An examination of Dr. Reid's Inquiry into the human mind on the principles of common sense; Dr. Beattie's Essay on the nature and immutability of truth; and Dr. Oswald's Appeal to common sense in behalf of religion

i i)

rIL ^.}0.

A N

EXAMINATION

O F

Dr. Re id's Inquiry into the Human Mind
on the Principles of Common Senje,

Dr. Beattie's' EJpiy on the Nature and
Immutability of Truths

AND

Dr. Oswald's Appeal to Common Safe
in Behcilf of Religion,

By JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, LL. D. F.R.S.
THE SECOND EDITION.

Aifome men have imagined innate ideas, hecaufc they had forgot
hoiv they came by them ; fo others have fet up ahitoji as many
diftindt inll:in6ls as there are acquired principles of aSling.

Preliminary Diflertation to Law's tranflatioa of King's
Origin of Evil.

LONDON:

Printed for J.JOHNSON, N=. 72, St. Paul's Church-Yard.
M.DCC.LXXV,

Ta Dr. Reid, i)?\ Beattie, and
Dr. Oswald.

Gentlemen,

I Take the liberty to prefent
each of you with a copy of
my remarks on your writings, re-
quefting that you would give them
that attention which, according to
your own ideas, the fubjeft de-
ferves.

You cannot be juftly offended
at me for treating you with the
fame freedom with which you
have treated others. If the pub-
lic voice, which has hitherto feem-
ed to incline to your fide, fhould,
notwithftanding, finally determine
in my favour, you will be confi-
a 2 dered

iv THE DEDICATION.

dered as bold and infolent inno-
vators in what, has hitherto been
the received doctrine concerning
human nature, and in the funda-
mental principles oi truth and rea-
Jon, But if your tenets be admit-
ted, and my objeclions to them be
deemed frivolous, I muft be con-
tent to cover my head with infa-
my, and fall under the indelible
dilgrace of a weak or wicked op-
pofer of new and important truth.

I fiiould not have written this
book, Gentlemen, if I had not
meant to call you forth to defend
the ground which you have boldly
feized and occupied. It is, there-
fore, my expeftation, and my
wifli, that you would all of you,
either jointly or feparately, enter
into an open and free difcuffion

of

THE DEDICATION, v

of the queftions which are now
before the public. I promife to
proceed with equal fairnejs and
freedom, acknowledging, with the
greatelt franknefs, any miftakes or
overfiohts of which I fhall be con-

o

vinced ; and, judging by your
profeiTed liberality and candour,
I and the public fhall expeft the
fame condu6t from you.

Sincerely wifhing you all pofTi-
ble fuccefs in your laudable en-
deavours to ferve the caufe of
truth, virtue, and relinon, thoup-li
my writings, and myfclf, fhould
be the viftims at their fhrine,

lam, Gentlemen,
Your moft obedient
humble fervant,
J. PRIESTLEY.

Qalne, Au^vjl lo. 1774.

THE

I

THE

PREFACE.

NOTHING could be more unex-
pefted by me, but a very few
months ago, than this publication.
Dr. Reid's Inquiry into the principles of
the human viind fell into my hands pre-
fently after the firfl publication of it ;
but being at that time intent upon my
ele6lrical purfuits, and others of a fimilar
nature, I did no more than look very
flightly into it. Finding his notions of
human nature the very -reverfe of thofe
which I had learned from Mr. Locke and
Dr. Hartley (in which I thought I had fuffi-
cient reafon to acquiefce) I did not give my-
felf the trouble to read the book through.

It appeared to me to be an ingenious

piece of fophiflry, and had it been written

a 4 for

X THE PREFACE.

to the third volume of my Infiitutes.
And there would have been a fufficient
propriety in it ; becaufe, if this new
fcherae of an immediate appeal to com-
mon J'enfe upon every important queftion
in religion (and which fuperieded almoft
all reafoning on the fubjecl) (hould take
place, the plan of my work, with which
I had taken fome pains, and which I
hoped would be of fome ufe to young
perfons, was abfurd from the very-
beginning.

Accordingly I made fome notes upon
Dr. Ofwald's treatife with this view ; but
finding that I had entered upon a co-
pious, amufmg, and not uninftiTiftive
iubjecl, I determined to confider it more
at large. I therefore contented myfelf
with a few general remarks upon the fub-
je8, and an extraft or two from Dr. Of-
wald, in the preface to that third volume,
juft to give fome idea of the nature and
fpirit of the principles I meant to oppofe ;
promifing to difcufs the fiibjeft more at
large in a feparate work, in which I might

alfo

T H E P R E F A C E. xl

alfo take fome notice of Dr. Reid, who
firft advanced the principles of which Dr.
Beattie and Dr. Ofwald had made fo
much ufe. This has produced the pre-
fent pubHcation, in which I have intro-
duced feveral of the remarks and quo-
tations contained in the above-mentioned
preface ; fuppofing that, as this work is of
a very different nature from that, the fame
perfons might not be poffeffed of them
both.

Thinking farther upon this fubjetl, it
occurred to me, that the moft effeclual
method to divert the attention of the more
fenfible part of the pubhc from fuch
an incoherent fcheme as that of Dr.
Reid, and to eftabhfli the true fcience of
human nature, would be to facilitate the
Itudy of Dr. Hartleys Theory. I there-
fore communicated my defign to the fon
of that extraordinary man, who was
pleafed to approve of my undertaking.
Accordingly I have now in the prefs an
edition of fo much of the Obfervations on
Man as relate to the dodrine of aflbci-

atign

xii THE PREFACE.

ation of ideas, leaving: out the doctrine
o^ vibrations, and fome other things which
might difcourage many readers ; and in-
troducing it with fome differtations of my
own.

Alfo, to (how the great importance and
extenfive ufe of this excellent theory of
the mind, I thought it might be of fer-
vice to give fome fpecimens of the appli-
cation of Dr. Hartley's doctrine to fuch
fubjecls of inquiry as it had a near relation
to, and to which I had had occafion to
give particular attention. And as I had,
on other accounts, been frequently re-
quelled to publifh the Lectures on Philo-
.fophical Criticifm, which I compofed
when I v^as tutor in the Belles Lettres at
the academy at Warrington, this was
another inducement to the publication.
For it appears to me that the fubjetl; of
criticifm admits of the happieft illullra-
tion from Dr. Hardey's principles ; and
accordmgly, in the compofition of thofe
leclures, I kept them continually in view.

But

THE PREFACE.

xiu

But the moft important application of
Dr. Hartley's doclrine of the affociation
of ideas is to the condud of human life,
and efpecially the bulinefs of education,
I therefore propofe to publidi fome ob-
fervations on this fubjcfcl, perhaps pretty
foon ; and I (hall referve for a time of
more leifure, and more advanced age.
the throwing together and fyftematizing
the obfervations that I am from time to
time making on the general conduft of
human life and hafpinefs, and on the na-
tural progrefs and perfetiion of intellec-
tual beings.

This v/ork, if I be able, in any tole-
rable meafure, to accomplifh my defign,
will contain not merely illujlrations, and
the mod important applications of Hart-
ley's theory, but may contribute in fome
meafure to the improvement and extenfion
of it. Speculations of this kind contri-
bute to my own entertainment and hap-
pinefs almolt every day of my life ; and
were philofophers in general to attend to
them, they would find in them an inex-

hauftiblc

^w T H E P R E F A C E.

hauftible fund of difqulfition, abounding
Avith the moft excellent pra6lical ufes ;
more efpecially infpiring the greatefl: ele-
vation of thought, continually leading the
mind to views beyond the narrow limits
of the preient ftate, and filling it with the
purefl fentiments of benevolence and de-
votion.

1 am fully aware how exceedingly un-
popular fome of the opinions advanced in
this work will be, not with the vulgar
only, but alfo with many ingenious and
excellent perfons, for whom I have the
higheft efteem, and who are difpofed to
think favourably of my other publica-
tions. But as they have not difapproved
of my ufual freedom in avowing and de-
fending opinions in which they concur
with me ; I hope they will bear with the
fame umformjreedom, and* love of truth,
though it fhould lead me to adopt and
aifert opinions in which they cannnot give
me their concurrence.

As

THE PREFACE. xv

As to the doftrine o^neceffity, to which
I now principally ^efer, it may poflibly
fave fome perfons, who will think that I
would not fpeak at random, not a litde
trouble, if I here give it as my opinion',
that unlefs they apply themfelves to the
ftudy of this queftion pretty early in life,
and in a regular ftudy of Pneumatology
and Ethics, they will never truly under-
ftand the fubjeft ; but will always be liable
to be impofed upon, ftaggered, con-
founded, and terrified, by the reprefen-
tations of the generality of writers, who,
how fpecioufly foever they declaim, in
reality know no more about it than
themfelves. The common Arminian
do6lrine o^free xoill, in the only fenfe of
the words in which mankind generally
ufe them, viz. the power of doing what
we pleafe, or will, is the doftrine of the
fcriptures, and is what the philofophical
do6trine of neceffity fuppofes; and farther
than this no man does, or need to look,
in the common condud of life, or of re-

lidon.

o

If

XVI THE PREFACE.

If any perfon, at a proper time of life,
with his mind divefted of vulgar preju-
dices, polfefled of the neceffary prepara^
tory knowledge, and likewile of fome
degree of fortitude, which is certainly
requifite for the Ready contem.plation of
great and intereiling fubie6ls, fiiould chufe
to inquire ferioufly into this bufmefs, I
would recommend to him, beiides the
Jtudv (for the peru/al is faying and doing
nothing at all) of Dr. Hartley's Obferva-
tions on man, Mr. Jonatho.n Edwards's
treatife on free vnll. This writer difculfes
the fubjeft with great clearnefs and judg-
menr, obviating every Ihadow of objec-
tion to it, and, in my opinion, his work
is unanfwerable. But the concurrence
of the philofophical do6lrine of necejfity
with the gloomy notions of Calvin ap-
pears to me to be a flrange kind of phe-
nomenon ; and I cannot help thinking
that had this ingenious writer lived a litle
longer, and refle61ed upon the natural
connexion and tendency of his fentiments,
as explained in his treatife, he could not

but

THE PREFACE. xvii

but have feen things in a very different
light, and have been fenhble that his phi-
lofophy was much more nearly allied to
Socinianifm than to Calvinifm.

In reality, I can hardly help thinking
it to have been a piece of artifice in Mr.
Edwards to reprefent the do6lrine of phi-
lofophical neceffity as being the fame
thing with Calvinifm, and the do61rine of
philofophical liberty as the fame thing
with Arminianifm. Both Arminians. and
Calvinifts had certainly the very fame
opinion concerning the freedom of the
human will in general, though they dif-
fered in their notions of it where religion
was concerned. In fa6t, the modern
queftion of liberty and neceffity is what
thofe divines never underftood, or indeed
had fo much as heard of. The Armi-
nians maintained, in general, that it de-
pends upon men themfelves whether they
will be faved or not, and the Calvinifts
maintained the contrary opinion, af-
ferting that it depends wholly upon an
arbitrary decree of God. At leaft, this

b was

xviii THE PREFACE.

was the cafe till, in the courfe of the contro-
verfy, they were led to refine upon the
fubjeft, and at length Mr. Edwards hit
upon the true philofophical do6lrine of
necejfdy, which I fcruple not to affert,
that no other Calvinid ever did before.

Zealous Calvinifts, who regard my
writings with abhorrence, will be fur-
prized to hear me fo full and earned in
my recommendation of a book which
they themfelves boaft of, as the flrongeft
bulwark of their own gloomy faith. And
they mufh continue to wonder, as it would
be to no purpofe for me to explain to
them why they ought not to ^v'onder at
the matter. What I fliould fay on
that fubje6l would not be intelligible
to them.

Thofe who are not fond of much
clofe thinking, which is neceffarily the
cafe with the generality of readers, and
fome writers, will not thank me for en-
deavouring to introduce into more public
notice fuch a theoiy of the human mind

as

T H E P R E F A C E. xix

as that of Dr. Hartley. His is not a
book that a man can read over in a few
evenings, fo as to be ready to give a fatif-
faftory account of it to any of his friends
who may happen to afk him what there
is in it, and expe6l an anfwer in a few
fentences. In fa6t, it contains a new and
moft Gxtenrive Jcience, and requires a vaft
fund of preparatory knowledge to enter
upon the (ludy of it with any profped of
fuccefs.

But, in return, I will promife any per-
fon who fhall apply to this work, with
proper furniture, that the ftudy of it will
abundantly reward his labour. It will be
like entering upon a new world, afford
inexhauftible matter for curious and ufe-
ful fpeculation, and be of unfpeakable
advantage in almoft every purfuit, and
even in things to which it feems, at firfl:
fight, to bear no fort of relation. For my
own part, I can almoft fay, that I think
myfelf more indebted to this one treatife,
than to all the books I ever read befide ;
thefcriptures excepted.

b2 On

XX THE PREFACE.

On the other hand, fuch a theory of
the human mind as that of Dr. Reid,
adopted by Dr. Beattie and Dr. Ofwald
(if that can be called a theory which in fa6l
explains nothing) does not, indeed, re-
quire much ftudy ; but when you have
given all pofiible attention to it, you find
yourfelf no w^ifer than before. Dr. Reid
meets with a particular fentiment, or per-
fuafion, and not being able to explain the
origin of it, without more ado he afcribes it
to a particular original inJiinEly provided
for that very purpofe. He finds another
difficulty, which he alfo folves in the
fame concife and eafy manner. And thus
he goes on accounting for every thing,
by telling you, not only that he cannot
explain it himfelf, but that it will be
in vain for you, or any other perfon, to
endeavour to inveftigate it farther than
he has done. Thus avowed ignorance
is to pafs for real knowledge^ and, as with
the old Sceptics, that man is to be reckoned
the greateft philofopher who aflferts that
he knows nothing himfelf, and can per-
fuade others that they know no more

than

THE PREFACE. xxi

than he docs. There is tliis difference
between the ancient and thefe modern
fcepticSj that the ancients profelFed nei-
ther to inid-erftand nor believe any thing,
whereas thefe moderns believe every
thing, though they profels to underiland
nothmg. And the former, I think, are
the more confident of tlie two.

Thofe of my readers who have not
been much converfant with metaphyfical
writers, and are not acquainted widi the
artful manner in which fome of them
draw coniequences from their docirines,
in order to inhance the value of their
{peculations, cannot poflibly be a.v/are
how much, in the opinion of thofe wliofe
fentiments I am oppofing, depends upon
the controverfy in which I am now en-
gaged. I (hall, thcrei'ore, m order to
excite his attention to the fubjecl (befi des
w^hat I have obferved of this nature in
the body of the work) quote a few paP
fages from Dr. Reid's Dedication, which
(liow what important fervice he imagined
he was doing to mankind by his perfor-
mance ; and his dilciples Dr. Beti.t.iie and
b 3 Dr.

xxii THE PREFACE.

Dr. Ofwald are not behind their mafler
in the ideas they entertain of the value
of their refpeclive writings.

He begins with obferving, p. 3, that,
though the fubjedl of it had been canvafTed
by men of very great penetration and genius
fuch as Defcartes, Malebranche, Locke,
Berkley, and Hume ; yet he has given a
view of the human underftanding fo very
different from them, as to be apprehen-
five of being condemned by many for his
temerity and vanity, p. 4.

A whole fyftem of fcepticifm, he fays,
p, 5, has been fairly built upon the prin-
ciples of Mr. Locke. Then he obferves,
p. 6, that if all belief be laid afide, pi-
ety, patriotifm, friendfhip, parental af-
fetlion, and private virtue appear as ri^
diculous as knight errantry. Upon the
hypothcfis that he combats, he fays, p. 8,
the whole univerfe about him, body and
fpirit, fun, moon, flars and earth, friends
and relations, all things without excep-
tion, vanilh at once, and, like the hafelefs

Jabrick

THE PREFACE. xxiii

fahrick of a vifion, leave not a track he-
hind. He therefore informs his patron,
that he thought it unreafonable, upon the
authority of philofophers, to admit an
hypothefis, which, in his opinion, over-
turned all philofophy, all religion, and
virtue, and common fenfe. And finding
that all the fyftems concerning the
human underflanding that he was aC"
quainted with were built upon this hypo-
thefis, he was refolved to inquire into the
fubjeft anew, without regard to any hy-
pothefis ; and the leifure of an academical
life, p. lo, difengaged from the purfuits
of intereil and ambition, the duty of his
profeffion, which obliged him to give pre-
lections on thefe fubjetts to youth, and an
early inclination to fpeculations of this
kind, enabled him, he flatters himfelf,
to give a more minute attention to the
fubjetl of this inquiry, than had been
given before.

He concludes with hinting to his

patron, p. ii, who, with many others,

had approved of his fentiments, that in it

b 4 he

xxiv T H E P R E F A C E.

he has juriified the common fenfe and
reafon of mankind, againft the fceptical
fubtikies which, in this age, have endea-
voured to put them out of countenance,
and to throw new Hght upon one of the
nobleft parts of the divine workmanfhip ;
and therefore that his Lordfliip's refpeft
for the arts and fciences, and his attention
to the improvement of them, as well as
to every thing elfe that contributes to the
fehcity of his country, leaves him no
room to doubt of his favourable ac-
ceptance of his Eflay.

According to this view of the fubje6l,
the intereft and happinefs of mankind are
nearly concerned in this bufmefs ; and
therefore it behoves me to proceed with
the greateft caution. If I deprive the
world of the benefit of Dr. Reid's im-
portant fervices, I do them an irreparable
injury ; but, on the other hand, if I un-
deceive them with refpetl to "he confi-
dence they have been induced to put in
one, who, notv/ithfiandinghis profeffions,
in which I doubt not he is very fincere,

cannot

THE PREFACE.

XXV

cannot in reality be of any ufe to them,
I (hall be intitled to fome portion of their
gratitude, though I fhould confer upon
them no pofitive benefit.

I have a flight apology to make to thofe
perfons who have not read the writings
on which I have animadverted, for the
freedom with which I have fometimes
treated them. Thofe who have read
them, and have obferved the airs of felf-
futhciency, arrogance, and contempt of
all others who have treated, or touched
upon, thefe flibjecls before them, and the
frightful confequences which they perpe-
tually afcribe to the opinions they con-
trovert (and which are generally my own
favourite opinions) will think me to have
been very temperate in the ufe that I have
made of fuch a mode of writing, as tends
to render metaphyfical fpeculation not
quite tedious, infipid, and difgufling. At
mod I have treated them as thev have
treated others, far fuperior to themfelves.

As

xxvi THE PREFACE.

As to Dr. Ofwald, whom I have treated
with the leaft ceremony, the difguft his
writings gave me was fo great, that I
could not poflibly fhewhim more refpeQ.
Indeed I think him in general not intitled
to a grave anfwer ; and accordingly have
for the moft part contented myfelf with
exhibiting his fentiments, without replying
to them at all. This will probably con-
firm him in the opinion ^s^hich he has al-
ready expreffed, viz. \\\2X he fees I have
notjtudied the fubjecl of this controverjy.

As my remarks on thefe three writers
are necefTarily mifcellaneous, I thought
it would not be improper to prefix to
-them a preliminary ef'ay, on the nature of
judgment and reafoning, with a general
view of the progrefs of the intellect, efpe-
cially with refpetl to our knowledge of the
external world. By this means I hope
my reader will enter upon the particular
remarks with the advantage of a pretty
good general knowledge of the fubjed ;
but for a more particular knov/ledge of it,
I muft refer him to the edition of Hardey

above-

THE PREFACE. xxvii

above-mentioned, and the difTertations
that I propofe to prefix to it.

Some may wonder that I fhould be fo
fevere on thefe three chriftian writers, and
take no notice of Mr. Hume, whofe fo-
phiftry, being deemed by them to be
unanfwerable on the common principles,
compelled them to have recourfe to thefe
new ones. And others may even think it
wrong that, being a chriftian myfelf, I
fhould not join the triumph of my friends,
though the vi6tory was not gained with
my weapons.

To the former I anfwer, that, in my
opinion, Mr. Hume has been very ably
anfwered, again and again, upon more
folid principles than thofe of this new
common fenfe ; and I beg leave to refer
them to the two firft volumes of my
Injiitutes above mentioned, and efpecially
the fecond, which relates to the evidences
of chriftianity. Befides, though I have
not, in this treatife, anfwered Mr. Hume
diredly, I have done it, in fome meafure,

indiredly

xxviii THE PREFACE.

indireEily, when I Qiow that there %vas no
occafion to have recourfe to this new
mode of defending rehgion, the old being
abundantly fufficient.

To the latter I would reply, that I re-
Ipett chrilliamty chiefly as it is the caufe
of truth, and that the true interell of
chriRianity is promoted no lefs by throw-
ing dov/n weak and rotten fupports, than
by fupplying it with firm and good ones.

After I had announced my intention to
animadvert upon Dr. Reid, Dr. Beattie,
and Dr. Ofwald, i was told of an anony-
mous pamphlet, written to fhow that Dr.
Beattie's EiTay on Truth is/ophiftical and
fromotive of fcepticifm and infidelity.
Though I do not approve of what feems
to have been the defign of this writer,
i think his remarks are, in the main, ju.fl
with refpetl to Dr. Beattie. My obferva-
tions are frequently the fame with his.

It is neceffar)' for the fake of verifying
my quotations to obferve that I Iiave

made

THE PREFACE.

XXIX

made ufe of Dr, ReitTs Inquiry, third
edition, London, 17%; Dr. Beatties
EJfay, fifth edition, London, 1774; and
Dr. Ofwald!s Appeal, vol. i, fecond edi-
tion, London, 1768 ; vol. 2, the firfl edi-
tion, Edinburgh, 1772; Dr. Prices Re-
viezo, fecond edition, London, 1769;
Harris's Hermes, London, 1751.

When no particular volume of Dr.
Ofwald is exprelTed, the firll is always
intended.

THE

THE

CONTENTS.

Remarks on Dr, ReidV Theory >

TPage
HE Introduction • i

SECTION I.

A Table of Dr. Reid'^ inJlinElive
^principles g

SECTION II.

A view of the fever al fallacies by tohich
Dr, Reid has been mifed in his
inquiry 2^

SECTION III.

Of Dr. Reid'^ objedion to the do&rine
of ideas from their want of refem-
blance to their corref ponding objeSis 28

SEC-

THE CONTENTS. xxxi
SECTION IV.

Page

Of Br. Reid'j objeElion to Mr. Locked
divijion of ideas into thofe of fen-
fation and refleElion 37

SECTION V.

Dr. Reid'i poftion that fey fation im-
plies the belief of the pre/ent ex-
iftejice of external ohjeEls, and his
view of Berkleys theory particu-
larly confidered < 41

SECTION VI.

Mr. Locke'j doElrine not fo favour-
able to Berkley i theory as Dr,
Reid'i 56

SECTION VII.

A fophifm of Mr. Hume i in piirfu-
ance o/Berkley'i theory adopted by
Dr. Reid 62

SECTION VIIL

Cafes of the affociation of ideas u^hick
had efcapcd the attejition of Dr.
Reid — ™ 56

SEC^

xxxii THE CONTENTS.
SECTION IX.

Page

Concejfwns of Dr. Reid and, other cir-
cuni/iances, which might have led
him to have recourfe to the affoci-
ation of ideas rather than to his
inllin61ive principles 74

SECTION X.

Of Dr. Reid'j principle ^credulity,
and his idea of the principles of in-
du6lion and analogy 82

SECTION XI.

Of the natural figns of the paffions ^g

SECTION XII.

Of the judgment -we form concerning
the feat of pain 92

SECTION XIII.
Mfcellaneous obfervations. 96

Remarks on Dr. Beattiei EJfay.

The introduBion ' ..^— 115

SEC-

THE CONTENTS. xxxiii
SECTION I.

Page

Of Dr. Beattie'j- account of the foun-
dation of truth 119

SECTION II.

Ofthetefimonyofthefhfes 139

SECTION III.

Dr, Beattie'j view ^Berkley'^ theory 146

SECTION IV.

Dr. Beattie J account of the four ce of
moral obligation, and of the funda-
mental principles of religion — 157

SECTION V.

Dr, Beattie J view of the do6lrine of
neceflity, i65

SECTION VI.

The conclufion 187

Remarks on Dr. Ofwald j Appeal.

The Introduction 197

c SEC-

xxxiv THE CONTEXTS.
S E C T I O N I.

Page

0/"i'A^ HiRory of Common Senfc 205

SECTION IL

Of the nature, limits, and general
ufe of the principle of Common
fenfe 213

SECTION III.

Of the fufficiency and univerfality of
the principle of Common fenfe — 225

SECTION IV.

Of the natural imperfe6lions and ne-
ceffary culture of Common fenfe — 232

SECTION V.

Of the extenfve application of the prin-
ciple of Common fenfe to morals
and religion 243

SECTION \T.

Of the incroachments of Common fenfe
on the province of Reafon — 262

SEC-

THE CONTENTS. xxxv
SECTION Vll.

Page

Of Dr. Ofwald'j refutation of the ar-
gument in proof of the being of a
God. 285

SECTION VIII.

Of the application of Common f en fe to
various difquifitions in Morals and.
Theology 297

The Appendix,

NUMBER I.

Of the refemhlance between the do5irine
of Common fenfe, and the prin-
ciples of Dr. Price'j Review of the .
quefioiis and difficulties in morals 319

NUMBER II.

Of Mr. Harris'i hypothecs concern-
ing Mind and Ideas 334

NUMBER III.

The correfpondence of the author with
Dr. Ofwald and Dr. Beattie, re-
lating to this controverfy 346

c 2 Intro-

Introduclory Ohfervations on the nature of
judgment andrcdSoning, with a general
view of the progrefs of the intelleft,
xcith refped to the principal fiib] eels of
this trcatife,

HEN our minds are firfl expofed
to the influence of external ob-
jefts, all their parts and proper-
ties, and even accidental variable adjuntis,
are prefented to our view at the fame time ;
fo that the whole makes but one impref-
fion upon our organs of fenfe, and con-
fequently upon the mind. By this means
all the parts of the fimultaneous impref-
iion are fo intimately aflbciated together,
that the idea of any one of them introduces
the idea of all the reft. But as the necef-
fary parts and properties will occur more
often than the variable adjunfts, the ideas
of thefe will not be fo perfeftly aflbciated
with the reft ; and thus we fiiall be able
to diftinguifli between thofe parts or pro-
c 3 perties

xxxviii INTRODUCTORY

perties that have been found feparate, and
thofe that have never been obferved
afunder.

The idea of any thing, and of its ne-
ceffary infeparable properties, as thofe of
milk and whitenefs, gold and yellow,
always occurring together, is the foun-
dation of, and fuppKes the materials for
propojiiions, in which they are affirmed of
one another, andare/^zz^to be infeparable ;
or, to ufe the terms of logic, in which
one is made xh^ Jiihjcct and the other the
preS.icate of a propofition ; and nothing
is requifite but toords to denote the names
of things and properties, and any arbi-
trary fign for a copula, and the propofition
is complete ; as, milk is zchite, gold is
yellozo, or, viilk has xvliitenefs, gold has
ydloxcnefs. This clafs of truth contains
thofe in which there is an univerfal, and
therefore a fuppofedneceiTary connetlion'
between the fubjeft and the predicate. '

Another clafs of truths contains thdfe'
in which the fubjeft and predicate appear,

upon

OBSERVATIONS. xxxix

upon comparifon, to be, in reality, no-
thinsT more than different names for the
fame thing. To this clafs 'belong all
equations^ or proportions relating to
number and quantity, that is, all that
admit of mathematical demonftration, as,
tmice two is Jour, and the three angles
of a right lined triangle o.re equal to two
right angles. For when the terms of thefe
propofitions are duly coniidered, it is
found that they do not really differ, but
exprefs the very fame quantity. This is,
in its own nature, a convi6l;ioa or perfua-
fion of the fulled kind.

Thefe two kinds of proportions, being
very different in their natures, require
very different kinds oi proof ,

The evidence, that any two things or
properties are neceffarily united is the
conftant obfervation of their union, ft
having always been obferved, for in-
ftance, that the milk of animals is white,
the idea of lohite becomes a neceffary
part, or attendant of the idea of milk,
c 4 In

xl INTRODUCTORY

In other words, we call it an ejfential
property of milk. This, however, only
refpecls the miik of thofe animals w'lxh
which we are acquainted. But fmce the
milk of all the animals with which we are
acquainted, or of which we have heard,
is white, we can have no reafon tofufpeft
that the milk of any new and ftrange ani-
mal is of any other colour. Alfo, fince
wherever there has been the fpecihc
gravity, duftiiity, and other properties of
gold, the colour has always been yellow,
we conclude that thofe circumitances are
necefiarily united, though by fome un-
known bond of union, and that they will
always go together.

The proper j?^?-^^, therefore, of univer-
fal propohtions, fuch as the above, that
milk is white, that gold is yellow, or that
a certain degree of cold will freeze water,
confifts in what is called an induction of
particular fads, oi precifely the fame na-
ture. Having found, by much and va-
rious experience, that the fame events ne-
ver fail to take place in the fame circum-

flances.

OBSERVATIONS. xli

fiances, the expedatioii of the fame con-
fequences from the fame previous circum-
flances is neceffarily generated in oar
minds, and we can have no more fufpi-
cion of a different event, than we can
feparate the idea o^ w/iitene/s irom that of
the other properties o^milk.

Thus when the previous circumllances
are precifely the fame, we call the procefs
of proof by the name oiinduElion. But if
they be notprecifely the fame, but only bear
a confiderable refemblance to the circum-
flances from which any particular appear-
ance has been foundtorefult, we call the ar-
gument analogy; and it is flronger in pro-
portion to the degree of refemblance in the
previous circum fiances. Thus if we have
found the milk of all the animals with
which we are acquainted to be nourilhing,
though the natures of thofe animals be
confiderably different, we think it proba-
ble that the milk of any flrange animal
will be nourifhing. If, therefore, the evi-
dence of a propohtion of this kind be
weak, qx doubtful, it can be ilrengthened

only

xlii INTRODUCTORY

only by finding more fads of the fame,
or of a fimiiar nature.

If the truth of a propofition of the
other clafs be not feif evident, that is, if
the fubjeft and predicate do not appear,
at firft fight, to be different names for the
fame thing, another terra muft be found
that fliali be fynonyraous to them both.
Thus, to prove that the three internal an-
gles of a right lined triangle are equal to
two right angles, I produce tlie bafe of
the triangle ; and having, by this means,
made it evident that all the internal an-
gles are equal to three angles formed by
lines drawn from the lame point in a right
line, which I know to be equal to two
right angles, the demondration is com-
plete.

This procefs exaQly correfponds to the
method of learning and teaching the fig-
nincation of words in an unknown lan-
guage, by means of one that is known.
I may not know, for inftance, what is
meant by the Latin word domus ; but if

I be

OBSERVATIONS. xliii

I be informed that it has the fame mean-
ing with maifon in French, with which I
am well acquainted, it imm-ediately occurs
to me, that it muft have the fame fignifi-
cation as hoiife in Englilli. And as the
idea of a hoiifc was perfe6lly aflbciated
with the word maifon, I no fooner put
the word domus in its place, than the idea
that was at firH; annexed to the word mai-
Jon becomes connefted with the word do-
mus. For fome time, however, the word
domus will not excite the idea of a houfe
without the help of the v/ord maifon; but
by degrees it gets united to the idea im-
mediately, fo that afterwards they will be
as infeparable as the fame idea and the
word maifon were before.

In like manner, \7hen fyllogifiis become
familiar, the fubjeft and predicate of
the propofition to be proved unite, and
coalefce immediately without the help
of the middle term ; in which cafe the
conclufion is as inftantaneous as a (imple
judgment. In this manner it is that
authority, as that of a parent, or of God,

pro-

xliv INTRODUCTORY

produces inftant conviclion. We firft
put confidence in them, and then the
moment that any thing is known to have
their fan6lion, it engages our affent and
acquiefcence.

I may fee no natural connexion, for
inllance, between this life and another,
butfirmiy believing that the declarations
of Jefus Chrill have the fan6tion of diviiae
authority, wliich I know cannot deceive
me ; the moment I find that he has
aflferted that there will be a refurrection
of the dead to a future life, it becomes
an article of my faith ; and not the leaft
perceivable fpace of time is loft in forming
the two lyilogifmsjby which I conclude.firft,
that what Chrift fays is true, becaufe he
fpeaks by commiffion from God; and
iecondly, that the dotlrine of the re-
furreclion is true, becaufe he has af-
ferted it»

In fa6l, hoih prop qfitions 2iwA fyllogifms
are things of art and not of nature.
The ideas belonging to the two terms

of

OBSERVATIONS. xh

of milk and whitenefs, out of which is
formed the propofition, milk is whie,
were originally imprefied, as was obferved
before, at the fame time, and only formed
a (ingle complex idea. So alfo the mo-
ment that any two terms coalefce, as lac
in Latin, and milk in Englilh, the ideas
annexed to the word milk and that of
tohitenefs among the reft, are immediately
transferred to the word lac, without any-
formal fyllogifm.

The word truth, and the idea annexed
to it, is alfo the child of art, and not of
nature, as v/ell as the ideas annexed to
the words fir op qfition 3.nd Jyllogi/m. Ideas
coalefce in our minds by the principle of
affociation, thefe affociations extend them-
felves, and ideas belonging to one word
are transferred to another, without our
giving any attention to thefe mental ope-
rations or affections. But when thefe
procefles have taken place in our minds
many times, we are capable of obferving
them, as well as the ideas which are the
fubjecl of them ; and we give names to

thefe

klvi INTRODUCTORY

thefe mental procefTes juftas we do to the
afFe6tions of things without ouiTelves.

Thus the perfe6l coincidence of the
ideas belonging to different terms, as twice
two andifour, and Hkewife the univerfal
and neceffary concurrence of two ideas,
as thofe of viilk and whitenefs, having
been obferved, we make ufe of fome
term, truth, for inftance, to exprefs either
of thofe circumftances ; for bemg very
much ahke, it has not been found necef-
fary to diftinguifh them by different ap-
pellations.

Since propofitions and reafoning are
mental operations, and, in fa8;, nothing
more than cafes of the a/fociation of
ideas, every thing neceffary to the pro-
cefles may take place in the mind of a
child, of an ideot, or of a brute animal,
and produce the proper affe6lions and
aclions, in proportion to the extent of
their intelleftual powers. The knowledge
of thefe operations, Vv^hich is gained by the
attention we give to them, is a thing of a

very

OBSERVATIONS. xlvii

very different nature, jufl as different as
the knowledge of the nature of vilion is
different from vifion itfelf. The philo-
fopher only is acquainted with the llruc-
ture of the eye, and the theory of vifion,
but the clown fees as well as he does,
and makes as good ufe of his eyes.

Suppofe a dog to have been puflied
into a fire and feverely burned. Upon
this the idea o^Jire and the idea that has
been left by the painful fenfationof Z'm?'?^-
ing; become intimately alfociated tosrether:
fo that the idea of being pulhed into the
fire, and the idea of the pain that was the
confequence of it are ever after infepa-
rable. He cannot tell you in words, that
fire has a poioer of burniyig, becaufe he
has not the faculty of fpeech ; or, though
he might have figns to exprefsj^?*^ and
burning, he might not have got fo abftraci:
an idea as that of power ; but notwith-
ftanding this , the two ideas o^fire and of
burning are as intimately united in his
mind, as they can be in the mind of a
philofopher, who has reflecled upon his

mental

xlvlii INTRODUCTORY^

mental afre61ions, and is able to defcribe
that union, or aflbciation of ideas, in pro-
per terms.

If you endeavour to pufn the dog into
the fire, he will inftantly fpring from it,
before he has felt any thing of the heat ;
which as clearly fhows his apprehenfion
of dano-er from a fituation in which he
fuffered before, as if he could have ex-
plained the foundation of his fear in the
form of regular fyllogifms and conclu-
fions. No philofopher, who can analize
the operations of his mind, and difcourfe
concerning them, could reafon more
juftly, more effeftually, or more expe-
ditioufly, than he does.

Words are of great ufe in the bufmefs
of thinking, but are not neceffary to it.
In like manner though the knowledge
of logic is not without its ufe, it is
by no means neceffary for the purpofe of
reafoning. And as the doftrine oi fyl-
logijms was deduced from obfervations
on reafoning, juft as other theories are

deduced

OBSERVATIONS. xlix

deduced from fafts previoufly known;
fo the do6lrine of propojitions and judg-
ment was deduced from obfervations on
the coincidence of ideas, which took
place antecedent to any knowledge of
tliat kind.

There is hardly any thing to which we
give the name of opinion, or belief, that
does not require fome degree of abftrac-
tion, and knowledge of what palTes with-
in the mind. And the common a6lions
of life, which may be analized into opi-
nions and reafoning, and which difcover
what we call fagacity in a very high de-
gree, may be performed without any fuch
thing, that is, without any explicit know-
ledge of fuch mental affe£lions and ope-
rations. Let us, for an example of this,
take the belief of an external world. This
is thought to be univerfal ; and yet it ap-
pears to me to be very polfible, not only
that the lower animals, but even that
children may not have reflefted fo much
as that, properly fpeaking, they can be
faid to have formed any fuch opinion.

d When

I I N TR 6 D U CT O R Y

When fenfation firft takes place, tlie'^
child has no notices of any thing but by
means of certain impreffions, generally
called Jenfations, which objefts excite in
his mind, by means of the organs of
fenfe, and their correfponding nerves.
Suppofmg the fenfes to be perfe6l, and
expofed to tlie influence of external ob-
je^ls, the child is immediately fenfibldT"
of thefe imprefTions ; feme of which give,
him pleafure, others pain, and others-
fenfations between both. At the fame,
time. the mufcular fyftem is peculiarly
irritable, fo that thofe mufcles which
^fe afterwards mod perfedly fubje6l to
the voluntary power are almoft continu-
ally in aftion, but in a random and auto-
matic manner, as long as the child is
awake and in health.

Let u^ mp'pofe now that His own hand
palles frequently before his eye. The
imprefTion of it will be conveyed: to th^
^nind ; and when, by any kind of mecha-
hifm (vibrations, or any thing elfe) tliat
imprelTion is revived, he will get ^
- •- fixed

OBSERVATIONS. li

fixed idea of his hand. Let now any
painful impreffion be made upon his
hand, as by the flame of a candle. The
violeiice that is thereby done to his nerves
will throw the whole nervous and mufcu-
lar fyflem into agitation, and will more
efpecially occafion the contra6lion of
thofe mufcles which are neceflary to with-
draw his hand from the obje6l that gave
him pain, as Dr, Hartley has (hewn by
curious anatomical difquifitions in a va-
riety of inftances. Admitting then the
principle of the affociation of ideas; after
a fufficient number of thefe joint impref-
fions, the aftion of drawing back his
hand will mechanically follow the idea of
the near approach of the candle.

In a manner equally mechanical, de-f
fcribed at length by Dr. Hartley, the mo-
tions of reaching and gra/ping at things
that give children pleafure are acquired
By them. And in time, by the fame pro-
cefs, the ideas of things that give us plea-
fure or pain become affociated with a va-
riety of other motions, befides the mere
d 2 withdrawing

Hi INTRODUCTORY

withdrawing of the hand and thmftingit
forward, &c. and thefe alfo, as well as
many circumftances attending thofe
ftates of mind get their own feparate
aiTociations ; fo that, at length, a great
variety of methods of purfuing pleafure
and avoiding pain is acquired by us.

When the different impreflions nearly
balance one another, the ideas, or mo-
tions in the brain, interfering with and
checking one another, fome fenfible
(pace of time intervenes before the final
determination to purfue any particular
object, or to ufe any particular method of
gaining the objeft takes place. To this
flate of mind, when we obferve it, we give
the name of deliberation^ and to the de-
termination itfelf, that of will. But flill
that motion, or connefted train of mo-
tions, will take place which is the moft
intimately connefted with, and dependent
upon the ftate of mind, or impreflions,
immediately previous to it.

It

OBSERVATIONS. liii

It will readily be concluded from this,
that the more extenfive are the intelleclual
powers, that is, the greater is the iiuraber
of ideas, and confequently their afifocia-
ations, the oftener will this cafe of delibe-
ration, OY fiifpence, occur. Brutes are
hardly ever at a lofs what to do, and
children feldom ; fo that to explain their
aftions we have hardly any occafion for
the ufe ofthe terms deliberation, volition,
or will; the ideas of every pleafurable
and painful objeft being immediately
followed by one particular definite aclion,
proper to fecure the one and avoid the
other ; the tendencies to other anions
having never interfered to check and re-
tard it. Now it can only be during this
ftate of deliberation, and fufpence, that
we have any opportunity of perceiving,
and attending to what pafles within our
own minds ; fo that a confiderable com-
pafs of intelletl, a large ftock of ideas,
and much experience, are neceffary to
this reflection, and the knowledge that is
gained by it.

d Q We

liv I N T R ODUCTORY

We fee, then, that a child, or brute
animal, is in pofTeffion of a power of pur-
fuing pleafure and avoiding pain, and, in
like manner, a power of purfuing other
intermediate and different objetls, in con-
fequence of impreflions made upon their
minds by things external to them, without
their having given any attention to the
affe6lions or operations of their minds ;
and indeed, confequently, without having
fiich an idea as that of mind at all, or
hardly o^felf. Some brute animals may
poffibly never advance farther than this ;
excepting that, their pleafurable and pain-
■ ful imprefTions being affociated with a va-
riety of particular perfons and circum-
flances, they will neceffarily acquire the
rudiments of all th^pojfi^ns, as of joy and
forrow, love and hatred, gratitude and
refentment, hope and fear, &c. each of
which may be as intenfe, though lefs com-
plex than they are found in the human
fpecies. Indeed they will be more fen-
fiblc, and quick in their operations and
effefts, from the Vv^ant of that variety -cf
alTociaiions Vvliich take place in our mLids,

and

OB S E R V A T I O N S. Iv

^and .which check and overrule one ano-
ther.

It is evident, however, that if time and
opportunity be given for the purpofe,
^which, for the reafon afligned above,
can only be obtained where there is a
confiderable compafs of intelleft, and
much exercife of it) the affections of our
ideas are as capable of being the fubjeQs
of obfervation as the ideas themfelves,
juft as the attractions, repulfions and va-
rious affe6lions of external bodies may be
obferved as well as the bodies themfelves.
^ And it is polTible that, at length, no af-
feftion or modification of ideas (hall take
place, without leaving what we may call
ani^^<2 of every part of the procefs. And
as we give names to other things which
are diftinguifhed by certain properties, fo
•we, give the name of mind., fcntient prin-
ciple or ijitellecl, to that v/ithin our-
felves in which thefe ideas exiilj and tliefe
operations are performed.

d 4 At

Ivi IN T R O D U C T O R Y

At firft a child can have no notion of
any difference between external objeds
themfelves, and the immediate objefts of
his contemplation. He has no knowledge,
for inftance, of impreffions being made
by vifible things on his eye, and ftill lefs
has he any knowledge of the nerves or
brain. But having given fufficient atten-
tion to the phenomena of vifion, and of
the other fenfes, he is convinced, firft,
that the eye, the ear, or fome other fenfe
is neceffary to convey to him the know-
ledge of external objefts ; and that with-
out thefe organs of fenfe, he would have
been for ever infenfible of all that pafled
without himfelf.

By attending to thefe obfervations he is
likewife convinced, that the immediate
objefts of his attention are not, as he be-
fore imagined, the external things them-
felves, but fome affeftion of his fenfes,
occafioncd bv them. Afterwards he finds
that his eye, his ear, and other organs of
fenfe, cannot convey to him the know-
ledge of any thing, unlefs there be a

communication

OBSERVATIONS. Ivii

communication between thefe organs and
the brain, by means of proper nerves ;
which convinces him that the immediate
obje6ls of his thoughts are not in the or-
gans of fenfe, but in the brain, farther
than which he is not able to trace any
thing.

This kind of knowledge is gained by
obfervation and experiment, as much as
the theory of the eye and of light, though
we ourfelves are the fubje6l of the ob-
fervations and experiments. And our
thinking and afting, in the conducl of
life, is as much independent of this branch
of knowledge, as the powers of air and
light are independent of our knowledge
of them.

Having, by this procefs, gained the
knowledge of the diftinftion between the
immediate obje6ts of our thoughts, and
external objefts, it may occur to fome
perfons, that, fmce we are not properly
cofi/czous, or know in the Jirjl inftance,
any thing more than what paffes within "

ourfelves,

jy;jii IN T>R G P U C T O R .Y

-jDurfelves, that is, pyr own fenfations and
ideas, thefcjcnay I?e impreflfed upon the
3p[jiin4 without die help of any thing ex-
ternal to us, by the immediate agency
.of the authoT of our beiqs:. This no
philpfopher will fay is impfiffible, but, pf
two hypothefes to account for the fame
phenomenon, he will confider which is
the^ more, probable, as being mare confo-
.nant to the courfe ,of nature in other
,refpe6ls.

Half the inhabitants of the globe, for
^Jpftance, may be looking towards the

heavens at the fame time, and all their
; minds are imprefled in the fame rnanner.
,All fee the moon, ftars, a,nd planets Jn

precifely the fame fituations ; and even

the obfervations of thofe who ufe tele-
j^fcopes correfpond yrith the utmoft exa6l-
v^efs. To explain this, Bifhop Berkley
.jfays, that the divine being, attending
"vito eaph individual mind, imprefles their
. fenforiums in the fame, or a correfpond-

ing manner, without diq medium of any
;i^thing external to them. On the other

hand.

OBSERVATIONS. lix

hand, another perfon, without pretend-
ing that his fcheme is impoffible, where di-
vine power is concerned, may think,
•however, that it is more natural to fup-
pofe that there really are fuch bodies as
the moon, ftars, and planets, placed at
certain diflances from us, and moving in
certain directions ; by means of which,
and a more general agency of the dfeitry
^than Bilhop Berkley fuppofes, all our
minds are neceffarily imprefled in this
correfponding manner.

It is fufficient evidence for this hypo-
thefis, that it exhibits particular appear-
ances, as arifmg horn general laws, which
is agreeable to the analogy of every thing
. elfe that we obferve. It is recommended
by the {dimt Jimp licity that recommends
every other philofophical theory, and
needs no other evidence whatever ; and
I fhould think that a perfon muft have
very little knowledge of the nature of
philofophy, who (hall think of having
recourfe to any other for the purpofe.
Dr. Reid; however, not fatisfied with this

evidence.

:lx INTRODUCTORY

* ■

evidence, pretends that the certain belief
of the real exiftence of external objetls
is arbitrarily conne6led with the ideas of
them. The hypothefis of knozving things
by means of ideas only, he fays, * Dedi-

* cation/ p. 7, ' is antient, indeed, and has
' been generally received by philofophers,

* but of which I could find nofolid proof.

* The hypothefis I mean is, that nothing

* is perceived but what is in the mind
' which perceives it : That we do not
' really perceive things that are external,

* but only certain images and pi6tures of

* them, imprinted upon the mind, which

* are called imprejfions and ideasj

In fa6l, it is not true that we neceffarity
believe the exillence of external objefts,
as diJlinU:from our ideas of them. Origi-
fjnally, we have no knowledge of any fuch
I- thing as ideas, any more than we have of
the images of objefts on the retina ; and
the moment we have attained to the
knowledge of ideas, the external world is
nothing more than an hypothefis, to ac-
count for thofe ideas ; fo probable, in-
deed.

OBSERVATIONS. Ixt

deed, that few perfons ferioufly doubt of
its real exiflence, and of its being the
caufe of our ideas. But ftill the contrary-
may be affirmed without any proper ab-
Jurdity. Thus, alfo, the revohition of
the planets round the fun bed accounts
for the appearances of nature, but the
contrary may be fuppofed and affirmed
without fubjefting a perfon to the charge
of talking nonfenfe. This, however, is
the language that is now adopted when
any of the diftates of a pretended prin-
ciple of common fenfe is controverted;
and one of the arbitrary decrees of this
new infallible guide to truth is, it feems,
the reality of an external world.

Such is the leading principle of that
philofophy which I principally mean to
combat in the enfuing Remarks on the
writings of Dr. Reid, Dr. Beattie, and
Dr. Ofwald.

RE-

REMARKS

O N

Dr. REID's INQUIRY

INTO THE

PRINCIPLES

O F T H E

HUMAN MIND.

THE

INTRODUCTION.

