adriatic, and based on the island of Lossini, was in
position to attack the forts of Venice. The skge of Peschiera was
about to be undertaken and the siege guns were already in transit
from France. On July 2nd the French crossed the Mincio, establishing
their headquarters at Villafranca and Sommacampagna, names redol-
ent of Charles Albert's campaign in 1848. But all these preparations
for the due fulfilment of Napoleon's promise, to free Italy 'from the
Alps to the Adriatic*, came to nothing when suddenly, after giving a
hint to Victor Emanuel, the Emperor on July 6th sent General Fleury
to Franz Joseph's headquarters with a request for an armistice. This
was signed on the 8th. On the nth the two Emperors met at Villa-
franca, and the next day, two months from his landing in Italy,
Napoleon signed the terms of peace and the war was over.
CHAPTER EIGHT
THE POLITICAL REACTIONS OF
THE WAR
WTH the outbreak of hostilities Cavour took over the War
Dffice, vacated by La Marmora who was attached in an
ambiguous capacity to the staff of the King as military adviser.
Though he already held both the portfolios of Foreign and Internal
Affairs^ Cavour carried out his triple duties with amazing efficiency*
for all three ministries were housed In the same building and he slept
where he worked. At his meeting with Napoleon at Plombieres
Cavour had taken care not to contravene the Emperor's proposals
for the re-division of Italy, but It Is clear from the policy he
adopted that he had every intention of thwarting them, for his objec-
tive was Italian unity. ' Of the four suggested divisions, he welcomed
the formation of the Kingdom of Upper Italy, agreed with the
retention of the Papal States* but on a reduced scale, for his inter-
pretation of Napoleon's phrase 'from the Alps to the Adriatic* meant
from 4 the Alps to Ancona* because he wanted the Romagna. Naples
he left aside for the time being, but he rejected the Idea of a Kingdom
of Central Italy. To prevent this his policy was now directed.
The events in the early part of the year. Napoleon's words to
Hiibner, the grido di dolore speech and the marriage of Prince
Napoleon, had naturally created great excitement throughout Italy.
On March I4th to clarify the attitude of the Grand-ducal government,
Cavour had instructed his Minister at Florence, Boncompagni, to
propose an alliance between the two states in view of the approaching
war. It was an astute move* for if It was accepted, It put a spoke in
the wheel of any Kingdom of Central Italy, and if it was refused,' It
at once separated the Grand-duke from the national movement. But
Leopold, an Austrian Archduke, put upon his throne by Austrian
troops after 1848, had small option in Ms choice and It was refused.
The result was to consolidate the Unitarian party and with Boncom-
pagni at its head an agitation for the removal of the dynasty began.
Cavour waite,d patiently until the crisis came, and on April 24th, the
day after the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum* Boncompagni
was instructed to demand from the Tuscan Foreign Minister a formal
declaration in favour of Piedmont. The reply was evasive, but the
in
124 The Evolution of Modem Italy
Grand-duke knew what it meant. Ho refused to abdicate, but three
days later, undisturbed by any hostile demonstration, with all his
family he took the road to exile.
After the withdrawal of the Grand-duke there was great confusion
in Tuscany. Boncornpagni,for the moment the most important figure,
was lacking in decision. He made a wise choice, however, in select-
ing the Baron Bettino Ricasoli as the new head of the government.
But opinion was far from unanimous about union with Piedmont.
Some wanted the young Archduke Ferdinand with liberal guarantees,
others desired an autonomous state under a new line, and amongst
these, the Prince Napoleon, as son-in-law of Victor Emanuel, had his
adherents. Ricasoli, however, supported by Cavour, was determined
on union and Boncompagni received secret instructions to prepare it.
The first proposal of the government was to offer the dictatorship of
the duchy to Victor Emanuel. But this opened difficult questions and
the delegates were referred to Napoleon to whom they exposed the
confusion reigning at Florence. Napoleon then decided to send Prince
Napoleon with his division to Tuscany to keep order and forestall
any Austrian attempt at a coup de main. The King, in^the meantime,
refused the dictatorship but accepted a provisional 'protectorship*,
leaving open the final destiny of die duchy until after tie war. It has
often been said that the presence of the Prince and his division was
the first step to the formation of the Central Italian Kingdom to which
he was secretly destined. There is no evidence for this. The Emperor
denied it, as did the Prince, and his well-known support of Tuscan
union with Piedmont discounts all the rumours of his aspirations to
the throne.
After the battle of Magenta and the Austrian evacuation of Lom-
bardy, both the Duke of Modena and the Duchess of Parma sought
safety in flight. Provisional governments were at once installed, both
of which asked for union with Piedmont This was accepted, and a
Royal Commissioner was appointed for each, Count Pallieri at Parma
and Loigi Zini, and later L. C. Farini at Modena. At the same
timeM. Vigliaai, a prominent Piedmo&tese magistrate, was nominated
Governor of Lombardy. As Lombardy and the duchies had Jbeen
included in the 'Kingdom of Upper Italy' there was no difficulty
with. Napoleon over these appointments, though he was not too pleased
at the promptitude with which Cavour gathered the fruits resulting
from French efforts. It was a different matter when at came to the
Romagna. On June nth Austria withdrew her garrison from Bolog-
na- The Cardinal Legate at once left the city for Rome, and Bologna,
The Political Reactions of the War 125
after an outbreak of rejoicing, nominated a provisional government
whose first act was to telegraph to Victor Einaniiel and offer him the
dictatorship. Almost immediately the scattered garrisons throughout
the Papal States were withdrawn and the example of Bologna was
followed everywhere. Not only did the revolt spread throughout the
Romagna, but it penetrated into the Marches, as far south as Pertigia,
all alike throwing off the Papal yoke and calling for absorption In
Piedmont. The Allies were now face to face with the thorny problem
of the Temporal Power.
Cavour had long ago made up his mind that the temporal power of
the Pope must be abolished, and the personal opinion of Napoleon
was very much the same, for he was disgusted at the Pope's refusal .to
reform and at the hopeless futility of Ms notions of government. But
it was not a question to be solved on personal predilections. The
Temporal Power was regarded by the whole Catholic world as the
guarantee of Papal independence, and by none with greater intensity
than the Catholic party in France, upon which the stability of the
Napoleonic government rested. To occupy the territory of the Holy
Father with French troops or to permit the Italians to do so s except
for Papal safely, like the garrison of French troops in Rome, might
lead not only to a general protest and outcry, but to clerical opposition
in France. Victor Emanuel was advised on all sides, 'refuse the
dictatorship, refuse the protectorate, but accept aU help for the
war*. While the outcome was still in suspense, the Pope ordered
Colonel Schmidt with his two thousand Swiss troops to suppress the
revolt in Perugia. This he did with such brutal thoroughness that
Europe was shocked. This sample of Papal ideas of restoring order
convinced Napoleon that action would have to be taken. He threw
the responsibility on Victor Emanuel, refused to allow French troops
to cross into Papal territory, and endeavoured to minimize the Italian
occupation as merely a temporary expedient to ensure order. So
Cavour sent Massimo D'Azeglio, the former Premier, to Bologna
with sufficient troops to keep order and officers to train the new
levies.
Napoleon had not the fibre of a successful general He had never
seen the realism of war until General Bourbaki took him over the
field of Palestro, and the sight revolted him; and now came the
slaughter of Solferino; after this his mind was set on peace. He had
plenty of reasons for dissatisfaction with the military situation and
for uneasiness in regard to the political. His losses were severe and
reinforcements were not easy to find. The Italian response to the call
126 The Evolution of Modern Italy
for recruits was feeble in the extreme. From the letters of Cavour
and the King, Napoleon had been led to expect a great national
rising, but the reality was otherwise. The Italians were lavish with
cheers and compliments but parsimonious when it came to fighting
material. They much preferred that the battles should be fought by
the French and the Piedmontese. All the efforts of the National Society
produced only twelve thousand out of twenty millions. They have
not altered much since. The task still before the allied army meant
more severe fighting, for the resources of Austria were far from
exhausted. No less disquieting was the political aspect. The guidance
of the national movement was rapidly slipping from the Emperor's
hands. He was consulted and treated with all respect, but it was to
Cavour that every one turned for advice. The Kingdom of Central
Italy was still in the clouds and that of Upper Italy incomplete. His
relations, too, with Victor Emanuel had deteriorated and were not
without a tincture of jealousy. The King's love of fighting had in-
spired unpleasant comparisons. Had not the Zouaves after Palestro
made him the first corporal of the regiment, as another French
regiment had done to his father before him, when he fought with the
Grenadiers at the storming of the Trocadero at Cadiz ? To all these
reasons was now added the unpleasant but indubitable fact that Prussia
had four hundred thousand men in arms on the Rhine. It was time
he considered the safety of France. So Napoleon, after showing a
pessimistic letter from the Empress to Victor Emanuel, had sent
General Fleury to Franz Joseph to ask for an armistice, and without
wasting a day, drew up peace terms and finished the war.
By the terms of Peace Lombardy was to be surrendered to Napoleon,
who would give it to Victor Emanuel: Venetia with Peschiera and
Mantua were to remain with Austria : the dispossessed Princes were
to be restored, but without force being used: Italy was to be a
Confederation under the Pope. On getting word in a telegram from
La Marmora that the armistice was being signed, Cavour and Nigra
hurried to headquarters. He was not consulted; the Peace was signed
unknown to him, and he felt no responsibility for its execution. Late
in the evening the King returned with the Peace terms signed. A
terrible scene followed. When Cavour, distraught with impatience,
heard the terms all his control gave way. The whole fabric he had
raised crumbled before his eyes. Austria, ensconced in Venetia with
Mantua and Peschiera in her hands was still master in Italy, and now
admitted on an equal footing with the rest of Italy as a member of the
Italian Confederation under Papal presidency. The Dukes of Tuscany
The Political Reactions of the War 127
and Modem to return : Lombardy won as a gift from Napoleon. After
a furious outburst of denunciation, Cavour resigned, and the next day
returned to Turin and shortly afterwards left Piedmont* for Switzer-
land. As to Napoleon, dissatisfied and frightened, knowing that he
had betrayed Italy and left his self-imposed task half done, nervous
for the safety of his throne and country, he^ hurried back to Paris,
leaving orders for the bulk of his forces to follow Mm with all speed.
Prussia, thwarted in her aim, demobilized with angry mutterings to
wait for another opportunity to rise against her hereditary enemy.
This first tentative and immature effort at Pan-Germanism had
failed, but it is wel to remember that all the formative elements of
the German creed were already in being. Bismarck was active, his
eyes already on Schleswig-Holstein. Treitschke was lecturing on
history at Leipsic. Aryanism and Racialism, Pan-Germanism with its
correlative anti-semitism, were being discussed and formulated,
ideas whose ripened fruit is poisoning the world to-day.
Before leaving Turin Cavour had given Ms last directions to the
disputed provinces. Parma was to prepare the act of union with
Piedmont at once. As to Tuscany, he had told her envoy BiancM to
prepare a Liberal government, to resist diplomatic pressure, and refuse
the return of the Grand-duke. *If Tuscany holds firm it may save
everything*, he added. The official recall of the Royal Commissioners
had followed the conclusion of peace and D'Azeglio had returned
from Bologna; but at Modena, Farini after resigning his official post,
was promptly elected dictator, first at Modena and then at Parma and
Bologna, which, with the inclusive title of Emilia, he proceeded to
govern with energy and firmness. No less decided was RicasoE's
conduct at Florence. These two men saved Italy. For the six months
Cavour was out of office, despite the protests of La Marmora's new
Ministry and pressure from the representatives of France, they held
firm to union with Piedmont, rendering the return of the old order
impossible except by armed force. Farini was anxious for the two
states to join forces, but Ricasoli, with greater political perspicacity,
realized that by so doing they would be creating just that Kingdom of
Central Italy wMch was Napoleon's* objective, and all he would have
to do would be to name the individual for whom they had prepared
a throne, so he insisted that their policy should be Identical but dis-
tinct*. To make Ms policy quite clear Ricasoli called an Assembly
wMch passed unaniniously two resolutions. The first, that they would
never receive back the House of Lorraine; the second, that it was
Tuscany \ firm intention c to make part of a strong Italian Kingdom
128 The Evolution of Modem Italy
under the constitutional sceptre of King Victor EmanueF. Similar
resolutions were passed by the three states under Farini, and all alike
were presented and received by the King, who promised to make
their wishes known to Europe but made no mention of annexation.
Both dictators then set to work to 'piedmontize' their states, unifying
the currency, the customs and the postal arrangements, and while
Farini numbered the new regiments in continuation of those of the
Piedmontese army, Ricasoli put up the royal arms on all public
places and headed public documents with the title, Regnando S.M.
Vittorio Emanuele.
The destiny of Emilia and Tuscany was at the same time the subject
of earnest deliberation at Zurich, where the Plenipotentiaries of
Austria, France and Piedmont, were assembled to sign the Peace
Treaty. Austria wanted the compulsory return of the dispossessed
rulers, France a Central Kingdom, and Piedmont union. Outside the
Conference England was all for union, Napoleon forbade annexation
and likewise the use of force, which checkmated Austria. The
government at Turin was too weak to take decided action and referred
every suggestion to the Emperor. It was Cavour who divined the
cause of Napoleon's obstructive attitude and was prepared to provide
the remedy. On leaving Turin the Emperor had said to Victor
Emanuel, *You will pay rne the cost of the war and we will say no
more of Savoy and Nice*. When he got back to Paris, however, he
was soon made aware of popular discontent with the outcome of the
'Italian adventure*. On the surface it had been a remarkable tour de
force. In two months France had transported a quarter of a million
men to Italy, won two resounding victories without a single check,
rescued Lombardy for Italy, made peace, and was back in Paris
almost before Europe had realized that the war had begun. Napo-
leon's prestige had risen sharply, France's military reputation was
increased, and Piedmont was to pay the expenses. But France had
got nothing but glory, and highly as she prized it, she liked it best
when accompanied by increase of territory. The exchange of Savoy
for Lombardy was an old suggestion in European diplomatic annals,
Queen Elizabeth had once discussed it with the Venetian ambassador,
and in well-informed French circles it had been an open secret that
this was to be the quid pro quo France was to receive; it was enshrined,
moreover, in the Treaty of Alliance, with Nice added. So Napoleon
began to scheme to get the coveted provinces. A visit of General
Dabormida, the Foreign Secretary in the new government, gave
Napoleon an opening, and he suggested that Nice and Savoy might
The Political Reactions of the War 129
be accepted instead of cash for Ms expenses. But the general reminded
him of the unfortunate phrase 'from the Alps to the Adriatic*, and that
not having been fulfilled, the Savoy and Nice clause did not apply.
So the deadlock continued.
After two months 1 holiday Cavour returned to Piedmont, and his
farmstead at Leri at once became a centre for envoys and diplomats.
He offered to help the government but he was a poor consultant, for
the delicate operations he suggested could only be successfully per-
formed by himself. As in the parliamentary debates, so now, the
varied opinions and information he received from correspondents and
visitors, clarified his thought, and before long he was busy with new
plans and a fresh policy. It was based on the conviction that the
original terms of the alliance must be fulfilled. Savoy and Nice must
go, but Italy must get Tuscany and the Romagna in exchange. Cavour
now wanted to get back to power: he had not long to wait. The
government, faced with, the prospect of Cavour in opposition* for
Parliament was to meet in the new year, resigned, and after a difficult
interview with die King, who still smarted at Cavour's outburst at
Monzambano, he found himself once more President of the Council.
His first act was to dissolve the Chamber and order a general election
which was to include the nomination of deputies from Lombardy,
Tuscany and Emilia. This he followed with a circular letter to Ms
agents and diplomats abroad announcing that, as Europe had failed to
agree on the settlement of Italy, she was now entitled to deal with her
internal problems herself. He then let Napoleon know privately, as
did Victor Emanuel, that they were prepared to surrender Savoy and
Nice in exchange for Central Italy. His plan was to hold a plebiscite
in both areas, for he was certain that Nice and Savoy would vote for in-
corporation in France, by means, ifnecessary , of judicious manipulation.
He intended, however, to have parliamentary sanction and to regularize
the exchange of territory by constitutional methods. Cavour's hands
were at this point much strengthened by the work of Lord John
Russell, who induced Napoleon to adhere to a four-point programme,
non-interference by France and Austria in Italy, a plebiscite, the
withdrawal of French troops and no interference in the internal affairs
of Venetia. The winning of Central Italy now appeared assured and
Cavour hurried on the plebiscite. But it was not to be all plain sailing,
Cavour had hitherto kept Nice and Savoy in the background, but now
Napoleon became suspicious that Italy having got her quota might
repudiate the cession of Nice and Savoy, so he inspired strong articles
in the Press demanding his share of the spoils. This infuriated England,
130 Tlit' Evolution of Modem Italy
who wrote about the shame of sacrificing the cradle of the race.
Cavour denied and prevaricated, insisting that he would neither cede
nor exchange Italian soil, but added to Sir James Hudson, that if Savoy
of her own will voted for incorporation in France, Italy would accept
the verdict, as it would accept that of Tuscany and Emilia, Napoleon
regarded Cavour^s constitutional methods as mere finesse, and im-
patient for his pound of flesh, under the pretext of withdrawing the
French forces from Italy, marched troops into Nice and Savoy before
the plebiscite. This made the outcome inevitable and in due course
Tuscany and Emilia voted themselves into Italy and Nice and Savoy
into France, The new of things was regulated by an open
treaty accepted and sanctioned by Parliament.
Having out-manoeuvred by Cavour over Central Italy,
Napoleon had his four-part division of the peninsula
reduced to three. He now became uneasy lest by turning south it
should be further reduced to two, by the absorption of Naples. In
the of his VElafranca Cavour had declared that the
should never be executed. He would turn to Naples* become
a conspirator, anything to prevent the treaty from being carried
out. TMs outburst merely brought to the surface ideas long latent
in his mind, for, as he wrote in a calmer moment* he had fore-
when the national aims were blocked from going cast,
they would inevitably turn south. But Cavour *$ policy did not in-
for the present an attack on Naples. Before that was feasible
the Papal States had to be dealt with. He wanted to work from north
to south and deal with the centre first. He had already an assurance
the French garrison would leave Rome during the summer.
When took place a condition similar to that of the Romagna
would soon be created. If Naples stepped in to keep
order, could at once be regarded as a breach of non-intervention,
and with by force if necessary. But until that situation material-
lie would be content to bring order and organization to the new
and weld together the Italy already redeemed. In May 1859
King Ferdinand of Naples had died and Ms feeble son Francis suc-
ceeded him. Cavour, badly in need of more troops, had offered Mm
an which had been refused^ and since then there had been
between the two states. In March 1860 the Pied-
Minister at Naples wrote warning Cavour that a plot was on
foot to recover the Romagna by Neapolitan arms. It was a. strange
combination of forces s consisting of Francis II, Cardinal AntoneUi
the Papal Foreign Secretary, the Archduchess Sophia at Vienna and
The Political Reactions of the War 131
die Qtieen at Naples, supported by Mons. GineEi, the Papal
Nuncio, and die Spanish ambassador, Bermudez di Castro, who talked
openly of the "great Catholic league', Cavour instructed his Minister
to act with reserve, but with vigour if the Neapolitan troops
occupied any Papal territory. It was not, however, to be Neapolitan
aggression but Piedmontese which opened the southern problem^
Sicily was the conspirator's paradise. The hatred of the Sicilians
for the' Neapolitans, the long tale of ill-treatment meted out to them,
the poverty and misery of the peasantry had made incipient rebellion
a chronic condition amongst the mass of the people. Since the failure
of Pisacane's expedition in 1857, Mazzini had turned his attention to
Sicily, so too had La Farina, himself a Sicilian, with the resources
of die National Society. Their principal agents were Nicola Fabrizi,
whose headquarters were in Francesco Crispi, the future
Italian Premier, and Rosaliiio Pilo. Unrest had naturally been in-
creased by recent events, and the of their efforts was a rising
at the Gancia Convent at Palermo on April 6th. In itself it was a small
affair and was quickly stamped out bv the police, but it was sympto-
matic of a larger movement. News of what was taking place in Sicily
quickly reached Cavour. It was an inopportune moment, for four
days before, the had opened the first Italian Parliament amid
great popular pride and interest. Turin was foil of deputies and the
city was given over to festivity. Cavoiar found time, nevertheless, to
consult Ms Minister for War, General Fanti , as to a suitable officer who
might be sent to guide and stimulate the movement; for Cavour ,
though anxious for peace with Naples, had no compunction in helping
to create trouble for her in Sicily. One never knew what oppor-
tunities might emerge. Fanti suggested Colonel Ribotri, who had
taken part in Bentivegna's rising in 1857. Ribotti, however, wasnever
sent While Cavour was thus engaged, the news had reached Genoa,
and Nino Brno and Crispi at once hurried to Turin to endeavour to
induce Garibaldi, who was now a deputy, to take command of an
expedition to the island. After much persuasion he consented. But
Garibaldi hesitated. There were twenty thousand troops on the island.
The value of the local support he would get was small and unreliable.
The strength of Sicilian resistance iay in street fighting, where every
one could join in and defend barricades or hurl coping stones from the
roof tops and leave off fighting when they chose. The local levies s
the sytadre, without leaders or discipline, were of small fighting value.
For a month there was indecision. In the meantime preparations
wait on. Garibaldi's request to the King to take with him a brigade
132 The Evolution of Modem Italy
of his old Hunters of the Alps who had fought under Mm In 1859
and were now part of the regular army, was refused* and he had to
rely on volunteers. Before long they were flocking to Genoa. Arms
and stores were being collected. The expedition was becoming a
national conspiracy. The King was supporting it with money ?
Cavoor knew all about it, and so did diplomacy. Talleyrand, the
French ambassador, went to Genoa to see for himself and kindly kept
Cavour informed of all that was taking place. It was nothing less
than a filibustering expedition organized with the knowledge of the
government, and a breach of iniemational law. Then a second
expedition organized by the National Society under the leadership
of Colonel La Masa amalgamated with Garibaldi, and thereby made
it impossible for Cavour to scop it, for the political party supporting
the National Society was the backbone of Cavour's parliamentary
majority, needed to pass the Bill on the cession of Nice and Savoy.
At length* the first week in May, the expedition, numbering eleven
hundred men, steamed out from. Quarto near Genoa in two old
merchant ships commandeered from the Rubattino company, and,
as Cavour put it, the fate of Italy was 'once more on the high seas in
the midst of storms and dangers*. *But what can we do ?' he added,
& as long as Italy is not made we carniot think of reposing in the calm
of the past years*.
The expedition of the Thousand is an oft told tale. It thrilled Italy
as no other episode in the whole Risorgimento ever did. A week
after Garibaldi sailed The Times correspondent wrote, *Men of all
classes, of all ages, of ail parties, have only one business, only one
subject and object how to help Garibaldi. To live in Turin or Genoa,
in or Florence* and not to be Garibaldi-mad is impossible/
The interest in England was scarcely less than in Italy. The audacity
of the whole proceeding, a thousand men setting out to overthrow
a kingdom and doing it, recalled the triumphs of Drake and Frobisher
and appealed to every Englishman. Diplomacy was furious at such
an outrage. Russia 9 Prussia and Austria protested in the strongest
terms. But no one moved. Cavour did everything he could think
of to keep the ring for Garibaldi. He fought off diplomacy, mobilized
every available soldier and concentrated the navy at Cagliari, but the
ultimatum from Naples which he expected never came. Some time
before he had said that he wanted England to do for the south of Italy
what France had done for the north, and England did not disappoint
him. 17
In the meanwhile Garibaldi had landed safely at Marsala at the
The Political Reactions of the War 133
western extremity of the island, after narrowly escaping from two
Neapolitan cruisers* which, having just missed him at sea, returned in
time to He offshore and bombard the disembarking troops, until the
protests of two English warships in the harbour stopped them. He
now set off north-east across the comer of the island for Palermo.
At Sa!emi ? Garibaldi proclaimed Ms dictatorship over the island,
nominating Francesco Crispi as pro-dictator. The next day he con-
tinued Ms march. At Caiatafimi, his road was barred by a strong
force greatly outnumbering Mm and posted in an admirable position
on a terraced hill It had to be stormed with the bayonet terrace by
terrace. w As the afternoon wore on exhaustion and losses made Gari-
baldi's situation almost desperate, until even Nino Bixio, Ms fiery
lieutenant yvho feared nothing, spoke of the necessity of retreat. It
was then that the real greatness of Garibaldi showed itself. He knew
victor)- was vital and he replied, *Here we make Italy or die*. One
last rush and the summit was reached , the Neapolitans broke, and
victory was won. Garibaldi had left Quarto on May 5th, he landed
on the nth and won Ms first battle at Calatafimi on the I5th. Three
days later he was in sight of Palermo at Renda. Here he received
information that all entrance to Palermo from the west was barred
by the main Neapolitan forces and to avoid disaster he turned south
and then east. In so doing he eluded a strong force under von
Mechel sent out to intercept Mm, and sent them on a fruitless journey
to Corleone. At Gibilrossa, he met La Masa with three thousand
Sicilians and after a difficult journey through the mountains arrived
where he was least expected, on the east side of the city. On May
2yth ? he seized the Porta Termini and fighting began in the city. The
population rose in support* erecting barricades and joining in the battle,
while Lanza, the timid governor, bombarded the city by sea and land.
After a three days* batde, Mundy, the English Admiral, induced Lanza
to ask for an armistice, offering Ms flagsMp as a neutral place for the
conference. Terms were arranged, the Neapolitan troops with-
drawn, and Garibaldi was left victorious. He was now practically in
possession of Sicily but he had one more battle to fight before the
island was fully conquered. TMs was fought at Milazzo on July 2Oth
and Garibaldi's victory left Sicily completely in Ms hands.
The military occupation of Sicily at once brought the political
aspect to the front. Cavour tried the same technique with Garibaldi
gathering the fruits as soon as they fell as he had found so successful
with Napoleon, but the Dictator had other views. He was s moreover,
still bitterly incensed with Cavour over the surrender of Ms birth-
134 The Evolution of Modern Italy
place, Nice, to Napoleon, the man who had crushed the Roman
Republic. He had appeared at Turin for the opening of Parliament
on purpose to indict the government, and had he done so, it is certain
that the harmony of the first national Parliament would have been
marred by a stormy scene. But ignorant of procedure aad scornful of
politicians, his attempt to interpellate the Ministry, before the Cham-
ber was properly constituted, was ruled out of order; and before
another opportunity presented itself the expedition to Sicily absorbed
all his attention. As it was, he was only just stopped from raiding
Nice and smashing the ballot boxes. It was not, then, surprising that
to Cavour's request for immediate annexation Garibaldi replied with
a refusal and when Cavour sent La Farina to Sicily to persuade him,
he promptly shipped the new agent back to Genoa. Garibaldi had set
his obstinate mind on a single aim. He intended to cross the Straits,
conquer Naples, then pressjon to Rome and evict the French garrison,
and crown Victor Emanuel on the Campidoglio. He was going to
present Victor Emanuel with a Kingdom and nothing less, and he had
no intention of spoiling this glittering gift by handing over piecemeal
to the politicians what he had conquered with his sword. As to the
political compEcations which such a programme would arouse, he
knew little and cared less. Cavour, though exceedingly annoyed at
Garibaldi's obstinacy* nevertheless continued in the policy which had
been decided upon with the King at a meeting at Bologna on the eve
of the departure of the expedition ; to help it all he could while keeping
the complicity of the government in the background, always provided
that no attack was made on the States of the Church, because this
would at once provoke active opposition from Napoleon. Naples,
but no further, was Cavour's ultimatum. So a second expedition of
reinforcements under Medici, another of Garibaldi's well-tried lieu-
tenants, sailed for Sicily and supplies and munitions were freely
provided.
The amazing success of Garibaldi revealed a condition of weakness
at Naples which made anything possible, and Napoleon, who, though
he wanted Italian independence never wanted Italian unity, saw with
dismay that undesirable prospect steadily approaching realization.
He now put forward another solution, that of dualism. Italy was to
be divided into north and south with the Papacy at Rome set like a
jewel between them. The same idea had occurred to Cavour, though
probably as a temporary measure until the southern fruit was fully
ripe but coupled with the necessity of a complete change of system
and policy at Naples, and in April, Victor Emanuel had written to
The Reactions of the War 13 5
II of Naples proposing cooperation between the two states
on but had rejected all advice. Napoleon now
with England, putting forward the new idea and
proposing, as a necessary preliminary to negotiation, that the fleets
of the two patrol the Straits of Messina and prevent the
Dictator to the mainland. At the same time the Emperor
brought pressure to on Victor Emanuel, if not to forbid, at least
to not to cross the Straits. The King forwarded an
request to this effect, but enclosed a private note telling Gari-
baldi to to obey, which he did. Fortunately Cavour found out
what was place and England turned down the Emperor s
suggestions.
The conquest of Naples Cavour more anxiety than any other
problem he had to face, excepting only the crisis of war or peace in
1859. It was not Ms plan. It was an improvisation inspired by
Mazzini, but not Mazzini the republican but Mazzini the Unitarian,
for Garibaldi insisted from the first that the expedition must be under-
taken in the of Italy Victor Emanuel, and Garibaldi's
loyalty to the King was absolutely to be relied on; and Mazzini
acquiesced. For this reason it probable that Cavour's insistence
on the dangers of the devolution* in his correspondence at this time
was not genuine, but had an ulterior purpose. Cavour never feared
Mazzini, he was in fiurt useful to Ms policy. He was the terrible
alternative paraded before Europe when Cavour's programme was
not accepted. It was otherwise with Garibaldi. As Cavour once
wrote, he had the instincts of a poet, he was also headstrong and
obstinate", and carried away by his imagination he was quite capable
of pushing on from Naples to Rome and embroiling Italy with
France. There was another point. The prestige of the crown. The
position of a subject at the head of an army and the idol of the nation,
with a kingdom in Ms gift, was not without dangers. The last phase,
as Cavour saw clearly, must then be dominated by the King, not the
subject. Victor Imanuel, of course, could come south by sea, but it
would be infinitely more impressive if he arrived at the head of his
army. These considerations taken together forced two facts on
Cavour. Garibaldi must be stopped at Naples and the King must lead
his army through the Papal States and bar the road to Rome.
Cavour's first idea was to provoke a palace revolution at Naples,
procure the flight of the King and take over the administration before
the arrival of Garibaldi. The plan failed completely. Naples, like
the rest of southern Italy, would not raise a finger to save the Bourbon
136 The Evolution of Modern Italy
but would not fight against him, they just waited for the 'Red
Man 1 as they called Garibaldi. In the meantime in Sicily Garibaldi,
having strengthened and reorganized Ms forces and completed his
plans, crossed the Straits without opposition on August i8th and the
inarch upon Naples began. There was no fighting. The southern
army either disbanded or surrendered and the Dictator with his troops
following on behind him drove forward to the capital. The evening
before Garibaldi reached Naples the King and Queen sailed for Gaeta,
the fleet refusing to follow them. The next day came the tumultuous
entry of Garibaldi. On that same day, September 7th, Cavour sent an
ultimatum to Rome, followed at once by the entry of the army into
the Papal States. He had prepared the way by a mission to Napoleon,
then at Chambery, whose consent was given. One cdrps marched on
Ancona, scattered the little Papal army at Castelfidardo and laid siege
to the city, which surrendered on September 29th. The 'other corps
occupied Umbria. The King joined Ms army at Ancona and marched
south. While these events were taking place, Garibaldi, having
collected Ms troops, left Naples for the Volturno front where the
remaining Neapolitan army, more loyal than the southern troops,
were concentrated. The battle of the Voltumo fought on October ist
ended in a victory for Garibaldi but it checked any idea of an imme-
diate march on Rome. While Garibaldi rested and reorganized his
exhausted troops and wrestled with the political chaos, the royal army
crossed the Garigliano. On the 26th King and Dictator met at Teano
and a few days later after driving together through Naples, the man
who had won a kingdom, refusing all offers of reward, sailed back
unnoticed to his island home on Caprera.
The political reaction in Europe to the invasion of the Papal States
proved less dangerous than Cavour feared. France at once withdrew
her Minister from Turin, more to placate French clerical susceptibilities
than as a sign of genuine disapproval, and Austria and Russia followed
suit But England was working for peace and the Prussian Minister
remained in Italy. England openly approved and Lord John Russell's
despatch met with deep and heartfelt gratitude throughout Italy.
Cavour's first thought was to obliterate the atmosphere of revolution
which surrounded the conquest of the south and regularize the
political union of Italy by parliamentary sanction. Electoral lists were
hastily prepared and Parliament summoned for January 1861. The
last phase of the conquest of the south had been full of difficulty.
Garibaldi still refused to alow annexation and had twice written to
the King demanding the dismissal of Gavour. Prepared to go .to any
The Political Reactions of the War 13?
length to prevent an open dissension between state and dictator
Cavour had formally offered his resignation if it would lessen the
tension. Victor Emanuel refosed to accept it, and he remained in
power. The battle of the Voltumo at last removed the danger of a
forward movement on Rome, and when die Parliament met at Turin
for the autumn session the day after the battle, Cavour laid a single
clause BE! before the Chamber authorizing the annexation of the
south. The Bill was passed without a dissentient voice and the
Ministry was given a unanimous vote of confidence and knowing the
country was behind him Cavour acted quickly. A plebiscite was taken
and Italy became at last a single country.
The first truly national Parliament met at Turin on January 27,
1861. It was opened in person by Victor Emanuel. The address from
the throne was brief and when the royal session was over Cavour at
once laid before the Chamber a short Bill proclaiming Victor Emanuel
King of Italy. He then announced the resignation of the ministry in
order that the King might have a free hand in selecting the first
government of the united country, Cavour was recalled to power
because indispensable, though the King would have liked RicasolL
A fresh Cabinet was formed, including members representing the new
provinces, and then Parliament settled down to work.
The new Chamber of Deputies was profoundly different -both in
character and composition from any that had preceded it. In size
alone it was more than double that of the old Piedmontese Chamber,
numbering 443 members against 204, and a special building had had
to be erected in Turin to accommodate it. Few of the new members
from the south, representing nearly half the Chamber, had any know-
ledge of constitutional government and small appreciation of the
liberal principles which had informed Cavour's policy for the last
ten years. Still fewer had any political or even administrative experi-
ence and in many cases their claims to election had been based
rather on the warmth of their patriotism than their political gifts.
Faced with these exceptional features in die Chamber, Cavour thought
it desirable to give a lead to Parliament, and through them to the
country, on the question occupying every one's thought, the problem
of Rome. As to Venice, he was not anxious to deal with it, but in
his letters to the Kong and others he made it clear that he thought any
provocation of Austria for 'at least two years* would be madness, as
it would take that length of time if not longer to organize the army
and navy to be fit to face a campaign. Cavour had already initiated
secret negotiations at Rome, which, after a too promising begin-
138 The Evolution of Modem Italy
ning, had been suddenly liquidated, Ms agent being expelled from
the city. He now, first in the Chamber of Deputies and then in the
Senate (March 27th, April 9th), made two set speeches upon the
subject, laying down the principles upon which he proposed to act.
In so doing he traced the line of policy which, after his death two
months later, succeeding Ministers for the next fifteen years endea-
voured to follow and which became known as the *Cavourian
tradition'.
Cavour began by affirming that Rome, the Eternal City upon which
so many centuries of greatness look down, the only city in Italy to
which all others gave precedence* must be the capital of the new
Kingdom. But if Italy must go to Rome, this could only be by moral
means, by negotiation and consent, and not only of the Papacy but
also of her eldest daughter, France. This meant the surrender of what
remained of the Temporal Power, He then defended two proposi-
tions, first that the Temporal Power did not give the Pope indepen-
dence, and secondly, that the Holy Father would have greater in-
dependence without it. Cavour then dealt with the basis upon which
negotiations to this end could be undertaken, and summed them up in
one word* Liberty. A complete separation between the two powers
the State and the Church, a free Church in a free State. To-day, he
said, there was complete civil liberty of speech and meeting, there
must be likewise religious liberty. It would be necessary, first, to con-
vince the Catholic world of Italian honesty and the reality and fullness
of the liberty Italy offered to the Papacy, and then he believed that
the Church would bring peace to Italy by accepting the nation's
offer,
Cavour was too optimistic. The response for which he hoped
never came, and when Italy at last went to Rome ten years later, it
was occupied by force not by persuasion. These two- speeches were
the last of national importance which Cavour ever made. He was
absorbed in administrative work. He had much to worry him. The
condition of Naples was a growing anxiety. He had sent there the
best men he could find but matters seemed to get worse rather than
better. Brigandage had broken out and was assuming dangerous
proportions, and lie had been urged from more than one quarter to
proclaim a state of siege, but he had steadily refused. He believed
in the virtues of liberty and jwBamentary not military government
*I am die son of liberty*, he had recently written to a friend, 'and to
her I owe all Aat I am. If it is necessary to veil her statue it is not
for me to do It* The treatment of die disbanded Garibaldini was
The Political Reactions of the War 139
of difficulty. Neither the King nor General Fanti had
very and the complaints reached Garibaldi, who,
furiously angry, came to Turk. A painful scene followed in the
Chamber with Cavour. The King patched up the quarrel but Cavour
was never the after it His last speech was a plea for con-
cord and oblivion of past differences. At the close of May he had an
attack, was a temporary rally, but another followed, and after
that he steadily. On June 6th he died. Cavour's death was a
calamity.' He held all the threads of national policy in his
hands. It is difficult to find any parallel to the loss which Italy sus-
tained. The nearest is perchance that of Abraham Lincoln four years
later, whose political career was not without analogous features. Both
plunged country into war,, the one to create unity the other to
preserve it; the of both was their profound love of liberty, and
both died when was newly completed. Alike, they were
without rancour and above party and thought only of their country
and died at a moment when their presence seemed vital for a true
peace, for of both it might be said that they came with 'healing on
their wings', and the noble of Walt Whitman, *O captain, my
captain, die fearful trip is done", as applicable to Italy's statesman
as to the great American who inspired them.
CHAPTER NINE
VENICE WITHOUT VICTORY, 1861-1866
geographical unity of Italy, apart from Rome and Venetia,
J[ was* at last, a reality. It was now the task of government and
people to weld themselves into a unified nation. To appreciate the
difficulties of such an undertaking it must be borne in mind that
nothing had as yet altered the separatist life of the different states.
Piedmont and Tuscany, the Papal States and Naples, stiU had their in-
dividual laws and administration, their peculiar customs and traditions
and their varieties of language; for though the cultured classes spoke
both Italian and French, they likewise spoke the regional dialect,
which differed so widely that to a Piedmontese the speech* of a
Neapolitan was unintelligible. The amalgamation effected by Napo-
leon over two-thirds of the peninsula had been only temporary, and
although Napoleon's influence was still active in the legal systems,
the old life had now been resumed without interruption for forty-five
years, since the resettlement at the Congress of Vienna in 1815.
Surrounded by a customs barrier* each state was self-contained.