THE great bufinefs of philofophy li
to reduce into clafTes the various
appearances which nature prefents
to ouf view. For by this means we ac-
quire an eafy and diftinft knowledge of
them, and gain a more perfeQ, compre-
henfion of their various natures^ relations,
and ufes. Nature prefents to our view
particular effeEis, in conne6lion with their
Jeparate caiifeSy by which we are often
puzzled, till philofophy fteps in to our
alTiftance, pointing out a fimilafity in thefe
effe6ts, and the probability of fuch fimi-
lar effe^s arifing from the fame caufe*
Having got into this track o^Jimplifyifig
all appearances, and all caufes, we are
able to predi6l new appearances from
their known previous circuraftances ; and
B thu»

« REMARKS ON ^

Ihus we add to otif own power, coftvenfi
cnce, and happinefs, by availing ourfelves
of the powers of nature. ; i *

A very confiderable advance has been
made in this truly philofophical and ufe^-
ful progrefs with refpeft to the knowledge
of the world around us, and the laws by
which it is governed. And the know-
ledge of our/elves, both body and mind,
has likewife advanced in the proportion
that might have been expefted from the
natural order of our thoughts ; which are
firft engaged by an attention to external
obje^s before we refle6l upon ourfelves.
Something was done in this field of know-
ledge by Defcartes, very much by Mr.
Locke, but mod of all by Dr. Hartley,
who has thrown more ufeful light upon
the theory of the mind than Newton did

upon the theory of the natural world. .

it- . t,

But while fome are employed in
making real advances in the knowledge
of nature, there have always been others
poflelTed not always, perhaps, of enyious

T:>ii& but

Dr. R E I D '« T H E O R Y. j

but of kittle and contrafted minds, who,
inftead of doing, or attempting to do any
thing themfelves, are bufily employed in
V^tching the footfteps of others, and ca-
villing at every thing they do ; which is
I30t without a good effe6l, as it obliges
philofophers to ufe greater caution and
circumfpedion, to review their fteps, and
tread upon furer ground than they would
otherwife do. .. -ii

Every difcovery in natural philofophy
made by Copernicus, Galileo, and NeW-
^tpn, was difputed inch by inch ; and can
we be furprifed that the labours of Mr.
Locke fhould {hare the fame fate? As
to Dr. Hartley, his day qftrml is not yet
come, and one of my views in this pub-
lication, and fome others that I have pro-
jefted, is to bring it on; not doubting
but that it will ftand the teft, and be bet-
ter kn own, and more firmly eftablifhed
after fuch a fcrutiny .

The fate of Mr. Locke*s principles of

rfie human mind has, however, been rat-

^^m B2 tiher

4 REMARKS ON

ther fingularly hard. The ryftems of other
philofophers, after having been fully and-
rigoroufly criticized, and then generally
acquiefced in, have paffed without much
controverfy ; but his, after having under-
gone this ftricl: examination from all the
learned of his own age, and having been
acquiefced in for near a century, has of
late met with a more rude, and more per-
tinacious fet of adverfaries ; who, inftead
of allowing the knowledge of the mind
to advance with the knowledge of nature
in general, appear to me to be throwing
every tiling into its priftine confufion, and
,even introducing more darknefs than na-
^turally ever belonged to the fubje6l.

, riThe outlines of Mr. Locke's fyftem are,

that the mind perceives all things that are

external to it by means of certain impref-

fions, made upon the organs of fenfe ; that

thofe impreflions are conveyed by the

jriierves to the brain, and from the brain

^ to the mind, where they are called y^Tz/i-

^tions, and when recollecled are called

ideas ; that by the attention which the

mindj or fentient principle, gives to thefc

fenfations

Dr. REID's THEORY. 5

lenfations and ideas^ obferving their mu-
tual relations, &c, it acquires other
ideas, which he calls ideas of refleEiion^
and thereby becomes pofTefied of the
materials of all its knowledge. Other
things he has adopted, and taken for
granted concerning the mind, which are
not well founded ; and I think he has been
hafty in concluding that there is fome
other fource of our ideas befides the ex-
ternal fenfes ; but the reft of his fyftem
appears to me, and others, to be the

comer ftone of all juft and rational know-
ledge of ourfelves.

This folid foundation, however, has
lately been attempted to be overturned by
a fet of pretended philofophers, of whom
the raoft confpicuous and affuming is Dr.
Reid, profeffor of moral philofophy in the
uoiverfity of Glafgow, who, in order to
combat Bifhop Berkley, and the feep-
ticifm of Mr. Hume, has himfelf intro-
duced almoft univerfal fcepticifm and
confufion ; denying all the connexions
which bad before been fuppofed to fublifl

■ ^.t*v.r^ >%qi'miV^ .

be-

^miim

■i.ia^i

6K !^ E^'it R K S ON

Hetween the feveral phenomena, poweryj^
and operations of the mind, and fubfti*
tuting fuch a number of independenty
arbitrary, inflinBive principles, that the
very enumeration of them is really tireforae.

^ It IS very pofTible, indeed, and no per-
Ibn can deny it, that we may proceed too
rapidly in fimplifying appearances, and
therefore fuch writers as Dr. Reid are
an ufeful and feafonable check upon us.
But, on the other hand, fo loofe and in-
coherent a fyftem as he would fubftitute
in the place of Mr. Locke's, ought not
to be adopted without the moft urgent
neceffity ; fmce it wants the recommenda-
tion of that agreeable^??^/>^*a^, which is
(b apparent in other parts of the conftitu-
tion of nature. Appearances and ana-
logy being fo much againft this fyftem,
we are juftified in requiring the flronger
evidence for it.

It is impoflible to contemplate fuch a
theory of the human mind as that of Dr«

^i-Reid

Dr. H,ElI>'s JHE,Of.Y. ^

Reid with any ratisfa6tipn, and the ftirther
ftudy of the fubje6l is thereby rendered
exceedingly difguiling and unpromifing.
I flatter myfelf therefore, that I may be
doing fome fervice to future inquirers,
by endeavouring to fhow that this new
fyftem has in it a$ little of truth as it has
of ^<r^i^^, that we rpay fafely take up the
fvbje6l, where Mr. Locke left it, and
proceed to attend to what Dr. Hanley
has done by following his fleps ; when,
if I have any forefight, we (hall fmile at
Dr. Reid's hypothefis, or rather (Iring of
hypothefes, as a mere puzzle, and Ipojc
back upon it as upon a dream. ^ ^^

, r To proceed with as much perfpicuity
as I poITibly can in this perplexed fubje6l,
I {hall firft prefcnt my reader with a view
of all the unconnefted inftindive princi-
ples which Dr. Reid pretends to have dif-
covered in the mind, and I Ihall then es;-
amine, in diftinft fedions, his objections
to Mr. Locke's dotlrine, and the founda-t
tion he has laid for his pwn peculiar 1>)^«
pothefes.

B 4 That

8 HE MA R K S ON -

That I may preferve at the fame time
the greateft diftinanefs with refped to
- my reader, and the greateft faimefs with
refpe6t to the author on whom I am ani-
madverting, I fhall enumerate all the pre-
tended inftinaive principles of which he
has given any accou^^ in this treatife/and
Exhibit them in the form of a table, iub-
.joining my authorities, in quotations
'^from thofe different parts of his work from
tvhich I have colkaed them, and alfo
numbering the articles, fo that they may
correfpond to one another, and be'eafily
compared together.

t:ZK _ •

■•-:■' ^*--'-

SEC-

Dr. RE I D's^ t H EO R Y.

S E C T I O N^ 1;

t&{\I

A Table of Dr. Reid's ijifUnMive principles,^

the belief of the prefent-cX'
\ irtence ot an obje6l.

fA prefent fenfatlon fuggefts

Memory
V^Imaglnation

a Mental affedtlons

^ Odours, taftes,"
founds, and cer-
tain atfections of
the optic nerve

4 A hard fubftance

the belief of its pait exiftenw.
no belief at all. :

J the idea and belief of our

\^ own exiilence.

M

their peculiar correfporiding
fenfations. *

"the fenfationof hardnefs, and
the belief of fomcthing
hard.

5 An extended fubftance ■ — the idea of extenfion and fpacc.

6 All the primary"

their peculiar fenfations.

the idea of motion.

qualities of bo-
dies
^ A body in motion

6 Certain forms ofl

the features, ar-
ticulations of the
voice, and at-
titudes of the
body <

7 Inverted images ~[

on the retina J

8 Images in corre-'

fponding parts
of both eyes*

9 Pains In any part 1

of the body J
He ^Ifo enumeratei the folloivinfr amon^ inftin^ive faculties or
principles^ viz.

The parallel motion of the eyes, as nec^fTary to diftinft vilion.
Thefenfe of veracity, or a difpofition to fpeak truth.
A fenfe of credulity, or a difpotition to believe others.
The indudive faculty, by which we infer firailar effedta
from fimilar caufes.
N. B. All thefe feparate inllinftive principles Dr. Rei4
confiders as branches of what he terms common fenfe.

* Diffcreat Animals are fub]e£l to different laws la this rerpeft.

Aiithmtits

the idea and belief of certain
thoughts, purpofes, mid
difpofitiuns of the mind.

upright vifion.

fingle vifion.

r the idea of the place where,
\ the pain is feated.

lo

II

II

12

lo R.EJ^liAiR: K S O N

si'^^^thorities fir the preceding table.

I, ' CENSATION compels our belief
^xt5*'^-of the prefent exiftence of a

* thing, luemory the belief of its pad

* exiftence, and imagination no belief at
'-all^ Thefe are all fimple and original,

* and therefore inexplicable ads of the

* mind/ p. 31.

Ij* The connexion between our fenfa-
*iions and the conception and belief of

* external exiftences cannot be produced

* by habit, education, or any principle of
t human nature that has been admitted

* by philofophers/ p. 91.

"^^'^ A third clafs of natural figns compre-

* hends thofe which, though we never be-

* fore had any notion or conception of

* the things lignified, do fuggeft it, or

* conjure it up, as it were, by a natural
' kind of magic, and at once give us ^
' conception, and create a belief of it.

* P* 9^* This clafs of natural (igns is the
^ * * foundation '

Dr. R El D's' THEORY. rt

* foundation of common fenfe, a part of
'human nature which has never beea

* explained.' p. 91. - r

* Senfation, and the perception of exr

* ternal objecls by the fenfes, though very

* diiFerent in their nature, have commonly
' been confidered as one and the fame
' thing.' p. 288. -*^'* "if^. "

* I know that the perception of a»

* obje6l implies both the conception of

* its form, and a behef of its prefent ex-

* iftence. I know, moreover, that this

* belief is not the effect of argument and

* reafoning. It is the immediate effe^
' of my conftitution.' p. 290. ; v>! -

'2. * The idea of our own exiftence
' precedes all reafoning and experience/
p. 48^ >Toi ■'■

3. See p. 84, quoted below, and hi«
treatife paffim. ^i^wn iu Uxii '

B f,tioiK]r>tTor> *

4. ' By

tx R EM A R K S O N

tH4. * By an original principle of our

* -conftitution a certain fenfation of touch

* both fyggefts to the mind the concept

* tion of hardnefs, and creates the be-

* lief of it, or in other words, this fen-

* fatioa is a natural fign of hardaefs.'
p. 86.

5. * Space, motion, and extenfion,

* and all the primary qualities of bodies,

* have no rclemblance to any fenfation or

* any operation of our minds, and there-

* fore cannot be ideas either of fenfation

* or reflexion. The very conception of

* them is irreconcileable to the principles
•of all our philofbphical fyftems of the

* univerfe. The belief of them is.no lefs

* fo/ p. 3Q2«

* The notion of extension is fo familiar

* to us from our infancy, and fo jcon-
' ftantly obtruded by every thing we fee

* or feel, that we are apt to think it ob-
' vious how it comes into the mind ; but
•upon a narrower examination we fbail
;',fimd it utterly^ iiicxplicf»bil^. It is true
v.; ■■ ■'' * wc

Dr. R EI D's T H E O R Y. 13

* we have feelings of touch, which every

* moment prefent extenfiori to the mind ;

* but how they come to do fo is the que-
*ftion: for thofe feelings do no more re-

* femble extenHon than they refemble

* juftice or courage, nor can the exiftence

* of extended things be inferred frortt

* thofe feelings by any rule of reafoning ;
"^ fo that the feelings we have by touch

* can neither explain how we get the no-

* tion, nor how we came by the belief of

* extended things.' p. 96.

6. * The thoughts, purpofes, and dif-

* pofitions of the mind, have their na-
' turai figns in the features of the face,

* the modification of the voice, and th6
' attitude of the body. p. 87. In thefe
^ natural figns,' he fays, ib. * there is, a«

* in artificial figns, often neither fimili-

* tude between the fign and the thing
*" fignified, nor any connexion that arifes
^^ neceffarily from the nature of thingsl'
Of thefe particular natural figns he fays,
p. 89, that * they are not only efta»
*blifhedby nature, but difcovered to us

• by

)4 REMARKS ON

* by a natural principle, without rea^on-

* ing or experience. An infant, he adds,

* may be put in a fright by an angry
*■ countenance, and foothed again by

* figns and blandilhments.'
i ' . •

hofi See ch. i. fe£lion xi. paflim.

8. ' The correfpondence of certain

* points in the retinae is prior to the

* habits we acquire in vifion, and confe-

* quently is natural and original.' p. 261.

' Since there is a prodigious variety
*- in the ftrudure, the motions, and the
*• number of eyes in different animals and

* infecls, it is probable that the laws
<•. by which vifion is regulated are not
i* the fame in all, but various, adapted to

* the eyes which nature has given them.*
p. 233. See alfo ch. vi. fetlion xiii.
paflim. tAuodi '

' 9. * How do we know the parts of

* our body affeded by particular pains.**

:fdl' ' * not

Dr RE ID'S T H E O ITY. >$

* not by experience, or by reafoning, but

* by the conftitution of nature.* p. 209.

v<1lo. * The parallel motion of the eyes
' we refolve into an original power and

* principle of the human mind, and not

* to be referred to cuftom, to anatomical
or mechanical caufes.' p. 185. He
alfo calls it a natural vnjiin^, p. 187.
But fee ch. vi, fe6lionx. paffim*

•DD.e T// «TfdEn '
11. * There is in the human mind an

* early anticipation, neither derived from

* experience nor reafoning, nor from any

* compaft or promife, that our fellow-

* creatures %\all ufe the fame figns in lan-

* guage when they have the fame fenti-

* ments. This is, in reality, a kind of

* prefcience of human aftions, and feems
' to me to be an original principle of the
' human conftitution, without which we

* (hould be incapable of language, and

* confequently incapable of inftru6lion/

^. ;;^--, n-^B'^Bfi ybod tijo *

?^ ^ ' The

i6 R E M A R K S O N

' The wife author of our nature has

* implanted in our natures two prin-

* ciples that tally with each other, the

* firft is a propenfity to fpeak truth, and

* to ufe the iigns of language fo as to

* convey our real fentiments, p. 33^.

* Another original principle implanted
' in us by the fupreme being, is a difpo-

* fition to confide in the veracity of

* others, and to believe what they tell

* us. This is the counterpart to the

* former ; and as that may be called the
^principle of veracity, we (liall, for want

* of a more proper name, call this the
'principle of credulity J

12. ' The belief of the continuance
' of the prefent courfe of nature mufl: b&
' the effeft of infiincl, and not of reafon,

* p. 343. All our knowledge of nature

* beyond our original perceptions is got

* by experience, and confifts in the in-
' terpretation of natural figns. The ap-
' pearance of the fign is followed by the

* belief of the thing fignified. Upon this

* principle of our conftitution not only

* acquired

Dr. R E I D 's THEORY. 17

* acquired perception, but alio induftive

* reafoning, and all our reafoning from

* analogy is grounded ; and therefore,
•for want of another name, we (hall beg
' leave to call it the indu&ive principle.
' It is from the force of this principle that

* we immediately affent to that axiom,

* upon which all our knowledge of nature

* is built, tbat effe6ls of the fame kind

* hiufi have the fame caufe, p. 347*

* Take away the light of this induftive

* principle, and experience is as blind as

* a mole. She may indeed feel what is
' prefent, and what immediately touches

* her, but (lie fees nothing that is eithet
' before or behind, upon the right hand

* or upon the left, future or paft.' p. 349* '

It will be obferved, that in this table I
have connected the name of the thing or
circumftance that gives rife to the; corre-
fponding feeling by the word fuggefl.
This, however, is not to be miftaken for
a mere form of contie6lion. Our author
tvould have us to confider it in* £t much
tAoxt fcriou> light, as a real power of the
C mind.

i8 R E M A R K S O N'

JTiind, which had efcaped the notice of all
the philofophers who had gone before
hiai in thefe refearches. * Suggejlion,^
he fays, p. 49, * is a power of the mind

* which feems entirely to have efcaped

* the notice of philofophers, and to which
^we owe many of our fimple notions

* which are neither impreffions nor ideas,
Vas well as many original principles of
;A»belief.'

My reader will, I fufpecl, imagine with
me, that this catalogue of original in-
ftin6live principles is pretty large, and
tJiat when nature had gone fo far in this
track, but little could be wanting to ac-
complifh all herpurpofes; and that, with
fefpcft uxpi'inciplcs, little remained to be
donr by an^• other means. But our au-
thor. It ferms, thinks differently. * The
;ff original perceptions which nature gives

* are infufficient,* he fays, p. 351, 'for
^^the purpofes of life, and therefore fhe has

* made men capable of acquiring many

* more perceptions by habit.' Now my
Yiew m the following inquiry is to relieve

*jp/ dame

Dr. R E I D's THEORY. 19

dame nature of the unneceflary load which
Dr. Reid has laid upon her, by afcribing
a little more to habit, and to the necelTary
connexions and confequences of things
than he has done.

When my reader fhall have given fuf-
ficient attention to the preceding table,
and the authorities from which it was col-
lefted, I hope that he, our author, and
myfelf, may proceed with a perfectly
right underftanding of one another.
However, to complete this good under-
Handing, and to prevent the poflibility of
a miftake, I fhall fubjoin a few more ex-
tra6ls, which fhow how perfedly inde-
pendent of one another Dr. Reid ima-
gined the principles enumerated in this
table to be.

.^Tf No man can give a reafon why the
If vibration of a body might not have
^f. given the fenfation of fmelling, and the

* effluvia of bodies affeQed our hearing,
:? if it had fo pleafed our maker. In like

* manner no man can give a reafon why
" C2 'th^-

20 REMARKS ON

"* the fenfations of fmell or tafle miglit
*'ubt have, indicated hardnefs, as'vvefl^ais
^'ihat renfaUon which by our coriftitulion
^^ does, indicate it. Indeed no man ca^
'■^conceive lahyfenfation to refemble ari^

* known quality of bodies, nor can aiiy
,^ man fhow by any good argument that

* ,all our fenfatiohs might not have been
'• as 'they ate; though no body, or quality
*^ of bodies, had ^ver exifted/ p. 841-"'^

-*« Perhaps '#e'hiight hd\^'e b^eh fo Ttiade
■^':is to tafle with our fingers, to fmell with
/^ our ears, and to hear by the nofe. Per-
^liaps we might have been fo made as to
*^lifaX^fe 'a;ll the perceptions andfenfations
'*^ which- we' have without any impreflion
■^ttliide upon our bodily organs at alU'

^''305.-

s

' The perceptions we ha\^ might have
''been immediately corinefted Avith the

* impreffions 6f 'our organs; 'without any

* intervention of fenfation. This laft
' feems^ really to be the cafe in one in-
*^ ftance, to wnt, in our perception of the
*:'*^'ifible figure of bodies'/ • p. -^o^.

Dr. REID's THEORY. 21

/ We .know nothing of the machinery >
*fby means of which every different im-
* preflion upon the organs, nerves, and
'brain exhibits its corrcfponding fenfa-
' tion, or of the machinery by means of
\ which each fenfation exhibits its corre-
' fponding perception. We are infpired
' with the fenfation, and we are infpired
t-with the corrcfponding perception by
'means unknown.' p. 300.

^Our author feems, however, to be'
wilhng to provide a decent retreat from
his dodrine of original iftinftive princi-
ples, by faying, p. 223, *Ifin any cafe

* we fhould give the name of a law of na-
' ture to a general phenomenon, which

* human induflry fhould afterwards trace
Mo one more general, there is no great^'

* harm done. The moft general affumei'
' the name of a law of nature when it is

/.difcovered, and the lefs general is cohV
**tained and comprehended in it.'

' . But I mud take the liberty to fay, tbat^*
iF this ftould happen, harm toill be done'

C3 to

22 R EM ARKS ON

to tne Tiypothefis of that man Who had
been fo rafh and unguarded as to advance
over and over, fo that no body could
miflake his meaning, that a certain law
of nature was abfolutely ultimate, which
afterwards appeared not to be fo ; who
fhould have aflerted that thefe principles
zx^Jimple, original, and therefore inex-
plicable aEls of the viindy and that they
cannot be produced by any prmciple of
human nature that has ever been admit-
ted by philofophers. This is afferting
that it is impoffible to advance any farther
5n theinveftigation ; for who can ever get
hdyond^inple, original^ and inexplicable
acls of tlie mind.

Mil

The fufpicion that we are got to ulti-
mate principles neceflarily checks all far-
ther inquiry, and is therefore of great dif-
fervice in philofophy. Let Dr. Reid lay
his hand upon his breafl, and fay, whe-
ther, after what he has written, he would
not be exceedingly mortified to find it
clearly proved, to the fatisfa6lion of all
th^ world, that all the Inflindive princi-
ples

Dr. R E I D 's T H E O R y. 23

pics in the preceding table were really ac-
quired, and that all of them were nothing
more than fo many different cafes of the
old and well known principle of ojjocid'
tion of ideas.

It muft, moreover, be obfcrved, that
the table I have given by no means con-
tains a view of all the original inftin£live
principles which our fagacious author
finds in human nature. Thefe are only
fuch as have occurred to him in his fuY-
vey of the external fenfes. * We have
' taken notice/ he fays, p. 378, * offeveral

* original principles of belief in thecourfc

* of this inquiry ; and when other facul ties

* of the mind are examined, we (hall find

* more which have not occured in the

* examination of the ^\t fenfes.'

It may be faid that, fmcc our author
has not finifhed his fchemc, this critique
upon it is premature, that we ought firft
to hear him out, and that it is not good
manners to rife from the table after the
firtt courfe though we be not difpofed to
C4 partake

U^ REMARKS ON

partake of the fecond. I anfwer, that
Dr. Reid's gueRs have already waited
^bout ten years, and that poflibly this
account of the firft courfe may induce
our hoft to haflen his fecond. To drop
all figure : our author's fcheme appears
to be already complete as far as it goes,
and the evidence of what is before us is
altogether independent of what is to
come ; at lead there is no hint given ^c^
us of the contrary.

X:f;li \\})i\[

Dr. R E I D> T.H E O R Y, ^r

SECTION II.

A view of the fever al fallacies hy. .which
■ t)r. Reid has been mifled in his inquiry,

T Now proceed to confider Dr. Reid*s
^ objeftions to the great outlines of Mr.
Locke's doftrine, and the feveral prin-
ciples on which he has founded his own;
endeavouring, at the fame time, to fhew,
the fufficiency of the commonly received
principles for thofe purpofes for which
Dr. Reid pretends that they are altogo-
(her infufficient, fo as to oblige., him to
quit them for others of his own. , '"'^

As my remarks on the Doclors per-
formance were made in the courfe of read-,
ing him, and thereby things of a different
nature will be unavoidably a little inter-
mixed (though I (hall take all the care I, can
in the arrangement of them) I fliall intro-
duce them with diftinftly noting the fe-
veral falfe fteps which he has made in the
courfe of 1X3 or the ^x'S^x^m fallacies to

which

tS K E M ARKS O N

which he leems to have been fubjed, and
which have been tlie.fQurce of the prin-
cipal of his miftakes.

1 . Becaufe he cannot perceive any re-
femblance between obje6ls and ideas, he
concludes, that the one cannot be pro-
duced by the other.

2. Becaufe he cannot perceive any ne-
cefTary connexion between fenfations and
theobjecls of them, and therefore cannot
abfolutely demonflrate the reality of ex-*
ternal objefts, or even the exiflence of
mind itfelf, by the do6lrine of ideas, he
reje6ls that do£lrine altogether, and has'
recourfe to arbitrary inft:in6ls.

3. He takes it for granted that our
ideas have no exiflence but when we are
confcious of them, and attend to them.

4. He confounds the faculty of fen-
fation with ideas of fenfation.

5. Becaufe we do not know the me-
chanifm by which a particular motion^ or

"a let

Dr. R E I D's T H E O R Y. 27-

a fet of connctlcd motions, is performed,
he concludes that thofe motions are per-
formed by inftintlive principles, and were
pot acquired by experience and the affo-
ciation of ideas. . a1a>>

6. Suppofing, without any foundation,
that certain determinations or emotions
were prior to experience, he conckides

that they are inftin6tive.

:;^; lii'v, rt'tvil,. ;5K.r);:j

Let it be noted, that I do not affert
that our learned profeflbr is uniform m
thefe miftakes, for by fome of my re-
marks I think it will appear that he is not
perfectly confident with himfclf. ^-''

ii)-\-

•fe:
SEC-

REMARKS ON

; SECTION III.

Oj Dr. Reid'j objeaion to the docirine of
ideas from their zoant of refemblance to
i'iji€}r corrcfponding objects. ^j

Tr\IL Reid objetls to every fyftem
^^ which fuppofcs that the mind re-
ceives images of things from without
by means of the : fehfes, ■ and. " thinks
that they are fufficiently. refuted by the
obfervation, that fenfations bear no re-
femblance to bodies, or any of their
quahties. * The properties of extenlion,
^ figure, foHdity, motion, hardnefs, rough-

* nefs, as well as colour, heat, and cold,
' found, tafte, and fmell, which all man-
' kind have conceived to be the qualities
' of bodies, have not', he fays, p. 147,
' among them all, one fmgle image of

* body, or any of its qualities. I am fure

* that, by proper attention and care,
'I tnay knov/ my fenfations, and be
' able to affirm with certainty what they
' rcfemble. and ^diat thev do not refem-

' ble.

Dr. R E I D' s T H E O R Y. ag

' ble. . I have examined them one by one,
f a"nd compared them with matter an3' its
' qualities, and I cannot find one of them

* that confefles a refemblinsr feature.'

'^' S&vcTiy^ confident' is our -author of Ae
ftrength of this argument, that he fcruples
not to vel]: tfee wjiole of his fyftem., upon
it^ "^. "jll^iis/ fays he j 'p. 108, ' I would

* hurtAl]p^ ^prdpofe as 'an experwicntuin

* criicisy by which the' ideal fyHem.muft
' ftand br fall ; and it brings the mattev
'' to a fhon iffue. Extenfion, figure, mo-

* tiqn,'.'itiay, any one, or all of them, be

* tiakenfor the fubjeft of this iexperiment,
' Either they are' jc^ei^ of fenfatioHj or

* they are ' not. I/' ahy one of them caiii
' bfe fhOwri to be an idea of fenfation, or
'to have the lead refemblance' to any fen-

* fation. Hay my* hand upon my mOuth,

* and give up all pretenfeto reconcile rca^
*.^n to common fenfe in this mattei*, arid
'■ttuft'Tiiffer the ideal fcepticifm to'tri-

* jdhiplx. But if, on the other han4, they

* are not ideas of fenfation, nor like to

' any. fenfation, then the id^al fyflem is a

, ' "rope

"h I

3P R E M A R K S O N

^Tope of fand, and all the laboured argu-
*- ments of the fceptical philofophy againft
'^- a rnaterial world, and againft the exi-
* ftence of every thing but imprefTions
' and ideas, proceed upon a falfe hypo-
-* thefis/

Before our author had refted fo much
upon this argument, it behoved him, I
think, to have examined the ftrength of
it a Htde more carefully than he feems to
have done ; for he appears to me to have
fuffered himfelf to be mifled in the very
foundation of it, merely by philofophers
liappcning to call ideas the images of ex-
ternal things ; as if this was not known to
be a figurative exprefTion, denoting not
that the a6lual fhapes of things were dcr
lineated in the brain, or upon the mind,
but only that imprelTions of fome kind
or other were conveyed to the mind by

means of the organs of fcnfe and their cor-
refponding nerves, and that between thefe
imprefTions and the fenfations exifting in
the mind there is a real and neceffary,
though at prefent an unknown conne6Hon.

I do

Dr. R E I D's T H E O R Y. 31

I do not fee but that by Dr. Reid's
mode of reafoning, he might as well deny
that the found of a mufical ftring is caufed
by the ftroke o^d^pleElrum, or that founds,
confidered as tremulous motions of the
particles of the air, are produced by bo-
dies ftriking againft one another, becaule
he can perceive no proper refemblance be-
tween the caufe and the effeft, between
the found that is produced and the fliape
of the thing or things by which the founds
are made ; and yet thefe founds vary ac-
cording to the bodies that occafion them,
and the circumftances that attend their
impinging on one another ; fo that, with-
out any fuch refemblance as the Do6lor
feems to expeft, they correfpond {lri6lly
to one another, and the one may be called
the proper and necejfary, and not the ar-
bitrary (or as Dr. Reid would call it the
natural) fign of the other. ^ >

The transferring of this comparifon
to the doclrine of ideas is very eafy. If,
as Dr. Hartley fuppofes, the nerves and
brain be a vibrating fubftance, the ana-
^h i logy

0^ R E M.A R K S O N

logy. jwill hold very nearly indeed ; ,all
renfations and ideas being vibrations' ill
that fubflance, and all that is properly
unknovv'n in the bufinefs being the fimple
pov/erin the mind to perceive,, or be af-
fe61ed by, thofe vibrations.' And. if, as
Locke and pthers fuppofe, matter i'tfelf
may be indued with that fentient pow6f^
even that difficulty, as "far as the- preferlt
queltion can be afFe6led, is removed. ' '

Our author's doubts are not confined td
ideas being produced by eiiternal obje6ls,
but affe6l the ufe of the, nerves belonging
to the organs of fenfe, and the brain itfelf,
as the inllruments of tranfmitting them to
the mind, reducing the fuppohtion to a
mere probability, .

' It is very probable,' he fays, p. 200^

* that the optic nerve is the inllrUment of

* vifion, no lefs neceffary than the retina.'
But it appears tome tl;at, arguing in this
manner, .one might doubt of every thing j
and that \v-e miglit jufl as well fay, it, is
ytry pxQbal^lc on! v that the feet and leg<>

are

Dr R E 1 D 's THEORY. 3^

ate the inftruraents of walking, aS that
the optic nerve is only probably the in^
ftrument of vifion.

Iri another place, he does not leave
I'oom to fuppofe that it is even probable
that the optic nerves are the inllrument
of vifion ; calling the hypothefis a mere
conje6lure. * From the firft dawn of phi-
' lofophy to this day/ he fays, p. 277,
' it has been believed that the optic nerves
' are intended to carry the images* of

* vifible obje6ls from the bottom of the

* eye to the mind, and that the nerves be-

* longing to the other fenfes have a like

* office. But how do we know this ? We
' Conje61ure it, and taking this conjefture
' for a truth, we confid^r how the nerves

* may beft anfwer the purpofe.* It is
agreeable to this that he fays, p. 303,

* We are infpired with the fenfation, and

* If Dr. Reid thinks to reconcile thefe two paflages by
faying that by images, in this place, he did not mean impref-
Jions in general, but the vtaXJljapes and forms of thing, the
IV hole charge is falfe, and he is fighting a chimera ot his
own creating.

H

REMARKS ON

' we are infpired with the correfponding

* perception, by means unknown.'

This fcepticifm vrith refpeQ to the doc-
trine of ideas, the ufe of the organs ol
fenfe, and their correfponding nerves in
tranfmitting them, appears to me to be
very extraordinary indeed ; and yet, fuch
are the caprices of die human mind. Dr.
Reid exprefles as much furprize at the
prevalence of the common opinion. ' It
' is very flrange,' he fays, p. 201, * that
' philofophers of all ages fhould have
' agreed in this notion, that the images>
' of external objefts are conveyed by the
' organs of fenfe to the brain, and are
" there perceived by the mind. Nothing'
" can be more unphilofophical. Forfirft,

* this notion has no foundation in fa61:
' and obfervation. Of all the organs of

* fenfe the eye only, as far as we can dif-

* cover, forms any kind of image of its ob-
' je6l, and the images formed by the eye

* are not in the brain, but only in the hot*
' torn of the eye ; nor are they at all per-
' ceived or felt by the mind. Secondly^

Dr. REI D's THEORY, 35

* it is as difficult to conceive how the
' mind perceives images in the brain, as

* how it perceives things more diftant. If

* any man will fliev/ how the mind may
' perceive images in the brain, I will un*
' dertake to (hew how it may perceive

* the mofl diftant obje^ls : for if we give
' eyes to the mind, to perceive what is
' tranfafted at home in its dark chamber,

* why may we not make thefe eyes a little

* longer fighted, and then we (hall have
' no occafion for that unphilofophical fic-

* tion of images in the brain ? In a word,
•the manner and mechanifm of the mind 3

* perception is quite beyond our compre-
' henfion.*

In this way of arguing "We might fay
that the whole fyftem ofourfenfes, nerves,
and brain is of no real ufe whatever ; for
it is impoflible to fay how they aft upon
the mind, or the mind upon them. But
by the fame reafoning we may deny every
principle in nature. For when we have
traced it as far as we can, we are ftill
compelled to flop fomewhere, and to con-
fefs our inability to proceed any farther.
D 2 I know^

36 REMARKS ON

I know, however, very well, that an eye
is the inftrument of vifion, becaufe with-
out it nothing can be feen. I alfo know
th'it the retina and optic nerve are likewiie
necefiary, becaufe. if they be difordered,
vifion is flill wantilfg ; and laftly, I am
equally certain that the brain is neceflary
to all perception, becaufe if that be dif*
ordered, thinking either intirely ceafes, or
is proportionably dillurbed.

For my part, I knotv no conclufions in
philofophy more certain than thefe, and
they are not rendered at all lefs certain
by our not being able to go a flep farther,
(b as to know in what ?nanner the brain,
or the aifedions of it, can be the inftru-
ment or fubje6l of perception. I may
conjecture that the brain itfelf may be the
ukmiate caufe, or I may fubftitute fome-
tiiing elfe that I may think better adapted
to anfwer the purpofe, that is, to fuit the
phenomena.

SEC-

Dr. REID's THEORY. 37

SECTION IV.

Of Dr. Reldi abjcElion to- Mr. Lockei
divijion of ideas into thofe of faifation
and. rtficEhion.

1_I AVING examined one great pillar
of our author's fchemej I now pro-
ceed to another, of which he likewife
boafts great things; but if my reader be
able to confider it with perfeft ferioufnefs,
it is more than I can expecl of him, for it
is more than I am able to do myfelf. It
is his objeftion to Mr. Locke's divifion of
ideas into thofe oS. fenfaiion, and thofe of
rejledion.

* This', he fays, p. 575, '' i.^ contrar}^ to

* all rules of logic, becaufe the fecond
' member of the divifion includes the
' firll. For can we form clear and jul}

* notions of our fenfiuioas any other way

* than by refledion? Surely we cannot.

* Senfation is an operation of the mind, of
' which we are confcious, and we get the

D 3 ' notion

gt R E M A R K S O N

' notion of fenfation by refle6llng upon

* that which we are confcious of. In hke
' manner doubting and believing are

* operations of the mind, whereof we are
' confcious, and we get the notion of

* them by reflecting upon what we are

* confcious. The ideas of fenfation, there-

* fore, arc ideas of refle6l;ion, as much as
' the ideas of doubting or beheving, or

* any other idea wliatfoever.'

This I fcruple not to fay is as mere a
quibble, as either the ignorance or the
perverfion of logic ever produced, arifing
from our author's confounding the pro-
per ideas offenfaiion v*'ith the idea o^ fenfa-
tion itfelf which is, no doubt, of the fame
clafs with the ideas of doubting, believing,
or thofc of an/ other operation of the
mind ; and fo Mr. Locke would have
acknowledged. But the ideas belonging
to the clafs of fenfation do not require
any fcientifical knowledge of that power,
or any refleclion upon it. If this were the
cafe, brute animals, having no proper
ideas of refleclion, could have no ideas of

fenfation

Dr. R E I D \s T H E O R V. ^9

fenfation. Indeed, it is qaefHonablc
whether the bulk of mankind,., who are
not philofophers, could have them, and
confequently whether they muft not be
deflitute of all ideas.

A more palpable blunder than this I
think I hardly ever met with in any argu-
mentative treatife, and yet this is one of
the great engines with which our author
aflails Mr. Locke's doftrine of ideas.
Dr. Reid might jufl as well fay that houfes
and utenjils neceffarily belong to the fame
clafs of objefts, and that they ought never
to be diftinguifhed, becaufe the former
contain the latter.

Befides our author himfelf fuppofes
that even human beings may have ideas
of mere fenfation fome time before they
difcover any power of reflexion, and that
this power may difcover itfelf and come
into play afterwards. * Perhaps,' lays
he, p. 112, * a child in the womb, or for

* fome (hort period of his exiftence, is

* merely a fentient being, the faculty by

D 4 * which

4^ RJ^HARKSON

^ which it perceives an external worJi,

* by which It reiieds on its o/rn thoughts
^ * and e>dP.ence, and relation to other

■ things as w^U ^s its reafoning and mO"
' ral facuhies, unfold themfelves by de-
^ grees ; fo that it is infpired with the va-
"^ ' rious principles of common fenfe as with
' the paffions of love and refentment,

* when it has occafion for them.' Let
our author fay how this fuppofition of

V fiis could be pofTible, if ideas of fenfation

"^^r were neceflarily included under the head

.^.of ideas of refleftion, when they are here

faid to have exifted prior to the very

power of refleftion, or at lead to any ex-

ercife of that po\rer.

By the way, this hypothelis of the gra-
dual unfolding of the powers of the mind
, very much relembles the gradual acqui-
X Jition of them, from the imprefiions to
I which v;e are expofed. I fliould have
iliought that Dr. Reid would hardly have
^ Jiad an idea of real powers lying fo long
dormant as this notion may require fome
^^pi them to do, while other faculties were
f^. awake

DiV R E I D's T H E a R. Y>*4i

awake and vigorous. He wi4i notV-I find,
afTert of powers what he'-dcJes o^ ideas,
VIZ. that they have no ©xiftence but when
they are in ufe andexercife.

SECTION V.

Dr. Reid'j pojition, that fenfaiion im-
plies the belief of the prefent cxi/fence of
external objects, and his view ^ Berk-
ley'^ theory, particularly confidcred,

TJAVING replied to our author's capi-
^ tal obje61ions to Mr. Locke's, or
the common hypothefis, concerning fen-
fations, ideas^ and objects, I come to
conlider what he has fartiicr to advance
in fupport of his ov/n. Now one would
imagine a priori, that a man w^ho fhould
have alTumed the airs and tone that Dr.
Reid has o-iven himfelf throudi the
whole of this treatife, as if he had utterly
demoliilied all the preceding fyfiems of

the'

42 REMARKSON

the mind, and erected another quite diffe-
rent from any thing that was ever heard
or thought of before, would be able to
produce fomething like pojitive evidence
for it. But, behold, when we have got
to the end of thefe negative arguments,
he has, in fiict, nothing more to offer,
befides his own very confident affertions
(repeated indeed without end, if that
would give them any weight) that the
thing mull certainly be as he reprefents it.

'' Now though I, who do not pretend to
advance any hypothefis of my own, might
very reafonably imitate this example.;
and, having fhewn the futility of his ob-
je6lions to the commonly received hypo-
thecs, content rayfelf with leaving things
in Jlatu quo ; yet for the greater fatisfac-
tion of my readers, 1 fhall make a few
more obfervations on the fubjeci: of our
author's in{lin6tive principles, felecling
for a more particular examination that by
which he fays our perceptions necejfarily
imply the belief of the prefent exijlence of
external ohjeUs* There i^j no one article

oF

Dr. R E I D' s THEORY. 43

of his whole fyftem of common fenfe that
he can lefs fcruple to fubmit to this exa-
mination; for there is no one thing that
he repeats fo often, or feems to triumph
in fo much, as this ; imagining that his
m.ethod of confidering the fubjeft is an
efFeclual antidote, and the only effe^lual
antidote to all the fcepticifm of the prefent
age.

Now excepting what our author has
faid about the abfurdity of Mr. Locke's
principles, of which I think I have offered
a fufficient vindication, and of the pecu-
liarly abfurd and dangerous confequences
which he afcribes to Berkley's theory, and
which I fhall prefently (how to be no bet*
ter founded, all that he fays amounts to
nothing more than this ; that he cannot,
in his own mind, feparate the belief of
the exiltence of external objetls from
his fenfations, as thofe of tafte, touch,
fight, See. With refpeft to this I would
make the following obfervations.

I. There

44 REMARKS ON

1 . There are many opinions which we
know to be acquired, and even founded
on prejudice and miflake, whkh, how-
ever, the fulled conviftion that they are
void of all real foundation cannot erafe
from the mind ; the groundlefs beliefs and
exfjed,aticm-, founded upon it, being fo
clofely conneded with the idea of certain
circum fiances, tliat no mental power of
"which we are polTc/fcd can feparate them.

Though, for indance. Dr. Reid, no
doubt, as well as other philofophers, be-
lieves the earth to be fphencal, aud con-
fequently is fenfible that no one part of
its furface can be upper mo fi and another
part under it ; or, that if there were fuch
a thing as an uppermod part, every part
mull become fo in its turn ; yet he always
coniiders the place on which he Hands as
icondantly uppermod, and conceives of
his antipodes as hanging with their heads
downwards. Nay he cannot help having
an idea of their having a tendency to fall
dowjv 5w*o ^^ void fpace below the earth.

Dr. REID^s THEORY. 45

He may talk as a philofopher, but I am
confident he conceives and thinks as the
vulgar do ; and though in many things
our author appeals to the fentiments of
the vulgar as the teft of truth, in oppofi-
tion to the philofophers, I think he will
hardly chufe to do fo in this cafe. He
cannot, however, poflibJy feparate in his
imagination the idea of a tendency to fall
from his idea of the fituation of the anti-
podes. Now why may not this be the
^fe with refpetl to Berkley's theory, fo
that though we cannot feparate the idea
of the real exiftence of external obje6ls
and our fenfations ; it may, like the other,
be no more than a prejudice, void of all
real foundation. As we cannot pretend
to diftinguffh between our feelings in
thefe two cafes, and one of them we know
to be fallacious, why may not the other
be fallacious alfo ? There muft be fome
otkcr kind of evidence ht^iAts feeling, to
prove that it is not fo.

Secondly, This fcheiiie of Dr. Reid's
fuppofes that an extraordinary povifion

46 R E M A R K S O N

is made for a ki?id of faith, that is by no
means neceflary for the purpofe of it, viz.
with refpeft to the conducl of life. For
a very high degree of probability, not to
be diilinguirried in feehng from abrdutQ
certainty, is attainable without it. Now
fince it cannot be denied but that the di«
vine ocmg leaves us to be governed by a
kind of faith iar iriierior to mathematical
certainty m things of infinitely more con-
feqjfnce (in this, hov.-ever, .1 do not ap*
p-al to Dr. Ofwald) it is abfclutely in*
credible that he fliould have implanted in
us a peculiar inftinclive principle, merely
for the fake of giving us a pUiiary con*
vi'dion with refpecl to this bufmefs, which
is comparatively of s^xy trifling confe-
quence.

Thirdly, Our author's fcheme has this
farther untoward circumllance attending
it, that it fuppofes the divine being to
have formed us in fucli a manner, as that
we mud necerfarily believe what, by our
author's own confeOTion, might not have
beeii true. For * no man,' fays he, p. 85,

^ can

Dr. REI D's THEORY. 47

' can {how by any good argument, that

* all our fenfations might not have been

* as they are, though no body or quality

* of body had ever exifted.' Now this I
fhould think to be, upon the face of it, fo
very unlikely to be true, that no perfon
who confiders the cafe can admit of it.
For this is very different from thofe de-
ceptions which neceflarily arife from ge-
neral laws, and to which all mankind are
fubje6i; ; but with refpeft to which it is in
their power, by the proper ufe of their
faculties, to relieve themfelves.

It appears, therefore, that confident as
our author is of the truth and importance
of his fyflem, he acknowledges it to be
founded not on abfolute but relative truth,
arifing from his conflitution, which (con-
trary to what is advanced by his follow-
ers Dr. Beattie and Dr. Ofwald) is effen-
tially different from that kind of evidence
by which we are fatisfied that two and
two are four, which is independent of any
arbitrary conflitution whatever.

I wonder

4^ R E M A R K S O K

I wonder it (hould not have a litll(i
ftaggered Dr. Reid, to confider that his
whole fyRem muft fall at once before the
fainted fufpicion, that God may think
proper that mankind fhould be fubjetl to
deceptions for their good, at which my
jDind does not Tnudder, wlien I fee it to
be the necefTary confequence of the mofl
CJccei-ent general laws. Do we not
.^e that the bulk of mankind live and aie
in the belief that the fua moves round the
earth, and of other tiiiugs in which they
are deceived by the teitimony of their
fcnfes ? Now let Dr. Reid nl^Agn a. (rood
rea/on, why the fame being who permits
his creatures to believe that the fun moves
round the earth, might not permit thera
to beheve that there was a fun, though,
ia reality, there ihould be no fuch thing;
af the fame time that, by his own imme-
diate power, without the aid of any real
fcn, he ihould afford them all the benefit
o*" Hght and heat which they had falfely
a'cribed to that luminary. I allow it to
be as improbable as any perfon pleafeSj
but the fuppofition is certainly not

diredly

Dr. R E I D' s THEORY. 49 *

clireclly abfurd and impojfible, and this is
liie only thing in debate. ' -

Fourthly, I wonder that our author "^
fliould not have attempted fome folution
of the phenomena of dreams, reveries,
x}S^di vifions upon his hypothefis. In all
tliefe circumilances it cannot be denied%'
that men imagine themfelves to be fur-
rounded with obje6ls which have no real
exiftence, and yet their fenfations are not
to be diftinguifhed from thofe of men
awake; fo that \^ Jcn/atiuns, as Juch, ne-
cefTarily draw after them the beHef ofthe
prefent exiftence of objc6ls, this belief
takes place in dreams, reveries, and vi-
fions, as indeed is the cafe ; and if there
be a fallacy in thefe cafes, it is certainly
within the combafs of pojjihility, that there "
may be a fallacy in the other alfo. %

Notwithftanding thefe obvious difficul-
ties with which our author's fcheme is
clogged, and which a genius of any order
lefs than the moji daring would think to
be infuperable, nothing can exceed the
E confidence

^

50 R E M A R K S O N

confidence with which he exprefTes his
fall perfuafion of the truth of it, from the
fuppofed impoffibiliiy of beheving the con-
trary, or the fupercihous and cavalier
manner in which he treats all obje6tions
to it.

' I ara aware,^ fays he, p. 291, ' that

* this belief M^hich I have in perception
' Hands cxpofed to the ftrongcft batteries

* of fccpiicifm. But they make no great

* impreifion upon it. The fceptic afks
' me, why do you believe the exiflence
' of the external object which you per-

* ceive ? This belief, Sir, is none of my
' manufa6lure ; it came from the mint of
' nature ; it bears her image and fuper-

* fcription ; and if it is not right, the fault

* is not mine. I even took it upon trufi:,

* and without fufpicion. Reafon, fays

* the fceptic, is the only judge of truth,

* and you ought to throw off every opi-

* nion, and every belief, that is not

* grounded on reafon. Well, Sir, why
' (hould I believe the faculty of reafon

* more th.-n that of perception.^ They

both

Dr. R E I D's T H E O R Y. 51

* both came out of the fame fhop, and

* were made by the fame artifl ; and if he

* puts one piece of falfc ware into my

* hands, what fhould hinder him from

* putting anodier ?'

* Pcrliaps the fceptic will agree to dif-
truft reafon, ratlier than give any credit to
perception. For, fays he, fince by your
own confefiion, the objecl which you
perceive, and that aQ of your mind by
which you perceive it are quite different
things, the one may exift without the
other ; and as the objetl may exift with-
out being perceived, fo the perception
may exift without an objeQ. There is
nothing fo fhameful in a philofopher as
to be deceived, and deluded, and there-
fore you ought firmly to withhold your
affent, and throw off this belief of ex-
ternal objefts, which may be all delu-
fion. For my part, I will never attempt
to throw it ofP, and although the fober
part of mankind will not be very anxious
to know any reafons, yet if they can be
of ufe to any fceptic, they are thefe.'

E 2 No^v

52 R E M A R K S O X

Now, as I do not pretend to rank my-
felf v/ith thofe whom Dr. Reid will call
the foher part of mankind, I frankly ac-
knowledge that I have had a little curio-
fity to look at thefe reafons.

The firil I find is, that it is not in his
power to believe otherwife, which I pre-
fume I have confidered fufficiently
above.

His fecond argument is derived from
the dangerous confequences which ,he
afcribes to Berkley's hypothefis, and
which he exprefles in that ludicrous and
contemptuous manner in which the
greateft part of this philofophical treatife
is written.

* I think,' fays he, p. 291, ' it would
' not be prudent to throw off this belief,
' if it ^v'ere in my power. If nature in-

* tended to deceive me, and impofe upon
' me by falfe appearances-, and I, by my
' great cunning and profound logic, have

* difcovered the impofbire, prudence

"^ would

Dr. R E I D 's T H E O R Y. 53

would di6tate to me in this cafe even to
' put up this indignity done me, as qui-
' etly as I could, and not to call her an

* impoftor to her face, left flie (liould be
' even with me in another way. For
' what do I gain by refenting this injury?

* You ought, at leaft, not to believe what
' {he fays. This, indeed, feems reafon-

* able if (lie intends to impofe upon me.