There were few railways and none intersecting different states. Pied-
mont had 850 kilometres, mainly strategical, connecting Genoa,
Turin and Alessandria with Milan. There were 200 kilometres in
Lombardy and 308 in Tuscany. Naples had two short lines, joining
Portici and Caserta with the capital: elsewhere there were none. Hie
difference in the prosperity levels were also very marked, central and
southern Italy being fir below the north in material wealth, The
average of illiteracy was reckoned at 78 per cent, rising to 90 in Naples
and Sicily. Schools were few s scattered and of poor quality and in
the hands of the Church. An entire new national system of law and
administration, education and transport, had to be devised, put in
action* and paid for, and to do this in such a way as not to press un-
fitizly on the poorer areas was a task of the utmost difficulty.
The composition of the Chamber of Deputies which had these
problems to solve, reflected fairly enough the prevalent feeling in the
country. The core of it was the solid block of Piedmontese deputies,
aratina whom gathered supporters from aU over Italy. This formed
die Right. The Left wore Mazanians and Ganbaldini, containing a
strong infusion of southern deputies, with an element drawn from
140
Venice without Victory, 1861-1866 14*
Tuscany and central Italy, all more or less opposed to the predomin-
ance of Piedmont, and including in their ranks the group known as
the Party of Action, of which Garibaldi was the leader, with a pro-
gramme of 'Venice and Rome' as quickly as possible, and by any
means. For fifteen years the electorate unfailingly returned a^ solid
Right majority, although during this period 'there were thirteen
different Ministries and eight Premiers, and many rifts and jealousies
within die party. It would seem that the electors were determined
that Italy should be settled on the Cavourian tradition before the alien
tradition of the south was allowed to predominate.
The first step taken was to extend die Piedmontese political system
throughout Italy, which ensured freedom of speech and association,
but which also necessitated drafting officials from Turin all over the
country and began the process, known later as s Piedmontism* which
was the cause of so much jealousy. The next step was to decide on
the administrative system to be adopted. Cavour had favoured a
widespread decentralization, a 'regional' system, and a scheme on this
basis was prepared under his direction and submitted to Parliament
But the fear of perpetuating the old regional jealousies and of encour-
aging separatism, caused its rejection, and the Chamber adopted the
French system, dividing the country into fifty-three departments,
called provinces, each under a prefect, dkecdy dependent from the
Home Office. Customs and coinage, weights and measures, were
quickly unified, and commissions appointed to deal with the new
legal code, railways, roads and education. Similar measures were
taken with regard to die armed forces. Cavour himself had been
engaged just before his deadi on a scheme for the amalgamation of the
two navies, Piedmontese and Neapolitan, and the army chiefs were
busy with a similar task based on conscription. All this required time
to produce results, and in the meanwhile there was much confusion
and discontent over the inevitable dislocation of the accustomed way
oflife.
As Gavour's successor the King nominated the Baron RIcasoli,
already the leader of the government majority in the Chamber and
formerly the Dictator of Tuscany. It was an obvious, bat hardly a
fortunate, choice. RicasoM had few gifts as a parliammtary Premier,
He was a born dictator. Proud and unbendable and lacking tact and
finesse, he was devoid, moreover, of that gift of compromise which
is essential in parliamentary government. He was, however, a fine
speaker, honest and incorruptible, with a dear grasp of essentials, jfa
particular, he was anxious to come to an amicable arrangement with
142 The Evolution of Modern Italy
Rome on the lines laid down by Cavour, and in spite of Ms pre-
decessor's failure, he reopened negotiations, but he was equally un-
successful. Another rebuff came from Napoleon, who, on the death
of Cavour, perhaps the one man. he trusted, at once suspended the
arrangement made for the withdrawal of the French troops from
Rome, which effectively closed the anticipated opening for trouble in
the city and its occupation by the Italian army. Ricasoli Sent the
President of the Chamber, Urbano Rattazzi, to Paris, to try and in-
fluence the Emperor, but he met with no success. Ricasoli was a
failure both in his handling of the Chamber and in his relations with
the King, His haughty manner and the uncompromising rigidity
with which he held to his point of view offended both equally, and
after nine months of office he resigned,
Urbano Rattazzi, who followed Ricasoli, was a much more con-
genial Premier from the King's point of view, to whom he was
always obsequiously devoted. A clever, adroit politician, admirable
in catching the feeling of the Chamber and trimming his sails thereto,
Rattazzi was always something of die intriguer. His name was
already coupled with one national calamity, Novara, and it was
destined to be linked with two more, Aspromonte and Mentana.
The comment of Garibaldi that 'one can always do something with
Rattazzi*, reveals much. During these first years of the united king-
dom the country was under the spell of illusion. It had always been
accepted, for example, that unity would lighten greatly the financial
burden, whereas the opposite was the fact. Want of money was the
fimdamental weakness of the new Italy. Union had been expensive.
The debts of seven states had to be taken over, and the necessary
measures for national defence, administration, education and trans-
port added an enormous burden. Under the old regime, states like
Tuscany or the States of the Church had no military or naval expenses,
and little was spent on education or transport, but now they aad to
bear their share of the national expenditure and taxation grew steadily
heavier as the expenses Increased with development Another illusion
was in regard to the strength of the nation. Italians took it for granted
tfaat they were now a Great Power and must do as others did. An
imposing army of 350,000 was planned with a navy to match; a
national education system and a network of railways were to follow,
all this regardless of the financial strain. Yet Italy had scarcely any
industries. She had neither coal nor ken, and the armour, gum and
madimcry of the new navy had to come mainly from England or
America* and military equipment from France. The export of oranges
Venice without Victory, iS6xiS66 143
and lemons, even with silk and wines and sulphur added, was hardly
abound basis for a Great Power, and until the era of electricity enabled
her to use her abundant water supply to provide cheap power, her
basic industries were sadly handicapped.
This new and fictitious sense of power increased the impatience of
the country for the satisfactory solution of the problems of Rome
and Venice. The ease with which the south had been conquered
convinced Garibaldi and his more ardent followers that, backed now
by a formidable army, all that was needed was a good push to over-
turn what he termed 'the tottering shanty of PapaEsm' and little more
to incite a massed rising in Venetia and its rapid liberation from Austria.
He quickly became restless in his voluntary exile at Caprcra. A plot
was soon on foot for a" rising in Venetia, volunteers began to collect
on the borders round Samico, and Garibaldi, under cover of opening
new branches of the Rifle Shooting Associations, left Caprera and
appeared at Brescia, Como and elsewhere. The government was
loathe to interfere with the Hero, whose popularity was such as to
make him almost independent of official restraint, but they could not
ignore the reports of the Prefects as to the imminence of an incursion
into the Tyrol or Vraetia, and possibly on a hint from Vienna* the
arms and volunteers were suddenly seized and the design broken tip*
Garibaldi at first protested violently,, then altered his attitude, prob-
ably under royal influence, and went back to Caprera, and die
government promptly despatched warship to prevent his return to
die mainland.
In appointing Rattazti to the premiership the King had followed
his personal inclination rather than correct constitutional procedure,
for Rattazzi was not a member of the Cavourian majority, lie be-
longed to the Left, and in consequence, his in the Chamber
was at a discount and at any time a determined attack by the majority
would have unseated him. He kept Ms place, in feet, only by under-
ground manipulations^ and only so long as no untoward event took
place which would consolidate the majority against Mm, In this
difficult position Garibaldi was a terrible embarrassment to the govern-
ment, and die country had now to pay for its infatuation for the extrar-
legal methods of its Hero and the connivance of die King and govern-
ment in die events of 1 860. Conspiracy had arisen in Italy as the natural
reaction of the more daring section of Ac people against the repressive
policy of Mettetnkk It had been elevated into a gospel by Mazzm
and so long as it was directed against Austria* it was* however fettle;
a .legitimate aueans of expressing pubic feeling against a
144 The Evolution of Modern Italy
oppressor. But It had lost this character with Garibaldi's invasion of
Sicily and became a filibustering expedition, directed against a nomin-
ally friendly power, backed by public support and at least the know-
ledge of the government. Cavour, unable to stop it, used it as a short
cut to his own political ends, but took care to smother it as quickly
as possible under the cloak of constituted authority. The support of
the King, the temporizing attitude of the government, together with
its ultimate assistance, above all the amazing success of the expedition
itself, convinced large sections of the country that this was undoubtedly
the way to get Rome and Venice. The hand of the government must
be forced, then, presented with the fait accompli they would gratefully
accept it, and Europe would bluster but acquiesce. This feeling could
not be eradicated so long as Garibaldi and Mazzini were active in
support of it, and it had become so deep-seated that the throne, the
parliament and the public were alike infected and fascinated by it.
Garibaldi was so idolized by the public and by all who knew him
or had served under him, that he had only to lift his finger and
volunteers would hasten to his standard from every corner of Italy
and support would come to him from everywhere. But it was no
longer a question of opposing the decrepit Bourbon, despised and
contemned by every country in Europe, but of attacking Rome
defended by French troops or Venetia belonging to Austria, and
Rattazzi had good reason to know that both Emperors meant what
they said in their warnings against the use of filibustering methods.
Garibaldi, however, cared for none of these things. Evading the
naval cordon sent to stop him, he reached the mainland and sud-
denly appeared in Sicily. Welcomed with effusion by the Governor,
the Marquis Pallavicini, recently appointed by Rattazzi, Garibaldi was
lodged in the Viceregal Palazzo at Palermo and permitted by the
Governor to address the crowd from the balcony. It is doubtful
whether at this moment Garibaldi had any definite plan of action in
his mind, but the cry of 'Rome or Death* from an unknown voice in
the crowd gave him his cue, and on this text he toured the island call-
ing for volunteers and arms. The mass of telegrams, letters and
despatches which now began to pass to and fro between the Minister
of the Interior, who was Rattazzi himself, and officials all over Italy,
have been deciphered and published and make curious reading.
Though Rattazzi's name will probably always be associated with the
humiliation of Aspromontc, which as head of the government could
hardly be otherwise 9 it is nevertheless obvious that he lent no conni-
vance to Ac expedition. He made It unmistakably clear, once Garir
Venice without Victory, i8fa-?866 US
baldi's intention to make for Rome became evident, that lie must be
stopped by all means and at any cost from crossing to die mainland.
From all over Italy came telegrams from Prefects or others of the
Imminent departure of volunteers for Sicily 'secredy and in small
groups'. To which the replies were always to stop them. Notices of
demonstrations in favour of the expedition came likewise. Amongst
more responsible officials there was both weakness and credulity. We
find, for instance, General Cugia, in command in Sicily, telegraphing,
*All the captains of trading vessels are accomplices, disembarking
volunteers. Civil service nearly all betraying the government, many
thinking they are seconding it. It seems true that Mazzini has been in
Palermo,' Mazzini never left London. A royal proclamation was
issued forbidding the expedition. Orders were sent to General Cugia
to concentrate the troops in Sicily between Messina and Catania.
Cialdini took the command in Calabria, to block the road to Rome if
Garibaldi landed on the continent. Admiral Persano, Minister of
Marine, came to Sicily to direct the naval patrol, with strict orders
to stop the expedition at all costs. Every precaution seems to have
been taken and energetic action urged by RattazzL
In spite of this, the cause of all the trouble, Garibaldi himself, went
about the island unhindered, no one daring to lay hands on him*
When all Ms arrangements were complete, he seized two ships and
crossed unmolested, though two cruisers lay off the port of embarka-
tion (August 24th). Avoiding Reggio, strongly held by royal
troops, he withdrew his now famished and weary men, two thousand
in all, to the mountains around Asptonionte. Here the troops under
Colonel Palkvicini met him. A few volleys were exchanged, and
then Garibaldi surrendered, having stopped his men from firing on
their fellow Italians, but not before he himself was wounded by an
Italian bullet in the heel He was taken by so to Varignano, near
Speaa. Aspromonte was a wretched business. The wounding of
Garibaldi evoking sympathy everywhere, the frantic efforts of the
government to stop him from fear of Napoleon, the weakness
displayed by those in command, were felt as a bitter humiliation for
Italy. Persano as the Minister of Marine was probably most to blame,
for his orders were clear, but he would not face the outcry or take the
responsibility of having to Open fire, and possibly sink, Garibaldi and
his ships. He kept out of the way and gave vagtie orders to his sub-
ordinate, Admiral Albini, who followed suit at the critical moment.
There was, moreover, a general feeling that it was 1860 ova: again:
that there was an traderstanding between Battazzi, die King and
146 The Evolution of Modern Italy
Garibaldi and that the orders were not meant to be executed. There
were too many high interests involved and too much secret intrigue*
to permit any serious inquiry, and Rattazzi and the government
resigned.
After refusal by his first two choices, Victor Emanuel nominated
Carlo Luigi Farini, the former dictator of Emilia, as Premier: but
Farini was already suffering from brain trouble and in a short rime
retired from political life and the premiership devolved upon his
Finance Minister, Marco Minghetti. The new President of the Coun-
cil was born at Bologna and was a disciple of Cavour. He had been
a member of the Papal government in 1848, had collaborated with
Cavour at the Congress of Paris in 1856, and had been responsible
four years later for the scheme of 'regional* administration which had
been rejected by the Chamber in favour of centralization. Minghetti
was a capable economist and an admirable speaker* moderate and
prudent, but lacking strength of character. Incapable of taking a
strong line either in the direction of policy or in the control of his
colleagues, the bad tendencies already perceptible in the parliamentary
system developed throughout his leadership, and opened the road to
that decay of sound political life which later discredited the parlia-
mentary system in Italy.
The Piedmontese constitution which had been adopted for united
Italy was modelled on 'the French constitution of 1830, with English
influences added. The Premier was nominated by the King, but was
not of necessity die leader of the majority in the Chamber, as we have
seen in the case of the appointment of Urbano Rattaza. Nor did his
defeat imply a general election and a new party in office, but a change
of Cabinet. THs produced in Italy, as in France, a rapid succession of
Ministries (there were thirteen in the first ten years), great difficulty
in carrying through any big programme, and the lack of a sustained
and steady national poEcy. Another weak point in the constitution
was the narrowness of the franchise, this, togethef with the dame
occluding illiterates from voting, reduced die electorate to litde more
thaa a cfiqiiG in each constituency. It was estimated that die 443
were actually elected by about 150,000 voters out of above
twenty millions, or about soo'per seat. Thus the great majority of
die nation had no 'direct interest in the parliamentary life of the
country. The want of railways and the position of Turin in the
extreme north of Ac peninsula, cut off Ac majority of members from
constituents waorn they seldom saw, and inability to read
a fwrcratage of all poEtical education. Thus when die
Venice without Victory, iS6iiS6^ 147
first novelty of voting had worn off, public interest in politics steadily
lessened and instead of being die centre of a network of interest
extending throughout the country Parliament became a self-con-
tained organism in which the public took small interest.
Within the Chamber, the party system was weak and undeveloped.
It was difficult to procure concerted action on broad party lines and
groups partook of the nature of factions. These again were traversed
by regional divisions. Under these conditions the course of legislation
was at all times uncertain and accompanied by the inevitable correla-
tives of faction secret bargaining and the corrupt use of power and
patronage. Local patriotism has always been a strong characteristic of
the Italian people and there was a strong regional clamushness amongst
members, Tuscans, Piedmontese and Neapolitans working in close
corporations. The weakness of Minghetti encouraged this dangerous
tendency, of which the most obnoxious sample was the consorteria 9 a
group, mainly Tuscan, under the leadership of the new Minister of
the Interior, the Florentine Perazzi, whose policy was founded on
jealousy of Piedmont and s Piedmontisui*. Italy cannot be governed
from Turin* was a favourite dictum and they used the Press to sug-
gest the need to change the capital. This concentration on sectional
interests not only created much bitter feeling but led to a neglect or
indifference to die real social needs of the country which still further
tended to separate Parliament from the thought of the nation.
Meanwhile the government was fully occupied with the two
problems of finance and brigandage. The previous Ministry had dis-
covered in the young Quintino Sella, a Finance Minister prepared to
face the unjwpularity of ruthless taxation and stringent economy.
Minghetti, who now took over his portfolio, produced a budget full
of financial jugglery which was to bring in vast sums to the treasury.
The nation had already subscribed a loan of five hundred million
lire and spent it, and Minghetti now reEed on large amounts to be saved
by departmental economies, dismissal of suporfeiotts officials, and Ac
increase of national wealth due to the efforts of a hardworking people.
But palliatives and economies were of little use as the blueprints for
public works and the paper schemes for education and finance trans-
lated themselves into wage bills and salaries* and the financial position
grew steadily worse. As to brigandage, it had now assumed the
character of a semi-religious war. The south was garrisoned by an
army of ninety thousand and warfare* as bitter and relentless as that
waged by General Manhes in die days of Marat; against the same
eaemy* was being earned on throughout daesoathrai provinces* King
148 The Evolution of Modem Italy
Francis on his expulsion from Gaeta took refuge in the Papal States,
and with the support of the Papal authorities organized and encour-
aged the resistance of the brigands. But the movement was too
general and too widespread to be regarded simply as a straggle
against bands of brigands. It was a civil war, whose methods degener-
ated into a savagery which neither gave nor expected quarter. To
claim that these half-organized bands were fighting for the return of
Francis II or for religion, would be probably an overstatement, but
both these motives were present in varying degree. What is certain
is that the methods employed by the Piedmontese commanders made
them more hated than the Bourbon, and ill calculated to reconcile
the south to union. Towns were sacked and burnt, the prisons were
overcrowded with suspects, many not brought to trial, and priests
and even bishops thrown into prison. Neither men nor women were
spared if suspected of harbouring or even sympathizing widbt the
brigands. It is small wonder that for fifty years the south was an
unceasing source of expense, vexation and often sullen opposition to
Italy, for the union had been enforced at the point of the bayonet,
and had the plebiscite been taken in 1863 instead of 1861, it is open to
question whether the verdict would not have been reversed in favour
of Francis II.
The loyalty of Victor JEmanuel had saved constitutional govern-
ment in Italy, but although he had not the passion for personal rule
of his father Charles Albert, he had nevertheless a hankering to mix
himself in affairs of state. This tendency had had no chance of
developing under strong Ministers such as Cavour and Ricasoli, but
with an intrigant such as Rattazzi, or a weak character such as
Minghetti the King had small difficulty in initiating a secret policy of
his own. Although the problems of Venice and Rome, after Sarnico
and Aspromonte, had for the moment dropped into the background,
they were always present to the minds of Mazzini and Garibaldi, and
moreover, occupied the thought of Victor Emanuel. Garibaldi's
change of attitude after Saniico was undoubtedly due to some assur-
ances as to national policy given to him by the King or Rattazzi,
possibly both. They appear to have been connected with a plan to
embarrass Austria by a rising in Hungary and Galicia and an attempt
to seize Venetia while she was thus occupied elsewhere* Early in
i $63 Mazzini got Into touch with the Bang through an old adherent,
the engineer Diamilla-Mijller, who was sent to London by the govern-
ment to buy riles for die National Guard, and who, as a sideline,
procured six hundred for Mazzini to be despatched to the Tyrol.
Venice without Victory, iH6i-i866 149
Garibaldi was soon drawn into the conspiracy, which finally deve-
loped into a tripartite plan in which Mazzini was to be resppnsible
for a rising of volunteer forces in Venetia, Garibaldi was to organize
an expedition into Galicia, while the King was to prepare the support
of the royal army, when the movement in Venetia had Beached a
certain degree of success. The plan came to nothing. Mazzini, as
usual, worked indefatigably, until, his patience exhausted, he broke
with the King whose constant insistence that they must await the
opportune moment, exasperated him beyond bearing, and disgusted
with monarchy he declared his fixed intention to resort once more to
republicanism.
Garibaldi was equally active and unsuccessful. In the spring of 1864
he suddenly left Caprera on his famous visit to England, giving as a
reason the need for medical advice for Ms injured foot. His reception
was magnificent, but Ms political activities in London, where he
resumed his friendsMp with Mazzini and conferred with Hungarian
and Polish refugees, created alarm in diplomatic circles, for none
could tell what nefarious schemes might issue from such a reunion.
TMs was probably the reason why Ms visit was unexpectedly curtailed
and he was politely but firmly repatriated in the comfort or the Duke
of Sutherland's yacht. He remained at Caprera for two months,
during wMch he made his peace with the King, who was exceedingly
angry over the Aspromonte fiasco, by undertaking to take up the
threads of the Galician expedition wMch had the royal consent. In
July he left Caprer-a for IscMa near Naples and set to work collecting
arms and enrolling volunteers, but concealed Ms purpose by an
absolute silence. Rumours of an expedition abroad leaked out,
however, and reached the Party of Action who strongly disapproved
of a movement concerted without their sanction or co-operation,
and wMch involved the absence of Garibaldi from Italy at a moment
so fraught with possibilities. So in July 1864 they published a dis-
claimer in the columns of If Diritto* condemning the proposed expedi-
tion and dissociating themselves from a movement Bordered by
Princes and wMch must serve their interests rather than those of the
people*. The exposure of Ms secret mission annoyed both Garibaldi
and the King, but it acMeved its object and the idea was abandoned*
Whether or not the discovery of the unauthorized royal intrigues
acted as a spur to the energies of the government, the fact remains
that very soon afterwards they took up the Roman Question once
more. Thek intermediary in Paris was the Italian ambassador. Count
Pepoli, a cousin of the Emperor, In the most profound secrecy.
150 The Evolution of Modern Italy
Minghettij the Foreign Secretary the Marquis Visconri Vcnosta,
together with Count Pasolini his predecessor and Genera! La Mar-
mora, met at Pcgli on the Italian Riviera and carried through the final
negotiations. The Roman Question was a veritable shirt of Nessus
to the Emperor; he would have been more than thankful to be rid
of it but it clung to him irrevocably. This time, however, he made
one more effort to solve the problem by agreeing to the terms of the
arrangement made previously with Cavour, Italy was to guarantee
the Papal territory from all attack and the Emperor would withdraw
his troops within two years. But the sting of the Convention was
in the tail, for a secret clause was added that the Italian government
would move the capital from Turin within six months. There was a
certain ingenuity about this secret provision saving the face of both
parties, for it enabled the Italians to claim the transfer of the capital
to Florence as a half-way house to its final position on the banks of the
Tiber, and the French to interpret it as the definite surrender by Italy
of Rome as the capital of the Kingdom.
The Convention of September as it was called had little to com-
mend it. It pleased the con$0rtena y who, to humiliate the Pied-
raontcse* had been advocating the removal of the capital for months.
It improved somewhat relations with France, and satisfied the
national dignity, irritated at the presence of French troops in Italy, but
it was a cruel insult to Turin. It also alarmed and angered Rome,
which well knew what to expect when the French garrison was with-
drawn. The Convention was announced on the iyth September
and on the 2ist riots broke out in Turin: the next day they
were renewed: the military arrangements were badly mismanaged,
the troops firing on the crowd in the Piazza San Carlo and on each
other as well. More than fifty were killed. On the 2jrd the King
requested the resignation of the Ministry and a few days later
appointed General La Marmora as Premier. This helped to calm the
angry spirit in Turin but the obvious resentment of the populace hurt
and saddened Victor Emanuel who withdrew for a rime from the
city. It was a tragic and thankless ending to the primacy of loyal
Turin, which throughout the straggle for unity had borne die burden
and heat of the day, giving to Italy the thinkers, the soldiers and the
statesman who created her, and sparing neither her sons nor her
substance for the unity and independence of the country.
The Church tad not hitherto taken the ofiensive against the spolia-
tion of her possessions and territory by the State* or, as it was widely
regarded, the emancipation of her subjects from the ignorance ana
Venice without Victor y^ i&6i-iS66 151
the oppression of her rale. There had been, nevertheless, a concentra-
tion of her forces for the struggle. To meet the dangers around her,
a strict subjection to Rome had been imposed on the Bishops, whose
hands were at the same time strengthened in their control of the
clergy. This was a precautionary measure against internal revolt,
in view of the radical condemnation of modern views being prepared
in the encyclical Quanta ana. There was before the Papacy in this
struggle between Church and State, a choice of two paths: either to
accept the modem position, and strive to absorb and spiritualize it,
as had been done in earlier ages with the crude religions of the
barbarians, or to bind her mediaeval robe more closely around her
and condemn the principles of the new world. She chose the latter.
At the close of 1864 Pius IX published the encyclical, accompanied
by a syllabus of eighty modem errors condemned by the Church.
Into die furnace of her condemnation the Church threw Socialism,
Communism, Bible Societies freedom of conscience and cult, reli-
gious toleration, state education, and the whole prospectus of the
Liberal Catholic movement in Europe which sought to reconcile
religion with the State. Accepted in Europe as a deliberate attack on
Free Government, in Italy it was interpreted as a. declaration of war*
While it disturbed many sincere Catholics who had hoped to find a
via media between modern knowledge and the Church's doctrine,
it confirmed the anti-clericals in their belief that there could be no
compromise with* Rome, and hardened them in their determination
to assert the supremacy of the State over the claims of the Church.
Quanta cura and the syllabus were, in fact, a declaration of Catholic
immobility : the apotheosis of die past. Italy in these years was divided
in two. On one side stood die Italy of history, whose dominant
tradition and atmosphere was religious, with its host of cathedrals
and churches, convents and monasteries, set amid the lavish beauty
of the land; the Italy of religious art, with its endless Madonnas and
Saints and Angels; die Italy of faith and devotion, but also of super-
stition and ignorance, and above all, poverty. From this basis rose
die hierarchy of religion, penetrating every phase of life and crowned
with die pomp and splendour of Pontifical Rome. On the other side
stood, the new Italy, a blend of pride in her new nationality, of thirst
for power and greatness, and grim determination to eradicate the
predominance of priest and monk and seat her King in the Eternal
City. Between these two aspects of die national life no compromise
could as yet be found. The outstanding feature of her new political
life was prodigality. Much of it was vital and necessary, but it was
152 The Evolution of Modem Italy
conceived in a grandiose spirit which fitted ill with her narrow
resources. Millions were voted for railways and arsenals, docks and
harbours. More millions were spent on her large conscript army and
still more on her new navy of ironclads, whose pride of place was
given to the Re /Italia, armoured and engined in America and fitted
with the latest of Armstrong's guns.
To meet this abnormal expenditure, the receipts from the budget
were totally inadequate. A series of loans had to be floated, increasing
the national debt to ruinous proportions. Taxation was steadily in-
creased, but nothing seemed to make an impression on the annual
deficit. In such circumstances the reputed wealth of the Church was
a sore temptation to the harassed government. Already greedy eyes
had been cast in this direction and tentative efforts made to tap this
unexploited source of wealth. Appointments to vacant episcopal sees
were delayed and the incomes transferred to the Treasury, In 1864 a
report to Parliament revealed that no less than a hundred and eight
sees were empty. The next year a Bill for the suppression of the
religious orders was prepared, but was opposed by the extremists of
the Left as not sufficiently comprehensive. Its introduction caused a
storm of protest in the country and it was withdrawn. But in 1866,
under the financial pressure of the war with Austria, a thoroughgoing
Bill was carried through by which 2,382 monasteries and convents,
housing 29,000 religious, were suppressed, their property confiscated,
and the inmates pensioned off at die rate of about fourpence a day.
A few, very few, were spared. Monte Cassino, the cradle of Western
monasticism, was saved by an effort. A white robed monk still con-
ducts tourists from Florence through the Certosa di Val d'Ema, where
the past generations of the Ricasoli family lie interred, but to-day the
most famous are just show places, and few visitors can have escaped
a feeling of regret and sadness as a government official leads them
through the silent emptiness of what were once amongst the most
revered shrines in Christendom.
The transfer of the capital from Turin to Florence took place in the
early months of 1865. To move the royal household, the two houses
of Parliament, together with aU the government officials and their
staffs, was a long and most troublesome proceeding. Florence was ill
prepared for such an invasion, and large sums had to be spent and
much inconvenience caused before it was completed. It coincided,
moreover, with a diplomatic crisis of the greatest delicacy and of
critical importance to Italy, the growing friction, and all that that
implied, between Prussia and Austria. The change of capital was
Venice without Victory, 1861-1866 153
accompanied by a general election. The new Chamber was no
improvement, the Left making a vigorous bid to force La Marmora
to resign. His Finance Minister and others left the Cabinet, but the
King would hear of no other Prime Minister and the Ministry was
reconstituted. The financial position was almost desperate: rank
extravagance in the departments, notably the War Office, for which
La Marmora had the utmost difficulty in finding a Minister, ugly cases
of peculation amongst officials, brought demands for public inquiry
and drastic economies in the armed forces. But this latter was the one
thing that had to be avoided, in view of the possibility of war between
Austria and Prussia, for this would at last open a road to the recovery
of Venetia.
The first definite approach to good relations with Prussia, whose
position vis-a-vis to Austria was closely analogous to that of Italy,
had been made by Cavour, when in 1861 he had sent General La
Marmora to Berlin to congratulate the new King William I on Ms
accession. The result had been a special mission under General von
Bonin to Turin, which was present at the Royal Session which, pro-
claimed Victor Emanuel King of Italy. In 1863 and 1864 diplomatic
Europe had been convulsed over the Schleswig-Holstein question,
which had ended in a joint attack on Denmark by Prussia and Austria,
the seizure of the two duchies, and their partition between the victors.
But the robbers had quarrelled over the spoil and it now looked as if
there would be war between them. This, in fact, was Bismarck^s
objective but it was contingent upon two conditions, the neutrality
of Franbe and alliance with Italy. To Italy, war between Austria and
Prussia would be an opportunity for the recovery of Venetia such as
hardly any other combination could present, for not only did an
alliance with Prussia impose a war on two fronts upon Austria, but
success would mean the recovery of Venetia without any obligation
being incurred towards France. It would be a situation almost as
favourable as 1848, but now Italy with a large army at her disposal
had taken the place of Piedmont, To Prussia, the Italian alliance
had equal value, for an Italian victory could in no way embarrass
Prussia, and whatever the issue on the Italian front might be, Italy
would immobilize a large Austrian force and create for her all die
difficulties of a war on two fronts, leaving Prussia to deal with, at
most, two-thirds of the Austrian strength.
Hie unknown quantity was Napoleon. If France joined Austria
the war would not take place, for it would be Prussia not Austria
who would thai have die double front to defend, and Italy would
154 ^ e Evolution of Modern Italy
certainly not oppose Napoleon. Even If France remained neutral,
but placed a veto on an Italian alliance with Prussia, Bismarck's
position would be jeopardized, for she must face the concentrated
power of Austria instead of only a part of it. The first opening move
was made by Prussia whose Minister at Turin, Count Usedom, in an
interview with La Marmora on August 4th put the plain question,
*What would the attitude of Italy be in the probable event of a war
between Prussia and Austria ?' La Marmora's reply was very cautious.
If, he said, Prussia seriously contemplated making war on Austria,
and if she made Italy a serious ana formal proposal, they would
examine it; but if the Italian reply was to be used merely to exert
diplomatic pressure on Austria, the proposal would not be considered.
When a few days later the Prussian Minister assured La Marmora
that Prussia had decided to make war on Austria, La Marmora replied
that no pledge could be taken until they knew the attitude of Napo-
leon, which was as necessary for Prussia as for Italy. Still persistent
in his attempt to get Italy to make a premature declaration, Usedom
a week later insisted that he knew for certain that accord with Austria
was now impossible, that if Italy now promised her alliance with
Prussia, Venice was in her hands. The next day La Marmora received
the notice of the Convention of Gastein, by which a settlement of
their difficulties and mutual concord had been established between
the two German Powers. Usedom hurriedly left Turin and La
Marmora did not see him for two months.
Few knowledgeable persons regarded the Convention of Gastein as
a permanent settlement. The question of hegemony in Germany
had to be settled between the two rival Powers. But it suited Bis-
marck. The military preparations were not complete and it was
necessary to assure himself that France would remain neutral and that
the Emperor would place no veto on a Prussian alliance with Italy.
So Bismarck paid his visit to Napoleon at Biarritz, It was successful,
France would be neutral and Italy was free to do as she liked at her
own risk, for no support would come from Paris, At the same time
La Marmora sent to Vienna a special agent to discover whether
Venetia was for sale, suggesting a thousand million lire, but all
suggestions of such a kind were at once tinned down and the mission
was abortive. He then again took up die threads with Berlin.
Bismarck* once sure of France, wasted no time. In January, a deputa-
tion amvedt feomWilliam I with the Grand Collar of the Order of
Ac Black Eagle for die King, together with, a request to said in the
greatest secrecy to Berlin, a general in the confidence of the govern-
Venice without Victory* 18611X66 155
mcnt to confer with die Prussian authorities in preparation for war
with Austria. This was followed by a Treaty of Commerce between
the two nations, which a year previously Bismarck had refused. In
March, General Govonc was sent to Berlin. An alliance was a fore-
gone conclusion, for as La Marmora said, no Italian government
would last a week which refused to try and seize Venetia the moment
Austria was engaged with another Power, but it was necessary to be
wary. Italy had had one Villafranca and she did not want a second.
The' treaty most be offensive and defensive and there oiust be no
loophole which would enable Prussia to withdraw at a critical
moment and leave Italy to face the full strength of an exasperated
Austria. Bismarck tried hard to induce La Marmora to sign a treaty
of alliance at once, to anticipate any private arrangement with Austria
which would make war unnecessary for Italy, but he refused. War
with Austria was not popular in Germany and stiff opposition came
from the King and die Court. England was urging peace and offering
mediation, and Bismarck was almost at his wits* end to find a casus
belli. He suggested that if Italy would begin the war, he could then
force the hands of the King. But La Marmora refused again. Finally
on March zyth the terms of the Offensive and Defensive Treaty
arrived at Turin. Italy was to declare war immediately after hostilities
commenced between Prussia and Austria. There was ^ to be no
separate peace. Italy was to get Venetia but not the Trentino, which
was within the Germanic Confederation, and Prussia was ^ to get a
territorial equivalent If the Austrian fleet left the Adriatic, the
Italian fleet was to proceed to the Baltic. The terms were accepted.
Full powers were given to GOVOBC at Berlin and the treaty was
signed on April 8th.
The relations of Austria and Prussia were alive with mutual sus-
picion but both denied any aggressive intentions, and having received
Bismarck's official disclaimer, Vienna now proposed simultaneous
disarmament. This proposal was at otice supported by all parties
anxious for peace, and Bismarck found it impossible to refiise, and
both sides called a halt Almost at die same moment Austria accused
Italy of strengthening her forces cm the Venetian border; the charge
was based on a misconception, for the troops observed returning to
Bologna were, in fact, normal garrison cavalry regiments recalled
from Naples as no longer required* but Austria at once reinforced
her Venetian troops. The information received by La Marmora of the
steady despatch of large raofbrcements into Veaetia and the need to
take defaawe steps was darified on April a6th by a letter from the
156 The Evolution of Mo Jem Italy
Foreign Minister at Vienna to Bismarck, telegraphed from Berlin.
In this, after expressing his satisfaction at the resumed peaceful rela-
tions with Prussia, he went on to say that as Italy had put her army
in a condition to attack Venetia, Austria was obliged to call up the
reserves and put her Italian army on a war footing. This letter,
welcomed at Florence as meaning an Austrian attack on Italy, v$dch
would not only bring the terms of the Prussian Treaty into force but
would bring over France to the Italian side, decided La Marmora on
immediate action and on April 27th he ordered mobilization.
But precisely at this moment the bellicose attitude of Italy received
a severe setback. Instead of approving her action Napoleon dis-
approved, and worse than this, the one thing La Marmora had always
feared, that at the last minute Prussia would draw back and leave Italy
to face Austria alone, seemed about to be realized. On May 2nd La
Marmora received a despatch from Govone reporting an interview
with Bismarck in which he told him that *the King would refuse to
engage himself to declare war on Austria immediately it broke out in
Italy, that he does not interpret the treaty in this sense, nor does he
believe that this obligation was reciprocal according to the literal
interpretation of the text*. But Bismarck could not refuse to honour
Ms own signature to the treaty, and two days later came reassuring
news. Partial mobilization was ordered, and an attack on Italy by
Austria would mean war with Prussia, and Italy at once declared
herself determined not to take the initiative. Austria had failed to
detach Prussia from Italy, as no doubt was her real objective, and a
war on two fronts now appeared imminent. She made one last
desperate effort to save herself, offering to cede Venetia for a definite
guarantee of Italian neutrality. It was a sore temptation to Italy, a less
Honourable Premier might have found some way to accept it, but La
Marmora was loyal to the treaty and refused. As usual, Napoleon
had been hankering after a congress but both Italy and Prussia had
rejected it, now, as a last minute solution it was put forward again by
England, France and Russia; it was wrecked as in 18^9 by Austria,
who refused the three suggested bases, the cession of Venetia, decision
by universal suffrage in the Duchies, and Federal reform. On June
itfdb Prussia declared war on Austria and Italy four days later did die
same.
Opinion as to the outcome of the war was to prove very wide of
tbe mark In France, popular favour ran to Prussia, bat Napoleon
'expected a long war ending in die victory of Austria and an Italian
conquest of oietialea < viijg France die arbte ofEorope. IE England,
Venice without Victory, 1861-1866 157
It was believed that Italy would defeat Austria but that Prussia would
be beaten. The Italians were very confident. Their fleet, especially in
ironclads, was more powerful than that of Austria and her new con-
script army far outnumbered the force which a divided Austria
could bring against her. The army of nearly a quarter of a million
men was divided into three groups. In the north, around Como, was
Garibaldi with 30,000 volunteers, with much the same task ^ as in
1859, to overran the Tyrol and Trentino. Along the Mincio lay
the main army under the King and La Marmora (who was now
replaced as Premier by Ricasoli) numbering 130,000 men, while at
right angles to this force along the valley of the Po, Cialdini com-
manded an army of 70,000 ready to advance into Venetia. Though
of imposing proportions the Italian army was weak in the higher
branches of staff work and intelligence: the quality of the conscripts
was untested, and above all, it lacked unity of command. The rela-
tions between the two commanders was so delicately adjusted that La
Marmora could give no orders to Cialdini but only invite him to alter
his dispositions. The Austrian army under die Archduke Albert
numbered 130,000, but from this the fortress garrisons and troops to
keep order had to be deducted, and it is doubtful if he had even half
the strength of the force opposed to Mm.
On June 24th, four days after the declaration of war, the main
Italian army advanced in seven columns to the Mincio. ^ No opposition
was expected for they believed the Austrians to be behind the Adige,
whereas the previous day the Archduke had advanced his main force
and seized the high ground of Sommacampagna, and now occupied
a strong, compact, crescent-shaped front of fifteen kilometres, with
ninety thousand men. Thus in the second battle of Custoza the role
of the two armies was exactly reversed, the Aostrians defending tie
high ground above and beyond the river, while the Italians attacked;
whereas in 1848 it was the Austrians who attacked and the Italians
who defended. In both the Austrians wore the victors. The difficulties
of the terrain made a simultaneous advance of the Italian, columns
impossible, and the Austrians, with the advantage of fighting cm
interior lines, which largely discounted the enemy *s superior numbers,
and in a position overlooking his advance, were enabled to deal with
Ms columns in detail. The fighting lasted all day, but La Marmora's
failure to exploit his numerical superiority and to bring his reserves
into action at die right time and place, made it possible for die Arch-
duke to have local superiority wherever it was needed. In die erasing
after long hours of confbsed figuring the Italians withdrew across the
158 The Evolution of Modern Italy
river. The Italians lost about 8,000 men; half of them prisoners, with
700 killed and over 3,000 wounded. The Austrians lost more killed
and wounded but only 1,000 were taken prisoner.