* But what is the confcquence ? I refolve

* not to believe my fenfes. I break my

* nofe againft a poft that comes in my

* way ; I ftep into a dirty kennel ; and

* after twenty fuch wife and rational ac-

* tions, I am taken up, and clapt into a

* mad-houfe. Now Iconfefs I had rather

* make one of the credulous fools whom
' nature impofes upon, than of thofe wife
' and rational philofophers, who refolve

* to withhold allent at all this expence.'

But all this profufion of genuine wit
and humour turns upon a grofs mifrepre-
lentation of Berkley s theory ; and it is
really a pity that what is fo excellent in
its kind fliould be thrown away, bv being
mifplaccd.

E 3 This

54 RE M ARKS ON

This mirreprerentation and abule is cx-
a6lly the conducl of innnv divines, who
charge one another will i a6iually maintain-
ing the fuppofed confeqnences of their re-
fpetlive opinions. But this is no fair con-
fequence. Berkley did not exclude from
his fyftem fcn/ations and ideas, together
with matter, the necejfary conne5iions that
fubfift among them or our fiozuer over
them. He only afcribed to them a dz/fe-
rent origin ; fo that all the rules of con-
duct depending upon them are the fame
on his fcheme as on ours. Our philofo-
phical language only is different.

I fay there is a pod in my way, and
I muff turn afide, left I hurt myfelf by
running againft it. He, in the fame fitu-
ation, is as apprehenfive of danger as
myfelf, though he fays he has only the
idea of a poft before him ; for if he do
not introduce \he idea of avoiding it, he
is fenfible that he (hall experience a very
painful fenfation, which may bring on
other fenfations, till death itfelf enfue.
I may fmile at his language, but he is

confiftent

Dr. REID's THEORY. 55

confident with himfLlf, and his fears have
as much foundation as mine.

Tliis reprefentation of Berkley's theory,
which is common to Dr. Reid, Dr.
Beattie, and Dr. Ofwald, and with which
they often make themfelves and their rea-
ders foohfhly merry, is exceedingly unjufl: ;
but when conhdered by philofophers, the
laugh mufl rebound upon themfelves.

The third reafon, as our author is
pleafed to call it, why he believes in the
exigence of a material world, or the evi-
dence of his fenfes, is that he does not
find that he has been impofed upon by
this belief. ' I find,' fays he, p. 293 ' that

* without it I mufl have perifhed by a

* thoufand accidents. I find that without

* it I fhould have been no wifer now than
' when I was born,' &c. &c. &c. But all
this goes upon the fame mifreprefentation
with the former argument, and is not, in
fa6l, at all different from it. Befides, a
reafonable degree of evidence, which may
be attained witliout tliis extraordinary,

E 4 inftinclivc-

56 RE M ARKS ON

inftinQive, abfolute, and as our author
calls it, infpired belief, is juft as ufeful for
any real purpofe

SECTION VI.

Mr. Locke'j doclrine not Jo favourable to
Berkleys theory as Dr. Reid'j.

TT is by an evident abufe and perverfion
"*" of Mr. Locke's do6lrine that Dr. Reid
pretends that it is favourable to BiOiop
Berkley's notion of there being no mate-
rial world ; when, in reality, our author's
own principles are much more favourable
to that notion than Mr. Locke's.

:' If/ fays he, p. 42, ' impreffions and
' ideas are the only obje6ls of thought,

* then heaven and earth, and body and

* fpirit, and eveiy thing you pleafe, muil
' lignifv only imprelTions and ideas, or
' they muft be words wiuiout any mean-

* kg.'

no.. But

Dr. R E I D 's T H E O R Y. 57

But it was never" fuppofcd by Mr.
Locke, or any other advocate for ideas,
that they were more than the immediate
obJe6i of our thoughts, the things of which
we are properly fpeaking coiifcious, or
that we know in the. ji:Ji injtance. From
them, however, we think we can infer
the real exiflence of other things, from
which thofe ideas are derived ; and then
we can reafon about thofe objetls, as vrcli
as about the ideas themfelves. In facl,
ideas being only the ligns of external
things, we reafon about the external
things themfelves, without ever attending
to the ideas which reprefent them, and
even without knowing that there are any
fuch things in the mind, till we come to
reflect upon the fubjefl. In like manner,
a perfon may fee perfecllv without ever
thinking of his eyes, or indeed knowing
that he has any fuch organs.

Mr. Locke would not, indeed, pretend
to fuch an abfolute demoyift ration of the
reality of an external world as Dr. Reid
pleads for ; but neither iii that ftriti de-

monitration

58 R E M A R K S O N

monflration necelTary. It is quite fuffi-
cient if tlie fiippofitioii be the eafiefl; hy-
potheiis for explaining the origin of our
ideas. The evidence of it is fuch that
we allow it to be barely poflTible to doubt
of it ; but that it is as certain as that
two and two make four, w^e do not pre-
tend.

Strongly attached as our author is to
this material world of ours, let us fee
whether his own fyftem, in other refpecls,
be fufficiendy adapted to it. Now it
appears to me that his notions of mindy
ideas, and external ohjcEls, are fuch
as are hardly compatible with one ano-
ther, that he puts an impaflable gulph be-
tween them, fo asintircly to prevent their
conneclion or correfpondence ; which is
all that the biOiop could wifli in favour of
his dotlrine.

' I take it for granted,' fays Dr. Reid,
p. 381, ' upon the teRimony of common

* fenfe, that mv mind is a fubftance, that

• is, a permanent fubjcftof thought, and

* my

Dr. R E I IVs T H E O R Y. 59

* my reafon convinces me? thai it is an un-

* extended and invilible (ubtlance ; and
' hence I infer that there cannot be in it any
' thini^that refembles extenfion.' But with
equal appearance of truth he might infer
that the mindcannot be ^^i'(^c'a' by any thing
that has extenfion ; for how can any thing
aft upon another but by means of fome
common property ? Though, therefore,
the divine being has thought proper to
create an external world, it can be of no
proper ufe to give us fenfations or ideas.
It muft be he himfelf that imprefTvi our
minds with the notices of external thing's,
without any real injlrumentalitv of their
own ; fo that the external world is quite
a fuperfluity in the creation. If, therefore,
the author of all things be a xoife being,
and have made nothing in vain, we may
conclude that this external world, which
has been the fubje6l; of fo much contro-
verfy, can have no exiftence.

If then we wifli to preferve this external
world, which is very convenient for many
purpofeS; we mud take care to entertain

notions

6o R E M A R K S O N

notions of mind and ideas more compati-
ble with it than thofe of Dr. Reid.

Our author's fallacious argument
from the want of refemblance between
our ideas and external obje6ls leads him
into many difficulties. It makes him, in
feveral refpeRs, allow too much to Dr.
Berkley, and to come nearer to him than
he is aware. And in fpite of his averfion
to the union, and of every thing that he
can do or fay, their common principles
will bring them together, ' Our fenfa-

* tions,' he fays, p. 305, ' have no refera-
' blance to external obje6ls, nor can w&
' difcover by our reafon any neceffary

* conneclion between the exillence of the

* former and that of the latter. No man,*
fays he, p. 85, ' can fiiew by any good

* argument, that all our fenfations might
Inot have been as they are, though no

* body or quality of body had ever ex-

* ifted.' He even fays, p. 304, ' that

* when we confide r the different attributes

* of Tdind and body, they feem to be fo
' different, and fo unlike, that we can fmd

' no

Dr. R E I D's T H E O R Y. 61

* no handle by which one may lay hold

* of the other.'

According: to our author, thereforc.
Berkley's theory is at leafl; pojfihle ; anri
if, as he fays, p. 117, ' fenfations and

* ideas in our minds can referable nothing

* but fenfations and ideas in other minds/
it may well diip^p^dir probable that they are
transferred (as Malebranche, I think, fup-
pofes) immediately from the divine mind
to ours, without any real agency of a ma-
terial world. If I could admit Dr. Reid's
premifes, I think I could hardly help draw-
ing this conclufion from them ; efpecially
as nothing can be pleaded for the ex-
iftence of this fame material world, but a
mere unaccountable perfaajion that it does
exift. This perfuafion Dr. Reid fays
arifes from a branch of his new common
fenfe. But if I cannot difcover or imagine
any end or reafon why it fhouid exift ;
common fenfe, in its old and familiar
acceptation, would tell me that it does
not exift at all.

SEC.

62 R E M A R K S O N

SECTION VII.

Afophifm of Mr. Hume'j in purfuance of
Berkley'i theory adopted by Dr. Reid.

/^UR author, flruck with a panic fear
^^ of fccpticifm, has been no lefs mif-
led and thrown olf his guard by the dan-
gerous fophifms of Mr. Hume, than by
the innocent ones oFBifliop Berkley.

* The new fftemj by which he means
that of Defcartes and Locke, &c. he fays,
p. 360, ' admits only of the principles

* of common fenfe as a firft principle, and

* pretends by flrict argumentation to de-

* duce z\\ the red from it. That our
' thoughts, our fenfations, and ever)ahing

* of which we are confcious has a real ex-

* iflence is admitted in this fyflem as a

* firfl: principle, but every thing elfe mufi:

* be made evident by the light of reafon.
' That the rational iffue of this fyflem is

* fcepticifm, with regard to every thing

* excepting the exillence of our ideas,

* and

Dr. R E I D 's T H E O R V. 63

' and their necefFary relations, which ap-
' pear upon comparing them, is evident.

* For ideas being the only objefts of

* thought, and having no exiftence but

* when we are confcious of them, it ne-

* cefTarily follows, that there is no object

* of our thought which can have a conti-

* nued and permanent exiflence. Body

* and fpirit, caufe and effecl, time and

* fpace, to which we were wont to afcribe
' an exiflence independent of our thought,

* all are turned out of exiflence by this

* fhort dilemma. Either thefe thinirs are

* ideas of fenfation or reflection, or they

* are not. If they are ideas of fenfation

* or refletlion, they can have no ex-

* iftence but when we are confcious of

* them. If they are not ideas of fenfation

* or refleclion, they are words without any
' meaning.' p. 373.

From this pitiftd fophifin, advanced
by Mr. Hume, and deemed unanfwerable
by Dr. Rcid, have been derived to us all
the inftinclive principles contained in this
curious treatife. For being determined

al

64 REMARKS ON

at all adventures to maintain the reality
of body and fpirit, caufe and efFe6l, time
and fpace, &c. and the old theory of the
mind not being, in his opinion, fufficient
for the purpofe, a new one muft be found ;
and if nothing eife can be had, dill the
good things above mentioned muft be re-
tained, though we can fay nothing in their
favour but tliev are fo becaiife they are Jo,
which is Dr. Reid's common fenfe, and
his Ihort irrefragable argument.

But if, inflead of fuch a plenary ajfw
raiice as only this new common fenfe pro-
mifcSj.he would have been content with a
reafoncibU degree of evidence for the reality
of aJi the things above mentioned, the old
Jy, pothehs would have been quite fuffici-
ent. It fuits every cafe of fenfations and
ideas ; and therefore, according to the re-
ceived rules of philofbphizing, has a juft
claim to be admitted.

That mind exifls I have tlie very fame
rcafon to believe as I have that body ex-
jits ; fince it is only by that name that I

diftinguifh

Dr. R E I D's THEORY. 65

diftinguifh that to which certain powers
and properties, of which I am confcious,
2i^ perception y memory, will, &c. belong.

I am furprifed that it fhould have been
fo readily admitted, that even ideas have
no exiftence but when we are confcious
of them. We have juft the fame reafon
to beheve the identity of an idea, as that
of a tree, that of any external body, or
that of our own minds themfelves. The
idea that I have of my wife or child to-day
as much refembles the idea I had of them
yefterday, though fome hours of found
fleep have intervened, as my houfe of to-
day refembles my houfe of yefterday. In
this cafe I only judge by the refemblance
of my ideas of it ; and if the ideas of my
houfe yefterday and to-day were not the
fa-me, I fliould have no medium by which
to prove the identity of the houfe.

SEC

66 REMARKS ON

SECTION VIII.

Cafes of the ojfociation of ideo^ which had
efcaped the attention of Dr, Reid.

Have obferved that one of the fallaci-
ous mediums of proof which our au-
thor makes much ufe of, in order to prove
that we judge and aft from original iri-
f[in6l, and not by any acquired power,
is our ignorance of the means by which
any aftion is performed, and our having
made thofe judgments, and performed
thofe a6lions, prior to experience. In
the former of thefe cafes he draws wrong
concliifions from his premiles, and in the
latter I have no doubt but he is miftaken
with refpeO: to the fa&:s from which he
argues. I (hall now prefent my readers
with fome inftances of both thefe kinds of
fallacy.

* In fome of the voluntary as well as
* the involuntary motions' (which Dr. Reid
exemplifies by that of the parallel motion

of

Dr. R EI D's T H E O R Y. Gf

of both the eyes, which he fays takes place
previousto cuilora, in confequence of fome
natural inftinct) * many mufcles,' he fays,
p. 187, ' which have no material tie or
' connection, acl in concert, each of them
' being taught to play its part in exatl

* time and meafurc ; yet we fee fuch ac-

* tions no leis (kilfully and regularly per*

* formed in children, and thole who know*
' not that they have fuch mufcles, than
' in the mod fkilful anatomiil and phylio-
Mogift;

From thefe premifes we might jufl as
well have inferred that we have no fuch
mufcles. In fact, our knowledge of the
particular mufcles employed in any mo-
tion is of no confequence whatever to the
performance of it. Nature has fufficiently
provided for that in the fimple power of
aflbciation, whereby one idea or motion
introduces another affociated idea or mo-
tion mechanically, and without the exer-
tion of any voluntary power in us : and
this is equally the cafe whether volition
was employed in forming the original af*
fociation, or not.

F 2 It

68 R E M A R K S O N

It was my misfortune to have the idea
of darknefs, and the ideas of invifible
mahgnant fpirits and apparitions very
clofely connefted in my infancy ; and to
this day, notwithftanding I beheve no-
thing of thofe invifible powers, and con-
fequently of their connexion with dark-
nefs, or any thing elfe, I cannot be per-
fectly eafy in every kind of fituation in
the dark, though I am fenfible I gain
ground upon this prejudice continually.

I likewife fometimes amufe myfelf with
playing on a flute, which I did not learn
\ery early, fo that I have a perfe6l re-
membrance that I exerted an exprefs vo-
luntar)^ power every time that I covered
any particular hole wnth my finger. But
though I am no great proficient on the
inftrument, there are fome tunes which I
now Ycry often play without ever attend-
ing to my fingers, or explicitly to the tune.
I have even played in concert, and, as I
was informed, perfe6lly in tune, when I
have been fo abfent, that, excepting at
the beginning, I did not recollect that I
had been playing at all. The fame is alfo

frequently

Dr REID's THEORY. 69

frequently the cafe with perfons who are
reading.

Now, reaforiing as Dr. Reid does, I
fliould conclude that, in this cafe, nofkill,
acquired by habit, was employed, but
that my fingers were guided by fome ori-
ginal inftinftive principle ; and if I had
been able to do this earlier than my re-
membrance of any thing, I mufthave faid
that this was one of thofe powers, which,
being latent in the mind, was called forth
by proper circumftances. Whereas, I
think it more natural to fav, that the aflb-
ciation between the ideas of certain founds
and the caufe of certain motions of the
fingers became in time fo perfeft, that the
one introduced the other without any
attention ; the interveningexprefs volition,
previous to each motion, having been
gradually excluded. Fafts of this kind
demonftrate that the power of alfociation
is fo great, and fo extenfive, that even
whole trains and very long trains of ideas,
are by this means fo conne6led, that if the
firil take place, all the reft will follow of
F 3 courfe.

70 R E M A R K S O N •

courfe, without our giving any attention
to them, and even while we are attending
to other things, and things of a very dif-
ferent nature.

* Who,' fays our author, p. 188, Maught

* all the mufcles that are concerned in
' fucking, in fwallowing our food, in

* breathing, and in feveral natural expul-

* fions, to aft their part in fuch regular

* order, and exa6l meafure ? It was not

* cuftom furely.' But in thefe, and many
fuch inftances, it is exceedingly probable
that the aclions of the mufcles were ori-
ginally automatic, having been fo placed
by our maker, that at firil they are ftimu-
lated and contraB mechanically whenever
their atiion is requifite ; and though the
mufcles themfelves have no connexion,
their nerves are connefted, and they may
be fo fituated, that the fame caufes of
contra6lion fliall neceffarily affeft: feveral
of them at the fame time, or in a certain
regular fucceffion. In fom.e of the ac-
tions to which Dr. Reid refers, we fee
evident marks of fuch a mechanical pro-

grefs ;

Dr. REID's THEORY. 71

grefs ; and more knowledge of nature and
phyfiology may lead to the difcovery of
more of them ; provided this fyilem of
having recourfe at once to ultimate caiifcs
does not prevent men from giving proper
attention to them.

The f^ces are at firft expelled involim-
tarily, and a voluntary power over the
mufcles which are fubfervient to that ope-
ration is evidently acquired gradually.
The fame is the progrefs in the a6lion of
blowing the nofe. Children have not,
naturally, the lead notion how to do it,
any more than they have how to walk.
The aftion o^ fucking, I am alfo confi-
dent, from my own obfervations, is not
natural but acquired ; and fo I believe are
all the aftions which Dr. Reid and others,
who judge fuperficially in thefe cafes, re-
fer to inflinct ; and with refpeft to which
I would refer him to Dr. Hartley, who has
written exprefsly, and pretty largely upon
thefe fubjefts. .

With refpecl to feeing obje£ls erecl by

means of inverted images, Dr. Reid fays,

F4 p. 151,

72 REMARKSON

pi 151-5 that 'the premifes from which

* all mankind are fuppofed to draw the

* concluhon (referring to the Cartefian

* hypothefis) never entered into the minds

* of the far greater part, but are abfolutely

* unknown to them. In order to fee ob?
' je8;S ereft, according to the principles

* of Kepler, we muft previoufly know

* that the rays of light come from the

* obje6l in llraight lines, we muft know
' that the rays from the different points
' of the objeft crofs one another before
' they form pictures upon the retina, and
' laftly we muft know that thefe pidures
' are really inverted. Now though all

* thefe things be true, and known to phi-

* lofophers, yet they are abfolutely un-

* known to the far greateft part of man-
' kind ; nor is it poflible that they wlio

* are abfolutely ignorant of them fhould

* reafon from them, and build conclufions
' upon them.'

I do not know how this may affecl
others, but it really furprifes me to hear
a man of any underftanding reafon fo very

weakly.

Dr. REID's THEORY. 73

weakly. To feel a thing, to be affected
by it, and to be influenced and direded
in our future condu6l by that feeling,
certainly cannot require that we fhould
knoio the connexion there is between the
objecls and our perceptions of them ; but
(imply that there he that connexion.
They who are the moil ignorant of the
laws of vilion are neverthelefs fubjeEi to
them ; fo that their retinas, optic nerves,
brains, and minds are differently affefted
in confequence of the rays of light com-
ing in (traight lines, crofTmg one another
before they reach the retina ; and pic-
tures are adually formed there, whether
we know of them or not. All men,
even the moft ignorant, find by expe-
rience which way they muft turn their
heads and eyes to look for any obje6l by
which they are impreffed ; and thefe al^
fociations are fo frequent, that we pafs
immediately and mechanically, from the
one to the other ; fo that the moment we
perceive an obje6l we throw our heads
and dire61 our eyes into the mofl proper
pofition for the di(lin6l view of it. If,

for

74 R ^ M A R K S ON

for this purpofe, we find that we muft
turn our heads and eyes upwards, we fay
the objeft is above us; but if we muft
turn them downwards, we fay it is below
us, without knowing any thmg farther
about the matter.

SECTION IX.,

ConceJJions of Dr. Reid, and other circiim-
Jlances which viight have led him to have
recourfe to the aflbciation of ideas, ra-
ther than to his inftinftive principles.

npHOUGH it is apparent, from the
•^ whole of Dr. Reid's treatife, that he
has given very little attention to the doc-
trine of the affijciation of ideas (far lefs
tban its obvious importance demanded)
yet in fome cafes, it could not poflibly
efcape his notice ; and he has exprelfed
himfelf in fuch a manner with refpeft to
fome of them as makes me wonder that
he did not fee that more ufe might be

made

Dr. R E I D 's T H E O R Y. 75

made of it, and that the phenomena
w^oiild admit of a very eafy explanation,
without having recour.'s to his in{lin6live
principles : Vv'hich ought to have heeii
kept for great emergencies only, nodi deo
vindice digni.

I am "particularly furprized that Dr.
Reid fhould hefitate to acknowledge that
our judgment of the unity of an objeQ:
feen with both eyes is acquired, when he
owns that we do acquire a judgment
w^liich appears to me to be exactly fimilar
to it.

He fays, p. 363, that ^ Dr. Smith juftly
' attributes to cuftom that well known

* fallacy in vifion, v^'-hereby a button
' prefied v/ith two oppofite fides of two

* contiffuous finders, laid acrofs, is felt

* double.' He adds, that, * as cuftom
- produces this phenomenon, fo a con-

* trary cuftom deftroys it. For if a man
' frequently accuftoms himfelf to feel the

* button with his ftngers acrofs, it will at

* laft be felt fmglc, as I have found by

' experience.'

'j^ REMARKSON

' experience.' Now why may not cuftom
do the fame thing with refpect to vifion ?
It is evident, from thefe fimilar fatls, that
it is within the ^cwt^r of cuflom, and of
the affociation of ideas to do it. I can
fee no more occafion for naturally corre-
fponding points of the retina, than for
naturally correfponding places in the
fingers.

But he fays, p. 261, ' If fingle vifion
' is the effeft of cuftom, it muft appear

* very ftrange that not one inftance has

* been found of a perfon who had acquired

* the habit of feeing objects fingle with

* both eyes, while they were directed in
' any other manner,' viz. than fo that the
centers correfpond. But are not all our
eyes fimilar, and arc they not all expofed
to fimilar influences ; and what can refult
from this but uniformity in our rules of
judging by their affeftions P

Our author allows, p. 188, that ' al-

* though it appears to be by natural in-

* ftind that both eyes are always turned

the

Dr. R E I D's T H E O R Y. 77

* the fame way, there is ft ill fome latitude

* left for cuftom. Nature has wifely left

* us the power of varying the parallelifni

* of the eyes a little, fo that we can di-

* reft them to the fame point, whether
' remote or near. This no doubt is

* learned by cuftom, and accordingly we
' fee that it is a long time before children
' get this habit in perfe6lion.' But ac-
cording to Dr. Reid's general rule, we
ought to have referred this cafe alfo to
original inftinft, becaufe we are poftefled
of this power prior to any experience that
we can remember, and we are not con-
fcious of the means by which we exert it,
or indeed know that we do any fuch thing
at all. Previous to refletlion, we ima-
gine that we have ftmply a power of fee-
ing diftinclly at different diftances. We
are confcious of nothing farther, and
therefore, according to this new mode
of philofophizing, we may reafonably ac-
quiefce in the faft, and call the power
original and inftinftive ; in other words,
one of the many branches of the new
common fenfe.

' Though

78 REMARKS ON

' Though we are not confcious/ lays
Dr. Reid, p. 310, 'of the motions wc
' perform in order to ht the eyes to the
' diilance of obje6ls, we are confcious of
' the effort employed in producing thefc

* motions, and probably have fomefenfa-
' tion which accompanies them, to which

* we give as little attention as to other

* fenfations.' But unlefs the diilance be
confiderable, we are not confcious of
uhng^ny effort at alL Befides, accord-
ing to this new mode of reafoning, how
can the mind employ the mufcles that are
requifite to make this effort, when it has
no knowledge of them, or indeed of the
nature and mode of atlion of any muf-
cle whatever?

As our author generally refers that to
inftinfcl; which has been acquired by ex-
perience and the affociation of ideas, fo
he gives to cuflom and experience what
properly belongs to reafoning and judg-
ment : thoucrh here alio his ov/n concef-
lions might have led him to a right judg-
ment in the feveral cafes.

' When

Dr. R E I D 's T H E O R Y. 79

' Wlien I hear a certain found,' he fays,
p. 71, * I conclude immediately v/ithout

* reafoning, that a coach paffes by. There
' are no premifes by w^hich this conclu-
' fion is inferred by any rules of logic.

* It is the effecl of a principle of our na-
' lure common to us v/ith the brutes.'
This principle he before called cuftom or
experience.

In what diiferent lights may the fame
thing be feen by diiferent perfons, accord-
ing as their different hypothefes incline
them to regard it. In this very mentaj
operation, or procefs, in which Dr. Reid
can find no trace of reafoning or judg-
ment, I think I fee every part of a com;
plete ars^ument; and even that facility,
and readinefs in paffing from the premifes
to the conclufion, which argues, the very
perfeftion of intelleft in the cafe. For
in my idea it is only in confequence of
the mode of reafoning being very familiar.,
that the mind jumps with fuch rapidity to
the final judgment, that it requires fome
attention to difcover the medium of propf.

The

So REMARKS ON

The procefs, when properly unfolded, is
as follows : The found I now hear is, in
all refpefts, fuch as I have formerly heard,
which appeared to be occafioned by a
coach paffing by, ergo, this is alfo occa-
fioned by a coach. Into this fyllogifm it
appears to me that the mental procefs
that Dr. Reid mentions may fairly be re-
folved ; and I am furprized he fhould not
have thought fo himfelf, when he exprefsly
allows, p. 128, that' the operations of the
' mind may be fo fubtle, that we draw

* conclufions without ever perceiving that
' the premiles entered the mind.' This
conceffion, which is a verv juft and rea-
fonable one, certainly overturns the very
foundation of his argument in the pre-
ceding cafe.

In this one cafe Dr. Ofwald, more con-
fidently with thefyftem, decides againft
his mafter. * The fuppofition, ' fays he,
vol. 2, p. 56, ' of a procefs of reafon-

* ing which pafles fo quickly through

* the mind as not to be perceived, is al-

* together arbitrary ; and arbitrary fup-

* pofitions are extremely injurious to truth,

* and

Dr. R E I D 's THEORY. 81 .t

* and give birth to that multitude of chi-

* merical hypothefes by which mankind

* have been milled.'

If a dog can form the fame conclufion
from the fame premifes, I would notfcru-
ple to fay that the dog reafoned as well
and as juftly as myfelf. I fee no reafon to
deny brute animals the power of rearon*-
ing concerning the objects about which
they are converfant. They certainly a6l
as confequentially, as if they reafoned.

Again, upon our author's miftaking
a feagull for a man on horfeback, he fays,
p. 319, ' the miflake and the correftion

* of it are both fo fudden, that we are at

* a lofs whether to call them by the name

* of judgment, or by that of fimple per-

* ception.' In fa6l, thefe things run in-
fenfibly into one another.

Laftly, he acknowledges, p. 154, that

* it muft be extremely dithcult to diflin-

* guifh the immediate and natural obje6ls

* of fight, from the conclufions which we

G ' have

82 REMARKS ON

'have been accuftomed to draw from

them/

SECTION X.

Of Dr. Kti^s principle of credulity, and^
his idea of the principles of indudion,
and analogy,

T^HAT any man fhould imagine that
-*• a peculiar inftindive principle was
neceffary to explain our giving credit to
the relations of others, appears to me,
who have been ufed to fee things in a
different light, very extraordinary; and
yet this do6lrine is advanced by Dr.
Reid, and adopted by Dr. Beattie. But
really what our author fays in favour of
it is hardly defer ving of theflighteft notice.

* If credulity,' he fays, p. 340, * were
' the effecl; of reafoning and experience,

* it muft grow up and gather ftrength irt

* the fame proportion as reafon and ex-

* perience

Dr. RE ID'S THEORY. 83

' perience do. But if it is the gift of

* nature, it will be the ftrongeft in child-

* hood, and limited and reflrained by ex-

* perience ; and the moft fuperficial view

* of human life fliows that this laft is re-
' ally the cafe^ and not the firft.'

This reafoning is exceedingly falla-
cious. It is a long time before a cl i'd
hear any thing but truth, and therefore it
can expe6i nothing elfe. The contrary
would be abfolutely miraculous. Fahe-
hood is a new circuniflance, which he like-
wife comes to expeft in proportion as he
has been taught by experience to expe6l
it. What evidence can we poflibly have
of any thing being neceflarily connefted
with experience and derived from it, be-
fides its never being prior to it, always
confequent upon it, and exa£lly in pro-
portion to it ?

I fhall now confider what our author
fays of the nature of reafoning by induc-
tion and analogy. * If,' fays he, p. 340,

* a certain degree of cold freezes water

G 2 * to-day.

84 REMARKS QK

to-day, and has been known to do fo in
all time paft, we have no doubt but the
fame degree of cold will freeze water
to-morrow, or a year hence. When I
compare the idea of cold, with that of
water hardened into a tranfparent folid
body, I can perceive no connexion be-
tvsreenthem. No rriancan fliew the one
to be the neceffary effe6l of the other.
No [mail can give a (hadow of a reafon
why nature has conjoined them. But
do not we learn that conjunftion from
experience? True, experience informs
us that they have been conjoined in time
paft, but no man ever had any expe-
rience of what is future ; and this is the
very queftion to be refolved. How
come we to believe that the future will
be like the paft ? Children and ideots
have the belief of the continuance of
the prefent courfe of nature as foon as
they know that fire will burn them. It
muft therefore be the effecl of inftin6l
not of reafon.'

But

Dr; R E I D 's T H E O R Y. 85

But experience does a great deal more
than Dr. Reid here fuppofes. It not only
informs us that cold and freezing have
been conjoined in time paft, but alfo that
what is now \\mt pajl, was once, future ;
and therefore that there is no more reafon
to fufpeft that cold will not freeze water
now, than there was to doubt yefterday
that it would freeze it to-day. It is only
puzzling the quefliion to confider time as
pafl or future in this cafe. We alfo find
by experience that we have not hitherto
been deceived in our expeftation that the
future will be like the paft in former in-
flances, and therefore cannot have any
fufpicion of being deceived in a fimilar
expeftation in other inftances. It is re-
ally aftonifhing that any man fhould afk
the queftion that Dr. Reid does here,

• How came we to believe that the fu-

* ture will be like the pafl ? It is certainly
fufficient to fay in anfwer to this. Have
we not always found it to be fo ? and
therefore, how can we fufpe^l the con-
trary ? Though no man has had any ex-
perience of what is future, every man has

G3 had

86 REMARKSON

had experience of w^^at was future.
Every ftep that I take among this writer's
fophifms raifes my aftonifhment higher
than before.

He farther fays, p. 347, ' If any reader

* (liould imagine that the induftive prin-.
' ciple may be refolved into what philo-
' fophers ufuaDy call afTociation of ideas,

* let him obferve that by this principle

* natural figns are not aflbciated widi
' ideas only, but with the belief of the

* things fignified. Now tliis can with no

* propriety be called an affociation of

* ideas, unlefs ideas and behef be one

* and the fame thing.'

This appears to me to be a mere quib-
ble, for not only may ideas, properly fo
called, but every thing that is mentalj as
hdief, and every other operation or af-
fection of the mind, and even the imme-
diate caufe of mufcular motion, be the
fubje6l of affociation, as we fee it to be in
faft. Not to fay that beliefs as Dr. Hart-
ley has explained it, confiRs of ideas, and

is.

Dr. REID's THEORY. 87

is, in faft, nothing but a complex idea,
or feeling.

I could have had no conception that a
profefTed enemy to fcepticifra, as Dr. Reid
is, fhould himfelf be To fceptical as he is
with refpeft to many of the mod uncon-
troverted maxims of philofophy. But,
indeed, it is no uncommon thing to charge
another with our own peculiar failings,
and to fee a mote in our brother's eye,
when we cannot difcern a beam in our
own. And as fcepticifm and credulity
go hand in hand with unbelievers, fo they
do with Dr. Reid. Where all the reft of
the world fee the moft clofely connefted
chain of reafoning, he is always ready to
fufpe6l that fome link is wanting, and as
ready to fupply the imaginary defe6l, not
with another link, but with fomethingthat
is no proper part of a chain, but fome in-
vifible power to keep the two parts toge-
ther.

He is fo eager to find arbitrary connec-

iions between objeQs and fenfations, and

G 4 between

88 REMARKSON

between fenfations and judgment, that he
fometimes overlooks the moft neceflary
connexions of things. He fays, p. 163
that * the material imprefTion upon the

* retina, by means of the rays of light,
- * fuggeft colour, and the pofition of fome

* external objeft ; but no man can give a

* reafon why the fame material impreflion

* might not have fuggefted found, or fmell,

* or either of thefe, along with the pofi-

*tionofthe obje6l. And fmce there is
^ * no neceflary connexion between thefe

* two things, it might, if it had fo pleafed

* our creator, have fuggefted one of them

* without the other.' But it is obvious
to remark, that then rays of light muft
not have been made ufe of, for thefe ne-
cejfarily fuggeft both colour and form.

SEC-

Dr. R E I D' s THEORY. 89

SECTION XI.

Of the natural Jigns of the pajfions.

/^NE would think that a manmuflne-
^^ ver have heard of the general prin-
ciple of the ajfociation of ideas , who could
poflibly take it into his head that certain
■features, modulations of the voice, and
attitudes of the body, require any other
principle, in order to fuggeft the idea and
belief of certain thoughts, purpofes, and
difpofitions of mind. Dr. Reid indeed
afferts, in proof of this, that ' an infant

* may ^be put into a fright by an angry
' countenance, and foothed againby fmiles

* and blandifhments,' p. 89. Now I have
had children of my own, and have made
many obfervations and experiments of this
kind upon them, and upon this authority
I do not hefitate abfolutely to deny the
fa6l with refpe6l to them ; and I have no
doubt but that the fame is the cafe with
refpeft to all other infants ; unlefs thofe
of Dr. Reid ftiould be as different front

mine

9» R E M A R K S O N

mine as are our notions of human nature.
But nature, I believe, is pretty uniform in
her operations and produftions, how dif-
ferently foever we may conceive of them*

. Dr. Reid talks of an infant being pert
into a fright. On the contrary, I affert
that au infant (unlefs by an infant he;
{hould mean a child w^ho has had a good
deal of experience, and of courfe has mad^
many oblervations on the connexions of
things) is abfolutely incapable of terror^
J. am pofitive that no child ever (howed the
leaft. fvtnptom of fear or apprehenfion,
till he had actually received hurts, and
had felt pain ; and that children have no
fear of any particular perfon or thing, but
ii> tonfequence of forae connexion be-
tween that perfon or thing and the pain
they had fek.
■ f-», •, ,

If any inilinct of this kind was more
.neceffary than another, it would be the
dread ofjire. But every body muff have
obferved that infants fhow no fign of any
fuch thing ; for they will as readily put

their

Dr. REI D's THEORY. ^i

their fiqger to the flame of a candle as to
any thing elfe, till they have been burned.
But after fome painful experience of this
knd their dread of fire becomes one of
Dr. Reid's original inflinctive principles,
and it is as quick and as effeftual in its
operations as the very befl of them.

I, moreover, do not hefitate to fay, that
if it were polTible always to beat and ter-
rify a child with a placid countenance,
fo as never to alTume that appearance but
in thofe circumflances, and always to
footh him with what we call an angry
countenance, this natural and neceffary
connexion of ideas that Dr. Reid talks of
would be reverfed, and we fhould fee the
child frighted with a fmile, and delighted
with a frown.

In faft, there is no more reafon to be-
lieve that a child is naturally afraid of a
frown, than he is afraid of being in the
dark ; and of this children certainly dif-
cover no fign, till they have either found
fomething difagreeable to them in the

dark.

93 REMARKS ON

dark, or have been told that there is
fomething dreadful in it.

SECTION XII.

Of the judgment we form concerning the
feat of pain,

TT alfo appears to me that a man miifl
*^ be flrangely prepofTelTed in favour of
inftin6live principles who (hould think of
having recourfe to them for diftinguifhing
the parts of our bodies affe6led with par-
ticular pleafures or pains, when the cafe
Vs To eafily explained by the general laws
bf affbciation, aided by experience.

' The fenfation of pain,' Dr. Reid fays,
p. 209, * is no doubt in the mind, and cant
*' not be faid to have any relation, from it§
' own nature, to any part of the body.
* But this fenfation by our conflitution
^^'^gives a perception of fome particular

* part

Dr REID's THEORY. 93

' part of our body whofe diforder caufes

* the uneafy fenfation. If it were not fo,
' a man who never before felt either the

* gout or tooth ach, when he is firft feized

* with the gout in his toe might miftake

* it for the tooth ach.'

Now this, I believCj would be the cafe
if a man had never before had any fenfa-
tion of anv kind either in his toe or in his
tooth. For though Dr. Reid fays that
judgments of this kind are antecedent to
all experience, I am pofitive he can have
no authority from fa6l for the affertion,
or for believing that an infant can diftin-
guifli the feat of any fenfation, or fo much
as know to which of his organs to refer
any of them, the firft time that they are
perceived. Indeed, there is no fort of
occafion for any fuch early knowledge of
this kind ; for though the very firft time
that a child ftiould make ufe of his ears
or nofe, he fhould not know which of
them it was that was affefted by afmell or
a found, he would foon acquire that know-
ledge by experience ; finding himfelf re-
lieved

94 R E M A R K S O N

lieved by flopping his nofe when he per-
ceived a difagreeable fmell, and by Hop-
ping his ears v/hen he perceived a dis-
agreeable found.

In the fame manner in which we learn
to refer the feveral fenfations to their pro-
per organs, we learn to refer pains and
impreffions of all kinds to the places from
which the nerves convey them. If Dr.
Reid has ever made obfervations upon
children, he muft have obfer\'ed that they
do this in a very imperfe6l manner,
making many miftakes, and growing more
perfecl in the exercife by degrees.

Even men cannot accurately diflinguilh
the part of the body affefted with pain
without the afTi fiance of fight, in thofe
parts which have not been the feat of any
very diflinguifhable fenfation. Let the
experiment be made by pricking the part,
and requiring the perfon to put the tip of
his finger exa6lly upon it, when he is blind-
folded.

Of

Dr. R E I D's T H E O R Y 95

Of the feat of internal pains mankind
in general have very little knowledge.
But in this refpeft alfo men improve by
obfervation and experience, and thofe
who have had the moft experience have
the moft accurate knowledge of this kind^
as is the cafe of all other knowledge ac-
quired by experience. Let Dr. Reid ap-
ply to this cafe his own obfervations con-
cerning xh^fenfe of credulity.

From the whole of Dr. Reid's reafon-
ing on thefe fubje6ls, one would think
that he had never heard of fuch things as
nerves proceeding from all the different
parts of the body to the brain, all ap-
propriated to their refpe6live ufes, fuch
as the optic nerves, the auditory nerves,
the olfactory nerves, each of which
convey fenfations of different kinds, en-
tering the brain at different places ; but
that the bufmefs of fenfation and percep-
tion was performed in fome ftrange arbi-
trary manner without them, or any thing
of the kind.

SEC-

96 REMARKS ON

SECTION XIII.

Mifcellaneous obfervations.

T Shall clofe thefe animadverfions on
Dr. Reid's performance with a few
mifcellaneous articles which (hew either
the extreme inattention of our author, in
condemning others for faults of which
he himfelf is guilty, claiming difcoveries
which have really nothing in them,
or making g:reat boafts when he appears
to have been exceedingly ignorant with
refpeft to the fubje6l of which he writes,
and the hiftory of it.

Dr. Reid joins in the general laugh at
Defcartes's argument to prove his own
exigence from an atl of his mind, viz.
doubting, p. 1 1 . * For he takes his ex-

* iftence for granted in this argument, and

* proves nothing at all.' Yet this author
himfelf argues in a manner exa6lly fimilar
to this of Defcartes. * No man,' fays he,
p. 29, * can conceive or believe fmelling

' to

Dr. R E I D 's T H E O R Y. 97

' to exifl of itfelf without a mind, or

* fomething that has the power of fmell-

* ing,' and p. 48, * It appears to be an
' undeniable fa6l, that, from thought or
' fenfation, all mankind, conftantly and

* invariably, from the firfl dawning of re-

* fle£lion, do infer a power or faculty of
'thinking, and a permanent being, or

* mind, to which that faculty belongs.'
Though, how this is confident with what
he had faid juft before, viz. that ' the

* belief of our exiftence precedes all rea-

* foning and experience,' I do not fee.

Certainly the firfl thing that the mind
attends to is not itfelf, but the things that
affetl it, or operate upon it. We firfl per-
ceive fome property of every thing before
we think of the thing itfelf. Let Dr.
Reid, or any other perfon, fay how the
exiflence of the mind mufl be evidenced
but by its affe6lions or operations. Our
author even allows that a perfon may have
exifled a confiderable time without any
power of refleclion, and confequently
without having an idea of his own ex-
H iflence.

98 REMARKS 0>f

iftence. In reality we fmrle at Defcartfess
argument, notbecaufe it is an fnconclufive
or improper one, but becaixfe the thing
to be proved is fo evident, that it needs
no proof.

Our author argues largely, p. 135, in
favour of the opinion of the vulgar, that
colour is a quahty of bodies. Of this he
makes a great parade, as of fome ver^
ferious bufinefs ; but I fhall not argue ihd
matter ferioufly with him, becaufe I take'
it for granted he has feen optical e±-
periments, and therefore cannot poflTibly
differ from me except in words. I (hall
only obferve with refpeft to the fubjeft,
that the vulgar are eafily brought tcr 2it-^
knowledge their miftake, and never fail to(
exprefs their furprize, as at a real difco^-
very, and what was utterly inconfifterit
with their former notions of the matter,
when they are fhewn pieces of white?
paper affuming all the colours of the
rainbow by means of a prifm, without an/
real change in the paper. This has con-
vinced every perfon to whom I have evef

(hewed

Dr. "'R E I D 's T H E O R Y. '^^

fheW^d the experiment, that colour is in
the rays &f light, and not in the body.

* Nothing,' fays our author, p. 16 J,

* fhews more clearly otir indifpofition to
' attend to vifible figure, and vifible ex-
' tenfion, than this, that, although ma-

* thematical reafoning is nolefs applicable
' to them than to tangible figure and

* extenfion ; yet they have intirely efcaped

* the notice of mathematicians.

By vifible figure, &c. our author means
the projection of the forms of external
obje6ts on the concave bottom of the
eye. But to what purpofi would it have
i)een to have taken any pains with the
fubjeft, when it can be of no pofTible ufe,
and all that we have really any thing to
do with are the properties of the things
of which thefe images are merely the
Jlgns. No ^an who had any thing feri-
ous to attend to would ever think of it.
I do not remember ever to have feen a
more egregious piece of folemn trifling
than the chapter which our author calls
H 2 the

loo R E M A R K S O N

the geometry ofvijibles and his account of
the Idomenians, as he terms thofe imagi-
nary beings who had no ideas of fub-
fiance but from fight. Befides, our au-
thor acknowledges that the figures upon
the retina differ exceedingly little from
the real figures which they reprefent.

Another afFeftation of originality we
fee in what our author fays concerning
the idea of hardne/s. ' The fenfation
' of hardnefs,' he fays, p. 83, ' is fo much

* unknown as never to have been the

* objeft of tliought and refleftion, nor to

* have been honoured with a name in any*

* language. May we not hence conclude
' that the knowledge of the human facul-^

* ties is but in its infancy ?'

Now I fee nothing particularly A^ra?, to
ufe a pun, in the cafe of this fame idea of
hardnefs. Indeed, it is very rarely that
we bellow a name upon the idea of any
thing. It is very well if the thing itfelf
have got a name ; for many are obliged
to go without names. But though I fhall

not

Dr. R E I D's THEORY, loi

not take the trouble to look into Mr.
Locke forthe purpofe, I make no doubt
but that he, and many others, have men-
tioned the idea of hardnefs among other
abilraft ideas, of much more importance,
without confounding it with the hard fub-
ftance that occafioned the idea. At lead
Dr. Reid's obfervation does not ftrike me
as any thing either new, or at all im-
portant.

That our author is extremely ignorant
of what has been written by others on
the fubjeft of the human mind, is evi-
dent, not only from his total filence con-
cerning Dr. Hartley (whofe name, how-
ever, appears to have reached Scotland ;
for his work is quoted with fome degree
of refpecl by Dr. Beattie) but from his
grofs miftake concerning the hints that
Newton and others have dropped on the
fubje£l.

' About the time of Dr. Briggs,' hej

fays, p. 278, ' the fyflem of the nerves

* was thought to be a ftringed inftrument,

^ compofed of vibrating chords^ each of

H 3 * which

102 R E M A R K S O N

' vfhich had its proper tenfion and tone/
I fhall not explain to our author what
kind of vibration w^as fuppofed to affe6t
the nerves, that I may give him an op-
portunity of getting a httle more know-
ledge of his fabjetl by looking into Nev\^-
ton or Hartley himfelf. But this I will
-venture to fay, that fueh grofs ignorance
in a profeffor of this very fubjetl;, in fo
confiderable an univerfity, which has hi-
therto been diftinguiflied for the real emi-
nence of its profeffors in that department,
is difgraceful to himfelf and to the uni-
verfity. I will even venture to call upon
Dr. Reid to name any writer (that has
ever had the leafl; fhadow of reputation)
who ferioufly maintained that the fyflem
of the nerves does refemble ajiringed in-
Jirament, compofed of vibrating chords,
if any fuch hypothefis w^as ever advan-
ced, I own, it has efcaped my notice.
The hypothefis of Dr. Briggs himfelf, to
which our author probably refers, was very
different from this.

To

Dr. RE I D's T H EORY. 103

To trcAJt with contempt, as Dr. Reid
docs, every hypothecs that has been pro-
pofed, and to offer another ftill more ah-
furd, merely to laugh at it, and to turn the
whole rubjc-8; into pdicuie, certainly does
r>ot,become a philofopher, who means to
promote an inquiry into the powers of
nature. I can compai;e Dr. Reid's conducl
in this cafe to nothing but that of the dog
in the mcinger ; for he profefTedly has no
knowledge of the fubjetl himfelf, and
does every thing in his power to prevent
others from knowing any thing about it,
or inquiring into it.

To give my reader an idea of our au-
thor's talent for ii'ony, and at the fame
time to afford him a little refpite from
metaphyhcal reafoning, I fhall fubjoin
his account of this new hypothefis of the
ufe of the nerves. After enumerating
and laughing at every other hypothefis,
he fay^, p. 278,

* Thefe, I think, are all the engines

" into which the nervous fyllem has been

H 4 * moulded

104 R E M A R K S O N

* moulded by philofophers, for conveying

* the images of fenfible things from the

* organ to the fenforium. And for all
' that we know of the matter every man

* may freely chufe what he thinks fitted

* for the purpofe ; for from fa6l and ex-
' periment no one of them can claim pre-

* ference to another. Indeed, they all

* feem fo unhandy engines for carrying
' images, that a man would be tempted
' to invent a new one,

' Since then a blind man may guefs as

* well in the dark as one that fees, I beg

* leave to offer another conje6lurc touch-
' ing the nervous fyflem, which I hope
' will anfwer the purpofe as well as thofe
' we have mentioned, and which recom-
' mends itfelf by its fimplicity. Why
' may not the optic nerves, for inftance,

* be made up of empty tubes, opening
' their mouths wide enough to receive the

* rays of light which form the image up-
' on the retina, and gently conveying
' them fafe, and in their proper order, to
' the very feat of the foul, until theyjlajh

* 1)1

Dr. R E I D 's THEORY. 105

'in her faceup It is eafy for an ingeni-

* ous philofopher to fit the caliber of thofe

* empty tubes to the diameter of the par-

* tides of light, fo as they (hall receive

* no grofler kind of matter. And if thefe

* rays fhould be in danger of miflaking
'their way, an expedient may alfo be

* found to prevent this. For it requires

* no more than to beftow upon the tubes

* of the nervous fyftem a periftaltic mo-

* tion, like that of the alimentary tube.

* It is a peculiar advantage of this hy-

* pothefis, that, although all philofophers
' believe that the fpecies or images of
' things are conveyed by the nerves to

* the foul, yet none oftheirhypothefesfhew

* how this may be done. For how can

* the images of found, tafte, fmell, co-

* lour, figure, and all fenfible qualities,

* be made out of the vibrations of mufi-
' cal chords, or the undulation of animal

* fpirits, or of aether ? We ought not to

* fuppofe means inadequate to the end.
' Is it not as philofophical, and more in-

* A very expreffive and elegant phrafe.

^ telligiblc:,

loS REM ARKS ON

* J^elligible, to conceive, that as the flo-
' paach receivCvS its food, fo the foi^l re-

* ceives her images by a kind of ner^aus

* deglutition ? I might add, th^ w>e ^i^ed
' only continue this perilialtic motion of

* the nervous tubes from the fenforium to

* |:he extremities of the nerves that ferve
~* the mufcles, in order to account for muf-

* eular motion.

* Thus nature will be confonan,t to her-

* felf, and as fenfation will be the convey-

* ance of the ideal aliment to the mind, fo

* mufcular motion will be the expullion

* of the reciementiiious part of it. For

* who can deny that the images of things

* conveyed by fenfation may, after due

* concoclion, become fit to be thrown off

* ty mufcular motion? I only give hints

* of thefe things to the ingenious, hoping

* that in time this hypothehs may be
' wrought up into a fyftem, as truly philo-
' fophical as that of animal fpirits, or the

* vibration of nervous fibres. To be

* ferious'-rr-T^ — -

To

Dr. R E I D ' s THEORY 107

To be ferious then. By fome perfons
all this may be thought very ingenious
and clever, the irony delicate, and the ex-
prefTion eleganjt. But while fome laugh
with the writer, others may be more difpofed
to laugh at him, both for his ignorance
and his buffoonery. I ftiall only fay that
if I h^ve the leafl notion of what the true
fpirit of philofophy is, this is the very re-
verfe of it ; and thatfuch a mode of writing
ought to be treated with indignation and
contempt.

Our author's concliifion, as well as his
dedication, which, though printed firfl, fup-
pofes the book to have been written before
it, fhews a perfuafion of his having done
great things, though his ftyle is unlike
that of Horace or Ovid, Jamque Opus

exegv 'He imagined, I fuppofe, that

he had thrown many new lights upon the
fubjeQ: of human nature, by throwing
down the old ones erefted by Defcartes
?md Locke.

In-

io8 R E M A R K S O N

* I intended to have examined more

* particularly and fully this doftrine of

* the exiftence of ideas, or images of things

* in the mind, and likewife another doc-

* trine which is founded upon it, to wit,

* that judgment or belief is nothing but a

* perception of the agreement or difagree-

* ment of our ideas, but having already

* fhewn that the operations of the mind
'* which we have examined give no coun-

* tenance to either of thefe do6lrines, and

* in many things contradi6l them, I have
' thought it proper to drop this part of

* my defign. It may be executed with

* more advantage, if it is at all neceffary,

* after inquiring into fome other powers

* of the human underflanding.

' Although we have examined only the
' five fenfes, and the principles of the hu-

* man mind which are employed about

* them, orfuch as have fallen in our way

* in the courfe of this examination, we

* (hall leave the further profecutionofthis

* inquiry to future deliberation. The

* powers of memory, of imagination, of

' tafte.

Dr. REID's THEORY. 109

* tafte, of reafoning, of moral perception,

* the will, the paflions, the afFeftions, and
' all the atlive powers of the foul, prefent
' a vaft and boundlefs field of philofophi-

* cal difquifition, which the author of this

* inquiry is far from thinking himfclf able •
' to furvey with accuracy. Many authors

* of ingenuity have made excurfions into
' this vaft territory, and have communi-

* cated ufeful obfervations, but there is
' reafon to believe that thofe who have

* pretended to give us a map of the whole

* have fatisfied themfelves with a very in-

* accurate and incomplete furvey.*

Then fpeaking of what Galileo and
Newton have done in the natural world,'-
he adds, ' Ambitious of following fuch
' great examples, with unequal fteps, alas

* and unequal force, we have attempt-

* ed an inquiry only into one little corner
' of the human mind, that corner which

* feems to be moft expofed to vulgar ob-
' fervation, and to be moft eafily compre-

* hended ; and yet, if we have delineated
' itjuftly, itmuft be acknowledged that

* the

I'lo REMARK^ ON

'the accounts heretofore given of it were
' very lame, and wide of the truth.'

The fubjefts our author here fpeaks of
do certainly prefent a wide field of phi-
lofophical difquifition ; and if fo many-
new and important truths have occurred
to our philofopher and guide in the exa-
mination of the five fenfes only, xKis/malL
corner of the human nmnd, what may we"
not exped; from his farther progrefs?
which I hope the learned Benengeli will
not fail to relate. Inftinftive principles
will then be as common and as cheap —
but I forget the proverb — and as many
dillinct independent laws of nature Will
be found in this mwrocofm of man only,
as have by others been thought neceffary
for the fyftem of the unrverfe. But what
an idea rauft this author, and his admirers
Jiave of the laws of nature !

SliouM another genius arife, and dif--
cover as many new laws in the fyftem
o^ matter, as Dr. Reid has in the fyftem
of mind, we fkall be fo bewildered and

con-

Dr. REID's THEORY. iji

confounded as hardly to retain the ufe of
thofe five fenfes about which our author
has taken To much elaborate pains. But
I hope our knowledge of this part of na-
ture is too far advanced to faffer ourfelves
to be fo much bewildered and puzzled,
as it feems the inhabitants of Great-Bri*
tain and Ireland have hitherto been, with
the ingenious fpeculations of Dr. Reid.

REMARKS

■ r^\]n

REMARKS

ON - i

Dr. B E AT T I E's ESS AY

O N T H E

NATURE and IMMUTABILITY

O F

T R U ■t H.

THE

INTRODUCTION.

HAVING animadverted fo largely
upon Dr. Reid's performance, I
fhall have the lefs to fay with re-
fpe6l to that of Dr. Beattie, who adopts
his general fyftem oiinJlinElive principles of
truth, and difcovers too muchofhisy^m^
and manner, which is exceedingly deci-
five, and infolent to thofe who think diffe-
rently from himfelf ; and he even exceeds
Dr. Reid in throwing an odium upon
thofe whofe fentiments he is willing to de-
cry, by afcribing to them dangerous and
frightful confequences, with which they
are far from being juftly chargeable.

I believe, however, that Dr. Beattie

wrote his EJ/ay on the Nature and Imviu-

tability of Truth with the very befl inten-

1 2 tion

ii6 R E M A R K S O N

tion in the world ; and that it was nothing
but his zeal in the moft excellent caufe,
that of religion, which has betrayed him
into thefe rafh cenfures, and into a mode
of reafoning which I cannot help thinking
to be very prejudicial to the caufe of that
very truth which he means to fupport,
and favouring that very fcepticifm which
he imagined he was overthrowing.

I believe farther, and I moft fincerely
rejoice in it, that Dr. Beattie's treatife has
done a great deal of good to the caufe of
religion ; and I hope it will ftill continue
to do fo, with a great majority of thofe
who are moft in danger of being feduced
by the fophiiiry of Mr Hume, and other
modern unbelievers ; I mean with Jicper-
Jicial iJunkers, who are fatisfied \yith fee-
ing fuperficial objections anfwered in a
lively, though a fuperii^ial manner. Be-
llies, I do think that, infeveral refpe6ls.
Dr. Beattie's ilriclures on Mr. Hume are
juft; and therefore that they will be an
ufeful antidote to the mifchief that might
be apprehended from his writings.

But

Dr. BE AT TIE'S ESSAY. 117

.• But there is danger left other perfons,
of greater penetration, finding that
Dr. Beattie argues on fallacious un-
philofophical principles, (hould rejeft at
once, and without farther examination,
all that he has built upon them. With
refpecl to fuch perfons, it may be of im-
portance to (how that religion, though
affailed from fo many quarters as it has
been of late, is under no neceffity of tak-
ing refuge in fuch untenable fortrefles as
Dr. Reid, Dr. Beattie, and Dr. Ofwald
Jaave provided for her ; but that fhe may
fafely face the enemy on his own ground,
oppofing argument to argument, and
filencing fophiftry by rational difcuffion.

In this opinion I am by no means fin-
gular. Many judicious perfons, excel-
lent fcholars and divines, and whofe me^
taphyfical fyftem is very different from
mine, think Dr. Beattie's book by no
means calculated to ferve the caufe of
truth with philofophical and thinking
men ; and that it will be doing fervice to
truth and religion to point out the faults
1 3 and

ii8 R E M A R K S O N

and defefts of it. And as I believe Dr.
Beattie to be a rtian of candour, I doubt
not but he will himfelf take in good part
the followinec free animadverfions. If
truth be really our obje61, as it is in th^
titles of our books, and we be free from
any improper bias, we (hall rejoice in the
detection of error, though it fhould ap-
pear to have (heltered itfelf under our
own roofs. I am very ferious when I
add, that fuch a degree of candour and
impartiality may be more efpecially ex-
pefted of chriftiansy and more efpeciall]^
flill, of thofe who fland forth as cham-
pions in the caufe of chriftianity, which is
at the fame time the caufe of the moft im-
portant truth, and of the moll generous
and difmterefted virtue.

To preferve as much order as I well
#n in my remarks on Dr. Beattie's per-
formance, I fhall firft confider his ac-
count of the foundation of truth, and
then the feveral particular do6lrines, that
he has built upon it.

bbv ' SEC-

Dr. BEATTiE's ESSAV. ng

SECTION I.

Of Dr, Beattie J account of the foundation
of truth,

/^UR author adopts Dr. Reid's general
^^ idea of conmion fenfet as the faculty
by which we perceive felf-evident truths
p. 37, and always confiders it as of the
nature of a peculiar kind of injiin6l, ancj
very different from Locke's idea o^ judg-
ment, in the firft inftance, as refulting
from comparing our ideas* This I can-
not help thinking to be^ theoretically
fpeaking, a very fundamental error, affect-
ing the very efjence of truths and leading
to endlefs abfurdities.

Had thefe writers affumed, as the ele-
ments of their common fenfe, certain truths
which are fo plain that no man could
doubt of them (without entering into the
ground of our aflent to them) their con-
du6l would have been liable to very little
objection. All that could have been faid
1 4 would

120 R E M A R K SON.

would have been, that, without any n^-
ceflity, they had made an innovation in
the received ufe of a term. For no per-
fon ever ^denied that there are felf-evident
truths, and that thefe mufl be afmmed as
the foundation of all our reafoning. I
never met with any perfon who did not
acknowledge this, or heard of any argu-
mentative treatife that did not go upon
the fuppofition of it. The mofl rigorous
reafoners are mathematicians, and they all
begin with laying down certain axiomsi
diwdi- pojlulatii, which muft be admitted
without proof, in order to the demon-
ftration of every thing elfe ; and therefore
I am really furprized that Dr. Beattie,
and Dr. Ofwald (hould take fo much pains
to prove it. Had the thing been really
difpu table, they have faid enough upon
thefubjed tobe quite tirefome.

But if we coniider the general tenor of
their writings, it will appear that they are
faying'one thing and really doing another,
talking plaufibly about the neceffity of
admitting axioms m general, as the foun-
^ dation

Dr. BEATTIp's ESSAY. 121

dation of all reafo^ing, but meaning to
recommend partifiUm\.pqfi.[i.o%s as axioms,
not as being fauix4c4 P" the perception
of the agreement or difagreement of any
^(ieas, v/hich is the great dociriiie.of Air.
Locke, and which makes trtith to. a^^
■pend upon the' necefiary natiire 01 thingsir
to be abfolutCf unchangeable, and ever Lijif
ing ; but merely fome unaccountable z?^j
Jimciim perfaajions^ depending upon the
.arbitrary conftitution of our nature; which
makes ail truth to be a thing that is leia^
live to ourfelves only, and confequently
to be infinitely vague and precarious.

This fyftem admits of no appeal to
r.eafan, properly confidered, which any
perfon might be at liberty to examine and
difcufs ; but, on the contrary, every man
■ is taught to think himfelf authorized to
pronounce deciiively upon every queftion
according to his ^rQ^^nifeeliyig, and per-
fuafion; under the notion of its being
fomething original, inftintlive, ultimate,
and uncontrovertible; though, if ftrictly
analized, it might appear to be a mere
prejudice, the offspring of miflake.

This

T22 R E M A R K S 6 isr

This may appear t6 terfte to bfey 3tfiti
all, a bufinefs of metaphyfics only, and si
Refinement of no real importance to man*
kind ; but it is a miftake that has really
Tery ferious and alarming confequences \
for inftead of leading to humility, cau*-
tion, and patience in the inveftigation of
truth ; it necefTarily ihfpires conceit, and
leads to great arrogance and infolfehcd
with refpeft to our opponents in contro-
verfy, as perfons defeftive in their confti-
tution, deftitute of common fenfe, and
therefore not to be argued with, but to be
treated as ideots or madmen.

Thefe objections aflPecl the ^tMrai
fchertie and plan of l3r. Beattie and Dr.
Ofwald. My particular obje6l:ion to both
thefe writers, as well asi to Dr. Reid, is
that they have adopted their elements of
knowledge too haftily, and that they hav^
acquiefced in certain maxims, as felf-evi-
dent truths, and have treated with great
infolence and contempt all endeavours to
difprove them ; though fome of thefe max-
ims are fo Far from being felf evident, that

m

Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 123

in my opinion they are riot true, but capa-
ble of a fatisfaftory refutation. At the
fa^me time, fmce nio man can pretend to
any natural right to Bx the principles of
feith for another, they teach unbelievers,
and by their example authorize them, to
re}c6l the principles of religion by the
fame fummary and fuperficial procefs ; as
•what appear to them to be, at firft fight, too
aMird and ridiculous to be admitted as
trtae and divine.

Though I (hall never quarrel with any
rrian for the mere ufe of his terms, fmce
they are, in their own nature, nothmg
ttiore than the arbitrary figns of ideas, I
cannot help thinking that the inconveni-
cncies above mentioned may attend even
the calling of that faculty by which we
difcern truth by the name oifenft. By
this term philofophers in general have hi-
therto denominated thofe faculties in con-
fequence of which we are liable tofeelings
relative to our/elves only, and from which
they have not pretended to draw any con-
clufions concerning the nature of things ;

whereas

^.24 . R E M A R -K S ON

whereas truth is a thing not relative, but
'Hbfolute, and real, independent of any re-
lation to this or that particular being, or
"this or that order of beings. And I think
I can evidently perceive that Dr. Beattie
•and Dr..Ofwald have both been mifled by
this new application of the term fenfi ;
Jiaving been led by it to confider all truth
as an arbitrary thing, relative to particular
beings, and even particular perfons, like
the perceptions of any of our external
fenfes. In confequcnce alfo of the fame
-fundamental error, after having degraded
the jiidgment to the level of the fenfes,
,they naturally confider the fenfes as in-
titled to the fame refpect, which had
■iifualiy been appropriated to that fuperior
faculty by which we diftinguifh truth.

' All that we know of truth or falfe-
' hoo ],' fays Dr. Beattie, p. 196, ' is that
"'"our conftitution determines us in fome
''' cafes to believe, in others to difbelieve ;
' &nd that to us is truth which ^s^ feel that

* we muft believe, and that to us is falfe-

* hood which ^Q,feel that we mull difbe-

' lieve.

Dr. ^ B E AT T I E's E S S A Y. 12^

* lieve. If, p. 20I9, a creature of a different
' nature from man were to fay that fnow

* is black and hot, I fhould reply ; it ma^
' poffibly have that appearance to your

* fenfes, but it has not that appearance to
' mine. It may therefore, in regard to

* your faculties, be true ; and if fo, it
' ought to conftitute a part of your philo-

* fophy ; but of my philofophy it cannot

* conftitute a part, becaufe, in refpe6t of

* my faculties, it is falfe, being contrary
' to fa6l and experience.'

To me this do6lrine appears to be in-
tirely fubverfive of all truth ; fince, fpeak-
ing agreeably to it, all that we can ever
fay is, that certain maxims and propo-
rtions appear to be true with refped to
our/elves, but how they may appear to
others we cannot tell ; and as to what they
are in them/elves, which alone is, ftri611y
fpeaking, the truths we have no means of
judging at all ; for we can only fee with
our own eyes, and judge by our own fa-
culties, or rather feelings.

If

126 REMATIKS ON ■'

If this be not a fair conclufion from
pr. Seattle's reprefentation of the prin-
ciples of truth and common fenfe I arft
-pot capable of drawing a conclufion. I
^m fure I do not mean to be uncandid.
J hope, indeed, and believe, that he will
be daggered when he attends to the una-
voidable confequences of his do6lrine,
fo very unfuitable to a difcourfe on the
immutability of truth; becaule it is al-
mofl the very thing that he objefts to
Mr. Locke, whofe principles he thinks
erroneous SLYid dangerous, p. 16, forfpeak-
ing of one part of his philofophy he fays,
p. 239, ' if it be true, it would go near

* to prove that truth and virtue have at
f lead nothing permanent in their nature,
' but may be as changeable as the inclL-

* nations and capacities of men.'

All the reafon that our author afligns
why the principle by which we judge of
felf-evident truth may.be called di fenfe \^,
that fuch judgments are inflantaneous and
irrefiftible, like impreflions made upon the
mind by means of the external fenfes.

* The term common fenfe,' he fays, p. 45,

* has

Dr. BEATTIE'S ESSAy. 127

> has, in moderrj times, been ufed by

« philofophers to fignify that power of the

"^ jnind which perceives truth or com-

* mands beUef, not by progreffive argu-

* mentation but by an inflantaneous, inr

* ftinclive, and irreft Table impulfe, derived

* ^either from education nor from habit,

* bi^t from nature, afting independently

* on our will, whenever the objeft is pre^

* iented, according to an eftablifhed law ;

* and therefore not improperly called

* ienfe ; and a6ling in a fimilar manner

* upon all, or, at le^ft, upon a great mar

* jority of mankind, and therefore pro-?

* perly called common fenfe^

But fhould we, out of complaifance,
admit that what has hitherto been called
jW^wm^ may be called y^wy^, it is making
top free with the ellablifhed (ignification
pf words to call it common fmfe, which in
eommpn acceptation has long been ap-
propriated to a very different thing, viZv
to that capacity forjudging of comm^on
things that perfons of middling capacities
are capable of.

If

128 REMARKS ON ■■ '

If the determinations of this new prin-
ciple of common fenfe be fo inftanta-
neous, irrefiftible, and infalHble, as Dr.
Reid, Dr. Beattie, and Dr. Ofwald re-
prefent, how can we account for all the
error there is in the world? When we
fee how miferably bewildered the bulk of
mankind are,^ one would think that this
principle of truth is like the god Baal,
W'ho, when he was moft wanted, and
ought to have made a point of being pr6-
fent, tf -^ffiii his worl^hippers, was afleep,
or on a journey, or engaged fome other
way. See i. Kings, xviii.

If we apply to Dr. Beattie in this great
difficulty he tells us, p. 49, that ' com-

* mon fenfe may^Ianguifh for iwant of ex-J

* ercifcj as in the cafe of a perfon who,.

* blinded by a falfe religion, has been all

* his days accuftomed to diftrull; his own

* fentiments, and to receive his creed from

* the mouth of a prieiL'

Bat if this languifliing of common fenfe
refembles the languifliing of any other

fenfe.

Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 129

fenfe, I fhould expe6l that the confequence
would be our feeing very dimly and ob-
fcurely, as with a weak eye, only bear-
ing to be ufed with great tendernefs and
caution. But though a weak eye can-
not bear a (Irong light, and only admits
i)f faint and indiflin£l vifion, yet it ex-
hibits all things on which it is exercifec}
truly, and in their juft proportions, or with-
out diftorting one thing more than ano-
ther. If a man be fo blind that he cannot
fee a houfe, neither can he fee a tree, or
any other objeft. I fhould, therefore,
expeft that, if a man was fo totally de-
prived of common fenfe, as not to be abl^
to diftinguifh truth from falfehood in one
cafe, he would be equally incapable of
diflinguifhing it in another; and therefore,
that the man who fhould put implicit faitk
in his prieft would, if he wanted common
fenfe, be equally abfurd in his whole con*
du6l, which is far from being the cafe -
for in other refpe6ls no men think or a6l
more rationally than the Roman Catho-
lics. How then do the affedions of this
common fenfe refemble thofe of the other
K fenfes ?

130 REMARKS ON

fenfes ? The analogy appears to me to
fail moft eflentially. It does not at all
refemble the eye, the ear, the nofe, or
any other of the organs of fenfe.

Since Dr. Beattie writes with a prafti-
cal, and indeed an excellent defign, let Us
confider for a moment, the praBical in-
JLuence of this new, and to me ftrange doc^
trine. A man who finds that he thinks
differently from the reft of mankind, with
refped to any of the principles which Dr*
Beattie fhall be pleafed to cdXX primary,
SLudJiind a mental (fuppofe the do6lrine of
human liberty; or take the cafe of the
poor prieft ridden mortal above mention-
ed, w^ho may with equal right confider
his ow^n principles as fundamental) if he
believes, with myfelf, and thofewho have
not yet heard of this new principle of
faith, that all juft knowledge refults from
ajuft view of things, and a comparing of
his ideas, and that a habit of juft thinking
may be acquired by a courfe of obferva-
tion and refleftion duly perfifted in ; and
confequently, that if he be in an error, it

is

Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 131

is in his own power to fet himfelf right
(for that, naturally, he has as good a
power of diftinguifliing truth from falfe-
hood as his neighbours) a man, I fay,
who has thefe views of the nature of truth,
and of the faculties by which it is per-
ceived, is encouraged to indulge a free-
dom of inquiry, and to perfifl in his in-
vefligations, though they {hould prove
very laborious.

Whereas, if he fliould have read the
writers on whom I am animadverting, or
Dr. Beattie only, and, in confequence of
it, be perfuaded that he perceives all fun-
damental truths by fomething that is of
the nature of ^fenfc ; he may, indeed,
fee reafon to look at any principle pretty
attentively ; but if, after giving this kind
of attention to it, he perceives that he is
not affefted in that inftantaneous, injlinc-
live, and irrefiftible manner that Dr. Reid
defcribes, he neceflarily concludes that
either it was not truth that he was con-
templating, or that he is not one of that
great majority of mankind who are endued
K 2 with

132 REMARKS ON

with the faculty that is neceffary to the
perception of it. But which ever of thefe
he concludes to be the cafe, he remits his
attention, fatisfied that his view of the
obje6l is conftitutional and irremediable.

And certainly his determination would
be fufficiently countenancedby Dr. Beattie,
who fays, p. 47, that * common fenfe
' which, like other inftincls, arrives at
' maturity with almoft no care of ours,

* cannot poflibly be taught to one who

* wants it. You may,' fays our author,
p. 47, ' make him remember afet of firft

* principles, and fay that he believes them,
' even as you may teach one born blind

* to fpeak intelligibly of colours and light ;

* but neither to the one nor to the other
' can you, by any means, communicate

* \\\^ peculiar feeling which accompanies

* the operation of that faculty which na-

* ture has denied him. A man defedive

* in common fenfe may acquire learning,

* he may even poflefs genius to a certain

* degree, but the defecl of nature he ne-

* ver can fupply. A peculiar modifica-.

* tion

Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 133

* tiori of fcepticifm, or credulity, or le-
' vity, will to tl^ end of his life diftin-

* guifh him from other men.' Then, af-
ter mentioning the different ,^^^?-€^^ in
which different men are poffeffed of com-
Hion fenfe, he fays, p. 48, * Thefe diver-
•fities are, I think, to be referred, for

* the moil part, to the original conftitu-

* tion of the mind, which it \s not in the

* power of education to alter.'

Dr. Beattie may imagine, and I believe
does, that he is ferving the caufe of God
and of truth by fuch views of things as
thefe ; but it appears very clearly to me,
who have no pretenfions to the common
fenfe that he defcribes, that, as far as fpe-
culation can go, he is fub verting it all.

I am aware that Dr. Beattie. will re-
ply, that this doftrine of his concern-
ing common fenfe is only to be ap-
plied iofirjl principles. But v/ho is to
4ell us what are firft principles ? The
man who has from his infancy laboured
iunder a miflake, will imagine his moft
K3 - fun-

1J4 R E M A R K S O N

fundamental errors to be firft principles:
With a papift, implicit confidence in his*
prieft, or holy church, which he takes
for granted is the fame thing with faith in
God and the bible, a6ls upon his mind
asinfiantanedti/lyr £ind irrefiflihly as any
of Dr. Beattie's firft principles ; and this
principle in the poor papift cannot ap-
pear more abfurd to Dr. Beattie, than
fome of Dr. Beattie*s firft principles ap-
pear to me.

Now who is to help us in this cafe ?
Muft we, in good earneft, put the quef*
tion to the vote, being previoufly afilired
by Dr. Beattie, p. 45, that a. great vid-
jority of mankind are poflefifedof the true
principles of common fenfe, and there-
fore cannot miftake concerning it? But
I appeal from a tribunal whofe decifions
have been fo unfteady, and may change
again ; and think that nothing is fo likely
to fervie our purpofe, and the purpofe of
truth, as a perfuafion the very reverfe oF
Dr. Beattie 's, viz. that the faculty by
which we perceive truth is the fartheft

poflible

Dr. BEATTtE's ESSAY. 135

poffible from any thing that refembles a
fcnfe ; that every misfortune we do, or
may labour under, with refpeft td
judgment, is naturally remediable; and
confequently that it depends, upon our-
felves, as far as any thing of practical
importance is concerned, to be as wife,
judicious, and knowing, as any other per-
fon whatfoever.

V Dr. Beattie feems to place the fame
confidence in his external fenfes that Dr.
Reid does, which is much more than
I can, perfuade myfelf to put in them ;
J)i>t with refpe6l to the various inftindive
principles of truth which our maker has
arbitrarily annexed to them. Dr. Beattie
fpeaks fometimes with more caution ; as
if he had now and then fome fecret diftruft
pfthem. I (hall, with this view, quote
what he fays of the foundation of reafon-
mg by mdu6iion and analogy.

. ;.■ The mind,' he fays, p. 122, * by its

* own innate force, and in confequence

* of an irrefiflible and inflindive impulfe,

K 4 ^ inferos

t^6 REMARKS ON

* infers the future- from the paft, without

* the intervention of any argument. The
•* fea hais ebbed and flowed twice every
^ day in time paft, therefore the fea will

rt* continue to ebb and flow every day ift

* time to come, is by no means a logical
y * dedu6llon of a conclufion from premifes.
j^ * Reafoning from analogy, p. 126, ' when

- * traced up to its fource, will be found irt

* like manner to terminate in a certain in-
^>* ftinclive propenfity, implanted in us by
^^-* our maker, which leads us toexpeft thai

* fimilar caufes, in fimilar circumftances^,

* do probably produce, or will produce,

- ^ fimilar effeCls. A child,' p. 128, ' who
f "^'has been burned with a red hot coal is
sf^'cdrefulto avoid touching the flame of ^

' •*k:arldle. And it deferves to be remarked

ft-

«;* that the judgment a child forms ohthefe
f-:' occafions may arife, and often does arife,
' previous to education and reafoning,
< ' and while experience is very limited.*

^rv-It'ls m this lafl; claufe that Dr. Beattie
fhows his caution, and betrays his fufpi-
cion of thefe new principles* He does

not

Dr. BE AT TIE'S ESSAY. M37

wdtfchufe to fay that children judge hi

this manner with no. experience at all^

' ..which, if the judgment was properly ^?^«-

■jiin6iive, ought to be the cafe, (but which

'iiappens to be too notorioufly contrary to

''*fa6l) but only tohen their experience is

■ very limited. But if they had had any

experience at all, it cannot be faid with

-tniththat they \'^tx^ vi'w^ciOMX. education ;

'for experience is the fchool of nature;

lind in this courfe of education we make

much ufe of our reafon, and the power

x>{ ajfociation is very bufily employed*

By the fimple principle of the afTocia-
lion of ideas, the idea of the flame of a
xandle is intimately aflbciated with the
idea of the pain which it has occafioned,
in fo much, that ever after they are confi-
dered in the clofeft conne6liott, as it were
the infeparable parts of the fame thing ;
-fo that whatever recals the idea of the
'One recals likewife the idea of the other,
• and. a dread of the one cannot be fepa*
Tated from a dread of the other.

. i i J I

Suppofing,

ig-S REMARKS O N

Suppofing, therefore, that the child has
an averfion to pain, and that he is mafter
of thofe aftions by which it is avoided,
he will mechanically, and inftantly, draw
(back his hand from the near approach of
a candle, without any intermediate idea
rwJiatever^ ,

};K

' As to Dr. Reids general principle, that
:ike laws, of nature xoitl continue (with

which he fuppofes that the mind of a
■jchild is infpired) or, as Dr. Beattie here

cxpfefles it, xh^xJ^lnilar caufes, in Jimilar

cir-cumJianceSt will probably produce fimi-
■lar ejfeds, as a foundation for its con-
fcluding that a candle which has burned
thim' onc6 will burn him again, it is not

certainly at all probable that he has
.the leaft notion of any fuch thing. It is
. a Jong tin^ before a child attains to any

fuch general knowledge. Particular fads
• are firft difcovered, and general propofi-

tions, or principles, are formed from them.
-But according to the hypotheiis of Dr.

Reid and Dr. Beattie, the mind is, prior

tp any experience, either furnilhed with
-^.m,oi[i\ii< the

Dr. BEATTIE*s ESSAY. 139

the general maxims, that there are laws
of nature, and that thele laws will con-
tinue, or elfe with a thoufand particular
independent maxims, comprehended un-
der that general one. But thefe pro-
Vifions are equally unneceffary, when
the fimple law of afTociation of ideas fo
eafily fupplies the place of them both.

SECTION II.

Of the tejlimony of thefenfes,

'T'HROUGH a degree of fairnefs and
' mgenuoufnefs, for which very fhrewd

difputants are not always remarkable.
Dr. Beattie is no lefs unfortunate with re-
fpeft to that part of his fyflem which re-
lates to the external fenfes , than we have
feen him to be in the inftances mentioned
in the laft feciion. He fpeaks in general
with more confidence than Dr. Reid him-
felf does of his faith in his eyes, ears,
nofe, tafte, and feeling (though it is pof-

fible

no REMARKS ON

fible that his writing with more ftrength
and eloquence upon this fubje6l may only
proceed from his having a greater com-
mand of language, and not from a
ftronger conviftion of mind) but then he
inadvertently fubjoins fuch conce[Jion6 and
exceptions, as, in faci;, overturn all his
preceding do6lrine, and throw us back
into all our former dillruft of our fenfes.

* Upon the evidence of the external
- fenfes^' he fays, p. 63, ' hearing, feeing,

* touching, tafting, and fmelling, is

* founded all our knowledge of natural

* or material things ; and therefore all

* conclufions in natural philofophy, and

* all thofe prudential confideraticms
' which regard the prefervation of our

* body, as it is liable to be affefted by the

* fenfible qualities of matter, muft finally

* be refolved into this principle, that

* tJnngs are as our fenfes reprefent them.

* When I touch a ftone, I am confcious
'*'of a fenfation, or feeling in my mind,
' accompanied with an irrefiftible belief
f that this fenfation is excited by the appli-
' - * cation

Dr. BE AT tie's ESSAY. i^t

cation of an external and hard fubdance
to feme part of my body. This beUef
as certainly accompanies the fenfation,
as the fenfation accompanies the appHca-
tion of the ftone to my organs of fenfe.
I am as certain,' p. 6^, ' that at prefent
I am in a hoiife, and not in the open air,
that I fee by the hght of the fun, and
not by the hght of a candle, that I feel
the ground hard under my feet, and
that I lean againft a real material
table, as I can be of the truth of any
geometrical axiom, or of any demon-
llrated conclufion. Nay I am as cer-
tain of all this as of my own exiftence.
But I cannot prove by argument that
tliere is fuch a thins: as matter in the
world, or even that I myfeif exifl.'

All this is perfeftly agreeable to the
new fyftem, and an extremely fhort, eafy,
and convenient one it certainly is, for
thofe who are not difpofed to take much
pains in the invefligation of truth ; but
it is certainly not agreeable to nature and
fad ; and as the ojd proverb fays, A'atu-

ram

142 R E M A R K S O N

ramfurca licet expeMas, tamen ufque re^
curret ; fo here Dr. Beattie could not
help Taying, p. 189, ' A diftempered fenfe,
*■ as well as an impure and unequal me-

* dium may doubtlefs communicate fa Ife

* fenfations ; but we are never impofed

* upon by them in matters of con/e queue e*

Now I can eafily conceive how all
this might have been faid by Dr. Beattie
very innocently, and without the Icall
fufpicion that any caviller, like myfelf,
could polTibly make any ufe of it to his
prejudice ; when, in faft, it effeflually
pvertuns his whole ryitem of implicit
confidence in hisjeiifesy as the fure guides
to truth. For certainly, if they be capa*
b'C of deceiving us at all, they are no
more to be trulled without fome guard
of a different nature. The man who is
under the deception has no help from
them to undeceive himfelf. Thus if all
mankind had jaundiced eyes, they mufl
have been under a necelTity of concluding
that every objeft was tinged with yellow;
and indeed, according to this newfyflem,

as

Dr. BE AT TIE'S ESSAY. 143

as explained before, it would then have
been fo not in appearance only, but alfo
in reality ; nay this would have begun to
be true, when only a great majority of
mankind had their eyes thus affe^led.

Our author is, farther, fo very much
off his guard upon this unfortunate fub-
jeft, as to allow that fome of our fenfes
give us information that is contradifted
by the teftimony of others, which cer-
tainly very ill agrees with his idea of
them as infallible guides to truth. . \

'Of magnitude,' he fays, p. iiyp, 'we
'judge both by fight and touch. With

* regard to magnitude we muft, there-

* fore, believe either our fight, or our

* touch, or both, or neither. To believe

* neither is impoflible. If we believe
' both, we (hall contradi6l ourfelves,* and
at length he determines in favour of the
touch. If we afk why we believe the
touch rather than the fight, he fays, p.
177, 'it is in{lin6l, and not reafon, that
' determines me to believe my touch.'

But

144 RE M A R K S O N

But did not he that made the fenfe of
feeling make the fenfe of fight alfo ; and
if, as our author pretends, he had defigU'-
ed that our fenfes, as fuck, fhould give
us true information concerning external
objefts, would he not have provided that
their teftimony fhould have been in all
refpe6ls perfeftly confident ? Befides, it
is obvious to remark, that if the eye re-
quire to be correfted by the touch, the
touch may poffibly require to be corre^t^
ed by fomething elfe. Dr. Beattie may
fay that the fame common fenfe that bid§
him believe his touch in preference to his
light, and to corred the evidence of fight
by that of touch, affires him that the
touch requires no corre6lion whatever.
But this can have weight only with
thofe who have faith in this fame com-^
mon fenfe.

I fhould be glad to alk Dr. Beattie,
and others who admit it as a maxim, that
things are as their ferjes reprefent them t9
he, what a man of common fenfe, and
altogedier without e:jiperience (which in-
deed

Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 145

deed can hardly be the cafe in fa.6t) would
fay upon looking at a ftraight flick held
obliquely, with half of it under water.
Would he not be pofitive that it was bent
in the middle ; and would he not have the
plain teflimony of his eyes for it ? If you
(hould take the flick out of the water, and
bid him look at it again, and handle it,
would he not affert the very reverfe of
Dr. Beattie's maxim, viz. that his eyes
had impofed upon him, and that the thing
was not as hisjenfes had reprefented it ?

Do not the bulk of mankind believe
that the earth is at refl, and that the fun,
moon, and flars have a diurnal revolu-
tion ; and have they not the teflimony of
their fenfes for it ? They certainly think
fo. They alfo all believe (as Dr. Reid
himfelf pretends to believe with them)
that colour is a property of bodies, and
yet are eafily convinced that it is a
miflake.

If, after all, it really be a dictate of

this new common fenfe, that, notwith-

L ftanding

546 "R E M A R K S O N

flanding all this, things ftill are as onr
fenfes reprefent them to be, I think that in
thefe cafes our common fenfe is in league
with our other fenfes to impofe upon us,
and therefore that we are juftified in ex-
cluding it, as well as them, from being the
teft of truth.

SECTION III.

Dr. Beattie J view of Berkley j theory-^

I

T is curious to obferve how much our
acquaintance both with truth and
enor refembles the introdudion of the
fox to the lion, m the fable of Efop. We
grow bolder by degrees, and each encou-
rages his neighbour to go a few fteps far-
tlier than, himfelf.

The principles both of Dr. Reid and
Dr. Beattie lead them to rejeft Berkley's
hypothefis. Indeed, their whole fcheme
appeal's to me to liave been, in a great

meafure.

Dr. BE AT TIE'S ESSAY. 147

meafure, fuggefted by it ; but Dr. Beattie
rifes greatly upon Dr. Reid in his tone
and emphafis upon this occafion. If Dr.
Reid conquered and (lew his adverfary,
Dr. Beattie not only conquers, and puts
him to death a fecond time, but tramples
upon him. Dr. Reid did not vanquifti
him till after a pretty hard combat, in
which fome fl<.ili and dexterity in the ufe
of his weapons was requifite ; but Dr.
Beattie does it at once, without giving
him an opportunity of drawing in his own
defence. Hear his own account of their
different modes of conducing this con-
troverfy.

' Though it be abfurd,' fays Dr. Beattie,
p. 290, 'to attempt a proof of what is

* felf-evident, it is manly and meritorious

* to confute the objeftions that fophiflry

* may urge againfl it. This, with refpe6l

* to the fubjecl in queftion, has been done
'' in a decifive and mafterly manner by

* Dr. Reid, w^ho proves that the reafon-

* ings of Berkley, and others, concerning
' primary and fecondary qualities owe all

L 2 ' their

T48 R E M A R K S O N

' their ftrength to the ambiguity of words.'
This, then, is the ynanly and vieritorious
condud of Dr. Reid ; but being only of
relative ufe and importance, and abfurd
in it/elf, our author takes a different
ground ; which he immediately defcribes.
' I have proved that though this funda-

* mental error had never been dete6led,

* the philofophy of Berkley is, in its own
^ nature, abfurd, becaufe it fuppofes the

* original principles of common fenfe

* controvertible and fallacious ; a fuppo-
' fition repugnant to the genius of the
' tRie' (alias the new) ' philofophy, and
' which leads to univerfal credulity, or

* univerfal fcepticifm, and confequently

* to the fubveriion of knowledge and vir-

* tue, and' — but firfl; guefs reader, if you
can, what follows — ' the extermination of

* the human fpecies.' He even fixes the
time, very nearly, in which this calami-
tous event would take place.

Defcribing what he imagined would
follow if all mankind fhould, in one in-
ftant, be made to believe that matter has

no

Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 149

no exiftence, he fays, p. 281, ' Doubtlefs

* this cataflrophe would, according to our

* metaphyficians, throw a wonderful light

* on all the parts of knowledge. I pre-

* tend not even to guefs at the number,

* extent, or quality, of the aftonifliing dif-

* coveries, that would then ftart forth into
' view. But of this I am certain, that, in
' l^s than a month after, there could not,

* without another miracle, be one human

* creature alive on the face of the earth.'

Dr. Reid fairly encounters his enemy,
vanquifhes, flays, and buries him, all in
theirproper order ;butDr.Beattiebeginsat
once with the laft a6l of burying, without
troubling himfelf whether he be dead or
alive, thinking the a6l of burying will
fuffice for all. This is that curious and
fummary procefs which Dr. Ofwald is
taking to rid the world of all dangerous
errors in religion. Without giving himfelf
the unneceffary trouble to argue the mat-
ter, except for his own amufement, and
that of his readers, he only throws him-
felf back in his chair, fliuts his eyes, fees

L 3 them

1^ R E M A R K S O N

them to be abfurd, and the delufion va-
nifties. This is indeed fighting with the
fpear of Ithufiel, at the touch of which
all impoflure vaniflies*.

I fhall quote one paflage more from
Dr. Beattie on this fubje^l, in which he
exprefles the nature and fullnefs of his
perfuafion concerning the reality of the
material world, in a manner that is pecu-
liarly emphatical, and therefore muft be
very fatisfaftory to men of tafte, who
can feel the beauties of fine writing.
' That matter has a real, feparate, and

* independent exiftence/ p. 261, 'is be-
' lieved, not becaufe it can be proved by
' argument, but becaufe the conftitution

* The pafTage in Dr. OTwald, to which I here allude,
is lb very curious, that I think my reader will not be dif-
pleafed to fee it quoted in a note on this part of my remarks
an Dr. Beattie, though he will find it quoted again in its
proper place. 'Area! believer,' p. 2^5", 'will not defpife

* the well-meant labours of thofe who have endeavoured to
' demondrate the primary truths by reducing their oppo-

* fites to abfurdity ; but knows, that without their help,

* he can, hy afingk thought., reduce thofe chimeras to the

* grolfeft of all abfurdities, namely, to nonfenfe,

*of

Dr. BEATTLE's ESSAY. 151

* of our nature is fuch, that '^s^e mufi be-

* lieve it. There is here the fame ground
' of behef, that there is in the following
' propofitions. I exift : whatever is is ;
' two and two make four. It is abfurd,

* nay it is impoflible to believe the con-
' trary.' Accordingly, he fays, ' I have

* known many v/ho could not anfwer
' Berkley's arguments, I never knew on^
' who believed his do6lrine.'

I find, however, that I have travelled
a little farther than Dr. Beattie, for I
have met with a very ingenious man who
maintained Berkley's doclrine with great
ferioufnefs, and I have known others who
have efpoufed the fame opinion'; But
perhaps Dr. Beattie may have the indul-
gence of the Welch jury I have heard of,
who would not believe a man who con-
feffed himfelf to be guilty, and fairly ac-
quitted him.

My friend and I ufed to debate this fub-

ject, but for want of being acquainted with

the principles of Meffrs.Reid, Beattie, and

L 4 ORv^ald;

152 R E M A R K S O N

Ofwaldjlwasglad topleadfortheexiftence
*^ of the material world only as the moft pro-
bable hypotlieiis to accouit for appear-
ances, and never thought of there being
the fame kind of evidence forit, asof two
'-and two being equal to four. Had I
^^been acquainted with thefe new princi-
ples, I might have faved myfelf a great
deal of trouble ; but I am apprehenfive
that I fiiould hardly have efcaped a great
-=^'deal of ridicule ; and we ought not to
forget that ridicule has been deemed the
- tejl of truth as well as this new common
fenfe. I think with equal reafon, and 1
flatter myfelf that the reign of this new
ufurper will not be much longer than that
of his predeceffor, to whom he is very
nearly related.

In this fome may think that I only

■mean to be jocular, but really I am f^ri-

^^'^ous. Why was ridicide tver thought to

-*^be theteft of truth, butbecaufe the things

^ at which we can laugh were fuppofed to

be fo abfurd that their falfehood was

felf-evident ; fo that there was no occa-

V-^i^'J. fion

Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 153

fion to examine any farther ? We were
fuppofed to feel them to be falfe ; and
what is a feeling but the affection of a
farfe? In reahty, therefore, this new
doftrine of common fenfe being the ftan-
dard of truth is no other than ridicule
being the ftandard of truth. The words
are different, but not the things. I ffiould
be glad to fee fo acute a metaphyfician as
Dr. Reid, fo fine a writer as Dr. Beattie,
and, to adopt Dr. Beattie's compliment,
fo elegant an author as Dr. Ofwald, fepa-
rately employed to afcertain the precife
difference between thefe twofchemes.

In my opinion the chief difference, be-
fides what I faid above, confifts in this, that
the one may be called the y^^T^ of truth,
and the other xh^feife offalfchood. There
is alfo fome doubt whether Shaftefbury
was really in earneft in propofing ridicule
as the teft of truth. Many think that he
never could be fo abfurd. Whereas there
can be no doubt but that this triumvirate
of authors are perfectly ferious. There
is, however, another difference that will

flrongly

i54 R E M A R K S O X ^-

ilrongly recommend the claims of com-
mon icnk in preference to thofe of ridi-
cule, which is, that this was advanced in
fupport of infideiit)% but that in fupport
of rehgion. But 1 fhould think that
the greater weight we have to fupport.
the lironger buttrelfes we fhould ufe.

In remarking upon Dr. Reid, I pointed
out the inconclufivenels of the confe-
quences he drew from Berkley's hypo-
thehs. Dr. Beattie lays llie iame things
after him, but with conhderable iipprove-
ments in point of diction and energy, and
With an air of much greater ferioufnels
with refpetl to religion, which appeals to
me to have nothing to do in the bufmefs.
i do not wonder, however, at Dr.
Beattie's zeal in the cafe, when he ima-
gined tliat fo much depended upon it,
any more than I do at Don Quixote s
heroic enthufiafra, when he miftook inns
for caftles, a flock of fheep for an army,
and a barbers bafon for Mambrino's
Jhtelrxiet.

* Sure/

Dj-. BEATTIE^ ESSAY. 15^

• Sure,' fays our author, p. 283, ' the

* laws of nature are not fuch trifles as that

* it muft be a matter of perfeft indifference

* whether wc act or ihink agreeable to

* them or no,' I think if I had not ap-
prized my reader of it before hand, he
Vould not have gueffed that, in this
folemn fentence^ our author had nothing
in view but diis fame innocent theory of
Berkley; and efpecially if he had not
feen, in. the preceding quotation, that the
very extermination of the humamjpecies
is the confequence of this fame fcheme ;
which appears to me to be as complete
raving as any thing in Don Quixote
hlmfelf.

Our author fardier fays, p. 289, * Berk-
' ley's doctrine is fubverfive of man's mod

* important interefts, as a moral, intelli-

* gent, and percipient being. I doubt
' not,' fays he, ib. ' but it may have over-
' caft many of his days with a gloom,
' which neither the approbation of his
*" confcience, nor the natural ferenity of

* his temper could entirely diffipate.*

Now

156 R E M A R K S O N .

Now I can fee no difficulty in conceiving
that I myfelf might have adopted this
opinion, and yet have been very eafy,
chearful, virtuous, religious, and happy,
in the full expeftation of a reftoration to
a future life, as real as that which I enjoy
at prefent, and in circumftances infinitely
fuperior. In fo very different lights do
we fometimes fee the fame thing, though
we are all, at leaft we all think ourfelves,
pofleffed of this fame infallible ftandard
oftruthj Viz » common f^nfe.

SEC

Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 157

SECTION IV.

Dr. Beattle'i account of the four ce ^mo-
ral obligation, and of the fundamental
principles of religi'on.

TJITHERTO I muft acknowledge
"*• ^ that I have not always been able to
refift the temptation to divert myfelf with
my author's Quixotifm. For, ferious a^
he himfelf has been, his adventures have
fometimes appeared laughable enough to
me. But I muft now begin to be a little
more ferious, becaufe I apprehend the
confequences are fo. For our author, af-
ter having made his common fenfe the
tefi of truth, proceeds to make it the
ftandard of moral obligation , exprefsly
excluding all reafoning upon the fubjecl.

' They,' fays Dr. Beattie, p. 74, mean-
ing mankind, ' believe a certain mode of

* conduct to be incumbent upon them in
' certain circumftances, becaufe a notion

• of duty arifes in their mind when they

* con-

158 R E M A R K S O N

contemplate that condu6t in relation to
thofe circumttances. I ought to be
grateful for a favour received. V/hy ?
becaufe myconfcience tells m^o. How
do you know that you ought to do that
of which your confcience enjoins the
performance ? I can give no further
reafon for it but I feel that fuch is my
duty. Here the inveftigation muft ftop ;
or if carried a little farther it muft re-
turn to this point. I know that I ought
to do what my confcience enjoins be-
caufe God is the author of my conftku-
tion, and I obey his will when I acl ac-
cording to the principles of my conftitu-
tion. Why do you obey the v/ili of
God ? Becaufe it is my duty. How
know you that ? Becaufe my confcience
tells me fo, &c.*

In any other cafe, therefore, if a man
JeehxhTii any thing is his duty, or, which
is the fame thing with refpeCl: to himfelf,
if lie thinks he feels it, he has no occafion
to trouble himfelf with examining into
the ground of that feeling. He muft

follow

Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 159

follow it without hefitation, or referve.
So that even the poor prie 11- ridden mor-
tal above mentioned will be jufliiied, if,
at the command of his ghofily fuperior^
he murders his heretical neighbour ; for
had he gone the round of the felf-exa-
mination defcribed by Dr. Beattie, it
would have been like travelling round
the world for nothing but to come to the
fame place from which he fet out, Viz./o
viy confcience diBates,

Judging in the firft and laft inftancd
by TCiQie. feeling, it is impoffible to diftin-
guifii the injundions of a well-informed,
from thofe of an ill-informed confcience.
Many, I doubt not, have felt as real re-
morfe upon the omilTion of a fuperftitious
ceremony, and have been as unhappy in
confequence of it, as they have ever been
for the negle6t of the mofl; important
moral duty. As, on the other hand,
they have felt as real fatisfaftion after
confeffing to aprieft, and having received
his abfolution, as others have felt from
the confcioufnefs of genuine repentance.

i6o R E M A R K S O N

or of a well fpent life. Yea feme, t
am perfuaded, have felt as perfe6lly eafy
at a Portuguefe ad of faith, as if they had
been glorifying God in any other manner.

Not content with this, Dr. Beattie
fcruples not to reft all the future hopes
and expectations of man, as derived
from religion, on the foundation of this
lame principle of common fenfe. ' Scep-

* tics,' fays Dr. Beattie, p. 113, 'may

* wrangle, and mockers may blafpheme ;

* but the pious man knows, by evidence

* too fublime for their comprehenfion,

* that his affections are not mifplaced,

* and that his hopes ftiall not be difap-

* pointed : by evidence which to every

* found mind is fully fatisfaftory, but

* which to the humble and tender hearted

* is altogether overwhelming, irrefiftible,

* and divine.'

With whatever feelings Dr. Beattie
might compofe this paragraph, it ftrikes
me as containing matter that is exceed-
ingly dangerous and alarming; letting

afide

Dr. BE AT TIE'S ESSAY. 161

afide all reafoning about the fundamental
principles of religion, and making way
for all the extravagancies of credulity,
enthufiafm, and myflicifmi.