Custoza was neither a victory nor a defeat, for the Austrians made
no attempt to cross the Mincio in force, but its effects were a moral
disaster for Italy, and a striking example of incompetent leadership.
Owing to defective intelligence work the vigorous Austrian defence
had all the elements of surprise. Early in the engagement one Italian
division gave way badly, and as they streamed back to the bridge
where the King and La Marmora were posted, the latter seems to have
lost his head and believed the whole army was in retreat. At midday
he left Valeggio and galloped twenty miles to Goito looking for
reserves to cover the retirement. Corps and divisional commanders
were left without orders or directions, and knew nothing of what was
taking place elsewhere. For most of the day the army fought on the
initiative of individual commanders. Cialdini received no word of
what was happening until he heard that the army was in full retreat
and was urged to fall back on Modern to protect the capital. Not
content with recrossing the Mincio La Marmora fell back to Cremona
and took up a defensive position behind the Oglio. This ended the
first phase of the campaign. In the meanwhile everything went well
for Prussia and on July 3rd came the great victory of Sadowa which
decided the war. The Archduke Albert with the bulk of his forces
was tastily recalled and unable to defend Venetia Austria prepared to
surrender it to France for restitution to Italy. By this time the Italian
army had rallied. La Marmora resigned his command and Cialdini
replaced him and the army crossed the Po and without opposition
occupied Padua and Vicenza and by July 25th the whole force was
pressing steadily forwards.
Custoza was a cruel blow to Italy but the country had still hopes of a
great naval victory which would offset the military Mure. The fleet
was at Taranto, where Admiral Persano was still making ready to
put to sea. Urged to take action, he steamed up the coast to Ancona
and awaited further reinforcements. Here he remained at ^anchor
until peremptory orders, coupled with the threat of replacing him,
brought in person by Depretis, the Minister of Marine, forced Mm to
put to sea. with die intention of seizing the strongly defended island
oflissa. News of the attack on lissa reached the Austrian Admiral
TegethoC at Pola* by telegraph. Tegetfaof was a Dane and a bold sailor*
he at once put to sea ana aware of his inferiority in gun power and
armour gave otnfczs to use the ram if possible. Peoano was still
Venice without Victory, 1861-1866 159
engaged in bombarding LIssa when the approach of the Austrian fleet
was signalled. He drew up his ships in a double line broadside on to
the enemy, and at the last moment left his flagship, the Re d* Italia,
and went on board the torretship Affbndatore, without apprising the
fleet of his change of ship. The orders of the Austrian admiral were
carried out. With Tegethof on his flagship, the Max, leading, the
fleet broke the Italian line, flung It Into confusion, and In the melee
that followed the Max rammed and sank the Re d f Italia with the loss
of over four hundred of her crew. Another Italian Ironclad, the
Pakstro v was rammed, set on fire, and blew up. No Austrian ship
was lost. The main action lasted about an hour, after which the two
fleets disengaged and Tegethof, having steamed right through the
Italian lines, reformed his ships between LIssa and the adjacent Island
of Lesina. But Persano made no attempt to renew the battle and
retired to Ancona, where a few days later the Affondatore sank at icr
moorings. In spite of the equivocal character of Persano's first
despatches, which seemed to Imply a victory, the truth was soon known
and with a sense of bitter humiliation Italy realized that, like Custoza,
LIssa was a national disaster. Persano was afterwards tried for coward-
ice and incompetence. Though exonerated from the first charge
he was dismissed the service without pension, and ended his days
dependent on the King's generosity. Custoza and Lissa were closely
arallel. In both there was superiority In numbers rendered useless
y Incompetence In the higher command. Lissa was fought on July
20th and on the 26th Bismarck, ignoring die terms of the alliance,
signed an armistice with Austria without consulting Ms ally. Austria
at once reinforced her Italian front with all available troops and
Cialdini found himself facing three hundred thousand men. Un-
supported by Bismarck Italy had to submit. The Traitino was
evacuated, and Venetia, handed over to France, was retroceded to
Italy at second hand. ls
Defeated on land and sea, 1866 was a black year for the national
pride of Italy. She strove to forget her wounded spirit in an outburst
of rejoicing for the recovery of Venecia and the restoration of the
iron crown of Lombardy which the Emperor returned to Victor
EmanueL But even so her troubles were not aided. In September
rebellion broke out in Palermo and for six days the city was in the
hands of the mob. The mania for immediate unification regardless of
the deep-seated mode of life of the people, which characterized Italian
legislation during these years, was disastrous in Sicily. The new
provincial system upset the traditional economy of the island: hatred
E
160 The Evolution of Modem Italy
of conscription drove the peasants to the hills as brigands, whilst the
wholesale dissolution of the convents and monasteries outraged the
religious bond which still existed between the Church and the people.
Poverty, ignorance and superstition played their inevitable part and
the familiar methods of insurrection provided the means of rebellion.
Troops had to be poured into the island, a military regime set up and
the miserable tale of executions, imprisonments and repression, re-
peated once more. It was a tragic ending to a disastrous year relieved
only by the final solution of the problem of Venice and her return at
last to Italy. It was a great compensation, but the methods by which
it was achieved gave small cause for satisfaction.
CHAPTER TEN
ROME AT LAST, 1866-1870
^ 1 H HE Peace of Prague which ended the war of 1866 left Italy in a
JL very similar position to that in which she found herself after
VMlafranca in 1859. She had won Venice, as she had previously won
Lombardy, by the help of an ally stronger than herself; but just as
Napoleon had left Mantua and Peschiera in Austria's hands, giving
her direct access to her lost province, so now the lack of support from
Prussia left Italy once again in a weak strategic position which im-
periled her safety and made her task in 1915 one of enormous
difficulty. It was the policy of Bismarck, once Austria was defeated, to
avoid creating a spirit Off revanche and to give the defeated enemy as
generous terms as possible. So he gave Italy no support over the
Tyrol or the Trentino and allowed Austria, not only to retain both,
but to secure a strategic frontier which dominated the entire boundary
of northern Italy. With the deep wedge of the Trentino on the west,
and Istria and the valley of the Isonzo in her hands, Austria threatened
the Venetian plain and the Po valley from east and west, while her
possession of the commanding ridges from Monte Nevoso to the
Brenner gave her an almost impregnable southern frontier. It was
not, however, until fifty years had passed that the strategic weakness
of her northern boundary became a national danger to Italy.
The recovery of Venetia left Italy with her last problem, Rome,
and in December 1866, in accordance with the terms of the Septem-
ber Convention, the last French troops left the city and Italy became
responsible for safeguarding the Papal frontier. The wolves were set
to guard the fold. Rome, however, was not undefended. To keep
internal order the Pope had been permitted to enroll an army of
thirteen thousand men, commanded by General Kanzler, Part of this
force, the Papal Zouaves, were recruited from all over Europe. In
addition, Napoleon had sanctioned the formation of a body of French
troops known as the Legion d'Antibes. Such a force was capable of
repelling incursions by volunteer bands but could offer no serious
resistance to the Italian army. It was hardly to be expected that Gari-
baldi and the Party of Action would respect the new situation for very
long, and an unauthorized attempt on Rome was regarded almost as
inevitable, Ricasoli must have been well aware of tito danger, and in
161
162 The Evolution of Modem Italy
order to forestall It he determined once more to endeavour to come
to an understanding with the Vatican. He had resigned the premier-
ship in 1862 after the failure of his first effort at conciliation, Rattazzi
had followed Mm and Aspromonte had followed Rattazzi. The same
series of events were now to be repeated, with Mentana replacing
Aspromonte.
RIcasoli was profoundly distressed over the widening breach
between Italy and Rome. He was a religious man, and realized how
deep were the roots of the Catholic Faith in the country, and he was
determined that, if generous concessions would win over Rome to
work with, not against, the new Kingdom, he would make them.
As a preparatory step he sent to Rome the Councillor of State,
Tonelio, nominally to arrange for the appointment of bishops to the
vacant sees, but in reality to open the political question. In the mean-
time he prepared Ms Free Church BiJJ. The mission of Tpnello met
with small success. Agreement was effected in the appointment of
fourteen bishops but all idea of co-operation between the two Powers,
Rome summarily rejected. Then Ricasoli brought forward his Bill.
It was Cavourian in principle, embodying the separation of Church
and State on the basis of mutual freedom. The State would surrender
the exequatur and the placet, giving Rome complete liberty in the
appointment of bishops. 19 He offered to put the sale of the Church
lands into the hands of the Episcopacy who were to hand over a
stipulated proportion to the State. The Church was to be disestablished
but to possess a freedom such as it possessed in no other country in
Europe. This irapEed that the first clause in the Constitution, per-
sonally insisted upon by Charles Albert in 1847, that the religion of the
State was 'Catholic, Roman and Apostolic', was to be abrogated.
When these views became known die opposition in the Chamber
became intense. The policy of surrender infuriated the anti-clericals
as much as the separation of Church and State offended the Vatican.
It was quickly obvious that the Bill was doomed, and Ricasoli, realizing
the strength of the opposition, induced the King to dissolve Parlia-
ment. The new elections were fought with unusual bitterness. Gari-
baldi was brought in to make speeches in Venetia, where he
denounced Pope and priests with all his accustomed vehemence.
Ricasoli might have known that with the hopelessly narrow franchise
the country had no chance of expressing its opinion. The elections
were in the hands of the sitting members, lite prefects, who took their
orders from the Home Office, and the dv service, and with the
wright of die Church thrown against him, the result was a foregone
Rome at Last, 1866-1870 163
conclusion. The new Chamber proved as adverse to the Bill as its
predecessor and Ricasoli, in despair of passing it, resigned. The
King, as five years before, nominated Rittazzi as his successor (April
1867).
Rattazzi's third and last premiership was no more fortunate for
the country than those which preceded it. The Cabinet, composed of
new men of no outstanding quality, was completed by the middle of
April. Rattazzi himself held the critical office, that for Home Affairs,
and the Marquis Visconti-Venosta, the ambassador at Constantinople,
was destined for the Foreign Office, but the brief duration of the
Ministry prevented his arriving in time to take part in it. The
Cabinet, however, contained one straightforward member not afraid
to speak his mind, General Genova di Revel, the younger brother of
the old leader of the Right in the Piedmontese Parliament. We get
an insight into the general situation and die official attitude of die
government in an order issued by General Revel to the Command-
ants at Florence and Naples on April i6th.
This Ministry is informed that the insurrectionary party may be prepar-
ing attempts at invasion in die territories still subject to Rome. Your
Excellency is therefore warned to make such dispositions that, if such
attempts materialize, they shall be stopped at all costs, it bong die firm
intention and duty of die Government scrupulously to respect the Conven-
tion of September 1864. I believe it opportune to add that, one of the
means by which the individuals of this party hope to facilitate die execution
of their plans, is to get the idea circulated and believed that the Government*
although declaring that it is hostile to their designs, is secxedy in &.VOUT of
them. It is therefore necessaiy that the Commandants and officers under
Your Excellency's command should be warned of this, so as not to be
deceived; rather, if such rumours circulate it will be necessary to trace diek
origin in order to discover die tree agents of the party. This Ministry like-
wise wains VJE.* as to the need for carefiil disposition of the troops guarding
the frontier, for it might happen that individuals of this party, liaving created
some disturbance within the Papal boundary, should then appeal to oar
troops to intervene. The commanding officers on the frontier should be
warned against this trick, since on no account axe diey to cross the
boundary. * V.R = Vostra Exedlenza.
This correct official attitude was unfortunately undermined by an
unofficial attitude, inspired or winked at by Rattazzi himself which
before long created an impossible situation between the army and the
volunteers, which reduced the frontier guard to an ineffective
demonstration.
Tbc Convention of September provided this solitary satisfaction,
Evolution of Modern Italy
that there were now no foreign troops In Italy; but it denied
her any opportunity of profiting thereby to complete her unity,
for she must now keep herself and every one else from touching
the sacred ground of the Papal territory. There was, of course, an
underlying plan of campaign, to provoke a revolution in Rome and
then occupy it to restore order; the same method as Cavour employed
unsuccessfully at Naples in 1860, for the 'Cavourian tradition', which
still inspired the government, included the bad side as well as the
good of their model, though they failed to improve on the one or to
emulate successfully the other. The new responsibilities of the
government produced, however, no weakening or change of plan
in the two men from whose influence most danger was to be antici-
pated, Garibaldi and Mazzini. Both were set on going to Rome with
or without the government, but their purposes in so doing were
different. Mazzini, who had now gone oack to an uncompromising
republicanism, full of contempt and bitterness towards Napoleon and
Victor Enianue! alike, meant Rome to be the springboard for the
declaration of a republic; Garibaldi, whose simple directness of tem-
perament saw no further than cutting the Gordian knot of the political
imbroglio by direct action, wished to leave all political issues aside"
until Rome belonged to Italy, and refused to take what Mazzini
termed 'the republican initiative'. This divergence of view is made
clear in their correspondence.
In a^ letter dated the zoth of June, 1867, Mazzini writes, 'Garibaldi,
one thing Italy demands from you and me before we die : and it is a
republican initiative. This we must give to Italy from Rome, You
are a Roman general, but republican, and charged to hold high the
banner of the Republic. I was a triumvir. Neither you nor I have
surrendered: we have the right and duty to continue 1849*; and Gari-
baldi answers, 1 think we rain the Roman affair by imposing a political
programme. Let the child be bom; once bom it will be baptized and
we will baptize it. The urge to-day is to rain the Papal Government.
Let us both then work together to that end.* The same note is struck
in other letters of Mazzini written at this time. To the 'brothers at
Genoa/ he says, 'for us republicans to carry the monarchy of Custoza
and Lissa to the Campidoglio, is, in truth, too much*, and to his
emissary at Turin, 'I work now only for the Republic. If the Pied-
montesc understood their mission they would unite with me to begin
die republican initiative from Rome. To-day 150,000 lire would en-
sure it/ Money, as usual, is the crying need, and in an unexpected
appeal to Bismarck, he raises his terms for services yet to be rendered
Rome at Last, iS66-iSyo 165
though he can offer no security. *I abhor the Emperor', he writes,
*and the supremacy which France exercises in Europe. I believe that
an alliance with her against Prussia, to whose victories we owe
Venetia, would be a crime that would stain our young Italian banner.
I think that there is need for a strategic alliance between Prussia and
our Party of Action. The Prussian Government must furnish us with
two million Ere and two thousand needle guns. I pledge myself,
on my honour, with such means to destroy every possibility of alli-
ance between Italy and the Emperor, and to ruin the government if it
persists. 9 It was a dangerous propaganda. The House of Savoy had
already its enemies and the next few months would increase them.
The scandal of the King's private life, the hated veto of Napoleon and
the reputed subservience of the King, did little to strengthen the
House of Savoy on the throne of Italy and of the many seeds sown
haphazard by Mazzini some were sure to germinate.
The opening session of the new Chamber, which lasted until the
beginning of August, was chiefly occupied with finance. The army
estimates and the problems connected with the sale of Church pro-
perty involved in the dissolution of the monasteries, being the
principal subjects of discussion. Revel, the Minister for War, was
forced to reduce his estimates from 150 million lire, his original
minimum, to 134, and the State finally undertook the sale of ecclesias-
tical property. It was not long, however, before the volunteer move-
ment began to attract attention. During this summer of iS6y Rome
was crowded with foreign clergy and delegates assembled to celebrate
the eighteenth centenary of the martyrdom of S. Peter and S. Paul,
and the occasion was used by Garibaldi for a violent attack on the
Church, this 4 nest of vipers* as he termed Rome, which he declared
his intention of cleansing. There were hundreds of volunteers only
waiting for the word as to when and where to assemble, and the
encouragement given in the speeches of Garibaldi and the clear in-
dication of his intention to march on Rome, began the process. In
the middle of June some two hundred young men were assembled at
Temi where a deposit of arms was stored. It was discovered by the mili-
tary, the arms were seized, and though the volunteers quickly dispersed,
seventy-two were arrested. Almost at the same time great excitement
was caused and given excessive prominence in the Press, over a visit
of a prominent French general, Dumont, to Rome, where at the
request of the Papal authorities he inspected the Legion d'Antibes.
This action by a highly placed officer, retaining his status as a general
of the French regular army, was a bad diplomatic blunder, for it
66 The Evolution of Modern Italy
thereby recognized the national character of the Legion as part of the
French army, and in so doing violated the terms of the Convention of
September.
In response to questions in the Chamber Rattazzi replied that the
government had protested to Paris regarding the general's action:
France, he said, had recognized the irregularity of such conduct and
had promised to remedy it, declaring, however (to escape its own
responsibility) that the general had gone to Rome on his own initia-
tive s without any mandate from the government, having imprudently
acquiesced in the request of the Roman authorities. The French
government had, moreover, admitted that such an action was not
consonant with the loyal and absolute execution of the Convention.
This incident, Rattazzi added, should make Italy more than ever
careful to avoid any infringement of the Convention, and the
government was determined to do so. It is necessary 9 , he concluded,
'that from this bench there should be a solemn, authoritative, pro-
nouncement that those who impute to the government a secret con-
nivance with any attempt on Roman territory, not only speak falsely
but do the greatest injury to the government of the country.' The
discussion which followed closed with the acceptance of the Cavour-
ian maxim that Italy must go to Rome, but by moral means, a
method which the Left was at the time doing its best to replace by a
volunteer expeditionary force under the command of Garibaldi.
The firm statement of Rattazzi, that the government was deter-
mined to uphold the terms of the Convention, backed as it was by the
arrest of the seventy-two volunteers, calmed their ardour for a time,
and during the summer there was a marked cessation of their activity.
But below the surface an organization was at work, a repetition of that
which preceded the expedition of Garibaldi and the Thousand in 1860.
At the head of it, as before, was Crispi, Garibaldi's organizing brain,
together with Berrani and others of the same stamp. The Deputies
of the Left were, of course, in sympathy, and when the Chamber rose
at the beginning of August, they departed to their constituencies fidl
of ardour for the volunteer movement. It was iust another con-
spiracy to force the hands of the government, but even more elabor-
ate and successful than before, though the outcome was otherwise.
More important than the help of individual deputies was that of the
permanent officials* in whose hands was the real power. Two of
these, Monzani, the secretary-general for the Home Office, the senior
permanent official under Rattazzf himself, and Melegari, who held
a similar post at the Ministry of Marine, wore ardent GaribaldinL It
Rome at Last, 1866-1870 167
was Monzani from whom the prefects, sub-prefects and the officials
of the railways and telegraphs took their orders, and received pro-
motion or dismissal, and his word was law. From Melcgari went
orders to all harbour and dockyard officials, and these two played a
vital part in subsequent events.