The plenary perfuafion tliat our religf*
ous affetiions are not viifplaced, and that
our hopes JJiall not be difappointed, evi-
dently fuppofes the belief of the being,
the perfetlions, and moral attributes of
God, and a ftate of future retribution;
and what ^i?2^ of evidence has Dr. Beattie
fpoken of as overwhelming, and irrejijiible,
but this of common ienfe ? the effefts of
which he always defcribes in that ftyle,
and to which he had before applied thofe
very epithets, and others of a fimilar im-
port. And yet this common fenfe appears
to me, and to others, who feem to be in
our fober fenfes> to be very infuflEcient
for this purpofe ; though Dr. Ofv/ald has
attempted to prove at large, and in de-
tail, all the particulars which Dr. Beattie
only afferts in grofs. But I am afraid
that, after all his pious pains, the evi-
dence will be found to be what Dr.
M Beattie

i62 R E M A R K S O N

Beattie here fays of it, too fublime for our
comprehenjiun.

That our author imagined he had fuffi-
ciently eflabhflied fome very important
rehgious and praclical principles, is evi-
dent from what he fays in the conclufion
of his work, where he is reciting his
achievements in it. * That the human

* foul is a real and permanent fubftance,'
he fays, p. 491, * that God is infinitely

* wife and good, that virtue and vice are
' effentially different, that there is fuch a
^ thing as truth, and that man, in many

* cafes, is capable of difcovering it, are

* fome of the principles which this book

* is intended to vindicate from the ob-

* jedions of fcepticifm.'

Now I do not recolleQ, after reading
Dr. Beattie's book through (with how
much attention and care let the reader
judge) that he has attempted a demons
llration of the human foul being a rational
and permanent fubftance, of the infinite
wildom and goodnefs of God, that virtue

and

Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 163

and vice are efTentially different. Sec. by
any proper medium of proof whatever ;
but only, if he has proved them at all, by
an appeal to this principle of common
fenfe, which is faid to affure us, without
rea/oning, that fuch and fuch dodrines
are true.

Alfo, though Dr. Beattie has not taken
the fame large field of argument that Dr.
Ofwald has done, thinking probably that,
after him, it was unneceffary, yet he quotes
from him with reipeft, and no doubt
with intire approbation (or why did he
quote him at all ?) a paflage in which he
not only afferts the propriety of defend-
ing primary truths on the fole authority
of common fenfe, but vindicates the doing
of it with a peculiar emphajis, and without
much delicacy. And I have already
fhewn in what an extenfive fenfe Dr. Of-
wald confiders the primary trul:hs of reli-
gion, a fenfe with which Dr. Beattie could
not be unacquainted.

M 2 Dr.

i64 R E M A R K S O N

Dr. Beattie's quotation, in vindication
of his vehemence of expreflion in this-
treatife, is as follows, p. 512. * There

* is no fatisfying the demands of falfe >

* delicacy, fays an elegant and pious au-
' thor, becaufe they are not regulated by
' any fixed flandard. But a man of can-
' dour and judgment will allow that the
' bafhful timidity, praftifed by thofe who

* put themfelves on a level with the ad-

* verfaries of religion, would ill become

* one who, declining all difputes, affercs

* primary truths on the authority of com-

* mon fenfe ; and that whoever pleads

* the caufe of religion in this way has a
' right to aflume a firmer tone, and to
' pronounce with a more decifive air, not

* upon the flrength of his own judgment,
' but on the reverence due from all mail-
' kind to the tribunal to which he appeals.

* OJwald's apppeal in behalf of religion,

* p. 14/ Thefe gentlemen, therefore,
having difcr^rded all pretences to reafon-^
irg, think themfelves juftified in dif-
carding all good maiinersj and in af-

fuming

Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 165

fuming an arrogance and infolence
which does not become us poor rea-
fonerS. A happy privilege truly!

From thefe circumftances it appears to
me to be impoflible not to conclude,
that Dr. Beattie approved, in the main,
of what Dr. Ofwald had written. In-
deed, writing upon this fubjeQ, and men-
tioning him at all, it behoved him to
have guarded his readers againft his
dangerous extravagancies, if he had not
gone the fame lengths himfelf. His can-
did letter to me, however, which the
reader will find at the end of this book,
makes me conclude, that he does not now
approve of Dr. Ofwald's writings ; and
I hope that, after more reflexion, he will
acknowledge that he has given his ab-
furd and dangerous principles too much
countenance by what he has written
himfelf.

M3 SEC-

)66 REMARKS ON

SECTION V.

Dr. Beattie'j view of the doElrine of
neceflity.

A FTER the very fevere and injurious
-^ ^ treatment that Bifhop Berkley's
amufing theor)'' has met with, it cannot
be expefted that the doftrine of necejjity,
which, Hke many other very good things,
has had the misfortune to fall 'into the
hands of fome unbehevers, fhbiild efcape
Dr. Beattie's cenfure ; efpecially as, Hke
other great truths, removed from the
conception of the vulgar (as that of the
revolution of the earth upon its axis)
it neceffarily Hands expofed to fome
plaufible, but fuperficial, objeftions.
There is, at the bottom, however, fome-
thing fo ingenuous in Dr. Beattie, that
notwithftanding the vehemence of his
aflertions, he has not been able to conceal
evident marks of the impreffion ihat has
been made upon him by the arguments of
the Neceflarians. Thefe, I doubt not,

have

Dr. BE AT TIE'S ESSAY. 167

have had no fmall influence in determining
him= to fhut his eyes Co obftinately, to
difclaim all argument upon the fubje6l,
and to take refuge in his moft convenient
and never failing principle of common
fenfe.

Both the thorough fatisfa6lion that
Dr. Beattie has in his own principles,
and the manner in which he attained and
preferves that fatisfa6tion, notwithftand-
ing the unaiifwerable arguments (as he
can hardly help acknowledging) of the
Neceflarians, may be feen in the follow-
ing quotations, which I can read and
tranfcribe without feeling myfelf more
offended than I fhould be at hearing any
perfon affert his full conviclion of the
.earth Jtanding Jiill ; being fully fatisfied
with the evidence that I have of the veiy
fuperficial grounds on which his opinion
has been formed-

* My intention/ p. 295, * Is to treat

* the doftrine of neceffity as I have

^ treated that of non-exiftence of matter,

M 4 * by

i68 REMARKSON

* by inquiring whether the one be not, as

* well as the other, contrary to common

* fenfe, and therefore abfurd. Both doc-
' trines,' p. 360, ' are repugnant to the

* general belief of mankind, both, not-

* withftanding all the efforts of the fubtleft

* fophiftry, are ftill incredible ; both are
^ fo contrary to nature, and to the condi-

* tion of human beings, that they can-

* not be carried into pra6tice, and fo con-
' trary to true philofophy, that they can-

* not be admitted into fcience ; withdut

* bringing fcepticifm along with them,

* and rendering queftionable the plaineft

* principles of moral truth, and the very

* diftinftion between truth and falfehood.

* In a w©rd, we have proved that com-

* men fenfe, as it teaches us to believe,

* and be allured of the exigence of mat-

* ter, doth alfo teach us to believe, and be

* aflured, that man is a free agent. My

* liberty, in thefe inftances,'p. 295, * Ican-

* not prove by argument, but there is not

* a truth in geometry of which I am more
' certain.' Speaking of the fame thing,
he fays, p. 31 1, * Some philofophers

* want

Dr. BE AT TIE'S ESSAY. 169

* want to prove what I know by inftin^l

* to be unqueftionably certain. I am as
'■ confcious/ p. 70, ' that fome atlions

* are in my power, and that others are

* not, &c. as I am of my own exiftence,'

I have no occafion to enter into a diA
cuffion of this queftion with Dr. Beattie.
Indeed, I am precluded from doing it ;
for what can it avail to argue with a man
who declares that he will neither argue
himfelf nor hear the arguments of others
upon the fubjeft ? But to anfwer this
very pertinacious believer, in fometbing
of his own way, I will tell him that, if I
'Were to take my choice of any metaphy^
Heal queftion, to defend it againft all op-
pugners, it fliouid be this very abfurd and
obnoxious doctrine of neceffity, of the
falfehood of which our author is as cer-
tain as he is of his own exiftence. There
is no truth of which I have lefs doubt, and
of the grounds of which I am more, fully
fatisfied; and I am likewife fully per-
faaded, not only of the perfeft innocence,
but alfo of the happy moral injluencs^oi

i7o REMARKS ON

it. Indeed, there is no abfurdity more
glaring to my underftanding than the no-
tion of philofophical liberty ; and (judg-
ing as Dr. Beattie does of Berkley's the-
ory) of more dangerous confequence.
But I have long learned to entertain no
great dread of opinions theoretically dan-
gerous, and to repeat what I have faid
upon a former occafion, ' Notwithfland-

* ing fome fe6^t:s do, in words, fubvert the

* foundations of all virtue, they have al-
' ways fome Jalvo whereby they preferve

* a regard to it, and in reality enforce it,

* Such a foundation has the God of na-
' ture laid for the praftice of virtue in

* our hearts, that it is hardly in the power

* of any error in our heads to erafe it.'
Difcourfe on the Lord's Supper » third
edition, p. 107

What could lead Dr. Beattie to quote
Dr. Hartley upon the fubje6l I cannot
tell^ as he does not propofe to enter into
any difcuflion of the queftion, except it
was to take an opportunity of contradi6l-
ing him in his appeal to experience with
relation to it, ^ In all my experience/

fays

Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 171

fays he, p. 333, ' I have never been con-

* fcious of any fuch necefhty as the au-

* thor (Dr. Hartley) fpeaks of.' But fo
very little attention did Dr. Beattie give
to any t hing like reafonivg on this fubjeft,
or even neceffary explanations of it, that
though Dr. Hartley, in the very pafTage
that Dr. Beattie quotes from him, gives
a very accurate ftate of the queftion, de-
fining philofophical liberty to be a power
of doing different things, the motives, or
previous circumjtances, remaining precijely
the fame, all that our author fays upon
the fubjeft (hows that the liberty which he
contends for is the power of doing lohat we
pleafe, or toill, which Dr. Hartley is far
from denying.

It makes me fmile, and I am confident
it muft make others fmile, who fliall read
both thefe writers, to find Dr. Beattie
calling Dr. Hartley a fanciful author.
To judge by the ftyle and manner of the
two writers, I think any indifferent perfon
would fee that ferious and difpaflion te
argument was with Dr. Hartley, 2Lnd fancy
and imagination wholly with JDr, Beattie.

There

172 R E M A R K S O N

There is fomething very fingular in the
manner in which Dr. Beattie treats diis
iubject of neceffity ; firft difclaiming all
reafoning about it, then, from his natu-
ral ingenuoufnefs, not being able intirely
to fatisfy himfelf ^vith this condu61, half
hinting at fome objections, and fiib join-
ing fome half anfwers to them ; then ac-
knowledging that the arguments on both
lides coine at loft to appear unaiifwerable,
p. 362, and fo reverting to his common
fenfc again ; jufi; as he did in his account
of the foundation of moral obligation, . in
which he both began and ended with an
appeal to the fame common fenfe.

Among other things, our author
gently touches upon the objeftion to the
contingency .of human a6lions from
the doctrine of the divine prefcience. In
anfwer to which, or rather in dcfcant-
ing upon which (thinking, I fuppofe,
to chuie the lefs of two evils) he
feems to make no great difficulty of re-
jefting that moft eflential prerogative of
the divine nature, though nothing can be

more

Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 173

more fully afcertained by independent
evidence from revelation, rather than
give up his darling hypothefis of human
liberty ; fatisfying himfelf with obferving,
pv352, that ' it implies no reflection on

* the divine power, that it cannot perform

* impoflibilities.' In the very fame man-
ner he might make himfeif perfeftly eafy
if his hypothefis fhould compel him to
deny any other of the attributes of God,
or even his very being, for what reflexion
is it upon any perfon that things impoffi-
ble cannot be. Thus our author, in the
blind rage of difputation, hefitates not
to deprive the ever blefled God of that
very attribute by which, in the books of
fcripture, he exprefsly diftinguifhes him-
felf from all falie Gods, and than which
nothing can be more eflentially neceffary
to the government of the univerfe, rather
than relinquifh his fond claim to the
fancied privilege of f elf -determination ;
a claim which appears to me to be juft as
abfurd as that o^felf-ex'tftence, and which
could not polholy do him any good if he
had it.

Terrified,

174 REMARKS ON

Terrified, however, as I am willing to
fiippofe (though he does not exprefs any
fuch thing, as he feems to be ready,
upon any emergency, v/ith all xh^fang-
froid in the world, to ftrike from his creed
the doftrine of the divine prefcience) at
this confequence of his fyftem, he thinks,
with thofe who maintain the doclrine of
a trinity of perfons in the unity of the
divine eiTence, and with thofe who affert
the doctrine of tranfubjiantiation, to '
fnelter himfelf in the objcurity of his fub«
jecl ; faying, p. 353, that * we cannot
' comprehend the manner in which the
* divme being operates.' But this refuge
is equally untenable in all the cafes, be-
caulc the things themfelves are, in their
own nature, impoflible, and imply a con-
tradiction. I might juft as well fay that,
though to us, whole underitandmgs are
fo limited, two and two appear to make
no more xh^xifour ; yet in the divine mind,
the comprelienfion of which is infinite,
into which, however, we cannot look,
and concerning which it is nnpoflibie,

and

Dr. BE AT TIE'S ESSAY. 175

and even dangerous to form conje6lurcs,
they may make^ve.

Were I pofTeffed of Dr. Beattie's
talent of declamation, and had as little
fcruple to make ufe of it, what might I
not fay of the abfurdity of this way of
talking, and of the horribje immoral con-
lequences of denying the fore-knowledge
of God ? I fhould foon make our author
and all his adherents as black as atheiifs.
The very admiffion of fo untraftable a
principle as contingency into the univerfe
would be no better than admitting the
Manichean doftrine of an independent
evil principle ; nay it would be really of
worfe confequence ; for the one might be
controlled, but the other could not. But
I thank God my principles are more ge-
nerous, and I am as far from afcribing to
Dr. Beattie all the real confequences of
his doftrine, (which, if he could fee with
my eyes, I believe he would reprobate as
heartily as I do myfelf) as I am from ad-
mitting his injurious imputations with re-

fpe6l to mine.

Not-

176 REMARKS ON

Notwithilandin? Dr. Beattie, confiding:
in the foliditv of his own judgment,
ftrcngthened by the fanction of a great
majority of mankind, is pleafed to call
Dr. Hartley a fanciful author, he does
vouchfafe. at the fame time, to call him
an ingenious and worthy one, which, con-
fidering the liorrid confequences he de-
duces Irom his pri-iciples, muft argue a
great deal of candour. But, indeed, I
think it abfolutely impofhble for any per-
fon to read his Obferva ions on inan, and
not lay down the book with the fulleil
conviclion both of the amazing compre-
henfivenefs and llrength of his mind (to
which the trifling t\M\Qi oi ingenious is
very inadequate) and of the piety, bene-
volence and reftitude of his heart. All
who were acquainted with him join their
teliimony to this mternal evidence from
his Vvritings.

Without, however, attempting to ac-
count for this, or any fafts of the fame
kind, our author takes it for granted, p.
473' 35^' that the dodrine of necefhty is

incon-

Dr. BE AT TIE'S ESSAY. 177

inconfiftent with the firft principles of na-
tural religion. After enumerating a
number of abfurd and atheiflical tenets,
he fums up the whole with faying, p. 317,

' and now the liberty of the human

' will is queftioned and debated. What
' could we expe6l but that it fhould (hare

* the fame fate ?' ' To believe,' fays he,
P- 355' 'that the di6lates of confcience

* are falfe, unreafonable, or infignificant,

* is one cenain effe6l of my becoming a
' fatalifi;, or even fceptical with regard to

* moral liberty.' If I could think that
this would be the confequence, I (hould
be very forry to hear of Dr. Beattie's
changing his fentiments on this fubje6l;
but we know very little of our own hearts,
and what we fhould think, feel, or do, in
very new fituations. For my own part,
I doubt not but that this very change of
opinion which he dreads fo much (if it be
not too late for him to bear the fhock
that fo total a revolution in his fyftem of
thinking would occafion) would bear a
very favourable afpe6l on his virtue, and
even make him a better man than he is at

N prefent ;

T78 R E M A R K S O N

prefent; though, by all accounts, he is a
very good one.

As to the hackneyed objeftion to the
doftrine of neceffity, from its being incon^
fiftent with the idea of virtue and vice, as
implying praife and blame, it may be
fully retorted upon its opponents. For
as to their hodHed /elf-detciniining power
(were the thing polTible in itfelf, and did
not imply an abfurdity) by which they
pretend to have a power of a6ling inde-
pendently of every thing that comes un-
der the defcription oF motive, I fcruple not
to fay, that it is as foreign to every idea
of virtue or vice, praife or blame, as the
grofleft kind of mechanifm, that the moft
blundering writer in defence of liberty
ever afcribed to the advocates for moral
neceflity.

It is true that, (Iriftly fpeaking, the
doclrine of neceffity would oblige a man
to depart from the common language in
fpeaking of human aftions : but this makes
no change with refpecl to his conduci»

The

Dr. BE AT tie's ESSAY. 179

The very fame is the cafe with rerpe6t to
the doctrine of the fun Jianding ftill,
Philofophers ufe the language of the
vulgar with refpeft to this fubje6i:, and
even think with them too, except in
their clofets, and when they are explicitly
attending to it. Copernicus and Newton
themfelves, I will venture to fay, not only
talked of the fun riling and fetting, but,
in their ordinary conceptions, had the very
fame ideas that a common farmer annexes
to thofe words. So alio it is impoflible
that, with refpeft to common life, a ne-
ceflarian Ihould have any other ideas to
the words praife and blame (which how-
ever are equally foreign to both the
fchemes of liberty and neceffity, philofo-
phically and ftriftly conhdered) than
other people have, and he will be in-
fluenced as much by them. And as to
the different views that he will be able to
take of thefe things in contemplation, they
appear to me only to remove virtue from
one foundation to place it upon another,
much broader and firmer. Our conduft
depends not upon what we think our con-
N 2 (litution

i8o REMARKS ON

llitution to be, but upon what it really is.
But upon this fubjetl I refer to Dr.
Hartley, both for argument, and example.

Upon this, as upon a former occafion,
I cannot help obferving what different
company I and Dr. Beattie have kept. ' I

* have found,' fays he, p. 344, ' all the

* impartial, the moll fagacious, and wor-
' thy part of mankind, enemies to fatality

* in their hearts.' On the contrary, a
confiderable majority of my acquain-
tance, men of whofe undeiilanding and
hearts not myielf only, but all who know
them have the higheft opinion, have
been, and are, confirmed necelfarians.

For my own part, if I might be al-
lowed to follow Dr. Beattie's example
in appealing to my own experience, I
would tell him that I embraced the doc-
trine of neceffity from the time that I fird
ftudied the fubje6l ; I have been a firm
believer of it ever fince, without having
ever entertained the lead fufpicion of
there being^any fallacy belonging to it;

I meditate

Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. t8i

I meditate frequently upon it, and yet
every confideration of it, and every view
of things fuggefled by it, appears to me
to give an elevation to the fentiments, the
moft exalted conceptions of the great
author of nature, and of the excellence
and perfection of his works and defigns,
the greatefl: purity and fervor to our
virtue, the moft unbounded benevolence
to our fellow creatures, the moft ardent
zeal to ferve them, and the moft unre-
ferved and joyful confidence in divine
providence, with refpe6l to all things,
paft, prefent, and to come.

In (hort, I have no conception that
the man whofe mind is capable of enter-
taining, and duly contemplating vv'hat is
called the do6trine of neceffity, and its
genuine confequences, as unfolded by
Dr. Hartley, can be a bad man ; nay
that he can be other than an extraordi-
nary good one. I am confident that I
ihall improve myfelf continually by fre-
quent 2ind Jieady views of this fabjett,
and fuch as are connected witji it, and
N3 t)y

i82 REMARKS ON

by being a^luated by them more than I
have been. It is true that I had the un-
fpeakable happinefs of a very ftrift and
religious education; but notwithftanding
this, had the do6lrine of necefhty, in:
reahty, any immoral tendency, I am po-
fitive it would have done me an irrepara-
ble injury at the time that I adopted it.

Let Dr. Beattie refleft upon thefe
things with the candour that lam willing
to think is natural to him, and I doubt
not he will feel himfelf difpofed to unfay
fome of the harfh tilings that have
dropped from him on this fubje6l.

That my reader may enjoy the plea-
fure oicontrafi in a higher degree, I fhall
fubjoin to this fecliona fewextrafts from
Mr. Jonathan Edwards, in which he ex-
prefTes his opinion of the unfavourable
tendency of the dodrine of pbilofophi^
cal liberty, which he calls the Arminian
doftrine with refpc6l to virtue and reli-
gion, &c. in his Treatife on free rmll ;
which I had not read till after the whole

of

Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 183

of this book, and even the preface, ex-
cept the paragraph relating to it, was
tranfcribed for the prefs.

- :* An^ii^i^n principles and notions,'
p. 267, ' when fairly examined, and

* purfued in their demonftrable confe*
' quences, do evidently (hut all virtue
' out of the world, and make it im-
' poffible that there fliould ever be any
^ fuch thing, in any cafe, or that any fuch
' thing fhould ever be conceived of. For

* by thefe principles the very notion of
' virtue or vice implies abfurdity ^nd

* contradi6lion.'

. * A moral neceflity of men's actions,'
p. 16, Appendix, * is not at all incon-
' fiftent with any liberty that any creature
-■ has, or can have, as a free, accountable,

* moral agent, and fubjett of moral go-
': vernment. This moral neceflity is fo
" far from being inconfiftent with praife

* and blame, and the benefit and ufe of
' men's own care and labour, that, on the

* contrary, it implies the very ground and

N 4 ' reafon

184REMARKSON

' reafon why men's alliens are to be
' afcribed to them as then" own, in that
' nanner as to infer defert, praife. and
' blame, approbation and reraorfe of con-
' fcience, reward and punifhment ; and it
' eftabhfhes the moral fyftem of the uni-
' verfe, and God's moral government, in
' every refpecl, with the proper ufe of
' motives, exhortations, commands, coun-

* cils, promifes and threatnings, and the

* ufe and benefit of endeavours, care and

* induflry ; and therefore there is no need

* that the Rritt philofophic truth fliould

* be at all concealed from men. So faf

* from this, the truth in this matter is of
' vaft importance, and extremely need-
' ful to be knov/n, and the more con-

* ftantly it is m view the better.'

' The moral neceflity of men's aftions,'
p. 7, ' is requifiie to the being of virtue

* and vice, or any thing praife-worthy or

* culpable ; and the liberty of indifference,
' and contingence, which is advanced in
' oppohtion to that neceffity, is incon-
' fiflent with the bemg of thefe. — If we

' purfue

Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. iS5

* purfue thefe principles,' p. 258, ' v/e fhall

* find that virtue and vice are ^yhoIly ex-

* eluded out of the world, and that there

* never was, or ever can be, any fiich

* thing as one or the other, either in God,

* angels, or men/

* The doclrine of necefTity,' p, 3S5,

* which fuppofes a necellary connexion
' of all events, on fome antecedent ground

* and reafon of their exiftence, is the only

* medium we have to prove the being of
' God. And the contrary doclrine of

* contingence, which certainly implies, or

* infers, that events may come into ex-

* iftence, or begin to be, without de-

* pendence on any thing foregoing, as
' their caufe, ground, or reafon, takes
' away all proof of the being of God.'

* It is fo far from being true,' p. 15,
' that our minds are naturally poflelled

* with a notion of fuch liberty as this, (;o
' ftrongly that it is impoffible to root it
' out) that, indeed, men have no fuch

* notion of liberty at all, and it is utterly

* impolhble^

iS6 R E M A R K S O N

* impoflible, by any means whatfoever;
^ to implant or introduce fuch a notion

* into the mind. — The greateft and moft
' learned advocates themfelves for liberty
'of indifference and felf-determination

* have no fuch notion ; and indeed they
' mean fomething wholly inconfiftent
' with, and direftly fubverfive of, what
' they flrenuoufly affirm, and earneftly
' contend for.'

' All the Arminians on earth/ p. 411,

* might he challenged, without arrogance,

* to make thefe principles of theirvS con-
' fiflent with common ienie, yea and per-

* haps to produce any doclrine ever em-

* braced by the blinded bigot of the

* church of Rome, or the moft ignorant
' MuflTulman, or extravagant enthufiaft,
' that might be reduced to more, and
'more demonftrable inconfiftencies and

* repugnancies to common fenfe, and to
' themfelves ; though their inconfiftencies

* may not, indeed, lie fo deep, or be fo

* artfully vailed by a deceitful ambiguity

'of

Br./'BEATTIE's ESSAY. 187

* of words, and an indeterminate figni-
'- fication of phrafes.'

How very different is the common fenfc
of Mr/ Edwards from the common fenfe
of Dr. Beattie I How uniform and infal-
lible is this guide to truth !

SEC T I O N VI.

The conclujion,

T^T'HEN I confider the many feem^
v^^rjT ,-i^g^y plain and unequivocal marks
df a good intention, and good difpofition
in Dr. Beattie, I am puzzled to account
for his grofs and injurious mifreprefen-
tations of the fentiments of his ad-
verfaries, and at the violence with which
he is aftuated, bordering fometimes upoa
a fpirit of perfecution.

^* The

i8B R E M A R K S O N

* The vulgar,' he fays, p. 49, ' when
' they are puzzled with argument, . have
' recourfe to their common fenfe, and
' acquiefce in it {"o fteadily, as often to
' render all the arts of the logician in-
' effectual ; / am confuted, but not con-
' vinced, is an apology fometimes offered
' when one has nothing to oppofe to the

* arguments of the antagonift ; but the
^ original undifguifed feelings of his own
' mind. This apology is, indeed, very
' inconfiftent with the- dignity of philofo-

* phic pride, which, taking for granted

* that nothing exceeds the limits of hu-
' man capacity, profeffes to confute what-
' ever it cannot believe, and, which is ftill
'^more difficult, to believe whatever if
*^ cannot confute; but this apology may
' be perfedly confiflent with fmcerity and
' candour, and with that principle, of
' which Pope fays, that, though nofcience,
''it is fairly worth the f even J

.Now what is this but infmuating, nay
it is fomething more than infmuating, that
all thofe who do not admit this new doc-
trine

Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 189

trine of the iiifallibility of common fenfe,
are pofTefTed of fo much philofophic pride,
that they take it for granted that nothing
can exceed the limits of their capacity ;
that we profefs to confute whatever we
cannot beUeve, and to beHeve whatever we
cannot confute. But whatever effetl this
reprefentation may have upon thofe who,
knowing but Httle of men and books, are
difpofed to take for granted whatever fuch
a man as Dr. Beattie will venture to affert
fo roundly, it is a mere chimera of his own
brain : and this mode of writing is a mofl;
unjuflifiable method of drawing an odium
upon his opponents, who, perhaps, have
no more philofophic pride than himfelf.
If arrogance and infolence be an indica-
tion of pride. Dr. Beattie has certainly
no fmall fhare of it, though it may hi-
therto have efcaped his own fearch.

His tacking the do61rine of neceffity to
the end of a lift of peculiarly obnoxious
and atheiftical tenets, as if it was the na-
tural and neceiTary completion of the
\/hole fcheme, in the preceding quota-
tion.

i§6 REMARKS ON

tion, is another inftance of his unfairnels,
that looks very hke artifice ; and which
I think exceedingly unjulHfiable. A lit-
tle of irony a.nd Jatyr, and fomething ap-
proaching to afperity, may, perhaps, be
indulged, as in a manner neceflary to
enliven controverfial writing; at leaft it
may be apologized for, as almoft una-
voidably fuggefted by the heat of debate;
but the paffages I have quoted above have
a very different and a more malignant af-
pe6l.

Dn Beattie's vehemence, and his anti-
pathy to diofe who differ from him, though
he is quite a volunteer in the controvcrfy,
and cannot plead that he w^as heated by
any perfonal oppojition, approaches too
near to the fpirit of perfecution. At leaft
I do not fee how elfe to interpret the fol-
lowing paffage, and I earneftly wifh that
the ingenuous author would do it himfelf,
and help us, if it be poffible, to interpret
it without having recouife to fo unfavour-
able a comment. * Had I,' p. 20, * done
* but half as much as he (Mr. Hume) in

* labour-

Dr. BEATTIE's E S S;A Y. 191

' labouring to fubvert principles which

* oucrht ever to be held facred, I know not

* whether ih.Q friends of truth would have
' granted me any indulgence. I am fure
' they ought not. Let me be treated with

* the lenity due to a good citizen no longer
' than I a6l as becomes one.*

Certainly the obvious conftruftion of
this pafTage is, that Mr. Hume ought not
to be treated with the indulgence and
lenity due to a good citizen, but ought
to be puniflied as a bad one. And what is
this but what a Bonner or a Gardiner midit

o

have put into the preamble of an order for
his execution ? Judging as Dr. Beattie
does, by his own ideas of the tendency of
principles, exprefled in this book, he will,
I doubt not, think feveral of my writings,
if they have happened to fall in his way,
and efpecially thefe remarks on his treatife
(in which I own I have endeavoured to lay
the ax to the very root of his fundamental
principles of virtue, religion and truth) to
be equally dangerous, provided he fhould
think them in equal danger of fpreading ;

and.

192 R E M A R K S O N

and, if he be confiftent with himfelf, and
think me worthy of his notice, I (hall ex-
pert, after a fummary procefs before the
tribunal of his common fenfe, to be con-
figned to the difpofal of his friends of
truth, who may not be equally the friends
and lovers of mercy. But, thanks to ti
good fuperintending providence, which
iRfluences the hearts^ and dire6is the af-
fairs of men, our governors either do not
entertain the fentimeuts, or are not in-
fpired with the zeal of our author.

Dr. Beattie and I muft certainly think
and feel very differently with refpeft to
many thmgs. His dread of infidel writ-
ings, and his apprehenfion of the mifchief
they may do, far exceeds mine. * The

* writings of Mr. Hume,' he fays, p. 472,

* notwithflanding their obfcurity, have
' done mifchief enough to make every

* fober-mmded perfbn earneftly wifh that

* they had never exifted.'

Now I, for my part, am truly pleafed
with fuch publications as thofe of Mr.

Hume,

Dr. BEATTIE's ESSAY. 193

Hume, and I do not think it requires any-
great fagacity. Or ftrength of mind, tcyfee
that fuch writings mufl be of great fervice
to religion, natural and revealed. They
hiVe aHually occafioned the fubjecl to
be more thorouglily canvafTed, and con-
fequently to be better underilood than
ever it was before ; and thus vice cotis
funguntur.

In what a wretched flate would chrifti-
anity have univerfally been at prefent,
loaded with fuch abfurdities and impieties
as all the eflablilhments of it contain,
(that of Scotland by no means excepted)
if it had not been for fuch a fcrutiny into
it as the writings of unbelievers have pro-
moted, and indeed have made abfolutely
neceffary.

Infidelity appears to me to have been
the natural and neceffary produce of cor-
rupted chriftianity ; but I have no doubt
but that this evil will find its own remedy,
by purging our religion of all the abfur-
dities it contains, and thereby enabling it
O to

194 • REM ARKS ON

to triumph over all oppofition. Things
are now in fuch a train that infidelity will
have every day lefs and lefs to carp at in
chriftianityi till at length its excellence
.and divine authority will be univerfally
acknowledged.

REMARKS

REMARKS

O N

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL

T O

COMMON SENSE

IN BEHALF OF

RELIGION.

Oil

THE

INTRQPUCTION.

THE controverfy in which I am now
engaged may perhaps illuftrate the
propriety of the old Latin proverb
Principiis objla. Dr. Reid's new princi-
ple of Common fenfe, or, to give it a name
\t.{% ambiguous, and more appropriated
to its office, his fenfe of truth, notwith-
ftanding the prodigious afTurance with
which it was ufhered into the world, and
notwithftanding the manifeft inconfiflency
there is between it and the fundamental
principles of Mr. Locke, concerning the
human mind, was fuffered to pafs without
any particular notice. I fuppofe becaufe
no particular life was made of it. It was
confidered as nothing more than a new-
fafhioned theory of the human mind, ea^
gerly adopted and cried up by fome,
O 3 who.

iqS REMARKS ON

who, in my opinion, were very fuperfi-
, cial j'.idges of luch things; while thofe
who thought with me, that the whole
fyftem was ill founded, did not, I fup-
pofe, think it worth their while to make
any oppofition to it ; concluding that in
due time the futility of it could not fail
to be feen through, when it would fall
into oblivion of itfelf.

Prefently, however, we find two writers,
men of fome note, Dr. Beattie and Dr.
Ofwald, (feeing that this new doftrine of
a fen/e of trutk was received without any
oppofition) beginning to avail themfelves
of it for the defence of religion, and of
fome peculiar tenets of their own, in the
regular proof of which they had been em-
barrafTed. Dr. Beattie, indeed, with fome
degree of moderation and timidity, and
not much in the detail of things ; but
Dr. Ofwald with great particularity, and
with as much bigotry and violence, as if
his principles had been the eftablifhed
faith of all mankind in all ages, and not,
-as in truth they sue, a thing of'yejlerday.

rinding

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 199

Finding this new power of the human
mind to be decifive and irrefiftible within
its jurifdiftion, and requiring no aid from
reafon, he immediately fets about enlarg-
ing its province (as the Englifh govern-
ment have lately done that of Quebec)
throwing into it, without any regard to
reafon or confcience, every thing that
he thought of value, and which he had
found any difficulty in defending upon
©ther principles.

By this means he has eafed himfelf at
©nee of the defence of all the firil princi-
ples, or, as he calls them, primary truths
of religion ; fuch as the being, the unity,
the moral perfeftions, and providence of
God, and a future ftate ; of the evi-
dences alfo of chriftianity, and even many
of his favourite and leaft defenfible doc-
trines in the chriftian fyftem. And, more-
over, on this new ground, as from a fanc-
tuary, he pours the grolTeft abufe both
upon all unbelievers, and thofe who have
oppofed them on the principles of reafon
©niy ; treating them alike as fools'or mad-
O4 men.

200 R E M A R K S O N

men. Dr. Ofwald's treatife, however, as
well as Dr. Beattie's, has many admirers,
both north and fouth of the Tweed.

Finding things in this fituation, I own
I was willmg to interpofe my feeble en-
deavours to put a flop to this fuddeii tor-
rent of nonfenfe and abufe that is pouring
down upon us from the North, though at
the evident rijk of my chdracier, as Dr.
Ofwald, vol. 2, p. 328, .will tell me, ^qd
laying my account with meeting alh that
magifteriai infolence, which he, and in-
deed the whole triuynvirate, have boldly
affumed with refpecl to others.

But if this tafk (hould not be undertaken
by fome perfon, I am afraid we fliall find
thefe new principles extending their au-
thority farther than the precinfts of meta-
phyfics, morals, religion, chriftianity, and
proteflantifm, to which they have been
hitherto confined. Papifis may begin to
avail themfelves of them for the fupport
of all thofe doftrines and maxims for
wiiich the powers of reafon had proved

infufiicient :

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 20^

infufficient ; and politicians alfo, pofTeffinff
therafelves of this advantage, may venture
pnce more to thunder out upon us their
exploded doctrines of pafFive obedience
and non-refiftance. For having now
nothing to fear from the powers o^rea/on,
and being encouraged by the example of
grave divines and metaphyficians, they
inay venture to ^flert their favourite max-
ims with the greatell confidence ; appeal-
ing at once to this ultimate tribunal of
common fenfe, and giving out their own
mandates as the decifions of this new tri-
bunal. For every man will think himfelf
authorized to afiume the office of inter-
preting its decrees, as this new power
holds a feparate office in every man's own
breaft. Indeed our author has left the
politician but little to do with refpetl to
this dodrine, having ranked obedience to
the magiftrate among the primary truths
of nature, p. 247.

Confidering the very late origin of this
new empire of common fenfe, its con-
quefts, it muft be confefled, have been

pretty

S02 R E M A R K S O N

pretty rapid ; and as it has fubdued all
the regions of metaphyficSj morals, and
theology in the fpace of ten years, it
may be computed that, with this addition
of ftrength, it may, in ten years morcj
complete the reduftion of all the'-fevert
fciences ; when the whole bufmefs of
thinking will be in a manner over, anc}
we fhall have nothing to do but to fee
and believe.

Now, being no friend to implicit faith;
becaufe, perhaps, it has been no friend
to me, I am willing to oppofe the farther
encroachments of this bold invader, be-
fore it be quite too late. And having al-
ready made two campaigns in this jufl
caufe, as it appears to me, lam now pre-'
paring for a third, which I forefee will
be more difficult and hazardous than both
the former. Nevertheiefs I will not de-
fpair ; fince, if I mil, I (hall, at ieaft, be
intitled to the epitaph of Phaeton, Mag-
nis tamm e:^cidiiciujis.

But,

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 203

But, dropping this figure, I really am
much more at a lofs how to anfwer Dr.
Ofwald, than either Dr. Reid, or Dr.
Beattie, on account of the great inco-
herence of his work, and hi^ remarkably
loofe and declamatory way of wriring;
©n which account his argument is lb in-
volved, that there is hardly any fuch thing
as coming at it ; fo that, though I have
often faid, that if I have any talent, it is
a facility in arrangement, I own that, for
once, I have been exceedingly puzzled,
and do not clearly fee my way. I fliall
proceed, however, in the beft manner
that I can ; giving, in the firft place, the
hiftory of this new fcience, as deduced
by our author ; then explaining the na-
ture and extent of it ; after which I (hall
fliow more particularly the relation it
bears to reafoning, and point out fome
particular applications that our author has
made of it.

In all this I fhall do little more than
fele6i and arrange a number of paflages
t;hat I have colietted from our author.

For

?o4 REMARKS ON

for I muft acknowledge, that if he, has
epibarraffed me, and taken up my time
in the difpofition of my materials, he has
made me amends by faving me the trou-
J)Ie of making many obfervations. Ir^
facl, I fhall have occafion to do little
niore than let our author fpeak for him-
felf, only putting his words a little nearer
together than he would have done.
And as our author feems to have had
great fatisfaclion in the firft publica-
tion of his work, I hope he will not be
difpleafed at this new edition of it. For
whatever my reader may think of him, as
a reafoner, my quotations cannot fail to
verify the character that Dr. Beattie
(whofe judgment in this cafe no perfon
will call in queftion) gives of him, viz.
that he is an elefrant writer.

SEC-

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. ^

SECTION i.

Of the Hiftory oj Common fenfc ,

f'T has b^en a great lofs to hiftbry, that
■ tfie pVincipal a6tors in many great
idhie^r'einerits have not themfelv^s written
the hiftory of them. But Dr. Ofwald
has taken fufficient c£jre that there {hould
be no cotnplaint of rhi^ kind with refpe^l
to ' the late triumph of fcnfe over" reafdri.
For though he himfelf is but thte feco'nd
iti fucceflion from Dr. Reid, who plahnted
arid began the attack, he has taken an
opportunity of fully ftating the ground
bf the War, and informing us of the pro-
grefs that his predecelTor had made in it.

The more fully to explain the rife of
this ne\<r fyflem, our author goes back to
the times preceding the reformation from
popery. Speaking of this popifh dark-
nefs, he fays, p. 52, ' Upon confulting

* the facred records, and appealing to

* 'them' (riot redfoning from them) ' one

' half

2o6 -REMARKS ON.

half of Chriftendom were made fenfible
of their folly, and (hook off the domi-
nion of ignorance and error. They

fplit again into fefts, formed different
creeds, and different plans of worfhip
and government ; and having been
much exercifed in fubtle and hot dif-
putes with the Romifh doftors, they
entered into contefls of much the fame
kind, and in much the fame fpirit, with
one another, about their peculiar tenets.
Mean time, a fe8; arofe who called the
whole in queflion ; and, believing them-
felves equally privileged with otliers to
found unfathomable depths, they em-
ployed the fame fubtlety of reafoning
againft religion which contending di-
vines had employed againft each other;
and the friends of religion, not aware
Qf.:.the confequence, did partly from
their zeal for the truth, and partly from
a habit of difputing, and a confidence
* of victory, admit the whole to debate.'

Religion being now, through the fatal
imprudence of its belt friends, and the

ableft

Dr. OSWALD'S APPKAL. so;

ableft that the times (which produced no
fuch men as Dr. Reid, Dr. Beattie, or
Dr. Ofwald) afforded, become a fubjecl
of debate, divines were obliged to rtiake
the bed of the arms with which they were
furniihed for the engagement. How
things were condii6led before the time of
Mr. Locke our author does not parti-
cularly lay^ but though his writings were
univerfally thought to be of great advan-
tage to the caufe. of truth and rehgion,
yet Dr. Ofwald informs us that he fet out
v/rong, and thereby gave the enemy too
great advantage.

'Mr. Locke, p. 108, unfortunately,

* derived all our knowledge from fenfa-
' tion or refleclion, intirely overlooking
' another principle, more important than

* them both, and without which they are
*ofno avail. Senfation and reflection,'
our author fays, * do indeed give occafion
' to all our ideas, but they do not pro-

* duce them. They may, in our prefent

* ftate, be confidered as th^^ne qua non
' to our mod rational and fublime con-

* ceptionsj

2oS R E M A R K S O N

* ceptrons, but are not therefore the poH^f"-

* ers by which we form them. Thefe

* conceptions are formed in us by anothef

* and different power, which Mr. Locke^

* and unhappily, afrer him, the bulk of

* the learned, have overlooked. In this/
' p. log, he has committed a capital over-

* fight of very bad confequence. He has

* not only put the learned upon a falfe

* fcent^ but has brought the primary

* truths of nature under fufpicion, and

* opened a door touniverfal fcepticifm.'

At this door, fet open by Mr. Locke,
Mr. Hume and others have found ad-
miffioh. * Hence, p. no, difpiites
' upon the moft important fubj^ds have
' been maintained, to the detrivnefit oF
' rehgion, and the difgrace of the huhian
'' tmderftanding ; nor will it be poffibl6

* to put an end to thefe difputes, without
' fearching farther into the powers of th^

* human mind than Mr. Locke has done/

To purfue this curious hiflory a little
farther, * Mr. Hume had penetration

* enough/

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 209

* enough/ p. 110, ' to perceive the defe6l
' of Mr. Locke's hypothefis, but had not

* the courage to f-ipply that defeft, by the
' only way in which it could be fupphed.

* Perhaps he fufpefted that philofophers

* would not fubmit to the authority of

* common fenfe, or was himfelf too much

* a philofopher to have recourfe to an
' authority fo vulgar and homely. He
' therefore found himfelf under a necef-
' fity of making the belt account he

* could of the phenomena of nature by
' the received do6irine of the conneftion

* and affociation of ideas ; and it muft

* be owned that his account is extremely
' ingenious.'

' The author of the EJfays on the prin-
' ciples of morality and natural religion^
' pubhflied Edinburgh, 1751, p. 94, 112,

* alarmed at Mr. Hume's confounding

* rational belief with credulity, and deny-

* ing the connexion between caufe and

* effeft, has faid all that is neceffary in

* confutation of his opinion ; but he has

* -confuted Mr, Hume upon principles too

P ^ muck

210 R E M A R K S O N

* much a-kin to his own. He has recourfe
' to our being fo conftituted that we mufl

* perceive, feel, and beheve certain truths,
' w^ithout laying open the human confti-
' tution, or once attempting to point out
' that in our frame which produces the

* way of thinking, which hejuftly fays is

* unavoidable. That certain perfons are
' fo conftituted is perhaps all the account
' that can be made of odd and fanciful
' perceptions or feelings ; but a more fa-

* tisfaclory account ought to be given of

* the primary truths of nature. He has
' not beflowed that attention on the lead-

* ing power which is due ; nor feems he
' to have reached a true and full view of

* the charafteriflic of a rational beina;/

p. 114.

After thefe grofs blunders of Mr.
Locke, Mr. Hume, and the author of
the EfTays, it is pleahng to obferve the
approach that was made towards the dif-
' CO very of this great principle of common
fenfe by Mr. Hutchefon. ' Mr. Hutche-
' fon/ p. 158, * thought that he had made

' a dif-

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 211

' a difcovery of a new faculty of the hu-

* man iriind, which he Was intitled to call
' by a new name, and thereby gave of-
^ fence to the friends of demonltration ;

* but in reality this great philofopher had
' only, got a view, and but a partial view

* of common fenfe.'

Behold, however, at length, the great
defideratum completely difcovered; and
after this ftate of deplorable darknefs and
obfcure gueflTmgs, full day light is diffufed
by Dr. Reid. * Dr. Reid,' vol. 2, p. 329,

* has put an effeftual ilop to the artifices
' of fceptics, by pointing out three
' powers of the mind, evidently diftinft,

* and eafily diflinguifhed,' meaning per-
ception, memory, and imagination ; the
operations of two of which imply the
belief of the real exiftence of their re-
fpeftive objecls. * We have found then,'
fays our author, p. 268, ' a fource of
' ideas that has been too long over-
' looked, and in it have found the much

* contefted fource of moral obligation.

* Theology and ethics are now to be

P 2 ' con-

212 R E M A R K S O N

* confidered as a real fcience, founded on
' principles of indubitable certainty ; prin-
' ciples, which, if they are not as much

* regarded, are, however, intitled to equal

* regard with the axioms of the fchools —
' the principles of common fenfe.'

' Of late, p. 168, there has appeared

* All inquiry into the human mind, on the
'principles of common fenfe, by Dr. Reid,

* in which he aives fuch an account of the

* operations of our powers, as fliews it to
' be impoffible for a rational being to

* doubt the reality of the objefts of fenfe,

* and gives us ground to expeft, from a
^ farther purfuit of his inquiry, fuch a dif-

* play of the powers of the Imman mind

* as will render it impoffible for any one

* to doubt of the obvious truths of religion

* and virtue, without being con lifted of
' folly or madnefs ; fo that the triumph of

* truth over error, and of true fcienceover

* falle philofophy may not be vtxy diftant.

* Upon the whole, p. 169, we are ar-

* rived at a period, in which, if it is not

* our

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 213

' our own fault, we may difmifs frivolous
' controverfies, and fettle in the belief of
* primary truth upon the moft folid foun-
' dation/

It is my misfortune, or, as Dr. Ofwald
fays above, my fault, that I cannot as
yet difmifs all controverfy, and fettle up-
on this folid foundation.

SECTION II.

Of the nature, limits, and general \x{& of
the principle of Common fenfe,

TTAVING feen the hiflory of this great
difcovery deduced, with a folemnity
worthy of its importance, my reader, if
I had not in fome meafure gratified his
curiofity already, in my account of Dr.
Reid's and Dr. Beattie's performances,
would have been impatient to be inform-
ed more particularly what this common
P 3 fenfe

214 REMARKS ON

fenfe is. I can promife him, however,
that though he has leen much, there is
more to be feen ; and that he will get new
light and information from this and the
following fedions.

In the firft place, I fiiall prefent him
with Dr. Ofwaid's idea of the nature, \
limitSy and general nfes of the faculty of
common fenfe. 1

According to our author, this new-
difcovcred faculty is the * leading and fu-
' preme power of the rational mind,' as
he defcribes it in the following paffage,
in which he alfo mod pathetically laments
that it has been hitherto much over-
looked and negleded.

' The powers of compounding,' p. 86,

* dividing, and abflra6ling our ideas have
' been unfolded with the greateft accu-
' racy and judgment ; but its leading
' power, that which is fupreme in the
' rational mind, and is its chief preroga-

• tive and charaderiflic, has been much

* neg-

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 215

' negle6led. Its objefts are not enume-

* rated, its extent is not known, and its
'^ authority is little regarded. For which

* reafon a ftandard of theologic, ethic,
' and political truth is to this hour a defi-
' deratum with the learned. On all thefe

* fubjetls we are become expert reafon-

* ers, but hardly know when or where to

* flop, or how to form a firm and iteady

* judgment/

The great importance of this principle
may farther appear from the following
cenfure of Mr. Locke. ' There is a ne-

* ceflity of declaring,' p. 70, * in plain

* terms, that Mr. Locke, in his account

* of the origin of our ideas, is guilty of
' an overfight of very bad confequence.

* If, as our author reprefents, we can

* have no ideas befides thofe ariling im-
' mediately from imprefiTions made on our

* organs of fenfe, or our own refle6lions

* upon thofe, then the authority of com-

* mon fenfe mufl go for nothing, and a

* free fcope is given to fcepticifm with re-

P 4 * fpea

2i6 REMARKS ON

' f^e6l to all truths that are not the im«
' mediate objefts of fenfe.*

If we a(k why this new faculty is to be
C2\\^A fenfe, or comraon fenfe (for as to a
regular definition, that he abfolutely de-
clines giving us, leaving us to make it
out as we can) he anfwers as follows,

* This characleriftic power of the rational
' mind/ vol. 2, p. iv. Advertifement, ' on
' account of its quicknefs, clearnefs, and

* indubitable certainty, is called fenfe, and

* on account of its being poffeffedin one
' degree or other by all of the rational

* kind, is called common fenfe.' In this
I would obferve that our author differs
from Dr. Beattie, who only fays that this
common fenfe is given to a great majority
of mankind.

The great ufe of this common fenfe is
that, inftead olhTivmg perceptions or emo-
tions for its obje£l, like the other fenfes,
it is employed about the more important
bufmefs of truth ^ which it fuggefts with-
out

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 217

out the help of any proper evidence ;
and yet it is the means of making the
greatefl and mod in:^ortant dircoveries.