In August the volunteer movement began in earnest on both sides
of the border. There was already a national committee in Rome
working for a revolution from within and at Rattazzi's personal
request a Major Ghirelli had been given a year's leave and sent to
Rome to form a Roman Legion to start it There were com-
mittees all over the country, protected by the Deputies of the Left,
enrolling volunteers, collecting arms and munitions. The Prefects
and railway officials were under orders from Monzani to provide free
transport and passes to volunteers. Secret deposits of arms were
established both on the frontier and in Roman territory. As to
Garibaldi, he did as he pleased. Italy is made', wrote Revel, the one
man in the Cabinet with a mind of his own, 4 but can this be called a
state when it lacks a government superior to the individuals within
it ? Here is Garibaldi, a Deputy who wii not take the oath, a citizen
who gives no heed to the laws. We have reached a point when a
private individual can do as he likes, can prepare a war against a
neighbouring state which" the government has pledged itself to
respect ! Is this a government ?*
The first week in September Garibaldi suddenly left Italy for the
Peace Conference at Geneva. He was hardly a success, he was hissed,
according to Revel. A week later he was back in Italy, now deter-
mined to push matters to extremes and planning to join the volunteers
at the frontier. 80 The moment was critical and at a Cabinet meeting
Revel proposed boldly to arrest him. Hie members hesitated, dread-
ing the unpopularity of such an action, but in a talk afterwards with
Revel, Rattazzi agreed. Revel had everything ready and Garibaldi
was arrested in bed at Sinaltinga on his way to Terni He was taken
to Alessandria, then to Genoa and finally deposited once more under
naval guard at Caprera. The whole proceedings were more like a
triumphal journey than an arrest. At every stop fimctionaries of all
kinds and groups of enthusiastic volunteers were on the platform to
greet him. At Alessandria Garibaldi addressed the crowd, and he
wrote to Crispi that if he had but said die word the whole garrison
would have followed him to a man. The tactful conduct of Captain
Incisa of tie Espknxtore, who transferred him from Genoa to
Caprera,, prevented trouble at the port, helped by Garibaldi himself.
168 The Evolution of Modem Italy
who assured the crowd that he was returning of his own freewill and
not under compulsion.
The temporary absence of Garibaldi made little difference to the
general progress of the volunteer movement, now left in charge of his
sonMenotti. The method was simple and effective. The volunteers
arrived at the frontier unarmed, and were thus free from interference
by the troops on guard. They then crossed the boundary and were
armed and organized into bands at one of the secret stores of arms, or
else crossed by night in an unguarded spot with arms already provided
on Italian soil. The first band crossed on September 28th, four days
after Garibaldi's arrest. There was little co-ordination and isolated
groups of volunteers skirmished with the Papalini without any effective
result throughout the first half of October.
Up to the end of September the policy of Rattazzi, at least out-
wardly, had Been loyal to the Convention, though there was always
an underlying suspicion of his possible duplicity amongst those who
knew him best. On the 2ist an article had appeared in the Official
Gazette warning the public that if any tried to violate the frontier,
and thus infringe the country's pledged word, the Ministry would
not allow it; and three days later it announced the arrest of Garibaldi
as a proof of its determination to do its duty. But the first week in
October Rattazzi changed direction. He was politically dependent
on the support of the Left, and the influence of Crispi over him was
strong. Equally so was that of his own wife, formerly Marie de
Solxus, a distant cousin of Napoleon's and a well-known romantic
writer. She urged him on to rival Cavour and he was not averse.
After the arrest of Garibaldi, in Rattazzfs absence from home, his
house was violently attacked, one of the guards killed and two
wounded. This too had happened to Cavour. Then came a letter
from Garibaldi to Crispi, passed on doubtless to Rattazzi, in which
he said, 1 see but one way to satisfy the nation. To invade Rome with
the Italian army and at once. I will pardon the misery of Italy but
not Its degradation, and to-day not only the nation but the army feels
outraged. Let the government consider this and it will be persuaded
that a few days of energy will settle everything and satisfy the entire
nation, and if there are threats from abroad of stopping us, the very
women and dhildren will rise and the world wiM see a revolution of a
people such as it has never seen yet/ Perhaps this was^the final straw;
anyway on October 6th Crispi entered in his diary, 'Rattazzi alters
into' the system*, and the same day in a letter of Dina to Castelli, he
says t *It is the policy i k Cavour. Rattazzi has assured me that he will
Rome at Last, i866-iS^o 169
intervene at Rome. I hope he means It." There was no more inter-
ference with the volunteers. Revel himself saw on Rattazzi's desk a
demand for free transport for six hundred volunteers from Genoa to
Temij signed by the Director General of Public Security.
After the attack on Rattazzf s house the Court became alarmed,
demanding the concentration of cavalry and artillery in the capital.
But Revel had no opinion of the bellicose temper of the Florentines
and calmed the Court, but he gave exact orders to the four battalions
as to their actions at the first sign of disturbance. Nevertheless the
public agitation grew. The Press were in the van. The journals were
foil of accounts of insurrections in the Papal States repressed by^the
Zouaves, which were inventions to disturb the country. *All lies !
Revolutionary inventions f wrote Revel. Before the situation grew
worse Rattazzi made a final effort to induce the Papacy to give way.
The Canon Ortalda went to Rome with a letter written by Revel
The government, he said, would leave the Pope Rome and Civita-
vecchia: would take over the public debt: and guarantee tranquillity
by occupying the provinces. It was quite useless, the Canon obtained
nothing. On October jyth Revel and Rattazzi had a private audience
with the King. The outcome was a telegram to Count Nigra, Italian
Ambassador at Paris, ordering him to go at once to Napoleon at
Biarritz and expose the situation. The government, he was to say,
could no longer control the situation. They proposed to enter the
provinces, to disarm the volunteers, restore tranquillity and respect
the Papal independence. They would not enter either Rome or
Civitavecchia unless requested so to do by the Roman government.
Afterwards the troops would be withdrawn. Revel then explained
that he had already given all the necessary military orders to carry out
these arrangements at the shortest notice. It happened that the same
evening there was a Cabinet meeting. Rattazzi asked Revel to
explain his proposals. He did so. His scheme was rejected, and he
then and there resigned and left the room. This mined the Ministry,,
and on the receipt two days later of threatening despatches fromParis 8
the Cabinet resigned in a body (October i?tb).
Events now moved with startling rapidity. The country was with-
out a government and while Cialdini tried unsuccessfully to form
a Cabinet, Garibaldi acted. The same day that Rattazzi resigned,
evading the naval patrols, he escaped to die mainland and on tic
22nd appeared at Florence. All attempts on the part of Crispi and his
friends to restrain Mm were useless, and that same day he wait
through by train to the frontier. Official attempts to stop Mm failed
170 The Evolution of Modem Italy
completely, the telegrams being obviously delayed on purpose ^until
Ms train had passed through. The next day he crossed the frontier at
Porto Carese with seven thousand men. The one chance of a success-
fill occupation of Rome by Italy in 1867, lay in a spontaneous and
effective rising within the city. Had the Romans revealed the same
spirit as the Palermitans of 1 860, Rome might have been won with die
tacit consent of Napoleon. But nothing was less calculated to inspire
such a movement than the presence of Garibaldi as the deus ex machina.
In 1860 at Palermo Garibaldi was a legend, an invincible fate. Did
he not shake the Bourbon bullets, unharmed, from his poncho?
Besides, die Palermitans had a real hatred of their government, a
rebellious spirit, and an effective technique of street fighting. Rome
was profoundly different. For centuries the Romans had lived in the
ambit of Papal influence and had, as it were, absorbed a clerical men-
tality. Their interests, their amusements and recreations, were based
on ecclesiastical functions, and they loved the pomp and cir-
cumstance of Catholic ritual. Their gossip circled round the intrigues
of die Papal court, their scandal was ripe with the reputed peccadilloes
of Canons and Cardinals. The Church amused them, employed
them and fed them, and to her they looked alike for consolation in
trouble and material help in times of stress. They were, moreover,
fond of Pio Mono, and If they were jealous of their right to criticize
the Papacy, this was merely the obverse of their devotion. Self-
contained, unambitious, content with their government of priests,
proud of their unique city, they asked for no more than to be left
alone. What support were such a people likely to give to Garibaldi,
with his flaming denunciations of the Papacy, his hatred of priests
and monks, who described the Eternal City as a 'tank full of vipers* e
Nevertheless, on the night of the 22nd an attempt to master the
city was made. A bomb blew up part of die Zouaves* barracks: a
gate was seized, and if the people had risen success might have been
achieved. But they did not. Kanzler recaptured the gate, quelled
the few demonstrations, and restored order. The next day there was
a partial rising in the Trastevere, always the storm centre of the
city, but it came to nothing. The same night a small detachment of
Garibaldini, led by two of the devoted CakoM brothers, both of whom
were killed, attempted to bring a boadoad of arms to the city by
water; but they waited at the appointed place in vain. They retired
to the villa Glori where they were attacked and the survivors dispersed.
So ended the revolt of Rome. Garibaldi, undeterred by the Roman
fiasco, pressed on. On the 25th he captured Monte Rotondo, but it
Rome at Last, ifff-lfyo 1 71
was expensive and delayed him longer than he could afford. The
next day he was within a few miles of the city but here his advance
stopped. It was impossible to seize Rome without artillery and with
but a few thousand tired and wayworn troops. He decided to make
for Tivoli where he hoped to be joined by Nicotera. The decision
was fatal. The Garibaldini always went forward not back. Demorali-
zation sec in: the troops began to slip away. Two thousand, it was
said, disbanded before he reached Mentana on the 27th. Here he was
trapped by the PapaHni, supported by the French, across whose front
he had to march to reach Tivoli. There is one force more powerful
than patriotism, religious fanaticism; the power that Cromwell
evoked to crash the gallant cavaliers of Charles I. These Papal forces
were of this type. Moved by devotion to their faith, the main body
of the Zouaves had come from Ireland and Canada, from Belgium
and Spain and France, to defend the Pope. They fought with staunch
determination, as did the Garibaldini, but the latter were no longer
flushed with victory and they lacked the genius of the old leadership,
for neither Garibaldi nor his volunteers were of quite the same stamp
as the heroes of the Thousand. As evening fell the defeat of Garibaldi
was complete. He left the field with his scattered forces and lecrossed
the frontier where he was arrested and sent back to Caprera.
The failure of the rising in Rome, whose success might have in-
duced Napoleon to let things take their course, and the incursion of
Garibaldi in flagrant contempt of the Convention of September,
decided the Emperor on action. He had hesitated long, but the day
before Mentana the French troops at last sailed from Toulon. The
pride of Victor Emantiel was roused, and he telegraphed that if they
landed in Italy the royal army would cross the frontier, and at the
information of their disembarkation at Civita Vecchia the Italians
occupied Viterbo and Velletri. The French troops reached Rome on
October 30th. The Italian action was but a gesture* Two days before
General Menabrea had formed a new Cabinet He had no sympathy
with Garibaldi's action. He refused to allow any more volunteers to
cross the border, confiscated supplies, and on the sist recalled the
Italian troops from Papal territory. There was to be no war with
France. The bitterness felt at Garibaldi's defeat was intensified by the
tactless boast of the French commander that "the champots had done
marvels*, and the subsequent debate in the French Ctambor, which
upheld the action of die government, coupled with Rouher's grandi-
loquent Jmmm\ that the Italians should never get Rome, added ango:
to Inmuiia&Qtfc. Montana cancelled all Italy's gratitude for what the
172 The Evolution of Modem Italy
Emperor had done for her in 1859 and almost with a sense of shame,
the country realized its weakness and inability to defy the dictation
of its powerful neighbour.
When the excitement over Mcntana died down ind the hopes of
Rome faded, the country turned back wearily to the chronic struggle
with the financial deficit. The new Premier, Menabrea, a distin-
guished engineer, had been one of the reactionary stalwarts of die
old Piedmontese Right. At the time of Cavour's formation of his
centre party, Menabrea had accused him of wishing to "sail to other
shores' and had received* the reply that the new party had no such
intentions but they intended to sail *in the direction of the prow
not of the poop*. Menabrea was still a rigid conservative and his
Ministry gave Italy her first lesson in restricted liberty. His^first
Cabinet did not last long. After a month of furious debates arising
out of Mentana and the policy of RattazzTs government, the Cham-
ber gave him a vote of confidence by only two votes and he resigned.
He then remodelled Ate, Cabinet which held on its troubled course
until December 1869. The new Finance Minister, Cambray-Digny,
was bent on economy. He farmed out the State Tobacco Monopoly
for a hundred and fifty millions in cash, and at last imposed the
much debated and greatly hated grist-tax, an excise on all corn that
passed through the mill. By such means the increase in debt was
checked but the State was still far from establishing an equilibrium.
Whilst the Chamber wrestled with the financial problem the more
moderate opinion in the country, both in Parliament and outside it t
was seriously concerned by the danger to Italy's reputation for trust-
worthiness, revealed by die conduct of government officials in the
events which culminated in Mentana. In this Menabrea fully agreed,
and promptly exposed what had taken place by the publication of a
long series of telegrams received or sent by officials in the critical
months of 1 867. The revelation was disturbing. Public money, naval
stores, rifles and ammunition, the free use of trains and telegraph,
had been put without stint at the service of the volunteers, while at
the same moment the government was loudly expressing its deter-
mination to uphold the nation's honour by the firm maintenance of
the obligations involved in the Convention of September. Equally
prejudicial to the best interest of die Kingdom had been the attitude
of the Press, which, carried away by the publicity value of an attack
on Rome by Garibaldi, and ignorant or indifferent to the pledge to
protect the Papal frontier, as wei as to the international dangers
involved, had systematically published all the baseless rumours best
Rome at Last, ifff-ityo *73
calculated to excite public opinion, 'Is there a journal*, wrote Revel,
'that openly defends our political loyalty to treaties ? Not one/ The
whole business was thoroughly discreditable. Ministers, deputies,
permanent officials, were alike implicated, and the reaction against
this abuse of liberty was a healthy sign, but It could not disguise the
fact that the national conscience had not yet grasped the conception of
national honour as the first charge on government action. The policy
of repression which followed, the Press prosecutions and the^ police
inquisitions, the confiscation of documents and the dissolution of
democratic societies, did not, however, commend Itself to the best
elements in the country. They probably knew that the real culprits
went unscathed. However, if the means employed were to be con-
demned, as they certainly were, they at least made it clear that the
end y the possession of Rome, was one which in one way or another
the country was determined to realize.
It was here that Menabrea was weak. He showed an almost com-
plete indifference to the Roman question and certainly would not
have allowed it to become either a cause of internal agkation or even
of diplomatic protest. Perhaps he shared the curious Idea of Ricasoli
who, at one time, thought of using Rome (when they entered it) as a
kind of capital emerUa, for use on state occasions, whilst the govern-
ment of the country was carried on from Florence. What finally
ruined the Ministry, however, was not Rome but the scandal which
arose over the farming out of the Tobacco Monopoly. Shares in the
bank which found the money for the government became a very
profitable investment, and the Right was openly charged by a
deputy of the Left, Lobbia, of speculating in them. Both Ministers
and members were accused of being Implicated and the royal family
itself was not exempted. A few days later Lobbia was found stabbed.
The inference was obvious, and though Menabrea fought off the
charges for a time, die reputation of the Ministry was mined and in
December 1869 Menabrea resigned.
The appointment of his successor was a matter of more than usual
difficulty. The generally accepted candidate was Giovanni Lanza,
an opponent of Menabrea whose election as President of the Chamber
by forty votes over the government nominee had been the imme-
diate cause of Menabrea s resignation. Lanza was a Piedmontese of
the old school whose parliamentary eacperiesice dated back for twenty
years. A doctor by profession, neither brilliant nor wealthy, whose
reputation for sterling honesty was his principal asset, he was accept-
able to the moderates on both sides of the Chamber. The difficulty
174 ^ e Evolution of Modem Italy
arose with the King, who had a partiality for Ministers drawn from
the Court circle, so that he himself was kept in close touch with policy.
Menabrea, for example, was a personal A.D.C, to the King and the
two most prominent members of his late Cabinet, Cambray-Digny
and the Marquis Goalterio, were respectively Grand Master of Cere-
monies and Minister of the Royal Household. Lanza came from
another stratum of society, whose wife, in reply to his letter announc-
ing that the King had offered him the premiership, could write from
her farm in the historic village of Roncaglia, where once Frederic
Barbarossa parleyed with the rebellious communes, 'The stock is
increased by a fine bull calf. The vinegar is made. The white, wine
is turned and 1 do not think it will be necessary to turn it again as it is
very sweet/ The King offered Lanza the Presidency of a Coalition
Cabinet to include the three ex-ministers mentioned. He not only
refused bet demanded the dismissal of all three ex-ministers from
their Court appointments as a necessary condition of forming a new
Cabinet. He did not intend to have a camarilla hostile to him at
Court. The struggle was prolonged but Lanza was victorious. The
ex-ministers withdrew from Court and Lanza formed his Cabinet,
with Sclk as Finance Minister and Visconti Venosta at the Foreign
Office, while he himself took charge of the Ministry for Internal
Affairs.
Once again the first place had to be given to rigid economy^ Lanza
pledging himself that all public grants should be expended 'with the
parsimony of a miser', while Sella, not to be outdone, promised
that all expenses should be 'cut to the bone*. It was their joint opinion
that the country could stand no more taxation, and they relied for
economy chiefly on a ruthless cutting down of the Army and Navy
Estimates. The Ministry had hardly settled down, however, before
die country was upset by a scattered series of futile outbreaks. It was
Mazzmi' s last effort before the winning of Rpme robbed him of his
principal weapon against the monarchy. After the conquest of Venice
be had started yet another organization, the Universal Republican
Affiance, whose objective was Rome, die Trentino and Istria, and
of wlttch he wrote, The Republic is the word of order for all: Rome
the objective: insurrection and national war to die invader, the
means*. There were groups of Ms- ajjigliati throughout the country
and die republican idea had even penetrated into the army. One of
Mazziafs circulars fcfi into die hands of die government, and dim
forewarned, die officials easily controlled die weak efforts of die
mcmsnent, kit at Genoa, Padua, Ravenna and elsewhere attempts
Rome at Last,, x$66-iSjo 175
were made without the least success. At Pavia a sergeant was killed
aad two soldiers wounded, and a corporal who had joined the malcon-
tents was tried and shot. In the south trouble was caused by Ricciotti
and Menotti Garibaldi, who having obtained a concession from the
government for constructing a railway tunnel in Calabria used their
isolated situation to stir up republican ardour. It was all very futile
and useless, but with the sporadic brigandage still alive in the south
and the terrorism which was endemic in the Romagna it revealed a
state of unrest which distressed all who had the true interests of the
country at heart.
Another source of uneasiness to the Ministry was the Oecumenical
Council which met in Rome during the first half of 1870 to promul-
gate the doctrine of Papal InfaMbmty. Thoughtful people in Italy
feared the extension of the doctrine from spiritual matters to the
possession of the Temporal Power, making its retention thereby an
article of faith. Lanza sent the Deputy Domenico Berti to Rome to
get in touch with the more moderate Bishops and at the same rime
to keep the Ministry informed of the course of the Council's delibera-
tions. The Dogma, restricted, however, to matters of faith and
morals, was promulgated on July i8th and though It raised great
controversies throughout Europe, had no direct bearing upon die
problem of Rome. There was, nevertheless, a political programme
beneath the spiritual surface of the Dogma. Throughout it was the
work of the Jesuits who claimed the supreme dominance of the Faith
over the State. Infallibility was the consecration of the absolute
authority of the Church over Society, involving the subjection of
civil and political rights to an infallible Pope. It was a claim in com-
plete contradiction to the system of modem civilizatioa and a chal-
lenge to every Catholic State and it did much to sap their resistance
to the extinction of the Temporal Power and the entry of Italy into
Rome.
Lanza had a desperate struggle over the reduction of the Army
Estimates, especially in the Smate, whore General Cialdini, voicing
not only the opinion of die Generals bat also of the King, put up a
bitter opposition. He was accused of imperiling the national security*
of disorganizing die whole system of national defence and reducing
die armed forces of the Kingdom Wow safety point. Though die
Bill was passed, its provisions were never executed, for die outbreak
of die Franco-Pm^ian war in July reversed the whole situation, and
before long Lanza had to enlarge instead of reduce die army and*
moreover* demand an appropriation of forty millions in access of
176 The Evolution of Modem Italy
his original estimates. In the preceding summer Napoleon had
approached both Austria and Italy with the suggestion of a triple
alliance. But Menabrea, who was then Premier, had cut short the
negotiations by insisting that the settlement made after the war of
1866 should not be disturbed. The Italian government had quickly
perceived that Napoleon had a war with Prussia in view, and they
were unwilling, as well as unprepared, to fight their former ally.