* Mr. Locke unhappily overlooked the
•* chief inlet to truth,' voL 2, p. 42. ' That
' difcoveries may be made in the arts and

* fciencesby reafoning will not be denied;
' but that difcoveries more numerous,
' more ufeful, and more certain may be
' made in both by a judicious attention

* to the operations of nature, cannot be

* doubted.' p. 34.

But the mod important ufe of this new
principle is derived from its relation to
morals. It is * the faculty of diftin-

* guifhing between fit and unfit, right

* and wrong in condu6l.' p. 119.

This principle of common fenfe our
author alfo confiders as ' the charac-
' teriflic of rationality* p. 102. ' We

* are not diftinguifhed/ he fays, p. 114,

* from ideots and the lower animals by

* perceptions, feelings, and inftin6live

* emo*

2i8 R E M A R K S O N

' emotions. We have perceptions fpeci-

* fically different from thefe, which the
' lower animals have not,' p. 116, * viz,
' the perception of obvious truth and pal-
' pabie abfurdity,' p. 1 1 7. * Mr. Locke/
p. 179, ' was guilty of a capital overfight;

* in making abifraclion the charafteriftic
' of rationality. There is another faculty

* which makes a yet more perfect diftinBion
' between men and brutes, the faculty, to
*" wit, of perceivingand pronouncing upon
' the connexion which fubfifts between
' qualities and powers, and thefubie6i:s to

* which they belong ; of which faculty if

* the brutes were pofleffed, there feems no

* ground to doubt of their power of ab-
' llratling, occafionally, thofe qualities
' »jnd powers, in the fame manner we do.*

So plain is it, that it is this common
fenfe that makes the difference between
men and the lower animals, that, accord-
ingto our author, none but thofewhoare
themfelves ideots can doubt of it. ' That

* we are diftinguifhed by a fet of ideas,
^ and a fydem of knowledge fpecifically

* different

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 219

' different from theirs (the brutes) might
' without more ado be appealed to the
' brealt of every man who is above the
' rank of an ideot ; were it not that the

* learned lay us under a neceflity of giv-
' ing them in detail.* p. 189.

It is the poflefTion of this faculty of
€ommon fenfe that diflinguifhes men from
ideots no lefs than from the lower ani-
mals. ' The characlerillic of ideotifni

* confifts in an incapacity to diftinguilh
' between chance and defign.' Vol. 2,

P- 55*

We fhall now confider how this new
faculty, is to be diftinguifhed from the old
ones, and firfl from intuition ; with refpeft
to which we fhall find there has been fome
little flu6luation in our author's judgment,
which appears to be rather unufual with
him.

' The man who from the looks, gc-
' ftures, and fpeech of his adverfary, fees

* rage and rcfentment, which are not,

* ftriaiy

22® REMARKS ON

' ftri6lly fpeaking, obje6ls of intuition,
' has the fame information of thofe paf-

* (ions as he has ofany other reality, which

* he perceives intuitively by his external

* and internal fenfes/ p. 238. ' If I be
' alked whether primary truths are difco-

* vered by intuition, the anfwer will be in
' the negative ; becaufe intuition has been
' confined to our perceptions of the ob-
' vious relations and qualities of being.'
But he affirms, at the fame time, that our
knowledge of primary truths is equally
certain and indubitable as that of intui-
tion, p. 238.

Afterwards our author owns that the
knowledge we acquire by common fenfe
is properly intuitive. ' I was,' fays he,
p. 357, ' too fcrupulousonthat occafion.

* Our knowledge of primary truth has an
' equal title with our knowledge of all

* other felf-evident truths to be refolved

* into intuition/

Our author dillinguiflies the informa-
tions of common fenfe from thofe of ex-
perience'.

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. £2t

perience, as being more certain. ' I do
' not/ p. 361, * found our belief of pri-

* mary truths on experience alone ; for
' experience alone doth not produce cer-

* tainty. The unthinking part of man-

' kind,' p. 363, ' are often governed folely

* by experience in much the fame man-
' ner as children and ideots ; but men of
' underftanding fearch for a more firm
' foundation of their faith. — The vulgar

* are not accurate reafoners. and yet you

* will find that they do not chufe to reft

* in experience alone.'

It has been feen above that our author
complains of the author of the Eflaysfor
confuting Mr. Hume upon principles too
near a-kin to his own. However I muft.
own that, for my part, I can fee no mate-
rial difference between the fentiments of
the author of the Effays, as explained by
our author, and thofe of Dr. Ofwald him-
felf. ' He has recourfe, Tays our author,
p. 112, 'to our being fo conftituted that
' we muft perceive, feel, and believe cer-

* tain truths, without laying open the

^ human

222 RE MARKS ON

* human conftitLition, are once attempting

* to point out that in our frame whicli
' produces a way of thinking, which he
' jultly fays is unavoidable.' Now it ap-
pears to me that all the more fatis factory
account that Dr. Ofwald himfelfcan give
of this part of my conilitution, and all
that he and Dr. Reid have done towards
laying it open, is merely verbal, viz. giv-
ing a 7iame to this unknown fomething,
calling it common fenfe . But v/hat addi-
tion is this to our knowledge of the
fubjea?

Our author appears to be a little em-
barraffed about the boundary between
the province of reafon and that of com-
mon fenfe, in the bufinefs of inferring the
laws of nature from the phenomena.
This has hitherto been afcribed to reafon,
but our author, defirous to find fufficient
employment for his new principle, is un-
willing to admit of this, except in a quali-
fied fenfe. ' It is common to fay.' p. 235,

* that we infer the laws of nature from

* the phenomena ; but that way of fpeak-

' ing

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 225

' ing is not philofophically, nor flriftly

* true. In every juft inference there is a
' reference to fome well known truth, by
' the help of which the inference is made,

* and on the truth of which its judnels
' depends. But there is no truth in na-
' ture by which we can infer thofe realities
' which are not the objecls of fenfe from

* thofe that are. From the appearance

* of fmokc we infer fire. Why.t^ Becaufe

* we know the connection between the
' one and the other. Thus fome general
' truth is always underflood, on the
' knowledge of which the inference de-
' pends.'

But he afterwards favs, ' if any,' vol. 2,
p. 36, ' chufe to fay that they infer the
' primary truths from the phenomena,
' we allow the phrafeology, upon condi-

* tion they keep in mind, that the inference

* refults immediately and unavoidably

* from due attention to the objett, and
' without the help of any middle term.

* Or if they chufe to call fuch obvious

* and neceffary deductions reafoning, wc

' will

224 REMARKS ON

* will not difpute about a word, provided
' they allow that fuchreafoningis notfub-

* jeft to the danger of thofe errors and

* miftakes we are liable to in every other

* exercife of the difcurfive faculty.'

Some of the di6lates of this general
principle of common fenfe, our author
inarms us, are the mathematical axioms ;
and the difference between thefe and other
primary truths he explains as follows.

* The difference between the evidence

* for mathematical axioms and that which

* we "have for other primary truths is

* merely circumftantial/ p. 139. *^ In

* judging of mathematical axioms you fee

* the ground on which you proceed,

* which you donot fee in judging of many
' other truths, on which we pronounce

* with equal ceVtainty,' vol. 2, p. 324.
So that whether we fee the ground on
which we walk, or not, we may proceed
witli equal confidence, being equally fe-
cure from falling.

SEC-

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 425

SECTION III.

Of the fufficiency and, univerfality of the
principle of Common fcnfe.

/CONSIDERING the very important
^^ nature, high rank, and authority of
common fenfe, my reader wiJl be pleafed
to be informed of xhe^ fufficiency and uni"
verfality of it, and of the confidence with
which its diftates may, and ought to be
deHvered, whenever fceptical reafoners
call them in queftion.

* The principles of good fenfe are (b
' plain,' fays our author, p. 17, ^ that to

* illuftrate and inculcate them is to tire

* the patience, and affront the judgment

* of the reader. The human mind/ p.
8, ' has a power of pronouncing, at firft

* fight, on obvious truth with a quicknefs,

* clearnefs, and indubitable certainty, fi-
' milar, if not equal, to the information

* conveyed by the external organs of

* fenfe. Its exercife begins in children

0 • with

2j6. .RiE:MA R K S O N

* with the firft dawn of rationality, and

* not till, then ; and is ever after enjoyed,
' in fome degree, by learned and un-

* learned, and by every individual of the
'humankind, who is notan ideot, and

* fomehow difordered in his intelle61;uals.
' No man can be at a lofs,' p. 249, * to

* know the propofitions that are the ob-
*^je6ls of common fenfe from thofe that

* iare riot^ and to determine with himfelf
' whether he has, or has not, a right to
*-f(ifper^4 his judgment.'

Confidering that the di6lates of this
common fenfe are fo clear, and likewife
univ^rfsbit^Oux author mud not be.cen-
furcd' when -he treats thofe who do riot
liflen to them with. ^ feverity fuited to
their defpera|.e folly and .madnefs ; even
though* uppn fome particular occafions
be flioujd'ifo far tranfgrefs the fcripture
yule, as tp call his brother a/i?(?/.

* Jf yoi^r adverfary,' p. 12, 'have the
"*.bo]dr)els tb queftion the truth of firft
/ prificiplesj pr tp lubftitute chimeras,
lji:v/» *inftead \

Dr. OSWALD'S ;APPE:AL. 227

* inftead of principles, you muft necefla-

* rily appeal to common knk ; and if you
' do fo/you mufhfhow him how far he

* deviates from tite ftandard appealed to,

* i. t. in other, words you mult convift

* him of nowfmfe. The harih expreliion
*" may and ought to be avoided, but the
'idea conveyed by it muft be kept in

* view. Without that you do nothing.

* Your appeal will be found frivolous

* and unjud:.'

* It is impoffible/ p. 134, ' to obferve

* inferior animals move hither and thither

* by the direction of their appetites and

* inclinations without conceiving the idea

* of that felf-determining power by which

* they a6l, &c. If any one has attended
' to fuch operations, without arriving at

* the knowledge and belief of fuch princi-

* pies of a^lioUj we do not blame the

* dulnefs or flownefs of his apprehenfion,

* but without fcr^jiple pronounce him a

Q 2 So

22S R E M A R K S O N

So abundantly fufiicient are the dilates
pf this common fenfe, that in many cafes
they even fuperfede allother helpsto truth.
With refped to religion more efpecially
we are much better without them. They
only embarrals and perplex us.

* I fhould not be very glad/ fays our
author, p. 353, * to fee a demonftration
/ of the being and perfeftions of God that

* would ftand the fevereft trial : For a de-
..* monftration equal to any in Euclid could

* add nothing to the belief that every ratio-

* nal being has of it. You may reft

* aflured,' p. 354, ' that the beft proof

* or demonllration of thefe truths is that
' you cannot admit the fuppofition of the

* contrary, v/ithout your being confcious
' of your playing xhefoolox the madman.*
He recoramtnds, p. 92, ' ?.lTerting in a
' high tone, t);;;t no demouftration is of
' equal force wiili coromou fenfc, and no

* confutation can ferv^ethe interefl of truth
' fo effeftually, as a plain convi6lion of

* nonfenfe. And therefore/ fays he, • it

* was

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 229

' was the bufinefs of divines and phil.^fo-
' phers to have recourfe to the fimplc de-

* cifion of common fenfe, on rubje61s fo

* plain and important. Too much can

* hardly be faid/ p. 171, 'to perfuade

* men to put lefe confidence in the faculty

* of reafoning, andmore in the faculty of

* judgment than they commonly do.'

Such firm hold have the principles of
common fenfe on the bulk of mankind,
that no perfon who has any regard to his
reputation will ever dare to call them in
queftion ; fo that we may be perfe6lly eafy
in refting the caufe of religion upon this
iblid foundation. * If one incline,' vol. 2,
p. 328, * to fet afide the authority of

* reafon' (as diftinguifhed from reafoning^
p. 327) * and deliver himfeif over to fancy,

* he may ufe what freedoms he will with

* primary truths, but not with fafety to

* his ch4ra6ler. One mud either admit

* all obvious trutis, or fall under the im-
' putation of folly and nonfenfe. This
\ is learned nonfenfe.' p' Q27j * and fo are

230 R E M A R K S O M

' all the furmifes that can be offered
' agaiiiij: Jricbifcatable truths- •.

Con{i<iering how amply the dilates, of
common fenfe are guarded hy their own
evidence,, and - the fanftion of all man-
kind, in fo niucrH that every rnan mult be
confcious that he is playing the fool or tfie
madman who ihall prefume to gainfay
them, t4hat'hi G^rfot do itwiihfofety to
Jus char^cier, *^at every man who heatls"'
him ha«' at'. -right to^dl him to Ms f&oe'
that he talks- v/)nf€njei and even need not
fcrnple t<^' call him ?t. fodi, it is rather
wonder fqlthot our author (hould v/ant
any other guard for his primary truths?
and yet he, as well as Br. Beattie, give^
hints that the* aid of the inagijirate, 2iX\d.^
little wholefome fe verity, might not.be.
improper ; provided that, contrary to his
expectation, the above mentioned guards
fhould prove not to be quite fufficient for
fo great and good a purpofe. But, in
fa6l, no people have been fo ready to
have recourie to perfecution, as thofe

who

Dr. aSWA'L'D's; APP£AL. 231

who have pretended to infallibility. This
was the cafe both'with the infallible church
of Rome, and the no lefs infallible Calvin.
Countenanced by thefe great (Example's,
the patrons of common fenf^, which is
as infallible as either of them can pretend
to be, need not be afhamed to do fts they
did. .s.Lj>.'

' All pbffibfe erTmurag^mem,"^ 'feys'onf
author, vol. 2f, p.335, *oughttobegiv6il

* to rational and juft, and all manner df

* difcouragement to foolifh and nonfeh-

* fical way of talking. No pleafantry, nb
*' vivacity, no appearance of wit atfd hu^

* ttiour, ought to atone .fofnonfenft eft

* any fubjeft, efpecially in th'ofe of th^
' greateft weight and importance."' ^It
' were even to be wifhed that the civil

* TMgiJtrati were authorized td ^"t a,

* ftigma on palpable abfurdity,''5Vr fub-

* jeds where the honour of God and the

* intereft of mankind are deeply con-

* cerned. But as this might be danger*
' ous, it is alfo unneceffary.*

9.A S E C-

S32 REMARKS ON

S E C T I O N IV.

Of the natural imperfe6lions ani^ectf-
fary culture of Common fcnfen^'^'^^ j

T EST the idea which my reader vrill
"^ naturally conceive of the power and
influence of common fenfe, frotn the con-
tents of the laft feftion, Ihould lea4 him
to expeft from it more than he will find,
it is necelTary, before we procexsdi any
farther, to apprize him, that here, as in
/ many oth. r cafes, (examples of which he
will find in abundance in the profecution
of his ftudies) fad and experience do
not exactly tally with the pifcconceived
theory.

He would too naturally imagine that
the principle which diRinguilhes every
individual of the human race, being the
very charaB:eriftic of rationality, which
pronounces with quicknefsy dearnefs, and
indubitable certainty, on all primary
truths, and which was intended by our

maker

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAX. '233

maker to be an almoft infallible diredion,
in the whole condud of life , and efpecially
in matters of ?'^/z^Z(? 72, would be a fove-
reign and efFeclual antidote, or rather
preventive, of all error, impofition and
vice ; and that upon this foundation the
empire of truth and virtue would be le-
curely and for evereftablifhed.

But, alas! our authbr, having; fi©
doubt for good reafons, given this exer-
cife to our imaginations, thinks proper to
■ give us a lelTon of humility, patience,
and induftry, by acquainting us, that^ in
• fa6l, the di6tates of common fenfe are=very
' little known or regarded in the woiW ;
for that, what througli thfe kffer en-
croachment of vulgar prejudice onvone
fide, and the greater and bolder en-
croachments of philofophy on the'^^ther,
her authority is almoft annihilated ;"fo
t?hat almoft all received opinions and
eftabliftied maxims are fundamentally
wrong.

All

834 REMARKS ON

All this, however, is eafily explained
and accounted for, by a little variation
in the idea he had firft given us of this
wonderful power: and which, in'f^ft*,
only ferves to raife our admiration of it
higher than ever. Before hie' <i6\ri:-
pared it to ^fenfe in general, now'tti-W-
fembles the m oft perfe6^ of all the fenfes
the eye, which we have a power of ren-
dering quite ufelefs to tis by coveving
it with the eye-lid, w^hich nature has;' t6
be fure, provided for that purpofc; !^ft by
the too free ufe both of the external afrwi
internal eye, we (hould injure them,, and
thereby intirely deprive ourfelyes of
them. And though no man ever vo-
luntarily fhut up his external eyes,' ex-
cept to relieve them, and make them
more ferviceable to him afterwards ; yet
men are almoft univerfally difpofedto do
this with refpeft to the eye of the mihcf,
taking particular pleafurein thedfverfion
which in the country is called blind-
mans-hjff.

K\

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 235

. ' As the eye,' fays our author, p. 361,
Vhaa ft power of letting m more or lefs
* light, fo the mind has a power of ad^
' -jTHttiing thefe t/uths ia a greater or lefs
' degree at pleafure.*

Again, whereas the other fenfes are

improved by exereife to a certain de-

gitt, this internal fefife is capable of in-

de^uite improve«aeijt, even ad infinitum ;

fatth&t Uipugh die eye and ear admit of no

fenfibie ; iiTiptoveiaajent ftom ten to four-

fcpre yearsf, this eye of the mind is

improved, as our author has found by

comipujtaiion, in an exaft arithmetical

ratio- with the application of it. Forw'ith

the 'Cye.of the mdnd ydu fee every thing

juft a thoufand times better for having

looked at them a thoufand times. A man,

therefore, who has but juft begun to make

ufe of his common fenfe is no more fit to

hold an argument with a man w^ho has

grown expert in t-he ufe of it, than a

man with his naked eyes only can difpute

about the fpots of the fun with one who'

has got a telefcope. The latter fees a

thoufand

236 R E M A R. K S O N .^

• •' - .1'' '■

thoufand thiogsin ©bjefts that the former
cannot poffibly fee at alj. How this can
be reconciled with the fa6l, of mankind
not improving in knowledge, but fome-
times going backwards, I leave to our
author's i^/m*^ publication on thefubje6l.

* It may feem a paradox/ fays our au-
thor, vol. 2, p. 349, ' but it is a certain
' truth that common fenfe, as it is in-
* deed more worthy, fo it is nolefs capa*
^tble. of culture than any other of our fa^
^> Celtics, We do not pretend,' p, 255,
'* to xletermine the degree of certainty at
' which he will arrive, for that will be
' proportioned to the degree of rationa-
3*;]3ty of which he is poffeffed ; but he
fr<pay promife himfelf fatisfa£lion fuited
'6?to- the 6xercife he gives his good fenfe
^sSand probity on this important occafion.
^ This prefcription is no lefs proper for
V ^ tl^.e unthinking part of mankind, than
af for profelTed fceptics. Many take pri-
/innary.ritfuths for granted, without at-
>*keflding to their evidence ; who, if they.
.fjjtOQk :the trouble of comparing them

' with

Dr. OSWALDll APPEAL. 237

' with the oppofite abfurdities, would be-
' lieve them more cordially, and feel their

* influence upon the temper and manner

* more fenfibly than they do.*

«'^^ He who has diftinguifhed fifty times,*

* vol. 2, p. 346, * between obWous truth

* and arbitrary conceit, pronounces with
' a clearnefs of perfuafion fifty times

* greater than that with which another

* pronounces, who has difcerned the dif-

* ference but once only* and he who ha«

* diftinguifhed a hundred times, pro-

* nounces with a quicknefs and firmnefs
' a hutidred times greater,' &c*

To'improve upon this hint, fuppofe
our amhor were to draw up a lift of pri-
mary truths, get it printed, and, in order
to employ the civil magiftrate in pre*
venting rather than punifliing error, let
hini compel every child, from the very
firft dawn of rationality, to repeat them
fifty or a hundred times every morn-
ing. We knew before that fuch an ex-
ercife would ftrengthen the I'oicey and

now

238 RE WA HCJC SON .:

now we have rearori to think it would
contribute no lefs toftrengthen thejttd^^*
7nent. The danger would be left, by this
exercife, mankind (hould be too know-
ing for their rank in the creation.

This doftrine of Dr. Ofwald's con-
cerning the improveablenefs ©f the fa-
culty of common fenfe by culture, it may
be proper to obferve, is the very reverfe
of Dr. Beattie's fentiments on the fame
fubje6t. In his comparifon of reafon and
common fenfe, p. 47, he fays, that tha
former is more in our poxoer than the
latter. He adds, * There are few facul-
' ties, either of our mind or body, more

* irtiproveable by culture than that of

* reafoning ; whereas common fenfe, like
*''6ther inftin6ls, arrives at maturity with

* almoft no care of ours.' This, and
other points of difference, I hope thele
learned doftors will fettle between them-
felves, before they join their forces for
their common defence.

This

Dr. OSWALDS APPEAL. 239

This . opening of the intelledual eye
mnll^ iiowever, be a very difagreeable
and painful operation ; or, fince the ad-
vantages of keeping it open are fo very
great, one would think that men would
have hit upon fome contrivance to keep
them always open. Whereas, on the
c<)ntrary, they feem to have got fome ex-
traordinary, and mod efFeftual method of
keeping their eye-lids down.

* It is,' fays our author, fpeaking oE
common fenfe, p. 17, * the gift of heaven.,
' but needs to be flirred up ; and has been

* fo long and univerfally neglefted, that
' to give it full exercife, requires more

* attention, and application of thought,,
*. than mofl people are willing to beftow.
' The principles of good fenie, ibid, are
^ diametrically oppofite to received opi-
' nions, and eftablifhed maxims.'

■ But, notwithftanding this, common
fenfe has more hold of the vulgar, than
it has of the learned. ' There are thofe,'
p. 274, ' not indeed of the unlearned,

'bwt

240 REMARKS ON

' but among the learned, who diflrefl the
' authority of comir.ou fen^e, and {eem
' to doubt its exiftence ; and fome there
' are who pofitively affirm that there nei-

* ther is, nor can be, any fuch thing. In

* truth, the unlearned are the only peo'

* pie who retain a clear idea of common

* fenfe, and appeal to it as an oracle, and

* the learned only are fceptical. You

* fliall not find a man of fenfe among the

* unlearned who hefitates, and fcarce will
' you find one among the learned who

* doth not. Such are the bleffed effeds of

* modern learning.'

If the too fagacious reader Ihould dif-
cover any thing like inconfiftency be-
tween this quotation and the preceding,
he (houid confider that, though I have
brought them together, one of them is
taken from p. 17, and the other from
p. 274, which are fufficiently diftant from
one another. In the following para-
graphs our author explains tlie reafon of
this departure from common fenfe, both
in the vulgar and in the learned.

'As

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 24^.

* As-thc vulgar, through the groflhefs

* of their conceptions, have lame and
/ confufed ideas of primary truths, fo

* the learned have puzzled themfelves

* and others about them by the arts of
5 reafoning, to which they have been fo
l4ong and fo violently attached. So

* that, in fa£t, the common people de-

* prive themfelves of the bleffingg of
' common fenfe by thinking too little,
^and the learned by thinking too much,'

Befides the general defers, and neg-
le6ls, relating to this power of common
fenfe, it feems to be more efpecially de-
fetlive in its information concerning the
Jelf determining power, which our author
is .refolvcd to preferve, though all man-
kind, at leafl both the learned and un-
learned, which I fuppofe includes them
all, think differently from him on the
fubjed. ■ Notwithflanding our averfion
' to frivolous difputes,' vol. 2, p. 208,

* about obvious truths, fomething mufl
' be done to give fatisfaflLon concerning

* a felf determining power. Otherwife

R ^all

442 R E M A R K S O N

* all that has been faid, or can be faid, in

* favour oF virtue, rnuft go for nothing ;

* becaufe all men, learned and unlearned,

* bigots or free-thinkers, are not merely
' fceptical, but infidels with regard to thfe
' reality of this power/ It is, indeed,
very ftrange^ but not the lefs true, that
all mankind (hould be poffefTed of this
mod important power, on which all vir-
tue depends, and yet that they fliould be
(b far from knowing, or fufpetling it,
and that they cannot be perfuaded to
believe they have any fuch thing. This
fomethiftg refembleg Moliere's Medecin

SEC-

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 5^3

SECTION V.

X)J the extenjzve application oftheprhrcipU
vf common finfe to morals and religion.

^ I ''HIS life is nothing but a fcene of
joys and forrows, hopes and fears;
^itd'we are continually palfing from the
bite "to the other. All this will be fre-
quently exemplified by my reader. And
as I firft gave him a general view of the
bright fide of my pifture, and then de-
fired him to contemplate the fhade, I
fhall now exhibit the bright fide agairi,
and defire him to take a more particular
ftirvey of it.

We fliall here find that this great oracle
6i the human breail has pronounced mof!:
diftinftly concerning all the fundamental
do6lrines and duties of morality, compre-
hending the whole of natural religion,
t^ evidences of chriftianity, and even
the more effential articles of chriftian
faith. To tliis, however, we muft fub-

R 2 join

2|4 RE M A R K SON a

join our author's JLift, pathetic, and elo-
quent complaints of the fhameful negleft
of this principle; and the great folly of
philofophers and divines in having re-
courfe to the deceitful principle oh'eafon ;
'U'hich, according to our author, may
almoft be conlidered as tlie fource of all
evil and mifchief ; when every thing they
ought, to have wifhed for might have
been obtained without any trouble at all,
by only applying to common fenfe.

Speaking of the great oudines of mo-
rality in general, our author. fays, vol. 2,
p. 195^ * The obligations arifmg from
-* obvious relations arg the objefts of
' common fenfe.' Again, p. 24, ' Befides
' thofe in{lin6live emotions and feelings,

* which we have in cornmon with the
/. Jo wei^ J animals, every individual of the
f human jkind; has a perception, which
' idcots and the inferior animals have

* not, of what he owes to himfelf, to his

* offspring, to his friends, and benefac-
X tors,. to liis country, aiid to his God. —

* Thofe fae red obligations, which have

* been

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 245

* been the fubje£l of difpute with the
' learned, are objects of fimple per-

* ception and judgment to men offenfe.'

' That magiftrates ought to be obeyed/
p. 247, ' that the workman is worthy of

* his wages, that every one ought to take.
' care of his own, and his family's intereft,

* and that men ought to do kind and
' friendly offices to each other; thefe,

* and the like propofitions, appear obvi-
' oufly true, as the propofitions oppofite

* to them appear obvioufly falfe, to every

* man of common fenfe.'

Such are the diftates of our infallible
inftruftor and guide as to the great duties
of morality, refpecling this life. If we
want to be informed concerning the pQ-
culiar JknSions of natural religion, our
author affures us, p. 8, that this great
principle ' affords men an almoft infal-

* lible dirc6lion in the whole condu6l of

* their lives, and that it was intended hy
' the author of our being for giving us

* intire fatisfa6lion concerning all primary

R3 * truths,

246 REMARKS ON

' truths, thofe of religion in particular ;

* and that our not having recourfe to this
' power is the true caufe of thofe idle dif-
^ putes, which have been maintained of

* late about the truth of rehgion.'

That the being of God ought not to he
attempted to be proved by reafon we have
infome meafurefeen already, and wefball
hear more on that fubjeft hereafter ; we
fhall, therefore, proceed to other articles of
rehgion. ' To acknowledge the being,

* and difpute the attributes of God, he-
' trays,' fays our author, vol. 2, p. 80,

* great flupidity, or grofs prevarication.
Xow for the divine unity. ' A work of de-
' figo,' vol. 2, p. ']^, * indicates one and
^' but one author to a found underftand-

* ing.' With refpe6l to the obligation ta
roorjhip and obey God, he acknowledges,
indeed, p, 21 6, that ' it would be un-
' reafonable to expect the fame inftinftive
' emotions and inclinations that we have

* to the other offices of hfe. But,* he
fays, * \ic have a clear perception of

* thofe obligations, accompanied \vith

^ enactions

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 247

* emotions and inclinations which nearly

* refemble thofe we call inftin6live.'

Speaking of trufting in God, with re-
fpeft to things that are above our cont-
prehenfion, our author fays, with peculiar
cmphafis and eloquence, vol.2, p. 140,

* This, is religion, this is philofophy, this

* is common fenfe. It is n(m/enfe,' fays
he, vol. 2, p. 97, * to talk of difficulties
' and embarralfments ariling from a con-
' ftkution of things to which the fupreme

* being gave exiftence of his free choice.*
Other divines are content with faying that
this conduct is highly unreafonable^

The gfeat difficulty in the theory of
natural religion is the proof of 2i future
life ; but, happily, that difficulty is now
intirely removed. Let us only filence"
the impertinence of reafon, and common
fenfe will fpeak plain enough, and to the
purpofe on this fubje6L ' We do not
' pretend,' fays Dr. Ofwald, vol. 2,
p. 296, ' to demonftrate, from any thing
that we know of the prefent ftate, that
R 4 ' there

248 R E M A R K S O N

* there will be a future ftate of exiftence.V
This has been, faid by many chriftian
divines, but then they have recourfe to
revelation for a fure foundation of their
faith in this great doftrine ; but our au-
thor can do without this refource.

' We muft,* fays he, vol. 2, p. 306,

* enter a complaint againft the learned of

* both fides, for their injurioiJs manner

* of tieating this interefling and impor-
' tant fubjeft. In place of fetting full in

* the view of mankind, a truth which

* none pretend to doubt of, and about

* which no man can be unconcerned, viz.

* that we are accottntablc to God for our

* condu6l, the friends of religion and

* virtue have ranfacked all nature for

* arguments to prove that we fliall a&u-

* ally be called to account^ and have there-

* by turned the attention of mankind
' from their proper buiinefs to an endlefs

* and fruitlefs difpute, about what is pof-

* fible and impoffible in nature, and may

* or may not come to pafs. Was this

* well advifed? Ifa man is defirous of

* certain

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 24^

' certain information concerning tliis
' great event, let him confult the revel a-
' tion which God has made of his mind.
' Or if he is not fatisfied about that, let
' him confult the fentiments of his own

* heart, about his being liable to account,

* But if he will do neither, your rea-

* fonins ia vain: for the man is a fool.

* and his folly is voluntarv, and there-

* fore incurable, or not to be cured by

* the art of reafoning.'

If my reader will not perufe this para«
graph over again, he will perhap*^ over-
look the mod excellent diftin^lion witJi*-
out a diffsrence, with which the whole
compafs of hij reading will ever furnifli
him. That we are accountable to God
for our conduct, is a truth that no man
can pretend to doubt of, or be uncon-
cerned about ; and yet all the powers of
reafon cannot perfuade the fame man to
believe that he (hall be actually called
te account. And all the mifchief that has
been done by philofophcrs and divines
has arifen from their not having attended

to

ft5o REMARKS ON

to the diftinftion between thofe two very
different things.

Since this drftinftion is of fuch un-
speakable confequence, and has hitherto
been intirely overlooked by all divines'
and philofophers. it would certainly very
much oblige and benefit the world if
Dr. Ofwald would give us a difcourfe
upon the fubje6l ; inlifling largely and
(Irongly on the confideration of our be-
ing accountable to God, and being liable
io he called to account, but, at the fame
time, carefully avoiding every thing that
could give us an idea of our ever being
iiBnally brought to account. I the lefs
wonder at the condu£l of divines in thi^
cafe, becaufe 1 think it muft require nc^
fmafl ingenuity and (kill to do it. But
what may not be e:Xpe6^ed from the elo-
quence of Dr, Ofwald !

Speaking more paTticularly of So-
crates's arguments for a future ftatCj he
fays, vol. 3, p. 288, ^ But in that variety
* of arguments, advanced by this great

* and

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 251

' and good man, none give fuch faris-
' fa6lion to a plain underRanding, as his

* obfervation to Crito, that the carcafs he
' fhewed fo great concern about was not

* Socrates ; that Socrates was he who

* then difcourfed, reafoned, and gave
' arrangements to his thoughts, and who,
' he faid, would foon give xh^m the flip.

* This is common fenle.'

Deriving fo much information frora
common fenfe., and finding fuch effeclaal
fan6lions of virtue in it, one would have
thought that revelation might have been
l^ared ; and many good chriftians would
be exceedingly offended at our author
for afcribing fo much to nature in this
refpeft. But then he makes atonement^
by eftablifhing the evidences of revelation
upon the foundation of the fame commoa
fenfe ; which, of courfe, fuperfedes all
reafining about the matter, and thereby
faves thofe good chriftians a great deal
of trouble, in inquiring for themfelves, or
replying to the impertinent cavils of
others.

i j2 REMARKS ON

* Of a revelation from God,' meaning
no doubt the Jewifli and chriftian, he
fays, p* 55, that * few have any ferious

* doubt, and that no man can difbeheve
' it in any confiftency with common fenfe.*
But for the farther ilhiflration of this im-
portant fubje6i; another whole volume is
promifed us.

As the truth of the fcripture hiftory is
founded on common fenfe, fo we may
take it for granted that its contents are'
agreeable to it. ' The fcriptures,' fays
Our author, vol. 2, p. 203, ' are the true,

* if not the only fource of found philofo-

* phy and good fenfe on thefe fubjetls,

* \i^, moral obligation.' By the way,
after making good fenfe the fource of fo
much knowledge in morals, I do not fee
with what propriety our author can call
the fcriptures the fource of this good fenfe.

Themanm rin which Dr.Ofwaldfpeaks
of * two important truths,' which, he fays,
the chriftian revelation fuperadds to our
natural notions of religion, which .it has

revived.

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 2^3

• revived, viz. * an ceconomy of grace in
' this life, and an exa6t retribution in the

* next/ is particularly curious. ' One

* cannot conceive/ fays he, p. 254, ' what
^prejudice a man of fenfe can have to
^' this plain do6^rine. And as it was re-
^* ceivedby perfons no wife prejudiced in

* its favour, upon an atteftation in which

* they could not be deceived, one muJi

* reckon all fcepticifm concerning it as
' mere affetlation.' When a man fpeaks
of indubitable truths he ought at leaft to
ufe intelligible language ; but what our
author means by ancEConomy of grace, I
really do not underftand.

I now come to prefent my reader with
a few fpecimens of our author's pathetic
and eloquent complaints on the fubjeft
of neglefting this common fenfe, in the
defence of religion, natural and revealed,
and on divines having imprudently con-
defcended to reafon about it, which Wi^
a piece of complaifance as mifchievous
as it was unneceiTary. Infidels are a fet.
of people with whom it is exceedingly

improper

'i^4 R E M A R K ^S O N

improper for a chriftian philofopher, and
much beneath his dignity, to hold any
parley.

* Is there not,' fays Dr. Ofwald, p. 364,

* jiift caufe of complaint againft the
•f, learned for overlooking diflinftions

* which fel do m cfcape the obfervation of

/the vulgar,, and thereby expofing reli- j

* gion to objections which would be re- m
' jecled with difdain on any other fubjec^ ? *
' Not only the chriRian revelation,',pi: 55,

* but the moral perfections and gbvern-
■' ment of God, yea and the very bfeing
' of virtue, have been made the fubje^
' of difpute. Free-thinkers are not

* afliamed to publifli their doubts con-

* cerning thefe reahties, divines and phl-

* lofophers have not difdamed to eftablifh

* them. by a multitude of arguments.'

* The pow^r of cuftonr/ vol. 2, p. 152,
' in reconciling the mind to meafures how-
' ever abfurd, which are become familiar,
' is almoll incredible. Should an Indian
' of good fenfe be told, that for feme

' time

Dr. OSWALD'S? APPEAL. 255

^ time paft, men of the greateft eminence

* in the learned world had been employed

* in difputing with one another about thfe

* reaHty of virtue and vice ; whether,

* for inftance, the obhgations of jufticej
' temp erance, gratitude, were nominal^

* fi6litious and fanciful ; or whether We
^ were, indeed, bound to the pratiice of
' thefe and fuch like virtues; that volumes

* have been written on both fides, and
' deep attention given to the controverfy,
' and that each hypothelis had its vo-

* taries ; would the foreignef give credit
' to this report ?

* Yet this condu6l, fo unaccountable
^ to a foreigner, has been continued

* among us without much notice. The
^ fubje6i, it is true, merits the ftri6left

* attention ', the refearches on both fides
' were curious enough, acquifitions of

* fome value were made in the abftra£i

* fciences ; the audacity of one (ide feeraed

* to require a check and the zeal of the
' other was at lead pardonable. But, in

* good earnell; might not that zeaJ, that

* ficute-

256 R E M A R K S O N

* acutenefs, penetration, and compaft of

* thought, have been employed with
' greater propriety, and to more advan-

* tage ? Was there any occafion at all

* for fuch difquifitions ? Mull metaphyfi-
' cians and fubtle difputants be called in

* to evince our obligations to do the

* right and fhun the wrong? Can we,

* without renouncing common fenfe, be
f ignorant, doubtful, or even infenfible to

* fuch obligations ? There is need, great

* need, to awaken, revive, and enforce

* them ; but without the influence of

* falfe learning there couLd be no room

* to doubt what every man of common
*- underftanding does, and mull perceive

* at firft fight.

How fatal would a Ariel, regard to
truth be to a turn for eloquence. All this
truly fine piece of declamation would
have been loll: to the world, if our author
had recollected, that moral obligation
lijclf never was a fubjecl of difpute, but
only the foundation of this obligation.
Let our audior endeavour to recolletl:

tlie

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 257

the names of the writers who ever d^.f-
puted whether men were indeed bound
tothepradice ofjuilice, temperance, &c.

Thefe complaints refpeft writers chief-
ly, but his complaints againft xhtprcachers
of tfis gofpei, on the fame fcore, are ftill
flronger. ' Wliat is* more to be regretted/
fays Dr. Ofwald, p. 56, ' the preachers
' of the gofpei, forgetting the dignity of

* their charatler, and the defign of their

* office, h-ave condefcended to plead the
' caufe of religion in much the fame man-

* ner as lawyers maintain a difputed right

* of property. Inftead of awakening the
' natural fentiments of the human heart,

* and giving them a true direction, they

* have entered into reafonings about
' piety, juftice, and benevolence, too
' profound to be fathomed by the multi-

* tude, and too fubtle to produce any

* confiderable effe6l. Inftead of fetting

* forth the difplays of the divine perfec-

* tions in the difpenfation of the gofpei,

* fo admirably fitted to touch, to pene-
' trate, and to fubdue the human mind,

§ ' they

258 R E M A R K S O N

' they have entertained their audiences

* with long and laboured proofs of a reve-
' lation from God, of which few have any

* ferious doubt, and which no man can
' difbelieve in any confiftency with com-
^ mon fenfe. May not this be called,

* with propriety, a throwing cold water
' on religion ? and bught it not to be
' confidered as one of the chief caufes of
' that infenfibility to all its concerns of
' which we fo frequently complain ? The
' multitude has been aflonifhed, wife men
' have been afhamed, and good men
^ grieved at this treatment of religion, ^o
' much beneath its dignity.'

Our author intimates, however, that,
bad as the cafe is, it is not yet quite def-
perate. Accefs to the tree of life is yet
open, and common fenfe, this remedy
for all our ills, though hitherto fo fhame-
fully neglefted, will nc* refufe herfuccour
upon proper applicat: -n.

' Till divines and thUofophers,' vol. 2,
/ p. 221 , ' have abated their ardour for fri-

* volous

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 25^

* volous inquiries, and learned the o.i of
' turning the attention of mankind to ob-

* vious and interefting truth, they have
' no title to complain of the unthinking

* part of mankind. For one may be bold

* to affirm, that multitudes would act a
' better part than they do, if they were
' under better treatment.' Now as Dr.
Ofwald's parifh is undoubtedly under
this very treatment, I (hould be glad to
be informed of the ftate of it. Though
his books have, in fome meafure, put all
the world under the fame treatment, it is
too large a field of inquiry ; and though I
have read his performance with fome
degree of attention, there may be fome«
thing in my particular conflitution that
turns medicine into poifon. See p. 372.

' It is apparent,' fays our author, vol. 2,
p. 204, ' that if common fenfe had been

* confulted, a controverfy of the moil

* pernicious kind might have been vv^holly

* prevented, or foon flopped. And, if
' men will yet pay the regard that is
' due to common fenfe, they fhall find

$ 2 * them-

26o REMARKS ON

' themleives relieved from embarralTments-
^they have always complained of, and
* fee the whole of reli-jion rife to their
' view in that obvious^ plain, and plea-
' fant light, in \rhich the face of nature
' appears when freed from thofe mills and
•' clouds by which it was obfcured,'

Laflly, our autlK>r proceeds to give
more particular dire6lions concerning
what is neceffary to be done by divines
towards the reformation of the world,
without addreiTmg the reafon of their
jjiearers ; which is a thing that they ought,
if poiTible, to have nothing to do with.
This is to put them under the direftion
of God, in the di6lates of common fenfe,
if I underdand him rightly, when I put all
the paffages together. For there is
foraething of the air of myfiicifm in what
Ipse fays upon this fubjeft ; and things of
that nature do not find the readied: ad-
saiffion to my underflanding.

' Till divines and philofophers/ vol. 2,
p. 227, * are better fldlled in touching

' the

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 261

^ the fpyings of the human heart than
' they are, or afFe6l to appear, they can-
' not reach the end they propofe ; and
' were they pofTeffed of all the eloquence
' of Greece or Rome, they could not ac-
' comphfh what they ought to have irl
' view, I mean to fave thofe from ruin
' who will not take the trouble of faving

* themfelves ; and in order thereto^ to
' correct and cure the inveterate folly of

* the human heart. There is fomethins^
' here that demands a deeper attention
' than has been given to it ; fomething too

* that points at a method of forming

* mankind to virtue which has been too
^ much neglefted.

' The great fecret informing men to
' religion and virtue,' vol. 2, p. 232, * if
' it is fit to call that a fecret which is fo
' palpable to common fenfe, and ought
' to have been publifhed to all the world,
' is to perfuade them to refign themfelves

* to God, as docile and dutiful pupils, to

* a faithful and capable tutor. To put

* mankind under a divine dire6tion and

S 3 * ia

262 R E M A R K S O N

^ influence/ vol. 2, p. 229, * ought to be,

* the chief aim of all our inftruftors in

* religion and virtue. For without doing
' fo, all their other prefcriptions will be

* found ineffeftual, and indeed a mere

* projeft. , All partial proceedings ought

* to be difmiiTed, and juflice done to pri-

* mary truths/ Vol. 2, p. 230.

SECTION VI.

Of the incroacliments of common fenfe on
the province of Reafon.

T EST Dr. Ofwald ftould blame me
'^ for exhibiting his fentiments without
any proper refutation, which I have not
always done, becaufe I really thought it
to be needlefs, efpecially after what I
have faid in anfwer to his fuperiors. Dr.
Reid and Dr. Beattie ; and alfo becaufe
I thought it would be doing for my
reader what he would very eafify do for

himfelf,

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 263

himfelf, and might rather chufe to do for
himfelf ; I promife to^be a little more fe-
rious in this and the following fe6lions ;
in the firft of which I fhall endeavour to
fhow that, as great an enemy as Dr. Of-
wald is to reafoning on the fubjecl of
morals and religion, he himfelf makes
more ufe of it than he is willing to ac-
knowledge. For, to make the more of
his principle of common fenfe, he has
manifeftly encroached upon what has hi-
therto been univerfally deemed the pro-
vince of reafon.

To prevent all miftake of my meaning
I fhall here obferve, that a propofition
may be faid to be proved by reafon when
a third term is neceffary to fhow the con-
nexion between the fuhjeB and predicate
of it ; and that a general propofition is
proved by an induction of a fufhcient
number of the particulars which are com-
prized in it.

Thus, when I want to prove that the

three internal angles of a right lined tri-

S 4 angle

864 REMARKSON

r

angle are equal to two right angles, I
make another fet of angles, to which I
know that the three angles in queftion are
equal, and which I can alfo eafily Ihew
to be eqnal to two right angles. If I want
to prove that any particular perfon is
generous, I point out a number of gene-
rous things that he has done, which indi-
cate that charafter.

If our author will fay that this is not
reafoning, I anfwer that then there is no
fuch thing as reafoning. This, I will
venture to fay, has hitherto been univer-
fally deemed reafoning; and if Dr. Ofwald
chufes to call it by any other name, he
impcTes upon himfelf and the world, by
changing the eftablifhed fignification of
"words. But, in fad, it will appear,
from a paffage that I (hall prefently
quote, that Dr. Ofwald has the fame ideas
of the nature of reafoning, though he
feems very often to have loft fight of
them.

That

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 465

That Dr. Ofwald, in many cafes,
merely cavils at the terms reafo.n, proof,
and demonjlration, and that he mifappHes
them, in order to ridicule and explode
them, is very evident to me ; and I think
it cannot but appear fo to all my readers,
who are not quite adepts in this uew
fcience of common fenfe, and confe-
quently accuftomed to the phrafes and
fenfe of terms peculiar to it.

Speaking of the being and attributes of
God, he fays, p. 151, ' To whatpurpofe

* demonftrate a truth, to the indubitable
' certainty of which all nature bears telU-

* mony ?' Now excepting Dr. Clark's
arguments a priori, which have long
ceafed to be fo much as mentioned by
divines, all tl-at, in faft, has ever been
meant by demonjlrating the being and
attributes of God, is to exhibit and ex-
plain the teftimony of nature ; by point-
ing out fuch marks of defign, power, and
benevolence in the conftitution of the
world, as prove not only that it had a
caufe, but that this caufe muflbe a being

' poffeffed

266 REMARKS ON

poflefled of great power, wifdom, and
goodnefs.

Again he fays, p. 197, 'You cannot
' form an idea of God by gazing upon
' his works, without obfcrving their ten-

* dency ; and entering as far as your,
' faculties will carry you into his greats
' wife, and gracious plan.'

After our author has evinced the being.
of a God, without the help of reafon, he ,
proceeds to affert, in the title of the firft
chapter of book third, that ' to acknow-

* ledge the being and difpute the attri-

* butes of God, betrays great flupidity,
' or grofs prevarication/ But the man-
ner in which he fupports this w^ith refpeft
to the particular attributes, is fo like rea*
foning, that I own I can fee no difference
between it and reafoning. Let the reader
judge.

' We acknowledge,' vol. 2, p. 81, ' that

* it is impoffible to avoid the idea of God

* when we look on the phenomena of na-

* ture :

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 267

tufe ; but if we do not content ourfelves
with words without meaning, we muft,
at the fame time, acknowledge, that it
is impoffible for us to form any concep-
tion of the immenfe fyftem of nature,
without an idea of the immenfity of his
power who made and upholds it ; that
it is impoffible to trace the endlefs con-
nexion and combination ofcaufes con-
fpiring to one great defign, without
having an idea of the unfathomable
depth of the divine wifdom ; that it is
impoffible to furvey the multitude of
living creatures he has brought into be-
ing, which he upholds in being, and
protefts from danger, and for whom he
makes continual and bountiful fupplies,
without acknowledging his immenfe be-
nevolence and parental care. And
when we recolleft the various fufferings
of body and mind, which he has con-
neftedwith, and made confequent upon
almoft every deviation from moral rec-
titude, even in this life, and the natural
dread which every guilty perfon has of
a more exad retribution in another ftate,

'it

268 R E M A R K S O N

' it is impoITible for us to avoid an idea

* of his tremendous juftice.'

That any perfon (hould be able to write
this and call it by any other name than
reafimmg I own furpfizes me not a little ;-
and I can only compare our author ta
the poor man who had fpoken profe all
his life without knowing it.

Alfo when Dr. Ofwald fays, p. 338^

* It is nonfen/e to expeft that lead Ihould
"' fwim in water/ it is impoiTible that his
meaning (hould really differ from that of
the generality of philofophers, to whom
liis language muft, I araperfaaded, found
Tery Itrange. They would fhow, by
obfervation and ejcperiment, tkat nothing
of this kind has ever happened, and
would fay they had then proved that the
expectation of its happening was very
Mnreafonahle ; but would think it a ftrange
abufe of words to call it nonfeitjical. To
nonfenfe, as the term has generally been
ufed hitherto, no ideas at all can be an-
nexed, except fuch as are inconfiftent

with

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 269

with one another ; and we can form as
clear an idea of lead not finking in water,
as of its finking. What is really noa-
fenfe can never become fenfe; but by
miraculous power the laws of nature
can be fufpended or reverfed.

To enlarge the province of this
new principle of common fenfe, Dr.
Ofwald manifeftly incroaches upon the
province of reafon in other inllances.
He exprelTes the greateft poflible furprize
and indignation that divines (hould have
endeavoured ^ to difcover a medium to
' demon (Irate that we ought to worfloip

* God, to do juftice to men, and to keep

* our paflions and appetites within juft
' and proper bounds,' p. 91. Upon this
occafion he fays, as was quoted above,

* No demonflration is of equal force with

* common fenfe ; and no confutation can

* ferve the intereft of truth fo efFeftually
' as a plain conviclion of nonfenfe ; and

* therefore it was the bufmefs.of divines

* and philofophers to have recourfe to

' the

270 REMARKS ON

' the fimple decifion of common fem^e on
' a fubjecl To plain and important.'