Then came Mentana, which ruined any hope of public support for a
French alliance and the subject was dropped.
In May 1870 when war with Prussia was becoming inevitable
Napoleon revived the question of a triple alliance. Italy demanded
the withdrawal of the French garrison and a free hand -with Rome,
and the Emperor, still under the clerical influence of the Empress and
Grammont, ruined his chance of help from Italy by a refusal; so
when the war broke out in July, Italy announced her neutrality. In
August when complete disaster threatened, Napoleon made his last
bid for Italian help, sending the Prince Napoleon to beg sixty thousand
men from the government of his father-in-law. But it was impossible.
The scales of victory were already heavily tilted against France. What
troops Italy had were on the Roman frontier: her financial condition
was parlous, and though the generous heart of Victor Emanuel urged
the Ministry to the help of Napoleon, Lanza and Sella were immov-
able, and the Prince returned empty handed. Not the least curious
example of Italian feeling at this time was revealed in the conduct of
Mazzini, who reopened his correspondence with Bismarck, this time
offering three thousand men to fight for Prussia. A ship was to be
sent and the contingent was to be treated as part of the German army.
This was in July 1870. An emissary arrived but the negotiations were
brief, for the Italian government came into possession of the corre-
spondence. The authorities were warned, and in August Mazzini was
arrested at Palermo and interned at Gaeta. Then came the disaster
of Sedan and the proclamation of the republic, and Mazzini's three
thousand turned Garibaldini and joined the force commanded by
Garibaldi in France to fight against the Prussians.
On the last day of July the Italian government called up two classes
of the army* Two days later word came from France that the
government was to recall the Rome garrison at once, and die terms
of the Convention of September were to be brought back into force,
and Lanza accepted these conditions. On August loth two more
classes wore called to the colours and on the i6th Parliament was
summoned, having already risen for the summer vacation, and on the
Rome at Last, i866-x$jQ 177
19th the Ministry asked for an extraordinary grant of forty Billions.
The same day the last French troops sailed for France. By now
General Raffade Cadoma was in command of thirty thousand men
on the frontier and the presence of this imposing force guarding the
Papal State exasperated the impatient Deputies of the Left and the
debate on the forty millions developed into a violent attack on the
whole policy of the government. They were accused of betraying
the nation, of sacrificing the national aspirations and of using the army
as a police force to guard the Pope. If you wiH not go to Rome",
cried the deputy Meiana, 'at least let us go, this attitude of yours
thwarts the revolution/ Which was precisely what Lanza intended
to do. The speech of the Foreign Secretary, Visconti Venosta, foil of
discreet reservations, was no help. Finally, after a stormy sitting,
Lanza replied, and without disclosing the policy of the Ministry, gave
sufficient reassurances of his intention to go to Rome to obtain a vote
of confidence by 214 votes against 152.
The policy of Lanza was both wise and pradociL He laid down
three necessary pre-conditions before he took action: to prevent any
untoward demonstration by the volunteers; to win in advance the
consent of Catholic Europe; and by the presence of an overwhelming
force to prevent, if possible, any bloodshed. To these might also be
added a further effort to induce the Pope to speak the word of peace
to Italy. Mazzini was already safely interned at Gaeta. Strict sur-
veillance was ordered regarding Garibaldi, and no laxity was per-
mitted amongst functionaries in the matter of passes and transport
to volunteers. There was, Lanza knew, one saving clause in Ac
Convention of September which might give him Sic opening he
required, for it contained a phrase, inserted by Italy and accepted by
the Emperor, that *in the case of extraordinary events both of dbe
contracting parties would resume their freedom of action*. Having
scotched as far as might be the danger of extra-legal efforts from
within, Lanza on August 29th circulated a memorandum amongst
the Powers insisting on the necessity of die immediate occupation of
Rome. Four days later the 'extraordinary events* materialized, Sedan,
the surrender of Napoleon, and two days later (September 4th) the
proclamation of die Republic. The Convention of September was
dead and Italy at last had a free hand. But Lanza, cautions as CFOT,
refused to be stampeded. On September 7th he circularized ti&e
Powers, again, this time giving in outline the steps wMch the goYo~
ment proposal to take to ensure the freedom and spiritual indepen-
dence of the Papacy when Rome passed to Italy. At the same time
The Evolution of Modem Italy
he sent Count Ponza di San Martino with a final appeal to the Pope.
The response of the Powers was most gratifying. They were satisfied
that the Papal independence would be preserved, and convinced that
the occupation of Rome was now inevitable. Not a single Power
protested. Spain, Austria, Germany, even France, recognized that the
hour had struck for the fall of the Temporal Power and that Rome
must be the capital of the new Italy. The Pope, as before, rejected all
compromise, he would yield only to force.
This phase coincided with Prince Napoleon's last desperate appeal
for help, and the chivalrous nature of Victor Eraanuel revolted at the
thought that so cold blooded a reason as mere want of money, should
prove an insurmountable barrier to giving, to one who had done
so much for Italy, the instant help in his hour of need which ^his
generous heart prompted. In his anger and bitterness he turned against
Lanza and so strongly and openly did he express his feelings that
Lanza sent in his resignation, having, as he said in Ms letter, *no longer
the heart to remain at the head of the government after the repeated
manifestations of the King's distrust and dissatisfaction shown to him
both when alone and in the presence of his colleagues*. Victor
Emanuel realized his mistake and a reconciliation took place at once
and Lanza continued as Premier. The restored relations with the
King, the response of Catholic Europe, and the telegrams received
from all over Italy urging the government to action, cleared the way
for the final operations. On September nth Cadoma crossed the
frontier and on the ipth the army was in position before the city, and
a last minute appeal to General Kanzler to avoid bloodshed having
been rejected, the next day Cadoma attacked. The artillery breached
die walls near the Porta Pia and the troops stormed into the city, but
the Zouaves fought with courage and determination and the losses on
both sides would have been far heavier had not Kanzler surrendered,
in obedience to the orders of the Pope, when honour was satisfied.
Order was quickly restored in the city and at the request of Cardinal
Antondli both the Leonine City and the Castle S. Angelo were
occupied by Italian troops. The King did not come at once to Rome
but appointed General La Marmora as King's Lieutenant As soon
as possible a plebiscite was held which gave an overwhelming vote
fee union with Italy, and it is interesting to note that it was taken
even in die Vatican itself which, doubdess, made a handsome con-
tribution to the fifteen hundred negatives which made up the sum total
of Ac opposition. The consolidation of Rome as the capital of Italy
was not however accomplished without a period of stress and uot-
Rom at Last, itff-ityo *79
for the government. The bitter complaints and recriminations
of the broadcast over the Catholic world produced, as was to be
expected, a chorus of protests and appeals against such an outrage. 21
But the Catholic governments were content to await events before
contemplating action. The wise and clever poHcv of Lanza had put
them in an awkward position, for not only had they known before-
the general of his policy and had not protested, but he had
to make die conditions to be established regarding Papal
independence a matter of international agreement, recognizing the
world-wide interest in the question. Of die alternatives thus offered of
either sharing the responsibility or of being in a position to dirow aM
the blame on Italy, they chose the latter, and thus Italy was enabled
to arrange matters without foreign interference.
There was great impatience for the official occupation of the
national capital. It did not matter, the Deputies declared, if the King
had no palace and the Chamber was imfiimished, the essential was to
have King and Parliament in Rome. But Lanza insisted on an effective
entrance, and would promise no more than that die capital should be
transferred within six months. On October 9th the King issued a
general amnesty and Mazzinl was released with die rest. This was
followed by the dissolution of Parliament and a general election and
the new Parliament met at Florence on December 5, 1870. Its main
task was the setdement of the relations with the Papacy. The Law
of Guarantees, promulgated on May 13, 1871, gave to the Papacy foil
liberty in its spiritual authority and jurisdiction: freedom of commu-
nication between Rome and all die members of the Church: liberty
of association and reunion: Eberty of appointment to all ecclesiastical
offices and liberty of teaching. The Pope retained die full preroga-
tives of sovereignty and received an annual grant of ^129,000, a sum
equal to that assigned to him in die last Papal budget. He retained,
free of all taxation and government kterference, die Vatican, S. John
Lateran and his Vilk at Castel Gandolfo and die buildings hitherto
reserved for Councils and Conclaves, Only Ms summer residence tin
Rome, die Quirinale, was excepted* for it was chosen as the Residence
of die King, Though the Papacy had lost its temporal power, it
retained all its spiritual authority and its position as Head, of the
Catholic Church with its prestige and dignity undiminished, and it
was even more fully independent spiritually, freed as it was from d
trammels of Ac civil power*
The weak point m the Law of Guarantees lay in Ac &ct that it
was unilateral The Papacy had no faand in it .Tic Pope refiised to
*8o The Evolution of Modem Italy
accept or even recognize it. He regarded it as coming from a usurping
government. He ignored the annual grant and closed the Vatican,
declaring himself a prisoner. Henceforth there was always a doiibt on
the question of possession. What the State had given it could reclaim,
and, in fact, after the death of Pius IX when there was uncertainty as
to whether the Conclave would not assemble elsewhere than in
Rome, Crispi threatened that if the Vatican was vacated the State
would occupy it, which revealed the uncertainty of the Church's
tenure. In November the Pope issued a violent protest against the
acts of the *subalpine Government 1 , for he would not even say the
word Italian', declaring once more that the Temporal Power was
essential to the liberty and effective functioning of the Church.
On June joth the government was transferred to Rome. The
Senate was installed in the Palazzo Madama, previously the Roman
Custom House, and the Deputies in that of Montecitorio. Two days
later Victor Emanuel took up his residence at the Quirinale, and on
November 2yth Parliament was formally opened by the King. The
Risorgimcnto was over. A new Italy had arisen, free, independent
and united, under a constitutional government with her King in
the Eternal City. It had taken fifty years to achieve, if we date it from
the risings of 1820 to 1821 when both North and South first demanded
a Constitution, Nothing is perhaps more remarkable about this long
struggle than the pertinacity with which Italy clung to her ideal and
the amazing resilience of the national spirit in the face of disappoint-
ment, defeat and failure. Every resource was called into action. Poets
and writers, politicians and orators, kept alive the struggle even in the
darkest hours. The one free Kingdom, Piedmont, found soldiers and
statesmen and the royal house for Italy. Led by her Kings she fought
and lost and fought again. Conspirators and filibusters, inspired by
Mazzini and Garibaldi, with utterly inadequate resources and by the
most unprincipled methods, yet filled with the highest aims and the
purest spirit of self-sacrifice, flung themselves into the struggle defying
governments and armies alike. Every one had to help; France and
England and Prussia had all to make their contribution. Exiles carried
the cry of Hberty and independence across the world, irritating
governments, causing trouble everywhere, but never ceasing to pro-
test and conspire. When men were wanted they arrived. Venice
found her Mania, Tuscany her Ricasoli, Piedmont her Cavour.
Defeats ^ were merely postponements. The whole movement was
alive with paradoxes and contradictions. Maztini quarrelled with
Garibaldi and both hated Cavottr, Victor Emanuel intrigued with
Rome at Last, 1 '866-1 '?/$ 181
ij conspired with Garibaldi and submitted with an ill grace to
the genius of Cavour. Yet all were working for the same end, 'With
the affection of a son, the faith of a Catholic and the honour of a King*
Victor Emanuel despoiled the Pope of Rome, and he meant it all.
And yet from Pope and King, from poets and conspirators, from all
who fought and struggled and suffered* we seem to hear the same
refrain aHke in defeat and victory, Italy, my Italy !
CHAPTER ELEVEN
THE NEW ITALY: TO THE FALL OF
CRISPI, i 871-1896
occupation of Rome made no change in the government,
JL save that it brought Lanza the Collar of the Annunciata, an
honour he would fain have refused from a sense of social inequality,
but was persuaded to accept. He remained in office for another two
years. Two important measures were introduced in his last period.
The first, which was unsuccessful, was a Bill for the reorganization
of the Provincial and Communal administration. Ever since the
introduction of the centralized system its working had been unsatis-
factory. Several tentative efforts had been made to improve it with-
out success. The trouble with the existing system was that nobody
would mind their own business. 4 We have sixty-eight little Parlia-
ments*, wrote the Senator Jacini, an expert on the question, 'called
Provincial Councils, which busy themselves with such questions as
Garibaldi's Million Rifle Fund, the Tobacco Scandal and the Roman
question, and at the same time we have a National Parliament which
has the right to occupy itself with the smallest details of local adminis-
tration*. Lanza's Bill defined their powers and their relations with the
central government, and endeavoured to remove the overlapping
which everywhere complicated local administration. Unfortunately,
there was a political motive at the back of the deputies* determination
not to alter the existing system, for since the appointment of the
Syndic of the smallest Commune, as of Provincial councillors,
depended directly from die Home Office, it was in the interest of
individual deputies to get men of the right colour appointed, and this
led to perpetual wire pulling, and the Bill was rejected. The other
measure was the application of the Law on Religious Corporations
to those existing in Rome, It v^as a thorny question and the cause
of strong clerical opposition, but he carried it through and removed
one more difficulty from the path of his successors. It was over a
financial question that the Ministry was finally defeated in June 1873
and Lanza resigned. He was weary of office and overstrained. Ac-
knowledging the King*s acceptance of his resignation "he wrote, *I
repeat the words of old Simeon, Nttnc dimltie servum tuum . , / and
die King repEed f 1 fear that in singing the Nunc Dimittis you are
152
The Xeu> My: to the Pall of Crispi, 1871-2896 183
mixing it with Alleluias. My friendship for you, and equally yours
for me, will last until the valley of Jchoshaphat/
The fail of Lanza brought once more to power, and his
Ministry, the last of the Right, covered the three years from 1873 to
it, and together they made a filial desperate but
on the adverse balance. Italy was gratified during
years by Victor Emanuel's visit to Vienna and Berlin, which
was returned 'in the autumn of 1875 by Franz Joseph's visit to Venice
and that of the German Emperor to Milan, the delicate relations of
and Pope It Inadvisable for either monarch to come to
Rome, In 1876 announced the balancing of the
but received with satisfaction, it was the cause
of his fall. Selk had employed the utmost severity in the application
of taxation, especially in that of the grist tax. If Cambray-
Digny had scourged* the taxpayers with whips, Selk had chastised
with scorpions and extracted the last ounce of profit ^ for the
Exchequer. His had the who withdrew
their support, and the Left seized the opportunity for a vote of cen-
sure, which was carried, and die Right, after years of office,
was driven from power.
The fail of the on the iSth 1876, was regarded by
the more in the country as less than a disaster.
They embodied an ideal and a which all that was
best in the national thought None of them Cavour were great
statesmen, but they had united Italy, given her Rome, settled the
basis of her new life and set a personal in political life.
Their work throughout had constructive and with die winning
of Rome as capital, it was What was now needed was a
period of consolidation, of government, boldly the
social problems with which the Right had had no to deal, NeYer-
thdess, a good had and the of the lavish
expenditure were to reveal Railway
construction, for instance, from 1,500 to 6,500,
and the trunk lines were completed, now from Turin
to BrindisL Fourteen hundred kilometres of new roads, mostly ^ in
the south, had opened. The service had twice
doubled, and great improvements in the harboer works at
Genoa, Livomo, Naples and BrincisL Negotiations were on foot
for the passage of goods and from Europe to
for trade with die which, with the of the
Canal, promised * future for Italy,
184 The Evolution of Modem Italy
^ Italy, in fact, was a rapidly changing country. The old mode of
Efe was disappearing and with it the men who had brought about the
new nationality. Mazzini died in 1872, saddened at the failure of Ms
republican propaganda and at the inability of the people to rise to the
foil stature of his lofty moral ideal, haunted by the ever present
doubt
Are this and this and this the shining ones
Meet for the SMning City ?
Rattazzi died in 1873 and his mantle of leadership of the Left
descended on Agostino Depretis. Napoleon III died during the same
year. Abroad, Italy's new position was recognized, and her handling
of the Roman question generally accepted as wise and generous. As
aU opposition parties, when power comes within their grasp, the
Left had been lavish of promises. Taxation was to be lightened, the
grist tax abolished, higher wages and better conditions, a widened
franchise, were all, at last, to be realized. When the shock of the fall
of the Right was past, there was a wave of hope and enthusiasm for
the new government, but it did not last long. On March 28, 1876,
the new Cabinet was announced: Depretis, President of the Council
and Minister of Finance; Amedeo Melegari, Foreign Affairs; Gio-
vanni Nicotera, the Home Office; and Mancini Justice, with Giuseppe
Zanardelli in charge of Public Works. The record of most of the
new government was- not reassuring. They were mainly converted
Garibaldini nurtured in the creed of conspiracy and extra-legal
methods. They had no tradition behind them and lacked any unifying
moral principle. The first act of Depretis was to confirm his position
by a general election. Giovanni Nicotera, upon whom as Minister
for Internal Affairs the working of the election mainly fell, was a
violent person of an authoritarian type, perfectly shameless in his
application of government pressure to secure a large majority. By
threats of dismissal or promises of promotion, or, if necessary, the
removal of recalcitrant officials, he obtained a resounding success,
four-fifths of the new Chamber professing loyalty to the Left, Lanza
was re-elected but Sella and Minghetti were both defeated.'
Up till 1876 the two party system, at least in name, had been kept
in being, but the Chamber was now inundated with new men,
devoid of any political experience and often inspired more by per-
sonal aims of advancement or profit than by any sound principles of
party loyalty. The election was, in fact, the crucial test of the success
or failure of parliamentary government in Italy. Had it resulted in a
compact and eJfedive opposition, containing the best dements of the
The New My: to the Fall of Crispi, 187 1-1896 185
Right, it would have and restrained all tendencies to violence
and disorganization and forced the Cabinet to produce a sound pro-
gramme. But the men were and the Right dissolved,
and in its place was an unwieldy unorganized majority, tending
at once to split into which made support and opposition
equally incalculable, so its very success proved a greater emlar-
to the Ministry the presence of a genuine opposition
would produced. When the Chamber assembled the weakness
of the government quickly apparent, for Depretis not only
announced Ms intention to every penny of the revenue, which
meant no lightening of taxation, but he to produce a definite
programme of Ms own, content for the most part to carry on
with left- over from the Ministry. Commissions were
appointed to the more difficult problems, such as the grist
tax; a scale was introduced in the lower categories of the
income tax, which some relief to with small incomes; in
educational matters, optional, and
school compulsory the of six and nine,
which, however, in the breach the observ-
for many of the unable to find
the money to or to pay for teachers. What
credit the Ministry from out-
by the public the restrictive activities of
Nicotcra. Both and were busy making trouble,
both working up public the government, and
Nicotera in reply, newspapers, prohibited public meetings
and sent strikers to the with a for the law
on liberty of association and profoundly disturbed
the public. When to this was of corruption and of
violating the secrecy of the in the of his own
newspapers, the was to 1877).
Depretis was not but the Cabinet,
Crispi for Nicotera.
The second Ministry of Depretis scarcely when the
country was grief by the death of
Victor Emanuel and Pope Pirn IX 0aniiary to February 1878). Be-
tween the two great of was a
personal regard the them.
Victor Emamiel bat he was every a King, a
soldier and a loyal friend. His was.
a real help to m& aacl Ms nature
1 86 The Evolution of Modern Italy
dictation from any one, even Cavour and Ricasoli, whose own
strength of character too often clashed with his, bore witness to the
King's loyalty and judgement. No greater contrast could well be
found, both in appearance and character, than that between Pio Nono
and Victor Emanuel. Pius had the good looks and the personal charm
which the King lacked. His early liberalism came from his heart not
his head, and the Roman Republic of 184.9 cured him of it for ever.