I cannot help thinking, however, that
it would anfwer a very good purpofe
both to define ftriftly what we mean by
7.oorJJiipir,g God, doing jnjlice to men, and
bringing our paffions within proper bounds;
and alfothat, when thefepropofitions have
been defined, intermediate and plainer
propofitions may be found, which will
ferve to (how the truth of the former.
And fuch proofs of thefe moral duties I
think have been given by many writers,
and I hope have not been impertinently
alledged in my Injiitutes of natural and
revealed religidu, vol. 1.

I am the more furprized at Dr. Ofwald's
obje^lions to the common language of
logicians, as he himfelf diilinguiflies very
well between fuch propofitions as are felf
evident, and fuch as are not. ' No man/
fays he, p, 248, ' can be at a lofs to know
* propofitions that are the objetl of com-
mon

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 271

* mon fenfe from thofe that are not/ and
' to determine with himfelf where he has,
' or has not a right to fufpend his judg-

* ment. If the evidence of the propo-

* fition under confideration flows from its
' relation to or connexion with fome

/other truth, he has no doubt a right to
' fufpend his judgment till he has inquired

* into that connexion and relation.'

Now furely the propofition that ttx^^z-
Jlrates ought to be obeyed depends upon
this other proportion j \h^.l the good aftlu
fociety ought to be provided for. Or if our
author be an advocate for^ natural and
" divine right, ftill he muft give fome rea-
fon for it. If he refleft at all upon the
fubje^l;, he will hardly maintain that fuch
a right is/elf evident. This latter propo-
rtion then, viz. that the good of the fi ate
ought to be cojifuLted, may properly be
urged in fupport of the former, that ma-
giitrates ought to be obeyed. It is fo
much of an argument, that I dare fay nei-
ther our author, nor any other perfon

qouldi

272 R E, M A R K S O N

could poflibly avoid it in difcourfing on
the fubjeft.

Our author, indeed, admits of a kind
of denionJlraUon of primary truths, which,
arifes from coviparing them with their op-
pojite ahjurdities ; m coniequence of which
hefays.p. 255, ' we (hall believe them more
' cordially, and feel their influence more
' feniihiy than we do. A real behever,'
he fays, * will not defpife the well meant
' labours of thofe who have endeavoured
*' to demondrate the primary truths by

* reducing their oppofites to abfurdity;

* but knows that, without their help, he

* can, by a fingle thought, reduce thefe

* chimeras to the grofieftofall abfurdities,
' namely, to nonfenfe.' Though, there-
fore, it is pardonable to demonftrate the
being and perfeftions of God, the necef-
fitv of obeying magiflrates, &c. he ad-
vifes us to fpare ourfelves that trouble,
and with more magnanimity appeal at
once to the great tribunal of common
fenfe. An admirably fhort and decifive

method

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 273

method truly! fomething fimilar to
Defoe's Short method luith the Dijfenters ;
with this difference, that Defoe was in
jeft, but Dr. Ofwald is in moll ferious
carnefl.

Such is the force of common fenfe; in
my ufe of the word, that our author not
only allows of reafoning in others, but
falls into downright reafoning himfelf upon
feveral fubje6ls, which he had exprefsly ex-
empted from the province x)f reafoning,
and in the very chapter in the title of which
he difclaims reafoning.

' Lord Bolingbroke,' he fays, vol. 2,
p. 276, ' who contends fo zealoufly for

* the being and providence of God, is no

* lefs zealous in decrying our natural

* notions of his moral perfe£iions, and

* moral government, together with the

* expeftation we have of an exa6l retri-
' bution of our good and evil a6lions.

* But never was a great genius more ab-

* furdly, or indeed more idly employed,

* For, in fpite of all the arts of logic, of

T * rhetoric.

274 R EM ARKS ON

* rhetoric, of bullying, and of canting,

* prafliced by his Lordfhip, every one
' who beheves there is a God will believe
' that he loves the right and hates the
' wrong; and expeft, ofcourfe, that he

* vvHll reward the one and punifh the

* other/ ■ Now is not Dr. Ofwald's fug-
gefting that God loves the right and hates
the wrong a proper argument » to prove
that' 'he v^'ill reward the one and punifh
the other? Indeed, why did he ufe the
word therefore, if he was not arguing
and proving one thing by means of ano-
ther ? If this be not reafoning, and in the
neceflary forms, I know not what is.

But, pofTibly, our author might think
himfelf fufBciently guarded againfl this
objeclion by the manner in which he has
exprefiedthe title of this chapter, whicli
is ingenious en:>u'gh. 'To maintain,'
vol. 2, p. 275, ' a curious debate about a

* future' judgment, when we ought to be

* preparing for fo awful an event, is

* unpardonable folly.' The three next

chap-

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 275

chapters have the title of ' The fame fub-
* jeSi continued,'

The objeftion then is not to arguments,
but to curious arguments. But how fnall
we diftinguifh curious debates from thole
that are not curious, and what does our
author mean by curious ? A word of fo
very vague a meaning is certainly very
improperly ufed upon fuch an occafioa
as this. If I fhould be allied to point to
a fpecimenof cz^n^za reafoning^ I fhould
name this very treatife of Dr. Ofwald's.

But the propriety of the title of this
fame chapter is guarded in another cu-
rious manner. ' It is unpardonable folly/
he fays, ' to maintain a curious debate
' about a future judgment, when we ought
' to be preparing for it.' But whoever
denied that tliere was a time to prepare
for a future event, as well as {or proving
that it will happen, and that thefe two
ought not to interfere with one another ?
If he meant that we ought never to de-
bate, but to be always preparing, it was
T 2 unpar-

i'jS R E M A R K S O N

unpardonable folly in him to write his
treatife ; mw^hicli he not only debates, but
is the occalion of more debating, as the
book lam now writing; evidences.

*t»

I have defcanted a little upon the title
of this one chapter, or rather of four
chapters (which, by the way, is very auk-
ward and confufed in point of method) in
order to exhibit a fpecimen of Our au-
thor's unfair and equivocal manner of
writing throughout. By an artful choice
of v.ords he makes, upon all occafions,
a fpecious harangue, when his pompous
aflertions are all the while either nuga-
tory, or falle.

As the greateft part of Dr. Ofwald's
two volumes confifls of fuch writing as
this, I thall, for the more complete
information of my reader concerning
the nature of it, produce another ex-
ample of his artmlly adopting a mode
of expreihon which cuts off all re-
ply, except that of its being abfolutely
trifling ; w^hile he is ufmg all the pomp

and

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. z-j'j

and parade of the moft important obfer-
vations.

* To ftate the piimary truths,' p. 315,

* in their native light and ftrength, and in
' comparifon with their oppofite falfities,
' and to fhow, in the cleared, plained

* manner, which ought to preponde-
' rate, was in jullice due to the pubHc.

* But to trace every conceit, of every
' bold projeftor, through all the windings

* of abftrufe and fophiftical reafoning, or

* to offer laborious and minute defences
' of truths which neither require nor ad*

* mit of any, was ill advifed/

I challenge our author to fpecify the
writers on whom this cenfure falls, viz.
thofe who have traced every conceit of every
bold projeBor through all the zuindings of
ahjlrufe and fophijiical reafoning, or who
have offered laborious and minute defence.'^
of truths which neither required nor admit-
ted of any. One would imagine, from
reading Dr. Ofwald, that this egregious
and laborious trifling had been univerfal
T 3 with

278 REMARKS ON

with the infatuated /riends of religion.
But let our author name the men, and
prove his charge ; or be confidered as
having given himfelf ridiculous airs, by
cloathing mere calumny in rant.

Indeed, the exceptions which our au-
thor himfelf makes to his violent accufa-
tions will almofl amount to a full con-
futation of his declamatory abufe.

' It was no doubt proper,' he fays, p.
316, •' to detecc the fcandalous fliuffling
' of Col! ins, to expofe the rambling con-
' ceits of Lord Shaftefbur}', the dangerous

* paradoxes of Mr. Hume, and the pre-

* fumptuous boldnefs of Lord Boling-
' broke. It might alfo be fit to take fome
' notice of the quibbles of inferior writers.
^ But to engage the attention of a whole

* nation to a formal difpute between grave
' divines, and writers of this ftamp, about

* the truth of religioUj as if tliis was a point

* yet unfettled, was a mannerof proceeding

* m-uch below the dignity of the fubjeft,

* and from which little good could be ex-

^ peded..

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. ^79

' pe61ed. From the common effe6l pro-
*. duced on the minds of the mukitude,.
* by attending the pleading of lawyers in
' a. contentious law fuit, one might fore-
' tel the confequences of this ill judged
' meafure.'

Now I really do not know to w^hat kind
of reafoning any of the defenders of chri-
flianityhave had recourfe, except fuch as
was adopted in the controverfies above
referred to, and which our author allows
to have been proper. And, exclufive of
fuch controverfies as he himfelf exprefsly
approves, I challenge him to fay w^hen
the attention of any zohoU nation was ever
engaged to a formal difpute between grave
divines about the truth of religion, as if it
was a point yet unfettled. This aflertion,
I will venture to fay, was made abfolutely
at random, and has no foundation in
truth. It is a mere rhetorical flourifh, in
fupport of a piece of miferable faphiftry.

Our author farther allow$, vol. 2, p. jS,

that * the difciples of Manes were intitled

T 4 ' t.o

28o RE MA R K S O N ^'-^-

' to fatisfriclioii, becaufe/ as he- curioufly
enough exprefles it, ^ they founded on

* realities' He adds, *^ but it is below

* the dignity of divines or philofophers to

* fight with chimeras. Thefe antient

* heretics had not the boldnefs of modern
' theorifts,- who fcruple not to refolve

* natural and moral evil into the divine
' will ; but from the fame averfion %\'hich

* all guilty perfons have of bringing the

* charge home to themfelves, they fancied

* themfelves under the necefhty of hav-

* ing recourfe to two gods, the authors
' of all that is good or evil in the world.'

Not to remark upon our author's taking
it for granted that all NecefTarians are
unbelievers (though the very beft of all
the defences of chriftianity has been
written by a NecefTarian) I fhall only afk,
"whether all who objeft to religion and
chriftianity Ao not pretend to found their
objetlions on realities, as well as Manes.

The remainder of the paragraph quoted
above is not lefs curious, and of a piece

witji

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. fi§t

with the reft of the treatife. * This grofs
5 error/ viz. that of Manes ' is, however,
' long fince extiild, and the friends of
■ rehgion can be under no obligation to
^ prove the unity of God, till at lead

* fome one appear who can fay, with a
.^ good confcience, that he fufpeds that

* there are more than one, to whom we

* owe that worfhip and obedience which, is
" due, in return for his being and pre-
^ fervation ; and till he affign fome
^ plaufible reafon for his fufpicion.' p. 79.

But can there be no propriety or ad-
vantage in reviewing the errors of pafl:
ages, and in the confutation of them?
May we not hope, by that means, to
prevent a relapfe into them ? Can we be
too well eftabliflied in truths of great im-
portance ? Befides, with refpeft to this
very queftion, of the unity of God, has
not the church of Rome, the church of
England, and even the church of Scot-
land, more objecls of fupreme worfliip
than one ?

I would

jsS'2 REMARKS ON

I would alfo afk, what the word plau/z-
Ue has to do in this tufmefs. If an error
be aEluaUy embraced, and fpreads ; muft
I defer thje combating of it till fome gyand
jury, appointed for the purpofe, fhall
vote that it is a plaufible one ? Had thef^
preliminaries been requifite, it is not
certain that I fhould have been permitted
to anfwer Dr* Ofwald,

I fhall produce but one inftance more
of our author's complaints of the cottducl
of chriftian divines, who have judged and
a61ed differently from himfelf ; becaufe,
for once, he names his man. ' Had Dr.
' Clarke/ p. 151, * employed his natural
' good fenfe, which was not inferior to

* his learning, in fetting in a true and full
' light all the ihameful abfurdities of thofe
' who believe there is a God, and behave
^ as if there was none, he would have
' done .more fervice to the interefts of
' truth, than can be done by a thoufand

* demonllrations.'

Bui

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 283

But why may it not be offervice to fet
in a ftronorliahtthe abfiirdity of not believ-
ing, or affefting not to bblievethat there isa
God, as well as of not ading in a manner
agreeable to that belief? The latter is
certainly as obvious, and therefore is as
little neceffary to be infitted upon as the
former. But fo great is our author's
averfion to reafoning^ that a man muft
not touch upon the former, however ne-
ceflary, becaufe fomething like argument^
proof 'andi demonjlration may be wanted ;.
whereas on the latter of thefe topics a
man may declaim as long as he pleafes,
writing as Dr. Ofwald does, without any
reafoning at all,

Laftly, our author very much mifre-
prefents the conduft of they^rr^^^ writers,
in order to favour his fyftem, and to de-
cry reafoning. * The infpired writers do

* not oflFer any proof of the being and
' perfeftions of God. They tell us that

* the invifible things of him are clearly
' feen from the things which he has

* made, &c. — but never enter into trains

' of

£84 REMARKS ON

* of reafoning, to eflablifh a truth that is

* too obvious to admit of any proof/
Vol. 2, p. s^> 5^*

But how do any divines pretend to
prove the invifible power of God
othcrwife than by the vifible effe6ls of it ;
at leaft I never had recourfe to any other
irrgument, and yet I imagine that I have
reafoned on the fubje6l. See my Li/li-
tutes, vol. 1*

Perhaps our author may think to
efcape my aniuiadverfions, by faying that,
thotigh the fcicred writers do reafon, they
do not enter into trains of rea/bning
on the fubjeft. But whether a man ufes
trains of reafoning or not, or whether
the trains be longer or fhorter is not the
queflion ; but whether they reafon at all.
In my opinion our author may find both
excellent reafoning, and even long trains
of reafoning on the being, perfeclions,
and providence of God in various parts
of the books of fcripture, as in tlie book
of Job, tlie PfalmS; and the Prophets. In

my

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 285

my opinion Paul reafoned very clofely on
this fubjeft in his difcourfe before the Athe-
nian Areopagites. See A6ls xvii. But the
facred writers had no occafion to prov(?
the being or perfeftioris of God to thofe
who admitted them, which was generally
the cafe with thofe to whom, or for whom
they wrote.

SECTION VII.

Of Dr. Ofwald'i refutation of the argu-
ment in proof of the being of a God.

nPHERE is no fubjea on which Df.
Ofwald declaims fo frequently, or
with fo much veherhence, and feeming /k-
tisfaftion to himfelf, as on the want of
judgment in divines, in reafoning con-
cerning the being of a God ; which he al-
ways fpeaks of as ' too obvious and fa-
* cred a truth to be fubje6led to the rea-
^ fonings of men,, and that too muqh en-

* courage-

286 ^ ^^., U AAK.,S ^ q. N

,* .courpgement has heen given to, tke ca-
/ yils of fceptics by, entering into reaion-
/ ing about it.' Th^fe propontipns are
the titles of tvv^o feparate chapters in his
.f^c.Qnd vobjipQ, p. 50 and 57.

^ In the latter of thefe chapters he even
openly aflumes the chara6le.r oFari atheifl,
and undertakes a complete refutation
of the Handing argument for the being
of a God; in' orders:© fhew that it i^ in-
capable of any proper proof: but that
the propofitiorr, being neverthelefs true,
muft be admitted on the fole authority

-of common fenfe ; not confidjering that
if this new principle of common fenfe
fhould ever be exploded ; he has no re-

.foiirce left, but muft in good earneil pro-

vfefs-.himfclf an atheift. And thus, like
the dog in the fable, by catching , at a

;fhadow, he will have loit the fubitante.

- NoWj as I fhould be very forry for fuch a

- cataftrophe, -I fliall go over the feveral
ifeps of this dGmondration alqng with
Dr. Ofwald ; in <^de:r . tp coi^yince him,
that, notwithftandjng lj.is confident ob-

jedions.

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 287

jeftionSji it is a very g(X)d one, and will
bear the ftritlefl examination.

, . .' No proeefs of reafoning/ lays Dr.

Gfwald, voL 2, p- 57, * -can be employed
-* in favour of this capital truth, that will
^^ not be found, either falfe or frivolous;

^ or if the premifes are admitted to proof,

* there can be no jull conclufion. The

* piTemifes arfe thefe, a ivbrk that indicates
' defign rritrft be afcribed to an intelligent
' author. The world is a work that in-
' dicates defign,' -&c.-

■ f + r i • ^

From thefe premifes, each of which
Dr. Ofwald allows to be juft, though not
demonftrable, I think it may/ be clearly
proved that the world iniifi be afcribed to
an intelligent author, which .is what v/e
mean by the term God.'' if' the conclu-
■ fion be allowed to be fairly drawn from
the premifes, which Dr. Ofwald does not
deny, the argument is certainly complete,
whether wc proceed any farther, viz. to
prove the truth of the premifes or not.
To this, however, our author gives no

atten-

288 il E M A R K S ON

attention ; but only fays it is impofTible
to prove the premifes. Let us confider
then, in what manner he pretends that
neither of thefe premifes can be proved,
fo that an unbeliever may be juftified
in witholding his affentto them, and con-
fequently to the conclufion that is
drawn from them.

Off -J'-

' A work that indicated defign muft be
* afcribed to an intelligent author.'

This is an abftraft propofition, to
which, if the terms of it be defined, I \vill
venture to fay that no man can poffibly
withold his affent, being really identical
and felf-evident. To invalidate this, or
jather to evade it, our author abfolutely
changes it, and fubftitutes another in its
place. For, from an abflracl and univer-
faly he makes it 2l particular propolition;
aflerting as the reverfe of it, that this par-
ticular work, viz. this worlds hears no
marks of dejign ; in fupport of which he
alledges the trite atheillical fuppofition
of the poflibility of it3 havi,ng been pro-
duced

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 289

duced by the concourfe of atoms. ' By
' repeated throws of dice,' he fays, vol. 2,
p, 59, * one may caft up any number
' called for, within a given time ; and

* therefore any pofTible ftate of nature

* may refult from unlimited revolutions

* of matter.'

Not to fay that this does not amount to
a fliadow of an objection to the truth
of a propofition, which only afferts that
a work which adiially does indicate defign
is to be afcribed to an intelligent author ;
which, by fuppofition, excludes all idea
of chance, it may certainly be faid, on
the behalf of the being of a God, that let
atoms revolve, ad infiiiitum, and move
without a mover, nothing can refult
from it but new combinatio-ns , andj^^-
tions. ¥ ox powers, fuch as thofe of attrac-
tion, repulfion, magnetifm, ele6tricity,
&c. could never be gained by it ; there
being no conceivable or polTible connec-
tion between fuch a revolution, and the
acquifition of any fuch powers. It is
poflible that the ingenuity of Dr. Ofwald
U may

290 REMARKS O N

may fuggeft fomething to an atlieift in
anfwer tp this, but I own I cannot. And
yet, as if the behever could make no
reply to this objetlion, which is both mif-
placed and frivolous, he concludes that
he had fufficiently invalidated the force
of this DLojor propohtion, and proceeds
with great confidence to attack the minorj
viz. that

* The world is a work that indicates

* defign/

Here, after acknowledging, p. 61,
'■ that it is eafy to fliow them (atheifts) a

* connexion of parts and unity of dehgn,
' which they cannot gainfay ;' he yet
maintains that, * becaufe they can point
' out fome ftrange and uncouth appear-
' ances, which we cannot explain, they
' have a right to withhold their affent,

* if the cafe is to be determined by reafon,
' and not by the authority of common
' fenfe, But furely, after admitting

* defign in viany things, they cannot poffi-

* bly withold their aflent to thofe things

' having

Dr. O S WA I. D's A P P E A L. 291

* bavins: an intelJiiTjcnt author, whatever

* they may do with refped to the refl.'

If, for inflan^e, it be undeniable, that
the formation of the eye, and of the light
which fo admirably correfpond to one
another, and to the purpofe of giving
us notices oF diftant obje6l;s, is an excel-
lent contrivance ; it is plain that there
muft have been a contriver, or an intelli-
gent author of that part of our conflitu-
tion, though there fhould be other parts
of ^hefamefyflem, the fpleen, forinftance,
thd ufes of which we could not explain.
So that it appears to me, that the propo-
fitlon is completely proved, according
to the flriftefl forms of logic.

But our author fays, ' You may uiv
' riddle many difficulties, and give fatis-

* faftion tofeveral objc6lions. You may

* do more. By careful infpeftion, you

* can fhow, to the fatisfaftion of the

* fceptic, that what appeared irregularity

* is regularity in the higheft degree ; that

* feeming difcord is harmony not un-

U 2 ' derflood.

tg2 R E M A R K S O N

* derRood, and that a feeming blemifh

* is a beauty in the works of God ; but
' you will not filence hini. You have

* fomething farther to explain, and fome-

* thing farther ftill, and cannot give a

* full anfwer to his obje6lions until you

* explain the whole, and that you cannot
' do. Good fenfe requires that he (hould
' be contented with lefs fatisfaftion, but
' he demands proof, and as you have

* undertaken it, you muft give it without

* referve or limitation.'

The propofition, however, propofes
no fuch thing. It only afferts that this
world muft have had an intelligent author.
So that if I prove that any thing in the
world necelTarily requires fuch an author,
w^hich Dr. Ofwald himfelf, in the charac-
ter of a fceptic, allows, I have fully
proved all that I propofed. I will ven-
ture to fay, that no perfon, who ever pro-
pofed the ftrifteft demonftration of the
being of God, ever thought of any thing
elfe ; and I even challenge Dr. Ofwald
to name any atheift who expelled more.

If

Dr. O S W A L D's APPEAL. 293

If a man (hould be fo foolifh as to give
out that he could explain all the pheno-
mena of nature, %^'hich he certainly could
not do, and (liould acknowledge that he
had not demonftrated the being of a God,
till he had done it, I do not fee how good
fcnfc (hould help a man to {^<^ that he
had fulfilled his promife, when it was evi-
dent to reafon that he had not done it.
If, therefore, a man advances no more
than he can prove, which is fufficient for
the demonftration of the being of a God,
an appeal may as fafely be made to rea-
fon, as to any thing bearing the name of
common Jenfe, or any other name that
admits of evidence without proof. As,
on the other hand, if he advances more
than he can prove, I do not think that
there is any power in human nature that
can oblige us to fay that lie had done what
he himfelf acknowledges he could not do.

At the conclufion, however, of all this

miferable quibbling and fophiflry, our au

thor fums up this chapter w^ith the airs

of an acknowledged conqueror, ' Whe»

U3 'thqr

294 R E M A R K S O N

* tlier the fceptic is actuated by iniper-
' tinent curiofity, afpirltof contradiftion,

* or a vet worfe principle, it mud be
^ owned that, as a difputant, he has a
' right to infift on his demand ; and, on

* being refufed, to withhold his afFent ;
' which he can do ^l^ith the more eafe,

* and with much better grace, in the

* courfe of a difpute, than he could have
' flone, if you had fubmitted the truth to

* his judgment, by a fnnple appeal.* That
is, if I beg the queftion, he may, as a

favour f condefcendto grant it.

' It. is furprizing,' continues our author,
' that this inconvenience attending the
' method of argumentation fhould have

* been fo long overlooked by fo many

* friends of religion,, diftinguiflied by their

* good fenfe, as well as bv their learning.
' Yet anv one may recolle6l hmilar in-
' fiances of men of good underilanding,

* difappointing themlelvesin common life,

* by too great eagernef':: to prove truths
' too obvious to admit of proof or de-
' monflration.'

But

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 295

But what had efcaped not only tlie
learniii<r, but, what is much more, the
good fen fe of all preceding ages, has been

luckily difcovcrcd by our author. To

conclude this fcction with ferioufnefs.
I know no parallel to fuch wretched fo-
phillry and conceit. And that diny friend
of religion (liould thus lend weapons to
the common adverfaries, and in their
name challenge all the powers of reafon,
certainly would not have gained credit
before the publication of this work of
Dr. Ofwald's. Such are the happy fruits
of difcarding reafon, and lubftituting this
new common fenle in its place. And yet
this is the man, who, upon all occafions,
and from the beginning of his two vo-
lumes to the end of them, ridicules and
infults the greatefl mafters of argumenta-
tion.

' Can you tell me,' fays he, p. 375,
'* whence it comes to pafs, that our cele-

* brated divines and philofophers blunder

* fo grofsly in an art to which they are fo

U4. ' much

«9S REMARKS ON

' mvch devoted?' But before a man had
affe6led this contempt of reafoning, he
fliould certainly have known what it was ;
which appears not to have been the cafe
with Dr. Ofwald. I have ftudied, and I
have taught logic, but in no fcholar*s ex-
ercife did I ever fee fuch marks of a total
ignorance of the plaineft rules of it, as in
Dr. Ofwald's critical examination of the
argument for the being of God ; and it
is evident that in him common fcnfe has
not fupplied the place of logicy though
he boafts of it's doing infinitely more.

SEC

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 297

SECTION VIIL

Of the application of Common fenfe to va-
rious difquifitions in Morals and The-
ology.

Tl.T'HEN the idea of this newfenfe was
^ ^ firfl flarted, it had the appearance
offomething new and whimfical, indeed,
but it threatened nothing ; feeming to be
only a new method of explaining the
manner in which we give our affent to felf-
evident propofitions ; and, provided the
proportions were really felf evident, it
fignified nothing in prafticeby what means
we evince them to be fo.

Going thus backwards, into the obfcure
regions of Metaphvfics, could do no great
harm, and might prove an innocent
amufement to many perfons who had no-
thing better to do, or to thofe who chofe
to relax from more important ftudies.
But when this new power, after thus
fecuring its retreat backwards, begins to

advance

298 REMARKS ON

advance forwarcjs, into the regions of
fcience, philofophy, and life, fuperfeding
reafoning wherever it comes, we begin
to mark its progrefs with more attention:
for we muft not fufFer her invafion of the
right of another. Accordingly I have
endeavoured to reprefs tlie inroads which
this new power has made on the frontiers
of morals and theology ; and now I mufl
{how what attempts (lie has made to pe-
netrate into the interior parts of thit'
country.

To drop this alluiion, which I am not
able to CTurry much farther, I propofe, in
this I aft feft.ion, to exliibit to my reader
the fiimmary proccfs by which our au-
thor treats feveral intricate and impor-
tant queftions ; as thefpring of aElion in
the deity, the diftmciion betxoeen the facul-
ties ofmeji and brutes, and the do6lrines,
or pretended doclrines, of the divinity of
Chrijl, atonemcJit, the neio birth, and pre-
dejiination, wnth other fmaller matters.
None of thefe Ibbjecls, which have been
thought to be very difficult, and which

have

Dr. OS W A L D 's A P P E A L, 299

have exercifed the genius of the ableft
men in all nations, occafion the leafl dif-
ficulty to Dr. Ofwald. His common
fenfe knows no difference of queftions,
but decides with equal quicknefs, clear-
nefs, and indubitable certainty ^ on every
thing that you fliall bring before it. Hear
then in what manner our author decides
the long and well debated queflion con-
cerning the Jp ring ofaElion in the deity*

' The learned of our day/ vol. 2,
' p. 156, ' will have us to think that hap-

* pinels, mere happincfs, is the ultimate

* end and object of the divine govern-
' ment. They confidently affirm that

* a being completely happy in himfelf
' could have no other end in bringing

* creatures into exiftence, than to make
' them happy. But this is unpardonable
' rafhnefs. For if the fole end of bring:-

* ing creatures into being was to make

* them happy, then they could not be in

* pain or mifery for a fingle moment ; be-

* caufe the fupreme ruler could not be

* difappointed of his end in one fingle

* inftance.

Soo REMARKS ON

' inftance, or for one moment of time.

* Plans formed by beings of limited ca-

* pacity may fail in the execution, but no

* defeft can be imputed to him whofe un-

* derftanding is infinite, and whofe power
' without control. This hypothefis, there-

* fore, muft be fundamentally wrong. It

* is plain,' vol. 2, p. 157, * God does not

* all that is pofTible to be done to make his
' creatures happy/

Having thus, contrary to his cuftom,
condefcended to overturn by reafon a
feheme that was founded on reafon, he
eflablifhes another, and, as far as I know,
a feheme intirely his own, which cannot
fail to recommend it to my reader, on
the foundation of common fenfe.

* Common fenfe/ vol. 2, p. 157, * will

* hardly authorize weak mortals to fix

* the ultimate end and objc6l of the

* divine government, but the greatejl
^ poffihle increafe of moral worth feems

* beft to correfpond to appearances, and

* to the dignity ofthefupreme ruler, and,

^ probably.

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 301

' probably, was meant in the laft age by

* the glory of God, and is now exchanged

* for the happinefs of the creature, by

* thofe who favour a more lax theology,

* the tendency of which error is to bring
' down virtue to the rank of a mean or

* fubordinate end ; the place it always

* held with hypocrites and villains of all
' kinds, who regard it no farther than it

* ferves their purpofe.'

Here we fee our author not depending
intirely upon the force of his principle of
common fenfe, but v/illing to take a little
indireSi advantage, by reprefenting his
opponents as perfons who favour a lax
theology, and who regard virtue no far-
ther than it ferves their purpofes. But
not to digrefs.

* It is impoffible,' vol. 2, p. lit, ' that

* the deity fhould have any other obje6l
' of his government behdes the exercife

* and enjoyment of his own adorable per-

* fe6lions. — He makes the good happy,
Vand the bad wretched, not from any

' fuck

302 REMARKS O N

' fucli political reafons as influence human

* government, but from the eflential per-

* fe6tions of his nature/

One would think that the fcheme which
our author adopts, viz. the greatcfl pof-
fible increafe of moral worth (which
differs materially from the fcheme of rec-
titude propofed by Dr. Balguy, or that of
xoifdom by Mr. Grove) was liable to the
very fame obie6lion which he thought
unanfwerable with refpeft to the fcheme of
benevolence. For it is as evident that God
has not made all his intelligent creatures
completely virtuous, as that he has not
made them completely happy ; efpecially
as our author will not deny that the divine
being might, if he had thought proper,
have influenced the minds of his creatures,
or have originally formed them fo, that
nothing could have overpowered their in-
clination to virtue. But common fenfe,
it feems, declares that, though this ob-
jection was fufhcient to overturn the
fcheme of benevolence, it is impertinence
to urge it againfl this new fcheme of our

author's.

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 303

author's. So eafily does tliis principle
decide wliere there feems to be nothing
to determine the judgment ; in which it
bears a wonderful refemblance to they^^
determining poxoer in man. But hear the
oracle.

* Whether God/ vol. 2, p. ^\2, * might
' not have ordered things fo, that men
' would have be^n laid under the fame
' neceffity of regulating themfelves by

* the laws of nature, is an impertinent

* qucflion, becaufe we know he will not.'

However, to give us fome little help to
our conceptions, befides this authoritative
determination of common fenfe, our au-
thor tranfports us into the invifible world
of fpirits, and gives us a profpcft that
cannot fail to demonftrate the unfpeak-
able preference of his fcheme above that
of benevolence.

After defcribing a good man having
broke loofefrom ilds cuviherfomejlcjh, and
efcaped the vanities of life, and being

bi'ought

304 REMARKS ON

brought into the prefence of God, with
what he feels then, and what he finds he
has to do afterwards, he fays, voL 2,
p. 177, ' This is a profpeft we mu[{: al-

* low to be grand ; and whether this, or

* a fucceffion of pleafurable fenfations, is

* the mofl; worthy of the ukimate end and

* objecl of the fupreme ruler, may be fub-
' mitted to every one who is endued with

* the judgment and fpirit of man.'

Let us now appeal to this new oracle
on the fubje6l of a much controverted
point of divinity, about which profane
reafon might have bufied itfelf to no Dur-
pofe, and which has much embarrafTed
many cjiriftian divines, efpeeially thofe who
have received certain emoluments from
religious eflabliihments, on the condition
of maintaining the fame faith with the
all-wife founders of thofe happy ellablifli-

. ments. I now mean the knottv queftion
of the equality of the fon of God zvith his

father. Now, by the help of this omni-
potent common fenfe, we are able to keep
clear of all difficulties, and even to fleer

evenly

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 305

evenly between the two oppofite rc<:ks
of the creation and no-creation of the
fon of God.

* The fon of God derives life from the
' Father in a manner totally diitcienc from

* creation, and which we neither under-
' ftand, nor have any occahon to inquire

* into, any farther than is neceflary to af-
' fare us, that he is of a rank as much

* fuperior to created beings, as he has

* obtained a more excellent n^me than
*,they/ Vol. u, p. 128.

-Now, by the way, I rather fufpe6l that
our author's philofophy and fyftematical
theology do not perfeftly tally. The
Affembly's catechifm, which I prefume
our author has fubfcribed, and by which
he holds his church preferment, fays that
the three perfons in the godhead are of
the fame /ub/iance, equal in poicer and
glory, which I fhould think to be hardly
confiftent with the notion of the fon de-
riving hfe from the Father ; however it
may be /oftened, or rather oh/cured, by

X faying

3o6 REMARKS ON

faying that this derivation is fomething ef-
fentially different from creation. But we
may take it for granted that fo pious a
man as Dr. Ofwald could not poffibly
prevaricate in a matter of this nature, ef-
pecially after his own folemn declaration
on the fubjeft.

* We appeal to common fenfe, and
' defy them to offer a fhadow of reafon,

* why the man who prevaricates in reli-
' gion fhould not be as much the objeft

* of contempt and abhorrence, as he who

* prevaricates on any other fubjecl of im-

* portance/ Vol.2, p. 115. I fhould
be glad, however, if our author would
condefcend to clear up the confiflency of
his condu6l in this cafe, for the fatisfac-
tion of fome v» hofe common fenfe is not
fo nice and,diflinguifhing as his, and who
cannot fplit fo fine a hair.

With refpeB to the do6lrine of atone-
ment, our author's common fenfe decides
clearly in favour of orthodoxy, which is
a great happinefs, as it faves him the

trouble

Dr. OSWALD'S A F F Z ^v L. 307

trouble oF con^de^^iDg ?ti(1 anfwerin.; a
great number of ih re wd objecticns to that:
fuppofed doctrine of kripture.

Speaking of the difpenfation of thegof-
pel, he fays, p. 50, ' MeiTengers were
difpatched to the diiTerent nations, call-
ing upon them to forfake their vices and
impieties, and to return to God, who
was willing to receive them to favour,
through the mediation of that divine
perfon ; w^ho, having expiated their
guilt by his death, has afcended into
heaven.' He calls Chrift, vol. 2, p. 98,
a perfon of the higheft dignity, who, by
a courfe of unparalleled obedience, has
merited y in the ftri8:e{l fenfe of the word,
favours of various kinds for his adhe-
rents, which in no confiftency with wif-
dom, equity, or juftice, could otherwife
be conferred upon them. Can we fup-
pofe,' fays he, vol. 2, p. i5i, * that a
good God would fuffer a perfon offuch
an amiable chara6ler, and one fo near and
dear to him, to undergo fuch exquifite
X 2 * fuffer^

3o8 REMARKS ON

' fufferings, if juitice did not make it ne-
* cefTary ?'

The doftrines of divine influence, and
the new birth have given much exercife
to fome inquifitive minds, but as they
give no trouble to our author, he won-
ders that any bodyelfe (liouldhave found
the leaR difficulty in them. Common
fenfe can folve thefe difficulties, and much
greater.

' One cannot help fmiling,' fays our
author, ' at the pitiful (hifts which the
' pretenders to learning go into, to ex-
' tricate themfelves from the embarraff-

* ment they are under with refpeft to

* the operation of the Holy Ghoft, and
' the new birth, which to a man of true
' judgment, creates no difficulty at all/
vol. 2, P' 137. Then, comparing this
fupernatural influence to the light of the
fun, he fays, ' Why then, may not he,
' Vvith equal eafe, and with equal fafety

* to the order of nature, and v/rihout the

Meaft

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 309

* leaft infringement of any of its laws, pro-

* duce a total change of fentiments and

* inclinations, with* new habits of thinking
' and afting, in thofe who refign them-

* felves to his influence, and conform
' themfelves to his direftion. If this

* fubjeft were explained by the fame
' rules of good fenfe, and true philofo-

* phy, which are employed on fubjefts of
' far lefs confequence, the nerjo birth
' would be equally intelligible with any
' other of the produftions of nature we
' feem to be bcft acquainted with.'

Hitherto our author's common fenfe
has always happened to fleer him pretty
nearly into the fafe and comfortable
harbour of orthodoxy ; but with refpe6l
to the do6trine concerning the power of
man to do the will of God, I am afraid it
will appear to have driven him quite
wide of it. For if I have any knowledge
of fcholaftic divinity. Dr. Ofwald's doc-
trine on this fubjecl is the very reverfe of
what the Scotch minifters are obliged to

X 2 fubicribe.

310 REMARKS ON

fubfcribe, as well as to that of the church
of Endand.

*o'

' Take one of the vulgar afide/ vol. 2,
p. 208, ' and point out to Yiimfome duties

* he neglefts, and fome vices he indulges.
' — He will acknowledge the fact, but
' will conclude that till God work it in
' him he can do nothing. This/ fays he,
p. 208, * they are taught to fay.' And
fo, if I be not greatly miftaken, Dr. Of-
wald himfelf is under an obligation, equi-
valent to the molt folemn of all oaths, to
teach them.

* To all'^dge the neceflity,' p. 212, ^ of

* an interpolition which we have no reafon

* to expeft, and which one in an hundred

* is not favoured with, is a heinous im-
' piety : for it amounts to nothing lefs

* than a declamation, that the fupreme

* being looks on, and fees ninety nine of

* a hundred perifh for want of an inter-
' polition, which is neceffary to deter-
' mine them to do the right and (hun the
' wrong.'

This

Br. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 311

This is certainly very found Arminian
do6lrine, but very unfound Calvinifm.
If our author holds his Scotch living, I
hope he will explain, in his next, how he
can do this, and keep clear of a dan-
gerous refinement, and prevarication in
matters of religien. Let him take care
that this common fenfe do not a little in-
terfere with common honejlyi and chriflian
fincerity.

The difference between the intelleclual
faculties of men and brutes has dccafioned
a good deal of difficulty both to philofo-
phers and divines ; but on this fubjecl
our author is equally clear and decifive
as on all the others on which he has
favoured us with his opinion. In fiiort,
it is Common kn{e. that is the characierif-
tic of rationality. Every individual of ike
human race has it, ideots excepted.

* If,' fays our author, p. 186, ' Vve
' know any thing at all of the Ipeciiic
* difference between our underftcinding
' and that of inferior animals, itmuft con-

X4 ^fift

312 REMARKS O M

' lift in our having perceptions of truth
^ which are imperceptible to them, In>

* ferior animals/ p. 185, ' fly things of

* hurtful appearance, and purfue objefts

* of pleafure and convenience, with the fa-

* gacity and earneftnefs, as if they really

* knew thofe powers in nature by which

* they may be profited or hurt. But that

* they do not know them in the manner
' we do ; and, indeed, that they can have

* no idea of them at all appears from

* hence, that they never make the leafl:

* attempt to employ thofe pov/ers in their

* favour. There are numberlefs occa-

* Rons,' ib. 'on which inferior animals

* could relieve themfelves from danger

* and from death, if they had the leafl

* notion of many powers in nature which

* they could eafily lay hold of. It is

* worthy of notice,* he fays, p. 183, * that

* brutes never thruft one another over

* precipices, into ponds, or rivers, or into

* fire. They may do it by accident, but

* never through mirth, or malice, as chil-

* dren do ; becaufc they have not thofe

* ideas of the laws of nature which chil-

* dren

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEAL. 313

* dren have. Who doubts/ p. 186, * that

* many of the inferior animals, under deep

* provocation, would J^urn houfes, and

* do other dreadful afts of mifchief, if

* they had the leaft idea of power in fire

* to confume combuftibles ?*

Our author does not give himfelf the
trouble to anfwer many obje6lions, talcing
the eafy method of treating them with
contempt, as things that are, in their own
nature, altogether impertinent, or I could
mention feveral. Dogs may not have
a fancy for pufhing one another into
ponds, or into the fire, thinking perhaps
there may be no great diverfion in it, but
they mouthe and tumble one another
about in a very pretty, and ingenious
manner, juft as if they knew as much of
the laws of nature as relate to bitino; and
tumbling; and fome animals of the mon-
key tribe both divert themfelves and plague
others, feemingly, with as perfe6l a know-
ledge of the natural powers of various
inftruments which they make ufe of for
that purpofe, as any unlucky young boy

ia

314 R EM ARKS ON

in the world. As far as I fee, brutes both
judge and reafon as properly as we do,
as far as their idea^. extend. But I mean
not to difcufs any of thefe deep fubjefts,
but only make fuch obfervations as may
tend to illuftrate the fentlments of my
author.

The laft article I (hall mention (and I
do not know whether Dr. Ofwald, my
reader, or rnyfelf, is mod pleafed that
I have got to the laft article) is a very
fmall one indeed, but nothing can pro-
perly be called inconfiderable that relates
to this moft wonderful new difcovered
faculty of the human mind. So the mofl
trifling cuftoni of a new difcovered people
engages more attention than the moft
folemn and important ones of our old
neighbours. And though our author does
not, in this cafe, mention any obligation
he was under to his principle of common
fenfe, it might pof.bly have been of fome
indire6l ufe to him in the difcovery.

Moft perfons who have any refpe6l for
religion, afk a blcffing on their meat,

efpecially

Dr. OSWALD'S APPEA'L. 315

efpecially when they fit down to dine in
a fecial manner ; and perhaps they may
think they know the reafon of this cuftom ;
but I am now authorized to inform them
that they are much miftaken, and that
they are not quite fo wife as they fancy
themfelves to be. In proof of this hear
our author.

' There may be fomething in man's

* conftitution which deftroys the nutritive
' quaUty of bread, and may turn it into

* poifon, which is a good philofophical
' account of the common practice of afk-

* ing a bleflingon our food/ p. 372.

Having now dined very plentifully at
the expence of our author, I thank him,
for myfelf and my readers, for the enter-
tainment he has given us. And that he
may make his own epilogue, I (hall con-
clude with what he fays of the greatnefs
of his fcheme, and his hopes of fuccefs in
it. And to (hew my readinefs to adopt
my author's fentiments, as far as I poffibly
can, I beg my reader would fancy to him-

felf

3i6 REMARKS ON

felf that as foon as Dr. Ofwald has re-
peated the following fentences, I alfo
Hand up, and, mutatis mutandis, repeat
them audibly after him.

* I hope the public will take in good

* part,' p. 390, * this effort I have made

* to check a folly which has retarded the

* progrefs of knowledge in all ages, and

* threatened the prefent age with a per-

* verfion of judgment fimilar to what

* prevailed in that period, when, as Mr.

* Pope fays.

Faith, Golpel, all feem'd made to be difputed,
And none had fenfe enough to be confuted.

' It is not poflible/ fays he to his friend,
p. 349, * to give at once a new and op-

* pofite turn to men's way of thinking ; but

* as I hope to fatisfy your fcruples in a

* little time, fo I believe that in due time

* the bulk of mankind may be brought
^ to a jull wav of thinking qn this fub-
*jea/

THE

THE

APPENDIX.

i

THE

APPENDIX.

NUMBER I.

Of the refemblance between the doBrine of
Common fenfe, and the principles of
Dr. Prices Review of the qucjlions and
difficulties in morals,

I Have mentioned my furprife that none
of the authors on whom I have been
animadverting fliouid feem to have
heard of Dr. Hartley's Obfervations on
man, except Dr. Beattie, who appears not
to have underftood him, and who pays
him the trifling compliment of an inge-
nious but fanciful author. I mud alfo
exprefs my furprife, though not in the
fame degree, that none of them fhould
have mentioned Dr, Price's Review of

the

320 R E M A R K S O N

the principle queftions and difficulties^ in
Tiwrals, which was publidied in 1758;
and which, both with refpecl to the theory
of the mind, and the praclical application
of it, contains all that is original, and
that has the appearance of being juft and
ufeful in any of them.

This writer, whofe fuperiority to Dr.
Reid, Dr. Beattie, or Dr. Ofwald, is
exceedingly nianifeft, maintains that the
underjlcinding is the fource of many of
our moft important fimple ideas ; as that
of the necejfary conne&ion of ei>£nts in na-
ture, the vis inertice of matter, fuljlance, dii-
ration, fp ace, infinity, neceffity, equality,
identity, contingency, pofjihility , power , and
caufation. Sec. and more efpeciaily to this
fource he refers our ideas of moral right
aid wrong, and of moral oh ligation. It
is, he obferves, of the effence of thefe
ideas to imply fomethin^g; true or falfe of
an object:, and that they by no means de-
note the manner in which we are affected
by it ; fo tliat they cannot with any pro-
priety be referred to that part of our

con-

Dr. PRICE'S R'EVIEW. 321

conftitution which has hitherto been dif-
tinguifhed by the appellation olfenfe^

This Tcheme has all the flattering ad-
vantages of the new doclrine of common
fenfe, without the capital inconveniencies
attending it. Like this fcheme, it cuts off",
if it be admitted, (and without this no
fcheme can have any operation or effe6l)
all objeftions to primary moral truths,
reft-ing them on a fimple appeal to the
faculty of intuition ; and refufing to
reafon upon a fubje6l which is maintained
to be as evident as the truth of the geo-
metrical pofl-ulatum, that if equal things
be taken from equal things the remainders
will be equal. But this philofopher had
more good fenfe than to load his fcheme
with the belief of the real exifl:ence of the
external world ; and he is more efpecially
careful to keep intirely clear of every
thing that can reprefent our ideas of vir-
tue as arbitrary and precarious, which is
the neceffary confequence of this new
fcheme

If

322 REMARKS ON

If the ideas of moral right and v/rong
&c. be perceived by Tifenfe, it depends
upon our arbitrary conllitution that we
conceive of them as we do, or whether
we perceive them at all ; and we have no
method whatever of invefli statin sr whe-
ther they have any foundation in the abfo-
Inte nature of things. Whereas by making
moral ideas the objecl of the underjland-
ing or intelle6l, asfiich, the principles of
morality become part of the fyftem of
necejjary, eternal, and unalterable truth,
perceived by the divine being, as by
ourfelves, but altogether independent of
his will, as well as of all other beings, and
things whatfoever; as much fo as the
truth of the pojlulatiiin above mentioned,
or of the propofition thdii'twa and two
viakefour.

To exhibit as di(lin6ily as pofTible this
original fcheme of Dr. Price's, with as
much of the evidence of it as I can find
exprefled, in a fhort compafs, by the
author himfelf, I fhall prefent my reader

witl

bf. P R I C E's REVIEW. 323

with the following extra6ls from his very
elaborate work*

' I cannot help wondering,' p. 48, 'that
^ m inquiring into the original of our

* ideas, the undcrjlanding, which, though
' not firft in time, is the mod important

* fource of our ideas, fhould have been
' overlooked. It has, indeed, been al-
'*'ways confide red as the fource of know-
' ledge ; but it fhould have been more at-

* tended to, that, as the fource of know-

* ledge, it is likewife the fource of nezo

* ideas, and that it cannot be one of thele
' without being the other.'

' The various kinds of agreement and
' difagreement between our ideas, which,

* Mr. Locke fays, is its ofhce to difcover
' and trace, are fo many new fimple ideas,
' of which it muft itfelf have been the

* original. Thus when it confiders the

* two angles made by a right line, ftand-

* ing in any direction on another, and

* perceives the agreevient between them

* and two right angles, what is this agree-

y 2 ' merit

324 REMARKS ON

* merit befides their equality ? And is not

* the idea of this equahty a new fimple

* idea, derived from the underftanding,

* v/holly different from that of the two
' angles compared, and reprefenting felf-

* evident truth ?'

' In much the fame manner in other
, cafes, knowledge and intuition fuppofe
' fomewhat perceived or difcovered in

* their objc6ls, denoting fimple ideas, to
' which themfelves gave rife. This is

* true of our ideas of proportion^ of our

* ideas of identity and diverjity, exijience,
' conneBion, ccuufe and effeB, power, pojji-
' hility and ivipojfibility, and of our ideas
' of moral right and wrong. The firft
' concerns quantity, the laft a£lions, the

* reft all things. They comprehend the
' moft confiderable part of what we can
' defire to know of things, and are theob-
' jccls of almoft all reafonings and dif-

* quifitions/

* It is therefore efTential to the under-
' {landing to be the fountain of new

' ideas.

Dr. PRICE'S REVIEW. 325

* ideas. As bodily fight difcovers to us

* the qualities of outward vifible objecls,

* fo does the underftandino:, which is the

* eye of the mind, and infinitely more
' fubtle and penetrating, difcover to us
' the qualities of intelligible objefts ; and
' thus, in a like fenfe with the former,

* becomes the inlet of new ideas.'

The whole of what Dr. Beattie and Dr.
Ofwald have written about the neceffity
of acquiefcing in primary truths, and on
the inutility and infufficiency of reafon-
ing in many cafes, is fo fully expreffed
by Dr. Price, that one can hardly help
thinking that they muft have read him,
and have commented upon him. But he
is fo clear and full, though concife, that
any commentary was certainly unnecef-
fary.