Moreover, he had men beside him like Cardinal Antonelli, with all
the traditional rigidity of Romanism, who saw to it that he never
wandered from the narrow path again. The quarrel with Italy was
not with the King but with democracy, for the Catholic Church is a
hierarchy with a creed of absolutism, and it would make no com-
promise with popular government in Italy; nor is it uninstructive to
observe that the non possumus attitude the Church adopted, was main-
tained steadily for fifty years until democracy was swept away by
Fascism and Rome had a Dictator to deal with. Then, and only then,
did she consent to come to terms.
King Humbert, who succeeded his father, was a brave soldier like all
Ms race, as he had proved on the field of Custoza in 1866, but his
political tendencies were as yet an unknown quantity. His Queen,
Margherita of Savoy, was one of the jewels of the new Italy, whose
beauty and gracious manner did much to make the royal house
popular and left a memory still treasured in Italy. The election of the
new Pope was viewed with some trepidation, and there were rumours
that the Conclave would be held outside Italy, but, as already men-
tioned, the firm attitude of Crispi, who threatened to occupy the
Vatican if the Cardinals vacated it, and at the same time guaranteed
absolute liberty and safety if the Conclave was held as usual in Rome,
sufficed to prevent any unaccustomed procedure and after a brief
conclave Cardinal Pecci was elected. He took the tide of Leo XIII.
The perfect tranquillity in which the election was held was a good
omen for the future, and the government had good reason to be
grateful to Crispi for his able handling of what might have been a
difficult situation.
Crispins influence had already strengthened the Ministry, when a
most scandalous sample of political revenge drove him to resignation.
His predecessor* Nicotera, out of jealousy and bitterness at his loss of
office* unearthed an incident in Crispi's private life, similar to that
brought against Parnell, and induced the editor of II Piccolo to publish
it. The result was much moral indignation and Crispins retirement
for .some yean from pablc Kfc. Political leaders were not easy to find
The An*' Italy; to the Fall of Crisp I, i8yi~i8y6 187
in the ranks of the Left, and the new King had some difficulty in
discovering a successor to Deprctis, who resigned with the retirement
of Crispi. He finally nominated Benedetto Cairoli, a name dear to
the nation, for he was the only survivor of five brothers, the rest^of
whom had given their lives for Italy. Cairoli was a better patriot
than statesman. Uncomplimentary remarks were made by his oppo-
nents as to his political capacities "and he was certainly unfortunate.
He held power twice and each time Italy received a setback. He had
absorbed the lofty moral ideals of Mazzini, and applied to international
politics the high standard of his own personal life. Faced with the
competition of such masters of craft as Bismarck and Disraeli, Italy's
aspirations found chance of fulfilment under the leadership
of a man to whom clean hands were of far greater Importance than
full pockets. Cairoli's Ministry took in March 1878, on the eve
of the Congress of Berlin, which opened in June. His Foreign Minister
was Count Cord, a very- reserved man an indifferent speaker.
Zanardelli took the Home Office.
The foreign policy of the new Italy was entirely unaggressive, and
the reorganization of her army and navy, upon which she was spend-
ing large sums, was purely defensive. Her relations with France and
Austria, which years previously had satisfactory* had since
deteriorated, and in the autumn of 1877 Dcpretis had sent Crispi on a
tour of the European capitals, partly for information but also
with a definite idea of sounding Serin as to an which would
safeguard Italy against an attack by France or Austria. The
reply of Bismarck was yes, as to France, but no, as to Austria, and
the proposal went no further. At Vienna, Crispi found the govern-
ment greatly annoyed at the irredentist activity of Italy in the Tyrol
France, he found MI of suspicion, strengthened by Ms visit to Berlin,
that Italy was preparing an attack on France in with Germany.
England, on the other hand, was friendly, and discussions
for a joint understanding oa of interest to
both countries. But no proposals of to Italian interests
seem to have been put forward for at the forAcoming
Congress. Such was the position when CairoE office. His
handling of the situation was Yery weak. The Engish suggestions,
which might have given Italy a were allowed to lapse,
and no check was put upon the on in the Tyrol.
ZaaardeUi into whose province matters came, was a j^reat
believer in Ebertv, whose motto was 'repress bet not prevent*, m
other words tt> alow agitation it resulted in action*
1 88 The Evolution of Modern Italy
and only then to stop it. So the republicans held meetings and cheered
for the republic, and the irredentists fulminated against Austrian
oppression, without the least interference by the government. Thus,
when the Congress opened, and Italy made her debut as a European
power, she was without support, with at least two powers, France
and Austria, irritated, if not hostile, towards her.
Count Corri went to Berlin without experience of a Congress,
without previous contact with the plenipotentiaries he was to meet,
and under the depressing influence of the successive dicta of the new
Italy's Foreign Ministers: that of Visconri Venosta that Italy's foreign
policy should be one of 'wise inertia'; of the remark of Depretis,
4 When I see an international question on the horizon, I open^my
umbrella and wait till it has passed', and the statement of Cairoli, *We
shall not be clever: but we wish above all to be honest'. It is indeed
small wonder that he returned with his hands unsoiled but his pockets
empty. When the Congress assembled the members had already
divided the spoils in private, to which they now gave a joint sanction.
England, with her usual blend of moral principle and realism,
returned with 'Peace with Honour' plus Cyprus. Austria acquired
rights over Bosnia and Herzegovina, while France made good her
claim to have Tunis recognized as her 'sphere of influence'. Italy,
as the newest and weakest member, was certainly in no position
to dictate, but she would have gained much in prestige if she had
boldly protested against Austria's new acquisitions or at least used
them to claim the 'rectification' of her Tyrolese frontier. But Count
Corti showed little spirit and less initiative. He signed everything
on behalf of Italy and returned without having even succeeded in
getting Italy's disinterested honesty recognized as something to her
credit.
The Cabinet had to face a storm of abuse from the Press when
Corti returned empty handed. The weakness and want of foresight
of the Ministry and the feebleness of Italy's first appearance as a Great
Power* roused intense indignation and deepened the sense of failure
which brooded over the nation. The Ministry did not, however,
immediately resign. In November, Cairoli accompanied the King
and Queen on their first visit to Naples, where, as they drove through
the streets, a fanatic, armed with a knife, attempted to assassinate King
Humbert. With great courage and promptitude Cairoli flung himself
in front of the King and deflected the blow, which wounded him in
the thigh, and in so doing probably saved the King's Efe. Cairoli's
brave action was greatly applauded but the blame was put upon
The New My: la the Fall of Crispi,
Zanarde!!i ? as the firstfruits of his views of liberty, and the public in-
dignation, in conjunction with the failure at Berlin, ruined the
government, which resigned in December.
Cairoli's Ministry began a year later after a confused interval
in which Depretis was President of the Council. He found himself
quickly involved in a tangle of cross interests with France in Tunis.
After securing Algiers, France had begun the process of peaceful
penetration her border. Before long she had control
of the post and her officers were training the Bey's small
army, and by grants in aid, she secured financial control of the
country. During the period, the area around Bizerta was
being rapidly developed by Italian emigrants from Sicily. A
fierce rivalry between the two energetic consuls ended with the
purchase of the Goletta-Tums railway by Italy, whose government
found the exorbitant sum demanded For its purchase. This brought
matters to a crisis. France, had already the consent of
the Powers given at the Congress of Berlin, at once sent troops,
occupied the ports, Bizerta, and by the Treaty of Bardo
(May 1881) signed with the Bey, a protectorate over the
country. There was a furious outcry in Italy, but her position, unless
prepared for war with France, was A storm of questions
and demands for explanation CairoM in the Chamber, and
quite unable to meet them, he resigned. The loss of Tunis, or rather
its occupation by France, was a severe blow to Italy. It seemed to put
the seal on her sense of failure and impotence. But the methods of
France laid up trouble for herself, for they Italy into the arms
of the Central Powers, and still further her position in
Europe.
The soreness of Italy over Tunis gave Hs opportunity,
and it was not long after the return of Dcprcris to power, wtuch he
was to hold until Ms in 1887, that Germany to approach
Italy to join die Austro-German was already in exis-
tence. Bismarck's aim to order in Europe tad always the
alliance of the three Emperors, Germany, Austria anil Russia. But
after die Congress of Berlin Russia drew apart, and Bismarck now
turned to Italy. Over an with Germany
was little difficulty* but to bring Austria and Italy together was not so
easy. Yet except for the hereditary of Austria, die only
difficulty was die anti-Austrian in the Tyrol. But Zanac-
delFs reversal of die old adage prevention is better dban cur e*
had been discredited after die attempted of King Hum-*
190 The Evolution of Modern Italy
bert, and a little firmness was all that was needed, Bismarck pressed
his suit and in the autumn of 1881 the King-aiid Queen went to
Vienna and were very well received. After that there was no trouble
and the next year, 1882, Italy joined the Central Powers and consti-
tuted the Triple Alliance.
On the whole, especially at the time of its first signature, to join
the Alliance was probably a wise move on the part of Italy, for it
gave her what she most needed for her development, a sense of
security, but she had to pay dearly for it. France was by far her best
customer, and the Commercial Treaty with her signed the year
before was an important source of income. France did not repudiate
it, but when it expired in 1886 she would not renew it, and a tariff
war began from which Italy suffered severely. The withdrawal of
French capital and the hostile attitude of the French bankers, did much
to bring about the banking scandal which ended in the failure of the
Banca Romana. It led also, through a false sense of pride, to an
excessive expenditure on the army and navy, which absorbed at one
time 25 per cent of the annual budget. Nor did Italy gain much from
the Alliance in prestige. She was very much the junior partner, and
too often for her liking she was treated as such, and though the
Alliance was at least four times renewed and lasted until the Great
War, neither of her allies placed much faith in her support and before
1914 she had become little more than an appendage.
During the last years of his Ministry Depretis carried through two
important reforms. The grist tax was reduced by successive stages
and finally abolished and the franchise was widened. The new
electoral law raised the number of voters from six hundred thousand
to Wei over two millions, but the educational standard required,
though low enough, pressed unfairly on the south and the country
districts, where schools were fewer, and excluded many rural voters.
But in Italy the eligible number of voters was one thing on paper and
another in practice, largely through the adverse attitude of the
Chnrck From 1860 Rome had supported the general principle that
'neither electors nor elected* should be the attitude of Catholics, and
it had greatly reduced the poll In 1874 the Pope issued his nan cxpeM
that it was not expedient for Catholics to vote, and this too had its
effect, so that the actual number of votes was always much smaller
titan it should have been, and still represented an inadequate expres-
sion of pobEc opinion. The name of Depretis in Italian political
history wii not, however, be generally associated either with the
franchise or even die Triple Affiance, bet rather with the political
The New My: to the Fall ofCrispi, 1871-1X96 191
svstcm as Wisformism*. A rigid party discipline had never
commended Itself to the It conflicted with their individualism,
with their of freedom of thought and expression,
and to with other personal or regional loyalties.
The had been that, from the first, the Chamber contained
by than that of party loyalty. With the
of the Left, the grew even more complicated. The
the had kept them together, but the Left had
n0 such principle, and the Chamber split into divisions
was The solution of the problem as
to how to get a majority, as devised by Depretis, was the
system of Vansformism'
In theory, it a government, in which the men best
to were to be without regard to parties,
but in practice is was very different. Deprctis was a cynic
who that had their price and did not hesitate
to ask them to it, and he the principle of making
it worth while for an or a to vote for the govern-
ment. As as any of the Chamber became dangerous to
the of a government or an individual made himself
sufficiently objectionable as to they were bribed.
If of sufficient or importance, a might be offered a seat
in the Cabinet, or a profitable He be won over by a
decoration or possibly information of financial value. Some-
times a member could be by the provision of a sthoolfaouse
or a railway in Ms constituency and thereby induced to vote
the right way. There were various but the end was the same.
A good example of Ms method is by die sogar tax. In a
speech at Stradelk, Dcpretis tad the between
the heavy tax on salt, a prime of the and that
on sogar, 4 the salt of toe rich*. was and his
intention of correcting it. The was that the salt
tax would be lightened, of increased
the sugar tax. It was an and strong
opposition was anticipated when the Bit was in, of
which, it was passed with but opposition. The came
a few days later* when in the Gazette a list of no less
Deputies who had supported the Bill wore the of
Hie e&et of oa life was daasttoiB*
The post of Deputy became the road to or
192 The Evolution of Modern Italy
advancement. The Chamber itself became a hotbed of intrigue and
life at Montecitorio became a thing to itself, cut off from the nation^
representing personal and sectional interests, in the midst of which the
wider needs of the nation were neglected, if not ignored. In his last
year of office Depretis brought Crispi back into the Cabinet, which
he quickly dominated, and when Depretis resigned shortly before his
death Crispi took over the presidency (1887).
When Crispi assumed office, the morale of Italy was at its lowest
ebb. To the failure at Berlin and the occupation of Tunis by France
was now added the unpopular Triple Alliance, by which Italy found
herself an ally of her hereditary enemy Austria, against whom, even
then, as the unjustified possessor of the Tyrol and Trentino, the
patriotic elements were raising the banner of irredentism. From the
Congress of Vienna, a Parliament had been too often regarded in
Italy as a self-acting panacea, which once established, would bring
in the millennium. The idea that they would have to learn to work it,
a long and difficult process, seems not to have occurred to any one.
Now, after fifty years of struggle to obtain it, the reality proved a
cruel disillusion. Ten years of Depretis completed the process, for
Depretis was a pessimist who never believed in the greatness of Italy
but in her weakness, and his policy was to run the country on the
lowest common denominator and to avoid difficulties in Parliament
by inertia and judicious corruption. While Parliament thus con-
ducted robbed Italy of any feeling of pride in her new political
system, its hand fell heavily on every aspect of life. Italy was a poor
country. It was calculated that the income per head of the population
was under ^8 a year, compared with ^3 1 in England and ^26 in
France. Having as yet no extensive manufactures, taxation fell on all
the prime necessities of life, flour, meat, oil, wine, salt, sugar, and
much else. Everything was taxed, and being an agricultural country
with innumerable villages and small towns the collection of the
revenue necessitated an expensive army of officials. In Crispi's day
they had already reached a hundred thousand. Not a peasant could
drive his little cart into town or village without its contents being
examined* weighed and taxed. Thus taxation was not only heavy
but vexatious. Salaries and wages were low. The highest state func-
tionaries seldom drew ^800 a year. Sela calculated that no more
than thirty-three thousand of the twenty-five millions in the country
had an income exceeding ^400 a year. A village doctor might cam
100 a year: a schoolmaster half that sum: few agricultural labourers
could earn ten shillings a week. There were compensations in cheap
The New My: to the Fall of Crispi, 1871-1896 19*
and grazing: living was cheap and luxuries few.
But life was hard and of work long, and the whole standard of
life was to a level of simplicity which bordered on in-
digence. But Italy would have borne her poverty, If not with cheer-
at least with if she could have held her head high
Europe, have felt proud of her government and
that she was and not pitied. It was just this
Crispi set himself to do-
Crispi was a by He had a conspirator through-
out the Risorgimento. A by conviction, he had changed
Italy had on monarchy, and had quarrelled with
his dictum, "The Monarchy
us s the us'. He had the
and the Thousand in and had acted as his pro-
dictator. 1870 he had parties,
the of a as his reply to the as to what party
he 1', he said, Sun Crispi*. In character, he was
by nature with a to methods, bom
of his and belief in his own ability. In the
he a deal in re a
lack of in His was Ms impulsiveness and
to act OB He this almost to
the point of want of balance, to and reversing
with violence. His was *encrgy* and he was determined
not only to Parliament activity, bet to the coun-
try fee! it had a real government which would hold its in
Europe and Italy out of the
Almost his action to off to to consult
Bismarck. The in mystery. Critics
its to Ms and to
by Its was probably
to find out how far the policy of the Triple in to
France* was defensive or His
A Bill on Provincial and giving them
regional control and freedom from interference* An
admirable Law on and
the death and impropd the of die The
a of ZanardelK's code, a
spkit s the stil farther.
People to fed the was and
sdf-c0nfidcnce back The adc of Crispi*s
The New Italy: to the Fait of Crispi, ityi-ztyf 19$
for the opposition of Germany and Austria to Pope Leo's feelers on
behalf of the restoration of the Temporal Power, made Papal enthu-
siasm unlikely. His intermediary was the old Neo-Guelf of 1848,
Father Tosti s but the opposition of Jesuits on one side and Freemasons
on the other, quickly brought the negotiations to an abrupt conclu-
sion. Crispi at once went to the other extreme and revealed himself
as a determined anti-clerical, introducing clauses dealing with clerical
abuses into the new Penal Code, removing schools in the Near East
from the Religious Orders and putting them under lay control:
making religious education in the primary schools optional, and,
finally* adding insult to injury by sanctioning the erection of a statue
of the philosopher Giordano Bruno in the Campo di Fiori, on
the site where the Church had burnt him as a heretic in the year
1600 A.D.
Crispi had a passionate love of his country, *my Italy* as he always
called her. He longed to see her strong and flourishing, and amongst
his visions for her future was a great colonial empire. Italian
explorers, travellers and traders, were already active in Africa, but
the history of Italian colonial enterprise began in 1882, when England,
shortly after the bombardment of Alexandria, invited Italy, on die
withdrawal of French collaboration, to take her place in the pacifica-
tion of Egypt. Mancini the Foreign Secretary in the Depretis
Cabinet, refused, partly from fear of French annoyance, partly from
financial reasons and partly from Italian sympathy with Arab! Pasha
whom they regarded as a kind of Garibaldi. Two years later the
murder of an Italian trader brought up the question of Italian colonial
activity in Parliament. This time Mancmi announced the despatch
of a military force to protect Italian interests. Two further expedi-
tions followed, and encouraged by England* jealous of French expan-
sion, Italy occupied Massawa and a number of other places. Bet both
in the country and in Parliament a forward colonial policy met with
strong opposition on accoimt of the cost* and the budget of 1885 was
passed with so narrow a margin the Cabinet resigned. Maactni
was replaced by cH Robilant, Italian ambassador at Vienna* who,
oooipiod with the revision of the terms of the Triple Alliance previous
to its renewal, neglected the colonial question altogether* until
suddenly the country was horrified at me massacre of an Italian
column under Colonel de Cristoforis at Dogai in January 1887. It
was typical of Depretis that he regarded die of Dogali not as
a challenge to Italum prick and scKHCSpect, but as Just one proof
of Italian and he was aM for withdrawal from A&ica,
10 The Evolution of Modern Italy
when this was stopped by the firm opposition of Crispi in the
Chamber, lie promptly brought him into the Cabinet to share the
responsibility. Soon after Depretis died and Crispi succeeded him.
The colonial policy of Crispi was one of consolidation : he drew to-
gether the scattered areas in Italian occupation and formed them into
a colony which he called Eritrea. He made friends with the treacher-
ous Menelik, King of Shoa 5 who, on the death of the Abyssinian Negus
John, became Emperor. With him he signed the Treaty of Uccialli
^1889} an d in 1890 announced to Europe that Abyssinia was an Italian
protectorate. Such was the position when Crispi resigned his first
Ministry in 1891.
Throughout all his first Ministry Crispins cardinal preoccupation
was neither with colonies nor Papacy* but with France, and for the
hostility between them French pride was chiefly to blame. Through-
out the Risorgimento the influence of France over Italy was supreme^
and she could not now reconcile herself to a non-dependent Italy.
Italian unity galled her, and the alliance with Germany intensified
French ill feeling, which Crispi did nothing to soften. In 1888, and
again the next year, he ostentatiously visited Bismarck, and the more
he flaunted Ms friendship with the all-powerful Chancellor the
angrier France became. Bismarck was only t 