* The fecond ground of belief,' p. 163,

* is intuition, by which I mean the m.ind's

* furvey of its own ideas, and the rela-
' tions between them, and the notice it
' takes, by its own innate light, andintel-

Y 3 ' ledive

}26 R E M A R K S O N

* leclive power, of what abfolutely and

* neceflarily is, or is not, true and falfe,
' confident and inconfiftent, poffible and
' impoflible, in the natures of things. It

* is to this that we owe our beUef of all
' felf-evident truths, our ideas of the ge-

* neral abflraft affe6lions and relations of

* things, our moral ideas, and whatever

* elfe we difcover without making ufe of

* any procefs of reafoning.

* It is on this power of intuition, eflen-
' tial in fome degree or other, to all ra-

* tional minds, that the whole pofTibility

* of all reafoning is founded. To it the laft

* appeal is ever made. Many of its per-

* ceptions are capable, by attention, of
' being rendered more clear, and many
' of the truths difcovered by it may be
' illuftrated by an advantageous repre-
' fenfation of them, or by being viewed in

* particular lights, but feldom will admit

* of proper proof,

* Some truths there muft be which can
' appear only by their own light, and

' which

Dr. PRICE'S REVIEW. 327

^ which are incapable of proof. Other-

* wife nothing could be proved or known ;

* in the fame manner as if there were no

* letters, there could be no words ; or if

* there were no fimple or undeHnable

* ideas, there could be no complex ideas.

* — I might mention many inftances of
' truths difcernible no other way than
' intuitively, which learned men have

* flrangely confounded and obfcured,

* by treating them as ^\}b]^B.s o^ reafoning
' and deduSiion. One of the m.oft im.por-

* tant inftances the fubje61 of this treatife*
(viz. morals) ' affords us, and another

* we have in our notions of the neceffity
' of a caiife of whatever begins to exift,
' or our general ideas of power and con-

* nexion. And fometimes reafon has been

* ridiculoufly employed to prove even our
' own exiftence.'

The writers on whom I have been ani-
madverting feem even to have borrowed
their language, as well as their ideas from
Dr. Price, who alfo ufes the term cammon
fenfe, but with much more propriety than
Y 4 they

3'28 REMARKS ON

they do. Of this I (hall give tv/o in-
fiances .

* The necefTity of a caufe,' p. 31^ 'of
whatever events arife is an effential
principle, a primary perception of the
underftanding ; nothing being more
palpably abfurd than the notion of a
change which has been derived from
nothing, and of which there is no reafon
to be given ; af an exiflence which has
begun, but never was produced; of a
body, for inflance, that has ceafed to
move, but has not been Hopped, or that
has begun to move, without being
moved. Nothing can be done to con-
vince a perfbn who profcfTes to deny
this, befides referring him to common

Jenfe. If he cannot find there the per-
ception I have mentioned, he is not
farther to be argued with ; for the fub-
je6l will not admit of argument ; there
being nothing clearer than the point
itfelf difputed, to be brought to con-

■ firm it.'

* Were

Dr. PRICE'S REVIEW. 329

' Were the quellion,' p. 62, ' what that
' perception is which we have of number y

* diverjity, caufation, or proportion; and

* whether our ideas of them fignify truth

* and reality, perceived by the under-

* (landing, or particular impreflions, made
' by the objefts to which we afcribe them

* on our minds ; were, I fay, this the

* quedion, would it not be fufficient to

* appeal to common fenfe?' This is not
ufmg the word fenfe according to the
technical philofophical meaning of it,
and making it, asjuch^ the tell of truth ;
but only appealing to it as another term for
2i plain underjtanding. But it is no un-
common thing for commentators to
miftake the meaning of their author.

I thought it • right to point out what
feemed to me to be the probable fource
of wliat has the appearance of truth and
reafon, as alfo, perhaps, of the miftakes
of the writers on whom I have been ani-
madverting ; though I muft acknowledge
that I have been led to entertain a
very different opinion from that of Dr.

Price/

330 R E M A R K S O N

Price concerning the nature and origin of
the ideas above mentioned. For, in-
flead of being properly Jimple ideas, as
he confiders them, feveral of them appear
to me to be exceedingly compUx, or
fubftitutes for defcriptions and definitions ;
and that at firft view they feem to be
fimple for the fame reafon that white is
imagined to be a fimple colour, before we
have learned how to analize it. As to the
idiCdiS o{ moral right and wrong, and moral
obligation, inflead of bearing the proper
marks of fimple and original ideas, necef-
farily refulting from the view of any ob-
je6l, they appear to me exa6lly to re-
femble ideas compounded of many parts,
fome of which are obtained earlier and
others later, and which require time per-
feftly to coalefce into one. The minds
of children are long deflitute of them ;
they are acquired ver)^ gradually ; they
are at firlt extremely imperfect, but grow
more perfeft and accurate by degrees,
as their growth is more or lefs favoured
by the circumflances to which the mind
is expofed : they are fubje6l to great

variations

Dr. PRICE'S REVIEW. 331

variations in the courfe of our lives ; and
in fome minds, thofe ideas are never per-
feclly formed, fome incoherent rudiments
of them only being obfervable.

I am rather furprized that Dr. Price
fhould fee any occafion for fuppofmg the
faculty by which we judge of the truth
of propofitions, as di{lin6l from fimple
perception, to be the fource of ideas ;
fmce every perception may be refolved
into a propqfition, and therefore necef-
farily fuggefts a truth. If I only open
my eyes, and get the idea of a white horje,
I as evidently perceive a truthy viz. that
the horfe is white, as I perceive a truth
when I have the fentiment o^ approving a
generous aSiion ; and the latter is juft as
much involved, and requires to be un-
folded, before it can take the form of a
propofition, as the former. I do not
therefore fee why this very accurate rea-
foner (hould con^iA^r feeling and intuition
as two different grounds of belief, efpe-
cially as he afcribes to feeling the know-
ledge of our own exiJlencCi and oj the

feverat

332 REMARKS ON

fever al operations, paffions, andfenfations
of our minds, p. 162. It appears to mc
to be a diftinftion without a difference
to make the faculty by which we judge
of thefe things, to be different from that
by which we judge of all f elf evident
truths, and get our ideas of general ab-
ftrad affed,ions and relations of things,
our moral ideas, and whatever elfe we
difcover without 7naking ufe of any procefs
of reafoning ; which, however, we have
feen that he afcribes to intuition, as diftin6l
i'rom feeling. It equally requires an at-
tention to what paffes within our minds,
or refleBion, to difcover the operations
and pcffions of our minds, as to get ideas
o^ general abftra^i aJfe6lions and relations
of things. We may live and a6i under
the influence of thefe ideas without know-
ing any thing about them ; but the fame
reflex attention to what paffes within our-
felves will equally difcover them all. I
do not mean to difcufs this fubje8; with
Dr. Price, it being foreign to my prefent
purpofe. Some obfervations, however,
he reader will find relating to it in the

preliminary

Dr. P R I C E's R E V I E W. 335

preliminary EJfay, and more in the Dijfer-
tations prefixed to my edition o^ Hartley s
Obfervations on man. But for every thing
of this nature I would more efpecially
refer my reader to Dr. Hartley himfelf,
to whom I am indebted for almofl all my
knowledge of this fubjetl;.

NUM^

334 R E M A R K S O N

NUMBER 11,

Of Mr. Harris'^ hypothefis concerning
Mind and Ideas,

T Think it not altogether improper, in
^ this Appendix, to take fome flight no*
tice of the hypothefis of Mr. Harris (the
ingenious author of Hermes) relating to
mind and ideas ^ which is fo hke that of
Dr. Reid, that it might have been ex-
pefted that he would have acknowledged
fome obligation to him for it ; or, at
leafl:, that (as Dr. Price has done) he
would have quoted him, as exprefling
fentiments fo very hmilar to his own.
The hypothefis is fmgular enough ; but,
I believe, fomething a-kin to that of Ma-
lebranche ; though, not having ftudied
the writings of this French philofopher,
I am not able to pronounce with cer-
tainty.

If I underftand Mr. Harris aright, all our
ideas are innate ; having been originally

im-

Mr. HARRIS'S SYSTEM. 335

imprefled upon our minds by the Deity,
and being only awakened, or called forth,
by the prefence of external objcfts. But
unlefs he could have advanced fome more
direct evidence for this fyftem than he
has done, I think he is hardly to be jufti-
fied for treating with fo much ridicule
and contempt the hypothefis of Mr.
Locke and others, that ideas are properly
produced by the aclions of external ohjecls ;
there being the fame neceffary connexion
between them, as between any other
caufes and effefts in nature.

* Mark the order of things,' fays he,
p. 392, ' according to their account of

* them. Firft comes that huge body the

* fenfible world, then this and its attri-

* butes beget fenfible ideas. Then, out

* of fenfible ideas, by a kind of lopping

* or pruning, are made ideas intelligible-,
' whether fpecific or general. Thus

* (hould they admit that mind was coeval

* with body, yet till body gave it ideas,

* and awakened its dormant powers, it

* could at bell have been nothing more

' than

336 REMARKS ON

* than a fort of dead capacity ; for innate

* ideas it could not poflTibly have any.'

There is a good deal of humour and
fine defcriptioQ in our author's repre-
fentation ofths various hypothefes of the
ufe of the nerves in conveying ideas.

* At another time,' ibid. * we hear of
' bodies fo exceedingly fine that their

* very exility makes them fufceptible of

* fenfation and knowledge; as if they

* flirunk into intelletl by their exquifite
' fubtilty, which rendered them too deli-

* cate to be bodies any longer. It is to

* this notion wc owe many curious inven-

* tions, fuch 2iS fubtle ether, aniimlfpirits,
' nervous duBs, vibrations, &c. terms

* which modern philofophy, upon parting
' with occult qualities, has found expe-

* dient to provide itfelf to fupply their

* place.*

This, however, appears to me to be an
evidence rather of a fine imagination in
6ur author, than of his fairnefs, or ac-
quaintance with the fubje6l. He could

not

Mr. HARRIS'S SYSTEM. 537

not ferioufly imagine that any perfijn ever
fuppofed that matter was capable, by us
fuhtilty only, of approaching to the
nature of immateriality. All that has
ever been fuppofed (and what fatts will
fufficiently authorize) is that ideas, and
their affedions, are the re fait of certain
impreflions made upon the fyftem of the
nerves and brain. To prove that this
is an unphilofophical hypothecs, Mr.
Harris muft (hew, not that we cannot ex^
plain the connexion between thought
and this material fyftem, but that there
isnofuch connexion, and that the faculty
of thinking in man can fubfift without
that fyftem ; which I think he will not
attempt to do.

Let us now confider the arguments on
which his own hypothecs is founded;
which, as far as I have been able to col-
left them out of what he has written upon
the fubjetl:, are the following.

Firft, ideas are of the ejfence of mind,

and therefore, having no relation to cor-

3 poreal

338 RE M A R K S O N

poreal things, cannot be produced by
them. ' The nature of ideas,' p. 380,

* is not difficult to explain, if we once

* allow a poffibility of their exiflence.
' That they are exquifitely beautiful, va-

* rious, and orderly, is evident from the
' exquifite beauty, variety, and order,
' feen in natural hibftances, which are but

* their copies or pictures. That they are
'. mental, is plain, as they are of the ejfence
^-ofmind; and confequently no odje6ls

* to any of the fenfes, nor therefore cir-
' cumfcribed either by time or place. — But

* the intelleftual fcheme,' p. 394, * which
' never forgets deity, poftpones every

* thing corporeal to the primary mental
' caufe. It is here it looks for the origin

* of intelligible ideas, even of thofe which

* exift in human capacities. For though

* thofe fenfible objefts may be the de-
' (lined medium to awaken the dormant

* energies of man's underflanding, yet

* are thofe energies themfelves no more
' contained in fenfe, than the explofion

* of a cannon, in the fpark that gave it
^ fire.'

But

Mr. HARRIS'S SYSTEM. 339

*^^But this goes upon the fuppofition th it
mind is of fuch a nature, as that it can
have no polhble conne6lion with matter,
or be properly afFeded by it, which is
contrary to all appearance, if the fubje6l
of perception and thought in man be
mind. For, judging by the moft obvious
fafts, and univerfal experience, nothing is
more evident, than that the principle which
we call mind, whether it be material or im-
material, is of fuch a nature, that it canhe
affefted by external objefts, and that its
perceptions correfpond to the ftate of the
corporeal fyftem, efpecially that of the
brain; And there is the fame reafon to
conclude that thig affeftion is natural and
necejfary, as that the found of a muhcal
chord is the natural and neceffary effeft of
the ftroke oS. a plectrum. If my eye be open,
and a houfe be before me, I as neceffarily
perceive the idea of a houfe ; or if fire be
applied to any part of my body, I as ne-
ceffarily perceive the fenfation of burning,
as found follows the flroke above men-
tioned. If a due attention to thefe fafts
obliges us to alter our notions ohnind, and
maUrialifmi the received rules of philo-
Z 2 fophi-

340 REMARKS ON

fophizing compel us to do it ; and thefe
are certainly a better authority than the
mere fpeCulations of metaphyficians
founded on no obfervations at all.

I readily adoiit our author's compari-
fen of ideas to the explojion of a cannon,
and of an external object to difpark that
occafionsit ; but I wonder that he fhould
make ufe of this comparifon, which, in
effeft, overthrows his whole hypothefis.
For is not the explofion of the cannon
the mechanical effect of the produ6lion of
elaftic vapour, and of the increafe of
the expanfion of the air, by heat ? If
ideas refult from external objecls, in a
manner at all analogous to the explofion
of gunpowder from the application of
fire, I lee no occafion for having recourfe
to any immaterial priL-^-plc in man, or for
fur : cling that IJeas, as fiich, are fo far
cftke ejfence of mind, that chey can .have
no relation to time or place.

Mr. Harris, moreover, admits that
fenfible objetls may be a medium to a-
•waken the dormant energies of mans un-
der-

Mr. HARRIS'S SYSTEM. 341

derflanding, by which I fuppofe he means
ideas J in the firil inftance, and mental
operations 2ihe.xw2iY As, Butif fenuble ob-
jects have a natural power of awakening
ideas, why may they not have a natural
power of originally exciting them, in the
fame mind ? Let Mr. Harris explain the
difference. In both the cafes fome mu-
tual a^ion, or ajfe^ion, muft be fup-
pofed.

The manner in which our author thinks
that he can reduce us to the necefiity of

'^.admitting the derivation of ideas from
mind, rather than from body, is fo curious,
that I fhall tranfcribe the whole piffage.

1/ Either all minds/ p. 400, * have their

* ideas derived, or all have them original;

* or fome have them original, and fom*

* derived. If all minds have them de-

* rived, they muft be derived from fome-
' thing which is itfelf not mind, and thus

* we fall infenfibly into a kind of atheifm.
' If all have them original, then are all

* minds divine, an hypothefis far more

* plaufible than the former. But if this
v-* be not admitted, then muft one mind

Z 3 'at

342 R E M A R K S O N .

* at lead, have original ideas, and the
' reft have them derived. Now, fuppofing
' this laft, whence are thofe minds, whofe
^ ideas are derived, moft like to derive

* them ; from mind, or from body ; from

* hiind, a thing homogeneous, or from

* body, a thing hetdrogeneous ; from
' mind, fuch as, from the hypothefis, has

* originally ideas, as from body, which
' we cannot difcover to have any ide^s
' at all ?;

But it is no more neceflary that bodies
•fhould themfelves have ideas,_ in order
to excite them in us, than it is neceffary
that b. ple^lrum (hould have found in
i felf, in orcier to excite it in a: rriulical
chord ; or that a fpark of fire fliould con-
tain an explofion, in order to produce
it, by its application to gunpowder ; and
yet pothing but matier ^vidi viotion arc
concerned in thefe cafes.

Secondly, Mr. Harris Teems to think
his hypothefis neceflary to account for
the identity of the ideas of different minds.

* Now

Mr, HARRIS'S SYSTEM. 343

' Now is it not marvellous/ p. 399, ' that
' there fhould be fo exaft an identity of
' our ideas, if they were only generated

* from fenfible objefts, infinite in number,

* ever changing, dillant in time, diftant
*. in place, and no one particular the

* fame with any other?'

r ■ But is there not equal identity or
.diverfity in external objeEls, as there is in
pur ideas of them ? It appears to me that
the correfpondence is fo ftri8;, that it
amounts to a Sufficient proof of our ideas
having this very origin, and no other.
Men in the fame fituations, that is, ex-
pofed to the fame influences, we have rea-
fon to believe, will have the fame ideas,
in fimilar fituations they will have fimilar
ideas, and in different fituations they will
have different ideas, and different in
proportion to the difference in their
fituations.

Thirdly, our author fuppofes the men-
tal origin of our ideas neceffary to ac-
count for the correfpondence there is be-
V Z 4 tween

344 REMARKS ON

tween the ideas of the divine mind and-

thofe of ours, and confequently to the

, .communication between him and us. ' In

Vfhort,' p. 395, ^ all minds that are, are

* finoilar and congenial, and fo too arc

* their ideas, or intelligible forms. Were

* it otherwife, there could be no inter-

* courfe between man and man, or (what
' is more important) between man and

* God. — Let ideas then,* p. 399, * be

* Origrinal : let them be connate and eflen-
' tial to the divine mind. If this be true,

^* is it not a fortunate event, that ideas of

* corporeal rife, and others of mental,
' (things derived from fubjefts fo totaliy

* didnicl) {hould {o happily coincide in
' the fame wonderful identity ?^

Now, for my part, I fee no great diffi-
culty in admitting that the divine being
fhould caufe material objects to excite the
very fame ideas in our minds, that might
come into his fome other way. Befides,
with refpeft to' the divine mind, I think
it is fufficient, in this cafe, to plead our
utter Ignorance of the nature or affe6lions

of

Mr. HARRIS'S SYSTEM. 345

of it. This, however, I would obferve,
and I think it well deferves the ferious at-
tention of Mr. Harris, and Dr. Reid ; that
' if things materidl and immaterial be fo
* very remote in their nature, the one
' ^having a relation to time and place, and
the other being incapable of any relation
'Ho either, in fo much that they cannot
poffibly affetl one another (and upon this
notion only can our author deny the pof-
'fibility of external obje£ls impreffing our
I minds) and if, as he afferts, all mmds be
'"' Jimilar, homogeneous, and co7igenial, mat-
ter can no more affe6i;, or be affefted by,
' the divine mind, than it can affeft, or be
aiT"6led by ours. Confequently no fuch
thing can exift, or, if it do exift, it can-
not have been created by God. If I be
capable of drawing any confequence, this
appears to be a juft one. Let FVlr. Harris
or Dr. Reid invalidate it, if they can.

As to the origin and nature of ideas m
the divine mind, I 111 uft be allowed to
profefs the fame ignorance, as of the ori-
gm or nature of his being.

NUM.

346 CORRESPONDENCE WITH

NUMBER III.

The correfpondence of the author with
Dr. Ofwald and Dr. Beattie, relating
to this controverjy ,

TTAVING thought proper to acquaint
^^ Dr. Reid, Dr. Beattie, and Dr.
Ofwaid, with my intention of animad-
verting upon their writings, I fent the
fame notice to each of them, at the fame
time: together with a printed copy of
the preface to my third volume of the In-
Jtitutes of natural and revealed religion;
and having received anfwers from Dr.
Ofw.ild and Dr. Beattie, I have here in-
ferted them, with my repUes, for reafons
that will fufficiently appear in the perufal
of them.

As Dr. Ofwald feems to lay peculiar
ftrefs on h'm feventh letter, to which he
refers me ; and I am willing to give him
all poflible advantage, I have fubjoined
the whole of it. But if any body can

think

UflWrn^l^ SWA L D. 347

think it to be of the leaft ufe to his pur-

pofe, or that it exhibits any thing more

than another fpecimen of juft fuch futile

"decla'mation as 1 'have already quoted

'again and again, 1 own he fees more in it

thari I can fee. I think it altogether un-

neceflary to make any particular remarks

upon it. His fifth letter alfo,. I think as

little fati'sfadory. ^ ^^'"2

■.■X ■■.. :•■ '• ' -'t

To Dr. OSWALD.

•-"Reverend Sir,

npHlNKING it right that every perfoti
j^J -...(hould be apprized of any publica-
.&nin which his writings are criticized, I
take the liberty to fend you a copy of a
Jlieet that will be foori publilhed, in which
I announce my intention to animadvert
upon the. principles o^ your Appeal to
■common fenfe*

I am, Reverend Sir,.

Your obedient humble fervant,

J.PRIESTLEY.
London t April 28, 1774.

Reverenb

'348 CORRESPONDENCE WITH

Reverend Sir,

T Have received your letter, announcing
jf"^ remarks you are to publifti on my Ap-
^eal to common fen/e, with one inclofed
{heet, containing thefe remarks for my
perufal. This, I own, is gentlemanny ;
but I am in no difpofition for accepting
the challenge. I fhall, however, point
out a few things which may deferve your
notice;

Though numbers of high rank for
literature in this and the preceding age
have aimed at nothing beyond high pro-
bability ; and though the evidence offered
by Dr. Reidj Dr. Beattie, and myfelf
for primary truths doth not give you
fatisfa6i:ion, you ought not to be poHtive
that no other than probable evidence be-
longs to the fubje6t ; but ought to allow
that higher evidence, too much neg!e6led
hitherto, and of which you have no clear
conception, may poIFibly belong to the^
primary truths of religion.

Your

Dr. OSWALD. 549

Your allufion to a lottery ticket is in-
decent. The utmoft afTurance arifing
from the chance of a thoufand to one, is
burdened with a juft and rational dread
of difappointment ; but the evidence pe-
culiar to the primary truths of religion
leaves no room for a dread of difap-
pointment, that can be called juft or
rational.

When you confult your heart, you
will, I hope, find your belief of the Co-
pcrnican fyftem different from your
belief of the primary truths of religion,
and founded on evidence of an inferior
kind. The polTibility, at leaft, of error
attends the moft complete demonflration ;
but no fuch charge lies againft the pri-
mary truth of religion; and this circum-
ftance is of too great importance to be
(lightly paffed over.

I Ihall not promife that the fifth letter
annexed to the firft volume of my Appeal
on the difference between poffibility,

proba-

350 CORRESPON^DENCE WITH

probability, and certainty, or that the laft
book of the fame volume, on the diffe-
rence between reafoning and judging
will give you fatisfaclion ; but thefe are
fubjefts you ought to be acquainted with,'
before you pronounce on the evidence
which belongs to primary truths.

I fhould be (hy of recommending a^
fecond reading of my Appeal to one who
is pofitive that it contains juft nothing;
but if you will take the trouble of reading
the feventh letter, annexed to the firft
volume, you may find that an appeal to
common fenfe in behalf of obvious truth
may amount to more than people's calling
one another reciprocally fools and block-
heads.

I thought, and dill think, that divines
of eminence ought to have offered fome-
thing more than the higbell probability
for the primary truths of religion, and
that I had a right to complain of their
not doing fo, without derogating from

their

Dr. O S W A L D. 351

their merit, or being liable to the imputa-
tion of arrogance from thofe who are in
the daily exercife of uttering complaints
of the mifcondu6l of their fuperiors.

If you know no other evidence for the
primary truths of religion than the highefl
degree of probability, you cannot be
juftly blamed for offering that, and that
alone, to thofe under your care ; nor
have you the leaft occafion for quarrelling
with others, who are pofifefled, or believe
themfelves poffefled, of higher evidence ;
and I am of opinion you may employ
yourfelf with more advantage to the pub-
lic by purfuing other branches of fcience,
than by deciding rafhly on a fubje6l
which I fee you have not ftudied.

When you have thought better of the
matter, you will not, I prefume, chufe to
publifh the (heet you fent me in the pre-
fent form ; but if you do, I (hall expe8:
you will do me the jullice of publifning
this letter along with it. I have declined

entering

35* CORRESPONDENCE WITH

entering into a controverfy, but this I
infift on. I am.

Reverend Sir,

Your moft humble fervant,

JAMES OSWALD.

Mcthven, May 12, 1774.

.ReverenpSir,

MM arioi
'T'HE ftieet I inclofecl was publifh-
ed exatlly as it was fent to you,
about a fortnight afterwards. Bat if it
had not, I fhould not have thought pro-
per to have printed your letter along with
it, as I do not fee a (hadow of a founda-^
lion in jujiice for your infifting upon it. f
Dr Reid, Dr. Beattie, and others, have
juft the fame right, and I do rot profefs
to be publillier for all the world. The
prefs is as open to you, as it is to me;
and if you do act tnink proper to have

»* recourfe

Dr. OSWALD. 353

recourfe to it upon this occafion, the fault
is not mine. It is poffible, however, that,
in my intended publication, I may infert
tills letter of yours ; but if you faw it in
the fame light in which I do, you would
requeft that I would not.

Vou fay yoMfee I have noijludied the
/ubjeci ; and this letter alone proves to
me that you have not thought fufficient!y
upon it, But neither am I a judge of
you, nor you of me. The queftion is be*
fore the public.

Your friends, I doubt not, think very
well of your writings ; and on the other
hand mine {among whom I have the
honour to reckon a confiderable number
,of the ablell fcholars and divines of this
kingdom) think exaftly as I do with re-
Tped to them ; and think it very proper
that principles which appear to them fp
falfe and dangerous Ihouid receive fome
check ; that, at leaft, it may appear that
p//,,.cJ;iriftians are not fo ready to aba-i-
A a, 4on

354 CORRESPONDENdE WITH

doir the only rational defence of reli-
gion, lam, e

Reverend Sir^ &^

Calne, May 2i^, i774- ''^'

I might farther obferve ^vith refpe6l to
fome parts of Dr. Ofwald's letter, that
he places our belief of the being of God^
and of the other prin^ary truths of reli-
gion on the fame foundation with that
of the external world, th^ evidence of
%vhich I think I have (hewn to be not
flridly fpeaking demoiiflrative, though it
admits of no rational doubt. In like
manner what philofopher will fay that
the truth of the Copernican fyftem admits
of any rational doubt, though there is A
pojjibility that it may not be true ? The
being of a God I confider as flriftly (i^-
monjlrahle, which abundantly fatisfies m6
with refpe6l to it ; though Dr. Ofwald
fays, what I have no conception of, that
the pojjibility of error attends the viojt
complete dcmonjiratian. And' when I
^'^^^ ^'' fuppofc

Dr. OS W A L D. 355

fii^ofe the otber primary truths of reli-
gion to be as Httle liable to rational doubt
as the truth of the Copernican fyftem, I
think no perfon can be of opinion that I
do them any injultice.

It V

The reception of the primary truths
of religion, and efpeciallyof chriftianity, is
reprefented in the fcriptures as depending,
in fome meafure, upon men's previous
difpofitions and moral chara6lers. As
our Saviour fays, John vii. 17. If any
man will do his will, hejiiall know of the
dodrine whether it be of God. But this
could not be the cafe if thefs truths were
properly felf-evidcnt, fo that no perfon
who had common fenfe could rejed them.
No doubt the fcribes and PHarifees, who
rejefted Chrift, had common fenfe, as
well as the twelve apofllcs ; but their-
pride, ambition, and other vices, laid a
firong and undue bias upon their minds,
and prejudiced them againft him. To
ufe Dr. Ofwald's own ftyle, / appeal to
p^tt of underflanding, whether it be not
A a 2 isi more

hsS CORRESPONDENCE WITH

a more rational account of the matter; to
Fay that, in all ages, men reje6l the pri-
mary truths of religion, natural and re-
vealed, becaufe they are defettiv'? iii
moral aifpofdions, rather Inah'm cojnvwft
fcyifc.

As to the indecen-cy of my .'allufibn to
the do6lrine of chances, I can only fav
tliat 1 am not fenfible of it. 7.

Had Dr. Ofwald's book been written
in the fame flraln with this letter (in which
he fays that, if I know no other eviden<'e
,for the primary truths of religion than the
h'ghefl degree of probability, I cannot
be juftly blamed for offering that and
that alone) I llTiOuld not bave quarrelled
with him as he terms it, for advancing
what he calls his higher evidence. But
1 appeal to the extrafts that I have given,
and to the whole drain of his publication,
if his violen md unjuil cenfures of others,
for not advancing more than they thought
the nature of the cafe admitted, does not

abun-

, rDr. O S W A 1, D. 357

abundantly juftify the manner in which
I have vindicated their condu6l, and
animadverted upon his.

i)r. Ofwald is pleafed to pay me a com-r
phment in faying that * / might employ

* myfelf to more advantage to the pubhc,

* by purfuing other branches of Icience,
' than by deciding rafhly on a fubjeft
' which, he fee^, I have not ftudied.' In
return to this compHment, I fhall not

, affront him by telhng him how very little
of my time this buhnefs has hitherto taken
up. If he alludes to my experiments, I
can aflure him that I have loft no time at
^il ; for having been intent upon fuch as
require the ufe of a burning lens, I believe
I have not loft one hour of fur-ihine on
this account. And the public may per-
haps be informed, fome time or other,
of what I have been doing in thtfany as
well &s in the Jhade.

A a 3 Dr»

358 CORRESPONDENCE WITH

Dr. OSWALD'S Seventh Letler.

' 'VT'OU feem to think that a fceptic ;4yill

, make light of the charge of folly

1 that I bring againil him ; but will he

* 'make light of being convi£led of folly
' to himfelf ; for that is what I aim at?
^By appealing to common fenfe, I do
^,not truit the caufe of religion to a mar

* jority of mankind, or.^jto a, certain
,^ number of feleft judges, but to ever)'
s* man of fenfe, and to the fceptic him-

* felf ; who, if he poiTeiTes that quality in
J*, any tolerable degree, will at length pro-
^>^nounce in favour of religion. Indeed,
/ij^ 2L ii}ap,is deflitiue of common fenfe,

^orif, by difeafe, or otherwife, that cha-
*^'raclerifLi('al power of the rational mind
./, is fo impaired, as to render him inca-
-* pable of diftinguifhing between obvious

* truth and palpable abfurdity, I do not

* fuftain him a judge. But that, I pre-
' fume, is not a common cafe ; for, as

'^ m the praftice of our duty, we often

* find ourfelves urged by oppoiite affec*

tionsa

Dr. O S W A L D. 359

* tions, and may yield to the direclion of
'either, as we chufe; fo in judging on
' plain fubjecls, true and falfc fentiments

* often prefcnt themfelves to our mind,
' in fuch a way as leaves us at liberty to

* adopt the one or the other, as we chufc.
^ Have you not known perfons far gone

* in folly, who fiill retained ^o much dif-

* cernmentj that, upon fome occafions,

* they have caught themfelves fpeaking
' nonfenfe, have bluflied, and turned
' filent ? I can recolletl inllances of per-

* fons, in the beginning of a fever, who

* have told thofe about them that they
' were going to rave, and have a6lually

* flopped themfelves ; and nothing is

* more common than for thofe who are

* getting drunk to perceive the growing
' diforder by the nonfenfe which they
' utter. If, indeed, they go on to drink,
' they will perceive it no longer, but

* turn downright fools, without the poffi-
' bility of being made fenfibie of the

* diforder.

Aa4 *IaI.

360 CORP.ESPONDEN^CE WITH

.jfrj -Si always avoid charging thofe Tault*

i- on the will, which can be fairly placed

-^ to the account of the underftanding :

^. but cannot help thinking that fceplic^

'^^ and infidels might prevent a great deal

;-*.of thct abfurdity they run into on the

a* fubjecl of religion : for, certain difeafed

' caies excepted, the progrefs of folly Ms

f, gradual, and the perfon affefted may

jf* perceive it if he will, or may, in its

4 firR appoaches, be made fenfible of it,

./ by the affiftance of a friend. And I

,* know no greater friendlhip that can- be

,,.* done to thefe people, than to fet the

* difference between fenfe and nonfenft?'

* full in their view : and am perfuadtd
-5 that if t}"«is good otfice had been done

^ * to mankind by tlie friends of religion,
., * wheri the controverfy firft broke out, we
,, / had not orUy got rid of fcepticifm lohg

* ago, but alio would have made a greater

* proficiency ill ufefiii knowledge than we

* have done: and I would fain. hope that
2- ' the evil may yet be redreffed, by reftor^

- * ing the authority of common fenfe.

Do

Dr. O S W A L D. 361

' ' ' Do not you think that fomething ought
^'* to be done for the honour of literature.

* and of the age in which we live ? for
' what a fhameful thing is it, that wc

* fhould be found wrangling about firfc

* principles, when difcoveries of truths
r* unknown to thofe who came before u«

* might, in all reafon, be expected from

* a people who enjoy our advantages-.

* We laugh at thofe fubtil difputes of

* the fchoolmen, which never could be

* brought to an iffue ; but are not aware
' of aconducl no lefs ridiculous, in writ-

* ing volumes of controverfy about truths

* which no man of fenfe can gainfay.

' I know your zeal for freedom of in-

* quiry, and heartily agree with you ; but

* cannot be reconciled to that filly vanity
' of maintaining either fide of a queftion

* by plaufible arguments ; ^vhich you

* know was firlt introduced by the antient

* fophifts, and brought again into reputa-
tion by the Popifh fchoolmen, and is

* now become the chief faculty of modern

* fceptics.

362 CORRESPONDENCE -WITH

* fceptics, and not difcountenanced in the
'manner it ought by men of fenfe and

* learning.

* How often have you and I been dif-
' guRed with idle conceits, chimerical fu.p-
*^pofitions, and monftrous paradoxes, in

* favourite authors, which they would not
' have had the boldnefs to offer to the
' public, if men of learning and judgtnent

* had a6led with the fpirit which became

* them ? Do you think there would be

* any harm in obliging men of genius to

* put their opinions to the trial of common
^ fenfc before they obtruded them on the
'unthinking multitude? And if any
? /hould, through petulance and prcfump-
'■' tion, nr gleft this neceffary precautioic;
' would it be any prejudice to the intereft

* o{ tPjliTj or of freedom of thought, that
' their grofs ablbrdities, or crude concep-
' tions, "Nvere receive.! by the public with

* that cold contempt, which they are fure
' to meet with in every circle of men of

* fenfe and fpint ? I know no right any

fet

WlV^^r. O S W*X L D. ^63

* fct of men can have to infult the con;-

* men fenfe of mankind ; nor do I fee any

* reafon why the public fhould bear with

* freedoms from writers of any kind,
' which one man of fpirit would not bear

with from another.

c

•inf# l^fi^ef all, I am as diflBdentof myfuc-

* cefs as you can be, both from a fenfe of
' my incapacity to do juftice to the fub*

* je6l, and a fufpicion that mankind chufe

* either to be entertained with fubtil de*-

* bates, or to give up inquiry altogether ;

* but I hope the public will take in good

* part this effort I have made/ &c.

See the remainder of this paragraph at
the clofe of my remarks on this writer.

Aberdeen^

^64 CORRESPONDENCE -WITH

''■'■ Aberdeen^ May 27, 1774-

,. Reverend Sir,

I

Received yours of the a^th of April
incloflng a printed fheet o^ a. preface
not then pubUflied, in which you exprefs
y©ur fjifapprobationof 7"/^^ EJfayon Tru^k^
and intirnate your defign of animadverts
ing further upon it. I thank you for
this early notice of your intentions^ and
for the juftice you do me in that part of
your preface where you declare that you
■believe me to. be a fincere friend to rcver
lation.

The Effay on Trutli is fo well iu-

tended, and its principles fo well founded',

that its author can have nothing to fear

from the animadverfions of a man of fci-

enc^ and candour. If I had not thought

thole principles true, I fhould never have

given them to the world. If I did not

•l^ill tltink them true, I fhould publifli my

recantation to-morrow; or, if I could,

to-day.

All

Dr. B EAT T I ^. ' 3%

-All that you have faid in your pre-
face againft me 1 (hall anfwer in few
words.

If your meaning, page 5th, fine 19^
h' thai * / reprefent common Tenfe as
' fuperleding almoft all reafonkig about
•religion, natural and revealed/- you
charge me with a do6liinc which I do
not, and never did believe, and which is
no where either aflferted or implied in any
thing I ever wrote.. ^ ".1 -'":» :.'iiii ri v

..-1
' IF 'you mean, page 6, lint 20, that

jhave ever^ in word or writing, taught,

or infmuated, that ^religion in general

' (1 fuppofe you mean natuml religion)

* or chriRianity ifa pi&ttitdar, does not

^ adrtrit of a 'ratiOMl and fatisfaftory

^'^jrobfj'yoti'are. Sir, egregioufly miftaken

ih regard to my principles.— My doclrine

i^'oMy this, that all reafoning terminates

In firft principles, and that firft principles

admit not of proof, becaufe reafoning

cannot extend in infinitum; and that it

is abfurdfor a man to fay, that he difbe-

lievcs

S66 CORR£SPONpKNe% V/I.^p

lieves a fiijit principle, ;-*^hichhiii.condu£l
fti<rvv'^.that he does notydubelieve.

,> J£ yoti charge vie with fuppofing,

;^ttril^'->teg, and. p;-o:/ideii}^,.p^ ^^i '?"i
*ffi,, future, flate, of retr^ution are,ei;heB
\,yrUuitively cei^.ain, . or (perta^ird^s of;i^>6
'Janpe, fort, with the c^xioms of geoinq^r.yj^
you .charge me with tl^at which J-ney;^^
beliqyed,: or fuppofed^: and which jpu
wili find nothing in my. writings to juftify.

i-.You are pleafed,, Sir, to call coigarrioii
fenfe a, pretended new principle. What
you may mean by the word coimmnjenfe
I know not ; but that which I call com-«
mon fenfe, is a real part of the human
conftitution, and as old and as eKtenJive
as human nature. I ara one of thofe,
Sir, who do not like a do6lrine one whit
the better for its being new, nor do I think
myfelf fagacious enough to difcover in
the human mind any tliing which was ne-
ver difcoveied there before.

-.j^..--

You

Df. B E A T T I E. 367

You honour mc with the epithet Re-
vetendy to which I have no title. I have
told the world in my book that I am not
a clergyman : but I humbly trnft I am a
chriftian ; and permit me to fay. Sir,
that I have better ground to believe that
piy writings have hurt the caufe of infi*
delity, than you can have to infmuate the
contrary, which in page 6, I. ly, in your
preface you feem to do.

I would have anfwered you fooner, but
have been prevented by bulinefs and bad
health. ^ .

I am. Reverend Sir,

Your very humble fervant, . 9^

■ 'I

JAMES BEATTIS:.

' is

Sii|,

$68 COS.RESPOKCSNCE WITH

Y'*I^^e ' tte ' lij^erty io ' trouble y6U 6nce
^ more to exprefs the ' plfeciiure I haVe
received from' the gre4t franknefs "and
generofity that are apparent in tfic letter
ypu have done me the honour to write tp
1^/" i wanted no afluraln'ce of the good*
tiefs'- of youT intentions ^ ox difpqfttion\
The drain of your writ'ings left me rii
room to entertain a doubt on that head.
Whether the principles of your Ejfay on
truth be well founded, is die only point
of difference between us; and as the af-
fair will foon be bcfor^e the public^ I (hall
not trouble you at prefent with any thing
relating to it. As foon as my remarks
fhall be printed, and a complete copy of
the; book can be made up, it fiicill cer-
tainly be forwarded to you.

I alfo engage to fhow the fame frank-
nefs and opennefs to conviftion that you
profefs, and a perfeft readinefs to retract
any thing that (hall appear to be ill

founded.

Dr. B E A T T I E. 569

founded, or too fevere, in my cenfure of

your performance.

#

I may be miftaken, and fee things in a
wrong and unfavourable light, but I am
far from meaning to cavil, and (hould
think myfelf difgraced by taking any fuch
advantage as unguarded exprefTions may
furniih ; though fomecontroverfial writers,
feem to think them juflifiable. And, con^
fidering that your work is in pofTeflion ofj
a very high degree of the pubhc efteem,^
that my opinions on fome of the fubje6ls
of our controverfy are exceedingly un-.
popular, and not likely to be ever other-
wife, and that I confider you as a friend
tp the caufe that I have myfelf moft.
^ Jieart ; I hope you will have the
candour to conclude, that nothing would
have induced me to have entered the lifts
with you on this occafion, but a lincere
and pretty ftrong, though perhaps a raif-
taken regard to truth; the fupport of
which, how much foever appearances
may be to the contrary, is the only me-^
thod of promoting, effedually and lajl-
.ingly, every caufe that is truly valuable,
and worth contending for.

B b Con

370 CORRESPONDENCE WITH

Confidering the very difrerent lights in
which we are apt to view the fame things,
in this imperfect Hate, it were to be wiihed
that we might all improve this circum-
ftanceinto a lelTon of mutual moderation ;
and that it might teach us to think as
, well as we poflibly can of each other, and
efpecially of the moral influence of our
refpeciive opinions. To me you appear
to have been exceedingly to blame in this
refpetl.

Perhaps no two perfons profelTmg chrl-

ilianitv ever thoudit more differehtlv than

you and I do ; which may appear odd in

men of liberal education, and who equally

think themfelves free from prejudice, and

to have be^n earned and impartial in their

fearch after truth. But I infer from your

zjoritings, and the obligation that I imagine

your profefiforfhip lays you under to fub-

fcribe the Scotch confeffion of faith., that

fo the cafe is. Indeed, you feem never

to have had the lead acquaintance with

fuch perfons as myfelf, and my friends in

this country are. But, notwithflanding

this, I hope that a little refledion, aided

by

BOOKS vmiteri hy Br, PRIESTLEY.

2^. Letters to the Author of Remarks onfeveyal late Pub-
Vtcat'ions relative to the DiJJenters, in a Letter to Dr. Priejiky, is,

26. An Appeal ro the ferious and candid Prorellors of
Chriftianity, on the following Subjecls, viz. i. The Ufe of
Reafon in Matters of Religion. 2. The Power of Man to
do the Will ot God. 3. Original Sin. 4. Eleiitiun and Re-
probation. ^. The Divinity of Chrift. And, -6. Atone-
ment for Sin by the Death of Chrifl, the fourth Edition, id.

27. A Familiar Illustratiox of certain PafTages of
Scripture relating to the fame Subjeff, ^d. or 3s. 6d. per
I>ozen.

28. The Triumph of Truth; being an account of the
Trial of Mr. Elwall, for Herefy and Blafphemy, at Stafford
AiTizes, before Judge Denton, &;c. the fecond Edition, id.

29. Co.vsiDERATioNS for the Ufe of Young Me.v, and
the Patents of Young Men, 2d.

Alfo publilhed under the Diredion of Dr. PRIESTLEY.

THE THEOLOGICAL REPOSITORY;

Confiding of original EfTays, Hints, Queries, Sec. calculated
to promote religious Knowledge, in 3 Volumes, 8vo,
Price 183. in Boards.

Among other Article?, too many to be eniunerated in an
Advertifement, thefe three Volumes will be found to con-
tain fuch original and truly valuable Obfervations on the
Doftrine of the Afofiefnent, the Pre-e.xijence of Chrift, and the
Infpiration of tlx Scriptures, more efpecially refpecfing the
Harmony of the EnjangeliJiS, and the Reafoning of the Apofllc
Paul, as cannot fail to recomr^end them to thofe Perfons,
who wilh to make a truly free Enquiry into thefe important
Subjefts.

In the Firfl: Volume, which is now reprinted, fereral Arti-
cles are added, particularly Two Letters from Dr. Tkomas"
Shaw to Dr. Benson, relating to the Paffaje of the TfraclitCB
(hrough the Red Sea.

ERR

r A.

Preface, P. lo, 1. 6, io: JupcrfaLJ, read ^jjouldfuperfedc.
P. 2 2 2, 1. I, ^ox are, reader.

290, dele the inverted commas from the word yj'«/*, I. 2^2,
to the end of the paragraph.

334, 1. 10, for Z'l?, read Dr. Reid.

^^^, 1. 10 lor adions^ read aHion.

Dr. B E A T T I E. 371

by the candour you fecm to be pofTcfled
of, will fhow you the impropriety of the
ftyle you have adopted with refpect to
fome of the points of difference between
us.

I propofe to take the liberty, in my in-
tended publication, to infert the letter you
have fent me, as I am perfuaded it will
do you honour ; and likewife fnow, that
whatever countenance your writings may
fcem to have given to my charge, you re-
ally difclaim the principles I have afcribed
to you. Your teftimony will add great
weight to my obfervations on that fubject,
efpecially in what I fliall fay to Dr. Of-
wald.

I am truly forry to hear of your indif-
pofition, and wnfhing the fpeedy and per-
feclre-eftablifliment of your health, I am,
^ith real efieem, S I R,

Your very humble fervant.

J. PRIESTLEY.

"Calne, June 29, 1774.

A Cj>TALoeuE ofT^OOKS written by
JOSEPH PxdliSTLEY, LL. D. F. R. S.

AND PRINTED FOR

J. JOHNSON, Bookfeller, at No. 72,
St. Paul's Church- Yard, London.

i.rr^HE History and Present State of Electri-

JL city, with original Experiments, illullrated with

Copper Piates, 2d Edit, correfted and enlarged, 4to. il. is.

2. A Familiar Introduction to the Study of Elec-
tricity, the Second Edition, 8vo. 2s. 6d.

3. The History and Present State ot Discoveries
relating to Vision, Light, and Colours, 2 vols. 4to.
illuftraied with a great Number of Copper Plates, il. iis.
6d. in Boardb.

4. A Familiar Introduction to the Theory and Prac-
tice of Perspective, with Copper Plates, Price 5s. in
Bo.'.rds.

5. Directions for impregnating Water with Fixed Air,
in order to Cv)mmunicate to it the peculiar Spirit and Virtues
of Pyrmont Water, and other Mineral Waters of a fimilar
Nature, the feccnd Edition, is.

6. Experiments and Obfervations on different kinds of Air,
with Copper Plates, 5s. in Boards.

7. A New Chart of History, containing a View of the
principal Revolutions of Empire that have taken Place in the
World ; with a Book defcribing it, containing an Epitome of
Univerfal Hiftory, the third Edition, los. 6d.

8. A Chart of Biography, with a Book, containing an
Explanation of it, and a Catalogue of all the Names inferted
in It, the 4th Edition, very much improved, los. 6d.

9. An EfTay on a Courfe of liberal Education of a Civil and
AftiveLifei with Plans of Leftures on, i. The Study of
Hiftory and general Policy. 2. The Hiftory of England.
3. The Conftitution and Laws of England.

10. The Rudiments of English Grammar, adapted
to the L^fe of Schools, is. 6d.

1 1» The above Grammar, with Notes and Obfervations,
for the Ufe of thcfe who have made fome Proficiency in the
l,anguage, the fourth Edition, 5s,

12, Aft

BOOKS written hy Br. PRIESTLEY.

12 An Essay on the First PsfNcjPLEs of Gover^-
ME?:: 'nd on the Nature of Political, Civii^, and Reli-
gious- Liberty, the lecond Edition, much enlarged, s^%,

I J. LvsTiTUTES of Natural -nd Revealed Religi-
on, Vol. L containing the Elements oi'Nutiiral Rejigion; to
whith is picrixed, An Eilay on the betl Method of conwiu-
nicanng' religious Knowledge to the Members ur Chriflian
Societies, 2s. 6d. fewed. — Vol. IL containing the Evidences
of "ho Jewirh and ChrilVian Revelation, 3s. leiycd.^V'ol.
in. containing the Docfrines of Revelation, 2s. 6d. leivrd.
— Preparing for the Prefs, the Fourth and laft Part of this
Work, containing the Corrupt:ons of Chriftianitv.
■ 14. A Free Address to Protestant Dissenters on the
S^-ibjed of the Lord's Supper, the third Edition, with Ad-
ditions, 2S.

I ?. The Additions to the above may be had alone, is.

16. An Address to Protestant Dissenters on the
SubJ^cVof giving the Lord's Supper to Children, is.

17. Considerations on Differences of Opinion"
[ amo-igChriftians ; with a Letter to the Rev. Mr. Venn, in

Anfwer to his Examination of the Addrefs to Protelfanf

Dulenters, is. 6d.

• 18. A Catechism for Children and Voung Persons,

the i^econd Edition, 3d.

' 19. A Scripture Catechism, confifting of a Series of

QiJ^l^iions, with References to the Scriptures, inftead of

Anfwers, 3d.

20. A Serious Address to Masters of Families, with
Forms of Family Prnyer, the fecond Ediriou, is. 6d.

21. A View of the Principles and Conduct o*" the Pro-
testant Dissenters, with refped to the Ci.il and Eccle-
lialt':c.:l Conffitui' -n of England, the fecond Edition, is. 6d,

22. A Free Adlkess to Protestant Dissenters, on the
Subjeift of Church Discipline- with a Preliminary Dif-
courfe cuncerning the Spirit of Chriflianity, and the Corrup-
tion of it by falfe Notions of Religio;-;* 2s. 6d.

25. A Sermon preached be: 're the Congregation of Pro-
testant Dissenters, at Mill Hill Chapel, in Leeds,
Blay 16, 1773, on Occalion of his refignlng his Paftoral
Office among them, is. _

24. A Free Address to Protestant Dissenters, as
itich. By a D?Renter. .\ new Edition, eiilarged and cor-
ref>ed, is. 6d. — An Allowance is ii~i:;Je to thofe who buy
thiS Pamphlet to give away.

i5. Lct^